Stephen Breyer

Stephen Breyer

Nonpartisan

Supreme Court of the United States (senior status)

Tenure

2022 - Present

Years in position

1

Prior offices

United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit

Successor: Sandra Lea Lynch

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Supreme Court of the United States

Successor: Ketanji Brown Jackson

Predecessor: Harry Blackmun

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Education

Bachelor's

Stanford University, 1961

Law

Harvard Law School, 1964

Personal

Birthplace

San Francisco, Calif.

Stephen Breyer is a federal judge on senior status with the Supreme Court of the United States. On January 27, 2022, President Joe Biden (D) and Breyer officially announced Breyer would retire at the start of the court's summer recess. NBC News had previously reported the retirement on January 26. On June 29, 2022, Breyer announced that his retirement will be effective at noon on June 30, 2022. Justice Breyer assumed senior status on June 30, 2022. Click here to read more.

Breyer was nominated by President Bill Clinton (D) to fill the seat left vacant by Harry Blackmun. He was confirmed by 87-9 vote and was sworn in on August 3, 1994.

Breyer graduated from Stanford University in 1959 and then enrolled in Magdelen College at Oxford University as a Marshall Scholar, where he graduated with honors in 1961. He went on to study at Harvard Law School, where he worked as an editor at the Harvard Law Review before graduating in 1964. Breyer began his legal career clerking for Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg. He held several government attorney roles, including assistant special prosecutor on the Watergate Special Prosecution Force and the chief counsel of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee.

In 1980, President Jimmy Carter (D) nominated Breyer to sit on the United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit. He served on the court from 1980 to 1994 and was chief judge in his final four years there.

Breyer’s notable opinions include the majority opinion in the recess appointment case NLRB v. Noel Canning and his dissenting opinion in the copyright law case Eldred v. Ashcroft.

Professional career

• 1994-present: Supreme Court of the United States
  • 2022-present: Senior judge
  • 1994-2022: Associate justice
• 1980-1994: Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit

• 1990-1994: Chief judge

• 1985-1989: Commissioner, United States Sentencing Commission
• 1979-1980: Chief counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee
• 1977-1980: Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
• 1975: Visiting lecturer, College of Law, Sydney, Australia
• 1974-1975: Special counsel, Administrative Practices Subcommittee, Senate Judiciary Committee
• 1973: Assistant special prosecutor, Watergate Special Prosecution Force
• 1967-1994: Faculty, Harvard Law School

• 1981-1994: Lecturer
• 1967-1980: Professor

• 1965-1967: Special assistant to the assistant attorney general, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice
• 1964-1965: Law clerk, Hon. Arthur Goldberg, Supreme Court of the United States

Biography

Early life and education

Breyer was born in San Francisco, California. Breyer's father was legal counsel for the San Francisco Board of Education.

Breyer earned a B.A. in philosophy from Stanford University in 1959, a B.A. from Magdalen College at the University of Oxford as a Marshall Scholar in 1961, and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1964. While at Harvard, Breyer was the article editor at the Harvard Law Review.

Military service

Breyer served in the United States Army and attained the rank of corporal. He served actively for six months, from June to December of 1957. He was honorably discharged after eight years as an army reserve member.

Approach to the law

In a review of his 2010 book, Making Our Democracy Work, a Judge's View, Breyer argued that:

“

The job of the Supreme Court is to apply the Constitution's values to modern circumstances, using the tools of judging: precedent, text and an assessment of the purpose of the constitutional provision at issue.

”

Breyer also believes in the Living Constitution. Nina Totenberg, NPR legal affairs correspondent, wrote of his views:

“

Breyer argued that the founders did want a living Constitution; they wrote a Constitution they wanted to last for the ages. The founders knew "perfectly well that conditions would change. The values don't change. The circumstances do."

”

Martin-Quinn score

Breyer's Martin-Quinn score following the 2021-2022 term was -2.05, making him the second-most liberal justice on the court at that time. Martin-Quinn scores were developed by political scientists Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn from the University of Michigan, and measure the justices of the Supreme Court along an ideological continuum. The further from zero on the scale, the more conservative (>0) or liberal (<0) the justice.

The chart below details every justice's Martin-Quinn score for the 2021-2022 term.

Video discussion (2015)

Breyer spoke at Harvard University in November 2015. He discussed the collegiality of the court, his view of the Constitution, and how he handles political disagreement. The video of that event is embedded below.

Breyer spoke on Legally Speaking, a show produced by University of California Television. He discussed the role of the court and its impact on the country. The video of that event is embedded below.

Judicial career

Supreme Court of the United States (1994 - 2022)

Nomination Tracker
Nominee Information
Name: Stephen Breyer
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Progress
Confirmed 83 days after nomination.
ANominated: May 7, 1994
AABA Rating: Unanimously Well Qualified
Questionnaire:
AHearing: July 12-15, 1994
Hearing Transcript: Hearing Transcript
QFRs: (Hover over QFRs to read more)
AReported: July 25, 1994
AConfirmed: July 29, 1994
AVote: 87-9

In 1993, President Bill Clinton (D) considered Breyer for the seat vacated by Byron White that ultimately went to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Breyer was instead appointed following the retirement of Harry Blackmun in 1994. Clinton nominated Breyer to be an associate justice of the Supreme Court on May 17, 1994.

The American Bar Association rated Breyer Unanimously Well Qualified to become an associate justice for the Supreme Court. Breyer found little resistance during his confirmation hearings. Two Republican senators expressed concerns, Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Robert C. Smith (R-N.H.) Lugar worried that investments with Lloyd's of London would cause possible conflicts of interest, while Smith found that Breyer stressed separation of church and state and could not "in good conscience, vote to confirm a nominee whose personal background, judicial record and testimony indicates he will move the Supreme Court away from ... conservative decisions."

Breyer was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on July 29, 1994, by a vote 87-9. He took his seat on August 3, 1994.

First Circuit Court of Appeals (1980-1994)

From 1980 to 1994, Breyer served as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit. Breyer served as the court's chief judge from 1990 to 1994. He was nominated to the court of appeals by President Jimmy Carter (D) on November 13, 1980. In the last days of the Carter administration, on December 9, 1980, the U.S. Senate confirmed Breyer by an 80-10 vote. He served as a member of the Judicial Conference of the United States between 1990 and 1994 and the United States Sentencing Commission between 1985 and 1989.

Supreme Court statistics

Opinions by year

Below is a table of the number of opinions, concurrences, and dissents that Breyer has issued since joining the Supreme Court, according to the data at Cornell University’s Legal Information Institute and from the annual Stat Pack produced by the website SCOTUSBlog. This information is updated annually at the end of each term.

Opinions written by year, Stephen Breyer
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Opinions	6	8	7	8	8	5	8	7	8	8	8	7	8	5	6	6
Concurrences	3	2	2	7	6	5	5	2	4	3	3	5	2	2	1	1
Dissents	8	6	10	10	6	12	5	5	4	1	6	7	10	7	7	8
Totals	20	19	21	27	21	23	18	14	16	12	17	19	20	14	14	15

Opinions written by year, Stephen Breyer
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Opinions	9	10	8	12	8	9	9	11	9	6	10
Concurrences	3	6	8	7	4	10	3	7	3	5	9
Dissents	7	3	11	7	4	10	11	6	4	10	5
Concur in part, Dissent in part	1	3	2	1	4	0	0	1	3	0	0
Totals	20	22	29	27	20	29	23	25	19	21	24

Justice agreement

In the 2021 term, Breyer had the highest agreement rate with Elena Kagan. He had the highest disagreement rate with Clarence Thomas. In the 2020 term, Breyer had the highest agreement rate with Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. He had the highest disagreement rate with Samuel Alito.

The table below highlights Breyer's agreement rate with each justice on the court during that term.

Stephen Breyer agreement rates by term, 2017 - 2021
Justice	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
John Roberts	70%	69%	74%	73%	62%
Anthony Kennedy	66%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Clarence Thomas	55%	51%	52%	63%	48%
Ruth Bader Ginsburg	89%	82%	93%	N/A	N/A
Samuel Alito	54%	64%	54%	59%	51%
Sonia Sotomayor	90%	85%	85%	93%	86%
Elena Kagan	93%	86%	90%	93%	89%
Neil Gorsuch	61%	54%	66%	66%	54%
Brett Kavanaugh	N/A	70%	70%	73%	62%
Amy Coney Barrett	N/A	N/A	N/A	64%	56%

Frequency in majority

In the 2021 term, Breyer was in the majority in 68 percent of decisions. He was in the majority more often than one other justice and less often than seven other justices.
Since the 2011 term, Breyer has been in the majority more than 80 percent of the time five times. Across those 10 terms, he has been in the majority for 81 percent of all cases.

Noteworthy cases

See also: Noteworthy cases heard by current justices on the U.S. Supreme Court

The noteworthy cases listed in this section include any case where the justice authored a 5-4 majority opinion or an 8-1 dissent. Other cases may be included in this section if they set or overturn an established legal precedent, are a major point of discussion in an election campaign, receive substantial media attention related to the justice's ruling, or based on our editorial judgment that the case is noteworthy. For more on how we decide which cases are noteworthy, click here.

Since he joined the court through the 2021 term, Breyer authored the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision 35 times and authored a dissent in an 8-1 decision eight times. The table below details these cases by year.

Stephen Breyer noteworthy cases
Year	5-4 majority opinion	8-1 dissenting opinion
Total	35	8
2021	1	1
2020	0	0
2019	1	1
2018	1	0
2017	1	0
2016	1	0
2015	0	0
2014	3	0
2013	0	0
2012	1	0
2011	3	1
2010	1	1
2009	1	0
2008	0	0
2007	2	1
2006	2	0
2005	0	0
2004	1	0
2003	1	1
2002	1	1
2001	2	0
2000	2	1
1999	3	0
1998	2	0
1997	3	0
1996	1	0
1995	1	0
1994	0	0

Supreme Court opinions and orders

States may not invoke sovereign immunity to block USERRA lawsuits (2022)

See also: Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety

Breyer authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety, holding that "by ratifying the Constitution, the States agreed their sovereignty would yield to the national power to raise and support the Armed Forces. Congress may exercise this power to authorize private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in USERRA." Breyer was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Brett Kavanaugh.

In the majority opinion, Breyer wrote:

“	The Constitution vests in Congress the power “[t]o raise and support Armies” and “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy.” Art. I, §8, cls. 1, 12–13. Pursuant to that authority, Congress enacted a federal law that gives returning veterans the right to reclaim their prior jobs with state employers and authorizes suit if those employers refuse to accommodate them. See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U. S. C. §4301 et seq. This case asks whether States may invoke sovereign immunity as a legal defense to block such suits. In our view, they cannot. Upon entering the Union, the States implicitly agreed that their sovereignty would yield to federal policy to build and keep a national military. States thus gave up their immunity from congressionally authorized suits pursuant to the “ ‘plan of the Convention,’ ” as part of “ ‘the structure of the original Constitution itself.’ ” PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 14) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 728 (1999)).	”
—Justice Stephen Breyer

No right to abortion under the U.S. Constitution (2022)

See also: Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization

Breyer was part of the three-justice dissent in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. Breyer and Associate Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan jointly authored the dissenting opinion. The majority opinion, authored by Associate Justice Samuel Alito, held that the U.S. Constitution did not provide a right to abortion. Alito was joined in the majority by Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Chief Justice John Roberts joined with the majority to uphold Mississippi's abortion law but not to overturn Roe and Casey. Alito wrote:

“	We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The right to abortion does not fall within this category.	”
—Justice Alito

In their dissent, the justices wrote:

“	Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one result of today’s decision is certain: the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens. ... The Constitution will, today’s majority holds, provide no shield, despite its guarantees of liberty and equality for all. ... Subsequent legal developments have only reinforced Roe and Casey. The Court has continued to embrace all the decisions Roe and Casey cited, decisions which recognize a constitutional right for an individual to make her own choices about “intimate relationships, the family,” and contraception. Casey, 505 U. S., at 857. Roe and Casey have themselves formed the legal foundation for subsequent decisions protecting these profoundly personal choices. As discussed earlier, the Court relied on Casey to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment protects same-sex intimate relationships. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 578; supra, at 23. The Court later invoked the same set of precedents to accord constitutional recognition to same-sex marriage. See Obergefell, 576 U. S., at 665–666; supra, at 23. In sum, Roe and Casey are inextricably interwoven with decades of precedent about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra, at 21–24. While the majority might wish it otherwise, Roe and Casey are the very opposite of “‘obsolete constitutional thinking.’” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 236 (1997) (quoting Casey 505 U. S., at 857). Moreover, no subsequent factual developments have undermined Roe and Casey. Women continue to experience unplanned pregnancies and unexpected developments in pregnancies. Pregnancies continue to have enormous physical, social, and economic consequences. Even an uncomplicated pregnancy imposes significant strain on the body, unavoidably involving significant physiological change and excruciating pain. For some women, pregnancy and childbirth can mean life-altering physical ailments or even death. Today, as noted earlier, the risks of carrying a pregnancy to term dwarf those of having an abortion. See supra, at 22. ... With sorrow—for this Court, but more, for the many millions of American women who have today lost a fundamental constitutional protection—we dissent.	”
—Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan

Does v. Mills (2021)

See also: Lawsuits about state actions and policies in response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, 2020

Does v. Mills: On October 19, 2021, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer declined to suspend Maine’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate for healthcare workers. The plaintiffs argued that the mandate violated their right, under the First Amendment, to the free exercise of religion because it did not provide for a religious exemption. Chief Judge Jon Levy, of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, denied the plaintiffs' earlier request for a temporary restraining order and later refused to grant a preliminary injunction against the mandate. Levy, a Barack Obama (D) appointee, concluded that the plaintiffs had not been “prevented from staying true to their professed religious beliefs,” because they were still able to refuse vaccination, albeit at the risk of being terminated from their jobs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit declined to intervene, prompting the plaintiffs to petition Breyer, the justice assigned to field emergency requests from Maine, to suspend the mandate pending appeal. Later on October 19, the First Circuit affirmed Levy’s decision, finding that "Maine's interest in safeguarding its residents is paramount." The plaintiffs then filed another emergency application with Breyer, seeking an injunction pending a decision by the full Court as to whether to take up the appeal.

Louisiana abortion law struck down (2019)

See also: June Medical Services LLC v. Russo

Breyer authored a 5-4 majority opinion in June Medical Services LLC v. Russo, holding Louisiana Act 620 was unconstitutional. Breyer was joined in the majority by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.

“ The plaintiff abortion providers and clinics in this case have challenged Act 620 on the ground that it infringes their patients’ rights to access an abortion. The State contends that the proper parties to assert these rights are the patients themselves. We think that the State has waived that argument. … Our dissenting colleagues suggest that this case is different because the plaintiffs have challenged a law ostensibly enacted to protect the women whose rights they are asserting. See post, at 25–26 (opinion of ALITO, J.); post, at 7 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). But that is a common feature of cases in which we have found third-party standing. … Turning to the merits, we apply the constitutional standards set forth in our earlier abortion-related cases, and in particular in Casey and Whole Woman’s Health. … In Whole Woman’s Health, we quoted Casey in explaining that “‘a statute which, while furthering [a] valid state interest has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.’” … We added that “ ‘[u]nnecessary health regulations’” impose an unconstitutional “‘undue burden’” if they have “‘the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.’” … We went on to explain that, in applying these standards, courts must “consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.” … The District Court found that enforcing the admitting privileges requirement would “result in a drastic reduction in the number and geographic distribution of abortion providers.” Id., at 87. In light of demographic, economic, and other evidence, the court concluded that this reduction would make it impossible for “many women seeking a safe, legal abortion in Louisiana . . . to obtain one” and that it would impose “substantial obstacles” on those who could. … We think that these findings and the evidence that underlies them are sufficient to support the District Court’s conclusion that Act 620 would place substantial obstacles in the path of women seeking an abortion in Louisiana. … We turn finally to the law’s asserted benefits. The District Court found that there was “‘no significant health-related problem that the new law helped to cure.’” 250 F. Supp. 3d, at 86 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22)). It found that the admitting privileges requirement “[d]oes [n]ot [p]rotect [w]omen’s [h]ealth,” provides “no significant health benefits,” and makes no improvement to women’s health “compared to prior law.” 250 F. Supp. 3d, at 86 (boldface deleted). Our examination of the record convinces us that these findings are not “clearly erroneous.” … We conclude, in light of the record, that the District Court’s significant factual findings—both as to burdens and as to benefits—have ample evidentiary support. None is “clearly erroneous.” Given the facts found, we must also uphold the District Court’s related factual and legal determinations. These include its determination that Louisiana’s law poses a “substantial obstacle” to women seeking an abortion; its determination that the law offers no significant health-related benefits; and its determination that the law consequently imposes an “undue burden” on a woman’s constitutional right to choose to have an abortion. We also agree with its ultimate legal conclusion that, in light of these findings and our precedents, Act 620 violates the Constitution. ... This case is similar to, nearly identical with, Whole Woman’s Health. And the law must consequently reach a similar conclusion. Act 620 is unconstitutional. ” —Justice Breyer

Previous noteworthy opinions

• 2018-2019 term (Click to expand)
  
  

  Native American state fuel taxes (2018)

  See also: Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den Inc.

  Breyer authored a 5-4 majority opinion in this case ruling that a fuel wholesaler owned by a member of the Yakama Indian Nation was exempt from paying state fuel taxes for using public highways because the Yakama Treaty of 1855 granted members of the Nation the right "to travel upon all public highways" and preempted its obligation to pay the tax. Breyer was joined in the majority by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Breyer wrote:

  “

  The State of Washington imposes a tax upon fuel importers who travel by public highway. The question before us is whether an 1855 treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation forbids the State of Washington to impose that tax upon fuel importers who are members of the Yakama Nation. We conclude that it does, and we affirm the Washington Supreme Court’s similar decision.

  ”

• 2000-2014 (Click to expand)
  
  

  Recess appointment power of president limited (2014)

  On June 26, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. Noel Canning, a case on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

  A NLRB order held that a soda distributor, Noel Canning, had unlawfully refused to execute a collective bargaining agreement with a labor union. The NLRB ordered the distributor to execute the agreement and to compensate the union members for any financial losses. Appealing the NLRB's decision to the D.C. Circuit, Noel Canning argued that three of the five NLRB members' appointments were made invalidly under the Recess Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution and, therefore, the NLRB did not have the necessary quorum of three members to issue its order. Noel Canning argued that the Senate was in between pro forma sessions and, therefore, was not in recess when the president made the three appointments. The D.C. Circuit agreed, holding that the three-day adjournment between pro forma sessions of the Senate did not constitute a sufficient recess to make recess appointments under the Recess Appointments Clause.

  Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stephen Breyer upheld the D.C. Circuit's judgment, holding that the Senate's authority to conduct business by unanimous consent in pro forma sessions indicated that the Senate was not in a formal recess sufficient to trigger the clause for the three NLRB appointments at issue in this case.

  Illinois checkpoint case (2004)

  Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the majority opinion in the case of Illinois v. Lidster. The question in the case concerned whether or not a highway checkpoint established to gather information on a hit-and-run death could be used to arrest others not related to the original intent of the checkpoint. The Court found that the use of the checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment when police arrested Robert Lidster for drunk driving after he was stopped at the checkpoint. While it was argued that Edmond, a prior case involving checkpoints, protected Lidster from random checkpoint searches, Breyer wrote the two cases differed:

  “

  The checkpoint stop here differs significantly from that in Edmond. The stop's primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others. The police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend, not that vehicle's occupants, but other individuals.

  ”

  Copyright law named for Sonny Bono upheld (2003)

  Justice Breyer was the dissenting writer in the case of Eldred v. Ashcroft. The case involved the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended copyright coverage by 20 years. Breyer's dissent focused on the ways that the ruling will benefit the interests of corporations and heirs to copyright holders but showed no benefit to the public as a whole. He concluded by writing:

  “

  This analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that the statute cannot be understood rationally to advance a constitutionally legitimate interest. The statute falls outside the scope of legislative power that the Copyright Clause, read in light of the First Amendment, grants to Congress. I would hold the statute unconstitutional.

  ”

  Nebraska's partial-birth-abortion law struck down (2000)

  On June 28, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case of Stenberg v. Carhart, a case on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit.

  In 1999, Nebraska passed a law that prohibited a medical procedure known as dilation and evacuation (D&E), which was more commonly known as partial birth abortion. The statute provided that "No partial birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself." The statute defined partial birth abortion as "an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery." A violation of the statute was a Class III felony, which carried a prison term of up to 20 years and a fine of up to $25,000 per violation. Further, any violation of the statute provided for an immediate revocation of a physician's license to practice medicine in Nebraska. Carhart, a Nebraska physician, filed a lawsuit alleging the law violated the U.S. Constitution. A federal district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the law was unconstitutional.

  Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the court. The court upheld the Eighth Circuit's judgment that the law was unconstitutional because the law placed an undue burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion. Breyer wrote, "because all those who perform abortion procedures using the D&E method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment, the Nebraska law imposes an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision."

See also

• Resignation of Stephen Breyer from the U.S. Supreme Court
• Supreme Court of the United States
• Supreme Court cases, October term 2021-2022

External links

• Search Google News for this topic
• Biography from the Federal Judicial Center
• Profile by Oyez

Footnotes

Political offices
Preceded by Harry Blackmun	Supreme Court of the United States 1994-2022	Succeeded by Ketanji Brown Jackson
Preceded by -	United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit 1980-1994	Succeeded by Sandra Lea Lynch