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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Sofya Ragozina
Adem Ferizaj
Vemund Aarbakke
Amina Šemsović
Ali Huseyinoglu
Selma Muhic Dizdarevic
Enrique Tessieri
Oliver Wäckerlig
farid hafez2020
By gathering 35 local scholars, experts, and civil society activists specialized in racism and human rights, the fifth edition of the European Islamophobia Report addresses a still timely and politically important issue. All 32 country reports included in this book follow a unique structure that is convenient, first, for comparing countries and, second, for selected readings on a particular topic such as politics, employment, or education with regard to Islamophobia across Europe. The present report investigates in detail the underlying dynamics that directly or indirectly support the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Europe. This extends from Islamophobic statements spread in national media to laws and policies that restrain the fundamental rights of European Muslim citizens and threaten the whole of society. As a result, the European Islamophobia Report 2019 discusses the impact of anti-Muslim racism on human rights, multiculturalism, and the state of law in Europe. This fifth edition of our report highlights how European societies are progressively overwhelmed by the Islamophobic discourse of the “Great Replacement” and other far-right conspiracy theories. The 32 country reports demonstrate how governments and mainstream media participate in reproducing such discourses that put the fundamental rights of millions of European citizens in jeopardy and how one can counteract these developments. This compendium of useful insights and data aims to provide European policy-makers, institutions, and NGOs with recommendations on how to tackle anti-Muslim racism in Europe seriously.
Related Papers
European Islamophobia Report 2022
European Islamophobia Report 20222023 •
By gathering 26 local scholars and experts specialised in racism and human rights, the eighth edition of the European Islamophobia Report addresses the state and development of Islamophobia across Europe in 2022. All 23 national reports included in this year’s annual edition invite policymakers, civil society, scholars, and all people interested in Islamophobia to gain insight and knowledge on the most important incidents and data regarding Islamophobia in Europe in 2022. Since the first publication of this report covering the year 2015, the European Islamophobia Report has become a cutting-edge source for information on Islamophobia in the fields of politics, media, employment, education, and justice. The annual report also exposes European Islamophobia networks and highlights initiatives to counter anti-Muslim racism. The present report investigates in detail the underlying dynamics that directly or indirectly contribute to the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Europe. This extends from Islamophobic statements spread in national media to laws and policies that restrain the fundamental rights of European Muslim citizens and ultimately threaten society as a whole. As a result, the European Islamophobia Report 2022 discusses the impact of anti-Muslim racism on human rights such as freedom of association, freedom of speech, and religious freedom, and the state of law in Europe. This eighth edition of our report reviews the effects of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the coverage of the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar in European media, and how anti-Muslim legislation and measures in states like Austria and France have developed and have been fought by civil society. The 23 country reports demonstrate how governments, political parties, and media participate and counteract in reproducing discourses that put the fundamental rights of European citizens in jeopardy. This compendium of useful insights and data aims to provide European policymakers, institutions, and NGOs with recommendations on how to tackle anti-Muslim racism in Europe both effectively and systematically.
European Islamophobia Report 2021
European Islamophobia Report 20212022 •
Enes Bayraklı, Richard McNeil-Willson, Sakellariou Alexandros, Inés Bolaños Somoano, Kawtar Najib, aziz shakir
By gathering 35 local scholars, experts, and civil society activists specialised in racism and human rights, the seventh edition of the European Islamophobia Report addresses a globally important issue. All 27 country reports included in this year’s annual report follow a unique structure that invites comparison between countries and across the years since this report series was first established in 2015. It allows for selected readings on a particular topic such as politics, employment, or education with regard to Islamophobia across Europe. The present report investigates in detail the underlying dynamics that directly or indirectly contribute to the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Europe. This extends from Islamophobic statements spread in national media to laws and policies that restrain the fundamental rights of European Muslim citizens and ultimately threaten the whole of society. As a result, the European Islamophobia Report 2021 discusses the impact of anti-Muslim racism on human rights such as freedom of association, freedom of speech, and religious freedom, and the state of law in Europe. This seventh edition of our report continues to show the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on Islamophobia, and how anti-Muslim legislation and measures in states like Austria and France have developed and been opposed by civil society. The 27 country reports demonstrate the ways in which governments, political parties, and media participate and counteract the reproduction of discourses that put the fundamental rights of European citizens in jeopardy. This compendium of fact-based and insights and practical data aims to provide European policymakers, institutions, and NGOs with recommendations on how to tackle anti-Muslim racism in Europe systematically and with success.
Sindre Bangstad, farid hafez, Juliana Ajdini, Amina Easat-Daas, Selma Muhic Dizdarevic, Linda Hyökki, Konrad Pedziwiatr, Enes Bayraklı, Đermana Kurić, Pia Jardi, Saira Orakzai
Since many EU and OSCE Member States do not properly record and report racially motivated crimes, the ‘European Islamophobia Report’ (EIR) was launched to counteract under-reporting anti-Muslim hate crimes and initiatives. Since Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism has become a growing threat in European societies, there was an urgent need to address this problem. The EIR is an annual report, which is presented for the first time this year. It currently comprises 25 national reports regarding each state and the tendencies of Islamophobia in each respective country. The current report features the work of 37 extraordinary scholars on nearly 600 pages. The EIR looks at the employment sector, education, politics, media, internet, the justice system, and networks. Islamophobia works without Muslims, as can be shown by the fact that Islamophobia played a role in the politics of many European countries, which has only a very small Muslim population. This trend was especially strengthened by the so called ‘refugee crisis’. Both attacks in Paris, which happened in 2015, became a discursive event that shaped the debates on Islam and Muslims throughout Europe.
ANATOLIA REPORT
Islamophobia Europe’s Deep Wound .pdf2022 •
INTRODUCTION In recent years, the European Union (EU) has been promoting cultural diplomacy, framed in terms of dialogue between civilisations/cultures, and has aimed to exploit its role in the conduct of foreign policy. Recent terrorist attacks in Europe have been claimed by Daesh and Al-Qaeda under the pretext of jihad in the name of Islam, which has marginalised Muslims worldwide[7]. An automatic association of ideas imputes terrorism to Islam. Olivier Roy, one of Europe’s distinguished scholars of Islam and extremism, argues: “The world is confronted to the Islamisation of radicalism instead of the radicalisation of Islam.”[8] While radicalisation as a whole is still not well understood, it is argued that violent extremism is, at root, a social and political phenomenon, rather than an intrinsically religious one[9]. “The 9/11 terrorist attacks drastically changed public opinion towards Muslims. Since then, terrorist acts such as the attacks by violent jihadists in London and Madrid, the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, and the massacre at the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris have increased fear and anxiety. The use of Islam by extremists to justify their terrorist acts has made many Europeans regard Islam as a threat and fear Muslims as the enemy.”[13] Islamic values have been the subject of many debates surrounding their compatibility with “Western values”. The socio-political rejection of Muslims has been transformed into Islamophobia. Islamophobia in Europe manifests itself in irrational hostility, fear, or hatred towards Islam, Muslims, and Islamic culture, as well as active discrimination against the groups or individuals therein.[14] There is a long history in European culture of portraying Muslims as barbaric and intolerant[15]. Pierre Conesa argues that: “The artificial production of an imaginary enemy ends up creating a real enemy”[16]. The portrayal of Islam and Muslims in the media is often detrimental and unrepresentative, relying on prejudice[17]. Nowadays, numerous media campaigns are going on against Islam and Muslims. Most Western media with considerable financial resources and multiple channels try to show a rough picture of Islam to their public.[18] Many reports have highlighted the disadvantaged position of Muslim minorities, evidence of a rise in manifestations of Islamophobia[19], and concerns about alienation and radicalisation, which have triggered a debate in the EU surrounding the need to re-examine cohesion intercommunity and integration measures. Muslim immigrants in Europe face discrimination and intolerance due to their religious and cultural identities. Former Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe Thomas Hammarberg has underlined the danger of Islamophobia as follow: “European countries appear to face another crisis beyond budget deficits – the disintegration of human values. One symptom is the increasing expression of intolerance towards Muslims. Opinion polls in several European countries reflect fear, suspicion and negative opinions of Muslims and Islamic culture. These Islamophobic prejudices are combined with racist attitudes – directed not least against people originating from Turkey, Arab countries and South Asia. Muslims with this background are discriminated [against] in the labour market and the education system in a number of European countries.”[20] The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance Council of Europe (ECRI)[21] has published two policy recommendations: General Policy Recommendation No. 5 on the fight against intolerance and discrimination against Muslims (CRI (2000) 21) and Policy Recommendation No. 7 on the national combating of racism and racial discrimination (CRI (2003) 8). In addition, General Recommendation No. 8, which combats racism and terrorism (ECRI (2004) 26), notes: “As a result of the fight against Terrorism launched since the events of 11 September 2001, some Groups, including Arabs, Jews, Muslims, Asylum seekers, political refugees and immigrants, certain minorities and Persons considered to belong to such groups, have become particularly vulnerable to racism and / or racial discrimination in many areas of public life, including education, employment, housing, access to Goods and services, access to public places and freedom of movement.”[22] A deep cultural comprehension of European Muslims is needed to have a better understanding of their uneasiness and worries. European Muslims are constituted by different ethnic groups, religious affiliations (Sunni, Shiite, Alevi and Sufis), philosophical beliefs, political convictions, secular trends, languages, and cultural traditions. Islam constitutes the second religious group in the European society of multiple beliefs[23]. Many Muslim communities in Western Europe have their origins in European labour shortages and immigration policies of the 1950s and 1960s. Varying colonial legacies and historical ties have resulted in different European countries attracting certain nationalities[24]. In the European context, one of the most important issues concerns whether Islam is compatible with the European value system and whether Muslims are well integrated into European societies or some of them suffer from social exclusion and alienation. The EU’s cultural identity and values can create social exclusion and identity crises within Muslim minorities in Europe who are culturally perceived as the “others”. The social exclusion of Muslims in Europe is undeniably linked to the identity crises which have rendered European Muslims vulnerable to Islamist radicalisation and indoctrination. From this perspective, in order to figure out the cultural misunderstanding, the reasons for radicalisation of young European Muslims, and to establish a constructive integration approach, we will try to answer the following questions briefly: Are European values such as freedom, democracy and human rights compatible with Islamic values and law? What resources are there in Muslim theologies to combat violence in the name of religion? How can Muslims integrate in European secular democracy? How can culture-based public diplomacy prevent radicalism and integrate Muslim minorities in a participative European cultural citizenship approach? This paper consists of three sections. Rather than concentrating on differences, we will try to focus on issues of commonality by identifying shared values and principles between Islam and Western values. The first section outlines definitions of the basic/core principles of Islamic values and figures out the controversial Islamic terminology. We decided to study the most controversial Islamic terminology as the source of terrorism and ideology of radical Islam against Western value system such as the dar al-islam and dar al-harb dichotomy, takvir and jihad. We based our study on the Quran and objective interpretation of Islamic terminology by the most distinguished Muslim scholars. The second section introduces ‘briefly’ two distinctive core values of Islam such as freedom and equality their explanation and representation within Quran and the Universal Human Rights Declaration. As a theoretical approach the final section explores radicalisation reasons of young European Muslims and the modus operandi and best practices for cultural integration of the Muslim community in the European secular system.
Europolity - Continuity and Change in European Governance
The Roots of Islamophobia in Contemporary Europe. The Results of an Empirical Research2017 •
This special issue draws on work from young scholars concerned with the impact recent waves of Islamophobia has affected the lives of Muslims in Europe. Isa Blumi authored the introduction and chapter one entitled: “Nothing New: Islamophobia by Default in Postwar Europe”. Works in this issue are drawn from conference held in January 2017 in Istanbul, organized by Dr. Mehmet Hacisalihoglu and supported by IRCICA. http://www.yildiz.edu.tr/media/files/etkinlikler/islamophobia-program.pdf Contributions in special issue include articles by: Ali Hüseyinoğlu Peter Polak-Springer Elena Lukinykh Leyla Yıldırım Ali Çaksu
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Routledge
Islamophobia and the Discursive Reconstitution of Religious Imagination in Europe2019 •
Since much of the discussion about Islamophobia has been concerned with positiveself and negative-other representations of Muslims, understanding it as a culturally racist discourse foregrounds the way Muslims are constructed as deeply threatening to the values and identities of the spaces they occupy. These representations invoke an essentialised and determinative Muslim culture that can be understood as the central organising principle of Islamophobia: the belief that relies upon binary oppositions that allow its proponents to advocate a host of positive values, while repudiating and denigrating Muslims. This paper explains how Islamophobia can be conceptualised as the racist discourse that upholds a system of Eurocentric supremacy, a historical development based on the universalising aspects of Western culture that led to the development of a racialised social system in Europe. By demonstrating the form and content of Islamophobic discourse, the paper draws attention to a wide array of issues ranging from the securitisation discourse, institutionalisation of Islamophobia, to its modes of articulation in specific European countries. It further argues that given the rise of racist, especially Islamophobic, far-right parties in European countries, combating Islamophobia becomes an institutional priority that requires outspoken and brave initiatives and persons who not only challenge this pervasive form of racism but also address structural forms of discrimination affecting Muslims or those perceived as such.
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
EUROPEAN
B
y gathering 35 local scholars, experts, and civil society activists specialized in
racism and human rights, the fifth edition of the European Islamophobia Report
ISLAMOPHOBIA
addresses a still timely and politically important issue. All 32 country reports
included in this book follow a unique structure that is convenient, first, for comparing
REPORT
countries and, second, for selected readings on a particular topic such as politics, em-
ployment, or education with regard to Islamophobia across Europe.
2019
The present report investigates in detail the underlying dynamics that directly or indirectly
ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (Eds)
support the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Europe. This extends from Islamophobic state-
ments spread in national media to laws and policies that restrain the fundamental rights
of European Muslim citizens and threaten the whole of society. As a result, the European
Islamophobia Report 2019 discusses the impact of anti-Muslim racism on human rights,
multiculturalism, and the state of law in Europe.
This fifth edition of our report highlights how European societies are progressively over-
whelmed by the Islamophobic discourse of the “Great Replacement” and other far-right
conspiracy theories. The 32 country reports demonstrate how governments and main-
stream media participate in reproducing such discourses that put the fundamental rights of
millions of European citizens in jeopardy and how one can counteract these developments.
This compendium of useful insights and data aims to provide European policy-makers,
institutions, and NGOs with recommendations on how to tackle anti-Muslim racism in
Europe seriously.
About SETA
ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (Eds)
Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) is a non-profit research
institute based in Turkey dedicated to innovative studies on national, regional and in-
ternational issues. SETA is the leading think tank in Turkey and has offices in Ankara,
Istanbul, Washington D.C., Berlin and Brussels. The objective of SETA is to produce
up-to-date and accurate knowledge and analyses in the fields of politics, economy, and
society, and inform policy makers and the public on changing political, economic, social,
and cultural conditions. Through research reports, publications, brain storming sessions,
conferences and policy recommendations, SETA seeks to guide leaders in government,
civil society, and business, and contributes to informed decision making mechanisms.
9 786257 040525
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EUROPEAN
ISLAMOPHOBIA
REPORT
2019
ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (Eds)
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contents
CONTENTS
FOREWORD 5
THE STATE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN EUROPE IN 2019 Enes Bayraklı, Farid Hafez 7
ALBANIA Nada Dosti 57
AUSTRIA Farid Hafez 79
BELGIUM Amina Easat-Daas 115
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Hikmet Karčić 141
BULGARIA Aziz Nazmi Şakir 161
CROATIA Nejra Kadić Meškić 183
CZECH REPUBLIC Selma Muhič Dizdarevič 207
DENMARK Amani Hassani 225
ESTONIA Egert Rünne, Liina Laanpere 247
FINLAND Enrique Tessieri 261
FRANCE Léonard Faytre 281
GERMANY Enes Bayraklı 327
GREECE Ali Huseyinoglu, Alexandros Sakellariou 357
HUNGARY Nadia Jones-Gailani, Gabi Gőbl 385
IRELAND James Carr 409
ITALY Antonia Roberta Siino 431
KOSOVO Adem Ferizaj 455
LITHUANIA Giedrė Blažytė 481
MALTA Sara Ezabe Malliue 497
MONTENEGRO Amina Šemsović 513
THE NETHERLANDS Amina Smits Akılma 531
NORTH MACEDONIA Orhan Ceka 563
NORWAY Vemund Aarbakke 591
POLAND Anna Piela 609
ROMANIA Bogdan Ghenea 637
RUSSIA Sofia A. Ragozina 657
SERBIA Ivan Ejub Kostić 679
SLOVAKIA Jozef Lenč 703
SLOVENIA Ana Frank 721
SPAIN Aurora Ali 737
SWITZERLAND Oliver Wäckerlig 765
THE UNITED KINGDOM Aristotle Kallis 791
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 3
ABOUT EDITORS
Enes Bayraklı
Mr. Bayraklı earned his BA, MA and PhD from the Department of Political Sci-
ence at the University of Vienna, and conducted research for his PhD thesis at the
University of Nottingham in Britain between 2009 and 2010. He took office as a
deputy director at Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center in London in 2011-2013.
Mr. Bayraklı also served as the founding director of Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural
Centers in Constanta and Bucharest during the period of August-December 2012.
Mr. Bayraklı has been a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at
the Turkish-German University since 2013. His fields of research include the Trans-
formation of Turkish Foreign Policy, Cultural Diplomacy, Foreign Policy Analysis,
German Politics and Foreign Policy. bayrakli@tau.edu.tr
Farid Hafez
Farid Hafez, PhD (Political Science, University of Vienna), is a political scientist and
non-resident senior researcher at Georgetown University’s “The Bridge Initiative” at
the School of Foreign Service. He defended his habilitation thesis on “Islam Politics
in the Second Republic of Austria” at the University of Salzburg in 2019. In 2017,
he was a Fulbright visiting professor at the University of California, Berkeley and in
2014, he was a visiting scholar at Columbia University, New York. Since 2010, he has
been the editor of the Islamophobia Studies Yearbook, and since 2015 the co-editor of
the European Islamophobia Report. Hafez has received the Bruno Kreisky Award for
the “Political Book of the Year” for his anthology Islamophobia in Austria (co-edited
with John Bunzl). He has more than 100 publications in leading journals such as
Politics and Religion, Patterns of Prejudice, and German Politics and Society. His latest
publications are Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies (Routledge, co-edited with
Enes Bayrakli, 2019) and Feindbild Islam. Über die Salonfähigkeit von Rassismus (Islam-
ophobia. On the Acceptance of Racism. Bohlau, 2019). Email: farid.hafez@sbg.ac.att
For more information about the EIR:
www.islamophobiaeurope.com
islamophobia@setav.org
Foreword
FOREWORD
In 2019, the world witnessed the bloody consequences of the white supremacist
ideology of the “Great Replacement” and other conspiracy theories that speculate
about the imagined danger posed to white people by non-white – often Muslim –
immigration. While the Islamophobic terror attack in Christchurch, New Zealand
made the headlines, mosques have also been targeted in Germany, the UK, France,
and Norway resulting in dozens of deaths and injured persons. Facing this rising
threat, most European states insist on a Janus-faced stance. On the one hand, Euro-
pean governments worked hard to track far-right terror groups and dismantle them.
On the other, through their discriminative declarations, bills, and security policies
targeting mainly Muslim people they directly participated in the normalization of
Islamophobia in Europe.
This 5th edition of the European Islamophobia Report draws on this fundamental
contradiction. The 35 local scholars, experts, and civil society activists gathered in
this book make clear that besides the liberal legacy of individualistic human rights,
a darker side of European history is recovering strength and gathering supporters
all around the continent. This is the passion of “dehumanizing the Other” and the
systematic exclusion of Muslim people from the European “We.”
Two sides of the same coin. While the Commissioner for Human Rights of
the Council of Europe Dunja Mijatović “expressed concern about the resurgence
of nationalistic movements which fuel anti-Muslim feelings and practices in Eu-
rope” following the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide on 11 July 2019,
the Austrian novelist Peter Handke – well known for his glorification of the Serbs
during the Bosnian genocide – received the Nobel Prize in Literature in October
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 5
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
2019. The European Islamophobia Report 2019 discloses the depth of this “Sre-
brenica scar” and analyzes the daily challenges resulting from such ambiguity for
millions of European Muslims.
All 32 country reports included in this report do not only analyze the phe-
nomenon of Islamophobia but also explore pro-active solutions by civil society and
propose detailed policy recommendations. We hope this compendium of useful in-
sights and data will provide European policy-makers and institutions valuable tools
to tackle anti-Muslim racism in Europe seriously.
Burhanettin Duran
SETA General Coordinator
6 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
THE STATE OF
ISLAMOPHOBIA
IN EUROPE IN 2019
ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ
Five years ago, the launching of the European Islamophobia Report responded to an
urgent need to demonstrate the very presence of Islamophobia across the European
continent in different fields such as media, politics, legislation, employment, and the
Internet. We felt obliged to produce a European-wide solid report to unmask the key
issues at hand. We are happy to present the fifth edition of the annual European Islam-
ophobia Report (EIR). The EIR 2019 includes a general assessment of Islamophobia in
Europe in the year 2019 and 32 country reports that include almost all EU member
states and additional countries such as Russia, Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia,
Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Montenegro. The EIR 2019 brought together 35
scholars, experts, and civil society activists from various European countries who are
specialized on racism and Islamophobia studies. They cover various issues from me-
dia, politics, and the justice system to the Internet, and offer concrete policy recom-
mendations for civil society and politics. As our audience grows to include practitio-
ners, scholars, and the general public, our website has acquired an audience from 165
countries, and the EIR and its findings have been cited frequently by international
organizations, politicians, NGOs, scholars, and local and international media outlets.
The year 2019 was an eventful year for Islamophobic developments both on a
global and a European level. Apart from the Islamophobic terror attacks in Christ-
church, New Zealand and Hanau, Germany, the most striking example of the nor-
malization of Islamophobia in 2019 in Europe was the scandal around the Nobel
Committee’s decision to award Peter Handke the Nobel Prize in Literature. One
cannot imagine that in the contemporary world a Holocaust denier can receive any
Nobel Prize, let alone the Nobel Prize in Literature. No matter the literary faculties
of an author, such an act is unimaginable. Yet the Austrian author Peter Handke was
awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature despite the outcry from sound intellectuals
across the world. This revealed again how insensitive and ignorant important global
institutions are to the long history of Islamophobic ideology, in this particular case
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 7
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
in the heart of Europe. Handke has a long history of genocide denial, as the author
of this year’s report on Kosovo, Adem Ferizaj, demonstrates. During the Kosovo War,
Handke expressed his wish to be “a Serbian-Orthodox monk fighting for Kosovo.”1
In 2006, Handke gave a eulogy at the funeral of Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian
dictator responsible for the genocides against Albanians and Bosnians in the 1990s.2
As Ferizaj suggests, “Awarding the most important literary prize to such a writer not
only suggests a deeply rooted Euro-Atlantic indifference towards the fate of Muslim-
majority European countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo, it also repre-
sents a fit occasion for the normalization of Islamophobic attacks against Kosovo’s
right to exist by European politicians.”3
Working Definition of Islamophobia
There are numerous definitions of Islamophobia which are influenced by different
theoretical approaches such as racism and prejudice studies or decolonial perspec-
tives.4 As we have outlined already in the first edition of the EIR in 2015, we use
a working definition of Islamophobia that theorizes Islamophobia as anti-Muslim
racism. “When talking about Islamophobia, we mean anti-Muslim racism. […] Is-
lamophobia is about a dominant group of people aiming at seizing, stabilizing and
widening their power by means of defining a scapegoat – real or invented – and
excluding this scapegoat from the resources/rights/definition of a constructed ‘we’.
Islamophobia operates by constructing a static ‘Muslim’ identity, which is attributed
in negative terms and generalized for all Muslims. At the same time, Islamophobic
images are fluid and vary in different contexts, because Islamophobia tells us more
about the Islamophobe than it tells us about the Muslims/Islam.”5
Combating Islamophobia in European
and International Institutions
In 2019, European and international institutions attempted to assess anti-Muslim
racism worldwide. Their surveys and reports warned world leaders about the dangers
for democracy and public order posed by three main aspects of Islamophobia:
1. Nataly Bleuel, “Peter Handke: Mars Attacks!”, Der Spiegel, 1 April 1999, https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/literatur/
peter-handke-mars-attacks-a-15537.html, (Access date: 26 January 2020). The quote has been translated from Ger-
man into English by the author of this report.
2. Aleksandar Hemon, “The Bob Dylan of Genocide Apologists”, The New York Times, 15 October 2019, https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/opinion/peter-handke-nobel-bosnia-genocide.html?auth=login-google, (Access
date: 26 January 2020).
3. For more information see the report on Kosovo by Adem Ferizaj in this volume.
4. Farid Hafez, “Schools of Thought in Islamophobia Studies: Prejudice, Racism, and Decoloniality”, Islamophobia
Studies Journal, 4, 2 (2018), pp. 210-225.
5. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, “Introduction”, European Islamophobia Report 2015, eds. Enes Bayraklı and Farid
Hafez, (SETA, Istanbul: 2016), pp. 5-8.
8 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
• International far-right networks that trigger Islamophobic terror attacks.
• Institutional racism, i.e. structural forms that discriminate against Muslim
citizens.
• The impact of counterterrorism policies on human rights.
The following paragraphs put forth the ways in which leading European and in-
ternational institutions draw on these three dimensions of Islamophobia. Following
this, their actions to combat Islamophobia will be analyzed.
International far-right networks and Islamophobia
The UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimina-
tion, Xenophobia and Racial Intolerance E. Tendayi Achiume reported on the rise
of neo-Nazi movements and “other practices that contribute to fuelling contempo-
rary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.”6 In
another report, she warned readers about the rising recruiting efforts of neo-Nazi
groups among young people.7 Achiume also pointed out the fact that the rise of
white supremacist groups leads to violent attacks such as the “Islamophobic attack
in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019, and the anti-Semitic attack in Pittsburgh,
United States in 2018.”8 Yet, she noticed that such groups have been tolerated in
Europe until today, neo-Nazi and far-right ideologies being “part of mainstream dis-
course” and receiving “political endorsement.” Achiume concluded, “The Radicalisa-
tion Awareness Network Centre of Excellence has noted that in Europe, the main
difference in status between neo-Nazi-inspired extremism and Islamist extremism is
that the latter is ‘quite clearly and broadly rejected within communities.’”9
The Council of Europe, through its European Commission against Racism
and Intolerance (ECRI), also underlined the risk inherent in the banalization of
far-right and white supremacist ideologies in Europe, and the bloody consequences
that might occur as a result. In the ECRI’s annual report on 2019 activities, Marija
Pejčinović Burić, secretary general of the Council of Europe, claimed, “Europe is
facing a shocking reality: antisemitic, anti-Muslim and other racist hate crimes are
increasing at an alarming rate, the most recent example being the extremist shoot-
ing in Hanau, Germany, in which nine people were killed and several wounded.
Such heinous acts are often precipitated by poisonous words and conspiracy theories
spread on social media and the internet.”10
6. “Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance”, UN General
Assembly, 30 July 2019, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3826582, (Access date: 26 January 2020).
7. “Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance, Visit to the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland”, UN General Assembly, 24 June-12 July 2019.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. “Annual Report of ECRI Activities Covering the Period from 1 January to 31 December 2019”, ECRI, March
2020, https://rm.coe.int/ecri-annual-report-2019/16809ca3e1, (Access date: 10 May 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
In its 12th Report on Islamophobia (March 2019), the Islamophobia Observatory
of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation highlighted the connections between
far-right movements that pave the way for the spread of hate ideologies. The report
focuses particularly on the links between the UK Independence Party, Marine Le
Pen’s French National Rally, Geert Wilders’s Dutch Freedom Party, the Italian Lega
(League), the Alternative for Germany, the Hungarian Fidesz party, and also Steve
Bannon, the American activist and former advisor to Donald Trump. The report
notices that all those parties are on the rise according to the latest elections. All these
actors share similar anti-EU, anti-Muslim, and anti-immigration ideology.11
In its report Countering Racism and Xenophobia in the EU (March 2019), the
European Commission highlighted the connection between the normalization of Is-
lamophobia, online far-right networks, and violent attacks against Muslims. Hence
“surveys published in 2018 show that within the EU, on average 37% of the popula-
tion admits to having unfavourable views of Muslims.”12 Similarly, “a study by the
European Parliament Research Service shows that the perception of incidence of anti-
Muslim hatred by the Muslim community rose from 12% in 2010 to 25% in 2016.”13
The Annual Activity Report 2019 of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the
Council of Europe Dunja Mijatović also warned against “the growing political and
societal acceptance of racism” as “Antisemitism, Islamophobia and anti-Gypsyism
have reached alarming levels.”14 Following the commemoration of the Srebrenica
genocide on 11 July 2019, Mijatović published an op-ed in the Osservatorio Balcani
e Caucaso15 in which “she expressed concern about the resurgence of nationalistic
movements which fuel anti-Muslim feelings and practices in Europe and about the
hate incidents occurring against Roma and Jews.”16 In this piece, she claimed the
Srebrenica genocide was the result of a long process of “dehumanising the Other,” a
process that she believes nowadays is on the rise.
Institutional racism
The UN special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and racial intolerance in a visit to the United Kingdom and Northern
11. “12th Report on Islamophobia”, Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, March 2019, https://www.oic-oci.
org/upload/islamophobia/2019/12th_islamophobia_annual_report_2019_en.pdf, (Access date: 10 May 2020).
12. “Countering Racism and Xenophobia in the EU: Fostering a Society Where Pluralism, Tolerance and Non-dis-
crimination Prevail”, European Commission, 15 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/swd_coun-
tering_racism_and_xenophobia_in_the_eu.pdf, (Access date: 10 May 2020).
13. Ibid.
14. Dunja Mijatović, “Annual Activity Report 2019”, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe,
21 April 2020.
15. Dunja Mijatović, “Srebrenica: Dehumanising the Other”, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, 10 July 2019,
Transeuropahttps://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Bosnia-Herzegovina/Srebrenica-dehumanising-the-Oth-
er-195579, (Access date: 10 May 2020)
16. Ibid.
10 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
Ireland underlined the importance of addressing “structural forms of racial discrimi-
nation and inequality” that lead “persons belonging to racial and ethnic minorities
[to] have poorer outcomes in many areas of life.”17 Achiume advised countries to
assess “the racial impact of laws and policies on austerity measures, criminal justice,
counter-terrorism and immigration.”18 By “racial impact” we should understand here
the discriminative impact on individuals based on race, religious identity, gender,
etc. Achiume noticed that these factors are often conflated in daily discrimination.
In the specific case of the United Kingdom, the rapporteur reported that the criminal
justice process targets “ethnic minority communities […] disproportionately.”19 She
shows for instance that “Muslims, who are about 5 per cent of the United Kingdom
population, now make up about 15 per cent of the prison population. This dramatic
rise is not associated with terrorism offences.”20 Achiume concluded that “racial and
ethnic minority offenders are overrepresented in both the adult (25 per cent) and
youth (40 per cent) prison estates” and “overrepresentation is more acute among
Black, Muslim and Gypsy, Roma and Traveller youth.”21
In its annual report on 2019 activities, the European Commission against Rac-
ism and Intolerance (ECRI) showed how the normalization of xenophobic national-
ism tends to structurally discriminate Muslims in Europe. “Xenophobic nationalism
frequently continues to portray Islam as a religion alien to the national culture and
identity of many member states. Anti-Muslim rhetoric makes Muslims wearing signs
of their religion far more vulnerable, while multiple discrimination worsens the situ-
ation further, notably for Muslim women.”22 The ECRI noticed that discriminating
laws are not only backed by ultra-nationalist parties: “The elections to the European
Parliament and to several national parliaments saw a further rise in popularity of
ultra-nationalist parties in some countries. Yet, merely looking at the number of seats
gained in parliamentary elections is not enough. What is remarkable is that a grow-
ing number of mainstream political parties adopted restrictive policies regarding
migration and integration that were previously associated with right-wing parties.”23
In its report Countering Racism and Xenophobia in the EU (March 2019), the
European Commission noticed that “people from ethnic or racial minorities in the
EU experience higher risks of economic hardship, poor quality housing, residential
segregation, unemployment and assault, whose individual impact is quantifiable in
17. “Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance, Visit to the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland”, UN General Assembly.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. “Annual Report of ECRI Activities Covering the Period from 1 January to 31 December 2019”, ECRI.
23. Ibid.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 11
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
lost earnings from €1.8 billion up to €8 billion.”24 The report also refers to the study
of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) second European
Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU MIDIS II) published in 201725 that
“indicated that almost one in three Muslims felt discriminated against when look-
ing for a job.”26 The report adds that “there is evidence that candidates who openly
identify as Muslim in their CV receive fewer invitations to a job interview compared
to equally qualified candidates with a religiously neutral CV. Muslim women remain
the most vulnerable victims in this regard.”27
The Democracy and Human Rights in the OSCE report published by the OSCE-
ODIHR in 2019 took an intersectional perspective and focused on the multiple bias
motivations (gender, religion, race, class, etc.) in structural discrimination in Europe.
The report showed that racisms are most of the time gendered ideologies that first
and foremost target women. This only confirms other reports and observations that
institutional Islamophobia primarily impacts women.28
In her Annual Activity Report 2019, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the
Council of Europe Dunja Mijatović drew similar conclusions. Mijatović demon-
strated how “Muslim women have been the targets of assaults for wearing face veils or
headscarves.”29 Yet, she also pointed out how structural discrimination negatively impacts
all Muslims. “Discriminatory practices in certain contexts have made it difficult for Mus-
lims to get a job, a house, or citizenship. Patterns revealing unspoken biases have persisted,
with law enforcement officers still engaged in the illegal practice of profiling Muslims.”30
Impact of counterterrorism policies on human rights
The UN special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and racial intolerance stressed how “counter-terrorism laws and policies
have vastly exacerbated Islamophobic sentiment” in the UK. Actually, the situation
described by Achiume is also valid for other European countries, i.e. “national panic
regarding security” and outrageous public discourse against Muslims following “ter-
rorist attacks by individuals purporting to act in the name Islam.”31 Similarly, her
24. “Countering Racism and Xenophobia in the EU: Fostering a Society Where Pluralism, Tolerance and Non-discrim-
ination Prevail”, European Commission.
25. “EU-MIDIS II: Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey”, European Commission, 3
October 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/dataset/ds00141_en, (Access date: 10 May 2020).
26. “Countering Racism and Xenophobia in the EU: Fostering a Society Where Pluralism, Tolerance and Non-
discrimination Prevail”, European Commission.
27. Ibid.
28. “Democracy and Human Rights in the OSCE”, OSCE-ODHIR, (2019), https://www.osce.org/odihr/annual-
report/2019?download=true, (Access date: 15 May 2020).
29. Dunja Mijatović, “Annual Activity Report 2019”, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe.
30. Ibid.
31. “Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related forms of Intolerance, Visit to the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland”, UN General Assembly.
12 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
concerns regarding the impact of the government’s policy against extremism on hu-
man rights can be applied for everywhere else in Europe.
Leading concerns over the Prevent Strategy relate to the lack of clear, work-
able definitions of “extremism”, “terrorism” and “British values”, as well as the
criteria used to refer individuals considered at risk of radicalization. Among oth-
er national and international stakeholders, the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination has expressed serious concern that the “prevent duty” cre-
ates an atmosphere of suspicion towards members of Muslim communities, that it
leads to increased profiling of individuals on the basis of ethnicity and/or religion
and that it adversely affects the rights to freedom of expression, education and
freedom of religion (CERD/C/GBR/CO/21-23, paras. 18–19). The Special Rap-
porteur shares these concerns, which were reiterated during many of her consulta-
tions with civil society representatives. She is especially concerned that uncertainty
and ambiguity in terminology have serious consequences for racial equality as they
create a wide scope for discretionary interpretation.32
The recommendation Achiume provided to the UK government is valid for
other European governments analyzed in the EIR 2019, namely “the Government
must urgently confront the exclusionary, divisive and discriminatory environments
its policies are generating.”33
Linked to counterterrorism policy is the growing use of artificial intelligence
(AI) by governments to control citizens. In her Annual Activity Report 2019, the
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe Dunja Mijatović warned
authorities about “the risks that unregulated uses of digital technologies and artificial
intelligence pose to human rights, in particular privacy, equality, freedom of expres-
sion and assembly.”34 She called for a “right balance between technological develop-
ment and human rights protection.”35
Recommendations and responses to Islamophobia
in European and international institutions
The UN special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and racial intolerance called on governments to assess the impact of their
counterterrorism policies on human rights. She especially urged them not to “dispro-
portionately target groups on the basis of religious and ethnic belonging.”36
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) calls the
members states of the Council of Europe to work in cooperation with the commis-
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Dunja Mijatović, “Annual Activity Report 2019”, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe.
35. Ibid.
36. “Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance, Visit to the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland”, UN General Assembly.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 13
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
sion in order to apply its recommendation against the “right-wing threat.”37 Among
the recommendations, we underline:
1. “A more pro-active approach and support for inclusive education are necessary.”
2. A protective and supportive approach towards grassroots NGOs and people
“who advocate the interests of vulnerable groups, the national equality bod-
ies, [who] are still lacking financial resources and staff.”
3. The acknowledgment of civil society organizations that help victims both
legally and financially.
4. A careful use of artificial intelligence (AI) in security policies. AI should not
lead to discrimination in societies.38
Besides these recommendations, the ECRI has also led concrete actions on
the ground. Celebrating the 25th anniversary of the organization, the ECRI or-
ganized an international high-level conference entitled “On the Road to Effective
Equality” in Paris under the French Presidency of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe. The ECRI published guidelines for the coming years and
started to actualize some of its General Policy Recommendations, including Gen-
eral Policy Recommendation No. 5 on combating intolerance and discrimination
against Muslims (originally published on 27 April 2000). The ECRI also cooper-
ated with equality bodies through numerous workshops and panels such as the
80th plenary meeting (10-13 December 2019) or the meeting with the European
Court of Human Rights (10 December 2019) on combating anti-Semitic and
anti-Muslim hatred.
On 15 November 2019, the OSCE ODIHR published hate crime records
for the year 2018 as reported by 42 states and 178 NGOs. This data is precious
since without data there is no problem and without a problem there can be no
policy to address it. Besides the publication of data, the OSCE organized a series
of events such as the “Youth Activist Forum: Engaging the OSCE to Address Rac-
ism and Xenophobia” (Warsaw, 23 September 2019); the “Supplementary Human
Dimension Meeting (SHDM) I - Upholding the Principles of Tolerance and Non-
Discrimination Including in the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Religion
or Belief ” (Vienna, Hofburg, 1-2 April 2019); or the workshop “Combatting In-
tolerance against Muslims through Education” (Istanbul, 15 April 2019). In all the
events, the OSCE worked together with grassroots NGOs and activists in order
to draw pro-active solutions to tackle racism, discrimination, and Islamophobia.
Following the “Consultative Expert Meeting on Understanding Anti-Muslim Hate
Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Muslim Communities” (Oslo, 9-10
37. “Annual Report of ECRI Activities Covering the Period from 1 January to 31 December 2019”, ECRI.
38. Ibid.
14 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
December 2019), the OSCE ODIHR published a guide “to aid governments in
their actions on preventing and combating hate crimes including by an analysis of
security risks and the necessary actions required, with the aim of improving the
capacity of the police and other institutions to meet the security needs of Muslim
communities and individuals.”39
The EU Commission supported the European Union Agency for Fundamental
Rights (FRA) as it provides an “online repository of case law, reports and knowl-
edge on cases of anti-Muslim hatred in the Member States.”40 The EU Commis-
sion started to fund projects to prevent and counter anti-Muslim hatred through
the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme. Furthermore, “several projects on
promoting religious tolerance and inclusion have been sponsored under the Erasmus+
programme.”41 In a general manner, the EU Commission focused its efforts on educa-
tion, and positive narratives of tolerance and cooperation with civil society actors and
national authorities.42
In February 2019, the EU Commission presented in Brussels the results
of the 4th monitoring exercise on the implementation of the Code of conduct.
Among the defined targets were “fighting racism and xenophobia, which re-
quires authors of illegal hate speech offences - whether online or offline - to be
effectively prosecuted.”43
Yet, one of the EU Commission’s most effective actions regarding the fight
against anti-Muslim hatred has been through the actions of the Coordinator on Com-
bating Anti-Muslim Hatred Tommaso Chiamparino. Among the different initiatives
taken by Chiamparino was the organization of the “Workshop on Synergies and
Good Practices on Tackling Anti-Muslin Racism and Discrimination” (Madrid, 24-
25 June). More than 100 NGOs and national authorities met at this event to discuss
how to make concrete progress on tackling anti-Muslim hatred and discrimination.
“The program included not only keynote speeches and round tables, but workshops
where civil society actors, state officials and people from bureaucracy came together
to exchange experiences, ideas, and best practices examples.”44 One of the main con-
cerns expressed by the participants was that “fighting Islamophobia has not been
39. “Understanding Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes - Addressing the Security Needs of Muslim Communities: A Practical
Guide”, OSCE, (2020), https://www.osce.org/odihr/muslim-security-guide?download=true, (Access date: 15 May 2020).
40. “Countering Racism and Xenophobia in the EU: Fostering a Society Where Pluralism, Tolerance and Non-
discrimination Prevail”, European Commission.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. “How the Code of Conduct Helped Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online”, European Commission, Febru-
ary 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/hatespeech_infographic3_web.pdf, (Access date: 10 May 2020).
44. Farid Hafez, “The Second European Commission’s Meeting on Combatting Anti-Muslim Racism”, Bridge, 31 July
2019, https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/the-second-european-commissions-meeting-on-combatting-anti-mus-
lim-racism/, (Access date: 10 May 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 15
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
dealt with at the same level as fighting other forms of racism such as antisemitism or
Anti-Ziganism (also known as Romaphobia or anti-Gypsyism). For example, the Eu-
ropean Parliament adopted a resolution on combating Antisemitism on 1 June 2017
that entails specific policy recommendations for the EU level as well as national level.
As well, the European Parliament passed a resolution to combat anti-Gypsyism with
specific policies, but has yet to pass one for combatting Islamophobia.”45 During this
event, dozens of civil society organizations shared their recommendations for combat-
ing Islamophobia with member states and European institutions.
There have been other actions taken regarding anti-Muslim hatred as well. For
the first time, the European Parliament acknowledged the European Day of Action
against Islamophobia and Religious Intolerance on 21 September.46 On the Islamic
New Year, the first vice president of the commission sent a strong statement to tackle
anti-Muslim hatred. On 23-26 September 2019, the European Parliament Anti-Rac-
ism and Diversity Intergroup (ARDI) organized the EU Anti-Racism and Diversity
Week in the European Parliament. Finally, Equinet Europe published infographics
in February 2019 on World Hijab Day (1 February).
Anti-Muslim Attitudes High in Europe
A report published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in April
2019 showed that ahead of the elections for the European Parliament, while there
was no single issue on voters’ minds, large segments of the voters were concerned
about so-called Islamic radicalism. While 15% of the voting of the EU highlighted
migration as one of the top threats to Europe, 22% of the EU voting population
is concerned about so-called Islamic radicalism, which ranks highest amongst all
threatening images.47 According to this study, so-called Islamic radicalism is a greater
preoccupation for people aligned with center and center-right parties than necessar-
ily for those aligned with far-right parties.
Given that “Islamic radicalism” is is itself a peculiar notion that invites the
amalgamation of a variety of terms that are (often misguidedly) related to Islam
with no differentiation between the spheres of politics, society, and religion, this
poll reveals the centrality of Islamophobic discourses in political debates all across
Europe. The fact that this “fear” also exists among pro-European parties and not
only among anti-EU, far-right political parties tells us something about the relative
hegemony of Islamophobia.
45. Ibid.
46. Yusuf Hatip, “EU Parliament Holds Event on Islamophobia”, Anadolu Agency, 24 September 2019, https://
www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-parliament-holds-event-on-islamophobia/1592930, (Access date: 10 May 2020).
47. Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard and Susi Dennison, “What Europeans Really Want: Five Myths Debunked”, ECFR,
April 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/ECFR_What_Europeans_Really_Want_Five_Myths_Debunked.pdf, (Access
date: 10 May 2020).
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The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
Figure 1: What is the single biggest threat to Europe today?48
The Eurobarometer reveals something similar. In the latest poll published in
September 2019, 71% of respondents said that they would feel comfortable work-
ing with a Muslim colleague, which simultaneously implies that 29% do not feel
comfortable. Still, countries with a high rate of acceptance like the UK (93%), the
Netherlands (91%), France, and Sweden (both 87%) stand in contrast to countries
with a very high aversion like the Czech Republic (35%), Hungary (37%), and Lith-
uania (47%).49 Asked about having sons or daughters in a romantic relationship with
people from other religions, again Muslims were the least favored when compared to
Jews, Buddhists, Christians, and atheists. Only 53% would feel comfortable if one of
their children was romantically involved with a Muslim, again with the highest num-
ber in the UK (82%), followed by France (68%), Ireland, and Sweden (66%). The
respondents that were least favorable to such a notion were in the Czech Republic
(18%), Lithuania (22%), Cyprus, and Hungary (each 23%).50 The fact that the least
favorable positions vis-à-vis Muslims can be found in countries in Eastern Europe,
where the least number of Muslims live, confirms the theory that racism operates
with an imagined rather than a real figure of the other.
Other research reveals even stronger anti-Muslim attitudes. Political scientist
and sociologist Jørgen Goul Andersen conducted a survey of over 5,900 Danes in
2019, where he found that about 28% agreed/partly agreed that Muslim immigrants
should be deported.51 This shows that anti-Muslim attitudes go so far as to restrict
Muslims’ civil rights, as the author of the Danish report Amani Hassani reveals.
48. Ibid, p. 9.
49. “Special Eurobarometer 493, Discrimination in the European Union”, European Commission, October 2019, p. 18.
50. Ibid, p. 19.
51. Jens Reierman and Torben K. Andersen, “Hver fjerde dansker: Muslimer ud af Danmark”, Mandag Morgen, 21 October
2019, https://www.mm.dk/artikel/hver-fjerde-dansker-muslimer-skal-ud-af-danmark?utm_content=bufferc1d11&utm_
medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer, (Access date: 2 February 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
The spread of Islamophobia, however, also generates acts of solidarity. On 10
November 2019, the historical “March against Islamophobia” took place in Paris,
which gathered between 20,000 and 40,000 people (13,500 according to the Min-
istry of Interior).52 In the Czech Republic, over 200 families volunteered to accept
children and young adult immigrants from overcrowded refugee camps in Greece.
Yet, as the author of the Czech report reveals, the initiative was sabotaged by the
prime minister and other politicians. Up to and including 2020, the minister of
interior said no children would be admitted. This shows how little compassion there
is following campaigns that dehumanize Muslims.
Hate crime
As a consequence of the spread of anti-Muslim attitudes, data on hate crime only
confirms the rise of anti-Muslim attitudes in many European countries. The over-
whelming majority of European states do not record Islamophobic incidents as a
separate category of hate crime. The recording of anti-Muslim/Islamophobic hate
crimes by the police as a separate category of hate crime is essential in uncovering
the real extent of this problem and developing counterstrategies to combat it. At
the same time, we all know that it is only a small minority of around only 12%
of Muslims who say they have reported cases of discrimination, as the European
Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) had found in a report.53 In Belgium, 278
Islamophobic incidents were documented,54 including physical attacks on individu-
als and Muslim spaces.55 As the author of the report on Belgium shows, these hate
crimes include acts such as vandalism of mosques,56 leaving pig heads at Muslim
residences,57, and leaving excrement and urine at a Muslim home accompanied by
swastikas being graffitied onto the Muslim family’s car.58 What has already become
52. “Marche contre l'islamophobie: 13 500 manifestants présents à Paris”, Le Point, 18 November 2019, https://
www.lepoint.fr/societe/manifestation-contre-l-islamophobie-la-marche-controversee-prevue-ce-dimanche-a-par-
is-10-11-2019-2346290_23.php, (Access date: 2 February 2020).
53. “Press Release: Muslims in the EU: High Levels of Trust Despite Pervasive Discrimination”, FRA, 21 September
2017, https://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2017/muslims-eu-high-levels-trust-despite-pervasive-discrimination, (Access
date: 2 February 2020).
54. “Rapport des Chiffres 2018”, Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique, (CCIB, Brussels: 2019), http://
ccib-ctib.be/wp-content/uploads/CCIB_PUBLIC_PDF_RapportChiffresCCIB/RAPPORT_CHIFFRES_
CCIB_2018_Septembre2019.pdf, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
55. Ibid.
56. “Une mosquée vandalisée à Louvain: Il n’y a pas encore de suspects”, Le Soir, 1 January 2020. https://www.lesoir.
be/270228/article/2020-01-01/une-mosquee-vandalisee-louvain, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
57. “Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique”, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/islamophobia.ccib.be/,
(Access date: 12 January 2020).
58. “Hayat, mère de trois enfants se dit victime de racism: ‘On a eu de la diarrhée sur la porte’”, RTL Info, 16 Sep-
tember 2019, https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/victime-de-racisme-ayat-mere-de-trois-enfants-est-a-bout-
on-a-eu-de-la-diarrhee-sur-la-porte-video--1157531.aspx?dt=14%3A39&fbclid=IwAR2SjbQ-kHU76kTn86NZo-
WtxZc5fnoybWD2oKIdJP9uCE5r_z9igkonW2qU, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
18 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
obvious in many ways is that anti-Muslim hate crimes have continued to increase
steadily and that they are distinctly gendered in nature. As the report on Belgium
reveals, stabbings of Muslim women, the forced removal of Muslim women’s hijabs,
Muslim women being pushed onto metro tracks, and being denied employment and
education are largely part of the documented cases.59 Examples of direct discrimina-
tion are also revealed in the report on North Macedonia by Orhan Ceka. Ceka shows
that Muslims are rejected service in restaurants, face petitions to lower the volume of
adhan, and are attacked when wearing a hijab.60
Media
The media alongside politics are the most influential spaces where Islamophobia can
be either challenged or disseminated and further strengthened. While in some coun-
tries, the media challenge power structures to some extent, in most countries, the
media are very much connected to power structures and represent different camps
along ideological lines.
The year 2019 was no exception in terms of the central role of certain journalists
in spreading Islamophobia. On Albanian television channel Ora News, a journalist
suggested undertaking similar action in Albania to the Christchurch terrorist attacks.
In Bosnia, the newspaper Novosti RS falsely claimed, “Hundreds of Jihadists Are Ar-
riving to B&H.” On Finnish television, sexual assaults were connected to the “too
many asylum seekers.”
The yellow press continue to produce headlines such as that of the German Bild
“Out of Respect for the ‘Salvation’ Day-Care Centre Takes Pork from the Menu,”
which suggests a subversive Islamization of German society. Meanwhile far-right
newspapers openly foster fearmongering with headlines such as “Islam Invaded Ath-
ens. Fears about a Terrorist Attack during Christmas,” while nothing of the like
happened. When certain press outlets construe false ideas about Muslims or Islamic
institutions, politicians act accordingly. In the Netherlands, a report falsely claimed
that a newly established Muslim school had ties with Salafism, which led the prime
minister to declared in public that he “wouldn't send his child there.”61
The opinion section is often the place where the most blatant anti-Muslim posi-
tions can be read. In Austria, opinion pieces were published where authors denied
the existence of anti-Muslim racism62 or framed the “Islamic tradition” as a “unique
anti-Jewish tradition.” In Croatia, a theologian argued that Islam is masculine to the
59. For more information see the report on Belgium by Amina Easat-Daas in this volume.
60. For more information see the report on North Macedonia by Orhan Ceka in this volume.
61. For more information see the report on the Netherlands by Amina Smits Akılma in this volume.
62. Christian Ultsch, “Die nützlichen Idioten des Attentäters von Christchurch”, Die Presse, 15 March 2019, https://
diepresse.com/home/meinung/kommentare/leitartikel/5596641/Die-nuetzlichen-Idioten-des-Attentaeters-von-
Christchurch, (Access date: 15 May 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
point of being brutal (as opposed to the feminized Europe), and that it takes advan-
tage of the surrounding commotion to sneak up on the “woman” Europe.
Established newspapers such as the Spanish El-País published an op-ed where
the right of self-determination of Muslim women was questioned. The article stated,
“The importance of a piece of cloth: [t]hose who want to convince us of the innocu-
ousness of the hijab are precisely those who do not understand that the dignity of
women is above all consideration and, if necessary, of any divine text.”63
Online Islamophobia
In most European countries, a great proportion of Islamophobiac attacks against
individuals takes place on the Internet. In France, around 20% of Islamophobic
incidents reported by the Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France (CCIF) referred to
online harassment or threat. Besides attacks on individuals, online Islamophobia also
spreads conspiracy theories about the so-called Islamization of Europe. One of the
most striking examples, is the online activity of the European network Generation
Identity (GI), which is present in several countries such as France, the UK, Germany,
Austria, Slovenia, and Hungary. “GI openly promotes the belief that Muslims are
being brought into Europe illegally by liberal politicians to ‘replace’ Europeans in
Western countries (referred to within the group as the ‘Great Replacement’).”64 Oth-
er groups spread this white supremacist ideology, such as “the youth branch of the
FPÖ, the RFJ, that posted an ad on its social media channels stating, ‘Mohammed
most popular name for newborns in three Viennese districts.’”65 In France, websites
such as “FDeSouche, Resistance Républicaine, Riposte Laïque, Boulevard Voltaire,
TVLibertés, Breizh-info, or Observatoire de l’Islamisation openly claim being Is-
lamophobic and base their discourse upon the ‘clash of civilization’, ‘Great Replace-
ment’, and ‘reverse colonialism’ theories.”66 In Germany, “the right-wing extremist
blog ‘Politically Incorrect’, founded by the former teacher and right-wing extremist
Stefan Herre in 2004, is directed against the feared ‘Islamisation of Europe.’”67
Yet, it is not easy to analyze the extent of online Islamophobia with the rise of so-
cial media and the darknet. “According to the [Dutch] General Intelligence and Secu-
rity Service’s report extreme-right groups such as Pegida, Identair Verzet, Rechts in Ver-
zet, NVU, Erkenbrand, and Voorpost are usually active on the large platforms such as
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. The growth of right-extremist content is said to have
stagnated on their own websites, as is the short-lived boost in their followers. However,
63. For more information see the report on Spain by Aurora Ali in this volume.
64. For more information see the report on Hungary by Nadia Jones-Gailani and Gabi Gőbl in this volume.
65. For more information see the report on Austria by Farid Hafez in this volume.
66. For more information see the report on France by Léonard Faytre in this volume.
67. For more information see the report on Germany by Enes Bayraklı in this volume.
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The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
the focus seems to be shifting to international alternative forums, platforms, and chat
apps such as 4Chan, 8kun, and EndChan, where a lot of right-extremist content is
being shared, creating an international community. They use Gab (instead of Twitter),
Minds and VKontakte (instead of Facebook), Telegram (instead of WhatsApp) and
Bitchute (instead of YouTube) as these are less restrictive in their policy when it comes
to violent or extremist content than Facebook, Twitter, or Google.”68
However, online Islamophobia also comes from so-called mainstream media or
political parties. In the UK, “the Conservative Party was repeatedly put in the spotlight
for the anti-Muslim [online] content made by a number of its MP candidates, council-
lors, and ordinary members.”69 In France, “online activities of NGOs such as Printemps
républicain (Republican Spring) and Comité Laïcité République (Laicité – Republic
Committee) do not attack Muslim people straightforwardly but hide their anti-Mus-
lim racism under the veil of secularism, women’s rights, and Jacobin ideology.”70
Politics
Islamophobia is also normalized by a discourse used by those in power. In Romania,
the former president Traian Basescu, who was elected to the European Parliament
for the center-right party PMP, argued on a live show on on the television channel
Digi24 that his motivation for going to Brussels is to protect Europe’s border of the
“Muslim invasion.”71 In November 2019, the French minister of interior stigma-
tized Muslim people by using a rhetoric that stems from the far-right ideology of
the Great Replacement, which is central to Islamophobic terror today. He said, “As
Minister of the Interior, and in charge of relations with religions, it is not the debate
around the headscarf that concerns me, but rampant Islamism, in certain neigh-
bourhoods, which wants to be a political system competing with the Republic.”72
He thus invoked the phantasm of an “Islamist parallel society.” He also announced
that he had closed 12 places of worship, four private schools, nine associations, and
nearly 130 pubs because of radicalization and political Islam,73 claiming the “Re-
68. For more information see the report on the Netherlands by Amina Smits Akılma in this volume.
69. For more information see the report on the UK by Aristotle Kallis in this volume.
70. For more information see the report on France by Léonard Faytre in this volume.
71. “Why Is Traian Basescu Going to Bruxelles? There Are Some Battles to Be Fought. EU Is Almost Telling Us
That We Also Need to Live with the Muslim Invasion”, (De ce se duce Traian Băsescu la Bruxelles? ‚Sunt de dat
niște bătălii. UE parcă ne spune că trebuie să trăim și cu invazia musulmană”), Digi 24, 18 June 2019, https://
www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/traian-basescu-imigranti-refugiati-flota-militara-mafie-politica-externa-
ue-1148177, (Acces date: 21 January 2020).
72. Christophe Castaner, Twitter, 7 November 2019, https://twitter.com/CCastaner/status/1192409525829218304,
(Access date: 25 January 2020).
73. “Municipales 2020: Emmanuel Macron se prononce contre l’interdiction des listes communautaires”, 20 Min-
utes, 19 November 2019, https://www.20minutes.fr/politique/2655251-20191119-municipales-emmanuel-ma-
cron-prononce-contre-interdiction-listes-communautaires, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
publican Reconquest of Suburbs” (Quartiers de la Reconquete Republicaine)74 which
also fits into this racist discourse.
It is of little surprise that this discourse is still very much fed by far-right politi-
cal parties and their representatives such as Karla Maříková, an MP for the Czech
Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SDP), who invoked an openly racist argu-
ment by saying, “It is forbidden to import invasive, non-indigenous species of plants
and animals to the European Union. Muslim immigrants are also non-indigenous
inhabitants in Europe and the same way as other invasive species they represent the
unexpected expansion and gradual supplanting of the indigenous inhabitants of Eu-
rope. Therefore, they should be forbidden from entering the EU.”75 Certain far-right
political parties also made huge gains, such as the far-right Vlaams Belang in Bel-
gium. This translated into more anti-Muslim legislation. The Flemish governmental
agreement set out controls of “outward signs of … personal conviction” including
the hijab in Flemish governance and education. The agreement states, “External
symbols of philosophical, religious, political or other beliefs are therefore not worn
with direct customer contact… We also guarantee neutrality in education. In pro-
vincial and community education, we ensure the philosophical neutrality for teach-
ers and students.”76 Far-right parties drawing on anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim
mobilization also grew in parts of Europe with little to no immigrants and Muslims,
thus following an Eastern European trend.77 In the 2019 elections in Estonia, the
far-right nationalist Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) became part of
the ruling coalition.
The European Parliament held elections in 2019. Currently, the European Par-
liament has seven groups and while the far-right group Identity and Democracy
(formerly Europe of Nations and Freedom group) did not become the third-stron-
gest to destabilize the old establishment parties in the parliament, it now does not
come in last either. Ranking after the traditionally strong Christian Democratic
European People’s Party (EPP), the Social Democrats (S&D), the liberal Renew
Europe, and the Greens, Identity and Democracy now has 73 MEPs – only one less
MEP than the Greens. The far-right group has thus overtaken the European Con-
74. “For each ‘Republican Reconquest of Suburbs’ the French government plans to assign 10 to 35 additional police
or gendarmerie personnel. These additional personnel will be immediately operational and will go into the field. Each
of these districts also has an anti-trafficking unit (CLT) adapted to each territory and local situation. By the end of the
five-year period, 60 Republican Reconquest districts will be set up. By 2018, 15 neighborhoods have been set up and
326 staff members have been assigned to them.” For more information see “Effectifs de juin 2019 dans les quartiers
de reconquête républicaine”, interieur.gouv.fr, 21 June 2019, https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Le-ministre/Dossiers-
de-presse/Effectifs-de-juin-2019-dans-les-quartiers-de-reconquete-republicaine, (Access date: 26 March 2020).
75. For more information see the report on Czech Republic by Selma Muhic Dizdarevic in this volume.
76. Vlaamse regering 2019-2024: Regeerakkoord, http://docs.vlaamsparlement.be/docs/varia/regeerakkoord-2019-2024.
pdf, (Access date: 15 January 2020).
77. Farid Hafez, “Street-Level and Government-Level Islamophobia in the Visegrád Four Countries”, Patterns of
Prejudice, 52, 5 (2018), pp. 436-447.
22 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
servatives and Reformists (ECR) as well as the Left (GUE/NGL).78 This is already a
remarkable success for the radical right parties, who have come together with their
new focus on Islamophobia.79 They have not only overcome the split within the
right-wing and Eurosceptical/anti-EU camp (which is primarily due to the external
factor of Brexit anyway), but, and more importantly, they were able to get close to
the fourth rank in the European Parliament. It therefore seems that for the first time
in the history of the European Parliament, radical right-wing parties have succeeded
in forming a strong group that will be able to draw on more financial and human
resources than ever before.
Justice System
The spread of anti-Muslim attitudes and the rise of anti-Muslim forces in politics also
translate into legislation and administration. At the same time, examples show that the
rule of law can still defend basic liberties such as the freedom of religion and belief.
In Greece, an NGO visited the Foreigners’ Administration of Attica on Pe-
trou Ralli Avenue in Athens where an official public complaint was made by refu-
gee women being held there. A Muslim woman mentioned that “they forbade us
to wear our headscarves and they told us ‘outside of this place you can be Mus-
lims, but not in here! Here you are Christians…’” and another Muslim woman
complained that police officers took off a Syrian woman’s hijab.80 Similarly, in
Lithuania, Muslim immigrants staying in a Foreigners Registration Center in
Pabradė were not offered an alternative to pork dishes; the Seimas Ombudsman
protested against this.81
In Flanders, in January 2019, and in Wallonia, Belgium, in September 2019, a
ban of halal and kosher slaughter was implemented. In Denmark, legislation was in-
troduced to deprive dual citizens of their Danish citizenship easily by political means.
The author of the Danish report sees a problematic precedence for how the govern-
ment deals with dual citizens in general, particularly Muslim dual citizens. While in
the past, judicial procedures would determine citizenship rights, now the possibility
of depriving citizenship in the case of dual citizenship goes through the immigration
78. Farid Hafez, “What Has Changed for the Far-Right After the European Elections?”, The Maydan, 25 September
2019, https://themaydan.com/2019/09/what-has-changed-for-the-far-right-after-the-european-elections/, (Access
date: 31 January 2020).
79. Farid Hafez, “Shifting Borders: Islamophobia as Common Ground for Building Pan-European Right-Wing
Unity”, Patterns of Prejudice, 48, 5 (2014), pp. 479-499.
80. “Terrifying Testimonies of Women from Petrou Ralli”, Efimerida ton Syntakton, 5 January 2020, https://www.ef-
syn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/225643_frikiastikes-martyries-gynaikon-apo-tin-petroy-ralli, (Access date: 31 January 2020).
81. “Seimo kontrolierius: Užsieniečių registracijos centre užsieniečių teisės nėra tinkamai užtikrinamos”, The Seimas
Ombudsmen’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania, 19 September 2019, http://www.lrski.lt/naujienos/729-uzsie-
nieci-registracijos-centre-darbuotojai-nemoka-uzsienio-kalb-o-sulaikytos-uzsienieci-seimos-su-mazameciais-vaikais-
talpinamos-uz-grot.html, (Access date: 13 January 2019).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
and integration minister.82 While the United Nations criticized Denmark’s “ghetto”
policies, it was revealed that a category named “non-Western immigrants and de-
scendants” is used in the national register on unemployed Danish citizens, without
the consent or knowledge of the citizens identified as such. This category can only be
withdrawn, if the person affected contacts the respective governing bodies.
On the contrary, in Italy, the Constitutional Court rejected a provision adopted by
the region of Lombardy which was designed to hinder the construction of new mosques.
Most important in this case is the fact that the Constitutional Court explicitly referred to
the principle of religious freedom that is enshrined in the Italian Constitution.83 In Swit-
zerland, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed again that wearing the hijab was protected
by the freedom of religious belief which is enshrined in the constitution. The verdict came
after an appeal by the initiators of a hijab ban at schools in the canton of Valais.84
As these few examples show, the fight against Islamophobia should be continued
on a legal basis through the courts as well. At the same time, the struggle against anti-
Muslim discrimination with legal means has to be understood as a way of protecting
the constitutions which include legislation on anti-discrimination and freedom of
religion or belief.
The Rise of Islamophobic Terror
The editors of this report have already warned in the European Islamophobia Report
2018 that Islamophobic ideology plays a central role in white supremacist terrorist
groups.85 On 15 March 2019, in Christchurch, New Zealand, the world witnessed
what this means. The Christchurch terrorist attacks that left 51 people dead in two
mosques revealed the strong connection to European white supremacist and espe-
cially anti-Muslim groups and ideology. The terrorist’s actions were part of a transna-
tional subculture of anti-Muslim white supremacist groups, especially online forums
from Europe. Certain circles in Europe even openly praised these attacks.
In 2019, several attacks took place on German soil, from the synagogue attack in
Halle to the murder of Walter Lübcke. The suspect in the Walter Lübcke attack,86 who
82. Jeppe Sahlholdt, “Omstridt lov om fremmedkrigere er vedtaget med stemmer fra V og DF”, Altinget, 24 Octo-
ber 2019, https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/omstridt-lov-om-fremmedkrigere-er-vedtaget-med-stemmer-fra-v-og-df,
(Access date: 2 February 2020).
83. “Islam. Stop della Consulta alla legge lombarda anti-moschee, furia della Lega”, Dire Agenzia di Stampa Nazionale,
5 December 2019, https://www.dire.it/05-12-2019/399443-islam-stop-della-consulta-alla-legge-lombarda-anti-mos-
chee-furia-della-lega/, (Access date: 7 February 2020).
84.“SVP-Initiative für Kopftuchverbot an Schulen ist ungültig”, Tages-Anzeiger, 7 September 2018, https://www.
tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/svpinitiative-fuer-kopftuchverbot-an-schulen-ist-ungueltig/story/23958254,
(Access date: 11 January 2020).
85. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, “The State of Islamophobia in Europe” in European Islamophobia Report 2018,
eds. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, (SETA, Istanbul: 2019), pp. 20-26.
86. Farid Hafez, “The Silent Murder of Walter Lübcke”, Daily Sabah, 19 June 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/
op-ed/2019/06/19/the-silent-murder-of-walter-lubcke, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
24 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
is believed to have had connections with a number of far-right organizations includ-
ing the militant Combat 18, the National Democratic Party (NPD), and the neo-
Nazi group Autonome Nationalisten (Autonomous Nationalists), admitted to killing
the famous pro-immigrant politician. More importantly, the German public was only
recently informed about the existence of white supremacist groups that are operating
underground. Network Hannibal, which operates in Germany, Austria, and Switzer-
land, is a network that was founded in 2015 and recruits former and active security
service agents, soldiers, and police officers along with right-wing individuals to prepare
them for a “Day X,” i.e. a military coup d’état. While only the German daily TAZ
published a long piece on this issue early on, the case has since been handed over to
the federal prosecutor and several people were taken into custody. The police investiga-
tion has revealed that the network had created a “kill list” including more than 20,000
names with high-ranking politicians who are seen as having “pro-immigration” stances.
In Poland, far-right activists expressed their praise and admiration for the
Christchurch terrorist Brenton Tarrant. As the author for the report on Poland Anna
Piela shows, nationalist websites and their Facebook profiles enthusiastically encour-
aged their audiences to download and read the terrorist’s manifesto. One famous far-
right activist published a YouTube video praising the terrorist and high school pupils
staged an execution with a replica of a gun used by the killer at the Christchurch
mosque in March, which bore the Islamophobic statements written on the gun used
in the actual terrorist attack.
The author of the Czech Republic report Selma Muhič Dizdarevič reports that
in the Czech Republic following the terrorist attacks, there was a flood of comments
on social media, which approved of killing worshipers.87 Many claimed it was a jus-
tified revenge for terrorist attacks committed by Muslims in the West. One person
commented on the Facebook page of the far-right leader Tomio Okamura: “I do not
condemn this!!! At least he showed them we are not afraid of these cripples!!!!”88
In Norway, 21-year-old far-right terrorist Philip Manshaus had planned an
armed assault on the Al-Noor Islamic Centre Mosque in Bærum near Oslo. Before
going to the mosque, he shot his sister, who had been adopted from China as an
infant, in a racially motivated murder. Manshaus was equipped with a shotgun, two
rifles, a nail gun, a bulletproof vest, and a GoPro camera intended for live stream-
ing on social media mimicking Tarrant, whom he had lauded in an online forum
shortly before the assault.89
87. For more information see the report on the Czech Republic by Selma Muhič Dizdarevič in this volume.
88. “Desítky komentářů, ve kterých pisatelé schvalují neonacistický útok na Novém Zélandu. Policie prý už koná”,
ROMEA, 16 March 2019, http://www.romea.cz/cz/zpravodajstvi/domaci/desitky-komentaru-kde-pisatele-schvaluji-
neonacisticky-utok-na-novem-zelandu.policie-pry-uz-kona, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
89. For more information see the report on Norway by Vemund Aarbakke in this volume. Also see, for example, Andreas
Økland, “Kommentar: Moskéangrepet i Bærum. Vi må ta et nådeløst oppgjør med hatet“, Dagbladet, 11 August 2019.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
In the UK, the first physical attacks occurred within only a few hours after
the Christchurch terrorist attack and the second-highest spike in anti-Muslim hate
crimes across the UK was recorded since 2012.90 As a response, then home secretary
Sajid Javid announced the increase of funding for the security at UK mosques.91
While this was welcome news, the author of our UK report Aristotle Kallis contends
that this financial support still remains limited in comparison to a separate govern-
ment scheme protecting synagogues and Jewish schools - £14 million versus £2 mil-
lion for all other faiths combined.
Following the terrorist attack in Christchurch, French Minister of Interior Chris-
tophe Castaner was heard by the commission of inquiry on the fight against far-right
groups in May 2019. He confirmed that the rhetoric of these groups “is particularly
marked by Islamophobia and evokes the ‘Muslim invasion’ and the ‘Great Replace-
ment’ with violent intentions.” Following the question, whether an attack similar to
the one in Christchurch might occur in France, the Minister replied, “You want to
know if people carrying this far-right ideology are still likely to carry out attacks against
a mosque: yes, it is possible.”92 As the author for the French report Léonard Faytre93
tells us, in June 2019, French intelligence announced that they had dismantled far-
right terrorist groups that had planned attacks against Muslims and Jews.94
Following the Christchurch terrorist attacks, the Organization of Islamic Con-
ferences (OIC) held an emergency meeting and called on the United Nations and
other international and regional organizations to adopt 15 March as the Interna-
tional Day of Solidarity against Islamophobia. Also, the organization demanded the
UN secretary-general “to convene a special session of the UN General Assembly to
declare Islamophobia as a form of racism and to assign a special rapporteur for moni-
toring and combatting Islamophobia.”95
At the same time, the anti-Muslim genocide in Srebrenica is still being denied
not only by the Nobel Prize winner Peter Handke, but also by leading politicians.
90. Vikram Dodd, “Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Soar in UK after Christchurch Shooting”, The Guardian, 22 March
2019, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/mar/22/anti-muslim-hate-crimes-soar-in-uk-after-christchurch-
shootings, (Access date: 25 January 2020).
91. “Places of Worship: Security Funding”, Hansard, 659 (7 May 2019), https://hansard.parliament.uk/Com-
mons/2019-05-07/debates/21C4190A-5CAB-43DA-8360-AA944753E549/PlacesOfWorshipSecurityFunding, (Ac-
cess date: 20 January 2020).
92. “Compte rendu, Commission d’enquête sur la lutte contre les groupuscules d’extrême droite en France”, As-
semblée Nationale, 9 May 2019, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/cr-celgroued/18-19/c1819031.asp, (Access
date: 20 January 2020).
93. For more information see the report on France by Léonard Faytre in this volume.
94. “Démantèlement d'un groupe d'ultradroite qui visait les musulmans et juifs”, Le Point, 11 June 2019,
https://www.lepoint.fr/faits-divers/demantelement-d-un-groupe-d-ultradroite-qui-visait-les-musulmans-et-
juifs-11-06-2019-2318161_2627.php, (Access date: 5 January 2020).
95. Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Final Communique of the 14th Islamic Summit Conference (Ses-
sion of hand toward the future), Makkah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 31 May 2019, https://www.oic-oci.org/
docdown/?docID=4496&refID=1251, (Access date: 5 January 2020).
26 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
The strategy of belittlement is part of this denial. During the Jahorina Economic
Summit on 9 July, Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic referred to the Srebrenica
genocide as a “misunderstanding.”96 Such rhetoric is not rare among Serbia’s high-
est officials.97 At the same time, certain European politicians reframe the past and/
or present of Muslims’ realities in Europe and make today’s Bosnia the problem.
The most outstanding example of this was a remark by French President Emmanuel
Macron who said in an interview with the Economist: “If you're concerned about this
region, the first question is neither Macedonia, nor Albania, it's Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The time-bomb that's ticking right next to Croatia, and which faces the problem
of returning jihadists, is Bosnia-Herzegovina.”98 Macron neglected to mention the
white supremacist ideology that is not only represented by far-right groups, but also
by some of the top European leadership.
White Supremacist Movements and Ideology
Clearly, the ideas of terrorists such as Breivik or Tarrant have been revealed to stem
from white supremacist ideological movements such as the Identitarian movement.
Ideas such as the “Great Replacement” are by no means only part of the far right, as has
been shown before. In a subtle way, as mentioned above, these ideas are also present
in much higher political circles that are widely regarded as nominally “mainstream.”
Key to this strategy is to see the attack on Muslims and their political infringement as
a natural defence, an act of defending freedom and so-called Western values.
A prominent example therefore would be the French polemist Eric Zemmour.
In September 2019, he gave a public speech at the Convention of the Right where
he stated, “Today, we are experiencing a demographic inversion that is leading to
a reversal of migratory flows, which is leading to a reversal of colonization. I'll let
you guess who will be their ‘Indians’ and their ‘African slaves’. It will be you. […]
The question we have to ask ourselves is will young French people accept to live in
a minority on the land of their ancestors? If so, they deserve to be colonized. If not,
they will have to fight for their liberation. But how do we fight? Where to fight?
What to fight for?”99
96. Hikmet Karčić, “For Serbia the Srebrenica Genocide ‘Misunderstanding’ Paid Off”, TRT World, 12 July 2019,
https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/for-serbia-the-srebrenica-genocide-misunderstanding-paid-off-28190, (Access
date: 5 January 2019).
97. In July 2019, nine NGOs issued a statement condemning as “shameful and disgraceful” the fact that no Serbian
official has characterized the events at Srebrenica as a genocide. For more information see “NVO iz Srbije: Sramna
i porazna činjenica da zvaničnici Srbije negiraju genocid u Srebrenici”, Autonomija, 9 July 2019, https://www.
autonomija.info/nvo-iz-srbije-sramna-i-porazna-cinjenica-da-zvanicnici-srbije-negiraju-genocid-u-srebrenici.html,
(Access date: 10 January 2020).
98. “French President Calls Bosnia a 'Ticking Time-Bomb'”, Al Jazeera, 8 November 2019, https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2019/11/french-president-calls-bosnia-ticking-time-bomb-191108053518237.html, (Access date: 5
January 2019).
99. “Rapport CCIF 2020, Rapport sur l’Islamophobie pendant l’année 2019”, Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Another aspect at the intersection of white supremacist armed struggle and state
administrations is the relationship between white supremacists and terrorists, on
the one hand, and their infiltration of the state system, on the other. In France, a
54-year-old member of the far-right, anti-Muslim Identitarian movement was fined
EUR 30,000 and convicted to seven years imprisonment in 2017 for buying more
than 500 weapons, out of which six were used by the Jihadist Amedy Coulibaly. Ac-
cording to the police, the member of the Identitarian movement was a confidential
informant for the French secret service.100
The author of the North Macedonian report Orhan Ceka mentions a case of
a member of the army of the North Macedonian Republic. A professional soldier
called the Nobel Prize in Literature to be given to the Christchurch terrorist. While
the army proposed the termination of her engagement,101 no concrete measure was
taken thereafter.102 This instance poses a question concerning the spread of white
supremacist ideology within the ranks of important state institutions.
Education
Education is still a central space for the practice and dissemination of Islamophobia.
The French NGO monitoring body CCIF report published in 2019 reveals that
22.5% of its cases pertained to Islamophobia in education. 103 In Albania, the minis-
ter of education, sport and youth close three private schools including one religious
Islamic school claiming that “minor girls have to wear the hijab during the class.”104
The school decided to sue the minister.105 Also centrist-left parties mobilize against
Muslims in the education sector. In 2019, the Danish Social Democrats campaigned
in the general elections with the promise to remove public funding of Muslim in-
dependent schools because of a suspicion they are not sufficiently promoting so-
called Danish values of freedom, democracy, and gender equality.106 After winning
the elections, the government implemented an audit of 17 independent schools, out
of which seven were Islamic schools. Also, Muslim pupils beyond a 9th grade level
100. “Lille. 7 ans de prison pour une figure de l'extrême droite identitaire”, Quest France, 9 October 2017, https://
www.ouest-france.fr/societe/justice/lille-7-ans-de-prison-pour-une-figure-de-l-extreme-droite-identitaire-5301457,
(Access date: 5 January 2020).
101. “Плусинфо:Поради говор на омраза Татјана Лазаровска ќе лета од АРМ”, Македонски Медиа Сер-
вис (ММС), 26 March 2019, https://mms.mk/63408 (Access date: 20 May 2020).
102. “Застрашувачки говор на омраза”, Радио Слободна Европа, 26 March 2019,
https://www.slobodnaevropa.mk/a (Access date: 20 May 2020).
103. “Rapport des Chiffres 2018”, Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique.
104. Sulejman Rustemi, Facebook, 19 June 2019, https://www.facebook.com/SulejmanRustemi/videos/10
216838970639072/, (Access date: 26 December 2019).
105. Ibid.
106. Anders Redder, “Nye tal bekymrer: Muslimske friskoler står foran skærpet tilsyn”, Kristligt Dagblad, 25 No-
vember 2019 https://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/danmark/nye-tal-bekymrer-saerligt-muslimske-friskoler-testes-de-
mokratisk-sindelag, (Access date: 30 January 2020).
28 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
whose parents are not fluent in the Danish language are forced to attend mandatory
day-care for at least 25 hours per week.107
In Catalonia, Spain, PRODERAEV108 (Detection, Prevention and Interven-
tion in Processes of Radicalization and Violent Extremism) was introduced in 2016,
following the British PREVENT structure.109 Part of the program is that Catalo-
nian police officers and civil servants from the departments of Internal Affairs and
Education train schoolteachers in so-called “radicalization detection” tools. A leaked
document by the newspaper LaDirecta110 shows that radicalization indicators were,
among others, to be “born in a family from a Muslim-majority country,” hijab-wear-
ing, asking for halal food at school, neighbourhood of residence, and not drinking
Coca Cola. Also in the French University of Cergy-Pontoise, an email was sent to
the teaching staff asking them to list students and teachers who show “weak signals
of radicalization” such as they “stopped drinking alcohol”, “suddenly stopped eat-
ing pork”, “recent consumption of halal food”, “behavior changes towards women”,
“prayers in the buildings of the university”, “sudden interest in national politics and
international relations”, and “sudden interest in religion.”
Step Forward and Policy Recommendations
As the Islamophobic terror attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand and Hanau,
Germany demonstrated, the physical security of Muslims and their institutions
have become an urgent issue in Europe. The spread and increasing activity of Is-
lamophobic terror groups and networks in Europe are alarming and should be
taken seriously by the EU, the European states, and their security institutions. All
the signs indicate that an Islamophobic terror wave is about to hit Europe. Christ-
church and Hanau are not isolated incidents but a strong wake-up call for Europe
and beyond. Therefore, as the editors of the European Islamophobia Report we feel
the need to warn that this kind of attacks might happen anywhere, anytime in
Europe if the necessary measures are not taken.
In the report “Understanding Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes - Addressing the Se-
curity Needs of Muslim Communities: A Practical Guide Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe” (May 2020), the OSCE-ODIHR calls on European
107. “Obligatorisk læringstilbud til 1-årige i udsatte boligområder og skærpet straf til ledere for pligtforsømmelser”,
Ministry of Children and Education, https://www.uvm.dk/dagtilbud/love-og-regler--formaal-og-aftaler/aftalen-om-
parallelsamfund/om-aftalen, (Access date: 4 February 2020).
108. “Prevenció, detecció e intervenció de processos de radicalització als Centres Educatius”, The Department of
Education of the Generalitat, http://cgtense.pangea.org/IMG/pdf/proderai-ce.pdf, (Access date 22 February 2019).
109. “Factsheet: PREVENT”, The Bridge Initiative Team, 25 March 2019, https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/
prevent/, (Access date: 4 February 2020).
110. Ainhoa Douhaibi and Vicent Almela, “No beure Coca-Cola, no celebrar Sant Jordi o esborrar-se els tatuatges
són indicadors de ´radicalització islamista´, segons els Mossos”, LaDirecta, 18 December 2018, https://directa.cat/
no-beure-coca-cola-no-celebrar-sant-jordi-o-esborrar-se-els-tatuatges-son-indicadors-de-radicalitzacio-islamista-
segons-els-mossos/, (Access date: 4 February 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 29
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
governments to take strong measures to guarantee the security of all citizens, includ-
ing Muslims. The report provides ten recommendations, which we strongly support.
• Acknowledge the problem [of anti-Muslim hatred].
• Raise awareness.
• Recognize and record bias motivation of anti-Muslim hate crime.
• Work with Muslim communities to identify security needs.
• Build trust between national authorities and Muslim communities.
• Identify security gaps to assess risks and prevent attacks.
• Provide extra protection to Muslim communities when necessary.
• Set up crisis response systems.
• Reassure the community if an attack takes place.
• Provide targeted support to victims.111
Apart from the above measures, it is urgent to fight Islamophobia on the dis-
cursive level. Measures should be taken against politicians and media organs that
spread Islamophobic rhetoric and/or even explicitly trigger hatred against Muslims.
This can be achieved through stricter legislation against hate speech and the applica-
tion of penalties and sanctions in case of offense, while at the same time protecting
freedom of speech. Yet, we are aware that Islamophobia in the form of structural
racism shapes European societies and embraces the entire political scope. As a result,
without far reaching that incorporate all spheres of society such as employment, edu-
cation, and the justice system, there cannot be effective action against Islamophobia.
In other words, it is important to challenge the white supremacist narrative of the
Great Replacement that paves the way to Islamophobic attacks. Unfortunately, the
32 reports compiled here indicate that such narratives are becoming popular in Eu-
rope. Especially given the rise of violent activities perpetuated by white supremacist
against minorities such as Jews, Muslims, and Roma as well as against politicians
who represent the humanitarian politics of welcoming refugees and celebrating di-
versity, there is a need to reassess the work of security agencies in general and secret
services in particular with regard to their focus on societal threats.
As stated in previous reports there exists a need to tackle Islamophobia system-
atically on a European level. We are happy that some of the recommendations have
been put into practice like setting up a European-level conference on Islamophobia
with the support of at least one EU member state or the European Parliament. Also,
we welcome the latest steps towards creating a working definition of Islamophobia.
This should lead, as we stated in the introduction to the European Islamophobia Re-
port 2017, to the adoption of a resolution towards combatting Islamophobia with
111. “Understanding Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes - Addressing the Security Needs of Muslim Communities: A Practi-
cal Guide”, OSCE.
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The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
concrete policy recommendations and ways forward as witnessed in the European
Parliament’s efforts to combat anti-Semitism and anti-Gypsyism.112
We also welcome the fact that certain European governments such as Germany
have included the fight against Islamophobia in their National Action Plans against Rac-
ism, as we recommended in EIR 2017.113 Still, many more countries should follow this
example and these action plans have to be developed further and backed by resources.
It is very much true that Europe needs courageous leaders and activists in all spheres
of life who are willing to confront the Islamophobic discourses and narratives, and es-
pecially to stand up to the exclusion of Muslim women from access to employment.
112. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, “The State of Islamophobia in Europe”, European Islamophobia Report 2017,
eds. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, (SETA, Istanbul: 2018), p. 26.
113. Ibid.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 31
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NUMBERS
• “The overwhelming majority of European states do not record Islamo-
phobic incidents as a separate category of hate crime. The recording of
anti-Muslim/Islamophobic crimes by the police as a separate category of
hate crime is essential to uncover the real extent of this problem and to
develop counter-strategies to combat it.
• In the EU, only 12% of Muslims who have been discriminated against
report their cases to the authorities. The non-exhaustive list that follows
hints at the extent of underreporting of anti-Muslim hate crimes in Europe
by states and NGOs, which has serious implications regarding the aware-
ness of Muslims and the bureaucracy to tackle these issues. The diverging
numbers in the countries hint to a different degree of awareness and orga-
nization.” (EIR 2018)
BELGIUM
• According to the Interfederal Centre
for Equal Opportunities (UNIA), there were
278 cases of Islamophobia in 2018.
• The CCIB registered 80 cases of Islamophobia
in 2018.
AUSTRIA
• The NGO Dokustelle documented 1,051 cases of
anti-Muslim hate crime, which is nearly twice as many
compared to 2018 (540 cases). The majority consists of the
spread of hate (757 cases), followed by 118 cases of insult,
and 43 cases of discrimination. (Source: Dokustelle)
• The NGO ZARA documented 1,950 racist acts.
According to the organization, 385 of the 1,950 documented
acts were anti-Muslim. (Source: ZARA)
BOSNIA
• Thirteen Islamophobic incidents were documented in 2019.
(Source: Commission for Free-dom of Religion – Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
32 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
FRANCE
• The Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France (CCIF)
received 789 report forms referring to 1,043 Islamophobic inci-
dents. Among them, 68 concern physical attacks (6.5%); 618 concern
discrimination (59.3%); 210 concern hate speech and incitement to
racial hatred (20.1%); 93 concern defamation (8.9%); 22 concern deg-
radation of sacred places (2.1%); and 32 are linked to the fight against
terrorism (3.1%). (Source: Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France [CCIF])
GERMANY
• In 2019, 871 hate crimes against Muslims were
reported to the police. Fifty-eight of them were crimes against
Muslim religious sites and in 46 crimes Muslims were physi-
cally in-jured by anti-Muslim racists.
(Source: German Federal Government)
ITALY
• According to a social research project on the condi-
tion of Islam in Italy, 65% of people interviewed
declared to have suffered violence, prejudice or
discrimination because of being Muslim; the percentage rises to
70% among women while wearing a veil represents the trig-
ger for verbal or physical assault both at work and in daily life.
(Source: Fabrizio Cioc-ca, L’Islam italiano. Un’indagine tra religione, identità e islamofobia)
SLOVENIA
• In 2018, there were 15 reported cases of discrimina-
tion based on disability (9.62%), followed by ethnicity, race, and ethnic
background (14 cases or 8.24% of which 8 cases are related to race and 4 cases
are related to race or ethnic background). Gender-based discrimination oc-
curred in 8 cases (4.71%), followed by religion or belief (7 cases or 4.12%);
age and sexual orientation (5 cases or 2.94% each); social status, financial
situation, and place of residence (2 cases or 1.18% each).
(Source: Report of the Advocate of the Principle of Equality for 2018).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 33
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
NORWAY
• In a report about attitudes towards hate speech
and discrimination from 2019, 44% of those asked consider
that Muslims are targets of hate speech. (Source: Guri Tyldum, Hold-
ninger til discriminering, likestilling og hatprat i Norge 2. Ut-gave. Fafo-rapport [2019]: 26)
DENMARK
• A survey of over 5,900
Danes concluded that about 28%
agreed/partly agreed that Muslim im-
migrants should be deported.
(Source: Mandag Morgen)
FINLAND
• Hate crimes retreated in 2018 by 22% to 910 cases
from the previous year, according to the latest figures. The lion’s share
was due to ethnic or national origin (69.7%) and religion (17%). Six-
ty-seven percent of hate crimes due to ethnic or national background
were reported by men and 33% by women. The most effected group by
nationality were Iraqis. Af-ter rising by 58% in 2017, hate crimes due to
religious background fell by 34% and the most affected were Muslims.
(Source: Police University College [Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu])
BULGARIA
• According to the Chief Mufti’s Office, 2 Islamophobic
incidents were documented in 2019. Both of them concern physi-
cal attacks on buildings (a mosque and a mufti office) related to the
Muslim community. Acts concerning discrimination, and hate speech
are not part of any official statistics.
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The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
LITHUANIA
• In the period of January-November 2019, a total of 31
criminal offenses were registered on the grounds foreseen under
Chapter XXV of the Criminal Code “Crimes and Misdemeanours against
a Person's Equal Rights and Freedom of Conscience.”
• Twenty-eight were on the grounds foreseen under Article
170 “Incitement against Any National, Racial, Ethnic, Religious or Other
Group of Persons.” Three were based on incitement against religion and
two on the grounds foreseen under Article 171 “Disturbance of Religious
Ceremonies or Religious Celebrations.”
• There were no registered criminal offenses based on
Article 169 “Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality, Race, Sex, Descent,
Religion or Belonging to Other Groups” dur-ing the reported period. (Source:
Data on criminal offences committed in the Republic of Lithuania)
• Sixteen complaints of discrimination on the grounds of
religion, belief, convictions and views were received in 2019, eight of
them on the grounds of religion. (Source: Office of the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson)
THE NETHERLANDS
• According to Nieuwwij’s report, 99%
of the articles on terrorism in the newspaper
De Telegraaf related to “Muslim terror,” while
articles on Islamophobia made up only 0.7% of
all articles related to Muslims. (Source: Nieuwwij.nl)
UNITED KINGDOM
• The upward trend in Islamophobic incidents in the UK
continued in the figures for 2018-19, with the number of cases recorded in
official statistics rising by 10%, religion-specific cases by 3%, and those re-
corded under the racial flag up by 11%. There were 3,530 recorded cases
of Islamophobic hate crime, representing 47% of all recorded religiously
motivated hate crime offences.
• The percentage of Muslim adults (16 or over) who were
victims of religiously motivated crime in 2017-18 was nearly double that
recorded for any other religious group (0.8%). In the London metropoli-
tan area, Islamophobic hate crimes fell by 10% in 2019 (average of 100
incidents per month), albeit against the backdrop of a larger-than-usual rise
in 2018. Still, ‘racist and religious hate crime’ overall figures grew by 11%
in 2019. (Source: Metropolitan Police, Hate Crime Dashboard)
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 35
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
POLAND
• According to the data pro-
vided by the Ministry of Interior and
Administration, the number of hate
crimes against Muslims investigated in
2019 in Poland was 32, down from
53 in 2018. These statistics are likely to
be grossly underestimated – according
to the Polish Om-budsman’s Office,
only 5% of hate crime is reported to
the police in Poland. (Source: The Ombudsman’s
Office and the Ministry of Interior and Administration)
IRELAND
• According to official
police data, as published
by the Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights
of the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, 15
anti-Muslim hate crimes were
recorded for the 2018 period.
(Source: OSCE ODIHR)
SPAIN
• There was an overall 11.6%
increase in hate crime: out
of 1,598 complaints, 69 related to
religion (33% less than in 2017) and
524 to racism and xenophobia (1.3%
more than in 2017). No segregated
statistics for anti-Muslim bias are
available. (Source: The National Office for Hate
Crimes 2018 Report)
36 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
ROMANIA
• Survey results by the Na-
tional Council for Combatting
Discrimination reveal that 68% of
Romanians have a lack of trust in
relation to people of Muslim faith,
while 62% of those interviewed
think that Muslims are potentially
dangerous. Around 39% of the
respondents would not accept
having a Muslim relative, 28%
would not accept having a Muslim
friend, and 19% would not accept
a Muslim co-worker. (Source: National
Council for Combatting Discrimination [NCCD])
SWITZERLAND
• The KONID Survey
2019, a representative
survey on the role of religious CZECH REPUBLIC
and social identities, re- • According to the Ministry
vealed that one in two Mus- of Interior in the first half of 2019
lims stated that they had there were 90 hate-motivated crimes.
been discriminated against (Source: Ministerstvo vnitra)
based on their religious
identity. (Source: KONID Survey 2019)
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 37
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST
MUSLIMS IN EUROPE
Violent acts are an outcome of the violent ideology of racist dehumaniza-
tion. Muslims are increasingly becoming victims of physical attacks solely
because of their faith.
BELGIUM
• Muslim woman stabbed by her mother because she converted to Islam
(Source: DH Net)
• Muslim woman stabbed in front of her three young children in Ander-
lecht. (Source: SudInfo)
BOSNIA
• In Rogatica, Elvir Bahto, a Bosniak returnee, was attacked by his neighbor
with a shovel. (Source: AFP)
DENMARK
• Violent attack against a hijab-wearing 17-year-old girl. Her hijab was
ripped off, she was verbally assaulted with racist slurs and physically
assaulted with kicks to her head and punches to her body. The attack
happened in the afternoon and perpetrator was a Danish man in his 30s
or 40s. (Source: TV2)
ESTONIA
• Woman wearing a hijab was spat on in Tartu. (Source: Johannes Mihkelson Centre)
FINLAND
• Left Alliance candidate for parliament, Suldaan Said Ahmed, was physi-
cally attacked and harassed verbally while waiting for the metro. (Source: Yle)
FRANCE
• A supporter of the National Rally (far right) attempted to set fire to the
mosque of Bayonne and shot two individuals in front of the mosque,
wounding one severely. The attacker was then arrested in his home
38 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
and charged with attempted murder and destruction of property com-
mitted for reasons of race or religion by dangerous means to persons.
(Source: France Info)
GERMANY
• CDU politician Walter Lübcke who campaigned for the admission of refu-
gees was murdered by a right-wing extremist.
GREECE
• In May, an attack took place in the Muslim cemetery of the city of Alex-
androupolis. Nazi symbols were written on tombs and leaflets with the
slogan “Greece belongs to the Greeks” were thrown throughout the cem-
etery. The act was perpetrated by Golden Dawn supporters as was clear
from the leaflets. (Source: Efimerida ton Syntakton)
HUNGARY
• Four young people were severely beaten at a summer music festival in
Hungary for being considered “migrants.”
IRELAND
• Two Muslim men were attacked in a seemingly premeditated attack while
on their way home from a mosque in the city. (Source: The Irish Examiner)
KOSOVO
• A historical mosque (xhamia e Namazgjahut) was vandalized in Prizren.
(Source: inFokus)
MALTA
• Ivorian migrant Lassana Cisse was murdered in a racially motivated attack.
(Source: UNHCR Malta)
THE NETHERLANDS
• A banner stating insulting phrases was placed on a window frame of the
As-Sunnah Mosque in The Hague. In front of the banner a mannequin
dressed in “Arab clothes” was placed, half uncovered and with a beard and
a baby doll attached to his crotch. (Source: Republiek Allochtonie)
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 39
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
NORTH MACEDONIA
• Police with inspectors appeared at the mosque in Strumica to lower the
volume of the adhan. (Source: Ina Online)
NORWAY
• An Islamophobic terror attack took place on the Al-Noor Islamic Centre –
Mosque outside Oslo by the right-wing extremist Philip Manshaus on 10
August. He was disarmed by senior Muslims before he could inflict much
damage, but one person was injured. (Source: All News Media in Norway)
POLAND
• In January, Paweł Adamowicz, the mayor of Gdańsk and a vocal advocate
for receiving refugees, was fatally stabbed during an open-air event cel-
ebrating a nationwide charitable collection “in aid of paediatric hospitals.”
(Source: AFP)
RUSSIA
• In May, a prayer house built on private territory was demolished in the vil-
lage of Svoboda in the Kaliningrad region. (Source: Radio Svoboda)
SERBIA
• In April, a series of attacks took place targeting an Albanian bakery in the
Belgrade neighbourhood of Borča. (Source: N1)
SPAIN
• In December, at least 7 individuals brutally beat an unaccompanied
migrant minor in Zaragoza, sinking his skull and then fleeing, leaving the
17-year-old boy lying on the street. (Source: Heraldo)
SWITZERLAND
• In Lausanne, a 14-year-old schoolgirl wearing a headscarf in the metro
was described by an elderly man as a “slut” and “Muslim filth.” He told her
that she should “return to her country.” (Source: GRA Chronology)
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The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
UK
• On 21 March, five mosques are attacked and vandalized in Birmingham.
(Source: Euronews)
• Hours after the massacre in Christchurch, New Zealand, a worshipper
sustained head injuries outside Ashaadibi Centre Mosque in Whitechapel,
London. (Source: Aljazeera)
• On 28 August, two women in traditional Islamic dress were viciously
attacked and sustained serious injuries in South Ealing Underground Sta-
tion in London. (Source: The Independent)
• In June, two security staff of the Dar Ul-Isra Mosque in Cardiff, Wales suf-
fered minor injuries following an attack by two men armed with knives
(Source: Wales Online)
• On 11 November, an arson attack occurred against a place of worship in
Havenhill. (Source: Haverhill Echo)
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 41
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ISLAMOPHOBIC STATEMENTS
BY POLITICIANS
Islamophobic language by high-ranking politicians, mostly from the far right,
normalizes a dehumanizing and racist language when it comes to the por-
trayal of Muslims. This reduces the threshold of what is considered utterable
and overall acceptable in public discourse and legitimizes discrimination of
Muslims as human beings and as citizens.
AUSTRIA
• FPÖ Viennese chairman Dominik Nepp published a press release, in which
he spoke about “Muslim sexual delinquents, who see our daughters and
women as unprotected game from their misanthropic perception of
women.” According to Nepp, Shariah would rule in schools, where Mus-
lims make up the majority in Vienna.
• Chancellor Sebastian Kurz stated, “Politicians are urgently required to
protect our free society from political Islam and its excesses, such as anti-
Semitism.” (Source: Kleine Zeitung)
• During Austria’s most important weekly political debate on TV following
the murder of four women within one week, State Secretary Karoline Edt-
stadler (ÖVP) argued that there was no patriarchy in Austria. Rather, this
was due to “imported patriarchy” (from Muslim immigrants).
BELGIUM
• Local Koekelberg town councillor, Lucas Ducarme stated, “I don’t want
Koekelberg to become Molenbeek.” (Source: La Capitale)
BOSNIA
• President of Croatia Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović referred to B&H as “very
unstable, and [..] in some respects [has] been taken over by people who
have connections with Iran and terrorist organizations. The country is
now controlled by militant Islam.” (Source: Le Monde)
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The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
BULGARIA
• Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and leader of the Internal
Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) Krassimir Karakachanov
stated, “Gypsies in Bulgaria have become extremely arrogant… It’s a fact
that since the last year or two they have started adopting Islam.” (Source:
Deutsche Welle)
• Member of the European Parliament and vice-chairman of IMRO Angel
Dzhambazki stated, “We have always insisted that the (Roma) ghetto
should be demolished. And we will demolish it. Because the ghetto is
an ulcer. Because the ghetto is the soil in which the poisonous weeds of
Islamic radicalism grow.” (Source: Angel Dzhambazki’s blog)
CROATIA
• In July 2019, President of the Republic of Croatia Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic,
who won the 2014 presidential elections as a candidate of the right-wing
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), visited Israel on the occasion of the
Holocaust commemoration. One of the most influential Israeli newspa-
pers, The Jerusalem Post, published an article claiming that during the
meeting of Croatia’s president with Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, Grabar-
Kitarovic stated, “Bosnia and Herzegovina is a very unstable country and
under the control of militant Islam; in some aspects it has been taken over
by people associated with Iran and terrorists.” The president of the Re-
public of Croatia denied having said what was published in the Jerusalem
Post. (Source: Jutarnji.hr)
• Presidential candidate Anto Djapic from the political party Right accused
Muslims in Bosnia of cooperating with Serbs in the Islamization of Croa-
tian territory. (Source: Dnevno.hr)
CZECH REPUBLIC
• MP for the Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SDP) Karla Maříková
stated, “It is forbidden to import invasive, non-indigenous species of
plants and animals to the European Union. Muslim immigrants are also
non-indigenous inhabitants in Europe and the same way as other invasive
species they represent unexpected expansion and gradual supplanting
of indigenous inhabitants of Europe. Therefore, they should be forbidden
from entering the EU.” (Source: iRozhlas)
DENMARK
• Referring to a survey that showed that 28% of Danes want to deport
Muslims, Inger Støjberg (former integration minister and MP for Venstre)
said, “When the survey shows this, it is probably because there are a lot
of people who feel the way I do; I am so tired of hearing about Islam here
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 43
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
and there as a justification or poor excuse for everything from the crazi-
est terrorist acts to so-called honor-related violence, the demand to curb
freedom of speech and right to criticize religion, the lack of equality, the
demand for special treatment in the workplace, the school, or the swim-
ming pool.” (Source: B.T.)
ESTONIA
• Helle-Moonika Helme, the wife of the chair of the Far Right Party,
stated the following: “They are Muslims, they carry another culture
that is dangerous to us. They have already done their evil deeds.”
(Source: Eesti Päevaleht)
• Member of the European Parliament Jaak Madison (EKRE) shared his opin-
ion that the Notre-Dame de Paris fire could be an accident, but could also
be the work of Muslims. He added that many Muslims were happy about
the fire. (Source: Facebook)
FINLAND
• Petteri Orpo, chairperson of the National Coalition Party, stated, “One
must have the ability and will to adapt to Finnish society. We do not have
to change our own society because different people come here. We have
to be tolerant of difference, tolerant of [people’s] background, but in
Finland we live under Finnish laws.” (Source: Verkkouutiset)
FRANCE
• The Minister of Interior Christophe Castaner is heard by the French Na-
tional Assembly about the attack on the Paris Police Headquarter. Follow-
ing Macron’s speech, he calls on the French people to report to the police
any “weak signals of radicalization,” i.e. “having a beard; an exaggerated
practice of religion especially during Ramadan; ostentatious prayer; not
kissing the opposite gender; not wanting to work with women.” A few
days later, in the French Senate, he said that this was just a list of “signs
that could help to identify a radicalization towards radical Islam, political
Islam, and terrorism.” (Source: BFM TV)
GERMANY
• Thilo Sarrazin, former senator for finances in Berlin (Social Democrat-
ic Party) and author of Islamophobic books, stated, “In addition to the
measures that we have to take in Germany and in European coun-
tries, we must make a very clear decision to prevent immigration
from Muslim countries as completely as possible for many decades to
come.” (Source: YouTube)
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The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
GREECE
• Kyriakos Velopoulos, leader of Elliniki Lyssi (Hellenic Solution) stated in
parliament, “[Islam] is not a religion; it is a politico-religious ideology. It is
a judicial system since the mufti is also a judge. As a consequence, it is a
political-judicial system. Islam is incompatible with the legal culture and
the morals of western societies. If you [i.e. the government] from the love
you have for Ibrahim and Hassan [i.e. Muslim migrants] and not for Gior-
gos, Nikos, Stavros [i.e. Greeks] think that you can close your eyes, you are
wrong. Don’t you know, gentlemen, what Islam says about homosexuals?
You close your eyes? Don’t you know? They murder them. Don’t you know
that? Don’t you know what Islam says about women? That they have
to wear a burqa and that they have to accept clitoridectomy. You didn’t
know that either?” (Source: Kathimerini)
HUNGARY
• PM Viktor Orban campaign speech for the European Election contained
the following: “Our Christian civilization is at stake in the upcoming Euro-
pean parliamentary election.” (Source: Hungary Today)
IRELAND
• In August, video footage emerged on social media wherein member of
Anti-Corruption Ireland Gemma O’Doherty stated that hijabs “should be
burned.” (Source: Twitter)
ITALY
• The Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini stated, “We do not want to end up
like Sweden, this is not integration! NO to the EURABIA. Oriana, look at us
from heaven. SWEDEN ATTACKED. STOP EURABIA!” (Source: Twitter)
MALTA
• Maurice Mizzi, chairman of Guardian for Future Generations, which is a
government-appointed commission intended to promote sustainable
development in policymaking, stated, “We are living in a Catholic country,
and when I die, I want to die in a Catholic country. At the moment, there
are so many Muslims coming – they’re all having nine babies, next to our
two – and they will take over eventually.” (Source: Times of Malta)
MONTENEGRO
• Andrija Mandic, MP (Democratic Front), strongly “advised” Muslims not
to vote for the proposed Law on Freedom of Religion or Beliefs, other-
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 45
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
wise they will suffer horrific consequences. He concluded, “There are
more hidden weapons in Montenegro than anywhere else; the weapons
that will be unburied as soon as the first drop of blood falls. We will not
seek justice through the legal system, but rather personally knock on
the doors of those who did us injustice. That is the message you have to
understand.” (Source: n1info.com)
THE NETHERLANDS
• Prime Minister Mark Rutte stated throughout the debate on the Cornelius
Haga school that “he wouldn’t send his children there.” (Source: Het Parool)
NORTH MACEDONIA
• Dimitar Apasiev, a politician from the Left (Levica) stated, “There is no left-
wing government in the world that has not banned wearing the heads-
carf/hijab! A right-wing feminist throws the headscarf with indignation,
as a victory over patriarchal morality, and does not wear it. Only our NGO
Sorospi ‘feminists’ are defending this religious seduction of women.” (Source:
Republika Online)
NORWAY
• Progress Party leader Siv Jensen published a feature article on the “covert
Islamization” of Norway. (Source: VG [Verdens Gang])
POLAND
• Law and Justice Member of Parliament Dominik Tarczyński stated, “We
don’t want Poland to be taken over by Muslims, Buddhists, or anybody
else… and nobody will ever force us to receive Muslims, Buddhists, and
non-believers in huge numbers… For me, a multicultural society is not a
worthwhile value… it is not a virtue.” (Source: Al-Jazeera)
ROMANIA
• Traian Basescu, the former president of Romania who was elected as a
MEP in 2019, stated that he wants to get involved in protecting Europe’s
borders from a “Muslim invasion” and that the European Union should
work on stopping migrants from reaching Europe illegally, including in
international waters. (Source: Digi 24)
• Mihai Chirica, the current mayor of Iaşi, made racist statements referring
to Congolese, Somalis, Syrians, and people from other nations as “[na-
tions] that just came down from the tree.” (Source: Digi 24)
46 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
SERBIA
• Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić stated that political representatives of
Kosovo Albanians “are people from the forest.” (Source: Primer Minister statement for
the press)
SLOVAKIA
• Former Prime Minister and Chairman of Smer-SD: “Islam has no place in
Slovakia!” (Source: Nový čas)
• “I don't want a comprehensive Muslim community here. I don't. Okay. And
let everybody say what they want. They have coherent communities that
change the nature of our lives. We can't allow to change the character of
the Slovak Republic. It is a Christian country. For God's sake, however, let
us guard some of the values on which we stand, because we will also start
to question this elementary fact , which holds us anyway, so this country
will go in a particularly bad way.” (Source: .týždeň)
SPAIN
• Santiago Abascal, the leader of Vox party and a member of the Congress
of Deputies stated, “Islamists want to destroy Europe and western society
by celebrating the fire of #NotreDame. Take it into account before it´s too
late.” (Source: HuffPost)
SWITZERLAND
• At the National Council, SVP National Councillor Erich von Siebenthal
spoke out in favor of the initiative “No Muslim army chaplains in our
army” because, according to him, the goal of Islam was “world domina-
tion.” (Source: Official Bulletin of Swiss Parliament)
UK
• A dossier containing 110 incidents of Islamophobic content posted online
by Conservative Party members is passed on to ITV.
The comments made by people alleging to be Conservative Party mem-
bers include:
– "We are letting our children down by allowing this cult to take over our
country."
– "We don’t have a politician strong enough in the UK to lead us away from
this infestation."
– "They cause mayhem wherever they decide to invade." (Source: ITV)
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 47
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
LEGALIZING ISLAMOPHOBIA
Governments and political parties implement or demand legislations that
directly target Muslims as religious subjects, treating them differently than
members of other religious communities.
AUSTRIA
• After a hijab ban in kindergarten was already implemented in 2018, the ÖVP
invited the anti-Muslim author Zana Ramadani as an expert to the education
committee to expand the hijab ban up to 10 years of age. She argued, “Once
you wear it [hijab, Farid Hafez] as a girl, you won't take it off.” The proposed
text bans “wearing ideological or religious clothing, with which a covering of
the head is connected.”
• In September 2019, shortly before the new national parliamentary elections,
the FPÖ submitted an amendment to change to School Teaching Act to
include a hijab ban for pupils up to the age of 14 as well as for teachers. “The
headscarf is a symbol of political Islam and has no place in educational institu-
tions,” said FPÖ chairman Norbert Hofer. Due to considerations of fundamen-
tal rights, the initiative was postponed.
BELGIUM
• Halal slaughter ban introduced in Flanders (1 January 2019) and Wallonia (1
September 2019).
• Flemish governmental agreement limited visible faith symbols in education
and employment in Flanders.
BULGARIA
• Prosecutor General Sotir Tsatsarov rewarded prosecutor Nedialka Popova
from the Pazardzhik District Prosecutor’s Office for her performance during a
case regarding the alleged spread of radical Islam, a year after she delivered
an Islamophobic speech and was removed from the case.
CZECH REPUBLIC
• Repeated but unsuccessful attempts by the party Freedom and Direct De-
mocracy to ban Islam and the hijab. The initiatives found no support in the
parliament.
48 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
DENMARK
• On 1 January 2019, it became mandatory to shake public officials’ hands dur-
ing citizenship ceremonies.
FRANCE
• A bill to ensure so-called religious neutrality of persons contributing to the
public service of education (i.e. banning headscarf in those services) was
drafted by the Senate. The Senate, with a right-wing majority, adopted the
bill on 29 October 2019 at the first reading. The National Assembly has yet to
discuss the bill.
IRELAND
• Cork-based independent local election candidate, Joe O’Callaghan, a former
lord mayor of the city, called for a ban to be placed on Islamic face coverings
in Ireland. O’Callaghan referred to such face coverings as “a joke in this day
and age, particular in these dangerous times we live in… it’s a question of
security and integration.”
ITALY
• In 2019, the Court of Appeal of Milan authorized the use of illustrated signs to
prohibit access to health facilities of individuals wearing a burqa.
THE NETHERLANDS
• In May 2019, the PVV called for a ban on several Islamic expressions, such as
the building of mosques and the printing of the Qur’an, informally referred to
as the “Anti-Islam Law.”
SPAIN
• The Ministry of Education of the Autonomous Community of Madrid and the
Ombudsman allowed schools to ban the Islamic veil.
SWITZERLAND
• In the canton of Geneva, a referendum approved a law prohibiting "visible
religious features" in the civil service and in plenary sessions of the legislature.
Events on public grounds may be prohibited if "conspicuous religious fea-
tures" are displayed.
• The Geneva Constitutional Court partially revised the law on secularity in No-
vember 2019. Members of parliament may continue to wear signs of religious
affiliation such as headscarves.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 49
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ISLAMOPHOBIA
IN THE MEDIA
The media plays a crucial role in the reproduction and normalization of anti-
Muslim racism.
ALBANIA
On Ora News, Kastriot Myftaraj,
a well-known Islamophobe,
commented on the terror-
ist attack in Christchurch and
indirectly suggested undertak-
ing similar action in Albania. A
visual analysis of the still image
from the TV show, shows Scan-
derbeg, the Albanian national
hero, pointing to a minaret with his sword, a clear indication of what the host of
the show wanted to communicate to his audience.
AUSTRIA
In an opinion piece by Christian Ultsch in Die Presse, the author commented on the
Christchurch terrorist attacks with the following: “Anyone who draws exaggerated
conclusions about a ‘structural hatred of Islam’ from the bloody deed of a fascist in
New Zealand is wrong.”
BOSNIA
The newspaper Novosti RS
falsely claimed in a title,
“Hundreds of Jihadists Are
Arriving to B&H.”
50 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
CROATIA
Ivica Sola, a Croatian theo-
logian, professor, commu-
nicologist, and journalist
for Globus wrote columns in
which he argued that Islam is
masculine to the point of be-
ing brutal (as opposed to the
feminized Europe), and that it
takes advantage of the com-
motion to sneak up on the
“woman” Europe. (Source:
Narod.hr)
CZECH REPUBLIC
Reflex published an article with the title “Muslims Are Conquering Czech Judiciary;
Their Women in Hijab Will Sit in Our Schools.”
FINLAND
In January, a commentator
of Iltalehti TV claimed that
the Oulu sexual assault
cases are the result of im-
migration. He stated, “We
received too many asylum
seekers.”
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
FRANCE
On 28 September 2019,
the polemist Eric Zem-
mour’s public speech was
broadcasted by the right-
wing news channel LCI.
He stated, “In the street,
women in hijab and men
in djellaba are propaganda
in fact, an Islamization of
the street. [They wear] uni-
forms of an occupying army [that] reminds the defeated of his submission. The old
expression ‘Immigration, Integration, Assimilation’ has been replaced by ‘Invasion,
Colonization, Occupation.’”
GERMANY
The newspaper Bild re-
ported on a daycare center
which does not want to
serve pork anymore with
the title “Out of Respect
the ‘Salvation’ Daycare
Centre Takes Pork off the
Menu.” The headline was
on the front page of the
print and online versions.
GREECE
The front page of the extreme-right
newspaper Eleftheros Kosmos (Free World)
states “Islam Invaded Athens. Fears about a
Terrorist Attack during Christmas.”
52 setav.org
38
protect the “native” people
The of Hungary.
state As leader
of Islamophobia of the far-right
in Europe ın 2019 Evangelical Ch
network, Hit Gyülekezete, Németh takes as his mission the protection of Christian Europ
in particular, the preservation of Hungarian values.
HUNGARY
The article on news portal
Origo features a conspiracy
theory about the Hungarian
Islam Advocacy Associa-
tion (MIJE) teaming up with
human rights organizations
Helsinki Committee and
the Hungarian Civil Liber-
ties Union, which the article
refers to as the Hungarian
lawyers of George Soros,
Figureto
4: The headline of pro-government news portal, Origo, follows the governmental propaganda
settle migrants in Hungary.
“Hungarian Fake Muslim Rights Advocates Terrorizing the (Political) Right.” The article repeats th
conspiracy theory about the Hungarian Islam Advocacy Association (MIJE) teaming up with the lawyers of
Soros to settle migrants in Hungary 39.
MONTENEGRO
In another case, the headline of Magyar Nemzet quotes Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt S
saying, “Hungary will not let churchesThe
turnweb
intoportal in4s.net
shopping malls and mosques.” The stat
ran the headline “UN’s Says
was one of many expressed at the 2nd International Conference on Christian Persecution
There Was No Genocide in
in November, implying that Islam poses a clear and
Srebrenica. ” present danger to Christianity in Hu
and, furthermore, globally. 40 There are a number of other examples of media outlets tha
orchestrated the government’s Islamophobic stance, such as when Pesti srácok interv
Miklós Maróth, the new president of the Eötvös Loránd Research Network (ELKH) th
formed after the Hungarian Academy of Sciences lost its battle over its network of re
institutions to the government. In the interview, Maróth states that Islam is violent and am
This was not the first time Maróth made Islamophobic statements. Among others, earlier
38
Sándor Németh, “The European Union and Hungary”, Hit.hu, 22 September
https://www.hit.hu/hirek/european-union-and-hungary, (Access date: 30 April 2019).
39
Origo, “Magyarországi muszlim áljogvédők a jobboldaliakat terrorizálják”, Origo, 30 April
https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20190430-magyarorszagi-muszlim-aljogvedok-a-jobboldali-velemenyformal
vegzaljak.html, (Access date: 1 March 2020).
40
“Semjén Zsolt: Magyarországon nem lesz egyetlen templomból sem bevásárlóközpont, sem mecset”,
Nemzet, 26 November 2019, https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfd/semjen-zsolt-magyarorszagon-nem-lesz-eg
templombol-sem-bevasarlokozpont-sem-mecset-7533299/, (Access date: 16 January 2020).
41
Kata Jurák, “Maróth Miklós professzor: A multikulti hatása alatt álló fiatalok álomvilágban élnek és
hiszékenyek”, Petsi srácok, 28 December 2019, https://pestisracok.hu/maroth-miklos-professzor-a-mu
hatasa-alatt-allo-fiatalok-alomvilagban-elnek-es-nagyon-hiszekenyek-ps-interju, (Access date: 15 January
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 53
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
THE
NETHERLANDS
The AIVD published its
report on the newly founded
Islamic school Cornelius
Haga, falsely claiming it had
ties with Salafism. It led to
extensive debates and media
coverage for the rest of the
year. The premier Mark Rutte
declared that he “wouldn't
send his child there.”
NORWAY
In September, Human
Right Service published an
article with the title: “Will
Erna and Company Stop
the Extremists’ Plan for a
New Big Mosque and Pros-
elyting Centre for Young
People?”
54 setav.org
The state of Islamophobia in Europe ın 2019
SERBIA
Informer published a story
on an alleged Muslim inva-
sion of Bosnia. The title read,
“It Smells Like the Nineties!
Americans Insert Jihadists
into BiH and Prepare ‘Alija’s
Scenario’: Terrorism Expert
Reveals What Lies Behind
Muslim Invasion.”
ROMANIA
After a handball match between Romanian teams, Pagina de Media website stated
that “AHC Olimpia Braila, a tiny Christian team had a match with the Muslim con-
glomerate of HC Dunarea Braila, who absorbs money from the Quran.” Comparing
the game to a crusade, the publication added, “Victory was obtained by the team led
by [Christian] God, in detriment to the Quran, who sponsored the team that was sold
by the authorities to a sheik.”
SLOVENIA
Nova 24TV published an
article condemning the
possibility of halal food in
a public elementary school
claiming that children are
treated unequally because
the school has offered
pork-free meal options for
Muslim children.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
SPAIN
El País published an op-
ed questioning the rights
of Muslim women. “The
Importance of a Piece of
Cloth. Those who want to
convince us of the innocu-
ousness of the hijab are
precisely those who do not
understand that the dignity
of women is above all con-
sideration and, if necessary,
of any divine text.”
56 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
ALBANIA
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
NADA DOSTI
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 57
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
58 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
The Author
Nada Dosti holds an MA in English teaching from the University of Tirana, Alba-
nia, and finished her studies (MA) in journalism at the Faculty of Media and Com-
munication, University of Ankara, Turkey. With an experience of ten years already as
a journalist and an activist trying to be a voice for Muslim women in Albania by writ-
ing articles, Dosti responds publicly to Islamophobic attacks in media - especially on
the topic of the hijab - by giving interviews and participating in public debates. She
is the founder of Muslimania.al, a portal dedicated to Muslim women that promotes
success stories, challenges Islamophobia, and gives a voice to Muslim women to share
their concerns and opinions. Email: nada.dosti@gmail.com
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Nada Dosti: Islamophobia in Albania: National Report 2019, in: Enes Bayraklı & Farid
Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 59
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
This report records and analyzes Islamophobic incidents between January and De-
cember 2019. The report notes that there is an obsession among various portals, as
well as media practitioners regarding Islam and Muslims filled with negative ste-
reotypes and anti-Muslim sentiments. Furthermore, Muslims in Albania continue
to face difficulties in the job market, and often experience levels of discrimination
during job interviews.
During 2019, various Islamophobic and xenophobic incidents have been re-
ported, including physical attacks on sites, such as vandalistic attacks on the Turkish
Memorial in the capital Tirana which is dedicated to the memory of martyrs of the
15 July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. The incident follows the trend of other similar
provocative incidents that have been occurring in the last few years during the cele-
bration of Eid in Albania.
Similarly, there have been countless hate speech posts on social media from
journalists, TV hosts, as well as on Islamophobic Facebook pages. Journalists such
as Anila Basha, for instance, have called on Albanian people to unite under one
Christian flag, quoting from a book which has been criticized for using Islamopho-
bic language, while the author, Ben Blushi, a politician and writer, is known for his
Islamophobic stances. Others, like Mustafa Nano, an Islamophobic central figure in
Albanian media, have mocked Muslim public figures on TV such as Elvis Naçi, a
local imam in Tirana and the president of the Firdeus Foundation, a charity founda-
tion, for getting emotional during one of his sermons, claiming that such a reaction
was hypocritical.
In the same vain, the aftermath of the devastating earthquake on 26 November
2019 in Albania, was followed by a wave of hate speech and anti-Muslim sentiment
on social media after the Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama posted a number of re-
ligious quotes on his Facebook page under the heading “The Sacred Words.” Despite
the identity nature of Islamophobia in Albania, the report notes that, Islamophobic
incidents are mostly limited to an exclusive group of individuals, media, and politi-
cians, who frame the Albanian identity as an exclusively European one, and see Islam
and Muslims as a “foreign body” that has no place in Albanian society. Furthermore,
Islamophobia and Turkophobia in Albania are strictly connected, where the latest is
only a dimension of the general anti-Muslim sentiments promoted especially by a
section of the intellectual elite in the country. Turks, Arabs, Iranians, and other Mus-
lim nations are considered part of the “Islamic Orient,” which is seen as opposed to
the Westernization of Albanians. The incidents included in this report represent only
a small portion of the real problem of Islamophobia in Albania. Therefore, we can say
that Islamophobia in Albania is far more prevalent than the data available suggests.
60 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
Përmbledhje e shkurtër
Ky raport analizon rastet islamofobe të ndodhura midis janarit dhe dhjetorit 2019.
Raporti thekson se ekziston një tendencë në mesin e disa portaleve dhe figurave me-
diatike në lidhje me Islamin dhe muslimanët ku mbizotërojnë stereotipet negative
dhe ndjenjat anti-islame. Po ashtu, muslimanët në Shqipëri vazhdojnë të përballen
me vështirësi në tregun e punës, dhe shpesh përjetojnë nivele diskriminimi gjatë
intervistave për punë.
Gjatë vitit 2019 janë raportuar incidente të ndryshme islamofobe dhe kseno-
fobe, përfshirë sulme fizike ndaj objekteve, siç është vandalizimi i “Memorialit Turk”
në Tiranë kushtuar dëshmorëve që humbën jetën në 15 korrik 2016 gjatë tentativës
për grusht-shteti në Turqi. Ky incident pason incidente të ngjashme provokuese që
kanë ndodhur vitet e fundit gjatë festimit të Bajramit në Shqipëri.
Ngjashëm, ka pasur postime të panumërta në mediat sociale nga gazetarë, dre-
jtues programesh televizive, si dhe faqe islamofobe në Facebook të mbushura me
gjuhë urrejtjeje. Gazetarë si Anila Basha për shembull i kanë bërë thirrje shqiptarëve
të bashkohet nën një flamur të krishterë, duke cituar nga një libër që është kritikuar
për përdorimin e gjuhës islamofobe, ndërsa autori i tij, Ben Blushi, një politikan dhe
shkrimtar, është i njohur për qëndrimet e tij islamofobe. Ndërsa të tjerë, si Mustafa
Nano, një figure e rëndësishme islamofobe në media, është tallur me figura publike
muslimane si Elvis Naçi, imam në Tiranë, për shkak të një reagimi të tij emocional
gjatë një prej predikimeve të tij, duke pretenduar se një reagim i tillë është hipokrizi.
Po ashtu, periudha pas tërmetit shkatërrues më 26 nëntor 2019 në Shqipëri, u
pasuan nga një valë gjuhë urrejtjeje dhe ndjenjash anti-muslimane në rrjetet sociale
kur Kryeministri i Shqipërisë, Edi Rama postoi një numër citatesh fetare, të quajtura
“Fjalët e Shenjta”. Përkundër natyrës identitare të islamofobisë në Shqipëri, raporti
vëren se, incidentet islamofobe kryesisht janë të kufizuara në një grup ekskluziv të
individëve, mediave dhe politikanëve, të cilët e konsiderojnë identitetin shqiptar si të
lidhur pazgjidhshmërisht me Evropën, dhe e shohin Islamin dhe muslimanët si “një
trup i huaj” që nuk ka vend në shoqërinë shqiptare. Për më tepër, islamofobia dhe
turkofobia në Shqipëri janë të lidhura fort, ku kjo e fundit është vetëm një dimen-
sion i ndjenjave të përgjithshme anti-muslimane të promovuara veçanërisht nga disa
elita intelektuale në vend. Turqit, arabët, iranianët apo kombet e tjera myslimane
konsiderohen pjesë e “Orientit Islamik”, i cili shihen në kundërshtim me perën-
dimorizimin e shqiptarëve. Incidentet e përfshira në këtë raport paraqesin vetëm
një pjesë të problemit real të islamofobisë në Shqipëri. Prandaj, mund të themi se
islamofobia në Shqipëri është shumë më e përhapur nga sa sugjerojnë të dhënat në
dispozicion.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 61
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: Albania
Type of Regime: Democratic Republic
Form of Government: Constitutional Republic
Ruling Parties: Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë)
Opposition Parties: Democratic Party of Albania (Partia Demokratike e
Shqipërisë), Socialist Movement for Integration (Lëvizja Socialiste për Integrim)
Last Elections: 2017 Parliamentary Election (Socialist Party 48.34%; Demo-
cratic Party 28.85%; Socialist Movement for Integration 14.28%).
Total Population: 2,862,427 million (as of January 2019, INSTAT)
Major Languages: Albanian
Official Religion: No official religion (secularism)
Statistics on Islamophobia: N/A
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: N/A
Major Religions (% of Population): Islam (56.7%), Catholicism (10%), Or-
thodoxy (6.75%), Bektashism (2.1%), Non-affiliated (5.49%), Undeclared (13.8%),
Atheists (2.5%), Other Christians (0.14%) (INSTAT/Census 2011)
Muslim Population (% of Population): 1.587 million (56.7%) (INSTAT/
Census 2011)
Main Muslim Community Organizations: The Muslim Community of Al-
bania (Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë - KMSH); The Albanian Imam’s League
(Lidhja e Hoxhallarëve të Shqipërisë - LHSH); The Muslim Forum of Albania (Forumi
Musliman i Shqipërisë)
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: The Muslim Forum of Albania (Fo-
rumi Musliman i Shqipërisë)
Far-Right Parties: N/A
Far-Right Movements: N/A
Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: N/A
Limitations to Islamic Practices:
– Hijab Ban: None
– Halal Slaughter Ban: None
– Minaret Ban: None
– Circumcision Ban: None
– Burqa Ban: None
– Prayer Ban: None
62 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
Introduction
In recent years, Muslims in Albania have experienced an intensification of Islam-
ophobia in various spheres of life, including employment, education, media repre-
sentation, justice system, etc., with negative opinions and stereotyping, as well as
hate speech on mainstream media, social media, and other online platforms. This
discrimination against Albanian Muslims has been fueled by many media pundits,
journalists, and politicians in Albania.
Due to the nature of Islamophobia in Albania, which is mainly related to identity
politics, as previous reports1 and studies2 have found, the anti-Muslim discourse has
become a normalized rhetoric where various forms of Islamophobia can be observed in
media, politics, social media, textbooks, etc. While many politicians and media -espe-
cially online media- have been quick to report and condemn any kind of criminal act
committed by alleged Muslims around the world, they have failed to condemn any act
of Islamophobia against the Muslim population in any part of the world. Similarly, the
mainstream media has failed more than once to acknowledge and correct fake news
reported about certain Albanian Muslims and their alleged plans for terrorist attacks.
Furthermore, for many people, the phenomenon of Islamophobia seems un-
likely to exist in a Muslim-majority country like Albania. Therefore, the existence
of Islamophobia in Albania has often been denied as a phenomenon, particularly in
relation to main Islamophobic figures. For instance, the Albanian (Kosovar) journal-
ist Arbana Xharra, known for her Islamophobic stances, has stated various times in
the media that “there is no such things as Islamophobia, but there is Albanophobia.”3
Others have claimed that Islam is a political ideology and that it is normal to have
prejudice and phobia towards such an ideology. At the same time, these individuals
totally ignore the relationship between the discrimination experienced by Albanian
Muslims and Islamophobia as a phenomenon.4
1 Besnik Sinani and Elton Hatibi, “Islamophobia in Albania National Report 2017”, European Islamophobia Report
2017, ed. Enes Bayrakli and Farid Hafez (Ankara: SETA, 2018).
2 Rezart Beka, “Islamophobia in the Contemporary Albanian Public Discourse”, Islamophobia in Muslim Majority
Societies, ed. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez (Routledge, New York: 2019), p. 45
3 “A i paragjykojmë muslimanët”, TV Klan, Youtube, 5 October 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
HZF0QV_DENY&feature=emb_title, (Access date: 30 December 2019).
4 “Bashkëjetesa me islamofobinë në Shqipëri”, E-zani.com, 4 August 2019, http://www.e-zani.com/2019/04/08/
bashkejetesa-me-islamofobine/, (Access date: 30 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 63
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents
and Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
In March 2019, during two days of protests from the opposition in front of the Albanian
Parliament, the police special forces occupied the premises of the Great Mosque in Tirana,
which is under the administration of the Muslim Community of Albania and currently
under construction, and used it as an observation point to monitor the protesters. Follow-
ing this incident, the Muslim Forum of Albania (FMSH) issued a press release where the
stated that they considered this as an act that violates the sanctity of the mosque.5
On 11 August 2019, on the first day of Eid Al Adha, the Turkish Monument in
Tirana dedicated to the martyrs of the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey was vandalized6 by
unknown assailants using paper towels. Although the memorial was installed a few days
earlier, it was only on the day of Eid that the incident occurred. In recent years, the cel-
ebration of Eid has been accompanied by several provocative incidents, fueled by Islam-
ophobia, nationalism, and xenophobic feelings, and particularly by anti-Turkish feelings.7
Furthermore, the installation of the monument was followed by a wave of neg-
ative comments in the media, especially those close to the opposition. They claimed
that the memorial was part of the efforts by Prime Minister Edi Rama to curate the
image of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan after the failed coup attempt in
2016. They accused Rama of being a vassal of Erdogan and also claimed that such
behavior is not in line with the aspiration of Albania to become a member of the EU.8
Figure 1: On 10 August 10 2019, Don Agustin Bardhi, a self-proclaimed Catholic priest called on the Albanian people
to eradicate the Turkish Memorial saying, “I can tell you that if you eradicate the memorial in Tirana, it wouldn’t be a
sin, same as it was not a sin when people eradicated the statue of Enver [Hoxha].”9
Figure 1: On 10 August 10 2019, Don Agustin Bardhi, a self-proclaimed Catholic priest called on the Albanian
people to eradicate the Turkish Memorial saying, “I can tell you that if you eradicate the memorial in Tirana, it
wouldn’t be a sin, same as it was not a sin when people eradicated the statue of Enver [Hoxha].” 9
One day before
5. “Cenimi thesëattack
i shenjtërisë xhamisë on
nga the
forcatTurkish
e rendit”, Memorial, on i10
Forumi Musliman August6 March
Shqipërisë, 2019,2019,
a self-declared
http://www.
fmsh-al.org/new/2019/03/06/cenimi-i-shenjterise-se-xhamise-nga-forcat-e-rendit/,
Catholic priest named “Don Agustin Bardhi” posted on his Twitter (Accessaccount
date: 30 December
asking 2019).
people “to
6. “Letra higjenike dhe një shënim/ Përdhoset memoriali turk në Tiranë”, Shqiptarja.com, 11 August 2019, https://shqip-
eradicate” the memorial like the Albanian people did to the statue(Access
tarja.com/lajm/letra-higjenike-dhe-nje-shenim-perdhoset-memoriali-turk-ne-tirane, of thedate:
Albanian dictator Enver
1 March 2020).
10
Hoxha in 1991.
7. “Mbulimi’ i monumentit të Skënderbeut, Myftiu i Tiranës: Histeri mesazhesh kërcënuese”, Youtube, 2 September
2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L03PQ_GV2oo&sns=em, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
The monument that was built with the contribution of the Turkish Cooperation and
8. “Çfarë fshihet pas Memorialit turk për nder të Erdogan”, Mapo, 11 August 2019, https://gazetamapo.al/cfare-
Coordination Agency (TİKA) was desecrated
fshihet-pas-memorialit-turk-per-nder-te-erdogan/, (Access again on 302020).
date: 1 March August 2019. According to reports
9. Dom
by the Agustin
AlbanianBardhi,Twitter,the
police, 10 August 2019, https://twitter.com/AgustinBardhi/status/1160175395276230656?s=
assailants used a heavy object to damage part of the monument that
20, (Access date: 1 March 2020).
carried the names of the people killed in the 2016 coup attempt and the signs of the Turkish
flag. 11
64 setav.org
Employment
Discrimination in the workplace and employment is not something new to Albanian Muslims. 12
13
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
One day before the attack on the Turkish Memorial, on 10 August 2019, a
self-declared Catholic priest named “Don Agustin Bardhi” posted on his Twitter
account asking people “to eradicate” the memorial like the Albanian people did to
the statue of the Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha in 1991.10
The monument that was built with the contribution of the Turkish Cooperation
and Coordination Agency (TİKA) was desecrated again on 30 August 2019. Accord-
ing to reports by the Albanian police, the assailants used a heavy object to damage
part of the monument that carried the names of the people killed in the 2016 coup
attempt and the signs of the Turkish flag.11
Employment
Discrimination in the workplace and employment is not something new to Alba-
nian Muslims.12 Despite the constitutional rights to practice their religion freely13
anywhere, including the workplace, Muslims in Albania still continue to face dif-
ficulties.14 Muslims, particularly women with a hijab, face difficulties and limita-
tions in the job market.15 Muslims often experience various levels of discrimina-
tion at their jobs. Similarly, they face difficulties in their daily prayer practice in
the workplace. In fact, workplaces still lack special areas dedicated to prayer. Mus-
lims face difficulties in acquiring permission from their jobs for Jummah prayer.
For instance, according to the Muslim Forum of Albania (FMSH), the military
personnel in Albania not only lack the conditions to practice their religion freely
during working hours, but have been threatened by their superiors to be fired if
they choose to do so. The FMSH notes that this is a consistent concern that has
not found a solution yet.
According to the report by the Commissioner for Protection from Discrimina-
tion, published in 2019, the total number of complaints in the field of employment,
which were dealt with during the first half of 2019, was 71. Among the various rea-
son of discrimination in employment, none of them was reported as being religious.16
Nonetheless, the report notes that in some cases people are not able to recognize the
real reasons of discrimination.
10. Ibid.
11. “Turkish Monument in Albania Vandalized”, Daily Sabah, 31 August 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/tur-
key/2019/08/31/turkish-monument-in-albania-vandalized, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
12. Olsi Jazexhi, “Islamophobia in Albania National Report 2018”, European Islamophobia Report 2018, ed. Enes
Bayrakli and Farid Hafez (Ankara: SETA, 2019), p. 66.
13. “Kushtetuta e Shqiperisë”, President.al, http://president.al/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/kushtetuta-perditesu-
ar-1.pdf, (Access date: 1 March 2020).
14. “Islamophobia in Albania: Annual Report 2018”, Muslim Forum of Albania (FMSH).
15. Ibid.
16. “Raporti 6 mujor”, Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination, Janar – Qershor 2019, https://www.
kmd.al/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Raport-KMD-Janar-Qershor-2019-perfundimtar.pdf, (Access Date: 1 March
2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 65
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Causes of complaints
Political orientation
Sexual orientation
Pregnancy
Education
Economic Situation
Family
responsibilities
Color
Health situation
Race
Ethnicity
Marital status
Family
situation
Language
Gender
Religious beliefs
Residence
Disabilities
Figure 2: Causes of complaints recorded during the first half of 2019 by the Commissioner for Protection from
Discrimination.17
In addition, there are many cases of men and women who have faced various
forms of discrimination during their job interviews; however, they refused to make
their stories public due to fear of repercussions.18
Education
On 30 May 2019, the Minister of Education, Sports, and Youth of Albania Besa
Shahini gave the order to close three private schools, among which was a religious
Islamic school19 owned by Imam Sulejman Rustemi. According to Rustemi, the clo-
sure of his school was based on false claims and was discriminatory.20 On a Facebook
post on 19 June 2019, Rustemi wrote that the inspectors falsely claimed that his
institution forces “underage girls to wear the hijab during the class.”21 According to
him, his school has been rigorously implementing the law of the pre-education sys-
tem. According to the testimony of Rustemi, during the control, the inspection team
exerted pressure and started behaving like in an investigation process interviewing
students on religious knowledge and reasons for practicing religion at the school.
Imam Rustemi declared that he did not receive any official notification and that he
was informed about the decision by the media.
17. Ibid.
18. Olsi Jazexhi, “Islamophobia in Albania National Report 2018”, European Islamophobia Report 2018, ed. Enes
Bayrakli and Farid Hafez (Ankara: SETA, 2019), p. 67.
19. Official Communicate from Ministry of Education, Sports, and Youth of Albania, 3 June 2019, https://arsimi.
gov.al/urdher-nr-307-date-30-05-2019-per-mbylljen-e-veprimtarise-se-institucionit-arsimor-parauniversitar-privat-
shkolla-9-vjecre-visare-kavaje//, (Access date: 26 December 2019). See also the official document signed by Minister
Besa Shahini on 30 May 2019: https://arsimi.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/urdher-nr.-307-date-30.05.2019.
pdf, (Access date: 26 December 2019).
20. “Vajza të vogla me shami në kokë, ministria e Arsimit mbyll shkollën në Kavajë”, Newsbomb.al, 19 June 2019,
https://www.newsbomb.al/vajza-te-vogla-me-shami-ne-koke-ministria-e-arsimit-mbyll-shkollen-ne-kavaje-168845,
(Access date: 26 December 2019).
21. Suleman Rrustemi, Facebook, 19 June 2019, https://www.facebook.com/SulejmanRustemi/videos/10216838
970639072/, (Access date: 26 December 2019).
66 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
Politics
The anti-Muslim sentiments in Albania are rooted in the psychology and cultural
identity of many cultural and political elites. This is influenced by various factors,
including politics, their views on religion, individual interests, etc. The heritage of
the communist period and the social engineering and identity-making of the last
three decades have created a political elite which is either Islamophobic or insensitive
toward religion and the rights of the Muslim community.
A few weeks after the devastating earthquake on 26 November 2019 in Alba-
nia, the Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama traveled to Istanbul to participate as a
speaker in the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) High-Level Public and
Private Investment Conference hosted by Turkey on 8-9 December 2019 in Istan-
bul. The conference called on the OIC member countries to assist Albania after the
earthquake of 26 November. At the conference, Edi Rama also met with President
Erdogan. During his speech, Rama quoted a few verses from the Holy Quran, which
faced many negative comments from the media and social media users 22
On 18 October 2019, after long discussions, the leaders of the European Union
couldn’t reach an agreement on opening the accession process with Albania and
North Macedonia, postponing the process for the upcoming year. This was followed
by a wave of negative comments by many anti-Islamic hatemongers, who rushed to
blame Muslims and the Islamic identity of the majority of the population for the
rejection by the EU. For instance, Gani Mehmetaj, a Kosovar author and publicist
known for his Islamophobic stances, blamed the Islamic identity of Albania, claim-
ing that the EU could never accept a country “full of mosques built with Turkish
money.”23 In an article published on 19 October 2019,24 he claims that Europe is
alarmed by the construction of the Great Mosque in the capital Tirana. Furthermore,
he said that that Muslims should not be allowed to pray in the main streets (square)
of the capital (during Eid prayer). He went on to say that Albania is flirting with
Turkey and is losing its sovereignty. He called on the opposition parties to take note
and see how Europe rejected “Edi Rama’s Islamized Albania.”25 “The rejection of Edi
Rama’s Islamized Albania by the EU should be an example to the Albanian opposi-
tion on how politics and diplomacy should not be done. Albania should be removed
from the Turkish vassalage and subordination of the Gulf states to Islamism.”26
22. For more information, see: Edi Rama, Facebook, 8 December 2019, https://www.facebook.com/edirama.al/
videos/2360442754267870/, (Access date: 3 January 2020).
23. Gani Mehmetaj, “Shqipërinë e islamizuar të Edi Ramës nuk e duan në Evropë”, Bota Sot, 19 October 2019,
https://www.botasot.info/opinione/1173192/shqiperine-e-islamizuar-te-edi-rames-nuk-e-duan-ne-evrope/, (Access
date: 30 December 2019).
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 67
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Media
There is an obsession among various media and media practitioners pertaining to
Islam and Muslims, tinged with negative stereotypes and continuous negative por-
trayal of Islam and Muslims in particular.
The Albanian National Observatory Against Islamophobia,27 an online watch-
dog platform dedicated to countering Islamophobia, in cooperation with the Mus-
lim Forum of Albania (FMSH),28 a Tirana-based Muslim NGO, have identified
a list of online29 media and media practitioners30 that continuously incite Islam-
ophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments among Albanians. The report includes a list
of Albanian media from Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. These media
continuously promote anti-Muslim rhetoric by posting Islamophobic, racist, and
hate-motivated articles and comments. In their writings they attack Islam, Al-
banian Muslims, and their religious heritage. Their publications contain insults,
blasphemies, slander, and untruths about the Islamic religion, the Prophet Mu-
hammed, Albanian Muslim personalities, and ordinary Muslim believers. They
question the patriotism of Muslim Albanians, labeling them “Turks” and “Arabs,”
and calling for their expulsion from the country. It is worth noting that after the
publication of the “Black List” on Observer.al, all the articles listed in the report
were removed.31 However, the media identified in the above report continue to re-
main on the list due to the many other Islamophobic articles that are still available
on their websites.
In April, the Audio-visual Media Authority (AMA) decided to fine32 the radio
and television broadcaster “Ora News” for the hate speech used by Kastriot Myftaraj,
a well-known Islamophobe, during his TV show “Moscow Is Speaking.” On the offi-
cial website of Ora News, there are not many details available regarding the said TV
show.33 The TV show, hosted by Myftaraj, was broadcasted on 18 March 2019 on
Ora News and was dedicated to the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in two mosques
27. Albanian National Observatory Against Islamophobia, https://observer.al/, (Access date: 25 December 2019).
28. Muslim Forum of Albania, http://www.fmsh-al.org/al/, (Access date: 25 December 2019).
29. “Raport: Lista e zezë e faqeve islamofobe shqiptare on-line”, Observer.al, 20 February 2015, https://observer.al/
raport-lista-e-zeze-e-faqeve-islamofobe-shqiptare-on-line-2/, (Access date: 25 December 2019).
30. “Lista e analistëve islamofobë të Kosovës, Shqipërisë dhe Maqedonisë”, Observer.al, 13 September 2017, https://
observer.al/lista-e-analisteve-islamofobe-te-kosoves-shqiperise-dhe-maqedonise/, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
31. For more information, see: “Raport: Lista e zezë e faqeve islamofobe shqiptare on-line”. The report includes a
list of Albanian media from Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. We separated the media into two categories:
Black List and Grey List. In a recent control of the articles included in both categories, we noticed that all articles
listed have been removed. However, the list is not comprehensive and does not include many other media that
continuously provoke Islamophobia.
32. “Goditet ‘i paprekshmi’ i medias: gjobë e AMA-s për terrorin verbal të Kastriot Myftarajt”, Observer.al, 17
April 2019, https://observer.al/ama-gjobit-ora-news-per-islamofobine-e-kastriot-myftarajt/, (Access date: 23 De-
cember 2019).
33. For more information, see: “Ju flet Moska”, RTV Ora News, https://www.oranews.tv/emisionet/ju-flet-moska,
(Access Date: 1 March 2020).
68 setav.org
Islamophobe, during his TV show “Moscow Is Speaking.” On the official website of Ora News,
there are not many details available regarding the said TV show. 33 The TV show, hosted by
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
Myftaraj, was broadcasted on 18 March 2019 on Ora News and was dedicated to the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks in two mosques in New Zealand. It was entitled “Scanderbeg and the
killings in the mosques in New Zealand” (Skënderbeu dhe vrasjet në xhamitë e Zelandës së
in New Zealand. It was entitled “Scanderbeg and the killings in the mosques in New
Re). 34 Zealand” (Skënderbeu dhe vrasjet në xhamitë e Zelandës së Re).34
Figure 3: Kastriot Myftaraj during his TV show “Moscow Is Speaking”.35
Figure 3: Kastriot Myftaraj during his TV show "Moscow Is Speaking". 35
During the show, Myftaraj commented on the terrorist attack and indirectly
During thesuggested
show, undertaking
Myftaraj commented
similar action on the terrorist
in Albania. 36
A visualattack
analysisand
of theindirectly
still image suggested
undertakingfrom the TV
similar show,
action inshows Scanderbeg,
Albania. 36 the Albanian
A visual analysis national hero,
of the still pointing
image fromto the
the TV show,
minaret with his sword, a clear indication of what the host of the show wanted to
communicate to his audience. (Fig. 3) Following the broadcast of the TV show, the
Muslim Forum of Albania sent a letter to Ora News complaining about the Islam-
31
For more information, see: “Raport: Lista e zezë e37 faqeve islamofobe shqiptare on-line”. The report includes a
ophobic
list of Albanian language
media from usedKosovo,
Albania, by Myftaraj. AnMacedonia.
and North online petition was alsothe
We separated signed
mediabyinto
more
two categories:
Black List andthan
Grey1,000
List. people 38
condemning
In a recent Myftaraj’s
control of the anti-Muslim
articles included in bothrhetoric. The we
categories, AMA finned
noticed that all articles
listed have been
the television 400,000 Albanian Lek (around $3,636). In their statement, the AMA media that
removed. However, the list is not comprehensive and does not include many other
continuously provoke Islamophobia.
considered the language used by Myftaraj as a violation of Law No. 97/2013 on
32
“Goditet ‘i paprekshmi’ i medias: gjobë e AMA-s për terrorin verbal të Kastriot Myftarajt”, Observer.al, 17
April 2019, audiovisual media in the Republic of Albania. The AMA’s statement stated: “These
https://observer.al/ama-gjobit-ora-news-per-islamofobine-e-kastriot-myftarajt/, (Access date: 23
December 2019).statements promote intolerance among citizens, justify violence, and disrespect the
33
For more information,
diversity ofsee: "Ju fletreligious
customs, Moska",beliefs,
RTV Ora News,
culture andhttps://www.oranews.tv/emisionet/ju-flet-moska,
morality of citizens. Violation of
(Access Date: 1 March 2020).
34 these legal principles during this broadcast constitutes incitement to hatred on reli-
“Ju Flet Moska”, RTV Ora News, 18 March 2019, https://www.oranews.tv/emisionet/ju-flet-moska/skenderbeu-
dhe-vrasjet-ne-xhamite-e-zelandes-se-re?page=7, (Access date: 27 December 2019).
35
“Ju Flet Moska”, RTV Ora News, 18 March 2019, https://www.oranews.tv/emisionet/ju-flet-moska/skenderbeu-
dhe-vrasjet-ne-xhamite-e-zelandes-se-re?page=7,
34. “Ju Flet Moska”, RTV Ora News, 18 March (Access date: 27 December 2019).
2019, https://www.oranews.tv/emisionet/ju-flet-moska/skender-
36
“Islamofobibeu-dhe-vrasjet-ne-xhamite-e-zelandes-se-re?page=7,
Kastriot Myftaraj mbron dhe justifikon(Access terroristin
date: 27kristjan
Decembertë frymëzuar nga Skënderbeu”, Gazeta
2019).
Impakt, March 2019,
35. “Ju https://gazetaimpakt.com/islamofobi-kastriot-myftaraj-mbron-dhe-justifikon-terroristin-
Flet Moska”, RTV Ora News, 18 March 2019, https://www.oranews.tv/emisionet/ju-flet-moska/skender-
kristjan-te-frymezuar-nga-skenderbeu/, (Access date: 27
beu-dhe-vrasjet-ne-xhamite-e-zelandes-se-re?page=7, December
(Access 2019) 2019).
date: 27 December
36. “Islamofobi Kastriot Myftaraj mbron dhe justifikon terroristin kristjan të frymëzuar nga Skënderbeu”, Gazeta
Impakt, March 2019, https://gazetaimpakt.com/islamofobi-kastriot-myftaraj-mbron-dhe-justifikon-terroristin-krist-
jan-te-frymezuar-nga-skenderbeu/, (Access date: 27 December 2019)
37. Complain sent to Ora News by the Muslim Forum of Albania (FMSH) on 20 March 2019 regarding the Is-
lamophobic language used by the host of the TV show “Moscow Is Speaking” Kastriot Myftaraj, aired on 18 March
2019 (The video is no longer available online).
38. Vehap Kola, Facebook, 19 March 2019, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=219765876048
5320&id=100007236527045, (Access date: 3 January 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 69
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
gious grounds and, as such, is punishable by the law.”39 This is the first time a televi-
sion channel is fined for using hate speech against Muslims.
However, on 14 October 2019, the Administrative Court abolished the deci-
sion of the Audio-visual Media Authority concerning the show aired on 18 March
40
2019. Myftaraj reacted on his Facebook page, considering the court’s decision as a
victory against the AMA and “the radical Islamic NGOs,”41 referring to the Muslim
Forum of Albania. In his Facebook post he claimed that this was an operation based
on the “Shariah, not secular laws of Albania” aimed to damage the laïcité in Albania
and the image of Scanderbeg as a national value.42 (Fig. 4)
Figure 4: Kastriot Myftaraj reacts on his Facebook page after the decision of the court to abolish the decision of
the AMA: “This day, 14 October, is an important day regarding the freedom of speech, Laicite (Secularism) and the
Figure 4: Kastriot
preservation Myftaraj
of national reacts
values, on his concerning
especially Facebook the
page after the decision
constitution…”43 of the court to abolish the decision of
the AMA: “This day, 14 October, is an important day regarding the freedom of speech, Laicite (Secularism) and
the preservation of national values,
Furthermore, especially
as reported concerning
in various the constitution…”
online
43
media, Kastriot Myftaraj called for
Furthermore, as reported
the destruction of theinGreat
various onlineof
Mosque media,
TiranaKastriot Myftaraj called
with explosives, 44 for the
claiming destruction
that the
construction
of the of the
Great Mosque mosque
of Tirana is illegal.
with Myftaraj
explosives, 44 made that
claiming a similar call in 2015offollow-
the construction the mosque
ing the visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Albania. In a Facebook
is illegal. Myftaraj made a similar call in 2015 following the visit of Turkish President Recep
post on 16 May 2015, he called on the people to destroy the Great Mosque of
Tayyip Erdogan to Albania. In a Facebook post on 16 May 2015, he called on the people to
destroy the Great Mosque of Tirana, considering it a “military barrack,” and described Muslims
39. “Njoftim për shtyp”, Autoriteti i Mediave Audiovizive, 17 April 2019, http://ama.gov.al/2019/04/17/njoft-
45
whoim-per-shtyp/,
would pray(Access
there as3“Mujahideens.”
date: January 2020). At that time, he considered the visit of President
40. “RTV Ora fiton betejën ligjore me AMA-n, Administrativja shfuqizon dënimin me gjobë”, Oranews.com, 14
Erdogan in Albania
October as an open call to Jihad. 46 He also called for the assassination of the Turkish
2019, https://www.oranews.tv/article/rtv-ora-fiton-betejen-ligjore-me-ama-n-administrativja-shfuqizon-
denimin-me-gjobe,
47 (Access date: 27 December 2019).
president.
41. Kastriot Myftaraj, Facebook, 14 October 2019, https://www.facebook.com/kastriotmyftaraj1966/posts/255596
On 22 October(Access
6674462121, 2019, during
date: a monologue
17 December 2019). on his show “Provokacija” broadcasted on ABC
42. Mustafa
News, Ibid. Nano, a central Islamophobic figure in Albanian media, mocked Elvis Naçi, a
43. Ibid.
local imam in Tirana and the president of the charity Firdeus Foundation, for getting emotional
44. “Kastriot Myftaraj, thotë që Xhamia me katër minare në Tiranë duhet të shembet me dinamit”, Facebook, 1
during one of
December 2019, sermons 48 in his mosque in Tirana. Nano considered(Access
hishttps://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=external&v=459832738243815, the imam’s emotional
date: 27 Decem-
ber 2019).
43
Ibid.
44
“Kastriot
70 Myftaraj, thotë që Xhamia me katër minare në Tiranë duhet të shembet me dinamit”, Facebook, 1
setav.org
December 2019, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=external&v=459832738243815, (Access date: 27
December 2019).
45
Kastriot Myftaraj, Facebook, 16 May 2015,
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
Tirana, considering it a “military barrack,” and described Muslims who would
pray there as “Mujahideens.”45 At that time, he considered the visit of President
Erdogan in Albania as an open call to Jihad.46 He also called for the assassination
of the Turkish president.47
On 22 October 2019, during a monologue on his show “Provokacija” broad-
casted on ABC News, Mustafa Nano, a central Islamophobic figure in Albanian
media, mocked Elvis Naçi, a local imam in Tirana and the president of the charity
Firdeus Foundation, for getting emotional during one of his sermons48 in his mosque
in Tirana. Nano considered the imam’s emotional reaction a “theater” and a “come-
reaction
dy.”a In
“theater” and a “comedy.”
the conclusion In the Nano
of his monologue, conclusion of his
simulated monologue,
an emotional Nano
scene, simulated an
similar
to that
emotional of Imam
scene, Naçi.
similar
49
to that of Imam Naçi. 49
Figure 5: Mustafa Nano during his TV show “Provokacija.” He mocks the imam Elvis Naçi for his emotional reaction
Figure during one of his sermons at his his
mosque.50
5: Mustafa Nano during TV show "Provokacija." He mocks the imam Elvis Naçi for his emotional
reaction during one of his sermons at his mosque. 50
Furthermore, during the same show, he ridiculed the modern way of dressing of
Furthermore,
the imam,during
sayingthe same
that evenshow, he ridiculed
Ronaldo, theplayer,
the football modern waymore
looked of dressing of the imam,
Muslim than
sayinghim.
that “Even Ronaldo seems
even Ronaldo, much more
the football Muslim
player, when
looked talking
more aboutthan
Muslim his dressing style Ronaldo
him. “Even
seems 45.
much more Muslim when talking about his dressing style compared to the imam. The
Kastriot Myftaraj, Facebook, 16 May 2015, https://www.facebook.com/kastriotmyftaraj1966/posts/886283
331430472, (Access date: 27 December 2019).
only extreme thing about him is that moment when he cries. He cries with tears.” 51
46. Kastriot Myftaraj, “thirrje për gjenocid ndaj muslimanëve shqiptarë”, Observer.al 18 May 2015, https://observer.
al/kastriot-myftaraj-thirrje-per-gjenocid-ndaj-muslimaneve-shqiptare/, (Access date: 17 December 2019).
In November 2019, Imam Elvis Naçi was attacked again publicly by various journalists and
47. Besnik Sinani, Elton Hatibi, “Islamophobia in Albania National Report 2017” in European Islamophobia Report
social 2017,
mediaeds. Enes Bayrakli and Farid Hafez (Ankara: SETA, 2018), p. 43.
users, after he bought a private clinic in the name of the Foundation Firdeus.
48. “Përlotet Elvis Naçi gjatë ligjëratës! Çfarë e emocionoi atë?!”, YouTube, 25 March 2019, https://www.youtube.
Despite the fact that the imam had announced
com/watch?v=rJIEzqRWCpA&feature=emb_title, this17 indirectly
(Access date: a few months earlier during his
December 2019).
49. “Provokacija – Monologu”, ABC News Albania, 22 October 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4VAz-
TV show “Albanians for Albanians,”
jROz-h0&feature=emb_title, (Access date: 17this did not
December 2019).stop them from speculating and accusing him
of using charity funds to buy the hospital. However, Naçi later announced the purchase of the
50. Ibid.
hospital on his Facebook page. He informed the public 52 that the hospital will provide free visits
to all the people in need, especially
islamophobiaeurope.com • orphans, who cannot afford to pay. 53 In recent years,
@islamophobiaEIR 71 Imam
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
compared to the imam. The only extreme thing about him is that moment when he
cries. He cries with tears.”51
In November 2019, Imam Elvis Naçi was attacked again publicly by various
journalists and social media users, after he bought a private clinic in the name of the
Foundation Firdeus. Despite the fact that the imam had announced this indirectly a
few months earlier during his TV show “Albanians for Albanians,” this did not stop
them from speculating and accusing him of using charity funds to buy the hospital.
However, Naçi later announced the purchase of the hospital on his Facebook page.
He informed the public52 that the hospital will provide free visits to all the people
in need, especially orphans, who cannot afford to pay.53 In recent years, Imam Naçi
has gained fame with his charity foundation for helping people in need and with his
TV show “Shqiptarët për Shqiptarët” (Albanians for Albanians). He has gained a
great number of followers on social media with almost two million followers across
his social media platforms, ranking him amongst the most followed Albanian public
figures online. His videos have been viewed millions of times. For this reason, he
has been attacked and accused for using his popularity to gain ground for future
political purposes.54 Despite the fact that Imam Naçi has openly denied many times
that he has any intention of entering politics, this did not stop journalists and media
pundits from speculating.
Justice System
On 4 December 2019, the Prosecution for Serious Crimes dropped the case
against four Albanian Muslim citizens who were arrested in 2016 on suspicion of
planning a terrorist attack during the football match between Albania and Israel.55
After three years of investigation, the Prosecutor’s Office declared that it was not
possible to prove that they intended to carry out a terrorist attack. According to
the media accounts, the prosecutor who followed their case was expelled from the
51. “Edhe Ronaldo më mysliman se Elvis Naçi”, çfarë e bëri Mustafa Nanon të “qajë” në studio (Video)”, ABC
News, 22 October 2019, http://abcnews.al/edhe-ronaldo-me-mysliman-se-elvis-naci-cfare-e-beri-mustafa-nanon-
te-qaje-ne-studio-video/, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
52. “U akuzua për blerjen e një spitali privat, Elvis Naçi sqaron të vërtetën (FOTO)”, Gazeta Shqip, 25 November
2019, https://www.gazeta-shqip.com/2019/11/25/u-akuzua-per-blerjen-e-nje-spitali-privat-elvis-naci-sqaron-te-
verteten-foto/, (Access date: 27 December 2019).
53. Elvis Naçi, Facebook, 25 November 2019, https://www.facebook.com/ElvisNaci/posts/2559141104169889,
(Access date: 27 December 2019).
54. “Rudina Xhunga: Kosova gjeti Albin Kurtin, Shqipëria mund të presë Elvis Naçin”, ABC News, 22 October
2019, http://abcnews.al/rudina-xhunga-kosova-gjeti-albin-kurtin-shqiperia-mund-te-prese-elvis-nacin/, (Access
date: 27 December 2019).
55. “Akte terroriste në Shqipëri- Izrael? Ja përse u arrestuan 4 besimtarët në Shkodër”, Gazeta Panorama, 8 November 2016,
http://www.panorama.com.al/informacioni-sekret-besimtaret-e-arrestuar-do-vendosnin-bombe-ne-ndeshjen-me-
izraelin/, (Access date: 20 December 2019).
72 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
juridical system due to allegations of crime and misappropriation of property.56
Nevertheless, their release in December 2019 was reported in the media with
headlines57 similar to those used in 2016.58
Internet
Islam and Muslims are continuously attacked on social media, especially Facebook, by
all sorts of people from journalists, political figures and TV hosts to random citizens,
who spread hatred and use anti-Muslim rhetoric with the pretext of freedom of speech.
A few weeks after the attack on the Turkish Memorial, the well-known journal-
ist Anila Basha posted a quote on Facebook from the author Ben Blushi calling on
A few weeks after the attack on the Turkish Memorial, the well-known journalist Anila Basha
people to unite underposted a Christian
a quote flag,
on Facebook from regardless
the author of their
Ben Blushi calling on peopleethnic background.
to unite under a
59
Christian flag, regardless of their ethnic background. 59
Figure 6: The journalist Anila Basha posted on her Facebook page: “Christianity lost in front of the Turks because of
its own divisions, but nowFigure
we have to come together under one Christian flag whether we are Albanian or Serbian
6: The journalist Anila Basha posted on her Facebook page: “Christianity lost in front of the Turks because
or Greeks. The Byzantine Empire
of its own was the
divisions, butbrightest
now we have tobecause it under
come together managed toflag
one Christian unite
whetherunder one power
we are Albanian or three elements: a
Serbian or Greeks. The Byzantine Empire was the brightest because it managed to unite under one power three
Greek spirit, a Roman mind, andaaGreek
elements: Muslim body.mind,
spirit, a Roman This
and is the most
a Muslim perfect
body. This is the most balance
perfect balancethat history
that history has ever seen… Living on
has ever
an Island by Ben Blushi”.60 seen… Living on an Island by Ben Blushi”. 60
59
Anila Basha, Facebook, 14 September 2019,
https://www.facebook.com/anila.basha.1/posts/10158630827568765, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
Ibid.
56. “Sulmi terrorist në ndeshjen Shqipëri-Izrael një “fake news”, lirohet nga akuzat shkodrani”, Ora News, 19
60
December 2019, https://www.oranews.tv/article/sulmi-terrorist-ne-ndeshjen-shqiperi-izrael-nje-fake-news-lirohet-
nga-akuzat-shkodrani, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
57. “FOTO+EMRI/ Planifikuan sulm me eksploziv në “Loro Boriçi”? Pas 3 vitesh hetime, Krimet e Rënda zbulojnë
se të akuzuarit ishin të pafajshëm”, Panorama Newspaper, 19 December 2019, http://www.panorama.com.al/foto-
emri-planifikuan-sulm-me-eksploziv-ne-loro-borici-pas-3-vitesh-hetime-krimet-e-renda-zbulojne-se-te-akuzuarit-
ishin-te-pafajshem/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
58. “Akte terroriste në Shqipëri- Izrael? Ja përse u arrestuan 4 besimtarët në Shkodër”, Gazeta Panorama, 8 Novem-
ber 2016, http://www.panorama.com.al/informacioni-sekret-besimtaret-e-arrestuar-do-vendosnin-bombe-ne-ndesh-
jen-me-izraelin/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
59. Anila Basha, Facebook, 14 September 2019, https://www.facebook.com/anila.basha.1/posts/10158630827568
765, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
60. Ibid.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 73
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
The book which Basha quoted, namely Living on an Island, has been criticized
for using Islamophobic language, offending Prophet Muhammed, comparing
Muslims
The book to animals,
which
61
etc. The
Basha quoted, author,
namely BenonBlushi,
Living is also
an Island, known
has been for hisforIslam-
criticized using
ophobic stances.
Islamophobic language, offending Prophet Muhammed, comparing Muslims to animals, etc. 61
In September 2019, the Former Deputy Minister of Education, Sports, and
The author, Ben Blushi, is also known for his Islamophobic stances.
Youth Taulant Muka made a series of posts on his Facebook page complaining about
In September 2019, the Former Deputy Minister of Education, Sports, and Youth Taulant Muka
the number of mosques in the two major Albanian cities, the capital Tirana and the
made a series of posts on his Facebook page complaining about the number of mosques in the
coastal city of Durres. He also claimed that most of the people who serve in these
two major Albanian cities, the capital Tirana and the coastal city of Durres. He also claimed
“mosques or religious institutions” don’t have the minimum religious education re-
that most
62 of the people who serve in these “mosques or religious institutions” don’t have the
quired. He further suggested that instead of building mosques, the money should
62
minimum religious
go towards building education required.
schools. He furtherprovoked
His comments suggested reactions
that insteadfrom
of building mosques,
Muslims, and
the money should go towards building schools. His comments
were followed by racist and anti-Muslim comments on his Facebook page. provoked reactions from
Muslims, and were followed by racist and anti-Muslim comments on his Facebook page.
Figure 7: The former Deputy Minister of Education, Sports, and Youth Taulant Muka wrote a series of Facebook posts
during September 2019 complaining about the number of mosques and claiming that many of the people who work
in these mosques/religious institutions don’t have the appropriate religious education.63
61.
61 Justinian, Topulli, “Arti pezhishkë i Blushit”, academia.edu, January 2013, https://www.academia.edu/6138198/
Justinian, Topulli, “Arti pezhishkë i Blushit”, academia.edu, January 2013,
Arti_pezhishk%C3%AB_i_Blushit, (Access date: 31 December 2019). (Access date: 31 December 2019).
https://www.academia.edu/6138198/Arti_pezhishk%C3%AB_i_Blushit,
62
TaulantFacebook, 9 Muka,
62. Taulant Muka, September 2019, Facebook, 9 September 2019,
https://www.facebook.com/Taulant.Muka/posts/10215750693
https://www.facebook.com/Taulant.Muka/posts/10215750693536144,
536144, (Access date: 2 January 2020). (Access date: 2 January 2020).
63. Ibid.
74 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
In the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in Albania on 26 November
2019, which killed 51 people, left thousands injured, and hundreds homeless, Al-
banian Prime Minister Edi Rama posted several religious quotes on his Facebook
page, including Islamic,64 Christian, and even polytheistic quotes. He was criticized
for doing this by both Muslims and non-Muslims. He was accused of using religion
in a difficult moment for Albania. Furthermore, the journalist Ylli Rakipi mocked
the prime minister for his clothing in one of his public appearances and ironically
compared him with the Prophet Muhammed.65
Figure 8: Prime Minister Edi Rama was mocked in the media and compared to Prophet Muhammed for wearing a
black coat in one of his public appearances in the aftermath of the Albanian earthquake.66
Figure 8: Prime Minister Edi Rama was mocked in the media and compared to Prophet Muhammed for wearing
a black coat in one of his public appearances in the aftermath of the Albanian earthquake.
66
Moreover, during 2019, Facebook restricted or closed many Islamic pages and
Moreover, during 2019, Facebook restricted or closed many Islamic pages and personal
personal accounts of Muslim activists in Albania, with the justification of using hate
accounts of Muslim activists in Albania, with the justification of using hate speech, but has
speech, but has failed to do the same for countless Islamophobic pages and individ-
failed to do the same for countless Islamophobic pages and individual accounts that use social
64. Edi Rama, Facebook, 14 December 2019, https://www.facebook.com/edirama.al/posts/10157246830286523,
(Access date: 1 January 2020).
65. “Gazetari: Kënaqeni kur Rama vishet si profeti Muhamed”, Syri.net, 11 December 2019, https://www.syri.net/
66
Observatori Kombëtar Kundër Islamofobisë, Facebook,
politike/300667/gazetari-kenaqeni-kur-rama-vishet-si-profeti-muhamed/, (Access11date: 25
December
December2019,
2019).
https://www.facebook.com/ObservatoriOKI/posts/2454444041488398, (Access date: 29 December 2019).
66. Observatori Kombëtar Kundër Islamofobisë, Facebook, 11 December 2019, https://www.facebook.com/Obser-
vatoriOKI/posts/2454444041488398, (Access date: 29 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 75
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ual accounts that use social media to spread hate speech against Islam and Muslims,
Turks, Arabs, etc.67 In December 2019, Facebook closed the official page of the
Albanian National Observatory Against Islamophobia68 for three days for posting
a pro-Palestinian post. Since then, despite the high number of followers, the page
has suffered significant losses in its audience reach, going from tens of thousands to
several dozen.
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
There are no formal organizations focusing on the spread of Islamophobia69 in Al-
bania, but there are several media pundits, journalists, TV hosts, bloggers, politi-
cians, etc. who continuously promote hate speech against Islam and Muslims in
the mainstream media or social media platforms. In 2017, the Albanian National
Observatory Against Islamophobia and the Muslim Forum of Albania prepared a list
of well-known public figures who usually promote Islamophobia in their writings
and media appearances. The list, although not comprehensive, includes names such
as Kastriot Myftaraj, Mustafa Nano, Maks Velo, Arbana Xharra, Berat Buzhala, Gani
Mehmetaj, Sadri Ramabaja, etc.70
Observed Civil Society and Political Initiatives to
Counter Islamophobia
There are several NGOs in Albania focused on human rights, but none of them fo-
cus on Islamophobia in particular. Nevertheless, certain Muslim NGOs such as the
Muslim Forum of Albania (FMSH) have tried to tackle the issue of Islamophobia in
various ways. The FMSH prepares an annual report on the situation of Islamophobia
in Albania. It also provides legal advice to victims of Islamophobia.
Furthermore, the Albanian National Observatory Against Islamophobia (OKI),
an online platform established in 2015 that is fully dedicated to countering Islam-
ophobia in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, has been regularly addressing
the phenomenon of Islamophobia. The platform continuously monitors hate speech,
anti-Muslim, and Islamophobic rhetoric in the mainstream media, internet, poli-
tics, etc. It also collects information on various Islamophobic incidents in Albania,
67. See for instance the Islamophobic pages on Facebook such as Nje Komb.com, https://www.facebook.com/
1komb/; and Feja e Shqiptari Eshte Europa, https://www.facebook.com/ILLYROPIANO/, (Access date: 31 De-
cember 2019).
68. Observatori Kombëtar Kundër Islamofobisë, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ObservatoriOKI, (Access
date: 31 December 2019).
69. Besnik Sinani and Elton Hatibi, “Islamophobia in Albania National Report 2017”, European Islamophobia Re-
port 2017, ed. Enes Bayrakli and Farid Hafez (Ankara: SETA, 2018), p. 45.
70. For more information, see: “Lista e analistëve islamofobë të Kosovës, Shqipërisë dhe Maqedonisë”, Observer.
al 13 September 2017, https://observer.al/lista-e-analisteve-islamofobe-te-kosoves-shqiperise-dhe-maqedonise/, (Ac-
cess date: 23 December 2019).
76 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ALBANIA
Kosovo, and North Macedonia. Among others, the platform aims to raise awareness
about the negative impact of Islamophobia on society; to provide guides and opin-
ions on how to counter Islamophobia; to present a more positive view of Muslims in
the media; and to enhance the Muslim voice. Since its establishment, the platform
has denounced many Islamophobic incidents, including hate speech in the media,71
politics,72 textbooks,73 etc. The platform is a repository of over 250 articles exclusive-
ly dedicated to countering Islamophobia, and continues to grow.
In the same vain, other online media such as e-zani.com,74 tesheshi.com,75 Mus-
limania.al,76 and other online portals, mainly managed by Muslims, have dedicated
a significant space and attention to the issue of Islamophobia in recent years, with
many articles denouncing the anti-Muslim rhetoric.
Yet, these initiatives are not coordinated, which makes it difficult for them to
have the desired impact on countering Islamophobia. A common action plan could
direct these energies and efforts in the right direction.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Islamophobia in Albania is real and is affecting the everyday life of Muslim practi-
tioners. Islam and Muslims are being attacked and demonized in the media in the
name of freedom of speech. This form of racism should be addressed on a govern-
mental level as well as among NGOs working in the area of human rights. In fact,
anti-Muslim sentiments and Islamophobic hate speech negatively affects not only
Muslims, but seriously harms the country’s social cohesion, especially considering
that Muslims represent the religious majority in Albania. As shown in the report,
Islam in Albania is racialized along with the Turkish and Arab identity as foreign
to the Albanian identity. This rhetoric is focused on presenting Islam as something
imported from Arab countries or inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The nature of
Islamophobia in Albania facilitates the use of anti-Muslim stereotypes by politicians
from all sides of the political spectrum who often weaponize such stereotypes to
criticize their opponents, media, social media users, etc., contributing to the normal-
ization of Islamophobic rhetoric in Albanian society. In conclusion, we suggest the
following recommendations:
71. “Analiza dhe Hulumtime”, Observer.al, https://observer.al/category/analize/, (Access date: 26 December 2019).
72. “Metafora e gabuar e Kryeministrit Rama”, Observer.al, 24 November 2015, https://observer.al/metafo-
ra-e-gabuar-e-kryeministrit-rama/, (Access date: 26 December 2019).
73. “Çfarë fshihet pas trajnimit të mësuesve në luftën kundër ekstremizmit të dhunshëm?”, Observer.al, 21 Janu-
ary 2018, https://observer.al/cfare-fshihet-pas-trajnimit-te-mesuesve-ne-luften-kunder-ekstremizmit-te-dhunshem/,
(Access date: 26 December 2019).
74. E-Zani i Nalte, http://www.e-zani.com/, (Access date: 26 December 2019).
75. Teshehi.com, http://tesheshi.com/, (Access date: 26 December 2019).
76. Muslimania.al, https://muslimania.al/category/te-tjera/islamofobia/, (Access date: 26 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 77
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
• Muslim NGOs and other civil society organizations should cooperate more
closely to address the issue of Islamophobia.
• Muslim NGOs, in particular, should cooperate more closely and come up
with a common action plan to address the issue of Islamophobia in various
fields.
• Media should avoid the use of anti-Muslim stereotypes to the maximum ex-
tent possible. They should also avoid reporting unverified news on Muslims
and should correct any fake news in this regard.
• The authorities in Albania should investigate any hate crime against people
or sites. They should also monitor the continuous hate speech incidents
in the media and social media, especially when the perpetrators are major
public figures.
• Local governments in Albania should take into consideration complaints
coming from the Muslim community regarding any obstacle or concern
to perform their Jummah prayer in order to secure the freedom to practice
one’s religion.
• The government of Albania should prepare a draft law to regulate the con-
stitutional rights of Muslims to perform their daily prayer in the workplace,
especially regarding the necessary permission to take time off work to per-
form the Jummah prayer.
Chronology
• 18.03.2019: Anti-Muslim hate speech used during the TV show “Moscow
Is Speaking” in the aftermath of the terrorist attack at Christchurch, New
Zealand. The show was aired on 18 March 2019 on Ora News (now RTV
Ora).
• 30.05.2019: The closure of the Muslim school Visare by the Ministry of
Education.
• 22.10.2019: Journalist Mustafa Nano mocked Imam Elvis Naçi during his
show “Provokacija” aired on ABC News.
• 25.11.2019: Imam Elvis Naçi was publicly attacked after he bought a pri-
vate clinic in the name of the Firdeus Foundation, over which he presides.
• 19.12.2019: Four Albanian citizens accused 3 years ago of an attempted
terrorist attacks were acquitted. The media did not only not retract the fake
news reported at the time, but some outlets continued with similar head-
lines even after their release.
78 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
•
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
AUSTRIA
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
FARID HAFEZ
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 79
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
•
80 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
Farid Hafez, PhD (Political Science, University of Vienna), is a political scientist
and non-resident senior researcher at Georgetown University’s “The Bridge Initia-
tive” at the School of Foreign Service. He defended his habilitation thesis on “Islam
Politics in the Second Republic of Austria” at the University of Salzburg in 2019. In
2017, he was a Fulbright visiting professor at the University of California, Berkeley
and in 2014, he was a visiting scholar at Columbia University, New York. Since
2010, he has been the editor of the Islamophobia Studies Yearbook, and since 2015 the
co-editor of the European Islamophobia Report. Hafez has received the Bruno Kreisky
Award for the “Political Book of the Year” for his anthology Islamophobia in Austria
(co-edited with John Bunzl). He has more than 100 publications in leading journals
such as Politics and Religion, Patterns of Prejudice, and German Politics and Society.
His latest publications are Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies (Routledge,
co-edited with Enes Bayrakli, 2019) and Feindbild Islam. Über die Salonfähigkeit
von Rassismus (Islamophobia. On the Acceptance of Racism. Böhlau, 2019). Email:
farid.hafez@sbg.ac.at
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Farid Hafez: Islamophobia in Austria: National Report 2019, in: Enes Bayraklı & Farid
Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 81
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
The NGO Dokustelle documented 1,051 cases of anti-Muslim hate crime, which
is nearly twice as many compared to 2018 (540 cases). The far-right government
coalition of the ÖVP and FPÖ lasted only to 28 May following the Ibiza gate scan-
dal that led to the dismissal of the longtime FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian Strache.
This created a public climate that focused primarily on the Ibiza gate and its re-
percussions. Also, the subsequent government of experts that took power until the
upcoming elections in October 2019 gave a pause to the strong wave of anti-Mus-
lim legislation. Nevertheless, the lasting impact of new personnel appointed by the
far-right government in the state bureaucracy was evident. For example, the Interior
Ministry’s Secret Service (BVT) published a report that for the first time named the
Islamic Religious Community (IGGÖ) not as a partner in the fight against Jihadism,
but as a problem of extremism. This marks a radical shift in the BVT’s Islam-relat-
ed politics. The European Parliament elections that took place on 26 May did not
target Muslims as much as in previous years’ elections given the focus on the Ibiza
gate. The impact of this was that many of the political projects that affected Muslims
were put on the waiting list. The destabilization of the far-right coalition thus had
a positive impact, creating a breathing pause in the country. Nevertheless, the ÖVP
and the FPÖ both repeated their standard anti-Muslim policy claims in the elec-
tions campaign in 2019. The implementation of Islamophobic legislation went hand
in hand with other far-reaching authoritarian and repressive legislations. Following
the implementation of anti-Muslim legislation in 2018, some further restrictions
of Muslim religious practice were implemented such as the hijab ban up to an age
of 10 years. Also, no political party to date has really positioned itself against those
anti-Muslim claims, suggesting that Islamophobia still enjoys a hegemonic power
across the political spectrum. At the same time, more anti-racist initiatives could be
observed compared to 2018. With the negotiations for a new government that cul-
minated in a coalition of the ÖVP and the Greens beginning in January 2020, one
looks to the year 2020 with cautious optimism.
82 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
Zusammenfassung
Die Dokustelle dokumentierte 1051 antimuslimische Vorfälle, was im Vergleich zu
2018 (540 Fälle) fast doppelt so viel ist. Die rechte Regierungskoalition von ÖVP
und FPÖ dauerte nur bis zum 28. Mai, nachdem der Ibiza-Skandal zum Rücktritt
des langjährigen FPÖ-Vorsitzenden Heinz-Christian Strache sowie einer Auflösung
der Regierung führte. Dies schuf ein öffentliches Klima, das sich hauptsächlich auf
das Ibiza-Gate und seine Auswirkungen sowie auf die anschließende Expertenregie-
rung konzentrierte, die bis zu den Wahlen im Oktober 2019 die Regierungsgeschäfte
inne hatte. Gleichzeitig war der Einfluss der Umfärbung auf die Staatsbürokratie
offensichtlich. Beispielsweise veröffentlichte der das BVT einen Bericht, in dem die
Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft (IGGÖ) erstmals nicht als Partnerin im Kampf
gegen den Dschihadismus, sondern als Problem des Extremismus genannt wurde.
Dies markiert eine radikale Veränderung in der Islam-bezogenen Politik des BVT.
Im Schatten des Ibiza-Gate fokussierten die Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament
am 26. Mai weniger auf MuslimImnnen als zuvor. Die Auswirkungen auf die Ent-
wicklung von Islamophobie waren positiv, da viele politische Projekte gegen Mus-
lim*innen auf die Warteliste kamen. Trotzdem wiederholten sowohl die ÖVP als
auch die FPÖ im Wahlkampf 2019 ihre üblichen anti-muslimischen Forderungen.
Die Destabalisierung der rechtsextremen Koalition wirkte sich somit positiv aus und
schuf eine Atempause. Die Umsetzung der anti-muslimischen Gesetzgebung ging
Hand in Hand mit anderen weitreichenden autoritären und repressiven Gesetzen
einher. Nach der Umsetzung der anti-muslimischen Gesetzgebung im Jahr 2018
wurden einige weitere Einschränkungen der muslimischen Religionsausübung ein-
geführt, wie beispielsweise das Hijab-Verbot bis zu einem Alter von bis zu 10 Jahren.
Gleichzeitig konnten mehr antirassistische Initiativen beobachtet werden. Mit den
Verhandlungen für eine neue Regierung, die im Jänner 2020 in einer Koalition von
ÖVP und Grünen gipfelte, blickt man vorsichtig optimistisch auf das Jahr 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 83
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: Republic of Austria
Type of Regime: Representative democracy
Form of Government: Semi-presidential federal parliamentary republic
Ruling Parties: Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP, centrist-right) and Austrian Free-
dom Party (FPÖ, right-wing)
Opposition Parties: Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), The Greens,
NEOS, Liste Pilz/Liste Jetzt!
Last Elections: October 2019, Parliamentary Elections (ÖVP 71 seats [37.5%];
SPÖ, 40 seats [21.2%]; FPÖ, 30 seats [16.2%]; Greens, 26 seats [13.9%]; NEOS,
15 seats [8.1%]).
Governments in 2019: ÖVP and FPÖ (right-wing) until 28 May, expert gov-
ernment from 3 June to 7 January 2020.
Total Population: 8.9 million
Major Languages: German
Official Religion: No official religion. Federal constitution recognizes 13
churches and religious communities. Islam has been legally recognized since 1912.
Statistics on Islamophobia: 1,051 cases documented by Dokustelle Muslime;
385 of 1,950 documented cases by ZARA.
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: The NGO ZARA documented
1,950 cases.
Major Religions (% of Population): Catholics 57.24%, Protestants 3.3%,
Muslims 8%
Muslim Population (% of Population): 700,000 (8%) according to estima-
tions made by the Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF)
Main Muslim Community Organizations: Islamic Religious Authority in
Austria (Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, IGGÖ). With the new Islam
Act of 2015, all major Muslim organizations are part of the IGGÖ.
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: SOS Mitmensch, Dokustelle Islam-
feindlichkeit und antimuslimischer Rassismus, ZARA, Gleichbehandlungsanwaltschaft
Far-Right Parties: FPÖ
Far-Right Movements: Identitarian Movement, Info Direkt
Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: N/A
Limitations to Islamic Practices:
ű Hijab Ban: In kindergartens since 2018. Since 2109, in primary school up
to 10 years of age.
ű Halal Slaughter Ban: Partly banned
ű Minaret Ban: In the counties of Carinthia and Vorarlberg.
ű Circumcision Ban: None
ű Burka Ban: Yes, since 2017.
ű Prayer Ban: None
84 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
Introduction
The far-right government coalition of the ÖVP and FPÖ lasted only until 28 May
following the Ibiza gate scandal1 that led to the dismissal of the longtime FPÖ lead-
er Heinz-Christian Strache. This also created a public climate that focused primarily
on the Ibiza gate and its repercussions Also, the subsequent government of experts
presented itself as an ‘unpolitical’ one, thus leaving little space for debating Islam and
Muslims. The impact of this was that many of the political projects that affected Mus-
lims were put on the waiting list. The destabilizing of the far-right coalition thus had
a positive impact, creating a breathing pause in the country. The implementation of
Islamophobic legislation went hand in hand with other far-reaching authoritarian and
repressive legislations. The far-right government had implemented several restrictive
legislations such as the amendment of the “law of aliens” (Fremdenrechtsnovelle) in July
2018 that included the possibility to analyze data from mobile phones. Asylum seekers
who have committed a criminal offense can be placed in so-called detention pending
deportation after serving their prison terms. Individuals officially registered as refugees
can now apply for Austrian citizenship after a minimum of ten years of residency and
work. Civil society aid organizations for refugees were planned to be replaced by state
agencies.2 Other limitations of religious freedom such as the abolishment of the legal
recognition of the previously established Protestant holiday of Good Friday (which is
the most important one for Protestants in Austria) revealed that the shrinking of hu-
man rights and religious freedom will subsequently affect other minorities.3
According to a survey conducted by Salzburg University-based sociologist Wolf-
gang Aschauer, 79 percent of 1,200 respondents believe that Islamic institutions
should be increasingly surveilled. Seventy percent believe that Islam is not compati-
ble with the Western world, 60% fear that there are terrorists among Muslims, while
87% supported the statement that Muslims have to adopt to the Austrian culture.
This shows the deep-seated and widely shared anti-Muslim prejudice which Aschau-
er traces back to a political climate that allowed for these views to become normal.4
1. The Ibiza-gate was triggered on 17 May 2019 by the publication of a secretly recorded video of a meeting in Ibiza,
Spain, in July 2017, held by Strache and FPÖ-Gudenus discussing their party’s underhanded practices and inten-
tions. Both politicians intend to sell government contracts to an alleged niece of a Russian businessman and hinted
at corrupt political practices involving other wealthy donors to the FPÖ. As a consequence, the scandal caused the
collapse of the governing coalition on 18 May 2019. Elections were set for 29 September.
2. Lucian Mayringer, “Anschlusshaft bis Kopftuchverbot: Ein Regierungsprogramm gegen Ausländer”, Nachrichten,
26 March 2019, https://www.nachrichten.at/politik/innenpolitik/anschlusshaft-bis-kopftuchverbot-ein-regierung-
sprogramm-fuer-auslaender;art385,3113918, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
3. “Strache: ‘Bin gegen muslimischen Feiertag’ Vizekanzler zu Karfreitag, Opernball & Sicherungshaft”, OE24, 2
March 2019, https://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/Strache-Bin-gegen-muslimischen-Feiertag/370187741, (Ac-
cess date: 19 December 2019).
4. “Mehrheit der Österreicher sieht Islam kritisch”, Der Standard, 26 September 2019, https://apps.derstandard.
at/privacywall/story/2000109103695/mehrheit-der-oesterreicher-sehen-islam-kritisch, (Access date: 19 Decem-
ber 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 85
the Austrian
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA culture.
REPORT 2019 This shows the deep-seated and widely shared anti-M
Aschauer traces back to a political climate that allowed for these views to b
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and Discursive Eve
Discussion Physical
of Islamophobic Incidents and
and Verbal Attacks
Discursive Events
The NGO ZARA documented 1,950 racist acts. The civil society organizatio
Physical and Verbal Attacks1,051 cases of anti-Muslim incidents in 2019. The majority co
documented
The NGO ZARA documented 1,950 racist acts. The civil society organization Do-
hate (757 cases), followed by 118 cases of insult, discrimination (43 cases),
kustelle Muslime documented 1,051 cases of anti-Muslim incidents in 2019. The
to the
majority consists of ZARA,
spread385 of 1,950
of hate documented
(757 cases), followedracist
by 118acts were
cases anti-Muslim. 6
of insult,
discrimination (43Incases),
April, others.5 According
andMuslims notified theto ZARA,
police385
thatofthey
1,950had
document-
heard gunshots in front o
ed racist acts were anti-Muslim. 6
Vienna.
In April, Muslims Thethe
notified police
policefound cartridges
that they had heardof gunshots
a blank gun in front
in front of of the entrance
the Islamic Centerinin Vienna.
Vienna. TheAccording
police foundto the police,
cartridges of athe gunshots
blank wereofthe result of a qu
gun in front
the entrance of the largest mosque in Vienna. According to the police, the gunshots
drivers. 7
were the result of a quarrel between two car drivers.7
A sticker withAthesticker with the
intimidation intimidationNOT
“RAPEFUGEES “RAPEFUGEES
WELCOME” NOT was seenWELCOME” was
on a bench in thefifth
fifth district
district of
ofVienna.
Vienna.(Fig. 1) 1)
(Fig. Refugees are often
Refugees equated
are often with with being Musl
equated
being Muslim, especially after the influx in 2015.
influx in 2015.
Figure 1: Sticker with the words “RAPEFUGEES NOT WELCOME” on a bench in the fifth district of Vienna, 1050.8
Figure 1: Sticker with the words “RAPEFUGEES NOT WELCOME” on a bench in the fif
Employment
The Dokustelle and ZARA document discrimination in the labor market. For fur-
ther data, their reports should be consulted. The presentation of the 2019 report
was postponed due 4 to the COVID-19
“Mehrheit der pandemic. The idea
Österreicher siehtthatIslam
womenkritisch”,
cannot Der Standard,
https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000109103695/mehrheit-der-oesterreicher-s
wear a hijab as attorneys, judges, and police officers, as discussed in 2017 alongside
(Access date: 19 December 2019).
5
Personal correspondence with Dokustelle prior to the release of their annual report.
5. Personal correspondence6 with Dokustelle prior to the release of their annual report.
Personal correspondence with ZARA prior to the release of their annual report.
6. Personal correspondence Josef Galley, “Polizei-Einsatz unter Wiens Minarett. Panik nach Schüssen vor größter Mo
7 with ZARA prior to the release of their annual report.
8 April
7. Josef Galley, “Polizei-Einsatz 2019,
unter Wiens Minarett.https://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/chronik/wien/Panik-nach-Schuess
Panik nach Schüssen vor größter Moschee Österreichs”,
Oesterreichs/375267972, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
OE24, 8 April 2019, https://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/chronik/wien/Panik-nach-Schuessen-vor-groesster-Moschee-
Oesterreichs/375267972,8 (Access
Emaildate: 19 December
to the 2019).
author, December 2019.
8. Email to the author, December 2019.
86 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
the implementation of the full-face veil ban in the Integration Act 2017, was fur-
ther expanded. A Muslim legal intern was not allowed to sit on the judge’s bench.
The Linz Higher Regional Court (OLG) ruled that the young woman could not
represent the state and the judiciary if she wore the hijab. According to the presi-
dent of the OLG, Katharina Lehmayer, the “tricky issue was not yet regulated by
the legislator.”9
Education
In March 2019, ÖVP Minister of Education Heinz Faßmann informed the public
that a survey will be conducted on social climate and integration in schools. One
question in the survey involved the increase/decrease of the number of girls wearing
the hijab. Kenan Güngör, who was also a member of the expert council on integra-
tion of the Foreign Ministry, was in charge of the survey that claims to engage with
teachers.10 The results have not been published yet.
Minister of Education Faßmann (ÖVP) replaced eleven executive personnel in
his ministry. Many pedagogues were forced to leave and were replaced by loyal party
members such as Markus Benesch who has been working for Sebastian Kurz in var-
ious leading positions.11 This has the potential that anti-Muslim legislation will be
further entrenched in the field of education.
A male student appeared armed with a weapon for lectures at the Faculty of
Physics of the University of Vienna in October. On social media, he had made
remarks and expressed violent fantasies about Islam. After another knife was dis-
covered, he was banned from the university as a first reaction. On his Twitter
account he stated, “I would like to die in a fight against Islam and kill as many of
them as possible.”12
A highly problematic aspect is the Secret Service’s (BVT) new approach to deal-
ing with the Muslim community. While in the past, the Islamic Religious Commu-
nity (IGGÖ) was seen as a partner in the fight against Jihadism, now major aspects
of the IGGÖ’s activities from religious education in public schools to the training of
teachers in college are seen with suspicion.13
9. “Gerichtspraktikantin mit Kopftuch nur Zuschauerin”, ORF, 3 December 2019, https://ooe.orf.at/sto-
ries/3024477/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
10. “Start für Schulstudie zu sozialem Klima und Integration”, ORF, 27 March 2019, https://orf.at/stories/3116613/,
(Access date: 19 December 2019).
11. Lisa Nimmervoll, “Heinz Faßmanns Ministeriumsumbau sorgt für Aufruhr”, Der Standard, 2 May 2019,
https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000102344996/fassmanns-ministeriumsumbau-sorgt-fuer-aufruhr,
(Access date: 19 December 2019).
12. Thomas Hoisl, “Uni Wien: Student mit Waffe im Hörsaal”, Profil, 21 October 2019, https://www.profil.at/
oesterreich/uni-wien-student-waffe-hoersaal-11181987, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
13. Farid Hafez, “Perspective: Official Islam as a Threat? The Paradigm Shift in Austria’s Security Politics”, SETA
Perspective, 27 September 2019, https://setav.org/en/assets/uploads/2019/09/P56En.pdf, (Access date: 19 Decem-
ber 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 87
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Politics
On 11 January 2019, the weekly Profil reported that the federal far-right govern-
ment wants to create a monitoring center that tracks religious extremism, conducts
research, and archives and documents it.14 Freedom Party whip Johann Gudenus
said there would be a “law against political Islam modelled on the Prohibition Act
of 1947.”15 The law was planned to be published in the second half of 2019 and
was not implemented because the government resigned. The exclusive focus on Is-
lam was overruled by the constitutional committee as unconstitutional. According
to the Freedom Party, there are two foci: “religious laws that are put above state
law and the unequal treatment of women due to religious reasons.”16 Independent
MP Efgani Dönmez supported this initiative to monitor movements such as “the
Muslim Brotherhood and the Turkish Milli Görüs.”17 Vice chancellor and party
leader Heinz-Christian Strache emphasized the need to “ban political Islam on a
legal basis.”18
Following Strache’s launch of his think tank debating “Islamic Anti-Semitism”
and the presentation of a study on anti-Semitism according to which Arab and Turk-
ish immigrants were more anti-Semitic than others, the government demanded that
a “Monitoring Center for political Islam, Rule of Law, and Prevention” (Dokumen-
tationsstelle für politischen Islam, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Prävention) be established in
2020.19 Certain journalists uttered their suspicion of these consecutive happenings.20
Chancellor Kurz said, “Politicians are urgently required to protect our free society
from political Islam and its excesses, such as anti-Semitism.”21 Kurz explained that
this means to monitor Islamist associations, Islamist ideology on social media, and
segregation in the realm of education. The law was planned to be debated in parlia-
ment in the summer of 2019.22
14. “Offenbar Beobachtungsstelle gegen Extremismus geplant”, ORF, 12 January 2019.
15. Clemens Neuhold, “Türkis-Blaues Islamisten-Watch”, Profil, 11 January 2019, https://www.profil.at/oesterre-
ich/tuerkis-blaues-islamisten-watch-10586605, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. “EU-Wahl: FPÖ brutal gegen Karas”, OE24, 19 January 2019, https://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/EU-
Wahl-FPOe-brutal-gegen-Karas/364549446, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
19. “Regierungsplan. 2020 kommt Stelle gegen Islamismus”, OE24, 2 March 2019, https://www.oe24.at/oesterre-
ich/politik/2020-kommt-Stelle-gegen-Islamismus/370186720, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
20. Georg Renner, “Beobachtungsstelle neu. Ein DÖW für Islamisten! Oder: Wie die Regierung schnell zurück zu
ihrem Lieblingsthema kommt”, Kleine Zeitung, 3 March 2019, https://www.kleinezeitung.at/meinung/5588894/
Beobachtungsstelle-neu_Ein-DOeW-fuer-Islamisten-Oder_Wie-die, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
21. Ibid.
22. “Präventivarbeit. Regierung verstärkt den Kampf gegen Antisemitismus”, Kronen Zeitung, 3 March 2019,
https://www.krone.at/1875035, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
88 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
Peter Pilz, leader of the small parliamentary party Liste Jetzt, argued that Austria’s po-
litical system was infiltrated by political Islam. Specifically, he stated “Milli Görüs, the
Turkish Muslim Brotherhood… [a]long with Erdogan’s ATIB [Turkish Islamic Union
for Cultural and Social Cooperation, FH], both have taken over the Islamic Religious
Community (IGGÖ).”23 According to him, with the new president Ümit Vural, the
“power of political Islam” was set in cement. Pilz further argued, “We have to look at
whether individual representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood have not had an impact
on the law. We have to be careful that Milli Görüs does not exploit parts of domes-
tic politics.”24 He warned that the ÖVP and SPÖ could be infiltrated by them. Pilz
claimed that Sebastian Kurz had given the Muslim Brotherhood the possibility to use
the law for its own purpose, especially in terms of financial aid from foreign countries.25
The ATIB protested against these allegations by Pilz and argued that the ATIB would
be “one of the strongest proponents in the fight against extremist religious tendencies,”
thus again reproducing anti-Muslim stereotypes.26 According to the ATIB, Pilz is a
populist who engages in conspiracies because of his own insignificance, and it accused
him of dividing society.27 Also, the former party member and independent MP Martha
Bißmann criticized her former party leader for being as populist as the far right.28 Fol-
lowing a visit to a meeting in Cologne by the president of the Islamic Religious Com-
munity, FPÖ party whip Johann Gudenus asked him to step down. President Vural
participated in a conference organized by the Turkish department of religious affairs,
Diyanet. Gudenus saw this as a proof that Vural was a “radical Islamist” participating
in a “secret meeting”29 – it should be noted that the meeting was never secret.
Following the coverage of a “Turkish-nationalist Milli Görüs movement” by the
daily Krone, ÖVP minister and party leader of the Viennese branch, Gernot Blümel,
argued, “Years of looking away paved the way for the emergence of parallel societies
23. “Pilz sieht Parteien durch politischen Islam unterwandert”, ORF, 3 March 2019, https://orf.at/stories/3113756/,
(Access date: 19 December 2019).
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. “Türkischer Moscheeverein ATIB: Pilz-Attacken ‘schamlos’ und ‘an den Haaren herbeigezogen”, Kleine Zeitung,
5 March 2019, https://www.kleinezeitung.at/politik/innenpolitik/5590179/Tuerkischer-Moscheeverein_ATIB_Pil-
zAttacken-schamlos-und-an-den, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
27. “ATIB: ATIB empört über haltlose Anschuldigungen durch Peter Pilz”, OTS, 5 March 2019, https://www.ots.
at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190305_OTS0121/atib-empoert-ueber-haltlose-anschuldigungen-durch-peter-pilz,
(Access date: 19 December 2019).
28. “Bißmann reagiert auf Angriff von Peter Pilz auf Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft und warnt vor gefährlichem
Populismus”, OTS, 5 March 2019, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190305_OTS0170/bissmann-re-
agiert-auf-angriff-von-peter-pilz-auf-islamische-glaubensgemeinschaft-und-warnt-vor-gefaehrlichem-populismus,
(Access date: 20 December 2019).
29. “FPÖ-Gudenus: IGGÖ-Präsident Vural muss nach Teilnahme an islamistischem Vernetzungstreffen sofort ab-
berufen werden”, OTS, 8 April 2019, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190408_OTS0115/fpoe-gude-
nus-iggoe-praesident-vural-muss-nach-teilnahme-an-islamistischem-vernetzungstreffen-sofort-abberufen-werden,
(Access date: 20 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 89
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
in Vienna.”30 He stated that the city must not become the “center of political Islam
[…] What has been sown by the red-green government for decades is now bearing
fruit in the form of organized Islamic associations. In this way, our society does not
ask for integration but segregation.”31 Rather than counteracting this discourse, the
social democratic government argued that the federal government was in charge of
this issue. According to them, they had already filed a petition to the interior minis-
ter to “closely monitor associations who spread authoritarian or Islamic-nationalist
ideologies and to regulate the states on a regular basis.”32
A discussion on the Christchurch terrorist attack took place in national par-
liament. According to the information from the Ministry of Interior, the terrorist
Tarrant came to Vienna via Budapest and had left Austria on his way to Estonia.
With a group of other people, Tarrant had visited North Korea. Two of them were
Austrians. The Interior Ministry said that there were no relations to persons or
right-wing extremist organizations. MP Walter Rosenkranz (FPÖ) criticized the
opposition by claiming that it did not act on the danger of right-wing extremism
and argued that the opposition parties were blind in one eye, refusing to see left-
wing extremist and Islamist terror. FPÖ party whip Johann Gudenus even argued
that the “daily persecution of Christians” would be uncommented by political
leaders and thus criticized the lack of empathy with all victims of terrorist attacks.
He then argued that the ban of political Islam would be the right answer to fight
radical Islamist terrorist movements “who want to destroy our culture.”33 Peter
Weidinger from the governing ÖVP also stated, “We are not blind on the left, nor
on the right eye,” thus equating the threat of right-wing extremism with leftist
groups. Previously, ÖVP MP Efgani Dönmez also argued that right-wing extrem-
ism and Islamist extremism both share the same goals: the destruction of society
and the state. Alma Zadić (Jetzt) criticized FPO politicians for using the same
language as the Identitarians. Prominent politicians of the FPÖ spoke of com-
batting “invaders.” She identified parallels with the beginning of the Yugoslavian
war, where the society was divided and people took to arms. Social democratic MP
Peter Wittmann argued that one could not deny the strong links between Interior
Minister Herbert Kickl (FPÖ) and the Identitarian movement. A resolution from
the government was adopted by all parties to re-implement a strategy against right-
wing extremism. Also, the government argued that the permanent investigation
30. “Debatte um Milli-Görüs-Jugendzentrum”, ORF, 7 February 2019, https://wien.orf.at/v2/news/sto-
ries/2963305/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. “Anschlag in Neuseeland: Kickl will sämtliche Hinweise und Spuren mit Österreich-Bezug überprüfen”,
OTS, 28 March 2019, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190328_OTS0233/anschlag-in-neusee-
land-kickl-will-saemtliche-hinweise-und-spuren-mit-oesterreich-bezug-ueberpruefen, (Access date: 19 December
2019).
90 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
committee and the National Security Council would allow for more detailed in-
formation about Tarrant’s relation to Austria.34
Following the dissolution of the far-right government, Viennese FPÖ Chair-
man Dominik Nepp said that the Islamic Community (IGGÖ), which is a le-
gally recognized corporative institution, should be investigated regarding its legal
status because its president Ümit Vural asked to build a visible mosque in every
state of Austria. He stated, “The IGGÖ is … by legalist Islamists, whose goal
is to create an Islamic theocratic state with peaceful means.”35 Karl Nehammer,
general secretary of the ÖVP, responded to Vural saying that integration was
more important than the construction of a mosque in every state of Austria. “The
IGGÖ must not bring Muslims further away from our society, but must help to
improve their integration. This requires joint efforts and a commitment to our
catalog of values instead of false fantasies with mosques. We are of course not
against mosques per se, but I see the outlined path from a large mosque per fed-
eral state as critical because it does not contribute to the integration of Muslims,
but does the opposite.”36
In 2017, members of a chat group of the student union AG, which is ideolog-
ically linked to the governing ÖVP, had spread anti-Semitic and white supremacist
content. While a member was excluded from the ÖVP youth organization and a
local MP was removed from the ÖVP in Lower Austria, the public came to know
that a member of this very chat group was working in the Foreign Ministry. He had
worked for the ministry and the Austrian Integration Fund ÖIF.37
Political scientist Bassam Tibi warned of a “new anti-Semitism” emerging in
Iran that is rooted in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. He was invited to speak
at an official commemoration of the Holocaust and said that he “adored him [Se-
bastian Kurz, FH] very much.”38 Tibi stated, “If a new systematic pogrom of Jews
is repeated, then it will be in the Near East.”39 In contrast to Tibi and his narrative
of anti-Semitic Muslims, the president of the Austrian Federal Council (SPÖ), the
second chamber of the parliament, did not focus on the “new anti-Semitism” but on
human rights and democracy.
34. Ibid.
35. “Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft: Wiener FPÖ-Chef will Auflösung”, Kurier, 19 November 2019, https://
kurier.at/chronik/wien/islamische-glaubensgemeinschaft-wiener-fpoe-chef-will-aufloesung/400679021, (Access
date: 19 December 2019).
36. Die neue Volkspartei, “Nehammer: Integration wichtiger als der Bau von einer Moschee pro Bundesland”, OTS,
18 November 2019, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20191118_OTS0125/nehammer-integration-
wichtiger-als-der-bau-von-einer-moschee-pro-bundesland, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
37. “Antisemitische Chats: Mitglied arbeitet im Außenministerium”, ORF, 18 January 2019, https://orf.at/sto-
ries/3108171/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
38. “Wenn sich Holocaust wiederholt, wird es im Nahen Osten sein”, Die Presse, 3 May 2019, https://www.diepres-
se.com/5622059/wenn-sich-holocaust-wiederholt-wird-es-im-nahen-osten-sein, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
39. Ibid.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
In an interview with the daily Österreich, Vice-Chancellor Strache said that the
deletion of the legal recognition of the established Protestant holiday Good Friday
was necessary in order not to let Muslims claim a separate legally recognized holiday.
He said, “We definitely do not want a Muslim holiday.”40 Norbert Hofer (FPÖ)
reiterated this.41 This also had an effect on the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, forcing
Protestants and Jews to take an extra day off on their religious holidays.42 The Prot-
estant Church prepared a lawsuit against the removal of its holiday from the official
list of national holidays.
During a parliamentary debate in the Viennese Council on 27 February 2019,
an FPÖ MP argued that Rami Ali, an anti-racist political activist, is presumably a
Muslim Brother. The FPÖ argued that he was linked to the Social Democratic Party
and Green MP Faika El-Nagashi.43 Because of parliamentary privilege, the MP can-
not be sued.
Thomas Bulant of the Social Democratic labor union FSG criticized the federal
government for not allocating enough money to teaching staff. Naming the prob-
lems, he argued, “Part of this, of course, is the creeping Islamization in our society,
violence or crime.”44
According to the head of the SPÖ in Lower Austria, Franz Schnabl, the ÖVP’s
strategy in the election campaign to discuss Islam as a security threat was a distrac-
tion from internal scandals. He stated, “Creating fear is not the job of responsible
politicians.”45
During the convention of the European Peoples Party (EPP) in May 2019 in
Zagreb, Sebastian Kurz declared that Europe had to “defend Europe’s Christian-Jewish
identity.” 46 He further stated that “it should not accept more people, whom it is not
able to integrate.”47 The original proposal for a department of the European Com-
mission was “Commissioner on the Protection of European Way of Life,” which was
40. Isabell Daniel, “Strache: ‚Bin gegen muslimischen Feiertag”, OE24, 2 March 2019.
41. “Karfreitag-Kompromiss sorgt für schlechte Stimmung”, Der Standard, 20 February 2019, https://apps.der-
standard.at/privacywall/story/2000098264338/hofer-ueberlegt-fuer-handel-am-karfreitag-8-dezember-regelung,
(Access date: 19 December 2019).
42. “Karfreitag: Regierung streicht auch Jom Kippur”, Heute, 26 February 2019, https://www.heute.at/s/karfreit-
ag-regierung-streicht-auch-jom-kippur-49071858, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
43. Gemeinderat, 48. Sitzung vom 27.02.2019, Wörtliches Protokoll - Seite 86 von 100, https://www.wien.gv.at/
mdb/gr/2019/gr-048-w-2019-02-27-086.html, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
44. “SPÖ-Gewerkschafter warnt vor Islamisierung”, Heute.at, 28 January 2019.
45. SPÖ Niederösterreich, “Schnabl/Kocevar zu ÖVP-Extremismuspapier: ‘Durchschaubares Ablenkungs-
manöver!”, OTS, 17 August 2019, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190817_OTS0009/schnablkoce-
var-zu-oevp-extremismuspapier-durchschaubares-ablenkungsmanoever, (20 December 2019).
46. Daniel Kittner, “Kurz will, dass die EU die ‚christlich-jüdische Identität schützt”, Kurier, 21 November
2019.
47. Ibid.
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
regarded as populist by the Social Democrats and the Greens. The term “protection”
was later changed to “Promotion,” which was not welcomed by Sebastian Kurz.48
During the election campaign, the ÖVP demanded that marriages can only be
contracted with a minimum age of 18 years. A request by the Austrian Press Agency
APA made clear that this initiative targeted Muslims, claiming that with immigra-
tion, people came to Austria who think that Islamic values were more important
than Austrian ones.49
In a response to the ÖVP’s attempt to ban the Identitarian movement, the FPÖ
reiterated its will to ban political Islam.50 When the ÖVP called for a ban of political
Islam in its election program, the FPÖ argued that it was the justice minister of the
‘ÖVP who had not put such a law into practice.51
Legislation
After a hijab ban in kindergarten was already implemented in 2018, the ÖVP invited
the anti-Muslim author Zana Ramadani as an expert to the education committee to
expand the hijab ban up to 10 years of age. She argued, “Once you wear it [hijab,
FH] as a girl, you won’t take it off.”52 The proposed text bans “wearing ideological
or religious clothing, with which a covering of the head is connected.” An explicit
naming of the hijab would be problematic while this description allows the kippah
and dastar (turban worn by Sikhs) not to be affected. Minister of Education Heinz
Faßmann argued that this would be done for secularity and the equal treatment of
men and women. Another expert, Ebrahim Afsah, called the hijab a “modern, po-
litical symbol” and argued that the ban was not problematic since it was not obliga-
tory at this young age. NEOS and SPÖ did not support the proposal, though they
declared that they would not support young girls being forced to wear the hijab. In
addition to the hijab ban, they called for a more comprehensive policy to support
social workers and language skills. Minister Faßmann also argued that he envisions
a space for public servants that is ideology and religion-free specifically mention-
ing policewomen, judges, and teachers (except teachers of religion classes). Minister
48. Ibid.
49. “ÖVP will Ehe künftig erst ab 18 Jahren erlauben”, ORF, 28 August 2019, https://orf.at/stories/3135209/,
(Access date: 21 December 2019).
50. “Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub – FPÖ, FPÖ-Jenewein zu Nehammer: ‚Gerichte und Behörden sind für Vere-
insverbote zuständig”, OTS, 26 August 2019, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190826_OTS0112/
fpoe-jenewein-zu-nehammer-gerichte-und-behoerden-sind-fuer-vereinsverbote-zustaendig, (Access date: 21 De-
cember 2019).
51. “Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub – FPÖ, FPÖ-Kickl: „ÖVP hat Gesetz gegen den politischen Islam blockiert
und damit verhindert”, OTS, 16 August 2019, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190816_OTS0012/
fpoe-kickl-oevp-hat-gesetz-gegen-den-politischen-islam-blockiert-und-damit-verhindert, (Access date: 21 Decem-
ber 2019).
52. Julia Neuhauser, “Die Ausdehnung des Kopftuchverbots”, Die Presse, 20 March 2019, https://www.diepresse.
com/5598480/die-ausdehnung-des-kopftuchverbots, (Access date: 20 December 2019).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Faßmann said that the ban is only up to 10 years of age because this is less risky to be
against religious freedom. He added, “I am nobody that fights with the machete.” To
this, his expert, Zana Ramadani, added, “I am here for using the machete.”53
President of the Islamic Community Vural had proclaimed that he would liti-
gate against the hijab ban, which was introduced by the ÖVP and FPÖ in 2018. At
the same time, the ÖVP called for a broadening of the hijab ban to include pupils
up to 14 years as well as Muslim teachers because they “implicitly undermine the
neutrality of the state and promote a social system in which women do not have the
same position as in our Western, enlightened society.”54
During the election campaign in late 2019, the FPÖ called for an expansion of
the hijab ban to up to 14 years of age in school. This stance was also taken by the
ÖVP. The FPÖ also called for a hijab ban for teachers. According to MP Hermann
Brückl, the hijab supports an early social and gender segregation.55 In September
2019, shortly before the new national parliamentary elections, the FPÖ submitted
an amendment to change to School Teaching Act to include a hijab ban for pupils up
to the age of 14 as well as for teachers. “The headscarf is a symbol of political Islam
and has no place in educational institutions,” said FPÖ chairman Norbert Hofer.56
The motion was not accepted by the rest of the parties. MP Christoph Matznetter
(SPÖ) argued that the only teachers wearing a headscarf would be nuns and MP
Michaela Steinacker (ÖVP) agreed that such a ban would also threaten Catholic
teachers of religious education. Due to considerations of fundamental rights, the
initiative was postponed.57
FPÖ Viennese chairman Dominik Nepp published a press release, in which he
spoke about “Muslim sexual delinquents, who see our daughters and women as un-
protected game from their misanthropic perception of women.” According to him,
Shariah would rule in schools, where Muslims make up the majority in Vienna.58
53. Ibid.
54. “ÖVP will Kopftuchverbot ausweiten”, Kurier, 23 August 2018, https://kurier.at/politik/inland/oevp-will-kop-
ftuchverbot-ausweiten/400585082, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
55. Pressedienst der Parlamentsdirektion – Parlamentskorrespondenz, “Betrug mit EU-Geldern: Abgeordnete geb-
en grünes Licht für neue Tatbestände im StGB”, OTS, 3 December 2019, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/
OTS_20191203_OTS0202/betrug-mit-eu-geldern-abgeordnete-geben-gruenes-licht-fuer-neue-tatbestaende-im-
stgb, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
56. “FPÖ-Antrag für erweitertes Kopftuch-Verbot in Schulen”, FPÖ, 19 September 2019, https://www.fpoe.at/
artikel/fpoe-antrag-fuer-erweitertes-kopftuch-verbot-in-schulen/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
57. Pressedienst der Parlamentsdirektion – Parlamentskorrespondenz, “Betrug mit EU-Geldern: Abgeordnete geben
grünes Licht für neue Tatbestände im StGB”.
58. Dominik Nepp, “Unsere Wiener Kultur steht auf dem Spiel!”, OE24, 7 August 2019, https://www.domini-
knepp.at/unsere-wiener-kultur-steht-auf-dem-spiel/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
Media
On 17 January, three female ministers presented their measures to fight violence
against women.
Minister of Women Juliane Bogner-Strauß (ÖVP) headed the initiative. The
argument was that anti-Semitism, radical Islamism, and a different perception of
women was “imported” with the “migration wave.” According to Foreign Minis-
ter Karin Kneissl, violence against women increased with the “migration crisis.”59
During Austria’s most important weekly political debate on TV following the mur-
der of four women within one week, State Secretary Karoline Edtstadler (ÖVP)60
argued that there was no patriarchy in Austria. Rather, this was due to “imported
patriarchy” (from Muslim immigrants).61
A theologian was interviewed on the ban of the headscarf and gave different an-
swers to critical questions. On the one hand, she criticized the government that puts
pressure on Muslim girls and their parents. On the other, she argued that one has to
be cautious and look at which ideology is spread by religious teachers, thus repro-
ducing a general suspicion against a religious community.62 Some figures such as the
self-proclaimed “moderate Muslim” Abulwafa Mohammed supported the notion of
the government’s European Islam without uttering one word of critique towards the
government’s policies vis-à-vis Muslims.63 In another op-ed, the same author argued
that the spirit of the Islam Act of 2015, which was widely criticized as being discrimi-
natory in many respects, “aimed at the independence and responsibility of Muslims in
Austria.”64 He further argued that some Muslim associations and organizations – with-
out naming them and thus creating a suspicion around many – “are not open about
their ideological and political goals.”65 He concluded his op-ed with the words: “Out
of love for Austria and Islam, I urge for more transparency in Muslim communities.”66
59. “Gewalt an Frauen: Regierung präsentiert Gegenmaßnahmen”, ORF, 17 January 2019, https://orf.at/sto-
ries/3108033/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
60. “Im Visier: Karoline Edtstadler”, Linkswende, 4 February 2019, http://linkswende.org/im-visier-karoline-edt-
stadler/?fbclid=IwAR3QvYigrjdbtY7aquq3wt2FfM66eL7M7g0vov9mmqB-QgZ37UlAGexISSE (Access date: 19
December 2019).
61. Olivera Stajić, “Staatssekretärin Edtstadler bei „Im Zentrum“: Es gibt kein Patriarchat”, Der Standard, 21 Jan-
uary 2019, https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000096748287/staatssekretaerin-edtstadler-bei-im-zen-
trum-es-gibt-kein-patriarchat, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
62. “Dann gehen sie bis zur Schule mit dem Kopftuch und nehmen es davor ab”, Die Presse, 11 January 2019,
https://www.diepresse.com/5559173/dann-gehen-sie-bis-zur-schule-mit-dem-kopftuch-und-nehmen-es-davor-ab,
(Access date: 19 December 2019).
63. Abualwafa Mohammed, “Österreich und seine Muslime. Man vermisst ein vollständiges Konzept für einen
europäischen Islam”, Wiener Zeitung, 11 Januuary 2019, https://www.wienerzeitung.at/meinung/gastkommentar-
e/1012048-Oesterreich-und-seine-Muslime.html, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
64. Abdulwafa Mohammed, “Die islamische Transparenzfrage”, Wiener Zeitung, 21 August 2019, https://www.
wienerzeitung.at/meinung/gastkommentare/2023685-Die-islamische-Transparenzfrage.html, (Access date: 19 De-
cember 2019).
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Activist Rami Ali published one of the most comprehensive critical op-eds in Der
Standard on Susanne Wiesinger’s book dealing with the alleged threat of Islam in school.67
Philosopher of law Stefan Hammer argued in an interview in Die Presse that a hijab ban
in school and universities would be an unlawful interference in religious freedom.68
A panel was held at the University of Vienna to discuss the ban of the hijab.
While all panelists supported the claim that young girls should not wear a hijab, Heiko
Heinisch called for a general ban in school. Policy advisor Kenan Güngör criticized the
language used by parts of the government in the legitimization of the ban and feared
that this language would counteract the goal of weakening conservative Islam. Michael
Kramer represented the Islamic Community (IGGÖ) and argued that the initiative
was “right and important, but the implementation via a law was wrong.”69 NEOS party
whip Christoph Wiederkehr argued that this ban would be used against one particular
religious group, while supporting a “religion-neutral school up to 14 years.”70 Martin
Kienl from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the law.
While the Islamic Community criticized the hijab ban as an interference in the
parents’ right to education, according to the head of the education department of the
Islamic Community, Amina Baghajati, they had a “good practice” when dealing with
kids who wear the hijab, be it forced or not.71 In the weekly Falter journalist and cultural
studies scholar Judith Kohlenberger discussed a study conducted by two political sci-
entists from Stanford University who assess the impact of the headscarf ban on Muslim
societal integration in France. Kohlenberg takes the evidence to counteract the govern-
ment’s proclamation that a headscarf ban would enhance societal integration.72
In an interview with the Upper Austrian Federation of Austrian Industry, its
CEO said that the canon of values would be violated when Santa Claus is not al-
lowed to enter kindergarten anymore because of migration, thus reiterating a false
idea of Muslim immigrants changing the culture of the country.73
The daily Krone published a story on the “Turkish-nationalist Milli Görüs
movement,” which had established a European youth headquarter in the 15th Vien-
67. “Wiesinger-Buch ‘Kulturkampf im Klassenzimmer’: Zum ‘Problem’ Islam in Schulen”, Der Standard, 24 Janu-
ary 2019, https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000096200072/wiesinger-buch-kulturkampf-im-klassen-
zimmer-zum-problem-islam-in-schulen, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
68. Erich Kocina, “Kopftuchverbot an Unis ist zu großer Eingriff ”, Die Presse, 17 January 2019, https://www.die-
presse.com/5563399/bdquokopftuchverbot-an-unis-ist-zu-grosser-eingriffldquo, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
69. “Geteilte Meinungen beim Kopftuchverbot für Kinder”, ORF, 13 January 2019, https://orf.at/stories/3107496/,
(Access date: 19 December 2019).
70. Ibid.
71. Clara Akinyosoye, “IGGÖ zu Kopftuch in Schulen: ‘Haben bewährte Praxis”, Religion ORF, 16 January 2019,
https://religion.orf.at/stories/2958832/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
72. Judith Kohlenberger, “Fördert das Kopftuch die Integration”, Falter, 2 December 2019, https://cms.falter.at/
blogs/thinktank/2019/12/02/foerdert-das-kopftuchverbot-die-integration/ (Access date: 19 December 2019).
73. Josef Ertl, “Migrationspolitik der letzten Jahrzehnte hat versagt”, Kurier, 27 January 2019, https://kurier.at/
chronik/oberoesterreich/migrationspolitik-der-letzten-jahrzehnte-hat-versagt/400387535, (Access date: 19 Decem-
ber 2019).
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
nese district. State youth attorney Nik Nafs said that he had asked the secret service
for further information on the allegations that the movement stands for problematic
values such as homophobia, anti-Semitism, and nationalism.74
In an opinion piece by Christian Ultsch in Die Presse, the author commented
on the Christchurch terrorist attacks as follows, “Anyone who draws exaggerated
conclusions about a ‘structural hatred of Islam’ from the bloody deed of a fascist in
New Zealand is wrong.”75 While Ultsch on the one hand realizes the danger that
comes from white supremacist racists, he sees this ideology as an old relict that is
drawn upon by a few isolated people. He argues that one has to rethink how issues
like Islam and migration are discussed, but also criticizes the social democrats who
linked this anti-Muslim ideology of the right-wing government with the Christ-
church terrorist. Furthermore, he criticizes the SPÖ leader’s words that there was
a “structural hate against Islam.”76 “In doing so, it is promoting the Islamophobia
debate, the function of which is not least to prevent a critical examination of Islam.”77
Adelheid Wölfl from Der Standard informed the public of the ideological relations of
the Christchurch terrorist to Serb nationalist ideology and its genocide of Muslims
during the Yugoslavian civil war in the 1990s.78
Following the Christchurch attacks, the Islamic Religious Community doubted
the integrity of expressions of mourning by politicians of the FPÖ, who have been
a strong force of anti-Muslim discourse for decades.79 The president of the Jew-
ish Community expressed his condolences to the Muslim community.80 Chancellor
Kurz was not willing to name the ideology behind the terrorist attack, but gave a
general statement saying: “Our position on this is very clear, no kind of extremism
whatsoever – whether it’s radical Islamists or right-wing extremist fanatics – has any
place in our society.”81
74. “Debatte um Milli-Görüs-Jugendzentrum”, Wien ORF, 7 February 2019, https://wien.orf.at/v2/news/sto-
ries/2963305/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
75. Christian Ultsch, “Die nützlichen Idioten des Attentäters von Christchurch”, Die Presse, 15 March 2019,
https://www.diepresse.com/5596641/die-nutzlichen-idioten-des-attentaters-von-christchurch, (Access date: 19 De-
cember 2019).
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Adelheid Wölfl, “Christchurch-Attentäter ließ sich durch Muslimenhass auf dem Balkan ‚inspirieren”, Der
Standard, 18 March 2019, https://apps.derstandard.de/privacywall/story/2000099696495/christchurchatten-
taeter-von-liess-sich-durch-muslimenhass-auf-dem-balkan-inspirieren, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
79. “IGGÖ: Bundesregierung muss sich klar von anti-muslimischer Hetze distanzieren”, OTS, 15 March 2019,
https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190315_OTS0230/iggoe-bundesregierung-muss-sich-klar-von-an-
ti-muslimischer-hetze-distanzieren, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
80. Israelitische Kultusgemeinde, “KG verurteilt Anschlag in Neuseeland”, OTS, 15 March 2019.
81. Chris Baynes, “New Zealand terror attacker had financial links with European far-right group Generation Iden-
tity, Austrian chancellor reveals”, Independent, 27 March 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/eu-
rope/new-zealand-terror-attack-generation-identity-austria-kurz-a8841841.html, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
In an op-ed in Die Presse, Nina Scholz discussed a survey on anti-Semitism
conducted in 2016 on youngsters in youth centers.82 According to this study, 47%
of Muslim youth, 27% of Christian Orthodox, and 7% of Catholic youth hold
anti-Semitic views. But what Scholz continues to argue is that “a look at the literary
Islamic tradition would bring a unique anti-Jewish tradition to the fore”83 and would
question the assumption that anti-Semitism was imported to Muslim thought by
Europeans. According to her, Islamic anti-Semitism has to be searched in the Islamic
tradition and reappraised.
The newspaper Österreich falsely claimed that the Muslim organization Milli
Görüs is monitored by the Secret Service (BVT).84 Milli Görüs did not react.
The European delegation leader of the FPÖ Harald Vilimsky supported far-
right extremist newspaper Info Direkt, which is close to the Identitarian Movement,
as an MEP.85
In an op-ed, two academics questioned the data provided by the Dokustelle
Muslime, which monitors anti-Muslim hate crime. They also questioned whether
racism and religion could be conceptualized within one category, thus questioning
the existence of anti-Muslim racism. They especially criticized the fact that the media
had covered the rise of hate crime as reported by Dokustelle. From a Eurocentrist
perspective, they argued that “religion has to be domesticated and surveilled.” Fur-
ther, they claimed that one should look at racism in Arab societies and anti-Semitism
among Muslims in Europe.86
In an op-ed, Ednan Aslan critically reflected on the Islam policies of the gov-
ernment coalition of the ÖVP and FPÖ. He argued in favor of training imams
in Austria, as the Islam Act of 2015 had claimed (which is not the case). He
also claimed that the government had planned to define standards for the estab-
lishment of mosques along with the Islamic Religious Community (IGGÖ). He
argued that it was the government’s goal to prevent ideological indoctrination in
Islamic kindergartens, check textbooks for Islamic religious education in public
schools, fight the radicalization of Muslim youth, and close down mosques of rad-
82. Nina Scholz, “Woher der Antisemitismus unter Muslimen kommt”, Die Presse, 1 April 2019, https://www.
diepresse.com/5605562/woher-der-antisemitismus-unter-muslimen-kommt, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
83. Ibid.
84. “Nach EU-Wahl will Koalition islamistische Vereine verbieten”, OE24, 8 April 2019, https://www.oe24.at/
oesterreich/politik/daniel/Nach-EU-Wahl-will-Koalition-islamistische-Vereine-verbieten/375388329, (Access date:
19 December 2019).
85. “Vilimsky finanziert rechtsextreme Szene durch Inseratschaltungen”, SOS Mitmensch, 25 February 2019,
https://www2.sosmitmensch.at/vilimsky-finanziert-rechtsextreme-szene?fbclid=IwAR33jEAifW0BVd9prEhxlN-
CuiTFp5w5qD_QXGRnYBMVUNjAwHJtZUi5rH8w, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
86. Nikolaus Dimmel and Roland Fürst, “Religionskritik als Rassismus?”, Der Standard, 26 April 2019, https://
apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000102055735/religionskritik-als-rassismus, (Access date: 19 December
2019).
98 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
icalization. According to Aslan, not a single one of these goals had been achieved,
even more imams from abroad had entered Austria following the influx of refu-
gees, and more schools founded by several states for the training of imams had
been opened. While Aslan welcomed that the previous government was open and
clear about not wanting a “radical Islam,” he argued that they did not say which
form of Islam they wanted to support. He especially criticized the fact that the
government did not speak out about supporting an “Islam of European imprint”
(Islam europäischer Prägung). Aslan supports the Islam Act of 2015 and wishes that
further steps are taken.87
Justice System
The application for recognition as a religious community on behalf of the Alevi com-
munity was rejected by the Viennese High Administrative Court. The reason for this
was that the statutes were in most parts identical to those of the already legally rec-
ognized community of the Islamic Alevi Community (ALEVI), which is recognized
under the Islam Act of 2015. The Alevi community asserts to represent 70,000 Alevis
and protested the verdict, arguing that its facilities might be closed, if they do not
subordinate to the Islamic Alevi Community. Also, the Office for Cultural Affairs
(Kultusamt) of the Austrian Republic requested the community to change its name
in order to prevent a confusion with the recognized “ALEVI.”88
According to a letter by the federal department of education, the hijab ban has
also implications for sports education. The letter states, “Pupils up to ten years are
forbidden to wear ideological or religious garments that are related to the covering of
the head, also in sports classes.”89 This also explicitly includes the burkini. The pres-
ident of the IGGÖ, Ümit Vural, stated that the IGGÖ will submit a lawsuit against
the ban of the hijab in elementary school in December 2019.90
Vural also criticized the shortage of 65 imams in Austrian mosques following
the deportation of imams and the designation of imams from ATIB as an endan-
germent of public safety and order.91After having been elected, Vural stressed that
87. Ednan Aslan, “Die Sichtbarkeit des Islam”, Der Standard, 19 December 2019, https://apps.derstandard.at/
privacywall/story/2000108050729/die-sichtbarkeit-des-islam, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
88. “Antrag der Aleviten in Österreich abgelehnt”, Religion ORF, 31 January 2019, https://religion.orf.at/sto-
ries/2961904/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
89. “Kein Burkini für Schülerinnen unter zehn”, Die Presse, 22 October 2019, https://www.diepresse.com/5710060/
kopftuchverbot-kein-burkini-fur-schulerinnen-unter-zehn, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
90. “IGGÖ Feiert 40-Jähriges Bestehen”, Kismetonline, https://www.kismetonline.at/iggoe-feiert-40-jaehrig-
es-bestehen/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
91. “Präsident Vural klagt über Imamemangel”, Religion ORF, 3 February 2019, https://religion.orf.at/sto-
ries/2962394/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 99
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Vural also criticized the shortage of 65 imams in Austrian mosques following the deportation of
imams and the designation of imams from ATIB as an endangerment of public safety and
“racism should not become the normal.”92 He also made clear that the number of
order. 91After having been elected, Vural stressed that “racism should not become the normal.” 92
hijab-wearing girls in elementary school is extremely low. 93
He also made clear that the number of hijab-wearing girls in elementary school is extremely low. 93
Following the implementation of the Symbol Act, the Ministry of Interior pub-
Following the implementation of the Symbol Act, the Ministry of Interior published the 13 logos
lished the 13 logos that are banned according to the amended act. (Fig. 2)
that are banned according to the amended act. (Fig. 2)
Figure
Figure2:2:Banned
Banned logos
logos of different
differentorganizations.
organizations.
9494
The logos of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Grey Wolves, the military arm of Hizbullah, and Hamas
The logos of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Grey Wolves, the military arm of
are amongst them.
Hizbullah, The fineareforamongst
and Hamas showingthem.
such aThe
logofine
in public is up tosuch
for showing EUR 4,000,inand
a logo repeat
public
95
offences
is up toincur
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4,000, to EUR 10,000.
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incurin the pastof
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to EUR had only95banned
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in the past the Symbol Act had only banned the logos of DAESH and Al-Qaeda,
91
this move,
“Präsident where
Vural the Imamemangel”,
klagt über logos of non-violent organizations
Religion ORF, 3 February 2019,arehttps://religion.orf.at/stories/2962394/,
banned alongside violent
(Access date: 19 December 2019).
92 ones, can be interpreted as a potential move towards further suppression of organi-
“Ümit Vural: ‘Rassismus darf nicht zur Normalität werden”, Tiroler Tageszeitung, 2 January 2019,
https://www.tt.com/artikel/15175496/uemit-vural-rassismus-darf-nicht-zur-normalitaet-werden,
zations that are allegedly related to the named organizations. The recent (Access plans todate:
ban 19
December 2019).
93 so-called political Islam can be read as such a move.96
Peter Mayr and Nina Weißensteiner, “Muslimenchef beklagt Übergriffe: ‘Es ist schlimmer geworden”, Der Standard,
10 January 2019, https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000095786269/muslimen-chef-beklagt-uebergriffe-
gegen-glaeubige-es-ist-schlimmer-geworden, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
94
Federal Chancellery Republic of Austria, https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/en.html, (Access date: 19 December
2019).
92. “Ümit Vural: ‘Rassismus darf nicht zur Normalität werden”, Tiroler Tageszeitung, 2 January 2019, https://
95
“Symbole – Anhang”, Rechtsinformationssystem des Bundes,
www.tt.com/artikel/15175496/uemit-vural-rassismus-darf-nicht-zur-normalitaet-werden, (Access date: 19 Decem-
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Begut/BEGUT_COO_2026_100_2_1611984/COO_2026_100_2_1612005.ht
ml,ber(Access
2019). date: 19 December 2019).
93. Peter Mayr and Nina Weißensteiner, “Muslimenchef beklagt Übergriffe: ‘Es ist schlimmer geworden”, Der
Standard, 10 January 2019, https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000095786269/muslimen-chef-beklagt-
uebergriffe-gegen-glaeubige-es-ist-schlimmer-geworden, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
94. Federal Chancellery Republic of Austria, https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/en.html, (Access date: 19 De-
cember 2019).
95. “Symbole – Anhang”, Rechtsinformationssystem des Bundes, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Begut/BE
GUT_COO_2026_100_2_1611984/COO_2026_100_2_1612005.html, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
96. Farid Hafez, “Perspective: Banning Symbols of Extremism in Austria | Targeting Extremism or Civil Society?”,
SETA Perspective, 10 December 2018, https://setav.org/en/assets/uploads/2018/12/49_Perspective.pdf, (Access
date: 19 December 2019).
100 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
The Arab Cultus Community, which is part of the Islamic Religious Commu-
nity and is home to more than ten mosques, won a lawsuit against the govern-
ment’s initiative to close down the community and its mosques. In closing down the
mosques and the community, the Office for Cultural Affairs (Kultusamt) had acted
against the law according to the verdict of the Viennese Administration Court.97 At
the same time, the government vowed to appeal the verdict at the Federal Higher
Administrative Court. Minister Gernot Blümel argued that if this means changing
the law, then this had to be done by the federal government.98
Various mosques in Vienna and Lower Austria were visited by personnel of the
state’s Cultural Office without prior notification. The Islamic Religious Community
said this was an “exceedance of one’s level of competency.” The officials told the com-
munity members and imams that they would “check if everything is fine.”99
According to the newspaper Addendum, associations of the Turkish Federation
in Wiener Neustadt were closed. Reasons were not made public.100
Following news that the first newborn baby of 2018 had Muslim parents with
a mother wearing a hijab, a 65-year-old pensioner was given a six-month probation
due to a hate posting.101
A 67-year-old pensioner was given a 15-month probation because he had fixed
a sign outside of his private apartment that showed Nazi symbols and the sentence
“Office Moslem-Hunter. Kill them all.”102
Both Karl Nehammer (ÖVP) and Johann Gudenus (FPÖ) were delighted with
the verdict of the Constitutional Court which supported the expulsion of two imams
from ATIB mosques that were financed by the Diyanet.103
Sabine Matejka, president of the Austrian Lawyers Association, argued in Au-
gust during the Alpbach talks that the governance of religious neutrality in the court
97. “IGGÖ gewinnt Rechtsstreit: Arabische Kultusgemeinde bleibt bestehen”, OTS, 14 February 2019, https://
www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190214_OTS0016/iggoe-gewinnt-rechtsstreit-arabische-kultusge-
meinde-bleibt-bestehen, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
98. Bernhard Ichner, “Höchstgericht soll über Arabische Kultusgemeinde entscheiden”, Kurier, 14February 2 019,
https://kurier.at/politik/inland/hoechstgericht-soll-ueber-arabische-kultusgemeinde-entscheiden/400406888, (Ac-
cess date: 19 December 2019).
99. Georg Renner, “Regierung lässt Kultusamt Moscheen kontrollieren”, Kleine Zeitung, 1 April 2019, https://www.
kleinezeitung.at/politik/innenpolitik/5605062/Muslime-protestieren_Regierung-laesst-Kultusamt-Moscheen-kon-
trollieren, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
100. “Der Einfluss türkischer Vereine in Österreich”, Addendum, 25 June 2019, https://www.addendum.org/
tuerken-in-oesterreich/tuerkische-vereine/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
101. “Hassposting gegen Wiener Neujahrsbaby: Weiteres Urteil”, ORF, 11 March 2019, https://orf.at/sto-
ries/3114767/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
102. Johannes Weichhart, “Die Zahl 88? Ich bin ein Fan von Hansi Hinterseer”, Kurier, 13 March 2 019, https://
kurier.at/chronik/niederoesterreich/die-zahl-88-ich-bin-ein-fan-von-hansi-hinterseer/400433689, (Access date: 19
December 2019).
103. Die neue Volkspartei, “Nehammer/Gudenus: Urteil stützt Linie der Regierung gegen politischen Islam”, OTS,
21 March 2019, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190321_OTS0178/nehammergudenus-urteil-stu-
etzt-linie-der-regierung-gegen-politischen-islam, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 101
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
should be dealt with in a comprehensive way. “It is not okay to ban only the hijab for
lawyers. Either the ban is for everybody or for nobody.”104 The president of Austrian
lawyers, Rupert Wolff, argued during the debate that neutrality should be compul-
sory for all state authorities.105
The court in the city of Graz ruled on an attack on a mosque that was perpe-
trated on 6 May 2016. The head of a pig was put outside of the mosque and pig
blood was spilled. Three men were convicted on the grounds of vilification of reli-
gious teachings and a woman reached an extrajudicial agreement. The court pro-
ceedings were not open to the public on the grounds of “public order and national
security.” The judge argued that “the work by the secret services and the identity
of the officials had to be protected” and he wanted to “prevent the dissemination
of extremist propaganda.”106
In autumn of 2018, the Ummet Mosque in Feldkirch was closed because it was
said that it had radicalized youth with the dissemination of the Koran. According to
a study conducted by the institution “okay zusammen leben” led by Eva Grabherr,
this mosque was a “political-Salafist” one and the administration of the mosque re-
fused to give interviews to them. The report claimed that many youths that partici-
pated in the campaign ‘Read’ (Lies) would have joined Jihadist organizations and left
to Syria in 2014/2015. The mosque was closed because the lease had ended.107
In December 2019, the mosque Savjet in Vienna was raided. According to the
police, this was a “usual control.” According to the tabloid press, this was due to
migrants without legal documents who visit the mosque.108
Following the publication of our European Islamophobia Report in 2019, an
open letter against the publication was written by people whom I had mentioned in
the national report for 2018 on Austria in the European Islamophobia Report. Every
single Austrian newspaper published the piece, and my reply as well.109 Following
the publication and a media campaign against the report and myself, I also received
a letter, where I was personally threatened. The letter wrote, “Are you a political
scientist? No, you are a Moslem! You are dumb like nearly all Muslims! Also, Islam
is no religion, but an epidemic, epidemics have to be exterminated! […]”. (Fig. 3)
104. “Matejka will Gesetz für Religionsneutralität vor Gericht”, Religion ORF, 25 August 2019, https://orf.at/
stories/3134884/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
105. Ibid.
106. “Schuldsprüche nach Moschee-Anschlag in Graz”, Steiermark ORF, 29 March 2019, https://steiermark.orf.at/
v2/news/stories/2972874/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
107. “Aufgelöste Moschee trug in Vorarlberg zu Radikalisierung bei”, Kleine Zeitung, 28 March 2019.
108. Stefan Steinkogler and Sandra Ramsauer, “Großrazzia bei Freitagsgebet in Wiener Moschee”, Kronenzeitung,
7 December 2019, https://www.krone.at/2057550, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
109. Farid Hafez, “Rassismus diskutieren ist demokratiepolitisch notwendig!”, Die Presse, 12 December 2019,
https://www.diepresse.com/5737631/rassismus-diskutieren-ist-demokratiepolitisch-notwendig, (Access date: 19
December 2019).
102 setav.org
in the European Islamophobia Report. Every single Austrian newspap
my reply as well. 109 Following the publication and a media campaign ag
I also received a letter, where I was personally
ISLAMOPHOBIA threatened. The letter
IN AUSTRIA
scientist? No, you are a Moslem! You are dumb like nearly all Muslims
but an epidemic, epidemics have to be exterminated! […]”. (Fig. 3)
Figure 3: “Letter to the editor”110
Figure 3: “Letter to the editor” 110
Internet
According to the Guardian, organized hate groups based in Israel were active in
spreading anti-Muslim prejudices on Facebook in several countries, including the
U.S., Canada, Australia, Great Britain, and Austria.111
Internet
According to the Guardian, organized hate groups based in Israel were active in spreading anti-
Following the verdict of the Constitutional Court that the deportation of imams
Muslim prejudices on Facebook in several countries, including the U.S., Canada, Australia, Great
was legal, FPÖ party whip Britain,
Johann Gudenus spread the message on his social media.
and Austria. 111
At the beginning of theFollowing
New the Year, the
verdict youth
of the branch
Constitutional Court of
that the FPÖ, the
the deportation RFJ,
of imams was post-
legal, FPÖ
party whip Johann Gudenus spread the message on his social media.
ed an ad on its social mediaAt the
channels stating, “Mohammed most popular name for
beginning of the New Year, the youth branch of the FPÖ, the RFJ, posted an ad on its social
107
“Aufgelöste
newborns in three Viennesemediadistricts.” Moschee
(Fig.
channels stating, 4) trug
“Mohammed mostin Vorarlberg
popular zu Radikalisierung
name for newborns bei”, Kleine Zeitung
in three Viennese districts.”
108
Stefan
(Fig. 4) Steinkogler and Sandra Ramsauer, “Großrazzia bei Freitagsgebet in Wie
December 2019, https://www.krone.at/2057550, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
109
Farid Hafez, “Rassismus diskutieren ist demokratiepolitisch notwendig!”, D
https://www.diepresse.com/5737631/rassismus-diskutieren-ist-demokratiepolitisch-n
December 2019).
110
Personal Archive, October 2019.
Figure 4: The social media post by theFigure
RFJ, the FPÖ’s
4: The social youth
media post branch: “Mohammed
by the RFJ, the FPÖ’s youthmost
branch:popular name
“Mohammed for newborns
most popular in
name for newborns
in three Viennese districts.” 112
three Viennese districts.”112
110. Personal Archive, October 2019.111
“Hassfabriken: Facebooks Geschäft mit antimuslimischer Hetze”, Der Standard, 6 December 2019,
https://apps.derstandard.de/privacywall/story/2000111972194/hassfabriken-facebooks-geschaeft-mit-
111. “Hassfabriken: Facebooks Geschäft mit antimuslimischer Hetze”, Der Standard, 6 December 2019, https://
antimuslimischer-hetze, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
apps.derstandard.de/privacywall/story/2000111972194/hassfabriken-facebooks-geschaeft-mit-antimuslim-
112
“Freiheitliche Jugend”, Screenshot, 29 December 2019.
ischer-hetze, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
112. “Freiheitliche Jugend”, Screenshot, 29 December 2019.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 103
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
The Austrian National Youth Council, a representative of more than 50 youth
The Austrian National Youth Council, a representative of more than 50 youth organiza
organizations in Austria, demonstrated against the government’s hijab ban. (Fig. 5)
Austria, demonstrated against the government’s hijab ban. (Fig. 5)
The Austrian National Youth Council, a representative of more than 50 youth organizations in
Austria, demonstrated against the government’s hijab ban. (Fig. 5)
Figure 5: Austrian National
FigureYouth Council’s National
5: Austrian demonstration
Youthagainst the hijabdemonstration
Council’s ban: “Politics is not to be done
against on theban: “Politics is not to be do
the hijab
expense of Muslims.expense
This racist
ofdiscourse
Figure
Muslims.is poisonous
5: Austrian
This for
National
racist the
Youth social
discourse climate
Council’s in the long
isdemonstration
poisonous term.
against
for the ”113
the hijab ban:
social “Politics
climate inisthe
not long
to be done on 113
term.” the
expense of Muslims. This racist discourse is poisonous for the social climate in the long term.” 113
Figure
Figure 6: FPÖ party whip Johann 6: FPÖ party
Gudenus postswhip Johann Gudenus
“Deportation postslegal.
of imams “Deportation
”114 of imams legal.” 114
FPÖ partyFigure 6: FPÖNorbert
chairman party whip Johann
Hofer Gudenus
posts, “The posts “Deportation
Battle against of imams legal.”
Political Islam114Is
Only Possible with a113Strong FPÖ”
“Politics is not to beduring the
done on the election
expense campaign
of Muslims. in 2019.
This racist discourse (Fig. 7)
is poisonous for the social climate in
the long term”, Austrian National Youth Council, Screenshot, 2019.
114
“Deportation of imams legal”, Johann Gudenus, Screenshot, 29 December 2019.
113
“Politics is not to be done on the expense of Muslims. This racist discourse is poisonous for the social c
the long term”, Austrian National Youth Council, Screenshot, 2019.
113. “Politics is not114
to “Deportation
be done on the of
expense
imamsof legal”,
Muslims.Johann
This racist discourse
Gudenus, is poisonous29
Screenshot, forDecember
the social climate
2019.
in the long term”, Austrian National Youth Council, Screenshot, 2019.
114. “Deportation of imams legal”, Johann Gudenus, Screenshot, 29 December 2019.
104 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
FPÖ partyFPÖ party chairman
chairman NorbertNorbert
HoferHofer posts,“The
posts, “The Battle
Battle against Political
against Islam IsIslam
Political Only Possibl
Is O
a Strong
a Strong FPÖ” FPÖ” during
during the election
the election campaign in
campaign in2019.
2019. (Fig. 7) 7)
(Fig.
Figure 7: FPÖ party chairman Norbert Hofer posts, “The Battle against political Islam is only Possible with a
FPÖ.” 115
Figure
Figure 7: FPÖ 7: FPÖ
party chairman partyHofer
Norbert chairman
posts, “TheNorbert Hofer
Battle against posts,
political Islam “The Battlewith
is only Possible against
a strongpolitical
FPÖ.”115 Islam is only Po
FPÖ.” 115
Figure 8: FPÖ Vienna party Figure 8:Dominik
chairman FPÖ Vienna
Nepp party
posts,chairman
“I don’t letDominik
myself beNepp posts, in“Ithe
intimidated don’t let against
myself
be intimidated in the battle
battle
political Islam.”116
political Islam.” 116
Figure
FPÖ Vienna 8: party
FPÖ chairman
Vienna party chairman
Dominik Dominik
Nepp Neppa post
also spread posts,mobilizing
“I don’t let myself be intimidated
against
political Islam.” 116
the hijab, showing a woman in a niqab in the background. (Fig. 9) and another post
115
where he states not to “The Battle against political
be “intimidated in theIslam is only
battle Possiblepolitical
against with a strong FPÖ”, Norbert Hofer, Screenshot, 2019.
Islam”.
116
“I don’t let myself be intimidated in the battle against political Islam”, Dominik Nepp, Screenshot, 2019.
115
“The
115. “The Battle Battle
against against
political Islam ispolitical Islam
only Possible with is onlyFPÖ”,
a strong Possible with
Norbert a strong
Hofer, FPÖ”,
Screenshot, 2019.Norbert Hofer, Screen
116. “I don’t let“Imyself
don’t be let myselfinbetheintimidated in the battle against Nepp,
political Islam”, Dominik Nepp, Screens
116
intimidated battle against political Islam”, Dominik Screenshot, 2019.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 105
FPÖ Vienna party chairman Dominik Nepp also spread
showing a woman in a niqab in the background. (Fig. 9) an
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
“intimidated in the battle against political Islam”.
Figure 9: FPÖ Vienna party chairman Dominik Nepp posts, “Hijab and Shariah have no place in Vienna.”117
Figure 9: FPÖ Vienna party chairman Dominik Nepp posts, “Hijab an
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Networ
Vice-chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ) established the think tank Denkwerk
Zukunftsreich. Unlike the think tank of the chancellor Sebastian Kurz Think Austria
Vice-chancellor
with six employees, Heinz-Christian
Strache’s think tank has Strache
one employee only, the historian Thomas (FPÖ) esta
Grischany. The first and only event that took place was on 13 February, where po-
118
Michael Ley presentedUnlike
Zukunftsreich.
litical scientist the Anti-Semitism
his book Islamic think tank of the
(Islamischer An- chancellor S
tisemitismus) and shared a podium with German Jewish journalist Henryk M. Brod-
employees, Strache’s think tank has one employee only, th
er and anti-Muslim public figure Laila Mirzo, who has a relationship with various
far-right outlets and movements. Another guest was Birol Kilic, who represents the
first and only event that took place was on 13 February,
Turkish Cultural Association, and who argued against Ley. Broder spoke of Islamic an-
presented his book Islamic Anti-Semitism (Islamischer Ant
ti-Semitism as an “insolvable problem.” Ley warned of an “Islamization and blatant in-
crease of Islamism” in Europe. He went on to say, “Europe is facing Islamization - and
German
if you like, the Jewish
final solution journalist
of Judaism.” Henryk
Michael Ley M. Broder
was previously interviewedand anti-Mus
119
by Martin Sellner, discussing their shared views, where Ley stated, “It is important
a relationship
that the Identitarians with
become stronger.” 120
various
Liste-Jetzt MPfar-right outlets
Alma Zadić asked and movement
on whose
initiative Ley was invited. Vice-chancellor Strache answered, “The initiative and idea
for this event represents the Turkish
and for the selection of the guests onCultural
the podiumAssociation,
was developed by me and who argue
in cooperation with the department’s own think tank and my cabinet.”121 Laila Mirzo
works for the anti-Semitism as an
far-right weekly magazine “insolvable
Wochenblick. problem.”
Leaked internal documents Ley
of warned of a
the Identitarian movement revealed that “Laila” was in charge of the social media
Islamism” in Europe. He went on to say, “Europe is facing
117. “Hijab and Shariah have no place in Vienna”, Dominik Nepp, Screenshot, 29 December 2019.
119 ORF, 12 February 2019, https://orf.at/sto-
solution of Judaism.”
118. “Denkwerk Zukunftsreich’: Strache bekommt Thinktank”,
ries/3111247/, (Access date: 19 December 2019). Michael Ley was previously inte
119. “Straches hitzige Debatte über ‚islamischen Antisemitismus”, OE24, 13 February 2019, https://www.oe24.at/
their shared views, where Ley stated, “It is important that
oesterreich/politik/Straches-hitzige-Debatte-ueber-islamischen-Antisemitismus/367946689, (Access date: 19 De-
cember 2019).
Liste-Jetzt MP Alma Zadić asked on whose initiative Ley
120. Fabian Schmid and Maria Sterkl, “Strache lud Identitären-Verbündeten auf Steuerkosten ein”, Der Standard,
12 April 2019, https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000101303275/strache-lud-identitaeren-verbuende-
ten-auf-steuerkosten-ein, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
121. Ibid. answered, “The initiative and idea for this event and for th
106 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
channels of the movement. She was invited as an “Islam expert,” though the institu-
tion Stoppt die Rechten could not identify any qualifications justifying the descrip-
tion.122 I have sued Michael Ley for his comments in his key note during the event,
where he claimed that I was an Islamist and won the case in the second instance.
The Austrian Integration Fund continued organizing one-sided events. On 22
February 2019, it organized a discussion with Hamed Abdel-Samad entitled “The
Secular State and Islam,” moderated by Michael Fleischhacker.123
The FPÖ’s ally in the U.S. Congress, Republican Congressman Steve King, lost
his influence after being removed from all committee assignments after bipartisan
condemnation of his remarks on white supremacy on 14 January 2019.124 Bernhard
Gaul reported this in the daily Kurier.125
It was revealed that an underground network of right-wing extremists with
headquarters in Germany and links to Austria and Switzerland had prepared for
a “Day X.” The network Hannibal (named after its leader) that consists of former
policemen and personnel from the Secret Service and Defense Ministry prepared
for the day when all order would collapse. The group had prepared a death list of its
political opponents. The Austrian connection is the knights’ order Lazarus Union,
which is officially only a charitable organization. Its headquarters is in Burg Kreuzen-
stein near Vienna. Hannibal was the vice president until reports of the organization
made the news and his membership was revoked. The Austrian secret services kept a
low profile in their investigation.126
Personnel from the Foreign Ministry’s secret service warned that armed groups
of soldiers are also organizing themselves in Austria. Based on investigations in
Germany, Austrian ex-soldiers were identified as participating in transnational
WhatsApp chat groups. The association Milf-O, which is considered to have links to
right-wing extremism, was mentioned in the chats. Two candidates for the FPÖ in
the national elections have prominent positions within the armed forces and thus,
122. Fabian Schmid and Maria Sterkl, “Strache lud Identitären-Verbündeten auf Steuerkosten ein”, Der Standard,
12 April 2019, https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000101303275/strache-lud-identitaeren-verbuende-
ten-auf-steuerkosten-ein, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
123. “Podiumsgespräch mit Hamed Abdel-Samad”, Austrian Integration Fund, http://integrationsfonds.eyepin-
news.com/eventview/?p=zb791bc2ccf743b765bff8ae57cb9309684eb75780f1986556fcd3384e36fc1d4, (Access
date: 19 December 2019).
124. Trip Gabriel, Jonathan Martin and Nicholas Fandos, “Steve King Removed from Committee Assignments over
White Supremacy Remark”, The New York Times, 14 January 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/
politics/steve-king-white-supremacy.html, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
125. Bernhard Gaul, “Rassismus: Rauswurf von Steve King, Freund der FPÖ in den USA”, Kurier, 15 January 2019,
https://kurier.at/politik/inland/rassismus-rauswurf-von-steve-king-freund-der-fpoe-in-den-usa/400378865, (Access
date: 19 December 2019).
126. Fabian Schmid and Laurin Lorenz, “Christchurch-Attentäter bezog sich auf rechte Soldaten in Bundeswehr
– deren Netzwerk führt nach Österreich”, Der Standard, 15 March 2019, https://apps.derstandard.de/privacywall/
story/2000099600939/spuren-nach-oesterreich-bei-rechtem-netzwerk-deutscher-soldaten, (Access date: 19 Decem-
ber 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 107
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
the secret service fears that important information could have been handed over to
people outside of the department of defense. At first, the new FPÖ defense minister
did not express concern about the fact that Austrian soldiers were members of the
Identitarian Movement.127
Prosecutors instigated a probe into the “disproportionately high donation” from
Australian white supremacist Brenton Tarrant to the head of Identitarian move-
ment’s Austrian branch.128 Martin Sellner, head of the movement, received EUR
1,500 in early 2018 from the terrorist, who had murdered 50 people at two mosques
in Christchurch. Sellner was blocked in 2018 from entering Great Britain before
a Generation Identity conference near London. According to state authorities, the
terrorist Tarrant had visited the country before the massacre and according to the
Independent, he had met right-wing extremists in Europe two years prior to the at-
tacks.129 According to the Minister of Interior, Tarrant had visited Austria from 27
November to 4 December 2018.130 Following the news about these relations, the
Austrian government announced its will to close down the Identitarian movement.131
The Australian terrorist had visited the cities Steyr, Vienna, and Klagenfurt. In 2016,
Vice-chancellor Strache had called the Identitarian movement a non-leftist civil so-
ciety movement. (Fig. 10)
Figure 10: Screenshot
Figureof10: Screenshotofofthe
a posting a posting of the chairman
chairman of the FPÖof theon
FPÖ on Identitarian
the the Identitarian movement,
movement, where he calls
where hethecalls the
Identitarian
Identitarian movement movement a “non-partisan
a “non-partisan non-leftistnon-leftist civic movement”that
civic movement” that draws
draws on on
“peaceful activism”.
“peaceful
132
activism”.132
While Strache argued that he had no links to the Identitarian movement, journalists have traced the
127. Fabian Schmidt,
many“Abwehramt-Whistleblower warnen
personal ties between Identitarians vor personnel.
and FPÖ bewaffnetem
133 Netzwerk”,
Following Dergate,
the Ibiza Standard,
former 22 Novem-
ber 2019.
vice-chancellor and FPÖ chairman Heinz-Christian Strache gave his first interview to the German
128. Chris Baynes, “New Zealand terror attacker had financial links with European far-right group Generation
Russian TV channel RT. 134
branch of thereveals”.
Identity, Austrian chancellor
129. Ibid. Martin Sellner, the voice of the European Identitarian movement, was given a platform on the
Austrian“Christchurch-Attentäter
130. Raffaela Lindorfer, Breitbart Servus-TV, where hewar
positioned himself as a victim
mit Österreichern of the Christchurch
in Nordkorea”, terrorist,
Kurier, 8March 2 019,
arguing that his name would now forever be related to the terrorist.135 Anne-Catherine Simon
https://kurier.at/politik/inland/christchurch-attentaeter-war-mit-oesterreichern-in-nordkorea/400449628, (Access
date: 19 December 2019).
criticized the fact that Servus TV had invited one of the leading German right-wing extremist
131. Werner Reisinger and Jan Michael Marchart, “Identitäre Verstrickungen”, Wiener Zeitung, 27 March 2019,
ideologues, namely Götz Kubitschek, mainstreaming his views but not challenging his very
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/oesterreich/2002494-Identitaere-Verstrickungen.html, (Access
date: 19 Decemberproblematic
2019). statements. Kubitschek has not been given any platform on German TV. The debate
132. “HC Strache”was moderated18byApril
Facebook, Michael Fleischhacker and a famous Islamophobe, Henryk Broder, was also
2016.
invited. 136
108 setav.org
132
“HC Strache” Facebook, 18 April 2016.
133
Werner Reisinger and Jan Michael Marchart, “Identitäre Verstrickungen”.
134
“Exklusiv-Interview mit Ex-Vizekanzler HC Strache: ‘Die FPÖ war für die EU ein Dorn im Auge”, RT Deutsch, 9
August 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BD6vYa2c9w, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
While Strache argued that he had no links to the Identitarian movement,
journalists have traced the many personal ties between Identitarians and FPÖ
personnel.133 Following the Ibiza gate, former vice-chancellor and FPÖ chairman
Heinz-Christian Strache gave his first interview to the German branch of the Rus-
sian TV channel RT.134
Martin Sellner, the voice of the European Identitarian movement, was given
a platform on the Austrian "Breitbart" Servus-TV, where he positioned himself as
a victim of the Christchurch terrorist, arguing that his name would now forever
be related to the terrorist.135 Anne-Catherine Simon criticized the fact that Servus
TV had invited one of the leading German right-wing extremist ideologues, namely
Götz Kubitschek, mainstreaming his views but not challenging his very problematic
statements. Kubitschek has not been given any platform on German TV. The debate
was moderated by Michael Fleischhacker and a famous Islamophobe, Henryk Brod-
er, was also invited.136
According to political scientist Strobl, international activities by the Identitar-
ian movement in Europe are planned in Austria. The Identitarian movement has
official branches in France, Austria, Germany, and Italy, and informal representa-
tives in Ireland, Britain, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia.
Following a lawsuit in Austria that took four years, 17 activists were acquitted in the
summer of 2018. There are around 300 Identitarian activists in Austria, between
the ages of 15 and 35.137
While the Identitarian movement was not banned, there were discussions to
amend the Symbol Act 2015 to include the ban of the logo of the Identitarian move-
ment.138 Since the meeting was postponed and the government dissolved, this was
not implemented.139 During the elections, Karl Nehammer said that the ÖVP will
133. Werner Reisinger and Jan Michael Marchart, “Identitäre Verstrickungen”.
134. “Exklusiv-Interview mit Ex-Vizekanzler HC Strache: ‘Die FPÖ war für die EU ein Dorn im Auge”, RT
Deutsch, 9 August 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BD6vYa2c9w, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
135. Astrid Ebenführer, “Eine Bühne für Selbstmitleid: Identitären-Chef Martin Sellner auf Servus TV”, Der Stan-
dard, 28 March 2019, https://apps.derstandard.de/privacywall/story/2000100395610/eine-buehne-fuer-selbstmit-
leid-identitaeren-chef-martin-sellner-auf-servus, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
136. Anne-Catherine Simon, “Servus TV beglückt einen radikalen Denker der Neuen Rechten”, Die Presse, 5 April
2019, https://www.diepresse.com/5607683/servus-tv-begluckt-einen-radikalen-denker-der-neuen-rechten, (Access
date: 19 December 2019).
137. Raffaela Lindorfer and Birgit Seiser, “Österreich, Welt-Zentrale der neuen Rechtsextremen”, Kurier, 27 March
2019, https://kurier.at/politik/inland/oesterreich-welt-zentrale-der-neuen-rechtsextremen/400449067, (Access
date: 19 December 2019).
138. “Antrag”, Republik Österreich Parlament, 25 April 2019, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX-
VI/A/A_00772/fname_749665.pdf, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
139. “Rechtsinformationssystem des Bundes”, Bundesrecht konsolidiert: Gesamte Rechtsvorschrift für Symbole-Ge-
setz, Fassung vom 29.04.2020, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetz-
esnummer=20009040, (Access date: 29 April 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ban the right-wing extremist Identitarian movement.140 Consequently, the logo of
the Identitarian movement was banned.
Ednan Aslan had to step down from his position as head of the research project
“Islamic Theological Institute” at the University of Vienna. According to Der Standard,
the reasons the rector made this move are not fully clear. Some insiders argue that it was
due to “fundamental misconduct, not least in personnel management” ranging from
mobbing to bad atmosphere within the team. Aslan rejected these allegations.141
Ilham Manea, a senior advisor142 of the European Foundation for Democracy143, in-
vited by the Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF) to give a talk in the city of Wels. The ÖVP-
owned newspaper Volksblatt titled an interview with Manea “‘I Have No Problem with
the Headscarf Ban’ Muslim Political Scientist Elham Manea Warns of the Excesses of
Political Islam.” In the interview, Manea questioned why Austrian authorities are dealing
with Alif (Upper Austrian Muslim organization with historical roots in the Milli Görüs
movement), which she called the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Milli Görüs movement.
She stated that Milli Görüs is inspired by political Islam, that they have “totalitarian
views,” and that it would be wrong for people belonging to this movement to work as
religious teachers in public schools. Also, she supported the government’s hijab ban in
the same interview. When confronted with the position of the IGGÖ,, who think that
the ban would be discriminatory, she stated, “It is not discriminatory. With all religious
freedom, there must also be the possibility to prevent certain phenomena of religious
excesses.” She also supported the ÖVP’s position to ban “political Islam.”144
The anti-Muslim author Michael Ley was interviewed in far-right media such
as Wochenblick, where he argued that orthodox Islam was a political religion and
similar to European fascism, representing a totalitarian ideology, and that political
Islam was as anti-Semitic as Islam itself.145
A historical report commissioned by the FPÖ on the party’s relationship with
Nazism, included questionable authors. One was the known anti-Muslim author
Laila Mirzo, who is also aligned to the Identitarian movement. Mirzo was in charge
of content for the Identitarian movement’s social media platform on Facebook. She
140. “Nehammer: Kampf gegen Extremismus hat oberste Priorität”, OTS, 26 August 2019, https://www.ots.at/
presseaussendung/OTS_20190826_OTS0096/nehammer-kampf-gegen-extremismus-hat-oberste-prioritaet, (Ac-
cess date: 19 December 2019).
141. Lisa Nimmervoll, “Aslan als Leiter des islamischen Uni-Instituts abberufen”, Der Standard, 20 April 2019,
https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000101744347/ednan-aslan-als-leiter-des-islamischen-uni-insti-
tuts-abberufen, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
142. EFD: Team Member Ilham Manea, https://www.europeandemocracy.eu/author/dr-elham-manea/ (Access
date: 29 October 2019)
143. Bridge Initiative Team. Factsheet: European Foundation for Democracy, 5 December 2019, https://bridge.
georgetown.edu/research/factsheet-european-foundation-for-democracy/ (Access date: 29 October 2019)
144. “Ich habe kein Problem mit dem Kopftuchverbot”, Volksblatt, 4 September 2019, https://volksblatt.at/, (Ac-
cess date: 19 December 2019).
145. Julian Utz, “Neues Europa – Werte Und Nationen”, Wochenblick, 29 October 2019.
110 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
writes for far-right media outlets such as Wochenblick and Jüdische Rundschau, who
often support AfD claims. In the same report, there were also two Israeli authors,
who were chosen to support the non-anti-Semitic image of the FPÖ. According to
the Israeli far-right author and former secret service agent Mordechai Kedar, Nazis
were always “very friendly” to Muslims and thus, the “battle against political Islam”
would not be a continuity of the Nazi past. According to the Rabin Center, Kedar is
a “sick conspiracy theorist.” He had argued that the best weapon against Jihadists is
to rape their mothers and sisters. The second Israeli author was 84-year-old Raphael
Israeli, who in 2017 had suggested to detain Israeli Arabs in camps.146
Observed Civil Society and Political Initiatives to
Counter Islamophobia
Compared to 2018, there were many more initiatives taken against anti-Muslim racism
in 2019. This is especially the case with NGOs that dedicate their efforts to counter-
acting Islamophobia. The following is a short list of attempts to tackle Islamophobia:
ű The anti-racist NGO SOS Mitmensch presented its first report on anti-Muslim
racism in Austrian politics. This report presented 20 cases of anti-Muslim speech
by members of the FPÖ in 2018. The report was drafted by the internationally
renowned linguist Ruth Wodak. During the press conference, Wodak warned
that with the FPÖ in power, anti-Muslim racism became central to the govern-
ment. She criticized the ÖVP for not taking a clear position. She warned of the
perils of demagogy and reminded the audience of the national-socialist rhetoric.147
ű The president of the Styrian parliament organized a memorial event on the
Holocaust to discuss not only history, but what history means for today. The
title of the event was “How Does Resistance Work?”148
ű Muslim women of the Islamic Religious Community published the declara-
tion “Muslim Women Speak” where they criticized the fact that many legis-
lations discuss them, while nobody listens to them.149
ű The Islamic Religious Community organized a conference to discuss the use
and misuse of the term “political Islam” in order to counter the government’s
attempt to criminalize Muslims.
146. Fabian Schmid, “Die dubiosen Autoren des FPÖ-Historikerberichts”, Der Standard, 26 December 2019,
https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000112677397/die-dubiosen-autoren-des-fpoe-historikerberichts,
(Access date: 30 December 2019).
147. “Ruth Wodak über Rhetorik der Demagogie”, Science ORF, 22 January 2019, https://science.orf.at/v2/sto-
ries/2960166/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
148. “Wie geht Widerstand?” - Holocaust-Gedenkveranstaltung im Landtag, http://www.landtag.steiermark.at/
cms/beitrag/12711771/28242427/, (Access date: 19 December 2019).
149. Bernhard Ichner, “Muslimische Frauen: ‘Misstrauen in die Politik ist groß”, Kurier, 8 March 2019, https://
kurier.at/chronik/oesterreich/muslimische-frauen-wollen-sich-gehoer-verschaffen/400427207, (Access date: 19 De-
cember 2019).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ű Both the Islamic Religious Community and the Jewish Community (IKG)
criticized an anti-Muslim racist poster published by the Styrian youth wing
of the FPÖ, the RFJ.150
ű The Viennese Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammer) awarded a dissertation on
anti-Muslim racism in Austria, written by Benjamin Opratko, with its Anto-
nio Gramsci Prize for Critical Research in the Migration Society.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The hegemony of the anti-Muslim discourse is unbroken. Following the governance
of the ÖVP and the FPÖ, which has fully institutionalized anti-Muslim political
claims, the lack of anti-racist initiatives is most outstanding. SOS Mitmensch’s re-
port documenting anti-Muslim racism was an important attempt of intervention,
although it only tackled the FPÖ’s discourse and not both parties’ politics. Still,
civil society and a political opposition are most important. Aside from the detailed
recommendations offered in the last years, this seems incredibly urgent. The political
hegemony of Islamophobia, in specific, has to be contested. While the IGGÖ argued
that it would challenge certain laws like the hijab ban in court, much more has to be
done on a legal level. A selection of recommendations follow:
ű The Islam Act has to be legally contested.
ű The two hijab bans have to be litigated against.
ű The organized anti-Muslim network has to be uncovered.
ű Training on racism, especially Islamophobia, should be offered to journalists,
lawyers, and police (security officials) by qualified personnel.
ű Muslim civil society has to be empowered with tools to combat Islamophobia,
especially in the creation of a consciousness towards the illegality of hate crimes.
ű Educational institutions and stakeholders have to work towards creating an
alternative narrative of Muslims in Austria which will work to dispel the
widely accepted negative image of Islam.
Chronology
• January 2019: At the beginning of the New Year, the FPÖ’s youth organi-
zation RFJ published ads intending to scandalize with the slogan “Moham-
med most popular name for newborns in three Viennese districts.”
• 22.01.2019: The anti-racist NGO SOS Mitmensch presented its first re-
port on anti-Muslim racism in Austrian politics.
150. “Rassistisches RFJ-Plakat: IKG und IGGÖ kritisieren Darstellung”, Tiroler Tageszeitung, 3 May 2019, https://
www.tt.com/artikel/15578217/rassistisches-rfj-plakat-ikg-und-iggoe-kritisieren-darstellung, (Access date: 19 De-
cember 2019).
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA
• 11.03.2019: News media reported that following the news of 2018 that the
first newborn baby had Muslim parents with a mother wearing a hijab, a
65-year-old pensioner was given a six-month probation for a hate posting.
• 20.03.2019: The ÖVP invited Zana Ramadani as an expert for the edu-
cation committee that proposed the expansion of the hijab ban up to 10
years of age following a hijab ban that was already implemented in 2018
for kindergarten. Defending the ban, Zana Ramadani said, “I am here for
using the machete.”
• 21.03.2019: The ÖVP and the FPÖ were delighted by the verdict of the
Constitutional Court which supported the expulsion of two imams from
ATIB mosques as an effect of the Islam Act of 2015.
• 27.03.2019: The media made public that the Austrian Identitarian move-
ment leader Martin Sellner had received funds from Brenton Tarrant, the
white supremacist Christchurch terrorist.
• 29.03.2019: The court in the city of Graz ruled on an attack on a mosque
that was perpetrated on 6 May 2016. Three men were convicted of vilifica-
tion of religious teachings and a woman reached an extrajudicial agreement.
• 14.07.2019: The Interior Ministry’s Secret Service (BVT) published a
report that for the first time named the Islamic Religious Community
(IGGÖ) not as a partner in the fight against Jihadism, but as a problem of
extremism.
• 21.10.2019: The weekly Profil reported that a male student appeared armed
for lectures at the University of Vienna. He had previously posted tweets
such as “I would like to die in a firefight against Islam and kill as many of
them as possible.”
• 03.12.2019: News media reported that the Linz Higher Regional Court
(OLG) ruled that a woman could not represent the state and the judiciary
if she wore the hijab.
• 26.12.2019: The FPÖ presented a historical report on its relationship with
Nazism, which included a chapter by the Islamophobe Laila Mirzo, who
is connected to the Identitarian movement. The report also had a chapter
written by far-right author and former Israeli secret service agent Mordechai
Kedar, who had argued in the past that the best weapon against Jihadists is
to rape their mothers and sisters.
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
•
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
BELGIUM
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
AMINA EASAT-DAAS
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
•
116 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
The Author
Amina Easat-Daas is an Early Career Academic Fellow at De Montfort Uni-
versity, Leicester, UK, where she lectures in politics. Her research interests include
the study of Islamophobia and in particular gendered Islamophobia, the effective
countering of Islamophobia, Islam in Europe, anti-racism studies, and Muslim po-
litical participation in francophone Europe. Her forthcoming manuscript is entitled
Muslim Women’s Political Participation in France and Belgium (Palgrave Macmillan).
Alongside her academic scholarship, Easat-Daas has regularly worked with and pre-
sented her work, among others, at the OSCE-ODIHR, the European Parliament,
and the Council of Europe. Easat-Daas also engages with media on Muslim-related
current affairs. Email: amina.easat-daas@dmu.ac.uk
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Amina Easat-Daas: Islamophobia in Belgium: National Report 2019, in: Enes Bayraklı
& Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 117
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
As with previous years, there has been a sustained and continued growth of Islam-
ophobia in Belgium during 2019. This increase has been apparent across a variety of
diverse fields including in explicit and measurable Islamophobic hate crimes. Specific
examples from 2019 include vandalism of mosques, and pig heads being left at and
swastikas being graffitied onto Muslim property. Manifest examples of Islamophobic
hate crime were also often heavily gendered and thus distinctly impacted Muslim
women, and visibly Muslim women in particular. Attacks against Muslim women
in 2019 include stabbings, forced removal of the headscarf, denial of services, and
exclusion from education and the workplace.
In addition, Islamophobia in Belgium during 2019 has also seen the increase in
the legislated Islamophobic controls around Muslimness. Examples of this include
the bans on ritual slaughter (including halal and kosher slaughter) implemented in
Flanders in January 2019 and Wallonia in September 2019, and the issuing of the
new Flanders Government Agreement 2019-2024, which stipulates controls on the
presence of visible faith symbols (including the headscarf ) in the region in schooling
and employment on the grounds of neutrality. The agreement sets a precedent and
signals legitimacy of gendered Islamophobia towards visibly Muslim women and
was, in part, made possible by the growth of the far-right and right-wing parliamen-
tary presence in the Flemish Belgian region.
Notwithstanding, Belgium continues to be home to strong civil society and
government-supported counter-Islamophobia initiatives, including monitoring of
cyber-Islamophobia by public volunteers.
The report on Belgium closes with conclusions and recommendations, includ-
ing the warning against the increasing move towards French-style, secular-based ar-
gument rooted in narratives centred on neutrality, in order to limit the presence of
visibly Muslim women in Belgian society and their presence in education or the
workplace.
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
Note de Synthèse
Comme les années précédentes, il y a eu une croissance soutenue de l’islamophobie
en Belgique en 2019. Cette augmentation de l’islamophobie s’est manifestée dans
une variété de domaines divers, y compris dans les crimes de haine islamophobes
explicites et mesurables. Des exemples spécifiques de 2019 incluent le vandalisme
des mosquées, têtes de cochons laissées et les croix gammées tagués sur la propriété
musulmane. Les exemples manifestes de crimes de haine islamophobes étaient éga-
lement souvent fortement sexo-spécifiques et donc ils avaient un impact distinct
sur les femmes musulmanes, et les femmes musulmanes visibles en particulier.
Les attaques contre les femmes musulmanes en 2019 comprennent des coups de
couteau, le retrait forcé du foulard, le déni de services et l’exclusion des lieues de
travail et de l’éducation.
En outre, l’islamophobie en Belgique en 2019 a également vu l’augmentation
des contrôles islamophobes légiférés autour de la ‘musulmanité’. Des exemples de
cela incluent les interdictions d’abattage rituel (y compris l’abattage halal et kosher)
mises en œuvre en Flandre en janvier 2019 et en Wallonie en septembre 2019. La
publication du nouvel accord gouvernemental flamand 2019-2024, qui prévoit des
contrôles sur la présence des symboles philosophiques et religieuses (y compris le
foulard) dans la scolarisation et l’emploi pour des raisons de neutralité. L’accord éta-
blit un précèdent et signale la légitimité de l’islamophobie genré envers les femmes
visiblement musulmanes et en partie a été rendu possible par la croissance parlemen-
taire de l’extrême droite et de la droite dans la région belge flamande.
Nonobstant, la Belgique a une société civile forte et des initiatives de lutte
contre l’islamophobie soutenues par le gouvernement, y compris la surveillance de la
cyber-Islamophobie par des volontaires publics.
L’édition belge du rapport se termine par des conclusions et des recomman-
dations, y compris une mise en garde contre la tendance croissante vers une laïcité
à la française - enracinée dans la neutralité afin de limiter la présence de femmes
visiblement musulmanes dans la société belge et spécifiquement leur présence dans
l’éducation ou le lieu de travail.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: Belgium
Type of Regime: Federal parliamentary constitutional monarchy
Form of Government: Representative democratic federal bicameral parliamen-
tary system, headed by the monarch.
Ruling Parties: Following May 2019, the Belgian federal government is yet to
be decided.
Opposition Parties: Francophone parties include Mouvement Réformateur
(MR), Parti Socialiste (PS), Centre Démocrate Humaniste (CdH), Écolo, and Parti
Populiste. Flemish parties include Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (NVA), Christen Democ-
ratische en Vlaamse and Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democrate, Socialistiche Partij An-
ders, Vlaams Belang (VB), and Groen.
Last Elections: The last elections took place in May 2019 and run on a five-year-
ly cycle in line with the European Parliamentary elections. The highest-ranking par-
ties were as follows: NVA – 25 seats, PS – 20 seats, VB – 18 seats, MR – 14 seats,
and Écolo – 13 seats.
Total Population: 11.4 million
Major Languages: Flemish in Flanders (approx. 59% of population) Wallonia and
Brussels are predominantly francophone. Finally, 0.7% of the total population is
German-speaking and based in francophone Liège. English is also widely spoken
throughout.
Official Religion: There is no official state religion in Belgium. However, Chris-
tianity, Islam, and Judaism are officially recognised, with much of the nation identi-
fying as Roman Catholic.
Statistics on Islamophobia: The Counter Islamophobia Collective in Belgium
(Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en Belgiqie – CCIB/Collectief Tegen Islamofobie en Bel-
gië – CTIB) documents statistics annually on Islamophobia in Belgium, based on
evidence derived from the Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities (UNIA), and
direct reports.
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: Statistics are compiled by the UNIA,
under seventeen of the nineteen legal bases of discrimination, including racial dis-
crimination (presumed race, skin colour, nationality, ancestry, and ethnic origin),
disability-based discrimination, philosophical/religious discrimination, sexual orien-
tation, age, wealth, civil status, political beliefs, trade union membership, health,
physical/genetic characteristics, birth, and social background.
Major Religions (% of Population): Although there is no official state census
of religious affiliation in Belgium, estimates suggest a 60.7% Christian population
(predominantly Roman Catholic but also including some Protestants and Orthodox
Christians), 6% Muslims, and 0.4% Jewish.
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
Muslim Population (% of Population): 6% of the Belgian population (esti-
mated 870,000).
Main Muslim Community Organizations: The Belgian Muslim Executive
(Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique/ Executief van de Moslims van België – EMB)
serves as the official national interlocutor on Islam and Muslim communities in the
country (under the official recognition of Islam), comprising representatives from
the federal regions. It oversees the registration of mosques and clergy, chaplains,
Muslim/ Islamic religious education teachers in state schools, ritual slaughter certifi-
cates, and announcing religious festivals among other key details in the function of
Islam in Belgium.
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: CCIB, UNIA, ENAR, among others.
Far-Right Parties: Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang – VB)
Far-Right Movements: Katholiek Vlaams Hoogstudentenverbond, Nationalis-
tische Studentenvereniging, Schild en Vrienden, and Voorpost.
Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: Rather than organisations being directly des-
ignated as far-right terrorist organisations, far-right actions tend to be condemned.
Limitations to Islamic Practices:
ű Hijab Ban: No national ban, regional ban in Verviers and individual
school-specific bans.
ű Halal Slaughter Ban: Flanders since January 2019, Wallonia since Septem-
ber 2019.
ű Minaret Ban: Only discussion following the Swiss calls for a ban during the
early 2010s.
ű Circumcision Ban: Only discussion.
ű Burka Ban: A burka ban is in place since 1 June 2011. Those found wearing
the burka in Belgian public spaces are subject to monetary fines of between
€15 and €25, and imprisonment of up to seven days.
ű Prayer Ban: There is no specific national or federal ban on prayer in Belgium.
However, it is linked to employment discrimination cases.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Introduction
Throughout the nation, 2019 saw a sustained and continued growth in Islamopho-
bia. As this national report in the EIR details, Belgium has witnessed steadily in-
creasing Islamophobia across a range of fields; for example, visible manifestations of
Islamophobic hate crime have been ever-present throughout the year and include
attacks on physical locations and spaces presumed to be linked to Muslims apparent
in the dumping of pig heads or swastikas being graffitied on cars, yet this only rep-
resents the tip of the iceberg that is Islamophobia in Belgium.
Islamophobic hate crime in Belgium, as with preceding years documented in the
European Islamophobia report, has continued to have a distinctly gendered focus, as
detailed below. Beyond the apparent manifestations of Islamophobia, the phenome-
non has continued to grow also in Belgian institutions. For example, the marked suc-
cess of the right and the far-right in Flanders during the May 2019 Belgian federal
elections and similarly the Belgian representation in the European Parliament, paved
the way for increased legislated controls of Muslim women’s dress in Belgian educa-
tion and employment. The growing institutionalisation of Islamophobia in Belgium
clearly points to the ways in which Islamophobia in the country permeates the wider
Belgian political arena and its increasing banalisation.
This year, however, also marks the growth of civil society projects that attempt
to counter Islamophobia in Belgium. These are detailed further in the report, but
prominent examples include the Veilleurs de l’Islamophobie (Islamophobia Lookouts)
project headed by the Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique/Collectief Tegen Islam-
ofobie en België (Counter Islamophobia Collective in Belgium, henceforth CCIB),
or the newly formed branch of the public body Actiris, dedicated to combatting
workplace and labour market discrimination.
The current national report details the developments in terms of Islamophobia
in Belgium during 2019: the manifestations, the institutionalisation, and the count-
er-Islamophobia work that is being undertaken in the country. It concludes with
policy recommendations that can be garnered from Belgium during 2019 before
presenting a chronology of the most prominent Islamophobic events that took place
in the country in 2019.
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and
Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
In terms of Islamophobic physical and verbal attacks on individuals and institu-
tions in Belgium during 2019, several principle trends are clear. First, as stated
above, Islamophobia has continued to grow in the nation. The CCIB statistical
report published in 2019 detailing the analysis of the Interfederal Centre for Equal
122 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
Opportunities’ (UNIA) figures for the previous year indicates the growth in Is-
lamophobic incidents to 278 during the preceding year.1 Physical Islamophobic
attacks include both those
year indicates on individuals
the growth and tothose
in Islamophobic incidents enacted
278 during the precedingon
year.Muslim
1
Physical spaces,
which stand at 4%, such as the vandalism of the Al Ihssan Mosque on the very last
2
Islamophobic attacks include both those on individuals and those enacted on Muslim spaces,
day of the year,3 the leaving of pig heads at a Muslim residence,4 and the leaving of
which stand at 4%,2 such as the vandalism of the Al Ihssan Mosque on the very last day of the
excrement and urine3 at a Muslim home accompanied by swastikas being graffitied
year, the leaving5 of pig heads at a Muslim residence,4 and the leaving of excrement and urine
on the Muslim family’s car.
at a Muslim home accompanied by swastikas being graffitied on the Muslim family’s car.5
Figure 1: Pigs head left atFigure
a Muslim residence
1: Pigs head (13 October
left at a Muslim 2019)
residence (13 . 2019) 6.
October
6
1. “Rapport des Chiffres1 2018”, Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique, (September 2019), http://ccib-ctib.be/
“Rapport des Chiffres 2018”, Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique, (September 2019), http://ccib-
wp-content/uploads/CCIB_PUBLIC_PDF_RapportChiffresCCIB/RAPPORT_CHIFFRES_CCIB_2018_Sep-
ctib.be/wp-
tembre2019.pdf, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
content/uploads/CCIB_PUBLIC_PDF_RapportChiffresCCIB/RAPPORT_CHIFFRES_CCIB_2018_Septembre
2. Ibid. 2019.pdf, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
2
Ibid.
3. D.R., “Une mosquée 3 vandalisée à Louvain”, Le Soir, 1 January 2020. https://www.lesoir.be/270228/arti-
D.R., “Une mosquée vandalisée à Louvain”, Le Soir, 1 January 2020.
cle/2020-01-01/une-mosquee-vandalisee-louvain, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
https://www.lesoir.be/270228/article/2020-01-01/une-mosquee-vandalisee-louvain, (Access date: 12 January
2020).
4. Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique, Facebook, 12 January 2020, https://www.facebook.com/islamopho-
4
bia.ccib.be/, (Access date: 12Collectif
January Contre2020). l’Islamophobie en Belgique, Facebook, 12 January 2020,
https://www.facebook.com/islamophobia.ccib.be/, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
5. “Hayat, mère de trois 5enfants se dit
“Hayat, mère victime
de trois enfantsdese racism:
dit victime‘On a eu ‘On
de racism: de laa eudiarrhée sur sur
de la diarrhée la porte”,
la porte”, RTL Info,
RTL Info, 16 16 Septem-
ber 2019, https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/victime-de-racisme-ayat-mere-de-trois-enfants-est-a-bout-on-a-
September 2019, https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/victime-de-racisme-ayat-mere-de-trois-enfants-est-a-
eu-de-la-diarrhee-sur-la-porte-video--1157531.aspx?dt=14%3A39&fbclid=IwAR2SjbQ-kHU76kTn86NZoWtx-
bout-on-a-eu-de-la-diarrhee-sur-la-porte-video--1157531.aspx?dt=14%3A39&fbclid=IwAR2SjbQ-
Zc5fnoybWD2oKIdJP9uCE5r_z9igkonW2qU, (Access date: 23 December
kHU76kTn86NZoWtxZc5fnoybWD2oKIdJP9uCE5r_z9igkonW2qU, 2019).
(Access date: 23 December 2019).
6
Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique, Facebook,
6. Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique, Facebook, 13 October 2019, https://www.facebook.com/islamopho- 13 October 2019,
https://www.facebook.com/islamophobia.ccib.be/,
bia.ccib.be/, (Access date: 16 March 2020). – French text reads (Access
asdate: 16 March
follows: 2020). –evening
‘Good French texteverybody.
reads as follows:
This Saturday
‘Good evening everybody. This Saturday 13/10 between 9 and 11pm, on Trichon Street in Sauvenière, a cooked
13/10 between 9 and 11pm, on Trichon Street in Sauvenière, a cooked pig’s head was dumped at my house. I don’t
pig’s head was dumped at my house. I don’t have the words to describe this act. Given that we are Muslims, in
have the words to describe this act.
my opinion it is Given that
a racist act. we areofMuslims,
If residents Gembloux ofin my opinion
Sauvenière it isfrom
an especially a racist
Trichonact. If has
Street residents
seen of Gem-
bloux of Sauvenière, andindividuals
especially
who from Trichon
had anything Street,
to do with hasthanks
this act, seenforindividuals who had
sharing your statements with anything to do with this act,
me. Good evening.’
thanks for sharing your statements with me. Good evening.’
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 123
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Secondly, physical and verbal Islamophobic attacks have continued to have a
distinctly gendered focus. Specifically, the CCIB statistical analysis points to 77% of
reported Islamophobic attacks being perpetrated against presumed Muslim women,
compared to 23% against presumed Muslim men. Examples of gendered Islamopho-
bia include the attack on a headscarf-wearing Muslim woman in Anderlecht in Janu-
ary 2019.7 The event triggered fear across the Belgian Muslim community. The verbal
attack on two headscarf-wearing Muslim women by the driver of a public transport
bus in Uccle who stated “I am a racist and I hate women who wear the headscarf ”
in March 2019.8 A Muslim woman was stabbed in front of her three young chil-
dren in Anderlecht, due to a presumed Islamophobic motive in April 2019.9 Or in
August 2019, the case of an inebriated woman attacking and attempting to remove
the headscarf of a visibly Muslim woman. The attacker was subsequently arrested on
charge of public intoxication.10 Another case bares a distinct similarity: a 50-year-old
drunk and homeless woman who, for the second distinct instance, pushed a head-
scarf-wearing Muslim woman onto the tracks of the Brussels metro.11
These attacks only represent a small subsection of the likely vast and far-reaching
nature of manifested Islamophobia in Belgium; however, they too are numerous.
The expansiveness of gendered Islamophobia in Belgium in 2019 also highlights
the interplay between the institutionalisation of gendered Islamophobia (as detailed
further under the themes of Politics and Employment) and the ways in which these
often state-sanctioned Islamophobic measures targeting Muslim women seemingly
‘otherise’, banalise, and legitimise attacks and violence by members of the Belgian
public sphere on Muslim women in the nation. This trend is not unique to Belgium.
Rather, it is indicative of pan-European and global trends in this manner.
Employment
As with other dimensions considered in this report, Islamophobic discrimination
has continued to grow throughout the nation. As with other fields, whilst Mus-
7. “Aggression Islamophobe d’une maman à Anderlecht” CCIB, 19 January 2019, http://ccib-ctib.be/index.
php/2019/01/19/agression-islamophobe-dune-maman-a-anderlecht/?fbclid=IwAR21BP1vXh46rWnPkbV3GLSX-
zu54kPqKdcuy9kbTdK1oeIl2RB4KcbKvwTk, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
8. Marie-Noëlle Dinant and Béatrice Broutout, “Uccle : deux femmes voilées se disent victime d’une agression
raciste par un conducteur”, BX1, https://bx1.be/uccle/uccle-deux-femmes-voilees-se-disent-victime-dune-agres-
sion-raciste-par-un-conducteur/?fbclid=IwAR12mN00GmwCmLRGswlF5ddwsD2HPPHdkV2q3u7H059J5wof-
ByA-tGzmqWk, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
9. “Une femme poignardée devant ses trois enfants à Anderlecht”, SudInfo, 2 April 2019, https://www.sudinfo.be/
id110980/article/2019-04-02/une-femme-poignardee-devant-ses-trois-enfants-anderlecht, (Access date: 24 Decem-
ber 2019)
10. “Dronken vrouw valt moslima aan in Deurne”, GVA, 6 July 2019, https://www.gva.be/cnt/dmf20190706_04498173/
dronken-vrouw-valt-moslima-aan-in-deurne?fbclid=IwAR2Ex1KC38Bens8vtnaSUYJmKThrTyNuQNh55O26XD-
m6k5ZFdDBRhLrWwtM, (Access date: 23 December 2019)
11. “Bruxelles: Laila pousse des femmes sur les rails du métro!” La Capitale, 6 November 2019, https://www.
lacapitale.be/468490/article/2019-11-06/bruxelles-laila-pousse-des-femmes-sur-les-rails-du-metro (Access date: 23
December 2019).
124 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
lim males have been significantly impacted my employment-based Islamophobia,
Muslim women have borne the brunt of Islamophobia in the Belgian labour mar-
ket and workforce.
The UNIA statistics published in 2019 point to 510 cases of employ-
ment-based discrimination and 25% of these pertain to ‘racial’ or ethnic charac-
teristics.12 The CCIB’s disaggregation of all reported Islamophobic cases, published
in 2019, indicates that 6% of all dossiers it dealt with pertained to employment
and Islamophobia.13
Specific examples of workplace-based Islamophobic discrimination include the
example published in March 2018 which detailed the case of young, headscarf-wear-
ing Muslim women who faced difficulties whilst on a work experience placement at a
Belgian nursery. The young Muslim women intended to complete a short several-day
observation at the nursery (and thus would not be in direct contact with the children
at the nursery) but were asked by the nursery management to remove their headscarves.
The UNIA intervened and the Muslim women were allowed to retain their headscarves
on a technicality, namely that they would be present as observers rather than interact-
ing with the children. The UNIA welcomed the discussions but indicated the growth
in limitations on work experience placements. This is noteworthy since work experi-
ence students typically work on a temporary and voluntary basis, thus highlighting the
reach of increasing gendered Islamophobia in the Belgian workplace.
Similarly, a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf who is a legal expert took the
STIB (Brussels public transport company) to court over workplace and recruitment
discrimination on the grounds of her headscarf.14
In addition to such specific examples, given the significant growth of the right
and the far-right in Flanders, there have been increasing legislative controls over
visible Muslim appearance under the guise of neutrality in numerous fields includ-
ing the workplace.15 Of course, institutionalised Islamophobia is not the preserve of
the right wing of the political spectrum. Furthermore, the framing of such controls
echoes the terms and frames of reference employed within the French context, thus
pointing to the increasing globalisation of legislated controls of Muslimness in the
workplace and beyond.
Notwithstanding, the year 2019 also saw the growth of noteworthy count-
er-projects in the area, including that led by the CCIB entitled #OpenJobsTesting
12. “Rapport Annuel 2018: Renouer avec les droits humaines”, UNIA, (June 2019), https://www.unia.be/files/
Documenten/Jaarrapport/Unia_Rapport_egalite_2018_FR_AS.pdf, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
13. “Rapport des Chiffres 2018”, CCIB.
14. Elodie Blogie, “La Stib attaquée pour discrimination à l’embauche”, Le Soir, 27 September 2019 https://
plus.lesoir.be/249859/article/2019-09-27/la-stib-attaquee-pour-discrimination-lembauche (Access date: 23 De-
cember 2019).
15. Vlaamse Overheid, “Vlaamse regering 2019-2024: Regeerakkoord”, Departement Kanselarij & Bestuur, (2019),
http://docs.vlaamsparlement.be/docs/varia/regeerakkoord-2019-2024.pdf, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 125
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
whereby the organisation sought to understand the intersecting discriminations at
play (including Islamophobia) in terms of access to the workforce. The work fol-
lows on from extensive academic work in this field, albeit in different geographical
sites of study.
Additionally, in the Brussels-Capital Region, Actiris launched its “Actiris Inclusive”
project in December 2019. The work is headed by Fatima Zibouh and seeks to combat
workplace discrimination in the region16 including Islamophobic discrimination.
Education
As with previous years, 2019 continued to present cases of Islamophobia in the
education system. The aforementioned CCIB statistical report reveals that 22.5%
of all cases it received in the preceding year pertained to education-based Islam-
ophobia. This category was the largest alongside Islamophobia in the provision of
goods and services.17
In terms of specific cases during 2019, examples include the instance in Feb-
ruary 2019 whereby students at the Pater Jozefieten school in Melle came to school
dressed as stereotypical Arabs/Muslims. The students wore Gulf Arab-style thobes,
veils, and headscarves, accompanied by explosive belts. The school students pro-
ceeded to mock Islamic prayer in the school corridors. Candidly filmed videos sur-
faced on social and popular media and perhaps unsurprisingly provoked outrage and
strong condemnation.18 The incident demonstrates the intersection of traditional
racisms with Islamophobia in Belgium and also the increasingly normalised nature
of Islamophobia.
Beyond Islamophobia perpetrated by pupils, in May 2019, a Brussels-based pri-
mary school issued a disclaimer refuting any responsibility of school students who
were fasting for the month of Ramadan.19 Not only are students unlikely to be fasting
since they are predominantly too young, but the case also serves to normalise the
targeting of practices related to Muslimness.
As with other areas of Belgian Islamophobia in 2019, Islamophobia in the Bel-
gian schooling system was often distinctly gendered. For example, in August 2019,
16. Emilie Eickhoff, Thierry Dubocquet and Toine Guévart, “Un nouveau service chez Actiris pour lutter con-
tre la discrimination à l’embauche” BX1, 4 December 2019, https://bx1.be/news/un-nouveau-service-chez-acti-
ris-pour-lutter-contre-la-discrimination-a-lembauche/?theme=classic&fbclid=IwAR0e93B-JdAzTcLIEB_X6uZrx-
brrmQZP-sOVpZ_IAUNZTcSdYmL2bKGer-A, (Access date: 24 December 2019).
17. Rapport des Chiffres 2018, CCIB.
18. Chloé Lauvergnier, “Video of Belgian School Kids Dressed up as ‘Muslims’, Complete with Explosive Belt, Pro-
vokes Outrage” Observers, 3 April 2019, https://observers.france24.com/en/20190304-video-belgian-school-kids-
dressing-muslims-complete-explosive-belt-provokes-shock (Access date: 24 December 2019).
19. Karim Fadoul, “Ramadan: une école primaire de Bruxelles décline toute responsabilité en cas de malaise”, RTBF, 6
April 2019, https://www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_ramadan-une-ecole-primaire-de-bruxelles-decline-toute-respons-
abilite-en-cas-de malaise?id=10213165&utm_source=rtbfinfo&utm_campaign=social_share&utm_medium=fb_
share&fbclid=IwAR37IzRp7mZRfkKTdcSV9WAxiVcDSGklT4zUyk6rcei_1FkIE8W1g0moHQs, (Access date: 24
December 2019).
126 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
a Leuven court ruled that a Muslim schoolgirl who wears the headscarf could con-
tinue to do so in school and that her doing so would be lawful.20 Similarly, as de-
tailed further in relation to the Belgian justice system, an Islamic studies religious
education teacher who had previously faced difficulty and had been asked to remove
her headscarf by her employer, reached a resolution with the help of the UNIA and
continues to teach. The case is paradoxical given that the Belgian constitution allows
for religious freedom, Islam is officially recognised nationally (meaning that Islamic
religious education is provided and permitted), and thus in theory demonstrating
one’s Muslimness should not be problematic. Similarly, also as detailed under the
section of this report pertaining to the Belgian justice system, eleven Muslim school-
girls with headscarves from Maasmechelen, from the Nikola Tesla and the then Ath-
eneum Maasland school (now GO! Maxwell school) were originally banned from
their respective schools on the grounds of their headscarves in 2018. Subsequently,
the schoolgirls and their parents took the case to the Tongeren Court and the school’s
decision was overturned, meaning that the girls could continue to attend school
whilst maintaining their outward Muslim appearance. The Tongeren Court based
its decision on the European Court of Human Rights’ rulings on freedom of faith.
Unhappy with this ruling, the school appealed the Tongeren Court’s decision at the
Antwerp Court of Appeal and won in December 2019, meaning that the schoolgirls
are deprived of their education.
The aforementioned cases pertaining to gendered Islamophobia in the Belgian
education system, distinctly recall the French headscarf affairs which have been
ongoing since 1989 and notably resulted in the implementation of the 2004 Loi
Stasi which explicitly bans the presence of ‘ostentatious faith symbols’ in French
schooling.21 However, the Belgian case appears to be following French precedent
in an expedited fashion. Previously, religious dress or headscarves were not subject
to a national ban; however, there are growing controls. For example, the Verviers
region’s wide ban implemented in 2012,22 or the ban in Flanders as stipulated in
the Flanders’ Government Regional Governance Agreement of 2019, which fore-
sees a region-wide limitation on religious symbols (Muslim women’s dress). It is
framed as follows: ‘We also guarantee neutrality in education. In provincial and
community education, we ensure the philosophical neutrality for teachers and
20. Hanne Decre, “Rechter beslist dat meisje uit Leuven hoofddoek tóch mag dragen op school”, VRT, 27 August 2019,
https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2019/08/27/rechter-beslist-dat-meisje-uit-leuven-hoofddoek-toch-mag-dragen/ (Access
date: 24 December 2019).
21. “LOI n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou
de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics”, Légifrance, (2004),
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000417977&categorieLien=id, (Access
date: 24 December 2019).
22. “Déclaration Politique Générale - Mandature Communale 2013- 2018”, Verviers Conseil Communal, (Verviers,
Belgium: 2013).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 127
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
students.’23 The agreement has the potential to send a clear signal to other areas of
governance across the country.
Politics
In May 2019, both the Belgian federal elections and European Parliamentary
elections took place. Although the Belgian federal government is yet to be decid-
ed (something which is not unusual in Belgian formal federal politics in part due
to its political structure which is based on proportional representation), the May
2019 elections saw distinct gains made by the Flemish far-right and right-wing par-
ties both in Flanders and in the European Parliament, whilst in francophone Bel-
gium the Greens and left-wing parties’ representative presence grew. Specifically, at
the European Parliament the highest-ranking Dutch parties include NVA and VB
who each won three seats in the European Parliament, followed by Open VLD and
CD&V who each scored two seats. In francophone Belgium, the PS, Écolo, and MR
each secured two European Parliamentary seats.24
At the federal level, VB made the biggest gains at the polls nationally, gaining
a total of fifteen extra seats compared to the 2014-2019 period. Whilst in the fran-
cophone electoral college Écolo made the largest gains, winning a further seven seats
(compared to the last voting period).25
This growth in the far-right presence paved the way for increased legislated lim-
itations on visible Muslim appearance in education and employment. The Flemish
Governmental Regional Agreement sets out controls of “outward signs of their per-
sonal conviction” (i.e. religious symbols such as the headscarf) in Flemish governance
and education. It states, “External symbols of philosophical, religious, political or other
beliefs are therefore not worn with direct customer contact… We also guarantee neu-
trality in education. In provincial and community education, we ensure the philosoph-
ical neutrality for teachers and students.”26 As stated numerous times in this report,
although the far right does not exclusively promote Islamophobic legislation and po-
litical discourse (for example, consider left-wing liberal Islamophobia), their presence
in Belgium has given way to a rise in Islamophobic political discourse and legislation
over the years. The recent move by the Flemish governance sends a clear public signal
regarding the permissibility of Islamophobic discrimination both in the Belgian work-
place and Belgian education, and sets a precedent for both Belgium and beyond. The
terminology employed in the Flemish Governmental Regional Agreement 2019-2024
23. Vlaamse Overheid, “Vlaamse regering 2019-2024: Regeerakkoord”.
24. “2019 European Election Results: Belgium – All Electoral Colleges”, Europarl, 14 June 2019, https://europarl.
europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/national-results/belgium/2019-2024/, (Access date: 12 December 2019).
25. “Elections 2019”, IBZ Official Results, 26 May 2019, https://elections2019.belgium.be/en/election?el=CK (Ac-
cess date: 23 December 2019).
26. Vlaamse Overheid, “Vlaamse regering 2019-2024: Regeerakkoord”.
128 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
strongly echoes French discourse,27 highlighting the increasing cross-national permea-
bility of seemingly legitimised and legislated Islamophobia.
On a local level, local town councillor from the opposition party in Koekelberg,
Lucas Ducarme, stated that he doesn’t want his town to become like Molenbeek.28
The connotations here being linked to popular myth of Muslim demographic take-
over and more specifically since Molenbeek is densely populated by Muslims and has
been implicated with individuals leaving the area to become Islamic extremists in
the Levant, Ducarme’s comments stoke stereotypes and enforce images of Muslims
as barbaric and ‘other’.
In terms of noteworthy Muslim political officials, the year 2019 saw the loss
of the first Western headscarf-wearing Muslim politician, Mahinur Özdemir, from
the Belgian political arena as she moved on to become the Turkish ambassador to
Algeria. Özdemir was a role model for many and undertook a range of political
dossiers in her ten-year career as Schaerbeek MP, but regrettably was not immune to
Islamophobia during her political tenure in Belgium.29 Notwithstanding, Belgium
continues to have significant and noteworthy political representation by Muslims –
something which in itself can serve to counter-Islamophobia.30
Combining consideration of the far-right growth and Muslim political repre-
sentation in Belgium in 2019, Écolo co-president Zakia Khattabi saw her candidature
for a Belgian constitutional judge post postponed in November 2019 following the
NVA and VB’s lobbying against her candidacy. Her campaign was defeated in Janu-
ary 2020.31 Although the NVA and VB claimed their blocking was on the grounds
of her alleged ‘activist’ behaviour, it is difficult to disaggregate ethnic, gendered, reli-
gious, and even age-based features from this affair.
Similarly, in 2019, the Brussels Youth Parliament circulated an advertisement
showing the photograph of a youth parliamentarian, Chéima, who wears a headscarf.
The advertisement came under attack, perhaps unsurprisingly, under the frames of
neutrality and secularism.
Finally, in terms of political legislation, the year 2019 saw the implementation
of the ritual slaughter ban (i.e. halal and kosher) in Belgium; first in Flanders, in Jan-
uary 2019 and then in Wallonia, in September 2019. Journalist Fabrice Grosfilley ar-
27. See for example: “LOI n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de
signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics”, Légifrance.
28. Isabelle Anneet, “Ducarme: ‘Je ne veux pas que Koekelberg devienne Molenbeek bis” La Capitale, 4 August 2019,
https://www.lacapitale.be/420008/article/2019-08-04/ducarme-je-ne-veux-pas-que-koekelberg-devienne-molen-
beek-bis?fbclid=IwAR1C7h7OonkKInWiK7W2cSLKjDJMd4-zF0bjX8Tlw5wHuI_7-2sqp8IuuiM (Access date:
23 December 2019).
29. For more information, see: www.islamophobiaeurope.com.
30. Isabelle Anneet, “Ducarme: ‘Je ne veux pas que Koekelberg devienne Molenbeek bis”.
31. “Former Co-Leader of Francophone Greens’ Candidature for Constitutional Court Job Gets Insufficient Sup-
port from Senators”, VRT, 17 January 2020, https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/2020/01/17/former-co-leader-of-fran-
cophone-greens-candidature-for-constitut/ (Access date: 17 January 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 129
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
gued for the extension of such bans to the Brussels-Capital Region also, highlighting
the spread and perceived legitimacy of Islamophobic controls over Muslim practices.
Media
As with previous years, 2019 saw a sustained presence of media-based Islamophobia
in Belgium. As before, in Belgium and beyond, the popular media serve as a mouth-
piece for Islamophobic discourse, and work to silence positions that are not sympa-
thetic to hegemonic and normative discourses in the nation. Nonetheless, from a
global perspective, Belgium is recognised for its largely plural press. 32
The CCIB statistics published in 2019 highlight that 10% of the eighty dossiers
that they handled pertained to Islamophobia in the media and online.33 However,
importantly, these statistics are likely to be an underrepresentation of the real state
of affairs in the nation, as the CCIB points out that Muslim citizens don’t report
hate crimes they face given fear of ‘reprisals’ or ‘prejudicial media coverage’.34 This
highlights the power of the Belgian media in national Islamophobic discourse and in
directly contributing to the underreporting of Islamophobia in Belgium.
Specific examples of media-based Islamophobic media coverage in Belgium in
2019 include providing a platform for controversial cases, such as making the videos
from the Melle school viral whereby students dressed up and mocked Arabness and
Muslimness.35 Or, providing a platform for the call for the extension of ritual slaugh-
ter bans to the Brussels-Capital Region.
Meanwhile, Belgian media also has the potential to be a mouthpiece for the
diffusion of positive counter-narratives in the country within the frame of Islam-
ophobia. For example, the media stories that reported growing Islamophobia in the
country published in August 2019.36 Examples of this include the publication by
DH.net noting that an Islamophobic attack takes place every two days in Belgium.37
Justice System
As previous sections of this report have demonstrated, the Belgian justice system
has the potential to stoke Islamophobia through implementation and maintenance
of Islamophobic legislation. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these in 2019 in-
32. Peggy Valke, Pieter-Jan Ombelet and Ingrid Lambrecht, Media Pluralism Monitor 2016 Monitoring Risks
for Media Pluralism in the EU and Beyond – Country Report: Belgium (Centre for Media Pluralism and Media
Freedom, Brussels: 2016).
33. “Rapport des Chiffres 2018”, CCIB.
34. Ibid.
35. Chloé Lauvergnier, “Video of Belgian School Kids Dressed up as ‘Muslims”.
36. For more information, see: http://www.islamophobiaeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/BELGIUM.pdf.
37. Maïli Bernaerts, “Une attaque islamophobe a lieu tous les deux jours en Belgique”, DH Net, 4 October 2019,
https://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/une-attaque-islamophobe-a-lieu-tous-les-deux-jours-en-belgique-5d96290fd8ad-
5841fc3ef426?fbclid=IwAR2t8zbHWIbtxKbBHlXE1SKUhOfm4zwSuRS1e-rKpuQHOJdjAD47YwAzSEg, (Access
date: 24 December 2019).
130 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
cludes the implementation of the bans on halal and kosher slaughter in both Flan-
ders and Wallonia.
Similarly, the justice system at the Belgian regional, federal, and European su-
pranational levels has the potential to spread ambiguity surrounding potentially Is-
lamophobic cases. For example, in December 2019, the Antwerp Court of Appeal
overturned the previous ruling issued by the Court of Tongeren regarding the per-
missibility of young Muslim schoolgirls being allowed to wear the headscarf to their
respective schools. The case is detailed further under the education section of this
report. Essentially the case went from a school-imposed ban, which was appealed by
parents, to a ruling issued by the Court of Tongeren that followed legal precedent
and guidance from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and allowed for
the young girls to wear the headscarf, to an appeal by the school and an overturning
of the previous ruling by the more senior Antwerp Court of Appeal.38 In face of this
legal to-ing and fro-ing, the Muslim schoolgirls and their education has been com-
promised. In addition, the legal ambiguity has the potential to send a signal both to
further instances of control of Muslim women’s dress/bodies in the Belgian educa-
tion system and the potential to legitimise further gendered Islamophobia, especially
concerning visible gendered Muslimness.
However, the Belgian justice system also plays a distinct and significant role
in the criminalisation of Islamophobia. For example, in June 2019, Belgian courts
issued an €800 fine to a 65-year-old Twitter user who had been posting racist and
Islamophobic tweets and harassing UNIA co-director Els Keytman.39 In the same
month, Belgian courts heard the case of a Schaerbeek woman who had had headscarf
forcibly removed whilst in a parking lot.40 Or the case of a Muslim job-hunter who
took the STIB to court in September 2019.41
At the same time, the Belgian legal system has a role to play in effectively coun-
tering Islamophobia. The most apparent examples of this in 2019 pertain to the
work of the UNIA and the CCIB. For example, in October 2019, the UNIA was
able to support a Muslim woman who wears the headscarf in a resolution with her
employer. The woman, who was contracted to teach religious education in a Belgian
state school, had been asked to remove her headscarf. By intervening in writing and
recalling Belgian legislation (most likely that concerning the constitutionally agreed
38. Maïthe Chini, “Headscarf Ban in Public Schools Justified as Court of Appeal Overturns Previous Decision”, Brussels
Times, 24 December 2019, https://www.brusselstimes.com/all-news/belgium-all-news/85728/headscarf-ban-in-pub-
lic-schools-justified-as-court-of-appeal-overturns-previous-verdict-maasmechelen-atheneum-maasland-go-maxwell-ni-
kola-tesla-echr-education/, (Access date: 24 December 2019).
39. Belga, “Ses tweets islamophobes lui ont coûté cher”, 7sur7, 5 June 2019, https://www.7sur7.be/belgique/
ses-tweets-islamophobes-lui-ont-coute-cher~ab2c99a7/?fbclid=IwAR05Z7qF2Ah8WARn4eLCfbMlPc7A9Zm-
3TrtCYyZbE64ARLRIflLNLWaAIqI&referrer=https://l.facebook.com/, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
40. The case is detailed in last year’s edition of the European Islamophobia Report in the Belgian section. For more
information, see: http://www.islamophobiaeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/BELGIUM.pdf.
41. Blogie, “La Stib attaquée pour discrimination à l’embauche”.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 131
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
freedom of faith and also legally based acknowledgement of Islam and the subse-
quent scope for Islamic religious education within the Belgian education system),
the UNIA was able to help the woman reach an agreement with her employer whilst
maintaining her headscarf.42 Similar guidance was issued following the case that re-
ceived media attention of a headscarf-wearing Muslim woman driver, who was using
her headscarf to hold her phone (thus creating a hands-free way of using her phone
and driving). Her actions were deemed lawful, but nonetheless the case sparked con-
troversy.43 Perhaps the case, and many of the others detailed in this section, do not
pertain to secularism, security, or neutrality, but rather serve to problematise Mus-
limness in Belgian society.
Internet
Regarding cyber-Islamophobia, given the expansiveness of the internet it is difficult
to determine the scale and extent of online Islamophobia in Belgium. The CCIB
statistics published in 2019 note that 10% of the cases handled the previous year are
rooted in the cyber and media world. The year 2019 has seen a sustained growth of
online hate towards Muslims that often intersects with ethnicity and gender (among
other features).
and media world. The year 2019 has seen a sustained growth of online hate towards Muslims
that often intersects with ethnicity and gender (among other features).
Figure 2: Still image from a video on Filip Dewinter’s Facebook page .
44
Figure 2: Still image from a video on Filip Dewinter’s Facebook page44.
A key example of the use of the internet and in particular social media for furthering
Islamophobic narratives (that intersect with political gain/popularity), is that of the Facebook
page of Vlaams Belang politician Filip Dewinter, who, for example, on 26 May 2019, posted
42. “Rapport chiffres 2018: Renouer avec les droits humaines”, UNIA.
an arguably Islamophobic video to his Facebook page (which has over 29,000 followers). (Fig.
43. “Téléphoner au volant en coinçant le GSM sous le foulard, c’est parfaitement legal” DH Net, 18 February 2019,
2) The video, entitled ‘Time for De-Islamisation’ was viewed over 13,000 times, sparked 318
https://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/telephoner-au-volant-en-coincant-le-gsm-sous-le-foulard-c-est-parfaitement-legal-
Facebook reactions,(Access
5c6a85d97b50a60724c47487, 300 comments, and 53 shares,
date: 24 December 2019).and showed Arabic script on Belgian
shopfronts,
44. Filip Dewinter “Tijdwith
voorparticular emphasis onFacebook,
DE-Islamisering”, halal signs.
22The
Mayvideo continues
2019, to show these shop
https://www.facebook.com/fdwvb/vid-
signs being covered
eos/2189638998033293/, with
(Access ‘Stop
date: Islamisation’
2 March 2020).posters and concludes with a call to vote for Filip
Dewinter and Vlaams Belang in the then upcoming elections on 26 May 2019. 45
132 setav.org
44
Filip Dewinter “Tijd voor DE-Islamisering”, Facebook, 22 May 2019,
https://www.facebook.com/fdwvb/videos/2189638998033293/, (Access date: 2 March 2020).
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
A key example of the use of the internet and in particular social media for
furthering Islamophobic narratives (that intersect with political gain/popularity), is
that of the Facebook page of Vlaams Belang politician Filip Dewinter, who, for
example, on 26 May 2019, posted an arguably Islamophobic video to his Facebook
page (which has over 29,000 followers). (Fig. 2) The video, entitled ‘Time for De-Is-
lamisation’ was viewed over 13,000 times, sparked 318 Facebook reactions, 300
comments, and 53 shares, and showed Arabic script on Belgian shopfronts, with
particular emphasis on halal signs. The video continues to show these shop signs
being covered with ‘Stop Islamisation’ posters and concludes with a call to vote for
Filip Dewinter and Vlaams Belang in the then upcoming elections on 26 May 2019.45
Figure
Figure 3: Examples
3: Examples of online
of online hatehate speech
speech on the
on the CCIBCCIB
socialsocial
media media (compiled
(compiled by CCIB).
by CCIB).46 46
In response to this, the CCIB published details of its Veilleurs de l’Islamophobie (Islamophobia
In response to this, the CCIB published details of its Veilleurs de l’Islamophobie
Lookouts) project, launched the preceding year. The project is supported by the Federation of
(Islamophobia Lookouts) project, launched the preceding year. The project is sup-
Wallonia and Brussels and consists of twenty volunteers who were trained on four themes:
ported by the Federation of Wallonia and Brussels and consists of twenty volunteers
understanding prejudice stereotypes and discrimination, hate speech, (Belgian) secularism and
who were trained on four themes: understanding prejudice stereotypes and discrim-
freedom of expression, and how to react to online Islamophobia. This example demonstrates
best practice in countering online Islamophobia.
45. Ibid.
46. Central Figures
“Collectif contre in theenIslamophobia
l’Islamophobie Belgique”, Facebook,Network
13 October 2019, https://www.facebook.com/islam-
In previous (Access
ophobia.ccib.be/, years date:
and 16
previous editions
March 2020). of translations
Selected the Belgian fromnational
the imagereport in theshared
of comments European
by CCIB
following the 2019 terror attacks on New Zealand Muslims, including: ‘For once it’s not a Muslim terrorist who
Islamophobia Report, there have been consistent standout figures in the Islamophobia network
committed an attack… I am surprised.’, or ‘it is not a terrorist, it is someone who rights wrongdoings, and there will
including
be more key politicians
and more’, or finally ‘At as
thehighlighted
same time weearlier in this
don’t give report
a damn, yousuch as Filip
reap what Dewinter. This year
you sow.’
in Belgium, Islamophobia has been marked by its increasing institutionalisation. In sum, the
islamophobiaeurope.com
46
“Collectif contre
• l’Islamophobie
@islamophobiaEIR
en Belgique”, Facebook, 13 October
133
2019,
https://www.facebook.com/islamophobia.ccib.be/, (Access date: 16 March 2020). Selected translations from the
image of comments shared by CCIB following the 2019 terror attacks on New Zealand Muslims, including: ‘For
once it’s not a Muslim terrorist who committed an attack… I am surprised.’, or ‘it is not a terrorist, it is someone
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ination, hate speech, (Belgian) secularism and freedom of expression, and how to
react to online Islamophobia. This example demonstrates best practice in countering
online Islamophobia.
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
In previous years and previous editions of the Belgian national report in the European
Islamophobia Report, there have been consistent standout figures in the Islamophobia
network including key politicians as highlighted earlier in this report such as Filip
Dewinter. This year in Belgium, Islamophobia has been marked by its increasing in-
stitutionalisation. In sum, the year 2019 has seen the state via its national normative
mechanism at the centre of growing Islamophobia. This, in turn, has signalled the
growing acceptability of Islamophobia, and in particular gendered Islamophobia,
in the nation. This is borne out in the everyday attacks on Muslim practices, Mus-
lim sites, and Muslims individuals in Belgium by a wide variety of members of the
broader public. Arguably, this year suggests a change in the tone and pace of Belgian
Islamophobia – no longer does the network exist through lone or marginal far-right
actors, but rather it is becoming increasingly normalised.
Observed Civil Society and Political Initiatives to
Counter Islamophobia
Like in previous years, in 2019, Belgium has continued to demonstrate a strong
civil society response to the ever shifting and ever-growing Islamophobia. Examples
in 2019 include the CCIB – VIB project aiming to tackle - or at least document -
growing online Islamophobia in the nation.
Similarly, in 2019, the UNIA has continued to document and support those
facing Islamophobia. In particular, their practices of data collection and data shar-
ing with Belgian civil society organisations, namely the CCIB, allow for the further
analysis and disaggregation of hate crime data, which is often under-reported and
poorly understood.
Finally, given the growth of workplace-based Islamophobic discrimination of
Muslims and Muslim women in particular, the launching of the “Actiris Inclusive”
project, represents a positive move towards combatting Islamophobic discrimination
in the Belgian labour market and workforce, and the widespread levels of discrimi-
nation and prejudice that exist in this field within the nation.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
By way of principle conclusions based of this year’s Belgian report of the European Is-
lamophobia Report, the following principle points are clear: Islamophobia in Belgium
in 2019 has continued to grow steadily and is distinctly gendered in nature. This is
134 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
evident in the numerous individual and detailed cases presented above and includes
damage to mosques; swastikas being graffitied on Muslim property and pig heads
being left at Muslim homes; stabbings of Muslim women; forced removal of Muslim
women’s headscarves; Muslim women being pushed onto the metro tracks; and Mus-
lim women being denied employment and education. These events are only the tip
of the iceberg, and show the intersectional nature of Islamophobic discrimination as
it crosscuts with traditional racisms, anti-Semitism, and sexism.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, rather than being confined to
key figures, actors and networks, Belgian Islamophobia in 2019 has distinctly
been marked by its growing institutionalisation. Examples of increasingly institu-
tionalised Belgian Islamophobia include the implementation of the ban on ritual
slaughter (meaning halal and kosher) in Flanders in January 2019 and in Wallonia
in September 2019, and the controls on philosophical and religious symbols (in-
cluding Muslim women’s headscarves) in Flemish Belgian workplaces and education
thanks to the Flemish Governmental Agreement (aided in part by the 2019 right
and far-right parliamentary growth) that was implemented in 2019. The latter fol-
lows on from specific local bans and is often framed around principles of neutrality.
This national report highlights the remarkable similarities with French-style and
secular-based limitations on Muslim women’s dress in neighbouring France. Yet,
while the French affairs began in 1989 and have continued since, the Belgian case
appears to be an expedited track towards similar levels of control of Muslimness
in the nation. The legislation of Islamophobic action in Belgium in 2019 points
towards the wide-reaching scope of such controls, its potential to signal legitimacy
of Islamophobic action among the wider public, and the possible growth and tra-
jectory of the phenomenon in Belgium in coming years.
In terms of recommendations, measures must be taken across the diverse levels
of Belgian society to stem the legislated growth in Islamophobia. These steps may be
taken by civil society actors, media, jurists, educators, and political figures alike, and
should include the documentation, contestation, and deconstruction of dominant
Islamophobic narratives in the nation. For example, where the headscarf is being
constructed as a threat to Belgian neutrality, measures should be taken both to nor-
malise its presence in Belgian society and to highlight the incongruence of limiting
Muslim women’s dress on the grounds of neutrality in Belgian society, which guar-
antees religious freedom and furthermore officially recognises faiths including Islam
within its state-level structure.
At the civil society level, given the already strong presence of counter-Islam-
ophobia initiatives, work should be done to continue to support such projects and
the strong track record of data and good practice-sharing across organisations in the
country. On the whole, the precedents set in Belgium in 2019, point to remarkable
and concerning trends that going forward should be stemmed.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 135
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Chronology
• 01.01.2019: Flanders bans halal slaughter.47
• 19.01.2019: Reports emerge of a Muslim mother being attacked by a man
with a taser in Anderlecht (presumably motivated by her headscarf ).48
• 20.01.2019: Muslim woman hit in Anderlecht. Attack is believed to be
Islamophobic and as a result, the attack sparks concern among Muslim
women in Belgium.49
• 30.01.2019: A nineteen-year-old woman who converted to Islam is stabbed
by her mother. The 54-year-old mother is sentenced to three-year impris-
onment.50
• 04.02.2019: Controversy erupts following publication of Belgian Youth
Parliament advertisement campaign featuring a young Muslim woman. The
campaign sparks widespread online Islamophobic hate. It also triggers a de-
fence statement by the Belgian youth parliament, assuring its commitment
to inclusivity and diversity.51
• 08.02.2019: The University of Liège hosts the event ‘Dialogue sur la pres-
ence Musulmane en Belgique’ (Dialogue on the Muslim presence in Bel-
gium’ thus highlighting its problematised nature.
• 13.02.2019: Brussels Parliament gives the go-ahead to a project seeking
to encourage diversity and counter discrimination in the workplace (civil
servant focus).52
• 18.02.2019: Woman photographed on E411 Brussels-Namur highway
using her headscarf to hold her mobile phone, sparks controversy, but
deemed lawful.53
47. Milan Schruer, “Belgium Bans Religious Slaughtering Practices, Drawing Praise and Protest”, The New York Times,
5 January 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/europe/belgium-ban-jewish-muslim-animal-slaugh-
ter.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur&fbclid=IwAR1Qb9KFBK8LFPl2ymRm-TII-A1CmgaZdQTUzyQrK9_
zkERkVwdBLtvUC0s, (Access date: 24 December 2019).
48. “Aggression Islamophobe d’une maman à Anderlecht”, CCIB.
49. Elodie Blogie, “L’agression d’Anderlecht inquiète les musulmanes”, Le Soir, 20 January 2019, https://plus.le-
soir.be/201728/article/2019-01-20/lagression-danderlecht-inquiete-les-musulmanes?fbclid=IwAR3JUhek3IhjkK-
slQw653tyr9XhoqcU7D8CpaM1l1_-_D9sWcf80VS77Weg, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
50. N. Ben, “Sa fille se convertit à l’islam, elle la poignarde”, DH Net, 30 January 2019 https://www.dhnet.be/actu/
faits/sa-fille-se-convertit-a-l-islam-elle-la-poignarde-5c507a647b50a6072425f120?fbclid=IwAR2P8nCBFU8kFfH-
Fzud9ONu6SaIT489us5SxD_mtyvBWEf5dmyFZeSUZu0M, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
51. “BePax”, Facebook, 4 February 2019, https://www.facebook.com/bepaxasbl/photos/pcb.2510074889006198/
2510074815672872/?type=3&theater, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
52. Véronique Fievet, “La région bruxelloise veut favoriser la diversité dans les administrations communales”, RTBF, 14
February 2019, https://www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_la-region-bruxelloise-veut-favoriser-la-diversite-dans-les-ad-
ministrations-communales?id=10145856&utm_source=rtbfinfo&utm_campaign=social_share&utm_medium=fb_
share&fbclid=IwAR14GsleR5V_5wlzpQSuUL6NIlz7KwMulFL9aeQxySGOdksnPkU08s9orew, (Access date: 24
December 2019).
53. “Téléphoner au volant en coinçant le GSM sous le foulard, c’est parfaitement legal”, DH Net.
136 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
• 28.02.2019: School students dress up as stereotypes of Arabs/Muslims and
mock Islam. The event sparks controversy.54
• 15.03.2019: Following New Zealand attacks, the EMB issues a statement
to Belgian mosques warning against gatherings outside of the mosque space,
encouraging vigilance amongst worshippers, promoting calm and prayer
for New Zealand victims – demonstrating the globalisation of Islamopho-
bia and the fear it creates.55
• 16.03.2019: Veilleurs de l’Islamophobie en Belgique record surge in online
hateollowing New Zealand attacks.
• 20.03.2019: Two women report facing Islamophobia on public transport
bus in Uccle. The driver is alleged to have said ‘Je suis raciste et je déteste les
femmes voilées’ (I am a racist and I hate women who wear the headscarf ).56
• 21.03.2019: Rassamblement contre l’Islamophobie counter-Islamophobia
gathering held in Brussels.
• 29.03.2019: Controversy emerges surrounding the term Islamophobia in
Schaerbeek local council. The area has high levels of Muslim political rep-
resentation.57
• 02.04.2019: Woman stabbed in front of her three children, aged between 8 and
9, whilst on the school run in Anderlecht - presumed Islamophobic motive.58
• 04.04.2019: The UNIA recalls the lawful nature of a religious education
teacher’s headscarf. The woman wasn’t permitted to take her teacher’s certif-
icate exam on the grounds of her visibility as Muslim.59
• 06.05.2019: Brussels-based school issues a disclaimer of any culpability
of injury or ill health of any of its students fasting during Ramadan. Dis-
agreement within local authority and limited likelihood of young primary
school-aged children fasting.60
54. Eickhoff, Dubocquet and Guévart, “Un nouveau service chez Actiris pour lutter contre la discrimination à
l’embauche”.
55. Mehmet Üstün, “Discours de M. Mehmet Üstün à l’ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande à Bruxelles”, Executif des
Musulmans de Belgique, https://www.embnet.be/fr/discours-de-m-mehmet-ustun-lambassade-de-nouvelle-zelande-
bruxelles (Access date: 24 December 2019).
56. Dinant and Broutout, “Uccle: deux femmes voilées se disent victime d’une agression raciste par un conducteur”.
57. Erkan Ozdemir, “Schaerbeek : le mot “islamophobie” fait débat au Conseil Communal de mars 2019”, La Man-
chette, 28 March 2019, http://www.lamanchette.be/main/2019/03/29/schaerbeek-le-mot-islamophobie-fait-de-
bat-au-conseil-communal-de-mars-2019/?fbclid=IwAR3p_VHOvGjxFHIaAwHUzFfB68fbGmyti26SutCwRN-
MI632I9EGLHFz-bH8, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
58. “Une femme poignardée devant ses trois enfants à Anderlecht”, SudInfo.
59. “Une future prof de religion islamique ale droit de porter le voile”, UNIA, 12 March 2019 https://www.unia.
be/fr/jurisprudence-alternatives/solutions-negociees/une-future-prof-de-religion-islamique-a-le-droit-de-por-
ter-le-voile?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Unia+News+Fr++avril+2019&utm_content=Unia+News+-
Fr++avril+2019+CID_b7053bc674f9f0cedf255b9aa6522690&utm_source=REIKO+nieuwsbrieven&utm_ter-
m=Une+future+prof+de+religion+islamique+a+le+droit+de+porter+le+voile&fbclid=IwAR1gT6RmCn6twCLUR-
8to_nwGlGJuAfce0lfEbhCZoFxkbNSkPuvnctDnAvA, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
60. Fadoul, “Ramadan: une école primaire de Bruxelles décline toute responsabilité en cas de malaise”.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 137
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
• 26.05.2019: Belgian Federal and European Parliamentary election – strong
far-right growth, particularly in Flanders.
• 05.06.2019: A 65-year-old from Antwerp was sentenced to ten-months
imprisonment and ordered to pay €800 fine for tweets inciting hatred both
racist and specifically Islamophobic in nature. The man also harassed UNIA
director Els Keytman.61
• 17.06.2019: First hearing in the Brussels correctional court over case in
August 2018, whereby a woman had her headscarf forcibly removed in a
Schaerbeek car park.
• 06.07.2019: An inebriated woman attacked a headscarf-wearing Muslim
woman in Duerne and tried to forcibly remove her headscarf (although
some reports state face veil). The attacker was arrested due to being publicly
intoxicated.62
• 04.08.2019: Local councillor Lucas Ducarme of opposition party in
Koekelberg states that he doesn’t want his town to become like Molen-
beek.63
• 08.08.2019: BePax report “Islamophobie: mettre fin aux discrimina-
tions” (Islamophobia: Put an End to Discrimination) is published de-
tailing growing rates of Islamophobia and in particular, its gendered di-
mensions.64
• 21.08.2019: Newspaper report published noting significant increase in Is-
lamophobia in Belgium.65
• 27.08.2019: Flemish judge rules that a Muslim schoolgirl from Leuven
can wear her headscarf to school in spite of the school operating a ban on
religious symbols. The judge deemed the school ban to be in contradiction
with laws governing religious freedom.66
• 01.09.2019: Halal slaughter ban comes into action in Wallonia.
• 18.09.2019: Reports emerge of a Muslim woman and her family facing
racist abuse – verbal taunts, swastikas graffitied on their car and excrement/
urine left at their doorstep. Difficult to disaggregate race, ethnicity, etc.67
61. Belga, “Ses tweets islamophobes lui ont coûté cher”.
62. SaRe. “Dronken vrouw valt moslima aan in Deurne”.
63. Anneet, “Ducarme: ‘Je ne veux pas que Koekelberg devienne Molenbeek bis”.
64. For more information, see: http://www.bepax.org/files/files/BePax-Signes-des-Temps-08-2019-%20Islamopho-
bie.pdf
65. Belga, “Les actes de discrimination contre des communautés religieuses sont en hausse en Belgique”, DH Net,
21 August 2019, https://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/les-actes-de-discrimination-contre-des-communautes-reli-
gieuses-sont-en-hausse-en-belgique-5d5d5b3dd8ad585935b4d77e?fbclid=IwAR0syBSBQPZL4OGSr4rAFy-sqP-
P3uf9tmkjWuTY08W5t3A1oh7QB6utWT4Q#.XV2Qq3-rjn0.facebook, (Access date: 23 December 2019).
66. Decre, “Rechter beslist dat meisje uit Leuven hoofddoek tóch mag dragen op school”.
67. RTL Info “Hayat, mère de trois enfants se dit victime de racism: “On a eu de la diarrhée sur la porte” (vidéo).
16 September 2019.
138 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BELGIUM
• 01.10.2019: Flemish governmental declaration published. Given the
strong far-right gains made in May elections, the declaration curbs religious
freedoms in the workplace and education.68
• 03.10.2019: Calls for extension of halal slaughter ban to Brussels-Capital
Region from Fabrice Grosfilley aired on BX1.
• 04.10.2019: News reports indicate that an Islamophobic attack takes place
once every two days in Belgium.69
• 05.10.2019: Fifty-year-old inebriated homeless woman pushes head-
scarf-wearing woman on the tracks of the Brussels metro. This is the second
time that the woman has done this.70
• 13.10.2019: Pig head left at residential address in Wallonia (reported to
the CCIB).
• 16.10.2019: School allows for a Muslim religious education teacher to
wear her headscarf to school following support by the UNIA.71
• 27.10.2019: STIB (Belgian public transport management company) taken
to court by a headscarf-wearing job applicant over discrimination based on
the headscarf.72
• 27.11.2019: At the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) the Cercle des Etudi-
ants Arabo-Européens de ULB (The Circle of Arabo-Europea Students at
ULB), along with other students’ organisations submit contestation sur-
rounding the restriction of Muslim women’s dress.
• 04.12.2019: ‘Actris Inclusive’ – Belgian office for work launches its office
dedicated to combatting workplace/job-hunter discrimination.73
• 24.12.2019: The Court of Appeal in Antwerp rules that a ban on wearing
headscarves in two schools in the municipality of Maasmechelen in the
Limburg province is justified.74
• 31.12.2019: Al-Ihssan Mosque in Leuven is vandalised and attacked as the
year closes.75
68. Vlaamse Overheid “Vlaamse regering 2019-2024: Regeerakkoord” (Vlaamse Overheid, Flanders: 2019).
69. Maïli Bernaerts, “Une attaque islamophobe a lieu tous les deux jours en Belgique”, DH Net, 4 October 2019,
https://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/une-attaque-islamophobe-a-lieu-tous-les-deux-jours-en-belgique-5d96290fd8ad-
5841fc3ef426?fbclid=IwAR2t8zbHWIbtxKbBHlXE1SKUhOfm4zwSuRS1e-rKpuQHOJdjAD47YwAzSEg (Ac-
cess date: 24 December 2019).
70. D. H., “Bruxelles: Laila pousse des femmes sur les rails du métro!”.
71. UNIA, “Une future prof de religion Islamique à le droit de porter le voile”.
72. Blogie, “La Stib attaquée pour discrimination à l’embauche”.
73. Eickhoff, Dubocquet and Guévart,“Un nouveau service chez Actiris pour lutter contre la discrimination à l’em-
bauche”.
74. Chini, “Headscarf Ban in Public Schools”.
75. D.R., “Une mosquée vandalisée à Louvain”.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 139
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
HIKMET KARČIĆ
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 141
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
142 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The Author
Hikmet Karčić is a researcher at the Institute for Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks
in Sarajevo. He has a BA and LL.M. from the Faculty of Law, University of Saraje-
vo, and a PhD in Political Science and Sociology from the International University
of Sarajevo. Previously, Karčić worked at the Missing Persons Institute of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the Center for Advanced Studies (CNS) in Sarajevo, and was the
project coordinator for “Mapping of Detention Camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1992-1995” at the association Tranzicijska pravda, odgovornost i sjećanje (TPOS). He
was also the editor of Remembering the Bosnian Genocide: Justice, Memory and Denial
(Institute for Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks, 2016). He is the author of several research
articles on the subject of war crimes and memorialization, and has produced two
documentaries related to the former. Email: karcic@iitb.ba
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Hikmet Karčić: Islamophobia in Bosnia Herzegovina: National Report 2019, in: Enes
Bayraklı & Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 143
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
Anti-Muslim bigotry and negative trends towards Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina were evident mainly in the educational, political, and media sectors. As in previ-
ous years, the main generators of Islamophobic discourse and anti-Muslim bigotry
are the Bosnian Serb politicians, media and academic circles In addition, the year
2019 saw a large increase in anti-Bosnian and anti-Muslim bigotry by the Bosnian
Croat and Croatian political establishment and by regional political actors. These ac-
tors continue to present Bosnia and Herzegovina as a failed state which is harboring
extremists and which needs to be territorially divided in order to secure peace and se-
curity. The Bosnian Serb and Serbian authorities continued their institutional denial
and revisionist activities aimed at creating their own narrative about the genocide
committed against Bosniaks during the 1992-95 period.
This year also saw the continuation of the denial of genocide and war crimes by
the Serb authorities. The local and regional media contributed to anti-Muslim big-
otry with reports about terrorist threats and radical ideology, connecting it with the
Bosniak political and religious establishment. In 2019, Islamophobic and anti-Mus-
lim rhetoric was centered around the return of former foreign terrorist fighters from
Syria and the so-called migrant crisis.
Lastly, this year saw a continuation of physical and verbal attacks on mosques
and imams, mostly in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian entity Republika Srpska but also
in Croat-majority areas. Additionally, anti-Muslim hatred was visible at football
matches and in graffiti in Serb-dominated towns.
144 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Sažetak
Anti-muslimanska netrpeljivost i negativni trendovi prema muslimanima u Bosni i
Hercegovini se uglavnom očituju u obrazovnom, političkom i medijskom sistemu.
Kao i u prethodnim godinama, glavni generatori islamofobije i anti-muslimanske
netrpeljivosti su čelnici bosanskih Srba - politički, medijski i akademski nosioci poli-
tike. U 2019. godini došlo je do porasta anti-bosanske i anti-muslimanske retorike
od strane Hrvatskog političkog rukovodstva i od strane regionalnih aktera. Ovi
akteri prikazuju Bosnu i Hercegovinu kao propalu državu koja je sjedište ekstremista
i koja treba biti teritorijalno podijeljena kako bi se očuvao mir i sigurnost.
Ove godine se nastavilo negiranje genocida i ratnih zločina od strane srpskih
zvaničnika. Domaći i regionalni mediji doprinijeli su anti-muslimanskim netrpelji-
vostima kroz izvještavanje o terorističkim prijetnjama i radikalnoj ideologiji, povezi-
vajući ih s bošnjačkim političkim i vjerskim zvaničnicima.
Konačno, ove godine je vidljiv nastavak fizičkih i usmenih napada na džamije
i imame, većinom u bosanskohercegovačkom entitetu Republika Srpska.. Dodatna
anti-muslimanska mržnja bila je vidljiva na fudbalskim utakmicama i na grafitima u
pojedinim gradovima.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Type of Regime: Parliamentary representative democracy
Form of Government: Three-member presidential system
Ruling Parties: Party for Democratic Action (SDA), Croatian Democratic
Union (HDZ), Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)
Opposition Parties: Social Democratic Party (SDP), Serb Democratic Party
(SDS), Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990)
Last Elections: 2018 Presidential Election (Šefik Džaferović won 36.61% of
the vote; Željko Komšić 52.64% of the vote; and Milorad Dodik 53.88% of the
vote); Legislative Election (SDA: 9 seats, HDZ: 5 seats, SNSD: 6 seats)
Total Population: 3,511,372 (in 2013)
Major Languages: Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian
Official Religion: No official religion (secularism)
Statistics on Islamophobia: In 2019, the Commission for Freedom of Religion
reported 13 anti-Muslim attacks.
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: N/A
Major Religions (% of Population): Islam (50.11%), Serbian Orthodoxy
(31%), Catholicism (15%), Others/None/Not stated (3%)
Muslim Population (% of Population): 1,769,592 (50.11%) in 2013 (Census of
Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina - 2013 Final Results)
Main Muslim Community Organizations: Islamic Community of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: Riyasat Commission for Freedom of
Religion; NAHLA
Far-Right Parties: SNSD - Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata (Alliance of Inde-
pendent Social Democrats); SDS - Srpska demokratska stranka (Serb Democratic Par-
ty); SRS - Srpska radikalna stranka (Serb Radical Party); HDZ - Hrvatska demokrats-
ka zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)
Far-Right Movements: Serb Nationalists Chetnik Movement, Croat Neo-Usta-
sha Movement
Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: N/A
Limitations to Islamic Practices:
ű Hijab Ban: None
ű Halal Slaughter Ban: None
ű Minaret Ban: None
ű Circumcision Ban: None
ű Burka Ban: None
ű Prayer Ban: None
146 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Introduction
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a specific case of Islamophobia. Anti-Muslim bigotry has
been present in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a long time. This Islamophobia reached
the highest peaks with mass atrocities including genocide; Islamophobia was present
during World War II and during the Bosnian War (1992-1995). Although anti-Mus-
lim bigotry has deep roots, the first contemporary Islamophobic statements appeared
in the late 1980s and were made by scholars, Orientalists, and self-proclaimed Islam
experts at the University of Belgrade. Slavic Muslims were represented as traitors of
Orthodox Christianity, people with weak genes who converted to Islam. This is an
interesting case of Islamophobia where hatred is aimed mainly at Slavic Muslims.
After the Serbian aggression and genocide of 1992-95, Islamophobia has been pres-
ent in the country and in the region. Islamophobia is manifested through political
statements, in the media, and in physical attacks. Most of the attacks are aimed at
Bosniak returnees in Republika Srpska and in Croat-majority areas. The largest con-
centration of Bosniaks is in the federation where there are almost no attacks other
than occasional Islamophobic statements or writings. Research for this report was
based on available reports, media analysis, and interviews with important stakehold-
ers. People and institutions were contacted in order to gain relevant information on
different topics that included the media, justice, education, etc.
It is generally accepted that Islam arrived in Bosnia with the Ottoman Empire in
the fifteenth century. Today, Bosnian Muslims are overwhelmingly Sunnis. Bosnian
Muslims (Bosniaks) are an indigenous Slavic ethnic group. More than 55 years of
communism (1945-1990) in Yugoslavia kept religion in the dark. However, after
Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito’s death in 1980, a rise of Serb nationalism first in-
cited anti-Albanian and later anti-Muslim rhetoric. Centuries-old ideas of establish-
ing a homogenous greater Serbian state were revived by the Yugoslav regime under
Slobodan Milošević. During 1992-95, an international armed conflict and genocide
(the aim of establishing a Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia meant dividing Bosnia
and Herzegovina and getting rid of its Muslim population) caused the deaths of at
least 100,000 people, 30,000 enforced disappearances, and the rape of 30,000 wom-
en and girls. The vast majority of the victims were Bosniaks whose remains were bur-
ied in hundreds of hidden mass graves throughout the country. In addition to this,
an estimated 600 mosques and a variety of Islamic religious objects were deliberately
destroyed by the Bosnian Serb Army and the Croatian Defence Council. A decade
of communism followed by genocidal massacres of the Bosniak population resulted
in today’s situation where interreligious understanding and tolerance are fragile and
complex. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to the war entrenching
the results of genocide, and cementing the divide in the country.
When it comes to the population of Muslims in B&H, according to the cen-
sus conducted in 2013, 50.11% (1,769,592) of inhabitants declared themselves to
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 147
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
be Bosniaks (out of a total of 3,531,159). A slightly larger percentage (50.70%)
stated that their religion is Islam. Since, in the case of all three constituent ethnic
communities in Bosnia, the ethnic and religious identities overlap to a large extent,
this figure is usually taken as indicative of the number of adherents to Islam. Due
to war-related death, expulsion, and internal and external migration in the 1992-
1995 aggression against B&H, the numbers and demographic distribution of ethnic
groups have significantly changed.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a secular state with no state religion. In today’s post-
war B&H, the increased presence of religion in the public arena is evident. Some
welcome the religious revival as a healthy assertion of identity after the decades-long
de-Islamization process that occurred during the communist period, while others see
it as a rising threat to the secular and politically fragile state.
Annex 1 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina includes 15 main
documents on human rights. The constitution states that the rights and freedoms
set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly to Bosnia and Herze-
govina. A special law providing for the freedom of religion and religious non-dis-
crimination, as well as the legal status of churches and religious communities was
adopted in 2004. This is the Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Position
of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According
to this law everyone has the right to freedom of religion or belief, including the
freedom to publicly profess, or not profess, a religion. Along with this, the Law on
Prohibition of Discrimination was also adopted in 2009. According to this law,
discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief consists of any differential
treatment, including any type of exclusion, limitation or preference based on real
or assumed features towards any person or group of persons on grounds of religion
or belief, and every other circumstance with a purpose or a consequence that inhib-
its or endangers recognition, enjoyment or realization of rights and freedoms in all
areas of public life (Article 2.1).
Hate crime as a specific crime is motivated by intolerance towards certain
groups in society. Some of the several criminal codes in B&H contain limited pro-
visions that allow more severe punishment to be imposed for crimes committed
with a motivation of bias. Use of these provisions is inconsistent and relatively rare.
For example, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H) and the Brčko
District Criminal Codes include aggravated forms of some criminal acts, such as
murder, rape, or causing grievous bodily injury when committed with a motivation
of bias. The FB&H Criminal Code also includes an aggravated form of malicious
mischief. Many laws on peace and public order at the cantonal level also include
minor offences, punishable with a fine, which encompass insulting behavior based
on national, racial, or religious grounds. The FB&H, Republika Srpska, and Brčko
148 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
District Criminal Codes also include provisions on incitement to national, racial,
or religious hatred, discord, or hostility. According to the statistics for hate crimes
of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), hate crimes
in B&H often target returnee communities (who are often isolated and vulnera-
ble) and religious and sacred objects (mosques, churches, and graveyards), as well as
private property belonging to returnees or members of minority communities. The
OSCE B&H also records hate crimes through the Hate Monitor. More than 85%
of all hate crimes registered through the Hate Monitor target are due to ethnicity/
religion. Unfortunately, the statistics are not segregated by religion. When it comes
to hate speech regulations, the FB&H and Republika Srpska laws do not specifically
proscribe hate speech, but prohibit acts that cause ethnic, racial, or religious hatred.
Nevertheless, usage of incendiary language (in the media, by politicians, and others)
usually goes unpunished.
Islamophobic hate speech is particularly common online. To this date, no pro-
cedures have been initiated that would limit or sanction such activities. More infor-
mation on hate speech in the media will be given in the report’s Media section.
Some of the main events that sparked Islamophobic rhetoric in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina were related to political instability and the so-called migrant crisis. First, the
state-level government could not be formed for more than a year after elections were
held due to the disruptive efforts of various political parties.. This was in relation to
the refusal of the Serbs to send the Annual National Programme (ANP) to NATO.
Similarly to previous years, this year saw a high level of anti-Bosnian rhetoric from
Croatia and Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina is portrayed by them as a failed state
which is a safe haven for terrorists. B&H entity Republika Srpska continued its sep-
aratist policy in 2019 announcing that it is preparing the grounds for succession and
for eventually joining Serbia.
The second event is the rising so-called migrant crisis which initially had not
affected Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since Serbia and Hungary closed their borders, the
migrants found their way through Bosnia and Herzegovina. In most cases, Serbian
authorities encourage them to go to Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of easing
the Serbian migrant issue. On the other hand, the migrants which the Croatian po-
lice capture are sent back over the border to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This influx of
migrants was one of the main causes of Islamophobia and conspiracy theories pushed
by the Bosnian Serb politicians and media.
Similarly to 2018, the Islamophobic rhetoric by political figures and media is on
the rise. In relation to physical attacks, 2019 was a year in which attacks were slightly
higher than in 2018.
The following incidents were collected through media reports, direct reporting
to the commission, and personal contacts. The Commission for the Freedom of Reli-
gion and the Interreligious Council of B&H also published a report on the monitor-
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 149
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ing and the responses to attacks on religious buildings and other holy sites in B&H.
When this report was being written, the data for 2019 had not yet been published.
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and
Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
On 6 January, the Srebrenica Genocide Memorial in Potočari was desecrated with
the bag of pork intestines. Nisvet Mujanović, chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Srebrenica Memorial Center stated that it was the period of Orthodox holidays,
so slaughter of pigs is very common, and it is hard for those working in the Memorial
Center to know that their Serb neighbors use their holidays to commit such acts.1
On 7 January, Aleksandar Mlađenović, a local Orthodox priest from Srebrenica,
can be seen on a video leading a group of people on Christmas Eve singing Chetnik
songs. Mlađenović can be seen singing songs about Kosovo and greeting Kosovo
Serbs for “Serbs’ Srebrenica”. Just a month before this provocation, the priest shared
a photograph of himself together with a local imam and another priest with a caption
“Today in Srebrenica this photograph was made as a symbol for a better and prettier
part of our everyday lives that we rarely see in media” on his Facebook profile.2
On 8 January, two Serb members of the B&H Armed Forces were seen on a
video singing songs containing hate speech toward Muslims. The video was shared
on their Instagram social media account. Some of the lyrics that soldiers sang stated,
“I will not give three Christmas days for thousands of Ramadans...”3
On 13 January, Tomislav Zelenika, a young Bosnian Croat, updated his status
on his Facebook profile, claiming that Bosniak Muslims are the biggest and most
dangerous threat: “Muslims, Bosniaks, are your greatest and most dangerous threat”
adding that “Bosniaks are genetically predetermined for treason, what to expect from
people whose ancestors betrayed their faith.” This post was later published on a web-
site with close ties to the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).4
1. “Memorijalni centar Srebrenica: Pozivamo nadležne da reaguju”, Radio BIR, 7 January 2019, https://www.bir.
ba/index.php/vijesti/bih/item/8007-memorijalni-centar-srebrenica-pozivamo-nadlezne-da-reaguju, (Access date: 17
January 2020).
2. “Tenzije u Srebrenici Zbog Incidenta na Badnje Veče: Ovo je sveštenik iz Srebrenice koji je predvodio kolonu
i s posebnim zanosom pjevao četničke pjesme”, Slobodna Bosna, 8 January 2019, https://www.slobodnabosna.
ba/vijest/102454/tenzije_u_srebrenici_zbog_incidenta_na_badnje_veche_ovo_je_svestenik_iz_srebrenice_koji_je_
predvodio_kolonu_i_s_posebnim_zanosom_pjevao_chetnichke_pjesme.html, (Access date: 17 January 2020).
3. “Pripadnici OS BiH u Bileći vrijeđaju muslimane: Tri božićna ne dam dana, za hiljade Ramazana…”, Oslo-
bođenje, 8 January 2019, https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/video-pripadnici-os-bih-u-bileci-vrijedaju-mus-
limane-tri-bozicna-ne-dam-dana-za-hiljade-ramazana423301?fbclid=IwAR3UnP0J79E4Vo8y4eB83FqqHFN-
w9Ek9skJJuqeaEnLAMaEpgF55-ZVWsrg, (Access date: 17 January 2020).
4. Dragan Bursać, “Jesu li Bošnjaci labilni ljudi koji žele istrijebiti Hrvate i Srbe?”, Oslobođenje, 13 January 2019,
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/dragan-bursac-jesu-li-bosnjaci-labilni-ljudi-koji-zele-istrijebiti-hrvate-i-sr-
be-424701, (Access date: 17 January 2020).
150 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
On 3 March, Bosnian Croat carnivals were held in several towns in Herzegov-
ina, where the Bosniak Muslim identity and Islamic values were ridiculed.5 (Fig. 1)
Figure
Figure 1: Bosnian
1: Bosnian Croat
Croat carnival
carnival in Ljubuški
in Ljubuški taunting
taunting Bosniaks.
Bosniaks.6 6
On 3 March, the entrance to the women’s section of the Čaršijska Mosque in
On 3 March, the entrance to the women’s section of the Čaršijska Mosque in Prijedor and the
Prijedor and the garage belonging to the mosque were vandalized with offensive Serb
garage belonging to the mosque were vandalized with offensive Serb nationalist graffiti. 7 The
nationalist graffiti.7 The perpetrators were not apprehended.
perpetrators were not apprehended.
On 11 March, in Kozarac near Prijedor, a Bosniak returnee Azrin Hodžić, was
On 11 March, in Kozarac near Prijedor, a Bosniak returnee Azrin Hodžić, was attacked both
attacked both physically and verbally by Renato Marjanović. After threats and abuse,
physically and
Marjanović verbally
pulled out abyphone
RenatotoMarjanović.
record the After
victimthreats
as heand abuse, Marjanović
promised to removepulled out a
a stick-
er phone
of thetoB&H
recordflag
the victim as hetruck,
from his promised
andtohumiliated
remove a sticker
him.of8 the B&H flag from his truck, and
On 13 March, Marjanović
8
washumiliated
arrested him. On 13 March,
by Prijedor policeMarjanović wasafter
and released arrested
24 by Prijedor
hours. 9 police and released after 24
9
hours.
From 3 March to 21 September, Imam Emir Nuhić from Blagaj, Bosanski Novi
received death threats from Daniel Rajković via Facebook. Imam Nuhić reported
everything to the police who eventually arrested Rajković.10
5. “Zavadi Pa Vladaj: Hrvati vole ismijavati bošnjačko-muslimanske vrijednosti!”, Dnevno.ba, 7 February 2019,
https://www.dnevno.ba/vijesti/zavadi-pa-vladaj-hrvati-vole-ismijavati-bosnjacko-muslimanske-vrijednosti-163192/
, (Access date: 17 January 2020).
“Zavadi Pa Vladaj: Hrvati vole ismijavati bošnjačko-muslimanske vrijednosti!”.
6
7
“Četiri
6. “Zavadi S’ naHrvati
Pa Vladaj: ulazuvole
u ismijavati
harem Čaršijske džamije u Prijedoru”,
bošnjačko-muslimanske vrijednosti!”.Radio Sarajevo, 6 March 2019,
https://www.radiosarajevo.ba/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/cetiri-s-na-ulazu-u-harem-carsijske-dzamije-u-
7. “Četiri S’ na ulazu u harem Čaršijske džamije u Prijedoru”, Radio Sarajevo, 6 March 2019, https://www.radiosa-
prijedoru/329050, (Access date: 17 January 2020).
rajevo.ba/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/cetiri-s-na-ulazu-u-harem-carsijske-dzamije-u-prijedoru/329050,
8
“Azrin Hodžić nakon napada: Nasilnik mi je prijetio da će me zaklati ako pozovem policiju”, Klix.ba,(Access12date:
March
17 2019,
January 2020).https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/azrin-hodzic-nakon-napada-nasilnik-mi-je-prijetio-da-ce-me-zaklati-ako-
pozovem-policiju/190312069,
8. “Azrin (Access date:
Hodžić nakon napada: Nasilnik mi je17 January
prijetio da2020).
će me zaklati ako pozovem policiju”, Klix.ba, 12 March
9
“Renato Marjanović, koji se iživljavao na povratniku Azrinu Hodžiću, pušten na slobodu”, Klix.ba, 13 March 2019,
2019, https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/azrin-hodzic-nakon-napada-nasilnik-mi-je-prijetio-da-ce-me-zaklati-ako-po-
https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/renato-marjanovic-koji-se-izivljavao-na-povratniku-azrinu-hodzicu-pusten-na-
zovem-policiju/190312069,
slobodu/190313101, (Access(Access
date:date: 17 January
18 January 2020).
2020).
9. “Renato Marjanović, koji se iživljavao na povratniku Azrinu Hodžiću, pušten na slobodu”, Klix.ba, 13 March 2019,
https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/renato-marjanovic-koji-se-izivljavao-na-povratniku-azrinu-hodzicu-pusten-na-
slobodu/190313101, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
10. “Imam Emir Nuhić iz Bosanskog Novog dobio ozbiljne prijetnje smrću: Šta ako uradi što je rekao?”, Klix.ba, 17
March 2019, https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/imam-emir-nuhic-iz-bosanskog-novog-dobio-ozbiljne-prijetnje-smr-
cu-sta-ako-uradi-sto-je-rekao/190317054, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 151
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
From 3 March to 21 September, Imam Emir Nuhić from Blagaj, Bosanski Novi received death
threats from Daniel Rajković via Facebook. Imam Nuhić reported everything to the police who
10
eventually
On 10 arrested Rajković.
March, members of the Ravnagora Chetnik Movement, a neo-fascist
On
Serb10nationalist
March, members of the Ravnagora
paramilitary Chetnik
organization, Movement,
paraded a neo-fascist
through the townSerb nationalist
of Visegrad.
paramilitary organization,
They sang songs paraded
threatening through the
Bosniaks withtown of Visegrad.
lyrics They
such as “It willsang songs
be hell threatening
and bloody
Bosniaks withcome
Drina, here lyrics the
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be hell andmountains.”
Serb bloody Drina,11here come the Chetnik from Serb
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nationalistgraffiti
graffition
onreconstructed
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12 12
On 10 April, while still under construction, the mosque Arnaudija in Banjaluka
10
was“Imam Emir Nuhić The
vandalized. iz Bosanskog Novog dobio
perpetrator(s) ozbiljne others
among prijetnje graffitied
smrću: Šta ako uradi što je Nazi
enormous rekao?”,swastikas
Klix.ba, 17
March 2019, https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/imam-emir-nuhic-iz-bosanskog-novog-dobio-ozbiljne-prijetnje-smrcu-
and the Serb nationalist four(Access
sta-ako-uradi-sto-je-rekao/190317054, S symbols. 13
(Fig.2020).
date: 18 January 2)
11
Samir Huseinovic, “Četnici slave ratnog zločinca i prijete, srpske vlasti šute”, Deutsche Welle, 11 March 2019,
On 5 May, Bosniaks in a local mosque in Obradovac in Bosanska Gradiška were
https://www.dw.com/hr/%C4%8Detnici-slave-ratnog-zlo%C4%8Dinca-i-prijete-srpske-vlasti-%C5%A1ute/a-
47848050, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
exposed
12 to threats and Serb nationalist Chetnik songs on the eve of Ramadan. A
“Vandalizam u Banjoj Luci: Džamija Arnaudija išarana sa četiri ‘S’ i kukastim križevima”, Oslobođenje, 10 April
2019,
column of https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/vandalizam-u-banjoj-luci-dzamija-arnaudija-isarana-sa-cetiri-s-i-
cars circled around the mosque in broad daylight, mimicking weaponry
kukastim-krizevima-448314, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
in their hands while aiming at the mosque and shooting.14
11. Samir Huseinovic, “Četnici slave ratnog zločinca i prijete, srpske vlasti šute”, Deutsche Welle, 11 March 2019,
https://www.dw.com/hr/%C4%8Detnici-slave-ratnog-zlo%C4%8Dinca-i-prijete-srpske-vlasti-%C5%A1ute/a-
47848050, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
12. “Vandalizam u Banjoj Luci: Džamija Arnaudija išarana sa četiri ‘S’ i kukastim križevima”, Oslobođenje, 10 April
2019, https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/vandalizam-u-banjoj-luci-dzamija-arnaudija-isarana-sa-cetiri-s-i-ku-
kastim-krizevima-448314, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
13. “Vandalizam u Banjoj Luci: Džamija Arnaudija išarana sa četiri ‘S’ i kukastim križevima”, Oslobođenje.
14. “Prijetnje i četničke pjesme: Vjernici kod Bosanske Gradiške izvrijeđani uoči početka ramazana”, Klix.ba, 5 May
2019, https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/prijetnje-i-cetnicke-pjesme-vjernici-kod-bosanske-gradiske-izvrijedjani-uo-
ci-pocetka-ramazana/190505103, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
152 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
On 13 May, unknown perpetrators destroyed the flags of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Islamic Community in front of the mosque in Nova Kasaba during Ramadan.15
On 1 June, in Rogatica, the Bosniak returnee Elvir Bahto was attacked by his
neighbor with a shovel. Bahto was on his way to break his fast during Ramadan,
when he was greeted outside his house by a neighbor who cursed his “Turkish”
mother, and soon after vandalized his car. Bahto contacted the police immediately
and the drunk abuser was arrested.16
On 8 June, several perpetrators destroyed four tombstones in the Muslim ceme-
tery Kazanbašča in Zvornik. The police station of Zvornik condemned this criminal
act and promised to bring the perpetrators to justice.17
On 6 June, several Serb nationalistic stickers referring to the Srebrenica geno-
cide and other offensive writings were stuck on Muslim religious objects in Bijeljina.18
On 19 July, a group of young Serb nationalists, gathered in front of the Majlis
building in Trebinje and sung nationalist songs.19
On 25 July, an hour after midnight, five young men (three of them underage)
vandalized a fence of the mosque in Zvornik. The officials identified and apprehend-
ed the five young men.20
On 13 August, a Serb man in Nevesinje beat a Roma man cursing his “Muslim
and balija [derogatory term for Bosniaks] mother.” The attack was filmed by by-
standers and shows two RS policemen standing by and not intervening.21
On 17 August, the officials from the police station in Banja Luka arrested a man
with initials “D.V.” for verbally abusing the local imam of the Islamic community in
front of the mosque.22
15. “Ispred džamije u Novoj Kasabi: Potrgane zastave Islamske zajednice BiH i države Bosne i Hercegovine”, Oslo-
bođenje, 13 May 2019, https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/crna-hronika/ispred-dzamije-u-novoj-kasabi-potrgane-
zastave-islamske-zajednice-bih-i-drzave-bosne-i-hercegovine-456624?fb_comment_id=2312404868806507_2312
419632138364, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
16. “Rogatica: Povratnika Elvira Bahtu napao komšija, lopatom mu polupao auto”, Faktor.ba, 1 June 2019, https://
www.faktor.ba/vijest/rogatica-povratnika-elvira-bahtu-napao-komsija-lopatom-mu-polupao-auto/38716, (Access
date: 18 January 2020).
17. “Na muslimanskom groblju Kazanbašča uništeni nišani”, Zvornicki.ba, 8 June 2019, https://zvornicki.ba/
na-muslimanskom-groblju-kazanbasca-unisteni-nisani-foto/, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
18. Albina Sorguc, “BiH: Napadi na džamije i nacionalističke pretnje”, Balkan Insight, 14 June 2019, https://balka-
ninsight.com/2019/06/14/bih-napadi-na-dzamije-i-nacionalisticke-pretnje/?lang=sr, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
19. “Imam Mustafić: Došli su mi pod prozor i pjevali ‘Ne volim te Alija, zato što si balija’ i pjesme o Draži, čet-
nicima, Srebrenici…”, Dnevni avaz, 19 July 2019, https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/503628/imam-mustafic-dosli-su-mi-
pod-prozor-i-pjevali-%E2%80%9Cne-volim-te-alija-zato-sto-si-balija%E2%80%9D-i-pjesme-o-drazi-cetnicima-
srebrenici, (Access date: 18 January 2020).
20. “Novi napad u Zvorniku: Petorica mladića gađala ogradu džamije u centru grada”, Radio Sarajevo, 26 July 2019,
https://www.radiosarajevo.ba/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/novi-napad-u-zvorniku-pet-mladica-gadala-ogradu-dz-
amije-u-centru-grada/345543, (Access date: 15 January 2020).
21. “Muškarac na očigled policajca tukao Roma psujući mu majku”, Radio Sarajevo, 14 August 2019, https://
www.radiosarajevo.ba/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/muskarac-na-ocigled-policajca-tukao-roma-psujuci-mu-ma-
jku/347534, (Access date: 5 January 2019).
22. “Banjalučanin uhapšen zbog vrijeđanja imama”, Nezavisne novine, 17 August 2019, https://www.nezavisne.
com/novosti/hronika/Banjalucanin-uhapsen-zbog-vrijedjanja-imama/553912, (Access date: 5 January 2019).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
On 24 September, Danel Rajković was arrested for relieving himself in front of
the mosque in Gacko. The Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina filed an
indictment against Daniel Rajković from Gacko for sending disturbing and threat-
ening messages to Imam Emir Nuhić from Blagaj, Bosanski Novi.23
Employment
On another note, a worrying fact is that the number of Bosniaks living and working
in Republika Srpska is decreasing. For example, in Republika Srpska institutions, out
of a total of 5,066 employees, only 43 are Bosniaks. 24 This trend of Bosniaks leaving
Republika Srpska is the result of the perpetually uncomfortable and discriminatory
atmosphere against Bosniak employees.
Education
The year 2019 saw a continuity in denying Bosniak returnees the right to learn
the Bosnian language in Republika Srpska. This is a serious violation of Bosniak
children’s constitutional right to be taught as a “national group” in schools in the
Serb-majority entity. As a result of this discrimination, in 2016, several Bosniak re-
turnee communities refused to enroll their children in school. As a result, the Islam-
ic Community provided temporary improvised schools where children are taught
according to the national B&H curriculum and teachers are brought in from the
Federation B&H. The issue of discrimination in education is also visible in Cro-
at-dominated areas where the concept of “two schools under one roof ” exists. This
is an apartheid-style segregation, where in Kiseljak, for example, Bosniak and Croat
children attend school separately.25
Politics
In 2019, there was a rise in statements from local and regional political actors who
used Islamophobic rhetoric to undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina, and portray it
as a radical Muslim safe haven. This was spearheaded by Bosnian Serb and Bosnian
Croat politicians as well as Serbian and Croatian politicians. However, the most
dangerous rhetoric came from foreign dignitaries.
Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović during a meeting in Israel with
Israeli President Reuven Rivlin claimed that Bosnia and Herzegovina “was very
unstable, and had in some respects been taken over by people who have connec-
23. “Gačanin optužen jer je imamu slao prijeteće poruke”, ATVBL, 20 December 2019, https://www.atvbl.com/
vijesti/hronika/gacanin-optuzen-jer-je-imamu-slao-prijetece-poruke-20-12-2019
24. “Diskriminacija Bošnjaka I Srba u RS I FBiH”, TV1, 11 August 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=It-
maBY48-hU (Access date: 2 January 2020).
25. Vedrana Maglajlija, “Razdvajanje učenika u Kiseljaku: Školstvo kao ratni plijen”, Al Jazeera Balkans, 16 Septem-
ber 2017, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/razdvajanje-ucenika-u-kiseljaku-skolstvo-kao-ratni-plijen, (Access date:
5 January 2019).
154 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
tions with Iran and terrorist organizations. The country is now controlled by
militant Islam.”26
French President Emmanuel Macron stated in an interview with The Economist:
“If you’re concerned about this region, the first question is neither Macedonia, nor
Albania, it’s Bosnia-Herzegovina. The time-bomb that’s ticking right next to Croatia,
and which faces the problem of returning jihadists, is Bosnia-Herzegovina.”27
While attending the Jahorina Economic Forum on July 9, Serbian Prime Minis-
ter Ana Brnabic referred to the Srebrenica genocide as a “misunderstanding.”28
One of the most worrisome events was a Croatian intelligence agency false flag
operation which was uncovered by the Bosnian-Herzegovina intelligence agency
in March 2019. Sarajevo web portal Zurnal published evidence which claims that
Croatian intelligence, with the help of Croatian diplomats in Bosnia, intended to
discredit Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “land of radical Islamic terrorism” by planting
weapons in several mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina.29
In addition, the glorification of war criminals was also a center of some politi-
cians in 20219 Jelena Trivić, a member of the RS Assembly withthe Party for Demo-
cratic Progress (PDP), published a photo of World War II Nazi collaborator and war
criminal General Draža Mihailović on her Facebook account.30
Media
The anti-Bosnian sentiment in the media was usually followed by Islamophobic rhet-
oric. The statements made in the media usually associated B&H, Bosniak politicians,
or former Army officers with radical extremism. These analytical statements were
made by a group of already well-known self-proclaimed experts. Two main events
which raised Islamophobic and anti-Muslim rhetoric in 2019 were the so-called mi-
grant crises and the return of former fighters from Syria. Additionally, anti-Bosnian
and anti-Muslim rhetoric was triggered by the Peter Handke Nobel prize affair.31
26. Hamza Karčić, “Croatian President’s Islamophobia Masks Historical Revisionism”, Jerusalem Post, 12 August
2019, revisionismhttps://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Croatian-presidents-Islamophobia-masks-historical-revisionism-
598266, (Access date: 29 January 2020).
27. “French President Calls Bosnia a ‘Ticking Time-Bomb’”, Al Jazeera, 8 November 2019, https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2019/11/french-president-calls-bosnia-ticking-time-bomb-191108053518237.html, (Access date: 5 Jan-
uary 2019).
28. Hikmet Karčić, “For Serbia the Srebrenica Genocide ‘Misunderstanding’ Paid Off ”, TRT World, 12 July 2019,
https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/for-serbia-the-srebrenica-genocide-misunderstanding-paid-off-28190, (Access
date: 5 January 2019).
29. Aleksandar Brezar, “Croatia Looks Implicated in Serious Hybrid Warfare Against Bosnia”, Balkan In-
sight, 15 March 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/03/15/croatia-looks-implicated-in-serious-hybrid-war-
fare-against-bosnia/, (Access date: 5 January 2019).
30. “Jelena Trivić: Draža Mihailović nije zločinac, to je moj stav”, N1, 25 October 2019, http://ba.n1info.com/
Vijesti/a386688/Jelena-Trivic-Draza-Mihailovic-nije-zlocinac-to-je-moj-stav.html, (Access date: 5 January 2019).
31. See for example: “Fašisto, Fašisto! Muslimani IiAlbanci Brutalno Vređali Handkea u Oslu, a on im Odgovorio: Id-
ite u Pakao!”, Espreso, 11 October 2019, https://www.espreso.rs/svet/planeta/451779/fasisto-fasisto-muslimani-i-al-
banci-brutalno-vredjali-handkea-u-oslu-a-on-im-odgovorio-idite-u-pakao-video, (Access date: 5 January 2019).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
In January 2019, the newly appointed Banja Luka Mufti Nusret Abdibegović
was proclaimed as a “mujahedeen” and “British spy” by Serb tabloid Vesti. This was
then republished by several Bosnian Serb web portals including the Republika Srps-
ka Radio and Television website.32
RS President Milorad Dodik used the event of the return of former fighters
from Syria in order to heighten tensions in the country.33
In November 2019, a book by Ilija Branković, a former Yugoslav People’s Army
general, was launched at a Serbian Defence Ministry venue, the Central Military
Club in Belgrade, Serbia, with a large media coverage.34 The book claims that the
Bosnian Army shelled its own citizens in Tuzla in May 1995, in order to blame it
on the Serbs. This kind of denialist rhetoric is similar to Serbian political and media
attempts to deny the genocide in Srebrenica and the siege of Sarajevo.
Justice System
Overall, hate crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina are underreported and rarely prose-
cuted.35 Dragica Tojagic, a spokesperson for the Republika Srpska public prosecutor’s
office, stated that in 2018 and 2017 there were “no upheld or confirmed indictments
for hate crimes.”36
However, two judgements were issued which can be viewed as positive signs.
In October 2019, the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision that the
Serbian Orthodox church which was built illegally in the backyard of a house owned
by Bosniak woman Fata Orlović in Konjevic Polje, near Srebrenica, must be removed
within three months.37
The RS Supreme Court in December 2019 issued a decision that Bosniak chil-
dren in Sveti Sava Elementary School in Vrbanjci, Kotor Varoš can learn the Bosnian
language.38 This was a result of a six-year legal battle by the Bosniak returnees whose
children are attending the school.
32. “Prvi mudžahedin britanski agent?!”, RTRS, 16 January 2019, https://lat.rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=323221,
(Access date: 5 January 2019).
33. “Dodik: Povratak islamista iz Sirije je trajni problem BiH”, ATV BL, 6 August 2019, https://www.atvbl.com/
vijesti/bih/dodik-povratak-islamista-iz-sirije-je-trajni-problem-bih-6-8-2019, (Access date: 05 January 2019).
34. Azra Husarić, “Bosnians Protest Against Serbian Book Denying War Crime”, N1, 13 November 2019, https://
balkaninsight.com/2019/11/13/bosnians-protest-against-serbian-book-denying-war-crime/, (Access date: 5 Janu-
ary 2019).
35. “Hate Crimes in Bosnia: Under-Reported and Rarely Prosecuted”, Balkan Insight, 26 April 2019, https://balkanin-
sight.com/2019/04/26/hate-crimes-in-bosnia-under-reported-and-rarely-prosecuted/, (Access date: 5 January 2019).
36. Ibid.
37. Mladen Lakic and Albina Sorguc, “European Court Tells Bosnia to Remove Illegal Church”, Balkan Insight, 1
October 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/01/european-court-tells-bosnia-to-remove-illegal-church/, (Ac-
cess date: 5 January 2019).
38. Sanela Karaica, “Čekanje se isplatilo: Djeca iz Vrbanjaca se izborila za bosanski jezik!”, Oslobođenje, 5 Decem-
ber 2019, https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/dosjei/teme/foto-cekanje-se-isplatilo-djeca-iz-vrbanjaca-se-izborila-za-bosans-
ki-jezik-512476?fbclid=IwAR3CdXSHKan7tGP6MrMPjxPxTEq0fNlQj8JZzfQRAcSK9LXNmg_UCpFt-zc, (Access
date: 5 January 2019).
156 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Internet
Social media remain the main source of anti-Muslim bigotry and Islamophobic rhet-
oric online. Several Facebook pages, mainly representing Serb nationalistic groups,
published articles which spread fear of Bosniaks and included genocide denial. One
such example is “Srbija naša zemlja“ (Serbia is our country) which closed down in
2019.39 These social media pages remain the same as in previous years. Additionally,
several Bosnian Croat web portals such as Poskok.info continued their anti-Bosniak
discourse using Islamophobic rhetoric.40 One of the most infamous examples is “Re-
move kebab,” by which “kebab” is used as a synonym for Muslims. This rhetoric is
used by white extremists throughout the world.41
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
The central figures in spreading Islamophobia in B&H can be divided into three
categories. First, the academic and semi-academic circles in Serbia and Republika
Srpska, most notably Serbian “experts” on security, terrorism, and Islam such as
Predrag Ceranić, Miroljub Jevtić, Dževad Galijašević, and Darko Trifunović. Sec-
ond, several high-ranking officials from the Serb Orthodox Church such as Bishops
Amfilohije and Patriarch Irinej. The third category is politicians and include local
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, as well as Croatian and Serbian politicians such
as Milorad Dodik and Mario Karamatić. In the majority of cases, these are elected
MPs in the parliamentary assemblies. These political subjects give statements which
are anti-Muslim and Islamophobic aimed at Bosniak Muslims, and their political
and religious establishments.
Observed Civil Society and Political Initiatives to
Counter Islamophobia
The Commission on Freedom of Religion (Komisija za slobodu vjere) is a commission
of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is active in helping
secure religious freedoms and battling Islamophobia. Members of the commission
took an active role in monitoring cases of violation of religious freedoms and have
provided legal advice to several appellants.
39. Filip Rudić, “FB Page Attacking Serbian Media ‘Linked’ to Breitbart”, Balkan Insight, 29 March 2019,
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/03/29/fb-page-attacking-serbian-media-linked-to-breitbart/, (Access date: 29
February 2020).
40. For example, see: “Očekivana Demonstracija Sile: Mahmuljin, šef terorista koji su rušili WTC predložen za počas-
noga građanina Zenice, [“Expected Demostration Of Power: Mahmuljin, Chief of the Terrorists Who Took down
WTC, Recommended as Honorary Citizen of Zenica”], https://poskok.info/ocekivana-demonstracija-sile-mahmul-
jin-sef-terorista-koji-su-rusili-wtc-predlozen-za-pocasnoga-gradanina-zenice/, (Access date: 29 February 2020).
41. Robert Coalson, “Christchurch Attacks: Suspect Took Inspiration From Former Yugoslavia’s Ethnically Fueled
Wars”, Radio Free Europe, 15 March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/christchurch-attacks-yugoslavia-tarrant-inspira-
tion-suspect-new-zealand/29823655.html, (Access date: 29 February 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 157
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
In 2019, the number of Islamophobic attacks on people and property was slightly
higher than in 2018. Similarly to 2018, there was an overall increase in regional
political anti-Bosniak and anti-Muslim activities. Bosnia and Herzegovina was once
again presented as an unstable state which harbors extremists. “
Considering the state of Islamophobia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the follow-
ing policy recommendations to combat Islamophobia effectively can be made:
• Cooperation between governments (state level, entity level, and district
Brčko level), the Islamic Community, and NGOs in fighting discrimina-
tion against Muslims should be fostered.
• Public awareness of human rights and freedom of religion and belief should
be raised by NGOs, media, etc. The methods of documentation of cases of
violation of the rights of Muslims should be enhanced by the Islamic Com-
munity, NGOs, the police, and judiciary.
• Awareness of hate crimes against Muslims, and their proper registration and
prosecution should be raised by the Islamic Community, NGOs, the police,
and judiciary.
• Awareness of hate speech (online and offline) by media, politicians, etc.
should be raised.
• Awareness about Islamic practice (prayer, jumaah, and the headscarf ) and
available ways to accommodate this in education and employment should
be raised. Regulations should be adjusted accordingly.
• Laws that stipulate that public officers or officials “shall refrain from public
manifestation of their religious beliefs” (Zakon o policijskim službenicima
Bosne i Hercegovine), which discriminate against Muslim employees in fast-
ing, taking a break for daily prayers, or wearing the headscarf, should be
amended. The most flagrant cases should be referred to the HJPC (High
Judicial and Prosecutorial Council).
• Awareness among citizens and NGOs about reporting offensive media lan-
guage to the Press Council in B&H and the Communications Regulatory
Agency should be raised.
• Awareness among citizens and NGOs about filing complaints related to
human rights violations to the B&H Ombudsman’s office, the Ministry for
Human Rights and Refugees, and in regular courts should be raised.
• Commitment to countering violent extremism, but not at the expense of
freedom of religion and not solely focusing on Islam or Muslims, should be
developed.
158 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Chronology
• 07.01.2019: The Srebrenica Genocide Memorial in Potočari is desecrated
with a bag of pork intestines.
• 07.01.2019: Aleksandar Mlađenović, a local orthodox priest from Sre-
brenica, is seen leading a group of people on Christmas Eve singing Chet-
nik songs.
• 08.01.2019: Two Serb members of the Armed Forces BiH are seen on vid-
eo singing songs containing hate speech toward Muslims.
• 13.01.2019: Tomislav Zelenik uploads a dangerous and hurtful status on
his Facebook profile, where he claims that Muslims/Bosniaks are the biggest
and most dangerous threat.
• 14.02.2019: Bosniak children are forced to sing songs about Saint Sava
before icons in a primary school in Srebrenica.
• 05.03.2019: The entrance to the women’s section of the Čaršijska Mosque
in Prijedor and the garage belonging to the mosque are vandalized with
offensive Nazi graffiti.
• 07.03.2019: A Croat carnival is held in a few cities in Herzegovina, where
Bosniak-Muslim identity and Islamic values are ridiculed.
• 11.03.2019: Azrin Hodžić, a returnee, is attacked in Prijedor.
• 13.03.2019: Renato Marjanović is released after attacking a returnee.
• 17.03.2019: Imam Emir Nuhić receives death threats.
• 10.04.2019: The mosque Arnaudija in Banjaluka is vandalized.
• 04.05.2019: Safeta and Senad Ganibegović seek protection from Slavko
Pena and his son Marko, who have been harassing them physically and
verbally for the last two years.
• 05.05.2019: Muslim believers are exposed to threats and Chetnik songs on
the eve of Ramadan in Obradovac in Bosanska Gradiška.
• 12.05.2019: Unknown perpetrators destroy the flags of Bosnia and Herze-
govina and the Islamic Community in front of the mosque in Nova Kasaba
during Ramadan.
• 01.06.2019: A car of the Bosniak returnee in Rogatica, Elvir Bahto, is de-
stroyed by his neighbor with a shovel.
• 12.06.2019: Nationalistic stickers referring to the Srebrenica genocide and
other offensive writings are posted on Muslim religious objects in Bijeljina.
• 25.07.2019: Five young men (three of them underage) vandalize a fence of
the mosque in Zvornik.
• 07-08.06.2019: Unknown perpetrators destroy four tombstones in the
Muslim cemetery Kazanbašča in Zvornik.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
• 16.08.2019: A citizen of Banja Luka “D.V.” is arrested for verbally attack-
ing the imam of the Islamic community.
• 24.09.2019: Danel Rajković is arrested for relieving himself in front of the
mosque and many other offenses committed between the period of 3 March
and 21 September.
160 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BULGARIA
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
BULGARIA
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
AZİZ NAZMİ ŞAKİR
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 161
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
162 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BULGARIA
The Author
Aziz Nazmi Şakir (PhD, History of Sciences, Istanbul University) earned his BA
and MA from the Arabic Philology and Turkic Studies Departments of St. Kliment
Ohridski, University of Sofia respectively. Since 2001 he has been a faculty member
at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and School of Languages at Sabanci Uni-
versity, Istanbul. Şakir is currently lecturing at New Bulgarian University, Sofia and
Okan University, Istanbul. Besides his academic research dedicated to the Ottoman
heritage in the Balkans and Bulgaria’s Muslims, he is an accomplished writer and
translator with more than thirty translations of poetry and prose to his credit. Email:
azizshakir@yahoo.com
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Aziz Nazmi Şakir: Islamophobia in Bulgaria: National Report 2019, in: Enes Bayraklı &
Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 163
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
In 2019, Bulgaria’s Pandora’s box of Islamophobic and racist hate speech was opened
by Deputy Prime Minister Krasimir Karakachanov, leader of the IMRO party, after
an altercation between two Roma brothers and a commando of Bulgarian ethnic or-
igin took place on 6 January in the village of Voivodinovo, near Plovdiv. The conflict
was not religious in nature, but it was a source of interethnic tensions, backed by hate
speech emitted by TV stations and numerous discussions on social networks. The
latter targeted Roma Muslims by claiming that adopting Islam by representatives of
the ghetto was a negative development catalysing the conflicts between the Roma
community and the other groups within Bulgarian society. The next apple of discord
was a bill proposed by the Coalition between Citizens for the European Develop-
ment of Bulgaria (GERB) and the MRF for an amendment of the Law of Religions,
submitted to parliament on 31 January and voted at the first reading on 7 March.
The bill foresaw the state subsidizing of religious denominations, and the pardoning
of their debts to the state up to 31 December 2018. When it became clear that the
greater part of the mentioned debts belonged to the Muslim community, the Chief
Mufti’s Office and the party representatives who had submitted the bill became the
target of multiple attacks, echoed by most media. This led to a change in the text of
the amendment before its second vote on 21 March, according to which the debts
were only deferred.
In May, the Prosecutor General rewarded prosecutor Nedialka Popova from the
Pazardzhik District Prosecutor’s Office for her performance during a case regarding
the spread of radical Islam, a year after an Islamophobic speech she had given raised a
serious concern among the local Muslim community. The case in question, brought
in 2009, led in December 2019 to the effective sentences of 14 people for preaching
religious hatred and ISIS ideas: allegations without any clear evidence. On the other
hand, the Bulgarian prosecution continues to be ineffective against perpetrators of
alleged Islamophobic attacks, such as the attack on the building of the Chief Mufti’s
Office in June, and does not impose any sanctions on anti-Muslim hate speech.
164 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BULGARIA
Резюме
През 2019 г. в България пълната с ислямофобско и расистко слово кутия
на Пандора, беше отворена не от кой да е, а Красимир Каракачанов – ли-
дер на партия ВМРО, с ранг заместник министър-председател, след като
на 6 януарив пловдивскотос. Войводиново при спречкване между двама
братя от ромски и командос от български етнически произход, последният
пострада сериозно. Конфликтът нямаше религиозен характер, но стана по-
вод за генериране на междуетническо напрежение, подплатено от слово на
омразата от телевизионните екрани и множеството дискусии в социални-
те мрежи. Въпросните атакуваха Ромите-мюсюлмани, посредством твър-
дението, че приемането на исляма от страна на представители на гетото,
катализира конфликтите между ромската общност и останалите групи в
българското общество.
Следващата ябълка на раздора, се оказа предложеният от ГЕРБ и ДПС
проектозакон за изменения в закона за вероизповеданията, внесен в пар-
ламента на 31 януари и гласуван на първо четене на 7 март. Въпросният
предвиждаше субсидиране на вероизповеданията, а също и опрощаване на
натрупаните от тях до 31 декември 2018 г. задължения. След като се раз-
бра, че Главно мюфтийство е най-големият длъжник, то и вносителите на
проектозакона станаха мишена на множество нападки, получили отзвук по
всички медийни средства, довел до нова промяна преди второ гласуване на
21 март, според която дълговете само се отсрочват.
През май Главният прокурор награди за работата й по дело за разпрос-
транение на радикален ислям обвинителя Недялка Попова от Окръжната
прокуратура в Пазарджик, която година по-рано с ислямофобско изказване,
предизвика сериозно безпокойство сред мюсюлманската общност. Въпрос-
ното дело, образувано 2009 г., доведе през декемвридо налагането на ефек-
тивни присъди на 14 души за проповядване на религиозна омраза и идеи на
„Ислямска държава“ – обвинения, за които липсват ясни доказателства. За
сметка на това българската прокуратура продължава да е неефективна по
отношение на извършителите на несъмнени ислямофобски атаки, каквато
имаше през месец юни над сградата на Главното мюфтийство, и да не санк-
ционире анти-мюсюлманското слово на омразата.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 165
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: Bulgaria
Type of Regime: Democracy
Form of Government: Unitary Parliamentary Republic
Ruling Parties: Coalition between Citizens for the European Development of
Bulgaria (GERB) (acronym translated in Bulgarian as “coat of arms”, a right-centrist,
populist party) and United Patriots (an elective alliance formed by the National
Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria [NFSB], the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organisation [IMRO], and [until 25 July 2019] Ataka [Attack], all of them conser-
vative, ultranationalistic parties).
Opposition Parties: Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) (center-left, social-dem-
ocratic, left-wing populism with a pro-EU stance); Movement for Rights and Free-
doms (MRF) (a centrist, liberal party); Volya (literally “Willpower”, a populist
party).
Last Elections: 27 October/3 November 2019 (Local Elections): On the pro-
vincial level (from a total of 25), GERB won 16 mayoral positions; BSP 4; The
Movement for Rights and Freedoms 1; The Union of Democratic Forces 1; Direct
Democracy 1; The Bulgaria for Citizens Movement 1; Independent candidates 2.
26 May 2019 (European Parliament Elections): The list of parties, seats, and
percentage of votes won is as follows: GERB (member of EPP) 6 seats (31.07%);
Bulgarian Socialist Party (member of PES) 5 seats (24.26%); Movement for Rights
and Freedoms (member of ALDE) 3 seats (16.55%); Internal Macedonian Revolu-
tionary Organisation (member of ECR) 2 (7.36%); Democratic Bulgaria (member
of EPP) 1 (6.06%).
26 March 2017 (Parliamentary Elections): GERB won 33.54% of the vote
with 95 of 240 seats; The Bulgarian Socialist Party 27.93% and 80 seats; United
Patriots 9.31% and 27 seats; Movement for Rights and Freedoms 9.24% and 26
seats; Volya party 4.26% and 12 seats. GERB formed a coalition with the United
Patriots, and Boyko Borisov (leader of GERB) was elected prime minister for a 3rd
subsequent time.
Total Population: 7,364,570 (in 2011)
Major Languages: Bulgarian, Turkish, Roma
Official Religion: No official religion (secularism). The constitution designates
Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the “traditional religion” of the country.
Statistics on Islamophobia: In 2019, the Chief Mufti’s Office reported 1 Is-
lamophobic attack and 1 attack against a place of worship. Both figures represent a
decrease of 50%.
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: No special statistics and database on
racism and discrimination
166 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BULGARIA
Major Religions (% of Population): Eastern Orthodox Christianity (76% or
4,374,135 individuals); Islam (7.8% or 577,139); No religion (4.7% or 272,264);
Protestantism (1.1% or 64,476); Catholicism (0.8% or 48,945); Judaism (0.015%
or 1,162)
Muslim Population (% of Population): 7.8% or 577,139 in 2011. (2011 Pop-
ulation Census in Bulgaria [Final Data])
Main Muslim Community Organizations: Muslim Denomination in Bulgar-
ia (Chief Mufti’s Office).
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: There is no specific NGO dedicated
to combating Islamophobia.
Far-Right Parties: Bulgarian National Union – New Democracy; Ataka; Na-
tional Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria; Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Or-
ganisation; Vazrazhdane (Revival) party
Far-Right Movements: National Resistance, Blood and Honour, Fortress Eu-
rope Alliance (since April 2019)
Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: N/A
Limitations to Islamic Practices:
ű Hijab Ban: None
ű Halal Slaughter Ban: None
ű Minaret Ban: N/A (depends on local municipality decisions)
ű Circumcision Ban: None
ű Burka Ban: The parliament adopted the so-called anti-burqa law or “Law
for Prohibiting the Wearing of Clothing Concealing One’s Face in Public
Spaces” (30 September 2016).
ű Prayer Ban: None
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 167
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Introduction
Bulgaria is home to the largest indigenous Muslim minority within the boundaries
of the European Union. Despite the continuing rise of Islamophobic views with
nationalistic and xenophobic overtones supported even by high-ranking officials,
both Bulgaria’s historical Muslim population (Turks, Pomaks, and Roma), and the
recently formed, relatively small, Arab Muslim community,1 did not face major
conflicts with Bulgaria’s non-Muslim majority. Nevertheless, in 2019, there were
several cases in which Muslims, and Islamic symbols, were subjected to various
forms of violation. These included biased representations of religious identity by
the media, the refusal of public prosecutors to initiate criminal proceedings for
public instigation of religious hatred, and, to a lesser degree, hate crime and van-
dalized places of worship.
After the parliamentary elections held in 2017, the extreme nationalist parties
known for their anti-Muslim positions (namely the National Front for the Salvation
of Bulgaria [NFSB], the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation [IMRO],
and Ataka) formed the United Patriots alliance and became coalition partners with
the leading center-right party, Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria
(GERB). The United Patriots entered politics through the use of hate speech and
aggressive stances towards vulnerable groups, such as refugees from the Middle East,
ethnic Roma, and Turks belonging to local Muslim communities. Accordingly, Is-
lamophobic hate speech not only remained a common phenomenon in the Bulgar-
ian political and media landscape, but it also found propagators among representa-
tives of the judiciary and the educational system.
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and
Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
There is a tendency in recent years towards a decrease in the number of physical
attacks against representatives of the Muslim community and Muslim shrines. Nev-
ertheless, anti-Muslim verbal assaults undertaken even by high-level officials have be-
come a routine. Given the fact that this type of oral discourses remains unsanctioned,
and thus tolerated by the judiciary, this phenomenon comes as no surprise.
1. This group consists of immigrants in transit to Western Europe, and former university students who came to the
country during the communist period.
168 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BULGARIA
Figure 1: Graffiti on one of the walls of Kurshum Mosque in Karlovo, which dates back to AD 1485.2
On 2 July 2019, the historical Kurshum Mosque in Karlovo, Plovdiv Province,
was desecrated with graffiti. On one of the walls of the oldest architectural monu-
Figure
ments 1: Graffiti
in Karlovo, built on one1485,
in AD of thethewalls
wordof Kurshum
“pig” Mosquewas
(Bulg. “прасе”) in Karlovo,
written, which dates
a swastika, an “advertisement” for sexual services provided by a “married widow”,
and names of heavy metal bands such as “Metallica” and “AC/DC” placed alongside
On 2 July 2019, the historical Kurshum Mosque in Karlovo, Plovdiv P
other images with vague purpose. (Fig. 1) The Chief Mufti’s Office reacted with a call
with
to the law graffiti.
enforcementOn one ofand
authorities thethewalls of theofoldest
Municipality architectural
Karlovo to take measures monument
for finding the perpetrators and for preserving the centuries-old cultural monument.
The1485, the word
announcement “pig”
regarding (Bulg.
the attack “прасе”)
issued wasDenomination
by the Muslim written, a read:
swastika, an “ad
“We consider it outrageous and highly inappropriate to express Nazi and sexual pre-
services provided by a “married widow”, and names of heavy metal b
dilections on a religious temple. This serial act of abusing a Muslim shrine is un-
and “AC/DC”
acceptable, placed
especially the ‘Kurshum alongside
Mosque’ whichother hasimages with
sentimental valuevague
for the purpose. (F
Muslims in Bulgaria.” 3
Office reacted with a call to the law enforcement authorities and the
2. “Muslim Denomination Strongly Condemns the Desecration of ‘Kurshum Mosque’ in Karlovo”, Muslim De-
to take measures for finding the perpetrators and for preserving th
nomination in Bulgaria, 4 July 2019, https://www.grandmufti.bg/en/za-nas-3/news/7972-myusyulmansko-izpove-
danie-osazhda-oskvernyavaneto-na-kurshun-dzhamiya-v-karlovo-2.html, (Access date: 10 January 2020).
monument. The announcement regarding the attack issued by the Mus
3. Ibid.
“We consider it outrageous and highly inappropriate to express Nazi
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 169
on a religious temple. This serial act of abusing a Muslim shrine is una
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Figure 2: The stoned glass of the main entrance of the Chief Mufti’s Office in Sofia (4 July 2019). 4
Figure 2: The stoned glass of the main entrance of the Chief Mufti’s Office in Sofia (4 July 2019).4
JustJust a couple
a couple of daysofafter
daystheafter the aforementioned
aforementioned occasion
occasion in Karlovo, on 4inJuly
Karlovo,
2019, inon 4 of
front July
2019,
dozensinoffront of dozens
witnesses, of witnesses,
an unidentified personan unidentified
stoned the windows person stonedfloor
at the ground theofwindows
the Chief at
the ground
Mufti’s floor
Office of theonChief
building Mufti’s
27 Bratya Office building
Miladinovi on 27 Bratya
Str. in Bulgaria’s capital, Miladinovi
Sofia. (Fig. 2) Str.
inNobody
Bulgaria’s
was capital, Sofia.the(Fig.
injured during 2)vandalism,
act of Nobody whichwas injured during
was recorded bythe act of vandalism,
the security cameras.
which was recordings
The video recorded showed
by thethat security cameras.ranThe
the perpetrator in anvideo recordings
unknown direction.showed thatactthe
The violent
perpetrator ran in an unknown direction. The violent act can be added to
can be added to the list of such actions perpetrated over the last years against the Chief Muftiate.the list of
such actionsthe
As usually perpetrated over the last
Muslim Denomination years that
insisted against the was
the case Chiefto Muftiate. As usually
be investigated as a hatethe
Muslim Denomination
crime, and not just as an actinsisted that the5 case was to be investigated as a hate crime,
of hooliganism.
and not just2020,
In January as ana 54-year-old
act of hooliganism. 5
resident of Izgrev village, Shoumen district, alerted the police
Inthe
about January 2020,
destruction a 54-year-old
of Muslim tombstonesresident of cemetery.
in the local Izgrev village,
AccordingShoumen district,
to him, this had
alerted the police about the destruction of Muslim tombstones in
happened between December 2019 and January 2020. An on-site inspection was carried out the local cemetery.
According to him, this
and four tombstones werehad foundhappened between
to have been December
destroyed. 2019
As a result and January
of further 2020.
investigations
An on-site inspection was carried out and four tombstones were found to have been
the perpetrators were identified and the police detained two 15-year-old minors from the same
destroyed. As a result of further investigations the perpetrators were identified and
village. Pretrial proceedings have been instituted for the crime committed by the two young
the police detained two 15-year-old minors from the same village. Pretrial proceed-
men. 6
ings have been instituted for the crime committed by the two young men.6
Employment
The main law in Bulgaria banning discrimination based on race, ethnicity, belief, and
religion is the Protection against Discrimination Act (PADA).7 The organ established
under
4
“The PADA as an
Building the independent
Grand collegiate
Mufti’s Office in the Capital semi-judicial
Was Subjected to authority
Islamophobic with adjudicating
Attack”, Republic of
Bulgaria Muslim Denomination Grand Mufti`s Office, 4 July 2019, https://www.grandmufti.bg/en/za-nas-
3/news/7981-sgradata-na-glavno-myuftiistvo-v-stolitzata-stana-obekt-na-islyamofobsko-napadenie-4.html,
4. (Access date: 10 the
“The Building January 2020).
Grand Mufti’s Office in the Capital Was Subjected to Islamophobic Attack”, Republic of
5
Ibid. Muslim Denomination Grand Mufti`s Office, 4 July 2019, https://www.grandmufti.bg/en/za-nas-3/
Bulgaria
6
“Задържаха непълнолетни момчета, чупили надгробни паметници”, Шум.Бг, 30 January 2020,
news/7981-sgradata-na-glavno-myuftiistvo-v-stolitzata-stana-obekt-na-islyamofobsko-napadenie-4.html, (Access
http://old.shum.bg/index.php?item=194067, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
date: 10 January 2020).
5. Ibid
6. “Задържаха непълнолетни момчета, чупили надгробни паметници”, Шум.Бг, 30 January 2020, http://
old.shum.bg/index.php?item=194067, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
7. “General Provisions”, Protection Against Discrimination Act, 12 July 2006, https://www.legislationline.org/
download/id/7046/file/Bulgaria_anti-discrimination_act_2003_2006_am.pdf, (Access date: 4 January 2020).
170 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BULGARIA
powers exercising control over its implementation is the Commission for Protection
against Discrimination (CPAD). It is worth mentioning that two of its nine cur-
rent members, Baki Hyuseinov and Sabrie Sapundzhieva,8 are Muslims. For 2019,
there was no data issued by the CPAD or any other state equality body concerning
discrimination cases in the Bulgarian job market based on being Muslim. However,
even a brief survey of the matter (undergone among friends for the purposes of this
report) has shown that there are cases that never make it to the official statistics. Such
is the story of A.M. who wanted anonymity: “When I decided to put on a headscarf
(in June 2019), I was working at a pharmacy. I, as a conscientious person, warned
my employers in advance of my decision, because I was aware of the fact that in our
country putting on a headscarf is considered ‘abnormal’. My boss’s first reaction was
to tell me that he did not have the legal right to sack me since I had not committed
any violation. He wanted to keep me, but the lady, our job superior, was not happy
with my decision, and she convinced my boss to change his mind. So, the next day,
he called me again and said that we should end our work relationship without any
legal notice.” This type of discrimination is hard to prove, which maybe explains why
the majority of Muslims in Bulgaria do not expect their rights to be defended.
Education
Two years ago, in 2018, Nia Staykova, an ethnic Bulgarian studying in high school
converted to Islam. After she started wearing a headscarf (similarly to the abovemen-
tioned case of A.M.) the attitude of her teachers and classmates towards her changed
drastically. In 2018 and 2019, she was subjected to systematical pressure in class
by her tutors. They openly wanted her to reject Islam, to stop wearing a headscarf,
and even proposed Buddhism as an acceptable alternative. One of her teachers even
blamed her by saying, “One day you will come to school and shoot us all!” Besides
being marginalized, she was forced to regularly visit a psychologist. In January 2020,
Nia shared her story as part of an online project titled #nooffencebut maintained by
the Bulgarian Fund for Women. In support of the Muslim women wearing head-
scarves, Nia published a photograph of herself in which she holds a whiteboard with
the most common words of intimidation she was subjected to: “Why did you put a
veil, aren’t you a Bulgarian?”9 (Fig. 3) The photograph caused a significant impact on
social networks such as Facebook and Instagram. Many commentators blamed her
for pursuing quick fame and even for discrediting Islam. The roots of the Islamopho-
bic approach Nia was subjected to by her teachers and schoolmates are deeply im-
planted in the history and literature-related subjects taught in the Bulgarian schools.
8.“Членове”, Commission for Protection Against Discrimination, http://www.kzd-nondiscrimination.com/layout/
index.php/za-nas/chlenowe, (Access date: 4 January 2020).
9. Не ми се обиждай, но, Facebook, 20 January 2020, https://www.facebook.com/nemiseobijdai/photos/a.460161
414561333/592719337972206/?type=3&theater, (Access date: 2 February 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 171
Facebook and Instagram. Many commentators blamed her for pursuing quick fame and even
for discrediting Islam. The roots of the Islamophobic approach Nia was subjected to by her
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
teachers and schoolmates are deeply implanted in the history and literature-related subjects
taught in the Bulgarian schools.
Figure 3: Nia Staykova, an ethnic Bulgarian who as a high school student converted to Islam, participates in a project
titled #nooffencebut in support of the Muslim women wearing headscarves.10
Figure 3: Nia Staykova, an ethnic Bulgarian who as a high school student converted to Islam, participates in a
project titled
Despite the total #nooffencebutof
revision in support
all ofschool
the Muslim curricula
women wearing headscarves. 10
after the end of the Commu-
nist era (1944-1989), history textbooks regarding the Ottoman period still pre-
Despite the total revision of all school curricula after the end of the Communist era (1944-
serve most of their Islamophobic characteristics. In the newest textbooks on the
1989), history
subject called “History andtextbooks regarding the Ottoman
Civilizations” forperiod
thestill6preserve
th
andmost10ofththeir Islamophobic
grades approved by
the Ministry of Education
characteristics. In theinnewest
2019, theon the
textbooks notorious mythandabout
subject called “History thefor compulsory
Civilizations” the
individual and mass conversions of Orthodox Christians to Islam is reconfirmed. 11
6th and 10th grades approved by the Ministry of Education in 2019, the notorious myth about
One of the crucial issues triggering the absolute negation of the Ottoman legacy
the compulsory
is the fact that most Bulgarian individual and mass conversions
politicians have never of Orthodox Christians the
accepted to Islam is
otherwise ob-
vious fact that forreconfirmed.
almost11 five One ofcenturies
the crucial issuesthe Bulgarian
triggering lands ofwere
the absolute negation a significant
the Ottoman legacy part
of a multiethnic and multicultural texture and that Bulgarians as subjects of the
is the fact that most Bulgarian politicians have never accepted the otherwise obvious fact that
Ottoman state more or less actively contributed to the formation of its common
for almostThe
cultural environment. five centuries
students the Bulgarian lands were a significant
are introduced only to part the
of a multiethnic
nameless and figures of
the sultan, the janissaries, the and
multicultural texture Muslim fanatics,
that Bulgarians as subjectsetc., actingstateinmore
of the Ottoman a continuum,
or less actively spread
over the whole Bulgarian territory for centuries-long periods. This fact results in
contributed to the formation of its common cultural environment. The students are introduced
establishing the mindset in students of a trivial collective image of Muslims as un-
only tounjust
civilized conquerors, the namelessrulers,
figures ofand
the sultan, the janissaries, theoppressors.
bloodthirsty Muslim fanatics, etc.,Subsequently,
acting in a the
historical vision of grinning
continuum, janissaries
spread over armed
the whole Bulgarian with
territory yataghans,
for centuries-long andThistax
periods. fact collectors
forcing Christian families to pay their “blood-tax” is used as a founding milestone
results in establishing the mindset in students of a trivial collective image of Muslims as
of Islamophobia in present-time Bulgaria.
uncivilized conquerors, unjust rulers, and bloodthirsty oppressors. Subsequently, the historical
Politics
In April 2019, the Vazrazhdane party (after registering to participate in the forth-
coming elections 9for Members
Не ми of се European
обиждай, Parliament)
но, Facebook, released
20 a statement
January 2020, accus-
https://www.facebook.com/nemiseobijdai/photos/a.460161414561333/592719337972206/?type=3&theater,
ing the Ministry of Education of falsifying Bulgarian history. It read,
(Access date: 2 February 2020).
“Since the10
Ibid.
beginning of this year, the Ministry has been conducting an ex-
11
Вескоcampaign
tremely aggressive Янков Обрешковtoandcompletely
Красимир Сашковreplace
Кръстев, История и цивилизации 6 клас, (Издателство
the methodology used to teach
„Архимед и Диоген“, София: 2017), p.116.
10. Ibid.
11. Веско Янков Обрешков and Красимир Сашков Кръстев, История и цивилизации 6 клас, (Издателство
„Архимед и Диоген“, София: 2017), p.116.
172 setav.org
In April 2019, the Vazrazhdane party (after registering to participate in the fo
elections for Members of European Parliament) released a statement accusing the M
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BULGARIA
Education of falsifying Bulgarian history. It read,
“Since the beginning of this year, the Ministry has been conducting an extremely aggressive
completely replace the methodology used to teach Bulgarian history, with the main aim b
Bulgarian history, with the main aim being to make Bulgarian teachers suggest
Bulgarian teachers suggest to Bulgarian children that Bulgaria’s main enemy is Russia, that ou
to Bulgarian children that Bulgaria’s main enemy is Russia, that our closest ally is
is Turkey, that Turkish slavery did not exist, that Bulgarians adopted Islam and gave their c
Turkey, that Turkish
raised slavery voluntarily…”
as Janissaries did not exist, that
12 Bulgarians adopted Islam and gave
their children to be raised as Janissaries voluntarily…”12
The
Theleaders
leaders ofofVazrazhdane
Vazrazhdane “warned”
“warned” the public,
the public, despite
despite the theIslam
fact that factand
that Islam and M
Muslims are still portrayed in a rather negative manner. The accusations were meant
still portrayed in a rather negative manner. The accusations were meant to serv
to serve electoral purposes (adequately rejected by the Ministry of Education), and
purposes
were (adequately rejected by the Ministry of Education), and were unfounded.
unfounded.
Figure 4: Deputy Prime Minister Krasimir Karakachanov in Voivodinovo: “Gypsies in Bulgaria have become extremely
arrogant…”13
On 6 January, two young men from the Roma ghetto in Voivodinovo village,
Figure 4: Deputy Prime Minister Krasimir Karakachanov in Voivodinovo: “Gypsies in Bulgaria
nearextremely
Plovdiv, arrogant…”
beat up a 33-year-old
13 special forces corporal (Valentin Dimov). As
a response, the authorities launched an operation for the demolition of the illegal
constructions in the Roma neighbourhood. While commenting on the situation to
the media, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Krasimir Karakachanov
made the following generalisation: “Gypsies in Bulgaria have become extremely ar-
12
“Възраждане алармира: МОН обучава учители как да фалшифицират българскат
OFFNews.bg, 27 April 2019, https://offnews.bg/politika/vazrazhdane-alarmira-mon-obuchava-uch
falshifitcirat-balg-702121.html,
12. “Възраждане
(Access date: 2 February 2020).
алармира: МОН обучава учители как да фалшифицират българската история”, OFF-
13
“Каракачанов във Войводиново: Циганите са станали изключително нагли”, Youtube, 8 J
News.bg, 27 April 2019, https://offnews.bg/politika/vazrazhdane-alarmira-mon-obuchava-uchiteli-kak-da-falshifit-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P0seoowdi4o,
cirat-balg-702121.html, (Access date: 2 February 2020). (Access date: 13 February 2020).
13. “Каракачанов във Войводиново: Циганите са станали изключително нагли”, Youtube, 8 January 2019,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P0seoowdi4o, (Access date: 13 February 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 173
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
rogant… It’s a fact that in the last year or two, they have started adopting Islam.”14
(Fig. 4) The Roma community and a number of NGOs reacted to this biased state-
ment and the demolishing of houses in the middle of winter, by organising a protest
in front of the Council of Ministers.15 As a guest of the TV program “Hi, Bulgar-
ia”, and in front of the cameras broadcasting the protest, the Roma activist Lilyana
Kovacheva criticised the authorities for imposing a collective responsibility on the
Roma community because of a domestic crime and informed the audience that she
had filed a complaint against Karakachanov with the Commission for Protection
against Discrimination. She also complained that politicians like Volen Siderov and
Valeri Simeonov (two months earlier he had called Roma women “bitches”) were
also using hate speech at the expense of the Roma.16 As a matter of fact, represen-
tatives from all levels of the IMRO, Ataka, NFSB, and Vazrazhdane parties exercise
anti-Muslim discourse as a major tool of campaigning for votes from voters with
nationalistic inclinations.
Media
Figuratively speaking, if Bulgarian education is the soil, Islamophobic flora is rooted
in, local media is the gardener, who takes care of its growth, its giving fruit, and its
transportation to the market. Due to the progress in the field of communications
fueled by the vast use of social media, the stages of this otherwise long-term process
occur faster and have broadened their range.
The champions in the category “Islamophobic media” in Bulgaria for 2019 are
the television channels Skat TV and Alfa TV. This comes as no surprise since these
usual suspects are owned by the far-right parties NFSB and Ataka. The list of cases in
which anti-Muslim discourse has been used in different programs through the year
is too long, and we will confine ourselves to mentioning only a couple of striking
examples. On 2 May 2019, the presenter of the TV program with the meaningful
title “Unveiling” Nikolay Pankov chose the following provocative theme: “If You
Are a Mufti, It Is as If You Are Minister Vladisslav Goranov’s Best Man”, suggesting
that the Minister of Finance tolerated the Chief Muftiate. The words of the host
were full of dangerous speculations and offensive qualifications directed at the head
of the Muslim Denomination. “The mufti of Turkey Mustafa Hadji threatens the
country with terror if he is not paid… We are becoming the Bulgarian Trojan scare-
crow of Europe, because this is where Diyanet [the Turkish Directorate of Religious
14. Emiliya Milcheva, “Как вярата променя живота на българските роми”, 10 January 2019, Deutsche Welle,
https://p.dw.com/p/3BIvO, (Access date: 13 February 2020).
15. Протест на циганите пред МС заради думите на Каракачанов за Войводиново (Protest of the Gypsies in
Front of the Council of Ministers Because of the Words of Karakachanov about Voivodinovo), Youtube, 14 January
2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9n9eupz8Tg0, (Access date: 14 February 2020).
16. “Здравей, България”, Nova Tv, 11 January 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-xfEOcDBPzM, (Access
date: 14 February 2020).
174 setav.org
suggesting that the Minister of Finance tolerated the Chief Muftiate. The words of the hos
full of dangerous speculations and offensive qualifications directed at the head of the M
Denomination. “The mufti of Turkey Mustafa Hadji threatens
ISLAMOPHOBIA the country with terror i
IN BULGARIA
not paid… We are becoming the Bulgarian Trojan scarecrow of Europe, because this is
Diyanet [the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs] personnel expelled from Europe w
brought expelled
Affairs] personnel up… Bulgaria will become
from Europe will be the nucleus
brought up… forBulgaria
the jihadists returning from ISIS fo
will become
the nucleus for the jihadists
respective returninga from
march towards ISIS
Balkan for their We
caliphate. respective marchafter
are looking towards
people who are a th
a Balkan caliphate. We are looking after people who are a threat to our national se-
curity…”17our national
(Fig. 5) security…” 17 (Fig. 5)
Figure 5: Nikolay Pankov, host of SKAT TV’s weekly program “Unveiling”: “If you are a mufti, it is as if you are Minister
Vladisslav Goranov’s best man”.18
Figure 5: Nikolay Pankov, host of SKAT TV’s weekly program “Unveiling”: “If you are a mufti, it is a
On 29areApril,
Minister VladisslavZhelev
Liubomir Goranov’s
frombestSkat
man”.TV,
18
on his program “On the Bos-
porus” demonstrated how the lack of basic knowledge about Islam results in mis-
On 29 April, Liubomir
leading interpretations. “But whenZhelev
we sayfrom Skat
‘Allah’, TV,comes
there on histhe
program “On the of
cruel principle Bosporus” demon
the Islamist
howjihad, the principle
the lack of basic of monotheism,
knowledge aboutwhich
Islamforbids
results any understanding
in misleading interpretations. “But
and tolerance of the other’s faith. In Turkish it is vahdet, from here comes the word
we say ‘Allah’, there comes the cruel principle of the Islamist jihad, the princi
tevhid: you know well what happened in the name of this principle last Sunday (Sri
monotheism,
Lanka Easter Bombings which forbids any
on 21 April)...” 19
understanding and tolerance of the other's faith. In Turki
vahdet, from here comes the word tevhid: you know well what happened in the name
Justice System
Islamophobia is often
principle lastmanifested in parliament
Sunday (Sri when
Lanka Easter MPs debate
Bombings on 21laws and bills
April)...” 19 re-
lated to religious denominations. In this sense, the year 2019 was no exception. On
31 January 2019, the GERB and MRF submitted a bill for an amendment to the
Law of Religions foreseeing a state subsidizing of religious denominations, as well as
17
“Мюфтия ли си, все едно си кумец на министър Владислав Горанов!?”, Skat.bg, 2 May
http://www.skat.bg/products.php?type=10&genre=5145, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
17. “Мюфтия лиIbid.
18
си, все едно си кумец на министър Владислав Горанов!?”, Skat.bg, 2 May 2019, http://www.
19
“За лъжата, (Access
skat.bg/products.php?type=10&genre=5145, наказанието и
date: 1 February 2020). прошката”, Skat.bg, 29 April
18. Ibid. http://www.skat.bg/products.php?type=10&genre=5050, (Access date: 30 December 2019).
19. “За лъжата, наказанието и прошката”, Skat.bg, 29 April 2019, http://www.skat.bg/products.php?type=10&-
genre=5050, (Access date: 30 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 175
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
the pardoning of their debts to the state up to 31 December 2018.20 When it became
clear that the greater part of the mentioned debts belonged to the Muslim Denom-
ination, the Chief Mufti’s Office and the party representatives who had submitted
the bill (voted at first reading on 7 March) became the target of multiple verbal at-
tacks from the microphone of the National Assembly and most media organs.21 This
led to a change in the text of the amendment before its second vote on 21 March,
according to which the debts were only deferred.22 The Turkish Foreign Minister
was also involved in the scandal after his comment concerning the same draft law
was interpreted as interfering in Bulgaria’s internal affairs.23 Prof. Stanislav Stoilov,
a MP from Ataka party, commented on the case for Alfa TV claiming that Turkish
President Erdogan had phoned Bulgarian PM Boyko Borisov to ask him for the debt
forgiveness in question. (Fig. 6) The host of the program Magdalena Tasheva claimed
that the Law of Religions was written or at least edited by the Turkish Presidency of
Religious Affairs, the (Turkish) National Intelligence Organization, and the Turkish
Cooperation and Coordination Agency. This would allow Turkish, Arab, and Saudi
funding of Bulgarian Muslim communities aimed at radicalising the latter.24
On 20 May 2019, the Prosecutor General Sotir Tsatsarov rewarded prosecutor
Nedialka Popova from the Pazardzhik District Prosecutor’s Office for her perfor-
mance during a case regarding the spread of radical Islam, a year after she delivered
an Islamophobic speech which had raised a serious concern among the local Muslim
community. The case in question, brought in 2009, led in December 2019 to the
effective sentences of 14 people for preaching religious hatred and ISIS ideas;25 the
allegations were made without any clear evidence. On 7 May 2019, the Supreme
Muslim Council adopted a declaration “in connection with the actions of the inves-
tigating authorities causing fear and disturbance in the ranks of the Muslim Denom-
ination by carrying out investigating actions based on complaints and signals, which
20. “Законопроекти”, Народно събрание на Република България, 31 January 2019, https://parliament.bg/bg/
bills/ID/156855/, (Access date: 3 January 2020).
21. For example: “Ами сега? Няма време!”, Skat.bg, 7 February 2019, http://www.skat.bg/products.php?-
type=10&genre=4220,https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2019/03/07/3401236_durjavata_
oproshtava_zaduljeniiata_na/, (Access date: 27 December 2019).
22. “Комисия По Вероизповеданията И Правата На Човека”, Народно събрание на Република България,
21 March 2019, https://parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/2593/reports/ID/10129, (Access
date: 14 February 2020).
23. Маргарита Колева, “Турция призна намеса в Закона за вероизповеданията”, Darik News, 28 March
2019, https://dariknews.bg/novini/bylgariia/turciia-prizna-namesa-v-zakona-za-veroizpovedaniiata-2156565, (Ac-
cess date: 15 February 2020).
24. “В окото на бурята”, Youtube, 30 March 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0CKKNehEcEg, (Access
date: 14 February 2020).
25.“Цацаров награди прокурорката Недялка Попова за работата ѝ по делото за радикалния ислям”,
Lex News, 20 May 2019, https://news.lex.bg/%D1%86%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%
D0%B2-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0
%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%B-
D%D0%B5%D0%B4%D1%8F%D0%BB%D0%BA/, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
176 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BULGARIA
can be qualified as claptrap.”26 In the meantime, the Bulgarian prosecution continues
to be ineffective against perpetrators of alleged Islamophobic attacks, such as the
attack on the building of the Chief Mufti’s Office in June, and does not impose any
sanctions for anti-Muslim hate speech.
Figure 6: Prof. Stanislav Stanilov, MP from Ataka Party, claiming in front of the cameras of Alfa TV that Turkish
President Erdogan has phoned
Figure Bulgarian
6: Prof. PM Boyko
Stanislav Borisov
Stanilov, to ask
MP from him for
Ataka theclaiming
Party, debt forgiveness
in front ofofthe
thecameras
Muslimof Alfa TV that Turkish
community.27 President Erdogan has phoned Bulgarian PM Boyko Borisov to ask him for the debt forgiveness of the Muslim
community. 25
Internet Оn 20 May 2019, the Prosecutor General Sotir Tsatsarov rewarded prosecutor Nedialka Popova
On 9 January, Angel
from theDzhambazki, a member
Pazardzhik District of theOffice
Prosecutor’s European Parliament
for her performance and depu-
during a case regarding
ty-chairman of the
IMRO,
spreadcommented ona the
of radical Islam, yearaforementioned
after she deliveredincident in Voivodinovo
an Islamophobic speech which had raised
on his blog (which is part of his personal webpage). (Fig. 8) “We have always
a serious concern among the local Muslim community. The case in question, insisted
brought in 2009,
that the (Roma)ledghetto should be demolished. And we will demolish it. Because the
in December 2019 to the effective sentences of 14 people for preaching religious hatred and
ghetto is an ulcer.
ISISBecause
ideas; 26 the ghetto is the
the allegations soilmade
were in which
withouttheanypoisonous weedsOnof7Is-May 2019, the
clear evidence.
lamic radicalismSupreme Only inCouncil
grow.” Muslim
28
Facebook, thisatext
adopted entitled“in
declaration “Gypsy Arrogance”
connection wasactions of the
with the
shared more than 12,000 times. (Fig. 9) Nine out of ten of all 74 comments under
investigating authorities causing fear and disturbance in the ranks of the Muslim Denomination
the text praised Dzhambazki’s approach. A person by the name of Ivan Petrov even
by carrying out investigating actions based on complaints and signals, which can be qualified
exclaimed: “Get the army into the ghetto with infantry fighting vehicles and fire, fire,
as claptrap.” 27 In the meantime, the Bulgarian prosecution continues to be ineffective against
fire… If there is no one to do it, just tell me, and I, as a former army officer, will come
and participate for free, I will sit in the first of machines to enter the ghetto!”
26. “Ramadan Meeting
25 of the Supreme Muslim Council”, Republic of Bulgaria Muslim Denomination Grand
Ibid.
“Цацаров награди прокурорката Недялка Попова за работата ѝ по делото за радикалния ислям”, Lex
26 2019, https://www.grandmufti.bg/en/za-nas-3/news/7627-ramazansko-zasedanie-na-visshi-
Mufti`s Office, 7 May
News, 20 May
ya-myusyulmanski-savet-2.html, 2019,date:
(Access https://news.lex.bg/%D1%86%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2-
28 January 2019).
%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8-
27. Ibid. %D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%82%
D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%B4%D1%8F%D0%BB%D0%BA/,
28. Angel Dzhambazki, (Access date: 1 February
9 January 2019, https://www.djambazki.org/blog/view/226/ciganskata-naglost, (Access 2020).
date: 5 January 2020). “Ramadan Meeting of the Supreme Muslim Council”, Republic of Bulgaria Muslim Denomination Grand
27
Mufti`s Office, 7 May 2019, https://www.grandmufti.bg/en/za-nas-3/news/7627-ramazansko-zasedanie-na-
visshiya-myusyulmanski-savet-2.html, (Access date: 28 January 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 177
fire, fire, fire… If there is no one to do it, just tell me, and I, as a former army officer, w
andISLAMOPHOBIA
EUROPEAN participate for free,
REPORT I will
2019 sit in the first of machines to enter the ghetto!”
Figure 8: Angel Dzhambazki’s webpage addressing the Roma problem: “No to the ethnic, domestic and gypsy
crimes.”29
Figure 8: Angel Dzhambazki’s webpage addressing the Roma problem: “No to the ethnic, domestic
crimes.” 29
28
Angel Dzhambazki, 9 January 2019, https://www.djambazki.org/blog/view/226/ciganskata-naglos
date: 5 January 2020).
29
Ibid.
Figure 9: Racist commentaries under Angel Dzhambazki’s text “Gypsy Arrogance”.30
Figure 9: Racist commentaries under Angel Dzhambazki’s text “Gypsy Arrogance”. 30
As usually, state security agencies did not react to these racist, anti-Mus-
lim statements, nor did the Commission for Protection against Discrimination.
As usually, state security agencies did not react to these racist, anti-Muslim statements, no
Since there are no sanctions or any measures imposed by the state authorities to
combat the Commission
Islamophobia, for Protection
similar comments against Discrimination.
accompany Since
almost all news theretoare no sanctions or
related
29. Ibid.
measures imposed by the state authorities to combat Islamophobia, similar comm
30. Ibid. accompany almost all news related to Islam and Muslims, and consequently, moderators r
take action to remove or criticise them.
178 setav.org
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BULGARIA
Islam and Muslims, and consequently, moderators rarely take action to remove
or criticise them.
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
Major figures triggering Islamophobia in Bulgaria are the leaders (including MPs
and EPMs) of the far-right nationalistic parties and movements: NFSB, IMRO,
Ataka, Vazrazhdane, Bulgarian National Union – New Democracy, National Resis-
tance, Blood and Honour, and Fortress Europe Alliance. They are backed by various
channels for dissemination of anti-Muslim propaganda such as media organs, either
owned by their parties or via national TV, or radio programs and daily press, whose
producers evaluate the participation of “scandalous” politicians and the broadcasting
of hate speech as a source of increased viewer/listener/reader interest and higher rat-
ings, a process undisturbed by any kind of censorship or state control.
Observed Civil Society and Political Initiatives to
Counter Islamophobia
Initiatives, both on the federal and local level, aimed at combating anti-Muslim
racism are a rarity in Bulgaria. The only official event of this kind for 2019 was a
discussion titled “Islamophobia: Causes and Consequences” held on 26 March by
the Chief Mufti’s Office, the only institution reporting anti-Muslim incidents and
rhetoric. The discussion started with an exposé of Prof. Mihail Ivanov, who traced
the origins of Islamophobia back to the Bulgarian history textbooks. He stated,
“One of the elements that fuel Islamophobia is Turkophobia... Bulgarian
nationalism is formed as ethno-nationalism, not as civic nationalism... What the
school does is later reproduced and multiplied throughout the community. Natu-
rally, part of the politicians, media owners, journalists, and reputable public figures
become bearers of negative attitudes inherited from the school years... The influ-
ence of this public elite on public opinion is dominant and through the media,
it inevitably affects the minds of the general public. The social environment “in-
flamed” by racist - in this case Islamophobic is Turkophobic - attitudes is nourish-
ing for the political speculations of national populism...”31
Therefore, the “medical” treating of the listed causes should start with a dis-
cussion within the whole community and the rewriting of history in a more objec-
tive manner. Hayri Emin, an expert at the International Affairs Department of the
Chief Mufti’s Office, contributed to the discussion by giving up-to-date examples
of Islamophobia such as the announcement in parliament of the amendments to
31. “Дискусия - Ислямофобия причини и следствия”, Youtube, 28 March 2019, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=t8kEC2s2v2s, (Access date: 25 January 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 179
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
the Law of Religions on the grounds of national security, and called on the state to
take concrete measures.32
On 8 December, in Sofia, the Supreme Muslim Council presented the first
Honorary Award of the Hodzhazade Mehmed Muhyiddin Efendi annual awards,
which were established by the central collective body of the Muslim Denomina-
tion, to the Chairman of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee Krasimir Kanev. He
was nominated for his long-lasting activities in the field of human rights, and
especially for defending the religious rights of the Bulgarian Muslims and com-
bating Islamophobia.33
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The content of this report shows that in Islamophobic terms, the year 2019 was
dominated more by unpunished (both political and civilian) anti-Muslim hate
speech instances than physical attacks on Muslims and mosques. Populist politicians
used the momentum to unleash hatred towards Muslims by exploiting negative his-
torical sentiments, problems within the Roma communities, and concerns mounted
due to the movement of refugees from the Middle East passing through Bulgaria
on their way to Europe. Despite the fact that the domestic criminal code contains
articles sanctioning this type of discourses, these are rarely applied. Therefore, there
is an acute need for NGOs to monitor media on a daily basis and generate pres-
sure on the judiciary and the Commission for Protection against Discrimination to
take adequate action in cases and events dictated by Islamophobia, especially those
that negatively impact the Muslim community. Presumably, over time, this civilian
pressure is expected to generate a preventative effect and force politicians to abstain
from using hate speech publicly. The media should take the opportunity to change
the negative image of Islam by broadcasting popular science and documentary films
dedicated to various aspects of this religion, as well as programs discussing up-to-
date Islamic issues. The lack of adequate knowledge about Islam enables the spread
of false and distorted information about it in the public domain by pseudo-experts
and malevolent public figures. Educational institutions also have to work towards
creating an alternative narrative of Muslims. In the long list of history textbook
authors, there are no Muslims. Keeping in mind that the curricula include topics
related to Islam, the Bulgarian ministry should engage if not an author, at least an
adviser appointed by the Chief Mufti’s Office in Sofia to comment on the content
from a Muslim perspective.
32. Ibid.
33. “Supreme Muslim Council Awards a Human Rights Defender”, Republic of Bulgaria Muslim Denomination
Grand Mufti`s Office, 6 December 2019, https://www.grandmufti.bg/en/za-nas-3/news/8993-visshiyat-myusyul-
manski-savet-nagrazhdava-zashtitnik-na-choveshkite-prava-4.html, (Access date: 25 January 2020).
180 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BULGARIA
Chronology
• 26.03.2019: The Chief Mufti’s Office hеld a discussion entitled “Islam-
ophobia: Causes and Consequences”.
• 20.05.2019: Prosecutor General Sotir Tsatsarov awarded prosecutor Nedy-
alka Popova from the Pazardzhik District Prosecutor’s Office, investigator
Daniela Yaneva, and the SANS (State Agency for National Security) team
who worked on the so-called notorious Case of 13 Imams for spreading
radical Islam.
• 02.06.2019: Vandalism against the historical Kurshum Mosque in Karlo-
vo, which was desecrated with graffiti.
• 04.06.2019: An unidentified person stoned the glass entrance on the
ground floor of the Grand Mufti’s Office building in Sofia.
• 01.12.2019 – 15.01.2020: In the cemetery of Izgrev village, in the Shou-
men district, four Muslim tombstones were desecrated by two 15-year-old
minors from the same village.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 181
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
CROATIA
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
NEJRA KADIĆ MEŠKIĆ
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 183
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
184 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
The Author
Nejra Kadic Meskic is the executive director at the Center for Cultural Dia-
logue and an associate at the Islamic Community in Croatia. She graduated from
the School for Economics and Business of the University of Sarajevo. She has nine
years of experience as a program and campaign leader in the fields of human rights,
culture of dialogue, migrants and youth, and gender equality including the political
and implementational level. She is familiar with the issues of human rights in Croa-
tia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as she has worked in the NGO sector in both coun-
tries. In 2019, she completed the KAICIID Fellowship program in interreligious
and intercultural dialogue. In 2013, Kadic Meskic received an award from the BIH
Parliament for her contribution towards the achievement of gender equality. She has
experience in project management, event management, as well as in public relations
and marketing. She is the author and co-author of strategic documents related to the
improvement in the implementation of human rights. Kadic Meskic is also a trainer
on teamwork and leadership in educational programs for youth. Email: nejra.kadic.
sa@gmail.com
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Nejra Kadic Meskic: Islamophobia in Croatia: National Report 2019, in: Enes Bayraklı
& Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 185
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
In Croatia in 2019, incidents that can be addressed as hate speech against Muslims
or potentially Islamophobic mostly occurred in the field of politics or involved pol-
iticians since two elections took place in the year in question: the EU parliamentary
elections and the presidential elections.
The polarization of society and the use of populist rhetoric in political cam-
paigns for the EU parliamentary elections and the election for the presidency of the
Republic of Croatia with regards to migrants were present on almost every social
level, media, and platforms. Unacceptable messages and hate speech against Islam
marred the media, the Internet, and political appearances in election periods.
The lack of self-criticism in the context of recognizing discriminatory messages
is also evident in some of the media. Often, they correctly recognize the discrimina-
tory speech of public figures, politicians and others, however, do not show sufficient
willingness to renounce their own unacceptable speech and condemn the egregious
examples of their employers in articles.
People are reluctant to speak up when they feel discriminated against for being
Muslims, because of vulnerability when expressing religious beliefs in public and re-
specting religious customs. This is why we don’t have true insight into the frequency
of discrimination on the basis of Islam in Croatia.
On the other hand, government bodies and institutions as well as other religious
communities spread the message of social cohesion, their openness to policies that
promote and secure diversity and equality, and the coexistence and acceptance of all
Croatian citizens regardless of religious differences. The few incidents that took place
are considered individual and sporadic occurrences, and were condemned by the
majority. Overall, comparing to other European countries, Croatian society does not
follow the trend of fast growing Islamophobia. One of the reasons is that Republic
of Croatia is one of the few countries in Europe that institutionally recognized Islam
as an equal religion.
186 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
Sažetak
Incidenti koji nagovještavaju govor mržnje prema muslimanima ili potencijalno
islamofobne incidente u Hrvatskoj u 2019. godini uglavnom su bili u području
politike ili su dolazili od strane političara obzirom da je 2019. godina u Hrvatskoj
obilježena predsjedničkim izborima i izborima za Europski parlament.
Polariziranje društva te korištenje populističke retorike pri razračunavanju s mi-
grantima i izbjeglicama a u svrhu političkih bodova na izborima za Europski parla-
ment i Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske bilo je prisutno na svim društvenim razin-
ama, medijima i platformama. Neprihvatljive poruke i govor mržnje prema islamu
obilježile su kako političke istupe tako i medije i internet u periodu izbora.
Nedostatak samokritičnosti u kontekstu prepoznavanja diskriminatornih poru-
ka, vidljiv je kod dijela medija. Oni nerijetko ispravno prepoznaju diskriminatoran
govor javnih osoba, političara i drugih, međutim, ne pokazuju dovoljnu spremnost
da se odreknu vlastitog neprihvatljivog govora i osude eklatantne primjere u članci-
ma svojih zaposlenika/ca.
Pojedinci, kada smatraju da su diskriminirani temeljem toga što su muslimani,
nerado o tome progovaraju, zbog ranjivosti kojoj su izloženi prilikom javnog očito-
vanja religijskih uvjerenja i poštivanja vjerskih običaja, a to je razlog zašto izostaje
pravi uvid u kvantitet diskriminacije prema muslimanima u Hrvatskoj.
S druge strane, tijela i institucije vlasti u Republici Hrvatskoj kao i druge religi-
jske zajednice širili su poruke vrijednosti socijalne kohezije i pokazali volju za politi-
kama koje promoviraju i jamče raznolikost i jednakost, zajednički život i prihvaćanje
svih hrvatskih građana neovisno o njihovim religijskim razlikama.
Sumirajući, možemo reći da pokazana anti-muslimanska netrpeljivost pred-
stavlja pojedinačne i sporadične ispade individualaca koji su bili osuđeni od većine.
U suštini, u poređenju s drugim zemljama Europe, hrvatsko društvo ne prati trend
brzog rasta islamofobije u Europi. Svakako da je jedan od razloga tome i činjenica
da je Republika Hrvatska jedna od samo četiri zemlje Evrope koja je institucionalno
priznala islam kao ravnopravnu religiju.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 187
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: Croatia
Type of Regime: Democratic republic
Form of Government: Unitary parliamentary constitutional republic
Ruling Parties: Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)
Opposition Parties: Social Democratic Party (SDP)
Last Elections: 2014 Presidential Election (Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović won
50.74% of the vote against 49.26% that went to Ivo Josipović in the second round);
2016 Legislative Election (HDZ, HDS, HSLS: 61 seats; SDP, HNS, HSS, HSU:
54 seats; MOST: 13 seats; ŽIVI ZID, PH, AM: 8 seats; IDS, PGS, RI: 3 seats;
STRANKA RADA I SOLIDARNOSTI, REFORMISTI, NOVI VAL, HSS-SR,
BUZ: 2 seats; HDSSB, HKS: 1 seat; NL-ŽELJKO GLASNOVIĆ: 1 seat; National
Minorities: 8 seats)
Total Population: 4,284,889 (2011)
Major Languages: Croatian
Official Religion: No official religion (secularism)
Statistics on Islamophobia: N/A
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: N/A
Major Religions (% of Population): Christianity (86.28% Catholics and
4.44% Orthodox), No Religion (3.81%), Islam (1.47%), Others (less than 1%)
Muslim Population (% of Population): 62,977 (1.47%) (2011)
Main Muslim Community Organizations: Islamic Community in Croatia (Is-
lamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj)
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: Center for Cultural Dialogue (CCD),
The International Red Cross, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Je-
suit Refugee Service (JRS), Human Rights House Zagreb, Are You Serious, Center
for Missing and Abused Children, Centre for Peace Studies (CMS; CPS), Centre
for Promotion of Tolerance and Preservation of Holocaust Remembrance, Croatian
Legal Center
Far-Right Parties: N/A
Far-Right Movements: N/A
Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: N/A
Limitations to Islamic Practices:
ű Hijab Ban: None
ű Halal Slaughter Ban: None
ű Minaret Ban: None
ű Circumcision Ban: None
ű Burka Ban: None
ű Prayer Ban: None
188 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
Introduction
The Islamic Community in Croatia continues to play an integrative role in Croa-
tian society. The Republic of Croatia used the position of the Islamic Community
as a role model of integrating Muslim minorities into European societies and as
an instrument in building its democratic, inclusive, and intercultural state brand.
Institutionally and strategically regulated relationships through the Treaty on Issues
of Common Interest between the government of the Republic of Croatia and the
Islamic Community in Croatia from 2002 were used as examples of promising prac-
tice in integrating religious minorities into societies around the world. The construc-
tion of the Islamic Cultural Center in Sisak continues and with it Croatia will get
its fifth mosque (in addition to the ones in Zagreb, Rijeka, Bogovolja, and Gunja).
The Islamic Community in Croatia hosted a gala dinner to celebrate Eid al-Fitr with
the presence of all state leaders, their presence there testifies to their good relations
with the country’s Islamic Community and Muslims.1 The President of the Republic
of Croatia Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic,2 Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia
Andrej Plenkovic,3 Speaker of the Croatian Parliament Gordan Jandrokovic,4 and
President of the Croatian Episcopal Conference (HBK) Zelimir Puljić5 expressed
their best wishes on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha to the Mufti and
President of the Islamic Community of Croatia Aziz Hasanovic and all Muslims in
Croatia with the warm messages of coexistence, respect, and acceptance as values
underpinning the intercultural Croatian society.6
The annual report published by Croatia’s Security Intelligence Agency (SOA)
stated, “Although Islamist radicalism has gained a significant number of supporters
in the western EU countries and in the countries neighboring southeastern south-
eastern Croatia, it has not been able to gather more followers in the Republic of
Croatia. One of the main reasons for the absence of significant Islamist radicalism in
Croatia is the good position, reputation and integration of the Islamic community
1. “Državni vrh na proslavi Ramazanskog bajrama. Svečanost u zagrebačkom Westinu obliježio je potez američkog
i iranskog ambasadora u Hrvatskoj”, Jutarnji.hr, 3 June 2019, https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/foto-drza-
vni-vrh-na-proslavi-ramazanskog-bajrama-svecanost-u-zagrebackom-westinu-obiljezio-je-potez-americkog-i-iransk-
og-ambasadora-u-hrvatskoj/8962805/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
2. “Kolinda čestitala Bajram: ‘Prepoznala sam želju za istinskim zajedništvom”, Index.hr, 3 June 2019, https://www.
index.hr/vijesti/clanak/kolinda-cestitala-bajram-prepoznala-sam-zelju-za-istinskim-zajednistvom/2090421.aspx,
(Access date: 10 December 2019).
3. “Premijer Plenković čestitao Ramazanski bajram”, Jutarnji.hr, 3 June 2019, https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvats-
ka/premijer-plenkovic-cestitao-ramazanski-bajram/8961770/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
4. “Jandrokovic čestitao Kurban Bajram”, Index.hr, 11 August 2019, https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/jan-
drokovic-cestitao-kurbanbajram/2107803.aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
5. “Predsjednik HBK čestitao Ramazanski bajram”, Jutarnji.hr, 3 June 2019, https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvats-
ka/predsjednik-hbk-cestitao-ramazanski-bajram/8961764/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
6. “Muftija Hasanović: Bog nam je naredio da se volimo”, Večernji.hr, 4 June 2019, https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/
muftija-hasanovic-bog-nam-je-naredio-da-se-volimo-1323629, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 189
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
in Croatian society.”7
Thes Croatian neighborhood includes Bosnia and Herzegovina whose rela-
tions with Croatia in 2019 were marked by a scandal in which the SOA was ac-
cused of smuggling weapons into places connected with the Salafi Islamist move-
ment in Bosnia.
The SOA in its annual report also reported that there is no serious anti-im-
migration extremism in Croatia, although the trend of the growing popularity of
anti-immigration movements in Europe could lead to the equivalent developments
of similar groups in Croatia.
The question of financing religious communities with funds from the public
budget was raised in public discourse and in the Croatian Parliament. According to
Eurostat data, the Republic of Croatia is among the member states that allocate the
highest percentage of their GDP to religious communities (0.6% in 2016), with
only Hungary allocating more. A proposal to start negotiations on amendments to
the treaty between the Holy See and the Republic of Croatia was raised in Croatian
Parliament and several organizations including the Movement for Secular Croatia
raised the issue of the Catholic Church being in a privileged position compared to
other religious communities, a fact that violates constitutionally guaranteed secu-
larity. In 2019, the Croatian Parliament and government rejected the proposal to
amend the treaty.
It remains positive that religious leaders from different religious communi-
ties in most cases emphasized the quality of mutual cooperation and the impor-
tance of building friendly relationships. One example of interreligious dialogue
is the establishment of the Interreligious Council of Rijeka which brought to-
gether the most represented religious communities in the city within the frame-
work of the Rijeka – European Capital of Culture 2020 program to further
advance interreligious dialogue. Catholic religion teachers on several occasions
pointed out the beauty and purity of Islam and how different it is from the dis-
torted interpretation of the faith often found in the media or often circulated in
popularist publications.
The issue of Croatian border safety in relation to migrants heading to Europe
was raised several times in public discourse and media. Under the excuse of guard-
ing the Croatian border and ensuring the security of Croatian territory, the humane
approach and compassion for refugees increasingly faded. Politicians such as Ivan
Pernar continued sharing negative stories and foreign media news about refugees,
instilling fear of migrants and refugees in the local population. On the other hand,
non-governmental organizations reminded the public of the fact that the EU and
7 “SOA objavila izvješće o prijetnjama Hrvatskoj, okrili smo koliko je Hrvata u ISISu”, Index.hr, 3 June 2019,
https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/soa-objavila-izvjesce-o-prijetnjama-hrvatskoj-otkrili-koliko-je-hrvata-u-isi-
su/2090371.aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
190 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
Croatia weren’t facing a migration crisis but rather a solidarity and humanity crisis
presented under the pretext of a so-called security issue.
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and
Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
Hate crimes that threaten basic human rights and freedoms were often not reported,
were not sufficiently recognized, and their prosecution was sometimes inadequate.
The non-reporting of hate crimes occurs because of the victims’ lack of confidence
that the authorized institutions will provide them with adequate protection, and
because of the fear of revictimization.
According to statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the basis of discrim-
ination in 9 complaints was religion (3% of all recorded complaints). Eight crimes
were against Jews (specifically identified by the Ministry of Internal Affair as an-
ti-Semitism), while the motive of one crime was religion.8 Authorities didn’t specify
whether that was against Muslims because they do not label crimes as Islamophobic.
Anti-Muslim hate crime doesn’t exist as a separate category in the hate crime statis-
tics. According to the Ministry of Justice, courts have dealt with 35 hate crimes cases,
and in 13% of them the motive was religion.
In April 2019, a group of seven Muslim tourists prayed in a parking lot in the
Croatian city of Split. Several people reported the situation to the police, who deter-
mined that no misdemeanor or criminal act had been committed. Photographs and
a video were published online by the media, causing a number of negative reactions.
City Council member Martin Pauk wrote a Facebook post saying that the praying
individuals marked their territory and sent a message that they have arrived and that
there will be more of them, comparing the prayer to the act of dogs when they uri-
nate to mark their territory.9
The question of the difference between Muslims praying in the parking lot in
Split and Catholics praying in front of a hospital providing abortions was raised by
critics and freedom advocates, who concluded that Muslim individuals praying at
least didn’t condemn the actions of others.10
8 “Report of the Ombudsman for 2018”, Office for Ombudsman of the Republic of Croatia, 25 April 2019, https://
www.ombudsman.hr/hr/download/izvjesce-pucke-pravobraniteljice-za-2018-godinu/, (Access date: 10 December
2019).
9 “Molitva na parkingu. Sisački imam odgovorio je li uobičajeno da muslimani mole na ulici”, Dnevnik.hr, 25 April
2019, https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/molitva-na-parkingu-sisacki-imam-odgovorio-je-li-uobicajeno-da-musli-
mani-mole-na-ulici---558455.html, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
10. Vladimir Matijanić, “Ima li razlike između muslimana na splitskom parking i moliteljima pred bolnicama”, In-
dex.hr, 25 April 2019, https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/ima-li-razlike-izmedju-muslimana-na-splitskom-parkin-
gu-i-molitelja-pred-bolnicama/2081025.aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 191
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Figure 1: Transcript of Facebook post of Split City Council member Martin Pauk on the news portal Dnevnik.hr
saying: “From their acts the goal of this performance (referring to praying act of group of Muslim tourists at one
parking in Split) is completely obvious and it sends the message: We came. We are here. There is more of us
coming. Just like a dog that comes to the meadow and has an enormous need to pee on it and marks the territory,
these newcomers from another continent marked parking. After the parking, comes the park, the neighborhood,
the city, the country…”10
The question of the difference between Muslims praying in the parking lot in Split and Catholics
praying in front of a hospital providing abortions was raised by critics and freedom advocates,
Figure 1: Transcript of Facebook post of Split City Council member Martin Pauk on the news portal Dnevnik.hr saying:
“From their acts the goal of this performance (referring to praying act of group of Muslim tourists at one parking in
Figure 1: Transcript of Facebook post of Split City Council member Martin Pauk 11 on Just
the news portal Dnevnik.hr
saying: “From their who concluded that Muslim individuals praying at least didn’t condemn the actions of others.
Split) is completely obvious and it sends the message: We came. We are here. There is more of us coming.
acts the goal of this performance (referring to praying act of group
dog that comes to the meadow and has an enormous need to pee on it and marks the territory, these newcomers
like a
of Muslim
from tourists at one
parking in Split)marked
another continent is completely obvious
parking. After andcomes
the parking, it sends the the
the park, message: We came.
neighborhood, the city,We are here.11There is more of us
the country…”
coming. Just like a dog that comes to the meadow and has an enormous need to pee on it and marks the territory,
these newcomers from another continent marked parking. After the parking, comes the park, the neighborhood,
the city, the country…” 10
The question of the difference between Muslims praying in the parking lot in Split and Catholics
praying in front of a hospital providing abortions was raised by critics and freedom advocates,
who concluded that Muslim individuals praying at least didn’t condemn the actions of others. 11
Figure 2: Muslim tourists praying at parking in Split.12
Employment
Research shows thatFigure 2:the
Muslimpresence
tourists praying at parking in Split.
of discrimination
12
in society is still much higher
than reported to the relevant authorities. For example, in 2019, the request of a
Muslim woman to wear a hijab in her working place was denied by a public institu-
tion in Croatia. The decision of the institution’s directorship referred to the practice
and previous rulings of the European courts. This case wasn’t reported to relevant
10
Ibid. praying at parking in Split. 12
Figure 2: Muslim tourists
institutions for discrimination.
11
Vladimir Matijanić, “Ima li razlike između muslimana na splitskom parking i moliteljima pred bolnicama”,
Index.hr, 25 April 2019, https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/ima-li-razlike-izmedju-muslimana-na-splitskom-
11. Ibid. parkingu-i-molitelja-pred-bolnicama/2081025.aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
12. Ibid. 12
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Vladimir Matijanić, “Ima li razlike između muslimana na splitskom parking i moliteljima pred bolnicama”,
Index.hr,
192
25 April 2019, https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/ima-li-razlike-izmedju-muslimana-na-splitskom-
setav.org
parkingu-i-molitelja-pred-bolnicama/2081025.aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
12
Ibid.
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
The Ombudswoman received inquiries from Muslims about the right not to
work on religious holidays, which happened in previous years as well. Also, the
Catholic Faculty of Theology continued demanding baptismal certificates as part of
the application documentation in the process of hiring administrative and technical
staff, which is a case of direct discrimination based on religion.
Education
The Islamic Community in Croatia published the following books: The Islamic En-
cyclopedic Almanac that listed almost 500 Muslims who have contributed to the de-
velopment of the Islamic community and Croatian society in different areas,13 and
Halal – Standard for Humankind by the author Aldin Dugonjic, PhD, about the
importance of halal and the halal market in every segment of life.14
There were accusations that the textbooks for Croatian language and for re-
ligious education potentially encouraged discrimination. The Ministry of Science
and Education stated that they would consider the remarks and adopt the necessary
changes in future textbook editions.15
The association of students of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of
Zagreb Virtus on the occasion of International Women’s Day in 2019 organized a
panel on the position of women in monotheistic religions with representatives of
Islam, Catholicism, and Judaism. During the event, an incident occurred when sev-
eral students interrupted and complained about a public educational institution in
a secular country like Croatia hosting a discussion on a religious topic with religious
representatives. The left-wing Internet news portal index.hr reported that during the
event shaytan (devil) entered the imam when he said that we are all equal but we have
different roles in this world and that was the moment when the situation escalated.16
He also stated that society shouldn’t force gender equality because it is unnatural.
However, when listening to the entire speech, it becomes clear that what he was
actually referring to were the different biological characteristics of men and women,
and he was not implying that they shouldn’t be respected in the same way and treated
equally in the context of human rights.
13. Tomislav Šoštarić, “Knjiga koja svjedoči o sveprisutnosti i doprinosu muslimana u Hrvatskoj”, Aljazeera Bal-
kans, 23 June 2019, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/knjiga-koja-svjedoci-o-sveprisutnosti-i-doprinosu-muslima-
na-u-hrvatskoj, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
14. Sanadin Voloder , “Dugonjić: Halal industrija je perspektiva za privredni rast i razvoj”, Aljazeera Balkans, 21 May
2019, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/dugonjic-halal-industrija-je-perspektiva-za-privredni-rast-i-razvoj, (Access
date: 10 December 2019).
15. “Report of the Ombudsman for 2018”, Office for Ombudsman of the Republic of Croatia, 25 April 2019,
https://www.ombudsman.hr/hr/download/izvjesce-pucke-pravobraniteljice-za-2018-godinu/, (Access date: 10 De-
cember 2019).
16. “Don Stojić, musliman i židov na faksu pričali o ženama. Stojić nije bio najgori”, Index.hr, 7 March 2019,
https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/don-stojic-musliman-i-zidov-na-faksu-pricali-o-zenama-stojic-nije-bio-na-
jgori/2069293.aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Politics
In March 2019, the independent news website zurnal.info,17 based in Sarajevo, pub-
lished interviews with Bosnian Muslims who said the Croatia’s Security Intelligence
Agency (SOA) had tried to coerce them into smuggling weapons into places con-
nected with the Salafi Islamist movement in Bosnia.
The “discovery” of these arms caches would then justify comments by Croatia’s
President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic. Two years ago she said there were 10,000 peo-
ple with “very radical rhetoric and intentions” in Bosnia – remarks which caused
outrage at the time.18
Not surprisingly, the website’s allegations caused a furor. Croatia’s Prime Min-
ister Andrej Plenkovic called the story “a matter of creative manipulation” during a
visit to the Bosnian town of Neum. The SOA described the claims as “false and ma-
licious,” though it confirmed that its officers had been in contact with the Bosnian
citizens quoted in the story.19
Meanwhile, Bosnia’s Security Minister Dragan Mektic rushed to claim credit for
foiling a “false flag” operation which would have tarnished his country’s international
reputation. “The plan was to discredit Bosnia and show it as a terrorist hub and a
threat to the region and Europe,” he said.
It seemed logical when Bosnia’s state prosecutor stepped in to investigate the al-
legations. But then it turned out that the focus of the investigation was Mektic.20 The
prosecutor suspected the security minister of revealing secret information and giving
false statements. Mektic called the investigation “a farce, to mislead the public.”21
Confusion would be understandable. But Bosnians understand that the claims
and counter-claims fit into a queasy ethnopolitical game which has persisted since
the Dayton Agreement brought an end to Bosnia’s ruinous conflict in 1995.22
17 “Hrvatska protjerala bh. građane koji su odbili špijunirati za SOA”, Žurnal.info, 16 March 2019, https://zurnal.
info/novost/21954/hrvatska-protjerala-bh.-gradane-koji-su-odbili-spijunirati-za-soa?fbclid=IwAR1s7SFflGJLEAll-
Jizb_DqcuPLw0KnZaccrPGnBI5vrtdBx5it106UXCj0, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
18. Jurica Körbler, “Hrvatske obavještajne službe državnom vrhu poslale dramatično upozorenje: Islamski radikali
sun a granicama Hrvatske, u BiH ih ima 5 do 10 tisuća”, Jutarnji list.hr, 5 September 2017, https://www.jutarnji.hr/
globus/Globus-politika/hrvatske-obavjestajne-sluzbe-drzavnom-vrhu-poslale-dramaticno-upozorenje-islamski-radi-
kali-su-na-granicama-hrvatske-u-bih-ih-ima-5-do-10-tisuca/6522508/ (Access date: 10 December 2019).
19. “SOA se oglasila o špijunskom skandalu s BIH”, Index.hr, 14 March 2019, https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/
soa-se-oglasila-o-spijunskom-skandalu-s-bih/2070878.aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
20. “Potpuni obrat u špijunskoj aferi, BIH pokreće istragu protiv svog ministra”, Index.hr, 5 April 2019, https://
www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/potpuni-obrat-u-spijunskoj-aferi-bih-pokrece-istragu-protiv-svog-ministra/2076295.
aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
21. “Mektić ispitan u Tužilaštvu BIH: Potvrđujem sve što sam rekao”, Index.hr, 15 March 2019, https://www.index.
hr/vijesti/clanak/mektic-ispitan-u-tuziteljstvu-bih-potvrdjujem-sve-sto-sam-rekao/2071129.aspx (Access date: De-
cember 2020).
22. Guy De Launey, “Bosnia in Spat with Croatia over ‘Arms in Mosques’”, BBC, 20 April 2019, https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-47990274, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
194 setav.org
It seemed logical when Bosnia's state prosecutor stepped in to investigate the allegations. But
then it turned out that the focus of the investigation was Mektic. 20 The prosecutor suspected the
security minister of revealing secret information and giving false statements. Mektic calledIN
ISLAMOPHOBIA theCROATIA
investigation "a farce, to mislead the public." 21
Confusion would be understandable. But Bosnians understand that the claims and counter-
claims fit into a queasy ethnopolitical game which has persisted since the Dayton Agreement
brought an end to Bosnia's ruinous conflict in 1995. 22
TheTheBIH presidency sent a protest note to Croatia.23 It stated that the Prosecu-
BIH presidency sent a protest note to Croatia. 23 It stated that the Prosecutor's Office of BIH
tor’s Office of BIH will not investigate persons mentioned in an alleged intelligence
will not investigate persons mentioned in an alleged intelligence affair that is part of the affair
affair thatknown
is part ofSalafia
as ‘the the affair
affair’ known
in media. 24as ‘the Salafia affair’ in media.
24
Figure 3: A screenshot of an article published by BIH news portal Zurnal that accused Croatia for expelling citizens
who refusedFigure
to spy3:forA Croatia’s
screenshotSecurity
of an article publishedAgency
Intelligence by BIH (SOA).
news portal
25 Zurnal that accused Croatia for expelling
citizens who refused to spy for Croatia’s Security Intelligence Agency (SOA).
25
In July 2019, the President of the Republic of Croatia Kolinda Grabar-Ki-
tarovic, who
20 won
“Potpuni obratthe 2014 presidential
u špijunskoj aferi, BIH pokreće elections
istragu protiv assvoga ministra”,
candidate of5 the
Index.hr, April right-wing
2019,
https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/potpuni-obrat-u-spijunskoj-aferi-bih-pokrece-istragu-protiv-svog-
Croatianministra/2076295.aspx,
Democratic Union (HDZ), visited
(Access date: 10 December 2019). Israel on the occasion of the Holocaust
21
“Mektić ispitan u Tužilaštvu BIH: Potvrđujem sve što sam rekao”, Index.hr, 15 March 2019,
commemoration. One of the most influential Israeli newspapers, The Jerusalem Post,
https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/mektic-ispitan-u-tuziteljstvu-bih-potvrdjujem-sve-sto-sam-
published rekao/2071129.aspx
an (Access
article claiming date: that
December 2020). the meeting of Croatia’s president with the
during
22
Guy De Launey, “Bosnia in Spat with Croatia over ‘Arms in Mosques’”, BBC, 20 April 2019,
Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, Kolinda (Access
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47990274,
23
Grabar-Kitarovic stated, “Bosnia and Her-
date: 10 December 2019).
“Novi obrat, BIH šalje prosvjednu notu Hrvatskoj zbog špijunske afere”, Index.hr, 17 April 2019,
zegovinahttps://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/novi-obrat-bih-salje-prosvjednu-notu-hrvatskoj-zbog-spijunske-
is a very unstable country and under the control of militant Islam; in some
afere/2079234.aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
aspects it24 has been
“Preokret taken
u BIH, overistraga
pokrenuta by špijunske
peopleafere
associated withHrvtasku”,
za koju su optužili Iran and terrorists.”
Index.hr, 26
3 April 2019,
https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/preokret-u-bih-prekinuta-istraga-spijunske-afere-za-koju-su-optuzivali-
Thishrvatsku/2075779.aspx,
statement provoked a strong
(Access date: resonance
10 December 2019). in the media and political public of
25
Ibid.
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH). There were many reactions from BIH stating that
the statement by Croatia’s president tried to revive wartime ideologies, and that the
BIH citizens are clearly targeted as a threat and enemy not only to their neighbors
but also to one another. Very negative reactions came from the Croat member of the
presidency Zeljko Komsic, the Bosniak member of the presidency Sefik Dzaferovic,
23. “Novi obrat, BIH šalje prosvjednu notu Hrvatskoj zbog špijunske afere”, Index.hr, 17 April 2019, https://www.
index.hr/vijesti/clanak/novi-obrat-bih-salje-prosvjednu-notu-hrvatskoj-zbog-spijunske-afere/2079234.aspx, (Access
date: 10 December 2019).
24. “Preokret u BIH, pokrenuta istraga špijunske afere za koju su optužili Hrvtasku”, Index.hr, 3 April 2019,
https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/preokret-u-bih-prekinuta-istraga-spijunske-afere-za-koju-su-optuzivali-hrvat-
sku/2075779.aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
25. Ibid.
26. “Grabar-Kitarovic: BiH je vrlo nestabilna i pod kontrolom militantnog islama, u nekim aspektima su je preu-
zeli ljudi povezani s Iranom i teroristima”, Jutarnji.hr, 30 July 2019, https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/svijet/grabar-ki-
tarovic-bih-je-vrlo-nestabilna-i-pod-kontrolom-militantnog-islama-u-nekim-aspektima-su-je-preuzeli-ljudi-poveza-
ni-s-iranom-i-teroristima/9185855/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 195
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
from chairmen of the political parties Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Party of
Democratic Action (SDA) in BIH, from the President of the Jewish community in
BIH Jakob Finci, etc.
All media in Croatia and BIH reported on this event. For example, Al Jazeera
Balkans published a commentary on their portal entitled “Is Militant Islam Guilty
for Jasenovac?”27
The head of the Islamic Community in BIH Hussein Kavazovic also reacted:
“This person who calls herself the Croatian president is known for her attitudes and
attempts to dehumanize Muslims. It is a two-faced person who tells one story in
Muslim countries and another in Israel and other countries. It’s about political op-
portunism and nothing more. That’s the worst kind of politician!”28
The first reaction to the scandal from Croatia came from the former Croatian
Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor via her Twitter account: “Apologies to neighboring
and friendly Bosnia and Herzegovina. To all nations.”29
Figure 4: Twitter account of former Croatian Prime Minister Jadnaka Kosor in which she apologized to neighboring
and friendly BIH for the statement made by President of the Republic of Croatia Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic during a visit
Figure
to Israel.30
4: Twitter account of former Croatian Prime Minister Jadnaka Kosor in which she apologized to
neighboring and friendly BIH for the statement made by President of the Republic of Croatia Kolinda Grabar-
Finally,during
Kitarovic the president of the30 Republic of Croatia denied31 the claims of the Jeru-
a visit to Israel.
salem Post32 and later on this portal issued a correction and deleted the controversial
Finally, the president of the Republic of Croatia denied 31 the claims of the Jerusalem Post 32
and later on this portal issued a correction and deleted the controversial statement that caused
33 “Je li i za Jasenovac kriv militantni islam?”, Aljazeera Balkans, 30 July 2019, http://balkans.alja-
turmoil.
27. Mirnes Kovač, The journalist who wrote the article apologized for the mistake. 34
zeera.net/vijesti/je-li-i-za-jasenovac-kriv-militantni-islam, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
The Austrian
28. “Pljušte newspaper
gnjevne reakcije Der izjavu
na kontroverznu Standard published
predsjednice da u BiH an article
dominira stating
militantni islam.that President Grabar-
Poglavar
Islamske zajednice nije birao riječi”, Jutarnji.hr, 31 July 2019, https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/pljuste-gn-
Kitarovic, for the purpose of her re-election campaign, was "running an anti-Muslim campaign"
jevne-reakcije-na-kontroverznu-izjavu-predsjednice-da-u-bih-dominira-militantni-islam-poglavar-islamske-zajed-
nice-nije-birao-rijeci/9187331/, (Access date: 10 December 2019). 35
and "hustling on neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina."
29. “Jadranka Kosor se zbog Kolinde ispričala BiH”, Index.hr, 31 July 2019, https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/
jadranka-kosor-se-zbog-kolinde-ispricala-bih/2105256.aspx, (Access date: 10 Decmber 2019).
30. Ibid.
31. “Predsjednica odbacuje tvrdnje izraelskog medija, ‘Nisam to rekla, mimo presica u Izraelu nisam davala interv-
jue i nisam davala izjave novinarima”, Jutarnji.hr, 31 July 2019, https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/predsjedni-
ca-odbacuje-tvrdnje-izraelskog-medija-nisam-to-rekla-mimo-presica-u-izraelu-nisam-davala-intervjue-i-nisam-dav-
ala-izjave-novinarima/9187472/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
32. Greer Fay Cashman, “Holocaust Main Subject of Conversation between Rivlin and Croatian President”, The
Jerusalem Post, 31 July 2019, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Holocaust-main-subject-of-conversation-be-
tween-Rivlin-and-Croatian-President-597095, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
196 setav.org
30
Ibid.
31
“Predsjednica odbacuje tvrdnje izraelskog medija, ‘Nisam to rekla, mimo presica u Izraelu nisam davala
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
statement that caused turmoil.33 The journalist who wrote the article apologized for
the mistake.34
The Austrian newspaper Der Standard published an article stating that President
Grabar-Kitarovic, for the purpose of her re-election campaign, was “running an an-
ti-Muslim campaign” and “hustling on neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina.”35
Figure5:5:Screenshot
Figure Screenshotofofarticle
article
byby Austrian
Austrian newspaper
newspaper DerDer aboutabout
Standard
Standard Croatia’s
Croatia’s President
President Grabar-Kitarovic
Grabar-Kitarovic
running an
running an anti-Muslim
anti-Muslimcampaign
campaignfor forthe
thepurpose
purposeofof her
her re-election.
re-election.36 36
Croatia’s
Croatia’s president
president commemorated
commemorated the secondthe second of
anniversary anniversary of Praljak’s
Praljak’s death who was death
found
who was found guilty for war crimes in BIH by The Hague tribunal.37 Praljak was a
guilty for war crimes in BIH by The Hague tribunal. 37 Praljak was a Bosnian Croat general who
Bosnian Croat general who served in the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence
served in the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council, an army of the Croatian
Council, an army of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, between 1992 and
Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, between 1992 and 1995. The convicted Bosnian Croat war criminal
1995. The convicted Bosnian Croat war criminal killed himself on live television by
killed himself on live television by drinking poison in a courtroom in The Hague upon
drinking poison in a courtroom in The Hague upon confirmation of his 20-year jail
confirmation of his 20-year jail term for crimes committed during the Bosnian War.
term for crimes committed during the Bosnian War.
33. “Jerusalem post korigirao sporni članak novinarka se preznojavala kad su je pitali o lažnoj Kolindinoj izjavi: ‘Ma
to nije velika priča”, Jutarnji.hr, 31 July 2019, https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/svijet/jerusalem-post-korigirao-spor-
ni-clanak-novinarka-se-preznojavala-kad-su-je-pitali-o-laznoj-kolindinoj-izjavi-ma-to-nije-velika-prica/9188282/,
(Access date: 10 December 2019).
34. “Novinarka Jerusalem posta: ‘o navodnim izjavama Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović o Bosni i Hercegovini”, Dnevnik.
hr, 31 July 2019, https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/novinarka-jerusalem-posta-o-navodnim-izjavama-ko-
linde-grabar-kitarovic-o-bosni-i-hercegovini---570120.html, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
35. “Austrijski list: Kolinda vodi kampanju za reizbor huškanjem protiv BiH”, Index.hr, 7 August 2019, https://
www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/austrijski-list-kolinda-vodi-kampanju-za-reizbor-huskanjem-protiv-bih/2106926.aspx,
(Access date: 10 December 2019).
36. Ibid.
37. “Kolinda odala počast oduđenom ratnom zločincu Praljku”, Index.hr, 1 December 2019, https://www.
index.hr/vijesti/clanak/kolinda-odala-pocast-osudjenom-ratnom-zlocincu-praljku/2136754.aspx, (Access date:
10 January 2020).
36
Ibid.
37
“Kolinda odala počast oduđenom ratnom zločincu Praljku”, Index.hr, 1 December 2019,
https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/kolinda-odala-pocast-osudjenom-ratnom-zlocincu-praljku/2136754.aspx,
(Access date: 10 January 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 197
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Figure 6: Screenshot of Croatian president’s commemoration of the second anniversary of the death of Praljak, a
convict of war crimesFigure 6: Screenshot
in BIH by The of Croatian president’s commemoration of the
Hague tribunal.38 second anniversary of
convict of war crimes in BIH by The Hague tribunal. 38
In August 2019, the senior Berlin-based Croatian diplomat Elizabeta Madjar-
evic was accusedIn of
August
damaging2019,
her the seniorreputation
country’s Berlin-based Croatian
after writing diplomat Elizabeta Madja
inflammatory
Facebook posts alongside idyllic images of the Adriatic coast. She posted the fol-
of damaging her country’s reputation after writing inflammatory Faceboo
lowing comment: “Pure and authentic Europe. Just white Europeans as it used to
be only 30 yearsidyllic
ago inimages
the whole ofEurope.
the Adriatic coast.
This should be She
a goodposted the following
advertisement for comment: “P
vacations. OneEurope.
would think
Justthis is no Europeans
white longer possible
asbut luckilytoit be
it used is.”39only 30 years ago in the wh
Initially she defended her post, arguing that she has a right to speak as a pri-
vate individual.should besuggested
She also a good advertisement
her Facebook pageforhad
vacations.
been hacked.One Howev-
would think this is no lo
luckily
er, Croatian news is.” 39 reported that in earlier Facebook posts she had
it index.hr
portal
written about the “Islamization agenda” of Muslims and espoused homophobic
Initially she defended her post, arguing that she has a right to speak as a priva
views. Madjarevic was also outspoken about German attempts to integrate mi-
also40suggested her Facebook page had been hacked. However, Croatian new
grants into society.
reported that in earlier Facebook posts she had written about the “Islamiz
38. Ibid.
39. Gordan Duhaček, Muslims
“Skandalozniand espoused
rasizam homophobic
naše diplomatkinje views.
u Berlinu: ‘Hrvatska Madjarevic
je zemlja bijelaca’”, Index.was also outspok
hr, August 2019, https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/skandalozni-rasizam-nase-diplomatkinje-u-berlinu-hrvats-
attempts to(Access
ka-je-zemlja-bijelaca/2108985.aspx, integrate migrants
date: 10 December into society. 40
2019).
40. “Croatian Diplomat Suspended for ‘White Europe’ Comments”, BBC, 20 August 2019, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-49405099, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
198 setav.org
38
Ibid.
39
Gordan Duhaček, “Skandalozni rasizam naše diplomatkinje u Berlinu: ‘Hrvatska je zemlj
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
Figure 7: Screenshot of Facebook post by Berlin-based Croatian diplomat Elizabeta Madjarevic stating that “pure and
Figure
authentic Europe” 7: Screenshot
is inhabited of white
solely by Facebook post by 41Berlin-based Croatian diplomat Elizabeta Madjarevic stating that “pure
Europeans.
and authentic Europe” is inhabited solely by white Europeans. 41
The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs considered the situation a serious
The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs considered the situation a serious breach of
breach of official duty and Madjarevic was suspended. 42
42
official duty and Madjarevic was suspended.
Islamophobic speech was part of presidential election campaigns in 2019 run by
candidates such as Anto Djapic from the party Right. He accused Muslims in BIH of
41
Ibid.
cooperating 42with Serbs
Željka in “Elizabeta
Godeč, the Islamization of Croatian
Madjarevic suspendirana territory.
i povucena
43
iz veleposlanstva u Berlinu, inspekcija
Ministarstva vanjskih poslova predložila da joj se da otkaz”, Jutarnji.hr, 19 August 2019,
41. Ibid.
42. Željka Godeč, “Elizabeta Madjarevic suspendirana i povucena iz veleposlanstva u Berlinu, inspekcija Minis-
tarstva vanjskih poslova predložila da joj se da otkaz”, Jutarnji.hr, 19 August 2019, https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/
hrvatska/elizabeta-madarevic-suspendirana-i-povucena-iz-veleposlanstva-u-berlinu-inspekcija-ministarstva-van-
jskih-poslova-predlozila-da-joj-se-da-otkaz/9253580/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
43. “Đapić teško optužio muslimane u BIH! ‘Surađujete sa Srbima u islamizaciji hrvatskih prostora. Jasno je zašto
u RS-u nema migranata’”, Dnevno.hr, 8 November 2019, https://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/dapic-tesko-op-
tuzio-muslimane-u-bih-suradujete-sa-srbima-u-islamizaciji-hrvatskih-prostora-jasno-je-zasto-u-rs-u-nema-migrana-
ta-1390029/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 199
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Islamophobic speech was part of presidential election campaigns in 2019 run by candidates
such as Anto Djapic from the party Right. He accused Muslims in BIH of cooperating with
Serbs in the Islamization of Croatian territory. 43
Croatia’s Member of Parliament and presidential election candidate Ivan Pernar
Croatia’s Member of Parliament and presidential election candidate Ivan Pernar continued
continued posting and sharing news about migrants that painted them as responsible
posting and sharing news about migrants that painted them as responsible for explosions, fires,
for explosions,
knife attacks, etc. fires, knife attacks, etc.
https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/elizabeta-madarevic-suspendirana-i-povucena-iz-veleposlanstva-u-
berlinu-inspekcija-ministarstva-vanjskih-poslova-predlozila-da-joj-se-da-otkaz/9253580/, (Access date: 10
December 2019).
43
“Đapić teško optužio muslimane u BIH! ‘Surađujete sa Srbima u islamizaciji hrvatskih prostora. Jasno je zašto
u RS-u8:nema
Figure migranata’”,
Screenshots Dnevno.hr,
of Facebook post8ofNovember 2019,
Croatia’s MP Ivanhttps://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/dapic-tesko-
Pernar in which he presented migrants as responsible for
Figure 8: Screenshots of Facebook44 post of Croatia’s MP Ivan Pernar in which he presented migrants as responsible
optuzio-muslimane-u-bih-suradujete-sa-srbima-u-islamizaciji-hrvatskih-prostora-jasno-je-zasto-u-rs-u-nema-
explosions, fires, knife attacks, etc. 44
migranata-1390029/,
for explosions, fires,(Access date: 10
knife attacks, .
etcDecember 2019).
The EU parliamentary election campaigns in 2019 featured negative political
The EU parliamentary election campaigns in 2019 featured negative political opinions about
opinions about Islam in Europe such as Ladislav Ilcic’s political platform which ad-
Islam in Europe such as Ladislav Ilcic’s political platform which advocated for Europe as a
vocated for Europe as a dominantly Christian continent. He said that Christian val-
dominantly Christian continent. He said that Christian values and culture produce freedom and
ues and culture produce
equality for all people unlikefreedom and 45equality for all people unlike those of Islam.45
those of Islam.
When When Croatia’s
Croatia’s and
and BIH’s BIH’swere
relations relations were
disrupted, disrupted,
Muslims Muslims
and Islam and mentioned
usually were Islam usually
were mentioned
in a negative in aasnegative
way such by the MEPwayZeljana
such Zovko.
as by the MEP Zeljana Zovko.
46 46
Media
Migrants
44. are Facebook,
Ivan Pernar, often portrayed in an unacceptable way(Access
https://www.facebook.com/pernari/, and some media
date: 10 continue
December to market
2019).
content
45. filled
“Ladislav Ilčićwith hate N1,
na N1”, speech and other
17 April 2019, forms of unacceptable speech. On occasion, media
http://hr.n1info.com/Vijesti/a395836/Ladislav-Ilcic-na-N1.html,
(Access
outletsdate: 10 December
published 2019).
articles that unnecessarily emphasized the nationality or religion of the
46. Gordan Duhaček,
perpetrators “Tko
of illegal actsje despite
Željana the
Zovko,
fact eurozastupnica
that omitting koja slavi zločinačku
this information Herceg-Bosnu?”,
would Index.hr,
not affect the
2 September 2019, https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/tko-je-zeljana-zovko-eurozastupnica-koja-slavi-zlocina-
quality of the reporting.
cku-hercegbosnu/2113045.aspx, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
Examples of such abuse occurred during a broadcast on six regional televisions when the host
said that migrants are savages who come from the east to rape, and during a broadcast in which
200 setav.org
44
Ivan Pernar, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/pernari/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
45
“Ladislav Ilčić na N1”, N1, 17 April 2019, http://hr.n1info.com/Vijesti/a395836/Ladislav-Ilcic-na-N1.html,
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
Media
Migrants are often portrayed in an unacceptable way and some media continue to
market content filled with hate speech and other forms of unacceptable speech. On
occasion, media outlets published articles that unnecessarily emphasized the nation-
ality or religion of the perpetrators of illegal acts despite the fact that omitting this
information would not affect the quality of the reporting.
Examples of such abuse occurred during a broadcast on six regional televisions
when the host said that migrants are savages who come from the east to rape, and
during a broadcast in which the alleged victim of a robbery stated that migrants
should be beaten to a pulp, while guests in the studio talked about migrants as a
sick group of people infected with serious and transmissible diseases such as AIDS
and hepatitis. The Electronic Media Council in Croatia found that the broadcast
violated the Electronic Media Act and temporarily revoked the concession. For
three local television stations concessions were withdrawn for 24 hours, while the
remaining stations had their rights revoked for 3 hours. Following this decision,
the Electronic Media Council members received death threats, which they report-
ed to the authorities.47
Ivica Sola, a Croatian theologian, professor, communicologist, and journalist for
Globus (Hanza Media) wrote that the Pope’s document on the reception of migrants
is pure misuse of the Gospel for political purpose. He wrote that the Christ’s teach-
ings were not conceived as part of a political program which is characteristic of the
Qur’an and Islam where there is no difference between religious and worldly in terms
of “competence.” He argued that migration policy is the responsibility of the secular
state and religious institutions should not intervene.48
Sola also wrote columns in which he argued that Islam in masculine to the
point of being brutal (as opposed to the feminized Europe), and that it takes advan-
tage of the commontion to sneak up on the “woman” Europe.49 In another column
he claimed that we should call migration by its real name namely an invasion from
the Islamic world.50
47. “Report of the Ombudsman for 2018”, Office for Ombudsman of the Republic of Croatia, 25 April 2019,
https://www.ombudsman.hr/hr/download/izvjesce-pucke-pravobraniteljice-za-2018-godinu/, (Access date: 10 De-
cember 2019).
48. Ivica Šola, “Za Globus piše Ivica Šola, više nije jasno vodi li Crkvu papa Franjo ili Soros”, Globus, 21 January
2019, https://www.jutarnji.hr/globus/Globus-komentari/za-globus-pise-ivica-sola-vise-nije-jasno-vodi-li-crkvu-pa-
pa-franjo-ili-soros/8295971/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
49. Ivica Šola, “Ivica Šola: Islam nasuprot feminiziranoj Europi, muževan do brutalnosti, koristi gužvu i uvlači se
ženi Europi pod skute”, Narod.hr, 9 May 2019, https://narod.hr/eu/ivica-sola-islam-nasuprot-feminiziranoj-euro-
pi-muzevan-do-brutalnosti-koristi-guzvu-i-uvlaci-se-zeni-europi-pod-skute, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
50. “Ivica Šola: Nazovimo migracije pravim imenom – invazija islamskog svijeta”, Naron.hr, 10 December 2019,
https://narod.hr/hrvatska/ivica-sola-nazovimo-migracije-pravim-imenom-invazija-islamskog-svijeta, (Access date:
15 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 201
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Justice System
Most of the proceedings in 2018 and 2019 were conducted for criminal offenses
based on discriminatory grounds of sexual orientation and language, followed by
national origin, race and ethnicity, gender, religion, social status, and other char-
acteristics.51
The Ombudsman acted on the basis of several events that highlighted prob-
lems in prosecuting hate crimes and the inadequate punishment of perpetrators. For
example, traces of an unknown substance similar to lard were observed on Muslim
obituaries on a streetlight in Zagreb. Although this indicated a hate crime, police
officers didn’t determine the circumstances, the identity of the person, or the motive
behind the act after the criminal investigation had been carried out.52
In the case of a student recorded by his/her classmates while sharing discrimina-
tory opinions, and expressing contempt and intolerance against Serbs and Muslims,
the State Attorney’s Office responded in a timely manner acting on reasonable suspi-
cion that a crime against public order had been committed by inciting violence and
hatred as referred to in Article 325 (1) of the Panel Code. The State Attorney’s Office
proposed the investigative detention of the alleged perpetrator because of the risk of
influencing witnesses. The process is still ongoing.53
In general, hate speech towards Islam and migrants was present in online content
including social networks. The Croatian government announced the Law on Pre-
venting Inappropriate Behavior on Social Networks so as to apply the best solutions
that will effectively counter this negative phenomenon while respecting the highest
standards of protection and respect for the human rights of freedom of expression in
accordance with the Croatian Constitution and international conventions.54
Internet
Several Croatian news portals including dnevno.hr55 shared a news story about the
results of a research by the Pew Research Center that showed that Islam is the fastest
growing religion in the world and that due to the increased number of migrants in
Europe, Islam will become the world’s leading religion by 2070. Another story that
circulated was that in 80 years according to figures by the United Nations, Islam will be
51. “Report of the Ombudsman for 2018”, Office for Ombudsman of the Republic of Croatia.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. “Panel Discussion Regulation of Hate Speech on Social Networks – Threats to Freedom of Expression”, Kuća
ljudskih prava, 13 November 2019, https://www.kucaljudskihprava.hr/en/2019/11/12/panel-discussion-regula-
tion-hate-speech-social-networks-threats-freedom-expression/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
55. “Konačni pad kršćanstva? Evo kada će islam postati dominanstva svjertska religija!”, Dnevno.hr, 31 August 2019,
https://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/svijet/konacni-pad-krscanstva-evo-kada-ce-islam-postati-dominantna-svjetska-religi-
ja-1357591/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
202 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
the most popular religion in the world. This story was reported by poskok.hr56 that shared
news from the website of the Atlantic.57 The Croatian portals mentioned above pre-
worried about. Following these publications, dnevno.hr published stories ab
sented this information as alarming facts that Croats should be worried about. Fol-
lowing Islam and how St.
these publications, Francis
dnevno.hr defeated
published the
stories of Islam.in58Islam and
Godweaknesses
about
how St. Francis defeated the God of Islam. 58
Figure of9:Croatian
Figure 9: Screenshot Screenshot
news portalof Croatian
dnevno.hr newsresearch
that tagged portal dnevno.hr
results that the
of Islam becoming tagged research
dominant results o
dominant world religion as alarmist data.
world religion as alarmist data.59 59
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
56. “Svijet za 80 godina: Islam najpopularnija religija, staraca više nego ikad”, Poskok.hr, 8 August 2019, https://
Central figures that portrayed Islam in a negative context, spreading h
poskok.info/svijet-za-80-godina-islam-najpopularnija-religija-staraca-vise-nego-ikad/, (Access date: 10 December
2019).
religion, can be divided into three groups based on their functions and area
57. Joe Pinsker, “What Happens When the World’s Population Stops Growing?”, The Atlantic, 31 July 2019,
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/07/world-population-stop-growing/595165/, (Access date: 10
group consists of politicians such as the president of the Republic of
December 2019).
58. “Ovo se skriva, čak i Crkvi: evo kako je sveti Franjo pobijedio Boga islama”, Dnevno.hr, 4 October 2019,
presidential candidate Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, Croatian Parliament m
https://www.dnevno.hr/vjera/svjedocanstva/ovo-se-skriva-cak-i-crkvi-evo-kako-je-sveti-franjo-pobijedio-boga-isla-
ma-1373657/, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
59. Ibid. presidential candidate Ivan Pernar, 2019 presidential candidate Anto Djapic,
European Parliament Zeljana Zovko. The second group consists of diplomats
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 203
Berlin-based Croatian diplomat Elizabeta Madjarevic. The third group con
and academics like Ivica Šola who wrote for different media outlets like Glob
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
Central figures that portrayed Islam in a negative context, spreading hatred towards
this religion, can be divided into three groups based on their functions and area
of work. The first group consists of politicians such as the president of the Repub-
lic of Croatia and 2019 presidential candidate Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, Croatian
Parliament member and 2019 presidential candidate Ivan Pernar, 2019 presidential
candidate Anto Djapic, and member of the European Parliament Zeljana Zovko.
The second group consists of diplomats such as the senior Berlin-based Croatian
diplomat Elizabeta Madjarevic. The third group consists of journalists and academ-
ics like Ivica Šola who wrote for different media outlets like Globus and Jutarnjih.hr
(Hanza Media).
Observed Civil Society and Political Initiatives to
Counter Islamophobia
In 2019, many steps in social development were taken by different actors in Croatia
in order to prevent and condemn discrimination.
The Islamic Community in Croatia and the World Muslim Communities
Council organized a conference that gathered 25 European countries in Zagreb
where the Croatian model of integration of Muslims was presented as a model that
can be used in countries around the world.60 The Minister of Justice Drazen Bosn-
jakovic was present during this event. Usually, every event organized by the Islamic
Community in Croatia is attended by representatives the state and government. The
Islamic Community in cooperation with other religious communities, especially the
Croatian Episcopal Conference, organized a number of encounters and events such
as The Spirit of Assisi,61 etc.
The Center for Cultural Dialogue organized the Balkan Youth School, an edu-
cational program for youth on the challenges of Islam in the contemporary world. It
also marked World Hijab Day62 with the panel where the culture of women’s dressing
and covering in this region was presented.
The Human Rights House Zagreb in partnership with the Center for Peace
Studies organized the panel discussion “Regulation of Hate Speech on Social Net-
works – Threats to Freedom of Expression.” The panel discussion galvanized a public
debate in the wake of the Croatian government’s plan to enact a Law on Preventing
60. “Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj model u rješavanju muslimanskog pitanja u Europi”, Večernji.hr, 15 Janu-
ary 2019, https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/islamska-zajednica-u-hrvatskoj-model-u-rjesavanju-muslimanskog-pitan-
ja-u-europi-1294672, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
61. “Duh Asiza’ kao prilika za kršćane, muslimane i židove”, Vecernji.hr, 30 October 2019, https://www.vecernji.hr/
premium/duh-asiza-kao-prilika-za-krscane-muslimane-i-zidove-1355783, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
62. “U Zagrebu obilježen Svjetski dan hidžaba”, Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj, 4 February 2019, https://www.
islamska-zajednica.hr/izdvojeno/u-zagrebu-obiljezen-svjetski-dan-hidzaba, (Access date: 10 December 2019).
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CROATIA
Inappropriate Behavior on Social Networks, a new legislation designed to combat,
inter alia hate speech online, fake news, and cyberbullying.
The Office for Human Rights and Rights of National Minorities and NGOs
also organized activities and events designed to raise awareness and protect minori-
ties’ human rights and the principles of non-discrimination.
Croatian national television HRT produced a documentary film about the in-
tegration of migrants in Croatian society entitled “New Neighbors” which was in-
tended to fight stereotypes about those who come from a different culture, have a
different skin color, religion, etc. The film is the result of the joint collaboration with
eight national televisions from eight European countries that also produced films on
the same topic in their countries. HRT will show all nine films in its 2020 program.
HRT also broadcast a live stream of prayers on Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha in
2019 from the cities of Zagreb and Rijeka.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The Islamophobic incidents mentioned in the report do not have wider public support,
a significant number of followers, or even a driving potential. They can be treated as
individual outbursts and actions by single individuals. In general, we can still note the
peaceful coexistence between Muslims and other religious groups in Croatia.
Government efforts showcased the desire to put sound policies in place for so-
cial cohesion and acceptance. Religious institutions have displayed their choice to
live together and understand one another.
On the other hand, there were politicians who used anti-Islam and anti-Muslim
rhetoric to incite Islamophobia and win political points that would give them power.
Behaviors and attitudes of politicians are merely the results of political populism.
Recommendations follow:
ű At a time when hate speech and occurrences of extremism in Europe are on
the rise, the joint work and efforts of all actors in implementing prevention
programs and using dialogue to reverse the tide, to heal, to support human
rights, and religious freedoms are more important than ever.
ű Prevention as part of a system for protecting against discrimination should
gain more importance (informing citizens about how to protect themselves,
educating people who face discrimination cases through their work so that
they don’t deny someone their right to equal treatment while making deci-
sions).
ű Croatian authorities should raise awareness among media professionals and
their organizations about the danger of racism and intolerance.
ű All media should act objectively and allow the public to form their own opin-
ions based on facts provided by journalists rather than present the public with
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
personal conclusions made by authors, derogatory epithets, and unacceptable
statements. Media should strive to offer information that can create unbiased
perceptions. It is the responsibility of all segments of society, including the
media, politicians and other public figures to convey messages in a non-dis-
criminatory and non-hateful way, even though they might resonate with a
smaller number of people.
Chronology
• 16.03.2019: BIH journalists and Bosnia’s Security Minister Dragan Mektic
accused Croatia’s Security Intelligence Agency (SOA) of smuggling weap-
ons into places connected with the Salafi Islamist movement in Bosnia.
• 17.04.2019: EU Parliament candidate Ladislav Ilcic stated that Christian
vales and culture produce freedom and equality for all people unlike those
of Islam.
• 25.04.2019: Following a group of seven Muslim tourists praying in a park-
ing lot in the Croatian city of Split, City Council member of Split Martin
Pauk stated that they had announced their invasion in European territory
and compared their prayer to dogs urinating to mark their territory.
• 30.07.2019: The media published a statement by President of Republic of
Croatia Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic that BIH is a very unstable country and
under the control of militant Islam, and that in some aspects it has been
taken over by people associated with Iran and terrorists.
• 31.07.2019: The president of the Republic of Croatia denied having said
what was published in the Jerusalem Post.
• 08.08.2019: The senior Berlin-based Croatian diplomat Elizabeta Madjar-
evic stated that pure and authentic Europe means a Europe inhabited only
by white Europeans.
• 19.08.2019: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Croatia suspended
Croatian diplomat Elizabeta Madjarevic.
• 08.11.2019: Presidential candidate Anto Djapic from the political party
Right accused Muslims in BIH of cooperating with Serbs in the Islamiza-
tion of Croatian territory.
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
CZECH
REPUBLIC
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
SELMA MUHIČ DIZDAREVIČ
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CZECH REPUBLIC
The Author
Selma Muhič Dizdarevič is a sociologist with a degree in political philosophy.
She works as a teacher and researcher in the fields of public and social policy, immi-
gration and integration, civil society, and gender and human rights at Charles Uni-
versity, Faculty of Humanities, Prague and is a board member of the Czech Helsinki
Committee. Her projects include areas such as the political participation of refugees
and asylum seekers; the role of non-governmental organizations in the integration
of minorities in the Czech Republic; and the inclusion of Muslim women into the
Czech job market. She was a Fulbright visiting scholar at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley. Email: selmamuhdiz@gmail.com
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Selma Muhič Dizdarevič: Islamophobia in the Czech Republic: National Report 2019, in:
Enes Bayraklı & Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
In 2019 we see the continuing trend of mainstreaming and normalising Islamopho-
bia in the public discourse, particularly among politicians and in social media. How-
ever, we may say that it takes a new form of total rejection of admitting any refugees
in the Czech Republic. Rejecting Muslims and rejecting refugees merged into one
complex of hate speech and hostile proclamations by politicians, journalists, artists,
public personalities, and social media users. We are in the situation in which the
president of the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy party, which is in parlia-
ment, advocates for banning Islam and thus limiting the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of denomination. There is an increasing trend of dealing with hate speech
by the state using legal means, perhaps due to the radicalisation of a Czech pensioner
who was sentenced for committing a terrorist act inspired by hate towards Muslims.
Even though the number and visibility of Muslims and Muslim community orga-
nizations remain low, there is general fear and distrust directed at them. This makes
the community extremely cautious and limits its capacity to advocate for itself and
control the narrative. In most Czech media, every misstep on the part of the com-
munity is used against it and against Islam as a religion. The affair with an attempt
by citizens, their initiatives, and some politicians to admit 50 orphan children from
Greek camps and later the Greek call for admitting unaccompanied minors with
health problems show how deep the lack of compassion is for those perceived by the
majority as undesirable. Even though there were some 200 families who volunteered
to host the children, the politicians from the ruling party ANO and their coalition
partner, the Social Democrats, obstructed the process successfully. Due to this type
of hostility and radical rejection, the whole society becomes vulnerable to fake news
and false alarms spread about Muslims in most media.
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Shrnutí
V roce 2019 pokračoval trend normalizace islamofobie, která se zároveň stal součástí
hlavního proudu ve veřejném diskurzu, zejména mezi politiky a na sociálních sítích.
Musíme však zdůraznit, že má novou tvář, která je patrná v naprostém odmítání
přijímání uprchlíků Českou republikou. Odmítání muslimů a odmítání uprchlíků
splynulo do jakéhosi komplexu hovoru z nenávisti a nepřátelských proklamací po-
litiků, novinářů, umělců, veřejných osobností a uživatelů sociálních sítí. Jsme v si-
tuaci, kdy předseda parlamentní strany Svobody a přímé demokracie volá po zákazu
islámu a tím i po omezování ústavně zaručené svobody vyznání. Posiluje tendence
státu trestat hovor z nenávisti právními prostředky, možná i v důsledku radikalizace,
kterou prošel česky důchodce a který byl odsouzen za teroristický čin inspirován ne-
návisti vůči muslimům. Přestože počet a viditelnost muslimů a muslimské komunity
zůstávají nízké, panují všeobecně vůči obojímu strach a nedůvěra. Z toho důvodu
je muslimská komunita extrémně opatrná a limitovaná ve svém potenciálu se svých
členů a členek zastávat a kontrolovat škodlivý diskurz, který v souvislosti s muslimy
dominuje v české společnosti. Většina medií v České republice i sebemenší prohřešek
komunity využívá jako nástroj proti této komunitě a proti islámu jako náboženství.
Na popud občanů, občanských iniciativ a některých politiků a političek, vznikla ini-
ciativa tykající se přijetí 50 sirotků z řeckých táborů a pozdější řecké výzvy k přijetí
nezletilých bez doprovodu se zdravotními problémy. Přestože se přihlásilo kolem 200
rodin ochotných sirotky ubytovat a postarat se o ně, politici z vládnoucí strany ANO
a jejich koaliční partner Sociální demokracie blokovali veškeré kroky k uskutečnění
iniciativy, která tím pádem skončila. Tato aféra poukazuje na hluboký nedostatek
soucitu s těmi, které majorita považuje za nežádoucí. Díky takovému radikálnímu
odmítání je cela společnost více zranitelná pokud jde o falešné a poplašné zprávy,
které najdeme v souvislosti s muslimskou komunitou ve většině medií.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: Czech Republic
Type of Regime: Parliamentary representative democracy
Form of Government: Unitary parliamentary constitutional republic
Ruling Parties: ANO 2011 (centrist, populist) and Czech Social Democratic
Party (centre-left, populist)
Opposition Parties: Civic Democratic Party, (centre-right); Czech Pirate Party;
Freedom and Direct Democracy (far-right); Communist Party of Bohemia and Mora-
via (far-left); Czech Social Democratic Party (centre-left); Christian Democratic Union,
(centre-right); TOP 09 (centre-right); Mayors and Independents (local issues party)
Last Elections: 2018 Presidential election (Miloš Zeman won 51.37% of the
vote in the second round); 2017 Legislative election (ANO 2011, 78 seats; Civic
Democratic Party, 25; Czech Pirate Party, 22; Freedom and Direct Democracy, 22;
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, 15; Czech Social Democratic Party, 15;
Christian Democratic Union, 10; TOP 09, 7; Mayors and Independents, 6)
Total Population: 10.65 million
Major Languages: Czech
Official Religion: No official religion
Statistics on Islamophobia: For the year 2019 there are no statistics about
victims of hate crimes in general or victims of Islamophobia as of yet. According to
the Ministry of Interior´s data there were 90 hate-motivated crimes in the first half
of 2019. In 2018, this number was 179.
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: According to the statistics of the
Ombudswoman´s office, for the period 1 January -30 September 2019, there were
186 cases of alleged discrimination of all inhabitants on a variety of grounds. In
2018, this number was 227.
Major Religions (% of Population): According to the 2011 census: no religion
(34.5%), Catholics (10.5%), Protestants (1%), believers with no affiliation to reli-
gious institutions (6.8%), undeclared, no answer (44.7%).
Muslim Population (% of Population): According to the 2011 census 3,358
individuals (0.03%); according to estimates 22,000 (0.2%).
Main Muslim Community Organizations: Centre of Muslim Communities,
General Union of Muslim Students in the Czech Republic, Muslim Union
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: In Iustitia (collecting data on hate
crimes), OPU (Organization for Aid to Refugees), Czechs Help, We Help People on
the Run, ROMEA, Multicultural Centre
Far-Right Parties: Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD)
Far-Right Movements: We Do Not Want Islam in the Czech Republic, 7. Re-
publika, National Resistance
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CZECH REPUBLIC
Far-Right Terrorist Organisations: N/A
Limitations to Islamic Practices:
ű Hijab Ban: Limitations at schools and work-regulated by dress codes of the
given institutions
ű Halal Slaughter Ban: None
ű Minaret Ban: None (depends on local decision)
ű Circumcision Ban: None
ű Burka Ban: No specific regulations; however, there are no burqa-clad indi-
viduals in the country
ű Prayer Ban: None
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Introduction
In addition to the normalisation and mainstreaming of Islamophobia in the Czech Re-
public, we can say that in the year 2019 there have been no radical changes. The most
important fact for anti-Muslim discourse is its close relatedness to the issue of refugees
and particularly to the relocation quotas problem, also documented in the previous
report. The Czech Republic remains adamant about not accepting any refugees either
in the framework of relocation quotas or on its own. Refugees are perceived almost
exclusively as Muslims but also as “non-compatible” citizens coming from sub-Saharan
Africa or predominantly Asian Muslim countries. In the Czech Republic, we can see
the mixing of Islamophobia and racism (directed mostly at non-white people). In the
public discourse, mentioning refugees usually leads to discussing Muslims and Islam in
a negative way. The extreme form this approach has reached can be understood from
the ongoing affair about admitting orphans or unaccompanied minors who are already
in the EU, namely in Greek refugee camps, to the Czech Republic. Civil society backed
by a politician from the Christian Democrat Party developed an initiative to admit a
few tens of such children. Over 200 families volunteered to accept them. However,
they were constantly sabotaged by the prime minister and other politicians until in
2020, the minister of interior said no children would be admitted. In the opinion of
this author, this shows how deeply Islamophobia has penetrated Czech society: even
children or young adults deserve no compassion or trust but are instead left on their
own in terrible conditions in overcrowded refugee camps in Greece. On the other
hand, significantly, the 200 or so families who volunteered to accept refugee children
and youth show there is resistance to general intolerance and distrust.
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and
Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
While incidents of physical nature are fortunately relatively rare, incidents of verbal
attacks offline and particularly online are very common. There is no systematic col-
lection of such incidents by the police or the non-governmental (NGO) sector. The
Czech Ministry of Interior publishes reports entitled “Incidents of Extremism and
Prejudice-Based Hatred”,1 which on the level of incidents cover only those that reach
legal threshold. For the period covered in this report, the latest info is for the second
quarter of 2019.
Some of the incidents and legal proceedings are of interest to this report. An
MP for the rabidly Islamophobic party frequently mentioned in the previous report
1. “Projevy extremismu a předsudečné nenávisti, Souhrnná situační zpráva 2. čtvrtletí roku 2019”, Ministerstvo
vnitra, https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/ctvrtletni-zpravy-o-extremismu-odboru-bezpecnostni-politiky-mv.aspx, (Access
date: 1 February 2020).
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CZECH REPUBLIC
(Freedom and Direct Democracy, SDP), Karla Maříková, compared Muslims to in-
vasive species of plants and animals whose import to the EU is forbidden. She did
this on her Facebook page in January 2019.2 In the report, the Ministry of Interior
states that the police started gathering information on possible violation of the Czech
law, which forbids incitement of hate against a group of people.3
In June 2019, an unsuccessful asylum seeker believed to be of Libyan origin from
Germany is alleged to have raped and robbed a Czech woman. He was apprehended
and is currently being investigated. This incident provoked numerous and extreme
verbal attacks on Muslims, refugees, migrants, and undocumented migrants. As stat-
ed in the previous reports, in the Czech Republic, most of the commentators are not
anonymous, they comment online under their own names. Perhaps aware that they
will not be condemned or seriously punished, they openly compared, in reaction to
the rape incident, Muslims to monkeys and pigs. One of the commentators suggest-
ed that the Libyan man should be “immediately shot, then sewn into pig skin, put in
the coffin made of zinc, and sent to his country of origin with a message that you all
will end up like this if you break the law in such an appalling manner”.4 According
to the said report, the Prague police is investigating some of the comments.
Employment
As stated in previous reports on Islamophobia in the Czech Republic, there is no
data on employment of Muslims particularly. They are a tiny minority, diverse in
their countries of origin, and status in the Czech Republic. They are also frequently
employed within their own ethnic group.
Education
In the sensationalistic and biased magazine Reflex, we find an article under the title
“Muslims Are Conquering Czech Judiciary; Their Women in Hijab Will Sit in Our
Schools”. The article in a very caustic manner reacts to the Supreme Court verdict in
the case of the Somali student Ayan Jamaal Ahmednuur. Six years ago, she alleged
discrimination on the part of the High School for Nurses in Prague 10 because she
was unable to wear a hijab during the theoretical part of the lectures (she agreed to
remove the hijab during the practical part). The lower courts sided with the school
but the Supreme Court stated that wearing a hijab is her personal choice, which does
not endanger anyone and that not wearing a hijab might have a negative impact on
the student who can then be in a worse position than other students. The verdict also
2. ČTK, “Policie vyšetřuje poslankyni SPD Maříkovou Na facebooku přirovnala migranty k invazivním druhům”,
iRozhlas, 16 August 2019, https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/spd-karla-marikova-policie-vysetrovani-mi-
grace-uprchlici-evropska-unie_1908162152_gak, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
3. “Projevy extremismu a předsudečné nenávisti, Souhrnná situační zpráva 2. čtvrtletí roku 2019”.
4. lre vlc, “Zastřelit, reagují lidé k násilníkovi z ciziny. Komentáře prošetří policie”, iDnes, 19 July 2019, https://
www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/okamura-prispevek-facebook-znasilneni-v-terezine-nenavistne-komentare-nasi-
li-na-zenach.A190619_094654_domaci_lre, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
mentions that schools should teach tolerance and diversity. The verdict means that
the lower courts will have to carry out a retrial.
The article, though, first repeats fake news that the student was excluded from
the school for not having proper documents, while the student left because of the
hijab dispute. It then goes on to mention the negative role of the Ombudswoman
(who gave support to the student) and “professional NGOs”,5 claims that Muslims
ask for exceptions from religious neutrality in the Czech educational system, and
ends with asking for a Saudi Arab or Qatari Supreme Court verdict in the matter of
protection of Christian children in their high schools.
Politics
In high politics not much changed from 2018. The mainstreaming of Islamophobia
continues and it is now well-established in the political discourse. In 2019, Islam-
ophobia transformed into a particularly hostile attitude toward refugees. One big on-
going affair is the issue of the relocation of orphans and unaccompanied minors from
refugee camps in Greece. Already in 2018, Prime Minister Babiš said that the Czech
Republic would not admit any migrants at all, including orphans. He added that the
Czech have their own orphans and asked why they should accept Syrian ones.6 The
prime minister is from the populist centre-right party ANO. His opponent was an
MP for Christian Democrats, Michaela Šojdrová, who, together with the voluntary
citizens’ movement Czechs Help, led the initiative to admit 50 Syrian refugees who
were already in Greece. The prime minister´s argument was that Czechs didn´t ad-
mit Ukrainian refugees either and that the Czech Republic helps by having already
invested 2.5 billion CZK in the hospital in Syria, which also serves Syrian children.7
Finally, Minister of Interior Jan Hamáček, who initially claimed that the Czech Re-
public has more than enough capacity to admit 50 orphans, changed his tune and
closed the whole affair by saying that “there is no point in admitting 17-year-olds
without right to asylum”.8
In the meantime, Hlidácí pes, the investigative independent media outlet, found
out that Greek Minister of Citizen Protection Michalis Chrysochoidis sent a letter
to all EU ministers in August asking them to help by admitting unaccompanied
minors who are in Greek camps and who are sick. Hlidáci pes found out that the
5. Marek Stoniš, “Muslimové si podmaňují českou justici; v našich školách mají sedět jejich ženy v hidžábech”,
Reflex, 6 December 2019, https://www.reflex.cz/clanek/komentare/98803/muslimove-si-podmanuji-ceskou-justi-
ci-v-nasich-skolach-maji-sedet-jejich-zeny-v-hidzabech.html, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
6. lre, ČTK, “Česko nepřijme ani nezletilé syrské sirotky, řekl Babiš. Hamáček oponuje”, iDnes, 15 September
2018, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/andrej-babis-rozhovor-uprchlici-nechce-syrske-sirotky-v-ceske-repub-
lice.A180915_132056_domaci_lre, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
7. Ibid.
8. Redakce Euro.cz, ČTK, “Hamáček: Sirotky z uprchlických táborů nepřijmeme. Nemá to smysl”, Euro.cz, 7 Novem-
ber 2019, https://www.euro.cz/politika/hamacek-sirotky-z-uprchlickych-taboru-neprijmeme-nema-to-smysl-1472939,
(Access date: 1 February 2020).
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CZECH REPUBLIC
Czech minister ignored the letter. Prompted by the publicity of the article, Hamáček
asked his Greek counterpart for a list of 40 eligible minors. However, it wasn´t clear
if he was referring to his previous letter, in which he demanded for a list only with
Syrian nationals and only up to 10 years of age. Chrysochoidis replied that no such
list could be issued. Hamáček concluded for the Czech public that those who would
be relocated would be almost adult males, the group which in his view presents a
security threat.9
Media
Most media in the Czech Republic are to be found online, thus, it is difficult to sep-
arate this category from the one listed as “Internet”. We will, therefore, focus here on
media, and for the section on Internet, on social media.
The media range from reasonably credible (such as Aktuálně.cz, DeníkN.cz - a
paid news channel -, Hlídacípes.org, Investigace.cz, Neovlivní.cz, revuebabylon.cz,
Romea.cz, A2larm.cz, and Denikreferendum.cz) through to mainstream media (e.g.
Czech TV and radio), sensationalistic plus politically biased (Seznam, Seznam TV,
Echo, Info, Forum 24, Lidové noviny, iDNES, Novinky) to downright inflammato-
ry (We Don´t Want Islam in the Czech Republic, Aeronet, Eurabia, Parlametní listy,
Pravdive.eu).
A media outlet of particular interest to the issue of Islamophobia is an on-
line outlet called Center for Study of Political Islam (CSPI),10 which in addition to
English and Czech has mutations in Hungarian, Slovak, Dutch, Lithuanian, Ger-
man, Danish, Polish, and Romanian. It is founded by one Bill Warner, who is listed
by the Southern Poverty Law Center as part of a core group of “10 Anti-Muslim
hard-liners”.11
We will focus here on the Czech version of the CSPI. In the introduction, it
defines its character as “a nonprofit, apolitical and nonreligious international edu-
cational movement” with a mission to focus on political Islam, e.g. “the part of Is-
lam dealing with kafirs.” It also claims that 51% of the core Islamic doctrine deals
with kafirs.12 One of the examples of the CSPI educational approach can be found
in the blog entry from 28 September 2019 called “Migration and International
Treats as Instrument of Jihad for Spreading of Islam”.13 This organization poses
9. Tereza Engelová, “Hamáček odepsal do Atén kvůli dětským uprchlíkům. Sám prý už rok čeká na odpověď
z Řecka”, Hlídací pes, 14 November 2019, https://hlidacipes.org/hamacek-odepsal-do-aten-kvuli-detskym-up-
rchlikum-sam-pry-uz-rok-ceka-na-odpoved-z-recka/?hilite=%27ham%C3%A1%C4%8Dek%27, (Access date: 1
February 2020).
10. For further information see their website at https://www.cspii.org/cz
11. “Bill Warner (writer)”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Warner_(writer), (Access date: 11 March 2020).
12. “Introduction page”, CSPI, https://www.cspii.org/cz, (Access date: 11 March 2020).
13. “Migrace a mezinárodní smlouvy jako nástroje džihádu k šíření islámu”, CSPI, https://www.cspii.org/cz/blog/
migrace-a-mezinarodni-smlouvy-jako-nastroje-dzihadu-k-sireni-islamu, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
as one which provides rational and objective information on Islamic teaching but
actually claims that, according to its books, Islam is necessarily violent and expan-
sive and can be stopped by violence only. One of the main figures in the CSPI
leadership mentioned only in the English version is the Czech Milan Podlipný,
who frequently blogs on the platform of the above mentioned Parlamentní listy.14
By focusing on the term “political Islam”, Bill Warner contributed to Islamopho-
bia by seemingly separating teaching on kafirs from teaching of Islam in general,
and falsely claiming that political Islam does not target Muslims and practicing
of their faith.
In a somewhat bizarre feud between internationally infamous fake news outlet
Sputnik and the leading Czech Islamophobe and businessman Tomio Okamura, we
read about Okamura being attacked for selling halal meat through his online shop.
Sputnik in the Czech version rightly calls Okamura out for blatant hypocrisy, which,
however, did not impress his followers much. Even though Okamura invited his fol-
lowers to fight against halal food and boycott kebab, he himself was making a profit
from selling halal-certified food. Sputnik attacked him for hypocrisy but not for the
battle against halal food in the context of fighting Muslims.15
Justice System
According to ROMEA reporting, “The acquittal of the former chair of the Muslim
Community of Prague, Vladimír Sáňka, with respect to the case involving his dis-
tribution of a Czech translation of The Fundamentals of TAWHEED (Islamic Mono-
theism) has now been made definitive. According to InfoSoud, a database of judicial
rulings, the Czech Supreme Court has rejected an appeal by Supreme State Prosecu-
tor Pavel Zeman against the acquittal.”16
News server iDNES.cz reports that prosecutors have indicted a man and wo-
man who detectives say made threats against a Muslim couple in Šanov Park
in Teplice, Czech Republic in the summer of 2018. The incident happened du-
ring an event organised by the Teplice branch of the „Bloc against Islamisation“
group. Those attending the event saw a Muslim woman with a baby carriage
walking past them and called her vulgar names, after which her husband attemp-
ted to discuss their behavior with them. „The 40-year-old man who had verbally
assaulted the woman is said to have pulled out a gas pistol, cocked it, and ai-
med it at the injured party‘s husband,“ Teplice Police spokesperson Daniel Vítek
14. For example: “Milan Podlipný: Násilí je neoddělitelnou součástí politické doktríny islámuhttps”, Parlament-
níListy.cz, 12 June 2017, https://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/nazory-a-petice/Milan-Podlipny-Nasili-je-neod-
delitelnou-soucasti-politicke-doktriny-islamu-491817, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
15. “Jak to, že není ve střetu zájmů? Na Facebooku vidíme, jak Okamura prodává ve svém obchodě halal potraviny
pro muslimy”, Sputnik, 23 July 2019, https://sptnkne.ws/7XY5, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
16. ČTK, “Czech Courts Definitively Acquit Publisher of Salafist Book of Promoting a Movement against Human
Rights”, ROMEA, 18 February 2019, http://www.romea.cz/en/news/czech/czech-courts-definitively-acquit-pub-
lisher-of-salafist-book-of-promoting-a-movement-against-human-rights, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
218 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CZECH REPUBLIC
said. „According to eyewitness testimony, the man then threatened to kill the
Muslim woman‘s husband because of his religious faith,“ the spokesperson said.
The suspect‘s 44-year-old wife has also been indicted for verbally assaulting and
threatening the Muslim couple.17 Later in 2019, the couple received a suspended
sentence and was fined.18
Internet
The hotbed of Islamophobia in the Czech Republic is online. It is currently nor-
malised to come upon casual and extreme forms of it. Particularly popular are social
media, namely Facebook and Twitter, and YouTube. Overall Islamophobic material
can be classified as: (a) insults, humiliation, hostility, calls for violence; (b) fake news,
false alarms; (c) manipulation of facts and events in order to stress the negative na-
ture of Muslims and connect it to their faith.
There has been a fusion in public life between Islamophobia and refugee is-
sues. Refugees are often seen as exclusively Muslims. Furthermore, we often come
across racism regarding black people from sub-Saharan Africa, even when they are
not Muslims. Top and local politicians, and mainstream public opinion and citizens
commenting online are united in the rejection of refugees - all refugees, under any
conditions. This anti-refugee attitude comes with the rejection of the EU and, in
some circles, the glorification of Russia. A particularly strong feature of Islamopho-
bia on the Internet is the generally present view that Western societies are ruined by
migration and by yielding to Muslims and their habits (food, dress code, polygamy,
etc.). Among the claims about Western European countries is that Muslims are par-
asites, invited to the West by corrupt or naïve politicians. This fits perfectly into the
famous white supremacist conspiracy theory of the Great Replacement. In some
circles, Jews are accused of importing Muslims to ruin white people.19
An example of spreading fake news and false alarm can be illustrated by Tomio
Okamura´s social media post (on Facebook) in which he was “warning of increas-
ing numbers of acid attacks in Great Britain” and alleging incorrectly that they are
being committed by “Muslim immigrants” against women. Okamura used a drastic
photograph of a woman who was indeed victimized by an acid attack in 1991, by a
native Brit, Kelvin Greenhalgs. The Daily Mirror reported last year that Greenhalgs
17. “Czech Court to Try Islamophobes Who Attacked Muslim Couple in a Park Last Year”, ROMEA, 10 July 2019,
http://www.romea.cz/en/news/czech/czech-court-to-try-islamophobes-who-attacked-muslim-couple-in-a-park-last-
year, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
18. “Za výhrůžky Arabům padly podmíněné i peněžité tresty”, ROMEA, 7 October 2019, http://www.romea.cz/
cz/zpravodajstvi/domaci/za-vyhruzky-arabum-padly-podminene-i-penezite-tresty, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
19. “Euroafrika: Globalizace nejen kultur, ale i hmyzu, rostlin a podnebí? Kdo ovládá a řídí migraci černochů a Arabů do
Evropy?...” AENEWS, 30 June 2018, https://aeronet.cz/news/euroafrika-globalizace-nejen-kultur-ale-i-hmyzu-ros-
tlin-a-podnebi-kdo-ovlada-a-ridi-migraci-cernochu-a-arabu-do-evropy-kdo-ridi-na-6-prioritach-cely-system-global-
izace-uz-to-vime-komu-vyhovuje/, (Access date: 26 February 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
had disappeared after failing to turn up for a court date and republished photographs
of his victim online, which Okamura used.20
The Notre Dame disaster was another source for hoaxes. According to Hlidácí
pes, a video of a smiling group of men was combined with the photo of the burning
cathedral. It was alleged on the Facebook page of the association Pro-Vlast (For-Fa-
therland) that this combination means Muslims are celebrating the destruction of
the Christian place of worship. In addition, a person who self-identified as Miroslav
Provod sent all Czech media an email “full of proof ” that the fire was organized by
women from so-called ISIS. To crown it all, a hoax spread that a car full of gas bombs
was parked in front of the cathedral and that a Muslim girl, disappointed from love,
committed the attack.21
The Christchurch mosque terrorist attack was significant for the flood of
comments on social media which approved of killing worshipers. Many of the
commentators claimed it was a justified revenge for the terrorist attacks commit-
ted by Muslims in the West. Jiři Kalvoda from Brno - I would like to reiterate that
people comment under their real names - commented as a reaction to the attack
on the webpage of media outlet novinky.cz: “No Muslims, no mosques, no prob-
lem”. Petr Matys Vraný commented on the Facebook page of Tomio Okamura
(SPD): “I do not condemn this!!! At least he showed them we are not afraid of
these cripples!!!!”22
President of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman sent his condolences to Gov-
ernor-General of New Zealand Patricia Reddy, in which he confirmed that the
Czech Republic strongly condemns the terrorist attack. The prime minister, min-
ister of foreign affairs, minister of interior, and chairs of some parties also con-
demned the attack.
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
One of the central figures in Islamophobic propaganda is half-Czech half-Japanese
leader of the parliamentary party Freedom and Direct Democracy Tomio Okamura
and his party members. Regarding his party, even the report of the Ministry of In-
terior on extremism states: “Xenophobic attitudes of the part of the Czech society
were skilfully inspired, particularly through social networks, by the party of SDP. The
20. “Czech Ultra-Nationalist Falsely Attributes Acid Attack Committed by Native British Man to “Muslim Im-
migrants”, ROMEA, 3 February 2019, http://www.romea.cz/en/news/czech/czech-ultra-nationalist-falsely-attri-
butes-acid-attack-committed-by-native-british-man-to-muslim-immigrants, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
21. Tereza Engelová, “Zkázu Notre-Dame využívají i autoři hoaxů. Za požárem vidí smějící se muslimy i „černé
vdovy”, Hlídací pes, 16 April 2019, https://hlidacipes.org/zkazu-notre-dame-vyuzivaji-i-autori-hoaxu-za-pozarem-
vidi-smejici-se-muslimy-i-cerne-vdovy/, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
22. “Desítky komentářů, ve kterých pisatelé schvalují neonacistický útok na Novém Zélandu. Policie prý už koná”,
ROMEA, 16 March 2019, http://www.romea.cz/cz/zpravodajstvi/domaci/desitky-komentaru-kde-pisatele-schvalu-
ji-neonacisticky-utok-na-novem-zelandu.policie-pry-uz-kona, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CZECH REPUBLIC
party (movement) continuously and intentionally provoked the impression that the
majority in the Czech Republic is in acute danger of immigration and Islamisation,
that it is necessary to start defending ourselves immediately, otherwise we will end
up as ´citizens of second category in our own country´. The SDP representatives
took a very proactive stance in commenting on every single registered negative phe-
nomenon both in the Czech Republic and abroad, which was related to migrants or
Muslims.”23 His party campaigns for a ban of Islam and hijabs, so far has been un-
successful. As demonstrated throughout this report, Islamophobia runs across party
affiliations. Thus Jaroslav Foldyna, from the Czech Social Democrats, is famous for
his denial of the Srebrenica genocide.24
In addition to politicians and unmentioned in the previous report is an interest-
ing case of a woman who founded an initiative called Angry Mothers. Eva Hrindová
is dedicated to the cause of fighting against migration and Islamisation. For example,
on her blog we find her article under the title “Women´s Security Is Endangered the
Most by Migration and Political Correctness”,25 in which she claims that the fact
that rapes are related to migration is constantly suppressed. She is also a staunch an-
ti-feminist particularly when it comes to feminists calling for tolerance and diversity.
Observed Civil Society and Political Initiatives to
Counter Islamophobia
According to the European Council for Foreign Affairs survey conducted in 14
countries of the European Union, the respondents from the Czech Republic identi-
fied Islamic radicals and migration as the single biggest threat to Europe today.26 In
such an atmosphere, it is challenging to promote policies or even discourse to count-
er Islamophobia. That´s why such initiatives deserve special appreciation.
The non-formal movement “Czechs Help” led by Czech truck-driver Jaroslav
Miko has already been mentioned. He relentlessly fights for the admission of Syrian
orphans and for more tolerance in general. He is joined in this initiative by the afore-
mentioned MP Šojdrová and Martin Rozumek, director of the NGO “Organization
for Aid to Refugees”.
23. “Projevy extremismu a předsudečné nenávisti, Souhrnná situační zpráva 2. čtvrtletí roku 2019”.
24. Tomáš Krist, “Foldyna: Masakr v Srebrenici naplánovali sami muslimové”, Lidové noviny, 27 May 2011, https://
www.lidovky.cz/domov/foldyna-masakr-v-srebrenici-naplanovali-sami-muslimove.A110527_182544_ln_domov_
spa, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
25. Eva Hrindová, “Bezpečnost žen nejvíce ohrožuje migrace a politická korektnost”, Evahrindová.cz, 4 January
2020, https://www.evahrindova.cz/bezpecnost-zen-nejvice-ohrozuje-migrace-politicka-korektnost, (Access date: 1
February 2020).
26. Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard and Susi Dennison, “What Europeans Really Want: Five Myths Debunked”, Eu-
ropean Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/what_europeans_really_want_five_
myths_debunked#country-cz, (Access date: 1 February 2020); “The poll reveals that Europeans fear Islamic radical-
ism (more) than any other threat.” See p. 9.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
The Initiative Central Station, again, a purely voluntary non-formal association
of citizens, provides migrants released from detention camps in the Czech Republic
with food, lodging, mobile phones, and tickets to continue their journey to the
West. The migrants are caught while in transition to the West, held in detention
camps, stripped of all belongings and cash, and released with a deportation order.
Without mobile phones they often have no way of knowing where they are.
Finally, the author of this report would like to stress a tiny trend of Muslim com-
munity and Muslims fighting against predominantly hostile attitudes towards them.
According to Radio Prague, “Imam Leonid Kushnarenko, head of the Prague Mus-
lim Community, has been removed from office and expelled from the community.
Both the Czech Muslim Community and its Prague branch distanced themselves from
Kushnarenko after he posted a call on Facebook for Muslims to arm themselves in re-
sponse to the shooting in Christchurch, New Zealand. The head of the Czech Muslim
Community Munib Alvari said the vote to expel Kushnarenko had been unanimous.”27
Kushnarenko is an Ukrainian convert to Islam. Even though there was nothing illegal
in his call, it was perceived by the Muslim Community as inflammatory.
Nur Ashraf Bekai, a Palestinian woman from Lebanon, is a beloved teacher of
English and civics in the socially excluded location of Předlice, populated mostly by
Roma. It is difficult to find teachers for the almost exclusively Roma children school.
She wears a hijab and says “discussions about prohibiting the hijab are equally absurd
as those forcing women to wear it.”28
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
There is continuity in the mainstreaming of Islamophobia in the Czech society. In
the realm of politics, with few exceptions the process of othering Muslims is expect-
ed and encouraged. In media, there are balanced voices but still very few authentic
voices of Muslims from the Muslim community. There are also media whose reason
of existence is to spread only the worst stereotypes about Muslims. In the realm of
social media, unbridled hate, scare- and conflict-mongering challenge the limitations
of freedom of speech and present society with the question of illegality of certain
types of speech and fake news. The issue of hatred towards Muslims intensely fused
with the issue of refugees and relocation quotas. There are scarce but brave initiatives,
particularly in the sphere of civil society that counter the dominant narrative of total
rejection. Some Muslims are becoming mildly visible in the Czech society.
27. Daniela Lazarová, “Head of Prague Muslim Community Expelled after Call for Muslims to Arm Themselves”,
Radio Prague International, 25 March 2019, https://www.radio.cz/en/section/news/head-of-prague-muslim-com-
munity-expelled-after-call-for-muslims-to-arm-themselves, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
28. “Muslimka Nur Ashraf Bekai učí romské žáky ve vyloučené lokalitě”, ROMEA, 9 May 2019, http://www.
romea.cz/cz/zpravodajstvi/domaci/muslimka-nur-ashraf-bekai-uci-romske-zaky-ve-vyloucene-lokalite, (Access date:
1 February 2020).
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CZECH REPUBLIC
ű In the case of politicians, it is recommended that they be held to the same
standard as regular citizens. They need to take responsibility for the damage
brought about by the hate they create.
ű In the case of media, there must be an efficient system of countering fake
news. Social networks should be held responsible (also financially responsi-
ble) for providing a platform for hate speech.
ű Civil society organisation should be more persuasive in showing that this is
not only an issue of hating Muslims but that Islamophobia, like other forms
of hate, endangers the foundations of democracy for everyone.
ű Finally, Muslims in the Czech Republic and the Muslim community should
be encouraged to take control of the narrative and become more visible.
Chronology
• January 2019: On Facebook, MP for the Freedom and Direct Democracy
party (SDP) Karla Maříková: “It is forbidden to import invasive, non-in-
digenous species of plants and animals to the European Union. Muslim im-
migrants are also non-indigenous inhabitants in Europe and the same way
as other invasive species they represent unexpected expansion and gradual
supplanting of indigenous inhabitants of Europe. Therefore, they should be
forbidden from entering the EU.”
• 07.09.2019: Michal Kraft, assistant to MP for Social Democrats Jaroslav
Foldyna: “[The parallel measure should be] immediate deportation of all
members of the invasive culture to their country of origin or anywhere else.
It is clear today that their integration is impossible (at least in a reasonable
time) … this measure should affect all members of the invasive ethnicity
regardless of their citizenship just like after WWII…” The last point refers
to when Czechs expelled Czech Germans regardless of their citizenship.
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
DENMARK
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
AMANI HASSANI
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
The Author
Amani Hassani is a Danish anthropologist with a PhD from Concordia Univer-
sity, Canada. She is an urban ethnographer who combines anthropology, sociology,
and geography in the study of Muslim minorities living in the Global North. Her
recent research compares the experiences of young Muslims in Denmark and Cana-
da, exploring issues of racialisation, social mobility, and urban life in a transatlantic
perspective. She is also an active member of the Centre for Danish-Muslim Relations
(CEDAR), a Danish NGO that seeks to raise awareness and address Islamophobia
and anti-Muslim racism in Denmark. Email: hassani.amani@gmail.com
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Amani Hassani: Islamophobia in Denmark: National Report 2019, in: Enes Bayraklı &
Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 227
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
In the 2019 general elections, the centre-left parties won a majority mandate. This
brought minorities and anti-racism campaigners some hope that the ethnonation-
alist political discourse would be reduced. However, Muslim citizens continued to
face political stigmatisation and anti-Muslim racism in 2019. The Social Democrats
campaigned with a promise to continue the harsh immigration policies and work
against “parallel communities” (an implicit reference to Muslim citizens). They have
continued to implement the internationally criticised ‘ghetto’-policies which par-
ticularly target and discriminate so-called non-Western citizens. Furthermore, the
government has introduced legislation that allows the Minister of Immigration and
Integration to deprive dual citizens their Danish citizenship to prevent Danish for-
eign fighters who have travelled to Syria from re-entering Denmark. This poses a
challenge for the division of power within Danish governance, as dual citizens can
now be deprived of their citizenship without judicial oversight.
The 2018 niqab ban has been particularly worrisome for Muslim women. The
police and state attorney have yet to prosecute any hate crime that women wearing a
niqab have reported. This seems to have set a precedence that these women have little
recourse for legal action. Nevertheless, the national police have campaigned among
the Muslim community to encourage reporting experiences of hate crime in 2018-
19, which is an important step to raise awareness of hate crime against Muslims.
Far-right politician Rasmus Paludan and his party, Hard Line, were approved to
run for the 2019 elections and campaigned throughout Denmark on an anti-Mus-
lim platform under heavy police protection. However, they did not win any seats
in parliament. On a hopeful note, anti-Islamophobia and anti-racist NGOs seem
to have become better at creating coalitions and collaborating on common issues in
2019. These NGOs are creating a basis for grassroots mobilisation against racism and
Islamophobia, and collaborating with international civil rights organisations.
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ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
Sammenfatning
Folketingsvalget i 2019 resulterede i en sejr for de venstreorienterede partier, og så-
ledes et håb om en formindskelse af den etnonationalistiske politiske diskurs. Det
har dog vist sig, at muslimske borgere fortsat oplevede politisk stigmatisering og
anti-muslimsk racisme i 2019 selv efter folkestingsvalget. Socialdemokratiets valg-
kampagne fokuserede på at fortsætte den hårde indvandringspolitik og arbejde imod
hvad de betegner som ”parallelsamfund” (en implicit henvisning til muslimske bor-
gere). De har fortsat implementeringen af den internationalt kritiseret ’ghetto’-lov-
pakke som især diskriminerer såkaldt ”ikke-vestlige indvandrere og efterkommere”.
Derudover har regeringen indført lovgivning, der giver Udlændinge- og Integrati-
onsministeren magt til at fratage dobbeltsstatsborgere deres danske statsborgerskab
– en lov indført for at forhindre, at danske ”fremmedkrigere” vender hjem. Denne
lovgivning er blevet kritiseret for at være en trussel mod Danmarks tredeling af magt,
idet dobbeltstatsborgere kan få frataget deres statsborgerskab uden retsligt tilsyn.
Forbuddet mod niqab i 2018 har især været bekymrende for niqab-bærende
kvinders sikkerhed. På trods af, at flere af disse kvinder har oplevet hadforbrydelser,
når de færdes offentligt, har hverken politiet eller statsadvokaten retsforfulgt no-
gen for disse hadforbrydelser. Dette er en bekymrende tendens, da det påviser en
manglende villighed til at tage disse kvinders anklager alvorligt. Ikke desto mindre
har det nationale politi øget engagementet blandt det muslimske trossamfund for
at understrege vigtigheden af at rapportere hadforbrydelser i 2018-19. Dette er et
vigtigt skridt for at skabe opmærksomhed omkring hadkriminalitet mod muslimer.
Rasmus Paludan og hans parti, Stram Kurs, blev godkendt til at stille op til val-
get i 2019 og førte valgkampagne på et anti-muslimsk grundlag under høj politibe-
skyttelse. De vandt dog ingen pladser i folketinget. Året 2019 har dog vist en positiv
fremgang blandt NGO’ers samarbejde i at bekæmpe islamofobi og racisme. Dette
har skabt et godt grundlag for græsrodsmobilisering, samt et bedre samarbejde med
internationale organisationer der arbejder for borgerrettigheder.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 229
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: Denmark
Type of Regime: Constitutional Monarchy
Form of Government: Unitary parliamentarism
Ruling Parties: The Social Democrats (supporting parties: Danish Social Lib-
eral Party, Red-
Green Alliance, Socialist People’s Party)
Opposition Parties: Venstre - Denmark’s Liberal Party, Danish People’s Party,
Liberal Alliance, Conservative People’s Party, the New Right, the Alternative (the
only leftist party in the opposition)
Last Elections: 2019 General Elections: the Social Democrats won 25.9% of
the vote against 23.4% of Venstre. The Social Democrats with Mette Frederiksen as
prime minister formed a single-party minority government in summer 2019.
Total Population: 5.8 million
Major Languages: Danish
Official Religion: Protestant-Lutheran Christianity (the orientation of the
Church of Denmark)
Statistics on Islamophobia: According to the latest available Danish National Po-
lice (Rigspolitiet) hate crime report, there was a total of 112 religiously motivated hate
crimes in Denmark, 63 cases were against Muslims or Muslim institutions in 2018. This
means that a majority of religiously motivated hate crime target Muslim (56%).
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: According to the latest available
Danish National Police hate crime report there were 260 cases of racist incidents
reported.
Major Religions (% of Population): Protestant Christians (74.7%), Islam (est.
5.5 %), Catholics (0.6 %).
Muslim Population (% of Population): 320,000 people (5.5%) in 2019. This
estimate is an increase of 12,000 from 2018. The reason for this is that Statistics Den-
mark gained access through CPR (citizen identification data) of the ethnicity of third
generation descendants of non-Western immigrants in 2019. Thus, those who origi-
nate from Muslim-majority countries can be included in the statistical calculations.
Main Muslim Community Organizations: Dansk-Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse,
Det Islamiske Trossamfund (DIT), Dansk Islamisk Center (DIC), Muslimsk Ungdom
i Danmark (MUNIDA), Minhaj-ul-Quran Denmark, Dansk Muslimsk Ungdom,
Dansk Muslimsk Union (DMU), Dansk Islamisk Råd
Main NGOs combating Islamophobia: Centre for Danish Muslim Relations,
Sameksistens.dk, SOS Racisme, Kvinder I Dialog (Women in Dialogue), European
Network Against Racism-Denmark, Center for Forbyggelse af Ekslusion (Centre for
Prevention of Exclusion)
230 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
Far-Right Parties: Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti), The New Right
(Nye Borgerlige), Hard Line (Stram Kurs)
Far-Right Movements: Generation Identitær, For Frihed (For Freedom, former
PEGIDA), Nordfront
Far-Right Terrorist Organisations: N/A
Limitations to Islamic Practices:
ű Hijab Ban: None. The parliament rejected a bill-proposal to ban public ser-
vants from wearing religious symbols in March 2019.
ű Halal Slaughter Ban: None
ű Minaret Ban: None
ű Circumcision Ban: None
ű Burka Ban: Yes, implemented in 2018 following a parliamentary vote with a
majority ruling in favour of a ban.
ű Prayer Ban: None. The parliament rejected a proposal to prohibit prayer
rooms in public educational institutions in 2018.
ű
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 231
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Introduction
Denmark does not shy away from directly targeting Muslims in legislation. At the
same time, because it is illegal to register a citizen’s religion, it struggles to recognise
the everyday and structural Islamophobia that its Muslim citizens experience. Rac-
ism is neglected in the Danish context.1 By extension, Islamophobia as a form of rac-
ism is often socially dismissed, on the presumption that Muslims are not a ‘race’ and
thus cannot be discriminated against based on their religious beliefs. Also, it is often
claimed that the concept of Islamophobia curbs criticism of Islam and thus threatens
freedom of speech.2 This is an important backdrop to understand Islamophobia in
Denmark in 2019.
A survey of over 5,900 Danes was conducted in 2019 by Professor Jørgen Goul
Andersen in collaboration with the news site Mandag Morgen.3 The survey focused
on Danes’ sentiments towards immigration, and concluded that about 28% agreed/
partly agreed that Muslim immigrants should be deported. If this number is an in-
dicator of the general sentiments of the Danish population, it means that almost a
quarter of all Danes have significantly prejudicial views towards Muslims that may
lead them to support restricting Muslims’ civil rights. This is a worrying conclusion as
it threatens the constitutional principle of religious freedom in Denmark. Although
public discourse has become emboldened through the last several years in targeting
Muslim citizens, the rhetoric is often masked behind a conflation of non-Western
immigrants and descendants. Muslims represent the idea of ‘non-Western’ in policy,
political rhetoric, and the public’s imagination. This is significant in Denmark where
race and racism are presumed to be non-existent, yet prevail through colour-blind
rhetoric. In other words, ‘non-Western’ serves a colour-blind veneer to avoid em-
phasising a person’s racial or religious belonging. The implication of this is that the
Danish government can implement discriminatory legislation targeting ‘non-West-
ern immigrants and descendants’ that in effect is aimed at Muslim citizens. In turn,
this makes the case of Islamophobia in Denmark difficult to document, let alone
address and contest.
This report is not a comprehensive overview of Islamophobic occurrences in
2019; rather, it focuses on major events within each subheading to demonstrate how
prejudicial rhetoric of previous years is exacerbated with expanding legislation, sur-
veillance, and negative campaigns towards Muslim citizens.
1. R. Andreassen and K. Vitus, “Introduction: Affectivity as a Lens to Racial Formations in the Nordic Countries”,
Affectivity and Race, eds. R. Andreassen and K. Vitus, (Routledge, New York: 2016), p. 11–28.
2. F. Elahi and O. Khan, “Introduction”, Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us All, eds. F. Elahi and O. Khan, (Run-
nymede Trust, London: 2017), p. 5-12.
3. Jens Reierman and Torben K. Andersen, “Hver fjerde dansker: Muslimer ud af Danmark”, Mandag Morgen,
21 October 2019, https://www.mm.dk/artikel/hver-fjerde-dansker-muslimer-skal-ud-af-danmark?utm_con-
tent=bufferc1d11&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer, (Access date: 2 Feb-
ruary 2020).
232 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and
Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
The number of physical and verbal attacks on Muslims in 2019 has yet to be pub-
lished by the Danish National Police. There are however several public cases per-
taining particularly to Muslim women wearing the niqab (face veil) or hijab that are
worth mentioning. In April 2019, a 17-year-old girl wearing a hijab was violently
attacked by a Danish man.4 The man yelled racist slurs at her, ripped off her hijab,
kicked her in the head and punched her repeatedly. The attack took place in broad
daylight and one man came to protect the young woman from her attacker.5
In late 2018 (a few months after the niqab ban took effect), a woman wearing
a niqab in a grocery store was verbally assaulted by several male shoppers.6 In Jan-
uary 2019, the woman took the case to the state attorney who, after reviewing her
case, argued she was not ‘threatened’ by the assaulters (according to §266 in Danish
criminal law) and she could therefore not press charges. Yet, the woman’s attorney
explained to the online platform Hadforbrydelser that the woman was reporting the
assault as a hate crime, which the state attorney neglected to address. The woman’s
attorney further highlighted that this case sets the precedence for vigilantism against
women who wear the niqab.7 In line with this prediction, a niqab-wearing woman
shared her experience of being assaulted in late 2019 on social media.8 In her post,
she explains how a man approached her and her friend as she was leaving a shop and
started yelling at her that it was illegal to wear the niqab after which he pulled it off.
According to a message she shared on the support page on Facebook for women who
wear the niqab in Denmark, she questioned whether she should report the assault to
the police as she may be fined for wearing the niqab in the first place.
The Danish National Police have noted a significant rise in hate crimes against
the Muslim population in Denmark in 2018, and have therefore started campaign-
ing and raising awareness about hate crimes and the importance of reporting them
to the police. As part of the campaign, the police visited a mosque to raise aware-
4. “Vidner søges i sag om overfald på 17 årig pige i Albertslund”, Copenhagen West Police Force, 4 April 2019,
https://politi.dk/koebenhavns-vestegns-politi/efterlyste-og-savnede-personer/vidner-soeges-i-sag-om-overfald-paa-
17aarig-pige-i-albertslund/2019/04/04, (Access date: 30 January 2020).
5. Caroline Haslund Siegumfeldt, “17-årig udsat for groft overfald - fik revet tørklædet af ”, TV2 Nyheder, 4 April
2019, https://nyheder.tv2.dk/krimi/2019-04-04-17-aarig-udsat-for-groft-overfald-fik-revet-toerklaede-af, (Access
date: 30 January 2020).
6. Sibel Özcan and Zeynep Bangert, “Islamophobia in Denmark: National Report 2018”, European Islamophobia
Report 2018, ed. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, (SETA, Istanbul: 2018), p. 251-282.
7. Ronni Abergel, “Statsadvokat afviser racisme sag fra Kvickly”, Hardforbrydelser.dk, 23 July 2019 http://hadfor-
brydelser.dk/statsadvokat-afviser-racisme-sag-fra-kvickly/ (Access date: 30 January 2020).
8. Kvinder i Dialog, Facebook, 1 December 2019 https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=kvinder%20i%20dia-
log&epa=SEARCH_BOX (Access date: 30 January 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 233
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ness, answer questions and encourage the congregation to report any experiences
of hate crime to the police. They continued this awareness campaign in 2019 and
it will be important to see if there has been a change in the amount of reporting of
Islamophobic hate crimes in 2019, when the Danish National Police publish their
report later this year.
Employment
In 2019, news media revealed that Danish jobcentres - institutions that are in charge
of assisting unemployed citizens find employment - have been categorising unem-
ployed ethnic minorities as ‘non-Western immigrant/descendant’.9 There is an im-
plicit - and sometimes explicit -racialisation of Muslims as non-Western in Danish
public consciousness. Since it is illegal to register religious affiliations in Denmark,
the structural discrimination that occurs when citizens are categorised by the public
system as ‘non-Western’ can be experienced as Islamophobic. This means that de-
scendants of immigrants from the Global South whose families may have resided in
Denmark for several generations are still categorised within policies and the public
system as non-Western citizens.
In the case of jobcentres, unemployed ethnic minorities discovered that their on-
line profile included the categorisation of non-Western immigrant/descendant with
no easy recourse to delete the designation. Furthermore, they did not volunteer this
information; rather, it was provided through the personal records the government
has on all Danish citizens through their CPR (citizen identification data), which
includes age, employment records, and ethnicity.10 The Center for Danish-Muslim
Relations (CEDAR) as well as local Copenhagen politician Badar Shah, a member of
the political party Alternative, requested access to official information regarding this
issue from the Employment and Integration authorities in Copenhagen. They were
informed that ethnic profiling was a state directive which could influence what offers
are given to particular citizens based on their ethnic heritage.11 CEDAR sent further
information requests to the National Board of Labour and Employment questioning
the differentiation between ethnic Danes and ethnic minorities within jobcentre reg-
isters. They received a clarification that they use statistical information that evaluates
which factors can predict who becomes long-term unemployed, and Danish citizens
9. Tania Andersen, “Jurist: Dataprofilering af langtidsledige med etnicitet er ulovlig”, Version 2, 17 October
2019, https://www.version2.dk/artikel/jurist-dataprofilering-langtidsledige-med-etnicitet-ulovlig-1089176?f-
bclid=IwAR26QicbA0F-Xe8VPCPwoWGacUMarlUl0e8dBqgMHJFDETieQsrMljM_eqQ, (Access date: 3
February 2020).
10. “Profilafklaring – det digitale forberedelsesskema på Jobnet”, The National Board of Labour and Employment,
6 November 2019, https://star.dk/it/borger-it/profilafklaring-forberedelsesskema/ (Access date: 30 January 2020).
11. “Badar Shah’s Correspondance with the Employment and Integration Authorities”, Direktion Beskæftigelses- og
Integrationsforvaltningen, 9 October 2019, https://www.kk.dk/sites/default/files/uploaded-files/09-10-2019_svar_
til_badar_shah_vedr._personoplysninger_paa_jobnet.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3juYyBtiL-25s43D8jwtEz8Wp_HkEu-
V6uR176w0O5Fjo6gDENZ8Efgs7U, (Access date: 3 February 2020).
234 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
who originate from the Global South are evaluated to be at a higher risk.12 Never-
theless, several jurists and human rights advocates have highlighted that acquiring
information on citizens’ ethnicity, race, faith, and sexuality without their consent is
against EU law and that it discriminates and stigmatises the citizens affected by it.13
Education
In 2019, the Social Democrats campaigned in the Danish general elections with sev-
eral promises to continue strict integration policies. One of these campaign promises
was to remove public funding of Muslim independent schools in Denmark because
of a suspicion they are not sufficiently promoting Danish values of freedom, democ-
racy, and gender equality.14 Following their electoral win, the Social Democrats im-
plemented an audit of 17 independent schools out of which 7 schools were Muslim
schools. With only 25 Muslim schools out of 558 independent schools in Denmark,
there is a significant overrepresentation of Muslim schools in this audit.15 One can
wonder why this overrepresentation exits; egregiously, one of the selection criteria for
the audit is that a school has at least 50% non-Western students.16 This demonstrates
the legal loophole the state has created with the category of ‘non-Western’ to be able
to target Muslim citizens. The majority of these students are presumably Danish
citizens, but as explained in the introduction, ‘non-Western immigrants and descen-
dants’ is a category often used as a placeholder for Muslim.
The Social Democratic government (with the support of the Danish People’s
Party) seems to be gearing up to attempt to restrict public funding to these schools.
Venstre and the Conservative People’s Party, however, are voicing caution. They argue
that the government’s use of ‘non-Western students’ as reasoning for restricting access
to public funds can be viewed as discriminatory on the basis of their ethnicity. The
Social Liberals are also voicing concern as they worry that the government’s attempt
at closing down Muslim schools could be an infringement of the rights and freedom
of schooling in Denmark.17
12. Author’s personal communication with CEDAR activists regarding their email correspondence with the Nation-
al Board of Labour and Employment.
13. “Jobcentre anklages for ulovlig diskrimination: Rammer særlig gruppe ledige”, Radio24syv, 7 October 2019,
https://www.a4nu.dk/artikel/jurister-jobcentre-diskriminerer-med-nyt-profileringsvaerktoej, (Access date: 30
January 2020).
14. Anders Redder, “Nye tal bekymrer: Muslimske friskoler står foran skærpet tilsyn”, Kristligt Dagblad, 25 November
2019, https://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/danmark/nye-tal-bekymrer-saerligt-muslimske-friskoler-testes-demokratisk-sin-
delag, (Access date: 30 January 2020).
15. Ibid.
16. Ritzau, “Muslimske friskoler står foran skærpet tilsyn”, Politiken Skoleliv, 26 November 2019, https://skole-
liv.dk/nyheder/art7517440/Muslimske-friskoler-st%C3%A5r-foran-sk%C3%A6rpet-tilsyn, (Access date: 30
January 2020).
17. “Ny rapport bestyrker S-ønske om at lukke de muslimske friskoler” Politiken Skoleliv, 24 April 2019, https://
skoleliv.dk/nyheder/art7156232/Ny-rapport-bestyrker-S-%C3%B8nske-om-at-lukke-de-muslimske-friskoler, (Ac-
cess date: 30 January 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 235
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
The schools that are being audited had until December 6, 2019, to answer a
number of questions posed by the Ministry of Education on how the schools han-
dle issues pertaining to equality, ‘social control’, and the curriculum in Christianity
Studies. In early February 2020, the media reported that 24 Muslim schools receive
financial support from the government despite the government’s campaign promise
to stop funding independent schools with more than 50% non-Western students.18
However, the Justice Ministry has cautioned that discriminating schools based on
ethnicity is against the Danish constitution and the government has not yet found
a way to implement their campaign promise without transgressing the constitution.
It will be important in 2020 to see if the government succeeds in finding a way to
discriminate against Muslim independent schools without transgressing the Danish
constitution. Five Muslim schools have already been closed since 2017 through al-
legations of undemocratic schooling (e.g. finding teaching material on ‘jihad’ in a
school’s copy room)19 or funding from anonymous donors. The government’s cur-
rent approach seems to be looking for ways of changing current legislation to make it
particularly harder for Muslim schools to get public funding as well as funding from
anonymous donors. However, they have to formulate a legal language that bypasses
laws of rights and freedoms that prohibit discriminating citizens based on ethnicity
and religion.20
Politics
The year 2019 saw a change of government in Denmark. The left-leaning parties
won with a majority of seats (91 mandates out of 179), leaving the right-wing parties
defeated. The Danish People’s Party (DPP) in particular lost a large number of seats:
from 21% in 2015 to 8.7% in 2019.21 For many minorities and anti-racism cam-
paigners, this shift in government presented a hope that the harsh political rhetoric
and legislation against Muslims and refugees would change for the better. However,
the Social Democrats, who won 25.9% of the national vote, ran a campaign on con-
tinuing the harsh legislation against Muslims, ethnic minorities, and refugees/asylum
seekers,22 and they were thereby able to attract a large number of DPP voters. Instead
of creating a coalition government with other left parties that also won many seats
18. Martin Borre, “Socialdemokratiet: Vi gør noget ved muslimske friskoler inden næste valg”, Berlingske, 10 February
2020, https://www.berlingske.dk/politik/socialdemokratiet-vi-goer-noget-ved-muslimske-friskoler-inden-naeste-valg
(Access date: 18 February 2020).
19. Henrik Jensen and Jens Anton Bjørnager, ”Efter alvorlige lovbrud: Muslimsk friskole mister statslig million-
støtte”, Berlingske, 27 September 2017, https://www.berlingske.dk/samfund/efter-alvorlige-lovbrud-muslimsk-fris-
kole-mister-statslig-millionstoette (Access date: 18 February 2020).
20.“Ny rapport bestyrker S-ønske om at lukke de muslimske friskoler”, Politiken Skoleliv.
21. Elis Gjevori, “Denmark’s Left Wins Election by Adopting Right-Wing Rhetoric”, TRT World, 6 June 2019,
https://www.trtworld.com/europe/denmark-s-left-wins-election-by-adopting-right-wing-rhetoric-27298, (Access
date: 30 January 2020).
22. Ibid.
236 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
(e.g. Social Liberals or Red-Green Alliance) giving the government a clear majority
government, the new prime minister Mette Frederiksen decided to form a minority
single-party government with the approval of the center-left parties.23 This would
mean that although the political left parties would be the government’s support-
ing parties, Frederiksen’s government was free to create alliances across the political
spectrum. In practice, forming a minority government allows the Social Democrats
to collaborate with the political right on issues pertaining to creating a harsher en-
vironment for refugees, immigrants, and Muslim minorities, while simultaneously
collaborating with left-wing parties on issues of welfare, environment, etc. Neverthe-
less, the strong mandate of the leftist parties means that the Social Democrats cannot
completely neglect the left in their political issues.
Because of this development, general Islamophobic political attitudes have risen
in recent years. Right-centrist policies seem to have continued in the latter half of 2019
with the Social Democrats in government. They have introduced legislation on citizen-
ships, ‘ghetto’-policies, and a general continuation of Islamophobic political rhetoric.
For instance, in October 2019, MP Ida Auken, a member of the left-centre Social
Liberal Party, published an opinion piece about meeting with a Muslim male citizen
who shook her hand as he entered her office, but explained that he preferred not to
shake hands in general because of his religious beliefs. In response to this explanation,
Auken published an opinion piece in which she refers to the man as an ‘idiot’ for not
wanting physical contact with her and discloses a number of her prejudicial views
towards Muslim men (e.g. as oppressive). As an elected politician, this opinion piece
can be perceived as a promotion of Islamophobic rhetoric directed at Muslims.24 It is
highly problematic that as an elected politician who is ethnically Danish and with the
power to condemn an already targeted representative of a religious minority, Auken
puts herself as a victim vis-à-vis a citizen who has no public power to defend himself.
This abuse of power was even criticised by Auken’s colleague, Jens Rohde, who called
her out on her controversial article. He argued that as an elected politician, any meet-
ings with citizens should be confidential. In this case, Rohde contends, Auken did not
only breach this confidentiality but also put herself in the position of the victim of this
encounter, when in fact she is part of a powerful privileged political elite.25
23. Kristine Korsgaard, “Mette Frederiksen bliver statsminister for en ren S-regering: Svære kampe venter”, Altinget,
26 June 2019, https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/mette-frederiksen-bliver-statsminister-for-en-ren-s-regering, (Access
date: 30 January 2020).
24. Ida Auken, “Ida Auken er rasende: Manden, der kom ind på mit kontor, var tydeligvis idiot!”, Politiken, 1 Octo-
ber 2019, https://politiken.dk/debat/debatindlaeg/art7416529/Manden-der-kom-ind-p%C3%A5-mit-kontor-var-
tydeligvis-idiot, (Access date: 30 January 2020).
25. Jens Rohde, “Jens Rohde: Hvad ville der ske, hvis jeg som MAND kaldte en kvinde for IDIOT, blot fordi hun
hilser med hånden på hjertet og ikke ved at tage min hånd?”, Politiken, 15 October 2019, https://politiken.dk/
debat/debatindlaeg/art7440850/Hvad-ville-der-ske-hvis-jeg-som-MAND-kaldte-en-kvinde-for-IDIOT-blot-fordi-
hun-hilser-med-h%C3%A5nden-p%C3%A5-hjertet-og-ikke-ved-at-tage-min-h%C3%A5nd?shareToken=W3X-
vEaAAHPHw, (Access date: 30 January 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 237
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
The New Right won 4 seats in the 2019 general elections. The party is a new
right-wing political party established in 2015, and believes the Danish People’s Party
- previously the most anti-immigration/Islamophobic party in Danish politics - is
too lenient on immigration issues and issues pertaining to Muslims. One MP from
the New Right, Mette Thiesen, shared on her Facebook profile that, as a member of
the citizenship committee in parliament, she would make sure to vote against any
citizenship application originating from Muslim-majority countries. Questioned on
this discriminatory logic, she argued that as long as the parliament does not address
the inherent issues of immigration (i.e. allowing Muslim migrants residency), she
would not change her position.26
Figure 1: Mette Thiesen describes how she plans to reject citizenship applications from people originating from
Muslim-majority countries.27
Figure 1: Mette Thiesen describes how she plans to reject citizenship applicatio
A few days before Thiesen’s social
Muslim-majority media post,
countries. 27 an opinion piece on the Dan-
ish citizenship procedures was published in the newspaper Politiken. In this arti-
A fewChristian
cle, the author questioned days before Thiesen’s
Langballe socialParty),
(Danish People’s media post, an opinion piece
a long-time
chairman and member of the citizenship committee, who admitted to always voting
procedures was published in the newspaper Politiken. In this arti
Christian Langballe (Danish People’s Party), a long-time
26. Philip Sune Dam, “Nye Borgerlige-profil: ‘Folk fra muslimske lande skal ikke have dansk statsborgerskab”, Ber-
lingske, 16 August 2019, https://www.berlingske.dk/samfund/nye-borgerlige-profil-folk-fra-muslimske-lande-skal-
chair
ikke-have-dansk, (Access date: 10 February 2020).
citizenship committee, who admitted to always voting against a ci
27. Mette Thiesen, Facebook, 15 August 2019, https://www.facebook.com/mette.thiesen/?__tn__=%2C-
applicant was from “a distant Middle Eastern country”.
d%2CP-R&eid=ARDsYb7MwH1l7KHDJuwZUDM28Zy17i-g_aDnZDgKgNvw8RGu2SIl3pAsVirZ6fTqOli-
8UV2iV55Qtv_B, (Access date: 10 February 2020).
He furth
political interest in reducing the number of Danish Muslim citizens.
238 the approach of both Langballe and Thiesen is a politisation of citize
setav.org
individual applicants. 28 This is a worrying development in Danis
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
against a citizenship application if the applicant was from “a distant Middle East-
ern country”. He further explained that he had a political interest in reducing the
number of Danish Muslim citizens. The article highlights how the approach of both
Langballe and Thiesen is a politisation of citizenship rather than about the individ-
ual applicants.28 This is a worrying development in Danish politics, as the political
motivations of MPs in the citizenship committee can discriminate applicants from
Muslim-majority countries with impunity. These proceedings happen behind closed
doors and with no public transparency, and thus there is no way of contesting rejec-
tions on the basis of discrimination.
Media
Minorities in general, and Muslims in particular, are often excluded from public
debates regarding minorities’ experiences in Denmark but also other contemporary
and global political issues though they may profess appropriate forms of expertise.29
Unfortunately, the lack of recognition in Danish media discourse of its own bias
and reproduction of political rhetoric towards minorities, means that the general
representation of Muslims continues to be that of ‘Other’ within Danish society.
For instance, the culture editor of the newspaper Berlingske, Anne Sofie Hermansen
wrote an opinion piece criticising the nomination of a song written by the Danish
Muslim artist Isam Bachiri (Isam B) in the Danish School Songbook. In her article,
she accuses Isam B of being a “Muslim fundamentalist” who should not be included
in the Danish songbook, which is a national representation of Danish identity.30 She
includes a number of unverified examples that present Isam B as someone who is
incompatible with Danish culture and criticises the choice of including him in the
songbook as an attempt to be politically correct.31 This example demonstrates the
level of power the media has in both how debates on Muslims are framed as well as
journalists’ capacity to discredit individual Muslims to promote a nationalist and
Islamophobic agenda.
A few Muslim public speakers have been able to gain popularity in media de-
bates by publishing opinion pieces regarding experiences of discrimination partic-
28. Thomas Borchert, “Tysker i Danmark: ‘I har gjort det til en absurd øvelse at forsøge at blive statsborger”, Politik-
en, 10 August 2019, https://politiken.dk/debat/kroniken/art7321358/I-har-gjort-det-til-en-absurd-%C3%B8velse-
at-fors%C3%B8ge-at-blive-statsborger, (Access date: 2 February 2020).
29. Mrutyuanjaj Mishra, “Danske mediers dækning er racistisk” Information, 7 May 2019, https://www.informa-
tion.dk/debat/2019/05/danske-mediers-daekning-racistisk, (Access date: 11 March 2020).
30. Anne Sofie Hermansen, “Hvad skal en fundamentalistisk muslim som Isam B i Højskolesangbogen?” Berling-
ske, 8 August 2019, https://www.berlingske.dk/aok/anne-sophia-hermansen-hvad-skal-en-fundamentalistisk-mus-
lim-som-isam-b-i, (Access date: 4 February 2020).
31. Steffen Groth, “Isam B udråbes til muslimsk fundamentalist i Berlingske”, POV, 9 August 2019, https://pov.in-
ternational/personagreb-pa-isam-b-omtaget-af-dampene-fra-antiislamiske-netfora/, (Access date: 4 February 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 239
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ularly pertaining to Muslims as well as calling out the racism in society.32 This is
progress. Yet without a conversation about the lack of cultural, ethnic, and religious
diversity in Danish news media -not only in representation of the topics that are be-
ing discussed but also who decides what topics and issues are reported on - the racist,
Islamophobic, and often reductionist representation of Muslims in Danish media
will most likely continue.
Justice System
Several bills have been implemented in 2019 that target Muslim and/or non-Western
citizens: e.g. forced handshake during citizenship ceremonies; a ‘paradigm-shift’ in
immigration/asylum procedures focused on repatriation rather than settlement; and
citizenship deprivation of dual citizenship. For the sake of brevity, this report will fo-
cus on the last point of citizenship deprivation of dual citizens, specifically targeting
‘foreign fighters’ who have travelled to Syria and presumed to have joined so-called
ISIS. Legislation was introduced to deprive dual citizens of their Danish citizenship
easily by political means. This seems to set a problematic precedence for how the
government deals with dual citizens in general, particularly Muslim dual citizens.
The change in legislation was introduced through an emergency vote on the issue of
depriving citizenship of Danish citizens with dual citizenship through the Minister
of Immigration and Integration rather than by the traditional judicial procedures.
It thus gives one individual - a politician - full power and authority to deprive dual
citizens of their Danish citizenship outside of legal procedures.33 The Danish govern-
ment is being pressured to take back its citizens captured and stranded in prisons in
Syria and neighbouring regions. With this bill, the government is attempting to find
a way around it. The bill won a majority vote with the support of parties from the
right-centre, mainly Venstre and Danish People’s Party in October 2019, only a day
after the bill was first introduced to parliament.
The bill has been heavily criticised by other politicians, legal experts, and civil
rights organisations. Some of the arguments they raise is that the new legislation threat-
ens the division of power in governance as well as being a threat to the Danish judicial
system, which already has legal procedures in place to tackle treason as well as other
charges related to ‘foreign fighters’.34 As of November 2019, the Danish Security and
Intelligence Service (PET) could declare that around 35 ‘foreign fighters’ are currently
in the conflict zone. Most of them, however, are Danish citizens and very few are dual
32. Tarek Hussein, “Antidemokraterne i DF”, Altinget, 14 June 2019, https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/tarek-hus-
sein-antidemokraterne-i-df, (Access date: 4 February 2020).
33. Jeppe Sahlholdt, “Omstridt lov om fremmedkrigere er vedtaget med stemmer fra V og DF”, Altinget, 24 Octo-
ber 2019, https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/omstridt-lov-om-fremmedkrigere-er-vedtaget-med-stemmer-fra-v-og-df,
(Access date: 2 February 2020).
34. Philip Sune Dam and Frederikke Palmu Johansen, “Eksperter kommer med hard kritik af nyt lovforslag: ‘På
kanten af menneskerettigheder”, Berlingske, 15 October 2019, https://www.berlingske.dk/samfund/eksperter-kom-
mer-med-haard-kritik-af-nyt-lovforslag-paa-kanten-af, (Access date 2 February 2020).
240 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
citizens.35 This has made some critics argue that it is mostly political ‘spin’ to introduce
this bill, because Danish citizens cannot be rejected entry into Denmark.36
Internet Internet
Online media, especially socialespecially
Online media, media, are tools
social thatare
media, aretools
actively used
that are to promote
actively and and enhance
used to promote
enhance an Islamophobic public rhetoric. In 2019, this pattern continued, where
an Islamophobic public rhetoric. In 2019, this pattern continued, where right-wing politicians
right-wing politicians perpetuated Islamophobia on social media platforms. One
such example wasperpetuated
in late 2019,Islamophobia
when an on ad
social media
from platforms.
a major One such
grocery example
store chainwas in late 2019, when
pre-
sumably displayedanDanish
ad fromChristmas
a major grocery storeaschain
pastries presumably
’winter pastries’.displayed Danish went
The picture Christmas pastries as
viral especially among
’winteranti-Muslim
pastries’. The groups whoviral
picture went perceived theamong
especially picture as an accom-
anti-Muslim groups who perceived
modation of Muslims who do not celebrate Christmas at the expense of ’real Danes’
the picture as an accommodation of Muslims who do not celebrate Christmas at the expense of
and Danish Christmas traditions.37 These viral posts were promoted not only by
’real Danes’ and Danish Christmas traditions.37 These viral posts were promoted not only by
nationalist individuals and blog sites, but also by Danish politicians from the po-
nationalist
litical right. The grocery individuals
store and blog sites,
later explained thatbutthey
also still
by Danish
sold politicians
traditional from the political right. The
Danish
Christmas pastriesgrocery
- they store
simply later explained
added ‘winterthatpastries’
they still to
sold traditional
their bakeryDanish Christmas
selection. The pastries - they
whole ordeal, however,
simply demonstrates
added ‘winter how Islamophobic
pastries’ rhetoric
to their bakery and fake
selection. Thenews
wholecanordeal, however,
quickly go viral online withouthow
demonstrates much fact-checking
Islamophobic – thus
rhetoric legitimising
and fake news can Islamophobic
quickly go viral online without
politics and populist rhetoric.
much fact-checking – thus legitimising Islamophobic politics and populist rhetoric.
Figure 2: Picture of “winter pastries” instead of “Christmas pastries” circulated on Facebook by right-wing
Figure 2: Picture of “winter pastries” instead of “Christmas pastries” circulated on Facebook by right-wing politicians.
politicians. Printed in Lars Dahlager, “Nationalister raser over Føtex’ vinterbolle – men de burde nok lige have
Printed in Lars Dahlager, “Nationalister raser38over Føtex’ vinterbolle – men de burde nok lige have tjekket historien”.38
tjekket historien”.
35. Emma Busk, “De dansken fremmedkrigere: Her er de nu”, Ekstra Bladet, 22 November 2019, https://ekstrabladet.
While social media platforms have given Islamophobes an open forum to promote anti-Muslim
dk/nyheder/politik/danskpolitik/de-danske-fremmedkrigere-her-er-de-nu/7882892, (Access date: 2 February 2020).
36. Theis Lange Olsen,sentiments and
“Syrienkriger Islamophobia,
anholdt: they havepolitikere
Professor beskylder also proved
for at to behyklere”,
være an important resource in anti-racist
DR Indland,
12 November 2019, https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/syrienkriger-anholdt-professor-beskylder-politikere-vaere-
and anti-Islamophobic
hyklere, (Access date: 2 February 2020). mobilisation. Anti-racist NGOs have been able to collaborate, engage,
and promote
37. Lars Dahlager, “Nationalister eachFøtex’
raser over other’s events,– reports,
vinterbolle and work
men de burde through
nok lige the use
have tjekket of social
historien”, Poli-media platforms.
tiken, 15 November 2019, https://politiken.dk/forbrugogliv/art7493846/Nationalister-raser-over-F%C3%B8tex-
vinterbolle-%E2%80%93-men-de-burde-nok-lige-have-tjekket-historien, (Access date: 2 February 2020).
37
Lars Dahlager,
38. Lars Dahlager, “Nationalister raser over“Nationalister raser–over
Føtex’ vinterbolle menFøtex’ vinterbolle
de burde nok lige–have
mentjekket
de burde nok lige Poli-
historien”, have tjekket historien”,
tiken, 15 November 2019,Politiken, 15 November 2019, https://politiken.dk/forbrugogliv/art7493846/Nationalister-raser-over-
https://politiken.dk/forbrugogliv/art7493846/Nationalister-raser-over-F%C3%B8tex-
F%C3%B8tex-vinterbolle-%E2%80%93-men-de-burde-nok-lige-have-tjekket-historien,
vinterbolle-%E2%80%93-men-de-burde-nok-lige-have-tjekket-historien, (Access date: 11 March 2020). (Access date: 2 February
2020).
38
Lars Dahlager, “Nationalister raser over Føtex’ vinterbolle – men de burde nok lige have tjekket historien”,
Politiken, 15 November 2019, https://politiken.dk/forbrugogliv/art7493846/Nationalister-raser-over-
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR
F%C3%B8tex-vinterbolle-%E2%80%93-men-de-burde-nok-lige-have-tjekket-historien, 241 date: 11 March
(Access
2020).
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
While social media platforms have given Islamophobes an open forum to pro-
mote anti-Muslim sentiments and Islamophobia, they have also proved to be an
important resource in anti-racist and anti-Islamophobic mobilisation. Anti-racist
NGOs have been able to collaborate, engage, and promote each other’s events, re-
ports, and work through the use of social media platforms. Furthermore, Muslims,
who have experienced Islamophobic abuse, or Danes who have witnessed minorities
becoming victims of racist transgressions have used social media to bring aware-
ness to these issues. They have thus been able to bring public awareness to issues
that are often neglected in political and media discourse. One example of a positive
use of social media platforms was the mobilisation that happened during the 2019
general elections where Muslim citizens established the Facebook group “Muslimer
til stemmeboksene” (“Muslims to the voting booths”), which quickly grew to several
thousand members. The group promoted Muslim participation in the general elec-
tions, mobilising group members to scrutinise politicians’ views on issues that were
important to Danish Muslims, i.e. who would work against racist, Islamophobic,
and anti-immigration policies. This created an interesting debate following the elec-
tions, which questioned the democratic validity of such popular mobilisation.39 This
debate demonstrates how Muslim citizens can be demonised whenever they engage
with the political structures. Muslims are often represented as anti-democratic for
not engaging in Danish politics, and yet, in the 2019 elections, they were perceived
to be a threat to Danish democracy for politically mobilising to promote democratic
involvement. Today, over six months following the elections, the Facebook group has
a member count of more than 24,000 members, who use the platform to share and
discuss political news regarding Muslims and ethnic minorities.
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
The developments noted in the European Islamophobia Report 2018 on central
figures in the Danish Islamophobia network seem to have continued in 2019. For
instance, Rasmus Paludan, party leader of Hard Line (Stram Kurs), has organised
anti-Muslim demonstrations throughout neighbourhoods with a large number of
Muslim residents, where he has burnt a copy of the Quran under large police pro-
tection.40 During one such demonstration, the repercussions of his demonstration
resulted in clashes between the police and young male residents who were pro-
voked by Paludan and his followers. Paludan argues that he is using his freedom
39. Klaus Dohm, “Muslimsk mobilisering af vælgere vækker bekymring for øget polarisering”, Jyllands-Posten,
9 June 2019, https://jyllands-posten.dk/politik/ECE11433173/muslimsk-mobilisering-af-vaelgere-vaekker-bekym-
ring-for-oeget-polarisering/, (Access date: 3 February 2020).
40. Peter Thomsen, “Blågårds Plads efter Paludan kom forbi: ‘Han vandt. İ går fik han det, som han ville”, Berling-
ske, 15 April 2019, https://www.berlingske.dk/hovedstaden/blaagaards-plads-efter-paludan-kom-forbi-han-vandt.-
i-gaar-fik-han-det, (Access date: 2 February 2020).
242 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
of speech to protest against the presence of Muslims and Islam in Denmark. Nev-
ertheless, burning the Quran in a neighbourhood with a large number of Muslim
residents can be perceived as an emphasis of his power to discriminate verbally
against their religious beliefs with impunity and under police protection. In turn,
this can be perceived as symbolic racist violence where the victims have little legal
recourse for action. It is important to highlight that the debate that followed this
incidence focused on the violent clashes between the youth in the neighbourhood
and the police with little attention to the extreme measures Paludan utilises in his
rhetoric. In the first half of 2019, leading up to the general elections, the Danish
police force estimated that approximately 100 million DKK had been used to pro-
tect Paludan and his party’s election campaign.41 Paludan qualified to run for the
general election in 2019, and although he only received 1.8% of the general vote
and no mandate in parliament, his party Hard Line did qualify to receive yearly
party support of 2 million DKK for the next four years until the next general elec-
tion in order to continue their political work.42
It will be important in 2020 to monitor not only the obvious Islamophobes of
the right in Denmark, but also observe how the political left becomes complicit in
normalising Islamophobic rhetoric that seeks to demonise Muslim citizens with little
debate about religious accommodation of minorities to ensure upholding the Danish
constitutional right to freedom of religion.
Observed Civil Society and Political Initiatives to
Counter Islamophobia
There have been a number of positive developments in civil society mobilising on an-
ti-racism in Denmark with a particular focus on anti-Muslim racism. Approximately
130 psychologists have formed a professional network working against discrimina-
tion. They published an opinion piece highlighting how the debate about racialized
minorities can affect the physical, social, and mental health of these citizens.43 With
this article, they added an important professional voice critiquing the problematic
effects of discrimination and racism against particular minorities.
A number of NGOs have created a coalition to work particularly against the
‘ghetto’-policies that took effect in 2019, which will be implemented through the
41. Emma Toft, “Politiet har brugt over 100 millioner på at beskytte Paludan i år”, DR Indland, 11 June 2019,
https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/politiet-har-brugt-over-100-millioner-paa-beskytte-paludan-i-aar, (Access date:
2 February 2020).
42. Lars Lindevall, “Stram Kurs får ingen plads i Folketinget – men millioner i partistøtte”, DR Nyheder, 6 June
2019, https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/folketingsvalg/stram-kurs-faar-ingen-plads-i-folketinget-men-millioner-i,
(Access date: 2 February 2020).
43. Naderah Parwani and Iram Khawaja, “Kroniken: Tonen i debatten er sundhedsskadelig”, Politiken, 13 Septem-
ber 2019, https://politiken.dk/debat/kroniken/art7374320/Tonen-i-debatten-er-sundhedsskadelig, (Access date: 2
February 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 243
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
next couple of years. Furthermore, in 2019, NGOs demonstrated a greater ability to
engage with the international community to raise awareness of racism, xenophobia,
and Islamophobia in Denmark. For instance, the Centre for Danish-Muslim Rela-
tions (CEDAR), SOS Racisme Denmark, Women in Dialogue, Refugees Welcome,
Almen Modstand (Common Resistance), DEMOS, and ENAR Denmark created a
coalition to contribute to a shadow report on the Danish ‘ghetto’-policies to the Of-
fice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.44 The UN con-
cluded that the ‘ghetto’-policies were particularly discriminatory against non-Western
immigrants and descendants creating a clear differentiation between ethnic Danish
citizens and non-Western citizens. Other international civil rights organisations have
likewise been important supporters of anti-racism and anti-Islamophobia NGOs in
Denmark. They have offered important encouragement and support to grassroots
organisations to collaborate and mobilise on issues they have in common, particular-
ly related to tackling the discriminatory nature of the government’s ghetto policies.
The way that anti-racism NGOs have been able to collaborate and support each
other’s work in 2019 is an indication of civil society’s growing awareness and motiva-
tion to combat and protest against the structural racism that all minorities experience.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This report has highlighted some of the general tendencies and issues of Islamophobia
in Denmark in 2019. The general election in the summer 2019 meant a change of
government from the centre-right majority coalition government of Venstre, Conser-
vative People’s Party, and Danish People’s Party to a centre-left minority government
of the Social Democrats, and with a majority mandate to the centre-left parties. Many
minorities and anti-racist campaigners hoped that the change of government would
mean less racist and nationalistic discourse in political rhetoric. However, as this report
documents, the general Islamophobic tendencies observed in 2018 have continued in
the following year. This is unsurprising: research has shown that xenophobia in polit-
ical discourse is not a partisan issue, but can be found across the political spectrum.45
The Social Democrats campaigned on harsh immigration policies towards
non-Western immigrants and asylum seekers; promised to implement the ‘ghetto’-pol-
icies some of which particularly target Muslim citizens; and promised to increase sur-
44. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “Concluding Observations on Sixth Periodic Report
of Denmark”, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commission, 2019, https://tbinternet.ohchr.
org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fDNK%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en;
John Graversgaard and Liz Fekete, “Denmark’s ‘Ghetto Package’ – Discrimination Enshrined in Law”, Institute
of Race Relations, 21 November 2019, http://www.irr.org.uk/news/denmarks-ghetto-package-discrimination-en-
shrined-in-law/?fbclid=IwAR1esCcEAk7XJRUyEtOs9U3YJea2_lR1is5_lXGsKXRDhRUWrxO-AX-kSkc, (Access
date: 2 February 2020).
45. Sivamohan Valluvan, The Clamour of Nationalism: Race and Nation in Twenty-First-Century Britain, (Manchester
University Press, Manchester: 2019).
244 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN DENMARK
veillance and attempt to shut down as many Muslim independent schools as possible.
With the Social Democrats continuing ethnonationalist strategies that seek to differ-
entiate between ethnic white Danes and non-Western Danes (who are presumed to
be Muslim), 2019 has proven to be a year where it was not only the traditional right
and nationalist voices who promoted Islamophobic behaviour. Instead, the traditional
left seemed to have adopted a similar rhetoric and helped normalise Islamophobia.
Nevertheless, 2019 has also been an important year for civil society and anti-racist
NGOs to collaborate and challenge this rhetoric both in policy (especially regarding
the ‘ghetto’-policies) and in everyday life by using social media platforms and other
open forums to bring awareness to issues of racism and Islamophobia in particular.
The following are a few policy recommendations that focus on bringing public
and political awareness to the issues of Islamophobia:
• Political and public recognition of Islamophobia as a real societal issue that
discriminates, affects, and limits Muslim citizens’ lives, prospects, and feel-
ings of inclusion in Danish society.
• Invest in public bodies to document and address experiences of Islamopho-
bia beyond hate crimes – including experiences of discrimination in educa-
tional institutions, employment opportunities, housing, and in interactions
with social and health institutions.
• Invest in research that explores issues and experiences of Islamophobia as a
unique form of racism and discrimination that targets Muslim citizens or
citizens perceived to be Muslim.
• Promote civil society initiatives that work against racism and discrimination
in general, and Islamophobia in particular.
Chronology
• 01.01.2019: Law requiring citizen applicants shake hands with public offi-
cials during citizenship ceremony come into effect. The legislation was vot-
ed in by parliament in late 2018 to oppose Muslim citizen applicants’ po-
tential refusal of shaking hands with public officials of the opposite gender.
• 16.01.2019: State attorney closed the case of a woman who was verbally as-
saulted while wearing a niqab, claiming the woman was not threatened and
could therefore not press charges on that basis, but neglected to consider
the case as a hate crime.
• 21.02.2019: Government introduced a ‘paradigm shift’ in immigration
policies with an emphasis on repatriation of immigrants and refugees as
soon as legally possibly (according to international conventions).46
46. Folketinget, “L 140 Forslag til lov om ændring af udlændingeloven, integrationsloven, repatrieringsloven og
forskellige andre love”, Folketinget, 21 February 2019, https://www.ft.dk/samling/20181/lovforslag/l140/index.
htm, (Access date: 2 February 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
• 01.07.2019: As part of the ‘ghetto’-policies, one-year-old toddlers, living in
‘ghetto’-neighbourhoods and whose parents cannot speak Danish beyond
a 9th grade level, will be forced to attend mandatory day care for at least 25
hours per week.47
• 15.08.2019: Right-wing MPs admit of voting against citizenship applica-
tions on the basis of applicants originating from Muslim-majority countries.
• 07.10.2019: It was revealed that Danish jobcentres obtain information
from national registers on unemployed Danish citizens who are catego-
rised as ‘non-Western immigrants and descendants’ without the consent or
knowledge of the citizens. Citizens have to formally contact governing bod-
ies to have this information withdrawn from their jobcentre profiles.
• 24.10.2019: Legislation passed to allow the Minister of Immigration and
Integration to deprive dual citizens their Danish citizenship to limit foreign
fighters from Syria returning to Denmark.
• 12.11.2019: UN criticised Denmark’s ‘ghetto’-policies on the basis of dis-
crimination of minorities.
• 06.12.2019: Auditing of seven Muslim independent schools.
47. “Obligatorisk læringstilbud til 1-årige i udsatte boligområder og skærpet straf til ledere for pligtforsømmels-
er”, Ministry of Children and Education, https://www.uvm.dk/dagtilbud/love-og-regler--formaal-og-aftaler/af-
talen-om-parallelsamfund/om-aftalen, (Access date: 4 February 2020).
246 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ESTONIA
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
ESTONIA
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
EGERT RÜNNE, LIINA LAANPERE
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 247
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
248 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ESTONIA
The Authors
Egert Rünne is the executive director of the Estonian Human Rights Centre.
He is the Estonian project manager of the European Union Agency for Fundamen-
tal Rights research network FRANET. Currently, Rünne is also involved in various
studies related to the Roma community and their well-being in Estonia and Europe.
Email: egert.rynne@humanrights.ee
Liina Laanpere is a lawyer at the Estonian Human Rights Centre and partici-
pates as a legal expert in the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights re-
search network FRANET. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Law from Tartu Uni-
versity and a Master’s degree in International Human Rights Law from University
College Cork, Ireland. Email: liina.laanpere@humanrights.ee
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Egert Rünne and Liina Laanppere: Islamophobia in Estonia: National Report 2019, in:
Enes Bayraklı & Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 249
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
The Estonian Muslim community makes up approximately 0.1% to 0.3% of the
national population, based on different estimations. The local Muslim community,
historically comprising largely of Tatars, is rarely the target of any negative attention.
However, Islamophobic attitudes are rising in the context of immigration.
In 2019, there were two examples of physical attacks that could be considered
Islamophobic, although it is difficult to make a distinction between anti-migrant
bias and specifically Islamophobic bias. Verbal attacks were more common, accord-
ing to refugee organisations, but they were usually not reported to the police. The
attacks reflect a hostile attitude towards refugees and migrants, promoted by right-
wing politicians. After the elections in March 2019, the far-right nationalist Con-
servative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) became part of the ruling coalition. The
figureheads of the EKRE actively spread anti-refugee and anti-immigration views,
which often include Islamophobic stereotypes.
In 2019, the Estonian media mainly focused on incidents involving Muslims in
other EU countries; however, there were examples of reporting styles that generate
fear and distrust towards Muslims and migrants in general.
There are no legal restrictions to the practice of Islam. However, there is a need
to amend the regulation concerning hate speech and hate crime, to ensure that peo-
ple are held accountable for inciting anti-Muslim hatred, and prosecuted accordingly
when committing hate crimes against Muslims or other minority groups.
There were a few positive examples of initiatives aimed at challenging stereo-
types and promoting equal treatment of different minority groups. There are no
initiatives directly targeting Islamophobia, as it is usually dealt with in the context
of xenophobia.
250 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ESTONIA
Kokkuvõte
Erinevate hinnangute põhjal moodustab Eesti moslemikogukond umbes 0,1–0,3%
riigi elanikkonnast. Kohalik moslemikogukond, millest on ajalooliselt moodustanud
suure hulga tatarlased, satub harva negatiivse tähelepanu alla, kuid islamofoobsed
hoiakud on tõusetunud immigratsiooni kontekstis.
2019. aasta jooksul raporteeriti kaks füüsilist rünnakut, mis võisid olla ajen-
datud moslemitevaenust, kuid samas on keeruline eristada konkreetselt moslemi-
vaenulikku motivatsiooni üldisemast migrandivaenulikust motivatsioonist. Pagu-
lasorganisatsioonide sõnul olid verbaalsed rünnakud sagedasemad kui füüsilised
rünnakud, kuid politseile neist tavaliselt ei teatatud. Rünnakud kajastavad vae-
nulikku suhtumist pagulastesse ja migrantidesse, mida propageerivad parempool-
sed poliitikud. Pärast 2019. aasta märtsis toimunud valimisi sai paremäärmuslik
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (EKRE) valitsevasse koalitsiooni. EKRE juhid
levitavad aktiivselt pagulas- ja immigratsioonivastaseid seisukohti, mis sisaldavad
sageli ka islamofoobseid stereotüüpe.
Eesti meedia keskendus 2019. aasta jooksul peamiselt moslemitega seotud intsi-
dentidele teistes Euroopa Liidu riikides, kuid leidus näiteid artiklitest, mis õhutavad
hirmu ja usaldamatust moslemite ja migrantide suhtes üldiselt.
Eesti seadused ei sätesta takistusi Islami praktiseerimisele. Samas vajab muu-
datusi vaenukõne ja vaenukuritegude regulatsioon, et tagada vastutusele võtmine
moslemivastase vaenu õhutamise eest ning kuriteole vastav karistus vaenukuritegude
toimepanijatele.
Positiivsena on võimalik esile tõsta mõned näited algatustest erinevate pagulas-
organisatsioonide ning Sotsiaalministeeriumi eestvedamisel, mille eesmärk on stereo-
tüüpide murdmine ja erinevate vähemusrühmade võrdse kohtlemise edendamine.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 251
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: Republic of Estonia
Type of Regime: Democratic Republic
Form of Government: Unitary Parliamentary Republic
Ruling Parties: Centre Party, Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, Pro Patria
(coalition)
Opposition Parties: Reform Party, Social Democratic Party
Last Elections: 2019 Parliamentary Election (Reform Party: 34 mandates, Cen-
tre Party: 26 mandates, Conservative People’s Party of Estonia: 19 mandates, Pro Pa-
tria: 12 mandates, Social Democratic Party: 10 mandates, Total: 101); 2017 Munic-
ipal Council Elections (Centre Party: 27.3%, Citizens’ elections coalitions: 26.8%,
Reform Party: 19.5%, Social Democratic Party: 10.4%, Pro Patria and Res Publica
Union: 8%, Conservative People’s Party of Estonia: 6.7%, Estonian Greens: 0.8%);
2016 Presidential Election (Kersti Kaljulaid was elected president of the Republic of
Estonia with 81 votes in the parliament)
Total Population: 1,3 million (estimated in 2019)
Major Languages: Estonian
Official Religion: No official religion (secularism)
Statistics on Islamophobia: There are no available statistics on Islamophobia.
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: N/A
Major Religions (% of Population): Christianity (28%), No religion (54%)
Muslim Population (% of Population): 1,508 (0.12%) according to the last
national census in 2011
Main Muslim Community Organizations: Estonian Islamic Centre, Estonian
Islamic Congregation
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: NGOs that focus, amongst other
things, on equal treatment of Muslims and other minorities in Estonia are the Esto-
nian Human Rights Centre, Estonian Refugee Council, Johannes Mihkelson Cen-
tre, and International House Tartu.
Far-Right Parties: Conservative People’s Party of Estonia
Far-Right Movements: Soldiers of Odin
Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: N/A
Limitations to Islamic Practices:
ű Hijab Ban: None
ű Halal Slaughter Ban: None. According to the Animal Protection Act, to
slaughter a farm animal for a religious purpose, a religious association must
obtain the relevant permit.
ű Minaret Ban: None
ű Circumcision Ban: None
ű Burka Ban: None
ű Prayer Ban: None
252 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ESTONIA
Introduction
The Muslim community in Estonia is one of the smallest in Europe, although it
is difficult to estimate its exact size. According to the last national census in 2011,
there were 1,508 people in Estonia who stated their religion to be Islam, making
up approximately 0.12% of the Estonian population. However, it is estimated that
the actual number is higher, as many Muslims preferred not to state their religious
affiliation in the census.1 In 2005, based on the Estonian Islamic Congregation’s
estimation, the number of practicing Muslims was approximately 3,500. In 2013,
due to increased immigration, Estonians’ and Russians’ conversion to Islam, and the
increased religious activity of younger descendants of Central Asian and Caucasian
immigrants, the number was estimated to be nearly 4,500.2 The three largest ethnic
groups in Estonia who identified themselves as Muslims in 2011 were Tatars, Azer-
baijanis, and Estonians. In the past years, there has also been a growing proportion
of new immigrants from North Africa and Asia.3
There are no mosques in Estonia. At first, the Estonian Islamic Congregation
held religious services in rented rooms. In 2009, the congregation’s activities moved
to a permanent location in a former office building near Tallinn Airport. In 2015,
the Estonian Islamic Centre was established with the main goal to administer, main-
tain, and use these premises, as well as to represent Islam in Estonia.4
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and
Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
According to the Ministry of Justice, there was one crime recorded in 2019 that was
possibly motivated by anti-Muslim bias. It was a case of physical abuse (§121 of
the Estonian Penal Code). Before the attack, the perpetrator asked the victim about
Muslims, Islam, but also about Russians.5
Another attack with a possible Islamophobic motivation was reported in the news:
on 22 May 2019, a man from Pakistan was verbally and physically attacked in Tallinn.
The police started an investigation under §262 of the Estonian Penal Code (Breach of
Public Order). It is not possible to claim that the motivation was specifically related
to anti-Muslim hatred, as the victim appeared to be targeted because of his migrant
background. The perpetrator yelled at the victim “Go home, this is Estonia”.6
1. Islam Eestis (Islam in Estonia), http://www.islam.pri.ee/index.php?id=66, (Access date: 18 February 2020)
2. Ege Lepa, “Eesti islamikogukonna dünaamika pärast taasiseseisvumist”, PhD Thesis, (Tartu University, Tartu:
2019), p. 195.
3. Ibid, p. 11.
4. Ibid, pp. 194-195.
5. Ministry of Justice, 3 February 2020, https://www.just.ee/en, (Access date: 18 February 2020).
6. “Politsei alustas pakistanlase rünnaku uurimist avaliku korra rikkumise paragrahvi alusel”, Delfi, 13 January 2020,
https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/krimi/politsei-alustas-pakistanlase-runnaku-uurimist-avaliku-korra-rikku-
mise-paragrahvi-alusel?id=86303537, (Access date: 3 February 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 253
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
According to the Estonian Refugee Council, there have been several cases of
verbal abuse against Muslims in Tallinn, for example, on public transport, especially
towards women and girls wearing a hijab.7 There have also been cases of verbal abuse
in Tartu, according to the Johannes Mihkelson Centre. Furthermore, at the end of
2019, a woman wearing a hijab was spat on in Tartu. These incidents were not re-
ported to the police.8
Employment
According to the Labour Inspectorate of Estonia9 and the Gender Equality and Equal
Treatment Commissioner,10 no discrimination cases against Muslims or persons per-
ceived as Muslims have been registered in the job market.
Education
Islamophobic content has not become part of curricula, textbooks, or other educa-
tion materials.
Politics
During the period under review, both the 2019 Estonian parliamentary election and
the European Parliament election were held in Estonia.
One of the key narratives of the far-right Conservative People’s Party of Estonia
(EKRE) in both election campaigns was aimed against refugees and migration, and
the discourse was Islamophobic in nature.”
Figure 1: The EKRE’s campaign video stated, “Muslim immigrants are given housing at the expense of the state”.11
Figure 1: The EKRE's campaign
stated, "Muslim immigrants are given housing at the expense of the state". 11
7. Estonian Refugee Council, 13 January 2020, https://www.pagulasabi.ee/, (Access date: 5 February 2020).
The EKRE’s parliamentary election programme stated the following: “We are hel
8. Interview with Johannes Mihkelson Centre, 5 February 2020.
rebuildof Estonia,
9. Labour Inspectorate the war-affected areas by sending back
23 January 2020, https://www.ti.ee/en/home/, refugees
(Access date: 5 Februarystaying
2020). in Estonia”, 12 an
10. Gender Equality and Equal Treatment Commissioner, 10 February 2020, https://eige.europa.eu/gen-
European Parliament programme stated that “Europe's rapidly growing
der-mainstreaming/structures/estonia/gender-equality-and-equal-treatment-commissioner-soolise-vordoiguslik- Muslim popula
kuse-ja-vordse-kohtlemise-volinik, (Access date: 5 February 2020).
11. “Platformput European
for the identity
Estonian Parliament and values
Elections for 2019”,at risk”. 13 People’s Party of Estonia, 5 January
Conservative
2019, https://www.ekre.ee/ekre-programm-riigikogu-valimisteks-2019/, (Access date: 10 February 2020).
One of EKRE’s election campaign videos for the parliamentary election that was broa
on TV and social media showed people coming in boats and destroying the city, w
254 setav.org
voiceover read, “Muslim immigrants are given housing at the expense of the state”. 14 (
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ESTONIA
The EKRE’s parliamentary election programme stated the following: “We are
helping to rebuild the war-affected areas by sending back refugees staying in Es-
tonia”,12 and their European Parliament programme stated that “Europe’s rapidly
growing Muslim population has put European identity and values at risk”.13
One of EKRE’s election campaign videos for the parliamentary election that
was broadcasted on TV and social media showed people coming in boats and de-
stroying the city, while the voiceover read, “Muslim immigrants are given housing at
the expense of the state”.14 (Fig. 1)
During the campaign period, party members also published various opinion
pieces in national newspapers, where they mentioned Muslims in a negative con-
text. For example, the party chair’s wife Helle-Moonika Helme stated the following:
“They are Muslims, they carry another culture that is dangerous to us. They have
already done their evil deeds.”15
Figure 2:Figure
EKRE’s Jaak
2: EKRE’s Madison
Jaak sharedhishis
Madison shared opinion
opinion on Facebook
on Facebook that the Notre-Dame
that the Notre-Dame de Paris
de Paris fire could fireancould have been an ac
have been
16
but couldaccident,
also have beenalso
but could thehave
work ofthe
been Muslims. 16
work of Muslims.
Far-right politicians also actively share hate speech and negativity about Islam
Far-right politicians also actively share hate speech and negativity about Islam o
online, especially on Facebook. For example, then just a candidate, and now a new
especially on Facebook.
member For Parliament,
of the European example, EKRE’s
then just
Jaaka Madison
candidate, andhisnow
shared a new member o
opinion
thatParliament,
European the Notre-Dame de ParisJaak
EKRE’s fire could have been
Madison an accident,
shared but could
his opinion also
that have
the Notre-Dame de
fire could have been an accident, but could also have been the work of Muslims. He also a
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
that many Muslims were happy about the incident. 17 (Fig. 2)
14. “For Estonia”, Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, Youtube, 28 January 2019, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=v7R5gUQoY3c, (Access date: 7 February 2020).
Media 15.“MoonikaHelme:kuimeesteenibkorralikult,siisnaineeipeagikäimaorjatööl”,EestiPäevaleht,9March2019,https://
epl.delfi.ee/lp/moonika-helme-kui-mees-teenib-korralikult-siis-naine-ei-peagi-kaima-orjatool?id=85529945,
In 2019, different
(Access media
date: 7 February 2020). outlets published opinion pieces by members of the Conserv
16. Jaak Madison, Facebook, 16 April 2019, https://www.facebook.com/jaak.madison/posts/10213700239439843,
People’s Party
(Access date: 7of Estonia,
February 2020). using anti-immigration rhetoric and Islamophobic statements
example, in one opinion piece Jaak Madison promised to focus on “curbing the spre
terrorism and Islam”. 18 In• another
islamophobiaeurope.com article, Martin Helme spoke out against
@islamophobiaEIR 255 multicultura
using France and Sweden as threatening examples for the spread of Islam. 19 However, m
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
been the work of Muslims. He also added that many Muslims were happy about
the incident.17 (Fig. 2)
Media
In 2019, different media outlets published opinion pieces by members of the Con-
servative People’s Party of Estonia, using anti-immigration rhetoric and Islamopho-
bic statements. For example, in one opinion piece Jaak Madison promised to focus
on “curbing the spread of terrorism and Islam”.18 In another article, Martin Helme
spoke out against multiculturalism, using France and Sweden as threatening exam-
ples for the spread of Islam.19 However, most of the media coverage on Islam or
Muslims focused on incidents from other countries, usually in a neutral way, but
sometimes using extreme examples of crimes committed by Muslims in a sensation-
alist manner, for example, “DIE, DIE, DIE! Yelled a Refugee While Stabbing the
Child of His Helper”.20
Justice System
There have been no Islamophobic laws or regulations introduced in 2019. However,
one problem that can be outlined is that the current Estonian legislation does not
provide an effective possibility for prosecuting hate crime and hate speech against
Muslims or other minority groups. Estonia has not transposed the Council Frame-
work Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms
and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. Estonian Penal
Code does not include hate crime as a specific type of crime, nor bias motive as an
aggravating circumstance. The Penal Code does include a provision for “incitement
to hatred”; however, since the provision requires the existence of “danger to the life,
health or property of a person”, it is difficult to apply in real situations.
Internet
There are several websites that regularly spread Islamophobic stereotypes, but
there are no websites specifically dedicated to covering topics related to Islam.
For example, there is the blog Rahvuslane (The Nationalist)21 that posts stories
like “There’s No Place for Islamic Propaganda in Estonian Schools, Islam Is Not
17. Ibid.
18. “Jaak Madison: rahvuskonservatiivid kui uus tegus jõud Euroopas”, ERR, 21 May 2019, https://www.err.
ee/943716/jaak-madison-rahvuskonservatiivid-kui-uus-tegus-joud-euroopas, (Access date: 17 February 2020).
19. “Rahandusminister Martin Helme Soome väljaandele: Eestis käib kultuurimarksistlik rünnak rahva vaimu vas-
tu”, Lõunaeestlane, 11 May 2019, https://lounaeestlane.ee/rahandusminister-martin-helme-soome-valjaandele-ees-
tis-kaib-kultuurimarksistlik-runnak-rahva-vaimu-vastu/, (Access date: 17 February 2020).
20. “SURE! SURE! SURE!’ karjus oma abistaja last pussitanud põgenik”, Õhtuleht, 18 June 2019, https://www.
ohtuleht.ee/967397/sure-sure-sure-karjus-oma-abistaja-last-pussitanud-pogenik, (Access date: 3 February 2020).
21. Rahvuslane, http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com, (Access date: 2 February 2020).
256 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ESTONIA
Part of Europe!”22 Also, there is the EKRE news portal Uued uudised (The New
News),23 which has 17,000 followers on its Facebook page.24 Some of the 2019
headlines include “Martti Kalda, Expert on the Orient: ‘The Goal of Islam Is
to Destroy Europe and the West’”;25 “Recommendations of Finland’s Minister
of the Interior, Extremist Maria Ohisalo, Give Islamic Extremists a Chance to
Infiltrate Law Enforcement”26; and “Estonian Muslim: National Broadcasting
Portrays It as an Idyllic Fairy Tale”.27 The list goes on, and all of them feature
negative stereotypes.
In addition, Objektiiv (The Lens),28 a popular fundamentalist Christian web-
site, publishes stories such as “Muslim of the Year Finalist Called for Jihad”29and
“Muslims Rejoice at the Fire of Notre-Dame on Social Media”.30 Objektiiv also has a
significant following on Facebook;31 around 17,000 users read its posts.
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
Islamophobic stereotypes are mainly promoted by the Conservative People’s Par-
ty of Estonia in the context of their anti-immigration platform. The most ac-
tive members spreading hostile content against migrants and refugees, including
Muslims, are the party leader and current Minister of the Interior Mart Helme,
Minister of Finance Martin Helme, and MEP Jaak Madison. In addition, Varro
Vooglaid, the founder of Objektiiv, regularly shares Islamophobic content in the
context of immigration.
22. “Islamipropaganda tegemine Eesti koolides on lubamatu, islam ei kuulu Euroopasse!”, Rahvuslane, 10
April 2018, http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com/2018/04/islamipropaganda-tegemine-eesti.html, (Access date: 3
February 2020).
23. Uued uudised, https://uueduudised.ee, (Access date: 3 February 2020).
24. Uued uudised, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/uueduudised/, (Access date: 3 February 2020).
25. “Idamaade tundja Martti Kalda: islami idee on Euroopa ja lääs põhimõtteliselt hävitada”, Uued uudised, 25
January 2020, https://uueduudised.ee/uudis/maailm/idamaade-tundja-martti-kalda-islami-idee-on-euroopa-ja-laas-
pohimotteliselt-havitada/, (Access date: 2 February 2020).
26.“Soome äärmusliku siseministri Maria Ohisalo soovitused annaksid islamiäärmuslastele võimaluse korrakaitsesse
imbuda”, Uued uudised, 8 December 2019, https://uueduudised.ee/uudis/maailm/soome-aarmusliku-siseminis-
tri-maria-ohisalo-soovitused-annaksid-islamiaarmuslastele-voimaluse-korrakaitsesse-imbuda/, (Access date: 1 Feb-
ruary 2020).
27. “Milline on Eesti moslem – ERR kirjeldab seda idüllilises muinasloos”, Uued uudised, 12 April 2019, https://
uueduudised.ee/uudis/eesti/milline-on-eesti-moslem-err-kirjeldab-seda-idullilises-muinasloos/, (Access date 1 Feb-
ruary 2020).
28. Objektiiv, https://objektiiv.ee, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
29. “Aasta moslemi” finalist kutsus üles džihaadile”, Objektiiv, 30 September 2019, https://objektiiv.ee/aasta-mos-
lemi-finalist-kutsus-ules-dzihaadile/, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
30.“Moslemid rõõmustavad sotsiaalmeedias Jumalaema kiriku põlengu üle”, Objektiiv, 16 April 2020, https://ob-
jektiiv.ee/moslemid-roomustavad-sotsiaalmeedias-jumalaema-kiriku-polengu-ule/, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
31. Objektiiv, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/objektiiv, (Access date: 1 February 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 257
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Observed Civil Society and Political Initiatives to
Counter Islamophobia
There are no initiatives that specifically target combating anti-Muslim racism, but
there are projects and campaigns targeting equal treatment of minority groups. For
example, the Ministry of Social Affairs has launched a campaign entitled “Everyone
Is Different, But Equally Human” encouraging good will towards all minorities. It
aims to raise awareness of equal treatment and to highlight the contributions made
to Estonian society by members of its minorities.32
The Estonian Refugee Council, the Johannes Mihkelson Centre, and the Tartu
International House initiated the project ‘Let’s Meet!’, during which they organised
45 different events all around Estonia bringing together beneficiaries of international
protection, foreigners living in Estonia, and the local population. The project aimed
to challenge the stereotypes surrounding ‘otherness’ and give everyone the possibility
to discover new cultures and make personal connections.33
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The expressions of Islamophobia in Estonia are usually connected to fear of im-
migration. This means more awareness-raising activities among the general public
could be beneficial. As the Estonian Muslim community is small and most people
only hear about Islam in the media, where it is often discussed in a negative con-
text, more attention could be paid to introducing the historical Muslim commu-
nities in Estonia.
In addition, to ensure effective prosecution of incidents of hate speech and
hate crime against Muslims and other minority groups, the Estonian Penal Code
should be reviewed and necessary amendments should be adopted to bring Esto-
nian legislation in line with EU law, in particular the Council Framework Decision
2008/913/JHA.
Chronology
• 28.01.2019: The EKRE published an election campaign video that
showed people coming in boats and destroying the city, while the voi-
ceover read, “Muslim immigrants are given housing at the expense of
the state”.
32. “Kampaania „Kõik on erinevad, kuid sama palju inimesed”, Ministry of Social Affairs, 24 January 2020, https://
www.sm.ee/et/sama-palju-inimene, (Access date: 2 February 2020)
33. “Saame tuttavaks”, Estonian Refugee Council, October 2017 - March 2019, https://www.pagulasabi.ee/projek-
tid/saame-tuttavaks-kohaliku-tasandi-koostoouritused-rahvusvahelise-kaitse-valdkonnas, (Access date: 2 February
2020).
258 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ESTONIA
• 08.04.2019: The EKRE published its programme for the European Parlia-
ment elections stating that “Europe’s rapidly growing Muslim population
has put European identity and values at risk”.
• 22.05.2019: A man from Pakistan was verbally and physically attacked
in Tallinn. The police started an investigation under §262 of the Estonian
Penal Code (Breach of Public Order).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 259
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN fınland
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
FINLAND
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
ENRIQUE TESSIERI
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 261
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
262 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN fınland
The Author
Enrique Tessieri is a sociologist and former journalist who writes and researches
immigration topics. As a journalist, Tessieri worked in countries like Finland, Spain,
Italy, Argentina, and Colombia writing on topics including human rights, business,
and foreign investment. Tessieri is editor of Migrant Tales, a community blog he
founded in 2007. He is chairperson and founder of the Anti-Hate Crime Organisa-
tion Finland and vice president of Rom-Mikkeli, an association founded in 2015 to
further the rights of the Roma minority of Mikkeli, a city located in Eastern Finland.
Tessieri works at Otava Folk High School near the city of Mikkeli, and is an advisor
for the Master in Conflict, Peace and Security at the Open University of Catalonia.
Email: editor@migranttales.net
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Enrique Tessieri: Islamophobia in Finland: National Report 2019, in: Enes Bayraklı &
Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 263
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
Last year was especially challenging to Muslims in Finland because it was an elec-
tion year. As in the parliamentary elections of 2011 and 2015, anti-Muslim rhetoric
played important roles in attracting voter support for the Islamophobic Finns Party
(PS). Last year, the sexual assault cases that took place in the northern Finnish city of
Oulu provided the PS with an election lifesaver. Support for the PS in opinion polls
stood at 8.6% in December 2018 but soared to 22.7% a year later.
The big prize for the party came in the parliamentary elections of 14 April when
it won 39 seats and came in second place losing only by a hair to the Social Demo-
crats. The European Parliament (MEP) elections (26 May) a month later were a sad
example of the hostile attitude some candidates expressed concerning asylum seekers.
As many as 36.3% (85/234) of the Finnish MEP candidates disagreed or were neutral
in an election compass that the EU is obliged to save people from drowning in the
Mediterranean Sea. Anti-Muslim sentiment lifted its head again at the end of the year
when a heated political debate took place on the repatriation of 11 women and their
30-odd children to Finland from the al-Hol refugee camp in northeast Syria.
The fact that the PS is the biggest opposition party in parliament with 39 MPs
means that the following three and half years will be especially trying for the cen-
ter-left coalition of Prime Minister Sanna Marin, a Social Democrat. The fact that
the PS led in the polls at the end of the year has not emboldened the party but is
proof that xenophobia and anti-Muslim racism will continue to dominate political
discussion in Finland. The awaited reforms to relax asylum policy may take longer
than expected due to strong opposition from the PS and other opposition parties like
the National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) and the Christian Democrats.
264 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN fınland
Tiivistelmä
Viime vuosi oli erityisen haastava muslimeille Suomessa, koska 2019 oli vaalivuosi.
Kuten vuosien 2011 ja 2015 eduskuntavaaleissa, muslimien vastaisella retoriikalla
oli iso rooli populistisen Perussuomalaisen puolueen kannatuksessa. Viime vuoden
seksuaalirikostapaukset Oulussa tarjosi Perussuomalaisille tärkeän vaalipelastuksen.
Mielipidetutkimukset puhuvat puolestaan: Perussuomalaisten tuki oli joulukuus-
sa 2018 8,6%, mutta se kasvoi 22,7% vuodessa. Puolue sai ison lahjan huhtikuun
eduskuntavaalissa, joissa Perussuomalaiset sai 39 kansanedustajaa ja hävisi niukasti
sosiaalidemokraateille, jotka voittivat vaalit. Noin kuukausi myöhemmin Europarla-
menttivaalien (26. toukokuuta) kampanjoinnissa nähtiin vihamielisyyttä turvapaik-
kahakijoita kohtaan. Yhdessä vaalikoneessa 36,3% (84/234) eurovaaliehdokkaista
katsoi, ettei ole EU:n velvollisuus pelastaa siirtolaisia hukkumisvaaralta Välimerel-
lä. Muslimi-vastainen ilmapiiri nosti jälleen päänsä vuoden lopulla, kun alkoi vil-
kas politiinen keskustelu 11 naisen ja heidän 30 lapsensa kotiuttamisesta Suomeen
al-Holin pakolaisleiristä Koillis-Syyriassa. Koska perussuomalaiset ovat suurin op-
positiopuolue eduskunnassa 39 kansanedustajan voimalla, on selvää että seuraavat
kolme vuotta ennen vaaleja tulee olemaan vaikeita pääministeri Sanna Marinin kes-
kustavasemmistolaiselle hallitukselle. Perussuomalaiset johtavat myös mielipidetut-
kimuksia. Perussuomalaisten muslimivastainen retoriikka tule olemaan poliittisen
keskustelun keskiössä. Odotettu maahanmuuttolain löystyminen tulee kestämään
kauemmin, koska hallituksella on pelko perussuomalaisten ja muiden oppositiopuo-
lueiden (kokoomus ja kristillisdemokraatit) kannatuksen noususta.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 265
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: Finland
Type of Regime: Parliamentary Republic
Form of Government: Republic
Ruling Parties: Social Democratic Party, Centre Party, Green League, Left Alli-
ance, and Swedish People’s Party
Opposition Parties: Finns Party, National Coalition Party, Christian Demo-
crats, and Movement Now
Last Elections: 2019 Parliamentary election (Social Democrats: 40 seats, Finns
Party: 39 seats, National Coalition Party: 38 seats, Centre Party: 31 seats, Green
League: 20 seats, Left Alliance: 16 seats, Swedish People’s Party: 9 seats, Christian
Democrats: 5 seats, Movement Now: 1 seat, and Åland Coalition: 1 seat); 2019 Eu-
ropean Parliament election (National Coalition Party: 3 seats, Green League: 1 + 1
seat if the UK leaves the EU, Social Democratic Party: 2 seats, Finns Party: 2 seats,
Centre Party: 2 seats, and Left Alliance: 1 seat).
Total Population: 5,527,573 (in 2019)
Major Languages: Finnish and Swedish
Official Religion: N/A
Statistics on Islamophobia: The latest Police University College hate crime
report for 2018, the only source for hate crime in the country, showed suspected hate
crimes decreased by 22% to 910 cases from the previous year, while Muslims contin-
ued to be the most affected group. Police sources state that there is a sharp drop in
asylum seekers entering the country after 2015. The lion’s share of hate crimes was
due to ethnic or national origin (69.7%), and religion (17%). Sixty-seven percent of
hate crimes due to ethnic or national background were reported by men and 33%
by women. The most affected group by nationality were Iraqis. After rising by 58%
in 2017, hate crimes due to religious background fell by 34% and the most affected
were Muslims. Like in many EU countries, hate crime cases are underreported and
represent only the tip of the iceberg.
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: Different studies show that labor
market discrimination is a problem in Finland. Akhlaq Ahmad’s study in October
confirmed what we have known for a long time: if you have a Muslim foreign-sound-
ing name, your chances of getting a job interview may be difficult. Organizations
like the Council of Europe Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)
have called on Finland to take a tougher stance on hate speech and racism.
Major Religions (% of Population): Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church
3,853,106 (69.7%); Islam est. 110,000-120,000 (2-2.2%); Finnish Orthodox
Church 59,560 (1.08%); Jehovah’s Witnesses 17,303 (0.31%); Finnish Free Church
15,312 (0.28%); Catholic Church 14,357 (0.26%); Pentecostals 11,237 (0.20%);
266 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN fınland
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 3,275 (0.6%); Buddhist 1,777 (0.03%);
Baptist Church 1,568 (0.03%); United Methodist Church 1,381 (0.02%); Judaism
1,096 (0.02%)
Muslim Population (% of Population): Estimated at 110,000-120,000 (2-
2.2%)
Main Muslim Community Organizations: Federation of Islamic Organiza-
tions of Finland (Islamilaisten järjestöjen liitto); Suomen Islamilainen Yhdyskunta;
Islamic Council of Finland (Suomen Islamilainen Neuvosto); Resalat Islamilainen Yh-
dyskunta (Resalat Islamic Society); Suomen Islam-Seurakunta; Helsinki Islam Keskus;
Suomen Muslimiliitto; Nuoret Muslimit; Nuorten Muslimien Foorumi; Tampeeren Is-
lamin yhdyskunta, Islamic Society of Northern Finland (Pohjois-Suomen Islamilainen
Yhdyskunta), The Islamic Rahma Center in Finland, Turun Islamilainen Yhdyskunta,
and Suomen Islamilainen Diyanet Yhdyskunta.
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: Finland does not have a specific
NGO that combats Islamophobia. Some that address the issue are the Islamic Coun-
cil of Finland, The National Forum for Cooperation of Religions in Finland, Nuoret
Muslimit, Helsingin Muslimit, Anti-Hate Crime Organisation Finland, Anti-Racist
Forum, Liikkukaa -Sports for All, and Migrant Tales.
Far-Right Parties: The Finns Party, Suomen Kansa Ensin, Reformi puolue (not a
registered party yet).
Far-Right Movements: Kohti vapautta! (formerly Kansallinen Vastarinta/
Suomen vastarintaliike), Soldiers of Odin, Finnish Defence League, Suomi Ensi (Fin-
land First), Suomen Sisu
Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: N/A
ű Limits to Islamic Practices: None
ű Hijab Ban: None
ű Halal Slaughter Ban: None. There were plans by the former government of
Prime Minister Juha Sipilä to ban halal slaughter from 1 January 2021 with
the Animal Welfare Act. The draft law became redundant after Sipilä’s gov-
ernment resigned in March 2019.
ű Minaret Ban: None
ű Circumcision Ban: None
ű Burka Ban: The far right and Islamophobic parties like the Finns Party (PS)
and Finnish People First have tried to ban the burka and the niqab. PS First
Vice-President Riikka Purra stated before the parliamentary election that the
party wants to ban the use of the burka, niqab, and girls using hijabs.
ű Prayer Ban: None
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 267
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Introduction
After four years of tougher immigration policy spearheaded by the previous right-
wing government of Prime Minister Juha Sipilä, there was renewed hope that matters
would change with the new government led by the Social Democrats and formed by
the Centre Party, Green League, Left Alliance and Swedish People’s Party. According
to Prime Minister Sanna Marin’s government program, human rights and respecting
international agreements on refugees are high priorities. The program states: “Hu-
man rights and human dignity belong to us all. We pledge to build a Finland that is
tolerant and respects and promotes everyone’s human rights. Our country has zero
tolerance for bullying and racism. We want to build a nation that is equal, accessible
and supportive”.1 While the Muslim community hopes that the government will
take bolder steps to challenge racism and discrimination, the big question is how
far it will go in light of the Finns Party, which is the biggest opposition party and is
openly hostile to Muslims and people of color.
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and
Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
In January 2020, there was a plot by a 22-year-old Latvian national to kill Muslims
and migrants in Helsinki on New Year’s Eve 2018 with a homemade bomb.2 Unfor-
tunately, the Latvian construction worker, who denies such plans to kill people, is
not being charged with plotting a terrorist act but for preparing “a serious crime that
threatens life and health.” The suspect will be indicted in February by a court and
faces a four-year prison term.
After being vandalized nine times since September 2017, the Oulu Mosque did
not suffer any new attacks after 26 February 2019.3 The Al-Ikhlas Mosque in the
Helsinki suburb of Espoo saw fireworks thrown at it on 10 May and 23 May 2019.4
Another mosque in the eastern Helsinki neighborhood of Mellunmäki was smeared
a number of times with hate graffiti.5 (Fig. 1)
1. “Programme of Prime Minister Sanna Marin’s Government 10 December 2019 – Inclusive and Competent
Finland”, Publication of the Finnish Government, 33 (2019), http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/han-
dle/10024/161935/VN_2019_33.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
2. Kimmo Oksanen and Kaisu Moilanen, “Miksi pommi-isku suunnittelusta epäiltyä miestä ei syytetä terrorismista?
Syyttäjä ja oikeustieteilijä arvioivat ratkaisua”, Helsingin Sanomat, 17 January 2020, https://www.hs.fi/kaupunki/
art-2000006375914.html?share=e413a0190ea236b4db1228bcff00fc66, (Access date: 19 January 2020).
3. Enrique Tessieri, “Oulu Mosque Vandalized for the Ninth Time”, Migrant Tales, 26 February 2019, https://www.
migranttales.net/oulu-mosque-vandalized-for-the-ninth-time/, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
4. Enrique Tessieri, “Another Firework Is Thrown at the Al-Ikhlas Mosque on Thursday,” Migrant Tales, 25 May
2019, https://www.migranttales.net/another-firework-is-thrown-at-the-al-ikhlas-mosque-on-thursday/, (Access
date: 12 January 2020).
5. Enrique Tessieri, “Facebook Abbas Bahmanpour: Kun syyllistät kaikki muslmit ja hiljaisuus on vastaus”, Migrant
Tales, 14 March 2019, https://www.migranttales.net/facebook-abbas-bahmanpour-kun-syyllistat-kaikki-muslim-
it-ja-hiljaisuus-on-vastaus/, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
268 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN fınland
saw fireworks thrown at it on 10 May and 23 May 2019. 4 Another mosqu
Helsinki neighborhood of Mellunmäki was smeared with hate graffiti. 5 (Fig. 1
Figure 1: Facebook post by Imam Abbas Bahmanpour: “It is irritating to arrive in the morning to open the mosque
[in east Helsinki] to a group of students who came to see the mosque and find such text written on the wall.
Figurewhen
Unfortunately, this happens 1: Facebook posttoby
politicians start Imam
blame Abbas
Muslims Bahmanpour:
collectively as a result of“It is one
what irritating to arrive in the morning
person has
[in even
done. It is irritating that eastpeople
Helsinki] to a deputy
like [Helsinki groupmayor
of students
for leisure who cameNasima
and culture] to see the mosque
Razmyar cave in to and find such text w
this [type of rhetoric]. Is everyone blamed
Unfortunately, when
this [white Finn] Teppo
happens stabs his girlfriend?
when politicians start toI am very disappointed
blame Muslims with collectively as a result
our MPs. One should not spread hatred in our society to get votes. Moral values should be above populism if we do
has done. It is irritating
not want to suffer from fascism and oppression.” 6 that even people like [Helsinki deputy mayor for leisure and culture
cave in to this [type of rhetoric]. Is everyone blamed when [white Finn] Teppo stabs his gi
disappointed
Oulu Mosque’s imamwithDr. our MPs.Mannan
Abdul One should
saidnot spread
that hatred inenvironment
the hostile our society toin
get votes. Moral val
populism if we do not want to suffer from fascism and oppression.” 6
Oulu caused by the sexual assault cases involving former asylum seekers, and which
brought Islamophobes like Katie Hopkins to the city in January, made Muslims feel
Oulu Mosque’s imam Dr. Abdul Mannan said that the hostile environment in
unsafe, and that some avoided going to the city center.7 Despite the hostile envi-
the sexual
ronment experienced assault
by some cases in
Muslims involving formercalmed
Oulu, matters asylumdownseekers, and14
after the which brought Is
April parliamentary
Katieelections,
Hopkinsaccording to Dr.
to the city Mannan. The
in January, made Christchurch
Muslims feel attack was and that som
unsafe,
another factor that instilled fear. Members of the Oulu mosque guarded the build-
to the city center. 7 Despite the hostile environment experienced by some M
ing during Friday prayers because their request for security by the police was turned
matters
down. Other hostile actscalmed
against down aftercommunity
the Muslim the 14 April parliamentary
of Finland elections, according
were seen before
the European Other
Parliament elections
hostile of May when
acts against a far-right
the Muslim Finland First
community of candidate
Finland were seen befo
desecrated the Koran in public. 8
Even if suspected hate crime cases retreated by 21.9% in 2018 compared with
the previous year, or a total of 910 versus 1,165 cases, the lion’s share (86.8%) of all
4
EnriqueFacebook,
6. Imam Abbas Bahmanpour, Tessieri,https://www.facebook.com/abbas.bahmanpour,
“Another Firework Is Thrown at the14 Al-Ikhlas Mosque
March 2019, (Accesson Thursday,” Mig
2019, https://www.migranttales.net/another-firework-is-thrown-at-the-al-ikhlas-mosque-on-
date: 3 February 2020).
7. Enrique Tessieri,date: 12 January
“Is Oulu, Finland, a 2020).
Safe Place for Muslims?”, Migrant Tales, 29 April 2019, https://www.mi-
5
Enrique Tessieri, “Facebook
granttales.net/is-oulu-finland-a-safe-place-for-muslims/, Abbas
(Access Bahmanpour:
date: 29 April 2019). Kun syyllistät kaikki
muslmit ja hilj
Migrant Tales, 14 March 2019, https://www.migranttales.net/facebook-abbas-bahmanpour-ku
8. Ali Murat Alhas, “Far-right Finnish Politician Rips up Quran”, Anadolu Agency, 26 May 2019, https://www.
muslimit-ja-hiljaisuus-on-vastaus/, (Access(Access
aa.com.tr/en/europe/far-right-finnish-politician-rips-up-quran/1489562, date:date:
12 January
12 March 2020).
2020).
6
Imam Abbas Bahmanpour, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/abbas.bahmanpour, 14 M
date: 3 February 2020).
7
Enrique Tessieri, “Is Oulu, Finland, a Safe Place for Muslims?”, Migrant Tales
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR
https://www.migranttales.net/is-oulu-finland-a-safe-place-for-muslims/, 269
(Access date: 29 Apr
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
hate crimes were motivated by national-ethnic origin and religion.9 The Iraqis faced
the highest frequency of hate crime due to national and ethnic origin; the majority
of hate crimes due to religious backgrounds were against Muslims. An intense public
debate at the end of the year, which almost turned into a political crisis,10 surround-
ing the repatriation of 11 Finnish women and about 30 children from the al-Hol ref-
ugee camp in Syria. This was reported to have impacted Muslim women in Finland
who wear a niqab negatively as they were harassed publicly for being “ISIS wives.”11
The European Court of Human Rights announced in November that Finland
was guilty of violating Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Article 2 guarantees that everyone has a right to life, while Article 3 prohibits
inhumane treatment like torture. The decision was seen as a visible thumbs down
against Finland’s strict asylum policy. The case involves an Iraqi national who was de-
nied asylum in 2017 and who was allegedly killed few weeks after he returned to his
home country.12 The majority of asylum seekers who came to Finland (1 January-6
December 2015) were from Muslim-majority countries like Iraq (20,031 or 64% of
total), Afghanistan (4,816 or 15%), Somalia (1,954 or 6%), and Syria (785 or 3%).13
Employment
Finding work is one of the biggest challenges migrants in general and Muslims spe-
cifically face in Finland’s racialized and segregated labor markets. Unemployment of
people who don’t speak Finnish, Swedish, or Saami as their mother tongue, stood
at 22.4% against the national average of 10.48% for 2017, according to the lat-
est Statistics Finland figures.14 Some of the groups with the highest unemployment
rate were Arabic speakers (50.9%), Somali speakers (43.5%), Pastu Afghan speakers
(41.4%), Persian Farsi speakers (36.5%), Turkish speakers (24.3%), and Urdu speak-
ers (19.5%). By sex, national unemployment rates for men and women were 11.8%
and 9.1%, respectively. That compares with 65.4% for women who are Arabic speak-
ers and 49.5% for Somali speakers.
9. Jenita Rauta, “Poliisin tietoon tullut viharikollisuus Suomessa 2018”, Poliisiammatikorkeakoulu, 4 November
2019, https://www.theseus.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/261556/Polamk_katsaus_15_Viharikos_B5_WEB.pdf?se-
quence=1&isAllowed=y, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
10. “Timeline: The Foreign Ministry Flap over Repatriating Finns from al-Hol Refugee Camp”, Yle News, https://
yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/timeline_the_foreign_ministry_flap_over_repatriating_finns_from_al-hol_refugee_
camp/11111113, (Access date: 20 February 2020).
11. Conversation with Linda Hyökki via Facebook Messenger (16 January 2020).
12. “Court Rules Finland Violated Human Rights of Murdered Asylum Seeker”, Yle News, 14 November 2019,
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/court_rules_finland_violated_human_rights_of_murdered_asylum_seek-
er/11068398, (Access date: 21 January 2020).
13. “Vireille tullet turvapaikkahakemukset 1.12015- 6.12.2015”, Maahanmuuttovirasto, 7 December 2015, https://
migri.fi/documents/5202425/6160773/2015+Vireille+tulleet+turvapaikkahakemukset+1.1.-6.12.+%28fi%29,
(Access date: 23 January 2020).
14. “Population by Main Type of Activity, Language, Occupational Status, Sex, Age and Year 2000-2017”, Sta-
tistics Finland, http://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/fi/StatFin_Passiivi/StatFin_Passiivi__vrm__tyokay/statfinpas_
tyokay_pxt_006_201700.px/, (Access date: 1 January 2020).
270 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN fınland
It is important to note that the most vulnerable groups in the Finnish labor market
are immigrants from the Middle East, Northern Africa, Somalia, and those who have
arrived as refugees.15 Moreover, women from these groups suffer higher unemployment
than their countrymen even if they have the same level of schooling. Of all the Nordic
countries, Finland has performed the worse when it comes to employing migrant women.
The employment rate of migrant women was 55% while for migrant men it was 72%.16
A study published in October by Akhlaq Ahmad showed again that having a for-
eign-sounding name puts you at a clear disadvantage in the low-skilled Finnish labor
market.17 All of the applicants had the same qualifications and spoke the same level of
Finnish. Those with Finnish names scored the highest (390 people out of 500), with
the corresponding figure for Iraqi and Somalis being 134 and 99, respectively.18
While it is possible to get employment with a hijab, the religion of the person
can be a hindrance. In September, the district court of Helsinki ruled in favor of a
Muslim against the City of Helsinki for discrimination and paid him 36,000 euros
in damages.19 The worker, who was hired, was turned down for the job after he asked
if he could get 5 minutes unpaid prayer time and one hour on Fridays.
Education
One particular complaint from Muslim parents is that their children are not getting
the right Muslim education at school because teachers are not Muslim or are not
qualified.20 Some imams considered the Salam series, which was published by the
Finnish National Agency for Education (Opetushallitus) for comprehensive and mid-
dle school as steps in the right direction for teaching Islam. The new Salam series for
7-9 graders will be published in spring.21
15. Ojeaku Nwabuzo, “Racism & Discrimination in Employment in Europe 2013-2017”, European Network
Against Racism Shadow Report, p. 18-19, file:///Users/etessieri/Downloads/ENAR_Shadowreport_2013_2017%20
(3).pdf, (Access date: 1 January 2020).
16. “Report: Finland Trails Nordics in Employing Immigrant Women”, Yle New”, 22 January 2020, https://yle.fi/
uutiset/osasto/news/report_finland_trails_nordics_in_employing_immigrant_women/11170260?fbclid=IwAR3N-
liQqNCiwxxk-NHFJPbzy2wucqFA5-eMFIJIS0hxzl-Wt6iLRlNRQ_cc, (Access date: 23 January 2020).
17. Enrique Tessieri, “Study: If You Have a ‘Foreign’-Sounding Name, You Will Need More Than Luck to Get
Work”, Migrant Tales, 21 October 2019, https://www.migranttales.net/study-if-you-have-a-foreign-sounding-
name-you-will-need-more-than-luck-to-get-work/, (Access date: 1 January 2020).
18. “Mies pyysi rukoushetkiä, työsuhde peruuntui – virkamiehille tuomi työsyrjinnnästä”, Yle, 19 September 2019,
https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10980003, (Access date: 1 January 2020).
19. “Mies pyysi rukoushetkiä, työsuhde peruuntui – virkamiehille tuomio työsyrjinnästä”, YLE-STT, 19 September
2019, https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10980003, (Access date: 12 January 2020).
20. For more information, see: Helsingin Muslimit, “Islamin opetus kouluissa”, Islamin Opetus Kouluissa, https://
helsinginmuslimit.fi/islamin-opetus-kouluissa/?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=0d9fa829b5688ea04e3ee181645d69096c2
010d8-1579457438-0-Aap5IU4pA-LDdmyKxnV2u-E1hdGIT5rbZ4CnfOKNWMPReQE6ZfyooduQ3_Wr-
ElWuyzkoBh6aSd7_989sy3pYXpklDRPuol7qp7b2Us6ETZvuBd0G9GPEwnRsGq9Tyf4M0-O9qNQNF92R-
ja3ixR7_W0bsgY495TvhYA0J6cqND5iruZMjiuocPNXP6W7ONbX7R7RIKdZcK4nHagMyxUIuU7DzKVGN-
j5rZTU8ndnR0_f7rKpTMbpZjuPDoW3ahDrnakumHC9NrbtNoZ61yiWEdPOsT0-JZn0Z3ZcPZVoD1weMy,
(Access date: 19 January 2020). Also telephone conversation with Imam Abbas Bahampour (31 December 2019).
21. Telephone conversation with Imam Anas Hajar (8 January 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 271
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Politics
After four years (2015-2019) of a conservative government headed by Prime Min-
ister Juha Sipilä that tightened immigration laws like family reunification in 2016,22
there is hope that matters may improve with the new government. The biggest ob-
stacle to any loosening of asylum laws is the Finns Party (PS), which is openly hostile
to what it calls “harmful” immigration, which is code for Muslim asylum seekers.23
One of the anti-Islam claims is to “stop all harmful immigration” to Finland. Some
interpret this to mean leaving the Geneva Refugee Convention and the European
Convention on Human Rights.24
The brainchild of the PS’s anti-Islam message is its leader Jussi Halla-aho, who
was convicted of ethnic agitation and breaching the sanctity of religion in 2012. In
an interview with Danish daily Politiken,25 published a day before the April parlia-
mentary election, Halla-aho said that his only aim in politics is to change immigra-
tion policy and convert the Finns Party into such a powerful political force that other
parties will have no choice but to accept their policies like the Danish People’s Party
did in Denmark. Halla-aho’s comments are no surprise, considering that the Finns
Party has been a close ideological ally of the Danish People’s Party26 which was instru-
mental in making Denmark a hostile country for Muslims.27 In light of the present
situation and political landscape of the country, anti-Muslim rhetoric will continue
to dominate Finnish politics for the time being.
Media
Stories about Muslims in the Finnish media are too often biased and unbalanced.
Likewise, there is little trust among certain leaders of the Muslim community of
the media, where there are very few, if any, Muslims working as reporters, never
mind as editors. Two cases of biased reporting were the sexual assault cases of
22. ”Amnesty International Report 2016/2017”, Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Doc-
uments/POL1048002017ENGLISH.PDF, (Access date: 1 January 2020).
23. “Vote Finland Back”, The Finns Party Election Programme 2019, https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/wp-content/
uploads/2019/06/Eduskuntavaaliohjelma-2019_SU_In_English_1.pdf, (Accessed date: 19 January 2020).
24. Lauri Finér, “Millaista on perussuomalaisten maahanmuuttopolitiikka?”, Veropolitiikka blogi, 6 January 2020,
https://veropolitiikka.blog/2020/01/06/millaista-on-perussuomalaisten-maahanmuuttopolitiikka/, (Access date: 19
January 2020).
25. Kristian Klarskov, “Usædvanlig finsk højrefløjsleder har fordoblet målingerne på fire måneder: ‘Man kan se på mit
ansigt, at jeg absolut ikke nyder det her”, Politiken, 13 April 2019, https://politiken.dk/udland/art7137325/»Man-
kan-se-på-mit-ansigt-at-jeg-absolut-ikke-nyder-det-her«, (Access date: 1 January 2020).
26. Enrique Tessieri, “The ‘Denmarkization’ of Finnish Immigration Policy”, Migrant Tales, 19 December
2015, https://www.migranttales.net/the-denmarkization-of-finnish-immigration-policy/, (Access date: 1 Janu-
ary 2020).
27. Sibel Özcan and Zeynep Bangert, “Islamophobia in Denmark National Report 2018”, ed. Enes Bayraklı and
Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2018, (SETA, İstanbul: 2019), p. 251-282, http://www.islamophobiaeu-
rope.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/DENMARK.pdf, (Access date: 1 January 2020).
272 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN fınland
Oulu28 that came to public light at the end of November 2018, and at the end of
last year, the repatriation of 11 women and about 30 children in the al-Hol refugee
camp in northeast Syria. During a 79-day period Yle alone published 77 stories
(27 November 2018 - 13 February 2019) about the sexual29 assault cases;30 in the
case of al-Hol, Yle published 71 stories and Helsingin Sanomat 36 stories during
a twenty-day period (2-21 December 2019).31 While some believed there was “a
sexual assault epidemic of minors” by Muslims, only eight were found guilty and
handed prison terms.32
Figure 2: The Finnish media commonly reinforces stereotypic perceptions of Muslim women. The story by
Figure 2: The Finnish media commonly reinforces stereotypic perceptions of Muslim women. The story by Finland’s
Finland’s
leading daily, leadingSanomat,
Helsingin daily, Helsingin thatsuggests
Sanomat,
suggests the 11 that the 11women
Finnish Finnish women and roughly
and their their roughly 30 childrenatatthe al-Hol
30 children
camp in Syria
the al-Hol camp in Syria wear burkas, even if they actually wear niqabs. Such illustrations help tothe
wear burkas, even if they actually wear niqabs. Such illustrations help to create assumption
create the that all
Muslim women, even Finnish converts to Islam, wear burkas.33
assumption that all Muslim women, even Finnish converts to Islam, wear burkas. 33
Negative and overzealous reporting by the media had an especially negative im-
pact onNegative
the Muslim community
and overzealous reporting of
by Oulu.
the mediaThe media’s
had an reporting
especially and on
negative impact public
the outrage,
fueled by politicians
Muslim communityand even
of Oulu. Thethe police,
media’s encouraged
overzealous knee-jerk
reporting and responses
public outrage, fueled by by govern-
politicians and even the police, encouraged knee-jerk responses by government politicians who
28. Enrique Tessieri,asylum
demanded “YLE seekers
Coveragebe of Sexual
given testsAssaults Committed
on Finnish values, thebyloss
White Finns andifMigrants
of citizenship convictedIs Unbalanced,
Racialized and Opinionated”, Migrant Tales, 10 April 2018, https://www.migranttales.net/yle-coverage-of-sexu-
of a serious crime, 34 and brought about recommendations by city officials to momentarily ban
al-assaults-committed-by-white-finns-and-migrants-is-unbalanced-racialized-and-opinionated/, (Access date: 29
Decemberasylum
2019).seekers from visiting day care centers and elementary schools. 35
29. Enrique Tessieri, “Actions of the Finnish Police and Yle Reveal Multicultural Incompetence in Coverage of
Oulu Sexual Assault Cases”, Migrant Tales, 24 April 2019, https://www.migranttales.net/actions-of-the-finnish-po-
lice-and-yle-reveal-multicultural-incompetence-in-coverage-of-oulu-sexual-assault-cases/, (Access date: 29 Decem-
ber 2019).
30. Anu Koivunen, “Turvallisuusuhka”, Suomen Kuvalehti, 25 January 2019 https://suomenkuvalehti.fi/jutut/
kulttuuri/mita-saadaan-kun-seksuaalirikokset-turvapaikanhakijat-ja-perussuomalaisten-gallupnousu-kohtaavat-tol-
kuton-mediapaniikki/?shared=1059892-60bafb74-999, (Access date: 4 February 2020). For more information, see:
Enrique Tessieri, “The Media of Finland Is Part of the Country’s Islamophobia and Racism Problem”, Migrant
Tales, 26 January 2019, https://www.migranttales.net/the-media-of-finland-is-part-of-the-countrys-islamophobia-
and-racism-problem/, (Access date: 4 February 2020).
33
Sami Silanpää, “11 naista ja heidän lapsensa”, Helsingin Sanomat, 13 December 2019,
https://www.hs.fi/sunnuntai/art-2000006341623.html,
31. Enrique Tessieri, “Media Coverage of the Women (Access date: 29 December
and Children Refugees2019).
of the al-Hol Camp Is a Low for Finn-
34
“FasterMigrant
ish Journalism”, Asylum Process,
Tales,Civics Test, Proof of
22 December Study https://www.migranttales.net/media-coverage-of-the-women-
2019, or Work: Govt’s Plans to Combat Immigrant Crime”, Yle
News,
and-children-refugees-of-the-al-hol-camp-is-a-low-in-finnish-journalism/, (Access date: 29 December 2019).
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/faster_asylum_process_civics_test_proof_of_study_or_work_govts_plans_to_c
32. “Käräjäoikeus antoi viimeiset tuomiot
ombat_immigrant_crime/10655505, Oulun
20 February seksuaalirikosjutussa
2019, – kaikki
(Access date: 29 December 2019). kahdeksan syytettyä vankeuteen,
35
pisin tuomioEnrique
4,5 Tessieri,
vuotta”,“City of Oulu’s ‘Ban’
Ilta-Sanomat, 12onJuly
Asylum Seekers
2019, Visiting Day-Care Center and Schools May Be
https://www.is.fi/oulun-seutu/art-2000006171458.html,
Unconstitutional.
(Access date: ‘Ban’ to Be Lifted on April 14”, Migrant Tales, 5 March 2019,
25 January 2020).
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/faster_asylum_process_civics_test_proof_of_study_or_work_govts_plans_to_c
33. Sami ombat_immigrant_crime/10655505,
Silanpää, “11 naista ja heidän(Access
lapsensa”, Helsingin
date: 29 December Sanomat,
2019). 13 December 2019, https://www.hs.fi/sun-
nuntai/art-2000006341623.html, (Access date: 29 December 2019).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 273
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ment politicians who demanded asylum seekers be given tests on Finnish values, the
loss of citizenship if convicted of a serious crime,34 and brought about recommen-
dations by city officials to momentarily ban asylum seekers from visiting day care
centers and elementary schools.35
Figure 3:
Figure 3: Helsingin
Helsingin Sanomat’s
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newsroom. 3737
Justice System
Justice System
Juho Sipilä’s government (2015-2019) aimed at changing laws that would impact
Juho Sipilä’s government (2015-2019) aimed at changing laws that would impact migrants but
migrants but they never came into force due to time constraints and because his
they never came into force due to time constraints and because his government resigned in
government resigned in March.
March.
In light of the Oulu sexual assault cases, former National Coalition Party Interior Minister Kai
Mykkänen stated that
34. “Faster Asylum on top
Process, of Test,
Civics deportations, a person
Proof of Study guilty
or Work: of a Plans
Govt’s serious crime, like
to Combat gross sexual
Immigrant Crime”, Yle
News, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/faster_asylum_process_civics_test_proof_of_study_or_work_govts_plans_
assault, could lose his citizenship. 38 Mykkänen suggested that all asylum seekers who are 16
to_combat_immigrant_crime/10655505, 20 February 2019, (Access date: 29 December 2019).
35. Enrique Tessieri, “City of Oulu’s ‘Ban’ on Asylum Seekers Visiting Day-Care Center and Schools May Be Un-
constitutional. ‘Ban’ to Be Lifted on April 14”, Migrant Tales, 5 March 2019, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/fast-
36
Miska Rantanen and Juhani Saarinen, “HS täyttää 130 vuotta ja teki lukijoilleen erikoislehden”, Helsingin
er_asylum_process_civics_test_proof_of_study_or_work_govts_plans_to_combat_immigrant_crime/10655505,
Sanomat, 16 November 2019, https://www.hs.fi/kulttuuri/art-2000006308542.html, (Access date: 29 December
(Access date: 29 December 2019).
2019).
37
“Joka
36. Miska Rantanenkuudes helsinkiläinen
and Juhani on 130
Saarinen, “HS täyttää ulkomaalaistaustainen”, Helsingin
vuotta ja teki lukijoilleen erikoislehden”, kaupunki,Sano-
Helsingin
https://www.ulkomaalaistaustaisethelsingissa.fi/fi/nykytilanne, (Access date: 29 December
mat, 16 November 2019, https://www.hs.fi/kulttuuri/art-2000006308542.html, (Access 2019).
date: 29 December 2019).
38
“Sisäministeri Mykkänen olisi valmis viemään kanalaisuuden törkeään seksuaalirikokseen syyllistyneeltä –
37. “Joka
myös kuudes helsinkiläinen
Maahanmuuttovirastossa on ulkomaalaistaustainen”,
uskotaan, Helsingin
että kovemmat rangaistukset kaupunki,
voisivat https://www.ulkomaalaistaustais
auttaa”, Yle, 13 December 2018,
ethelsingissa.fi/fi/nykytilanne, (Access
https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10547528, date:
(Access 298 December
date: 2019).
January 2020).
274 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN fınland
In light of the Oulu sexual assault cases, former National Coalition Party In-
terior Minister Kai Mykkänen stated that on top of deportations, a person guilty
of a serious crime, like gross sexual assault, could lose his citizenship.38 Mykkänen
suggested that all asylum seekers who are 16 years old and above must take a course
on Finnish values and sign an agreement that they will abide by the law.39
Internet
One of the biggest hate crime stories last year was the abrupt 59.2% fall in ethnic
agitation cases in 2019 from the previous year due to a drop in police funding.40
Måns Enqvist of the National Board of Police of Finland said that there are at most
10 police officers monitoring online hate speech.41 According to the justice ministry,
ethnic agitation cases that were taken to court in 2018 numbered 31, up 138.5%
from 13 in the previous year. The corresponding figures for 2013, 2014, 2015, and
2016 were 4, 3, 1, and 5, respectively.42 Even if the number of ethnic agitation cases
fell sharply, they are only the tip of the iceberg.
Concern about hate speech was brought up by President Sauli Niinistö in his
New Year’s speech. He stated, “Online shaming and hate speech are new concepts in
public debate. However, our legislator has been far-sighted. For example, incitement
to ethnic hatred and offences against personal reputation, dignity or privacy of the
individual are already criminalized by law. A person committing a crime against an-
other person is liable to prosecution. This has no connection to freedom of speech,
let alone its limitation.”43
Another challenge to growing online hate speech is the founding on 25 December
of the Silakkaliike, or Baltic Herring Movement. Just like Italy’s Sardines Movement,
its Finnish counterpart has no political affiliation and aims to be a “non-violent coun-
terforce to populist, hate, and racist-provoking policies.”44 Despite its popularity, the
38. “Sisäministeri Mykkänen olisi valmis viemään kanalaisuuden törkeään seksuaalirikokseen syyllistyneeltä – myös
Maahanmuuttovirastossa uskotaan, että kovemmat rangaistukset voisivat auttaa”, Yle, 13 December 2018, https://
yle.fi/uutiset/3-10547528, (Access date: 8 January 2020).
39. ”Mykkänen ehdottaa vastaanottokeskuksiin kokeita suomalaisen yhteiskunnan pelisäännöistä”, Yle/STT, 10
February 2019, (Access date: 8 January 2020).
40. Enrique Tessieri, “Does the Finnish Police Really Care about Online Hate Speech?” Migrant Tales, 18 January
2020, https://www.migranttales.net/does-the-finnish-police-really-care-about-online-hate-speech/, (Access date: 20
January 2020).
41. Enrique Tessieri, “Finland Should Have More Police Monitoring Hate Speech on the Internet, Not Less”,
Migrant Tales, 31 August 2019, https://www.migranttales.net/finland-should-have-more-police-monitoring-hate-
speech-on-the-internet-not-less/, (Access date: 6 January 2020).
42. ”Viharikokset käräjäoikeuksissa vuonna 2018”, Oikeusministeriö, https://api.hankeikkuna.fi/asiakirjat/80a-
c0a59-5434-4983-b89e-e2ab0013ba21/f8cd2930-307a-4c79-9df3-d36defb38e91/MUISTIO_20190524105518.
pdf, (Access date: 6 January 2020).
43. Sauli Ninistö, “President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö’s New Year’s Speech on 1 January 2020”, President of the
Republic of Finland, 1 January 2020, https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/president-of-the-republic-sauli-niinis-
tos-new-years-speech-on-1-january-2020/, (Access date: 6 January 2020).
44. “Silakkaliike Official Website”, https://silakkaliike.fi/, (Access date: 12 March 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 275
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
jury is still out on how successful it will be. After two weeks of its founding (6 Janu-
ary), it had over 24,000 followers on Facebook and over 13,700 on Twitter.45
Ilja Janitskin, the former editor of the online MV-lehti publication who was
Ilja Janitskin, the former editor of the online MV-lehti publication who was sen-
tenced in 2018 to to aa 22-month
22-monthprisonprison
term forterm for aggravated
aggravated defamation,
defamation, ethnic agita- ethnic agitati
tion, and copyright infringement, and ordered to pay 136,000 euros in damages to his
infringement, and ordered to pay 136,000 euros in damages to his victims, w
victims, was unsuccessful in getting the court to reverse the convictions he received last
getting
year.46 New charges werethe courtagainst
brought to reverse
Janitskinthebyconvictions he received
Hanna Huumonen, who was last year. 46 New ch
attacked by social media mobs
against for campaigning
Janitskin by Hanna successfully in 2016 for
Huumonen, whoadvertisers to
was attacked by social
stop placing ads in MV-lehti.47 Janitskin died of cancer on 7 February 2020.48
campaigning successfully in 2016 for advertisers to stop placing ads in MV
Figure 4: Sira Moksi is a prolific anti-racism cartoonist. The cartoon was removed by Silakkaliike’s Facebook page.49 In
the cartoon, there is a Baltic herring fishing Finns Party leader Jussi Halla-aho.50
Figure 4: Sira Moksi is a prolific anti-racism cartoonist. The cartoon was removed by S
page. 48 In the cartoon, there is a Baltic herring fishing Finns Party leader Jussi Halla-aho. 4
45. Silakkaliike, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/groups/Silakkaliike/ and Silakkaliike, Twitter, https://twitter.
com/silakkaliike, (Access date: 6 January 2020).
46. “Court Hears Anti-immigrant Agitator Janitskin’s Appeal,” Yle News, 14 October 2019, https://yle.fi/uutiset/
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
osasto/news/court_hears_anti-immigrant_agitator_janitskins_appeal/11018971, (Access date: 20 January 2020).
47. Enrique Tessieri, “The MV-lehti Case Should Be Made into an Important Watershed against Hate Speech”,
The good showing of the Finns Party in the April parliamentary
Migrant Tales, 14 October 2019, https://www.migranttales.net/the-mv-lehti-case-should-be-made-into-an-import-
ant-watershed-against-hate-speech/, (Access date: 20 January 2020).
elections and
polls agitator
48. “Iltalehti: Anti-immigrant have dies
emboldened the
aged 42,” Yle News, far-right
7 February party and forced opposition
2020, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/ mainstre
iltalehti_anti-immigrant_agitator_dies_aged_42/11198014, (Access date: 1 June 2020).
49. Silakat, Facebook,National Coalition Party (Kookomus)
https://www.facebook.com/Silakkaliike/, and 2020).
(Access date: 19 February Christian Democrats to flirt wit
50. “AJAN KUVIA–poliittisia piirroksia”, Facebook, 30 December 2019, https://www.facebook.com/AJAN-
KUVIA-poliittisia-piirroksia-431508767274763/?__xts__[0]=68.ARBthxiGnH8b44hVzzuZkHy5cTd-
JTQlOwvt9QXZ3wrRKOXffqnX2DV43lVqfAW_jxh4skGyLjPtNhVykTCUP-ObI8HfEu3paSVPJBxm-
wiSiwdwZyOeAqx7r3XoML9CUpe40obhQNl6aTeGMaEJKkcA7Qgo8y2Rj_OcdYf4qqc_pDWZP9NqA-
46
“Court Hears Anti-immigrant Agitator Janitskin’s Appeal,” Yle News,
uDbx0SAFqAJOIrMlRk1zFr8-i_SjEvdDboYVbLJ2OedA-8mGxi-3sY25ns6WAKZebsoofe7WdhRVo8ix-
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/court_hears_anti-immigrant_agitator_janitskins_appeal/1
O2yYNErgxGQ3GPQBR_Tt7lYvlUCs1agtAt8TA-IFC17qH79GYkFk46Iz8IX1Rdw9O4U_4aGgwECK-
S92i1ke4, (Access date: 4 February 2020).
date: 20 January 2020).
47
Enrique Tessieri, “The MV-lehti Case Should Be Made into an Important Watershed
Migrant Tales, 14 October 2019, https://www.migranttales.net/the-mv-lehti-case-sh
276 important-watershed-against-hate-speech/, (Access date: 20 January
setav.org2020).
48
Silakat, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/Silakkaliike/, (Access date: 19 February 2
49
“AJAN KUVIA–poliittisia piirroksia”, Facebook, 30 December 2019, https://www
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN fınland
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
The good showing of the Finns Party in the April parliamentary elections and its
lead in opinion polls have emboldened the far-right party and forced opposition
mainstream parties like the National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) and Christian
Democrats to flirt with the PS. In many respects, Finland’s Islamophobia network
is a cut-and-paste job of other similar-minded parties across the EU and using the
same racist soundbites like “Vote Finland Back,” and “harmful” and “uncontrolled
immigration.”51 Some “notable” PS Islamophobes in 2019 were Jussi Halla-aho,
Riikka Purra, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ville Tavio, Laura Huhtasaari, Juha Mäenpää,
Ano Turtiainen, Jari Ronkainen, Matias Turkkila, Mauri Peltokangas, Sanna Anti-
kainen, and a long list of others like Asseri Kinnunen and Johannes Sipola of PS
Youth. Among the other parties: Kokoomus’s Wille Rydman, Atte Kaleva, and Kai
Mykkänen; Christian Democrats’ Sarah Essayah and Päivi Räsänen; and in far-right
groups such as Finland First Marco de Witt, Junnes Lokka, and Tiina Wiik. Katie
Hopkins, who was interviewed by the Finns Party and invited by Islamophobes like
Lokka and Wiik, visited Oulu in January to “help” the municipality and police con-
cerning the sexual assault cases that took place there.52 The mayor of Oulu turned
down a meeting with Hopkins.
Observed Civil Society and Political Initiatives to
Counter Islamophobia
The track record of combating Islamophobia and other forms of racism is mixed.
The creation of a police group to monitor hate crime on the Internet was created
in 2017 but suffered in the 2019 budget cuts, which led to a sharp drop in ethnic
agitation cases brought to the attention of the public prosecutor. As a Nordic wel-
fare state, Finland has good laws and programs, which if applied rigorously, would
effectively challenge Islamophobia. In many respects, anti-Islamophobia initiatives
hinge on political and civil will as well as leadership. This means that society must
come to terms with its Muslim minority and stop seeing them as “good” (Tatars)
and “bad” (Muslims). Tatars are an 800 to 900-strong Muslim community who
emigrated to Finland at the end of the 19th century. Social Democratic Prime
Minister Sanna Marin’s government has stated in the government program53 its
willingness to uphold human rights and abide by international agreements that
51. “Vote Finland Back”, The Finns Party’s Election Program 2019, https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/wp-content/
uploads/2019/06/Eduskuntavaaliohjelma-2019_SU_In_English_1.pdf, (Access date: 20 January 2020).
52. “Factsheet: Katie Hopkins”, Bridge Initiative Team, 7 August 2018, https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/fact-
sheet-katie-hopkins/, (Access date: 21 February 2020).
53. “Inclusive and Competent Finland – a Socially, Economically and Ecologically Sustainable Society”, Finnish Gov-
ernment, 2019, http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/161935/VN_2019_33.pdf?sequence=1
&isAllowed=y, (Access date: 20 January 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
protect refugees. When comparing the previous government’s program,54 terms
like inclusion, asylum seekers, and racism appear in Marin’s government program
more often than in Sipilä’s. In the face of hate speech, which impacts white Finns
as well, it appears that Finland is slowly waking up with President Sauli Niinistö
expressing concern about such social ills in his New Year’s speech. While such
leadership is crucial in the struggle against Islamophobia, the jury is still out on
how effective it will be.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Finland’s Muslim community continues to believe that direct contact and open di-
alogue are crucial to challenging Islamophobia and fostering a more harmonious
society that respects difference. Strong leadership is needed from all walks of public
life, especially from the Muslim and migrant communities. Such efforts, however,
face an uphill battle considering that Islamophobia is presently politically in vogue
and exploited by parties like the Finns Party.
Building and coexisting in a culturally diverse society is not easy but requires
effective solutions like the enforcement of laws that discourage discrimination and
hate speech. This long journey towards a better functioning, culturally diverse society
will not materialize in a year, four years, or a decade, but will take generations. It is,
however, important that we begin this journey for the sake of our children, grand-
children, and great-grandchildren.
Chronology
• 31.01.2019: In the face of political pressure and parental concerns
due to the highly politicized sexual assault cases of Oulu, the city tem-
porarily banned asylum seekers and refugees from visiting day care
centers and schools.55 According to Mika Penttilä, the city’s director
of education and culture, the ban would be lifted on 14 April, or after
parliamentary elections. “This is not a ban,” he said, “but a recom-
mendation that asylum seekers should not be allowed to visit day care
centers and schools.”56
• 22.02.2019: “We want to prohibit the use of clothing that degrades wom-
en like the burqa, niqab veils (sic) as well as veils used by little girls. Forced
54. “Finland, a Land of Solutions”, Strategic Programme of Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Government, 29 May
2015, https://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10184/1427398/Ratkaisujen+Suomi_EN_YHDISTETTY_netti.pd-
f/8d2e1a66-e24a-4073-8303-ee3127fbfcac/Ratkaisujen+Suomi_EN_YHDISTETTY_netti.pdf, (Access date: 21
January 2020).
55. “Oulu Bans Asylum Seeker Visits to Schools”, Yle News, 31 January 2019, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/
oulu_bans_asylum_seeker_visits_to_schools/10623356, (Access date: 6 January 2020).
56. Enrique Tessieri, “City of Oulu’s ‘Ban’ on Asylum Seekers Visiting Day-Care Centers and Schools”.
278 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN fınland
marriages, genital mutilation, and sending children [abroad] to be indoc-
trinated by Islam should be effectively punished”, according to PS First
Vice-President Riikka Purra.57
• 16.03.2019: “The New Zealand case shows ever-convincingly that mul-
ticultural society does not work,” said Lapland Finns Party Youth leader,
Johannes Sipola, tweeting right after the Christchurch, New Zealand,
mosque shootings. “When other people [of other backgrounds] rape and
kill enough [people], it is only a question of time when there will be a reac-
tion from the opposite side.”58
• 26.03.2019: Finns Party MP Ville Tavio said that closing down the Oulu
Mosque should be considered in light of the sexual abuse case of a minor
there. Imam Abdul Mannan of the Oulu Mosque denies that a child was
sexually abused in the mosque.59 An appeal was sent to the supreme dis-
trict court to overturn the district court’s decision, which found the suspect
guilty of sexually abusing a minor.
• 13.06.2019: Finns Party MP Juha Mäenpää linked asylum seekers to an
“invasive species” that should be repelled. The state prosecutor announced
in January that Mäenpää would be charged for ethnic agitation but needed
the approval of parliament. The Finns Party have enough votes to block the
request that would remove the MP’s immunity.60
• 17.07.2019: Finnish Party chairperson Jussi Halla-aho on being a white
Finn: “I think we all have a relatively cohesive, intuitive understanding of
whether or not someone walking towards us is a Finn. And this question
is much more complicated than what’s that someone’s skin color or family
background. We can’t even start by saying that everyone who was born in
Finland is part of this group.” 61
• 04.09.2019: The Non-Discrimination Ombudsman recommended that
all public swimming pool halls in Finland must permit the use of the bur-
kini. The Ombudsman stated that public pool halls should build separate
57. Riikka Purra, Twitter, 22 February 2019, https://twitter.com/ir_rkp/status/1098920935732727808, (Access
date: 6 January 2020).
58. Enrique Tessieri, “Twitter: Perussuomalaiset Youth Leader Condones Terrorist Attack in New Zealand”, Migrant
Tales, 16 March 2019, https://www.migranttales.net/twitter-perussuomalaiset-youth-leader-condones-terrorist-at-
tack-in-new-zealand/, (Access date: 6 January 2020).
59. “Kansanedustaja Tavio: Oulun moskeijan sulkemisa on harkittava”, Kaleva, 26 March 2019, https://www.
kaleva.fi/uutiset/oulu/kansanedustaja-tavio-oulun-moskeijan-sulkemista-on-harkittava/817507/, (Access date:
6 January 2020).
60. “Prosecutor General Aims to Charge Finns Party MP for Incitement”, Yle News, 23 January 2020, https://yle.
fi/uutiset/osasto/news/prosecutor_general_aims_to_charge_finns_party_mp_for_incitement/11172792, (Access
date: 25 January 2020).
61. “Halla-aho: We All Have Intuitive Understanding of Whether Someone Is a Finn”, Helsinki Times, 17 July 2019,
https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/politics/16570-halla-aho-we-all-have-intuitive-understanding-of-
whether-someone-is-a-finn.html, (Access date: 3 February 2020).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
showering quarters so that no group is discriminated. “Burkini bans can
be discriminatory,” the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman stated.62
• 10-31.10.2019: Two Finns Party politicians were convicted for ethnic ag-
itation for social media postings in 2016 and 2017. MP Sebastian Tynk-
kynen was convicted for a second time of ethnic agitation for publishing
on Facebook and Instagram racist and insulting posts about Islam.63 Finns
Party Espoo city councilor, Teemu Lahtinen, was convicted for ethnic ag-
itation and breaching the sanctity of religion for a tweet where he labelled
Mohammed a pedophile and for denigrating Somalis.64
• 21.11.2019: “The right [of asylum seekers] to come to Finland and live off
tax-payers’ money is not a human right,” said Finns Party chairperson, Jussi
Halla-aho.65
62. “Yhdenvertaisuusvaltuutettu: burkinit tulisi sallia uimahalleisa”, Yhdenvertaisuusvaltuutettu (Non-Discrimi-
nation Ombudsman), 4 September 2019, https://www.syrjinta.fi/-/yhdenvertaisuusvaltuutettu-burkinit-tulisi-sal-
lia-uimahalleissa, (Access date: 6 January 2020).
63. “Perussuomlaisten Sebastian Tynkkyselle toinen tuomio kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan – Halla-aho:
Nakertaa oikeuslaitoksen uskottavuutta,” Yle, 10 October 2019, https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-11013740, (Access date: 8
January 2020).
64. Juho Jokinen, “Perussuomalaisten poliitikko rinnasti profeetta Muhammedin ja pedofilian, tuomio uskonrau-
han rikkomisesta”, Helsingin Sanomat, 31 October 2019, https://www.hs.fi/kaupunki/art-2000006291455.html,
(Access date: 8 January 2020).
65. Perussuomalaiset, Twitter, 21 November 2019, https://twitter.com/persut/status/1197394532196847618/pho-
to/1, (Access date: 21 November 2019).
280 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN france
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
FRANCE
NATIONAL REPORT 2019
LÉONARD FAYTRE
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 281
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
282 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN france
The Author
Léonard Faytre graduated from Sciences Po Paris University with degrees in
both political science (BA) and urban policy (MA). After moving to Istanbul in
2013, he continued his studies and completed a second MA in argumentation theo-
ries (münazara) at the Alliance of Civilization Institute (Ibn Khaldun University) in
2018. His research focuses on political theory, French foreign affairs, and French im-
migration policy. Besides French, he speaks English, Turkish, and Arabic. Currently,
Faytre works as a research assistant at the European Studies Department of SETA
(Istanbul Office). Email: l.faytre@gmail.com
Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions. No representation, either expressed or im-
plied, is made of the accuracy of the material in the national reports. The editors of
the European Islamophobia Report cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The reader must make his or
her own evaluation of the accuracy and appropriateness of the material.
To cite this report: Léonard Faytre: Islamophobia in France: National Report 2019, in: Enes Bayraklı &
Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2019, Istanbul, SETA, 2020.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 283
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Executive Summary
Similarly to previous years, Islamophobia shaped French society in 2019. The nor-
malization of Islamophobia through endless controversies did not only legitimize
the systemic discrimination French Muslims experience but also paved the way to
physically violent acts. Two symptomatic examples are the gunshot attack against
the mosque of Brest and its popular imam Rachid Eljay (27 June), and the attack
against the mosque of Bayonne (28 October) that wounded four. Inquiries for both
attacks are still ongoing. Moreover, French intelligence keeps monitoring and dis-
mantling far-right groups that plan attacks against Muslims and Jews. The Collectif
contre l’islamophobie en France (CCIF) received 789 report forms referring to 1,043
Islamophobic incidents that occurred in 2019.
In October and November 2019, a significant “terror attack – Islamophobia
sequence” took place after an attack on Paris Police Headquarters on 3 October by
a convert to Islam (4 dead, 4 wounded). Following this incident, President Macron
started a campaign targeting the whole Muslim population. Calling for a “watchdog
society” and inciting the French people to check “weak signals of radicalization,”
Macron and Minister of Interior Christophe Castaner connected terrorism with reg-
ular Muslim behaviors and culture (such as having a beard, praying five times a
day, eating halal food, not kissing the opposite gender, etc.). The government and
many media organs implicitly presented the Muslim communities as responsible and
accomplices of the attack, jumping from controversy to controversy. However, the
inquiry is still underway.
This sequence also exposed the ambiguity of the French antiterrorism policy
that stands officially on two main principles: (1) “combating violent radicalization
which can lead to terrorism (these individuals are monitored and prosecuted, if their
dangerousness is established)”; and (2) “combating communitarianism (communau-
tarisme) and a rigorous practice that deviates from Islam.” If the first principle cor-
responds to legitimate measures to maintain public order, the second is vague and
unclear, and threatens the rights and way of life of French Muslim citizens. This
report demonstrates this latter argument and discloses how Islamophobia works as a
state racism in a multitude of ways.
At the same time, the French people also protested against the rise of Islam-
ophobia in 2019 as illustrated by the “March against Islamophobia” (10 November)
that gathered between 20,000 and 40,000 protestors in Paris (13,500 according to
the Ministry of Interior).
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Résumé
A l’image des années précédentes, l’islamophobie a profondément marqué la société
française en 2019. La normalisation de l’islamophobie à travers d’incessantes contro-
verses n’a pas seulement légitimé la discrimination systémique des musulmans, mais
a également ouvert la voie à des actes de violence physique. Deux exemples sympto-
matiques peuvent être cités à cet égard, à savoir l’attaque par balles devant la mosquée
de Brest – touchant notamment l’imam populaire Rachid Eljay (27 juin) – et l’at-
taque contre la mosquée de Bayonne (28 octobre). Les services de renseignement ont
d’ailleurs démantelé plusieurs groupes d’extrême droite qui planifiaient des attaques
contre des citoyens musulmans et juifs. Enfin, le Collectif contre l’islamophobie en
France (CCIF) a reçu 789 fiches de signalement faisant état de 1043 incidents isla-
mophobes survenus en 2019.
Entre octobre et novembre 2019, une importante séquence entremêlant atten-
tat terroriste et islamophobie a eu lieu après l’attaque de la préfecture de police de
Paris le 3 octobre par un musulman converti (4 morts, 4 blessés). Suite à cet incident,
le président Macron a lancé une campagne visant l’ensemble de la communauté
musulmane. Appelant à une « société de vigilance » et incitant les Français à signaler
les « signaux faibles de radicalisation », le président Macron et son ministre de l’in-
térieur Christophe Castaner ont fait le lien entre le terrorisme et des traits culturels
communs à l’ensemble des musulmans (comme porter la barbe, prier cinq fois par
jour, manger de la nourriture halal, ne pas embrasser les femmes, etc.). A travers d’in-
cessantes controverses, le gouvernement et de nombreux médias ont implicitement
désigné les musulmans comme responsables et complices de l’attentat. Cependant,
l’enquête est toujours en cours.
Cette séquence a également montré l’ambiguïté de la politique antiterroriste
française qui repose officiellement sur deux grands principes : i) la lutte contre « la ra-
dicalisation violente qui peut conduire au terrorisme (ces individus sont suivis et ju-
diciarisés, si leur dangerosité est établie) » ; ii) la lutte contre « le communautarisme
et une pratique religieuse qui dévoie l’islam ». Si le premier principe correspond à
des mesures légitimes de maintien de l’ordre public, le second est vague, peu clair
et menace les droits des citoyens musulmans ainsi que leur mode de vie. Ce rapport
discute ce dernier point et révèle comment l’islamophobie fonctionne, à bien des
égards, comme un racisme d’État.
Néanmoins, les Français ne sont pas restés passifs face à cette situation et ont
protesté contre la montée de l’islamophobie, comme l’illustre la « Marche contre
l’islamophobie » (10 novembre) qui a rassemblé à Paris entre 20 000 et 40 000 per-
sonnes (13.500 d’après le ministère de l’intérieur).
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Country Profile
EIR 2019
Country: France
Type of Regime: Unitary constitutional republic
Form of Government: Semi-presidential system
Ruling Parties: La République En Marche! (right)
Opposition Parties: Le Rassemblement National, Les Républicains, La France In-
soumise
Last Elections: 2019 European Election (Le Rassemblement National (far-
right) party won 23.34%, La Republic en Marche! (right) 22.42% and Europe
Ecologie les Verts (green) 13.48%); 2017 Presidential Election (Emmanuel Macron
won 66.1% of the vote against 33.9% of far-right leader Marine Le Pen); 2017
Legislative Election (La République En Marche! (Macron’s right): 297 seats; Les Re-
publicains (anti-Macron’s right): 104 seats; Mouvement Democrate (pro-Macron’s
right): 46 seats; Socialistes (left - ruling party in 2012-2017): 30 seats; UDI, Agir
et Independants (right): 27 seats; Libertes et Territoires (center): 20 seats; La France
Insoumise (far-left): 17; Gauche democrate et republicaine (far-left): 16; Without a
group (many of far-right): 20)
Total Population: 66.3 million (2015)
Major Languages: French
Official Religion: No official religion (secularism)
Statistics on Islamophobia: The Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France (CCIF)
received 789 report forms referring to 1,043 Islamophobic incidents. Among the
1,043 incidents mentioned above, 68 concern physical attacks (6.5%), 618 concern
discrimination (59.3%), 210 concern hate speech and incitement to racial hatred
(20.1%), 93 concern defamation (8.9%), 22 concern degradation of sacred places
(2.1%), and 32 are linked to the fight against terrorism (3.1%).
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: The number of racist and xenopho-
bic incidents increased in 2019, with 1,142 incidents recorded (compared with 496
in 2018). Most of these incidents fall under the category of “threats” (977).
Major Religions (% of Population): The compilation of official statistics based
on religious beliefs is not permitted by French law. Depending on the methodolo-
gy applied by the surveys, the figures may differ. For example, according to a note
published in GeoConfluences, 64% of the French are Catholics (of which 4.5%
regularly go to Sunday mass), 63% have no religion, 6.4% are Muslims, and 0.5%
are Jews (see various studies on this subject in “Statistiques sur la pratique religieuse
en France”, GeoConfluences, December 2016).
Muslim Population (% of Population): The compilation of official statistics
based on religious beliefs is not permitted by French law. According to the Pew Research
Center, the Muslim population may stand between 5 and 6 million people (8.8%).
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Main Muslim Community Organizations: CFCM (Conseil français du culte
musulman), UMF (Union des mosquées de France), Islam de France, DITIB, Milli
Görüş, L.E.S Musulmans, Association musulmane pour l’islam de France
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: CCIF (Collectif contre l’islamophobie
en France), CRI (Coordination contre le racisme et l’islamophobie), CJL (Comité Justice
et Libertés pour tous), ADM (Action Droits des Musulmans)
Far-Right Parties: The National Rally (Rassemblement national, RN), France
Arise (Debout la France), The Patriots (Les Patriotes)
Far-Right Movements: Génération identitaire, Réseau Remora, Volontaire pour la
France (VPF), Soldats d’Odin Breizh
Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: AFO (Action of Operational Forces)
Limitations to Islamic Practices:
ű Hijab Ban: Ban of religious symbols including Muslim headscarf from pri-
mary school to high school (2004); “Chatel circular” prohibits parents who
accompany children on school trips to display religious symbols (2013).
ű Halal Slaughter Ban: None
ű Minaret Ban: None (depends on local decisions)
ű Circumcision Ban: None
ű Burka Ban: Under a decree issued by French Prime Minister François Fillon
women are banned from wearing the niqab in any public place (11 April
2011).
ű Prayer Ban: None - depends on local decisions since the European Court of
Justice ruled in March 2017 that employers can ban staff from manifesting
visible religious expressions, including prayers.
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Introduction
Anti-Muslim racism continued to increase in France in 2019. The Collectif contre
l’islamophobie en France (CCIF) received 789 report forms referring to 1,043 Is-
lamophobic incidents that occurred in 2019. Furthermore, one report form can list
many incidents; in other words, a discrimination might be associated with an insult
and an attack. The year before (2018), the CCIF collected only 676 report forms.
There is thus an increase of 17% between 2018 and 2019. Among the 1,043 inci-
dents mentioned above, 68 concern physical attacks (6.5%), 618 concern discrimi-
nation (59.3%), 210 concern hate speech and incitement to racial hatred (20.1%),
93 concern defamation (8.9%), 22 concern degradation of sacred places (2.1%), and
32 are linked to the fight against terrorism (3.1%).1
This report does not aim to report all incidents related to Islamophobia but
instead to highlight the main underlying dynamics related to anti-Muslim racism in
2019. We can summarize those dynamics into three main issues:
• The normalization of hate speech against Muslims that paves the way to
physical attacks.
• Islamophobic incidents that reflect a systemic racism or even state racism.
• The vicious intertwining of Islamist terrorist attacks, French antiterrorism
policy, and Islamophobia.
First, attention needs to be drawn to the fact that there is an ongoing normal-
ization of hate speech against Muslims through endless controversies in the media
and the political arena. This normalization of Islamophobia does not only legiti-
mize the systemic discrimination that French Muslims experience but also paves
the way to physically violent acts. Two symptomatic examples are the gunshot
attack against the mosque of Brest and its popular imam Rachid Eljay (27 June),
and the attack against the mosque of Bayonne (28 October) that wounded four.
The motives behind both attacks have not been clarified and inquiries are still on-
going. Moreover, French intelligence keeps monitoring and dismantling far-right
groups that plan attacks against Muslims and Jews at an alarming level.2 Even if
it is difficult to prove the link between the normalization of Islamophobic speech
and terrorist attacks, we should not forget that the terrorist behind the shootings
at the Christchurch mosques (15 March), who killed 51 and wounded 49, revealed
1. “Rapport CCIF 2020, Rapport sur l’Islamophobie pendant l’année 2019”, Collectif contre l’islamophobie en
France, 25 February 2020, http://www.islamophobie.net/rapport-2020/, (Access date: 20 March 2020).
2. “Un groupuscule d’ultra-droite soupçonné d’attentats sur des lieux de culte a été démantelé”, La Croix, 11 June
2019, https://www.la-croix.com/France/Justice/groupuscule-dultra-droite-soupconne-dattentats-lieux-culte-ete-de-
mantele-2019-06-11-1201028144, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
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he was influenced by the French thinker Renaud Camus and his idea of the Great
Replacement.3
Secondly, the nature and numbers of Islamophobic incidents interrogate the
very quiddity of this racism. Do French Muslims face a state racism (racisme d’Etat),4,
a systemic racism,5, or just an individual racism6 that does not go beyond the individ-
ual experience? For sure, we must exclude the third option since statistics show the
extent to which Islamophobia shapes the job market, real estate, education, and pol-
itics. As a result, Islamophobia is a systemic phenomenon that structures society. Yet,
can we speak of “state racism”? On the one hand, the French state does not officially
base its actions upon a discriminating corpus of law such as the Nuremberg laws, the
Apartheid system, or the racial segregation in the United States. On the other hand,
major aspects of Islamophobia in France originate in relations to the state:
• The French government partially bases its antiterrorism policy on Islam-
ophobic misconceptions such as “combating communitarianism (commu-
nautarisme) in French suburbs (banlieues).”
• The French Parliament debates bills to ban the burkini, the hijab, and “com-
munitarian” habits in certain public services and/or public places.
3. The Great Replacement is “a racist conspiracy theory […] which was popularized by right-wing French philos-
opher Renaud Camus. An extension of colonialist theory, it is predicated on the notion that white women are not
having enough children and that falling birthrates will lead to white people around the world being replaced by non-
white people.” For more information, see: Nellie Bowles, “Replacement Theory’, A Racist, Sexist Doctrine, Spreads
in Far-Right Circles”, The New York Times, 18 March 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/technology/
replacement-theory.html, (Access date: 4 March 2020).
4. This term regularly triggers debates in France. “If the terms ‘state racism’ are still so much debated today, it is
because, unlike ‘institutional racism’, they imply not only the responsibility of the state, but also a form of in-
tentionality.” For more information, see: Pierre Ropert, “Racisme d’Etat’: derrière l’expression taboue, une réalité
discriminatoire”, France Culture, 24 October 2017, https://www.franceculture.fr/sociologie/Racisme-Etat-expres-
sion-tabou-discrimination (Access date: 22 March 2020).
In November 2017, the Education Minister Jean-Michel Blanquer brought a defamation lawsuit against the SUD
Education 93 teachers union because the latter “has decided to talk about state racism.” The announcement in
front of the National Assembly was greeted with a standing ovation from the deputies. For more information, see:
Frantz Durupt, “Blanquer porte plainte contre un syndicat qui a utilisé l’expression ‘racisme d’Etat”, Liberation,
21 November 2017, https://www.liberation.fr/france/2017/11/21/blanquer-porte-plainte-contre-un-syndicat-qui-
a-utilise-l-expression-racisme-d-etat_1611537, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
5. “Systemic Racism includes the policies and practices entrenched in established institutions, which result in the
exclusion or promotion of designated groups. It differs from overt discrimination in that no individual intent is
necessary.” For more information, see: “Individual and Systemic Racism”, Alberta Civil Liberties Research Centre
http://www.aclrc.com/forms-of-racism, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
A study conducted by the Ombudsman office in January 2017 shows that out of a sample of 5,000 people, 80
percent of those who fit the profile of “young man perceived as black or Arab” reported having been stopped by the
police in the last five years, compared to 16 percent of the rest of the respondents. For more information, see: Leila
Khouiel, “Jeunes noirs ou arabes, vous êtes 20 fois plus contrôlés que la moyenne (mais ce n’est pas une surprise)”,
BondyBlog, 20 January 2017, https://www.bondyblog.fr/societe/police-justice/jeunes-noirs-ou-arabes-vous-etes-
20-fois-plus-controles-que-la-moyenne-mais-ce-nest-pas-une-surprise/, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
6. “Individual Racism refers to an individual’s racist assumptions, beliefs or behaviours and is ‘a form of racial dis-
crimination that stems from conscious and unconscious, personal prejudice.” (Henry & Tator, 2006, p. 329). “In-
dividual Racism is connected to/learned from broader socio-economic histories and processes and is supported and
reinforced by systemic racism.” For more information, see: “Individual and Systemic Racism”, Alberta Civil Liberties
Research Centre, http://www.aclrc.com/forms-of-racism, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
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• Prominent figures of the French government took Islamophobic positions
these last months such as the Minister of Education Jean-Michel Blan-
quer who on several occasions repeated that the headscarf was not wel-
come in France.
• The statistics show that Muslims primarily face discrimination in the public
service (59%). Hence, the major expression of anti-Muslin racism takes
place in the public sector, which emanates from the state itself.
• One of the daily expressions of Islamophobia comes from interactions with
the police. The state of emergency following the 2015 terror attacks has
only worsened this fact.7
We should also mention that this state racism takes place in the more general
context of the securitization of the public sphere in France, mainly due, first, to the
Islamic terrorist attacks and antiterrorism policy8, and, second, to the yellow jackets
movement and the hard security response chosen by Macron’s office.9
The tension between Islamist terrorist attacks and Islamophobia is the third
aspect of anti-Muslim racism in 2019. This issue is at the heart of the debates on Is-
lamophobia in France and has already been analyzed in the previous reports.10 Ev-
ery Islamist terrorist attack – or presumed as such when the motives of the attack
are unclear – triggers xenophobic campaigns against the Muslim community as a
whole. Such campaigns directly impact the life of millions of French citizens who
experience a resurgence of discriminations, insults, and physical assaults. Yet, it is
not easy for French people – and even worse when they are Muslims – to counter
such Islamophobic campaigns as they are immediately labeled “traitors of the na-
tion” or/and “supporters of terrorism” if they “dare” to criticize. Moreover, as we
just described above, Islamophobia in France is structural and thus partially shapes
society. As a result, it is very difficult to counter a racism that takes many different
forms according to the context (job, public place, school, media, etc.). In 2019, a
significant “terror attack – Islamophobia sequence” took place after the attack on
the Paris Police Headquarters on 3 October by one of its employees, a convert to
Islam (4 dead, 4 wounded). Following the incident, President Macron started a
campaign targeting France’s entire Muslim population. Calling for a “watchdog
7. For more information, see: Yasser Louati, “Islamophobia in France: National Report 2017”, European Islamopho-
bia Report 2017, ed. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, (SETA, Istanbul: 2018).
8. For more information, see: Ibid.
9. François Vignal, “Violences: la réponse sécuritaire du gouvernement”, Public Senat, 18 March 2019, https://
www.publicsenat.fr/article/politique/violences-la-reponse-securitaire-du-gouvernement-139326, (Access date: 22
March 2020).
10. For more information, see: Olivier Esteves, “Islamophobia in France: National Report 2015”, European Islam-
ophobia Report 2015, ed. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, (SETA, Istanbul: 2016).
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society” and inciting the French people to check “weak signals of radicalization,”11
Macron and Minister of Interior Christophe Castaner connected terrorism with
regular Muslim behavior and culture (such as having a beard, praying five times a
day, eating halal food, not kissing the opposite gender, etc.).12 The government and
many media organs implicitly represented the Muslim communities as responsible
and accomplices of the attack, jumping from controversy to controversy.13 Mean-
while, the inquiry is still underway.
This sequence shows the ambiguity of the French antiterrorism policy that offi-
cially stands on two main principles: (1) “combating violent radicalization which can
lead to terrorism (these individuals are monitored and prosecuted, if their danger-
ousness is established)”; and (2) “combating communitarianism (communautarisme)14
and a rigorous practice that deviates from Islam.”15 If the first principle corresponds
to legitimate measures to maintain public order, the second is vague and unclear, and
threatens the rights and way of life of French Muslim citizens. Indeed, we can refute
the accusation of “communitarianism” in this simple way: first, if there is a criminal
offence, then criminals can be put on trial. In this case there is no need for the expres-
sion “communitarianism” since both the existing law and the existing vocabulary are
operative. Second, if there is no criminal offence and no one is harmed, then what is
the problem with being “communitarian” (communautaire)? 16
Ironically, this sequence triggered the organization of one of the greatest man-
ifestations against Islamophobia from common people, activists, and scholars. The
“March against Islamophobia” took place on 10 November in Paris and gathered
11. Guillaume Erner, “Signaux faibles de radicalisation: vers une societe de la surveillance?”, France Culture, 16 Octo-
ber 2019, https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/linvite-des-matins/signaux-faibles-de-radicalisation-vers-une-so-
ciete-de-la-surveillance, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
12. “Christophe Castaner liste les signes de radicalisation? ‘Vous avez une barbe vous-même’, lui répond un député”,
Europe 1, 9 October 2019,
https://www.europe1.fr/politique/christophe-castaner-liste-les-signes-de-radicalisation-religieuse-vous-avez-une-
barbe-vous-meme-lui-repond-un-depute-3924324, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
13. For an analysis of the controversies related to this sequence, see sections below. The homemade bomb attack
in the center of Lyon on 24 May (13 light injuries) also triggered such a hatred sequence. The motives of this
attack are still unclear. For more information, see: “Explosion à Lyon: le suspect a avoué avoir conçu la bombe”,
Le Parisien, 30 May 2019, http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/explosion-a-lyon-le-suspect-a-avoue-avoir-concu-la-
bombe-29-05-2019-8082699.php, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
14. “Communautarisme” is a French term negatively depicting “community life” as an ontological threat to the unici-
ty of the French nation, for more information, see: Fabrice Dhume, “Communautarisme, une catégorie mutante”, La
Vie des Idées, 25 September 2018, https://laviedesidees.fr/Communautarisme-une-categorie-mutante.html, (Access
date: 5 April 2020). The expression “communautarisme” serves as an injunction to maintain minorities in their
subaltern status.
15. “Islamisme et repli Communautaire”, Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radi-
calisation, https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/islamisme-et-repli-communautaire/, (Access date: 22 March 2020); Laurent
Nunez, Twitter, 24 October 2019, https://twitter.com/NunezLaurent/status/1187290364060864512, (Access date:
22 March 2020).
16. We can present the exact same argument against the claim that “many among Muslims put the law of God above
the law of the Republic.”
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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
between 20,000 and 40,000 people (13,500 according to the Ministry of Interior).17
Although the protest was the target of virulent controversies, it constituted a strong
signal for the political elite and the rest of the French society that the current spread
of Islamophobia is not normal and will not be accepted without dissent.
Nevertheless, the denunciation of Islamophobia in France will have to overcome
a huge obstacle: the condemnation for “communitarianism” and/or “indigenism.”
Indeed, this condemnation is a rhetorical weapon to prevent anti-racist movements
from claiming justice and equality. Any complaint against a discriminative stance
is depicted as being a “communitarianism-based demand” that threatens national
unity and the common good. As a result, most politicians and intellectuals agree to
condemn any movements that - according to them - fall into these two categories.
Even the Fondation Jean Jaures18 that in November 2019 published a survey on an-
ti-Muslim racism depicts other anti-racist groups such as the CCIF as “indigenist,
communitarian, [and] Islamist.”19
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and
Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
For 2019, the Ministry of Interior reported 154 incidents, consisting of 63 actions
and 91 threats.20 Officially, the French government severely condemns anti-Muslim
racism. The Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France (CCIF) reported many more
incidents since this organization collects report forms sent to its services instead of
complaints made at police stations (and thus preserving its monitoring from many
biases just mentioned above). The CCIF received 789 report forms referring to 1,043
Islamophobic incidents that occurred in 2019. It should be noted that one report
form can list many incidents, for example a discrimination might be associated with
an insult and an attack.21
The CCIF highlights three major tendencies in Islamophobia in 2019. First of
all, Islamophobia is a gendered racism since 70% of the incidents concern women.
17. Julien Salingue, “Succès de la marche du 10 novembre contre l’islamophobie”, NPA, 23 November 2019, https://
npa2009.org/actualite/antiracisme/succes-de-la-marche-du-10-novembre-contre-lislamophobie, (Access date: 22
March 2020).
18. The Fondation Jean Jaures is a French “independent, Europeanist and Social-Democrat” think tank, created in
1992 and close to the French Socialist Party (PS). For more information, see: https://jean-jaures.org.
19. “L’enquête sur le racisme anti-musulmans”, C l’hebdo, 9 November 2019, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=LqhWkosF3OU, (see. from 8’30), (Access date: 22 March 2020).
20. “Bilan 2019 des actes antireligieux, antisémites, racistes et xenophobes”, Gouvernement.fr, 28 January 2020,
https://www.gouvernement.fr/bilan-2019-des-actes-antireligieux-antisemites-racistes-et-xenophobes, (Access date:
22 March 2020).
21. “Rapport CCIF 2020, Rapport sur l’Islamophobie pendant l’année 2019”, Collectif contre l’islamophobie en
France, 25 February 2020, http://www.islamophobie.net/rapport-2020/, (Access date: 20 March 2020).
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Secondly, in most instances, Islamophobia takes the form of discrimination (59%
of incidents). Finally, public services are those who discriminate the most against
Muslims (59% of all discriminations).22 The survey conducted by the Fondation Jean
Jaures in November 2019 confirmed these tendencies. It shows, first, that women
feel much more discriminated against and report being victims of racism because of
their religion much more often than men. Forty-two percent of Muslims living in
France have experienced at least one form of discrimination related to their religion
in their lifetime; this holds true for 35% of men and 45% of women. This overvic-
timization of women is also pulled upwards by the record rates of discrimination
observed among women wearing a headscarf: 60% of women who “often” wear a
headscarf report having been the victim of at least one form of discrimination in
their lifetime, compared with 44% of women who have never worn it and 38%
of men.23 Furthermore, the survey shows that there is a significant gap concerning
the report of discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims: 42% of Muslims
living in France have experienced at least one form of discrimination related to their
religion during their lifetime. That is 5.25 times higher than the national average
(8%). Finally, the survey also confirms that public services systemically discriminate
against Muslims. Eleven percent of all Muslims report that they have been discrimi-
nated against at least once in their lives by public officials (e.g. at the mayor’s office,
prefecture, etc.), with this rate reaching a record high among women who “often”
wear a headscarf (21%) and among Muslims living in rural areas or in areas with a
low proportion of immigrants (19%). Discrimination by the police appears to be
proportionally the most frequent (28% among the 44% of Muslims who have ever
been stopped by police).24
These figures show that Muslim women are the most targeted. We must connect
this tendency to French public debates that especially attacked the way of life of
Muslim women. Those controversies diabolize the burkini, sports hijab, or Muslim
women accompanying school trips on a national scale and legitimize attacks and
discrimination against Muslim women (see Politics and Media sections).
Moreover, there are many other examples of discrimination on the local level.
On 8 and 9 March 2019, the event Salon de la Femme et du Bien-être was held in
Béziers. The mayor of Béziers (South France) refused to allow a manager of a cloth-
22. Ibid.
23. Ismail Ferhat and François Kraus, “Etat des lieux des discriminations et des agressions racistes envers les musul-
mans de France”, Fondation Jean Jaures, 6 November 2019, https://jean-jaures.org/nos-productions/etat-des-lieux-
des-discriminations-et-des-agressions-racistes-envers-les-musulmans, (Access date: 20 March 2020). This study was
conducted in cooperation with an “Interministerial delegation for the fight against racism, anti-Semitism and an-
ti-LGBT hate” (Dilcrah) and Ifop. The study was carried out among 1,000 persons of the Muslim faith.
24. Ibid.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 293
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
ing store to participate because she was wearing a headscarf.25 The mayor, Robert
Menard, is a famous figure of the Islamophobia network, close to the National Rally.
Similarly, in April, the president of Association R’éveil26 refused to sell a garage sale
site to two women on the grounds that they wore Islamic headscarves. Under pres-
sure after the publication of a video of the incident on social media, the association
decided to dismiss the president a few days later.27
Regarding verbal attacks, the survey by the Fondation Jean Jaures shows that a
quarter of Muslims have been insulted because of their religion (24%) during their
lifetime, a proportion twice as high as that observed among non-Muslims residing in
France (9%). The apparent religiosity of individuals increases the risk of insult: 42%
of women who wear a hijab have already been victims of a religious insult, compared
to 27% of women who do not wear it and 19% of men.28 The CCIF monitored 210
incidents related to hate speech and incitement to racial hatred in 2019, which cor-
responds to 20.1% of all reported Islamophobic acts.
Physical attacks are also another trend of anti-Muslim racism in France. On this
matter, both the CCIF and the Fondation Jean Jaures underline the link between the
spread of Islamophobia across society and the increasing risk of violent aggressions
or/and anti-Muslim terror attacks. The survey of the Fondation Jean Jaures indicates
that 7% of Muslims have been physically assaulted because of their religion at least
once in their life, compared to 3% of non-Muslims. The CCIF monitored 68 physi-
cal attacks, i.e. 6.5% of all Islamophobic reported acts. Among them, there was Sylia
a woman wearing hijab who was insulted and stabbed seven times by an unknown
man in front of her two children after she parked her car in Sury-le-Comtal (small
village near Lyon).29
On 27 June, the famous imam of the Sunna Mosque in Brest, Rachid Eljay, and
one of the worshippers were victims of several shots in front of the mosque, injuring
them both. Rachid Eljay was shot four times, two in the abdomen, two in the legs.
The worshipper was shot twice in the legs. Despite the violence of the act and its re-
semblance to the Christchurch terror attack earlier that year, mainstream media and
25. “Rapport CCIF 2020, Rapport sur l’Islamophobie pendant l’année 2019”, Collectif contre l’islamophobie en
France, 25 February 2020, http://www.islamophobie.net/rapport-2020/, (Access date: 20 March 2020).
26. Local NGO (North of France) that aims at “changing the image of coma and brain injury to the public and
governments. […] To promote self-help and moral support among traumatized people and their families.” It is a
well-known NGO supported by public institutions. For more information, see: “Bienvenue sur le site de l’Associa-
tion R’éveil!”, l’association R’éveil, https://reveil-coma5962.org, (Access date: 20 March 2020).
27. Bruno Renoul, “Discrimination à Croix L’association R’éveil annonce la démission de Myriam Cattoire”, La
Voix du Nord, 30 April 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/576135/article/2019-04-30/l-association-r-eveil-an-
nonce-la-demission-de-myriam-cattoire, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
28. Ismail Ferhat and François Kraus, “Etat des lieux des discriminations et des agressions racistes envers les musul-
mans de France”, Fondation Jean Jaures, 6 November 2019, https://jean-jaures.org/nos-productions/etat-des-lieux-
des-discriminations-et-des-agressions-racistes-envers-les-musulmans, (Access date: 20 March 2020).
29. “Rapport CCIF 2020, Rapport sur l’Islamophobie pendant l’année 2019”, Collectif contre l’islamophobie en
France.
294 setav.org
unknown man in front of her two children after she parked her car in Sury-le-Comtal (small
village near Lyon). 29
On 27 June, the famous imam of the Sunna Mosque in Brest, RachidISLAMOPHOBIA
Eljay, and one of the
IN france
worshippers were victims of several shots in front of the mosque, injuring them both. Rachid
Eljay was shot four times, two in the abdomen, two in the legs. The worshipper was shot twice
in the legs. Despite the violence of the act and its resemblance to the Christchurch terror attack
politics
earlier that remained relatively
year, mainstream silent.
media andThe assailant
politics was found
remained dead
relatively in his
silent. carassailant
The 500 meters
was
away.
found The
dead motive
in his of the
car 500 attack
meters is still
away. The unclear.
motive ofAthe
letter by isthe
attack attacker
still unclear.was found
A letter bythat
the
allegedly shows signs of mental illness.30
attacker was found that allegedly shows signs of mental illness. 30
On 28 October, a supporter of the National Rally (far right) attempted to set
On 28 October, a supporter of the National Rally (far right) attempted to set fire to the mosque
fire to the mosque of Bayonne and shot two individuals in front of the mosque,
of Bayonne and shot two individuals in front of the mosque, severely wounding one. (Fig. 1)
severely wounding one. (Fig. 1) The attacker was then arrested at his home and
Thecharged
attackerwith
was then arrestedmurder
attempted at his home
andand charged with
destruction attemptedcommitted
of property murder and for
destruction
reasons
of of
property
race or religion by dangerous means to persons. In February 2020, he died In
committed for reasons of race or religion by dangerous means to persons. in
February
custody.2020,
31 he motive
The behind 31this
died in custody. The motive
attack hasbehind this attack
not been hasyet
clarified notand
beenthe
clarified
inquiryyetis
andstill
the underway.
inquiry is still
32
underway. 32
Figure 1: Front of the Mosque of Bayonne. On 28 October, a supporter of the National Rally (far right) attempted to
set fire
Figure 1: to the of
Front mosque of Bayonne
the Mosque and shotOn
of Bayonne. two28
individuals
October,ina front of theofmosque,
supporter severely
the National wounding
Rally one.attempted
(far right) 33
to set fire to the mosque of Bayonne and shot two individuals in front of the mosque, severely wounding one. 33
Following the attack at Christchurch, the Minister of Interior Christophe Cas-
taner was heard by the commission of inquiry on the fight against far-right groups
29
“Rapport CCIF 2020, Rapport sur l’Islamophobie pendant l’année 2019”, Collectif contre l’islamophobie en
(9 May). He stressed that the rhetoric of these groups “is particularly marked by
France.
30
“Ce que l’on sait de it
Islamophobia: l’attaque
evokesd’une
the mosquée
‘Muslim à Brest, qui a fait
invasion’ anddeux
theblessés
‘Great dont un imam”, L’Obs,
Replacement’ with28 June
vio-
2019, https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/20190628.OBS15095/ce-que-l-on-sait-de-l-attaque-d-une-mosquee-a-
lent intentions.” To the question of whether an attack like the one in Christchurch
34
brest-qui-a-fait-deux-blesses-dont-un-imam.html, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
31
“L'octogénaire accusé de l'attaque de la mosquée de Bayonne est mort pendant sa detention”, France Info, 27
is likely
February 2020,to occur in France, the Minister of Interior replied, “You want to know if
https://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/attaque-de-la-mosquee-de-bayonne/l-octogenaire-accuse-
de-l-attaque-de-la-mosquee-de-bayonne-est-mort-pendant-sa-detention_3843507.html, (Access date: 25 March
2020).
32 30. “Ce que l’on sait de l’attaque d’une mosquée à Brest, qui a fait deux blessés dont un imam”, L’Obs, 28 June
“Attaque à Bayonne : on vous explique pourquoi le Parquet national antiterroriste ne s'est pas saisi de l'affaire”,
2019, Info,
France https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/20190628.OBS15095/ce-que-l-on-sait-de-l-attaque-d-une-mosquee-a-
31 October 2019, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/attaque-de-la-mosquee-de-
brest-qui-a-fait-deux-blesses-dont-un-imam.html, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
bayonne/attaque-a-bayonne-on-vous-explique-pourquoi-le-parquet-national-antiterroriste-ne-s-est-pas-saisi-de-l-
affaire_3682739.html, (Access
31. “L’octogénaire accusé dedate: 25 March
l’attaque de la 2020).
mosquée de Bayonne est mort pendant sa detention”, France Info,
33
“Attaque de la 2020,
27 February mosquée de Bayonne : ‘Un acte terroriste qui doit être reconnu comme tel’, estime le fils d'une
https://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/attaque-de-la-mosquee-de-bayonne/l-octogenaire-
des victimes”, France Info, 31 October 2019, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/religion/attaque-de-la-mosquee-
accuse-de-l-attaque-de-la-mosquee-de-bayonne-est-mort-pendant-sa-detention_3843507.html, (Access date:
25 March 2020).
32. “Attaque à Bayonne : on vous explique pourquoi le Parquet national antiterroriste ne s’est pas saisi de l’affaire”,
France Info, 31 October 2019, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/attaque-de-la-mosquee-de-bayonne/attaque-
a-bayonne-on-vous-explique-pourquoi-le-parquet-national-antiterroriste-ne-s-est-pas-saisi-de-l-affaire_3682739.
html, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
33. “Attaque de la mosquée de Bayonne : ‘Un acte terroriste qui doit être reconnu comme tel’, estime le fils d’une
des victimes”, France Info, 31 October 2019, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/religion/attaque-de-la-mosquee-
de-bayonne-un-acte-terroriste-qui-doit-etre-reconnu-comme-tel-estime-le-fils-d-une-des-victimes_3683349.html,
(Access date: 25 March 2020).
34. “Compte rendu – Audition de M. Christophe Castaner, ministre de l’Intérieur”, Commission d’enquête sur la
lutte contre les groupuscules d’extrême droite en France – Assemblee Nationale, 9 May 2019, http://www.assem-
blee-nationale.fr/15/cr-celgroued/18-19/c1819031.asp, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 295
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
people carrying this far-right ideology are still likely to carry out attacks against a
mosque: yes, it is possible.”35 We should not forget that the terrorist of Christchurch
had donated more than 2,000 euros to the French far-right group Generation Iden-
tity (GI).36 In fact, French intelligence announced in June 2019 that they had dis-
mantled far-right groups that plan attacks against Muslims and Jews.37
Verbal and physical attacks also took place within the “terror attack – Islam-
ophobia sequence” that followed the attack on the Paris Police Headquarters by
Mickaël Harpon, a Muslim convert. This incident fuelled a series of verbal attacks,
instances of physical aggression and defamation against the entire Muslim commu-
nity. One of the discriminating incidents during this period occurred on 11 Octo-
ber 2019. During a meeting of the regional council of Bourgogne-Franche-Comté,
Julien Odoul, a local representative of the far-right party National Rally, verbally
attacked a woman in the public that had come accompanying her son’s class on a
school trip. He asked the rest of the assembly to expulse the woman from the council
because she wore a headscarf, claiming this piece of cloth was against democratic and
secular values. The mother was also violently attacked and prosecuted in the corri-
dors of the council.38 (Fig. 2)
Figure 2: Drawing of the mother that was forced to leave the regional council meeting in Bourgogne Franche-Comté
Figure 2: Drawing of the mother that was forced to leave the regional council meeting in Bourgogne
embracing her son in tears.39
Franche-
Comté embracing her son in tears. 39
35. Ibid.
Employment
36. James Kleinfeld, “NZ Suspect Donated Money to French Branch of Far-Right Group”, Aljazeera, 5 April 2019,
According to the survey of the Fondation Jean Jaures, nearly a quarter (24%) of
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/nz-suspect-donated-money-french-branch-group-190405090848567. Muslims who
html, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
have everd’un
37. “Démantèlement looked
groupefor a job in qui
d’ultradroite their lives
visait report having
les musulmans been
et juifs”, Le discriminated against because of
Point, 11 June 2019,
https://www.lepoint.fr/faits-divers/demantelement-d-un-groupe-d-ultradroite-qui-visait-les-musulmans-et-
their religion, including
juifs-11-06-2019-2318161_2627.php, 16%
(Access in25theMarch
date: last2020).
five years. Similarly, nearly one in four Muslims who
38. “Un éluwork (23%)
RN prend reports
à partie having
une femme been
voilée, discriminated
qui accompagnait against
la classe de son in
filsthe last five
lors d’une visite years
scolaire of
à their working
un Conseil regional”, BFM TV, 13 October 2019, https://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/un-elu-rn-prend-
life (26% for women, 20% for men), a proportion five times higher than that
a-partie-une-femme-voilee-qui-accompagnait-la-classe-de-son-fils-lors-d-une-visite-scolaire-a-un-conseil-region- of the French
al-1193779.html, (Access date: 28 March 2020).
40
population
39. “Rapport CCIF 2020,asRapport
a whole (5%).
sur l’Islamophobie pendant l’année 2019”, Collectif contre l’islamophobie en
France.
Surprisingly enough, the greater number of Muslims reach higher ranks in the professional
world, the more they experience discrimination and racism. This point refutes one of the major
296 setav.org
ideals of the French Republic, i.e. a meritocratic system and the promise of success through
education and work. Indeed, 44% of adults aged 25-44, 48% of the most highly educated (at
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN france
Employment
According to the survey of the Fondation Jean Jaures, nearly a quarter (24%) of Mus-
lims who have ever looked for a job in their lives report having been discriminated
against because of their religion, including 16% in the last five years. Similarly, nearly
one in four Muslims who work (23%) reports having been discriminated against in
the last five years of their working life (26% for women, 20% for men), a proportion
five times higher than that of the French population as a whole (5%).40
Surprisingly enough, the greater number of Muslims reach higher ranks in the
professional world, the more they experience discrimination and racism. This point
refutes one of the major ideals of the French Republic, i.e. a meritocratic system and
the promise of success through education and work. Indeed, 44% of adults aged 25-
44, 48% of the most highly educated (at least MA level), and 63% of managers and
senior professionals report racist experiences in their professional life. This indicates
that the categories that should be the most integrated in society (young adults, uni-
versity graduates, higher professions) are precisely those who are the most exposed
to racism. In other words, Islamophobia cannot be confronted through a “better
integration” or even “assimilation.”41
Education
According to the survey of the Fondation Jean Jaures, the rate of victims of discrimi-
nation by teachers in an educational establishment (e.g. college, high school, univer-
sity, etc.) in the last five years is higher among Muslims (7%) than among the rest of
the population for all reasons combined (5.4%).42
An example of such discrimination – and of its institutionalization – is the form
sent by email by the University of Cergy-Pontoise (near Paris) to all academic staff
asking them to list students and colleagues who show “weak signals of radicalization”
(14 October). Among the possible signals, we find: “stopped drinking alcohol”, “sud-
denly stopped eating pork”, “recent consumption of halal food”, “behavioral changes
towards women”, “prayers in the buildings of the university”, “sudden interest in
national politics and international relations”, “sudden interest in religion.” (Fig. 3)
In the period and Islamophobic sequence described above, three mothers wear-
ing hijabs were abused by the rector of the Academy of Versailles (near Paris). On
10 October 2019, activities were organized with parents at the Charles de Gaulle
nursery school in Clamart as part of the National Anti-Harassment Day. An offi-
cial visit by the rector of the Academy of Versailles, the academic director, and the
40. Ismail Ferhat and François Kraus, “Etat des lieux des discriminations et des agressions racistes envers les musul-
mans de France”, Fondation Jean Jaures, 6 November 2019, https://jean-jaures.org/nos-productions/etat-des-lieux-
des-discriminations-et-des-agressions-racistes-envers-les-musulmans, (Access date: 20 March 2020).
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 297
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
five years is higher among Muslims (7%) than among the rest of the population for all reasons
mayor took
combined place
(5.4%). 42 in order to promote “mutual aid and respect for others.” But once
they
An saw three
example mothers
of such wearing–hijabs
discrimination and of among the mothers accompanying
its institutionalization – is the form sentthe
bypupils,
email
they shortened their visit and stopped the workshops under the name of secularism.
by the University of Cergy-Pontoise (near Paris) to all academic staff asking them to list
The rector claimed that “the rule is clear, inside the school, religious signs are not
students and43colleagues who show “weak signals of radicalization” (14 October). Among the
allowed.” Similarly, on 14 October 2019, a school trip to a fire station was cancelled
possible signals, we find: “stopped drinking alcohol”, “suddenly stopped eating pork”, “recent
in Creil (North Paris) because two mothers who were escorting the class wore hijabs.
consumption of halal food”, “behavioral changes towards women”, “prayers in the buildings of
The fire station’s officials announced later that their teams made a “mistake in the
the university”, “sudden
interpretation” interest
of laïcité.44 in national politics and international relations”, “sudden
interest in religion.” (Fig. 3)
Figure3:3:Screenshot
Figure Screenshot ofof the
the form
formshared
sharedwithwithteachers
teachersbybythe
theUniversity
Universityof Cergy-Pontoise.
of Cergy-Pontoise.Academic staff can
Academic tick
staff can
several
tick options
several to indicate
options thethe
to indicate possible
possibleradicalization of one
radicalization of their
of one students
of their or colleagues.
students Among
or colleagues. the options:
Among the options:
“stoppeddrinking
“stopped drinking alcohol”,
alcohol”, “suddenly
“suddenly stopped
stoppedeating pork”,
eating “recent
pork”, consumption
“recent of halal
consumption offood”,
halal“behavioral changes
food”, “behavioral
towardstowards
changes women”,women”,
“prayers in the buildings
“prayers in theofbuildings
the university”,
of the“sudden interest
university”, in national
“sudden politics
interest and international
in national politics and
relations",
relation “sudden interest
internationals”, in religion”.
“sudden
45
interest in religion”. 43
A few and
In the period days later, the teacher
Islamophobic sequenceunion SUD
described Éducation
above, 93 denounced
three mothers the grow-
wearing hijabs were
ing Islamophobic
abused by the rector ofatmosphere
the Academyinofeducation and announced
Versailles (near Paris). On 10that it stands
October with col-
2019, activities
leagues, students, and parents of students who may be its victims. They especially
were organized with parents at the Charles de Gaulle nursery school in Clamart as part of the
criticized the Minister of Education Jean-Michel Blanquer who spread the fake news
National Anti-Harassment Day. An official visit by the rector of the Academy of Versailles, the
that in some schools little boys “refuse to hold the hands of little girls” and claimed
academic director, and the mayor took place in order to promote “mutual aid and respect for
that “the headscarf would not be desirable in our society.”46 This same minister had
others.” But once they saw three mothers wearing hijabs among the mothers accompanying the
also strongly criticized the decision of the left-wing parents’ association FCPE to
pupils, they shortened their visit and stopped the workshops under the name of secularism. The
43. Jahan Lutz, “Islamophobie à l’école: 3 mères voilées dans l’école, la rectrice fait demi-tour”, Revolution Per-
manente, 9 November 2019, https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/Islamophobie-a-l-ecole-3-meres-voilees-dans-l-
ecole-la-rectrice-fait-demi-tour, (Access date: 29 March 2020).
42
Ibid.“Oise: Une sortie scolaire dans une caserne de pompiers annulée à cause du voile d’une accompagnatrice”,
44.
43
“Université
20 Minutes,de16Cergy-Pontoise:
October 2019,unhttps://www.20minutes.fr/societe/2629087-20191016-oise-sortie-scolaire-annu-
formulaire, destiné à détecter les ‘signaux faibles de radicalisation’ parmi les
étudiants et les enseignants, crée la polémique”, France Info, 14 October 2019, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-
lee-cause-voile-accompagnatrice, (Access date: 29 March 2020).
divers/police/attaque-a-la-prefecture-de-police-de-paris/universite-de-cergy-pontoise-un-formulaire-destine-a-
detecter-les-signaux-faibles-de-radicalisation-parmi-les-etudiants-et-les-enseignants-cree-la-
45. “Université de Cergy-Pontoise: un formulaire, destiné à détecter les ‘signaux faibles de radicalisation’ parmi les
polemique_3659205.html, (Access
étudiants et les enseignants, crée la date: 20 March
polémique”, 2020).
France Info, 14 October 2019, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-div-
ers/police/attaque-a-la-prefecture-de-police-de-paris/universite-de-cergy-pontoise-un-formulaire-destine-a-de-
tecter-les-signaux-faibles-de-radicalisation-parmi-les-etudiants-et-les-enseignants-cree-la-polemique_3659205.
html, (Access date: 20 March 2020).
46. “Islamophobie a l’école: SUD Éducation 93 dénonce un climat de plus en plus pesant”, Sud Education 93, 16
October 2019, https://www.sudeducation93.org/Islamophobie-a-l-ecole-SUD-Education-93-denonce-un-climat-
de-plus-en-plus.html, (Access date: 29 March 2020).
298 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN france
launch a campaign supporting the right of Muslim mothers to accompany school
trips wearing their hijabs. (Fig. 4) Similarly, thousands of people signed the petition
“No to Islamophobia in education” after the escalation of Islamophobic discourse
and acts following the attack on the Paris Police Headquarters.47
Figure 4: The campaign by the parents’ association FCPE supporting the right of Muslim mothers to accompany
school trips wearing their hijabs. The campaign was part of the parents’ association elections. The flyer reads, “Yes,
I come to the school trip. So what? Secularism means welcoming all parents without exception, Let’s respect each
other, Vote FCPE.”48
In January 2019, Aala Abdelgadir and Vasiliki Fouka, two researchers at Stan-
ford University, published an article assessing the effects of the hijab ban at school
(voted in 2004). The article “Political Secularism and Muslim Integration in the
West: Assessing the Effects of the French Headscarf Ban” shows that the law re-
duces the secondary educational attainment of Muslim girls, and impacts their
trajectory in the labor market and family composition in the long run. The authors
state, “We provide evidence that the ban operates through increased perceptions
of discrimination and that it reduces assimilation by casting religion and national
identities as incompatible.”49
47. Rached Cherif, “Une pétition appelle à dire ‘Non à l’islamophobie’ dans l’éducation”, Le Courrier de L’Atlas, 31
October 2019, https://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/societe-une-petition-appelle-a-dire-non-a-l-islamophobie-dans-
l-education-22891, (Access date: 29 March 2020).
48. Delphine Bancaud, “Affiche de la FCPE: Pourquoi le sujet des sorties scolaires avec des mères voilées refait-il
surface?”, 20 Minutes, 24 September 2019, https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/2611979-20190924-affiche-fcpe-
pourquoi-sujet-sorties-scolaires-meres-voilees-refait-surface, (Access date: 29 March 2020).
49. Aala Abdelgadir and Vasiliki Fouka, “Secular Policies and Muslim Integration in the West: The Effects of the
French Headscarf Ban”, American Political Science Review, (January 2019), https://vfouka.people.stanford.edu/
sites/g/files/sbiybj4871/f/abdelgadirfoukajan2019.pdf, (Access date: 29 March 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 299
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
Politics
Like the previous years, in 2019, politicians and political debates exacerbated the Is-
lamophobic discourse in society. Any topic, any issue can be a pretext for scapegoat-
ing Muslims in the name of identity, public order, secular values, or women rights.
Actually, the “Lepenization of minds”50 is such that defending the Muslim way of life
in the name of human rights and multiculturalism is now depicted as treason to the
French nation. Anti-racist activists hardly find support in political parties whether
from the right or the left, from nationalists or liberals. Examples of Islamophobic
controversies that animated the year 2019 follow below.
In October and November 2019, while political parties were preparing for the
local elections of spring 2020, a debate arose about “communitarian party lists” (listes
communautaristes). Presented as party lists that would defend communitarian and
particular interests against majority interests,51 these few lists were actually attacked
because Muslims were on top of them and/or their candidates did not hide their be-
longing to Islam. In other words, this expression was used by the government and other
politicians to exclude the legitimate formation of a representative party.52 The debate
was focused above all on the party Union of French Muslim Democrats (L’Union des
démocrates musulmans français) that had already presented a list at the European elec-
tion in spring 2019. (Fig. 5) The government spokesperson Sibeth Ndiaye advocated
for “a high degree of severity with regard to these communitarian lists.”53
As early as 16 June, the Minister of Action and Public Accounts Gérald Darm-
anin proposed to extend “the obligation of neutrality to all local elected officials” in
order to “defend the Republic” from “communitarian lists.”54 On 8 November 2019,
the senator of Les Republicains (right) Bruno Retailleau presented a bill “to ensure re-
spect for the values of the Republic in the face of communitarian threats.”55 Accord-
ing to the bill, parties that have the “intention to run for elections with the aim of
undermining the unity of the Republic” will be deprived of financing and excluded
from the elections. The whole bill is then based on the very vague concept of “inten-
50. The meaning of “Lepenization” is the “minds that get shaped by Jean Marie Le Pen’s ideas and worldview.” The term
is constructed from the famous French xenophobic leader’s name (Le Pen) and from the suffix of action “-ation”. For
more information, see: Pierre Tevanian and Sylvie Tissot, Les mots sont importants, (Libertaria, Paris: 2010).
51. For more information, see: statements by Sebastien Lecornu, the minister responsible for local and regional
government, in “Listes communautaires, ça existe vraiment?” BFM TV, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Zno-
fi8_qfE, (0’44), (Access date: 29 March 2020).
52. For more information, see: interview of Fabrice Dhume in Justine Faure, “’Listes communautaires’ aux mu-
nicipales: de quoi parle-t-on exactement?”, LCI, 30 October 2019, https://www.lci.fr/politique/listes-communau-
taires-aux-municipales-de-quoi-parle-t-on-exactement-2136334.html, (Access date: 29 March 2020).
53. “Listes communautaires, ça existe vraiment?” BFM TV, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Znofi8_qfE,
(3’24), (Access date: 29 March 2020).
54. Frederic Fortin, “Interdiction des listes communautaristes: le débat reste ouvert”, MCM Presse, 13 November
2019, https://www.banquedesterritoires.fr/interdiction-des-listes-communautaristes-le-debat-reste-ouvert, (Access
date: 29 March 2020).
55. Ibid.
300 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN france
tion” - no mention on who and how this “intention” would be assessed. The presi-
dent of the region Hauts-de-France (North France), Xavier Bertrand (independent,
right), even called on the government for an outright ban of the so-called communi-
tarian party lists.56 Both Bruno Retailleau and Xavier Bertrand were received by the
Minister of Interior Christophe Castaner on 12 November, to discuss the subject of
“communitarian” lists for the next municipal elections. Christophe Castaner himself
conflated those lists, French suburbs, communitarianism, Islam, and anti-Semitism
in an interview on 17 November.57 Finally, the President of the Republic Emmanuel
Macron rejected any ban of these lists during the French Mayors Congress on 19 No-
vember. Yet, he stressed that the government will fight “political Islam” and “political
the European
Islamism” election
that have in spring
“a project 2019. (Fig.
of separation 5) The
from government
the Republic.” 58
spokesperson
In conclusion, Sibeth
the Ndiaye
head of the state
advocated for “aparticipated
high degreeinofthis Islamophobic
severity discourse
with regard to theseover the “communitar-
communitarian lists.” 53
ian party lists” but did not go as far as banning them.
Figure 5: Picture of members of the party Union of French Muslim Democrats.59
Figure 5: Picture of members of the party Union of French Muslim Democrats. 54
56.As
Ibid.early as 16 June, the Minister of Action and Public Accounts Gérald Darmanin proposed to
57. Christophe Castaner, Twitter, 17 November 2019, https://twitter.com/CCastaner/status/1196033688116637702,
extend “the obligation of neutrality to all local elected officials” in order to “defend
(Access date: 22 March 2020).
the
58.Republic” 55
from “communitarian
Emmanuel Macron, “Discours du Présidentlists.”
Emmanuel OnMacron
8 November
au Congrès2019, the etsenator
des Maires of Lesd’in-
des Présidents Republicains
tercommunalité de France”, Elysee, 19 November 2019, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/11/19/
(right) Bruno Retailleau presented a bill “to ensure respect for the values of the Republic in the
discours-du-president-emmanuel-macron-au-congres-des-maires-et-des-presidents-dintercommunalite-de-france,
(Access date: 22 March 2020).
face of communitarian threats.” 56 According to the bill, parties that have the “intention to run
59. “Quinze minute - Premier tour des Municipales en France: focus sur l’UDMF, l’Union des démocrates mu-
sulmans français”, RTS, 14 March 2020, https://www.rts.ch/play/radio/quinze-minutes/audio/quinze-minute-pre-
for elections with the aim of undermining the unity of the Republic” will be deprived of
mier-tour-des-municipales-en-france-focus-sur-ludmf-lunion-des-democrates-musulmans-franais?id=11146264,
financing
(Access and excluded
date: 29 March 2020). from the elections. The whole bill is then based on the very vague
concept of “intention” - no mention on who and how this “intention” would be assessed. The
president of the region•
islamophobiaeurope.com Hauts-de-France (North France), Xavier Bertrand (independent,
@islamophobiaEIR 301 right),
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
This debate takes place in the “terror attack – Islamophobia sequence” described
above. Actually, the sequence opened the doors to explicit racism without any limits or
feeling of shame. In this way, fake news and provocations became the new standards.
On 7 October, the deputy of Les Republicains Valerie Boyer said that “50% of Muslims
consider the Shari’a more important than the law of the Republic.”60 The survey she
is referring to mentions 27% of Muslims in France think so - not 50%. Furthermore,
we could even interrogate the meaning of such poll questions and in specific, the very
question “Do you consider the Shari’a more important than the law of the Republic?”61
Indeed, as long as the citizens of a country respect the laws of that specific country it is
of questionable worth to inspect what they personally believe about ethics and norms. In
another example of Islamophobic provocation, on 13 October, the Minister of the Edu-
cation Jean-Michel Blanquer claimed on BFM TV that “the headscarf is not desirable in
our society, it is not something to be encouraged. What it says about the status of women
is not in line with our values.”62 Politicians well known for their Islamophobic positions
Islamophobic
applauded the statement. Ericpositions
Ciotti, applauded
deputy ofthethe statement. Eric Ciotti, deputy
Les Republicains, wroteofontheTwitter
Les Republicains,
that “Jean-Michel wrote on Twitter
Blanquer that “Jean-Michel
is right, the IslamicBlanquer
headscarf is right, the desirable
is not Islamic headscarf
in France.is not Idesirable in
63
applaud the courage France. I applaud
of this the courage
stance.” 63
(Fig.of6)thisSuch
stance.” (Fig. 6) Such
statements statements
directly directlythe
undermine undermine the
liberal aspect of theliberal aspect
French of the
state andFrench
deny state and deny
the basics the basics expressions
expressions of freedomofoffreedom
thought. of thought. In
other words, it is an unacceptable intervention from
In other words, it is an unacceptable intervention from politics into private life.politics into private life.
Figure 6: The tweet by Eric Ciotti, deputy of the right-wing party Les Republicains, applauding the Islamophobic comment
Figure
of the Minister of Education: 6: The tweet
“Jean-Michel by EricisCiotti,
Blanquer deputy
right, the of the
Islamic right-wing
headscarf party
is not in France. Iapplauding
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applaud the
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courage of this stance. I hope ofbe
he will thelistened
MinisterbyofPresident
Education: “Jean-Michel
Macron Blanquerunder
who is currently is right, the Islamic
pressure headscarf
”64 is not desirable in
of leftists.
France. I applaud the courage of this stance. I hope he will be listened by President Macron who is currently under
pressure of leftists.” 64
60. Anais Condomines, “Un sondage affirme-t-il que 50% des musulmans placent la Charia au-dessus des lois, comme le dit
Valérie Boyer ?”, Liberation, 11 October
In 2019, 2019,claim
one can https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/2019/10/11/un-sondage-affirme-t-il-
that there was a competition between politicians regarding who will
que-50-des-musulmans-placent-la-charia-au-dessus-des-lois-comme-le-dit-valer_1756730, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
push the limits of Islamophobia further. The examples are countless and on most occasions
61. “Etude auprès de la population musulmane en France, 30 ans après l’affaire des foulards de Creil”, Le Point, Ifop
concern
and Fondation Jean Jaures, Muslim2019,
September women. On 23 June, a dozen women of the civil association Alliance citoyenne
https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/116646_Rap-
port_Ifop_le_Point_FJJ_2019.09.11.pdf, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
de Grenoble entered the swimming pool of Grenoble (Southeast France) wearing burkinis in
62. “Cette folle semaine où un élu RN, Julien Odoul, a relancé la chasse au voile”, L’Obs, 18 October 2019, https://
order to claim the right to bathe in this attire. Covering clothes such as the burkini are not
www.nouvelobs.com/politique/20191018.OBS20000/cette-folle-semaine-ou-un-elu-rn-julien-odoul-a-relance-la-
allowed
chasse-au-voile.html, (Access date:in22
most local
March swimming pools in France. Most French journals and TV channels spoke
2020).
63. Ibid. of a “provocative operation,” while some politicians even evoked an action of “Islamist
64. Eric Ciotti, Twitter, 13 October
activists” 65 and2019, https://twitter.com/ECiotti/status/1183401703598690305,
“fundamentalist Muslim women.” 66 The government through(Access
the Secretary of
date: 22 March 2020).
63
Ibid.
64
Eric Ciotti, Twitter, 13 October 2019, https://twitter.com/ECiotti/status/1183401703598690305, (Access date:
302 22 March 2020).
setav.org
65
Eric Ciotti: “The #Burkini has no place in France where women are equal to men. Letting these Islamist activists
in #Grenoble as everywhere in France is to renounce the Republic. I will never accept it.” For more information,
see: Elisa Frisullo, “Tout comprendre à l'opération burkini qui provoque une vague de reactions”, 20 Minutes, 24
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN france
In 2019, one can claim that there was a competition between politicians
regarding who will push the limits of Islamophobia further. The examples are
countless and on most occasions concern Muslim women. On 23 June, a dozen
women of the civil association Alliance citoyenne de Grenoble entered the swim-
ming pool of Grenoble (Southeast France) wearing burkinis in order to claim the
right to bathe in this attire. Covering clothes such as the burkini are not allowed
in most local swimming pools in France. Most French journals and TV channels
spoke of a “provocative operation,” while some politicians even evoked an action
of “Islamist activists”65 and “fundamentalist Muslim women.”66 The government
through the Secretary of State to the Minister of the Interior Laurent Nunez
shared the same view in the French Senate and depicted the incident as a “po-
litical provocation” that threatened French Republican values (i.e. public order
and laïcité). He maintained that the burkini is forbidden because of hygienic and
security issues. He finally stated, “You can trust our determination to eradicate
these kinds of ‘communitarianist actions’ (replis communautaires)” under the gov-
ernmental program of prevention against radicalization.67 However, we must keep
in mind that the French Council of State (Conseil d’Etat) in a ruling of 26 August
2016 considered that the ban of the burkini constitutes a serious and illegal in-
fringement of fundamental freedoms.68 Earlier in the year, at the end of February,
a controversy started on Twitter over the promotion of a hijab designed especially
for running by the company Decathlon (Fig. 7). The retailer planned to sell this
product on March 2019. Government members and politicians from the left to
far right competed in messages of consternation and rejection of this product. Au-
rore Bergé, spokesperson and deputy of the ruling party LREM, claimed, “Sport
emancipates. It does not submit. My choice as a woman and a citizen will be to
no longer trust a brand that breaks with our values. Those who tolerate women in
65. Eric Ciotti: “The #Burkini has no place in France where women are equal to men. Letting these Islamist activists
in #Grenoble as everywhere in France is to renounce the Republic. I will never accept it.” For more information, see:
Elisa Frisullo, “Tout comprendre à l’opération burkini qui provoque une vague de reactions”, 20 Minutes, 24 June
2019, https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/2547983-20190624-grenoble-tout-comprendre-operation-burkini-provo-
que-vague-reactions, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
66. Local opposition: “Following the new intrusion of fundamentalist Muslim women in the municipal swimming
pool, I ask Eric Piolle @EricPiolle (city mayor) to stop these provocations, to enforce the rules that apply to every-
one. His laxity goes beyond the Republican limits.” For more information, see: Elisa Frisullo, “Tout comprendre à
l’opération burkini qui provoque une vague de reactions”, 20 Minutes, 24 June 2019, https://www.20minutes.fr/
societe/2547983-20190624-grenoble-tout-comprendre-operation-burkini-provoque-vague-reactions, (Access date:
22 March 2020).
67. Video of Laurent Nunez posted on Senate Twitter account: “Count on our determination to eradicate these
communitarian secessionist phenomena”, Sénate, Twitter, 9 July 2019, https://twitter.com/Senat/status/11486
10880529022977, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
68. Aurelia Gervais, “Suspension par le Conseil d’Etat d’une mesure d’interdiction des ‘burkinis”, Legal News, 30
August 2016, http://legalnews.fr/index.php?option=com_content&id=325432, (Access date: 22 March 2020)
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 303
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
the public space only when they are hiding are not lovers of freedom.”69 Nicolas
Dupont-Aignan, president of Republic Arise (Debout la France, far right) added,
“I have two daughters and I don’t want them to live in a country where the place
of women in society is regressing like in Saudi Arabia. I call for a boycott of the
#Decathlon brand that markets this type of clothing!”70 Within a few days, De-
cathlon had to cancel its project to sell this product in France after having received
hundreds of insulting and threatening emails. Once again, this controversy polit-
icizes and stigmatizes Muslim women’s right to participate in activities – in this
case sports – that are taken for granted by the majority.71
Figure 7:Figure
Tweet7: that launched the polemic over Decathlon’s “sports hijab”. Lydia Guirous, a member of the party
Tweet that launched the polemic over Decathlon’s “sports hijab”. Lydia Guirous, a member of the party Les
Les Republicains (right)
Republicains (right)wrote, “Decathlon
wrote, “Decathlon alsoalso submits
submits to #Islamism
to #Islamism which
which only onlywomen
tolerates tolerates
with women with
their heads their heads
covered
covered with
with aahijab
hijab to affirm
to affirm their belonging
their belonging to theand
to the ummah ummah and theirtosubmission
their submission to men.
men. #Decathlon #Decathlon
therefore denies the therefore
denies thevalues of our
values of civilization for the market
our civilization for theandmarket
community
and marketing.
community ”72 marketing.” 72
The organization of the “March against Islamophobia” (10 November) was par-
The organization of the “March against Islamophobia” (10 November) was paradoxically a
adoxically a great moment of Islamophobic expression too. Naturally, politicians of
great moment of Islamophobic
right-wing and far-rightexpression too. Naturally,
parties depicted politicians
this rally as of right-wing
a provocation and far-right
and denounced
parties depicted this of
the presence rally as a provocation
so-called Islamists. Aand
fewdenounced
days beforethethepresence
rally, theofMinister
so-calledof Islamists.
the
A few days before the rally, the Minister of the Education Jean-Michel Blanquer described it
69. “Rapport CCIF 2020, Rapport sur l’Islamophobie pendant l’année 2019”, Collectif contre l’islamophobie en
73
as “pathetic”
France. and “a fight against secularism.” Even among leftist politicians who first
supported thepolémique
70. “La rally the debate
autour du hijabwas intense.
de running For instance,
de Decathlon theFrance
en sept actes”, deputy
Info, of Unsubmissive
26 February 2019, https://France
www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/religion/laicite/la-polemique-autour-du-hijab-de-running-de-decathlon-en-sept-
Alexis Corbière who had signed the manifesto calling for the rally, later told the right-wing
actes_3208539.html, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
71. “La polémique du ‘hijab running’ de Décathlon expliquée en cinq points”, Les Inrocks, 27 February 2019,
newspaper Le Figaro that he thought that “the Human Rights League
https://www.lesinrocks.com/2019/02/27/actualite/actualite/__trashed-60/, was
(Access date: behind
22 March the initiative
2020).
72. Lydia Guirous, Twitter, 24 February 2019, https://twitter.com/LydiaGuirous/status/1099635203188903936?ref_
74
of this protest.”
s rc = t w s rc % 5In
Etother
fw%7C words,
t wc a m phe
% 5regretted
Et we e t e m bhaving
e d % 7 C tsigned
w t e r m %the
5 E 1manifesto.
1 0 0 0 5 6 2 7 9 1Another
8 6 3 2 1 4 0 8emblematic
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url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.lesinrocks.com%2F2019%2F02%2F27%2Factualite%2Factualite%2F__trashed-
leader of60%2F,
the far-left movement,
(Access date: François Ruffin, when asked whether he will attend the rally
22 March 2020).
alongside the CCIF, replied, “I will not go there on Sunday because I'm playing football.” 75
Victims304
of Islamophobia must feel content to hear such euphemisms from peoplesetav.org
who present
themselves as protectors of the oppressed. As for the leader of the Green party Yannick Jadot,
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN france
Education Jean-Michel Blanquer described it as “pathetic” and “a fight against sec-
ularism.”73 Even among leftist politicians who first supported the rally the debate
was intense. For instance, the deputy of Unsubmissive France Alexis Corbière who
had signed the manifesto calling for the rally, later told the right-wing newspaper Le
Figaro that he thought that “the Human Rights League was behind the initiative of
this protest.”74 In other words, he regretted having signed the manifesto. Another
emblematic leader of the far-left movement, François Ruffin, when asked whether
he will attend the rally alongside the CCIF, replied, “I will not go there on Sun-
day because I’m playing football.”75 Victims of Islamophobia must feel content to
hear such euphemisms from people who present themselves as protectors of the op-
pressed. As for the leader of the Green party Yannick Jadot, he refused to attend the
rally even if he had signed the manifesto, and mentioned, “I have never considered
that there was state racism in our country... I don’t see any oppressive laws today
against Muslims in our country.”76
All the messages of hesitation and rejection highlight the contradiction in
French politics towards Muslims. On the one hand, they do not want to see the rise
of an autonomous Muslim agency, independent from their political influence. On
the other, they do not want to endorse the cause of Muslim people.
Regarding the government’s approach towards Islamophobia, we must stress
two main tendencies. First, despite its tolerant appearance, Macron’s office relies on
conservative discourse on identity and immigration. For instance, Macron is the one
who included the question of “immigration and identity” in the grand debate fol-
lowing the yellow vest movement that was grounded in social and economic claims.77
This hostile approach towards diversity and multiculturalism clearly discloses the
government’s understanding of the Muslim question. The quotations of ministers
mentioned above provide examples. Second, the government maintains an Islam-
ophobic stance on issues concerning Muslims through its antiterrorism policy. This
latter has two dimensions:
73. “Interview de M. Jean-Michel Blanquer, ministre de l’éducation nationale et de la jeunesse, à France 2 le 7
novembre 2019, sur les conditions de travail des enseignants et le harcèlement scolaire”, Vie Publique, 7 November
2019, https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/272157-jean-michel-blanquer-7112019-enseignants-harcelement-sco-
laire, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
74. “Pourquoi la manifestation contre l’islamophobie du 10 novembre divise au sein de la gauche”, BFM TV, 6
November 2019, https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/pourquoi-la-manifestation-contre-l-islamophobie-du-10-no-
vembre-divise-au-sein-de-la-gauche-1800559.html, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
75. Guillaume Stoll, “Ces élus de gauche qui n’assument plus d’avoir signé la tribune contre l’islamophobie”, L’OBS,
6 November 2019, https://www.nouvelobs.com/politique/20191106.OBS20773/ces-elus-de-gauche-qui-n-assu-
ment-plus-d-avoir-signe-la-tribune-contre-l-islamophobie.html, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
76. Ibid.
77. Nathalie Birchem, “Grand débat national: Identité, retrouver un vivre-ensemble”, La Croix, 13 January 2019,
https://www.la-croix.com/Economie/Economie-et-entreprises/Grand-debat-national-Identite-retrouver-vivre-en-
semble-2019-01-13-1200995008, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 305
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
1. “Combating violent radicalization which can lead to terrorism (these indi-
viduals are monitored and prosecuted, if their dangerousness is established).”
2. “Combating communitarianism (communautarisme)78 and a rigorous prac-
tice that deviates from Islam.”79
Relying on the second principle, Macron takes a stance against “people who in
the name of a religion are pursuing a political project, a political Islam that wants to
secede from our republic.”80
If the first principle corresponds to legitimate measures to maintain public or-
der, the second is vague, unclear, and threatens the rights and way of life of French
Muslim citizens. Indeed, we can refute the accusation of “communitarianism” in
this simple way: if there is a criminal offence, then criminals can be put on trial.
In this case there is no need for the expression “communitarianism” since both
the existing law and the existing vocabulary are operative. If there is no criminal
offence and no one is harmed, then what is the problem with being “communitar-
ian” (communautaire)? 81
As a result, beyond Macron’s call for a “watchdog society” (on 8 October, see
above), the institutionalization of Islamophobia in France takes its roots in this sec-
ond dimension of French antiterror policy, i.e. misconceptions about a so-called
communitarianism and related security measures to tackle it. In fact, the term “com-
munitarianism” conflates a wide range of meanings that do not help to understand
the issue of radicalization nor terror: namely political Islam, Islamist parallel society,
Islamism, obscurantism, parallel economy, inequality between women and men,
Shari’a laws above those of the Republic…82 Again, these expressions are vague and
target a way of life (religious and not secular) more than real offenses.
Put differently, the term “communitarianism” refers in fine to the far-right ideol-
ogy of “reverse colonization” or “Great Replacement.”83 The boundary between anti-
terror policies and far-right ideology then becomes thin and permeable. So, when the
president and the minister of interior announce that since the beginning of the year
they have closed 12 places of worship, 4 private schools, 9 associations, and nearly
130 bars/pubs because of radicalization and political Islam, we do not know if we
78. For more information, see: footnote 14.
79. “Islamisme et repli Communautaire”, Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radi-
calisation, https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/islamisme-et-repli-communautaire/, (Access date: 22 March 2020); Laurent
Nunez, Twitter, 24 October 2019, https://twitter.com/NunezLaurent/status/1187290364060864512, (Access date:
22 March 2020).
80. “Conférence de presse à l’issue du Grand Débat national”, Elysee, 25 April 2019, https://www.elysee.fr/emman-
uel-macron/2019/04/25/conference-de-presse-grand-debat-national, (Access date: 22 March 2020).
81. For more information, see: footnote 16.
82. Christophe Castaner, Twitter, 29 November 2019, https://twitter.com/CCastaner/status/1200375164325773313,
(Access date: 25 March 2020).
83. For more information, see: Leonard Faytre, “Islamophobia in France: National Report 2018”, European Islam-
ophobia Report 2018, ed. Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, (SETA, Istanbul: 2019).
306 setav.org
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN france
should see in those measures the success of war on terror or the progress of far-right
ideology.84 Yet, the government applies many policies based on this understanding
such as circulars to prefects or the “Republican Reconquest of Suburbs” (Quartiers de
la Reconquete Republicaine).85
It is exactly on this issue that Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin, the UN special rap-
porteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, published a report on 8 May 2019, where she warns that the new
antiterrorism laws (i.e. SILT law)86 risk undermining fundamental rights and
freedoms. The report states, “The Special Rapporteur highlights the potentially
disproportionate effects of administrative measures on individual and collective
rights occasioned by the SILT law. She is particularly conscious of encroachment
on religious freedom implicated by the closure of some mosques, allied with the
broader social and religious consequences of judicial power over religious exer-
cise, and recalls that any restriction on the right to freedom of religion or belief
must strictly comply with the limitation regime stipulated by international hu-
man rights law (A/73/362 and A/HRC/31/65).”87
Similarly, the French NGO Action droits des musulmans (ADM) published a
report on 13 June that counts seven mosque closures since the SILT law came into
force (October 2017). The NGO denounces the use of an administrative and non-ju-
dicial procedure for this, and calls for “stopping to conflate Islam and terrorism.”88
Media
Like in the previous years, in 2019, Islamophobic controversies often started from
social media before being debated in mainstream media and triggering reactions
among French politicians. It is not always easy to untangle these three spheres. Yet,
mainstream media (i.e. books, TV, radio, and newspapers) greatly participated in
84. “Municipales 2020: Emmanuel Macron se prononce contre l’interdiction des listes communautaires”, 20 Min-
utes, 19 November 2019, https://www.20minutes.fr/politique/2655251-20191119-municipales-emmanuel-ma-
cron-prononce-contre-interdiction-listes-communautaires, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
85. “For each ‘Republican Reconquest of Suburbs’ 10 to 35 additional police or gendarmerie personnel will be as-
signed. These additional personnel will be immediately operational and will go into the field. Each of these districts
also has an anti-trafficking unit (CLT) adapted to each territory and local situation. By the end of the five-year
period, 60 Republican Reconquest districts will be set up. By 2018, 15 neighborhoods have been set up and 326
staff members have been assigned to them.” For more information, see: “Effectifs de juin 2019 dans les quartiers
de reconquête républicaine”, interieur.gouv.fr, 21 June 2019, https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Le-ministre/Dos-
siers-de-presse/Effectifs-de-juin-2019-dans-les-quartiers-de-reconquete-republicaine, (Access date: 26 March 2020).
86. Maxime Jacob, “French Anti-terrorism Law Normalises State of Emergency”, 15 December 2017, https://www.
euractiv.com/section/politics/news/french-anti-terrorism-law-normalises-state-of-emergency/, (Access date: 25
March 2020).
87. “Visit to France – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism”, United Nations General Assembly, 8 May 2019, https://
www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2012517/a_hrc_40_52_add.4_E.pdf, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
88. Anne-Benedicte Hoffner, “Une association musulmane qualifie les fermetures de mosquées de ‘punitions col-
lectives”, La Croix, 14 June 2019, https://www.la-croix.com/Religion/Islam/association-musulmane-qualifie-ferme-
tures-mosquees-punitions-collectives-2019-06-14-1201028723, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 307
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2019
creating a negative newspeak related to Islam and Muslims. We can define this Is-
lamophobic newspeak as a process of keeping French Muslims within a degrading
linguistic framework. The main expressions of the Islamophobic newspeak in the
2019 French media follow.
- Hysteria over the “Islamic Headscarf ”
Following the aggression of Julien Odoul, a local representative of the National
Rally, towards a woman wearing a hijab in the regional council audience, main-
stream TV channels kept debating this issue for days. Surprisingly enough, they
did not discuss the violence of Julien Odoul but the legitimacy of wearing a hijab
in a public place – here the council of the region of Bourgogne-Franche-Comté.
Around 85 debates were organized in just a week on the channels LCI, CNews,
France-Info, and BFMTV.89 This media frenzy led to many excessive statements.
For instance, while the journalist Olivier Galzi and his guests were discussing
the possibilities of banning the hijab in public places (i.e. everywhere but inside
people’s homes) on a talk show, Galzi stated, “Shouldn’t we move it [the prob-
lem] and say: it’s not a religious sign that we want to ban but a political signal,
just as we banned SS uniform, that’s all.”90 In most media broadcasts, the hijab
became a sign of aversion and repugnance. A few days before, during a similar
talk show on the same channel about the same topic, the deputy editorial director
of the newspaper Le Figaro Yves Thréard claimed, “There were times in France
when I took a bus or a boat and then I saw someone with a headscarf, and I got
off.”91 He then added, “I hate the Muslim religion... You have the right to hate a
religion, you have every right to say so.”92 There was the same hysteria about the
sports hijab, a controversy we already mentioned in this report. On a talk show
on CNews (26 February), the speaker Laurence Ferrari could not bear listening
to one of her guests defending the right of Muslim women to wear a hijab. She
tried to refute him and then shouted, “It’s freedom! Freedom! Freedom not to
wear the headscarf!”93 This hysteria over the headscarf also informed the topic
89. “Cette folle semaine où un élu RN, Julien Odoul, a relancé la chasse au voile”, L’OBS, 18 October 2019, https://
www.nouvelobs.com/politique/20191018.OBS20000/cette-folle-semaine-ou-un-elu-rn-julien-odoul-a-relance-la-
chasse-au-voile.html, (Access date: 25 March 2020).
90. “Stupeur: sur LCI, Olivier Gal