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Terms in this set (108)
King's messengers broke into Entick's home in search of seditious pamphlets. The messengers caused £2,000 worth of damages. Guilty of trespassing.
The messengers were not acting on specific legal authority. Lord Camden said:
'If this is law, it would be found in our books, but no such law ever existed in this country.'
The messengers were not acting on specific legal authority. Lord Camden said:
'If this is law, it would be found in our books, but no such law ever existed in this country.'
British forces detroyed oil fields in Burma during WWII. Burma Oil Co Ltd brought a claim against the UK government. Compensation was awarded.
Interestingly, against Dicey's rule of law, the War Damages Act 1965 was subsequently enacted with retrospectively exempted the Crown from any liability in respect of any damage made during war.
The seizure and destruction of oil fields was deemed to fall under prerogative and compensation was to be awarded (as this was covered in statute).
Interestingly, against Dicey's rule of law, the War Damages Act 1965 was subsequently enacted with retrospectively exempted the Crown from any liability in respect of any damage made during war.
The seizure and destruction of oil fields was deemed to fall under prerogative and compensation was to be awarded (as this was covered in statute).
Defendant was charged with the rape of his wife, from whom he had noot legally separated. At the time of the rape, a 1739 common law rule said that it was impossible for a husband to rape his own wife. He was convicted.
The court acted, supposedly against a formal conception of the rule of law, and found the 1739 law to be no longer compatible. The court had acted retroactively.
The court acted, supposedly against a formal conception of the rule of law, and found the 1739 law to be no longer compatible. The court had acted retroactively.
Cheney claimed that the imposition of taxes under the Finance Act 1964 was unlawful as the taxes were being used to fund nuclear weapons, which was against the Geneva Convention. This argument failed.
Parliament can make or unmake any law (Dicey's first limb). As Ungoed-Thomas J said, 'it is the law that prevails over every other form of law'.
Parliament can make or unmake any law (Dicey's first limb). As Ungoed-Thomas J said, 'it is the law that prevails over every other form of law'.
Wauchope had his land claimed for use by the railway company, pursuant to an Act of Parliament - yet the land was never used. He argued that the Act was invalid as he was not notified. This was rejected by the court.
Nobody can question an Act of Parliament (Dicey's second limb), all Acts that have recieved Royal Assent are assumed to have been passed according to the correct procedural requirements (the rule of recognition) - this is known as the 'enrolled bill rule'.
Nobody can question an Act of Parliament (Dicey's second limb), all Acts that have recieved Royal Assent are assumed to have been passed according to the correct procedural requirements (the rule of recognition) - this is known as the 'enrolled bill rule'.
The Minister attempted the cumpulsory purchase of properties pursuant to statute, however it was unenforceable as it was not concluded within three years. As a result, the Minister attempted the purchase using a recently enacted Act. The plaintiff argued that the earlier Act was in conflict with the later one. This was rejected.
According to the theory of continuing sovereignty (Dicey's third limb) later Acts impliedly repeal any earlier Acts in conflict through the doctrine of implied repeal.
According to the theory of continuing sovereignty (Dicey's third limb) later Acts impliedly repeal any earlier Acts in conflict through the doctrine of implied repeal.
Concerning the Hunting Act 2004 (which was passed under the Parliament Act 1949), Jackson and the Countryside Alliance questioned its validity. They argued, inter alia, that the Hunting Act 2004, as well as the Parliament Act 1949 were delegated legislation and thus ultra vires and the Parliament Act 1911 did not permit the expansion of powers. The House of Lords rejected this argument - both Acts were constitutional.
Lord Hope and Lord Steyn stated that 'constitutional sovereignty' may prevail over Parliamentary Sovereignty where the rule of law and constitutional fundamentals are threatened. This may be allowed as Parliamentary Sovereignty is essentially a construct of the common law.
This decision also supports the idea of self-embracing sovereignty as well as the manner and form argument (procedural entrenchment). It may also, against Wade's views, suggest through logic that contingent entrenchment is possible.
Lord Hope and Lord Steyn stated that 'constitutional sovereignty' may prevail over Parliamentary Sovereignty where the rule of law and constitutional fundamentals are threatened. This may be allowed as Parliamentary Sovereignty is essentially a construct of the common law.
This decision also supports the idea of self-embracing sovereignty as well as the manner and form argument (procedural entrenchment). It may also, against Wade's views, suggest through logic that contingent entrenchment is possible.
Spain had recently joined the EU and was given limited access to fish in the waters of member states. As a result, many Spanish fishermen re-registered their ships as British. In order to counter this, the Merchant Shipping Act was passed, setting out new restrictions on the registering of British vessels. The fishermen argued that this was against EC law. The House of Lords agreed.
It was written into the European Communities Act 1972 that all Act must conform with the 1972 Act.
This decision showed that contingent entrenchment is possible as the 1972 Act is immune to implied repeal.
Wade believes that this decision was revolutionary.
The evolutionary 'construction' approach is that the 1988 Act was meant to be read in a wider context and so was intended, on this construction, to be bound to the 1972 Act. Furthermore, it is always possible to repeal the 1972 Act.
It was written into the European Communities Act 1972 that all Act must conform with the 1972 Act.
This decision showed that contingent entrenchment is possible as the 1972 Act is immune to implied repeal.
Wade believes that this decision was revolutionary.
The evolutionary 'construction' approach is that the 1988 Act was meant to be read in a wider context and so was intended, on this construction, to be bound to the 1972 Act. Furthermore, it is always possible to repeal the 1972 Act.
An English statute permitted both pounds and kilograms as legal measurements yet an EU directive came into force, permitting only the use of kilograms. Thoburn continued to use pounds and argued that the original English statute impliedly repealed the 1972 Act so the directive had no force. This argument was rejected.
Once again, this supported the contingent entrenchment idea.
Laws J suggested that the 1972 Act is one of a number of 'constitutional statutes' which protect immune constitutional rights. This also supports a three-tier syste of laws rather than a two-tier system.
Once again, this supported the contingent entrenchment idea.
Laws J suggested that the 1972 Act is one of a number of 'constitutional statutes' which protect immune constitutional rights. This also supports a three-tier syste of laws rather than a two-tier system.
In this case, Lords Mance and Neuberger simply state that the constitutional statutes mentioned in Thoburn can themselves be put into a hierarchy. Mark Elliot argues this point.
Such constitutional statutes may include:
The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949;
Bill of Rights 1689;
Magna Carta (though not a statute);
European Communities Act 1972;
Human Rights Act 1998.
(Other statutes are mentioned).
Such constitutional statutes may include:
The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949;
Bill of Rights 1689;
Magna Carta (though not a statute);
European Communities Act 1972;
Human Rights Act 1998.
(Other statutes are mentioned).
Concerned the 'metering' of telephone calls by police and, although clearly in breach of a right to private and family life, there was no law codifying this right or forbidding this practice. Rejected in court.
The matter was not justiciable in English courts (they said that listening to phone calls was not a tort) and the common law did not recognise the right to privacy.
It is clear that the pre-2000 position offered insufficient protection.
The matter was not justiciable in English courts (they said that listening to phone calls was not a tort) and the common law did not recognise the right to privacy.
It is clear that the pre-2000 position offered insufficient protection.