Albert Sidney Johnston's plan used at Shiloh?

In Timothy B. Smith's article on Shiloh for the Savas Beatie's recent collection of alternate history scenarios, he covers the most common scenarios of Sidney Johnston not being mortally wounded, or the Confederates attacking on 5 April as planned. Smith concludes that neither would have been very likely to have won the battle for them.

However, Smith does not mention one scenario: if Albert Sidney Johnston's original plan for the battle had been used instead of Beauregard's. The historical plan was ultimately too complex, made for the intermingling of commands in the woods, and ended up forcing the Union toward Pittsburg Landing.

Johnston's plan was certainly not perfect, but placing most of their weight against the Union left is ultimately a better option, as well as lining the corps of the army end-on-end rather than on top of each other.

Is the flaw in ASJ's plan not actually that he didn't alter it despite delaying two days because of rain? With Buell two days closer, Grant knew he only had to hang on for one day. Just a thought.

A S Johnston had lost the Kentucky/Tennessee border, Nashville, Middle Tennessee, allowed a raid up the Tennessee all the way to Muscle Shoals, turned executive command of the army over to Beauregard, he was being depicted in News Papers as an imbecile… what, exactly is it that indicates A S Johnston was capable of formulating, communicating & carrying out any kind of a plan? Even he doubted his abilities to the point where he surrendered his responsibilities to someone else. I happen to think he was right.

Rhea Cole said:

A S Johnston had lost the Kentucky/Tennessee border, Nashville, Middle Tennessee, allowed a raid up the Tennessee all the way to Muscle Shoals, turned executive command of the army over to Beauregard, he was being depicted in News Papers as an imbecile… what, exactly is it that indicates A S Johnston was capable of formulating, communicating & carrying out any kind of a plan? Even he doubted his abilities to the point where he surrendered his responsibilities to someone else. I happen to think he was right.

Click to expand...

One thing that gets ignored regarding the "alteration" of the plan is that Johnston himself was partly responsible. This is analysis that Tim has done in the past:

"Johnston's original plan had been to turn the Union left flank and drive Grant's forces into the swampy morass of Owl and Snake creeks north and west of the battlefield. Johnston witnessed the heavy fighting from Prentiss's division westward, but saw no sign of any Union position to his right. He concluded that he had found and turned the Union left, and thus began his major drive to push the enemy into the swamps. Johnston sent the bulk of his force, which by this time had involved the first three stacked corps in intermingled units, to the north and west to end the battle in victory. But Johnston had made his turn too early. He had heard no fighting to his east because there was a half mile gap between Prentiss and the next unit, a detached brigade of Sherman's division guarding a road to the river."

In addition, we know how and where Johnston was MW. He was playing the role of a field officer rather than an army CO with effective command and control. Urban legend has pinned the flaws on Beauregard but the "blame pie" should be spread around.

Can't think of much to add here. AS Johnston's battlefield death (and the post-mortem efforts of his son, William Preston) had the effect of at least trying to cannonize him in Confederate mythology. But attempts to vindicate or reimagine Johnston's actions and command decisions before and during Shiloh belie the fact that he alone was the responsible commander in that engagement.

Belfoured said:

One thing that gets ignored regarding the "alteration" of the plan is that Johnston himself was partly responsible. This is analysis that Tim has done in the past:

"Johnston's original plan had been to turn the Union left flank and drive Grant's forces into the swampy morass of Owl and Snake creeks north and west of the battlefield. Johnston witnessed the heavy fighting from Prentiss's division westward, but saw no sign of any Union position to his right. He concluded that he had found and turned the Union left, and thus began his major drive to push the enemy into the swamps. Johnston sent the bulk of his force, which by this time had involved the first three stacked corps in intermingled units, to the north and west to end the battle in victory. But Johnston had made his turn too early. He had heard no fighting to his east because there was a half mile gap between Prentiss and the next unit, a detached brigade of Sherman's division guarding a road to the river."

In addition, we know how and where Johnston was MW. He was playing the role of a field officer rather than an army CO with effective command and control. Urban legend has pinned the flaws on Beauregard but the "blame pie" should be spread around.

Click to expand...

There is an interesting data point about the turn the Union left flank thing. The units on Johnston’s right, Forrest among others, were not issued any orders to attack. Eventually, they attacked on their own responsibility, but too late to affect the outcome of the battle. The level of command incompetence displayed beggars belief.

OldReliable1862 said:

In Timothy B. Smith's article on Shiloh for the Savas Beatie's recent collection of alternate history scenarios, he covers the most common scenarios of Sidney Johnston not being mortally wounded, or the Confederates attacking on 5 April as planned. Smith concludes that neither would have been very likely to have won the battle for them.

However, Smith does not mention one scenario: if Albert Sidney Johnston's original plan for the battle had been used instead of Beauregard's. The historical plan was ultimately too complex, made for the intermingling of commands in the woods, and ended up forcing the Union toward Pittsburg Landing.

Johnston's plan was certainly not perfect, but placing most of their weight against the Union left is ultimately a better option, as well as lining the corps of the army end-on-end rather than on top of each other.

Click to expand...

I haven't read Smith's article, but I think either battle plan would have been disrupted by the heavily forested terrain, muddy roads, and flooded creeks.

The Confederates had poor maps and did not understand the topography of the battlefield or the disposition of the Union forces. Beauregard had been in the area since mid February and failed to attain such valuable information.

The Confederate attack was successful primarily due to the lack of Union preparation against such an assault, the courage and determination of the soldiers, and Johnston's personal leadership.

Tim Smith wrote: Amazingly, the attack worked on almost the entire front, mostly because of Johnston's personal leadership... Beauregard, who was no fan of Johnston, accurately wrote that Johnston 'gave resistless impulsion to his columns at critical moments'.

A.L. Conger wrote: The cohesion and persistency [of the Confederate army at Shiloh] in its attack... were really marvelous, and an enduring tribute to its commander... Lee and Jackson, with their insight into the soldier mind, more than overcame the disparity in numbers which was against them... In the West, Grant possessed this insight; so did Albert Sidney Johnston; that was why Shiloh was one of the hardest-fought battles of all time.

Rhea Cole said:

There is an interesting data point about the turn the Union left flank thing. The units on Johnston’s right, Forrest among others, were not issued any orders to attack. Eventually, they attacked on their own responsibility, but too late to affect the outcome of the battle. The level of command incompetence displayed beggars belief.

Click to expand...

Wrong. Early on the 6th, Johnston had sent Colonel George Maney's 1st Tenn infantry to Lick Creek, giving Maney command of Forrest's troops and another regiment of Tenn infantry under Colonel D.H. Cummings. Maney's instructions from Johnston were "to watch and resist any demonstration of the enemy against the extreme right flank or the rear of the army from the direction of Hamburg." Johnston's orders, Maney officially reported 3 weeks later, "left me at liberty, in case I became perfectly satisfied that no enemy was in my direction, to... join in the main battle; and about 11am, having from diligent observations been unable to learn the presence of any enemy toward or at Hamburg and the battle continuing to rage, I left Colonels Forrest and Cummings to carry out their instructions existing before my presence with them." He had gone about a mile when a courier from Forrest brought word that "it was not certain but that a portion of the enemy was in the direction of Hamburg." Maney halted briefly, and then received orders to bring all his men, including Forrest and Cummings, to the scene of action.

Belfoured said:

One thing that gets ignored regarding the "alteration" of the plan is that Johnston himself was partly responsible. This is analysis that Tim has done in the past:

"Johnston's original plan had been to turn the Union left flank and drive Grant's forces into the swampy morass of Owl and Snake creeks north and west of the battlefield. Johnston witnessed the heavy fighting from Prentiss's division westward, but saw no sign of any Union position to his right. He concluded that he had found and turned the Union left, and thus began his major drive to push the enemy into the swamps. Johnston sent the bulk of his force, which by this time had involved the first three stacked corps in intermingled units, to the north and west to end the battle in victory. But Johnston had made his turn too early. He had heard no fighting to his east because there was a half mile gap between Prentiss and the next unit, a detached brigade of Sherman's division guarding a road to the river."

In addition, we know how and where Johnston was MW. He was playing the role of a field officer rather than an army CO with effective command and control. Urban legend has pinned the flaws on Beauregard but the "blame pie" should be spread around.

Click to expand...

In addition to the assessment by Tim Smith I posted previously regarding Johnston's error in turning his forces too early, Tim has also said the following:

Perhaps most detrimental of all was that Johnston had engaged nearly his entire army by 11:00 a.m.; only one of his sixteen brigades was not on line at this point. Johnston had certainly hit Sherman and Prentiss hard, particularly Prentiss, but it had taken his entire army and six hours to do so. By this time, the Confederate army was becoming alarmingly bloodied, tired, and confused.

As for Johnston leading from the front, one problem is that by doing so he left decisions to his corps and division commanders - especially an issue in light of the terrain. Johnston's "personal leadership" may have had some effect for a time, but that's not the place for an army CO to exercise command and control. And there's the added issue - what happened to Johnston is yet another reason why an army CO isn't riding around at the forefront. Even the foot soldiers of the Texas Brigade knew that at the Wilderness in May 1864.

Belfoured said:

In addition to the assessment by Tim Smith I posted previously regarding Johnston's error in turning his forces too early, Tim has also said the following:

Perhaps most detrimental of all was that Johnston had engaged nearly his entire army by 11:00 a.m.; only one of his sixteen brigades was not on line at this point. Johnston had certainly hit Sherman and Prentiss hard, particularly Prentiss, but it had taken his entire army and six hours to do so. By this time, the Confederate army was becoming alarmingly bloodied, tired, and confused.

As for Johnston leading from the front, one problem is that by doing so he left decisions to his corps and division commanders - especially an issue in light of the terrain. Johnston's "personal leadership" may have had some effect for a time, but that's not the place for an army CO to exercise command and control. And there's the added issue - what happened to Johnston is yet another reason why an army CO isn't riding around at the forefront. Even the foot soldiers of the Texas Brigade knew that at the Wilderness in May 1864.

Click to expand...

As you have pointed out, turning Grant’s left was the goal of the Shiloh attack. The attack as proposed would drive Grant away from the landing & force his soldiers into the interior. Instead, as we all know, the attacks on Grant’s right & center were where almost all of the attacks were concentrated. As a result, the vital link to the Tennessee River wasn’t even threatened.

Rhea Cole said:

As you have pointed out, turning Grant’s left was the goal of the Shiloh attack. The attack as proposed would drive Grant away from the landing & force his soldiers into the interior. Instead, as we all know, the attacks on Grant’s right & center were where almost all of the attacks were concentrated. As a result, the vital link to the Tennessee River wasn’t even threatened.

Click to expand...

Tim Smith's "what if" conclusion that was the basis for the OP makes a whole lot of sense. He and others have also rejected the idea that there was a "lull" in the Confederate attack when Johnston fell and, as he has pointed out, the bolt was pretty much shot. The idea that Johnston would have succeeded where Beauregard did not is a nice theory, but it's almost certainly fiction. And, as I keep insisting, as an army CO he should not have been where he was.

Belfoured said:

Tim Smith's "what if" conclusion that was the basis for the OP makes a whole lot of sense. He and others have also rejected the idea that there was a "lull" in the Confederate attack when Johnston fell and, as he has pointed out, the bolt was pretty much shot. The idea that Johnston would have succeeded where Beauregard did not is a nice theory, but it's almost certainly fiction. And, as I keep insisting, as an army CO he should not have been where he was.

Click to expand...

I'd argue that's correct. The Confederate forces had effectively shot their bolt after the hard fighting that day, and with bad maps, bad coordination, and simply terrible terrain, they had accomplished a lot simply because of an overall ineffective early response by Union commanders who, with their bearings under them the next day, counterattacked quite well.

Perhaps the best which could have happened would be for a portion of Grant's army to be cut off and captured, while a surviving Johnston realizes his attack has misfired and withdraws, keeping his men's spirits high through his personal leadership and maybe he learns something from it all going forward.

Barring a simply spectacular collapse of Union morale worse than historically, the battle was not going to have a very different outcome.

CanadianCanuck said:

I'd argue that's correct. The Confederate forces had effectively shot their bolt after the hard fighting that day, and with bad maps, bad coordination, and simply terrible terrain, they had accomplished a lot simply because of an overall ineffective early response by Union commanders who, with their bearings under them the next day, counterattacked quite well.

Perhaps the best which could have happened would be for a portion of Grant's army to be cut off and captured, while a surviving Johnston realizes his attack has misfired and withdraws, keeping his men's spirits high through his personal leadership and maybe he learns something from it all going forward.

Barring a simply spectacular collapse of Union morale worse than historically, the battle was not going to have a very different outcome.

Click to expand...

I think this is correct. There also seems to be a tendency to absolve Johnston for the defective attack plan that he delegated to Beauregard. Johnston was the CO of the army. If he failed to review the plan that Beauregard came up with or to alter it, that's on him.

Belfoured said:

I think this is correct. There also seems to be a tendency to absolve Johnston for the defective attack plan that he delegated to Beauregard. Johnston was the CO of the army. If he failed to review the plan that Beauregard came up with or to alter it, that's on him.

Click to expand...

With more reading done (and understanding that the Battles and Leaders report from the 1880s by his son was a bit of a hit piece) I do think that while Johnston had a good attack plan initially, however, he failed to act as a CO of the army and instead effectively over delegated tasks and never rode herd on his officers in a way you'd expect a general to do. He failed to follow up on the defences of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, failed to follow up on the defences of Nashville, and rather badly failed to follow up on Beauregard as well. While perhaps its not a failing for an officer to delegate and expect orders to be followed, he seems to have overcompensated for this at Shiloh by doing a lot of leading from the front, possibly because the effects of the last half year made him doubt his officers would actually do what he told them.

OldReliable1862 said:

...
Johnston's plan was certainly not perfect, but placing most of their weight against the Union left is ultimately a better option, as well as lining the corps of the army end-on-end rather than on top of each other.

Click to expand...

I was under the impression that given the roads used to get there and the amount of space to deploy between the creeks of Owl and Lick, the Confederates could not line up the corps next to each other

CanadianCanuck said:

With more reading done (and understanding that the Battles and Leaders report from the 1880s by his son was a bit of a hit piece) I do think that while Johnston had a good attack plan initially, however, he failed to act as a CO of the army and instead effectively over delegated tasks and never rode herd on his officers in a way you'd expect a general to do. He failed to follow up on the defences of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, failed to follow up on the defences of Nashville, and rather badly failed to follow up on Beauregard as well. While perhaps its not a failing for an officer to delegate and expect orders to be followed, he seems to have overcompensated for this at Shiloh by doing a lot of leading from the front, possibly because the effects of the last half year made him doubt his officers would actually do what he told them.

Click to expand...

That's a fair point - mine is that there are folks who have blamed Beauregard for the attacking formation but IMHO the buck stops with Johnston. In other words. IF there was a problem with what Beauregard devised, Johnston could - and should - have reviewed it and amended it. So he owns it.

Belfoured said:

That's a fair point - mine is that there are folks who have blamed Beauregard for the attacking formation but IMHO the buck stops with Johnston. In other words. IF there was a problem with what Beauregard devised, Johnston could - and should - have reviewed it and amended it. So he owns it.

Click to expand...

I am with you. The double back flips that it requires to make A S Johnston come out as even vaguely competent never ceases to amaze me.

NedBaldwin said:

I was under the impression that given the roads used to get there and the amount of space to deploy between the creeks of Owl and Lick, the Confederates could not line up the corps next to each other

Click to expand...

Good question, Beauregard came up with his tactically unworkable plan independently of the terrain.

Just as an aside, no General in the war was as far forward as Rosecrans. At Stones River he rode in front of Thomas’ line. In practically every battle, he had somebody’s blood & brains splattered on his face & coat. It was not an especially sensible thing to do, but he never got a scratch & inspired the troops.

Rhea Cole said:

Just as an aside, no General in the war was as far forward as Rosecrans. At Stones River he rode in front of Thomas’ line. In practically every battle, he had somebody’s blood & brains splattered on his face & coat. It was not an especially sensible thing to do, but he never got a scratch & inspired the troops.

Click to expand...

True, but "inspiring" the troops can be done without riding around like an overpaid company commander. Maybe I'm just "cautious" but by 1862 the size of these armies required a CO to exercise command and control from farther back. You might pull it off with "armies' at a maximum size of 20,000, such as used by both sides in the AWI, but not for double that or more.