Biol Philos
DOI 10.1007/s10539-011-9270-6
Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy
and psychology of normative relativism
Katinka J. P. Quintelier • Daniel M. T. Fessler
Received: 28 August 2010 / Accepted: 9 May 2011
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
Abstract Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral
relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be
constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked
if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can
have on an individual’s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in
philosophers’ normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work,
while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and
empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working
definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative
relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning.
Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the
philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral rela-
tivism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how
moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral
relativism in the future.
Keywords Moral relativism Moral psychology Experimental ethics
Normative ethics Tolerance
K. J. P. Quintelier (&)
Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences and Research Unit ‘The Moral Brain’, Ghent
University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
e-mail: katinka.quintelier@UGent.be
K. J. P. Quintelier D. M. T. Fessler
Department of Anthropology and Center for Behavior, Evolution & Culture, University of
California, Los Angeles, 375 Portola Plaza, 341 Haines Hall, Los Angeles,
CA 90095-1553, USA
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K. J. P. Quintelier, D. M. T. Fessler
Moral relativism and its opposites
The goal of this paper is to integrate recent naturalist philosophical and moral
psychological work on moral relativism. Philosophers draw distinctions between
cultural and individual relativism, and between extreme and moderate moral
relativism, and ask what moral prescriptions are in accordance with human
psychology. However, moral psychologists generally do not employ these
distinctions, making it difficult to examine the extent to which their research
findings can or cannot be compared to various philosophical positions. We aim to
bridge this disciplinary divide and integrate this conceptual landscape in contem-
porary and future research. Where appropriate, we will make explicit and defend our
philosophical commitments, and clarify the concepts we use. We start by
introducing a working definition of moral relativism.
The term ‘moral relativism’ is associated with a variety of very different
concepts, some of which function mainly to oppose the view. Schematically, we
intend to use the term as follows: Moral relativism consists of three components.
First, it holds that descriptive, prescriptive, or meta-ethical aspects of prescriptive
terms such as ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘ought,’ etc., (e.g., their use, legitimacy, or meaning)
are relative to a moral view. Second, moral relativism holds that there is variation in
these moral views, and, third, this variation cannot be entirely eliminated, either
practically or by following certain epistemological rules.
This is quite abstract; in order to clarify this we will first give a stylized example
of moral relativism and then contrast moral relativism with other ethical views that
are sometimes used as its opposite. Since we are interested in the empirical
constraints of normative, or prescriptive moral relativism, we give a normative
example. Assume that Claudia, a pro-choice activist, says abortion is permissible
and is having an abortion; meanwhile Susan, a pro-life activist, says abortion is
wrong and she continues her pregnancy. A normative relativist may hold that
Claudia is permitted to have an abortion because it is in accordance with her values
while at the same time it would be wrong for Susan to have an abortion because
abortion is not in accordance with Susan’s values; the moral relativist may also hold
that his own moral standards are not important in judging Claudia or Susan. The
normative relativist can, moreover, hold that pro-life and pro-choice values are both
equally legitimate.
As to normative relativism’s opposites, we turn to the three components that we
outlined. The first component relates legitimacy to moral views, meaning that what
is right or wrong depends at least partially on a subject’s or culture’s moral views
and not entirely on anything that exists independent of people’s minds. This makes
moral relativism markedly different than moral objectivism, the latter here holding
that what is right or wrong is substantially mind-independent. With this meaning of
moral objectivism we stay very close to its use by scholars whose work we will
discuss later in ‘‘The relevance of empirical data for philosophical theories’’ and
‘‘Empirical studies on moral relativism’’ (e.g., Ruse 1986; Nichols and Folds-
Bennett 2003; Goodwin and Darley 2008). The second aspect in our scheme
concerns scope, where relativism is distinct from universalism. Moral universalism
holds that acts are right or wrong for everyone. Universalism does not entail any
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Varying versions of moral relativism
metaphysical claim: objectivism and universalism may be orthogonal concepts,
though objectivism usually entails universalism. These concepts will be of interest
in ‘‘Empirical studies on moral relativism’’, when we evaluate normative theories’
empirical assumptions. But first we turn to distinctions and theories within
normative relativism.
Distinctions and theories within normative relativism
First, an important initial distinction is between extreme and moderate relativism
(Moser and Carson 2001; cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2009). Extreme normative
relativism holds that all moral actions are relatively right or wrong, or that every
action can be required or ought to be tolerated or respected. Those who criticize
moral relativism often equate relativism with extreme normative relativism.
According to Levy (2002: 25), for example, its opponents fear that ‘‘If relativism
is true, then there are no absolute moral standards in the name of which we can
denounce the Nazi holocaust, the slave trade or the Spanish Inquisition…If
relativism is true, then anything goes.’’ According to Brandt (1967/2001: 28), the
following extremely relativistic view is popular: ‘‘if someone thinks it is right
(wrong) to do A, then it is right (wrong) for him to do A,’’ a view that amounts to
subjectivism. However, contemporary moral philosophers hardly ever defend
extreme normative relativism.1 Instead, their view is best described as moderate
normative relativism, which holds that some but not all moral actions are relatively
right or wrong, and other moral actions are universally right or wrong. Wong (1984;
2006) and Levy (2002), for example, hold that we can find many different existing
moral views, but only a subset of these are legitimate.
Second, there is a continuum with cultural relativism at one end and individual
relativism at the other end. Individual relativism holds that an action is right or
wrong depending on the moral view of the individual. In contrast, cultural relativists
hold that whether an action is right or wrong depends on the moral viewpoint of the
individual’s culture. In works on moral relativism, the distinction between
individuals and their cultural context is often implicit (e.g., Beebe 2010).
A common prescriptive view discussed under the rubric of moral relativism is
tolerance. A prescription to tolerate means that you should not interfere with actions
that you (or your culture) consider wrong. Again, moderate tolerance means that not
all actions ought to be tolerated; only a subset of the actions one deems wrong ought
to be tolerated (Wong 2006). Often tolerance is only required of moral relativists.
The idea of tolerance is criticized for being psychologically impossible (‘‘The
relevance of empirical data for philosophical theories’’); accordingly, some
empirical studies touch upon the topic of tolerance (‘‘Empirical studies on moral
relativism’’).
1
This is different for meta-ethical relativism: meta-ethical relativism is most often presented or defended
in its extreme form, namely that all moral statements are relatively right or wrong if meta-ethical
relativism is correct. For a discussion of this view, see Sinnott-Armstrong 2009.
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Irrespective of empirical findings, Wong (2006) rejects tolerance. Instead, he
recommends that if one considers an act to be wrong, one should accommodate,
meaning that one should attempt to understand the other’s viewpoint. For example,
stated simplistically, the Western world prioritizes autonomy over community,
while the Eastern world prioritizes community over autonomy. Individuals from
both types of cultures can nevertheless understand that autonomy and community
are valuable. When confronted with another morality, one thus has to put oneself in
the other’s shoes. Wong’s theory is relativistic because it centralizes the notion of
ambivalence. Ambivalence happens when one comes to understand the other’s point
of view, and thereafter holds two values in mind. These values thus prescribe
irreconcilable actions for one and the same actor. If community-values dictate that
one must take care for one’s family, while autonomy-values dictate that one must
pursue one’s own interests, one experiences ambivalence. This experience is similar
to that of a moral dilemma : ‘‘even if we are firm in taking a side, we can understand
that something of moral value is lost when we act on that side, and the loss is of
such a nature that we cannot simply dismiss it as a regrettable though justifiable
result of the right decision’’ (Wong 2006: 21).
Wong’s view resembles notions of respect. For Levy (2002: 62–66), respect
demands that one tries to understand the value of certain other ways of life in order
to either affirm them as worthwhile or reject them as illegitimate. For Heyd (1996),
respect is the value of understanding individuals in order to evaluate them
independently of their acts. Respect here entails that one does not immediately
judge the person because of his or her actions.
The relevance of empirical data for philosophical theories
When arguing for or against the theories sketched above, naturalist philosophers
introduce both normative and empirical assumptions. Below we outline their major
arguments with the aim of evaluating their empirical assumptions in ‘‘Empirical
studies on moral relativism’’.
Arguments for normative relativism
A popular line of argument in defense of normative relativism, procedural
argument, depends on the existence of fundamental disagreement. This is
disagreement that cannot be resolved by a specified procedure. An example of
such a procedure is given by Brandt when he says that, to assert that moral
disagreements are non-fundamental is to presume that ‘‘all ethical diversity2 can be
removed, in principle, by the advance of science, leading to agreement about the
properties of the things being appraised,’’ (Brandt 1967/2001: 25–26). If moral
disagreement cannot be removed by the advance of science, then Brandt speaks
about fundamental moral disagreement. Other such procedures have been proposed
2
Ethical diversity is here the same as moral diversity. All moral disagreement is an instance of moral
diversity but not all moral diversity is an instance of moral disagreement.
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(Levy 2002: 77; Wong 1984: Chapter 12; Wong 2006; Doris and Plakias 2008). In
general, a procedural argument holds that when one cannot convince others with
‘reasonable’ arguments, this is, arguments that comply with the accepted
epistemology, one has no right to impose one’s view on others. We can clarify
this reasoning with the following example: a pro-life activist might want to
convince a hearer that abortion is wrong. However, both might think that only
rational arguments are acceptable. If the activist has exhausted all her rational
arguments without convincing her conversational partner, then she is not justified in
prohibiting or interfering with the hearer’s abortion, even though she is certain that
abortion is wrong. Granted, the activist might consider attempting to influence the
other with more manipulative techniques, such as repulsive and saddening images of
dead fetuses. While affective reactions might induce one to disapprove of abortion,
such images, and the affects they induce, do not constitute rational arguments. The
pro-life activist is therefore not warranted to use these arguments, or to interfere
with abortion.
Other naturalist arguments in defense of normative relativism follow the same
strategy of starting from empirical assumptions about moral diversity and
introducing normative assumptions. However, since we will mainly evaluate
empirical arguments against specific theories of normative relativism, we will now
discuss the latter.
Arguments against normative relativism
Other philosophers have objected that we cannot impose relativist norms on people
because it would not fit with our species’ moral psychology. First of all, in order to
tolerate other points of view, one has to be capable of entertaining the idea that
different requirements hold for different people. A first critique argues that this way
of thinking about morality is not possible. This is the problem of feasibility. Ruse
(1986) argues that we evolved to think of morality as objectively true in the service
of motivating us to act upon our values. As a consequence, people are innately
objectivist about morality. Another consequence is that, should one manage to think
of a judgment as relative, then one necessarily would no longer think of it as a moral
judgment. This leads us to ask if people are indeed inclined to be moral objectivists.
We will examine empirical results that speak to the question of the feasibility of
normative relativism in ‘‘Empirical studies on moral relativism’’.
Flanagan (1991), who is equally committed to a notion of feasibility (Flanagan
1991: 32), stresses that we have to make a distinction between the realizability of
relativism for everyone and its realizability for particular individuals (Flanagan
1991: 48). In this view, it might be psychologically plausible to impose a relativist
morality on some people but not on everyone. Interpreted like this, the problem of
feasibility simply leads us to ask whether at least some people are moral relativists.
In ‘‘Empirical studies on moral relativism’’ we will therefore examine empirical
findings on individual differences in moral relativism.
Wong (2006) presents a still more nuanced take on psychological realism. He
claims that we should not ask whether something is feasible; instead, for
epistemological reasons, the criterion should be that it is not impossible. Even
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more, moralities that wrongly reject possible requirements should be ruled out as
legitimate moralities: ‘‘Interestingly, however, seeing that certain possibilities are
real enough (if not realistic) also works as a constraint on adequate moralities.
Those moralities that in some way depend for their acceptance on denying the
reality of certain possibilities must also be ruled out as inadequate,’’ (Wong 2006:
176). This more nuanced interpretation of the problem of feasibility leads us to ask
if we can reasonably say that it is impossible for human beings to think of morality
as relative, no matter what the developmental conditions. Again, empirical research
bears on this question (‘‘Empirical studies on moral relativism’’).
A second critique holds that, if we do think of morality as relative, then we will
come to rely less upon moral values. This is the problem of confidence. Moral
relativism would lead us to weaken our adherence to moral principles, thereby being
less motivated to act or judge in accordance with them. This problem of confidence
is foregrounded by Ruse (1986) when he says that ‘‘we think [morality is] binding
upon us because we think it has an objective status,’’ (his emphasis). As we will see
in ‘‘Empirical studies on moral relativism’’, studies have compared the (reported)
moral behavior of relativists and non-relativists.
A third criticism specifically holds for tolerance. Judging an act to be wrong
allegedly implies that we are motivated to stop the action. An appeal to tolerate
what we condemn is unstable because it goes against the drive to interfere with what
we condemn. This is the paradox of toleration. Fletcher (1996) gives a clear account
of the paradox of toleration: ‘‘tolerance presupposes a complexity of two
sentiments: the first, an impulse to intervene and regulate the lives of others, and
the second, an imperative—either logical or moral––to restrain that impulse,’’
(Fletcher 1996: 158). For this reason, tolerance will never hold for long.
Wong (2006) equally rejects tolerance; he therefore suggests that ambivalence
and the process of accommodation will introduce new values and open up new
morally permissible possibilities—without devaluing our previous commitments or
urging us to intervene in previously condemned behavior. Levy’s (2002) and Heyd’s
(1996) notions of respect are inspired by the same rejection of tolerance. However,
criticisms of tolerance beg the question of whether disapproving an act is in fact
psychologically linked to an irresistible impulse to intervene. This is, after all, an
empirical question.
Empirical studies on moral relativism
Feasability
Defining moral relativism away
Are individuals inclined to think of morality as non-relative, as Ruse (1986)
proclaimed? At first sight research into the development of morality indeed hints
that our moral psychology is at odds with relativism. Piaget argues that, by the age
of seven, children are moral realists, meaning that they regard values as
independent of the mind and imposing themselves, regardless of the circumstances
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(Piaget 1932: 106). However, after the age of ten, rules in general are
conceptualized as autonomous, being thought of as man-made and as legitimated
by consensus or conformity. Different rules can be fair if everybody agrees with
them or follows them (Piaget 1932: 57). Hence, in this view, children start off as
moral non-relativists but develop in the direction of relativity (Piaget 1932: 316).
However, Kohlberg added four more stages after the two moral stages proposed by
Piaget. In Kohlberg’s scheme, the final stage of moral development is characterized
by the form of norms: moral rules are right whenever they are universalizable.
Stages three to five are characterized by the content of general moral principles—
interpersonal relations, social order, and rights, respectively. Accordingly, individ-
uals who have reached stages three to five think that all moral rules are guided by
those specific universal principles, while individuals who have reached stage six
hold that moral rules are right whenever they are universalizable.
A closer look at this research adds nuance to the above conclusions. Kohlberg’s
conception of morality was biased towards non-relativism: he defined the moral
domain by referring to Kant’s formal principle of universalizability. This
necessarily limits the scope of empirical investigation. If the researcher does not
conceptualize a certain rule as universalizable, it will not be studied as a moral rule,
even if subjects would categorize the rule as moral, if asked. Granted, one needs a
prior conception of morality in order to know what to investigate. However, this
conception could be minimal and broader at the start, allowing the data to guide the
investigation by, for example, asking participants if the rule has anything to do with
morality as they conceptualize it. Kohlberg-inspired methods are biased towards
finding people to be moral non-relativists. For example, consider instruments such
as Rest’s Defining Issues Test (Rest 1979). It is not surprising that moral reasoning
scores, and hence moral universalism, increase with age (Rest 1983) and college
attendance (Rest 1988), given that only universalist thinking is seen as moral
thinking by the investigators.
The above problem shows up to an even larger extent in domain theory and,
more specifically, research concerning the postulated moral-conventional distinc-
tion. Theorists in this tradition (e.g., Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 1987; Smetana
2006; Shweder 1990) hold that people make a distinction between ‘morality’ and
‘convention.’ In early work, Turiel (1983: 35) provides working definitions for
‘the moral domain’ and ‘the conventional domain.’ He describes conventions as
relative to the societal context: conventions are rules that vary from one social
system to another or when general usage or consensus differs, and they are
justified by referring to convention, habit, or behavioral uniformities. For
example, a conventional rule has to be followed when and because everybody
does it. Turiel (1983: 39) further describes moral rules as universal and justified
by referring to concepts of harm, justice and rights. As a consequence, moral
rules cannot vary as long as the moral properties of the situation are the
same.
Turiel and followers have since employed a specific method (the moral/
conventional task) to determine if individuals indeed distinguish conventional from
moral rules on the basis of their variability and justification. The dimension of
justification is assessed by asking subjects why a specific transgression is wrong,
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while the dimension of variability is assessed by asking if the act would also be
wrong in a different social system, or when general usage differs. Either of these
criteria can determine that the transgression is non-relatively wrong. If a
transgression is claimed to be wrong because of consensus, but is claimed to be
wrong even when varying a range of societal factors, we cannot decide it is
relative–—it might be universally wrong. If a transgression is deemed wrong
because it causes harm but it is deemed not wrong in a different society B, it might
be the case that following the rule in society B would have morally reprehensible
consequences and that the rule is in fact based on universal principles of, for
example, justice. A rule can only be relatively right or wrong if it’s wrongness
varies from one society to another and if the rule is justified by referring to local
moral views, not by referring to universal moral principles. Hence, under this
paradigm, it will be much easier to determine that participants perceive a rule to be
non-relative than to determine that participants perceive a rule to be relative.
Consonant with the aforementioned asymmetry in the affordances of the Turiel
paradigm, an impressive corpus of empirical investigations employing this
conceptual framework supports the conclusion that people are moral non-relativists
(e.g., Wainryb et al. 2004; Turiel et al. 1987). Indeed, studies find that
transgressions that are intuitively judged to be in the moral domain are consistently
categorized as generalizably wrong and as wrong due to issues of harm, justice, and
rights (e.g., Nucci and Turiel 1993). Despite this voluminous evidence, however, we
argue that the methods used in these studies will fail to detect moral relativism when
it occurs.
Like Kohlberg, Turiel (1983) premises his approach on a narrow conception of
‘morality’ and ‘conventionality,’ drawing on a selection of philosophical theories
that support universal accounts of morality (e.g., Searle 1969). Morality is defined as
‘‘analytically independent of systems of social organization that coordinate
interactions,’’ (Turiel 1983: 39). Moral right and wrong are determined by, and
justified by, universal values of justice, rights, and ‘do no harm.’ As a consequence,
what is morally wrong is morally wrong everywhere and its wrongness is justified
by these universal values—wrongness is not determined by consensus. This is not a
description, as moral systems do vary—it is a definition about the proper moral
domain. In this conception, by definition, relativistic rules cannot be moral rules.
For example, socio-functional accounts of morality as a device to regulate
cooperation (e.g. Wong 2006) are excluded from the scope of research.
In the moral/conventional task, participants are confronted with transgressions
that have been selected and categorized by the researchers. In early studies (e.g.
Nucci and Turiel 1978; Turiel et al. 1987: 172–174; Nucci and Nucci 1982),
researchers or independent jurors classified the transgressions based on the prior
definitions of ‘moral’ and ‘conventional.’ Some later studies (e.g. Nichols 2004;
Nucci and Turiel 1993) adapt previously used scenarios. This opens the possibility
that participants had to rate a biased sample of transgressions. There might be
transgressions that many of us would intuitively classify as ‘moral’ but that are not
generalizable or not dependent on issues of harm, justice or rights according to the
researchers. Such transgressions would not have been included in these studies
because they could not have been classified as either ‘moral’ or ‘conventional’ due
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Varying versions of moral relativism
to their ‘atypical’ combination of characteristics. Hence, the finding that participants
rated all ‘moral’ transgressions as generalizable means nothing more than that the
participants agreed with the researchers regarding the generalizability of the
selected transgressions. In addition, participants have typically been asked to rate a
small number of transgressions. This opens the possibility that their answers were
specific to the transgression considered and not to morality per se (Wright et al.
2008). Studies that included a wider range of scenarios and did not have inclusion or
characterization criteria based on Turiel’s (1983) classification did not find this
clear-cut conceptual distinction (e.g. Huebner et al. 2010; Nichols 2004; Kelly et al.
2007). Finally, there are cultural differences in how people classify transgressions.
When participants belong to the same cultural group as do the researchers, we can
expect that their response patterns will reflect the same intuitions as those of the
researchers. Clear cultural differences have been found in the response patterns in
regard to putative moral or conventional transgressions (e.g., Miller et al. 1990).
Clearly, most studies do not ask participants whether they think of the transgression
as moral or conventional-the distinction is made by the researchers, and its
affirmation by participants is entirely implicit, dependent on their answers to
questions intended to tap into the relevant properties. Wright et al. (2008) presented
participants with a broad range of issues and asked them to explicitly classify them
as moral or conventional. They found that, for almost all issues, there was no
consensus among participants. Many issues were considered moral by one
participant and conventional by another participant; some of these issues would
have been classified as moral according to Turiel’s (1983) criteria, while other
issues would have been classified as conventional. Huebner et al. (2010) employed
principal components analysis to explore how participants’ judgments regarding a
wide variety of putative moral and conventional transgressions assort. While
arguing that postulated moral transgressions do cluster together, they also report that
postulated conventional transgressions seem to form a continuum from conventional
at one end to moralized at the other end. Findings such as these indicate that there
are reasons to doubt the a priori rationale given for drawing the moral/conventional
distinction where many researchers place it (see also Bauman and Skitka 2009). We
suggest that, unless one knows the participants’ categorization, there is no reason to
categorize particular transgressions one way or another (indeed, there might not
even be a strict conceptual distinction at all, but instead a continuum, with moral
and conventional as poles).
This has important implications for the empirical question of whether or not
people are moral relativists. Testing a limited range of moral issues is only
informative if one expects that some individuals will be extreme relativists. Suppose
it were the case that people were moderate moral relativists, deeming as ‘moral’
some transgressions that researchers in the Turiel tradition did not include or would
have classified as ‘conventional.’ If participants are not asked how they classify
such transgressions, and if participants are presented with only a small set of
transgressions that have been pre-selected by researchers on the basis of the
intuition that (in the researcher’s opinion) each is clearly moral or conventional,
then even copious research will not reveal people’s relativist leanings.
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Ethical Ideologies A more open-minded body of research relevant to the present
discussion is that employing the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) developed by
Forsyth (1980). Forsyth proposes that people differ in their personal ‘ethical
ideologies’: people differ in the degree they are relativists and idealists, two
orthogonal continua ranging from low to high. Forsyth describes highly relativistic
individuals as those that ‘‘feel that moral actions depend upon the nature of the
situation and the individuals involved, and when judging others they weigh the
circumstances more than the ethical principle that was violated,’’ (Forsyth 1992). At
first glance, this definition might seem to differ substantially from our previous
definition of relativism. Nonetheless, consider the components of the EPQ designed
to categorize people along this dimension. Participants employ a 9-point Likert
scale to indicate how much they agree with each of ten items. In Table 1, we
reproduce these ten items, noting in the right column the extent to which each item
bears on relativism as we have defined it. Items differ in the extent to which they tap
whether people think of moral principles as variable, and whether moral
disagreements can be resolved.
Most items combine at least two of the three criteria of individual relativism.
When an individual scores high on all of these criteria, we can conclude that the
participant explicitly endorses moral relativism as here defined. The items are
biased towards extreme moral relativism: moderate moral relativists would agree
Table 1 Items 11–20 of the Ethics Position Questionnaire (left) and how they relate to our proposed
definition of moral relativism (right), from (Forsyth 1980)
Item Morality is …
11 There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should Variable, relative to a code
be a part of any code of ethics of ethics
12 What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another Variable, relative to
situation and society
13 Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one Variable, relative to
person considers to be moral may be judged to be immoral by individual
another person
14 Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to ‘‘rightness’’ Variable and irresolvable
15 Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since Relative to individual, and
what is moral or immoral is up to the individual irresolvable
16 Moral standards are simply personal rules which indicate how a Relative to individual
person should behave, and are not to be applied in making
judgments of others
17 Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that Relative to individual
individuals should be allowed to formulate their own individual
codes
18 Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of Variable
actions could stand in the way of better human relations and
adjustment
19 No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is Variable, relative to
permissible or not permissible totally depends on the situation situation
20 Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the Variable, relative to
circumstances surrounding the action situation
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that some moral standards are individualistic (item 11) or personal rules (item 16),
but they would not necessarily agree with the more general wording that is used.
Moreover, it is not clear if normative relativism is assessed. ‘Relativist’ answers are
also concomitant with other interpretations, such as meta-ethical relativism (moral
statements are relatively true or false) (see also Goodwin and Darley 2010). On the
other hand, Forsyth (1992) explicitly avoids an a priori commitment to an
objectivistic moral philosophy. All things considered, this is a useful starting point if
we want to know about the possibility of lay people being folk moral relativists.
Studies that make use of the EPQ frequently inform us about variation in moral
views, as suggested by Flanagan (1991). Researchers often report that, among
adults, age is negatively correlated with relativism (e.g., Chen and Liu 2009;
Dubinsky et al. 2005; Hartikainen and Torstila 2004; Fernando et al. 2008; Vitell
and Paolillo 2003). In most studies, religiosity is negatively correlated with
relativism (Chen and Liu 2009; Barnett et al. 1996; Vitell and Paolillo 2003 but see
Fernando et al. 2008). Relativism also differs significantly between nations (Forsyth
et al. 2008; Alas et al. 2010), with the East generally being more relativistic than the
West (Forsyth et al. 2008). We see here that a very general but less biased
conception of relativism yields a more nuanced view on folk moral relativism. We
suggest that more elaborate scales could differentiate between normative and meta-
ethical relativism, between cultural and individual relativism, and between extreme
and moderate relativism.
Moral heuristics Experimental philosophers have recently begun to examine
individuals’ implicit moral heuristics by presenting them with scenarios and varying
the relevant conditions therein. However, these studies mostly tap into meta-ethical
commitments: participants are asked to assess the truth value of moral statements
(Sarkissian et al. 2010; Goodwin and Darley 2008, 2010). While these studies offer
preliminary indications that some individuals could be meta-ethical relativists, it
would be useful to explicitly try to tap into normative implicit heuristics.
A critique that might be raised is that researchers mostly study moral psychology
by analyzing subjects’ explicit verbal reports of their reasoning while many moral
psychologists now hold that moral behavior and moral judgment do not correlate
with explicit reasoning (e.g., Haidt 2001; interestingly, Piaget [1932] was already
aware of this difficulty). On the other hand, explicit verbal reasoning is used to
convince others about one’s moral judgments and to influence others’ moral
behavior (also Haidt 2001). This suggests that it is appropriate to approach the issue
of folk morality from different angles: moral behavior, implicit moral judgments,
and explicit moral reasoning.
Development and transparency
Many developmental studies are premised on the assumption that there is a moral/
conventional distinction. These studies suggest that young children (ages 4–7) are
non-relativists about morality (e.g., Nichols and Folds-Bennett 2003; Wainryb et al.
2004). However, some of the previously mentioned caveats are important, most
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notably that only a small number of typically moral items were tested (hitting,
kicking, helping, and breaking another child’s toys). This raises the issue that a
distinction should be made between extreme and moderate relativism. This
distinction is even more important in light of Gabennesch’s critique on the
development of the moral/conventional distinction. Gabennesch suggests that
certain issues might be relativized more easily than others. He reviews previous
studies and notes that both moral and conventional transgressions are non-
relativistically wrong for young children, while fewer transgressions are relativis-
tically wrong for older children. He also notes that some conventional transgressions
are more likely than others to continue to be reified at a later age. This, he argues, is
caused by their lack of transparency, the extent to which their human origins are
visible for the subject. A range of factors influence a rule’s transparency. For
example, a rule with which the child is familiar will be more transparent than a new
one; a rule that applies only to certain groups or only in certain contexts will be
more transparent; and so on. In accordance with this, non-relativism was found to
not be exclusive to moral issues (Nichols and Folds-Bennet 2003; Wainryb 2004).
Given the previously stated critique (‘‘Defining moral relativism away’’) that it
should be up to the participant to explicitly classify rules as ‘moral’ or
‘conventional,’ there are not sufficient grounds to conclude that only conventional
rules can become relative, while moral rules cannot. Kelly et al. (2007) provide
findings consonant with the suggestion that moral rules can be thought of as relative.
They find that participants are indeed more likely to say that more historically and
locally variable moral rules against slavery or cannibalism are ok or not depending
on time and place. However, as Kelly et al. did not ask participants to justify their
responses, we cannot know for certain how their findings, including order effects,
articulate with folk moral relativism. Also, Nichols (2004) found in one study that
moral non-objectivism was positively correlated with years spent in college. Moral
non-objectivism being a function of education is consonant with the transparency
hypothesis; nonetheless, more research is needed to establish a potential causal link
between non-objectivism, relativism, and education. Moreover, this finding did not
replicate in additional studies (id.). In short, preliminary data suggest that factors
that have to do with the rule in question can interact with age or education to make a
rule relative, independent of the rule being moral or conventional. While other
factors undoubtedly matter in reifying rules (Shweder 1990), Gabennesch’s critique
is a promising one.
Confidence
Can empirical studies inform the philosophical discussion about moral confidence?
More specifically, does moral relativism lead to a weakened adherence to moral
principles? Research using Forsyth’s EPQ sheds light on the question of whether
moral confidence is undergirded by moral non-relativism. More relativistic adult
U.S. consumers are less likely to find a range of consumer practices wrong (Vitell
and Paolillo 2003). Practices examined concerned illegal behavior such as changing
price tags as a consumer on consumer products, lying about a child’s age in order to
get a lower price, not telling the truth when negotiating about the price of a car, and
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Varying versions of moral relativism
illegally copying computer software. Among marketing managers, those who score
high on relativism have been found to think that ethics is less important for a firm’s
long term plans (Vitell et al. 2003). Chinese managers are reportedly more favorable
towards bribery and kickbacks if they score higher on relativism (Tian 2008). In
another study, relativists are shown to be more accepting of violating property rights
(Winter et al. 2004). Business undergraduates at a U.S. university who score higher
on relativism score lower on corporate social responsibility, the extent to which they
take the wider social impact of their business into account instead of just caring
about profits and stockholders (Kolodinsky et al. 2010). Nichols (2004) categorized
adult participants as moral non-objectivists if they said that there was no fact of the
matter regarding a moral disagreement; otherwise, they were classified as moral
objectivists. He made use of the moral/conventional task and found that, in all four
studies, non-objectivists found ‘moral’ transgressions less serious (but equally non-
permissible) compared to objectivists, suggesting again a negative relationship
between relativism and confidence.
Being motivated to act in accordance with moral principles is another major
aspect of moral confidence. As for behavior, Forsyth (1980) and Forsyth and Berger
(1982) did not find a relationship between ethical position and cheating behavior on
a test. On the other hand, Indonesian consumers scoring high on relativism report
being more likely to engage in questionable but legal activities, and being more
likely to initiate an illegal activity from which they would benefit (Lu and Lu 2010).
In all of the studies discussed above, it is possible that moral confidence
decreases relativism as well as the other way around. Fernando et al. (2008) find that
Australian relativist managers score lower on the ‘corporate ethical values scale,’
which measures the employee’s perceived ethical values in his company, and the
authors hypothesize that perceived corporate ethical values have a causal influence
on relativism scores. Also, these studies do not make a distinction between different
kinds of moral relativism. Here it would be particularly interesting to know if the
correlation holds for all moral issues or only for a specific subset, and to investigate
what happens when people come to take new values into account, as described by
Wong (2006).
Tolerance and respect
We mentioned philosophers who argue that tolerance—not interfering with
behavior that one judges to be morally wrong—is psychologically unstable. The
purported reason is that a moral judgment involves the desire to regulate others’
behavior. There are different gradations of intervention, and openly judging an act
may in itself partially inhibit others from performing the given act. Also, even in the
case where judgments are kept private, studies suggest that people prefer to distance
themselves from others who hold diverging moral beliefs. Haidt et al. (2003) found
that participants preferred roommates who held similar political and moral views.
They were much more willing to have more moral variation in a classroom seminar,
and slightly less at the university as a whole. Other kinds of diversity (e.g.,
demographic) were much more readily accepted in roommates. This was partly
replicated by Wright et al. (2008), whose study we discussed in ‘‘Defining moral
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K. J. P. Quintelier, D. M. T. Fessler
relativism away’’. Participants were less accepting of someone as a potential
roommate who differed in moral issues, than of encountering a morally disagreeing
person in a seminar or at university as a whole. Participants were also less accepting
of encountering someone who disagreed on moral issues than when encountering
someone who differed on non-moral issues. They also found that participants would
sit farther away from, and more turned away from, a discussion partner who
disagreed on a moral issue than a discussion partner who disagreed on a
conventional issue. Other subtle changes in behavior occur: participants in an
experimental setting gave fewer raffle tickets to a student whom they thought
disagreed with them on moral attitudes than they gave to a student who was said to
disagree on non-moral attitudes (Wright et al. 2008). This indicates that, at the
interpersonal level, the requirement of tolerance may run counter to subtle
discriminatory mechanisms, such as shunning, that are not easily regulated because
of their intimate nature.
This suggests that tolerance is less of a problem between groups that do not
intimately interact in the first place. Nonetheless, Lester & Roberts (2009) noticed
that even when participants claimed to tolerate behavior that was symbolic of a
worldview they did not agree with, people were less willing to defend the rights of
groups with which they did not agree. However, after taking a course on the seven
major world religions, students claimed to be more willing to defend the rights of
suppressed groups and to allow individuals from all other worldviews to execute
their rights. This effect was slight, but significant. It is hard to know whether
participants’ self-reports reflect their actual behavior, but explicitly formulated
judgments might have a general effect on one’s own and others’ behavior (see also
Haidt 2001).
The possibility of tolerance might depend on the principles in question, and the
relativism or age of actors. In observations of naturally-occurring behavior among
7–14 year old children in Chicago, Nucci and Nucci (1982) find that moral
transgressions elicited more retaliatory actions than did conventional transgressions;
however, conventional transgressions elicited more ridicule than did moral
transgressions, and there were no differences in threats and commands to stop the
act between the two kinds of transgressions. There were no main age effects for
retaliation, threat, ridicule or command. Smetana (1981) asked 2 to 9 year old
children if perpetrators deserved punishment and how much (none, a little or a lot).
She found that moral transgressions were deemed more punishable than conven-
tional transgressions. Hollos et al. (1986) tested 8–18 year old Nigerians and found
that these participants wanted an authority figure to react to moral transgression by
flogging the transgressor. However, in line with the previously discussed age
differences, 8–11 year old subjects thought that conventional transgressions should
be punished by flogging, while 15–18 year old subjects gave this response
significantly less. These findings suggest that both moral and conventional
transgressions do elicit interference from children and adolescents, be it in the
form of punishment, retaliation, ridicule, threats, or commands. However, since it is
likely that moral transgressions are less tolerated than conventional transgressions, it
is also likely that, mediated by age, relativized moral judgments will be more
tolerated than universal or objective moral judgments.
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Similar age differences are evident in the realm of respect. Here we have to ask
how people judge others with whom they morally disagree, as opposed to judging
their moral opinions. In ‘‘Defining moral relativism away’’, we discussed the study
of Wainryb et al. (2004), conducted among 5–9 years old children. The moral issues
used were breaking other children’s toys and kicking other children. The children
used positive descriptors to describe the characters who expressed divergent beliefs
bearing on taste, ambiguous facts, and facts, but they described as bad characters
who expressed divergent moral beliefs. Regardless of the realm of disagreement,
7–9 year olds described disagreeing characters as nice or normal more often than
did 5 year olds. Enright and Lapsley (1981) presented a short vignette to adults,
students from grades 3 to 12, and college students, and asked for their judgment
about a moral dilemma. They then confronted participants with an audio-taped peer
stating the opposite judgment. Participants could then choose what they thought
about the other person. Possible items were ‘‘The other does not seem to be a
predominantly good person but there is some good in everyone’’ (level 1), ‘‘the
other is probably as good a person as anyone else’’ (level 2) and ‘‘I cannot tell what
kind of a person the other is until I know much more about the other’s beliefs’’
(level 3). The authors found that college students were most likely to agree with
level 3-like items, denoting that one can judge others, but not based on only this one
moral belief; adults (older than college students but matched on amount of
education) scored slightly lower than college students. This indicates that character
judgments are initially linked to moral belief judgments, and that respect increases
with age or education, regardless of the realm of disagreement. This is also
analogous to the finding that education is positively related to relativism (see
‘‘Moral heuristics’’). Again, we conclude that factors that have to do with the rule in
question could make diversity more or less difficult to respect, highlighting the need
for moderate accounts of tolerance and respect.
Summary and conclusions
Naturalist philosophers welcome empirical evidence to constrain or support theories
of normative relativism. An important critique against all versions of normative
relativism holds that individuals think of morality as non-relative, therefore it is not
feasible to impose normative relativism as a requirement. At first sight, results from
moral psychology inspired by Kohlberg and findings from domain theory, indeed
suggest that morality is inherently non-relative: children and adults are non-
relativists about moral rules, and they only relativize rules that are not in the moral
domain. However, a deeper look suggests that skepticism is in order, as much of
moral psychology defines morality as non-relative, either implicitly or explicitly.
Subsequently, no measures are taken to independently decide whether or not
participants’ moral reasoning is at work. As such, no relative rule will ever be
described under the headings of moral psychology. While it might well be the case
that people are moral non-relativists, the methods employed in most of this research
are biased against finding moral relativist leanings.
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K. J. P. Quintelier, D. M. T. Fessler
Other traditions, for example research making use of the Ethics Position
Questionnaire, do find diversity in moral views. Moral relativism is less abundant in
the West and among religious people, and it declines with age among adults.
Promising possibilities of folk moral relativism can also be found in moral
development research and studies that are critical of mainstream interpretations of
the moral/conventional distinction. Older children treat a wider range of rules as
relative than do younger children. Assuming that some of these rules might be
categorized as moral by the children themselves, children might become more
relativistic in the course of moral development. The relativity of moral rules might
also depend on the specific properties of the rule, most notably the degree to which
their human origins are transparent. In all of this, we have to keep in mind that it is
unlikely that people are extreme moral relativists. Therefore, it is important to test
participants on a range of issues. Here, the lack of an encompassing theory of folk
moral relativism makes it difficult to predict what moral rules are likely to be
relativized and who will be what kind of moral relativist.
The second worry is that we need the idea that morality is objective in order to
have confidence in our moral values. Some results are in accordance with moral
relativism being negatively correlated with moral confidence as measured by
perceived seriousness of moral transgressions and judging moral behavior.
However, researchers have yet to explore the relationship between moral relativism
and actual behavior. Moreover, these studies do not inform us much regarding the
direction of causality, which could go either way—as such, philosophers’ intuitions
that relativism correlates with decreased confidence might reflect an existing
correlation, but with the causal arrows going from confidence to relativism instead
of the other way around. More research on this topic is clearly necessary.
A third constraint is linked to the requirement of tolerance: judging an action to
be wrong purportedly implies that we are motivated to stop the action. The
paradoxical nature of tolerance led philosophers to develop notions of respect and
ambivalence. Studies do find a link between moral (and conventional) disagreement
and interference; this speaks against tolerance as a feasible strategy towards much of
moral diversity. However, findings to date also suggest that distance, operation-
alized as amount of intimate interaction, can be a mediating factor, suggesting the
need to distinguish between cultural and individual moral diversity. Moreover, we
find the same moderating factors for tolerance and respect as for moral relativism—
age and education seem to impact one’s capacity to tolerate and respect certain other
ways of life. The possibility remains that moderate tolerance and respect are
psychologically feasible.
We therefore arrive at the following circumspect conclusions. Major traditions in
the empirical literature seem to support the view that morality is intuitively thought
of as objective. However, a deeper reading indicates that caution is in order here. It
is indeed unlikely that people are extreme moral relativists, meaning that no moral
rules are thought of as objective or universal. However, this should not be taken as
implying that moral rules are intrinsically non-relative: there are both individual
differences and properties of the rules themselves that influence whether or not a
rule is thought of as relative. Results indicate that, in the course of moral
development, individuals might become more relativist, tolerant, and respectful.
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Varying versions of moral relativism
More transparent rules might be more likely to become relativized. Moreover,
results are consistent with tolerance and respect being mediated by distance to
others. In sum, it is likely that many people are, or can be, moderate moral
relativists.
All in all, this is a relatively underexplored field, both in empirical work and in
philosophical theories. We argue that empiricists can learn from philosophers when
investigating folk moral relativism. Future research would provide a clearer portrait
of the nature and extent of folk moral relativism were investigators to adopt some
rules of thumb. First, participants should always be asked to categorize events as
moral or non-moral instead of leaving this categorization solely to the researchers.
Second, a distinction should be made between the extremes of individual and
cultural relativism. Preliminary evidence indicates that adults are more likely to
tolerate cultural than individual diversity. Since this is an important philosophical
and social distinction, it is one of the mediating factors that deserve empirical
attention. Third, we would urge researchers to investigate the development of
relativism for ‘transparent’ moral issues, such as gender discrimination, hierarchy,
inequality, or modes of punishment. One should take into account that relativism
most likely does not mean extreme relativism. Finally, investigators should probe
implicit heuristics as well as explicit reasoning and behavior. Behavior is of primary
importance for discussions surrounding confidence and tolerance. Lastly, studies in
which participants are asked to evaluate the person as well as the behavior are
particularly informative for the notion of respect.
In contrast to the diversity of philosophical perspectives being developed on
these issues, most empirical researchers have been, and continue to be, deeply
influenced by modern Western moral philosophies; as such they conceptualize
morality as objective. Due to its influence on methodological design, this
perspective then biases empirical findings accordingly. Similarly, most empirical
research that addresses relativism, objectivity, or universalism does so in broad
categorical fashion, ignoring philosophers’ distinctions between different kinds of
moral relativism, and this despite the fact that at least some of the empirical findings
to date indicate that such distinctions should be taken seriously. It is time that, on
the one hand, more philosophers recognize the empirical nature of much of the
discussion surrounding relativism, and, on the other hand, moral psychologists
question their conceptual assumptions. Awareness of both existing findings and
lacunae therein should invite philosophers to become more familiar with the
empirical literature at hand; it should also invite more empiricists to directly address
the question of folk moral relativism without presupposing it.
Acknowledgments K.Q. is grateful for the financial support of the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-
Vlaanderen. Without implying that they would agree with our perspectives, we thank UCLA’s XBA
group, and Stephen Stich, whose ideas helped shape our thoughts on these matters.
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