helsinki committee for human rights in serbia
YugoslaviA
from a histORical
perspective
Yugoslavia
from a
Historical
Perspective
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
Yugoslavia
from a
Historical
Perspective
Belgrade, 2017
YUGOSLAVIA FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Publisher
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
For the publisher
Sonja Biserko
Copyright © Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2017.
Editorial Board
Latinka Perović
Drago Roksandić
Mitja Velikonja
Wolfgang Hoepken
Florian Bieber
Proofreading
Sheila Sofrenović
Cover design and typesetting
Ivan Hrašovec
Photos and illustrations on the cover
• Youths Day, Maribor, 1961. photo: wikipedia.org
• Vukovar 1991, photo by Željko Jovanović
• Map of SFRY, www.jugosloveni.info
Illustration on the back cover and first page of the book
• Pablo Picasso, poster for the movie Neretva, 1969.
Printed by Delfimedia
Circulation 500
This book has been published thanks
to the support provided by the Federal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Federal
Republic of Germany
CIP – Каталогизација у публикацији –
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд
ISBN 978-86-7208-208-1
COBISS.SR-ID 240800780
Contents
Publisher’s Note
Why this project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Foreword
YU-History: A multi-perspective historical account . . . . .13
Introduction
Th e multi-perspectivity of (post)Yugoslav histories . . . . . 17
I – MANIFOLD YUGOSLAVISMS –
HOW YUGOSLAV NATIONS ENTERED INTO YUGOSLAVIA
Drago Roksandić
Yugoslavism before the creation of Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . 29
II – YUGOSLAV EXPERIENCE FROM NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
husnija Kamberović
The Bosniaks, the Croats and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Their Experiences of Yugoslavia
In permanent gap. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Šerbo Rastoder
Montenegro and the Montenegrins in the Yugoslavia
Statehood loss and its renewal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Ivo Goldstein
Croatia and Croats in Yugoslavia
Resitance to centralism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Aleksandar Litovski
Macedonia and Macedonians in Yugoslavia
In search for identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Božo Repe
Slovenia and Slovens in Yugoslavia
Reasons for entering and exiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
–
Latinka Perović
The Serbs and Serbia in Modern History
Experience with other nations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220
Mrika Limani
Kosova in Yugoslavia
Against colonial status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Milivoj Bešlin
Vojvodina in Yugoslavia
Th e struggle for the autonomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .295
III – YUGOSLAVIA FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1918–1991)
Srđan Milošević
Yugoslav Society 1918–1991
From the stagnation to the revolution. . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Igor Duda
Everyday Life in Both Yugoslavias
Catching up with Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
Vladimir Gligorov
Yugoslavia and Development
Benefits and costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
Nenad Makuljević
Yugoslav Art and Culture
From the art of a nation to the art of a territory . . . . . . 442
Tvrtko Jakovina
Yugoslavia on the International Scene
Th e active coexistence of non-aligned Yugoslavia. . . . . . 461
mitja Velikonja
Ways of Remembering Yugoslavia
Th e Yugoslav rear-view mirror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
6
IV – CLOSING REMARKS
Milivoj Bešlin, Srđan Milošević
After Yugoslavia
Societies transform at a snail’s pace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
Vladimir Gligorov
Causes and consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555
ANNEX
Notes on the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .565
7
why this project
Publisher’s Note
why this project
More than two decades have passed since the beginning of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration that ended with Kosovo’s independ-
ence declaration in 2008. The international community was
actively involved in the crisis from the very start. It attempted to
settle differences (The Hague Conference), then set the criteria for
the mutual recognition of the successor-states (acknowledgment
of republican borders as state borders), provided humanitarian
aid throughout the war, imposed peace agreements on the war-
ring sides, embarked on armed intervention in Bosnia and then
in Kosovo, and finally opened up avenues towards Europe to all
the states emerging from Yugoslavia. However, the signatures put
on the peace agreements did not put an end to national projects
nor to territorial ambitions (albeit to be achieved by other means).
As long as these aspirations were predominant, any reconcilia-
tion process was inconceivable. The thesis also prevailed that the
war had been waged for re-composition of the Balkans, of course
along ethnic lines. The borders defined by the Badinter Commis-
sion on Yugoslavia remained, though most of the newly-estab-
lished countries became predominantly nation-states. The ethnic
principle taking precedence over the civic still keeps the issues of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia open. There is no doubt that
it also keeps open the question of Kosovo, regardless of its many
minority communities.
The international community undertook many fact-finding
initiatives (aimed at ascertaining the number of victims, for exam-
ple) that turned out to be successful. In this context, much has
likewise been done in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (in
the newly-emerged states), mostly in publishing, the compilation
9
–
of documentation and testimonies, video-recordings, etc. And
notable progress has been made in the establishment of the num-
ber of victims on all sides. This is of major significance as it bars
the way to further myth construction and manipulation with the
number of victims.
It goes without saying that the Hague Tribunal has made the
biggest contribution and left the region an invaluable legacy. This
mostly relates to its numerous rulings, documentation, video-
material, and so on. True, regardless of all the important work it
has done, The Hague Tribunal has not answered the crucial ques-
tion about the character of the war.
Despite the indisputably precious insight into the develop-
ment of the war, contextualization and a vertical chronology of
the events that eventually led up to it are still lacking. In other
words, a proper understanding of Yugoslavia’s brutal disintegra-
tion calls for an insight into the crucial cause of the break-up – an
insight into the conflict between various concepts for Yugoslavia’s
re-organization (while the country was still in existence).
The majority of citizens in the successor states do not have a
real understanding of the reasons behind the disintegration of
their former country and the hardships the war brought with it..
Strong emotions and impressions, individual and collective, have
been stirred up, but without essential knowledge about the Sec-
ond Yugoslavia or knowledge about one or other of the peoples
that were its constituent elements. This is particularly true of the
younger generations who are almost indifferent to the former
Yugoslavia and barely know anything about the region. Their atti-
tude towards other ethnic communities ranges from utter uncon-
cern to extreme intolerance. This is the result of the fact that all
the successor states that ethnically adjusted and largely fabricated
their histories have distanced themselves from Yugoslavia.
A state of confusion, mutual animosity and distrust, espe-
cially characteristic of the young, hinders reconciliation and
10
why this project
normalization, which can only be attained through historical
truth. As things stand now in the region, reconciliation will be left
to younger generations that had nothing to do with the conflict.
The purpose of this project is to interpret and describe objec-
tively key historical processes that are vital to an understanding of
Yugoslavia and its brutal disintegration. Yugoslavia played a cru-
cial historical role: it functioned as a framework for the emanci-
pation of all the Yugoslav peoples and the constitution of their
republics – states.
This collection of papers is the product of a joint endeavor by
a group of historians, art historians, culturologists, sociologists,
economists, politicologists and other researchers of different gen-
erations. It can also guide the reader through more copious read-
ing material made up of studies that are already in place or will be
placed in due course on the Web portal at www.yuhistorija.com.
This research project was realized thanks to support by the Fed-
eral Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the FR of Germany. Formally,
the research behind it took two years, but it is actually the product
of a much longer-term process. All the researchers involved have
invested years or even decades of research work in their studies.
Thanks to the fact that they trusted one another and cooperat-
ed as true colleagues – a pre-condition for harmonious work on
this project and the result of long years of interaction, the project
proceeded smoothly as the logical outcome of the collaboration
of many years by critically-minded humanities scholars in post-
Yugoslavia territory. Since its initial stage, work on the project has
so far involved almost fifty researchers and experts in (post) Yugo-
slav history from all the successor states and many from the West.
The fact that the past is being misused on a daily basis in all the
post-Yugoslav states, without exception, shows that we are right
when we argue that rational knowledge and historical research are
both a starting point and an essential element of stable relations in
the region, which are imperative to its sustainability.
11
–
We make no claim to present a definitive picture of Yugosla-
via’s disintegration as that will be certainly the focus of research
of future scholars. The truth about its break-up is not simple or
one-sided; on the contrary, it is extremely complex and calls for
a multi-disciplinary approach. Our ambition, however, is to pro-
vide enough information and analysis to younger generations that
will give them a deeper insight into the context other than the one
they are being offered. Our ambition is not only to assist them in
overcoming the historical narratives that have been imposed on
them, but also to encourage their constructive and deeper reason-
ing about their future in the countries in which they live.
Sonja Biserko
12
yu-history: a multi-perspective historical account
Foreword
yu-history: a
multi-perspective
historical account
Under a variety of titles, numerous books in different languag-
es, published before and after the disintegration of the SFR of
Yugoslavia tackle the history of Yugoslavia. A major character-
istic of the works by South Slav writers is that they are authored
by one and rarely two historians. Representative Yugoslav multi-
ethnic projects have been realized only partially. By 1959, two vol-
umes of The History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia rounded off con-
current historical narratives about the period till approx. 1790–
1800. Thirty years later practically nothing could have been done
to get the other three volumes into print. “The spring of the peo-
ple” (Proljeće naroda) and the emergence of civil society in the
19th century remained insurmountable challenges to Yugoslav
national historiographies. The case of the history of the Commu-
nist Party/League of Communists of Yugoslavia could not basi-
cally have been any different. Despite currently widespread stere-
otypes about Yugoslav communist uniformity A Historical Over-
view of the CPY(Pregled povijesti SKJ) Belgrade 1963) caused many
conflicts, in the Party most of all. This is why the foreword to this
single volume penned by sixty researchers of all Yugoslav nation-
alities was published with many reservations in 1985. Multi-dis-
ciplinary encyclopedic articles in the first and second volume of
Krleža’s Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia (Enciklopedija Jugoslavije,
4/Hil – Jugos, Zagreb 1960, 567–651, 5/Jugos – Mak, Zagreb 1962,
1–154 and 6/Jap – Kat, Zagreb 1990, 161–608) are the truly valuable
exceptions. Historians were on the margins of that project.
13
–
The disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia in the war has
always and still does incite the interest of historians from almost
all over the world. The trends of seeing only one’s own national
history and legitimizing the breakdown of the Yugoslav commu-
nity as something more or less “inevitable” dominate the nation-
al historiographies of the post-Yugoslav states – with due respect
for the individuals aware of their professional responsibility to
research the phenomenon of Yugoslavia’s history most compre-
hensively and critically. In other words, by criticizing the teleo-
logical and historical-deterministic aspects of Yugoslav historiog-
raphy in all its phases from 1918 to 1990–91 that imply – on theo-
retical and ideological assumptions – the concept of “Schicksal-
gemeinschaft” – we see historiographic production likewise con-
vincing us – based on theoretical and ideological assumptions –
that the Yugoslav community simply had to disintegrate.
The value of this project initiated by the Helsinki Committee
for Human Rights in Serbia with financial assistance from the
Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Germany is that it is based on the belief that the end of Yugosla-
via was not the end. On the contrary, it was the beginning of crit-
ical reflection of the “quasi-totality” of the history of Yugoslavia,
of peoples and nations alike – regardless of their constitutional
statuses – sharing, at any time and in any way, the same Yugo-
slav experience. The project also posits that the history of Yugosla-
via represents an unavoidable aspect of European and even global
history of the 20th century.
No doubt that the history of Yugoslavia will always be in the
plural and at all times faced with the variously formulated ques-
tions researchers have raised. When one bears in mind how
important the Yugoslav period of all the Yugoslav peoples and
nationalities (minorities) has been – and still is – for understand-
ing their modernity, but also their tragedies and traumas, and for
understanding all the problems they had to cope with and are still
14
yu-history: a multi-perspective historical account
coping with at this turbulent crossroads of people of different eth-
nicities and religions, cultures and civilizations, projects like this
are indispensible to ensure and maintain, above all, dialogue and
communication between historians of national historiographies
and the post-Yugoslav states, who anyway have limited opportu-
nity to obtain even basic information about the professional work
done all over the world, let alone to work together as people coop-
erating for their own sake and for the sake of the European future
that we are all, hopefully, looking forward to. From this point of
view, no matter of how multi-perspective it is, this joint endeavor
is in fact uni-perspective.
Drago Roksandić
15
the multi-perspectivity of (post) yugoslav histories
Introduction
the multi-perspectivity
of (post) yugoslav
histories
The ideological paradigm of Yugoslavia radically changed
from the mid-1980s till the early 1990s all over its former territo-
ry. Under this paradigm Yugoslavia was seen as an optimal frame
which, having broken off with unitarianism and centralism, could
present a new picture of Yugoslavia, different from the integral
Yugoslavism in the period between two world wars. By the end of
his rule, Tito became critical about what he saw as over-empha-
sized republican interests and a neglected Yugoslav frame. Even
the determiner “Yugoslav” was more present in public life, among
the urban and educated population as a rule, as evidenced by the
1981 census according to which the number of Yugoslavs was more
than four times greater than in 1971 (from 1.3 percent it had grown
to 5.8 percent of the total population). Songs glorifying Yugosla-
via, its unity, the brotherhood of its peoples and national minor-
ities, were still being sung in the mid-1980s, while Yugoslavism
was promoted mostly through pop culture. The life of “an aver-
age Yugoslav” was more noticeable by far in public discourse than
in earlier decades. Despite all the problems, everything more or
less resembled a society that was certainly not facing the kind of
bloody collapse that was soon to follow.
But what was actually hidden deep below the surface and trig-
gered off such a strong eruption? Yugoslavia has left a deep imprint
behind it to this very day and it can be assumed that this will be
the case for a long time to come and fill all its successor states with
strong emotions. The Yugoslav experience cannot be wiped out
17
–
just like that and independently of how anyone perceives and val-
ues it today. Yugoslavia had a dynamic and extremely complex
history like many other countries if not all. What makes it differ-
ent is the fact that we refer to it – as we do to a handful of oth-
er countries that emerged and disappeared in the 20th century
– solely in the past tense. This collection of papers is yet another
attempt to try and explain the reasons why this is so.
The Yugoslav state emerged in 1918 when Serbia and Montene-
gro united with the South Slav provinces of a smashed Austria-
Hungary on December 1 (they formally united in the State of Slo-
venes, Croats and Serbs). The new state was named the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This state was created by the unifi-
cation of the South Slavs whose each and every grouping (peo-
ple, ethnicity) was at a different stage of identity-building. This
process was recognized and acknowledged as rounded off in the
case of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians although all three peo-
ples were at a different stage of identity-building. This percep-
tion was mirrored in the country’s name and in the concept of
the people that had united, albeit under three names. The emerg-
ing national identities of the Macedonians, Bosniaks and Monte-
negrins were ignored and their identity-building stalled. In other
words, the Serbian political and intellectual elite took for granted
that the majority of these peoples belonged to the Serbian part of
the three-named nation. The Croatian national program was cer-
tainly exempt from most of this thesis, especially in the case of the
Muslim population. The concept of the three-named nation was
redefined in 1929 under the imposed, decretal Yugoslavism meant
to amalgamate all South Slav identities/entities into one and only
one Yugoslav nation.
Yet the idea of national unity, the ideal of the existence/crea-
tion of a unique Yugoslav nation had emerged from many schools
of thought and was accompanied by many different torchbear-
ers, idealists and pragmatists, true believers and heretics, zealots
18
the multi-perspectivity of (post) yugoslav histories
and dissidents, sincere followers and conformists. And it had its
opponents, too. Was it “compromised” by serving centralization
and the political dominance by parts of the Serbian political elite
or, regardless of this, was the further development of individu-
al national identities a more probable historical process, the real
question. History proved the latter to be correct. Why? Were the
reasons why simply the consequences of a specific political con-
stellation or the logical outcome of the identity-building pro-
cesses? Yet again, the argument that Yugoslavia was doomed as a
state project seems unjustified. On the other hand, the arguments
that the different peoples in the “Slav South” made up one single
nation were also unjustified, the same as the high hopes that they
would one day merge into one nation. Such expectations were
simply unrealistic, based only on the idealism of the idealists and
the cynicism of the hegemonists. The obvious differences between
these two were interpreted as a historical aberration that had to
be and could be “corrected” within a new state frame. However,
consensus on the character of the common state, mostly seen as
a cause promoted by elites of questionable legitimacy, was based
on petty politics and never truly reached. Yugoslavism was a fac-
tual, if diffuse, idea that lost much of its initial power when rigidly
boiled down to a single, decretal formula.
Destroyed in the war that broke out in 1941, burdened by the
legacy of ethnically motivated domestic crimes, Yugoslavia was
renewed as a federal republic with internal cohesion (brother-
hood and unity), cosmopolitanism and the denial of provincial-
ism as the predominant pattern of the party and political elite. The
purpose of this pattern was to weaken and pacify nationalist ide-
ologies that had to be overcome through the Yugoslav state frame,
with civic identity as a supra-national formula and existing, rec-
ognized individual ethnic identities of the Yugoslav peoples (and
minorities) rather than their amalgamation. In short, the concept
of national unity was discarded, but the state idea was preserved.
19
–
This is how the concept of complex identity that implied a nation-
al (ethnic) and supra-national (state) component as a guarantee
of equality of the peoples that made up a common state, at home
and internationally, was systematically built up. Yugoslavism as
an identity determiner was thus provided with a realistic content.
This was the realistic and largely accepted historical and political
legitimacy of the state, based on the common anti-fascist struggle
of members of all ethnic (Yugoslav and minority) groups (1941–
45), on anti-Stalinism and open conflict with Stalin (948–53), self-
management as the authentic Yugoslav road to socialism, non-
alignment that ranked Yugoslavia among the torchbearers among
a large number of countries that would not accept the Cold War
partition of the spheres of interest between Moscow and Wash-
ington, and on the emancipation and growth of a social state
that opened up avenues to lead its citizens out of poverty and the
breadline. From this point of view, Yugoslavia was a historical-
ly inimitable, nationally identified, emancipatory and progressive,
but also secure, framework for the development of all the nations
living in it. The final constitution of the national subjectivity of the
Muslims, Montenegrins and Macedonians and a breakthrough in
modernization, but at the same time protection from the territo-
rial aspirations of its neighbors testify to the historical significance
of the Yugoslav integration.
The de-legitimization of socialist ideology and monopoly of the
ruling party (KPJ-SKJ), and the collapse of socialism after 1989
were followed by the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. In the
name of democracy (understood as a counterpoint to the exist-
ing order), Yugoslavia was demolished under the pretext that “the
national question” was “a democratic question,” which would be
undeniable were it not assumed that a nationalist response was
also – democratic. Yugoslavia was brought down on the national-
ist platform and with the unanimous argument that its very exist-
ence stood in the way of progress and freedom. The elites of all the
20
the multi-perspectivity of (post) yugoslav histories
Yugoslav nations found reasons to detect real or ostensible short-
comings that they saw as problematic in their own republics, plus
the problems between republics, within the Yugoslav frame. They
mostly disagreed about the future concept for the Yugoslav com-
munity. The rise of the nationalist perception of federal relations
that mostly prevailed among Serbia’s elites in the 1980s, backed by
the masses finally turned into republican policy created an atmos-
phere in which the largest republic in Yugoslavia felt certain that,
through a series of political offensives, it would manage to enforce
constitutional reforms proclaiming the formula of a “modern fed-
eration,” which no other republic would accept as it implied re-
centralization. From Serbia’s point of view, there was only one
alternative to constitutional reforms that could be summed up in
its belief that not even armed conflicts could be “excluded” and
“inter-republican borders dictated by the strongest.” The sum and
substance was that Serbia’s elite made it clear that, with the excep-
tion of Slovenia, they would not recognize any future internation-
ally recognized status of borders between members of the feder-
ation. To realize its vision of Yugoslavia, Serbia counted on the
power of the more or less entire JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army).
Although nationalist responses to the epochal challenges facing
Yugoslavia in the late 1980s could be recognized in all the repub-
lics, the policy propagated by Serbia’s elites and implemented by
its regime was a catalyst that, in the form of open threats, galva-
nized other nationalisms and decided the character and course of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Hence Serbia, during the Yugoslav cri-
sis (when it was over, and in many ways to this day) found itself
standing alone and on the opposite side of the other countries that
emerged from Yugoslavia’s disintegration.
As in the history of the emergence and constitution of the Yugo-
slav peoples, the history of their “exit” from Yugoslavia evolved in
quite different historical circumstances. Each country emerging
from Yugoslavia (1991) had to cope with problems only partially
21
–
similar to the problems facing the rest as early as the actual pro-
cess of disintegration. As they were all bent on different goals, the
evolution of each and every former Yugoslav republic was singu-
lar. And when their shared prospects for membership of the EU
finally crystallized, their starting-points were dramatically differ-
ent. This can only partially be ascribed to Yugoslavia’s unbalanced
development. Most of the reasons why this was so found their
roots in the first half of the 1990s that – with the exception of Slo-
venia – annihilated almost all the modernization achieved in the
20th century.
The reasons behind the outcome as such and the breakup of
the Yugoslav state go much deeper. Their roots lie in the historical
continuity of Yugoslav society, politics and economy, in the cumu-
lative experience of the people in the region, and their expecta-
tions and the choices they made. These causes are not to be found
in simply one point in history when developments took an alleg-
edly inevitable course. However, certain preconditions, the entire
range of that society’s diverse characteristics, a series of political
decisions taken and economic solutions found, the global-histor-
ical context and, to some extent, the role of actual figures enti-
tled to make decisions, all this and much more render certain out-
comes possible or more probable than others and, finally turned
them into reality. This project was developed with the aim of help-
ing to recognize all these causes or at least to hint at them.
This collection of papers has four sections, unequal in size. The
first provides an overview of (self) perceptions, realizations and
representations of the South Slav communities from the late 18th
century onward, of the concept of South Slav similarities and dif-
ferences, interrelations and a life together, and Yugoslav ideolo-
gies and politics in various South Slav national traditions up to
1918. It was written by Drago Roksandić.
The second section, mostly dealing with political history, is
further segmented and logically follows the course of Yugoslavia’s
22
the multi-perspectivity of (post) yugoslav histories
separation – into the constitutive elements of its federalism, except
for two provinces, each with notable specificities of its own in the
second Yugoslavia. Each chapter – Slovenia (Božo Repe), Croa-
tia (Ivo Goldstein), Serbia (Latinka Perović), Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na (Husnija Kamberović), Montenegro (Šerbo Rastoder), Mace-
donia (Ljubica Jančeva and Aleksandar Litovski), Vojvodina (Mil-
ivoj Bešlin) and Kosovo (Mrika Limani) – is written as a logical
overview, but their authors were selected according to the criteria
of their research of their subject matter so that they could incor-
porate their own heuristic capacity into their works. All the texts
in this section follow the development of the nations and histori-
cal provinces included in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slo-
venes as of 1918, and give brief outlines of the 19th century. The
authors first outlined the histories and their constituents in the
first Yugoslavia and during the World War II, and then paid due
attention to the histories of each republic or province in republi-
can Yugoslavia up to its disintegration in 1991. In most cases, they
also summed up the post-Yugoslav period and took stock of the
countries under their scrutiny after they left the Yugoslav com-
munity. For the first time in our historiography, all the elements
of the Yugoslav community were thus scanned, initially and con-
clusively, in a single volume from longitudinal and multi-dimen-
sional angles.
The third section includes several works that, unlike the sec-
ond, focus on Yugoslavia as a whole: its society, economy, cul-
ture and Yugoslav everyday life. In their contributions the authors
tried to encompass the dynamics of the Yugoslav area through-
out the 20th century by throwing light on major aspects such as
social emancipation, the modernization of society, changes in the
social structure, education system, etc. This was the main focus of
Srđan Milošević. The economic-historical dimension of the Yugo-
slav 20th century was analyzed by Vladimir Gligorov. From a sec-
ular angle and with a special emphasis on the negative effects of
23
–
nationalist impositions on economic policies, he noticed that the
series of wrong decisions that hindered the converging process
had been badly needed by Yugoslavia to overcome regional dif-
ferences in economic development, substantively characterized in
the economic history of Yugoslavia. In his paper on Yugoslav cul-
ture (mostly on the arts) Nenad Makuljević honed in on the com-
plex interaction between culture and politics or, more precisely,
on the interaction between the arts and the Yugoslav idea from
the mid-19th century, the revolutionary content of this interac-
tion, resistance to the growing ideologization and integration of
the arts in socialist Yugoslavia into epochal global trends. For his
part, Igor Duda provided an overview of the everyday life of cit-
izens of Yugoslavia, marked by a continuing rise in the standard
of living, meeting everyday needs and spending free time. This
particularly referred to the second half of the 20th century when
people from practically all social strata experienced enormous
improvements in their lifestyle of a kind that many Yugoslavs
born in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could not have even imagined
as children but which, after just a decade or two, became a reality
and a reality for most citizens of Yugoslavia.
Finally, two studies make up the last, fourth, section that deals
with perceptions of Yugoslavia. Mitja Velikonja’s work focuses on
the phenomenon of post-Yugoslavia in the territory of the once
common state. Velikonja dissects a variety of discursive practic-
es and narratives about Yugoslavia in the aftermath of its breakup.
First he examines the initial damtatio memoriae, then the paral-
lelism of memories and their contrariety, the “dialectics of mem-
ory and no memory” and instrumentalization of the memory to
conclude with the emergence of nostalgia as a “retrospective uto-
pia.” On the other hand, Wolfgang Hoeppner’s study scrutinizes
the perceptions of Yugoslavia in Europe.
However, once all the studies, including those not found in this
volume, are placed on the Web portal and this collection of papers
24
the multi-perspectivity of (post) yugoslav histories
goes into print, this project does not end. In fact, this is when its
life actually begins. Feedback on this endeavor and reactions to it
in all the societies concerned could be as dynamic as the research
work itself. No doubt that the results of this project will a priori
clash with predominant ideological matrixes, especially with the
nationalist prejudices of each society in question. Academic cir-
cles will also have their say.
The very variety of these research topics indicate the inter-dis-
ciplinary and multi-perspective approach to this project. National
or ideological plurality is present, though not in the foreground.
The multi-perspective aspect of the research was a priority. Just
as in this collection of papers and the works placed on the por-
tal, members of the project team tried to strike as much balance
as possible in representing all the constituent elements of Yugosla-
via. This is the factuality of specific circumstances. Due to various
obstacles that are, fortunately, growing fewer and fewer, research
into the national histories of the countries emerging from Yugo-
slavia, as well as the best authorities on these histories, are still
concentrated in each of the countries with which this project is
concerned. One of the goals of this project is to change this situa-
tion in some way and to induce and intensify mutual interest in the
histories of neighboring countries. This was why much in this col-
lection of papers deals with some national perceptions that under-
score the problems and specific traits of each society that other-
wise might be lost in a summarized overview. However, the stud-
ies in this volume do not overlook the Yugoslav frame, although
they perceive its significance differently. Hence, these are, in fact,
histories of Yugoslavia, which, taken as a whole, provide a picture
in relief showing the absolute complexity of Yugoslavia’s history.
Milivoj Bešlin
Srđan Milošević
25
I
Manifold Yugoslavisms
– How Yugoslav
Nations Entered
Yugoslavia
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
yugoslavism
before the
creation of
yugoslavia
DRAGO ROKSANDIĆ
The concept of (Yugo) Slavism or Slavdom (Yugoslavism or
Yugoslavdom) is a neologism of German origin (Slawentum)
which points to the – by origin and meaning – comparable Ger-
man concept of Deutschtum, Germanness, created around 1770
within the Sturm und Drang, (Storm and Stress) movement, that
is, during the formative period of modern German nationalism.
It was Johann Gottfried Herder (born in Mohrungen on August
25, 1744– died in Weimar on December 18, 1803), who in thinking
about the relationship between thought and language, developed
the concepts of ‘national genius’ and ‘national language’, thus lay-
ing the groundwork for the Romantic concept of the nation. In
his philosophical history of mankind, he highly valued the future
of Slavdom, and as he was one of the leading German/European
thinkers who developed the concept of Kulturnation, that is, the
model of thinking about nationhood in terms of philological-lit-
erary concepts (e.g. “national rebirth”), he is unavoidable in any
29
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
attempt to understand the process of the national integration of
the majority of (south) Slavic nations. He is all the more relevant
in so far as he anticipated the later much developed principles
of Slavic interconnectedness and Pan-Slavism. Jan Kollar (Mos-
ovce, July 29, 1793, – Vienna, January 24, 1852), then developed
these principles which, in the entire Slavic world – but particu-
larly in the South Slavic – wielded enormous influence (On the
Literary Reciprocity of Different Tribes and Dialects of the Slavic
Nation, 1837 / Über die literarische Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den
verschiedenen Stämmen und Mundarten der slawischen Nation).
However, nations, understood primarily as a sovereign people,
had in the “long 19th century”, already after the French Revolu-
tion of 1789, become historical subjects that had appropriated the
experience of the national past, the national present and future, so
that (Yugo) Slavism, too, originally a phenomenon of South Slavic
interconnectedness, had conceptually changed its meanings dra-
matically in different national traditions. From that standpoint,
(Yugo) Slavism cannot be an analytical concept, but nevertheless
can be the subject of analysis, including in all its distinct, particu-
lar historical manifestations, meaning also as an ideologeme.
Even though Duden now interprets Slavdom/Slavism/Slawen-
tum as “the character and culture of the Slavs (Wesen und Kul-
tur der Slawen)”, while taking Germanness / Deutschtum to mean:
“1.the totality of Germanic manifestations of life; German char-
acter / Gesamtheit der für die Deutschen typischen Lebensäu-
ßerungen; deutsche Wesenart; 2. belonging to the German peo-
ple / Zugehörigkeit zum deutschen Volk;3. the totality of German
national groups abroad Gesamtheit der deutschen Volksgruppen
im Ausland)”, for an historian these definitions are merely “arche-
ological”, since, in a reductionist way, they merely follow the shifts
in meaning of both concepts from the 18th to the 20th century.
The duty of the historian is to deduce meanings from both text
and context. In this regard, something should first be said about
30
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
the South Slavic context of Yugoslavism from the perspective of
long-term history.
I
Even though the topic of early Slavic “ethnogenesis” is being
innovatively debated today (for example, F. Curta, D. Dzino, V.
Sokol), the South Slavs are the only Slavs who, at the crossroads
of Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages, were to be found
within the borders (limes) of the Roman Empire, settling in the
regions between the Mediterranean and the Danube basin. They
inhabited regions that by sea and/or land connected and/or sep-
arated its western from its eastern parts – the one predominantly
Romanized, the other predominantly Hellenized, that is, regions
that seperated Rome from “New Rome” (Constantinopole). Nev-
ertheless, this is a unique and contiguous space in which, accord-
ing to epigraphic findings, Greek and Latin parts can be found
within the same text or, in other instances, Latin texts written with
Greek letters can be found. At the same time, this was the only
European area that was, after the Slavic migrations and by the
end of the first millennium, settled by the last migratory waves of
peoples from Eurasian regions (Bulgarians and Hungarians), but
also a unique area in which the Romanization of Late Antiquity
endured, even where it was weak and relatively the furthest away
from its Roman epicenter (Romanians). Furthermore, it was the
only European region where, side by side, “Greeks” and “Barbar-
ians”, and “Romans” and “Barbarians” endured simultaneously. It
was also unique by the fact that Christianization began very ear-
ly and ended very late, with numerous jurisdictional, ritual, con-
fessional and ecclesiastical controversies characterizing the shift-
ing borders of the Christian West and the Christian East, which
was also marked by deeply rooted paganism, heresy and, from
the 15th century onward, its own autochthonic version of Islam.
There is in fact no European monotheistic religion that did not
31
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
become autochthonic in this region. This was a unique European
region that spawned and maintained Glagolitic, Cyrillic, Roman
and even Arabic Slavic literacy, parallel with Greek and Latin lan-
guage culture.
And there is another aspect, perhaps the most important. This
was the only European region in which, first, the epicenters of
hegemonic power always lay elsewhere, outside of the region itself;
and second, from Late Antiquity onwards it was never controlled
by only one empire. There was no European or global power in the
“long” 19th and the “short” 20th centuries that did not try its hand
out in the region, precisely during the era of South Slavic and Bal-
kan national integrations. To all empires this region was periph-
eral, but also, in different ways and at different times, it was the
be all and end all of everything! Between circa 1500 and 1800 the
socio-demographic, ethno-demographic and confessional-demo-
graphic circumstances in the entire region changed so much and
became so complex that the already belated European processes
of modernization and national integration among the South Slavs
faced challenges that were rarely as great elsewhere in Europe.
In a multitude of different versions, already by the 19th centu-
ry Yugoslavism had far surpassed the limits of concepts, linguis-
tic and cultural practices implied by “Slavic interconnectedness.”
However, it became a realistic, but still equally diverse, political
option only – in circumstances initiated by World War I – after
the empires of the European “ancient regime” had disintegrated
(the Habsburg Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, together with the
Russian Empire).
There is no South Slavic nation, or for that matter any other
nation in the region, that, from the perspective of the 19th and
20th centuries, did not in their medieval epoch have their own
“golden age”. For modern Slovenes it was (the Duchy of) Caran-
tania (626–745 CE), for the Croats it was the era of national lords
[end of 8th century to 1102 – King Tomislav (925?), King Peter
32
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
Krešimir IV], for the Montenegrins, but also the Serbs, in differ-
ent ways, the era of the Vojislavljevic dynasty [1168–1371 – King
Mihajlo Vojislavljević (10770], for the Serbs again in the era of the
Nemanjić dynasty [1168–1371 – King Stefan Prvovenčani (the ‘First-
Crowned’ King, in 1217) and Stefan Dušan (emperor in1346)], for
the Macedonians and Bulgarians (also in different ways) Samu-
el’s Empire(976–1014), for the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, again in different ways, the Kotormanić dynas-
ty [cca. 1250–1463 – duke and king Tvrtko I (1353–1377 and 1377–
1391)]. On the other hand, there is no South Slavic nation that
does not nurture the tradition of various historical defeats (para-
digmatic example – “Kosovo”) and that, during the 19th and 20th
centuries, did not aspire towards the national renewal of its erst-
while “greatness”, with the protection and support of one or more
of the European or global powers, secular and/or spiritual. At the
same time, the mutual borders between the South Slavic peoples
always more or less overlapped (and still do), and as far as tra-
dition goes, everything was or could become contentious (eth-
nicity, language, culture etc.). Furthermore, in contra-distinction
to the Middle Ages, the modern South Slavic nations of the 19th
and 20th centuries, as soon as they were constituted as territo-
rial nation-states – founded on the principle of inviolable sover-
eignty – were inevitably faced with the harsh and complex reali-
ties of their own societies and cultures. There is hardly any bound-
ary within them – of whatever nature – that coincides with the
state boundary! Additionally, precisely because of this complexity,
there is no South Slavic nation-state that does not have a polycen-
tric geographical, social, economic and cultural morphology that
from the “inside” resists national hegemony tailored to the inter-
ests of the epicenter of state and national power.
Yugoslavism was essentially the only attempt among the South
Slavs in mid-south-eastern Europe to use endogenic processes
from “below” to go beyond the (sub) regional logic of survival
33
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
at the periphery of imperial regimes, to secure a better future for
all by constituting a multifaceted complex state union according
to the measure of its own needs. However, such an ideal type of
Yugoslavism never, in fact, existed. It could not have existed any-
way, since the dynamics of interconnected changes “externally”
and “internally” prevented all nations individually in their devel-
opment in central and south-eastern Europe. They were forced
to earmark large portions of their potential for the armed forces
or police units because of the disputes and conflicts within their
own borders or with their neighbors, in peace or in war. Once
again, Yugoslavism as an alternative saw its first opportunity only
when, in the course of World War I, the empires that had pre-
viously enjoyed hegemonic status during an extended period of
time in the region disintegrated. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes received its international legitimacy
from the powers victorious in the war that had no borders with
it (the United States, Great Britain, France), while the one pow-
er that had – Italy – was at the same time the single biggest exter-
nal threat to the international survival of the Yugoslav state. At the
same time, with the partial exception of Greece, there was not a
single neighboring state with which the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes did not have open or potential territorial disputes. In
conclusion, the Yugoslav alternative in mid-south-eastern Europe
in its end result could not escape peripheralizing effects – precise-
ly of the kind it was conceived to prevent.
II
With the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes on December 1, 1918 – through the hasty unification of
the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Ser-
bia – the majority of Serbs and Croats, but also, at the time, the
majority of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandžak Muslims, found
themselves within the borders of the same, South Slavic state, for
34
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
the first time in history. The same was true of the Montenegrins,
who, by the unification of the Kingdom of Montenegro with the
Kingdom of Serbia at the Podgorica Assembly on November 24
and 29, 1918, entered into the new state deeply divided as a nation.
The Slovenes, who were constitutionally recognized – and who
were also, like the Croats, vitally short-changed victims of the 1915
Treaty of London – and the constitutionally unrecognized Mace-
donians, became citizens of the new state only in part. Basically,
the Slovenes became citizens through the principle of self-deter-
mination, and the Macedonians by the logic of international rec-
ognition of the borders of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1913. Mace-
donians and other residents of Macedonia were denied the right
of self-determination, not only by the Serbian side, but also by
the Bulgarian and Greek sides. Bearing in mind that the mem-
bers of the largest national minorities – Albanian, Hungarian,
German and Turkish – also became residents of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes without having any say in it, a crucial
question – still open for debate even today – is what Yugoslavism
meant to each mentioned nationality and to what degree their his-
torical expectations were fulfilled or denied on December 1, 1918?
This question is all the more pertinent also because the so-called
Habsburg Monarchy South Slavs (Slovenes, Croats and, to a degree,
Bosnians – trans.) were deeply involved in the war against Serbia
and Montenegro and also played an important role in the occupa-
tion regime in these two countries. On the other hand, there were
also many Austro-Hungarian South Slavs who participated as vol-
unteers on the Serbian or (Triple) Entente side – something that
also needs to be taken into consideration. South Slavic political
émigrés from the Habsburg Monarchy from 1914 to 1918, along with
the Yugoslav Committee as the key player, but also with the Yugo-
slav movement among the South Slavic émigrés from Austria-Hun-
gary abroad, essentially modified the picture of World War I as a
fratricidal war between the peoples and the nations that in 1918 had
35
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
opted to live in a common state. Without this it would have been
very difficult to legitimize internationally the character of World
War I among the South Slavs as anything but fratricidal.
III
By December 1, 1918, the Croats and Serbs were already old
European peoples. All the other, Slavic and non-Slavic peoples
within the borders of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
were also deeply rooted in the regions of central, south-eastern
and Mediterranean Europe, regardless of how and when they were
given ethnic attributes or to what degree they were constituted as
modern nations at the time of Yugoslavia’s establishment. Regard-
less of their enormous mutual differences, they all held in com-
mon the fact that in 1918 they were at the periphery of moderni-
zation processes that had in the “long 19th century” transformed
the civilizational morphology of Europe and the world. There-
fore, the question of history before the establishment of Yugosla-
via had, in each individual case, been posed – in the terminolo-
gy of Koselleck – on the one hand, as a question of cultivating the
experience with which each nation joined the new, common state
(‘experience’, Erfahrungsraum) and, on the other, as a question of
their expectations from the newly-proclaimed state at the time of
joining it (‘expectation horizon’, Erwartungshorizont).
From this standpoint, the problem of Yugoslavism before the
creation of Yugoslavia is, above all, a problem of the epoch of con-
stituting the modern South Slavic nations – something that took
place from the late 18th century onwards. Yet it is also a problem
of the epoch of transformations in Europe and the world through
modernization, in the end result, even independently of how and
to what extent individual South Slavic communities participated
in these processes. Both the cultivated experience and the horizon
of expectation are phenomena and processes that demand con-
crete historical analysis. They are thus subject to both endurance
36
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
and change and so the history of Yugoslavism before the creation
of Yugoslavia was also subject to change and re-creation in eve-
ry historical situation, if and when Yugoslavism was at all histor-
ically relevant. Therefore, Yugoslavism, in all its different mani-
festations, was always somewhere in between the experiences of
the conceived and the unattained in the historically open-ended
South Slavic national-integrative and modernization processes.
Just as societies in the Slavic south modernized in a convulsive
way, equally so the South Slavic nations went through the process
of national integration burdened by a multitude of “delays” when
compared to different European models and patterns of integra-
tion, at the same time going through various forms of contradic-
tory (self) recognition, inclusion and exclusion, different territo-
rial logic etc. All these phenomena and processes were likewise
reflected in the experience and practice of Yugoslavism before the
creation of Yugoslavia.
At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the devel-
opmental logic of both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman
Empire from the second half of the 18th century to the beginning
of the 20th century could in different ways accelerate and/or delay
the processes of modernization and national integration among
the individual South Slavic nations – and frequently in contradic-
tory ways [the Ottoman Patriarchate of Peć, 1557–1766, and the
Habsburg Metropolitanate of Karlovci versus. the trans-regional
dispersion of Serbian Orthodoxy; the Habsburg imperial Illyrian
Movement vs.. the ideology of the Illyrian Movement of the Croa-
tian National Revival; the Habsburg-Ottoman trade relations after
1718 vs. the trade and communications networking of the South
Slavic countries etc.].
From this viewpoint, the modernization and national integra-
tion processes of the Croats and Serbs were more complex as they
were the subjects of both empires – of course, much more com-
plex among the Serbs than the Croats, because proportionally
37
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
there were many more Serbs on the Habsburg side than Croats
on the Ottoman side and because the two autonomous states, and
later kingdoms – Serbia and, irrespective of certain reservations,
Montenegro – were the main spearheads of national integration.
Both were internationally recognized at the Berlin Congress in
1878, Serbia becoming a kingdom in 1882 and Montenegro in 1910.
Both had autochthonic dynasties, which in south-eastern Europe
of the 19th and 20th centuries was more the exception than the
rule (the Petrović, Obrenović and Karađorđević dynasties). None
of these dynasties had noble ancestry, which was truly a special
case without precedent in the Europe of the time. On the other
hand, the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia (i.e.
Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia – trans.) was the only enti-
ty among the South Slavs that had maintained intact legal-state
continuity for practically a millennium, regardless of the fact that
after 1102 it was not a recognized international entity and that ter-
ritorially it was not integrated under the authority of the Habs-
burgs (1527–1918).
IV
A special research problem is Yugoslavism avant la lettre, that
is, Yugoslavism before Yugoslavism as it is being discussed in this
paper. What are involved here are the phenomena and process-
es that anticipated (South) Slavic reciprocity/mutuality or (South)
Slavic inter-connectedness. It is sufficient for the moment to con-
fine ourselves to several examples.
In 1768, Jovan Rajić (Sremski Karlovci, 11 November 1726 –
Kovilj Monastery, 11 December 1801), a theologian, philosopher
and, above all, historian educated in Europe, concluded the manu-
script of his long, four-volume work with a title without precedent:
“A History of Different Slavic Peoples, especially Bulgarians, Cro-
atians and Serbians” (История разныхъ славенскиъ народовъ
наипаче Болгаровъ, Хорватов и Сербовъ …). After much delay
38
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
it was finally published in Vienna in 1794 and 1795, through the
perseverance of the Metropolitan of the Karlovac Archbishopric
Stevan Stratimirović. Realizing that he could not write about Ser-
bian history if he followed the territorial principle, Rajić opted
for a history of the nation – an approach that had already gained
legitimacy in European historiography. Having simultaneously
in mind the Slavic – but not in the confessional (religious) sense
– framework of Serbian history, he joined Serbian history to the
history of its neighbors, the Bulgarians and the Croats: “At first,
Rajić wanted to connect the history of the Serbs to the history of
all Slavic peoples, especially the Russians, but soon had to desist
from this plan, confining his narrative to the South Slavs. He went
on, in the introduction, to give an overview of knowledge about
the Slavic peoples in general, their beginnings and their home-
land, their name, language, customs and beliefs, and then moved
to present the history of the Bulgarians from the beginning to the
fall of the Second Bulgarian Empire, also briefly outlining the his-
tory of the Croats. The remainder of the work (three out of four
volumes) was devoted to Serbian history…” (Ćirković – Mihaljčić
1997: 614). The secular approach of the work, laid out in the, albeit
limited, South Slavic context, was ahead of its time in Serbian cul-
ture and Serbian historiography, in terms of a working model and
there was no viable alternative to his work for a long time after-
wards. It was a Serbian history in a South Slavic context.
When Josip Šipuš (Karlovac, circa 1770 – ?), in his Basis of
the Wheat Trade (Temely xitne tergovine polag narave y dogacsa-
jev), published in Zagreb in 1796 – a work otherwise dedicated
to Zagreb bishop Maksimilian Vrhovec – opened up the issue of
the modern standardization of the Croatian language, he did not
confine himself to Croatian linguistic traditions: “Many are famil-
iar with the different ways of speaking (German) by residents in
Upper and Lower Saxony, and again how both speak different-
ly from Swabians, Austrians, residents of the Lower Rhine region
39
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
(Niederrhein) and the Swiss – they speak differently to such a
degree that they can barely understand each other. Nevertheless,
their scholars and writers everywhere speak a uniformly pure,
compatible and comprehensible language, unified by rules and
pronunciation. Our glorious nation, I think, still has a long way to
go to such concord. If it were not so dispersed and huge, it would
already have disappeared a long time ago, given how forces from
every side impede it, and in some cases even destroy it.” (Šipuš
1993: 8, translated by Dr. Mijo Lončarić). Referring to the German
linguistic situation and talking about “our…dispersed and huge…
glorious nation”, Šipuš was obviously appealing to his readers not
to turn a deaf ear – when considering a modern Croatian linguis-
tic standard – to the Slavic incentives that were already coming
from people like Josef Dobrovsky (Gyarmat, July 17, 1753 – Brno,
January 6, 1829), the Czech philologist, Slavic scholar and key fig-
ure of the early Czech National Revival.
With its petition of May 19, 1790, addressed to the Croa-
tian Assembly, the Zagreb Royal Academy of Sciences request-
ed the “powerful protection” of the upper classes and ecclesias-
tical orders in an appeal to be given university privilege (Sidak
1969: 317–319). The faculty initiated this after the breakdown of
the regime of Joseph II and the renewal of constitutionality in the
Habsburg Monarchy, as well as in the face of tectonic changes in
the European “ancien régime” after the French Revolution of 1789.
It did so at a time when it was expected that the Habsburg Army
would continue its anti-Ottoman push towards Bosnia and Serbia,
which had begun in 1788 and continued through October 8, 1789
when it managed to take Belgrade. In asking for university priv-
ileges (extended teaching rights, status for faculty, funds for the
university etc. – trans.), the Royal Academy argued its case thus:
“…if we bear in mind the present circumstances, when serious
thought is being given not only to the removal of impediments to
science but also to the appointment of citizens of our homeland
40
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
to all offices in these kingdoms, and if we also take into consider-
ation future circumstances in which not only those parts of Croa-
tia that still suffer under the Turkish yoke, but also the kingdoms
of Bosnia and Serbia – as favorable omens so far seem to indi-
cate – will be liberated and thus that these glorious kingdoms will
even be expanded, we consider that it is not only right and use-
ful, but also absolutely necessary to have in our midst a university
in which – once impediments to scientific work are removed and
once proper funds are secured for its development – our domestic
youth will gather in great numbers and acquire an education in all
sciences and noble skills enabling them to work in different fields
in our homeland” (Sidak 1969: 318). At a time when the national-
ism of the Hungarian upper classes was in full swing, and when
the preservation of the status quo ante was of tantamount impor-
tance to the Croatian upper classes, the professors’ faculty of the
Royal Academy made its voice heard stating “we are of the view
that, with this humble proposal to the upper classes and ecclesias-
tical orders, we have in part fulfilled our duty as citizens respect-
fully concerned about the greater good of all”! This was anticipa-
tion of the modern Croatian national revival, but in a context that
was not exclusively Croatian because it also included the king-
doms of Bosnia and Serbia.
The leading Vienna Slavic scholars of Slovenian and Croatian
origin [Jernej Kopitar (Repanj, August 21, 1780 – Vienna, August
11, 1844), Franc Miklošič (Ljutomer, November 29, 1813 – Vienna,
March 7, 1891), Vatroslav Jagić (Varaždin, July 6, 1838 – Vienna,
August 5, 1923) and Milan Rešetar (Dubrovnik, February 1, 1860 –
Florence, January 14, 1942)] exerted great influence on the process-
es of standardization in the South Slavic languages and especially
on the linguistic convergence of Croats and Serbs. In that regard
the greatest success was achieved through Jernej Kopitar’s influ-
ence on the ingenious autodidact Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (Tršić,
November 6, 1787 – Vienna, February 7, 1864) who lived in Vienna
41
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
from 1813 until his death in 1864. Karadžić’s linguistic reform of the
Serbian language, based on the neo-Shtokavian Ijekavian dialect
(the eastern Herzegovina dialect of Serbian which Karadžić spoke
– trans.), radically separated the Serbian language and its Cyrillic
alphabet from its Slavic-Serbian tradition, that is, from its organic
connection with the Russian language. The much more complex
development of the Croatian language in its threefold literary tra-
ditions (Chakavian, Kajkavian and Shtokavian), which were more
or less interconnected in the early modern period, following the
period from 1780 to 1815, was increasingly directed towards stand-
ardization based on its own Shtokavian tradition. This opened up
the process which, in the period from 1835 to 1850, laid the foun-
dations for the Vienna Literary Agreement between the principal
Croatian and Serbian linguists – this being the key initiative in the
process of linguistic convergence between Croats and Serbs, Bos-
niaks and Montenegrins.
V
In the above examples, the implicit ‘(South) Slavic common
horizon’ is the precondition for the modern approach to one’s own
national issues and aspirations, that is, Yugoslavism is the in statu
nascendi (nascent state) for the period of early nationalism. Still,
Yugoslavism cannot be understood only from the perspective of
modernization. In the history of South Slavic nations, both in the
early modern period and in the “long 19th century”, tradition and
innovation keep up in equal pace – something that is typical of
European fringe countries. ‘Common Slavic horizons’ coexisted
in the Middle Ages in the experience of various Slavic peoples –
mainly due to Old Slavic linguistic and cultural traditions, largely
immune even to confessional boundaries – only to gain in impor-
tance through European influences – which remained strong all
the way up to and including the 20th century – in the epochs of
humanistic and then baroque Slavic studies.
42
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
The Protestant fringe in the history of South Slavs exerted both
in the linguistic and also in the cultural sense a crucial influence
on the national formation of the Slovenes, the South Slavic nation
that in a long historical period maintained itself at the crossroads
of European Slavic, Romance and German cultures. Primož Tru-
bar (Rascica, June 9, 1508 – Derendingen, June 28, 1586) – coming
of age and maturing in the Slavic, Romance and German worlds
at the time of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, in the
time of the “Ottoman scare” and, more broadly, the time of the
shifting European world view – was not only a Protestant thinker
and preacher, but also a humanist who left such an indelible mark
on Slovenian culture that it could not be called into question even
by the comprehensive re-Catholicization of the Slovenes. Howev-
er, his work was projected along South Slavic lines and was ulti-
mately the most influential among the Croats.
The Slovenes, as subjects of the Habsburg Hereditary Lands,
and the Croats in the ‘Reliquiae reliquiarum’ (the ‘leftovers of the
leftovers’) of the Croatian Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Sla-
vonia after the Ottoman conquest of Slavonia in the late 16th cen-
tury – trans.), were never as close as they were in the period from
1526–27 to 1606, between the enthronement of Ferdinand I as the
Croatian King and the Treaty of Zsitvatorok (of 1606), and before
and after the Bruce Treaty of 1578 (both treaties were between
the Habsburgs and the Ottomans – trans.). Intellectual exchange
between individuals on both sides of the Croatian-Slovenian bor-
der were far-reaching and stimulating, while the South Slavic
Protestant imagination barely had limits at a time when everyone
all the way down to Constantinople was fair game for conversion,
regardless of their faith. Many a strong individual, from both the
Croatian and the Slovenian sides, took part in these exchanges.
Although they probably would not have existed if there had been
no Reformation, one should also not overlook the numerous cul-
tural transfers from both Italy and Germany that had made their
43
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
way into Croatia by way of Slovenian mediation before and after
the Reformation. Even though the meaning of such mediation
changed after the Battle of Vienna (1683–1699), when the borders
of the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia shifted eastward to Zemun,
they were important at least until the Berlin Congress in 1815.
Mavro Orbini (Dubrovnik, mid-16th century – Dubrovnik,
1611)– even though he was not the first in the early modern era to
write about the Slavs – is the founder of the modern understand-
ing of Slavism. In his work “Kingdom of the Slavs” (Il Regno deg-
li Slavi, Pesaro, 1601), the spirit of Catholic renewal and erudite
culture are amalgamated in a way that far surpasses the bound-
aries of his initial inspiration by Dubrovnik culture. He set forth
a work that in different ways became a point of reference in the
culture of all Slavic, especially South Slavic nations. Orbini’s Slavs
originate in Old Testament times: “…the father of Japhet, namely,
knowing that necessarily there must be three stages of human life
and granting each of his sons a profession that would fit the giv-
en character of each, made his decision known thus: ‘You, Shem,
as a priest will conduct the service of God. You, Ham, will work
the land and devote yourself to crafts. You, Japhet,, will rule and
defend the country as king and be skilled in arms as a soldier’ (…)
Thus the Slavs, having descended from Japhet, had always been
courageous in arms and had conquered many peoples” (Orbini
1999: 76). Orbini also names all the peoples of his time of Slav-
ic origin: “These peoples of Slavic ethnicity and language are not
only those inhabiting Dalmatia, Illyria, Istria and Carpathia, but
also other famous and powerful nations like the Bulgarians, the
Ras or Rasani (old, medieval Serbs – trans.), Serbs, Bosnians,
Croats, the inhabitants of the five surrounding mountains (Pet-
ogorci, “the Five-Mountain people”), the Russians, Ukrainians
(Podolans), Muscovites (a variation of Russians – trans.), the Cir-
cassians (close to the Macedonians – trans.), the Pomeranians (liv-
ing in southwestern, central Europe near the Baltic Sea – trans.)
44
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
and those living in the Bay of Veneti (in the Baltic Sea – possi-
bly precursors of the Slovenes – trans.) and all the way to the riv-
er Laba (present-day Russia – trans.). Those that have descended
from these nations are called by the Germans, to this day, call the
Slavs or the Vendi or the Vindi (Slovenes): ultimately these consist
of Lusatian Serbs, the Kasubi (Polish Serbs), Moravians, the Poles,
the Lithuanians, the Silesians (inhabiting what is mostly present-
day Poland – trans.) and the Czechs. In brief, Slavic languages
extend from the Caspian Sea to Saxony and from the Adriatic to
the North (German) Sea where all throughout Slavic peoples are
to be found” (Orbini 1999: 77). Orbini’s baroque Slavic imagology,
published at the time of the exhausting Habsburg-Ottoman Long
Turkish War (1593–1606), had its South Slavic epicenters as they
could be perceived from Orbini’s broad Dubrovnik-based view,
which compiled many literary sources from Antiquity and the
Middle Ages. It suggests an essentially different understanding of
a nation from that suggested by (Johann Gottfried) Herder and as
such has remained a lasting fountain of South Slavic inspiration.
The Jesuit Juraj Križanić (Obrh near Ozalj in Croatia, 1617 or
1618 – Vienna, September 12, 1683) undoubtedly contributed the
most to the early modern understanding of Slavism as something
beyond confessional boundaries (‘trans-confessional’). From an
early age in his homeland Croatia, he gained first-hand experience
of the scope and consequences of Catholic-Orthodox in-fighting.
Educated in Ljubljana, Graz, Bologna and Rome, Križanić ded-
icated his life to the ecclesiastical and cultural unity of the Slav-
ic West and East, and to the support of Russia which he saw, once
Europeanized, as the leader of the Slavic nations’ renewal. His
huge intellectual output, which did not falter even in the time of
his Siberian exile, was overwhelmingly dedicated to his chosen
calling. The tragic episodes of his life – the utter misunderstand-
ing which followed him from Rome to Moscow, his Siberian exile,
and, finally, his death in Vienna on the very day on which the
45
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
Ottoman siege ended – are all a testimony to the fact that he was
at odds with his time. Irrespective of just how differently he was
perceived by different individuals at different times, he was either
the misguided dreamer or the herald of possible different futures.
There never would have been Yugoslavism in the “long 19th cen-
tury” without its dreamers or visionaries.
In contrast to Križanić, his contemporary, the Pauline monk Ivan
Belostenec (Joannis Bellosztenecz; Varaždin, circa 1594 – Lepogla-
va, 1675), spent most of his life laboring on his voluminous “Treas-
ury – A Latin-Illyrian (i.e. Slavic) Dictionary”(Gazophylacium,
seu Latino-Illyricorum onomatum aerarium;vol. I-II, Zagreb
1740), the first Croatian dictionary to include words in the Kajka-
vian, Chakavian and Shtokavian dialects – with an emphasis on
the Kajkavian dialect. In spite of his seminal role in Croatian cul-
ture, Belostenec’s South Slavic vision was constrained by the eru-
dite constructs that came out of the Pax Ottomanica Ottoman
Peace) in central south-eastern Europe of the 17th century.
In Belostenec’s dictionary there is even no clear distinction
between “Slav” and “Slovene”! Sclavus (Slav) is Szlovenecz (Slo-
vene – I, 1092), but also Sclavonia (Slavonia) is Szlovenſzki orſzag
(Slovenian country, state), while Sclavonicus (Slavic) is szlovenſzki
(Slovenian as inszlovenſki jezik, Slovenian language – I, 1092). A
Szlovènecz (Slovene) is, on the other hand, Illyrius, Illyricus, Scla-
vus (an Illyrian, a Slav). A Szlovènka (a female Slovene)is Illyri-
ca mulier(female Illyrian), Szlovenſki Orſag (Slovenian country)
is Illyrica, Illyris, Illyrium, Illyricum, Sclavonia (Illyria, Slavonia).
Finally, Szlovenſzki (Slovenian) is Illyricus, Illyricanus, Sclavonicus
(Illyrian, Slavic – II, 507).
Additionally, Croata (Croat) is Horvath, Hervat, “(a)ntiquitùs
nominabantur Curetes” (“the ancient legendary tribal name”
– I, 379). Croatia, olim Crobatia(Croatia, formerly Crobatia) is
Horvatſzki orſzak, horvatſzka zemlya (Croatian state, Croatian
country), y Kralyevſztvo (the Kingdom – I, 379). Horvatſkiorpo
46
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
horvatſki (Croatian) is Croaticè, Illyricè (Croatian, Illyrian – II,
129). In Belostenec’s dictionary, the meanings for Illyrian, Slav
and Croat overlap, but it is highly questionable when he is talking
about Slovenes as Slovenes, and when Slovenes become Slavoni-
ans and even simply Slavs.
Furthermore, Dalmata (Dalmatian male) and Dalmatius (Dal-
matian female) is Dalmatin, Dalmatinka (Slavic versions of the
same), while Dalmatia (Dalmatia) is Dalmaczia, Dalmatinſzki
orſzag (Dalmatian country – I, 400). As distinct from the mutu-
ally overlapping Croats and Slovenes, in Belostenec’s diction-
ary Dalmatians are uniform (‘one-dimensional’) from Antiquity
onwards. Even though his Dalmatia is not a kingdom but a coun-
try, he fails to describe its relationshipwith Croatia proper!
A similar constructivist approach, with its serious, ‘epochal’
limitations, was also applied in the case of the Bosniaks, Serbs and
Bulgarians:
Bosnya Orſzag (Bosnian country, state) is Bosna zemlya (Bos-
nian country), Bosnia, Misia, Regnum Bosniae (kingdom of Bos-
nia). Bosnyak(a Bosniak)…is koi je iz Bosnye… (“he who comes
from Bosnia – II, 26).
Raſtia (Rastia or Rascia – the country of the Ras, ‘Old Serbs’)
is Thracia (Thrace – the ancient name given to the south-east-
ern Balkan region, the land inhabited by the Thracians – I, 1020),
while Thraca, Thracia (Thrace) is Rasci (Rasia) or Valachia mag-
na (Great Valachia or Walachia – a historical region of south-east
Romania between the Transylvanian Alps and the Danube Riv-
er – trans.) or Vlaski orſzag (Walachian country – 1210). Szërblya-
nin is Rascianus (Serbia is Rascia), while Szërbſka zemlya (Serbi-
an country, land) is Rascia, Servia (Rascia, Serbia – II, 498) Ulàh
(Vlach) is Valachus, Rascianus, Trax, Tracus, Thracis (Walachian,
Rascian, Thracian – II, 569).
Bùlgarin (Bulgarian) is Bugarin, Bùgar, Bulgarus, Maesus (Moe-
sia), while Bulgárſki zemlya (Bulgarian country, land) is Bulgaria,
47
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
Maesia Superior (Greater Moesia – Moesia was an ancient region
and later Roman province situated in the Balkans along the south
bank of the Danube river. It included most of the territory of mod-
ern-day Serbia (without Vojvodina) and the northern parts of the
modern Macedonia (Moesia Superior), as well as Northern Bul-
garia and Romanian Dobruđa (Moesia Inferior) – trans.), Trib-
all (Triballi) – an ancient tribe whose dominion was around the
plains of modern southern Serbia and western Bulgaria, roughly
centered where Serbia and Bulgaria are joined – trans. – (II, 34)].
The common denominator of Belostenec’s “etymologizing”
is the implicit belief that the (South) Slavs are an autochthonic
people in south-eastern Europe. Whether it is viable to connect
the ethno-genesis of the South Slavic peoples to their predeces-
sors from Antiquity is still an open question and it certainly did
not interest Belostenec as a question in cultural anthropology but
rather as an issue of legitimacy in the historical sense. In this he
was consistent, and one could say that Belostenec belonged to
those scholars who anticipated one of the great issues of Croatian
and other South Slavic national integrations in the 19th century –
that is, to what degree as a nation they are historically rooted in
(the territory of) their own countries. Namely, following the log-
ic of Romantic “primordialism,” those who in the past were firm-
ly rooted (in their territory) could also with greater confidence
believe that they would sustain themselves there in the future too.
The interweaving of different types of identity in Belostenec’s
work is fascinating because it enables multiple constructs, but
also because it opens up the possibility for alternative solutions
which could become the binding tissue for all of them. With his
pan-Croatianism, formulated in his work Croatia rediviva (Croa-
tia revisited), published in Vienna in 1701, Pavao Ritter Vitezović
(Senj, February 7, 1652 – Vienna, January 20, 1713) dissolved the
dilemmas of scholars like Belostenec and extended the name Cro-
atian to all South Slavs and, in that respect, completed the work
48
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
on the first modern history of Serbia, Serbiae illustrate libri octo
(Eight illustrated books of Serbia).
From 1701, to 1835 – when Ljudevit Gaj (Krapina, July 8, 1809
– Zagreb, April 20, 1872)in Zagreb launched the Novine horvatzke
(Croatian News) and the Daniczu horvatzku, slavonzku y dalmat-
inzku (Croatian, Slavonic and Dalmatian Morning Star), which,
the following year, he had already renamed as Ilirske narodne
novine (Illyrian National News) and the Danicu ilirsku (Illyri-
an Morning Star) – the process of Croatian national integration
explicitly shifted to a program of South Slavic, “Illyrian” linguis-
tic and cultural linking and integration, whilst at the same time
not abandoning the class political program of the state and legal
unification of Croatian lands: “ The ideology of the Illyrian Move-
ment contained and expressed two levels of integrationist impuls-
es, the Croatian and the South Slavic. The latter was most strong-
ly felt on Croatian territory, which was at the core of the dynam-
ic, northern part of South Slavic territory, partly adjoining Slove-
nian territory and partly overlapping with Serbian territory. The
South Slavic idea neutralized strong specific provincialisms… and
played an important role in forming the Croatian nation. At the
same time, it facilitated the cooperation of Croats and Serbs in
Croatia in achieving common interests – the building of insti-
tutions needed by a society in its transition from a feudal to a
bourgeois society and maintaining the special political position
of the “Triune Kingdom” as a bulwark against Hungarian politi-
cal and national expansionism” (Stančić 1990: 133). In this sense,
the Illyrian Movement played both a Croatian international and
a South Slavic international role. Irrespective of the fact that its
results were contradictory, both amongst the Croats, and amongst
the other South Slavs, especially the Serbs and Slovenes, there is
no doubt that the Illyrian Movement opened up, in a concrete his-
torical way, the issue of what should and could be the process-
es leading to the establishment of modern South Slavic nations
49
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
and the development of modern societies in general. In different
ways, this issue was of vital importance to all South Slavic nations.
The practical, political effects of this movement were visible in the
spring of 1848. Even though the idea of “Austro-Slavism” – a South
Slavic synonym for Yugoslavism – as a liberally based project of
the (con) federal, constitutional reform of the Habsburg Monar-
chy, remained only at the level of political aspirations of the South
Slavic national elites, (Yugo) Slavism, which conceptually soon
marginalized the concept of Illyrism, achieved legitimacy in cir-
cles in favor of South Slavic integration, especially in Croatia. Not
even the many controversies associated with this concept would
question this all the way up to 1918.
The name Illyrian was contentious both amongst Serbs and
amongst Slovenes, and Teodor Pavlović (Karlovo – today Novo
Miloševo – February 14, 1804 – Karlovo, August 12, 1854), the
editor of Serbskoga narodnog lista (Serbian National Paper) – as
much as he supported “pan-Slavic literary interconnectedness” –
also emphasized: “Let the Krajnci (Slovenians) be the Krajnci; the
Horvats (Croats) the Horvats, and the Srblji (Serbs) individually;
but when we talk about all of them together, let us call ourselves
as we by nature do and must call ourselves: of one tribe born, dear
brother Yugoslavians and Yugoslavs!” (Novak 1930: 78–79).
The experience of the simultaneous Serbian coming-of-age
in respect to national integration both as Habsburg and Otto-
man subjects – which, on the one hand, implied dynastic/monar-
chic loyalty, and on the other, an agrarian revolution reduced to
a bureaucratic nation-state – is reflected in the critical question-
ing of the socialist Svetozar Marković. He was a decisive advocate
of the federalist resolution of the Serbian national issue and the
national issue of every other nation that overlaps and intermingles
with the Serbs: “The Serbian people are so positioned as to inter-
mingle with the Bulgarians, Croats and Romanians, while two
of these nations, the Bulgarians and the Croats, are their closest
50
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
relatives by blood and language. Where are the frontiers of ‘the
united Serbs’, of the new Serbian state? This is difficult to achieve,
if we do not wish to get into conflict with all these peoples. (…)
The Serbian people have no geographic or ethnographic bound-
aries which would set it apart as a unique whole. In order to cre-
ate a state of five to five and a half million Serbs, the Serbian peo-
ple would have to make enemies out of the Bulgarians, Croats and
Romanians. They would have to take on the role of conqueror, as
the Hungarians are doing today.”
When the Croatian national elite accepted the Yugoslav name, it
accepted it more consistently than any other South Slavic national
elite, but it should also be emphasized that it did so with the sup-
port of many influential Serbs, mainly from Croatia, but also –
and not too rarely – with the support of the Slovenes, and in oth-
er parts as well. From the Society for Yugoslav History (Družtva
za povjestnicu jugoslavensku, 1850), and the Archive of Yugoslav
History (Arkiva za povjestnicu jugoslavensku, 1851), via the Yugo-
slav Academy of Sciences and Arts (Jugoslavenska akademija zna-
nosti i umjetnosti, 1866) – established in great part by the dona-
tion of Đakovo bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (Osijek, February
4, 1815 – Đakovo, March 8, 1905) – all the way up to the Yugoslav
Committee (Jugoslavenski odbor, 1915–1919), which was made up
of influential Croats, Serbs and Slovenes, war refugees from the
Habsburg Monarchy including Frano Supilo (Cavtat, November
30, 1870 – London, September 25, 1917) and Ante Trumbić (Split,
May 15, 1864 – Zagreb, November 17, 1938), Yugoslavism as a con-
cept, a cultural and/or political program, a practice and above all
a vision realized itself in many contradictory forms amongst pri-
marily Croats but also other South Slavs in the Habsburg Mon-
archy, as well as outside its borders, above all in Serbia and Mon-
tenegro. However, the short-lived State of Slovenes, Croats and
Serbs (October 29 – December 1, 1918) did not choose the Yugo-
slav name as its own, nor did it become the name of the Kingdom
51
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (December 1, 1918), up until the roy-
al ‘octroyed’ (or ‘granted’) acts of October 3, 1929, when the dicta-
torship of King Alexander I invalidated the project of the common
Yugoslav state. The true motive for evading the Yugoslav name in
1918 was to formally disguise what was in reality a unitaristic pro-
ject, while in 1929, by conceding the Yugoslav name, the intention
was to formalize a deception which no longer had any real bearing
on the national interests of the Yugoslav peoples.
VI
As far as the geographic aspects of South Slavic national inte-
gration in the “long 19th century” are concerned, Yugoslav stud-
ies and ideologies were particularly focused on – what we would
call today – economic geography and ecology. Here it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that at the time autochthonic ideas about the
South Slavic world were already taking shape on the margins of
the Dinaric-Pannonian basins, also in large part on the bounda-
ries between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire
and were strictly monitored by the “sanitary cordons” (Sani-
tatscordon) of the Military-Krajina buffer regions, practically until
the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878.
Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade are cities along the Sava River and
whatever separates them, they had in common that they mutual-
ly recognized each other by way of urbanity and by way of ethnic-
ity – at least from 1840 onwards –as the epicenters of events in the
South Slavic north and south, along the Danubian and the Adri-
atic routes. Ljudevit Gaj was the first who programmatically, lin-
guistically and culturally integrated the area from the Julian Alps
to the Black Sea, from the west to the east, endowing the Croatian
national renewal (i.e. Illyrian Movement) with a Yugoslav mean-
ing. (1835–1848). However, it was only in the latter part of the 19th
century that the conservative national élites, confronted with the
great challenges of European-wide modernization, would begin
52
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
to realize that less than a third of the mostly northern South Slav-
ic territories were agriculturally fertile flatlands, while two thirds
consisted of mountainous terrain, significantly less agricultural-
ly productive, with limited lines of communication and very few
natural throughways from the plains to the Adriatic Sea, and with-
out waterways that led into this sea. In these areas, there was not
enough drinking water to sustain concentrated populations and
larger livestock funds. These were problems confronting all South
Slavic peoples except for the Macedonians integrated into the Var-
dar-Aegean plains, who, in any case, were not capable, during the
better part of the 19th century, of developing larger urban areas
or huge livestock funds – especially since, as Ottoman subjects
up until 1912–13, they were also confronted by various challeng-
es from the Bulgarian and Serbian, but also Greek and Albanian
sides. If there was a geographic basis to the South Slavic/Yugoslav
issue, it could only be concerned with the pro-modernizing and
pro-national-integration transversal and longitudinal network-
ing of territories to the north and south of the Middle-European-
Adriatic basins, between the sub-Danubian and Adriatic regions,
predominantly in the mountainous areas of the Balkan Peninsula.
The ideologues of South Slavic/Yugoslav cooperation sought
the economic basis of Yugoslavism primarily in agrarian econom-
ics, and even if they had anticipated industrial economics, they
were more focused on the development of the state rather than on
the development of entrepreneurship, driven more by the fear of
mass pauperization than by the transitional processes leading to
capitalist economics. Agrarian economics and rural culture were
dominant in South Slavic societies up until the socialist moderni-
zation and industrialization in the second half of the 20th centu-
ry, but the social and economic types were very different, from the
Habsburg Hereditary Lands in the north-west to the tribal com-
munities in the south-east, and from classic Ottoman serf-like
relations to the agrarian economics and rural culture of the free
53
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
farmers in traditional communities in autonomous/independent
Serbia. It was very difficult to project any kind of common, stable
South Slavic state on that basis. Therefore, the ideologues of South
Slavic/ Yugoslav cooperation advocated a different approach. The
German Drang nach Sudosten (lit. “thrust towards the south-east”
i.e. the former German policy of eastward expansion – trans.), Ital-
ian irredentism, as well as all the other grand national programs of
the South Slavic neighbors, provided more than sufficient reason
for the South Slavs to defend their vital, common interest, crucial
for their future, together, in a common Yugoslav state, within or
outside of the borders of the Habsburg Monarchy. After the Bal-
kan Wars of 1912 and 1913, that began in part as a reaction to Ita-
ly’s war against the Ottoman Empire, this issue came to a head and
its resolution depended on the great powers which were ready for
such an outcome because of their numerous other interests.
On the eve of 1914, Jovan Skerlić (Belgrade, August 20, 1877
– Belgrade, May 15, 1914) was one of the Serbian ideologues of
integral Yugoslavism as the South Slavic response to the challeng-
es of the “age of empires”, but also as the guarantee of successful
Westernization, advocating – among other things – a compromise
in linguistic unification (neo-Shtokavian Ekavian plus Roman
script). As a huge authority in Serbian culture, he was also a lead-
ing influence on the political beliefs of many, especially the young
generation.
In contrast to Skerlić, his contemporary Dimitrije Tucović
(Gostilje at Zlatibor, May 13, 1881 – Vrače Brdo near Lazarevac,
September 20, 1914), a Marxist and social-democrat, was consist-
ently against all trans-national projects that legitimize the hegem-
ony of one nation over another. In his work “Serbia and Albania: A
Contribution to the Critique of the Serbian Bourgeoisie’s Policy of
Conquest” (Srbija i Arbanija. Jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke poli-
tike srpske buržoazije, Beograd 1914), he wrote things which today
seem like prophecy: “We dealt here in detail with the Albanian
54
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
issue driven more by practical needs than theoretical interests.
The Albanian policy of our government ended in defeat which
cost us many lives. In that respect, even greater sacrifices await
us in the future. The policy of conquest pursued by the Serbian
government towards the Albanian people has created such rela-
tions on the western border of Serbia that peace and a normal
state of affairs can hardly be expected anytime in the near future.
At the same time, this policy has pushed Albania into the hands
of two major powers that have the greatest interest in the West-
ern Balkans – and every consolidation of any outside capitalist
state in the Balkan Peninsula represents a serious danger to Ser-
bia and the normal development of all the Balkan nations.” He was
also deeply convinced that relations between the South Slavic and
Balkan nations must develop along (con) federal lines and, in the
long term, be secured through the socialist transformation of all
of them. However, the outcome of World War I was such that the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes became a problem the
moment it was established, both within its borders, but also out-
side them.
None of the states established by Versailles after 1918 was a
(con) federation. Even though the key players in this order were
liberal democracies (the United States, Great Britain and France),
practically none of the newly – established states – with the pos-
sible exception of the Czecho-Slovak Republic – was a liberal
democracy. Although all of them emerged from the experience of
life in multi-national empires, none of them consistently respect-
ed the imperatives of multi-nationality. Moreover, Weimar Ger-
many was, with respect to its constitution, incomparably more
centralized than the Deutsches Reich (one army, centralized fiscal
authority etc.): “The German Republic from 1919 was thus poten-
tially much stronger than the Reich from 1871 ever was” (Simms
2016: 287). Thus all who participated in the establishment of the
Yugoslav state as a state based on Woodrow Wilson’s principles
55
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
were obviously mistaken, since the only formula that in the civ-
ic sense could have been sustainable was a federal one, one that
the victorious side did not recommend even to vanquished Ger-
many. Bearing in mind that World War II was in many respects a
continuation of World War I, the Yugoslav state was an anomaly.
Its reconstruction was possible based only on radically different
assumptions.
In 1996, John Lampe published a book of synthetic analysis
called Yugoslavia as History. Twice There Was a Country (1996),
reminding readers that the Yugoslav state had disappeared in 1941,
only to be re-established, after the hell of war from 1941 to 1945,
and then, in 1991/1992, only to disappear again in the whirlpool
of war and violence from 1991 to 1995. Therefore the question that
for all researchers is all the more intriguing is how it was possible,
after everything that had burdened relations between the peoples
and nations of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes / King-
dom of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941, and the terrible human deg-
radation and deprivation of the occupied Yugoslav territories from
1941 to 1945, to renew Yugoslavia as a federal state with a politi-
cal monopoly by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia/ League of
Communists of Yugoslavia?
The paradox was all the greater since the Yugoslav communists
were the only ones, after the capitulation of the Yugoslav Royal
Army in April 1941, in the process of the establishment of occu-
pational and collaborationist régimes, to declare a willingness to
universally lead the resistance against occupation and collabora-
tion and for the renewal of Yugoslavia as a community of nations.
Namely, they were banned and literally outlawed in the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1920/1921, subject to state terror
and proscribed in dominantly anti-communist public opinion,
including the opposition. In 1941, in terms of strength, they were
a barely discernible force. No one who knew anything about them
could doubt that their determination to lead armed resistance was
56
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
not motivated by restorational but by revolutionary inspiration.
“Never a return to the old!” was the message to all who were invit-
ed to join them. This was ultimately a message to all those who in
the previous Yugoslavia felt deceived and betrayed and who did
not rule out the possibility of a better, more just world. The sec-
ond message, “brotherhood and unity”, was directed at all who,
for whatever reason, felt marginalized and denied in their human,
civic and national rights and who did not exclude the same rights
for others. This alternative was so radical that the national-liber-
ation resistance to occupation and collaboration could not avoid
being burdened on its margins by civil war. However inclusive this
communist – inspired, national-front mobilization, it had to be
selective in order not to lose its credibility. The brakes failed seri-
ously for the first time at the moment of “victory”. Revanchism
against the vanquished, however limited, had far-reaching con-
sequences, as did every other repressive campaign, with loss of
human life or without it, which ensued all the way up to the dis-
solution of the SFR Yugoslavia in war. Even though in terms of
modernization and level of civilization, socialist Yugoslavia did
achieve results and values that were without precedent in the his-
tory of South Slavic nations, it did not manage to create a politi-
cal culture and a political system capable of withstanding the pres-
sures of internal and external crisis.
To Lampe’s insights we could add a post scriptum, namely, the
year 1999, as well as numerous other phenomena in the “Western
Balkans” and in the “region” that still confront us with disturb-
ing uncertainties. Tragedies and traumas are everyday occurrenc-
es for millions of people, former citizens of the SFR of Yugoslavia
and the many and varied transitions from the proscribed (social-
ist) “uniform thinking” seem endless. While Slovenia and Croa-
tia have managed to become members of the European Union, it
is still a huge open question whether any other state that emerged
from the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia will manage to enter
57
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
into its full membership, even though the majority of the popu-
lation in all of them wants this. Simultaneously, the recognizable
contours of a repeated transformation of the “Western Balkans”
into a global field of imperial confrontation are increasingly visi-
ble. There is nothing new under the sun in the Balkans.
* Given that in the literature devoted to the Yugoslav heritage
of the different nations that made up Yugoslavia at the time of
its dissolution there is considerable discussion about the history
of Yugoslavism before the creation of Yugoslavia, the author of
this paper – written after the above – mentioned works – decid-
ed upon a textbook-like, individually-profiled review of the “big
topics”.
LITERATURE
1. Ivo BANAC, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History,
Politics, Ithaca – London 1984.
2. Ivan BELOSTENEC, Gazophylacium, seu latino-illyricorum onomatum
aerarium…, vol. 1.–2. (Treasury – A Latin-Illyrian Dictionary, vol. 1 & 2),
Zagreb 1740. /reprint: Liber – Mladost, Zagreb 1972./
3. Ivan BOŽIĆ – Sima ĆIRKOVIĆ – Milorad EKMEČIĆ – Vladimir
DEDIJER, Historija Jugoslavije (History of Yugoslavia), Beograd 1972.
4. Marie-Janine ĆALIĆ, Geschichte Jugoslawiens im 20. Jahrhundert(History
iof Yugoslavia in the 20th Century), München 2010.
5. Florin CURTA, The Making of the Slavs: History and Archaeology of the
Lower Danube Region, C. 500–700, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
6. Jovan CVIJIĆ, Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje(The Balkan
Peninsula and the South Slavic Countries), Beograd 1987.
7. Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ, Istorija političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka (The History
of Political Thought in 19th Century Serbia), Beograd 1958.
8. Sima ĆIRKOVIĆ, Srbi među europskim narodima (Serbs Among the
European Nations), Zagreb 2008.
9. Sima ĆIRKOVIĆ – Rade MIHALJČIĆ, Enciklopedija srpske istoriografije
(The Encyclopedia of Serbian Historiography), Beograd 1997.
10. Danijel DZINO, Becoming Slav, Becoming Croat. Identity Transformation
in Post-Roman and Early Medieval Dalmatia, Brill, 2010.
58
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
11. Srećko DŽAJA, Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine.
Predemancipacijsko razdoblje, 1463–1804(Religion and Nationality in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Period Before Emancipation 1463–1804),
Mostar 1999.
12. Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ, Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije (Essays in
Recent Balkan History), Beograd, 1989.
13. Milorad EKMEČIĆ, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918, sv. I–II(The Creation
of Yugoslavia 1790–1918, vol. 1 & 2), Beograd 1989.
14. Ivo GOLDSTEIN, Hrvatska povijest(History of Croatia), Zagreb 2013.
15. Mirjana GROSS, Povijest pravaške ideologije [History of the (Party of)
Rights (i.e. Ustashi) Ideology], Zagreb 1973.
16. Mirjana GROSS, Vladavina Hrvatsko-srpske koalicije 1906–1907 (The
Government of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition 1906–1907) , Beograd
1960.
17. Historija naroda Jugoslavije, sv. I–II (History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia,
vol. 1 & 2), Beograd – Zagreb – Ljubljana 1953, 1960.
18. Egidio IVETIC, Jugoslavia sognata. Lo jugoslavismo delle
origini(Yugoslavia Dreamed. The Origins of Yugoslavism), Milano 2012.
19. Reinhart KOSELLECK, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing
History, Spacing Concepts, Stanford University Press, 2002.
20. Stipe KUTLEŠA (editor in chief), Filozofski leksikon(Philosophical
Lexicon), Zagreb 2012.
21. John LAMPE, Yugoslavia as history. Twice there was a country, Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
22. La perception d’Europe – Percepcija Europe (Perception of Europe),
Litteris, Zagreb 2009.
23. Vladimir MAŽURANIĆ, Prinosi za hrvatski pravno-povjestni rječnik
(Contributions for a Croatian Legal-Historical Dictionary), Part two: P
– Ž, Informator, Zagreb 1975. (“Slavonija”, pp. 1324–1325; “Slovênin”, pp.
1329–1330)
24. Branko NADOVEZA, Balkanski socijalisti i Balkanska federacija (Balkan
Socialists and the Balkan Federation), Beograd 1997.
25. Viktor NOVAK, Antologija jugoslovenske misli i narodnog jedinstva
1390–1930(Anthology of Yugoslav Thought and National Unity 1390–
1930), Beograd 1930.
26. Mavro ORBINI, Kraljevstvo Slavena (translated by Snježana Husić; The
Kingdom of Slavs), Zagreb 1999.
27. Latinka PEROVIĆ, O istoriografiji i istoriji levice u Srbiji (On the
Historiography and History of the Left in Serbia – http://pescanik.net/
levica-u-srbiji /26. 3. 2017./)
59
I – Manifold Yugoslavisms – How Yugoslav Nations Entered Yugoslavia
28. Branko PETRANOVIĆ, Agonija dve Jugoslavije (The Agony of Two
Yugoslavias), Beograd 1991.
29. Branko PETRANOVIĆ, Jugoslovensko iskustvo srpske nacionalne
integracije (The Yugoslav Experience of Serbian National Integration),
Beograd 1993.
30. Branko PETRANOVIĆ – Miodrag ZEČEVIĆ, Jugoslavenski federalizam.
Ideje i stvarnost (Yugoslav Federalism. Ideas and Reality), Beograd 1987.
31. Janko PLETERSKI, Nacije Jugoslavija revolucija(Nations, Yugoslavia,
Revolutions), Beograd 1985.
32. Drago ROKSANDIĆ, Etnos, konfesija, tolerancija(Etnicity, Religion,
Tolerance), Zagreb 2004.
33. Drago ROKSANDIĆ, Srbi u Hrvatskoj od 15. stoljeća do naših dana(Serbs
in Croatia from the 15th Century to the Present), Zagreb 1991.
34. Drago ROKSANDIĆ, Srpska i hrvatska povijest i ‘nova historija’(Serbian
and Croatian History and ‘New History’), Zagreb 1991.
35. Drago ROKSANDIĆ, Triplex Confinium ili o granicama i regijama
hrvatske povijesti, 1500– 1800 (Threefold Borders – On Borders and
Regions in Croatian History 1500–1800), Zagreb 2003.
36. Drago ROKSANDIĆ, Vojna Hrvatska – La Croatie militaire: Krajiško
društvo u Francuskom Carstvu (1809–1813) (Military Croatia – Krajina
Society in the French Kingdom 1809–1813), vol.. I–II, Zagreb 1988.
37. Jovan SKERLIĆ, “Istočno ili južno narečje?”, Srpski književni
glasnik(“Eastern or Southern Dialect?”, Serbian Literary Herald), no. X,
1913.
38. Petar SKOK, Etimologijski rječnik hrvatskoga ili srpskoga jezika, knjiga
treća (Etymological Dictionary of the Croatian or Serbian Language),
Zagreb 1973. (see “Slàvēn”, pp. 281–281)
39. Nikša STANČIĆ, “Jugoslavenska (jugoslovenska) i južnoslavenska
(južnoslovenska) ideja” (The Yugoslav and the South Slavic Idea), in:
Enciklopedija Jugoslavije (The Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia), vol. 6/Jap–Kat,
Zagreb 1990., pp. 128–144.
40. Đorđe STANKOVIĆ, Nikola Pašić i stvaranje jugoslovenske države (Nikola
Pasic and the Creation of the Yugoslav State), Beograd 1984.
41. Trajan STOJANOVIĆ, Balkanski svetovi: Prva i poslednja Evropa (Balkan
Worlds: First and Last Europe), Beograd 1997.
42. Holm SUNDHAUSEN, Experiment Jugoslawien. Von der Staatsgründung
bis zum Staatszerfall 1918–1991 (The Yugoslav Experiment:From the
Founding to the Collapse of the State 1918–1991), Mannheim 1993.
43. Holm SUNDHAUSEN, Istorija Srbije od 19. do 21. veka(History of Serbia
from the 19th to the 21st Century), Beograd 2008.
60
yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia yugoslavism before the creation of yugoslavia
44. Dragovan ŠEPIĆ, Italija, saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje 1914–1918 (Italy,
the Allies and the Yugoslav Question), Zagreb 1970.
45. Dragovan ŠEPIĆ, Pisma i memorandumi Frana Supila 1914–1918(Letters
and Memoranda of Frano Supilo 1914–1918), Beograd 1967.
46. Jaroslav ŠIDAK (gl. ur.), Spomenica u povodu proslave 300-godišnjice
Sveučilišta u Zagrebu (On the Ocassion of the 300th Anniversary of the
University in Zagreb), vol. I, Sveučilište u Zagrebu (University of Zagreb),
Zagreb 1969.
47. Jaroslav ŠIDAK, Studije iz hrvatske povijesti u XIX stoljeću (Studies in
Croatian History in the 19th Century), Zagreb 1973.
48. Jaroslav ŠIDAK, Studije iz hrvatske povijesti za revolucije 1848–49 (Studies
in Croatian History During the Revolution of 1848–49), Zagreb 1979.
49. Josip ŠIPUŠ, Temelj žitne trgovine (Foundations of the Wheat Trade,
edited by Ivan Erceg / translated by Mijo Lončarić), Karlovac 1993.
50. Ferdo ŠIŠIĆ, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca
1914–1919 (Documents on the Establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes 1914–1919), Zagreb 1920.
51. ***
52. “Slawentum” Slavdom, “Deutschtum” / Germanness, Germandom(http://
www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Deutschtum /4. 2. 2017./)
53. “Slaveni | Hrvatska enciklopedija”, Slavs | Croatian Encyclopedia (http://
www.enciklopedija.hr/natuknica.aspx?id=56587 /5. 2. 2017/).
61
II
Yugoslav Experience
from National
Perspectives
in permanent gap in permanent gap
The Bosniaks, the Croats and the
Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their
Experiences of Yugoslavia
in permanent
gap
HUSNIJA KAMBEROVIĆ
Now that integration into Europe is on the public agenda, the
discourse in Bosnia-Herzegovina is tending to build up a narra-
tive about Bosnia-Herzegovina that is not actually integrating but
returning to Europe from which it was “torn away” when it joined
the Yugoslav state in 1918. Similar narratives, characteristic of Cro-
atia and Slovenia, may have found their way into Bosnia-Herze-
govina too. Indeed, what happened to Bosnia-Herzegovina from
1918 up to 1992, and was it really “abducted” from Europe where,
as part of the Habsburg Monarchy, it had spent the last decades of
the 19th and first decades of the 20th century? Has Bosnia-Herze-
govina returned to the Balkans since 1918, where it had been up to
1878 and wherefrom, now in the early 21st century, it is trying to
join Europe or – in line with this new narrative – is it once again
“making a break” for it? What, in this sense, are Bosniak, Croat
and Serb experiences of Yugoslavia and what memories of Yugo-
slavia are they building in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
65
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
BETWEEN THE STATE OF SLOVENS,
CROATS AND SERBS AND THE KINGDOM
OF SLOVENS, CROATS AND SERBS
They experienced Yugoslavia differently. The Bosniaks and the
Croats joined Yugoslavia in 1918 after centuries of life in multi-eth-
nic empires. The Bosniaks experienced the Ottoman Empire as
their own, while the Croats mostly saw the Habsburg Monarchy
as best suited to their national interests as a whole. Bosnian Serbs
mostly nourished bad memories of these two empires. Hence,
Yugoslavia was for them a state best suited to their national inter-
ests in toto. These all seem to be the starting points for Bosniak,
Serbian and Croatian understanding of the very act of establish-
ment of the Yugoslav state in 1918. “A Bosniak is never satisfied with
anything. He is a threesome. What suits a Croat is unacceptable to
a Muslim or a Serb, and the other way round. The Muslims aim for
some kind of autonomy and integration into Hungary, at least most
of them do, the Serbs yearn for some kind of Serbian state, while the
Croats want to be incorporated into Croatia,” said General Stjepan
Sarkotić, head of the administration for Bosnia-Herzegovina, at an
audience with Emperor Karl in the spring of 1918.
And yet, though the true will of the people in Bosnia at the
time regarding the establishment of the state of Yugoslavia is hard
to determine, the standpoints of the political elites (or whoever
today believes that they belong to this group) about the issue can
at least be outlined.
The end of World War I left the Muslim political elite total-
ly disoriented. Although historical processes clearly indicate that
great monarchies – and thus the Habsburg Empire – were near-
ing their end, in 1917 Muslim politicians submitted to Austrian
Emperor Karl a memorandum in which they dreamed of Bosnia-
Herzegovina with a special autonomous status within the monar-
chy! At the time everyone was involved in the creation of a new
state, including a section of the Muslim youth that, under the
66
in permanent gap in permanent gap
influence of various structures from Serbia, had already joined
youth movements bent on destroying the monarchy, the great
majority of Muslim politicians looked upon the falling monarchy
as Bosnia-Herzegovina’s future! It was only in September 1918 that
they came to accept the Yugoslav idea and caught the train that
took them to the proclamation of the Yugoslav state. Having wan-
dered for a long time and been quite at a loss during World War
I and having vegetated on the political margins at the time that
the state was being created, in the autumn of 1918, this elite finally
managed to recognize the main course of history and accept the
fact that a new state had been established. According to records,
as early as spring 1918 the reis-ul-ulema Jamaluddin Čaušević, a
Muslim religious dignitary, told Dr. Anton Korošec
that he supported the establishment of a Yugoslav state, saying,
“Do whatever you have to do, and I will stand by every action that
brings freedom to our people. I am fed up with our own, Turkish
and German rule.” His views were compatible with those of Mus-
lim political leaders whom only developing circumstances pushed
onto the “Yugoslav train.” An analyst from Sarajevo is likewise on
record as writing that Muslims were somewhat anxious about
what awaited them in the new, Yugoslav state, their qualms deriv-
ing, among other things, from their traditional struggle for Bos-
nia’s autonomy throughout history – their “desperate … struggle
against the entry of foreign troops into Bosnia, as testified by the
struggle against the entry of Austrian troops in 1897.” “No wonder,
therefore, that some felt uneasy anticipating the entry of the Ser-
bian army, for they misguidedly saw it as a foreign army of occu-
pation.” Besides, the literature often quotes an argument justify-
ing Muslim fears of life in a Yugoslav state: an alleged statement by
Stojan Protić promising an easy solution to the Muslim question
saying, “Once our army has crossed the Drina river we shall give
the Turks twenty-four hours, or even forty-eight, to convert to the
faith of their ancestors. Those refusing to obey will be beheaded,
67
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
as happened in Serbia earlier.” Although proved beyond any doubt
to be a fabrication, at all crucial moments in the history of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina that statement was brought up as clear evidence
that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be, from the very
beginning of the Yugoslav state, cast in the role of poor wretches.
But the Muslim elite overcame these fears and shortly after Ser-
bian troops entered Bosnia-Herzegovina in early November 1918
honored them with a special, magnificent banquet in the Officers,
Club in Sarajevo. The guests were served “perfectly prepared dish-
es of Bosnian-Muslim cuisine.” Along with other social celebri-
ties of Sarajevo at the time, the “flower of Muslim citizenship and
intelligentsia” attended the ceremony. The Croatian political elite
in Bosnia-Herzegovina – having long dreamed of a triadic system
in the Habsburg Empire only to realize later how unrealistic that
idea had been compared to the predominant Yugoslav idea – also
joined in the process of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s unification with
the Yugoslav state. All Croatian political groups, including lead-
ing circles of the Catholic Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina, backed
the “Yugoslav solution.” Together with Serbian political represent-
atives, Croatian politicians also clearly demonstrated this support
at a meeting with Hungarian prime minister Count Istvan Tisza in
September 1918 when, in a special memorandum, they cast their
vote for Yugoslav unification. Shortly afterwards, even the Catho-
lic Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina issued a circular calling on its
believers and the priesthood to be “loyal to the new authorities”
and did not label the entry of Serbian troops into Bosnia-Herze-
govina as a form of occupation. “The people need not be afraid of
them. They should be told that this is not a hostile occupation, but
that the Serbian troops have come at the request of our authori-
ties, to put an end to plundering and other illegal acts…”
Serbian political and religious leaders were the most actively
involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s unification with Serbia. Torn
between the idea of Bosnia’s unification with Serbia in a common
68
in permanent gap in permanent gap
state and that of broader Yugoslav unification, the Serbian politi-
cal elite in Bosnia-Herzegovina preferred the latter. Serbian polit-
ical representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina had worked for the
Yugoslav Committee in London, while in Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na proper several outstanding Serbian politicians – of whom the
most active were Vojislav Šola, Šćepan Grđić and Danilo Dimović
– had endeavored to come closer to their Croatian counterparts
(Jozo Sunarić, Đuro Džamonja, Vjekoslav Jelavić and others) and
strengthen the Yugoslav movement. When their dream came true
in late 1918, the main objective of the Serbian political elite was
attained: a large state incorporating the majority of Balkan Serbs
was established. “God bless the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes,” said the Metropolitan of Sarajevo Evgenije Letica
on December 5, 1918 rejoicing at the establishment of the Yugo-
slav state.
All in all, regardless of some assistance from Serbian and Cro-
atian figures and, by the end of the process, from a small group of
Muslim politicians from the circle of Mehmed Spaho and Halid-
beg Hrasnica, both of them young and barely influential at the
time, Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a major factor in the estab-
lishment of this state in 1918. Besides, it did not join the Yugo-
slav state in 1918 in the same manner as Vojvodina and Monte-
negro, which had first united with Serbia and then with Croatia
and Slovenia. Bosnia-Herzegovina entered the Yugoslav state in a
roundabout way – through the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs
that brought together Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na. This creation, though termed “a state,” functioned in Octo-
ber and November 1918 without internationally recognized sover-
eignty and by its character was more of a provisional rather than
a real state. It had, however, functional institutions of provision-
al government, in which representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na were included. The Committee of the People’s Council of Slo-
venes, Croats and Serbs /SCS/ constituted on October 5, 1918 in
69
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Zagreb with the participation, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Ser-
bian and Croatian politicians (Danilo Dimović, Đuro Džamonja,
Kosta Majkić, Jozo Sunarić and Vojislav Šola) addressed Serbian
and Croatian leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying that Bosnia-
Herzegovina would have 18 deputies in the Plenary Council (8
Serbs, 4 Croats and 6 Muslims). Still, out of the six planned Mus-
lim members, only two were elected to the Council (Hamid Svrzo
and Mehmed Spaho). Dr. Halid-beg Hrasnica was only later add-
ed to the list.
The People’s Council of SCS for Bosnia-Herzegovina was estab-
lished in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is much controversy about
the exact date of its establishment, but what can be said with cer-
tainty is that the event took place before October 24, 1918 when the
Main Committee of the People’s Council of SCS for Bosnia-Her-
zegovina initiated the formation of territorial committees. Gligo-
rije Jeftanović was the president of the Main Committee, and Jozo
Sunarić and Halid-beg Hrasnica vice-presidents. At the sugges-
tion of the Main Committee, the Central Committee of the Peo-
ple’s Council of SCS decided on October 30, 1918 in Zagreb that
“the Presidency of the People’s Council of SCS should be in touch
(….) with the People’s Council in Sarajevo about members of the
government.” Svetozar Pribićević told the meeting of the Cen-
tral Committee that Atanasije Šola from Sarajevo had informed
him that they “were waiting for a decision by the People’s Council
before assuming power.” At a meeting on November 3, the Cen-
tral Committee discussed the issue and approved the appoint-
ment of “autonomous authorities (…) in Bosnia,” which meant
that the People’s Government for Bosnia-Herzegovina had been
formed in the meantime. Atansije Šola was at the head of the gov-
ernment made up of 11 ministries. Six members of his Cabinet
were Serbs, four were Croats and one was a Muslim. On Novem-
ber 1 the government formally assumed office in Bosnia-Herze-
govina from Stjepan Sarkotić and already on November 3 sent a
70
in permanent gap in permanent gap
special diplomatic mission to Višegrad to talk to the command-
er of the Serbian Army about the role Serbian troops should play
in the establishment of law and order in Bosnia-Herzegovina at a
time when the “old regime” was falling apart while the new one
was barely effective. On November 6, 1918 Serbian troops arrived
in Sarajevo.
It is interesting to follow the relationship between the People’s
Government for B-H and the Zagreb-seated People’s Government
of SCS. When the establishment of the Government of People’s
Council of SCS for B-H was decided, Matko Laginja, politician,
lawyer and the Council’s commissioner for Istria, argued that in
the State of SCS all institutions should comply with the Central
Government in Zagreb and, in that context, put an emphasis on
the government in B-H. “The Bosnian Government can only be a
branch office of the Central Government. No government should
be special.” Was this really the case?
When Dr. Mate Drinković, the commissioner for defense in the
People’s Government of SCS in Zagreb, delegated some of his offic-
ers to “keep law and order” in Bosnia, Sarajevo responded prompt-
ly. The meeting of the People’s Government for B-H of November
10, 1918 communicated to him that there was nothing for these
officers to do in B-H given that they (the government) had invit-
ed the Serbian Army and its commander Duke Stepa Stepanović
whose troops had already entered B-H and they had been enforc-
ing law and order. Therefore, the communication quotes, the gov-
ernment in Sarajevo is returning these officers, suggesting to the
Zagreb-seated government “to deploy them, at your convenience,
to keep law and order in Yugoslav regions in need of their servic-
es.” “Some of the officers who had come to Sarajevo at the order of
the government in Zagreb, i.e. Defense Minister Mate Drinković,
the government in Sarajevo will be put at the disposal either of
the armed forces or the commanders of the Serbian Army.” Estab-
lishment of any army whatsoever, concluded the government in
71
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Sarajevo, would be met with disapproval by the people and, there-
fore, “we deem that such an attempt should not even be made…
Serbian troops will be keeping law and order here.” In conclusion,
the communication asks the Zagreb-seated government to “seek
the consent of the People’s Government for Bosnia-Herzegovina
or at least of a member of the People’s Council in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina prior to taking such major decisions so as to avoid any
misunderstanding.”
This shows how far the government in Sarajevo relied on the
Serbian Army, although B-H entered the Yugoslav state in 1918
through the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs rather than via
direct unification with Serbia as proposed by the Serbian Gov-
ernment. The Serbian government’s plans for B-H’s direct unifi-
cation with Serbia rather than through the State of Slovenes, Cro-
ats and Serbs are substantiated in many writings as well as in the
many telegrams local authorities sent to the Serbian government
calling for direct unification with Serbia regardless of the views of
the Central Committee of the People’s Council of SCS in Zagreb.
On the grounds of these documents some researchers have argued
that the people in B-H were delighted with the arrival of Serbian
troops and prospects for unification in a Yugoslav state.
FACING NEW REALITIES
The very act of proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Cro-
ats and Slovenes on December 1, 1918 was not accompanied by
any grand manifestations of excitement by the masses in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Whether or not the common people were aware of
this piece of news also remains disputable. The fact that telegrams
advocating direct unification with Serbia were sent to Belgrade
from some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina even after December 1,
when the new state had already been proclaimed, leaves room for
various interpretations, not only of the identities of the authors
of those telegrams but also of the state of affairs in the field after
72
in permanent gap in permanent gap
unification. The common people had other worries. Serbian peas-
ants were making use of the time of instability and rather ineffi-
cient government to maltreat landowners and seize their lands,
Muslim landowners were looking for a way to protect their own
lives, while the common people were just trying to survive the
cold winter of hunger.
Still, the question of the position of some religious and eth-
nic communities, but also of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, in
the newly-formed Yugoslav state was raised. Formally, all reli-
gious communities were equal before the law. It took time, how-
ever, for that equality to prove itself in real life. Religious commu-
nities were subject to political influence throughout the life of the
First Yugoslavia, and the agrarian reforms had a greater effect on
the Islamic religious community and the Catholic rather than on
the Orthodox Church. The Orthodox Church cooperated close-
ly with the state, given that their views about the necessity of cen-
tralization coincided.
The state mainly controlled the activity of the Islamic reli-
gious community, except for the first decade when this commu-
nity retained its autonomous status from the Habsburg era. For
its part, the Islamic religious community demonstrated its loyal-
ty to the state. This was most evident in reis-ul-ulema Jamaluddin
Čaušević’s address to Regent Alexander during his visit to Saraje-
vo in 1920. “Your Royal Highness,” he said, “allow me to empha-
size in this solemn hour that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina
truly love your Royal Highness and the entire noble house of the
Karađorđević dynasty. I am obliged by my love for the homeland
to stress that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina would like to
see the noble person of Your Royal Highness as the source of their
full equality and equity!”
The attitude of the Catholic Church was approximately the
same. During the Regent’s visit in 1920 Archbishop of Saraje-
vo Ivan Šarić emphasized Bosnian Catholics’ loyalty to the new
73
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
state and their endeavor for “a wonderfully prosperous and even
more glorious Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” Neverthe-
less, regulation of the status of the Catholic Church was beset by
many problems as testified by the failed Concordat project with
the Vatican.
Though formally equal, some communities in Bosnia-Herze-
govina were faced with multiple challenges in everyday life after
the proclamation of unification. Muslim landowners were badly
affected by agrarian reforms, the Muslim and Croat populations
were subject to plunder and assaults, especially in the borderland
with Montenegro, and political elites organized in parties by reli-
gion and ethnic origin – with the exception of the Communist
Party, which prioritized social issues over religious and national
– were preoccupied with debates on the number of seats in pro-
visional representational institutions, not because they believed
that this number proved Bosnia-Herzegovina’s actual position in
Yugoslavia, but rather, as they saw it, as a way to best represent
the religious and ethnic interests of the communities they stood
for. Bosnia-Herzegovina had 42 representatives in the Provisional
People’s Representation (PNP) of the Kingdom of SCS. However,
they did not act as a single delegation advocating the interests of
B-H. Instead, they advocated the interests of the parties that had
delegated them, many of which had their seats outside Bosnia-
Herzegovina. They participated in the Yugoslav Club (members
of the Yugoslav Democratic Party and the Croatian People’s Party)
and the Radical and People’s Club (members of the Croatian Peo-
ple’s Community), but some of them were also in the Non-Parti-
san Club.
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s status in Yugoslavia was defined in the
St. Vitus Day Constitution of 1920, the declaration of which had
obtained the support of B-H political parties. The Constitution
provided centralism. The reasons why representatives of the Yugo-
slav Muslim Organization – the political party mostly standing
74
in permanent gap in permanent gap
for the social, political and religious interests of the Muslims, and
originally for federalization of the state – voted in the highly cen-
tralist Constitution as such, have been the subject of a lengthy
public debate. No doubt that one of the reasons for their support
was that the government had promised to respect the historical
borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina when organizing the administra-
tion, i.e. to protect its territorial integrity. The promise was met
under Article 135 of the Constitution but the loose wording of the
provision left room for some municipalities and even districts to
integrate with other regions if so decided by 3/5 of the vote in the
Assembly. Consequently, it happened that the Constitution and
the subsequent law on the state’s division into 33 regions – 6 of
which related to Bosnia-Herzegovina within its historical borders
– provided territorial entirety for Bosnia-Herzegovina but, at the
same time, opened the door to disintegration of that entirety. And,
indeed, this is what happened in 1929, though not through the
possibility allowed by the constitutional provision, but at the time
of dictatorship when the Constitution was suspended. This was
the first time Bosnia-Herzegovina was territorially dismembered
in the Yugoslav state and it was also the first partition in the peri-
od between the two world wars that scarred the Bosniaks’ mem-
ory of Yugoslavia as a state openly hostile to Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na. Under the law of October 3, 1929 on the state’s name and divi-
sion into administrative regions, Yugoslavia was divided into nine
banates (or, banovina) and Bosnia-Herzegovina into four (Vrbas-
ka, Drinska, Savska and Zetska banovina). Two banates out of the
four had seats outside B-H, and the Muslims were in the minor-
ity in each (the Serbs were in the majority in three banates and
the Croats in one). This fact was played on in subsequent politi-
cal activity, but also in political propaganda and publishing – even
in scholarly books – to emphasize the anti-Muslim and anti-Bos-
nian character of the state’s administrative division, and anti-Bos-
nian and anti-Muslim dimension of the new policy of integral
75
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Yugoslavianism. This division certainly signaled abolition of the
provincial specificity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, preserved for some
time after 1918. More importantly, as the border at the Drina riv-
er was annulled, the latter found itself almost in the midst of the
Drinska Banovina.
Between the two world wars, the Bosniaks were notably con-
cerned with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s specificity. Ever since the estab-
lishment of the Yugoslav state their policy was to preserve Bos-
nia-Herzegovina’s entirety and the main promoter of that policy
was the Yugoslav Muslim Organization. In the mid-1930s, follow-
ing the dictatorship (either overt or covert) the Bosniaks estab-
lished the Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
On the other hand, and in opposition to the ideas of autonomy
advocated by the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, there emerged
another movement formed by some Muslim and pro-Croatian
politicians and led by Hakija Hadžić. The Movement cooperated
with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Croats active in the Croatian People’s
Movement and its leader Vladko Maček. As Maček put it once, the
objective of his Movement was to unite Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia on “the grounds of the Croatian ethnic majority” (accord-
ing to him, Catholics and Muslims made up the Croatian com-
munity). “Should this turn out to be impossible to accomplish,
we could accept a compromise on B-H that remains as a com-
plete entity but obtains autonomy,” he said. With this blurred idea
about safeguarding Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, Maček won
over some Muslim politicians dissatisfied with Mehmed Spaho,
leader of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, for his coalition with
Milan Stojadinović in the mid-1930s. Spaho was blamed for hav-
ing renounced his party’s program for autonomy, though at the
time of dictatorship he said on several occasions that Yugoslavia
should become federalized. “Federation or separation,” he alleg-
edly told British archeologist Arthurs Evans in 1932. However, his
coalition with Stojadinović imparted fresh vigor to the Muslim
76
in permanent gap in permanent gap
branch of the Croatian Peasants’ Party (HSS) that advocated fed-
eralization as a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, but never detailing
the federal units that would make up the state.
In the late 1930s, the Bosniak leading party, the Yugoslav Mus-
lim Organization (JMO), supported Serbian-Croatian negotia-
tions on a compromise between two conflicting concepts (cen-
tralist and federalist). They did not have the remotest idea that the
establishment of the Banovina of Croatia /Banate), emerging from
partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1939, would create that com-
promise solution. The notorious Cvetković – Maček Agreement
was nourished in the memory of the Bosniaks as a perfidious Ser-
bian-Croatian pact evoking concerns for the integrity of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in the late 20th and the early 21st century.
While the Bosniaks were struggling for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
integrity and autonomy within Yugoslavia – all the time wavering
between the Serbian and Croatian confronted blocs, sometimes
siding with the former and sometimes with the latter – Croatian
and Serbian political leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina proper were
divided into those who favored Bosnia’s unification with Croa-
tia and those aiming at its unification with Serbia. Some of them,
however, stood for safeguarding Bosnia-Herzegovina’s autonomy
from Croatia and Serbia alike, as they thought it far better to have
autonomy than lose a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
WARTIME SPLITS AND POLITICAL (DIS)ORIENTATION
When World War II broke out, Bosnia-Herzegovina faced new
challenges. Against the backdrop of the Bosniak autonomy move-
ment of 1939–40 – still active though not homogeneous in practice
– and in wartime conditions that smashed the state of Yugoslavia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into the Independent State
of Croatia (NDH) in its entirety. The Drina river became the bor-
der once again. However, the division into 12 big administrative
districts – six entirely in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
77
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
six only partially – annulled its historical and political territorial
integrity. The seats of five big districts were located outside Bos-
nia-Herzegovina’s historical borders.
Establishment of the Independent State of Croatia was the out-
come of Yugoslavia’s defeat in the war, and the peoples of Bosnia-
Herzegovina had no say in the matter. Most Croats and Bosniaks
accepted and welcomed the newly-established state and even
hailed the entry of German troops, while the Serbs had many rea-
sons to distrust the NDH from the very outset.
Dissatisfied with the Cvetković – Maček Agreement and the
establishment of the Banovina of Croatia, some Muslim politi-
cians who used to form the Muslim branch of the HSS joined the
Ustasha movement upon the outbreak of war in 1941 and inte-
grated into structures of the new NDH regime. They believed that
integration of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the NDH
was more acceptable than partition, whereby a part would go to
Croatia and another remain reserved for the Serbian portion of
the Yugoslav state. Others had an eye on autonomy from the very
start and so in April 1941, their delegation, in cooperation with
some Serbian activists, urged reis-ul-ulema Fehim Spahu to initi-
ate autonomy for B-H with the German authorities within the new
world order. This attempt ended in disaster: the Serbian mem-
bers of the delegation were killed while the NDH regime strongly
cautioned Muslim members to stay away from anti-government
activity. Later on that “spark of autonomy” developed into the still
mysterious Memorandum, allegedly sent straight to Hitler in late
1942, asking for B-H autonomy from the NDH. However, all this
underlined how lost the Bosniaks were during the war, how divid-
ed and committed to various political and military formations. In
the historical arena of World War II, the Bosniak divide constitut-
ed a large spectrum ranging from loyalty to the NDH and partici-
pation in Ustasha, Domobran (homeland defenders: transl. note)
and German military formations, through activism in the troops
78
in permanent gap in permanent gap
of the “Yugoslav Army in the Homeland” and the movement for
autonomy, to struggle in the Partisan movement, which offered
a new vision of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an equal member of the
Yugoslav federation. The first signs of the Bosniaks’ shaken trust
in the NDH were already visible in the autumn of 1941 in the so-
called Muslim resolutions that indicated crisis in Bosniak circles.
When they realized that the NDH was no protection from Chetnik
pogroms, the Muslims’ trust in it began spiraling downward and
rapidly shifting to the Partisan movement.
The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina mostly welcomed the NDH
as their nation-state, especially in Western Herzegovina where
news of its establishment was met with “euphoria.” The idea of the
NDH as the final realization of the centennial dream of a Croa-
tian nation-state had been nourished for a very long time, there-
fore, it was simply referred to as “our state,” “the Croatian state,”
and the like. This was due to the Croats’ bad experience with mon-
archist Yugoslavia on the one hand and, on the other, to promis-
es about the new state being solely “Croatian and peasant,” which
were music to the ears of the peasantry making up the majority of
the B-H population, especially the peasantry in areas with a Cro-
atian majority population, such as Western Herzegovina. Experi-
ences were quite different in areas with an ethnically mixed popu-
lation. However, already during the war the idea of the NDH as a
Croatian nation-state was challenged by the realities of the crimes
committed in the name of that centennial dream. In the broad-
er context of relations between the warring parties, this was what
gradually destroyed this state and eventually wiped it out by the
end of the war. However, promoters of the idea popped up for
decades following the end of World War II.
Unlike the Croats and the Bosniaks, the Serbs in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina distrusted and opposed the NDH from the very start. As
early as April 1941. albeit still timidly at the time, they gave vent to
their feelings. Loyal to Yugoslavia on the one hand, and exposed
79
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
to legal and physical violence on the other, the Serbs refused to
recognize the NDH as a state in which they saw a future for them-
selves. They soon rose up in arms: first in June in Eastern Her-
zegovina and then, in late July, in other parts of Bosnia-Herze-
govina. In June, it was more of a spontaneous revolt against vio-
lence than anything else and the rebels were predominantly well-
off peasants, the clergy and the middle-class. The June rebellion
was mostly organized by the Communists in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina. The two movements cooperated at the beginning, but split
up over time and some of the rebels in the June rebellion joined
the Communist ranks, while others transformed themselves into
the Chetnik movement. In late 1941, the two movements became
distinct: the Partisan movement fought for a new social order,
although committing crimes in its struggle, especially against the
Muslims, while the other was barely concerned with Bosnia-Her-
zegovina and believed in a post-war revival of Yugoslavia with the
Serbs playing a leading role. As the war neared its end, the Parti-
san movement was on the up and up, among other things thanks
to recruitment of rebels who used to fight against the Partisans
and were accomplices in the crimes against the Muslims and the
Croats. This sowed the seed of Muslim and Croatian distrust in
the Partisan movement, which found notable expression in their
memorial culture in the early 1990s. The final result of World War
II in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a heavy toll in human lives: out
of 320,000 people killed, 164,000 were Serbs, 75,000 Bosniaks,
64,000 Croats and about 9,000 Jews.
All in all, World War II in Bosnia-Herzegovina was multi-lay-
ered, with everyone fighting everyone else, and “five fronts were
in confrontation – the occupying force, the Ustashas, the Chet-
niks, the Muslims and the Partisans” The occupying troops had
two wings: one in the hands of the Germans and the other of the
Italians. “Of all the countries making up the Yugoslav state, B-H
had the most complex war situation.” In the end, the Partisan
80
in permanent gap in permanent gap
movement, which after noisy and fierce debates among the Com-
munist elite opted for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s equality within the
Yugoslav federation, emerged as the winner. The debates on Bos-
nia-Herzegovina’s status in the future Yugoslav state (an autono-
mous or a federal unit) were not at all present on the scholarly and
social agenda in the aftermath of the war, even once they had been
placed on the social scene, and they were not explained adequate-
ly against the social, military and political backdrop of World War
II, but used instead as an argument for the alleged anti-Bosnian
and anti-Muslim orientation of the Partisan movement. Howev-
er, the truth is that the Communist leadership’s dilemma about
the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina derived from its commitment
to the Soviet model, according to which only ethnically pure his-
torical regions could have the status of a republic, while ethnical-
ly mixed areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina just the status of an
autonomous unit in a federation of national republics. And yet,
that dilemma was settled in 1943 and 1944 when ZAVNOBi H (the
State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina) sessions finally defined Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
federal unit, equal with other republics within the Yugoslav state.
THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIALISM
At the end of World War II in Bosnia-Herzegovina “the Serbi-
an masses were in the winning camp, the Muslims were in second
place, while the Croats occupied the back seat (…) With the lug-
gage of old legacies and new controversial tendencies Bosnia-Her-
zegovina was opening a new chapter in its history” when it had to
actually put into effect the equality it had formally obtained in the
war. It was only in the late 1960s that Bosnia-Herzegovina, faced
with the centralism of the Yugoslav state over the initial decades
of socialist Yugoslavia, realized its full equality.
Likewise, some peoples in B-H proper were challenged with
preserving the national equality that had been proclaimed in the
81
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
war. Though formally equal, though mostly on the account of
developments duringthe war,, their experience of socialist Yugo-
slavia was a different story. Some regions with a majority Croatian
population such as Western Herzegovina had been marginalized
for almost two decades. At the so-called Mostar Council in 1966,
the leadership of the B-H League of Communists raised its voice
against it, began removing the Ustasha “mortgage” from the entire
population of this region and thus launched the process of West-
ern Herzegovina’s integration into the larger B-H frame. However,
that process has been never brought to an end while marginaliza-
tion of the Croat – populated regions – evident in the aftermath of
the war – would leave resentful memories of the period of socialist
Yugoslavia in the minds of the Croats. The Croatian political elite
of the 1990s particularly insisted on those memories, emphasizing
that the Croats had been subjugated in socialist Yugoslavia. The
hardship the Croats had undergone in the aftermath of the war
and their mass migration abroad in search of work was stressed.
In the early 1970s, for instance, the Zagreb-seated Glas koncila
(Voice of the Council) magazine that was distributed through-
out B-H underlined that “one Croat in every five is away from
his homeland” and that “sad and painful is the very thought that
this flower and hope of the Croatian people has to earn his daily
bread away from our Beautiful Homeland.” The repression against
the Croats during and after the Croatian Spring of the 1970s was a
major argument used to support this thesis. One of the HDZ lead-
ers in B-H said, “We, the Croats, have definitely served our time,”
referring to many Croats who had spent years in jail at the time of
socialist Yugoslavia. The fact was that the percentage of the Cro-
ats in the population structure of B-H steadily dropped through-
out the period of socialist Yugoslavia (according to the census of
1948, the Croats made up 24% of the entire population, but only
17% in 1991), as a result of their emigration either to Croatia or
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in permanent gap in permanent gap
abroad (mostly to Germany), but also of the growth of the Mus-
lim population.
After the war not only the Croats but the Bosniaks, too, were
faced with the challenge of rounding off their national integration.
In the early 1960s, the B-H Communists initiated recognition of
the Muslim nation, which they campaigned for with scholarly
argumentation throughout the 1960s. By the end of the 1960s, the
reality of the Muslim nation was definitely recognized by the B-H
and Yugoslav Communist elites. Subsequent denials of the Mus-
lim nation, especially in the 1980s, were used to create precondi-
tions for destruction of the Yugoslav state and the integrity of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. Although in Yugoslavia the Bosniaks were fully
acknowledged as a nation, became a major cultural and social fac-
tor and expanded demographically (from 30% of the B-H popu-
lation in the 1948 census, the percentage of Bosniaks grew to 43%
in the census of 1991), in the 1990s the Bosniak political elite was
building a negative image of their experience of Yugoslavia. They
emphasized the Muslims’ subjugation in the socialist era, insisting
that that their national identity had not been recognized, that they
had not been adequately represented in the army officer corps,
in the police, etc, that they had been exposed to various waves of
violence (hardship in the aftermath of World War II and trials of
members of the Young Muslims group in 1947, 1949 and 1983, a
hard life and migration to the Sandžak and Turkey, especially in
the “Ranković era”), and the like.
The B-H Serbs emerged from the war as the greatest victims and
perceived Yugoslavia as their “ home sweet home”. Researchers
have proven that in the socialist era they had occupied key polit-
ical and social positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a long time.
The story about mass atrocities and genocide against them fanned
the flame of the Serbs’ perception of their major contribution to
the creation of the Yugoslav socialist state and their responsibil-
ity for its safekeeping. In the early 1990s, Serbian political leaders
83
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
in B-H kept reminding the people that the Serbs had suffered the
most in World War II and had been the biggest victims of the con-
flict with the Cominform, underlining that the loss of their demo-
graphic majority in B-H was a consequence of the misguided pol-
icy of the Communist elite which, having recognized the Muslims’
national identity, had ruthlessly worked against Serbian national
interests, etc.
The truth is that the percentage of Serbs in the entire popula-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina almost crumbled at the time of social-
ist Yugoslavia (from 44% of the population in 1948 it fell to 31% in
1991). Despite that fact, the majority of Serbian Communists were
devoted to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s affirmation as an equal federal
unit of Yugoslavia throughout the socialist era. What seems most
convincing is that the B-H Communist movement as a whole
was not ethnically oriented since the Communists endeavored to
affirm and develop all national identities and opposed the build-
ing of a supra-national identity that could have disturbed the eth-
nic balance – a major factor of B-H, s integrity. This was evident in
the 1960s and 1970s when some circles promoted Yugoslavianism
and Bosnianism as national identities. The Communists of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina turned down both options flat, arguing that any-
thing like that could lead towards centralization and unitarianiza-
tion of the country (Yugoslavianism) or denial of the Serbian and
Croatian national identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnianism).
The Communist movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained
loyal to a man to Yugoslavia for a very long time. Thanks to this
unity, Bosnia-Herzegovina modernized its society in the social-
ist era, made economic progress, integrated its infrastructure, set
up scientific and cultural institutions, and opened itself up to the
world. In the mid-1980s, however, serious cracks started appearing
in this unity and continued spreading and multiplying in the sec-
ond half of the decade and, finally, after much scandal and heavy
political propaganda, brought Bosnia-Herzegovina closer to the
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in permanent gap in permanent gap
bloody war of the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the Serbian political
elite was rapidly turning its eyes towards Belgrade and pinning its
hopes on survival of Yugoslavia as a safe haven for its identity. On
the other hand, by promoting the story about marginalization of
the Croats the Croatian and Bosniak elites were practically pre-
paring their compatriots for Yugoslavia’s inevitable disintegration
– which, indeed, took place soon afterwards.
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA IN YUGOSLAVIA’S FINALE
As in 1918 when the state of Yugoslavia was established, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina was no major factor whatsoever in its disinte-
gration in the 1990s. After the parliamentary elections in 1990,
national parties (the SDA, SDS and HDZ) came to power in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and differences in the way they perceived the
future of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia became evident in
almost no time. The HDZ promoted Yugoslavia as a loose fed-
eration, the SDS was opposing to the very idea and insisted on a
“democratic Yugoslavia organized as a modern state,” while the
SDA did not take a firm stand, but advocated “a modern state”
that would be neither a confederation – as the Croats wanted –
nor a federation, the Serbian concept. As the time went by, ideas
about the future constitutional status of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Yugoslavia took shape within the SDA, which eventually resulted
in the Izetbegović – Gligorov proposal for Yugoslavia as an asym-
metrical federation. When that proposal was turned down, like
the one for safeguarding a “rump” Yugoslavia that would include
neither Croatia nor Slovenia, the door opened wide to Bosnia-
Herzegovina to leave Yugoslavia. On that road, however, it had to
overcome new stumbling blocks. Non-national (left-wing) parties
were weak and only in power in Tuzla and Vareš, while the resent-
ment of the citizens in all other parts was represented by a bloc of
national parties that were already at loggerheads. This situation
led towards Bosnia-Herzegovina’s implosion. The ruling political
85
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
parties, including the SDS and HDZ, which had their sponsors in
Serbia and Croatia, could not reach agreement on a single mat-
ter of any importance. Debates in the republican assembly were
fierce, brimming with nationalistic rhetoric, even warmonger-
ing, and were often conducted in a rough and crude manner. The
strategy implemented in the field was a strategy for the breakup
of the B-H entity through so-called regionalization. In late 1991,
when the majority in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted
for independence from Yugoslavia – a vote verified in the referen-
dum of early March 1992, it became clear that the course towards
independence would be a bloody one. The SDS opposed the out-
come of the referendum on independence, mobilized the Serbs
with the idea about “remaining within Yugoslavia,” and decided
to realize its policy through war. Before war actually broke out,
with the assistance of some smaller Serbian parties (though not
supported by the Serbs active in non-national parties), the SDS
had established parallel Serbian institutions in municipalities and
but also all over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Simultaneously, the HDZ in
B-H also formed the Croatian Community (later the Republic) of
Herceg-Bosnia thus lessening the chances for the survival of B-H
as a whole outside Yugoslavia. Nonetheless,, in the situation as it
was in the early 1990s when the political actors in Bosnia-Herze-
govina stood no chance whatsoever of influencing the course of
history in any major way, by following that course Bosnia-Her-
zegovina joined the states that had become independent of Yugo-
slavia. The turnout in the referendum of February 29 – March 1,
1992 was 64% of the electorate (mostly Bosniaks and Croats) and
99% of the people who went to the polls voted for an independent
and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. On April 6, 1992, the Euro-
pean Union acknowledged an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina
and other countries followed suit. For the first time after sever-
al centuries, Bosnia-Herzegovina had the opportunity to develop
86
in permanent gap in permanent gap
its identity as a state outside other large state structures, includ-
ing Yugoslavia. It started down a road that turned out to be very
thorny.
CONCLUSION
The Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats experienced Yugoslavia differ-
ently, above all, monarchist and socialist Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Her-
zegovina did not contribute much to the creation of the Yugo-
slav state, which it joined indirectly, through the so-called State of
Slovenians, Croats and Serbs, and its Bosniak, Serbian and Cro-
atian representatives were not equally active in the process. Most
Serbs and Croats adopted the idea of a Yugoslav state relatively
early in the process but most Muslim politicians, after a long peri-
od of vacillation, only caught the “Yugoslav train” at the very end
of the war. However, once they entered Yugoslavia, they accepted
it as a state and actively participated in its constitutional structur-
ing, but were negatively affected by certain government moves,
principally the agrarian reforms. The Croats and the Serbs com-
peted against each other over organization of the state, but most
researchers claim that both Croats and Bosniaks were marginal-
ized in monarchist Yugoslavia.
The experience of socialist Yugoslavia was quite different.
Socialist Yugoslavia ensured not only formal but true equality,
especially as from the early 1960s. However, when perceived from
the angle of the country’s disintegration in the 1990s and the expe-
rience of war and hardship, socialist Yugoslavia is pictured badly,
which is then transferred into a historical experience. For exam-
ple, the level of modernization Bosnia-Herzegovina attained in
the Yugoslav state is denied. This approach, however, has noth-
ing to do with the real historical experience of the Yugoslav state,
especially of socialist Yugoslavia.
87
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Selected references
1. Neven Anđelić, Bosna i Hercegovina. Između Tita i rata (translated from
English by Ranko Mastilović), Beograd: Samizdat B92, 2005
2. Ioannis Armakolas, Politika i društvo u Tuzli od 1992. do 1995. godine.
Političko natjecanje i građanska alternativa. Sarajevo: Udruženje za
modernu historiju, 2016.
3. Ksavije Bugarel, Bosna. Anatomija rata (translated from French by Jelena
Stakić), Beograd: Edicija REČ, 2004.
4. Mari-Žanin Čalić, Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. veku (translated from German
by Ranka Gašić and Vladimir Babić), Beograd: Clio, 2013
5. Robert Donia, Radovan Karadžić. Uzroci, postanak i uspon genocida u
Bosni i Hercegovni (translated from English by Daniela Valenta), Sarajevo:
University Press, 2016
6. Srećko M. Džaja, Politička realnost jugoslavenstva (1918–1991) s posebnim
osvrtom na Bosnu i Hercegovinu (translated from German by Ladislav Z.
Fišić), Sarajevo – Zagreb: Svjetlo riječi, 2004.
7. Šaćir Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, Sarajevo: Sejtarija, 1998.
8. Zlatko Hasanbegović, Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija 1929. –
1941. ((U ratu i revoluciji 1941. – 1945.), Zagreb: Bošnjačka nacionalna
zajednica za Grad Zagreb i Zagrebačku županiju – Institut društvenih
znanosti Ivo Pilar – Medžlis Islamske zjednice u Zagrebu, 2012
9. Marko Attila Hoare, The Bosnian Muslims in the Second World War. A
History, London: Hurst&Company, 2013
10. Rasim Hurem, Bosna i Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu 1941–1945.,
Zagreb – Sarajevo: Plejada-University Press, 2016
11. Tomislav Išek, Hrvatska seljačka stranka u Bosni i Hercegovini 1929–1941.
Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 1991.
12. Adnan Jahić, Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini za vrijeme
monarhističke Jugoslavije (1918–1941), Zagreb: Bošnjačka nacionalna
zajednica za Grad Zagreb i Zagrebačku županiju – Medžlis Islamske
zajednice u Zagrebu, 2010.
13. Adnan Jahić, Vrijeme izazova. Bošnjaci u prvoj polovini XX stoljeća,
Zagreb-Sarajevo: Bošnjačka nacionalna zajednica za Grad Zagreb i
Zagrebačku županiju – Bošnjački institut Fondacija Adila Zulfikarpašića,
2014
14. Nada Kisić Kolanović, Muslimani i hrvatski nacionaizam 1941. – 1945.
Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest – Školska knjiga, 2009.
15. Husnija Kamberović, Prema modernom društvu. Bosna i Hercegovina od
1945. do 1953, Tešanj 2000.
88
in permanent gap in permanent gap
16. Husnija Kamberović, Hod po trnju. Iz bosanskohercegovačke historije 20.
stoljeća. Sarajevo: Institutu za istoriju, 2011
17. Husnija Kamberović, Džemal Bijedić. Politička biografija (drugo,
dopunjeno izdanje). Sarajevo: Udruženje za modernu historiju, 2017
18. Vera Katz, Društveni i ekonomski razvoj Bosne i Hercegovine 1945. – 1953.
Sarajevo: Institut za Istoriju, 2011
19. Iva Lučić, Im Namen der Nation. Die politische Aufwertungsprozess der
Muslime im sozialistischen Jugoslawien (1956–1971). Uppsala: Uppsala
Universitet, 2016.
20. Admir Mulaosmanović, Iskušenje opstanka. Izetbegovićevih deset godina
1990–2000, Sarajevo: Dobra knjiga. 2013.
21. Enver Redžić, Bosna i Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu, Sarajevo:
Oko, 1998
22. Ciril Ribičič, Geneza jedne zablude. Ustavnopravna analiza formiranja
i djelovanja Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosne, drugo izdanje, Zagreb-
Sarajevo-Idrija:Naklada Jesenski i Turk-Sejtarija-Založba Bogataj, 2001
23. Ivica Šarac, Kultura selektivnog sjećanja. Hrvati Hercegovine i Nezavisna
Država Hrvatska. Od proklamacije NDH do talijanske reokupacije
(travanja-rujan 1941), Mostar: Crkva na kamenu, 2012
24. Nusret Šehić, Bosna i Hercegovina 1918–1925. Privredni i politički razvoj,
Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 1991.
25. Holm Zundhausen, Istorija Srbije od 19. do 21. veka.(translated from
German by Tomislav Bekić), Beograd: Clio, 2008.
89
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Montenegro and the Montenegrins in the Yugoslavia
statehood loss
and its renewal
ŠERBO RASTODER
Montenegro in the 20th century is an example of “accelerated
history” in which the dynamics of change and the complexity of
historical occurrences accentuated the phenomenology of its his-
tory and its largely ideologically biased perception. In the 20th
century, Montenegro had been an independent state until 1918;
an integral part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–1943); one of
the six socialist republics in socialist Yugoslavia (1943–1992); and
a member state of the two-state Yugoslav federation (FRY) 1992–
2006. At the referendum of May 21,2006 Montenegro renewed its
statehood and once again became an agent in its own right in Bal-
kan and European history. It looked as if Montenegro had “spent”
an entire century running around in a circle looking for itself. Cru-
cified between the myth of its own historical significance and its
objective importance as measured by statistics and hard pragma-
tism Montenegro had always strived to outdo itself. This is why,
in the historical sense, it is a place of extremes and contradictions
that are difficult to reconcile. In that kingdom of illusions mod-
ern ideologies supplanted the old in an attempt to “bury” them,
90
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
just as the “old”, for which many had thought they were already
only a part of historical archives, kept resurrecting themselves. In
the 20th century the conflict between the traditional and patriar-
chal and the modern also determined the dramatic social changes
that appeared on the surface to be the surrogates of different ide-
ologies. In the 20th century, Montenegro had gone through four
wars, two of them world wars. At the end of World War I it had
lost its statehood, and at the end of World War II it had partially
restored the attributes of statehood. At the end of the 20th centu-
ry, in the break-up of Yugoslavia, Montenegrin society was con-
fronted with a new historical challenge and with the re-emergence
of old historical redundancies. Although it was not, as an inde-
pendent political agent, a direct participant in the wars marking
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the consequences of events
of the last decade of the 20th century, excluding the fact that on its
territory there were no direct hostilities, were equally as dramatic
for Montenegrin society as the previous wars.
THE FIRST WORLD WAR: THE SMALLEST ALLIED ARMY
During World War I, 1914–1918, Montenegro fought on the side
of the Triple Entente forces. In the July 1914 crisis, triggered by the
assassination in Sarajevo of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Ferdi-
nand, Montenegro unconditionally sided with Serbia. The same
day the Austro-Hungarians declared war on Serbia, King Nicholas
issued a decree on mobilization and by August 6 Montenegro had
already officially declared war against Austro-Hungary, ignoring
the promise made by the empire’s diplomats that in the case of
neutrality it could count on territorial concessions (Skadar). Hav-
ing just emerged from the Balkan Wars in which its demograph-
ic, economic and military resources had been depleted, Montene-
gro entered into a new military conflict, which will prove to be its
last as an independent state. At the insistence of its allies, above
all Russia, a high command was established at the very outset of
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
the war to coordinate military operations with the Serbian mili-
tary. Serbian general Božidar Janković was appointed head of the
general staff of the Montenegrin High Command, placing the
Montenegrin Army under the command of the Serbian military.
With Serbian officers having taken up key command positions,
the Montenegrin Army was used in accordance with the strate-
gic interests of Serbia and by the orders of the Serbian High Com-
mand – which had detrimental effects on the Montenegrin mili-
tary and Montenegro as a whole.
The great offensive against Serbia, beginning in October 1915,
and the suppression of its military to the south also meant the
beginning of hostilities in the Montenegrin theatre of war. The
Serbian Army was in retreat along three lines, of which the Pec-
Andrijevica-Podgorica-Skadar-Ljes (Medua) line was closest to
the operations of the Montenegrin Army and directly dependent
on its performance. In its retreat the Serbian government arrived
at Skadar on November 26, 1915 and its High Command followed
ten days later. The Montenegrin National Assembly had last con-
vened on December 25, 1915, determined to do the same as Serbia.
But there was no one to protect the Montenegrin retreat. Securing
the withdrawal of the Serbian Army and protecting it from enemy
incursions across Sandžak, Herzegovina and the bay and littoral
of Kotor. The Montenegrins had been left all alone in the Balkan
war theatre. Even though the smallest and the weakest of the allies,
Montenegro had been given the role of last defense. Barely 40,000
Montenegrin soldiers were given the impossible task of defend-
ing a front line some 500 kilometers long. The pleas made by King
Nicholas and the Montenegrin government to the Allies for help
in men, food, munitions and supplies turned out to be futile. The
Allies were only prepared to fight for the “common good” to the
last Montenegrin soldier. In the famous Battle of Mojkovac, which
took place on January 6 and 7, 1916, the Austro-Hungarian Army
had been stopped. The Montenegrin victory at Mojkovac would
92
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
go on to become unique, among other things because it is a rare
example in history of an army that went on to capitulate practical-
ly only days after a great victory – because the main thrust of the
attack by the Austro-Hungarian Army had been directed towards
Mt. Lovčen, defended by meager forces. By January 11, 1916, the
Austro-Hungarian Army had taken over all strategic points on the
Lovčen mountain massif on January 13 it entered undefended Cet-
inje, and by January 15it had full control of the city and surround-
ing territory. At the order of the Serbian government, Serbian offic-
ers withdrew from Montenegro. Likewise, King Nicholas started to
retreat with a part of the government, appointing beforehand gen-
eral Janko Vukotić head of the High Command to replace the Ser-
bian officers who had left. By January 21, Skadar had been taken by
the Austro-Hungarians and the expected defense along the river
Bojana and around Skadar had been abandoned. All lines of retreat
for the Montenegrin Army had been cut off. A document on the
surrender of arms was signed on January 25, 1916 and Montene-
gro had in reality capitulated, although a formal document by that
name had never been signed. The causes of its capitulation became
the subject of heated political and propaganda disputes within its
state leadership. All the while no one thought of posing the logi-
cal question: was it truly realistic to expect of the smallest Allied
army, abandoned and alone in the entire Balkan theater of war,
devoid of assistance from its allies, stretched thin on a 500 kilome-
ter front line, and surrounded on several fronts, to stop an armada
which could not be stopped even by armies 20 times the size of the
Montenegrin Army? In any case, the consequences of the improv-
ident policies of the Montenegrin state leadership and its sover-
eign, King Nicholas, would prove to be catastrophic for Montene-
gro. For by that time already, the question of the future of Monte-
negro and its prospective unification with Serbia had been opened,
an issue that was also supported by some of the great Allied pow-
ers. Russia wanted the unification of Montenegro and Serbia under
93
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
the Karađorđević dynasty and the creation of a great Serbian state
in the Balkans that would underpin its policies in the region. This
is why in 1916 Russia cut off its aid to Montenegro and reject-
ed the possibility of King Nicholas coming to Russia. Suspected
of secret negotiations with Austria-Hungary and blamed for the
capitulation of Montenegro, King Nicholas and the circles around
him would not enjoy the unconditional support of the other Allies
either – France, Great Britain, or even Italy. That Montenegro had
been “sacrificed” by the Allies had already become clear towards
the end of the war. Instead of returning, like King Peter I of Ser-
bia, to his country as one of the allies, King Nicholas had practical-
ly been barred from returning from France, where, in Neuilly-sur-
Seine near Paris, his court and government had been staying. After
the breakthrough of the Salonika Front (i.e. Macedonian Front –
trans.), and after the Allied conference in Versailles on 7 October
1918, a decision was made for Allied forces tooccupy Montenegro.
Sidestepping all agreements, the French tacitly allowed the partic-
ipation of Serbian troops in these operations, with clear political
objectives that had been shared with the Serbian Command. In
any case, military reasons were not crucial in making this decision
because immediately after the Salonika Front breakthrough, Mon-
tenegrin irregulars (known as comes or komiti – trans.) and insur-
gents had liberated Montenegro from Austro-Hungarian occupa-
tion. Only in the fighting for the liberation of Podgorica did units
of the Serbian Army come to the aid of Montenegrin irregulars and
insurgents. By order of the Serbian High Command of October25,
1918, Montenegrin insurgent troops were disbanded, and the same
fate befell the Montenegrin irregulars by an order of November 12,
1918. Thus the end of the war saw Montenegro occupied by Allied
forces, that is, by French, British, Italian, American and Serbian
troops. A joint command of the Allied forces was formed in Kotor,
headed by a French general. The first to withdraw from Montene-
grin territory were the British (April 1919), followed by the French
94
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
(by March 1920) and the Italians (by June 1920). In the meantime,
Serbian troops were rebranded into the Yugoslav Army and as a
legalized military force stayed in Montenegro. The Allied forces
had not fulfilled the main mandate with which they had entered
Montenegro. Instead of restoring order and peace – which, by the
way, no one had brought into jeopardy in the first place – they left
Montenegro in a state of civil war.
Later reckoning would show that in World War I Montene-
gro had lost some 20,000 soldiers. Some 15,000 Montenegrins
had gone through concentration camps in Austria, Hungary and
Albania. Material damages and losses from the war were an esti-
mated 723 million francs – the amount presented for war repa-
rations at the Paris Peace Conference. Additionally, Montenegro
was left without its own state, as well as without the oldest ruling
dynasty (the Petrovićs) in the Balkans, which had governed Mon-
tenegro for 221 years.
UNIFICATION WITH SERBIA AND ENTERING THE
KINGDOM OF SLOVENS, CROATS AND SERBS
In 1918, together with the Serbian Army, came politicians in
charge of implementing the policy of “unification of Montenegro
with Serbia”. Immediately upon the arrival of Serbian troops on
Montenegrin soil, they formed the Provisional Central Executive
Committee for the Unification of Serbia and Montenegro, which act-
ed under the instructions of the Serbian government. The policy
of the Serbian primeminister, Nikola Pašić, was motivated by the
need to present the work on unification as the will of the Monte-
negrin people and thus reduce the possibility of foreign meddling
given that Montenegro was an internationally recognized state
and a formal ally. It was thus necessary to confer formal legitima-
cy to the four-member Provisional Committee, consisting of two
Serbian and two Montenegrin citizens. That Committee had real-
ly usurped the powers of Montenegro’s legislative and executive
95
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
bodies. At a meeting in Berane on October 25, 1918, the Com-
mittee proscribed “Rules for Electing National Representatives to
the Great National Assembly.” A deadline of seven days was given
for “holding assemblies and electing” representatives, and in some
places, like Cetinje, this was reduced to three days. The “elector-
al” process was managed by the Central Executive Committee via
its commissioners and representatives, who convened assemblies
and meetings and determined the results of the election. The Ser-
bian Army had orders to “energetically pursue and by all available
means suppress any agitation, regardless of theorigin, on the terri-
tory occupied by our forces”. At the same time, the Serbian High
Command issued orders to its headquarters in Sarajevo, Zagreb
and Belgrade to prevent the return of respectable Montenegrin
concentration camp internees until the “issue of unification was
settled”. And since a large part of the Montenegrin military and
political elite were internees, it is easy to comprehend the signif-
icance and consequences of such a decision. In such conditions,
165 representatives (MPs) were “elected” by acclamation during
the “likeminded assemblies”. The Great National Assembly was in
session from November 11–16, 1918 in Podgorica (and was known
as the Podgorica Assembly). The main decision was adopted at its
2nd regular session on November 13, 1918. The assembly repre-
sentatives adopted, without a debate, by acclamation, the prede-
termined text of the Decision and later signed it. The decisions of
the Podgorica Assembly were not recognized by any of the Great
Powers. On December 28, 1918 Serbia officially severed diplomatic
ties with Montenegro – practically a month after the decision on
unconditional unification had been adopted. With these decisions
of the Podgorica Assembly, Montenegro de facto ceased to exist.
Both internationally and domestically the process of its “burial”
was totake time, but in the end this fait accompli policy paid off.
The mood in favor of unification and the creation of a Yugo-
slav state was ubiquitous and had a tangible manifest character in
96
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
Montenegro. The dispute was brought about over the issue of how
to implement unification with Serbia and the other Yugoslav terri-
tories, that is, how to be an equitable partner in the creation of the
Yugoslav state. Some were in favor of the unification being imple-
mented on an equal footing and that it should be decided upon
by the legal representatives of Montenegro: the king, the govern-
ment and the National Assembly. Others had accepted the con-
cept of (Serbian prime minister) Nikola Pašić and the Serbian gov-
ernment that Montenegro should first unite with Serbia through
a unification of their essentially one (“Serbian”) nation under the
Karađorđević dynasty and then, thus unified, enter a joint Yugo-
slav state. Dissatisfied with the decisions of the Podgorica Assem-
bly, the conduct of the authorities and the policy of the unifier (Ser-
bia) – which was directed at the belittling of everything with the
prefix ‘Montenegrin’ or the Petrović dynasty – but also dissatisfied
with the dire socio-economic conditions, the opponents of this de
facto annexation started preparations for an uprising. The plan of
the uprising was discovered beforehand and a few days ahead of its
occurrence 125 of its more prominent members were arrested. Nev-
ertheless, on December 21, 1918, the rebels surrounded the major
towns and cities in Montenegro. The headquarters of the rebels was
in the vicinity of Cetinje, from where on December 22 they issued
their Demands to General Venel, commander of the Allied troops
(formally the main military authority in Montenegro), as well as to
the Executive National Committee, the provisional “government”
of the Podgorica Assembly, in which, among other things, they
stated: “1. We all agree that Montenegro should, under equal rights
with the other territories, enter into one great Yugoslav state devoid of
all internal political borders – and we leave the decision of the politi-
cal order to be legally resolved by the regularly elected assembly of all
(constituent) Yugoslavs, and we will wholeheartedly abide by it.”
Conflict broke out on December 24,1918 in the morning
when the rebels tried to enter Cetinje and the Serbian Army and
97
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
supporters of the annexation fired at them. The hostilities end-
ed at the intervention of Allied commander General Venel who
demanded the rebels surrender their arms and return home. Some
of the rebels fled to the Bay of Kotor and Bar, whence the Italians
moved them first to the Albanian port of Shengjin (It: San Gio-
vanni di Medua – trans.), and then further on to Italy, while a con-
siderable number of the rebels went underground ‘into the for-
est’. The Christmas Uprising of 1918 had been quelled for a while,
but resistance to the annexation wouldcontinue until 1924. The
uprising had turned the attention of the Paris Peace Conference
towards Montenegro, an effect thathad been one of the objectives
of the rebels, but it also initiated a long-term struggle between
the supporters and the opponents of unconditional unification.
Mobile units of the irregulars (the comes – trans.) began a guerril-
la struggle – supported by the local population – and persisted in
spite of repression from the authorities during frequent punitive
expeditions. The largest organized military campaign against the
rebels in Montenegro was conducted in December 1919 and in Jan-
uary and February of 1920. At the order of high military and state
bodies, which had estimated that there were at the time some 900
rebels at large in the Montenegrin countryside, the region of the
(Yugoslav) Zeta division militarily covering Montenegro had been
divided into 14 smaller areas from which simultaneous incursions
against the rebels began, coupled with the arrest and detention of
their family members and all who directly or indirectly aided the
rebels. In this campaign alone 22 rebels were killed, some 599 were
arrested or forced to surrender, together with 138 renegade sol-
diers – all in all 757 individuals. From 1920 to 1927 warrants with
rewards for the arrest or liquidation of the rebels were issued. The
estimate for the total number of rebels arrested, detained, con-
victed or killed in these conflicts mounts to five thousand. Many
houses were torched and great material damage was done. Many
rebels and their families, confidants and supporters were brought
98
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
to trial. A number of them were amnestied by the decrees of King
Alexander on November 28, 1920. A number of them were also
pardoned in 1925, so that at the beginning of 1928 there were still
some 120 Montenegrin irregulars and opponents of unconditional
unification in prisons in Podgorica, Mitrovica and Zenica.
Refugee rebels and a sizable number of Montenegrin émi-
grés gathered around the Montenegrin government and court
in exile led desperate diplomatic and military battles in order to
annul the decisions of the Podgorica Assembly. After the deci-
sions of the Podgorica Assembly and the beginning of the upris-
ing in Montenegro, the Montenegrin Army in exile was founded
with the support of Italy and with the objective that it should be
used for incursions into Montenegro and in assisting with annul-
ment of the decisions made by the Podgorica Assembly and the
return of King Nicholas to the country. On the basis of an April
1919 convention between the Montenegrin and the Italian govern-
ments, Italy provided for the support of Montenegrin soldiers sta-
tioned in Gaeta, a small town between Rome and Naples on the
shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea. The Montenegrin Army in Italy at
full capacity numbered four battalions, a special artillery unit in
Font d’Amore, and a National Guard. At the beginning of 1921 it
numbered 1,559 soldiers, not counting family members who also
lived as émigrés. Italy used this army as a way of blackmailing the
Yugoslav state regarding territorial disputes. Had Italy been sin-
cere about its support for the Montenegrin émigrés it probably
would not have lodged the army on the shores of the Tyrrhenian
but on the opposite shore of the Adriatic Sea – closer to the Mon-
tenegrin shore. This became clear in November 1920 when Ita-
ly signed the Rapallo Treatywith the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes resolving the territorial disputes. By December 1920
the Italian War Ministry issued orders banning further entryof
Montenegrin émigrés. In March 1921 the Montenegrin Army was
disarmed and its battalions relocated. The soldiers were offered a
99
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
return passage to their country. Those who refused were incarcer-
ated. The greatest number of soldiers expressed a desire to emi-
grate to Russia or the United States. Italy rejected requests for pas-
sage to Russia. The position of the remaining Montenegrin sol-
diers improved for a short period after the fall of the Giolitti cab-
inet (July 1921), together with the departure of foreign minister
Count Sforza, who was considered by Montenegrin émigrés to be
their main opponent and the man secretly negotiating with (Ser-
bian prime minister) Pašić on disbanding the Montenegrin Army.
Italy formally cut off its support to the Montenegrin Army on
June 1, 1921. The largest number of émigrés returned to Montene-
gro. A number of them left for Argentina and the United States,
while others, in an attempt to reach Russia, were still wondering
through Turkey and other countries as late as 1923, and yet oth-
ers traveled to Belgium and other European countries. Very few
remained in Italy and with Mussolini’s ascent to power they were
dispelled altogether. During the whole period between 1918 and
1924, the Montenegrin émigrés tried to draw attention of Europe-
an diplomacy and the public to the Montenegrin issue. The state-
ment by Lord Gladstone, son of the famous William Ewart Glad-
stone, an old friend of Montenegro, made in the House of Lords
on March 11, 1920, that “Montenegro would not have been treat-
ed worse if it had fought on the side of our enemies” was possi-
bly the most indicative assessment at the time of the behavior of
European diplomacy towards the Montenegro issue. In a situation
in which the Great Powers fully supported the idea of the crea-
tion of a Yugoslav state on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire, the
essence was more important than the form, the objective more
important than the procedure, and expedience overruled justice.
Serbia had become the backbone of French policy in the Balkans,
and the Yugoslav state the project of Versailles Europe. There
was no place for Montenegro in this situation. It was too small
to become an alternative to the Yugoslav project. Therefore, the
100
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
main concern of European diplomats was how to satisfy the form
and bring the “burial” of Montenegro to its conclusion. The emp-
ty seat with the sign “Montenegro” at the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919, as well as the formal protocol reception of the Montene-
grin government-in-exile delegation (consisting of General Ante
Gvozdenović, prime minister Jovan Plamenac and Dr. Pero Soc)
by the High Council of the Paris Peace Conference in March 1919,
were all just courteous responses to the numerous appeals, memo-
randums and letters sent by the Montenegrin émigrés, more a part
of the political folklore in which the Montenegrin issue was posed
before European diplomats at the end of World War I as a matter
of a mere formal dilemma of justice and equity.
From 1918 to 1943 Montenegro was part of the centrally organ-
ized Yugoslav state. According to the administrative division from
April 1922, according to which the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes was divided into 33 regions, a part of the territory of the
former Kingdom of Montenegro became part of the Zeta region
with the capital in Cetinje. The former districts of Bjelopolje and
Pljevlja became a part of the Užice region. In the later administra-
tive division of the country into banates (banovina – trans.) from
1929, when the Yugoslav state was divided into nine banates, Mon-
tenegro became a part of the Zeta banate.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE IN THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA
In the period from 1918 to 1941 Montenegro was an agricultural-
ly underdeveloped region in which small landownership was dom-
inant. It was isolated by way of communication, without connec-
tions to its hinterland, and culturally backward with a high per-
centage of the population being illiterate. According to census data
from 1921, the agrarian population made-up 85.3% of the over-
all population; ten years later it was down to 79.1% – which was
above the Yugoslav average that in 1921 amounted to 78.9% and
in 1931 76.5%. Only Bosnia-Herzegovina had a higher percentage
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of agrarian population – by some 3.3%, while Slovenia was low-
er by 18.8% Because of isolated communications, products that
were in demand were some of the most expensive in the country,
while market surplus, consisting mainly of livestock products, was
sold at dumping prices. In such conditions farm villages became
impoverished, farmers were in debt, and famine was a pervasive
occurrence. The Montenegrin farmer, tied to the local market, suf-
fered the negative consequences of the advance of industrial pro-
duction, which was eroding the traditional manufacturing crafts
and accelerating the decline of old patriarchal cooperatives. The
underdeveloped market forced the farmer to pay higher prices
for goods in demand and sell his surplus at lower prices. Assess-
ments right after 1918 were that over 150,000people in Montene-
gro were without any means of livelihood – mainly because of the
war in which the majority of the labor force was interned and the
land left uncultivated due to war devastation and requisitions. The
years 1927 and 1928 were exceptionally difficult since a longstand-
ing drought destroyed even the potato crop and cases of starvation
were recorded. The situation was again similar in 1935–36 when
famine spread to all districts in Montenegro. In order to survive,
or make it possible for their children to escape poverty through
education, the farmer would borrow from the bank, or more fre-
quently, from individuals (merchants, pensioners, teachers, priests,
clerks). In time the indebtedness of farmers became a dramat-
ic social problem. According to assessments made by appropriate
institutions, the overall farmer debt in Montenegro came to 496
million dinars, or 7.1% of the overall agrarian debt in Yugoslavia,
while the share of Montenegrin agriculture was only 0.30%of all
Yugoslav crop production or just 1.44% of all livestock production.
A special problem was the fact that 2/3 of all (farmers’) debt was in
the hands of local loan sharks (given as IOUs, by word of honor).
For the state, such a debt was legally nonexistent. In 1936, the Yugo-
slav state enacted a decree liquidating all farmers’ debt. The said
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statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
trends accelerated the process of eroding the village economy and
contributed to transforming farmers into the proletariat. Thus, for
example, in 1935, 70% of homesteads put up for auction were left in
the hands of the banks since no one could buy them.
The value of per capita industrial production was only 15.5% of
the Yugoslav average and was similar to that of Macedonia, and
way below those in Bosnia-Herzegovina (59.5%), Serbia (73.5%),
Croatia (138%) and Slovenia (290%). These parameters indicate a
value that was up to 25 times less than the percentage participation
of the Montenegrin population in the overall Yugoslav population
and hence comes as no surprise that the Montenegrin national
income was only 31% of the average Yugoslav income. Montenegro
lagged behind Slovenia, which was the most developed, by over 22
times. Montenegro expected that the Yugoslav state would assist
its economic development and enable a more productive use of its
natural resources. As capital was distributed in accordance with
political power and influence, economic and social circumstances
changed very slowly in Montenegro since in a centrally organized
state its influence was bound to remain minimal or even negligible.
In 1921, the illiteracy rate in Montenegro was about 67%, while
ten years later it was reduced to 56.1%, of which 34.2% were male
and 77.3% female. After 1918, the Serbian school curriculum from
1899 was introduced into Montenegrin schools. Simultaneously,
the Serbian 1904 Education Law was implemented in Montenegrin
schools up until the (Yugoslav) unification of school legislation in
December 1929 when unified curricula plans and programs were
introduced for the whole country. Subject matter tied to the his-
tory of Montenegro and the Petrović dynasty was dropped from
these programs as they were generally bent on eradicating every-
thing that was connected to the state and historical specificity of
Montenegro.
Political life in Montenegro between 1918 and 1941 was marked
by the founding of new political parties, harsh parliamentary and
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extra-parliamentary clashes, numerous victims of political con-
flicts, the politicization of society and a social rhetoric, which
ranged from despair to illusion. In a centrally organized state, the
influence of Montenegro was reduced to a statistical error in the
process of adopting decisions at the level of Yugoslavia. From sev-
en to thirteen Yugoslav parliamentary representatives were elect-
ed from Montenegrin territory, frequently dividedup into sev-
eral mutually opposed parties. In the Yugoslav Assembly, which
numbered anywhere from 419 to 319 representatives, Montene-
grin MPs, even if they had all been from the same party, made-
up such a minority that they had no influence whatsoever on the
decision – making process. The fact that in 39 Yugoslav govern-
ments in the period between the two World Wars, in which there
were altogether 819 ministerial portfolios, only five were ministers
from Montenegro, who had been active for less than an average
mandate of a government, is fairly indicative. In the period before
the introduction of dictatorship in 1929, four parliamentary elec-
tions were held in the Yugoslav state (1920, 1923, 1925, 1927). The
general characteristic of parliamentary life in the electoral district
of Montenegro before the dictatorship of 6 January was that the
parties in power (the Radicals and Democrats, in coalition or sep-
arately) could never gain a majority. The introduction of dictator-
ship did not meetwith resistance either in Montenegro or in oth-
er parts of Yugoslavia. The first to feel the repression of the dic-
tatorship were the Communists. Some 100 members and sympa-
thizers of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) were arrested
in Montenegro, including some high-ranking party officials. They
were convicted and handed down long-term sentences, while oth-
ers immigrated to the Soviet Union. In the country, the center of
resistance to dictatorship was at Belgrade University. The resur-
gence of political life during the dictatorship came after the organ-
ization of “elections” on November8, 1931, in which only the pro-
government, pro-dictatorship party participated – known first as
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statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
the Yugoslav Radical Farmer’s Democracy Party (JRSD), and then
changing its name to the Yugoslav National Party (JNS) in 1933. In
Montenegro this regime party of the “6 January dictatorship” was
joined mainly by high-ranking party officials of the Radical and
Democratic parties and by individuals who supported the dicta-
torship. The party acted with support from the government and
up to the time of King Alexander’s death (1934) it was the political
backbone of the dictatorship.
The three most influential opposition groups (Democrats,
Farmers and Federalists) renewed their political activities on the
eve of the May 1935 elections. From 1933 onwards the Commu-
nist Party advocated cooperation with other opposition parties
but as yet still lacked the influence to make itself politically effec-
tive. In a situation in which objectively there was no possibility
of resolving even a single issue of concern for Montenegro, an
increasing number of malcontents were joining the Communists
and their ideology of toppling the existing order. In brutal raids
and reprisals in March 1936over 230 Communists from Monte-
negro were arrested. The fierceness of the political clashes and the
terror that reigned in Montenegro is convincingly borne out by
the fact that in the period from 1936 to 1938 alone 11 people were
killed and over 40 were wounded in political violence. The num-
ber of those killed, arrested, detained and put on trial in Monte-
negro in the period from 1918 to 1941 was, percentage-wise, sever-
al dozen times greater per population than in any other region of
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Instead of being one of the expected
“backbones” of the Yugoslav state, in this period Montenegro was
one of its most turbulent regions.
INTERNAL SCHISMS IN WORLD WAR II
In World War II from 1941 to 1945 Montenegro shared the fate
of the Yugoslav state. Montenegro was occupied by Italian troops,
which entered its territory on the same day that the Kingdom of
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Yugoslavia capitulated (17 April 1941). The High Civilian Com-
missariat was established, representing the highest occupation-
al authority until the uprising of 13 July 1941, when military rule
through the Military Governorship was introduced. The territory
of present-day Montenegro was splintered so that the region of the
Bay of Kotor was annexed to Italy as a separate province within
the Dalmatian Governorship (by a decree on May 20, 1941), while
the region along the Montenegro-Albania border was annexed to
so-called Greater Albania, an entity created under the Italian pro-
tectorate which also encompassed the larger part of Kosovo and
Metohia, a part of western Macedonia, and Albania proper. On
the remaining part of Montenegrin territory the fascists, support-
ed by a faction of the Montenegrin (Federalist) Party, tried to rees-
tablish the independent state of Montenegro.
Expectations harbored by a part of the Montenegrin Federal-
ists (pro-independence party – trans.) that they could establish
a Montenegro within the boundariesof 1914, or a Greater Mon-
tenegro from the Neretva River to Mat, along with Metohija and
Sandžak and the proclamation of Mihailo Petrović as king, melted
away in the pragmatism of the occupying forces and the refusal of
the grandson of King Nicholas to accept the throne under Italian
occupation. The state boundaries of “independent Montenegro”
were determined in Rome and reduced to the area not annexed
by Italy or incorporated into Albania. The role of film extras,
directed by Italy, Montenegrin Federalists also suffered because
of the fact that the declaration, adopted by acclamation by the
“assembly” convened on July 12 (Petrovdan Assembly), was writ-
ten in Rome. The delegates adopted the declaration by acclama-
tion, ostensibly annulling the decisions of the Podgorica Assem-
bly from 1918 and thus repealing the regime of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia and also dissolving the Yugoslav constitution, while
proclaiming Montenegro a “sovereign and independent state” in
the form of a constitutional monarchy. The idea of renewing the
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statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
Montenegrin state had been politically compromised as a result
of the occupation by fascist Italy and its existence confined to the
length of that occupation. The general popular uprising (of July 13,
1941 – trans.) made the effects of the Petrovdan Assembly redun-
dant and intimated a completely different direction for resolv-
ing the issue of Montenegro’s status. Namely, from the middle of
the 1930s the communist movement in Montenegro grew steadi-
ly in strength as it had been renewed generationally and organiza-
tionally and it flourished mainly amongst the younger generation
of intellectuals, students of Belgrade and other universities. Ger-
many’s attack on the Soviet Union (June22, 1941) accelerated the
decision to stage the uprising in keeping with so-called commu-
nist internationalism, which obligated members towards solidari-
ty and struggle against a common enemy. By June 27, 1941the mil-
itary leadership of the uprising had been formed – the so-called
General Headquarters of the Partisan National Liberation Forces
of Yugoslavia (NOB POJ), headed by Tito. The decision on hold-
ing the uprising was itself brought by the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CK KPJ) at a
session on July 4, 1941 in Belgrade. Milovan Đilas, a member of
the CK KPJ Politburo from Montenegro, was sent to Montenegro
with directives to initiate the uprising. The uprising, beginning on
July 13,1941 turned into a mass supported, general uprising. The
massive response surprised both the organizers and the occupi-
ers, considering that the Italian occupation was one of the mildest
occupation regimes at the time in Europe. Estimates are that by
July 20, 1941 there were some 32,000 armed fighters on the side of
the uprising. With the exception of a few larger cities, the whole of
Montenegro was liberated within 10 days. In its scope and massive
character, it was the largest uprising by a nation in the whole of
occupied Europe. From the military-strategic point of view, also
in terms of its scope, response and speed of organization the Mon-
tenegrin uprising of July 13,1941 had no precedent either in the
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Yugoslav or the European theater of war at the time. In the fall of
1941 the fighters of the uprising were already reorganized into ter-
ritorial units, mobile Partisan units under the command of the
General Headquarters of the National Liberation Forces (NOP) for
Montenegro and the Bay of Kotor established on October 20, 1941.
The uncompromising struggle against the occupation forces and
their collaborators during the entire length of the war, coupled
with revolutionary enthusiasm that excluded every possibility of
renewing the old regime and form of state organization, clearly
demonstrated by the setting-up of new authorities of government
on liberated territories, established the Partisans as the “main ene-
my” not only of the occupiers, but also of all domicile collabora-
tor forces and quisling regimes that had emerged from different
ideologies. In time the Partisan movement under Tito’s leadership
grew into a wide movement that offered an alternative to the radi-
cal chauvinism and nationalism present in all ethnic and religious
communities threatening all groups on the territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia with extinction. In time the Partisan movement
became a respectable, organized, disciplined, and to a significant
degree, fanatical military force, even within the scope of the Euro-
pean anti-fascist movement.
The second armed formation on the territory of Montenegro
was known as the Chetnik Movement and it was organized in Ser-
bia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, parts of Croatia, Sandžak,
Montenegro and Kosovo and Metohija. The Chetniks personified
the Greater Serbia nationalist movement which fought for “king
and country” and the creation of a “Greater Yugoslavia and an eth-
nically pure Greater Serbia encompassing the boundaries of Serbia,
Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Srem, Banat and Bačka” (the last
three being parts of what is called Vojvodina – trans.) within it.
This implied the “cleansing of state territory of all ethnic minori-
ties and national elements”. The Chetniks considered the Partisan
movement – necessarily always also seen as Communist also – as
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statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
their greatest enemy and against it they cooperated with all occu-
pation and quisling forces. The organization of this movement in
Montenegro, as a military formation of the Royal (Yugoslav) Army
in the homeland, began towards the end of 1941. On October 15,
1941 Draža Mihailović, as the leader of the Chetnik Movement at
the Yugoslav level, appointed General Staff major Đorđe Lašić as
commander of all Chetnik orces in Montenegro and captain Pavle
Đurišić as commander of Chetnik forces for the counties of Andri-
jevica, Berane, Kolašin, Bjelopolje, Prijepolje and Pljevla and for
some smaller municipalities. Going from Serbia (Mihailović’s HQ
at Ravna Gora) into Montenegro, Lasic came with Instructions
highlighting that the “Chetnik forces represent a continuation of the
former Yugoslav Army” and explicit orders that the struggle against
the Partisans in Montenegro should begin from the said HQ. The
elimination of Partisan leaders and the fight against the Partisan
Movement as the main enemy began with support from occupa-
tion forces which ultimately led the Montenegrin Chetniks into the
most unprincipled forms of collaboration.
The third armed formation, established on the basis of an ide-
ology that was present in Montenegro well before the war, was the
Independence Movement of Krsto Popović (literally the ‘Green” or
Zelenaški Movement – trans.). The political and military elite of
this faction was comprised of members of the Montenegrin (Fed-
eralist) Party and so-called gaetans (members of the Montenegrin
Army in Italy after the Christmas uprising of 1918) who enjoyed
the greatest support on the part of Montenegrin territory that was
defined as such in 1878 (so-called Old Montenegro). This faction
refused to lend its support to the Italian proclamation of “Inde-
pendent Montenegro” and opted for a political platform that did
not exclude the possibility of a Yugoslav state with Montenegro as
a federal unit – distinguishing itself from the other federalist fac-
tion headed by Sekula Drljević that was against any kind of Yugo-
slav state. This faction too saw the occupying forces as allies in
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
the process of “pacifying” Montenegro, that is, in eliminating the
Partisan Movement. The Independence Movement disintegrat-
ed with the capitulation of Italy. Except for Krsto Popović and a
smaller group of his closer followers, the bulk of the Independ-
ence Movement members switched sides and joined the Partisan
Movement. In March 1947 Krsto Popović himself was shot as a
“renegade”. From the end of September to the end of October 1943
the Partisans had liberated about two thirds of Montenegrin terri-
tory. Large parts of liberated territory also meant the influx of new
combatants (from September to the end of 1943, 31 Partisan bat-
talions were formed). The General Headquarters of the National
Liberation Forces of Montenegro was established in October 1943.
Kolašin became the seat of Partisan Montenegro – a town that
for eight months had also previously been the seat of the Chet-
nik High Command. The process of the renewal of Montenegrin
statehood during the war was also tied to Kolašin.
The decisions of the Second convocation of the Anti-fascist
Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), the
highest governing body on Partisan liberated territory, on the fed-
eral restructuring of the Yugoslav state, were supported at the sec-
ond session of the State Anti-fascist Council for the National Lib-
eration of Montenegro (ZAVNO CG) in Kolašin on February 16,
1944. At the third session of ZAVNO, July 13–15, 1944, this body
became the Montenegrin Anti-Fascist Assembly for National Lib-
eration (CASNO) as the highest legislative and executive body of
Montenegro. At this session a decision was also adopted that Mon-
tenegro, as an equal federal unit, should enter into the composi-
tion of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFJ). This in effect
renewed the statehood of Montenegro that had been annulled in
1918, this time within the framework of a federal Yugoslav state.
After the capitulation of Italy, Montenegro was occupied by
Nazi Germany. The 17-month – long German occupation of Mon-
tenegro ended at the beginning of 1945 when the last city had been
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statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
liberated and when the last German soldier had been expelled
from Montenegrin soil. The main operations for the liberation of
Montenegro began in the fall of 1944, after attempts by occupy-
ing forces to destroy the units of the National Liberation Army of
Yugoslavia (NOVJ) in northwestern Montenegro were thwarted
in the summer of the same year. In the closing operations in lib-
erating Montenegro the Partisans showed little clemency towards
their enemies. In spite of Tito’s declaration towards the end of the
war that advocated amnesty on condition fighters switched sides
to the ranks of the NOVJ, by and large the Montenegrin Parti-
sans were not very open to such a possibility. Therefore there were
relatively few crossovers and surrenders in the finish of the war
in Montenegro and this pushed some Chetnik units into retreat
towards Slovenia and ultimately into great anguish, misery and
death.
Later assessments determined that about 10% of the over-
all population or some 37,000 Montenegrins were killed in the
course of World War II. About 14,500 Partisan fighters from Mon-
tenegro died in the war and about the same number were killed
on the side of the Chetniks and collaborationists. War damages
were assessed to be almost 44 billion dinars. The ambivalence of
Montenegro is also reflected in the fact that few regions of Yugo-
slavia had as strong a revolution, but equally as strong a coun-
ter-revolution, more massive resistance to the occupying forc-
es and greater collaboration with them, a stronger Communist
but equally as strong anti-Communist movement. Nevertheless,
thanks to the victorious side – the Partisan Movement of Monte-
negro – Montenegro entered into federal Yugoslavia with enor-
mous moral capital. With the most massive uprising in 1941 as a
phenomenon of European scope, it had some 1850 people in lead-
ership positions at various military, political and party high-rank-
ing levels throughout Yugoslavia in the period from 1941 to 1945.
Of the 23 members of the Partisan High Command, more than a
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
third (eight) were Montenegrins. At the end of 1944, Montene-
grins were at the head of eight out of eighteen Partisanmilitary
corps. Montenegrins made up 36% of all Partisan generals at the
end of the war even though Montenegrins barely added up to 2%
of the overall Yugoslav population.
MONTENEGRO IN THE FEDERAL YUGOSLAVIA
Right after the end of the war, the Communists embarked on
the process of acquiring legitimacy for the changes in authority
that had taken place during the war. The election for the Constitu-
tional Assembly on November 11,1945 was dominated by the list of
the Yugoslav National Front (an organization led and controlled
by the Communists) which won an absolute majority. This was
taken as a formal confirmation of the new state organization, of
revolutionary development and of the new republican framework
of the state. At a session in Belgrade on November 29, 1945 the
Constitutional Assembly adopted a declaration proclaiming the
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) which was defined
as a federal ‘people’s state’ with a republican order and a union
of equal nations that had freely determined to remain united in
Yugoslavia. The Constitution adopted on January 31, 1946 was the
final act in forming a Yugoslav federation consisting of six repub-
lics. The administrative, state, political, economic and cultural
space of Montenegro – which had undergone multiple changes in
the first half of the 20th century (in 1912, 1918, 1922, 1929) – was
finally rounded off in 1945 and for a long time to come it would
be the precondition for the social integration of this region. The
territorial-administrative demarcation with Serbia on the whole
coincided with the Montenegrin-Serbian boundaries from 1912,
with the exception of Metohija (in 1912 it had become a part of
Montenegro), which now became a part of the Autonomous Kos-
ovo-Metohija Region as a part of federal Serbia. Within this terri-
torial framework the future governments of Federal Montenegro,
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statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
the People’s Republic of Montenegro (1946–1963), the Socialist
Republic of Montenegro (1963–1991), and the Republic of Monte-
negro (1991), would be constituted.
The elections for the representatives of the Constitutional
Assembly of the People’s Republic of Montenegro (PR Montene-
gro = NR Crna Gora – trans.) were held on November 3, 1946, and
the constitution of the PR of Montenegro was adopted on Decem-
ber 31,1946 the same day as the constitutions of Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na and Macedonia (Serbia adopted its constitution on January 17
and Croatia its on January 18, 1947). This constitution established
in Montenegro the same form of government as the one at the
federal level and the ones in the other republics. It defined Mon-
tenegro as a “people’s state with a republican order”, in which the
Montenegrin nation, on the basis of the right to “self-determina-
tion, including the right of secession”, and on the principal of equal
rights, enters or unites, along with other nations and their repub-
lics, into the Federal PR of Yugoslavia. As in the FPR of Yugoslavia
and the other republics, a system of parliamentary government
was established in Montenegro and lasted from 1946 to 1974, to
be replaced later by a delegate system (1974–1989/1992), all being
confirmed by republic-level and federal constitutions (1953, 1963,
1974). The constitution of the SFR of Yugoslavia adopted on Feb-
ruary 21,1974, and in accordance with it, the constitution of the SR
of Montenegro adopted on February 25,1974, defined this repub-
lic as the state of the Montenegrin nation and other nations and
‘nationalities’ (ethnic groups – trans.) residing in the republic.
By 1948, larger private ownerships had been turned into state-
owned property. On the basis of the Yugoslav Law on Agrar-
ian Reform and Colonization, adopted on August 23,1945expro-
priation of larger land properties had been implemented and an
agrarian land fund had been established for distributing land to
the poor, those with no land, and veteran families that had insuffi-
cient land. From 1945 to 1948, 5,394 families with 37,425 members
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
from Montenegro colonized arable land in Bačka in Vojvodina (in
northern Serbia, from where a huge German minority had been
expelled) – a little less than 10% of the overall colonized house-
holds (60,000) from other parts of Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia,
Serbia, Macedonia).
From 1947 to 1954, 68.8 billion dinars – 8.6 billion dinars a year
– had been invested into Montenegro. For the first time in the
Yugoslav state, Montenegro could count on economic assistance
whose objective was not only the acceleration of economic devel-
opment, but also the leveling-out of growth with the more devel-
oped parts of Yugoslavia. From 1945 to 1948, Montenegro’s econo-
my was on the rise; then from 1948 to 1952, it went through a peri-
od of stagnation, and then it dropped again below the level of 1948
in 1952. Yugoslavia’s conflict with Stalin prevented any significant
investments by the Yugoslav state in the economy of Montenegro
and this caused it to stagnate since Yugoslav investments in Mon-
tenegro dropped from 79.2% (of Montenegro’s budget) in 1947 to
29.9% in 1952.
The split between Tito and Stalin in 1948 had grave consequenc-
es for Montenegrin Communists. This schism among the Commu-
nists over different concepts of “building socialism” – like all other
political schisms of the 20th century – was the most severe in Mon-
tenegro. The Resolution of the Informbiro (i.e. the Soviet Commu-
nist Information Bureau), that is Stalin, was supported by mem-
bers of the highest party leadership of Montenegro – out of the
nine members of the highest body of Montenegrin Communists,
four supported Stalin’s accusations against the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia (KPJ). Some high-ranking Yugoslav military and dip-
lomatic officials from Montenegro also had greater faith in Stalin
than Tito. In such circumstances, Tito applied Stalinist methods of
concentration camps and jails “for re-education” against his oppo-
nents. This “re-education of the misled” was reflected in the prac-
tice of isolation and establishment of internment campsof which
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statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
the most famous was Goli otok (“Bare Island” – trans.) – an island
in the Adriatic chosen because of its proximity to the West for fear
that in the event of a Soviet invasion, the pro-Stalinist internees
could provide the Soviets with logistical support. This danger was
at its highest at the time the Korean War broke out in 1950. Stalin-
ist Gulag-like torture methods were applied against his support-
ers in Yugoslav jails and internment camps. And percentage-wise
the largest number of internees was from Montenegro. In Mon-
tenegro, 5,007 people were arrested on charges of supporting the
pro-Stalinists – or 8.99% of the overall number of individuals in
Yugoslavia arrested on such charges (compared to Serbia prop-
er with 51.49%, Croatia 12.49% and Vojvodina 9.68%). Compared
to overall population size, the percentage rate was by far the larg-
est in Montenegro (1.16%), almost as twice as large as that in Ser-
bia (0.59%), and more than twenty times greater than in Slovenia
(0.05%). Of all those arrested in Montenegro, 2,067 were convicted
which made up 12.77% of all those convicted in Yugoslavia. Regu-
lar courts adjudicated in 34 cases and military courts in 457 cas-
es, while 1,567 individuals were sent to internment camps (“sen-
tenced to socially useful work”). According to records left by for-
mer internees, some 150 individuals from Montenegro did not sur-
vive the torture in jails and internment camps or were killed while
being arrested – the most infamous case of the latter being the Bije-
lo Polje municipal Communist Party committee when, in January
1949, twelve out of eighteen renegade members were killed dur-
ing arrest. Some 130 individuals fled Montenegro to Eastern bloc
countries, and another 27 fled by 1952 to Albania.
In the period from 1945 to 2006, the population of Montenegro
underwent radical changes in every respect. In some segments of
life the rhythm of change was fast and dramatic. The general trends
of moderate growth in population, change of lifestyle, social struc-
ture, quality of life, the educational and cultural level of the pop-
ulation, inter-ethnic marriages, dissolution of large households, a
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
drop in both birth and mortality rates, accelerated urbanization
and modernization, migration from country to city, from north to
south, emigration in order to become guest workers abroad or in
other parts of Yugoslavia – in many of these segments the param-
eters oscillate but within them the general trends of modern socie-
ty can still be discerned. By its population size, as well as its overall
land area of 13, 812 square kilometers, Montenegro was the small-
est Yugoslav republic. Montenegro’s population went from 2.4% of
the total Yugoslav population in 1948 to 2.6% in 1981, while its land
area represented 5.4% of the total Yugoslav land area.
Montenegro had always been a pronounced area of emigra-
tion. The estimates are that in the period from 1953 to 2006 some
115,000 more people emigrated than immigrated –which is one
third of its natural birthrate. According to the 1981 census results,
on the entire territory of Yugoslavia there were 579,043 individ-
uals who thought of themselves as “Montenegrin” in the ethnic
sense – of which 30.8% did not live in Montenegro, but in the
other republics (Serbia 147,466, Bosnia-Herzegovina 14,114, Croa-
tia 9,818). The general opinion about Montenegrins was that they
were a mobile community and that they were as a rule profession-
ally successful in environments outside Montenegro.
The number of migrants was especially high in the period from
1991 to 2006, which was the result of the break-up of Yugoslavia,
the local wars, uncertain livelihood, insecurity and the like. In April
1993, there were 64,258 refugees in Montenegro from the war-torn
areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; and during the NATO
intervention of 1999, some 80,000 refugees from Kosovo entered
Montenegro. The greater part of the refugees returned to their pre-
vious places of residence after the war, but in the period from 1991
to 2003 the number of migrants leaving Montenegro increased by
122.9% because 29,211 people left Montenegro for “third countries”
In 2003, Montenegro had a Human Development Index
(HDI) of 0.879 and by that parameter it belonged to countries of
116
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
medium development level (0.5–0.8) like Bulgaria, Russia, Mace-
donia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, Malaysia, Pan-
ama etc. Montenegro’s annual domestic product saw its biggest
drop in 1993 ($1706 dollars) and by 2003 it achieved only 85.1% of
its GDP in 1991, that is, $ 2,682 dollars per capita. The participa-
tion of the service industry in the GDP in 2000 was 56.7%, while
the participation of industrial production was 19.6% in 2001. In
2003 the tourist sector accounted for 14.4% of GDP. Montenegro’s
overall foreign debt in 2003 was 496.4 million dollars or 28.4% of
the GNP. At the same time, unemployment increased in the years
1991–2000 and in 2003 the official unemployment rate was 34%.
Beginning with 1989, Montenegro also underwent a drastic fall in
the standard of living. In 1989, the annual domestic product per
capita was around $ 2, 300 dollars, only to fall by 1994 to a realis-
tic value of between $ 200 and $ 300 dollars. The economic sanc-
tions imposed by the international community in May 1992 on the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY – Serbia and Montenegro)
brought about additional economic and other forms of isolation of
this region. In the course of 1993 the FR of Yugoslavia underwent
the highest hyper-inflation ever recorded – 120 billion per annum
–and a huge redistribution of the economy occurred, along with
a misappropriation of citizens’ foreign currency savings. Unem-
ployment went up to 40%, the economy was by and large devas-
tated, grinding to a halt and shifting into the gray zone. This dra-
matic economic downturn was a consequence of the break-up of
Yugoslavia and the wars in the region.
YUGOSLAVIA: THE FINAL STAGE
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a two-member federa-
tion made up of Serbia and Montenegro was established on April
27, 1992. The international community had in the meantime rec-
ognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as independ-
ent states. In April 1992 the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina escalated
117
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
and the international community got involved in the conflicts in
former Yugoslavia as both a mediator and one of the interested
parties.
The conflicts formally came to an end in November 1995 in
Dayton, USA, when the presidents of Croatia (Franjo Tuđman),
Serbia (Slobodan Milošević) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Alija
Izetbegović) agreed to a cessation of hostilities, which ended the
war in Bosnia Herzegovina; the full peace accord was then signed
in Paris in December of that year.
Since mediation by the international community to peacefully
resolve the conflict in Kosovo was unsuccessful – mainly because
the political negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris in February and
March of 1999 had collapsed – the NATO alliance intervened mil-
itarily (March-June 1999). On March 24, 1999, 19 NATO members
began an air campaign against the FR of Yugoslavia in which it is
estimated that 1,200 to 2,500 people were killed. The air campaign,
which lasted for 78 days, seriously damaged infrastructure, mili-
tary and commercial installations and buildings, and media out-
lets, especially in Serbia. The air campaign against the FRY end-
ed on June 10 with the adoption UN SC Resolution 1244. The day
before, representatives of the Yugoslav Army and NATO signed
a Military-Technical Agreement in Kumanovo (in Macedonia on
the border with Kosovo – trans.), which laid out details for the
withdrawal of the Serbian police forces and the Yugoslav Army
from Kosovo and for the entry of international military troops.
Under pressure from the international community, especially
the European Union, on March 14, 2002 the Agreement on Prin-
ciples of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro within the State
Union (dubbed as the “Belgrade Agreement” for short) was adopt-
ed and with it a new state entity, called the (State Union of) Ser-
bia and Montenegro, was established for a term of three years.
The agreement stipulated that after a period of three years each
member state had the right to organize a referendum and decide
118
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
whether to continue the state union or become independent. This
ended the existence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. State
sovereignty had been transferred to the member states. The Bel-
grade Agreement did not define the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro as the state of all the citizens of Serbia and Montene-
gro, but as a union of the member states – Serbia and Montenegro.
The establishment of the state union of Serbia and Montene-
gro temporarily halted the process of dissolution of the former
Yugoslavia. Thus Montenegro had – from the annexation of 1918
whereby it was a part of a centralized Yugoslav state (1918); then
to the status of a federal unit in a six-member Yugoslav federation
(1943); then to part of a two-member federation (1992), and ulti-
mately to a member state in the state union of Serbia and Monte-
negro (2003) – completed an historical circle in which each new
change in its legal-and-state status also meant an increase in its
state personhood. In this sense, the referendum organized on May
21, 2006, after which Montenegro became an independent state,
was the logical historical conclusion of that process.
Selected literature
WORLD WAR I AND UNIFICATION
1. Novica, Rakočević, Crna Gora u Prvom svjetskom ratu, Podgorica 1997
2. Dimitrije Dimo Vujović, Ujedinjenje Crne Gore i Srbije 1918.godine,
Titograd, 1962
3. Dimitrije Dimo Vujović, Podgorička skupština 1918, Zagreb,1989
4. Mijat Šuković, Podgorička skupština 1918, Podgorica, 1999
5. Jovan Ćetković, Ujedinitelji Crne Gore i Srbije, Dubrovnik, 1940
6. Jovan B. Bojović, Podgorička skupština 1918, Gornji Milanovac, 1989
7. Živojin Perić, Crna Gora u jugoslovenskoj federaciji, Podgorica, 1997
8. Vojislav Vučković, Diplomatska pozadina ujedinjenja Srbije i Crne Gore,
Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo 2, Beograd, 1959
119
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
9. Miomir Dašić, Jugoslovenska misao u Crnoj Gori do stvaranja Jugoslavije,
JIČ 1–4/1989
10. Miomir Dašić, O korijenima i razvoju jugoslovenske ideje u Crnoj Gori
do 1918.godine, u: Ogledi iz istorije Crne Gore, Podgorica, 2000
11. Miomir Dašić, O jugoslovenskoj ideji u Crnoj Gori do stvaranja
jugoslovenske države 1918, u: Zbornik – Jugoslovenska država 1918–1988,
ISI,1999
12. Radoslav Raspopović, Stav Crnogorskog odbora za narodno ujedinjenje
prema jugoslovenskom ujedinjenju, Zbornik: Srbija 1918, Beograd,1989
13. Đeneral Vešović pred sudom, Zemun, 1921
14. Vuk Vinaver, O interesovanju engleske javnosti za problem Crne Gore
posle prvog svetskog rata, Istorijski zapisi 1, 1965
15. Šerbo Rastoder, Skrivana strana istorije, Crnogorska buna i odmetnički
pokret 1918–1929, Zbirka dokumenata , I-IV, Bar, 1997
16. Šerbo Rastoder, Petrovići – suton jedne dinastije, Dinastija Petrović
Njegoš, CANU, 2002, tom II, 227–303
17. Šerbo Rastoder, Crna Gora u egzilu I-II, Podgorica, 2004
18. Dr Jozef Bajza, Crnogorsko pitanje, Podgorica, 2001; Giuzeppe de Bajza,
La questione montenegrina, Budapest, 1928
19. Gavro Perazić, Nestanak crnogorske države u Prvom svetskom ratu sa
stanovišta međunarodnog prava, Beograd, 1988
20. Dragoljub Živojinović, Crna Gora u borbi za opstanak 1914–1922,
Beograd, 1996
21. Dragoljub Živojinović, Italija i Crna Gora 1914–1925, Studija o
izneverenom savezništvu, Beograd,1998
22. Dragoljub R. Živojinović, Nevoljni saveznici 1914–1918, Beograd, 2000
23. Dragoljub Živojinović, Kraj Kraljevine Crne Gore : mirovna konferencija
i posle 1918–1921, Beograd, 2002
24. Mijat Šuković, Činjenice su odlučujuće, Stvaranje 10–12 , 2000, 254–284
25. Zoran Lakić, Političko mišljenje ili naučni stav, Crnogorske istorijske
teme, Podgorica 2001 : “Stvaranje” 2000, br.1–5, str.220–245
26. Miomir Dašić, O dilemi da li je Velika narodna skupština u Podgorici
bila legalna i legitimna, u: Ogledi iz istorije Crne Gore, Podgorica, 2000,
323–337
27. Vladimir Jovićević, Ujedinjenje ili prisajedinjenje – Crna Gora 1914–1925,
Glasnik ODN, CANU 12,1998
28. Džon Trodwey, Crnogorski Aleksandar Divajn, Alexandria , oktobar-
novembar 1998
120
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
29. Mile Kordić, Crnogorska buna 1919–1924, Beograd, 1986; Božićna pobuna
u Crnoj Gori, Beograd, 1991
30. Dimitrije Dimo Vujović, Ratna saradnja Crne Gore i Francuske 1914–1916,
Podgorica 1994
31. Aleksandar Drašković, Mojkovačka bitka, Beograd 1991, Podgorica 1996
32. Radoslav Rotković, Velika zavjera protiv Crne Gore, Od Prizrena do
Versaja, Podgorica, 2001
33. Jakov Mrvaljević, Kraj crnogorskog kraljevstva (iz dvorskih albuma),
Cetinje, 1989
34. Novak Adžić, Poslednji dani Kraljevine Crne Gore, Cetinje, 1998
35. Novica Radović, Crna Gora na savezničkoj golgoti, Podgorica, 2000
36. Nikola Đonović, Crna Gora pre i posle ujedinjenja, Beograd, 1939
37. Šerbo Rastoder, Crnogorsko pitanje u Društvu naroda 1920–1924, Matica
7/8, 2001
38. Novak Adžić, Otvaranje poslanstva Kraljevine Crne Gore u Vašinktonu,
Matica 7/8, 2001
39. Bogumil Hrabak , Crnogorski vojni logori u Italiji 1918–1921, Istorijski
zapisi 3/ 1997, 137–157
40. Bogumil Hrabak, Poslednje godine kralja Nikole, Kralj Nikola – ličnost,
djelo i vrijeme I, Zbornik radova, CANU 21, 1998, 81–127
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LIFE 1918–1941
1. Nikola Đonović, Zahtevi Crne Gore: privredni i poltički, Bar, 1936
2. Nikola Đonović, Rad i karakter Crnogoraca , Beograd, 1935
3. Dimo Vujović, Crnogorski federalisti 1919–1929, Titograd, CANU, 1981
4. Šerbo Rastoder, Životna pitanja Crne Gore 1918–1929, Bar, 1996
5. Jovan Bojović , Napredni omladinski pokret u Crnoj Gori 1918–1941,
Cetinje, 1976
6. Jovan Bojović, Pisana djelatnost KPJ u Crnoj Gori 1919–1936, Titograd,
1983
7. Đoko Pejović , Prosvjetni i kulturni rad u Crnoj Gori 1918–1941, Titograd,
1982
8. Obren Blagojević, Ekonomska misao u Crnoj Gori do Drugog svjetskog
rata, Beograd, 1996
9. Aleksandar Stamatović, Položaj oficira, podoficira, barjaktara i perjanika
Kraljevine Crne Gore između dva svjetska rata, Podgorica, 1995
10. Šerbo Rastoder, Političke borbe u Crnoj Gori 1918–1929, Beograd, 1996
121
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
11. Šerbo Rastoder, Političke stranke u Crnoj Gori 1918–1929, Conteco, Bar,
2000
12. Šerbo Rastoder, Političke borbe u Crnoj Gori 1929–1941, Podgorica, 2015
13. Šerbo Rastoder, Janusovo lice istorije, Podgorica, 2000
14. Nikčević Tomica, Prilog izučavanju političkih borbi u Crnoj Gori 1929–
1937, Istorija XX veka , Zbornik radova III, Beograd, 1962
15. Senka Babović-Raspopović, Kulturna politika u Zetskoj banovini 1929–
1941, Podgorica, 2002
16. Perko Vojinović, Politička i nacionalna misao crnogorske inteligencije
(1918–1941), Nikšić, 1989
17. Čedomir Pejović, KPJ u Crnoj Gori 1919–1941, CID, Podgorica,1999
18. Slobodan Boban Tomić, Spomenica odlikovanih lica iz Zetske banovine
(Crne Gore) od 1912. do 1941.godine, Beograd, 1996
19. Veljko Sjekloća, Krsto Popović u istorijskoj građi i literaturi, Podgorica,
1998
20. Dragomir M. Kićović, Radomir P. Guberinić, Puniša Račić, Život za jednu
ideju, Beograd, 2000
21. Savo P. Vuletić, Članci i rasprave, Bijelo Polje, 1998
22. Blagota Radović, Privredne prilike u Crnoj Gori između dva svjetska rata,
(priredio Branko Radović), Podgorica, 1994
23. Spasoje Medenica, Privredni razvitak Crne Gore između dva rata,
Titograd, 1959
24. Iko Mirković, Podgorička štamparija i list Zeta Jovana–Joza Vukčevića
1930–1941, Podgorica,1998
25. Krstajić Pero, Stojan Cerović (1883–1943), Život i djelo, Nikšić,1986
26. Šerbo Rastoder, Belvederski protestni zbor 1936.godine, Doclea 1/2000
27. Luka Vukčević, Odjek belvederskih događaja od 26.06.1936, Istorijski
zapisi 2,1996
28. Dragoslav Bojović, Optužnica državnog tužioca iz decembra 1936.protiv
33 crnogorskih komunista, Istorijski zapisi 1–2/1991
WORLD WAR II 1941–1945
1. Đuro Vujović, Crna Gora u Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu 1941–1945,
Podgorica,1997
2. Radoica Luburić, Društvo Crne Gore u Drugom svjetskom ratu 1939–
1945, Podgorica, 1995
3. Špiro Lagator-Đuro Batrićević, Pljevaljska bitka 1941.godine,
Beograd,1990
122
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
4. Obrad Bjelica, Borci Osme crnogorske brigade, Beograd, 1992
5. Milija Stanišić, Kadrovi revolucije:Crnogorci na rukovodećim dužnostima
u NOR-u naroda Jugoslavije, Titograd, 1984
6. Milija Stanišić, Rukovodeći kadrovi NOB-a u Crnoj Gori 1941–1945,
Podgorica,1995
7. Milija Stanišić, Tokovi revolucije u Crnoj Gori I-III, Nikšić, 1988
8. Radoje Pajović, Kontrarevolucija u Crnoj Gori: četnički i federalistički
pokret 1941–1945, Cetinje, 1977
9. Zoran Lakić, Narodna vlast u Crnoj Gori 1941–1945, Beograd, 1981
10. Zoran Lakić, Zapisi o revoluciji, Cetinje, 1971
11. Branislav Kovačević, Od Vezirovog do Zidanog mosta –tragična sudbina
crnogorskih četnika u završnoj fazi rata 1944–1945, Beograd, 1993
THE PERIOD AFTER 1945
1. Branislav Marović, Društveno-ekonomski razvoj Crne Gore 1945–1953,
Titograd, 1987
2. Branislav Kovačević, Đilas-heroj-antiheroj, iskazi za istoriju, Titograd,1991
3. Kovačević, Komunistička partija Crne Gore 1945–1952, Podgorica 1986,
1988
4. Zoran Lakić, Istoriografija o sukobu sa Informbiroom 1948.godine,
Istorija i istoriografija, Bijelo Polje, 1997
5. Vladimir Goati, Partije Srbije i Crne Gore u političkim borbama od 1990
do 2000, Conteco, Bar, 2000
6. Popović Milan, Crnogorska alternativa, Podgorica,2000
7. Živko M. Andrijašević, Nacrt za ideologiju jedne vlasti, Bar,1999
8. Veselin Pavićević, Izborni sistem i izbori u Crnoj Gori 1990–1996,
Podgorica,1997
THE MONTENEGRIN NATIONAL ISSUE
1. Dušan Ičević, Savezna država i savez država, Podgorica, 2001
2. Mijat Šuković, Crna Gora od federacije ka nezavisnosti, CANU,
Podgorica, 2001
3. Savo Brković, O postanku i razvoju crnogorske nacije, Titograd, 1974
4. Dimitrije Dimo Vujović, Prilozi izučavanju crnogorskog nacionalnog
pitanja, Nikšić, 1987
5. Batrić Jovanović, Crnogorci o sebi, Beograd, 1986
6. Jovan Bojović, Srpski narod u jugoslovenskoj federaciji 1945–1991,
Podgorica, 1993
123
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
7. Sreten Zeković, Posetnik o Crnoj Gori i Crnogorstvu, Zbornik, Cetinje,
1996
8. Zeković Sreten, Crnogorska hrestomatija. Nauka(a) o samobitnosti
Crnogoraca i 65 po(d)uka, za sakoga od čobanina do akademika Knj. I,
Cetinje, 1999
9. Novak Adžić, Stvaranje i razvoj crnogorske nacije, Cetinje, 1995
10. Milorad Popović, Mali narodi i nacionalizam, Cetinje, 1997
11. Milorad Popović, Crnogorsko pitanje, Plima, Ulcinj, 1999
12. Dušan Ičević, Crnogorska nacija, Forum za etničke odnose, Beograd,
13. 1998
14. Mijat Šuković, Za pravo, čast i slobodu crnogosrke nacije: otvoreno
pismo i javni poziv akademiku Dejanu Medakoviću, predsjedniku Srpske
akedemije nauka i umjetnosti i akademiku Vasiliju Krestiću, sekretaru
Odeljenja istorijskih nauka i direktoru Arhiva Srpske akademije nauka
i umjetnosti, (Pobjeda, 4.02.2000, br. 12262– Pobjeda, 22.02. 2000, br.
12280)
15. Aleksandar Stamatović, Istorijske osnove nacionalnog identiteta
Crnogoraca 1918–1953, Srpska radikalna stranka, Zemun,2000
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
1. Branislav Gligorijević, Ujedinjenje Srpske pravoslavne crkve i
uspostavljanje srpske patrijaršije u Jugoslaviji, Istorija 20. veka, 2/ 1997
2. Zvezdan Folić, Vjerske zajednice u Crnoj Gori 1918–1953, Podgorica, 2001
3. Šerbo Rastoder, Jasmina Rastoder : Dr Nikola Dobrečić, arcibiskup barski
i primas srpski (1872–1955), Život i djelo, Prilog izučavanju istorije barske
arcibiskupije, Budva, 1991
4. Šerbo Rastoder, Istorijsko-metodološki okvir istraživanja novije istorije
crkve (vjerskih zajednica) u Crnoj Gori (1878–1945), Istorijska nauka i
nastava istorije u savremenim uslovima, CANU 14, 1994, 199–242
5. Šerbo Rastoder, Vakufi u Crnoj Gori krajem XIXi u prvoj polovini XX
vijeka, Istorijski zapisi 2, 1997
6. Velibor V. Džomlić, Golgota mitropolita crnogorsko-primorskog
Joanikija (1941–1945), Cetinje, 1996
7. Zvezdan Folić, Ateizam vlasti u Crnoj Gori 1945–1953, Istorijski zapisi 3–4
/ 1995
8. Nikola Žutić, Neka pitanja položaja rimokatoličke crkve u Crnoj Gori
1918–1926, Istorijski zapisi 1–2, 2000
9. Senka Babović-Raspopović, Mitropolija Crnogorsko-primorska 1929–
1941, Istorijski zapisi 1–2/ 2000, 133–141
124
statehood loss and its renewal statehood loss and its renewal
10. Zvezdan Folić, Kotorska biskupija i stvaranje jugoslovenske države 1918–
1920, u: Vjerske zajednice u Crnoj Gori 1918–1953, Podgorica , 2001
11. Zoran Lakić, Život i stvaralačko djelo patrijarha dr Gavrila Dožića (1881–
1950), Istorijski zapisi 1–2/ 2000, 141–153
12. Zvezdan Folić, Bogoslovija Sv Petar Cetinjski 1921–1926, Istorijski zapisi
1–2/ 2000, 117–133
COMPILATIONS/ANTHOLOGIES
1. Trinajestojulski ustanak, predmet nauke i umjetnosti, Radovi sa naučnog
skupa, Titograd 11. i 12. jul 1991., CANU, 12, 1992
2. Crna Gora u Prvom svjetskom ratu, Zbornik radova sa okruglog stola
Istorijskog instituta Crne Gore, knj.2, Podgorica, 1998
3. Kralj Nikola – ličnost, djelo i vrijeme, Zbornik radova sa međunarodnog
naučnog skupa, Podgorica 1–3. oktobar 1997, CANU 21, 1998
4. Prelomni događaji Narodnooslobodilačkog rata u Crnoj Gori 1943.
godine, Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa održanog 19. i 20.12. 1983,
Titograd, 1985
5. Goli otok (1949–1956), Radovi sa okruglog stola, održanog u Podgorici
27. juna 1995. godine, CANU 20, 1998
BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA (MONTENEGRO)
1. Slavoljub Šćekić, Kilibarda, Ispovijest o deceniji koja je promijenila lice
Crne Gore, Podgorica, 2001
2. Blažo Orlandić, Sjećanja i dokumenta (1978–1999), Podgorica, 2002
3. Veseljko Koprivica, Sve je bilo meta, zapisi sa dubrovačko-hercegovačkog
ratišta, Podgorica, 1996
4. Živko M. Andrijašević, Nacrt za ideologiju jedne vlasti, Bar,1999
5. Momir Bulatović, Pravila ćutanja – istiniti politički triler sa poznatim
završetkom, Narodna knjiga, Alfa, Beograd, 2004
6. Branko Kostić, 1991 – da se ne zaboravi, Beograd, 1996
7. Šeki Radončić, Crna kutija, Policijska tortura u Crnoj Gori 1992–1996,
Podgorica, 1996
8. Šeki Radončić, Crna kutija 2, Podgorica , 2003
9. Vladimir Keković, Vrijeme meteža 1988–1989, Podgorica, 2003
125
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Croatia and Croats in Yugoslavia
resitance to
centralism
IVO GOLDSTEIN
Our analysis will focus on the Croatian experience of Yugoslav
history. The question that is usually asked, at the level of popular
understanding of the past, is confined to the very simple dilemma
of whether Yugoslavia was a good or bad solution for the Croa-
tian people. It is clear that a simple or short answer does not exist.
In both Yugoslavias, the “Croatian question” (although it was
not so called after 1945) , in other words, the question of the status
of the Croatian lands and Croatian people was still relevant just
like in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The promotion of “Cro-
atian interests” and “Yugoslavism” was not necessarily contradic-
tory; rather, it consisted, or could consist, in some form of feder-
al union.
Yugoslavism among the Croats grew on the foundations of
Illyrism (although expressly distancing itself from the name
“Illyrian” and what it signified) as a specific supra-national idea.
First, during the revolutions of 1848 and 1849, it pleaded for forg-
ing links among the South Slavs in the Monarchy. It primarily
associated Croatism, that is, the Croatian national feeling, with a
126
resitance to centralism resitance to centralism
broader feeling of cultural belonging to Slavism and South Slav-
ism as the framework, or even prerequisite, for the survival of the
small and weak Croatian nation. In Croatia, the Yugoslav ideolo-
gy had many interpreters or, more precisely, a number of currents,
perceiving the relationship between Croatism and Yugoslavism
in different ways. The main ideologist of Yugoslavism was Fran-
jo Rački. As a historian and politician, he was also the defender of
the Croatian state right. Yugoslavism mobilized educated individ-
uals for the creation of a modern civic culture. The entwined Cro-
atian and Yugoslav feelings left an imprint on literature and the
struggle for a standard language and historiography.
THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE CORFU DECLARATION
As the First World War approached, it was increasingly believed,
especially by Croatian intellectuals, that the Yugoslav option was
the result of a maturing cultural and national consciousness at a
higher level. These intellectuals bore in mind the examples of Ger-
many and Italy, whose nations were still hopelessly divided in the
mid-19th century, but succeeded in transforming themselves into
the strongest European nations and states by the early 20th century.
During the First World War, one part of the Croatian politi-
cal scene believed in the survival of the monarchy and its reor-
ganisation on a federal basis, which would lead to the creation of
a South Slavic federal unit covering the area from Mount Triglav
to Sarajevo. On the other hand, political émigrés (Ante Trumbić,
Frano Supilo, Ivan Meštrović and others) held that the survival of
Croatia in any union with Austria-Hungary had no perspective,
thus pinning their hopes on a state union with Serbia and Mon-
tenegro. Therefore, in April 1915, in Paris, they formed the Yugo-
slav Committee with the aim of representing the interests of the
western part of the future South Slavic state, including the pre-
sent-day states of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as
well as Vojvodina.
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Before long, representatives of the Yugoslav Committee and a
circle of like-minded people established the first contact with Ser-
bian political representatives. However, the Serbian government
did not want the Committee to be treated as its interlocutor on an
equal footing, but rather as a political propaganda body in the ser-
vice of its Yugoslav programme.
The Serbian government pursued a two-faced policy. Already
towards the end of 1914, it stated (and often repeated) in the
National Assembly that “Serbia’s war is a struggle for the libera-
tion and unification of all our enslaved brothers, Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes” and equalized the “great cause of the Serbian state and
the Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian tribe”. However, Prime Minis-
ter Nikola Pašić also periodically promoted an alternative option
– he pleaded that Serbia should obtain only those lands whose
addition would not call into question the Serbian (and Orthodox)
majority in the future state. For example, he proposed the “divi-
sion of Slavonia into Catholic and Orthodox”, recognized Italy’s
right to the Eastern Adriatic coast, etc.
In July 1917, representatives of the Yugoslav Committee and the
Serbian government signed the Corfu Declaration that laid down
the basic principles for the unification and organisation of the
future Yugoslav state as a constitutional, parliamentary and dem-
ocratic monarchy under the Karađorđević dynasty, based on uni-
versal civil liberties. A special guarantee was given for the equal-
ity of all three flags (Serbian, Slovenian and Croatian), all three
national denominations, all three religions and two alphabets.
Ante Trumbić later interpreted the Corfu Declaration as a doc-
ument that implicitly defined the South Slavic union as a federa-
tion, which was systematically ignored by Pašić.
When the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (State of SCS),
which included Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Voj
vodina, was created on October 29, 1918, it theoretically had the
following options at its disposal: to remain independent or enter
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into a union with the other states. In practice, there was almost no
choice. As members of the Allied coalition, the Serbian and Ital-
ian armies began entering its territory. In a week or two, the Ital-
ian army occupied a large part of the Adriatic coast and it seemed
most likely that it would not withdraw from that territory. In a
considerable number of places, like Split, the Serbian army was
greeted as a liberator.
BLURRED ARRANGEMENTS
However, the arrangements between the State of SCS and the
Serbian government on organisation of the state and other issues
remained vague. In the days to follow, the Serbian side failed to
give any guarantee. Internationally unrecognized, fearing the Ital-
ian advance, exposed to manipulations and diplomatic games,
and lacking its own armed forces, the State of SCS was forced to
take urgent steps. In principle, the common state with Serbia was
accepted, but there remained the dilemma of whether it would be
based on a confederal or federal concept, which would imply long-
er negotiations, or whether it should be immediately accepted,
which would mean that no conditions would be set. In the Con-
clusions and Instructions of the Central Committee of the Nation-
al Council of the State of SCS on Unification with the Kingdom
of the Serbia, adopted on November 24,, it was demanded that
the organisation of the future state should be left to the Constitu-
ent Assembly for decision-making. A delegation of the National
Council hurried to Belgrade despite Stjepan Radić’s call for them
“not to go like geese into the fog”. With this sentence, which was
frequently quoted later on, Radić did not oppose a union with
Serbia, as often interpreted; rather, he was calling on top politi-
cians not to rush into making a decision or, in other words, to ask
Belgrade to give them clear guarantees that previous agreements
would be observed before making any decision.
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Upon its arrival in Belgrade, the delegation presented an address
to Regent Alexander. The text only partially respected the Instruc-
tions of the National Council, thus practically leaving the politi-
cal initiative and all authority to the Regent. Thereafter, Alexander
proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and on
December 1, 1918 the delegation signed the act of unification with
the Kingdom of Serbia.
The new state stretched from the Alps almost to the Aegean Sea
and covered the area that had not been under a single administra-
tion since the 4th century. Such a framework put Croatia in quite
a different situation. The Central European environment, which
had been important for Croatia for centuries, disintegrated. In
return, it was attempted to develop a new cultural and national
self-consciousness of the South Slavic peoples.
At that time and in subsequent years, many Croats opted for the
Yugoslav state, thinking that it would remove the “curse of small
numbers”, which had always accompanied them under the Habs-
burg Monarchy. However, they did not think that it would be nec-
essary to level regional specificities or negate national identities.
Miroslav Krleža pointed out that in 1918 the “Serbian state” was in
the heads of Croatian politicians “faced with their own political
nothingness” and that in comparison with the “Austrian perspec-
tive it resembled a warm domestic home”.
During the subsequent years, there were no political parties in
Croatia which called into question the survival of the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that is, the Kingdom of Yugosla-
via – they mostly called for federalisation of the state. The excep-
tions included the remaining members of the pre-war Rightists
(pravaši) and Frankists (frankovci), who were active both in Cro-
atia and abroad until 1929 and then only abroad as émigrés where
they formed the Ustasha movement that had its political leaders
and paramilitary formations.
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Croatian politicians, especially those from the coastal regions
(from Istria up to Dalmatia) considered Yugoslavia to be the best
bulwark against Italian imperialism. In 1920, as the first Yugo-
slav Foreign Minister, Ante Trumbić explained how he was born a
Croat and would die a Croat and that he was a politician and nev-
er a fanatic. As a Croat he worked for the Yugoslav idea and not
for a separate Croatian state. For such a commitment he present-
ed several arguments and concluded: “If I had not worked for the
State of SCS, that is, Yugoslavia, I am convinced that we would
have become the spoil of foreign interests and greed”.
In 1921, for example, many inhabitants of Korčula enthusiasti-
cally greeted the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes when the Italian army left the island (but retained
Lastovo in the vicinity). At that time, the Korčula priest Mašo
Bodulić said that “this liberated island is a Serbian land because
it is Croatian and vice versa, and all is Yugoslav. We are one body,
one soul, one country”.
The Catholic Church also pleaded for the creation of a Yugo-
slav state on the basis of Strossmayer’s idea of Church union and
awareness that the Croatian (and Slavic) people in a state with
German and Hungarian domination (as it had experienced Aus-
tria-Hungary) was deliberately neglected.
Support of Yugoslavism in the Croatian national corpus
stretched up to “orjunaštvo”: Orjuna (the Organisation of Yugo-
slav Nationalists) was an extremist nationalist and terrorist organ-
isation founded in Split in 1921 with the aim of protecting a uni-
tary Yugoslav state. Its members fostered the cult of the Yugoslav
nation, which sometimes bordered on fanaticism. At the same
time, they justified a strong authoritarian state, as opposed to the
postulates of democracy and parliamentarism. Orjuna was theo-
retically independent but, in practice, it was the regime’s auxilia-
ry, paramilitary force and repressive apparatus for a showdown
with the political opponents of Greater Serbism, that is, Yugoslav
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integralism. Orjuna included a considerable number of Croats.
Some of them were also among its leaders.
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE NEW STATE
However, most Croats became disappointed with the new state
very soon. The differences had already come out into the open in
understanding the role of the Serbian army, which had risen to
fame in the First World War, but its political culture was utterly
undeveloped. Despite staying out of daily politics, the top military
leadership was the pillar of Karađorđević’s politics. The generals
were convinced that with the entry of their army into the territo-
ry of the former Austria-Hungary and independent Montenegro,
they were fulfilling a historically significant mission. Some greet-
ed it as the liberator, while others came to hate it due to its violent
behaviour and lack of discipline. The alleged or actual lawbreak-
ers were arrested, beaten and sometimes even executed. After a
few months, the army was replaced by the gendarmerie, but the
methods did not change. A considerable number of gendarmes
came as loyal cadres from Serbia, which only enhanced the feel-
ings of animosity.
At the end of 1919, dissatisfaction in the former Austro-Hun-
garian territories was also caused by the decision to affix spe-
cial stamps on all Austro-Hungarian banknotes charging a 20%
fee. Even greater dissatisfaction was caused in 1920–21 when uni-
fication of the monetary system started and the Serbian dinar
became the sole medium of payment. At that time, the dinar was
exchanged at a rate of 1 dinar = 4 kronen although the actual value
of these two currencies was the same.
In order to strengthen their position in the process of adopt-
ing a constitution, the ruling circles adopted the provisional Rules
of Procedure for the Constituent Assembly under which the dep-
uties were obliged to take the oath before the King immediately
after the elections. Thus, the Republic or Monarchy dilemma was
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largely prejudiced. The deputies of the Croatian Republican Peas-
ant Party (HRSS) decided to boycott the work of the Assembly
which significantly weakened the other advocates of the republi-
can system of government – Communists and Republicans , which
facilitated a formal victory by the unitarist and centralist forces.
In debates on the Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, the
ruling Radical-Democratic Coalition sought to impose its solu-
tion on all issues concerning the country’s system of government
and political life. All drafts, proposals and remarks were rejected,
not only if they were advanced by the opposition political parties,
but also by more sober-minded members of the ruling circles (e.g.
Stojan Protić). Mate Drinković, a then member of the Provisional
National Assembly and since 1920 the Minister of Postal Services,
warned the proposer of the centralist option: “Gentlemen, you all
know very well where such a constitution leads”, and continued:
“Such centralism is very dangerous for our state because, by force
of natural law, its arbitrariness must provoke organized resistance,
which can pose a serious threat”.
In the end, the Constitution legitimized the principles of uni-
tarism and state centralism. The historical provinces were dis-
solved and the whole country was divided into 33 districts. Cro-
atia was divided into six districts. Zagreb only remained the seat
of the Zagreb District. Since the 16th century, the authorities seat-
ed in Zagreb had never had jurisdiction over such a small area.
The Croatian Parliament (Sabor) was dissolved for the first time
after several hundred years. This centralized state was illogical
and impractical from both the social and economic aspect, so this
alone generated political and social instability.
In 1922, author Ksaver Šandor Gjalski (1854–1935) stated that
he had “worked towards South Slavic harmony, love and unifica-
tion on all sides for forty years” and that now he “must admit that
a unified people still does not exist… In order to achieve a unique
entity, it is necessary, first of all, to put an end to all grief and
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misfortunes emanating now from power in Belgrade and spread-
ing among its public”.
Tensions culminated in 1928 when the Croatian Peasant Par-
ty (HSS) deputies Pavle Radić and Đuro Basariček were assas-
sinated, while Stjepan Radić, Ivan Pernar and Stjepan Granđa
were wounded in Belgrade’s Parliament. News of the assassina-
tions provoked demonstrations and in clashes with the police dur-
ing the following days, at least five people were killed and many
more were wounded. In fact, there was no larger settlement in
Croatia where commemorations and mournful processions were
not organized despite being prohibited. The Peasant-Democratic
Coalition (SDK), which included the HSS and Pribićević’s Inde-
pendent Democratic Party, announced that it would not recog-
nize either the St Vitus’ Day Constitution or the system of govern-
ment and that all decisions made in Belgrade would be null and
void for the people in the prečani regions. The SDK held that eve-
rything should be returned to the status before 1 December 1918.
Some newspapers published geographic maps showing the
options for Croatia’s independence, that is, the severance of the
western parts of Yugoslavia and the creation of a United States of
Central Europe.
The situation was additionally aggravated by the fact that the
assassin Račić enjoyed tacit support in some high government cir-
cles and that this was no secret. Admittedly, he was sentenced to
20 years’ imprisonment (at that time, the death penalty was giv-
en for much less serious crimes), but he was placed under com-
fortable house arrest. The situation reached a critical point in ear-
ly August when Stjepan Radić died of his wounds. His funeral,
which saw the largest attendance in the history of Zagreb and
Croatia, turned into a big political event – it is estimated that there
were about 150,000 people in the funeral procession.
Funeral speeches were delivered by Miroslav Krleža, who spoke
about another “Croatian tragedy”, and Svetozar Pribićević, who
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said: “We all feel, and the local Serbs are especially aware of the
fact, that the Croats brought their historical statehood into the
common state and this is one more, even stronger reason for such
organisation of relations in our state that those who knew how to
preserve their state over the centuries are guaranteed full equali-
ty”. A few days earlier, Pribićević said in Belgrade’s Parliament that
the established system of government did not offer equality to all
of its parts and that the “Serbs in the prečani regions must show
solidarity with the Croats”.
The assassination of Radić and his associates had a shock effect
on the situation in Croatia. It definitely sealed the fate of parlia-
mentarism in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, open-
ing the door to its abolition and the proclamation of absolutism
and, in the subsequent phase, to the collapse of monarchist Yugo-
slavia. Over a longer term, this event remained a profound trau-
matic experience for Croatian society and Croatian-Serbian rela-
tions in general.
PROCLAMATION OF DICTATORSHIP
The situation could not be calmed for months. On the 10th
anniversary of the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes (December 1,1928), the Zagreb police started shoot-
ing at protesters shouting “free Croatia” and “Peasant-Democratic
Coalition”, as well as at Maček, Pribićević and Radić. At least two
persons were killed and a number were seriously wounded.
King Alexander gained support for the proclamation of a dic-
tatorship on January 6, 1929, first from the army, gendarmerie and
police, and then from the government bureaucracy. At first, the
dictatorship was also supported by a section of the Croatian polit-
ical scene, reckoning that it would be easier to agree on the settle-
ment of a dramatic situation with the King personally than with
Serbian politicians. Vladko Maček stated at that time that “the
vest is now unbuttoned and should be buttoned up”, implying that
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the “vest” was wrongly buttoned in 1918. He held that the “aboli-
tion of the St Vitus’ Day Constitution, which has oppressed the
Croatian people for seven years” was a favourable fact and expect-
ed an offer from Belgrade. He added that he was “absolutely sure
of the great wisdom of His Majesty the King and that we will suc-
ceed in achieving the ideal of the Croatian people that the Croat is
a master in his own home, in his free Croatia”.
Cautious optimism was soon replaced by bitter disappointment
because, with the introduction of dictatorship, the ten-year debate
on the constitutional system and, hence, settlement of the “Croa-
tian question” was forcibly interrupted. It was renewed much later
in the second half of the 1930s, without King Alexander, but in a
situation that was much less favourable for both sides concerned.
Since all national emblems –flags, coats-of-arms, national
anthems, institutions, symbols of historical development and state
law – were forbidden, this represented one more blow to nation-
al pride.
Just at that time, in 1932, Ante Pavelić founded the Ustasha
movement in Italy. In his program texts, he advocated national
exclusivism and announced the creation of an independent Cro-
atia as the ultimate goal. He and his followers stirred up the cult
of hatred and revenge, primarily towards all supporters of the
Yugoslav idea and then towards the Serbs (and later the Jews).
The movement announced the most radical methods of strug-
gle, including terrorism. The obsession with blood and violence
reached mythical proportions, creating fertile ground for geno-
cidal crimes in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). At the
beginning, the Ustasha movement was linked to Fascist Italy and
a little later to Nazi Germany as well.
From the summer of 1932, members of the Ustasha organisa-
tion planted bombs at railway stations and police stations in Croa-
tia, leaving dead and wounded civilians. They also raised the failed
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Velebit Uprising, after which the gendarmerie undertook a series
of severe repressive measures, which caused further discontent.
During the dictatorship, a number of politicians ended up in
prison. Radić’s successor as leader of the HSS, Vladko Maček,
was accused of helping terrorist activities (after he had spent five
months in prison, the charges against him were dropped and he
was released). In 1929, due to criticism of the dictatorship in his
speech on the occasion of the establishment of the Bar Associa-
tion, its Chairman Ivo Politeo was also arrested. Even Svetozar
Pribićević, who was a great believer in Yugoslavia, did not fare
any better. He was interned in Brus for some time and was also
hospitalized in Belgrade for a short period. Following the inter-
vention of foreign diplomats, he (already sick) was allowed to go
abroad where he supported Croatian aspirations towards greater
independence and then full independence until his death in 1936.
He also wrote the book King Alexander’s Dictatorship, which actu-
ally represented his showdown with the ruler.
Although the goal of the January 6 Dictatorship was to perse-
cute the promoters of national/nationalist and liberal ideas, it first
showed its repressive face to the communists who, for their part,
offered a pretext for repression by staging an armed uprising. Dur-
ing the “White Terror” from 1929 to 1932 at least 328 people and
probably many more were killed. The center of the police activi-
ties and persecution of the communists was Zagreb, where Đuro
Đaković, Secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and
Nikola Hećimović, Secretary of Red Aid, were arrested and then
tortured and killed. All “seven secretaries of the League of Com-
munist Youth of Yugoslavia (SKOJ)” were also killed in Zagreb
and its surroundings. All this testifies to the antagonism towards
the regime, which was felt in Croatia and among the Croats.
By changing the name of the state into the Kingdom of Yugosla-
via in the autumn of 1929, King Alexander rejected the concept of
compromise-based national unitarism (expressed in the syntagms
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“three-named people” and “three tribes of a single people”) and
replaced it by integral Yugoslavism in which there was no room
for tribal affiliation and national designations. The administrative
division into banates (banovine) had no ethnic, economic or geo-
graphic justification. It was a deliberate attempt to annul the con-
tinuity of historical and national regions and their boundaries. All
these actions were direct blows to Croatian national feelings and
interests.
The King held that, after ten years of unsuccessful parliamen-
tary efforts, he alone should realize the most important goal: to
level the Yugoslav space in a national sense or, in other words,
to create a single Yugoslav nation on an ideological basis – inte-
gral Yugoslavism. In the following years, it turned out that he was
greatly mistaken. First, national specificities in the Yugoslav space
were already developed, so that historical processes could not be
reversed. Second, he tried to achieve goals that were unachievable
in a democratic environment by using dictatorship. Maček called
the King’s intention to create a unified “Yugoslav nation” using
repression “nonsense” and cited a unnamed HSS member: “You
cannot create a child by a decree and King Alexander thinks that
he can create a whole new breed of people in such a way”.
In the Belgrade Parliament, which was strictly controlled by
the King, even the supporters of nation-building protested against
the repression. In 1932, Budislav Grga Anđelinović spoke about
the existence of the “Croatian question” (“Let us not act like an
ostrich and bury our heads in the sand.”), which was pure blas-
phemy for the supporters of unitarism, while deputy Ivo Elegović
warned that “we, the people’s deputies, especially from the Croa-
tian regions, know on the basis of direct observation that, unfor-
tunately, the national cauldron is boiling. Gentlemen, don’t let this
cauldron explode”.
Dictatorship and its implementation additionally strength-
ened its opponents and also encouraged them to use aggressive
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methods. One of the first victims of the violence was King Alex-
ander himself.
THE KING’S ASSASSINATION AND THE
CVETKOVIĆ-MAČEK AGREEMENT
The King’s assassination in Marseilles was organized by Mace
donian nationalists together with the Ustasha organisation. The
Ustashas themselves said that the “Ustasha gun had spoken out”.
A significant role in this event was also played by the Italian and
Hungarian secret services.
Alexander’s violent death like the assassination of the Croa-
tian deputies in 1928 imposed a heavy burden on political life and
“hampered the modernisation of Yugoslavia as a state and, in par-
ticular, as a society”. These two tragedies demonstrated the extent
of the rift between Serbs and Croats – probably not so much
in politics as in an emotional sense and at the level of popular
mythology. For many years, they were one of the key arguments
in national memories that “we can’t go on together any more”.
However, a considerable number of people still did not share such
this opinion. These were primarily the numerous Serbs in Croatia
who sided with their broader homeland Croatia in 1928 and fol-
lowed the policy of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). On the
other hand, the Croats that were inclined towards the monarchist
option (their number was smaller than during the 1920s and over
time, as the Second World War approached, it grew even smaller)
also mourned over the King’s assassination in Marseilles. Many
of them visited the King’s tomb on top of Oplenac Hill, while 30
young men from Smokvica on the island of Korčula did not shave
their beards for six months in the memory of the King.
At that time, the Ustashas in Croatia were weak – their organ-
isation did not exist and the newspapers and brochures under
their influence had a small circulation. They gained weight in 1937
when Prime Minister Stojadinović reached agreement with the
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Italian government to grant amnesty to some of them, so that they
could return to Yugoslavia. Accordingly, by the summer of 1939,
some 260 Ustasha émigrés, among whom Mile Budak was the best
known, had returned to the homeland.
Although the authorities – during the parliamentary election
campaign in 1935 – largely used aggressive measures (at election
rallies in Croatia the police killed 20 or so people), the unita-
rist forces won a Pyrrhic victory. This was a sign that the author-
ities must negotiate with the opposition, especially the Croa-
tian. Hence, after 1935 it was again possible to speak more freely
about inter-ethnic and social problems and tensions that could be
termed “the Croatian question”.
As a supporter of the idea of integral Yugoslavism and a political
realist, regent Paul Karađorđević met with Vladko Maček short-
ly thereafter. Maček asked him to call a new election and “restore
the 1918 status”, but Paul rejected this proposal. In passing, he
asked Maček “whether the Croats want this state” and “how many
Frankists there are and what is their program”. He did not get a
clear answer to this question. Although this meeting did not pro-
duce direct results, it was clear to all that some kind of compro-
mise should be sought.
The Cvetković-Maček Agreement (in fact, the agreement
between the Croatian political elite and Belgrade’s Royal Court)
was concluded on 26 August 1939 in a state of imminent war psy-
chosis, only five days before the outbreak of war. The essential part
of the agreement was the establishment of the Banovina (Banate)
of Croatia as an administrative unit. The Banovina included those
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a majority Croat popula-
tion and part of Srijem. The boundaries so determined were an
attempt to solve the Croatian national question. However, when
the boundaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina were determined, the
Muslim population was ignored and only the proportions of the
Serbs and Croats in the districts were taken into account. This
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imposed a heavy burden on the hitherto cooperation between the
HSS and Muslim politicians in the anti-centralist program.
At such moments, however, internal tensions and foreign pres-
sure were too heavy, so that even more prudent political solu-
tions could not relax them. There were many opponents to this
agreement – some HSS members also held that Maček did not get
enough. Maček was exposed to an even greater number of attacks
from right-wing nationalists, Frankists and others, most of whom
joined the Ustasha movement later on. They proclaimed him a
traitor, arguing that the only solution to the “Croatian question”
lay in separation from Yugoslavia. For their part,, Serbian nation-
alists and conservatives viewed the Cvetković-Maček Agreement
as a surrender to the Croats.
The HSS had a strong coalition partner – the Independent
Democratic Party which differed from all other Serbian and pro-
Yugoslav political parties because it consistently defended the
Croatian right to its state-legal and ethnic specificities in the King-
dom of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it firmly defended the view
that the solution to the “Croatian question” should not be sought
beyond the boundaries of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
Although it seemed that the Cvetković-Maček Agreement actu-
ally saved Yugoslavia, it turned out that it had an opposite effect
– it “unintentionally proved the limitations of centralist Yugoslav-
ism and opened the door to alternative solutions”.
“INDEPENDENT” CROATIA
Due to their severe disappointments encountered in Monar-
chist Yugoslavia, many welcomed the creation of the Independent
State of Croatia (NDH) in April 1941. They also held that, by creat-
ing a new state that would be politically close to the Nazi regime,
Croatia would avoid the ravages of war into which Europe was
being dramatically plunged – all this under the slogan “There is
no war and we have a state!”
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With the proclamation of an “independent” Croatia, the goal
to which Croatian extremists had aspired for years, with lesser or
greater support from some circles in Croatia, was now achieved.
However, it was mostly impossible to resolve the problems placed
on the agenda. The first problem – dependence on the Reich and
Italy – was interpreted by the Ustashas and their supporters as
if this were an advantage. They held that by linking the NDH to
the Reich, they would make fast progress because the Reich had
established a thousand-year “New Order in Europe”, which pro-
claimed its superiority over decadent Western capitalism and god-
less Communism. However, it soon turned out that it was a noose
around their neck which the NDH authorities could not – or per-
haps more accurately, did not want to – remove.
The sympathy that a section of the public had for the NDH soon
gave way to dissatisfaction. Through demarcation of the borders
with Italy and Hungary, the NDH lost large parts of Croatian ter-
ritory while the German and Italian armies enjoyed special treat-
ment, so an increasing number of people realized that the NDH
was actually a German-Italian protectorate. The persecutions of
Serbs, Jews and Roma on racial, religious and ethnic grounds, as
well as the brutal terror against their Croat political opponents
caused aversion and uncertainty among an increasing number of
people (“great enthusiasm in the streets soon dwindled after the
emergence of the first posters of shot and hanged opponents and
innocent hostages”).
All this was accompanied by great economic problems, so that
many people found themselves on the brink of starvation. The
abrupt emergence and continuous strengthening of political and
armed resistance against the Ustasha regime and foreign occupa-
tion were the most convincing indicators of the political senti-
ments of the Croatian and non-Croatian population in the NDH.
Despite feeling the rigidity of Ustashism, some people deceived
themselvs that “it is better to have any Croatia than none at all”,
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but such a view would soon “force them to make a choice bur-
dened by severe consequences”.
In September 1941, Juraj Krnjević, Vice-President of the Yugo-
slav government-in-exile in London, claimed that the “people at
home cannot openly raise their voice due to the unprecedented
terror”. At that time, Krnjević conveyed Maček’s message to Brit-
ish Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that Croatia was still demo-
cratic and that Pavelić’s government was not the desired choice of
the Croatian people.
Toward the end of 1941, Glaise von Horstenau, appointed Ger-
man General in Zagreb, reported: “Too little support from the
people for Pavelić in the creation of the state is increasingly man-
ifesting itself as a flaw”, and then in February 1943: “The Ustashas
are a worn-down piano that can barely produce full tones”. Just as
Pavelić came to power with the support of his great allies, his stay
in power also depended on their goodwill.
The NDH population was more sharply differentiated in rela-
tion to developments than in most other countries under the occu-
pation or influence of Nazi Germany. There were relatively more
participants in crimes and relatively still more forms of domestic
resistance against the perpetrators of those crimes. In his speech
in Glina in February 1944, answering the question of “why did he
join the Partisans?”, the great poet Vladimir Nazor (1876–1949)
said that he was “prompted to do so because of the inhuman per-
secution and extermination of the Jews, who are humans like us,
and especially because of the terrorising and killing of the Serbs,
who are our blood brothers and with whom we have lived for so
many centuries”.
THE UPRISING AND PARTISAN AUTHORITIES
At first, the calls of the Partisans for an uprising against the for-
eign occupation and the Ustasha regime were exclusively anti-fas-
cist and patriotic. They resisted “fratricidal war”, condemned the
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Ustasha crimes against the Serbs and Chetnik retaliation, and
crimes against the Croats and Muslims. Aware of the people’s dis-
content with pre-war Yugoslavia, the Communists also announced
a struggle for a better post-war order in the country – democracy
and inter-ethnic equality. The proclaimed the goals of the Nation-
al Liberation Struggle (NOB) to be “the “liberation of the country
from foreign rule and domination” and the establishment of “a new
democratic Yugoslavia of free and equal peoples, with a free Croa-
tia built on the basis of self-determination”. Hearing these slogans,
anti-fascist armed resistance gradually spread among the Croats,
so the idea of Yugoslavia was reaffirmed among them.
In June, in the newly-liberated territory in Otočac and the fol-
lowing day at Plitvice in Lika, the Partisans founded the Region-
al Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council (ZAVNOH), their
supreme representative body of Croatia. In a resolution adopted
by ZAVNOH, “the reactionary regimes” of the Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia and the Banovina of Croatia were resolutely condemned,
while at the same time emphasizing the need to built a new peo-
ple’s government in all Croatia as a guarantee for a new democrat-
ic Croatia within a new democratic Yugoslavia. This was the basic
document used to build the position of Croatia in the new, social-
ist Yugoslavia in the following years.
The situation on the battlefield was directly reflected in the
changed attitude towards the belligerent parties. The year 1943 was
a groundbreaking because the forces of the National Liberation
Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ) took the initiative on the battlefield,
but even more so because Croats were increasingly joining the
Partisans. Although there are no sources that can directly testify
to this, there is no doubt that, at the time, especially in the autumn
of that year, most Croats supported the anti-fascist Partisan side,
helping it actively. There are numerous data – whose impartiali-
ty should not be doubted – which witness this phenomenon. For
example, the German South-East Command sent the following
144
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report to Supreme Command concerning the military and politi-
cal situation in NDH territory in August 1943: “The political situ-
ation in the country is worsening. The NDH authorities have lost
all supporters, even among sections of the Croatian people… The
NDH army can be dismissed as the pillar of the state”.
In late September 1943, thanks to Nazi military power, the Usta-
shas entered Split, but the Intelligence Service of the Directorate
for Liberated Territories in Split informed Zagreb two months lat-
er that “due to extraordinary circumstances in Dalmatia, the sit-
uation for direct development of the Ustasha movement is unfa-
vourable. Unfortunately, enemy propaganda has succeeded in
politically poisoning the great majority of people and arousing
hatred towards Ustashism and the Ustasha movement.”
After the final liberation, the new authorities in Yugoslavia and
in Croatia, were more popular than in any other East European
country. Many people gave credit to the Communists for ending
the war and ethnic carnage. In addition, calling for equality in a
poor country had to be met with approval. Propaganda slogans
and mobilisation songs (such as the song “Fall down force and
injustice… our day, too, has dawned”) had a significant effect. Dur-
ing the following years and decades, the regime enjoyed relative-
ly great support among the wide strata of the population, primar-
ily due to the building of State Socialism, which brought acceler-
ated industrialisation, mass education and health and social care.
LIBERATION AND POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT
Support of the regime in Croatia and among the Croats was
also helped by the fact that Zadar and some of the islands,, Istria
and parts of the Croatian Littoral were included in Yugoslavia or,
more precisely, Croatia, thereby healing long years of frustration.
However, behind the polished mask of building a new and sat-
isfied society there were a considerable number of people who
were extremely dissatisfied. There were also many people who
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had lost someone in “squaring accounts with the People’s enemy”,
although he or she did not deserve death. The authorities used up
this credit they had among some people rather quickly. As early
as the summer of 1945, many innocent people, picked up in mass
arrests at the end of the war, primarily civilians and Domobrani
(Home Guard), did not return home. In addition, the sweeping
nationalisation after 1946 left only small-scale crafts and trade in
private hands, causing discontent and a change of attitude towards
the government.
Part of the population still cherished the hope that the eco-
nomic and social situation would improve. Since there were no
free elections or any other way of freely expressing their political
views, it is impossible to assess more precisely the degree of pub-
lic support for the regime and how quickly this support was lost,
or periodically recovered thanks to some actions. In this connec-
tion, the national factor in Croatia was important because, despite
political slogans about the equality of the republics, it was obvious
that a new centralism had been installed.
Croatia became one of the six republics making up the feder-
al state that promoted Yugoslav patriotism with its politics and
supra-national ideologies (brotherhood and unity, socialist inter-
nationalism). However, it tried to maintain the balance by pro-
moting national identities and the interests of individual peoples
(and nationalities). It was held that the national form was strictly
observed, primarily thanks to the establishment of a federal sys-
tem. However, in expressing this national form some tradition-
al contents were missing. “The canon of Croatian national cul-
ture, constructed during the time marked by HSS cultural policy,
remained almost intact, like the presentation of Croatian folkore
onstage during the period of socialist Yugoslavia. In the reali-
ty of everyday life and suppressed by modernisation processes,
as well as the policy of de-Christianization and putting pressure
on the peasants, national culture was retreating. However, being
146
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refined and shaped into a canon, it seemed to be the least danger-
ous expression of national culture for real politics”.
In the sphere of historical memory in Croatia, the brunt was
borne by Ban Josip Jelačić (and partly the Zrinski family). Since
Jelačić was defamed as an “enemy of the working class” (because,
in Karl Marx’s opinion, he took part in the suppression of the pro-
gressive Hungarian revolution in 1848), his monument in Zagreb
was removed in 1947 and streets and squares bearing his name
in Croatia were re-named. The names of Ante Starčević with his
rightist ideology and Stjepan Radić with his general human rights
were allowed (or ar least tolerated), the latter more than the for-
mer, but they were served to the public in strictly “measured”
quantities. It was in this atmosphere that we should place the state-
ment by well-known singer Vice Vukov (1936–2008) that during
the 1960s it was possible to speak about “Slovenian” and “Mac-
edonian” singers, while he was always called a “Zagreb’” singer ,
not “Croatian”. He added that “those from Belgrade were likewise
called “Belgrade” singers, not “Serbian”.
During the immediate post-war years, contrary to public proc-
lamations, all power was concentrated in the hands of a small
number of federal or republic Politburo members. The Croatian
Politburo had fifteen or so members. According to recently pub-
lished records, it is clear that the Politburo controlled all aspects
of social life. At all events – it decided on the the composition of
the government, what the government would say at an important
public meeting, which government members would speak, how
many HRSS members would be in the Parliament – after the 1950
elections – whether killers would be handed over to the police or
not. There were no great discussions on strategic issues at their
sessions, let alone discussions on decisions taken at a higher level
– the Federal Politburo in Belgrade. In the early 1950s, although a
process of democratisation and federalisation had been initiated,
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the functioning of both the federal and republican Politburos still
bore many characteristics of strict centralisation.
Pursuant to a 1952 parliamentary decision, the Government of
the People’s Republic of Croatia was reorganized and reconstruct-
ed, establishing the Presidency of the Government, five ministries
and nine councils. Although this process, called “decentralisation
and de-bureaucratisation” in party parlance, produced only par-
tial results for years, or even for decades, it nonetheless signifi-
cantly changed Yugoslav/Croatian society. It brought changes in
all spheres of life, including the army in which territorial defense,
organized at republic level, was gaining importance.
Although the government wore the mask of self-satisfaction in
public and confidently claimed that the situation was ideal, the
highest officials knew that this was not true. They would openly
admit this in their narrow circle. For example, in 1950, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia (CK KPH) stat-
ed that it was necessary to “fight against chauvinism, especially
in mixed districts… now and then there appear enemies who use
various slogans about the inequality of one’s own or another peo-
ple, about alleged neglect or suppression and the like”.
In the meantime, in January 1953, the Federal Assembly adopt-
ed the Constitutional Law on Elements of the Socio-Political Sys-
tem and the Federal Organs of Government. In February, the Par-
liament adopted a similar legal act. At that time, one could already
observe the trend whereby the adoption of federal regulations was
immediately followed by the adoption of republican ones. While
elections for the Constituent Assembly and adoption of the Con-
stitution of the People’s Republic of Croatia took place in 1946–
47, one year after the adoption of these procedures at federal level,
Croatian regulations were adopted just three weeks after their fed-
eral counterparts. Nevertheless, after the adoption of the Consti-
tutional Law in early 1953, things started moving towards decen-
tralisation, in contrast to the immediate post-war period.
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During these years, a parallel process was underway. As in the
whole of Yugoslavia, Croatia was also developing both economi-
cally and socially at an accelerated pace.
The most important characteristic of this period was fast eco-
nomic growth. Between 1952 and 1960, the social product in Cro-
atia increased by 106% and in the following decade (1961–1970)
by a further 76%. During the period 1953–63, the average annu-
al growth in production was 9.5%, while the growth of personal
consumption was exactly 10%. This economic growth, backed by
Western financial assistance, was one of the highest in the world.
Under the influence of economic reforms and Ranković’s
downfall, the 1960s constituted the period of the most vigorous
economic growth in post-war Croatia and Yugoslavia. Between
1962 and 1970, average real pay (without taking into account a
high increase in the employment rate) increased by 90%. In some
years, its increase was only 14%, but it was never lower than 4%. At
that time, the manager stratum was also formed in Croatia. These
people developed the entrepreneurial spirit and promoted West-
ern behavioural patterns within the socialist economic and social
system.
Liberalisation was most clearly reflected in almost full freedom
of movement, both inside and outside the country, including con-
siderably relaxed border controls. Although the border with Aus-
tria was opened in 1953 and with Italy two years later, the num-
ber of border crossings did not register a striking increase until
the mid-1960s. In the Zagreb area the number of issued passports
increased from 47,479 in 1964 to a total of 307,163 in 1966 and 1967.
During this period, a large number of Croats from Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina proportionally many more than any other
Yugoslav nation) went to “work abroad temporarily”. Until 1971,
most of them went to the Federal Republic of Germany (70%).
In 1971, the Croats constituted 22.1% of the Yugoslav population,
while in the total number of migrants (763,000) they accounted
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for 39%. At that time, the Croats constituted 20.6% of the popu-
lation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their share among the work-
ers from this republic who were employed abroad was more than
double – 42.4%. Many of these “workers temporarily employed
abroad” (Gastarbeiter)” converted their temporary stay into a
permanent one, but maintained ties with the homeland and sent
about 500 million dollars to Yugoslavia each year, of which 300
million dollars went to Croatia. In 1967, foreign exchange remit-
tances by these workers accounted for 1.2% of Croatia’s national
income, while seven years later this share had grown to 7.4%.
Workers temporarily employed abroad built houses and
brought other material goods (cars, household appliances), so that
many underdeveloped regions were transformed from the mid-
1960s till around the mid-1980s solely thanks to the work of their
compatriots abroad.
The increase in Croatian tourism was of special importance.
In 1938, less than 3 million tourist nights were recorded, in 1958
already eight million, while in 1969 this rose to more than 28 mil-
lion tourist nights. During the 1960s, the annual growth rate of
tourist nights recorded two-digit numbers. In 1963, for example,
Dalmatia recorded 57% more foreign tourist nights than the year
before. Roads were also built. The building of the Adriatic High-
way, over 650 km long, had a crucial impact on tourism develop-
ment. Roads were also built in the interior of Croatia. Thanks to
its modern roads (for that time), Croatia was connected to the
West and other federal republics, as well as within the country
itself, so that it started functioning as a transport entity. Airports
were also opened in Dubrovnik and Split (1966), and thereafter in
Pula (1967) and Zadar (1969).
During these years,, the University of Zagreb expanded at an
accelerated rate, and separate departments and then faculties were
also founded in other cities. They turned into universities in Split,
Rijeka and Osijek in the 1970s.
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Zagreb TV began broadcasting in September 1956, as Yugosla-
via’s first TV station. Even earlier, an important role in newspa-
per publishing was held by Vjesnik u srijedu, the first Yugoslav
entertainment and political weekly spanning a broad spectrum,
which was launched in 1952. In some periods, it had a circulation
of 300,000 copies and exerted a strong influence on the develop-
ment of the Croatian and Yugoslav media and society in general.
In the subsequent years, the Vjesnik Newspaper Publishing Enter-
prise carried out many successful and important projects.
This was also the period of cultural expansion in numerous
spheres. The Zagreb School of Animated Film was founded in the
mid-1950s. In the following years and decades, its authors received
won numerous international awards, culminating in the Academy
Award (Oscar) for the Best Animated Short Film in 1962, won by
Dušan Vukotić (1927–1998) for his film Surogat (The Substitute).
The cultural upswing, caused partly by liberalisation and
democratisation during the 1950s and 1960s, brought new ideas
and new trends into Croatian culture and its public. During these
years, they naturally exerted an influence on Croatian politics and
society as a whole.
RAISING “FORBIDDEN” QUESTIONS
During the 1960s, an increase in the standard of living strong-
ly contributed to the formation of an increasingly broad middle
class that was developing a world view different from the rigid
Marxist line. The Western way of life and, in particular, a consum-
er mentality, were becoming increasingly evident. As early as the
late 1960s, true party believers warned that Marxism was being
“disputed” and proclaimed “obsolete” and that Marxist ideology
was considered “outdated”. They also claimed that various anti-
Marxist ideological tendencies were being revived and that their
opponents aspired towards the “de-ideologisation” and the “con-
vergence” of social systems.
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It was logical that in such a libertarian environment, in a con-
siderably more affluent society, a new atmosphere was created and
that hitherto forbidden questions began to be asked. This meant
that relations within the Federation, that is, inter-ethnic rela-
tions would also be reassessed. At first, debates about them were
refracted – or politically coded – by emphasizing the question of
language.
After the downfall of Aleksandar Ranković, the need was felt
for decentralisation and federalization. Hence,, public discus-
sion about constitutional amendments was initiated. In March
1967, the Telegram weekly published a document entitled Decla-
ration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Standard Language,
which was signed by 18 scientific and cultural institutions in Cro-
atia. The signatories of the Declaration demanded equality in the
status of the Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian lan-
guages in federal institutions and the consistent use of the Cro-
atian standard language in Croatia. Publication of this text had
broader implications since it indicated national inequality and, in
particular, repression of the Croats and the Croatian language. At
the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Com-
munists of Croatia, the Declaration was branded as “an act direct-
ed against the brotherhood and unity of the peoples and nation-
alities of the SFRY” and as “tendentious and politically harmful”.
The Parliament claimed that “with their demands the signatories
attacked the main achievement of the National Liberation War –
brotherhood and unity”. The party members who had signed the
Declaration were branded as “politically immature”. All state and
party forums gave bureaucratic and ssentially deceitful assess-
ments that “the Yugoslav union created the conditions for resolv-
ing inter-ethnic relations – including the question of language, in
a different way”.
Of the 70 party members who had signed the Declaration, 34
were punished in various ways, while 10 were expelled from the
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League of Communists. The authors of the Declaration were sub-
jected to political pressure and temporarily or partially removed
from public life.
Although the events associated with the Declaration had an
unsuccessful outcome for Croatian interests, some of the demands
were adopted very soon. For example, at the end of 1967, the Fed-
eral Executive Council decided that as of 1968 all federal regula-
tions should be published in the languages of all the peoples. The
Declaration and related events were a prelude to a general eman-
cipation movement in the years to come.
During these months, both the League of Communists and
society in general demanded a realistic debate about the devel-
opment of self-management, the operation of banks and inter-
republic relations. All this clearly indicated that it would be diffi-
cult to preserve the indisputable “brotherhood and unity” dogma
with the wave of democratisation. One of the most sensitive topics
was whether the interests of individual republics should be subor-
dinated to the imaginary “common” interest.
During these years, power in Croatia was gradually taken over
by a reformist and nationally-oriented leadership headed by Sav-
ka Dabčević-Kučar and Mika Tripalo. It also included Ivan Šibl,
Pero Pirker, Dragutin Haramija and Srećko Bijelić. Apart from
some minor (insubstantial) differences, this circle of people took
a unique stand – they advocated a radical transformation of the
economic system and the democratisation of political life.
By the end of 1971, when the movement, called the “Croatian
Spring” after the Prague movement bearing the same name, was
forcibly suppressed, it was spontaneously joined by a large number
of the Croatian people and enjoyed wide public support. Although
various ideological, national and social aspirations (many of which
could not be explained due to the limited democratisation of soci-
ety) came to the fore during that relatively short but eventful peri-
od, two basic ideas dominated – national and liberal-democratic.
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
With different people and on different occasions, one or the oth-
er would be more strongly expressed, but most often they merged
together, with the national idea being more dominant.
Even these two basic ideas were never clearly defined and ana-
lysed, while many people were afraid to say all that was in their
minds. In public, the wish for further democratisation was exclu-
sively presented as a reform within the socialist system, but
some people obviously thought that it would be necessary to
aspire towards the development of pluralistic liberal democracy.
Although the publicly avowed goal was a more independent Cro-
atia within Yugoslavia, between the lines of some writings and in
some incidents the wish for the full independence of Croatia could
be discerned. Later events, especially after 1990, when individuals
and groups were freer to speak out and act as they wished, sug-
gest that two visions of the Croatian state were present at the time:
one was democratic, with an anti-fascist and democratic identity,
while the other was based on national exclusionism and in some
ways continued the traditions of the NDH. Although there were
also some inappropriate anti-Serbian acts and procedures, anti-
Serbian feelings appeared only sporadically and on the margins of
the “Croatian Spring”.
According to the “Croatian Spring” participants, the unequal
status of Croatia was especially evident in the economic sphere
because, for example, the unjust provision under which export-
ers, whose seat was mostly located in the north-western republics,
tourism and Croatian workers temporarily employed abroad had
to deposit a high percentage of foreign exchange in the National
Bank of Yugoslavia. In many newspapers in Croatia it was insist-
ed that “the unfair distribution of wealth in which the person who
creates this wealth receives the least, must be eliminated in our
environment”.
There is no doubt that it was very difficult to fulfil the wish
to establish “clean accounts”. After the collapse of the “Croatian
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Spring”, Stipe Šuvar argued that theses about the exploitation of
Croatia were not correct. He rejected the assessments given in pre-
vious years that the federal state favoured Serbia and the under-
developed republics. He argued that economic analyses showed
that insofar as overall development was concerned, all republics
were developing at an almost equal pace. However, if shorter peri-
ods were taken into account, some republics fared better than oth-
ers. On the other hand, some analyses pointed out that the more
developed republics were developing at a faster pace (he was right
because, for example, Croatia in 1953 was more developed than
the Yugoslav average by 14%, while in 1979 by as much as 30%).
The market carried out redistribution in favour of more devel-
oped republics due to price differences between finished products
and raw materials, while redistribution in favour of the under-
developed republics was carried out by subsidising general con-
sumption and earmarking resources for additional investments.
Šuvar agreed that the administration was making mistakes and
even behaving in a biased manner, depending on the prevalent
national structure. However, he saw the causes of these econom-
ic problems as lying in the preservation of centralism, different
development levels of the republics and the redistribution of prof-
its due to the functioning of the market and investments.
However, similar tensions also occurred at the level of Croa-
tia, although they were much less publicly present, since Croa-
tia itself was actually divided into developed and underdeveloped
parts. North-Eastern Croatia, Slavonia and parts of the Adriatic
coast were more developed, while Lika, parts of Dalmatinska Zag-
ora and other mountainous regions were underdeveloped. The
republic had the funds for underdeveloped regions. The resourc-
es earmarked for this purpose were increasing faster than the
social product, but that did not help either. As the years passed,
the underdevelopment of the “passive” regions only deepened
due to their inability to overcome it. It is no accident that national
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
antagonisms, which soon evolved into a war, erupted first in those
regions towards the end of the 1980s.
The forcible suppression of the “Croatian Spring” generated
strong negative feelings towards the Yugoslav authorities in Croa-
tia, but the conformism of many people did not allow the under-
standing that Yugoslavia as such should be replaced by an inde-
pendent Croatia that had now come to maturity. Apathy also
reigned since the general opinion was that decisions were made
by the will of the state-party apparatus and not by the majority
will of the people.
Nevertheless,, the ideas of the “Croatian Spring” participants
were incorporated into the 1974 Constitution, which affirmed
the statehood of the republics, thus laying the foundation for the
independent states of the early 1990s. Finally, political apathy in
the 1970s was somewhat mitigated by the fact that this period
saw the highest standard of living both in Yugoslavia and Croa-
tia (between 1965 and 1979 onwards the average growth rate was
6.5%).
The result of apathy as well as political repression was the crea-
tion of a social and political atmosphere that was later termed the
“Croatian silence”.
Until second half of the 1980s, Croatian leaders remained more
rigid than in most other republics and did not allow any more
open discussion. Since they understood the “struggle against
nationalism” as one of their primary tasks, it was impossible to
speak about the status of Croatia in Yugoslavia during these years.
The situation in Croatia was additionally aggravated by the
deaths of Krleža in 1981 and Bakarić two years later. There were no
more authority figures of the kind that had dominated Croatian
cultural and political life for decades and who might reverse the
negative trends. At the same time, the Croatian economy ran into
problems because its construction, metallurgy, machine-building
and shipbuilding industries plunged into crisis.
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The relative stability of the system (and hence Croatia’s attitude
towards Yugoslavia and in Yugoslavia) was secured by Yugosla-
via’s decades-long openness towards the world, where Croatia had
an advantage over the other republics due its intensive contacts
with the world at large and vigorous tourism that continued to
increase. According to all the statistics, in the late 1970s and early
1980s, the Croatian social product was about 25–30% higher than
the Yugoslav average. The developed parts of the country were
even more developed – Zagreb’s social product was 111% high-
er than the Yugoslav average, while Rijeka, Poreč and Krk lagged
only slightly behind Zagreb.
However, the party nomenclature did not know how to use all
this to its advantage because it was not inclined towards changing
the utterly inefficient political and economic system. The situa-
tion was worsening. One of the indicators was the distancing and
antagonism of young people towards current politics. In Croatia
in 1974, 13% of people did not want to be members of the League of
Communists, while in 1989 this percentage increased to 70% and
in 1989 to as much as 75%. As a comparison, these figures in Yugo-
slavia were 9% in 1974, 50% in 1986 and finally 51% in 1989.
In the mid-1980s, a certain degree of liberalization started in
Croatia, partly due to the fact that the League of Communists was
losing its legitimacy to act as supreme arbitrator. Liberalisation
was also reflected in the increasingly open criticism of social real-
ity, in discussions about a civil society, reform and pluralism. So
the criticism of Milošević’s movement, when it began to devel-
op, was left to liberalized public life and the media. However, the
indecisiveness and hesitation of the leadership of the League of
Communists of Croatia was one of the key reasons for its election
setback in the spring of 1990.
In such circumstances and as a result of similar processes in
other Communist countries, initiatives emerged for the formation
of opposition societies and political parties in late 1988 and early
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1989. The newly-formed opposition was faced with two problems:
the introduction of multi-party liberal democracy and resolution
of the national question.
Despite the tensions, inter-ethnic relations in Croatia could be
considered relatively stable even towards the end of 1989. Accord-
ing to surveys, the great majority of Croats (65.8%) and Serbs
(72.1%) considered inter-ethnic relations to be good or very good,
while only 8.7% of Croats and 4.5% of Serbs considered them as
mostly bad or very bad. Are these findings realistic or was it a
question of self-deception or the fear of expressing sincerely held
views?
DISINTEGRATION OF THE FEDERATION
However, those were the weeks and months when it was
increasingly expressed that Croatia should not remain in a Yugo-
slavia organized according to the wishes of Milošević’s movement.
It turned out that the political system based on “brotherhood
and unity” (replaced mostly by the term “togetherness” at that
time) was very fragile and that its stability was largely false. The
reasons for the relatively fast changes in Croatia and the entire
Yugoslav space partly lay in the poorly developed political cul-
ture. The public was inclined towards “mass authoritarianism” or,
in other words, towards reacting collectovely and not individual-
ly. Consequently, gregariousness at work! In a specified social sit-
uation and at the will or “order of the social hierarchy, the prev-
alent value orientation (in this case – inter-ethnic tolerance) is
very quickly transformed into its opposite (ethno-nationalism).
It should also be taken into account that the 1980s were marked
by a protracted economic crisis, leaving behind disappointed, if
not poor, people, and this always opens the door for demagogu-
ery, populism and manipulation. The instigator of the collapse of
the Yugoslav socialist union should be sought not only in Croatia,
that is, “social poverty and economic irrationality”, but also in the
158
resitance to centralism resitance to centralism
symbiosis of “awakened nationalism and the hunger for a restora-
tion of identity”.
The attitude of the Croats and Croatia towards Yugoslavia is
well illustrated by the attitude towards Yugoslav sports teams. In
June 1989, Zagreb was the venue for the European basketball chan-
pionships. The Yugoslav national team led by Dražen Petrović
won all their games convincingly and became European cham-
pions. A celebration after winning the gold medal was organized
on Republic Square. The popular singer Kićo Slabinac was the
show’s presenter . The basketball players appeared on the stage at
around one thirty in the morning. Shouts of ‘Yugoslavia! Yugo-
slavia!’ resounded throughout the square. Sixty thousand people
greeted the national team. “The celebration continued in Zagreb’s
clubs until the early hours”, Večernji list reported.
Exactly a year later, in June 1990, Zagreb was the venue for a
football match between the Yugoslav and Dutch teams. The Yugo-
slav team members actually played this match for themselves since
there was no one to root for them. When the national anthem was
played, most spectators turned their backs towards the pitch and
whistled. The stadium was full of Dutch colours and flags and the
majority of Yugoslav team members and selector Ivica Osim were
on the receiving end of insults.
Around 1990, empires and socialist federations were falling
apart. But the principle of freedom, involving not only individ-
ual freedom, but also the free will of the people, decided the fate
of the Yugoslav state. This was one of the fundamental reasons
why Croatia became an independent state one or two years later,
for most Croatian citizens simply did not want Yugoslavia in any
form any more.
159
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
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162
in search for identity in search for identity
Macedonia and Macedonians in Yugoslavia
in search for
identity
ALEKSANDAR LITOVSKI
Macedonia was the most southerly region, i.e. republic (South
Serbia, Vardar Banovina, Vardar Macedonia, the Democratic
Federal Republic of Macedonia, the People’s Republic of Mace-
donia, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia) of the once kingdom
or republic prefixed Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia linked a part of the
Macedonian people and other Yugoslav peoples into a common
state. In the period 1918–91, Macedonia’s territory of 25,713 square
kilometers was an integral part of Yugoslavia and its population
ranged from 808,724 to 2,022,547 people (according to the cen-
suses of 1921 and 2002 respectively). Characteristic of this region
or republic throughout the Yugoslav era was its multi-ethnicity.
According to statistics in the period of the Kingdom of SCS/Yugo-
slavia, the Macedonian ethnic community predominated in the
corps of the Serbian ethnic community in Macedonia. Of all oth-
er ethnic communities, Turkish, Serbian, Bosniak, Aromanian,
Roma, etc. the Albanian was the biggest.
163
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Table: Population Of The Republic Of Macedonia
CENSUS 1953. 1961. 1971. 1981. 1991. 1994. 2002.
Macedonians 860.699 1.000.854 1.142.375 1.279.323 1.328.187 1.295.964 1.297.981
Albanians 162.524 183.108 279.871 377.208 441.987 441.104 509.083
Aromanians 8.668 8046 7.190 6.384 7.764 8.601 9.695
Roma 20.462 20.606 24.505 43.125 52.103 43.707 53.879
Turks 203.938 131.484 108.552 86.591 77.080 78.019 77.959
Bosniaks / / / / / 6.892 17.018
Slovenians 1.147 838 648 983 513 403 365
Serbs 35.112 42.728 46.465 44.468 42.775 40.228 35.939
Croats 2.770 3.801 3.882 3.307 2.878 2.248 2.686
Montenegrins 3.414 3.246 3.920 2.526 3.225 2.318 2.003
Others 6.832 10.815 30.384 64.162 77.452 26.511 15.939
TOTAL 1.304.514 1.406.003 1.647.308 1.909.136 2.033.964 1.945.932 2.022.547
1.305.566 1.405.526 1.647.792 1.908.077 2.033.964 1.945.995 2.022.547
PLANNED AND ORGANIZED DENATIONALIZATION
In the period 1918–91, the history of Macedonia opened with
yet another partition of its territory that had started in the Balkan
Wars and been verified at the Paris Peace Conference. This parti-
tion determined relations between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria in
the time to come.
The states that partitioned Macedonia – though each by a dif-
ferent method – constantly, in a planned and in organized way,
worked on denationalization and assimilation of the Macedonian
people. These were the years during which anything representing
any form of Macedonian national feeling was persecuted and bru-
tally punished.
The partition badly affected the economy of the Vardar part of
Macedonia, the region allocated to the Kingdom of SCS. The new-
ly-established border with Greece severed the channels of normal
trade with Salonika as the most important economic and trading
center. Years of almost non-stop military action laid waste to the
economy. This, plus the policy of the Serbian authorities – ruth-
less economic exploitation and total economic discrimination in
164
in search for identity in search for identity
World War I – rounded off the picture of deplorable economic cir-
cumstances in this part of Macedonia.
In the aftermath of World War I, the régime tried to maintain
a system of “emergency measures” in Vardar Macedonia imposed
on it during the war. The Macedonian population was compact
in the territory of Macedonia within the borders of the Kingdom
of SCS. However, with an eye to converting them to Serbs, the
régime worked on their denationalization on the one hand, and
colonization by the Serbs on the other. It also went for “adminis-
trative colonization.” In other words, most public servants were of
Serbian origin and were as such settled in that part of Macedonia.
Colonization was also intended as a protective military measure:
the colonies were strategically built in the borderland and close
to major roads and railroads. The constant presence of army and
police forces was characteristic of rule over Vardar Macedonia..
Following the occupation, Macedonia was named South Serbia
and the Macedonians called the South Serbs. The Serbian régime
wished to create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity at all times.
Its policy for Macedonia was one aimed at strengthening “Serbi-
an patriotism” and Bulgarophobia. To implement this, the régime
overstressed the threat of “Bulgarization” and its duty to take eve-
ry precaution to avoid it.
In addition, action by the VMRO (the Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organization) played into the hands of the Serbi-
an régime: from 1919 to 1934 233 public servants and 185 civilians
were killed and 268 wounded in 467 attacks by party activists.
Vanče Mihailov’s VMRO activism culminated in the assas-
sination of Serbia’s King Alexander on October 9, 1934 in Mar-
seilles. Party action was also responsible for the formation of a
Štip-based, special military-Chetnik organization, the “Associa-
tion against Bulgarian Bandits,” and the deployment of “federal-
ist” troops under the command of Stojan Mišev and Gligor Ciklev,
paid for from the pockets of the population of the eastern parts of
165
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Vardar Macedonia, whom the same troops often terrorized for no
reason whatsoever.
The entire state administration, the press, schools, the Church
and numbers of nationalist organizations were engaged in the
denationalization and assimilation of the Macedonian people.
Any Macedonian legal and independent political action was disa-
bled. The Macedonian language was banned from public and pri-
vate use, while the law and politics prohibited any manifestation
of Macedonian national consciousness or culture. Terror, pres-
sure, arrests, detention and expulsion were the main methods of
the policy for Vardar Macedonia. This was why people in Mace-
donia barely felt any difference when the dictatorship of January
6, 1926 was proclai166med, banning all political freedoms in the
country: Macedonia was by then already used to this situation. In
October 1929, the monarchy was divided into banships (banovine)
and Macedonia was included in the so-called Vardar Banovina.
Bowing to the pressure of popular dissatisfaction, the régime had
to make some concessions as of 1932. By calling municipal elec-
tions in 1933, it hinted at a return to parliamentary democracy.
Municipal elections in Macedonia were held on October 15, 1933
in the entire territory of the Vardar Banovina, in 440 municipali-
ties, with the participation of 1,113 candidate lists. Out of 354,242
registered voters, 246,976 cast their vote, which meant that the
turnout was 69.79%. In the parliamentary elections in the King-
dom of Yugoslavia in 1935, the people in the Vardar Macedonia
voted for four candidate lists.
The activity of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ)
strongly influenced the development on the political scene in Var-
dar Macedonia. The communists were the only ones to recognize
Macedonian national individuality. In this context, the stands
the KPJ took on the Macedonian national issue, which in large
part corresponded to the goals of the Macedonian movement for
national liberation, played a major role on the eve of World War
166
in search for identity in search for identity
II. Those stands, no matter how blurred especially on Macedo-
nian unification, mobilized the Macedonians for the anti-fascist
war and partially enabled resolution of the Macedonian nation-
al question.
That KPJ policy contributed to the emergence and activism of
the Macedonian National Movement (MANAPO) and most Mac-
edonian students studying in Belgrade, Zagreb, Skopje and else-
where joined in. Standing up against Serbia’s policy of denation-
alization, the Macedonian student youth of the 1930s resolute-
ly spread ideas about the need to fight for Macedonian national
and social rights. The basic postulates of the movement were put
in black and white in a document called the “Political Declara-
tion,” adopted undercover at a meeting of Macedonian students
on August 26, 1936 in Zagreb and subsequently signed by the rest
of the student youth.
Actually, MANAPO was fighting for Macedonian national
freedom and equality in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the coun-
try’s transformation into a federation that would ensure equali-
ty before the law. Most importantly, the members of the move-
ment actively joined the anti-fascist struggle later on, and became
promoters of Macedonia’s national emancipation. Kiro Gligorov,
the first president of the independent and sovereign Republic of
Macedonia, was one of them.
THE OCCUPATION OF MACEDONIA IN WORLD WAR II
In April 1941, when the Balkans became a theater of war, Mace-
donia became subject to new geopolitical divisions. Thanks to its
central position on the Balkan Peninsula, Macedonia was a terri-
tory of strategic importance to the Third Reich’s plans for occupa-
tion of the Balkans. On the eve of World War II, other great pow-
ers and neighboring Balkan countries were also aspiring to take
control of Macedonia and making plans of their own.
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Following the attack on Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941 and hence
on the territory of Vardar Macedonia, the German army rapid-
ly progressed through all the frontlines and totally smashed the
Yugoslav troops by the end of April 1941. Having suffered mili-
tary defeat, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was erased as a state, while
Germany, Italy and their “satellites” divided its territory among
themselves.
The territory of Vardar Macedonia was also partitioned at the
so-called Vienna Conference of the foreign ministers of Germa-
ny and Italy on April 21–22, 1941. The Vardar part of Macedonia
was handed over to Bulgaria with the exception of the territories
in the west around Kičevo, Gostivar, Debar and Tetovo that were
integrated into Albania with its puppet government.
The Bulgarian occupation forces divided Vardar Macedonia
into two administrative regions, Skopska and Bitolska, and installed
completely new judicial, police, military, financial and religious
authorities. The state of Bulgaria passed numbers of laws and by-
laws on Macedonia. It thus established a special legal system quite
different from its own. The entire population of the occupied ter-
ritory immediately received Bulgarian citizenship and was strict-
ly forbidden to declare itself as Macedonian. In fact and contra-
ry to all international norms, Bulgaria both formally and legally
annexed the territories of Vardar and Aegean Macedonia.
Propaganda spreading “Bulgarian national consciousness” in
the “newly liberated” territories was the priority of all governmen-
tal and non-governmental institutions. Concrete measures were
taken through the education system, the Church and a large num-
ber of “cultural institutions.”
Macedonia’s right-wing and pro-Bulgarian groups and organi-
zations played a special role in all this by upholding the Bulgarian
occupation régime and its plans for denationalization and assim-
ilation. To a greater or lesser extent, depending on their actual
needs, they all worked for the Greater Bulgaria project and the
168
in search for identity in search for identity
Bulgarian state. Before Bulgaria’s capitulation, and in tandem with
German intelligence and diplomatic services, even supporters
of the Čkatrov-Đuzelov group and Mihailov’s VMRO attempted
to set up an “independent” Macedonian state with either Hris-
to Tatarčev or Vančo Mihailov at the helm. Given that ASNOM
(the Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Macedonia)
had already constituted a Macedonian nation-state, it goes with-
out saying that their anti-Macedonian action stood no chance.
Following the Italian occupation and under the Royal Envoy
to Albania Francesco Jakomoni’s decree, the territory of Western
Macedonia was annexed to so-called Greater Albania. Adminis-
tratively, the territory of Western Macedonia included the Debar
Prefecture with its seven sub-prefectures or districts. The Ital-
ian 41st Florence Division and its commanding officer, General
Arnold Arci, were headquartered in Debar. This military com-
mand held all the reins in the occupied territory and had com-
mand over all Italian military-police institutions. It even appoint-
ed even civilian commissariats.
The main Albanian quisling organization was Belli Kombeter
(National Front) formed in November 1942. Its ideology stemmed
from fascism and the Greater Albania project. Thanks to the lat-
ter, it was most influential among the Albanian minority popu-
lation in Western Macedonia. The process of “Albanization” was
carried out intensively in all spheres throughout the occupation.
This practice was continued after Italy’s capitulation in even more
manifest forms.
Macedonia’s occupation instigated the gradual organization of
an armed, anti-occupation and liberation struggle by the Macedo-
nian people under the leadership of the Macedonian national-lib-
eration and pro-communist movement. One should bear in mind
that the very organization of an armed anti-fascist struggle against
the backdrop of strong “Greater-Bulgarian” and “Greater-Albani-
an” propaganda, and the repressive institutions of the occupier,
169
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
resolved to destroy that struggle and its promoters by all means,
legal and illegal, was an extremely complex task.
In September 1941, the KPJ Provincial Committee for Mace-
donia decided resolutely to start preparing for armed struggle.
Soon after, on October 11, 1941, actions by the Prilep Partisan Pla-
toon marked the beginning of the anti-fascist uprising of the Mac-
edonian people as an integral part of the Yugoslav People’s Libera-
tion Struggle led by the KPJ.
In the spring of 1942, armed operations intensified, thus
strengthening the armed struggle. In the autumn and winter of
1942, armed struggle was still unquestionable despite a Bulgari-
an massive military offensive against the Partisans. On the con-
trary, their struggle was growing stronger and stronger. In fact, it
even intensified in 1943 with the arrival of Svetozar Vukmanović-
Tempo, the KPJ Central Committee (CK KPJ) delegate to Mace-
donia and member of the Supreme Command of the People’s Lib-
eration Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ). Soon after, the membership
of the newly formed Central Committee of the KPM (Commu-
nist Party of Macedonia) was tasked not only with party, but also
political and military, activity in the field.
The decisions taken at the Prespan meeting of the CC of KPM
on August 2, 1943 near the village of Oteševo considerably con-
tributed to strengthening the armed struggle and its organization-
al structure. Namely, the meeting decided to form larger military
formations, which subsequently characterized the NOVJ and Par-
tisan troops in Macedonia as a regular army.
After Italy’s capitulation on September 8, 1943 the troops of the
People’s Liberation Army and Macedonian Partisans (NOV and
POM) partially disarmed the Italian forces in Western Macedonia
and established an extensive belt of liberated territory including
the towns of Kičevo and Debar for a time. The Initiating Com-
mittee to Convene the Anti-fascist Council of People’s Libera-
tion of Macedonia (ASNOM) was also formed at the time. The
170
in search for identity in search for identity
Committee gave a green light to those who had already been
planned to be its delegates. First, schools in the Macedonian lan-
guage were opened on the liberated territory and action taken to
restore the independence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church
(MPC). Within the ranks of the Macedonian People’s Liberation
Movement, the liberated territory was seen as an embodiment of
the “Free Macedonia” slogan and the nucleus of a Macedonian
state. The Manifesto of the General Staff of NOV and POM, the
most important document defining the goals of the anti-fascist
struggle in Macedonia, with a platform for Macedonia’s national
liberation, was also prepared and published on the liberated terri-
tory in the second half of October 1943.
The liberated territory in Western Macedonia was sustained till
early December 1943. By December 18, 1943, the majority of NOV
and POM troops had arrived in the liberated territory, in Meglen-
sko in the Aegean part of Macedonia. On December 21, 1943 in
Meglensko, the CC of the KPM held a consultation – known as
the Fuštani Consultation – to analyze the work done and set guide-
lines for further development of the armed struggle.
The beginning of 1944 marked the beginning of a German-Bul-
garian winter offensive against NOV and POM troops in the area
of Meglensko. The Partisan troops were not smashed in the offen-
sive but, on the contrary, grew in numbers and intensified their
activity in early 1944. The so-called February counter-offensive
caused their struggle to increase dramatically as did the number
of new fighters.
The establishment of a liberated territory in the Kumanovo-
Vranje area was a threat to the most important transportation and
communication route of German troops in the Balkans. There-
fore, as of late April 1944, German and Bulgarian forces mount-
ed massive military offensives meant to annihilate Partisan units
in the area. The Bulgarian offensive of May 1944, known as the
Spring Offensive, ended in disaster despite the multitude of strong
171
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
administrative and propaganda measures the Bulgarian authori-
ties had taken in the territory under their control.
From the summer of 1944, anti-fascist sentiments grew visibly
stronger among the Macedonians and support for the Partisans
became almost popular. Following pitched battles waged through-
out Vardar Macedonia in June and July 1944, many newly-liberat-
ed territories were established.
After thorough preparations in the spring and summer of 1944,
and in line with the decisions of the Second Session of AVNOJ
in the Prohor Pčinjski monastery (now in present-day Serbia),
the Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Macedonia
(ASNOM) held its first session on August 2, 1944. With the par-
ticipation of the majority of the elected delegates from the Vard-
ar, Pyrenean and Aegean parts of Macedonia and with represent-
atives of the Great Powers and the Yugoslav military and political
top leadership in attendance, this session laid the foundations for
Macedonian statehood.
MACEDONIA’S INTEGRATION INTO THE YUGOSLAV STATE
The session adopted a Decision proclaiming ASNOM the high-
est judiciary and executive representative body and the high-
est body of the state whereby it legalized Macedonia’s statehood,
which was further confirmed by having Macedonian declared the
official language.
The Declaration on the Fundamental Rights of Citizens, anoth-
er document adopted at the first ASNOM session claimed that the
feeling for togetherness, inter-ethnic tolerance and equality had
been centennial characteristics of the Macedonian people.
ASNOM approved the decisions of the AVNOJ Second Session
by publicizing that Macedonia had joined the Yugoslav state in the
first phase of the next act that would bring about unification of the
entire Macedonian people in a single state.
172
in search for identity in search for identity
The role of the main executive power up until final liberation
was allocated to the Presidium of ASNOM. The federal leadership
was dissatisfied with the efficiency of this body. Its “bulkiness” and
inability to carry out major duties, as well as the need for its “re-
organization” were “a unique example” of the then federal state.
This was why, for inexplicable reasons, Macedonia was the first
republic to undergo centralization through its executive body, the
so-called working committee of the ASNOM Presidium, which
was nothing but a fabrication though admittedly invested with
certain legislative powers that overstepped its portfolio (for exam-
ple, the ASNOM documents did not provide for this committee).
There are no records about its “dismissal.” However, there are also
no records about its activity following the establishment of the
government of the People’s Republic of Macedonia (NRM).
The process of constituting the NRM as a state ended in the
appointment of the republican government. Planned as “the peo-
ple’s government” and a true representation of popular will, it
turned out to be centralized, alienated from the people and “above
it.” The same was true of the codification of the Macedonian stand-
ard language in 1945.
DEPENDENCY ON THE FEDERATION
The constitutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ)
and the NRM confirmed the centralist character of the state by
defining Macedonia as “the people’s state in the form of a republic
in which the Macedonian people shall freely exercise their rights
and freedoms” and enjoy sovereignty limited by the federal bod-
ies. In fact, this meant that, although independent, Macedonia in
actual fact depended much on the federation. This was evident in
its economy and economic development and in the 1947–51 five-
year economic plan for the rapid industrialization and electrifi-
cation of Macedonia and GNP growth in order for it to bridge
the existing gap between the developed and less developed. This
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
concept was not implemented in practice. On the contrary, all
republican officials did everything in their power to channel most
investment funds into their own republics. The departure from
the electrification and industrialization plan for Macedonia was
an excuse for its abandonment. In terms of its GNP, Macedonia
was at the bottom of the scale. Moreover, despite the planned
“rapid” electrification, only 13 million dinars had been set aside
for Macedonia – ten times less than for the same purpose in oth-
er republics. The next development plan was additionally detailed
and supplemented with new systemic solutions. The Crediting
Fund for the Underdeveloped Republics and Autonomous Prov-
inces, which included Macedonia, was established at federal level.
Republics were freed from paying back credits and the funds were
used for investment in the underdeveloped regions.
The landmark of this period was the Cominform Resolution or
Tito-Stalin conflict. In Macedonia, as in other republics, the state
used the method of re-educating those who believed in Stalin and
distrusted Tito. Following the Stalinist model, Tito isolated these
Macedonians, as well as other like-minded persons from all over
Yugoslavia, in the Goli Otok concentration camp. About 1,000
Macedonians – outstanding activists and communists many of
whom had occupied high political positions or made up the core
of the then Macedonian intelligentsia such as Panko Brašnarov,
Lazar Sokolov, Vladimir Poležinovski, Venko Markovski, Petre
Piruze-Majski, as well as the first prime minister of independ-
ent and sovereign Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Kljusev – were
imprisoned on Goli Otok.
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Workers’ self-government – or, the socialist self-government
system and decentralization model meant to introduce a unique,
Yugoslav “socialism with a human face” – was characteristic of the
1950s and put into practice through the Constitutional Law of 1953.
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in search for identity in search for identity
Macedonia wholeheartedly accepted workers’ self-government
although it had lost in its power structure with the constitution-
al reforms. It also said yes to introduction of a commune system
and a number of by-laws enabling it. A municipality-commune
became a basic unit of this system. Two administrative-territorial
units, 86 municipalities and 7 districts were established in Mace-
donia. Under the constitutional amendments of 1963, districts
were deprived of their power and municipalities became the cent-
ers of self-governing decision-making. Administratively and ter-
ritorially, Macedonia was divided into 32 municipalities.
A new constitutional preamble adopted in 1963 determining
Macedonia as “socialist” – the Socialist Republic of Macedonia
/SRM/ – and defining it as “a socialist democratic community,
and the state of the Macedonian people and Turkish and Albani-
an nationalities in Macedonia” – then replacing the term “nation-
al minorities” by “nationalities” were the landmarks of this peri-
od. The changes made to improve inter-ethnic relations did not
achieve the desired effects – on the contrary. They were followed
by a period of open dissatisfaction of the Albanian ethnic commu-
nity that culminated in the 1968 well-organized protests of which
the most intense were staged in Tetovo. Protesters demanded
“more human rights,” while the Albanian banners taken off offi-
cial buildings had triggered their protest. Nationalism was grow-
ing in areas with ethically mixed population. Protesters marched
under nationalist slogans such as “The time has come for civil
war” or “This is the end of Albanian slavery.” Some party officials
were also making nationalist statements, while at the same time
calling for democratization, decentralization and more independ-
ent republics. Dissatisfaction was also evident at the Fifth Con-
gress of the SKM (1968). Six out of seven Albanian and Turkish
candidates for the Central Committee were not elected. A com-
promise solution to the “problem” was found in an acclamatory
enlargement of the Central Committee.
175
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Nationalism was growing in Macedonia. In order to fend it off,
strengthen the federation and give priority to Yugoslavianism as
an ethnicity, the federal leadership began working on constitu-
tional amendments that implied amendments to the republican
constitutions as well.
These amendments and the 1974 Constitution defined the SRM
as a common state of the Macedonian people and Albanians,
Turks and members of other equal nationalities, and provided the
rights and duties of the Macedonian people and other nationali-
ties vis-à-vis their constitutionally guaranteed rights. Further on,
the Constitution provided for equality of the mother tongues and
alphabets of nationalities in the municipalities of their residence
where they constituted a considerable percentage of the total pop-
ulation, with the Macedonian language. It also guaranteed their
religious rights, the right to stage their own cultural events, etc.
The expanding nationalism of the last decade of the SFR of Yugo-
slavia verified these rights in their true sense. In this period Mac-
edonian Moslems were under strong pressure to replace the suf-
fixes of their family names from ski and ov with i and u. Statistics
show an impressive number of changes in family names in certain
municipalities (Skoplje – 578 persons, Veles 366, Prilep 472, Res-
en 257, Debar 255, Struga 218, Bitolj 87). In addition, the number
of settlers from Kosovo when compared with the number of per-
sons who emigrated from Macedonia was on the increase. Some
22,000 Albanians moved in. while about 5,000 moved out (the
ratio being 4:1).
The trend of national affirmation of the nationalities was a fact.
However, where do you cross the line between affirmation and
nationalism? This question was in the wind at the time, just as it
still is today.
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in search for identity in search for identity
AFFIRMATION OF CULTURE
Basically, the constitutional amendments represented a posi-
tive trend in the exercise of Macedonia’s statehood. Equal repre-
sentation of the republics in federal bodies improved. In 1967, for
the first time, a Macedonian high official, Kiro Gligorov, was elect-
ed vice-president of the Federal Executive Council (SIV). The fact
is, however, that never before in five decades of the federation’s life
had a Macedonian been elected president of the SIV (i.e. the prime
minister).
An upward parity trend was also noted in the nomination of
ambassadors and consuls. In this period and for the first time since
the Liberation, a Macedonian, Vasko Karangeleski, was appoint-
ed army commander of Macedonia. At the same time, Macedo-
nia’s statehood grew stronger. Establishment of the Macedonian
Academy of Arts and Sciences (MANU) and the proclamation
of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church additionally
affirmed its statehood.
This was a period when Macedonian culture was truly affirmed
both in Yugoslavia and internationally, mostly thanks to the Tanec
folk troupe (established in 1949), the federal and internation-
al Evenings of Poetry in Struga (Struške večeri) launched in 1961,
the Ohrid Summer (Ohridskog leto, started in the same year), the
Macedonian National Theater, the Macedonian Opera and Ballet,
and the Theater of Nationalities staging a multitude of events, both
domestic and international – all of which represented symbols of
Macedonian identity.
However, what mostly marked this period and symbolized
Yugoslav unity and solidarity was the Fund for the Reconstruc-
tion and Construction of Skopje. It was established by the Fed-
eral Assembly to help relieve the consequences of the disastrous
earthquake that destroyed Skopje and killed many. The peoples
177
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
of Yugoslavia were the first to generously offer a helping hand
in cleaning up the debris and rebuilding a city that was in ruins.
With their help and the help of the international community, the
city was rebuilt in record time and named “The City of Solidarity.”
LIBERAL TRENDS IN THE LC OF MACEDONIA
A reformist wave was sweeping through the SKJ and SKM. The
liberal faction of the Party was louder, advocating its democratic
transformation. Its protagonists were younger party cadres who
had not taken part in NOB (the People’s Liberation Struggle).
Liberal trends in SRM were directly affected by similar tenden-
cies in other republics. Liberalism in SRM was actually autoch-
thonous. Krste Crvenkovski was seen as its main proponent and
his liberal statements sounded reasonable and acceptable to many
“radical” intellectuals, but also to party officials such as Ljupčo
Arnaudovski, Slavko Milosavlevski, Dimitar Mirčev, Milan Nedk-
ov, Ćamuran Tahir, Tomislav Čokrevski and many others.
Macedonian liberals called for “democratic ideas” – in prac-
tice, the right to strike, pluralism, the democratization of the
trade unions, etc. The reaction to these tendencies was anti-lib-
eral and started with the famous “Letter” (Pismo, a program doc-
ument adopted at the 21st Session of the Executive Committee of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia). The Party leadership
had the “Letter on its agenda but took no steps regarding it. Tito,
therefore, visited Macedonia in late 1972. The end results of his
visit were all messages and lessons: “Implementation of the Let-
ter is not to be questioned…just do what was agreed on…do not
waste time clearing up personal relationships…There should be
no different opinions about certain problems…Problem-solving
starts at the top, from the leadership…”
The showdown with the liberals began in 1973 under the mot-
to “Implementation of the Letter” and culminated at the 36th Ses-
sion of the CK of SPM (January 18–21, 1973).
178
in search for identity in search for identity
“Maximum unity in the Party” was conceived as a political
campaign but it was also used by certain party officials to square
accounts of a quite personal nature. “Who’s for whom, who’s with
whom?” or “Who’s for Laza, who’s for Krsta?” These were just
some of the formulations that transcripts taken at party meetings
were brimming over with, alongside qualifications such as con-
servative, progressive, a bureaucrat, a democrat, a factionist, etc.
What followed was a multitude of “voluntary” resignations and
“early” retirements by individual liberals who did not fit into the
newly-constructed party scheme.
The economic reforms, launched in the mid-1960s, unfold-
ed independently of reforms in the Party and the Constitution.
Investments had stagnated. Investments which the federation was
duty bound to make and put into effect were curbed. The living
standard dropped, primarily as a consequence of two devalua-
tions of the dinar in 1971. Productivity lagged behind the Yugo-
slav average by 19%, which resulted in low revenues of enterprises,
the latter itself resulting from an inappropriate production struc-
ture (out of 248 representative industrial products manufactured
in the SFR, Macedonian industry produced only 109). This direct-
ly caused low profits, lower anyway than the Yugoslav average by
10–15%, as well as the growing domestic indebtedness of the Mac-
edonian economy.
THE CULMINATION OF ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS
In the decade preceding Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Mace-
donia’s underdevelopment was at its peak. This was manifest in
banking and business losses, a rise in unemployment, low wages,
domestic and foreign debts, etc. The widening social gap was giv-
ing rise to tension and inciting strikes. In 1986, 140 strikes were
registered in the SR of Macedonia with the participation of 23,045
employees. Work hours lost to strikes amounted to 202,245. In
six months in 1989 alone there were 92 work stoppages of more
179
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
than 9,000 employees and 67,293 work hours lost. The fall in pro-
duction quite logically resulted in a liquidity crisis blocking bank
accounts of 50 OURs (abbr. for organization of joint work, organi-
zacija udruzenog rada) that provided jobs for 98,000 people. Eco-
nomic enterprises owed 53,300,000 dinars to domestic banks and
their foreign debts totalled 309,000,000 dollars, which exceeded
Macedonia’s capital inflow by 40%. By December 31, 1988, Mac-
edonia’s foreign debt had reached 1,150,000 dollars, of which
985,000 dollars were convertible debts. Another reason for under-
development was that the republics were highly inter-dependent
in terms of raw materials, final products and sales. Macedonia’s
own production met just 48% of consumer demand for cooking
oil, 48% for wheat, 25% for sugar and 47% for coffee. The remain-
ing demand had to be compensated for by “imports” from oth-
er republics, which included 373 medicaments not produced in
Macedonia. Unemployment was the biggest threat and the most
complex problem. Unemployment soared in Macedonia. In 1982,
119,000 persons were registered as jobless, while in 1988 the fig-
ure rocketed to 136,417. The last attempt at a rescue mission was
in the form of the SIV package of economic reforms supposed,
among other things, to bridge the gap between the “developed”
and “underdeveloped” republics. However, some republics (Ser-
bia, Slovenia and Croatia) had not paid their taxes to the federal
budget for months and, with a helping hand from their “people,”
“raided” the Yugoslav financial system and the Central Bank (the
People’s Bank of Yugoslavia) borrowing 1,400,000,000 dollars. All
the then Macedonian leadership could possibly do was to con-
clude that the Yugoslav economic system was no more.
THE STATE IDENTITY-BUILDING PROCESS
Apart from the economic sphere, the crisis was also manifest in
the dysfunctional political system. In Macedonia, categorized as
far behind among the “conservative republics,” this was manifest
180
in search for identity in search for identity
in the form of an almost silent promotion of a Macedonian state,
a shy attempt at democratization and in the idea of “no-party plu-
ralism” that was accepted at the federal level.
This sort of pluralism was fully affirmed by the 10th Congress
of the SKM (1989). The reformist wing proved to have the upper
hand over the dogmatic-conservative. Petar Gošev was elected
president of the Presidency of the Central Committee of SKM.
Once transformed, the SKM, the unique political factor up to
then, paved the way for its own demission. Several ecological asso-
ciations formed at the time were seen as possibilities for “alter-
native expression.” Amendments to the Law on Social Organiza-
tions and Citizens’ Associations (1990) legalized political plural-
ism in Macedonia. In 1990, the number of registered political par-
ties grew to 23.
In Macedonia, the process of federal democratization acted as a
catalyst. The winner of the first multi-party elections in 1990 was
the VMRO-DPMNE (the party with the “national prefix”) that
had advocated secession in the election campaign. Macedonia’s
separation from Yugoslavia was highly democratic, following the
referendum of May 8, 1991. Its citizens voted for an independent
and sovereign Republic of Macedonia.
181
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
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(материјали од политичките разговори за македонското прашање),
Скопје, 1998.
67. Црвенковски Крсте/Милосавлевски Славко, Нашиот поглед на
времето на Колишевски, Скопје, 1996.
68. Црвенковски Крсте/Томовски Мирче, Заробена вистина, Скопје,
2003.
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Slovenia and Slovens in Yugoslavia
reasons for
entering and
exiting
BOŽO REPE
ENTERING THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA
The current Slovenian view of Yugoslavia, particularly from a
political standpoint, is based on the thesis that Yugoslavism was a
solution arrived at out of necessity, something that helped the Slo-
venians to overcome a difficult period until they returned to where
they belong –to so-called Europe. History, of course, paints a differ-
ent picture. Slovenians did believe in Yugoslavia and they invested a
lot of energy and money, as well as political effort, into its democra-
tization; both major politicians, priest Anton Korošec and commu-
nist Edvard Kardelj were proud Yugoslavs, but both also saw in it
an ideological connotation: Korošec saw a guarantee that his party
would have absolute rule over Slovenia in agreement with the court
and Serbian parties and that he would organize it in accordance
with Catholic principles, while Kardelj was convinced that the main
connective tissue of Yugoslavia was socialism and that the country
would collapse without it – which ultimately did happen.
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It was not until the second half of the 1980s that Slovenians
arrived at thoughts or even a national program which did not
simultaneously prejudice, in one way or another, the solving of the
national question within Yugoslavia. And the ideas about Yugo-
slavia were different, even contradictory to one another. Dur-
ing World War I and practically until its conclusion, Slovenians
believed in the possibility of solving their national question with-
in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Of course, Yugoslavism’s prede-
cessor, the Illyrian movement, had previously appeared to them
as a similar possibility. The movement was a South Slavic liter-
ary-cultural and national-political movement dating back to the
first half of the 19thcentury. The idea stems from Jan Kolar’s Pan-
Slavictheory. Its basis was belief in Slav autochthony in the Bal-
kans, the theory that the South Slavs descended from the ancient
Illyrians. For this reason the Shtokavian dialect of the Croatian
and Serbian language was named lingua Illyrica (ilirika; illyrische
Sprache) and the residents Illyrians. Some respected educators saw
the possibility of a Slavic state as early as the time of Illyrian prov-
inces, after the defeat of Napoleon, when the Illyrian kingdom was
founded in 1816 as a special administrative creation within Aus-
tria, and which would later became the country of Austrian South
Slavs. The Illyrian movement was particularly important in Croa-
tia, while for Slovenians, the implementation of Illyrianism meant
accepting a common South Slavic language – some combination
of Shtokavian with elements of other languages. For this reason,
not many Slovenians supported the idea. Instead, they were more
in favor of certain forms of cultural and political cooperation with
the South Slavs.
The Illyrian movement was followed by trialism, the idea of
merging “all South Slavs within the monarchy into a governmen-
tally and judicially independent body under the crown of the Hab-
sburg Monarchy”, as defined by the statement made by the Kranj
State Council on 16 January 1909. Trialism primarily depended
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
on Croatian stances, which were at first not inclined to connect-
ing with Slovenia (for example, the so-called Rijeka Declaration
in October 1905), all in agreement with the Hungarians and the
Italians. Slovenian politicians sought to include Croatian politi-
cians in their governmental and judicial programs. The idea of
trialism reached its final stage in the Austrian part of the monar-
chy thanks to the May Declaration in May 1917, and just one day
before the Austrian part of the monarchy restored parliamentary
life, the Yugoslav Club was founded, which united Slovenian, Cro-
atian and Serbian deputies from the Austrian part of the monar-
chy (there had previously been three clubs: the Croatian-Sloveni-
an Club, the National Club and the Dalmatian Club). On 30 May,
1917, on behalf of the Club, Dr Anton Korošec read in German
the so-called May Declaration, which was the name of the docu-
ment put together at the beginning of May by Dr Janez Evange-
list Krek, and whose final draft involved Dr Anton Korošec, Vje-
koslav Spinčić, Dr Josip Smodlaka and Dr Melko Čingrija (who
was also Prefect of the Dubrovnik county and one of the found-
ers of the Croatian-Serbian coalition), and which was signed by
all members of the Yugoslav Club. The declaration stated: “The
undersigned deputies, united at the Yugoslav club, hereby state that
based on ethnic principles and Croatian national law, we request-
that all territories of the monarchy inhabited by Slovenians, Croats
and Serbs unite under the crown of the Habsburg-Lorraine dynas-
ty into an independent government body, free from any foreign rule
and established on the basis of democracy. We will wholeheartedly
invest ourselves into achieving this request made by our unique peo-
ple. With this in mind, those signed here will continue to participate
in parliamentary work.”The May Declaration was not only a tool
used in the parliamentary struggles in Vienna, even though that
had been its main purpose initially. A strong movement in sup-
port of the Declaration sprang from the Slovenian regions, which
gave the Declaration a necessary multinational scope.
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As the war was drawing to a close, the course of military and
political events resulted in the increasingly significant option
of unifying the Yugoslav nations outside the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. It is true that even before the war the option had sup-
porters in a small students’ society Preporod (Revival)(associated
also with Young Bosnia), while a federal Yugoslav state was also
promoted by Slovenia’s most famous writer Ivan Cankar. During
the first two years of the war, despite their unquestionable loyalty
to the monarchy, Slovenians were subjected to brutal government
violence (prison, confinements). Then, towards the end of the
war, Slovenian politicians gradually and cautiously began labe-
ling the May Declaration as the minimum of their requirements,
mentioning possible solutions in spite of the government and the
monarchy, as their patriotism and loyalty to the throne began to
diminish. However, when it came to the Yugoslav option out-
side of Austria-Hungary, Slovenian politicians had little impact.
The most important, so-called “Piedmont” role (named after the
region that united Italy) belonged to Serbia. That role stemmed
from Serbia’s position: it was an independent state, a member of
the Allied forces, it had military power and all this put together
is what gave it a dominant position during the unification. The
Serbian government made its intentions clear at the very begin-
ning of the war – on 7 December 1914 – when, in addition to lib-
eration, it proclaimed the unification of “all our enslaved brothers
– Serbs, Croats and Slovenians” as a military goal within the Niš
Declaration. With this move, it manifestly exceeded its historical
program from 1849, Garašanin’s Draft [Načertanije], i.e. the aspi-
ration towards the unification of all Serbs under one state. Impe-
rial Russian diplomats warned Serbian politicians against creating
such a state (i.e. Yugoslavia), in which the Serbs as a nation and
Orthodoxy as a religion would indeed have a relative majority, but
where other, different nations put together against them and oth-
er religions in relation to Orthodoxy would constitute a majority,
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which could push Serbia into a crisis, similar to the one Impe-
rial Russia experienced during the war. There was no mention
of internal organization of the state within the Niš Declaration,
which is why there was a justified fear that the Serbs would merely
use annexation (“adjoining”, as they called it) to expand their ter-
ritory, as they had done after the Balkan Wars with Vardar Mace-
donia. Since it was not entirely clear to Regent Aleksandar and the
Prime Minister what they were getting into, Serbian geographer
Jovan Cvijić showed them at the beginning of the war where all
South Slavic nations were living on a map, on the basis of which
they then determined their military targets and included Slove-
nians in them. This was followed, to a large extent, by complaints
from Niko Zupančič, a Slovenian ethnographer who lived in Bel-
grade and was in charge of a local museum there.
Moving towards and away from the Greater Serbia program –
which was called the “small” and “large” Yugoslav program due
to territorial overlapping with the Yugoslav program – was part
of Serbian politics until the end of the war. Especially because the
dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the emergence
of new states in its territory did not appear very likely up until
October 1918, i.e. it was contrary to the politics led by the Allied
countries, and many Serbian politicians did not want to make the
Serbian cause secondary to Yugoslavism, and later also constant-
ly equated the two.
Leaving aside the politically encouraged hostility towards Ser-
bia at the beginning of World War I ( the most famous slogan was
“Srbe na vrbe”, which literally meant “Hang Serbs from the wil-
low trees!”), it can be said that positive Yugoslav feelings certain-
ly existed among the Slovenians, at least from the Balkan Wars
onwards. Slovenia’s leading newspapers kept an ongoing check on
events on the fronts and expressed their sympathy for the Serbs
and the Bulgarians (to whom they also added the Macedoni-
ans), particularly during the First Balkan War. During the Second
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Balkan War, Slovenian journalists sided with the Bulgarians and
were critical of Serbia, but they primarily complained because the
previous alliance had been broken off.
Because of the war, violence and a ban of political activity with-
in Austria-Hungary, the third core of the Yugoslav idea was rep-
resented by political émigrés, primarily of Croatian politicians
from Dalmatia (Dalmatian deputy and and member of the State
Council Dr Franjo Supilo, Dr Ante Trumbić, world famous sculp-
tor Ivan Meštrović and others). These migrant politicians founded
the Yugoslav Committee which included several Slovenian politi-
cians: Bogumil Vošnjak, Gustav Gregorin, Josip Jedlowsky, Niko
Župančičand Drago Marušić. Members of the Committee sought
to gain the support from the Allies and proved to be quite success-
ful at it due to their personal ties. In mid-July 1917 (Serbia was sig-
nificantly weakened at the time because of the situation in Russia,
which was Serbia’s main supporter), Nikola Pašic convened a con-
ference in Corfu which was attended by the Serbian Government
and the Yugoslav Committee. The result was the so-called Corfu
Declaration, adopted on 20 July 1917. According to the Declara-
tion, the new Yugoslav state would be established on the basis of
self-orientation, not annexation, but it would be a constitutional
monarchy with the Karađorđević dynasty at its helm. It would be
called to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS), the
Constitution would be adopted by a qualified (absolute) majority
in the constituent assembly that would be elected through univer-
sal, direct elections. Due to its shortcomings, the Committee led by
Ante Trumbić could not affirm the principles of a federationdur-
ing these negotiations. The country would be divided according to
natural, social and economic criteria, and not based on historical
and national criteria, although there was talk of an equality of lan-
guage, writings and religions between Yugoslav “tribes”. The Cor-
fu Declaration was essentially a political manifesto and the Ser-
bian government treated it as such (for example, it subsequently
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
did not respect the conclusions on the adoption of a constitu-
tion with a qualified majority). When necessary, when it was in
its favor (the question of the monarchy, centralized regulation),
Serbia characterized it as a government act. Even afterwards, the
Serbian government sought to prevent the Yugoslav Committee
from obtaining the role of an internationally recognized entity. Its
role was becoming weaker, though it was still involved in unifica-
tion discussions that were held in Geneva from 6 to 9 November
1918 between the representatives of the State of SCS and the Serbi-
an government. One of the reasons for the underestimated role of
the Committee was the fact that the Committee had not formed
its own military units – unlike the Czechoslovak National Coun-
cil, for instance.
Objectively speaking, Yugoslavism was part of a wider and het-
erogeneous pan-slavism, which no longer had any influence on
events in the monarchy during the final months of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. Everyone was resolving their national ques-
tion in their own way. The final attempts from the court and poli-
tics, which were, in truth, aware of the necessity to solve the Yugo-
slav question, were in a so-called sub-dualistic situation, i.e. sep-
arate – in the Austrian and in the Hungarian part of the monar-
chy – which was, in fact, requestedby the Hungarian government
(which wanted to expand its authority onto Dalmatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina). With such a concept, the May Declaration would
remain unfulfilled. Despite that, the Austrian authorities attempt-
ed to make an impression of trying to turn the monarchy into a
union of federal states, the plans of which were reported in a vari-
ety of newspapers in August 1918. Under pressure from the Ger-
man parties, the authorities gave up on the idea. On October 11,
1918, Emperor Karl received the President of each national club
separately. He offered Korošec an autonomous unit for the South
Slavs within the monarchy, but Trieste and Rijeka, along with the
communication lines to the two ports would remain under the
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jurisdiction of a common state. Korošec insisted on Trieste being
covered by the South Slavic state. Karl unsuccessfully tried to play
the Catholicism card. During the conversation, Korošec (alleged-
ly) told him: “Es ist zu spät, Ihre Majestät!” (“It’s too late, Your
Majesty!”) as well as “What has happened is cause enough for our
distrust.” Slovenians will not commit suicide just to do someone
a favor. Korošec’s impression of the conversation was as follows:
“You could see the Emperor was so depressed that he seemed on the
verge of giving up.”
Starting from the summer of 1917, the Yugoslav idea became a
reality in the consciousness of the Slovenian people. However, the
decision to connect on a governmental and judicial level outside
the Austro-Hungarian Empire was not an easy onefor the Sloveni-
an elite. For centuries, loyalty to the monarchy was something that
had gone without saying for all social strata – for ordinary peo-
ple, for the educated, and particularly for the clergy. Of the Slav
peoples, the Czechs and Slovaks were most similar to Slovenians
in culture and mentality, but they had opted for their own coun-
try, and also still had the Austrians in between them. Politicians
had a glorified perception of the South Slavs, but in truth, they did
not know them well. The predominant cause of caution was dif-
ferences in religion.”How difficult will it be for us if we come under
the rule of an Orthodox king after leaving a Catholic emperor! Deus
misereatur nostri! [May God have mercy on us!],”prince and bishop
Anton Bonaventura Jeglič wrote on November 22, 1918, although
he later confessed that he could see no other solution because the
Slovenians would have otherwise been Germanized. The uncom-
promising and fanatic behavior of the German Austrians towards
Slovenians left no great options. The same was true of the Hun-
garians. Austria-Hungary fell apart against the will and influence
of Slovenia. The Italian army had been pressing. Austrian Ger-
mans wanted unification with Germany, which at the end of the
war seemed like a realistic option. Not even the Hungarians ever
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thought of giving up on Slovenian territory. The possibility of
breaking up into pieces was looming large. Slovenians were part
of the defeated country; Serbia was in the winning camp. The Aus-
trian emperor signed a truce in the night between 2 and 3 Novem-
ber 1918, and it came into force on November 4. According to the
London pact, Italian troops gradually arrived at (and sometimes
attempted to cross) the demarcation line as early as 19 November.
Slovenians waved goodbye to Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavism
via the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) which lasted for
onemonth, and soon afterwards they became part of the King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which would later become
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During this transitional period, there
was dual Austrian-Yugoslav rule in the territory of the Austro-
Hungarian South Slavs, and it was being resolved gradually and
peacefully. The final shift in government occurred on October 29,
1918 in Zagreb when the Croatian Parliament broke off law and
state links with Austria-Hungary, declared the Croatian-Hungar-
ian Agreement from 1868 to be null and void, and proclaimed the
establishment of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Croa-
tia’s Parliament also recognised the National Council – the high-
est governing body of the short-lived state of the Austro-Hungar-
ian South Slavs – as the highest authority. Slovenians also joined
the new state on the very same day, at a mass event in Ljublja-
na which was attended by around 30,000 people. The National
Council, a political body formed in 1918 and composed of rep-
resentatives from all Slovenian parties, had not adopted the spe-
cial declaration of statehood, but did end up backing the conclu-
sions reached by the Croatian Parliament and the National Coun-
cil in Zagrebat a public event on October 29. In the opinion of his-
torians and lawyers from former Yugoslavia (Dr Ferdo Člinović,
for example), a constitutional act is made up for by referencing
the conclusion of the Croatian parliament. Objectively speaking,
Croats had a firmer legal basis than the Slovenians thanks to the
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Croatian Parliament’s decision, but this was not true of Dalmatia
which remained an Austrian province with which the Croatian-
Hungarian agreement was not concerned. In the case of Dalmatia,
they referred to Croatian state law. Not having their own state tra-
dition, Slovenians could still refer to natural law, the stances of the
United States of America (the so-called Wilson’s points), and last
but not least, to Austria-Hungary’s consent that its peoples may
decide on their own destinies. Considering that the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire’s days were numbered, and that the State of SCS
was only a transitional entity, the legal basis for the formation of
the State of SCS was only of internal significance during the heat-
ed inter-ethnic debates within what would become Yugoslavia.
The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was not internationally
recognized and lasted for only one month. It was a short-term and
interim solution during the disintegration of the Austro-Hungar-
ian Empire. In the internal and foreign policy circumstances at
the time, its chances of survival were slim. However, it initiated a
momentum of nationalist sentiments, which had been hampered
and even oppressed, and gave the Slovenians their first national
Government (officially, the Government of SCS in Ljubljana) and
allowed them the feeling of having lived up to resolving public law
acts, since Slovenia’s national government was peacefully taking
over duties from former Austrian authorities and addressing the
issues of succession. There were, however, hiccups when it came
to the issue of borders. The indecisive and lethargic behavior of
the Slovenian government had to be rectified by individuals – par-
ticularly Rudolf Maister, who managed to preserve Maribor and
Styria. Due to volatile politics and the vagueness of jurisdiction,
the government was often in conflict with the National Council in
Maribor, as well as with other local national councils.
The unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with
the Kingdom of Serbia and other former Yugoslav areas into a
single state has been described in great detail and from various
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aspects in Yugoslav historiography, so we will not repeat it here.
We shall recall only that this process had initially been carried
out in parallel and without coordination at crucial moments. Dr
Anton Korošec, delegates of the State of SCS and representatives
of the Yugoslav Committee negotiated in Geneva with Serbian
Prime Minister Nikola Pašić and representatives of Serbian par-
liamentary parties between November 6–9, 1918. The situation
was unfavorable for the representatives of the State of SCS, the
state had not been internationally recognized and its territory was
being penetrated by Italian forces. Despite the disproportionate
political power between the sides, an agreement which acknowl-
edged the equality of the two unifying countries was concluded
(in relation to the unification of the people of Montenegro, the
Geneva Declaration says, “We welcome them with our brotherly
embrace and we are sure that they will rush to welcome it and join
in this act that has always been their highest ideal.”). The agreement
also stipulated a confederative unification (although this term was
not directly used), and a constituent assembly was supposed to be
established prior to the election, one which was made up of tem-
porary national representation and composed on a basis of pari-
ty between deputies from the Serbian National Assembly and the
National Council. The Constitution was to be adopted by a quali-
fied (two-thirds) majority. In Serbia, the Geneva Declaration was
labeled as an insult to Serbian weapons, and the declaration was
not recognized by either regent Alexander or the Serbian Govern-
ment. Several days after the signing, Pašić told representatives of
the National Council and the Yugoslav Committee Korošec and
Trumbić that, due to pressures from home, he was forced to with-
draw and that the agreement was invalid.
At the same time, a confusing debate was being held at the
National Council in Zagreb about how to unite with Serbia (Vojvo-
dina had already done so on its own, directly), and was under
additional pressure from the Austro-Hungarian Serbs. There were
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conflicting views on the formation of a single, Yugoslav people.
After various opinions of its members during the debate on 16
and 18 November, the cultural department of the National Coun-
cil proposed a resolution which advocated for national individu-
ality and political autonomy: “The Slovenian part of the Yugoslav
nation has developed independently in terms of language, therefore
the Slovenian language is the vessel of that spiritual content – its
closest relative, the Serbo-Croatian language, is a self-functioning
organism – and in the domain of the Slovenian standard language,
successful cultural activities are now possible only in this particular
language.” The resolution was not signed by liberal cultural work-
ers, who advocated for Yugoslav Unitarianism just like the Liberal
Party did with its “Declaration of social workers”. Slovenia’s strong-
est party, the Slovene People’s Party, did indeed advocate autono-
my, but due to the absence of Korošec, it had no real leadership
and was in a state of confusion (like Slovenian politics overall).
The Yugoslav state unification, as it is known, was carried out
at a special ceremony on 1 December 1918. The National Coun-
cil’s delegation arrived in Zemun on 27 November and on the fol-
lowing day in Belgrade, where it was situated at Belgrade’s fin-
est hotel, the Grand. They were received ceremoniously, with the
performance of all three national anthems –Slovenian, Croatian
and Serbian (“Forward, Flag of Glory”, “Our Beautiful” and “God
of Justice”), as all three flags were hoisted on the home of regent
Alexander. During the ceremony, the first delegation to address
regent Alexander was the National Council with its so-called
“Address”. It stated that the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from Aus-
tro-Hungary had carried out a coup, temporarily formed an inde-
pendent, national state, and as early as 19 October, expressed a
desire to unite with Serbia and Montenegro “into a single nation-
al state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which would include all con-
tinuous ethnographic territories of the South Slavs”. On 24 Novem-
ber, the National Council decided to declare the unification of the
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with Serbia and Montenegro
into a single state and elected a delegation, “which stands before
Your Royal Highness to officially and ceremonially communicate
this decision.” The “Address” subsequently stated that the monar-
chy of King Peter and regent Alexander was accepted as an uncon-
ditional form of government, that it would be decided on by its
constituent assembly, and that “a single country,” i.e. a centralized
form of government, was also unconditionally accepted. This lat-
er led to numerous criticisms of the delegation. The criticisms,
however, were partly justified, because the National Council was
divided and did not know how to act, and conveyed its insecurity
onto the delegation. Regardless of the manner of unification and
the subsequent dissatisfaction with the Kingdom of SCS and lat-
er with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Slovenia accepted the unifica-
tion as a necessary shield from Germanic and Romanic pressure.
The regent’s pretentious response (the Proclamation of Establishing
the Kingdom of SCS) referred to the work of his ancestors and the
Serbian people and accepted the “Address” of the National Coun-
cil’s delegation saying,”On behalf of His Majesty King Peter I, I pro-
claim the unification of Serbia with the provinces of the independent
state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs into a single Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes.”He also specially emphasized national unity
and its centralist and monarchical form as a self-evident fact. In
accordance with the principle of compromise unitarianism, the
new state was to be a constitutional, parliamentary and demo-
cratic state of a “trinomial nation” with the Karađorđević dynasty
at its helm. The regent’s act –by which the Kingdom of Serbia de
facto ceased to exist –was subsequently confirmed by the Serbi-
an Assembly on 29 December. The first government (which lasted
until August 1919) was appointed on 20 December 1918, was led by
Protic, and included representatives of all major parties from the
newly formed country. Anton Korošec became its vice-president,
Ante Trumbić, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, while Svetozar
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Pribićević, the most deserving “prečanin” politician advocating
a quick and centralized unification, became Minister of Internal
Affairs (Serbs labeled the provinces of the former Austro-Hun-
garian Empire across [“preko”]the Sava, Drina and Danube rivers
as “prečani”). The military which recruited around 140,000 peo-
ple, 2,550 Austro-Hungarian officers and around a hundred Mon-
tenegrin officers was also reorganized, with the regent Alexander
and Serbian politicians carefully making sure that Serbian officers
retain the highest positions and overall dominance in the army.
After long and heated debates between the Yugoslav Commit-
tee and the Serbian Government which had started back in Cor-
fu and continued after the formation of a joint government on 1
March 1919, an interim National Parliament (temporary assembly)
was established, and was active until November 28, 1920, when
the regent dissolvedit, i.e. it lasted for twenty months including
interruptions, and was effectively active for about sixteen months.
The interim Parliament included a total of 296 members, of which
84 were from Serbia, 62 from Croatia, 32 from Slovenia, 12 from
Dalmatia, 42 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12 from Montene-
gro, 24from Macedonia, 4from Istria, and 24 from Vojvodina. The
National Parliament adopted few laws, and even the budget was
mostly adopted through governmental regulations. However, the
National Parliament managed to dismiss two monarchical-cen-
tralist drafts of the constitution, which were in truth not that dif-
ferent from the subsequently accepted the St. Vitus Day Constitu-
tion, meaning it was merely a case of delaying the inevitable.
The Allied powers, including the United States, recognized the
new country as late as mid-1919, when it was necessary to sign a
peace treaty with Germany, while numerous countries recognized
it even later, having acknowledged Serbia as an entity in interna-
tional relations up until that point. Even at the peace conference
in Paris, the Yugoslav delegation was the official delegation of the
Kingdom of Serbia, although it persistently declared itself as the
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delegation of the Kingdom of SCS, which is why some leading
Allied powers (excluding Italy!) silently recognized it. Also, many
Serbian politicians spoke about how the unification of Decem-
ber 1 was merely an adjoining of the “prečan” provinces to Ser-
bia. Internally, with the exception of the Serbian Assembly, no
authority specifically ratified the act of December 1, neither the
Croatian Parliament, nor the National Council in Zagreb (which
was abolished on December 3, and its administrative tasks trans-
ferred to the presidency that was supposed to act until the forma-
tion of a joint government), nor the National Council in Ljublja-
na. Because of its centralized nature, the unification of December
1 was accepted with mixed feelings, since parties and groups, as
well as prominent individuals viewed it differently.
After the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1919,
Slovenians found themselves divided into four states. After defin-
ing the national borders of the Kingdom of SCS, the Yugoslav part
of Slovenia extended to 16,197 square kilometers (and was divid-
ed into the Ljubljana and Maribor regions), and after the admin-
istrative division of the country in the thirties, the Slovenian ter-
ritory in Yugoslavia (along with the Drava banovina) occupied
15,849square kilometers. Nearly one third of Slovenians were liv-
ing outside the borders of Slovenia. This was a heavy blow for Slo-
venian national integrity. The largest number of Slovenians, more
than 378,234 of them, remained in Italy (based on the so-called
Treaty of London from 1915 and the subsequent Treaty of Rapal-
lo from 1920). Close to 100,000 of them remained in Austria – in
the south and east of Carinthia, in Klagenfurt and its surround-
ings, above the Vrbovsko Lake, in Villach and its surroundings, as
well as the Gailtal valley. Smaller portions of the Slovenian people
were still living in the border areas of Styria between Kozjak and
Radgona. Based on the 1920 census, 6,087 Slovenes remained in
Porablje above Monostra in the Kingdom of Hungary. There were
also many immigrants abroad (around 373,000).
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The Kingdom of SCS provided Slovenians with a new govern-
ment and political system, and they also stepped into a quite dif-
ferent philosophical and cultural environment compared to what
they had been accustomed to. What prevented Slovenians from
having a bigger impact on common state policies were a central-
ized government and a relatively low percentage of the popula-
tion within the same country (eight percent), as well as the incon-
sistencies, contradictions, disputes and mutual hostilities with-
in Slovenian politics. Essentially (with the exception of the royal
dictatorship period), their impact was based on the fact that they
were the “kingmaker” in Serbo-Croatian disputes, the so-called
“petty politics”, i.e. connecting with the court and Serbian cen-
tralist parties. It was not until the eve of the war in Europe, after
the Cvetković-Maček agreement, that this kind of politics, led by
Korošec, lost influence. Korošec secretly started initiating con-
tacts with the Nazis, a practice which was continued by his suc-
cessors after his death in December 1940. The goal was to obtain
a German protectorate (modeled on Slovakia) for Slovenia, either
independently or together with the Croats, before the attack on
Yugoslavia happened. The basic division into three blocs – con-
servative-Christian, liberal and socialist – was maintained dur-
ing the interwar period, but there were new divisions within the
blocs, and as a consequence, new parties were also formed. In fact,
the political orientation of the Slovenians in the Kingdom of SCS
and in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (as shown by election results)
prior to the introduction of the dictatorship in 1929 remained
identical to that of their final decade within Austria-Hungary. The
Catholic-oriented Slovene People’s Party had an absolute majority
throughout. The exception was only in 1920 during the rise of the
Communists, which was the result of social and political process-
es at the end of the World War, and partly due to the impact of a
new political space, which somewhat strengthened the position of
unitary liberals (in truth, they were divided into two parties at the
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time). The political structure started to change significantly after
1929, when the dictatorship banned parties from certain Yugo-
slav peoples. In this forced political paralysis, large parties began
to fragment into numerous smaller groups and movements, and
new informal and connections began to emerge. Due to ideolog-
ical and religious reasons, opposites between parties and groups
became more prominent, and the polarization was contributed to
by the search for a way out of the economic crisis (the attractive-
ness of Soviet collectivism on the one hand, and fascist corporat-
ism on the other), and because of this vulnerability, the national
question came to the fore. The significance and reputation of civ-
il parties began to fade as the left-wing grew stronger and alter-
native forms of political action sought affirmation (connecting at
an anti-fascist and people’s-front basis). But the relative and pri-
marily party democracy existed only up until 1928. Among oth-
er things in the kingdom, women were not allowed to vote. Also,
election results were of no significance for parties, because rul-
ing depended on a coalition at the level of Yugoslavia, and the
two most powerful parties, Catholic and Liberal, ruled within dif-
ferent coalitions and time periods, each of them individually, for
around half of the period between the two wars, despite the fact
that the otherwise weak Liberals barely managed to garner 20 per-
cent of the vote. After becoming part of the Yugoslav People’s Par-
ty, i.e. the Yugoslav Radical Union in the 1930s, the Slovene Peo-
ple’s Party ruled without interruption from 1935 until the begin-
ning of the war.
Despite periods of crisis (agriculture was the exception), Slo-
venians prospered economically in the kingdom, and also set
the foundations of a national economy through various forms of
nationalizing German property. They could affect economic pol-
icies much more significantly than in the preceding monarchy,
which was fragmented into nationally mixed historic states where
Slovenians only had a majority in Kranjska. Although the levers of
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political power which regulated the economy in Yugoslavia rested
largely in the hands of the Serbs, the Slovenian economy made use
of the more developed part of the country, an educated workforce,
a developed transport infrastructure and high protective tariffs.
This is why manufacturing production, as well as textile and sim-
ilar industries were primarily developed, under the influence of
favorable prices of raw materials and a large, open market.
The greatest gains were made in the sphere of national and lin-
guistic preservation, as well as the development of education and
culture. The entire school system was Slovenized, and a univer-
sity was founded in addition to a number of other cultural insti-
tutions. This was all the more significant because the minorities
in neighboring countries were subjected to forced assimilation,
political and judicial persecution, planned economic impoverish-
ment and mass migration.
THE AVNOJ YUGOSLAVIA
The concept and the formation of Slovenia in the second, federal
(AVNOJ) and socialist Yugoslavia was no longer in the hands of the
clergy and Catholic politicians, but the Communists who found-
ed (initially, the coalition of) the Liberation Front (Oslobodilački
front) as early as April 1941, right after the attack on and break-
ing up of Yugoslavia. Already in September 1941, the Front decid-
ed to join the Yugoslav liberation movement under the leadership
of Josip Broz – Tito and opted for a new, federal (later renamed
“AVNOJ”) Yugoslavia. During the war, the Liberation Front sys-
tematically built up Slovenian statehood and national power. A
key event in this process was the Assembly of the Delegates of the
Slovene Nation in Kočevje in October 1943, which elected the first
parliament in Slovenian history, the Slovenian National Libera-
tion Committee (Slovenski narodnoosvobodilni odbor – SNOO) –
SNOO pleaded for a new, democratic Yugoslavia with a repub-
lican form of government, and with its conclusions changed the
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
position of Slovenia in Yugoslavia – fromthe status of an adminis-
trative unit (Drava Province) to one with apolitical and legal (fed-
eral) status. After the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Coun-
cil for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Novem-
ber 1943 in Jajce, which definitely favored a federal Yugoslavia,
SNOO was renamed the Slovenian National Liberation Council
(Slovenski narodnooslvobodilni svet – SNOS) (SNOO’s session in
Crnomelj in February 1944) and operated as the Slovenian Parlia-
ment until its dissolution in September 1946. In May 1945, SNOS
also appointed the Slovenian national government. After that,
SNOS was dissolved, its presidency (presidium) organized elec-
tions for a constituent assembly, and after constituting the Assem-
bly, the first constitution in Slovenia’s history was passed in early
1947. In this way, the continuity of national authority was guaran-
teed at a formal level. When regulating inter-ethnic relationships,
the thesis on resolving the national question in the context of the
class question was adhered to. This had a series of consequences,
including (re-centralization, which only began to loosen as late
as the 1960s. Despite everything, we can say that the Slovenians
in AVNOJ Yugoslavia went from declarative to republican state-
hood, from a written constitutional right to sovereignty, including
the right to secession from 1946/47, practically until the confeder-
al status under the 1974 Constitution. During all the post-war dec-
ades, Slovenian politicians, and particularly Edvard Kardelj, were
among those who were crucial decision-makers in the design of
the constitutional and political system of Yugoslavia.
Objectively speaking, inter-ethnic conflicts and objections to
Slovenian separatism were a constant of political events from
the end of the fifties. They became public during the sixties with
the recognition that Yugoslav socialism had not once and for all
resolved the national question (the Congress of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) in 1964). The differences in the
perception of Yugoslavia in connection with Slovenian stances
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were described as early as the sixties by Serbian writer Dobri-
ca Ćosić: either an alliance of independent states or a unitary
state, which would eventually also become ethno-national with
a majority, Yugoslav people. When Josip Broz Tito (the main fac-
tor of an integrated Yugoslavia along with the League of Commu-
nists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People’s Army) died in 1980,
Yugoslavia was plunged into a period of agony and mutual accu-
sations of exploitation and historical injustices that had happened
to individual nations, and had been committed by other nations.
Cultural and economic differences (7:1 between Slovenia and
Kosovo), insufficient mutual knowledge and stereotypical imag-
es of each other began to grow rapidly despite decades of having
lived together. Information systems operated primarily within the
republics. Slovenians increasingly began to view Yugoslavia with
mixed feelings. This was caused by the economic crisis, the now
vanished fear of once powerful enemies (Germany and Italy), an
increased fear of Serbia’s aggressive politics, and last but not least,
generational differences. Slovenian views became homogenized
as the Yugoslav crisis progressed. The feeling that Slovenia was
lagging behind became stronger and stronger, because according
to the data available to the authorities, the purchasing power of
the Slovenians, which had been 80 percent of Austria’s purchasing
power in the mid-seventies, fell to 45 percent in the mid-eighties.
The homogenization of Slovenians was also contributed to by the
tendentiousness of media reports in the other republics, as well as
envy, because the economic situation in Slovenia was better than
in other federal units. In moments of crisis, Slovenians also had
a better organized supply, in addition to the possibility of buying
from close abroad. So-called “autochthonous” theories began to
form, according to which the Slovenians were not South Slavs, but
natives, Etruscans, Veneti, etc. Also, the so-called “Central Euro-
pean” identity was getting stronger and more prominent.
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
The attitude of the Slovenian authorities towards the Federa-
tion in the first half of the eighties was a quiet, grouchy and most-
ly futile battle with the growing centralization reminiscent of the
fifties and sixties. The older, primarily partisan generation, har-
bored an emotional relationship towards Yugoslavia, which was
particularly true of the politicians who had taken part in its cre-
ation. Although they persistently defended Slovenia’s interests,
they could not imagine Slovenia’s future outside Yugoslavia (Slo-
venian attitudes were reported on as completely different, and
proclaimed as separatist, particularly by Serbia’s media and pol-
iticians). The stances of the generation born during the war and
immediately after it did not differ significantly. This belief (despite
some earlier doubts) did finally change in the late eighties and ear-
ly nineties.
For the younger generation, Yugoslav consciousness in the
eighties functioned only when it came to sports (primarily foot-
ball and basketball) and Yugoslav rock music. For the male youth
segment of the population, the main Yugoslav ordeal was mili-
tary service. Traditional school trips and prom trips across Yugo-
slavia were reoriented to the West, most generations that were
growing up never saw their capital and had no personal relation-
ship towards Belgrade as the center, nor would they recognize the
Yugoslav Assembly building from a picture of it. Values had also
completely changed. For Slovenians (regardless of the generation
in question), there was a prevailing economic “egoism” (as they
were often told), an orientation towards the West, a consumer-
ist fever and a desire for modernization which would make Slove-
nia a post-industrial society and align it with Europe’s developed
countries. Nationalism (which, except for one part of the intellec-
tuals and later politicians, was a value in itself) stemmed primarily
from the realization that Yugoslavia was becoming a “setback” for
Slovenia’s developmental ambition. The well-known stereotypes
about Slovenian superiority in Yugoslavia, emphasizing economic
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efficiency and standards, the difference in relation to the “Balkan
south”, diligence, modesty, Austro-Hungarian Central European
tradition, grew stronger among the Slovenians as foreign media
reported on it more commonly while the Yugoslav crisis began to
deepen. Slovenian ambitions – although not overly stated in pub-
lic – were clear: to remain the strongest economic factor in Yugo-
slavia, make use of the advantages it offered, and at the same time
increase its competitiveness in the capitalist markets, especially
in those of neighboring countries. Slovenia was internally quite
aware of both its role and its importance in Yugoslavia and made
efforts to take full advantage of them, i.e. to use everyday econom-
ic processes to compensate for what the Federation was adminis-
tratively taking away from it. As more doubt was being cast over
whether Yugoslavia (highly influential in international circles)
was really prepared to join European integrations which were of
vital importance for Slovenia, the dilemma of how much it made
sense for Yugoslavia to maintain an unchanged form also began to
increase. Although Slovenia’s official policy was not ideologically
different from Yugoslavia’s, it showed significantly more pragma-
tism and had no prejudices or reservations in relation to opening
up to the West, especially in economic terms. In domestic Yugo-
slav relations, Slovenia became much more affected by national-
ism. Nationalism was caused by the growing crisis, and was direct-
ed primarily against immigrants from the south (“southern broth-
ers”, as people used to call them derisively). This was significantly
aggravated by the media, which increasingly declared Slovenia to
be Yugoslavia’s “scapegoat”.
Slovenia’s policy towards the center in the period after Tito’s
death and until the second half of the eighties can be character-
ized as defensive and focusing primarily on preserving what had
been achieved. On the economic front, there was the pretty clear
position of a developed republic which was resisting demands
for the socialization of debts, payments into the so-called Fund
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
for Reciprocity and Solidarity (which was primarily used by oth-
er republics to cover their losses), increases in assistance to the
underdeveloped, increases in payments to the federal budget,
increases in the percentage of direct sources for funding the Fed-
eration at the expense of registration fees and an overall centrali-
zation of power, as well as various measures – due to the economic
crisis – that introduced an administrative division of goods, simi-
lar to the one after the end of World War II (the abundance of anti-
crisis proposals included, for example, one according to which all
of Yugoslavia should have a unified arrangement for the produc-
tion of bread). When it came to the functioning of the federation,
there was resistance towards aspirations to changing the constitu-
tional order, the harmonization of certain important segments of
society such as education (resistance on the issue of the so-called
common program core, resistance was put up by cultural work-
ers, whereas politicians only backed them up later), science and
great infrastructure systems (mail, railway, electric power sys-
tem), which were allegedly inefficient because of their “fragmen-
tation” across the republics. One of the points on which Slovenia
remained powerless was the increase inthe bureaucratic appara-
tus, which used the political stalemate in Yugoslav political bodies
to strengthen its authority and power. In the area of foreign policy,
Slovenia had a tendency towards multiple opportunities for direct
contacts (which was primarily its economic interest), more equal
representation in diplomacy, as well as linguistic equality.
In the second part of the eighties, the attitude towards the
Federation was formed as part of the gradual changes in polit-
ical relations between the authorities and the opposition which
was still in its early days. With the 57th edition of the Nova revi-
ja (New Review) magazine in 1987, the question of the future posi-
tion of the Slovenian people became the focus of debate in liter-
ary and other forums, as well as in constitutional discussions. The
discussions had a common red thread: the Slovenian people had
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to form a nation, i.e. attain statehood with original sovereignty
which would not be subordinate to Yugoslavia’s; at the same time,
a new legal order needed to be established, one that would allow
the democratic expression of the will of the citizens (a request for
the revocation of “tutoring” by the League of Communists of Slo-
venia over the Slovenian people and a request for the introduction
of political pluralism). The ideas presented in Nova revija gradual-
ly became part of the official policy, which in 1989, under reform-
ist Milan Kučan, opted for a “departure from the government”, i.e.
assessing itself at multi-party elections. With the expansion of a
democratic space, the impact of the public increased greatly and
the role of the Assembly also strengthened since the delegates had
a more independent role.
The thing that had a decisive influence on Slovenia’s attitude
towards the Federation in the late eighties was a dispute with the
then most powerful federal institution – Jugoslovenska narod-
na armija – JNA (the Yugoslav People’s Army) which did not
hide its intention of introducing a state of emergency in Slovenia
and removing what was, in its opinion, a nationalist leadership.
A mass response to the dispute was evoked during the process
against “the four” (three journalists from Mladina (Youth) mag-
azine and a non-commissioned military officer), who were tak-
en to a military court in Ljubljana by the JNA in late July and
early August of 1988, for allegedly revealing military secrets. The
trial had all of Slovenia on its feet, triggered mass protests and
the establishment of the Committee for the Protection of Human
Rights, which ultimately did not become (as the Croatian Demo-
cratic Union (HDZ) did in Croatia) the largest opposition force,
but silently disintegrated after the trial ended.
At that time, the question of the political system and the ques-
tion of Slovenia’s position in Yugoslavia were merged under the
issue of constitutional order. The Constitution became the major
field of competition between the socialist government and a
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
portion of critical public experts. The first to speak out against the
amendment to the federal constitution was the Slovene Writers’
Association in 1987. Legal experts from the opposition estimat-
ed that changes would lead to a greater Unitarianism.. Constitu-
tional changes, in the opinion of the opposition, should not have
gone in the direction of greater centralization, but towards great-
er autonomy of the republics (confederations), support for private
entrepreneurship, abolition of the monopolistic role of the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia and the introduction of political
pluralism (direct elections with multiple candidates). The Slove-
nian leadership was able to influence the improvement of some
amendments that the Federal Council of the Assembly of Yugo-
slavia adopted in October 1988, but Slovenian supporters of the
amendments also acknowledged that the criticisms leveled at cen-
tralization were justified. While the debate on amendments to the
Federal constitution was taking place, the question of a change
to the Slovenian constitution also began to circle. Proposals for
amendments to the Slovenian constitution were put up for public
debate in the spring of 1989 after Serbia had changed its own con-
stitution and thus seized provincial jurisdiction from both Koso-
vo and Vojvodina (whereby the constitutional order of Yugoslavia
had formally come to an end). Slovenian constitutional amend-
ments (which strengthened Slovenian sovereignty and forbade
the introduction of a state of emergency without the approval of
the Slovenian Assembly) encountered strong opposition from all
bodies of the federal leadership, as well as the leadership of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia. There was a wish to pre-
vent their annexation in every way, threats of a state of emergen-
cy in Slovenia had resurfaced thanks to an agreement between
Milošević and the JNA leadership, but the then Defense Minister
Veljko Kadijević changed his mind at the last minute. The amend-
ments which spoke of the right to self-orientation, secession and
association, and the amendments on economic sovereignty and
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jurisdiction of the federal government in Slovenian territory were
the primary targets of criticism, or were completely rejected. Slo-
venia’s basic arguments were brushed aside along with Slovenia’s
indication towards the fact that Serbia had changed the Yugoslav
constitutional order in February and then demanded that the oth-
er republics do not interfere in its “internal” affairs. All federal
authorities pleaded against the amendment, and an announce-
ment was issued to trains of protesters from other parts of Yugo-
slavia who were willing to come to Slovenia. Since blocking the
adoption of the amendment had failed, Milošević’s bloc attempt-
ed to organize a so-called bureaucratic revolution against the Slo-
venian leadership, by means of which the leaderships in Vojvo-
dina and Montenegro had already been displaced. Organizing a
meeting in Ljubljana was, in truth, planned several times, initial-
ly during a wave of meetings in the summer and fall of 1988, but
the organizers needed greater preparation at that time, and their
primary goal was to discipline the “Serbian” territories. Another
attempt was made on December 1, 1989 in response to the adopt-
ed amendments, but the Slovenian authorities strongly opposed it
(even at the cost of potential conflict and bloodshed).
During Yugoslavia’s final stages, Ante Marković’s government
attempted to salvage the country through a concept of “modern
socialism. “Marković had taken over the country several months
after the collective resignation (the first in the history of social-
ist Yugoslavia) of Branko Mikulić’s Government on December 30,
1988. Marković’s programme was met with many objections at eve-
ry level in Slovenia, especially when it came to the concentration
of jurisdiction at the Savezno izvršno veće/ SIV (Federal Executive
Council) and the National Bank of Yugoslavia. The program also
recognized the possibility of an organized, deliberate and planned
redistribution of all internal and, to an even greater extent, (addi-
tional) parts of foreign debt. It was clear that the actual debtors
could not be forced to pay their debts, and that the solvent (i.e.
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
the most developed) parts of the country were to take on the larg-
est burden. In spite of all the objections, the Slovenian Assembly
adopted Markovic’s program. Despite reservations after the first
multiparty elections in April 1990, which were narrowly won by
the opposition, the new Government continued to support Mark-
ovic’s program for a brief period. The economic situation began to
deteriorate rapidly, the currency market stopped functioning in
the fall of 1990 (the Government had initially limited the purchas-
ing of foreign currency, and then banned it altogether). Starting
from October 1990, the Slovenian government stopped support-
ing Markovic program, i.e. endeavored to avoid it. As it has often
been the case throughout history, customs became a key point of
dispute. Apart from the JNA, the customs authorities remained
the only institution under the Federation’s jurisdiction, but Slove-
nian customs officers started to play on it with prepared balance
sheets. In truth, the Slovenian authorities did promise Marković
in Belgrade that they would pay customs duties in accordance
with the principle of registration fees, but avoided doing so (other
republics behaved in a similar manner).
BREAKUP
Once the opposition (Demos) assumed power in Slovenia, the
first republic to hold multiparty elections, a stance was formed
in reference to Yugoslavia that the Federation cannot be an equal
partner in the negotiations, but only the nations which had
formed Yugoslavia and which had to reach a mutual agreement–
one that was in accordance with the principle of sovereignty – on
what would happen in the future. It was only several weeks before
independence was achieved that talks with the federal authori-
ties, primarily with Marković, had occurred. Marković (including
his visits to Slovenia) tried to convince the Slovenian leadership
to drop their plans for independence, but was not ready to give
up the jurisdiction that the Federation still had. At the beginning
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of 1991 (in terms of the economy, Yugoslavia had already practi-
cally disintegrated because of Serbia’sbreach of the monetary sys-
tem and other reasons), Slovenia held talks with representatives
of all the republics and presented their decision on independ-
ence to them. The decision was based on a referendum conduct-
ed on 23 December 1990 – 93.2%of the voting population voted,
and 88.2%voted for independence. The results of the referendum
were announced on December 26. In truth, the referendum did
not explicitly reject Yugoslavia, which is why Slovenian authori-
ties offered the possibility of an alliance of autonomous, sover-
eign and independent states (a confederation), or an economic
community. Only Croatia shared their opinion (the two republics
drafted a proposal for a confederate agreement together), Serbia
and Montenegro wanted a “modern federation,” Macedonia was
in favor of “any option” which the Yugoslav nations would agree
on, while Bosnia persisted on a modified federation. After the col-
lapse of negotiations on February 20, 1991, the Slovenian parlia-
ment adopted a resolution on amicable dissociation, but the oth-
er republics would not make their stances on the matter known in
the beginning (except for the Croatian Parliament, which passed a
similar resolution). No significant progress was made even during
negotiations at the Federation’s Presidium (extended to include
the presidents and presidents of the republics’ Presidiums), nor at
meetings between presidents of the republics (their Presidiums),
which took place in March and April. The European Communi-
ty’s (EC) stance was that it would recognize the independence of
Slovenia or Croatia as long as there was a possibility of an agree-
ment on Yugoslavia, which was promised loans in the amount of
billions of dollars along with a quick inclusion in the EC if it were
to stay in one piece and reform. The United States (US)had a sim-
ilar stance to most other countries. Despite the adverse external
circumstances and threats from Belgrade, as well as the military,
the Slovenian Parliament passed a basic constitutional charter on
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
25 June, a constitutional law for its implementation and a decla-
ration of independence, whereby Slovenia formally declared its
independence.
On the very same day, Slovenian authorities took control over
customs offices and border crossings, where around 300 Slove-
nian police and territorial defense officers had arrived. Impro-
vised international border crossings began operating on the bor-
der with Croatia. The next day, on June 26, a solemn declaration
of independence was held in front of Parliament. In the night of
June 25–26, 1991, the federal government held a session and decid-
ed that due to the realization of federal regulations on crossing the
state border, the smooth flow of traffic and of fulfilling Yugosla-
via’s international obligations, control of the border crossings in
Slovenia needed to be taken back. The government entrusted this
task to the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs and the Federal
Secretariat of People’s Defense. This initiated the so-called Ten-
Day War in Slovenia, which ended in negotiations on Brioni (the
so-called Brioni Declaration), but the war continued in Croatia
and, subsequently, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
OVERVIEW OF SLOVENIA’S TIME IN YUGOSLAVIA
Despite its constant dissatisfaction, Slovenia believed in the
country of Yugoslavia, and invested an enormous amount of ener-
gy in its survival and organization; during the first, and to an even
greater extent during the second Yugoslavia, Slovenia’s political
and economic elites had a major impact on the national leader-
ship which is why they did not even think to look for a solution
outside Yugoslavia until the late 1980s. Their main objective was
to secure the best possible position for Slovenia within the Yugo-
slav (con)federation, which was in line with the true state of global
relations after World War II, especially the division into two blocs
between which Yugoslavia had established a specific position. On
the whole, Slovenia’s time in both the kingdom and the socialist
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reasons for entering and exiting reasons for entering and exiting
state of Yugoslavia had a positive result. There were plenty of bad
or dubious things, from centralism and unitarianism to them is
guided socialist revolution. However, in uncertain times of terri-
torial fragmentation and pressure from German and Italian impe-
rialism, Yugoslavia offered a chance of survival. In the first Yugo-
slavia, Slovenians attained informal cultural autonomy, which
included their own university, and they grew stronger economi-
cally. For the first time in history, Prekmurje was directly connect-
ed to its nucleus. In the second Yugoslavia, the position of Slove-
nia was the result of the National Liberation Struggle and the fact
that the Slovenians, as part of the Yugoslav anti-fascist movement,
ended the war on the side of the anti-fascist coalition. The Slovene
Littoral region (more than one third of the Slovenian population
and a quarter of its territory) became an integral part of the newly
formed republic and Slovenia claimed access to the sea. Without
the status of one of the six republics with the right to self-orien-
tation, including the right to secession, a stance on independence
would have had no real basis.
Although it is impossible to deny Slovenian nationalism, Slo-
venia’s exit from Yugoslavia was primarily caused by an inabili-
ty to democratize and modernize Yugoslavia, as well as secure the
national rights to its peoples and bridge the gap with more devel-
oped countries which began to connect in Europe, not just eco-
nomically, but also politically. Independence became a possibil-
ity due to a combination of liberal ideas and national sentiment
which accumulated sufficient mass energy. Nevertheless, the cru-
cial implementation was aided primarily by international chang-
es. When it comes to the psychosocial aspect of Slovenians, the
vanished fear of their centuries-old enemies Germany and Italy
certainly represented an important element, alongside a sense of
being under threat from Serbia (which was not based on nation-
al enmity, but on different concepts of development). Political and
social changes during the eighties in Slovenia took place in the
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context of the global crisis of communism, the dissolution of the
bipolar division of the world and of the Soviet Union, as well as
a profound political, international and economic crisis in Yugo-
slavia. Without changes in the outside world, the entire process
would have probably ended up in a forced unification of Yugo-
slavia, a defeat of alternative movements, a clash with the opposi-
tion and a departure of the reformist Government from Slovenia’s
political scene. During the independence process and the brief
armed conflict, circumstances were favorable for Slovenia. The
military intervention in Slovenia was powerful enough to bring
about the unity of the government and the population, but not
so powerful as to lead to a new schism. This would have inevita-
bly happened had the conflicts continued, since some politicians
advocated a peaceful solutionas soon as possible, while others
saw the possibility of their own rise to and consolidation of pow-
er as the conflict intensified. Slovenia managed to stop the JNA’s
attack by combining military and police operations, knowledge
of events in the army (which was still ethnically mixed and which
was in great confusion) and the reasonable behavior of individ-
ual Teritorijalna odbrana – TO(Territorial Defense) command-
ers (who disobeyed orders to attack certain barracks and other
buildings) and JNA officers, many of whom were living in Slo-
venia with their families, with the important role of local politi-
cians in individual negotiations in the field and with the acquisi-
tion of support from the global community, which forced Western
politicians who had been against the disintegration of Yugoslavia
to change their attitudes. What was significant for the outcome
of the conflict in Slovenia was the fact that the Serbian political
leadership led by Milošević, as well as some of the JNA’s leading
officers decided to try and implement the concept of Greater Ser-
bia, so they were no longer interested in the survival of Yugoslavia
and the preservation of Slovenia within it. At the right time and
under pressure from public opinion, the European Community
216
reasons for entering and exiting reasons for entering and exiting
also got involved, having been shocked by conflicts on Europe-
an soil. The conflict between Serbia and the JNA on the one side
and Slovenia on the other had already been replaced by what was
for Yugoslavia a truly fateful inter-ethnic conflict between Serbia
and Croatia, one which was the final nail in Yugoslavia’s coffin.
War scenes from Croatia, and later from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
became everyday occurrences and had a psychological impact on
the political decisions of European and world officials. They also
did not know how to find a solution to the wars in other parts of
Yugoslavia which were ethnically mixed, unlike Slovenia.
217
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Selected literature
1. Neven Borak, Žarko Lazarević, Prevrati in slovensko gospodarstvo v XX.
stoletju 1918–1945–1991, Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana, 1996;
2. Neven Borak, Žarko Lazarević, Od kapitalizma do kapitalizma. Izbrane
zamisli o razvoju slovenskega gospodarstva v XX. Stoletju, Cankarjeva
založba, Ljubljana 1997;
3. Neven Borak Gospodarske krize in Slovenci; Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo
zgodovino: Zveza ekonomistov Slovenije, Ljubljana 1999;
4. Neven Borak, Ekonomski vidiki delovanja in razpada Jugoslavije,
Znanstveno in publicistično središče, Ljubljana 2002;
5. Fran Erjavec: Slovenci. Zemljepisni, zgodovinski, politični, kulturni,
gospodarski in socialni pogled, Ljubljana, 1923;
6. Ervin Dolenc, Bojan Godeša, Aleš Gabrič: Slovenska kultura in politika v
Jugoslaviji, Modrijan, Ljubljana 1999;
7. Aleš Gabrič: Slovenska agitpropovska kulturna politika 1945–1952,
Ljubljana, Borec 1991;
8. Aleš Gabrič: Socialistična kulturna revolucija, slovenska kulturna politika
1953–1962, Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana 1995;
9. Bojan Godeša: Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno
vojno
10. Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, Ljubljana, 2006;
11. Bojan Godeša, Čas odločitev. Katoliški tabor in začetek okupacije,
Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana, 2011;
12. Žarko Lazarević: Slovensko gospodarstvo v prvi Jugoslaviji. Korak k
industrijski družbi. Modrijan, Ljubljana 1997;
13. Uroš Lipušček, Ave Wilson: ZDA in prekrajanje Slovenije v Versaillesu
1919–1920, Ljubljana, Sophia 2003;
14. Uroš Lipušček, Sacro Egoismo. Slovenci v krempljih tajnega londonskega
pakta 1915, Ljubljana, Cankarjeva založba 1912;
15. Andrej Mitrović: Jugoslavija na konferenciji mira 1919–1920, Zavod za
izdavanje udžbenika socialističke republike Srbije 1969;
16. Dušan Nećak, Božo Repe: Prelom 1914–1918. Svet in Slovenci v 1. svetovni
vojni, Sophia, Ljubljana, 2005;
17. Dušan Nećak, Božo Repe: Kriza. Svet in Slovenci od konca prve svetovne
vojne do srede tridesetih let. Znanstveni inštitut filozofske fakultete
Ljubljana, 2008;
18. Janko Pleterski: Študije o slovenski zgodovini in narodnem vprašanju,
Obzorja, Maribor 1981;
218
reasons for entering and exiting reasons for entering and exiting
19. Janko Pleterski: Narodi, Jugoslavija, revolucija Komunist, Državna
založba Slovenije, Ljubljana 1986;
20. Jože Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918–1992. Nastanek, razvoj ter razpad
Karađorđevićeve in Titove Jugoslavije, Lipa, Koper 1995;
21. Leopoldina Plut – Pregelj, Aleš Gabrič and Božo Repe, The
Repluratization of Slovenia in the 1980s, New relevations from Archival
Records, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies,
University of Washington 2000;
22. Leopoldina Plut – Pregelj, Carole Roger, Historical Dictionary of Slovenia.
– – The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Md. and London 1996;
23. Jože Prinčič: Slovensko gospodarstvo v drugi Jugoslaviji, Modrijan,
Ljubljana 1997;
24. Božo Repe: Jugoslovanstvo kot ideja in kot praksa. Priročnik za študente
druge stopnje zgodovine, (druga, dopolnjena izdaja);http://www.
zgodovina-ff-uni-lj.net/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=26&fu
nc=startdown&id=67;
25. Božo Repe: Jutri je nov dan. Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije. Modrijan,
Ljubljana 2002.
26. Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja 1900–1941, Nova revija, Ljubljana 1995;
27. Slovenska novejša zgodovina 1848–1992. Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino,
Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana 2005;
28. Mirko Stiplovšek, Slovenski parlamentarizem 1927–1929, Znanstveni
inštitut FF v Ljubljani, Ljubljana 2000;
29. Miroslav Stiplovšek: Banski svet Dravske banovine 1930–1935,
Znanstvenoraziskovalni inštitut Filozofske fakultete Ljubljana, 2006;
30. Peter Vodopivec: Od Pohlinove slovnice do samostojne države, Modrijan,
Ljubljana 2006.
219
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
The Serbs and Serbia in Modern History
experience
with other
nations
LATINKA PEROVIĆ
There are many more or less detailed histories of Serbia in the
19th and the 20thcenturies. This paper tries to summarize the his-
tory of the modern Serbian state, established at the turn of the cen-
tury and its experience in the common state with other Yugoslav
nations; Yugoslavia’s development and the reasons why it turned
out to beunsustainable at two global historical crossroads: the
beginning of World War II and the demise of the Soviet Union as
a political-military and ideological hegemonist in Eastern Europe.
And both times it collapsed in bloody wars between its nations.
One of the first detailed insights into 19th century Serbia after
the rule of the Obrenović dynasty was penned by Serbian law-
yer, historian and politician Slobodan Jovanović (1869–1958). This
paper refers to it not because of its originality and completeness,
but also the indisputable intellectual authority of its author who
also wrote another – true, more concise – overview of Serbia’s
220
experience with other nations experience with other nations
historical experience up to the mid-19th century published, in
deference to the author’s last will and testament, after his death.
Slobodan Jovanović wrote, “From the social viewpoint, it is
hard to imagine a plainer and simpler country than Serbia in the
19th century. Above all, it is a small country with the population
of barely two and a half million – and that figure only by the end
of Obrenović rule.1 The ethnic composition of its population is
uniform, the same as their religion and language.2 Social gaps are
almost nonexistent: peasants make up the majority and public
servants and well-to-do merchants at thin layer.3 […] Differences
among the peasantry are meager: there are no large landed estates.
“The tasks of our new state are tough but not complex: we have
to establish, in the territory of a recently Turkish pashalik, a mod-
ern European state with an administration and army of its own,
with courts and schools, banks and railroads. And then we have to
incorporate into a thus organized country other Serb lands that are
still under foreign rule4 […]. The policy of the Obrenović era, both
1 In 1900 Serbia had a population of almost 2.5 million.
2 The great majority of people were Serbs (90.26%); other ethnic groups made up
less than 10% of the population. Vladimir Karić, Srbija – opis zemlje, naroda i
države.
3 At the beginning of the 19th century “all the Serbs were peasants.” It was only in
1866 that 1.6 out of 100 citizens were literate. Ibid.
4 For these tough tasks Serbia had, at the beginning of the 19th century, nothing but
human resources – ethnically, religiously, linguistically and socially homogeneous,
and dreaming for centuries about restoring its ancient glory and the state it had
in the Middle Ages – one that had actually never been homogeneous Responding
almost 100 years later to Lajos Kossuth’s claim that “The Serbs believe they are a
nation but they are nothing but a bunch of highway robbers, “ Dušan J. Popović
(O hajducima, Part II) says that Kossuth “overlooked the basic truth that those
‘bunches of highway robbers’ had established a state, while the Hungarian peasant
has remained to this very day cannon fodder for his lords.” And when Slobodan
Jovanović asked his father Vladimir Jovanović (1833–1922), the precursor of
liberalism in Serbia and, at the same time, a great national romantic, how it was
that his generation had so glorified the past, the latter replied they had nothing
else to start with. Hence, the function of a myth was twofold: to compensate for a
feeble past and to encourage a better future.
221
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
foreign and domestic, is resolute and solid enough.5Everything is
geared to the same goals: national unity and the Europeanization
of institutions.6 The Obrenovićs will go down in history as Mihail-
ounbending about the first goal and Milan about the second.
“[…]Still, Serbia has had a turbulent and bloody history. Prince
Mihailo was killed. King Milan, having survived a military coup,
a peasant rebellion and two assassination attempts, abdicated
when only 35 years old. King Alexander’s rule begins and ends in
an army officers’ plot; and there were three coups d’état between
these two plots. And once Alexander was killed like Milan, the
Obrenović dynasty was wiped out in blood. […] Foreigners say
that our country is in a permanent state of crisis.
“A simple country, Serbia is a new one at the same time. No
traditions have been created or rooted. Throughout the 19th cen-
tury two opponent dynasties battled and slaughtered each other,
and neither was capable of entrenching itself ultimately; this non-
existent dynastic tradition was one of major sources of perma-
nent uprisings and turmoil. There are also no partisan traditions.
All the parties are new and, instead of drawing their missions
from their people’s past, they copy Western European party pro-
grams […] We do have social classes and ranks, but none possess
a strong class consciousness […] Our only tradition, deep-root-
ed and steadfast as it has been cherished for centuries, is national-
ism. Nationalism is what inspires rulers, parties and masses alike
to lofty deeds.
5 All the players in foreign and domestic policy – the people, intelligentsia,
politicians and rulers – originate from the same rural substrate. The nonexistent
differences between them constitute the foundation of their unity.
6 In practice this meant transplanting the rules of a modern, essentially
individualistic society onto a pre-modern and essentially collectivist one; hence
the resistance and conficts between form and substance. The intelligentsia was
“borrowing”, but not at the cost of “distancing itself from the people.” On the other
hand, the form itself was claimed to prove that 19th-century Serbia was a Western
European state.
222
experience with other nations experience with other nations
“Along withundeveloped traditions, we have also not devel-
oped apolitical culture. We are still ayoung, artless people that are-
just beginning to accumulate political experience and, having no
other skills, solve everything by the use of force […]
“Serbia’s biggest driving force in the Obrenović era was nation-
alism. When we fought against the Turks and were threatened by
Austria’s imperialism our nationalism came to resemble the fanat-
icism of a persecuted sect. Neither the monarchic principle nor
class consciousness was as important as nationalism […] Astate-
hood idea was by far more important than the monarchic princi-
ple and class consciousness. But this idea has never possessed the
authentic power of nationalism; and it has developed slowly, nev-
er emerging as pure, but mixed with other ideas […]
“The Obrenović era can lay claim to finally organizing Serbia as
a state – a process the Ustavobranitelji /Defenders of the Constitu-
tion/ had launched. Rulers and politicians alike are to be praised
here, though the successful outcome is not to be ascribed only
to their statesmanship but also to our national energy. Now, as
in our entire 19th-century history, the power of national energy
is amazing. In just decades we had to build an illiterate peasant
country with no capital or technology into a modern state, which
was an enterprise necessitating commitment, capital and technol-
ogy alike. That was, in a way, a mission as lofty as had been lib-
eration from the Turks and defense against Austria. The people’s
strength was so strained that it all but burst at the seams and many
thought a mission that was far beyond our strength would crush
us […] However, despite everything, we entered the 20th century
with an organized state.” (Slobodan Jovanović, “Vlada Aleksandra
Obrenovića,” III /”The Rule of Alexander Obrenović,” Vol. 3)
The long-lived Slobodan Jovanović (he died in the late 1960s)
not only witnessed, but also learnt his lesson in the no less dra-
matic follow-up to the Serbs and Serbia’s history in the second half
of the 20th century. He witnessed the curtain fall on the struggle
223
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
between Serbia’s dynasties, a struggleending in the brutal mur-
der of the last of the Obrenovićfamily. He witnessed the army’s
influence growingand, in parallel with emerging parliamentari-
anism and its limitations, booming militarism and nationalism.
He despaired over the situation of the administration, economy
and education. And yet, in the aftermath of the Balkan wars, he
wrote to a friend (October 3, 1913), “I would say, with no false
modesty, that our army is the very best in the Balkans” – and that
such an army must have a heart and energy. In the two Balkan
wars and WWI he was the head of the Supreme Command’s press
bureau. He watched the emergence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Cro-
ats and Slovenes (1918–29) and then of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
(1929–41). For the first time all the Serbs were living in onestate,
but alongside other nations now. Crises over national identities
and the state system shookthe Kingdom from start to finish. In
response to the Serb-Croat agreement (1939) Jovanović estab-
lished the Serbian Cultural Club, advocating an administrative
unit for the Serbs as well. Following Serbia’s signature under the
Tripartite Pact (1941) he engaged in politics. First he was the dep-
uty premier in the cabinet of General Dušan Simović (1941) and
then premier of the royal cabinet in exile (1942–43) and represent-
ative of Supreme Commander of the Royal Army in the Home-
land Dragoljub Draža Mihailović. In the trial against Mihailović
(1946) he was sentenced to a 20-year suspension of civil rights.
This meant that his works were condemned to oblivion – and it
turned to be groundless.
By the end of his life, Slobodan Jovanović – drawing from his
rich experience and knowledge of 19th century Serbia – wrote
“A Contribution to the Study of the Serbian National Charac-
ter” /Jedan prilog za proučavanje srpskog nacionalnog karaktera/,
explicitly stipulating in his will that the work could only bepub-
lished after his death (it was first published in Cleveland in 1964).
The absence of a cultural pattern as an indispensible supplement
224
experience with other nations experience with other nations
to the national and political one crucially influenced Serbia’s mod-
ern history – thatis the main message this study puts across. “The
intelligentsia has neither transplanted any actual cultural pattern
(they had even been hostile to Serbs from Austria-Hungary, who
could helpin this regard despite the fact that their names, religion
and language were the same as those of Serbs in the Princedom of
Serbia – L. P.) nor nurtured any elements of our people into an
original pattern,” wrote Slobodan Jovanović.
To achieve the primary goal – the creation of a state – all an
illiterate peasant could rely on was national energy. Other means
were necessary for solving more complex tasks such as organiza-
tion of the state. This task required commitment and knowledge.
But even aspiration towards the latter was seen as a waste of the
energy needed for the primary task – the one seen as unfinished
until “the last Serb” is living within the borders of a single state.
(To Nikola Pašić “freedom of the entire Serbian nation” was an
ideal loftier than civil freedoms in the Kingdom”.) In his above-
mentioned work Slobodan Jovanovićimplicitly raised this ques-
tion by saying that Serbia had not produced the intellectual and
political elite with a modern understanding of what constitutes a
nation. A half-intellectual feeding on nationalism as the only tra-
dition prevailed, said Slobodan Jovanović.
A half-intellectual is a “man who has duly finished his school-
ing but learned almost nothing about culture and morality […] He
neither understands spiritual values at all nor appreciates them.”
He appreciates everything only by the standards of personal suc-
cess, while his perception of success is provincial – hence, materi-
alistic. In the same way as spiritual values, he disclaims the cultur-
al aspects of moral values though does not negate them complete-
ly since breaches of discipline as such imply criminal accountabil-
ity. And yet, he is basically still a primitive.
“He sees politics as a means for getting rich and turning himself
into a gentleman once given high office. He does not care a straw
225
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
about some lofty and general goals. Only when a half-intellectu-
al elbows his way to the top of the political ladder is his dwarfish-
ness exposed.”
Unlike the half-intellectual, in whose eyes history is static and
simple, a modern intellectual views it as a dynamic and complex
process. For, “As soon as a man overcomes national egoism just a
bit he realizes that a nation itself is not what philosophy calls a val-
ue” (emphasis, L. P.). Only general cultural ideals, to whose ser-
vice a nation pledges itself, can invest it with values (Slobodan
Jovanović).
Basically business-like and aggressive as he was, a half-intellec-
tual was also concerned with theinterpretation of Serbian history.
And his interpretation was not without influence on the course of
history. Hence, authors of Serbian histories engaged in a debate
(1879) shortly after the state’s independence (1878). Two tendencies
were visible here: the national-romantic approach was promptly
adopted by the half-intellectual, and the critical approach based
on facts connected them into a process. Though not characteris-
tic of historiography alone, that is where thisgap has entrenched
itself to this very day.
In his book “The Serbs among the European Nations”, out
standing Serbian historian Sima M. Ćirković provides a compre-
hensive insight into the history of the Serbs and Serbia. Unlike Slo-
bodan Jovanović, Ćirković starts from Serbs’ most distant known
past, and travellingthrough time, space and people, reaches the
end of the 20th century, the second half of which Jovanovićdid
not live to see – but had predicted. Ćirković’s wrote down his
interpretation in the most dramatic period of Serbia’s history –
the 1990s. English Blackwell Publishing house asked him to write
a book about the Serbs for the edition “Peoples.” The book titled
“The Serbs” was publicized in 2004 in London. It was translat-
ed into ten languages. Though published in the Serbian language
the same year, 2004, the book barely evinced any echo in Serbia’s
226
experience with other nations experience with other nations
academic circles. How, then, can one learn from history when his-
toriographic masterpieces are ignored? Be that as it may, a suc-
cinct analysis of the history of the Serbs and Serbia in the late 19th
and the 20th century would hardly be possible without reliance
on the syntheses penned by two great scholars such as Slobodan
Jovanović and Sima M. Ćirković.
THE BEGINNING OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE AGAINST THE
TURKS: THE EMERGENCE OF THE STATE (1804–1878).
On Sretenje (Candlemas) of February 15, 1804 in the village
of Orašac, nearby Topola, Serbs from the Belgrade pashalik and
Šumadija, led by Đorđe Petrović (1762–1817), rebelled against the
dahijas.7And this was whatpeople at the time and their descend-
ents called the event: the Uprising against the Dahijas. Later on,
it was named the First Serbian Uprising under the leadership of
Karađorđe to distinguish it from the Second Serbian Uprising led
by Miloš Obrenović (1780–1860). German historian Leopold von
Ranke termed it “the Serbian revolution” in a book published in
1829. Other historians also saw this term “revolution” as legitimate
considering its two legacies: national liberation in the form of
permanent autonomy, and personal freedom and property rights
acquired with disappearance of serfdom. “But these legacies came
only after an unending 30-year tension, so that the revolution was
not just one event but a chain of events (Sima M. Ćirković).
The course of the Uprising, which lasted for almost ten years
(1804–1813) and went through several phases, was interrupted
byinternational developments. When they achieved their first
objective (murdering or expelling the dahijas), the rebels strove
for more and more rights, including governance of the Belgrade
pashalik. A permanent body, the Ruling Council (Praviteljstvujušči
sovjet) of the Serbian People was established as a government with
7 Dahije or dahijas were renegade janissary officers; the Turkish origin of the word
means ‘uncle.’
227
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
six ministers (1811). The Serbs from Hungary lent considerable
assistance to the rebels: Dositej Obradović was appointed Minis-
ter of Education. The title vožd – leader – was introduced specif-
ically for Karađorđe. At the same time, opposition to Karađorđe
appeared for the first time. Its leaders were expelled, but remained
split nevertheless. In the mid-summer of 1813, strong Turkish forc-
es penetrated the rebels’ lines of defense. The leaders of the upris-
ing fled the country, whereas the masses were forced either to fol-
low in their footsteps or adjust themselves to new circumstanc-
es. Management of the Turkish pashalik was restored: ajanissary
regime without janissaries.
And yet, resistance continued despite the catastrophe in 1813
(the rebellion in the Požega nahija). The decision to start a new
uprising was made in Takovo on April 23, 1815. Miloš Obrenović,
one of the leaders of the First Serbian Uprising and the only duke
who had not fled the country after its breakdown, was elected
leader. Illiterate but with a strong instinct for diplomacy he was
against armed struggle and economized on his own forces from
the very beginning. He negotiated an unwritten agreement with
Marashli Ali Pasha and also negotiatedwith the Sublime Porte
while fortifying his rule. His regime did not differ much from the
Turkish. In dealing with his opponents he was ruthless. He put
down several revolts (1817, 1821, 1825 and 1826) and slaughtered
many of his opponents, including Karađorđe once he returned to
Serbia (1817).
Miloš Obrenovića cquired autonomy with the Sultan’s decrees
–hatti-sherifs of 1829, 1830 and 1833. The hatti-sherif of 1830 pro-
claimed Serbia a vassal state with autonomous administration.
Bya special act Miloš was recognized as prince.
The other side of the coin of Prince Miloš’s rule lay in his initia-
tives for a stronger economy, better healthcare and cultural insti-
tutions. The stratum of leaders that emerged with Miloš and got
rich thanks to him, wanted to damp down his personal power and
228
experience with other nations experience with other nations
called for a constitution. The Prince agreed and entrusted publi-
cist Dimitrije Davidović (1780–1838), born in Zemun and secre-
tary of the Prince’s office since he moved to Serbia in 1829, with
drafting the document. The Sretenje Constitution (February 15,
1835) only lasted two weeks. Everyone had a reason to be against
it: the Sublime Porte, Russia, Austria and Prince Miloš. Work on
another constitution was moved to Constantinopleandthere Ser-
bian representatives, Turkish officials and Russian diplomats, pro-
duced in tandem, in late 1838 and in the form of a hatti-sherif, a
constitution called the Turkish Constitution.
Under the Turkish Constitution the Prince appointed minis-
ters and seventeen members of the Soviet, who soon took over
all judiciary authority and so forced Prince Miloš to leave Ser-
bia (April 1839). Into his shoes, as agreed with the Sublime Porte,
stepped his younger son Mihailo (1823 –1868) as an elected rather
than hereditary prince.
Defenders of the Constitution (ustavobranitelji) – Toma Vučić
Perišić and Avram Petronijević – were intent on ousting Prince
Mihailo by force of arms. Under this pressure, he was also forced
to leave Serbia (1842). The Ustavobranitelji brought in Prince Alex-
ander Karađorđević (1826–1885), Karađorđe’s son, in his place.
Relying onthe legacy of Prince Miloš’s rule in the era of the
ustavobranitelji, Serbia (1842–1858) made major progress in state-
building (laws, institutions, administration etc.). Serbs sent to
study abroad since 1839 returned home as promoters of new ideas
and the Serbs from Austria-Hungary also contributed muchto the
process. One of the most important achievements of the ustavo-
branitelji regime was the Civil Law (1844) produced by writer and
jurist Jovan Hadžić (1779–1869), an Austro-Hungarian Serb.
Serbia’s foreign policy program – Načertanije8 – kept as a top
secret till the early 20th century – was developed in the mid-
8 An old term denoting a “draft,” trans. note
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
1840s (1844) under the influence of Polish emigrants hostile to
both Austria and Russia. Drafted by Franjo Zah, Načertanije was
finally blue-penciled by Ilija Garašanin who replaced Zah’s term
“South Slavs” with Serbs and “the Serbian nation.” Considering
the upcoming collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Serbia should –
according to Garašanin’s revised version – eventually assemble “all
Serbian people in the region” and create “a new Serbian state” on
the “good old foundations of the ancient Serbian empire.” (Sima
M. Ćirković).
The ideas that the Serbs educated abroad were bringing back
home were primarily liberal (Latinka Perović, Srpskisocijalisti 19.
veka, 1). The generations raised between 1848 and 1858 consist-
ed of individuals who, having encountered liberal and democrat-
ic ideas during their studies abroad, called for a people’s assembly
invested with judicial powers and for freedom ofthe press. They
allied with the strongmen in the Council who were opposed to
Prince Alexander Karađorđević’s autocratic rule for quite differ-
ent reasons. By the end of 1858, they managed to have the parlia-
ment invested with advisory powers but also with a say in the elec-
tion of a ruler. They called for theresignation of the Prince who,
afraid of assassination, was hiding in a fortress from where he
escapedto Austria. Miloš Obrenović, already a very old man, was
elected Prince. His second rule was in no way different from his
first.. In his stead came his younger son, Mihailo: mature, cosmo-
politan and enlightened. Mihailo shared Garašanin’s stance that
“the people should be ruled by a strong and enlightened authori-
ty.” Prince Miloš used to say that Mihailo was certainly not a high-
wayman (hajduk).
From the beginning of his second term as ruler, Prince Mihailo
tried to free the princedom from the Porte’s meddling in its affairs.
By passing a law on the State Council (1861), he annulled the Turk-
ish Constitution. Lawson the People’s Assembly and the People’s
Army followed, and then the Law on the State Administration
230
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(1862). Playing on incidents, brawls and the bombing of Belgrade
(1862), he applied pressure on the Porte to withdraw Turkish
troops from the Belgrade fortress– which Turkeyeventually did
in 1867.
At the same time Prince Mihailo was preparing the country
for possible conflict. In 1866–67 he entered into formal alliances
with Montenegro and Greece and signed with Bulgarian émigrés,
on their initiative, an agreement on a common state with him as
its ruler and an agreement on integrating Bosnia into Serbia with
Croatia’s People’s Party.
Because he avoidedarmed conflict with Turkey, Prince Mihailo
was not popular in the ranks of the United Serbian Youth, estab-
lished in Novi Sad (1866). The second convention of the organi-
zation was banned in Belgrade (1867), and its activities were also
restricted in Novi Sad.
Prince Mihailo advocated reconciliation between the two
dynasties, whose conflictswere undermining Serbia’s develop-
ment. However, he himself was killed by a group of Karađorđević
supporters (Belgrade, June 1868).
His assassination was a heavy blow to Serbia that had nev-
er before had such an important figure as ruler who, moreover,
had left no successor designate. Regency was established. With
a helping hand from the army, Army Minister Milivoje Blazna-
vac enthroned the underage Milan Obrenović (1854–1901), Miloš’s
brother Jevrem’s grandson. The second regency was set up (Mil-
ivoje Blaznavac, Jovan Ristić and Jovan Gavrilović) and another
member elected when Milivoje Blaznevac died. The regency gov-
erned until Milan Obrenović came of age (1872). Having reached
an agreement with the Liberals in 1858 the regency passed the 1869
Constitution. This Constitution, itself a major step toward state-
building, was strongly opposed by conservative and democratic
political currents alike.
231
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
The status of the Serbs in Austria-Hungary was changeable,
contingent on the state of affairs in the empire. As such, it affect-
ed their relations with their fellow nationals in the Princedom of
Serbia, with whom they shared the same language and religion. In
the late 18th century they had been placedunder the rule of Hun-
garian nobles. Buda and Pest were centers where Serbian cultur-
al institutions were begotten. “Hungarian” Serbs were most con-
cerned with the Princedom’s fate after the 1813 uprising had been
put down. They had assisted Serbia under Miloš Obrenović’s rule
although viewed as foreigners – nemčkari9.
During the revolution of 1848 when the Hungarians pro-
claimed their revolutionary program (February 15), the Karlovci
Serbs proclaimed Vojvodina10 in the territories of Srem, Baranja,
Banat and Bačka (May 12–14). Metropolitan Josif Rajačić (1775–
1868) was elected Patriarch while Colonel Stevan Šupljikac (1778–
1848) was elected Duke. The proclamation of Vojvodina echoed
throughout Croatia. The historical impact of these developments
is seen by historians as lying in the factthat the grassroots had
enforced a reorganization of the monarchy.
Having suffered defeat in the war with France and Piedmont-
Sardinia (1859) and, especially when defeated by Prussia (1866),
Austria had to redefine its relationship with the Hungarian part
of the empire. The result was the formal annulment of Vojvodina.
Dualism was agreed (1867), and the Hungarian part of the mon-
archy was turned into a Hungarian nation-state. Novi Sad became
the center of Serbs’ cultural life (the “Serbian Athens”). This was
the time when figures that were subsequently to play major roles
in Serbia’s politics emerged on the public scene: Svetozar Miletić
(1826–1901) and Mihailo Polit-Desančić (1833–1921). Following
the Law on National Minorities (1868), with which both lawmak-
ers and beneficiaries were dissatisfied, the battleground moved to
9 Germans, though in a derogatory sense, transl. note
10 Dukedom, duchy
232
experience with other nations experience with other nations
the Parliament, butcitizens’ associations (cultural, sport, etc.) that
enjoyed freedom of action were those crucial factors in safeguard-
ing the Serbs’ identity.
By the mid-19th century, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia had
been freed from the Sultan’s administrators and clerks. However,
the majority of Balkan Christians, mostly peasants, were still liv-
ing in fiefdoms. Under pressure from rival powers and in fear of
revolts, the Ottoman Empire tried to introduce reforms and mod-
ernization. Under the 1833 hatti-sherif, the central government
guaranteed personal and property freedoms but the peasantsre-
mained on feudal land. The new lords of the spahi lands – chit-
luk sahibs – imposednew taxes on them, while the agas, beys and
Muslim clergy were opposed toreform of the central government.
The peasants stagedrevolts that were neither territorially restrict-
ed nor socially motivated. The uprising of July 9, 1878, known
as Nevesinjska puška (the Gun of Nevesinje) was not organized.
Nevertheless it spread throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The upris-
ing in Bosnia-Herzegovina found an echo among the Serbs in the
Princedom, Hungary and Croatia (where people formed human-
itarian aid units). Prince Mihailo was reserved. A brutal show-
down with the rebels attracted the attention of European Turkey.
Russia and Austria had signed a secret agreement on the divi-
sion of spheres of influence, in which Austria disputed Serbia’s
enlargement to include Bosnia, while Russia had nothing against
it considering its own interests in Bulgaria and Constantinople.
Having become allies, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on
Turkey in July 1876. Their armies were poorly prepared for war-
fare, but help came from Russia and Russian General Chernyayev
was in command of military operations. As these operations took
a bad turn for the Serbian army, Prince Milan accepted a help-
ing hand from the Great Powers. Montenegro continued along the
warpath and won major battles.
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Faced with strong resistance near Plevna, Russia forced Serbia
to re-enter the war. Serbia started military action in mid-Decem-
ber 1877. While the war was still in full swing, it announced that
it aspired to the territory of the “Old Serbia” (the Kosovo vilayet
under Ottoman administration). These ambitions were curbed by
the Russian-Ottoman treaty of San Stefano, granting Serbia inde-
pendence and enlarging its territory by 150 square kilometers. The
territory granted to Montenegro was much bigger, whereas Bul-
garia got the region spreading “from the Danube to the Aegean
coastand Albanian mountains.” Russia made no bones about pri-
oritizing Bulgaria’s interests over Serbia’s.
England and Austria, both dissatisfied, pressed for revision of
the San Stefano treaty. At an international conference in Berlin
(the Berlin Congress, June 1878), Serbia and Montenegro were
declared independent. Montenegro doubled its territory while
Serbia enlarged its own by five towns (Niš, Pirot, Vranje, Lesko-
vac and Prokuplje).
To protect its interests Serbia turned to Austria-Hungary. In
return, it accepted a trade agreement obliging it to build, over the
following three years, a railroad connecting the country to the
Hungarian railroad system. Serbia and Montenegro were the only
countries in Europe without railroads.
The Serbs were deeply disappointed with the outcome of the
Berlin Congress, More than this, it seemed to them like a nation-
al tragedy, mostly because of the Austro-Hungarian occupa-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which “cut off expansion to include
these lands, whose Serbian population now had to be liberated”
(Ćirković, ibid.).
In the above-mentioned work “Serbs among the Europe-
an Nations” Sima M. Ćirković calls the progress the Serbsmade
after the Berlin Congress “divergent.” The Serbs in the Habsburg
monarchy were territorially partitioned and once equality before
the law was proclaimed, the issue of national collectivity became
234
experience with other nations experience with other nations
central. The monarchy established under the agreement of 1867
was dual, but Serbs were now divided into four rather than two
entities.
In the territory of “historical” Hungary and under the Agree-
ment /Nagodba/ of 1868 Croatia was given autonomy and the Law
on National Minorities did not apply to it. At the time the “mil-
itary frontier”/Vojna krajina/ was not under the jurisdiction of
the Croatian authorities (1881), 497,796 Serbs or 26.30 percent of
the entire Serbian population lived in Croatia. The Serbian Pro-
gressive Party was established after the annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The Serbs advocated independence for Croatia and
its enlargement. They dedicated themselves to economic devel-
opment (1895 – the “Serbian Bank” in Zagreb; the”Privrednik” /
businessman/association). The “Croatian-Serbian Coalition” was
formed (1905). Its founding fathers were political figures that were
destined to playan important part in the creation of the Yugoslav
state – Frano Supilo (1870–1917), Ante Trumbić (1864–1938) and
Svetozar Pribićević (1875–1936). The annexation of Bosnia-Herze-
govina sharpened the relationship between the Croats and Serbs.
Nevertheless Croat lawyers were those whorepresented Serbian
defendants at framed trials.
Dalmatia was not in Croatia but in the Austrian part of the mon-
archy. Serbs made up 17 percent of the local, mostly rural, popu-
lation. They supportedcalls for Dalmatia’s annexation to Croatia
and Slavonia. The differences emerged after Austria’s occupation
of Bosnia and Croatia whenthe Croats placed the annexation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina on their political agenda.
Until annexed (1908) Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the Sul-
tan’s rule. Serbs made up 42.88 percent of its population (1879)
– totalling438,496people. The Austrian authorities relied on
the Muslim gentry. Among the Serbian population, tradesmen
became the spearhead to safeguard the language and education of
Serbian Orthodox youth.
235
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
The Tsar passed the 1910 Constitution the modern provisions
of which had not brought stability. Young people were advocating
revolutionary ideas and nation-states. The policy to impose “the
Bosnian nation” on the population failed. Neither Croatian nor
Bosnian nationalism managed to “absorb the Muslims” (Ibid.).
Four hundred and sixty thousand Serbs lived on Hungari-
an territory (anarea much larger than present-day Vojvodina).
They were the more urban and literate part of the Serbian popula-
tion. By the end of the 19th century they were head and shoulders
above the Serbs living in the monarchy. In the early 20th century,
the Serbs would take over this leading role.
The civilian movement developed into the Serbian Liber-
al Party, which subsequently split. Onewing assembling rich and
outstanding politicians (“notables”) did not want to staunchly
oppose the 1867 Agreement. By contrast,, radical elements (the
Radical Party 1902–14) spoke for thelower strata, advocating uni-
versal suffrage and gender equality. At its helm was Jaša Tomić
(1856–1922), whom historians call a controversial figure because
of his anti-Semitism and the murder of the Liberals’ leader Miša
Dimitrijevića (1889.)
Though divided by state borders, the different parts of the Ser-
bian nation were linked by a common language and religion.
Through their intellectual elites, these parts with differing socio-
economic development made up a unique cultural space – a
space of different mentalities and lifestyles, and open to Europe-
an influence.
TWO STATE-BUILDING IDEAS IN THE PRINCEDOM OF SERBIA
AFTER THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: DEVELOPMENT
OF THE YOUNG STATE ON THE INSIDE AND ITS ENLARGEMENT
Following the Berlin Congress, the question of domestic
and foreign policy orientation challenged the newly independ-
ent state. Nikola Pašić (1845–1926) noted, “It can be said that
236
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the common people were dissatisfied with the outcome, but
enquired no further. However, the intelligentsia was divided into
two camps”(Nikola P. Pašić, Pisma, članciigovori 1872–1891/Let-
ters, Articles and Speeches/). This was analogous to the Russian
intelligentsia’s split into Slavophiles and Westerners in the 1840s.
And it was also mirrored in the political parties established in the
Princedom of Serbia in 1881.
All three parties (Liberal, Progressive and Radical) had long-
er or shorter track records. The Liberals were involved in the dec-
laration of the 1869 Constitution after Prince Mihailo’s assassi-
nation, and were in power during the 1876–77 wars. Jovan Ristić
(1831–99) resigned the premiership in 1880. The intellectual core
of the Progressive Party (Milan Piroćanac, Stojan Novaković,
Milutin Garašanin and Čedomilj Mijatović) – all of them Ser-
bia’s first intellectuals in the modern sense of the term – hinted
at its European orientation in the Videlo magazine (1880). Even
before formally established as a party, the Radicals hadfought
against the Liberals for ten years: the Serbian United Youth split
into Liberals and Socialists (1866); the parliamentary opposition
(1874–75 (Adam Bogosavljević) and in 1878 (Nikola Pašić); activ-
ism at home in the 1876–78 wartime period (Nikola Pašić) and in
exile (Pera Todorović). They saw Svetozar Marković (1846–75) as
their forefather. As a government stipendiary in Russia, Marković
adopted the revolutionary ideas of the Russianintelligentsia of the
1860s and then befriended a group of Serbs (Nikola Pašić, Pera
Velimirović, etc.) living in Switzerland at the time. The Serbs in
Switzerland were close to Russia’s revolutionaries in exile promot-
ing the ideas of their leaders (A. I. Herzen, M. A. Bakunin, P. L.
Lavrov, P. N. Tkatchev and S. G. Nechayev).
Marković lost the government stipend for criticizing the 1869
Constitution and returned to Serbia. He and like-minded fig-
ures published newspapers(Radnik/Worker/, Javnost/Vox Populi/
and Oslobođenje/Liberation/) and the Rad /Work/ magazine. He
237
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
criticized Serbia’s development after the declaration of the 1869
Constitution and was opposed to a repeat of the Western Europe-
an course (against liberalism and capitalism). On the other hand,
he promoted people’s self-government with reliance on patriar-
chal municipalities and communes. He came out with the idea of
a radical opposition to liberal thought also after the declaration of
the 1869 Constitution. Students adopted his ideas, but it was the
hard-core parliamentary opposition from the ranks of the peas-
antry– “gunjac and opanak” 11 – that had established the state – to
spread these ideas.
When Jovan Ristić’s cabinet resigned on account of the trade
arrangements provided under the Treaty of Berlin, Prince Milan
entrusted Progressive Milan Piroćanac (1837–97) with the pre-
miership. His Cabinet launched synchronous reforms that were
labeled “top-down revolution.” It passed laws on the press, assem-
bly and associations, the judiciary, compulsory education, the
Central Bank, a national currency and astanding army. The gov-
ernment was after rounding off these reforms with a new con-
stitution that would place an individual at the top of its agenda
and introduce the presidential system. The Radicals were at the
same time secretly drafting “their” constitution in which popu-
lar representation equalled a covenant.. And that was why Milan
Piroćanac tendered his resignation.
A deep crisis broke out over the law that provided for disarma-
ment of the popular army and establishment of a standing force.
A rebellion (the Timok Rebellion, 1883) broke out in the villag-
es of the Eastern Serbia. Prince Milan crushed it with his army.
The epilogue wasastate of emergency, court martials, members of
the Main Committee of the People’s Radical Party on trial, two
of them (Pera Todorović and Raša Milošević) sentenced to death
only to be amnestied by Prince Milan. Nikola Pašić was the only
11 A sheepskin fur jacket and peasant footwear
238
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one who was not arrested or brought before a court martial. He
fled the country, first to Rumania and then Bulgaria. This actually
put an end to the activity of the People’s Radical Party.
Another crisis broke out in 1885 when King Milan (the king
since 1882) went to war against Bulgaria for having annexed East-
ern Rumelia. The marital skirmish between King Milan and Queen
Natalia only added fuel to the fire and King Milan was forced to
seek a compromise with the Radicals. The outcome was a Radical-
Liberal coalition government (1887).
The end of the second Progressive government, formed by Milu-
tin Garašanin (1843–98), was marked by a fierce showdown with
party members in the provinces. They were fired from public ser-
vice, had their property confiscated and were brutally killed (some
140 of them were targeted). The second showdown, in Belgrade,
came after the proclamation of the Liberal Constitution (1888).
This one, from which the Progressivesnever recovered, was called
“the people giving vent to their deep frustrations” /”veliki narodni
odisaj”/ though it was less violent than its predecessor in the prov-
inces. However, they both testified to the attitude towards political
opponents. They were treated like enemies as Nikola Pašić termed
them upon his return from hissix-year-long exile (1883–89).
King Milan initiated the proclamation of a new constitution on
condition that it was accepted “from cover to cover.” He appointed
representatives from all three parties as members of the Constitu-
tional Committee. The constitution was drafted along the lines of
Belgium’s liberal constitution of 1831. Rumanian, Greek and Bul-
garian constitutions had already been developed according to
the same model. Soon after the 1888 Constitution was declared
(December 22) King Milan abdicated in favor of his son Alexan-
der, a minor (February 22, 1889). After six years in exile, on March
10, 1889, Nikola Pašić came back to Serbia.
While in exile – and until the war against Bulgaria (1885) –
Nikola Pašićwas a torchbearer for the country’s Western course
239
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
after the dethronement of King Milan. He established relations
with Metropolitan Mihailo, a pronounced Russophile, who was
also in exile. And through the latter, he first came into contact
with Slavophile circles in Russia, and then with Russian officials.
On his return to Serbia Pašić first disciplined the People’s Radi-
cal Partywhile imbuing it witha hostile attitude towards other par-
ties and strengthening his own leadership of the party. In the early
elections (September 14, 1889) out of 117 parliamentary seats, the
Radicals won 102 and the Liberals 15, while the Progressivesonce
again boycotted the elections. This elected parliament was “consti-
tuted as a one-party assembly” (Živan Živanović, Političkaistorija
Srbije u drugojpolovini XIX veka /A Political History of Serbia in
the Second Half of the 19th Century/). It was a homogeneous Rad-
ical government andit was governed by the party’s Main Commit-
tee’s instrument – the party caucus. Apart from the Regency, the
Radicals were in the majority in the State Council, in the courts of
appeal and cassation, and in the main inspectorate.
In the coup d’état (1893), King Alexander proclaimed himself of
age, and then (1894) replaced the 1888 Constitution with the one
declared in 1869. Feeling free after his father’s death (1901 in Vien-
na), King Alexander proclaimed (in 1901) the so-called Imposed
Constitution /Oktroisaniustav/. The leader of the People’s Radical
Party considered it a good enough instrument, though not per-
fect “for the easier attainment of greater and loftier goals such as
liberation and unification of the Serbian nation.” The freedom of
the “entire Serbian nation” was “an ideal greater and worthier than
the freedom of the citizen in the Kingdom” (Nikola Pašić, Moja
politička ispovest/My Political Confession/)
Additionally compromised by his marriage to his mother’s
widowed lady-in – waiting Draga Mašin, King Alexander was
much resented.. In a plot hatched by officers and politicians, the
King and the Queen were brutally murdered on the night of May
28–28, 1903. This drew back the curtain on dynastic conflict (three
240
experience with other nations experience with other nations
murders and three expelled rulers), shaking Serbia throughout
the 19th century.
A couple of days after the murder of the last of the Obrenovićs,
the 1888 Constitution was restored in a somewhat amended form,
as the 1903 Constitution. Petar Karađorđević I, Prince Alexander
Karađorđević’s son, was chosen to beking.
The May coup d’état put an end to the era of omnipotent rul-
ers and gave Serbia’s biggest party – the People’s Radical Party –a
historic victory. At the same time, it opened the door to politics to
the army as a powerful constitutional player. Influencing the com-
position of a new cabinet, the conspirators marginalized all con-
stitutional factors – the King, the government and the parliament.
The Court and the government, however, raised their safeguard
to the level of national policy, as the plotters were, in fact, guaran-
teesof the Court and its policy (Olga Popović – Obradović).
Three years later (July 22, 1906) in the National Assembly Niko-
la Pašić commented, “The act of May 29 is not a crime: if it were, all
the struggles for liberation all over the world would be crimes…
This act is seen as a lofty, patriotic act.” Referring to the “threat of
the army”, of whose opposition representatives had issued warn-
ings, he said such a danger was “totally over-exaggerated.” It was
only in 1906 that the conspirators – under strong pressure from
abroad, especially from England whobroke off diplomatic rela-
tions with Serbia because of the officers’ role in the murder of the
last of the Obrenovićs – were dismissed from the army only to
form, under the leadership of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis
(1877–17) a secret organization Unification or Death, better known
as The Black Hand /Crna ruka/ (1917).
The growing nationalism, fueled by Austria-Hungary (the Cus-
toms War/Pig War between Serbia and Austria-Hungary in 1906–
11 and annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908–9) contribut-
ed to the complete militarization of society. The brief period of
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Serbia’s parliamentarianism was marked by preparations for war
and wars themselves.
WARS: 1912, 1913 AND 1914.
Not many Serbs were left in the Ottoman Empire after the Ber-
lin Congress and Serbia’s enlargement (“four districts”), but what
was left behind were territories Serbs cared about very much (Priz-
ren, Skopje, the Patriarchate and Kosovo with its “central place in
Serbia’s historical tradition”, for which generations had dreamed
of taking vengeance. However, not only the Sultan’s rule, but the
ambitions of Bulgaria and Greece in Macedonia, and of the local
Albanian population stood in the way of Serbia’s spread towards
its “historical core.”
Macedonia’s population had been already aware of their spec-
ificity (neither Serbs nor Bulgarians) and they demanded auton-
omy within the Ottoman Empire. After the Berlin Congress, the
Albanians also called for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire,
considering the demographic changes in Kosovo (the Prizren
League).
Quarrels over Macedonia had prevented the contestantsfrom
joining hands in a war against the Ottoman Empire. But then, in
1912, Serbia and Bulgaria entered into a military alliance to be fol-
lowed by the Bulgaria-Greece alliance and one between Serbia and
Montenegro. These allies entered the war in October 1912. Hav-
ing triumphed at Kumanovo (October 23–24, 1912), the Serbian
troops marched into Skopje (October 26), and then Bitola. Turkey
turned to the Great Powers for mediation. A truce was signed, but
hostilities were revived again bymid-1913. After Macedonia, Ser-
bian troops entered Albania occupying Llesh, Drach and Elbasan.
An ambassadorial conference demanded the withdrawal of
Serbian troops. The troops did withdraw, but Serbia’s military cir-
cles would not say yes to Macedonia’s partition.
242
experience with other nations experience with other nations
Bulgaria started another Balkan war (June 29 – July 31, 1913).
When Rumania, Serbia, Greece and the Ottoman Empire entered
into the war, Bulgaria was forced to sign a truce, while Serbian
troops remained in Macedonia.
The military and civilian authorities bickered with each other
in the newly – acquired territories. The Constitution of the King-
dom of Serbia did not apply to these territories. Having sided with
the army, King Peter Karađorđević I abdicated in favor of his son,
Regent Alexander. The Salonika trial (1917) put an end to military-
civilian clashes.
The victory of the Serbian army in the Balkan wars found
an echo among the Slav population in the Hapsburg monar-
chy, which responded to the Slavs’ enthusiasm with increasingly
repressive measures. The Serbs formed secret organizations. One
of them was Young Bosnia /Mlada Bosna/. Ready to go for assas-
sinations, its members opted for one, which, in the atmosphere
that prevailed in the aftermath of Bosnia’s annexationwas a trig-
ger mechanism. On St. Vitus’ Day on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo
they gunned down Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Archduke
Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophia. The assassination heralded
the outbreak of WWI.
One of the ten points of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to
Serbia demanded that the Austrian authorities should be includ-
ed in the investigation of the assassins’ ties with Serbia. The Ser-
bian government condemned the assassination and – unprepared
for another war after the losses suffered in 1912–13 – accepted all
the points except for the one mentioned above that questioned the
country’s sovereignty.
The controversy over the assassins’ ties with Serbia – permeat-
ing historiography too – was revived on the occasion of the 100th
anniversary of the outbreak of WWI (2014). Serbian scholars of
authority claim, “Without a doubt, the participants had received
arms from Serbian officers, while in a report in 1917 Colonel
243
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Dragutin Dimitrijević Apisacknowledged that he was responsible
for planning the assassination” (Sima M. Ćirković, Ibid.). Howev-
er, who was used as an instrument by whom – soldiers by conspir-
ators or the other way round – remained an open question. But
those raising it seem to neglect that both sides were advocating
the “unification of death” program.
Playing on Serbia’s unpreparedness for anotherarmed conflict,
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914. A chain
of alliances followed: Montenegro declared war on Austria-Hun-
gary (August 6) and then on Germany (August 11); Russia sided
with Serbia; Germany sided with Austria-Hungary, and declared
war on Russia, France and Belgium; Austria-Hungary declared
war on Russia, and France and Great Britain on Austria-Hunga-
ry. When Japan sided with the Triple Entente and the Ottoman
Empire, the Triple Alliance/the Central Powers, the war became
global in character.
On the eve of WWI, about two million Serbs lived in Aus-
tria-Hungary. After its enlargement in 1912 Serbia had a popu-
lation of some 4.5 million, compared with Austro-Hungarian
Empire’s 50 million. Against thisbackground of power unbalance
Serbia defeated the Austrian troops at Mt. Cer (the battle of Cer,
August 20, 1914) and crossed into the enemy’s territory. In another
offensive, the Austrian army occupied Belgrade and the territory
between the rivers Sava and Danube. Then the tables turned (the
battle of Kolubara, Nov. 17 – Dec. 15). The enemy had to withdraw.
Both sides sought allies during a ceasefire. The Triple Entente
signed the Treaty of London with Italy promising it a large part of
the Adriatic coast. On the other hand, Bulgaria joined forces with
the Central Powers since Nikole Pašić would not agree to conces-
sions in Macedonia.
Following another offensive, Serbian troops, along with civil-
ians, were forced to withdraw to Kosovo and then, through Mon-
tenegro and Albania (the “Albanian Ordeal”) – from Valona to
244
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Corfu – to the coast. With a helping hand from the Allies, the
surviving troops and civilians found refuge in camps in Greece,
France, Switzerland and North Africa. Young people who had
survived were provided with schooling in Switzerland.
Territorial loss was seen as a heavy blow. The government split
up: the cabinet and the parliament in Corfu on the one hand, and
the Regent and those officers faithful to him, including members
of the Black Hand, on the Salonika front on the other. Suspected
of planning the assassination of the Regent, members of the Black
Hand were put on trial in 1917 (the Salonika trial) and Dragu-
tin Dimitrijević Apis was sentenced to death (the trial underwent
revision after WWII).
A meeting in Corfu (July 20, 1917) between representatives of
the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee resulted in
the Corfu Declaration on the organization of a future state.
In the spring of 1917, Slovenian MPs in the Austro-Hungari-
an parliament passed the May Declaration invoking the people’s
right to self-determination and the Croats’ right to statehood, and
demanding the establishment of the state of Slovenes, Croats and
Serbs within the Habsburg monarchy.
A major development in the international arena (the Russian
Revolution and Russia’s withdrawal from WWI, the US entering
the war and its unwillingness to safeguard the old European order
with the Habsburg monarchy) sped up these processes among the
South Slavs.
The Salonika Front was breached on September 15, 1918. The
People’s Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was established in
Zagreb (October 6, 1918). The Council made a number of deci-
sions on the breakup with the Habsburg monarchy and the crea-
tion of the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Historians and the-
oreticians of law at the time were in disagreement over the status
of this state. It was threatened from two sides: from the outside,
with Italy aspiring to Slovenian and Croatian territories, and from
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the inside, where the danger was seen in revolutionary elements
(“green forces”). The Council counted on assistance from the Ser-
bian army.
Serbia was in favor of annexation of as many regions as possible.
A decision on unification with Serbia and oustingthe Petrović
dynasty was made in Montenegro (the Podgorica Assembly, Nov.
26, 1918). And in Novi Sad, the “big people’s assembly” decided
on unification with Serbia (Nov. 25, 1918). In Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na, municipalities proclaimed unification with Serbia whereas the
Sarajevo-based People’s Council opted for Zagreb.
In Geneva, negotiations on dualism with representatives of the
Zagreb-based People’s Council failed because the cabinet of Niko-
la Pašić had resigned. The Council in Zagreb voted for unifica-
tion with Serbia and sent an elected delegation with instructions
/Naputak/ to Belgrade where, on December 1, 1918, King Alexan-
der Karađorđević proclaimed unification.
SERBS ASSEMBLED IN ONE STATE FOR THE FIRST TIME:
TERRITORIALLY DIVIDED AND MIXED WITH OTHER NATIONS
Of all the newly-established European states after WWI, the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918–29) / the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia (1929 –41)12was faced with the biggest challenges. It
had to strengthen its international standing and define its borders.
Its nations had known almost nothing about one another and it
was only within the new state that they realized what their inter-
ests were and how to set their goals. They were divided by their
12 This is a summary of the study “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918–29)
/ Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929–1941)” and three case studies detailing it 1. “The
St. Vitus Day Constitution of June 28, 1921, Yugoslavia’s the first constitution:
unitarian-centralistic principles win against the concept of a complex state;” 2.
“Croatian respresentatives assassinated in the People’s Assembly: June 20, 1928;”
and 3. “Separatism: a reaction to the dictatorship of January 6, 1929.” This study
and case studies are available at the Helsinki Committee’s web portal, under the
subtitle “Yugoslavia’s dissolution.”
246
experience with other nations experience with other nations
different histories, religions and traditions but also by large eco-
nomic disparities and levels of literacy. The new state with its dis-
parate judicial, educational and economic systems looked chaot-
ic. The consequences of the war – poverty, hunger, disease and the
like – were palpable and threatened turmoil. Frustration over the
heavy losses in human life hung in the air. Observers of thesechal-
lenges, both domestic and foreign, used to comment, “Yugoslavia
is easier to imagine than to realize.”
Shortly after King Alexander proclaimed unification on Decem-
ber 1, 1918, Yugoslavia’s very first cabinet under the premiership of
Stojan Protić (1857–23), one of the leaders of the People’s Radical
Party, was formed. The cabinet decisively influenced the compo-
sition of the provisional people’s representation tasked with pre-
paring a constituent assembly. The outcome of the elections for
the constituent assembly (Nov. 20, 1920) revealed that the elector-
ate was deeply divided into two blocs – centralist and federalist.
This gap was also manifest in the number of constitutional drafts
put forth as alternatives to that of the government. New divisions
emerged over the cabinet’s draft house rules for the Constitution-
al Assembly, which were contrary to the provisions of the Elec-
tion Law. They obliged representativesto pledge allegiance to the
King, which prejudged the form of the state, and the constitution,
declared by a simple rather than qualified majority vote. Nikola
Pašić’scabinet stopped at nothing to get the constitution voted in.
The Croat Republican Peasant Party boycotted the proceedings of
the Constitutional Assembly to demonstrate that the Constitution
would be declared against its will. The state was thus placed on the
limit of legitimacy (see, Latinka Perović, “The St. Vitus’ Day Con-
stitution of June 28, 1921, Yugoslavia’s First Constitution: Central-
istic-Unitarian Concept Wins against the Concept for a Complex
State”).
Several constitutional drafts from different parts of the country,
submitted by different political parties, groups and individuals
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
– none of them disputing the state’s unity but only its centralist
system – raises thequestion of the grounds on which the admin-
istration, the main promoter of centralism and unitarianism,
was refusing to discuss any form of autonomy, federation or
confederation.
At the very beginning of WWI, the Serbian government had set
unification with the Croats and Slovenians as its goal. To Serbs,
the document of December 1, 1918 was tantamount to realization
of that goal.
The Serbs brought their state, their monarchy and their victori-
ous army, as well as the territories won in the 1912–13 wars, to the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The population of South
Serbia – as the area of Macedonia alongside the Vardar River was
called at the time – was not so integrated into the Serbian nation
as the population in the territories Serbia was enlarged with at the
Berlin Congress.
The manner in which the unification of December 1, 1918 was
realized left the process of integration of the Serbian nation unfin-
ished and generated divides. The Montenegrins who entered the
new kingdom having left behind a state and dynasty of their own at
the Podgorica Assembly in 1918 split into the supporters of uncon-
ditional unification (bjelaši)13 and those opposing it (zelenaši)14.
Problems in the countries who found themselves in a single
state after December 1 were a different story. In Slovenia, there
were almost no Serbs. Things stood differently in Croatia and Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. In Croatia, Serbs – though a minority nation
– became a political majority. To leading Serbian politicians in
Croatia (such as Svetozar Pribićević), Serbia was – until the Ser-
bian-Croatian coalition (1927) and especially until the January 6
dictatorship (1929) when Stjepan Radić was already dead (1928)
and Svetozar Pribićević himself confined – “the most authoritative
13 The Whites
14 The Greens
248
experience with other nations experience with other nations
factor in determining Serbian interests.”Ruling circles ‘perceived
and managed the new state as if it were an enlarged Serbia. ‘To
them, Yugoslav integration was the top priority. In a strong, com-
mon state Serbs were everywhere safe and secure. However, the
processes of integration and disintegration were simultaneous.
Members of other nations were flocking together on the national
principle basis, whereas Serbs, Slovenians and even Muslims were
splitting up.
Croatian politicians were trying to internationalize the Croa-
tian question. After one mission he paid to Moscow with this in
mind, Stjepan Radić was arrested. He was faced with a 10-year
term of imprisonment and a ban on his party. Then they changed
their strategy. One of party leaders, representative Pavle Radić
declared in the National Assembly that they recognized the St.
Vitus’ Constitution and were changing the name of their party
to the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS). From 1925 till 1927, the HSS
participated in the government. However, the continual parlia-
mentary conflicts culminated in bloodshed. Radical Puniš a Račić
shot dead two Croatian representativesand wounded another two.
Stjepan Radić, the main target, was wounded and soon died of his
wounds. Though their murderer was called a lunatic, all indica-
tors (the press, the Prime Minister, the chairman of the People’s
Assembly, the Court, etc.) speak of a thoroughly prepared assas-
sination. This was evident in the scandalous trial of the murder-
er that foreign observers saw as a warning of bad Serbian-Croa-
tian relations to come (see, “Croatian representativesassassinated
in the People’s Assembly: June 20, 1928” at the web portal).
The crime committed in the highest representative body of
the common state not only compromised parliamentarianism,
but deepened people’s mistrust of the state itself. It would appear
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thatthe crime was meant to trigger a solution prepared long
before.15
Responding to the state crisis, King Alexander issued the Man-
ifesto of January 6, 1926. He proclaimed that the time had come to
block out intermediaries between the King and the people. He sus-
pended the Constitution and dismissed the People’s Assembly. He
appointed politicians loyal to the Court members of the cabinet of
General Petar Živković, the commander of the Royal Guard. He
banned political parties and placed their leaders under control.
Its “tribal characteristics”having been taken away, the name of the
state changed from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenesto
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Instead of 33 districts, nine banships
(banovina) were established with the King appointing the bans.
The goal was to abolish the historical provinces.
The Yugoslavia of banships was “supposed to be a melting pot
for a new Yugoslav nation. “The ideology of integral Yugoslavian-
ism, born in dictatorship, was everywhere met with disapproval.
Separatism and irredentism were growing stronger and strong-
er (see, (Latinka Perović, “Separatism: a Reaction to the Dictator-
ship” on the web portal).
On September 9, the King “gifted” to hispeople a new consti-
tution – Oktroisani ustav (the Imposed, or September 1931 Con-
stitution). Dictatorship was formally annulled, but well disguised
(“the little constitution”). When Hitler rose to power (1933), King
Alexander turned his back on France, Serbia’s traditional ally, and
looked to Germany. While the King was visiting France, Croa-
tian and Macedonian separatists killed him in Marseilles on Octo-
ber 9, 1934. His heir, King Peter II (1923–70) was underage at the
time. Hence, under King Alexander’s last will and testament, the
15 For more details see the study headlined “The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes (1918–1929). The Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929–1941) published on the
web portal. Here the author just emphasizes the crucial points leading towards the
state’s short lifespan. .
250
experience with other nations experience with other nations
state was ruled by aregency with the King’s cousin, Prince Paul
Karađorđević (1893–76) at the helm.
After the declaration of the Imposed (September) Constitu-
tion, the pro-regime party – Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democ-
racy (the Yugoslav National Party after 1933) also advocated an
ideology of integral Yugoslavism. The cabinet of financial expert
Milan Stojadinović (1888–1961) lasted longer than any other cab-
inet formed under the Regency (1935–39). Stojadinović contin-
ued the policy of taking sides with Germany and settling accounts
with Italy. He won overthe Slovenian People’s Party and Yugoslav
Muslim Organization to a new party – the Yugoslav Radical Com-
munity – and imposed himself as its leader. (Count Ciano noted
down in his diary, “Stojadinović is a fascist, if not by party mem-
bership then by his views on government and a way of life” (Jože
Pirjevec).
Stojadinović’s conflict with the Serbian Orthodox Church over
the Concordat and the election victories of Croatia’s and Serbia’s
opposition in 1938 provided Prince Paul with the opportunity to
bring Dragiša Cvetković (1893–1969), a politician who was little-
known but ready to come to an agreement with the Croats, into
the government. The Cvetković – Maček Agreement was signed
after brief negotiations (August 26, 1939) and Maček and his min-
isters joined the cabinet. Croatia got its ban, its assembly /Sabor/,
and jurisdiction over the administration, education, the economy,
and traffic policy. Strongly opposed to the establishment of the
Banship of Croatia was the Serbian Cultural Club (1937), the core
of Serbia’s intellectual and political elite.
Only a day after the Agreement was signed (September 1939),
WWII broke out. The Kingdom found itself in a difficult position.
The alliance with Hitler was unpopular. On the other hand, its
power to resist was poor. “In a cage with a tiger, “Churchill said of
Prince Paul. On March 25, 1941 Yugoslavia joined the Axis Powers.
Two days later (March 27, 1941), mass protests erupted in Belgrade
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
and other towns in Serbia. The generals carried out a coup d’état.
Dušan Simović (1882–1962) was appointed Prime Minister. The
new cabinet did not annul the country’s membership of the Axis
(Sima M. Ćirković is probably Serbia’s only historian to mention
this fact). Without declaring war, Hitler, filled with vengeance,
decided to bomb Belgrade (April 6, 1941). German troops entered
Yugoslavia from several sides. The Independent State of Croatia /
NDH/ was proclaimed in Croatia on April 10, 1941. Deputy Prime
Minister of the Royal Government, Dr. Vlatko Maček, appealed
to the Croats to accept the new government. First Ustasha con-
centration camps wereestablished in Italy and Hungary after the
proclamation of the January 6 dictatorship /1929/, whilst Ustasha
tenets on an ethnically pure Croatia had been known since the
early 1930s.
WORLD WAR II (1941–45)
Even historians argue about what it was that crucially decided
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s short lifespan: aggression from out-
side or unsettled controversies at home? And, probably the same
fate that befellthe Republic of Yugoslavia, even if there had been
no aggression andwith domestic controversies seemingly settled,
indicates that we need to take a different approach to the King-
dom and the Republic alikeas entitiesin the light of the long his-
tories of their composite nations. Taken separately, the histories
of each and every nation – in the “from-to”form – do not provide
explanations of their alliances or their dramatic conflicts.
After the brief “April War” (April 6–18, 1941), Yugoslavia capit-
ulated and was soon partitioned among the countries that had
requested a revision of the division following WWI. Hunga-
ry (Bačka, Baranja and Međumurje), Bulgaria (Macedonia and
Southeast Serbia) and Italy (Kosovo and Metohija through its vas-
sal Albania, and occupied Montenegro) were parties to the deal.
Slovenia’sterritory was divided up between the Reich and Italy.
252
experience with other nations experience with other nations
The Independent State of Croatia spread over a large part of Yugo-
slavia. Its Ustasha regime ruled with “militia, army, secret police and
more than twenty-odd concentration camps” (Mari Žanin Čalić,
Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. veku). The first Ustasha camps in Italy and
Hungary had been established at the time of the January 6, 1929 dic-
tatorship, while the first Ustashadocuments were written in the ear-
ly 1930s. They quoted an ethnically pure state of Croatia as their pri-
mary goal (see Latinka Perović on “Separatism: a Reaction” on the
web portal). This, above all, referred to Serbs making up 30 percent
of the NDH’s population. The Ustasha concept ofan ethnically pure
state implied a planned destruction of the Serbs. The Serbian alpha-
bet was banned, their priests were killed and their churches demol-
ished. In late September 1941, some 120,000 Serbs fled Croatia, and
another 200,000 a year later. In collection centers turned into con-
centration camps to which they had been deported, Serbs – along
with Jews, Roma and opponents to the Ustasha regime – were being
physically eliminated. Most infamous of all were the concentration
camps of Jasenovac, Stara Gradiška and Jadovno. Horrible enough
in itself, the truth about the Ustasha system of concentration camps,
especially Jasenovac, became the subjectof mythologythat declare-
dall scientific truth null and void.16
What was left of Serbia was under German military command
that relied on the domestic civilian authorities: the Commissioner
Department and then, as of the end of August 1941, on the “Serbi-
an government” of the extreme nationalist General Milan Nedić
(1878–1946). The Germans were in command of the army, the
police, the economy and finance unlike in France where they left
these domains to the domestic quisling government.
Milan Nedić counted on the supporters of Dimitrije Ljotić’s
“Zbor” /Gathering/and Kosta Pećanac’s Chetniks. To him, the
establishment of a peasant state in Serbia hinged on the Reich’s
16 Ivo Goldstein, Jasenovac. Tragika, mitomanija, istina…
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
victory. Serbia’s quisling regime persecuted Communists and
other anti-Fascists. Education, culture and the press underwent
changes. The Jewish community was destroyed. Military forc-
es were formed with German assistance: the Serbian Volunteer
Corps and Serbian National Guard.
“Serbian Chetniks” and Communists were at the forefront of
resistance. With a group of officers, Colonel Draža Mihailović
(1893–1946) came from Bosnia to Western Serbia and established
his headquarters on Mt. Ravna Gora. He would not accept the
country’s occupation nor would he confront the occupiers – and
so he ended up in collaboration. He considered himself the King’s
legitimate representative. The government in exile appointed him
commander of the Yugoslav Army Headquarters in the Home-
land. His military organization was spread all over the country,
undisciplined and led by self-willed commanders. The Chetniks
stood for “restoration of the monarchy, the old ownership rela-
tions and the hegemony of the Serbian bourgeoisie” (Branko
Petranović). Their program for an ethnically pure Serbia implied
deportation and dislocation of some four million people. Ethnic
cleansing was not spontaneous, but executed on command, and
its purpose was to ethnically homogenize the Serbian nation.
On the eve of WWII (in 1940 at the Fifth Territorial Confer-
ence in Zagreb) and after long wavering over the national ques-
tion, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia /KPJ/ decided to defend
the country. After twenty years of illegal activity, new generations
of party members had replaced the old, factional struggles end-
ed, and Bolshevization was completed. In that closed circle, open
only to the Soviet Union via the Comintern, the strategy for social
(“there shall be no return to the old ways”) and national ques-
tions (Yugoslavia restored on federal foundations) was decided.
And that strategy implied a struggle against the occupier and Par-
tisan warfare backed up by a firmly organized Communist Party
of Yugoslaviaactually structuring the Partisan resistance.
254
experience with other nations experience with other nations
The autumn of 1941 saw two meetings between Dragoljub
Draža Mihailović and Communist and Partisan leader Josip Broz
Tito (1892–1980). The meetings produced no results since the pro-
grams of the main players were diametrically opposed and already
by November 1941 the Chetniks and Partisansclashed for the first
time.
In Western Serbia (September-November), the Partisans had a
hold on a considerable amount of territory centred in Užice (the
“Užice Republic”). A German offensive made them withdraw and
“after that the Partisans were left without a major stronghold in
Serbia” (Sima M. Ćirković, Ibid.).
Draža Mihailović’s authority was backed up by the fact that
he had the support of the government in exile that had promot-
ed him to general and appointed him Minister of the Army and,
moreover, secured him Allied assistance. However, the state of
affairs became more and more dependent on the balance of forc-
es at the fronts. With the capitulation of Italy (1943), Germany was
no longer capable of fighting on all fronts.
The Partisan leadership (in late 1942) was in favor of estab-
lishing parallel rule, not only at local, but also at national level. It
formed the Anti-fascist Council of People’s Liberation /AVNOJ/,
assembling representatives of different parties and groups. At its
second session (November 29–30, 1943 in Jajce) AVNOJ assumed
the function of a government body. It suspended the King’s gov-
ernment, banned the King from the country, decided on a federal
system for the country and invested Josip Broz Tito with the rank
of Marshal.
While the Partisans were struggling for international recog-
nition, the Allies were discussing the post-war order in Europe.
At their meeting, Stalin and Churchill (1944, Moscow) includ-
ed Yugoslavia among the countries destined for a fifty-fifty split.
Churchill was trying to get the Partisan and Chetnik movements
to unite. On the island of Vis (June 1944), representatives of the
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London-based government and Partisan leadership agreed to
form a democratically-oriented government capable of uniting all
the forces in the struggle against the Germans, andleave discus-
sion on the post-war system of governmenttill the end of the war.
The Yalta conference (February 1945) decided that AVNOJ should
include ex-Yugoslav MPs (elected in 1938). The King appealed to
the so-called Yugoslav Army in the Homeland to join the Parti-
sans. This sealed Draža Mihailović’s fate; “to the nations at home
and to major allies, the reconstruction of Yugoslavia became a
natural and indisputable goal” (Ćirković, Ibid.).
In the summer of 1944, Partisan forces broke into Serbia. Sta-
lin wanted the Partisan leadership to include Red Army troops –
that had come to the Yugoslav border from Rumania – in the lib-
eration of Belgrade (October 20, 1944). In early March 1944, as
agreed between Tito and Ivan Šubašić, the coalition government
of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was formed.
A non-judicial showdown with collaborators began. Pre-war
politicians walked out of the government. Elections for the Con-
stitutive Assembly were called for in November 11, 1945. The turn-
out was 88.66 percent with 90 percent of the electorate casting
their votes for the People’s Front formed by the Communist Party
of Yugoslavia. The strategy for a revolutionary takeover, one of the
goals of the liberation war, was proceeding smoothly.
On November 29, 1945, the Republic was proclaimed. Federal
Yugoslavia’s first constitution drafted along Soviet lineswas prom-
ulgated on January 31, 1946. The state named the Federal Peo-
ple’s Republic of Yugoslavia was made up of six republics (Slove-
nia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Mace-
donia) each with a government, the highest people’s representa-
tion, and a constitution of its own. Serbia had one autonomous
province – Vojvodina – and one autonomous area – Kosovo and
Metohija.
256
experience with other nations experience with other nations
THE SERBS IN ONE STATE ONCE AGAIN AND ONCE
AGAIN TOGETHER WITH OTHER NATIONS
Established on the principles of federalism, the Second Yugo-
slavia began its life as a strongly centralized state and under the
proclaimed dictatorship of a modern class – the proletariat, the
sole assumption in a state of peasants. The Serbs who had made
up the main the body of the Partisan army enabling Yugoslavia’s
reconstruction saw the federal system as detrimental to them for
two reasons; one was the establishment of new nations – Macedo-
nian, Montenegrin and even Bosnian Muslims; and the other was
Serbia’s asymmetric arrangement – the autonomous province of
Vojvodina and the autonomous area of Kosovo and Metohija. It
was not fair to Serbia, they thought, that Istria, Dalmatia and Her-
zegovina had not been given the same, autonomous status.
Following the fall of the “Užice Republic”, the Partisan move-
ment no longer operated in the territory of Serbia. As said above,
“cleaning up” the terrain for the new regime had made people
even more reserved about it. Their grudge was based on their
reaction to violence. In May 1944, the Department for the Pro-
tection of the People (OZNA) was formed. At its helm was Alek-
sandar Ranković (1909–1983), a member of the party and state top
leadership along with Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj and Milo-
van Đilas. A wave of terror started that swept over collaborators,
quislings and political opponents –genuine and potential alike.
And especially at local level, this outside-the-courtroom show-
down grew into variously motivated forms of revenge. In parallel
with a sigh of relief at the end of the war, there was a spread of fear,
the fear that – often undercover – questioned the legitimacy of the
new regime. The situation changed only gradually since violence
– planned or spontaneous – was turning into the modus operandi
of the new regime.
In the period 1945–48, the new regime altered the status of
ownership relationsbased on the Soviet model. Properties were
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nationalized, the management of economic affairs taken over, a
planned economy established and heavy industry and infrastruc-
ture prioritized. The neglect of agriculture resulted in poor supply,
a problem that was, in turn, solved by force (compulsory buyouts,
forced membership of peasant communes, etc.).
It was only in 1948 that the Serbian public slightlymodified its
attitude towards the new regime. Stalin’s assault on the KPJ lead-
ership, accused of veering towards the West and capitalism, and
the expulsion of the KPJ from the Information Bureau of Com-
munist Parties started yet another wave of violence. Some 16,000
people, dissenters from among the ranks of the Communists, were
arrested and sent to concentration camps, including the most
infamous, Goli Otok. Armed incidents at the border and unprec-
edented resistance by the KPJ were broadening the frontline of
defense at home. That was Josip Broz Tito’s biggest success. In his
memoirs, one of the leading members of Belgrade’s Praxiscircle,
Mihailo Marković, says, “Tito accomplished something incredi-
ble. Despite all their Slavophilism and Russophilism, in 1948, 1949
and 1950 the Serbs were ready to fight the Red Army that they had
onceso admired.” It was in defense of the country’s independence,
as a shared interest, that Josip Broz Tito became “nearer and dear-
er” to Serbia. There were several reasons why this was so.
Tito had renewed Yugoslavia to envelop all Serbs. He had relied
on Russia as Serbia’s historical ally. He had formed a strong army,
which was a major factor in Serbia’s history (according to German
sources, German commanders used to say during the war that, if
captured. Tito would be treated as a marshal because of his mili-
tary and statebuilding skills). A party of the type Tito had creat-
ed originated from Russian revolutionary, 19th century ideas. Last
but not least, the Serbs and Tito had been identified with Yugosla-
via (when, after proclamation of the 1974 Constitution, high-rank-
ing party official Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo asked Tito what
would happen to Yugoslavia, the latter replied, “Yugoslavia is no
258
experience with other nations experience with other nations
longer.” In other words, to both Serbs and Tito a state is non-exist-
ent if not centralized and unitarized – Jože Pirjevec).
When speaking in public Tito struck a balance between cen-
tralism and federalism – in the state, though not in the party.
Actually, he himself was always in favor of a centralized and uni-
tary state. Hence, he recognized how significant Serbia was for
Yugoslavia. He kept his ears open to any criticism of his personal-
ity coming out of Serbia. When the criticism became more open
– as at the time of Croatia’s maspok (mass movement) – he angri-
ly told a small circle of Serbian officials, “I came here in 1941 and
from here I went on” (Latinka Perović, Zatvaranje kruga). And
the agreement he had made with a part of the Serbian leadership
paved the way for the showdown with the entire leadership of
Croatia (Ibid.).
In 1948, Tito was above all defending the independence of the
country he symbolized. His breakwith the communist ideologi-
cal monolith was a by-product of his attempt to better explain the
conflict. He would approve changes unless theychangedthe basic
characteristic of the Soviet model: state ownership and the polit-
ical monopoly of the Communist Party (some twenty years lat-
er, at the time of dramatic debates on constitutionalamendments,
Edvar Kardelj told Serbian party leaders that Tito and Serbia
had been against all changes from the very beginning (Latinka
Perović, ibid.).
Even when he tried for the first time to democratize the coun-
try – following the change in the party’s name into the League of
Communists (1952) and Stalin’s death (1953) – Milovan Đilas was
severely criticized by the party leadership and then excommuni-
cated, put on secret trial four times and sentenced to nineyears’
imprisonment. Đilas had the support of liberal, academic circles
in the West and Western officials saw Yugoslavia’s stability as a
priority.
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Josip Broz Tito’s mental ties with the Soviet Communist Party’s
ideological core had never been severed. Even at the time of the
biggest bilateral crisis in 1948, he himself told a meeting with lead-
ing army officers, “Every wolf has a lair that he never leaves for
good.” And indeed, he eventually returned to his own lair.
In 1955, a Soviet state andparty delegation came to Belgrade.
According to some Yugoslav diplomatic sources (such as Koča
Popović and Veljko Mićunović), thismarked the beginning of
Tito’s defensive attitude towards a reformist model for society.
Tito was seismographically reacting to change anddirectly ques-
tioning, especially in the long run, the organic characteristics of
the Soviet model – state ownership and party monopoly, as said
above. And he reacted not in institutions, but when addressing
mass meetings, thereby severing the orientation towards a market
economy (Split, 1962) and arrangements aimed at “dethroning”
the party (Maribor, 1966).
In a Yugoslavia that moved from being one of the most back-
ward countries in Europe on the eve of WWII to a middle-income
country with industry and many modern characteristics, the Serbs
prospered, and prospered more than ever before in their modern
history. “Sudden and swift changes had taken place in earlier peri-
ods, mostly among the 19th century Serbs in Hungary, and lat-
er in the Kingdom of Serbia under the rule of Prince Miloš, but
all of them benefited only the smaller, educated, well-to-do and
urban part of the society. In the second half of the 20th centu-
ry, the changes were massive, covering virtually the entire nation,
and altering its profile” (Sima M. Ćirković, Ibid.).
Though limited in attainment, these changes indicate that, at
the end of the 20th century, the Serbs were no longer a nation of
peasants. In 1946, peasants made up 72.3 percent of Serbia’s popu-
lation and in 1966–56 percent, whereas in 1976, only one third of
the population earned its living from farming. Urban settlements
mushroomedovernight. Mandatory eight-year schooling cut
260
experience with other nations experience with other nations
down the number of illiterates. The network of schools at all levels
of education spread beyond Belgrade: Novi Sad (1960), Priština
(1970) and then Niš and Kragujevac became new university cent-
ers and university faculties were opened in several other towns.
Health and social insurance improved the nation’s healthcare and
social security. People’s lifespanwas longer (from 45 years of age
in the aftermath of WWII to 77 in women and 77 in men in 1981).
The position of women changed radically – both normatively and
in real life. The population became upwardly mobile. Industry was
shifting from villages to the towns. Later, the downward employ-
ment spiral took them abroad – out of 800,000 Yugoslavs working
abroad, 300,000 were Serbs. The press, radio and television ser-
vices (since 1958 in Belgrade) expanded. By not only publishing
domestic but also foreign authors, publishing houses contributed
to this diversity and the country’s opening up to the world. Many
translated books; by authors from East and West saw the light of
the day. Thearts were blossoming (“the Age of Pericles” was how
writer and film director Živojin Pavlovićtermed this era in cul-
ture). Literary works, paintings, music and movies that were pro-
duced far outstripped a purely domestic level and often received
important international awards, including the Nobel Prize for
Literature – awarded to Ivo Andrić. Writers and artists were
conducting”double”dialogues: with regime officials and among
themselves. Realists and Modernists had magazines of their own:
Savremenik (The Contemporary) and Delo (Work).
This poor, underdeveloped country was making progress
thanks to foreign assistance and loans. However, many histori-
ans (such as Žanin Čalić, Istorija Jugoslavije, or Sima M. Ćirković,
Srbimeđuevropskimnarodima)are of the opinion that voluntary
work by ordinary citizens – especially young people – made a
great contribution as well. The fact that cannot be avoided was the
Serbs’ adjustment to the post-war regime and their compatibility
with Josip Broz Tito. Like Tito himself, they reluctantly accepted
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frequent constitutional amendments seeking a formula to sustain
the complex and contradictory Yugoslav state after Tito’s death. In
a way, this was all part and parcel of Serbian tradition. Slobodan
Jovanović was wont to say that the Serbs did not react “during a
process” but all of a sudden, so their reactions seemed something
unexpected. To illustrate this, he quoted the year 1839 when the
Defenders of the Constitution had forced Prince Miloš to abdi-
cate, or 1858 when, under pressure from the Liberals, Prince Alex-
ander Karađorđević had to seek refuge in a fortress and then cross
over into Austria. But it was perhaps Nikola Pašić who, speak-
ing about the ousting of the dynasty in the early 20th century,
best explained the reasons why this “accumulated” dissatisfac-
tion suedenly erupted.. When asked by a reporter shortly after the
murder of the last of the Obrenovićs (1903), “Was such a catas-
trophe predictable?” he answered, “You know that in Serbia we
have had coup d’état after coup d’état, laws that have been declared
and then annulled, and conflicts coming in series. We Serbs or –
the South Slavs in general – are not like the peoples in the West
that promptly protest against breaches of the law. We are some-
how passive by nature and would allow wrongs done to us accu-
mulate until the offender really overshoots the mark and realizes
himself that he has no other way out. Conflicts had inevitably led
the late King Alexander towards catastrophe.
“I know our parliamentarians and senators too well. These peo-
ple, the great majority of them, are for the monarchy. A republic
doesn’t suit Serbia it’s too early for a republic and too far awayfro-
mus. As a republic, Serbia would be exposed to all sorts of foreign
influences and that would be the biggest evil of all. Serbia is con-
cerned not only with its today’s self, but also with Serbian ideas. Hav-
ing a republic would be like abandoning the pledge we made to our-
selves (emphasis by the author). Even as a monarchy we have had
much difficulty in fending off foreign influences…And besides,
dear sir, you are aware that there are Serbs who do not knowwhat
262
experience with other nations experience with other nations
to do with universal and totally unrestricted freedom because they
know nothing about respecting that freedom”(Čedomir Višnjić).
This is what Pašić said on the eve of the wars in 1912, 1913 and
1914 in which Serbia, after its declaration of independencein 1878,
was extending its territory so as to bring all Serbs into a single
state. The Serbs wasted an inordinate amount of human resourc-
es on this crucial aim, not seeing the brute force they used against
others as a crime. For them, a centralized and unitary state was a
path to integration and therefore, they shunned any idea what-
soever of a composite state: autonomy, federation or confedera-
tion. They relied on what they had staked themselves: a state – the
Kingdom of Serbia, the Serbian monarchy, the Serbian army, their
victims and the percentage of Serbs in the total population of the
new state. They saw violence against others (such as the procla-
mation of the St. Vitus’ Day Constitution or the assassination of
Croatian representatives in the People’s Assembly), and then dic-
tatorship, as the means necessary to overpower resistance by oth-
ers. As an epilogue: it was aggression from outside together with
the absence of inner cohesion that accelerated the disintegration
of the first Yugoslav state.
In a complex state, other nations, mostly Croats and Slovenians,
as nations in the modern sense of the term, and those in the pro-
cess of formation, always found ways to protect themselves from
hegemony, meaning ways to complete their national integration.
In the Second Yugoslavia, renewed by federal standards, feder-
alism itself was formal for toolong. It was only when some parts of
the Federation, following the Soviet model, were invested with the
first elements of statehood that the two concepts clashed. Histori-
ans are divided over the issue: according to one school ofthought,
decentralization –republics turned into nation-states –brought
about Yugoslavia’s disintegration; the other sees decentraliza-
tion as the realization of people’s right to self-determination pro-
claimed in all the Yugoslavia’s constitutions and a precondition
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to free nations’ agreement on the context of their rational uni-
ty. However, the actual process was far more contradictory and
dramatic.
From the early 1960s the dynamics of developments in Yugo-
slavia intensified. The extensive economic growth wasted away.
Breakthroughs in science and technology, as well as new policies,
had considerably changed the world. At the same time, especial-
ly after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Sovi-
et Union and Khrushchev’s address, Communism fell into crisis,
which was differently coped with within the international Com-
munist movement. In the East, there were attempted reforms to
halt the arms of the Warsaw Pact, while in the West, Euro-Com-
munism shattered its delusion about the applicability of the Sovi-
et model to Western society. In Germany, following its economic
revival, accountability for Nazism was on the agenda and its new
Eastern policy formulated. By overlooking the generally “slow”
course of history, contemporary authors are also neglecting the
influence these changes had on Yugoslavia, and especially the dif-
ferent reactions to them in the country itself.
Faced with new challenges the Yugoslav party leadership
responded differently (March 1962), their responses correspond-
ing with either of the two conflicting currents of thought personi-
fied by Serb Aleksandar Ranković and Slovenian Edvard Kardelj.
Centralism or federalism in both the party and the state once
again became a key issue. Tito seemed to be weighting the pros
and cons, though actually siding with Aleksandar Ranković. At
the 8th Congress of the SKJ (1964) a liberal economic orienta-
tion prevailed (the gap between the “developed” and “underde-
veloped” was very deep at the time); and so did a decentraliza-
tiontrend in the party. Specifying the federal parity of the par-
ty’s Executive Committee Tito declared himself a Croat. The party
was shocked. Professor Mihailo Markovićwrites, “The public was
264
experience with other nations experience with other nations
stunned to hear Tito saying outloud thathe was a Croat (the gen-
eral opinion having always been he was a dedicated Yugoslav).”
Work on constitutional amendments (1963) and economic
reforms, termed by historians from abroad the most radical in
Eastern Europe(John Lampe) were natural follow-ups to the lib-
eral orientation of the SKJ 8th Congress. But these reforms met
with strong resistance. Aleksandar Ranković, seen as the pillar
of the resistance, was soon discharged. The reasons why he had
to be removed were weak: he was accused of having been aware
that Josip Broz Tito had been bugged. The most lucid insiders,
however, said thatthey could not explain Tito’s decision to have
Ranković removed(Aleksandar Nenadović, Razgovori s Kočom).
The fact that not long before, the sacked Rankovićhad been wel-
comed at the highest state level in the Soviet Union and addressed
as Josip Broz Tito’s heir, is often quoted. In Serbia, the ouster of
Ranković, a powerful Serb in the state and the party, was seen as
the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia. The first to address Tito
about it with assurance was writer Dobrica Ćosić (1921–2014). But
that also marked the birth of an informal opposition, assembling
the regime’s “opponents” and “renegades” fromdifferent periods
(Chetniks, Kominformers, Ranković’supporters and some priests).
The 1967 local elections in Serbia mirrored the response to the
removal of Serbia’s “strongman” (the list of candidates included-
several retired generals, some of whomhadreceived the green light
for their candidacy from Josip Broz Tito himself).
The student revolt in Belgrade in June 1968 coincided with
student protests breaking out all over the world, but also boast-
ed local characteristics. It was areaction to the social inequalities
that the economic reforms weregenerating, which indirectly influ-
enced its collapse. Tito sided with the students.
Shortly after, in May 1968, Dobrica Ćosić and Jovan Marjanović
(1922–1981), professor and member of the CC of the SKS, called
for a change of policy on national issues (many authors say this
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
was the reason why Ćosić was excluded from party membership.
Actually, this was not true given the prevailing balance of forces
both in the Serbian leadership and in Serbia at large).
The entryof Warsaw Pact troops in Prague (August 1968)
marked the end of the delusion about “socialism with a human
face” that presupposed the possibility of a reform of Soviet social-
ism. Yet,, emerging from the liberal tendencies of the 8th Congress
of the SKS – now already a distant echo – some liberal changes did
take place within the party. Party congresses in the republics were
held before the Federal congress. And all these congresses elect-
ed leaderships of the next generation – not as new biologically
as mentally. Marko Nikezić (1921–1991), a Belgrade underground
fighter in WWII, diplomat, ambassador and Foreign Minister, was
elected president of the CC of the SKS. This marked the begin-
ning of a fresh boost to the economy, but in politics as well. “A
new man,” said the public, in fact, meaning “a man of the West.”
His main idea was that Serbia should not identify with Yugosla-
via, but focus on its own development. He refused to have Ser-
bia used as “the other party” in the conflict with Croatia’s leader-
ship (1971). He wanted to have Yugoslav institutions discuss the
problems raised by the Croats, but others as well. Otherwise, Josip
Broz Tito would continue to be the chief arbiter and his person-
al power would grow stronger and stronger. The views held by
Nikezićcreated a certain reserve on the part of some of Serbia’s
state leaders.. Though considered “his” Foreign Minister whom
he knew fairly well, Tito himself was reserved about Nikezić for
the same reasons. Following the removal of Croatia’s leadership
(December 1, 1971 at the 21st session of the CK SKJ Presidency in
Karađorđevo) and as a result of the four-day talks Tito had with
Serbia’s “enlarged” leadership (October 1972), their party coun-
terparts in Serbia were discharged. Slovenia’s leadership was also
on the carpet, though without themass purges in the economy,
culture and media as in Croatia and Serbia. “The young guard”
266
experience with other nations experience with other nations
as Slovenian historian Jože Pirjevec (Tito in tovariši) called the
key figures in these leaderships had not overstepped the princi-
ples inherent in the party’s change of name (1952) andparty pro-
gram (1958), but, with a sense of realityafter the country’s mod-
ernization and democratization, includingits inter-national rela-
tions.. Oriented towards dialogue and agreement, they wanted
to take the country into a new era together with Josip Broz Tito.
The U-turn the “Letter” of the CK SKJ Presidency took (1972) that
returned the party to the period before the changes announced in
1952 and 1958, as well as the ensuing showdown with the “young
guard”, were reminders that the legacy of the Cominform was still
alive and kicking.
Against the backdrop of the permanent hot-cold, release-grab,
centralization-decentralization tactics, work on the constitutional
amendmentssped up. The new, 1974 Constitution – to which the
1968/1972 constitutional amendments had actually paved the way
– was now in the hands of new republican leaderships that had
emerged from mass purges. Tito was reserved about the confed-
eralist constitution: “The entire Yugoslavia was too small for him”
(Aleksandar Nenadović, Mirko Tepavac). However, he believed
that stronger unity of the party and his personal position (now
proclaimed lifelong president) would counterthe egoism of the
republics. And yet, it was the balance of forces that tipped the
scales. Serbia had been on one side and all other republics on the
other. The constitutional amendments were strongly opposed in
Serbia. Serbia saw itself asthe damaged party. Its two provinces
had become constitutive elements of the Federation, which the
political scene had viewed as a step towards the status of republic,
whilethe republics as nation-states prevented the national integra-
tion of the Serbian nation, although – as often neglected – Serbs
had been a constitutive people of another two republics beside
Serbia (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). However, the Serbs
kept quiet all along – till the death of Josip Broz Tito (1980).
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
Questioning the 1974 Constitution started with a request for a
change in the status of the provinces and continued with numer-
oussigns of dissatisfaction with the position of the Serbian nation
in Yugoslavia. First the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences
decided (1986) to have its say about the Yugoslav crisis and put
forth solutions to it (SANU Memorandum). Regardless of the cir-
cumstances in which that document saw the light of day (the man-
ner in which it became public and the ensuing ban on the ceremo-
ny to mark the 100th anniversary of SANU), it resounded strong-
ly in Serbia and Yugoslavia because of the Academy’s high repute.
Some thought that it was only after the Memorandum that “Acad-
emy was ready to take over the role of the Serbian nation’s leading
institution, something which it had only been in words only till
then” (Mihailo Marković, Ibid.). Some others like the then presi-
dent of the CK SKS Ivan Stambolić (1936–2000) – who was to be
killed on the eve of the change of regime in 2000 – saw the Mem-
orandum as a Memorial to Yugoslavia.
The 8th session of the CK SKS that crystallized the differenc-
es in views was held in an atmosphere of already dissenting voic-
es over resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. The group led by Slo-
bodan Milošević (1941–2006)called for radicalization of the Kos-
ovo question, whereas that headed by Ivan Stambolićadvocated
dialogue. But this split did not polarize the Serbian public. On the
contrary, Slobodan Milošević actually homogenized it. The media,
associations, especially the Writers’ Association of Serbia, imbued
the myth of Kosovo with fresh emotions fueling mass mobiliza-
tion. “Anti-bureaucratic revolution” meetings in Belgrade and
Kosovo Polje, staged to mark the 600th anniversary of the Bat-
tle of Kosovo in 1389, brought together hundreds of thousands
of Serbs. Slobodan Milošević was perceived as the leader of the
Serbian nation and Serbs were being mobilized in all the repub-
lics – in fact, wherever they had lived for centuries together with
other nations. “That was an irreparable mistake” (Zoran Đinđić).
268
experience with other nations experience with other nations
Well-organized groups were being dispatched to other repub-
lics to “tell the truth” about Kosovo. This was the atmosphere in
which the leaderships were ousted in Vojvodina and Montenegro.
The “truth-tellers” were prevented from entering Slovenia. Conse-
quently, Serbia kicked back (with an “economic war,” and a cam-
paign against Slovenians accused of being ungrateful to Serbia
where 7,000 of their countrymen had found refuge during WWII,
etc.).
The last, 14th, Congress of Yugoslav communists ended with
the Slovenian and Croatian delegationswalking outbecause all
their proposals for the Europeanization of Yugoslav society had
been turned down. President of the Federal Government, Ante
Marković, responded to the split with optimism: the SKJ has gone
but not Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, however, was a party state. Fol-
lowing the death of Josip Broz Tito as the arch arbiter in domes-
tic affairs, another pillar went – the party as a guarantee of the
country’s unity. And what was left once Serbiaproclaimedaconsti-
tution that put an end to the consensus the 1974 Constitution had
achieved – was either separation or conflict. Slovenia and Croatia
went after their constitutional right to self-determination. As the
program for a “Serbian Yugoslavia” – a Serbian-dominated Yugo-
slavia or Yugoslavia as an enlarged Serbia – failed, Serbia opted
for the program for a Serbian nation-state in all the territories
inhabited by Serbs. And that meant a territorial war – the war that
counted on the unity of the Yugoslav People’s Armyand the exist-
ence of the Soviet Union.
Many books written on the 1990s wars have differently inter-
preted the experience of the Serbs and Serbia. Theirreparable
losses in human lives and damage resulting in fatal regression
– in a dangerous conflict with the times – are still being calcu-
lated. The moral and intellectual collapse of society is being put
into words, together with the loss of future prospects. And yet-
the Serbs – not only seen by European nations, but also, to start
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
with, by the nations of ex-Yugoslavia – are still faced with one cru-
cial question: how much didhistory – both as an objective process
and consciousness and knowledge of it – influence their orienta-
tion and inappropriate response to the challenges of the Yugoslav
crisis (Sima M. Ćirković, Ibid.)? And the dreadful consequenc-
es the Serbian nation suffered testify to the inappropriateness of
their response. A search for the answer to the above question is
the purpose of this overview of the modern history of Serbia and
the Serbs.
270
against colonial status against colonial status
Kosova in Yugoslavia
against
colonial
status
MRIKA LIMANI
To situate Serbs and Albanians in a historical context – espe-
cially where Kosovo is concerned – is a difficult task to achieve.
While historical inquires often tend to shed light on complicat-
ed and disputed matters, they generally have the advantage of
mulling over past conflicts and topics that no longer have a direct
impact on anyone’s everyday life. It is perhaps precisely this trivi-
ality that spoils most historical narratives on Kosovo, as they will
indubitably impact on its current political situation one way or
another, or be influenced by the prevailing situation. Remaining
true to objectivity has proven time and time again to be trouble-
some, as it has somehow been assumed that it falls upon the his-
torian to approve or negate Kosovo’s ownership by one or other of
the leading players. In saying this, however, I contend that it falls
upon no one, still less upon a historian, to intentionally fashion
the historical and mythical narratives of any polarized side, which
serves no greater purpose than to induce and fuel hatred and con-
flict even more.
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The modern history of the Albanians begins with their plea for
liberation from the Ottoman Empire. After numerous hardships
and about five centuries of Ottoman occupation, and only after
the Empire was damaged by the Balkan Wars, the Albanians final-
ly seized their chance and declared independence on the Novem-
ber 28, 1912, in an area partially occupied by Serbs. It would take
another year until it was internationally recognized at the Confer-
ence of Ambassadors in 1913. Once this was achieved, however, a
large part of Albanian-inhabited territories remained outside the
official borders of Albania. Kosovo being the largest territory that
remained outside Albania was to be bound by a completely differ-
ent fate from the former.
The advancement of the Serbs in Kosovo was considered a glo-
rious Serbian achievement. They consider the Patriarchate in Pejëa
historical and religious treasure, which collapsed in 1766 under
Sultan Mustafa III. In taking Kosovo, the Serbs relocated the seat
of the Serbian Patriarch to Pejë. The monastery in itself was quite
well preserved throughout this time, a task that was gracefully
completed by the tribes of Rugova, who took pride in proclaiming
themselves the “vojvode”, or keepers, of the monastery. The Ser-
bian invasion was ultimately welcomed by the Serbian population
of Kosovo, who thought of it as liberation rather than invasion.
The arrival of the Serbs resulted in a violent century. Filled with
wars, resistance, and pure political incompatibility, Kosovo’s place
in Yugoslavia is quite turbulent.
In the falls of 1912 and 1913, Kosovo and Albania were invaded
by Serbia and Montenegro. The Balkan Wars had wreaked havoc
on Kosovar Albanians whose villages were burned to ashes and
whose residents that had managed to escape death were forced to
flee their homes. Under such brutal wartime conditions, the Mon-
tenegrin and Serbian authorities targeted the Muslim population
of Kosovo, the majority of which was Albanian. Some chronicles
evidence the atrocities committed by the Montenegrins, including
272
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decapitation and mutilation. The Balkan wars had cost the Koso-
var Albanians thousands of dead and more destroyed houses. It is
estimated that around 20–25.000 Albanians were killed up to the
end of 1912 and about 20,000 emigrated from Kosovo. Dimitrije
Tucović wrote about this conquest where he strongly voiced his
concern that due to these events it would be extremely difficult to
establish amicable relations with the Albanians in the near future.
After the Balkan Wars, Kosovo remained a troubled area that
presented significant difficulties to Serbian and Montenegrin
attempts to establish an effective administration or reign and thus
subjected the inhabitants to military occupation.
In further establishing Serbian rule in Kosovo, the arrival of
Serbian settlers in 1913 and 1914 changed the ethnic composi-
tion significantly, seeing that at the same time numerous Albani-
ans were also emigrating to either Turkey or Albania. At the same
time, Serbian intellectuals were waging a propaganda war against
the Albanians, which described the latter in strongly racist tones
– such as claiming that the Albanians had lost their evolutionary
history as late as the 19th century.
During this time, the Albanian population of Kosovo had
remained largely illiterate, with an incredibly small active political
class since they had mostly emigrated and continued their meagre
and somewhat inconspicuous patriotic activity as émigrés, albe-
it a group who voiced its dissatisfaction with the existing political
system in Yugoslavia. The remaining Albanian population was left
isolated from state affairs and positioned as second-class citizens
amidst the new Serbian and Montenegrin administration.
However, the situation did improve temporarily for the Alba-
nian population in Kosovo during the First World War. With the
advance of the Austro-Hungarians into Serbia, between 1916 and
1918, the Albanians in Kosovo arguably welcomed the Austrians as
liberators, who at least were willing to let Albanian schools open
in Kosovo, contrary to the previous established administration.
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The Austro-Hungarians went even further in their attempts to
appease the Albanians by giving them government and authority
in local and municipal matters, arguably in their attempts to fend
off Serbian influence and support however weak local Albanian
resistance to the Serbs, a gesture which would ultimately prevent
the Serbs from gaining access to the Adriatic coast. This in itself
was a continuation of previous policies evidenced in 1913 when
Italy and Austria-Hungary strongly objected to the procurement
of a port by the Serbs on the Adriatic. Such policies left a strong
pro-Austro-Hungarian sentiment among the majority of Albani-
ans in Kosovo, a sentiment that later contributed to some extent
in exuding sympathy towards the Germans during the Second
World War.
The violence exercised against the Kosovar Albanian population
incited an armed rebellion against the Serbs, although not entirely
systematic and consistent. The rebellion known as the kaçak move-
ment involved small bands of armed men who protected their vil-
lages and local areas. These groups were recorded as early as 1913
and their origin is thought of more as a retaliatory response against
the atrocities committed during the First Balkan War in particu-
lar, and generally against the Montenegrin and Serbian onslaught.
The Albanians were swift to retaliate in other ways, too, particular-
ly in that they barely expressed a sympathetic approach towards the
Serbian Army during their retreat in the winter of 1915 through the
Montenegrin border, to the Adriatic coast and off to Corfu, when
the Serbian army was downsized from 300,000 soldiers to nearly
half its number during this retreat.
KOSOVO AND ITS TUMULTUOUS PLACE
IN THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA
The new Yugoslav state was formed on the December 1, 1918, and
it included Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia under the Karađorđević
dynasty. Although Kosovo and Vojvodina were also included in
274
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the Yugoslav kingdom, no such clear stipulation stressed this
extension of borders. The inclusion of Kosovo within the First
Yugoslavia, which the Serbs re-took in September 1918, was not
welcomed by the Kosovar Albanians as a result of previous hostil-
ities between the Serbs and Albanians. The local Albanians in Pejë
even pleaded with the commander of the French troops to liber-
ate the area from the Serbs. This stance can be attributed to previ-
ous enmities with the Serbs, but it was also a situation provoked
by Belgrade’s attempt to requisition the arms of Kosovar Albani-
ans. Maintaining peace and order in Kosovo proved increasing-
ly difficult for the Serbian state authorities. The insurgents’ activ-
ity was limited to small attacks on official buildings and Serbian
officials provided the latter were outnumbered. Such was the case
in November 1918, for example, when a local band of armed men
attacked the municipality in a village in the vicinity of Prishtina.
The insurgents’ advantage was their ability to scatter in moun-
tainous areas, and in this period they began to rapidly shape their
ideology. Some Albanian figures, who enjoyed a good reputation
among those in Kosovo formed the “National Defense of Koso-
vo” (Komiteti Mbrojtja Kombëtare e Kosovës) Committee in May
of 1918– a movement which shaped the resistance into a national
movement with a strong liberation character. The Committee was
led by Hasan Prishtina and Bajram Curri, who fought for Albani-
an national rights in Yugoslavia.
The kaçak (kachak) rebellion of 1919 organized by Azem Bej-
ta and his band in Drenicë, received massive support from oth-
er leaders of local bands – including those in the Dukagjini. The
rebellion was also strong in the Dukagjini Plain, where at one
point about 1,000 men were gathered and ready to fight the state
military in the region between Pejë and Deçan.
In 1920, the state initiated another wave of disarmament, which
proved successful in maintaining peace in Kosovo for a while. It is
worth noting that despite the existing hostilities, Albanians were
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
not completely deprived of basic rights within the kingdom – they
had the right to vote in elections for the Constitutional Assem-
bly, and there even were some Albanian members of parliament.
The latter were to some extent active in promoting the nation-
al interests of the Kosovar Albanians, especially by forming the
Islamic Movement for Protection and Justice (henceforth Xhem-
ijet/Cemiyet) in 1919. An interesting series of events developed
during these years in Kosovo, which served as a battleground,
both figuratively and literally, for Albanian and Serbian hostili-
ties. Mark Gjoni, for example, a tribal leader from the Northern
Albanian Highlands, declared the “Republic of Mirdita” in Priz-
ren in July 1921 – and later sent a request for recognition to the
League of Nations, which was denied. As to how bizarre a signal
this must have seemed to the League of Nations, we can only spec-
ulate – especially in terms of desensitizing the international play-
ers in any Albanian cause – including those within Yugoslavia. It
would not be unusual to assume that having numerous fractured
Albanian groups must have made it incredibly difficult for anyone
to discern whether there was a fight for national liberation, or in
any case for unification with Albania proper, or if they were mere-
ly voicing political ambition rather than national interests. How-
ever, the atrocities committed against Albanians did leave a mark
and in effect, the League of Nations pressured the Yugoslav troops
to respect the previously established demarcation line, and pref-
erably cease the killings. The Yugoslav troops obliged and retreat-
ed to the previously determined demarcation line, which in fact
formed the neutral area of Junik in 1923. Midhat Frashëri, who
would later establish the National Front, sent a letter of protest to
the League of Nations where he went into detail, explaining the
violence exerted against Albanians by state-sponsored units.
The Albanian national identity among those living in Kosovo
was strongly promoted and enforced by the “National Defense of
Kosovo” Committee, mostly because the leading intellectuals at
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the time were rightfully afraid that the local Albanians would be
soon assimilated as Turks – even the state did not recognize their
national identity, and in lieu of it, defined them as Muslims. Some-
what congruent with the Sundhausen postulate regarding the
provenance of national identity in the Balkans, it is evident that
the Albanian national identity was shaped (and intentionally pro-
moted as such) within the margins of defiance towards the Otto-
man Empire, albeit in a different tone from their Balkan counter-
parts who adamantly resisted Ottoman acculturation and fought
the Turks off until the Empire’s demise. Although oxymoronic, the
Albanian members of the Xhemijet (Cemiyet) party did accept
the Muslim veil, probably also because it was the only legal way
they could become a member of the parliament as an Albanian.
On a broader plane, it is worth mentioning Oran’s postulate
where he states that it is evident that in cases “where the reli-
gion of the dominant nation is different from that of the domi-
nated nation, the religion of the latter supports its nationalism or
national identity”, which seems to be pretty much the case with
the Xhemijet party and its promotion of the national movement.
The Kosovar Albanians were strongly influenced by these
nationalist ideas – later to befurther promoted during the Sec-
ond World War – which were imported through schoolteachers
from Albania who taught in Kosovo. In this sense, it is evident
that Albania proper served as a matrix state for Albanians living
in Kosovo.
In terms of education and literacy, the majority of Kosovar
Albanians were uneducated and illiterate. This came as a result of
prohibiting schools in their native language, in an attempt to instill
linguistic assimilation among the local Albanians. Those who had
the economic means to pursue their education were forced to do
so only in Turkish through elementary religious schools, limit-
ing their education to a purely religious nature. This in itself dam-
aged the centralized character of the resistance and it did to some
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extent distort national sentiment among the local Albanians,
which contributed greatly to the maintenance of relative peace in
the following years.
In the meantime, Albania’s political role had diminished great-
ly in relation to Kosovo. With copious difficulties in holding up
a stable government, it simply lacked the necessary political and
economic stamina to involve in what were considered Albani-
an territories remaining outside Albania’s borders. Although ini-
tially against the creation of Albania, Yugoslavia did eventually
establish diplomatic relations with Albania in 1922, which to some
extent signaled that Kosovo was already considered lost territo-
ry for Albania. The case of Kosovo became henceforth a Yugoslav
and Serbian problem.
During this period, the local Albanian Kosovars continued
fighting for unison with Albania proper, in what appeared to be an
expression of unquenched idealism that was completely overruled
by the state’s authority. The aforementioned Albanian parliamen-
tary members, stemming from the Xhemijet party, did attempt to
promote Albanian issues on a state level. Although most of their
attempts were to no avail, they did have some influence in main-
taining some sense of unity and political representation among
the local Kosovar Albanians, whose mere existence as a minority,
was completely denied in 1919. Ferat Draga, a member of this par-
ty and eventually its leader, was vociferous in promoting nation-
al unification.
The 1920s were bleak years for both Serbs and Albanians in
general. Economic conditions were far from satisfactory and
a large number of Albanians emigrated to Turkey and left their
lands to the new incoming Yugoslav colonists. It is estimated that
115,427 Albanians, Turks and Bosnians emigrated from Yugosla-
via to Turkey between the 1920s and 1930s. The economic depres-
sion of 1929 hit Yugoslavia as well, and caused a drop of 60 %in the
state’s exports. The metallurgy industry with the Trepça mines at
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against colonial status against colonial status
their head – already established in Kosovo – continued to operate
and meet the state’s consumption of zinc and lead, but this did not
ultimately alleviate the severe economic situation.
This decade proved extremely violent. The Serbian settlers had
expelled Albanian peasants from some villages in the vicinity of
Gjilan and Mitrovicë in 1921–1923, which led to acts of retaliation
by the Albanians.
In the midst of internal political turmoil under the authoritar-
ian reign of King Alexander when in 1929 he annulled the consti-
tution of 1921, which had made Yugoslavia a constitutional mon-
archy with much power attributed to the King and which, admit-
tedly, was based excessively on Serbia’s constitution of 1903, the
state-supported suppression of Albanians in Kosovo continued .
The ‘1930s were just as desolate, as a similar policy of suppres-
sion continued unabated under Stojadinović and Cvetković after
King Alexander’s assassination in 1934. Kosovo had no schools
in Albanian, except some that were opened illegally and hidden
away from the state authorities. Some religious schools were used
for teaching in Albanian, and were effectively an Albanian cradle
against the state. In similar vein, the Albanian Catholics in Kos-
ovo were strongly devoted to maintaining at least some shred of
Albanian culture among the locals, be it through opening illegal
Albanian schools, distributing literature in Albanian or deliver-
ing sermons in Albanian. In 1931 alone, Albanians made up only
3.6 %of the population of Yugoslavia – a figure that continued to
grow rapidly in the forthcoming decades. By 1937, 70% of the pop-
ulation in Kosovo was Albanian.
The state-induced wave of new settlers in Kosovo came from all
over Yugoslavia, including Vojvodina. The colonists from Vojvo-
dina especially seemed to have great difficulty in mingling and
adapting to the local mindset, which further indicates the evi-
dent cultural differences, not only between Serbs and Albanians,
but also the Serbs from Kosovo and those from Vojvodina. This is
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
an interesting observation because it implies that local grievanc-
es were more likely to have been the product of complex socio-
cultural and economic situations rather than ancient inter-ethnic
hatred.
There is some evidence that, at least on the diplomatic level, the
Albanian state authorities did address the problem of the Alba-
nian minorities in Yugoslavia, as reported by Sir Andrew Ryan
to Lord Halifax in 1939. However, this could equally have been a
strong indication that King Zogu was aware of deteriorating Ital-
ian-Yugoslav relations and chose this as an appropriate time to
voice his concerns over the Albanians in Kosovo.
The history of Kosovo within the First Yugoslavia can be
summed up as a continuous process of colonization combined
with agrarian reform to induce the expulsion of Albanians from
Kosovo and the settlement of Serb and Montenegrin colonists,
policies, which ultimately further strengthened inter-ethnic
enmity in Kosovo. Kosovo was a purely agrarian society during
this period.
THE AXIS OCCUPATION OF KOSOVO AND THE
PARTISAN STRUGGLE FOR SUPPORT
Yugoslavia was attacked by the Axis forces in April 1941. Not
fully prepared to handle attacks on all fronts, the Yugoslav Army
organized and resisted the invasion for as long as it could – the
resistance lasting for a total of ten days. No noticeably strong
resistance was recorded in Kosovo. Albanian conscripts were
not allowed to participate in the operations and those Yugoslav
detachments that were standing their ground in Kosovo, were too
weak to fight off the German Panzer divisions. Some small resist-
ance was recorded in Suharekë and Prizren, but this faded quickly.
The Germans, Italians and Bulgarians occupied Yugoslavia swift-
ly thereafter.
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against colonial status against colonial status
The Axis occupation was perceived as a great opportunity for
numerous Albanian leading figures whose collaboration with the
Axis forces would further their political ambitions. Avni Gjilani,
for example, who was a member of the irredentist group in Fiume,
a city on the disputed Italian-Yugoslav Dalmatian border, sided
with the Italians. After the invasion, he was quick to write to Jac-
omini where he stressed the urgency of forming a “Great Alba-
nian” state. This type of individual rather than state – level diplo-
macy continued well on throughout the duration of the occupa-
tion. Gani Kryeziu, Ferat Draga and Ali Draga also embarked on a
similar initiative to unite Kosovo with Albania proper in autumn
1941, by addressing a similar note to the Duce. Kosovo’s proper
administrative function as an Albanian state per se did not begin
until the formation of the Ministry of the Liberated Lands (Min-
istria e Tokave të Liruara) in December 1941.
The installment of a German-Italian administration in Kosovo
after the invasion in April of 1941 elicited a mixed reaction among
the local population. The Albanians in Kosovo who became part
of the Kingdom of Albania together with Albania proper were
thrilled that they would finally have schools in Albanian and a
considerable number of them treated the Italians as liberators
rather than occupiers.
On the other hand, one must note that there was no established
fascist movement in Kosovo. A letter written by Martin Schliep, a
German diplomat, describing the popular Albanian stance towards
the Italians, is quoted as saying how vast was “(…)the hatred of the
Albanians for the Italians, which cannot be denied because the Ital-
ians attempted to develop fascism in Albania, which for many Alba-
nians was a foreign concept. It is for this reason that despite all the
respect they feel for the Führer, National-Socialism never aroused
a deeper interest in them”. Granted, he said this after the Italians
had capitulated and left the Germans without an ally in Europe,
which goes a long way to explaining the bitterness of this recorded
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communication between German officials. In any case, it is evi-
dent that the situation was as described in Albania prior to its
invasion by Italy in 1939, which shows that the pro-Italian Alba-
nians temporarily embraced fascism because they equated it with
positive Italian colonialism to be used as a means to catalyze mod-
ernization within the European context, a sentiment which greatly
extended to the Kosovar Albanians under Italian rule in 1941. As
far as the attitude of the Kosovar Albanians towards the Germans
who administered the area within Serbia proper is concerned, it is
worth noting that they were grateful to the Germans for providing
regional autonomy in a sense, as agreed upon with Xhafer Deva,
who served as a leader. How far this autonomy stretched, howev-
er, remains a topic of debate. Discussions on a final demarcation
line between German and Italian occupied territories lasted from
April until August, when an imperial decree declared the annex-
ation of parts of Kosovo to Albania proper. The area of Albania
expanded by about 50% and its population by around 75%With-
out a doubt, the interests of both parties related more to econom-
ics, therefore they were understandably more interested in gain-
ing access to the mines in Kosovo rather than liberating these are-
as or helping the residents to lessen local divisions.
The variation in the balance of power in favor of the Albanians,
initiated the expulsion of those Serbs who remained in the Kosovo
area that had been annexed to Albania proper – a wave of expul-
sions which peaked in 1942, namely about 20,000 Serbs. A num-
ber of Montenegrins who had settled in Kosovo during the inter-
war period were also expelled from Kosovo in 1941. There were
instances where Serb-populated villages were exposed to violence
as well. This was not necessarily a result of state-administered Ital-
ian policies, but the policy aimed at expanding territorial control
by both the Italians and the Germans certainly played effectively
on local enmities and divisions and the local players did not hesi-
tate for a moment in using violence. Inter-ethnic-fueled violence
282
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was rampant in the area between the border of Montenegro and
modern-day Kosovo during the period from August 1941 until
December 1942.
A new wave of German policies relating to the Kosovar Alba-
nians was introduced after Italy’s capitulation in September 1943.
These were aimed at maintaining a stable and pacified situation in
the lands inhabited by Albanians. The Germans took good advan-
tage of the national sentiments of the Albanian Kosovars regard-
ing unification with Albania proper.
Counter-insurgent activity also developed at a much slower
pace in Kosovo. This was mostly due to the fact that the Commu-
nist Party of Yugoslavia did not appeal to the local Kosovar Alba-
nian peasants because the Party bore more of a national connota-
tion, i.e. Slavic. The Kosovar Albanian Communists who did even-
tually gain sufficient support to form their own units were mostly
educated in Albania and had close ties with the Communist group
in Shkodër, the majority of whom had likewise completed their
education in Albania, which seemed to have shaped their ideolog-
ical inclinations to some extent. Miladin Popović was President of
the Regional Kosovo Communist group, which under Comintern
orders, greatly helped in forming the Communist Party of Albania
together with Dušan Mugoša.
The policies of the Comintern, and in effect CPY policies in
Kosovo, were in agreement in terms of appeasing national interests
to entice support, a policy which took precedence over the prole-
tarian revolution in places where the latter was lacking. Mimick-
ing a similar approach, despite their Leftist inclinations, the Kos-
ovar Albanian Partisans took a pragmatic approach in persuad-
ing the Kosovar Albanians to side with them by appealing to their
national interest –unification with Albania proper.
A meeting held in summer 1943 in Mukje, a village in north-
ern Albania near the city of Krujë, was held in order to discuss the
formation of a unified front between the Partisans by members
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of the National Liberation Council and nationalists represented
by the National Front, in waging war against fascism. The agree-
ment was never implemented due to a disagreement that arose in
regard to Kosovo. The memorandum from the meeting stipulat-
ed the formation of an ethnic Albania, and hence Kosovo’s unifi-
cation with Albania proper – a topic that was thought best avoid-
ed at the time. The issue re-emerged later during the winter of
that year at a conference in Bujan, a village in northwestern Alba-
nia, where the Kosovar Albanian Partisans vowed to unite Koso-
vo with Albania proper after the war, which was later overruled
by the Yugoslav leadership. The division between the Partisans
and the National Front was raised as an issue by Miladin Popović,
who was concerned that he was unable to obtain sufficient sup-
port from the Albanians.
The alignment of the Kosovar Albanians regarding foreign
forces during the war presents an interesting historical case. Some
politicians were openly very pro-German, such as Xhafer Deva,
then there were others who were perhaps less fond of the Nazi ide-
ology, but still co-operated with the Germans likely for utilitarian
reasons. Such was the case with Rexhep Mitrovica and Bedri Peja-
ni. Their involvement in establishing the Second League of Priz-
ren in September 1943 signaled the formation of what appeared to
be a strong nationalistic front in Kosovo backed by the Germans.
The League’s mandate to form a state military was perhaps a only
dim hint of some sort of existing sovereignty in Kosovo, despite
it all being very short-lived. The League did eventually manage to
form a militia, but it was nowhere near the size of the army that
Rexhep Mitrovica promised to Hitler in early 1944, where the for-
mer mentioned a figure of 120,000 to 150,000 soldiers.
There were some state-sponsored Albanian militias that were
active in Kosovo prior to Italy’s capitulation, who continued their
activities under German occupation after a slight restructur-
ing and a short pause in late 1943. They were mainly tasked with
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protecting the border with Serbia and Montenegro and fighting
off the Partisans.
Tasked with a similar assignment was also the most notorious
of the Albanian militias during the war, the SS Skanderbeg Divi-
sion, which aside from taking part in two battles against the Parti-
sans, also rounded up and deported 281 Jews in 1944. The division
ceased operating shortly after.
Stabilizing the territory after Germany’s retreat, and incorpo-
rating it under the Partisans’ control took longer than anticipated,
due to the fact that a number of Albanians continued fighting off
Partisan units well into May1945, including the area of Drenicë,
Trepçë, and Gjilan. Martial law was declared in February 1945 in
Kosovo. Through the workings of the Conference of the Nation-
al Liberation Council for Kosovo and Metohija, in July 1945, Kos-
ovo was annexed to the Serbian Federation. The Conference was
attended by 33 Albanian delegates, as opposed to 142 Serbian and
Montenegrin delegates combined.
KOSOVO AS PART OF THE SERBIAN FEDERATION
IN THE SECOND YUGOSLAVIA
The Communist representatives of the Popular Front abolished
the monarchy on the November 29, 1945, two years after they had
proclaimed a provisional government in Jajce. The new Federal
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six republics, with
Kosovo as part of the Serbian Federation. Although the Kosovar
Albanians’ position in Yugoslavia was not enviable, it was not until
Yugoslavia’s ideological split with the Soviet Union in 1948, which
saw the emergence of a new political reality for Kosovar Albani-
ans. Maintaining a similar ideological alignment with the Sovi-
et Union, Albania positioned itself politically vis-à-vis the Com-
informists and thus its ties with Yugoslavia were damaged. Upto
that point, the Kosovar Albanians had enjoyed cultural, political
and economic ties with Albania proper. However the situation
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
changed afterwards and certain Kosovar Albanians were in effect
labeled “fifth-columnists”. The Yugoslav secret police claimed it
had discovered a network of spies who had infiltrated the area
from Albania. The secret police had opened 170,000 files on Kos-
ovar Albanians who were considered suspect. The severing of ties
with Albania in effect caused the Kosovar Albanians to become
scapegoats, which invited their persecution by the Yugoslav secret
police. The re-emergence of the disarmament campaign by the
Kosovar Albanians in 1955/55 and the emigration of Albanians to
Turkey brought to the surface the inter-ethnic tension between
Serbs and Albanians, a rift which grew even wider through the
next decade. Between 1945 and 1966, around 246.000 Albanians
emigrated from Yugoslavia.
However, Kosovo’s position within Yugoslavia changed signif-
icantly in 1966when the Fourth Plenum of the Central Commit-
tee of the League of Communists was held on the Brijuni Islands.
There Aleksandar Ranković was heavily criticized by Josip Broz
Tito for his dubious work with the secret police. He was dismissed
from his position in the Party the same year.
A new wave of politics emerged in Kosovo, which pushed for-
ward the agenda of transforming Kosovo into a Yugoslav repub-
lic. As a leading Kosovar Albanian politician, Fadil Hoxha was
also adamant in demanding equal rights for Kosovar Albanians.
These new developments were vocalized by the Kosovar Albani-
an masses as well. In the demonstrations of November 1968, the
demonstrators insisted that Albanians were to be recognized as
a nation and, in effect, have the political status of Kosovo elevat-
ed to that a republic within the Yugoslav Federation. The dem-
onstrations represented both nationalist unrest and a display of
discontent for Kosovo’s socio-economic stagnation. The impris-
onment of numerous Kosovar Albanians who were suspected of
political dissidence deepened the discontent of Kosovar Albani-
ans with the regime. These events indicate that the disruption of
286
against colonial status against colonial status
the balance of rights and sovereignty given to the Kosovar Alba-
nians contributed greatly to further exacerbating Serbian-Albani-
an relations.
The following decade was a fairly prosperous one for the Kos-
ovar Albanians, who enjoyed rapid cultural and economic pro-
gress. The founding of the University of Prishtina in 1971great-
ly influenced the development of an intellectual class among the
Kosovar Albanians, who would later play a defining role in Koso-
vo’s partition from Serbia. Furthermore, a loan given by the World
Bank to Yugoslavia in 1971, which was invested primarily in Kos-
ovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, helped in
the economic prosperity of these regions.
Meanwhile, Kosovar Albanian politicians were appointed to
key state position in Yugoslavia. Fadil Hoxha was appointed Vice-
President of Yugoslavia in 1978–79 and later Sinan Hasani served
as President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia in 1986–1987. Their
appointments guaranteed that Kosovo’s interests would be pro-
moted on a federal level. The emergence of an Albanian Yugo-
slav identity among the Albanians took firmer shape during the
‘70s and ‘80s, represented by a younger urban generation who had
reaped the benefits of being a Yugoslav citizen, a name which no
longer triggered a threatening connotation among them, although
the sentiment was not fully shared among the rural Albanian pop-
ulation in Kosovo.
From the Albanian perspective, the apex of this progress came
in February1974when the Yugoslav constitution was reformed for
the fourth time after the war. Kosovo was recognized asan auton-
omous region, and was transformed into a constituent element
of the Federation, retaining a complete state apparatus including
a Parliament, Supreme Court, independent police force, territo-
rial autonomy and so forth. Kosovo’s status was dual because it
was still defined as a province within Serbia, as an appeasing ges-
ture to Belgrade. Yugoslav-Albanian relations were re-established
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
in the same period, mostly as a diplomatic move by Yugoslavia in
an attempt to strengthen internal security in the light of the threat
of Soviet expansion. Albania’s influence among the Kosovar Alba-
nians re-emerged in the sense of strengthening their national feel-
ings.. However much the industrialization of Kosovo was initial-
ly stimulated, it eventually became stagnant- – a deficiency which
was most evident in the 1980s. Investments were made into fur-
ther industrializing Kosovo, such as the expansion the zinc and
silver foundry in Trepça, and the construction of two power plants
“Kosova A” and “Kosova B”. However, the quality of the ores was
not very high and this affected the foundry’s volume of produc-
tion. A similar issue arose with production at the “Kosova B” pow-
er plant, which was not functioning because it lacked the capacity
to extract the natural resources needed to power the plant. At the
same time, the incongruity of population growth vis-à-vis eco-
nomic growth also contributed to Kosovo’s economic stagnation.
Likewise, tensions were growing in the other republics of the Fed-
eration resulting from the economic decline that had fallen upon
Yugoslavia due to its debts. The more advanced republics in the
north were more eager to join the German economic zone rather
than subsidize the poorer republics and regions in the south. On
a local level, the rapid population growth of Albanians in Kosovo
also contributed to strengthening inter-ethnic tensions with the
Serbs, who were outnumbered by the Albanians. In 1981 alone,
there were 1.7 million Albanians compared to only 427,000 Serbs.
The student riots of March and April in 1981 had shed light on
the growing tensions between Belgrade and Prishtina. Although
what initially began as riots by students demanding better con-
ditions, the rioters eventually grew in their thousands, demon-
strating more general discontentment with the social, political
and economic situation in Kosovo. What had started out as stu-
dent protests swiftly changed to appeals for Kosovo to become a
constitutional republic. Retaliation and brutal intervention by the
288
against colonial status against colonial status
Serbian police resulted in widespread indignation from the Alba-
nians and in effect further increased the number of rioters. As a
result, nine people lost their lives and around ten thousand Alba-
nians were arrested, most of whom were released after serving 30
days in prison. The University of Prishtina was labeled a bastion
of Albanian nationalism and separatism.
The economic situation became most severe during the 1980s.
This was followed by a migration of Serbs from Kosovo, who felt
threatened by the growing Albanian population in Kosovo, but
also because the competition for jobs had increased. These devel-
opments were received negatively by public opinion in Serbia and
ignited extremely hostile inter-ethnic sentiments. The situation
became even more adverse when, in 1986, a Memorandum relat-
ing to current social issues was leaked from the Serbian Academy
of Science and Arts, which raised the alarm that the Serbian pop-
ulation was enduring “[...]physical, political, legal and cultural gen-
ocide [...]” in Kosovo.
The emergence of nationalist narratives in the public arena of
Serbia and Kosovo was cunningly exploited by Slobodan Milošević,
a young politician who, up to that point, had been extremely apa-
thetic to the issue of Kosovo. His attitude changed swiftly in 1987,
when a petition was signed by 60,000 Kosovar Serbs the same
year claiming that genocide was taking place against the Serbs in
Kosovo.
The vocal discontent of the Kosovar Serbs with the tense, inter-
ethnic relations in Kosovo was exploited by Milošević. In a speech
held at a rally in Kosovo Polje in 1987, he proclaimed to the Koso-
var Serbs: “No one has the right to beat you”.
The strikes held by the Trepça miners in February of 1989 were
countered with violent measures by the state authorities.
Arguing that an uprising was being planned in Kosovo, the Ser-
bian regime sent troops to Kosovo and in March 1989, a manipulat-
ed meeting of the Kosovo Parliament revoked Kosovo’s autonomy.
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
The revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy paved the way for the Ser-
bian regime to suppress the Kosovar Albanians during the follow-
ing decade. The initial Albanian response was to pursue a policy
of non-violent resistance under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova.
However the extensive segregation of the Albanians exacerbated
inter-ethnic grievances, and ultimately resulted in the emergence
of the Kosovo Liberation Army.
Unable to fend off Serbian aggression militarily, foreign assis-
tance was sought throughout the 1990s which culminated in
NATO intervention in the war after the Yugoslav delegation refu
sed to accept the Rambouillet Agreement. This intervention suc-
cessfully halted ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians. The
retreat of the Yugoslav army left a power gap during which the
majority of the Serbian population was forced to flee Kosovo.
CONCLUSIONS
The Serbian occupation in the first decade of the 20th century
was violent and one that possibly strongly influenced local griev-
ances among the Albanian and Serbian populations. Settlement
programs, agrarian reforms, state-sponsored imprisonment and
the overall suppression of Albanians in Kosovo account for the
deep inter-ethnic divisions. While the position of the Albanians in
Yugoslavia was not always favorable, especially in the First Yugo-
slavia, there was some advancement and development in the Sec-
ond Yugoslavia. It is undeniable that Kosovo was a deeply back-
ward region whose population was mainly agrarian. In this con-
text, the establishment of the University of Prishtina, the Alban-
ology Institute, the Academy of Science and Arts, and the forma-
tion of the Institute for History in the 1970s speak volumes for the
development of national consciousness, but also for the foresight
in establishing institutions that proved essential in forming an
independent state apparatus of Kosovo. The conditions in which
these institutions were established and the Albanian cause in
290
against colonial status against colonial status
Kosovo propelled forward were undoubtedly only possible in the
specific political circumstances in Yugoslavia that emerged from
the liberals’ influence in Tito’s leadership. Although intended for
the contrary, this political approach was ultimately detrimental in
nurturing fertile ground for ethno-centrism in Yugoslavia.
After declaring its independence and enjoying statehood for
eight years, Kosovo is currently enduring political hardships as
a direct result of Serbia’s official state policy of not recognizing
its independence and lobbying against it in international coun-
cils of relevance to Kosovo’s economic development. It is possible
to imagine that these political tensions could be overcome with
a proper dialogue format. Although the dialogue between Ser-
bia and Kosovo has been ongoing for almost a decade in Brussels
and some achievement has been reached in this respect, it is high-
ly unlikely that Kosovo and Serbia will normalize their political
relations until Serbia officially acknowledges and apologizes for
the violence exercised in 1998/99 and recognizes Kosovo’s inde-
pendence if Kosovo is to aim for a future in the European Union.
On the other hand, unless Kosovo addresses its serious corrup-
tion issues within the government and public sector, its stagna-
tion and perhaps even regression, both economically and politi-
cally, is inevitable.
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Primary sources
1. Arkivi digjital i Institutit të Historisë – Tiranë (Ad IHT)
2. Arkivi i Institutit të Historisë ‘Ali Hadri’ – Prishtinë (AIHP)
3. Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit Shqiptar (AQSH)
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the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
Vojvodina in Yugoslavia
the struggle
for the autonomy
MILIVOJ BEŠLIN
In the Middle Age the area occupied by present-day Vojvodi-
na was part of the Hungarian Kingdom. From the 14th century
through the 15th century, due to Ottoman attacks on the Serbi-
an Despotate and parts of southern Hungary, the Hungarian pop-
ulation retreated for security reasons further north, while the
deserted Hungarian lands were settled by the masses of the Ser-
bian population, fleeing Ottoman invasions. During that period
and earlier, as well as after the fall of Serbia (1459), the territory
of present-day Vojvodina became ethnically heterogeneous with
a volatile and variable population density and ethno-confession-
al composition. During the following centuries, Serbs continued
to settle in southern Hungary, whose rulers used them as a bul-
wark against the Ottoman Empire and thus granted them privi-
leges. After the Battle of Mohacs (1526) and, in particular, after the
fall of Buda in 1541, the area occupied by present-day Vojvodina
was also settled by Ottomans, either as the privileged population
in fortresses or the underprivileged populace (raja) The border
on the Danube between the Ottoman Empire, including Serbia as
295
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
its northernmost part, and the Habsburg Momarchy, which also
included Hungary after the Battle of Mohacs, was only stabilized
as late as the 18th century. The southern parts of the former Hun-
gary were already settled by heterogeneous groups of the Serbian
population.
In the mid-18th century, when war operations became less fre-
quent, the Serbian population in the southern parts of the Austri-
an Empire (Habsburg Monarchy) began to demand the expansion
of its privileges and rights. The most important assembly before
1848 was the Timisoara Assembly which was held in 1790 and
where the creation of a separate territorial unit was also demand-
ed. In a political sense, it laid down the foundation for the demand
for autonomy and aspirations for the formation of the Duchy of
Serbia. As for the territory demanded by Serbs at that time, it can
be said with confidence that it included the whole area of Banat,
but not the territories that would later become known as Vojvo-
dina.1 At that time, Serbs enjoyed support in Vienna against the
rebellious Hungarian estates, while the ideas of the Timisoara
Assembly were, in essence, made to function by the Habsburg
central authorities in order to weaken the disloyal Hungarian
aristrocracy.17
The idea of Vojvodina only crystallized and became more con-
sistently formulated half a century later at the well-known May
Assembly, which was held in Sremski Karlovci from 12 to 15 May.
During the great European Revolution of 1848–49, the rebel Serbs
demanded the vojvodstvo (voivodeship) of Serbia, including the
territories of Srem, Banat with the Kikinda District, Bačka with
17 At the Timisoara Assembly, or even earlier, at the Assembly in Baja (1694), the
Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy demanded a separate territorial unit, especially
because in an estate monarchy such as Austria, the key question of political
influence was the possession of historical territory and the institution of an
assembly. Only then could they be equal with other peoples that had already
fulfilled these achievements. However, from 1848 onwards, the Serbian demands
becane nationally motivated and were not estate-based any more.
296
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
the Šajkaš District, Baranja and the Military Frontier. This was
the first conceptually complete programme of territorial auton-
omy as the nationally delineated Serbian space. The emerging
young nation demanded its clearly determined territorial unit
and defined its borders and name within the Habsburg Monar-
chy. Its national and emancipatory movement proclaimed Serbs
as an independent and politically free people, subordinated to the
Royal House of Habsburg and the Hungarian Crown. All these
decisions, inspired by the revolutionary ideas of national and lib-
eral movements in Europe during 1848, were also founded on the
rights and privileges granted to Serbs as an ethno-confessional
group by Austrian Emperor Leopold I in 1691 and 1695, which
they considered a legal and historical basis for their autonomy.
Such Serbian demands would also call into question the terri-
torial integrity of the monarchy and, in particular, the national-
ly homogenising intentions of the Hungarian revolutionary and
national movement. Therefore, the demands of the May Assem-
bly were met with vehement political resistance from the lead-
ers of the Hungarian Revolution, branding them as illegitimate,
rebellious, separatist and contrary to Hungarian historical rights
and aspirations towards the creation of the Hungarian political
nation. Historian Ranko Končar held that “already at that time,
Vojvodina’s autonomy clashed with the idea of a nation – state,
which would come to be expressed both in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies, and in the 21st century, regardless of whether it will emerge
within a foreign or nation state. Historically, this could be desig-
nated as a phenomenon of long duration, since in the 19th centu-
ry autonomy was determined by national (Serbian) reasons and
in the 20th century by historical, democratic, anti-centralist and
national-pluralist reasons”. (Ranko Končar,). In a word, Vojvodina
posed an obstacle to the creation of a homogeneous and central-
ist nation state both to Hungarian nationalism in the 19th century
and Serbian nationalism in the 20th century.
297
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
The Serbian national and revolutionary movement of 1848–49,
aimed at building a modern nation, brought about the emergence
of several draft constitutions that formulated their demands. The
draft constitution of March 1849 probably formulated the Serbian
demands more clearly than others. According to this draft, Vojvo-
dina was considered part of the monarchy, but as a state that was
equal with other federal members. Serbian Vojvodina was auton-
omous, indivisible and, in all respects, equal with other states
within the Habsburg Monarchy. According to this draft, the bor-
ders of Vojvodina could only be changed by its assembly. The draft
also envisaged Novi Sad as the capital of Vojvodina and its sym-
bols: the coat-of-arms and flag. Vojvodina left foreign policy to
the central government, demanding parity in the appointment of
officials. The common financial administration was also left to the
central government. Management of the revenues deriving from
internal sources – state property and taxes covering central gov-
ernment expenses – would fall within Vojvodina’s competence as
its direct income. Finally, whatever was not left to the central gov-
ernment remained Vojvodina’s competence.
In recognition of the help provided by the rebellious Serbs to
the Viennese court in its war against the Hungarian revolution-
ary movement, their aspirations for autonomy were fulfilled, albe-
it largely modified. Thus, in 1849, the Voivodeship of Serbia and
Temes Banat was created as a crown land within the monarchy. Its
borders were moved towards the east, so that its territorial reach
precluded the demographic predominance of the Serbs and thus
the national character of this province. This was the period of
Bach’s absolutism and strict centralisation of the monarchy so that
the Voivodeship had no more significant influence on the formu-
lation of state policy and it was abolished just as it had been cre-
ated – by an imperial rescript in 1860. However, as early as 1861,
after the collapse of absolutism and the abolition of the Voivode-
ship, the Serbs formulated their demands at the Annunciation
298
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
Assembly, based on the May Assembly’s decisions about their right
to political territory and autonomous status.18 Under the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the status of Serbian autonomy
within the monarchy fell under the legal and political competence
of Hungary, which meant that the possibilities for fullfiling the
mentioned aspirations on the basis of the radical programme plat-
form of the May Assembly were reduced to a minimum in view
of the fact that Hungarian nationalists aspired towards building a
homogenous nation state by converting all existing ethnic groups
into the so-called Hungarian political nation.
During the following decades, until the beginning of the First
World War, Serbian autonomist aspirations would be limited to
the confines of the schools and Church, and largely politically
marginalized. Nevertheless, from 1848 onwards there existed the
awareness of the historical name of Vojvodina, the need for its
identity, territorial delimitation and specific identity characteris-
tics – which would provide a basis for the aspirations of its lib-
eral citizens in the Yugoslav phase of their defense of the right to
self-government, in other words, the supranational autonomy of
Vojvodina and not the Serbian one any more.
EXPLOITATION OF VOJVODINA IN CENTRALISTIC YUGOSLAVIA
The new ideas affirmed during the First World War and its out-
come cardinally changed the constitutional position and legal sta-
tus of Vojvodina. The affirmation of the national principle dur-
ing this war, under the influence of the historical document of
US President Woodrow Wilson – Fourteen Points,19 as well as the
18 The territories delineating the Serbian Voivodeship at the Annunciation Assembly
were changed relative to the territorial claims set out at the May Assembly. Thus,
the territories of Vojvodina did not include Baranja any more, while Bačka lost
its northern part and Subotica. As for Banat, only its western part, predominantly
populated by Serbs, was demanded.
19 This refers to President Woodrow Wilson’s historical speech delivered at the
joint session of the US Senate and House of Representatives on 8 January 1918.
299
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary, led to the implosion of
the Dual Monarchy. This was a decisive moment in the creation of
the common South Slav state in 1918. Different ideological groups
and political entities from Vojvodina participated in these histor-
ical processes, especially during the last year of the war, when the
question of Vojvodina territory clearly imposed itself, too. They
reached a consensus on the need for Vojvodina’s legal separation
from Hungary, but differed a lot in their views on its future sta-
tus and methods for achieving such an aim. The question that
imposed itself was whether Vojvodina would be treated as a his-
torical province with its own subjectivity and thus be political-
ly realized and affirmed within the Yugoslav state, or should it
first join Serbia, lose its historical identity and join the emerging
unified Serbian state. Thus, there were two tendencies in Vojvo-
dina’s political life, which were to characterize it during the fol-
lowing decades – a broader, pro-Yugoslav and narrrower Serbian
and nationalist conception of the future status and constitutional
position of Vojvodina. The Yugoslav idea and broader framework
for settling its position were advocated by democratically orient-
ed politicians and some intellectuals, including specifically Vasa
Stajić, Tihomir Ostojić, Petar Konjović and others. The opposite
conception was advocated by the nationalist Radical Party led by
Jaša Tomić. It promoted the unconditional inclusion of Vojvodi-
na in the Kingdom of Serbia as its primary political and national
aim. The Radicals also accepted the unification of South Slavs into
Prompted by the strengthening of European nationalisms during the First World
War and the victory of the October Revolution in Russia (1917), whose leaders
(Bolsheviks) published all secret diplomatic documents and proclaimed the
principle of national self-determination – President Wilson presented the new
conception of the national question, compatible with the American revolutionary
and democratic experience. The crucial principle of the 14 Points is the principle
of national self-determination and the right of peoples to “round off ” their nation
states. This was one of the fundamental steps towards the destruction of the
centuries-long multi-ethnic Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.
300
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
a state, but only after the clear delineation of the Serbian ethnic
space or, in other words, after the realisation of the great-state idea
of pan-Serbian unification. In their aspirations, Tomić’s Radicals
only reflected the political views of the Serbian government led by
Nikola Pašić. This also raised the fundamental question concern-
ing the creation and constitutional foundation of the future state
– what are its constituents: South Slav peoples or historical prov-
inces, that is, states?
This was one of the crucial disputes at the Great People’s Assem-
bly held in Novi Sad on November 25, 1918. In the presence of only
Slavic peoples (about one third of the population), the opinion of
Jaša Tomić’s Radicals prevailed and the Assembly adopted the Res-
olution that “Banat, Bačka and Baranja” should join the Kingdom
of Serbia and that every effort should be made towards the realiza-
tion of the unified state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The alterna-
tive conception advocated the thesis on the preservation of Vojvo-
dina’s political subjectivity, so that it would join the state of Slo-
venes, Croats and Serbs, which had already been acceded by Slo-
venia, Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia – Herzegovina, as a historical
province. After the unification of South Slavs on 1 December 1918,
the provincial administration of “Bačka, Banat and Baranja” was
the first to dissolve itself in favour of the central government in
Belgrade, which pursued a policy of compulsory state centralism
and national unitarism. This policy was upset by the traditions
of historical provinces, especially Vojvodina, which was also evi-
denced by the heated debates of the leading Serbian political par-
ties, Radicals and Democrats, at the Constituent Assembly.
During the constitutional debates in March 1919, Vojvodi-
na’s Radicals, who had merged with Pašić’s Serbian Radicals in
the meantime, represented the most extreme political wing of the
centralist forces. They vehemently opposed the implementation
of any historical or “tribal” criteria in proposals for the federal
structure of the Kingdom. They often emphasized that Vojvodina
301
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
had unconditionally joined Serbia and that it renounced self-
ish “autonomous separatism” in favour of homogenisation of the
Serbs, as emphasized in their party organ Zastava in August 1919.
The Radical fear of federalist constitutional concepts was moti-
vated by both ideological and demographic reasons. Namely, the
Serbs living in the territory of Bačka, Banat and Baranja consti-
tuted only about one third of the total population (33.7 %), so that
any constitution of Vojvodina as a unit within a decentralized
Yugoslavia would result in the outvoting of this ethnic commu-
nity. In the constitutional debate and drafts of the supreme law of
the new South Slav community, which anticipated the creation of
a complex state laid on a historical foundation, the Radicals saw
the recurrence of hostile influences, the obsolete legal framework
and legacy of “Austrianism” and “Compromisism”. Similar views
on the system of government were also shared by the Democrat-
ic Party. The essential difference lay in the fact that the Radicals
were overwhelmingly inclined to a centralist system of govern-
ment with indisputable Serbian domination, while the Democrats
considered national unitarism (Yugoslavism) as the assumption
of a centralist system. For the Radicals it was important to deline-
ate a Greater Serbia and Vojvodina, incorporated without any spe-
cificities into the Serbian framework first, and then into Yugosla-
via. On the other hand, for the Democrats the loss of Vojvodi-
na’s historical identity and name in the Yugoslav state constella-
tion was also acceptable. A strict opposition to “historism” and
an aspiration towards the disappearance of any sign of autonomy
was still confirmation of the survival of the idea of Vojvodina as a
highly specific historical entity, which did not fade away with the
act of its unconditional merger with Serbia. Vojvodina’s liberal cit-
izens would use these arguments as a basis for their political asu-
pirations, and would demand autonomous rights in the following
decades.
302
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
The irreversible process of centralization and unitarization of
the new Yugoslav state were to aggravate the intention that its
constitutional system also show respect for historical provinces
and their specificities, including Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia – Her-
zegovina and Vojvodina. Precisely for this reason, it is no won-
der that the debate on the constitution of the new state was most-
ly dedicated to the historical provinces as its possible constituent
entities. The political parties in Serbia – Radicals, Democrats and
their branches in Vojvodina mostly opposed the identification of
Vojvodina as a historical province. This was to be be the constant
of the Serbian political views on Vojvodina throughout the 20th
century. All draft constitutions which, to a lesser or greater degree,
observed the historical specificities of Vojvodina, were rejected,
and Pašić’s proposal, which anticipated a strictly centralized state,
divided into 33 regions, was adopted on 28 June 1921, owing to
political corruption in the Parliament. Despite the unconditional
unification of Vojvodina and the unitarist St. Vitus’ Day Consti-
tution, which even removed its name from the political nomen-
clature, and politically marginalized and completely economically
subordinated it by an unsuccessful agrarian reform and the high-
est tax charges, the awareness of Vojvodina as a historical prov-
ince did not vanish. Instead, the Vojvodina question began to
emerge as a political, economic and constitutional question. How-
ever, great eonomic problems would soon divert attention from
political issues and replace nationalist exaltation over unification
with concerns for daily survival.
Centralization in Vojvodina, which was always hidden behind
patriotic rhetoric, brought accelerated pauperisation, caused by
the heaviest tax burden in Yugoslavia. Thus, according to the
data of the Ministry of Finance for 1925, the first year for which
precise calculations are available, tax payments in Vojvodina
amounted to 131,336,108 dinars, while in the entire so-called Ser-
bian bloc (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia), which
303
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
had over four times as many inhabitants than Vojvodina, they
were lower by almost half – 60,212,689 dinars; in Croatia and Sla-
vonia 66,889,580, in Bosnia-Herzegovina 30,066,204, Slovenia
56,570,775 and Dalmatia 10,787,467. The direct tax burden of each
Vojvodina inhabitant was ten times higher than that of a Serbian
citizen, which was termed “tax robbery” by historians. Accord-
ing to their estimates, during the period 1919–28, each citizen of
Vojvodina paid an annual amount of 939 dinars on average, while
each citizen of the so-called Serbian bloc paid only 180 dinars.
Slovenia – 507 dinars, Croatia and Slavonia 406 dinars, Dalmatia
406 dinars, and Bosnia-H erzegovina 267 dinars (Lazar Vrkatić,
O konzervativnim političkim idejama..., pp. 216–217). Despite tax
harmonization and state unification, after the imposition of the
6 January Dictatorship (1929), differences in tax burdens among
the different parts of the Kingdom remained. The Danube Banate
(banovina), whose core territory was the former Vojvodina, was
burdened by taxation three and a half times higher than the Ser-
bian parts of the kingdom.
As for budget replenishment, the afore-mentioned proportions
were just the opposite in the case of expenditure and government
investment. According to the first available official data for 1925,
the Ministry of Construction invested 16 million dinars in Vojvo-
dina, as opposed to as much as 220 million dinars in the so-called
Serbian bloc. During the period 1925–34, according to the data of
this Ministry, 63 % of its budget was invested in Serbia and only
4 % in Vojvodina. Similar discrepancies can also be observed in
the data of other investment-making ministries. During the peri-
od 1920–35, the Ministry of Transport invested 84 % of its budg-
et in Serbia (including Macedonia) and only 2.5 % in Vojvodina.
If the mentioned percentages could be justified in the first post-
war years due to the destruction of Serbia during the war, the pro-
longed treatment of Vojvodina and other prečani regions as con-
quered territorieswas losing justification because such a status was
304
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
retained throughout the inter-war period. (Ranko Končar, Dimi-
trije Boarov).
As early as the mid-1920s, due to the unquestionable exploi-
tation of Vojvodina as a result of state centralism, there emerged
political currents aimed at protecting the interests of this histor-
ical province. Pančevo lawyer Dušan Duda Bošković, who was
an Independent Democrat at the time, put himself at the head
of this nationally heterogeneous political movement for the pro-
tection of Vojvodina’s interests, which included parts of dissat-
isfied Radicals and Democrats. In a political sense, the position
of the prečani regions as well as Vojvodina was strengthened to
some extent due to the expansion of the front pleading for the
revision of the St. Vitus’ Day Constitution, which was especially
highlighted in 1927 with the formation of the Peasant-Democratic
Coalition, comprising Svetozar Pribićević’s Independent Demo-
crats and Stjepan Radić’s Croatian Peasant Party. The dynamics of
political life was intensified. In 1928, the Croatian political leaders
were assassinated in the Parliament and on 6 January 1929 King
Alexander Karađorđević suspended the Constitution, banned all
political parties and divided the country into nine banates (bano-
vine). Vojvodina became part of the Danube Banate which, in the
south, extended deep into Šumadija, including Kragujevac, thus
breaking up the historical regions and ensuring a Serbian eth-
nic majority. Due to this specific Gleichschaltung of the autocrat-
ic monarch, political life faded away, but only for a short peri-
od of time. The failure of the 6 January regime led to the politi-
cal radicalization and crystallization of the Vojvodina emancipa-
tory movement, which was growing stronger as awareness of the
need for the federalisation of Yugoslavia was ripening. Exposed
to repressive dictatorial measures and unprecedented economic
exploitation, Vojvodina was witnessing the emergence of a broad
autonomist front aiming to change the legal status and constitu-
tional position of this historical province.
305
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
SUPRANATIONAL IDEA OF AUTONOMY
The dynamics of political life in the country after the imposition
of King Alexander’s’s personal rule was not moving in the desired
direction. Instead of calming political passions and resolving var-
ious national questions, the dictatorship placed constitutional
problems on the agenda and raised numerous questions, includ-
ing that of Vojvodina. Due to harsh repression, the first to begin
arousing the weakened political life in the country was the Peas-
ant-Democratic Coalition with its Zagreb Punctuations issued in
November 1932, demanding the termination of the dictatorship
and radical legal changes. In contrast to the Serbian Radicals, who
remained the mainstay of the centralist system, the Vojvodina
Radicals defined their stance on the necessary legal status of this
province at the Sombor Conference, held semi-legally in Jovan
Lalošević’s apartment in July 1932. This gathering was also attend-
ed by the representatives of other political parties – the Vojvodi-
na wings of the Democrats and Peasants. The host of this gath-
ering and head of the Sombor Radicals, Lalošević, gloomily pre-
sented the 10-year achievements of Vojvodina within Yugoslavia,
saying that at the time of its entry into the new state it was “rich,
organized, abounding in resources and advanced ... in economic,
cultural and social terms”. He described the current situation in
Vojvodina as a “squeezed lemon” because it was “ruined, torment-
ed and pauperized”. He saw the main causes of the pauperization
and devastation of Vojvodina in its tax inequality and tax burden,
dissolution of municipal self-governments, administrative disor-
der and corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy “brought in from
outside”.20
20 The Serbian sentiment in Vojvodina was affected in various ways; the notice
for state police recruitment in Novi Sad, published by the Ban of the Danube
Banovina in the daily Politika on 9 August 1930 was often quoted where it said
that one of the requirements was that “only candidates from the territory of pre-
war Serbia will be eligible for recruitment”.
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the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
The participants adopted the well-known Sombor Resolution,
which demanded the establishment of a parliamentary system,
the return of civil rights, and freedom of speech and the press,
and political activity. Its third and most important item called for
the “immediate implementation of the principle: Vojvodina for
Vojvodinians, with the same rights that will be enjoyed by other
provinces and the same administrative system that will be estab-
lished in other provinces. We will not tolerate any more that our
sons are systematically marginalized and stigmatized as insuffi-
ciently reliable, that appointed officials are persons who do not
know and do not wish to know our situation, our laws, our cus-
toms and our needs, who do not demonstrate a true affinity with
the people in this region, who do not make any effort to get to
know our mentality and our way of life, who do not respect our
customs, traditions and views, and only regard the whole prov-
ince as a convenient object of exploitation.” (Ranko Končar). It
was also demanded that government administration jobs in the
territory of Vojvodina should be filled by Vojvodinians and that
Vojvodina’s citizens should have their representatives in the gov-
ernment and all state institutions in Belgrade. Finally, the authors
of this resolution dismissed the allegations that they were separa-
tists, claiming that they did not call into question state borders.
They rather pleaded for the reorganisztion and consolidation of
the existing state.
In fact, the Sombor Conference and its Resolution marked the
beginning of the work of the Vojvodina Front, a supranational and
anti-centralist group of civic political parties aiming towards the
reorganization of the state and achievement of its aim – Vojvo-
dina’s autonomy. The Sombor Resolution returned the historical
notion and name of Vojvodina comprising Banat, Bačka, Baranja
and Srem into the political nomenclature and rhetoric. The cen-
tralistic solutions of the St. Vitus’ Day Constitution and segmen-
tation of Vojvodina, allowing more efficient exploitation, were
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
rejected. The solutions based on the banate system, imposed by
the 6 January Dictatorship, were also rejected. In these concep-
tions Vojvodina was treated as a Yugoslav constitutional question.
Therefore, as a historical province, it had to enjoy the same polit-
ical status as other regions. The Sombor Resolution also showed
the unity of all opposition parties over the Vojvodina platform
that had two cornerstones – criticism of the dictatorship and
deconstruction of state centralism, and the advocacy of Vojvodi-
na’s new position.
In their reactions to these developments, the Independent Dem-
ocrats went the furthest. They took a clear stand together with the
Democratic Party. According to them, Vojvodina should enjoy
the status of an equal federal unit within a restructured Yugosla-
via. The Sombor Conference was followed by the Novi Sad Con-
ference (1932) where various political actors sought to find a legal
solution to the Vojvodina question. The least common denomi-
nator was still the demand for a federal structure for Yugoslavia,
where Vojvodina should have the status of a federal unit. This plat-
form provided a basis for the political activities of the Vojvodina
opposition until the beginning of the Second World War in Yugo-
slavia. It was opposed by leaders of the political parties in Bel-
grade, especially the Radicals. The Main Committee of the Radi-
cal Party called on its Vojvodina branch not to adopt the Novi Sad
Resolution, considering it an attempt to “tear up Serbdom”. The
Democratic Party also opposed the Novi Sad Resolution, albeit
less vehemently than the Radicals, considering it an attack on the
“integrity of Serbian national interests” In the opinion of the lead-
ers of the Democratic Party, Vojvodina could only be a govern-
mental and administrative question and not a political and legal
one. Although the Agrarian Party, especially its left wing led by
Dragoljub Jovanović, showed more understanding for Vojvodina,
it also rejected the Novi Sad Resolution. Consequently, all relevant
Serbian political parties rejected the ideas and aims presented in
308
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
the Novi Sad Resolution as the constituted platform of the Vojvo-
dina Front, considering them a paradigm of separatism. These
principles were only supported by the the Peasant-Democratic
Coalition of Vladko Maček and Svetozar Pribićević, which viewed
Vojvodina as part of the federal system of Yugoslavia.
Despite objections from Belgrade, both the Novi Sad and Som-
bor Resolutions affirmed the ideas of Vojvodina’s autonomy and
strengthened its self-awareness, as well as its opposition and dem-
ocratic movements. Nevertheless, the formation of the Vojvodina
Movement finally took place in 1935, bringing together the politi-
cal actors who had supported the Novi Sad Resolution three years
earlier, as well as members of the illegal Communist Party of Yugo-
slavia (CPY) due to their commitment to Vojvodina’s autonomy
and sharp anti-regime stance. Attempts to integrate the Vojvodina
Movement into a single political party failed because its members
wanted to preserve their original identity, while at the same time
working together on resolving Vojvodina’s legal status. The politi-
cal agenda of the Vojvodina Front, as a politically pluralistic asso-
ciation that would formulate the Vojvodina question as a constitu-
tional one, aspired towards the federalisation of Yugoslavia within
which Vojvodina would be a federal unit and equal to other such
units. They held that federal status would be necessary as a form
of Vojvodina’s “self-defense” against abuse and economic exploi-
tation. According to the interpretation of the Independent Dem-
ocratic Party, the Vojvodina question emerged due to economic
problems, “it is led by Serbs over there. That’s not separatism. That’s
Vojvodina’s self-defense... Vojvodina’s main motive is economic”.
(R. Končar, D. Boarov). In this way, liberal – mostly Serbian – citi-
zens imposed the Vojvodina question as being both constitution-
al and democratic, rejecting the narrow Serbian concepts of the
nationalist circles opposed to any form of Vojvodina’s autonomy.
Serbian opposition parties took a critical stand on the Vojvodi-
na Front not only because they did not agree with the legal status
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
of Vojvodina, but also because they held that it should come under
the umbrella of the United Opposition. In 1940, the leader of the
Democrats, Milan Grol, said that Vojvodina “must remain Ser-
bian” and part of a future Serbian unit. On the other hand, the
dictatorship regime, which, in the meantime, had become a lit-
tle more flexible under Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović, harsh-
ly accused the Vojvodina Movement of separatism, national trea-
son, tearing up the Serbian nation and the like. One of the fiercest
attacks occured on 12 January 1936 when a group of pro-regime
public and political figures and intellectuals of Vojvodina descent,
who worked in Belgrade, denounced the Vojvodina Front in their
Memorandum for separatism, which was leading to the “inevita-
ble” death of Vojvodina because, in this way, “the people of Vojvo-
dina would deny their entire past”.
On the other hand, the stand adopted by the illegal CPY was
opposite to these nationalist patterns. Already in 1929, it took a
clearer attitude towards the Vojvodina question, which was reflect-
ed in its organizational structure. The Communists, especially in
Serbia, took a definite stand on Vojvodina in 1935, when the Sec-
retary of the Provincial Committee of the CPY for Serbia wrote
that the Vojvodina question had no characteristics of a national
movement. It existed as the question of “an oppressed province
that should be granted self-government and should not be plun-
dered any more” and that the slogan “Vojvodina for the Vojvodin-
ians” should be accepted. The following year (1936) similar views
were also expressed by the top party leadership. On 2 November,
there appeared a Letter from the Central Committee of the CPY,
better known as “Tito’s Letter to the Serbian Communists” where
it was stated that they should consistently stick to the “principle
of national self-determination, including secession. In order to be
equal, this right must be recognized to every people. The Left-
ists support a free community of all Yugoslav peoples within the
present borders, organized on a federal basis... Consequently, the
310
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
Croatian, Slovenian, Serbian, Macedonian and Montenegrin peo-
ples must declare themselves in a democratic way on how they
wish to arrange mutual relations within the state community.
Likewise, the peoples in Vojvodina and Bosnia-Herzegovina have
the right to declare themselves on their relations within the state
community”. (Ranko Končar). Although the Communists agreed
with the platform of the Vojvodina Movement and also cooper-
ate with the civic political parties within the National Front, they
proceeded from the social identity of an autonomous Vojvodina.
They held that the constitutional question was actually a nation-
al question which could only be resolved with a revolution. The
Communist platform on Vojvodina was written by Žarko Zren-
janin, the Provincial Secretary of the CPY for Vojvodina, in 1939.
He explicitly pleaded for the “federal status” of Vojvodina within
the future federal Yugoslavia. “Simply because Vojvodina has spe-
cial tasks both in the economic and national field, and because it
is an autonomous historical entity with its tradition, it cannot be
included in any province without affecting its peoples… Vojvo-
dina must be equal with other provinces in the future reorgani-
sation of the country”. (Ibid..., p. 100) Due to such a position, the
CPY inevitably sided with the Vojvodina Front because it saw the
reasons for Vojvodina’s autonomy in its specific ethnic composi-
tion. Due to all these motives for Vojvodina’s autonomous status
given by the Vojvodina Movement, the question of Vojvodina and
its autonomy began to be viewed inits historical, democratic and
multiethnic context.
VOJVODINA IN ANTI-FASCIST STRUGGLE
After the aggression of the Third Reich against Yugoslavia
(1941), the capitulation of the Yugoslav army and dismember-
ment of the state by the occupiers, Vojvodina fell under three bru-
tal occupation regimes. Srem was included in the so-called Inde-
pendent State of Croatia (NDH), Bačka and Baranja were annexed
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
by Horthy’s Hungary, while Banat was placed under a special Ger-
man administration. Even before the war, the complex interna-
tional and intra-Yugoslav circumstances were echoed in Vojvodi-
na’s complex ethnic composition. All phenomena, ranging from
the mass Nazification of Germans to antagonized Serbo-Croa-
tian relations and Horthy’s regime in Hungary, were also reflect-
ed in large measure in the political and national circumstances in
Vojvodina. They were characterized by the processes of political
homogenisation on a national basis, which especially rallied Ger-
mans and Hungarians around an anti-Yugoslav platform. Nation-
al homogenisation also took place among Serbs and Croats, insti-
gated by the views of the leading political parties.
Communists’ views had special significance for Vojvodina due
to their ideas for resolving the national question and their consist-
ent commitment to Yugoslavia, including Vojvodina as a separate
unit. Therefore, one should not be surprised at the success of the
People’s Liberation Movement (PLM) in Vojvodina to which this
province alone made a significant military, political and econom-
ic contribution. The specificities of the PLM in Vojvodina were
mostly determined by the geographical features of this region –
flat terrain intersected by three big rivers, which contributed to
the preservation of the unified organisation of the movement, as
well as the complex ethnic composition and character of the occu-
pation regimes. Three highly repressive occupation regimes in
this region relied mostly on Vojvodina’s ethnic composition and,
in particular, on its German and Hungarian minorities.
The occupation policy for Vojvodina was characterized by
discrimination, genocide, denationalisation and ethnic cleans-
ing. The character of the Ustasha occupation regime was certain-
ly most radical. Its methods were based on the racist policy of
“blood and soil”, which implied the extermination of the Serbi-
an people, including genocide, forcible conversion to Catholicism
and resettlement. These unfavourable assumptions determined
312
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
the development of the liberation movement in Vojvodina and
its historical possibilities. It seemed that these assumptions did
not provide any serious possibilities for real resistance or the suc-
cess of a liberation movement. The CPY in Vojvodina was con-
vinced that despite these complex political and geographical cir-
cumstances, it was still possible to organize an armed liberation
movement against the occupiers, although it had only 1,200 mem-
bers at that time. Thus, special importance was attached to the
organisation and development of the liberation movement among
all the peoples of Vojvodina in order to prevent the abuse of the
national question, that is, the belief in “national liberation”, as
part of the political concept of the occupation forces. In that con-
text, the liberation and anti-fascist movement in Vojvodina was
to make a truly significant contribution because it would become
ethnically pluralistic and not one-dimensional. Proceeding from
the assumption that an armed struggle is the only alternative in
the current cirrcumstances, the CPY sought to express the lib-
eration, anti-fascist and Yugoslav character of its struggle in its
first documents and proclamations. Therefore, in its proclama-
tions the CPY appealed to Serbs, Hungarians, Germans, Roma-
nians, Slovaks and Ruthenians to join it in a common struggle for
national liberation and equality in a future free Vojvodina. In the
conception of the CPY, which especially insisted on the Yugoslav
character of the struggle of the Vojvodina peoples, it was empha-
sized that the PLM in Vojvodina should have an anti-fascist char-
acter because the occupation was an act by fascist countries, apart
from the propaganda directed towards Germans and Hungarians.
The People’s Liberation Struggle (PLS) was gradually to win the
support of almost all the peoples in Vojvodina with the obvious
exception of the ethnic Germans on this anti-occupier, social and
Yugoslav platform alone.
Consequently, the PLM in Vojvodina organized itself and
solidly developed in Bačka, Banat and Srem as early as 1941. A
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
number of partisan detachments were formed and offered resist-
ance against the occupier under very complex circumstances. In
Bačka and Banat, at the end of 1941, the movement experienced
a big crisis and defeat, but still managed to survive and develop
in the spirit of the political ideas defined by the CPY as early as
1941 and during 1942, 1943 and 1944. Many of the mistakes and
failures in developing the movement in Banat and Bačka result-
ed from inferior leadership, poor adjustment of the movement to
geographical circumstances, the overly dogmatic approach of the
movement’s leaders, and erroneous expectations that the conflict
would not last long and that the Soviets would win a swift victory
on the Eastern Front...
The anti-fascist movement in Srem achieved more success in
an organisational sense. Although it began developing a little later,
the movement did not have many weaknesses that characterized
the PLM in Bačka and Banat. It grew gradually and had a distinct
Yugoslav and liberation character from the the very beginning. It
also developed into a broader-based social movement despite the
many historical prejudices. The political and military processes
in Srem encouraged progress in the behaviour of specified social
strata vis-à-vis the Communists and their aspirations. The politi-
cal homogenisation of the Serbs in Srem on the eve of the Second
World War did not have a nationalist character. Instead, it took on
a Yugoslav and national-liberation character based on the well-
known CPY platform. In mid-1942, the movement in Srem already
became more massive. This process was preceded by fierce resist-
ance to forceful conversion to Catholicism by the Ustasha author-
ities. This led to popularization of the movement and its expan-
sion throughout Srem and not just to Mt. Fruška Gora and its sur-
roundings. Sthis kind of development soon enabled it to assume a
leading role in the Vojvodina liberation movement. Srem became
the crucial political cohesion factor, which had a primary influ-
ence on the political development of the movement.
314
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
From the very beginning, the anti-fascist and liberation move-
ment also caused the question of Vojvodina in the future feder-
al system to be established during the war and after liberation of
the country. This was a clear political commitment to Vojvodina’s
autonomy in the process of federalizing the Yugoslav state. The
development of the PLM in Vojvodina and its political and mili-
tary institutionalization with a clearly Vojvodinian character (the
General Staff, Main People’s Liberation Committee of Vojvodina,
Provincial Committee of the CPY) provided a basis for a feder-
al solution to Vojvodina’s status. A lasting solution to the nation-
al question in Yugoslavia was seen in a broader ethnic foundation
of the Yugoslav federation. In this sense, the political and mili-
tary institutionalization of the People’s Liberation Movement of
Vojvodina and its direct links with Yugoslav institutions, as well
as a well-developed anti-fascist movement, decisively anticipated
its autonomous status as a Yugoslav unit. In other words, Vojvodi-
na came out of the Second World War with its own bodies of mil-
itary and civilian authority which were subordinated to the Yugo-
slav and not the Serbian authorities. Thus, it was expected that the
decisions of the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council for the
National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce (1943) would
confirm this political intention and Vojvodina’s war and politi-
cal reality. However, the AVNOJ decisions anticipated the crea-
tion of the Yugoslav federation on national, not historical, foun-
dations (with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina). From a legal
aspect, five Yugoslav nations (Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Mace-
donians and Montenegrins) would constitute the Yugoslav fed-
eration, based on the principle of national self-determination,
including secession, which meant that the federal units had the
character of a state.
Already at the time of the Second Session of the AVNOJ it was
agreed that Vojvodina would be granted autonomy within a fed-
eral Serbia. This solution was justified by the national foundations
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
of Yugoslav federalism, the interests of the Serbian people, the
complex political situation in Serbia upon which, as the largest
federal unit, the constitution of the Yugoslav state and character
of the federation were also dependent, especially if one bears in
mind the prevalence of the quisling and nationalist forces resist-
ing the federalisation of Yugoslavia as being contrary to the inter-
ests of the Serbian people. Tito himself pointed out that in Serbia
it would be necessary to “solve the question of the system of gov-
ernment, the government-in-exile in London and, in particular,
the king”. While interpreting the decisions of AVNOJ in the article
“The significance of the AVNOJ decisions for the further develop-
ment of our struggle and the creation of the federal state commu-
nity” (March 1944), Tito would explicitly confirm that Vojvodina
would undoubtedly be “granted the broadest possible autonomy,
like other regions pretending to it, but the question of autonomy
and the question of the federal unit to which the relevant prov-
ince will be added, depend on the people themselves or, in other
words, their representatives when, after the war, the definite sys-
tem of government will be decided” (Ranko Končar).
Up to the liberation of Vojvodina, in October 1944, the develop-
ment of the People’s Liberation Movement based on the CPY plat-
form contributed to its military strength, large membership and
political influence. From that time onward, however, the politi-
cal processes in Vojvodina reversed their direction. Although
there was an attempt to preserve the continuity of previous pol-
icy by introducing the Military Administration in Banat, Bačka
and Baranja, the movement encountered phenomena and tenden-
cies that largely narrowed it both socially and politically, includ-
ing repressive elements as well. On 17 October 1944, by the order
of the General Staff of Vojvodina, the Military Administration for
Banat, Bačka and Baranja was established. It was divided into the
Military Administration for Banat and the Military Administra-
tion for Bačka and Baranja and assumed executive and judicial
316
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
powers. Its establishment was justified by political, ethnic, eco-
nomic and military reasons, but the political motive was certainly
most disputable, since it was based on the barely provable evalu-
ation of the underdevelopment of the people’s liberation commit-
tees and their lack ofreadiness to assume power. Without enter-
ing into all motives due to which the military administration was
introduced, the methods of its short-lived activities (from 17 Octo-
ber 1944 to 15 February 1945) were even more disputable, includ-
ing specifically its repressive measures against the German and, in
part, Hungarian communities. Due to its insufficiently differenti-
ated attitude towards the complex ethnic composition in Vojvodi-
na, it aroused various political suspicions and created great prob-
lems in inter-ethnic relations. Thus, the Military Administration
also contributed to the suffering of a certain number of Hungari-
an and German civilians.
Nevertheless, due to the great contribution of Vojvodina’s peo-
ples to the anti-fascist victory and the fact that already during the
war Vojvodina developed into a separate territorial and politi-
cal unit, it was necessary to find the modality of its inclusion in
the new concept of Yugoslav federalism that was being created.
Thus, after the liberation of Yugoslavia from fascism, from 30 to
31 July 1945, the Assembly of Delegates of the Peoples of Vojvodi-
na – Serbs, Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, Ruthenians
and Jews – was convened and it was decided to constitute Vojvo-
dina as an autonomous province, based on its historical, ethnic
and other specificities. At the same time, it was decided that the
autonomous province “should join federal Serbia”. Thus, by the
will of its peoples, Vojvodina was constituted as an autonomous
province and then integrated into Serbia. Each people was repre-
sented by one deputy, who delivered a speech and supported the
stance on an autonomous Vojvodina joining Serbia – their state-
ments were official and printed together with the Assembly Deci-
sion in Službeni list Vojvodine. The presence of the delegates of all
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
the peoples in Vojvodina at the Assembly confirmed Vojvodina’s
nationally pluralistic identity as the basis of its autonomy, there-
by legalising the stance that Vojvodina’s autonomy derived from
the determination of all of its peoples who thus became constitu-
ents of this autonomous province. The Decision of the Assembly
of Delegates and nationally and politically pluralistic institutions
were verified at the Third Session of AVNOJ held on 10 August
1945. That same day, AVNOJ was transformed into the Provisional
People’s Assembly of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia – the highest
legislative and administrative body of the new Yugoslavia, which
also enjoyed full international recognition. AVNOJ “unanimous-
ly adopted the decision of the First Assembly of Delegates of the
Peoples of Vojodina that the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina
should join federal Serbia within borders that will be determined
by the Provisional People’s Assembly”.
In the immediate post-war period, Vojvodina and Croatia were
delineated, so that the province assumed its final contours. The
most controversial question was that of the border in Srem and
the status of Baranja. During the Second World War, Srem was
ruled by the so-called Independent State of Croatia and the Parti-
sans hinted at the delineation in Srem in July 1943, when the Gen-
eral Staff of Vojvodina was formed. According to Tito’s order, the
whole area of Srem east of the Vukovar-Vinkovci-Županja fell
within the competence of the General Staff, Already at that time
there was controversy between the military political leaders of the
People’s Liberation Movements in Vojvodina and Croatia about
whether anticipation of the future borders should also fall within
the competence of the General Staff. As the war was drawing to an
end, the leaders of the People’s Liberation Movement in Vojvodi-
na were increasingly insistent that Srem should form part of this
province. One argument why it should be included in Vojvodina
was the Ustasha terror campaign in that region during the war. In
order to overcome the arguments, at the session of the Politburo
318
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
of the CPY’s Central Committee held as early as June 1945, the
party leadership proposed a five-member commission for “prep-
aration of a proposal to define he border between Vojvodina and
Croatia”, to be chaired by Milovan Đilas. On 19 June, the AVNOJ
Presidency appointed the commission with a clear mandate. The
commission went out into the field, examined the population cen-
suses, acquainted itself with the ethnic composition of the region
and talked with local government and political representatives in
order to prepare the report with its delineation proposals. On 26
June 1945, the CPY Politburo discussed the report and thereafter
the commission also submitted its report to the AVNOJ Presiden-
cy on 1 July, which forwarded it to the Government on 10 July.
The so-called Đilas Commission listed the following territories
as being a matter of dispute between Vojvodina and Croatia: the
counties of Subotica, Sombor, Apatin and Odžaci in Bačka, the
counties of Batina and Darda in Baranja, and the counties of Vuk-
ovar, Šid and Ilok in Srem. As for the counties in Bačka, the Com-
mission stated that an overwhelming Croatian majority existed
only in Subotica and that a separation of this county from its sur-
roundings and a merger with Croatia would be unnatural, while
Subotica, a big city, would find itself out on a limb with communi-
cations directed towards the south and not towards the west. The
incorporation of all these counties into Croatia was unacceptable
due to a relative Serbian population majority. Thus, the disputed
parts of Bačka remained in Vojvodina. As for Baranja, the findings
of the commission showed that in both counties (Batina and Dar-
da) there was a relative Croatian majority and both of them were
economically and commercially oriented towards the west. Con-
sequently, both economic and ethnic reasons favoured their ces-
sion to federal Croatia. Delineation in Srem was especially com-
plex. The commission proposed that the border should be drawn
between Šid and Vukovar, whereby the former would remain in
Vojvodina and the latter would be given to Croatia. As for Ilok,
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
the Commission proposed that it should remain in Vojvodina, but
already on 1 September 1945, pursuant to the decision of its res-
idents, Ilok was included in the county of Vukovar, in Croatia.
(Ljubo Boban).
The Commission also stated in its report that this was just a pro-
visional solution until a “solution is made by the competent bod-
ies responsible for the definite delineation”. Since the question of
the borders between the Yugoslav federal units was not raised any
more, this “provisional” solution of the Đilas Commission turned
out to be permanent. All federal units entered in their constitu-
tions the provision that the borders could not be changed without
the prior approval of the highest representative body of the repub-
lic. Under these decisions, Vojvodina preserved the whole region
of Bačka within its borders. It remained with Baranja, which had
seldom been considered as part of it since the 19th century, but
obtained a significant part of Srem which had never been consid-
ered part of Vojvodina, except for the short period of the revolu-
tionary Serbian Vojvodina and post-revolutionary Voivodeship.
AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE IN THE FEDERAL YUGOSLAVIA
As early as 1 September 1945, despite the unambigious deci-
sion of the Assembly of Delegates, the Presidency of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Serbia passed the Law on the Establishment and
Organisation of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. The Ser-
bian leadership tried, through this law, to legalize the interpre-
tation according to which Vojvodina’s autonomy was formed by
Serbia, so that Serbia could also abolish it. The Law raised the
question: who established Vojvodina’s autonomy and whether the
decision of the Assembly of the Delegates of Vojvodina People
and the confirmation by the Yugoslav Assembly of 10 August 1945
were thereby legally derogated? In essence, throughout the 20th
century the Vojvodina question was in the focus of both Yugoslav
and Serbian political life – at the beginning it manifested itself as
320
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
a political and economic question, but most of the time it imposed
itself as a question that concerned the constitutional position and
legal status of the province.
During the period of Vojvodina’s liberation from fascism, then
the military administration and immediately after its abolition, the
province changed its ethnic composition due to the emigration of
the German population. An estimated 200,000 Germans retreat-
ed together with Wehrmacht soldiers, while during military rule
most of those who remained were sent to camps (about 140,000).
Due to the retreat, emigration and killing of people, Vojvodina
lost about 350,000 of its inhabitants. Nevertheless, the expulsion
of the German population, which had provided an important
support to the occupier’s terror apparatus, was practised by most
European countries with a German minority. A small number of
Germans who had supported the People’s Liberation Movement
or declared themselves as belonging to the Hungarian minority
remained in Vojvodina. The property of the expelled Gemans and
all collaborationists was confiscated as the accompanying penalty
for collaboration. The German emigrants were replaced by people
from other parts of Yugoslavia in a process of colonisation. Dur-
ing the first wave of colonisation between August 1945 and July
1947, some 225,000 people were settled in 114 places. Pursuant to
the decision that Vojvodina should join Serbia, its population was
comprised mostly of Serbs – 72 %, Montenegrins accounted for 18
% and Macedonians for about 5 % of its population.
At the end of 1946, nationalisation of the means of produc-
tion was carried out as part of establishing the socialist system
in Yugoslavia. In the first wave of nationalisation, the state seized
894 domestic and foreign-owned industrial enterprises in the
province. When the Nationalisation Law (1948) was amended, so
that the private sector of industry was completely abolished, 2,593
trade and catering facilities were seized from their owners. (Dim-
itrije Boarov). As early as 1945–1946, the policy of compulsory
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purchase of agricultural products was introduced. Compulsory
purchase quotas were too high and the penalties for households
that failed to meet them were draconian. Among the top party
leadership there was also talk about the repression, torture, beat-
ing, incarceration and even killings of peasants.
Thus, due to confiscation, colonisation, compulsory purchase
and nationalisation, Vojvodina largely changed not only its ethnic,
but also its social composition, thus losing its hitherto inter-eth-
nic balance and the economic basis of its economy – a developed
middle class. Ironically, during the first years of Vojvodina’s bol-
shevization, some aims of the inter-war nationalist circles in Bel-
grade (such as the Serbian Cultural Club) were achieved, includ-
ing a change in the ethnic picture of the province and the need
for its Serbianization. If we add to these processes in the econo-
my the relocation of industrial facilities to the west of the country
because it was believed that Stalin’s potential attack on Yugoslavia
(after 1948) would be launched through the plain of Vojvodina, as
well a rigid centralist system and formal character of autonomy
– it was to be expected that Vojvodina would be an economical-
ly backward region during the late 1940s and the 1950s.21 Howev-
er, Vojvodina was hit especially hard by the forceful accumulation
of capital for industrial development at the expense of agricul-
tural production. According to the calculations of economists, in
Yugoslavia, between 1952 and 1966, about five billion dollars were
21 In 1969, Yugoslav President Tito said that Vojvodina’s lagging behind in economic
development was doubly caused by party policy of which he said that it was forced
upon them. First of all, after 1948, almost all industrial facilities were relocated to
other regions and, as he said, Vojvodina found itself “discriminated against”. These
solutions were imposed due to an external threat. As Tito also said, “later on, it
was considered how you would make up for that and how you would speed up
your development”. The second reason should be sought in very low purchasing
prices of agricultural products, thus creating accumulation for industrialisation
at the expense of agriculture. However, he also mentioned the third reason –
colonisation and the arrival of a population from the most underdeveloped parts
of the country, unaccustomed to modern agricultural methods.
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the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
spilled over from agriculture into industry due to disparities in
the prices of agricultural and industrial products. Bearing in mind
the structure of Vojvodina’s economy, it is estimated that more
than two billion dollars were taken from Vojvodina in this way
and then pumped into industrialisation. A special problem was
posed by the fact that the building of industrial facilities during
that period bypassed Vojvodina, while the reverse process – the
relocation of industrial facilities from Vojvodina – had an espe-
cially disastrous effect. During the period 1945–1951, the following
industrial facilities were seized from Vojvodina and reallocated to
other parts of Yugoslavia: 59 industrial enterprises, including pow-
er stations, foundries, chemical factories, wood-processing plants,
printing shops, brickyards, wool mills, sugar refineries, oil facto-
ries, flour mills, etc. Moreover, none of the 66 factories, obtained
by Yugoslavia from Germany in compensation for war damages,
were located in Vojvodina. If one also takes into account the dra-
matic price disparities between industry and agriculture, the fol-
lowing statement by economist Kosta Mihajlović is not surprising:
“Vojvodina made an extremely large contribution to capital accu-
mulation in Yugoslavia, while at the same time losing enormous
resources for its own development”. (Dimitrije Boarov). Up to
the end of the 1960s, Vojvodina’s economic development slowed
down and lagged behind other parts of the country.
After the great economic problems encountered by the prov-
ince during the 1950s, it seemed, already in the early 1960s, that
conditions were being created for its political degradation. In
search of a regulatory formula for the sustainability of the federa-
tion in 1961, shortly before the constitutional changes, top Serbi-
an officials raised the Vojvodina question once again. Prior to the
adoption of a new constitution, the Executive Committee of the
League of Communists of Serbia attempted to resolve the ques-
tion of Vojvodina’s autonomy to the detriment of the province
and ultimately abolish it. Their demands were primarily aimed
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
at disputing the very foundations of autonomy, attempting to see
Vojvodina exclusively as a Serbian province, constituted by Ser-
bia’s unilateral decision and whose status could be changed at any
moment. This question was to provoke a fierce debate between
Vojvodina and Serbian party leaders after the question was raised
as to whether the national minorities should be considered as
political actors in the creation of Vojvodina’s autonomy or, in oth-
er words, its constituents. Serbia’s leading officials unambigous-
ly rejected such an understanding which, in their opinion, would
imply that the territory of Vojvodina also belonged to the national
minorities. During the constitutional debate in 1962, Serbian offi-
cials demanded that the new federal constitution should stipulate
the sovereign right of the republic to create political units with
an autonomous status in some parts of its territory and that the
Yugoslav constitution should also stipulate that on the basis of this
right “the Republic of Serbia created the Autonomous Province of
Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohi-
ja in its territory (1945)”. (Ranko Končar, Dimitrije Boarov). This
post factum demand that the Yugoslav constitution should legal-
ize the stand that the autonomous provinces were constituted by
Serbia, testified to Serbia’s real intentions towards the autonomous
provinces and their status. It was actually a question of disagree-
ment with the existence of the autonomous provinces within it, so
that an alternative was sought in order to eliminate or neutralize
the foundations of their existence. Already in the early 1960s, the
prevailing idea among Serbian political leaders involved a com-
plete unitarization of the republic, namely the abolition of the
existing autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo) in order
to neutralize the real reasons for their existence as autonomous
units, especially Vojvodina. In this way, it would be possible to
legitimize the constitutional solutions that Vojvodina’s autonomy
originated from Serbia and not from its historical, national and
324
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
other specificities, so that the republic could also abolish it by its
decision.
Insofar as Vojvodina’s autonomy was concerned, the failure to
understand and accept the idea of a complex state was most open-
ly and most convincingly expressed by the Vice-President of the
Executive Council of Serbia, Slobodan Penezić: “If we don’t unite
Vojvodina now, we’ll never again be able to do it.” At that time,
researchers noticed the intention to legalize the view that Serbia
could not be constituted as a nation-state due to its complex char-
acter, namely the existence of the provinces. The key points in this
decisive dispute about Vojvodina were distorted, while interpre-
tations of the motives for the creation of its autonomy and the
extent to which Vojvodina’s autonomy should be built into the
Yugoslav federalist constellation were ahistorical. The Serbian par-
ty leadership, which was under Aleksandar Ranković’s influence
at that time, relativized the historical conceptions and continuity
of Vojvodina’s autonomy and marginalized the historical signifi-
cance of its multi-national composition in the process of consti-
tuting its autonomy and justification of this autonomy as a cate-
gory of Yugoslav federalism. The country’s second most influen-
tial person often pointed to the consequences of “ruinous autono-
mism” and the emergence of “separatism”. For the first time in the
new Yugoslavia some provincial leaders (Stevan Doronjski, Geza
Tikvicki, Pál Sóti, etc.) were faced with serious allegations in dis-
putes with leading Serbian officials concerning Vojvodina’s consti-
tutional position, legal status and investment policy.
The constitutional changes in 1963 did not bring any significant
changes to Vojvodina, except that under the new Constitution the
Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija was elevated to an
autonomous province, thus being equalized in status with Vojvo-
dina. Nevertheless, during the following years, Vojvodina’s eco-
nomic development was tumultuous due to a change in the polit-
ical situation in Yugoslavia. First of all, at the 8th Congress of the
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
League of Communists of Yugoslavia they began speaking openly
about the fact that the national question in a state with a centralist
system was not resolved. That same year, Serbian Prime Minister
Slobodan Penezić vanished from the political scene, killed in a car
accident. Next year, there began the most comprehensive econom-
ic reforms in Yugoslavia with one of its basic aims being that eve-
ryone should be remunerated according to their results, depend-
ing on the economic feasibility. The following year, 1966, Alek-
sandar Ranković, the Yugoslav Vice-President, Organising Secre-
tary of the LCY and de facto head of the Yugoslav Security Police
(UDB), was removed from office at the Brioni Plenum. After his
removal, preceded by the 8th Congress and the beginning of a
comprehensive reform, there began a ten-year period of decen-
tralization and democratization of the Yugoslav state and society.
With the departure of Ranković and Penezić from the country’s
top political leadership, as powerful centers of resistance to Vojvo-
dina’s autonomy, conditions were created for the improvement of
its status. Thus, as early as 1967, there began a process of funda-
mental reform of the 1963 Constitution which, according to its
character and content, was a compromise between centralism and
substantial federalism, to which it aspired and which character-
ized the period and transitional political processes within which
it was created. The meaning and essence of changes to the charac-
ter of Yugoslav federalism were based on a new constitutive con-
ception, encapsulated in three sets of constitutional amendments
adopted by the Federal Assembly from 1967 to 1971. The first set of
constitutional amendments, promulgated by the Federal Assem-
bly on 18 April 1967, did not concern the constitutional status of
the autonomous provinces.
On 26 December 1968, the Federal Assembly adopted the sec-
ond set of constitutional amendments, which brought more fun-
damental changes to the character of Yugoslav federalism and
especially dealt with Serbia’s complex character or, more exactly,
326
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
the problem of provincial autonomy. This intention on the part of
those framing the Constitution was especially evident in Amend-
ment VII, listing all republics and thus emphasizing their state-
hood, whereby, in being explicitly mentioned in Amendment
XVIII, both provinces were actually elevated to an element of fed-
eralism, thus emphasizing their more direct link to the federation
and describing them both as provinces forming part of Serbia and
as elements of Yugoslavia’s federalism. Amendment VII also add-
ed the attribute “socialist” before the names of the provinces as in
the case of the republics. Amendment XVIII stated expressly that
the “Federation shall protect the constitutional rights and duties
of the autonomous provinces”. The 1968 Amendments also stip-
ulated that the territory of the autonomous provinces could not
be changed without the consent of the provincial assemblies. The
provincial judicial system was equalized with its republican coun-
terparts to such an extent that “the supreme court of the province
shall exercise the rights and duties of the republican supreme court
in the territory of the province” (Ustav SFRJ). Amendment XVI-
II regulated most of the provincial competencies and defined this
territorial unit as a “socialist, democratic, socio-political commu-
nity with a special ethnic composition and other specificities in
which the working people exercise social self-management, and
which shall regulate social relations by provincial laws and other
regulations, ensure constitutionality and legality, guide the devel-
opment of the economy and social services, organize government
and self-management organs, ensure the equality of the peoples
and nationalities, take care of national defense preparation and
organization, and the protection of the order established by the
Constitution, and perform other tasks of common interest for
the province’s political, economic and cultural life and develop-
ment – with the exception of tasks that are of interest to the whole
republic, which shall be stipulated by the republican constitution”.
The same amendment also stated that the “autonomous provinces
327
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
shall also assume responsibility in their territories” for perfor-
mance of the tasks and activities of the Federation (Ibid...177–
178). Amendment XIX, the last amendment, which was adopted
in 1968, equalized the rights and duties of the peoples and nation-
alities or, more exactly, the South Slav and minority nationalities.
Thus, the minority peoples in Yugoslavia became legitimate and
equal political actors de factо and de jure and not only cultural or
linguistic ones. Also, the Statute of the Autonomous Province of
Vojvodina, its basic legal act, changed the name into the Consti-
tutional Law of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.
The third set of amendments, promulgated by the Assembly of
the SFRY on 30 June in 1971, brought the most substantial and
far-reaching changes to the legislation and empirics of Yugoslav
federalism. The first amendment, adopted in 1971, pointed to the
essence and spirit of the new constitutional concept. It stated that
“the working people, peoples and nationalities shall exercise their
sovereign rights in the socialist republics and socialist auton-
omous provinces (...), and in the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia if that is in the common interest...” In almost all cases,
the federal organs (Presidency, Federal Executive Council, Feder-
al Assembly) had the constitutional obligation to reconcile their
views so that their decisions would have legal force. The meth-
od for “reconciling views” was regulated by Amendment XXXIII,
which stated that the Federation can only make a decision “on the
basis of views reconciled with the competent republican and pro-
vincial organs”. In addition, any common decision of the Federa-
tion would be preceded by the initiative of the Federal Executive
Council, which will “ensure the reconciliation of views” with the
republican and provincial executive councils. In fact, the repub-
lics and provinces had the right to lodge a veto should they assess
that their vital interests were under threat. Finally, the Constitu-
tion could be changed by a decision of the Federal Assembly with
328
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
the consent of all republics and autonomous provinces or, in oth-
er words, by consensus.
It is indicative that all provincial aspirations towards greater
competencies were disputed by the Constitutional Commission
of the Republic of Serbia, headed by Dragoslav Draža Marković,
and that the dispute caused by conflicting views was transferred
to the Federal Constitutional Commission headed by Milentije
Popović, where the provincial demands were met. This time, the
Federation also guaranteed something that was rejected by Serbia.
However, the part of the Serbian conservative leaderhip close to
the President of the Assembly, Draža Marković, initiated a debate
at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade in March 1971, where a signif-
icant part of the Serbian intellectual elite disputed the constitu-
tional changes, fiercely attacking the provincial autonomies as the
source of separatism, and the weakening and discrimination of
Serbia. (Milivoj Bešlin).
These changes culminated in the adoption of the last Yugoslav
constitution in February 1974. Under its provisions, the provinces
were granted the right to their own constitutions, but that did not
imply their legal equalisation with the republics. Since the Sec-
ond World War, the federal units, as the states of their peoples,
who were the constituents of the Federation, possessed the qual-
ity of statehood and the right to self-determination, but this right
was never granted to the provinces. In addition, they were ele-
vated to elements of Yugoslav federalism and not to constituent
elements of the federal Yugoslav state. Vojvodina adopted its first
and only constitution on 28 February 1974.22 The constitution of
Vojvodina’s genuine autonomy was to provide scope for the most
22 Under pressure from violence, after a change in the Vojvodina leadership in
October 1988, the Vojvodina Assembly unanimously renounced its constitutional
competencies on 25 February 1989. This was an introduction to the change in the
Serbian Constitution in March 1989, as well as the complete destruction of the
autonomous rights and all legislative prerogatives of the province.
329
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
intensive economic growth and the largest investments in its his-
tory. The policy of favouring industrial development, which was
conducted by all convocations of the provincial executive council,
contributed to the construction or significant reconstruction and
modernization of hundreds of industrial facilities operating with-
in the chemical industry: oil, metal-working, food, textile, foot-
wear, timber and wood, and construction industries, as well as
agrocomplexes, sugar refineries, breweries, malt factories, winer-
ies, cold storage plants and abattoirs were opened; the old road
and bridge infrastructure was reconstructed and a new one con-
structed, not to mention the construction of modern hydro – irri-
gation systems and numerous capital business, health, education-
al, scientific and cultural facilities.
Just as in the previous decades, the pressure to reduce or abolish
autonomy did not stop. Only two years after the adoption of the
Constitution, in 1976, a group of Serbian political leaders wrote a
“Blue Paper” where the status of the autonomous provinces was
openly attacked. The initiative for the preparation of the “White
Paper” and its circulation at closed party forums in early 1977 is
interpreted by historians as an expression of the culmination of
dissatisfaction with the degree of provincial autonomy by the then
most influential Serbian politician, Draža Marković. This internal
document, whose preparation was ordered by the Presidency of
the Socialist Republic of Serbia, headed by Marković, expressed
its dissatisfaction and pointed to the controversy concerning the
scope of provincial and republic competencies. Like all previous
efforts to abolish or significantly restrict Vojvodina’s autonomy,
this document also proceeded from the assumption that the Ser-
bian people was not equal since the existence of the provinces pre-
vented them from creating their own nation-state (within Yugo-
slavia), based on the principle of national self-determination. The
existence of Tito’s authority repressed both the “Blue Paper” and
the dissatisfaction of the Serbian leaders, who waited for more
330
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
favourable circumstances to express themselves again. A few years
later, in the mid-1980s, the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy
of Sciences and Arts – an introduction to the dismemberment of
Yugoslavia – also fiercely attacked Vojvodina’s autonomy, consid-
ering it anti-Serbian and separatist.
Nevertheless, Vojvodina’s position in the Yugoslav federal con-
stellation wasequitable, its autonomy was guaranteed by the feder-
al constitution and its veto power. It would turn out, however, that
this position could only be changed against Vojvodina’s will by
violent methods, which the new Serbian leaders were to employ
by destroying the Yugoslav constitutional system and abolishing
provincial autonomy in 1988–89.
DESTRUCTION OF AUTONOMY
After a series of earlier Serbian efforts at significantly restrict-
ing and de facto abolishing Vojvodina’s autonomy, while the fed-
eral leadership protected provincial interests, thus protecting the
Yugoslav constitutional system as well, the weakening of the Fed-
eration after Tito’s death (1980) and accelerated delegitimization
led to the last attack on provincial autonomy, which was to prove
fatal. Provincial autonomy, considered by the Serbian leadership
as a crucial problem in the functioning of the republic, was espe-
cially in focus after the protests in Kosovo (1981) and was radi-
calizd after the massacre of a few Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA)
soldiers in the military barracks in Paraćin (1987), which was
committed by an Albanian soldier from Kosovo. Anti-Albanian
hysteria in Serbia, which had not existed during the 1980s, now
reached its culmination. The atmosphere of nationalist homoge-
nization and the demand for the “reunification” of Serbia, which
had been “broken up” by the provinces, was considered a prime
political aim. Nevertheless, part of the Serbian leadership accused
the campaign leaders, the newspaper publishing company Politi-
ka, of stirring up hatred, aiming indirectly at Slobodan Milošević,
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
who controlled it through his cadres. The ensuing conflict end-
ed with the defeat of the moderate President of the Presidency,
Ivan Stambolić, at the well-known 8th Session of the Serbian par-
ty leadership (1987) and the election of a new leader, Slobodan
Milošević. The provincial leadership of Vojvodina did not want
to take sides, remaining neutral in the conflict within so-called
Serbia proper, knowing that Stambolić and Milošević did not dif-
fer substantially in their approach to provincial autonomy. At that
time, the model of destroying autonomy was not taken into con-
sideration because if the newly installed regime in Belgrade were
to use forcible methods, this would be something absolutely new
and beyond the hitherto compromise (agreed-on) patterns of
political activity in the second Yugoslavia.
In early 1988, the new republican and provincial leaderships
continued their talks about constitutional changes, initiated at the
time of Ivan Stambolić, in order to ensure the functioning of Ser-
bia as a specific federal unit. When the republican and two pro-
vincial leaderships reached agreement, the conflict was renewed
due to the demand of the Serbian leadership that changes should
be accelerated and their degree significantly enhanced, thus com-
pletely restricting and derogating provincial autonomy. This was
unambigously resisted by the provincial leaderships, especial-
ly in Vojvodina. In the summer of 1988, the republican leaders
launched an unprecedented propaganda campaign against the
provincial leaderships, especially the Vojvodina leadership, in all
the Belgrade media. Serious allegations and open threats on a dai-
ly basis did not break the provincial leaders; instead, they drew
them together. When the pressures of media and party forums
did not produce results, mass street protests were staged with the
aim of forcibly ousting the Vojvodina leadership. In early July
1988, a group of several hundred “self-organized” Serbs from Kos-
ovo came to Novi Sad and began a protest in front of the provin-
cial assembly building. The relatively small number of protesters
332
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
(supported by declared nationalists from Belgrade such as jurist
Vojislav Šešelj and singer Olivera Katarina), the ignorance of the
resident population and demands that were still insufficiently
clearly articulated, would not have attracted so much attention if
it had not been for the manipulation of Belgrade’s media. Name-
ly, a fleeting incident involving switching off the power to the pro-
testers in order to prevent hate speeches, uncharacteristic of pre-
vious public discourse in Yugoslavia, assumed an utterly dramat-
ic tone in detailed reports by Belgrade’s media. Day after day, the
political temperature in Serbia was systematically raised by rigging
and manipulation. Pressure on the disobedient provincial leaders
increased. An initiated countercampaign by political activists of
the League of Communists of Vojvodina and media loyal to the
provincial leadership was not producing any results due to their
sticking to old patterns and delegitimized formulas. At the same
time, the Belgrade regime was using a new homogenising pow-
er in society – nationalism – and a more brutal approach to the
media, coupled with an unscrupulous propaganda that was signif-
icantly more modern.
The sign for the beginning of the showdown with the disobe-
dient provincial leaderships was given by the newly installed Ser-
bian leader, Slobodan Milošević, in an interview with NIN, the
country’s most influential weekly, in July of the same year. He said
that parts of the provincial leaderships wanted “the provinces to
become states in a near or more distant future” due to which they
“are negotiating about winning certain rights which, should they
be won, will provide a basis for Serbia’s disintegration into three
independent and separate parts – three states”. Thus, the leaders
of the Vojvodina and Kosovo provinces were directly accused of
separatism, which, in the Serb-dominated northern province, was
an accusation that seriously shook up the already fractured legiti-
macy of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists
of Vojvodina. Coupled with the daily propaganda of Belgrade’s
333
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
media, which used a systematic Gleichschaltung after Milošević’s
victory in order to support this new policy, further gatherings of
citizens across Vojvodina, called “the people have happened,”were
announced. According to the relevant research, the great majori-
ty of the rallies during August and September 1988 were staged in
places with a predominant colonist population, settled in Vojvo-
dina after the Second World War. Of the 28 rallies where the abo-
lition of Vojvodina’s autonomy was demanded, only two were held
in places with a predominantly autochthonous population.
Apart from non-institutional pressure, the provincial leader-
ship was also exposed to increasing institutional pressure. Pressure
was exerted in two directions. The first pressure was an attempt to
cause divisions within the Provincial Committee of Vojvodina and
take over the provincial party’s “base”or rather to have the local
party committees demand removal of the provincial leadership
in Novi Sad. The other form of institutional pressure was exert-
ed by the republican leaders themselves. At the 12th Session of the
Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, they
stated that the ongoing crisis was caused by a conflict between
the “democratic aspirations of the people” and the “bureaucrat-
ic defense of ... provincial natiocracy”, pejoratively called “arm-
chairists”. The legal leadership of the Socialist Autonomous Prov-
ince (SAP) of Vojvodina was also accused of an “insolent demon-
stration of statehood... at an imaginary border on the Belgrade-
Novi Sad highway” aimed at creating the “Vojvodina people” and
providing support to the “Albanian irredenta”. These and similar
accusations of anti-Serbism, pronounced for the first time in the
public discourse of the second Yugoslavia, in the atmosphere of
perennial anti-Albanian hysteria and ebullient nationalism, were
a call for the lynching of the provincial leaders who did not accept
Milošević’s proposal for the voluntary self-abolition of Vojvodi-
na’s autonomy. The propaganda of the Belgrads regime, charac-
teristic of the 1990s and especially intensive during the wars in
334
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was postulated and used for
the first time vis-à-vis Vojvodina. As this propaganda spread and
increased, its content was becoming increasingly more extremist,
pronouncing accusations like that on the supposed formation of
an “anti-Serbian Zagreb-Novi Sad-Ljubljana axis”.
When Belgrade assessed that the provincial leadership was
shaken up and thoroughly compromised and that the citizens were
sufficiently homogenized and whipped up against it, there began a
second round of rallies in Vojvodina in the second half of August.
The number of rallies and the turnout of citizens exponentially
increased from day to day. The fury of the assembled people was
also increasing, while the risks of casualties in clashes between
protesters and the police forces, which were still under the com-
mand of the provincial authorities, were also growing. For the
first time in the second Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church
(SPC) took an active part in the ongoing political events. Bishop
Amfilohije (Risto) Radović of Banat, who had already affirmed
himself as the advocate of a hard-line nationalist stand, support-
ed the protests aiming at abolishing Vojvodina’s autonomy. The
basic organisations of the League of Communists of Vojvodina
increasingly denounced obedience to their direct party leader-
ship in Vojvodina, thereby leaving the political system and plac-
ing themselves under the control of the republic’s party structure
against the provincial ones. The centers of resistance to the pro-
vincial leadership included the colonist towns of Bačka Palanka,
Titov Vrbas, Nova Pazova.
The federal political leaders, who had guaranteed the inviola-
bility of Vojvodina’s autonomy in 1945, seemed confused and dis-
interested during the blitzkrieg against Vojvodina, carried out by
Serbia under Slobodan Milošević. Although the constitutional
order of the federation was called into question, especially because
Serbia began exporting its street methods to other republics in
August (first to Montenegro), the federal political center seemed
335
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
to be insufficiently interested, hoping that Slobodan Milošević
would finish his campaign by subduing the provinces. In mid-
September, the federal leadership tried to mediate in the conflict
between Serbia and Vojvodina, but this mediation ended unsuc-
cessfully. It was stated that the differences were insurmountable
and that the stance of the President of the Presidency of Yugosla-
via, Raif Dizdarević, was ambivalent. However, all appeals to stop
the increasingly violent rallies and increasingly ebullient cam-
paign in the media remained without effect because the federal
leadership confined its activity to pleas and appeals. The modus
operandi of the federal bodies became evident during the final act
of destruction of Vojvodina’s autonomy that started on 25 Sep-
tember 1988. In contrast to the previous one, this rally of Kos-
ovo Serbs in Novi Sad was much better supported by the local
population. It received a broad welcome from the citizens of Novi
Sad, party organisations from the interior of Vojvodina and, in
particular, several large factories, including “Jugoalat” from Novi
Sad. The federal police detachment sent to Vojvodina’s capital
was instructed to intervene only in the case of serious bloodshed,
although it was clear that the country’s constitutional order was
being destroyed on the streets.
The last act of destruction of Vojvodina’s autonomy took place
on 5 October 1988. The previous day, the Presidency of the Pro-
vincial Committee of the League of Communists of Vojvodi-
na tried to call to account the key organizers of the rally – the
Bačka Palanka leaders, Mihalj Kertes and Radovan Pankov. Their
response was a procession of 10,000 people heading for Novi Sad
with the aim of ousting the leadership of the Socialist Autono-
mous Province of Vojvodina with the slogan: “Palanka stood up
for a change in the Constitution”.23 With strong support from the
23 Apart from the demonised provincial officials, the 1974 Constitution, which
guaranteed substantial and genuine autonomy to Vojvodina, was also at the center
of the protesters’ negative campaign.
336
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
Belgrade media and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the
League of Communists of Serbia, Zoran Sokolović, tens of thou-
sands of people transported from all parts of Vojvodinaas well
as from Serbia and Montenegro, gathered in Novi Sad. The pro-
testers threw stones and cartons of yogurt at the building of the
Executive Council of Vojvodina, the symbol of provincial auton-
omy, due to which the whole event was later called – the Yogurt
Revolution. The isolated provincial leadership sought help both
from the republic and federal bodies. Despite promises, help did
not arrive. The next day, 6 October, Vojvodina’s complete leader-
ship and its representatives in federal institutions stepped down.
This was a total triumph of the Serbian leaderhip’s policy. Vojvo-
dina’s disobedient leaders were soon replaced by Milošević’s loy-
alists (M. Kertes, R. Pankov, N. Šipovac, R. Božović). The media
campaign against the ousted leadership continued during the next
months and aimed at preparing the public for the final abolition
of Vojvodina’s autonomous rights. “Radical cadre changes,”as they
were called, and breakaway from the “autonomist” policy brought
the most conservative supporters of centralism into key positions
in Vojvodina. The new provincial cadres, as well as the hitherto
cosmopolitan media in Vojvodina, became the loudest promot-
ers of nationalist policy and everyday hate speeches. The reality
created on the street had to be implanted in the broadest strata
of the population. Thus, Vojvodina became an important logistic
base of Slobodan Milošević’s further campaign against Yugoslavia.
The Socialist Republic of Montenegro and Socialist Autonomous
Province of Kosovo were the first.
After the forcible removal of the provincial leadership in Octo-
ber, the constitutional changes and de facto abolition of Vojvo-
dina’s autonomy were just a formality. The final act took place in
March 1989 when amendments to the Constitution of the Social-
ist Republic of Serbia were adopted. Under these amendments,
the autonomy of the two provinces was reduced to a minimum
337
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
and, in essence, ceased to exist. Thus, the Autonomous Province
of Vojvodina willingly stopped being a political actor in the archi-
tecture of Yugoslav federalism and soon stopped being any actor
at all. Economic journalist and publicist Dimitrije Boarov argues
that Vojvodina, a “historical region with a Serbian autonomist tra-
dition and over 40 % of the population who are neither Serbs nor
Montenegrins, by the will of all people renounces its vested rights
and demands of the Serbian national center not to have the right
to decide autonomously on any important political issue, that the
taxes collected in its territory be distributed and spent outside
Vojvodina, that its firms... lose their business independence and
their own financial accounts... Vojvodina’s political suicide was
committed by the cumulative effect of tremendous political and
media pressure from Belgrade and the silence of other Yugoslav
political centers, fearing that their turn will also come”. (Dimitri-
je Boarov).
Soon after the removal of the provincial leadership and con-
stitutional changes one of the most thorough purges in Vojvo-
dina’s history began. There are no precise data, but it is estimat-
ed that during and after the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolu-
tion about 40,000 political officials, senior government officials,
chiefs of police, judges and directors of health, cultural, educa-
tional, scientific and information centers were removed. In the
business sector, about 80 % of executive personnel were removed.
In the capital of Vojvodina, Novi Sad, alone the managers of all
five banks were removed and so were postmasters, general man-
agers of railways, “Naftagas”... Not one media editor remained. All
editorial boards in all the official languages in the province were
changed. The Vojvodina investment and retirement funds were
abolished and their resources transferred to the republican center.
Finally, after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the beginning of the
wars (1991), Vojvodina was subjected to ethnic engineering, that
is, a change in the composition of its population. Ethnic cleansing
338
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
in Vojvodina was especially evident in Srem whose inhabitants,
mostly non-Serbs, emigrated, frequently prompted by violence,
beatings, threats or killings, as in a number of villages in Srem,
and were replaced by Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Thus, the plans of the inter-war rightist ideologists
of “nationalisation”, that is, Serbianization of Vojvodina were real-
ized in the last decade of the 20th century. The strict centraliza-
tion of the 1990s resulted in the rapid and fundamental impover-
ishment of Vojvodina, which went from being one of more devel-
oped political–territorial entities of the second Yugoslavia to an
underdeveloped Serbian region.
After the democratic changes in Serbia and the ousting of the
authoritarian regime (2000), the position of Vojvodina improved
to some extent. Under the Statute of 2009, it was granted the
right to its symbols (coat-of-arms and flag) and its powers were
increased. However, all this was very far from the legislative, exec-
utive and judicial branches of power and the right to dispose of
one’s own assets and collect revenues in its territory as in the sec-
ond Yugoslavia. However, even such a minimal change was dis-
puted by Serbia and, pursuant to a decision by the Constitution-
al Court (2012), the crucial provisions of the Vojvodina Statute
were repealed. The nominal autonomous status of Vojvodina,
as a centuries-long historical province, which originally consti-
tuted its autonomy by the will of its peoples in 1945, is probably
best presented by Article 182 of the Serbian Constitution of 2006.
This states that the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina was estab-
lished in 2006 by the Constitution and that it may also be revoked
by the Constitution, employing the appropriate legal procedure.24
24 In an economic sense, Vojvodina’s overall results within Yugoslavia were
devastating. It became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in
1918 as the “richest South Slavic region”, as written by historian Bogumil Hrabak.
According to the level of development, Vojvodina was equalised with Slovenia;
it was more developed than Croatia and much more developed than any other
region. Shortly before the collapse of Yugoslavia, in 1986, the ratio in development
339
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
CONCLUSION
The historical notion of Vojvodina has at least two different,
mutually barely compatible interpretations, two quite incompati-
ble concepts, which largely exclude each other. The first interpreta-
tion is nationalist, monoethnic, yet originally Vojvodinian, which
derives its tradition from the 18th century and Serbian national
movement in the 19th century when the nations were constituted
in these regions. Within the framework of the Habsburg state, this
Vojvodina, conceived as an ethnically and culturally defined Ser-
bian space, failed to realize itself. Nevertheless, being preserved as
an idea, it provided a program basis for all Serbian national parties
and political movements. It was finally achieved in the first post-
war days of November 1918 by joining the Kingdom of Serbia. In
this way, the Serbian nation from southern Hungary succeeded in
obtaining its fundamental testimonial imperative – organic unity.
However, this self-realisation of a nationalist doctrine was not
consensual. A considerable section of the Serbian political pub-
lic resisted organicist tendencies and direct and unconditional
incorporation into Serbia, which was also supported by almost
all the other peoples living in the territory of Vojvodina, many
of whom were not asked for their opinion This potential contro-
versy, coupled with radical and unprecedented economic exploi-
tation, was one of the many internal contradictions and lasting
problems which the inter-war unitarist Yugoslavia did not wish
or was unable to solve, and which would lead to the formation of
level between Vojvodina and Slovenia was 1:1.4. After the seven decades of its
development within Yugoslavia, Slovenia surpassed Vojvodina by 40% in gross
domestic product. However, these calculations seem excellent in comparison with
Vojvodina’s results in centralist Serbia after the collapse of Yugoslavia. If we take
the year 2000 alone for our comparison, then any comparison between Slovenia
and Vojvodina must be characterised as a total historical catastrophe, since the
ratio is 8:1. Only one decade spent in the strictly centralist Serbia, as a result of the
so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution, increased the difference in development
level between Slovenia and Vojvodina as much as eight times, to the detriment of
the province (Dragomir Jankov).
340
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
the Vojvodina Front as the nucleus of the new anti-centralist and
supranational conception of Vojvodina.
During the People’s Liberation Struggle of all of its peoples, this
new Vojvodina, conceived in the 1930s, at the time of a repressive
monarcho-dictatorship, and realized and affirmed during the Sec-
ond World War, was founded on the values of anti-fascism, social
and national emancipation, modernism and supranational inte-
gration. This kind of Vojvodina was realistic and attainable only
in the social and political system that was dominant in the sec-
ond Yugoslavia. And then, as before, Vojvodina’s autonomy was a
par excellence Yugoslav question and could survive only with the
support of the Yugoslav political center, despite constant politi-
cal pressure from Serbia in an attempt to restrict or abolish its
autonomous rights. Frst time when the Yugoslav federation expe-
rienced atrophy, Serbia forcibly destroyed Vojvodina’s autonomy
by annexing the province.
Serbian Vojvodina achieved its aim by self-realising the his-
torical aspirations of its conceptual creators through its unifica-
tion with the unitary Serbian state and then the Yugoslav state in
1918. The advocates of the narrow-Serbian conception of Vojvodi-
na also tried to continue and reaffirm their orientation at the time
of the collapse of Autonomous Vojvodina in 1988 by organising
the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution and adopting the con-
stitutional amendments in 1989, as well as through the wars and
change in ethnic composition of the province, its political subor-
dination and economic exploitation. There is no doubt that there
are two conceptions of Vojvodina. Both of them are based on his-
torical experience – one reflects the character of the 19th century
and the other the values of the 20th century. The idea of Vojvo-
dina in the 21st century still does not show any signs of an articu-
lated concept. The ideology of nationalism as the dominant legit-
imation matrix in Serbia, with the nation as an organic category,
has never reconciled itself with Autonomous Vojvodina, holding
341
II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
that this implies separatism and splitting the unity of the nation,
and sparing no effort to suppress such an alternative. Neverthe-
less, the historical, democratic and nationally pluralistic motives
of Vojvodina’s autonomy as well as the raison d’être of Vojvodina
itself did not cease to exist, even when its very survival was open-
ly challenged.
342
the struggle for the autonomy the struggle for the autonomy
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Savremenost, 1⁄74, Novi Sad, 1974, pp. 89–160.
2. “Ustav Republike Srbije”, Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, 98/2006.
3. Aleksa Ivić, Istorija Srba u Vojvodini, Novi Sad, 1996.
4. Aleksandar Kasaš, Mađari u Vojvodini 1941–1946, Novi Sad, 1996.
5. Aleksandar R. Miletić, “Generacije srpskih (re)centralista, 1968–1990:
Opravdani zahtevi ili put u raspad Jugoslavije?”, http://www.yuhistorija.
com/serbian/jug_druga_txt01c3.html.
6. Antifašizam – AVNOJ – Autonomija, Stanko Šušnjar (ed.), Novi Sad, 2013.
7. Bogumil Hrabak, “Demokratska stranka i Samostalna demokratska
stranka u Vojvodini”, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 34⁄1986, pp.
157–191.
8. Bogumil Hrabak, “Autonomizam u Vojvodini 1919–1928. kao reakcija na
finansijsko iscrpljivanje i političko zapostavljanje pokrajine”, Godišnjak
Društva istoričara Vojvodine, Novi Sad, 1982, pp. 69–112.
9. Boris Kršev, Bankarstvo u Dunavskoj banovini, Novi Sad, 1998.
10. Boško Krunić, Decenija zamora i raskola, Novi Sad, 2009.
11. Branko Petranović, Momčilo Zečević, Jugoslovenski federalizam. Ideje i
stvarnost, 1–2, Belgrade, 1987.
12. Branko Petranović, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945, Belgrade,
1992.
13. Čarls Ingrao, Habzburška monarhija 1618–1815, Beograd – Novi Sad, 2014.
14. Čedomir i Jelena Popov, Autonomija Vojvodine – srpsko pitanje, Sremski
Karlovci, 2000.
15. Dejan Mikavica, Srpska Vojvodina u Habzburškoj monarhiji 1690–1920,
Novi Sad, 2005.
16. Dimitrije Boarov, Politička istorija Vojvodine, Novi Sad, 2001.
17. Dragan Đukanović, “Vojvodina u post-jugoslavenskome kontekstu:
nastavak suspendiranja autonomije”, Politička misao, Year LIII, No.1,
Zagreb, 2016, pp. 51–70.
18. Dragan Gmizić, Zemlja, nafta i ljudi. Svedočenja o razvoju Vojvodine u
periodu od 1974. do 1988. godine, Novi Sad, 2014.
19. Dragomir Jankov, Vojvodina – propadanje jednog regiona, Novi Sad, 2005.
20. Društveno-ekonomski razvoj Vojvodine, Novi Sad, 1978.
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II – Yugoslav Experience from National Perspectives
22. Dušan J. Popović, Srbi u Vojvodini, I–III, Novi Sad, 1957–1963.
23. Dušan Popović, Letopis o Vlaovićima, I–III, Novi Sad, 2006.
24. Dušan Popović, Srbi u Vojvodini 1–3, Novi Sad, 1999.
25. Duško Radosavljević, O Vojvodini 2000–2014: pačvork, Novi Sad, 2014.
26. Đorđe Stojšić, Osma sednica. Kako je Slobodan Milošević pobedio a Srbija
istorijski izgubila, Belgrade, 2014.
27. Istorija bankarstva u Vojvodini, ur. Nikola Gaćeša, Novi Sad, 2001.
28. Jelena Popov, Drama na vojvođaskom selu 1945–1952, Novi Sad, 2002.
29. Jovan Komšić, Demokratsko upravljanje kulturološkim različitostima:
Vojvodina u svetlu evropskih iskustava, Novi Sad – Belgrade, 2015.
30. Jovan Komšić, Vojvođansko pitanje u procesu srpske tranzicije: (1988–
2013), Novi Sad, 2014.
31. Jovan Veselinov Žarko, Svi smo mi jedna partija, Novi Sad, 1980.
32. Lazar Rakić, Radikalna stranka u Vojvodini 1902–1919, Novi Sad, 1983.
33. Lazar Vrkatić, O konzervativnim političkim idejama, Novi Sad, 2009.
34. Ljubica Vasilić, Pokrajinski komitet KPJ za Vojvodinu 1941–1945. Građa za
istoriju Vojvodine, Vol. VII, Novi Sad – Sremski Karlovci, 1971.
35. Ljubo Boban, Hrvatske granice 1918–1993, Zagreb, 1995.4
36. Ljubodrag Dimić, Istorija srpske državnosti. Srbija u Jugoslaviji, 3,
Belgrade, 2001.
37. Ljubomirka Krkljuš, Središnji organi vlasti u Srpskoj Vojvodovini 1848–
1849, Novi Sad, 2013.
38. Milivoj Bešlin, “Autonomija Vojvodine u jugoslovenskom federalizmu”,
in: Antifašizam – AVNOJ – Autonomija, Stanko Šušnjar (ed.), Novi Sad,
2013, pp. 47–59.
39. Milivoj Bešlin, Pokušaj modernizacije u Srbiji 1968–1972. Između
“revolucionarnog kursa” i reformskih težnji, Novi Sad, 2014 (Doctoral
Dissertation Manuscript)
40. Milivoj Bešlin, “Reforma jugоslоvеnske fеdеrаciјe i Srbija: dekonstrukcija
centralističke paradigme i formulisanje alternativa”, http://www.
yuhistorija.com/serbian/jug_druga_txt01c1.html.
41. Nadežda Jovanović, Politički sukobi u Vojvodini 1925–1928, Belgrade, 1984.
42. Nikola Gaćeša, Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije, Novi Sad, 1995.
43. Novak Petrović, Autonomna Pokrajina Vojvodina, Belgrade, 1968.
44. Olga Zirojević, Panonska urbana kultura, Belgrade, 2014.
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45. Petar Atanacković, “Srbija iz tri dela mora biti cela. Položaj pokrajina i
ustavne reforme u Srbiji 1980-ih godina: pozicija Vojvodine”, in: Slobodni
i suvereni. Umetnost, teorija i politika – knjiga eseja i intervjua o Kosovu
i Srbiji, V. Knežević, K. Lukić, I. Marjanović, G. Nikolić (eds.), Novi Sad,
2013, pp. 137–156.
46. Ranko Končar, “Autonomija Vojvodine – istorijska geneza i njeno
konstituisanje”, in: Antifašizam – AVNOJ – Autonomija, Stanko Šušnjar
(ed.), Novi Sad, 2013, pp. 15–27.
47. Ranko Končar, “Formiranje pokrajinskog Narodnooslobodilačkog odbora
Vojvodine”, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 19⁄1980, pp. 49–60.
48. Ranko Končar, “Osnivački kongres KPS i istorijske osnove federalne
Srbije kao složene jedinice”, in: Osnivački kongres Komunističke partije
Srbije, Zbornik radova, Belgrade, 1988, pp. 145–151.
49. Ranko Končar, Dimitrije Boarov, Stevan Doronjski – odbrana autonomije
Vojvodine, Novi Sad, 2011.
50. Ranko Končar, Opozicione partije i autonomija Vojvodine 1929–1941, Novi
Sad, 1995.
51. Ranko Končar, Stvaranje federacije, Novi Sad, 1983.
52. Slavko Gavrilović, Srbi u Habsburškoj monarhiji (1792–1849), Novi Sad,
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53. Slobodan Ćurčić, Broj stanovnika Vojvodine, Novi Sad, 1996.
54. Socio-kulturni aspekti regionalizacije Srbije u kontekstu evrointegracija,
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55. Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije; Ustavni amandmani
od I do XLII (iz 1967, 1968. i 1971. godine), Bеlgrаde, 1971.
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57. Vojvodina: predeli i ljudi, Boško Ivkov (ed.), Novi Sad, 2005.
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345
III
Yugoslavia
from a Historical
Perspective
(1918–1991)
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
Yugoslav Society 1918–1991
from the
stagnation to
the revolution
SRĐAN MILOŠEVIĆ
At the time it came into existence, the first Yugoslav state was
composed of regions differing very much among themselves eco-
nomically (different stages of capitalist development), socially
(primarily the relationship between urban and rural structures),
culturally (primarily literacy and education), and religiously
(multiconfessionality), not to mention their political institutions
and political culture, as well as their legal frameworks (the lev-
el of bureaucratization and the rule of law). Taking into account
all quantitative and qualitative criteria, it is difficult to imagine
a more diverse territory. Some historical regions were sharply
divided within themselves by multiple lines separating groups and
smaller regions according to various criteria. Class, ethnic and
religious differences were dominant for a long time but, with the
development of capitalism on Europe’s periphery, the class dimen-
sion was increasingly important, adding a new quality to the exist-
ing multiple relationships.
349
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
The Yugoslav state began its life in a territory, which, according
to the 1917 Corfu Declaration, was divided into “eleven provincial
divisions and thirteen legislations”. With its overwhelmingly rural
polulation and remnants of landed aristocracy, Yugoslavia was a
“museum of agrarian structures”, including the remnants of the
agrarian relations inherited from the period of antiquity (the col-
onate in Dalmatia). The bourgeois and working classes were une-
qually, but essentially poorly, developed.
The system of a unitary and centralized parliamentary monar-
chy was very soon replaced by a monarchical dictatorship. After
the collapse of the common state during the Second World War,
Yugoslavia was restored as a federation, characterized by a more
or less pronounced – but permanent – transformation of rela-
tions within the federation and its political and econonomic sys-
tems, as well as pronounced dynamics of social change. By mak-
ing a small modification and paraphrasing one historian dealing
with the post-war Balkans, it can be said that socialist Yugoslavia
was developed and collapsed as a country with one official ideol-
ogy, two official scripts, three main religions, four constitutional
changes, five (and then six) constituent peoples and as many con-
stituent republics, seven neighbours, eight members of the presi-
dency, nine parliaments and ten communist parties. This was an
extremely complex political, cultural and economic environment
whose historical basis was founded on a society that was no less
complex.
Social structure and political dynamics are in a permanently
reversible relationship. This was most clearly formulated by Peter
Burke, proceeding from the seemingly simple insight that “change
is structured and structures change”. Likewise, significant ques-
tions can be raised (in historiography they have already been
raised) on the basis of the conception of “modernization without
modernity”, which was developed by Ralf Dahrendorf, bearing
in mind socialist societies. Research on the discreet nature of the
350
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
relationship between the structural features of society (which are
changeable and exert influence on the political and economic sys-
tem) and the economic and political system (which “structures”
change, or at least try to do so) would certainly provide impor-
tant information about, for example, the way in which the speci-
fied features of society exert influence on the character of a politi-
cal regime, regardless of, or even contrary, to the will of their crea-
tors and providers. Did the political system reflect social circum-
stances to a greater extent at every point in development, or was it
just a discrepancy between social reality and system architecture?
What were the objective restrictions (or advantages) of the exist-
ing social structure vis-à-vis changes carried out “top-down”? This
paper does not pretend to answer such questions with respect to
the entire Yugoslav space. Its goal is much more modest: to point
to those aspects of social development which could be significant
for answering big research questions in a centennial perspective,
relying on previous research.
The society in the first Yugoslav state (1918–1941) as a whole was
specific, but each of its constituent parts had its counterparts with-
in the Balkan or Central European framework. Being at the devel-
opment level of the regions forming part of the common state,
overall Yugoslav society reflected a specified development level of
capitalism on its periphery: the whole entity was unique within
the European framework, while its parts were not. Consequently,
the primary historical framework of society in the first Yugosla-
via was capitalism on Europe’s periphery. According to its signifi-
cance, the multinational character of the state took second place.
National homogenization of each ethnic group within the Yugo-
slav community abstracted the inter-ethnic regional differences,
which were periodically greater than the differences between the
regions within the political-geographic area inhabited by different
ethnic groups.
351
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
During the Second World War (1941–1945), a unique process
involving the national liberation struggle and social revolution
occurred in Yugoslavia. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as
the organiser of the struggle against the occupiers, held that the
unity of liberation and revolutionary struggles was established
due to fact that the Yugoslav bourgeoisie aligned with the occupi-
ers and overwhelmingly collaborated with them. Such an expla-
nation appeared only in 1944/45, while until then the revolution-
ary component of this struggle occurred via facti, but without offi-
cial political and ideological formulations by the top leadership
of the movement. The socialist revolution, as a “total revolution”,
was related to all segments of society to a lesser or greater degree.
Nevertheless, war dynamics brought significant changes to soci-
ety irrespective of military operations: a general decline in the
standard of living, mass migrations, the disappearance of a num-
ber of activities, social structural changes and very serious conse-
quences for agriculture – the activity performed by the majority
of the economically active population. Considered as a whole, the
war brought a substantial change to the primary historical con-
text: from peripheral capitalism to one of the centers where a new,
socialist order was built. The national question also obtained a
new solution.
As regards the second Yugoslavia (1945–1991), the historical
framework, which underwent a revolutionary change relative
to the previous epoch, was also transformed: it was soon shift-
ed from state socialism developed immediately after the Second
352
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
World War, on the ruins (both figuratively and literally) of the
previous socio-political and economic structure, based mostly on
Soviet formulas, to the development of relations based on self-
management socialism, which also underwent internal transfor-
mation during the existence of socialist Yugoslavia. There is no
doubt that Yugoslav society underwent dramatic changes in all
stages of socialist development, whose main task was its mod-
ernization. It had to be increasingly similar to modern (Western)
societies as regards its technical and technological achievements
and standard of living, while at the same time developing more
humane and, as emphasized, more equitable social relations with-
in the framework of self-management socialism, a system hither-
to unknown in world history.
However, no matter how revolutionary, the revolution cannot
achieve its main goal – to create the “new man” at the pace it was
changing the political system. Therefore, the new society was also
being built at a pace hindered primarily by its internal obstacles,
which made social transformation too complicated, even if we
disregard inevitable meanderings such as the dogmatic adoption
of Soviet formulas or the search for new ones.
YUGOSLAV SOCIETY
As regards Yugoslav society, the first question that imposes itself
is related to the change in the number of inhabitants. The tabular
overview (see table overleaf) of population trends already shows
dynamics that, at first glance, points to demographic turbulence.
353
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
No. of
Population No.of
mem
Number of inhabi
bers per
households tants per
Total Male Female house
sq.m.
hold
1921.
a) 11.984.911 5.879.691 6.105.220 2.347.879 5,10 48,4
b) 12.473.000 6.154.452 6.390.548 2.459.803 5,10 49,0
1931.
a) 13.934.038 6.891.637 7.042.411 2.709.309 5,14 56,3
b) 14.534.000 7.188.371 7.345.629 2.827.626 5,14 56,8
1941.¹ 15.839.364 — — — — —
1945.¹ 16.601.493 — — — — —
1948.
a) 15.772.098 7.582.461 8.189.637 3.609.725 4,37 61,8
b) 15.841.566 7.615.023 8.226.543 3.627.024 4,37 61,9
1953.
a) 16.936.573 8.204.595 8.731.978 3.954.287 4,29 66,3
b) 16.991.449 8.231.936 8.759.513 3.963.234 4,29 66,4
1961. 18.549.291 9.043.424 9.505.867 4.648.536 3,99 72,5
1971. 20.522.972 10.077.282 10.445.690 5.375.384 3,82 80,2
1981. 22.424.711 11.083.778 11.340.933 6.195.826 3,62 87,7
1991.² 24.040.721 11.878.047 12.162.648 — — 91,8
The data under a) and b) differ depending on the territory covered: the data under a)
are the data from the current Yugoslav territory at census-taking time, while the
data under b) are the population data for the area covered by FPR/SFR Yugoslavia
after the delineation of all borders.
¹ The estimated number of inhabitants in 1945, which is implied by the data on the
number of inhabitants assuming that there were no war victims.
² The estimated number of inhabitants based on growth trends.
What is especially evident is a negative difference between the
population projection for 1945, when it was expected that Yugo-
slavia would have 16.6 million inhabitants, and that for 1948, when
there were about 830,000 inhabitants less than expected in the
same (pre-war) territory. This was undoubtedly the result of the
ravages of war, which should also include the fact that, according
354
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
to the last inter-war and first post-war censuses, the difference
between the (previously constantly numerous) female and male
populations quadrupled. (According to these censuses, Kosovo
and Metohija were the only regions where the male population
constantly outnumbered the female).
Although the table does not show such data, according to an
estimate of war damages, in the territory of Yugoslavia about
300,000 pre-war households were destroyed, thus accounting for
about 8–10 percent of the total number of pre-war households.
Continuous population growth after 1945 coincided with dom-
inant global trends. One can especially observe a high increase in
the number of households, which is the result of an increase in the
number of nuclear families, one element of the modernization of
society in socialist Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is understandable why
the average number of members per household was decreasing.
However, what is especially striking is an abrupt increase in the
number of households with one and two members. Thus, accord-
ing to the 1921 and 1931 censuses, the number of such households
was lower than in the later period: in 1921, there were 119,082 sin-
gle-member households and 247,327 two-member households;
according to the 1931 census, there were 140,277 single-member
households and 331,511 two-member households. In 1948, howev-
er, we observe as many as 451,184 single-member households and
509,353 two-member households. This trend also continued lat-
er on, so that up to 1981 there were 810,915 single-member house-
holds and 1,147,798 two-member households. There were various
reasons for such a development of this household category: the
consequence of war victims, increasing population shift to cit-
ies, whereby the oldest household members remained in their
old environment, as well as greater opportunities for independ-
ent living. As regards households having a higher average number
of members, one can observe, as a rule, an increase in the num-
ber of 3–6 member households, but it is significantly lower than
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
the increase in the number of 3–6 member households. Finally, it
is indicative that the number of households having 7, 8 or more
members was continuously declining.
The improvement of state-sponsored social care for the popu-
lation also resulted in a great decline of infant and child mortality
rates due to which the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had ranked among
the most backward European countries, A high birth rate in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia – 26 newborns per 1,000 inhabitants in
1939 – was accompanied by a high infant mortality rate which, in
1931 and 1939 accounted for 16.5 and 13.2 percent of the total num-
ber of newborns respectively. From 1947 to 1966, the high birth
rate, 20–30 newborns per 1000 inhabitants, continued; since then
until 1990, the birth rate was between 14 and 19 newborns per
1000 inhabitants, showing mostly a continuous downward trend.
At the same time, the infant mortality rate was decreasing. As for
the period after 1945, the first available data are for 1949, when
the infant mortality rate relative to the total number of live births
amounted to 10.2 percent. During the period 1949–1958, this per-
centage varied at the Yugoslav level from the maximum 13.9 per
cent to the minimum 10.1 per cent, while after 1957 it was con-
stantly below 10 per cent: 1958 – 8.6 per cent, 1968 – 5.9 per cent,
1978 – 3.4 per cent, 1988 – 2.4 per cent. In this domain, there were
also significant differences across the republics and provinc-
es. The best situation was in Slovenia where the infant mortal-
ity rate was in 1950 – 8.3 percent, 1970 – 2.5 percent and 1990 –
0.8 percent. Although in 1950 all republics, except Slovenia, had
the infant mortality rate of over 10 percent, the worst situation
was in Vojvodina where the infant mortality rate was 14.5 percent.
Here one should bear in mind that Vojvodina was the area of an
intensive colonization by the people from regions where mortal-
ity rates were high, which was directly attributed to the low lev-
el of health culture. In Vojvodina until 1990, the number of infant
deaths dropped to 1.4 percent.
356
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
Life expectancy was also significantly increasing. In 1931, the life
expectancy for females and males was 46.1 and 45.1 years respec-
tively. Already in 1948, the life expectancy levels had increased to
53 years for females and 48.6 years for males, whereby there were
significant regional differences, which also remained in the first
post-war decade. So, for example, in 1952–54, the shortest average
life expectancy was recorded in Kosovo, both for males (48.6) and
females (45.3), and the longest in Slovenia – 63.0 for males and
68.1 for females. Up to 1981, the life expectancy at the Yugoslav
level increased to 73.2 for females and 67.7 for males. Its increase
continued, so that in 1990 the expected life expectancy for females
in Yugoslavia was 74.9 and for males 69.1 years, whereby region-
al differences were reduced (the span was as follows: for males,
from 67.4 in Vojvodina to 72.8 in Montenegro, and for females,
from 74.2, also in Vojvodina, to 78.2, also in Montenegro). The
improvement was especially evident in Kosovo where, until 1990,
the life expectancy for males (70.5) and females (74.9) dramatical-
ly increased compared to the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
and the first years of socialist Yugoslavia.
Finally, the mortality rate also declined: from 21 deaths per
1,000 inhabitants in 1921 to 15 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants until
1939. After 1945, the mortality rate continued to decline from the
maximum 14.2 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants to the minimum 8.1
deaths per 1,000 inhabitants in 1966. At the end of the observation
period, the mortality rate was 9 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants, thus
being lower than in Germany (9.2), France (9.3) or Britain (11.2).
As to the causes of death, such statistics did not exist in the King-
dom of Yugoslavia, so that the cause of death for three-fourths of
all deceased persons remained unknown.
357
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
SOCIAL STRUCTURE: PEASANTS, WORKERS,
CLERKS, INTELLIGENTSIA
According to its general and simple definition, social structure
represents the totality of social groups and their mutual relations,
based immanently on relations of production. In the first half of
the 20th century, Yugoslavia’s social structure was primarily char-
acterized by a high prevalence of peasants. The process of indus-
trialization was the necessary catalyst for change in the social
structure, but during the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia it
was rather slow. A greater impetus to the economic migration of
the peasantry to cities and its employment in the non-agricultural
sector was given in the aftermath of the First World War, but dur-
ing the first two or three years there also began a reversible pro-
cess, so that the 1921 census showed that in the then Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as much as 83 percent of the total eco-
nomically active population engaged in agriculture. This percent-
age slightly declined during the following decade, until the 1931
census, when it amounted to 79.3 percent.
The high proportion of agricultural population is only one side
of the story about the backwardness of inter-war Yugoslav socie-
ty. Its other side is a distinctly low standard of living of the peas-
ants due to the low level of agricultural production, its extensive
nature and low yields. In addition, the peasants were heavily bur-
dened with debt, which posed a great social and political prob-
lem that the state tried to solve by taking mostly half-measures,
from the mid-1920s until the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941. Social
and health care for a large part of the rural population was almost
unattainable. Although the political and intellectual elite empha-
sized with pathos that Yugoslavia was a “peasant country”, it was
only such a country due to the numerical data showing a high
percentage of the agricultural population. The romantic visions of
the rural idyll and the peasant as the “foundation of the state edi-
fice” collided with the harsh reality of rural life, which was best
358
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
described by the sentence that on his small estate the peasant can
“neither live nor die”. The proportionally small number of rural
landowners constituted the lower stratum of the capitalist class in
inter-war Yugoslavia, which exploited the increasingly poor wide
strata of the peasantry in various ways.
From 1945 onwards, the share of the economically active agri-
cultural population in the total economically active population
continuously declined. In terms of the general activity of the pop-
ulation in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, it should be noted above
all else that its rate was proportionally high: 51 and 46 percent
according to the 1921 and 1931 censuses. In socialist Yugoslavia,
the activity rate of the population was 49.1 percent in 1948 and
46.3 percent in 1953 (thus increasing by 3.1 percent and 0.6 per-
cent respectively, compared to the 1931 figure. From 1961 to 1989, it
was continuously lower than in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, rang-
ing from 44.9 percent to 43.3 percent. A general downward trend
in the economically active population was the result of modern-
ization breakthroughs: longer schooling, raising the age limit for
gaining the status of an economically active person (a decrease
in the number of economically active minors), longer life expec-
tancy and an increasing number of those living long enough to
receive retirement pensions.
In 1948, the share of the economically active agricultural pop-
ulation in the total economically active population amounted
to 72.7 percent, thus decreasing by 6.6 percent compared to the
1931 figure. However, according to the 1953 and 1961 censuses,
this share decreased to 68.3 percent and 56.3 percent respectively.
Until 1971, the share of the economically active agricultural popu-
lation in the total economically active population dropped below
50 percent for the first time: it was 47.3 percent and declined to
26.6 percent in 1981.
When speaking about the fate of the rural population after 1945,
it should be noted that the main characteristic of this period was
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
the social homogenization of the peasantry. By introducing the
land maximum (up to 30 hectares in 1945 and then, in 1953, to 10
hectares), compulsory purchase of agricultural products at gov-
ernment-fixed prices and progressive taxation, the peasantry was
homogenized, while the survival of private agricultural estates
after the failure of collectivization (1945–1953) did not create con-
ditions for capitalist exploitation.
The material status of the rural population did not essential-
ly improve immediately after the war compared to the inter-war
period, except in some important respects such as better nutri-
tion, greater access to health care and culture and education, gov-
ernment support for agriculture, etc. Consequently, one can also
speak about an increase in the standard of living of the rural pop-
ulation. The standard of living also continued to increase, but at
a much slower pace than that of other strata of the population. In
addition, already since the 1950s the prospects for peasants’ partic-
ipation in governance structures also began to diminish. In short,
the road to the emancipation of peasants was not closed, but only
if they changed their status and freely joined the working class or
some other social stratum (the intelligentsia, bureaucracy).
Apart from some changes in its standard of living, the peasant-
ry remained the most static stratum in socialist Yugoslavia due to
the private ownership of the means of production. According to
the 1981 census, as much as 82 percent of arable land was privately
owned, while out of 10 million hectares of arable land no less than
8.6 million hectares were also privately owned. This land as culti-
vated by2.6 million rural households and the average size of these
holdings was about 3.5 hectares.
The socialist state organized society according to collectiv-
ist principles, and institutionalized togetherness and solidari-
ty in various ways through the People’s Front, trade unions, vari-
ous and the Party itself. The first post-war years were marked by
massive economic, cultural-educational and political campaigns
360
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
aimed at developing the concept of the common good, achiev-
ing specified goals more rapidly (for example, mass literacy cours-
es), and replacing the lack of specified technical and technologi-
cal means by joint work (work drives, ranging from agricultural
work to the construction of the economic infrastructure). To that
end, immediately after the war, effort was invested in concretiza-
tion of the maxim about “the worker-peasant alliance”. Therefore,
during the first post-war years, visits to villages were organized
in order to help the rural population in farming and performing
specified activities that required skill (repair of agricultural equip-
ment and household appliances, hairdresser services, accounting
services in cooperatives, health services, etc.). Those were some of
the so-called “Village-Town” activities performed by trade union
organizations. Children from cities were sent in an organized way
to villages, especially collective farms, while children from villages
were sent to urban environments. This was one way to accelerate
the social cohesion and solidarity of the “working people of the
villages and towns”, although such an activity lost in importance
relatively soon, while its volume was significantly reduced in the
second half of the 1950s. Afterwards, the main tendency was to
transform the peasantry into the working class, although collec-
tivization, which was meant to facilitate it, was a failure.
However, peasant-related policy took a different path towards
the same goal. After 1953, the intention of the state was to gradu-
ally include the peasantry in the socialist relations of production,
so that in perspective it would shift to socialist agricultural pro-
duction, but without setting any timeframe. However, despite the
restrictive land maximum of 10 hectares, “low-intensity” capital-
ist relations of production were reproduced in various forms in
the villages until the end of socialism. At the end, even land lease
exceeding the legal maximum and hired labour were restored.
Research carried out in the mid-1980s shows that the peas-
ant family underwent transformation, which was reflected in a
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
higher evaluation of everyone’s individual work; a change in the
traditional (postmodern) attitude toward land; the increased
independence of every individual from his or her family, relatives
and local community itself; the visible (but not overwhelming)
erosion of patriarchal patterns of relations between the sexes; the
emergence of family planning (fewer unwanted pregnancies), as
well as a reduction towards two-generation families; an increased
number of women employed outside the household and farm; a
more equitable division of work and the strengthening of emo-
tional family ties; and a general weakening of the role and pres-
ence of traditional behavioural patterns. These changes were not
straightforward and some were largely a tendency, but they still
were the main directions. The diversity of peasant families cer-
tainly calls in question the possibility of establishing an average
pattern, but the mentioned phenomena were present in each type
of peasant family. The differences lay in the degree of their pres-
ence, which depended on a number of factors: regional, ethnic,
cultural, religious and numerous other characteristics.
While the highest proportion of the rural population worked in
agriculture, cities were inhabited by people with very diverse voca-
tions: craftsmen, industrial workers, clerks, persons employed in
the public sector, as well as a small number of those engaging in
agriculture. In all Yugoslavia, a small number of settlements could
be considered a city and the relevant criteria differed from one
census to another. Up to 1981, there were 37 settlements with over
50,000 inhabitants and the majority population engaged in agri-
cultural activities. Among them there were 14 with over 100,000
inhabitants. The capital city – Belgrade was growing at the abso-
lutely fastest pace: in 1921, it had about 111,759 inhabitants, that
is, slightly more than Zagreb (108,674). However, the number of
inhabitants in Belgrade more than doubled by 1931 (238,775). In
1961, having only nine cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, Yugo-
slavia held the penultimate position in Europe (Albania was the
362
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
last) according to that criterion. Until 1981, Belgrade had 1,087,915
inhabitants. The fastest-growing capital city was Titograd whose
population increased more than eleven times from 1921 to 1981 –
from 8,212 to 96,074. High population growth was also recorded
by Skopje, whose population increased more than tenfold from
1921 to 1981 (from 40,666 to 408,143 inhabitants).
The increased share of the urban population in the total popu-
lation in inter-war Yugoslavia was insignificant, due to the lack of
sufficient possibilities and incentives for people to move to a city:
insufficiently developed urban (primarily industrial) activities, a
proportionally low level of cultural and educational needs of the
population, and the distinctly low mobility of the rural population
in general. An additional problem was also posed by underde-
veloped agriculture, which could not satisfy the needs of a larger
urban population. In the inter-war period, the state of the Yugo-
slav economy, especially its industry, was even unable to absorb
the proleterized peasantry that became increasingly numerous
over time, but mostly stayed in the village, joining hired labour.
Other urban vocations were also not open to people coming from
rural regions. As much as 58 percent of all wage workers engag-
ing in productive activities accounted for those engaging in agri-
culture, and most of them were proleterized peasants. For all these
reasons, according to the 1921 and 1931 censuses, only 16.5–18 per-
cent of the Yugoslav population lived in cities.
After the Second World War, the revolutionary authorities set
industrialization as their imperative task. The building of fac-
tories, largely for heavy industry needs as well as for the needs
of other industries, brought about a massive inflow of the rural
population to urban areas. Until 1953, the share of the agricultur-
al population in Yugoslavia declined by 14 percent compared to
1938. As Kidrič said, this de-agrarization was so “unnatural” that
at one moment in the early 1950s a part of the labour force had to
be returned from industry to agriculture. Up to 1953, the number
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
of inhabitants increased by 7.6 percent compared to 1939, while
the size of the non-agricultural population increased by 39 per-
cent, although not all deagrarized population moved to urban are-
as. According to the 1961 census, the percentage of the population
that moved to cities until 1945 was 15.1 percent, while only in the
period from 1945 to 1952 this percentage increased to 28.6 per-
cent, whereby most migrants came from rural areas (consequent-
ly, not from one city to another). Up to 1955, however, migration
from rural areas could not absorb the overall natural increase of
the rural population, which had begun to change.
Agricultural abandonment started with the seasonal and
incomplete abandonment of agriculture by agricultural work-
ers, often with a view to making more money in industry, which
was needed for the erection of industrial buildings on agricultur-
al estates. Their job in the industrial sector soon became the main
one, while agricultural activity was confined to other household
members until they also switched to non-agricultural activities
and finally moved to a city. Up to 1953, the agricultural population
declined by 300,000, but if one bears in mind the natural increase,
the actual outflow from agriculture amounted to between 1.13
and 1.5 million people. Until 1960, rural areas were abandoned
by 2.16 million people and at the end of this decade the struc-
ture of rural households was as follows: 25 percent accounted for
elderly households, 40 percent accounted for households having
all younger members attending school, while 30 percent account-
ed for households that retained their offspring at home. From the
viewpoint of the socialist state, the reduced reproduction of rural
households did not seem to be an unfavourable trend. However,
the trend displayed by individual agricultural holdings was their
fragmentation. This was evidently due to the fact that the house-
hold members who had moved to a city did not entirely renounce
their inheritance rights to their hereditary share, or at least some
segment of it.
364
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
However, as already mentioned, de-agrarization did not imply
an equal change in the ratio of urban to rural population. In this
respect, the change was significantly less pronounced. Namely,
a great number of industrial workers continued to live in their
villages, thus increasing the number of so-called “half-peas-
ants”, worker-peasants, that is, people who lived in their villages
and engaged in agriculture, but were also employed in the indus-
trial sector; such people had already existed in the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia. Among 10.6 million individual peasants in 1949, there
were about 670,000 worker-peasants (6.3 percent). Until the early
1970s, the number of mixed households increased to 44 percent.
According to 1960 data, as much as 48 percent of rural popula-
tion’s income derived from non-agricultural activities. Also, one-
third of arable land was owned by those “mixed” worker-peas-
ant households. However, all things considered, the great migra-
tion of people from rural to urban areas was a reality, which also
relativized the romantic notions of the peasants’ deep emotional
attachment to their land, for the prospect of abandoning agricul-
ture seemed attractive to a great number of peasants.
On the other hand, other factors also influenced the reduction
of a direct population transfer from rural to urban areas. One of
those factors was the urbanization of rural settlements themselves:
the construction of roads and other infrastructure, schools, first-
aid stations, smaller production plants. On the other hand, despite
significant steps in that direction, the development of urban are-
as was not so dynamic as to absorb and employ a greater number
of people from rural areas. Despite all these problems, however,
by 1961, the percentage of urban population had more than dou-
bled – from 16.5–18 percent in the pre-war period to 28.3 percent.
In this process one could also observe specific yet not minor
regional differences. So, for example, in Slovenia in 1961, the non-
agricultural population accounted for 68 percent, but only 27 per-
cent accounted for the urban population, which was below the
365
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
Yugoslav average. Due to the urbanization of suburban and rural
settlements, good road networks and linkages between suburban
and rural settlements with urban centers, the permanent reloca-
tion of people to the city was not of the utmost significance for
their daily life. On the other hand, in Vojvodina, the non-agri-
cultural population accounted for only 48 percent, but 39 per-
cent of its inhabitants lived in cities. Macedonia was also specif-
ic. According to the 1961 census, it experienced an abrupt increase
in the urban population – up to 35 percent, but the highest con-
centration was in its capital city, while the development of oth-
er urban settlements was considerably slower. At the same time,
the non-agricultural population accounted for only 48 percent.
Mention must also be made of Kosovo where de-agrarization
and urbanization did not take any deeper root. One more spe-
cific feature of Yugoslav cities was the fact that in the cities with
10,000–20,000 inhabitants 10 percent acounted for the agricul-
tural population, with the exception of Slovenia and Montenegro.
In Macedonia and Kosovo, 20 percent of the population in the cit-
ies with 20,000–50,000 inhabitants accounted for the agricultur-
al population.
Up to 1981, the share of the urban population increased to 46.1
percent of the Yugoslav population. Somewhat more than 50 per-
cent of the urban population was recorded in Macedonia (53.9
percent), Montenegro (50.7 percent) and Croatia (50.1 percent),
as well as Vojvodina (54.1 percent), which was the most urban-
ized region until 1981. The lowest share of the urban population
was recorded in Bosnia and Herzegovina (34.2 percent) and Kos-
ovo (32.5 percent). Serbia with 47.6 percent of the urban popula-
tion (central Serbia with 47.8 percent) and Slovenia with 48.9 per-
cent were around the Yugoslav average. It should be noted that an
increase in the urban population was also caused by the change
of status of some settlements, which acquired the status of urban
settlements: in 1953 there were 0.9 percent of such settlements
366
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
and in 1981 – 2.8 percent. Nevertheless, village urbanization was
not sufficiently achieved: research on housing quality shows that
towards the end of the socialist epoch there were greater differ-
ences between village and city within each republic than between
urban settlements in different republics, indicating that urban set-
tlements were more rapidly “catching up” with each other. Also,
individual rural households were more urbanized compared to
rural settlements as a whole: villages remained under-urbanized
despite the evident process of their urbanization.
The working class, which mostly lived in cities, was not numer-
ous in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Before the end of the inter-
war epoch, it had about 700,000 members (about 4.4 percent of
the population). The life of the working class was characterized
by scarcity and a low standard of living, which was at the Euro-
pean bottom. According to some later calculations, one employed
worker could successfully meet his cost of living, since his wage
covered 1.28–1.70 percent of estimated average monthly costs.
However, the worker’s family (with an employed husband, unem-
ployed wife and two children) could not cover the cost of living
with its earnings. Namely, during the period 1930–1940, the cost-
of-living index for a worker’s family ranged from 0.5 to 0.66 per-
cent (where 1 indicates the full coverage of minimum needs). In
the inter-war period, the hygienic, health, social, housing and
general social conditions of the working class oscillated between
more favourable and less favourable. This class was largely disem-
powered both socially and politically, which is evidenced by bru-
tal clashes with the organisers of numerous worker strikes and
their participants.
In 1945, immediately after the war, there were about 307,000
workers, which was less than half of their number towards the end
of the inter-war period. Until 1950, however, there were already 1.2
million workers; until 1960 – 1.9 million; 1970 – 2.4 million; 1980
– 3.3 million and 1990 – 5 million. Immediately after the liberation
367
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
in 1945, significant efforts were made toward improving the over-
all social status of the working class. The important political, eco-
nomic and ideological aim was to have industrial workers live bet-
ter than the peasants, which speaks a lot about the worker sta-
tus before and immediately after the war. Thus, various training
courses for workers were organized; food was supplied at rela-
tively low prices, and new forms of social protection were intro-
duced. However, industrial development was much faster than the
provision of skilled workers, so that, according to the 1952 data,
the skills structure of the working class was very unfavourable:
there were only 1.5 percent of highly skilled workers; 35.5 percent –
skilled workers; 25.5 percent – semi-skilled workers, and 39.5 per-
cent – unskilled workers. The lowest percentage of highly skilled
workers came from rural areas – only 17 percent. Such a structure
of the labour force implied that only 30 percent of workers were
sufficiently skilled for the jobs they pursued. Until 1961, the num-
ber of highly skilled workers increased to 7 percent, but there were
still 40 percent of unskilled workers; the ratio was 10 percent of
highly skilled to 32 percent of unskilled workers.
Immediately after the war, the state-socialist ownership struc-
ture still had an unfavourable impact on the abolition of the hire-
ling and petty-proprietor consciousness of new workers, frequent-
ly “semi-peasants”, who were employed in industry, but lived in
their villages where they also participated in the agricultural work
of their households. Only the development of self-management
socialism created at least the theoretical presumption for over-
coming these forms of workers’ class resistance that were born out
of statism. Self-management socialism had to push back the hire-
ling mentality of the working class and develop a free one. Instead
of the struggle against the hireling nature supported by the direc-
tive plan and state property relations in which it was reproduced,
the organization of work based on social ownership and self-man-
agement had to further increase workers’ self-awareness.
368
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
According to the post-1945 criteria, in Yugoslavia at the end of
the inter-war period there were about 492,000 representatives of
the industrial and urban bourgeoisie (industrialists, rentiers and
big merchants), while by 1948 this number was reduced to less
than 12,000 such persons, who lived on income from their proper-
ty and the sale of valuables. After the implementation of compre-
hensive measures of nationalization, this social stratum vanished
completely by the first half of the 1950s. As regards members of the
rural bourgeoisie, landowners with 20 hectares of land or more,
there were about 310,000 of them or more at the end of the inter-
war period, while in 1948, after the war changes, expropriation
of the properties of collaborators with the occupiers, land reform
and division of larger agricultural estates, there remained 124,905
members of this social stratum. As regards the number of crafts-
men, small retailers and caterers, its decline was smaller in the
first post-war years: from 587,994 in 1947 to 469,525 in 1952. They
were transformed into small commodity producers and providers
of services based on their own work. However, tax and political
pressures on them were rather strong, so that a large number of
private entrepreneurs gave up private practice and found employ-
ment in the state sector. The extent of this revolutionary change
is also evidenced by the data that as early as 1950 the private sec-
tor’s share in the creation of national income was only 0.3 percent.
Due to confiscation (as a measure accompanying the punishment
for collaboration) and nationalization (as the structural mecha-
nism of primitive socialist accumulation), the inter-war bourgeoi-
sie was completely deprived of its ownership of the means of pro-
duction, while conditions for the reproduction of rural capitalists
disappeared with the introduction of a maximum of 10 hectares
of arable land in 1953.
As for employed persons in general, it should be noted that
after 1921, when 528,914 employed persons were recorded (4.4 per-
cent of the total population), their number increased to 1,032,344
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
(about 7 percent of the population) until 1940. After the Second
World War, the principal employer was the state, which employed
an increasing number of people, so that in the period from 1945
to 1949, the total number of employed persons increased from
450,000 to 2,000,000. Their number was rapidly increasing, so
that in 1960 there were 3 million employees; in 1970 – 3.9 mil-
lion; in 1980 – 5.8 million and in 1990 – 6.5 million. At the same
time, remuneration differences were proportionally small and
their ratio was 1:3.5. However, instead of decreasing over time,
these differences increased. In 1980, the range between the high-
est and lowest wages was 1:4.5, but this was just the average. In
some organizations, the wage span was even 1:30. When consid-
ering the cumulative ratios in 1973, it can be seen that 50 percent
of households accounted for about 30 percent of total income and
that the distribution in 1983 was more even, so that this share was
35 percent. From the viewpoint of capitalist society, this distribu-
tion was fairly egalitarian, but one would expect a socialist society
to take a different path.
As regards the share of the intelligentsia in the Yugoslav society,
if we take into account a simple criterion –educational level, and
if we include the population with higher and two-year post-sec-
ondary education in this stratuma, then the following dynamic is
obtained: in 1939 there were about 0.3–0.4 inhabitants with higher
or two-year post-secondary situation; in 1953 there were already
0.6 percent and in 1981 – 5.6 percent. In both the first and second
Yugoslavia, the intelligentsia was a state project in various ways, to
the extent to which its social role was enabled, thanks to more or
less generous state support. Here by “intelligentsia” I mean a very
wide circle of intellectuals, namely persons active in cultural and
educational life, as well as formally educated persons. It should be
noted that in inter-war Yugoslavia, despite the widespread belief
that the intelligentsia was derived from the “common people”, that
is, from the countryside, it was mostly of bourgeois origin, as is
370
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
shown by prosopographical studies of the inter-war intelligent-
sia. It is also important to note that in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
the labour market was unable to absorb even the relatively small
number of highly educated experts, including even persons with
secondary education. Hence they talked about the “overcrowding
of the universities” and “unemployment of intellectual youth”. A
specific turnaround occurred after the Second World War in both
directions: the access of worker and peasant youth to higher edu-
cation increased considerably, while the lack of experts remained
the chronic ailment of the Yugoslav economy. In socialist Yugo-
slavia, especially in the first post-war years, greater attention was
devoted to the so-called technical intelligentsia (various business
experts), which had constituted 12 percent of this pre-war stra-
tum. In 1952, however, it rose to 42.7 percent.
The intelligentsia was also the pillar of the regime, both in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia and in socialist Yugoslavia. At the same
time, it also played a critical role to a much greater extent than
allowed, considering its great dependence on state support, which
the regimes had to tolerate and against which sporadically under-
took some repressive measures.
In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the bureaucratic-administrative
stratum was in essence a subgroup within the bourgeois class. It
included in large measure the alienated stratum of the population,
closely linked to the privileged ruling class, hence being a syno-
nym for corruption and repression.
In socialist Yugoslavia, the bureaucratic-administrative stra-
tum was recruited from the ranks of workers and peasants or
more exactly, revolutionary cadres and, despite alienation tenden-
cies, workers had high access to administrative positions. Dur-
ing the immediate post-war years, in particular, administrative
positions were a “revolutionary vocation and not a profession”.
Over time, this structure became increasingly detached from
the whole of society. During the first years, there were no wage
371
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
differences. However, there were differences in the inherited con-
ceptions of the status of a bureaucrat. Bureaucratism was identi-
fied as one of the key opponents of the genuine development of
socialist relations, but socialist society was unable to resolve this
aporia – between bureaucracy and the struggle against this phe-
nomenon – anywhere, including Yugoslavia. In the phase of revo-
lutionary statism, class distinctions emerged as the result of com-
manding positions and privileges (the “new class”). In this peri-
od, about 10 percent of all people employed in the state sector
accounted for the bureaucratic-administrative stratum: all literate
people became clerks and in 1947 they constituted 54.4 percent of
all non-manual workers in the socialist sector.
The privileges of administrative functions also persisted in
self-management socialism, which was conceived as a system for
overcoming them, whereby under the self-management system
the actual differences in material status were significantly more
important than the position of power itself, as in the period of
statism. Certain privileges also began to be granted for non-man-
ual activities. Namely, they began to be paid better than manufac-
turing jobs. In short, the working class did not completely dispose
of its surplus labour, a considerable portion of which was included
in the budget and allocated by the state. The budgetary financing
of non-productive activities meant the alienation of the working
class from a portion of surplus labour and the tendency of self-
management socialism was to have the working class assume full
control over expanded reproduction as a whole through self-man-
agement communities of interest. The full control of the working
class over expanded reproduction would actually mark the end of
the bureaucratic setting of high wages in the non-productive sec-
tor and the resulting formation of class distinctions. Non-produc-
tive activities had to be performed as a result of recognized social
needs for which self-management communities would allocate a
specified portion of surplus labour on the basis of independent
372
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
decision-making, thus realising the concept of associated labour
and harmonising the pluralism of self-management interests. In a
certain sense, this would mean that those engaged in non-produc-
tive activities would become, conditionally speaking, the “hire-
lings” of the working class. In this way, they would also become the
working class and encompass the whole of society, thus ceasing to
exist as a class (classless society). Naturally, this was not realized
until the collapse of socialism and Yugoslavia. On the contrary,
class distinctions became increasingly more pronounced, which
was the inevitable price of developing “market socialism”.
Studies of social stratification in the society in socialist Yugo-
slavia show that not all individuals in positions of power were
rich and that not all rich people were the members of the Par-
ty and political elite. However, the systemic possibilities enabled
some individuals holding leadership positions in socio-political
communities to use their privileges and amass wealth. In short,
all relevant research shows that social distinctions were greater
than they should have been according to the ideological postu-
lates of the ruling Marxist paradigm, but were still smaller than
in capitalist countries and, in essence, diffusely distributed: politi-
cal command functions did not necessarily always imply material
enrichment, nor were they a prerequisite for it. They undoubted-
ly facilitated enrichment, but wage differences were the least rea-
son for this. In fact, indirect channels were a very important form
of enrichment – lucrative official trips, various informal channels
for the provision of cheap land and building materials for a house,
various privileges of high officials based on internal regulations,
etc. Thus, their already high personal income was relieved of vari-
ous liabilities that had to be borne by the underprivileged individ-
uals. It should also be noted that in officials’ families, both spous-
es were most often employed and, as a rule, neither of them had a
low personal income.
373
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
In addition, research conducted at the end of the observation
period showed that the social mobility of Party members was
twice as high as that of non-Party members. At the same time,
parental Party membership was highly significant for the social
mobility of children. The essential upward mobility channel was
still a general transformation that occurred in Yugoslavia after the
Second World War.
THE GREATEST MODERNIZATION BREAKTHROUGHS: HEALTH
CARE, EDUCATION AND WOMEN’S EMANCIPATION
During the inter-war period, social processes were taking place,
to a lesser or greater degree, within the limits of the liberal par-
adigm of the state that had no possibility or will to intervene in
social relations. State intervention was an exception rather than
a rule, and if it was carried out, it was closely linked to quite con-
crete political circles and periodically to personal and group busi-
ness interests. The government extinguished the “fire” here and
there when the situation in some sphere became intolerable but,
with the exception of very inconsistent land reforms, there was no
greater intervention in the social sphere.
The post-1945 change in the social structure, to which the
greater part of this paper is devoted, was a result of the processes
of modernization, primarily the industrialization of the country,
which falls under economic history, but is also the fundamental
generator of social change. Here one should point to another three
important modernization breakthroughs that brought significant
changes to the general social patterns – health care, education and
womens’ emancipation. Unlike the inter-war period, in all these
processes one could observe the strong role of Yugoslav com-
munists whose party was in power and for whom the success in
these spheres implied the attainment of the program goals of the
Party in its struggle for the “new man”. There was no significant
374
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
breakthrough in the mentioned spheres which was not discussed
at Party’s forums and publicized in its documents.
As regards the health care of the population in the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia, it was at the lowest level according to the European
standards. According to 1930 data, there were 12,204 medical per-
sonnel members, including 4,545 doctors and 208 dentists. There
were also 172 hospitals and 22,895 hospital beds. In Yugoslavia up
to 1939, there were 18,193 medical personnel members, including
5,131 doctors and 380 dentists, implying that there was one doctor
per 3,060 inhabitants and one dentist per 41,324 inhabitants. Of
this number of doctors, 927 worked in 169 hospitals with 23,534
beds (only 429 more than twenty or so years earlier). The Drava
Banovina (the territory of present-day Slovenia) had the greatest
number of hospitals per inhabitant: in 1939, it accounted for 21.2
percent of all hospital stays in the country. Bearing in mind that
medical experts were mostly concentrated in the cities, the fact
remains that a large proportion of the rural population and some
smaller environments had no adequate health care. During the
period 1930–1939, only the number of health centers increased –
from 260 to 552. We do not have reliable data for the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia, but it is rather indicative that in 1939 at least 12 per-
cent25 of all deaths were due to tuberculosis – a disease that most
often accompanies extreme poverty.
In socialist Yugoslavia, the situation radically improved. Up to
1950, there were only 5,138 doctors and 196 dentists, while already
in 1952 there were 6,548 doctors (since the first generations of
post-war medical students had graduated), while the number
of dentists decreased to 184. Until 1987, the Yugoslav population
was treated by 43,869 doctors and 9,232 dentists, which means
that there was one doctor per 533 inhabitants and one dentist per
25 The percentage refers only to one-fourth of all deaths, because for three-fourths
the cause of death is unknown. Namely, out of 233,196 dead persons the cause of
death is known only for 53,228 and it is known that 27.605 died of tuberculosis.
375
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
2,535 inhabitants. In 1950, compared to 1939, the number of hos-
pital beds increased more than twofold – there were 53,760 hospi-
tal beds. By 1960, this number had also increased more than two-
fold, so that there were 102,329 hospital beds, while until 1988 this
number increased to 142,957. Understandably, the most advanced
medical services were provided in urban centers, but spa rehabil-
itation centers were being developed and basic health care also
reached rural areas. Until 1989, in addition to hospitals, 8,384 gen-
eral and specialist medical centers and 4, 425 dental surgeries were
opened. In addition, thanks to the development of the road net-
work, better communications and different social policy, health
care became accessible to a significantly greater number of people.
Apart from doctors, the number of other medical personnel also
increased. According to the 1962 data, there was a total of 112,946
medical workers; in 1975 – 193,374, and in 1987 – 303,105.
Throughout the existence of the Yugoslav state, despite the
great success in the expansion of health care coverage during the
period of socialism, which also strongly influenced the extension
of average life expectancy, there remained significant differences
among the republics and autonomous provinces. As the most evi-
dent example one can take mortality due to parasitic and infec-
tious diseases. Although it is undoubtedly due to the geographi-
cal area, it is also largely due to the health culture of the popula-
tion – a good indicator of the overall quality of life. Thus, in 1990,
the death rate due to these diseases per 100,000 inhabitants, by
republics and autonomous provinces, was as follows: Montenegro
– 9.3; Slovenia – 11.5; Bosnia and Herzegovina – 16.5; Serbia – 18.2;
Croatis – 22.2 and Macedonia – 32.1. If we take into account only
Serbia, it can be noted that differences within it were quite dis-
tinct: in central Serbia 11.7 patients died per 100,000 inhabitants;
in Vojvodina – 13 and in Kosovo – as many as 43.
The next important breakthrough was made in the field of pop-
ulation education. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, despite specific
376
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
efforts to raise the educational level of the population, no more sig-
nificant breakthroughs in this field were made. In 1921, the num-
ber of illiterate persons older than 10 years was even 4,402,059
(50.5 percent of the population), while by the 1931 census their
number had increased to 4,408,471 (44.6 percent of the popula-
tion older than 10 years).
According to the 1948 census already, this number was consid-
erably smaller – 3,162,941 (25.4 percent of the population). This
decrease was the result of a mass literacy campaign during the war
and in its aftermath, but it probably does not give a true picture
of the situation, especially if functional illiteracy is not taken into
account. Nevertheless, considerable efforts were made towards
educating the population, so that the number of illiterate per-
sons older than 10 years continually declined, accompanied by an
increase in the total population, so that in 1961 there were 3,066,165
(21 percent) such persons; in 1971 – 2,549,571 (15.1 percent) and in
1981 – 1,780,902 (9.5 percent). Of this number 1,576,238 were aged
over 39 or, in other words, born before 1945. As in all other spheres,
regional differences were very pronounced. The lowest number of
illiterate people was in Slovenia and the highest number in Mace-
donia, including mostly the Albanian female population.
In 1919, in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia there were 5,610 elemen-
tary schools (4 grades) with 658,876 students and 11,064 teachers.
There were also 115 civil schools, 120 high schools and secondary
schools, and 24 teacher’s schools with a total of 63,599 students
and 3,279 teachers. By 1939, the number of elementary school had
increased to 9,190; there were 1,470,983 students and 34,663 teach-
ers. By 1939, there were 1,086 secondary schools with a total of
213,100 students and 13,515 teachers. Most students attended high
schools and secondary schools – 81,688, while others attended
various specialized schools. In the whole country in 1922, there
were 23 institutions of higher and two-year post-secondary edu-
cation with 10,568 students and 682 teachers; in 1939, there were
377
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
29 two-year post-secondary schools and faculties with 21,253 stu-
dents and 1,394 teachers. This relatively sparse educational net-
work still produced more personnel than could be employed in
the Yugoslav economy and other sectors.
After 1945, the educational network expanded rapidly, both in
terms of the number of schools and in terms of teaching diver-
sity, while the number of compulsory years of elementary edu-
cation increased and in 1958 compulsory eight-year elementary
education was introduced. In the territory of Yugoslavia in 1946,
there were 10,666 elementary schools with 1,441,679 students and
23,270 teachers which, considering the number of teachers, was a
big decline compared to 1939. By 1975/78, the number of elemen-
tary schools in Yugoslavia had grown to 13,442, but after that it
started to decline, mostly due to the merger of smaller schools,
which was made possible thanks to improved transport and great-
er student mobility. Thus, in 1989/90, the number of elementa-
ry schools dropped to 11,841. The number of students also var-
ied. The highest number was recorded in the school year 1975/76
– 2,856,453, while until 1989/90 it declined to 2,798,738. According
to the 1987 data, there were 139,167 elementary school teachers.
In 1953, 50.2 percent of the population had elementary education
(minimum four grades); in 1961 – 55.9 percent; 1971 – 57.4 percent
and 1981 – 51.1 percent.
As regards secondary education, in the post-1945 period,
emphasis was mostly placed on vocational schools. From 1946
to 1987, the number of secondary schools increased from 959 to
1,248. However, their greatest number was in 1978 – 2,787. In the
same period, the number of students increased from 138,393 to
901,351. Finally, in 1946, there were 14,549 secondary school teach-
ers and in 1987 – 63,711. By 1953, 6.6 percent of the population had
secondary education; in 1961, this percentage increased to 9.3 per-
cent; in 1971 – 15.2 percent and in 1981 – 25.5 percent.
378
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
In Yugoslavia, as early as 1946, there were 39 two-year post-sec-
ondary schools and faculties (ten more than in 1939), with 39,239
students and 1,390 teachers. From 1945 to 1953, even 30,000 stu-
dents graduated from two-year post-graduate schools and fac-
ulties, thus accounting for about 50 percent of the total number
of inhabitants with university and two-year post-graduate edu-
cation in 1939. The number of higher education institutions also
continued to increase in the subsequent period, so that as early as
1950 there were 84 educational institutions of this type. The great-
est number of faculties and two-year post-graduate schools was
recorded in 1981 – 357, while the greatest number of students was
recorded in 1979 – 447.880. At the end of the observation period,
in 1991, there were 306 two-year post-graduate schools and facul-
ties with 325,481 students. As for teaching staff, until 1991, there
were 22,626 teachers at two-year post-secondary schools and fac-
ulties in Yugoslavia. The share of the population with two-year
post-secondary and university education was as follows: 1953 –
0.6 percent, 1961 – 1.3 percent, 1971 – 2.8 percent and 1981 – 5.6
percent.
If we take into account primarily scientific activity, we will see
that this activity underwent a real revolution in the second Yugo-
slavia. In the school year 1919/20, 89 persons completed doctor-
ates,, and in the school year 1938/39 – 296. The greatest number
of persons who earned doctorates in the Kingdom of Yugosla-
via was in 1929/30 – 412. Immediately after the war, 1945–1949, 87
persons completed doctorates. From 1950 to 1959, 1,221 persons
earned doctorates; from 1960 to 1969 – 3,425; from 1970 to 1979 –
5,748, and from 1980 to 1990 – 10,376. Apart from two-year post-
graduate schools and faculties, scientists were also employed in an
increasing number of research institutes.
After 1945, the main problem facing education was the lack of
teaching staff. Due to relatively low salaries, teaching did not seem
an attractive career choice. On the other hand, in 1975, despite
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
high achievements in the field of education, 28 percent of indus-
trial enterprises had no highly educated personnel. The educa-
tional system could not keep pace with the economy that was
developing more rapidly. When one takes into account all work
organizations in Yugoslavia in 1975, it can be noted that 57 percent
of them had no highly educated personnel. It is also interesting
to note that the greatest number of organizations without highly
educated personnel was recorded in Slovenia (62 percent), then in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (60 percent), Croatia (54 percent), Ser-
bia (56 percent or, more precisely, even 66 percent in Vojvodina
and 58 percent in Kosovo), and in Macedonia and Montenegro (51
percent each).
Finally, attention should also be devoted to a very important
issue – the issue of women’s status in society. Women’s emanci-
pation in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was the result of individual
efforts, while in socialist Yugoslavia it was the result of an organ-
ized policy. Although a feminist movement existed in the King-
dom of Yugoslavia, it remained on the margins of social influence,
while the status of women was best expressed in the Civil Code
under which a married woman was denied legal capacity. This
anachronous legal provision was abolished as early as 1946, with
termination of the validity of the Civil Code. Thanks to women’s
equal participation in the National Liberation War (some of them
also held command positions and were declared national heroes
after the war), the new position of women in the Yugoslav socie-
ty was more easily accepted. Women understandably obtained the
right to vote, marital relations were liberalized, the political activ-
ism of women was promoted through the Anti-Fascist Womens’
Front and other mass organizations, and women were increasing-
ly assuming social and political functions, while the legal solu-
tions in all spheres of life tried to ensure gender equality. A con-
siderable increase in the number of divorces can also be consid-
ered an expression of women’s emancipation. In the early 1960s,
380
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
the attitude towards abortion was liberalized, which was one of
the important breakthroughs the socialist state did not make in
the aftermath of the war.
At literacy courses conducted during the period 1948–1950 as
much as 70 percent of attendees were women, although the lit-
eracy and schooling of female children met with resistance in
conservative environments, mostly for religious and patriarchal
reasons. From 1921 to 1981, the percentage of illiterate women
declined from 60 percent to 14.7 percent. However, until the end
of the socialist epoch, women still accounted for 80 percent of
all illiterate citizens. One of the mitigating circumstances in the
process of women’s emancipation was also children’s social care,
which was intended to help women overcome their traditional
role as mother.
Here one should point to some characteristics of the ratio
between male and female population with respect to the activi-
ties carried out by the population in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
and socialist Yugoslavia. According to the 1921 census, the share of
male and female populations in the economically active popula-
tion accounted for 64 percent and 62.8 percent respectively, while
according to the 1931 census this share was 36.4 percent and 30
percent respectively. After 1945, the share of the male population
in the economically active population was decreasing, while the
rate of the economically active population within the female pop-
ulation was relatively stable and ranged from 30.7 percent to 35.1
percent. This means that the absolute number of the economically
active female population (and thus the share of the economically
active population) was increasing in proportion to an increase in
the share of the female population in the total population. How-
ever, this was not the case with the male population. This is a very
credible testimony to women’s emancipation compared to the pre-
war period, which was especially evident after 1961. Namely, in the
pre-war period the highest percentage of the economically active
381
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
female population (about 85 percent) was engaged in agriculture,
which also refers to the first post-war years (88.9 percent accord-
ing to the 1948 census). All subsequent censuses revealed that the
share of the female agricultural population in the total economi-
cally active female population was very distinctly decreasing. The
last time that more than half of the economically active female
population was engaged in agriculture was recorded in 1971 –
55.4 percent. According to the 1981 census, this percentage had
declined to 31.5 percent.
Nevertheless, throughout the observation period, women were
more engaged in agriculture than in other activities. Moreover,
their share in this activity grew continually since other activities
were much more accessible to men. According to the 1931 data, the
share of the economically active female agricultural population
in the total economically active agricultural population amounted
to 36.6 percent, although in the total economically active popula-
tion women accounted for 32.8 percent. By 1981, as much as 47.5
percent of the economically active agricultural population were
women, while their share in the total economically active popula-
tion accounted for 38 percent. As for males, according to the 1931
census, 66.3 percent of the economically active male population
were actively engaged in agriculture, while in 1981 – only 21.4 per-
cent. This difference points to the fact that despite their unambig-
uous emancipation and faster increase in the activity of women
within the female population relative to an increase in the activity
of men within the male population, they still had more difficulty
than men in finding employment outside agriculture.
In the socialist era, women still failed to achieve full equality
with men, including access to all social positions, ensuring equal
pay for equal work, and all other social relations where the issue of
gender differences is relevant. However, compared to the inter-war
epoch, their success in achieving equality is more than evident.
382
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
CONCLUSION
In a 20th-century perspective, Yugoslav society shared the
fate of the political entity whose material and human basis was
constituted by it, just as the fate of the state was determined in
many respects by the social circumstances within which differ-
ent frameworks changed one after another. The state was able to
impose itself as the “power standing above society” in a quite lit-
eral sense, but the essential characteristics avoided engineering,
acting autonomously and imposing strong obstacles on the pro-
tagonists of history in pursuing their reformatory, revolutionary
ot conservative agenda.
When the Yugoslav state was created in 1918, it was primar-
ily an entity on the periphery of European capitalism, with the
basic social-class structure which was comprised of peasants as
the dominant stratum, a thin working class stratum and ramified
yet sparse bourgeoisie, ranging from capital owners to the intel-
ligentsia and bureaucrats. Nevertheless, it was not easy to imag-
ine a more complex structure, primarily due to the very diverse
social characteristics of various regions in the new state, in which
one should still not seek the causes of its subsequent collapse. The
lack of skills and abilities to find creative answers to the challeng-
es posed by a new historical framework is a much more credible
explanation for the failure of the first Yugoslavia than the alleged
insurmountability of the differences themselves.
The society in the first Yugoslavia was a neglected society, lack-
ing serious efforts to level out those differences that could and
should have been levelled out (economic development, dispro-
portions in the cultural level, wealth and the like), while at the
same instisting on an alleged national unity as the platform for
eliminating those differences which could not be eliminated nor
was there a need to eliminate them (national identities). The over-
all social development of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941 was over-
whelmingly slow, so that the country was at the lower end of
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
European trends (population poverty, illiteracy, low level of health
culture, poor mobility, etc.), with a rather closed perspective.
The socialist revolution brought the change that, apart from an
essentially different political system, implied quite the opposite
attitude towards society as compared to that in the inter-war peri-
od. The communists’ modus operandi for achieving their aims was
just a specific form of social engineering that objectively had to
accelerate the progress of all strata that accepted the new state of
affairs, or dictatorship by the proletariat, or at least did not open-
ly oppose it. In socialist Yugoslavia, the communists created a
new social structure, which was comprised of workers, owners of
the means of production by which, using their own labour (non-
exploitatively) they earned their income (peasants, craftsmen),
“people’s” intelligentsia (opposed to the de-classed – “anti-people”
one), and administrative-bureaucratic structure, which was ideo-
logically the “executive committee” of the working class, but was
still essentially its avant-garde both in an ideological sense and in
the sense of its power vis-à-vis the working class itself, thus even
constituting a counter-class according to some views.
However, in these circumstances, in which the idea of dicta-
torship by the proletariat was, at the very least, inconsistent-
ly achieved, for which there were numerous political and eco-
nomic reasons, modernization breakthroughs – which objective-
ly improved the position of the formerly neglected social strata
– were underway. These modernization breakthroughs cannot be
overemphasized, especially in the spheres of health care, educa-
tion and women’s emancipation. On the other hand, however, the
fact that there were also some failures and stagnation, opens up a
debate as to whether the reasons for failure are inherent in social-
ism, or originated from its “non-socialist” modifications.
384
from the stagnation to the revolution from the stagnation to the revolution
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390
catching up with europe catching up with europe
Everyday Life in Both Yugoslavias
catching up
with europe
IGOR DUDA
As in most of Europe during the past century, the everyday life of
the majority of the population in both Yugoslavias was taking big
strides toward change. Shorter and traumatic periods of high mor-
tality rates and destruction (during the wars) alternated with long
peaceful periods, and the initial and final results of both Yugoslav
half-times pointed to an increase in the quality of life. This was
especially felt among those strata of the population – workers and
most peasants – whose initial position was low and unenviable
and their basic material safety uncertain over both the short and
long term. After two wars, social, economic and cultural circum-
stances were guided by the idea of shaping a better environment
and significant leaps towards moderization, which was especially
pronounced during the second post-war period, when the society
was shaped according to the principles of socialist modernization,
based on rapid industrialization, electrification and urbanization.
New everyday practices and customs were permeated with new
conceptions, shaping different identities and gradually changing
long-established mentalities.
391
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
Due to the initial, predominantly agrarian, structure of the pop-
ulation, the village-city relationship is the paradigm within which
it is possible to consider the complexity of social change since the
place of residence implied a slower or faster movement towards
modernization. The quality of this movement was also determined
by distinct regional differences within the country. Moving from
one environment to another meant breaking up the centuries-long
structure of social relations – usually patriarchal and sometimes
even feudal – and entering the world of a more distinct individ-
uality that was integrated, on a different basis, into the collective,
ranging from the nuclear family to the broader community. Strict
parental authority within the extended family or cooperative com-
munity was fading away, while new supportive social networks,
like those of neighbors, friends and colleagues, as well as extended
family and homeland networks, were taking shape. Within these
communities women and children, the group to which the 20th
century brought emancipation, were becoming increasingly inde-
pendent, so that their role in the everyday life of their community
was increasingly pronounced, their successes increasingly impor-
tant and their defeats increasingly hard to accept. The new role of
woman who was now entering the world of the labour force and
public life, took shape simultaneously with the new role of man,
who was more clealry turning to his family and becoming emo-
tionally engaged in it. Social upheavals could mean the loss of old
traditions and the adoption of new ones, transition from old ritu-
als to new collective public events, the weakening of religious feel-
ings and the acceptance of secularism, or a different understand-
ing of religiousness. At the same time, literacy and the education-
al level of the population were on the rise, thus creating condi-
tions for a greater openness of society and the mitigation of class
differences. In the 1980s, the grandchildren of illiterate grandpar-
ents could play computer games. After growing up in fields or pas-
tures, they could spend their youth working on an assembly line
392
catching up with europe catching up with europe
or at an office desk. The transition from peasant clothes to civil-
ian clothes and blue jeans, from the woman’s more or less cov-
ered head to coloured hair and perms, from sleeping on straw to
sleeping on a comfortable mattress, was very fast. The participants
in all these changes included adults and their children who were,
for example, mostly called Vesna, Snežana, Ljiljana, Zoran, Dra-
gan and Goran in Belgrade in the 1960s, and Snježana, Gordana,
Branka, Željko, Tomislav and Mladen in Zagreb at the very begin-
ning of the 1970s. In many respects, their everyday life, like that of
their parents and grandparents, has so far been studied historio-
graphically, including related disciplines, but it is still necessary to
deal with those processes and practices for which there exist only
rare data and general notions handed down orally or in print.
APARTMENTS, HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES, A BETTER DIET...
During the past century, the housing situation improved for the
majority of the population. In the inter-war period, the housing
infrastructure outside cities was either poor or non-existent, lack-
ing electricity, water and sewage connections. Living conditions
in municipal workers’ or peripheral settlements were poor. Life in
the villages located in the northern part of the country was better,
but in other regions those who had a bed of their own were rare.
In the underdeveloped parts of the country, the bed was usually
reserved for the head of the household, grandfather, sick person or
small children, while numerous other housedhold members slept
on the floor, together with the animals in winter and outdoors in
summer. A great wave of urbanization took place in the second
half of the century when settlements with larger residential build-
ings and skyscrapers were built. New cities or larger urban com-
plexes, such as New Belgrade, New Zagreb, New Gorica, Velenje
and Split 3, were also built. From the aspect of urban planning, the
reconstruction of Skopje after the disastrous earthquake of 1963
was especially successful. These new settlements were based on
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
contemporary urban planning and architectural concepts such as
residential buildings with social amenities, surrounded by green
areas and having no direct access to major roads. Kindergartens
and schools, parks, health centers, trading and small-scale craft
facilities were also built according to plan. The provision of addi-
tional amenities was often delayed, so that such parts of the city
were often called dormitories: “People go home to the settlement
only to eat and sleep, while for everything else they must go into
town”. However, due to a higher percentage of young families
and a greater number of children, their life was far from the usu-
al notion of alienated urban life. Each year, from the early 1960s
through the 1980s, 100–150 thousand apartments were built and
one third of them was built by the socially-owned sector. These
apartments were given to workers on the basis of their occupan-
cy right acquired in the enterprises and institutions where they
were employed. A survey shows that in the years of peak hous-
ing construction, that is, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, all
three-member worker households had electricity, almost of them
had water and sewage connections, one third had central heat-
ing and eight out of ten had a bathroom and toilet in the apart-
ment. These above-average results were contributed to by certain
rural areas and, occasionally, illegally built peripheral urban set-
tlements. Namely, the state tacitly allowed the illegal construc-
tion of entire individual housing complexes in order to mitigate
the housing problem among the fast-growing urban population.
The state did not succeed in meeting the demand for telephone
line connections fast enough. It often took years to get one, so the
arrival of the telephone was a reason for celebration and calling up
all and sundry to spread the happy news.
Until the mid-20th century, shifts in equipping apartments and
houses with furniture and household appliances were modest. In
1938, the price of a kitchen table was equal to 70 percent of a sal-
ary on the first and second pay scale, which was received by every
394
catching up with europe catching up with europe
tenth worker. An enamelled stove cost as much as the month-
ly salary on almost the highest, eleventh pay scale, which was
received by every twentieth worker. Laundry was washed by hand
and washing was often part of the social life of women who would
take this opportunity to get together. Over time, cleanliness stand-
ards improved. Home and personal hygiene became increasingly
important, especially in the 1960s when there appeared an auto-
matic washing machine that cost as much as three times the aver-
age salary. Sales increased rapidly and by 1973 every third Yugoslav
household had an automatic washing machine and by 1988 – two
out of three households. This machine greatly facilitated house-
work, so that housewives could also do something else – pay more
attention to their children or enjoy leisure time. It was increas-
ingly supplemented by TV sets, record players and tape record-
ers. By 1973, every second household owned a TV set. In 1978, its
price was equal to the average salary, and byl 1988 a black-and-
white or colour TV set was owned by 96 percent of non-agricul-
tural households and 58 percent of agricultural households, which
otherwise lagged behind in the purchase of household applianc-
es. The TV set brought the greatest number of changes into family
life; it assumed a central place in the living-room and became the
most accessible source of entertainment in leisure time. The light
of the TV screen brought together household members as the fire-
place had done before.. Other appliances also found their way to
users, but at a different pace. Up to the end of the 1980s, a vacu-
um cleaner was used by two out of three households and a refrig-
erator by nine out of ten; an electric or gas stove was owned by all
households and only a very few still used wood-burning stoves.
During the same decade, meat shortages and purchases of larg-
er amounts of meat through trade unions or from private sourc-
es enhanced the importance of freezer chests and drawers: “I cook
a larger amount and then divide it into daily portions. I put eve-
rything in the freezer and everyone will reheat their portion later
395
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
on. If it weren’t for this aid, I don’t know how we would eat. The
freezer chest is of the greatest help to me. I would sacrifice both
washing machine and vacuum cleaner, but I couldn’t give this up.”.
Food supply problems, shortages and hunger were not only the
result of wartime and post-war circumstances; they also depend-
ed on weather conditions and the situation in the countryside,
which was the only or main source of supply. However, the prob-
lems also included overpopulation, fragmentation of land hold-
ings, technological backwardness and the burden of debt. In the
1920s and 1930s as high a percentage as 75–80 of the population
earned their living exclusively from agriculture. The years 1935,
1950 and 1952 were especially dry. During the first drought, hun-
dreds of children from Lika, the Croatian coast, Dalmatia and
Herzegovina were sent to regions north of the Sava. The wave of
droughts in the early 1950s coincided with the already aggravat-
ed food supply and decline in agricultural production. Post-war
hunger would have been even more pronounced if it had not been
for shipments from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration (UNRRA). From 1945 to 1952, the government
resorted to rationed or guaranteed supply, dividing the consum-
ers into categories and restricting the availability of goods, so that
they could only be obtained by presenting a ration book. Thereaf-
ter, food supply was normalized, but the average food consump-
tion and the energy values of foods were not satisfactory until the
1960s. According to the statistical data, consumption reached its
maximum in 1982. Thus, per capita consumption included, for
example, 149 kg of wheat products, 61 kg of potatoes, 96 kg of oth-
er vegetables, 52 kg of meat and meat products, 3.8 kg of fish, 101
l of milk and 187 eggs. Accordingly, daily consumption included
about 16 dag of fruits and 15 dag of meat, as well as an egg eve-
ry second day. The food industry gained great momentum in the
second half of the century, while a modernized diet also includ-
ed packet soups and cooking in the pressure cooker. Numerous
396
catching up with europe catching up with europe
cookery books were published; there appeared TV shows giv-
ing cooking instructions, and recipes for the preparation of vari-
ous dishes and cakes were exchanged. Travel and migration with-
in the country contributed to the establishment of culinary link-
ages, the permeation of different tastes, the mixing of traditional
cuisines and the formation of new food habits. Despite the exist-
ence of numerous restaurants and cafes, workers’ canteens, school
cafeterias, the first pizzerias and fast food restaurants, the main
cooked meal was most often eaten at home with the family where
the womenfolk were still in charge of food provision and cooking.
A RISE IN CONSUMPTION
Nutrition and hygiene greatly influenced the health of the pop-
ulation. In some parts of the country the rural population did not
go to the doctor, at least not until the mid-century. They preferred
to turn for help to quacks, herbalists and medicine men. Health
culture and the availability of doctors in the first Yugoslavia were
not sufficiently developed, so significant steps were taken towards
changing people’s understanding and modernizing the system,
with the emphasis on prevention and hygiene activities, as well
as the development of social medicine. In the late 1930s, 7.5 per-
cent of the population was covered by social and health insurance,
but the state succeeded in developing a system of two hundred or
so hospitals and over five hundred social-medicine institutions,
including institutes of hygiene and public health centres. Howev-
er, the masses still remained without regular health care and were
exposed to epidemics of tuberculosis, malaria, trachoma and oth-
er diseases.
The post-war development of medicine and health institutions
made possible a greater availability of doctors and an almost five-
fold increase in the number of hospital beds (in 1986 there were
about 143,000), while all services were covered by mandato-
ry health insurance. Regular medical check-ups and mandatory
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vaccination of the population were also organised. Occupation-
al medicine and an occupational safety system provided great-
er security for the employed. Pensions and homes for the elder-
ly instilled confidence in end-of-life care. Thanks to better health
and hygiene as well as improved socio-economic conditions, the
estimated life expectancy for those born in the early 1980s was
68 years for men and 73 for women, that is, twenty or so years
longer than that for the generations born in the 1940s. For the
same reasons, infant mortality declined from 143 per thousand in
the 1930s to 27 per thousand in the mid-1980s, ranging from 12.6
per thousand in Slovenia to 54.3 per thousand in Kosovo. In the
mid-20th century, Yugoslavia underwent a demographic transi-
tion: the birth and death rates declined to 15 and 9 per thousand
respectively. In the early 1950s, the higher level of development
brought about family planning and expansion of the right to abor-
tion. During the 1960s, Yugoslavia also experienced a sexual revo-
lution, while a more liberal attitude toward homosexuality led to
its legalization in some parts of the federation.
Trade modernization and the spread of consumer culture were
largely changing the consumer’s purchasing behaviour and atti-
tude towards goods. Traditional trade at fairs and markets – imply-
ing direct buyer-seller relationships, negotiating prices, occasion-
al exchanges of goods and an inevitable backdrop of noises, smells
and colours – were preserved in rural and urban environments,
but were not the only methods of purchasing goods. Green mar-
kets were the meeting place of the urban and rural, or industri-
al and agricultural worlds, which supplemented each other well
since urban citizens needed goods from the immediate vicinity on
a daily basis. In big cities there were department stores, which had
been known as temples of consumer culture since the 19th centu-
ry. They represented both selling and exhibition spaces and usu-
ally attracted middle-to-upper class customers. However, there
were even more smaller and technically ill-equipped shops. In the
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1920s, there were more than 100,000 shops of this type, while in
the 1930s their number remained at about 86,000, which meant
that there was one shop per 182 inhabitants or, more precisely, one
food shop per 277 inhabitants. These ratios were two times better
in comparison with only 40,000 shops in the post-war period. Due
to reorganization and nationalization, their number decreased to
35,000 in 1955, but thereafter began to increase, reaching 100,000
in the late 1980s. Being used to communication with the seller
who would show them goods, put them on the counter and col-
lect payment, buyers were faced with an unknown and quite new
method of sales when self-service shops appeared. The first such
shop was opened in 1956, in the town of Ivanec in northern Croa-
tia. Thus, strolling around the aisles, picking up industrially-pack-
aged goods within close proximity and spending more time on
shopping were becoming part of everyday life. In Yugoslavia, less
than ten years after the opening of the first self-service shop, there
were almost a thousand shops of this type, while in the second
part of the 1980s there were seven times more. During the same
period, the number of department stores increased at the same
rate and exceeded the figure of 700. Modernization of the trade
network and methods of sale formed part of the development of
consumer culture, whose key features, especially among the upper
and middle strata of the population, were already present in the
inter-war period. However, consumer culture was only embraced
by all strata during the period of higher economic growth and liv-
ing standards, so that in the late 1950s and during the 1960s one
could speak about the formation of a Yugoslav consumer society.
At the popular music festival in Opatija in 1958, the winning song
Little Girl, better known for its refrain Papa, buy me a car... buy
me everything!, marked the beginning of the consumer revolution.
Daily shortages did not lastingly characterise Yugoslav trade.
However, between 1979 and 1985, due to an economic crisis, there
were shortages of oil, detergents, coffee, chocolate, corn cooking
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oil, citrus fruits, hygiene items and the like. For the first time since
the immediate post-war period, citizens waited in line and coped
with the situation in various ways. Whatever could not be found
in the country between the 1960s and 1980s came through pri-
vate channels from abroad: people would travel usually to Italy
and Austria, and make purchases within a day. Goods were also
brought in by Yugoslavs working abroad and tourists. Customs
officials at border crossings sometimes met women wearing fur
coats in the summer heat, or men wearing several pairs of trou-
sers. The earnings of about one million Yugoslav workers tem-
porarily employed abroad flowed into domestic banks. In addi-
tion,, these workers were also bringing new life habits. However,
an even stronger engine of consumerism was tourism.
TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION MOBILITY
Population mobility in this territory was poor. Life mostly
unfolded in the vicinity of one’s place of birth. The culture of trav-
el began to develop only in the second half of the century. Up to
then, the rural population would most often go only to a fair or
for pilgrimage, usually on foot, or emigrate to European and over-
seas countries, or move within Yugoslavia as part of land reform
and colonization. During the 1920s and 1930s, the number of
rail passengers doubled and reached over 58 million. The maxi-
mum number was reached in 1965 – 236 million. Before the Sec-
ond World War, there were more than 900 buses providing public
transport services on almost 500 intercity lines. In the early 1950s,
there were about 15 million bus passengers, while 30 years later
there were even 70 times more – over one billion. The bus was
absolutely the most popular form of public transport. For exam-
ple, according to relevant data for the late 1970s and early 1980s,
maritime transport services were used by up to about 8 million
passengers each year, while air transport reached its peak in the
second half of the 1980s, exceeding 6 million passengers. At that
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time, the Yugoslav fleet operated about 250 routes with 50 planes.
Most of the credit for these figures should be given to Yugoslav
Airlines (JAT) which, as the key air carrier, connected 53 cities
on five continents. Domestic passengers were attracted by such
slogans as “The shortest route to the sun”, or “Turning a trip into
a vacation”. The beginnings of the first scheduled passenger air-
line service, Aeroput, were much more modest. During the ten
years of its existence, until the late 1930s, it increased its fleet to 14
planes and carried a modest number of more affluent passengers
– about 13,000.
Down on the ground, roads still bore the burden of the great-
erst number of passengers, but during the inter-war period there
were still no larger infrastructure investments. According to statis-
tics, unpaved roads were prevalent until the early 1980s, although
the first highway sections were constructed in the early 1970s. The
country’s development level and way of life were unable to make
possible anything more than a rather slow development of auto-
mobile culture. In 1938, only 13,600 cars and 7,700 motorcycles
were registered, which means that horse carriages and occasion-
ally bicycles were still the dominant modes of personal transport.
After the Second World War, up to the 1960s, people most often
drove motorcycles. In 1955, however, there appeared the Zastava
750, popularly called “Fićo”, “Fića” or “Fičko”, the first Yugoslav
passenger car and the first product of cooperation between the
Zastava factory in Kragujevac and the Italian Fiat, which were to
roll down down the assembly line for 30 years. The importance
of this first car in the country’s motorisation was not even over-
shadowed by Zastava’s later basic models: Zastava 101 or “Stoja-
din” produced in 1970, or Jugo 45 produced in 1980. While the
price of more expensive Western car models was equivalent to
40 or more average monthly salaries, a Fića and Stojadin cost 13
and 20 monthly salaries respectively in 1971. However, money was
found and the country embarked on a fast motorization process
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
in which the car was becoming a status symbol. In 1970, one news-
paper printed a photograph of a man from Sandžak with his car in
front of a dilapidated shack after deciding to invest money first in
a Fića and then in his home. It was also written about the residents
of a Macedonian village on Mount Šar who kept their forty or so
cars in the neighbouring town of Tetovo because their village had
no connection to a road. In 1972, butcher Štef Galović told jour-
nalists that owning a car was not a luxury; it was his right after so
many years of service. Many people were guided by precisely this
principle. In 1961, there were as many as 238 Yugoslavs per passen-
ger car, 10 years later – 24 and in the late 1980s – seven on aver-
age; in Kosovo there were as many as 23 persons per passenger car
and only four in Slovenia. After being considered a luxury, own-
ing a car was gradually becoming the sign of a common standard
of living. However, it was still viewed as a striking consumption
item and the most expensive asset kept outside one’s safe home. It
enjoyed the status of a pet or family member, so that it could often
be found on family photographs. A car was treated with personal
or family pride. Its owner purchased accessories for it, its engine
was maintained and its body was polished. In return, it faithful-
ly served its owners, helping them to carry out everyday tasks,
whose pace and success were becoming increasingly dependent
just on it, as well as to conquer new spaces during excursions and
travels. Thus, it was becoming the symbol of freedom because one
could travel by car almost everywhere at any time, regardless of
public transport lines and timetables. Simply enjoying the ride
became part of everyday life.
THE RISE OF TOURISM
If the culture of travel had not taken hold, such rides would not
have been possible. At the time of the formation of the first Yugo-
slav state there already existed a good basis for the development
of domestic tourism. It included the Adriatic coast, spas in the
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interior of the country and regions with a tradition of mountain-
eering clubs and chalets. In 1923, the Putnik Travel Agency was
established as a joint-stock company with the aim of “preparing
travel programs and organizing tours, instructional people’s and
other tourist travel within the country and abroad”. Four years lat-
er, it became a state-owned company and, as such, it restored its
operations after the Second World War. A number of independ-
ent travel agencies sprang up from this first seed. Tourism did not
occupy a special place in the inter-war economy and everyday life.
During the 1930s, Yugoslavia was visited by about 900,000 tour-
ists, spending about five million nights each year. In the years pre-
ceding the Second World War, domestic tourists constituted the
majority, while one fourth were foreign tourists, mostly Germans
and then Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Italians, Britons and Aus-
trians. Domestic tourists included middle-to-upper class holiday-
makers, while the other urban population would stick to urban
resorts, and seaside and freshwater bathing areas. In the 1920s,
the sun-tanned body became the symbol of health and well-being.
Otherwise, bathing and wearing a swimming suit in public were
not easily accepted by the older generations. A defining moment
for the popularisation of tourism was a new approach taken by
socialist Yugoslavia by introducing paid annual leave and social
tourism. The general workers’ right to annual leave for two to four
weeks was introduced in 1946. Going on holiday was understood
as an essential part of the standard of living and the right of the
entire population. Social tourism anticipated preferential accom-
modation and transport rates, a holiday bonus, and workers’, chil-
dren’s and youth holiday homes. Despite some remarks, many
workers were satisfied: “Workers’ holiday homes are cheaper and
make you feel more relaxed because around here there are mostly
your friends and acquaintances. It is more comfortable than being
with unknown people. In addition, everything is organised, so
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that I don’t have to think about anything. So you can spend com-
fortable and really carefree holidays.”
In the mid-20th century, many people traveled and saw the sea
for the first time. The sea was the main holiday destination. Fas-
cination with the sea was a frequent theme in popular songs and
media, which regularly reported on the holidays of workers and
domestic film, music and sports stars. One of many similar state-
ments published in the domestic press was: “My most favourite
encounter is with our blue Adriatic coast and I feel best when I
swim.” Thanks to large investments, tourism grew rapidly until
the record year of 1986 when over 111 million tourist nights were
realised. According to their share of tourist nights, most domes-
tic and foreign guests came from West Germany, Serbia, Slove-
nia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Kingdom, Aus-
tria and Italy. The surveys showed that during the period of late
socialism every second citizen travelled somewhere on annual
leave. These were mainly smaller families, better educated, with a
higher income, and a permanent address in one of the larger cit-
ies in the interior of the country. Commercial and foreign tour-
ism grew stronger during the 1960s when the country opened up
to the West and when the importance of foreign exchange earn-
ings from tourism was recognized. The proliferation of beds at
private accommodation facilities and an increasing number of
family houses exhibiting the sign “Zimmer frei” pointed to the
change brought by tourism to the local population, especially on
the Adriatic coast mostly in Croatia. With their consumer goods,
behaviour and customs, foreign guests brought their hosts closer
to the contemporary West, while well-appointed beaches, sports
grounds, swimming pools, hotel restaurants and congress halls
found a public purpose throughout the year.
In contrast to annual leave, the weekend had to wait to ful-
fil its complete role of weekly rest until 1965 when the working
week was shortened to 42 hours by law. For most workplaces this
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implied five 8-hour working days and one working Saturday per
month, or working extra two hours once a week. A weekend was
often extended by one or more adjacent non-working state holi-
days. In 1967, every fifth citizen of Zagreb would go on a hal-day
or full-day excursion, while in the early 1980s every third Yugo-
slav used to go on weekend excursions, at least occasionally. Peo-
ple were most often forced to stay at home due to the lack of mon-
ey or time or the habit or need to spend their leisure time in this
way. Weekends were inevitably associated with weekend cottages,
whose building began in the 1950s. By the 1980s this practice had
spread among different strata of the population. These cottages
were mostly built in the vicinity of large cities and industrial cen-
tres where they really served for spending short weekly holidays,
breathing fresh, clean air and having a barbecue. For many people
it was important to have a summer cottage at the seaside: “We live
here ‘on our own terms’. “It’s simply different from being a tourist.
It gives you a different feeling, a different attitude. You feel com-
fortable and free […] You live life on your own terms.”
IN THE RHYTHM OF THE CENTURY
Apart from excursions and travels during this century, pop-
ular culture was also increasingly penetrating leisure time, pro-
moted by thousands of daily, weekly and monthly newspapers, as
well as programs broadcast by radio stations (Radio Zagreb since
1926, Radio Ljubljana since 1928 and Radio Belgrade since 1929)
and television stations (TV Zagreb since 1956, and TV Belgrade
and TV Ljubljana since 1958). Foreign radio and television pro-
grams were also popular. Cinemas showed domestic, Hollywood
and other foreign blockbusters; record companies were produc-
ing records and cassettes featuring domestic and foreign artists;
and publishing companies were printing literary works by domes-
tic authors as well as translated works by foreign ones. Apart
from actors, singers and authors, star status was also enjoyed by
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athletes. Sports events were watched live or through the media.
Apart from professional sports, amateur sports were also devel-
oped, especially in the second Yugoslavia. Young people social-
ized with each other in the open, in city centres, dance halls and,
finally, discotheques, turning evenings-out into nights-out and
behaving in accordance with the selected subculture. From the
1960s onwards, leisure time was increasingly occupied by various
hobbies, which reflected various life styles and were an increas-
ingly important determinant of identity.
In 1938, the basic living costs per person amounted to 630
dinars each month or, more precisely, 1,500 dinars for an average
worker’s family consisting of 2.4 members. However, half of all
workers earned less than the amount needed for only one person.
So there was enormous dissatisfaction and strikes were frequent.
In the 1920s, the share of food costs in the living costs of a four-
member family in Zagreb amounted to about 40 percent. In the
second half of the century, at the country level, a worker’s four-
member family had to earmark about 50 percent of its income for
food, which still represented a high share. The lowest share, about
40 percent, was recorded in the late 1970s when the standard of
living and purchasing power were at their highest level. In 1978,
the average salary was 5,075 dinars, ranging from 4,084 in Kos-
ovo to 5,903 Slovenia. If the consumer basket contained 1 kg of
bread, 1 kg of sugar, 1 kg of beef, 1 kg of apples, 1 l of milk, an egg,
a pair of men’s shoes, a haircut and a movie ticket, it turned out
that in 1978 the average salary could cover the cost of 8.4 baskets.
Due to a drop in the standard of living ten years later, the salary
could cover the cost of 5.7 baskets; in 1968 – exactly 8; in 1958 –
4.2 and in the pre-war year 1938 – only 3.8. This simplified exam-
ple shows that in the late 1960s the average purchasing power was
about double that of the pre-war year, and it went on increasing
until 1978, when it reached highest level in the history of Yugo-
slavia. This picture of the increase in the standard of living will
406
catching up with europe catching up with europe
become more complete if one takes into account the achieved lev-
el of tehnological development, high health and hygiene standards
and higher educational level of the population. Should the ques-
tion of progress be posed from the aspect of everyday life, it would
be reflected in the wish for electricity, paved roads, a comfortable
apartment or house, a marriage of love and not an arranged mar-
riage, fertile land, job security, as well as the wish for the children
to be better off in the future. It is precisely these issues that are
conversation topics in the prize-winning feature film Train With-
out a Timetable (Veljko Bulajić, 1959): “There is also electricity and
a state road over there, and you can have a radio in the house. It
can play and sing for you all day long! Just like in a dream...” This
dream was part of the changes brought by the 20th century to eve-
ryday life, including increased opportunities and needs. Yugosla-
via was attuning the rhythm of the century to its own develop-
ment level and political priorities.
Selected Bibliography
1. Adrić, Iris et al. (ed.), Leksikon YU mitologije, Postscriptum i Rende,
Zagreb and Belgrade, 2004.
2. Bilandžić, Dušan, Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije.
Glavni procesi 1918–1985, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1985.
3. Dijanić, Dijana, Mirka Merunka-Golubić, Iva Niemčić, Dijana Stanić,
Ženski biografski leksikon. Sjećanje žena na život u socijalizmu, Center for
Women’s Studies, Zagreb, 2004.
4. Dobrivojević, Ivana, Selo i grad. Transformacija agrarnog društva Srbije
1945–1955., Institute for Contemporary History, Belgrade, 2013.
5. Duda, Igor, U potrazi za blagostanjem. O povijesti dokolice i potrošačkog
društva u Hrvatskoj 1950-ih i 1960-ih, Srednja Europa, Zagreb, 2005.
6. Duda, Igor, Pronađeno blagostanje. Svakodnevni život i potrošačka kultura
u Hrvatskoj 1970-ih i 1980-ih, Srednja Europa, Zagreb, 2010.
407
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7. Grandits, Hannes, Karin Taylor (eds.), Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side. A History
of Tourism in Socialism (1950s-1980s), Central European University Press,
Budapest – New York, 2010. / Sunčana strana Jugoslavije. Povijest turizma
u socijalizmu, Srednja Europa, Zagreb, 2013.
8. Janjetović, Zoran, Od internacionale do komercijale. Popularna kultura
u Jugoslaviji 1945–1991., Institute for Recent History of Serbia, Belgrade,
2011.
9. Kolar Dimitrijević, Mira, Radni slojevi Zagreba od 1918. do 1931., Institute
for the History of the Workers’ Movement of Croatia, Zagreb, 1973.
10. Luthar, Breda, Maruša Pušnik (eds.), Remembering Utopia. The Culture
of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia, New Academia Publishing,
Washington, 2010.
11. Marković, Predrag J., Beograd između Istoka i Zapada 1948–1955.,
Službeni list, Belgrade, 1996.
12. Marković, Predrag J., Trajnost i promena. Društvena istorija socijalističke
i postsocijalističke svakodnevnice u Jugoslaviji i Srbiji, Službeni glasnik,
Belgrade, 2012.
13. Panić, Ana (ed.), Nikad im bolje nije bilo? Modernizacija svakodnevnog
života u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji, Muzej istorije Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2014.
/ They Never Had It Better? Modernization of Everyday Life in Socialist
Yugoslavia, Museum of Yugoslav History, Belgrade, 2014.
14. Patterson, Patrick Hyder, Bought and Sold. Living and Losing the Good Life
in Socialist Yugoslavia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London, 2011.
15. Petranović, Branko, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988., Nolit, Belgrade, 1988.
16. Rihtman-Auguštin, Dunja, Etnologija naše svakodnevice, Školska knjiga,
Zagreb, 1988.
17. Ristović, Milan (ed.), Privatni život kod Srba u dvadesetom veku, Clio,
Belgrade, 2007.
18. Senjković, Reana, Izgubljeno u prijenosu. Pop iskustvo soc kulture, Institute
of Ethnology and Folklore, Zagreb, 2008.
19. Sklevicky, Lydia (prir. Dunja Rihtman-Auguštin), Konji, žene, ratovi,
Ženska infoteka, Zagreb, 1996.
20. Šuvar, Stipe, Sociološki presjek jugoslavenskog društva, Školska knjiga,
Zagreb, 1970.
21. Vučetić, Radina, Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslovenske
popularne kulture šezdesetih godina XX veka, Službeni glasnik, Belgrade,
2012.
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benefits and costs benefits and costs
Yugoslavia and Development
benefits
and costs
VLADIMIR GLIGOROV
The creation of Yugoslavia was not motivated by economic or
even social development, but its establishment was rather to serve
the usual reasons of the state – above all security, but also equity.
The latter, understood as the fulfillment of national – in the sense
of ethnic – rights and objectives, was also the basis for its legitima-
cy. However, no durable agreement was ever reached on the con-
stitutional framework of its national and Yugoslav legitimacy. In
the pursuit of an equitable solution to its national issues, the coun-
try was in a state of perpetual crisis of legitimacy. This unfulfilled
nationalism blocked its democratization and resulted in the adop-
tion of misguided decisions, among others also in the domain of
economic policy.
Both the economic and political history of Yugoslavia consists
of a series of ill-advised constitutional decisions and then inter-
mittent attempts to implement necessary reforms so as to recti-
fy these decisions. These decisions would regularly go on to prove
themselves as untenable since they were guided by the same,
mainly ethnic or national motives. Some form of dictatorship was
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
always seen as justified, above all from the perspective of securi-
ty. And then one form or other of territorial devolution was used
to seek out equity for national-territorial and economic interests.
At the same time, the external circumstances were not favora-
ble. The country needed (i) a liberal-democratic constitution in an
era of rising nationalism; (ii) the development of a private-owner-
ship-based economy open for exchange with the world in a time
of growing protectionism and totalitarianism and (iii) the rule of
law in revolutionary times. Favorable conditions for liberalization
and democratization occurred only on the eve of the country’s
dissolution.
During the last couple of decades after the break-up, seven ex-
Yugoslav states co-exist within a system of regional cooperation
that suffers from the same shortcomings as the former common
state. Thus the current situation seems as temporary and unnat-
ural as any of the Yugoslav structures from the inception of the
common state to its disappearance.
Even though the common state was conceived as a project in
modernization, both national and social, the overall consequence
of the Yugoslav political and economic explorations, which reg-
ularly brought about short-lived and misguided solutions, was
backwardness, and not only economic at that. This failure should
not be taken as proof against the project itself since neither before
nor after the existence of Yugoslavia have political instability and
a general lagging behind been removed. But history is not suita-
ble for counterfactual evaluation, except when speculating about
the future. In real time, let’s say towards the end of the 1980s, the
project of a democratic Yugoslavia was not inferior to its nation-
alist alternatives measured by what could be expected from those
alternatives. But nationalisms prevailed, and this is now history,
which needs to be explained. That the fall was so steep represents
a challenge to that explanation. But that is a matter of political
choice and not historical inevitability.
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benefits and costs benefits and costs
This text will deal with a historical overview of Yugoslavia’s eco-
nomic development and economic policy, with attention focusing
on the period after 1948. First, I’ll set out the theoretical frame-
work then I’ll show the most significant institutional and develop-
mental characteristics, then outline above all the fiscal dilemmas
of the joint state and finally, sketch out the economic development
after the dissolution, that is, during the last few decades. Separate-
ly, in short asides, I’ll focus on the financial crisis, the collapse of
economic reforms from the 1960s, the stagnation of the 1980s, the
unequal development of the new states, and the creation of a com-
mon market in 2006.
POLITICS BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM
Political history is not completely positivistic since it is based at
least on the tacit assumption that there are certain durable regu-
larities, if not full-scale historical laws. These regularities exist for
two reasons. One is the perpetual problems faced by those who
make political decisions. On the one hand, there is the need to
secure a certain level of public goods, above all security, and on
the other, there are changing circumstances, which require adjust-
ability in carrying out political objectives. The other reason is that
constitutional or other government solutions constrain the avail-
able set of means which can be used to resolve durable political
problems in changing external and internal circumstances. This
primarily concerns the constitutional framework that is the basis
for legitimacy, regardless of the fact how much support one gov-
ernment or another, one holder of office or another actually has.
On the other hand, economic history is at least partially auton-
omous in relation to political decisions and, in fact, is part of
the changing circumstances that have to be taken into account
in decision-making since both objectives and especially available
means are subject to change. This is due to both the development
of technology and changes in the significance and character of
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external economic relations. Foreign trade and public finances are
undoubtedly of great significance for small countries and small
economies. Yugoslavia was certainly a small country, at least from
the economic perspective. Even more so are the post-Yugoslav
countries that emerged after the break-up of the common state.
Bearing in mind the political circumstances and the economic
development of the 20th century, Yugoslavia represented a polit-
ical solution from the standpoint of the basic political problem,
the problem of security as a public good. The problem it perpetu-
ally faced, however, lay in the discrepancy between the nationalist
conception of politics and the economic need for liberal relations
both internally and externally. Consequently, the state could not
secure the desired level of equity and justice and was confront-
ed with social discontent regarding the level and distribution of
wealth.
On the one hand, the country was supposed to reconcile the
nationalist conception of equity with the liberal demands of eco-
nomic development. The latter, in turn, spurred social discon-
tent. The country fell apart when nationalism became the political
expression of social dissatisfaction. At the same time, the liberal-
democratic alternative was rejected. After the break-up, the slug-
gish and indecisive democratization and liberalization were the
cause of a relatively unsatisfactory political and economic devel-
opment, partly also due to misguided economic policy.
Therefore, the discord between nationalist objectives and liber-
al means is, simply put, the reason behind the perpetual instability
of the Yugoslav state and the practically constant adoption of mis-
guided, or at best, short-sighted political solutions.
A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT
The data on Yugoslavia’s development is not unknown and
therefore it is unnecessary to go into detail. Image 1 shows the
GDP per capita in steady dollars. From 1921 to the outbreak of
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benefits and costs benefits and costs
World War II, the country was not characterized by any exception-
al economic progress. In that, however, it was no different from
the majority of neighboring countries, whether it be, for example,
Greece, Hungary or Bulgaria. Partly this was the consequence of
demographic growth, but since we are talking about several dec-
ades, it is clear that on the whole the economy was stagnant and
that it is not possible to talk about any significant progress in rela-
tion to economic development on Yugoslav territory in the time
before the establishment of the common state.
Image 1: Yugoslavia, GDP per capita, steady dollar
Source: Maddison database
Development in the years after World War II, if we put aside the
years of the Soviet blockade, is characterized by significant eco-
nomic growth and development, if the latter is expressed, again, by
the per capita GDP. While in the first twenty years or so the GDP
per capita increased just under 40 percent, in the period from 1952
to 1979 it increased just under 5 times. As in both cases it was a
matter of rebuilding the country after great war devastation, there
is no doubt that Yugoslavia after World War II achieved an incom-
parably better economic development than it did after World War
I. Of course, one has to bear in mind that economic development
the world over was much faster, and not only compared to the
development in the period between the two great wars, but was in
fact much faster than in any previous period in history – at least to
the degree that such comparisons are at all possible.
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
This can also be seen by comparison with neighboring coun-
tries, all of which had successful economic growth in the peri-
od after World War II, before the end of 1970 and in the decade
that followed. Irrespective of statistical problems, due to which
comparisons are not always fruitful, there is no doubt that, for
example, Greece, Hungary and Bulgaria, not to mention the more
developed countries of Western Europe, also had accelerated eco-
nomic growth and development.
In fact, the 1980s are the key here. Namely, in that period all
socialist countries, including Yugoslavia, underwent economic
stagnation and decelerated growth. This can also be seen in Table 1.
In the period from 1979 to 1989 there is actually zero growth of per
capita income. A similar situation prevailed in neighbouring Bul-
garia and Hungary, but, for example, not in Greece. And if to this
group we add Austria, it becomes completely clear that this stagna-
tion was not a consequence of European, much less world, econom-
ic trends. In order to understand the break-up of Yugoslavia, this is
certainly the most important political and economic period.
This is followed by the 1990s, which, up to 1993–1994, brought a
reduction of economic activity by about roughly a half, even though
it was about a third smaller than in the years 1979, 1989 and 1999.
Recovery begins again after 2000 – and for all ex-Yugoslav countries
together it is such that on the whole the levels from 1979 and 1989
are reached again. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind the demo-
graphic changes, which are now negative, for a part of the popula-
tion was lost due to the wars, due to a negative birthrate, and due to
emigration. All the same, when the GDP per capita is in question,
for about thirty years, for all ex-Yugoslav states taken together, it
barely marked an increase. In other words, the country or countries
had stagnated for practically three decades.
Finally, economic development ground to a halt or was signifi-
cantly slowed down – if not completely negative – after 2008, as a
consequence of the global financial crisis. Some ex-Yugoslav states
414
benefits and costs benefits and costs
fared better than others – which in itself neccessitates an explana-
tion. In this context, the role of the liberalization of trade both with
the European Union, as well as regionally by the establishment of a
regional free trade zone known as CEFTA (Central European Free
Trade Agreement), was of great significance. The European Union
had opened its market to those ex-Yugoslav countries that had not
joined the EU like Slovenia in 2001. CEFTA, in turn, had inherited
bilateral free trade agreements when it was established in 2006. In
any case, one cannot stress enough the importance of foreign trade
for these very small ex-Yugoslav economies.
In the century between the establishment of Yugoslavia and
the present, development was either slow or unsustainable. In the
entire period, however, there was no political stability either in
Yugoslavia, or between the newly independent states, and not even
within them internally. And this irrespective of the great, in real-
ity revolutionary, changes and independently of the different con-
stitutional reforms and political changes, including changes in eco-
nomic policy. The common country, as well as the independent
states, did not aspire towards democratization, while liberalization
measures were often confronted by suspicion about who was bet-
ter and who worse off. Non-democratic solutions and the non-lib-
eral economic policy temporarily contributed to stabilization, but
in the long run they signified the abandonment of a more dura-
ble political community. The consequence of this discord between
nationalist interests and liberal means of economic development is
the long-term lagging behind of the Yugoslav countries.
There is no simple explanation for this stagnation. Geographical-
ly, Yugoslavia is in the immediate vicinity of the developed world,
so this backwardness, if one can call it such, could not be explained
by geographic isolation from the advanced part of the world. More-
over, at least at the time of stagnation during the 1980s, external cir-
cumstances in fact favored the political changes that were necessary
in order for the country to join the developed part of the world. So
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
that the lack of development and lagging behind, especially during
the last forty years, can only be explained by the decisions made by
the Yugoslav authorities, the authorities of the Yugoslav republics
and autonomous provinces, and the authorities of the newly inde-
pendent states – and not in the last resort by the citizens.
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES
Bearing in mind the permanent instability of the country, it is
not unimportant to see whether dissatisfaction was based on the
enduring bias of the political and economic system towards one
or another region. Again, the data for development after World
War II is better and more easily compared than the data for the
period between the two great wars. Also, it can be analyzed more
or less in detail. Still, a rough picture of comparative development
can be gained on the basis of differences in per capita income.
Table 1: GNP per capita in 1910 (US dollar exchange rate in 1970)
Germany 958 Dalmatia 650
Austria 810 Bosnia 546
Czech Republic 819 Croatia 542
Hungary 616 Serbia 462
Italy 546 Transylvania 542
Greece 455 Russia 398
Source: Palairet, The Balkan Economy. CUP, 1997. pp. 233.
For the period before the establishment of Yugoslavia there are
varying assessments of differences in development and one of these
is given in Table 1. The data for Slovenia and Macedonia is missing,
but the differences in development could not have been too great
because even the differences in relation to Austria and the Czech
Republic are not as great as they would be later. In any case, region-
al differences, which were to dominate the (economic and political)
debates in both Yugoslavias, do not appear to be such as to repre-
sent an insurmountable obstacle to creating a common state.
416
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For the period between the two wars the quality of the data
leaves something to be desired. This was due, among other things,
to frequent changes in internal regions. Probably the most influen-
tial was the claim by Rudolf Bićanić that more developed regions,
which had been a part of Austria-Hungary before the unification
(of Yugoslavia), were paying higher agrarian land tax rates than
Serbia, Montenegro and Dalmatia. Table 2 provides a cumulative
review for the period before the Great Economic Depression.
Table 2: Land tax, 1919–1928
Indirect Tax per Taxes in
Percentage of
taxes (in capita Serbia 100
the total tax
dinars mil.) (in dinars) dinars
Slovenia 1411 13,9 1336 240
Croatia and
2123 20,9 915 160
Slavonia
Dalmatia 296 22,9 454 80
Bosnia and
1312 12,9 634 110
Herzegovina
Vojvodina 2550 25,2 1864 330
Serbia and
2420 23,9 559 100
Montenegro
Total or
10.112 100 777
average
Izvor: Bićanić
Differences in tax burdens would be the subject of political dis-
putes throughout the entire history of Yugoslavia as the common
country. An additional subject of disagreement was the expend-
iture of public funds in which it was usually claimed that great-
er investments are being poured into less developed areas – that
is, into Serbia between the two wars – and fewer into the more
developed. As agriculture was the dominant economic activity in
the first Yugoslavia, data on different agrarian land tax burdens
is undoubtedly significant. It is important to note that with time
the budget was less dependent on indirect taxes – which included
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
agrarian land tax – and that these made up about 50 percent of the
budget immediately after the establishment of the common state,
falling to about a third of overall tax revenue before World War II,
while the share in the budget from immediate taxes and revenues
from state enterprises went up. Before the war the overall sum of
the latter was just below from what it was from indirect taxes.
The main objection during that period, however, was that the
tax burden of the more developed areas had increased in the tran-
sition from Austria-Hungary to the Yugoslav state. This undoubt-
edly continued to be a hot topic later as well when tax burdens
in Yugoslavia were compared to the ones in the newly independ-
ent states. It must be said that it is not unexpected that a new state
should invest more in its underdeveloped areas because it is rea-
sonable to expect that regional differences should decrease after
state unification. After all, this is the key economic rationale in
establishing any common state. Therefore, this was to become the
second most important topic of debate – could Yugoslavia secure
the kind of economic growth that would lead to an evening-out of
the level of economic growth in all of its regions, could it lead to a
convergence in the per capita income levels?
The data is not reliable in the case of the first Yugoslavia, but
since the overall growth was modest, it would not be realistic to
expect that a particularly significant increase of regional differenc-
es had taken place. Besides, if and to the degree that it happened,
the effects of negative international economic trends would in all
likelihood have to be greater than any domestic redistribution of
funds. This, of course, doesn’t change the substance of the prob-
lem of equity, both as regards the less developed as well as the
more developed regions because all expectations are that, in the
long run, the state would secure a convergence of the levels of
per capita income between the regions. To put it another way, it
would be reasonable to expect that less developed areas have faster
418
benefits and costs benefits and costs
economic growth than more developed areas in order to even out
the levels of the standard of living throughout the country.
It is not very likely that this occurred in the first Yugoslavia,
but the interesting question here is whether the second Yugosla-
via secured faster economic growth for the less developed repub-
lics and provinces? This is the subject of enormous amounts of
research, but the rough and very general answer is not particularly
contentious. In other words, there was no obvious convergence in
economic development between the particular regions. This can
be seen in Table 3
Tabela 3: GDP per capita (Slovenia = 100, unless stated otherwise)
year 1952 1965 1974 1980 1989 19971) 1999 2)
Slovenia 100 100 100 100 100 100 10.078
Croatia 66.7 65.8 62.5 64.1 64.1 48.0 6464
Vojvodina 49.1 60.9 58.0 57.1 59.6 24.3 6006
Serbia (minor) 56.7 52.2 48.0 49.5 52.0 18.9 5243
Serbia (with
Vojvodina and 51.5 50.0 45.0 45.5 46.0 17.1 4632
Kosovo)
Montenegro 48.5 41.3 34.0 39.9 36.9 16.1 3716
Bosnia and
52.6 39.1 33.0 33.3 34.3 10.2 3461
Herzegovina
Macedonia 39.2 36.4 34.0 33.8 33.3 20.3 3359
Kosovo 25.7 19.6 16.0 14.1 12.6 5.1 1272
1) D
ata for 1997. refer to gross material product per capita for all Yugoslav republics
(including Kosovo) and gross domestic product for other countries.
2) Th
e actual GDP per capita (in USD according to the exchange rate) for Slovenia
and the hypothetically achievable level of GDP per capita (in USD according to
the exchange rate) for other republics, assuming that the differences in the region
(measured according to the GDP per capita) are the same as in 1989.
Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
for 1997 and 1999 and the OECD for other years.
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
Slovenia’s GDP per capita equals 100. As can be seen from the
table, the Croatian per capita GDP was about two thirds of Slove-
nia’s, the Serbian about half, the autonomous province of Vojvo-
dina’s about 60 percent, while the other republics and provinces
trailed behind with roughly a third of Slovenia’s per capita GDP.
Kosovo lagged behind mainly because of its high birth rate – but
its overall (economic) growth rate was even a little higher than in
other parts of the country. The less developed regions underwent
slower progress in the first period after 1952, which, at least in part,
was due to isolation from external markets after the introduction
of the so-called Iron Curtain. It is also important to note that there
were no further negative consequences as regards their develop-
ment, especially if one takes into account the demographic chang-
es, after the changes in the economic system in the mid-1960s.
Generally speaking, one could not say that Yugoslavia had
managed to secure convergent development for different parts
of the country. In fact, particularly after the systemic changes in
the mid-1960s, it seems that regional development, in better and
worse times, was fairly balanced. Regional differences were not
small – with the exception of Kosovo, up to a ratio of 1 to 3 – but
such differences are not unheard of in many complex countries.
However, the fact that over time they did not change significant-
ly, and particularly that they were not significantly reduced, points
to systemic deficiencies and also challenges the economic ration-
ale of the political, especially the nationalist, disputes – the latter
particularly if one takes into account the difference in employ-
ment and unemployment. Table 4 gives the rates of unemploy-
ment from 1952 to just before the break-up.
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Table 4: Unemployment rate in %
year 1952 1965 1974 1980 1989
Slovenia 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.4 3.2
Croatia 2.9 5.6 4.8 5.2 8.0
Serbia (minor) 2.5 7.4 11.3 15.8 15.6
Serbia (including Vojvodina
2.6 7.1 11.5 16.1 17.6
and Kosovo)
Vojvodina 2.9 4.5 8.9 12.4 13.6
Kosovo 2.6 15.2 21.0 27.6 36.4
Montenegro 3.2 5.1 12.7 14.7 21.5
Macedonia 6.3 13.5 19.7 21.5 21.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.5 4.8 9.7 14.1 20.3
Source: OECD
It is clear from the above that the less developed areas were,
partly due to higher demographic activity, much worse off in
terms of the labor market than the developed areas. In truth, the
high unemployment rate that was especially prominent in the
1980s has remained a structural economic characteristic for the
majority of the new independent states to this day. The causes are
surely not the same, at least not entirely. It is important to point
to the durability of low employment and high unemployment
even in Croatia after it became independent, but it is particularly
important to do so in the other regions and states. Slovenia is an
exception here – and this is of notable significance in explaining
the dissolution of the common country – because Slovenia was
a leader among the secessionists, at least from around 1988. This
casts doubt on the explanation for the country’s break-up, which
states that it is to be found in Yugoslavia’s economic failure and
the failure of its economic system, which was biased in favor of
the underdeveloped regions and against the more developed ones.
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
Image 2: National income per capita
Source: Maddison database
After the break-up of the country, there was a great increase in
regional differences, that is, in differences pertaining to the eco-
nomic activity of the states that emerged from Yugoslavia. Table
3 also gives the state of affairs at the end of the 1990s, when these
differences, due to the consequences of the wars, were the greatest.
In the meantime there came about a relative convergence, which
can partly be discerned from Image 2, but nevertheless today’s dif-
ferences are greater than in any period of Yugoslav history and if
one is to believe the data from admittedly not very reliable sourc-
es, regional differences were also smaller before the establishment
of the common state in 1918.
All in all, Yugoslavia was not a country with convergent econom-
ic development, but neither was it particularly biased, negatively
or positively, towards the less developed areas, at least if we are to
judge by the growth of the per capita income. The overall develop-
ment, expressed as per capita income, can be seen pretty clearly in
Image 2. The differences between the republics did not change sig-
nificantly (Kosovo is the exception due to its demographic growth),
and then increased in relation to Slovenia and later in relation to
Croatia as well, while the others converged, especially with Serbia.
422
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Concerning employment and social development, the less devel-
oped areas were on the whole lagging behind. A more detailed
analysis would certainly show that development in different seg-
ments and particular fields was not unequivocal, especially where
education and the development of industrial production are con-
cerned, but this would not be of crucial importance in explaining
stability and the sustainability of the economy and the state.
REFORM AND DEADLOCK
Most attention has probably been focused on studying the self-
management system and the economic reforms of the mid-1960s.
The motivation was as much political as it was economic. Financ-
es from abroad also played an important role, as did bilateral aid
and multilateral credits and finally access to the foreign financial
market. The political limitation was maintenance of the one-party
monopoly of power.
Generally speaking, socialist reforms followed the strategy –
first economic, and then political reform – in other words, first
liberalization of the market, and then democratization. The pro-
gram of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia from 1958 con-
tains a clear ranking of alternative systems. A multi-party democ-
racy was more acceptable than the Soviet system if socialist self-
management and non-party pluralism proved to be unsustaina-
ble, in the sense that they are neither economically nor politically
more progressive than alternative systems. One could, therefore,
say that democratization was seen as the political exit strategy if it
turned out that there was no other way to maintain political sta-
bility and economic development.
One problem was the nationalization of investments. A key
systemic difference between capitalism and socialism was – and
as a matter of fact, still is – who initiates investment decisions?
The nationalization of assets was the precondition for the state
to monopolize investment decisions. Investments were financed
423
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
from the profits of companies that were in state ownership on the
basis of a central plan. This is the very essence of the Soviet system
which was established by Stalin’s collectivization and nationaliza-
tion of the 1930s. In the beginning, self-management was seen as a
transfer of the management role to the economic collectives, that
is, companies. The reforms of the sixties brought about a change
in ownership relations, state property became social property and
thus the central, state-owned investment fund was abolished. With
it went the system of central planning, too. The power to decide on
investments was conferred, at least nominally, on the companies
which themselves – albeit in the name of society – were owned by
the workers employed in them. Finally, and probably most impor-
tantly, normal trade and financial relations with the world were
established, mediated by commercial banks. This, in turn, necessi-
tated conducting the usual monetary and fiscal policy.
The final motivation, however, was that the next reform and
future economic and political adaptations would lead to privati-
zation and democratization. And truly, with certain constitution-
al solutions and changes to the electoral system from the begin-
ning of the sixties, it seemed as if things were starting to move in
that direction. To this one should add the opening up of borders
and an increase in international cooperation. All these system-
ic changes had a temporary character and the next changes were
to involve privatization and democratization. At least, this is how
things looked in the mid-sixties.
The reforms turned out to be a political failure. Their contin-
uation was abandoned, while political changes took a complete-
ly different, if not unexpected, course. Privatization was stopped
by the student protests of 1968, while democratization was halt-
ed by nationalist movements that threatened to bring about the
break-up of the country, also occurring in 1968. The result was
that the majority of economic changes were kept, although lat-
er certain elements of the economic system were modified so as
424
benefits and costs benefits and costs
to harmonize with the political changes. The latter, on the other
hand, went mainly in the direction of strengthening the republics
and provinces at the expense of the federation. Of key importance
here were the changes to the banking system and the system of
public finances. In a sense, nationalization (by the republics and
provinces – trans.) of assets and taxpayers came about.
The research, both foreign and domestic, most frequently
focused on the wrong issues. Foreign economic research, which
was extensive, focused with special intensity on the performance
of self-management companies and their drawbacks that were to
be expected if one started out from the assumptions of econom-
ic theory. On the other hand, domestic studies were devoted to
the country’s downgrading mostly from the legal or constitution-
al aspects, as well as to the shortcomings of a decentralized social-
ist system in which it was not possible to control wages or invest-
ments from a center, since the federation lacked above all the fis-
cal, but also political instruments necessary..
Of crucial importance, however, was the relinquishing of fur-
ther democratization, which came about in order to preserve sta-
bility – and was achieved by a return to authoritarianism and by
a redistribution of national competencies. A debate similar to the
one conducted in the first Yugoslavia, above all after the territori-
al reorganization of 1939, was renewed. This turnabout also deter-
mined the political disputes and their solutions which ultimately
led to the break-up of the country.
How did a system created to stop economic reforms function?
During the 1970s, monetary policy was mainly used to make sure
that the economy did business with a negative real interest rate.
This was a key macroeconomic fact. As the federal government
had very limited powers in the domain of fiscal policy, monetary
policy was the most important instrument of overall economic
policy. Details are not of paramount importance; it is sufficient to
point out that interest rates were lower than the rate of inflation
425
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
in conditions of what was practically a fixed rate of exchange. As
a consequence, this led to an increase of investment and spend-
ing, financed by foreign loans and a growth in imports. As mon-
ey was cheap globally in the seventies, this kind of economic poli-
cy was not at odds with what was going on, not only in the devel-
oped countries of the world, but in some socialist countries as well.
Yugoslavia probably fared better than most because its foreign
debt was to a large degree funneled into investments, while in oth-
er socialist countries, for example the Soviet Union, it was directed
towards spending (on wheat imports, for example). Nevertheless,
a great disparity in the trade balance developed, while foreign debt
accumulated. All the way up to the economic crash of the eighties.
The economic system created in the mid-sixties was supposed
to increase the efficiency of investments and spur competitiveness
on foreign markets. The sum of reform measures undertaken then
were not that different from those undertaken by countries at the
time of abandoning socialism at the end of the eighties and begin-
ning of the nineties. The regime of the foreign exchange rate was
balanced out, central banks were empowered to deal with infla-
tion, while the fiscal system was meant to secure the sustainabil-
ity of public finances. Finally, commercial banks were established
that took deposits in hard currency and gradually became capa-
ble of taking out foreign loans and financing the investments of
domestic companies. Direct foreign investments were not possi-
ble, and neither were private domestic investments – shortcom-
ings that were intended to be eliminated at a later date. The system
thus established was capable of recycling foreign assets, as well as
of monetary subsidies to the economy – which in fact it did do
once further reforms were relinquished. So the system that was
established to increase the efficiency of the economy was ultimate-
ly used to sustain self-management companies, national budgets
and buying stability by increasing spending.
426
benefits and costs benefits and costs
The seventies were the time when this system produced favora-
ble results. Much research sees this period – and the short peri-
od of Ante Markovic’s government in 1990 – as the golden age of
Yugoslavia. The dinar was strong, imported goods were accessible,
investments raised the economy’s capacities, and in the infrastruc-
ture was partially renewed or enlarged. Remittances from abroad
also made a certain contribution since in the sixties a great num-
ber of workers had emigrated to Germany and other countries
that enjoyed faster growth than there was available work force.
Thus a macroeconomic system was established that in certain ele-
ments persisted mainly in Serbia up until the crisis of 2008–2009.
FOREIGN TRADE
Judging by the data of the Yugoslav National Bank, the balance of
trade in the first Yugoslavia was on the whole equalized. The econ-
omy was pretty closed, measured by the ratio of imports to exports
and domestic production. It was a matter of some ten percent, that
is, around twenty if overall foreign exchange was taken into account.
In part this was a consequence of the economic trends immediate-
ly after World War I, when inflation was a problem throughout
Europe, and then came the Great Depression when foreign trade
was reduced everywhere. In later years, the state attempted to uti-
lize protection measures, which curtailed imports, but also exports
since there would occasionally be a ban on exporting agricultural
goods, which was the most important export commodity.
In the second Yugoslavia, financing from abroad played a sig-
nificant role and thus imports were on the whole greater than
exports. Still, the trade deficit began to be significant only after
the economic reforms of the sixties, and became particularly so
after the political stabilization at the beginning of the seventies.
Apart from the policies of the exchange rate (relatively stable) and
of prices (accelerated inflation), a significant role was played by
increasing remittances from abroad. Also, in the second half of
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III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
the seventies especially, loans taken abroad also played a signifi-
cant role. By the end of the seventies, exports covered imports by
about 50 percent. The balance of services was positive due to tran-
sit revenues, as well as growing tourism, so that, if remittances
from workers abroad are taken into account, the current account
of the balance of payments showed a lesser deficit. This character-
istic will endure in the majority of the newly – independent states,
at least until the crisis of 2008–2009.
Table 5: Trade flows in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Including end products and intermediate goods)
Placement on the local market, in % GDP
1970 1976 1983 1987
Slovenia 53,6 60,9 42,4 57,5
Croatia 62,6 66,1 59,7 67,0
Vojvodina 49,0 58,8 54,8 58,1
Serbia (minor) 58,9 64,0 52,1 62,3
Serbia (incl. Vojvodina and Kosovo) 67,0 71,3 60,9 69,0
Montenegro 50,8 59,9 54,4 57,5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 50,5 61,4 49,1 56,1
Macedonia 63,2 61,9 55,3 60,8
Kosovo 57,6 56,8 58,2 64,6
YUGOSLAVIA TOTAL 58,6 63,0 53,4 62,2
Placement in other regions, in % GDP
1970 1976 1983 1987
Slovenia 28,7 22,0 15,7 20,3
Croatia 21,8 19,0 14,8 18,7
Vojvodina 40,1 30,1 22,5 28,8
Serbia (minor) 23,7 21,1 16,5 17,4
Serbia (incl. Vojvodina and Kosovo) 18,0 14,8 10,9 13,4
Montenegro 40,6 22,6 21,0 25,0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 36,6 22,7 18,6 24,2
Macedonia 23,1 23,1 18,1 21,4
Kosovo 34,7 25,7 19,2 24,0
YUGOSLAVIA TOTAL 26,3 21,9 16,6 19,9
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benefits and costs benefits and costs
Export, in % GDP
1970 1976 1983 1987
Slovenia 17,7 17,1 41,9 22,2
Croatia 15,6 14,9 25,5 14,3
Vojvodina 10,9 11,1 22,7 13,1
Serbia (minor) 17,4 14,9 31,4 20,3
Serbia (incl. Vojvodina and Kosovo) 15,0 13,9 28,2 17,6
Montenegro 8,6 17,5 24,6 17,5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12,9 15,9 32,3 19,8
Macedonia 13,7 15,0 26,6 17,8
Kosovo 7,7 17,5 22,6 11,4
YUGOSLAVIA TOTAL 15,1 15,1 30,0 17,9
Source: OECD
Table 5 contains data on domestic and foreign trade. As can
be seen, the domestic market was certainly much more impor-
tant than the foreign market, a characteristic which will again per-
sist even after the break-up of the country, albeit not in Slovenia,
while things begin to change under the influence of the crisis of
the eighties. The role of this crisis is also visible in Table 5.
429
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
Table 6 : Trade in Southeast Europe (1980–1985)
Exports in % of total value Imports in % of total value
country Bulgaria Romania Yugoslavia Bulgaria Romania Yugoslavia
to/from 1980. 1981. 1985. 1980. 1981. 1985.
Bulgaria — 1.4 1.5 — 1.7 1.0
Romania 2.2 — 1.2 1.9 — 1.0
Yugoslavia 1.6 — — 1.1 — —
Austria 0.9 2.0 2.5 1.7 1.8 3.3
Germany 1)
2.6 7.2 8.4 4.8 5.7 13.6
Greece 3.8 2.5 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.9
Hungary 1.9 2.0 2.8 1.9 2.0 2.4
Italy 1.4 3.3 9.2 1.4 2.0 8.5
USSR 49.9 18.1 30.5 57.3 18.2 15.5
Turkey 1.1 — — 0.1 — —
SEE-12) 5.7 3.4 5.5 4.9 3.7 4.4
SEE-23) 10.6 6.0 6.9 5.6 4.5 5.3
1) West Germany
2) S EE-1 (Southeast Europe – 1) Includes Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia.
3) SEE-2 (Southeast Europe – 2) Includes SEE-1 with Greece and Turkey..
Source: The Vienna Institute for Iinternational Economic Studies
Right after the outbreak of the crisis at the beginning of the eight-
ies, exports show a significant growth in relation to GDP. Moreo-
ver, this whole decade will show a much more equalized trade bal-
ance than the previous decade. The overall picture becomes even
better if we add the export of services, which became very sig-
nificant with the development of tourism. Generally speaking, if
overall foreign exchange is taken into account, Yugoslavia in the
period after the economic reforms (of the 1960s) was trade-wise a
significantly more open country than the majority of the succes-
sor states after the break-up, but before the crisis of 2008–2009.
430
benefits and costs benefits and costs
Table 7: Trade in Southeast Europe (1990.)
Exports in % of total value Imports in % of total value
country
Bulgaria Romania Yugoslavia Bulgaria Romania Yugoslavia
to/from
Bulgaria — 1.9 0.7 — 2.3 0.8
Romania 3.9 — 1.2 1.3 — 0.6
Yugoslavia 1.0 — — 0.9 — —
Austria 0.5 1.2 4.0 1.6 1.7 5.8
Germany 1)
4.2 11.0 17.1 10.4 11.4 19.3
Greece 0.8 1.5 1.5 0.3 0.7 1.1
Hungary 1.2 2.6 1.4 0.7 2.4 2.6
Italy 0.8 8.8 17.3 1.9 1.2 13.0
USSR 64.0 25.2 18.6 56.5 23.6 13.0
Turkey 0.4 — — 0.2 — —
SEE-12) 6.1 4.5 3.3 2.9 4.7 4.0
SEE-2 3)
7.2 5.9 4.8 3.4 5.4 5.1
1) Including West and East Germany
2) SEE-1 (Southeast Europe – 1) Includes Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia.
3) SEE-2 (Southeast Europe – 2) Includes SEE-1 with Greece and Turkey.
Source: The Vienna Institute for Iinternational Economic Studies
It is also interesting to note the change in trade partners dur-
ing the crisis of the 1980s. Tables 6 and 7 contain some compara-
tive data. The second half of the eighties sees a significant increase
of exports to Germany and Italy, which will go on to become the
most significant trade partners of the newly-emerged independ-
ent states as well. Imports from these two countries were already
significant earlier. In any case, Yugoslavia had an increasingly
open economy in the period after the economic reforms of the
sixties.
431
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
THE LOST DECADE
The eighties were of key significance not only for Yugoslavia,
but for the European socialist world as a whole. If we look at Imag-
es 1 and 2 it is clear that this was a decade in which the economy
stagnated. From Tables 3 and 4 it can be seen that certain republics
fared better than others, especially where employment was con-
cerned. But in terms of economic growth there is practically lit-
tle difference between the regions. The case was similar with oth-
er socialist countries, even though the reasons were different. In
some, like Yugoslavia, the problem was high foreign debt, while
in others it was the drop in prices of oil and other raw materials.
Yugoslavia practically went bankrupt in 1981–1982 because it
was unable to pay back its foreign debt. The reason for this was
that monetary policy had changed in the United States and there
was a sudden jump in interest rates. Given that at the time the for-
eign trade deficit of Yugoslavia was really huge, the further financ-
ing of imports through foreign loans was not sustainable and thus
it was necessary to rebalance imports and exports. Furthermore, it
was necessary to secure the refinancing of already existing loans at
much higher, and from the position of the country’s trade capabil-
ities, unsustainable interest rates. A reduction of the foreign trade
deficit required a significant correction to the dinar exchange rate,
while financing of debt called for finding new sources of revenue.
The country, however, could not adapt quickly enough and actual-
ly never managed to fully adapt all the way up to its very breakup.
Why?
The reason was of a systemic nature. It is necessary to bear in
mind three key characteristics.
The first was the dispute over the dinar exchange rate. Deval-
uation would redistribute expenditures among the republics. The
issue of hard currency earnings from tourism was particular-
ly sensitive. The export sector, especially tourism, would certain-
ly gain from devaluation, while sellers on the domestic market
432
benefits and costs benefits and costs
would be worse off. There was no mechanism of compensation,
mainly because the fiscal system had changed significantly in the
meantime so that the federal budget no longer had the neces-
sary means to compensate those who fared worse from revenue
achieved by taxing those who fared better. The central bank used
the hard currency rate of exchange and selective lines of credit
to compensate, but this only increased the disputes because the
terms were inequitable in a matter that should have been equita-
ble. In fact, in this way the central bank incurred obligations that
could then easily be turned into losses and thus into fiscal expend-
iture for the republics and provinces.
The second characteristic was the expectation that credit would
be worth less when it became payable because a negative interest
rate would be ascribed to it. In conditions of loss of value of the
exchange rate, it would have been necessary for inflation not to
compensate corrections to the nominal exchange rate. This would
have, however, required a significant change in the behavior of
companies, which, in turn, did not show a willingness to sacri-
fice implicit subvention through accelerated inflation. And so the
entire decade was marked by losses in the exchange rate and a
parallel acceleration of inflation. The correction of the trade defi-
cit was more a consequence of the inability to finance it and less a
result of exchange rate and monetary policies.
The third characteristic is probably the most important. As a
consequence of social and national resistance to economic reforms,
one was precluded from selling property as a means to finance for-
eign debt. At the beginning of the crisis in 1981–1982, foreign debt
made up less than a third of the overall Yugoslav product. Interest
rate obligations were not small, but they in no way exceeded sev-
eral percentage points of the domestic product. It would have been
relatively easy to turn the debt into foreign investment if compa-
nies had been allowed to issue shares so as to secure the necessary
financing. This was not feasible because of the ownership system
433
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
which precluded the sale of property, especially to foreigners, but
also to private individuals in general, and because it could also
lead to the spilling-over of obligations and profits across the bor-
ders of republics and provinces, which was politically very hard to
swallow. It was not until 1988 that agreement was reached with the
International Monetary Fund about solidarity in sharing responsi-
bility for the foreign debt of the country.
These obstacles to a relatively quick solution to the problem
of foreign debt made it very difficult to start up economic pro-
duction in improved macroeconomic conditions, which ultimate-
ly resulted in the economy stagnating for a whole decade with
the constant acceleration of inflation and growth of the unem-
ployment rate. Only at the end of 1989 the government of Ante
Marković embarked on changing these systemic characteristics,
which in the short term led to improved economic trends in 1990,
but also to a renewed economic crisis at the end of that year and
finally to the break-up of the country in 1991.
During that entire decade, the advocates of liberal economic
solutions and democratic political legitimacy could not garner
public support for the necessary changes while, at the same time,
the influence of the nationalists grew until they finally prevailed
in Serbia, after which the break-up of the country was inevitable.
The more developed republics repeatedly highlighted the inequity
of the fiscal system, which was the alleged cause of the overspill of
their assets to less developed regions, while in Serbia the interest
in new territorial delimitation along ethnic lines prevailed. While
fiscal problems were solvable, territorial delineation along ethnic
lines naturally signified the end of the common state.
BREAKDOWN AND SETBACK
Practically from the very inception of the common state, the
distribution of gains and expenditures between its constituent
parts was the key topic of debate and dispute. The constitutional
434
benefits and costs benefits and costs
framework was never accepted by certain national (ethnic) com-
munities and in certain places local control of the territory was
disputed. In the economic domain, the fiscal system was deemed
inequitable by practically all sides. In the end, the country broke
apart over the dispute of who was paying how much into the com-
mon coffer. This, of course, was just the rationalization. Howev-
er, this dispute was to be expected given that the diminishment of
fiscal powers by the federal government had been a key demand
from 1968 up to the break – up itself. There was thus first a fiscal
devolution, which was thoroughgoing and practically complete,
and then the Fund for the Underdeveloped, which was practically
the only remaining fiscal instrument for the reallocation of assets,
became the focus of disputes, and then finally even the central
bank, which intervened with selective credits thus causing differ-
ent regional consequences, became a contentious issue.
What was the specific problem with the Central Bank and the
banking system as a whole? In the period of adaptation to the crisis
of foreign debt during the eighties, the financial picture changed
in such a way that the developed republics had a trade surplus in
exchange with the less developed republics and the province of
Kosovo. In other words, the country had divided itself into cred-
itor and debtor republics. The financial significance of Slovenia
grew markedly. In part this was a consequence of the Fund for the
Underdeveloped, even though it was precisely the more developed
republics, above all Croatia and Slovenia, which sought its abolish-
ment. However, to the degree that money really moved from, let’s
say, Slovenia to Macedonia, goods followed the money, too. So the
republics that had paid more money into the Fund for the Under-
developed and then left it were also the republics who sold more
of their goods to the less developed republics and the province of
Kosovo. This was simply the domestic balance of payments: that
domestic trade was financed by credits from the more developed
republics, turning them into creditor republics, while the lesser
435
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
developed regions became the debtors. Because of this financial
asymmetry, measures that would in one way or another assist the
financial recovery of the debtors were not acceptable to the credi-
tor republics. But if the balance of power at the level of the federal
government had changed, that could have become feasible.
In this context, the rise of nationalism in Serbia was of special
concern. The motives of the Serbian nationalists were neither eco-
nomic nor predominantly financial (apart from personal interest,
of course). Instead, they sought a change in the balance of power
at the federal level with the objective of revising the existing con-
stitution and making possible territorial corrections. And truly,
the Serbian nationalist movement was a combination of anti-lib-
eral social demands from 1968 and nationalist territorial demands
above all towards the provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo – trans.),
but implicitly also towards other regions (in other republics) pop-
ulated by Serbs (so-called ‘Serbian lands’ – trans.). These politi-
cal objectives brought about the break-up of the country. But the
country never functioned well economically either, and the neces-
sary reforms were not in harmony with any of the Yugoslav actors’
nationalist interests.
COSTS OF THE BREAK UP
The nineties were economically bad for all the states that
emerged out of Yugoslavia except for Slovenia. There was a dis-
ruption of trade ties, except for those within the rump Yugosla-
via (Serbia and Montenegro – trans.), and between Bosnia-Her-
zegovina and neighboring Serbia and Croatia, but the scope of
that exchange was significantly less than before the break-up
and the wars. Table 3 shows the difference of the real per capita
income in relation to the income that would have been achieved
had long-term relations with the Slovenian economy been main-
tained. So that during the nineties all other emerging Yugoslav
countries started lagging significantly behind Slovenia, but also
436
benefits and costs benefits and costs
behind other European countries. From Image 2 it can be seen
that in practically all the newly-emerged Yugoslav states the lev-
el of the per capita income at the beginning of the second decade
of the 21st century was on a par with the level achieved during the
seventies or eighties (given that the eighties were marked by stag-
nation). In other words., the countries in question had lost about
three decades of development. If we take into account that the
bigger countries – Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina – did not
achieve visible growth in the period from 2008 until today, then
we can even talk about four decades of stagnation. Only Slovenia
had positive growth, even though by certain indicators, today it
too is further away from the European developed countries than
it was at the end of the seventies or the end of the eighties.
All in all, it is difficult to talk about the economic benefits of
leaving Yugoslavia. Furthermore, if one is to compare tax burdens,
especially bearing in mind the gains of such tax expenditures, and
putting aside defense spending, which in the second Yugoslavia
was considerable and today is much reduced, it is difficult to claim
that the newly-emerged states are less of a burden to the taxpayers
and the economy. It neither runs counter to logic nor simple fact
that smaller states pose a greater burden on taxpayers (with the
exception of micro-states, but only Montenegro qualifies as such),
simply for reasons of the economy of scope.
Finally, in terms of democratization and liberalization, the
newly-independent states, with the exception of Slovenia, are
more restricted than Yugoslavia, or at least this has only started
to change very recently. Democratization is incomplete and a few
of the newly-emerged states are going through a constitutional
limbo. Slovenia and Croatia have become European Union mem-
bers, a fact that has a stabilizing effect on the economy and on
political relations, but the rest of the former Yugoslavia has not
achieved a more durable stabilization of the democratic system of
decision-making.
437
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
REGIONAL COOPERATION
After the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and particularly after the
war in Kosovo, the international community, especially the Unit-
ed States and the European Union, formulated a policy of region-
al cooperation with the idea that increased economic coopera-
tion would bring about political stabilization and normalization.
The European Union has invested substantial effort in mobiliz-
ing interest in regional cooperation principally among the former
Yugoslav states. Probably the most important such regional pro-
ject is the regional free trade zone known as CEFTA. It was estab-
lished in 2006 after existing bilateral agreements on free trade
developed into a regional agreement. The European Union addi-
tionally supported this project by first removing customs barri-
ers on imports from the Yugoslav countries, and then concluding
with them Agreements on Stabilization and Association which
would ultimately lead to European Union membership. With
CEFTA and free trade with the European Union, liberalization
finally prevailed in the newly-emerged Yugoslav states.
What is the possible contribution of liberalization to econom-
ic development? This is particularly interesting because the cri-
sis that took hold of the Yugoslav states from 2008 up to the pre-
sent has a lot in common with the crisis from the beginning of the
eighties. In the same way, the period that preceded the crisis has
much in common with the period from the seventies. Thus these
two distinct crisis periods and their consequences are comparable.
Development after 2000, which represents a kind of new begin-
ning for the entire region since both (Croatian strongman) Fran-
jo Tuđman and (Serbian strongman) Slobodan Milošević exit-
ed the political stage, has the same characteristics of uneven pro-
gress as the period of the seventies. Trade deficits increase, foreign
debt becomes greater, and unemployment has not been reduced
to an acceptable level.. The last is noteworthy among other things
because many explanations for the growth of unemployment
438
benefits and costs benefits and costs
in Yugoslavia after the economic reforms (of the sixties) can be
understood differently today.
Back then explanations saw the growth of unemployment as
caused by institutional factors, especially by the system of self-
management. Namely, employees as owners have an inter-
est in increasing investments and not increasing the number
of employed because that way they increase their own income,
which apart from their salary also partakes in the company prof-
its.. This should explain the growth of capital in relation to labor
and the limited mobility of the labor force. Nevertheless, when one
looks at development in the majority of European post-socialist or
transition countries, one notices that the tendency for economic
growth to be based on growth in productivity and not growth in
employment, is present everywhere. This makes sense if the devel-
opment in question is financed by foreign assets, as was to a large
degree the case in Yugoslavia after the economic reforms because
investments will be turned into the most productive technology,
due to which, again, employment will grow at a slower rate, par-
ticularly if it is a question of those employed in the state sector
being pre-qualified for work in the new industries or the services
sector. So that in transition economies, and such at the outset was
the Yugoslav economy after economic reforms, productivity takes
precedence over employment. This to a large degree also occurred
in the emerging Yugoslav states in the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury. Growth was mainly based on productivity, while employ-
ment even showed a tendency to shrink.
Therefore the problem lay not in unemployment, but rather in
the economic sectors in which investments were directed. Dur-
ing the seventies, Yugoslavia invested in industry, but not an insig-
nificant part of the foreign debt went into spending. Addition-
ally, efficiency was a problem due to negative interest rate subsi-
dies. By contrast, most emerging Yugoslav states, except for Cro-
atia and Montenegro, made use of the post-2000 period of low
439
interest rates mainly to invest in non-export services. As a result,
by and large foreign debt was directed into the production of non-
exchangeable goods and into spending. Ultimately, all the former
Yugoslav countries faced the financial crisis of 2008 with high for-
eign debt. Just as at beginning of the eighties, the refinancing of
these debts was made difficult, not so much by the higher cost of
loans, but by the need for foreign creditors to put their own financ-
es into order. And so the entire region found itself in a similar situ-
ation to the one from the 1980s, with the difference that there was
now little leftover property, the sale of which would help cover the
debts. Thus it was necessary to correct the exchange rate where it
was overvalued, or cut spending, by reducing employment if there
was no other way, leading to a leveling-out of the current balance
of payments with greater exports and reduced imports. This is a
process that has been underway for almost a decade in the new
Yugoslav states, which, time-wise, is similar to the eighties.
Here it is important only to see what the role of a more liber-
al trade framework is in relation to the one from the 1980s. The
existence of a regional free trade zone was certainly helpful, for
it preserved the level of trade inherited from the period prior to
2008. However, access to the market of the European Union had
significantly more impact. In the period from 2008 to 2016, all the
new Yugoslav countries increased their exports from 30 to 60 per-
cent, with imports stagnating at a level close to that of 2008. The
advantage of liberalization today in relation to resistance against
it during the eighties certainly influenced adaptability to the cri-
sis. Even though the key problems – foreign trade deficits and for-
eign debt – are the same.
However, it is worth pointing out that, irrespective of the above,
the European Union is increasingly unpopular, that nationalism is
on the rise, and that regional cooperation has occurred in spite
of, and not as a consequence of, the policies of the new Yugoslav
states.
benefits and costs benefits and costs
CONCLUSION
Yugoslavia did not succeed in achieving liberalization and
democratization, but it was not an obstacle to them either since
the newly-emerging states after its dissolution have not displayed
a durable affinity for liberal measures or sustainable democracy,
nor, for that matter, for regional cooperation either. However, cir-
cumstances have changed and so far nationalist and authoritarian
forces have not prevailed as they did when they dissolved the joint
state. The economic cost of non-liberal and nationalist politics is
permanent backwardness due to their unsustainability in condi-
tions of modern development.
Literature
1. Bićanić, R, Ekonomska podloga hrvatskog pitanja (The Economic Basis of
the Croatian National Issue). Zagreb, 2004 (first edition 1933).
2. Gligorov, V, Why Do Countries Break Up? The Case of Yugoslavia.
Uppsala, 1994.
3. Gligorov, V, “Elusive Development in the Balkans: Research Findings”,
wiiw Policy Notes and Reports 2016 (wiiw – Wiener Institut für
Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche; Vienna Institute for International
Economic Studies).
4. Lampe, J. R, Yugoslavia as History. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
5. Palairet, M, Balkan Economies c. 1980–1914: Evolution without
Development. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
441
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
Yugoslav Art and Culture
from the art of a
nation to the art
of a territory
NENAD MAKULJEVIĆ
Art and culture have great significance in the creation of nations
and national identities. Art was understood as the embodiment of
the national spirit and testimony to its existence, as well as a means
for creating a nation. The historical processes of creating Yugoslav
art and culture, as well as their fates show just that. The rise and fall
of the idea of Yugoslav art occurred during three different historical
periods – the period until the unification in 1918, in the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia and in the socialist Yugoslav
state. The dynamics of the emergence and duration of the idea of
Yugoslav art was determined by different political contexts, which
never completely interrupted the initiated processes.
UP TO UNIFICATION
The idea of South Slav unity is closely associated with the idea
of Yugoslav culture and art. Cultural closeness, understood in the
broadest sense, as well as a common space and historical fates con-
tributed to the building of togetherness among the South Slavic
peoples. The Yugoslav “Kulturnation” gradually took shape within
442
from the art of a nation to the art of a territory from the art of a nation to the art of a territory
the scope of the numerous activities of intellectual and cultural
elites, individuals and organisations during the 19th and early 20th
centuries.
Cooperation between the South Slavic literary and cultural elites
began to develop in the first half of the 19th century. National lib-
eration struggles against different invaders, oral tradition and epics,
the revolution of 1848, linguistic connectivity and the emergence of
pan-Slavic ideas contributed to the recognition and revelation of a
common culture of the South Slavic peoples. Over time, South Slav-
ic cultural interconnectivity brought about the creation of a cultur-
al context and network in which a prominent place was assumed by
the most prominent cultural figures. Authors such as Vuk Karadzić,
Jernej Kopitar and Petar II Petrović Njegoš became well known and
gained recognition in various cultural centers – Zagreb, Belgrade,
Ljubljana and Novi Sad, thus contributing to the mutual rapproche-
ment of the South Slavic peoples.
The first idea of Yugoslavism coincided with the emergence of
the idea of the development of Yugoslav fine arts. The Croatian his-
torian Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski was the first to undertake encyclo-
pedic work in the field of fine arts among the South Slavs. He wrote
Slovnik umjetnikah jugoslavenskih (A Lexicon of Yugoslav Artists)
presenting the knowledge about Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian
artists.. It was published in five volumes from 1858 to 1860. As he
emphasized, the idea was to compile the first lexicon of South Slav-
ic artists, since there were no other people, except the Slavs, who
had no art history and that “the knowledge and education of every
people are judged on the basis of their scientific and art history”.26 It
is evident that, in accordance with the dominant ideas of his time,
Sakcinski advocated the opinion that national and cultural affirma-
tions were closely related and that art history could contribute to
nation-building. He carried out the work on Slovnik, including the
26 I. Kukuljević, Sakcinski, Slovnik umjetnikah jugoslavenskih, Zagreb 1858,
Predgovor (Foreward), unpaginated.
443
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
gathering of material and preparation of the lexicon for publication,
in cooperation with other South Slavic intellectuals, writers and
artists. As for the artists’ lithographs, he said that they were made
by “our prominent painter and lithographer, Anastas Jovanović
Bugarin”.27 Sakcinski’s activity was of great significance because it
laid the groundwork for Yugoslav art history.
During the second half of the 19th century a cultural rapproche-
ment among the South Slavic peoples continued. At the initiative of
Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences
and Arts (JAZU) was founded in Zagreb in 1866. It was the first sci-
entific and cultural institution bearing the designation “Yugoslav”
in its name. Strossmayer also manifested his commitment to the
Yugoslav idea in the paintings commissioned for Đakovo Cathe-
dral. Members of South Slavic peoples are depicted in the composi-
tions of the Adoration of the Magi, Last Judgement and Lamentation
of Christ. The events in Herzegovina and Montenegro also played a
part in strengthening the Yugoslav idea in the artistic world. Rep-
resentations of the uprisings and struggles against the Ottoman
Empire popularized the peoples in those territories among the
South Slavs and beyond. Artists such as Đura Jakšić, Ferdo Kik-
erec and Jaroslav Čermak were inspired by these events. Strossmay-
er bought Čermak’s painting The Wounded Montenegrin and donat-
ed it to the JAZU Gallery.
The idea about Yugoslav cultural unity reached its highest point
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. One of its manifesta-
tions was the joint Serbian-Slovenian funeral festivity, involving
the transfer of the bodies of Jernej Kopitar and Vuk Karadžić from
St Marx Cemetery in Vienna to Ljubljana and Belgrade respec-
tively. In October 1897, the exhumation and transfer of their bod-
ies were organized by the Serbian Royal Academy and Slovenska
27 I. Kukuljević, Sakcinski, Slovnik umjetnikah jugoslavenskih, Zagreb 1858,
Predgovor (Foreword), unpaginated.
444
from the art of a nation to the art of a territory from the art of a nation to the art of a territory
Matica (Slovene Society). This public manifestation was the testi-
mony to strong South Slavic interconnectivity, based on cultural
cooperation.
The year 1904 played a major role in the development of the
Yugoslav cultural idea since it brought a great political change in
the Kingdom of Serbia. The royal throne was mounted by Peter I
Karađorđević, while state cultural policy began intensively to pro-
mote the Yugoslav idea. Yugoslavism was already highlighted dur-
ing the coronation celebrations and served as propaganda for King
Peter I Karađorđević.
The First Yugoslav Art Exhibition was organized on the basis of
the idea and advocacy of Mihailo Valtrović, a renowned professor at
the Great School, about the joint exhibition activity of Yugoslav art-
ists. The exhibition was formally organized by the Great School stu-
dents in Belgrade, but its initiators were Valtrović and his younger
associate, archeologist Miloje Vasić. The Serbian state stood behind
the organisation of the whole event. The exhibition was staged on
the premises of the Great School in September 1904. It was opened
by King Peter I Karađorđević and the works were exhibited by Ser-
bian, Croatian, Slovenian and Bulgarian artists. The exhibition was
of crucial importance. It demonstrated the unity of Yugoslav artists,
new artistic trends were presented to the public and the paintings of
Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian artists were bought for the Yugo-
slav Gallery in the National Museum in Belgrade.
Up to the World War I, Yugoslav art exhibitions were also staged
in Sofia in 1906, Zagreb in 1908 and Belgrade in 1912. At the Sec-
ond Yugoslav Exhibition in Sofia, the joint artistic society Lada was
founded. This society became the organizer of future exhibitions.
Yugoslav exhibitions made a considerable contribution to the for-
mation of a common South Slavic cultural space, while other sim-
ilar activities were also initiated. The artists who were dissatis-
fied with Lada, which functioned on the federal principle and had
national sections, organized the Yugoslav Art Colony. It operated as
445
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
an association of integral Yugoslavs and included Nadežda Petrović,
Ivan Meštrović, Ferdo Vesel, Emanuel Vidović, Ivan Grohar and
Rihard Jakopič. The First Dalmatian Exhibition in Split in 1908 and
the exhibition entitled “Despite Unheroic Times” held in Zagreb in
1910 also had pro-Yugoslav programmes.
The pro-Yugoslav cultural policy pursued by Belgrade after 1904
also resulted in the commissioning of Ivan Meštrović to design pub-
lic monuments in Serbia. In any case, he had always declared himself
a Yugoslav artist. He held that the cultural basis of a common Yugo-
slav identity should be sought in epic poetry. He saw in the Koso-
vo Cycle both Serbian and Yugoslav mythology, so he designed the
Vidovdanski Hram (St Vitus’ Day Temple) as a monument to Yugo-
slav folk religion.
Meštrović was also entrusted with the design of the Art Pavilion
of the Kingdom of Serbia at the International Exhibition in Rome
in 1911. At the invitation of the Serbian government, a group of Cro-
atian artists led by Meštrović exhibited their works in the Serbi-
an pavilion. Meštrović, Ljubo Babić, Mirko Rački, Vladimir Becić
and other Croatian artists exhibited works inspired by the Koso-
vo Cycle, the central theme of the pavilion. This was a clear sign of
their Yugoslav commitment and a strong political message to the
international public. At the same time, Paja Jovanović, celebrated as
a great Serbian painter, exhibited his works in the Austrian pavilion.
During World War I, the significance of culture and art in the
presentation of pro-Yugoslav ideas did not decline. On the contra-
ry, art became one of the important testimonies to the existence of
the Yugoslav nation, as well as a means for spreading the idea of a
Yugoslav state. Ivan Meštrović took an active part in the Yugoslav
Committee which, within the scope of its propaganda activities,
organized numerous exhibitions. The most important propaganda
and exhibition projects included Meštrović’s exhibition at the Vic-
toria and Albert Museum in London in 1915 and joint exhibitions by
Yugoslav artists in Lyons in 1917 and Geneva in 1918.
446
from the art of a nation to the art of a territory from the art of a nation to the art of a territory
IN THE KINGDOM
The end of World War I and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes represented a new social and political reality.
The Kingdom brought together peoples who had lived in different
cultural environments. The territory occupied by the new state had
a different historical and cultural past, which was reflected in all
aspects of public and private life. Urban design, public monuments,
artistic life, cultural institutions, the appearance and furnishing of
private spaces, as well as the cultural identity of the population dif-
fered very much in the region, from Slovenia to Macedonia.
Under the new conditions, the creation of a single state and
national cultural and artistic identity imposed itself as an important
question. Emphasis was laid on the transition to a new phase in the
creation/unification of the Yugoslavs. However, the pre-war enthu-
siasm of the pro-Yugoslav artistic and cultural elites began to fade
away in the complex reality of the new state. The further develop-
ment and strengthening of the Yugoslav idea gave way to the begin-
ning of inter-ethnic political struggles. In such circumstances, a
very complex cultural situation, coupled with different concepts of
understanding Yugoslavism was created. This also influenced the
adoption of different artistic practices aimed at highlighting and
building a state and national identity, as well as monarchist propa-
ganda. Fine arts, architecture and public monuments were building
the cultural identity of Yugoslavia, but the process was neither har-
monized nor conceptually unique.
Artistic life was marked by the individual commitments and aspi-
rations of artists in displaying their artistic expression, on the one
hand, and efforts to create a Yugoslav artistic culture, on the oth-
er. In the post-war period, artistic life was gradually restored. The
majority of artists turned to the most important European center
– Paris, from which new ideas and modernist stylistic beliefs were
brought to the country. Thus, there was a generation of artists in the
Yugoslav space whose work was harmonized with contemporary
447
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
European artistic ideals. The most distinguished artists among
them included, inter alia, Sava Šumanović, Marin Tartaglia, Petar
Palavičini, Jovan Bijelić, Lazar Ličenoski, Ivan Tabaković, Krsto
Hegedušić, Tone Kralj, Lojze Dolinar, Rihard Jakopič... At the same
time, authentic avant-garde movements, such as Zenit, also emerged
in the Yugoslav space. Although the most current trend on the art
scene was not primarily concerned with the issues of Yugoslavism
in art, various activities were carried out with the aim of contribut-
ing to the creation of a common Yugoslav identity.
The organisation of Yugoslav art exhibitions continued in the
post-war period, but without the participation of Bulgarian artists.
The Fifth Yugoslav Art Exhibition, staged in Belgrade in 1922, was
an event that accompanied the wedding ceremony of King Alexan-
der I Karađorđević and Princess Maria of Romania. Due to its con-
nection with current monarchist events, this exhibition resembled
the First Yugoslav Art Exhibition held in 1904. However, the 1904
exhibition marked a new pro-Yugoslav state policy, while the 1922
exhibition pointed up King Alexander’s authoritarian and person-
al regime. It can even be said that it represented the humiliation of
the Yugoslav art scene and its reduction to an ancillary wedding
event. The last, Sixth, Yugoslav Exhibition was held in Novi Sad in
1927. It was part of the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Mat-
ica Srpska and the accompanying exhibition was dedicated to old
Serbian painting in Vojvodina. The organisation of these two Yugo-
slav exhibitions was supported by the authorities, but they did not
achieve great success. It was not recorded that it attracted greater
public interest, while the Novi Sad exhibition was largely ignored
by the Yugoslav public. Many significant artists did not participate
in these exhibitions, including Ivan Meštrović, the most important
adherent of Yugoslavism among artists. .
Yugoslav artists continued to jointly exhibit their works in the
Spring Salon held at the Cvijeta Zuzorić Art Pavilion in Kalemeg-
dan. Up to 1931, its sponsor was Prince Paul Karađorđević, who had
448
from the art of a nation to the art of a territory from the art of a nation to the art of a territory
distinguished himself as an art lover and collector. However, the cri-
sis of the Yugoslav idea in art was evident. The exhibitions in the
Spring Salon had a Yugoslav character, but they were not accept-
ed by artists from all parts of the state. Thus, they had great signif-
icance for the artistic life of Belgrade, but their political, Yugoslav
character was not successfully realized.
While the organisation of artistic life at the federal level was
faltering and weakening, integral Yugoslavs were distinguishing
themselves in political and cultural life. In Zagreb, Milan Ćurčin
launched the journal Nova Evropa 1920, rallying integral Yugoslavs.
They promoted Ivan Meštrović as the leading Yugoslav artist, while
his work was intensively followed and popularized.
The efforts of integral Yugoslavs were not completely recognized.
Meštrović, who had been engaged in pro-Yugoslav efforts since
1904 and had taken an active part in the Yugoslav Committee dur-
ing World War I, did not retain the same position in the newly –
created state. His most ambitious project – St Vitus’ Day Temple –
was not realized. Moreover, some of the Serbian authorities criti-
cized his artistic conception, especially his naked statues of heroes.
Meštrović’s work often combined sculptural and architectural
projects. The public function of architecture highlighted its signif-
icance in mapping and characterising specified spaces. Expressing
Yugoslavism in architecture was not monolithic. Meštrović was the
exponent of the so-called primordial approach, but different ideas
and practices of highlighting Yugoslavism in architecture were still
preserved. Thus, buildings with different stylistic and construction
features were considered part of Yugoslav architecture. In the 19th
century, the Serbian-Byzantine architectural style was created for
the needs of Serbian public buildings. In the post-war period, it was
primarily characteristic of Orthodox Church buildings throughout
Yugoslavia.
The territory of the new state was also marked by public monu-
ments. The monuments to Habsburg rulers in the regions that once
449
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
belonged to Austria-Hungary were demolished. Monuments to
monarchs from the Karađorđević dynasty were erected throughout
the country. Hence, for example, the Croatian sculptor Rudolf Val-
dec made monuments dedicated to King Petar in Veliki Bečkerek
and Bijeljina. After King Alexander’s assassination, the erection of
monuments dedicated to him began. Monuments were also erect-
ed in memory of the Serbian soldiers killed in the Balkan Wars and
World War I. One of the most significant monuments, designed by
architect Momir Korunović, was erected at Zebrnjak near Kumano-
vo. Inscriptions on these military monuments emphasized that they
were erected to the soldiers fallen for liberation and unification,
thus giving them both a Serbian and proto-Yugoslav character.28
The creation of the new state had a positive effect on presenting
the cultural wealth of the Yugoslav peoples. In the period before
World War I, when the artistic heritage of the South Slavs was large-
ly denied, especially by the Austro-Hungarian elite, an Oriental-
ist view of the Balkans colored the perception of cultural heritage
and gave rise to the belief that folklore was the highest South Slav-
ic cultural achievement. Hence, in the inter-war period, a process
of cultural heritage research and presentation was initiated. Inten-
sive medieval and antique heritage research was carried out in the
area from Dalmatia to Macedonia. New cultural institutions, such
as the Museum of Southern Serbia in Skopje, were also established.
Their work was coordinated with the dominant political ideology
of the state.
A significant tone to artistic life was given by members of the
ruling Karađorđević family. Apart from the constant use of artis-
tic events for their propaganda, the Karađorđević rulers also
tried to present themselves as bearers and guardians of the Yugo-
slav idea. Apart from extensive visual propaganda, two examples
28 In the charter built into the Monument to the Unknown Hero it is written that
the monument is erected “To the Serbian Unknown Hero fallen in the wars from
1912 to 1918 for the liberation and unification of the South Slavs”.
450
from the art of a nation to the art of a territory from the art of a nation to the art of a territory
likewise show the extreme monarchist use of art. King Alexander
used the citizens’ initiative for the erection of the Monument to
the Unknown Soldier on Mount Avala. He demolished the exist-
ing monument and the medieval fortified town of Žrnov. He com-
missioned Ivan Meštrović to design a new monument and left his
own imprint on it, which was also confirmed by the text of the char-
ter issued on St Vitus’ Day in 1934. It is stated that the monument
is his endowment “to the eternal memory to my fallen comrades
and as a shining example to future Yugoslav generations”. Another
example involves Prince Paul Karađorđević. In 1929, he founded the
Contemporary Art Museum in Princess Ljubica’s Residence in Bel-
grade. During 1935, at the initiative of Prince Paul, who was acting
as Regent of Yugoslavia, this institution and the National Museum
of Belgrade merged into the Prince Paul Museum, which was locat-
ed at the New Royal Palace. In this way Prince Paul distinguished
himself in the public eye and placed the museologized artistic herit-
age of the Serbian people at the service of his propaganda.
IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA
After World War II, under new social and political conditions,
the role of art in Yugoslav society was significantly reassessed. The
most important issue became the ideology of art and its role in
building a socialist society. The first post-war years were marked
by the development of art based on the Soviet model and efforts to
define Socialist Realism. The thematic framework took precedence
over artistic considerations, so that art concentrated on memoriz-
ing and celebrating the Partisan struggle in World War II and the
building of a new socialist society. Early art production in socialist
Yugoslavia was also modelled on Soviet art. The best-known Social-
ist Realist paintings are those like Boža Ilić’s “Exploratory drilling in
New Belgrade”. The Soviet influence also left a significant imprint
on memorial sculpture. This is evidenced by the imposing monu-
ment to the fallen soldiers of the Red Army in Batina, designed by
451
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
Antun Augustinčić and built from 1945 to 1947 and the monument
to the fallen soldiers at Iriški Venac designed by sculptor Sreten
Stojanović in 1951.
Reactions to Socialist Realist trends appeared after the breaka-
way from the Soviet Union. A significant event took place at the
Writers’ Congress in Ljubljana in 1952, where Miroslav Krleža deliv-
ered a speech that marked a symbolic turning-point in Yugoslavia’s
cultural policy. Among other things, Krleža criticized Soviet Social-
ist Realism in painting, which he perceived as a revival of bourgeois
academic forms. He pointed to the many positive sides of the mod-
ern experience, “art for art’s sake”, and added that modern paint-
ing “addressed ...a whole universe of details and nuances of lighting
and form, motives being authentic and important for the intensity
of the realistic human experience of reality...”29 Krleža pleaded for
freedom of creativity and concluded that “our own Art will be born
with the appearance of artists who will know how to ‘express the
objective motives of our leftist reality subjectively’ thanks to their
talent, their knowledge and their taste. If we develop a socialist cul-
tural medium that will be aware of its rich past and its cultural mis-
sion in the current European space and time, our Art will inevitably
appear”30 Departure from the Soviet model had a great impact on
Yugoslav art. Art was freed from the shackles imposed by party pol-
icy, while modernist expression became one of the characteristics of
Yugoslav artistic practice. Modernism became not only the domi-
nant art trend, but also an important foreign policy element. Yugo-
slav modern art was presented at numerous international exhibi-
tions, thus demonstrating Yugoslavia’s specificity in the socialist
world, distancing itself from the Soviet Union and Socialist Real-
ist art, as well as belonging to more culturally developed countries.
29 M. Krleža, Govor na kongresu književnika u Ljubljani, Svjedočanstva vremena,
književno-estetske varijacije, Sarajevo 1988, 23.
30 M. Krleža, Govor na kongresu književnika u Ljubljani, 48.
452
from the art of a nation to the art of a territory from the art of a nation to the art of a territory
Modern painting was also accepted to a certain extent by Josip
Broz Tito. His personality was promoted in all the media, including
the fine arts. Artists were commissioned to paint his portrait. Tito
was even painted by Paja Jovanović, the artist who had painted por-
traits of Emperor Franz Joseph, King Alexander and Queen Maria
Karađorđević during his long career. Over time, Božidar Jakac’s
drawing of Tito in profile and August Augustinčić’s sculpture in
Kumrovec were selected as the “canonic portraits” of Tito and were
widely reproduced. Josip Broz adopted a critical stance towards
abstraction and preferred figural art. According to Miodrag Protić,
he visited the Contemporary Art Museum in Belgrade only once.
On that occasion, he said that he liked Miljenko Stančić’s painting.
Although Tito disapproved of abstraction, his personal taste and
attitude did not stop the trends in modern Yugoslav art. Censorship
was primarily practised when Tito’s personality was criticized.31 In
1974, the opening of Mića Popović’s exhibition was cancelled due
to his paintings “Richard of Tito’s Face” and “Ceremonial Painting”.
Miroslav Krleža was one of the most important figures in the con-
ception and creation of the image of Yugoslav art and culture. Apart
from pleading for the modernisation of artistic practice, as Director
of the Yugoslav Lexicographical Institute in Zagreb and editor-in-
chief of numerous encyclopaedic editions, he had insight and par-
tial control in writing about the artistic past. Krleža did not have a
high opinion of 19th-century academic artistic practice; he saw the
basis of the Yugoslav artistic identity in medieval times. He was one
of the main organizers and author of the preface to the catalogue of
the exhibition of Yugoslav medieval art, held in Paris in 1950 and
Zagreb in 1951. Krleža’s basic idea was that the Yugoslav peoples
had advanced medieval culture and civilisation, “which vanished
in the whirlpool of the 600-year Turkish, Austrian and Venetian
31 Tito’s personality was protected under the legal regulations of 1953, 1977 and
1984 (O. Manojlović Pintar).
453
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
wars from the 14th to the 20th century”.32 For Krleža, a reference
to medieval times was closely related to the contemporary social-
ist Yugoslav state: “Today, the contemporary South Slavic socialist
anticipation is only a dialectical pendant on the whole range of our
medieval anticipations, Old Slavic, Glagolitic, the Cyril-Methodi-
an struggle for the equality of ethnicities and languages... the Bogu-
mil lay revolution... and, finally, the anticipation of pre-Giotto and
neo-Hellenistic painting... producing several artistic works on our
soil, at Sopoćani and Mileševa, which can be compared to the mas-
terpieces of mature Renaissance art in Western Europe which, in
terms of their artistic value, can be compared to mature Renais-
sance masterpieces in Western Europe”.33 Krleža considered Yugo-
slav medieval art, especially the Bogumil heritage, to be an antith-
esis to Byzantium and Rome and the third component of European
art of that period. Such views could provide a basis for the cultural
and political position of socialist Yugoslavia and its third way.
In socialist Yugoslavia, the issue of Yugoslavism in art was being
slowly pushed into the background. Artistic practice and theory
were evolving within the framework of global modernist trends.
Modern art was becoming the dominant artistic expression, while
current art trends were adopted and evolved simultaneously with
the world’s artistic centers. Art informel, abstract art, constructiv-
ism and conceptual art marked the decades from the liberalisation
of artistic practice to the collapse of the Socialist Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia. The openness of Yugoslav society towards mod-
ern art was also demonstrated by the organisation of significant
exhibitions of world modernity. One of the most important exhibi-
tions was the exhibition of Henry Moore’s sculptures at the Cvijeta
Zuzorić Art Pavilion in Belgrade in 1955, which marked a turning-
point in Yugoslavia’s artistic life.
32 M. Krleža, Predgovor, Izložba srednjovjekovne umjetnosti naroda Jugoslavije,
Zagreb 1951, 5.
33 M. Krleža, Predgovor, 6.
454
from the art of a nation to the art of a territory from the art of a nation to the art of a territory
Artistic life in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
experiencing a rapid rise. Most republics had fine arts academies
that educated generations of painters, sculptors and graphic art-
ists. Republican associations of fine artists as well as a similar asso-
ciation at federal level were also established with the aim of con-
tributing to the better status of artists in society. Exhibition activity
was developing throughout Yugoslav territory. Apart from salons,
staged in the capitals of the federal republics, some exhibitions had
a federal character. For example, Tuzla was the venue of Yugoslav
portrait exhibitions, the Yugoslav Youth Biennial in Rijeka was
staged in Rijeka from 1961 to 1991, the Biennial of Yugoslav Stu-
dent Drawing was held in the Students’ Town Gallery in Belgrade,
the Yugoslav Drawing Triennial was held in Sombor and the Yugo-
slav Ceramics Triennial was held at the Applied Art Museum in
Belgrade, while Yugoslav Graphic Art Exhibitions were staged in
Zagreb and Belgrade.
The most important public monuments erected throughout the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were memorials dedicat-
ed to the victims and heroes of World War II. Monumental cul-
ture was undergoing transformation from post-war Socialist Real-
ist memorials to modern monuments. The modernisation and cre-
ation of a unique artistic expression is exemplified in the monu-
ments designed by architect Bogdan Bogdanović. By developing
archaic visual forms, Bogdanović endowed his sculptures with com-
plex symbolism and humanist meaning. His monuments, erected
throughout Yugoslavia – in Mostar, Belgrade, Kruševac and Jaseno-
vac, became universal symbols of the horrors of war, crossing dog-
matic-ideological and republican-national boundaries.
An important place in cultural life was held by institutions pro-
moting Yugoslav art occupied an important place in cultural life.
One institution with a Yugoslav character was the Contempo-
rary Art Museum. Originally called the Modern Gallery in 1958,
the museum was formally founded – according to its founder and
455
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
director Miodrag B. Protić – as an institution of the People’s Repub-
lic of Serbia but, according to its programme, it had a Yugoslav char-
acter. Protić bought up artworks from Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia,
thus creating the “most complete and most valuable collections of
20th-century Serbian and Yugoslav art”.34 A new modern building
was also erected to serve the needs of the museum. Designed by
architects Ivan Antić and Ivanka Raspopović, it opened on 20 Octo-
ber 1965. It was aimed at promoting Yugoslav modern art, while at
the same time representing the most significant project in the artis-
tic life of Belgrade and Serbia.35 The museum contained the works
of artists from all parts of the country, while 20th-century Yugoslav
art was presented at accompanying exhibitions and in programme-
related editions. However, Yugoslav art was presented not accord-
ing to its national characteristics, but according to its style and chro-
nology. Modern art was also promoted by other institutions, such as
the Art Gallery of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Modern Gallery in
Ljubljana, the City Gallery/Contemporary Art Museum in Zagreb
and the Contemporary Art Museum in Skopje.
Artistic life in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not have
a unique flow; it also mirrored the dynamics of ongoing events in
the country. Apart from positive modern and integration trends at
the federal level, disintegration processes were also underway. The
republican Academies of Sciences and Arts were gradually becom-
ing the proponents of national culture. At the same time, the coun-
try’s highest cultural achievements were denigrated according to
local and ideological needs. The non-reconciliation of different
views was demonstrated on numerous occasions and one exam-
ple was the demolition of Njegoš’s chapel and the erection of his
34 M. B. Protić, Nojeva barka, Vol. I, 515.
35 According to M. B. Protić, Ivo Andrić argued that the content of this museum
exceeds the actual level of the culture of Yugoslav society: M. B. Protić,
Nojeva barka, Vol. I, 633. These words especially carry weight today when the
Contemporary Art Museum and National Museum in Belgrade have been closed
for years due to restoration work.
456
from the art of a nation to the art of a territory from the art of a nation to the art of a territory
mausoleum on Mount Lovćen, designed by Ivan Meštrović. This
idea was opposed by the professional community. Art historians,
like Lazar Trifunović from Belgrade and Franc Stele from Ljublja-
na, held that the chapel should not be demolished. Their view was
shared by Miroslav Krleža, who had voiced a negative opinion of
Ivan Meštrović’s work in the inter-war period. He wrote: “Njegoš’s
mausoleum by Meštrović will be a mausoleum, if it is ever built,
which would certainly be the better option, since it is terribly stu-
pid! And it costs a lot!”36 Despite opposition by a significant num-
ber of Yugoslav intellectuals, the Municipality of Cetinje carried
through this idea and erected Ivan Meštrović’s monument. At that
time, he himself was living as an emigré in the United States.
Differences in the conceptions and understanding of culture and
art were also reflected in the preparation of encyclopedic entries.
As can be learned from Miroslav Krleža’s Marginalije, a covert war
between the republican editorial boards was underway. Krleža was
highly dissatisfied with his relationship with the Serbian editorial
board during the preparation of a Yugoslav art encyclopedia. He
stated bitterly on a number of occasions that his initial advocacy of
the promotion of Yugoslav medieval art was being taken over and
used in a Serbian national context. In one note made during his
work on the encyclopedia it is stated: “… I have continuous clashes
with ‘experts’ like Đurđe Bošković, (Radivoje) Ljubinković, (Dejan)
Medaković and the like, who are forever distorting the meaning of
the theses of this encyclopedia in their well-known manner where
Serbian-Macedonian issues are concerned”.37
The examples of Njegoš’s chapel and work on the encyclopedia
point to the gradual fragmentation of art and culture in the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is evident that it was possible to
map different interests in the field of culture. The bloody collapse of
36 M. Krleža, Marginalije, Belgrade 2011, 463.
37 M. Krleža, Marginalije, 559. The names in parentheses have been added by the
author of this text.
457
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia brought about chang-
es in political circumstances and the cultural scene, as well as the
emergence of nationalist elites. Some prominent figures, such
as Bogdan Bogdanović, emigrated, while a great number of art-
ists found themselves in a “vacuum”. Educated and doing creative
work in the Yugoslav context, they could not identify themselves
and their works with the newly-established nation states. Anoth-
er example is Marina Abramović, the world’s best-known perfor-
mance artist from Yugoslavia, who periodically emphasizes that she
comes from a country that no longer exists.38
The idea of Yugoslav art was closely related to the rise, duration
and fall of the Yugoslav idea. From the mid-19th century, South Slav
artists began to establish mutual relations and organize themselves
with a view to presenting the cultural and ethnic closeness of the
South Slav peoples. The formation of a common state, the King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia, did not contribute
to the creation of a common art and culture. The cultural differ-
ences among the Yugoslav peoples and different political interests
weakened the idea of a common artistic identity. A specific phe-
nomenon was the rise of the integral Yugoslav Ivan Meštrović, an
artist who embodied the Yugoslav spirit. After World War II, the
art of socialist Yugoslavia was geared towards mastering modern
artistic expression. The negative trends that were leading towards
the collapse of the state were strengthening republican and nation-
al movements. The initial idea of creating the art of the Yugoslav
nation was not realized. However, the existence of a common state
did bring about the creation of a cultural and artistic space and the
formulation of Yugoslav art as the artistic practice developed in the
Yugoslav territory.
38 “When people ask me where I am from,” she says, “I never say Serbia. I always
say I come from a country that no longer exists”; https://www.theguardian.
com/artanddesign/2010/oct/03/interview-marina-abramovic-performance-artist
(accessed on 30 July 2016).
458
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22. M. Krleža, Govor na kongresu književnika u Ljubljani, Svjedočanstva
vremena, književno-estetske varijacije, Sarajevo 1988, 23.
23. M. Krleža, Marginalije, Belgrade 2011.
24. I. Kukuljević, Sakcinski, Slovnik umjetnikah jugoslavenskih, Vols. 1–5,
Zagreb 1858–1860.
25. N. Makuljević, Umetnost i nacionalna ideja u XIX veku: sistem evropske i
srpske umetnosti u službi nacije, Belgrade 2006.
26. N. Makuljević, U ime jugoslovenstva: Ivan Meštrović u Novoj Evropi,
in: Nova Evropa 1920–1941, Zbornik radova, edited by M. Nedić – V.
Matović, Belgrade 2010, 589–600.
27. N. Makuljević, Jugoslawien vor Jugoslawien, Südslawische
Brüderlichkeit unter Künstlern, in: Brüderlichkeit und Bruderzwist:
Mediale Inszenierungen des Aufbaus un des Niedergangs politischer
Gemeinschaften in Ost – und Südost Europe, Hrsgb. von T.
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28. I. Mance, Kukuljevićev Slovnik umjetnikaj jugoslavenskih: povijest
umjetnosti kao bibliografski univerzum, Radovi instituta za povijest
umjetnosti, No. 32 (2008), 285–296.
29. O. Manojlović Pintar, Arheologija sećanja: spomenici i identiteti u Srbiji
1918–1989, Belgrade 2014.
30. L. Merenik, Ideološki modeli: srpsko slikarstvo 1945–1968, Belgrade 2001.
31. I. Meštrović, Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje, Zagreb 1969.
32. G. Miloradović, Lepota pod nadzorom: sovjetski kulturni uticaji u
Jugoslaviji: 1945–1955, Belgrade 2012.
33. M. B. Protić, Jugoslovensko slikarstvo 1900–1950, Belgrade 1973.
34. M. B. Protić, Nojeva barka, Vols. I-III, Belgrade 2000.
35. N. Simić, Hercegovačko-bosanski ustanci u likovnoj umetnosti, Belgrade 1959.
36. D. Tošić, Jugoslovenske umetničke izložbe, Belgrade 1983.
37. R. Vučetić Mladenović, Evropa na Kalemegdanu: “Cvijeta Zuzorić” i
kulturni život Beograda 1918–1941, Belgrade 2003.
38. R. Vučetić, Jugoslavenstvo u umjetnosti i kulturi: od zavodljivog mita
do okrutne realnosti (Jugoslavenske izložbe 1904–1940), Časopis za
suvremenu povijest, No. 3 (2009), 701–714.
39. R. Vučetić, Između avangarde i cenzure. Tito i umetnost šezdesetih, in: Tito
– viđenja i tumačenja, prepared by O. Manojlović Pintar, Belgrade 2011.
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kulturpolitische Prägungen, Cologne-Weimar-Vienna: Böhlau Verlag 2014.
460
the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia
Yugoslavia on the International Scene
the active
coexistence of
non-aligned
yugoslavia
TVRTKO JAKOVINA
THE SAME AS THE SOVIET UNION
The foreign policy of Tito’s Yugoslavia was always unusually
dynamic, conspicuous and creative. Even immediately after the
Second World War, when diplomats were impregnated with revo-
lutionary charge, while the ideologized interpretation of the world
and its future, search for allies among ideologically like-minded
people, and the belief in restructuring based on a Marxist vision
of the world and relying on the Soviet Union, did not mean that
the diplomacy of the new Yugoslavia was not active and dynam-
ic from the very outset. It often remained proactive and dynamic,
distinguishing itself from the diplomacies of similar communist
countries. The first generation of diplomats, including the first
three ministers of foreign affairs – Josip Smodlaka, Ivan Šubašić
and Stanoje Simić – included a great number of individuals from
461
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
civic circles, many of whom enjoyed a great reputation. Until the
mid-1950s, the Yugoslavs were primarily oriented towards Europe,
while top-level diplomatic contacts and visits were almost entirely
confined to the countries with a similar social system. Josip Broz
Tito played host to his Polish, Bulgarian, Albanian and other col-
leagues, but he himself only travelled to East European countries.
Europe was the place of contact between the worlds and emerg-
ing blocs. It was the space in which Yugoslavia had a lot of unfin-
ished business. After the war, Yugoslavia had an unresolved bor-
der issue with Italy. Yugoslav army units had entered Austrian ter-
ritory from which they had to withdraw just as in the case of Tri-
este. The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) either
intervened or provided military support to the communist gue-
rillas in Greece. Yugoslav armed forces later entered into Albania,
but admittedly they were called upon by Albania to do so. They
also worked with Bulgaria on the creation of a Balkan federation.
Yugoslavia was a loyal and agile member of the emerging Soviet
bloc and sincere Moscow ally in the first few years after the Sec-
ond World War. However, it felt that its achievements were greater
than those of other countries, that its path to victory was different,
that the establishment of Tito’s power and selection of Belgrade
as the seat of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)
in 1947 were logical and justified. Thus, these should not only be
treated as a reward, but also as recognition of a country closest to
the ideal of the new world being created in Moscow.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that diplomats and politicians
in Belgrade remained blind to developments in Asia or the Near
East. Ešref Badnjević, a pre-war communist and Tito’s confiden-
tial associate, was accused of maintaining contacts with banned
communist groups in Egypt where he was the newly-appointed
head of the Yugoslav legation. In 1947, the Royal Government of
Egypt asked him to leave Cairo to avoid a scandal. His succes-
sor Šahinpašić continued to maintain such contacts, which was
462
the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia
considered unacceptable by the Egyptian authorities, but his
career ended after a year because he left the post with some staff
members and aligned himself with the Soviet Union.39 The Arab
countries were ruled by monarchs, so Egypt was a much less desir-
able ally in the Near East than Israel, which had been founded by
leftists. Yugoslavia was one of the countries helping Israeli Jews to
arm themselves during their war of independence.40 Yugoslavia’s
relations with Egypt improved only after its revolution in 1952. At
that time, the Yugoslav Ambassador was the educated and capa-
ble Nijaz Dizdarević. In late 1952, his colleague in Syria, Mihaj-
lo Javorski, informed the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs that
Ali Naguib, the Egyptian Ambassador to Damascus and brother
of General Naguib, head of the new government in Cairo, spoke
with admiration about the Yugoslav struggle for independence
and mentioned that the Egyptians “probably like and appreci-
ate the Yugoslavs more than they (the Yugoslavs) know”.41 Thus,
excellent relations with Egypt were established very soon after the
overthrow of its king. In some other cases. such as Ethiopia, the
emperor did not pose a problem, since good relations with the
Horn of Africa had been established very early on.
During the first few post-war years, the basic idea of Yugo-
slav foreign policy was obsessively oriented towards the commu-
nists and leftist groups. Due to ideological closeness, diplomats
were ready to endanger normal relations with the host country.
Although the United States was the main sponsor of UNRRA
assistance, which virtually rescued the FPRY in the aftermath of
the Second World War, the United States of America (USA) was
vitriolically attacked. During the first post-war years, the lives of
39 Životić 2008:486.
40 Shay 2008:475–476. Weapons were imported via rivers in Rijeka and Šibenik.
Spitfire fighter planes were also delivered using Yugoslav airspace.
41 DAMSP, 1952, File No. 20 (Egipat), Reel 15, Doc. No. 416758, 17 December
1952.b (I express my gratitude to my colleague Bojan Smode for this source).
463
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
American diplomats in Belgrade and Zagreb were often dramati-
cally bad and unpleasant.42
As announced by US president Harry Truman to the US Con-
gress in March 1947, the United Kingom could no longer ensure
the economic stability and military and political security of Greece
and Turkey. The United Kindom intended to retreat from Bur-
ma, India, Egypt and Palestine.43 The Truman Doctrine was the
American response to the British decision and was directly asso-
ciate with the aggressiveness of the Yugoslav foreign policy aiding
the communist-led partisan guerillas in Greece.44 Already in 1947,
Belgrade hosted Indian, Burmese and Chinese communists who
came to see and study Yugoslavia’s development. In January 1948,
Belgrade recognized India and Pakistan. During their visit to Cal-
cutta, where they attended the Second Congress of the Commu-
nist Party of India, which was held in February 1948, Vladimir
Dedijer and Radovan Zogović, the then two hard-core commu-
nist believers, talked the Indian communists into starting a rebel-
lion and then waging a guerilla war against Jawaharlal Nehru, who
had just been elected prime minister.45 The duo probably referred
to the Yugoslavia and their own Partisan experience, mentioning
how the Yugoslav People’s Army had succeeded in taking large
areas of Italian territory and entering Austria. Thereafter, Yugo-
slavia continued to be militant. In the summer of 1946, Yugoslav
fighter planes shot down an American military aircraft, while the
Yugoslav side was probably also involved in the incident in the
Corfu Channel when 54 British sailors were killed.46 This kind of
country, most loyal and most similar to Stalin’s Soviet Union, mili-
42 Jakovina 2003: 134–140, 158–213.
43 Cabot, Reel 6, The National War College, Strategy, Policy and Planning Course,
National Security Problem, 17–28 March 1947; Wilson 1979:123.
44 Banac 1990:46–49.
45 Čavoški 529–530; Pirjevec 2011:391.
46 Jakovina 2003:56–77.
464
the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia
tant and often unrestrained, soon stopped being praised and serv-
ing as a model to others, while its leadership had to be removed
from power.
Yugoslavia’s position changed in the summer of 1948. Its expul-
sion from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)
came as a shock to many observers. Although some of the better
analysts among the diplomats had predicted Yugoslav-Soviet mis-
understandings, the final act, which occurred on 28 June 1948, left
them “with their eyes wide open” – the comment by John Cabot,
the former US Chargé d’Affaires in Belgrade and later the Ameri-
cam Consul General in Shangai. He wrote that he still wondered
what stood behind all this and how serious it all was.47 The split
with Moscow was not easy for Stalin’s best students. The Yugo-
slavs did not plan it or invoke it, but they did not hesitate to accept
the conflict. Belgrade’s first reaction was to establish good rela-
tions with those leftists who were not close to the Soviets. The
break-up of relations between the FPRY and Moscow faced the
young diplomacy with different challenges. Similarly to the shifts
and “differentiation” within the country, it became much more
“compact” and was abruptly filled with the proven wartime cad-
res – loyal young men whose mission was to prove that the split
between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was genuine and real.
At the same time, the bellicose and impudent Yugoslav diploma-
cy was given a different role in saving the country’s sovereignty.
It was still felt that it would be primarily necessary to establish
ties with those who were “more similar”, like Scandinavia’s Social
Democrats or those communist parties that had not yet aligned
with the Soviet Union in its condemnation of Belgrade. Gradu-
ally yet rapidly, it was realized that the only possible way out was
to come up with a clear policy and establish ties with those who
could be truly helpful. However, the permanent tensions – which
47 Cabot, Reel 12; John M. Cabot to Downs Donald, Esquire, Department of State;
American Consulate General, Shangai, China, 20 August 1948.
465
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
arose from the views that Yugoslavia was a communist coun-
try and that Western countries were still different, despite being
accepted in many respects and being important for the surviv-
al of the country, and which lasted until the collapse of Yugosla-
via – paved the way for the establishment of relations with those
countries which just gained sovereignty or were to be created in
the years to come. Something that Yugoslavia had already start-
ed in the 1950s became adopted a little later as the norm by the
West European Left that was increasingly less concerned with the
exploitation of factory workers – which was also formally abol-
ished in Yugoslavia where factories were worker-owned. Instead,
it increasingly openly supported emancipation movements and
the struggle against colonialism and racism. Thus, the policy that
was partly born out of necessity and involved hitherto unimagina-
ble, distant regions and ties with those whose names could prob-
ably barely be pronounced, became the most original and most
important part of Yugoslav foreign policy, not because the coun-
try was neglecting its relations with any superpower, but because
it was exerting an influence on all other policies and bilateral rela-
tions of socialist Yugoslavia through its role in the Third World.
Yugoslav diplomacy was joined by plenty of young people, who
were then sent to the countries of Scandinavia and the United
States in order to present a different picture of the FPRY.48
Yugoslavia established full diplomatic relations with India
on 5 December 1948. As stated by Nehru’s sister and the Indian
Ambassador to London, the Indians were interested in doing the
same thing, but at that moment they had no acceptable ambassa-
dor who would be sent to Belgrade. The first Indian ambassador
accredited to the FPRY was the ambassador in Rome. The Yugo-
slavs opened an embassy in New Delhi and a consulate in Bom-
bay as early as 1950. The first Ambassador was Josip Đerđa, who
48 Jakovina 2002:905.
466
the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia
was also appointed Ambassador to Burma later on, just at the
time when – more than ever in the postwar period – Yugoslavia
increasingly leaned towards the West. It was not easy to cooper-
ate with this direct, outspoken and self-educated printing worker.
However, his analyses were original and those sent from New Del-
hi to Belgrade were also far-sighted. Tito and Edvard Kardelj, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs appointed after the split with Stalin,
were more interested in the establishment of closer relations with
the Indians than vice versa. India was a distant and poor country
but, judging by the instructions received by Đerđa’s successor, Jože
Vilfan, the efforts to continuously improve mutual relations were
accepted. At the same time, Ivo Vejvoda was sent to Brazil (he was
also accredited to Venezuela) with the clear “global” vision of a
new Yugoslav foreign policy that also covered South America.49
Relations with Burma, which were helped by Tito through deliv-
eries of weapons and experience in thwarting a rebellion, were
developing at the fastest pace. The Yugoslavs were selling guns and
other weapons to a country endangered by a conflict that could be
called a “quadrilateral” civil war.50
All this marked the beginning of a systematic and active
approach by Yugoslav diplomacy to Asia. Although India was
not always ready to cooperate with Belgrade in the way Yugosla-
via wished, the very fact that it was behind Yugoslav initiatives
or supported them, turned into one of the basic principles of
49 Berić 2008:136–137. One of Vejvoda’s first tasks was to establish relations with
the South American countries. As he later said, he realized that it would be
difficult to normalize relations with Peru, Equador and other countries as long as
relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See were broken. At the same time, the
Communist Parties of Venezuela and Brazil were attacking “Tito’s Ambassador”
as an “American agent” whose task was to divide the workers’ movement in Latin
America.
50 Cabot, Reel 12; John M. Cabot to Downs Donald, Esquire, Department of
State; American Consulate General, Shangai, China, August 20, 1948; Čavoški
2008:537–542; Jakovina 202:905–906; Jakovina 2003:488–489.
467
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
Yugoslav diplomacy, the minimum Yugoslavia needed from this
big country.
LEANING TOWARDS THE WEST, THE SEARCH FOR NEW PATHS
The first foreign head of state who paid an official visit to Yugo-
slavia after its split with the Soviet Union was the Negus of Ethio-
pia, Emperor Haile Selassie. Diplomatic relations between the two
countries were established in early 1952. In July 1954, he stayed in
the former Royal Palace in Belgrade and then went to Tito’s Sum-
mer Residence on the Brijuni Islands and Split. Haile Selassie used
to say that having more Yugoslavs at different places in Ethiopia
meant having fewer Italians. The possibilities that opened up for
cooperation exceeded the Yugoslav potential.51
Relations with the South Asian countries were enhanced dur-
ing Tito’s long voyage aboard Galeb in late 1954 and early 1955.
This voyage was also historic for India because Tito was the first
European statesman who visited this country after its proclama-
tion of independence. Partly for this reason, Tito was welcomed
like a king. As for his visit to Burma, the host’s behaviour was well-
nigh ecstatic. Peaceful and active coexistence, which accepts the
struggle for peace, independence and equality, was the idea link-
ing these three countries together. Yugoslavia also needed strong
allies in its struggle for independence.52 Like his ambassador in
New Delhi, George Allen, who served in Belgrade (1949–1953)
and was an expert on Yugoslavia, US Secretary of State John Fos-
ter Dulles (1953–1959) did not find the fact that socialist Yugosla-
via was spreading ideas of neutrality among the Indians particu-
larly acceptable. At the same time, some American analysts held
51 Tasić 2008:515–516. In honour of the emperor, the Split seafront promenade
was decorated with flowers for which soil had to be transported. Everything was
arranged, so that the saying “That’s all Haile Selassie!” is still used when someone
wants to say that something was done in the garden.
52 Pirjevec 2011:394–395; Jakovina 2003:490–493.
468
the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia
that Tito was an excellent example of a communist who was open
for cooperation and was not close to Beijing or Moscow. Some
American analysts wondered whether Tito could also learn some-
thing from the world’s biggest parliamentary country during his
stay in India.
Tito’s first trip across the ocean meant the discovery of a new
world and, in many respects, was an eye-opening experience. His
stop in Egypt on the way back to Europe marked the beginning of
one of the most sincere friendships in the history of the Cold War,
that is, the friendship between Tito and President Nasser. Ameri-
can analysts observed Yugoslavia’s search for a “middle way” with
dissatisfaction, but were still convinced that it would remain ori-
ented towards the West should any more serious tensions emerge.
In early 1955, Washington concluded that Yugoslavia would con-
tinue to gravitate toward powers such as India and Burma, sens-
ing a certain unity of interest and outlook with them and holding
that cooperation would help reduce tension, promote peace, over-
come isolation and increase its own prestige.53
This trip also resulted in the strengthening of Yugoslav diplo-
matic ties with Rangoon. Economic cooperation lagged behind
military cooperation, which was flourishing. Burmese leader U
Nu was not willing to accept military assistance from big coun-
tries, but wished to receive it from Yugoslavia and Israel. Burma
was surrounded by India, China and Indochina; it was the seat
of the Asian Socialist International and thus Yugoslavia’s poten-
tial gate to a broader Asian space.54 Burmese leader U Nu visited
Yugoslavia in 1955, only a few days after the historic repentant vis-
it of Nikita Khrushchev to Belgrade in May 1955. U Nu’s visit to
Belgrade and Zagreb aimed at emphasizing the unity of the two
peoples and a common peace policy. As noted by American dip-
lomats, the arrival of the Burmese leader was announced across
53 NIE 31–55; Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 Februrary 1955.
54 Čavoški 2008:541.
469
III – Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (1918–1991)
the entire front page of Borba,, while Khrushchev was given only
five out of seven columns in the official Yugoslav organ.55 A few
days after the Burmese leader’s visit, Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljublja-
na were visited by Indian prime minister Nehru. Since the sum-
mer holidays were just starting at the time of Nehru’s stay in Yugo-
slavia, he was welcomed by a much smaller number of enthsiastic
citizens than the guest from Burma.
U Nu was deeply impressed with the Yugoslavs and how he
was welcomed. After returning to his country, he also wished to
express his thanks to the Yugoslav Chargé d’Affaires in Rangoon.
Thus, U Nu organized a dinner for him and his American col-
league. One of the topics discussed during the dinner included
Tito and the Partisan struggle. In order to illustrate the courage of
the Yugoslav people, U Nu picked up a hot pepper from the table
and pushed it into the mouth of Miroslav Kreačić, the top-ranking
Yugoslav diplomat in the Burmese capital. His tears began to flow,
but he did not say anything. The Partisans’ courage was proven.
There were few such moments in diplomatic life.56
In late 1955, Galeb set sail for Egypt and Ethiopia. There were
some (probably those poorly informed) who were afraid that Tito
could infect the Ethiopian emperor with communism. Ameri-
can diplomats commented that the Yugoslavs had a problem with
understanding their limitations and the fact that they were not a
great power. American consul in Zagreb Martindale said that it
was stupid to change a reliable ally like the United States for unre-
liable allies in the Third World.57 The partnerships sought by Tito
were based on the wish to remain independent. During these trips,
it also became clear that the Third World countries represented a
55 Jakovina 2003:514; Bekić 1988:640–644.
56 Jakovina 2002:905–906.
57 Jakovina 2003:517–522. Based on NARA, Records of the US Department of
State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia, 1950–1954, Decimal File
768, Reel 3, 768.00/1–3156.
470
the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia the active coexistence of non-aligned yugoslavia
potential market for Yugoslav companies. Promotion of the “eco-
nomic independence” of these countries opened up opportunities
for the sale of Yugoslav products. However, it was often easier to
determine or say something rather than to take action. Howev-
er, some later examples proved that those who also saw economic
reasons for the promotion of relations were right.58
After 1955 and the reconciliation between Belgrade and Mos-
cow, Yugoslavia hoped that the Soviets would change their Stalin-
ist interpretation of communism. Parallel with the promotion of
its policy toward Asia and Africa since the early 1950s at the lat-
est, Yugoslavia seemed to be increasingly dissatisfied with exces-
sively close cooperation with the West. Likewise, many Yugoslavs
were not immune to racism or simply could not understand Tito’s
ties with distant Asian and African countries.59 Finally, nobody in
Belgrade, at least those in power, contemplated abandoning com-
munism as the leading ideology. For such people, the West was
only the place where Yugoslavia would be exploited.
In April 1956, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CC CPY), the highest party
body, Marshal Josip Broz Tito said: “I think that we should can-
cel US military aid. It was only symbolic, but the question that
imposes itself now is who are we arming ourselves against.”60
Josip Broz Tito concluded that Yugoslavia’s reputation called
for stronger foreign policy action and activity. He also said that
the disarmament policy was not sufficiently active and that rela-
tions with India, Burma and, partly, with Egypt were not suffi-
ciently used in the struggle for peace, which would be mutual