1 Introduction

Following the fall of communism, we have seen a spectacular revival and strengthening of Christian democratic thinking in Hungary. In the wake of the regime change the institutional system of the communist (state socialist) people’s republic (dictatorship) was dismantled and the economic, political, organizational, and human cultural conditions for a new type of internal order were established throughout Central Europe. During the first period of the new awakening, the questions of what freedom means, which economic model best fits the traditions of Hungarian society, how a multi-party system can be guaranteed, and, more generally, what the internal order of the new Hungarian democracy should be, became particularly interesting (Romsics 2007). In answering these questions Christian democratic thinking became a dominant force in the political life of Hungary, and today it has become an important self-definition of the Hungarian government. At the same time, over the past thirty-three years, fundamental differences can be discerned in the perception of Christianity and Christian democracy between the first-generation government of the first freely elected Prime Minister, József Antall (1990–1993), and the generation of the current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has governed with a two-thirds mandate for several consecutive terms since 2010. The link between the two governments is the only historical party in the Hungarian Parliament, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Keresztéydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP), which was represented in both the government of József Antall and those led by Viktor Orbán since 2010. It is interesting to note that both the first freely elected Hungarian Prime Minister and also the current one have favored the term Christian Democrat and have placed themselves in the heritage of this intellectual movement. Therefore, it is perhaps worth looking at the elements that have defined this school of thought and how the social teaching of the church has been reflected in them. But if we look at the writing and speeches of József Antall and the thinkers he quoted, a different tradition and a different picture of Hungarian Christian democracy emerges than in the speeches of today’s Prime Minister. This is particularly interesting because the first Hungarian Prime Minister was cited several times as a role model by Viktor Orbán. But what is this difference and how can it be identified? This is what we will try to answer in the following paragraphs. After all, this could help us to understand the roots of today’s concept of Christian democracy in some Central European countries, including Hungary.

Hungarian Christian democracy could not exist in public before 1989. The Soviet occupation in 1945 wiped out the new Christian approach from Hungarian political life, represented by the just founded Christian Democratic People’s Party led by the well-known politician István Barankovics (1906–1974). In the last years of the Horthy-era he wanted to form “a party that is active, bears democratic credibility, free of all past burdens and offers a nationwide political program. A party that can employ the full range of modern political weaponry to protect the material, social and political prerequisites of the successful fulfilment of the Church’s spiritual mission, i.e., to protect the interests of faithful masses too” (cited by Petrás 2017, 21.). This political community represented a completely new color in modern Hungarian politics. The movement wanted to break with many of the previous Christian conservative political topoi and sought a new way forward from the previous directions of political Catholicism. Its thinking clearly rejected totalitarian state structures and advocated the elements of democracy and human liberties, as well as profound state reform based on Christian solidarity. This movement also sought to organize the relationship between the individual and the state, and between political representation and economic actors, along the lines of the social doctrine of Christianity. The new party clearly distanced itself from the conservative Catholic Church leadership and sought to develop an independent political perspective by moving toward ecumenism. With this background the newly formed Democratic People’s Party (Demokrata Néppárt, DNP)—which dropped the word Christian from its name in 1945—was characterized by a deep democratic approach based on freedom and equality; a strong social sensibility; the support of the workers and “the ordinary people” against large industrialists, capital owners, and large estate holders; by tolerance toward national minorities; by the endeavor to build a local government system and to renew Hungarian politics based on a Christian ideal of the state (Szabó 2017, 32–36). Although it had large support in the Hungarian population, its operation was made impossible by the communist authorities from the beginning through administrative means, then through open intimidation, harassment, and finally through radical punishment and the operation of the secret service. The Christian social political alternative became completely impossible in the Soviet-occupied part of Central Europe after 1948 at the latest (Soós 2015).

The opportunity for a real unfolding opened up for the Christian Democratic tradition with the erosion of the Kádár-regime (1957–1989) and the emergence of internal opposition. And, as had happened between the two world wars, the revival of the movement preceded the party, partly by reorganizing the structures of the previous era (like the Hungarian Scout Association or the National Society of Christian Agrarian Youth, KALOT) and partly by founding new ones. Among the latter, the Márton Áron Society, led by Sándor Keresztes, and the Association of Christian Intellectuals, founded by Béla Csanád, the largest Hungarian Christian ecumenical civil evangelization organization, played a prominent role (Zachar 2021). The modern Christian conservative worldview appeared in an organized form in the context of the first free elections and were eventually incorporated into the political program of the first freely elected Prime Minister. Here, József Antall always claimed the influence of the earlier Barankovics-legacy, the aforementioned traditions, although he was not the leading politician of the re-established Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), but of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF). Nevertheless, for the conservative politician, Christian traditions and the social teachings of the Church were an important reference point.

2 József Antall

Antall’s political program was very clear and simple. Hungary wants to return to the European heritage, but also to all the new values that Europe has created over the past 40 years in the wake of the terrible experiences and lessons of the Second World War. József Antall’s conception of Christian democracy was inspired both by the basic tenets of the great Western statesmen, notably Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, and Alcide De Gasperi (rejection of extremism, social justice, family-centeredness, solidarity, a strong Europe with the cooperation of different nations) and by the Christian Democratic program laid down by Barankovics (human liberties, Christian state, freedom and equality, democracy, and self-government). He underlined in several speeches that in Christian democracy, democracy means the same as in popular-national and national-liberal systems, but it has a special meaning because it represents the fundamental ethical values, the fundamental spirit and the universality of two thousand years of Christianity, which unites the peoples of Europe and balances national prejudices. It was this Christian spirit that motivated Antall when he consistently distanced himself from more conservative Christian movements that confronted democratic concepts. In his thinking, national-liberal and Christian democratic values were far from being irreconcilable, contradictory, or opposing ideologies. For him, it was clear that liberalism and democracy have been so intertwined since the nineteenth century that when we talk about liberalism, we basically mean the rule of law, democratic state, and free-market economy. However, in Hungarian historical development, all this was linked to the realization of national liberalism as a defining feature of the political heritage. Hungarian historical liberalism, when it was born, was closely linked to the idea of nationalism, to the idea of national rebirth, to the idea of independence, sovereignty, and a continuous progress toward a better society (Erdődy 2011). But interestingly, in Antall’s views, national autonomy was necessary so that nations of similar development and thinking could then create political actions together. In this way the idea of nationalism went well with the idea of federalism, and also with the idea of European subsidiarity. In Antall’s views through subsidiarity, fundamental issues should remain local, at member state level, but common law, common economic policy, and common security policy could be areas where member states could decide together, relinquishing some elements of their own sovereignty, in the interests of all. For Antall, this could also have been the issue of settling the fate of Hungarians beyond the borders, since by making borders permeable and strengthening local cooperation, it would have been possible to overcome divisions and achieve peaceful cross-border national unification. His personal commitment was exemplified by the fact that he placed the European flag next to the Hungarian flag on his desk, while stressing that Hungary and the other Eastern European countries have a legitimate claim to integration, as they have sacrificed their blood for freedom. For József Antall, therefore, Christianity, Europeanism, liberal thinking, and social sensitivity are values that are not mutually exclusive, but rather integrated. In an interview Antall stated:

The MDF has moved towards the Austrian People’s Party and other Western European people’s parties, the various liberal parties of the European Democratic Union (EDU), some of them Christian Democrats, others conservative. The liberal, Christian and social elements are common to all Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe. It is, of course, an emphatically inter-confessional, non-ideological party, in which European Christianity and the Christian ethic are the dominant motives. It is precisely this lack of ideological character that distinguishes it from the Christian Democratic People’s Party. … The political commitment of the MDF is clear, with a synthesis of the liberal rule of law and the social state, a commitment to the social market economy and the representation of Christian values, balancing national and European, individual and community human rights (Antall 1990).

At the heart of Antall’s program was the human being, whose needs at community level would be served by the political institutions, including governance, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. This presupposed a rule of law, so that the citizens of the state and the economic and social organizations that operate in it could calculate the legal consequences of their behavior with a high degree of certainty and over the long term. Antall saw Hungarian history primarily in the context of interruptions and continuity. From his point of view, his political program was ending the disjuncture, i.e., restoring continuity. He interpreted historical events—however shocking or tragic—not as a set of dramatic situations, but as part of an epic process; he was not interested in the moral-emotional lessons that would have a cathartic effect, but rather in the causes of events and the ways in which they could be overwritten or continued (Kulin 2018). He was aware that the last 40 years had marked a huge break in the history of Hungary. However, he wanted to return to the Hungarian democratic and deep European heritage, but also to all the new values that Europe had created over the preceding 40 years, in the wake of and after the terrible experiences of the Second World War (Antall 1994, 35). In this regard Antall saw Christianity—just like István Barankovics 45 years earlier—not necessarily as a religious or ecclesiastical obligation, but as a culture, an ethic virtue, a spiritual community that would show the way.

If we look at today’s Hungarian political statements, it may seem that these aspects are not the most important; that we see a substantially different approach in the interpretation of Christian Democracy. One of the most important of these departures is the notion that Western models no longer cover the original content of Christian democracy, and the Christian parties of Western Europe have become empty, have lost their ideological roots and have drifted more to the left in order to win votes. The criticism that many political science studies in Hungary now level against the Western model of (liberal and Christian) democracy is not entirely new. Very similar topics and very similar questions were already raised in Hungary and throughout Europe after the First World War. In today’s political discourse in Hungary there are numerous references to the political history of the interwar period. The following short analysis focuses on the extent to which thoughts of today’s understanding of democracy in Hungary are rooted in the political thinking of the interwar period. Terms used by leading Hungarian politicians, especially Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, show a clear overlap or reference to the discourses of the earlier era. These terms include expressions such as “society of labor,” the “duty of capital,” “protection of Christian social structure,” “outdated and obsolete liberalism,” “third way,” “protection of families,” “strengthening of birth rates,” “protection of Christian Europe.” These terms are particularly important because of the redefinition of conservative Christian democracy in Hungary in recent years by the statements of Viktor Orbán.

3 Viktor Orbán

If we look at the state concept of the current Prime Minister, we see that two major turns emerge from his speeches: according to his concept there were two revolutionary changes in modern Hungary. The first one, the “liberal change in regime,” freed Hungary from oppression and Soviet rule, and produced a liberal democracy that focused on “freedom from something.” Although he sees Antall as a role model, the current Prime Minister also believes that his opportunities were limited. Antall failed to achieve what he believed was his goal: a strong, Christian, new Hungarian state that would break with communism in every respect. Therefore, the only way Orbán, as the spiritual heir of Antall,Footnote 1 can pay tribute to the memory of the former Prime Minister is—free from the constraints due to the two-thirds mandate—to build and realize a new Hungarian state on the basis of traditional Christian values (Orbán 2018).

In 2019, the Hungarian Prime Minister declared: “We have created a Hungarian Christian Democratic state. The second regime change was a Christian regime change, the philosophical basis of which was Christian freedom.” This “constitutional revolution” based on a two-thirds majority—as Orbán called it—resulted in a new Christian democracy based on Christian freedom. In his view, “the era of liberal democracy is over,” it has become incapable of defending the dignity of man, of granting freedom, it can no longer guarantee physical security, and it can no longer maintain Christian culture. Viktor Orbán called a work-based society (society of labor) the basis of Christian freedom, supporting families instead of immigration, welcoming Hungarian people from beyond the borders instead of betraying the nation. The Hungarian response to a changed world is to “build a twenty-first century Christian democracy instead of a liberal democracy that has run aground, which guarantees human dignity, freedom and security, protects the equality of men and women, the traditional family model, curbs anti-Semitism, defends our Christian culture and gives our nation a chance to survive and prosper” (Orbán 2019).

As can be seen, central to the Hungarian Prime Minister’s explanation is the unfolding of Christian freedom and its manifestation in every aspect of state life. This newly discovered traditional concept of Christian freedom is today a point of reference not only for social issues but also for economic and state organization issues in Hungary. In some of his speeches the Prime Minister says that after 2010, Hungary is operating on a “Christian democratic economic model.” But, more importantly, he has called for a return to an earlier way of thinking, questioning a major phase of European development. In a radio interview, Orbán expressed that “We are not liberals, and we are not building a liberal democracy: we are building a Christian democracy”; and later, he continued, “I could say we are working on building an old-school Christian democracy, rooted in European traditions” (cited by Jancsó 2022). The background to this may be the concept of Christian freedom, which we already have touched upon and which Orbán has repeatedly addressed in his famous speeches at Bálványos Free Summer University (Tusnádfürdő/Baile Tusnad in Romania) in 2014 and 2018. According to Christian freedom the new state has to be built on those individual achievements which also benefit the community, such as: self-reliance; work and the ability to create and to make a living; learning; a healthy lifestyle; paying taxes; starting a family and raising children; the ability to orient oneself in the affairs and history of the nation; and participating in national self-reflection. But the most important point is that Christian freedom justifies a new governing principle, and according to Orbán it summarizes a kind of politics, which defends the Christian way of life. In this train of thought, Christian freedom is not an individual goal anymore but a national program for a true Christian democrat (Szabó 2020). This is why we can assume—partly because of the vocabulary and similar topics—that the current understanding of the conservative Hungarian political class is strongly rooted in the political Catholicism of Hungary in the interwar period (Wolkenstein 2022a).

4 Catholic Anti-Liberalism in Interwar Europe

Interwar Europe became a breeding ground for a race of various concepts from the point of view of intellectual history. Common to different political ideas popular during the era was that they wished to radically break away from the overloaded forms of liberalism that had become almost hegemonic by the end of the nineteenth century and the patterns of plutocratic Manchester Capitalism resulting from liberalism. Various movements, including political Catholicism raised serious criticism against individualism and the homo oeconomicus driven by market and profit maximization from the last third of the nineteenth century onward. At the same time, the ideas of community and social cohesion gained more ground, Christian intellectuals rediscovered the moral theology of St Thomas Aquinas and the moral philosophy of St Augustine. Therefore, the need to create a new political and socio-economic system emerged and came to be widely accepted in conservative-catholic circles. This anti-liberalism became a negation of modern parliamentarism, and anti-capitalism turned into the search for social justice, though this took different forms. The prominent ideologues of the era were convinced that this new state order would enable society to get rid of the “liberalistic” approach to state, and, at the same time, the “total state” represented by bolshevism (Stalin’s international socialism), fascism, or national socialism (Hitlerism).

Contemporary Christian intellectuals looking for answers (economists, philosophers, historians, sociologists, clerics) could base their concepts on several forerunners, reaching back to the “organic society approach” by Saint Thomas Aquinas. A common characteristic of theories emerging in the era was that they did not approach the structure of the state from the aspect of the individual, but that of social groups. The latter form of thought, based primarily on the social teachings of the Catholic Church, recommended the creation of a new socio-economic order based on subsidiarity, also providing space for democratic elements. Its determinant documents were the encyclical Rerum novarum on the condition of the working classes, issued by Pope Leo XIII on 15 May 1891, and the encyclical Quadragesimo anno issued by Pope Pius XI, commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the great predecessor. These papal statements resulted in a more detailed elaboration of the system based on vocational orders, and several attempts to put the idea of solidarism and the idea of vocational orders into practice. The leading figures in the scientific discourse emerging throughout Europe were convinced that faith- and community-based socio-political instruments could be created to tackle the crisis and bring about renewal. The new solutions, based on the former Jesuit school of economics (the solidarism of Heinrich Pesch), sought to remedy the contradictions in modern society (referred to in Marxist literature as class contradictions) by a new form of representation, by implementing a horizontal occupational stratification of society (vocational orders), by a solidarity and subsidiarity of interests built on this, and by generalizing a new virtuous economic policy conception that put man at the center again. “For what is the essence of this vocational order?”—The question was posed by Vid Mihelics, a Catholic sociologist who was one of the most important researchers in Hungary at the time. “The restoration of the right order in the relationship between the individual and the community, between small communities and society, between society and the state, so that the masses may once again become a people, whose political and economic activity in particular is guided by its natural leaders in the spirit of social justice” (Mihelics 1940, 5).

The appearance of these ideas in the Hungarian academic discourse around the turn of the century can be clearly noticed. Priest, scientist, diocesan, preacher, philosopher Ottokár Prohászka (1858–1927) translated Rerum Novarum, rejected in his writings the socialist ideology based on Marxism as well as the liberal secularized political order, but embraced social sensitivity stemming from the Christian traditions. Prohászka did not only translate the encyclical into Hungarian, but also initiated the organization of the Catholic People’s Party, which was intended to protect church interests on the political stage. Then the establishment of Christian labor associations, the promotion of social reform efforts, and the approach toward democratic ideas started under the leadership of papal prelate Sándor Giesswein (1856–1923), who was also a member of parliament for the Catholic People’s Party (Gergely 1993). It was their efforts that led to the emergence in Hungary of an increasingly strong tendency toward the representation of interests according to occupational branches (vocational orders) and thus toward the establishment of a more just social order. A significant part of Hungarian political Catholicism was convinced that the Marxist approach of opposition between social classes can be eliminated by the cooperation of Christian organizations of occupational fields (Strausz 2010). The appearance of such organizations took place in Hungary within a short period of time in the wake and framework of the Actio Catholica [Catholic Action] (AC), which catalyzed the establishment of further organizations (Gianone 2000).

If we examine relevant contemporary documents and events, it becomes clear that we may regard Jesuit father László Varga (1901–1974) as the most significant Hungarian thinker of the new social order and of political Catholicism in the thirties. His thoughts are extremely significant imprints of Hungarian interwar theorizing, as he always strove to give professional, precise, and practical guidance based on facts known to him at the time in order to resolve the social and economic crisis of the era. He repeatedly gave voice to the view that changes were necessary following the publication of Quadragesimo anno: the papal encyclical forced all thinkers open to reforms to address the spiritual, social, economic, and societal problems mentioned in the encyclical (Varga 1933).The focus of his ideas was the construction of a society based on a new non-liberal order. The past search for solutions made it clear that the ways taken before had come to a dead end. On the one hand, the implementation of socialism had neutralized all economic initiative created by entrepreneurs. According to László Varga, this made effective production impossible. However, on the other hand, unlimited capitalism did not possess the moral powers that could have preserved human character and initiative within a rapidly progressing world of technology (Varga 1941). During the search for a way out, Varga’s views also expressed the clear rejection of revolutionary solutions and dictatorial efforts. However, he professed his faith in a strong state, whose role is to serve the nation as its most important organization of law, power, and welfare. Society takes precedence in all issues, but is further divided into smaller communities which strive to achieve partial aims besides the political common good of the nation. His opinion was that the state therefore would be right if “it organizes economic society (or the society of those operating in economy) in a way that it serves national public interests independently, by directing itself according to social justice” (Strausz 2011, 190). This organic, neo-thomistic view of society proposed the creation of voluntary (professional) self-governing organizations, which could become the basic units of solidarity in society, overcoming individualism and replacing the dreaded Marxist class society. On the basis of subsidiarity, they would be able to decide for themselves on the most important (even political) issues, so that the state would only perform those tasks that the citizens’ associations (vocational orders) are not able to carry out. With his writings he aimed to promote the implementation of this new “social order” and to spread the theory of Jesuit solidarism based on papal encyclicals and the teachings of Heinrich Pesch S.J., Gustav Gundlach S.J., and Oswald Nell-Breuning S.J. (Zachar 2018).

Regarding the structure and role of the state, Father Varga clearly depicted a strong public authority responsible for public good, still within certain limits. According to him, the state was “nothing else than the public entity of social justice based on self-government” as a result of its structural and systemic diversification into vocational orders. The state actually becomes a servant of society through its help in making individuals achieve their aims more easily and completely within the frameworks of this self-governing units, while the public good is also realized in the cooperation of the vocational orders. However, the state—in order to satisfy the theory of subsidiarity and maintain peace and the common good—may not extend its responsibilities to tasks and issues that belong to individual citizens or their vocational communities, because it would lead to the creation of a totalitarian regime (Varga 1941, 19–23).

This all can only be achieved with the economic order defined by Quadragesimo anno, by the equality of labor and capital, and the construction of the “society of work.” In a society, which has three major frameworks, families, working (vocational) associations, and the state, the reconciliation of individual freedom and public interests becomes possible through the work of the intermediate vocational orders, the class struggle is terminated, and social responsibility is no longer a private issue, but—through solidarity—a public matter (Varga 1941, 25–31). Summarizing the traditional ideas of solidarism based on the works of ethicist and economist Heinrich Pesch S.J. (1854–1926), László Varga’s expectation was that social justice, that is the fair distribution of wealth, opportunities, and privileges within a society, would become the primary governing principle of national economy instead of the selfishness of unbridled capitalism, which Varga—using journalistic terms of his times—described as the dictatorship of free competition and capital. By implementing the new state-theoretical framework Varga outlined in his works, he believed that a fair distribution of incomes could be realized, and class struggle would be replaced by the cooperation of various professions, under the supervision and control of state power (Varga 1933, 20–21). In this system of vocational orders, the market economy does not give up on individual initiative and provides an opportunity for individuals with outstanding skills to develop their talents, also stimulating enterprise in society. Following the footsteps of the Fribourg Union, Rerum Novarum, and Quadragesimo anno, László Varga also declared that profits and gains acquired in a fair and honest way were not morally questionable, but necessary for the economy. However, he also emphasized the dual nature of wealth and the social responsibility stemming from it (Varga 1941, 65–67). One of the most important consequences of the introduction of the vocational order based on the teachings of the Catholic Church for Varga was the fact that in contrast to capitalism, where profit is the only norm of economic activity, the new framework involved private interests as a force inspiring people to enterprise and work, while the basic governing principle was the interest of public good, the law of social justice. Varga also strove to realize his beliefs on the stage of everyday politics.

With other prominent figures of the vocational order, their common political program was to convince society to find the Christian social order that would protect and further develop the Hungarian state apparatus, even in times of extremist ideas, in the midst of unlimited liberalism, Stalinist Bolshevism, Hitler’s National Socialism, and European authoritarian tendencies. This meant a reaffirmation of clear social hierarchies, stability, and national traditions. Therefore, it was seen as indispensable to create a state apparatus with the objective of the public good, and, at the same time, to ensure the operation of small communities, social groups, and organizations which shared the aim of the public good. In other words, the modern state ought to be strong, but well-structured and take into consideration all the rights derived from Christian teaching, not allowing liberal or socialist political thought to undermine traditional elements. Without precisely defining the form of state (whether monarchy, republic, or any other form of state), a new social order based on the social teaching of the church was defined as a counterweight to the liberal parliamentary state system, corrective of and supplementary to the modern democratic concept of state. However, in the midst of the preparations for war in Europe and later the tragedy of the Second World War, this could not be implemented in Hungary.

5 Political Catholicism After Second World War

At the end of the Second World War, Hungary’s Catholic political elite recognized that the previous concept, mainly outlined by Father Varga, would no longer be feasible in politics and that the European academic debate and Christian elite were clearly focused on the correction, not the abolition, of the liberal state. This required a modern Catholic-based party in order to carry out the reform program. In the last years of the war, the first attempt to form a new party along Christian traditions and reforms was launched. As a result of the secret meeting of Catholic intelligentsia in Győr in 1943, the new Catholic Social People’s Movement was established and in the last months of 1944 a modern Christian Democratic organization grew out of it (Klestenitz et al. 2019). This marked the emergence of a modern, Western-type Christian Democratic tendency, and a departure from the previous concept of the vocational order. Sociologist, politician, writer Vid Mihelics—one of the most prominent figures of the new movement—repeatedly pointed out that it is the task of religious society to complement the liberal political system in crisis, to complement parliamentary politics, and thus to give a democratic underpinning to a system not based solely on mass parties and majority voting. He was convinced that a new model of state organization can be created which would most effectively implement modern democracy (Petrás 2017). His views and solutions were in many ways in line with the Montesquieu-principle of checks and balances, the papal acceptance of the republican form of government and democracy, and the birth of ecumenical Christian democratic politics. The members of the Catholic Social People’s Movement introduced the notions of the common good, local self-government, and civil society into political thought and highlighted the importance of two new branches of power: the economy and the media. Finally, in contrast to the hard-line political Catholicism of the past, István Barankovics’ new, Western-style conception of Christian democracy prevailed in Hungary in 1945.

6 Contemporary Return to Interwar Ideas

But if we go back to the ideas raised in our paper, we can basically see that these ideas and questions are reflected again in today’s political debates. It is clear from the above that the current Hungarian political elite’s ambition is to redefine twenty-first century Christian democracy in the country, while returning to its historical model and especially the roots laid down by Father Varga and the movement for vocational orders in the interwar era. In Orbán’s interpretation, the path followed by Christian politics after the Second World War is no longer viable. He is offering a diverging path to the one professed since the Second World War by this political family; that is, a Christianity used in party politics as a civilizational heritage to heal conflicts in a secular and politically liberal era, implying a distancing from its nineteenth-century origin and a new rejection of liberal democracy. Orbán goes back to this origin of Christian democracy. His views echo many elements of the earlier argument that liberalism has failed to create a political and social environment that is viable for all. Not only liberal parliamentarism, but also some other non-liberal-based political representation could be the solution to modern democracy. Christian freedom is in this context opposed to “European (political) correctness.” For this reason, the Prime Minister also makes radical or what he considers to be unambiguous statements in many cases and tries to avoid the appearance of political correctness in his language. Although the announced program lacks the grand visions and comprehensive systemic interpretations of an earlier era, it tries to turn Christian tradition into a norm for decision-making in everyday life and regularly refers to the prior two thousand years of tradition in the decision-making processes. This shows the influence of Saint John Paul II and Benedict XVI, who wished to revive the notion of Christian Europe. Popes wanted to start a “re-evangelization of Europe” and wanted the Central European countries to join the West in order to change, transform, and revitalize the secularized and multicultural countries of the West with their thousands year-old Christian heritage (Wolkenstein 2022b).

Orbán said in 2019 that Christian freedom is constituted by “patriots instead of cosmopolitans, patriotism instead of internationalism, marriage and family instead of promoting same-sex relationships, protection of the children instead of drug liberalization, border protection instead of migration, Hungarian children instead of migrants and Christian culture instead of a multicultural mishmash.” This Christian freedom teaches us—so Orbán—“that nations are free and should not be subordinated to the laws of a global government, as empires oppress nations and are therefore dangerous and undesirable” (Orbán, 2019). Therefore, the Hungarian government uses Christian freedom as the right to defend its Christian way of life. If there are liberal rights there should be rights to defend everything that—derived from Christianity over the course of two thousand years, from the accumulated lives of successive generations—has created a Christian culture. This is the political meaning of Christian freedom in Hungarian politics of the twenty-first century. In this sense, it has become not only an individual goal but a national program with a strong and devoted leader. We see some recurring elements like order and clear social hierarchies, male values and roles, stability, national independence, strong leadership and ethno-national exceptionalism, strong state control with controlled markets and civil sphere (Heinrich 2019). The Hungarian Prime Minister has also promised in his speeches to fight for a politics where Christian traditions are not subject to any ideological censorship (Wolkenstein 2022b). And he is confident that the heart of Christian Europe and the core of modern Christian democracy lie within the countries of Central Europe (Krastev and Holmes 2018, 127). In this regard, the picture of Christian traditions and Christian democracy is a completely different one than that of József Antall in the first years of the free Hungarian state. However, its functioning, actual experience, and consequences require further analysis, and it will be up to historians and political scientists to explain the deeper layers of this in future discussions.