Frank Cameron Jackson
Frank Cameron Jackson
|Education||Trinity College, Melbourne|
La Trobe University (PhD)
|Doctoral advisor||Brian Ellis|
|Philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and meta-ethics|
Frank Cameron Jackson FBA (born 1943) is an Australian analytic philosopher and Emeritus Professor in the School of Philosophy (Research School of Social Sciences) at Australian National University (ANU). Jackson spent much of his career at ANU (1986–2014) and he was a regular visiting professor of philosophy at Princeton University (2007–14). His research focuses primarily on the philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and meta-ethics.
Jackson studied mathematics and philosophy at the University of Melbourne, going into residence at Trinity College in 1961. In his later years in College, he was Clarke Scholar, and a member of the 2nd XVIII football team. Jackson received his PhD in philosophy from La Trobe University, where he was supervised by Brian Ellis. He taught at the University of Adelaide for a year in 1967. In 1978, he became chair of the philosophy department at Monash University. In 1986, he joined ANU as Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Program, within the Research School of Social Sciences. At ANU, he served as Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies (1998–2001), Deputy Vice-Chancellor – Research (2001), and Director of the Research School of Social Sciences (2004–7). Jackson was appointed as Distinguished Professor at ANU in 2003; he became an Emeritus Professor upon his retirement in 2014.
Jackson was awarded the Order of Australia in 2006 for service to philosophy and social sciences as an academic, administrator, and researcher. Jackson delivered the John Locke Lectures at the University of Oxford in 1995. Notably, his father had also delivered the 1957–8 lectures, making them the first father–son pair to deliver them.
In philosophy of mind, Jackson is known, among other things, for the knowledge argument against physicalism—the view that the universe is entirely physical (i.e., the kinds of entities postulated in physics). Jackson motivates the knowledge argument by a thought experiment known as Mary's room. Jackson phrases the thought experiment as follows:
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is blue'. (…) What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false.
Jackson's thought experiment was dramatised in the three-part Channel 4 documentary "Brainspotting." It also forms the central motif of author David Lodge's novel Thinks... (2001), in which Jackson appears as a character.
Jackson used the knowledge argument, as well as other arguments, to establish a sort of dualism, according to which certain mental states, especially qualitative ones, are non-physical. The view that Jackson urged was a modest version of epiphenomenalism—the view that certain mental states are non-physical and, although caused to come into existence by physical events, do not then cause any changes in the physical world.
Most contemporary philosophers given a choice between going with science and going with intuitions, go with science. Although I once dissented from the majority, I have capitulated and now see the interesting issue as being where the arguments from the intuitions against physicalism—the arguments that seem so compelling—go wrong.
Jackson is also known for his defence of the centrality of conceptual analysis to philosophy; his approach, set out in his Locke Lectures and published as his 1998 book, is often referred to as the Canberra Plan.
In 2003 he was appointed as Distinguished Professor at the Australian National University and Emeritus Professor in 2014. In November 2018 Jackson received the Peter Baume Award, which recognises substantial and significant achievement and merit.
- Perception: A Representative Theory (1977, CUP)
- Conditionals (1987, Basil Blackwell)
- (with David Braddon-Mitchell) Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction (1996, Basil Blackwell)
- From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (1998, OUP)
- Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays (1998, Routledge)
- (with Philip Pettit & Michael Smith) Mind, Morality, and Explanations: Selected Collaborations (2004, OUP)
- (with David Braddon-Mitchell) Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction (2nd edition) (2007, Basil Blackwell)
- Language, Names and Information (2010, Wiley-Blackwell)
- Conditionals (1991, OUP)
- (with Michael Smith) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (2005, OUP)
- (1975) 'Grue' Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72, no. 5, pp. 113–131.
- (1979) 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals' The Philosophical Review, vol. 88, no. 4, pp. 565–589.
- (1980) 'Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase' Philosophy, vol. 55, no. 213, pp. 303–315.
- (1981) 'Conditionals and Possibilia' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 81, pp. 125–137.
- (1982) 'Epiphenomenal Qualia' The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 27, pp. 127–136.
- (1982) 'Functionalism and Type-Type Identity Theories' Philosophical Studies, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 209–225. (with Robert Pargetter & Elizabeth W. Prior)
- (1984) 'Weakness of Will' Mind, vol. 93, no. 369, pp. 1–18.
- (1984) 'Petitio and the Purpose of Arguing' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 26–36.
- (1985) 'On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation' Mind, vol. 94, no. 374, pp. 177–196.
- (1986) 'Oughts, Options, and Actualism' The Philosophical Review, vol. 95, no. 2, 233–255. (with Robert Pargetter)
- (1986) 'What Mary Didn't Know' The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 83, no. 5, pp. 291–295.
- (1988) 'Functionalism and Broad Content' Mind, vol. 97, no. 387, pp. 381–400. (with Philip Pettit)
- (1990) 'Classifying Conditionals' Analysis, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 134–147.
- (1990) 'In Defence of Folk Psychology' Philosophical Studies, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 31–54. (with Philip Pettit)
- (1991) 'Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection' Ethics, vol. 101, no. 3, pp. 461–482.
- (1994) 'Minimalism and Truth Aptness' Mind, vol. 103, no. 411, pp. 287–302. (with Graham Oppy & Michael Smith)
- (1996) 'The Primary Quality View of Color' Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 10, pp. 199–219.
- (1996) 'Mental Causation' Mind, vol. 105, no. 419, pp. 377–413.
- (1998) 'A Problem for Expressivism' Analysis, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 239–251. (with Philip Pettit)
- (1999) 'The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytical Functionalism' Philosophical Topics, vol. 26, no. 1/2, pp. 71–88. (with David Braddon-Mitchell)
- (2001) 'Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation' The Philosophical Review, vol. 110, no. 3, pp. 315–360. (with David J. Chalmers)
- (2002) 'Response-Dependence without Tears' Philosophical Issues, vol. 12, pp. 97–117. (with Philip Pettit)
- (2003a) 'Cognitivism, A Priori Deduction, and Moore' Ethics, vol. 113, no. 3, pp. 557–575.
- (2003b) 'Mind and Illusion' in Minds and Persons, ed. Anthony O'Hear, Cambridge University Press, pp. 251–272.
- (2005) 'What Are Cognitivists Doing When They Do Normative Ethics?' Philosophical Issues, vol. 15, pp. 94–106.
- (2006) 'Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty' The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 103, no. 6, pp. 267–283. (with Michael Smith)
- (2007) 'Freedom from Fear' Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 249–265. (with Robert E. Goodin)
- (2010) 'The Autonomy of Mind' Philosophical Issues, vol. 20, pp. 170–184.
- (2012) 'Leibniz's Law and the Philosophy of Mind' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 112, pp. 269–283.
- Biographical information from Jackson's academic profile at ANU: http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/profile/frank-jackson Archived 2 March 2015 at the Wayback Machine
- Information about Jackson's father being a student of Wittgenstein's taken from "Alan Donagan: A Memoir" by Barbara Donagan, Ethics (104) 1993, p.150.
- "Minor Scholars", The Fleur-de-Lys, Nov. 1963, p. 43. See also pp. 21–22, 40.
- "Tree – David Chalmers". Retrieved 23 June 2020.
- Director (Research Services Division). "Professor Frank Jackson". researchers.anu.edu.au. Retrieved 23 June 2020.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
- Supervenience, Metaphysics, and Analysis (John Locke Lectures), Oxford University, 1994–95
- Jackson, 1982, p. 130.
- Torin Alter. "Jackson's Retraction". APA. Archived from the original on 16 May 2008.
- Jackson, 2003b, p. 251
- "Frank Jackson". Australian Academy of the Humanities. Retrieved 1 December 2018.
- "Emeritus Professor Frank Jackson AO". Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. Retrieved 1 December 2018.
- It's an Honour: Centenary Medal. Retrieved 22 November 2014
- It's an Honour: AO. Retrieved 22 November 2014
- "Peter Baume Award: Emeritus Professor Frank Jackson AO". ANU. 15 November 2018. Retrieved 1 December 2018.
References and further reading
- Franklin, J. 2003. Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia, Macleay Press, Ch. 9.
- Ludlow, P., Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar (eds.). 2004. There's Something About Mary, MIT Press.