Albert Sidney Johnston's plan used at Shiloh?

Belfoured said:

As for Johnston leading from the front, one problem is that by doing so he left decisions to his corps and division commanders - especially an issue in light of the terrain. Johnston's "personal leadership" may have had some effect for a time, but that's not the place for an army CO to exercise command and control. And there's the added issue - what happened to Johnston is yet another reason why an army CO isn't riding around at the forefront. Even the foot soldiers of the Texas Brigade knew that at the Wilderness in May 1864.

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I think Wiley Sword gives a good explanation: "Considering the fatal result, Sidney Johnston's exposure on the front line has been frequently interpreted as grossly reckless, and improper conduct for a commanding general. Yet, aside from considerations of misguided heroism, Johnston's presence along the battle line involved maintaining tactical control of his main offensive thrust. Thus, both his bravery and commitment to win should be apparent to all. Due to the tactical nightmare of mixed commands and random unit coordination, it was imperative that someone with high command authority be present to organize a cohesive attack. Like Johnston, the other senior commanders, Grant, Sherman, and later Beauregard, personally exposed themselves along the front line to obtain information, rally troops, and direct the fighting. All had close calls and were occasionally fired at. In fact, Johnston's limited exposure, and the random, chance nature of his fatal wound seems to have involved more ill-luck than a reckless abuse of command responsibility." p447, Shiloh: Bloody April.

Rhea Cole said:

Just as an aside, no General in the war was as far forward as Rosecrans. At Stones River he rode in front of Thomas’ line. In practically every battle, he had somebody’s blood & brains splattered on his face & coat. It was not an especially sensible thing to do, but he never got a scratch & inspired the troops.

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Yes, talking gibberish, frothing at the mouth, and issuing incomprehensible orders

When I get the time, I'll game this scenario out and see what happens.

What about the bad map the Confederates used at Shiloh? Didn't that throw them off completely as to the Union army's actual flank? I think the received wisdom has it that the attacks meant to hit Grant's flank actually hit his center.

TerryB said:

What about the bad map the Confederates used at Shiloh? Didn't that throw them off completely as to the Union army's actual flank? I think the received wisdom has it that the attacks meant to hit Grant's flank actually hit his center.

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At that point nobody had any decent maps. However, most would agree that the Tennessee River was a landmark that was impossible to miss. The inherently impractical flaw of Beauregard’s deployment all but guaranteed the inextricable confusion that characterized the attack. As the goole map documented, the majority of the fighting occurred on Grant’s right, as far away from the vital landing as possible.

Saruman said:

I think Wiley Sword gives a good explanation: "Considering the fatal result, Sidney Johnston's exposure on the front line has been frequently interpreted as grossly reckless, and improper conduct for a commanding general. Yet, aside from considerations of misguided heroism, Johnston's presence along the battle line involved maintaining tactical control of his main offensive thrust. Thus, both his bravery and commitment to win should be apparent to all. Due to the tactical nightmare of mixed commands and random unit coordination, it was imperative that someone with high command authority be present to organize a cohesive attack. Like Johnston, the other senior commanders, Grant, Sherman, and later Beauregard, personally exposed themselves along the front line to obtain information, rally troops, and direct the fighting. All had close calls and were occasionally fired at. In fact, Johnston's limited exposure, and the random, chance nature of his fatal wound seems to have involved more ill-luck than a reckless abuse of command responsibility." p447, Shiloh: Bloody April.

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Chicken-egg issue. Sword says "it was imperative that someone with high command authority be present to organize a cohesive attack". That's the core of the problem. If Johnston had done what he was supposed to do as CO - either design the attack plan himself or review it and correct any problems - he wouldn't have been needed at the front "to organize a cohesive attack". There is no way on earth that being where he was would allow him to effectively "maintain[ing] tactical control" of the large formations that were involved in the attack and were becoming increasingly commingled. How many times was Grant in this circumstance as an army CO, other than at Shiloh where he had to do what he did - for awhile - only because he had not effectively prepared for the attack in the first place. Vicksburg? Chattanooga? Overland Campaign? Petersburg Campaign? How many times did Sherman do this as an army CO during the Atlanta Campaign?

Sword also says "Thus, both his bravery and commitment to win should be apparent to all." That's nice but irrelevant. With armies that size battles were won by a CO doing the "boring" things that amount to effective control of all his forces through his subordinates rather than the "ride to the sound of the guns" approach that makes for great public relations spin. The "common soldiers" of the Texas Brigade at the Wilderness knew better.

Rhea Cole said:

At that point nobody had any decent maps. However, most would agree that the Tennessee River was a landmark that was impossible to miss. The inherently impractical flaw of Beauregard’s deployment all but guaranteed the inextricable confusion that characterized the attack. As the goole map documented, the majority of the fighting occurred on Grant’s right, as far away from the vital landing as possible.

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I don't know of anybody who has concluded that the attack plan was anything other than flawed - especially given the inexperience of so many field officers and troops. That begs the question why some exonerate the guy in charge of responsibility.

Rhea Cole said:

At that point nobody had any decent maps. However, most would agree that the Tennessee River was a landmark that was impossible to miss. The inherently impractical flaw of Beauregard’s deployment all but guaranteed the inextricable confusion that characterized the attack. As the goole map documented, the majority of the fighting occurred on Grant’s right, as far away from the vital landing as possible.

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A friend of mine, the late Bill Bryant, who wrote a book on Cahaba Prison and the Sultana disaster, once said of Bearegard's plan; " Maybe a Frenchman could understand it, but it made no sense whatever in English."

Saruman said:

Yes, talking gibberish, frothing at the mouth, and issuing incomprehensible orders

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From someone who was at Stones River:

It seemed to be beyond human power to avert the terrible catastrophe, but there was giant mind equal to the occasion, from line to line rode the towering form of the general commanding [Rosecrans]. Where the battle raged the fiercest, there stood the man who managed the workings. Cool, decided, brave in the darkest moments, he seemed to know but one idea. "We must fight to the bitter end." To see him was to feel in his hands that we were safe from defeat.

Source -this website is an great vehicle for reading some eyewitness accounts.

Belfoured said:

True, but "inspiring" the troops can be done without riding around like an overpaid company commander. Maybe I'm just "cautious" but by 1862 the size of these armies required a CO to exercise command and control from farther back. You might pull it off with "armies' at a maximum size of 20,000, such as used by both sides in the AWI, but not for double that or more.

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It seemed to be beyond human power to avert the terrible catastrophe, but there was giant mind equal to the occasion, from line to line rode the towering form of the general commanding [Rosecrans]. Where the battle raged the fiercest, there stood the man who managed the workings. Cool, decided, brave in the darkest moments, he seemed to know but one idea. "We must fight to the bitter end." To see him was to feel in his hands that we were safe from defeat. O! Father you can not imagine one's feelings at such a time. I thought the sun would never set upon the heart-breaking scene on that eventful day. There are said to be times when the bravest heart quails and sickens. I confess there was a moment when mine ceased to hope, and its life blood rushed in one thick cold blood to the fountain. I almost prayed to die-to have a coveted death shut out the agonizing fear that all was lost.

(No need to get into a fruitless discussion about word meanings like inspiring)
I recommend Dan Masters’ website to you.
Even more I recommend you get a subscription to one the historic newspaper sites and transcribe some letters. That would be a valuable and long lasting contribution to CW history.

David Moore said:

It seemed to be beyond human power to avert the terrible catastrophe, but there was giant mind equal to the occasion, from line to line rode the towering form of the general commanding [Rosecrans]. Where the battle raged the fiercest, there stood the man who managed the workings. Cool, decided, brave in the darkest moments, he seemed to know but one idea. "We must fight to the bitter end." To see him was to feel in his hands that we were safe from defeat. O! Father you can not imagine one's feelings at such a time. I thought the sun would never set upon the heart-breaking scene on that eventful day. There are said to be times when the bravest heart quails and sickens. I confess there was a moment when mine ceased to hope, and its life blood rushed in one thick cold blood to the fountain. I almost prayed to die-to have a coveted death shut out the agonizing fear that all was lost.

(No need to get into a fruitless discussion about word meanings like inspiring)
I recommend Dan Masters’ website to you.
Even more I recommend you get a subscription to one the historic newspaper sites and transcribe some letters. That would be a valuable and long lasting contribution to CW history.

"Yelling like fiends incarnate" The opening moments of Stones River

The opening shots of the Battle of Stones River were fired near the intersection of Old Fort Parkway (Tennessee 96) and Gresham Lane- i...

dan-masters-civil-war.blogspot.com

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I can't fathom how somebody like Lee ever won a battle.

Here is Johnston original plan.

Spirt of 1861 Copperhead said:

View attachment 459068
Here is Johnston original plan.

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Beauregard, not Johnston wrote the attack orders. The units on the tip of that row of arrows, including Forrest, did not receive an order to attack… in any case it wasn’t Johnston’s plan.

Spirt of 1861 Copperhead said:

View attachment 459068
Here is Johnston original plan.

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Given the actual terrain and conditions in that wet April of 1862, was this plan actually feasible?

Presumably, the first Confederate corps makes the initial attack to attract Union attention. Once the Union commits to this engagement the other two main corps serve as the right hook, one after the other. The reserve corps either reinforces the first corps, in case of a strong Union counterattack, or the right hook.

Joshism said:

Given the actual terrain and conditions in that wet April of 1862, was this plan actually feasible?

Presumably, the first Confederate corps makes the initial attack to attract Union attention. Once the Union commits to this engagement the other two main corps serve as the right hook, one after the other. The reserve corps either reinforces the first corps, in case of a strong Union counterattack, or the right hook.

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That makes sense. However, there was absolutely no way for commanders to maintain command & control over the parallel lines. Almost immediately the lines tumbled together into an uncontrollable mob. The tactical plan was fatally flawed to the point of being incomprehensible.

The question is really what ever possessed Beauregard to do such a thing? From the days of the Roman legions the formations of attackers had been established. Beauregard’s linear formation was never going to work.

Not being a professional trained historian, just a amatuer student, I can pontificate as to whether Albert Sidney Johnston had a plan let alone apply it to the Battle of Shiloh.

Johnston had a large army, consisting of 4 Corps with over 40,000 infantry, artillery, cavalry and supply trains all strung out over 20 miles of 2 muddy roads from Corinth. He had extremely difficulty in managing such a vast number of soldiers and was unable to have them move smoothly out of the small town of Corinth. No one had ever controlled that many units which had been hastily assembled in the small North Mississippi community in just days before the attack on Pittsburg Landing. Johnston was content to lead troops from the front and allow Beauregard to funnel the units forwarded as needed. Unfortunately for the Confederates we know the results of this tandem of commanders!

This was a cluster from the beginning and the lack of accurate maps and scouts caused the failure of the attack before it even began. Western Tennessee, around Savannah---8 miles down river from the battlefield---was Pro-Union and local guides hard to find who knew the area well. Johnston's leadership style was insufficient to control Beauregard, who loved the theatrical movements created by Bonaparte and designed the attack orders for the Army of the Mississippi in that spirit.

Johnston knew that to defeat Grant he would have to drive the Federals away from Pittsburgh Landing. By allowing the planned attack in successive waves instead of attacking in columns, the ability to drive Grant from his base of supplies was lost. Due to the severe terrain on the Union left it was difficult for the Confederates to separate the Army of the Tennessee from the Tennessee River.

The Confederates spent their men and energies attacking on a wide front and not throwing the right jab needed straight up the Eastern Corinth and Hamburg-Savannah roads driving the Federals away from Pittsburg Landing!
Regards
David

I'm somewhat fuzzy on Civil War tactics, what would attacking in "columns of corps" have looked like in practice? I assume the columns would have "unzipped" to fight in line of battle?

For reference, I'll include this map. It's for a board game, but it's very accurate:

OldReliable1862 said:

I'm somewhat fuzzy on Civil War tactics, what would attacking in "columns of corps" have looked like in practice? I assume the columns would have "unzipped" to fight in line of battle?

For reference, I'll include this map. It's for a board game, but it's very accurate:
View attachment 465977

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I know that map!

You may or may not find my experiment useful: https://civilwartalk.com/threads/return-to-“pittsburg-landing”.197049/

Don’t feel bad, Johnston & Beauregard were fuzzy about Civil War tactics, too.

I think your map exemplifies what I have heard from military historians. Johnston’s determination to fight Grant, no matter what, was a profound tactical error. I am not sure that there is anywhere on this map where a column of corps or anything else could be deployed with success.

Prizing Grant loose from the landing had to be the focus of the attack. Look at the ground. There was simply no way for green, untried officers & troops to maneuver on that ground. As it was, no attack orders were issued to Forrest or the right flank infantry to attack. Incompetent staff work will frustrate any attack plan, let alone one that guaranteed tactical confusion.

Pat Answer said:

I know that map!

You may or may not find my experiment useful: https://civilwartalk.com/threads/return-to-“pittsburg-landing”.197049/

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Thank you, this was a very fun read!

Here's my very rough idea for how the army could possibly deploy:
Polk

• Send Cheatham up the road from the Fraley Field, past the Widow Howell Field, and over the Shiloh branch
• Send Clark up the Corinth Road

Hardee:

• Turn off the Corinth Road and use the farm lane above Seay's Cotton Field

Bragg:

• Send Ruggles up the Bark Road, turn off onto the Eastern Corinth Road
• Send Withers up the Bark Road, turn onto the farm lane over Locust Grove Branch, or take the Hamburg Road

This plan seems to match the very vague maps I have so far encountered of just what Sidney Johnston's plan entailed.

Breckinridge really needs to be held back, and only be committed once he has to be. He should use Bark Road and Hamburg Road to place himself on the right, but he'll just have to tough it out over the creeks and ravines on the Union left.

The best thing about the plan, as stated before, is that the Confederates will have an easier time actually controlling the battle. Of course, much of their army is still green, the terrain around Shiloh is still unforgiving, and their right will still be under the fire of the gunboats, but if they can better coordinate the attacks, they might just have a shot.

If they can force Stuart back earlier, and move Ruggles and Withers up to the Davis Wheat Field-Peach Orchard area (maybe even the Wicker Field area?) while W. H. L. Wallace and Hurlbut are still in motion, they will be on track to turn the Union left once Breckinridge can be put in.