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NATIONALITY 
AND  THE  WAR 


^ 


NATIONALITY 
&   THE   WAR 

BY 

ARNOLD  J.  TOYNBEE 


LONDON  AND  TORONTO 

J.    M.    DENT    &    SONS    LTD. 

NEW  YORK:   E.  P.  DUTTON  »  CO. 

HCHXV 


"tZ-'R  I  «^ 


7  n  •.  v.  /c  ^-  wc/'vwC    ^  .'1'^'^- 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  an  attempt  to  review  the  problems  of 
Nationality  in  the  area  affected  by  the  War*  My 
principal  object  has  been  to  present  the  existing  facts 
in  their  historical  setting,  and  where  these  facts  are  of 
a  psychol<^cal  order,  as  they  so  often  are,  I  have 
tried  to  reproduce  sympathetically  the  different  nations^ 
conflicting  points  of  view* 

Some  readers  will  regret  that  I  have  not  confined 
myself  to  narrative  altogether,  and  will  resent  the  **  will  ** 
and  "  ought  *'  that  punctuate  the  *'  was ''  and  **  is/* 
I  would  answer  them  that  this  practical  application  is 
the  justification  of  the  book* 

National  questions  are  of  absorbing  interest  at  all 
times  to  the  particular  nations  they  concern ;  they  are 
of  occasional  interest  to  the  professional  historian  who 
toudies  them  in  the  course  of  his  research ;  to  the  world 
in  general  they  are  normally  of  no  interest  at  all*  **  But 
what  are  we  to  do  about  it  i  '"  people  exclaim  when  a 
problem  is  thrust  upon  their  attention,  and  finding  no 
answer  they  hark  back  to  their  own  affairs* 

This  normal  life  of  ours  has  suddenly  been  bewitched 
by  the  War,  and  in  the  **  revaluing  of  all  our  values "" 
the  right  reading  of  the  riddle  of  Nationality  has  become 
an  affair  of  life  and  death*  The  war  has  exploded  the 
mine  upon  which  diplomatists  have  feared  to  tread, 
and  we  are  walking  in  a  trance  across  ruins*  Solvitur 
ambulando,  or  else  we  break  our  necks* 

This  is  my  apology  for  laying  down  the  law,  and  it 
will  dear  up  a  further  difficulty  which  might  otherwise 


vi  NATIONALITY  AND  THE  WAR 

cause  trouble*  ''  When  you  change  from  present  to 
future/'  readers  will  say,  **  which  do  you  mean  to 
expotmd — ^what  will  happen,  what  may  happen  or  what 
ought  to  happen  i  ** 

Certainly  not  what  **  will  happen  ** :  '*  If  we  win  *'  is 
the  implied  hypothesis  of  every  sentence  I  have  written, 
a  hypothesis  that  baffles  prophecy*  If  I  become  cate- 
gorical, it  is  a  lapse  of  style,  not  of  standpoint* 

Certainly  not  what  **  ought  to  happen  '*  in  the 
Utopian  sense :  political  problems  have  no  universal 
solutions*  What  does  not  meet  the  situation  meets 
nothing :  what  meets  it  to-day  will  not  meet  it  to- 
morrow, because  the  situation  itself  will  have  been 
transformed  by  being  met* 

My  text  is  what  *'  may  happen,*'  yet  **  may  "  partakes 
of  both  **  will  **  and  **  ought  *' :  its  meaning  varies 
with  its  application*  The  problem  of  Nationality  has 
come  to  concern  ourselves,  and  so  far  as  it  concerns  us 
it  depends  upon  us  for  its  solution — upon  our  intellectual 
judgments,  the  making  up  of  our  mind,  and  upon  our 
moral  judgments,  the  determination  of  our  will*  We 
''may*'  think  this  or  that  thought,  feel  this  or  that 
feeling,  and  each  will  give  a  different  cast  to  the  clay 
fate  has  thrust  into  our  hands.  We  have  to  decide 
which  way  we  **  ought  **  to  fashion  it* 

Yet  the  solution  depends  upon  others  as  well*  In 
*'  ourselves  *'  we  often  include  our  allies,  but  the  power 
of  British  will  to  influence  Russian  action  is  slight 
indeed,  and  when  we  deal  with  neutrals  or  enemies,  our 
own  will  ceases  to  cotmt  while  theirs  becomes  all- 
important*  This  will  of  other  parties  is  for  us  an 
objective  fact :  we  can  conjecture  what  it  is  Ukely  to 
be,  and  frame  our  own  action  either  to  thwart  or  to 
promote  it,  but  we  cannot  determine  their  will  from 


PREFACE  vii 

i,  and  it  is  therefore  idle  for  us  to  debate  what 
they  ''ought*'  to  do.  In  discussing  what  ''may 
happen  **  on  the  European  continent  we  have  simply 
to  discover  what  national  ideals  or  ambitions  will  assert 
themselves  if  the  war  removes  certain  forces  like  the 
traditional  regime  in  Prussia  or  the  Dual  System  in  the 
Danufaian  Monarchy,  which  hitherto  have  prevented 
large  groups  of  population  from  exercising  dieir  will 
and  working  out  their  own  salvation, 

I  thus  repudiate  Utopianism,  and  declare  solvency 
for  every  draft  I  make  upon  the  future.  The  only  piece 
of  Utopianism  of  which  I  am  deliberately  guilty  is  the 
suggestion  that  the  UJSJ^,  might  undertake  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  Black  Sea  Straits  (Ch,  K,  Sect,  B,), 
Of  course  they  will  not,  and  of  course  Russia  wiU,  and 
again  the  reader  will  resent  my  inconsistency,  "  Better 
have  left  out  the  suggestion "'  he  will  say, 

I  have  left  it  in  because  it  crowns  an  argument.  It  is 
the  rednctio  ad  absurdum  of  that  dearth  of  international 
oq;anisation  which  is  largely  responsible  for  Europe's 
present  pass,  and  possibly  it  will  serve  to  bring  out  an 
tmderlying  purpose  of  this  book. 

My  review  of  problems  does  not  pretend  to  be 
exhaustive — ^that  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  a  single 
book  and  a  single  writer,  and  it  would  also  be  a  weariness 
of  the  flesh.  Problems  are  legion,  and  they  have  no 
individual  significance  in  themselves :  they  are  valuable 
only  as  illustrations  of  a  phenomenon.  By  looking  at 
Nationality  in  the  concrete  from  successive  perspectives, 
we  may  gain  a  clearer  notion  of  what  Nationality  is  than 
by  the  direct  approach  of  an  abstract  definition.  At  any 
rate  it  is  worth  while  making  the  experiment,  for  under- 
stand Nationality  we  must,  now  that  it  has  proved  itself 
die  dominant  political  factor  in  Europe, 


via        NATIONALITY  AND  THE  WAR 


I  have  still  to  acfaio^rfedge  my  obligations.  The  chief 
source  of  this  book  is  an  ingrained  habit  of  gazing  at 
maps,  and  much  of  my  material  had  been  imbibed 
unconsciously  in  this  way  long  before  the  war  broke  out 
and  I  sat  down  to  write.  My  consdous  debts  are  to 
Stieler's  HandrAdas  of  the  contemporary  world,  and 
to  the  wonderful  Historical  Adas  created  by  Karl 
Spriiner  and  Theodor  Menke  his  apostle.  Both  of 
these  I  have  consulted  continuously  ^Aiile  writing  the 
book  and  compiling  my  own  maps  that  accompany  it, 
and  I  have  also  derived  much  profit  from  the  little 
AUdeutscher  Adas  published  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Attdeutsche  Verband  by  Justus  Perthes,  which  plots  out 
the  distribution  of  languages  in  Central  Europe  with 
admirable  exactitude,  though  it  combines  scientific 
execution  with  duuvinistic  inspiration  in  a  duracteristL- 
cally  German  fashion*  The  reader  will  note  in  passing 
that  the  other  atlases  cited  are  also  of  German  author* 
ship,  and  that  oondusions  based  on  their  evidence  are 
not  likely  to  be  biassed  to  Germany's  disadvantage, 

I  am  also  indebted  to  books.  Among  works  of 
reference  I  would  single  out  two  of  Baedeker's  hand- 
books, the  deventh  edition  of  Austria-Hungary  (191 1) 
and  Konstantinopd  and  Kleinasien  (1905),  but  in  this 
case  the  German  source  yidds  precedence  to  the 
Encyclopaedia  Britannica  (deventh  edition,  published 
in  191 1),  which  has  proved  the  most  indispensable  of  all 
my  guides.  My  extracts  from  the  official  census  returns 
of  various  states  are  nearly  all  derived  through  this 
channel,^  and  I  have  made  especially  diligent  use  of  the 


'  The  19x1  editicm  of  the  Encychpiedia  takes  its  Austxx>-Hungarian 
statistics  nom  the  census  of  1900 :  I  might  have  rectified  them  by  the 
more  recent  returns  of  1910,  but  I  have  deliberately  refrained  from 
doing  so.  The  figures  of  1910  of  course  represent  the  present  absolute 
totals  of  the  various  populations  more  accurately  than  those  of  1900^ 


PREFACE  ix 


exodlendy  arranged  articles  on  '*  Austria-Hungary '^ 
and  **  Hungary/' 

For  what  I  have  written  on  Hungary  I  am  likewise 
in  debt  to  the  illumixiating  study  on  Hungary  in  the 
Eighteenth  Century ^^  by  Professor  Marczali,  the  Magyar 
historian,  but  atx>ve  all  to  the  work  of  Dr*  Seton- 
Watson.  So  far  as  I  deal  with  his  subjects,  my  informa- 
tion is  taken  at  second  hand  :  I  have  learnt  all  I  know 
about  **  Magyarisation  **  from  his  Racial  Problems  in 
Hungary,  and  all  I  know  about  modem  Croatia  from 
his  Southern  Slavs*  I  can  do  no  better  than  refer  the 
reader  to  these  two  books  for  the  substantiation  of  my 
indictment  against  the  Magyar  nation* 

The  War  and  Democracy,  written  in  collaboration  by 
Messrs.  Seton-Watson,  Dover  Wilson,  2Smmem  and 
Greenwood,  was  only  published  after  the  relevant  part 
of  my  own  book  was  already  in  proof,  and  I  have  not 
yet  had  leisure  to  read  it.  Yet  though  I  have  been 
unable  to  borrow  from  the  book  itself,  I  owe  an  incalcul- 
able debt  to  another  of  its  authors  besides  Dr.  Seton- 
Watson.  I  have  had  the  good  fortune  to  be  Mr. 
Zimmem's  pupil. 

So  much  for  maps  and  books  :  they  caxmot  compare 
with  friends.  Widiout  the  help  of  my  mother  and  my 
wife,  this  book  would  never  have  grown  ripe  for  publica- 
tion, and  I  have  to  thank  my  wife's  fadier.  Professor 
Gilbert  Murray,  Mr.  A.  D.  Undsay  and  Mr.  H.  W.  C. 

bat  relative  rather  than  absolute  quantities  are  valuable  for  my  purpose, 
and  in  this  respect  the  figures  of  zgoo  are  undoubtedly  more  accurate 
than  those  of  zgio.  In  1900  the  "  official "  proportions  were  doubdm 
already  distorted  by  the  Hungarian  census-officials,  and  doubtless  the 
real  proportions  have  slightly  shifted  in  the  meanwhile,  but  both  these 
margins  of  error  are  insignificant  compared  with  the  gross  perversions 
of  truth  perpetrated  by  Hungarian  officialdom  in  19x0.  So  rapidly 
is  a  nation  demoralised  when  once  it  succumbs  to  chauvinism. 

>  Published  by  the  Cambridge  University  Press. 


NATIONALITY  AND  THE  WAR 

of  BalUol  College,  and  Mr.  R*  W*  Qiafmian  of  the 
Clarendon  Press,  all  of  ^i^m  have  read  the  book  in 
^i^le  or  part  either  in  manuscript  or  in  proof.  Their 
advice  has  enabled  me  to  raise  the  standard  of  my  work 
in  every  respect.  When  the  critics  tear  my  final  draft 
in  pieces,  I  shall  reahse  how  my  first  draft  would  have 
fared,  had  it  been  exposed  naked  to  their  daws. 

Last  but  not  least,  I  must  express  my  gratitude  to  my 
publishers,  Messrs.  J.  M.  Dent  and  Sons,  Ltd.,  for  their 
unfailing  kindness,  cspedally  for  bearing  with  my  delays 
and  reproducing  my  maps. 

ARNOLD  TOYNBEE. 

Febntary  19x5. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

L  The  Futdre      ••••••«.  z 

II.  PRUSSIAHISU,  OR  GeRBIANY'S  AMBITIONS           •           •           .  21   ^ 

A.  The  German  Empire 21 

B.  The  French  Frontier 40 

C.  The  Danish  Frontier 48 

%^  D.  The  Polish  Frontier 51 

E.  Prussian  State  and  German  Nation    .        •        .  80 

IIL  The  Vitalitt  of  Austria 98 

IV.  Rkxmis'imuchow  in  the  Balkans       ....  138 

A.  Hungary Z4& 

B.  The  Southern  Slavs 167 

C.  A  Balkan  ZoUverein 2x6 

V.  TRiBsn  AND  Italy 246      / 

VL  TCHBCB  AND  GeRHAN  IN  THE  NeW  AUSTRIA                        .  261   l/    ^ 

^  VIL  Parslavish,  (»  Germany's  Fears       •        .        .        .  273 

wVIIL  The  Russian  Empire  and  National  Self-Government  281 

A.  The  Risorgimento  of  Poland     ....  281 

B.  The  National  Evolution  of  Russia                        .  294 
C  Devolution 300 

D.  Expansion 325 

^  DC.  Russia's  Needs  •••..••.  337 

A.  The  Liberation  of  the  Baltic      •        .         •        .  339 

B.  The  Liberation  of  the  Black  Sea         .        .        .  358 
X.  Tbb  Dismantling  ot  Titrkby 379 

A.  Thrace 379 

B.  Armenia 385 

C.  Pantslamism 399 

D.  The  New  Anatolia 412 

E.  The  New  Arabia 433 

XL  Nationality,  Esoploitation  and  Strong  Government 
IN  Persia    ..•..•• 

uXIL  Natignauty  and  Sovereignty 

Appbndix  on  the  Map  op  Europe      •        •        •        .  501 

Index      •••••»•••  513 


449      / 


LIST  OF  MAPS 


IN  THE  TEXT 

The  Kiel  Canal Fatmtpaie    48 

The  Dahube Page    105 

The  TRBmxiio ^      260 


ft 


HAP. 


IN  COLOURS 
L  The  Frahoo-Gebuan  Frontier 

IL  POLAIID        *         •  •         • 

IIL  The  Sodtbebn  Slavs  • 
IV.  The  Balkans 
V.  The  HnvTEKLAND  of  Okssa 
VL  TtaE  Nearer  East 
VIL  The  NAnoNALrms  of  Europe 


Fadttg  page    41 
51 


>» 


$» 


f9 


167 


303 


zu 


NATIONALITY  AND  THE  WAR 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  FUTURE 

For  the  first  time  in  our  lives,  we  find  ourselves  in 
coniplete  tmcertainty  as  to  the  future*  To  uncivilised 
people  the  situation  is  commonplace ;  but  in  twentieth- 
century  Europe  we  are  accustomed  to  look  ahead,  to 
forecast  accurately  what  lies  before  us,  and  then  to 
choose  our  path  and  follow  it  steadily  to  its  end ;  and 
we  rightly  consider  that  this  is  the  characteristic  of 
civilised  men«  The  same  ideal  appears  in  every  side  of 
our  life :  in  the  individual's  morality  as  a  desire  for 
**  Independence '"  strong  enough  to  control  most  human 
passions :  in  our  Economics  as  Estimates  and  Insur- 
ances :  in  our  Politics  as  a  great  sustained  concentration 
of  all  our  surplus  energies,  in  which  parties  are  becom- 
ing increasingly  at  one  in  aim  and  effort,  while  their 
differences  are  shrinking  to  alternatives  of  method,  to 
raise  the  material,  moral,  and  intellectual  standard  of  Uf  e 
throi^out  the  nation*  From  all  this  fruitful,  con- 
structive, exacting  work,  which  demands  the  best  from 
us  and  makes  us  the  better  for  giving  it,  we  have  been 
violently  wrenched  away  and  pltmged  into  a  struggle  for 
existence  with  people  very  much  like  oturselves,  with 
whom  we  have  no  quarrel* 

We  must  face  the  fact  that  this  is  pure  evil,  and  that 
we  cannot  escape  it*  We  must  fight  with  all  our 
strength  :  every  particle  of  our  energy  must  be  absorbed 


2  THE  FUTURE 

in  the  war  :  and  meanwhile  our  social  construction  must 
stand  still  indefinitely,  or  even  be  in  part  undone,  and 
every  class  and  individual  in  the  country  must  suffer  in 
their  degree,  according  to  the  quite  arbitrary  chance  of 
war,  in  lives  horribly  destroyed  and  work  ruined*  We 
have  to  carry  this  war  to  a  successful  issue,  because  on 
that  depends  our  freedom  to  govern  our  own  life  after 
the  war  is  over,  and  the  preservation  of  this  freedom 
itself  is  more  important  for  us  than  the  whole  sum  of 
concrete  gains  its  possession  has  so  far  brought  us* 

Thus  we  are  sacrificing  our  present  to  our  future, 
and,  therein,  obeying  the  dviUsed  man's  ideal  to  the 
uttermost*  But  we  shall  only  be  justified  in  our  most 
momentous  decision,  by  which  we  have  put  to  the 
touch  the  whole  of  our  fortunes  at  once,  if  the  path  we 
choose  and  follow  is  worthy  of  the  sacrifice  and  the 
danger  we  are  incurring  for  the  sake  of  it* 

At  present  we  are  all  working,  according  to  our 
individual  capacities,  for  success  in  the  war,  but  we 
have  little  influence,  even  collectively,  upon  the  result* 
We  have  unreservedly  put  the  control  of  it  into  the 
hands  of  experts  whom  we  trust,  and  rightly  done  so, 
because  it  is  the  essence  of  this  evil,  war,  whether  the 
veiled  war  of  Diplomacy  or  the  naked  war  of  military 
force,  that  its  conduct  must  be  secret  and  autocratic* 
Naturally  our  thoughts  are  with  the  fleets  and  armies, 
for  we  know  that  if  they  are  beaten,  we  lose  the  thing 
they  are  fighting  for,  freedom  of  choice;  but  we  are 
in  danger  of  forgetting  that,  if  we  win,  our  object  is  not 
automatically  attained*  If  we  read  in  the  newspaper 
one  day  that  the  powers  with  which  we  are  at  war  had 
submitted  unconditionally  to  the  Allies,  we  should  only 
be  at  the  beginning  of  our  real  task*  The  recotistruc- 
tion  of  Europe  would  be  in  our  hands ;  but  we  should 


THE  FUTURE  3 

be  exposed  to  the  one  thing  worse  than  defeat  in  the 
field,  to  the  misuse  of  the  immense  power  of  decision, 
for  good  or  evil,  given  us  by  victory* 

This  is  an  issue  incomparably  graver  than  the 
miUtary  struggle  that  lies  immediately  before  us. 
Firstly,  we  are  more  personally  responsible  for  it  as 
individuals.  The  war  itself  is  not  oidy  being  managed 
by  experts :  it  was  brought  upon  us  (the  **  White 
Paper  ^'  leaves  no  doubt  in  our  minds)  by  factors  outside 
Ei^^d  altogether.  But  our  policy  after  hostilities 
cease  will  be  decided  by  our  own  government  relying 
for  its  authority  upon  the  cotmtry  behind  it,  that  is,  it 
will  be  decided  ultimately  by  public  opinion.  Secondly, 
the  state  of  war  will  have  shaken  our  judgment  when 
we  are  most  in  need  of  judging  wisely. 

The  psychological  devastation  of  war  is  even  more 
terrible  than  the  material.  War  brings  the  savage 
substratum  of  human  character  to  the  surface,  after  it 
has  swept  away  the  strong  habits  that  generations  of 
civilised  effort  have  built  up.  We  saw  how  the  breath 
of  war  in  Ireland  demoralised  all  parties  alike.  We 
have  met  the  present  more  ghastly  reality  with  admir- 
able calmness ;  but  we  must  be  on  our  guard.  Time 
wears  out  nerves,  and  War  inevitably  brings  with  it  the 
st^;gestion  of  certain  obsolete  points  of  view,  which  in 
our  real,  normal  life,  have  loi^  been  buried  and 
forgotten. 

It  rouses  the  instinct  of  revenge.  **  If  Germany 
has  hurt  us,  we  will  hurt  her  more — ^to  teach  her  not  to 
do  it  again.''  The  wish  is  the  savs^e's  automatic 
reaction,  the  reason  his  perfunctory  justification  of  it : 
but  the  civilised  man  knows  that  die  impulse  is  hope- 
lessly unreasonable.  The  **  hurt ''  is  being  at  war,  and 
the  evil  we  wish  to  bann  is  the  possibility  of  being  at 


4  THE  FUTURE 

war  againt  because  war  prevents  us  working  out  our  own 
lives  as  we  choose*  If  we  beat  Germany  and  then 
humiliate  her,  she  will  never  rest  till  she  has  **  redeemed 
her  honour/*  by  humiliatii^  us  more  cruelly  in  turn* 
Instead  of  beii^  free  to  return  to  our  own  pressing 
business,  we  shall  have  to  be  constantly  on  the  watch 
against  her«  Two  great  nations  will  sit  idle,  weapon 
in  hand,  like  two  Afghans  in  their  loopholed  towers 
^en  the  blood  feud  is  between  them ;  and  we  shall 
have  sacrificed  dehberately  and  to  an  ever-increasing 
extent,  for  the  blood  feud  grows  by  geometrical  pro- 
gression, the  very  freedom  for  lAdch  we  are  now  giving 
our  lives* 

Another  war  instinct  is  plunder*  War  is  often  the 
savage's  profession :  **  *  With  my  sword,  spear  and 
shield  I  plough,  I  sow,  I  reap,  I  gather  in  the  vintage*'  ^ 
If  we  beat  Germany  our  own  mills  and  factories  will 
have  been  at  a  standstill,  our  horses  requisiticmed  and  our 
crops  unharvested,  our  merchant  steamers  stranded  in 
dock  if  not  sunk  on  the  high  seas,  and  our  *  blood 
and  treasure '  lavished  on  the  war :  but  in  the  end 
Germany's  wealth  wiU  be  in  our  grasp,  her  colonies, 
her  markets,  and  such  floating  riches  as  we  can  distrain 
upon  by  means  of  an  indemnity*  If  we  have  had  to 
beat  our  ploughshares  into  swords,  we  can  at  least  draw 
some  profit  from  the  new  tool,  and  recoup  ourselves 
partially  for  the  inconvenience*  It  ^  no  longer  a 
question  of  irrational,  impulsive  revenge,  perhaps  not 
even  of  sweetening  our  sorrow  by  a  litde  gain*  To 
draw  on  the  life-blood  of  German  wealdi  may  be  the 
only  way  to  rq>lenish  the  veins  of  our  exhausted 
Industry  and  Commerce*"  So  the  plunder  instinct 
m^t  be  clothed  in  civilised  garb  :  **  War,"  we  might 

'  TIk  soQK  of  ItyboM  the  KiclML 


THE  FUTURE  5 

eipress  it,  "'  is  an  investment  that  must  btwg  in  its 
return/' 

The  first  ailment  against  this  point  of  view  is  that 
it  has  clearly  been  the  inspiring  idea  of  Germany's 
policy,  and  history  already  shows  that  armaments  are 
as  unbusinesslike  a  speculation  for  civilised  countries 
as  war  is  an  abnormal  occupation  for  civilised  men. 
We  saw  the  efifect  of  the  Morocco  tension  upon  German 
finance  in  xgiit  a&d  the  first  phase  of  the  present  war 
has  been  enough  to  show  how  much  Germany's  com- 
merce will  inevitably  suffer,  whether  she  wins  or  loses* 

It  is  only  \^en  all  the  armaments  are  on  one  side  and 
all  the  wealth  is  on  the  other,  that  war  pays ;  when,  in 
£act,  an  armed  savage  attacks  a  civilised  man  possessed 
of  no  arms  for  the  protection  of  his  wealth*  Our 
Afghans  in  their  towers  are  sharp  enough  not  to  steal 
each  other's  cows  (supposing  they  possess  any  of  their 
own)  for  cows  do  not  multiply  by  being  exchanged,  and 
both  Afghans  would  starve  in  the  end  after  wasting  all 
their  bullets  in  the  skirmish*  They  save  their  bullets 
to  steal  cows  from  the  plainsman  who  cannot  make 
reprisals* 

If  Germany  vrere  really  nothing  but  a  **  nation  in 
arms,"  successful  war  might  be  as  lucrative  for  her  as 
an  Afghan's  raid  on  the  plain,  but  she  is  normally  a 
great  industrial  commtmity  like  ourselves*  In  the  last 
generation  she  has  achieved  a  national  growth  of  which 
she  is  justly  proud*  Like  our  own,  it  has  been  entirely 
social  and  economic*  Her  goods  have  been  peacefully 
conquering  the  world's  markets*  Now  her  workers 
have  been  diverted  en  masse  from  their  prospering 
industry  to  conquer  the  same  markets  by  military  force, 
and  the  whole  work  of  forty  years  is  jeopardised  by  the 
change  of  method* 


6  THE  FUTURE 

Fighting  for  trade  and  industry  is  not  like  %hting 
for  cattle*  Cattle  are  driven  from  one  fastness  to 
another,  and  if  no  better,  are  at  least  no  worse  for  the 
transit*  Civilised  wealth  perishes  on  the  way*  CXir 
economic  organisation  owes  its  power  and  range  to  the 
marvellous  forethought  and  co-operation  that  has  built 
it  up;  but  the  most  delicate  organisms  are  the  most 
easily  dislocated,  and  the  conqueror,  whether  England 
or  Germany,  will  have  to  realise  that,  though  he  may 
seem  to  have  got  the  wealth  of  the  conquered  into  his 
grip,  the  total  wealth  of  both  parties  will  have  been 
vastly  diminished  by  the  process  of  the  struggle* 

The  characteristic  feature  of  modem  wealth  is  that 
it  is  international*  Economic  gain  and  loss  is  shared 
by  the  whole  world,  and  the  shifting  of  the  economic 
balance  does  not  correspond  to  the  moves  in  the  game 
of  diplomatists  and  armies.  Germany's  economic 
growth  has  been  a  phenomenon  quite  independent 
of  her  political  ambitions,  and  Germany's  economic 
ruin  would  compromise  something  far  greater  than 
Germany's  political  future — ^the  whole  world's  pros- 
perity* British  wealth,  among  the  rest,  would  be  dealt 
a  deadly  wound  by  Germany's  economic  death,  and  it 
would  be  idle  to  pump  Germany's  last  life-blood  into 
our  veins,  if  we  were  automatically  draining  them  of  our 
own  blood  in  the  process* 

But  issues  greater  than  the  economic  are  involved* 
The  modern  **  Nation  "  is  for  good  or  ill  an  organism  one 
and  indivisible,  and  all  the  diverse  branches  of  national 
activity  flourish  or  wither  with  the  whole  national  well- 
being*  You  cannot  destroy  German  wealth  without 
paralysing  German  intellect  and  art,  and  European 
civilisation,  if  it  is  to  go  on  growing,  cannot  do  without 
them*    Every  doctor  and  musician,  every  scientist. 


THE  FUTURE  7 

engmeer,  political  economist  and  historian,  knows  well 
his  debt  to  the  spiritual  energy  of  the  German  nation* 
In  the  moments  vrhen  one  realises  the  full  horror  of  what 
is  happening,  the  worst  thought  is  the  aimless  hurling 
to  destruction  of  the  world^s  only  true  wealth,  the  skill 
and  nobility  and  genius  of  human  beings,  and  it  is 
probably  in  the  German  casualties  that  the  intellectual 
world  is  suffering  its  most  irreparable  human  losses. 

With  these  facts  in  our  minds,  we  can  look  into  the 
future  more  dearly,  and  choose  our  policy  (supposii^ 
that  we  win  the  war,  and,  thereby,  the  power  to  choose) 
with  greater  confidence*  We  have  accepted  the  fact 
that  war  itself  is  the  evil,  and  will  in  any  event  bring  pure 
loss  to  both  parties :  that  no  good  can  come  from  the 
war  itself,  but  only  from  our  policy  when  the  war  is 
over :  and  that  the  one  good  our  policy  can  achieve, 
without  which  every  gain  is  delusive,  is  the  banishing  of 
this  evil  from  the  realities  of  the  future.  This  is  our 
one  supreme  '"  British  interest,*'  and  it  is  a  German 
interest  just  as  much,  and  an  interest  of  the  whole  world* 

This  war,  and  the  cloud  of  war  that  has  weighed 
upon  us  so  many  years  before  the  bursting  of  the  storm, 
has  brought  to  bankruptcy  the  ''  National  State/*  Till 
1870  it  W3S  the  ultimate  ideal  of  European  politics,  as 
it  is  still  in  the  Balkans,  where  the  Turk  has  broken 
Time's  wings*  It  was  such  a  fruitful  ideal  that  it  has 
rapidly  carried  us  beyond  itself,  and  in  the  last  genera- 
tion the  life  of  the  world  has  been  steadily  finding  new 
and  wider  channels*  In  the  crisis  of  change  from 
nationalism  to  internationalism  we  were  still  exposed  to 
the  pk^e  of  war*  The  crisis  might  have  been  passed 
without  it,  and  war  banished  for  ever  between  the 
nations  of  civilised  Europe*  Now  that  the  catastrophe 
has  happened  (it  is  childish  to  waste  enei^  in  incrimina- 


8  THE  FUTURE 

tions  s^ainst  its  promoters)  we  must  carry  through  the 
change  completely  and  at  once :  we  cannot  possibly 
afford  to  be  exposed  to  the  danger  agam« 

No  tool,  machine,  or  idea  made  by  men  has  an 
immortal  career*  Sooner  or  later  they  all  run  amuck, 
and  begin  to  do  evil  instead  of  good.  At  that  stage 
savage  or  unskilful  men  destroy  them  by  force  and 
replace  them  by  their  opposite  :  civilised  men  get  them 
under  control,  and  build  them  into  something  new  and 
greater*  Nationality  will  sink  from  beii^  the  pinnacle 
of  politics  only  to  become  their  foundation,  and  till  the 
fotmdations  are  laid  true,  further  building  is  impossible. 
But  the  bases  of  nationality  have  never  yet  been  laid 
true  in  Europe*  When  we  say  that  **  nationality  was 
the  political  ideal  of  the  nineteenth  century,'*  and  that 
1870  left  the  populations  of  Etux)pe  organised  in 
national  groups,  we  are  taking  far  too  complacent  a  view 
of  historical  facts*  The  same  century  that  produced 
a  united  Italy  and  Germany,  saw  out  the  whole  tragedy 
of  Poland,  from  the  first  partition  in  1772  to  the  last 
revolt  in  1863*  Human  ideas  do  not  spring  into  the 
world  full-grown  and  shining,  like  Athena :  they  tnul 
the  infection  of  evil  things  from  the  past* 

In  the  Dark  Ages  Europe's  most  pressing  need  and 
only  practicable  ideal  was  stroi^  government*^  Strong 
government  came  with  its  blessings,  but  it  brot^ht  the 
evil  of  territorial  ambitions*  The  Duke  of  Burgundy 
spent  the  wealth  of  his  Netherland  subjects  in  trying 
to  conquer  the  Swiss  mountaineers*    Burgundy  suc- 

^  The  expression  "  Strong  Government "  is  used  throughout  this 
book  in  ^e  quasi-tedinical  sense  of  "  Government  in  which  the 
governed  have  no  share."  "  Absolutism  '*  and  *'  Autocracy  '*  are 
terms  more  usually  employed,  but  both  have  acquired  a  sinister 
connotation,  and  it  is  better  to  use  some  neutral  word  that  implies  no 
judgment  on  what  it  denotes. 


THE  FUTURE  9 

cumbed  to  the  king  of  France*  But  the  very  factor 
that  made  the  Frendi  kings  survive  in  the  struggle  for 
existence  between  governments,  the  force  of  compact 
nationality  which  the  French  kingdom  happened  to 
contain,  delivered  the  inheritance  of  the  kings  to  the 
Nation. 

The  French  Nation  in  the  Revolution  btirst  the 
chrysalis  of  irresponsible  government  beneath  which  it 
had  grown  to  organic  life,  but  like  a  true  heir  it  took 
oiver  the  Royal  Government's  ideal :  **  Peace  within 
and  piracy  without/'  France  had  already  begun 
aggression  abroad  before  she  had  accompli^ed  self- 
government  at  home,  and  in  delivering  herself  to 
Napoleon  she  sacrificed  her  liberty  to  her  ambition* 
Napoleon's  only  endurix^  achievements  outside  France 
were  the  things  he  set  himself  to  prevent,  the  realisation, 
by  a  forceful  reaction  against  force,  of  German  and 
Italian  nationality*  Nationalism  was  converted  to 
violence  from  the  outset,  and  the  struggle  for  existence 
between  absolute  governments  has  merely  been  replaced 
by  a  stru^e  between  nationalities,  equally  blind, 
haphazard,  and  non-moral,  but  far  more  terrific,  just 
because  the  virtue  of  self-govenmient  is  to  focus  and 
utilise  human  energy  so  much  more  effectively  than  the 
irresponsible  government  it  has  superseded* 

Naturally  the  result  of  this  planless  strife  has  been  no 
grouping  of  Europe  on  a  just  and  reasonable  national 
basis*  France  and  England,  achieving  racial  frontiers 
and  national  self-government  early,  inherited  the  Earth 
before  Germany  and  Italy  struggled  up  beside  them, 
to  take  their  leavings  of  markets  and  colonial  areas*  But 
the  government  that  united  Germany  had  founded  its 
power  on  the  partition  of  Poland,  and  in  the  second 
Balkan  War  of  1913  we  saw  a  striking  example  of  the 


10  THE  FUTURE 

endless  chain  of  eWl  forged  by  an  act  of  national 
injustice* 

The  Hungarians  used  the  liberty  they  won  in 
1867  to  subject  the  Slavonic  population  between 
themselves  and  the  sea,  and  prevent  its  union  with 
the  free  principality  of  Serbia  of  the  same  Slavonic 
nationality*  This  drove  Serbia  in  1912  to  follow 
Hungary^s  example  by  seizing  the  coast  of  the  non- 
Slavonic  Albanians ;  and  vAien  Austria-Hui^ary  pre- 
vented this  (a  right  act  prompted  by  most  unrighteous 
motives),  Serbia  fought  an  unjust  war  with  Bu^aria  and 
subjected  a  large  Bulgarian  population,  in  order  to  gain 
access  to  the  only  seaboard  left  her,  the  friendly  Greek 
port  of  Salonika* 

Hungary  and  Serbia  are  nominally  natiotial  states : 
but  more  than  half  the  population  in  Hungary,  and 
perhaps  nearly  a  quarter  in  Serbia,  is  alien,  only  held 
within  the  state  by  force  against  its  will*  The  energy 
of  both  states  is  perverted  to  the  futile  and  demoralis- 
ing work  of  **  Magyarisii^  **  and  **  Serbising  **  subject 
foreign  populations,  and  they  have  not  even  been 
successful*  The  resistance  of  Southern  Slav  nationalism 
on  the  defensive  to  the  agression  of  Hungarian 
nationalism  has  given  the  occasion  for  the  present 
catastrophe* 

The  evil  element  in  nationalism  under  its  many 
names,  **  Chauvinism,*'  **  Jingoism,*'  **  Prussianism,**  is 
the  one  thing  in  our  present  European  civilisation  that 
can  and  does  produce  the  calamity  of  war*  If  our  object 
is  to  prevent  war,  then,  the  way  to  do  so  is  to  purge 
Nationality  of  this  evil*  This  we  cannot  do  by  any 
mechanical  means,  but  only  by  a  change  of  heart,  by 
converting  public  opinion  throughout  Europe  from 
**  National  Competition  **  to  "  National  Co-operation*** 


THE  FUTURE  ii 

Public  opinion  will  never  be  converted  so  long  as  the 
present  system  of  injtistice  remains  in  force^  so  long  as 
one  nation  has  less  and  another  more  than  its  due*  The 
fiist  step  towards  internationalism  is  not  to  flout  the 
problems  of  nationality,  but  to  solve  them* 

The  most  important  practical  business,  then,  of  the 
conference  that  meets  when  war  is  over,  will  be  the 
revision  of  the  map  of  Europe*  Merely  to  suggest  such 
a  thing  is  a  complete  reversal  of  our  policy  during  the 
last  generation*  We  in  England  have  been  steadily 
shutttt^  our  eyes  to  nationality,  and  minimising  its 
importance*  CXur  English  national  question  was 
settled  long  ago*  Our  geographical  situation  as  an 
island  of  manageable  size  gave  our  mediaeval  Norman 
and  Angevin  kings  an  exceptional  opportunity  for 
establishing  at  an  early  date  a  strong  well-knit  govern- 
ment* The  nation  became  self-conscious  when  it 
e^Kuided  under  the  Tudors,  and  self-governing  by  the 
political  revolutions  of  the  seventeenth  century,  a  full 
hundred  years  ahead  of  France*  While  France  was 
realising  her  nationality,  we  were  passing  through  the 
Industrial  Revolution,  and  during  the  last  century  we 
have  been  working,  with  rapidly  increasing  success 
doling  latter  years,  to  adapt  ourselves  to  our  new 
economic  concUtions* 

If  we  do  not  think  about  nationality,  it  is  simply 
because  we  have  long  taken  it  for  granted,  and  our  mind 
is  focussed  on  posterior  developments;  but  it  is 
increasingly  hard  to  keep  ourselves  out  of  touch  with 
other  countries,  and  though  our  blindness  has  been 
partly  distraction,  it  has  also  been  in  part  deliberate 
policy*  We  saw  well  enough  that  the  present  phase  of 
the  national  problem  in  Europe  carried  in  it  the  seeds 
of  war*    We  rightly  thought  that  war  itself  was  the 


la  THE  FUTURE 

evil,  an  evil  incomparably  greater  than  the  national 
injustices  that  might  become  the  cause  of  iu  We  knew 
that,  if  these  questions  were  opened,  war  would  follow* 
We  accordingly  adopted  the  only  possible  course*  We 
built  our  policy  on  the  chance  that  national  feeling  could 
be  damped  down  till  it  had  been  superseded  in  the 
public  opinion  of  Europe  by  other  interests,  not  because 
Nationalism  was  unjustified,  but  because  it  endangered 
so  much  more  than  it  was  worth*  Knowing  that  we 
had  passed  out  of  the  nationalist  phase  ourselves,  and 
that  from  our  present  political  point  of  view  war  was 
purely  evil,  we  hoped  that  it  was  merely  a  question  of 
time  for  the  Continental  populations  to  reach  the  same 
standpoint*  Notably  in  Germany,  the  focus  of  danger, 
we  saw  social  interests  coming  more  and  more  to  the 
front  at  the  expense  of  militarism*  We  threw  ourselves 
into  the  negative  task  of  staving  o£F  the  catastrophe  in  the 
interim,  by  a  strenuous  policy  of  compromise  and  con- 
ciliation, which  has  been  successful  on  at  least  two 
critical  occasions*  Now  that  the  evil  has  been  too 
powerful  and  the  catastrophe  has  happened,  the  reasons 
for  this  policy  are  dead*  Nationalism  has  been  strong 
enough  to  produce  war  in  spite  of  us*  It  has  terribly 
proved  itself  to  be  no  outworn  creed,  but  a  vital  force  to 
be  reckoned  with*  It  is  stronger  on  the  Continent  than 
social  politics*  It  is  the  raw  material  that  Utters  the 
whole  grotmd*  We  must  build  it  into  our  foundations, 
or  give  up  the  task,  not  only  of  constructive  social 
advance  beyond  the  hmits  we  have  already  reached,  but 
even  of  any  fundamental  reconstruction  of  what  the 
war  will  have  destroyed* 

Perhaps  we  might  have  foretold  this  from  the  case  of 
Ireland  immediately  under  our  eyes*  Failure  to  solve 
her  national  problem  has  arrested  Ireland's  develop- 


THE  FUTURE  13 

me&t  since  the  seventeenth  century,  and  inq>nsoned  her 
in  a  world  of  ideas  ahnost  unintelligible  to  an  English- 
man till  he  has  travelled  in  the  Balkans*  This  has  been 
England's  fault,  and  we  are  now  at  last  in  a  fair  way  to 
remedy  it*  The  moment  we  have  succeeded  in  arrang- 
ing that  the  di£Ferent  national  groups  in  Ireland  govern 
diemselves  in  the  way  they  really  wish,  the  national 
question  will  pass  from  the  Irish  consciousness ;  they 
will  put  two  centuries  behind  them  at  one  leap,  and 
oome  into  line  with  ourselves*  The  Dublin  strike, 
ocmtemporary  with  the  arming  of  the  Volunteers,  shows 
how  the  modem  problems  are  jostling  at  the  heels  of 
the  old.  Although  ''  Unionist ''  and  ''  Nationalist '' 
politicians  could  still  declare  that  their  attitude  towards 
the  strike  was  neutral,  the  parliament  of  the  new  Irish 
state  will  discuss  the  social  problem  and  nothing  else* 

Ireland,  then,  has  forced  us  to  think  about  the  problem 
of  nationalism ;  and  our  Irish  experience  will  be  in- 
valuable to  us  when  peace  is  made,  and  we  take  in  hand, 
in  concert  with  our  allies,  the  national  questions  of  the 
rest  of  Europe*  To  begin  with,  we  already  have  a 
notion  of  what  Nationality  is.  Like  all  great  forces  in 
human  life,  it  is  nothing  material  or  mechanical,  but  a 
subjective  psychological  feeling  in  living  people*  This 
feeling  can  be  kindled  by  the  presence  of  one  or  several 
of  a  series  of  factors :  a  common  country,  especially  if 
it  is  a  well  defined  physical  region,  like  an  island,  a 
river  basin,  or  a  mountain  mass ;  a  common  language, 
eqsedally  if  it  has  given  birth  to  a  literature ;  a  common 
tdiffoaf  and  that  much  more  impalpable  force,  a 
common  tradition  or  sense  of  memories  shared  horn 
the  past* 

But  it  is  impossible  to  ai^e  a  priori  from  the  presence 
of  one  or  even  several  of  these  factors  to  the  existence  of  a 


14  THE  FUTURE 

nattonality :  they  may  have  been  there  for  ages  and 
kindled  no  response*  And  it  is  impossible  to  aj^^ue  from 
one  case  to  another :  precisely  the  same  group  of 
factors  may  produce  nationality  here,  and  there  have  no 
efiTecL  Great  Britain  is  a  nation  by  geography  and 
tradition,  though  important  Keltic-speaking  sections  of 
the  population  in  Wales  and  the  Highlands  do  not 
understand  the  predominant  English  language*  Ireland 
is  an  island  smaller  still  and  more  compact,  and  is 
further  unified  by  the  almost  complete  predominance  of 
the  same  Englisdb  language,  for  the  Keltic  speech  is 
incomparably  less  vigorous  here  than  in  Wales;  yet 
the  absence  of  common  tradition  combines  with 
religious  differences  to  divide  the  country  into  two 
nationalities,  at  present  sharply  distinct  from  one  another 
and  none  the  less  hostile  because  their  national  psycho- 
logy is  strikingly  the  same*  Germany  is  divided  by 
religion  in  precisely  the  same  way  as  Ireland,  her 
common  tradition  is  hardly  stronger,  and  her  geographi- 
cal boundaries  quite  vague :  yet  she  has  built  up  her 
present  concentrated  national  feeling  in  three  genera- 
tions* Italy  has  gec^aphy,  language  and  tradition  to 
bind  her  together ;  and  yet  a  more  vivid  tradition  is 
able  to  separate  the  Tidnese  from  his  neighbours,  and 
bind  him  to  people  of  alien  speech  and  religion  beyond 
a  great  mountain  rai^e*  The  Armenian  nationality 
does  not  occupy  a  continuous  territory,  but  lives  by 
language  and  religion*  The  Jews  speak  the  language 
of  the  country  where  they  sojourn,  but  religion  and 
tradition  hold  diem  together*  The  agnostic  Jew  accepts 
not  only  the  language  but  all  the  other  customs  of  his 
adopted  countrymen,  but  tradition  by  itself  is  too  strong 
for  him  :  he  remains  a  Jew  and  cannot  be  assimilated* 
These  instances  taken  at  random  show  that  each  case 


THE  FUTURE  15 

must  be  judged  on  its  own  merits,  and  that  no  argument 
kolds  good  except  the  ascertained  wish  of  the  living 
population  actually  concerned*  Above  all  we  must  be 
on  our  guard  against  **  historical  sentiment/'  that  is, 
zgaixist  arguments  taken  from  conditions  which  once 
eiisted  or  were  supposed  to  exist,  but  which  are  no 
longer  real  at  the  present  moment*  They  are  most 
easily  illustrated  by  extreme  examples*  lulian  news* 
papers  have  described  the  annexation  of  Tripoli  as 
**  recovering  the  soil  of  the  Fatherland  "  because  it  was 
once  a  province  of  the  Roman  Empire ;  and  the  entire 
region  of  Macedonia  is  claimed  by  Greek  chauvinists  on 
the  one  hand,  because  it  contains  the  site  of  Pella, 
the  cradle  of  Alexander  the  Great  in  the  fourth  century 
BX«,  and  by  Bulgarians  on  the  other,  because  Ohhrid^ 
in  the  opposite  comer,  was  the  capital  of  the  Bulgarian 
Tzardom  in  the  tenth  century  a*d*,  though  the  drift  of 
time  has  buried  the  tradition  of  the  latter  almost  as  deep 
as  the  achievements  of  the  **  Emathian  Conqueror,''  on 
wiiich  the  modem  Greek  nationalist  insists  so  strongly* 
The  national  problems  of  Europe  are  numerous,  and 
each  one  is  beset  by  arguments  good,  bad,  and  indif- 
ferent, some  no  more  specious  than  the  above,  some  so 
elaborately  staged  that  it  reqtures  the  greatest  discern- 
ment to  expose  them*  Vast  bodies  of  people,  with 
brains  and  money  at  their  disposal,  have  been  interested 
in  obscuring  the  truth,  and  have  used  every  instmment 
in  their  power  to  do  so*  It  is  therefore  essential  for  us 
in  England  to  take  up  these  hitherto  remote  and  un- 
interesting national  problems  in  earnest,  to  get  as  near 
to  the  truth  as  we  possibly  can,  both  as  to  what  the 
req>ective  wishes  of  the  different  populations  are,  and 
as  to  how  far  it  is  possible  to  reconcile  them  with  each 
other  and  with  Geography ;  and  to  come  to  the  con- 


i6  THE  FUTURE 

ference  which  will  follow  the  war,  and  is  so  much  more 
important  than  the  war  itself,  with  a  clear  idea  of  the 
alternative  solutions  and  a  mature  judgment  upon  their 
relative  merits* 

To  accomplish  this  we  need  a  co-ordination  of  know- 
ledge on  a  large  scale,  knowledge  of  history,  geography, 
religion,  national  psychology  and  public  opinion*  It 
is  a  case  for  the  collaboration  of  experts,  but  mean- 
while an  attempt  to  review  the  whole  question,  even  if 
there  is  no  deep  knowledge  behind  it,  may,  if  honestly 
made,  serve  at  least  as  a  plea  for  more  detailed  and 
authoritative  contributions* 

The  remainder  of  this  book  is  an  attempt  to  make 
such  a  beginning*  We  will  take  a  series  of  actual 
political  groups,  some  of  them  states  with  no  national 
basis,  some  in  which  state  and  nation  roughly  coincide, 
some  that  are  true  nationalities  at  present  prevented  from 
realising  themselves  in  concrete  form,  and  we  will  start 
in  each  case  by  trying  to  understand  the  group's  own 
point  of  view*  We  shall  find  that  it  nearly  always  has 
some  justification,  and  is  hardly  ever  justifiable  in  its 
entirety*  This  need  not  make  us  pessimistic  :  it  is  one 
of  the  commonest  traits  of  human  nature*  Right  and 
Wrong  are  always  a  question  of  degree,  and  our  next 
step  will  be  to  criticise  the  case  of  the  group  tmder  dis- 
cussion, and  estimate  how  far  it  is  just  and  reasonable  to 
give  it  what  it  asks*  In  reaching  our  conclusions  we 
shall  find  ourselves  evolving  a  scheme  for  the  recon- 
struction of  that  particular  comer  of  Europe* 

Such  a  reconstruction  must  be  guided  by  certain 
obvious  principles* 

(i*)  It  must  be  done  with  the  minimum  of  territorial 
or  administrative  chai^e*^  There  is  always  a  pre- 
sumption in  favour  of  the  existing  machinery,  so  long 


THE  FUTURE  17 


as  ft  works,  varying  in  proportioii  to  the  civilisation  of 
At  people  concerned*  In  a  civilised  country  the  plant 
€f  self-government  is  elaborately  installed,  not  only  in 
ihe  material  sense  of  public  services  and  administration, 
business  concerns  with  capital  invested  in  them,  which 
nust  in  great  measure  be  wasted  if  they  are  broken  up 
aid  reconstituted  on  quite  different  lines,  but  in  the 
more  important  psychological  sphere  of  political  habit* 
There  is  a  certain  political  value,  for  instance,  in  the 
esprit  de  corps  of  the  motley  Austrian  army,  or  even  in 
the  still  callow  constitutional  tradition  of  the  Austrian 
C^own*-lands'  parliament*  It  is  very  hard  to  make 
people  work  together,  very  easy  to  pull  them  apart 
again.  If  they  work  together  so  badly  that  they  bring 
the  whole  organism  to  a  deadlock,  there  is  no  course  left 
but  to  part  them,  and  r^oup  theni  on  other  lines  which 
will  enable  the  various  elements  to  function  more 
smoothly*  But  we  must  never  forget  that  the  negative 
work  of  demolishii^  what  other  men  have  spent  their 
labour  in  building  up,  even  if  it  be  a  Bastille,  is  at  best  a 
regrettable  necessity* 

(ii*)  In  the  last  resort  there  must  always  be  minorities 
that  suffer*  This  must  be  so  if  men  are  not  to  let 
difference  of  opinion  prevent  them  workii^  together, 
and  co-operation  in  spite  of  disagreement  is  the 
foundation  of  politics*  We  can  only  secure  that  the 
minorities  are  as  small  and  the  suffering  as  mild  as 
possible*  This  again  is  a  question  of  degree*  In 
Macedonia,  until  the  year  before  last,  one  Turk  with 
one  rifle  caused  a  **  minority  *'  of  a  hundred  Christians 
with  no  rifles  to  suffer  robbery,  rape,  and  murder* 
Every  one  ^^es  that  this  was  an  abomination*  In 
Great  Britain  at  the  present  moment  the  numerically 
small  Welsh-q>eaking  minority  of  school  children  have 


i8  THE  FUTURE 

to  learn  English  as  well  as  their  mother  tongue,  but  the 
English  majority  do  not  learn  Welsh.  Here  we  have 
'*  suffering '"  or  disadvantage  to  one  party,  without 
injustice :  the  Welsh  child  does  not  learn  English 
because  it  is  the  English-speaking  majority's  interest 
that  he  should  do  so,  but  because  it  is  his  own.  His 
only  quarrel  is  with  the  fact  that  the  English  population 
is  much  larger  than  his,  and  its  language  much  more 
widely  spoken,  and  it  is  as  useless  to  quarrel  with  £acts 
as  it  is  to  beat  the  sea  and  bind  it  in  chains. 
I^The  Irish  question  has  produced  a  rich  crop  of  mis- 
guided arguments  on  both  sides.  First  came  the 
skirmishes  of  **  historical  sentiment.*'  The  Unionists 
wished  to  keep  everything  as  it  was  **  because  Ireland 
has  been  conquered  by  England,  and  united  thereby 
to  the  English  Kingdom.''  They  were  silenced  by  the 
outstanding  fact  that  the  Catholic  Irish  are  a  separate 
nationality,  but  not  content  with  this,  the  Nationalists 
declared  that  the  whole  island  was  the  herits^e  of  the 
**  Irish  nation,"  with  the  deplorable  result  that  the 
Ulster  Protestants  made  good  their  objection  by  threats 
of  force.  Now  the  Protestants  in  turn  are  trying  to  grab 
more  than  their  share  by  maintaining  that  Ulster  is  **  one 
and  indivisible,"  in  defiance  of  the  fact  that  the  territory 
**  Ulster  "  as  such  has  no  organic  life,  or  in  other  words 
no  nationality,  of  its  own.  This  is  mere  encouragement 
to  Nationalists  to  claim  all  Ulster  counties  complete 
where  there  are  Catholic  majorities,  though  one  comer 
of  them  may  be  entirely  Protestant  in  population. 

The  only  way  out  is  for  both  parties  to  face  the  fact 
that  there  are  two  nationalities  in  Ireland,  English- 
speaking  Protestants  and  English-speaking  Catholics, 
which  in  the  greater  part  of  the  island  form  uniform 
populations  covering  continuous  territories;   but  that 


THE  FUTURE  19 

there  is  an  irreducible  zone,  especially  in  County  Tyrone, 
ivhere  the  two  nations  are  inextricably  minc;led,  not 
only  Catholic  village  interspersed  with  Protestant,  but 
Cadiolic  and  Protestant  householders  occupying 
akemate  premises  in  the  same  town*  Even  here  the 
territories  justly  belonging  to  each  nation  could  be 
plotted  out  to  a  nicety  on  a  big-scale  map,  but  it  would  be 
quite  impossible  to  draw  a  frontier  of  equal  delicacy 
for  the  practical  purposes  of  public  service  and  self- 
government* 

With  the  growth  of  civilisation  the  human  and  the 
terxitDrial  unit  become  less  and  less  identical*  In  a 
primitive  community  the  members  are  tmdifferentiated 
from  one  another :  the  true  human  unit  is  the  total 
group,  and  not  the  individual,  and  the  territory  this 
group  occupies  is  a  unit  too,  self-sufficing  and  cut  off 
from  intercourse  with  the  next  valley*  In  modem 
Europe  every  sub-group  and  every  individual  has 
developed  a  **  character "'  or  **  individuality  "'  of  its  own 
which  must  have  free  play ;  while  the  growth  of  com- 
munications, elaboration  of  organisation,,  and  economic 
interdependence  of  the  whole  world  have  broken  down 
the  barriers  between  region  and  region*  The  minimum 
territorial  block  that  can  be  organised  efficiently  as  a 
separate  political  unit  according  to  modem  standards 
is  constantly  growing  in  size :  the  maximum  human 
group  which  can  hold  together  without  serious  internal 
divergence  is  as  steadily  diminishing* 

This  would  look  like  an  impasse,  were  it  not  corrected 
by  the  virtues  of  civilisation  itself*  We  started  with 
the  fact  that  the  essence  of  civilisation  was  **  Fore- 
thought **  and  its  ideal  the  **  power  of  free  choice '' : 
the  complementary  side  of  this  ideal,  on  the  principle 
**  Do  as  you  would  be  done  by,'^  is  to  allow  free  choice 


ao  THE  FUTURE 

to  others  when  they  are  in  your  power.  It  is  a  virtue 
with  as  many  names  as  there  are  spheres  of  human  life : 
•*  Forbearance/^  '*  Toleration/'  ^*  Constitutionalisnu'' 
When  we  have  drawn  our  frontier  through  Tyrone  with 
all  the  ixq^uity  that  Geography  allows  us,  there 
will  inevitably  be  a  minority  left  on  either  stde^  a 
minority  no  map-makix^  can  further  reduce*  Savages 
wipe  out  minorities :  civilised  men  take  testimonials 
from  tfaem«  The  drawing  of  the  frontier  is  only  the 
first  step  towards  the  solution  of  the  Irish  question* 
It  will  truly  be  settled  if  the  minorities  find  that  the 
disadvantage  to  which  Geography  puts  them  is  more 
than  made  up  by  the  good-fellowship  of  the  population 
with  ixdiich  it  yokes  them*  Then  they  will  become  as 
strong  a  link  between  Catholic  Ireland  and  Ulster,  as 
the  **  colonies  **  of  business  men,  that  voluntarily  take 
up  their  residence  in  Liverpool  and  Hamburg,  are 
between  Germany  and  England* 

Having  stated  these  principles,  which  once  more 
draw  our  attention  to  psychological  hcts  as  beii^  the 
really  important  forces  to  whidi  all  concrete,  mechanical 
manipulations  of  frontiers  and  institutions  must  be 
referred  in  the  end,  we  may  now  more  safely  plunge 
into  the  great  sea  of  European  controversy*  Let  us 
begin  with  the  nation  ^ose  action  has  drawn  us  into  the 
vortex,  Germany* 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  ai 


CHAPTER  II 

PRUSSIANISM  :  OR  GERMANY'S  AMBITIONS 

A«  The  German  Empire 

The  living  generation  of  Germans  is  suffering  for  a 
thousand  years  of  history*  They  started  in  the  raoe 
to  emerge  from  the  Dark  Age  with  a  smaller  fund 
of  civilisation  than  France  had  accumulated  by  her 
thoroi^  Romanisation,  and  than  the  Norman  con- 
querors carried  from  France  to  England;  and  they 
further  handicapped  themselves  by  the  only  Roman 
tradition  they  did  inherit,  the  ghost  of  universal  empire. 
The  Hohenstaufen  dynasty,  Germany's  chance  of  a 
strong  government,  spent  its  strength  warring  in  Italy, 
on  the  impossible  quest  of  bringing  this  ghost  to  life 
again*  When  they  failed,  Germany  fell  to  pieces  into 
a  debris  of  principalities,  of  every  size  and  character: 
self-governing  trading-cities,  often  more  in  touch  with 
foreign  traders  across  the  sea  than  with  the  serfs  at  their 
gates ;  Imperial  knights,  the  landlords  of  these  serfs, 
ruling  their  estates  with  practically  sovereign  power; 
prince-bishops,  who  governed  some  of  the  most  civilised 
districts  of  Germany  in  the  valley  of  the  Rhine ;  and 
lay  princes  small  and  great,  from  the  Thuringian  dukes, 
whose  dominions  were  subdivided  equally  among  the 
^irfiole  male  issue  of  each  generation,  to  the  strong 
military  lords  of  the  marches,  Brandenburg  and  Austria, 
and  the  compact,  steadily-growing  duchy  of  Bavaria* 
When  the  Reformation  brought  religious  war,  even 
unified  France  and  England  were  riven  by  the  conflict : 
German  particularism  fought  out  the  issue  to  an  incon- 


22  PRUSSIANISM 

dtisive  compromise  in  the  devastating  War  of 
Years,  which  paralysed  the  growth  of  Germany  for 
a  century,  just  when  England  was  workii^  out  her 
internal  self-government  and  preparing  for  the  immense 
development  of  her  colonies  and  industry*  During  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  Germany's  consolidated  neighbours 
began  to  fish  in  her  troubled  waters  :  in  the  eighteenth 
century  she  had  become  the  plaything  of  the  powers, 
her  principalities  pawns  in  their  game :  at  the  end  of 
the  century  she  fell  completely  under  the  dominion  of 
France,  and  had  to  endure  the  merited  ridicule  of  the 
conqueror  for  her  particularism  and  its  results,  a 
**  second-handness  **  and  a  helpless  inert  stoUdity* 

This  was  the  more  bitter  in  that  she  was  not  merely 
feeding  upon  memories  of  a  past  dawn  that  had  never 
become  day :  she  was  conscious  of  an  immense  vitality 
in  the  present.  While  Napoleon  was  annexing  or 
humiliating  her  principalities,  Germany  was  giving 
Europe  the  greatest  philosopher  and  the  greatest  poet 
she  had  yet  known,  Kant  and  Goethe,  while  the  succes- 
sion of  German  masters  who  were  creating  European 
music  was  represented  by  Beethoven*  Germany  was 
already  a  nation :  the  spark  had  been  kindled  by 
intellect  and  art*  An  intense  desire  followed  to  build 
up  all  the  other  sides  of  national  life* 

Germany's  striking  defect  was  her  poUtical  disinte- 
gration :  this  delivered  her  into  the  hands  of  the  French, 
who  preached  their  creed  with  drums  and  bayonets* 
Civilised  Germany  turned  again  to  the  ideal  of  the  Dark 
Age,  which  more  forttmate  nations  had  long  realised 
and  transcended,  a  strong  military  government*  An 
organisation  of  just  this  type  presented  itself  in  the 
kingdom  of  Prussia*  Its  nudeus  was  the  march  of 
Brandenburg,  the  old  frontier  province  against  the 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  33 

Slavs  across  the  Elbe^  which  had  grown  by  conquest 
Eastward  and  been  united,  after  the  Reformation,  with 
the  colonial  territory  carved  out  by  the  Teutonic 
knights  among  heathen  Prussians  beyond  the  Vistula* 
Its  history  expressed  itself  in  the  character  of  the 
population*  The  rather  thin  soil  was  well  cultivated 
by  a  hard-working  submissive  peasantry  of  German 
settlers  or  Slavs  conquered  and  Germanised,  bound  by 
a  system  of  serfdom  little  modified  from  the  extreme 
mediaeval  type,  under  a  ruling  class  of  landed  pro- 
prietors who  remembered  that  they  had  come  in  as 
conquerors* 

The  government  had  all  the  virtues  of  European 
absolutism.  By  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury it  had  built  up  an  administration  and  an  army 
extraordinarily  efficient  for  the  size  and  wealth  of  the 
territory*  Frederick  the  Great  used  this  instrument 
to  double  the  extent  of  his  dominions  and  raise  Prussia 
to  the  status  of  a  European  power*^  The  debade  at 
Jena  in  1806  and  the  unwise  humiliations  to  which 
Napoleon  subjected  her,  only  roused  the  Prussian  state 
to  a  thorough  reconstruction :  serfdom  was  abolished 
and  universal  military  trainit^  invented*  The  rising 
of  the  Prussian  population  in  1813,  when  they  cast  out 
force  by  force  and  broke  the  French  power,  really  stood 
for  a  national  movement  of  the  whole  German  people ; 
and  its  success  was  achieved  under  the  leadership  of  the 
Prussian  government*  1813  marked  out  Prussia  as 
the  tool  ixdiich  was  to  fashion  a  new  political  structure 
for  Germany* 

The  transition  Germany  went  through  in  this  genera- 
tion may  be  illustrated  by  the  career  of  Stein*  Inherit- 
ing the  sovereignty  of  an  Imperial  knight  (his  little 

*  Invasion  of  Sflesia,  X74o* 


34  PRUSSIANISM 

principality  was  absorbed  in  Nassau  during  his  lifetime), 
he  did  not  find  his  vocation  therein,  but  took  service 
in  the  Prussian  administration.  He  came  to  the  front 
after  1806,  and  was  the  inspiration  both  of  the  internal 
reforms  and  of  the  war  of  liberation  they  made  possible* 
He  was  afterwards  fired  by  the  Romantic  movement,  and 
devoted  his  old  age  to  promoting  the  collection  and 
publication  of  documents  for  the  origins  of  German 
history,  a  historical  interest  that  really  looked  towards 
the  future. 

But  the  dibris  of  the  middle  ages  could  not  be  cleared 
away  in  a  moment,  and  the  next  fifty  years  were  a  period 
of  flux  and  indecision.  Two  factors  were  striving  to 
harmonise  and  never  succeeding.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
intellectual  and  artistic  growth  of  Germany  was  gather- 
ing momentum  :  in  music,  philology,  philosophy,  and 
theoretical  politics  the  nation  had  not  only  found  itself 
but  achieved  the  primacy  of  Etirope.  On  the  other  side 
stood  the  political  organism  of  Prussia,  far  stronger  than 
before,  for  the  Vienna  congress  had  greatly  increased 
her  territory,  and  far  more  representative  of  Germany 
as  a  whole,  for  she  had  exchsuiged  the  greater  part  of 
her  alien  Polish  provinces  in  the  East  for  the  German 
Rhineland  on  the  West,  which  made  her  a  Catholic  as 
well  as  a  Protestant  state  and  the  bulwark  of  Germany 
against  France.  She  used  the  fifty  years  to  unite  all 
North  Germany  in  her  customs  tmion ;  but  her  ruling 
class  kept  within  its  mediaeval  traditions  and  only  came 
into  hostile  contact  with  the  spiritual  movement  in 
which  German  nationalism  still  concentrated  itself. 
The  Prussian  governing  class  aspired  to  rule  Germany, 
but  it  did  not  wish  to  merge  itself  in  the  growth  of  the 
German  nation. 

These  two  discordant  elements  were  welded  together 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  25 

by  a  genius,  Bismarck*  He  persuaded  the  German  people 
that  the  Prussian  machine  alone  could  give  them  what 
they  wanted,  and  that  to  make  the  machine  work 
effectively  they  must  conform  themselves  to  its  action : 
there  must  be  no  more  liberalism*  He  persuaded  the 
Prussian  government  that  irresponsible  absolutism 
could  only  survive  by  **  giving  the  people  what  it  wants/' 
and  that  if  it  took  the  pltmge,  from  which  other  obsolete 
institutions,  like  the  Pope  and  the  Hapsburgs,  had 
shrunk  to  their  ruin,  it  had  a  great  future  before  it* 
He  worked  with  titanic  tools*  In  the  blast-furnace  of 
three  great  wars  with  Denmark,  Austria  and  France, 
he  poured  the  whole  energy  of  the  German  nation  into 
the  Prussian  crucible,  and  successfully  drew  out  a  solid 
mass  of  metal,  molten  in  just  the  form  he  had  intended, 
the  German  Empire. 

To  those  ^o  look  at  his  work  from  outside  after  a 
generation  has  passed,  it  appears  that  the  task  was  too 
gigantic  even  for  his  powers*  The  metal  shows  a  flaw* 
The  Prussian  machine  has  not  proved  itself  adaptable 
enot^ :  it  has  not  learnt  to  understand  and  work  for 
the  needs  and  tendencies  of  the  German  people*  The 
nation  on  the  other  hand  has  lost  in  success  some  of  the 
qualities  it  preserved  in  adversity,  and  taken  a  Prussian 
alloy  into  its  soul*  Bismarck's  harmonisation  was 
sovereign  for  achieving  the  immediate  result  he  had  in 
view*  If  his  material  had  not  been  men  but  stone,  the 
statue  of  Germany  he  carved  would  have  been  a  monu- 
ment to  him  for  ever*  But  living  material  is  always 
growing,  and  those  who  work  in  it  must  direct  their 
eye  less  upon  the  present  than  upon  the  future* 

Bismarck  brought  Germany  into  line  with  France 
and  England*  Her  national  question  was  solved  at  last, 
and  she  was  free  to  throw  herself  into  industrialism* 


26  PRUSSIANISM 

She  threw  herself  into  it  with  all  that  concentratton  of 
energy  of  which  Bismarck  had  first  mastered  the  secret* 
Here  was  a  new  sphere  where  intellectual  activity  and 
disciplined  organisation  might  co-operate  to  give 
German  nationality  expression* 

The  commerce  and  manufactures  that  Germany  has 
built  up  during  the  last  forty-three  years  are  among  the 
most  wonderful  achievements  in  history :  there  is  a 
vigour  behind  them  that  feels  itself  capable  of  inheriting 
the  whole  Earth*  Perhaps  if  the  Earth  had  lain  un- 
tenanted for  Germany  to  inherit,  she  would  have  found 
salvation  in  the  achievement,  and  Prussian  principles 
and  German  character  might  have  hardened  into  steel 
of  a  temper  that  Bismarck,  in  idealistic  moments,  may 
have  dreamed  of* 

But  unforttmately  the  pleasant  places  of  the  Earth 
were  occupied  already*  The  tropical  countries  that 
supply  Europe  with  raw  materials  her  own  climate 
cannot  produce,  were  in  the  hands  of  England,  France, 
and  Holland:  in  the  temperate  regions  arable  of 
receiving  the  overflow  of  European  population,  new 
white  nations  of  English,  Spanish,  or  Dutch  speech 
were  growing  up,  one  of  them,  the  U*S*A*,  already 
a  world  power,  the  rest  guaranteed  an  undisturbed 
development  to  maturity  either  by  the  United  States  or 
by  Great  Britain*  In  the  partition  of  the  waste  places 
of  Africa  during  the  last  twenty  years  of  the  nineteenth 
century  Germany  took  her  share,  but  she  got  little  by 
it*  Her  tropical  acqiusitions  seem  not  to  pay  their  way 
from  the  commercial  point  of  view,  and  the  only  colony 
with  a  temperate  climate,  S.W*  Africa,  was  vacant 
simply  because  its  soil  was  desert,  while  its  one  asset, 
the  good  harbour  of  Walfisch  Bay,  had  been  earmarked 
by  Great  Britain*    In  1870  the  Germans  thought  they 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  37 

had  at  last  buried  their  unhappy  political  past,  yet 
here  in  the  new  chapter  they  had  magnificently  opened, 
they  were  suffering  for  history  still*  This  has  been  more 
than  they  can  bear,  and  explains,  though  it  does  not 
excuse,  their  foreign  policy  ever  since*  With  the 
brilliant  success  of  the  Prussian  military  machine  fresh 
in  their  minds,  they  ttumed  to  Prussianism  once  more 
to  accomplish  their  desire*  Instead  of  purging  out 
the  alloy  ^en  once  the  metal  was  cast,  the  new  in- 
dustrial Germany  has  become  Prussianised  through 
and  through* 

In  hoping  to  cancel  by  the  use  of  military  force  the 
grave  initial  disadvantage  with  which  they  started  their 
industrial  career,  they  have  made  a  miscalculation 
that  has  brought  evil  upon  themselves  and  all  Europe* 
The  machine  is  entirely  unadaptable  to  the  new  task  set 
before  it*  **  Blood  and  Iron  **  could  drive  other  nations 
off  German  soil;  they  could  even,  in  Bismarck's 
handling,  cause  a  great  psychological  revolution  in  the 
political  feeling  of  the  German  people*  They  could 
not  possibly  be  made  fruitful  for  economic  progress* 

Economic  advance  can  only  be  made  by  economic 
effort*  We  are  deeply  conscious  of  this  in  England* 
War  as  a  constructive  national  activity  is  for  us  essentially 
a  thing  of  the  past :  between  our  warlike  ancestors  and 
ourselves  there  is  a  great  gulf  fixed,  the  Industrial 
Revolution,  which  has  put  us  into  a  new  environment* 
In  the  effort  to  adapt  ourselves  to  that  environment  we 
are  increasingly  absorbed ;  we  more  and  more  recognise 
the  vital  importance  of  succeeding  in  this,  and  resent  the 
unremitting  **  burden  of  armaments,^'  the  distracting 
rumours  of  war,  and  now  this  destructive  folly  into 
which  we  have  really  been  drawn  at  last. 

The  retort  is  easy :   **  Ei^;land  has  all  she  wants* 


a8  PRUSSIANISM 

She  got  it  by  war  a  century  ago  :  now  she  wants  to  be 
let  alone  to  exploit  it/^  That  merely  proves  that  we 
have  been  more  fortunate  than  Germany :  it  does  not 
prove  that  the  same  military  method  will  produce  the 
same  result  now  that  the  century  has  passed*  The 
conditions  have  changed^  and  not,  after  all,  in  Germany's 
disfavour*  In  spite  of  her  bad  start,  she  has  developed 
such  immense  industries  that  her  town  population  has 
increased  at  a  greater  rate  than  that  of  the  U*S«A*  dturing 
the  same  period :  she  has  won  markets  for  her  manu- 
factures, not  only  in  her  own  protectorates,  but  in  the 
colonies  of  other  nations,  and  even  in  the  homeland  of 
industrialism — Great  Britain  itself*  The  surplus  of  her 
population,  whose  growth  has  even  outstripped  her 
demand  for  labour,^  has  found  outlets,  entirely  satis- 
factory from  the  individual's  point  of  view,  in  North 
and  South  America,  where  they  already  form  a  very 
prosperous  section  of  the  population,  and  play  an 
influential  part  in  the  self-government  of  their  adopted 
countries*  German  enterprise  has  competed  on  equal 
terms  with  French,  English,  and  American  in  China  and 
Turkey,  and  obtained  contracts  that  offer  good  invest- 
ments for  all  surplus  German  capital  for  some  time  to 
come* 

This  has  been  Germany's  true  victory  in  the  en- 
vironment of  modem  civilisation,  and  she  has  done  it 
all  without  moving  a  single  gtm  against  her  ne^bours* 
She  has  not  yet  got  abreast  of  England  in  wealth  :  that 
is  not  the  fault  of  living  England  or  Germany,  but  of 
dead  history  :  but,  so  far  as  she  has  thrown  herself  into 

>  This  is  true  in  the  sense  that  the  home  market  for  skSUd  laboar 
xs  ghitted.  But  while  the  skilled  Gennan  is  seeking  new  openings 
abroad,  the  uoddlled  Pole  is  drifting  into  Westphalia  to  do  the  work 
for  which  the  native  German's  standard  is  too  high,  so  that  the  *«-—-- 
gntioii  statistics  at  present  otttbahttice  those  of  EmigratJon. 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  ag 

the  eoonoinic  field,  she  has,  by  her  own  merit,  gained 
upon  us  to  the  utmost  extent  possible.  Her  only  avoid* 
able  handicap  has  been  the  great  Prussian  fleet  and  army 
miiich  she  has  deliberately  imposed  upon  herself*  Their 
creation,  upkeep,  and  increase  have  steadily  taxed  her 
economic  growth,  and  their  existence  has  tempted  her, 
in  her  foolish  trust  in  their  efficacy  for  her  ulterior 
objects,  to  risk  all  her  real  economic  gains  by  bringir^ 
them  into  action* 

This  policy  of  Germany's  has  been  an  immense 
mistake*  It  can  work  her  no  good,  but  it  has  a  vast 
potentiality  for  working  both  herself  and  the  rest  of 
Europe  evil.  There  is  the  sum  of  all  evil  in  the  fact 
that  by  attacking  the  rest  of  Europe  with  arms,  she  has 
forced  us  all  to  take  up  arms  against  her*  It  is  only  our 
subordinate  object  to  beat  her,  because  we  know  that 
if  she  beats  us  her  public  opinion  will  become  more 
convinced  than  ever  that  her  militaristic  policy  was 
right*  But  the  converse  by  no  means  follows,  that  if 
we  beat  her  we  thereby  convince  her  of  her  error* 
Masses  of  people  are  only  converted  from  ingrained 
opinions  about  complicated  questions,  if  they  have  every 
opportunity  given  them  to  be  reasonable*  It  is  always 
tempting  to  refuse  to  be  reasonable  :  if  you  are  being 
harshly  treated,  and  at  the  same  time  presented  with 
unanswerable  refutations  of  cherished  beliefs,  you 
inevitably  prefer  to  go  mad  rather  than  be  convinced* 
Our  ultimate  object  is  to  prevent  war  for  the  future,  and 
the  essential  means  to  this  end  is  to  convince  Germany 
that  war  is  not  to  her  interest*  We  and  the  French 
disbelieve  in  war  already,  but  a  minority  of  one  can 
make  a  quarrel,  in  spite  of  the  proverb*  The  only 
way  to  convince  Germany  is  first  to  beat  her  badly  and 
dien  to  treat  her  well* 


90  PRUSSIANISM 

U  we  bitnwliarf  her,  we  shall  strengdicn  the  obsolete 
ideas  in  her  oonsdoastiess  more  than  ever — pahsKps 
no  longer  the  idea  of  **  Phinder,^  but  certainly  that  of 
^  Revenge,^  which  is  much  worse :  if  we  deal  **  dis- 
interestedly ^  with  her  (thou|^  it  win  be  in  our  own 
truest  interest)  we  may  produce  sudi  a  reacdon  of 
public  optnion  in  Germany,  that  the  curse  of  aggressive 
mihtansm  wiU  be  exorcised  ficom  her  as  effectively  in 
19x4,  as  the  curse  of  pditical  paralyse  was  exordsed 
in  1870. 

We  have  seen  that  Germany  was  led  to  pursue  the 
policy  which  has  nilnrinaird  in  this  war,  by  the  oppres- 
sive sense  that  her  development  was  bong  cramped  by 
the  action  of  her  nei^iibours.  At  first  she  conceived 
their  action  as  of  a  passive  kind,  as  the  mere  automatic, 
**  dog-in-the-manger  **  instinct  of  effete  powers  to  ding 
to  possessions  they  had  not  the  initiative  to  utilise,  and 
in  ^^ch  nothing  but  historical  diance  had  given  them 
their  vested  interest :  her  own  mission,  she  thought, 
was  to  bend  all  her  youthful  energy  and  resolution 
to  the  task  of  evicting  them,  in  order  to  actualise  all 
the  golden  opportunities  that  they  had  missed*  More 
recently,  however,  since  her  methodical  pursuit  of  her 
aim  has  roused  her  victims  to  a  sense  of  their  danger 
and  stimulated  them  to  concert  measures  for  their 
security,  she  has  viewed  their  behaviour  in  a  more 
sinister  light,  as  an  active,  though  veiled,  campaign  of 
hostilities  unremittingly  carried  on  to  compass  her 
destruction ;  and  now  that  her  ambition  has  combined 
with  this  undercurrent  of  fear  to  predpitate  her  into 
an  aggressive  war,  so  that  she  finds  herself  actually 
engaged  in  a  life-and-death  struggle  with  these  neigh- 
bours whom  she  has  envied,  despised,  and  feared  in  one 
oonq)licated  emotion,  she  is  more  firmly  convinced  than 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  31 

ever  that  the  aggression  comes,  not  from  her  side,  but 
£fom  theirs* 

We  cannot  dispel  this  obsession  by  discussions  of 
the  past :  the  only  aq^ument  that  has  a  chance  of  going 
home  is  our  action  in  the  future,  that  is,  the  attitude  we 
adopt  when  we  meet  Germany  at  the  coi^ess  that  will 
fellow  the  war*  Assuming  (what  is  the  necessary  pre- 
supposition of  this  book)  that  Germany  has  been 
defeated,  and  that  the  settlement,  in  so  far  as  it  depends 
on  terms  imposed  by  superior  force,  passes  thereby 
into  the  hands  of  the  Allies,  on  what  principles  shaU 
we  govern  otur  clearance  of  acootmts  with  the  German 
Nation  i" 

One  thing  is  dear :  whether  Germany's  feeling  of 
constriction  has  good  grounds  or  not,  we  must  avoid 
deliberately  furnishing  it  with  further  justification  than 
it  has  already*  It  would  be  possible  to  maintain  that 
the  oolotiies  and  concessions  Germany  has  already 
acquired  give  her  room  for  expansion  ample  enotigh  to 
deprive  her  of  excuse  for  her  envy,  not  to  speak  of  the 
conduct  by  ^^ch  she  has  attempted  to  satisfy  it; 
but  even  this  view  would  be  rash  in  face  of  Germany's 
vehement  conviction  to  the  contrary*  Germany  is 
likely  to  judge  her  own  plight  more  tnily  than  we  can, 
and  even  if  she  has  judged  wrongly,  her  opinion  is  more 
isapartant  for  our  purpose  than  the  objective  truth* 
To  give  the  lie  to  this  national  belief  by  taking  from  her 
even  that  which  she  hath,  would  be  the  surest  means 
of  deepening  and  perpetuating  her  national  bitterness* 

Let  us  make  the  unlikely  assumption  that,  before 
the  end  of  the  war,  every  fragment  of  German  territory 
overseas  wiU  have  come  into  our  power:  there  will 
certainly  be  a  body  of  opinion  in  this  country  in  favour 
of  retaining  the  spoils  of  war*    **  The  retention  of  Ger- 


92  PRUSSIANISH 

man  S*W.  Afirica,''  tfacy  will  say,  **  is  essential,  firstly 
in  order  to  round  off  the  frontieis  of  the  Soodi  African 
Conunonweakh,  and  secondly  to  prevent  for  the  future 
the  fostering^  from  thin  li^)^Tff»  fef^tffj  of  thff  disloyalty 
against  the  British  Entire,  unfoctonatdy  still  rife  in 
the  Dutch  dement*'' 

But  it  will  be  a  pervetse  cure  for  Dutch  disaffiwtian 
to  reinforce  it  by  including  a  still  more  irreconcilable 
German  populatkm  within  the  same  mrnnrnnity,  unless 
we  mean  to  abandon  the  liberal  policy  which  has  gone 
so  far  towards  wiping  out  the  memories  of  die  South 
African  War,  and  rule  Dutdi  and  German  alike  with  a 
heavy  hand«  Such  a  disastrous  course  would  lose  us 
Soudi  Africa  altogether,  by  a  war  of  independenoe  like 
that  wtddi  severed  from  us  the  North  American  states, 
the  finest  colonies  we  ever  had.  If,  on  die  other  hand, 
we  restore  Germany  her  territory,  and  avoid  disturbing 
die  natural  development  of  our  own  South  African 
G>mmonweat]h  by  the  problems  involved  in  the 
annexation,  we  shall  see  a  new  Soudi  African  nation- 
ality grow  up,  which  will  first  blend  Dutch  and  British 
into  one  people,  and  in  process  of  time  exercise  an 
attractive  mfluence  upon  the  temtones  adjoming,  vdien 
they  too  have  filled  up  with  a  vriiite  population  drawn 
ficom  their  respective  mother-countnes,  and  have 
evolved  a  sqiarate  life  of  their  own*  J£  German  S*W. 
Africa  is  not  subjected  to  the  South  African  Common- 
wealdi  now  as  a  conquered  province,  she  is  more  dian 
likely  to  join  the  Federation,  vdien  she  is  ripe  for  self- 
government,  as  an  independent  member  of  her  own 
free  win,  and  so  enridi  the  new  nationality  by  adding  a 
German  strain  to  the  Dutdi  and  Engli^  ba^«  When 
diis  happoasp  the  Soudi  African  federal  state  wiU  take  its 
place  by  the  side  of  Great  Britam  on  the  one  hand  and 


L 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  33 

Germany  on  the  other  as  a  separate  political  tinit^ 
absolved  £rom  the  control  of  either,  but  inheriting  the 
tradition  of  cordial  relations  with  each,  and  will  become 
the  strongest  bond  of  good  understanding  between  them 
instead  of  the  bitterest  cause  of  dissention* 

The  case  of  the  other  German  possessions  in  Africa  is 
sinq>ler«  They  are  not  **  white  men's  countries/'  and 
do  not  adjoin  any  great  self-governing  member  of  the 
ftitish  Empire,  whose  policy  and  interest  must  be  con- 
sidered as  well  as  our  own :  they  all  lie  within  the 
tropical  belt,  and  like  most  European  protectorates  in 
those  latitudes,  profit  their  owner,  if  at  all,  as  fields  for 
enterprise,  sources  for  raw  products,  and  markets  for 
manufactures^  Towards  these  too  we  may  be  tempttd 
to  stretch  out  a  grasping  hand.  **  They  do  not  even  pay 
their  way,''  people  wiU  declare ;  ""  and  she  has  not  learnt 
the  secret  of  governing  natives  :  it  would  save  Germany's 
pocket  and  her  African  subjects'  hides,  if  we  took  over 
the  business  instead  of  her*  Perhaps  Togoland  and 
Kamertm  might  be  passed  over;  every  country  in 
Europe,  after  all,  has  some  little  claim  staked  out  on  the 
West  African  coast,  and  they  are  hardly  worth  picking 
op :  but  German  East  Africa  is  another  question ;  and 
think  how  satisfactory  it  wiU  be  to  obtain  an  *  all-^red 
route '  for  the  Cape-to-Cairo  Railway*" 

Here  we  see  the  cloven  hoof,  and  it  is  sufficient  to 
answer  that  the  profit  and  loss  of  Germany's  African 
possessions  is  emphatically  her  afiEair  not  ours,  that  the 
skill  to  govern  native  races  is  only  acquired  by  experience 
(we  ourselves,  for  instance,  bltmdered  into  our  present 
more  or  less  satisfactory  Crown  Colony  system  through 
an  unhampered  century  of  experiments  in  misgovern* 
ment),  while  the  all-red  route,  even  if  it  ootild  be 
achieved  without  alienating  Germany  (and  it  would 


34  PRUSSIANISM 

be  out  of  all  proportion  to  obtain  it  at  the  cost  of 
the  alternative),  actually  presupposes  the  continuance 
of  that  national  ants^onism  which  it  is  our  object  to 
abolish*  Not  the  monopoly  of  the  chief  trunk  railway 
of  the  African  continent,  but  the  co-operation  of  all 
interested  parties  in  its  construction  and  utilisation, 
will  open  die  way  to  the  international  entente  we  hope 
to  call  into  being* 

The  most  serious  claim  to  German  East  Africa  might 
be  lodged  by  the  Indian  Empire*  The  population  of 
India  is  sufifering  from  congestion  at  least  as  acutely  as 
that  of  Germany,  and  the  East  African  coast  that  f^oes 
India  across  the  Arabian  Sea,  offers  the  obvious  field  for 
her  expansion*  There  has  indeed  been  an  attempt  to 
convert  into  a  **  white  man^s  cotmtry  **  the  highlands 
that,  both  in  the  German  and  in  the  English  territory, 
intervene  between  the  coast  and  the  great  lakes ;  but 
the  experiment  seems  to  be  in  process  of  breaking  down 
in  both  provinces*  India,  then,  might  conceivably  ask, 
as  a  reward  for  her  loyal  aid  in  the  present  war,  that 
both  British  and  German  East  Africa  should  be  assigned 
to  her  as  a  specifically  Indian  colonial  area* 

This,  however,  is  asking  for  more  than  is  in  our 
power  to  grant*  We  shall  be  ill-advised  if  we  do  not  in 
future  offer  the  Indian  citizens  of  our  empire  the  most 
favourable  openings  we  can,  at  least  in  regions  whose 
climate  renders  them  pre-eminently  suitable  for  Indian 
immigration,  like  our  own  East  African  protectorate* 
We  hope  that  our  German  neighbours  on  that  coast  will 
do  the  same,  and  we  might  even  point  out  to  them  that 
the  introduction  of  a  civilised  Indian  population  into  a 
cotmtry  where  there  is  little  question  of  their  coming 
into  competition  with  white  settlers,  will  enormously 
increase  its  economic  productiveness,  which  is  its  para* 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  35 

nouiit  asset  to  the  white  nation  to  which  it  belongs* 
Moreover^  British  government  in  India  is  building  for 
the  Future  an  immensely  powerful  Indian  nation ;  and 
the  exclusion  of  Indians  from  this  territory  would 
involve  Germany  in  the  same  conflict  that  already 
threatens  Canada  and  the  U*S«A*,  unless  they  modify 
their  poUcy  in  the  meanwhile*  But  we  must  let  our 
action  rest  at  that*  The  problem  of  Asiatic  expansion 
must  be  met  primarily  by  every  state  concerned  on  its 
own  account*  It  is  probable  that  they  will  find  the 
difficulty  of  its  solution  so  great  that  they  will  organise 
in  time  some  international  authority  to  co-ordinate  their 
policy  on  this  question,  and  voluntarily  submit  them- 
selves to  its  direction ;  but  the  solution  cannot  possibly 
be  furthered  by  pressture  of  one  individual  state  upon 
another,  exercised  as  the  result  of  a  victorious  war* 

Germany  has  another  group  of  possessions  in  the 
Pacific,  and  perhaps  here  she  cannot  succeed  in  coming 
out  of  the  war  unscathed*  Her  Pacific  territories  have 
little  value  as  areas  for  settlement  or  commerce* 
Kaiser-Wilhelmsland  in  New  Guinea  is  the  only  one 
of  any  extent ;  several  archipelagoes  of  small  islands 
only  useful  as  coaling  stations,  and  the  notorious 
fortress  of  Kiao-Qiao,  planted  like  a  piratical  strong- 
hold on  the  Chinese  peninsula  of  Shantung,  constitute 
the  remainder*  They  are  not  so  much  an  Empire  in 
themselves  as  a  strategical  framework  laid  down  for  a 
future  empire  of  indefinite  extent,  and  as  such  have 
caused  considerable  uneasiness  to  the  maritime  states 
in  this  part  of  the  Pacific,  especially  to  Japan  our  ally, 
and  to  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  two  self'^veming 
members  of  our  empire*  The  anticipations  of  these 
nations  with  regard  to  Germany^s  designs  are  revealed 
by  the  tntrgy  with  which  they  proceeded  to  attack 


36  PRUSSIANISM 

these  positions  as  soon  as  war  broke  out.  New 
Zealand  struck  at  Samoa,  Australia  at  Neu-Ponunem, 
Kaiser-Wilhelmsland,  and  the  Solomon  islands,  while 
Japan  undertook  the  severest  task  in  the  reduction  of 
Kiao-Giao.  Japan  will  emerge  from  the  war  in  posses- 
sion of  the  latter  place,  and  she  has  handed  over  the 
Caroline  and  Marshall  Islands,  which  she  occupied  in 
the  course  of  her  operations,  not  to  ourselves  but  to  our 
two  Pacific  Commonwealths. 

The  disposition  of  Germany's  Pacific  dependencies 
will  therefore  not  come  into  our  hands  at  alL  We  may 
ensure  that  Japan  keeps  to  her  declared  intention  of 
consigning  Kiao-Chao  to  its  ultimate  owner  China,  by 
ofiTering  to  resign  simultaneously  Wei-hai-wei  on  the 
other  coast  of  Shantung,  which  we  only  leased  as  an 
ofSset  to  Germany's  coup  in  seizing  Kiao-Chao;  but 
in  any  event  Kiao-Chao  will  not  pass  back  into 
Germany's  possession,  and  it  is  most  unlikely  that  any 
of  the  other  territories  in  question  will  be  relinquished 
by  their  respective  holders.  Certainly  Great  Britain 
has  no  authoritative  power  to  procure  dieir  retrocession 
to  Germany,  even  did  she  desire  it,  and  there  is  after 
all  no  reason  why  we  should  deplore  Germany's  loss 
of  them.  It  will  involve  no  corresponding  loss  to 
her  industrial  and  commercial  prosperity,  a  German 
interest  that  we  mean  scrupulously  to  respect  and  if 
possible  to  promote,  but  will  only  cripple  her  design  of  a 
militaristic  world-empire,  a  German  interest  that  we 
intend,  in  self-defence,  to  remove  from  the  sphere  of 
practical  politics. 

Great  Britain's  true  policy,  then,  is  to  allow  Germany 
to  retain  all  openings  for  peaceable,  as  opposed  to 
forcible,  expansion  afforded  her  by  her  oversea 
dominions  as  they  existed  before  this  war  broke  out. 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  37 

and  we  shall  have  a  particularly  free  hand  in  die 
decision  of  diis  question,  because  the  command  of  the 
sea,  and  the  world-wide  naval  operations  it  makes 
possible,  fall  almost  entirely  within  our  province,  and 
not  within  that  of  our  European  allies*  We  must 
furthermore  give  just  as  great  facilities  as  before  to 
German  immigration  through  all  the  vast  portions  of 
our  empire  that  are  still  only  in  process  of  being  opened 
up  and  settled,  and  we  must  urge  our  allies  to  adopt 
the  same  principle  with  regard  to  the  territories  in  a 
similar  phase  of  development  which  acknowledge  their 
sovereignty.  We  must  also  respect  the  concessions 
which  German  enterprise  has  secured  for  its  capital, 
with  such  fine  initiative  and  perseverance,  in  neutral 
oountries  of  backward  growth*  We  shaU  find  instances, 
similar  to  the  coaling  stations  in  the  Pacific,  where 
professedly  economic  concerns  have  an  essentially 
political  intention — certain  sections  of  the  projected 
Bagdad  railway  occur  at  once  to  our  minds — ^and  here 
we  may  be  compelled  to  reqtiire  Germany  to  abandon 
her  title;  but  we  must  confine  such  demands  to  a 
minimum*  Both  we  and  our  allies  must  take  care  that 
neither  political  panic  nor  economic  greed  induces  us 
to  carry  them  to  excess,  and  in  every  case  where  we 
decide  to  make  them,  we  must  give  Germany  the 
opportunity  of  acquiring,  in  compensation,  more  than 
their  equivalent  in  economic  value* 

If  we  meet  Germany  in  this  spirit,  she  will  at  least 
emei^  from  the  war  no  more  cramped  and  constricted 
dian  she  entered  it*  This  will  not,  of  cotuse,  satisfy  her 
ambitions,  for  they  were  evil  ambitions,  and  could  not 
be  satisfied  without  the  world's  ruin ;  but  it  will  surely 
allay  her  fears*  She  will  have  seen  that  we  had  it  in 
our  power  to  mutilate  her  all  rotmd  and  cripple  her 


38  PRUSSIANISM 

utterly,  and  that  we  held  our  hand.  Once  her  fear  is 
banished,  we  can  proceed  to  conjure  away  her  envy :  for 
to  leave  her  what  she  has  already  would  prepare  the 
ground  for  an  invitation  to  join  us  in  organising  some 
standing  international  authority  that  should  continuously 
adjust  the  claims  of  all  growing  nations,  Germany  among 
the  rest,  by  reasonable  methods  of  compromise,  and  so 
provide  openings  for  the  respective  expansion  of  their 
wealth  and  population* 

Such  an  international  oi^an  would  replace  the  struggle 
for  existence  between  nations,  in  which  each  tries  to 
snatch  his  neighbour's  last  crust,  by  a  co-operation  in 
which  all  would  work  together  for  a  common  end; 
but  many  tangled  problems  strew  the  ground  in  front 
of  us,  before  we  can  clear  it  for  such  a  construction. 
The  national  foundations  of  Europe  must  first  be  relaid ; 
and  just  as  in  the  question  of  territories  over  sea  the 
decisive  word  will  lie  with  ourselves,  so  in  the  case  of 
European  frontiers  it  will  lie  with  otu:  allies,  because 
the  war  on  land  is  their  province  and  because  the 
national  problems  at  issue  affect  them  even  more 
directly  than  us* 

This  does  not  absolve  us  from  the  duty  of  probing 
these  problems  to  their  bottom  :  rather  it  makes  it  the 
more  imperative  that  we  should  do  so,  inasmuch  as 
our  influence  upon  their  solution  will  depend  principally 
on  the  impartiality  of  our  point  of  view  and  die  reason- 
ableness of  our  suggestions,  and  very  litde  on  any  power 
of  making  our  will  prevail  by  mere  intransigeance, 
or  by  the  plea  of  paramount  interests*  Great  Britain 
ought  to  come  to  the  conference  with  very  definite 
opinions  about  the  details  of  these  problems,  even  at  the 
risk  of  annoying  her  allies  by  the  appearance  of  meddling 
with  what  is  less  her  business  than  theirs*    The  Allies 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  39 

have  proclaimed  to  the  world  that  they  will  wage  this 
war  to  its  conclusion  in  concert,  and  that  declaration 
will  not  be  difficult  for  them  to  observe  :  but  they  have 
also  implied  that  they  will  negotiate  in  concert  the  terms 
of  peace,  and  it  is  here  that  the  separateness  of  their 
positive  interests,  beyond  the  negative  bond  of  self- 
preservation,  will  be  in  danger  of  manifesting  itself* 
They  have  morally  pledged  themselves  to  a  settlement 
that  shall  subordinate  their  several,  and  even  their  collec- 
tive, interests  to  the  general  interests  of  the  civilised 
world,  and  it  is  on  this  grotmd  that  they  have  claimed 
the  sympathy  of  neutrals  in  the  struggle  with  their 
opponents*  To  fulfil  their  promise,  they  will  need  all 
the  wisdom,  patience  and  disinterestedness  that  they 
can  oommand;  and  the  supreme  value  of  Great  Britain^s 
voice  will  lie  in  the  proposal  of  formulas  calculated  to 
reconcile  the  views  of  the  Allies  with  each  other  and  also 
with  the  relatively  impartial  standpoint  of  the  non- 
nationalistic  element  that  happily  obtains  some  footing 
in  all  countries  and  in  all  strata  of  society* 

The  solutions  we  o£Fer,  then,  for  the  national  problems 
of  Europe  must  not  be  conceived  as  demands  which  it 
is  in  Great  Britain^s  vital  interest  to  propound  and 
in  her  absolute  power  to  enforce,  but  rather  as  sug- 
gestions compatible  with  British  interests,  and  capable 
of  acceptance  by  otu:  allies*  The  satisfaction  of  all 
parties  on  whom  their  translation  into  fact  will  depend, 
is,  however,  only  a  negative  condition :  they  must 
further  be  governed  by  the  positive  aim  of  dealing  im- 
partial justice  to  ourselves,  otu:  friends  and  our  enemies 
alike*  We  must  follow  the  principle  that  a  "'  dis- 
interested **  policy  ultimately  serves  the  truest  interest 
of  its  authors* 

The  first  problem  that  confronts  us  is  that  of  the  alien 


40  PRUSSIANISM 

nationalities  included  against  their  will  within  the 
present  frontiers  of  the  German  Empire*  The  settle- 
ment after  this  war  must  bring  justice  to  these  popula- 
tions by  affording  them  an  opportunity  for  choosing 
freely  whether  they  will  maintain  their  connection  with 
Germany  or  no,  and  if  not,  what  destiny  they  prefer* 
When  we  have  estimated  the  probable  results  of  their 
choice,  we  may  proceed  to  consider  what  the  effect  is 
likely  to  be  on  German  public  opinion,  and  look  for 
some  means  of  cancelling  the  bitterness  which  cannot 
fail  to  be  aroused  in  some  degree*  But  this  is  essentially 
a  secondary  consideration*  We  have  accepted  the 
principle  that  the  recognition  of  nationality  is  the 
necessary  foundation  for  European  peace ;  and  peace 
is  endangered  far  more  by  the  unjust  violation  of  the 
national  idea  than  by  the  resentment  due  to  the  just 
reversal  of  the  injustice,  even  if  the  wrongdoer  be  the 
most  potent  factor  in  Europe  and  his  victim  the  most 
insignificant*  We  will  proceed,  therefore,  to  consider 
in  turn  the  national  problems  within  the  German 
Empire  on  their  own  merits* 

B*  The  French  Frontier 

The  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  is  insoluble  S 
it  is  treated  as  a  controversy  between  France  and 
Germany*  **  This  land,"'  the  Germans  will  say,  "  has 
legally  remained  German  soil  ever  since  Karl  the  Great 
divided  his  empire  between  his  three  sons*  It  is  true 
that  the  French  annexed  it  by  a  series  of  conquests  in 
the  17th  and  i8th  centuries,  but  the  German  speech  of 
the  major  part  of  its  inhabitants  is  a  living  proof  of  its 
true  ownership*^' 

**  Granted,''  the  French  will  reply,  **  that  we  won 


THE  FRENCH  FRONTIER  4% 

our  title  by  oonquestt  yet  its  recognition  by  innumerable 
German  governments  in  inntmierable  treaties  gave  it  a 
validity  at  least  as  great  as  that  inherent  in  Qiarletnagne^s 
testament,  before  you  wrenched  it  from  us  again  by  no 
other  right  than  a  conquest  of  precisely  the  same  char- 
acter.  If  your  present  daims  rest  on  ancient  history, 
why  did  you  still  leave  us  half  Lorraine  in  1871,  for  you 
had  no  worse  a  tide  to  it  than  to  the  half  you  took  i 
You  left  it  because  you  knew  you  could  not  hope  to  hold 
down  by  force  so  large  a  territory  as  that«  No,  force 
is  your  sole  tide  now,  as  you  say  it  was  ours  before,  and 
the  moment  has  come  for  our  revenge/^ 

The  two  nations  have  bandied  historical  arguments 
like  these  for  forty*three  years,  without  approaching 
any  nearer  to  a  conclusion,  because  their  pleas,  though 
mosdy  correct  in  fact,  are  none  of  them  relevant  to  the 
sttuatkm*  The  question,  indeed,  only  a£Fects  France 
and  Germany  in  a  secondary  degree :  the  parties 
primarily  concerned  are  the  inhabitants  of  the  disputed 
territory  themselves,  and  their  present  will  is  the  only 
solution*  But  the  autocratic  regime  on  the  Prussian 
model,  established  in  the  **  Reichsland  **  since  its  cession 
to  the  German  Empire,  has  assiduously  suppressed  any 
attempts  on  the  part  of  that  will  to  declare  itself,  and 
our  first  business,  once  this  pressure  is  removed,  will  be 
to  oi^anise  some  machinery  for  ascertaining  what  the 
people^s  will  may  be« 

We  must,  in  fact,  insist  that  a  plebiscite  be  taken 
throughout  the  Reichsland*  Many  people  will  treat 
this  proposal  with  cynicism :  **  A  plebisdte,^^  they  will 
say,  **  invariably  confirms  the  desire  of  the  authority 
tkit  conducts  it*  A  vote  taken  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Allies  would  as  certainly  decide  for  union  with  France, 
at  one  taken  by  the  German  regime  before  the  war 


43  PRUSSIANISM 

would  have  declared  for  adhesion  to  the  German 
Empire." 

This,  however,  assumes  a  sinister  intention,  when  the 
presupposition  of  the  proposal  is  the  desire  on  our  part 
to  deal  justice  to  all  nationalities  and  a  behef  that  it  is 
our  interest  to  do  so  ;  and  it  is  clear  that  we  are  capable 
of  honestly  conducting  a  plebiscite,  if  we  will.  A 
more  valid  objection  would  be  that,  however  honest  our 
conduct,  our  opponents  would  never  credit  the  fact  if 
the  result  issued  to  our  advantage  and  to  their  dis- 
advantage, so  that  even  the  reality  of  free  dioice  by  die 
voters  would  not  modify  the  resentment  of  their  former 
masters.  The  remedy  for  this  would  be  that  the 
victorious  party  should  evacuate  the  districts  in  dispute 
altogether,  and  hand  over  the  oi^anisation  of  the  voting 
U>  some  neutral  power.  It  might  even  then  be  objected 
that  the  forgoing  decision  of  the  war  would  necessarily 
influence  the  decision  of  the  vote,  and  this  is  probably 
true ;  but  it  will  certainly  not  influence  it  automatically 
in  favour  of  the  conquerors.  All  sorts  of  events,  isolated 
incidents  of  the  war  itself  and  the  varied  memories  of 
half  a  century  before  it,  will  affect  the  voters'  judgment 
more  than  the  total  sum  of  past  history  drawn  by  the 
war's  issue  :  in  fact,  this  issue  will  be  only  one  ai  many 
stimuli  to  the  complicated  motives  that  viJl  go  to  make 
up  the  final  desire  of  the  voting  population. 

A  plebiscite,  then,  need  neither  be  an  unreality  to  the 
voters  nor  seem  so  to  the  parties  interested ;  and  just 
as  the  will  of  the  former  is  more  important  than  that  of 
the  latter,  so  the  moral  effect  upon  the  voters  themselves 
of  its  true  declaration  is  especially  valuable.  The  great 
merit  <si  the  plebiscite  is  that  it  saves  populations  from 
being  consigned  like  cattle  from  pen  to  pen,  a  treatment 
the  more  intolerable  in  proportion  to  the  civilisation 


THE  PRENCH  FRONTIER  4i 

of  the  people  that  sufifer  it,  and  little  calculated,  as  the 
case  of  the  **  Reichsland  *'  itself  has  proved,  to  conciliate 
them  to  the  nationality  with  which  they  are  thus 
arbitrarily  yoked* 

The  mere  taking  of  a  plebiscite  will  always  go  far 
towards  easing  the  situation  :  the  real  difficulty  lies  in 
determining  the  practical  method  on  which  it  is  to  be 
conducted*  Clearly  the  result  will  differ  according  to 
the'  size  of  the  minimum  unit  within  which  a  separate 
poll  is  taken.  If  the  votes  of  the  whole  population  of 
the  Reichsland  were  polled,  for  instance,  they  would 
probably  produce  a  balance  in  favour  of  the  reunion  of 
the  whole  unit  with  France,  while  at  the  same  time  a 
smaller  unit  or  units  could  have  been  detached  from  the 
wbcie,  which  with  almost  equal  certainty  would  have 
declared  for  standing  by  Germany.  But  it  is  obviously 
unjust  that  units  capable  of  being  separated  out  geo- 
graphically and  possessed  of  a  local  consciousness  of 
thdr  own,  should  be  denied  the  esqpression  of  their  will 
by  artificial  inclusion  in  a  larger  but  inoi^anic  mass. 
The  most  important  preliminary,  therefore,  to  the  taking 
of  a  plebiscite  is  the  definition  of  such  minimitm  areas, 
and  it  is  here  that  the  impartial  application  of  as  much 
objective  knowledge  as  we  can  muster  is  most  essential* 
Many  of  the  following  pages  are  occupied  by  tentative 
experiments  in  this  direction* 

The  Reichsland  ^  is  shaped  like  a  T-sqtiare  with  its 
angle  pointing  North-East,  and  its  two  arms  are  sharply 
divided  by  the  barrier  of  the  Vosges**  The  Western 
ann  stretches  across  the  gap  between  the  Vosges  and 
the  Ardennes,  and  forms  the  transition  between  the 

*  Tbe  total  pofmlation  was  ifii$/xio  in  1905,  the  Gcnnaii-speaktiig 
dcfncnt  oonstitutitig  85  per  cent,  of  the  whole* 
•Sec  Map  L 


44  PRUS5IANISM 

plains  of  Northern  France  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
Prussian  Rhineland  on  the  other. 

This  district  includes  both  French  and  German- 
speaking  populations,  and  a  line  drawn  diagonally 
aooss  it  from  North -West  to  South -East,  and 
rot^^y  coinciding  with  the  watershed  between  the 
Seille  and  the  Saar,  would  indicate  the  boundary 
between  the  two  elements.  It  is  certain  that  die 
French-speaking  section  of  the  district^  would  vote 
unanimously  for  reunion  with  France,  while  the  German- 
speaking  section,  on  the  other  hand,  seems  either  never  to 
have  felt,  or  easily  to  have  lost,  pohtical  sympathy  with 
France,  and  to  have  become  conscious  now  of  solidarity 
with  its  Northern  neighbours  of  the  same  speedi, 
further  down  the  Saar  and  the  Moselle.  The  areas 
respectively  inhabited  by  the  populations  in  question 
form  compact  blocks  adjoining  the  countries  with  which 
each  is  hkely  to  seek  union,  and  the  boundary  between 
them  follows  a  line  quite  suitable  for  a  military  and 
political  frontier.  Clearly,  therefore,  these  areas  present 
two  natural  units  within  ^lich  the  vote  shoidd  be 
taken  separately,  and  the  result  of  the  polling  should 
decide  definitively  the  fate  of  each. 

The  town  and  distria  of  ThionviUe  (Diedenhofen) 
ot^t  perhaps  to  vote  by  itself,  because  here  the 
population  is  mixed  and  the  decision  correspondingly 
doubtful,  while  its  geographical  situation  would  equally 
permit  its  inclusion  in  either  country.  It  is  probable 
that  it  will  vote  for  the  connection  with  France,  and 
this  will  certainly  be  the  case  with  Metz,  the  great 
fortress  of  purely  Frendi  population,  at  the  junction  of 
the  Seille  and  die  Moselle ;  with  dl  the  villages  and 
townships  of  the  Seille  basin  itself;  and  with  the 
■  About  15%  of  the  total  population  of  the  whole  Retdnland. 


'i 


THE  FRENCH  FRONTIER  45 

tippet  valley  of  the  Saar,  as  far  North  as^  and  including, 
Saarbourg.  The  rest  of  the  district  is  almost  equally 
certain  to  remain  with  Germany* 

In  the  Western  arm  of  the  Reichsland,  then,  the 
solution  is  fairly  simple,  but  the  Southern  wing  pre- 
sents more  difficult  problems.  This  district,  once  the 
province  of  Alsace,  consists  firstly  of  a  lox^  strip  rutming 
North  and  South,  bounded  on  the  West  by  the  summit  of 
the  Vo^es,  and  sloping  down  on  the  East  to  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  secondly  of  two  passes,  leading 
through  the  Vosges,  towards  their  Northern  end,  into 
that  Western  arm  of  the  Reichsland  with  which  we  have 
already  dealt*  The  more  Southerly  pass  is  commanded 
by  Zabem  at  its  Eastern  exit  and  Phalsbourg  at  its 
Western,  and  is  traversed  by  a  railway  and  a  canal, 
connecting  Strasbourg  near  the  Rhine  with  Saarbourg 
on  the  upper  Saar,  and  ultimately  with  Lunelle, 
Nancy  and  Toul :  the  Northerly  pass  carries  a  railway 
from  H^enau  in  the  Rhine  basin  through  Bitsch  to 
Saargemund. 

The  speech  of  this  entire  district,  except  for  a  few 
communes  high  up  in  the  Vosges,  is  German ;  but  the 
sympathies  of  the  population  have  remained  persistently 
alienated  from  the  German  Empire.  This  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  the  Alsatians  desire  reincorporation 
in  the  French  nation ;  there  remains  the  alternative  of 
cutting  their  connection  with  France  and  Germany  alike, 
and  during  the  last  forty-three  years  there  has  been  a 
considerable  party  in  the  country  which  favoured  such 
a  programme,  pointii^  out  that  Alsace  has  suffered  from 
the  quarrel  between  the  big  political  units  on  either 
side  of  her  out  of  all  proportion  to  her  own  local  stake 
in  the  issue* 

It  is  by  no  means  certain,  however,  that  they  are 


46  PRUSSIANISM 

imconqiromtsu^y  detennmed  to  break  loose  from  their 
present  ttnion  with  Germany.  The  notorious  incident 
that  occurred  at  Zabern  less  than  a  year  ago,  advertised 
the  fact  that  Prussian  military  government  was  intoler- 
^le,  and  that,  so  long  as  Alsace  was  subject  to  it,  the 
grant  of  constitutional  self-government  would  remain 
an  empty  formality  ;  but  it  might  well  become  a  reality 
as  a  result  of  this  war,  and  if  Alsace  had  the  opportunity 
of  entering  the  German  Empire  as  an  independent 
member  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  other  states,  still 
more  if  she  could  enter  it  as  part  of  a  united  Soutii 
German  state,  strot^  enough  to  hold  its  own  within 
the  Empire  against  the  Nordi,  there  is  strong  reason  to 
expect  that  the  bond  of  common  speech  would  assert 
itxlf,  and  attract  her  strongly  to  her  Soudi  German 
brethren  only  parted  &om  her  by  the  Rhine.^ 

On  the  other  hand  the  crescendo  and  culmination 
of  Prussian  brutality  may  have  alienated  Alsace  from 
Germany  altogether,  and  made  her  feel  that  her  salvation 
lies  neither  in  a  problematical  reform  of  the  German 
Empire's  internal  oi^ianisation,  which  she  would  have 
little  influence  in  promoting,  nor  in  a  precarious 
autonomy,  i^ch  she  could  never  defend  by  her  own 
resources,  but  solely  in  placing  herself  once  more  imder 
the  aegis  of  France,  ^ere  the  gratification  afforded  by 
her  choice  would  ensure  her  a  peculiarly  benevolent 
reception. 

liie  decision,  then,  of  Alsace,  or  in  other  words  her 
nationality,  is  quite  unpredictable,  and  the  question  of 
method  in  oiganising  the  plebiscite  accordingly  assumes 
here  a  special  importance.    It  is  clear,  in  the  first  place, 

'  EcDnomia,  as  well  as  Ungtugc,  dnw  Aliacx  towards  Gennany ; 
ail  ihe  maikets  tot  bcr  manufactuies  lie  down  the  Rhine,  none  of  ihaa 
Wcsi  of  the  Vo^cs. 


~1 


THE  FRENCH  FRONTIER  47 

that  the  probable  decision  of  North-Eastern  Lorraine 
to  remain  within  Germany  would  incidentally  decide 
the  £ate  of  the  northenmiost  strip  of  Alsace  adjoining 
it  on  the  East*  If  Saai^emund  continued  German,  it 
would  not  be  feasible  either  from  the  military  or  from 
the  economic  point  of  view  that  the  railway  connecting 
it  with  the  Rhine  valley  should  become  French,  so  that 
if  the  rectified  frontier  of  Germany  crossed  the  Saar 
not  far  North  of  Saarbourg,  it  would  have  to  include 
at  least  Weissenburg,  Hs^enau  and  Bisdiweiler  on  its 
way  to  the  Rhine*  The  small  minority  of  population 
inhabiting  this  strip  would  thus  inevitably  staffer  the 
loss  of  their  freedom  of  choice ;  but  the  rest  of  Alsace, 
that  is,  the  Southerly  pass  and  the  whole  country  South 
of  it  between  the  Vosges  and  the  Rhine,  would  still 
dedde  its  own  fate* 

The  crucial  question  next  arises :  What  tmits  of  voting 
should  be  adopted  in  this  area  i  Seeing  that  the  decision 
is  so  delicately  balanced,  it  might  be  argued  that  the 
units  should  be  as  small  and  numerous  as  possible, 
and  that  every  commune  should  be  allowed  to  make  its 
own  choice*  Such  a  procedure,  however,  would  in- 
volve us  in  difficulties*  Suppose  Phalsbourg  voted,  like 
Saa^emOnd,  for  Germany,  while  all  the  other  com- 
munes voted  for  France,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  give  Phabbourg  its  way,  because  its  fulfilment 
would  drive  a  German  wedge  across  the  extremely 
important  railway  and  canal  connecting  French  Saar^ 
bourg  with  French  Strasbourg ;  or  again,  suppose  that, 
^idiile  Strasbourg  voted  for  France,  Colmar  and 
Mulhausen  voted  for  Germany,  it  would  be  geo- 
graphically impossible  to  link  both  groups  with  their 
diosen  fa^erlands*  In  fact,  Alsace  itself  is  a  minimum 
unit*    There  are  no  suitable  lines  for  a  frontier  to  follow 


48  PRUS5IANISM 

between  the  Vosges  and  the  Rhine,  or  between  Phals- 
bourg,  Strasbotu^  and  Mulhauaen ;  so  that,  if  we  take 
the  pldnsdte  by  fragments  of  the  district,  we  shall  be 
compelled  seriously  to  tamper  with  its  mult  in  order 
to  reduce  it  to  a  workable  shape,  and  so  nullify  the  voting 
to  the  discontent  of  all  parties.  It  is  worse  than  useless 
to  take  a  vote  unless  it  is  meant  to  be  definitive,  and  the 
disappcuntment  of  a  single  large  minority  is  a  lesser 
evil  ^lan  the  disillusionment  of  many  sm^  majorities. 
Alsace,  then,  within  the  limits  defined,  must  vote  as 
a  single  umt.  We  cannot  foretell  how  the  decision  will 
go,  and  the  importance  of  the  result,  both  for  France 
and  Germany,  is  momentous.  Only  one  thing  is 
certain,  that  die  accession  of  Alsace  would  profit  either 
country  little,  unless  it  were  compassed  by  the  desire 
and  the  initiative  of  Alsace  herself. 


C.  The  Danish  Frontier 

The  question  of  Schleswig-Holstein  >  has  not  yet 
been  opened  by  this  war,  but  we  must  not  for  that 
reason  neglect  it,  for  the  seeds  of  future  war  are  there. 
When  the  German  Confederarion  fought  Denmai^  on 
this  account  in  1864,  the  two  provinces  had  long  been 
united  tmder  the  Danish  Crown,  and  the  prize  of  victwy 
was  their  cession  as  a  single  tinit  to  the  conquerors ; 
but  the  situation  before  the  war,  and  the  settlement 
after  it,  were  alike  unjust,  because  this  political  unity 
has  neither  a  national  nor  a  gec^rapbical  foundation. 
It  was  monstrous  that  the  whole  territory  should  be  in 
Denmark's  hands,  fcff  85%  of  the  total  population  'is 
Gertnan ;  but  it  is  equ^y  outrageous  that  the  Danirii 
minority  of  15%  should  have  been  violently  wrenched 
'  See  map  on  opposite  page.         *  Total  population  1,504,000  in  igoo. 


1 


THE  KIEL  CANAL  AND  THE  BALTIC  SEA 


k 


THE  DANISH  FRONTffiR  49 

away  firom  their  national  state*  The  problem  should 
DOW  be  solved  by  allowing  either  province  to  go  its 
own  way* 

Holstein  belongs  entirely  to  Germany^  by  nationality, 
gec^raphy,  and  tradition*  No  Danish  is  spoken  within 
its  limits  ;  it  flanks  the  Right  bank  of  the  Elbe  estuary 
bek>w  Hambu^ ;  it  contains  the  whole  course  of  the 
Kiel  Canal,  a  vital  artery  of  Germany's  commerce  that 
gives  her  the  necessary  direct  connection  between 
the  Baltic  and  the  North  Sea;  and  even  while 
actually  under  Danish  control,  it  always  formed  a 
juridical  part,  first  of  the  **  Holy  Roman  Empire  ** 
and  then  of  the  **  German  Confederation/'  throt^h  the 
darkest  days  of  Germany's  political  history*  To  sever 
the  connection  of  this  province  with  Germany  is  un- 
thinkable* 

Schleswig,  on  the  other  hand,  is  predominantly 
Danish  in  speech,  and  the  plebiscite  will  almost  certainly 
show  that  the  whole  province  (for  it  is  one  of  those 
minimum  units  that  are  not  susceptible  of  sub-divi- 
sion) is  Danish  in  national  sentiment*  Geographically, 
moreover,  its  links  are  as  strong  with  the  Jutland 
peninsula  as  are  those  of  Holstein  with  the  German 
continent,  and  the  present  Dano-German  frontier  is  as 
unnatural  and  meaningless  a  line  as  is  the  South-East 
boundary  of  Holstein  against  Hamburg,  Lubeck  and 
Mecklenburg*  The  true  frontier  of  Germany  and 
Denmark  does  not  lie  at  either  extremity  of  the  two 
provinces,  but  between  them*  In  sketching  it,  we 
must  compromise  between  racial  distribution  and 
geographical  necessity*  The  presumption  in  favour  of 
an  existing  line  would  suggest  that  we  should  simply 
fdlow  the  historical  boundary  between  Schles#ig 
and  Holstein,  but  unfortunately  the  Kiel  Ship  Canal 


50  PRUSSIANISM 

coincides  with  this  along  its  Eastern  section,  and  both 
banlcs  of  the  Canal  must  clearly  remain  within  German 
territory ;  so  that  while  still  taking  the  estuary  of  the 
Eider  as  the  Western  terminus  of  the  frontier,  we  must 
draw  its  Eastward  course  further  North,  and  bring  it  to 
the  Baltic  at  the  head  of  Eckemfdrde  Bay,  instead  of  the 
left  shore  of  Kiel  Haven. 

This  hne,  though  it  leaves  to  Germany  a  slice  of 
Schleswig  in  addition  to  all  Holstein,  which  is  in  itself 
by  far  the  more  populous  and  important  of  the  two 
provinces,  still  assigns  to  Denmark  a  small  German- 
speakii^  area,  including  the  towns  of  Schleswig  and 
Flensburg,  which  cannot  be  detached  ftom  the  Danisfa- 
speakit^  unit.^  The  sympathies  of  this  tiny  minority 
will  be  revealed  by  the  plebiscite.  Probably  the  factor 
of  language  will  be  outweighed  by  historiotl  tradtttoa 
and  by  the  rigour  of  Prussian  admuiistration,  for  which 
the  German  nationality  of  the  Prussian  state,  in  which 
Schleswig  has  been  forcibly  incorporated,  is  only  a 
theoretical  compensation;  but  even  if  these  German- 
speaking  Scbleswigers  would  prefer  to  remain  within  a 
reconstituted  Germany,  they  are  one  of  those  minorities 
that  must  inevitably  be  sacrificed  *  to  the  exigencies 
of  get^aphical  facts,  for  there  is  no  natural,  physical 
frontier  to  be  found  that  corresponds  more  closely  than 
the  Eider-line  to  the  actual  frontier  of  speech. 

In  detail,  then,  and  it  is  better  to  descend  to  detail, 
for  concreteness*  sake,  the  new  frontier  should  probably 
run  as  follows :  starting  from  the  head  of  EckemfSrde 
Bay,  so  as  to  assign  the  town  of  Schleswig  to  Denmarit 
but  to  leave  Eckemfdrde  to  Germany,  it  should  make  a 

'  With  ig,ooo  and  49/xx>  iohabiunts  respectively. 
'  Without  prejudice  to  a  possible  guarantee,  on  the  part  of  Europe, 
of  thdf  natioaal  culture  and  individuality. 


■ 

\ 


I 


T 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER 


51 


It  ootifse  for  Suderstapel  on  the  North  bank  of  the 
r,  and  follow  the  river  the  rest  of  the  way  to  its 
on  the  North  Sea* 


D.  The  Polish  Frontier 

is  yet  a  third  alien  nationality  in  Germanyt 

^les,  and,  judging  by  numbers  at  least,  the  Polish 

lem  is  the  most  serious  of  all*    There  are  over  three 

Poles  within  Germany's  Eastern  frontier*    What 

national  desire  of  this  important  population  i 

situation  in  German  Poland  is  different  from 
in  Schleswig  and  Alsace-Lorraine*  There  is  no 
ident  national  state  across  the  frontier  for  the 
jected  fraction  of  the  race  to  join  upon  liberation : 
whole  nation  is  partitioned  between  three  empires, 
ly,  Austria  and  Russia*  The  peaceful  main- 
of  the  statm  quo  in  Europe  meant  for  the  Poles 
(perpetuation  of  this  calamity  for  an  indefinite  period, 
ips  for  ever*  The  outbreak  of  war,  the  common 
of  their  taskmasters,  kindled  for  them  a  glimmer 
hope. 
0  The  war  brought  offers  of  better  treatment  for 
future  from  all  three  parties*  In  such  an  evenly 
struggle  the  decisive  adhesion  of  the  whole 
nation  to  one  side  or  die  other  became  of  im- 
ice,  especially  as  their  country  was  fated  to  be  the 
a  of  hostihties* 
(fr)  It  brought  them,  however,  no  expectation  of 
»lele  independence*  Their  oppressors  are  divided 
die  two  camps,  and  the  victorious  party,  which- 
way  victory  declares  itself,  will  certainly  not  relin<* 
its  hold  upon  territory  already  in  its  possessicm 
the  war  began. 


Sa  PRUSSIANISM 

(c)  The  Poles'  possible  gain  from  the  war  amounts, 
therefore,  to  the  creation  of  a  united  national  state,  enjoy- 
ing internal  autonomy,  but  incorporated  in  a  la^er 
political  organisation.  Any  of  the  three  powers  wotitd 
be  williag,  if  the  opportunity  arrived,  to  make  concessions 
to  the  Poles  already  subjea  to  it,  in  order  to  attract 
within  its  frontier  upon  the  same  terms  the  remaining 
sections  of  the  nation. 

The  Poles,  then,  can  make  a  bargain  on  much  the 
same  lines  with  either  group.  We  have  now  to  consider 
which  group  is  in  a  position  to  negotiate  most  favourably 
with  them. 

Our  ally  Russia  is  the  traditional  enemy  of  the  Polish 
nation.  The  two  peoples  have  been  rival  leaders  of 
die  Slavonic  world.  Poland  drew  her  culture  from  the 
Latin  West,  and  her  peasantry  remained  staunch  to  the 
Catholic  Church  ^  during  the  crisis  of  the  Reformation  : 
Russia  took  upon  herself  the  inheritance  of  the  Byzan- 
tine Empire,  Since  1814  more  than  half  Poland's 
territory  and  population,  including  the  national  capital, 
Warsaw,  has  been  incorporated  in  the  Russian  &npire. 
Accordingly,  the  national  revolts  of  1831  and  1863 
were  directed  primarily,  and  in  effect  solely,  against 
Russian  rule,  and  in  the  concerted  repression  which  they 
provoked  from  the  three  powers,  the  Russian  govern- 
ment has  taken  the  lead.  The  most  cruel  symbol  of 
Poland's  humiliation  is  the  flaunting  Orthodox  Cathedral 
planted  in  the  chief  public  square  of  Warsaw. 

The  bitter  hatred  Russia  had  incurred  from  the  Poles 
was  an  opportunity  for  Russia's  enemies.  Austria, 
realising  that  some  day  she  would  be  drawn  into  a 
life-and-death  struggle  with  Russia  over  the  question 
of  the  Balkans,  was  clever  enough  to  seize  it. 
'  The  hittofy  of  Poland  and  Ireland  hai  been  parallel  in  many  pamt>. 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  53 

The  Hapsburg  Empire,  with  its  medley  of  races, 
oottld  never  convert  itself  into  a  **  uninational "  state,  of 
the  type  to  which  nineteenth-century  Europe  was  con- 
fionmng :  its  true  policy  was  to  become  a  **  happy 
hmStf,**  in  which  various  nationalities  should  live  and 
let  live  side  by  sidt.  When  the  disasters  of  z866  forced 
internal  reconstruction  upon  the  government  at  Vienna^ 
it  miserably  failed,  on  the  whole,  to  realise  this  ideal :  ^ 
only  in  the  case  of  its  Polish  subjects  did  it  carry  its  new 
policy  to  completion*  In  1869  the  province  of  Galida, 
Austria's  share  in  the  Polish  spoils,  was  granted  a  fsu> 
reaching  measure  of  Home  Rtile,  and  Polish  was  declared 
the  normal  lat^fuage  of  its  administration  and  higher 
education* 

These  concessions*  have  made  the  Poles  the  most 
byal  citizens  of  the  Empire*  The  Polish  **  dub  **  or 
parliamentary  block  has  practically  become  the  **  govern- 
ment party  **  in  the  Austrian  Reichsrath,  on  which  the 
ministry  can  always  rely  for  the  voting  of  supplies  and 
die  passing  of  army  bills.  The  Austrian  Poles  have  not, 
of  course,  abandoned  the  dream  of  national  reunion, 
but  diey  have  learnt  to  seek  it  under  the  Hapsburg 
banner,  and  their  propaganda  in  the  Rtissian  provinces 
serves  Austrian  foreign  policy  at  least  as  much  as  the 
cause  of  Polish  nationalism*  When  the  Russians 
occupied  Galida  towards  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the 
Polish  population  rose  en  masse  against  the  invaders* 
Their  own  experience  will  never  commend  to  them  the 
diange  from  Austrian  to  Russian  allegiance*    The  only 

*  See  ch.  m. 

*  It  nmi  be  mcntioiied  that  this  recognition  of  the  Pdtah  language 
m  Galkta  Ut  not  only  Gennan,  which  was  fonnerly  the  univtnal 
taoguap  of  official  btaincs  in  the  province,  though  it  was  only  sp^en 
b^  an  magntficant  piopoction  of  the  population^  hut  also  the  Rudicac 
dalect  of  Ruanan,  the  native  speech  of  nearly  half  the  '  '  ' ' 
Set  Ch.  Vm*  C 


54  PRUSSIANISM 


£actor  that  may  modify  their  feeling  is  the  Polish  poliqr 
of  Austria's  German  ally* 

Prussia,  too,  found  her  interest  in  fomenting  the 
enmity  between  Russian  and  Pole,  but  since,  till  the 
last  generation  of  the  nineteenth-centiury,  she  was  still 
Austria's  rival  and  had  not  yet  become  her  ally,  she 
worked  for  the  same  object  by  supportix^  the  opposite 
party*  She  consistently  played  second  fiddle  to  Russia 
in  the  Polish  concert,  and  at  the  same  time  contrived 
to  call  the  tune*  Prussian  diplomacy  at  Petersbu^ 
thwarted  all  attempts  at  a  Russo-Polish  reconciliation, 
and  then  the  Prussian  military  authorities  lent  a  helpii^ 
hand  to  the  Russian  government  across  the  frontier  to 
suppress  those  insurrections  which  the  breakdown  of 
oondliadbn  had  stimulated*  By  their  machiavellian 
handling  of  the  Polish  situation,  the  Prussians  secured 
that  their  Russian  ne^bour  should  have  neither  the 
will  nor  the  power  to  menace  themselves* 

In  1879,  however,  the  German  Empire  transferred  its 
alliance  from  Russia  to  Austria,  and  the  counter-alliance 
between  Russia  and  France,  finally  consummated  in  the 
'nineties,  made  the  breach  irreparable*  Yet  while  she 
thus  reversed  her  foreign  policy,  Germany  entirely 
omitted  to  correct  her  behaviour  towards  the  Poles  at 
home,  so  as  to  bring  it  into  line  with  that  of  her  new 
Austrian  ally*  Instead,  she  succumbed  to  the  obsession 
of  nationalism,  and  began  to  chastise  her  Poles  with 
scorpions  instead  of  whips* 

In  z888  the  Prussian  parliament  established  an 
'^  Ansiedelungs-kommission  "  (Q>bnisation  Board)  for 
buying  up  the  land  of  Polish  proprietors  in  the  provinces 
of  Posen  and  West  Prussia  and  plantit^;  German  setders 
upon  it*  In  1908  the  Board  was  even  granted  powers 
of  compulsory  expropriation*    Since  1872  pressure  of 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  55 

the  most  eztxeme  kind^  has  been  exerted  to  make 
German  instead  of  Polish  the  medium  of  instruction, 
not  only  in  h^er  education,  but  in  the  local  elementary 
sdiools*  In  fact,  the  whole  Prussian  administrative 
machine  has  been  brought  to  bear  against  Polish 
nationality  within  the  German  Empire,  and  in  this  case 
its  efficiency  has  been  Germany^s  misfortune*  Russia's 
intentions  towards  the  Poles  may  have  been  equally 
amister,  but  she  lacked  the  means  to  carry  them  into 
effect,  and  national  sentiments  are  determined  less  by 
motives  than  by  results*  Germany  has  robbed  Russia 
of  the  premier  place  in  Poland's  hatred.  Her  Polish 
policy  since  1871  has  been  as  unintelligent  as  it  was 
astute  during  the  fifty  years  preceding*  She  has  called 
down  upon  her  head  the  enmity  of  both  Poles  and 
Russians  at  once* 

At  the  outbreak  of  war,  then,  the  Polish  national  con- 
sciousness hated  the  three  powers  in  the  following 
order  of  intensity:  Austria,  Russia,  Germany*  It 
remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  strong  preference  for 
Austria  over  Russia  will  be  outweighed  by  the  extreme 
detestation  of  Austria's  German  partner* 

Several  factors  make  it  probable  that  this  will  happen* 
Jn  the  first  place  there  are  the  events  of  the  war*  The 
war  has  already  made  it  patent  to  the  world  that 
Germany  is  the  dominant  partner  in  the  alliance,  and 
Austria  merely  her  tool*  If,  therefore,  the  Central- 
European  powers  win  the  war,  it  will  be  Germany's  and 
not  Austria's  policy  that  will  be  imposed  upon  Europe 
in  general  and  Pbland  in  particular*  Meanwhile,  the 
Germans  have  shown  beyond  all  doubt  what  that  policy 
win  be*  They  began,  of  course,  like  the  other  two 
powers,  by  proclaiming  the  tmity  and  autonomy  of  the 

^  Not  stopping  short  of  corporal  punishment* 


56  PRUSSIANISM 

Polish  nation ;  but  i^en  they  crossed  the  frontier  to 
make  their  word  good,  they  dealt  with  the  Polish  sub- 
jects of  Russia,  the  nation's  central  core,  not  as  friends 
to  be  liberated  but  as  a  hostile  poptdation  to  be  terrorised* 
The  treatment  of  the  frontier  town  of  Kalisch  was  on  a 
par  with  the  worst  incidents  in  Belgium*  Warsaw  has 
been  shuddering  ever  since  at  the  possibility  of  the  same 
fate  overtaking  her,  and  there  has  been  something  like 
a  national  rising  of  the  country  people  against  the  German 
troops  in  occupation.  Poles  and  Russians  seem  in 
process  of  being  fused  together  in  feeling  by  the  fire 
of  a  common  hate*  They  are  stimtdated  now  by  the 
instinct  to  defend  their  united  cotmtry  against  the 
invader,  but  when  the  Russian  armies  cross  the  frontier 
in  turn,  both  the  Polish  and  the  Russian  soldiers  that 
march  in  their  ranks  will  respond  alike  to  the  **  Panslav  " 
impulse  of  rescuing  the  Polish  minority  in  Prussia  &om 
the  jaws  of  Pangermanism* 

If,  then,  we  and  our  allies  are  victorious,  the  erection 
of  an  autonomous  Poland  within  the  Russian  Empire  is 
almost  assured,  and  it  will  include  not  only  the  former 
subjects  of  Russia  but  the  Polish  victims  of  Prussia  as 
well*  This  will  come  about  not  so  much  in  virtue  of 
the  Grand  Duke's  proclamation,  which  tmder  other 
circumstances  might  well  have  left  the  Poles  cold,  but 
becatise  Germany's  behaviour  has  put  the  Poles  in  a 
mood  to  respond  warmly  to  her  opponent's  overtures, 
and  to  compromise  with  Russia  in  a  spirit  of  **  give  and 
take*"  The  chief  obstacle  to  an  entente  between  Poles 
and  Russians  was  the  memory  of  wrongs  inflicted  by 
Russia  in  the  past*  These  memories  will  be  eclipsed 
efifectively  by  the  direct  action  of  Germany  in  the 
present* 

There  is  also  the  permanent  factor  of  Geography. 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  57 

The  Russian  provinces  by  their  central  position  and  their 
great  superiority  in  eactent  to  the  Prussian  and  Austrian 
fragments,  are  die  necessary  nucleus  of  a  united  natioiial 
state.  The  same  cause  that  made  the  Poles  single  out 
Russia  for  attack  when  they  hoped  to  restore  their  nation 
to  complete  independence,  will  make  them  rally  rotmd 
Russia  now  that  they  have  accepted  the  principle  of 
autonomy  within  a  larger  Empire*  The  victory  of  our 
enemies  would  certainly  ensure  to  the  Austrian  section 
of  the  nation  the  hberties  it  already  enjoys ;  but  in 
promoting  such  an  issue,  the  Galidan  Poles  would  be 
sacrificing  the  one  chance  of  national  tmity  to  the 
preservation  of  their  local  Home  Rule* 

In  making  her  bargain  with  the  Poles,  Russia  has  the 
supreme  advantage  of  being  one  and  indivisible,  while 
on  the  other  side  there  are  the  ambitions  of  two  parties 
to  be  satisfied*  Whatever  their  professions,  or  even 
their  wishes,  Germany  and  Austria  cotdd  never  arrange 
between  them  the  erection  of  a  tmited  Poland* 

The  retmion  of  the  whole  nation  within  the  frontier  of 
either  one  or  the  other  is  clearly  out  of  the  question,  for 
neither  would  surrender  its  own  Polish  provinces  to  its 
ne^^ibour*  A  second  possibility  wotdd  be  the  creation 
of  an  autonomous  Poland  under  their  joint  protectorate, 
to  which  they  shotdd  cede  their  respective  Polish  terri- 
tories* But  though  the  Galidan  Poles  are  perhaps  a 
strong  enough  power  in  Austria  to  compel  assent  to  their 
secfssion  into  the  new  national  state,  it  is  hardly  con- 
ceivable that  Prussia  would  of  her  own  free  will  relax 
her  grip  upon  her  Polish  districts*  The  German  and 
Mish  poptUations  on  her  Eastern  frontier  are  desperately 
intemiingled,  and  she  still  hopes  to  simplify  the  tangle 
by  the  forcible  Germanisation  of  the  aliens*  Moreover, 
modi  of  the  country  in  question  is  important,  to  her 


58  PRUSSIANISM 

strategically*  A  Poland  manufactured  under  Austio- 
German  auspices  would  therefore  be  robbed  from  the 
outset  of  at  least  three  million  of  its  citizens,  no  less  than 
17  per  cent*  of  the  whole  nation ;  and  it  is  further  pro- 
bable that  the  government  at  Vienna,  in  order  to  maintain 
the  balance  of  power  between  itself  and  its  ally,  would 
insist  upon  following  Prussia's  example,  and  success- 
fully oppose  the  transference  of  the  Galidan  Poles 
from  their  Austrian  allegiance  to  the  autonomous 
principality* 

In  the  event  of  Austro-German  victory,  therefore,  the 
promises  of  national  restoration  would  result  in  nothing 
but  the  grant  of  autonomy  to  the  present  Russian 
provinces,  which  include  no  more  than  three-fifths  of  the 
total  Polish  population*  The  new  Poland  would  start 
life  a  cripple,  and  even  this  maimed  esdstence  would 
probably  be  short,  for  the  situation  thus  created  could 
hardly  be  permanent.  The  emergence  of  a  self- 
governing  Polish  state  in  their  immediate  neighbourhood 
would  rouse  the  nationalism  of  the  Prussian  and  Austrian 
Poles  to  fever  heat.  They  would  be  obsessed  by  resent- 
ment at  their  arbitrary  exclusion  from  it,  and  the 
autonomous  principality,  in  turn,  could  not  ren:iain  in- 
different to  their  struggles.  Gratitude  towards  Austria 
and  Germany,  its  Uberators  from  Russian  rule  and  its 
official  guarantors  against  the  reimposition  of  it,  would 
be  eclipsed  by  indignation  at  these  patrons'  flagrantly 
inconsistent  treatment  of  its  brethren  within  their  own 
borders.  The  national  government  at  Warsaw  would 
begin  to  bargain,  behind  its  '"  protectors'  "  backs,  with 
defeated  and  chastened  Russia  for  a  genuine  reunion  of 
the  whole  nation  tmder  Russia's  banner.  Berlin  and 
Vienna  would  get  wind  of  the  danger  in  time,  and  they 
would  forestall  it  by  partitioning  the  principality  itself 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  59 

and  adding  its  dismembered  fragments  to  their  subject 
provinces*^ 

Thus  the  failure  to  achieve  national  unity  now  would 
after  all  compromise  the  local  liberty  of  the  Galidan 
Poles  in  the  future*  Atistria^s  Polish  policy  would  be 
degraded  to  the  Prussian  standard,  not  merely  in  her 
dealings  with  the  Poles  formerly  subject  to  Russia,  but 
m  her  relations  with  her  own  Polish  citizens*  The  ideal 
of  Polish  nationality  would  be  shattered  more  cruelly 
than  it  has  ever  been  since  the  black  decade  that  foUowed 
the  Partition  of  1795,  and  this  time  it  could  hardly  hope 
to  recover* 

On  the  other  hand,  the  victory  of  Russia  achieved 
widi  die  Pbles'  co-operation,  wotild  restore  liberty  and 
unity  at  once  to  all  the  Russian  and  Prussian  districts,' 
and  when  such  a  lai^e  majority  of  the  nation  had  been 
consolidated  into  a  self--goveming  state,  the  reluctance 
of  the  Galidan  minority  to  commit  itself  could  be 
removed  by  a  guarantee  that  it  should  forfeit  none  of  its 
constitutional  liberties*  It  would  then  succumb  to  the 
attraction  of  the  greater  mass,  and  fall  away  from  Vieima, 
with  which  it  has  no  latent  cohesion,  to  the  national 
centre  of  gravity  at  Warsaw* 

The  positive  terms  on  which  the  new  Poland  will  be 
incorporated  in  the  Russian  Empire,  must  be  the  sub- 
ject of  a  later  chapter*'  For  the  moment  we  may  be 
content  with  reaching  the  negative  conclusion  that,  if 
Germany  is  beaten  in  the  war,  her  Polish  subjects  will 

*  The  dfviwMi  of  spofls  would  probably  follow  the  precedent  of  1705, 
whea  Poland  was  triatd,  for  ten  years,  from  the  map  of  Europe.  Tbt 
Attitro-Pnissian  frontier  then  delimited  ran  diagonally  across  Poland 
from  Soutb-West  to  North-East,  following  the  course  of  the  River 
Pilfta^  and  reducing  Warsaw,  the  national  capital,  to  the  pontion  of  a 
Fkmsian  frontier  town* 


'  A  tefritocy  roughly  cotnddent  with  Napoleon's  **  Grand  Duchy  of 
it  eiisted  r 


Wanaw,**  as  it  eiisted  from  1809  to  1813. 
>  See  Ch.  VIII.  A. 


6o  PRUSSIANISM 

vote  to  a  man  for  k'beration  from  her  dominion,  and  will 
carry  the  Austrian  Poles  with  them*  It  is  one  of  the 
ironies  of  history  that  Gahda,  the  best  governed  pro- 
vince of  Austria,  should  also  be  the  province  whose  loss, 
in  the  event  of  defeat,  we  can  most  confidently  predict* 
Austria  will  lose  the  reward  for  her  righteousness  in 
Galida,  in  retribution  for  her  ally's  sins  in  Posen  and 
West  Prussia* 

The  exasperation  of  national  feeling  on  this  Eastern 
frontier  makes  it  considerably  easier  to  ascertain  the  will 
of  the  populations  concerned  than  on  the  frontiers 
towards  Denmark  and  France*  We  can  assume,  before 
any  plebiscite  is  taken,  that  every  Pole  desires  secession 
from  Germany,  and  we  must  also  keep  it  clearly  before 
our  minds  that  every  German  in  the  disputed  zone  will 
be  still  more  eager  to  remain  a  citizen  of  the  German 
fatherland* 

In  seeking  to  compromise  between  the  wishes  of  the 
German  and  Polish  inhabitants  of  these  districts,  we 
must  not  let  ourselves  be  prejudiced  by  the  atrocious 
policy  of  the  Prussian  government*  A  government's 
actions  are  no  certain  test  of  a  nation's  fundamental 
character:  political  systems  come  and  go,  and  their 
ideals  pass  with  them,  while  the  nation's  growth  main- 
tains its  even  course*  Let  us  foi^et,  for  the  moment, 
how  the  Prussian  administration  has  treated  the  Poles, 
and  refrain  from  conjecturing  how  a  nationalist  Polish 
regime  might  treat  any  German  subjects  it  acquired, 
but  compare  with  open  minds  the  relative  culture  of  the 
individual  German  and  Pole*  We  shall  probably  receive 
the  impression  that  the  German  would  suffer  greater  dis- 
advantage by  being  annexed  to  a  community  of  Poles, 
whose  standards  wotild  be  lower  than  his  own,  than  the 
Pole  wotild  suffer  by  enrohnent  as  a  German  dtizent 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  6i 

wlitdi  would  be  a  kind  of  compulsory  initiation  into  a 
superior  civilisation* 

Of  course  compulsory  conformity  to  an  alien  system 
of  life,  even  if  the  compulsion  does  not  extend  beyond 
the  sphere  of  politics,  is  almost  equally  distasteful, 
whether  the  people  whose  citizenship  you  have  been 
forced  to  adopt  are  relatively  more  advanced  than  your- 
self or  more  backward ;  but  in  the  present  instance  we 
are  in  face  of  the  situation  that  so  commonly  arises  in 
questions  of  nationality :  a  minority  must  inevitably 
suffer* 

The  German  and  Polish  poptdations  along  this  frontier 
are  intricately  interlaced*  This  is  not  due  to  the 
modem  activities  of  the  **  Q>lonisation  Board "" :  their 
result  has  been  the  stimulation  of  national  feeling,  not 
the  modification  of  national  distribution*^  The  racial 
confusion  is  the  gradual  effect  of  four  centuries,  the 
twelfdi  to  the  sixteenth,  during  which  the  superiority 
of  German  culture  over  Polish  was  so  marked  that 
German  speech  and  nationality  were  continuously  push- 
ing out  their  advance-guards  Eastward  at  the  Poles' 
txpense,  less  by  violent  conquest  than  by  **  peaceful 
penetration ''  at  the  summons  of  native  Polish  rulers* 
This  movement  died  down  as  soon  as  the  Poles  began 
to  overtake  in  civilisation  their  German  teachers,*  and 

X  Dimng  the  genentioo  stnoe  the  Board's  institution,  the  percental^ 
ol  the  peculation  in  Prussian  provinces  containing  both  nationalities 
have  persistently  shifted  in  favour  of  the  Poles.  Ine  Poles'  birthrate 
is  much  httjier  than  the  Germans',  and  this  gives  diem  a  greater  share 
in  the  tDtafannnal  increase.  A  higher  birthrate  is,  of  course,  vympto- 
mafic  of  a  lower  standard  of  life  :  ma  sense  the  Germans  are  su£Fering 
for  their  superior  civilisation,  and  this  eicplains  why  they  tolerate  ^ 
bttiMfous  methods  by  which  the  Prussian  government  attempts  to 
riglit  the  balance* 

*Li  the  sixteentfa  century  the  Polish  nobility  was  converted  to 
Calvudsni,  and  took  a  leadmg  part  in  the  cultural  development  of 
Enrope.  In  the  next  century  the  Polish  renaissance  was  submerged 
by  the  Counter^Refbrmation* 


62  PRUSSIANISM 

the  **  Q>bnisation  ^'  policy  is  an  unjustifiable  and  im- 
practicable attempt  to  set  it  going  again  by  force ;  but 
by  whatever  process  the  various  German  enclaves  have 
come  to  be  established  on  what  was  originally  Polish  soil, 
their  sole  but  sufficient  tide  is  their  actual  presence  there 
now.  In  dealing  with  these  awkward  German  minorities 
we  must  eschew  all  historical  arguments,  and  simply 
start  from  the  fact  of  their  present  existence* 

Besides  the  intermixture  of  the  two  nationalities,  there 
is  a  further  factor  which  limits  the  possibility  of  recti- 
fying the  Eastern  frontier  of  Germany  in  accordance 
with  the  wishes  of  the  local  population  in  the  various 
districts  affected* 

Our  object  in  changing  the  poUtical  map  is  to  sift  out 
as  large  a  proportion  of  the  Polish  element  as  we  can 
from  the  German,  and  free  them  from  their  present 
compulsory  association*  If  the  hberated  territories  were 
destined  to  be  incorporated  in  an  entirely  independent 
Polish  state,  we  cotdd  pursue  this  object  without  any 
secondary  considerations,  but  we  have  seen  that  the 
Prussian  Poles  will  break  their  association  with  Germany 
only  to  effect  a  new  association  with  Russia.  We  have 
still  to  examine  what  form  this  partnership  is  likely  to 
take,  but  we  can  prophesy  this  much  with  certainty,  that 
the  New  Poland  and  Russia  will  have  a  common  tariff- 
system  and  a  common  military  o^anisation :  in  the 
economic  and  the  strategical  sphere,  the  Western  frontier 
of  autonomous  Poland  will  be  identical  with  the  Western 
frontier  of  the  whole  Russian  Empire* 

No  setdement  would  be  permanent  which  left  Geiy 
many's  Eastern  flank  strategically  and  economically  at 
Russia's  mercy*  Frontier-lines  must  be  drawn  so  as 
to  enable  the  ootmtries  divided  by  them  severally  to 
lead  an  independent  and  self-sufficient  life  of  their  own* 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  63 

This  is  the  first  condition  they  must  satisfy  if  they  are 
to  have  any  significance  at  all,  and  an  essential  part  of 
**  Independence  "'  is  the  capacity  for  resisting  by  force 
of  anas  an  armed  attack  on  the  part  of  the  neighbour- 
ing state* 

This  fact  is  unquestionably  true  at  the  present  time  in 
Eampe,  and  our  reconstruction  after  the  war  is  over 
mH  be  Utopian  if  we  ignore  it*  We  are  all  hopiag  that 
revulsion  fiom  war  will  lead  to  disarmament,  and  that 
die  military  factor  will  cease  to  play  in  the  international 
politics  of  the  future  the  terribly  dominant  part  which 
it  has  played  in  the  past ;  we  are  all  agreed  that  the  posi- 
tive impulse  to  disarm  can  come  from  no  calculation  of 
material  advantage,  but  only  from  a  change  of  heart ; 
but  we  must  recognise  that  this  psychobgical  conversion 
will  not  be  produced  automatically  by  shutting  otur 
eyes  to  the  difficulties  in  its  way*  We  must  at  least 
facilitate  it  by  securing  that  it  involves  no  material 
sacrifices  of  prohibitive  magnitude* 

We  saw  that  we  could  banish  the  struggle  for  existence 
between  nationalities  only  by  solving  national  problems 
and  not  by  neglecting  them.  This  principle  applies  to 
the  crudest  form  of  the  struggle,  its  conduct  by  the  brute 
violence  of  war*  Nations  will  have  no  ear  for  the 
gospel  of  Peace,  so  bng  as  they  feel  themselves  exposed 
to  each  odier's  arms*  The  present  war  was  precipitated 
when  several  nations  reached  breaking-point  in  a  long- 
diawn  agony  of  mutual  fear*  We  shall  not  cure  them  of 
mtlitaiism  by  placing  them  at  each  other's  mercy  more 
completely  than  ever*  War  will  only  become  impossible 
when  either  party's  ftontier  has  been  made  so  invul- 
nerable that  the  other  abandons  all  idea  of  violating  it* 
U  die  firontiers  of  Be^tmi  against  Germany  and  France 
had  been  as  invindbly  fortified  as  the  Franco-German 

c 


64  PRUSSIANISM 

frontier  itself  is  fortified  on  either  side,  there  would  have 
been  no  campaign  in  the  West* 

{In  delimiting,  therefore,  our  new  frontier  between 
Germany  and  the  Russian  Empire,  we  must  escpose 
neither  country  to  the  other's  strategic  initiative  (other- 
wise we  shall  only  accentuate  their  fears,  and  open  a 
new  era  of  war  between  them,  instead  of  dosing  the  era 
that  is  past),  and  here  we  are  confronted  with  a  dilenuna, 
for  the  existing  frontier,  though  it  grievously  violates 
the  national  principle,  was  negotiated  with  the  precise 
intention  of  producing  a  true  strategic  equilibrium* 

This  frontier  dates  from  the  Q>ngress  of  Vienna, 
which  resettled  Europe  in  1814  after  the  overthrow  of 
Napoleon*  One  of  the  main  lines  of  settlement,  upon 
which  all  were  agreed,  was  that  Prussia  should  take  her 
share  of  the  spoils  in  Western  Germany,  while  Russia 
should  be  paid  off  with  those  Polish  provinces  which  had 
been  seized  by  Prussia  and  Austria  in  the  last  partitions,^ 
and  subsequendy  erected  by  Napoleon  into  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Warsaw*  Prussia  stipulated,  however,  that 
this  principle  should  not  apply  to  the  districts  of  Kulmer- 
land  *  and  Posen,  and  insisted  upon  their  inclusion  within 
her  own  frontier*  She  gained  her  point,  because  it  was 
universally  recognised  that  her  demands  in  this  quarter 
were  bas^  on  considerations  of  strategical  necessity, 
and  were  not  prompted  by  territorial  ambition* 

The  present  frontier,  dien,  was  admitted  in  1814  to 
be  the  minimum  line  which  Prussia  could  defend  success* 
fully  against  Russian  attack*  We  now  propose  to  push 
this  line  still  further  back  towards  Breslau  and  Berlin  in 
deference  to  the  principle  of  Nationality,  but  we  must 

*  179^  and  1795. 

'Situated  on  the  Right  bank  of  the  Vistula^  and  containing  the 
fortresses  Graudenz  and  Thorn* 


THE  POLISH  FRONTffiR  65 

not  allow  our  insistence  upon  true  national  frontiers  to 
Uind  us  to  the  strategic  factor*  Our  final  result  must 
be  a  compromise  between  the  two  principles,  and  before 
we  put  the  question  of  national  allegiance  to  the  vote 
amoi^  the  inhabitants  of  the  debatable  zont,  we  shall 
have^  like  the  diplomatists  of  1814,  to  lay  down  a  limit 
behind  which  the  German  frontier  must  not  be  driven, 
even  thot^  it  may  deprive  considerable  enclaves  of 
Polish  popubtion  lying  within  it  of  the  right  to  choose 
for  themselves  their  own  political  destiny* 

This  limit  imposed  upon  the  new  frontier  will 
seriously  restrict  the  range  of  the  Polish  plebiscite. 
Theoretically  the  vote  might  still  be  taken  in  the  strip  of 
territory  between  the  German  minimum  and  the  present 
fitontier-line ;  but  in  practice  there  would  be  a  one-sided- 
ness  about  such  an  arrangement  against  which  the 
victorious  Poles  and  Russians  would  energetically 
protest.  A  minimum  has  always  a  strong  tendency  to 
become  a  maximum  as  well,  and  our  allies  will  probably 
accept  the  principle  of  the  minimtun  line  only  on  con- 
dition that  Germans  on  the  wrong  side  of  it  shall  sufiFer 
the  same  toss  of  free  choice  that  the  Poles  must  sufiFer 
who  are  left  on  the  opposite  side. 

In  this  case  the  situation  would  be  exactly  opposite  to 
that  on  the  Franco-German  border.  There  the  tracing 
of  boundaries  by  the  parties  to  the  conference  will  be 
simply  a  preliminary  step  towards  constituting  the  local 
population  into  groups,  and  the  free  vote  of  these  groups 
wiU  then  decide  the  fate  of  their  respective  districts* 
In  Poland,  on  the  contrary,  the  plebiscite  would  be 
eliminated  altogether,  and  the  new  frontier  definitively 
constituted  by  negotiations  between  plenipotentiaries 
of  Germany  on  the  one  side  and  Poland  and  Russia  on 
the  other. 


66  PRUSSIANISM 

The  actual  ootsrse  the  new  line  will  follow  must 
depend  lately  upon  the  bargaining-power  possessed  at 
the  close  of  the  war  by  the  two  parties,  and  is  to  that 
extent  unpredictable,  but  the  transaction  will  not  be 
conducted  by  Germany  and  Russia  alone.  All  members 
of  the  Congress  will  take  a  hand  in  it,  and  Great 
Britain^s  influence  as  a  mediator  will  be  especially 
valuable  in  this  question,  because  she  has  absolutely  no 
direct  interest  in  the  issue*  It  is  incumbent  upon  us, 
therefore,  to  work  out  for  otirselves  a  compromise  vfbich 
we  can  recommend,  independendy  of  bargaining  power, 
as  the  best  possible  under  the  permanent  geographical 
and  racial  circumstances,  and  we  had  better  frame 
suggestions  for  a  new  frontier  in  some  detail. 

Our  discussion  will  be  clearer  if  we  treat  the  extensive 
line  from  the  Carpathians  to  the  Baltic  in  several 
sections.^    We  will  begin  with  Silesia* 

(a)  The  province  of  Silesia  occupies  the  whole  upper 
basin  of  the  River  Oder*  It  forms  a  portion  of  the  great 
North-European  plain,  and  its  only  physical  frontiers 
are  the  Riesen  Gebirge  Range  on  the  Soudi-West,  which 
lies  between  it  and  Bohemia,  and  the  Carpathian  Moun- 
tains on  the  South,  which  divide  it  from  Hungary*  The 
country  possesses  two  chief  lines  of  communication  with 
the  rest  of  the  world :  North-Westward,  the  Oder 
descends  to  the  port  of  Stetdn  at  the  head  of  a  land- 
locked arm  of  the  Baltic,  the  ''  Haff '' :  S.S.W.,  die 
great  Moravian  Gap  between  the  Riesen  Gebiige  and 
the  Carpathians  opens  a  route  to  the  Danube  basin 
which  is  traversed  by  several  lines  of  railway  leading 
to  Vienna* 

These  geographical  factors  have  determined  Silesian 
history*    Silesia  was  occupied  about  600  a*d*  by  the 

>  See  Map  IL  for  all  aections* 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  67 

Polish  wing  of  the  Sbvonic  migration  from  the  East, 
which  found  no  obstacle  to  its  progress  across  the  plain 
till  it  struck  against  the  mountains  on  the  further  side, 
but  five  centuries  later  ^  the  province  detached  itself 
£n>m  the  main  body  of  Poland,  and  ttuned  its  face  in 
the  opposite  direction* 

The  native  princes  were  converted  to  German  culture, 
and  invited  German  settlers  from  the  Saxon  marches  to 
ascend  the  vaUey  of  the  Oder,  just  as  the  Gaelic  kings 
of  Scotland  introduced  Teutonic  **  Lowlanders  ^^  from 
across  the  Firth  of  Forth  into  the  long  coastal  strip  from 
Fife  to  Aberdeen*  By  the  end  of  the  thirteenth  century 
Sksia,  like  Bohemia,  had  been  drawn  entirely  within  . 
the  orbit  of  Germany,  and  after  the  Thirty  Years^  War 
the  two  countries  remained  together  under  the  sceptre  of 
the  Hapsbturgs,  who  could  easily  control  Silesia  from 
Vienna  through  the  Moravian  Gap*  The  Hapsburg^s 
ritle  to  the  province  was  challenged  by  the  government 
at  Berlin,  wliich  ruled  the  lower  course  of  the  Oder  and 
so  commanded  Silesia^s  North-Westem  door*  Exactly 
a  century  after  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  the  Treaty  of 
Aachen  *  settled  the  destitiy  of  the  province  in  Prussians 
favour  by  a  partition,  whidi  left  nothing  to  Austria  but 
the  Southernmost  strip*  The  frontier  then  delimited 
between  Prussia  and  Austria  has  never  since  been  altered* 

The  Industrial  Revolution  has  made  Silesia  one  of 
the  most  important  districts  in  Europe*  The  Eras 
Gehirge  is  rich  in  mineral  ores,  and  there  are  immense 
coal-seams  in  the  plain.  These  assets  have  enabled 
her  to  devetop  great  manufacturing  activities,  and  the 
new  economics  have  further  emphasised  her  essential 
geographical  unity  *  The  industrial  area  extends  imparti- 

*  XZfo  A«I>. 

*  Z748,  at  the  ooaduaioa  of  the  *'  Austrian  Suooessjon  **  War. 


68  PRUSSIANISM 

ally  on  either  side  of  the  Austro-Prusstan  frontier,  while 
the  focus  of  the  ooal-district  ^  lies  just  within  the  Prussian 
frontier  against  Russia,  near  the  point  where  the  German, 
Austrian  and  Russian  Empires  meet,  and  is  continuous 
with  the  mining  districts  of  Russian  Poland,  from  which 
it  is  only  separated  by  an  artificial  boundary* 

The  existing  frontiers,  then,  do  not  eiq>ress  economic 
articulation,  but  they  correspond  still  less  to  the  bound- 
aries of  Nationality*  The  German  colonisation  up  the 
Oder  never  reached  the  head-waters  of  the  river*  Up  to 
a  point  between  Brieg  and  Oppeln,  slighdy  above  the 
confluence  of  the  Neisse  tributary,  the  Oder  is  flanked  by 
a  German  poptdation  on  either  side ;  but  above  that 
point,  though  along  the  motmtains  the  German  element 
stretches  still  further  South,  and  even  spreads  into  the 
Moravian  Gap  as  far  as  the  water-partii^  between  die 
Oder  and  Visttda  systems,  the  native  Pole  has  main- 
tained himself  astride  the  actual  course  of  the  Oder,  and 
is  in  occupation  of  the  river's  Left  bank  as  well  as  its 
Right*  Above  Ratilx>r,  again,  along  the  highest  reaches 
of  the  Oder,  the  Pole  is  repbced  by  the  Tchech*  We 
have  to  devise  a  new  frontier  which  shall  do  more  justice 
than  the  present  to  national  distribution,  without  running 
violendy  counter  to  economic  facts* 

The  Western  frontier  of  the  Russian  Empire  and  the 
New  Poland,  or  in  other  terms  the  Eastern  frontier  of 
Austria  and  Germany,  might  start  from  the  Hungarian 
boundary  on  the  summit  of  the  Carpathians,  at  a  point 
just  East  of  the  pass  through  which  the  railway  connects 
Sillein  (Zsolna)  in  Hungary  with  Teschen  in  Austrian 
Silesia  and  thereafter  with  Ratibor  in  Prussian  Silesia  on 


^The    towns    of    Gleiwitz»    Beutfaen,   Kftnigshiitte, 
Myslowitz  form  one  practically  continuous  urban  zone  skirting  the 
frontier* 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  69 

the  Left  hank  of  the  Oder*  From  this  starting-point  it 
might  run  parallel  to  the  railway,  along  the  divide 
between  the  Oder  and  Vistula  systems,  and  continue 
in  a  N.N«W.  direction  till  it  struck  the  Oder's  Right 
bank  a  few  miles  below  Ratibor*  It  might  thence  follow 
the  Oder  downwards  to  a  point  opposite  the  jtmction 
of  the  H5tzenpl5tz  tributary  from  the  Left  bank,  and 
dien  take  a  straight  line,  slightly  East  of  North,  to  the 
Southernmost  point  in  the  province  of  Posen. 

This  frontier  would  exclude  from  the  new  Poland  the 
Polish  popubtion  on  the  Left  bank  of  the  Oder,  but  even 
akmg  this  section  of  the  Oder's  course  it  is  only  the  rural 
population  that  is  PoUsh  :  the  towns  on  the  river-bank 
— Oppeln,  Kosel,  and  Ratibor — are  predominantly 
German.  If,  moreover,  we  allowed  Russia  to  cross  the 
Oder,  and  extend  the  frontier  of  her  Empire  right  up 
to  the  Erz  Gebii^e,  we  should  be  transferring  to  her 
die  strategical  command  of  the  Moravian  Gap,  placing 
Vienna  at  her  mercy,  and  cutting  the  direct  communica- 
tion.  East  of  the  mountains,  between  the  Prussian  and 
Austrian  sections  of  Silesia. 

We  are  proposing,  on  the  other  hand,  to  include  in 
'Polmd  the  extremely  important  mining-district  of  the 
^  Five  Towns/'  Germany  will  doubtless  protest  against 
this,  on  account  of  the  considerable  German  population 
that  has  been  attracted  to  this  area  by  the  openings  it 
o£Ens  for  all  kinds  of  employment ;  but  we  can  fairly 
write  off  this  German  minority  abandoned  to  Poland 
against  the  Poles  across  the  Oder  whom  we  have  assigned 
to  Germany.  Moi^ver,  the  German  element  here  is 
not  merely  a  minority,  but  actually  a  small  and  a  decreas- 
ing one.  The  mass  of  the  miners  and  workers  is 
recruited  from  the  PoUsh  countryside,  and  the  growth 
of  the  PoUsh  majority  has  already  made  itself  felt  in 


TO  PRUSSIANISM 

politics.  In  spite  of  official  pressure  exercised  upon 
elections,  the  **  Five  Towns  **  now  return  Polish 
Nationalist  representatives  to  the  Prussian  Landts^  and 
the  Imperial  Reichsts^* 

The  economic  issue  raised  by  the  transference  of  this 
district  to  Poland  is  not  so  simple  as  the  national.  By 
driving  a  political  frontier  between  these  coal*mines  in 
the  comer  of  Silesia  and  the  industrial  towns  further 
North-West,  which  at  present  consume  their  output, 
shall  we  be  ruining  the  prosperity  of  both  i  We  may 
answer  that  a  political  frontier  need  not  imply  an  insur- 
mountable tarifif-wall,  yet  if  such  a  fiscal  barrier  were 
to  be  erected  in  this  instance,  all  parts  of  Silesia  would 
certainly  sufiFer  economically  for  the  adjustment  of  the 
country's  national  problem.  Even  in  the  latter  case, 
however,  the  dislocation  would  only  be  temporary. 
There  are  coal-seams  in  the  German  portion  of  Silesia, 
round  Breslau,  which  could  be  developed  to  supply  in 
sufficiency  that  region's  industrial  demand.  This  would 
of  course  deprive  the  **  Five  Towns ''  of  their  current 
market,  but  they  would  rapidly  find  a  new  market 
towards  the  East.  A  considerable  manufacturing 
industry  has  already  grown  up  in  Russian  Poland,  notably 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Lodz.  It  is  capable  of  almost 
limitless  expansion,  because  the  huge  agricultural  and 
pastoral  hinterland  of  Russia  is  its  potential  customer. 
If  the  produce  of  the  frontier  coal-fields  were  diverted 
from  German  Silesia  hither,  the  expansion  of  Polish 
manufacture  would  receive  an  immense  impetus,  and 
would  more  than  keep  pace  in  its  demand  for  coal  with 
the  output  the  **  Five  Towns  *'  offered  it. 

The  frontier-line,  then,  which  we  have  suggested  in 
the  Silesian  section,  seems  to  stand  the  economic  as  well 
as  the  nationalistic  test.  We  may  now  turn  our  atten-* 
tion  to  the  section  that  follows. 


THE  POLISH  FRONTffiR  71 

(6)  The  pfovinoe  of  Pbsen  is  shaped  like  a  flint  arrow- 
head, with  its  wings  resting  on  the  present  Russian 
frontier,  and  its  point  directed  inwards  straight  towards 
Berlin*  Strategically,  as  we  have  seen,  its  control  is 
vitally  important  to  Germany  for  her  security.  A 
foreign  power  established  in  military  possession  of  Posen 
City  could,  from  this  fortified  base,  strike  South-West- 
ward towards  Glogau  on  the  Oder,  and  cut  the  con- 
nectbns  between  Silesia  and  Berlin ;  or  it  could  strike 
North-Eastward  towards  Danzig  on  the  Baltic,  and 
oobte  from  the  rest  of  Germany  the  provinces  East  of 
the  Vistula.  If  the  Russian  General  Staff  were  given  a 
fitee  hand  in  Posen,  Germany  would  virtually  cease  to 
be  an  independent  power* 

In  Naticmality,  on  the  other  hand,  Posen  is  predomin* 
astly  Polish.^  It  is  a  wedge  of  alien  population  driven 
deep  into  the  German  mass,  and  the  consuierable 
German  minority  is  mosdy  concentrated  on  the  Northern 
boaadary,  along  the  River  Netze.  Isolated  German 
enclaves,  however,  are  scattered  over  the  whole  area  of 
the  piDvmce. 

These  advance-guards  are  not  the  fruit  of  the 
**  Cokmisation  Board's  **  plantations,  which  have  hardly 
succeeded  in  affecting  the  racial  map :  like  their  com- 
patriots in  Silesia,  they  are  descended  from  German 
burghers  summoned  by  the  native  government  in  the 
Middle  Ages  to  civilise  the  cotmtry.  Their  history, 
therefore,  is  above  reproach,  and  even  had  the  tide  of 
the  original  setders  been  doubtful,  that  would  not  have 
warranted  us  in  treating  the  present  generation  with 
kss  than  justice. 

Neverdieless,  in  so  far  as  the  destiny  of  Posen  is  to 

'   ^  "Hie  populatioii  of  the  provuice  totalled  x,987/x)o  in  1905 :   the 
Midi  demett  mimbered  over  a  miUkMu 


72  PRUSSIANISM 

be  determined  by  the  national  factor,  this  dispersed 
minority  of  Germans  is  not  sufficiently  stroi^  to  retain 
fDr  Germany  any  part  of  the  province  but  its  Northern 
fringe,  and  we  find  ourselves  placed  in  a  dilemma*  If 
we  give  precedence  to  Nationality,  almost  the  whole  of 
Posen  shotild  be  ceded  to  the  New  IV>land :  if  to 
Strategy,  then  no  portion  of  the  cotmtry  should  be 
detached  from  its  present  connections. 

There  seems  to  be  only  one  possible  solution  of  the 
difficttlty*  The  overwhelmingly  Pblish  districts  must 
be  incorporated  in  the  Autonomous  Principality,  and 
this  means  that  they  will  come  within  the  bond  of  the 
Rtissian  Empire ;  but  Russia  in  return  must  allow  the 
fortifications  of  Pbsen  City  to  be  dismantled,  and  must 
undertake  not  to  push  forward  her  military  line  into  the 
new  territory,  but  to  keep  it  within  the  limits  of  the 
present  frontier. 

Military  conventions  of  this  kind,  which  have  no  sanc- 
tion behind  them  but  the  good  faith  of  the  contracting 
parties,  are  best  secured  by  being  made  reciprocal,  and 
the  question  of  Posen  might  give  occasion  for  a  compact 
between  the  Russian  Empire  and  Germany  of  a  much 
wider  range.  Russia  on  her  side  might  promise  to  con-* 
struct  no  military  works  in  any  of  the  territories  she  may 
acquire  from  Germany  along  the  whole  line  from  the 
upper  Oder  to  the  Baltic :  Germany  might  demolish,  tn 
compensation,  all  fortifications  in  her  provinces  East  of 
the  Vistula,  and  withdraw  her  strategical  front  to  the 
line  of  the  Vistulan  fortresses. 

Such  an  anangement  would  greatly  diminish  the 
extent  to  which  each  country  was  e3q)osed  to  an  2ggctsr 
sive  movement  on  the  part  of  the  other.  Of  course  it 
would  be  in  the  power  of  either  to  break  its  word  at  any 
moment,  and  fortify  the  neutralised  territory  within  its 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  73 

own  frontier,  and  this  wotild  give  it  a  momentary 
strategical  advantage  over  its  more  honourable  neigh- 
bour; but  fiortifications  cannot  be  built  in  a  day,  and  the 
other  would  immediately  retaliate  by  doing  the  same  in 
its  own  neutralised  area.  If,  as  we  have  suggested,  fear 
is  a  more  potent  stimulus  of  armaments  than  ambition,  a 
General  Staff  would  be  very  reluctant  to  increase  their 
power  of  offensive  against  the  rival  nation,  if  they  knew 
diat  the  inevitable  price  would  be  similar  action  on  the 
other's  part,  which  would  correspondingly  diminish  their 
own  power  of  defence*  A  compact,  therefore,  which 
strengthens  the  defensive  capacity  of  both  parties,  has 
the  greatest  possible  chance  of  stability* 

If  such  a  compromise  could  be  effected,  the  new 
frontier  might  run  from  the  Southernmost  comer  of 
Posen  along  the  whole  Western  boundary  of  the  pro- 
vince, to  the  point  where  that  boundary  hits  the  River 
Warta.  After  crossing  the  river,  the  frontier  should 
dumge  direction  abruptly  to  slighdy  North  of  East,  and 
take  a  course  midway  between  the  Warta  and  the  Netze, 
contintiing  in  the  same  line  till  it  struck  the  Vistula 
between  Bromberg  and  Thorn.  Tins  would  leave 
within  German  territory  the  whole  course  of  the  River 
Netze,  and  also  the  amal  which  links  the  Netze  and 
Vistula  systems  through  Bromberg,  and  is  one  of  the 
principal  inland  waterways  of  Prussia. 

(c)  The  lower  course  of  the  Vistula,  from  a  point  just 
above  Thorn  to  its  mouth,  runs  through  the  German 
province  of  West  Prussia,  which  flanks  the  river  on  both 
sides.  West  Pnissia,  in  spite  of  its  name,  is  a  com- 
paratively recent  acquisition  of  the  Prussian  kingdom. 
It  was  only  incorporated  at  the  first  Partition  of  Poland 
in  1772*    Before  that  date  it  had  been  Polish  territory. 


74  PRUSSIANISM 

ever  since  Yagiellon  ^  broke  the  power  of  the  Teutonic 
Knights  at  the  battle  of  Tannenberg  in  14x0  aj>. 

In  the  manifesto  addressed  to  the  Poles  shordy  after 
the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  Grand  Duke  made  a  pointed 
allusion  to  this  historic  victory/  and  hinted  that  if  the 
Russians  and  Poles  in  concert  carry  the  present  struggle 
to  a  tritunphant  conclusion.  West  Prussia  will  be  one  of 
die  national  heirlooms  which  he  will  restore  to  the  new 
Polish  state. 

The  Pblish  claim  to  the  province  has  strong  argu- 
ments in  its  favour.  The  Polish  element  is  hardly  less 
important  here  than  in  Posen*'  The  Germans  are  in  a 
majority,  but  they  are  concentrated  in  the  great  port 
of  Danzig,  and  only  thinly  scattered  through  the  rural 
districts*  On  strict  grounds  of  nationality,  a  strip  of 
West  Prussia  on  the  Left  bank  of  the  Vistula,  stretch- 
ing all  the  way  to  the  Baltic  so  as  to  include  a  small 
extent  of  coast  immediately  West  of  Danzig,  ought  to  be 
detached  from  Germany,  and  added,  just  like  the  major 
part  of  Posen,  to  autonomous  Poland* 

Probably  this  would  not  content  the  Poles.  For 
economic  reasons  they  covet  the  fundamentally  German 
city  of  Danzig,  and  would  therefore  insist  on  a  **  dean 
cut  ^*  of  the  whole  province,  PbUsh  and  German  portions 
alike,  although  any  such  demand  is  of  course  refuted  by 
the  National  Principle  itself.  Yet  the  ""  mangled  slice,^^ 
as  well  as  the  ^^  clean  cut,""  receives  a  categorical  veto 
&om  Geography. 

^  The  first  king  who  ruled  at  once  over  the  Polisb  and  the  Lithuanian 


■  The  reverse  sustained  a  few  weeks  afterwards  on  this  very  spot  by 
die  Russian  armies  in  their  first  invasion  of  Trans-Vistulan  G«nnatty, 
has  made  the  name  less  auspicious. 

*At  the  German  census  of  1905  the  population  of  West  Prussia 
totalled  1,643,000,  of  whom  S^/Ooo  (34%)  were  oflSdaUy  admitted  to 
be  Poles. 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  75 

The  seizure  of  West  Prussia  is  the  most  pardonable    ! 
dieft  Berlin  ever  oonunitted.    It  brought  the  solid  bbck 
of  German  population  which  had  established  itself 
ftirtfaer  afield  in  East  Prussia  round  the  intensely  German 
centre  of  Kfinigsberg,  into  direct  territorial  contact  with 
die  main  body  of  Germany.    Even  Napoleon,  when  he 
beat  Prussia  to  earth,  did  not  venture  to  reverse  this 
inevitable  outcome  of  the  geographical  situation.    He 
cut  off  Danzig  and  made  her  a  free  dty,  but  he  left  the 
land-bru^e  between  Berlin  and  Kdnigsbei^  intact* 
Now  that  the  bpse  of  a  century  has  cemented  more 
firmly  than  ever  the  union  between  West  Prussia  and  | 
die  German  lands  on  either  side  of  it,  we  should  be  ill- 
advised  if  we  departed  from  Napoleon's  precedent. 
The  German  majority  in  the  country  would  never 
reconcile  itself  to  Pol^  rule.    They  would  hate  thej 
Russian  Empire  as  bitterly  as  the  "'  Reichsland "'  torn  i 
from  France  in  1871  has  hated  its  German  masters,  and 
the  German  nation,  on  its  part,  would  never  rest  till  it 
had  liberated  its  enslaved  brothers  and  thereby  restored 
Its  own  geographical  integrity.    If  every  other  ques-i 
tkm  in  Europe  had  been  justly  solved.  West  Prussia!  \ 
would  suffice  in  itself  to  pltmge  all  Etm)pe  into  an-    j 
other  war. 

In  view,  however,  of  the  Prussian  Government's 
Polish  policy  in  the  past,  the  large  Polish  minority  in 
West  Prussia  cannot  be  abandoned  once  more  to  the 
mercy  of  German  chauvinism.  Germany's  retention 
of  the  province  must  be  conditional  upon  a  solemn  pledge 
on  her  part,  to  respect  the  Polish  language  wherever 
Bpohtn  witfain  her  reduced  frontier,  and  in  general  to 
allow  such  Polish  citizens  as  still  remain  to  her  com- 
plete freedom  in  the  development  of  their  national 
individuality.    This  guarantee  must  be  endorsed  by  all 


76  PRUSSIANISM 

the  parties  to  the  European  conference.  The  national 
ideals  of  the  West  Prussian  Poles  are  to  be  subordinated 
to  a  paramount  interest  of  the  German  nation*  It  is 
Germany^s  part  to  see  that  the  sacrifice  entailed  shall 
be  as  lis^t  as  possible,  and  she  must  not  be  allowed  to 
repudiate  her  obligation* 

Moreover,  the  exclusion  of  this  half  million  of  Poles 
from  their  national  state  a£Fects  not  only  the  disappointed 
fragment  itself,  but  also  the  liberated  Polish  nation. 
The  new  Autonomous  State  has  a  daim  to  compensation 
for  submitting  to  this  national  loss,  and  the  account  can 
best  be  settled  by  an  economic  concession* 

The  Vistula  is  Poland's  river*  It  rises  on  the  Polish 
flank  of  the  Carpathians,  both  the  national  capitals, 
Cracow  and  Warsaw,  lie  on  its  banks,  and  it  is  the 
main  artery  of  the  country's  commtmications*  If  the 
lower  reaches  of  the  river,  and  the  numerous  Polish 
population  that  dwells  along  them  also,  must  definitively 
remain  outside  the  new  political  frontier,  there  is  no 
reason  why  Pblish  traffic  on  the  river  should  be  barred 
by  a  tariff-fence  at  this  line*  A  further  condition  for 
the  retention  of  West  Prussia  must  be  imposed  on 
Germany*  She  must  grant  the  new  Poland  free  trade 
down  the  Vistula  to  the  Baltic,  and  throw  open  to  her 
Danzig,  at  the  river's  mouth,  as  a  free  port* 

This  provision  is  essential  to  Poland's  future  pros- 
perity* Its  extortion  through  military  defeat  may 
wotmd  the  pride  of  the  German  nation,  but  its  most 
ardent  advocates  will  be  the  great  German  business 
firms  at  Danzig  itself,  who  will  be  fully  sensible  of  the 
possibilities  opened  to  them  by  this  immense  extension 
of  their  city's  commercial  hinterland* 

(d)  We  have  still  to  discuss  the  frontier  East  of  the 
Vistula*    The   homogeneous   German   population   of 


THE  POLISH  FRONTffiR  77 

Bast  Prussia,  compactly  marshalled  along  the  Baltic 
coast  between  the  Vistula  and  the  Niemen,  does  not 
properly  come  into  question.  In  all  Germany  there  is 
no  more  German  land  than  this.  We  shall  doubtless  be 
reminded,  however,  that  this  inheritance  was  won  for 
Germanism  not  by  the  peaceful  penetration  of  burghers, 
like  Silesia  and  the  fringes  of  Posen  and  West  Prussia, 
but  by  the  sword  of  the  Teutonic  Knights*  **  The 
Germans  came  here,"'  the  fanatical  Germanophobe  will 
cry,  **  by  brute  force :  by  brute  force  let  them  be 
expelled  again/^ 

If  historical  aq^uments  must  needs  be  answered,  we 
may  point  out  that  the  folk  they  dispossessed  were  not 
Poles  nor  even  Slavs.  The  original  Prussians  belonged 
to  a  separate  branch  of  the  Indo-European  family,  and 
were  kinsmen  of  the  Lithtianians  across  the  Niemen ; 
but  the  German  crusaders  who  set  themselves  to  root 
out  heathenism  from  this  secluded  comer  of  Europe, 
did  dieir  work  so  thoroughly  that  they  annihilated  the 
heathen  themselves  together  with  their  beliefs.  No 
native  Prussian  now  survives  to  daim  his  ancestral 
inheritance,  and  the  title  remains  with  his  destroyers, 
yifbo  have  robbed  him  even  of  his  name,  and  raised  it 
from  an  obscure  tribal  appellation  to  be  the  official  style 
of  the  greatest  political  oiganism  that  Germany  has  yet 
created. 

The  German-speaking  region  in  East  Prussia,  then, 
must  be  left  on  the  same  side  of  the  frontier  as  before. 
Its  natural  boundaries  are  sharply  defined  towards  every 
quarter,  not  merely  by  the  Sea  on  the  North  and  the 
rivers  that  guard  its  flanks,  but  by  the  chain  of  the 
Masurian  Lakes,  that  stretches  parallel  to  the  coast,  and 
divides  the  district  from  its  hinterland. 

The  Slav  advancing  from  the  South-East  has  never 


76  PRUSSDINISM 

penetrated  this  barrier*  It  sheltered  first  the  aborigjaal 
Prussians  and  then  their  German  namesakes  from  the 
Poles^  and  in  the  present  war  it  is  provif^  itself  a 
formidable  obstacle  to  the  Russian  armies ;  yet  while 
Geography  has  made  it  the  permanent  strategical 
frontier  of  East  Prussia^  the  political  frontier  has  never 
coincided  with  it  since  the  setdement  after  Tannenberg, 
but  has  kept  to  a  quite  artificial  line  drawn  further  in- 
land towards  the  South* 

The  strip  of  country  between  this  present  frontier 
and  the  lakes  cotdd  be  detached  from  East  Prussia  with- 
out a£Fecting  the  strategical  situation,  and  it  is  inhabited 
by  a  Pblish  population,  the  Masurians.^  This  is  perhaps 
the  only  unit  in  the  whole  of  the  Eastern  £rontier-wne 
of  Germany  to  which  the  decision  by  plebiscite  can  be 
applied,  and  we  must  not  neglect  the  opportunity,  for 
we  cannot  predict  a  priori  the  choice  the  Masurians 
will  make,  as  we  can  predict  that  of  the  other  Poles* 
They  have  been  united  politically  with  their  German 
neighbours  beyond  the  lakes  for  considerably  more  than 
five  hundred  years,  and  in  the  sixteenth  century  they 
foUowed  them  in  their  secession  &om  the  Roman  Church. 
They  have  shared  since  then  in  the  Lutheran  culture  of 
Northern  Germany*  It  is  highly  probable  that  tradition 
will  prove  a  stronger  factor  than  language  in  determinit^ 
their  nationality,  but  certainty  will  not  be  reached  till 
that  nationality  declares  itself  in  the  vote* 

(a)  As  far  as  the  Left  bank  of  the  Niemen,  East 
Prussia,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  Masurian 
unit,  will  thus  maintain  its  present  connections*  We 
have  still  to  consider  the  fragment  of  the  province  beyond 
the  river's  further  bank*  This  is  the  only  portion  of  East 
Prussia  that  ought  undoubtedly  to  be  ceded  to  the 

^  Thty  mmiber  about  400^000* 


THE  POLISH  FRONTIER  79 

Ruanan  Empire.  The  majority  of  the  inhabitants  are 
Lithuanians,  at  present  separated  by  an  artificial  line 
£rom  the  mass  of  their  fellow-countrymen  on  the 
Russian  side  of  the  frontier.  The  only  considerable 
German  endave  is  the  port  of  Memel/  situated  on  the 
exit  from  the  ''  Kurisches  Haff ""  or  lagoon,  into  which 
the  Niemen  debouches ;  but  we  can  write  off  against 
Memel  the  Lithuanian  endaves  on  the  South  bank  of  the 
liver,'  which  we  propose  to  leave  within  the  German 
frontier,  and  from  the  economic  point  of  view  Russians 
datm  to  Memel  is  as  strong  as  Poland's  to  West  Prussia. 
The  upper  system  of  the  Niemen  provides  waterways 
for  the  traffic  of  Russians  Lithuanian  and  White  Russian 
provinces,  and  Memel  is  the  natural  point  of  connection 
between  this  internal  trade  and  the  sea. 

We  can  now  suggest  how  the  frontier  East  of  the 
Vistula  should  run. 

Crossing  the  Vistula  at  a  point  between  Bromberg 
and  Thorn,  it  should  assign  Thorn  to  Poland.  The 
possession  of  this  fortress  is  strategically  essential  to  the 
new  principality,  for  the  present  campaign  has  already 
shown  how  a  German  force  concentrated  on  the  lower 
Vistula  can  from  this  base  strike  towards  the  interior  in 
any  direction.  If  Thorn  remained  in  Germany's  hands, 
Poland  would  be  exposed  perpetually  to  a  German 
<^cnsive,  and  communication  between  Pdsen  and 
Warsaw  might  be  cut  at  any  moment.  In  Polish  hands, 
on  the  contrary.  Thorn  would  not  be  a  menace  to 
Germany,  for  the  course  of  the  Vistula  below  it  is  flanked 

'  Popoladon,  ax/x)o  in  1905. 

■There  are  X07«ooo  Lidnianiaiis  in  East  PruBti  altogether.  In 
S905  the  totol  poptilation  of  the  province  was  4/>3O/)0O.  Since  the 
iM^*ri»wtm  and  Lithuanians  amount  together  to  about  half  a  million,  the 
Ocraiatt  block  most  total  a  milliott  and  a  half. 


8o  PRUSSIANISM 

by  a  series  of  German  fortresses  ^  all  the  way  down, 
lliis  is  the  one  instance  we  have  encountered  in  which 
the  strategical  factor  outweighs  the  racial  to  Germany's 
detriment  and  not  to  her  gain,  for  Thorn  is  inhabited  by 
a  German  population** 

Beyond  Thorn  the  course  of  the  frontier  will  be  deter- 
mined by  the  Mastuians'  choice*  If  they  elect  to  abide 
by  Germany,  the  new  frontier,  after  skirting  Thorn  to 
the  North,  will  bend  Eastward,  and  coincide  with  the 
present  line  a  few  miles  East  of  the  fortress :  if  they 
merge  themselves  in  Poland,  the  frontier  will  head  Nortfa- 
Eastward  towards  the  line  of  the  lakes.  It  will  run 
just  South  of  Deutsch-Eylau,  Osterode  and  Allenstein, 
and  parallel  to  the  railway  that  connects  them.  Then, 
leavii^  LStzen  to  Germany  but  giving  Lyck  to  Poland, 
it  will  converge  upon  the  present  frontier  where  it  is 
intersected  by  the  54th  parallel  of  latitude* 

From  this  point  the  new  frontier  will  in  any  case 
foUow  the  line  of  the  old,  till  it  hits  the  Niemen*  Thence 
the  Left  bank  of  the  river  will  form  the  remainder  of  its 
course* 

E*  Prussian  State  and  German  Nation 

We  have  completed  our  survey  of  Germany's 
European  frontiers,  and  have  found  diat,  however  con- 
siderately we  treat  her,  she  cannot  escape  without  very 
serious  territorial  curtailment*  Can  we  reconcile  her 
feelings  to  this  necessary  loss  i 

1£  we  glance  back  at  the  cessions  we  have  demanded 
from  the  German  Empire,  we  shall  see  that  nearly  all  of 
them  are  at  Prussia's  expense*  In  fact,  our  proposals 
might  seem  intended  as  a  deUberate  reversal  of  Prussian 
history*     The  acquisition  of  Silesia  and  the  Polish 

>  Gfaudco]^  Maricttwerder,  Mancobttcg*  •  43/xx>* 


PRUSSIA  AND  GERMANY  8i 

provinces  first  raised  her  to  the  rank  of  a  great  power* 
The  campaign  against  Denmark  in  1864  won  her  not 
only  Schleswig  but  most  of  Northern  Germany  two 
years  later*  The  territory  taken  from  France  in  1871 
did  not  become  Prussian  soil,  but  as  the  **  Reichsland  ** 
it  symbolises  the  hegemony  over  all  Germany,  which 
Prussia  attained  through  her  French  victory  by  the 
fott&dation  of  the  German  Empire* 

Those  to  whom  V3t  victis  nuJces  the  paramount  appeal 
will  here  find  a  fresh  opportunity  to  interpose*  **  We 
are  now  prepared  to  grant  you/'  they  will  say,  **  that 
in  the  Allies'  settlement  with  the  German  nation,  justice 
and  mercy  may  prove  the  best  policy*  Your  hopes  of 
reconciling  Gemuiny  are  not  so  fantastic  as  m^t  be 
supposed ;  but  the  facts  to  which  you  have  just  called 
our  attention  prove  far  more  conclusively  that  you 
cannot  possibly  reconcile  Prussia*  We  therefore  offer 
you  a  general  principle  for  your  guidance*  Spare 
Germany  by  all  means,  but  humiliate  Prussia  without 
restraint*  Destroy  Prussia's  hegemony  in  Germany  by 
libeiatmg  all  the  German  lands  which  she  armexed  in 
18x4  and  1866*  Make  them  independent  members  of 
a  truly  federal  Empire,  and  remove  the  diminished 
Prussia's  last  hold  upon  the  remainder  of  the  nation,  by 
stipulating  in  the  terms  of  peace  that  the  Hohemoollem 
shall  resign  the  d^nity  of  German  Emperor*  You 
cannot  make  your  peace  with  Prussia :  then  you  must 
annihilate  her  with  a  ruthless  hand*" 

Our  first  reply  to  this  will  be  that  the  interference  of 
foreign  powers  in  a  nation's  internal  affairs  is  the  sove- 
re^  means  of  weldii^  together  that  nation's  most 
dttooidant  elements*^    If  we  ordered  Hanover  to  secede 

^  The  nsoooi  of  Btmaick's  policy  is  a  commentaiy  00  this  fiict* 
He  tndiioed  fomgnefs  to  put  wpikts  into  Gcnnan/s  wheel,  in  ofder  to 
ose  flicm  himself  as  levels  for  upheaving  German/s  national  sentiment* 


83  PRUSSIANISM 

firom  Prtissia,  the  Hanoverians  would  for  the  first  time 
realise  their  pride  in  Prussian  citizenship,  and  if  the 
Kaiser  were  bidden  doff  his  Imperial  Crown,  Bavaria 
would  for  the  first  time  acclaim  him  whole-heartedly  as 
her  war*lord*  Instead  of  crushing  Prussia  by  isolating 
her  from  the  German  nation,  we  should  most  effectively 
alienate  the  German  nation  by  rallying  it  round  Prussia. 

So  much  is  certain,  but  we  can  clear  up  the  argument 
more  satisfactorily  by  thinking  out  what  meaning  the 
name  **  Prussia  **  conveys  to  our  minds* 

Historically,  the  Prussian  is  the  **  Squire  from  beyond 
the  Elbe,''  ^  a  character  in  which  we  divine  the  feiodty 
of  the  Borderer,  the  fanaticism  of  the  Crusader,  and  the 
dogmatism  of  the  Protestant,  while  behind  the  squire 
marches  the  peasant  from  his  estate,  who  seems  to  have 
no  life  beyond  obedience  to  his  leader's  commands,  and 
to  revert,  whenever  he  finds  himself  leaderless,  to  the 
habits  of  his  barbarous  ancestors  in  the  days  before  the 
squire  appeared  in  the  land. 

Looked  at  from  one  point  of  view,  the  growth  of 
modem  Prussia  is  simply  the  story  of  how  this  sinister 
troop  (hostility  makes  us  distort  their  features  beyond 
the  truth)  has  imposed  its  domination  progressively  upon 
the  whole  German  world,  first  stretching  out  its  hands 
from  Elbe  to  Rhine  to  swallow  up  the  North,  and  then 
compelling  the  South  to  follow  in  its  train*  We  picture 
the  **  Prussian  drill-sergeant "  fordx^  the  too  pliable 
Rhinelander  into  his  iron  mould,  and  we  feel  that  we 
have  been  watching  the  deUberate  depravation  of  a 
nation's  character.  **  You  may  know  Prussia,"  we 
exclaim,  **  by  her  fruits*  Prussianism  made  the  war,  and 
the  war  is  a  disaster  for  Germany  and  for  the  whole  of 
Etux>pe." 

'  Ost-Elbiischer  Junker. 


PRUSSIA  AND  GERMANY  ^ 

This  account  of  the  matter  is  not  so  much  false  in 
statement,  though  at  best  a  gross  exaggeration,  as  mis- 
taken in  perspective*  The  shadow  from  beyond  the 
Elbe  doubtless  darkens  the  country,  but  the  shadow 
will  pass :  the  present  situation  is  no  more  than  a 
historical  survival* 

If  we  ignore  origins  for  a  moment,  and  look  at  modem 
Prussia  as  it  actually  is,  we  shall  see  that  it  is  only  another 
name  for  North  Germany*  The  present  frontiers  of 
the  Prussian  state  include  samples  of  North  German 
society  in  all  its  varieties  :  world-ports  like  Danzig  and 
Kiel,  scientifically  developed  agricultural  districts  like 
Brandenbuq;  and  Pomerania,  centres  of  twentieth- 
century  industrialism  like  Westphalia  and  Silesia*  The 
remaining  states  of  North  Germany  may  be  as  important 
individually  as  the  corresponding  elements  in  the  Prus- 
sian OTgxDism,  but  the  total  sum  of  their  population 
and  economic  energy  does  not  affect  the  balance  in 
comparison  with  Prussia's  weight,  and  territorially  they 
are  mere  enclaves,  emei^g  here  and  there  on  the  map 
from  the  background  of  the  Prussian  mass*^ 

The  most  significant  factor  we  have  mentioned  in 
nxxlem  Prussia  is  the  new  industry  on  the  Rhine  and 
the  Oder*  We  have  already  explained  that  the  national 
development  of  Germany  during  the  last  forty-three 
years  is  due  to  the  amazing  speed  and  thoroughness 
with  which  she  has  accomplished  her  industrial  revolu- 

Pmml  area  in  sq,  miles.       Population  in  xgos* 
^  Gcman  Bnqnre     208,780  6o,64x/kx> 

North  Geraany :   166^x41  49,8o4»ooo 

Pnaata  I34»6i6  80%  |  37#293#ooo  75%  ) 

RemsdauiK  >ofN*G*  >ofN.G* 

N*  G.  States    32,535  ao%  I  xa,5ix/)oo  35%  I 

The  figuns  for  North  Germany  are  obtained  by  subtracting  the  totals 
of  Bavaria,  Wiirtemberg  and  Baden  from  the  totals  of  the  Empire,  but 
ffHinfiftg  m^**  Reichsland*** 


1  e< 


84  PRU5SIANISM 

tion.  These  two  Prussiaii  areas  have  been  the  actual 
theatre  of  this  Gennan  achievement.  Looted  at  from 
die  economic  point  of  view,  Prussia  is  not  an  incubus 
whith  has  bstened  itself  upon  the  German  nation's  life, 
but  the  most  vital  element  of  that  life  itself,  which  has 
raised  Germany  to  her  present  pitch  of  greatness. 

The  I>russian  state  may  still  be  controlled  by  the 
"  Agrarian  Interest,"  but  the  squirardiy  is  not  tbe 
factor  in  Prussia  which  enables  her  to  control  in  turn 
die  rest  of  Germany.  The  German  Empire  is  held 
togedier  by  the  hegemony  not  of  the  Eastern  "  mark  " 
but  of  the  Industrial  North.  Westphalia  and  Silesia 
are  not  merely  typical  elements  of  modern  Germany : 
they  are  the  country's  core.  Junkerdom,  the  traditional 
Pnusia  of  the  squire,  may  still  call  the  tune,  but  no 
music  would  follow,  if  the  resourceful,  inde&t^ble 
Prussia  of  the  industrial  workers  were  not  there  to  trans- 
late the  demand  into  reality.  Germany  could  never 
have  borne  the  cost  of  her  stupendous  armaments,  if 
the  new  Prussia  had  not  all  the  time  been  disseminating 
her  manufactures  through  the  markets  of  the  world  and 
winning  for  her  profits  an  ever-increasing  proportion  of 
the  world's  surplus  wealth  :  she  could  not  have  outdone 
the  armaments  of  Great  Britain  and  France  in  quality 
and  elaboration  as  well  as  in  mere  mass,  had  not  West- 
phalia lent  all  her  engineerit^  skill  to  manu&cture  and 
improve  Germany's  armaments,  as  well  as  to  pay  for 
them.  The  new  Prussia  has  virtually  supplanted  the 
old  even  in  her  own  peculiar  sphere :  the  works  at 
Essen  are  the  driving  force  behind  the  militarism  which 
we  are  combatting  in  this  war,  and  the  Krupps  have 
eclipsed  as  the  exponents  of  Prusstanism  tixe  von 
Bluchers  and  von  Billows. 

Hie  future  character  of  Prussia,  then,  will  in  no  case 


PRUSSIA  AND  GERMANY  85 

be  determined  by  the  military  caste  which  originally 
bttilt  her  up*  Already  they  seem  to  feel  the  reins  slip- 
ping from  their  grasp,  and  to  stispect  that  the  creature 
will  one  day  be  impelled  to  deny  his  creator*  llie 
future,  however,  belongs  to  Herr  Krupp  as  little  as  to 
his  aristocratic  godfathers*  Behind  the  capitalist  stand 
the  myriads  of  his  workers.  All  over  Etux>pe  they  are 
coming  to  realise  the  services  of  their  dass  to  the  state, 
and  its  potential  power  in  politics,  and  they  are  resolv- 
ing to  conquer  the  position  in  society  which  is  their 
due ;  but  in  Germany  the  dass-consdousness  of  the 
Workers  is  even  stronger,  and  their  resentment  more 
bitter,  than  in  the  countries  of  the  West,  because 
they  are  here  thrust  more  ruthlessly  into  the  outer 
darimess* 

It  is  certain  that  the  German  Workers  will  one  day 
come  into  their  own*  Krupp  may  still  claim  all  credit 
for  the  cannon  and  armour-plate,  and  hold  his  own 
against  his  employees ;  yet  machines,  however  perfect, 
do  not  constitute  an  army :  its  essence  is  always  its  men* 
The  German  General  StafiF  boasts  far  more  loudly  of 
its  four  million  trained  combatants  than  of  its  42-centi- 
metre guns,  and  the  new  industrial  Prussia  supplies  the 
bkxxl  as  well  as  the  gold  and  the  iron*  The  increase  of 
50%  in  the  popubtion  of  the  Empire,  between  the  years 
1871  and  1905,  has  been  entirely  urban*  The  new 
industry  of  the  Westphalian  and  Silesian  towns  pro- 
duces the  subsistence  for  these  new  mouths*  The 
industrial  centres  have  become  the  main  reservoir  on 
yAddi  the  General  StafiF  depends  for  its  recruits*^ 

In  a  militaristic  state,  political  power  gravitates  into 

>  Bcmhaidi,  in  Gtrmany  and  tfm  Next  War,  diaciisacs  this  widiout 
muting  to  realise  its  significance.  He  notes,  and  deplores,  the  foct 
mat  the  townsman  is  not  such  sympathetic  material  for  the  Army  as 
the  peasant* 


86  PRUSSIANISM 

the  hands  of  those  who  bear  the  military  burdens.  It 
has  been  hinted  diat  the  forces  which  now  govern 
Germany,  Capital  and  Privilege  in  coalition,  actually 
precipitated  the  war  in  order  to  forestall  the  outbreak 
of  die  internal  class-struggle  and  their  own  downfall. 
Whether  there  is  any  tru^  in  this  or  not,  the  social 
problem  in  Germany  will  not  be  decided  automatically 
in  this  sense  or  in  that  by  victory  or  defeat.  An  army  of 
workers,  elated  by  a  inihtary  triumph  and  convinced 
that  it  was  due  to  their  own  organised  endeavour  and 
sacrifice,  m^t  well  make  short  work,  after  the  war 
was  over,  of  the  unscrupulous  directorate  which  had 
deliberately  involved  them  in  this  fiery  trial.  We  have 
seen,  on  the  other  hand,  that  defeat  followed  by  undia- 
criminating  humiliation  might  reconcile  the  principal 
vicCtms  to  the  schemers  who  were  ultimately  responsible 
for  both  misfortunes.  In  either  case  the  attitude 
of  die  industrial  masses  will  be  the  important  boor, 
and  their  state  of  mind,  in  the  event  of  the  Allies* 
victory,  will  depend  much  more  upon  how  we  deal  widi 
them  in  the  settlement  at  the  close  of  hostihties  than 
upon  the  military  results  of  the  war  itself. 

Here  the  believer  in  external  intervention  will  inters 
nipt  us  ^ain.  "  I  discern,"  he  will  exclaim,  "  an 
infallible  means  of  securing  for  ourselves  the  gratitude 
and  sympathy  of  this  industrial  class,  whom  you  have 
now  proved  to  be  the  real  Prussia  of  the  future.  I  no 
tenger  propose  to  crush  Prussia — I  see  that  the  Prussian 
hegemony  in  Germany  is  synonymous  with  the  natural, 
unalterable  economic  supremacy  of  the  North — but  I 
do  advocate  interventfon  in  the  social  evolution  d 
Prussia  heiself.  You  say  that  the  workers  are  bound  to 
gain  the  upper  hand,  let  them  gain  it  by  our  good 
offices. 


I 


PRUSSIA  AND  GERMANY  87 

**  The  political  monopoly  enjoyed  in  Prussia  by  the 
present  ruling  class  rests  on  the  reactionary  structure  of 
the  existing  constitution.  The  direct  manhood  suffrage 
by  which  the  Imperial  Reichstag  is  elected  is  in  striking 
contrast  to  the  machinery  of  the  Prussian  *  Landtag/ 
The  present  system  dates  from  the  Reform  Bill  of  19x0, 
but  the  reform  was  illusory*  It  was  virtually  a  reissue 
of  the  constitution  of  1851,  and  that  in  turn  was  intto- 
duced  as  a  reversal  of  the  truly  liberal  charter  extorted 
from  the  autocracy  in  1848* 

^  In  a  Prussian  constituency  the  electors  are  stratified 
in  three  *  property  classes/  equal  to  one  another  in  their 
respective  total  taxpaying  capacity,  but  most  unequal  in 
the  number  of  individuals  they  include*  Each  of  these 
numerically  disparate  groups  chooses  its  own  representa- 
tive, but  he  does  not  sit  in  the  Landtag :  his  function  is 
to  vote  at  his  own  discretion  for  the  actual  deputy,  in 
conjunction  with  his  colleagues*  Thus  the  Prussian 
franchise  is  both  narrow  and  indirect*  The  Prussian 
liandtag  ^  is  not  a  modem  parliament :  it  is  a  medixval 


""  The  European  settlement/'  he  will  continue,  **  offers 
an  excellent  opportunity  for  sweeping  away  this  political 
anachronism*  Let  us  stipulate  in  the  terms  of  peace 
diat  the  Pnissian  constitution  shall  be  liberalised  at  least 
to  the  standard  already  prevailing  in  the  South,  in 
Baden,  Wiirtembei^  and  Bavaria*  Thus  we  shall  bring 
the  true  Prussian  nation  into  belated  control  of  its 
own  political  destim'es*  The  standpoint  of  the  Social 
Democratic  Party,  debarred  from  practical  expression 

*Tbe  House  of  Peeis  would  be  an  almost  better  illustration  of 
Pruwfan  olifaschy*  The  hereditary  members  are  reinforced  by  othta 
created  for  hfe  bv  the  king^  but  a  certain  proportion  of  the  latter  are  in 
the  nomination  of  tfie  landed  aristocracy  from  the  eight  senior  provinces, 
ta  other  ifocds  ttut  **  East-of-Elbe  Junkers.'' 


88  PRUSSIANISM 

heretofore,  will  make  itself  felt  at  last,  and  will  inspire 
Prussian  policy  with  a  new  spirit* 

**  Moreover,  this  '  change  of  heart  *  (your  own  phrase) 
will  prepare  the  way  for  a  further  salutary  modifica- 
tion of  Prussia's  equilibrium*  Formerly  I  proposed  to 
detach  all  the  Uberal  parts  of  Prussia  from  her  irreclaim- 
able core  :  now  I  st^est  that  we  smother  and  soften 
the  core  by  reinforcing  the  fruitful  fibres  that  surround  iu 

**  You  have  pointed  out  that  the  non-Prussian  com- 
munities in  Northern  Germany  are  isolated  survivals, 
destined  to  ultimate  absorption  in  their  Prussian  environ- 
ment* Perhaps  you  have  not  sufficiently  emphasised 
the  effect  their  assimilation  will  have  upon  Prussia  her- 
self, for  their  importance  cannot  be  measured  by  their 
territorial  extent*  There  are  the  three  Hansa  towns  for 
instance*  Hamburg  is  the  second  laigest  city  in  the 
Empire,  even  Bremen  is  b^ger  than  Danzig,^  and  the 
group  as  a  whole  conducts  all  the  trade  of  the  Elbe 
and  the  Weser*  The  barren  naval  bases  of  Cuxhaven, 
Wilhelmshaven  and  Helgoland  are  the  only  mark 
Prussia's  advent  has  made  upon  the  North  Sea  ooast« 

**  You  have  related,  ^ain,  how  the  German  national 
consciousness  was  first  fostered  by  German  Intellect  and 
Art ;  but  if  you  call  to  mind  the  spiritual  centres  of 
Northern  Germany,  you  will  half  fancy  that  they  have 
purposely  been  boycotted  by  the  Prussian  frontier. 
Drc^en^  Leipzig,  Jena,  Weimar,  Gotha — not  one  of 
them  Ues  on  Prussian  soil*  Berlin  has  striven  for  a 
century  to  array  herself  in  their  glories,  but  there  is 

^  Populations  in  1905  : 

Berlin 2|040/>oo 

Hambturg 803^000 

Bremen 3x5,000 

Danzig loofioo 

Ltibeck 94»ooo 


PRUSSIA  AND  GERMANY  89 

a  tradition  in  their  very  names  which  she  cannot 
plagiarise*  Finally  I  will  meet  you  on  your  own  ground, 
and  remind  you  that  in  the  industrial  world  Silesia  and 
Westphalia  have  not  entirely  outdistanced  the  older 
manufactures  of  Saxony«  Chemnitz  can  still  bear  com- 
parison with  Beuthen  or  Elberfeld. 

^  The  incorporation,  then,  in  Prussia  of  the  other 
North-German  elements  will  immensely  strengthen  that 
industrial  democracy  whose  triumph  we  wish  to  ensure, 
^prfiile  they  on  their  part  will  find  no  grievance  in  such 
change  of  status,  if  it  coincides  with  a  radical  revision  of 
the  Prussian  constitution,  guaranteed  by  the  hand  and 
seal  of  Europe/' 

There  is  far  more  wisdom  in  these  suggestions  than  in 
the  pn^^nunme  they  supersede*  The  **  eradication  of 
Prussia  **  hardly  needed  refutation,  but  the  Uberalisation 
of  the  Prussian  constitution  and  the  consolidation  of  all 
Northern  Germany  within  the  Prussian  state  are  clearly 
essential  steps  towards  a  better  future*  In  this  instance 
die  end  is  not  at  fatdt,  but  only  the  means*  We  shaU 
have  to  insist  once  more  in  reply  that  even  the  mildest 
and  most  beneficial  of  internal  transformations  cannot 
be  effected  by  external  pressure,  that  a  ready-made 
constitution  has  no  more  charm  than  a  ready-made  coat, 
and  that  even  if  Industrial  Germany  accepted  the 
political  costume  we  offered  her,  there  would  be  no 
telling  in  what  fashion  our  gift  would  be  worn :  she 
might  even  give  it  a  militaristic  turn,  and  disconcert  us 
by  aping  the  **  drill-sergeants ''  from  whom  we  had 
delivered  her*  Nevertheless,  when  these  objections  have 
duly  been  filed,  we  shall  probably  admit  that  we  have 
sighted  our  desired  goal,  if  only^some  road  thitherward 
were  apparent* 

The  upshot  of  our  discussion  is  this*    We  hope  £or  a 


90  PRUSSIANISM 

fuwreadung  dumge  of  equilibrium  m  Nordiem  Gei^ 
many,  but  we  realise  that  if  we  meddle  with  the  scales 
ouiaehns,  we  shall  end  by  inclining  the  balance  more 
heavily  then  ever  in  ^e  present  direction.  The 
au^dous  revolutioQ  can  only  be  produced  by  a 
spontaneous  internal  raovenwnt. 

Can  we  promote,  or  at  any  rate  foresee,  any  issue 
iriiicfa  would  rouse  Northern  Gennany  to  cast  out 
Pmssianism  on  its  own  initiative  I* 

We  know  the  cause  of  Germany's  devoted  loyalty  to 
the  military  caste  in  the  present  war.  She  sees  in  tfaem 
the  champions  of  her  nationality,  the  leaders  in  her 
life-and-death  struggle  against  a  world  in  anns.  One 
thing  alone  would  utteriy  discredit  the  Prussian  squire- 
archy in  German  eyes :  if,  on  some  grave  question  of 
state,  die  Junkers  sacrificed  the  naticmal  interest  to  the 
interest  of  their  own  tradition. 

We  have  seen  that  die  keystone  of  Bsmarck's  policy 
was  ibe  creed  that  Prussia's  and  Germany's  interests 
were  identical.  He  equated  the  unification  of  Germany 
with  the  extension  of  Prussia's  hegemony,  but  h^ 
doctrine  had  one  stunU}ling-bk>ck  to  overcome :  it 
involved  the  exclusion  from  the  national  Bmpire  of 
one  sixth  part  ^  of  die  nation's  strength,  the  Germans 
of  Austria. 

The  settlement  between  Prussia  and  Austria  after  die 
"  Seven  Weeks'  War  "  of  1866  was  a  violation  of  German 
Mfinmal  tradition.  Since  the  "  Great  Interregnum  " 
into  vriiich  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  fell  after  the  niga  erf 
Frederick  II.  in  the  thirteenth  century,  German  unity 
had  been  little  more  than  a  name  ;  but  die  ghost  of  it 
that  lingered  on  had  attached  itself  during  the  last  four 

Not  oountiiig  the  Gennao-speakins  Si 


PRUSSIA  AND  GERMANY  91 

owmirigs  to  the  House  of  Hapsburg,  and  haunted  the 
inqxiial  city  of  Vienna*  In  1866  Austria  was  banished 
beyond  the  pale  of  the  German  world,  and  Prussia  was 
left  in  possession  >  Prussia  had  entered  the  arena  of 
Htstoiy  only  a  century  and  a  quarter  before,  when 
Fxcderidc  the  Great  challei^ed  the  Hapsbui^  suzerainty 
iidierited  by  Maria  Theresa,  and  the  state's  subsequent 
career  had  been  one  long  struggle  with  Austria  for  the 
hegemony  of  Germany*  For  Prussia,  therefore,  the 
events  of  1866  were  the  consummation  of  her  destiny : 
the  rupture  of  the  old  German  tradition  set  upon  die 
new  tradition  of  Prussia  the  seal  of  success* 

Bisniarck's  gmus  reconciled  Germany  to  the  accom- 
plished fact,  and  between  the  decade  of  Bismarck's  three 
wars  and  the  outbreak  of  the  present  strug^e,  the  tution 
grew  and  prospered  so  exceedingly  under  Prussian  shep- 
herding, that  it  remained  insensible  to  the  Austrian 
brethren's  absence  from  the  fold ;  but  if  Germany  is 
now  defeated  and  shorn  of  her  alien  provinces,  she  will 
remember  once  more  that  the  Austrians  are  of  German 
bkxxi* 

We  have  seen  that  to  the  **  traditional  Prussian  "  the 
bfli  of  Posen,  Schlesw^  and  Alsace  wouki  mean  the 
end  of  all  the  gtories,  the  levelling  of  the  edifice  built 
by  hts  ancestors'  valiant  hands*  Among  the  ""  modem 
Prussians,"  however,  who  constitute  the  industrial 
world  of  Northern  Germany,  the  misfortune  would 
awake  no  echo  of  sentiment,  but  only  an  anxious  com- 
putation of  forces*  To  them  the  forfeiture  of  these 
piovinces  would  betoken  the  weakening  of  Germany's 
material  power  by  so  much  territory,  population  and 
weahfaf  and  the  strengthening  in  the  same  degree  of 
mal  powers  on  Germany's  flanks,  who  had  already 
proved  themselves  more  than  Germany's  match,  and 


93  PRUSSIANISM 

who  would  be  enabled  by  this  he^tening  of  the  odds 
to  hold  her  entirely  at  their  mercy.  They  would  respond 
to  the  militansts'  call  for  still  greater  armaments,  not 
^m  motives  of  revenge  so  much  as  in  self-protecti(»i 
against  a  greater  evil. 

Such  mi^vings  would  be  set  at  rest  completely  by 
the  reunion  of  the  Austrian  Germans  with  the  Emptce. 
Even  if  every  Alsatian,  Schleswiger  and  Pole  managed 
to  extricate  himself  firom  Germany's  net,  the  accession 
of  the  Austrian  block  would  more  than  doubly  com- 
pensate the  loss.  Germany  would  be  placed  beyond  all 
danger  from  her  neighbours,  and  the  North  German 
would  have  solved  effectively  the  external  problem  of  the 
nation,  without  seriously  oompromisii^  his  internal 
supremacy  within  it. 

The  economic  primacy  of  Northern  Germany  is 
almost  certainly  sufficient  to  outweigh  Austrian  Gennany 
in  addition  to  the  South,  but  to  make  the  continuance 
of  their  hegemony  sure,  the  Northerners  would  probably 
take  of  dieir  own  free  will  the  steps  we  so  intensely  desire. 
The  reinforcement  of  the  Southern  groups  would  give 
Prussia  and  the  Northern  "  enclaves  "  a  strong  mutual 
interest  of  their  own  in  consolidation,  and  this  would 
necessitate  a  preliminary  reform  in  the  Prussian 
franchise,  for  Hambuig  and  Sazony  would  decline 
membership  of  the  Prussian  state  on  the  present  terms.^ 

*  tlw  comolidatioii  of  the  North  woukl  probably  evoke  ■  simiUr 
niovcnuat  on  tbe  port  d  the  three  Southern  itates.    Their  umted 

population  in  1905  was  only  lofyjfioo  and  their  ana,  43,649  iqiiare 


division  between  lb*  comolidatwl  atatci  of  Nordi  and  South  mnld 
start  from  the  Auatnan  feuuki  at  the  exttemc  Notdi-West  oonet  of 
Bohemia,  and  follow  the  present  botudaiy  between  Bmm  on  (be  one 
hand  and  Saxony  and  the  Thuringian  princ^l^^i[iil  on  the  oAei, 
Thence  ii  would  cut  into  what  is  now  Pruman  tenitory,  paning  ili^tly 
SeaA  of  Fulda,  till  it  hit  Ae  boundary  of  Hene-DamMadt  (the 


\ 


PRUSSIA  AND  GERMANY  93 

Thus  the  fntemal  effect  upon  Northern  Germany  of 
Austria's  restoration  to  the  Empire  would  immediately 
prove  fatal  to  the  traditional  Prussian  ruling  class.  They 
would  have  the  choice  of  letting  the  reins  drop  quietly 
fiom  their  hands,  or  of  being  overthrown  ignominiously 
in  the  effort  to  deflect  the  nation  from  its  natural  course. 
The  revision  of  the  Imperial  constitution  would  crown 
tfaetr  discomfiture. 

Under  the  present  system  the  supremacy  of  Prussia  is 
vested  in  the  Imperial  title  and  privileges  of  her  Ifohen* 
aolkin  king,  who  is  the  war-lord  and  executive  head  of 
the  whole  nation;  but  if  the  Hapsburgs  return,  the 
Hbhenioollem  can  be  suzerain  no  more*  Bismarck 
banished  the  Hapsburgs  from  Germany,  because  he 
knew  that  they  could  never  take  a  subordinate  place 
within  it.  H^burg  and  Hohenzollem  can  only  come 
into  partnership  agsin  on  terms  of  absolute  equality. 

TI10  does  not  mean  the  weakening  of  that  unity  with 
wltidi  Germany  was  endowed  by  Bismarck:  it  only 
means  that  unity,  will  no  longer  be  maintained  by  a 
monarchical  bond.    The  Hohemoollem  will  sink  to  be  no 

Ndrthctxi  blodc  of  tbt  pnnctpality).  It  would  ootacide  with  this 
hoandafy  alooy  its  Southern  segment,  and  break  next  into  Prusnan 
Naann,  following  the  crest  of  the  Taunus  Mountains  till  it  reached  the 
Kiiioe  opposite  Bmflen. 

Tltti  would  assign  to  the  South  not  only  Kanau  and  Wiesbaden  but 
Fnnkftir^  the  centre  of  German  railways  and  finance,  which  has  been 
incorporated  in  Prussia  since  z866.  By  Geography  the  whole  basin 
of  file  Main  beloogi  to  the  South  as  well  as  the  upper  basin  of  the 
Rhioe  as  £ar  as  Bingen  and  the  Taunus,  for  at  this  point  the  united 
sticam  foemed  through  their  junction  pierces  by  a  narrow  dfifile  a  line 
ofhtUs  athwart  its  course,  and  enters  a  new  stage  when  it  emerges  again 
■io  uie  open* 

Beyond  the  Rhine  the  boundaiy-line  would  owicide  widi  the  present 

a  Palai 


boundary  between  the  Bavarian  Palatinate  and  Rhenflh  Prussia,  as  far 
as  tlie  boundary  of  the  '*  Reichsland  '*  in  the  ne^bourhood  of  Saar^ 
oAady  where  it  would  take  to  the  water-parting  between  the  Rhme 
and  tlie  Biowlk  till  it  reached  the  frontier  of  France*  The  position 
off  the  Ffaaoo-German  frontier  would,  of  course  depend  on  whether 
Alnoe  united  herself  widi  France  or  with  this  new  South  German  unit. 


94  PRUSSIANISM 

more  than  oonstittttional  sovereign  of  die  new  North 
German  state,  consolidated  under  the  Prussian  title  and 
governed  from  Berlin  :  the  Imperial  Reichstag  will  gain, 
correspondingly  in  scope  and  authority  by  diis  relief 
from  monarchical  concurrence*  The  national  unity  that 
overrides  federal  particularism  will  thus  receive  in 
Germany  the  same  parliamentary  expression  that  it 
possesses  in  the  U*S.A.,  and  through  this  common 
democratic  organ  the  various  groups  within  the  nation 
will  be  represented  in  the  national  counsels  in  strict  pro* 
portion  to  their  several  importance*  On  this  principle 
the  North  will  preserve  its  leadership  in  Germany, 
Germany  will  be  freed  from  fear  of  her  neighbours,  and 
Europe  will  be  reassured  as  to  Germany's  policy  in  the 
future*  The  ejection  of  the  Hohenssollem  from  the 
highest  place  in  the  Empire  will  be  equivalent  in 
European  eyes  to  a  renunciation  of  Prussianism. 

These  are  great  expectations,  but  as  far  as  Europe  and 
Germany  are  concerned,  there  is  no  apparent  obstacle  to 
their  realisation*  Germany,  however,  is  no  more  in 
command  of  the  situation  than  ourselves*  Everything 
turns  upon  the  reincorporation  of  Austrian  Germany, 
and  this  lies  in  the  hands  of  the  Austrians  alone*  No 
one  can  compel  them  to  re-enter  Germany  against  their 
will,  nor  prevent  them  from  doing  so  if  they  wish* 

Will  the  Germans  of  Austria  be  moved  to  take  this 
step  or  no  i  Certainly  they  will  not  take  it  to  oblige 
Germany  or  Europe*  Nations  do  not  dispose  of  them- 
selves upon  altruistic  motives*  Austria  will  only  seek 
membenhip  in  the  German  Empire  if  she  finds  her  own 
interest  in  doing  so,  and  obviously  her  interest  will  not 
point  this  way  tmless  the  restilt  of  the  present  war 
upsets  the  statos  qao  even  more  momentously  for  her 
than  for  Germany* 


PRUSSIA  AND  GERMANY  95 

The  regime  under  which  the  Austrians  at  present 
live  was  established  in  consequence  of  the  events  of  z866. 
Neariy  half  a  century  has  passed  since  then,  during 
wfaidi  they  have  been  perfecdy  at  liberty  to  change  it 
and  adopt  some  alternative  form  of  political  organisation. 
The  £act  that  they  have  not  done  so  seems  to  prove  that 
they  will  uphold,  or  at  least  tolerate,  the  existing  system 
until  some  stonger  force  intervenes* 

The  reasons  for  such  an  attitude  are  not  obscure.  In 
the  first  place  there  is  the  factor  of  inertia*  The  present 
Hapsburg  Monarchy  is  oq^anised  so  elaborately  and  on 
so  large  a  scale  that  it  possesses  an  incalculable  momen- 
tum. Enormous  energy  must  be  mobilised  against  its 
mechanism  before  it  can  be  brot^t  to  a  standstill. 
Even  such  a  catastrophe  as  this  war  might  fail  to  shatter 
it,  and  one  of  its  own  elements  would  find  the  greatest 
difficulty  in  dissolving  its  structure  by  a  dehl>erate« 
uwtfimulated  exercise  of  will. 

The  change,  moreover,  would  not  only  be  diffictdt  for 
the  Austrian  Germans,  but  also  positively  to  their  dis- 
advantage. If  inertia  has  been  the  only  restraint  upon 
their  freedom  of  choice,  it  is  because,  during  this  half 
century,  they  have  been  one  of  the  dominant  factors  in 
their  own  political  enviroimient,  with  power,  as  far  as 
human  will  avaib  in  politics,  to  bind  or  to  loose.  By 
txansferrmg  their  allegiance  from  their  present  society 
to  the  German  Empire,  they  would  inevitably  sti£Fer 
in  status,  for  we  have  seen  that  they  would  have  to 
yield  precedence  to  the  consolidated  state  of  Northern 


We  may  therefore  draw  the  negative  conclusion  that 
the  Germans  of  Austria  certainly  will  not  enter  the 
German  Empire,  unless  the  Hapsburg  Empire  has 
pceviously  broken  up,  and  that  such  a  break-up  could 

D 


96  PRUSSIANISM 

only  be  caused  by  some  external  agency  in  their 
despite* 

This  definition  of  what  a  break-up  of  the  Hapsburg 
Empire  implies,  may  forestall  an  objection  that  must 
long  have  been  in  the  critic's  mind.  **  You  talk  very 
glibly/'  he  will  have  been  thinking,  **  about  reconciling 
Germany  by  giving  her  two-fold  compensation  for  her 
European  losses,  but  perhaps  her  conquerors  may  find 
such  conciliation  dear  at  the  price*  Do  you  really 
suppose  that  the  Allies,  if  they  finally  beat  Germany  by 
an  exhausting  war,  will  allow  her  to  emerge  even  stronger 
than  before  from  the  subseqpient  setdement  i  '* 

It  is  of  course  obvious  that  they  will  not,  and  the 
objection  is  so  &r  cogent*  It  is  not  relevant,  however, 
to  the  case  in  question* 

During  the  last  generation,  the  states  of  Europe  have 
tended  to  play  a  less  and  less  individual  part  in  the  game 
of  diplomacy  and  war*  The  coalition,  not  the  sii^e 
country,  has  become  the  unit  of  power*  Germany's 
military  strength  can  only  be  estimated  in  terms  of  die 
whole  group  to  which  she  belongs,  and,  since  the 
German  and  the  Hapsburg  Empires  have  now  been 
partners  in  international  politics  for  thirty-five  years,^ 
we  must  for  this  purpose  treat  them  as  a  single  block* 

It  is  true  that  the  standard  of  social  efficiency  in 
general,  and  of  military  organisation  in  particular,  is 
considerably  higher  in  die  German  section  of  the  block 
then  in  the  other,  so  that  the  transference  within  the 
block  of  an  important  element  from  the  inferior  Haps- 
burg system  to  the  superior  German  would  certainly 
increase  the  power  of  the  btock  as  a  whole,  given  that  its 
total  composition  continued  the  same*  If  the  break-up 
of  the  Hapsburg  Empire  were  merely  nominal,  and  the 

^  Since  tBjg* 


PRUSSIA  AND  GERMANY  97 

group  which  had  formerly  cx)nsisted  of  Germany  and 
Aiistiia-cum-Hungary  were  reconstituted  as  Germany- 
cum-Austria  and  Hungary,  then  our  critic's  comment 
would  be  quite  in  point*  The  coalition  would  indeed 
emerge  stronger  than  before,  with  a  margin  of  increase 
that  would  cover  the  bss  of  a  few  border  provinces,  and 
die  Allies  could  not  suffer  events  to  take  such  a  course* 

This  possibility  is  disposed  of,  however,  by  our  con- 
clusion that  Austria  will  never  merge  herself  in  Germany 
unless  the  other  elements  of  the  Hapsburg  Empire  do 
break  away  from  her  in  some  real  sense,  and  fly  off  at 
a  tangent  both  from  the  Hapsburg  state  and  from  the 
German  coalition.  If  this  were  to  happen,  it  would  of 
ccmrse  immeasurably  lessen  the  total  offensive  power  of 
Germany  and  her  group,  and  we  could  regard  a  con- 
siderable addition  to  the  individual  strength  of  Germany 
herself  with  perfect  equanimity* 

We  are  accordingly  faced  with  the  question :  will 
the  War  produce  a  radical  break-up  of  the  Hapsburg 
Monarchy,  and  if  it  does,  on  what  lines  will  the  dis- 
solution take  place  i 

We  shall  then  find  a  further  question  awaitif^  us* 
Dnsolution,  supposing  we  come  to  believe  it  probable, 
will  certainly  cancel  the  factors  which  at  present  render 
union  with  Germany  tmdesirable  to  Austria,  but  it  need 
not  inspire  her  widi  a  positive  desire  for  it.  If  the 
Hapsburg  compleicus  is  loosened,  Austria  will  find 
herself  released  from  old  ties*  She  may  prefer  to  con- 
tract no  new  ones,  and  embark  instead  upon  a  phase  of 
independent  existence*  This  is  a  contingency  we  shall 
have  to  consider,  before  we  can  proclaim  our  Austrian 
solution  of  the  German  problem  as  a  certainty;  but  we 
must  not  be  over-hasty*  We  will  try  to  deal  with  only 
one  questioci  at  a  time* 


98  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  VITAIITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

Can  the  Hapsburg  Empire  survive  the  present  crisis  i 
The  question  has  been  asked  several  times  akeady  during 
the  past  oentury,  and  has  been  answered  invariably  in 
the  n^^ative,  yet  the  Empire  still  exists,  and  is  playing  a 
leading  part  in  international  politics  at  this  moment* 

Twice  over  Austria  was  utterly  defeated  and  shorn  of 
eactensive  territories  by  Napoleon,  only  to  emerge  in 
18x4  with  wider  frontiers  than  she  possessed  in  1792* 
For  the  next  thirty-three  years  international  statesman- 
ship took  its  cue  from  the  Atistrian  Chancellor  Met- 
temich.  Then  the  international  revolution  of  1848 
overthrew  Mettemich  with  bewildering  suddenness, 
and  it  seemed  as  though  the  Monarchy  would  vanish 
with  the  diplomat  who  incarnated  its  ideals. 

In  this  year  it  was  bu£Feted  from  one  quarter  by  the 
full  storm  of  Italian  Nationalism,  which  had  been  brew- 
ing for  half  a  century,  and  now  swept  the  people  of  every 
Italian  principality  into  a  common  crusade  against  the 
alien  master  encamped  on  the  Po«  On  the  other  flank 
Tcfaechs  and  Magyars  renounced  all  participation  in  a 
Germanised  state,  and  summoned  the  Hapsburg  to 
accept  the  crowns  of  independent  Bohemia  and  Hungary 
at  Prag  and  P6sa9ony,  unless  he  were  willing  to  forfeit 
their  allegiance  altogether*  Even  Vienna,  the  capital 
and  core  of  the  Empire,  rejected  her  native  sovereign* 
The  fire  of  Liberalism  set  the  Viennese  popuhtion  in 
a  blaze :  they  made  common  cause  with  the  Magyar 
Liberals  further  down  the  Danube,  and  the  Enq)eior 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  99 

Ferdmand  retired  to  the  loyal  and  conservative  Tyrol. 
At  one  moment  the  army  of  Radetzky,  whom  the  Italian 
Tiohmteers  were  besieging  in  the  fortresses  of  the 
**  Quadrilateral/'  ^  was  the  only  rock  of  authority  that 
still  defied  the  flood* 

Under  these  circumstances  Ferdinand  despaired  of 
the  Monarchy  and  abdicated.*  The  task  of  recovering 
for  the  dynasty  its  ancestral  inheritance  viras  undertaken 
by  his  nephew  Frands  Joseph  as  a  ^^  forlorn  hope/' 
Yet  his  venture  met  with  such  success  that  he  has  enjoyed 
a  reign  of  almost  unparalleled  duration*  Radetzky  had 
already  broken  the  Italian  onset  at  the  battle  of  Custozza, 
and  the  government  had  re-entered  Vienna  by  force :  the 
gage  was  now  thrown  down  to  the  Magyars*  During  the 
winter  months  of  1849  the  struggle  in  Hungary  was 
bloody  and  indecisive  ;  but  in  March  Radetzky's  crush- 
ing victory  over  the  Piedmontese  at  Novara  enabled  the 
Monarchy  to  concentrate  all  its  forces  on  the  Hungarian 
front,  in  May  the  Tsar  Nicholas  decided  to  succour  his 
fellow-autocrat,  and  before  the  end  of  the  summer  the 
Hungarian  army  capitulated  to  the  Austro-Russian  com- 
manders at  Viligos*  Every  foot  of  territory  within  the 
Austrian  frontier  was  thus  once  more  under  the  govern- 
ment's control,  and  towards  the  end  of  1850  the 
Monarchy  reasserted  its  hegemony  over  Germany  by 
extorting  a  public  apology  '  from  Prussia  for  the  coun- 
tenance she  had  lent  to  the  German  national  move- 
ment while  Atistria  had  her  hands  full  on  the  South 
and  East* 

Austria  thus  succeeded  in  stifling  the  first  birth- 
spatsms  of  the  new  Europe  :  it  is  a  still  more  remarkable 
achievement  that  she  survived  their  inevitable  renewal 


*  Maotua,  Peschiera,  Verona  and  Legnano. 

*  Dccrmbrr  X848*  *  The  Convention'of  OlmQtz. 


too  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

and  consummation.  Napoleon  IIL  dealt  her  a  hard 
blow  in  1859,  which  led  direcdy  to  the  establishment 
of  the  Italian  national  state*  In  z866  the  new  Italy  and 
Prussia,  drawn  together  by  coincidence  of  resentment 
and  ambition,  attacked  Austria  simultaneously  from  two 
flanks,  and  ousted  her  completely  from  the  Italian  and 
German  spheres*  Yet  the  main  body  of  the  Bmpire  did 
not  dissolve  under  these  strokes :  external  humiliation 
merely  opened  a  new  epoch  of  internal  evolution* 

The  Hapsburg  Monarchy,  then,  has  resisted  the 
shock  of  three  titanic  phenomena :  Democracy,  the 
Risorgimento  and  Bismarck*  The  earthquake  carried 
away  Lombardy,  Venetia  and  the  hegemony  of  Germany 
— ^two  pinnacles  and  an  ornamental  facade — but  the 
building  itself  stood  firm*  So,  we  might  infer,  the 
present  catastrophe  may  detach  Galida,  and  possibly 
Bosnia  as  well,  but  still  the  Monarchy  will  not  collapse  : 
if  it  outlived  the  nineteenth  century,  it  need  have  no 
fear  of  the  twentieth* 

Nevertheless,  the  prophets  of  death  have  reason, 
though  not  precedent,  on  their  side* 

The  Hapsbui^  state,  like  the  Prussian,  has  grown  out 
of  one  of  Germany's  Eastern  ""  marks*''  It  is  entirely 
the  creation  of  the  Hapsbtirg  Dynasty,  which  estab- 
lished its  hold  on  the  duchies  of  Austria  and  Styria  in 
1282,  when  Rudolf  of  Hapsburg  was  Holy  Roman 
Emperor*  Round  this  nucleus  successive  generations 
of  Hapsbui^  have  gathered  the  present  collection  of 
provinces  by  conquest,  inheritance,  feudal  escheat, 
marriage-settlement,  free  gift,  legal  chicanery,  and  all 
the  other  methods  which  contribute  to  the  growth  of 
private  estates*  Austrian  history  has  therefore  been 
dominated  likewise  by  the  personal  factor,  but  here  the 
anal(^  with  Prussia  ends :    both  developments  are 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  loi 

espressions  of  family  character,  but  their  comparison 
iUustrates  the  marksd  divergence  of  Hapsbtu^  and 
HcAenzollem  temperament* 

The  Prussian  collector  has  been  systematic  and  self- 
controlled.  Starting  on  the  Eastern  fringe  of  the 
German  world,  we  have  seen  how  persistently  he  shifted 
his  land-marks  towards  the  West,  never  grasping  too 
eagerly  but  never  relaxing  his  grip,  till  his  estates  co- 
incided with  Northern  Germany  in  extent,  and  his 
administration  was  adopted  for  the  government  of  the 
German  nation* 

The  Hapsburg  has  shown  no  such  consistent  policy* 
He  has  pursued  his  hobby  in  happy-go-lucky  fashion, 
gaining  here  and  losing  there  with  good-humoured  in- 
difference* There  are  few  territories  in  Europe  that 
have  not  passed  through  his  hands.  Before  the  great 
prize  of  Austria  became  his,  he  Uved  in  a  casde  on  the 
hanks  of  the  Aar,^  from  which  he  derives  his  family  name* 
The  warriors  of  the  Five  Cantons  ejected  him  from  his 
ancestral  dweUing  when  they  founded  Switzerland,  and 
at  present  not  one  rood  remains  to  him  of  this  land,  nor 
of  Alsace  and  the  Black  Forest,  his  earliest  acquisitions* 
He  has  owned  Spain  and  Belgium  in  the  West,  Venice, 
Milan,  Naples  and  Sicily  have  been  ruled  by  him ;  in 
combat  with  the  Turk  he  advanced  far  deeper  into 
Serbia  during  the  eighteenth  century  than  his  armies 
have  penetrated  during  the  present  war,  and  the  occupa- 
txm  of  the  Danubian  principalities  once  carried  him  to 
die  Black  Sea  coast*  All  these  bizarre  properties  have 
been  lost  to  him,  but  there  is  variety  enough  in  the  assets 
that  remain* 

Prussia  has  made  herself  the  exponent  of  German 
natbnality :    modem  Austria  is  representative  of  no 

*  The  chief  Southern  tributary  of  the  Upper  Rhine* 


I02  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

nationality  at  all«  It  is  true  that  two  ^  small  nations^  the 
Magyars  and  the  Tchechs,  are  wholly  contained  within 
her  frontiers ;  but  these  constitute  no  more  than  18*9 
and  17*5  per  cent*  respectively  of  her  total  population** 
The  majority  that  remains  is  composed  of  fn^^ments 
detached  from  six  nationalities :  Germans^  Italians  and 
Roumans ;  Poles,  Ruthenes  and  Southern  Slavs*  In  aU 
these  six  cases  the  main  body  of  the  race  lies  beyond  the 
Atistrian  frontier,  while  in  four  of  them  it  is  organised 
into  a  national  state  immediately  conterminotis  with  it* 
Germany,  Italy,  Roumania  and  Serbia  are  each  waiting 
to  claim  their  Atistrian  **  irredenta  **  when  the  favoui^ 
able  moment  arrives* 

The  Hapsburg  Monarchy  has  set  Nationality  at 
defiance,  and  that  is  why  the  prophets  shake  their  heads 
over  its  destiny*  What  is  the  secret  of  its  extraordinary 
vitality,  which  has  falsified  all  the  prophets'  calculations 
and  enabled  it  to  survive  both  internal  dissidence  and 
pressure  from  without  $*  An  organism  cannot  thrive 
with  complete  disregard  to  its  environment*  If  the 
Monarchy  has  not  adapted  itself  to  the  national  principle, 
it  must  have  responded  to  some  other  factor  of  equal 
significance  in  the  modem  world* 

We  shall  find  this  factor  in  Geography* 

The  political  maps  of  mediaeval  and  contemporary 
Europe  produce  quite  different  impressions*  The 
former  is  complex  and  variegated  like  a  mosaic,  or  like 
some  rich  window  of  stained  glass,  which  has  been 
shattered  by  cannon  and  pieced  together  again  hap- 

>  We  might  bring  the  number  up  to  four,  if  we  treated  the  Slovaks 
as  a  nationality  independent  of  the  Tchechs,  and  distinguished  the 
Slovenes  from  the  Southern  Slavs. 

*  Total  population  of  Austria-Hungary,  45,405,000;  Magyars, 
8,589,000 ;  Tchechs-Slovaks,  7,946,000.  The  figures  are  taken  mm 
the  census  of  xgoo. 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  103 

hazard  out  of  the  fragments,  without  regard  to  the 
or^jtnal  design*  The  latter  recalls  the  work  of  a  skilled 
nineteenth-century  restorer,  who  has  taken  the  patch- 
work to  bits,  and  patiendy  regrouped  the  fragments  till 
the  plan  of  their  creator  is  once  more  apparent*  If 
Nationality  is  one  characteristic  of  the  modem  state,  the 
second  is  geographical  compactness  and  homogeneity* 

The  Hapsburg  Monarchy  has  conformed  itself  with 
striking  success  to  this  geographical  law*  At  the  setde- 
ment  of  1814  it  abandoned  its  tide  to  Belgium  and  the 
Black  Forest  in  exchange  for  Italian  territories  im- 
oiediately  contiguous  to  its  main  mass,  and  the  events 
of  x866,  which  expelled  it  from  Italy  and  Germany 
altogether,  completed  efifectually  its  geographical  con- 
solation* 

The  triumph  of  the  Risoigimento  and  of  Bismarck 
seemed  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy's  disaster :  in  reality 
it  did  the  Monarchy  good  service  by  forcing  it  to  accept 
its  natural  destiny  as  the  Danubian  tmit  in  the  European 
scheme* 

We  have  seen  that  the  nucleus  of  the  Dynasty's 
dominions  was  the  Mark  of  Austria*  This  province 
was  founded  in  976  a*d*  by  Otto  II*,  the  Holy  Roman 
Emperor,  to  be  the  bulwark  of  Bavaria  and  all  Southern 
Gennany  against  the  Magyars,  a  horde  of  nomads  from 
the  Eastern  steppes,^  who  had  forced  their  way  up  the 
Danube  and  raided  Western  Europe  for  a  century  as  far 
as  the  Mediterranean  and  even  the  Atlantic*  Otto's 
father,  the  Great  Otto,  had  at  last  broken  their  power  in 
a  series  of  crushing  victories,'  and  the  new  mark  was 

*  The  Magyar  language  belongs  to  the  Ugro-Pinnish  group,  but  they 
mst  have  amtfnflatfd  an  important  Turk^  element,  for  the  Byzantine 
Bmpuor  and  htstorian  Constantine  Porhyrogennetos  could  write  of 
them  in  the  tenth  century  as  the  ^  Turks  **par  exctUence^ 

•  The  battle  of  the  Lechfeld  in  955  was  tte  final  stroke. 


I04  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

intended  to  confine  the  chastened  Magyars  within  iron 
limits.  It  was  therefore  similar  in  design  to  the  Mark 
of  Brandenbtirg^  which  was  founded  during  the  same 
period  to  protect  Northern  Germany  against  the 
Slavonic  tribes  likewise  advancing  Westward  on  the 
further  flank  of  the  Carpathians* 

Austria^  however,  outstripped  Brandenburg  in  its 
early  development*  Under  die  House  of  Babenbeif;, 
which  ruled  it  from  its  fotmdation  until  their  own 
extinction  in  1246,  it  grew  steadily  in  population  and 
extent :  when  the  Hapsburgs  took  possession  of  it  in 
1282,  it  included  not  merely  Upper  and  Lower  Atistria 
up  to  their  present  boundaries,  but  the  Mark  of  Styria 
as  well,  and  was  thus  already  one  of  the  most  important 
units  in  the  German  world* 

This  prosperity  was  due  to  the  province's  command- 
ing geographical  situation.  Vienna,  which  has  been  its 
capital  since  the  tniddle  of  the  twelfth  century,  is  die  key 
to  the  Danube  basin,  because  it  lies  at  one  of  the 
principal  breaks  in  the  river's  course.^  At  this  point 
two  great  mountain^piants  stretch  out  their  arms  towards 
the  Danube  from  opposite  sides*  On  the  South-West 
the  Alps  press  forward  till  dieir  last  spur,  the  Wiener 
Wald,  plunges  into  the  stream  immediately  West  of  the 
city:  North-Eastward  the  Carpathians  spread  their 
wings  fanwise,  and  one  of  them,  the  **  Little  Car- 
pathian ''  ridge,  descends  as  far  as  the  North  bank  of  the 
Danube  immediately  East  of  the  March  tributary  and 
jtist  above  the  Htmgarian  town  of  Pdszony  (Pressbutg)* 
Between  these  two  lines  of  motmtains  there  intervenes 
a  strip  of  plain,  the  Marchfeld,  in  the  angle  formed 
by  the  junction  of  the  March  with  the  Danube* 

Across  the  Marchfeld,  Alp  and  Carpathian  beckon  to 

^  The  **  Iran  Gates  "  are  the  other* 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 


one  another,  and  the  river  whispers  to  all  human  way- 
Carers  from  the  South-East  that  they  must  sb'p  throi^ 
this  gap  if  they  wish  to  reach  his  source,  since  to  left  and 
right  the  mountains  close  their  ranks  and  present  an 
impenetrable  barrier.  Vienna,  however,  has  seized 
control  of  this  narrow  gate.  Ensconced  between  the 
Wiener  Wald  and  the  Danube,  it  commands  the  March- 
feld  on  the  opposite  bank.  An  army  that  traversed  the 
I^aiii  &Dm  tbe  East  and  sot^t  to  ascend  the  rivei 
further  in  Vienna's  despite,  would  make  the  attempt 
atitspeiiL 

Vienna  has  proved  its  strategic  worth  against  more 
fonnidable  enemies  than  the  Magyar  :  in  the  sixteenth 
and  seventeenth  centuries  it  shielded  Germany^  and 
Westem  Europe  from  the  Turk.  The  two  sieges  kud  to 
it  by  die  invader,  first  in  1530  and  then  again  in  1683, 
were  the  most  critical  moments  in  the  protracted  assault 
opcm  Christendom,  but  the  Turkish  tide  found  here  its 


io6  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

high-water  mark*  After  the  crucial  year  of  the  second 
siege,  it  ebbed  steadily  back,  and  Vienna  ceased  to  be  a 
military  outpost,  as  the  border  between  Christendom  and 
Islam  shifted  further  and  further  down  the  Danube  again* 

Thus  ended  the  medieval  phase  of  Vienna's  history* 
For  seven  hundred  years  die  place  was  a  fortress 
severing  the  upper  from  the  middle  basin  of  the 
Danube ;  since  then  it  has  become  an  imperial  dty,  the 
centre  of  a  state  formed  by  the  union  of  both  regions 
within  a  common  frontier*  Superficially,  this  looks 
like  a  complete  reversal  of  character :  in  reality,  Vienna 
has  risen  to  be  the  capital  of  a  great  modem  monarchy 
precisely  because  it  has  continued  to  be  the  point  of 
contact  and  division  between  two  worlds* 

The  portion  of  the  present  Hapsburg  Monarchy  that 
lies  West  of  Vienna  belongs  to  the  indtistrial  world 
of  Central  Europe*  The  manufacturing  district  of 
Reichenbe^  in  the  Northern  comer  of  Bohemia  is  con- 
tinuous with  the  Saxon  Black  Country  immediately 
across  the  frontier*  In  Silesia  we  have  seen  how 
negligible  the  political  boundaries  are  from  the  economic 
point  of  view  :  Austrian  and  Prussian  Silesia  constitute 
an  indivisible  economic  unit,  and  this  unit  in  tum  is  only 
one  section  of  a  vast  industrial  belt,  which  htgjaas  in 
Poland,  and  extends  Southward  through  Moravia  and 
Lower  Austria  as  far  as  Styria  beyond  the  Danube,  on 
the  Alps'  South-Eastem  slope* 

The  portion  of  the  Monarchy  that  lies  East  of  Vienna 
presents  a  striking  economic  contrast*  The  immense 
plain  of  alluvium  deposited  by  the  Danube  and  die 
Theiss,  which  opens  out  below  Buda-Pest  and  is  known 
as  the  "  Alfold,''  specialises  in  the  production  of  wheat 
and  horses*  The  mountainous  country  between  the 
Drave  and  the  Adriatic  is  devoted  to  stock-breeding* 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  107 

Both  these  districts  belong  to  the  Soudi-Eastem  gzoup, 
which  lemains  in  a  much  lower  stage  of  economic 
development  than  Central  and  Western  Europe*  Here 
modem  industry  has  not  yet  struck  root,  and  economic 
activity  is  still  confined  to  the  production  of  raw 
materials  for  the  industrial  world^s  factories  and  of 
foodstufEs  for  its  multiplied  workers.  The  AlfSld  is 
homogeneotis  in  productive  capacity  with  die  Rou- 
manian and  Bulgarian  plains  in  the  lower  basin  of  the 
Danube  beyond  the  **  Iron  Gates '' :  the  live-stock  trade 
of  the  mountains  reaches  its  acme  in  Serbia,  which  is 
dependent  entirely  upon  its  export  of  swine. 

The  two  sections  of  the  Monarchy  which  meet  at 
Vknna  are  thus  economically  complementary*  Co* 
operation  widi  the  Soudi-East  assures  to  the  North- 
western worker  that  raw  materials  will  not  run  short 
and  that  the  cost  of  living  will  remain  low :  oo-operation 
with  the  North-West  guarantees  the  South-Eastem 
husbandman  and  shepherd  a  stable  market  for  their 
amuial  surplus*  Isolated,  each  section  would  be 
txposcd  to  all  die  dislocations  of  shortage  and  over- 
piodtiction ;  combined,  they  constitute  a  self-sufficient 
economic  unit* 

We  can  now  understand  how  the  Hapsbuq;  state, 
after  centuries  of  territorial  fluctuation,  attained  throt^ 
the  aetdement  of  1866  an  equilibrium  which  has 
endured  for  nearly  fifty  years*  From  the  standpoint  of 
Natiooality,  the  Monarchy  in  19x4  is  as  chaotic  as  it 
was  in  1793  or  x6z8 :  from  the  point  of  view  of  economic 
geography,  it  has  slowly  but  surely  advanced  from  chaos 
to  order*  The  Mark  of  Austria  has  forfeited  its  national 
significance  as  the  bulwark  of  Germany,  only  to  realise 
its  economic  destiny  as  the  focus  of  the  Danube  Basin* 
The  great  river  which  Vienna  commands  runs  from 


io8  THEJVITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

head  to  foot  of  the  Empire  like  a  spinal  oord,  and  the 
Hapsburg  dominions  have  consolidated  themselves 
roimd  this  central  conductor  of  economic  life*  Hquftmig 
territories  beyond  the  range  of  the  Danubian  ""  nervous- 
system  "  have  inevitably  fallen  away  and  been  absorbed 
m  other  organisms,  while  territories  within  its  compass 
have  been  irresistibly  drawn  into  the  Hapsburg  sphmt, 
and  vitalised  into  an  organic  whole* 

The  centripetal  princ4>le  we  divined  in  the  Hs^burg 
Monarchy  reveals  itself,  therefore,  as  economic*  The 
Monarchy  has  accommodated  itself  to  the  current  set 
going  by  the  Industrial  Revolution  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  and  this  augurs  strongly  for  its  survival*  The 
economic  factor  operated  side  by  side  with  the  national 
in  the  moulding  of  nineteenth-century  Eufope*  The 
territorial  simplification,  which  we  have  noted  in  general 
and  traced  more  closely  in  the  Hapsburg  instance, 
was  determined  principally  by  the  economic  cause* 
Economics  have  been  winning  their  way  to  primacy, 
and  we  may  prophesy  that  in  the  future  **  international  *' 
phase  of  dvilisatum,  they  will  play  the  dominant  rftle* 

The  setdement  of  z866,  then,  brought  the  Hapsbuq; 
Monarchy  economic  unity  and  equilibrium*  A  living 
organism  cannot,  however,  remain  static :  to  survive, 
it  must  grow*  All  states  are  in  process  either  of  growth 
or  of  decline,  and  they  are  inevitably  reduced  to  the 
btter  phase  by  failure  to  succeed  in  the  former*  Until 
z866  Austria  wasted  her  strength  and  jeopardised  her 
future  by  failing  to  recognize  her  Danubian  character : 
l^marck  and  the  Risoi^^imento  tai^t  her,  by  a  rude 
lesson,  that  the  true  field  for  her  expansion  lay  neither 
towards  Italy  nor  towards  Germany,  but  in  the  same 
direction  as  die  Danube's  current*  Thenceforth  Austria 
set  her  face  steadfasdy  towards  a  South-Eastem  horizon* 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  109 

This  ''  trend  Eastwards''^  has  taken  a  very  sintster 
oomplezibn^  and  has  even  occasioned  the  present  war ; 
yet  its  motive  forot  is  not  the  dynastic  ambition  which 
governed  Austria's  development  as  recently  as  the 
Napoleonic  period*  It  is  only  pardy  acootmted  for 
by  that  national  chauvinism  of  the  ''  Prussian  "  type^ 
wliidi  during  the  last  century  has  been  supersedit^  the 
rivalries  of  Autocracy  and  caricaturing  them  in  its 
escaggerated  egotism*  The  essence  of  the  movement 
IS  not  militaristic  but  economic*  It  is  the  penetration 
of  an  indtistrialised  unit,  in  search  of  wider  markets  and 
wider  sources  of  raw  produce,  into  r^ons  still  on  the 
far  side  of  the  Industrial  Revolution* 

The  most  striking  expression  of  the  Eastward  Trend 
is  the  position  won  by  the  Austrian  Uoyd  Steamship 
Company  in  the  traffic  of  the  Levant*  You  can  board 
these  steamers  bound  for  Trieste  at  every  great  port  in 
tbe  Nearer  East*  The  express  service  firom  Alexandria 
has  become  the  favourite  route  of  British  officials 
returning  from  Egypt  and  the  Soudan  on  leave,  and  the 
Company  has  had  die  enterprise  to  run  anodier  service 
90  hr  afield  as  Bombay  and  Ce^n,  in  order  to  capture 
the  passenger-traffic  from  British  India  as  well*  Batoum, 
the  port  of  Russian  Caucasia,  is  another  terminus  of  the 
Une,  and  it  serves  the  whole  of  Asiatic  Turkey  for  the 
Gtfiiage  of  the  European  mail*  In  all  the  ^ean  you 
wiO  not  meet  finer  ships  than  these,  and  diey  produce 
die  sense  of  some  strong,  civilised  power  behind  the 
faonn>n* 

As  soon  as  you  have  passed  Corfii  the  impression 
deepens*  Slerious  competition  from  the  French 
Messageries  Maritimes  or  from  the  various  Italian 
lines    ceases    conspicuously   at    the    mouth    of   die 

1  **  Drang  aach  Oitai*'' 


no  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

Adriatic^  and  the  whole  trade  up  the  East  coast  of 
this  gulf  is  monopolised  by  the  Lloyd*^ 

In  Epinis  and  Albania  the  Lloyd  stands  for  European 
civilisation*  It  provides  the  only  means  of  transport 
for  no  practicable  roads  have  yet  been  constructed  on 
land.  Goods,  mails  and  travellers  depend  upon  it 
entirely  for  bcal  as  well  as  for  foreign  traffic :  in  the 
squalid  coast-towns  the  arrival  of  the  Austrian  packet- 
boat  is  the  event  of  the  week,  and  even  the  hosdle 
Montenegrins  cannot  afibrd  to  boycott  it  from  their 
more  imposing  harbour  of  Antivari. 

Montenegro  is  an  improvement  upon  Albania*  Here 
for  the  first  time  the  steamer  can  come  direcdy  alongside 
a  quay,  instead  of  anchoring  a  mile  out  and  transacting 
her  business  by  means  of  lighters  plying  dumsily  to 
and  fro  across  the  strip  of  shoal  water  inshore.  When, 
however,  you  leave  Antivari  behind,  and  turn  to  enter 
Cattaro  Fjord,  you  stumble  suddenly  into  European 
civilisation*  As  the  reaches  of  the  **  Bocche  **  open  out, 
finely-metalled  and  graded  roads,  substantially  buih 
cottages  and  beautifully  -  terraced  mountain  slopes  pie- 
sent  themselves  on  either  hand,  and  a  general  air  of 
prosperity  and  good  management  pervades  the  scene. 

TheresdFter  you  touch  in  succession  at  the  Dalmatian 
ports — Gravosa,  Spabto,  Sebenico— each  busier  than 
the  last,  and  you  wonder  curiously  in  what  this  series 
will  cuhninate,  and  what  is  the  fountain-head  of  this 
continually  intensified  economic  activity,  the  first 
symptoms  of  which  you  encountered  in  such  distant 
quarters.  In  Dalmatia,  as  in  Krete  and  the  Morea, 
your  imagination  is  fired  by  the  majestic  remains  of 

'The  Ungstfo-Cioata  line  from  Fiume  is  an  arttfictal  enterprne, 
with  the  same  political  intention  as  the  recent  attempt  to  make  Hungary 
industrially  independent  of  Austria  by  the  development  of  Hungarian 
maaufactum. 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  iii 

Venetian  fortresses  with  the  Lion  of  St*  Mark  sculptured 
upon  their  bastions,  but  you  are  aware  that  their  signifi- 
cance has  vanished.  Your  goal  is  not  mediaeval  Venice, 
and  you  are  not  disappointed  when  finally  you  make 


If  the  Danube  is  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy's  spinal 
cord,  Trieste  is  the  sensory  oi^^an  through  which  it 
communicates  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  Atlantic 
Imers  are  moored  at  its  jetties,  and  it  is  in  direct  railway 
communicatjon  with  every  part  of  Central  Europe. 
Here  you  become  fully  conscious  of  the  great  industrial 
hinterland  in  Styria  and  Lower  Austria,  Moravia  and 
Bohemia,  which  gives  the  Lloyd  work  to  do  in  ports 
thousands  of  miles  away,  and  you  remember  the  grain 
and  cattle  of  Hungary  which  feed  the  Austrian  manu- 
fixtures  like  fueL  Standing  in  Trieste,  you  at  last 
behold  the  modem  Hapsburg  Empire  in  its  true 
perspective* 

You  understand,  too,  how  this  racially  heterogeneous 
state  not  merely  holds  together,  but  achieves  a  con- 
structive and  even  aggressive  foreign  policy*  Economic 
exploitation  of  semi-dvilised  areas  demands  a  backing 
of  political  prestige*  The  Austrian  Lloyd  could  not  win 
and  hold  its  ground  without  the  constant  aid  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  consul,  and  the  ultimate  guarantee 
erf  the  ""  dreadnoughts  **  docked  at  Pola*  The  business 
of  modem  commerce  can  only  be  conducted  with  the 
capital^  both  material  and  mo»l,  of  a  great  power,  and 
no  single  element  in  the  Monarchy  is  strong  enough  to 
play  this  part  alone*  The  populations  of  the  Hapsburg 
Empire  depend  upon  union  for  the  maintenance  of  their 
present  position  in  the  world*^ 

*A  reocflllHniilt  Atatriaii^dfeadnoiight  was  chnstened  "Viribus 
Units  **— « tragically  ratiooal  piece  of  utopiaiitsin* 


112  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

The  economic  solidarity  of  the  Bmpife  was  striking 
illustrated  during  the  crisis  of  1908*  The  Min^try  for 
Foreign  AfEairs  had  seised  the  opportunity  of  the  Turidsh 
Revolution  to  proclaim  the  formal  annexation  of  die 
''  Occupied  provinces/'  Bosnia  -  Herzegovina.  The 
inhabitants  of  the  district  are  Southern  Slavs,  and  the 
act  was  a  much  heavier  blow  to  Serbian  nationalmn, 
which  still  aspired  to  incorporate  the  territory  in  the 
Serbian  state,  than  to  Ottoman  Imperialism,  which  had 
long  resigned  itself  to  a  merely  nominal  suzerainty* 
The  armounoement  accordingly  aroused  the  deepest 
resentment  throughout  the  Slavonic  world,  and  not 
least  among  the  Slavonic  citizens  of  the  Empire  itself. 

The  Slavs,  however,  could  make  no  reprisals*  Russia 
was  paralysed  by  disaster  in  the  Far  East  and  revoludbn 
at  home,  pro-Serbian  demonstrations  within  the  Haps* 
buig  K^narchy  itself  were  vigorously  suppressed  by  the 
government,  and  Serbia  was  impotent  without  external 
support*  Turkey,  on  the  other  hand,  was  able  to  re- 
taliate most  effectively  by  boycotting  Austrian  shipping 
along  her  whole  immense  coast-line,  and  eschewing  the 
use  of  Austrian  manufactures.  In  particular  the  Turks 
abandoned  the  **  fez,''  for  they  had  come  to  depend 
for  the  supply  of  their  national  headgear  almost  entirely 
upon  Austrian  industry* 

This  Austrian  manufacture  of  fezes  hxppantd  to  have 
become  localised  in  Bohemia,^  and  so  the  Turkish  retort 
hit  the  German  and  Magyar  elements  in  the  Monardiy, 
who  were  really  responsible  for  the  government's  actioa, 
far  less  severely  than  the  Tchechs,  its  bitterest  opponents. 
Austrian  **  Official  Circles  "  might  therefore  have  been 

^  Rekhenberg,  the  chief  industml  centre  of  the  province,  lies  in  a 
German-speaking  district ;  but  the  whole  of  Behead^  Tcfaecfa  and 
German  portions  alikCy  has  become  thofouf^ily  ««i#t««f>*ffiff^  dtuine 
the  last  century* 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  113 

txpected  to  ooi^ratulate  themselves  on  Hllmg  mo  birds 
widi  one  stone.  Yet  the  eoooomic  interactioti  of  eadi 
port  of  die  Monarchy  with  every  other  is  so  dose,  and 
Rohtmian  industry  is  such  an  indispensable  element  in 
this  delicate  rhythm,  that  the  effects  of  the  local  blow 
made  themselves  imiversally  felt.  Instead  of  rubbing 
its  hands,  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  AfEuis  was  broi^t 
tt>  its  knees,  and  strenuously  exerted  itself  on  the 
Tcfaecfas'  behalf.  The  Turkish  Government  was  able  to 
extort  mose  than  adequate  material  reparation  for  the 
Monarchy's  moral  delinquency  b^re  it  gave  the  signal 
for  the  boycott  to  cease. 

The  breach  with  Turkey  in  1908  was  an  interlude. 
Since  the  Balkan  crisis  which  culminated  in  the  Russo- 
Tuitiih  war  of  1878,  the  Hapsbui^  and  OtK>man 
Empires  have  normally  maintained  a  good  undeistand" 
ing,  and  the  birth  of  this  friendship  was  fbUowed 
immediately  by  the  alliance  with  Germany  in  1879. 

Tliis  trqtle  association,  which  has  endured  ever  since, 
and  has  embaAed  in  common  upon  the  present  war,  is 
likewise  aplaincd  by  the  economic  situation.  If  Pan- 
gcnnan  pc^tidans  dream  of  eventually  consolidating 
a  gone  of  territory  "  from  Hamburg  on  the  North  Sea 
to  Koweit  on  the  Persian  Gulf  "  into  a  sii^^e  pohdcal 
tmit,  this  is  simply  a  hypothetical  expansion  of  the 
giDupii^  which  already  exists  in  miniature  in  the  Haps- 
butg  Monarchy  itself.  The  Hapsbui^  state  is  built  up 
oat  of  the  inckistrial  districts  West  of  Vienna  and  the 
agrarian  districts  East  of  it :  the  "  Pangerman  Con- 
federation "  would  include  the  whole  of  industrialised 
Central  Europe  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  proportional 
agrarian  element  in  South-Eastem  Europe  and  Nearer 
Asia  on  the  other. 

There  is  oonsiderable  economic  iustification  for  this 


1X4  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

programme.^  Gec^^phy  has  imposed  the  **  Tiend 
Eastward  '^  upon  the  youi^r  industry  of  Central 
Europe  as  inevitably  as  she  summoned  the  older 
industry  of  the  West  to  the  Atlantic,  and  to  the  colonial 
areas  which  lay  along  its  highways*  Yet  Pangiermaniam 
has  set  itself  a  difficult  and  perhaps  a  disastrous  goal,  in 
determining  to  convert  this  economic  possibility  into  a 
political  fact*  It  has  begun  by  challenging  the  rest  of 
Europe  to  a  mortal  duel  upon  this  issue*  We  have  good 
hope  that  the  battle  will  end  in  the  discomfiture  of  the 
aggressor  and  the  frustration  of  his  plans,  but  even  if 
he  were  victorious  in  the  war,  he  would  find  himself 
hardly  nearer  to  his  objective*  He  hopes  to  fashion  a 
vast  political  structure  upon  his  economic  framework : 
he  has  first  to  learn  whether  this  basis  suffices  for  the 
execution  of  a  less  ambitious  piece  of  craftsmanship* 

Will  the  centripetal  force  of  economics  finally  over- 
come the  centrifugal  force  of  Nationality  in  the  present 
Hapsbui^  Empire  i  The  programme  of  Pangermanism 
stands  or  falls  by  the  answer  to  this  question,  and  it  is 
also  a  repetition,  in  more  precise  terms,  of  the  question 
we  asked  ourselves  at  the  close  of  the  last  chapter : 
Will  the  Hapsburg  Empire  break  up  as  the  result  of  this 
war  i  Our  attention  is  recalled  to  the  internal  struc- 
ture of  the  Hapsburg  state,  this  time  in  its  political 
aspect* 

The  countries  which  have  coalesced  into  the  present 
Hapsbui^  Empire  are  some  degrees  removed  from  the 
original  centres  of  modem  European  dvilisatton,  and 

*  The  Germano-Austio-Turkish  league  has  proved  itself  firmer  than 
the  official  **  Tr^le  AUiuioe,''  of  which  Italy,  not  Turloey,  ts  the  tfatrd 
member*  Italy  joined  the  Central  Buropcan  powers  in  xSSa  on 
account  of  a  temporary  economic  clash  with  Franoer  but  her  funda- 
mental interests,  as  we  shall  see  later,  are  entirely  dififiucnt  from  theirs. 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  115 

medixval  oondidons  here  continued  almost  unmodified 
until  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

The  new  leaven  began  to  work  rather  suddenly  in 
Maria  Theresa's  reign.  She  weathered  the  European 
storm  which  burst  out  upon  her  accession  by  arousing 
the  national  patriotism  of  the  Magyars/  but  the  Empire 
had  been  in  danger  of  complete  dissolution,  and  the 
attempt  to  recover  Silesia  from  the  Prussians  by  alliance 
with  France  did  not  meet  with  success.'  Maria  Theresa 
was  led  by  these  misfortunes  abroad  to  develop  the 
Empire's  latent  strength  by  reo^anisation  at  home. 
She  initiated  her  dominions  into  the  **  Strong  Govern- 
ment ''  phase,  by  a  policy  of  centralisation  on  the  model 
of  contemporary  Prussia  and  France. 

Political  evolution  in  the  **  Danubian  tmit  **  thus 
itself  at  the  outset  from  the  process  in  the 


West*  There  ""  Strong  Government ''  and  Nationality 
prevailed  in  succession,  and  the  latter  was  enriched  with 
the  former's  inheritance :  here  the  two  forces  appeared 
simultaneously  upon  the  scene,  and  it  was  not  long  before 
they  came  into  violent  collision. 

Li  1780  Maria  Theresa  was  succeeded  by  her  son 
Joseph  II.  Joseph  was  a  devoted  disciple  of  the  French 
philosophers,  and  he  attempted  to  carry  out  uncom- 
promisingly in  backward  Austria  that  transformation 
of  society  which  was  accomplished  a  few  years  later  in 
such  partial  measure  in  progressive  France.  The  actual 
achievements  of  the  French  Revolution  were  none  the 
less  stupendous,  however  short  they  fell  of  their  aim, 
and  they  were  only  made  possible  by  the  spiritual 
response  of  the  Nation  to  the  philosophers'  gospel. 
Joseph  undertook  the  mission  of  the  **  philosopher- 

>  **  War  of  the  Austrian  Successoii/'  1740-1748. 
•  •*  Seven  Years'  War,**  1756-17^. 


r 


ii6  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

king,"  and  attempted  by  means  oi  "  Strot^  Govern- 
ment" to  wrench  unenlightened  populations  out  of 
their  (dieiished  traditions  and  convert  them  fordbly  by 
the  accomplished  fact.  Neglecting  all  local  differences 
of  language^  religion,  and  custom,  he  proceeded  to  re- 
fashion his  dominions  on  a  pedantically  uniform  plan. 

Joseph's  crusade  was  a  disastrous  failure.  Reform 
was  checkmated  by  revolt,  and  he  was  killed  by  ten  years 
of  unrelieved  disappointments.  Yet  his  short  reign  has 
determined  the  course  of  the  Monarchy's  internal  history 
ever  since. 

He  contrived  to  rai^e  NationaUty  and  Enlighten- 
ment in  opposite  camps.  His  dt^matic  disr^ard  for 
national  feeling  awakened  it  into  frantic  life,  and  it 
arrayed  itself  for  the  battle  not  in  the  "  Rights  of  Man  " 
(of  viutii  it  had  never  heard),  but  in  the  familiar 
harness  of  mediant  vested  interests.  The  centres  of 
nationalistic  resistance  were  the  provincial  "  estates," 
bodies  representative  not  of  peoples  but  of  castes. 
Hiey  were  dominated  by  the  nobility  and  the  Church, 
so  that  nationalism  in  the  Hapsburg  Empire  started  with 
a  strong  feudal  and  clerical  bias,'  whidi  has  left  pei^ 
manent  effects.  The  movement  has  remained  legalistic 
instead  of  becoming  philosophic.  It  looks  to  the  past 
rather  than  to  the  future,  and  has  fallen  a  willing  victim 
to  the  malady  of  "  historical  sentiment." 

Joseph's  death  in  1790  concluded  the  first  bout 
in  the  contest  between  enl^tened  despotism  and 
nationalistic  reaction,  but  the  factors  of  success  and 

'  Thii  n  true  of  dw  difbmit  movemeoti  in  nnou*  degrees.  Magyar 
iutioaaIi>m.  for  instance,  hu  been  wholly  ariitocntic  sad  oot  dencal ; 
among  the  Slovenes,  wheie  the  nobility  was  German,  dcricalkB  has 
till  recently  been  supreme :  national  feeling  among  the  Tdiecfas  ms 
fostered,  in  its  earlier  phase,  by  the  Church  and  (be  oiiginaUy  Gtmaa 
--•--■''-  f  in  conjunction  I 


I 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  117 

failure  were  too  evenly  divided  between  the  two  forces 
to  allow  a  speedy  decision*  The  struggle  continued 
intermittently  till  the  revolutionary  year  of  1848  brought 
it  tD  a  head* 

We  have  already  seen  how  Hapsbturg  autocracy  was 
overthrown  in  one  year  only  to  rise  again  in  the  next^ 
how  the  national  principle  was  championed  by  the 
Magyars,  who  were  willing  to  take  up  arms  on  its  behalf, 
and  how  their  heroic  resistance  to  Francis  Joseph's 
armies  was  overcome  by  the  intervention  of  Nicholas, 
Us  accomplice* 

From  1849  to  z86x  Joseph's  theories  seemed  to  have 
triumphed,  but  in  the  Uttemess  of  the  conflict  despotism 
had  discarrifd  its  enlightenment*  A  uniform  regime 
of  absolutism  was  imposed  upon  the  whole  Monarchy, 
and  the  official  use  of  German,  the  language  of  the 
Viennese  bureaucracy,  was  umVersally  enforced,  with- 
out regard  to  the  nationality  of  the  governed*  Such  a 
system  could  not  last,  because  its  spirit  was  entirely 
negative*  It  was  created  to  repress  the  evolution  of 
mneteentli-oenttiry  Europe,  and  was  bound  to  succumb 
under  the  wave's  return* 

The  external  btows  which  forced  the  Monarchy  to 
rcs^  its  Western  ambitions  and  set  it  free  to  pursue 
die  economic  career  of  a  Danubian  tmit,  had  an  equally 
momentous  effisct  upon  its  internal  politics* 

The  war  of  1859  induced  the  govenunent  to  temper 
centralisation  by  the  grant  of  a  constitution*  The 
provincial  estates  or  **  diets  "  were  called  into  existence 
again,  thotsgh  their  traditional  institutions  were  now 
standardned  to  an  official  pattern,  and  each  diet  was 
empowered  to  elect  representatives  to  a  two-chambered 
parKammt  for  the  vAiole  Monarchy;  but  the  utter 
iUtde  of  1866  foUowed  hard  upon  this  concession. 


ii8  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

and  the  government  found  itself  at  its  subjects' 
mercy* 

At  this  crisis  the  initiative  was  seized  by  the  Magyar 
nation.  The  relative  weight  of  their  numbers  in  the 
motley  population  of  the  Monarchy,  the  corporate 
feeling  inspired  in  this  mass  by  the  tragedy  of  1849,  an 
inherited  political  tradition  and  able  leadership  in  the 
present  all  combined  to  give  them  the  mastery  of  the 
situation.  They  were  able  to  dictate  their  own  terms, 
and  the  **  Ausgleich  **  or  **  G>mpromise  '*  which  they 
imposed  upon  the  Dynasty  has  remained  the  basis  of 
the  Monarchy's  internal  organisation  ever  since. 

The  principal  terms  of  the  compact  were  as  follows  : 

(i.)  Hungary  recovered  her  separate  existence  as  a 
state,  with  the  territorial  extent  traditionally  claimed  by 
the  **  Crown  of  St.  Stephen/'  and  with  Magyar  as  its 
official  language. 

(iiJ)  This  state  was  o^anised  as  a  constitutional 
monarchy,  and  the  sovereignty  was  declared  hereditary 
in  the  House  of  Hapsbu^.  Francis  Joseph  and  his 
heirs  were  to  reign  with  the  tide  of  king  after  coronation 
at  Pest. 

(iii.)  The  new  Hungarian  Kingdom  was  made 
autonomous  in  every  department  of  political  activity, 
with  three  exceptions : 

(a)  Foreign  Affairs,  including  the  Q>nsular  Service. 

(b)  Naval  and  military  o^anisation. 

(c)  The  budget  required  for  these  purposes. 

(iv.)  The  control  of  these  three  departments  was 
vested  in  an  orgaai  of  authority  common  to  Hui^ary 
and  the  rest  of  the  Monarchy,  and  the  character  of  the 
common  institutions  was  jealously  defined  : 

(a)  Hungary's  allegiance  to  diem  was  oonditionai 
upon  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  a  unified 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  119 

system  of  parliamentary  govermnent  throughout  the 
rematmng  Hapsbu^  dominions* 

(A)  This  parliament,  and  not  merely  the  Dynasty,  was 
to  ratify  the  G>mpromise* 

(c)  The  Hungarian  and  Austrian  parliaments  were 
each  to  elect  annually  a  committee  or  '"  Delegation/' 
and  the  two  delegations  were  to  share  the  control  of 
the  Jomt  Executive. 

(iQ  The  Joint  Executive  was  to  consist  of  three 
ministries :  for  Foreign  AfiEairs,  for  War,  and  for  Finance 
respectively* 

The  Magyars'  ultimatum  was  accepted  uncondition- 
ally. In  1867  a  constituent  assembly  was  convened  to 
represent  the  remainder  of  the  Hapsbui^;  dominions, 
the  Au^eich  was  formally  voted  as  the  fundamental 
constitutijon  of  the  whole  Monarchy,  and  all  relations 
between  the  new  Hungary  and  the  diminished  Austria 
which  were  not  covered  by  its  terms,  were  settled  more 
or  less  satisfactorily  by  direct  negotiations*^ 

The  ''Dual  System''  created  by  these  actsj^has 
remained  in  existence  forty-seven  years  without  being 
denounced  by  either  party,  and  we  can  draw  important 
ooodusions  both  from  its  structure  and  from  its  per- 


The  Ausgleich  was  a  compromise  between  tmity  and 

*  The  foUowtng  wetc  the  chief  outstaiidiiig  questioas : 

(a)  There  was  die  public  debt  which  had  been  contracted  by  the 
oentralised  autocratic  government.  The  Magyars  repudiated  responsi- 
bOfty  for  it,  but  guaranteed  an  annual  contribution  which  amounted 
10  somewhat  less  than  a  quarter  of  the  total  interest  The  rest  of  the 
bofdcn  devolved  upon  Austria* 

(b)  A  cnstoms  Union  was  formed  between  Austria  and  Hungary. 
All  revenues  derived  from  it  were  assigned  to  the  Joint  Budget,  and  the 
proportion  was  fixed  in  whidi  the  two  states  should  oontrmute  the 
deficit  id  the  Customs-receq)ts  on  the  joint  expenditure.  Both  the 
Costoms  Union  and  the  current  quota  were  made  terminable  after 
periods  d  ten  years,  but  the  Customs  agreement  has  been  renewed  in 
one  form  or  anodier  ever  since,  and  the  readjustment  of  the  quota  has 
always  been  satisfactorily  effected* 


lao  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

independence*  During  the  war  of  1849  the  Magyars 
had  deposed  the  House  of  Hapsburg^  denounced  all 
connection  with  the  other  parts  of  the  Monarchy  and 
proclaimed  Hungary  a  republic.  This  declaration  of 
the  national  will  had  been  nullified  by  brute  fiorce^  for 
seventeen  years  the  national  freedom  had  been  paralysed 
by  a  tyrannical  regime,  and  now  at  last  in  1866  the  bonds 
were  broken  in  sunder*  After  passing  through  such 
an  experience  as  this,  the  Ms^ars  might  have  been 
expected  to  assert  their  independence  more  vehemently 
than  ever  before.  Yet  in  this  supreme  moment  the 
nation  was  guided  not  by  the  violent  *'  Kossuthists/'  ^ 
but  by  the  moderates  under  Deik :  it  chose  constitu- 
tional monarchy  within  the  Hapsbui^  complex  instead 
of  republican  independence  outside  it. 

The  Magyars  are  strongly  influenced  by  sentiment, 
and  this  choice  involved  the  most  severe  sentimental 
sacrifices.  Their  constancy  in  abiding  by  it  therefore 
proves  that  since  1848  they  have  become  conscious  of 
a  higher  necessity  which  impels  them  to  maintain  the 
Hapsbu^  unit  unbroken. 

The  Austrians,  on  their  part,  made  perhaps  even  a 
greater  sacrifice  in  accepting  the  Magyars'  terms* 
Sentiment  they  could  not  have  saved,  for  it  was  bound 
up  with  the  maintenance  of  the  **  Germanising  **  regime, 
and  since  the  dibdcle  that  was  of  course  beyond  their 
power ;  but  it  might  appear  that  they  would  have  con- 
sulted their  material  interests  better  by  resorting  to  the 
other  extreme,  and  breaking  ofiFfrom  Hungary  altogether. 
The  compromise  imposed  upon  them  a  disproportionate 
share  of  the  common  burdens  :  they  must  accordingly 
have  found  that  co-operation  with  Hungary  brought 


'  Louis  Kossuth  was  the  Mapyar  exponent  of  the  ideab  of  '48^  and 
he  was  president  of  the  Hungarian  republic  in  1849. 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  121 

tfaem  more  than  adequate  material  compensation  in  other 
directions* 

The  explanation  lies  in  the  economic  structure  of  the 
Danubian  unit  which  we  have  already  analysed*  The 
Ausgkich  is  simply  the  political  expression  of  the 
economic  situation*  The  Austrian  half  of  the  Dual 
BAonarchy  corresponds  to  the  industrial  region  above 
Vienna/  the  Hungarian  half  to  the  agrarian  region  below 
it.  Their  economic  interdependence  is  recognised  in 
die  common  tariff:  Hungary  abandons  the  possibility 
of  building  up  an  indigenous  industry  of  her  own,  by 
protection  against  Austrian  manufactures,  in  order  to 
secure  a  virtual  monopoly  of  the  Austrian  market  for 
foodstufib  and  raw  produce*  The  value  of  political 
massiveness  in  the  competition  of  international  com- 
meroe  is  recognised  m  the  three  Joint  Ministries: 
Austria  helps  Hungary  to  pay  her  way,  because  these 
common  organs  enable  her  to  draw  on  Hungary's 
strength  as  well  as  her  own  for  the  dipbmatic  and 
military  support  of  her  commercial  expansion* 

The  political  powers,  then,  which  control  respectively 
the  Austrian  and  the  Hungarian  half  of  the  Monarchy, 
have  reckoned  with  the  economic  factor,  and  have  bodi 
concluded  that  it  is  the  determining  force  in  their 
polidcal  destinies*  They  see  that  neither  of  them  is 
economically  strong  enough  to  stand  alone,  and  that 
the  akemative  to  **  Dualism  **  is  not  independence,  but 
die  incorporation  of  each  in  another  group  or  unit* 

Yet  why  shoukl  such  a  change  of  grouping  be 
caimrially  less  desirable  for  them  than  the  present 
arrangement  i    It  need  involve  no  economic  loss :  we 

*  The  pioviiioe  of  Dahnatia  beloags  to  Aistria,  thouj^  it  Iks  fiv 
down  the  Adtiatic,  00  the  other  side  of  the  ^  Crown  of  St*  Stephen's '' 
nxip  of  coast-line ;  but  it  is  an  insignificant  exception,  due  to  chance 
ijglifi  thm  design* 


133  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRU 

can  imagine  cxmditions  under  which  it  would  actually 
be  advantageous.  Suppose  the  Central  Powers  won 
this  war  and  realised  the  Pangennan's  dieam  by  building 
their  poKtico-economic  confederation  from  Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf,  this  colossal  complex  would 
naturally  articulate  itself  into  two  groups.  The  German 
Empire  and  Austria  would  coalesce  to  form  the  industrial 
half :  the  agrarian  half  would  constitute  itself  out  of 
Htmgary,  the  Balkans,  and  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

It  might  seem  that  Austria  and  Hungary  would  both 
gain  by  such  re-organisation.  We  have  allowed  that 
the  Germans  of  Austria  would  be  d^^raded  to  a  second- 
ary rdle  in  the  German  Empire ;  but  meanwhile  we 
have  discovered  that  they  cannot  stand  alone.  For 
them  it  is  merely  a  choice  of  yoke-fellows,  and  their 
mightier  kinsmen  of  Northern  Germany  would  be 
more  sympathetic  companions  than  the  Magyars  with 
their  aUen  speech  and  inferior  culture.  Moreover,  as 
members  of  a  consolidated  German  block  they  would 
obtain  mtich  better  terms  in  a  new  Au^eich  with  the 
agrarian  wing  than  they  enjoy  in  their  present  Ausgldch 
with  the  "  Crown  of  St.  Stephen." 

The  Magyars,  on  their  side,  would  gain  consider- 
ably in  political  importance.  In  the  Dual  Kbnarchy 
Hungary  is  no  more  than  an  equal,  if  not  actually  an 
inferior  partner :  in  a  new  South-Eastem  group,  her 
comparative  population,  wealth  and  culture  would  give 
her  undisputed  leadership. 

The  loyalty  with  wfaidi  bodi  parties  have  chmg  to  the 
Ausgldch  must  therefore  depend  upon  some  further 
factor  in  addition  to  the  economic. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Ausgleich  takes  fiiU  account  of 
the  economic  facts.  It  is  a  compromise  between  unity 
nd    independence    dictated    by   economic   necessity. 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  133 

but  it  has  another  and  a  less  creditable  side*  It  is 
abo  a  compromise  between  compulsory  uniformity  and 
national  devolution*  It  does  not  attempt  to  do  justice 
tQ  the  £acts  of  nationality  in  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy : 
it  merely  concedes  a  modictmi  calculated  to  shelve  die 
discussion  of  national  problems  that  are  in  urgent  need 
ofsohstion. 

The  Magyars  drew  the  boundary  of  the  **  Kingdom 
of  St*  Stephen/'  and  they  daim  to  speak  in  the  name  of 
its  people*  Yet  at  the  census  of  1900  only  44*6  per 
cent*  of  the  kingdom's  total  population  was  Magyar  in 
nationality^  while  even  in  Hungary  proper  the  Magyars 
only  amounted  to  52*38  per  cent*,  a  bare  majority.^ 

The  terms  of  the  Ausgleidi  between  the  new 
Hungary  and  the  rest  of  the  Monarchy  were  thus 
formulated  on  the  one  part  by  no  more  than  a  fraction 
of  the  Hui^arians,  and  the  parliament  which  accepted 
those  terms  on  the  other  part  was  even  less  representative 
of  the  **  diminished  Austria*''  *  Nominally  the  Ausgleich 
was  an  arrangement  between  the  whole  people  of  one 
half  of  the  Monarchy  and  the  whole  people  of  the 

^  Pofpahdsm  at  the  Census  of  xgoo : 

Grown  of  St*  Stephen    •        •        •  i9$!3i$%fioo 

Huogtty  proper    ....  z6328/xx> 

Magyais 8^589/>oo 

'  The  Tcfaechs  leftised  to  send  representatives  to  this  constituent 
asseflabiy,  and  so  tbt  Aus^eidi  was  passed  without  their  voice,  while 
an  the  noo-Gennan  deputies  who  did  attend  were  in  opposition  except 
the  Pcks,  The  hrttcr  were  won  over  fay  thesovemment  at  the  price  of 
■■p«****«*  concessions  to  their  nationality,  since  the  Germans  formed 
hanUy  more  than  a  third  of  the  Austrian  population,  their  supremacy 
ooald  only  be  maintained  by  a  coalition,  if  the  test  semblance  m 
oooatitutioiial  government  was  to  be  preserved.  They  chose  to  make 
tenm  witfi  the  Polish  block  radier  than  any  other  from  motives  of 
fordgB  poliey  which  we  have  already  examined.  The  internal  parlia- 
lueuiaiy  situation  explains  why  the  concessions  to  tiie  Poles  were  so 
Ut^^taiSbiag,  and  also  why^  they  have  never  become  a  precedent  for  a 
feaend  acfaeme  of  devolution.  ^  This  piece  of  Austrian  liberalism  was 
paDsatovy,  not  romcructive,  in  intention* 


ta4  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

remainder:  actually  it  was  concluded  between  the 
M^Cyan  of  Hui^ary,  a  strong  miaocity,  and  liie 
Germans  of  Austria,  who  constituted  do  more  dian 
J5.I  J  per  cent,  of  the  extra  -  Hungarian  or  "  Austrian  " 
population  in  1900.^ 

bi  this  light  the  "  Dual  System  "  acquires  a  sinister 
connotation.  It  could  fairly  be  representtd  as  a 
conspiracy  between  the  two  strongest  narionalities  in 
the  Hapsinurg  Empire  for  the  concerted  oppression  of 
the  rest.  From  1849  to  z866  the  entire  population  of 
the  Empire  was  subjected  to  compulsory  Gtermanisation, 
but  the  buffets  the  German  master  received  &om  his 
enemies  in  1866  so  weakened  him  that  he  was  driven 
to  take  one  of  his  serfe  into  partnership.  He  strudt  a 
bargain  with  the  Magyar,  the  sbve  with  the  most 
powerful  fists.  He  raised  him  to  be  his  peer,  made 
over  to  him  a  large  share  of  his  land  and  chattels  to  deal 
with  as  he  pleased,  and  obtained  for  himself  in  letum 
immunity  to  exploit  the  remainder  (^  his  ill-gotten 
possessions  jast  as  unscrupukntsly  as  ever.  Hie 
Au^jleich  roisters  no  real  advance  in  political  ideab. 
After  its  institution,  no  less  than  before,  the  population 
of  the  Monarchy  has  been  divisible  into  two  categories, 
oppressors  and  oppressed.  The  grouping  has  been 
modified,  the  system  has  endured. 

This  secondary  compromise  between  uniformity  and 
devolution  makes  not  for  stability  but  for  disruption. 
The  Germans  and  M^yars  muster  between  them  only 
43.35  per  cent,  of  the  total  population.  They  will  not 
succeed  in  expbitit^  die  tnajority  for  ever.  If  they  rely 
upon  economic  solidarity  K>  cover  their  sins,  they  axe 
leaning  on  a  broken  reed,  for  we  are  in  presoice  of  a 
factor  infinitely  stronger  than  the  economic.  Man  is 
'  Populatjon  of  Austria,  36,icrjjooo.    GttmanM,  9,173,0(10^ 


I 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  125 

no  more  exclusively  ''  homo  eoonomicus ''  than  he  is 
''  homo  sapiens  '' :  his  motives  are  determined  neither 
by  free  choice  nor  by  mechanical  reaction^  but  by  an 
incalculable  combination  of  both,  yet  as  he  advances  in 
civilisation  his  own  will  plays  a  more  and  more  dominant 
part*  No  amount  of  economic  pressture  will  stifle  a 
growing  nationality's  revolt  against  injustice*  The 
break-up  of  the  EKial  Monarchy  would  dislocate  the 
economic  life  of  oppressors  and  oppressed  without 
discrimination,  but  the  latter  will  assert  their  freedom  at 
the  cost  of  any  sacrifice*  Samson  dragged  down  the  pillar, 
though  he  knew  he  must  perish  with  the  Philistines. 

The  **  Dual "'  phase  of  the  Hapsburg  national  problem 
is  therefore  essentially  transient,  and  since  a  return  to 
the  centralisation  of  the  'fifties  is  out  of  the  question, 
the  alternatives  before  the  Monarchy  are  thorough 
devolution  to  all  nationalities  ahke  or  a  series  of  national 
secessions  which  will  be  equivalent  to  a  break-up. 

We  have  now  defined  our  original  question  within 
narrow  limits.  To  forecast  the  fate  of  the  Empire 
after  the  present  war,  we  have  to  examine  whether  the 
tendency  towards  devolution  has  been  on  the  increase 
or  on  the  decrease  during  the  forty-seven  years  since 
the  Dual  System  was  established.  A  house  that  re- 
mains divided  against  itself  must  fall  in  the  end.  Has 
the  rift  grown  so  wide  that  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy 
must  succumb  to  the  first  tremor  of  earthquake,  or  is 
it  so  nearly  closed  that  the  danger-point  is  passed, 
and  the  building  can  defy  even  the  most  appalling 

To  discover  this  we  must  review  the  internal  politics 
of  the  Monarchy  since  1867.  There  are  two  strands 
of  development  to  foUow,  for  tmder  the  Ausgleich  the 
''  Crown  of  St.  Stephen ''  has  disengaged  itself  from  the 


136  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

rest  of  the  Danubian  Unit,  and  led  a  separate  life  of  its 
own.  We  will  leave  this  junior  Hungarian  partner  for 
the  moment^  and  concentrate  our  attention  upon  the 
"  Austrian  "  *  half  of  the  complex,  which  has  continued 
in  the  direct  line  of  the  Hapsburg  tradition. 

The  Ausgleich  stipulated  for  the  establishment  of 
parliamentary  government  in  the  Austrian  as  well  as 
the  Hungarian  state.  The  cotmtry  thus  re-awakened 
tt)  poUtical  life  found  itself  divided  into  two  camps. 

On  the  one  side  stood  the  Paiticularists  who  had 
beaten  Joseph  e^hty  years  before.  They  championed 
the  traditional  rights  of  the  provinces,  and  preferred  the 
most  conservative  measure  of  local  Home  Rule  to  the 
most  hberally-conceived  centralist  constitution.  Demo- 
cracy was  indifferent  to  them,  for  their  mainstays  were 
still  the  nobility  and  the  Church,  and  their  influence  was 
confined  to  the  backward  provinces. 

They  were  not  primarily  nationalists.  One  of  their 
strongholds  was  the  Tyrol,  a  purely  German  district  * 
more  devoted  to  the  Dynasty  than  any  other  part  of  the 
Empire.  It  was  Particularist  because  the  unsophisti'- 
cated  peasants  had  not  emaodpated  themselves  from 
clerical  leadership,  and  because  the  piovince  itself  is 
motintainous  and  isolated.  Another  Particularist  strong- 

■  Since  1667  the  official  style  of  the  Hapaburg  state  hat  been  the 
"  Atstriaiv-Huiwariaa  Monafcby,"  yet  the  non-Hungariao  half  i>  not 
tcdmicalljr  cattOcd  AuKria.  Toe  only  oAdal "  AuMriai "  arc  the  two 
Danubian  arch-duchics,  the  old  German  mark,  and  the  concct  title  of 
Ac  non-Hungarian  partner  as  a  whole  seems  to  be  the  "  Miigdomi  and 
lands  repmenied  in  Ac  Rcichantb  at  Vienna."  A  ooonnient,  though 
quite  unofficial  formula  is  "  Cts-Lciduaia  "  and  "  Trana-Lcilhania." 
The  Lcitha  is  a  Southern  tributary  of  the  Danube,  which  forms  the 
boundary  between  the  two  sections  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  for  a  few 

■  Noi  counting  the  Italian-Speaking  Trentino  qipcnded  to  it  on  the 
South. 


1 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  ivj 

hold  was  Bohemia*  Here  the  majority  of  the  population 
was  Tchech^  yet  the  programme  of  the  local  diet  was  not 
conceived  on  racial  lines*  They  did  not  agitate  for  the 
recognition  of  the  Tchech  nationality  within  Bohemia 
so  much  as  for  the  segregation  of  the  whole  province, 
Tchech  and  German  elements  alike,  from  the  undis- 
tinguished mass  of  the  Dynasty's  dominions*  They 
demanded  the  restoration  of  the  historical  Kii^dom 
of  Bohemia*  **  The  coronation  of  Francis  Joseph  at 
Prag  **  was  their  party  cry,  not  **  The  acceptance  of  the 
Tchech  language  as  a  medium  of  secondary  education 
and  official  intercourse*'* 

If  the  various  Sbvonic  groups  in  Austria  tended,  on 
the  ^ole,^  to  range  themselves  on  the  Particularist 
side,  it  was  because  the  general  level  of  education  and 
enlightenment  among  them  was  at  that  time  lower 
than  in  the  German  section  of  the  population*  Bohemia 
was  then  only  in  the  first  stages  of  the  Industrial  Revo- 
lution, and  her  peasantry  was  as  fast  in  the  Church's 
grip  as  the  Slovenes  remained  till  a  few  years  ago*  They 
were  not  acutely  anti-German  in  feeling :  nationalism 
cannot  flourish  without  the  support  of  a  national 
culture* 

On  the  other  side  stood  the  Liberal  Party,  who  were 
really  Joseph's  disciples*  They  had  much  in  common 
with  die  party  of  the  same  name  which  had  won 
its  way  to  power  in  Great  Britain  by  the  Reform  Bill 
of  183a,  a  generation  earlier*  They  held  the  same 
xadier  narrow  but  intensely  important  doctrines,  and 
acted  with  the  same  honesty  up  to  their  principles* 
Like  the  **  Manchester  School,"  they  were  zealous  for 
material  progress*  They  were  determined  to  bring 
into  line  with  Western  Europe,  and  transform 

We  have  already  explained  why  the  Poles  were  an  exception* 


128  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

her  into  a  dosely-knitt  efficiently  organised^  i 
state.^ 

The  Liberals  found  their  chief  support  in  the  German 
element^  especially  in  the  provinces  of  Lower  Austria 
and  Styria*  The  reactionary  sympathies  of  the 
Tyrolese  were  as  exceptional  among  the  Germans  of 
Austria  as  they  were  normal  among  the  Sbvs^  and  the 
German  nationality  contributed  an  overwhelming 
proportion  of  the  commercial  and  professional  classes^ 
by  whom  the  new  Austria  was  to  be  built  up* 

The  Liberal  Party  accordingly  envisaged  its  policy 
from  a  German  point  of  view.  They  oontempbted 
the  Germanisation  of  the  Austrian  state^  not  so  much 
through  national  chauvinism  as  because  uniformity 
was  part  of  their  theoretical  programme  and  was  only 
conceivable  on  a  German  basis* 

The  Liberals  of  1867  met  with  far  more  success  than 
their  imperial  forerunner*  The  leaven  had  worked  its 
way  deeper  since  his  time*  The  philosopher-autocrat 
had  wrestled  alone  against  all  his  subjects :  now  his 
ideas  were  being  put  into  action  by  the  best-educated 
and  best -organised  section  of  the  poptdation  itself* 
Moreover,  they  were  setting  themselves  a  more  modest 
task*  Joseph  had  grappled  with  the  whole  Hapsburg 
Empire :  the  Liberals  were  loyal  and  convinced  sup- 
porters of  Dualism*  By  letting  the  ''  Crown  of  St* 
Stephen  ""  go  its  own  way,  they  had  relieved  themselves 
of  the  more  backward  and  stifif-necked  half  of  the 
Danubian  Unit,  and  saved  all  their  eneq;ies  for  dealing 
with  the  rest* 

In  the  parliamentary  strug^e  with  the  Particularists, 

^  The  application  of  their  political  creed  to  economics  led  diem  to 
the  fame  condusions  as  their  English  prcdecesKis*  They  were 
convinced  Free-traders. 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  139 

the  liberals  won  an  easy  victory.  The  Aui^ich 
itself  gave  them  a  preliminary  advantage  by  stipttlating 
for  unified  parliamentary  government*  A  common 
Gonstittient  assembly  had  to  be  summoned,  as  we  have 
seen,  to  ratify  the  Compromise  on  Austria's  part,  and 
this  body  proceeded  in  the  same  session  ^  to  frame  a 
parliamentary  constitution  on  centralist  lines*  On 
this  occasion,  and  on  many  others,  the  Particularise 
Bohemian  deputies  played  into  their  opponents'  hands 
by  refusing  to  take  their  seats  as  a  protest  against  the 
rejection  of  their  demands*  With  the  assistance  of  the 
Polish  group,  the  German  Liberals  were  still  able  to 
muster  a  quortmi  and  carry  on  the  government  according 
to  the  letter  of  the  constitution*  Bohemian  abstention 
merely  relieved  the  government  of  an  opposition* 

The  Liberal  ministry  rallied  to  itself  all  the  forces  of 
enlightenment  in  the  cotmtry  by  passing  in  1868  a 
series  of  laws  which  tmcompromisingly  abolished  the 
dvil  authority  of  the  Catholic  Church*'  In  1871  the 
Tchechs  made  their  supreme  effort  for  the  restoration 
of  the  Bohemian  kingdom,  and  failed*  In  1873 
Centralism  achieved  its  final  tritunph  by  carrying  a 
law  which  took  the  election  of  parliamentary  deputies 
from  the  provincial  diets  and  transferred  it  to  the  direct 
vote  of  the  constituencies* 

The  Liberals,  however,  had  a  short  career*  They  had 
shot  all  their  bolts*  Austria  was  freed  from  her  most 
gaJling  mediaeval  handicaps  and  initiated  into  her 
industrial  phase ;  the  party  had  no  more  to  offer  the 

>  Dcoembcr  X867* 

*  JoBcph  had  already  done  this  work,  but  the  ecdcstastical  otgaoaa- 
tioo  had  been  swept  back  into  power  by  the  re-action  against  the 
Revoltttioii*  The  concordat  of  1855  between  Viennese  /Q)8olutann 
aad  Fqnl  Obscurantism  had  given  the  Church  ahnost  complete  power 
over  maniage  and  education  in  the  Hsqjsburg  Monarchy. 


I30  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

country,  and  its  influence  began  to  decline.  A  financial 
crisis  in  1873  tainted  it  with  discredit,  and  six  years  later 
it  feU. 

The  era  of  Liberal  reform  was  followed  by  a  Itdl. 
For  fourteen  years  ^  Austria  acquiesced  in  the  neutral 
ministry  of  Count  Taaffe,  who  conciliated  all  parties 
by  a  poUcy  of  parliamentary  inactivity*  The  Industrial 
Revolution,  however,  was  producing  its  effect,  and  great 
changes  were  taking  place  beneath  the  surface* 

(a)  The  first  symptom  was  a  dramatic  reversal  in  the 
clerical  position*  llie  workers  of  the  German-speaking 
industrial  centres  were  beginning  to  achieve  dass- 
consdousness*  They  were  profotmdly  hostile  to  the 
Liberal  capitalism  which  had  created  and  exploited 
them,  and  were  determined  to  gain  a  hearing  for  their 
own  point  of  view*  The  Clericals  saw  their  opportunity* 
Their  old  enemies  and  conquerors  were  being  attacked 
on  the  opposite  flank :  they  did  not  remain  passive 
spectators,  but  circled  round  the  Liberals'  rear  from 
Right  to  Left,  and  joined  forces  with  the  new  movement* 

In  1882  the  Catholic  group  had  detached  itself  from 
the  Conservative  mass :  during  the  next  decade  it 
began  to  be  converted  to  Christian  Socialism*  The 
ideas  of  Joseph  had  triumphed  by  appealing  to  the 
middle  class :  the  Church  went  one  step  further,  and 
sought  to  re-establish  its  hold  over  the  people  by 
identifying  itself  with  Industrial  Democracy*  In  the 
course  of  the  'eighties  the  **  New  Toryism  **  achieved 
striking  successes*  Factory  legislation  was  passed  and 
National  Insurance  introduced*  The  clerical  current 
was  confirmed  in  its  new  trend* 

(b)  The  general  rise  in  economic  prosperity  had 
likewise  affected  the  Austrian  Sbvs*    Education  had 

» 1879-93, 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  131 

spread,  a  cultured  class  had  grown  up,^  and  therewith 
the  Language  Question  had  made  its  appearance*  So 
kng  as  the  Sbvonic  tongue  remained  a  peasant  patois, 
the  use  of  German  was  tmchallenged ;  but  now  Tchech 
students  in  the  secondary  schools  and  universities 
demanded  instruction  in  their  native  medium,  and 
Tchech  bwyers  and  officials  cotdd  claim  with  authority 
that  their  language  shotdd  be  placed  on  an  equal  footing 
with  German  in  the  administration  of  Bohemia* 

The  Language  Question  was  taken  up  by  a  new 
party,  the  ''  Yotmg  Tchechs/'  The  historical  kingdom 
of  Bohemia  meant  little  to  them,  and  they  did  not  insist 
strongly  upon  Home  Rule,  much  less  upon  secession* 
They  vehemently  disagreed  with  the  *'  Old  Tchechs'  '* 
parliamentary  policy  of  passive  resistance :  they  intended 
to  extort  the  recognition  of  their  national  individuality 
by  taking  a  vigorous  part  in  the  sessions  at  Vienna* 
Their  ideal  ran  directly  cotmter  to  the  old  Germanism 
of  the  Liberals*  They  were  impressed  by  the  fact  that 
three-fifths*  of  the  Austrian  popubtion  were  Sbvs, 
they  believed  that  with  the  advance  of  democracy 
numbers  must  prevail,  and  they  conceived  of  Austria  in 
the  future  as  a  Sbvonic  state*  Instead  of  detaching 
themselves  from  the  Austrian  unit,  its  Sbv  citizens  were 
to  conquer  it  for  Sbvdom,  and  convert  it  into  the  chief 
focus  criF  Slavonic  culture  in  Europe* 

^The  native  Tcfaedi  and  Slovene  aristocracy  had  been  either 
Germanised  or  replaced  by  Germans  in  the  later  Middle  Ages* 

"  At  the  Census  of  1900  the  population  of  Austria  was  composed  as 
felkms: 


Slavs  • 
Latins 
Others 

Total  *    06,107,000        zoo% 


9,172,000 

35.13% 

15,5x4,000 

59^% 

958/)oo 

a.07®^ 

463/xx> 

^•7"/q 

133  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

This  ptogxanune  was  not  Utopian*  The  Tchedis 
and  Poles  had  entered  the  pale  of  European  civilisation 
earlier  than  any  other  branch  of  the  Slavonic  race : 
Pmgand  Cracow  had  played  a  prominent  part  in  history 
before  the  foundation  of  Petersburg  or  Tobolsk*  More- 
over, the  emergence  of  the  new  Christian  Socialist  party 
among  the  Youi^  Tchechs^  German  feUow-dtizens 
offered  hopes  of  racial  reconciliation.  Industrialism 
and  the  Catholic  Church  both  overrode  the  divisions  of 
nationality.  The  German  Liberals  had  failed  to  remove 
the  national  problem :  tmity  might  still  be  attained  by 
transcendii^  it*  The  Promised  Land,  however,  was 
still  far  off,  and  the  path  was  so  beset  by  dangers  that  it 
was  doubtful  whether  Austria  would  reach  her  goal* 

(c)  Christian  Socialism  was  not  the  only  new  move- 
ment among  the  Austrian  Germans.  The  old  Liberals 
had  fallen  because  they  failed  to  move  with  the  times* 
They  had  lost  control  over  the  Industrial  Revolution,  and 
the  dericab  had  snatched  from  them  the  initiative  in 
social  politics;  but  they  had  also  mismanaged  the 
assimilation  of  the  Slavs,  and  the  Youi^  Tchechs  had 
arisen  in  their  despite*  This  Slavonic  renaissance 
evoked  a  German  party  of  a  purely  nationalistic 
diaracter* 

Austrian  **  Pangermantsm "  had  its  root  in  the 
'German  districts  of  Bohemia,  which  were  threatened 
most  immediately  by  the  progress  of  the  Tchechs  in 
numbers  and  education*  The  alliance  widi  the  Ger- 
man Empire  in  1879  gave  the  movement  great  impetus* 
In  z88o  an  association  called  the  **  German  School 
Union  **  ^  was  founded,  to  foster  education  in  the  Ger- 
man language  througlKmt  Austria*  Bismarck  became 
the  part/s  hero,  and  Prussian  methods  their  ideal* 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  133 


They  wished  to  direct  all  the  resources  of  government 
to  the  Germanisatk>n  of  Slovenes  and  Tchechs. 

This  German  chauvinism  thwarted  the  lai^er  interests 
of  the  German  nationality*  The  new  **  German  Left''  in 
the  Austrian  Reichsrath  was  obsessed  by  the  nationalis- 
tic idea,  and  spumed  all  the  factors  that  were  making  for 
progress  and  unity*  Had  it  triumphed,  the  bter  con- 
ception of  a  German  confederation  from  Hamburg  to 
At  Persian  Gulf  could  never  have  taken  shape,  for  the 
Danubian  Unit,  the  central  link  in  the  chain,  woukl 
have  been  shattered  in  pieces  by  German  fanaticism* 

The  crisis  came  four  years  after  Count  Taaffe's 
resignation*  In  1891  the  Young  Tchechs  had  com- 
pletely ousted  the  old  Bohemian  Particularists,  and 
thenceforward  they  were  a  power  in  the  Reichsrath* 
By  1897  they  had  become  strong  enough  to  impose 
Adi  will  upon  the  government,  and  ordinances  were 
promulgated  which  established  Tchech  as  an  official 
language  side  by  side  with  German  through  all  districts 
of  Bohemia* 

The  result  was  a  complete  breakdown  of  constitutional 
government*  The  German  nationalists  made  parlia- 
mentary procedure  impossible*  Obstruction  developed 
into  a  physical  struggle  between  the  parties  for  the 
possession  of  the  House*  The  resignation  of  the 
ministry  and  the  repeal  of  the  decrees  eased  the  situa- 
tion at  Vienna,  only  to  necessitate  martial  law  in 
Bohemia*  Both  sides  were  intractable,  and  since  they 
combined  to  prevent  the  conduct  of  any  business  in 
pariiament,  government  had  to  be  carried  on  for  nearly 
nine  years  independently  of  it,  by  aid  of  an  emergency 
clause  in  the  Constitution*  During  this  period  national 
hittemess  steadily  grew,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other 
political  interests* 


134  THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

Such  oonditioiis  could  not  last  for  ever.    Austria  was 

rapidly  losing  all  political  moraU,  and  unless  the  non- 
nationalistic  forces  in  the  country  could  rally  themselves 
sufficiently  to  make  some  great  step  forward,  nothing 
could  prevent  the  state  from  sinking  through  a  phase  of 
irresponsible  government  into  utter  disruption. 

The  situation  was  saved  by  a  fresh  appeal  to  demo- 
cracy. In  1905  people  began  to  discuss  die  introduction 
of  Manhood  Suffrage)  in  place  of  the  old  franchise  of 
die  Prussian  type. 

The  proposid  brought  out  the  positive  community  of 
interest  between  the  Slavonic  national  groups  and  the 
German  socialists.  Both  had  everything  to  gain  by  an 
electoral  system  based  not  on  privilege,  either  of  class  or 
of  race,  but  upon  the  numerical  proportion  between  the 
various  sections  of  the  popubtion,  and  there  was  no 
rivalry  between  them,  because  their  aims  did  not  come 
within  the  same  plane  of  politics.  The  Slavs  were  still 
occupied  by  the  preliminary  question  of  nationahty,  the 
German  workers  were  devoted  to  social  problems.  The 
satutfaction  of  the  Slavonic  nationalists  could  bring 
German  Labour  nothing  but  gain.  National  aspirations 
would  pass  out  of  the  realm  of  poUrics  as  soon  as  they 
were  realised,  and  their  Slavonic  devotees  would  be 
h'berated  to  recruit  the  non-nationalisric  ranks  of  Social 
Democracy  and  Christian  Socialism.^ 

The  projected  Reform  Bill  produced  a  beneficent 
effect  even  before  it  became  law.  Durii^  the  months 
when  it  was  in  debate,  a  &esh  current  of  polidcal  interest 
swept  through  the  mass  of  the  population,  and  it  did 
not  disappoint  the  country's  expectations  when  it  was 
finally  promit^ted  towaicb  the  dose  of  1906. 


\ 


THE  VITALITY  OF  AUSTRIA  135 

Besides  distributing  parliamentary  seats  between  the 
different  races  in  far  juster  proportion  than  before^  the 
new  electoral  law  made  an  admirable  attempt  to  mini- 
ffl^  racial  friction  in  the  details  of  its  mechanism/  but 
its  full  significance  was  only  seen  in  the  first  elections 
held  in  accordance  with  it  at  the  beginning  of  the 
following  year*  For  the  first  time  the  people  of  Austria 
had  been  free  to  return  a  chamber  of  deputies  really 
representative  of  the  country's  national  divisions^  yet 
the  actual  result  was  a  relative  weakening  of  the  various 
national  groups,  and  an  enormous  increase  among  the 
advocates  of  social  reconstruction*  Out  of  a  house  of 
5x6  members,  the  Social  Democrats  mustered  87 '  and 
the  Christian  Socialists  67 ' :  together  they  amotmted 
to  30  per  cent*  of  the  whole* 

Thus  between  1897  ^^^  <907  the  Austrian  State 
braved  and  weathered  the  tempest  of  nationalism* 
During  those  years  it  achieved  for  itself  a  success  we 
hoped  to  see  shared  in  due  course  by  the  whole  of 
Europe :  it  passed  over,  without  suffering  shipwreck, 
from  the  nationalistic  to  the  post-nationalist  phase  of 
development* 

As  far  as  her  own  seamanship  availed,  Austria  was 
ottt  of  danger*  The  session  of  1907  revealed  the 
influence  of  nationalism  distincdy  on  the  decline,  and 
sodal-eoonomic  factors  in  the  ascendant*  The  cotmtry 
needed  nothing  but  a  free  hand  to  work  out  its  own 
salvation*  Austria,  however,  is  more  cruelly  involved  in 
external  trammels  than  any  other  state  in  Europe*  She 
is  not  affected  merely  by  the  international  situation :  her 
fortunes  are  at  the  mercy  of  her  yoke-fellow  Hungary* 

^SceCh*VL  *Fonnerlyxi. 

*  Formerly  a?.  Tbey  had  by  this  time  absorbed  all  the  clericals 
down  10  the  last  of  the  Conservative  rear-guard* 


136  THE  VrrALITY  OF  AUSTRIA 

If  the  unity  of  the  Hapsbuq;  oomplex  is  essential  to 
the  maintenance  of  its  members'  position  in  the  worlds 
developments  accomplished  in  one  half  of  the  Monaidiy 
will  be  of  little  consequence  unless  they  extend  them- 
selves ultimately  to  the  other*  Austria  had  transcended 
nationalism  in  vain  if  the  same  sinister  force  were  still 
capable  of  precipitating  catastrophe  in  Hungary ;  yet 
the  Ausgleich  rigidly  debarred  the  Atistrian  people  from 
any  intervention  in  Hungarian  aflTairs*  There  was  only 
one  power  in  the  Empire  to  which  an  appeal  from  the 
Ausgleich  could  be  made^  and  that  was  the  Hapsbutg 
Dynasty* 

The  Ausgleich  had  never  challenged  the  Dynasty's 
supreme  position*  Francis  Joseph  had  witnessed  many 
transformations  of  his  Empire  before  z866,  and  he 
remained  the  living  symbol  of  a  tradition  older  and 
more  endturing  than  the  setdement  of  that  year.  It  was 
to  the  King-Emperor's  credit  that  he  accepted  the  Dual 
System  with  whole-hearted  loyalty,  though  the  very 
sinosrity  with  which  he  devoted  himself  to  securing  its 
success  rendered  him,  as  he  advanced  in  years,  less  and 
less  capable  of  seeing  beyond  it. 

Francis  Ferdinand,  however,  his  nephew  and  his 
heir,  held  a  very  different  opinion  about  the  Dynasty's 
mission  in  the  present*  For  him  Dualism  was  no  state 
of  perfection,  but  only  a  passing  phase  in  the  Monarchy's 
bng  history*  He  saw  with  a  clear  eye  that  the  Magyar- 
German  compact  was  botmd  up  widi  racial  oppression, 
and  that  so  long  as  it  remained  in  force,  the  Danubian 
Unit  went  in  danger  of  a  devastating  explosion  of 
nationalism*  What  he  would  have  accomplished  had 
he  ascended  the  throne,  it  is  impossible  to  say*  People 
are  always  apt  to  magnify  possibilities  that  have  been 
denied  the  chance  of  realisation,  yet  this  much  seems 


THE  VltALltV  Of  AUSTRIA  137^ 

oertam,  that  he  contemplated  the  abolitioii  of  Dualism, 
and  die  substitution  of  a  **  Trialism  *^  in  its  pbce*  The 
Slav  was  to  be  raised  to  an  equality  with  the  German 
and  the  Magyar,  and  to  receive  h^  just  share  in  the 
political  control  of  a  state  which  depended  upon  him 
so  largely  for  its  wealth  and  popubtion* 

Had  Francis  Ferdinand  lived  to  do  his  work,  he  might 
have  created  an  epoch  in  Hapsbturg  history  even  more 
important  than  that  of  the  Ausgleich.  The  forward 
movement  which  triumphed  in  Austria  in  1906,  might 
have  conquered  the  remainder  of  the  Monarchy  within 
the  next  generation*  Such  hopes  were  cut  short  by  his 
assassination  at  Sarayevo  in  June  1914*  That  crime 
was  the  tragedy  of  Austria*  By  pltmging  her  into  a 
European  war,  it  cancelled  in  a  moment  all  the  con- 
structive work  of  half  a  century  and  made  the  wound 
of  nationalism  break  out  again,  to  bleed  more  violently, 
perhaps,  than  it  has  ever  done  since  z848* 

We  have  seen  that  this  mortal  disaster  was  due  to 
no  causes  latent  in  Austria  herself*  To  understand 
its  antecedents,  we  must  examine  contemporary  events 
in  the  other  half  of  the  Monarchy,  the  **  Crown  of  St* 
Stephen*'^ 


xjS  THE  BALKANS 


CHAPTER  IV 

RECONSTRUCTION  IN  THE  BALKANS 

In  Vienna  people  like  to  say  that  '*  the  East  begins  at 
the  River  Leitha  ** :  if  we  borrow  the  epigram  with  the 
modification  that  the  ''  Balkans  *^  begin  there,  we  shall 
bring  Htmgarian  history  into  its  true  perspective* 

Vienna  is  not  merely  the  dividing-point  between  two 
economic  worlds :  it  is  also  the  point  of  transition 
between  opposite  phenomena  of  racial  distribution* 

West  of  the  Leitha,  the  nationalities  of  Europe  are 
mainly  grouped  in  compact  blocks,  which  correspond 
with  considerable  accuracy  to  the  physical  and  economic 
articubtion  of  the  continent*^  The  national  basis  would 
suggest  itself  naturally  to  the  observer  as  a  principle  of 
political  o^anisation,  and  this  quarter  of  the  world  was 
in  fact  the  cradle  of  the  National  State*  South-East 
of  the  Leitha,  however,  the  nationalities  are  interlaced 
in  inextricable  confusion  over  an  area  that  extends  to 
the  Bbck  Sea  and  the  iEgean,  and  the  international 
congress  which  will  follow  the  war  might  well  despair 
in  this  region  of  coaxing  sovereign  national  states  out 
of  Geography,  not  to  speak  of  reconciling  their  structure 
with  the  necessities  of  modem  economic  life* 

The  problem  must  be  faced  nevertheless*  The 
popubtions  of  South-Eastern  Europe  are  possessed  by 
the  idea  of  nationality  to  a  morbid  degree*  Intimate 
contact  has  produced  mutual  exasperation  instead  of 
understanding  and  good-fellowship,  while  the  difficulty 
of  devising  any  compromise  that  would  deal  impartial 

*  For  a  visuai  prcsentatum  of  this  £sict  see  Map  VIL 


HUNGARY  139 

justice  to  all  has  only  made  each  faction  determined  to 
push  its  own  interests  recklessly  at  the  expense  of  its 
rivals* 

These  nations  contribute  litde  to  European  culture* 
Hitherto  they  have  been  accustomed  to  take  rather 
than  to  give,  and  their  spiritual  evolution  has  not  the 
same  intense  interest  foi  us  as  that  of  Germany  or  of 
Russia*  Their  importance  to  Europe  lies  in  their 
immense  capacity  for  doing  her  injury* 

If  the  destructive  power  these  elements  have  accumu- 
lated threatened  nothing  more  precious  than  themselves 
with  destruction,  their  fate  would  be  comparatively 
tndififerent  to  us,  and  a  reader  who  had  followed  with 
patience  our  laborious  diagnosis  of  German  and  Austrian 
oomplaints,  and  our  minute  prescriptions  for  their  cure, 
might  refuse  attention  to  Magyar  or  Serbian  pathology* 
Yet  the  physician  comes  to  heal  the  sick  rather  than  the 
oomparatively  sound,  and  if  the  sickness  is  an  infectious 
plague,  the  interests  of  the  whole  community  urgently 
demand  his  intervention* 

The  Nearer  Eastern  Question  has  been  with  us  now 
for  a  century  in  continuously  aggravated  form*  The 
Congress  of  Berlin  tried  to  bury  it  tmderground  in  1878, 
and  succeeded  in  laying  a  mine  where  the  slightest 
eiq>losion  threatened  to  blow  up  the  European  powder- 
magazine*  Till  this  mine  is  thoroughly  damped,  we 
shall  not  have  reached  our  supreme  objective  —  the 
abolition  of  European  war* 

The  whole  of  the  unrestful  zone  beyond  Vienna  thtis 
£alls  within  our  scope,  and  in  the  present  chapter  we 
shall  not  confine  ourselves  to  the  Hungarian  half  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy,  but  shall  extend  our  discussion  to 
Hungary^s  Balkan  neighbours*  The  various  national 
problems  of  the  region  are  indeed  so  closely  intertwined 


I40  THE  BALKANS 

dttt  we  oould  not  deal  with  any  one  ai  them  in  isolaticHi. 
Wc  will  therefore  include  Htmgaiy  with  the  rest  under 
the  common  denomination  of  a  "  Balkan  State,"  and 
we  will  approach  her  first,  because  she  holds  the  premier 
place  in  the  group  both  in  geographical  situation  and 
in  d^iee  of  ^iritual  and  material  development.  We 
shall  find  Aat  she  displays  all  the  characteristics  of  the 
Balkan  type. 

A.  Hungary 

The  Kingdom  of  Hungary  coveis  the  major  part  of 
the  middle  Danube-basin.  From  the  junction  of  the 
March  tnbutary  as  far  as  the  "  Iron  Gates  "  the  river 
flows  through  Hungarian  territory.  The  Carpathian 
Range,  which  circles  from  the  former  point  to  the  second 
in  a  vast  sweep  towards  the  North  and  East,^  constitutes 
both  the  watershed  of  the  Danube-system  and  the 
frontier  of  the  Hungarian  state.  Southwards  alone 
Ae  kingdom  is  bounded  first  by  the  Drave  descending 
from  the  Eastern  face  of  the  Alps,  and  then  by  the 
Danube  itself,  from  the  point  where  it  unites  widi  the 
Drave  and  adopts  the  latter  stream's  Easterly  course. 
The  mountainous  zone  on  the  other  side  of  this  line, 
which  intervenes  between  the  Danube-basin  and  the 
Adriadc,  has  never  been  incorporated  in  Hungary 
directly. 

The  heart  of  the  Hungarian  land  is  the  AlfSld,  an 
alluvial  plain  deposited  in  the  hollow  of  a  vanished  sea. 
In  shape  it  is  roughly  an  isosceles  triangle,  with  die 
Southern  river-boundary  of  the  kingdom  as  its  base, 
and  with  its  apex  at  the  Vereczka  Pass,*  the  midmost 
point  of  the  Carpathian  arc.  The  Danube  flows  through 
it  from  Buda-Pcsi  to  its  junction  with  the  Drave,  and 

■  See  mu)  on  p.  lo;. 

■  Immedtatcty  Bast  of  the  l^ok  Pis. 


HUNGARY  141 

it  includes  the  strip  of  country  between  the  Danube 
and  the  Theiss,  as  well  as  a  wide  zone  beyond  the  Left 
or  Eastern  bank  of  the  latter  river* 

This  central  plain  was  occupied  by  the  Magyars  in  the 
ninth  century  A«o*  Bursting  through  the  Carpathians 
by  the  Vereczka  Pass,  they  entered  the  AlfSld  at  its  apex, 
flooded  it  with  their  setdements,  and  pressed  still  further 
up  the  Danube  above  Buda  till  they  were  checked,  as  we 
have  seen,  by  the  Austrian  and  Styrian  Marks* 

Yet  the  Magyars  never  made  the  whole  of  Hui^^ary 
their  own*  On  either  flank  of  the  AlfSld  there  are 
stretches  of  hill-cotmtry,  included  like  itself  within  the 
encircling  wall  of  the  Carpathians,  but  sundered  from 
it  by  lesser  mountain  barriers*  In  two  comparatively 
isolated  regions  the  earlier  possessors  of  the  land 
managed  to  maintain  their  existence  under  Magyar 
dominion* 

North-West  of  the  AlfSld  a  series  of  long,  winding 
valleys  descends  from  the  Carpathians  and  opens  upon 
the  Danube  between  Pressbttxg  and  Buda-Pest*  They 
have  remained  in  the  possession  of  the  Slovaks,  a 
Slavonic  population  hardly  distinguishable  in  dialect 
bom  the  Tchechs  of  Moravia  and  Bohemia  on  the  other 
side  of  the  River  March* 

East  of  the  Alfdld  lies  the  district  called  Transylvania* 
Between  the  Vereczka  Pass  and  the  Iron  Gates  the  main 
diain  of  the  Carpathians  makes  an  extremely  salient 
angle  towards  the  East,  but  a  secondary  brandi  of  the 
range  takes  the  shortest  cotuse  from  the  one  point  to  the 
odier,  and  skirts  the  Eastern  side  of  the  AlfSld  in  a 
North'-and-South  direction*^    A  considerable  extent  of 

*  Id  the  tfatrteenth  century  this  ridge  was  clothed  in  dense  forest,  and 
the  settlefs  who  penetrated  it  from  the  direction  of  the  Alfdld  therefore 
gme  the  name  of  Transjrhrania  to  the  country  they  reached  on  the  other 
side  of  it. 


142  THE  BALKANS 

tangled  hill  and  valley  is  caught  within  this  split  in  the 
mountain  line,  and  is  almost  equally  secluded  by  it 
from  the  more  open  cotmtry  on  all  three  sides. 

The  passes  which  lead  through  the  outer  Carpathian 
wall,  North-Eastward  into  the  Moldavian  steppe  and 
Southward  into  the  plain  of  WaUachia,  carry  as  many 
lines  of  railway  as  those  which  pierce  the  interior  wall 
and  debouch  upon  the  levels  of  the  AlfSld.  The 
province  is  rich  in  rivers,  but  the  water-system  hardly 
facilitates  commtmication  with  the  outer  world.  The 
ootmdess  streams  have  to  concentrate  their  forces  in 
three  main  channels  before  they  can  succeed  in  breaking 
through  the  motmtain  barriers,  and  even  then  they 
content  themselves  with  precipitous  gorges,  barely 
wide  enot^  for  the  current  itself*  Two  of  these 
channels,^  however,  find  their  way  to  the  Alf5ld  and 
only  one'  to  the  WaUachian  plain, so  that  to  that  extent 
Transylvania  may  be  reckoned  to  have  closer  geo- 
graphical links  with  Hungary  than  with  Rotmiania. 

When  the  Magyars  appeared  in  the  Alfdld,  this 
sheltered  province  was  already  occupied  by  the  Rotunans, 
a  popubtion  of  Latin  speech.* 

The  Kingdom  of  Hui^[ary  was  thus  heterogeneous 
in  nationality  from  the  beginning,  and  as  her  history 
developed  the  confusion  increased. 

After  the  conversion  of  the  Magyars  in  the  eleventh 
century  aj).,  German  colonies  were  introduced  to 
civilise  the  country.  They  opened  up  the  mineral 
resources  of  the  Slovak  hills,  and  established  themselves 

^  The  MaiQS  and  the  Szamos.  *  The  Alt  (Alula). 

'Prohably  they  are  descended  from  the  Tjfininfd  inhabttaiita  of 
niyricum,  die  aectkm  of  the  Roman  Entire  between  the  Alps,  the 
Dnve  and  the  Adriatic.  When  Sbvonic  munigrants  from  die  North 
descended  upon  the  Adriatic  coast  tn  the  seventh  century  aj).  (see 
beksw),  they  would  have  been  hkety  to  press  the  native  piovindais 
Eastward  across  the  Danube. 


HUNGARY  143 

still  more  successfully  in  the  no-man  Viand  of  Transyl- 
vania* The  seven  Saxon  towns  of  this  province  were 
diartered  in  the  thirteenth  century  by  the  Hungdiisoi 
Crown  as  practically  autonomous  communities.^ 

During  the  same  period  the  Ruthenes,'  the  southerly 
wing  of  the  Russian  race,  overflowed  the  Carpathian 
d^,  and  following  upon  the  heels  of  the  Magyars, 
possessed  themselves  of  the  eictreme  fringe  of  the  Alf 6ld 
from  the  Vereczka  Pass  as  far  as  Ungvar. 

These  two  new  factors  added  to  the  complication,  but 
die  present  phase  of  the  national  problem  in  Hungary 
has  been  principally  conditioned  by  a  much  later  event. 

An  essential  element  in  the  modem  Balkan  type  is  a 
past  experience  of  the  Turk*  The  evolution  of  all  the 
Balkan  States  might  be  stated  in  terms  of  a  devastating 
Turidsh  conquest,  which  destroyed  the  previous  tradi- 
tion of  native  culture,  and  a  hardly  less  devastating  war 
of  Liberation,  waged  with  a  depraved  ferocity  and  an 
exalted  heroism*  The  heroism  seems  to  inspire  the 
liberated  populations  with  the  spiritual  energy  to  rebuild 
dieir  national  life  from  the  foundations,  die  ferocity 
smirdies  the  fresh  page  in  their  history  with  a  Turkish 
stain,  which  it  takes  many  generations  to  wash  away. 

Hungary  suffered  this  characteristic  Balkan  calamity 
in  common  with  her  South-Eastem  neighbours.  In 
1536  the  Magyar  Kingdom  perished  on  the  terrible 
fiekl  of  Mohacs,  and  for  a  century  and  a  half'  the  AlfSld 
was  ruled  by  a  Turkish  pasha  established  in  the  fortress 
of  Buda.  The  Ttirk  was  expelled  again,  as  we  have 
seen,  after  the  crucial  siege  of  Vienna  in  1683.  Half  a 
century  of  vigorous  campaigns  drove  him  back  behind 

'  Hcnoe  the  German  synoaym  for  Traaaylvania — **  SkbeobOigen." 
■Abo  known  as  **  Little  Rusnans  '*  or  **  Ukrainians.''     See  Ctu 
VIILC. 


144  THE  BALKANS 

the  line  of  the  Save  and  the  Iron  Gatts,  and  the  Peace 
of  Belgrade  in  1739  delimited  a  frontier  between  the 
Ottoman  and  Hapsbuxg  Empires  which  resigned  the 
whole  of  Hungary  to  the  latter.^  Yet  the  ejected  Turk 
had  not  failed  to  set  his  mark  upon  the  bind,  and  the 
victors  found  the  AlfSld  a  desert* 

In  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  Hapsburg 
Monarchy  was  entering  the  '*  Strong  Government "' 
phase,  and  the  newly-acquired  territories  offered  a 
magnificent  field  of  experiment  for  the  ideas  of 
'*  Enlightened  Autocracy/' 

The  country  was  ridi  in  natural  resources:  it  lay 
waste  through  want  of  population  to  develop  them,  and 
the  Government  met  the  need  by  schemes  of  cobnisation 
and  town-building  on  an  extensive  scale*  The  re-con- 
struction of  Hungary  was  the  most  striking  success  of 
Maria  Theresa's  and  Joseph's  policy*  During  their 
reigns  the  material  traces  of  the  Turk's  presence  were 
obliterated,  and  before  the  end  of  the  century  the 
Kingdom  once  more  approached  the  standard  of 
Central  Europe,  in  acute  contrast  to  the  territories  still 
blighted  by  Turkish  mis^vemment  immediately  beyond 
her  frontier*  Yet  in  restoring  Hungary's  material  pro- 
sperity, her  new  rulers  immeasurably  aggravated  the 
impending  problem  of  nationality* 

Before  the  Turkish  conquest  die  Alf5ld  had  been  the 
stronghold  of  the  Magyar  race,  and  the  Magyars  had 
therefore  suffered  more  severely  than  any  other  element 
in  the  country  by  the  devastation  of  the  Turkish  wars* 
The  remnant  of  the  nation  that  survived  on  the  plain, 
and  the  fragment  of  it  that  lay  West  of  Buda  along  the 

^  ThB  frontier  remained  unaltered  mitil  tbe  occupation  of  Bosnia- 
Hetxegcmna  tn  1878*  The  only  change  in  the  interval  was  the  anneBi- 
tion  to  Austna  of  die  Dafanatian  coait-praivino^  lonneriy  a  VcnetiaQ 
poBcasion,  at  the  settlement  of  x8z4. 


HUNGARY 


145 


Attstrian  and  Stynan  bofder,  might  perhaps  have  made 
good  the  losses  by  their  own  gradual  increase  under  the 
regime  of  peace  and  security  that  had  descended  upon 
diem  at  last*  The  process^  however^  would  have 
been  extremely  sbw,  and  the  autocracy  was  neither 
psdent  nor  far-sighted,  while  it  wotdd  have  ignored  the 
factor  of  nationality  on  principle^  even  had  it  realised 
its  bearii^  on  the  situation* 

The  Government  therefore  re-peopled  the  Alfold 
by  the  indiscriminate  introduction  of  setders  from  all 
the  surrounding  races*  Roumans  from  Transylvania 
were  allowed  to  encroach  upon  the  plain  till  they  had 
advanced  half  the  distance  between  their  mountains 
and  the  Theiss*  Serb  refugees  from  Ottoman  territory 
were  encouraged  to  setde  on  the  Northern  bank  of  the 
Danube*  Enclaves  of  German  colonists  from  Swabia 
were  distributed  all  over  the  land  to  leaven  the  other 
elements  with  Western  civilisation*  By  the  time  the 
work  was  finished  Htmgary  had  been  reduced  to  such  a 
racial  medley  that  the  Magyars  no  longer  constituted 
more  than  a  bare  majority  of  the  population*^ 

'  An  analyn  of  the  census  taken  in  z  ooo  for  the  Kingdom  of  Hungary 
(cKtaaive  of  Croatia-Slavonia)  is  the  best  oonunentary  on  the  result : 


ffotumaUtus 


Roumans 


Magyars 


Cioati 
Otheis 


Non-l^Xagyar 
nationalities 


} 


Total  population 


Numbers 


2,785/000 

IMlfiOO 
ZfQOO/XX) 

«5iO0O 
439/)oo 
zSg/xx) 
446/)00 


8,589*000 


8*340^000 

x6,^8»ooo 


Percentages 


X6.S4 

zz*76 

a.59 
2.51 

Z*Z2 

2.66 


5Z.OO 


dQJOO 

■f  yaw** 


Z00.00 


Z46  THE  BALKANS 

Had  historical  continuity  been  broken  as  completely 
in  Hungary  as  in  other  Bsdkan  lands,  this  confusion  of 
tongues  might  have  proved  harmless.  Joseph^s  political 
genius  might  have  steered  the  cotmtry  into  the  wake 
of  the  Swiss  Confederation,  and  initiated  it  into  the 
European  fraternity  as  a  non-national  state.  The 
Turkish  rule  in  Hungary,  however,  had  been  short, 
and  it  had  never  extended  to  the  whole  kingdom.  The 
Slovak  country  in  the  North,  Pressburg  on  the  Danube, 
and  a  strip  of  territory  between  the  Danube  and  the 
Drave  atong  the  Styrian  boundary  had  all  escaped 
conquest  by  electing  the  Hapsburg  as  their  king  and 
sheltering  themselves  beneath  his  strong  arm.  In  die 
opposite  quarter  Transylvania  had  been  saved  by  a 
vigorous  line  of  princes,  who  secured  the  autonomy  of 
the  province  under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 
In  a  very  considerable  portion  of  the  country  the 
mediaeval  tradition  thus  maintained  itself  unbroken, 
and  when  the  unconquered  North-Westem  border,  the 
Turkish  pashalik,  and  the  Transylvanian  principality 
were  united  once  more,  the  forces  derived  from  the  past 
were  strong  enot^  to  challenge  the  Hapsburgs'  schemes 
for  the  future. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Hungarian  **  Estates ''  took 
the  lead  in  the  struggle  between  Centralisation  and 
Particularism  which  convulsed  the  whole  Hapsburg 
Monarchy  from  1780  to  1849.  They  were  able  to  do 
so  because  mediaeval  Htmgary  had  developed  her 
parliamentary  institutions  more  strongly  than  any  other 
European  country  except  our  own. 

The  Hungarian  nobility  was  abnormally  numerous. 
The  majority  of  the  class  consisted  simply  of  the  free 
proprietors  in  the  Magyar-speaking  districts,  including 
almost  everybody  who  was  not  a  serf.    Many  were 


HUNGARY  147 

natuially  of  quite  bw  standing,  but  there  was  also  a 
ocmtii^ent  of  great  landed  magnates,  and  these  were 
principally  to  be  found  on  the  non-Magyar  territory* 
They  were  descended  from  barons  established  there  by 
the  kings  'to  keep  the  subject  races  in  hand  or  to  guard 
the  border  against  foreign  powers*  Some  of  these 
families  were  of  pure  Magyar  blood,  still  more  of  them, 
peifaaps,  were  of  native  origin  and  had  been  Magyarised 
by  contact  with  the  royal  court,  but  the  difference  was 
immaterial:  in  tradition  and  culture  all  alike  had 
become  Magyar  to  the  core* 

Both  these  estates  of  nobiUty  were  represented  in 
the  Diet.^  The  magnates  ordinarily  overshadowed  the 
minor  gentry,  but  since  they  were  equally  Magyar  in 
their  point  of  view,  they  consistendy  directed  the  Diet^s 
activities  in  the  Magyar  interest,  and  whenever  less 
oligarchic  tendencies  prevailed,  it  was  always  the  body 
of  the  Magyar  freemen,  never  the  tmenfranchised  mass 
of  the  subject  nationalities,  that  made  its  voice  heard  in 
pariiament*  Thus  the  Hungarian  Diet,  unlike  the  diets 
of  Bohemia  and  Tyrol,  showed  a  strong  national  bias 
from  the  first,  and  particularist  traditionalism  passed 
over  into  nationalistic  chauvinism  more  rapidly  here 
dian  in  any  other  part  of  the  Hapsburg  Empire* 

Long  before  the  struggle  with  absolutism  was  over 
die  Magyars  gave  unmistakable  proof  of  their  intentions 
widi  regard  to  the  other  nationalities  in  Hungary* 
In  1848,  when  liberty  seemed  on  the  point  of 
triumph,  the  Serb  population  in  the  South-Eastem 
part  of  the  Alfold  sent  a  deputation  to  the  Htmgarian 
Diet  assembled  at  Pressburg*  They  expressed  their 
determinarion  to  aid  the  Magyars  in  defending  the 

As  in  Bngtatid^  the  lepctsentatiQO  wis  based  00  a  oountsr- 


Z4B  THE  BALKANS 

new-found  liberties  of  their  oommon  country^  but 
required  the  recognition  of  the  Serb  language  as  the 
official  medium  in  Serb  bcalities*  The  Magyar 
ministry  refused  to  consider  their  claim.  Magyar, 
they  declared,  must  be  the  only  language  of  administra- 
tion in  the  whole  kii^dom  of  Hungary,  and  when  the 
Serb  leaders  refused  their  allegiance  on  sudi  terms  as 
these,  Kossuth  replied  that  **  then  the  sword  must 
decide  between  them/' 

The  ruin  of  the  Magyars'  hopes  in  the  following  year 
was  largely  due  to  the  dread  with  which  the  rest  of  the 
Hungarians  looked  forward  to  their  success.  All  other 
nationalities  in  the  kingdom  sympathised  with  the 
Hapsburg  cause,  and  the  Serbs,  at  least,  fought  valiantly 
on  its  behalf.  When  the  events  of  z866  enabled  the 
Magyars  to  snatch  victory  out  of  defeat,  the  forebod- 
ings of  their  alien  fellow-citizens  were  more  than  realised* 
To  the  remaining  inhabitants  of  the  Hapsbuxg  Mon- 
archy the  Ausgleich  brought  some  measure  of  relief 
from  the  intolerable  regime  of  the  'fifties:  for  the 
subject  populations  of  Hungary  it  opened  the  gk)omiest 
page  of  a  precarious  history. 

The  Compromise  with  die  Germans  of  Austria  and 
the  Hapsburg  Dynasty  delivered  Hungary  into  the  hand 
of  the  Magyar  Liberal  Party.  If  the  Liberals  of  Austria 
correspond  to  the  Rnglish  Radicals  of  1833,  we  can 
only  liken  their  Magyar  namesakes  to  the  men  of  1688. 
The  **  Glorious  Revolution "  was  heralded  with  a 
flourish  of  trumpets,  and  the  tale  has  been  continually 
enhanced  by  conventional  eloquence ;  yet  in  Hut^^ary, 
as  in  Engkmd,  the  **  era  of  free  institutions  "  merely 
established  the  ascendancy  of  a  dose  oligardiy . 

The  Hungarian  magnates,  who  in  1867  emerged 
victorious  from  nearly  a  century  of  political  wac£aae> 


HUNGARY  149 

leptoduoed  both  the  virtues  and  the  vices  of  the  English 
\ini^^  They  treasured  an  ingrained  tradition  of 
statesmanship  that  has  been  valuable  to  the  backward 
majority  of  their  ootmtrymen,  and  experience  had  made 
than  convinced  haters  of  certain  pernicious  political 
ideab ;  but  they  were  not  concerned  to  practise  their 
principles  too  pedantically,  and  in  the  last  resort  they 
subordinated  all  scruples  to  the  retention  of  their  power* 

The  Liberalism  of  the  Magyar  Whigs  was  more 
than  a  veneer*  In  questions  of  religion,  for  instance, 
Ihrngpay  remained  true  to  her  traditions  of  toleration** 
But  diey  were  fanatical  nationalists,  and  the  whole 
political  energy  of  the  party  rapidly  became  absorbed  in 
a  campaign  of  Magyarisation* 

Magyar  chauvinism  has  been  of  a  different  stamp 
£tom  Ae  policy  of  any  German  party  in  Austria.  The 
Austrian  Germans  have  always  been  content  to  dominate 
dieir  fellow-nationalities.  The  Magyars,  however,  were 
less  civilised  than  the  Germans,  and  they  bore  a  much 
larger  proportion   to  the   total  population   of  their 

'Tbe  ooowfvatiofi  of  tttt  Wh^  fainiliiw  dependted  on  the  systetn 
qC  **  Batui/*  which  had  developed  in  the  seventeenth  century*  In 
Hnngary  the  consolidation  of  landed  estates  was  sdU  more  drasticalljir 
pRxnoied  by  a  bw  forbidding  any  noble  to  alienate  his  land*  Ths 
SMBine  was  introduced  by  Louis  L  in  1351,  and  remained  in  force  tiU 
1848. 

'Hnneary  is  divided  between  many  creeds*  The  Ronum  Church 
dfam  its  adherents  from  three  of  the  races  Magyars^  Germans  and 
Slovaks— and  accounted  in  2900  for  nearly  49%  of  the  population. 
CalvittiBm,  the  nest  strongest  sect  (14%),  is  confined  to  the  Magyars* 
All  the  Serbs  and  a  su^ority  of  the  Rotmuuis  are  orthodox  (ia%)#  while 
^  remainder  of  the  Roumans  and  all  the  Ruthenes  are  Uniats  (zi%), 
obsBTfiug  the  Orthodox  ritual  but  owning  allegiance  to  the  Pope. 
Luihsfantmi  (Tjf %)  is  common  to  Slovaks  mi  Gmnans* 

The  era  of  Turkish  rule  in  Hungary  was  contemporary  with  the 
Otfbolic  reaction.  While  the  Hapsburgs  were  savagely  repressing 
PWKisfiiifrim  in  the  territories  under  their  control,  the  Turks  extended 
their  toleration  to  all  Christian  sects  in  the  Alf61d,  and  the  Magyar 
CdviniMs  m  revolt  against  the  tyranny  of  Vienna  often  made  common 
cause  with  the  Moslem  across  the  bocder*  In  the  autonomous  princt- 
V^ikf  of  Transjrlvania  Protestantism  was  the  official  religioa* 


150  THE  BALKANS 


country*  They  aimed  at  nothing  less  than  the  extirpa- 
tion of  other  languages  and  cultures,  and  the  ultimate 
conversion  to  their  own  nationality  of  every  inhabitant 
of  the  Hungoiiaai  Kingdom* 

The  methods  for  obtaining  this  result  which  were 
inaugurated  by  the  Magyar  Liberals  after  1867  were  an 
imitation  on  a  far  larger  scale  of  Prussia's  policy  on 
her  Polish  frontier*  Nothing  comparable  to  them  has 
been  perpetrated  in  Western  Europe  for  at  least  a 
century.  To  find  an  English  parallel  we  must  hark 
back  once  more  to  the  Whigs  of  1688,  and  call  to  mind 
the  repression  of  the  Catholics  by  the  British  administra- 
tion in  Ireland  during  the  blade  era  that  followed  the 
Batde  of  the  Boyne* 

The  Magyars,  like  the  Russians,  Ottoman  Turks  and 
other  peoples  on  the  outskirts  of  European  civilisation, 
are  ostentatious  of  theoretical  enlightenment,  but  their 
borrowed  idealism  serves  to  cloak  the  survival  of 
realities  which  have  ceased  to  be  possible  further  West* 

By  the  new  constitution  all  citizens  of  Hux^;ary  were 
declared  equal  before  the  law  without  distinction  of 
race,  and  were  expressly  guaranteed  the  enjoyment  of 
their  national  individuality*  Yet  the  same  constitution 
recognises  Magyar  as  the  only  language  of  state,  and 
the  other  tongues  have  been  jealously  excluded  from 
official  use* 

This  ordinance  is  perpetually  in  evidence*  In 
ptu*ely  Slovak  or  Rouman  towns  the  names  of  the  streets 
are  posted  up  in  Magyar,  and  the  name  of  the  place  itself 
is  Magyarised  in  official  parlance*  On  the  state  railways 
the  Magyar  language  has  a  monopoly:  time-tabtes, 
notices,  and  even  the  tickets  are  printed  in  Magyar 
alone,  and  Magyar  is  the  administrative  langu^e  of  the 
railway  staff*    The  same  thing  applies  to  all  other 


HUNGARY  Z5I 

public  services*  Magyar  is  the  sole  medium  in  which 
their  business  is  conducted* 

It  might  be  answered  that  these  are  superficialities* 
"The  meticubus  enforcement  of  Magyar  is  childish 
rather  than  oppressive*  Official  formulas  are  easily 
learnt  by  rote*  If  Englishmen  or  Americans  who  know 
no  JDreign  language  can  still  travel  without  incon- 
venience on  the  Continent,  the  Slovak  peasant  ought 
not  to  be  at  a  loss  on  a  Hungarian  railway*  Moreover, 
some  general  measure  of  linguistic  tmiformity  is  essential 
if  the  various  nationalities  of  Htmgary  are  to  be  organised 
at  all  in  a  single  state*  The  Welsh  citizen  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  Breton  citizen  of  France  are  not  outraged 
by  the  ubiquitousness  of  the  English  and  French  tongues* 
Why  should  not  Roumans  and  Slovaks  be  as  reasonable 
as  they<  In  almost  every  European  state  there  are 
minorities  of  alien  speech,  to  whom  the  **  national  ** 
language  is  merely  a  lingua  franca.  It  is  true  that  in 
Kii^^ary  litde  more  than  half  the  popubtion  inherit 
from  their  parents  the  ruling  tongue  ;  yet  if  the  absolute 
maiority  of  the  Magyar-speaking  element  is  slight,  they 
are  in  a  great  relative  majority  over  any  other  single 
linguistic  group  in  the  population*  If  Magyar  were 
deposed  from  its  supremacy,  no  other  language  current 
to  Htmgary  wotdd  be  qualified  to  take  its  place*  It  is 
tiofortunate  that  Hungary  is  such  a  medley  of  races, 
but  the  &tdt  lies  with  history,  and  not  with  the  Magyar 
statesmen  of  the  last  half-century*^' 

The  Magyar  would  thus  defend  the  Hungarian 
language-ordinances  as  a  necessity  of  state,  yet  more 
than  petty  inconvenience  is  involved :  the  measure 
places  half  the  popubtion  at  a  serious  disadvantage  in 
fiice  of  the  other  half  «  It  gives  those  who  speak  Magyar 
native  tongue  an  undue  monopoly  of  pubhc 


152  THE  BALKANS 

service*  The  state  itself  must  suffer  by  forfeiting  the 
assistance  of  some  of  its  most  capabk  citizens* 

Again  the  Magyar  will  have  a  ready  answer.  **  We 
Magyars/'  he  will  say,  '*  have  a  much  higher  standard  of 
education  and  culture  than  the  other  inhabitants  of  our 
country*  Power  gravitates  towards  efficiency,  and  even 
if  no  hmguage-ordinanoes  had  been  passed,  the  Magyars 
would  have  found  themselves  in  control  of  die  Hungarian 
state/' 

This  also  is  true*  In  1867  the  Magyars  were  ahead 
of  the  rest  in  education,  and  they  have  likewise  main* 
tained  their  lead  in  the  meanwhile*  Yet  the  history  of 
education  in  Htmgary  during  this  period  should  put 
the  Magyar  apologist  to  silence* 

The  Magyars  have  ensured  their  superiority  by 
paralysing  their  neighbours'  progress  rather  than  by 
progressing  themselves*  If  the  subject  nationalities 
are  more  and  not  less  illiterate  now  than  they  were  fifty 
years  ago,  it  is  because  the  Magyar  government  has 
closed  practically  all  their  secondary,  and  the  great 
majority  of  their  primary  schools,  and  has  made  it 
increasingly  hard  to  obtain  instruction  in  any  but  the 
Magyar  tongue.  The  Magyars'  political  monopoly 
was  or^;inally  justified  by  culture,  but  they  have 
perverted  politics  to  the  monopolisation  of  culture 
itself  by  grotesquely  uncultured  means*  Under  these 
drctunstances  the  relative  degree  of  education  attained 
at  present  by  the  Magyars  and  their  fellow-dtizens  loses 
all  significance  as  a  standard  of  political  valtte* 

Hungary,  however,  is  at  least  a  constitutional  country* 
Why,  then,  have  the  minor  nationalities  failed  to  redress 
their  wrongs  by  constitutional  pressure  i  They  amount 
to  litde  less  than  half  the  population*  Surely  they 
oould  return  such  a  formidable  contingent  of  represents^ 


HUNGARY  153 

tives  to  the  parliament  at  Buda«*Pest,  that  Magyar 
fflinistries  would  be  driven  to  a  compromise  i 

This  door  is  closed  because  the  government  of 
Hungary  is  not  constitutional  in  the  modem  sense :  it 
is  only  called  so  by  cotutesy*  The  country  still  awaits 
its  **  Great  Reform  Bill/'  and  the  mediaeval  franchise, 
which  Great  Britain  sloughed  off  in  z832#  has  here 
endured  till  the  present  day*  We  have  said  that  the 
Magyar  politicians  of  1867  were  Whigs :  we  shall 
discover  their  '*  rotten  boroughs  *'  in  the  non-Magyar 
OMistituencies.  They  were  as  well-veised  in  corruption 
as  English  politicians  were  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
and  they  reinforced  bribery  by  intimidation*  In  non- 
Magyar  constituencies  the  precedent  of  overawing 
"  opposition  '^  voters  by  the  presence  of  troops  has 
become  well-established,  and  the  device  has  more  than 
once  led  to  bloodshed  which  wotdd  have  been  called 
**  massacre  "  if  it  had  occurred  in  Turkey* 

No  redress,  therefore,  is  possible  through  parliament, 
because  the  leaders  of  the  non-Magyar  nationalities 
can  never  obtain  a  seat  there*  They  are  rigidly  debarred 
from  a  political  career,  and  even  in  the  neutral  sphere 
of  literature,  art,  history,  and  all  that  is  included  under 
the  name  of  culture,  diey  are  made  to  suffer  for  the 
privilege  of  leadership* 

The  Magyars  have  adopted  the  Greek  tyrant's  policy 
of  **  cutting  off  the  tallest  ears  in  the  cornfield*''  Any 
form  of  distinction  renders  a  Slovak,  Rouman  or  Serb 
dtixm  of  Hungary  immediately  suspect  to  his  country's 
police.  Personal  hberty  in  Hungary  suffers  direly  from 
the  want  of  a  Habeas  Corpus  Act*  The  laws  of  oon- 
spincy  are  so  comprehensive  that  arrest  without 
specification  of  the  charge  and  protracted  imprisonment 
befofe  trial  are  events  of  normal  occurrence*    When 


*, 


Z54  THE  BALKANS 

it  is  remembered  that,  in  virtue  of  the  language-ordin- 
ances, all  proceedif^  in  court  have  to  be  conducted 
exclusively  in  the  Magyar  langu2^e,  the  picture  of  racial 
oppression  is  complete* 

This  atrocious  system  was  eleborated  by  the  Liberal 
Party  which  came  into  power  in  1867* 

The  Liberal  regime  was  protracted.  Deik,  the 
statesman  of  the  Ausgleich,  was  succeeded  in  1876 
by  Count  Coloman  Tisza,  the  Magyar  Walpole,  who 
remained  uninterruptedly  in  office  tmtil  iBgo.  His 
resignation  in  that  year  started  the  party  on  its  decline, 
but  its  fall  was  staved  off  for  a  dozen  years  longer  by 
the  raising  of  those  ecclesiastical  issues  which  Austria 
had  setded  as  early  as  i868*  In  1902  the  Liberals 
were  first  challenged  on  their  real  standing-ground^ 
the  maintenance  of  the  Ausgleich. 

A  radical  movement  had  been  gaining  strength,  which 
aspired  to  pass  beyond  compromise  to  independence. 
The  ideal  of  the  ""  Left '"  was  self-sufficiency*  They 
wished  to  see  Hungary  take  her  place  as  a  sovereign 
unit,  on  an  entire  equality  with  the  other  states  of 
Europe. 

In  our  analysis  of  the  Danubian  Monarchy  we  have 
noted  that  great  economic  difficulties  stood,  and  always 
will  stand,  in  the  way  of  such  a  development.  The 
oidy  chance  of  overcoming  them  would  be  the  enthusi- 
astic co-operation  for  this  end  of  the  whole  Hungarian 
people.  The  first  object,  therefore,  of  the  Magyar 
Left  should  have  been  the  conciliation  of  the  non- 
Magyar  nationalities.  They  shotdd  have  driven  their 
Liberal  opponents  from  office  on  this  issue,  justified 
their  own  installation  by  a  complete  reversal  of  the 
prevailing  chauvinism  and  a  definitive  solution  of  the 
racial  problem  on  democratic  lines,  and  then  joined 


HUNGARY  155 

battle  with  Austria  and  the  Dynasty  on  the  question  of 
Independence  with  the  whole  country  at  their  back* 

bstead  of  this,  they  chose  the  language-question  in  its 
most  inflammatory  form  as  the  chief  plank  in  their  plat- 
form* They  demanded  the  substitution  of  Magyar  for 
German  as  the  executive  language  in  all  the  Hungarian 
regiments  of  the  Joint  Army,  with  the  avowed  object 
of  promoting  the  Magyarisation  of  the  non-Magyar 
Hungarian  conscripts. 

This  was  a  simultaneous  challenge  to  the  Liberals, 
die  subject  nationalities,  and  the  Crown,  for  the 
Ausgleidi  had  left  the  supreme  control  of  the  Army 
in  the  King-Emperor^s  hands,  and  Francis  Joseph  was 
convinced  that  the  efficiency  of  the  service  and  there- 
with the  safety  of  the  Monarchy  as  a  whole  depended 
upon  strict  uniformity  of  organisation* 

The  sovereign  failed  to  maintain  the  Liberals  in  office* 
His  persistent  summoning  of  Liberal  ministries  was 
countered  by  obstruction  on  the  Opposition's  part* 
Count  Stephen  Tisza,  the  son  of  Coloman,  who  took 
office  in  1903  as  a  forlorn  hope,  tried  to  meet  the  situation 
by  revolutionising  parliamentary  procedure,  but  he 
merely  provoked  parliamentary  anarchy  as  deplorable  as 
die  hrndc-down  at  Vienna  in  1897*  At  the  beginning 
of  Z905  he  appealed  to  the  electors  and  suflTered  utter 
defeat*  The  Liberal  Party  was  dead,  and  a  coalition 
of  die  radical  groups  had  won  the  leadership  of  the 
Magyar  nation* 

The  King-Emperor,  however,  refused  to  give  in. 
He  proceeded  to  govern  without  parliament's  assistance, 
and  towards  the  end  of  the  year  he  took  the  offensive 
against  the  Coalition  by  engineering  a  bill  for  universal 
suflEcage*  Their  attitude  towards  the  national  question 
made  the  Coalition  defenceless  against  such  an  attack. 


156  THE  BALKANS 

and  they  surrendered  at  discretion  as  soon  as  it  became 
certain  that  a  bill  of  identical  purport  was  on  the  verge 
of  passing  into  law  in  the  Austrian  half  of  the  Monarchy. 

At  the  beginning  of  1906  a  G>alition  ministry  wfaidi 
had  renounced  the  **  Magyar  word  of  command  **  was 
at  last  called  into  office,  but  their  quiver  had  been 
emptied  of  its  arrows. 

Towards  the  end  of  1908  they  introduced  a  carefully 
planned  reform  bill,  which  would  have  advanced  the 
Htmgarian  franchise  from  the  mediaeval  to  the  Prussian 
level.  The  electorate  was  to  be  increased  very  con- 
siderably in  numbers,  the  qualification  for  su£Erage  was 
to  be  literacy,  the  electors  were  to  be  classified  acoordii^ 
to  degrees  of  education,  and  the  more  highly  qualified 
were  to  possess  more  than  one  vote.  Political  power 
was  thus  represented  as  the  privilege  of  culture,  but 
since  the  dominant  Magyars  had  long  been  engaged  in 
exterminating  all  non-Magyar  culture  within  the  borders 
of  Hungary,  the  bill  was  calculated  to  produce  a  demo- 
cratic impression  without  extending  the  franchise 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  Magyar  race. 

It  was  of  little  consequence,  therefore,  that  the 
ministry's  main  programme  of  independence  eclipsed 
their  perfunctory  efforts  towards  internal  reform  before 
the  franchise  bill  had  time  to  pass  into  law.  Its  mere 
formulation  proved  once  and  for  all  that  the  subject 
nationahties  had  nothing  to  expect  from  M^;yar 
Radicalism,^  and  in  the  trial  of  strength  widi  Austria 
and  the  Crown  to  which  the  G>alition  now  committed 
itself,  Francis  Joseph  was  still  able  to  wield  his  master- 
weapon. 

^  Aldiottg^  one  of  the  oomponents  of  the  Coalition  was  the  '*  People's 
partjr/Y^clerical  group  whidi  had  taken  the  cause  of  the  nationalitses 
dito  its  prosranune* 


HUNGARY  157 

Early  in  1909  the  more  extreme  elements  of  the 
Left  forced  the  G>alition  premier^  Dr.  Wekerle,  to 
open  the  campaign  for  economic  autonomy  with  die 
demand  for  a  separate  Hungarian  state  bank.  The 
Crown  refused  to  consider  the  question  so  long  as  the 
franchise  remained  unreformed :  such  a  momentous 
proposal,  Francis  Joseph  declared,  must  be  endorsed  by 
a  parliament  truly  representative  of  the  whole  Hungarian 
people* 

This  shrewdly-aimed  blow  broke  up  the  Coalition 
into  fragments.  The  moderates  and  the  intransigeants 
were  each  strong  enough  to  stalemate  the  other,  no 
ministry  could  be  formed,  and  in  1909,  as  in  1905, 
parliamentary  government  was  suspended*  At  the 
beginning  of  1910  Francis  Joseph  appointed  a  ministry 
of  ''  king's  friends  **  under  the  leadership  of  Count 
Khuen-Hedervary,  a  notorious  political  **  boss ""  who 
had  thoroi^;hly  learnt  his  trade  during  a  twenty-years 
tenure  of  the  Croatian  vice-royalty.^  The  Hedervary 
cabal  scattered  promises  broadcast  to  all  aggrieved 
elements  in  the  country,  and  the  elections  conducted 
under  its  auspices  next  stmmier  surpassed  even  Hun- 
garian precedent  in  their  corruption*  When  the  new 
parliament  met,  the  Count  had  a  docile  majority  at  his 
beck,  and  the  Magyars  saw  their  constitutional  tradition 
reduced  to  a  farce* 

The  lesson  sank  deep*  Khuen-Hedervary  was  too 
shady  a  diaracter  to  serve  as  more  than  a  stop-gap,  and 
when  he  vanished  from  the  scene  all  sections  of  Magyar 
opinion  were  more  than  content  to  accept  Count 
Stephen  Tisza  once  more*  Tisza  remains  in  office  at 
the  present  moment,  and  his  restoration  means  that  the 
evolution  of  Magyar  politics  has  come  to  a  dead  stop* 

'  Sec  Scctiott  B* 


158  THE  BALKANS 

He  stands  for  a  reaction  to  the  programme  of  1867 : 
compromise  with  Austria  and  the  Dynasty,  war  to  the 
knife  against  the  non-Magyar  nationalities  in  Htmgary 
itself.  The  Magyars  have  realised  that  democradsa- 
tion  and  Magyarisation  are  incompatible,  and  they  have 
preferred  to  sacrifice  progress  to  chauvinism* 

Thus  Hungary  and  Austria  have  dive^ed  profoundly 
in  their  political  history  since  the  year  of  the  Ausgleich. 
In  1867  Hungary  possessed  the  more  enlightened 
tradition  of  the  two,  and  the  initiative  towards  constitu- 
tional government  came  from  die  Magyar  side*  Then 
for  a  time  they  marched  abreast ;  but  when  die  problem 
of  nationality  emerged  like  a  steep  cliff  athwart  their 
path,  Austria  pressed  forward,  and  after  a  hazardous 
struggle  attained  the  summit :  Hungary  halted,  and 
without  even  scanning  the  cliff's  face  for  a  handhold, 
turned  about  and  began  to  retrace  her  steps. 

Between  1867  and  1914  the  political  standard  of  the 
Magyar  nation  has  grieviously  deteriorated* 

The  results  of  our  sturvey  warrant  the  assumption 
that  if  the  two  Central-European  monarchies  suffer 
defeat  in  the  present  war,  the  subject  nationalities  of 
Hungary,  when  the  plebiscite  at  last  enables  them  to 
express  their  desire,  will  act  like  the  Polish  subjects  of 
Germany,  and  vote  to  the  last  man  for  liberation  from 
die  Magyar  state*  We  have  to  examine  whether  their 
secession  from  Hungary  will  involve  the  disruption  of 
the  Danubian  Empire* 

Just  as  in  the  case  of  Poland,  their  extrication  will 
necessarily  be  incomplete*  Geography  has  made 
Hungary  a  natural  unit,  sundered  from  her  neighbours 
and  knit  together  within  herself  by  pronunent  physical 
barriers,  and  within  this  area  the  races  are  extraordinarily 


HUNGARY  159 

mtemiingled.  Certain  xninorities  will  therefore  remain 
fast  in  prison,  and  it  will  be  the  first  duty  of  the  Euro- 
pean Congress  to  convert  their  enforced  abode  into  a 
ixMise  of  liberty,  before  it  discusses  the  destiny  of  their 
more  fortunate  companions  who  are  able  to  effect  their 
escape. 

The  parties  to  the  European  Conference  must 
goarantee  the  observance  of  the  excellent  law  regarding 
the  rights  of  nationalities,  which  has  nominally  been 
valid  in  Hungary  since  it  was  passed  in  1868,  but  has 
remained  in  practice  a  dead  letter. 

Critics  will  point  out  that  such  a  guarantee  would  be 
an  intense  humiliation  for  the  Magyar  people,  that  they 
would  only  submit  to  it  under  constraint,  and  that  every 
time  a  Slovak  or  German-speaking  Htmgarian  appealed 
from  Magyar  injustice  to  the  guarantors,  there  would  be 
danger  of  racial  war  in  Hungary  and  of  a  conflagration 
m  Europe.  This  is  true,  but  it  is  equally  certain  that 
dse  minorities  will  no  longer  submit  to  Magyar  mis- 
government,  and  that  if  the  Concert  of  Europe  does  not 
help  them,  they  will  help  themselves,  and  tmhesitat- 
tngty  appeal  for  intervention  to  the  several  states  of  their 
own  respective  nationality  which  lie  immediately  beyond 
the  Hungarian  frontier.  The  evil  inheritance  of  the 
past  cannot  be  charmed  away  in  a  moment,  and  no 
reconstruction  of  the  Hungarian  state  will  leave  all 
parties  content.  In  either  event,  therefore,  the  immedi- 
ate future  will  be  fraught  with  anxiety,  and  the  most  we 
can  do  is  to  initiate  Htmgary  into  a  more  promising 
career  than  she  has  followed  in  the  immediate  past. 
If  some  hearts  must  still  be  sore,  it  is  better  that  the 
Magyars  should  chafe  at  restrictions  upon  racial  persecu- 
tion than  that  the  minor  nationalities  should  groan 
under  exposure  to  it. 

F 


i6o  THE  BALKANS 

From  the  sentimental  point  of  view,  we  need 
have  little  scruple  in  wotmding  the  Magyars'  pride. 
Individually  they  are  an  attractive  people,  and  they 
have  known  how  to  keep  the  sympathies  of  Western 
Europe  alive  on  their  behalf  by  harping  on  the  tragedy 
of  1849 ;  but  since  the  year  of  the  Compromise  they 
have  behaved  like  the  servant  in  the  parable,  who  was 
forgiven  by  his  lord  and  then  seized  his  fellow-servant 
by  the  throat.  They  cannot  altogether  escape  the 
hypocrite's  retribution* 

In  the  interests  of  common  justice,  therefore,  Europe 
must  guarantee  the  alien  enclaves  in  Magyar  territory* 
Yet  a  guaranteed  re-oi^anisation  of  the  Hungarian  state 
on  still  more  drastic  lines  might  well  be  in  the  best 
interests  of  the  Magyars  themselves,  for  it  would  be 
their  one  chance  of  inducing  the  much  larger  blocks  of 
alien  population  which  are  not  debarred  from  secession 
by  geography,  to  hold  fast  of  their  own  free  will  to  their 
present  allegiance* 

The  principal  terms  of  such  a  guaranteed  re-settle- 
ment should  run  as  follows  : 

(i«)  Local  self-government  should  be  re-organised. 
At  present  it  is  based  upon  the  medieval  counties, 
which  are  very  unequal  in  size  and  entirely  out  of 
rebdon  to  racial  botmdaries*  These  county  divisions 
should  be  recast  into  new  local  units,  standardised 
approximately  in  area  and  population  like  the  French 
departments,  and  each  department  should  be  made 
racially  homogeneous  as  far  as  possible*  This 
would  give  every  nationality  in  Hungary  a  number 
of  local  units  more  or  less  proportional  to  its  per- 
centage in  the  total  population  of  the  country* 
The  department  should  employ  its  national  language 
as  its  official  medium  of  administration,  and  should 


HUNGARY  i6i 

be  the  basts  of  electoral  organisation  for  the  central 
Hungarian  parliament. 

(iL)  There  should  be  no  parliamentary  devolution  to 
national  blocks*  The  races  are  so  interlaced  that  it 
lOttld  be  impossible  to  carve  out  areas  including  all  the 
Rouman  or  all  the  German  inhabitants  of  Hungary, 
aod  endow  them  with  extensive  Home  Rule*  The 
various  national  territories  are  too  scattered  for  effective 
Qfganisation  as  unities. 

(iii«)  On  the  other  hand,  national  education  and  all 
public  activities  that  contribute  to  national  culture 
should  be  placed  under  the  exclusive  control  of  national 
ammiittees,  consisting  of  the  deputies  elected  to  the 
central  Hungarian  parliament  by  the  various  depart- 
ments belotiging  to  each  particular  nationality.  These 
omimittees  should  share  between  them  the  annual 
budget  voted  for  public  education  by  the  parliament  as 
a  whole,  in  proportion  to  the  percentage  of  the  total 
population  which  they  respectively  represent. 

(iv.)  All  questions  of  universal  interest,  such  as 
ammmnications  and  defence,  social  and  economic 
development,  fiscal  relations  with  other  countries, 
consular  service  and  foreign  policy  in  general,  should 
remain  as  heretofore  within  the  province  of  the  central 
l,^  now  to  be  elected  on  the  new  departmental 


If  the  non-Magyar  nationalities  of  Hungary  were 
assured  some  such  reforms  as  these,  it  is  conceivable 
that  geographical  and  economic  considerations  would 
prevail  with  them  over  hatred  of  the  Magyars  and  desire 
for  incorporation  in  their  own  nationd  states;    but 

*  And  therefore  presumably  subject  to  the  conditions  of  the  Ausgleich, 
nnlcB  other  ctreinnstances  lead  the  Hungarian  parliament  to  terminate 
the  connection  with  Austria* 


i6a  THE  BALKANS 

piedictioii  is  impossible,  and  we  must  reckon  with  the 
coQtif^ency  that  certain  elements  may  in  any  event 
secede.'  Will  the  cohesion  of  the  whole  Hapsburg 
Monarchy  be  endangered  by  their  secession  i 

The  German  colonies  in  the  Alfdld  and  in  the  Slovak 
hills  are  too  widely  dispersed  for  extrication,*  and  the 
Sbvaks  themselves  do  not  come  into  question  from  our 
immediate  standpoint.  They  may  be  eager  to  secede 
from  Hungary,  but  they  would  only  do  so  in  order  to 
coalesce  with  the  Tchechs  of  Austria.  They  have  no 
blood-brethren  outside  the  frontiers  of  the  Danubian 
Empire,  and  the  satisfaction  of  their  national  aspirations 
would  affea  the  internal  organisation  of  the  whole  unit 
rather  than  its  solidarity  towards  the  outer  world.  We 
are  left  with  the  Ruthenes,  Roumans  and  Serbs. 

(i.)  The  Roumans  are  the  strongest  non-Magyar 
nationality  in  Hungary,  and  we  have  seen  that  they  are 
concentrated  in  Transylvania  and  the  adjoining  strip 
of  the  AlfOld,  towards  the  border  of  the  national 
Roumanian  Kingdom.*  Their  transference,  therefore, 
horn  Hungary  to  Roumania  would  seem  a  natural 

'  In  BpiU  of  Magyarisatton,  the  Slovaks,  Ruthenei  and  Roumans 
have  steadily  been  dwwigagirg  tbenuelves  since  1867  from  the  Magyar 
toils.  The  growth  of  ■  native  intellt^wum  has  heightened  tbett 
national  coosctouuuss,  and  in  recent  yfan  the  cunent  of  eaiigtation 
U)  the  VSA.  has  brought  wealth  into  their  dutricts.  Peasans  who 
have  made  tbeii  littfe  jnlt  in  America  have  been  buying  out  the  big 
estates  of  the  Whig  magnates,  and  thereby  freeing  their  soil  tram  the 


■  Though  the  Germans  of  Hungary  would  escape  from  die  Magyars 
if  they  could,  for  the  Ausgleich  has  secived  them  no  better  tteatment 
than  the  other  nationalities.  While  the  Magyars  have  been  in  alliance 
with  the  Germaos  of  Austria,  they  have  not  hesitated  to  "  Magjnrise  " 
the  two  miUion  Germans  in  their  midst.  For  the  distribution  of  the 
Uiter  see  Map  III. 

■  The  free  Roumans  of  the  present  kingdom  are jmbaUv  dacended 
from  Transyivaman  settlers,  mo  during  the  early  Middle  Ages  pushed 
out  through  th?  Carpathians  and  established  themselves  in  the  optn 


w 


HUNGARY  163 

appUcation  of  the  national  principle  to  political  group- 
ing. Since  Transylvania  is  hardly  less  isolated  from 
the  Alfold  than  from  the  Roumanian  plains^  the  geo- 
gr^hical  objections  would  be  comparatively  slight, 
wfafle  Roumania  on  her  part  would  gain  immensely  in 
territorial  compactness  by  the  incorporation  of  this 
region.  At  present  she  embraces  Transylvania  on  two 
sides,  as  the  young  moon  holds  the  old  moon  in  its  arms, 
and  she  is  eager  to  grow  to  her  full  orb. 

Unfortunately,  however,  the  heart  of  Transylvania  is 
tenanted  by  an  important  non-Rouman  poptdation. 
Three  counties  are  almost  exclusively  inhabited  by  the 
Szekels,  a  flying  column  of  the  Magyar  host  which 
became  entangled  and  isolated  in  the  Transylvanian 
hills,  when  the  main  body  of  the  nation  pressed  down 
into  the  AlfSld.  There  are  also  the  Saxon  towns,  which 
are  the  most  important  German  endaves  in  all  Hungary. 

The  Szekel  and  Saxon  districts  cannot  be  separated 
bom  the  Rouman  zone  which  hems  them  in.  The 
whole  ge(^;raphical  block  must  be  transferred  or  retained 
together,  and  if  the  status  quo  does  injustice  to  two- 
and-tfaree-quarter  millions  of  Rotunans,  the  alternative 
would  merely  reverse  the  parts,  and  put  over  a  million 
Saxons  and  Szekels  in  an  identical  plight.^  We  are  in 
presence  of  a  case  where  a  very  considerable  minority 
mtist  be  disappointed.  The  decision  probably  depends 
upon  the  action  of  the  Roumanian  Kingdom  in  the 

^  The  ocosus  of  1900  revealed  the  foUowing  figures : — 

Saaons 333,000         9.5% 

Szekeb 8z5/)oo       33«a% 

Rotunaiis  in  Transyhrania  .  1,397,000       56^% 

Total  pop.  of  Transvlvania  •        •  a,4A<:/xx)      xoo.o% 
RoomaDs  m  die  Alf 61a  •  .  x,388/xx) 

Total  pop*  of  whole  block   •        •  3,833,000    (of   whom    die 

Roumaaa  constituted  7a.43%)« 


i64  THE  BALKANS 

present  crisis.  If  Roumania  intervenes  in  the  war  in 
favour  of  the  Allies,  the  prize  will  fall  into  her  grasp  : 
if  she  remains  neutral  till  hostilities  cease,  her  claims 
will  not  obtain  preference  in  the  subsequent  settlement. 

(ii.)  The  Seri)  settlements  in  the  Alifold  are  conter- 
minous with  those  of  the  Roumans.  They  skirt  the 
Northern  bank  of  the  Danube  from  a  point  opposite  the 
junction  of  the  Morava  tributary  as  far  upstream  as 
the  junction  of  the  Drave,  but  they  are  bewilderingly 
entangled  with  German  and  Magyar  endaves*  The 
majority  of  them  lie  within  the  **  Banat  of  Temesvar/' 
a  square  field  delimited  in  the  South-Eastem  comer 
of  the  Alfold  by  the  Transylvanian  mountains  on  the 
East,  and  the  Maros,  Theiss  and  Danube  rivers  on  die 
other  three  sides. 

The  Banat  was  one  of  the  principal  theatres  of 
eighteenth-century  colonisation :  the  Roumans  have 
established  themselves  in  the  Eastern  half  of  it,  and 
the  Western  half  is  divided  between  Germans  and 
Serbs,  while  the  Magyar  element  is  almost  negligible* 
If  the  Rouman  section  became  detached  from 
Hungary,  the  annexation  of  the  remainder  to  Serbia 
would  be  a  logical  corollary.^  The  courses  of  die 
Theiss  and  the  Maros  offer  a  good  frontier  in  this 
quarter  for  the  Magyar  state,  and  the  Serbian  national 
kingdom  South  of  the  Danube  will  be  anxious  to  incor- 
porate its  **  irredenta  **  on  the  river's  further  shore, 
in  order  to  remove  Belgrade  beyond  the  range  of  siege- 
artillery  planted  on  Hungarian  soil.  If,  however,  the 
Rouman  part  of  the  Banat  fails  to  break  away  &om 
Hungary,  its  fate  will  be  decisive  for  the  Serb  districts 

^  This  would  inyolvt  the  transference  of  the  German  endavcs  m  the 
Banat  as  well ;  but  they  are  doomed  in  any  case  to  be  memd  m  a 
state  of  alien  nationality,  and  any  alternative  would  be  a  xtdief  from 
Mai 


HUNGARY  165 

15  wdL  They  are  no  more  than  a  wedge  dnven  in 
between  die  Magyar  and  Rouman  populations  of  the 
Aifajd,^  and  could  not  be  excluded  from  the  Hungarian 
frontief  if  the  country  on  both  sides  of  them  remained 
within  it* 

{iii.)  The  Ruthenes  occupy  the  opposite  comer  of  the 
Aifdki,  round  the  head-waters  of  the  Theiss*  They 
number  less  than  half  a  million,  and  are  divided  from 
their  Magyar  nei^bours  by  no  natural  boundary,  while 
die  other  twenty-five  millions  who  speak  the  same 
dialect'  live  on  the  furdxer  side  of  the  Carpathians. 
The  geographical  factor,  therefore,  strongly  favours  the 
existing  political  situation,  yet  the  force  of  national 
antipathy  and  sympathy  is  more  imperious  still,  and 
die  mountain  barrier  is  not  impassable*  Two  lines  of 
railway  traverse  that  section  of  the  range  under  the 
shadow  of  which  the  Hungarian  Ruthenes  dwell,  and  one 
of  die  routes  is  the  famotis  Vereczka  Pass,  which  gave 
entrance  into  the  land  first  to  the  Magyars  and  then  to 
the  Ruthenes  themselves,  and  has  witnessed  the  passage 
of  Russian  invaders  during  the  operations  of  the 
present  war*  It  is  therefore  possible  that  the  Ruthenes 
may  set  geography  at  defiance,  and  throw  in  their  lot 
with  the  vast  body  of  their  race  which  stretches  tmin- 
terruptedly  Eastward  from  the  Carpathians'  further 
slopes  to  the  upper  waters  of  the  Don. 

These,  then,  are  the  three  instances  in  which  Hungary 
is  liable  to  sufifer  territorial  loss.  Our  discussion  has 
yielded  no  certain  conclusions,'  but  it  has  sufiiced  to 
show  that  secession  in  these  quarters  will  not  jeopardise 
the  continued  existence  of  the  Hapsbui^  Empire.    Even 

>  See  Map  IIL  >  See  Ch.  VIII.  C. 

*  Rectifications  of  the  Hungarian  frontier  are  indeed  so  problematical 
that  we  have  not  attempted  to  indicate  possibilities  in  the  maps  attached 
to  this  book. 


i66  THE  BALKANS 

if  all  possibilities  were  actualised,  die  Magyar  Kingdom 
wotild  still  be  left  with  nearly  twelve  million  inhabitants  ^ 
in  occupation  of  a  compact  and  productive  territory* 
The  balance  between  Austria  and  Hungary  would,  of 
course,  be  destroyed,  but  the  break-down  of  die  Dual 
System  might  strengthen  the  inward  cohesion  of  the 
Monarchy  by  opening  die  way  for  a  federal  re-construc- 
tion of  the  whole  on  genuinely  national  lines.  Even 
if  the  losses  in  Galida  and  Hungary  were  serious  enough 
to  degrade  the  Danubian  unit  f]x>m  die  ranks  of  the 
Great  Powers,  it  might  survive  as  an  essential  member 
in  the  re-organised  fraternity  of  European  nations* 

We  have  now  examined  die  state  of  die  national 
problem  in  die  Kingdom  of  Hungary,  as  well  as  in  the 
**  Kingdoms  and  Lands  Represented  in  die  Reichsrath 
at  Vienna,^'  without  discovering  any  ulcer  fatal  to  the 
life  of  the  Hapsburg  organism ;  but  our  examination 
of  the  Trans-Leithanian  half  of  the  Monarchy  is  not 
yet  complete*  In  addition  to  die  Hungarian  realm, 
the  **  Crown  of  St*  Stephen  **  comprises  the  *'  Kingdom 
of  Croatia-Slavonia  **  beyond  the  Southern  bank  of  the 
Drave* 

This  Hungarian  dependency  has  implicated  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy  in  the  natk>nal  problem  of  the 
Sottdiem  Slavs* 


mat 


itioB    of    nmiguy    willuii    ptf.scnt 

^  (aooQfdtng  to  oemas  of  1900)  16,838/300 

Possible  ksssts  tfttr  tbt  piutat  war,  caico-' 

latKl  atammmim--  

Rounuos»  Swksli  and  ?8aOTW        •  ^Ji^/Mso 


(») 


(c) 

SMMQumsisly  •        •        •        •    2i5^/)oo 
{ij  Rumtacs 4a3tOoo 

Total  of  possible  ksssts    •  4,953/xx> 


MiBimmi  ftsaaiiidcr       •        •        •  1x^79'/'^'^ 


Southern 


S--'^        ^-N 

^w^ 


i 


i 

^ 


hern 


r 


.r^ 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 


167 


.^va 


B*  The  Southern  Slavs 

is  not  co-extensive  with  the  Middle  Danube 
:  ^  it  is  bounded  by  the  Drave,  and  the  Danube 
a  considerable  area  South  as  well  as  North  of 
le* 

tributaries  which  reach  the  river  from  the  Right 

in  this  section  of  its  course,  take  their  rise  in  a 

of  limestone  mountains  linking  the  Alps  with  the 

le  of  the  Balkan  peninsub.    The  chief  affluent 

Save*    Its  source  is  close  to  that  of  the  Drave,  in 

igle  between  the  main  chain  of  the  Alps,  where 

bend  North-Eastward  towards  Vienna,  and  this 

Lc  **  branch,  where  it  falls  away  in  the  direction 

Adriatic  coast*    The  two  streams  follow  a  parallel 

The  Drave  draws  its  one  auxiliary,  the  Mur, 

the  Eastern  face  of  the  Austrian  Alps  on  its  Left 

:  the  Save  is  enriched  by  several  large  rivers  from 

ight,*  which  spring  from  the  Dinaric  watershed 

[pursue  their  tortuous  way  through  the  hilly  country 

[intervenes.    Swelled  by  the  united  volume  of  these 

\,  the  Save  finally  enters  the  Danube  at  a  point 

Semlin  and  Belgrade,  nearly  a  hundred  and 

miles  below  the  confluence  of  the  Drave. 

le  second  affluent  is  the  Morava,  which  flows  into 

lube  from  the  South,  about  fifty  miles  further 

Its  drainage-area  extends  from  the  Drina  on 

fWest  to  the  extremity  of  the  Balkan  mountains  on 

Bast,  a  chain  which  continues  the  line  of  the  Car- 

on  the  other  flank  of  the  **  Iron  Gates,*'  and 

)letes  the  partition  of  the  Lower  from  the  Middle 

of  the  Danube. 

See  Map  00  p.  Z05 ;  abo  Map  IIL      '  Uiia^  Vrbas,  Boana,  Dium* 


i68  THE  BALKANS 

The  system  of  the  Morava  and  the  Save,  and  in  fact 
the  whole  region  between  the  Drave,  the  Iron  Gates, 
and  the  sea,  was  occupied  in  the  seventh  century  aj). 
by  a  swarm  of  the  great  Slavonic  host,  ^^ch  found  its 
way  throt^  the  Moravian  Gap  and  the  Marchfeld,  and 
drifted  down  upon  the  Adriatic  coast* 

This  flying  column  of  the  Slavonic  invasion  did  not 
remain  undifierentiated  within  itself*  Its  reai^uard 
tarried  under  the  lea  of  the  Alps,  and  is  represented 
by  the  modem  Sbvenes*  Its  vanguard  crossed  the 
watershed  of  the  Middle  Danube,  spread  out  fanwoe 
towards  the  ^ean  and  the  Black  Sea,  and  has  developed 
into  the  Bulgarian  nationality*  Both  these  detached 
groups  have  evolved  racial  and  dialectical  characteristics 
which  distinguish  them  sharply  from  the  main  body 
whidi  lies  between*^  We  will  leave  them  aside  for  the 
moment,  and  concentrate  our  attention  upon  the  btter, 
for  whom  we  will  reserve  the  tide  of  "  Southern  Slavs." 

The  ^  Southern  Slavs,**  in  this  specialised  sense  of 
the  name,  speak  an  absolutely  homogeneous  dialect, 
and  occupy  a  compact  geographical  area,  extending 
from  Agnun  (Zs^reb)  to  Uskub  (Skoplye),  and  fron 
Belgrade  to  Salona*  They  have  thtis  become  immediate 
neighbours  of  the  Magjrars,  who  two  centuries  later 
descended  upon  the  country  on  the  furdier  bank  of  tbe 
Danube  and  the  Drave,  and  at  the  present  time  the  tivo 
races  are  approximately  equal  in  numerical  strength,' 
but  in  every  other  respect  their  history  has  been 
strikingly  different* 

The  rich,  unbroken  levels  of  the  AlfSld  offer  a  natunl 
cradle  for  a  strong,  unified  national  state :  the  Sotsthen 


>The  Bulgars  derive  their  name,  but  nothing  else,  from  a 
Stavooic  catte  of  nomad  conquerors  off  the  steppes. 

*  Either  language  is  now  spoken  by  between  ogfat  and  nine  miOiDfls 
^peofrfe* 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  169 

Slavs,  on  the  odier  hand,  have  been  grievously  handi- 
capped  by  their  physical  environment*  The  gaunt 
tibs  of  the  Dinaric  Alps,  which  shoulder  the  Danube* 
system  away  from  the  Adriatic,  are  not  kindly  to  Man* 
The  lodcHnsfface  cropping  out  through  the  scanty  soil 
sets  a  figkl  limit  to  the  growth  <rf  population,  whik  the 
scanty  communities  that  maintain  dieir  existence  are 
isolated  from  one  another  by  the  parallel  ranges  of 
mountains  and  the  rushing  rivers  which  carve  their 
way  among  them*  Even  the  Adriatic  coast-line,  which 
ri^  Norway  in  the  maze  of  its  fjords  and  islands,  is 
of  little  avail  for  internal  communication*  The  land 
opens  towards  the  Danube,  and  the  watershed  rises 
hard  above  the  shore*  The  rivers  invariably  flow  inland, 
and  only  one,  the  Narenta,  drains  South-Westward  to 
the  sea* 

Such  a  land  oould  never  have  beoome  an  independent 
focus  of  human  life*  Its  physical  ftmction  as  a  link 
between  the  motmtain-masses  of  Central  and  South- 
Eastern  Europe  has  conditioned  the  history  of  its  in- 
habitants, and  doomed  them  to  be  the  victims  and  the 
spoil  in  the  warfare  of  alien  worlds* 

The  country  of  the  Southern  Slavs  has  been  debat- 
able ground  from  the  begmning*  Christtanity  pene- 
trated it  simultaneously  from  opposite  directions* 
The  Croats  in  the  North-West  were  converted  from  the 
Catholic  centres  of  Aquileia  and  Saltburg :  Ordiodox 
missaonaries  from  Byzantium  mounted  the  valley  of  the 
Vardar  and  secured  the  allegiance  of  the  Serbs  in  the 
Morava-basin*^ 

*  Gnat  jod  Serb  weie  in  origm  two  kmdftd  tribes^  ideatkai  with  the 
Chiobat  aad  Soiab  who  lemained  Ndctfa  of  the  Camutuaoi.  The 
oaoKs  have  siadaaUy  been  adapted  tt>  denote  all  Soitth-SlaEfonic 
ipeahcfs  who  betoag  respectively  to  the  Catholic  and  te  Orthodox 
Cbuich,  irrespective  of  political  grouping  or  local  habitat* 


tTo  THE  BALKANS 

The  independent  career  of  both  these  tribes  was 
brief*  The  Croatian  principality  flourished  in  the 
eleventh  century,  but  in  zzoa  it  was  annexfid  to  the 
txpsmddxig  realm  of  the  Magyars,  and  for  the  next  three 
centuries  Hungary  and  Venice  fought  for  the  sovereignty 
of  the  land,  till  the  dispute  was  settled  by  a  oomptomise. 
About  1430  Venice  finally  established  her  rule  along 
the  Dalmatian  littoral,  while  Hungary  retained  her 
suzerainty  over  the  hinterland. 

The  fortunes  of  Serbia  were  grander*  In  Z159  ^ 
House  of  Nemanya  came  to  the  front,  and  steadily  built 
up  a  national  state  which  attained  its  ssenith  in  the 
fourteenth  century*  Stephen  Dushan,  Tsar  of  the 
Serbs  from  1336  to  1356  a*d*,  ruled  from  the  Danube 
to  the  SgtzDL,  and  threatened  to  beside  Constantinople 
itself,  but  disaster  followed  dose  upon  his  triumphs* 
The  year  before  Stephen's  death,  the  Ottoman  Turks 
had  occupied  Gallipoli  on  the  European  shore  of  the 
Dardanelles :  thirty  years  bter  ^  they  fought  the  Serbs 
in  the  heart  of  their  country  on  the  field  of  Kossovo,* 
and  their  crushing  victory  made  an  end  of  Serbian 
independence* 

The  advance  of  the  Turks  ajs^ravated  the  disunion  of 
the  Southern  Slavs  by  introducing  another  creed*  In 
the  twelfth  century  the  Paulidan  heresy  from  Armenia 
had  obtained  a  footing  in  the  region,'  and  the  nobility 
of  Bosnia,  a  Hungarian  dependency  on  the  banks  of 
the  Bosna  River,  embraced  it  as  their  national  faith. 
Their  choice  isolated  them  from  their  neighbotus,  and 

•  ifixBovo  Pdlye»''  Field  of  BUckbuds.'' 

'  It  was  brought  by  Armenian  subjects  of  the  Bast  Roman  Bmpire, 
whom  the  Byzantine  government  had  failed  to  convert  to  OrthoaoKy, 
and  had  punished  for  their  contumacy  by  exiling  them  to  the  opposite 
border  of  the  Imperial  territory.  The  Slavonic  converts  they  made  in 
their  new  home  took  the  tide  of  Bogumils  (**  theo-t>hiloi ''). 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  171 

the  breach  was  only  widened  by  the  stubbornness  with 
wbich  they  dung  to  it  during  three  centtuies  of  indis- 
cnininate  persecution  :  when  the  enemies  at  their  gates 
succumbed  successively  to  the  Turk,  the  Bosniaks 
mdoomed  him  as  a  deliverer.  Their  creed  had  origi- 
nated on  the  borders  of  blam,  perhaps  under  Moslem 
inspiration,  and  there  was  mudi  in  common  between 
die  two  religions.  When  the  conqueror  offered  them 
the  traditional  alternative  between  conversion  and 
hek>tage,  they  did  not  hesitate.  Before  the  dose  of  the 
fifteenth  century  the  Bosniak  landowners  had  adopted 
blam  en  masse,  and  were  transformed  at  a  stroke  from 
oppressed  outcasts  to  equals  and  comrades  of  the  ruling 
face.  The  change  in  their  position,  however,  was  not 
feally  fundamental.  Their  new-found  prosperity  was 
destined  to  flow  and  ebb  with  the  Turkish  tide,  but  they 
have  held  to  their  second  **  apostasy  **  as  tenadously 
as  to  their  first,  and  have  remained  sundered  in  sympathy 
from  their  South-Slavonic  kinsmen  who  share  the  same 
speedi. 

In  the  sixteenth  century  the  Southern  Slavs  were 
diawn  into  the  supreme  struck  between  Christendom 
and  Islam.  The  Bosniaks  had  given  their  allegiance 
to  the  Ottoman  cause,  and  broken  away  from  Htm^arian 
suzerainty,  but  their  example  was  not  followed  by  the 
other  South-Slavonic  dependendes  of  the  Htmgarian 
Crown.  When  Htmgary  herself  was  prostrated  in  the 
fatal  battle  of  Mohacs,^  and  the  remnant  of  the  Kingdom 
elected  the  Hapsburg  as  its  sovereign,  the  prindpalities 
of  Croatia  and  Slavonia*  followed  their  suzerain's 

»i5a6. 

'Ooatsa  is  a  strn>  of  territory  eztendtng  from  the  Drave  to  the  Sea 
m  the  extreme  Norm-West  of  the  South  Slavonic  area,  along  the  Slovene 
border.  Stovonsa  is  the  '*  Mesopotamia ''  tnteromted  between  the 
Dnve  and  Danube  on  the  one  side  and  the  Save  on  the  other. 


s 


173  THE  BALKANS 

example.  From  1527  to  die  present  day,  the  Dynasty 
has  ruled  this  section  of  the  South-Slavonic  world  by 
hereditary  right. 

The  battles  between  Austrian  and  Turk  were  decided 
on  the  banks  of  the  Danube,  but  the  Dinaric  mountaon- 
i^one  was  the  scene  of  fierce  and  continuous  subsidiary 
warfare.  Durit^  two  centuries  of  inconclusive  strife 
the  Turkish  cavalry  sometimes  penetrated  ri^t  up  the 
Save,  and  ravaged  the  Venetian  plains  at  the  head  of 
the  Adriatic,  while  for  nearly  twenty  years  >  the  Haps- 
burg  standard  was  planted  in  Belgrade  and  the  Austrian 
frontier  pushed  far  up  the  valley  of  the  Morava. 
Neither  power,  however,  proved  strong  enough  to 
wrest  from  the  other  the  undisputed  dominion  tA 
the  whole  South-Slavonic  region,  and  the  Treaty  of 
Belgrade  in  1739  terminated  the  struggle  by  a  partition. 

The  whole  of  Croatia  and  Slavonia  fell  to  tix  Haps- 
burg  :  the  Ottoman  retained  Serbia  and  Bosnia.  The 
new  frontier  started  *  &om  the  Iron  Gates,  and  followed 
the  course  of  the  Danube,  upwards  as  far  as  the  junction 
of  the  Save.  Belgrade,  in  the  South-Eastem  angle 
between  the  two  rivers,  remained  a  Turkish  fortress, 
and  the  Hapsburg  frontier  proceeded  along  the  Save's 
Northern  bank,  till  it  reached  the  point  where  the  latter 
river  is  joined  by  the  Una.  Hience  it  turned  South- 
Westwaid,  first  oonfonoing  to  the  Una's  winding,  and 
then  taking  an  irregular  course  of  its  own  across  the 
mountains,  till  it  struck  the  coast  opposite  the  island 
of  Pago. 

This  made  the  Hapsbu^  Empire  immediately 
conterminous  with  the  province  of  Dalmatia,  which 
the  Venetians  had  managed  to  defend  against  Ottoman 


■  Sec  Mapll 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  173 

aggresBioa,  ever  since  it  finally  passed  into  their  hands 
in  die  fifteenth  century*  Napoleon  made  an  end  <^ 
die  Venetian  Republic  and  cast  her  territories  into  the 
meldng  pot*  In  the  general  re-setdement  of  18x4, 
Dalmatia  and  Ragusa  were  definitively  incorporated 
in  the  Hapsburg  dominions,  and  the  whole  Eastern 
Uttoral  of  the  Adriatic,  from  Trieste  to  the  fjord  of 
Cattaro,  thus  came  to  be  united  under  the  same  Austrian 
government.  With  this  exception,  however,  the  terri- 
torial arrangements  of  1739  still  remained  in  force 
when  die  events  of  1866  forced  the  Danubian  Monarchy 
into  the  most  recent  phase  of  its  history. 

In  the  year  of  the  Ausgleich  the  Monarchy's  position 
with  regard  to  the  Southern  Slavs  almost  exacdy 
rqModuced  its  relation  towards  the  Italian  nation 
af^  the  settlement  of  1814*  In  both  cases  one  section 
of  a  nationality  was  included  within  the  Hapsburg 
frontier  yNbHc  the  remainder  lay  beyond  it,  and  the 
Monardiy's  Italian  experience  had  proved  that 
such  a  situation  was  essentially  unstable*  A  divided 
nationality  was  bound  to  attain  tmity  in  time*  It  might 
achieve  it  within  the  compass  of  the  greater  Empire,  if 
the  btter  succeeded  in  advancing  its  frontier  to  include 
the  whole  race,  but  the  frontier  could  not  remain 
stationary*  If  it  failed  to  advance  it  must  retire,  and 
national  tmity  be  realised  at  the  Empire's  expense  by 
the  total  secession  of  the  nationality  from  its  (organism* 

In  the  Italian  case  we  have  seen  that  such  secession 
could  occur  without  vital  injury  to  the  Monarchy's 
structure :  in  the  present  instance  failure  involved  far 
more  serious  consequences*  The  Monarchy  had  just 
been  forced  to  accept  its  geographical  destiny  as  a 
Danubian  state,  and  in  the  new  development  of  its 
hotory  the  Soudi-Slavonic  region  offered  the  necessary 


174  THE  BALKANS 

avenue  for  expansion*  Excluded  from  Germany  and 
Italy,  Austria-Hungary  must  grow  Eastward,  or  else 
resign  herself  to  paralysis,  diminishment,  and  final 
dissolution. 

Since  1867,  therefore,  the  attention  of  the  Joint 
Ministry  for  Foreign  A£fairs  has  become  increasingly 
concentrated  upon  the  South-Slavonic  problem.  The 
Monarchy  has  never  been  faced  by  a  graver  issue,  but 
on  the  odier  hand  it  has  seldom  enjoyed  conditions  so 
favourable  for  a  successful  solution* 

The  South-Slavonic  population  within  the  frontier 
included  Orthodox  as  well  as  Catholic  elements,  and  the 
Dynasty  had  a  strong  traditional  hold  over  both  its  Serb 
and  its  Croat  subjects*  Each  regarded  the  Hapsburg 
as  their  saviour  from  the  Turk.  The  Croat^s  loyalty 
was  reinforced  by  religion,  for  he  was  a  devoted  clerical, 
and  Austria  has  never  abandoned  the  rdle  of  the 
leading  Catholic  state :  the  Serb  was  conciliated  by 
an  exceptional  measure  of  toleration*  Imperial  rescripts 
of  1690  and  1 691  granted  the  Serb  refugees  in  Hapsburg 
territory  complete  freedom  in  the  practice  of  their 
ritual,  and  allowed  them  to  organise  an  autonomous 
churdi  under  the  presidency  of  a  patriarch  established 
at  Karlowitz. 

The  erection  of  the  **  Military  Frontiers  **  along  the 
Save,  towards  the  close  of  Maria  Theresa's  reign, 
transformed  the  South-Slavonic  borderers  into  regular 
soldiery,  and  in  the  stn^gles  against  Napoleon  and  the 
Risorgimento,  the  Croat  regiments  were  the  flower  of 
the  Austrian  armies*  To  their  enemies  they  were 
merely  notorious  for  the  savagery  they  had  acquired 
in  their  warfare  with  the  Turks,  but  the  Dynasty  they 
served  was  deeply  indebted  to  their  admirable  constancy* 
In  1848  Croatia  was  the  only  non-German  province 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  175 

wfaidi  never  wavered  in  its  loyalty,  and  in  the  Autumn 
of  that  crucial  year  JellaiH^^  the  ''  Ban '" '  of  the 
kingdom,  led  across  the  Drave  the  first  army  that 
attacked  the  Magyars  in  Francis  Joseph^s  name. 

The  relations  between  the  Monarchy  and  the  Southern 
Slavs  within  the  frontier  were  thus  on  an  excellent  foot- 
ing, and  the  situation  on  the  further  side  of  it  was  not 
incompatible  with  Austro-Htmgarian  interests. 

In  this  quarter  the  chief  event  since  1739  had  been 
the  emergence  of  an  autonomous  Serb  principality 
in  the  basin  of  the  Morava*  The  population  of  this 
region  revolted  against  Ottoman  government  in  1804, 
and  after  a  long,  fluctuatix^  struggle,  in  which  it  received 
support  from  Russia  and  Austria  in  turn,  it  extorted 
the  Stdtan's  consent  to  Home  Rule  in  1817.  The 
Treaty  of  Adrianople,  imposed  on  Turkey  by  Russia 
after  the  war  of  1828,  stipulated  for  the  confirmation 
of  this  status,  and  the  Sultan  acknowledged  Serbian 
autonomy  by  a  formal  proclamation  in  1830* 

This  development  in  South  -  Slavonic  history  had 
left  the  Danubian  Monarchy  at  a  disadvantage.  For 
nearly  a  century  after  the  second  siege  of  Vienna, 
Austria  had  been  able  to  monopolise  the  part  of  sym- 
pathiser, protector  and  possible  saviour  for  all  the 
Turk's  Christian  subjects  in  Europe,  till  the  crushing 
bbwB  inflicted  upon  Turkey  by  the  Empress  Catherine 
enabled  Russia  to  intnide  herself  as  Atistria's  rival* 
The  Treaty  of  Kutchuk  Kainardji  in  1774  prepared 
the  ground  for  a  general  Russian  protectorate  over  all 
Christian  populations  in  the  Ottoman  dominions.  The 
Serb  revolt  offered  Mettemich  an  opportunity  for 
reasserting  Austrian  influence,  but  his  extreme  dread  of 
nationalism  made  him  averse  to  supporting  any  mani- 

*  PMiottiiocd  YeUacbit  *  **  Vicooy.'* 


\  oa 


176  THE  BALKANS 

festatkm  oi  it  against  any  constituted  autfaoiity  1 
ever.  By  his  over-k^cal  policy  he  played  into  Russia's 
bands.  Russia  followed  up  her  advantage  with  dedsioa, 
and  -when  Serbia  started  her  new  life  under  Russian 
au^ces,  the  Danubian  Monarchy  found  its  rival 
established  on  the  very  threshold  of  its  Balkan  doorway. 

Ever  since  the  turn  of  the  Turkish  tide  in  1683,  it  had 
been  obvious  that  the  ebb  would  never  cease  till  all 
Europe  was  free  of  1^  flood.  The  Tu^'s  presence 
might  be  protracted,  but  it  had  become  provisioiial, 
and  sooner  or  later  he  must  vanish  otit  of  the  land. 
The  Treaty  of  Adiianople  taught  Austrian  statesmen 
that  in  playing  for  the  Turk's  inheritance  they  must 
rcdun  with  Russia  henceforward. 

In  1867,  therefore,  die  Monarchy's  road  Eastwards 
was  already  overshadowed  by  the  Russian  doud,  but 
die  dai^er,  though  fbrmidabte,  mi^t  still  be  braved 
with  impunity.    The  cloud  might  pass  without  2  storm. 

The  Balkan  drama  was  not  yet  played  out.  The 
Serbs  irfio  had  won  their  freedom  with  Rnssa's 
aid  were  only  a  fraction  of  the  race.  The  miqoTtty 
still  remained  under  Turkish  rule,  and  the  principality 
in  die  Kbrava  valley  aspired  to  liberate  a  "  Serbia 
irredenta "  of  greater  territorial  extent  than  itself. 
West  of  the  River  Drina  lay  the  South-Slavonic  province 
of  Bosnia,  where  more  dian  half  the  pc^mlatian  -was 
Ordiodox  in  religioa :  Soudiwards  round  the  iq>per 
waters  of  the  Motxn  and  its  tributaries,  the  district  of 
Kossovo,  once  die  focus  of  die  patinial  life,  stiU  awaited 
its  reden^>tion.  Serbia  and  the  Danubian  Mooarv^y 
were  both  tmder  a  vital  necessity  to  advance  in  the  same 
direction,  and  both  were  obstructed  by  the  same  Turkish 
occupant  of  the  land.  Why  should  they  not  advsmce 
in  unison  bi  satisfy  their  comnuo  need  at  the  Turk's 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  177 

txpmst  i  Serbia  had  one  supreme  desire,  the  accom- 
plishment of  her  national  unity.  Russia  had  left  the 
work  half-done,  and  had  alienated  her  protege  into 
the  bargain,  by  intriguing  to  strengthen  her  influence 
over  her*  Serbia  was  ready  to  throw  herself  into  the 
arms  of  any  great  power  that  would  help  her  to  complete 
the  realisation  of  her  ideal*  The  refugee-communities 
North  of  the  Danube,  which  had  become  the  diief 
centres  of  modem  Serb  cultture,  afforded  a  spiritual  link 
between  the  Hapsbui^  Empire  and  the  autonomous 
principality*  If  the  Hapsburg  Government  had 
,  profited  by  the  experience  of  1830,  and  espoused  the 
cause  of  Serbian  nationality,  it  might  still  have  rallied 
the  ^diok  South-Slavonic  race  tmder  its  own  banner* 

The  breakdown  of  the  reactionary  regime  in  1866 
o£Ened  the  oocasion  for  such  a  change  of  policy  towards 
the  Southern  Slavs*  Some  concession  to  the  principle 
of  nationality  was  essential  if  the  internal  cohesion  of 
the  Monardiy  was  to  be  saved :  liberalism  in  this 
particular  instance  would  bring  positive  gain  as  well, 
by  setting  the  salvaged  **  Danubian  unit  ^*  upon  its  new 
path  towards  expansion  under  the  most  auspicious 
circiUDStances* 

Unfortunately,  however,  reform  was  baulked  by 
oompcomise*  We  have  seen  that  the  Ausgleich  of  1867 
was  no  reconstruction  of  the  Hapsburg  Empire  on  the 
bass  of  nationality,  but  simply  a  deed  of  partnership 
between  Germans  and  Magyars  for  the  continued  op- 
pression of  the  rest*  It  made  the  Magyar  oligarchy  a 
power  in  the  Monarchy*  That  was  the  only  new  factor 
it  introduced,  and  its  e£Eect  upon  the  foreign  policy 
of  Attstria-Htmgary  as  a  whole  has  been  even  more 
disastrotis  than  the  internal  race-conflict  to  which  it  has 
given  vent  within  Hui^ary  itself* 


178  THE  BALKANS 

The  Magyars  were  reckless,  q;otistic  and  well- 
organised.  These  qualities  gave  them  an  undue 
influence  in  the  Dual  State,  and  their  geographical 
situation  made  that  influence  paramount  on  the  South- 
Eastem  frontier*  After  1867  the  South-Slavonic 
problem,  and  therewith  the  fate  of  the  **  Eastward 
Trend,'^  passed  more  and  more  completely  under 
Magyar  control,  at  the  very  time  when  it  was  becoming 
of  extreme  importance  to  the  whole  Danubian  Unit* 

The  terms  of  the  Ausgleich  assigned  to  the  Crown 
of  St.  Stephen  almost  all  the  Southern  Slavs  within 
the  Hapsbuq;  frontier.^  The  struggle  of  1848-49  had 
inspired  the  Magyars  and  their  Slavonic  neighbours 
widi  mutual  fear  and  resentment,  and  the  memcMry  of 
it  did  not  promise  well  for  the  future  of  the  Hapsbu^ 
Croats  and  Serbs,  now  that  they  were  abandoned  to  the 
Magyars^  mercy. 

We  have  already  examined  the  case  of  the  Serbs  in 
Hungary:  we  have  now  to  consider  the  relations 
between  the  Magyar  government  and  the  vice-royalty 
of  Croatia-Slavonia* 

The  Magyars  secured  this  province  for  the  **  Crown 
of  St.  Stephen,*'  basing  their  claim  upon  their  mediaeval 
suzerainty  over  it.  Such  a  **  historical  argument ''  was 
of  course  without  value,  yet  the  terms  Croatia  obtained 
seemed  generous  enough  to  compensate  her  for  incor- 
poration with  her  lai^^  neig^ibour. 

The  Croato-Huii^arian  Compromise  was  voted  by 
the  Hungarian  parliament  and  the  Croatian  diet  in 
z868.  It  conceded  at  once  to  the  Croats  and  Serbs 
beyond  the  Drave  fundamental  rights  ^^ch  the 
nationalities  in  Htmgary  itself  have  been  struggling 
vainly  for  half  a  century  to  obtain.    There  was  no 

>  The  Dabnatiaos  were  the  czoepctoii. 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  179 

attempt  at  Magyarisation,  and  South-Slavonic  was 
constituted  the  official  meditun  of  all  administration 
within  tbe  limits  of  Croatian  territory.  The  adminis- 
tration itself  was  organised  in  a  liberal  spirit.  In  the 
spheres  of  education,  justice,  and  local  self-government 
Croatia  obtained  complete  Home  Rule :  defence, 
finance,  and  questions  of  economics  and  communications 
were  made  common  afTairs  of  the  **  Crown  of  St. 
Stephen,*'  but  the  Croatian  Diet  was  entitled  to  send 
deputies  to  the  parliament  at  Buda-Pest  to  discuss  and 
vote  upon  these  subjects.  The  deputies  had  the  right 
to  debate  in  their  native  language.  Their  numbers 
were  not  quite  proportional  to  the  population  they 
represented,^  but  on  the  other  hand  the  Croatian 
contribution  to  the  **  Crown  of  St.  Stephen's  **  common 
exchequer  was  rated  disproportionately  low. 

Nothing  could  have  been  fairer  on  paper.  In  practice 
the  Magyars  have  taken  advantage  of  their  partnership 
to  eq>loit  Croatia  systematically  in  their  own  economic 

m 

interest* 

The  province  is  important  to  the  M^yars  simply 
because  it  offers  the  only  access  from  Htmgary  to  the 
sea.  In  the  settlement  of  z868  the  Magyar  negotiators 
succeeded  in  excluding  from  the  boundaries  of  Croatia 
the  port  of  Fiume,  which  lies  dose  to  the  Austrian 
frontier  in  the  extreme  Western  comer  of  the  ootmtry, 
and  the  town  was  organised  as  an  ^'  autonomous 
municipality  *'  tmder  a  governor  responsible  to  the 
Hungarian  ministry.  The  trunk-railway  from  Buda- 
Pest  to  Agram  and  Karlovatz  was  pushed  on  over  the 
Dinaric  range,  and  reached  Fiume  in  1873.* 


'SeeMsq>IIL 


z8o  THE  BALKANS 

By  the  terms  of  the  Cioato-Hungarian  **  Com- 
promise **  this  state-built  and  state-owned  railway  was 
common  property  of  the  ^'  Crown  of  St.  Stephen/^  and 
the  control  of  it  fell  within  the  province  not  of  the 
Home  Rule  government  at  Agram  but  of  the  central 
government  at  Buda-Pest.  If  the  ^^  Compromise  **  had 
any  meaning,  the  railway  administration  should  have 
taken  due  account  of  both  Croatian  and  Hungarian 
interests,  but  the  fashion  in  which  Buda-Pest  inter- 
preted its  trust  revealed  the  **  Compromise ''  as  a 
fiction* 

The  Magyars  have  used  their  political  predominance 
in  the  common  parliament  to  govern  the  Fiume  railway 
exclusively  to  Hungary's  economic  advantage,  and 
deliberately  to  the  economic  detriment  of  Croatia* 
Freightage-tarifiEs  are  manipulated  so  as  to  favour 
through-traffic  from  the  Alf did  to  Fiume  at  the  expense 
of  local  traffic  in  Croatia  itself,^  and  every  effort  is  made 
to  focus  at  Buda-Pest  all  railway  connection  between 
Croatia  and  the  rest  of  the  continent.  Where  more 
direct  routes  are  already  in  existence,  not  only  tzri& 
but  time-cables  are  distorted  to  induce  goods  and 
passengers  to  travel  to  Vienna  or  Belgrade  by  way  of 
the  Hungarian  capital :  where  the  railways  have  yet  to 
be  built,  the  Magyar  government  does  everything  in  its 
power  to  obstruct  their  development*  While  Hungary 
itself  is  covered  with  a  network  of  lines,  the  section  of 
the  Fiume  railway  between  Agram  and  the  coast  has 
never  been  extended  by  a  sitigle  branch,  so  that  Croatia 
is  deprived  of  independent  communication  with  her 
natural  market  in  Austria  on  the  one  hand,  and  with  her 


>  In  29x1  the  goods-tarifif  from  Eisek  on  the  Drave  to  Agram 

lower  than  the  tanff  from  the  same  place  to  Fiume,  though  the  dtstance 
in  the  former  case  is  only  three-fifths  as  great  as  in  the  latter. 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  i8i 

Sottth-Slavooic  neighbours  in  Dalmatia  and  Bosnia  on 
the  other* 

The  Croats  could  not  be  expected  to  submit  gladly 
to  such  a  system,  and  the  attitude  of  the  M^yars 
towards  them  has  been  governed  solely  by  the  deter* 
mination  to  force  it  upon  them*  For  this  purpose  it 
was  necessary  to  hold  Croatian  politics  well  in  hand, 
and  the  settlement  of  1868  offered  facilities  for  the 


possesses  her  own  autonomous  legislature, 
but  the  **  Ban  **  or  viceroy,  the  supreme  executive 
authority,  is  appointed  by  the  ministry  at  Buda-Pest* 
The  Magyar  government  perceived  in  this  office  an 
instrument  for  keeping  Croatia  to  heel,  and  they  found 
the  right  man  for  the  post  in  Count  Khuen-Hedervary« 
The  Count  governed  Croatia  for  twenty  years  ^  by  a 
**  Tammany  **  regime  which  he  worked  out  almost  to 
perfection*  He  paralysed  the  opposition  in  the  Diet 
by  fomenting  the  rivalry  between  the  Croat  and  Serb 
sections  of  the  population,  and  secured  a  safe  govern- 
mental majority  over  the  disorganised  nationalist  votes 
by  the  Magyar  method  of  electoral  corruption*'  Official 
pressure  was  not  difficult  to  exert,  for  the  entire  political 
patronage  of  the  country  bebngs  to  the  Ban,  but  if  the 
polling  turned  out  against  him,  Khuen-Hedervary  was 
always  prepared  to  dissolve  the  newly-elected  diet  and 
repeat  the  process  till  he  obtained  a  house  of  a  more 
satisfactory  complexion* 

Such  were  the  effects  of  Magyar  domination  upon  die 
South-Slavonic  communities  under  the  *^  Crown  of 
St*   Stephen '*:    meanwhile,   M^yar   influence   had 

>  i8%-i909.  In  the  Utter  year  he  lent  his  services  to  Frands 
Jtweph  and  accepcsd  the  Hungjanan  pceniiersb^)*    See  above* 

■  Even  the  Diet  of  z868,  which  voted  the  **  Compromise  **  with 
Himgary,  had  been  **  packed  "  with  safe  men  by  illegitimate  means. 


i82  THE  BALKANS 

asserted  itself  in  the  relations  between  the  Monarchy 
and  the  Southern  Slavs  beyond  the  frontier* 

In  the  summer  of  1875  there  was  a  general  risix^ 
of  the  Christian  peasants  in  Bosnia*  The  Ottoman 
Government  failed  to  suppress  it^  and  in  the  following 
stmmier  the  Serbian  principality  in  the  Morava  valley 
intervened  in  favour  of  the  Bosnian  Serbs,  and  was 
followed  by  Montenegro,  a  little  oommtmity  of  Serb 
mountaineers  above  Cattaro  i^ord  which  had  never 
forfeited  its  independence  to  Austrian,  Venetian  or 
Turk*  In  a  few  months  the  Ottoman  armies  crushed 
Serbia  to  earth,  and  a  sympathetic  insurrection  of  the 
Bulgar  population  along  the  Danube  was  quelled  with 
appalling  savagery,  but  the  only  result  of  these  Turkish 
successes  was  to  bring  Russia  into  the  field*  The 
Tsar  declared  war  in  Turkey  in  the  spring  of  1877 : 
before  the  dose  of  the  year  the  Tchataldja  lines  were 
forced,  and  the  Russian  troops  within  striking  distance 
of  Constantinople*  In  March  1878  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment signed  the  Treaty  of  San  Stephano. 

Thus  once  more  salvation  had  come  to  the  Balkan 
Christians  from  the  Muscovite,  and  the  Danubian 
Monarchy  had  missed  another  opportunity*  This 
time  the  fault  lay  not  with  the  authoritarian  principles 
of  Vienna  but  with  the  M^yar  chauvinism  of  Buda- 
pest* While  Russia  was  hesitating  in  1876,  the  Monarchy 
might  have  forestalled  her  by  championitig  Serbia  in 
her  desperate  straits*  The  Croats  and  the  Hungarian 
Serbs  were  watching  with  intense  anxiety  the  vicissi- 
tudes of  their  Slavonic  brethren's  struggle  for  liberty, 
yet  so  far  from  being  guided  by  the  feelings  of  such  an 
important  element  in  the  **  Crown  of  St*  Stephen," 
the  Magyar  government  brutally  trampled  upon  them* 
Not  only  were  Hungarian  subjects  rigorously  debarred 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  183 

from  crossu^;  the  Save  to  join  the  Serbian  ranks,  but 
demonstrations  of  sympathy  with  the  Slavonic  cause 
were  suppressed  in  various  Hungarian  towns,  while 
pro-Turkish  demonstrations  were  officially  encouraged 
at  Buda-Pest.' 

By  the  end  of  1877  ^^  Monarchy  had  alienated  from 
itself  the  sympathies  of  all  Slavs,  and  when  Russia 
emerged  triumphant,  it  was  as  profoundly  alarmed 
about  its  own  future  in  the  Balkans  as  Great  Britain  was 
about  the  security  of  its  route  to  India*  At  the  congress 
called  at  Berlin  in  the  summer  of  1878  to  revise  the 
San  Stephano  Treaty,  the  two  powers  acted  in  co- 
operation, and  Disraeli  assisted  Count  Andrassy,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  plenipotentiary,  to  secure  his  share 
of  the  spoils. 

The  Coi^;ress  gave  the  Dual  Monarchy  a  mandate 
to  occupy  and  administer  Bosnia.  The  mandate  was 
acted  upon  immediately,  and  the  military  task  was 
completed  before  the  autumn* 

Superficially,  the  occupation  was  an  unfriendly  act 
to  Turkey,  and  the  Moslem  Bosniaks  offered  a  stout 
resistance  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  army,  but  the 
province  was  in  any  case  irretrievably  lost  to  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  and  the  blow  was  really  directed 
against  South-Slavonic  natiotiality* 

The  history  of  eighteenth-century "'  paternal  govern- 
ment **  in  the  Alf61d  has  curiously  repeated  itself  in 
Bosnia  during  the  last  generation.  Baron  Kallay,  who 
administered  the  **  Occupied  Provinces '"  *  from  i88a 
to  1903  on  behalf  of  the  Atistrian  and  Htmgarian  govem- 

*  The  leading  Mamr  politicians  were  bound  by  ties  of  personal 
sntitude  to  the  Turkish  Government,  which  had  given  them  asylum 
duBDg  the  daA  years  after  1849. 

*Tbey  are  accurately  described  as  BosmVHerzegovim^  but  '^  Bosnia'* 
alone  is  used  in  practice  to  cover  the  whole. 


i84  THE  BALKANS 

ments/  has  produced  remarkable  results.  In  striking 
contrast  to  die  policy  pursued  in  CtoztisL  during  the 
same  period  by  Magyar  statesmanship,  the  material 
prosperity  of  the  country  has  been  conscientiously 
fostered.  Law  and  order  have  been  established,  roads 
and  railways  have  been  built,  education  has  been 
provided  for.  On  the  other  hand,  the  development  of 
national  self-oonsdousness  has  been  uncompromisingly 
resisted. 

The  hostility  of  the  Moslem  Bosniaks  was  quickly 
overcome.  Left  stranded  by  the  ebb  of  the  Turkish 
tide,  they  found  their  existence  threatened  once  more 
by  the  Orthodox  and  Catholic  majority  of  their  fellow- 
Slavs,  among  whom  they  had  lived  a  life  apart,  as 
pariahs  or  taskmasters,  for  more  than  seven  centuries. 
Naturally  they  turned  for  protection  to  the  German 
and  the  Magyar,  to  whom  the  Christian  Slavs  were  as 
alien  as  to  themselves.  The  Joint  Administration,  on 
its  part,  espied  in  this  powerful  but  denationalised 
element  the  very  ally  it  needed,  and  set  itself  with 
success  to  win  die  Bosniaks^  support.  Although  the 
Moslems  constitute  barely  a  third  of  the  Bosnian 
population,*  they  were  encouraged  to  regard  the  country 
as  their  own,  and  to  stimulate  their  particularism  still 
further,  Kallay  even  attempted  to  create  the  conscious- 
ness of  a  separate  **  Bosniak  language,^'  differentiated 
from  the  standard  South-Slavonic  idiom  of  Croat  and 
Serb  by  a  few  insignificant  dialectical  peculiarities : 


'  The  adfflinistratiQn  of  Bosnia  was  assigned  to  the  departsient  of 
the  Joint  Ministry  for  Finance. 

'  Total  population  of  Bosnia  in  1895  .        .       1,568,000 
South-Slavonic  element  about 

(  Orthodox  Serbs 
Consisting  of  <  Moslem  Bosniaks 

Catholic  Croats 


1,554,000 
670/x)0    (4X«38%) 


550fioo    (33-97%) 


334*000    (ao.^%) 


For  their  distributiott  see  Map  IIL 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  185 

die  Serb  element  in  the  province,  which  amounts  to 
two-fifths  of  the  total  population,  was  correspondingly 
<&cotmtenanced. 

This  deliberate  discrimination  in  treatment  between 
the  various  sections  of  the  population  has  marred  the 
Administration  by  giving  it  an  illiberal  cast,  and  in  one 
important  sphere  it  has  hampered  the  policy  of  material 
improvement*  To  conciliate  the  Moslem  landowners  the 
pressing  agrarian  problem  has  been  indefinitely  shelved* 

The  occupation  of  Bosnia  thus  sowed  seeds  of 
dissention  between  the  Serb  nationality  and  the  Dual 
Monarchy,  yet  these  seeds  might  still  have  withered 
without  bearing  fruit.  The  excellence  of  the  Bosnian 
Administration  worked  potently  for  stability,  and  the 
step  might  plausibly  have  been  explained  as  the  final 
act  in  die  Danubian  Staters  geographical  evolution* 
Ever  since  the  Hapsbtu^  had  added  Dalmatia  as  well 
as  Slavonia  to  their  dominions,  the  ultimate  inoorpora- 
tioa  of  Bosnia  had  been  a  geographical  necessity* 
The  province  is  shaped  like  a  triangular  wedge,  and  its 
^>ex  presses  upwards,  perilously  dose  to  the  lines  of 
oooomunication  between  the  centres  of  industry  and 
agriculture  in  the  Danube-basin  and  their  ports  on 
the  Adriatic  seaboard*  The  occupation  of  the  triangle 
gacve  the  Monarchy  its  short  base-line  for  a  frontier, 
instead  of  the  combined  length  of  the  other  two  sides* 
The  General  Staff  might  have  vindicated  it  as  a  defensive 
measure  oi  purely  military  import* 

Unfortunately,  however,  the  Berlin  Conference 
did  not  confine  its  mandate  to  Bosnia*  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  were  both  granted  considerable  increases 
of  territory,^  but  their  frontiers  were  carefully  held 


obtained  in  addition  complete  independence  from  Ottoman 
smetainty — ^Montenesio  had  never  submitted  to  it* 


i86  THE  BALKANS 

asunder*  The  Ttirkish  Government  was  left  in 
possession  of  the  Sandjak  ^  of  Novi-Bazar^  a  strip  of 
mountainous  country  which  ran  from  South-East  to 
North-West  in  the  general  direction  of  the  Dinaric 
Range,  and  served  as  a  land-bridge  between  the  Dual 
Monarchy  now  in  occupation  of  Bosnia  and  the  Ottoman 
Empire  still  established  in  the  interior  of  Macedonia 
and  along  the  littoral  of  the  .Sgean*  To  make  the 
maintenance  of  this  bridge  secure,  the  two  powers 
concluded  a  convention,  under  which  the  district  was 
garrisoned  by  Austro-Htmgarian  troops,  without  pre- 
judice to  the  Ottoman  civil  administration^ 

The  garrisonix^  of  the  Sandjak  revealed  the  occupa- 
tion of  Bosnia  as  the  first  step  in  a  new  movement 
of  offence.  The  **  Trend  Eastward  *'  was  to  find  its 
realisation  in  territorial  escpansion  to  an  ^Bgean  sea- 
board, but  instead  of  proceeding  in  tmison  with  South- 
Slavonic  national  aspirations,  the  Dual  Monarchy  had 
made  up  its  mind  to  march  over  the  Southern  Slavs' 
dead  bodies* 

Ever  since  1878  Austro-Hungarian  statesmanship  has 
been  paving  the  way  for  a  fresh  advance*  During 
the  Hamidian  regime  the  garrisons  in  the  Sandjak 
looked  on  while  the  Serb  population  of  the  Kossovo 
district,  a  few  miles  away,  was  being  exterminated  by 
bands  of  Moslem  Albanians,  armed  and  incited  by 
the  Ottoman  Government.  Austria-Hungary  refused  to 
interfere  :  she  professed  scrupulous  respect  for  Ottoman 
sovereignty,  yet  all  the  time  she  was  spreading  her 
propaganda  among  Ottoman  subjects  in  the  immediate 
neighbourhood*  She  established  a  virtual  protectorate 
over  the  Catholic  Albanian  clans  in  the  hinterland  of 
Skodra,*  a  mountainous  region  between  Kossovo  and 

« "  Province/*  *  Skutari. 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  187 

the  ooast*  She  kept  them  supplied  with  arms,  and 
txpUAttd  their  lawless  instincts  in  order  to  harass 
Montenegro,  their  traditional  enemy,  and  even  to 
coerce,  if  necessary,  the  Turkish  government  itself* 

The  Danubian  Monarchy  had  thus  leagued  itself 
with  the  Southern  Slavs'  most  deadly  foes*  Over- 
shadowing Serbia  and  Montenegro  already  on  the  West 
and  North,  she  was  remorselessly  turning  their  flanks, 
and  threatening  to  surrotmd  them  on  the  South  and 
East  as  well*  Magyar  ideals  had  involved  her  in  a 
stru|^  to  the  death  with  the  principle  of  nationality 
in  the  Balkans*^  She  had  thrown  in  her  lot  with  the 
dying  Turk,  and  made  herself  both  his  physician  and 
his  executor*  The  Turk's  own  death  would  have  set 
the  natural  term  to  his  outworn  system  of  government : 
Austria-Hungary  showed  her  intention  of  perpetuating 
it  for  ever. 

The  Monarchy  had  thus  committed  itself  to  a  very 
serious  contest*  To  reach  its  goal,  it  must  overcome 
the  opposition  of  the  Balkan  nations  and  the  Russian 
Empire  simtdtaneously.  In  this  undertaking  conunon- 
sense  dictated  two  guiding  principles :  the  Southern 
Slavs  must  be  kept  divided,*  and  Russia  must  be 
**  squared  **  by  an  adequate  compromise* 

*  The  mandate  to  occupy  Bosnia  was  the  achievement  of  the  Magyar 
Andsaasy,  plcaq)otentiary  at  Berlin  and  Joint  Foreign-Minister,  and 
he  was  supported  whole-heartedly  by  Cokmian  Tisza,  leader  of  the 
Magyar  Liberal  Party  and  Hungarian  premier.  It  is  true  that  the 
apparently  anti-Turkish  tendency  of  the  coup  aroused  violent  opposi- 
tsoo  among  the  rank  and  file.  Magyar  public  opinion  compelled 
Aadnmy  to  retire,  and  Tisza  only  foiced  the  measure  throu^  parlia- 
ment by  plaoring  his  last  card  and  tendering  his  resignation.    Yet 


the  two  poliadans  had  shown  their  statesmanship  by  anticipating 

le  import  oft 
policy  revealed  itself,  Magyar  opinion  veered  round,  and  Toza  and 


the  luatuier  tudgment  of  the  nation  itself.    As  the  true  import  of  their 


Andraasy  were  both  national  heroes  again  before  their  deaths. 

*  At  the  dose  of  2878  they  were  partitioned  between  no  leas  than  seven 
political  regimes*  In  Dalmatia  mey  were  Austrian  citiseas.  North  of 
the  Danube  they  were  Hungarian,  in  Croatia  they  were  autonomous 


t88  THE  BALKANS 

At  first  the  statesmanship  of  1878  seemed  likely  to 
be  justified  by  success*  The  supersession  of  the  San 
Stephano  Treaty  by  the  diplomats  at  Berlin  went  far 
to  cancel  the  prestige  wfaidi  Russia  had  won  by  her 
military  victory,  and  the  new  principality  of  Bulgaria, 
which  the  Powers  had  grudgingly  allowed  to  come  into 
existence  within  reduced  limits,  did  not  prove  a  source 
of  strength  to  its  Russian  creator.  Like  the  Serbs  after 
1829,  ^^  Bulgars  found  Russian  tutels^  a  doubtful 
blessing,  but  they  displayed  far  more  vigour  in  shaking 
themselves  free.  In  an  incredibly  short  time  they 
ventured  to  steer  an  independent  course  of  their  own. 
Flouted  by  Bulgaria,  Russia  looked  to  Serbian  loyalty 
for  consolation,  but  Serbia  had  been  mortally  offended 
by  the  erection  of  a  rival  Slavonic  state  in  the  Balkan 
area,  and  had  entered  on  a  new  political  phase. 

The  throne  of  the  principality  was  occupied  at  this 
time  by  Milan  Obrenovitch,^  the  most  notable  statesman 
modem  Serbia  has  produced.  He  saw  that  Serbia  was 
not  strong  enough  to  achieve  her  destiny  tmaided,  and 
that  to  invoke  the  assistance  of  greater  powers  was 
merely  to  offer  herself  as  a  pawn  in  their  game.  It  was 
clear  that  the  Berlin  settlement  would  not  be  upset  in  a 
day,  and  Milan  determined  to  take  advantage  of  the 
inevitable  lull  for  the  development  of  his  country's 
material  prosperity.  Geography  has  made  the  Morava 
valley  a  natural  appendage  of  the  Middle  Danubian 
Basin.  The  Danubian  Monarchy  spreads  its  bulk 
between  Serbia  and  Western  Europe,  and  the  little  state 
could  not  begin  its  economic  growth  unless  it  had  secured 

under  the  Crown  of  St.  Strahen,  in  Bosnia  they  were  under  the  joint 
protectorate  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  in  Serbia  and  Montenegro  they 
were  members  of  independent  national  states,  in  Kosoovo  they  were  still 
subject  to  Turktth  miagDvemment. 
^  He  ascended  it  in  x868. 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  189 

its  big  ndg^bour^s  good-will.  Moved  by  these  con- 
skieratioiis,  Milan  did  not  hesitate  to  sacrifice  national 
ideals  and  turn  his  kingdom  into  a  satellite  of  Austria- 
Hungary* 

The  next  ten  years  witnessed  a  struggle  between  the 
king  supported  by  the  Liberal  or  **  Progressive  *'  Party 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Russophil  Radicals  on  the 
other*  Milan  succeeded  in  carrying  out  his  programme* 
Railways  were  built  and  the  finances  reorganised,  in 
spite  of  the  opposition  aroused  by  increased  taxes 
without  any  immediately  visible  returns*  In  1885  an 
opportunity  presented  itself  for  striking  at  Bulgaria, 
and  jealousy  prompted  Serbia  to  seize  it*  She  declared 
war  only  to  suffer  a  severe  defeat,  and  nothing  but  the 
Dual  Monarchy's  veto  prevented  the  Bulgarian  army 
from  marching  upon  Belgrade*  This  intervention 
marked  die  zenith  of  Austro-Hungarian  ascendency 
over  Serbia,^  yet  Milan  actually  survived  the  bankruptcy 
of  his  foreign  policy*  It  was  not  till  1889  that  he  was 
driven  to  abdicate,  and  allow  Alexander  his  son  to  reign 
in  his  stead* 

Alexander  was  a  minor,  and  the  Liberal  regency  found 
itself  unable  to  cope  with  the  growing  Radical  block  in 
pariiament*  In  1893  the  young  king  took  the  reins  into 
his  own  hands,  and  attempted  to  govern  through  a 
Radical  ministry,  but  the  experiment  soon  broke  down* 
Hie  Radicals  endangered  the  understanding  with  the 
Dual  Monarchy,  and  wrought  havoc  with  the  public 

*  And  abo  die  lowest  ebb  of  Russtan  influefice  in  the  Balkans.  At 
tke  oatbflvak  of  the  war,  Ruana  had  immediately  witbdfawn  her 
fldtury  atafif  which  was  engaged  in  building  up  the  Bulgarian  anny. 
She  hoped  that  this  step  would  at  once  conciliate  Serbia  and  t«ich  the 
wifwaid  Bolgais  that  the^  could  not  dispense  with  Russian  assistance. 
When  the  Bulgars  impioviaed  victorious  generalship  out  of  their  native 
ifjomiea,  and  Serbia  applied  to  die  Dual  Monarny  to  save  her  from 
the  consequences  of  defeat  Russia  was  dealt  two  staggering  blows. 


100  THE  BALKANS 

finances:  a  political  catastrophe  was  imminent,  and 
the  country  recalled  the  only  man  who  could  avert  it. 
Five  years  after  his  exile,  the  old  king  returned  to 
Belgrade  in  triumph*  His  policy  had  conquered. 
Serbia  submitted  herself  to  his  guidance,  party  rancours 
cooled  down,  and  the  national  energy  concentrated 
itself  in  economic  channels. 

King  Milan^s  success  did  not  fail  to  produce  its  effect 
upon  the  Russian  Foreign  Office.  Deserted  by  two 
of  her  protegtei,  Russia  found  herself  left  with  no  friend 
in  the  Balkans  but  Montenegro,  and  was  forced  to 
reconcile  herself  to  an  abatement  of  her  ambitions. 

Russian  and  Austro  -  Hungarian  interests  in  the 
Balkans  were  not  essentially  incompatible.  Russia's 
objective  was  the  Black  Sea  Straits :  the  Danubian 
Monarchy  coveted  an  ^Bgean  seaboard.  There  was  no 
geographical  obstacle  to  the  partition  of  the  Balkan 
peninsula  by  the  two  powers  into  an  Eastern  and  a 
Western  sphere,^  and  Russia  was  now  prepared  to 
consider  Atistro-Hungarian  overtures  to  this  efiFect. 
The  advent  of  the  next  phase  in  Turkey's  dissolution 
precipitated  a  compromise. 

The  Berlin  Congress  had  stipulated  for  administrative 
reform  throughout  the  territories  abandoned  to  Ottoman 
sovereignty  in  Macedonia,*  and  the  Porte  had  published 
a  pretentious  scheme  of  enlightened  government,  but 
the  project  remained  a  dead  letter,  and  the  Christian 
populations  at  last  determined  to  help  themselves.  The 
situation,  however,  was  complicated  by  their  distmion. 

>  The  idea  had  already  commended  itself  to  Joseph  IL  just  a  oeatiiry 
before.  In  1789  he  made  an  alliance  with  Cathenne  of  Ruasta  lor  the 
partition  of  the  Ottoman  Empire^  but  the  Turks  defended  themselves 
stoutly,  and  the  vultures  soon  diverted  their  attention  to  the  Pblsh 


*  An  unofficial  name  employed  to  cover  the  three  Ottoman  vilayets 
{**  governments  ")  of  Kdssovo,  Monastir,  and  Sakmika. 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  191 

Maordonia  is  the  meeting-plaoe  of  Southern«Slav, 
Biilgar^  and  Greek.  In  this  area  the  three  races  are 
ioezthcably  intermingled^  and  their  territorial  daims 
ffltttually  incompatible :  the  bitterness  of  each  against 
the  other  exceeded  their  common  hatred  of  the  Turk. 

In  1893  ^  terrible  revolutionary  propaganda  b^;an. 
Macedonia  became  infested  by  armed  bands,  equipped 
and  controlled  from  the  national  states  immediately 
beyond  the  Ottoman  frontier.  Their  activity  wais  only 
secondarily  directed  against  the  Turkish  government : 
their  principal  function  was  to  exterminate  villages  of 
alien  race  in  districts  damied  by  their  own  nationality, 
and  in  this  they  were  more  successful  than  in  protecting 
their  own  nationals  from  a  similar  fate,  for  to  harbour 
a  band  exposed  the  village  to  Turkish  reprisals*  The 
Macedonian  peasant  had  to  choose  between  the  scourge 
of  die  Anatolian  soldier  or  of  the  Balkan  brigand* 

The  crisis  developed  rapidly  from  bad  to  worse,  and 
in  1897  the  two  interested  powers  arrived  at  an  under- 
standing with  regard  to  their  eventual  policy.  In 
February  1903  this  fotmd  expression  in  an  ^^  identic 
note ""  to  the  Porte.  In  the  summer  of  the  same  year 
events  were  hastened  by  a  general  insurrection  of  the 
Bulgarian  element,^  and  its  brutal  suppression  by  the 
Turkish  troops.  In  the  October  of  the  same  year  the 
two  Emperors  met  at  Miirs^steg,  and  their  Foreign 
Ministries  elaborated  a  concrete  programme,  which 
they  compelled  the  Porte  to  accept.  The  civil  adminis- 
tration of  Macedonia  was  placed  tmder  the  supervision 
of  Russian  and  Austro-Hungarian  commissioners,  and 
the  gendarmerie  service  was  organised  in  local  zones  of 
inspection,  which  were  severally  assigned  to  all  the  Great 
Powers. 

'  Which  constitutes  the  great  majority  of  the  Macedonian  population. 

G 


192  THE  BALKANS 

The  Murzsteg  Programme  seemed  to  have  started 
the  Dual  Monarchy  upon  the  last  stage  of  its  advance 
towards  Salonika  without  committing  it  to  the  dreaded 
conflict  with  Russia^  In  1904  Russia  was  diverted 
from  the  Balkans  by  her  war  in  the  Far  East,  and  its 
disastrous  close  in  the  following  year  gave  Austro- 
Hungarian  statesmen  cause  to  congratulate  themselves* 
Apparently  the  *'  Eastward  Trend  **  had  an  absolutely 
dear  field  before  it :  their  good  fortune  had  exceeded 
their  expectations* 

At  the  very  moment,  however,  when  Russia  retired 
from  the  lists,  South-Slavonic  natiotiality  was  coming  of 
age,  and  preparing  to  champion  its  own  cause. 

In  1900  Alexander  of  Serbia  made  an  unfortunate 
marriage,  and  broke  away  from  his  father's  influence. 
His  action  was  bitterly  resented  by  the  country,  MOan 
died  before  he  cotdd  recover  his  authority,  and  his  loss 
increased  the  general  misgivii^.  A  conspiracy  was 
formed  among  the  officers  of  the  army,  and  in  1903  King 
Alexander  and  Queen  Draga  were  murdered  in  their 
palace  under  the  most  brutal  circumstances. 

This  atrocity  did  not  strike  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Foreign  Ministry  as  important  at  the  time,^  but  Austro- 
German  and  Magyar  hatred  has  battened  upon  it  during 
the  struggle  between  the  Dual  Monarchy  and  Serbia 
which  has  supervened.  In  the  October  of  1908  the 
writer  happened  to  be  dining  in  an  Oxford  college  where 
a  distinguished  Magyar  was  a  guest.  He  was  an  owner 
of  vineyards  in  the  Tokay  district,  a  major  of  Honved  * 
cavalry,  and  a  professor  of  mathematics  into  the  bargain, 
in  fine,  he  was  a  typical  representative  of  the  cultured 


la-Htsngary,  Riasia,  and  Montenegro  weie  the  only  foreign 
states  which  did  not  temponuily  withdraw  their  diplomatic  representa- 
tives from  Belgrade  as  a  protest, 
■  *•  Yeomanry." 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  193 

Whig  oligarchy.  The  Balkan  War  had  jtist  broken  out, 
and  the  name  of  Serbia  was  mentioned  in  the  conversa- 
tion, when  suddenly  the  table  was  startled  by  an 
exclamation  :  **  The  Serbs  I  Liarsand  thieves  !  They 
killed  their  king  and  queen  with  bayonets.  Thieves 
and  liaxsT"  During  the  hush  which  followed,  a 
graduate  of  the  college,  who  was  by  birth  a  Galidan 
Jew,  was  heard  remarking  aside  that  **  in  our  part  of  the 
world  you  can  always  guess  a  man's  nationality  by  the 
people  he  abuses/' 

The  conunent  hit  the  mark.  The  hate  was  primary 
in  the  professor's  mind,  his  jtistification  of  it  an  after- 
thought. In  arriving  at  his  estimate  of  the  Serbs' 
national  character,  he  had  never  consulted  his  reason : 
had  he  done  so,  it  would  have  shown  him  the  absurdity 
of  judging  a  yotmg  nation  by  the  scandals  in  its  high 
places.  The  history  of  Serbia  since  1878  is  not  to  be 
divined  in  the  intrigues  of  a  handful  of  politicians  at 
Belgrade,  but  in  the  industry  of  the  peasants,  who  have 
been  pturging  from  the  Morava-basin  the  traces  of 
Turkish  misrule.  The  success  with  which  they  have 
overcome  their  initial  handicap,  and  brought  their 
country  into  line  with  more  fortunate  parts  of  Europe, 
is  sufficient  to  vindicate  their  capacity  for  civilisation. 

When  Alexander  was  murdered,  his  father's  economic 
policy  was  already  bearing  fruit*  Serbia  had  developed 
her  agrarian  resources  to  the  point  of  producing  an 
annual  surplus  :  she  was  now  in  a  position  to  enter  the 
field  of  international  oonunerce.  Her  ziatural  market 
was  the  industrial  world  of  Central  Europe,  and  the 
direct  line  for  the  export  of  her  produce  accordingly  lay 
through  the  Danubian  Monarchy.  So  long,  however, 
as  she  monopolised  all  Serbia's  economic  outlets, 
Austria-Htmgary  ootdd  impose  on   Serbian  exports 


194  THE  BALKANS 

vAisitcvtt  prices  she  chose :  economic  independence 
could  only  be  achieved  by  opening  up  an  alternative 
route*  Alexander  Obrenovitch  was  succeeded  on  the 
throne  of  Serbia  by  Peter  Karageorgevitch,  the  heir  of  a 
rival  dynasty,  and  the  first  important  act  of  the  new  reign 
.  was  the  negotiation  in  1906  of  a  tariff-convention  with 
Bulgaria,  which  promised  Serbia  access  on  reasonable 
terms  to  a  port  on  the  Black  Sea* 

This  sudden  change  in  the  relations  of  the  two 
principalities  caused  considerable  consternation  at 
Vienna  and  Buda-Pest.  Not  only  did  it  threaten  to 
relieve  Serbia  from  her  economic  thraldom  to  the  Dual 
Monarchy :  it  portended  a  political  entente  between  the 
rival  Slavonic  groups  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula*  More 
ominous  still,  it  coincided  with  a  similar  movement 
among  the  South-Slavonic  citizens  of  the  Monarchy 
itself* 

When  Khuen-Hedervary  resigned  the  Croatian  vice- 
regency  in  1903,  he  left  no  competent  successor  behind 
him,  and  the  political  life  of  Croatia  began  to  revive* 
The  prolonged  parliamentary  crisis  at  Buda-Pest,  which 
followed  the  overthrow  of  the  Magyar  Liberal  Party, 
produced  its  echo  South  of  the  Drave*  In  the  Autunm 
of  X905,  a  conference  of  Croat  deputies  from  the 
Croatian  Diet  and  the  Austrian  Reichsrath  was  held  at 
Fiume.^  A  resolution  was  adopted,  expressing  sym- 
pathy with  the  Magyar  Coalition  in  its  struggle  against 
the  Cro¥m,  but  demanding  that  the  liberties  for  which 
the  Coalition  professed  to  be  fighting  should  be  extended 
to  Croatia  as  well :  the  Compromise  of  z868  was  to  be 
observed  in  spirit  as  well  as  in  letter,  and  constitutional 

^  The  initiative  came  from  the  Croat  leaders  in  Dahnatia,  who  as 
citizens  of  Austria  had  been  able  to  develop  a  more  untiammeled 
political  activity  than  their  less  fortunate  brethren  under  the  *'  Crown 
of  St*  Stephen* 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  195 

autonomy  to  be  made  a  reality*  The  union  ^  of  Croatia 
and  Dalmatia  was  to  be  achieved  under  the  *'  Crown  of 
St.  Stephen/' 

Before  the  Conference  dissolved,  an  executive 
committee  was  appointed  to  give  effect  to  its  intentions* 
They  at  once  opened  negotiations  with  the  Sefb 
members  of  the  Croatian  Diet**  Less  than  a  fort- 
night later  a  Serb  congress  met  at  Zara,  endorsed 
the  **  Resolution  of  Fiume/'  and  proclaimed  the  need 
for  political  co-operation  between  the  Croat  and  Serb 
elements  in  the  Dual  Monarchy*  During  the  winter 
the  two  groups  actually  combined  to  conduct  a  vigorous 
political  campaign,  and  in  the  spring  of  1906  the  same 
elections  that  brought  the  Magyar  Coalition  into  office 
at  Buda-Pest,  returned  to  the  Diet  at  Agr^m  a  formidable 
block  representative  of  the  new  coalition  between  Serbs 
and  Croats* 

Within  the  Monarchy  as  well  as  outside  it^  the 
Southern  Slavs  were  thus  beginning  to  close  their 
ranks*  Austro-Hungarian  statesmanship  had  counted 
on  its  ability  to  play  off  against  one  another  the  several 
victims  of  its  **  Eastward  Trend  ** :  the  events  of  X906 
threatened  it  with  the  forfeiture  of  its  most  effective 
weapon,  when  the  last  and  most  hazardous  step  in  the 
advance  was  still  to  take*  A  strong  personality  was 
required  at  the  Joint  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
the  appointment  of  Baron  Aerenthal  followed  before 
the  end  of  this  critical  year* 

Aerenthal  was  fully  alive  to  the  danger :  he  resolved 
to  forestall  it  by  a  determined  offensive*  Russia  was 
still  paralysed  by  her  disaster  in  the  Far  East :   the 

'Or  the  '^  reunion/'  as  Croat  nationalists  prefer  to  txprtss  it,harkixi« 
back  to  the  **  Triune  Kingdom  "  of  Dalmatia-Croatia-Slavonia  which 
floansbed  for  its  brief  moment  in  the  eleventh  century  a  J>. 

*  About  one  quarter  of  the  total  population  of  Croatia  is  Scib. 


196  THE  BALKANS 

Danubian  Monarchy  must  seize  this  opportunity  to 
realise  its  ambitions,  or  else  abandon  them  for  ever* 
Aerenthal  deliberately  embarked  upon  the  death* 
struggle  with  the  Soudiem  Slavs* 

The  first  bout  in  the  conflict  did  not  result  in  his 
favour*  Dtuing  1907  he  retaliated  upon  Serbia  for  her 
effort  towards  economic  liberty  by  waging  a  remorseless 
tariff-war  against  her.^  The  Serbian  peasantry  suffered 
severely,  but  they  showed  unexpected  obstinacy: 
instead  of  coming  to  terms,  they  developed  new  outlets 
and  markets  with  such  enterprise  that  Aerenthal  had 
to  abandon  his  campaign  as  a  failure* 

Next  year,  however,  he  returned  to  the  diarge*  In 
January  1908  he  concluded  a  convention  with  the 
Ottoman  Government  for  the  construction  of  a  railway 
through  the  Sandjak  of  Novibazar,  which  was  to  link 
the  Austro-Hungarian  railway  system  in  Bosnia  with 
the  Turkish  railhead  at  Mitrovitza*  His  object  was  to 
**  side-track  **  Serbia  by  diverting  to  this  new  route  the 
through-traffic  between  Central  Europe  and  the  ^Bgean 
littoral,  which  had  utilised  hitherto  the  line  through 
Belgrade  and  up  the  Morava  valley  to  Salonika**  He 
paid  dearly  for  this  move,  for  it  drew  Russia  once  more 
into  the  Balkan  arena* 

Russian  opinion  regarded  the  railway  scheme  as  a 
direct  violation  of  the  Miirzsteg  agreement :  it  por- 
tended the  consummation  of  the  Danubian  rival's 
"'  Eastward  Trend*'^  The  Government  shook  off  its 
lethargy,  and  determined  upon  a  counter-stroke*    In 

^ Nicknamed  the  ^Pig  War*'  in  Austria-Hungary,  swine  being 
Serbia's  chief  article  of  export. 

*The  Mitiovitza  line  traverses  the  Kossovo  district  and  joins  the 
Salonika  Railway  at  Uskub*  Like  the  Bosnian  system'and  the  piopoaed 
connecting  link,  it  is  narrow-gauge,  while  the  Belgrade-Uskub-SaKuuka 
Railway  h  built  on  the  rq^ular  CSmtinental  standard.    See  Map  III. 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  197 

June  1908  the  Tsar  entertained  King  Edward  VIL  at 
Reval,  and  Great  Britain  and  Rtissia  announced  in 
oonjtinction  a  new  and  drastic  scheme  of  Macedonian 
refonn*^ 

The  effect  was  momentous*  A  **  Young  Turk  ** 
committee  had  been  planning  for  years  the  overthrow 
of  Abd-^-hamid's  absolute  government*  Educated  by 
exile  in  Western  Europe,  they  had  imbibed  its  national 
chauvinism  as  well  as  its  liberal  ideals*  The  **  Reval 
Ptogramme''  convinced  them  that  Turkey  would 
forfeit  the  sovereignty  over  her  European  territories 
altogether,  unless  she  could  accomplish  immediate 
reform  from  within*  They  resolved  to  risk  everything 
to  save  the  integrity  of  the  Empire*  The  revolution 
was  started  among  the  troops  in  Macedonia  before  the 
next  month  was  out,  and  in  a  few  days  Turkey  was 
converted  into  a  constitutional  state* 

The  dtiel  between  Aerenthal  and  Serbia  had  thus  set 
all  the  Balkans  and  the  Nearer  East  in  commotion  before 
the  autumn  of  1908*  Meanwhile,  the  South-Slavonic 
problem  had  rapidly  been  assuming  more  serious  pro- 
portions within  the  borders  of  the  Dual  Monarchy* 

The  Spring  of  1907  witnessed  the  inevitable 
breach  between  the  Serbo-Croat  G>alition  Party  and 
the  Ms^;yar  Coalition  Ministry*  In  a  biU  submitted 
by  Francis  Kossuth  *  to  the  parliament  at  Buda-Pest, 
Magyar  was  declared  the  sole  official  language  for  the 
railway-system  not  merely  of  Hungary  as  heretofore, 
but  of  all  territories  included  under  the  **  Crown  of  St* 
Stephen*''  This  was  a  dear  contravention  of  the 
Compromise  of  1868,  by  which  the  South-Slavonic 

*  Qimmra  fear  of  Gennany  had  led  these  two  |K»wen  to  oompQW  th^ 
ootrtandtiis  dixEueiiccs  the  year  befdce* 

*  The  aoa  of  Lotttt. 


198  THE  BALKANS 

• 

tongue  had  been  guaranteed  official  status  within  the 
limits  of  Croatia*  In  proposing  it  the  Magyar  Radicals 
had  shown  their  hand*  Their  Liberal  predecessors 
had  confined  the  policy  of  Magyarisation  to  Hungary  : 
this  bill  was  an  attempt  to  extend  it  to  Croatia* 

The  Serbo-Croat  deputies  in  the  parliament  at  Buda- 
pest at  once  resorted  to  obstruction*  They  were 
defeated  by  a  tactical  manoeuvre  and  the  bill  became  law, 
but  the  struggle  was  only  continued  the  more  fiercely 
at  Agram*  At  the  beginning  of  1908  the  Magyar 
government  dismissed  the  **  Ban  **  then  in  office  as 
unequal  to  the  situation,  and  specially  appointed  Baron 
Paul  Rauch  to  superintend  as  viceroy  the  impending 
elections  in  Croatia ;  yet  Rauch,  though  he  strentiously 
applied  Khuen-Hedervary^s  methods,  did  not  obtain 
from  them  his  gifted  predecessor's  results*  The 
Croato-Serb  coalition  secured  an  absolute  majority  in 
the  new  Diet,  and  all  that  Rauch  could  do  was  to 
prorogue  the  session  for  an  indefinite  period,  and  govern 
in  defiance  of  the  constitution* 

Durixig  the  months,  therefore,  that  followed  the 
Turkish  revolution,  Aerenthal  found  all  sections  of  the 
South-Slavonic  race  in  a  dangerous  state  of  agitation* 
Being  a  man  of  courageous  temper,  he  resolved  to  crush 
the  spirit  of  Serb  and  Croat  alike  by  an  overwhelmii^ 
blow*  In  October  1908  he  repudiated  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Porte  over  Bosnia,  and  declared  the  annescation 
of  the  **  Occupied  Provinces  '^  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy*^ 

This  act  at  once  provoked  a  European  crisis,  but 
Aerenthal  showed  himself  not  unequal  to  the  occasion* 

^The  com  was  effected  in  coUusioii  with  Bulgaria,  which 
simultaneotisly  denounced  Ottoman  suzerainty  and  proclaimed  the 
''  annexation ''  (in  a  similar  sense)  of  Eastern  Rumelia. 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  199 

By  January  1909  he  had  compounded  with  the  **  Young 
Turk""  government*  Serbia  and  Montenegro^  whose 
interests  were  much  more  vital  than  Turkey's  in  Bosnia, 
had  mobilised  and  threatened  war,  but  this  was  provided 
for  in  Aerenthal's  programme*  He  met  it  by  a  vigorous 
counter-mobilisation  along  the  Save  and  the  Drina, 
and  uncompromisingly  rejected  all  claims  to  territorial, 
economic  or  moral  compensation*  When  Russia  took 
steps  in  support  of  the  two  Balkan  principalities,  he 
appealed  with  success  to  the  Monarchy's  German  ally, 
h  the  last  week  of  March  Berlin  addressed  a  virtual 
ukimattun  to  Petersburg,  the  Russian  protest  against 
the  Annexation  was  withdrawn,  and  Serbia  composed 
a  paUnodia  in  the  form  of  a  note  to  the  Austro-Htmgarian 
foreign  office,  in  which  she  renotmoed  all  stake  in  the 
destinies  of  Bosnia* 

Aerenthal  had  carried  his  manoeuvre  throt^,  but  it 
was  a  Pyrrhic  victory*  G>mmon  adversity  had  linked 
Serbia  fast  to  Montenegro,  and  her  latent  loyalty  to 
Russia  was  re-kindled  by  the  championship  she  had 
received  from  the  diplomacy  of  Petersburg*  Russia 
on  her  part  was  stirred  to  the  depths  by  the  humiliation 
she  had  endtired*^  The  Far  Eastern  disaster  and  the 
revolutionary  convulsion  which  followed  it  had  left  her 
still  too  greatly  diso]^;anised  to  fight ;  but  she  was  well 
on  the  way  towards  recovery,  and  she  needed  but  this 
stimulus  to  dispel  her  paralysis  altogether*  Deter^ 
mined  to  be  ready  **  next  time,^^  she  devoted  herself 
to  preparations*  The  South-Slavonic  question  became 
onoe  more  the  focus  of  her  foreign  policy,  and  was 
promoted  thereby  to  be  the  crucial  issue  between  the 


*  TbK  Kaaer's  speech  in  which  he  imaged  himself  as  **  ■»a«Ht<ig 
boide  his  ally  in  shining  armour'*  rankled  especially  deep  in  the 
RdBian  iHinn. 


aoo  THE  BALKANS 

two  camps  into  which  the  European  powers  were  divided. 
Aerenthal  had  unchained  forces  beyond  his  control* 
He  had  asserted  his  will  in  a  problem  of  vital  importance 
to  the  Danubian  Monarchy,  but  he  had  done  so  at  the 
price  of  transferring  the  initiative  for  the  future  to  the 
dominant  partner  in  the  Central-European  alliance. 

The  aftermath  of  the  crisis  within  the  Monarchy 
itself  was  hardly  less  embarrassing*  Baron  Rauch 
had  rid  himself  of  the  Croatian  Diet  for  the  moment : 
he  was  resolved  to  ruin  the  Croato-Serb  Coalition  before 
he  faced  it  again*  During  the  early  summer  of  1908 
his  official  press  worked  up  a  scare  of  **  Pan-Serb  ** 
conspiracy ;  in  July  the  first  arrest  was  made  on  the 
charge  of  High  Treason,  and  before  the  end  of  January 
X909  no  less  than  fifty-eight  Serb  citizens  of  Croatia, 
all  people  of  obscure  station,  were  in  prison  pending 
their  trial  on  this  account.  The  judicial  proceedings  at 
Agram  did  not  open  till  March,  when  the  external  crisis 
was  approaching  its  dttente,  and  the  attention  of  Europe 
was  concentrated  upon  them  before  they  dragged  to 
their  belated  close  in  October*  Thirty-one  of  the 
victims  were  sentenced  to  terms  of  imprisonment 
varying  from  twelve  to  five  years,  but  Rauch  had  failed 
in  his  real  objective :  all  attempts  to  implicate  the 
Coalition  members  of  the  Croatian  Diet  had  broken 
down,  and  the  party  was  able  to  follow  up  this  negative 
success  by  a  triumph  of  a  more  startling  character. 

During  the  same  month  of  March  in  which  the 
Bosnian  crisis  ended  and  the  Agram  trial  began,  the 
Neae  Freie  Presse  newspaper  had  published  at  Vienna 
an  article  on  the  relations  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  to 
the  South-Slavonic  problem  by  an  eminent  Austrian 
historian.  Dr.  Friedjung.  This  article  was  written  in 
an  authoritative  tone  :  it  specifically^charged  the  Serbo- 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  Toi 

Qoat  Coalition  with  being  the  exponents  and  tools  of 
agencies  in  Belgrade,  and  supported  its  assertions  by 
quotations  from  documents*  Some  of  the  documents 
purported  to  be  official  correspondence  of  the  Serbian 
Foreign  Office,  others  were  minutes  of  a  semi-official 
revolutionary  society,  but  Dr«  Friedjung,  when  chal- 
lenged, refused  to  reveal  their  provenance,  and  the 
Coalition  deputies  accordingly  entered  a  libel  action 
against  him  at  Vienna* 

The  hearing  of  this  case  only  came  on  in  December 
1909,  after  the  treason  trial  was  over,  but  this  time  the 
proceedings  lasted  no  longer  than  a  fortnight*  The 
trial  at  Agram  had  cast  a  lurid  light  upon  the  methods 
of  espionage  employed  by  the  Austro-Htmgarian 
Administration  in  Bosnia,  Croatia,  and  Dalmatia :  now 
at  Vienna  Dr*  Friedjung^s  documents  were  revealed 
as  forgeries  concocted  within  the  walls  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  legation  at  Belgrade,  oommimicated  to 
Friedjung  as  genuine  by  the  Joint  Foreign  Office,  and 
utilised  by  him  in  all  good  faith* 

The  action  was  hastily  stopped  by  a  compromise, 
before  these  results  could  be  registered  in  the  verdict 
of  the  court,  but  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  had 
created  an  immense  sensation*  Dr«  Spalaikovitch, 
the  incriminated  Serbian  official,  put  in  an  appearance 
and  brilliantly  vindicated  himself  and  his  country : 
The  Tcfaech  savant  Professor  Masaryk  of  Prag,  who 
counted  among  his  pupils  men  of  the  rising  generation 
in  all  the  Slavonic  countries  of  the  Danubian  Monarchy 
and  the  Balkans,  proved  himself  still  more  formidable* 
Implicated  as  a  witness  in  the  trial,  he  refused  to  let 
the  matter  drop*  He  was  a  member  of  the  Austrian 
Reichsrath,  and  when  the  Delegations  next  met  in 
November  1909,  he  was  elected  as  one  of  the  Austrian 


ao2  THE  BALKANS 

representatives.  This  gave  him  an  opportunity  for  a 
direct  pas5^;e  of  arms  with  the  Joint  Foreign  Minister  : 
Aerenthal  hardly  attempted  a  defence,  and  Masaryk 
proceeded  remorselessly  with  his  interpellations  till  he 
had  pieced  together  and  exposed  the  whole  official 
conspiracy.  Aerenthal  aspired  to  be  the  "  Austrian 
Bismardc "  without  possessing  the  capacity  of  his 
Prussian  ensample.  The  exposure  was  as  Hamning 
as  that  of  the  "  Ems  Telegram,"  and  it  had  overtaken 
him  with  disconcerting  speed. 

Thus  ended  the  first  bout  in  the  conflict :  before  the 
next  began  Baron  Aerenthal  had  been  removed  from  the 
scene,  but  during  five  short  years  of  office  ^  he  had  fixed 
the  lines  on  which  it  should  be  fought  to  its  conclusion. 

Baron  Rauch  did  not  survive  the  Friedjung  incident : 
early  in  1910  he  was  superseded,  and  the  Croatian  Diet 
was  convened  once  more.  The  respite,  however,  was 
brief.  The  ideals  of  the  Serbo-Croat  Coalition  and  of 
M^Cyar  nationalism  were  not  compatible  with  one 
another.  So  long  as  Magyar  ministries  could  control 
the  politics  of  Croatia,  it  was  possible  to  observe  in 
outward  form  the  Compromise  of  1868  :  now  that  the 
majority  in  the  Diet  was  possessed  by  a  party  truly 
representative  of  the  Croatian  people,  consperation 
between  the  parliaments  at  J^ram  and  Buda-Pest  had 
become  impracticable,  and  the  Compromise  inevitably 
broke  down.  A  fresh  deadlock  led  once  more  to  the 
suspension  of  constitutional  govenmient  in  Croatia  in 
the  spring  of  1912,  and  almost  immediately  afterwards 
the  Serb  Chtirch  in  the  Hapsbuig  dominions  was 
deprived  of  its  charter,  i^ch  had  been  consistently 
respected  since  its  original  grant  in  1691. 


KtirenMnl 

1 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  303 

At  tlie  height  of  this  intemal  crisis^  the  Monarchy 
1RB  suddenly  £aoed  by  that  external  event  which  its 
ittafesmen  had  dreaded  beyond  all  others*  During 
the  same  sununer  the  four  independent  states  in  the 
Balkans,^  upon  whose  rivaby  Austro-Hungarian  policy 
depended,  contrived  to  effect  an  understanding,  and 
in  September  191a  they  declared  war  upon  Turkey 
sifflultaneously**  Within  two  months  the  Turkish 
armies  were  driven  off  the  field,  the  Balkan  allies  were 
assaulting  the  Chataldja  and  Gallipoli  lines,  which 
cover  the  Black  Sea  Straits,  and  only  three  fortresses 
sdll  held  out  further  West*  Negotiations  opened  at 
London  during  a  winter  armistice  proved  abortive,  but 
diey  were  renewed  after  the  fall  <^  all  three  fortresses 
in  the  spring*  By  the  resultant  treaty  the  League 
oorporately  acquired  from  Tturkey  all  her  European 
territories  beyond  a  line  drawn  from  Ainos  on  the 
£gean  to  Midia  on  the  Blade  Sea«' 

Serbia  had  joined  the  League  for  two  objects.  The 
first  was  to  recover  her  *'  irredenta  **  in  Kossovo,  before 
it  was  overtaken  by  the  same  fate  as  Bosnia :  the  second 
was  to  obtain  direct  access  to  the  Adriatic* 

A  country  without  a  seaboard  is  economically  at  the 
mercy  of  its  neighbours.  Serbia  had  experienced  this 
in  X907,  when  the  Danubian  Monarchy  had  closed 
agamst  her  trade  the  land-route  to  Western  Europe. 
The  nearest  seaboard   to  the   Morava-basin  is  die 

'  Serbia,  Montcncgio,  Bulgam  and  Gfceoe. 

'Tbeyncie  givat  tfaetr  opportunity  by  the  Turoo-Italian  War,  which 
began  m  the  atftumn  of  291  land  dragged  on  for  a  y«ar.  The  signature 
of  peace  by  the  Turkish  and  Italian  plenqntentiarics  at  Latisanne  and 
the  dtrlararion  of  war  by  the  Balkan  Lngue  were  pncticaUY  simul- 

ffntnand  of  ^ 


and  undl  that  moment  the  Italian  fleet's  command  of  the  sea 
kxked  up  in  Tnpoh  some  of  Turlrey's  most  serviceable  troops,  and 
paialyaed  commimtcatinns  between  the  Turkish  military  estabhshment 
a  Marrrionia  and  its  Anatolian  reservoirs  of  men  and  supplies. 
'See  Map  IV. 


'k" 


ao4  THE  BALKANS 

Dalmatian  coast,  and  nationality  as  well  as  geography 
supports  Serbia's  title  to  an  outlet  in  this  direction,  since 
the  whoit  territory  that  intervenes  between  Belgrade 
and  Spalato  ^  is  occupied  by  a  homogeneous  South- 
Slavonic  population.  Yet  here,  K>o,  Serbia's  ubiquitous 
neighbour  blocked  the  way :  the  crisis  of  1908  had 
shown  that  Austria-Hungary  was  established  just  as 
permanently  West  of  the  Dnna  as  North  of  the  Save, 
and  that  Serbia's  dream  of  oonoessioos  in  this  quarter 
had  been  Utopian. 

A  casual  glance  at  the  map  suggests  that,  after  the 
annexation  of  the  Kossovo-district,  Serbia  might  have 
engineered  a  railway  across  it  to  the  Montenegrin  port 
of  Antivari,  and  thus  obtained  an  outlet  only  sU^tly 
further  K>  the  South ;  but  with  a  map  that  represents 
the  relief  (tf  the  land,  the  idea  will  be  dispelled  by  closer 
examination.  Antivari  possesses  a  tolerable  harbour 
but  an  impassable  hinterland.  The  massif  of  the 
"  Black  Afeuntain  "  rises  immediately  behind  it,  and 
the  very  physical  qualities  that  luve  sa£q;uarded 
Montenegro's  liberty  have  denied  her  the  possibility 
of  railway  development.    The  Dinaric  barrier  between 

■  Spalato  lies  appiomnattly  at  the  mid-point  of  die  Soutb-Sbvooic 
coan,  half  way  bctWccD  Piume  on  the  one  bond  and  ttw  mouth  of  Ac 
Boyana  Rivet  on  die  odiei.  It  is  destined  by  geography  to  be  die 
principal  pott  of  die  Soutb-Slavonic  area,  but  at  present  ita  c^iacidei 
are  neutnUwd  by  the  lack  of  railway  connections  with  its  binteriand 
(see  Mq>  IIL).  The  Boonian  Railway  hai  not  yet  opened  its  way  to 
any  port  further  up  the  coast  than  Metkovitdi  on  the  estuary  of  the 
Narenta,  though  a  branch  diverges  from  that  point  in  the  opposite 
direction  to  Ragtaa,  and  continues  still  further  South-Bast  as  tar  as 
Caitelnuovo,  at  the  entrance  of  Cattaro  fiord.  To  link  ifae  Serbian 
railway  system  with  these  actual  or  potential  ports  on  the  Dalmatian 
QUMt,  bttle  furdier  railway  construction  is  required.  A  Serbian  line 
aaceods  the  valley  of  the  Western  Morava  and  ita  tributary,  the  Tsetinya, 
as  fax  West  as  XTpat :  a  branch  of  die  Bosnian  Raitwav  starts  ftoin 
SarayevD,  crosses  the  Drina  at  Vishegrad,  and  runs  li^t  up  to  iIm 
Serbian  frontier  at  Vardiahtc.  The  distance  between  the  two  rail- 
heads is  less  than  twenty-five  miles  (see  Map  III.). 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  205 

the  Danube-basin  and  the  sea  is  at  no  point  more 
di£Bcult  to  surmount* 

Serbia  was  thus  driven  to  look  further  South*  As 
soon  as  the  Turkish  resistance  in  Northern  Macedonia 
had  been  overcome,  she  despatched  a  coltunn  by  forced 
maidies  across  the  Albanian  mountains,  and  occupied  a 
stretch  of  the  Turkish  coast-line  extending  from  Alessao 
at  die  mouth  of  the  Drin  as  far  Southward  as  the  port 
of  Durazso« 

At  this  point  the  Dual  Monarchy  intervened*  Count 
Berchtold,  who  had  succeeded  Baron  Aerenthal  at  the 
Joint  Ministry  for  Foreign  AfEairs,  set  his  veto  upon  the 
establishment  of  Serbian  sovereignty  at  any  point  on 
the  Adriatic  coast*  Once  more  the  Monarchy  had  to 
mobilise  her  troops  in  support  of  her  diplomacy,  and 
this  time  against  Russia  on  the  Galidan  frontier,  yet 
by  Sir  Edward  Grey^s  efforts  the  catastrophe  was  once 
more  averted,  and  Serbia  yielded  to  Berchtold's  demand* 

Berchtold^s  action  was  not  defensible*  He  made  play 
with  the  Austro-Hungarian  protectorate  over  the  North- 
Albanian  dans,  and  posed  as  the  champion  of  a  small 
nationality  against  its  unscrupulous  neighbour,  yet  in 
a  precisely  similar  case  the  Magyars  had  avowedly 
been  sacrificing  the  interests  of  the  Southern  Slavs  in 
Croatia  to  their  own  need  for  railway  conuntmication 
with  the  sea*  The  hypocrisy  of  Berchtold's  plea  was 
enhanced  by  the  fact  that  Serbia,  tmlike  Hungary,  could 
have  found  a  seaboard  in  Dalmatia  without  doing  any 
violence  at  all  to  the  national  principle,  had  not  her  way 
been  barred  by  the  Dual  Monarchy  itself* 

Even  the  occasion  for  this  stroke  seemed  ill-chosen. 
Feeling  in  Croatia  and  Bosnia  was  abeady  inflamed 
against  the  government  by  the  internal  situation :  the 
Serbian  sucoeflses  had  further  agitated  it  by  a  wave  of 


ao6  THE  BALKANS 

sjraqiatbetic  enthusiasm,  and  the  morale  of  Serbia 
herself  was  very  difierent  in  the  spring  of  1913  from 
what  it  had  been  in  the  Spring  of  1909.  Berchtold's 
diplomacy,  however,  had  an  ulterior  object.  He 
divined  that  Serbia,  now  entirely  debarred  from  the 
Adriatic,  would  insist  on  obtainii^  an  j^ean  outlet 
in  compensation.  This  would  brit^  her  into  coUiKon 
with  Bulgarian  claims  in  Macedonia,  the  Balkan  allies 
would  quarrel  over  the  division  of  their  Turkish  spoil, 
their  formidable  harmony  would  be  destroyed,  and  after 
they  had  exhausted  one  another  by  an  inttraedne  war, 
the  Monarchy's  path  towards  Salonika  would  once  more 
be  open. 

In  starting  this  train  of  events,  Berchtold  overreached 
himself.  Serbia  duly  enlarged  her  Macedonian  claims, 
the  tension  between  the  Balkan  allies  increased,  and 
towards  the  end  of  June  19x3  Bulgaria  opened  the 
Second  Balkan  War  by  a  treacherous  night-attack  upon 
the  Serbian  outposts  sixmg  the  line  of  the  Vardar. 
Yet  the  result  of  this  secondary  contest  was  an  even 
greater  surimse  than  the  collapse  of  the  Turks.  The 
Greek  and  Seri)ian  armies  almost  immediately  assumed 
the  ofEensive,  and  cleared  Macedonia  of  Bulgarian  troops ; 
Roumania  declared  war,  and  invaded  Bulgaria  from  the 
opposite  quarter :  hardly  more  than  a  month  had 
passed  before  the  Bulgarian  resistance  was  completely 
broken.  The  Treaty  of  Bukarcst,  which  defined  the 
terms  of  the  re-settlement,  was  a  proclamation  of 
Berchtold's  failure. 

Serbia's  gains  were  fai  greater  than  they  would  have 

been  if  the  Treaty  of  London  had  remained  in  force, 

and  the  four  allies  had  settled  their  claims  by  peaceful 

I  compromise.    The  Dual  Monarchy's  discom^ture  was 

L        pn^icionattly  aggravated.    Jn  the  autumn  of  19(3 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  207 

die  **  Eastwatd  Trend  **  had  indeed  lost  all  prospect  of 
realisation* 

(i*)  In  the  first  place  the  gateway  through  the  Sandjak 
had  been  walled  up,  and  a  continuous  belt  of  Serbian 
and  Montenegrin  territory  now  extended  all  the  way 
bom  Belgrade  to  Antivari*  This  was  a  legacy  from  the 
Bosnian  coap  of  1908.  Part  of  Aerenthal^s  indemnity 
to  the  Ottoman  Government  had  been  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  garrisons  from  this  district, 
and  the  bargain  had  proved  a  bad  one  for  both  parties. 
In  e£Eect  the  Monarchy  made  way  not  for  Turkey  but 
for  her  Balkan  heirs,  and  after  brief  service  as  a  sop  to 
**  Young  Turkish  "  pride,  the  Sandjak  went  to  swell  the 
booty  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro* 

(ii.)  In  the  second  place  Serbia  had  triumphantly 
adiieved  her  economic  independence.  The  elimination 
of  Bulgaria  left  Serbia  and  Greece  in  joint  possession 
of  the  Salonika  Railway,  and  while  Greece  incorporated 
the  Southernmost  section  of  the  line,  as  well  as  its 
terminal  port,  within  her  political  frontier,  Serbia 
retained  complete  equality  with  her  in  the  economic 
utilisation  of  both.  She  had  thus  secured  an  immedi- 
ately available  oudet  to  the  sea  without  expenditure  of 
time  or  capital,  whereas  the  task  of  pacifying  Northern 
Albania  and  constructing  a  new  railway  throt^  its 
mountains  from  the  Morava-valley  to  Duraszo  would 
have  absorbed  her  energy  for  years.  She  had  reason 
to  diank  G>unt  Berchtold  for  saving  her  from  a  false 
step  I 

(fii.)  Worse  still,  Serbia  and  Mcmtenegro  had  both 
almost  doubled  their  population  and  their  territorial 
extent.  When  they  had  assimilated  these  new  tissues, 
and  had  shaken  off  all  traces  of  their  two  wars  except 
die  prestige  of  rictoty,  they  wouU  develop  into  a 


I 


ao8  THE  BALKANS 

fennidabk  miUtary  power.  They  would  be  strcmg  in 
dmnsehres,  and,  wotst  of  all,  tliey  would  be  strcmg  in 
tbeir  friends. 

Berchtold's  diplomacy  had  exorcised  the  first  Balkan 
Confederacy  only  to  conjure  up  a  more  dangerous 
entente  in  its  place.  The  alliance  between  Serbia  and 
Bu^aria  was  essentially  directed  against  Turkey :  once 
the  Turks  were  driven  behind  the  Qutaldja  lines,  its 
positive  stimulus  would  in  any  case  have  vanished. 
Roiunania,  however,  was  as  disLiterested  in  respect  of 
Turkey  as  Bulgaria  was  towards  the  national  problems 
of  the  Middle  Danube-basin,  and  her  new  understand- 
ing with  Serbia  could  have  but  one  meaning.  Just 
as  Serbia  had  made  common  cause  with  Bulgaria  to 
liberate  the  Slav  populations  under  Ottoman  rule,  so 
she  would  fight  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Roumania 
to  wrench  away  from  the  Hapsbu^  complezus  the 
"  irredenta  "  coveted  by  each  <^  them  in  this  quarter. 
The  cherished  dream  of  a  "  Trend  Eastward "  was 
foding  away,  and  the  foreboding  of  a  "Westward 
Trend  "  at  the  Monarchy's  e:qiense  was  beginning  to 
take  its  place. 

Thus  ended  the  second  bout  in  the  conflict  between 
the  Dual  Monarchy  and  the  South  Slavonic  nationality. 

Could  the  Monarchy  retrieve  its  position  before  the 
drama  was  played  out  i  Yes,  if  the  face  of  Europe  were 
changed  by  a  trial  of  strength  between  the  opposing 
camps  into  which  the  European  Powers  were  divided. 
If  the  central  group  triumphed,  the  Danubian  partner 
could  snatdi  success  out  of  failure,  and  lay  hands  upon 
Salonika  after  all.^ 

Would  Germany,  the  dominant  member  in  the 
partnership,  be  willing  to  stake  her  all  upon  this  issue  i 
I  Sec  die  Britiih  Vhiu  Paper,  No.  8a. 


\ 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  209 

Yes  agaisi,  for  while  the  events  of  1908-9  had  akeady 
endowed  the  South-Slavonic  problem  with  international 
stgnificance,  the  solution  of  the  Moroccan  question  after 
the  crisis  of  19x1  had  promoted  it  to  be  the  supreme 
test  of  the  ''  Balance  of  Power/' 

These  considerations  counselled  the  Joint  Minister 
for  Foreign  AfEairs  to  precipitate  a  dinouement  at  the 
first  opportunity,  and  the  murder  of  the  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand  at  Sarayevo  in  Jtme  19x4  presented 
him  with  the  initiative. 

The  crime  was  perpetrated  by  a  South-Slavonic 
subject  of  the  Monarchy,  a  Bosnian  Serb.  It  is  idle 
to  brand  a  whole  race  with  an  individual's  misdeed : 
Qrstni's  attempt  to  assassinate  Napoleon  IIL  in  X858 
did  not  stain  the  honour  of  the  Italian  people,  still  less 
did  Napoleon  tax  the  Sardinian  Government  with 
responsibility  for  the  act  of  a  man  who  was  not  a 
Sardinian  subject.  There  is  no  shadow  of  proof  that 
King  Peter's  ministers  were  implicated  in  the  present 
a£Eaar  any  more  than  Cavour  was  in  the  other :  the  facts 
can  only  be  established  when  the  trial  of  the  murderers 
has  run  its  course,  yet  before  the  proceedings  were 
opened  at  Sarayevo,  Count  Berchtold  had  exploited  the 
occasion  to  force  war  upon  Serbia  against  her  will. 

German  and  Magyar  apologists  represent  this  un- 
provoked attack  as  a  '^punitive  expedition.''  They 
remind  us  that  when  the  A^hans  massacred  Sir  Lows 
Cavagnari  and  his  suite  at  Kabul,  Lord  Roberts  retraced 
his  steps  and  exacted  a  bloody  vengeance  :  **  Suppose," 
they  argue,  **  that  the  Viceroy  of  India  or  the  Prince  of 
Wales  were  sniped  at  his  camp-fire  during  a  tour  along 
tbt  North-West  Frontier,  you  would  carry  fire  and 
sword  through  the  hills  without  remorse." 

We  will  accept  the  comparison,  if  we  may  carry  it  to 


aio  THE  BALKANS 

a  sfustained  conclusion.  If  we  suppose  so  ifiudi,  we 
must  likewise  suppose  that  the  inhabitants  of  Ireland 
and  the  Scottish  Highlands  happen  themselves  to  be 
Afghans  in  race,  that  the  Welsh  and  the  Cornishmen, 
if  they  are  not  actually  Afghans  too,  speak  some  dosety 
allied  Persian  dialect,  and  that  Afghan  is  recognised 
as  an  official  language  in  the  British  Navy  :^  add  to  this 
an  inflexible  system  of  universal  conscription,  and  we 
shall  be  able  to  picture  our  A^hans  from  Ireland  and 
Scotland  being  mobilised  in  company  with  their 
English-speaking  neighbours  and  marched  across  the 
Indian  frontier  to  slay  their  **  barbarous  ''  brethren  who 
had  sniped  an  English  grandee.* 

Whatever  the  German  and  the  Magyar  may  feel  about 
their  onslaught  upon  Serbia,  for  their  South-Slavonic 
fellow-dtizens  it  is  compulsory  civil  war. 

This  abominable  culmination  of  the  ^  Dual  System  '* 
is  the  Third  Act  in  the  South  Slavonic  drama,  but  the 
plot  has  broadened  out.  This  time  we  are  participating 
in  the  action  ourselves,  and  playing  for  life  and  deadi* 
If  we  and  our  allies  succeed  in  dominating  the  finakf 
in  what  guise  will  the  original  actors  emerge  from  their 
protracted  ordeal  i 

If  the  Dual  Monarchy  suffers  defeat  in  the  present 
struggle,  its  South-Slavonic  subjects  will  find  themselves 
for  the  first  time  at  liberty  to  consult  their  own  interests, 
instead  of  being  exploited  in  the  selfish  interest  of  other 
nationalities.    We  can  be  sure  beforehand  of  their 

*  Every  officer  in  the  Aastro-Htmgar&n  Navy  is  required  to  show 
profidency  in  the  Sooth-Slavomc  tongue^  because  the  crews  are  drawn 
ahnost  entirely  from  the  Croat  population  (tf  Dalmatia  and  Istxia, 
and  are  Mt  to  understand  nothing  but  their  native  language,  beyond 
the  bare  Italian  words  cf  comffland. 

*  To  make  our  comparison  exact,  we  must  imagine  that  the  Aijghan 
who  fired  the  dastardly  shot  proved  to  hail  from  Ireland. 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  an 

cfaoioe.  Dalmatian  Croatia,  and  Bosnia  will  break 
away  from  the  toils  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  form 
some  kind  of  union  with  Serbia  and  Montenegro*  The 
European  fraternity  will  be  enriched  by  a  new  national 
state* 

What  political  organisation  will  the  South-Slavonic 
nation  adopts  Will  the  provinces  mei^e  themselves 
into  a  centralised  kingdom,  like  the  states  of  the  Italian 
peninsula  half  a  century  ago,  or  will  they  preserve  their 
individuality  and  content  themselves  widi  federation, 
Kke  the  Swiss  cantons  or  the  U*S*A*  i 

The  Italian  precedent  might  siiggest  the  former 
alternative.  In  Italy  there  was  the  same  utter  lack 
of  a  common  historiod  backgrotmd,^  accentuated  in  this 
case  by  the  marvellous  evolution  of  local  politics  and 
culture,  yet  here  the  mirade  was  achieved*  Florence 
and  Venice  gladly  humbled  themselves  to  exalt  their 
common  country :  why  should  not  Agram  and  Uskub 
do  likewise  < 

If  the  Southern  Slavs  fall  short  of  their  Italian  fore- 
ronners,  we  shall  find  the  reason  in  two  differences  of 
circumstanoe. 

The  contrast  between  Sicily  and  Lombardy  in 
x86o  was  striking  enough,  yet  Italy  had  been  spared 
the  worst  degree  of  spiritual  disunion*  The  Turk 
has  never  set  his  mark  upon  half  her  territories*  The 
disparity  between  Milan  and  Palermo  was  as  nothing 
compared  to  the  gulf  between  Agram,  whidi  has  never 
submitted  to  the  Ottoman  conqueror,  and  Uskub, 
lA^A  ejected  him  hardly  more  than  two  years  ago* 

■  The  Roman  Emptre  was  the  first  and  last  political  organism  that 
had  united  all  Italy  before  2870^  and  the  Empire  was  not  a  specifically 
Iialtai  institution*  Like  the  Roman  Church  it  was  a  common  possession 
of  Wcslem  Europe,  and  its  tradition  persisted  more  strongly  in  Germany 
than  Sotttfi  of  tfie  Alps* 


asa  THE  BALKANS 

This  gulf  will  take  many  years  to  brieve,  and  here  again 
drcumstances  have  ptaod  the  Southern  Slavs  at  a 
disadvantage  :  they  have  been  compelled  to  begin  the 
work  of  construction  from  the  wroi^  end. 

In  Italy  the  initiative  came  from  the  most  advanced 
community  in  the  country.  Starting  horn  Piedmont  on 
the  borders  of  France  the  movement  proceeded  methodi- 
cally towards  the  East  and  South  :  Lombardy,  Emilia, 
and  Tuscany  were  consolidated  into  a  national  state 
before  Garibaldi  sailed  for  Sicily  with  his  Thousand. 

If  Piedmont  had  shared  tht  fate  of  Venetia  and 
Lombardy,  and  had  been  assigned  to  Austria  at  the 
settlement  of  1814,  the  course  of  events  would  have 
been  very  different.  By  i860  the  North  would  have 
been  consolidated  not  as  an  independent  kingdom  but 
as  a  complex  of  provinces  jumbled  together  in  the 
Hapsburg  collection.  Italian  Nationalism  would  have 
been  forced  to  abandon  Tuscany  and  Romagna,  and 
would  have  found  no  standing-ground  North  of  the 
Marches.  If  at  this  stage  the  Pope  had  identified  him- 
self with  the  Risorgimento,  and  had  incorporated  the 
South  in  his  dominions,  as  Serbia  incorporated  Mace- 
donia after  her  Balkan  victories,  he  might  have  preached 
a  crusade  against  Austria  and  liberated  all  the  Notth 
from  her  yoke  with  the  assistance  of  her  European  rivals, 
yet  when  the  oppressor  had  been  driven  beyond  the 
Alps,  his  highly-dvilised  victims  and  their  Papal 
clumpion  wotUd  have  been  left  in  an  embarrassing 
position.  The  Pope  would  have  become  the  hero  of 
the  North,  but  the  clerical  ideals  whidi  had  inspired  his 
victorious  armies  would  not  have  commended  them- 
selves to  Italians  the  other  side  of  the  Apetmincs. 
The  Northerners  released  from  Austrian  "  strong 
government  "  would  have  hesitated  to  accept  a  clerical 
parliamentarianism  in  its  place. 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  3x3 


This  fantastic  analogy  may  serve  to  indicate  the 
attitude  of  patriotic  Croats  towards  the  ''  Orthodox  *' 
nationalism  of  the  Morava-prindpality*  When  Serbia 
prostrated  the  Turkish  and  Bulgarian  armies  in  two 
successive  campaigns^  her  triumph  reacted  upon  the 
South-Slavonic  provinces  of  the  Dtial  Monarchy.  The 
Serbs  of  Hungary  and  Croatia  turned  their  eyes  in 
earnest  towards  Belgrade,  and  the  Croats  took  pride  in 
their  kinship  with  the  victors*  This  spiritual  exalta- 
tion brought  the  South-Slavonic  nation  to  setf-oon- 
sdousness,  but  we  mtist  guard  against  over-estimatixig 
its  effect.  The  spell  of  the  Hapsbtirg  is  broken,  and 
Croatia,  Dalmatia,  and  Bosnia  are  ready  to  transfer  their 
aUegianoe  to  the  Karageoi^evitch,  yet  they  will  not  do 
so  at  the  sacrifice  of  their  **  historiod  sentiment/' 

We  have  noted  the  strength  of  tradition  in  this  part 
of  Europe.  When  Croatia  and  Dalmatia  are  set  free, 
their  first  impulse  will  be  to  restore  the  **  Triune 
Kingdom  '^  ^  as  it  existed  in  the  eleventh  century  A  J>., 
and  they  will  insist  on  entering  the  South-Slavonic 
Union  on  this  basis.  The  national  state  will  thus  take 
shape  as  a  federation  of  at  least  two  members. 

in  Bosnia  the  Serb  element  predominates  over  the 
two  others,  and  Serbia  will  doubtless  incorporate  the 
whole  cotmtry.  The  Bosnian  problem  involved  her  in 
her  struggle  for  life  and  death,  and  the  possession  of 
the  province  is  the  stake  of  victory :  as  the  protagonist 
in  the  national  cause,  Serbia  is  worthy  of  her  reward. 

Whether  the  federation  will  contain  more  than  two 
members  depends  upon  the  choice  of  Montenegro. 
No  South-Slavonic  commtmity  cherishes  so  glorious  a 
tradition  as  she,  but  her  history  is  bound  up  with  the 
national  adversity.    She  remained  a  virgin  fortress  of 

*  Croatia-: 


314  THE  BALKANS 

liberty  when  all  her  brethren  had  succumbed  to  alien 
masters :  when  they  are  hve  once  more»  her  isolation 
will  have  lost  it  significance,  and  if  she  clings  to  her 
particuUhsm,  she  will  be  holding  her  friends  at  arm's> 
length  instead  of  her  foes.  She  will  be  cutting  herself 
off  from  the  social  and  economic  development  upon 
which  the  South-Slavonic  world  will  enter  as  soon  as 
the  "  preUminary  question "  of  nationality  has  been 
solved.  When  Bosnia  gravitates  towards  Belgrade,  the 
moment  will  have  come  for  Montenegro  likewise  to 
merge  herself  in  a  "  Greater  Serbia." 

The  South-Slavonic  Union,  then,  will  articulate 
itself  into  a  "  Triune  Kingdom  "  of  Croatia-Slavonia- 
Dalmatia  on  the  one  hand  and  a  "  Greater  Serbia  " 
on  the  other,  with  an  autonomous  Montenqpto  as  a 
possible  third  partner. 

Its  geographical  frontiers  ^  are  dettrmined  already 
by  the  boundaries  of  the  several  provinces.  On  the 
North-West  it  will  inherit  the  former  frontier  between 
Austria  and  the  "  Crown  of  St.  Stephen,"  on  the  Nortfa- 
East  it  will  be  divided  from  Htugary  by  the  line  of  the 
Drave  *  and  the  Danube,  on  the  South-West  it  will  take 
possession  of  the  Adriatic  coast-line  from  Spisca  to 
Fiume.' 

<  See  M^  IIL 

■  The  triangular  enclave  between  the  Drave,  the  Mur,  and  the 
Styiian  border  ta  inhabited  exclusively  by  Ctoats,  and  should  therefore 
b«  anigaed  to  Croatia  in  addition,  instead  of  being  tnchtdcd,  ai  at 
pKient,  in  the  kingdom  of  Hungary. 

'  The  coast  ihould  be  distributed  between  the  members  of  the 
Confedency.  At  present  it  a  entuely  mooopolBed  by  Dafanatia,  but 
the  "  Triune  Kingdom,"  as  the  price  of  its  particularBOi,  should  cede 
to  Serbia  and  Montenegro  such  parts  of  the  Dalmatian  littoral  as  lie 
Soutb-Bast  of  the  Narenta  estuary,  induding  Mctkovitch  and  Ragun, 
the  tennini  ot  the  Bosnian  Railway,  as  well  as  the  shores  of  Cattaro 
fiord,  which  is  the  natural  doorway  of  the  Montenepm  Highlands. 
The  "  Triune  Kingdom "  should  be  compensated  m  the  opposite 
quarter  by  the  addition  of  three  islands — Vc8lia,Chefao,and  Lessin— - 
31  present  included  in  dte  "  Kltstenland  "  province  of  Austria. 


i 


THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  215 

Its  constitution  can  only  vaguely  be  surmised*  The 
indiiridual  states  are  certain  to  retain  a  very  wide  sphere 
of  sovereignty  for  themselves :  what  powers  will  they 
ooflsent  to  delegate  to  the  Federal  Government  i 

Last  stunmer,  on  the  eve  of  the  war^  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  were  negotiating  a  military  and  customs 
union.  The  provisions  of  this  conventioa  will  obviously 
be  extended  to  the  wider  federation :  the  defensive 
organisation  of  the  South-Slavonic  Unit  will  be  central- 
ised under  the  presidency  of  King  Peter^  and  the 
common  military  frontier  will  coincide  with  a  common 
tari£F-wall*  This,  however,  is  a  minimum,  and  the 
federal  authorities  will  probably  obtain  control  over  the 
more  important  financial  and  econbmic  departments  of 
government  as  well*  The  administration  of  the  railways 
wQl  assuredly  pass  into  their  hands. 

At  the  same  moment  Serbia  was  concluding  a  conr 
cordat  with  the  Pope  regarding  the  status  of  the  Roman 
Qiurch  in  Serbian  territory*  This  agreement  will 
likewise  ezteodn  itself  to  the  whole  Union,  and  will 
suggest  an  essential  clause  in  the  federal  constitution* 

The  Federal  Government  must  proclaim  the  com- 
plete dvil  equality  of  the  three  creeds  current  among 
its  dtittns — ^Roman  Catholicism,  Orthodox  Christianity, 
and  Islam — and  it  must  guarantee  the  observance  of 
thb  principle  by  the  governments  of  the  individual 
states*  The  transformation  of  the  South-Slavonic  race 
into  a  self-governing  nationality  depends  on  religious 
toleration* 

The  new  regime  will  stand  or  fall  by  its  success  in 
conciliating  the  Moslems  in  Bosnia*  While  Serb  and 
Croat  will  rejoice  whole-heartedly  at  their  escape  from 
the  Magyar  yoke,  the  Bosniak  alone  will  regret  Austro- 
Hungarian  bureaucracy,  as  he  regretted  the  Ottoman 


\ 


ai6  THE  BALKANS 

anarchy  it  aapersedtd.    He  mil  regard  the  national  idea 

with  suspicion,  and  the  long-deferred  but  inevitable 
solution  of  the  agrarian  problem  will  seem  to  confirm 
his  fears,  by  aipgling  h'T"  out  from  the  Christian 
peasants  and  impoverishing  him  to  their  advantage. 
Yet  the  spread  of  education  will  break  down  even  the 
Bosniak's  sulleii  tradition.  As  the  consdousness  of  his 
Slavonic  language  grows  upon  him,  the  barrier  of  his 
oriental  religion  will  melt  away.  Nationalism  will 
ultimately  heal  the  breach  between  the  descendant  of  the 
Bogutnils  and  the  men  of  his  own  blood  from  whom  he 
has  been  alienated  for  eight  centuries  by  religion. 


C.  A  Balkan  ZoUverein 

The  secession  of  the  Southern  Slavs  will  dislocate  the 
structure  of  the  Danubian  Monardiy  more  seriously 
than  any  mutilations  on  its  Carpathian  border.  The 
Hungarian  member  of  the  Dual  Partnership  will  be  cut 
off  from  the  sea  by  an  independent  sute  of  its  own 
calibre,^  occupying  the  whole  region  between  the 
Morava-basin  and  the  Austrian  frontier.  The  Magyars 
will  find  the  tables  turned  upon  them.  They  will 
eiqxrience  henceforth  the  geographical  disabilities  they 
imposed  upon  Serbia  heretofore.  Deprived  of  a  coast- 
line of  their  own,  they  will  be  compelled  to  make  terms 
with  one  of  their  neighbours  to  secure  access  to  a  port. 

Satisfy  this  vital  need  they  must,  yet  they  vrill  still 

■  A  reduced    Hungary   will   itiU   number  nearly  twelve  milliaD 
inbabiiana :   a  South-Slavonic  Union  will         -      - 
nine,  viz.: 

Scibi  .         .         .       < 

Craata 

Moslemi  . 


Total 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVEREIN  217 

be  free  to  choose  between  two  alternative  means  of 
doing  so.  They  may  address  themselves  either  to 
Austria  or  to  the  South-Slavonic  Union^  and  the  issue 
will  probably  be  taken  up  by  the  two  political  parties 
yAddi  have  been  struggling  for  the  allegiance  of  the 
Magyar  nation. 

Tisza  and  his  following  will  press  for  closer  tmion 
^th  Austria*  They  will  take  advantage  of  the  national 
animus  against  the  Slavs,  which  will  have  been  em- 
bittered immeasurably  by  the  result  of  the  war,  and 
they  will  appeal  to  the  national  pride  never  to  acknow- 
ledge defeat.  '^  Fate/'  they  will  say,  **  has  robbed  us 
of  our  railway  to  Fiume,  and  of  the  harbour  to  which 
we  have  devoted  so  much  money  and  labour,  yet  Fiume 
is  only  sundered  by  the  Istrian  peninsula  from  the 
Austrian  harbour  of  Trieste,  and  the  one  port  is  hardly 
more  remote  from  the  AlfSld  than  the  other.  Through 
Laibacfa,  Marburg,  and  Steinamanger  Trieste  can  be 
brought  into  direct  railway  communication  with  Buda- 
pest. Why  humiliate  ourselves  by  begging  favours  of 
the  enemy,  when  we  can  fall  back  upon  the  loyalty  of 
our  Atistrian  partners,  who  have  passed  with  us  through 
the  terrible  ordeal  of  war  i  ^*  Thus  Tisza  will  argue 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  Dual  System. 

The  secession  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  however,  will 
upset  that  economic  balance  on  which  Dualism  depends. 
When  either  half  of  the  Monarchy  stretched  from  the 
Carpathians  to  the  sea,  Austria  controlled  Hungary's 
access  to  her  markets  in  Central  Europe,  and  Hungary 
in  like  measure  controlled  Austria's  access  to  her  source 
of  raw  material  in  the  South-East.  Each  was  in  a 
position  to  inflict  equal  economic  damage  upon  the 
other,  and  both  would  have  been  left  losers  by  fiscal 
warfare,  while  fiscal  co-operation  brot^t  them  mutual 


2x8  THE  BALKANS 

gain.  It  was  therefore  in  their  common  interest  to 
compromise  on  a  joint  tariiF,  which  gave  each  the 
monopoly  of  the  other^s  custom* 

Under  the  new  conditions,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
operation  of  the  Dual  System  would  place  Hungary  at 
Austria^s  mercy*  So  long  as  the  Southern  Slavs  on 
the  Austrian  border  were  under  the  Magyar  yoke, 
Austria  was  debarred  by  Magyar  policy  from  opening 
up  relations  with  them  :  once  they  are  independent,  she 
will  be  able  to  deal  with  them  as  principals,  and  the 
long-delayed  railway  connections  will  at  last  be  estab- 
lished between  Salzbui^  and  Vienna  on  the  one  hand, 
and  Agram  on  the  other. 

After  this,  Htmgary^s  co-operation  will  no  longer  be 
indispensable  to  Austria*  Austria  will  be  able  to  turn 
Htmgary's  flank  at  any  moment  by  puttii^  her  industry 
into  direct  communication  with  the  Balkan  area  in 
Hungary's  rear  along  this  new  land-route  South  of  the 
Drave.  Htmgary  will  be  **  side-tracked  ""  as  effectively 
by  the  completion  of  the  Croatian  railway  system  as 
Serbia  would  have  been  by  Baron  Aerenthal's  abortive 
railway  schemes  in  the  Sandjak. 

This  would  give  Austria  a  crushing  tactical  advantage 
in  the  decennial  readjustment  of  the  Joint  Tariff*  By 
threatening  to  abandon  the  existing  partnership,  and 
to  contract  a  new  one  with  the  Southern  Slavs  instead, 
she  could  force  the  Magyars  to  tmconditional  surrender. 
If  the  threat  were  carried  into  effect,  Hungary  would 
be  powerless  to  disturb  Austria^s  communications  with 
the  South-East,  while  the  Austrian  tariff-wall  would 
debar  her  from  her  sole  remaining  egress  to  the  sea. 
Austria^s  economic  life  would  be  tmaffected,  Htmgary^s 
would  be  completely  paralysed. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  equality  of  the  two 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVEREIN  2x9 

states  would  be  reduced  to  a  fiction^  and  the  Magyars 
would  discover  that  **  Dualism  '*  was  compatible  with 
a  thraldom  worse  than  that  from  which  they  escaped 
10x867. 

This  would  give  the  **  Party  of  Independence  '^  their 
opportunity. 

The  Magyar  ^*  Left ""  will  issue  from  the  war  stronger 
than  it  has  ever  been  before.  In  1906  the  **  Coalition  ** 
ruined  itself  over  Magyarisation,  but  the  European 
settlement  will  loose  this  millstone  from  the  Party^s 
neck.  When  the  majority  of  the  non'-M^;yar  popu- 
lation has  been  detached  from  Htmgary  altogether^ 
and  the  status  of  the  remnant  has  been  placed  under 
an  international  guarantee^  the  racial  problem  will  be 
expunged  from  practical  politics,  and  the  **  Left ""  will 
actually  be  able  to  make  party  capital  out  of  this  blessing 
in  disguise,  by  casting  the  whole  responsibility  for  it 
upon  their  opponents* 

'*  Tisza/'  they  will  say,  **  has  been  Hungary^s  evil 
genius.  He  involved  us  in  a  European  war ;  he  sent 
our  soldiers  to  their  death  in  Poland,  while  he  let  the 
Russians  invade  our  homes  across  the  tmguarded  line 
of  the  Carpathians ;  to  ransom  half  the  land  from  the 
tavagers  he  signed  away  the  other  half  to  the  diplomatists: 
now,  not  content  with  his  disastrous  war  and  his  still 
more  disastrous  peace,  he  has  handed  us  over  bound 
hand  and  foot  to  Austria,  in  order  to  enshrine  otu: 
disasters  in  a  permanent  settlement. 

'*  Let  us  look  facts  in  the  face.  Tisza  tells  us  to  hate 
the  Southern  Slavs  in  the  future,  because  we  have 
struggled  with  them  for  the  mastery  in  the  past.  That 
struggle  is  over :  thanks  to  Tisza's  own  policy,  it  has 
been  concluded  by  our  defeat.  Why  foster  our  hatred 
any  fenger,  when  the  conclusion  is  unalterable  f    He 


aao  THE  BALKANS 

bids  us  be  loyal  to  die  AustTuiis,«4io  at  this  very  moment 
afe  taking  advanta^  of  our  diffiailties  to  exploit  us 
in  cold  blood.  Why  sentimentalise  over  a  partnership 
solely  recommended  by  opportunism,  mbea  loyalty 
to  it  quendies  the  last  glimmer  of  hope  fisr  our  national 
future  1* 

"  Let  us  shake  o£F  our  paralysis,  and  help  ourselves. 
The  secession  of  the  Southern  Slavs  has  destroyed  tlie 
equilibrium  between  Austria  and  out  own  country, 
but  it  has  also  cast  the  South  Slavonic  Confederation 
as  an  independent  weight  into  the  balance.  The 
equilibrium  may  still  be  righted,  if  we  can  indine  this 
weight  to  our  side  of  the  scales.  Let  us  take  the 
initiative  out  of  Austria's  hands  by  denouncing  the 
'  Ausgleich '  ourselves,  and  fisrestall  her  by  securing 
the  partnership  of  the  Southern  Slavs  for  Hungary." 

liiis  hypothetical  disputation  between  two  political 
parties  stands  in  effect  for  the  contest  between  national 
fanaticism  on  the  one  hand  and  eocmomic  necessity 
on  the  other.  Let  us  assume  that  a  short  experience  al 
"  Dualism "  under  the  new  conditions  converts  the 
Magyar  nation  *  to  the  "  Independence  "  point  of  view, 

*  Tbe  Skrvaki  art  the  only  important  element  in  Hungary  that  b 
likely  to  ding  to  the  Austrian  connection.  Theit  country  is  boked  by 
nature  with  Ptewny,  Buda-Pcst,  and  the  Alffild  :  their  dialect  is 
identical  with  that  of  the  Tchechs  ta  Austria.  Get^n^iby  and  nation- 
ality thus  draw  them  in  oppoaitc  diiectioni,  and  their  one  hope  of 
reconciling  the  two  factors  lies  in  some  form  of  nattooal  devolution 
within  an  unbroken  "  Danubian  Unit"  If  Austria  and  Hungary  pan, 
the  Slovaki  must  lacrifioe  one  factor  or  die  other.  The  Tcbcois  will 
urge  them  to  vindicate  their  nationality  by  ttf^fding  frocB  Hungary 
to  Austria.  Ths  would  benefit  the  Tchcchs  thcmsetvcs  by  ranr^ftrug 
their  numerical  inferiority  to  the  Austrian  Gcnnani  and  giving  them  dte 
proipect  of  a  majority  in  the  Reichtrath  at  Viemia,  but  it  a  doubtful 
trbeuier  the  Slovaks  would  be  influenced  by  this  considefiitioa.  Tlieir 
tnitherbood  with  the  Tchcdn  extends  to  lai^uage  alone  :  thnr  have 
never  shared  a  common  tradition,  and  there  are  few  indicatam  at 
present  of  a  common  national  consdousnes.  The  Slovaks  will 
probably  defer  to  geography,  and  work  out  a  natioeal  1^  of  their 


I 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVEREIN  aai 

and  suppose  that  the  **  Left ""  supersedes  Tis:^  in  office 
to  carry  out  its  rival  programme :  what  response  will 
its  overtures  receive  from  the  Southern  Slavs  i 

The  Southern  Slavs  will  be  torn  between  the  same 
two  motives  as  the  Ms^ars  themselves.  Their 
national  hatred  of  their  neighbours  is  at  least  as  strong 
as  their  neighbours'  hatred  of  them:  with  distant 
Vienna  they  have  always  been  on  friendly  terms*  When 
they  find  themselves  in  the  proud  position  of  being 
wooed  by  Austria  and  Hungary  in  competition,  prejudice 
will  certainly  incline  them  to  favour  the  Austrian  suit« 
Their  economic  interest,  on  the  other  hand,  will  really 
be  identical  with  the  interest  of  Htmgary. 

At  the  first  glance  their  new  economic  position  might 
appear  invulnerable :  the  territorial  resetdement  that 
ciduded  Htmgary  from  the  sea  will  have  assigned  to 
the  Southern  Slavs  an  extensive  Adriatic  seaboard,  and 
the  possession  of  open  ports  is  a  guarantee  of  economic 
independence.  Yet  so  long  as  the  new  G)nfederation 
stands  alone,  the  settlement  will  not  essentially  have 
improved  the  nation^s  continental  situation. 

Before  the  war  Serbia  was  isolated  from  Central 
and  Western  Europe  by  the  whole  btdk  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy :  after  the  setdement,  the  Austrian  half  of 
it  will  still  present  a  narrower  but  no  less  impenetrable 
barrier  to  the  tmited  South-Slavonic  nation,  and  the 
game  will  be  in  Austria's  hands  more  completely  than 
ever.  She  may  start  by  playing  off  the  Confederation 
against  Htmgary,  but  she  will  be  free  to  reverse  her 

own  witfam  a  regenerated  Huflgarian  state.  Prophecy^  however,  h 
ioipcMnble.  The  relation  of  the  Croats  to  the  Serbs  remained  precisely 
imUd  till  as  recently  as  xgxa,  and  with  this  precedent  before  our  eyes 
we  can  oi^  say  that  if  the  Slovaks  are  inspired  to  identify  themselves 
with  the  Tchech  nationality,  they  must  be  granted  pet&ct  liberty  to 
cny  their  cfaoioe  into  effect. 


N 


aaa  THE  BALKANS 

tactics  vbeaxvetaht  pleases,  and  play  o£F  Hungary 
against  the  Confederation.  The  Southern  Slavs  will 
discover,  like  the  Magyais,  that  Austria  is  mistress  of 
ihe  initiative,  so  long  as  they  attempt  to  cope  with  her 
^ngle-handed.  By  the  time  the  Hungarian  Indepen- 
dence Party  makes  its  overtures,  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment will  be  ready  to  welcome  xixm.  Ezperienoe  will 
have  prepared  both  nations  simultaneously  to  compose 
their  feud  and  adopt  the  alternative  policy  of  co- 
operation. 

If  the  negotiations  are  crowned  with  success,  the 
geographical  structure  of  the  "  Danubian  Unit " 
will  have  proved  itself  a  stronger  force  than  national 
chauvinism.  The  political  edifice  of  "  Dualism  "  will 
have  collapsed  under  the  tempest,  yet  the  Transleithania 
which  perished  with  the  break^  of  "  St.  Stephen's 
Crown  "  will  have  reasserted  its  economic  function  in 
a  Zollverein  between  two  independent  national  states. 

The  new  Zollverein  will  prove  in  turn  that  the  national 
and  the  economic  principles  of  articulation  are  not 
fundamentally  incompatible.  A  reconciliation  on  this 
basis  between  the  Magyais  and  the  Southern  Slavs 
will  win  for  both  parties  what  they  really  want.  The 
Southern  Slavs  will  enjoy  national  unity,  the  Magyars 
economic  freedom.  The  port  of  Fiume  will  become  the 
common  property  of  the  two  states,  and  the  railway  that 
links  it  with  the  AlfSld  through  Agram  will  be  ad- 
ministered oonjoindy  in  the  interests  of  both. 

The  South-Slavonic  Question  has  been  the  most 
difficult  problem  in  the  Balkans.  If  we  have  fotmd  its 
solution,  can  we  not  apply  our  discovery  to  solve  the 
rest  i  The  "  Transleithanian  ZoUvetein  "  will  already 
cover  a  wider  area  towards  the  South-East  than  was 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVEREIN 

in  the  frontiers  of  Hapsbtu^  **  Trans- 
cannot  its  limits  be  extended  still  further 
direction^ 

idships  as  well  as  the  enmities  of  Serbia  will 

by  the  South-Slavonic  Federation,  and 

^ooxid  Balkan  War  Serbia  has  maintained  a 

iding  yrith  Roumania  and  Greece*    This 

been  inspired  in  part  by  the  fear  of 

reprisals,  but  chiefly  by  the  discovery  of 

lomic  interests  of  an  endurix^  character. 

means  of  providing  for  these  interests  could 

jthan  the  incorporation  of  Serbians  two  friends 

Iverein. 

itely  after  the  settlement  at  Bukarest  in 
of  1913,  Roumania  began  to  negotiate  with 
the  construction  of  a  railway-bridge  across 
tbe  at  Tumu  Severing  whidi  was  to  link 
ly  systems  of  the  two  countries.  Roumania 
a  coast-line  of  her  own  on  the  Black  Sea,  but 
this  door  is  condemned  to  make  the 
passage  of  the  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles, 
at  any  moment  be  brought  to  a  complete 
by  the  caprice  of  the  Ottoman  Government, 
convention  with  Serbia  was  Rotunania's 
towards  an  open  port  on  the  Adriatic,  and 
It  struggle  between  Serbia  and  the  Dual 
ly  Roumanian  as  well  as  South-Slavonic  interests 
If  Bosnia  becomes  Serbian  soil  and  the 
Serbian  railhead  at  Ujitze  is  connected  through 
system  with  a  port  on  the  Adriatic,  the  new 
serve  not  only  the  basin  of  the  Morava,  but 
Wallachian  plain  beyond  the  bridge  at  Tumu 


SccMa«>IIL 


aa4  THB  BALKANS 

The  freedom  of  this  eoooonuc  higfaw;^  will  be  s 
important  to  Roumania  as  tbe  freedom  of  du  Fiome 
Railway  is  to  Hungary,  and  it  will  be  open  to  her  to 
secure  it  by  the  same  method.  Rouraania  mtl  almost 
certainly  ^iply  for  membership  in  the  "  Transleithaniaii 
Zotivemn,"  and  the  two  origmal  members  will  consuk 
their  beat  interests  by  grantii^;  her  request.  Roumama 
will  win  her  outlet  on  the  Adriatic  :  Hungary  and  die 
Southern  Slavs  will  gain  in  return  free  passage  over  die 
Roumanian  railways  to  the  port  of  Costanza  <»  the 
Black  Sea.' 

(ii.)  By  another  railway  convention  the  Bukaiest 
settlement  linked  Serbia  to  Greece. 

Befrice  the  Balkan  Wars,  Greece  was  practicaUy  in 
the  position  of  an  island :  for  communication  with  coa- 
tinental  Europe  she  was  as  dependent  upon  the  sea  as 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland.  By  1908  she  had  constructBd 
a  railway  of  standard  European  gai^e  from  Athens  as 
br  Nordi  as  Larissa,  and  before  1913  she  had  extended 
it  throu^  the  pass  of  Tea^>e  to  the  point  liriiere  dv 
Gncco-Turkish  frontier  struck  the  coast  of  the  JBgean. 
The  undertaking  had  involved  great  engiaeering 
difficulties  and  a  proportionate  expense,  yet  just  vhea 
the  arduous  part  of  the  task  had  been  accomplished,  and 
no  physical  barrier  remained  between  the  Gieek  railhead 
and  the  terminus  of  the  European  system  at  Salomfca, 
die  Ottoman  Govenmient  cheated  the  Greek  nation  d 
its  object  by  refusing  to  allow  die  ptolongaticm  of  the  . 
line  throi^  Turkish  territory. 


tttatia  i8;6>  1871,  167^  iS^ — the  riwr  wat  ihrown  open  to  fm 
ninCiCioo  &aQi  tis  nmiai  k  ttr  ttpwanli  tM  the  "  Iran  GfttBA."  Sc^ 
gaiaa  cnft,  bomtvtt,  canoot  mxad  above  BtaHn,  and  the  gnatmt  fie 
o[  Qiit  internatioiul  section  ii  only  availabk  for  barges  and  mc 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVEREIN  aas 

In  X9Z2-*i3  this  obstacle  was  removed  by  force*  The 
Titaty  of  Bttkarest  left  Greece  in  possession  of  Salonika 
tiaeif ,  and  the  construction  of  the  last  link  in  the  railway 
from  Athens  was  immediately  taken  in  hand«^  With 
its  eomidetion,  the  orientation  of  Greece  will  be  chat^^« 
Heretofore  the  traffic  between  Greece  and  Europe  has 
oamcd  at  Patras  on  the  G)rinthian  Gulf,  the  terminus 
of  steamship  routes  to  Brindisi  and  Trieste :  hereafter 
the  primacy  will  pass  from  steamer  to  railway,  and 
Rattvas  yield  precedence  to  Sabnika* 

The  connection  of  Athens  and  Salonika,  however,  is 
of  litde  use  in  itself,  unless  Greece  can  secure  free 
passage  for  her  commerce  along  the  route  kadii^  from 
•  Sfllnnflra  to  Central  and  Western  Europe.  This  neces- 
:i  sky  has  given  Greece  an  economic  interest  identical 
^  nith  that  of  her  new  Serbian  neighbour. 
i^  While  Sakmika  and  the  seaboard  of  Macedonia  was 
ff  assigned  to  Greece,  the  whole  hinterland  was  incor- 
^  porated  in  Serbia,  and  from  the  frontier-station  of 
^\  Yetyeli*  Northwards  the  trunk-line  up  the  Vardar 
1^  valley  to  Uskub  and  down  the  Morava  valley  to  Bel- 
^  gItaAt  now  runs  exclusively  through  Serbian  territory. 
^4  Beyood  Belgrade  the  Dual  Monarchy  shut  out  Greece 
^i  and  Serbia  alike  from  Central  Europe,  just  as  it  barred 
^  Roomania  and  Serbia  alike  from  the  Adriatic  beyond 
j^  the  laflfaead  at  Ujitaoe. 
^       Greece   therefore    had    as    strong  an    interest  as 

*  See  lifap  IV.    The  Mctjon  under  oonstnictioii  k  about  acve&ty 

nuks  long.    Starting  from  the  old  railhead  beyond  Tempe,  it  iktrfi 

^   the  Saltan  fhore  in  a  Northerly  ditcction,  below  the  Eastern  apim  of 

Je^  linnt  Olym^u*,  bridges  the  River  Vistritsa  C  Haliacmnn  %  and 

*zl  cSmcs  a  junction  tnunraately  beyond  it  with  the  old  line  oonnecttng 

9^,    Sakmiha  and  Monastir.    Fiom  this  jimctjon  die  Athens  Railway  will 

See  Map  IV. 


^  wwr  aooas  the  ffailoniian  "  Campagna. 


3a6  THE  BALKANS 

Roumania  in  seeking  economic  partnership  with  the 
South-Slavonic  state,  and  she  negotiated  a  railway 
agreement  on  very  similar  lines.  She  gave  Serbia  free 
access  to  the  JEgtaa,  and  received  in  return  the  freedom 
of  the  continental  route  as  far  as  the  Austro-Hungarian 
frontier.  Like  Roumania,  she  speculated  on  the 
eventual  removal  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  barrier : 
in  the  present  stru^e  the  Southern  Slavs  are  fi^^iting 
the  Greeks'  battle  as  well  as  their  own,  and  any  policy 
that  enables  them  to  succeed  in  their  endeavour  must 
oommend  itself  equally  to  Greece.  If  the  South- 
Slavonic  federation  can  only  oope  with  Austria  by 
joining  Hui^ary  in  a  Zollverein,  then  it  is  the  interest 
of  Greece  to  enter  the  Zollverein  too.  Her  application 
will  not  be  refused,  for  she  has  as  much  to  give  as  to 
receive.  The  admission  of  Roumania  will  extend  the 
Zollverein  to  the  Black  Sea :  the  admission  of  Greece 
will  realise  the  "  Trend  Eastward "  by  bringing  it 
down  to  the  JEgtaa. 

This  twofold  increase  in  its  membership  will  have 
eiq>anded  the  Zollverein  from  its  Transleithaman 
nucleus  to  the  opposite  limits  of  the  Balkans.  Four 
national  imiis  will  ab^ady  be  included  within  its 
boundary :  will  it  succeed  in  federating  the  two  that 
remain  i  U  Albania  and  Bulgaria  can  be  induced  to 
enter  the  fold,  the  Zollverein  will  become  co-extensive 
with  the  whole  Balkan  area. 

(iii.)  Albania  will  not  find  it  easy  to  stand  out  c£  a 
combination  to  which  both  Greece  and  the  South- 
Slavonic  Federation  beloi^.  Tlie  country  consists  of  a 
strip  of  coast  fronting  the  heel  of  Italy  across  the  narrowest 
part  of  the  Adriatic  and  backed  by  a  sone  of  barren 
mountains,  through  which  several  passages  lead  East- 
ward into  Macedonia  and  descend  eventually  to  the 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVBRBIN  337 

Nortfaern  littoral  of  the  JBgtBn.  This  hinterland  is 
enctrckd  by  Greek  and  South  Slavonic  territory  on  all 
sides. 

Albania  has  no  history*  The  principality  was  created 
fay  the  fiat  of  the  Pbwers ;  its  limits  were  laid  down 
by  the  conference  of  ambassadors  that  supervised  the 
making  of  the  Treaty  of  London ;  its  frontiers  were 
drawn  out  in  detail  by  an  international  boundary- 
Qommission.  It  was  called  into  existence  not  because 
it  had  the  will  to  exist  as  a  national  state^  but  simply 
as  an  alternative  to  a  vacuum  that  would  inevitably  have 
been  filled  by  the  encroachment  of  the  Greek  and 
Serbian  frontiers*  Its  function  is  to  ^'  hold  the  ring/* 
wfaSe  the  xiative  population  develops  from  a  biarbarous 
aggregate  of  dans  into  a  civilised  nationality* 

Meanwhile^  Albania  has  started  life  destitute.  Her 
population  is  uneducated  and  her  material  wealth 
tueiploited.  Her  only  immediately  available  asset 
is  her  geographical  position.  She  is  mistress  of  two 
ports  wiiich  have  recently  won  notoriety  in  Burope. 

The  direct  transit  from  Brindisi  ^  leads  to  the  Southern 
extremity  of  the  Albanian  coast.  Here  lies  the  moun- 
tatn-lodoed  basin  of  Avlona,  which  disputes  with  Spezsia 
Bay  the  daim  to  be  the  finest  harbour  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, but  suffers  more  than  Spessda  from  the  high 
mountains  that  hem  it  in  on  the  landward  side.  In 
^te  of  the  limestone  barriers,  Avlona  is  likely  to 
become  the  termintis  of  a  narrow-gauge  railway,* 
wfaidi  will  work  its  way  up  the  valleys  of  the  Viosa 
and  Dhrynos  to  Greek  Yannina,  and  thence  descend  to 
Arta  and  Agrinion,  whence  a  line  of  narrow  gaug^  runs 
already  to  a  point  opposite  Patras  on  the  North  coast  of 

Tlie  cfOBuiff  occupMS  most  of  the  niglic  in  an  onltiiafy  inafl 


aa8  THE  BALKANS 

the  Connthian  Gulf.  This  route  will  probably  coinpefr 
with  the  Salonika  Railway  for  die  ei^Mreaft-ttaffic 
between  Paris  and  Athens* 

Duraao,  the  other  port,  lies  half-way  up  the  Albanian 
ooast-line;  The  transit  from  Italy  is  aooordingly 
longer,  and  the  harbour  itself  is  wretched  beyond 
description.  The  town  lies  huddled  under  the  Southern 
lee  of  a  group  of  sand-dunes,  which  are  linked  to  the 
mainland  by  a  malarial  waste  of  marshes  and  lagoons. 
The  deposit  of  the  swamp  has  silted  up  the  sea  &r  out 
beyond  the  actual  shore-line,  and  die  smallest  steamer 
cannot  approach  within  half  a  mile  of  the  jetty •  Durazvo 
has  nothing  to  recommend  it  except  its  oommunicatioos 
with  the  interior,  which  are  as  excellent  as  those  of 
Avlona  are  poor. 

Since  the  Roman  period  Duraao  has  been  the 
terminus  of  a  route  ^  which  ascends  die  valley  of  the 
Skumbi  to  Elbassan,  penetrates  by  a  pass  to  the  valley 
of  the  Black  Drin,  crosses  die  stream  at  Struga,  what 
it  issues  from  the  Lake  of  Ohrida,  and  then,  after 
skirting  the  lake  shore  and  passing  through  (Mirida 
itself,  breasts  a  second  mountain  range  and  descends 
at  last  into  the  basin  of  Monastir. 

To  compensate  Serbia  for  the  renunciation  of  terri- 
torial sovereignty  over  Duraao,  the  Powers  bestowed 
on  her  the  freedom  of  the  port,  and  gave  her  the  ri^ 
to  construct  a  railway  through  Albanian  territory 
in  order  to  connect  this  outlet  with  her  own  railwaj 
system*  The  route  we  have  described  will  probably 
be  diosen  for  the  final  section  of  the  new  Serbian  line. 
From  Mbnastir  a  railway  already  leads  South-Eastward 
through  Greek  territory  to  Salonika :  it  will  only  be 

*  Set  Hap  IV.  The  Rofnam  tmpiovtd  the  tack  mto  a  neCafled 
road,  tbcir  ^  via  Bgnatu.'* 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVERBIN  aag 

necettary  to  construct  anotiier  section  Northwards  from 
Moosstir  to  Uskxib,^  and  the  whole  of  Macedonia  wiU 
have  been  broug^  into  direct  commtinicatton  with  the 
Adriatic  seaboard* 

Albania  thtis  possesses  two  commercial  highways  of 
pcKential  value  to  her  Greek  and  South  Slavonic  neig^- 
bottfSy  and  her  future  prosperity  depends  upon  die 
development  of  traffic  aloi^  diem*  It  is  therefore  of 
vol  tmportanoe  for  her  to  obtain  entrance  into  the 
Balkan  Zollverein*  If  she  remains  otrtside  it,  Greece 
and  the  South  Slavonic  Federation  will  dispense  widi 
her  ports,  and  open  up  equivalent  routes  to  the  Adriatic 
within  their  own  frontiers*  The  iron  tarifif-wall  of  the 
Zottverein  will  ring  Albania  round  on  the  landward 
side,  and  since  there  is  no  local  traffic  in  die  principality 
itself,  Aviona  and  Dttrasczo  will  never  be  awakened  by 
the  sdr  of  commerce*  If  she  decides  upon  isolation, 
Albania  will  be  condemning  herself  to  death :  if  die 
joins  hands  with  her  neighbours,  she  will  be  laying  the 
faundadon  of  that  economic  progress  whidi  is  her  first 
necessity* 

incofporation  in  the  ZoUverein  will  also  solve  several 
pfoUems  raised  by  the  delimitation  of  the  Albanian 
fponCier* 

(a)  Towards  die  North-Bast,  die  diplomatists  as- 
s^poed  the  yAiait  **  Metoya  **  district  to  Serbia  and 
Montenegro*' 

The  award  did  justice  to  die  principle  of  nationality, 
for  die  South-Slavonic  element  in  the  local  population 
sdll  preponderates  over  the  Albanian  intruders  licenced 
fior  years  to  exterminate  it  by  the  Turkish  Government* 


'Swll^iIV* 

•SKMapIV:  tfie  dtstrict  couidd« with  te  b«fai  of  tfie  WWie 


L       " 


390  THE  BALKANS 

On  tbe  other  h2iid,  it  inflicted  considetable  hard- 
ship upon  the  dans  inhabiting  the  mountainous 
country  immediately  West  of  the  Metoya,  iriio  had 
been  accustomed  to  deal  with  the  outer  world  through 
Ipek,  Jakyva,  and  Prisren,  the  thiee  towns  of  the  plain, 
and  now  found  themselves  barred  out  from  their  only 
available  market-places  by  the  new  Serbian  frontier. 
The  Zollverein  wilt  eliminate  the  new  injustice  widwut 
restoring  the  old.  The  Serbo-Albanian  frontier  will 
remain  where  the  commissioners  drew  it,  but  since  it 
will  no  loiter  constitute  a  customs-barrier  the  clansmen 
from  the  Albanian  side  will  once  more  be  able  to  visit 
the  towns  in  the  Serbian  plainland  as  freely  as  ^riien 
plain  and  moimtain  were  yoked  together  politically  by 
Ottoman  misrule. 

(6)  The  mountains  of  Northern  Albania  verge  on 
their  other  flank  towards  the  Lake  of  Skodra/  and  half 
the  clans  descend  to  market  at  Skodra  town,  which  lies 
at  die  lake's  South-Eaatem  extremity.  Geography  has 
destined  Skodra  to  be  a  focus  of  traffic,  llie  late 
discharges  itself  past  her  walls  into  the  channel  of  the 
Boyana  River,*  and  for  the  small  steamers  that  ply  upon 
the  lake  ^  Boyana  is  navigable  from  this  point  to  the 
sea.  The  sea-going  steamers  employed  in  the  coastal 
trade  find  good  ports  of  call  at  Duldgno,  a  few  miks 
North  of  the  Boyaoa's  mouth,  and  at  San  Giovanni  di 
Medua,  a  few  miles  South  of  it.  Both  these  barbotus 
(if  they  may  be  dignified  by  the  name)  are  connected 
with  Skodra  across  level  country  by  good  high-roads. 

If  all  die  shores  of  the  lake  were  Albanian,  no  problem 
vnMild    arise,    but    unfortunately    its    North-Westcm 

■  A  bfaacfa  thrown  off  by  the  muted  lueam  of  the  White  and  Bbck 
Dno,  after  tt  has  wound  it!  way  thn»»h  the  Albaniia  nututtaiiiii,  ud 
-     'leiea.    SceBbpEV. 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVBRBIN  931 

extftmity  passes  beyond  the  Albanian  frontier,  and 
penetrates  deep  into  die  mountain-mass  of  Montenegro* 
PbysicaUy,  Montenegro  and  Northern  Albania  con- 
stitute a  single  region,  of  which  Skodra  is  the  natural 
cqutal :  historically,  this  homogeneous  hinterland  has 
been  partitioned  between  two  hostile  races,  which 
can  never  merge  themselves  into  one  political  organism* 
An  open  door  at  Skodra  is  equally  vital  to  Albania  and 
to  Montenegro,  yet  the  town  cannot  be  included  in  the 
political  frontiers  of  both  at  once. 

The  rightful  ownership  of  Skodra  is  not  in  doubt* 
The  Southern  Slavs  extend  to  the  head  of  the  lake,  but 
an  Albanian  population  dwells  along  its  lower  shores, 
and  Skodra  itself,  at  its  opposite  extremity,  is  a  purely 
Albanian  dty*  The  struggle  for  Skodra  is  the  history 
of  Montenegrin  encroachment  upon  alien  territory* 

The  Sfontenegrins  have  been  forced  in  this  direc- 
tkm  through  the  fatilt  of  Austria-Hungary,  which  has 
debarred  them  from  their  lawful  outlet  to  the  South- 
Slavonic  coast*  Had  the  Montenegrins  been  at  liberty 
to  reach  the  sea  through  Cattaro  fjord,  by  incorporating 
the  kindred  villages  that  fringe  the  waterside,  they 
would  never  have  tried  to  reach  it  throtigh  Skodra  by 
subjugating  an  Albanian  population  almost  as  numerous 
as  their  own* 

In  1878  the  Gmgress  of  Berlin  assigned  to 
the  harbour  of  Antivari,  beyond  the 
ity  of  the  Austrian  littoral*  Antivari  is  not  a 
convenient  port  for  the  Black  Mountain*  A  hig^  range 
of  hills  blocks  the  way  thither  from  the  head  of  Skodra 
Lake,  yet  the  Montenegrins  have  striven  with  success  to 
overcome  this  physical  disadvantage  by  the  construction 
of  a  motmtain-railway  across  the  barrier*^    Austria- 

^  It  stam  from  Virpaaor,  on  the  lake-slioft. 


k  jr*i«if  ««(U^*j 


^  41  I  ^ I  iT, 


a3a  THE  BALKANS 

t^ingary,  however,  grudged  her  South-^avonic  ad^- 
bour  even  this  haxd-wcm  economic  liberty.  By  a 
ooiollary  to  the  Berlin  Treaty  she  secured  for  beiidf 
powers  of  control  ^  over  the  trafi&c  of  the  new  Montene- 
grin port,  and  to  win  an  nntrammeled  outlet  Montenegio 
was  forced  to  go  still  further  afield.  After  the  Berlin 
settlement  had  produced  a  revulsion  of  feeling  in  Great 
Britaint  Gladstone  succeeded  Disraeli  in  office  to  undo 
as  far  as  possible  what  Disraeli  had  done,  and  one  of 
his  first  acts  '  was  to  extort  the  transference  of  Duldgno 
from  Turkey  to  Montenegro. 

C^adstone's  gift  was  more  beneficent  in  its  intentton 
than  in  its  result.  The  only  practicable  route  between 
the  Montenegrin  hinterland  and  Duldgno  lies  throi^h 
Skodra.  So  loi^,  therefore,  as  Skodra  remained  in 
other  hands,  Dulc^no  was  of  no  economic  value  to  its 
new  masters,  while  Skodra  was  deprived  of  its  natural 
port.  In  191J  the  Balkan  War  gave  Montenegro  die 
opportunity  to  annex  Slasdra  as  well,  but  mbea  the 
fortress  capitulated  the  Powers  rightly  intervened,  aaid 
the  inclusion  of  Srodra  in  the  new  Albanian  principality 
put  an  end  for  ever  w  Monten^^  hopes. 

Skodra  and  Duldgno  can  now  never  be  reunited  tinder 
Monten^rin  sovereignty:  the  logical  alternative  is 
their  reunion  within  Albania.  Baulked  of  Skodca, 
Montenegro  will  lose  nothing  by  the  retxocessiao  of 
Skodra's  port,  and  her  whole  title  to  Duldgno  wdl  £ill 
to  the  ground  as  soon  as  Cattaio  ^ord  and  the  Austrian 
Uttoral  on  either  side  of  it  have  passed  into  her  posaesBton. 
Vet  no  amount  of  compensation  on  the  opposite  flmk 
mil  induce  Montenegro  to  yield  territory  to  Attica 
witiiout  some  equivalent  return  on  Albama's  part. 


'^ 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVEREIN  933 

The  present  territorial  arrangement  renders  Duldgno 
eoooomically  useless  to  both  states :  Montenegro  will 
not  barter  away  her  political  rights  exotpt  on  terms 
vhidi  restore  Duldgno^s  economic  utility  not  only  for 
Albania  but  for  herself,  and  it  is  easy  to  see  how  the 
bargain  must  run*  If  Montenegro  on  her  side  is  to 
leaotmce  all  claims  to  territorial  sovereignty  over 
Dulctgno  as  well  as  Skodra,  Albania  on  hers  must 
grant  Montenegro  complete  freedom  of  traffic  through 
Skodra  as  well  as  Duldgno* 

By  joining  the  Balkan  ZoUverein  Albania  vnll  fulfil 
her  part  of  this  compact.  Economic  co-operation  with 
her  neigfabours  will  thus  win  for  her  a  most  desirable 
extension  of  her  territorial  soverdgnty,  and  wiU  heal 
her  long  feud  with  Montenegro  by  recondling  here  also 
die  daims  of  nationality  and  economics. 

(c)  Beyond  Avlona,  the  Powers  assigned  to  Albania 
die  country  known  as  Epirus.^ 

Their  decision  set  Geography  at  defiance*  With 
Avlotia  Epirus  possesses  hardly  a  single  link :  with  the 
Greek  territory  towards  the  South  and  East  her  com- 
munications are  well  established*  In  this  instance  maps 
are  misleading*  The  rivers  of  Epirus  certainly  debouch 
upon,  the  Albanian  coast,  but  they  force  their  way 
dnrmgh  gorges  where  no  road  can  follow*  To  travel 
from  Koritza  to  Etux>pe  you  do  not  descend  the  valley 
of  die  Devol  to  the  Adriatic  but  cross  the  watershed  into 
Macedonia  and  board  at  Fbrina  the  train  to  Salonika* 
If  you  follow  the  road  inland  from  Santi  Quaranta,  the 
only  port  of  call  on  the  Epirot  coast,  it  does  not  lead  you 
Northwards  to  Berat,  but  South-Eastwards  to  Yannina, 
die  prindpal  town  of  North-Westem  Greece*    From 

^SeellapIV*  llieiiaiiieliMbMOQiiMdtooovcrtfieihicedJMnofii 
of  ffiiiriifTij  Aigyfokaitio^  md  Koritxi* 


^4  'THE  BALKANS 

the  ge(^taphical  point  of  view,  Epinis  and  Gttece  are 
inseparable. 

liu  Powers  took  their  stand  upon  nationality. 
"  The  country,"  they  argued,  "  may  be  Greek,  but  the 
people  are  Albanian.    They  speak  an  Albanian  dialect." 

This  ai^ument  betrays  a  misconception  of  vrbat 
nationahty  means.  Nationality  is  not  an  objective 
attribute  but  a  state  of  consciousness  which  depends  for 
its  stimulus  upon  a  certain  degree  of  civilisation.  We 
have  seen  that  among  the  majority  of  the  population 
included  within  the  prindpahty's  frontiers  it  is  con- 
spicuously absent :  they  have  no  group  consciousness 
beyond  the  clan.  The  Epirots  alone  are  civilised  enot^ 
to  possess  it,  and  their  civilisation  and  nationality  are 
both  drawn  from  the  same  external  source. 

The  s^nificant  fact  about  the  Epirot  is  not  that  he 
speaks  Albanian  at  home,  but  that  he  learns  Greek  at 
school,*  and  finds  in  his  adopted  langu^e  a  passport 
to  a  wider  life.  The  Epirots  are  the  only  Albanians 
who  can  boast  a  history,  and  their  history  consists  in 
the  casting  off  of  Albanian  barbarism  and  the  putting 
on  of  European  culture  in  its  Greek  form.  After  the 
Turkish  conquest  the  majority  of  the  Albanians  were 
converted  to  Islam :  the  Epirots  alone  followed  the 
example  of  their  Greek  neighbours,  and  remained  loyal 
to  the  Orthodox  Church.  In  the  eighteenth  century 
the  Orthodox  ecclesiastical  tradition  developed  into  a 
national  Greek  renaissance  :  the  Epirots  were  fired  by 
the  new  movement,  and  welcomed  the  Greek  sdiool 
^t  grew  up  beside  the  Greek  church.  They  looked 
forward   as   eagerly  as  the   Greek  of  Macedonia  or 

'  The  village  schools  in  Epirus  hne  monl^  been  endowed  bf  natives 
who  nude  their  fortunes  in  Greek  commefcul  centns  like  Sn^ma  and 
Alnandiia. 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVBRBIN  235 

Ifitylitii  to  the  day  when  nationality  should  find 
Gtpttsskm  in  political  liberation  and  unification.  When 
Yanmna  fell  in  the  spring  of  1913,  the  day  seemed  to 
have  dawned.  The  Pbwers  thrust  them  into  the  outer 
darkness  of  the  Albanian  principality  just  when  they 
were  on  the  threshold  of  the  promised  land. 

The  Bpirots  have  not  submitted  tamely  to  the  ruin  of 
their  hopes.  The  Powers  could  prevent  their  annexa- 
tion to  Greece^  but  they  could  not  compel  their  adhesion 
to  Albania.  In*  the  summer  of  19x3  they  raised  a 
national  militia,  and  have  successfully  resisted  all 
attempts  on  the  part  of  the  Albanian  Government  to 
assert  its  sovereignty.  If  Albania  is  to  secure  the 
friendship  of  Greece,  she  must  abandon  a  daim  which 
she  cannot  enforce*  The  Bpirots  have  proved  that 
common  language  is  in  this  case  no  national  bond,  by 
taking  up  arms  for  the  rig^t  to  me^e  themselves  in  a 
nation  of  other  speech. 

When  she  has  solved  the  frontier  problems  of  the 
Metoya,  Duldgno,  and  Bpirus,  Albania  will  be  free 
to  face  the  task  of  internal  construction.  The  new 
government  will  here  find  the  exercise  of  its  authority 
hanqiered  by  the  very  lack  of  that  national  consciousness 
the  presence  of  whidi  in  Bpirus  has  made  it  altogether 
i]]^)ossible.  Its  writ  wiU  run  where  the  Ottoman 
sohan's  ran,  in  the  ports  and  the  plains,  but  if 
it  is  wise  it  will  follow  the  Ottoman  policy  of  leaving 
the  mountains  to  themselves.  To  the  clansman  it  will 
make  no  difference  that  the  government  is  **  national  ^ : 
he  will  still  view  its  action  simply  as  a  menace  to  the 
liberty  of  the  dan,  and  he  will  feel  no  greater  obligation 
to  pay  taxes  to  an  **  Albanian  '^  exchequer  at  Duraao 
than  to  a  Pasha  who  collected  them  at  the  same ''  konak  ** 
for   transmission   to   Cotistantinople.    The   Albanian 


a^  THE  BALKANS 

revenues  vnH  depend  not  upon  the  oontribittions  of  the 
Albanian  population  but  upon  the  customs  levied  od 
the  trade  of  Avlona  and  Dunao:  diat  trade  in  turn  wili 
depend  upon  the  admission  of  the  prindpalitjr  to  the 
Balkan  2^11verein* 

(iv.)  The  2^11verein  vnH  not  be  complete  until  it  has 
secured  the  adhesion  of  Btilgaria. 

Snce  the  Balkan  Wars  the  Bulgarian  territory  has 
extended  to  the  ^ean  as  well  as  to  the  Black  Sea,^ 
and  the  Bulgarian  frontier  thus  blocks  every  land-coute 
from  the  remainder  of  the  Balkan  area  to  the  Black  Sea 
Straits  and  to  the  Anatolian  continent  that  lies  beyond** 
The  Zollverein  would  suffer  grave  injury  from  Bulgarians 
economic  hostility,  and  in  her  present  mood  Bulgaria 
is  prepared  to  inflict  as  much  injury  upon  her  neighboucs 
as  she  can* 

The  latest  liberated  of  all  the  Balkan  natioost  she 
devoted  herself  with  fierce  singleness  of  purpose  to  the 
realisation  of  her  national  destiny*  In  the  Balkan  Wars 
she  staked  all  to  win  all,  and  issued  the  loser*  For 
her  misfortune  she  has  chiefly  herself  to  blame*  By 
her  murderous  attack  upon  the  Serbian  outposts  she 
deliberately  provoked  the  disastrous  struggle  with  her 
allies,  and  her  tactless  dipk>macy  was  responsible  for 
the  intervention  of  Roumania*  Yet  the  victors  sacrificed 
the  righteousness  of  their  cause  to  a  most  unrighteous 
exploitation  of  their  victory**  In  the  division  of  spoils 
at  Bukarest  they  stripped  Bulgaria  naked,  and  unless 

'See  Map  IV* 

*  The  moot  impofiant  of  these  routes  is  the  "  Oriental  Railway/' 
which  strikes  Eastward  out  of  the  Morava  valley  at  Ntsh»  entecs 
Bulgarun  territory  just  beyond  Pirot,  andpanes  through  Sofia,  Philip- 
popolts,attd  Adnanoplc  to  StambouL  Ine  line  is  continued  on  tbe 
opposite  ride  of  the  Bosphorus  by  the  Anatolian  Railway,  which  atarts 
mtn  Stamboul's  Asiatic  suburbs. 

*  Bulgaria  is  the  Germany  of  the  Balkans:  the  Treaty  of  Bukareit  s 
a  wamiiBg  lo  the  Allies. 


1 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVEREIN  zyj 

iiiif^S  ate  pnspoxtd  to  faru^  tfactr  setdement  more  into 
acoocd  with  justioe,  they  must  not  expect  forgiveness 
fmn  their  victim* 

The  treaty  left  Bulgaria  with  a  heavy  score  ^painst 
eadi  of  them* 

(a)  Between  the  Danube  and  the  Black  Sea  Roumania 
took  a  atrip  of  territory  which  had  belonged  to  Bulgaria 
stnct  her  creation  and  contained  no  Rouman  inhabi* 
tanta.^  Her  object  was  to  lengthen  her  cramped  coast- 
liae  and  to  open  a  direa  route  throt^  Siltstria  between 
Bokarest  and  the  sea,  and  she  regarded  her  act  as  a 
rectification  of  frontier,  not  as  the  recovery  of  a  saoed 
national  inheritance* 

The  difEerence  between  die  two  states  should  thus 
be  cafiabk  of  adjustment*  If  die  present  war  brings 
Roumania  accessions  of  territory  in  other  quarters,  she 
flMght  modify  the  Dobrudja  frontier  again  in  Bulgarians 
favour : '  if  Bulgaria  enters  the  ZoUverein,  she  mig^ 
rctrocede  the  whole  strip,  for  the  political  fcontiet  will 
then  no  longer  constitute  an  economic  barrier* 

Nq^tiations  on  this  subject  are  already  on  foot 
between  Bulgaria  and  Roumania,  and  there  is  every 
reason  to  anticipate  their  success* 

Greece  and  Serbia  did  not  mulct  Bulgaria  of  territory 
she  possessed  before  the  war,  but  they  took  the  Uon's 
share  of  the  Turkish  spoils*  The  setdonent  of  Bukarest 
pcactically  eaduded  Bulgaria  from  Macedonia,  ahhou^^ 
the  majority  of  the  Macedonian  population  is  Bulgsur 
m  nationaUty* 

(6)  The  Bulgar  race  borders  upon  the  Greek  along  a 
line  nfimding  from  Salonika  Eastwards  as  far  as  the 
Bb^  Sea**    Throughout  th»  zone  die  coast  is  pre- 

*  Ite  poptilafipo  li  oompoMd  of  Biilgm  md  BtdsMopUl  Tsitis* 
'  At  pccent  the  line  rum  from  Tttrtiifad  ID  Baltdttk. 
•SeelbpIV. 


s 


23S  THE  BALKANS 

dominantly  Greek  and  the  hinterland  predominantiy 
Bulgar,  but  there  are  large  areas  where  the  two  nationali- 
ties are  inextricably  intermingled^  village  ahemattng 
with  village  in  the  same  valley* 

It  is  impossible  to  draw  a  political  frontier  in  strict 
accord  with  the  racial  distribution*  If  Bulgaria  claimed 
every  Bu^^ar  village,  it  would  not  be  feasible  to  sift 
out  the  Greek  enclaves,  and  the  whole  debatable  zone 
down  to  the  coast-line  itself  would  be  drawn  within 
the  Bulgarian  frontier :  on  the  other  hand,  if  Greeoe 
asserted  her  title  to  every  patch  of  Greek  population, 
she  would  have  to  incorporate  not  only  the  whole  coast 
but  extensive  portions  of  the  Bu^ar  hinterland* 

It  is  dear  that  the  problem  can  only  be  solved  by  a 
compromise,  and  durit^  the  negotiations  which  were 
interrupted  by  the  Second  Balkan  War,  Venezelos,  the 
Greek  premier,  worked  for  the  partition  of  the  zpot  into 
two  sections* 

The  Eastward  or  Thradan  section  was  to  be  co- 
extensive with  the  lower  basin  of  the  River  Maritza : 
here  he  proposed  to  resign  the  coast  as  well  as  the 
hinterland  to  Bulgaria*  The  Westward  or  Macedonian 
section  was  to  indude  the  lower  courses  of  the  Vardar 
and  of  the  Struma,  and  here  he  claimed  for  Greece  a 
suffident  hinterland  to  cover  the  coast* 

When  the  negotiations  were  superseded  by  war^  and 
victory  put  the  initiative  entirely  into  Vene^elos*  hands, 
he  interpreted  his  prindple  in  the  sense  most  favourable 
to  Greece,  and  extended  his  **  Western  section  *^  as 
far  as  the  River  Mesta*^ 

From  the  racial  point  of  view  the  settlement  v^as  still 
a  compromise*  If  Vene^elos  annexed  to  Greece  the 
Bulgar  hinterland  West  of  the  Mesta,  he  honourably 

*SccMapIV. 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVEREIN  239 

abandoned  to  Bulgaria  the  Greek  littoral  between  the 
'Mesta  and  the  Marit^a.  The  Bu^ars  demand  a  modi- 
fication of  the  present  frontier  on  economic  and  not  on 
national  grounds.  The  natural  route  from  Sofia,  their 
c^tal,  to  the  sea  follows  the  valley  of  the  Struma 
down  to  die  port  of  Kavala,  a  short  d^tance  East  of  its 
mouth*  The  Treaty  of  Bukarest  left  the  greater  part 
of  this  route  in  Bu^aria's  hands,  but  barred  her  out 
from  its  terminus*  Bulgaria  repudiates  reoondliation 
with  Greece  till  this  economic  wrong  is  righted  :  Greece 
refuses  to  satisfy  Bulgaria  at  the  cost  of  territorial  cessions 
which  would  violate  Venezelos*  racial  settlement* 

Bulgaria's  entrance  into  the  ZoUverein  is  thus  the 
only  means  of  composing  the  quarrel,  for  it  will  satisfy 
Bulgaria's  economic  need  without  necessitating  the 
change  of  political  frontier*  Kavala,  like  Salonika, 
will  remain  under  Greek  government,  but  Bulgaria 
will  be  as  free  to  make  commercial  use  of  it  as  Serbia  is 
free  to  trade  through  Salonika* 

In  this  instance  the  benefits  of  the  ZoUverein  accrue 
to  Bulgaria,  and  by  refusing  to  enter  it  on  this  account 
she  will  be  inflicting  more  harm  on  herself  than  on  her 
neighbours* 

(c)  Bulgaria's  differences  with  Roumania  and  Greece 
have  proved  to  be  not  irremediable  :  her  last  and  most 
serious  difference  is  with  Serbia,  and  this  time  the  parts 
are  reversed*  Bulgaria  claims  territory  on  national 
grounds:  Serbia  refuses  to  cede  it  for  economic  reasons* 

The  Vardar  rises  on  South-Slavonic  soil,  and  Uskub, 
at  the  junction  of  its  head-waters,  is  as  truly  a  Serb 
city  as  Nish  or  Belgrade*  Below  Uskub,  however,  the 
whole  basin  of  the  river  is  occupied  by  a  Bulgar  popula- 
tion which  extends  as  far  Westward  as  the  Albanian 
frontier*    The  nationality  of  this  population  is  not  in 


340  THE  BALKANS 

doubt :  it  is  as  Bulgar  in  sympadiy  as  In  diakctr^ 
and  it  regards  the  Serbian  regime  as  a  foreign  doimii»- 
tion.  Serbia  gave  witness  against  herself  in  the  treaty 
she  oonduded  with  Bulgaria  in  the  mtwnmrr  of  1913 
before  their  ioint  declaration  of  war  i^^inst  Turkey. 
She  admitted  Bu^aria's  ezclusiTc  r^t  to  the  region 
South  of  Uskub,  and  even  left  the  allotment  of  Usknb 
itself  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Tsar. 

By  extendii^  her  sovereignty  down  the  Vardar  &om 
Uskub  to  Yeryeli,  Serbia  committed  a  crime  ;^ipst 
the  principle  of  nationality  \riuch  can  only  be  ilii  1I 
by  the  retrocession  of  the  irtiole  territory  in  qucstioa 
to  Bulgaria.'  Before  the  oa^xtak  of  the  present  war 
sudi  a  suggestion  would  have  been  Utopian :  without 
compensation,  Serbia  would  never  have  consented  Q> 
disgorge  the  greater  part  of  the  spoils  for  which  she  had 
fought  two  desperate  campaigns.  If  Bosnia  faUs  to 
her  at  the  impending  settlement,  and  her  strength  is 
fiirdier  increased  by  the  incorporation  of  die  "  Triune 
Kingdom  "  in  a  South-Slavonic  Federation,  she  will  be 
in  a  position  to  do  full  justice  to  Bulgaria  on  her  IMacc- 
donian  frontier  without  being  crippled  by  the  territonal 
loss.    Should  she  still  persist  in  her  refusal,  she  would 

*Tbne  »  no  troth  in  tfas  Strtnan  coatentiaii  that  At  SInvnc 
dahct  ipoken  in  Centnl  Macedonia  a  a  niiety  of  "  Sotttb-Stmak  " 

"  SonA-Slavooic "  and  Bulgar.  The  two  bnguaga  an  atrnf^ 
dillltratiited  ttom  one  anotbet,  and  then  can  be  no  ainbiguitjr  in  dw 
danuficatfon  of  the  Macedonian  paton  uoda  ooe  head  or  iba  oOta. 


1 


twanty  yean 

with  OMipcalratt  of  ifatiriootw  who  live  b«|anddwBulnriaa& 

*Tha  moral  obli^ttoo  cowracwd  by  her  treaty  in  the  Snmnol 

ui3>  On  dK  odiet  hand,  if  the  securti  her  naiio«ial  unity  aa  a  cmdt 
ol  the  prcacnt  war,  her  obligation  to  itapect  the  prtndplc  of  natiaoaSiy 
h  Bwlgaria'i  case  will  be  proportionately  mcifed. 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVBREIN  341 

be  infhienccd  by  eoonomic  considerattons  that  aie  not 
afiecced  by  the  racial  and  territorial  factor. 

By  fe&oundng  her  sovereignty  over  the  Vardar-basin 
Serbia  would  put  herself  out  of  touch  with  her  Greek 
and  Albanian  partners  in  the  Zollverein*  Astride  the 
Salonika  Railway  £rom  Yevyeli  to  Uskub,  Bulgaria 
would  sever  Serbia  from  her  outlet  on  the  Agean  and 
deprive  Greece  of  her  continental  railway-connection 
widi  Western  Europe  through  the  territory  of  the  South- 
Slavonic  Federation.  Established  West  of  the  Vardar 
in  the  basin  of  Monastir,  Bulgaria  would  block  Serbians 
ptospecrive  route  through  that  point  to  an  Albanian 
port  on  the  Adriatic. 

Unless  they  are  guaranteed  against  these  economic 
disasters^  it  is  certain  that  neither  Greece  nor  Serbia 
will  allow  Bulgaria  to  recover  an  inch  of  Macedonian 
territory,  and  the  only  effective  guarantee  is  the  entrance 
of  Bulgaria  herself  into  the  Balkan  Zollverein. 

The  situation,  therefore,  will  stand  thus :  Bulgaria 
will  make  her  entrance  into  the  ZoUverein  conditional 
upon  territorial  compensation  :  Serbia  and  Greece  will 
only  grant  her  this  compensation  on  the  condition  that 
she  enter  the  ZoUverein. 

It  will  not  be  difficult  to  mediate  between  these  two 
points  of  view,  and  as  soon  as  Bulgaria  has  redinte- 
grated herself  into  the  Balkan  brotherhood  she  will  find 
die  way  open  for  a  rectification  of  the  Macedonian 
frontier.  This  definitive  line  of  cleavage  between  the 
two  Slav  nationalities  will  coincide  in  general  with  the 
line  laid  down  in  the  abortive  convention  of  19x2*^ 

Starting  £rom  the  Eastern  firontier  of  Albania  as 
AMftMt^A  by  the  International  Commission,  it 
probably  follow  the  old  boundary  between  the 

'See  Map  IV. 


242  THE  BALKANS 

''  vilayets  **  of  Kossovo  and  Monastir  in  an  Easterly 
direction,  till  it  strikes  the  River  Vardar  at  a  point 
below  the  junction  of  the  Peinya  tributary  but  above  the 
town  of  Veles.^  After  crossing  the  Vardar,  it  nug^t 
run  along  the  river-bank  up-stream,  and  continue  its 
course  up  the  Left  bank  of  the  Peinya  to  a  point  due 
East  of  Uskub*  Here  it  might  turn  Eastward  once  more 
and  mount  the  watershed  between  the  Peinya  and 
Bregalnitza  valleys  till  it  reaches  the  summit  of  Mount 
Qsigova  on  the  present  Serbo-Bulgarian  frontier. 

This  line  would  leave  to  the  South-Slavonic  Federa- 
tion both  Uskub  itself  and  the  railways  that  connect 
Uskub  with  Mitrovitza,  Nish,  and  the  Egri  Palanka 
Pass :  to  Bulgaria  it  would  assign  Ohrida,'  the  basin  of 
Monastir,  the  middle  course  of  the  Vardar,  and  all  the 
cotmtry  between  the  Vardar  and  the  Struma*' 

We  have  now  discussed  the  economic  federation  of 
the  six  Balkan  units  :  Hungary  and  the  Southern  Slavs, 
Roumania  and  Greece,  Albania  and  Bulgaria*  We 
can  abstract  our  conclusion  in  the  following  formula: — 

**  The  political  deadlock  between  national  aspirations 
in  the  Balkan  area  is  due  to  economic  individualism : 
economic  collectivism  is  the  necessary  condition  of 
national  self-realisation/' 

^  Better  known  under  its  Turkish  name  as  KGpriilQ  (^  bridge-place  *^. 

*  The  cajxttal  of  the  Bulgarian  Empire  in  the  devendi  centuiy  aj>. 

•To  begm  with, Bulgaria  will  depend  for  railway oommunicatioa 
with  her  new  territory  upon  the  Serbian  line  throu^  Uskub  and  the 
Greek  line  through  Salonika ;  but  she  will  certamly  follow  t^  her 
inoorporation  in  the  Zollverein  and  the  rectification  of  her  ficontier  by 
the  construction  of  two  new  railways : 

(i)  From  Kostendil  down  the  valley  of  the  Struma  to  Sertes,  wliicfa 
wiU  give  her  a  connection  along  the  Greek  railway  system  through 
Drama  to  Kavala. 

(iL)  From  Kostendil  to  Kodjana  in  the  Bregalnitsa  valley,  over  a 
pass  South  of  Mount  Osigova,  and  dience  throu^  Ishtip,  Vcdcs,  and 
Prilep  to  Monastir.  This  will  give  her  an  independent  connection  with 
her  Macedonian  territories. 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVEREIN  24? 

Li  the  envifonment  of  a  Zollverein  Hungary  and 
die  Southern  Slavs,  the  Southern  Slavs  and  Bulgaria, 
Bulgaria  and  Greece,  Albania  and  Montenegro  —  all 
alike  can  compose  their  respective  feuds  and  arrive  at 
a  mutually  satisfactory  territorial  recoxistruction  on  a 
national  txisis*  The  Zollverein  seems  to  be  the  instru- 
ment that  will  eradicate  the  seeds  of  war  from  the 
Balkans,  so  far  as  those  seeds  are  sown  by  the  Balkan 
nationalities  themselves* 

Our  discussion,  however,  has  also  shown  us  that  the 
Balkan  peoples  are  only  responsible  in  a  secondary 
degree.  They  have  erred  in  leaving  their  field  unfenced : 
dieir  stronger  neighbours  are  the  enemy  that  has 
scattered  the  tares. 

1£  we  recall  the  outstanding  factors  that  militate 
^;ainst  Balkan  peace,  we  shall  find  the  root  of  them  all 
in  the  machinations  of  the  Great  Powers*  If  Serbia 
has  fallen  out  with  Bulgaria  and  Montenegro  with 
Albania,  it  is  because  Austria-Hungary  excluded  both 
Serbia  and  Montenegro  from  the  Adriatic*  If  Albania 
is  at  enmity  with  Greece,  it  is  because  Italian  diplomacy 
robbed  Greece  of  Epirus*  If  Roumania  and  Bulgaria 
are  in  dispute  over  the  Dobrudja,  it  is  because  Russia 
in  1878  swindled  Roumania  out  of  her  coast-line  North 
of  the  Danube.  If  Albania  is  still  likely  to  be  convulsed 
within,  when  she  has  setded  her  differences  with  her 
two  neif^ibours,  it  is  because  Austro-Hungarian  pro- 
paganda has  incited  the  Catholic  clansmen  to  make 
the  task  of  the  Moslem  government  impossible*  By  the 
boilding-^p  of  a  Zollverein  these  standing  tares  may 
be  pulled  out  by  the  roots  :  how  can  we  hinder  their 
replacement  by  others  more  devastating  still  i 

The  Balkan  area  has  been  a  menace  to  peace  because 
it  has  been  a  no-man^s  land,  an  arena  flung  open  to  the 


344  THE  BALKANS 

strong  natioDS  of  Europe,  to  tttapt  them  to  turn  aside 
&offi  the  strait  and  narrow  way  of  social  advance  and 
tear  each  other  in  pieces  for  tiie  proprietorship  oi  a 
wilderness. 

Once  Germany  has  been  what  the  Balkans  are  now. 
In  the  seventeenth  century  she  was  dismembered  by 
the  "  Thirty  Years'  War,"  and  in  ^k  eigfateei^ 
century  the  Powers  fought  over  her  carcase,  as  they  have 
been  fighripg  over  the  Balkans  durii^  the  century  that 
has  just  eiqiired :  Sweden  drew  the  sword  to  hold 
Pomerania,  France  to  seize  the  Left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 
Bismarck  did  one  good  service  to  peace.  By  raiamg 
Germany  from  the  dead  and  making  her  the  peer  of  die 
Powers  instead  of  their  prey,  he  closed  the  German 
arena  to  the  conflicts  of  Europe. 

No  Bismarck  will  arise  to  weld  tc^etber  the  Balkan 
states  and  enrol  them  in  the  front  rank  of  the  com- 
batants :  that  possibility  need  cost  us  neither  hope  nor 
fear.  Inspiration  will  come  not  from  Central  Europe, 
die  shadow  from  which  the  Balkans  are  being  delivered 
by  the  present  war,  but  from  America,  the  land  of 
promise  to  which  Balkan  immigrants  are  fin<1ing  their 
way  in  ever  increasing  numbers. 

On  the  American  continent  durii^  the  last  century 
the  Latin  Republics  have  lived  through  their  "  Balkan 
phase  "  without  disturbing  the  peace  of  the  world  at 
lai^e,  because  the  United  States  have  held  the  ring 
and  have  prevented  the  big  dc^  outside  from  taking 
part  in  the  little  dogs'  sctiG9e.  The  Balkan  situation 
in  Europe  calls  even  more  urgently  for  a  "  Monroe 
Doctrine,"  and  if  it  is  to  be  directed  inqurtially  against 
all  the  European  Powers,  its  sanction  must  proceed 
from  the  Balkan  peoples  themselves. 

la  co-operative  movements  it  is  the  first  step  that 


\ 


A  BALKAN  ZOLLVBREIN  345 

is  hard*  J£  the  Balkan  states  succeed  in  organising 
diemselves  in  a  Zollverein,  the  ZoUverein  will  almost 
automatically  develop  into  a  defensive  league* 

Many  dreams  will  be  shattered  when  the  Balkan 
world  presents  a  tmited  £ront  to  the  rest  of  Europe* 
Turkey  will  realise  that  her  tide  is  not  destined  to 
ittttin  £rom  its  ebb ;  Russia  will  understand  that  there 
is  no  k>nger  a  high-road  to  Constantinople  on  the 
farther  side  of  the  Danube-delta ;  Italy  will  recognise 
diat  die  Straits  of  Otranto  are  a  natiomd  frontier ;  and 
Austria  will  avert  her  gaase  at  last  £rom  the  East,  and 
knock  for  admission  at  Germany's  door. 


346  TRIESTE  AND  ITALY 


CHAPTER  V 

TRIESTE  AND  ITALY 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  solve  the  problem  raised  at 
the  close  of  our  chapter  on  Germany*  We  had  con- 
cluded that  if  Germany  were  beaten  by  the  Allies  in  the 
present  war,  she  would  have  to  relinquish  her  subject 
provinces  of  alien  population,  French,  Danish,  and 
Polish ;  and  we  had  argued  that  it  would  be  in  the  best 
interests  both  of  Germany  herself  and  of  her  present 
opponents  if  this  loss  were  compensated  by  the  gain  of 
**  German  Austria/^ 

We  admitted,  however,  that  this  solution  of  the 
German  question,  convenient  though  it  might  be  to  us 
all,  depended  upon  the  wishes  neither  of  Germany  nor 
of  Europe,  but  solely  upon  the  initiative  of  the  Austrians 
themselves ;  and  we  saw  that  we  could  only  conjecture 
the  Austrian  point  of  view  by  making  clear  to  ourselves 
the  internal  situation  of  the  Dual  Monarchy*  Our 
survey  showed  that  the  Austrian  Germans  would  never 
amalgamate  with  the  German  national  state  unless  the 
Hapsburg  Empire  had  previously  been  laid  in  ruins,  but 
that  in  that  event  no  other  alternative  would  be  left  them, 
since  they  were  incapable  of  standing  alone* 

We  then  proceeded  to  discuss  the  Hapsbui^  Empire's 
strength  and  weakness*  We  found  that  the  Southern 
Slav  question  was  the  determining  factor  in  its  fate : 
if  the  Southern  Slavs  won  their  national  unity  outside, 
and  in  despite  of,  the  Dual  Monarchy,  the  Monarchy 
would  inevitably  be  shattered  in  the  process :  but  the 
very  victory  of  the  Allies,  which  would  make  the  in- 


TRIESTB  AND  ITALY  347 

corporation  of  the  German  Austrians  in  the  German 
Enqnre  desirable  from  the  general  point  of  view,  would 
mddentally  dissolve  the  Dual  Monarchy  by  solvit^  the 
Southern  Slav  question  on  just  these  lines,  and  would 
thereby  indirecdy  cause  the  special  interest  of  German 
Austria  itself  to  coincide  with  the  universal  interest  of 
Europe* 

If,  then,  our  forecast  comes  true,  and  the  present 
Austro*Hungarian  organism  is  superseded  in  South- 
Eastern  Europe  by  a  Balkan  ZoUverein  or  Entente, 
biiik  up  in  harmony  with  Nationality  instead  of  in 
defiance  of  it,  we  may  fairly  confidently  assume  that  the 
"'New  Germany  **  which  will  simultaneously  come  into 
being  will  include  within  its  frontiers  the  Germans  of 
Austria* 

We  have  now  to  define  what  territories  and  popula- 
tions this  **  New  Atistrian  **  member  of  the  **  New 
Germany  **  will  include*  Large  portions  of  the  present 
Wapabvag  dominions  have  already  been  eliminated  £rom 
consideration*  We  have  prophesied  that  all  Galida 
beyond  the  Carpathians  will  gravitate,  under  some 
status  or  other,  to  the  Russian  Empire ;  and  all '' Trans- 
kithania,'*  both  the  territories  of  the  Crown  of  St* 
Stq>hen,  and  the  outlying  Austrian  province  of 
Dahnatia,  enter  the  vortex  of  the  Balkans*  There 
remains  only  the  section  of  the  Austrian  Crown-Lands 
situated  to  the  West  of  Hungary^s  Western  frontier* 

Will  the  whole  of  this  region  rally  to  Germany  en 
Unci  It  is  hardly  conceivable  that  it  should  do  so, 
for  there  are  several  most  important  non-German 
elements  still  entangled  in  it*  The  German  population 
in  Austria,  like  the  Ms^ar  population  East  of  it  in 
Hungary,  ceases  on  the  North  bank  of  the  Drave,  and 
Slavonic  speech  re^^ns  South  of  the  river  as  far  as  the 


346  TRmSTB  AND  ITALY 

sea ;  but  the  situation  is  not  so  mmph  here  as  in 
Croatia.  The  Ooats,  we  stir,  hare  been  atrocioody 
treated  by  the  Magyars,  and,  moreover,  they  are  only 
one  fragment  of  a  larger  homogeneous  popnlatian,  t)i£ 
Southern  Slavs,  with  -vthost  other  sectims  they  can 
federate  as  soon  as  they  have  thrown  off  the  Magyar 
yoke.  The  Austrian  "  Slovenes  "  are  an  isolated  little 
branch  of  the  Slavonic  family,  speaking  a  dialect  dis- 
tinctly different  from  Southern  Slav.^  They  have  been 
well  treated  by  their  German  masters;  and,  what  is 
more  inq>ortant  still,  they  have  no  independent  tradi- 
tion or  civilisation  c£  dieir  own.  Laibach,  die  ducf 
town  of  Krain,"  has  a  dioroughly  German  character,  aod 
GottBchee,  in  the  extreme  South  of  the  country,  is  a 
genuine  enclave  of  German  population. 

U  Krain  were  a  unit  by  itself,  it  woukl  probably 
vote  for  continued  union  with  the  Germans  aocss  die 
Drave,  with  iriiom  politics  have  knit  the  district  for 
five  centuries.  But  unfortunately  Krain  is  inseparably 
linked  by  get^raphy  with  the  province  of  the  "  Kiisteii- 
land,"  and  the  Slovene  population,  neglecting  the 
artificial  boundary  between  the  two  arft«wtii»ira«i»> 
districts,  spreads  evenly  to  the  sea.  Tha  coast,  how- 
ever, has  had  a  very  different  history  from  its  hinter- 
land. Here,  too,  the  Slovene  has  adopted  dvilisaiiaD 
seoond^iand;  but  it  has  come  to  him  from  the  opposite 
quarter,  and  die  ports  have  taken  a  completely  baUan 
colour.  Trieste,  indeed,  was  an  early  acquisition  of  die 
H^sbu^,'  but  the  Western  half  of  Istxia  belonged  tD 
Venice  tfll  the  caOinction  of  her  independence  in  rTgy, 
and  did  not  pass  definitively  to  Austria  till  1814.    MoR- 

*  Tbcy  aus^end  j,im/xn>  «t  the  oi 


11: 


'  It  bat  bdcoKcd  to  them  since  1389  aj>. 


TRIESTE  AND  ITALY  349 

over,  the  Slavonic  substratum  in  the  Southern  parts  of 
the  btriaa  peninsula  does  not  even  speak  the  Slovene 
dialect,  but  belongs  to  the  neighbouring  Southern-Slav 
group.* 

It  is  dear,  therefore,  that  the  coast,  at  any  rate,  will 
sete  die  opportunity  to  detach  itself  £rom  its  present 
German  connections*  But  this  coast  and  hmterland 
fioim  together  just  one  of  those  geographical  minima, 
wUdi  are  the  limit  of  practical  political  subdivision* 
They  most  share  the  same  political  destiny,  idiatever 
it  ni  to  be* 

This  brings  us  to  the  claims  of  Italy*  The  Italian 
nation  re-arisen  has  picked  the  mantle  of  Venice  out  of 
the  dust,  and  adorns  her  ambitions  with  an  extensive 
**  fena  irredenta  **  across  the  Adriatic*  We  have  passed 
over  her  aspirations  in  Dalmada  without  a  word,  because 
here  the  Venetian  regime  is  a  mere  msmory,  and  has 
lesttlted  in  no  living  racial  fact,  as  any  one  who  travels 
up  dies  coast  can  see*  Educated  Dalmatian  Slavs  still 
speak  Italian  as  a  second  language»  as  educated  Greeks 
do  in  die  Ionian  Islands ;  but  the  current  speech  of  the 
diope,  streets  and  even  the  quays,  and  the  exclusive 
spcedi  of  the  country-side,  is  the  native  South  Slavonic, 
and  Italy  has  as  little  justification  for  coming  here*  as 
she  has  for  ruling  in  Corfu  or  2^te  * 

In  dbe  Austrian  Kiistenland  her  case  is  better*  The 
Ijtile  Irtrian  ports  still  possess  a  purely  Italian  popula- 
tioo,  and  so  did  Trieste  a  century  ago ;  but  in  sharing 
the  economic  movement  of  the  nineteenth  century  and 

^  In  1900  ibs  provmoe  of  btria  had  ^4*000  inhahitaiila^  of  vHioib 
^>b(Mst  d3S%  were  Italian  and  66.7%  Slav :  the  Istrian  Croats  number 
about  aoojooo :  so  that  90«ooo  ta  the  highest  estimate  we  can  giTe  for 
the  ftmatnuig  Slavs  in  me  penlBStth,  j«e.  the  Slovcaes. 

*Zan  ii  me  onfar  place  in  Dalmsiia  where  Italian  ii  in  aav  seoee  a 


aso  TRIESTE  AND  ITALY 

beooming  a  world-port,  Trieste  has  vastly  increased  her 
sise,  like  other  European  cities,  by  drawing  into  herself 
the  rural  population  £rom  a  wide  zone  of  attraction. 
Modem  urban  concentration  takes  no  accxnint  of 
mediaeval  race-divisions,  and  the  nucleus  of  Italian 
Triestini  has  been  alloyed  with  a  mass  of  Sknrene 
imm^fiants  who  have  come  to  stay.  Encouraged  by 
the  Austrian  govenunent,  the  new  Slovene  element  h^ 
been  struggling  for  some  years  with  the  Italian  to  share 
the  control  of  the  municipality  and  seems  likely  to  make 
good  its  claim  :  at  any  rate  Trieste  is  no  longer  a  purely 
Italian  city.' 

Th^  brings  us  to  the  negative  conclusion  that  the 
"  Slovene  Unit "  must  not  be  incorporated  politically 
either  in  Italy  or  in  the  new  Germany.  Laibach  and 
Gottschee  would  veto  Italian  annexation,  Parenzo  and 
Abba^ia  German,  the  Slovenes  who  are  making  them- 
selves a  power  in  Trieste  would  veto  both.  It  remains 
that  it  should  either  enter  the  "  Southern  Slav  United 
States "  or  become  an  independent  political  unit 
guaranteed  by  Europe. 

The  latter  alternative  is  undesirable.  Tiny  states  in 
occupation  of  important  and  intenselyKOveted  economic 
assets  are  not  likely  to  possess  the  resources  for  ad- 
ministering these  assets  on  the  increasinj^y  large  scale 
to  which  modem  life  is  tending,  or  for  defendii^  tiiem 
against  the  agression  of  bi^er  organisms  that  dunk 
they  cotdd  use  the  opportunity  better.  But  it  would  be 
still  worse  to  force  a  political  destiny  upon  a  population  of 
this  size  against  its  will.    It  is  probable,  however,  that 

'  The  total  popnUtion  of  Ttieue  is  339.000,  iaduding  about 
170.000  Italiant      =    7404  % 
^fioo  Slovenes    =    18.77  % 


TRIESTB  AND  ITALY  25X 

the  general  sense  of  the  various  elements,  as  expressed 
in  die  plebiscite,  will  reveal  itself  in  favour  of  federating 
die  unit  vrith  the  Southern  Slavs  as  a  third  member  of 
dieir  Union*  Guaranteed  independence  would  hardly 
relieve  the  Italian  and  German  minorities  from  the 
iheniatLve  fear  of  being  engtdfed  respectively  in  the 
German  and  Italian  national  state ;  and  such  a  possi- 
bility would  be  &r  more  reptxgnant  to  them  than  the 
pioqpect  of  loose  co-operation,  more  or  less  on  their 
own  terms,  with  a  Slavonic  nationality.  The  Sbvene 
majority  has  recently  been  roused  to  active  conscious- 
xKss  by  that  wave  of  national  enthusiasm  ^^lich  the 
Serbian  victories  over  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  sent  vibrat- 
tBg  through  the  Southern  Slavs*  While  a  few  years 
ago  it  would  have  foUowed  in  the  Italians'  or  die 
Germans'  wake,  it  will  now  take  an  initiative  of  its  own« 
Neverdieless,  where  wishes  are  divergent,  the  negative 
proposition  often  wins,  and  if  the  plebiscite  decides  for 
separatism,  there  is  no  more  to  be  said  about  the  political 
question*. 

The  economic  issue  is  quite  independent  of  the 
political  and  far  more  dear*  We  saw  that  the  Dual 
Monarchy,  in  its  present  shape  as  a  political  structure, 
was  a  negation  of  natural  grouping  imposed  upon  more 
than  half  its  total  popubtion  by  force ;  and  that  to 
safeguard  the  peace  of  Europe  we  must  allow  the  im- 
prisoned elements  to  burst  their  artificial  bands  asunder, 
and  fundamentally  reconstitute  themselves  on  the 
national  basis*  But  we  noted  first  of  all  that  it  had  a 
cogent  raison  JChre  as  an  economic  organisation.  The 
raw  production  of  the  Soutfa-Bast,  the  manufacture  of 
die  NorthrWest,  and  the  sea  traffic  up  the  Adriaric 
coast,  are  complementary  to  each  other;  and  our 
political  reorganisation,  so  far  from  dislocating  this 


352  TRIESTE  AND  ITALY 

ecoaomic  relatJon,  will  actually  emphasise  it  oa  a 
gfaader  scale.  Austria-Hungary  as  a  polidcsi  geoup 
will  perhaps  have  disappeared ;  but  the  economic  ueer- 
play  between  its  sections  wiU  thereby  extend  itself  to 
the  whole  Balkan  Zollverein  on  the  one  hand,  aad  to 
the  whole  rehabilitated  German  Qnpire  on  the  other, 
and  the  port  of  Trieste  will  still  remain  the  node  of 
this  larger  rhythm. 

Trieste  has  a  great  future  before  her,  and  it  is  very 
important  for  the  prosperity  of  Europe  to  keep  mi- 
broken  all  her  economic  links*  Whatever  its  political 
disposition,  the  state  of  **  Sbvenia  **  must  remain  9n 
open  martet  where  the  new  Germany  and  the  Banian 
Zollverein  can  meet,  that  is,  it  must  have  foee  trade 
with  both  at  once.  But  there  is  no  economic  oonnectioQ 
between  Trieste  and  Italy.  Italian  manufactnrca  are 
devebping  along  the  Northern  rim  <rf  the  Po  basin  where 
they  can  avail  themselves  of  Alpine  water  power;  but 
the  port  of  Lombardy  is  Genoa  on  the  Riviera  coast. 
Italian  industry  faces  Soutfa-West,  and  belongs  to  an 
economic  sphere  in  which  the  centre  of  gravity  verges 
towards  the  Mediterranean,  and  not  towards  the 
Adriatic. 

This  is  perhaps  the  strongest  reason  of  all  for  not  put- 
ting Trieste  into  Italy^s  hands.  Even  if  the  eychwkin 
of  the  Slovene  territory  from  the  Italian  tari£F-watt  wttt 
guaranteed  as  a  condition  of  its  inoorporaticm  widun 
her  political  frontier,  she  cotdd  hardly  fail  to  use  her 
political  control  to  deflect  Triestine  trade  in  her  own 
interest.  To  abandon  her  daim  to  Trieste  wiU  be  a 
grievous  disappointment  to  her ;  but  she  will  receive 
compensation  in  other  directions. 

(i.)  Though  she  must  throw  no  covetous  glance  tqxm 
Canton  Tidno,  which  is  Swiss  in  soul,  yet  farther  East 


TRIESTE  AND  ITALY  aS3 

the  ltalian-q)eakiiig  populatioti  ctf  the  Tientino  is  eager 
to  aasert  its  true  nationality.  The  rectified  frontier 
lienwecu  Italy  and  the  Austrian  Tyn>rwould  diverge 
bom  the  present  at  the  summit  of  the  Ortler/  run 
Eastivard  akmg  the  Northern  watershed  of  the  Nooe 
faOey,  and  dien  South-Bast  till  it  crossed  the  Adige  just 
Sottdi  of  Neumarkt.  Thence  it  would  again  tal^  a 
SKue  Northerly  direction  along  the  Northern  watershed 
of  the  Avisio  valley,  and  rejoin  the  old  line  again  on  the 
siffliflut  of  Monte  Marmolata* 

(ti.)  If  Alsace-Lorraine  elects  to  reunite  itself  with 
Fnoioe,  the  French  could  well  restore  to  Italy  the 
balian  poptdation  of  Nizza,  whose  session  was  part  of 
the  pace  for  French  aid  in  1859*  '^^  tawm  has  a 
sentiniental  value  for  the  Italian  nation  as  the  birthplace 
of  Garibaldi.  Italy  would  doubtless  wish  to  receive 
Coaica  as  well ;  but  sentiment  of  exactly  the  same  land 
will  make  the  French  always  ding  to  Napoleon's  native 
islaad,  though  strategically  and  economically  it  is  an 
unprofitable  possession  in  spite  of  its  size.  The 
Coisicans  speak  an  Italian  dialect,  but  they  have  no 
feeling  of  national  affinity  with  the  peninsular  state, 
because  dieir  horizon  has  never  extended  beyond  their 
own  coasts.  They  are  a  lavrfess  people,  still  in  need  of 
strong  government  firom  outside ;  and  this  the  French, 
with  more  than  a  century'is  e^ierience,  can  continue 
to  give  them  much  better  than  a  new  Italian  administra- 
tion ttntramed  to  the  task. 

(tii.)  Italy's  chief  gain,  however,  will  not  be  these 
minor  territorial  pickings,  but  the  undisputed  naval 
command  of  the  Adriatic,  for  which  she  is  at  present 
driven  to  compete  with  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The 
dttappeanmoe  of  the  latter  power  as  a  political  unit 

>Sftiii9oap.a6o. 


254  TRmSTB  AND  ITALY 

leave  the  Eastern  coast  of  this  sea  in  less  formidable 
hands. 

At  least  two  of  the  Austrian  naval  bases,  Sebenioo 
and  Cattaro,  will  ^  to  the  inheritance  of  the  Southern 
Slav  Union,  lAdda.  will  have  neither  the  interest  nor  the 
resources  to  initiate  a  policy  of  naval  adventure*  The 
headquarters  of  the  Austrian  navy  are  at  the  fortress  of 
Pola,  the  key  of  the  whole  Northern  Adriatic,  iMxh 
juts  out  into  the  sea  on  the  tip  of  Istria,  and  menaces  a 
la^e  stretch  of  Italian  coast  including  Venice  on  the 
one  hand  and  Ancona  on  the  other.  Pola  is  destined 
to  form  part  of  the  Slovene  unit,  and  if  the  latter  inclines 
to  a  guaranteed  autonomy,  the  natural  corollary  to  the 
grant  of  such  a  status  would  be  the  razing  of  all  fortifica- 
tions within  the  guaranteed  area.  But  even  should 
Slovenia  elect  to  throw  in  her  lot  with  the  Southern 
Slavs,  Italy  would  still  be  quite  justified  in  insistii^ 
upon  the  dismantling  of  Pola  as  the  condition  of  her 
consent  to  the  loss  of  Trieste,  while  the  other  parties 
to  the  conference  could  not  deny  her  such  a  logical 
compensation. 

While  Pola  controls  the  bottom  of  the  Adriatic  bottle, 
its  neck  is  potentially  dominated  by  the  bay  of  Avlona  ^ 
in  Albania,  whose  future  we  have  already  sketched  as 
a  part  of  transit  and  a  railway  terminus.  Under  the 
Turkish  regent  its  strategical  possibilities  were  never 
exploited,  but  in  the  hands  of  an  efficient  naval  power  it 
could  be  converted  into  a  position  strong  enough  to 
seal  up  the  Adriatic,  and  it  is  obvious  that  it  wouU 
threaten  Italy's  vital  interests  if  such  a  strategical  asset 
passed  into  the  possession  of  any  other  nation  than 
herself. 

The  fall  of  Yannina  in  the  Spring  of  19x3,  during  the 

'See  fXap  IV. 


TRIESTE  AND  ITALY  355 

ooufse  of  the  Balkan  War,  brought  Greek  armies  into 
the  neighbourhood.    The  Greek  government  politicly 
lefinined  from  proceeding  to  the  occupation  of  Avlona 
itself,  but  Italy^s  susceptibility  with  regard  to  the  fate 
of  the  town  was  so  extreme  that,  as  we  have  seen,  she 
created  an  international  complication  by  insisting  upon 
the  inclusion  of  Epirus,  a  district  of  Greek  nationality, 
in  the  new  principality  of  Albania,  in  order  to  interpose  a 
broad  zone  of  territory  between  Avlona  and  the  new 
Greek  frontier.    Events  have  already  shown  that  the 
artificial  severance  of  Epirus  from  Greece  cannot  be 
maintained  against  the  will  of  both ;  but  since  Avlona 
lies  beyond  the  Epirot  border,  and  her  Moslem  Albanian 
population  will  under  no  drcunostances  incorporate 
itself  in  the  Greek  national  state,  there  is  no  reason  why 
any  step  the  Epirots  may  take  with  regard  to  their  own 
destiny  should  involve  the  permanent  presence  of  Italy 
at  Avlona,^  a  state  of  things  that  would  virtually  reduce 
Albania  to  an  Italian  province,  and  would  hopelessly 
compromise  the  **  Monroe  doctrine  **  which  we  formu- 
lated for  the  whole  Balkan  region  as  one  of  the  necessary 
safeguards  of  European  peace*    Italy's  interests  can  be 
completely  satisfied  by  another  alternative,  the  perpetual 
neutralisation  of  Avlona,  tmder  a  guarantee,  similar  to 
that  we  have  proposed  in  the  case  of  Pola,  containing 
the  following  provisions : 
(a)  Avlona  shall  always  remain  part  of  Albania* 
(ft)  It  shall  never  be  fortified,  either  by  Albania 
herself  or  by  any  la^er  political  group  with  a  tmified 
military  organisation,  of  which  Albania  may  at  any  time 
hereafter  become  a  member* 

'la  November  19x4  Italy  virtuaUy  occupied  Avlona  itaeli^  and 
fofmaliy  aanoooced  htt  ooctspatjon  of  Saacno,  me  idaad  U^ 
the  tDtianoe  to  tlie  Bqr* 


356  TRIESTE  AND  ITALY 

The  gtntfal  tBtctf  tfaen^  of  these  vsnous  pfoponb 
will  be  to  leave  Italy  the  control  of  the  Adriatic  by  the 
disarmament  of  its  whole  Eastern  coast*  Sympatfaisefs 
with  Italy  will  probably  declare  that  this  is  after  all  a 
negative  gain^  and  hint  that  a  great  power  like  Italy 
cannot  in  the  re-settlement  of  Btirope  be  treated  in  so 
cavalier  a  fashion*  To  this  we  would  reply  that  we  have 
taken  our  lead  from  Italy^s  own  policy*  Her  decisive 
adoption  of  neutrality  at  the  beginning  of  the  present 
war  proved  that  she  herself  realised  what  was  already 
patent  from  the  facts^  that  she  had  no  vital  interests  at 
stake  on  the  European  continent* 

If  the  ultimate  reunion  of  Trieste  had  been  to  her  not 
merely  a  cherished  object  of  national  sentiment^  but  a 
necessity  of  life»  she  could  not  have  abstained  from 
intervention  now*  In  reality^  if  she  were  to  yield  to 
sentiment  and  insist  on  the  zssignmtnt  to  her  of  Trieste 
by  the  conference  that  will  meet  after  the  war,  she  would 
deUberately  be  involving  herself  in  intimate  relations 
with  Central  and  South-Eastern  Europe  :  every  phase 
in  the  policy  of  the  great  German  and  Balkan  groups 
would  thenceforth  seriously  affect  her,  and  she  might 
finally  bring  down  upon  her  head  the  combined  force 
of  the  two  groups  in  a  concerted  effort  to  oust  her  again 
from  the  possession  of  a  port  which,  thot^  of  no 
economic  interest  to  herself,  would  be  the  centre  in  vAiiA 
their  own  respective  interests  met  and  coincided* 

The  relief  from  naval  competition  in  the  Adriatic 
would,  on  the  contrary,  be  a  very  positive  advantage  to 
her*  Instead  of  the  promissory  notes  of  continental 
ambitions,  it  would  yield  her  ^e  immediate  gain  of 
millions  of  Ure  struck  off  from  her  annual  budget  for 
naval  construction,  and  enable  her  at  once  to  reduce 
her  naval  estimates  and  yet  spare  greater  facoe  dian 


TRIESTE  AND  ITALY  357 

befejre  for  the  pursuance  of  interests  beyond  the  xnoutfa  of 
the  Adriatic  on  which  her  future  development  depends* 

Italy,  like  Germany,  has  come  late  into  the  field, 
and  like  Germany  she  needs  above  all  things  to  obtain 
reservoirs  of  markets  and  raw  materials  for  her  growing 
industry,  and  unea^loited  spheres  of  activity  for  her 
enterprise*  The  manufactures  of  Lombardy  shipped 
from  Genoa  have  recently  secured  a  destination  in 
Tripoli;  but  the  war  with  Tturkey  in  ip^ch  Tripoli 
was  won  opened  up  the  prospect  of  more  fruitful 
e^Kuision  in  the  Levant*  Italy's  future  beckons  her 
across  the  Mediterranean,  and  it  will  occupy  otur  atten- 
tion again  when  we  oome  to  consider  the  problems  of 
the  Nearer  East ;  but  it  does  not  call  her  to  Trieste,  and 
we  can  discount  the  Italian  factor  in  turning  our  minds 
once  more  to  the  relations  between  the  **  Slovene  unit  '* 
and  its  hinterland  on  the  North* 

We  have  now  defined  the  **  New  Austria "'  still  more 
dosely,  by  detaching  the  Trentino  and  **  Slovenia ''  in 
the  South :  we  have  only  to  determine  her  frontier 
against  the  latter  in  detail,^  before  we  pass  on  to  the 
consideration  of  her  internal  constitution* 

We  have  seen  that  the  unity  of  **  Slovenia  **  is 
primarily  geographical  rather  tluui  racial ;  so  that,  in 
settling  its  exact  extent,  while  we  must  satisfy  as  far  as 
posttble  the  claims  of  the  Slovene  substratum  and 
majority,  after  which  we  have  named  the  whole  territory, 
we  must  subordinate  ihem  in  the  last  resort  to  geo- 
graphical considerations*  Slovenia  is  a  junction  of 
economic  arteries,  and  the  disposition  of  these  arteries 
most  be  the  decisive  factor  in  its  delimitation*  We  are 
creating  Slovenia  in  order  to  give  Austria,  and  the  whole 
of  Germany  behind  her,  a  £ree  communication  with  the 
Adriatic  that  shall  pass  neither  through  Croatian  terri- 

'  Sec  Map  in* 


258  TRIESTE  AND  ITALY 

tory  on  the  one  hand  nor  through  Italian  on  the  other, 
and  there  are  two  existing  lines  of  railway  along  which 
such  communication  can  be  effected : 

{L)  The  **  Sudbahn '"  from  Vienna,  that  skirts  the 
Eastern  flank  of  the  Alps,  passes  trough  the  heart  of 
Krain  at  Laibach,  and  proceeds  thence  to  Trieste,  which 
it  thus  links  to  an  industrial  hinterland  towards  the 
North-East  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia* 

(iiO  The  Tauem  Railway,  only  opened  in  1909,  which 
has  yielded  Trieste  a  new  hinterland  in  Southern 
Germany  by  giving  her  a  direct  Northward  connection 
through  the  Alps  themselves* 

This  line,  in  its  Southern  section,  skirts  the  present 
Italian  frontier,  keeping  just  outside  Italian  territory. 
Starting  from  Trieste,  it  runs  to  Gorz  on  the  East 
bank  of  the  Isonzo,  crosses  the  river,  follows  up 
its  West  bank  to  the  junction  of  the  Idria  stream, 
and  then  penetrates  by  a  tunnel  into  the  upper  valley 
of  the  Save,  crosses  this  river  too,  and  next  pierces  the 
Karawanken  mountains  by  another  tunnel,  to  emerge 
on  the  Drave  at  Villach*  Hence  the  Tauem  tunnel, 
the  biggest  engineering  feat  on  the  line,  carries  it 
through  the  main  chain  of  the  Alps  into  the  Danube 
lowlands,  which  it  enters  at  Salzburg.  It  is  clear  that 
this  railway  sets  a  limit  to  the  advance  of  Italy^s  Eastern 
frontier  against  Slovenia*  All  that  we  can  give  Italy  here 
is  a  tiny  strip  of  territory  on  the  West  bank  of  the  Isonzo 
below  GSfZ,  where  the  population  is  Italian  in  nation- 
ality, and  which  possesses  a  sentimental  importance  as 
containing  the  little  towns  of  Aquileia  and  Grado,  with 
their  beautiful  cathedrals  and  their  splendid  ecclesiastical 
memories  so  closely  bound  up  with  Italian  history* 

The  North-Westem  extension  of  Slovenia  in  turn  is 
limited  by  the  trunk  line  from  Vienna  to  Italy,  which 


TRIESTE  AND  ITALY  359 

passes  by  Leoben  up  the  valley  of  the  Mur,  crosses  into 
the  Drave  valley  at  Villach,  and  proceeds  thence  into 
the  T^^liamento  basin  at  Tarvis*  It  is  equally  dear 
that  this  line  must  run  entirely  through  Austrian  and 
Italian  territory,  and  pass  outside  Slovenia  altogether* 

This  further  suggests  the  limits  of  Slovenia  on  the 
North*  The  Slovene  population  overflows  the  water- 
shed between  Save  and  Drave,  and  occupies  the  whole 
Southern  bank  of  the  latter  river  along  its  upper  course, 
even  passing  beyond  it  in  places;  but  the  Northern 
bank  is  predominantly  German,  the  towns,  such  as 
Klagenfurt  and  Marburg,  being  completely  German  in 
diaracter,  and  the  whole  valley  forms  an  indivisible 
geographical  unity,  which  is  linked  by  its  railway  con- 
nections with  the  German  mass  towards  the  North 
rather  than  with  the  Slovene  mass  towards  the  South* 
Slovenia  must  therefore  abandon  her  frontiersmen  in 
die  Drave  valley  to  Austria,  and  accept  the  Southern 
watershed  of  that  river  as  her  Northern  limit* 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  designate  the  whole 
frontier  between  Slovenia  and  Austria*  It  should  start 
from  the  present  Italian  frontier  at  Mount  Kanin  (thus 
leaving  the  railway  junction  of  Tarvis  within  Austrian 
territory  as  before),  and  follow  the  Southern  boundary 
of  Karinthia  along  the  Karawanken  mountains  till  it 
reaches  the  point  where  the  Karinthian  boundary  turns 
North*  Here  it  should  part  from  the  latter,  and  con- 
tinue the  Easterly  direction  of  the  Karawanken  range, 
cutting  through  Styria  till  it  reaches  the  Bacher  moun- 
tains on  a  line  that  leaves  Windischgratz  and  St* 
Leonhard  to  Austria*  Thence  it  should  turn  South- 
East,  run  along  the  watershed  between  the  Sann  and 
Drann  systems  over  the  Cilli-Marburg  railway  ttmnel 
to  the  Wotsche  motmtains,  and  then  follow  their  summit 
till  it  hits  the  frontier  of  Croatia* 


afe 


TRIESTE  AND  ITALY 


Thif  is  a  rot^  attempt  to  sift  Slovene  from  Gennan 
along  a  line  corresponding  mdi  geographical  struc- 
ture, and  it  will  succeed  approximately  in  shaking 
German  Austria  free  from  her  Slavoiic  accretims  en 
the  Southern  side.  But  the  Austria  that  is  left,  thou^ 
now  a  compact  geographical  unit,  has  a  last  and  most 
bitter  national  problem  buried  in  her  heart ;  she  has  still 
to  settle  her  relatitms  with  du  Tchechs.    \ 


TCHECH  AND  GERMAN  afii 


CHAPTER  VI 

TCHECH  AND  GERMAN  IN  THE  NEW  AUSTRIA 

BoHEHXA  is  a  foux^^quare  block  of  primitive  mountains, 
the  relic  of  a  Europe  older  than  the  folding  of  the  Alps 
and  Carpathians*  Like  the  Baltic  plain  and  the  Danube 
valley  North  and  South  of  it,  it  was  occupied  in  the 
Dark  Ages  by  the  Slavs  in  their  Westward  su^* 
About  1000  AJ>«  the  Germans,  e3q>anding  with  the 
inq)etus  of  civilisation,  bq;an  to  roll  the  tide  back* 
Meissen  and  Brandenburg,  the  Saxon  marches,  turned 
the  Bohemian  Slavs'  flank  on  the  one  hand,  the 
Bavarians  pushed  their  settlements  down  the  Danube 
to  build  Austria  on  the  other,  and  when,  during 
the  thirteenth  century,  Silesia,  the  province  of  the 
Upper  Oder,  was  cut  away  from  the  body  of  Poland 
and  Germanised  by  settlers  from  the  North-West, 
Bohemia  was  isolated  on  the  East  as  well,  and  Germans 
bom  Vienna,  pressing  up  the  Right  bank  of  the  March 
River,  almost  joined  hands  with  Germans  from  Breslau 
through  the  Moravian  gap*^  Even  the  thickly-forested 
mountain-dykes  did  not  keep  out  the  flood,  and  a 
German  population  oozed  far  into  the  interior  of 
Bohemia  on  the  West  and  North* 

But  Geography  still  saved  the  native  Slavs  from 
destruction*  Their  mountain-shelter  gave  them  time 
to  adopt  from  the  Germans  the  armament  of  Latin 
civilisation  by  which  they  were  beit^  conquered,  and 
the  Kingdom  of  the  Tchechs  began  to  hold  its  ovm  as 
a  recognised,  independent  member  in  the  family  of 

'  Sm  Map  II. 


369  TCHECH  AND  GERMAN 

Western  Christendom.  In  die  fourteenth  century  its 
ruler,  Charles  of  Luzembourg,  attained  the  (by  this  time 
shadowy)  dignity  of  Holy  Roman  Emperor,  and  his 
Slavonic  capital  Prag  became  for  a  generation  the 
pohtical  focus  of  Central  Europe. 

The  cosmopolitan  university  of  Prag,  founded  in  1348 
and  organised  in  four  "  nations,"  whidi  was  Charles' 
most  enduring  legacy  to  the  country,  linked  it  still 
closer  to  the  great  world,  and  wandering  students  from 
England  sowed  seeds  of  Wyclifs  ideas  from  which 
sprang  two  leaders  of  European  importance,  John  Huss 
and  Jerome  of  Prag,  the  fore-runners  of  the  Refbmu- 
tum.  They  were  both  burnt  at  the  Council  of  Constanz 
in  1415,  but  their  followers  took  up  arms  for  the  rights 
of  the  Laity  against  the  Cleigy,  and  repelled  the  crusades 
of  all  Catholic  Europe. 

In  this  democraric  uprising,  half  a  universal  ttiiffovs 
movement,  half  a  local  revolt  of  the  peasant  against  his 
brd,  the  Tchech  nation  found  itself  and  defied  the 
world.  But  the  glory  of  the  Hussites  was  brief.  They 
were  ruined,  not  by  the  power  of  the  Roman  Church, 
but  by  the  bitterness  of  their  own  internal  factions.  In 
1436  the  moderate  "  Utraquists  "  crushed  the  fanatical 
"  T^x>rites,"  who  were  the  really  vital  element  in  the 
movement,  and  proceeded  to  make  a  concordat  widi 
Rome,  in  which  they  abandoned  their  actually  achieved 
religious  independence  in  return  for  a  formal  acknow- 
ledgment of  the  Laity's  right  to  communicate  in  both 
kinds,  the  empty  claim  enshrined  in  the  party's  title> 
The  star  of  Huss  had  set  before  Luther's  sun  rose :  in 
the  seventeenth  century,  while  the  Dutch  were  assert- 
ing their  national  independence  against  the  Hapsburg 
dynasty,  the  Tchechs  fell  under  its  autocratic  rule,  and 
have  never  extricated  themselves  since;  but  ttaditioii 


1 


TCHECH  AND  GERMAN  363 

Kved  on,  and  fed  the  flame  of  nationalism,  which  the 
nineteenth  century  kindled  in  the  Tchechs  as  in  all  other 
European  populations,  to  a  white  heat* 

No  settlement  of  Austria  is  worth  considering  that 
does  not  satisfy  the  Tchechs'  aspirations,  but  their 
daims  are  likely  to  be  eactravagant*  At  first  they  will 
probably  demand  the  erection  of  the  two  provinces, 
Bohemia  and  Moravia,  where  they  form  the  preponderant 
element  of  the  rural  population,  and  the  substratum 
of  the  urban  masses,  into  a  completely  independent 
national  state*  It  would  be  a  dose  parallel  to  this  claim 
if  the  Irish  Nationalists  proposed  the  complete  separa- 
tion of  the  whole  island  from  the  British  Empire  and 
the  absolute  supremacy  in  the  new  state  of  the  Catholic 
popttIatk>n;  except  that  to  the  Tchechs'  programme 
the  objections  are  graver  still. 

(i.)  In  whole  districts  along  the  borders  there  is  a  solid 
German  population,  and  a  German  element  has  estab- 
lished itself  permanently  in  most  of  the  towns,  especially 
in  the  more  accessible  province  of  Moravia*^  In  the 
streets  of  Prag,  riots  between  Tchech  and  German  mobs 
often  lead  to  bloodshed ;  and  the  present  war,  in  which 
the  Austrian  government  has  forced  the  Tchech  con- 
scripts to  fight  against  their  Slavonic  brethren,  the 
Russians,  and  shot  them  down  when  they  hesitated  to 
obey,  will  have  immeasurably  embittered  the  race- 
hatred* This  German  minority  cannot  be  abandoned 
to  Tchech  nationalism,  enjoying  power  for  the  first 
time,  and  schooled,  as  a  victim,  in  Austrian  methods  of 
using  it* 

Tefuchs.  Gtrmans. 

.    4»xo7/)oo  (65%)  3^1X1000(35%) 

.     x,738/)oo  (71%)  679/)oo&8%) 


Totil  pop.  of  both*^  5»845iOoo  (68%)  a^Sgo/xx)  (31.5%) 


a64  TCHBCH  AND  GERMAN 

(ii.)  Bohetntt  and  Mofavia  are  great  manu&cturti^ 
and  mining  diBtricCs,  depending  for  dietr  ptoeperity  on 
gcxxi  oommunication  with  markets.^  If  they  separate 
diemaehes  politically  from  the  New  Germany,  diey  put 
it  in  her  power  to  build  a  tariff  wall  against  ^em  vAdA 
will  cttt  them  off  from  the  oiftn  world*  Hie  interior  (rf 
the  Bohemian  bastion  is  drained  by  the  upper  system  of 
ibtWbt,  and  its  trade  is  tendmg  more  and  more  to  flow 
down  with  the  river  to  Hamburg  throiqli  the  gorge 
?dieie  it  breaks  the  Brt-gebirge ;  iwdiile  the  arteries  of 
Moravia  focus  at  V^nna,  where  the  Austrian  tmsk  Hot 
starts  for  Trieste*  In  both  difectk>ns  exit  and  entrance 
can  only  be  made  dirous^  German  territory* 

(iii.)  The  Tcheds  possess  a  third  door  to  the  East, 
of  which  Germany  does  not  own  die  thresfai^,  the 
Moravian  gap  that  leads  to  Roland*  But  none  of  their 
trade  pmses  in  diat  direction  to  the  vast  Russian  marisets 
diat  lie  beyond,  because  these  are  already  monc^iolised 
by  the  important  Polish  manu&ctttrmg  districts  that 
intervene,  and  the  Polish  Blad[  Country  and  the  Russian 
cofttkAxods  form  a  closed  economic  system  of  their  own. 

On  die  old  political  scale,  then,  Gec^praphy  decreed 

*  1  iMse  mo  pfofiBCcs  are  tn  net  me  ccinve  ok  suticj  oi  Auwmn 
Mosstfyv  bt  oOTnimncips  DOCB  ijoiver  aimimi  taa  on^En  n  lav 
wittt^fiy  activity  ifld  tlmr  tBitilc  fimwinictun^  wiule  tiie  pfovinotf 

SoUllHWCSt  OK  VlCtlMy  the  SlJQflSBOlds  of  pUfC  CjCflllAB  iMitionAfy» 


lit  Mtnde  the  BmIboi  Mctioa  of  the  Alp^  and  aie 
economicaWy  bv  their  geogr^ihical  diaiacter.    A  flompaiia'vc 
popwlatiom  (taken  €rmii  the  teiimi  of  1900)  will  flMke  tUs  dear : 


^^'^^'"'*     .    ^x%OQO         Lower  Aiotna    .        .     j^zoo/xx) 
Moravia         af^J«ooo         Styrb^       .  z^j6/)00 

OoZa 


iZfOoo         Cifinthia    ...  ^d/jMV 

— — "—         ijnii    \iiiiniuim    me 

»4S4/MM»          If  alimi  nf theTitatiBP)  gSo^ooo 

SnsNBS    •        >        •  r^Si'BSO 

t^perAMtfia     .  Oie^ooo 


rCMECH  AND  (GERMAN  a^ 

dial  tiie  Tdbcchs  should  be  a  nation :  on  ihc  newMonmnic 
scak  it  has  brigaded  them  inexorably  vvith  the  Gemua 
group*    But  though  her  common  frontier  with  the 
Russian  BmfAxe  would  give  an  independent  Tchccii 
state  no  economic  advanta^e^  it  would  have  political 
effects  most  dangerous  to  the  peace  of  Europe*    The 
iarritable  persecution  of  the  German  minority  by  the 
Tdiecfa  nationalists  would  provoke  economic  retaliatioa 
from  the  German  Empire,  and  the  Tchechs  would  dien 
ask  for  the  intervention  of  Russia  in  a  fit  of  Panslav 
pasBton«    The  Bohemian  bastion  is  the  strategic  key 
to  the  New  Germany/  and  Russia  could  throw  as  many 
troops  into  it  as  she  pleased  through  the  Moravian  gap, 
whidif  though  it  woukl  be  strategically  Germany^s  most 
Vtthierable  spot,  woukl  be  entirely  out  of  Gmnany's 
military  control.    Such  a  situation  would  be  intoleraUe 
to  Germany*    She  would  have  to  insure  herself  against 
its  oocurrence  by  a  system  of  alliances  like  those  till  now 
in  vogue,  and  the  re^t  would  be  another  tmiveisal  war* 
An  independent  Tchech  state,  then,  would  be  against 
the  uhimate  interest  of  the  Tchechs  themselves  (for 
neither  the  German  boycott  nor  the  Rtissian  suzerainty 
that  broke  it  wouki  please  them),  and  against  the  direct 
interest  of  all  Etuope*    On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
Tdiecfas  are  to  enter,  as  a  tiny  minority,  the  vast  cor- 
pQfatkm  of  the  new  German  Empire,  ihtir  natk>naltty 
will  have  to  be  safeguarded  energetically,  and  they  will 
pBobibly  propose  in  the  second  place  that  Bcrfiemia- 
Kloravia  enter  the  German  Empire  as  an  individual  tmit, 
a  femth  member  by  the  side  of  the  North,  the  South, 
and  Austria,  with  a  special  international  guarantee 
beiiind  her* 

^BfaaaxdL  once  said  that  the  mtlitafy  pofwar  which  ooatroltod 
BoboDtt  oontfoUed  Europe. 


~1 


a66  TCHECH  AND  GERMAN 

Guaiantees  to  a  weaker  partner  that  outsiders  will 
iq)hold  his  interests  are  a  poor  alternative  to  a  c^Mcity 
for  tqjholding  them  himself,  and  they  gall  the  stronger 
partner,  whose  free  action  they  limit  and  whose  honesty 
they  put  in  doubt.  They  are  an  occasion  for  bicteings, 
and  we  had  better  do  without  them  if  we  can.  A 
guarantee  can  perhaps  be  avoided  in  this  case  by  Uttiiig 
the  whole  of  Austria,  within  the  limits  to  whidi  we 
have  reduced  her,  enter  the  German  Empire  as  a  single 
unit,^  on  condition  that  she  grants  Home  Rule  within 
this  district  to  the  whole  Tchech  nationality.  The 
Tchechs,  possessing  more  than  a  third*  of  the  total 
population  and  equipped  with  national  self-government, 
would  easily  hold  their  own  within  the  Austrian  state, 
and  the  whole  Austrian  unit,  representing  proportioa- 
ately  the  interests  of  all  its  components,  would  hold  its 
own  in  turn  within  the  German  Empire. 

By  such  an  arrangement  the  Tchedi  tutionality 
would  assert  itself  through  co-operation  with  the 
German  neighbour,  and  not  by  making  war  on  him, 
and  two  farther  advantages  wiU  appear  when  the 
formula  is  worked  out  in  practice. 

(i.)  The  existing  pohtical  machinery  will  suffer  the 
minimum  amount  of  disturbance.  In  the  Crown-lands 
Parliament  which  at  present  sits  at  Vienna,  representa- 
tives elected  by  manhood  suffiage  from  pc^nilalioos 
speaking  half  a  dozen  different  languages,  have  nude 

'  To  whkh  "  North  Germany,"  for  comractoen'  sake,  migtat  cede 
tht  fragment  of  Silesia,  which  our  propaaed  Polish  frontier  woud  knc 
bcr  bejbnd  the  Rigbt  bank  of  the  HgtzenplBtt  stream. 

*  Rcckonm^  by  ptoviaces  on  the  boss  of  tbe  bat  ccnun  {19)0)  iht 
total  population  i»  our  "Reduced  Austria"  will  be  about  sintts 
millions ;  while  in  the  same  year  there  were  5,953,000  TdicdK  nd 
9,173,000  Germans  in  tbe  whole  Austrian  Crown-bnda,  all  of  whoa 
Will  remain,  acrordine  to  the  preaent  scheme,  within  die  Au9>iix> 
uni^  though  practicalqr  all  populationa  of  other  nationality  will  biK 
been  deladbed  from  it. 


TCHECH  AND  GERMAN 


TJSq 


the  efifort  to  do  legislative  work  together^  and  in  spite  of 
scenes  that  the  tension  of  the  racial  atmosphere  almost 
excuses,  have  begun  to  acquire  the  constitutional  habit* 
It  would  be  a  pity  if  Germans  and  Tchechs  (the  other 
nationalities  will  have  simplified  the  situation  by 
dropping  out)  should  deprive  themselves  of  this  field 
for  collaboration  and  mutual  understanding*^ 

(ii*)  The  pattern  for  Tchech  Home  Rule  already 
exists  in  the  Constitution  of  the  Austrian  Crown-lands, 
under  induch  the  several  provinces,  besides  being 
represented  in  the  Vienna  parliament,  enjoy  a  modicum 
of  local  self-government  under  diets  of  their  own*' 
This  system,  and  the  present  British  government's  bill 
for  Home  Rtile  in  Catholic  Ireland,  would  be  good 
precedents  for  the  scope  of  the  new  Tchech  parliament 
to  be  established  at  Prag*  As  in  Ireland,  the  chief 
difficulty  will  lie  in  settling,  not  the  powers  to  be 
del^^ated,  but  the  geographical  limits  within  which 
they  are  to  be  operative ;  and  this  problem  brings  out 
the  most  decisive  advantage  of  the  scheme  for  Home 

>  The  following  table  shows  the  ctspectivc  strengths  of  the  di£Bereiit 
aatiooalities  within  the  Atsstrian  Crown-hnds,  accordiiig  to  the  census 
of  zgoo,  and  the  number  of  seats  assigned  respectively  to  each  nation- 
aiity  in  the  parliament  at  Vienna  by  the  electoral  law  which  mtxoduoed 
Miuhood  Su£Erage  in  1906. 


Soitdiem  Slavs 


Populotun* 

RtpnswicBtifHU 

9,z7a/)oo 

a33-xs  39r365 

5/955.000 

108-1:  55«3 

3,a8a,ooo 

80-1:  !B#X50 

34-X5  9M7X 

z,Z93/)oo  I 
7zi«ooo  i 

37-x:  5M59 

TTTJfiOO 

X9-x:  38;^ 

7i5/)oo 

5-1 :  X43/»o 

Total  .  .    a6,i07,ooo  516 

The  representation  of  certain  nationalities  is  thus  still  very  te 
from  being  proportioiial  to  dieir  real  numbers* 
*  GaUcta  nas  secured  more  complete  Home  Rule  than  any  other 


i 


268  TCHECM  AND  GERMAN 

Rule  vnAin  Austria  as  against  separate  membetship 
in  the  German  Empire* 

In  the  latter  case  just  as  much  as  if  she  became  a 
completely  independent  state^  Bohemia-Moravia  wDold 
have  to  be  organised  as  a  compact  gec^^raphical  unit, 
so  that  the  German  minority  in  the  country  would  in 
both  cases  be  forced  to  take  its  government  from  Prag, 
and  would  need  an  external  guarantee  against  the 
Tchechs  of  just  the  same  kind  as  the  Tchedis  them- 
selves would  be  requiring  gainst  the  whole  German 
nation.  But  in  the  event  of  Home  Rule  within  a  united 
Austria,  the  total  population,  Tchech  and  German 
alike,  would  be  represented  in  the  Vienna  parliament 
already;  the  plebiscite  to  ascertain  what  sections  wuhed 
to  avail  themselves,  in  addition,  of  the  proffered  devolu- 
tion, could  be  taken  parish  by  parish ;  and  the  area 
the  Tchech  Nationalist  administration  should  control 
from  Prag  could  be  determined  to  a  nicety  by  its 
result** 

We  can,  in  fact,  state  the  general  principle  that  the 
less  absolute  the  sovereignty,  that  is,  the  power  of 
uncontrolled,  irresponsible  action,  demanded  by  any 

» 

^  The  materials  for  dcawtng  out  the  map  of  the  Tchech  Home  Ruk 
area  aie  akcady  to  hand,  m  the  electoral  districtB  constituted  in  1906 
for  the  Austnan  Central  Parliameat.  Some  distrkti  are  purely  Tchedi 
in  poptifaifion  and  return  only  Tchech  deputies :  dicse  would  oettajoly 
chooR  Home  Rule«  Others  contain  a  miied  popfulation  of  Tcfaeds 
and  Getmansy  and  are  organised  in  two  constituencies  of  identical  tool 
cjrtent  but  d^erent  nationality,  each  provided  with  its  own  register  of 
voters  and  returning  its  own  national  candidate  to  parliament:  the 
fatte  of  these  would  be  decided  by  whichever  natiofiality  was  in  the 
ni^onty*  The  Tchech  constituency,  if  its  register  contained  more  voces 
tfatti  the  German  constituency  fat  the  same  area,  would  outvote  the 
latter  in  favour  of  devolution  for  die  area  in  question,  while  the  Gcmufl 
constituency  in  ^  opposite  case  would  retain  the  area  for  centraltsatioa ; 
but  of  course  every  racial  constituency,  those  whidi  fell  witlun  the 
Home  Rule  area  and  those  which  remained  outside  it  alfte,  would 
continue  to  smd  representatives  to  the  general  parliament  at  Vieiuia 
00  the  same  esoellent  system  as  before* 


TCHBCH  AND  GERMAN  ^69 

gjvcn  political  group^  the  more  exactly  we  can  draw  its 
firontiefs  in  harmony  with  the  national  feelings  of  the 
k)cal  populations;  while  the  more  complete  the 
independence  it  demands^  the  more  we  shall  be  com- 
pelled to  sacrifice  the  wishes  of  minorities  to  considera- 
tions of  administrative^  economic  and  even  of  strategical 
geography.  But  it  is  not  yet  time  to  discuss  the  con- 
chisions  to  which  this  will  lead  us*  We  have  so  far 
surveyed  only  the  first  of  our  main  problems,  namely, 
irfiat  gains  and  losses  an  honest  relayix^  of  national 
feondations  will  bring  to  Germany^  and  before  we 
turn  our  attention  elsewhere,  we  will  attempt  to  give  a 
ckar  summary  of  our  present  results* 

(u)  We  have  detached  from  Germany  the  following 
populations,  estimated  at  maximum  figures,  on  the  basis 
of  the  census  taken  in  1905  : 

AhaefLoataat       .    1,8x5^000   i^upjfomDg  that  tfaa  whole  of  tht 

RadHlaad  elects  to  sepifate 
itself  fRxn  Germsfiy*) 

Schleswig  0oo/xx>    (AppfOKunate  csttmate  to  include 

both  die  X99fOoo  Danes  and  the 

.) 


aodW.ftasBa     .    3/Mfioo    (Atwimfng  that  all  Poles  subfect  to 

Gefmany  are  detached  from  her, 
tfaoup^  we  have  actualh^  left 
*^*^*?f*^ffabtf  iiMWffititi  in  oJIwia 
and  W.  Pkusna.) 

Total  detadied        5iaox/xx> 

(ii.)  In  compensation  we  have  added  to  Germany  a 
reduced  Austria  with  a  population  (on  the  basis  of  the 
census  taken  in  2900)  of  approximately  16,000,000. 

We  have  ultimately,  there£Dre,  increased  the  popula- 
tion of  the  whole  German  Empire,  which  numbered 
6o,64Z/x>o  in  1905,  by  20,799,000,  raising  it  to  a  total 
of  7i|44o,ooo>    Statisticians  calculate  that  the  popula- 


ayo  TCHECH  AND  GERMAN 

tion  of  Germany,  within  its  present  limits,  has  risen  in 
the  interval  since  2905  to  65/)oo,ooo,  an  increase  of 
7*5  per  cent*:  if  we  add  this  percentage  to  our  total  for 
the  United  Germany,^  we  shall  find  that  the  popula- 
tion of  the  new  German  Empire  within  the  proposed 
frontiers  would  amount  at  the  present  moment  to  no 
less  than  76,798,000  souls,  distributed  into  the  following 
groups : 


n 


(a)  North  Germany  .    46,50X1000    (Of  ^idioin  *    36,i3S/xk>   would 

formerly  have  faciooged  Ip  the 
prcaeot  ktogdom  of  Prussia*) 
South  Germany  .     13,0971000  * 

7)  Austria  17,900,000    (Including  about  io^ao/x»  Ger- 

mans and  6,88p»iooo  Tchecfas.) 

Total  T^/J^fi^^ 

If,  at  the  Conference  which  will  meet  at  the  end  of  this 
war  to  attempt,  like  the  Vienna  G>ngress  a  century  ago, 
the  lasting  settlement  of  Europe,  we  could  succ^  in 
reconstituting  the  German  Empire  on  some  such  lines 

*  The  rate  of  increase  among  the  added  Austrian  populatioo  is 
certainly  lower  than  the  average  within  the  present  limits  of  Gcmiasy; 
but  on  the  other  hand  the  Geiman  census  was  only  taken  in  tgof,  wmte 
the  census  on  which  our  figures  for  Austria  are  based  was  tuen  five 
years 


*    pop.  of  Prussia  \       .^    i  total  of  SdUmwigtrs 
in  1905        f  \and  PoUs  in  2905 

37/)oo/)oo  X  '^^     -.     3,38^,000  X  ^^  .  36,i35/)oo. 

'Bavaria 6,534*000 

Wurtemberg a,3oa/xx> 

Baden 2tOiifioo 

Hessen  (the  Southern  block  only)  9x3,000 

Frankfurt  ^     ^ 3B4>iooo 

Other  territories  detadied  fRrni  Prussia  00 

either  side  of  Frankfort  ....  xoo/)oo 


Total  (by  census  of  1905)  Z3,z^/x»  x  -^ 

■■  X3/)97/>oo. 


TCHECH  AND  GERMAN  271 

2s  these,  we  should  have  accomplished  most  of  the 
objects  with  which  we  started  this  discussion,  and 
avoided  most  of  the  dangers  vihich  we  saw  ahead  of  us* 

We  should  have  relaid  the  foundations  of  Nationality 
in  Alsace-Lorraine,  Schlesw^  and  Poland,  where 
Prussian  policy  has  deliberately  broken  them  up,  and 
we  should  have  restored  the  superstructure  of  European 
peace  endangered  thereby  for  many  years  and  now 
finally  shattered ;  yet  by  honourably  applying  the 
principle  of  Nationality  to  Germany's  advantage  as  well 
as  to  her  detriment,  we  should  have  left  her  with  a 
considerably  larger  territory  and  population  than  she 
possessed  before  this  war*  This  just  aggrandisement 
would  primarily  benefit  Germany  herself,  but  ulti- 
mately it  would  further  the  best  interests  of  all  Europe, 
because  it  would  be  more  likely  than  any  other  measure 
to  produce  that  change  in  German  public  opinion  whidi 
is  the  only  possible  keystone  of  peace  in  the  future* 

ff  Prussian  militarism  be  refuted  by  the  issue  of  this 
war,  the  German  nation  will  assuredly  be  alienated  from 
the  Prussian  system  for  ever,  unless  either  or  both  of 
two  consequences  follow :  eidier  the  humiliation  of  the|| 
national  honour,  or  such  a  rearrangement  of  frontierslj 
as  would  leave  Germany  at  the  mercy  of  her  neighbourship 
and  reduce  her  to  a  state  of  permanent  fear* 

Were  the  G>nference  to  create  such  a  situation  as  this, 
the  German  nation  would  be  thrown  into  the  arms  of 
Pnissianism,  and  would  serve  its  unsympathetic  ideals 
with  greater  enthusiasm  than  it  has  ever  yet  lavished 
upon  them*  But  if  the  settlement  takes  the  line  of  our 
proposals,  both  these  consequences  will  be  avoided* 
The  German  Empire  will  emerge  more  majestic  and 
less  vulnerable  than  before*  The  element  that  is  not 
Prussian,  but  is  Germany's  true  soul,  will  regain  free 


873  TCHBCH  AND  GBIOCAN 

flfav*  take  the  lead  in  the  natioii's  life  ivhidi  it  held  till 
]      BJemarck  wxested  it  away ^  and  swamp  Prmwiantim  not 
merely  by  the  greater  vteality  of  its  ideas,  but  even  by 
the  weight  of  superior  numbers* 
j  We  can  readily  discern  the  policy  ^Niiuch  the  New 

Germany  will  fc^ow*  Her  first  tadc  wifl  be  the  re- 
building of  that  magnificent  commerce  and  industry 
which  it  took  forty-three  years  to  conjure  up,  and  ooe 
season's  campaign  to  spirit  away  again*  She  will  have 
a  bitter  moment  when  she  gazes  at  its  ruins,  but  her 
emotion  will  be  regret  and  not  despair*  Our  setdemeiit 
offers  her  once  more  the  promise  of  a  great  economic 
future*  Hamburg,  Danzig  and  Trieste  will  be  secured 
to  her  as  open  doors  for  her  commerce,  and  motual 
interests  will  bring  her  to  an  understanding  with  the 
Balkan  ZoUverein,  more  stable  and  of  wider  effect  than 
Ae  present  precarious  customs-uaion  between  the  tm 
halves  of  the  Dual  Monarchy*    This  labour  of  good 

1    hope  will  occupy  the  New  Germany's  best  energies  for 

I    many  years  to  come* 


PANSLAVISM  373 


CHAPTER  VII 

PANSLAVISM,  OR  GERMANY'S  FEARS 

Wi  have  now  cosq>kt6d  half  our  task^  the  reconstruction 
of  Central  and  South-Eastem  Europe*  We  concluded 
the  last  chaq>ter  with  a  summary  of  our  results.  A 
leca^tulation  of  the  steps  by  which  we  reached  them 
will  be  the  best  introduction  to  the  problems  that  still 
lie  before  us* 

(L)  The  first  necessity  of  primitive  societies  is  **  Strong 
Government,'^  external  to  the  govemedt  because  they 
have  no  organic  lirJcs  with  one  another  in  themselves* 

(IL)  Within  this  chrysalis  of  mechanical  union,  a 
natural,  oq;anic  unity  grows  up  between  the  governed 
among  themselves,  expressing  itself  through  diverse 
common  factors:  language^  geography,  religion, 
tradition* 

(IIL)  It  is  a  necessary  phase  of  political  growth  that 
diis  common  self-consciousness  or  Nationality  should 
become  the  principle  of  political  structure,  and  the 
self-government  of  natural  human  groups  replace  the 
arbitrary  grouping  of  **  Strong  Government '"  as  the 
ideal  of  the  State* 

(TV*)  This  ideal  of  self-governing  national  states  with 
natural  frontiers  (frontiers,  that  is,  whose  sanction  is  not 
external  force,  but  the  respective  common  desires  of  the 
pqwilafions  on  either  side  of  them)  has  been  realised  in 
the  West  of  Europe  so  thoroughly  that  the  national 
states  so  formed  have  been  able  to  turn  all  their  energies 
to  new  phases  of  development  based  on  this  achievement* 

(a)  All  of  them  (Holland,  Belgium,  England,  France, 


a74  PANSLAVISM 

Spain,  Portt^)  have  expanded  over  the  less  civilised 
parts  of  the  Earth,  and  have  divided  between  them  both 
the  regions  producing  the  best  tropical  raw  materials, 
and  the  temperate  regions  outside  Europe  best  suited  to 
European  colonisation. 

(6)  Two  of  them,  France  and  England,  have  become 
"  Great  Powers  "  by  leading  the  way  m  the  "  Industrial 
Revolution  "  which  has  transformed  the  environment  ctf 
human  civilisation ;  and  they  are  now  with  all  their 
energies  and  with  increasing  success  adapting  themselves 
to  these  new  conditions. 

(V.)  In  Central  Europe,  on  the  other  hand,  owing  to  a 
less  favourable  start  in  civilisation  and  to  subsequent 
misfortunes,  Nationality  did  not  assert  itself  till  z866- 
1870,  and  then  only  by  a  compromise  with  "  Strong 
Government  "  typified  in  the  policy  of  Bismarck.  This 
has  caused  several  serious  flaws  in  development  here  as 
contrasted  with  the  West : 

(a)  Only  two  nationalities,  the  German  and  die 
Magyar,  have  here  attained  self-government,  and  diey 
have  been  usit^  it  ever  since  (foUowing  "  Strong 
Government  "  tradition),  to  maim  and  stunt  the  develop- 
ment of  weaker  nationalities  behindhand  in  the  race : 
Frenchmen  of  Lorraine  and  Alsatians,  Danes  of 
Schlesw^  Poles,  Tdiechs,  Italian  Trentini,  and 
Southern  Slavs. 

(6)  They  have  also  entered  with  vigour  the  "  post- 
nationalist  "  phase  of  expansion  and  Industrialism,  but 
here  they  have  been  handicapped  by  coming  late  in  the 
race  themselves,  as  compared  with  the  Western  poweis, 
who  have  already  "  inherited  the  Earth." 

(c)  Germany  is  bitterly  conscious  that  she  has  not 
found  for  herself  "  a  place  in  the  Stm,"  but  in  order 
to  win  it  she  has  not  concentrated  all  her  efforts  vpon 


\ 


PANSLAVISM  vn 

eoonomic  and  social  oonstruction,  though  this  is  the 
nonnal  activity  of  the  present  phase  of  Eutopean 
civilisation*  During  the  last  forty-three  years  she  has 
displayed  amaring  ability  in  this  direction,  and  already 
won  for  herself  a  very  large  niche  at  the  expense  of  her 
rivals  in  the  field,  and  to  their  advantage  as  well,  for 
the  whole  world  in  the  industrial  phase  profits  by  the 
success  of  any  one  member  of  it*  Nevertheless,  she  has 
chosen  to  foster  her  Militarism,  the  obsolete  weapon 
of  **  Strong  Government,'"  which  Bismarck  partially 
adapted  to  the  solution  of  the  national  problem,  but 
iidiich  is  entirely  unadaptable  to  the  conquest  of 
industrial  supremacy* 

(VI*)  The  present  war  is  Germany's  attempt  to  **  hack 
her  way  through''  the  Western  nations  to  the  best 
''  place  in  the  Sun,"  by  military  force*  The  best  com- 
mentary on  her  action  are  the  results  she  hopes  to 
achieve  by  it* 

(a)  She  hopes  to  annex  Belgium,  and  possibly  to  force 
Holland  into  a  disadvantageous  zoUverein,  in  order  that 
she  may  have  more  convenient  ports  for  her  industrial 
districts  in  Westphalia  and  the  Rhineland ;  and  so  to 
break  the  power  of  France  that  she  may  cease  to  be 
an  independent  factor  in  European  politics*  If  she 
succeeds  in  this,  she  will  have  reduced  the  West  to  a 
diaos  of  **  robbery  under  arms  "  such  as  it  has  not 
known  since  the  **  Hundred  Years'  War  "  and  the  career 
of  Charles  the  Bold,  and  have  swept  away  the  work  of 
four  centuries,  not  merely  the  **  national  self-govern- 
ment "  inaugurated  by  the  English  and  French  revolu- 
tions, but  even  the  preliminary  **  national  consolidation  ** 
accomplished  by  Louis  XI*  and  Henry  VII* 

(6)  She  threatens  to  seize  the  transmarine  possessions 
of  aU  the  Western  nations  alike,  great  powers  and  small. 


396  PANSLAVISM 

btUigcmUs  and  neutrals.  The  attitude  of  Votta^ 
and  Spain  i1io«b  wbat  tiiey  fear.  This  would  desoojr 
the  whole  vigorous  oolomal  development  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  triiidi  only  began  after  die  resuk  of  dw 
Napoleonic  wan  had  definitively  settled  the  ownenfaip 
of  these  tcrritoiies. 

(VII.)  We  may  birly  awdude  that  in  this  piratical 
atta^  Germany  stands  for  reactiott  to  a  crude  idui 
that  European  Gvilisation  has  consciously  transcended, 
vrbiic  the  Western  powers  that  are  defending  diemselves 
^^ainat  hex  represent  the  new  activities  by  which 
European  Civilisation  is  opening  a  better  diapter.  In 
diis  stn^gle,  therefore,  it  is  the  Worid's  vital  interest 
that  Getmany  should  fail. 

We  have  reached  these  propositions  through  a  survey 
of  the  facts,  starting  for  fairness'  salie  with  the  fact  that 
is  at  once  the  most  important  of  all  and  the  most  di£B- 
culc  for  us  to  appreciate  jusdy:  Germany's  attitude 
towards  her  own  ambitions.  But  we  found  tiut  "  tout 
conqucndxe,  c'est  unit  pardonner  peut-ttre,  mais  oe 
n'est  point  tout  petmettte ; "  and  we  made  up  our  minds 
that  we  must  refute  German  force  by  force,  in  order  that 
we  may  bring  it  into  our  power  to  reoi^janise  the  political 
structure  of  Central  Europe  on  the  basis  of  the  West, 
instead  of  sufFerii^  the  West  to  succumb  to  the  level 
of  the  centre.  We  have  therefore  approached  the  tadc 
of  leoomtruction  on  a  national  basis,  and  painfully 
striven  to  right  the  injustices  the  German  system  has 
perpetuated  from  Alsaoe-Lorraine  to  the  Westen 
frontier  of  Poland  and  from  Schleswig  to  Macedonia. 

But  we  have  also  recognised  that  this  recasting  of 
Europe,  based  though  it  be  on  the  living  will  of  popula- 
tions, has  no  virtue  in  itself,  and  that  it  is  merely  the 


\ 


PANSLAVISM  377 


pcduninary  oondition  for  a  change  of  hearty  the  sole 
e&ctnre  cuie  of  the  evil*  Our  objective  is  to  convert 
the  German  nation  from  the  Prussian  idea  to  otir  own, 
and  we  can  only  do  this  by  first  crushing  their  hopes 
of  military  victory,  and  then  convincing  them  that  we 
are  striving  for  a  settlement  on  impartial  lines*  We 
have  to  show  them  that  we  find  our  own  interest  in  tht 
peaceful  industrial  development  of  all  the  nations, 
Germany  included,  side  by  side  with  ourselves* 

If  we  have  taken  all  the  factors  into  considexalmn,  we 
ous^t  to  succeed  in  this,  but  we  have  not  yet  con- 
skteted  them  all*  Germany  is  at  war  not  merely  with 
Eoi^aiid,  Fiance  and  Belgium,  but  widi  Russia,  and 
if  we  tie  concerned  with  the  German  nation^s  psydbo- 
logy,  here  is  die  factor  that  dominates  its  pmseat 
disposition* 

At  this  moment  the  German  nation  is  as  tmited  in 
feelii^  as  otur  own,  and  every  individual  in  it  as  prepared 

tomake  the  ^Ktreme  sacrifice  for  the  tiattfinal  cause* 
People  do  not  rise  to  this  temper  for  a  cause  whidi 
they  know  to  be  bad  in  dieir  own  hearts,  and  which 
they  aie  aware  the  public  opinion  of  the  World  will 
oondenm*  Such  a  cause  may  be  the  tihimarr  or  pre- 
ponderant  object  for  which  they  are  fig^uing:  ihey 
may  dehl>ecately  have  been  concentrating  all  their 
satkmal  energies  upon  it  for  years  :  but  in  the  supreme 
stress  it  will  not  inspire  them*  The  Bulgarians  lost  the 
aeoottd  Balkan  War  because  in  a  bad  cause  their  qiirit 
fttled  them*  If  the  nation  ruies  to  the  occasion  never- 
theless, as  the  Germans  are  doing  now,  it  wiH  be 
heoauoe  they  are  looking  at  the  atrugs^  xd  fones  in 
y/Adch  they  are  engaged  from  a  wholly  di£Ferent  point 
df  view* 
The  Germans  aie  -noc  flo^  nwnking  of  ambitiOBS  to 


278  PANSLAVISM 

be  realised  at  the  expense  of  the  Western  nations, 
although  that  is  the  real  issue  at  stake.  The  conscious 
idea  that  spuis  them  is  substantially  identical  with  the 
conviction  that  governs  our  own  minds.  Hiey  feel 
themselves  to  be  the  champions  of  European  civilisation, 
"  whose  cause  Great  Britain  has  basely  betrayed," 
against  the  many^headed  hydra  of  Panslavism,  "  whom 
envy  has  moved  Great  Britain  to  aid."  For  them 
Russia  is  the  principal  and  we  are  merely  her  seconds  : 
German  defeat  spells  the  abasement  of  civilised  Europe 
beneath  the  barbarous  Russian  idea. 

The  whole  policy  of  Prussianism,  which  we  have 
weighed  and  found  wanting,  transforms  itself  to  German 
eyes  under  this  l^ht.'  If  Germany  is  attacking  tlie 
Western  nations,  it  is  because  they  have  sold  their 
birthright,  and  the  champion  of  civilisation  must  exact 
from  them  the  power  and  wealth  they  have  prostituted 
to  make  it  bear  fruit  again  in  civilisation's  cause.  U 
Magyardom  persecutes  the  Slovaks,  and  the  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  at  Vienna  ruthlessly  represses 
Southern  Slav  nationality,  it  is  because  these  are  new 
heads  of  tibe  hydra  reared  suddenly  from  an  unexpected 
quarter,  and  must  be  crushed  bdTore  the  vaster  fangs 
of  Russia  have  time  to  fasten  upon  the  German  world 
from  the  other  flanks  If  German  policy  maitifaing  the 
scandalous  mi^;ovemment  of  the  Turk^  Empire  over 
large  alien  populations,  it  is  not  simply  in  order  to  coax 
a  market  for  German  enterprise,  but  to  close  the  Russian 
monster's  Southern  sally-port.  We  can  understand 
Germany's  frame  of  mind  most  easily  from  this  last 
instance,  for  if  we  had  not  kept  the  same  dii^^oeful 

>  Thti,  of  cooTK,  expUini  why  the  officul  Tusti&catioa  of  dieii  actioa 
publiAcd  by  the  German  govenimeat  aftet  the  aUamophc  had 
happened,  bean  the  title  "  How  Rtnda  made  the  Wv." 


^ 


PANSLAVISM  379 

guard  over  Turkey  all  through  the  nineteentfa  century^ 
Genoany  would  not  have  been  able  to  relieve  us  of  it 
in  the  twentieth. 

The  arguments  with  which  we  defended  our  conduct 
then  read  like  first  drafts  of  the  German  arguments  now  : 
'"Russians  expansion  threatens  our  position  in  India, 
where  our  rule  stands  for  civilisation  and  progress  and 
where  Russian  conquest  would  bring  darkness  and 
reaction*  The  most  vulnerable  point  in  otu:  position  is 
our  line  of  oommtmications  through  the  Mediterranean, 
which  is  at  present  screened  from  Russia  by  Turkey* 
It  will  be  laid  bare  to  her  if  Turkey  collapses*  We  must 
therefore  bolster  up  the  '  integrity  of  Tturkey/  and 
if  the  Berlin  Treaty  brings  a  generation  more  of 
misery  to  the  Balkans,  only  to  be  terminated  by  a 
bloody  war,  that  does  not  weigh  in  the  balance  against 
the  harvest  of  civilisation  that  the  respite,  perhaps 
permanent,  will  have  enabled  India  to  reap*'' 

We  pass  our  verdict  on  this  argument  in  the  shame 
with  which  we  recall  it*  The  lacquer  of  idealism, 
deposited  upon  it  by  a  school  of  Victorian  statesmen 
with  such  good  faith,  has  worn  away,  and  we  can  see 
the  base  metal  of  unenlightened  self-seeking  beneath* 
Our  own  error  in  the  past  will  help  us  both  to  excuse 
and  to  correct  the  strongest  and  most  conscious  element 
in  Germany's  feeling  at  the  present* 

We  must  come  to  grips  with  Panslavism*  Germany's 
fear  of  it  is  a  psychological  fact*  In  her  belief  she  has 
been  driven  by  deadly  peril  to  put  her  whole  fortune 
to  the  touch*  In  the  light  of  our  own  attitude  towards 
Russia,  which  we  began  to  abandon  less  than  a  dozen 
years  ago>  this  creates  a  presumption  dut  some  real 
fulcrum  exists  to  sustain  such  an  immense  spiritual 
leverage,  and  if  Germany's  presentment  of  the  Russian 


aSo  PANSLAVISM 

aatjooal  duumcttr  is  trtie,  all  ottr  hbeturs  will  have  been 
of  no  avail*  England  and  Fiance  may  be  ^dis- 
interested/" and  Germany  may  oome  to  believe  it; 
but  it  is  no  use  bringing  Nationality  iinto  its  own  in 
Central  Euiope,  and  preserving  it  in  the  West,  if  West 
and  Centre  alike  are  thereby  delivered  over  to  be  ^ 
prey  of  Russian  militaristic  ambitions  as  bad  as,  or  wofse 

than,  those  we  are  now  combatting  in  Germany* 

If  the  Allies  win  this  war,  Russia  will  probably  have  a 
more  decisive  voice  than  any  of  us  in  the  European 
setdement  that  must  follow*  It  is  our  imperative  task, 
therefore,  to  analyse  those  forces  immanent  m  the 
Russian  Empire,  which  may  so  gready  modify  the 
realisation  of  our  own  intentions,  and  the  remainder  of 
this  book  will  be  devoted  to  dififerent  aspects  of  the 
same  question*  In  Eastern  as  in  Central  Europe,  we 
will  approach  our  problem  from  the  standpoint  of 
Nationality* 


THE  RISORGIMBNTO  OF  POLAND     aSi 


CHAPTER  Vin 

RUSSIAN  mPERIAUSH  AND  NATIONAL  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

A*  The  Risargimtnto  of  Pdand 

The  last  chapter  left  on  our  hands  the  question : 
What  will  be  the  attitude  of  a  victorious  Russia  towards 
the  National  princq;>le  in  Europe  i  Will  she  respect  it 
or  will  she  trample  upon  it  i 

The  German  conceives  **  Panslavism  *'  as  a  vast 
conspiracy  on  Russians  part,  in  which  the  minor  Slav 
nationalities  are  her  tools,  and  the  domination  of  Europe 
her  object*  He  will  argue  that  it  is  simply  a  specious 
name  for  **  Pan-Russianism/*  The  Russian  will  pro- 
bably ezdaim  that  the  very  meaning  of  the  word  is 
sufficient  vindication  of  his  honest  intentions*  **  The 
only  Panslavism,**  he  will  say,  **  that  the  Russian  People 
has  ever  taken  to  heart,  is  die  impulse  to  release  any 
and  every  Slav  population  in  Europe  from  alien  oppres- 
sion, precisely  in  order  that  each  may  work  out  for  itself 
its  own  national  salvation ;  **  and  he  will  point  out  that 
Russia  has  committed  herself  to  a  lif  e-and-death  struggle 
at  Serbians  call*  But  the  German  will  return  to  the 
charge,  and,  waiving  for  the  moment  the  case  of  Serbia, 
will  put  die  Russian  to  silence  by  the  mention  of  the 
Poles* 

**  U  Russia  is  the  leading  Slav  nation,  Poland  is  die 
second :  indeed,  she  may  claim  priority  over  her  more 
badEward  Easterly  neighbours  as  a  focus  of  Slavonic 
culture*  Yet  while  Russia  has  been  preachif^  Pan- 
slavism  in  BohiCTnia  and  the  Balkans,  she  has  been 


I 


a82  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

persistently  endeavouring  to  blot  out  &om  the  roll  of 
nations  the  noblest  member  of  the  Slavonic  brotherhood. 
It  is  irrelevant  that  we  Germans  have  aided  and  abetted 
her  Polish  pohcy.  We  are  not  now  concerned  to  dis- 
poove  our  own  gaUt,  but  only  to  demonstrate  that 
Russia's  is  at  least  as  great  as  ours.  The  history  of 
Russia's  past  relations  with  Poland  does  not  augur  well 
foi:  the  sincerity  of  her  new  homage  to  the  National 
Idea.  Woe  to  any  nationality  in  Europe  which  refuses 
to  subordinate  its  destiny  to  the  destiny  of  Russiat  H 
Russia  emerges  omnipotent  from  this  war." 

This  formidable  retort  offeis  us  a  definite  field  for 
our  disputation.  In  our  second  chapter  we  saw  that 
Germany's  action  during  the  present  war  is  transform- 
ing the  feeling  between  Russian  and  Pole  with  almost 
miraculous  completeness,  so  that,  when  the  re-settle- 
ment of  Europe  is  made,  the  Pol^  nation  will  almost 
certainly  be  prepared  to  accept  its  resuiration  as  a  gift 
&om  the  Tsar,  and  try  to  realise  its  aspirations  as  ao 
autonomous  member  of  the  Russian  Empire.  But 
stich  a  compact  demands  good  faith  from  both  parties, 
and  the  autonomy  of  Poland  will  indeed  put  Russia's 
to  ibt  test.  It  may  be  a  piece  of  Utopianism,  and  the 
Grand  DuIk's  manifesto  simply  the  vow  extorted  &om 
the  sinner  by  the  menace  of  God's  thunderbolt :  in  diat 
case  the  suppression  of  Poland  on  the  morrow  of  the 
settlement  might  well  herald  the  successive  ruin  of 
the  other  European  nations :  or  Russia  may  really 
abide  by  her  word,  and  respect  Poland's  new-found 
liberty. 

The  latter  event  would  serve  as  an  immediate 
guarantee  of  Russia's  good  intentions  towards  the 
nationalities  less  closely  involved  with  her  and  situated 
altogether  outside  her  pohtical  and  economic  frontiers ; 


\ 


THE  RISORGIMENTO  OF  POLAND     283 

but  it  vrotUd  also  have  a  momentous  effect  upon  the 
mtemal  structure  of  the  Russian  Empire  itself*  The 
kaven  of  Liberalism  would  not  confine  itself  to  Poland* 
It  would  steadily  penetrate  the  whole  lump,  and 
produce  a  Russia  that  might  lead  the  van  of  European 
civilisation,  instead  of  straggling  in  its  rear* 

We  must  discover,  then,  whether  Polish  and  Russian 
Nationalism  are  indeed  capable  of  reconciliation*  We 
will  begin  by  attempting  to  acquaint  ourselves  with  the 
Polish  point  of  view* 

The  history  of  Polish  Nationality  really  begins  with 
the  partition^  of  the  old  Polish  Empire  during  the 
last  generation  of  the  eighteenth  century  by  the  three 
vulture  powers,  Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria,  which  had 
established  themselves  on  its  flanks* 

Their  work  was  not  so  gross  a  crime  as  it  is  often 
painted*  Vultures  devour  carrion,  never  living  area* 
tures;  and  the  disappearance  of  the  Polish  state  was 
the  old  story,  a  long-accepted  commonplace  further 
West,  of  efficient  **  strong  government  *'  imposing  law 
and  order  by  force  upon  a  society  in  chaos* 

The  Empire  yoked  together  diverse  nationalities  and 
national  fragments*  Its  nucleus  was  the  union  of  two 
Catholic  popubtions,  the  Poles  on  the  Vistula  and  the 
Lithuanians  North-East  of  them,  between  the  Niemen 
and  the  Duna*  They  were  linked  first  in  1386  by  the 
acceptance  of  a  common  dynasty,  and  were  subse- 
quently fused  into  a  single  constitutional  kingdom  by 
die  Act  of  Lublin  in  1569.  From  that  date  the  strong 
monarchy  gradually  degenerated  into  an  inept  oligarchic 
republic*  The  Polo-Lithuanian  noble  caste  was 
paralysed  by  family  feuds,  and  more  inclined,  when  its 

^  In  diree  stages :  1773^  1793, 1795. 


a84  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

members  met  in  diet  moimted  and  armed,  to  relieve  ks 
feelings  in  bloodshed  than  to  carry  on  the  business  of 
government* 

If  the  Polish  nobility  had  reduced  merely  their  own 
country  to  anarchy,  it  would  have  been  bad  enough; 
but  they  were  visiting  their  incompetence  upon  large 
alien  populations  as  well,  and  the  eighteenth-century 
Partitions,  while  they  opened  the  Polish  national 
question,  dosed  once  and  for  all  several  others  of  long 
standing. 

(u)  In  the  fourteenth  century,  after  the  Mongol 
invasion  had  shattered  Russia  into  fragments,  Poland 
and  Lithuania  incorporated  by  conquest  vast  districts 
stretching  South-Eastward  into  the  Cossack  steppes 
towards  the  Black  Sea*  The  population  of  all  this 
region  was  Russian  by  language,  creed  and  tradition. 
It  induded  the  White  Russians,  who  lay  North  of  the 
Pripet  marshes,  and  were  hardly  distinguishable  from 
the  Muscovites  in  dialect,  and  the  Ruthenes  or  Little 
Russians,  extending  South  and  South-East  of  them  from 
the  Carpathian  mountains  to  Kieff  half-way  down  the 
course  of  the  Dniepr*  The  eighteenth-century  parti- 
tions retmited  these  peoples  with  the  national  Russian 
state,  except  for  a  Westerly  fn^;ment  of  the  Ruthenes 
in  Galida,  which  fell  to  Austria  in  1772*  We  shall  find 
later  on  diat  the  relation  between  the  Russian  Empire 
and  these  branches  of  the  Russian  race  still  requires 
adjustment,  but  their  transfer  from  Poland  to  the 
Muscovite  state  at  least  advanced  the  problem  many 
stages  nearer  solution* 

(ii.)  Besides  these  Russian-speaking  regions,  which 
became  a  more  or  less  integral  part  of  the  Russian 
national  oi^^anism,  the  Russian  Empire  had  incorpor- 
ated  by    1795    the   vtdiole    Lithuanian    nation.    No 


THE  RISORGIMBNTO  OF  POLAND     385 

pnbkm,  however,  atose  tn  iUs  case,  becauwTtht 
lirhiianiam  ait  the  most  backward  race  in  Buiope* 
They  were  not  converted  from  their  primitive  paganigm 
till  the  fourteenth  centnry,  and  since  then  they  have 
drawn  their  civilisation  at  second  hand  from  other 
people,  instead  of  creating  a  national  tradition  of  their 
own*^ 

{Hi.)  The  highly-dvilised  German  townspeople  of 
West  Prussia  were  annexed  by  the  Berlin  government 
in  ZTTdf  and  have  never  since  been  severed  again 
policicdly  from  the  entirely  German-speaking  provinces 
between  which  they  lie.  We  have  already  explained  the 
reasons,  racial  and  geographical,  why  West  Prussia 
must  remain  part  of  the  German  national  state. 

Having  disposed  of  Pbland's  alien  subjects,  let  us 
turn  to  the  fate  of  the  Poles  themselves.  The  P^fftition 
gave  them,  no  less  than  their  subjects,  the  much- 
needed  strong  government  in  place  of  the  extreme  chaos 
under  which  they  had  suffered  for  more  than  a  centtuy ; 
but  in  doing  so  it  deprived  them  of  the  one  priceless 
possession  they  had  won  and  kept,  their  national 
unity.  There  was  no  question  for  them,  as  for  their 
former  Russian  subjects,  of  rejoining  a  larger  national 
unit.  They  did  not  even  pass,  like  the  Lidiuanians, 
under  the  dominion  of  a  single  State.  The  carcase 
of  Poland  herself  was  shared  by  the  two  Western 
vultures,  for  Russia,  thot^^  reckoning  by  mere  extent 
of  territory,  the  lion's  share  of  the  spoils  had  fallen 
10  her,  had  not  acquired  a  single  Pblish-speaking  district. 
Warsaw,  the  Pbl^  capital  on  the  middle  Vistula,  be- 
came a  Prussian  frontier  fortress ;  Cracow,  the  second 
dty  of  the  country  near  the  river's  source,  was  assigned 


_^_^^  ^    dariy  tht  pwciod  of  ladtpsadgnot.  While  RwMan  mm  the 

O^DClSl  ISflSmflC  Ob  uK  muDUJHUSIQ  SCBtB* 


a86  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

tD  Austria^     The  Poles  drank  the  cup  of  national 
humiliation  to  the  dregs. 

The  nationalist  movement  to  which  the  Partition  gave 
birth  had  hardly  time  to  gather  force  before  the  deliverer 
came  from  France*  Napoleon  overthrew  Austria  and 
Prussia  in  succession/  and  imposed  on  them,  in  the 
territorial  re-settlement  that  followed,  the  cession  of  all 
their  Polish  acquisitions  except  the  first  of  1772.  He 
reconstituted  the  territory  disgoi^ed  into  the  **  Grand 
Duchy  of  Warsaw/'  The  reversal  of  fortune  was 
complete*  Not  only  was  the  whole  Polish  population, 
with  insignificant  exceptions,  rescued  from  the  foreign 
yoke,  but  for  the  first  time  it  experienced  the  benefits  of 
self-government*  To  Heine,  the  lonely  Jew  spumed 
by  a  Germany  with  a  still  unsoftened  medieval  heart, 
the  French  armies  came  as  the  bringers  of  good  tidings 
to  the  individual  soul*  In  Poland,  which  had  seen  native 
aristocratic  anarchy  succeeded  by  alien  bureaucratic 
repression,  the  **  principles  of  the  French  Revolution '' 
became  the  gospel  of  a  whole  nation*  The  advanced 
political  system  of  Western  Europe,  suddenly  intro- 
duced and  applied  for  seven  years  with  the  intense 
energy  of  the  Napoleonic  spirit,  left  a  tradition  in  the 
nation  which  never  died  out,  and  which  differentiated 
them  &om  their  neighbours  on  all  sides,  on  whom  the 
French  had  impressed  other  memories. 

With  Napoleon's  fall  the  flood  of  misfortune  did  not 
return  upon  the  Poles  at  once*  We  have  seen  how  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  shore  away  the  province  of  Posen, 
to  give  victorious  Prussia  a  strategic  frontier,  and  met 
Russia's  claims  by  erecting  the  remainder  of  tiie  Dudiy 
into  a  '*  constitutional  kingdom  of  Poland  "  under  die 

^  At  Auicerlits  in  1805  and  Jena  in  z8o6.  AuiCm  did  not  fofleit  her 
share  of  the  spoils  till  after  the  second  war  of  1809* 


THE  RISORGIMENTO  OF  POLAND     287 

Russian  Imperial  crown,  with  the  exception  of  Cracow; 
which  was  cut  off  and  permitted  to  be  a  ^^  free  dty  *^  on 
its  own  account,  to  satisfy  the  strategic  susceptibilities 
of  Austria.  For  fifteen  years  the  diminished  nation 
retained  its  liberal  constitution  and  even  its  French- 
o^;anised  native  army,  but  its  position  between  the 
three  vulture  powers,  risen  s^ain  from  the  dust  with 
beaks  and  talons  sharper  than  ever,  was  too  precarious 
to  survive  the  first  spasms  of  that  birth  of  nationalism 
in  Central  Europe,  which  the  shock  of  the  Napoleonic 
wars  inevitably  precipitated*  The  July  Revolution  of 
18^  in  France  stirred  Poland  to  an  ill-considered  re- 
volt in  the  following  year,  which  gave  Absolutism  its 
opportunity.  The  constitution  was  abolished,  and  the 
ootmtry  organised  in  Russian  military  governorships, 
v/hUe  in  1846  the  Austrians  marched  into  Cracow. 
The  desperate  revolution  that  broke  out  again  in  1863 
was  suppressed  by  the  cool  co-operation  of  the  three 
interest^  powers.  It  had  come  too  late.  The  crisis  of 
Italy's  risorgimento  was  already  overpassed ;  in  Prussia 
Bismarckianism  was  on  the  point  of  tritmiph.  With 
the  strangling  of  this  last  convulsion,  the  life  of  the 
Polish  nation  seemed  to  be  extinguished  for  ever. 

But  the  nineteenth  century  saw  a  more  important  event 
than  the  ups  and  downs  of  national  aspirations — ^the 
spread  over  Etirope  of  that  Industrial  Revolution  which 
takes  no  account  of  the  political  ordinances  of  men. 
Pbkmd's  rich  mineral  deposits  turned  her  into  a  strong- 
hold of  the  new  economic  regime,  and  during  the 
blackest  years  of  political  persecution  her  population  has 
grown  steadily  in  numbers  and  wealth.  There  are  now 
at  least  eighteen  million  Poles  in  the  world  :  within  the 
shelter  of  the  Imperial  tari£f-wall,  the  manufactures  of 
the  Russian  districts  have  a  preference  in  the  vast  rural 

K 


a88  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

market  that  stretches  East  o(  them  into  Asia ;  while 
Polish  unskilled  laboui  has  supplanted  the  native 
German  in  Wes^halia,  permeated  to  Odessa  on  the 
Black  Sea,  and  found  its  way  in  increasing  volume  to 
the  United  States. 

Thus  the  majority  of  the  Polish  nation  under  Russian 
rule  has  actually  benefited  ecooomically  by  its  subjection, 
and  economics  have  gone  far  tomrds  settling  the 
political  destinies  of  the  whole  reunited  Poland,  for 
yrbosc  creatiim  we  now  hope.  Even  her  eighteen 
millions  >  cannot  stand  by  themselves,  with  no  coast- 
line and  no  physical  finnttiers.'  She  must  go  into 
parmership  with  one  of  her  larger  neighbours. 

The  Ca^thian  barrier  shuts  her  out  from  the  Balkan 
Zollverein.  The  course  of  the  Vistula  and  the  £cee 
navigation  down  it  to  Danzi^  that  we  have  stipulated 
for  her,  point  to  union  with  Germany ;  but  the  bulk  <rf 
EHsland's  eqxjrts  do  not  flow  down  this  natural  route  to 
the  Baltic.  Her  real  commercial  links  are  with  the 
great  Rtissian  continent.  If  Galida  becomes  Russian 
soil  up  to  the  Carpathians,  the  trunk  railway  connectii^ 
Warsaw  with  the  Black  Sea  will  pass  through  Lemburg 
to  Odessa  without  encotmtering  either  political  frontier 
or  customs'  barrier,  and  Poland  will  turn  her  face  South- 
Eastwards  once  more,  but  this  time  in  co-opetatioii 
with  Russia,  and  not  in  rivalry  widi  her  as  during  the 
Middle  Ages. 

Muttial  economic  interests,  then,  favour  die  idea  of 

■  Accofdii^  to  the  last  eeaaaaea  <£.  tbe  ic^Mctivc  Bmptm,  tbex  aic 

{SSififoo  PcHci  in  Ruaua,  4^33/000  in  AusUia,  md  ova  3,000,000  ia 
'nuBia.  This  ^ves  a  total  of  ij.tSj/rao :  but  there  b«s  been  no 
centus  in  Ruma  siiice  1897,  and  in  1907  the  Russian  Pokt  wcrt 
unofficially  enunated  at  10,740.000. 

'  Except  for  a  short  sectioo  erf  the  Carpathians,  the  boundaries  of  the 
Polirii  natkn  are  demaications  of  the  Baltic  plain  as  aibitiarilr  dnwn 
IS  the  outlines  of  the  prairie  states  in  the  U£^ 


\ 


THE  RISORGIMENTO  OF  POLAND     aSg 

incorporating  the  new  Poland  within  the  Rtissian 
Empire  by  a  federal  union.  Till  the  outbreak  of  the 
present  war,  the  growing  economic  bond,  which  pointed 
to  oo-operation  in  the  future,  had  no  opportunity  of 
asserting  itself  in  face  of  the  political  enmity  inherited 
from  the  past  by  these  two  rival  leaders  of  the  Slavonic 
World*  But  now  that  the  war  has  miraculously  broken 
down  the  barriers  of  tradition,  the  economic  factor  will 
obtrude  itself  in  full  force.  If  the  war  is  won  by  the 
Allies,  the  experiment  of  federation,  which  will  almost 
certainly  be  attempted  in  the  subsequent  European 
settlement,  will  have  been  made  possible  by  this  sudden 
sentimental  reconciliation;  but  in  nations  as  in  in- 
dividuals, violent  emotions  pass  as  abruptly  as  they 
oome.  The  psychological  crisis  of  the  war  is  important 
in  the  present  case,  just  because  the  economic  motive  is 
there  to  deepen  its  e£fect  into  a  friendship  and  under- 
standing durable  enough  to  survive  the  psychological 
ditente  of  Pftaoe* 

The  scheme  of  federation  will  have  to  be  framed  in 
the  most  liberal  spirit.  The  national  self-oonsdousness 
of  die  Poles  has  been  almost  morbidly  hypertrophied  by 
generations  of  repression,  and  though  die  removal  of 
the  evil  will  gradually  weaken  the  memory  of  it,  the 
Catholic  Polish  nation  will  still  be  sundered  by  language 
and  rel^on  from  the  Lutheran  Prussians  and  Orthodox 
Russians  on  either  side  of  it.  Moreover,  the  capacity 
for  self-government  will  be  present,  as  well  as  the  desire 
for  it  (the  modem  Polish  people  has  travelled  far  from 
the  PoUsh  aristocracy  of  a  century  and  a  half  ago)  and 
this  capacity  will  have  the  highest  demands  made  upon 
it  by  die  industrial  problems  with  which  the  new  state 
will  be  confronted.  Pbland  will  take  her  share  with  die 
odier  nations  of  Europe  in  the  search  after  a  new 


ago  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

harmotiy  between  Man  and  his  changed  economic 
environment,  and  this  effort  cannot  be  guided  to  success 
by  an  alien ''  strong  government "'  imposed  from  without, 
but  only  by  a  national  democracy  of  the  Woriceis 
evolved  from  within* 

If,  then,  the  new  Poland  is  to  be  a  healthy  organism, 
she  will  require  the  maximum  measure  of  Home  Rule 
and  the  minimum  of  external  control  consistent  with 
membership  of  a  wider  political  group.  The  local 
autonomy  of  Galida,  the  most  liberally-treated  province 
of  Austria,  will  fix  a  level  which  the  Russian  govern- 
ment's concessions  will  have  to  surpass.  We  have 
seen  that  if  Russia  is  in  a  position  at  the  end  of  the  war 
to  reunite  the  Polish  nation,  the  Galidan  fragment  will 
be  irresistibly  attracted  by  the  possibility;  but  it  will 
also  be  full  of  apprehension  at  exchanging  the  certainty 
of  Austrian  toleration  for  a  dubiotis  reception  into  the 
bosom  of  Russia,  and  probably  it  will  refuse  to  commit 
itself  without  a  guarantee  from  all  the  parties  to  the 
European  settlement  that  the  autonomy  of  the  whole 
nation  within  the  new  state  shall  be  at  least  as  far  reach- 
ing as  that  which  this  favoured  section  already  enjoys. 

The  Russian  Government  would  certainly  chafe  at 
such  a  proposal,  and  deny  the  right  of  other  nations  to 
intervene  in  Russia's  internal  politics.  If  the  proposal 
concerned  merely  the  Poles  already  indtided  within 
the  Russian  Empire,  this  protest  wotdd  have  weight; 
but  it  would  actually  arise  as  the  corollary  to  a  large 
extension  of  the  Russian  frontier,  made  possible  by  the 
joint  action  of  the  Allied  Powers,  and  Russia  must 
admit  the  authority  of  France  and  Great  Britain  to 
assert  their  point  of  view  in  the  settlement  of  questions 
raised  by  the  war  in  the  East,  unless  she  is  willing  to 
resign  all  share  herself  in  the  settlement  of  the  West. 


THE  RISORGIMENTO  OF  POLAND     29X 

Without  derogating  from  the  dignity  of  Russia,  the 
Western  Powers  might  well  define  a  certain  measure 
of  Home  Rule  as  the  indispensable  condition  for  the 
re^union  of  the  Austrian  and  Prussian  fragments  to  the 
main  body  of  Poland  within  the  common  fix>ntier  of  the 
Russian  Empire*  They  cotdd  not,  of  coturse,  bring 
more  than  moral  pressure  to  bear  upon  Russia  either 
to  admit  or  to  endorse  the  guarantee ;  but  if  Russia 
withheld  her  pledge,  the  Galidan  plebiscite  would  give 
her  a  rude  shock  by  declaring  itself  for  federation  with 
the  Balkan  Zollverein  or  with  the  New  Germany,  and, 
deprived  of  the  support  of  her  friends, .  she  wotdd  find 
herself  compelled  to  yield  subsequently  with  a  bad  grace 
what  she  might  have  granted  beforehand  as  a  bounty* 

The  federal  relation,  then,  between  Poland  and 
Russia  shotdd  be  as  secure  as  material  interests  and 
treaty-stiptdations  can  make  it ;  but  we  have  still  to 
define  the  geographical  limits  of  the  future  autonomous 
state  against  the  main  body  of  the  Russian  Empire. 
It  goes  without  saying  that  die  Poles  must  abandon  the 
memory  of  their  past  dominion*  The  New  Poland 
must  include  no  districts  but  those  of  Polish  nationality ; 
and,  since  the  line  to  be  drawn  will  simply  be  an 
administrative  botmdary,  not  a  tariff  wall  or  a  strategic 
frontier,  it  can  follow  with  some  accuracy  the  convolu- 
tions of  the  linguistic  border*  Determined  on  this 
principle,  it  will  exclude  from  Poland  not  merely  a  strip 
of  the  present  **  Vistula-governments  *'  of  Russia,  but 
also  the  major  part  of  Galida  inhabited  by  a  Little 
Russian  population*  At  the  moment  when  they  are 
regaining  their  own  liberty,  the  Poles  cannot  grudge 
ne^bour  nationalities  the  same  boon* 

The  course  of  the  new  boundary  should  be  more  or 
less  as  follows : 


^       wiihi 


393  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

Starting  ^  from  the  South-East  comer  of  the  East- 
Prussian  fiontier,  just  West  of  the  point  where  the 
Lyck-Bialystock  Railway  crosses  it,  it  should  run  South- 
East  to  the  North  bank  of  the  River  Narew,  hitting  it 
near  the  junction  of  die  Augustowo  Canal,  that  links  the 
Vistula  and  Niemen  systems.  Hence  it  should  follow 
die  river's  course  upwards  to  a  point  due  South  of 
Bialystock.  Here  it  should  leave  the  river  and  take 
a  S.S.W.  direction,  excluding  Bielsk  awards  the  East, 
till  it  reaches  the  Bug.  Crossing  the  latter  river  about 
fifty  miles  below  Brest,  it  should  continue  in  the  same 
direction  till  it  hits  the  Wieprz,  and  should  then  follow 
up  the  course  of  this  stream  in  turn  towards  tlie  S.S.E., 
as  far  as  its  most  Easterly  bend,  thus  including  Lublin 
but  excluding  Cholm.  After  leaving  the  Wieprz,  die 
line  should  run  due  South,  excluding  Zamosz,  till  it 
hits  the  present  Austro-Russian  frontier,  whence  it 
should  b^  South-West,  tiU  it  meets  the  River  San 
at  its  great  at^  horn  East  to  North-West,  between 
Yaroslav  and  Przemysl.  Thence  it  should  follow  dte 
course  of  the  San  upwards,  thus  assigning  Yaroslav 
to  Poland,  but  exdudit^  Przemysl,  which  lies  on  the 
river's  R^t  bank,  till  it  reaches  the  other  great  bend 
horn  North  »>  East  between  Przemysl  and  Sanok.  At 
this  point  it  should  leave  the  San,  excluding  Sanok, 
run  due  South-West  till  it  strikes  the  Hui^arian  {louda 
along  the  summit  of  the  Carpathians,  and  proceed  to 
follow  the  mountains  Westward,  till  it  reaches  the  point 
on  the  summit  of  die  range,  just  East  of  the  Ratiboi- 
Sillein  Railway,  which  we  took  as  the  starting-place  for 
our  western  frontier.' 

'  Sec  Map  II. 

'  The  boundary  which  we  have  just  sketched  between  Autafxnwui 
PoUod  and  the  main  body  c^  tiie  Rusnan  Empire  practically  coinddti 
with  die  Baitem  border  of  the  lemtory  eontuaiaufy  inhabited  by  Poks : 


THE  RISORGIMENTO  OF  POLAND     293 

Between  this  new  boundary  and  tfae.Russo-Gennan 
frontier  sketched  in  our  second  chapter^  we  have 
delimited  a  territory  of  hardly  less  eactent  than  the  area 
of  England  and  Wales*  Up  till  now^  Russia  has  been 
draining  her  strength  by  holding  down  half  this  country 
against  its  will ;  but  if  the  whole  cotmtry  is  organised 
as  a  national  state  in  partnership  with  her,  it  will  be 
transformed  into  a  magnificent  btdwark  against  her 
ne^bours  on  the  West,  and  give  its  whole  eneqy  to 
swell  the  economic  and  military  resources  of  her 
Empire. 

Russia,  then,  has  every  motive  of  self-interest  for 
permanendy  conciliating  the  Pbles.  Otur  advocatus 
diaboli,  however,  will  not  throw  up  his  case*  **  To  the 
common  sense  of  liberal  Western  Europe,^^  he  will  say, 
**  your  argument  wotild  be  a  truism,  but  it  is  truer 
still  that '  Itistinct  is  Lord  of  All/    Russia  has  not  the 

bat  just  as  our  Western  frontier  of  Poland  detadbed  numerous  nolated 
enclaves  of  German  population  from  the  German  national  state  (Ch.  IL, 
Sect.  D),  so  its  new  eastern  boundary  will  leave  Polish  enclaves  of 
equal  importance  entangled  in  the  Ruthene  section  of  Galida  which  we 
are  proposing  to  eidude  from  the  Autonomous  Polish  Unit*  These 
PoUsh  advance-guards  in  Eastern  Galida  and  those  German  advance- 
snards  in  Western  Poland  are  precisely  parallel  to  one  another  in 
mslocJcal  origin  and  contemporary  character.  Just  like  the  Germans» 
the  Poles  overflowed  into  the  domain  of  their  more  backward  neigh- 
bours :  diey  have  Polonised  the  urban  centres— such  as  Lvov,  Tamc^ 
and  Staaislau — as  thoroughly  as  the  German  immigrants  have  Ger- 
manised the  cities  of  Posen  and  Thorn,  and  they  have  also  established 
themselves  in  force  in  the  suburban  countryside;  yet  it  would  be 
Bwyjphically  impossible  to  include  this  Poluh  **  Dtmersion  **  in  the 
Pofash  Autonomous  State  without  transferring  with  them  a  far  more 
numerous  Ruthene  element.  We  must  mete  the  same  measure  on 
both  frontiers :  if  the  Poles  are  to  gain  at  the  Germans' eipense  on  the 
West,  tfiev  must  reconcile  themselves  on  the  East  to  corresponding 
kssBcs  in  me  Ruthenes'  favour.  This  is  only  another  instance  of  that 
icreducible  nnWttwtm  of  national  injustice  which  is  involved  in  the  most 
ttfoatabiy  drawn  political  frontiers.  The  Polish  minority  is  doomed  to 
daappnintment  as  inexorably  as  the  German,  but  like  the  German  it 
nmit  oe  granted  in  compensation  a  European  Guarantee  of  its  national 
tndlviduality  under  the  alien  government  which  geogrqihy  imposes 
tqMO  it* 


294  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

understanding  to  grasp  a  liberal  policy*  If  she  were 
merely  unscruptdous,  she  wotdd  begin  to  act  righteously 
as  soon  as  it  paid  her  to  do  so ;  but  she  is  stupid  as  weU> 
and  from  the  combination  of  these  two  vices  no  good 
can  spring* ' 

This  criticism  compels  us  to  abandon  the  field 
of  Russia's  objective  interests^  and  to  reopen  our 
discussion  on  the  more  fundamental  plane  of  her 
subjective  character ;  for  unless  we  can  vindicate  that^ 
the  New  Poland  we  have  so  elaborately  built  up  will 
prove  a  house  of  cards^  and  may  carry  the  other  nations 
of  Europe  with  it  when  it  collapses  in  ruin* 


B«  The  National  Evolution  of  Rassia 

Germany's  reproach  to  England  for  having  joined 
forces  with  Russia  agaixist  her,  is  couched  in  terms  like 
these :  ''  You  have  decided  to  fight  us  because  you 
hate  and  fear  our  Militarism*  You  believe  we  aspire 
to  '  World  Empire  '  and  mean  to  take  your  inheritance 
from  you  by  force  ;  and  naturally  you  imagine,  as  every 
nation  must,  that  your  own  downfall  wotdd  be  a  setback 
to  civilisation*  We  will  not  be  at  the  pains  to  argue 
with  you,  but  we  point  out  that,  if  you  succeed  in 
crush^g  us  with  Russia's  aid,  you  are  laying  up  a  worse 
fate  both  for  yourselves  and  for  the  world*  Russia,  on 
the  most  favourable  interpretation,  is  only  made  of  the 
same  stuff  as  ourselves,  but  in  an  inferior  quality  and  of 
a  coarser  grain*  Her  ambitions  and  her  mediods  of 
forwarding  them  reflect  our  own,  and  our  strength  is  the 
only  bar  to  their  realisation*  The  Cossack  will  ride 
over  our  corpses  to  the  conquest  of  the  world,  and 
when  you  see  him  enter  Copenhagen  and  Stamboul  and 


THE  NATIONAL  EVOLUTION  OF  RUSSIA  295 

Koweitf  you  will  regret  the  annihilation  of  Gerznan 
cukure/* 

We  could  dismiss  Germany's  **  Panslav  **  bogy  with 
a  smilet  if  it  had  not  found  a  response  in  this  country, 
but  ^*  After  Germany,  Russia  '"  is  a  phrase  that  already 
comes  too  glibly  upon  people's  lips*  Is  the  supreme 
objective  of  Peace,  for  whidi  we  are  sacrificing  every- 
thmg  now,  illusory^  And  does  the  lifting  of  one  war- 
cloud  merely  draw  a  heavier  one  above  the  horisson  < 
U  the  sotd  of  Russia  is  like  the  soul  of  modem  Germany, 
with  the  evil  heightened  and  the  good  expunged,  there 
seems  no  issue  for  the  World*  Germany  has  challenged 
die  comparison,  and  we  will  take  her  at  her  word  and 
test  it* 

If  we  compare  the  governments  of  the  two  empires, 
die  German  contention  is  clearly  right*  The  purposes 
and  methods  of  the  Russian  and  German  bureaucracies 
are  roughly  the  same ;  but  whereas  the  German  govern- 
ment is  efficient  and,  on  the  whole,  has  public  opinion 
behind  it,  the  Russian  is  out  of  touch  with  the  nation, 
obscurantist  and  ineffective*  Judging,  then,  by  the 
functioning  of  the  administrative  machine,  Germany 
is  far  superior  to  Russia,  and  it  may  be  argued  diat 
administrative  efficiency  is  an  adequate  criterion  of  com- 
parative civilisation,  because  it  presupposes  that  faculty 
of  orderliness  and  looking-ahead,  which  we  emphasised 
at  the  beginning  as  civilisation's  essence* 

This  argument  would  be  valid  if  the  government 
and  the  governed  cotdd  be  equated ;  but  even  in  the 
democratically-organised  states  of  Western  Europe  the 
two  factors  do  not  coincide,  and  in  the  Centre  and 
Bast  diey  do  not  approximate  to  one  another*  On  die 
one  side  stands  the  German  Government,  exploiting  all 
the  national  accuracy  and  forethought  bom  of  civilise- 


296  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 


tjon  to  bring  about  its  own  specialised^  and^  as  we  jtidge 
it,  uncivilised  end  of  world-conquest,  jtist  as  a  tnist 
exploits  security  of  property  and  rapidity  of  communica- 
tions to  gnaw  die  wealth  ci  the  community  in  which  it 
shelters*  On  the  other  side  the  great  German  nation, 
renotmdng  its  ideals  and  surrendering  that  very  essence 
of  civilisation,  the  power  of  free  choice  and  of  lookii^ 
ahead  with  one's  own  eyes,  has  indentured  itself  to  the 
service  of  the  Government's  bad  cause*  The  success 
of  the  German  Government  in  its  present  policy  has  been 
an  indictment  of  the  German  Nation  in  the  present 
phase  of  its  character.  You  need  employ  no  violence 
against  a  willing  accomplice,  nor  conduct  an  obscurantist 
campa^  against  a  demoralised  inteUigenzia  which  has 
the  lie  already  in  its  sotd* 

We  have  seen  that  Germany's  history  has  reversed  the 
normal  order  of  European  evolution*  Prussianism  is  in 
the  ascendant :  it  is  the  dominant,  inspiring  force  of 
the  nation's  growth,  and  any  success  Germany  may 
achieve  tmder  its  banner  will  impress  the  iron  mould 
more  deeply  upon  her  soul*  The  Prussian  militaristic 
bureaucracy  is  a  living  power*  Russia,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  reproduced  so  far  precisely  the  phases  of 
Western  Europe,  though,  like  Serbia  and  her  other 
Balkan  prot^^es,  she  has  suffered  from  a  very  bte  start* 

Her  history  began  little  more  than  two  hundred  years 
ago*  In  the  seventeenth  century  she  was  a  stagnant 
mass,  still  dazed  by  the  shock  of  Mongol  conquest  that 
had  struck  her  down  four  centuries  earlier,  half 
orientalised  by  the  Mongol  suzerainty  that  had  followed 
the  impact,  and  cut  o£f  from  the  outer  World  by  the 
lack  of  a  seaboard*  She  stood  to  Europe  as  Macedonia 
stood  to  Hellas  at  the  beginning  of  the  fourth  century 
B«c*,  and  she  fotmd  her  Philip  in  Peter  the  Great* 


THE  NATIONAL  EVOLUTION  OF  RUSSIA  397 

Peter  gave  Russia  that  '^ strong  government'^  and 
**  oonsolidation  **  without  which  a  nation  cannot  begin 
to  grow*  He  forcefully  shook  her  into  wakefulness  by 
Europeanising  her  organisation  and  breaking  her  a 
doorway  on  to  the  Baltic  through  which  the  current  of 
European  ixifluence  should  thenceforth  flow  in*  The 
foundation  of  the  new  capital,  Petersburg,  typifies  both 
his  actual  achievement  and  die  orientation  he  gave  to 
the  future*  At  first  the  leaven  seemed  only  to  be 
fermenting  on  the  surface  (Peter  did  not  strike  his 
acquaintances  in  England  and  Holland  as  an  apostle  of 
culture),  but  the  stir  of  the  eighteenth  century  kneaded 
it  deeper  in*  On  the  West,  the  Swedish  dominion  over 
the  Baltic  was  finally  broken,  and  Russia  securely 
established  along  its  whole  Eastern  shore :  Southwards, 
the  Empress  Catherine  of  German  birth,  whose  long 
reign  marks  the  acme  of  the  **  strong  government  *' 
phase,  opened  another  door  on  the  North  coast  of  the 
Black  Sea,  and  in  this  quarter  Russian  advance  identified 
itself  with  the  march  of  civilisation*  Prosperous  com- 
mercial ports  repbced  the  Turkish  villages  on  the 
seaboard,  and  the  taming  of  the  nomad  Tatars  on 
die  steppe  threw  open  the  hinterland  to  agricultural 
development  for  the  first  time  since  the  break-up  of  the 
Ancient  World* 

The  e^teenth  century  in  Russia  corresponded  to  the 
Tudor  period  in  England,  and  to  the  regime  of  Richelieu 
and  Colbert  in  France  :  ^^  L'^tat,  c'itait  le  Gouveme- 
ment,*'  and  the  Administration  had  an  imposing  record 
of  progress  to  show  for  its  masterful  all-pervasiveness* 
As  in  France,  there  followed  an  age  of  transition, 
charged  with  an  atmosphere  of  foreboding  like  that 
which  drew  **  Aprte  moi  le  d^uge  **  from  Louis  XV* 

The  nineteenth  century  has  brought  the  Russian 


298  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

bureaucracy  to  bankruptcy.  It  has  no  loiter  risen  to 
the  problems  of  internal  growth,  and  it  has  suffeied 
grave  military  discredit  abroad.  The  Crimean  cam- 
pa^  was  its  "  War  of  the  Spanish  Successkm/'  ^ 
unexpectedly  disastrous  stn^i^  with  Jiq>an  its 
"  Seven  Years'  War."  Its  prest^e  has  suffuied  bknn 
fetm  which  it  can  never  recover,  but  the  outworn 
chrysalis  has  held  together  long  enoi^;h  to  do  its  wotk. 
During  this  same  nineteenth  century  the  Russian 
nation,  an  inarticulate  Tityos  lying  prone  across  half  a 
continent,  has  awakened  to  the  dearest  consciousness, 
and  expressed  itself  in  a  literature  as  distinctive  and  as 
momentous  for  the  spiritual  history  of  the  Workl  as 
the  literature  of  eighteenth-century  France. 

Nor  is  this  a  house  built  on  the  sands.  The  Russian 
int^igeruia  draws  its  living  water  from  a  deep  well- 
spring  of  national  Ufe.  When  you  read  a  Russian  novel 
you  pass  out  of  the  cosmopolitan  environment  of 
Industrial  Europe  into  "  Ikly  Russia,"  an  environment 
of  river  and  forest  and  snow  and  sun,  and  a  tradition  of 
religion  and  of  social  customs,  utterly  unfamiliar  to  you 
before,  but  you  habituate  yourself  to  it  with  unlooked- 
for  ease,  because  the  sense  of  life  that  pulses  through 
it  is  as  convincing  as  the  sound  of  the  sea,  when  it 
falls,  after  months  of  absence,  upon  your  ears.  The 
Russian  nation  has  found  its  soul:  the  next  phase 
will  inevitably  follow,  and  effete  "  strong  government " 
give  place  to  the  captaincy  of  the  nation  over  its 
own  destiny. 

The  present  war  is  a  very  important  moment  in  this 
transformation.  It,  too,  finds  a  parallel  in  the  history 
of  France,  namely,  the  successful  intervention  in  the 
cause  of  American  Independence,  that  gave  liberalism 
entrance   into   the   fortress  <tf  official   policy.    The 


i 


THE  NATIONAL  EVOLUTION  OF  RUSSIA  299 

Russian  Government  cannot  unfurl  its  banner  in  a 
similar  cause,  without  considerably  changing  the  legend 
embroidered  upon  it  before  it  is  laid  away  zgzin*  A 
change  of  outlook  will  mean  a  change  of  personnel : 
Russia  may  find  a  Turgot  and  a  Necker  who,  profiting 
by  the  experience  of  their  French  forerunners,  will  solve 
the  problems  of  which  they  despaired ;  and  there  may 
even  now  be  fighting  in  her  army's  ranks  a  stronger  and 
more  purposeful  Lafayette* 

The  friction  and  misunderstanding,  then,  that  at 
present  exists  between  the  Government  and  the  People 
of  Russia  is  not,  as  German  opinion  suggests,  a  sign 
of  dissolution  but  a  symptom  of  growth*  If  the  nation 
here  assented  to  the  bureaucracy's  standpoint,  that 
would  indeed  be  a  proof  of  national  depravity*  But 
the  Rus^an  bureaucracy  belongs  to  the  past :  Liberalism 
is  in  the  ascendant,  and  will  prevail* 

We  have  now  compared  Germany  and  Rtissia  by 
bringing  out  the  respective  tendencies  that  are  asserting 
themselves  in  each ;  and  this  is  the  only  true  principle  of 
estimating  national  valties*  The  symbolism  of  political 
cartoons,  in  which  the  figure  of  John  Bull,  a  squire  in 
''  Regency ''  costume,  stands  for  the  British  Nation, 
and  Uncle  Jonathan,  a  business  man  with  the  beard  and 
coat  of  the  'sixties,  for  the  United  States,  is  actively 
misleading*  It  takes  a  vivid  impression  of  a  nation  at 
some  critical  moment  in  its  history,  when  the  attention 
of  the  World  is  centred  upon  it,  and  perpetuates  it  with 
the  inqplication  that  that  is  the  nation's  eternal  essence* 
The  device  produces  the  same  comic  effect  as  the  snap^ 
shot  of  a  race-horse  galloping,  but  the  humotur  con- 
sists just  in  the  static  presentment  of  a  kinetic  reality, 
and  thus  depends  upon  a  distortion  of  **  historical " 
truth.    National  character  is  not  sutic,  because  a  nation 


300  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

is  alive.  The  essence  of  it  is  not  the  phase  it  happens 
to  occupy  at  the  moment,  but  the  vibole  movement  c£ 
its  growth,  and  we  can  forecast  a  movement's  tendency 
with  most  probability,  though,  of  course,  any  calcula- 
tion of  the  future  is  ex  hypothesi  conjectural,  by  a 
survey  of  such  phases  of  it  as  have  already  been 
actualised. 
Met  in  this  way,  Germany's  challei^e  turns  to  her 
■  own  despite.  Our  conclusion  makes  us  more  eager 
than  ever  for  Germany's  discomfiture  in  this  war  and 
more  zealous  in  our  alliance  with  Russia,  for  we  feel 
that  the  triumph  of  Russia,  as  well  as  the  triunq>h  of 
Great  Britain  and  France,  will  be  in  harmony  wi^  the 
true  advancement  of  European  civilisation. 

C.  Devolution 

We  have  compared  the  past  history  of  Russia  with 
that  of  other  European  nations,  and  analc^  has 
inclined  us  to  augur  for  her  a  liberal  future.  Yet  we 
shall  not  satisfy  our  German  critic  till  we  have  offered 
him  some  concrete  programme  of  the  lines  on  which 
this  prospective  liberalism  can,  should,  and  will  be 
realised. 

The  chief  obstacle  to  the  prc^ess  of  self-government 
in  Russia  has  been  the  shortness  of  her  history.  The 
second,  and  hardly  less  formidable,  factor  is  the  im- 
mensity of  her  territorial  extent.  Before  the  invention 
of  modem  communications,  a  v^orous  absolutism 
seemed  the  only  force  capable  of  holding  bother 
such  a  widespread  mass  of  humanity.  But  now  the 
mechanism  of  telegraph  and  railway  can  take  the  plaa 
of  "  strong-government's  "  centripetal  action,  and  local 
U        individuality  receive  free  play  in  the  political  ^here 

1 


DEVOLUTION  301 

widiout  risk  of  ultimate  disruption*  The  new  oi^anisa- 
tion  of  Poland  will  react  on  the  rest  of  the  Empire  of 
which  it  is  to  form  a  part,  and  the  first  step  towards 
self-government  will  be  devolution  on  an  extensive 
scale. 

(i*)  The  Baltic  G>ast  populations/  from  the  North- 
East  jErontier  of  Prussia  to  the  Gulf  of  Finland,  are  none 
of  them  Russian  in  nationality,  and,  till  their  successive 
absorption  in  the  Russian  Empire  during  the  course  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  they  have  all  had  a  distinctive 
history  of  their  own. 

(a)  The  Lithtianians,  occupying  the  provinces  of 
Kovno,  Vilna  and  Suvalki,  are  not  Slavs,  but  speak  a 
separate  language  of  the  Indo-European  funily.  Its 
closest  relations  are  with  Slavonic  on  the  one  hand 
and  Teutonic  on  the  other,  and  its  development,  like 
that  of  its  speakers,  has  been  arrested  in  a  phase  more 
archaic  than  any  other  living  form  of  Indo-European 
speech* 

The  Lithuanians  have  remained  Roman  Catholics 
since  their  voluntary  conversion  from  tribal  heathendom 
in  the  fourteenth  century  aj>.,  and  they  were  in  political 
partnership  with  the  Poles  between  that  time  and  the 
Partitions,  so  that  neither  language,  religion  nor  tradi- 
tion bind  them  to  the  Russian  people.  Though  geo- 
graphical considerations  have  made  it  advantageous 
to  both  parties  that  this  little  country'  should  come 
within  the  jErontiers  of  the  great  Empire,  the  Imperial 
Government  has  no  call  here  to  take  cognisance  of  other 
than  such  Imperial  business  as  communications  and 


■  See  the  map  of  European  NatiQiiaiitks  (VIL). 
'  The  number  of  Lithuanians  in  the  Russian  Empire  is  estimated  at 
h'^59/ioo.    There  are  further  about  107,000  Lithuanians  in  East 


302  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

defence^  and  might  satisfactonly  leave  the  whole  internal 
administration  of  Lithuania  to  Home  Rtde* 

(6)  The  Letts,  inhabiting  Courland  and  Livland  on 
either  bank  of  the  Duna,  lie  next  to  the  Lithuanians  in 
the  Northward  direction*  They  speak  a  variety  of  the 
same  language,  but  their  history  has  been  different. 
They  were  converted  to  Christianity  by  the  sword  of  the 
Teutonic  Knights,  and  at  the  Reformation  submissively 
followed  their  masters  into  the  Protestant  camp  like  the 
Masurians  in  Prussia*  After  the  dissolution  of  the  Order, 
this  territory  was  partitioned  between  Sweden  and 
Poland,  and,  when  it  became  one  again  under  Russian 
government,  the  German  landed  aristocracy,  descended 
from  the  secularised  knights,  played  for  a  time  a 
prominent  part  in  the  history  of  the  Empire,  owii^  to 
their  superior  education  and  acquaintance  with  Euro- 
pean life* 

(c)  The  Northern  part  of  Livland,  from  a  line  drawn 
East  and  West  between  the  Lake  of  Pskov  and  the  Gulf 
of  R^a,  together  with  Esthland,  the  sister  province  along 
the  Southern  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland,  has  shared 
the  political  and  religious  history  of  the  Lettish  districts ; 
but  the  population  here  speals  a  language  of  entirely 
different  origin,  a  dialect  of  the  great  Ugro-Finnish 
group. 

The  bond  of  common  Protestantism  and  German 
culture  may  override  these  differences  of  native  speech, 
and  incline  the  people  of  Courland,  Livland  and 
Esthland  to  consolidate  all  three  provinces  into  a  single 
self-governing  area ;  or,  inasmuch  as  public  education 
in  the  national  langtu^e  is  one  of  the  chief  objects  of 
devolution,  the  Lettish-speaking  and  Esthonian-speak- 
ing  sections  may  elect  to  organise  themselves  apart 


^ 


DEVOLUTION 


303 


i^rnatives   can   be  decided  by  the  plebiscite 


I 


re  now  passed  in  review  fottr  nationalities — 
Lithuanians,  Letts  and  Estfas — ^linii^  the 
Western  fringe  of  the  Russian  Empire,  on  whom 
tule  should  be  devolved  in  varying  degrees, 
iding  to  their  respective  material  importance 
units,  and  to  the  strength  of  their  national 
tdousness* 

the  present  war,  such  a  policy  would  have 
to  the  Russian  government  little  less  than  a 
of  the  Empire*  For  a  century  the  autocracy 
*sar  had  been  leagued  with  the  autocracies  of 
Europe  in  the  struggle  to  repress  all  nationalist 
wherever  manifested*  But  the  vitality  of 
Itsm  proved  so  great  that  it  swallowed  up  in 
tocracy's  point  of  view,  and  ever  since  Bismarck 
concordat  between  these  two  political  forces. 
It  of  principles  in  Europe  has  been  gradually 
^ts  ground  and  changing  its  character.  It  has 
be  waged  between  ruler  and  people  on  the 
'  strong  government ""  and  self-government, 

of  census  taken  in  1897 — 


Courland 

Livofda 

Esthonia 

Totals 

•     • 

534,000 
(79%) 

56/xx> 

(8^%) 
84,000 

(ia.75%) 

563,000 

5i8/)oo 

69.9%) 
98,000 

(7^%) 
1x7,000 

(9.1%) 

366/xx> 
16,000 
33,000 

88d.ooo 

170,000 

333/xx> 

674/xx> 

1,395,000 

414,000 

3,383/»o 

L— 

714,000 

1,411,000 

453,000 

3,577*000 

904  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

and  the  nations  themselves  have  come  to  man  die 
opposing  camps,  with  their  former  despots  at  their 
head  as  their  chosen  leaders,  while  the  issue  now  at  stake 
is  whether  the  strong  nation  shall  use  the  freedom  that 
it  has  won  for  the  oppression  of  its  neighbour,  or  whether 
all  nations,  great  and  small,  shall  live  orderly  side  by 
side  as  members  of  a  wider  commonwealth* 

Hiis  issue  is  being  fought  out  in  the  present  war,  and 
Russia  has  joined  battle  on  the  side  of  national  liberty. 
If  her  efibrts,  in  co-operation  with  those  of  the  Westeto 
powers,  decide  the  struggle  in  favour  of  our  common 
cause,  and  we  achieve  the  much-desired  re-settkment  of 
Central  Europe  on  the  national  basis,  at  the  expense 
of  German  and  Magyar  chauvinism,  Russia  will  have 
neither  the  will  nor  the  power  to  tarry  longer  from  setting 
her  own  house  in  order*  She  has  sinned  against  the 
National  Idea  in  the  past  no  less  than  her  present 
antagonists,  and  if  all  the  nationalities  in  her  Empire 
have  rallied  rotmd  her  government  at  the  present  crisis, 
it  is  because  they  are  willing  to  forget  the  past  in  the 
hope  of  a  happier  future*  Russia  cannot  now  afibrd 
to  disaqppoint  this  hope,  even  if  she  is  tempted  to  do  so. 

The  spark  of  Nationalism  has  oontinued  to  smoulder 
in  the  hearts  of  these  border  nations,  during  the  century 
that  they  have  been  ground  between  the  hammer  and 
anvil  of  rival  imperialisms,  and  each  oppressor  has 
fostered  it  in  turn  to  point  a  thrust  in  the  long  bout  of 
fence  against  his  accomplices.  But  now  Russia,  by 
putting  fordi  all  her  strength  to  remove  the  pressure 
from  the  one  side  with  **  blood  and  iron,''  has  pledged 
herself  to  relieve  it  by  her  own  free  grace  on  the  other. 
The  raising  up  of  these  prostrate  nations  in  the  blackest 
hour  of  their  despair  will  transform  diem  from  a  fringe 
<^  disaffection  into  a  gtrdk  <^  loyalty,  and  will  be  the 


DEVOLUTION  305 

best  guarantee  that  Russia  will  not  have  spent  her 
strength  in  vain ;  but  if  the  settlement^  at  the  dose  of 
this  war^  fails  to  alleviate  their  condition  by  Russia's 
good-will,  the  liberal  spirit  of  Europe  which  will  have 
triumphed  in  the  victory  of  the  Allies,  will  inevitably 
accomplish  their  redemption  in  spite  of  Russia,  and 
perhaps  to  her  undoing.  Russia  has  put  her  hand  to 
the  plough,  and  cannot  turn  back* 

(ii.)  The  same  considerations  shotild  induce  Russia 
not  merely  to  grant  Home  Rule  to  a  ring  of  nationalities 
within  her  frontier,  but  actually  to  abandon  all  hold 
txpon  a  population  whose  national  centre  of  gravity  lies 
definitely  on  the  f tuther  side  of  it*  In  the  present 
camjiaign  the  Rtissian  armies  have  occupied  the  Austrian 
Ciown-land  of  Bukovina,  pinioned  between  the  Car- 
pathians and  the  North-East  angle  of  Roumania ;  but 
with  the  dissolution  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  the  province 
shotild  pass,  not  to  Russia,  but  to  the  neighbouring 
Roumanian  state,  to  which  its  inhabitants  beloi^  by 
nationality* 

Raumania  is  at  present  considerably  the  most  pros- 
perous and  well-populated  >  of  the  Balkan  States,  and 
would  take  the  next  place  in  importance  to  Htmgary 
in  our  proposed  Balkan  League;  but  she  is  in  the 
unfortunate  position  of  possessing  a  large  **  irredenta  *' 
both  in  Hungarian  and  in  Russian  territory,  which  has 
so  far  alienated  her  sympathies  both  from  the  Dual 
Monarchy  and  from  the  Russian  Empire,  and  prevented 
her  arrivmg  at  an  enduring  understandii^  with  either. 
Should  the  European  settlement,  however,  secure  a 
satisEactory  modos  vivendi  for  the  non-Magyar  nationali- 
ties of  Htmgary,  including  her  Rotmian  citizens,  and 
so  enable  Htmgary  and  Rotunania  to  co-operate  in  the 

^  Populatioo  about  6^0,000  in  zgzo. 


3o6  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

new  nlhreseiiit  the  quanrel  between  these  two  states 
would  be  at  an  end^  and  Roumania's  resentment  would 
oonoentrate  itself  upon  Russia^  much  more  to  Russia's 
detriment  than  before,  because  Roumania  would  have 
the  whde  Balkan  group  behind  her.  It  would  therefore 
be  worth  Russia's  while  to  satisfy,  if  possibk,  Rou- 
manians just  claims  by  conceding  to  her  not  merely 
territories  conquered  in  this  war,  but  a  province  long 
incorporated  in  her  Empire* 

Roumania  covets  Bessarabia,^  the  district  between 
the  Pruth  and  the  Dniestr.  This  country  is  valuable 
to  Russia  simply  for  its  coast-line,  which  gives  her 
access  to  the  Northern  arm  of  the  Danube  delta*  The 
interior  is  unimportant  to  her,  for  though  her  chief 
Black  Sea  port,  Odessa,  lies  (mly  a  few  miles  up  die 
coast  East  of  the  Dniestr  ^^  liman,'"*  the  railways  linking 
it  to  its  hinterland,  even  to  the  new  Russian  territory  in 
Galida,  all  pass  outside  Bessarabia,  beyond  the  Dniestr's 
Left  bank*  The  interior,  however,  is  the  part  of  the 
province  where  the  Rouman  element  is  strong,  vrbSt  the 
steppe  towards  the  coast  is  inhabited  by  the  relics  of 
Tatar  nomads,  by  German  colonists  planted  there  to 
teach  them  agricultture,  and  by  a  large  Slavonic  element, 
Russian  colonists  and  Bulgarian  refugees,  who  have 
drifted  in  during  the  course  of  the  century* 

This  gives  us  a  reasonable  basis  for  division*  The 
new  frontier  between  Russia  and  Roumania  should  start 

*  Ceded  by  Turkey  to  Russia  in  1812.  The  popiladoii  registettd  id 
the  Russian  census  of  1897  was  1,9^8,000,  includmg 

931,000    Rouinans    (47.5%) 

103,000    Bulgars       (5*9%) 

60,000    Germans    (3.2%) 

but  Rouman  authorities  reckon  the  Rouman  element  to  be  three  quarters 
of  the  population.    See  Map  V* 
*  Estuary. 


DEVOLUTION  307 

at  the  junction  of  Prutfa  and  Danube,  pioceed  N*NJE* 
between  the  Pruth  on  the  West  and  the  Galatz-Bender 
railway  on  the  East,  leaving  Bender  to  Russia,  but 
assigning  Kishinev  to  Roumania,  and  hit  the  Dniestr 
at  the  elbow  of  its  South-Eastward  bend  between 
Kriulyany  and  GrigoriopoL  Then  it  should  follow 
the  course  of  the  Dniestr  up  to  a  point  just  below 
Cliotin,  whence  it  should  take  a  line  rather  South  of 
West  till  it  hits  the  left  bank  of  the  Pruth  again,  just 
above  Tchemowitz*  After  that,  it  should  follow  up  the 
Pruth  till  it  strikes  the  present  boundary  of  Bukovina 
towards  Galida,  and  should  take  a  South-Western 
course  identical  with  that  boundary  till  it  reaches  the 
Hungarian  frontier  along  the  summit  of  the  Carpathians, 
This  compromise,  while  it  satisfies  justice,  would 
not  in  itself  content  either  party*  Roumania,  for 
economic  reasons,  wants  more  coast-line,  in  spite  of 
her  recent  acquisitions  from  Bulgaria,  and  strategic 
considerations  would  disincline  Russia  from  introducing 
this  enormous  bend  into  her  new  frontier.  The  trans- 
action must  be  clinched  by  an  economic  arrangement. 
Even  if  Roumania  acquired  the  coast  between  the 
Danube  delta  and  the  Dniestr  Liman,  it  would  profit 
her  very  little,  since  Odessa,  which  is,  of  course,  for  ever 
beyond  Rotunania's  political  grasp,  offers  the  natural 
outlet,  not  only  to  Bessarabia,  but  to  Moldavia  and 
perhaps  even  Transylvania  as  well.  What  Roumania 
really  needs  is  the  use,  free  from  tariff,  of  this  port  and 
of  the  railway  leading  to  it  from  Yassy  and  Tchemowitz* 
It  would  serve  Russia's  own  interest  to  grant  her 
this  as  well,  for  Odessa  would  almost  double  the 
volume  of  her  trade,  by  focussing  all  the  traffic  from  her 
Western  hinterland  in  addition  to  that  from  the  North, 
yAiSit  in  return  Russia  could  obtain  from  the  Balkan 


3o8  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

2^11verein  the  free  use  of  a  railway  to  a  port  on  the 
^ean  ooastt  where  she  could  lade  and  unload  her 
goods  on  the  open  sea* 

We  have  now  dealt  with  the  whole  fringe  of  alien 
nationalities  within  the  Western  frontier  of  the  Russian 
Empire*  A  fringe  is  all  that  they  are :  their  territories 
are  insignificant  slices  carved  from  the  Empire's  enor- 
mous bulk,  and  their  populations  weigh  l^t  in  the 
balance  against  the  Russian-speaking  masses  that  lie 
away  to  their  East*  The  Russians  have  far  less  excuse 
than  the  Magyars  for  the  oppression  by  force  or  fraud 
of  their  fellow-nationalitiesi  because  the  most  quixotic 
generosity  could  not  endanger  the  Rtissian  element's 
preponderance*^  The  mere  weight  of  the  Russian 
population  is  sufficient  to  assture  for  ever  the  Russian 
character  of  the  Empire,  and  the  balance  of  numbers 
is  continually  shifting  further  in  its  favour  year  by  year, 
as  colonial  areas  fill  up  in  the  Great  North-East*  The 
only  really  difficult  problem  of  devolution  within  the 
Empire  concerns  the  relations  between  the  different 
branches  of  the  Russian  Nation  itself^ 

The  Russian  race  falls  into  two  great  divisions, 
distinguished  by  considerable  difference  of  dialect : — 

^  The  following  table,  showing  the  oomparative  strengdis  of  the  most 
io^ortant  natJooalities  within  the  Russian  Bmpkt,  was  compflcd  boa 
estimates  made  in  1906 : 

Great  Russians 
White  Russians 
Little  Russians 

Poles  •        •        •  'j^ijQoo 

Lithuanians  •        •  X/^9»ooo 

Letts  *        •        •  Z/43^/)oo 

Finns  .  •  a^496/xx> 

Tatars  .  9#738,ooo 

Bashkirs  i,^^fico 

Kirghiz        •        •  4,084,000 

The  total  population  of  the  Empire  was  estimated  at  i49,299»ooo 
in  the  same  year. 


55,^/x)o  \  Total  North  itostdm.  j,  ^  j^^^ 


DEVOLUTION  309 

(iO  The  ^ole  North  of  the  oountry  is  occupied  by 
the  **  Great  Russian  **  group,  which  is  compositd  of 
three  sub-sections : 

(a)  The  Northern,  corresponding  to  the  area  of 
the  former  republic  of  Novgorod,  where  the  Great 
Russian  dialect  is  spoken  in  its  most  extreme  form* 

(6)  The  Western,  coinciding  with  the  region  once 
subject  to  Lithuania,  where  the  so-called  ''  White 
Russian  **  variety  of  the  dialect  is  current. 

(c)  The  Eastern,  round  the  original  core  of  the 
Mtiscovite  principality,  where  the  dialect  shows  diverg- 
ences from  the  pure  Northern  type  similar  to  those 
that  prevail  in  White  Russia* 

These  three  modifications  of  the  Great  Rtissian  speech 
have  remained  mere  parochial  peculiarities,  and  have 
not  aroused  any  separatist  feelings  between  the  popula- 
tions that  respectively  speak  them.  The  third,  or 
**  fSoBcow,**  type  has  established  itself  as  the  otgim 
of  official  administration  and  of  educated  interooturse, 
because  the  principality  of  Moscow  was  the  nucleus 
out  of  ^Aiich  the  New  Russia  grew  up  as  the  Mongol 
storm  subsided.  The  sudden  birth  of  a  wonderful 
literature  in  the  nineteenth  century,  and  the  gradual 
spread  of  primary  education  since  the  beginning  of  the 
twentieth,  have  secured  it  for  ever  from  challenge  by 
the  odier  local  patois. 

(ii.)  **  Great  Russian,"'  then,  is  a  single  lai^;u2^e, 
and  all  the  populations  that  speak  it  form  a  single 
national  unit;  but  when  we  come  to  the  second  or 
"'  Little  Russian  ^*  division  of  the  race,  we  find  ourselves 
in  £ace  of  a  real  cleavage.  The  extension  of  the  **  Great 
Russians  **  coincides  on  the  vdiole  with  the  forest-mne 
of  the  country.  The  Little  Russians  lie  South  of  them, 
deployed  in  a  long  line  on  the  borderland  between  forest 


3IO  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

and  steppe,  which  extends  from  the  headwaters  of  the 
Vistula  and  Dniestr  systems  in  the  Carpathians  towards 
the  E*N*Ev  till  it  strikes  the  upper  oourse  of  the  Don 
near  Voronesh* 

This  wide«flung  ribbon  of  population  has  a  strong 
national  feeling  of  its  own*  The  **  Great  Russian  **  can 
claim  that  it  was  he  ^o  freed  the  race  from  the  Moslem 
yoke,  and  that  the  living  Russia  of  the  present,  with  its 
glories  of  arms  and  of  letters,  is  solely  his  creation; 
but  the  **  Little  Russian  **  looks  back  to  the  day  before 
the  Mongol  appeared  in  the  land,  when  the  Dniepr,  not 
the  Volga,  was  the  holy  river  of  Russia,  and  Kieff,  half 
way  down  its  course,  her  holy  dty,  the  meeting-place  of 
the  **  strot^  government  **  and  the  world-i«l^;ion  diat 
came  up  to  her  from  opposite  quarters,  out  of  the 
Baltic  and  the  Black  Sea*  He  regards  himself  as  the 
true  heir  to  this  primitive  tradition,  and  his  loyalty  to 
it  is  all  the  keener  because  so  many  centuries  lie  between 
the  Golden  Age  and  his  present  obscurity. 

Little  Russia,  unlike  Muscovy,  never  recovered  from 
the  Mot^ol  catastrophe*  She  escaped  from  allegiance 
to  the  Moslem  only  by  submission  to  the  Lithuanian 
and  Polish  dtholic ;  and  even  vdien  the  Polish  Empire 
was  broken  up,  she  did  not  win  her  unity  from  the 
re-settlement,  but  was  divided  with  the  rest  of  the 
spoils  between  the  governments  of  Moscow  and  Vienna* 
Yet  the  problem  of  Little  Russian  nationalism  might 
still  have  been  solved*  The  Ruthenes  of  Galida  were 
only  a  small  fraction  of  the  race  :  the  major  part  of  it, 
including  the  national  centre,  KiefiF,  and  the  whole  of  the 
Dniepr  basin,  was  once  more  gathered  into  the  fold  of  a 
national  Russian  state;  and  if  Moscow  could  have 
been  liberal  enough  to  accept  Kieff  as  her  peer,  the 
Little    Russians    would    soon    have    foo^tten   thetr 


DEVOLUTION  311 

partCcuJarism,  and  only  remembered  that  they  and  their 
Great  Russian  brethren  were  all  members  of  One 
Orthodox  Churchy  and  citizens  of  one  Holy  Russia* 
But  unfortunately  the  rulers  of  Moscow,  that  true  heart 
of  Russia  vdiere  all  her  races  and  dialects  meet,  had 
migrated  Northwards  to  the  Baltic,  and  the  new  regime 
of  Petersburg,  established  at  the  farther  extremity  of 
the  Great  Russian  area  and  exposed  to  the  full  influence 
of  German  ideas,  had  initiated  a  policy  of  uniformity 
as  baneful  as  that  of  Joseph  IL  in  the  Hapsburg  lands, 
btst  unrelieved  by  the  touch  of  genius  that  characterised 
Joseph's  activity*  Russia  was  to  be  ""  Great  Russian,'" 
and  the  Little  Russian  division  of  the  nation  was  to  be 
neither  conciliated  nor  assimilated,  but  ignored* 

This  unconstructive  policy  has  been  pursued 
mrchanirally  for  more  than  a  century*  The  Litde 
Russian  language  has  been  treated  as  a  patois  on 
the  same  footing  as  White  Russian  or  the  dialect  of 
Novgorod,  and  has  rigorously  been  denied  any  official 
status*  All  public  education  and  administration  has 
been  conducted  in  the  Moscow  variety  of  Great  Russian, 
the  natural  medium  in  the  North,  but  in  Southern 
Russia  almost  a  foreign  toxigue*  The  results  of  this 
system  have  been  tmfortunate.  Litde  Russian  national- 
ism, effectively  prevented  from  manifesting  itself  in 
external  forms  throughout  its  native  home,  the  Ukraine,^ 
has  been  irritated  by  this  wanton  provocation  to  an 
unnatural  tension  of  consdotisness,  and  has  found  a  new 
stronghold  across  the  Galidan  border* 

The  Little  Russian  or  Ruthene  population  of  the 
Austrian    Crown-lands   has   its   grievances.    Though 

^"Ukntne''  (meaning  ^borderland/'  the  same  word  as  the 
**  Kratn  **  of  the  Slovenes)  is  the  term  used  to  cover  all  distrjcts  of 
Ltttk  Russian  population  within  the  present  frontiers  of  the  Russian 


3»  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

the  Rutfaene  peasant  proprietors  constitute  the  bulk  of 
the  poptilation  in  Eastern  Galida,^  the  big  estates 
are  still  nearly  everywhere  in  the  hands  of  a  Polish 
upper  dass,  a  relic  of  the  Polish  domination  before  the 
Partition  of  1772,  and  in  the  'eighties  of  the  last  century 
the  Austrian  government  abandoned  the  Ruthene 
majority  to  the  mercy  of  the  Polish  minority,  yAaen  it 
was  bidding  for  the  support  of  the  Polish  vote  in  the 
parliament  at  Vienna* 

The  Poles  had  the  game  in  their  hands,  because  both 
wealth  and  education  were  at  that  time  their  monopoly, 
and  they  took  steps  to  confirm  their  racial  predomin- 
ance* They  compelled  the  Austrian  government  to 
recognise  Pblish  as  the  official  language  of  the  whole 
province,  and  it  has  taken  the  Ruthenes  a  generation  to 
secure  a  modicum  of  instruction  in  their  own  language 
at  Lemberg  '  University*  Resentment  at  their  betrayal 
to  the  Poles  raised  a  movement  amot^  them  in  favour 
of  Russia,  and  a  **  Moskalophil  **  party  grew  up,  yAost 
programme  was  that  reunion  with  the  national  Rtissian 
state  which  is  now  being  realised ;  but  the  Moskalophils 
have  always  been  in  a  minority,  and  no  indictment 
against  Russian  policy  in  the  Ukraine  could  be  more 
damning  than  the  almost  universal  rejection  of  Russiafl 
overtures  by  the  Ruthenes  of  Eastern  Galida* 

In  modem  Austria  **  official  language  ^*  has  not  the 
same  sinister  connotation  as  in  the  neighbotur  states  of 


*■  The  Ruthene  territory  amounti  to  about  two*tfairds  of  the  whole 
area  of  Galida,  even  if  we  make  a  liberal  allowance  for  the  Msh 
enclaves  embedded  in  it :  on  the  other  hand,  the  lUithene  deaiait  is 
only  a  minority  of  the  total  poptdation  of  Galicia  (3/3831000  in  igoo,  as 
a^unst  4^a/xx>  Poles),  because  the  Ruthene  country  is  more  moan- 
tainous  amd  less  developed  than  die  Western  districfB  occupied  by  tbe 
Poles. 

'  The  German  form  of  Russian  Lvov,  Little  Russian  Lwxw,  Pdlah 
Lwdw* 


DEVOLUTION  313 

Russia,  Prussia  and  Hungary.  Like  German  in  the 
remaining  Austrian  provinces,  Polish  is  **  official  ^*  in 
Galida  in  the  sense  that  it  is  the  vehicle  of  **  internal 
service  **  in  the  administration  of  the  country.  In  the 
'' external  service/'  however,  that  is,  in  all  relations 
between  the  provincial  government  and  the  individuals 
subject  to  its  jurisdiction,  Austrian  public  law  prescribes 
in  Galida  as  elsewhere  the  employment  of  the  private 
party^s  native  speech,  if  it  is  recogtiised  as  customary 
{**  Landesiiblich  **)  in  the  district* 

A  Ruthene  thus  enjoys  the  right  to  conduct  all  his 
business  with  the  Polish  administration  in  his  own 
Ruthene  tongue*  If  he  is  a  peasant,  he  can  bring  an 
action  in  Ruthene  before  the  public  courts :  if  he  is  a 
deputy,  he  can  debate  in  Ruthene  in  the  provincial  diet* 
If  he  can  secure  a  majority  in  his  village  or  municipality, 
he  may  make  Ruthene  the  medium  of  his  local  self- 
government*  If  he  travels  on  the  Galidan  railways,  he 
finds  every  official  notice  down  to  the  inscription  on  his 
ticket  printed  in  Ruthene  as  well  as  in  German  and 
Polish*  In  every  one  of  these  points  his  status  presents 
a  remarkable  contrast  to  the  position  of  his  brethren 
beyond  the  Russian  and  Hungarian  frontiers.  Even 
in  the  sphere  of  higher  education,  where  the  Polish 
regime  has  laid  itself  open  to  most  criticism,  the  number 
of  Ruthene  secondary  schools  in  Galida  has  at  least 
risen,  though  slowly,  since  1867,  while  in  Hungary  the 
non-Magyar  secondary  schools  have  steadily  shrunk 
in  numbm  during  the  same  period*  On  the  whole,  we 
may  say  that  the  Ruthene  majority  in  the  Eastern  part 
of  Galida  is  treated  as  equitably  as  is  consistent  with  the 
radal  supremacy  of  the  Polish  minority  in  the  region, 
and  that  here,  as  elsewhere,  Austria  has  been  Europe's 
pioneer  in  the  settlement  of  the  problem  of  nationality. 


314  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

In  Galiddt  then,  the  Little  Russian  language  is 
deprecated  but  in  no  sense  banned*  A  society  has 
floturished  for  many  years  at  Lemberg  which  fosters  the 
living  literature,  collects  and  edits  the  peasant-poetry  of 
the  past,  and  studies  the  philological  characteristics  of 
the  dialect,  with  a  freedom  unheard  of  East  of  the 
frontier*  The  Tsar^s  government  has  held  the  mistaken 
point  of  view  that  the  encouragement  of  traditional 
culture  inevitably  gives  rise  to  new-fangled  political 
aspirations,  and  has  thereby  provoked  this  literary  group 
at  Lemberg  to  become  in  fact  the  mouthpiece  of  a  Little 
Russian  nationalist  party,  which  has  the  allegiance  of  a 
majority  among  the  Austrian  Ruthenes*  This  party 
dreams  of  a  national  state  in  which  all  fractions  of  the 
Little  Russian  race  shall  be  united,  and  its  feeling  against 
Petersbtu^  is  so  bitter  that,  in  spite  of  the  entente  at  its 
expense  between  Vienna  and  the  Poles,  it  is  ready 
to  march  under  Austria's  banner,  and  aUows  its 
canvassing  in  the  Ukraine  to  assume  the  form  of 
Austrian  propaganda*^ 

This  bizarre  situation  has  suddenly  been  terminated 
by  the  present  war*  In  the  event  of  the  Allies' 
success,  we  have  seen  that  Galida  will  pass  to  the 
Russian  Empire*  The  whole  of  the  Little  Russian  race 
will  finally  be  united  within  Russia's  frontier,  but  the 
annexation  of  the  Galidan  Ruthenes  will  create  the 
same  situation  for  her  as  that  of  the  Galidan  Poles. 

^  It  is  true  that  to  win  the  loyalty  of  the  Ruthenes  the  Central  Govern- 
ment at  Vienna  has  had  to  reverse  in  some  measure  its  Galidan  policy, 
and  that  it  has  thereby  shaken  the  loyalty  of  the  Pole9»  who  were  out- 
raged to  find  the  racial  balance  in  Gadida  bein^  redressed  from  above. 
To  drive  Pole  and  Ruthene  in  double  harness  is  really  a  hopeless  task, 
and  it  n  probable  that  Vienna  only  attempted  it  at  the  mstanoe  of 
Berlin.  Since  her  bungling  policy  began  to  reconcile  Russian  and  Mt, 
Germany  has  sought  to  embarrass  Russia  in  another  quarter  by  txpidt- 
ing  the  problem  of  the  Ukraine. 


DEVOLUTION  315 

She  cannot  afford  to  be  less  liberal  at  Lemberg  than 
Austria  has  been*  She  will  have  to  take  accx>unt  of 
her  new  Ruthene  citizens'  demands,  and  this  will  raise 
simultaneously  the  question  of  the  Ukraine* 

The  Nationalists  will  doubtless  daim  the  utmost, 
namely,  the  consolidation  of  the  whole  area  speaking 
the  dialect  into  a  single  poUtical  unit  endowed  with 
very  extensive  Home  Rule,  but  such  a  solution  has 
almost  insurmotmtable  difficulties  in  its  way* 

(i«)  The  Litde  Russian  area  is  woefully  lacking 
in  geographical  compactness*  It  would  include  the 
Ruthene  section  of  Galida,  and  the  present  Rtsssian 
governments  of  Volhynia,  Podolia,  Kieff,  Poltava,  and 
Kharkov,  together  with  the  Southern  parts  of  Chernigov 
and  Voronesh;  but,  as  we  have  said,  this  is  not  so 
much  an  independent  region  as  a  border  intermediate 
between  two  others* 

It  is  true  that  it  has  acquired  a  peculiar  economic 
importance,  because  it  more  or  less  coincides  with  the 
famous  "'Black  Earth''  zone,  where  during  the  last 
century  agrictdture  has  been  developed  on  a  vast  scale 
under  modem  methods,  bringing  in  its  train  a  network 
of  railways,  and  therewith  the  beginnings  of  an  industrial 
growth*  The  new  wheat  production  has  not  confined 
itself,  however,  to  the  Litde  Russian  fringe:  it  has 
pushed  out  South  of  it  into  the  Black  Sea  steppe, 
which,  since  the  break-up  of  the  Ancient  World,  had 
been  a  **  no-man's  land  "  swept  by  one  wave  after 
another  of  nomad  barbarians,  till  in  the  latter  half 
of  the  eighteenth  century  the  Russian  government 
wrested  the  title  to  its  sovereignty  from  the  Porte, 
and  began  to  replace  the  handful  of  Nogai  Tatars, 
that  had  wandered  there  under  Ottoman  suzerainty, 
by  a  steady  influx  of  agrioiltural 


^ 


316  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

From  the  outset  this  new  population  has  been  very 
hettrogeneous.  The  Germanophil  government  Ot 
Catherine  II.  copied  the  Hapsbui^  experiment  of  sowing 
civilisation  by  scattering  plantations  of  German  settlers, 
and  in  "  New  Russia,"  as  in  Hui^ary,  the  balance  was 
largely  made  up  of  refi^ees  from  the  various  Christian 
populations  subject  to  Tturkish  oppression.  The 
colonisation  of  the  district  received  an  immense  impetus 
from  the  emancipation  of  the  ser&  in  1861,  since  when 
the  peasants  ia  every  province  of  Russia  have  been 
leaving  their  ancestral  villages  and  drifting  into  all  the 
tmdeveloped  areas  to  take  up  freehold  allotments  there ; 
but,  inasmuch  as  the  Great  Russian  population  of  the 
Empire  is  vastly  stroi^r  than  the  Little  Russian  in 
□umbers,  the  Great  Russian  immigrants  into  the  steppes 
outwe^  the  Little  Russian  in  the  like  proportion. 
When  New  Russia  has  been  completely  filled  up,  the 
Little  Russian  element  will  not  be  found  to  predominate, 
and  so,  when  the  various  elements  subsequently  fuse 
themselves  into  one  type,  the  "  New  Russian  "  blend 
will  not  asstune  a  specifically  "  Little  Russian  "  colour. 

What  is  true  of  the  Bladk  Sea  steppes  is  still  truer 
of  the  coast  upon  whidi  they  open.  Odessa,  the  new 
port  founded  in  1792,  is  an  indispensable  factor  in  the 
economic  system  of  the  "  Black  Earth  "  ^one,  for  die 
whole  grain  export  passes  through  its  harbour  ;  but  it 
has  no  special  links  of  tradition  or  dialect  with  the  little 
Russian  nationality,  and  is  essentially  a  common  oudet 
and  meeting-place  of  all  races  in  the  Empire,  inctudii^ 
the  Poles,  whUe  the  isolated  Crimean  peninsula  whidi 
adjoins  it  on  the  East  has  remained  the  stror^fhold  of  a 
dviUsed  agricultural  and  vine-growing  Tatar  population. 

New  Russia,  then,  has  no  social  bonds  of  cohesion  with 
Little  Russia,  and  could  never  be  absorbed  into  it ;  but 


DEVOLUTION  317 

a  sdf-govenui^  Little  Russian  unit  which  did  not  extend 
to  the  coast  would  gec^aphically  and  economically  be 
almost  unthinkable*  It  would  possess  none  of  the  pre- 
requisites for  self-sufficiency* 

(ii«)  Yet  even  if  Little  Russia  were  able,  by  assimilat- 
ii%  the  coast  or  otherwise,  to  consolidate  herself,  a  more 
serious  difficulty  would  still  remain :  she  would  be  too 
unwieldy  a  block  for  the  architecture  of  the  Russian 
Empire.  There  are  two  possible  plans  on  which  a 
federal  group  can  be  built  up. 

(a)  Where  the  whole  population  to  be  federated  is 
honu^eneous  in  nationality,  and  the  only  problem  is 
caused  by  its  bulk,  it  is  best  oi^anised  in  a  large  number 
of  self-governing  units,  which,  being  ex  hypothesi 
identical  in  quality,  will  probably  work  together  in 
harmony,  if  only  their  parity  in  size  and  importance  is 
secured  as  well.  This  structure  has  approved  itself  in 
the  history  of  the  U.S  J^*,  and  will  probably  be  adopted 
as  the  basis  of  the  New  China. 

(b)  American  history,  however,  has  also  shown  that  this 
system  of  equal  units  is  extremely  dangerous  where  the 
total  population  is  divided  by  differences  of  nationality. 
In  fact,  so  soon  as  the  least  divergence  of  national  self- 
ooosciousness  creeps  in,  it  will  transform  the  divisions 
between  units,  y/bidi  formerly  had  merely  administra- 
tive significance,  into  spiritual  lines  of  cleavage,  and 
since  the  units  are  equal  and  share  no  particular  centre 
of  gravity,  there  will  be  no  constructive  force  to  counter- 
act this  centrifugal  tendency.  A  gradual  divergence  of 
this  kind  within  such  a  structure  cost  the  United  States  a 
civil  war  before  they  could  remedy  it :  in  a  case  where 
the  national  differences  are  violent  and  traditional,  and 
where  the  architect  has  still  a  clean  slate,  to  adopt  this 
principle  would  be  deliberate  folly. 


^ 


318  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

When  common  interest  or  necessity  induces  several 
different  nationalities  to  attempt  combination  in  a  single 
oi^anic  political  group,'  success  CrT  only  oome  through 
inequality,  by  subjectix^  a  number  of  lesser  satellites  to 
the  attraction  of  a  central  planet,  and  the  inequality 
must  be  signal.  If  the  satellites  approach  the  planet  too 
nearly  in  mass,  or  the  planet  shiinla  into  too  even  a 
ratio  with  the  satellites,  they  will  all,  when  a  certain  point 
is  reached,  fly  off  at  a  tai^ent,  and  probably  collide 
fatally  with  one  another  before  diey  severally  disappear 
in  space. 

"The  unity  of  the  Russian  Empire  is  to  the  interest  of 
nearly  all  the  nationaUties  that  are  members  of  it ;  but 
that  unity  can  only  be  maintained  by  grouping  the  rest  * 
round  a  Russian  national  state  of  immense  preptmdei^ 
ance.  We  have  said  that  the  Russian  nation  nud  have 
no  fear  of  being  swamped  by  its  fellow-nadonalitia, 
but  ^t  remains  true  (uiiy  so  long  as  the  nation  itself 
remains  united.  The  Uttte  Russian  element  forms 
nearly  a  third  of  the  mbtAt  race,'  and  if  it  were  to  break 
off  from  the  main  body  and  attempt  to  follow  an  orbit  d 
its  own,  it  would  fatally  dislocate  the  balance  of  the  vbak 
Imperial  system.  It  would  approximate  sufficiently 
in  mass  to  the  Great  Russian  remnant  to  struck  with 
it  for  predominance,  and  this  fratricidal  strife  ifouU 
wear  down  the  strength  of  the  two  fragments,  and 
prevent  them  from  concentratit^  their  energy  to  keep 

'  As  eoMtaaad  with  a  loose,  panne  concert  like  the  proposeil  Balkaa 
ZoUvcrein. 
*  Without  prejudice,  of  course,  to  their  own  local  sclf-gaverameii(> 
'  Great  Ruasians    .  ,       6i.Si9,ooo  (.~70.$%) 

Little  Runtaos : 
latheUbaiae    33,381,0001     ---«,—„./_—,_«  1 
InGalida        .     3%^]    3S,763.«>o  (=39.5%) 

Total  of  Ruasian  Nation  .     87,333,000 


DEVOLUTION  319 

the  minor  bodies  in  their  courses*  The  result  would  be 
at  worst  the  complete  break-up  of  the  Russian  Empire, 
and  at  best  a  protracted  political  paralysis* 

If  diis  catastrophe  is  to  be  avoided,  the  Little  Russians 
must  abandon  their  particularism,  and  allow  themselves 
to  be  reabsorbed  in  the  indivisible  body  of  **  Holy 
Russia/^  But  this  can  only  come  about  if  the  splendid 
traditions  of  a  thousand  years  are  no  longer  obscured  by 
the  bitter  experience  of  a  century*  The  Tsar^s  govern- 
ment cannot  grant  the  Little  Russians  autonomy ;  but 
it  can  see  to  it  that  the  sacrifice  of  sentiment  which  the 
refusal  demands  shall  entail  no  loss  of  honour  or  of 
material  advantage,  and  that  the  Little  Russians  shall 
take  up  their  citizenship  in  the  new  national  unit  gladly 
as  the  Great  Russians'  peers,  and  not  sullenly  as  their 
inferiors.  The  Little  Russian  dialect  must  at  last  be 
given  just  recognition*  It  must  not  merely  become  the 
official  language  of  those  provinces  where  it  is  the 
native  speech,  but  it  must  be  allowed  equal  currency  with 
the  Moscow  dialect  in  the  central  executive  and  in  the 
common  parliament,  not  indeed  of  the  whole  Russian 
Empire,  but  of  the  Russian  national  state  that  will  be  its 
core* 

This  Russian  core  will  be  an  experiment  in  centralised 
self-govemment  on  a  lai^er  scale  than  any  yet  attempted.^ 
It  will  embrace  the  whole  country  from  Archangel  on 
the  White  Sea  to  Odessa  on  the  Bbck,  from  Petrograd 
on  the  Baltic  to  Astrakhan  on  the  Caspian,  and  from 
the  summit  of  the  Carpathian  mountains  to  the  further 
slope  of  the  Urals*  C)n  the  East  and  South  it  will  be 
bounded  only  by  the  vacant  areas  along  the  Trans- 

*  The^  actaon  of  the  ezxstjng  representative  organ,  the  Imperial 
Duma,  if  restricted,  and  it  cannot  in  any  sense  be  considered  as  the 
fomnug  power  in  Rusia :  ultimate  authority  is  still  in  the  hands  of 
uie  bureaucracy. 

L 


y»  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

Siberian  Railway,  irtiidi  still  await  effective  colonisation, 
and  by  the  military  districts  of  the  Caucasus  and  the 
Asiatic  steppes,  whose  primary  need  at  present  is  the 
unbroken  maintenance  of  strong  government,  and  which 
will  not  become  able  to  govern  themselves  till  many 
years  have  habituated  them  to  a  civilisation  established 
from  without.  The  region  ripe  for  immediate  self- 
government  is  nevertheless  immense,  and  the  popula- 
tioa  contained  within  the  limits  indicated,  which  will 
be  represented  in  the  parhament  of  the  national  Rus^an 
unit,  falls  little  short  of  a  hundred  milUons.  There 
are,  however,  several  factors  eminently  &vourable  to 
the  successful  oi^anisation  of  this  huge  mass  of  human 


1 


(i.)  The  geographical  unwieldiness  of  the  country  is 
counterbalanced  by  the  extraordinary  fadUty  of  com- 
munication. The  great  navigable  rivers  have  always 
afforded  magnificent  natural  highways :  the  Volga 
steamer  was  as  important  a  factor  in  nineteenth-century 
Russia  as  the  Mississippi  steamer  was  in  the  contem- 
potary  development  of  the  U.SA.,  and  the  network  of 
railways  whidi,  as  in  America,  has  first  supplemented, 
and  now  begun  to  supplant,  the  river-steamer's  use, 
especially  in  the  new  comlands  of  the  South,  can  extend 
itself  over  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  land  without 
encountering  any  barrier  of  mountains. 

(ii.)  The  Great  Russian  race  has  uken  full  advantage 
of  the  geographical  elasticity  of  its  habitat,  and,  expand- 
ing from  its  original  centre  of  dispersion  in  the  Nortb- 
Westera  forests,  has  kept  pace  with  the  political  exten- 
sion of  the  Muscovite  state's  frontiers.  In  its  contact 
with  the  alien  races  that  it  has  thereby  encountered,  it 
has  displayed  a  vitality  and  assimilative  power  com- 
parable to  that  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  in  Amedca. 


DEVOLUTION  331 

The  little  patches  of  Ugro-Finnish  population  that  still 
survive  in  the  heart  of  Great  Russia, — ^Karelians  between 
Novgorod  and  Tver  among  the  Valdai  hills,  Chere- 
misses  and  Mordvins  between  Nijni  Novgorod  and 
Kazan  on  the  Middle  Volga, — ^testify  to  the  vanished 
majorities  of  these  tribes,  which  have  adopted  the 
speech  and  nationality  of  their  Russian  conquerors  as 
far  as  the  White  Sea*  The  same  process  is  being  con- 
tinued to-day  at  the  expense  of  the  more  widely  spread 
Finnish  groups  of  the  North-East,  —  Votyaks  and 
Syryens  and  Voguls  and  Ostyaks, — ^protected  though 
they  are  by  the  rampart  of  the  Northern  Urals.^ 

The  nomadic,  Turkish  -  speaking  communities, 
Bashkirs  and  Chuvashes,'  that  adjoin  the  Volga-Finns 
on  the  South-East,  wandering  with  their  flocks  among 
the  Southern  Urals  and  along  the  border  of  the  steppes, 
are  suffering  the  fate  of  those  pathetic  litde  Red  Indian 
reservations  in  Canada  and  the  U*S.A«,  round  which 
the  tide  of  European  immigration  surged  higher  all 
through  the  nineteenth  centtuy,  till  some  inconsequent 
act  of  lawlessness  broke  the  moral  obligation  that  had 
so  far  preserved  their  bounds,  and  abandoned  them  to 
submergence  beneath  the  flood*  But  the  mere  engulfing 
of  inferior  races  is  not  the  greatest  triumph  of  the 

A  The  remnants  of  Finnish  population  still  awaiting  absorption  by  the 
Rmsian  race,  indudtng  the  Ural  groups,  but  excluding,  of  course,  the 
9,3  j3/)oo  Finns  of  the  Grand  Duchy  who  have  a  avilisatioa  and  a 
natioiaal  consciousness  superior,  on  the  whole,  to  the  Russian,  make  up 
a  total  of  a,353,ooo  (identical,  curiously  enough,  with  the  total  A 
civilised  Finns  in  Finland).  There  are  furthermore  141^,000  civilised 
Finns  in  Russian  territory  adjoining  the  Grand  Duchy  who  are  unlikely 
to  be  assimilated. 

'Bashkirs  ....     im9iOOO 
Chttvashes        •  844)000 

Total       •  .    a,337,ooo 


332  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

Russian  nation  :  it  has  known  how  to  lecondle  a  rival 
dvilisation. 

Christian  and  K^>slem  have  met  as  enemies  on  many 
fields,  and  the  result  of  the  struggle  has  often  brought 
them  into  the  relation  of  conquerors  and  conquered. 
Yet  whichever  party  has  triumphed,  a  great  gulf  has 
generally  remained  fixed  between  the  two,  and  enforced 
political  union,  instead  of  passing  over,  as  in  ao  many 
other  cases,  into  oi^anic  political  unity,  has  only 
accentuated  their  mutual  antipathy,  Russia  alone  has 
tnan^^ed  to  solve  the  problem.  The  Tatars  of  the 
Volga-Khanates,*  conquered  by  her  in  the  sixteenth 
century,  were  communities  of  peasants  and  merdiants 
widi  a  tradition  of  culture,  derived  from  Persia  and 
Baghdad,  as  strongly  characterised  as  that  which  Russia 
herself  had  drawn  from  Q)nstantinople  and  the  West ; 
yet  now  the  Tatars,  while  remaining  true  to  their 
religion,  have  become  Russian  in  soul,  and  have  fbtmd 
both  the  opporttmity  and  the  inclination  to  play  a  full 
part  in  the  social  and  political  life  of  the  Russian  nation. 
This  is  a  victory  not  of  race  but  of  civilisation,  or 
rather,  what  is  better  still,  it  is  the  blending  of  two 
civilisations  into  a  new  harmony. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  ttx  Great  Russian  element  has 
the  power  to  weld  the  whole  hundred  millions  into  a 
consolidated  nation,  and  in  the  process  not  only  Finns, 
Bashkirs  and  Tatars,  but  the  more  compact  Litde 
Russian  masses  as  well,  will  ultimately  lose  their 
peculiar  individuality.  It  would  be  idle  for  the  Utile 
Russians  to  complain  at  the  prospect.  U  tlieir  language 
is  henceforth  given  as  good  an  opporttmity  for  self- 
assertion  as  the  Moscow  dialect,  and  still  yields  ground 
before  the  latter,  the  cause  will  no  longer  be  human 
>  Kotu  and  AftraUua. 


\ 


DEVOLUTION  323 

violence  and  injustice,  but  the  simple,  unalterable 
fact  of  the  other  tongue's  superior  vitality*  The 
Little  Russian  need  not  be  ashamed  of  accepting  for 
his  own  a  language  which  during  the  last  century  has 
become  the  vehicle  of  a  literature  of  world-wide  im- 
portance, beside  which  the  traditional  peasant  ballads 
sedulously  published  at  Lembei^  sink  into  almost 
comic  insignificance* 

The  new  Russian  nation  will  look  not  towards  the 
past  but  towards  the  future,  and  the  national  character 
that  VTill  emerge  will  be  finer  than  any  of  its  component 
elements ;  for  litde  Russian  and  Tatar  will  nobly 
leaven  the  Great  Russian  lump,  and  **  Scratch  the 
Russian  and  you  find  the  Tatar  *^  will  invert  its  meaning, 
and  turn  from  a  national  reproach  to  be  the  national 
motto* 

This  homogeneous  national  state  will  finally  achieve 
devolution,  not  through  antagonistic,  or  at  any 
rate  unsymmetrical,  nationalistic  sub-parliaments,  but 
through  strongly  developed  county  councils*  In  1864, 
towards  the  end  of  the  great  decade  of  reform, 
Alexander  II*  called  into  existence  elective  assemblies 
based,  like  the  medieval  **  Estates  **  of  Western 
Europe,  upon  distinctions  of  social  caste,  and  graded 
in  two  scales :  the  provincial  zemstvos,  representing 
whole  governments,  and  the  district  s^emstvos  and 
municipal  dumas,  representing  their  sub-divisions* 

These  councils  did  not  produce  many  concrete  results 
by  the  feverish  activity  that  marked  the  first  years  of 
their  existence*  In  1890  their  powers  were  severely 
restricted,  and  it  seemed  as  though  confinement  to 
the  purely  consultative  sphere  would  reduce  them  to 
complete  unreality ;  but  the  revolutionary  movement  of 
1904-6,  precipitated  by  the  disastrous  war  with  Japan, 


334  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

awoke  in  them  an  unexpeaed  energy.  During  the 
chaos  into  which  the  Empire  fell  for  three  years,  they 
took  the  initiative.  Repeated  congresses  of  delegates 
from  the  local  dumas  and  zemstvos  evolved,  in  con- 
ference with  the  autocracy,  the  constitution  of  OcKiber 
190;,  and  the  elective  machinery  of  the  first  national 
dumas  was  modelled  on  the  local  plan.  The  provincial, 
district,  and  municipal  councils  have  not  let  their 
recovered  power  slip  again  from  their  hands,  and  a 
phase  of  really  constructive  activity  undoubtedly  lies 
before  them. 

This,  then,  is  the  Russia  of  the  future,  which  we 
can  discern  through  the  chrysalis  of  eighteenth  century 
autocracy,  from  which  the  Russia  of  the  present  has  been 
so  painfully  extricating  herself.  It  is  not  a  mere  dream 
of  the  imagination.  The  regime  in  possession  fasdnaus 
our  attention,  just  as  the  royal  murders  in  Serbia  occu' 
pied  the  whole  vision  of  the  Magyar  professor.  The 
repressive,  unscrupulous  police^ovemment  keeps  us 
unpleasantly  aware  of  its  existence  by  the  starring 
echoes  of  its  misdeeds  that  filter  tlirough  into  our  press, 
and  the  hysterical,  often  criminal,  intrigues  c^  the 
revolutionists,  who  claim  to  represent  the  intelligtiiiia, 
reveal  a  dearth  of  constructive  ideas  that  almost  justifies 
the  government's  attitude.  Yet  beneath  this  sordid 
surface  a  less  melodramatic  political  activity  has  been 
at  work  for  a  generation  without  attracting  the  world's 
notice.  The  exploitadoo  of  the  "  Black  Earth  "  zone, 
the  conciliation  of  the  Moslems,  and  the  evoludon  of 
the  zemstvos  are  s^ns  of  the  times. 


EXPANSION  325 


D*  Expansion 

We  have  not,  however,  completely  answered  the 
Germans'  case*  **  Granted/'  they  will  say,  **  that 
Russia  has  this  liberal  future  before  her,  that  national 
self-government  will  be  attained  by  the  different  races 
within  the  Empire,  alien  and  Russian  alike,  and  that 
the  old  ideal  of  *  Repression  at  home  and  aggression 
abroad,'  will  be  sloughed  off  together  with  her  obsolete 
eighteenth-century  ^  strong-government ' :  if  we  grant 
you  all  this,  you  must  allow  us  to  turn  against  you  your 
own  weapon  of  historical  analogy*  You  have  illustrated 
the  tendency  of  Russia's  growth  by  a  comparison  with 
eighteenth-centtuy  France.  But  France,  after  she  had 
achieved  national  self-government  in  the  Revolution, 
proceeded  to  rob  territory  from  other  nations  like  the 
most  vulgar-minded  despotic  conqueror*  Perhaps  you 
may  ascribe  this  conduct  not  to  France  herself,  but  to 
the  personal  ambition  of  Napoleon ;  or  you  may  say 
that,  though  the  French  nation  a  century  ago  did  adopt 
unmodified  the  Bourbons'  dynastic  point  of  view,  the 
Industrial  Revolution  has  intervened  meanwhile  and 
entirely  changed  the  attitude  of  self-governing  nations 
towards  their  foreign  policy — ^that  they  do  not  now  wage 
war  for  territorial  acquisition  but  for  economic  advan- 
tage, aiming  to  add  market  to  market,  not  province  to 
province*  If  you  take  up  this  position,  we  can  answer 
you  out  of  your  own  mouth* 

**  Let  us  return  to  your  comparison  of  Germany  and 
Russia*  You  have  proved  that  the  present  analogies 
between  them  are  deceptive :  strong  government  in 
Russia  did  its  work  under  Peter  the  Great,  and  is  now  a 
functionless  survival,  while  Bismarck  had  to  rehabituate 


3a6  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

a  coltuied,  peaceable  people  to  '  blood  and  ircm '  and 
put  strong  government  in  the  foreground  £^:ain,  because 
in  Germany  its  primary  task  of  consolidation  had  nevet 
previously  been  achieved.  But  our  new  militarism  did 
not  die  with  the  accomplishment  of  the  task  for  wfaicb 
it  had  been  called  into  being  :  rightly  or  wrongly,  wt 
Germans  have  cherished  it  (as  you  have  pointed  out) 
precisely  as  a  weapon  in  the  modem  economic  battle, 
to  snatch  the  industrial  markets  of  the  World  from  the 
nations  established  in  possession  of  them.  If  you  beat 
us  in  this  war,  we  shall  have  failed,  but  when  we  iaSi, 
the  Russian  nation  steps  into  our  shoes.  Like  ourselves 
they  will  covet,  and  justly  covet,  a  '  place  in  the  Sun/ 
and  do  you  imagine  that,  however  liberal  their  ideals 
may  be,  economic  pressure  will  not  in  the  end  fora 
them  to  stake  their  all  on  the  same  desperate  throw  iot 
World  Empire  that  we  are  making  at  this  moment^ 
Think  also  of  the  analogies  of  the  Future  :  economic 
environment  is  a  stronger  force  than  national  dis- 
position." 

This  is  the  German  advocate's  last  and  most  dangerous 
cotmter-attack ;  but  we  can  meet  it  with  a  crushing  reply, 
for  it  rests  on  an  entire  misconception  of  the  Russian 
Empire's  economic  character.  Germany,  by  the 
density  of  her  population,  the  nature  of  her  physical 
resources,  and  her  geographical  position  and  extent, 
inevitably  came  into  line  with  the  Western  nations  of 
Europe^  and  was  forced  into  industrial  competition 
with  them  under  exasperatit^ly  disadvantageous  con- 
ditions. The  economic  structure  of  the  Russian 
Empire  belongs  to  a  different  type  altogether. 

Beyond  the  densely-populated,  highly-organised  little 
states  of  Europe,  whidi  at  present  focus  in  themselves 
the  civilisation  of  the  world  by  drawing  all  its  raw 


EXPANSION  327 

products  into  the  crucible  of  their  industry,  lies  a  ring 
of  states  in  the  making,  which  dwarf  Europe  by  the 
vastness  of  their  cahbre*  None  of  them  are  full  grown 
yet«  Some  of  them,  like  Australia  and  Canada  and  the 
Argentine,  have  all  the  weapons  of  civilisation  at  their 
command,  but  not  the  hands  to  wield  them — empty 
lands,  crying  out  for  the  life-blood  of  population  to  fill 
their  veins*  Some,  like  India  and  China,  seethe  with 
human  life,  but  have  found  no  spirit  to  brood  over  the 
waters  and  call  order  out  of  chaos,  so  that  their  human 
forces  evaporate  in  anarchy,  and  the  material  wealth, 
that  might  make  their  millions  of  lives  worth  living,  still 
remains  untapped*  Only  one  of  them,  the  U*S*A*, 
has  yet  developed  far  enough  on  its  course  to  give  us 
an  inkling  of  what  Time  will  make  of  them  all* 

These  cosmopolitan  units  of  the  future  will  not 
compete  with  the  present  national  units  of  Europe : 
they  will  grow  up  to  supersede  them  as  human  life 
passes  over  from  the  national  to  the  international  scale ; 
but  they  are  still  young  and  can  afford  to  abide  their  time* 
We  have  only  to  look  East  of  the  Volga  and  the  Urals 
to  see  that  the  Russian  Empire  is  one  of  their  brother- 
hood* 

When  the  Trans-Siberian  railway  was  completed, 
after  ten  years^  work,in  1902,  we  thought  of  it  as  a  move  in 
the  Imperialist  game,  which  was  to  bring  the  Russian 
military  machine  within  striking  distance  of  the  Yellow 
Sea,  and  perhaps  reduce  China  to  be  the  Empire's  vassal* 
This  idea  may,  in  fact,  have  been  uppermost  in  the 
Government's  mind,  and  it  certainly  was  an  important 
link  in  the  chain  of  events  that  led  to  the  Japanese 
War*  But  the  real  significance  of  the  railway  is  far 
different,  and  has  been  in  no  wise  affected  by  the  ruin 
of  Russia's  ambitions  in  the  Far  East*    Its  building 


3a8  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

marks  an  epoch  in  the  expansion  of  the  Russian  nation 
as  important  as  that  marked  by  the  first  trans-con- 
tinental railways  of  North  America  for  the  expansion 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race* 

During  the  seventeenth  century,  when  the  Frendi 
explorers  were  penetrating  up  the  St«  Lawrence  into 
the  Great  Lakes,  and  discovering  portages  to  the  Ohio 
and  Mississippi  that  brought  their  canoes  on  to  the  river- 
system  of  the  Mexican  gulf,  0)ssack  adventurers  had 
already  crossed  the  Urals  and  worked  their  way  along 
the  equally  magnificent  water-routes  of  Northern  Asia, 
up  the  Obi  and  Angara  rivers,  across  Lake  Baikal,  and 
then  down  the  Amur  to  the  shores  of  the  Pacific. 

Like  Great  Britain,  however,  in  Australia,  the  Russian 
Govenmient  at  first  found  no  better  use  for  this  vacant 
land,  that  had  fallen  so  casually  into  their  hands,  than  to 
relegate  their  convicts  to  the  Siberian  mines,^  and  Siberia 
has  become  the  by-word  for  a  desobte  pbce  of  torment, 
like  the  frozen  asone  in  Dante's  Hell.  But  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  the  expanding  peasantry  of  Great  Russia 
b^an  to  cross  the  middle  Volga,  and  a  current  of 
Eastward  migration  set  in  among  them  as  strong  as 
that  which  carried  the  American  squatters  across  the 
Alleghanies  into  the  prairies  of  the  West*  Any  one  vAo 
has  read  Tolstoy's  tsde  of  the  land-hui^ry  peasant,  who 
abandoned  one  plot  after  another  for  still  larger  allot- 
ments further  East,  till  at  last  he  struck  a  bargain  with 
the  wandering  Bashkirs  and  fell  a  victim  to  his  own 
greed,  will  reo^inise  the  analogy  at  once,  and  mentally 
translate  the  scene  into  incidents  of  the  'forties,  T^en 
Mormon  settlers  bought  up  the  hunting-grounds  of 
Red  Indian  chiefs* 


I  The  ooly  wealth  of  the  country  they  diought  of  eiq>loitiiig,  beside 
the  fur  of  its  forest  creatures* 


EXPANSION  3^ 

Here,  as  in  America,  colomsation  has  followed  the 
railway,  and  now  the  peasant  is  establishix^  himself  on 
either  side  of  the  new.  line,  right  across  Siberia*  The 
eiq>erience  of  Canada  has  shown  what  human  occupation 
can  achieve  in  the  teeth  of  adverse  conditions,  how  it 
can  even  modify  the  rigour  of  climate  and  temperature 
by  introducing  agriculture  and  breaking  up  the  surface 
of  the  soil*  Siberia  will  be  the  Canada  of  the  twentieth 
century.  Already  the  well-watered  grazing  grounds  of 
the  steppe,  which  the  railway  traverses  between  the  Urals 
and  the  Yenisei,  are  exporting  dairy  produce  to  Western 
Europe,  and  the  plateaux  of  Irkutsk  and  Trans- 
baikalia will  yield  greater  wealth  still  when  their  timber 
and  mines  are  exploited  to  their  full  capacity* 

The  human  wealth  of  the  new  territories  is  even 
more  promising  than  their  material  prospects*  The 
criminal  convict  has  not  proved  a  bad  fotmdation  for 
the  new  Anglo-Saxon  nation  of  the  Australian  common- 
wealth ;  but  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  Siberian 
convicts  have  been  political  offenders,  that  is,  the  most 
independent,  enei^etic  and  intellectual  members  of  the 
Russian  urban  class*  Governmental  selection  has  en- 
dowed Siberia  with  Russia's  fittest,  and  the  descendants 
of  these  exiles,  granted  their  freedom  on  condition  that 
they  setded  in  the  country  for  ever,  have  mingled  with 
the  stock  of  the  Cossack  trappers  and  already  produced 
a  racial  variety  characterised  by  the  same  enterprising 
qualities  as  distinguish  the  Westerner  in  the  United 


The  territories  strung  along  the  railway,  then,  have 
as  great  a  future  before  them  as  the  Western  provinces 
of  the  Canadian  Dominion*  As  they  fill  with  a  vigoious 
population  of  Russian  speech,  they  will  gradually  claim 
Home  Rule,  and  take  their  place  by  the  side  of  **  Holy 


)9o  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

Russia '^  herself  and  the  lesser  natioiialities  of  the 
Western  border,  as  independent  members  of  die 
decentralised  Empire*  Just  as  in  Canadaj  moreover, 
setdement  and  exploitation  will  push  further  North 
from  their  base-line  along  the  railway  than  is  at  present 
conceived  possible,  moving  down  the  course  of  the  great 
rivers  till  they  reach  an  impassable  limit  in  the  frozen 
tundras*  That,  however,  will  not  be  the  end  of  Siberia's 
ei^ansion:  she  has  already  stretched  out  her  hands 
toward  the  South* 

The  settlement  after  the  Japanese  War  left  under 
Russian  control  the  Northern  section  of  Manchuria 
through  which  her  railway  takes  a  direct  line  from 
Lake  Baikal  to  Vladivostodc,  while  the  recent  revolu- 
tion in  China  gave  the  pastoral  tribes  of  Outer  Mongolia 
an  opportunity  to  throw  off  Chinese  suzerainty  and 
place  themselves  under  Russian  protection*  It  would 
be  a  gain  to  civilisation  if  these  territories  were  per- 
manendy  and  in  formal  terms  annexed  to  the  Russian 
Empire*  China's  sole  tide  to  them  is  their  conquest  by 
the  Manchu  dynasty  two  and  a  half  centuries  ago. 
She  has  done  nothing  to  improve  their  condition  all 
the  time  they  have  been  in  her  power,  and  now  that 
she  has  undertaken  that  task  of  internal  reconstruction 
which  will  demand  a  century  of  devoted  concentration 
if  it  is  to  be  carried  through,  they  can  be  nothing 
but  a  drag  upon  her  ill-spared  strength*  In  taking 
them  over  once  for  all,  Russia  would  have  the  precedent 
of  the  United  States,  which  compelled  Mexico  to  cede 
her  neglected  Northern  territories  in  1847*  They 
were  much  criticised  at  the  time  for  their  conduct,  but 
have  been  completely  justified  by  its  results* 

Outer  Mongolia  is  sundered  from  China  by  the  broad 
zone  of  the  Gobi  desert,  while  its  frontier  against  the 


EXPANSION  33Z 

Russiaii  Empire  is  an  arbitrary  line^  for  all  its  rivers 
flow  either  into  Lake. Baikal  or  into  the  Amur*  It  is 
that  **  Cauldron  of  the  North  **  from  whose  pasture- 
plateau  wave  after  wave  of  nomads  used  to  pour  out 
over  the  mountain  rim  into  the  Asiatic  steppes,  and 
devastate  the  cultivated  lands  of  the  South  and  West 
upon  which  they  burst*  The  expansion  of  Russia 
stemmed  that  tide,  and  now  Russian  enterprise  will 
penetrate  in  its  turn  into  the  **  cauldron/^  and  make  of 
it  one  of  the  most  productive  stock-breeding  areas  in 
the  World. 

jNor  is  Mongolia  the  only  Chinese  dependency  that 
would  benefit  by  transference  to  Russian  rule*  South- 
West  of  Mongolia  lies  the  Tarim  basin,  the  heart  of 
Asia,  girdled  on  South,  East,  and  North  by  giant 
motmtains,  the  Kuen-Lung,  the  Pamir  pbteau  and 
die  Thian  Shan,  but  open  towards  the  Gobi  desert  on  the 
East*  The  popubtion  is  as  alien  to  the  Chinese  nation 
as  are  the  Mongols*  In  spite  of  the  mountain  barriers^ 
all  its  links  are  towards  the  West*  It  is  Turkish  in 
speech,  a  rearguard  of  the  great  race,^  and  it  is  Moslem 
in  faith,  an  outpost  flung  Eastward  between  the  two 
Buddhist  masses  of  Mongolia  and  Tibet*  In  the 
'sixties  of  the  last  century  national  antipathy  vented 
itself  in  a  fierce  rebellion  against  Chinese  dominion, 
which  for  several  years  secured  the  country  a  harassed 
independence ;  but  the  tide  soon  turned*  Turkestan 
was  reduced  once  more  to  subjection  by  the  weight 
of  Chinese  numbers,  and  has  been  held  down  by 
Chinese  garrisons  during  the  forty  years  that  have 
elapsed* 

In  truth  the  country  is  not  hard  to  hold*    It  did  not 

^  Lost  to  this  blind  alley  when  the  main  body  bufst  out  of  the 
**  cauldron  **  and  streamed  towards  the  Oxtis  and  the  Volga. 


332  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

need  the  bloody  vei^eance  of  the  Chinese  anmes  to 
crush  the  people's  soul ;  it  was  being  crushed  already 
by  the  losing  fight  2^;ainst  the  physical  environment 
The  Tarim  basin  is  undergoing  a  long-drawn-out 
process  of  desiccation.  Every  year  the  streams  that 
flow  inwards  from  the  snow-covered  mountains  pene- 
trate less  deep  into  the  basin's  centre,  and  are  stifled  by 
the  desert  after  a  shorter  course ;  while  the  sand,  blown 
forward  by  the  constant  North-East  wind  in  great  wave- 
ridges  many  miles  long,  engulfs  every  year  a  fresh  village, 
and  buries  another  patch  of  cultivation*  The  batde 
against  the  desert  is  beyond  the  native's  strength,  but 
both  he  and  his  country  are  worth  saving,  and  a  vigorous 
European  government,  with  the  material  apparatus  of 
modem  civilisation  at  its  command,  could  stem  the 
sand  waves  by  embankments  and  plantations,  eke  out 
the  snow-water's  gift  by  subterranean  irrigation,  and  in 
some  measure  restore  the  Basin  to  the  prosperity  of  two 
thousand  years  ago,  when  the  cultures  of  Greece,  India 
and  China  found  in  it  their  blending-grotmd.  Only 
Russia  can  accomplish  Tturkestan's  salvation,  and 
Great  Britain  would  willingly  allow  her  a  free  hand 
there,  if  she  undertook  in  return  to  make  Kuen-Lung 
the  limit  of  her  Southward  advance,  and  to  leave  Tibet, 
that  lies  beyond  it,  under  the  tmdisputed  influence  of 
the  Indian  Empire. 

Here  is  Russia's  field  of  expansion  for  the  twentieth 
century.  She  has  to  fill  these  immense  empty  terri- 
tories with  the  white  population  their  temperate  climate 
invites,  and  the  achievement  of  the  task  will  be  a  race 
against  time*  The  population  of  the  Empire  may  now 
total  150  millions,  but  it  is  still  the  most  thinly-inhabited 
of  the  European  states,  while  South  of  the  Gobi  desert 
lies  China,  with  perhaps  three  times  as  many  millions 


EXPANSION  333 

Gxowded  on  to  a  space  less  than  a  quarter  of  Russia's 
extent* 

The  first  ripples  of  Chinese  migration  are  already 
striking  upon  the  East  Indies^  Australia  and  the  Pacific 
sea^board  of  North  America,  and  the  brutality  with 
which  these  states  are  repelling  this  peaceful,  casual 
invasion  shows  how  terribly  they  dread  the  pressure  to 
come.  Forcible  exclusion  will  succeed  for  the  present, 
because  China  still  lies  in  the  grip  of  a  thousand  years' 
political  paralysis;  but  the  power  of  movement  is 
already  returning  to  her  limbs.  The  fundamental 
factor  of  world-politics  during  the  next  century  will  be 
the  competition  between  China  and  the  new  common- 
wealths* China  will  strive  to  reorganise  her  national 
Hfe,  and  to  bring  all  her  immeasurable  latent  strength  to 
bear  on  the  effort  to  win  her  ''  place  in  the  Stm  **  (a 
more  titanic  struggle  this  than  Germany's  present 
endeavour) :  the  others  will  make  haste  to  swell  the 
ranks  of  their  white  population  till  they  can  muster 
enough  defenders  to  man  the  wide  boundaries  of  the 
inheritance  they  have  marked  out  for  themselves,  and 
become  strong  enough  either  to  fling  back  China's  onset 
or  to  deter  her  from  making  it  at  all*  All  the  threatened 
natbns — Canada,  the  U*S*A*,  the  South  American 
republics.  New  Zealand  and  Australia — ^will  draw 
together  into  a  league,  to  preserve  the  Pacific  from 
Chinese  domination*  Japan  will  probably  join  their 
ranks,  for  she  is  the  Ghreat  Britain  of  the  China  Seas, 
and,  just  like  ourselves,  would  be  menaced  most  seriously 
by  the  emergence  of  a  World-power  on  the  continent 
opposite  her  island  country*  Russia,  who  has  not 
even  a  strip  of  sea  to  protect  her,  but  is  China's  im- 
mediate continental  neighbour  along  a  vast  land- 
frontier,  will  actually  be  the  chief  promoter  of  this 


334  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

defensive  entente,  for  she  will  be  exposed  to  the  first 
brtint  of  the  Chinese  attack* 

Under  these  drcumstances  it  is  quite  inconceivable 
that  the  German  forecast  should  come  true.  The  great 
Russian  army  of  19x4,  when  it  has  fulfiilled  its  task  of 
crushing  militarism  in  Central  Europe,  will  have  no 
more  temptation  to  proceed  to  the  warlike  conquest  of 
the  world  than  the  American  armies  had,  after  they 
had  vindicated  the  Union  in  the  'sixties.  Like  them 
it  will  disband,  to  answer  the  call  of  economic  conquest 
from  the  steppes  and  forests  of  the  great  North-East. 
Nor  will  the  Russian  peasants,  in  the  generation  to  come, 
flock  into  urban  centres  and  exchange  agriculture  for 
industry,  as  the  German  peasants  have  been  doii^  since 
zSyx*  Russia  will  send  every  stirplus  child  bred  in  her 
home  villages  to  build  up  the  new  Russian  villages  in 
Siberia :  she  cannot  spare  a  man  for  the  towns*  Yet 
if  Russia  does  not  contemplate  an  industrial  career,  then, 
however  triumphant  be  her  issue  from  this  war,  she 
cannot  possibly  become  a  menace  to  the  Industrial 
nations  of  Europe.  Grant  that  her  strength  increases 
till  she  has  it  in  her  power  to  overcome  their  united 
forces,  she  will  still  have  no  motive  for  doing  so.  The 
only  spoils  of  victory  would  be  the  great  tropical  de- 
pendencies these  nations  maintain,  primarily  as  sources 
of  raw  material  and  to  a  lesser  degree  as  markets  for  their 
own  production :  to  a  nation  without  manufactures 
there  would  be  no  value  whatsoever  in  their  possession. 

These  considerations  finally  dispose  of  that  bug-bear 
which  haunted  British  fore^  policy  during  the  nine- 
teenth century,  the  darker  to  India  of  Russia's  East- 
ward advance.  The  Indian  Empire  is  the  vastest,  the 
most  populous,  and  the  most  difficult  to  govern  of  all 
tropical  dominions  held  by  European  powers :   it  is 


EXPANSION  335 

also  the  best  tropical  market  for  European  industry  that 
there  is,  and  we  are  the  most  industrialised  nation  in 
Europe  :  and  yet,  so  far  as  we  can  estimate  the  economic 
restilts  of  our  position  there,  the  balance  of  trade  is 
steadily  going  less  in  our  favour*  It  is  accordingly 
most  unlikely  that  Russia  will  ever  stake  her  fortune  on 
an  attempt  to  burden  herself  with  the  administration  of 
India,  which  in  her  case  would  bring  no  economic 
reward  whatsoever,  and  would  cripple  her  in  the  vital 
task  of  building  up  her  bulwarks  against  China* 

The  Indian  Empire,  moreover,  is  no  passive  con- 
glomeration of  populations,  that  can  be  transferred  like 
slaves  from  one  master  to  another*  That  was  more  or 
less  the  condition  of  the  peninsula  a  century  and  a  half 
ago,  otherwise  we  should  never  have  established  our  rule 
over  it,  with  the  absurdly  small  resources  of  which  we 
could  dispose  ;  but  in  the  meantime  **  strong  govern- 
ment''  has  here  performed  one  of  its  most  brilliant 
achievements  in  all  history*  The  three  htmdred  millions 
of  Indian  people  are  divided  by  religious  barriers  in 
the  extreme  form  of  caste,  by  differences  of  language 
that  coincide  with  the  traditional  race-hatred  of  con- 
querors and  conquered,  and  by  geographical  diversity 
as  great  as  that  between  the  Kashmir  valleys  and  the 
Deccan ;  yet  under  the  fostering  aegis  of  British  rule 
they  are  being  liberated  successively  from  chaos  and 
from  particularism*  They  have  at  last  begtm  to  find  a 
common  self-consciousness,  and  to  give  sure  promise 
that  India  will  take  its  place  in  the  end  as  a  great  self- 
governing  nation  of  the  new  calibre*  So  far  from  being 
in  danger  of  another  foreign  conquest,  India  is  beginning 
to  dispense  with  that  trusteeship  into  which  the  British 
conquest  of  the  eighteenth  century  has  gradually  de- 
veloped, and  when  she  is  mistress  of  her  own  destiny. 


336  THE  RUSSIAN  EMPIRE 

it  is  she  that  will  be  the  danger  to  others.  The  pioblem 
of  Indian  emigration  is  as  serious  as  that  of  Chinese, 
and  the  Khyber  Pass,  instead  of  being  traversed  by 
Russian  armies  marching  South,  will  become  the  high- 
road of  Indian  coolies  migratiiig  Northwards  to  labour 
on  the  irrigation  of  the  Ozus  and  Jaxartes  basins,  and 
settle  upon  the  lands  thdr  industry  will  have  recLnined 
ftotD  the  desert. 

Russia,  then,  has  no  booty  to  gain  &om  the  other 
nations  of  Europe.  "  But  if  this  is  so,"  the  Gennan 
will  ask,  "  why  has  she  thrown  herself  into  the  present 
struggle  with  the  German  Empire  and  the  Dual 
Monarchy  <  Why  does  she  regard  it,  as  she  evidently 
does,  as  a  supreme  crisis  in  her  history,  an  issue  of  life 
or  death  i  What  is  the  meaning  of  her  passionate  inter- 
vention on  Serbia's  behalf  i  "  The  answer  to  these 
questions  demands  a  separate  chapter. 


^ 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  337 


CHAPTER  DC 

RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

We  have  seen  that  the  Russian  Empire  will  never  become 
an  industrial  and  commercial  power;  but  like  every 
other  unit  in  the  new  international  World  she  has  need 
of  a  free  outlet  to  the  high  seas,  through  which  she  may 
transmit  to  foreign  markets  the  raw  produce  of  her 
vast  continental  hinterland,  and  supply  herself  with  the 
manufactured  goods  of  industrial  cotmtries  in  return* 

Such  outlets  she  has  never  yet  obtained*  Till  the 
eighteenth  century  her  only  port  was  Archangel  on  the 
White  Sea,  and  this  perhaps  sufficed  her  during  the 
era  of  stagnant  isolation :  at  any  rate  the  English 
Merchant  Adventurers  found  it  worth  their  while  to 
trade  there,  though  it  is  ice-bound  two-thirds  of  the 
year.^  In  the  year  1700,  the  Baltic  was  a  Swedish  lake, 
and  the  Black  Sea  a  Turkish  one*  Peter  and  Catherine 
broke  the  maritime  monopoly  of  these  two  powers,  and 
gave  Russia  a  sea-board  on  both  waters*  Odessa  and 
Riga  have  grown  in  a  century  and  a  half  to  be  magnifi- 
cent ports,  and  would  suffice  in  themselves  for  the  needs 
of  a  Russia  much  more  highly  developed  than  the 
present*  But  they  are  no  more  in  direct  communication 
with  the  Oceanic  highways  of  international  commerce 
than  are  the  ports  of  Milwaukee  and  Chicago  on  the 
Great  Lakes.  By  an  unlucky  fotality,  both  the  natural 
coastlines  of  Russia  only  introduce  her  to  land-locked 
seas,  and  the  narrow  passage  that  connects  each  of  them 
with  the  great  ocean-spaces  beyond  has  in  either  case 

>  From  about  October  to  May. 


^  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

lemained  till  tiiis  day  outside  die  boatiea  of  the 
Russian  Empire,  and  must  continue  so  to  remain  for 
cogent  reasons. 

(i.)  The  population  of  the  shores  in  question,  betveen 
which  these  narrow  seas  flow,  namely,  of  the  Danish 
peninsula  and  islands  on  the  one  hand  and  of  the 
Bosphonis  and  Dardanelles  on  the  other,  is  aUen  to 
Russia  in  nationality,  and  would  in  neither  case  wish  to 
become  part  of  the  IRussian  Empire. 

(ii.)  Even  if  these  populations  did  consent,  throi^ 
hope  of  economic  advantage,  promise  d  pohdcal 
privilege,  or  the  like,  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  Russia, 
the  situation  thus  created  would  be  still  more  unfair 
and  disadvantageous  to  the  smaller  states  that  share 
with  Russia  these  inland  waters,  than  it  is  to  Russia  as 
it  stands  at  present.  It  would  place  their  oommera 
completely  at  Russia's  mercy,  whereas  at  present  Russia 
is  already  formidable  enough  in  streng^  and  size  to 
make  the  powers  in  control  of  the  straits  respea  her  own 
commerce  under  ordinary  drcumstances. 

The  solution  indicated  by  these  considerations  is  that 
the  command  of  the  entrances  to  both  these  seas  should 
be  held  in  trust,  without  prejudice  to  the  national  self- 
government  of  the  populations  through  which  they  Sow, 
for  all  parties,  without  distinction,  that  are  interested 
in  their  use — primarily  for  all  states  possessing  ports  on 
the  inland  seas  in  question,  and  secondarily  for  all 
political  and  economic  groups  the  World  over  that  trade 
upon  the  sea,  since  commerce  is  an  international  concern 
and  will  become  so  more  and  more  as  our  civilisation 
develops. 

We  shall  be  able  to  discuss  more  effectively  how  this 
can  be  done,  if  we  deal  with  the  two  regions  separately 
and  in  detail. 


\ 


IN  THE  BALTIC  339 


A«  The  Liberation  of  the  Baltic 

The  mouth  of  the  Baltic  consists  of  several  winding 
channels^  that  force  their  way  between  Sweden,  the 
Danish  islands  and  Jutland.  They  are  all  of  them 
narrow  enough  to  be  commanded  in  pbces  by  fortress- 
artillery  on  shore,  and  their  length  and  intricacy  make 
them  ^  ideal  area  for  mines.  wUch,  as  the  pre^t  war 
has  shown,  can  be  laid  down  effectively  enough  to 
block  all  traffic  through  them,  even  by  a  navy  that  is  not 
in  immediate  possession  of  their  coasts*  In  fact  the 
power  to  close  or  open  these  entrances  to  the  Baltic 
really  passed  from  Denmark,  which  had  neither  the 
interest  nor  the  strength  to  treat  Russia  unjustly,  to 
Germany,  which  had  the  very  strongest  interest  in 
obtaining  the  power  to  do  so,  as  soon  as  the  cutting 
of  the  canal  from  the  Elbe  estuary  to  Kiel  Haven  gave 
the  German  fleet  the  means  of  transferring  its  whole 
force  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Baltic  and  back  again 
by  a  private  passage  under  its  own  exclusive  control* 
This  new  asset  gave  Germany  such  a  decisive  advantage 
over  Russia,  who  had  to  divide  her  strength  between 
three  separate  squadrons  in  the  Baltic,  the  Bbck  Sea,  and 
the  Far  East,  that  the  btter  Empire  abandoned  naval 
competition  for  the  control  of  the  Baltic,  and  sought 
to  find  egress  to  the  North  Atlantic  by  another  way* 

We  have  noted  that  Archangel,  the  earUest  port 
Russia  had,  and  still  her  only  port  on  the  open  ocean, 
is  practically  valueless  because  it  is  ice-bound  the  greater 
part  of  the  year*  But  if  you  follow  the  coast  Westward 
beyond  the  mouth  of  the  White  Sea,  and  then  round 
the  North  Cape,  which  is  the  North-West  comer  of 
the  Eurasian  continent,  you  come  within  the  influence 


340  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

of  the  Gtilf  Stieam.  Its  impetus  carries  it  past  the 
British  bles  up  the  West  coast  of  Norway,  keep- 
iag  the  clinute  temperate  and  the  sea  perennially  free 
&om  drift  ice  at  least  a  dozen  degrees  further  North- 
ward than  along  any  other  meridian.^  Unfortunately  for 
Russia,  Norwegian  colonists,  following  the  warm  current 
and  availing  themselves  of  the  easy  coast-wise  oavigatum 
from  fjord  to  fjord,  had  already  occupied  the  whole  of 
this  open  littoral  before  the  backwoodsmen  of  No^^rod 
had  made  their  laborious  way  overland  to  their  illusoiy 
sea-board  at  Archangel.  The  whole  coast-strip  as  fiar 
as  the  North  Cape  and  round  its  comer  to  the  Varai^r 
Fjord  has  become  and  remained  Norwegian  in  nation- 
ality, and  is  now  an  inalietuble  portion  of  Norway's 
territory. 

Between  this  important  region  and  the  Russiin 
frontier  a  broad  barrier  was  interposed  by  Finland,  so 
long  as  she  remained  a  Swedish  province,  but  the 
settlement  of  1814  endorsed  an  accomplished  fact  by 
bringing  Finland  within  the  Russian  Empire  as  a  self- 
governing  national  state  under  the  Imperial  crown,  widi 
much  the  same  status  as  the  constitutional  kingdom  of 
Poland.  During  the  whole  century  that  has  elapsed, 
there  has  been  a  silent  contest  on  Russia's  part  to  press 
her  way  over  Finland's  carcase  to  a  Norwegian  port  on 
the  open  Atlantic,  and  on  the  part  of  the  Scanc^navian 
powers,  backed  by  Great  Britain,  K>  maintain  the  ezisdi^ 
arrangement  of  constitutions  and  frontiers. 

To  fortify  the  Scandinavian  peninsula  against  Russian 
encroachment,  the  Vienna  Congress  linked  its  two  dts- 

■  On  the  fnrtber  side  of  tbc  Atlantic  a  c^d  current  setting  dom  dw 
Greenland  cout  carrica  the  vanguard  of  die  drift  ke  so  £ai  Soudi  that 
it  endangen  shipping  plying  on  the  routes  between  Europe  and  Nc* 
York. 


^ 


IN  THE  BALTIC  341 

oofdant  natjonalities  together  by  a  personal  union.  This 
experiment  had  a  more  successful  history  than  the 
United  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands,  which  the  same 
Congress  welded  together  as  a  bulwark  against  France ; 
but  it  collapsed  finally,  none  the  less,  nine  years  ago/ 
while  on  the  other  side  Russia  has  been  levelling  her 
path  by  a  systematic  attempt  to  crush  Finnish  nation- 
ality out  of  existence* 

In  their  politics  and  social  life  the  Finns  are  one 
of  the  most  li^;hly-civilised  nations  of  Europe*  The 
smallneas  of  their  population  '  and  the  unindustrialised 
character  of  their  economics  have  simplified  the 
problems  set  them  to  solve,  but  within  their  modest 
dimensions  they  have  solved  them  to  perfection*  The 
tradition  of  their  culture,  and  their  Lutheran  religion, 
both  come  from  Sweden,  and  the  townspeople  on  the 
coast  are  still  lai^ely  Swedish  in  race  and  language ; 
but  since  the  political  connection  with  Sweden  has  been 
broken,  the  native  Finnish  speech,  which  belongs  to  a 
non-Indo-European  family,  though  enriched  with  many 
primitive  Teutonic  loan  words,  has  raised  its  head  and 
proved  itself  to  possess  enough  vitality  to  become  the 
vehide  of  national  development. 

With  Russia  Finland  has  no  inward  bonds  of  union 
whatsoever,  neither  of  religion  nor  of  language  nor  of 
tradition  nor  even  of  geography,  for  she  lies  away  in  a 
comer,  and  her  sea-board,  besides  fronting  merely  upon 
the  Baltic,  is  much  less  accessible  from  the  Russian 
hinterland  than  are  the  outlets  upon  the  Baltic,  White 
Sea  and  Black  Sea  which  Russia  possesses  elsewhere* 

'In  1905. 

*  The  censiif  taken  to  1901  showed  a  total  of  3,713*000,  ttM>i*<^^fig 

3,353,000  Finns 
35O1O00  Swedes 

XO^OOO  OtbCfB. 


342  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 


Finland  has  simply  been  the  victim  of  Russia's  ambi- 
tion for  an  open  port  on  the  Norwegian  ooast^  because 
the  eventual  railway  to  that  port  must  run  through  her 
territory*  It  is  a  precise  repetition  of  the  relations 
between  the  Magyars  and  Croatia.  A  small  nationality 
has  been  inahenably  endowed  by  Geography  with  the 
fatal  function  of  standing  between  a  powerful  nation 
and  a  sea-board  to  which  she  ardently  desires  access : 
the  stronger  power  has  been  so  stup^  and  barbarous 
as  to  imagine  no  better  means  of  satisfying  her  wants 
than  the  destruction  of  the  little  nation  that  stands  in 
the  way  of  their  realisation ;  and  the  latter,  fighting 
desperately  for  life,  is  looking  round  for  some  stxot^ 
helper  ^o  will  bring  the  oppressor  to  his  knees,  set 
her  free  from  all  connection  with  him,  and  shatter 
for  ever  his  projects,  for  which  she  has  stiffered  so 
ternbly* 

There  would  be  poetical  justice  in  such  a  consumma- 
tion, for  it  would  be  the  natural  outcome  of  the  bullying 
power's  behaviour ;  but  it  would  not  solve  the  problem 
at  issue,  but  only  bring  forth  evil  from  evil,  reversing 
instead  of  eliminating  the  injustice  and  sowing  the  seeds 
of  future  war* 

We  have  seen  that  if  we  win  this  war,  and  the  Dual 
Monarchy  collapses,  Croatia  will  probably  achieve 
complete  political  freedom  from  Magyar  tyranny,  but 
that  she  must  not,  in  such  an  event,  be  allowed  to  use 
her  advantage  merely  to  take  the  offensive  in  the  racial 
feud :  she  must  give  Hungary  facilities  for  realising  all 
her  legitimate  political  desires  by  enterii^  into  economic 
co-operation  with  her*  But  the  same  issue  of  the  war, 
for  which  we  hope,  will  not  effect  the  forcible  h*bera- 
tion  of  Finland,  and  this  imposes  all  the  more  urgently 
upon  us  the  duty  of  securing  that,  ^en  the  setdement 


IN  THE  BALTIC  3^ 

comes,  Finland  shall  obtain  as  much  and  more  from 
the  justice,  good  sense  and  liberalism  of  our  victorious 
ally  Russia,  as  she  would  have  obtained  from  her  com- 
pulsory resignation  in  the  event  of  defeat* 

The  war  has  already  taught  Russia  that  her  Scandi- 
navian policy  has  been  a  blunder.  The  Eastern 
boundary  of  disaffected  Finland  is  only  a  few  miles 
from  Petrograd*  Germany's  complete  naval  command 
of  the  Baltic  gives  her  the  initiative  along  the  Finnish 
coast,  and  though  the  inntunerable  islands  and  skerries 
are  a  favourable  field  for  the  Russian  coast-defence 
torpedo-craft,  the  extent  of  coast  to  be  patrolled  and 
the  sympathies  of  the  population  with  the  enemy 
make  the  landing  of  German  troops  quite  a  feasible 
project*  Once  a  German  expeditionary  force  was 
operating  successfully  in  the  country,  there  is  little 
doubt  that  the  war  party  in  Sweden  would  gain  the 
upper  hand,  and  send  two  htmdred  thousand  men  across 
the  Bothnian  gulf  to  support  it,  and  this  pressure  on 
the  other  flank  would  have  as  weakening  an  e£Fect  upon 
the  Russian  offensive  along  the  Vistula  as  the  advance 
of  the  Russian  armies  in  the  latter  quarter  has  had  upon 
the  German  invasion  in  the  West* 

We  trust  that  the  danger  is  now  past,  and  that 
Sweden  will  preserve  her  neutrality,  but  we  must  take 
care  that  her  peaceful  policy  brings  gain  and  not  loss 
to  her  interest  and  her  honour,  by  including  in  the 
European  settlement  some  such  terms  as  follows : 

(i.)  The  perpetual  integrity  and  independence  of  both 
Norway  and  Sweden  shall  be  guaranteed  by  Europe* 

(ii*)  In  return  for  this,  Norway  shall  allow  Russia  to 
lead  a  railway  of  Russian  gauge  across  Finland  and  up 
the  left  bank  of  the  Tomei  River  to  some  perennially 
open  port  on  her  North-West  coast,  either  TromsS  or 


344  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 


Hammeif est  or  both^  according  to  the  lie  of  the  land,^ 
without  interposing  a  customs-barrier  at  any  point  along 
this  route  between  the  Russian  frontier  and  the  open 
sea* 

The  Russophobe  party  in  Sweden  might  still  be 
inclined  to  take  the  view  that  Swedish  ^'national 
honour  **  could  only  be  satisfied  by  obtaining  a  European 
guarantee  of  autonomy  for  Finland  within  the  Russian 
Empire^  in  addition  to  that  of  integrity  and  independ- 
ence for  Sweden  herself.  **  The  national  self-govern- 
ment of  Finland/'  they  will  say, '"  is  secured  to  her  under 
the  terms  by  which  she  was  incorporated  in  the  Empire 
in  1814,  yet  it  is  gradually  being  nullified,  by  the 
machiavellian  policy  of  the  Imperial  Government,  to 
the  same  dead  level  of  absolutism  to  which  constitu- 
tional Poland  was  reduced  at  a  stroke  in  February  183a. 
Fitmish  liberty  can  only  be  rescued  by  intervention 
from  outside/' 

The  facts  in  question  are  tmfortunately  true,  but  the 
foundation  upon  them  of  such  a  proposal  would  be 
open  to  very  grave  objections*  In  the  first  place  it 
would  certainly  be  Utopian  to  expect  that  a  victorious 
Russia  would  submit  to  the  imposition  of  a  guarantee 
which  would  reflect  upon  her  conduct  in  the  past  and 
thus  imply  her  humiliation  in  the  present*  The  case 
of  Finland  is  radically  different  from  that  of  Norway 
and  Sweden.  The  two  latter  countries  are  entirely 
external  to  the  Russian  Empire,  and  the  guarantee  we 
are  demanding  for  them  in  no  way  affects  Russia's 
internal  structure*  It  might  be  argued  that  it  is  levelled 
specifically  at  Russia  in  fact  if  not  in  name,  and  would 
seriously  limit  her  freedom  in  these  two  countries'  regard ; 

^  The  last  sectkm  of  this  raflway  wiU  tn  any  case  be  a  difficult  engineer- 
ing problem :  see  map  of  European  Nationalities  (VII.)- 


IN  THE  BALTIC  345 

but  the  formulation  in  general  instead  of  individual 
terms  is  of  great  importance  for  the  psychology  of 
national  pride,  and  after  all  this  potential  check  upon 
Russia's  free  action  2^;ainst  Norway  and  Sweden  is  only 
to  be  imposed  in  rettun  for  a  substantial  concession 
on  their  part  to  Russia's  vital  economic  interests  of 
facilities  which  by  their  very  nature  would  give  Russia, 
in  addition  to  her  fair  economic  gain,  a  wholly  un- 
warrantable political  leverage  in  this  quarter,  imless 
such  a  result  were  deliberately  guarded  against  by  a 
provision  of  the  kind  proposed* 

Guarantees  will  never  be  stable  so  long  as  they  are 
one-sided,  for  their  ultimate  sanction  is  not  the  ^inill  of 
the  guarantors,  but  the  mutual  advantage  of  the  parties 
affected*  This  explains  how  our  previous  require- 
ment of  a  guarantee  for  the  New  Poland  is  consistent 
with  our  present  standpoint  towards  the  Finnish 
question*  Both  Poland  and  Finland  are  to  be  members 
of  the  Russian  Empire ;  but  if  the  European  Concert 
guaranteed  the  constitutional  autonomy  within  this 
larger  group  of  the  united  Poland,  it  would  only  be 
imposing  an  obligation  upon  Russia  in  return  for  the 
simtdtaneous  extension  of  her  imperial  boundaries  by 
the  reunion  in  the  new  constitutional  state  of  the  Poles 
at  present  subject  to  Prussia  and  Austria*  Indeed,  these 
fragments  of  the  Polish  nation  would  be  so  unwilling  to 
enter  the  Russian  Empire  without  a  European  guarantee 
to  reassure  them,  that  it  would  actually  be  in  Russia's 
interest  to  st^gest  such  a  guarantee  herself  even  if  no 
other  party  took  the  initiative,  in  order  to  make  sure  of 
rallying  to  her  flag  the  whole  Polish  nation*  In  that 
case  she  would  be  conceding  autonomy  to  half  a 
nationality  already  subject  to  her,  in  order  to  obtain  the 
willing  co-operation  of  the  whole*  Finland,  however,  has 


\ 


346  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

ao  "  irredeata  "  beyond  the  Russian  frontier  i^ch  could 
be  made  the  basis  of  a  bai^ain  for  the  improved  status 
within  that  frontier  of  the  whole  nationality,  and  there- 
fore a  guarantee  extorted  from  Russia  in  Finland's 
favour  would  not  be  set  off  by  any  corresponding  gain 
on  Russia's  part.  The  element  a(  reciprocity  would  be 
lacking,  and  the  swallowing  of  such  an  tmsweetened  pill 
would  implant  a  dangerous  resentment  in  the  heart  of 
the  Russian  nation. 

Yet  even  supposing  that  Russia  would  not  only 
submit  in  this  question  to  the  dictation  of  Europe  but 
would  also  recover  from  the  resentment  it  at  first 
aroused,  we  learnt  from  our  discussion  of  the  Hungarian 
and  Tchech  problems  that  the  intrusion  of  an  inter- 
national scafiblding  in  the  structure  of  an  independent 
political  unit,  so  far  from  being  a  salutary  principle,  is 
a  dangerous  extemporisation.  It  is  only  to  be  employed 
as  a  pis  aUer  when  some  particular  national  house  is  too 
seriously  divided  against  itself  to  stand  on  its  own 
foundations  and  cannot  be  allowed  to  coUapse  without 
involving  the  whole  Etuopean  block  in  its  ruin. 

The  assumption  underlying  the  federation  of  a 
number  of  different  nations  within  a  sit^e  pditical 
group  like  the  Russian  Empire  is  that,  yrt^e  they  are 
severally  involved  with  one  another  too  closely  to 
disengage  for  themselves  a  completely  independent 
political  existence,  they  possess  a  common  interest  and 
a  common  unity  whidh  sharply  sunder  their  devekip- 
ment  as  a  group  from  that  of  all  other  groups  or  units 
outside  their  common  frontier.  If  Russia  and  Finland 
cannot  adjust  their  differences  entirely  between  them- 
selves without  the  intervention  of  an  external  guarantee, 
the  Empire  in  which  they  are  nominally  federated 
becomes  an  unreality,  for  the  guarantee  will  piise  its 


IN  THE  BALTIC  347 

joints  asunder  like  a  wedge*  Even  if  the  initial  friction 
between  Russia  and  Finland  were  overcome^  the 
reference  of  their  quarrels  to  European  arbitration 
would  aggravate  them  on  every  occasion,  and  the 
tension  would  extend  itself  to  the  relations  between 
Russia  and  Sweden,  who  would  almost  inevitably 
assume  the  r61e  of  Europe^s  inspector,  watching  to  see 
if  Finland  were  enjoying  her  guaranteed  rights* 

The  Finnish  guarantee,  then,  would  only  spoil  instead 
of  perfecting  those  good  relations  between  Russia  and  the 
two  nations  of  the  Scandinavian  peninsula,  which  our 
original  proposals  were  designed  to  create.  We  must 
trust  the  future  of  Finland  to  Russia's  good  faith  and 
good  sense*  In  opening  to  her  a  free  railway  across 
Finland  to  a  free  port  on  the  Norwegian  coast,  we 
eliminate  her  chief  motive  for  trampling  the  Finnish 
nation  to  death,  and  this  is  all  that  we  can  do*  We  have 
already  convinced  ourselves  that  the  ultimate  solution  of 
the  national  questions  of  Europe,  and  therewith  the 
establishment  of  European  peace,  depends  not  upon 
mechanical  adjustments,  but  upon  a  change  of  heart  in 
the  nations  themselves*  If  we  cannot  obtain  a  reversal 
of  Russians  attitude  towards  Finland  by  negotiating  her 
Atlantic  railway,  we  cannot  artificially  produce  the 
desired  result  by  forcing  her  to  submit  to  a  guarantee* 

There  is  every  reason  to  expect,  however,  that  the 
issue  between  Finland  and  Russia  will  find  its  solution 
as  a  secondary  consequence  of  the  Atlantic  railway  and 
the  guarantee  to  Scandinavia,  and  if  so,  our  arrange- 
ments will  have  secured  to  all  parties  concerned  what 
they  really  want :  to  Norway,  Sweden  and  Finland 
their  national  self-government,  and  to  Russia  her  direct 
commercial  access  to  an  open  Atlantic  port*  But  the 
problem  of  the  Baltic  remains  to  be  solved* 


\ 


348  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

"  Your  pfoposed  railway  to  the  Atlantic,"  a  critic 
would  object,  "  will  onl^  provide  a  clumsy  and  ci> 
cuitous  channel  of  communication  between  Russia  and 
the  outer  World.  Russia  will  always  fmd  the  most 
direct,  and  by  far  the  cheapest,  passage  for  the  flow  of 
trade  between  her  own  frontiers  and  the  commercial 
highways  of  the  Atlantic,  not  by  railway  transit  overland 
to  a  foreign  port  on  the  open  Ocean,  but  by  shipment 
from  the  ports  on  her  Baltic  oiast  down  the  water- 
passage  that  communicates  with  the  North  Sea  througli 
the  Baltic's  narrow  mouths.  These  entrances  of  the 
Baltic,  the  natural  outlet  for  the  vast  hinterland  of 
Russia,  are  at  present  at  the  mercy  of  the  German  navy. 

"  I  can  answer  off-hand  the  first  of  the  two  questions 
which  gave  rise  to  this  chapter  :  Rtissia  has  entered  upon 
this  struggle  against  Germany  with  all  her  national 
mu^t  to  realise  an  object  vital  to  her  national  existence, 
the  hlieration  of  the  Baltic  Sea  from  German  control. 
I&r  relations  with  Scandinavia  and  Finland  will  cer- 
tainly require  settlement,  and  you  are  r^t  to  devote 
attention  to  them  :  nevertheless,  they  are  of  altogether 
secondary  importance.  If  our  hopes  are  fulfilled,  and 
the  Allies  win  this  war,  Russia's  most  just  and  most 
urgent  mandate  to  the  Peace  Conference  will  be  the 
removal  from  the  strategical  points  of  vantage  in  the 
Baltic  of  this  German  pirate,  who  menaces  the  peaceful 
commerce  of  all  other  nations  with  ports  upon  die 
Baltic  coastline. 

"  The  satisfaction  of  Russia's  demand  is  the  problem 
before  you,  and  till  you  have  solved  it,  you  will  not 
have  quenched  the  well-spring  of  dissension  between 
the  German  and  Russian  nations.  Again  and  again  it 
will  spring  up  into  war,  vbik  even  your  Atlantic  railway 
will  turn  from  an  alleviation  into  a  new  danger.    Rusia> 


IN  THE  BALTIC  349 

tf  she  ts  compelled  once  and  for  all  to  resign  to  Germany 
the  naval  command  of  the  Baltic,  will  not  submit  to 
the  lack  of  any  naval  sally-port  whatsoever  upon  the 
Western  seas,  but  will  attempt  to  repeat  on  her  railway 
to  the  Norwegian  coast  the  policy  she  devised  at  the 
beginning  of  the  century  in  Manchuria.  She  will  seek 
to  turn  her  free  port  into  a  fortified  naval  base,  and  the 
danger  of  Tromso  or  Hammerfest  developing  into  an 
Atlantic  Port  Arthur  may  finally  wreck  the  good  under- 
standing between  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  and  involve 
the  latter  power  in  a  war  for  the  stronghold's  destruction 
as  costly  as  the  sieges  of  Sebastopol  and  of  Port  Arthur 
itself*  Such  may  be  the  consequences  of  indecision 
now*  In  the  question  of  the  Baltic  the  futture  peace  of  all 
the  European  powers  is  at  stake/' 

We  cannot  neglect  our  critic's  warning,  for  the  con- 
siderations by  which  he  supports  it  are  unanswerable, 
but  we  shall  be  in  a  better  position  to  give  him  satisfaction 
if  we  can  persuade  him  first  to  set  forth  on  his  own 
account  what  he  considers  the  indispensable  minimum 
of  conditions  necessary  to  ensure  the  liberation  of  the 
Baltic  in  the  sense  Russia  intends*  We  will  remind 
him,  however,  before  we  let  him  speak,  that  such  terms 
inevitably  involve  a  serious  alteration  of  the  status  quo 
to  Germany's  detriment,  and  that  it  is  therefore  doubly 
important  in  this  instance  sympathetically  to  bear  in 
mind  her  national  point  of  view,  and  scrupulously  to 
avoid  all  wanton  offence  to  her  honour  and  interest* 
He  will  probably  accept  otir  proposal  with  assurance, 
and  launch  out  into  his  disquisition  with  studied 
moderation* 

**  In  the  first  place,"  he  will  begin,  **  the  independ- 
ence and  neutraUty  of  Denmark  must  be  guaranteed 
by  Europe,  and  the  guarantors  must  further  subsidise 


390  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

her  to  a  sufficient  extent  to  enable  her  to  carry  ottt 
her  intenuttonal  duties  effectively.  Her  task  is  to 
fortify  the  three  channels  ^  between  the  Danish  islands 
and  the  peninsulas  of  Jutland  and  Sweden,  that  connect 
the  waters  of  the  Baltic  with  the  North  Sea,  and  also  the 
approaches  to  these  channels  at  either  end,  with  such 
formidable  batteries  on  land  and  torpedo  flotillas  cm 
sea,  that  she  will  be  able  to  '  move  on '  any  fleet  that 
attempts  to  bbckade  them  or  seal  them  up  with  mines. 

"  Denmark  would  have  every  reason  for  fulfillii^  this 
task  honottrably  and  impartially.  The  national  inde- 
pendence guaranteed  her  in  consideration  of  it  is  the 
tmly  remaining  object  of  her  foreign  policy,  when  oscx 
she  has  recovered  her  national  tmity  by  the  restoration 
of  Schleswig ;  and  the  only  event  that  could  endanger 
that  guarantee  would  be  another  attempt  by  a  sii^ 
power  to  impose  its  dominion  on  the  rest  of  Europe  by 
war.  If  any  power  planned  such  a  stroke,  Denmark 
would  be  the  last  state  to  enter  into  collusion  with  the 
criminal,  and  the  knowledge  of  her  incorruptibility 
wottld  go  far  to  discotur^e  the  design. 

"  But  Denmark  cannot  perform  this  function  suc- 
cessfully so  long  as  the  Kiel  Canal  is  at  the  disposal 
of  the  German  navy,  and  therefore  some  permanent 
arrangement  must  be  made  that  will  put  it  in  Dennia^'s 
power,  in  the  event  of  war,  at  once  to  hinder  Gemun 
warships  from  passing  through  it." 

He  will  admit  the  fact  which  we  have  already  estab- 
lished, that  the  whole  province  of  Ifolstein,  thiou^ 
which  the  Canal  runs,  is  German  in  nationahty,  and 
cannot  be  cut  away  from  the  United  German  state, 
and  he  will  therefore  hesitate  to  propose  the  singles! 
solution,  which  would  be  to  hiing  the  territory  on  either 

■  Great  Belt,  Little  Bel^  and  Sound. 


IN  THE  BALTIC  .  351 

bank  of  the  Canal  withm  the  Danish  frontier*  Nor, 
he  will  agree,  would  it  be  just  in  itself  to  deprive  Ger- 
many of  all  profit  from  a  great  engineering  work 
adiieved  by  h^  enterprise  and  at  her  expense.  **  But 
we  shall  judge  the  issue  better/^  he  will  explain,  **  if  we 
distinguish  in  our  minds  between  the  Canal^s  economic 
and  strategic  consequences* 

**  Geography/'  he  will  continue,  ''  has  put  the 
German  nation  in  possession  of  a  low-lying  isthmus 
between  the  estuary  of  the  Elbe  and  the  Baltic  Sea, 
and  the  nation,  by  its  own  energy,  has  taken  Nature's 
hint,  and  extracted  full  valtie  from  the  asset*  The 
artificial  canal  across  the  natural  isthmus  provides  a 
much  shorter  and  easier  route  than  the  Danish  straits  for 
commercial  traffic  between  the  Baltic  and  the  North 
Sea,  and  German  Commerce  has  the  right  to  take  every 
advantage  of  this  that  it  can,  by  giving  its  own  shipping 
rebates  on  the  toll,  rights  of  precedence  in  the  order  of 
pass^e,  or  any  other  privilege  that  commends  itself  to 
German  economic  theory,  while  alien  commerce  has 
no  right  to  complain  of  less  favourable  treatment  in  the 
Canal,  so  long  as  the  Danish  channels  are  open  to  it* 
If  all  the  states  that  possess  a  sea-board  on  the  Baltic 
were  to  claim  that  by  economic  justice  they  ought  to 
enjoy  equal  rights  with  Germany  in  the  nav^ation  of 
the  canal  that  has  been  cut  by  that  nation  through  its 
own  soil,  Germany  could  of  course  with  much  greater 
justice  demand  freedom  of  trade  through  the  ports  of 
Be^um  and  Holland,  which  have  been  rescued  from 
the  sea  by  the  Netherlanders'  dykes,  on  the  similar 
ground  that  they  are  placed  more  conveniently  for  her 
manufacturing  districts  in  the  Rhineland  than  are  the 
German  ports  on  the  estuary  of  the  Elbe*  Both  claims 
would  be  unfounded* 


352  RUSSIANS  NEEDS 

^'Nations,  like  individuals,  enter  into  oompetitioo 
with  one  another  very  unequally  equipped,  in  respect 
both  of  natural  and  of  acquired  advantages:  like 
individuals,  they  must  accept  the  conditions  as  they 
find  them,  neither  making  their  own  lack  a  justtficatkin 
for  robbing  by  force  their  neighbour's  superfluity,  nor 
using  their  own  strength  to  tyrannise  over  their  neigh- 
bour's weakness*  So  far  as  the  Kiel  Canal  gives 
Germany  an  economic  ptUl  in  the  commercial  conq)eti- 
tion  of  the  Baltic,  she  has  a  right  to  make  use  d  it : 
Russia,  if  we  win  the  war,  must  not  be  allowed  to  take 
this  advantage  from  her :  but  so  far  as  it  puts  it  in  her 
power  by  naval  force  to  paralyse  whenever  she  likes  the 
entire  conunerce  of  other  nations  whose  only  oudet  is 
thiough  the  Baltic,  and  the  commerce  of  the  whok 
World  in  so  far  as  it  wishes  to  do  business  with  die 
nations  in  question,  it  is  a  stumbling-block  to  Justia 
and  a  menace  to  Peace* 

''  We  must  devise  a  scheme,  then,  by  which  (a)  the 
province  of  Holstein  shall  remain  within  the  German 
frontier,  and  (b)  the  economic  control  and  profits  of  the 
Canal  shall  be  left  in  Germany's  hands,  but  (c)  the 
strategic  control  shall  be  taken  from  her/' 

Having  thus  explained  his  standpoint,  he  will  proceed 
to  formulate  lus  proposals*  **  We  can  destroy  Gei^ 
many's  naval  command  of  the  Canal  completely  by 
putting  any  single  vital  point  along  its  course  into  the 
possession  of  some  alien  military  power.  We  must 
choose  a  point  which,  while  of  decisive  importance  for 
the  Canal,  affects  as  little  as  may  be  Germany's 
interests  in  other  quarters*  This  rules  out  the  Western 
terminus,  for  the  power  which  commands  that  camiot 
help  commanding  likewise  Germany's  chief  artery  of 
Ocean  traffic,  the  estuary  of  the  Elbe*    We  are  accord- 


IN  THE  BALTIC  353 

ti^y  kft  with  Kiel,  and  the  right  power  to  hold  Kiel  in 
trust  for  Europe  is  clearly  the  '  policeman  *  Denmark* 

''  Denmark  must  maintain,  at  Europe^s  expense,  a  ring 
of  the  heaviest  fortifications  covering  Kiel  itself  and 
the  last  section  of  the  Canal  where  it  enters  Kiel  Haven, 
^a^l^^t>g  her  at  any  moment  to  block  the  Canal  against 
armed  German  attack,  and,  if  the  attack  presses  her  too 
hard  before  help  arrives,  to  blow  up  if  necessary  canal- 
mouth  and  fortifications  together,  and  to  mine  all  the 
sea  approaches,  thus  putting  the  Canal  out  of  gear  for 
an  indefinite  period.  This  fortified  area  in  Danish 
hands  must  be  secured  by  a  margin,  broader  than  the 
range  of  the  most  powerful  siege  artillery,  which  shall 
be  under  the  military  authority  of  the  Danish,  and  not 
of  the  German,  general  staff. 

^  The  boundary  of  this  zone  ^  should  start  from  the 
Dano- German  frontier  you  have  already  delimited 
between  Eckemfdrde  Bay  and  the  Eider,  at  a  point  just 
West  of  the  Schleswig-Rendsburg  railway,  and  should 
proceed  Southwards  parallel  to  the  railway,  crossing 
the  Canal  at  a  point  just  West  of  Rendsburg.  Thence 
it  shotild  run  South-East  to  the  Brahm  See,  then  East 
to  the  Bothkamper  See,  then  North-East  through  the 
Post-  and  Selenter-Seen  in  a  direct  line  to  the  Baltic, 
leaving  the  town  of  Preetz  outside. 

'^  The  administration  of  the  Canal  itself,  its  upkeep  and 
its  traffic,  both  outside  the  ssone  and  within  it,  must  in 
any  case  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  German  government, 
and  if  possible  the  population  of  the  zone  should  be 
included,  no  less  than  the  rest  of  Holstein,  within  the 
political  organisation  of  the  German  Empire  for  all 
purposes  of  civil  self-government,  in  spite  of  the 
exceptional  status  of  the  territory  in  the  military  sphere. 

^  See  map  facing  p.  48. 


354  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

But  if  such  absolute  separation  between  the  military  and 
the  dvil  control  of  a  district  is  in  practice  impossible^  and 
military  exigencies  require  that  both  administrations 
should  be  united  in  the  hands  of  the  same  govemmenti 
then  there  is  no  choice  but  to  detach  this  strip  of 
Holstein  altogether  from  the  body  of  Germany,  and 
allow  a  plebiscite  of  the  popubtion  to  decide  between 
direct  incorporation  in  Denmark,  or  *  Home  Rule ' 
under  the  Danish  government,  always  leaving  in  the 
hands  of  the  German  nation  full  property-r^ts  over 
the  Canal  throughout  its  whole  length/' 

With  these  suggestions  our  critic  will  conclude,  and 
it  will  be  our  turn  once  more  to  pass  judgment.  We  may 
first  commend  his  fairness  and  moderation,  and  admit 
our  conviction  that  he  has  herein  stated  the  strict 
nunimum  of  precautions  necessary  to  enstire  all  the 
entrances  to  the  Baltic  Sea  against  any  forcible  attempt 
on  Germany^s  part  to  seize  the  strategical  command  of 
them*  As  far  as  the  freedom  of  the  Baltic  is  concerned, 
it  will  tmder  such  an  arrangement  tDake  no  difference 
whether  Germany  reverses  her  aggressive  policy  or 
continues  in  her  present  courses.  But  the  Baltic  ques- 
tion is  only  one  factor,  however  important,  in  the 
problem  of  European  peace*  For  that  problem's 
general  solution  the  future  mood  of  Germany  is  of  more 
direct  and  vital  importance  still,  and  no  Baltic  settle- 
ment, however  perfect  in  itself,  is  worth  the  cost  of 
drivix^  Germany  into  exasperation  in  the  hour  of  her 
spiritual  crisis,  when  other  influences  have  so  fair  a 
prospect  of  inclining  her  into  the  paths  of  peace* 

The  Kiel  Canal  is  really  a  military  weapon,  like  a 
conscript  army  or  a  42-centimetre  gun*  It  is  a  part  of 
German/s  national  armament,  and  while  we  hope  diat 
one  of  the  results  of  the  settlement  will  be  a  scaling- 


IN  THE  BALTIC  355 

down  of  armaments  all  round,  by  a  voluntary  agree- 
ment among  the  nations  that  possess  them  and  an 
honourable  performance  of  its  respective  obligations  by 
each  nation  that  becomes  a  party  to  an  agreement  of 
sudi  a  kind,  no  one  would  seriously  propose  that  the 
limitation  of  troops  to  so  many  millions  of  trained  men 
or  of  guns  to  a  maximum  cahbre  of  so  many  centimetres 
should  be  enforced  by  international  police-commissions 
established  at  all  the  recruiting  depots  and  factories  of 
war  material  with  authority  to  control  the  output  and 
with  material  power  to  give  sanction  to  their  commands* 
^The  imagination  of  such  a  thing  is  chimerical,  and 
even  if  it  came  within  reach  of  realisation,  it  would 
absolutely  violate  one  of  the  most  essential  principles  of 
a  settlement  on  the  basis  of  national  self-government, 
that  ikett  must  be  no  interference  &om  outside  with  a 
nation's  internal  afiiairs*  The  cutting  off  of  ikt  Kiel 
endave,  though  on  the  one  hand  it  is  a  more  feasible 
project  to  execute,  is  on  the  other  a  far  grosser  violation 
of  national  liberty  and  tmity*  It  involves,  at  least  in 
part  and  probably  altogether,  the  detachment  from  the 
German  state  of  a  considerable  body  of  popubtion, 
including  the  citizens  of  Kiel,  a  great  port  and  dis- 
tinguished university  town,  not  becatise  they  desire 
this  severance  in  order  to  incorporate  themselves  in 
another  national  group,  nor  even  becatise  ikt  facts  of 
geography  make  it  impossible  to  fulfil  ihtit  national 
desire.  They  are' Germans  in  speech  and  in  sympa&y, 
the  district  forms  an  integral  part  of  the  German 
province  of  Holstein,  and  the  sole  motive  wotdd  be  the 
establishment  of  a  **  balance  of  power  ^  in  the  Baltic,  an 
object  in  which  they  have  no  concern  themselves,  but 
which  is  demanded  by  the  interest  of  the  Russian  Empire, 
a^Utical  group  with  which  theyare  in  no  way  connected* 


356  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

This  would  be  to  inflict  an  injustice  on  one  nadon 
to  the  special  advantage  of  another.  It  would  be 
parallel  to  the  Dual  Monarchy's  treatment  of  the 
Southern  Slavs,  to  Russia's  recent  behaviour  towards 
Finland,  and  to  all  the  other  smouldering  grievances  of 
nations,  which  have  combined  to  ignite  the  present  war. 
Just  as  those  had  caused  war  in  the  past,  so,  even  were 
they  all  eliminated  in  the  settlement,  this  alone  would  be 
a  new  and  most  efficacious  stimulus  to  war  in  the  future. 

The  spectacle  of  Kiel  under  the  military  oontiol  of 
Denmark  would  be  a  perpetual  incitement  to  Germany 
to  take  up  arms.  The  more  intricate  fortifications 
Denmark  threw  up,  and  the  heavier  guns  she  placed 
in  position  behind  them,  the  more  grimly  Gomany 
wouU  toil  to  construct  artillery  heavier  still,  and  to  open 
lines  oi  attack  that  would  more  than  counter  the  Danish 
lines  of  defence,  and  the  more  bitterly  she  would  hate  die 
"Concert  of  Europe  "  that  provided  the  Danish  staff  with 
the  material  means  for  carrying  out  its  commissioo, 
and  that  brought  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  Danish 
government  whenever  the  latter  indicated  its  wish  to 
resign  an  international  office  which  involved  it  in  un- 
requited responsibility  and  danger.  We  should  witness 
a  competition  of  armaments  and  an  aggravation  of 
national  antagonism  more  naked  and  direct  tiun  any  we 
have  experienced  yet :  the  crisis  would  be  precipitated 
by  the  harsh  treatment  of  the  German  pi^mlation  at 
Kiel,  provoked  by  their  natural  recalcitrance  towaids 
Danish  administratiOQ  and  their  eager  collusion  with 
the  German  spy-bureau,  or  else  by  the  imminent 
completion  of  a  Russian  programme  for  buiUing  op, 
behind  the  Danish  bulwark,  a  Baltic  fieet  more  dun 
stttMig  enough  to  cope  with  the  German  naval  force  in 
these  inland  waters  now  isolated  strategically  bom  its 


\ 


IN  THE  BALTIC  357 

sister  squadron  in  the  North  Sea.  Either  or  both  of 
these  causes  would  drive  Germany  to  throw  down  the 
gauadet  once  more  to  the  rest  of  Europe,  not  this  time 
in  hope  but  in  despair* 

The  remedy,  then,  for  the  German  command  of  the 
Baltic  entrances  would  ahnost  certainly  be  worse  than 
the  malady  itself,  and  we  find  ourselves  placed  in  a 
dilemma :  if  we  leave  the  Kiel  Canal  in  the  hands  of 
the  German  navy  we  cheat  Russia  of  one  of  the  diief 
objects  for  which  she  fought  this  war,  and  &il  to  remove 
a  stumbling-block  to  her  peaceful  progress  in  the  future : 
if  we  take  the  Canal  out  of  Germany's  strategic  control, 
we  cannot  avoid  measures  that  must  exasperate  her,  and 
create  a  new  obstacle  to  her  spiritual  conversion*  We 
have,  it  seems,  to  choose  the  lesser  of  two  evils* 

In  this  choice  of  dubious  alternatives  we  have  one 
dear  beacon*  Mechanical  manipulations  of  geogr^hical 
frocitiecs  and  political  statuses  possess,  we  agree,  but  a 
secondary  virtue  :  the  sure  foundation  of  Peace  Ues  in 
the  direct  production  of  a  healthy  state  of  consciousness 
in  all  the  nations  of  Europe*  J£  we  adopt  the  former 
alternative,  and  do  not  alter  the  present  status  of  the 
Canal,  we  afford  the  German  nation  the  most  favoturable 
conditions  for  throwing  off  the  disease  which  now 
vitiates  its  spirit ;  but  a  reformed  Germany  would  no 
longer  desire  to  use  for  aggressive  purposes  the  weapon 
left  in  her  hands,  and  so  this  psychological  change, 
when  once  it  came  about,  would  automatically  remove 
the  grounds  of  dissatisfaction  on  Russia's  part  which 
the  policy  entails*  To  remove  them  immediately  we 
must  adopt  the  other  alternative,  and  turn  Germany 
out  of  Kiel,  yet  we  can  only  do  so  at  the  price  of  aggravat- 
ing instead  of  alleviating  her  diseased  nationalism,  while 
Russia's  satisfaction,  instead  of  providing  a  natural  cure 


3S8  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

for  Germany's  sickness^  would  obviously  promote  it 
still  further,  in  exact  proportion  to  its  own  intensity* 

We  conclude,  accordingly,  that  we  shall  best  serve  the 
cause  of  ultimate  peace  if  we  oppose  ourselves  to  such 
a  drastic  bbw  at  Germany's  national  strength  and  pride 
as  the  military  confiscation  of  Kiel*  Our  judgment  is 
tentative,  but  at  least  it  seems  to  have  logic  on  its  side, 
for  it  is  surely  inconsistent  to  say  to  Germany  in  the 
same  breath :  *'  Europe  expects  of  you  that  you  will 
chai^  your  heart,  because  that  is  her  only  hope  of 
securing  Peace  for  the  future,"  and  **  Europe  regrets 
that  she  is  obliged  to  take  measures  for  the  security  of 
her  Peace,  in  case  you  should  not  change  your  heart 
after  all/'  If  we  approach  Germany  in  this  insinoere 
spirit  our  overtures  are  sure  to  prove  futile* 

Russia,  then,  must  be  persuaded  to  forego  her 
demands  in  part*  The  guaranteeing  of  Denmark  and 
her  armament  at  international  expense  are  both  excel- 
lent proposals*  She  is  one  of  those  small  nations  that 
contribute  much  to  European  civilisation,  and  her 
conservation  will  be  a  benefit  to  all  Europe  as  well  as  a 
partial  solution  of  the  Baltic  question*  But  the  transfer 
to  Deiunark  of  Kiel,  though  necessary  for  the  im- 
mediate solution  of  that  question  in  its  entirety,  must  be 
rejected,  because  it  would  impose  upon  Germany  a 
humiliation  much  less  justifiable  and  much  more  acute 
than  that  which  we  are  propositi  to  spare  Russia  in 
the  case  of  Finland* 

B.  The  Liberation  of  the  Black  Sea 

We  have  answered  one  of  the  questions  with  wfaidi 
we  started  this  chapter :  Russia  is  fighting  Germany 
now  for  the  liberation  of  the  Baltic  from  German  naval 


IN  THE  BLACK  SEA  359 

controL  We  have  tried  to  arrive  at  a  compromise,  by 
which  this  control  shall  be  vested  in  the  hands  of  some 
neutral  power  with  effective  sanction  behind  it,  and 
this  to  an  extent  which  will  finally  sadsfy  Russia  without 
alienating  Germany  once  and  for  all*  We  can  now  pass 
on  to  our  second  question  :  Why  is  Russia  also  putting 
forth  her  strength  against  Austria-Hungary  on  behalf  of 

Russia's  dominant  motive  is  simple.  She  has  looked 
on  for  more  than  a  generation  while  the  Dual  Monarchy 
oppressed  a  small,  weak,  divided  nationality,  the 
Southern  Slavs,  till  the  oppression  has  culminated  in 
an  implacable  war  of  annihilation  against  this  nation's 
largest  fragment,  the  state  of  Serbia. 

The  treatment  the  Southern  Slavs  have  received 
arouses  the  indignation  of  every  fair-minded  spectator 
who  acquaints  himself  with  their  case,  but  the  Russians 
are  not  detached  spectators.  The  Southern  Slavs  are 
their  closest  kixismen ;  they  speak  a  variety  of  the  same 
tongue,  and  turn  their  eyes  towards  Russia  for  salvation. 
The  Germans,  blinded  by  the  menace  to  their  own 
aspirations,  can  only  see  in  the  Panslav  movement  an 
engine  of  Russia's  imperialistic  ambitions.  Herein 
they  greatly  err :  Panslavism  was  not  bom  of  Russia's 
pride  and  covetousness,  but  of  the  Tchech's  and 
Southern  Slav's  deep  distress.  It  comes  from  their 
lips  as  a  cry  for  help,  not  from  Russia  as  a  solici- 
tation to  revolt;  and  it  is  in  answer  to  this  cry 
that  the  Russian  Nation  has  at  last  risen  with  a 
unanimity  undreamed  of  either  by  friends  or  foes, 
and  is  sweeping  westwards  with  the  spiritual  exalta- 
tion of  a  Crusade  to  break  her  brethren's  bonds. 

Here,  just  as  in  the  case  of  Belgium's  neutrality  and 
France's  loyalty  to  her  allies,  German  policy  has  shown 


V 


36o  RUSSU'S  NEEDS 

itself  singularly  obtuse  to  the  psycholc^  of  natioDS. 
It  has  disastrously  neglected  the  factor  of  Russia's 
disinterested  national  enthusiasm  in  its  estimate  ot 
military  forces.  Human  motives  are  always  complez, 
and  Germany  was  led  into  this  miscalculation  by  con- 
centrating her  attention  on  a  real,  though  subordinate, 
aspect  of  Russia's  intervention  in  the  Balkans.  The 
concerted  action  in  those  quarters  of  Austrian  and 
Turkish  rule  does  not  merely  challenge  Russia's  kni^t- 
errantry  by  blighting  the  growth  of  the  small  Balkan 
nationalities  :  it  directly  injures  her  economic  interests 
by  blocking  the  exit  from  the  Black  Sea,  while  every  step 
the  Balkan  nations  gain  with  Russia's  assistance  is  a 
further  step  forward  for  Russia  herself  on  the  road  to 
the  open  Mediterranean. 

The  Germans  a^^  that  Russia  is  preparing 
patriarchal  despotism  under  the  cloak  of  fraternal 
oo-operadon ;  and  that,  if  they  are  beaten  in  this  war, 
the  only  result  for  the  Balkans  will  be  to  subsQtule 
Russian  for  Austrian  domination. 

"  We  will  not  deny,"  they  say,  "  that  Austria,  in 
declaring  war,  intended  to  seize  the  railway  to  Saluuka, 
and  annex  the  whole  territory  through  which  it  runs 
as  &Lr  as  the  £gean  ;  but  if  Russia  wins,  she  will  aooez 
the  v^le  Eastern  coast  of  the  Black  Sea,  and  botb 
shores  of  the  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles,  while  she  will 
incorporate  Routnania  and  Bulgaria  in  her  empire, 
in  order  to  lead  through  them  a  railway  of  her  own  to 
the  Sea  of  Marmora  or  the  £gean." 

The  persistent  aloofness  of  both  Roumania  and 
Bulgaria  towards  Russia's  advances,  ever  since  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin,  and  the  reserved  attitude  they  have 
taken  up  in  the  present  crisis,  prove  that  the  German 
argument  is  not  altc^iether  groundless. 


IN  tHE  BLACK  SEA  3^1 

If  the  prophecy  really  came  true,  it  would  be  a  grave 
mttfortune  both  to  Germany  and  the  Balkan  states 
themselves,  and  a  violation  of  national  rights  and  wi^es 
fatal  to  the  endurance  of  Peace,  but  we  have  already 
sketched  a  series  of  arrangements  calculated  to  make 
Russian  and  German  hegemony  in  the  Balkans  alike 
impossible. 

{u)  The  grouping  of  the  six  Balkan  states  into  a 
'^  soUverein ''  which  may  develop  into  a  defensive 
alliance* 

(ii.)  The  maintenance  of  this  s^ollverein's  economic 
links  with  Germany  throu^  Trieste,  and  the  creatu^n 
of  new  links  with  Russia  through  Odessa* 

(iii.)  The  complete  settlement  of  racial  disputes 
between  the  Balkan  League  and  the  Russian  Empire, 
by  the  cession  of  North- Western  Bessarabia  to  Roumania* 

None  of  these  arrangements  will  stand  in  the  way  of 
Russia's  real  objective,  towards  which  hegemony  over 
the  Balkans  would  be  merely  a  means, — the  Liberation 
of  the  Black  Sea. 

The  entrance  to  the  Black  Sea  has  been  the  strongest 
naval  position  in  the  world  through  all  history,  but 
never  more  so  than  at  this  day,  when  waterways  can  be 
blocked  by  mines  capable  of  destroying  instantaneously 
the  most  magnificent  battleship. 

The  first  section  of  the  passage  is  the  Bosphorus, 
a  winding  strait  eighteen  miles  long,  and  varying 
from  700  to  3500  yards  in  width,  with  a  strong 
outward  current  flowing  through  it,  and  steqp  blu& 
overhai^ing  it  on  either  side.  At  the  further  end  of 
its  European  shore  the  hills  sink,  and  a  splendid  harbour, 
the  **  Golden  Horn,''  runs  inland,  protected  from  the 
more  open  waters  of  the  Sea  of  Marmora  by  the  penin- 
sula on  which  G>nstantinople  stands.    The  passage 


36a  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

of  about  ijo  miles  dovn  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  £com  the 
Golden  Horn  to  the  begmning  of  the  Dardanelles,  farms 
the  second  section ;  the  Dardanelles  thetsselvea  an 
ihe  last.  These  straits  are  forty  miles  long :  Aeir 
average  breadth  ^  is  considerably  greater  than  dut  of 
tlie  Bosphorus*  but  at  the  decisive  strategical  point 
between  Kilid-Bahr  and  Kaleh-i-Sultaniyeh  they 
narrow  to  1400  yards,  and  inside  this  line  thdr  ampUt 
windings  provide  good  anchorage  for  la;^  warships 
at  Ni^ara  and  at  Gallipoli.  When  you  have  put  the 
Dardanelles  behind  you,  you  have  still  to  clear  the 
channel  between  Imbros  and  Tenedos  islands,  before 
you  really  reach  the  open  waters  of  the  ^gean. 

The  free  use  of  this  extremely  difhcult  waterway  is 
of  vital  importance  to  all  states  possessing  potts  on 
the  Black  Sea,  principally,  of  course,  to  Rusta,  vAto 
depends  entirely  on  this  route  for  the  export  of  her 
wheat  and  her  petroleum,  but  likewise  to  Roumania 
and  Bulgaria  in  their  degree.  And  yet  control  of  die 
whole  passage  remains  in  the  hands  of  Turkey,  the  least 
civilised  of  all  the  Black  Sea  states  and  the  only  one  of 
them  who  has  no  commerce  of  her  own.  to  give  her  a 
Iq^timate  interest  in  the  waterway's  economic  utilisa- 
tion. Moreover,  she  takes  unscrupulous  advantage 
of  its  incomparable  strategic  qualities  to  push  a  policy 
of  adventure  even  more  dangerous  to  the  Peace  d 
Europe  than  the  national  chauvinism  of  Germans  and 
Magyars.  Turkish  chauvinism  has  no  ideas  behind  it 
or  objectives  in  front  of  it,  and  is  conducted  with  a 
travesty  c£  opportunism  by  ignorant  and  ill-educated 
men. 

The  Turks  have  held  this  waterway  for  five  hundred 
years.    They  seized  it  first  by  the  r^t  of  "stunt 

'  Three  to  four  miles. 


^ 


IN  THE  BLACK  SEA  363 

govemment/'  and  till  1700  their  administnttion  was 
perhaps  the  most  efficient,  and  the  poptilation  subject 
to  it  the  most  civilised^  of  any  that  bordered  on  the 
Black  Sea.  But  in  the  last  two  centuries  the  balance  of 
dviltsation  and  efficiency  has  been  entirely  reversed, 
axid  has  turned  the  Turk's  continued  presence  at  Con- 
stantinople into  a  scandal*  He  has  not  stayed  there  by 
his  own  e£forts :  he  would  have  been  cast  out  k>ng  ago 
if  first  Great  Britain  and  then  Germany  had  not  feared 
that  his  disappearance  would  merely  establish  Russia 
in  his  place.  Russia  entrenched  under  arms  on  the 
Bosphonis  and  Dardanelles  would  certainly  threaten 
German  enterprise  in  Asia  Minor  and  English  com- 
munications with  India;  but  Turkey  entrenched 
there,  besides  putting  Russia  in  such  an  intolerable 
position  that  she  will  end  it  by  war  at  the  first  oppor- 
tunity, has  again  and  again  proved  herself  an  in- 
sufferable nuisance  to  England  and  Germany,  her  rival 
protectors* 

It  is  time  that  we  abandoned  altogether  the  dis- 
creditable rdle  (in  which,  for  that  matter,  Germany 
has  already  supplanted  us)  of  safeguarding  the  most 
sinister  political  interest  in  Europe,  for  if,  at  the  oon- 
dusion  of  this  war,  we  attempt  to  keep  the  Turks  at 
Constantinople  in  face  of  a  victorious  Russia,  we  shall 
bring  about  the  very  result  we  want  to  avoid.  It  is 
a  phenomenon  of  htunan  nature  that  if  people  are 
thwarted  from  obtaining  their  due  by  peaoeftd  settle- 
ment, they  will  take  by  violence  not  only  their  due  but 
much  more  besides.  If  we  do  not  want,  a  generation 
hence,  to  see  Russia  challenge  all  Europe  to  war  for  the 
mastery  of  the  Straits  and  of  their  whole  Balkan  hinter- 
land, we  must  secure  her  the  freedom  of  the  Straits 
witlx>ut  delay.    If  we  satisfy  her  just  deihands,  she  will 


364  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

not  demand  more  than  is  just :  boilers  only  eqilode  if 
you  refuse  to  open  the  safety-valve. 

In  the  Black  Sea,  then,  as  in  the  Baltic,  we  have  to 
devise  some  organ  fdr  holding  the  entrance  in  trust  for 
the  states  that  have  ports  on  the  Black  Sea  coast,  and 
for  the  commerce  of  the  whole  World.   In  one  way  die 
question  is  simpler  here :   there  is  no  back-door,  like 
the  Kiel  Canal,  between  Black  Sea  and  ^gean,  and  we 
have  only  the  sii^le  passage  to  consider*    Turkey  has 
sunk  no  capital  in  improving  that,  and  we  need  have 
no  compunction  in  throwing  her  out,  neck  and  crop, 
without  compensation.    In  another  way  it  is  more 
difficult.    Turkey  does  not  merely  control  the  Bbck 
Sea  as  Germany  controls  the  Baltic :  she  is  in  actual 
possession  of  the  strategical  points,  and  there  is  here  no 
respectable,  impartial  policeman  like  Denmark,  waidi^ 
on  the  spot,  and  ready  to  take  up  his  duties  as  soon  as  he 
is  commissioned.    Turkey  cannot,  without  a  European 
catastrophe,  be  entrusted  any  longer  with  the  points  in 
question,  but  when  we  eject  her  we  shall  have  to 
organise  a  brand-new  administration  in  her  stead :  let 
us  begin  by  defining  exacdy  the  territories  to  be 
forfeited. 

(i.)  To  control  the  Bosphorus,  the  New  Administration 
must  take  over  both  its  shores,  and  also  the  shores  of  the 
Sea  of  Marmora  and  the  Black  Sea  for  a  certain  distance 
along  both  the  European  and  the  Asiatic  side  of  either 
entrance  to  the  Straits.  The  European  territory  should 
include  the  whole  district  of  Constantinople,  as  far  as  its 
boundary  against  the  vilayet  of  Adrianople,  that  is,  up 
to  a  line  leaving  the  Marmora  coast  midway  between 
Eregli  and  Silivri,  crossing  the  Adxianople-Constanttfiopk 
railway  half-way  between  Chorlu  and  Chataldja,  and 
proceeding  North  to  the   Black  Sea  coast  between 


IN  THE  BLACK  SEA  365 

Istrandja  and  Onnanlu.  The  frontier  of  the  Asiatic 
territory  should  start  from  Deredje,  on  the  Northern 
sliore  of  the  Gulf  of  Ismid^  and  run  N.N*E«  till  it  hits 
the  Black  Sea  coast  at  Kilia. 

(ii«)  In  the  Sea  of  Marmora  all  the  islands,  and  widi 
them  the  peninsula  of  Artaki  (Kapu  Dagh)  should  pass 
to  the  New  Administration. 

(iii*)  At  the  Dardanelles  it  should  be  given  authority 
on  the  Asiatic  side  over  the  whole  district  of  Bigha 
(the  *^  Troad  *'),  West  of  a  line  starting  from  the  Gulf  of 
Edremid  at  a  point  on  its  North  shore  on  the  same 
meridian  as  Aivali,  and  passing  first  over  the  summit  of 
Mount  Ida  and  then  in  a  general  North-Easterly  direc- 
tion to  the  Marmora  coast  East  of  Demotika.  On 
the  European  side  it  should  be  assigned,  not  only 
the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  (**  Thradan  Chersonnesus  **) 
but  sufficient  hinterland  to  cover  the  peninsulars  neck, 
where  it  is  lowest,  narrowest,  and  strategically  most 
vulnerable*  The  line  here  should  leave  the  £gean 
at  Ivridje  burun,  on  the  North  shore  of  the  Gulf  of 
Xeros,  run  North-East  along  the  summit  of  the  Kuru 
Dagh,  cross  the  Sayan  Dere  just  below  Emerli,  and 
thence  proceed  due  East,  over  the  summit  of  Mount 
Pyrgos  to  Ganos  on  the  Marmora  coast. 

(iv.)  In  the  ^gean  the  Administration  should  receive 
the  islands  of  Imbros  and  Tenedos,  which  were  left  in 
Turkey's  possession  by  the  Peace  of  London,  because 
they  play  an  essential  part  in  the  command  of  the 
Dardanelles* 

The  population  of  these  districts  is  very  diverse  in 
nationality.  The  peasants  of  the  Troad,  the  lai^est 
continuous  mass  of  land  within  the  Territory,  form  a 
solid  Turkish  block,  only  broken  by  a  few  Greek 
enclaves  along  the  shore  of  the  Dardanelles  and  of  the 


366  RUSSU'S  NEEDS 

Edremid  Gulf.  The  islands,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
purely  Greek,  but  their  area  is  small.  Constantinople, 
which,  together  with  its  suburbs,  accounts  for  the  great 
nujority  of  the  Territory's  inhabitants,  is  the  most 
cosmopolitan  City  in  the  World. 

When  the  Turks  conquered  her  in  the  fifteenth 
centtuy,  she  was  the  focus  of  Greek  nationality  and 
civilisation,  and  the  modem  kingdom  of  Hellas,  vriiich 
r^^ds  itself  as  the  Romaic  Empire's  heir,  openly 
aspires  to  raise  its  standard  over  the  capital  of  the  last 
Constantine.  But  for  four  and  a  half  centuries  Con- 
stantinople has  harboured  the  government  of  the 
greatest  political  power  in  Islam,  and  the  honour  of  its 
long-protracted  presence  has  altered  both  her  orienta- 
tion and  her  character.  She  has  drawn  within  her 
radius  lands  further  East  than  the  rule  of  her  Romaic 
emperors  ever  extended,  her  population  has  been 
enriched  by  all  the  races  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and 
Commerce  has  combined  with  Government  to  swell  her 
numbers ;  but  in  this  steady  growth  the  Greek  element, 
handicapped  by  the  Porte's  disfavour,  has  not  taken  its 
proportionate  share.  At  present  it  stands  at  no  more 
than  153,000,  perhaps  17.5  per  cent,  of  the  total  popula- 
tion,^ so  that  it  is  hardly  superior  numerically,  while 
decidedly  inferior  in  wealth,  to  the  flourishii^  Armenian 
colony. 

It  is  true  that  the  present  Turkish  majority  is  lately 

'  The  present  populatioci  of  Coastantinople  is  estimated  aa  Gallows  : 
Moslems        ....     385,000 


\ 


Foreign  subjects 

Jews 

Others  . 


153,000 

44/100 
13.000 

874,000 


IN  THE  BLACK  SEA  367 

artificial*  It  is  mainly  recnuted  from  two  classes, 
firstly  £rom  **  official  circles '"  with  their  immense 
households  and  **  retired  official  circles  **  in  their  palaces 
along  the  Bosphorus,  all  of  whom  would  automatically 
migrate  to  the  new  Turkish  seat  of  government,  where- 
ever  it  was  established ;  and  secondly,  from  unskilled 
labour,  demanded  in  increasii^  quantities  by  the 
docks,  and  supplied  by  the  surplus  of  the  Turkish 
population  along  the  Northern  ooast  of  Anatolia*  This 
army  of  stevedores,  though  it  has  won  itself  notoriety 
by  its  unruliness  and  fanaticism,  and  lent  itself  to  Young 
Turkish  chauvinism  by  boycotting  the  shipping  of 
various  foreign  nationalities  (a  proof  that  Turkey  is 
no  more  fit  to  be  entrusted  with  the  conunerdal  con- 
trol of  the  Black  Sea  Straits  than  with  their  military 
command),  is  really  just  as  casual  and  transient  an 
element  in   G>nstantinople    as   the    governing    dass 


It  is  probable,  then,  that  if  the  Straits  Territory  were 
cut  off  from  the  Turkish  Empire  and  erected  into  an 
independent  unit,  the  Greek  element  would  once  more 
become  sufficiently  preponderant  to  colour  the  wiiole 
population,  and  would  devote  its  political  capacity,  in 
which  it  is  undoubtedly  superior  to  the  other  nationali- 
ties, to  organising  the  whole  into  an  autonomous  republic 
on  a  Greek  basis,  and  with  Greek  as  its  official  language. 
Therewith,  in  spite  of  occasional  friction  between 
Greeks,  Armenians  and  Turks,  the  question  of  civil 
administration  wotdd  be  more  or  less  satisfactorily  solved, 
but  that  is  really  a  minor  problem*  The  distinctive 
characteristic  of  this  territory  is  its  international  im- 
portance* Even  in  its  social  and  economic  life,  the 
139,000  foreign  residents  count  for  more  than  the 
native  inhabitants,  yet  it  is  not  its  internal  condition 


368  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

but  its  military  importance  for  the  rest  of  Eurq)e 
that  has  led  us  to  mark  it  off  for  special  treatment. 
Here  our  difficulties  begin,  and  we  will  consider  the 
possible  solutions  of  them  in  turn. 

(u)  We  might  simply  demolish  all  existing  fortifica- 
tions, and  organise  no  military  force  in  the  Territory  at 
all.  But  to  leave  the  Straits  defenceless  would  be  a 
mere  invitation  to  all  powers  interested  and  well  armed 
to  scramble  for  their  occupation  :  we  could  not  offer  a 
more  potent  apple  of  discord. 

The  freedom  of  vitally  important  international 
communications  can  only  be  secured  by  a  military 
sanction  so  formidable  that  no  individual  nation  will 
have  the  means  to  challenge  it,  and  it  is  Utopian  to 
expect  that  the  several  nations  of  Europe  will  consent  to 
that  simultaneous  reduction  of  armaments  which  is  the 
goal  of  our  hopes.  They  will  not  do  this  till  the  balance 
of  armaments  has  already  shifted  from  national  to  inter- 
national control  and  the  military  force  of  the  individual 
states  has  ceased  to  be  (what  it  tmdeniably  has  been  until 
now)  the  decisive  factor  in  the  political  destiny  of  the 
World. 

Artificial  compacts  cannot,  in  themselves,  limit  the 
contracting  parties'  freedom  of  action*  In  the  last  resort 
they  will  always  break  the  agreement  if  they  can,  and 
try  to  get  their  own  way  by  summoning  up  aU  the 
resources  they  actually  command.  When  Sparta  and 
Argos  proposed  to  settle  their  differences  by  a  toumay 
between  three  hundred  chosen  champions  from  either 
dty,  the  Argive  champions  won ;  but  the  result  was 
reversed  when  the  whole  Spartan  army  rushed  in  to  the 
rescue  of  their  comrades,  and  took  the  more  honour- 
able Argive  army  off  its  guard*  Fair  play  could  only 
have  been  secured  if  the  lists  had  been  commanded  by 


IN  THE  BLACK  SEA  369 

a  dottn  twentieth-oentury  troops  with  a  machine  gun* 
Cotttracts  are  only  effective  if  there  is  a  power  in  the 
background  that  makes  it  worth  neither  party's  while  to 
break  their  plighted  word* 

The  necessary  preliminary,  then,  to  the  reduction  of 
aafianal  armaments  in  Europe  is  the  establishment  of 
other  armaments,  controlled  by  some  agency  acdng 
ftofii  an  impartial,  tntemational  point  of  view,  at  the 
strategical  keys  of  Europe — points  which  have  such 
military  strength  innate  in  their  geographical  disposi- 
tion, that  a  comparatively  small  force  stationed  there 
can  act  more  decisively,  **  to  bind  or  to  loose,"'  than 
the  kd^iest  forces  of  vrbick  the  separate  European  nations 
or  grot4>s  of  nations  dispose*  We  have  proposed  to 
install  such  a  force  at  the  mouth  of  the  Baltic  by  guaran- 
teeing Denmark  and  putting  her  in  possession  of  the 
necessary  military  positions,  and  we  have  a  similar 
duty  to  discharge  at  the  Black  Sea  Straits* 

(iL)  Our  problem,  then,  unfolds  itself  as  the  co- 
ordination of  a  strong  international  military  0]^;anisation 
with  the  k>cal  Greek  civil  government  of  the  Straits 
Territory*  Obviously  the  most  desirable  solution  would 
be  that  the  Autonomous  State  should  be  subsidised, 
like  Denmark,  to  organise  and  maintain  the  military 
defence  of  its  own  territory*  It  is  a  restricted  and 
unsatisfactory  form  of  self-government  that  does  not 
esctend  to  the  military  sphere,  and  the  friction  between 
the  native  dvil  administration  and  the  alien  military 
authorities,  which  we  anticipated  in  the  Kiel  enclave, 
would  be  more  serious  here  in  proportion  to  the  wider 
territory  and  larger  population  afiEccted.  But  unfor- 
tunately, while  the  interests  of  Denmark  and  Europe 
coinctde,  those  of  Europe  and  the  proposed  Autonomous 
Greek   State    do   not*     National   self -consciousness 


\ 


370  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

makes  Dennurk  wish  for  independgnce,  and  the 
guarantee,  the  terriuiml  gains,  and  the  armament- 
subsidy  give  her  the  best  means  of  securing  it ;  but  the 
same  inspiration  of  national  feeling  will  make  dte 
Greeks  <^  the  Straits  Territory  naturally  and  justty 
desirous  of  union  with,  and  absorption  in,  the  Kii^dom 
of  Hellas. 

This  is  another  instance  \diere  a  minority  must 
suffer.  If  the  Autonomous  State  had  it  in  its  power 
to  vote  by  plebiscite  for  union  with  the  Kingdom,  a 
majority  would  inevitably  be  secured  for  that  motioii, 
and  either  Russia  or  Turkey  or  both  would  make  the  act 
a  cams  bdli  against  Greece  or  even  against  the  wbok 
Balkan  League,  because  it  would  falsify  the  eiqtecta- 
tions  under  which  they  had  originally  consented  to  the 
liberation  and  intemationalisation  of  the  Straits.  Even 
if  war  were  averted  for  the  moment,  it  would  break  «U 
in  the  end.  The  acquisition  by  the  Balkan  League  of 
this  new  asset  would  encour^^  it  to  start  a  policy  of 
adventure  (the  pohtical  sense  of  the  Balkan  people  is 
still  in  its  in&ncy),  or  worse  still,  the  enlarged  Greece 
would  break  off  bom  the  zollverein,  and  begin  a  still 
more  extravagant  career  on  its  own  account.  Tbt 
Greek  population  of  the  Straits  Territory  must  acocsd- 
it^ly  suffer,  and,  while  enjoyii^  local  autonomy,  must 
for^  the  consummation  of  its  national  ideal.  Yet  «t 
cannot  expect  the  Greek  temperament  to  suffer  ^adtjr. 
We  have  the  experience  of  Krete  to  warn  us,  ^ete 
Unionist  activity  made  itself  a  nuisance  to  Europe  for  a 
doven  years,  till  union  was  achieved,  and  the  &ct  dut 
separation  was  a  wantonly  inflicted  evil  in  that  case  and 
is  a  necessary  evil  in  this,  only  makes  it  more  imperative 
that  in  this  case  the  arrangement  should  be  unswerving 
maintained.    The  fortification  of  the  Straits  is  essential 


IN  THE  BLACK  SEA  371 

to  the  peace  of  Europe^  but  to  place  these  fortificatioiis 
in  the  hands  of  the  native  Greek  population  would  be 
to  invite  a  coup  d*itat. 

(ill.)  We  are  reduced  to  search  for  some  alien  ex- 
ternal military  administration.  One  plan  wotdd  be  to 
garrison  the  territory  with  a  composite  force^  supplied 
on  some  agreed  system  of  proportion  by  the  tiational 
governments  of  Europe*  We  have  recent  precedents 
for  this  in  the  joint  occupation  of  Krete  by  four  powers 
from  1897  to  Z909 ;  in  the  ^^  asones  of  inspection/' 
maintained  from  1904  to  1908  in  Macedonia,  which 
were  unsuccessful,  and  did  not  even  achieve  their 
minimum  palliatory  object  of  staving  off  a  Balkan 
war ;  in  the  naval  landing-^parties  despatched  last  year 
CO  Skodra,  which  would  probably  have  succeeded 
in  establishing  law  and  order  throughout  Northern 
Albania,  if  the  present  war  had  not  brought  about  their 
dispersal ;  and,  on  a  far  larger  scale,  in  the  common 
defence  of  the  Pekin  legations  against  the  Boxers  in 
zgoo,  and  the  composite  expedition  fitted  out  to  relieve 
them  under  single  command* 

Most  of  these  cases  of  co-operation,  however,  were 
only  initiated  in  face  of  some  ui^ent  crisis,  and  all  of 
them  were  designed  for  a  temporary  purpose,  to  carry 
out  a  limited  task*  The  concerted  defence  of  the 
ItgiaLtioDS,  in  particular,  was  enforced  by  the  fear  of 
instant  massacre  and  the  hope  of  speedy  succour: 
the  fortifications  were  improvised,  and  of  no  import- 
ance except  to  the  refugees  they  sheltered  and  to  the 
Boxer  fanatics  they  kept  at  bay*  But  we  are  now 
proposing,  as  a  permanent  part  of  the  machinery  of 
Europe,  to  put  into  the  hands  of  national  contingents 
a  system  of  fortifications  stronger  and  more  elaborate 
than  any  other  in  Europe,  which  will  be  of  vital  interest 


\ 


373  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

to  the  policy  of  the  several  national  governments,  to 
whom  these  contingents  belong. 

A  fortress  demands  the  entire  loyalty  of  its  garrison, 
the  fcitiHIipg  in  them  of  a  common  spirit  as  wmng  as 
that  of  a  wvship's  crew.  It  is  essential  to  its  efficiency 
that  it  should  work  smoothly  under  centralised  direction, 
and  that  knowledge  of  its  organisation  and  funcdoning 
should  be  the  directorate's  monopoly.  Yet  this  loyalty, 
which  shows  its  colour  most  crudely  in  the  m^tary 
sphere  but  is  likewise  the  badq^round  of  all  social  life,  is 
in  modem  Europe  monopolised  by  the  national  state, 
and  men  cannot  serve  two  spiritual  masters.  The 
supreme  commandant,  supposing  that  the  diplomatic 
custom  were  followed  as  usual,  and  the  appointment 
devolved  auttmatically  upon  the  doyen  of  the  contingent- 
commanders,  would  feel  that  he  held  the  post  in  trust 
for  his  government  (a  point  ol  view  the  other  govern- 
ments would  not  endoise).  Each  member  of  his  cotn- 
posite  general  staff,  '"«««^?H  of  sharing  a  professional 
enthusiasm  for  their  common  duty,  would  feel  himself 
to  be  an  cUtacIU  retained  on  the  spot  by  his  parbcular 
government  to  report  upon  the  secrets  of  his  colleagues. 
The  contingents  themselves  would  feel  httle  respect  for 
their  superiors,  and  would  regard  the  various  positions 
with  which  they  were  entrusted  as  precious  additions 
to  the  sacred  soil  of  their  respective  fatherlands. 

(iv.)  A  commandant,  staff  and  personnel  that  had 
no  prior  allegiance,  would  be  relieved  from  this  blot 
position,  and  it  might  seem  possible,  by  rectuitii^ 
citizens  of  all  European  sutes  individually,  and  ofiefing 
them  a  life-loi%  career,  to  build  up  a  service  with  i 
tradition  and  a  professional  pride  of  its  own.  Experience, 
however,  is  discouraging.  Since  national  loy^  still 
holds  the  field,  some  form  of  national  service  will  attract 


IN  THE  BLACK  SEA  373 

the  nation's  best  men,  and  those  that  choose  to  bestow 
their  energies  elsewhere  will  probably  have  a  discredit- 
able reason  for  so  doing.  Soon  after  the  beginning 
of  British  control  in  Egypt,  the  Egyptian  government 
attempted,  with  our  sanction,  to  raise  a  cosmopolitan 
force,  but  dropped  the  idea  after  a  short  trial*  The 
French  Foreign  Legion  in  North  Africa  has  a  per- 
sistently evil  reputation,  and  even  the  **  Papal  Zouaves  '' 
in  the  middle  of  last  century  were  notorious  for  their 
bad  behaviour,  though  they  were  inspired  not  merely 
by  mercenary  motives,  but  by  a  spiritual  cause  which 
had  once  no  rival  in  Europe,  and  was  then  only  in 
process  of  being  supplanted  by  Nationality* 

To  find  an  auspicious  precedent  we  must  go  back 
to  the  time  when  Christendom  was  struggling  on  the 
defensive  against  the  advance  of  Islam.  In  the 
thirteenth  century  each  nationality  guarded  its  section 
of  curtain  and  tower  along  the  walls  of  Acre,^  and 
more  than  two  centuries  later  national  diversity  was 
still,  as  King  Stephen  had  conceived  it,  a  strengdi  and 
not  a  weakness,  a  spur  to  emulation  and  not  a  paralysing 
blight,  among  the  cosmopolitan  Knights  of  St«  John 
in  their  last  heroic  defence  of  Rhodes.*  Yet  at  that 
very  time  the  Most  Christian  King  of  France  was  o£fer- 
ing  his  harbour  of  Toulon  to  the  Turkish  fleet,  because 
the  Ottoman  power  was  the  greatest  thorn  in  the  side 
of  his  nation^s  Hapsbui^  enemy.  The  National  Idea 
was  replacing  oecumenical  anardiy  by  parochial  peace- 
and^mity,  and  it  was  a  symbolic  incident  when,  in 
1798,  the  armada  of  the  French  Republic  One  and 
Indivisible,  on  its  way  to  the  conquest  and  condliation 
of  an  enfeebled  Egypt,  extinguished  the  rule  of  the 
Hospitallers*  Order  in  its  final  refuge,  the  island  of  Malta. 

*  Fall  of  Acre,  1291  aj>.  *  Fall  of  Rhodes,  2523  aj>. 


374  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

We  hope  for  the  birth  of  a  loyalty  and  an  ideal  tbat 
shall  overshadow  Nationality  in  its  prime  even  moie 
conqiletely  than  the  Church  overshadowed  it  in  its 
infancy ;  but  such  a  spirit  is  not  abroad  among  us  yet, 
and  it  is  useless  to  build  up  concrete  cosmopolitan 
organisations  before  its  comity,  for  they  will  have  no 
vtrttie  in  them  until  they  have  received  its  baptism. 

(v.)  For  the  guardianship  of  the  Black  Sea  Straits, 
then,  we  must  fall  back  upon  the  services  of  some 
single  ezistii^  national  state.  Though  there  is  none 
in  this  case  that  has  a  special  interest  of  its  own  identical 
with  the  general  interest  of  Europe,  as  Denmark  has 
in  the  Baltic,  we  may  at  least  hope  to  find  one  with  no 
special  interest  adverse  to  the  interest  of  Europe,  wfuch 
we  may  induce  to  undertake  the  impartial  conduct  of 
the  task  for  the  general  advant^e. 

As  the  question  is  primarily  a  European  concern, 
it  would  be  reasonable  te  choose  a  European  state 
for  the  commission ;  and,  since  the  Great  Powen 
are  ex  hypothesi  ruled  out  (the  whole  problem  arisii^ 
from  their  mutual  rivalry),  our  choice  must  1^ 
upon  some  minor  nation.  But  here,  too,  the  piece- 
(tents  are  disquieting.  The  Belgian  customs-senrice 
and  the  Swefhsh  gendarmerie,  introduced  into  Persia 
to  establish  strong  government,  have  not  been  equal  to 
their  task  there.  They  have  no  natural  connection  with 
the  country,  and  no  power  of  influencing  its  destiny 
on  their  own  initiative  :  that  power  lies  with  Russia  and 
India,  the  great  armed  states  immediately  beyond  its 
frontiers.  The  Persian  population  reahses  this,  and 
r^tly  regards  the  Belgian  and  Swedish  administraton 
as  secondary  agents,  put  in  by  Russia  and  Great 
Britain  as  a  stopgap,  to  shelve  the  settlement  of  their 
own  rival  ambitions.    The  two  services  therefore  lack 


^ 


IN  THE  BLACK  SEA  375 

that  prestige  and  moral  authority  which  are  the  only 
invincible  weapons  of  ""  strong  government  ^^  in  war- 
ring against  the  chaos  of  the  "'  Dark  hgt*^ 

The  Dutch  Gendarmerie,  established  last  year  with 
such  solemnity  in  the  new  Albania,  has  been,  through 
no  fault  of  its  own,  a  still  more  lamentable  fiasco,  and 
there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  if  we  place  another 
small  European  nation,  for  example  the  Swiss,  in 
command  of  the  Black  Sea  Straits,  the  result  will  prove 
in  any  way  more  satisfactory.  In  fact,  it  is  almost 
certain  that  Switzerland  wotdd  decline  the  proposal. 
It  would  implicate  her  most  unfairly  in  every  cydone 
that  swept  over  the  European  horizon*  She  would 
have  constantly  to  make  grave  dedsioxis,  and  individual 
powers  might  attempt  to  force  her  hand,  either  by 
mobilisii^  against  her  frontiers  at  home,  or  combining 
to  bar  her  troops  and  officials  from  all  geographical 
access  to  the  Straits*  Her  relations  with  the  autonomous 
Greek  population,  which  would  resent  the  control  of  a 
state  not  immeasurably  stronger  than  itself,  would  be 
chronically  strained.  Neither  Switzerland,  nor  any 
other  small  power  in  Europe,  is  capable  of  tmdertaking 
the  charge. 

(vi.)  There  is  one  recourse  left,  which  is  at  least 
worth  tentative  suggestion.  President  Wilson  has 
offered  Europe  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States 
for  mediation  at  the  close  of  this  war  and  for  devising 
arrangements  that  shall  prevent  war  for  the  future. 
Europe  would  do  well  to  take  President  Wilson  at  his 
word,  and  ask  the  United  States  to  give  her  permanent 
assistance  of  a  very  practical  kind,  by  relieving  her  of 
the  concrete  problem  under  discussion.  The  proposi- 
tion would  doubtless  come  to  American  public  opinion 
as  a  shock,  for  it  has  been  a  constant  maxim  of  their 


376  RUSSIA'S 

foreign  policy  to  incur  no  political  obligations  across 
the  Atlantic,  and  they  will  be  more  eager  than  ever  to 
maintain  this  principle,  now  that  they  have  seen  what 
volcanoes  underlie  Europe's  smiling  sur£ace. 

Great  Britain,  however,  has  pursued  for  a  century  a 
policy  of  precisely  similar  intention,  keeping  her  eyes 
fixed  upon  her  Empire  and  her  social  problems,  and 
refusing  to  intervene  on  the  continent  across  the 
channel,  and  yet  drctmistances  have  been  too  strong 
for  her.  In  the  present  crisis  we  have  been  carried 
into  the  storm-centre  of  the  struggle,  and  America 
herself,  while  she  has  avoided  war,  has  by  no  means 
escaped  the  effects  of  iu  The  financial  business  of  New 
York,  no  less  than  that  of  London,  is  at  a  standstill. 

She  must  take  to  heart  the  lesson  of  this  catastrophe, 
and  realise  that  for  her,  too,  the  phase  of  **  splendid 
isolation  **  has  come  to  an  end.  The  present  hurricane 
has  bereft  the  ship  of  International  Peace  of  her  water- 
tight compartments  :  the  next  breach  in  her  side  will 
put  the  whole  vessel  in  danger  of  foundering. 

By  taking  this  burden,  then,  upon  their  shoulders^  the 
U.SJV.  would  be  performing  an  act  of  international 
generosity  which  would  be  the  proudest  record  in  their 
history,  but  they  wotild  also  be  consulting  their  true 
interest,  which  is  fundamentally  identical  with  the 
interest  of  united  Europe.  They  would  be  btlpiog  to 
assture  universal  peace. 

From  the  objective  point  of  view,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  they  are  admirably  qualified  to  tmdertake  the  task. 
They  have  no  private  interest  in  the  Black  Sea  Straits^ 
and  they  are  one  of  the  strongest  powers  in  the  world : 
their  decisions  would  therefore  pass  tmchallenged  by 
all  parties  affected,  especially  as  the  self-denyir^  side 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  attitude  they  are  main- 


IN  THE  BLACK  SEA  377 

taming  in  the  present  war,  have  won  the  U.S.A*  an 
imperishable  reputation  for  impartiality.  Moreover, 
they  have  intimate  connections  with  the  population  of 
the  Territory.  Since  the  close  of  last  century  the  most 
enterprising  and  able-bodied  peasants  all  over  Eastern 
Europe  have  been  finding  their  way  across  the  Atlantic, 
undergoing  the  industrial  metamorphosis,  and  returning 
home  with  smart  coats  on  their  backs,  strong  boots  on 
their  feet,  and  hard  money  in  their  pockets,  to  preach 
the  good  tidings  of  this  Eldorado  in  the  West*  America 
is  an  even  more  present  reality  in  the  minds  of  the  vast 
uneducated  majority  in  Turkey  and  the  Balkans  than 
are  the  powers  of  Europe  in  the  calculations  of  the  semi- 
educated  minority  that  controls  their  politics.  Yet 
America  has  a  strong  footing  among  this  important 
dass  as  well,  for  the  only  thorough  secondary  education, 
up  to  the  modem  civilised  standard,  that  the  inhabitants 
of  these  cotmtries  can  obtain  without  resorting  to  the 
foreign  universities  of  Central  and  Western  Europe,  is 
given  by  Robert  College,  the  famous  American  fotmda- 
tion  on  the  European  shore  of  the  Bosphorus,  which 
opens  its  doors  to  students  of  all  religions  and  nationali- 
ties,^ and  has  been  for  years  a  beacon  light  amid  an 
inconsdonable  welter  of  hatreds  and  particularisms. 
The  relations,  therefore,  between  the  American  adminis- 
tration and  the  autonomous  population  of  the  Territory 
would  be  fotmded  upon  a  strong  tradition  of  respect  and 
good-will. 

We  conclude  that  America  is  the  only  power  in  the 
world  capable  of  accomplishing  this  mission,  and  that 
the  omens  are  in  favour  of  her  accomplishing  it  well. 

1  This  foundation  for  men  is  supplemented  by  the  American  College 
for  women  on  the  Asiatic  side  of  me  Straits.  It  was  originally  opened 
for  Christian  girb  of  all  nationalities  within  the  Turkish  Empire,  but 
Moslems,  too,  have  recently  begun  to  send  their  daughters  there. 


378  RUSSIA'S  NEEDS 

The  true  solution,  then,  of  &e  Black  Sea  problem,  would 
be  for  Europe  to  throw  herself  on  the  United  States' 
iaercy»  and  ask  them  to  accept  her  commission,  until 
she  has  built  up  among  her  various  nationalities  that 
common  European  patriotism  which  alone  can  give  her 
the  spiritual  force  to  administer  the  trust  herself.  Those 
acquainted  with  the  American  political  outlook  will 
probably  object  that  it  is  Utopian  to  propose  sudt  an 
issue,  however  desirable  it  might  be ;  yet  even  if  the 
logical  conclusion  to  which  our  ai^;ument  has  led  us  ts 
no  more  than  a  rednctio  ad  absardtan  of  the  prevailing 
national  antagonisms  of  Europe,  it  will  at  least  point 
the  moral  that  Europe  can  only  be  saved  by  her  own 
efibrts,  and  that  if  she  does  not  find  an  occasion  for 
setting  her  house  in  order  in  the  settlement  after  this 
war,  she  will  never  be  able  thereafter  to  arrest  its 
progressive  rum. 


^ 


THRACE  379 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  DISMANTLING  OF  THE  TURKISH  EMPIRE 

We  have  seen  that,  by  her  presence  at  the  Straits, 
Turkey  chokes  the  egress  of  all  the  nations  fronting  the 
Black  Sea  coasts,  which  in  every  other  respect  have 
severally  achieved  national  self-stiffidency  and  inde- 
pendence* This,  however,  is  the  least  of  her  crimes. 
The  area  within  her  frontiers  is  a  veritable  cockpit  of 
nationalities  so  mutilated  that  they  have  never  even 
achieved  that  unity  which  is  the  essential  preliminary 
to  a  national  life* 

Turkey  in  19x4  is  sailing  in  those  shoal  waters  in 
which  Poland  foundered  in  1795,  and  if  she  wishes  to 
avoid  Poland's  shipwreck,  she  must  promptly  lighten  her 
drai^t  by  throwing  overboard  all  superfluous  cargo. 
We  shall  have  eased  her  coturse  considerably  by  relieving 
her  of  that  solid  bullion,  the  Territory  of  the  Straits ; 
but  she  must  reconcile  herself  to  making  jetsam  of  less 
cherished  but  bulkier  properties  as  well,  if  she  is  finally 
to  dear  the  ree£i  and  make  the  open  sea.  We  will  pass 
in  review  these  bales  of  tetritorial  merchandise. 

A.  Thrace 

The  carving  out  of  the  Straits  Territory  completdy 
severs  from  the  Anatolian  body  of  Turkey  die  European 
province  of  Thrace,  left  to  her  by  the  Treaty  of  London 
and  the  subsequent  compromise  with  Bulgaria  that 
followed  the  Second  Balkan  War.  The  population  of 
Thrace  is  predominantly  Greek,  and  though  there 


1 


38o      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

is  a  sprinkling  of  Turkish  villages  throughout,  and 
a  considerable  Bulgarian  element  in  its  mountainous 
North-Wcst  comer,  Greek  Irredentism  has  naturally, 
and  quite  justly,  kept  the  v^ole  region  inscribed  on 
its  book  of  claims.  Most  of  those  claims  are  already 
satisfied  or  else  in  process  of  satisfaction,  but  Thrace  is 
probably  destined  to  remain  a  bad  debt.  The  decisive 
foctor  here  is  Geography,  and  it  assigns  the  territory 
unmistakably  to  Bulgaria. 

The  natiural  route  of  egress  from  the  Bulgarian 
hinterland  to  a  door  on  the  .^^ean  follows  the  lines  of 
the  Maritsa  and  its  tributaries,  &om  their  sources  and 
&om  over  the  watershed  beyond,  to  their  triple  junction 
at  Adrianople,  and  then  proceeds  due  Southwards  aloug 
the  united  stream,  to  the  ports  of  Ainos  and  Dedeagatch 
on  the  East  and  West  flanks  of  its  mouth. 

Adrianople  was  built  with  the  express  strategical 
purpose  of  blocking  this  route.  It  was  the  bulwark 
of  the  venerable  Bysantine  Empire  against  Bu^aria 
in  her  Spring,  and  since  the  Berlin  Treaty  it  has  been 
the  bulwark  of  a  Turkey  galvanised  into  life  against  a 
Bulgaria  miraculously  re-arisen  from  the  dead.  For 
a  few  months  in  1913,  Bulgaria,  for  the  first  time  in  her 
history,  held  the  coveted  prize  in  her  grip,  to  lose  it 
again  by  her  own  folly,  when  the  Turkish  artny  quietly 
re-occupied  the  fortress  during  the  war  she  had  wantonly 
provoked  with  her  former  allies.  The  compromise 
which  Turkey  forced  upon  Bulgaria  in  her  eztteniity, 
confirmed  the  retrocession  of  Adrianople  and  Kiik- 
Kilisse  (its  strategic  complement)  to  the  Turkish 
Empire,  and  though  Bulgaria  retained  the  Sgeaa  coast- 
strip  between  the  mouths  of  the  Mesta  and  the  Matitsa, 
for  practical  purposes  her  road  to  the  sea  was  cut  off 
again  as  effectually  as  ever. 


THRACE  381 

Near  the  Western  end  of  .that  coast  there  is  the  excel- 
lent harbour  of  Porto  Lagos,  backed  by  the  fertile 
tobacco-growing  plain  of  Xanthi,  but  this  district 
is  separated  from  the  upper  valley  of  the  Maritsa  by 
die  immense  barrier  of  the  Rhodope  motmtains,  and 
though  from  the  port  a  narrow-gauge  railway  might 
be  engineered  across  them  through  Gimirdjina,  Kir- 
djaU  and  Haskevi  to  Philippopolis,  it  could  never,  any 
more  than  the  Bosnian  railway,  become  a  main  artery 
of  commerce.  The  main  economic  route  must  con- 
tinue to  skirt  the  course  of  the  Maritsa,  and  in  fact  a 
railway  already  runs  from  Sofia  over  the  watershed  to 
Philippopolis,  and  thence  along  the  Right  bank  of  the 
river  all  the  way  to  Dedeagatch,  the  port  westward  of  its 
mouth. 

This  railway  was  purposely  led  by  the  Turkish 
military  authorities  through  the  ring  of  the  Adrianople 
forts,  and  thus,  though  Dedeagatch  itself  has  passed  into 
Bu^;aria's  possession  together  with  the  Right  bank  of  the 
Maritsa  below  Adrianople,  its  railway  communications 
with  the  Bulgarian  interior  are  cut.  It  might  seem 
possible  to  avoid  Adrianople  by  constructing  an  "'  all- 
Bulgarian  ""  loop-line  from  point  to  point  on  the  Right 
bank  of  the  Maritsa  well  inside  the  Bulgarian  frontier ; 
but  the  low  cotmtry  suitable  for  railway  engineering 
between  the  river  and  the  Eastern  bastions  of  Rhodope 
is  narrow,  and  the  Turkish  military  authorities  quite 
justifiably  insisted  in  indudii^  within  their  frontier,  as 
rectified  by  the  compromise,  a  wide  radius  of  territory 
beyond  the  Adrianople  forts  on  the  Right  banks  of  the 
Tundja  and  the  Maritsa,  on  the  ground  that  its  pos- 
session was  essential  to  the  defence  of  Adrianople 
itself.  This  ^one  stretches  right  up  among  the  moun- 
tain spurs  :  the  loop-line  would  have  to  be  carried  by  a 


38a      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

tmar  ie  force  over  the  shoulder  of  Rhodope,  and  even 
then  it  could  be  cut  at  once,  in  the  event  of  war,  by  a 
force  astride  the  natural  line  of  communications  at 
Adrianople  itself* 

This  simply  proves  that  Adrianople  excellently  fulfils 
its  object,  and  that  so  long  as  it  remains  in  Turkey's 
hands,  free  communication  with  the  JEgtan  is  denied 
to  Bulgaria.  We  proposed  to  meet  the  problem  of 
Hungary's  railway  to  the  Adriatic  and  Russia's  to  the 
Atlantic  by  putting  the  politico-military  and  the  eco- 
nomic control  in  different  hands,  but  a  similar  solution  is 
in  this  case  impossible,  because  the  Turkish  government 
is  too  uncivilised  and  tmeducated  to  refrain  on  the  least 
temptation  from  exploiting  the  brute  force  we  should  be 
leaving  at  its  command.  Unless  she  can  prove  some 
strategical  necessity  more  pressing  than  Bu^iaria's 
economic  need  for  an  outlet  on  the  JEgean,  Turkey 
must  evacuate  Adrianople  altogether.  Till  now  she 
has  been  able  to  allege  the  defence  of  the  Dardanelles 
and  Constantinople,  but  when  we  have  relieved  her  of 
that  duty  by  pladi^  these  positions  in  the  keeping  of  a 
power,  and  tmder  the  sanction  of  a  concert  of  powetSi 
that  neither  Bulgaria  nor  the  united  Balkan  League 
would  venture  to  impugn,  the  case  for  her  presence  at 
Adrianople  falls  to  the  grotmd,  and  nothing  remains 
but  to  rescue  Thrace  at  once  from  that  misgovemment 
which  Turkish  chauvinism  has  aggravated  during  the 
past  year  in  its  impotent  thirst  for  revenge* 

The  incorporation  of  Thrace  in  Bu^ana  will  not 
benefit  the  latter  cotmtry  only :  it  will  vastly  improve 
the  condition  of  the  whole  population  of  Thrace.  The 
Greek  elements  will  have  to  abandon  their  dream  of 
national  retmion,  which,  in  the  bitterness  of  the  Second 
Balkan  War,  made  them  prefer  the  return  of  Turkish 


THRACE 


583 


f,  because  it  is  by  nature  transitory,  to  Bulgarian 

tent  that  is  too  efficient  not  to  strike  roots*    But 

le  the  Turk  has  made  them  suffer  for  their 

iwn  policy  of  possessing  their  souls  in  patience. 

goaded  them  beyond  human  endurance,  and 

such  a  foil  to  the  Bulgar  that  they  may  actually 

once  more  as  a  deliverer,  as  they  hailed  him 

the  Autumn  of  191a. 

ly  if  we  can  install  Bulgarian  government  in 
again  with  the  good-will  of  the  Greek  population, 
make  the  future  easier  for  all  parties  concerned, 
their  atrocious  behaviour  in  the  Second  Balkan 
is  almost  more  than  the  Bulgarians  deserve, 
not  rely  on  good  feeling  alone  to  settle  the 
question,  but  must  safeguard  the  Greeks 
province  by  the  strictest  guarantees  for  their 
individuality*  In  fact,  this  is  the  least  we 
to  satisfy  public  opinion  in  the  kingdom  of 
vAndi  has  not  yet  risen  to  the  insight  of  the 
^'s  political  good-genius,  the  premier  Venezelos. 
ideed,  recognises  that  the  solution  of  all  Balkan 
lies  in  compromises  rationally  concluded 
Lourably  observed,  and  was  always  willing  to 
funder  Bulgarian  rule  the  Greek  population  of 
itsa  basin,  if  Bulgaria  in  return  agreed  that 
;es  of  her  own  nationality  in  the  hinterland  of 
should  pass  to  Greece.  The  result  of  Bul- 
uncompromising  nationalism  was  the  Second 
War,  by  which  Greece  got  more  than  her  due, 
(aria  lost  much  of  what  she  could  justly  claim, 
id  arrangement  would  at  last  make  the 
ke  even,  and  allow  the  two  nations  to  forget  the 
ttable  relations  of  the  past. 
It  Turkish  elements  would  actually  have  less  cause 


N 


384      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

for  dreading  the  change  than  the  Greek.  The  Turk 
has  found  by  eq;>erience  that  good  government  by  the 
fore^ner  and  the  infidd  is  a  happier  lot  than  the  I^k 
Age  of  his  native  regime ;  and  the  Bulgars  have  been  as 
successful  in  reconciling  and  assimilatix^  their  Mosiem 
f ellow-dtisens,  of  whom  there  are  la^e  numbers  in  the 
North'-Eastem  parts  of  the  country^  as  the  Austrians  have 
been  in  Bosnia  or  the  Russians  in  Turkestan.  When 
every  Christian  peasant  in  Bulgaria  was  called  to  the 
colours  in  the  Stmmier  of  Z912,  the  Moslem  neif^bour, 
whose  services  the  Government  did  not  demand  for  the 
Turkish  war,  undertook  to  gather  in  the  harvest  on  the 
campaigner's  fields.  There  is  little  doubt  that  if  the 
Moslems  of  Thrace  pass  tmder  Bulgarian  administra- 
tion, their  loyalty  to  their  new  cotmtry  will  soon  be 
equally  intense. 

The  Bulgarians  have  no  incentive  to  treat  diis 
minority  ill :  the  battle  of  Lule  Bui^as  settled  old 
scores,  and  after  the  joint  occupation  of  Salonika  the 
Greek  eclipsed  the  Turk  as  the  national  rival.  Protests 
will  come,  not  from  the  local  Moslems,  but  from  Turkish 
nationalism  across  the  Straits.  Adrianople  was  for  a 
century  the  capital  of  the  Ottoman  State,  and  the  tombs 
of  the  Sultans  are  there :  the  sophisticated  Ottoman 
claims  them  as  national  monuments,  and  the  city  in 
which  they  stand  as  inalienable  Ottoman  soil.  No 
apter  example  could  be  fotmd  of  the  ai^;ument  from 
historical  sentiment,  and  we  have  only  to  classify  this 
fallacy  in  order  to  dismiss  it  from  consideration.  The 
desire  of  a  living  poptilation,  and  not  the  pride  of  dead 
conquerors,  must  settle  the  destiny  of  Adrianople,  asd 
it  will  not  settle  it  in  favour  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  b 
Bulgaria's  hands  the  tombs  will  be  as  well  tended  as  the 
whole  province. 


ARMENIA  385 

The  material  advantage  that  would  accrue  to  all 
sections  of  the  population  alike  is  not  open  to  doubt. 
For  the  first  time  since  the  Goths  crossed  the  Danube, 
the  country  would  be  united  economically  with  its 
natural  hinterland,  and  therewith  the  prosperity  it 
enjoyed  in  the  second  century  after  Christ  would 
assuredly  return  :  roads  and  railways  would  be  multi- 
plied, and  stock-breeding,  vine-^n^wing  and  agricul- 
ture regain  their  footing  on  its  desolate  downs. 

After  placing  the  national  rights  of  minorities  tmder 
guarantee,  we  may  accordingly  hand  over  to  Bulgaria 
the  sovereign  rights  of  defence,  communications  and 
civil  government  throughout  the  province,  up  to  the 
frontiers  we  have  marked  out  for  the  Territory  of  the 
Straits,  with  the  one  proviso  that  she  shall  not  fortify 
her  new  port  of  Rodosto  on  the  Marmora  coast,  nor 
establish  a  naval  base  therein* 

B.  Armenia 

We  have  now  cut  back  the  Turkish  Empire  from  its 
encroachments  on  alien  grotmd  in  the  West :  ^en  we 
turn  to  the  North-Eastem  frontier,  we  are  faced  with  a 
political  anarchy  and  a  racial  chaos  that  demand  more 
drastic  pruning  still*  The  question  of  Armenian  nation- 
ality lies  at  the  heart  of  this  tangle* 

The  Armenians  have  shown  an  indomitable  national 
consciousness,  and  there  are  several  strong  factors  to 
inspitt  iu  The  first  is  common  religion,  a  variety  of 
Christianity  with  certain  dogmas  peculiar  to  itself,  which 
distinguishes  its  professors  not  only  from  the  Moslems 
among  whom  they  live  but  from  the  international 
Oiristian  Churches  in  other  parts  of  the  World.  A 
second  is  common  language,  a  branch  of  the  Indo- 


j86      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

European  group  that  has  followed  a  very  indmdaal 
development  of  its  own,  and  produced  a  voluminoQS, 
though  chiefly  ecclesiastical,  literature.  Finally  diere  is 
the  common  tradition  of  a  political  independence  wfaidi 
endtured  almost  tmbroken  for  twelve  centuries,  and 
occasionally  played  a  decisive  part  in  the  history  of  the 
World. 

Unhappily  this  tradition  was  eactinguished  mm 
than  eight  centuries  ago*  Since  then  the  only  admifiis- 
trative  bond  uniting  the  Armenian  people  has  been  the 
organisation  of  their  national  Church,  and  the  nation's 
history  has  resembled  that  of  the  Jews.  The  A^n^ 
nians  in  Dispersion  have  prospered  exceedingly.  They 
have  shown  an  adaptability  capable  of  assimilating 
European  ways  of  life,  not  merely  the  social  supe^ 
fidalities  achieved  by  tibe  Young  Turks,  but  the  solid 
f otmdations  of  spiritual  ideas  and  technical  skill ;  and 
they  have  fotmd  the  energy  to  turn  their  acquisitions 
to  account  by  rivalling  and  even  outstripping  their 
European  teachers  in  the  economic  exploitation  of  the 
Nearer  East,  Their  recent  evolution  has  bridged  the 
gulf  between  Asiatic  and  European,  and,  like  the  rise 
of  Japan,  tends  to  prove  that  the  contrast  between 
**  Oriental  *'  and  **  Occidental  **  does  not  express  unde^ 
lying  difference  of  temperament  so  much  as  differena 
of  phase  in  an  identical  process  of  growth. 

Japan,  however,  in  her  awakening  has  mainly  utilised 
the  political  line  of  advance,  while  the  political  con- 
dition of  the  Armenian  peasant  who  has  stayed  at  home 
in  his  native  mountain-valleys,  has  steadily  been  g(»ng 
from  bad  to  worse.  Moslem  govenunent  has  gives 
the  advantage  to  his  Moslem  neighbours  from  die 
Zagros  moimtains  on  the  South-East,  the  quite  bar- 
barous  nomadic  Kurdish  clans;    and  during  the  last 


ARMENIA  387 

generation  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  regime  of 
Abdul  Hamid  converted  this  inevitable  tendency 
towards  official  partiality  into  a  deliberate  policy  of 
inflaming  a  racial  feud,  and  destroying  the  Armenian 
nationality  in  the  confl^ration*  The  Kurdish  chiefe 
were  decorated  with  Ottoman  military  rank,  and  their 
retainers  enrolled  as  Ottoman  irregular  troops*  Rifles 
were  distributed  to  these  **  regiments  **  in  abundance, 
while  the  Armenian  population  was  prohibited  under 
the  severest  penalties  from  carrying  arms*  Then  the 
Kurds  were  let  loose  on  the  Armenians,  as  the  Alba- 
nians were  let  loose  on  the  Serbs  in  the  valley  of  the 
White  Drin*  Village  after  village  of  native  peasants  has 
been  laid  desolate,  that  the  intrusive  Kurd  may  pitch 
his  tents  and  pasture  his  flocks  over  the  abandoned 
fields  :  the  concerted  massacres  which  have  shocked  us 
from  time  to  time,  are  merely  accentuations  of  a  steadily 
pushed  process,  which  is  successfully  annihilating  the 
most  civilised  and  industrious  race  in  Western  Asia,  and 
replacing  it  by  the  most  idle,  squalid  and  unruly* 

The  Armenian  Dispersion  lavishes  its  wealth  in 
building  schools,  supporting  refugees,  and  stemming 
^erever  it  can  the  tide  of  destruction,  but  it  is  powerless 
against  the  brute  force  of  Turkish  government  in  posses- 
sion* The  situation  is  even  worse  tmder  the  new 
regime  than  under  the  old,  for  the  administration  cannot 
easily  recall  rifles  recklessly  delivered  into  Kurdish 
hands,  even  if  it  has  the  yNiXL  to  do  so,  while  Young 
Turkish  diauvinism  looks  askance  at  the  Armenians' 
success,  and  contemplates  their  disappearance  with 
satisnction* 

The  civilised  World  cannot  zSord  to  let  these  out« 
n^es  continue,  and  if  the  two  Central  European  powers 
that  have  so  far  secured  Turkey  impunity  are  defeated 


388      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

in  the  present  war»  the  whole  territory  where  this  state 
of  things  prevails  must  be  severed  firom  the  Turkish 
Empire  at  once* 

The  true  solution  of  the  Armenian  question  is  for- 
tunately not  difficult  to  discern*  There  is  no  possi- 
bility yet  of  national  self-government :  the  Armenian 
peasantry  constitutes  only  one  half  of  the  population 
in  this  region,  it  is  defenceless,  and  it  is  crushed  by 
persecution*  The  first  requisite  is  efficient  govern- 
ment, inexorably  just  and  irresistibly  strong,  which  will 
carry  out  the  serious  military  task  of  disarming  and 
pacifying  the  Kurds,  and  proceed  to  establish  law-and- 
order  throughout  the  land*  Under  the  shadow  of  sudi 
a  government  both  races  would  for  the  first  time  be 
free  to  increase,  multiply,  and  inherit  this  portion  of 
the  earth,  according  to  their  respective  talents  and 
capacities* 

**  Strong  govenmient  **  of  just  the  kind  required 
exists  already  immediately  across  the  frontier,  and 
a  large  section  of  the  Armenian  population  has  long 
prospered  tmder  it  It  has  been  the  fashion  in 
England  to  depreciate  the  Russian  administration  in 
the  Caucasus*  **  It  was  imposed,'^  we  say,  **  by  re- 
lentless warfare  against  small  native  mountain  tribes 
struggling  for  their  freedom,  and  this  sacrifice  of  blood 
has  not  been  justified  by  its  results*  On  the  one  hand 
order  is  far  from  being  perfectly  established  (we  re- 
member the  racial  riots  between  Armenians  and  Tatars 
at  Baku  in  1904-5),^  and  on  the  other  hand  the  national 
development,  not  only  of  savage  mountaineers,  but  of 
civilised  Georgians  and  Armenians,  has  been  stifled 

^  Though  they  are  mot  a  fair  exainple  to  cite,  itiioe  they  were  due  to 
the  transitory  phase  of  anarchy  which  swept  during  these  years  over 
the  whole  Russian  Empire,  while  agauist  them  must  be  set  many  decades 
of  continuously  efficient  admihistnitiQn* 


ARMENIA  389 

with  a  heavy  hancL^^  But  we  have  only  to  look  at  our 
own  **  North-West  Frontier  **  in  India  to  see  that 
Russians  work  in  the  Caucasus  has  been  the  most 
brilliant  ttiumph  of  pacification  in  the  nineteenth 
century* 

The  British  advance  has  stopped  short  at  the  outer 
spurs  of  the  Hindu  Kush*  We  have  debarred  the  hill- 
tribes  from  makix^  a  Uvelihood  by  raiding  the  Plains, 
and  subsidised  them  in  compensation  for  their  loss; 
we  enforce  peace  upon  the  road  over  the  Khyber  Pass, 
fay  which  trade  passes  from  India  to  Kabul—and  that 
is  all,  though  those  who  have  experience  rightly  account 
it  much*  But  Russia  has  boldly  penetrated  to  the 
Caucasus'  heart,  cut  her  military  trails  through  its  forest 
slopes,  and  built  her  post  road  over  its  central  pass  of 
Dariel  from  rail-head  at  Vladivkavkas  to  another  rail 
at  Tiflisy  where  the  Transcaucasian  line  passes  on  its 
way  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Caspian*  Then  she  has 
cxmnected  these  two  railway  systems  by  a  new  line 
skirting  the  Caspian  coast,  and  turning  the  range's 
Eastern  flank*  Above  all,  and  through  all,  she  has 
opened  up  the  material  resources  of  the  whole  territory 
to  economic  exploitation* 

It  is  true  that  Russia's  Armenian  subjects  have 
sufEered,  like  the  other  national  minorities  in  the 
Empire,  from  her  mistaken  policy  of  repression* 
Just  as  the  Poles  found  the  efficiency  of  ad- 
vanced Prussia  more  terrible  than  the  slackness  of 
backward  Russia,  the  Russian  poUce  in  turn  pressed 
more  hardly  than  the  paralytic  Turkish  administra- 
tion upon  Armenian  nationalism*  Twenty  years  ago, 
and  again  for  a  moment  when  the  Turldsh  Revolu- 
tion kindled  so  many  hopes,  there  were  Armenians 
who  planned  a  national  unification  within  a  Turkey 


3^      THB  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

deceatcalised  after  enlargement  at  the  ea^ense  of 
the  Russian  frontier;  but,  as  in  Thrace,  the  Tuiis 
themselves  have  eflTectually  shattered  such  ddusions, 
and  there  is  not  an  Armenian  now  in  the  Turkish 
provinces  who  does  not  pray  for  the  coming  of  Russia. 

Btrhmiadrin,  the  ecclesiastical  cs^ital  of  the  nation, 
is  already  in  Russian  territory,  and  even  wbUt 
Armenian  political  ideah'sm  still  had  a  Turkish  orieata- 
tion,  the  actual  political  centre  of  gravity  was  auto- 
matically shifting  across  the  frontier*  The  Armenian 
husbandman,  ^en  the  barrenness  of  the  mountains 
and  the  ferociousness  of  the  Kurds  drive  him  to  seek 
his  fortune  abroad,  naturally  gravitates  to  the  most 
favourable  market  for  his  enei^es*  He  has  found  it  in 
Russian  Caucasia,  and  this  is  the  best  testimony  of  all 
to  the  virtue  of  Russian  rule*  Tiflis,  the  ancient 
capital  of  the  Georgian  nation,  has  become  practically 
an  Armenian  city,  boasting  almost  as  large  an  Armenian 
colony  as  Constantinople,  while  the  population  of  the 
native  Armenian  districts  on  the  Rtissian  side  of  the 
frontier  is  now  about  a  quarter  as  lai^e  again  as  the 
Armenian  population  in  the  Turkish  provinces  East 
of  the  Euphrates  and  North  of  the  Tigris,  though  it 
occupies  a  territory  of  less  than  half  this  area*^ 

We  must,  therefore,  attempt  to  hrixig  within  the 
Russian  frontier  all  Turkish  territory  where  the  funda- 
mental population  is  Armenian,  and  where  this  popular 
tion's  prosperity  is  being  mined  by  the  lq[alised 
aggression  of  the  Kurds* 

^  Annenian  populatioa  in  Tiflis xSSfOoo 

Armenian  population  in  Constantinople  •        .     xoz^ooo 

Armenian  population  in  Russian  provinces  Akfaaltsik^ 

Kars^  Alocandropol,  Erivan^  Nacfaitcfaevan,  Shusa      •     75o/x)0 
Armenian  population  in  Turkish  teiiitofy  within  limits 


ARMENIA  391 

This  territorial  settlement  ^  of  the  national  question 
must  take  due  account  of  the  geographical  factor,  and 
it  would  begin  by  assigning  Trebizond  to  the  Russian 
Empire,  because  a  great  caravan  route  starts  from  that 
port  across  the  mountains  through  Baiburt  to  Er^roum 
in  the  Armenian  interior*  The  Lazic  population  of 
the  coast  strip,  though  it  is  not  itself  Armenian,  is 
not  Turkish  either,  but  akin  to  the  Georgians  of 
the  Caucasus*'  The  frontier  should  accordingly  start 
from  Tireboli  on  the  South  coast  of  the  Black  Sea  West 
of  Trebizond,  and  run  due  South,  excluding  Karahissar 
to  the  West,  till  it  strikes  the  upper  reach  of  the  Kara  Su 
C' Western  Euphrates  *')  at  a  point  below  Endngan. 
Thence  it  should  follow  fhe  course  of  the  Euphrates 
Southwards,  as  far  as  Telek,  where  the  river  hits  the 
Tatirus  range  running  East  and  West,  and  slashes  its 
way  through  fhe  mountain  barrier  in  a  long,  tortuous 
gorge,  impassable  for  human  traflic* 

The  Armenian  race  is  not  confined  to  the  Eastern 
bank  of  the  Euphrates*  When  the  Turkish  avalanche 
from  Central  Asia  shattered  the  old  kingdom  of 
Armenia  in  the  eleventh  century  A.D*,  a  considerable 
fragment  of  the  nation  migrated  across  the  river  and 
beyond  the  open  plateau  of  Malatia  to  the  broken  ribs 
of  Taurus  further  West,  where  the  Sihun  (Sarus)  and 
Jihun  (Pyramus)  come  down  Southwards  between 
parallel  mountain-lines  to  the  plain  of  Adana  and  the 
sea*  Here  they  founded  a  kingdom  of  Little  Armenia, 
^vbidi  threw  in  its  lot  with  the  Latin  principalities 
carved  out  by  the  first  Crusade,  and  took  its  full  share 
in  the  losing  battle  against  the  returning  tide  of  Uam. 

>  See  Map  VL 

*  Diitcreuce  of  religjoOy  however,  prevents  Laze  and  Geoffian  €roai 
sharing  a  coounon  nat&mal  conaciomncas.    The  Latcs  are  Modon* 


392      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

All  the  Ghrisdan  states  alike  were  extinguished  in 
the  fourteenth  century,  but  the  population  did  not  perish 
with  the  kingdom,  and  the  Armenians  have  hdd  tbeir 
ground  to  this  day  in  their  second  home*  They  have, 
moreover,  been  reinforced  by  that  more  recent  eaqiansion 
from  the  original  motherland,  which  has  not  aflEected 
this  South-Eastern  comer  of  Anatolia  alone,  but  has 
endowed  the  urban  centres  throt^out  the  whole 
Eastern  half  of  the  peninsula  with  strong  Armenian 
colonies* 

Yet  in  spite  of  their  vigour  and  their  increasing 
numbers,  the  Armenians  have  not  made  Eastern 
Anatolia  their  own*  The  Turkish  substratum  remaim 
the  preponderant  element  West  of  Euphrates,  as  the 
Armenian  East  of  the  river,  and  though  the  memory  of 
the  terrible  Adana  massacres,  perpetrated  under  the 
Young  Turkish  regime  in  1909,^  will  cause  us  to  take 
the  most  stringent  precautions  for  safeguarding  the 
Armenian  nationality  in  the  territories  left  under  Turkish 
government,  it  must  not  blind  us  to  the  actual  numlkrical 
proportion  between  the  two  races  in  this  region*  Bxcqyt 
where  professional  brigands  are  subsidised  for  the  tas^ 
like  the  Kurds  across  the  river,  it  is  only  very  weak 
minorities  that  suffer  massacre:  what  tempted  the 
Turkish  masses  to  the  crime,  and  justified  it  in  their 
own  eyes,  was  the  sense  that  they  were  in  an  immense 
majority,  and  the  hope  that  one  determined  stroke  of 
brute  violence  might  rid  them  altogether  of  these  hated, 
progressive,  alien  tares  in  their  uniform  Moslem  fiekL 
In  execrating  their  action,  we  must  not  forget  that  the 
facts  on  which  they  based  it  remain  roughly  true* 

Having  reached  the  goq;e  of  Telek,  the  new  frontkr 
should  leave  the  Left  bank  of  the  Euphrates,  and  proceed 

*  Len  than  a  year  after  the  proclamation  of  the  Constttutioa. 


ARMENIA  393 

fiist  North  and  then  East  along  the  watershed  between 
the  Murad  Su  (''  Eastern  Euphrates  '0  ^^^  the  upper 
Tigris,  formed  by  a  ridge  of  Taurus  aknost  overhanging 
the  former  stream,  to  a  point  immediately  South  of 
Mush.  Here  it  should  abandon  the  ridge,  and  turn 
through  a  complete  right  angle,  taking  a  course  due 
South  alot^  a  line  West  of  the  Bitlis-Sert  road,  till  it 
strikes  the  Left  bank  of  the  upper  Tigris.  After  reach- 
ing the  Tigris,  it  should  follow  its  course  Eastward, 
past  the  junction  of  the  Sert  River  (**  Eastern  Tigris  '') 
from  the  North,  to  the  point  where  the  united  stream 
turns  abruptly  South -East,  and  enters  the  gorge 
between  the  Tor-Abdin  and  Judi  Dagh  ranges. 

South-East  of  the  basin  of  Lake  Van  and  the  course 
of  the  Sert  River  the  Armenian  element  does  not 
extend,  and  its  limit  coincides  with  the  transition  from 
the  Anatolian  plateau  to  the  Zagros  system,  of  which 
the  Judi  Dagh  is  the  most  North-Westerly  spur.  The 
Armenians  are  here  replaced  by  another  Christian 
popubtion,  of  di£Ferent  race  and  sect,  the  **  Chaldaeans  ** 
or  **  Assyrians/* 

These  are  descended,  as  their  name  implies,  from 
the  earlier  stratum  of  Semitic  population  in  the 
lower  basin  of  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates*  G>n- 
verted  to  the  Nestorian  form  of  Christianity  in  the 
fifth  and  sixth  centuries  A  j)«  by  missionary  propaganda 
from  Edessa,  they  survived  the  oppression  of  the 
fanatically  Zoroastrian  Sassanid  dynasty,  and 
under  the  benevolent  protection  of  the 
Abbasid  Caliphate  of  Bagdad*  This  era  of  pros- 
perity was  broken  in  the  thirteenth  century  by  the 
terrible  Mongol  invasions,  which  ruined  Arabic 
culture*  When  Bagdad  was  sacked,  the  Christians 
fled  to  the  fastnesses  of  Zagros  which  look  down  upon 


394      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 


the  Meaq;)oCaintan  plain^  and  the  seat  of  their  patriardi ' 
has  been  established  sinoe  then  at  Julamerk^  on  the 
highest  teach  of  the  Greater  Zab*  Most  of  the  refugees, 
however^  have  not  tarried  on  the  Western  slope  of  the 
mountains,  but  have  crossed  the  watershed  into  the 
Urumia  basint  where  they  form  the  exclusive  populatkm 
of  a  coxap^ct  district  on  the  West  shore  of  the  lake* 
Latterly  the  Chaldaeans  have  been  exposed  even  more 
cruelly  than  the  Armenians  to  Kurdish  barbarity,  and 
about  half  their  villages  on  Lake  Urumia  have  abandoned 
their  allegiance  to  the  patriarch  at  Julamerkr  and 
accepted  the  Orthodox  creed,  in  order  to  secure  the 
protection  of  Russia*  The  inauguration  of  Russian 
^  strong  government  '*  is  in  fact  as  essential  to  the 
survival  of  the  Chaldaeans  as  it  is  to  that  of  the  Armenians, 
and  the  only  solution  is  to  include  within  the  Russian 
frontier  the  whole  area  inhabited  by  this  race,  in  addition 
to  the  Armenian  plateau. 

The  distribution  of  the  Chaldaeans,  however,  oom- 
pletely  cuts  across  existing  political  divisions.  While 
Julamerk  is  in  Ottoman  territory,  the  Urumia  basin, 
the  nation's  centre  of  gravity,  belongs  to  Persia,  and 
the  Turco-Persian  frontier  follows  the  summit  of  the 
Zagros  range*  If,  then,  the  whole  Chaldaean  nation  is 
to  be  united  under  Russia's  aegis,  the  Russian  frontier 
will  have  to  be  advanced  at  the  expense  of  Persia,  as 
well  as  at  the  expense  of  Turkey* 

Fortunately,  there  is  no  obstacle  to  this,  for  Azer- 
the  North-Westernmost  province  of  Persia, 
^iriiich  the  Urumia  basin  lies,  has  no  national 
connection  with  the  state  in  which  it  is  at  present' 

^Ukt  the  Armenian  Katholikot  at  Btchmiadztn,  he  is  the  political 
as  well  as  the  reli^fious  head  of  the  nation. 

"During  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  it  several  nmes 
dUMged  hinds  between  Persia  and  Turkey. 


ARMENIA  395 

poltticaliy  incorporated*  While  the  Chaldatans  occupy 
the  Western  side  of  the  lake,  the  valleys  that  drain  into 
it  from  the  East,  one  of  which  contains  the  important 
town  of  Tabriz*  are  inhabited  by  an  equally  compact 
population  of  Tatars,  who  were  deposited  there  by  the 
Mot^ol  dominion  of  the  fourteenth  century,  and  speak 
a  variety  of  the  wide-spread  Turkish  tongue*  lliese 
have  as  little  sympathy  as  the  Chaldaeans  with  their 
Persian  masters  on  the  South,  whose  Iranian  language 
they  do  not  understand,  and  whose  Shiah  heresy  they 
detest.  All  their  links  are  Northward,  towards  the 
valley  of  the  Aras,  whence  the  railway  is  coming  to 
Tabriz  from  the  present  Russian  railhead  at  Julfa,  and 
towards  the  broad  steppes  that  fill  the  lower  basin  of  the 
river  as  far  as  Baku  on  the  Caspian  coast,  where  half 
their  race  is  already  living  contentedly  under  Russian 
rule*  The  ^ole  population  of  the  province  appreciates 
the  **  strong  government  "  and  the  economic  progress 
vfbidi  the  de  facto  Russian  occupation  ^  has  begun  to 
give  them,  and  it  would  still  further  foster  the  advance 
of  civilisation  here  if  the  gift  were  assured  by  the  formal 
annexation  of  Azerbaijan  to  the  Russian  Empire* 

At  the  gorge  between  the  Tor-Abdin  and  Judi  Dagh 
ranges,  the  new  Russian  frontier  should  leave  the  course 
of  the  Tigris,  and  proceed  Eastward  again  along  the 
summit  of  the  Judi  Dagh,  cross  the  Greater  Zab  below 
Julamerk,  where  it  makes  an  abrupt  bend  from  a 
South  -  Westerly  to  a  South  -  Easterly  direction,  and 
continue  Eastward  along  the  Giaour  Dagh,  till  it  strikes 
the  present  Turco*Persian  frontier  at  a  point  on  the 
same  parallel  as  the  South  end  of  Lake  Urumia*    After 

>  Stfice  I909»  when  the  anarchy  of  the  Penian  Revolutictti  led  Russia 
to  send  a  mce  across  the  frontier  into  Azerbaijan,  where  the  situation 
specuiily  acute* 


996      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

crosao^  the  eaasdng  frontier-line  it  should  run  South- 
East^  excluding  the  whole  basin  of  the  Lesser  Zab. 
When  it  reaches  the  thirty-sixth  parallel,  it  should  turn 
due  Eastward  along  the  latter,  till  it  hits  the  headrwaters 
of  the  River  Kisil  Usun,  ^ose  course  it  should  follow 
down  continuously  to  its  most  Northerly  point.  Here, 
where  the  river  turns  at  a  sharp  angle  to  the  South- 
East,  the  frontier  should  break  away  again  on  a  North- 
Easterly  course  of  its  own,  and  maintain  it  till  it  hits 
the  present  Russo-Persian  frontier  a  few  miles  before 
its  terminus  at  Astara  on  the  Caspian  Sea. 

The  rectification  of  frontier  we  have  just  sketched 
out  to  Russia's  profit  and  to  Turkey's  and  Persia's  loss, 
is  unimpeachable  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  territories 
and  populations  immediately  concerned* 

(u)  It  transfers  nationalities,  iii^ch,  owing  to  their 
geographical  interlacement  and  to  the  lawlessness  wfaidi 
it  stimulates,  are  in  any  case  incapable  for  the  present 
of  governing  themselves,  from  a  vicious  inconqietent 
government  whose  only  policy  is  to  foster  anardiy  by 
encours^ng  the  inferior  elements  to  exterminate  tbe 
higher,  to  a  civilised  ''  stroi^  government  "  yAiidi  has 
already  dealt  successfully  in  the  Caucasus  with  a  similar 
problem  of  even  more  serious  dimensions*  Ths 
government,  if  we  place  it  in  control,  will  use  its  ex- 
perience to  secure  the  most  enterprising,  receptive  and 
industrious  races  in  the  region  from  artificial  reprcssico 
by  brute  force* 

After  a  few  generations  of  good  government,  the 
Armenian  peasant  will  have  outstripped  the  Kurdish 
shepherd  entirely,  not  by  another  abuse  of  oflfidal 
favouritism,  but  by  his  innate  superior  qualities*  Every 
patch  of  soil  will  have  been  brought  tmder  cultivatioii  is 
the  valley  bottoms  and  on  the  terraced  moimtain-slopei 


ARMENIA  397 

of  tke  plateau,  and  the  flocks  of  the  nomad  will  have  been 
pushed  up  into  the  high  bleak  hills,  where  vine  and 
cereal  can  no  longer  compete  with  them*  The  popula- 
tion will  have  rapidly  increased,  and  the  growth  will  be 
to  the  account  of  the  Armenian  and  not  of  the  Kurdish 
section,  because  it  will  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  ^;ri- 
cultural  development  of  the  cotmtry*  In  the  cruel 
winters  the  Kurd  will  be  glad  to  descend  from  his 
mountain  wilderness  and  harbour  his  sheep  and  goats  in 
the  comfortable  Armenian  village  below*  His  children 
wiU  frequent  the  local  school  (the  Armenians  may  be 
trusted  to  establish  a  school  in  every  hamlet),  learn  the 
Armenian  language,  and  adopt  in  time,  if  they  have  the 
ability,  the  Armenian  way  of  life*  Like  the  Romance- 
speaking  Vlach  shepherds  in  modem  Greece,  the 
Kurdish  dans  will  be  absorbed  in  the  Armenian  nation, 
and  ¥dule  advancing  in  individual  prosperity  with  the 
advance  of  the  whole  country,  will  sink  to  the  relative 
position  they  deserve*  They  will  cease  to  be  a  dominant 
race,  and  lend  their  name  instead  to  a  subordinate 
economic  dass* 

When  this  stage  has  been  reached,  the  national 
problem  will  have  been  solved*  Armenia  will  be  ripe 
to  enter  the  phase  of "'  Home  Rule,*'  and  take  her  place 
beside  Poland  and  Finland  as  one  of  the  self-governing 
members  of  the  Russian  Imperial  Federation* 

(ii*)  Besides  securing  the  Armenians  their  spiritual 
birthright,  the  proposed  frontier  has  an  economic 
jtistification*  It  dosdy  follows  the  **  divide  **  between 
the  commerce  that  flows  to  the  Black  Sea  and  Caspian 
ports  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  which  goes  down  to  the 
Gulf  of  Iskanderun  and  the  Persian  Gulf  on  the  other* 
This  will  become  apparent  when  Western  Asia  has  been 
better  equipped  with  railways  than  it  is  at  present*    As 


398      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 


omstniction  prooeedst  the  frontier  mil  be  found  to 
mark  a  boundary  between  independent  systems,  that 
will  only  be  crossed  at  a  few  points  by  trunk  lines. 

In  spite,  however,  of  these  undeniable  merits,  any 
proposal  for  such  an  extension  of  the  Russian  frontier 
will  meet  with  a  storm  of  protest  from  at  least  two 
quarters* 

(i.)  Russophobes  in  Great  Britain  will  have  taken 
alarm  already  at  the  idea  of  ejecting  the  Ottoman 
Government  from  the  Black  Sea  Straits,  and  this 
second  scheme  for  docking  Turkey  on  her  Eastern 
frontier  as  well,  and  installing  Russia  in  full  possession 
of  the  Armem'an  plateau,  will  put  the  last  touch  to  their 
fears.  **  How,'*  they  will  ask,  **  can  we  expect  Turkey 
to  act  any  longer  as  the  bulwark  of  our  Mediterranean 
route  to  India,  if  we  wilfully  break  her  strength<^' 

It  will  be  sufficient  for  the  moment  to  take  these 
critics  entirely  on  their  own  ground,  and  reply  that,  from 
the  strategic^  point  of  view,  size  of  territory  is  not  die 
ultimate  criterion  of  strengdi.  It  is  true  that  we  shaD 
have  advanced  the  Russian  frontier  half  the  distance 
from  Kars  to  Iskanderun,  but  the  other  half  still 
remains,  and  Turkey,  rid  of  her  ulcers  by  the  surgeon's 
knife  and  enabled  to  devote  all  her  strength  to  building 
up  her  internal  health,  will  erect  a  more  formidaUe 
barrier  in  this  comparatively  narrow  strip  of  native 
territory,  than  if  she  pushed  a  precarious,  eiduusting 
domination  over  intractable  alien  populations  as  far  as 
the  very  summit  of  the  Caucasus. 

(ii*)  We  have  a  mudi  more  serious  opponent  to  con- 
vince in  Panislamism,  which,  so  far  as  it  concerns  us,  is 
the  public  opinion  of  the  Moslem  community  in  India. 


PANISLAMISM  399 


C*  Panislamism 

The  Indian  Moslems  have  developed  in  latter  years 
a  strong  self-consciousness*  Unlike  most  Moham- 
medan populations,  they  are  in  the  position  of  a  minority* 
The  Hindu  and  Tamil  mass  threatens  more  and  more  to 
engulf  them,  and  in  face  of  this  danger  they  have  put 
their  trust  in  British  rule*  They  have  devoted  them- 
selves loyally  to  the  support  of  our  **  strong  government " 
in  India,  and  adopted  our  ideal  for  the  future  of  the 
**  Indian  Empire/^  With  the  increase  of  education 
among  themselves,  and  of  means  of  communication 
throughout  the  world,  their  interest  has  extended 
beyond  the  limits  of  India  to  international  politics,  and 
has  natturally  concentrated  on  the  fortunes  of  Islam  in 
other  parts  of  the  world* 

The  spectacle  that  meets  their  eyes  is  melancholy* 
Everywhere  Islam  is  receding  and  Europe  triumphant. 
The  battle  for  the  penetration  and  possession  of  Central 
Africa  has  been  fought  out  between  them  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  to  Islam's  loss*  The  lAiolt  continent 
is  now  partitioned  among  European  powers,  and  even 
the  ancient  seats  of  Moslem  civilisation  along  the 
Mediterranean  coast  have  passed  under  European 
suzerainty,  from  Egypt  to  Morocco*  In  Central  Aria, 
during  the  same  period,  Russia,  which  once  obeyed 
the  Tatar  Khans  on  the  Volga,  has  subjected  the  last 
independent  Khanates  along  the  Ozus,  and  bridled 
the  freedom  of  the  desert  Turkomans* 

As  they  survey  the  Moslem  World,  the  Ottoman 
Empire  seems  to  them  the  only  exception  to  the  general 
dMkle.  It  akme,  in  the  &ce  of  all  Europe,  preserves 
the  old  tradition  that  the  Moslem  is  marked  out  by  Gpd 


400      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 


to  be  ruler,  and  fhe  Christian  to  be  his  slave ;  and  wfaat 
is  more  important  still  to  an  orthodox  Indian  Sanm, 
cut  off  from  his  fellow-believers  by  a  ring  of  headien 
Sikhs  and  Hindus,  and  of  heretical  Persians,  the  Otto- 
man state  is  the  guardian  of  the  holy  cities  of  Islain, 
and  the  Ottoman  sultan,  by  Itgai  inheritance,  the 
official  head  of  the  whole  Faith. 

The  grandeur  of  Turkey  gives  a  concrete  embodiment 
to  the  Indian  Moslems^  sentiment.  They  feel  them- 
selves to  be  a  strong  community,  they  have  deserved 
well  of  the  British  Empire,  and  in  return  they  jusdy 
claim  the  right  to  make  their  voice  heard  in  its  counsek. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  they  will  exert  their  influence  in 
favour  of  the  Ottoman  Government's  point  of  view,  and 
uncompromisingly  resist  any  proposal  to  interfere  with 
the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  &npire  as  it  stands  at 
present* 

We  cannot  neglect  this  attitude  of  Panislamism  in 
India.  We  must  examine  the  ideals  that  underlie  it, 
and  the  view  of  existing  facts  on  which  it  is  based ;  and 
if  we  conclude  that  these  ideals  will  not  be  realised 
by  the  programme  of  supporting  the  present  Turkish 
regime,  because  the  real  situation  in  Turkey  does  not 
correspond  to  the  facts  presupposed,  we  must  franUy 
declare  our  belief.  We  must  try  to  convince  Panis- 
lamism of  its  error  by  argument,  just  as  we  have  grappled 
before  with  the  attitude  of  Germany,  or  with  the  Dual 
Monarchy's  reason  ffitre. 

The  real  desire  of  Panislamism  is  that  the  BXoslem 
populations  which  have  so  far  preserved  their  inde- 
pendence from  Christian  dominion  should  not  suc- 
cumb to  the  fate  of  the  majority,  but  should  on  the 
contrary  so  develop  their  material  resources  by  economic 
enterprise,  and  their  spiritual  wealth  by  educatioa,  as 


PANISLAMISM  40X 

to  nise  themselves  to  a  footing  of  equality  with  the 
Euiopean  nations^  and  prove  to  the  world  that  now  once 
more,  as  a  thousand  years  ago,  Islam  has  an  indis- 
pensable part  to  play  in  the  advancement  of  civilisation* 

This  is  a  noble  ideal*  It  is  the  vision  of  a  national 
regeneration  in  every  sphere  of  human  life,  and 
because  of  its  very  universality,  it  includes  as  an 
incidental  element  the  object  of  the  British  Rtissophobe* 
The  latter,  starting  from  the  selfish  standpoint  of 
''  British  interests,^'  is  led  to  demand  that  **  some  power 
with  the  mihtary  capacity  to  protect  its  own  frontiers  ** 
shall  interpose  itself  permanently  between  the  Russian 
Empire  and  the  Mediterranean :  the  Panislamic  hope 
of  a  Tturkey  renewed  in  every  limb  fulfils  and  transcends 
this  narrow,  negative  stipulation*  Panislamism  and 
Russophobia  show  signs  of  making  a  strange  oppor- 
tunist alliance  for  the  furtherance  of  their  incom- 
mensurate aims,  and  we  can  answer  them  both  in  a 
single  disputation*  If  the  doubts  of  the  Panislamist  are 
set  at  rest,  his  British  ally  may  depart  assured  that  his 
own  qualms  are  thereby  satisfied* 

We  first  reply  to  Panislamism  that  the  policy  of  die 
present  **  Young  Turkish ''  regime  is  a  mistake*  Like 
the  chauvinism  of  Berlin  and  Buda  Pest,  it  is  the  obses- 
sion of  a  clique,  not  the  interest  of  the  people ;  and  now 
that  it  has  been  given  rein,  it  will  carry  the  last  inde- 
pendent Moslem  state  into  the  same  irreparable  disaster 
into  which  the  Central  European  Empires  are  being 
plunged  by  the  present  war« 

The  Turkish  Govermnent  still  rules  Christian  sub- 
jects, Greeks  in  Thrace  and  Armenians  East  of 
Eiqphrates*  If  this  really  ministers  to  the  Indian 
Moslem's  pride,  it  is  a  condemnation  of  his  political 
judgment  rather  than  of  his  political  morality,  for  the 


402      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

opptfwon  of  Greek  and  Armenian  is  almoit  out- 
balanced by  the  su£Fering  of  the  Moslem  peasant  on 
whom  falls  the  burden  of  holding  them  down  by  fioioe. 

Turkey  has  only  half  the  population  ^  of  the  smallest 
of  the  six  Ettfopean  powers ;  she  is  infinitely  poorer 
than  any  of  them,  in  eoonomic  and  social  development 
incomparably  more  backward ;  yet  no  European  state 
exacts  such  a  heavy  blood  tax  from  its  citizens  as  Turkey, 
whose  people  can  least  afiford  it*  The  length  of  service, 
both  with  the  colours  in  youth  and  with  the  varknis 
classes  of  reserve  in  later  life,  is  in  excess  of  most  other 
conscript  armies,*  and  mobilisation  is  far  more  frequent* 
On  a  partial  scale,  to  combat  the  never  outwearied  unrest 
of  the  subject  poptUadons,  it  is  practically  chronic^  and  it 
occurs  on  the  grand  scale  whenever  the  breath  of  war 
begins  to  blow  in  Europe,  even  when,  as  in  the  pcesent 
crisis,  the  interests  involved  do  not  naturally  afifect  the 
Turkish  people  at  all.  This  lu^pens  because  the  sub- 
ject populations  are  ever  ready  for  the  final  war  of 
liberation,  and  because  the  neighbouring  states  are 
always  waiting  for  the  opportunity  to  assist  them*  They 
know  too  well  the  Turkish  government's  incurable 
policy  of  adventure,  which  will  not  face  acconqrftshed 
facts,  but  still  dreams  of  recovering  Mitylene  and  Khios, 
and  perhaps  of  re-entering  Sabnika* 

Supposing  that,  through  the  tritmiph  of  the  Central 
European  powers,  the  Porte  were  to  recover  all  the 

*  No  exact  statistics  have  ever  been  taken,  but  since  the  territonal 
losses  of  Z9za-z3  the  numbers  cannot  much  exceed  ao,ooo,ooo. 

*  The  terms  of  compulsory  service  for  the  infantry  are  as  follows : 

Active  service  with  the  colours       «  .3  years. 

Active  service  in  the  reserve  •    6    ^^ 

Landwefar  service g    „ 

Landsturm  service 2    ^ 


Total  service  (from  aoth  to  40th  year  of  age)  ao 


9P 


PANISLAMISM  403 

territories  it  held  in  Europe  before  the  Autunm  of  X9Z2# 
this  success  would  bring  the  Turkish  peasant  nothing  but 
added  misery*  For  him  it  would  be  a  shouldering  of 
cast*o£F  burdens  :  he  would  once  more  spend  years  of 
hts  life  garrisoning  Macedonia  far  away  £rom  his  family 
and  his  Anatolian  farm,  to  perish  at  last  most  probably 
in  some  futile  summer  campaign  to  **  Ottomanise  ""  the 
untamable  Albanians*  The  Turkish  peasant  is  dumb : 
he  has  no  education  or  cohesion,  and  therefore  no  public 
opinion :  but  if  he  could  give  expression  to  his  will  in  a 
plebiscite,  he  would  vote  for  being  left  in  peace,  and  ask 
for  some  government  which  would  not  herd  his  folk  out 
oi  their  villages  in  thousands,  and  send  them  .without 
commissariat,  muziitions  of  war,  or  medical  succour,  to 
perish  in  the  deserts  of  Tripoli  or  on  the  stricken  field  of 
Luk  Burgas*  Since  he  is  too  inarticulate  to  express 
this,  it  is  surely  the  mission  of  Panislamism,  which  has 
the  ear  of  the  civilised  world  and  knows  how  to  address 
itself  to  it,  to  speak  for  him  and  save  him  from  his  own 
government,  instead  of  encouraging  that  government 
to  exploit  him  to  the  detriment  of  his  neighbours,  and 
the  danger  of  the  general  peace* 

The  Porte  claims  the  Indian  Moslem's  allegiance  as 
the  protector  of  the  Holy  Cities*  But  here  again  let 
him  try  his  religious  sentiment  in  the  fire  of  reality,  and 
imaiffnt  himself  in  the  place  of  the  unhappy  Turkish 
conscript,  transported  £rom  his  temperate  upland  home 
in  Anatolia  to  the  military  posts  along  that  tropical 
volcanic  plateau  of  **  Stony  Arabia ''  over  which  the 
Hejaz  railway  runs  from  Damascus  to  Medina,  or 
worse  still,  dispatched  by  troop-ship  down  the  Red  Sea 
to  the  terrible,  interminable  Yemen  campaign  from 
which  no  soldier  ever  returns ;  or  let  him  think  of  the 
Yemeni  Arab  himself*    Heir  to  an  archaic  civilisation. 


404      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

isolated  to  an  unparalleled  degree  by  the  deserts,  he 
IS  not  normally  afiEected  for  good  or  evil  by  the  rise 
and  fall  of  world-empires ;  but  now  he  is  desperately 
at  bay  against  the  brutal,  meaningless  aggression  of 
Turk^  Imperialism,  which  has  no  better  gift  for  him 
than  for  the  Armenian  or  the  Greek* 

The  Indian  Moslem  is  misled  by  his  own  eacperienoe. 
In  India  Islam  is  a  nationality*  Its  professors  may  have 
been  Arab,  Persian,  Afghan  or  Mogul  when  they  came 
as  oonquerors  to  the  oountry,  yet  now  they  are  ooe 
blood,  bound  together  by  the  common  menace  of  Hindu 
race-hatred*  Conditions  are  different  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire*  The  menace  of  the  Unbeliever  is  here  imper- 
fecdy  realised,  and  national  antagonisms  find  an  arena 
within  the  **  Bulwark  of  Islam*^'  Otur  educated  Indian 
Panislamist  should  talk  to  an  educated  Panarab  from 
Egypt,  if  he  wishes  to  discover  how  Moslems  of  Arab 
speech  feel  towards  the  political  ambitions  of  their 
Turkish  co-religionists* 

The  Egyptian  will  agree  with  the  Indian  emphatically^ 
that  the  rule  of  the  European  is  a  humiliation  for  Islam, 
and  that  British  administration,  however  beneficial  or 
even  necessary  it  may  be  for  the  moment,^  must  be  no 
more  than  a  transitory  phase  in  the  long  history  of 
Egypt  and  India ;  but  he  will  tell  him  that  he  has  e^>eri- 
enced  one  thing  worse  than  British  occupation,  and  diat 
was  the  tyranny  of  the  Turkish  official  class,  which 
Great  Britain  ended  just  a  generation  ago*  ''  It  is 
only  when  I  think  what  we  su£Fered  from  the  Turk," 
he  will  conclude,  **  that  I  can  find  it  in  my  heart  to 
tolerate  his  British  successor*'' 

The  founder  of  Islam  was  an  Arab*    He  wrote  his 

*  Though,  except  for  the  work  of  the  irrigation  engineers,  he  will  bt?e 
much  less  good  to  say  of  it  than  the  Indian. 


PANISLAMISM  405 

Book  in  his  native  toi^ue,  and  his  nation  carried  the 
book  and  the  religion  it  proclaimed  to  the  Atlantic 
on  the  one  side  and  to  Central  Asia  on  the  other*  The 
Empire  they  founded  converted  Islam  from  a  frenzy 
of  outcast  barbarians  into  a  culture  whose  poetry, 
science  and  philosophy  are  the  foundation  of  all  Nearer 
Eastern  civilisation  to-day,  just  as  the  culture  of  the 
Roman  Empire  is  the  spiritual  basis  of  Modem  Europe* 
The  Arab  empire,  moreover,  like  the  Roman,  was 
broken  in  pieces  by  a  deluge  of  rude  invaders  £rom 
the  North*  The  Turks,  like  the  Teutons,  had  vitality 
enough  to  realise  the  greatness  of  the  civilisation  upon 
which  they  had  stumbled,  and  to  submit  themselves  to 
its  spell ;  but  they  too  lacked  the  genius  to  conjure  back 
to  life  the  exquisite  thing  they  had  destroyed*  The 
confused  attempts  of  Turkish  dynasties  to  build  up 
again  in  brick  the  Arab  palaces  of  marble  constitute 
the  Dark  Age  of  Moslem  history*  The  house  of 
Othman,  the  supreme  creation  of  Turkish  political 
strivings,  is  a  house  built  upon  the  sands*  It  was 
doomed  to  dissolution  from  the  beginning  as  surely  as 
was  the  **  Holy  Roman  Empire*'^ 

When  Sultan  Selim  I*  conquered  Egypt  in  15x7,  he 
caused  the  last  Arab  Caliph  of  the  Abbasid  line,  who 
sheltered  there  under  Mamluk  protection,  to  bestow 
the  mande  of  the  Prophet  upon  him  and  his  heirs 
for  ever*  The  transaction  was  as  unreal  as  that  scene 
in  the  Vatican,  when  the  Pope,  the  highest  representa- 
tive of  Latin  civilisation,  crowned  Charlemagne  with  the 
diadem  of  the  Roman  Empire  which  his  predecessors 
had  trampled  in  the  dust ;  and  the  one  inheritance  was 
no  less  fatal  than  the  other  to  its  recipients*  Selim, 
like  Charlemagne,  has  had  many  successors  of  strong 
will  and  able  counsel,  but  they  have  su£Fered  the  tragedy 


4o6      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

of  the  Hohenstaufen,  and  squandered  the  strengdi  of 
their  empire  in  pursuii^  the  wiU-o'-the-wisps  of  a  dead 
world's  ideas. 

Meanwhile,  the  Arab  revival  has  been  paralysed  by 
this  heroic  sham,  as  Italy  was  paralysed  by  ^e  visitations 
of  the  medixval  Emperors  ;  and  if  the  encoun^ement 
of  Indian  Panislamism  breathes  misduevous  confidence 
into  this  sham  once  more,  it  will  work  as  mudi  woe  to 
all  Islam,  Arab  and  Indian  and  Turk  alike,  as  the 
triumi^  of  its  accomplice,  the  renovated  Gernun 
Imperialism,  will  work  to  Europe,  if  it  wins  this  war. 

Yet  our  Panislamist  (or  his  Young  Turk  ptot^, 
speaking  through  his  mouth),  while  admitting  all  that 
we  have  pointed  out,  will  still  put  up  a  plea  of  hif^ier 
necessity  for  the  existence  and  policy  of  the  present 
Turkish  regime.  It  will  be  very  much  like  the  apologia 
of  Piussianism,  its  ensample.  "  We  confess/'  he  will 
sadly  begin,  "  that  Turkish  Imperialism  frustrates  the 
material  advancement  of  the  Turkish  peasant,  and  stunts 
the  national  life  of  his  Arab  fellow-subject ;  but  it  is 
their  common  duty  to  bear  these  disadvantages  patn'otic- 
ally  for  the  sake  of  Ishna.  They  must  sacrifice  them- 
selves to  support  their  government,  because  the  Ottoman 
Empire  is  the  one  sovereign  independent  state  left  in 
bhun,  and  if  this  empire  falls,  the  Menlem  populations 
it  safeguards  will  be  partitioned,  like  all  their  brethren, 
among  the  Christian  powers.  Sudi  an  event  might, 
quite  probably,  increase  the  economic  prosperity  and 
social  well-being  of  the  individual  Moslem  more 
rapidly,  for  the  moment,  than  the  continuance  of  die 
Ottoman  administration ;  but  even  the  Christians  have 
a  proverb  that  '  Man  does  not  live  by  bread  alone.* 
For  a  '  mess  of  pottage '  the  Moslem  subjects  of  die 
^Porte  would  be  bartering  away  the  birthright  of  Islam, 


^Fortc  w 


PANISLAMISM  407 


making  impossible  the  great  ideal  of  the  futtire,  a  self- 
goveming  Moslem  nation  that  shall  hold  its  head  as  h^ 
as  the  nations  of  Europe/' 

If  Pamislamism  takes  up  this  position,  we  must 
undeceive  it  still  further*  We  do  not  call  "'  Young 
Turkey  ^'  a  sham  merely  because  it  taxes  the  strength 
of  the  Turkish  peasant  in  order  to  maltreat  weak 
Christian  nationalities  in  defiance  of  strong  Christian 
powers,  and  to  pose  grotesquely  as  the  successor  of  the 
Arab  Caliphate  in  the  captaincy  of  Islam*  In  spending 
the  blood-tax  wrung  from  the  peasant  upon  objects 
entirely  alien  to  the  peasant's  interest,  the  government 
of  Turkey  would  be  practising  a  fraud  at  least  no  grosser 
than  that  committed  by  the  two  Central  European 
Empires  against  their  industrial  conscripts*  The 
supreme  sham  is  the  '^  strength  and  independence  "'  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire  itself* 

The  German  government  takes  toll  of  blood  and  iron 
from  the  German  nation,  to  fashion  from  them  a  mailed 
fist,  quivering  with  a  vitality  that  gives  government  and 
nation  enleagued  not  only  security  to  walk  their  own 
ways  unhindered,  but  power  to  take  the  initiative  in 
evil  Bggrtsaion  against  their  neighbours*  The  mili- 
tarism of  the  Porte,  which  impresses  the  Indian  Moslem 
and  ruins  the  Turkish  peasant  with  its  wars  and 
rumours  of  wars,  has  no  effect  whatsoever  on  the  destiny 
of  the  Turkish  Empire*  Her  army  would  not  have 
saved  Turkey  from  annihilation  sixty  years  ago,  if 
England  and  France  had  not  fought  the  batde  against 
Russia  in  her  behalf,  and  during  the  two  generations 
that  have  passed  since  then,  Turkey,  threatened  with 
destruction  again  and  again,  has  owed  her  preservation 
invariably  to  the  mutual  jeabusies  of  the  European 
powers,  and  never  to  the  strength  of  her  own  right 


4o8      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

arm*  In  1877  the  defence  of  Plevna,  gallant  ^aouf^  it 
was,  did  not  prevent  the  Russians  from  forcing  the 
Qiataldja  lines :  a  diplomatic  warning  from  the  other 
powers  kept  them  out  of  Constantinople  when  the  forts 
were  down,  and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  rescued  for  Turkey 
half  her  territories  in  Europe* 

The  Indian  Moslems  must  face  the  fact  that  the  Porte 
is  not  the  champion  of  Islam,  but  a  parasite  upon  the 
national  rivalries  of  Europe*  Turkey^s  fate  is  not  in 
her  own  hands,  and  whatever  be  the  issue  of  the  war 
that  is  now  being  waged  between  the  European  powers, 
it  will  in  any  case  expose  the  Turkish  sham  by  patting 
a  decisive  end  to  Turkey's  present  position* 

But  the  Panislamist  who  has  studied  the  relaticms 
between  the  Porte  and  the  European  nations  during 
the  last  century,  will  be  justified  in  forming  the  very 
lowest  idea  of  European  political  morality*  The  actual 
survival  of  the  Turkish  regime  until  the  present  moment 
is  the  most  crushing  indictment  of  it ;  and  the  attitude 
of  all  the  powers  to  the  calamities  Turkish  chauvinism 
has  continued  to  cause,  has  been  so  uniformly  selfish 
and  cold-blooded,  that  even  an  impartial  spectator  might 
plausibly  ignore  Turkey's  guilt,  and  lay  the  responsi- 
bility at  Europe's  door*  In  discussing,  then,  with  an 
Indian  Moslem  the  probable  behaviour  of  these  natkms 
towards  Turkey  after  the  present  war  is  over,  we  shall 
carry  greater  conviction  if  we  leave  any  possible  factor 
of  idealism  out  of  the  question,  and  assume  that  all  alike 
will  follow  motives  of  the  strictest  self-interest* 

What  has  Turkey  to  expect  from  the  respective  tritimph 
of  the  two  rival  groups  of  powers  i 

Ever  since  the  rapprochement  between  France  and 
Russia  nearly  twenty  years  ago,  Germany  has  been 
offering  her  friendship   to   Turkey  with   increasii^ 


PANISLAMISM  409 

earnestness*  The  two  powers  have  fotuid  a  oonunon 
object  in  their  policy  towards  the  Entente,  and  at  the 
present  crisis  Germany  has  put  ready  money,  first-dass 
warships,  and  skilled  soldiers  at  Turkey^s  disposal,  and 
persuaded  her  to  join  in  a  struggle  the  issue  of  which  is 
this  concerted  policy's  success  or  failure* 

If  Germany  had  no  other  interest  in  the  Turkish 
Empire  than  its  military  value  in  the  battle  for  the  supre- 
macy of  Europe,  Turkey  might  win  Germany's  gratitude 
and  her  own  advant^e  by  throwing  her  sword  into  the 
balance;  but  the  Tturkish  sword  weighs  too  light  to 
affect  the  scales*  Its  value  to  Germany  is  negligible, 
and  if  the  Entente  is  crushed  it  will  vanish  altogether. 
In  her  inmost  heart  Germany  looks  at  the  Turkish 
Empire,  not  as  an  ally  in  the  war,  but  as  the  prize  of 
victory* 

Turkey  lies  nearer  than  any  other  part  of  Asia  to 
Europe ;  it  contains  temperate  country  suitable  for 
European  colonisation,  besides  semi-tropical  ootmtry 
that  can  grow  raw  materials  for  Europe's  industry,  and 
supply  markets  for  her  finished  productions ;  above  all, 
it  is  a  dominant  position  in  the  strategical  geography  of 
the  World*  Germany  claims  the  **  Sick  Man's  "  grati- 
tude because  she  has  saved  his  festering  limbs  from  the 
amputation  which  was  their  natural  destiny,  but  she 
has  only  done  so  because  she  has  a  more  voracious 
ambition  than  his  former  physicians  :  she  purposes  to 
swallow  him  whole  like  a  boa-constrictor,  and  digest 
him  without  any  preliminary  breaking  of  his  bones* 

If  Germany  wins,  the  Porte  may  be  maintained  in 
being  for  many  years  as  Germany's  cat's-paw,  but  the 
Moslem  nationalities,  over  whom  the  Porte  rules,  and 
whose  future  is  the  hope  of  Panislamism,  are  doomed 
to  extinction*    Germany  knows  that  she  cannot  undo 


4X0      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

Great  Britain's  work  in  Australia  or  New  Zealand^  and 
transform  them  into  German  lands :  the  vitality  of  the 
new  Anglo-Saxon  nations  we  have  founded  there  is 
already  too  strong*  Anatolia  offers  far  better  prospects. 
Its  cliioiate  is  equally  temperate,  while  its  poputation 
is  no  match  yet  for  Europeans  in  numbers,  energy, 
civilisation,  or  any  other  factors  of  survival*  Turk  and 
Arab  would  vanish  away  before  German  immigratiofi 
as  the  Red  Indian  faded  before  the  Anglo-Saxon  onrush 
in  North  America,  and  the  last  hope  of  Islam  would  be 
blasted  by  the  first  realisation  of  the  Pangerman  Idea* 

Turkey  may  be  linked  to  Germany  by  common 
ant^onism  towards  the  EnUnUp  yet  for  ^e  Moslem 
nationalities  the  result  of  Germany^s  victoiy  would  be 
annihilation* 

**  But  what,^^  our  Panislamist  will  ask,  **  if  the  Allies 
are  victorious  i  You  have  already  spoken  plainly  about 
dismantling  the  Turkish  Empire,  and  if  once  you  lay 
violent  hands  on  its  integrity,  I  fear  you  will  not 
stop  till  you  have  achieved  its  dismemberment*  You 
reassure  your  Russophobe  by  promising  that  his  de- 
mands shall  be  satisfied,  and  reassure  us  by  explaining 
that  the  Russophobe^s  standpoint  is  identical  with  our 
own,  but  the  flames  of  a  war  like  this  melt  down  the 
established  policies  of  nations*  You  hope  to  fof^e  in 
this  furnace  a  Concert  of  Europe*  Suppose  you  succeed, 
and  that  England,  France,  and  Russia  pass  beyond  the 
stage  of  opportunist  alliance  and  arrive  at  a  profound 
mutual  understanding :  the  Russophobe^s  point  of  view 
will  have  become  obsolete  in  a  moment,  and  the  union 
of  Europe  will  be  cemented  by  the  partition  of  the 
Moslem  nationalities*  The  opiate  of  *  compensation  * 
dulls  the  ache  of  the  most  irreconcilable  ambitions^ 
France  rested  her  daims  on  Egypt  when  England 


PANISLAMISM  411 

secured  her  a  free  hand  in  Morocco,  and  we  can  easily 
forecast  how  the  Three  Powers  will  carve  the  Arabic 
provinces  of  Asia  into  *  spheres  of  influence/  and 
actually  bring  sullen,  defeated  Germany  within  die 
European  fold  (if  their  statesmanship  rises  to  the 
occasion)  by  offering  her  the  coveted  Anatolia  as  a 
consolation/^ 

This  is  a  shrewd  interpellation,  and  it  does  even  more 
than  justice  to  our  lade  of  scruple;  but  it  fails  to 
envisage  the  fact  that  this  war,  though  it  may  have  been 
precipitated  by  the  conflict  between  incompatible 
applications  of  the  same  crude  nationalistic  idea,  is 
being  fought  out  on  the  issue  of  incompatible  ideals* 
The  cause  of  the  Allies  does  not  stand  for  the  triumph 
of  one  group  of  aggressively  ambitious  nations  over 
another,  nor  for  the  coalition  of  both  groups  in  a 
criminal  conspiracy  against  the  rest  of  the  world :  we 
have  identified  ourselves  with  the  victory  of  three  great 
principles — 

(L)  That  the  general  peace  of  the  world  is  our 
sovereign  interest,  and  that  no  political  or  economic 
advantage  of  an  individual  kind  is  commensurate  with  it. 

(ii.)  That  peace  can  only  be  secured  by  giving  free 
play  to  every  manifestation  of  the  spirit  of  Nationality* 

(iii«)  That  national  self-government,  so  far  from  being 
inimical  to  foreign  economic  interests  in  the  country 
whert  it  obtains,  is  able  to  reconcile  otherwise  incom- 
patible ambitions  by  giving  them  a  neutral  political 
medium  to  work  in. 

The  statement  of  these  principles  at  last  brings  us 
out  of  the  wood*  The  realisation  of  self-conscious- 
ness and  self-government  by  the  Arab  and  Turkish 
nationalities  in  the  Nearer  East  is  not  merely  the 
ultimate   object   of  Panislamism   or   the   ephemeral 


4X2      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

programme  of  English  Rtissophobia :  it  is  one  of  die 
most  important  foundation-stones  of  that  ideal  structure 
of  European  harmony  and  international  peace  to  wfaidi 
Great  Britain  and  her  allies  stand  publicly  pledged,  and 
which  we  cannot  betray  without  forfeiting  the  sympadiy 
of  neutrals  in  the  present  crisis,  and  destroying  all 
confidence  in  our  honour  for  the  future*  The  Pan- 
islamist  may  assure  himself  that  not  even  the  most 
brilliant  opportunity  of  immediate  material  gain  would 
tempt  us  thus  to  &lsify  our  ^ndiole  position,  while  the 
fact  that  adherence  to  these  principles  is  the  sole  meaos 
of  winning  the  Panislamist^s  trust  and  good-will,  afibrds 
a  further  proof  to  ourselves  of  the  proposition  from 
which  we  started,  that  our  own  true  interest  lies  in  a 
**  disinterested  **  effort  to  secure  impartial  justice  to  all 
our  neighbours.  It  is  our  part,  then,  to  proclaim  our 
solenm  intention  of  laying  this  stone  true,  and  to  sketdi 
out  a  plan  for  fashioning  it  to  fit  its  destined  place. 


D.  The  New  Anatolia 

Anatolia  is  physiologically  a  part  of  Europe,  the 
fourth  of  those  mountain-ribbed  peninsulas  that  reach 
out  from  the  European  mass,  and  bathe  their  feet  in 
the  Mediterranean  sea.  It  is  an  immense  plateau  of 
the  same  proportions  and  climatic  diaracter  as  Spain* 
An  arid  central  upland  is  embattled  against  the  coast  on 
North  and  South  by  parallel  sierras,  clothed  in  forest, 
and  rich  in  streams  which  are  all  engulfed,  after  a  brief 
course,  either  by  the  sea  on  the  outer  flank  or  the  steppe 
within :  only  towards  the  West  does  the  plateau  sink 
in  long,  fertile  river  valleys  to  a  clement,  sheltered 
coastline. 

The  aboriginal  population  of  the  region  is  a 


ANATOLIA  4x3 

in  that  chain  of  ^' Brachycephalic  ^^  stocks  which 
occupies  the  Eurasian  concatenation  of  mountains  from 
the  Alps  to  the  Mongolian  tableland.  It  is  distinguished 
by  its  sturdy  build,  hooked  nose,  and  **  sugar-loaf  *' 
skull*  No  race  in  the  world's  history  has  succumbed 
so  readily  to  the  impress  of  foreign  nationality  and 
civilisation,  while  none,  perhaps,  has  shown  such  a 
reserve  of  passive  vitality,  stich  a  power  of  perpetuatmg 
its  fundamental  characteristics* 

For  more  than  two  thousand  years  ^  the  race  was 
exposed  to  the  continually  intensified  influence  of  the 
Greeks,  the  strongest  nationality  in  the  Andent  World, 
till  the  Greek  language  had  supplanted  all  the  native 
dialects,  and  Greek  civilisation  become  the  standard  of 
Anatolian  uniformity.  Dtuing  the  last  eight  centuries 
the  Turk  from  Central  Asia,  the  most  vigorous  race 
that  has  yet  entered  the  world  of  Islam,  has  conquered 
this  land  from  the  Infidel  and  made  it  peculiarly  his  own. 

The  Turkish  lat^^us^e,  always  one  of  the  crudest  in 
the  world,  and  the  Greek,  once  the  most  exquisite, 
match  one  another  in  nothing  but  vitality  and  proselytis- 
ing power :  they  have  meastured  their  strength  in  the 
battle  for  the  dominion  of  the  Anatolian  race,  and  the 
Turkish  speech  has  won.  In  Cappadoda  (the  Eastern 
part  of  the  plateau)  the  Greek  dialects  spoken  by  the 
dwindling  Christian  section  of  the  population  are  on 
the  eve  of  disappearance  at  this  moment :  their  syntax 
has  already  conformed  to  the  Turkish  structure,  and 
soon  no  trace  will  be  left  of  them  except  a  few  fossils 
in  the  local  Turkish  vocabulary.  Even  on  the  East 
coast,  Greek  nationality  nowhere  now  maintains  itself 
with  any  vigour  except  at  a  few  ports  like  Smyrna  and 
if  where  it  is  backed  up  by  the  Greek  sea-traffic 

^  Pxom  about  zaoo  b.c«  to  zo6o  aj). 


4X4      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

of  the  JBgtan  and  by  the  dose  pioxunity  of  Greek 
isldfids* 

Yet  though  the  Anatolian  race  has  been  converted 
to  the  speech  of  its  Turkish  conquerors  as  completely 
as  it  was  converted  to  Hellenism  before,  and  has  adc^jited 
the  Moslem  creed  they  carried  with  them,  it  has  in- 
formed its  new  religion  and  nationality  with  its  own 
peculiar  spirit*  The  "'  Ottoman '"  peasant  thus  pro- 
duced has  litde  in  common  with  other  populations  that 
hold  the  same  faith  and  speak  the  same  tongue — Tatars 
of  Baku,  Kirghiz  nomads  on  the  Central  Asiatic  steppe^ 
or  Kashgari  villagers  in  Chinese  Turkestan :  we  can 
discern  much  more  clearly  his  aflKnity  with  the  Phrygian 
or  Cappadodan  familiar  to  the  andent  Greek*  He  has 
the  same  stolidity  and  lack  of  initiative  (with  thetr 
complementary  virtues),  as  antipathetic  then  as  now  to 
the  Levantine  of  the  /Egean«  He  has  even  the  same 
trappings  of  material  life,  from  his  housing-system  down 
to  the  conical-hat  and  curly-toed  boots  that  distinguish 
the  Hittites  in  ^yptian  bas-reliefs ;  and  beneath  this 
exterior  crust  bum  the  same  volcanic  fires  of  religious 
frenzy  which  gave  the  cult  of  Attis  and  the  Great 
Mother  to  Hellenism,  and  have  forced  upon  Islam, 
since  Anatolia  entered  the  Moslem  world,  the  ""  reviva- 
listic''  ecstasy  of  the  '^spinning  dervisli,""  so  extra- 
ordinarily alien  to  Islam^s  sober  genius* 

The  Anatolian,  then,  has  a  marked  national  character : 
he  is  also  ripe  for  national  self-^vemment.  To  us 
the  Tturkish  Empire  is  a  symbol  of  political  ineptitude^ 
but  three  centuries  ago  our  ancestors  looked  upon  the 
Sublime  Porte  as  the  most  effident  government  in 
Europe,  and  admired  the  solidity  of  its  paved  h^^ 
roads  and  nobly-arched  bridges,  the  magnificence  of  its 
karavansarais,  mosques,  and  arsenals,  the  professional 


ANATOLIA  415 

skill  of  its  fleets,  artillery,  and  standing  army,  precisely 
as  Herodotus  admired  the  far  less  ably  oi^anised  empire 
of  Darius*  Since  then  the  Turk  has  been  outstripped 
by  Europe,  but  if  he  has  stood  still,  he  has  at  any  rate 
not  lost  ground*  To  govern  oneself,  moreover,  is  an 
easier  task  than  to  govern  an  empire,  and  if  the  Turk 
now  confines  himself  to  this,  there  is  no  reason  why 
he  should  not  succeed  as  well  as  his  former  subjects 
in  the  Balkans* 

Anatolia  will  not  become,  any  more  than  the  Balkans, 
an  industrial  country,  and  the  Turk  will  always  be  a 
laborious  peasant  rather  than  a  keen-witted  business 
man,  but  the  political  problems  set  before  him  will  be 
simple*  For  four  centuries  the  country  has  been  in 
profound  peace,  and  law  and  order  are  as  firmly  rooted 
there  as  in  any  state  of  Southern  Europe,  in  striking 
contrast  to  the  anarchy  into  which  race  hatred  has 
plunged  Macedonia  and  Albania,  so  much  nearer  to  the 
centres  of  Etuopean  civilisation.  Abdul  Hamid  first 
conceived  the  fiendish  idea  of  spreading  this  infection 
to  his  Asiatic  subjects,  yet  unlil^  the  chronic  violence 
of  the  ''  bands '"  in  Macedonia,  the  massacres  of 
Greeks  and  Armenians  in  the  Anatolian  towns  have 
not  become  more  than  hideous  violations  of  a  normal 
harmony* 

If  official  chauvinism,  by  murder,  forcible  con- 
version, banishment,  and  that  terrorism  which  leaves 
no  real  alternative  to  emigration,  were  to  succeed  in  its 
object  of  eliminating  these  Christian  populations  from 
Anatolia  altogether,  it  would  be  dealing  as  fatal  a  blow 
to  the  country^s  future  prosperity  as  the  Castilian 
government  dealt  to  Spain,  when  it  robbed  her  of  her 
Moors  and  Jews*  At  that  period  the  Porte  showed  its 
superiority  to  contemporary  Christendom  not  merely 


4i6      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 


in  efficiency  but  in  liberality  of  soul,  by  giving  tlie 
Spanish  Jews  harbourage  in  its  own  commercial  ddes, 
to  their  contentment  and  to  the  advantage  of  their 
adopted  home*  Since  then  Ottoman  **  official  drdes/' 
in  contradistinction  to  the  Ottoman  nation,  have 
deteriorated  indeed*  They  are  venting  their  fury  for 
their  Balkan  defeats  not  only  upon  the  Greeks  dF  the 
Thradan  frontier,  but  upon  the  entirely  unimplicated 
Greek  population  of  the  West  coast,  and  now  that  they 
have  pltmged  their  country  into  the  great  European 
war,  they  may  be  expected  to  instigate  fresh  massacres 
of  their  Qiristian  subjects  at  any  moment. 

This  governing  class,  with  the  hopelessly  debaudied 
tradition  which  has  descended  from  Abdul  Hamid  to 
the  clique  that  overthrew  him,  must  be  swept  away 
before  it  can  complete  its  disastrous  work.  The 
Armenians  and  Greeks  whom  it  is  seeking  to  destroy 
are  an  indispensable  element  in  the  progress  of  die 
country.  They  possess  all  the  qualities  of  brain  that 
the  native  Anatolian  lacks,  and  they  have  furdier 
improved  their  brains  by  education.  To  begin  with,  at 
any  rate,  the  new  Anatolian  national  government  will 
depend  largely  upon  them  for  its  personnel,  and  they 
will  render  faithful  service  to  the  alien  country  of  their 
birth  if  she  grants  them  the  scope  which  their  abilitks 
deserve.  They  are  as  able  minded  as  are  the  classes 
of  corresponding  education  in  Europe,  they  have 
always  been  employed  in  the  subordinate  grades  of 
the  Ottoman  administration,  and  the  greatness  of  the 
Empire  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries 
falls  in  lai^e  measure  to  their  credit*  The  Anatolian 
Christian  is  the  chosen  vessel  for  the  fulfilment  of  die 
Panislamist's  prayer,  the  elevation  of  the  Anatolian  Turic 
to  an  equality  with  die  nations  of  Europe. 


ANATOLIA  417 

The  people  of  Anatolia  must  be  given  as  free  a  hand 
as  possible  to  build  up  a  native  political  tradition  on  a 
new  basis*  The  present  government  has  taken  the 
opporttmity  of  the  European  war  to  denounce  the 
**  Capitulations/'  and  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  all 
European  powers  have  protested  s^ainst  their  action* 
It  certainly  has  no  legal  justification,  and  is  but  a  further 
exemplification  of  the  existing  regime's  true  character* 
If,  however,  the  immense  changes  we  have  proposed  are 
to  any  extent  realised,  we  must  do  our  part  by  letting 
this  protest  lapse*  In  reimposing  the  Capitulations 
upon  a  reformed  national  government  of  Anatolia  we 
should  be  committing  a  grave  error,  not  because  the 
administration  of  justice  will  be  pu^ed  by  magic  of  its 
imperfections,  but  because  any  improvement  of  it  will 
be  impossible  so  long  as  these  humiliating  exceptions 
to  its  writ  are  maintained* 

European  residents  in  Turkey  enjoy  these  privileges 
by  a  historical  chance,  but  Europeans  elect  to  reside 
in  many  worse-governed  cotmtries  without  similar 
guarantees*  If,  moreover,  that  vital  artery  of  inter- 
national commerce,  the  Black  Sea  Straits,  be  removed, 
as  we  propose,  from  Turkish  jurisdiction,  the  most 
important  European  commercial  colony  which  the 
Capitulations  serve  to  protect  will  be  withdrawn  from 
the  operation  of  Turkish  justice* 

Anatolia  must  start  its  new  political  life  untrammelled, 
yet  political  self-government  is  not  the  only  factor  in 
the  prc^ess  of  a  cotmtry*  If  it  is  to  play  its  part  in 
modem  international  civih'sation,  it  must  also  tap  its 
native  sources  of  material  wealth,  and  this  can  only  be 
done  by  the  generous  application  of  capital*  Deposits 
of  minc^  ore  are  valueless  till  elaborate  plant  is  brought 
to  bear  on  them  by  men  with  skill  to  work  it*  The  margin 


4i8      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

of  the  central  steppe  cannot  be  made  to  yield  com  again, 
as  it  did  in  the  eleventh  century  aj)*  before  the  Turk 
came^  till  the  motmtain  torrents  have  been  made  to 
deliver  their  last  drop  of  water  to  the  husbandman  by 
irrigation-canals  below  and  barrage-storage  in  the  high 
valleys,  and  till  reapii^  machinery  has  been  imported 
from  Lincoln  or  Chicago*  Neither  grain  nor  metal 
can  be  brought  within  reach  of  consumers  till  mine  and 
field  have  been  put  into  communication  by  rail  with  the 
port  on  the  coast* 

These  operations  must  be  carried  out  before  a  single 
atom  of  wealth  can  be  extracted  from  the  resources 
they  are  intended  to  throw  open,  and  their  installation 
is  very  costly*  They  can  therefore  only  be  tmdertaken 
if  some  surplus  has  been  saved  from  wealth  previously 
produced  by  another  source  or  in  another  quarter. 
Such  surpluses  do  not  easily  begin  to  accrue,  but  once 
they  have  started,  their  effect  on  the  production  of 
wealth  is  so  immense  that  they  grow  by  geometrical 
progression* 

The  nucleus  of  that  capital  which  in  little  more  than 
a  century  has  transformed  the  face  of  the  world,  was 
accumulated  by  the  middle  class  in  the  nations  of 
Western  Europe,  after  they  had  put  wars  of  religion  and 
constitutional  struggles  behind  them,  and  arrived  at  a 
strong  national  government  which  set  them  free  to  turn 
their  best  energies  into  economic  channels*  The  force 
that  resides  in  capital,  the  magic  power  of  transforming 
the  earth  and  of  conjuring  wealth  from  its  bosom,  has 
placed  the  rest  of  the  world  at  Europe^s  feet ;  but  in 
Turkey,  as  in  other  countries  that  have  lagged  behind 
Europe  in  political  advance,  such  accumulation  has 
never  been  made*  Aimless  wars  of  adventure  have 
continued  to  keep  the  peasant  living  from  year  to  year 


ANATOLIA  419 

on  the  verge  of  ruin,  and  the  Greek  and  Armenian  towns^ 
folk,  who  had  the  intellectual  and  moral  capacity  for 
achieving  as  much  as  the  European  middle  class,  have 
been  singled  out  for  repression  by  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment* Turkey  must  borrow  the  capital  she  requires, 
not  from  her  own  citizens,  but  from  Europe ;  and 
Europe,  finding  that  she  holds  a  monopoly  of  this 
commodity  with  which  Turkey  cannot  dispense,  is  not 
disposed  to  offer  her  a  market  on  easy  conditions. 

The  history  of  exploitation  in  Anatolia  centres  round 
the  construction  of  her  railways*^  Immediately  after 
the  Crimean  War  an  English  and  a  French  company 
acquired  concessions  for  lines  which  started  from 
Smyrna,  the  natural  capital  of  Anatolia  on  the  middle 
point  of  the  West  coast,  and  worked  Eastwards  up  the 
river  valleys  on  to  the  interior  plateau*  The  French 
line  has  now  been  pushed  up  the  Hermus  valley  through 
Ala  Shehr  (Philadelphia)  to  Afiun  Kara  Hissar,  and 
the  English  line  up  the  parallel  Maeander  valley  to  the 
south  throt^h  Aidin  to  Qiivril  and  Buldur**  Germany, 
however,  since  she  supplanted  England  and  France  in 
the  Porters  friendship,  has  blocked  the  further  advance 
of  these  two  railways  by  securing  the  concession  for  a 
railway  to  Bagdad. 

The  German  line  starts  from  Skutari,  the  Asiatic 
suburb  of  Constantinople  in  a  remote  comer  of  Anatolia, 
and  makes  its  way  Southwards  past  Ismid  to  the 
plateau  level  at  Eski  Shehr,  across  a  very  difficult  series 
of  mountain  ranges  among  which  the  Sangarius  winds 
in  gorges*  Thereafter  the  way  is  plain  to  Afitm  Kara 
Hissar,  and  the  line  proceeds  South-East  along  the  inner 

Vf  >  See  Map  VL 

f-V'The  two  lines  reached  Kassaba  and  Aidm  respectively  in  i866. 

See  Map  VI. 


V 


430      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

edge  of  Taurus  through  Konia  to  Bulgharlu,  a  village 
at  the  foot  of  the  Bulbar  Dagh,  where  the  Taurus  wall 
begins  to  ttim  Nortb-East,  and  the  railway,  if  it  is  to 
continue  its  oiuise,  must  pierce  it  by  a  mighty  tunnel. 

As  £ar  as  this  tunnel,  the  line  has  been  in  working  order 
for  some  years.*  Its  achievement  is  a  triumph  of  that 
co-operation  between  individual  capital  and  national 
diplomacy  by  vriiich  modem  Germany  has  effected  so 
much.  Besides  pointing  the  way  to  the  promised  land 
beyond  the  Taurus,  it  absorbs  such  internal  trade  as 
already  exists  in  the  section  of  Anatolia  to  the  North- 
East,  except  for  the  little  that  goes  in  and  out  by  the 
Bladi  Sea  coast.  Connection  with  the  French  rail-head 
at  Aiiun  Kara  Hissar  is  carefully  avoided,  so  that 
all  tiafiEc  which  reaches  that  point  from  the  East  is 
oon^xUed  to  pass  the  vriiole  way  along  the  German  line 
to  l^taii  instead  of  takii^  the  natural  route  to  Smyrna. 

This  masterly  railway  is  the  most  potent  instrument 
Germany  has  foiged  for  diverting  all  new  wealth  tapped 
in  Anatolia  into  German  pockets,  and  finally  turning  the 
country  itself  into  a  G^man-peopled  land.  Yet  this 
policy  is  not  peculiar  to  Germany.  It  is  only  a  particu- 
larly successful  instance  of  whzt  all  European  nations 
attempt,  with  more  or  less  singleness  of  aim  and  persever- 
ance, so  soon  as  a  well-placed  loan  brii^  a  more  back- 
ward country  into  their  power.  It  is  usury  in  the  most 
sinister  sense,  conduct^  on  a  national  scale. 

Honourable  investment  aims  at  an  increase  of  wealth 

<  Tbc  ooacaaion  for  die  txttaaoa  n  Bagdad  was  unedta  Jamatr 
1900.  jlKCddBtantuioptt-unudsecDoiiivaiooQiiHftcdascnff  asi87% 
•nd  estendcd  to  Kotua  after  1888  by  die  Anatolian  Raihray  Cmofaaj. 
This  was  M  first  a  combined  Gennano-British  concern;  but  the 
German  poop  aoon  bou^t  out  the  Britisb  rigba,  and  proceeded  to 
obnin  the  B^dad  concwwon.  They  then  ce^nised  a  new  "  Bagdad 
Railway  Coo^pany  "  to  which  the  Anatolian  Railway  Company" 
'-    of thecontraa. 


ANATOLIA  4ai 

which  shall  bring  the  investor  a  just  profit  out  of  the 
surplus  thereby  created :  Usury  forces  the  borrower 
to  pledge  all  that  he  has,  up  to  many  times  the  value  of 
the  loan,  trading  on  the  fact  that  he  cannot  do  with- 
out borrowing  at  the  moment*  It  hopes,  not  for  his 
success,  but  for  his  ruin,  because  its  quarry  is  the  pledge 
and  not  the  interest :  its  object  is  achieved  when  it  has 
got  the  victim  into  its  power,  body  and  soul*  The 
plentifulness  of  capital  and  the  competition  of  investors 
have  made  usury  on  the  individual  scale  an  almost 
obsolete  evil  in  modem  Europe,  but  the  centralisation 
of  capitalistic  control  has  introduced  it  into  the  inter- 
course of  nations*  It  gives  the  stroi^  a  subtler,  more 
business-like  means  of  oppressing  the  weak  than  the 
clumsy  warfare  of  mere  diplomacy  and  armaments* 
Since  Peace  depends  ultimately  on  Justice,  our  ideal 
of  making  Peace  secure  will  not  be  realised  till  we  have 
exorcised,  not  only  "'  blood  and  iron,'"  but  National 
Usury  as  well* 

It  is  neither  possible  nor  desirable  to  confiscate 
foreign  capital  in  Anatolia.  That  would  be  an  inde- 
fensible breach  of  faith  with  the  bond-holders,  and  the 
worst  folly  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  country's  own 
interests,  for  it  would  close  to  her  the  coffers  of  inter- 
national finance  at  the  moment  when  she  needs  to  dip 
more  deeply  into  them  than  ever*  We  must  devise 
arrangements  by  which  foreign  enterprise  shall  secure 
profits  advantageous  enough  to  evoke  it  to  the  full  extent 
of  Anatolia's  needs,  without  enabling  it  to  seize  the 
paramount  economic  control,  and  thereby  the  ultimate 
political  dominion,  of  the  Anatolian  national  state* 

The  most  powerful  foreign  authority  to  which  the 
material  resources  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  are  at  present 
subject,  is  the  International  Administration  of  the  Public 


433      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

Debt.  Turkey's  allies  in  the  Crimean  War  tattght  her 
how  to  borrow  in  the  European  money  market,  and  a 
reckless  period  of  extravagance  followed.  When  it 
terminated  towards  the  end  of  the  'seventies  in  the 
Balkan  revolt  and  the  disastrous  Russian  War,  Turkey 
found  the  purse-strings  dosed  against  her,  and  became 
unable  either  to  meet  her  past  obligations  out  of  her 
revenue  or  to  incur  others  to  liquidate  them.  The 
result  was  the  Decree  of  December  1881,  which  oon- 
solidated  the  whole  outstanding  debt,  handed  over  die 
problem  of  dealing  with  it  to  a  mixed  committee,  con- 
sisting of  delegates  from  the  bond-holders  of  all  the 
interested  nationalities,  and  put  at  the  absolute  disposal 
of  this  committee,  in  which  the  Ottoman  Government 
itself  had  no  footing,  six  classes  of  pubUc  revenue  for 
the  debt's  service. 

This  international  administration  has  wielded  for  a 
generation  a  power  far  greater  than  any  single  foreign 
government  has  yet  acquired  in  Turkey,  or  could  ever 
acquire  without  the  virtual  supersession  of  Turkish 
sovereignty ;  but  it  has  employed  it  entirely  tt>  the 
country's  benefit,  just  because  it  does  not  represent 
the  sinister  interest  of  national  rivalry,  but  the  common 
interest  of  bond-holders  of  all  nationalities  to  co- 
operate with  the  Turkish  people  in  order  to  promote  the 
increase  of  the  country's  resources  upon  which  all  alike 
have  their  respective  claims.  The  commissioners  have 
interpreted  their  mandate  in  a  liberal  spirit,  and  some 
of  the  most  fruitful  economic  developments  that  Turkey 
has  experienced  in  the  meanwhile  have  been  initiated 
in  the  spheres  tmder  their  control,  and  financed  by 
funds  accumulated  in  their  coffers.  Whatever  political 
transformations  the  Ottoman  Empire  may  tmdergo, 
the  finandal  authority  of  the  International  Admints- 


\ 


ANATOLIA  423 

tration  must  remain  unimpaired,  not  only  out  of 
justice  to  the  foreign  bond-holders,  but  because  its 
continued  activity  will  be  the  New  Anatolia's  best  bul- 
wark against  exploitation  by  individual  nations,  and  the 
best  guarantee  for  the  continuance  of  her  economic 
progress  on  lines  primarily  advantageous  to  her  own 
citizens* 

But  there  are  other,  and  less  legitimate,  forms  of 
foreign  privilege  in  Turkey  which  might  well  lapse  with 
the  dismantling  of  the  Empire,  or  at  any  rate  be  allowed 
to  drag  less  heavily  upon  the  freedom  of  the  rejuvenated 
Anatolia* 

(L)  It  is  not  enough  to  give  the  new  Anatolian 
government  judicial  independence  by  abolishing  the 
Capitulations,  tmless  we  give  it  fiscal  independence  as 
well,  and  that  is  at  present  seriously  limited  by  a 
number  of  treaties  with  the  various  European  powers, 
iniiicfa  fix  a  maximum  ad  valorem  import  duty  for  the 
Turkish  Customs*  It  might  be  argued  that  if  European 
thrift  has  been  hit  so  heavily  by  Turkish  insolvency, 
it  is  only  fair  that  Europe  should  be  given  the  chance  of 
recouping  herself  by  obtaining  favoured  treatment  in 
Tturkish  trade*  Yet  European  merchants  have  already 
gained  infinitely  more  by  the  customs-treaties  than 
European  investors  lost  by  the  bankruptcy,  while  the 
latter  interest  is  actually  prejudiced  by  die  present 
arrangement,  for  the  Customs  were  one  of  the  six 
revenues  ceded  to  the  Debt  Administration,  and  their 
augmentation  would  profit  the  European  bond-holders 
as  well  as  the  Anatolian  government*  Even  in  equity, 
then,  the  statas  quo  has  litde  justification,  but  legally 
there  is  no  case  for  it  at  all*  Most  of  the  treaties 
lapsed  over  twenty  years  ago,  and  have  only  been 
maintained  in  operation  by  the  cynical  refusal  of  the 


434     THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

powers  oonoemed  to  discuss  their  modification*  In 
fact,  the  Powers^  attitude  towards  Turkish  finance  has 
rested  latterly  on  their  ability  to  exercise  coercion. 

The  time  has  now  come  to  cry  quits.  In  1907  the 
first  step  was  accomplished,  when  Turkey  obtained  per- 
mission to  raise  the  import  duty  to  iz  per  cent*,  in  order 
to  pay  for  the  special  administration  of  Macedonia 
demanded  by  the  Powers  themselves.  This  is  a  good 
precedent  for  compensating  the  Anatolian  government 
(and  its  European  bond-holders)  for  the  loss  of  their 
most  important  source  of  Customs  revenue  in  the 
Black  Sea  Straits,  by  setting  them  at  liberty  to  fix 
their  tariff  at  whatever  rate  they  choose  within  the 
sanctuary  of  their  reduced  frontiers.  The  authority 
of  the  Debt  Administration  gives  security  that  the  con- 
cession would  be  used  with  prudence,  and  even  a  mis- 
taken fiscal  policy  would  only  injure  Anatolia  herself, 
and  could  be  regarded  with  indifference  by  Europe,  so 
long  as  the  vitally  important  waterway  to  the  Bladk  Sea 
was  excluded  from  its  sphere  of  operation. 

(ii.)  The  foreign  railway  companies,  in  framing  their 
contracts  with  the  Government,  have  stipulated  that  the 
latter  shall  guarantee  them  a  certain  minimum  of  annual 
profit,  calculated  at  so  much  per  kilometre  of  permanent 
way  in  working  order.  The  Government  has  to  make 
good  any  deficits  on  this  amotmt. 

Considering  the  poorness  of  the  country  and  die 
irresponsible  character  of  the  Government,  which  by  its 
provocative  foreign  policy  was  capable  of  disorganising 
at  any  moment  such  trade  as  there  was,  it  was  reason- 
able that  Turkey  should  shoulder  the  economic  conse- 
quences of  any  political  folly  she  committed.^    li, 

^  The  system  was  not  applied  to  the  earlier  railway  enterprises  in  the 
Ottoman  empire.    It  was  only  initiated  in  z888,  when  railway  axh 


ANAtoLlA  425 

howvftt,  under  a  new  regime  the  annual  average  of 
Anatolian  trade  increases,  and  the  country  schools  itself 
to  a  more  reassuring  political  tradition,  the  risk  to  bond- 
holders will  gradually  sink  to  the  same  average  as  in 
Europe,  and  the  survival  of  the  **  kilometric  guarantee  ** 
will  leave  them  with  an  unearned  advantage,  while 
retaining  the  Anatolian  government  under  an  tmmerited 
liability*  When  this  stage  is  reached,  the  public  opinion 
of  the  European  nations  will  be  at  fault,  if  it  does  not 
permit  the  cancelling  of  the  guarantees  before  the  term 
fixed  by  the  contracts* 

{in.)  The  Anatolian  nation  can  most  effectively  parry 
the  political  danger  from  foreign  railway  enterprise 
by  establishing  a  ^'balance  of  power''  between  the 
companies  of  the  different  nations  concerned*^ 

At  present  the  German  concession  threatens  to 
dominate  Anatolia.  After  cuttix^  diagonally  across 
the  country  from  the  Straits  to  the  Taurus,  it  is  to 
proceed  through  the  Cilidan  tunnel  (which  is  being 
excavated  at  this  moment)  to  Adana,  the  urban  centre 
of  the  largest  and  most  fertile  Anatolian  coast-plain, 
whence  two  lines  already  run  to  the  ports  of  Mersina 
and  Iskanderun.*  It  will  thus  include  the  two  most 
important  strategical  positions  in  the  peninsula,  Afiun 
K^  Hissar,  the  central  node  of  communications,  and 
the  Glidan  tunnel,  the  door  through  the  chief  barrier 
between  the  country's  two  most  important  pieces  of 
coastline* 

stracdoa,  although  urgentiy  needed  for  the  development  d  the  ooontry, 
had  oome  to  a  standstill  because  no  foreign  investors  would  tat  thor 
capital^  and  its  adoption  certainly  brought  the  required  capital  into 
the  field.  The  scale  of  guarantee  is  fisted  independendy  for  each  oon- 
ctmkm,  and  there  is  no  umifonn  rate. 

>SeeMapVL 

*A  British  enterprise  compleied  in  x886  and  bought  out  by  the 
Oeman  compaii^* 


436      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

It  would  be  feasible  to  demand  that  the  German 
company^  in  return  for  adequate  compensation  else- 
where^ should  resign  its  claim  to  the  sections  of  the 
railway  South-East  of  Konia*  It  is  clear  that  these 
sections  are  not  economically  desirable  in  themsehres. 
The  first  runs  through  a  desolate  strip  between  steppe 
and  mountains,  the  second  is  the  costly  tunnel,  ^di 
will  eat  up  any  profits  the  Adana  section  beyond  it 
may  bring  in*  Their  importance  to  Germany  is  political, 
and  in  asking  her  to  resign  them  in  exchange  for 
economically  more  advantageous  openings  in  another 
direction  the  Anatolian  government  would  be  safe- 
guarding its  own  interests  without  violating  the  legiti- 
mate interests  of  Germany*  The  German  company 
would  be  more  than  compensated  by  receiving  the 
monopoly  of  all  construction  in  the  well-watered  but 
at  present  entirely  undeveloped  Cappadodan  region 
North-East  of  the  central  steppe,  as  far  as  the  new 
Russian  frontier*  A  branch  has  abready  thrust  itself 
Eastward  from  Eski  Shehr  to  Angora*  Hence  it  oodd 
be  carried  across  the  Kizil  Irmak  River  (Halys)  and 
might  split  thereafter  into  two  arms*  One  would  stretdi 
E*S*E*  through  Kaisaria  to  Malatia  on  the  West  bank 
of  Euphrates,  skirting  the  ribs  of  Taurus  on  the  Nordi ; 
the  other  would  work  its  way  North-East  through 
YozgSLt  and  Amasia  to  the  Black  Sea  port  of  Samsun*^ 

What  nation  is  to  step  into  Germany^s  shoes,  and 

^  The  startling  advantage  gained  by  Germany  in  the  Anatolian  Rail- 
way ooatract  led  Russia  to  obtain  an  agreement  from  Turkey  rcajuving 
to  her  own  enterprise  the  construction  of  all  railways  in  Anatolia  that 
should  debouch  on  the  Black  Sea  coast*  As  yet,  however,  she  has 
taken  no  advantage  of  this  concession,  and  if  she  gained  the  proposed 
extension  of  her  Caucasian  frontier  to  the  West  and  Soudi  she  bu^ 
fairly  be  asked  to  abandon  economic  interests  in  Anatolia  ootnde  ths 
new  line,  in  exchange  for  com|>lete  political  and  ecooomic  oostrol 
it. 


ANATOLIA  427 

secure  for  its  own  investors  the  right  to  buy  out 
the  German  company^s  interest  in  the  Konia-Adana 
section^  Every  consideration  suggests  Italy.  Italy 
has  suffered  even  more  than  Germany  by  being  handi- 
capped in  the  European  race*  Her  Abyssinian  adven- 
ture was  disastrous;  her  recent  acquisition  on  the 
North  African  coast  gives  her  a  very  limited  field ;  in 
the  interest  of  Balkan  independence  and  European 
peace  we  have  proposed  to  deny  her  expansion  across 
the  mouth  of  the  Adriatic  into  Albania,  and  finally 
we  have  asked  her  to  relinquish  her  aspirations  to  her 
Istrian  and  Triestine  **  irredenta/^  in  deference  to 
Germany^s  need  for  a  neutral  economic  outlet  upon 
the  Adriatic.  If,  then,  the  Anatolian  government,  for 
reasons  of  its  own,  decides  to  remove  a  certain  region 
from  the  sphere  of  German  enterprise,  Italy  has  surely 
the  best  claim  to  fill  the  vacant  place,  and  receive  the 
commission  of  opening  up  Anatolians  resources  in  this 
particular  direction* 

Italy,  moreover,  is  already  in  negotiation  with  the 
Ottoman  government  for  a  railway  concession  in  the 
hinterland  of  Adalia,  the  only  port  on  the  South  coast 
of  Anatolia  to  the  West  of  the  Adana  district  that  has 
practicable  lines  of  commtmication  through  the  Taurus 
with  the  central  plateau*  One  branch  of  the  new  Adalia 
railway  would  run  N.N.W.,  and  meet  the  English 
company^s  railhead  at  Buldur:  another  would  work 
across  the  mountains  in  a  North-Easterly  direction,  and 
emerge  after  many  detours  at  Konia.  Konia  would 
thus  become  the  junction  of  three  railway  systems*  The 
German  lines  from  the  North  would  meet  at  this  point 
the  two  railways  leading  to  Adana  and  Adalia  on  the 
South  coast,  and  it  would  be  an  obvious  convenience 
that  the  latter  should  be  under  the  same  management* 


4a8         THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

We  have  su^ested  the  partition  of  Anatohan  railway 
enterprise  among  companies  of  four  different  naticmali- 
ties,  French,  English,  German,  and  Italian,  co-ordiiut' 
ing  their  spheres  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  no  one  of  them 
the  opportunity  of  becoming  a  political  power  in  the 
land.  The  bond-holders  and  the  governments  behind 
them,  instead  of  regarding  their  economic  presena  in 
Anatolia  as  the  thin  end  of  a  political  mdge,  must 
count  it  all  gain  that  they  find  scope  for  theii  enterprise 
there  at  all,  and  resign  themselves  to  see  their  bold 
diminish  annually,  as  the  country  is  gradually  raised 
by  their  agency  towards  the  level  of  narive  wealth  viach 
will  enable  it  in  the  end  to  dispense  with  their  services 
alt(^ether.  On  the  day  when  she  has  accumulated 
enough  capital  to  buy  out  all  the  foreign  companies  at 
a  generous  price,  and  enough  human  skill  to  administer 
their  enterprises  with  a  national  personnel  of  her  own, 
Turkey  will  have  reached  her  majority,  and  fulfilled 
the  Panislamist's  dream  by  taking  her  stand  on  an  eqiul 
footing  with  the  nations  of  Europe. 

We  have  now  only  to  mark  out  the  frontiers  of  the 
rejuvenated  Anatolian  state,  before  we  pass  on  to 
Arabia.  On  the  North-West  towards  the  Black  Sea 
Straits  and  on  the  North-East  towards  the  Russian 
Empire,  they  are  already  defined :  we  have  still  two 
questions  to  consider,  the  sovereignty  of  the  Islands 
and  the  frontier  towards  Arabia  itself. 

(i.)  The  islands  off  the  AnatoUan  coast  ^  into 
three  divisions. 

(a)  The  group  along  the  Northern  section  of  tile  West 
coast,  whidi  is  entirely  Greek  in  nationaUty,  and  was 
conquered  by  the  Kingdom  of  Hellas  in  the  late  Balkan 
War.  It  consists  of  Mitylini,  Khios,  Psara,  Samos 
and  Nikaria.    In  spite  of  the  Young  Turk  chauvinists, 


ANATOLIA  429 

these  islands  must  remain  united  with  Greece,  since 
that  is  the  unanimous  desire  of  their  inhabitants* 

(6)  Those  along  the  Southern  section  of  the  West 
coast,  stretching  in  a  chain  from  Patmos  to  Rhodes 
(the  ""  Sporades  **)  and  including  the  stragglers  Asty- 
palia,  Karpathos  and  Kasos  besides*  This  group  was 
occupied  by  Italy  in  the  course  of  her  war  against 
Turkey  in  19x2,  and  she  stipulated  in  the  treaty  of 
Lausanne  that  it  should  remain  in  her  hands  till  Tripoli 
had  been  completely  evacuated  by  Turkish  troops,  after 
which  it  should  be  restored  to  the  Ottoman  government* 
Italy  has  shown  no  signs  of  relinquishing  her  hold, 
but  Europe  must  make  the  sanction  of  the  Adana  and 
Adalia  concessions  conditional  upon  her  doing  so*  The 
islands,  however,  must  not  pass  s^ain  into  the  hands  of 
Turkey*  They  are  as  Greek  as  the  Northern  group  in 
speech  and  feeling*  The  New  Anatolia  must  resign  all 
claims  over  them  to  the  Concert  of  Europe,  and  the 
Concert  must  assign  them  to  the  Kingdom  of  Hellas. 

(c)  Just  at  the  comer  where  West  and  South  coasts 
meet,  the  tiny  rock  of  Kastel6ritsa  lies  in  the  lee  of  the 
mainland*  Its  population  makes  a  considerable  liveli- 
hood by  the  Mediterranean  sponge-fishing  industry, 
which  attracts  its  sailing-boats  as  far  afield  as  the  North 
African  coast,  and  it  is  intensely  Greek  in  national 
sentiment* 

Kastel6ritsa  is  the  smallest  Greek  island  :  the  largest 
is  Cyprus*  It,  too,  lies  off  the  South  coast,  but  further 
to  the  East  and  far  out  to  sea,  its  outer  flank  being 
roughly  equidistant  from  Adalia,  Iskandenm  and 
Beirut* 

Till  Turkey  entered  the  war,  the  status  of  Cyprus 
was  similar  to  that  of  the  Sporades*  It  dated  from  a 
secret  agreement,  concluded  between  Ttirkey  and  Great 


430      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

Britain  in  June  1878,  after  the  close  of  the  Russo- 
Turkish  war  and  on  the  eve  of  the  Berlin  Cos^;ress« 

The  Russian  victory  had  alarmed  Great  Britain  £>r 
the  safety  of  her  Mediterranean  route  to  India*  She 
therefore  arranged  with  the  Porte  that  if  Russia  retained 
the  Armenian  fortress  of  Kars  in  the  settlement,  the 
island  of  Cyprus  should  be  placed  in  British  hands. 
The  legal  sovereignty  was  to  remain  with  the  Sultan, 
and  Great  Britain  tmdertook  in  return  to  guarantee  the 
integrity  of  the  Sultan's  continental  dominions  in  Asia, 
within  whatever  frontiers  were  fixed  at  the  impending 
Congress* 

The  terms  of  the  Berlin  Treaty  brought  these 
provisional  stipulations  into  force.  Russia  kept  Kars, 
but  the  British  guarantee  vetoed  her  further  advance 
towards  the  Levantine  coast :  even  should  the  guarantee 
prove  abortive,  the  occupation  of  Cyprus  left  Great 
Britain  in  strategical  command  of  the  situation. 

At  the  rupture  of  peace,  however,  the  Berlin  Treaty 
lapsed  with  all  its  corollaries,  and  Cyprus  was  formally 
annexed  to  the  British  Empire.^ 

Russophobes  will  rejoice  at  the  step,  because  it  brings 
Cyprus  completely  under  our  control*  ""  According  to 
your  own  proposals,'^  they  will  say,  **  the  resettlement 
after  the  present  war  is  to  advance  the  Russian  frontier 
right  across  the  Armenian  plateau,  at  least  half  the 
distance  towards  the  Mediterranean  shore.  This  makes 
the  retention  of  Cyprus  more  important  to  Great  Britain 
than  ever  it  was  before/^ 

Yet  the  problems  of  Cyprus  and  Armenia  are  comr 
pletely  on  a  par.    In  bodi  the  national  factor  is  at 


\ 


i  Ths  transfer  of  legal  sovereignty  to  the  actual  pogeasor  was  parallel 
to  the  Austrian  annexation  of  Bosnia  in  1908.  It  was  merely  a  farmal 
act.  Austria,  however,  was  at  peace  with  Turkey  when  she  took  the 
step,  and  therefore  acted  in  violation  of  valid 


ANATOLIA  431 

variance  with  such  strategical  considerations,  and  if  in 
Armenia  nationality  is  to  prevail,  we  must  defer  to  it  in 
Cyprus  likewise*  The  war  has  set  us  free  to  dispose  of 
Cyprus,  as  well  as  to  retain  it*  We  shall  choose  the 
former  alternative,  if  we  are  wise* 

The  island  has  benefited  much  by  our  strong  govern- 
ment (a  process  of  disinfection  which  every  country 
needs  to  go  through,  when  it  passes  out  of  Turkish  rale), 
but  that  phase  is  now  almost  past*  The  population  is 
Greek  in  language  and  civilisation,  and  is  becoming 
more  and  more  so  in  national  aspiration*^  It  cannot 
be  separated  permanently  from  the  Greek  national 
state*  At  some  moment  Great  Britain  must  gracefully 
retire,  and  we  should  allay  irritation  if  we  were  to 
proclaim  forthwith  tmder  what  circumstances  we  should 
consent  to  do  so*  The  natural  term  to  fix  would  be  the 
moment  when  Anatolia  buys  out  her  foreign  railways* 
When  she  has  so  far  recruited  her  native  economic 
strei^;th,  she  will  afford  such  an  effective  strategical 
bulwark  for  the  British  route  to  India  that  the  Russo- 
phobe will  sleep  in  peace  at  last* 

Thus  all  the  islands  off  the  Anatolian  coast  would 
pass  eventually  into  the  hands  of  Greece,  and  the 
continental  state  might  justly  complain  that  if  Greece 
were  allowed  to  fortify  them  and  convert  their  harbours 
into  naval  bases  at  her  pleasure,  Anatolia  would  virtu- 
ally be  subjected  to  a  continuous  blockade*  The  pass- 
age from  Smyrna  itself  to  the  open  sea  would  be  liable 
at  any  moment  to  be  dosed  by  flotillas  actii^  from 
Mitylini  and  Khios  on  either  flank*  In  handing  over, 
therefore,  to  Greece  the  islands  nowin  Italianoccupation, 
Europe  should  stipulate  that  not  only  they,  but  those 
acquired  by  Greece  in  1912,  and  also  Cyprus  whenever 

*  The  population  was  337,000  in  Z90Z,  of  whom  33%  were  Moslem* 


432      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

she  may  acquire  it,  shall  be  neutralised  from  the  military 
point  of  view :  Greece  on  her  part  must  promise  Europe 
to  leave  them  unfDrtified,  and  Europe  on  hers  mus: 
guarantee  their  perpetual  political  union  with  Greece* 
When  this  is  done,  it  will  be  both  needless  and  useless 
for  Anatolia  to  covet  the  possession  of  the  islands  any 
longer* 

(ii.)  In  drawing  the  frontier  between  Anatolia  and 
Arabia,  we  must  compromise,  as  usual,  between  national 
distribution  and  the  configtuation  of  the  country*  The 
line^  should  start  from  the  Mediterranean  coast  at  Ras 
al  Hanzir,  the  cape  that  contains  the  Gulf  of  Iskanderun 
on  the  South-East*  It  should  run  first  North-East  and 
then  North  along  the  summit  of  the  Amanus  range, 
parallel  to  the  coast  of  the  gulf  and  only  a  few  miles 
distant  from  it,  thus  assigning  Iskanderun  itself  to 
Anatolia*  When  it  reaches  the  latitude  of  the  most 
Northerly  point  in  the  gulf,  it  should  turn  East,  cross 
the  valley  of  the  Kara  Su,  and  proceed  North-East  again 
along  the  summit  of  the  Kurt  Dagh*  Thence  it  should 
follow  the  divide  between  the  Pyramus  and  Euphrates 
basins  in  the  same  direction,  till  it  reached  the  latitude 
in  which  the  Euphrates  makes  its  great  bend  from  a 
Westerly  to  a  Southerly  course,  below  Samsat*  At 
point  it  should  turn  due  East  and  head  for  the  Euphrati 
striking  it  just  at  the  bend* 

This  line  leaves  a  fringe  of  Turkish  population  outside, 
but  the  districts  this  minority  inhabits  are  geographic- 
ally dependent  on  the  great  Arabic  dty  of  Aleppo^  and 
cannot  be  sundered  from  it  politically* 

^  See  Vbp  VL 


ARABIA  433 


E*  The  New  Arabia 

We  have  now  to  deal  with  the  remainder  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  which  forms  an  indivisible  geo- 
graphical unit* 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  present  geological  period, 
the  heavy  rain  and  snow  falls  of  the  Armenian  plateau 
have  been  furrowing  out  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris 
systems  for  their  issue,  and  grinding  away  the  surface 
of  the  mountains  to  deposit  it  as  silt  at  the  head  of  the 
Persian  Gulf,  under  the  Western  lee  of  the  neighbour- 
plateau  of  Persia*  In  the  cotirse  of  ages  the  rivers^ 
action  has  made  the  sea  give  place  to  an  alluvial  plain 
hardly  less  level  than  itself,  nearly  four  hundred  miles 
long  and  about  a  third  as  much  in  breadth* 

If  we  compare  this  land  of  Irak-Arabi  (the  **  Shinar "" 
of  the  Bible)  to  the  orchestra  of  a  Greek  theatre,  we  shall 
find  the  auditorium  in  the  gently-tilted  plateaux  that 
rise  from  the  plain  in  a  great  semicircle  to  the  West  and 
South*  From  the  point  where  they  ascend  above  the 
irrigation-limit  of  the  rivers,  these  plateaux  become 
waterless  desert,  producing  at  best  a  sparse  crop  of 
grasses  in  the  spring,  and  presenting  at  worst  a  surface 
of  shifting  sand-hills,  or  of  basalt  botdder-fields,  the  relic 
of  volcanic  upheavals*  As  the  barren  shelves  mount 
away  from  the  rivers  their  slope  becomes  steeper,  till 
finally  it  culminates  in  agreat  retaining  wall  of  mountains 
which  rises  higher  than  all,  and  then  plunges  straight 
down  to  sea-level  on  its  sheer  Western  face* 

This  mountain-rim  of  the  desert  falls  into  two  sharply 
contrasted  sections*  Syria,  in  the  North,  abuts  upon 
the  Mediterranean,  and  the  West  winds  from  the 
Atlantic  carry  their  moisture  down  the  whole  length 


434      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 


\ 


of  the  Inland  Sea  to  surrender  it  in  life-giving  rain  when 
they  strike  Lebanon  and  the  **  Hill  country  of  Judah  '' 
on  its  extreme  shore*  Syria  shares  the  climate  and 
vegetation  of  Southern  Europe,  but  the  Hejaz,  idiich 
continues  the  line  of  Syria  towards  the  South-East, 
is  backed  by  nothing  better  than  the  Red  Sea,  a  sultry 
creek  separated  from  the  Atlantic  by  the  vast  breadth 
of  the  Sahara.  Here  the  desert  has  no  redeemmg 
Western  fringe,  and  the  strip  of  coast  beneath  the  motm- 
tain  wall,  along  which  lie  the  ports  of  the  Holy  Cities 
of  Islam,  is  the  most  cruel  ootmtry  in  the  whole  region* 

In  this  stem  theatre  has  been  played  the  world-<irama 
of  the  Semitic  Race*  Bred  in  the  keen  air  of  the  pitiless 
plateaux,  which  gives  men  the  fire  of  vitality  without  the 
fuel  to  maintain  it,  the  Semitic  nations  in  wave  after 
wave  have  surged  down  into  the  arena  of  Irak,  or  beaten 
upwards  against  the  breakwater  of  the  Syrian  mountains, 
to  scatter  themselves  in  spray  over  all  the  Mediterranean 
shores*  The  last  and  mightiest  of  these  catadysms 
was  Islam,  whose  tide  in  the  seventh  century  a*d*  swept 
out  from  the  Hejaz  over  the  world ;  and,  though  it  has 
bng  since  receded  from  its  furthest  marks,  it  has  settled 
permanently  over  this  original  Semitic  area,  and  given 
it  its  final  colour  both  in  religion  and  nationality* 

In  spite  of  a  few  surviving  outcrops  of  earlier  strata, 
the  present  population  of  the  region  is  as  homogeneous 
as  its  permanent  geographical  structure*  Arabic  speech 
and  Moslem  faith  provide  an  adequate  basis  for  a  new 
national  life,  and  materials  for  the  superstructure  itself 
are  ready  to  hand*  The  civilised  urban  class  of  the 
Syrian  towns  has  sent  repr^entatives  of  considerable 
pohtical  ability  to  the  Ottoman  parliament,  and  is  no 
less  capable  than  the  Anatolian  Turk  of  carrying  on  the 
functions  of  self-government  on  its  own  account*    Its 


ARABIA  435 

own  constructive  efforts  will  be  immensely  reinforced 
by  the  co-operation  of  talented  and  highly-educated 
volunteers  from  Arabic  lands  like  Egypt  and  Algeria, 
whose  populations  have  enjoyed  the  benefit  of  European 
**  strong  government/'  and  will  welcome  the  oppor- 
tunity of  propagating  its  fruits  without  its  thorns  in  this 
new  independent  focus  of  Arabic  tradition*  Moreover, 
the  **  New  Arabia '"  will  not  be  the  spiritual  centre  of 
the  Arab  race  alone*  By  taking  over  from  the  Ottoman 
Empire  the  guardianship  of  the  Holy  Cities,  it  will 
inherit  from  it  the  primacy  of  the  whole  Moslem  world* 
The  sovereign  of  the  new  state  will  become  the  official 
head  of  Islam,  and  Arabia  would  do  well  to  elect  as 
its  first  constitutional  sultan  some  prince  of  the  reigning 
Ottoman  house,  who  would  inherit  by  birth  the  personal 
claim  to  the  Caliphate  won  by  his  ancestor  SeUm,  and 
transmit  it  to  his  heirs.  This  junior  branch  of  the 
Ottoman  line  would  soon  eclipse  its  cousins  who  con- 
tinued to  rule  over  Anatolia,  and  the  Arab  would  oust 
the  Turk  again  from  the  dominant  place  among 
Mohammedan  nations* 

Yet  however  much  assistance  the  new  nation  may 
receive  from  the  loyal  sympathy  and  service  of  aU 
Islam,  the  task  before  it  is  not  easy*  The  Arabians 
will  inherit  more  evil  than  good  from  the  Ottoman 
Empire* 

Europe  must,  of  course,  free  them  from  the  bondage 
of  the  Capitulations  and  the  customs-treaties,  vnih  the 
same  UbtrHity  for  which  we  have  appealed  in  the  case 
of  Anatolia ;  but  they  will  have  to  shoulder  a  heavy 
burden  in  their  proportionate  share  of  the  Ottoman 
national  debt,  and  will  pay  for  the  follies  of  a  ruling 
class  for  which  they  are  even  less  responsible  than  the 
Anatolian  peasant* 


«6      THE  DISMANTLING  OF  TURKEY 

The  revenues  ceded,  by  the  decree  of  z88z,  to  the 
international  Administration  of  the  Debt  must  be  left, 
as  heretofore,  tmder  the  Administration's  control,  in 
spite  of  the  break  in  political  continuity*  The  surveil- 
lance of  an  expert  European  executive  over  the  chief 
factors  of  native  finance  will  indeed  be  as  great  a  boon 
to  the  New  Arabia  for  many  years  to  come  as  it  has  been 
to  the  moribund  Ottoman  Empire  during  the  last 
generation*  The  native  government  will  be  able  to 
devote  itself  to  internal  problems  of  nationality,  which 
are  ultimately  of  more  importance  and  immediately 
more  within  its  scope* 

(i*)  The  Christian  minority  falls  into  several  groups, 
of  which  the  Maronites  in  Lebanon  are  consider- 
ably the  most  important*  Descended  from  the  older 
Syriac  race,  they  have  preserved  their  dialect  and 
religion  ever  since  the  Arabs  brought  Islam  into  the 
land*  In  the  eighteenth  century  they  entered  into  full 
communion  vnth  the  Roman  Church,  and  came  thereby 
into  relation  with  France,  already  the  leading  Catholic 
power*  The  French  influence  was  confirmed  by  the 
result  of  the  Crimean  War*  In  1864,  not  many  years 
after  peace  had  been  made,  there  was  a  rising  of  the 
Maronites  in  defence  of  their  prescriptive  autonomy, 
and  France  insisted  upon  the  erection  of  an  autonomous 
Lebanon-vilayet,  which  was  placed  under  a  Christian 
governor  nominated  by  the  Porte,  but  was  also  guaran- 
teed by  Europe*  The  Maronites  constitute  about  three- 
fifths  of  the  population  in  this  favoured  area*^  Thanks 
to  their  native  history  and  to  the  French  missions,  they 
are  at  once  the  most  vigorous  and  the  most  intelligent 
element  in  Syria,  and  however  optimistic  we  may  be 

'  There  are  about  300,000  of  them  in  the  Lebanon,  and  perhaps 
half  a  million  in  the  whole  of  Syria* 


ARABIA  437 

of  the  New  Arabia's  success,  we  must  on  no  account 
allow  the  Lebanon  to  lose  its  special  status* 

Not  only  must  the  Maronites'  autonomy  be  preserved : 
it  must  be  extended,  if  possible,  in  a  more  rudimentary 
form  to  the  remnant  of  Monophysite  **  Jacobites '' 
scattered  through  the  provinces  of  Urfa,  Diarbekr 
and  Mardin,  and  to  that  fraction  of  the  Nestorians  that 
has  ventured  to  leave  its  mountain  refuge  in  2^gros 
and  the  Urumia  basin,  and  to  setde  among  the  Moslems 
in  the  lowland  district  of  Mostd  on  the  Tigris*  Unlike 
the  Maronites,  these  fragments  of  more  Easterly  com- 
munities are  sadly  broken  in  spirit,  but  their  social 
condition  has  been  gready  improved  of  late  years  by 
the  splendid  American  missions*  The  revival  already 
manifesting  itself  among  them  may  even  spread  to  the 
neglected  and  isolated  litde  sect  of  Satan-worshippers 
who  dwell  West  of  Mosul  in  the  Sinjar  hills,  and  secure 
for  them  a  similar  recognition* 

(ii.)  While  there  is  no  friction  between  the  Qiristi