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Global Politics Global Politics A N D R EW H EY WO O D © Andrew Heywood 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-4039-8982-6 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Printed in China For Oliver, Freya, Dominic and Toby This page intentionally left blank Brief Contents 1 Introducing Global Politics 1 2 Historical Context 25 3 Theories of Global Politics 53 4 The Economy in a Global Age 83 5 The State and Foreign Policy in a Global Age 111 6 Society in a Global Age 136 7 The Nation in a Global Age 157 8 Identity, Culture and Challenges to the West 181 9 Power and Twenty-first Century World Order 209 10 War and Peace 239 11 Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament 263 12 Terrorism 282 13 Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention 303 14 International Law 331 15 Poverty and Development 352 16 Global Environmental Issues 383 17 Gender in Global Politics 412 18 International Organization and the United Nations 432 19 Global Governance and the Bretton Woods System 456 20 Regionalism and Global Politics 480 21 Global Futures 507 vii This page intentionally left blank Contents List of Illustrative Material xiv Road to World War II 32 Preface xix End of Empires 36 Acknowledgements xxii Rise and fall of the Cold War 38 THE WORLD SINCE 1990 44 A ‘new world order’? 44 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’ 45 1 Introducing Global Politics 1 Shifting balances within the global economy 50 WHAT IS GLOBAL POLITICS? 2 What’s in a name? 2 3 Theories of Global Politics 53 From international politics to global politics 3 Globalization and its implications 9 MAINSTREAM PERSPECTIVES 54 LENSES ON GLOBAL POLITICS 12 Realism 54 Mainstream perspectives 12 Liberalism 61 Critical perspectives 15 CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 67 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN Marxism, neo-Marxism and critical GLOBAL POLITICS 17 theory 67 Power 17 Social constructivism 71 Security 19 Poststructuralism 73 Justice 21 Feminism 74 USING THIS BOOK 21 Green politics 75 Postcolonialism 76 THINKING GLOBALLY 77 2 Historical Context 25 Challenge of interconnectedness 77 Cosmopolitanism 79 MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 26 Paradigms: enlightening or constraining? 81 From ancient to modern 26 Rise of the West 27 Age of imperialism 28 4 The Economy in a Global Age 83 THE ‘SHORT’ TWENTIETH CENTURY: 1914–90 29 CAPITALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM 84 Origins of World War I 29 Capitalisms of the world 84 ix x CONTENTS Triumph of neoliberalism 90 Transnational social movements Implications of neoliberalism 91 and NGOs 152 ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 93 Globalization from below? 155 Causes of economic globalization 93 How globalized is economic life? 96 GLOBAL CAPITALISM IN CRISIS 100 7 The Nation in a Global Age 157 Explaining booms and slumps 100 NATIONALISM AND WORLD POLITICS 158 Lessons of the Great Crash 103 Making sense of nationalism 158 Modern crises and ‘contagions’ 104 A world of nation-states 161 Nationalism, war and conflict 165 NATIONS IN A GLOBAL WORLD 166 5 The State and Foreign Policy A world on the move 168 in a Global Age 111 Transnational communities and diasporas 171 STATES AND STATEHOOD IN FLUX 112 Hybridity and multiculturalism 173 States and sovereignty 112 NATIONALISM REVIVED 175 The state and globalization 114 National self-assertion in the post- State transformation 118 Cold War period 175 Return of the state 121 Rise of cultural and ethnic nationalism 178 Anti-globalization nationalism 179 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 123 From government to governance 123 Multi-level governance 126 8 Identity, Culture and FOREIGN POLICY 128 Challenges to the West 181 End of foreign policy? 128 RISE OF IDENTITY POLITICS 182 How decisions are made 129 Westernization as modernization 182 Politics of collective identity 183 Is cultural conflict inevitable? 187 6 Society in a Global Age 136 RELIGIOUS REVIVALISM 189 SOCIAL CONNECTEDNESS: THICK Religion and politics 189 TO THIN? 137 The fundamentalist upsurge 192 From industrialization to post- CHALLENGES TO THE WEST 194 industrialism 137 Postcolonialism 194 New technology and ‘information Asian values 195 society’ 138 Islam and the West 197 Risk, uncertainty and insecurity 141 Nature of political Islam 197 GLOBALIZATION, CONSUMERISM The West and the ‘Muslim question’ 205 AND THE INDIVIDUAL 145 Social and cultural implications of globalization 145 9 Power and Twenty-first Consumerism goes global 146 Century World Order 209 Rise of individualism 147 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 150 POWER AND GLOBAL POLITICS 210 Explaining global civil society 150 Power as capability 210 CONTENTS xi Relational power and structural power 211 12 Terrorism 282 Changing nature of power 213 POST-COLD WAR GLOBAL ORDER 216 UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM 283 End of Cold War bipolarity 216 Defining terrorism 283 The ‘new world order’ and its fate 217 Rise of ‘new’ terrorism 285 US HEGEMONY AND GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TERRORISM 289 ORDER 220 Terrorism goes global? 289 Rise to hegemony 220 Catastrophic terrorism? 291 The ‘war on terror’ and beyond 222 COUNTERING TERRORISM 296 Benevolent or malign hegemony? 226 Strengthening sate security 296 A MULTIPOLAR GLOBAL ORDER? 228 Military repression 298 Rise of multipolarity 228 Political deals 300 Multipolar order or disorder? 234 13 Human Rights and 10 War and Peace 239 Humanitarian Intervention 303 HUMAN RIGHTS 304 NATURE OF WAR 240 Defining human rights 304 Types of war 240 Protecting human rights 309 Why do wars occur? 241 Challenging human rights 316 War as a continuation of politics 243 CHANGING FACE OF WAR 245 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 318 From ‘old’ wars to ‘new’ wars? 245 Rise of humanitarian intervention 318 ‘Postmodern’ warfare 251 Conditions for humanitarian intervention 324 Does humanitarian intervention work? 327 JUSTIFYING WAR 254 Realpolitik 254 Just war theory 256 14 International Law 331 Pacifism 260 NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 What is law? 332 11 Nuclear Proliferation and Sources of international law 334 Disarmament 263 Why is international law obeyed? 337 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FLUX 339 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 264 From international law to world law? 339 Nature of nuclear weapons 264 Developments in the laws of war 344 Proliferation during the Cold War 266 International tribunals and the Proliferation in the post-Cold War era 267 International Criminal Court 346 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 273 Arms control and anti-proliferation 15 Poverty and Development 352 strategies 273 A world free of nuclear weapons? 278 UNDERSTANDING POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT 353 Defining and measuring poverty 353 Development: competing visions 355 xii CONTENTS A MORE UNEQUAL WORLD? 360 18 International Organization Making sense of global inequality 360 and the United Nations 432 Contours of global inequality 363 Globalization, poverty and inequality 365 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 433 Does global inequality matter? 368 Rise of international organization 433 DEVELOPMENT AND THE POLITICS Why are international organizations created 434 OF AID 369 THE UNITED NATIONS 435 Structural adjustment programmes From the League to the UN 435 and beyond 369 Promoting peace and security 440 International aid and the development Does UN peacekeeping work? 445 ethic 372 Promoting economic and social Debt relief and fair trade 378 development 446 Future of the UN: challenges and reform 448 16 Global Environmental 19 Global Governance and the Issues 383 Bretton Woods System 456 THE RISE OF GREEN POLITICS 384 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE? 455 The environment as a global issue 384 What global governance is, and is not 455 Green politics: reformism or radicalism? 386 Global governance: myth or reality? 459 CLIMATE CHANGE 391 GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: Causes of climate change 392 THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRETTON Consequences of climate change 395 WOODS SYSTEM 459 How should climate change be tackled? 399 Making of the Bretton Woods system 460 Why is international cooperation so Fate of the Bretton Woods system 464 difficult to achieve? 402 EVALUATING GLOBAL ECONOMIC RESOURCE SECURITY 406 GOVERNANCE 465 Resources, power and prosperity 408 The International Monetary Fund 465 The World Bank 458 The World Trade Organization 470 REFORMING THE BRETTON WOODS 17 Gender in Global Politics 412 SYSTEM 473 Global economic governance and the FEMINISM, GENDER AND GLOBAL 2007–09 crisis 473 POLITICS 413 Obstacles to reform 476 Varieties of feminism 413 ‘Gender lenses’ on global politics 416 GENDERING GLOBAL POLITICS 418 20 Regionalism and Global Gendered states and gendered nations 418 Politics 480 Gendering security, war and armed REGIONS AND REGIONALISM 481 conflict 422 Nature of regionalism 481 Gender, globalization and development 426 Why regionalism? 484 Regionalism and globalization 489 Regional integration outside Europe 489 CONTENTS xiii EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 494 A world of democracies? 512 What is the EU? 495 Civilizations in conflict? 513 The EU and the world 500 A Chinese century? 514 The EU in crisis? 501 The growth of international community? 516 The rise of the global South? 518 The coming environmental catastrophe? 519 21 Global Futures 507 Towards cosmopolitan democracy? 520 AN UNKNOWABLE FUTURE? 521 IMAGES AND REALITY 508 CONTENDING IMAGES OF THE GLOBAL FUTURE 508 Bibliography 524 A borderless world? 509 Index 541 List of Illustrative Material Global politics in action Google 142 Russia 177 September 11 and global security 21 Al Jazeera 204 Fall of the Berlin Wall 43 China 251 Paris Peace Conference 1919–20 59 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 253 Global financial crisis 2007–09 108 Al-Qaeda 295 The invasion of Iraq 2003 131 Amnesty International (AI) 313 The Rio ‘Earth Summit’, 1992 153 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 342 The rise and fall of Yugoslavia 167 World Bank 373 Iran’s ‘Islamic Revolution’ 200 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 396 The 2008 Russian war with Georgia 232 Women’s movement 415 The war in Afghanistan as a ‘just war’ 259 United Nations (UN) 449 The birth of the nuclear era 265 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 469 The 2002 Bali bombings 292 European Union (EU) 505 Humanitarian intervention in East Timor 323 World Trade Organization (WTO) 511 The Nuremberg Trials 335 The ‘Year of Africa’ 380 Approaches to The UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen 403 Balance of power 268 Gendered violence in anti-Muslim riots in Cold War, the end of the 218 Gujarat 421 Development 357 The UN and Iraq 443 Gender relations 419 The collapse of Bretton Woods 446 Global economic governance 463 The EU expands to the east 504 Global political economy 87 Globalization 12 History 31 Global actors Human nature 56 Non-governmental organizations (NGO) 6 Human rights 310 United States of America (USA) 46 Identity 184 The anti-capitalist movement 70 International law 340 Transnational corporations 99 International organization 437 Group of Twenty (G-20) 117 Nationalism 162 xiv L I S T O F I L L U S T R AT I V E M AT E R I A L xv Nature 393 Definitions of globalization 11 Society 139 Hitler’s war? 35 The state 115 Neorealist stability theory: the logic of Terrorism 287 numbers? 63 War and peace 244 Closing the realist–liberal divide? 65 Structure or agency? 72 Debating All in the mind? 75 A Chinese economic model? 89 Was the Cold War inevitable? 40 The Washington consensus 92 Is democracy a guarantee of peace? 66 A ‘knowledge economy’? 93 Do moral obligations extend to the whole Problems of state-building 123 of humanity? 80 Perception or misperception? 133 Does economic globalization promote Consumerism as captivity? 148 prosperity and opportunity for all? 101 The two nationalisms: good and bad? 163 Is state sovereignty now an outdated International migration: are people pulled or concept? 124 pushed? 170 Is globalization producing a global Identity politics: who are we? 186 monoculture? 151 Cultural rights or women’s rights? 196 Is nationalism inherently aggressive and Islamism: religion as politics? 199 oppressive? 169 Promoting democracy: for or against? 206 Is there an emerging ‘clash of civilizations’? 190 Elements of national power 212 Does the USA remain a global hegemon? 227 Beyond ‘power over’? 215 Has military power become redundant in The ‘war on terror’ 223 global politics? 246 Pre-emptive attack 225 Do nuclear weapons promote peace and Hegemonic stability theory 229 stability? 272 Offensive or defensive realism? 234 Does the need to counter terrorism justify To balance or to bandwagon? 236 restricting human rights and basic The Iraq War as a ‘new’ war? 252 freedoms? 299 Principles of a just war 257 Is humanitarian intervention justified? 328 North Korea: a rogue nuclear state? 277 Is the International Criminal Court an effective Nuclear ethics: indefensible weapons? 279 means of upholding order and justice? 349 Suicide terrorism: religious martydom or Does international aid work? 379 political strategy? 294 Can only radical action tackle the problem of Democracy as a human right? 307 climate change? 406 Human development 356 Would a matriarchal society be more The North–South divide 360 peaceful? 425 The Zapatistas in Mexico: alternative Is the UN obsolete and unnecessary? 451 development in action? 361 Does free trade ensure prosperity and peace? 474 World-systems theory 367 Does the advance of regionalism threaten Structural adjustment programmes 371 global order and stability? 490 Millennium Development Goals: ending global poverty? 374 Focus on The tragedy of the commons? 388 International Relations: the ‘great debates’ 4 Sustainable development: reconciling The Westphalian state-system 6 growth with ecology? 390 xvi L I S T O F I L L U S T R AT I V E M AT E R I A L Obligations to future generations? 391 Federalism 128 The Gaia hypothesis: a living planet? 392 Fordism/post-Fordism 137 The greenhouse effect 397 Foreign policy 129 The paradox of plenty: resources as a curse? 409 Gender 416 Human security: individuals at risk? 423 Genocide 326 Relative or absolute gains? 436 Geopolitics 407 How the United Nations works 439 Global civil society 152 Reforming the UN Security Council? 450 Global governance 455 A welfare dilemma? 461 Globalization 9 The G-7/8: an abandoned project? 465 Governance 125 The BRICs: the ‘rise of the rest’? 477 Great power 7 Regionalism in Asia: replicating European Hegemony 221 experience? 492 Humanitarian intervention 319 How the European Union works 499 Human rights 304 The euro: a viable currency? 505 Idealism 62 Imperialism 28 Deconstructing Individualism 150 Interdependence 8 ‘Cold war’ 39 Intergovernmentalism 459 ‘Nation’ 160 International aid 376 ‘Terrorism’ 286 International law 332 ‘War on terror’ 297 International organization 433 ‘Human rights’ 317 International regime 67 ‘Humanitarian intervention’ 325 International society 10 ‘Poverty’ 355 Internationalism 64 ‘Development’ 359 Laissez-faire 103 ‘Climate change’ 395 Liberal democracy 185 ‘United Nations’ 442 Multiculturalism 174 Multilateralism 460 Concepts Multipolarity 230 Arms race 266 National interest 130 Balance of power 256 Nation-state 164 Bipolarity 216 Nation, the 158 Chaos theory 79 Neoconservatism 226 Collective security 440 Neoliberalism 90 Colonialism 182 Patriarchy 417 Confucianism 195 Peace-building 445 Consumerism 149 Peacekeeping 444 Cosmopolitanism 21 Political globalization 118 Cultural globalization 147 Politics 2 Culture 188 Postcolonialism 194 Ecology 384 Postmaterialism 154 Economic globalization 94 Power 210 Ethnicity 175 Racialism 168 Failed state 121 Reciprocity 338 L I S T O F I L L U S T R AT I V E M AT E R I A L xvii Regionalism 482 Garrett Hardin 404 Religion 191 Thomas Hobbes 14 Religious fundamentalism 193 Samuel P. Huntington 514 Rogue state 224 Mary Kaldor 250 Security dilemma 19 Immanuel Kant 16 Sovereignty 3 Robert Keohane 435 State, the 114 John Maynard Keynes 105 Subsidiarity 500 Ayatollah Khomeini 192 Superpower 38 David Kilkullen 250 Supranationalism 458 Naomi Klein 146 Terrorism 284 Paul Krugman 107 Third World 36 James Lovelock 77 Transnational community 173 Niccolò Machiavelli 55 Unipolarity 222 Thomas Malthus 408 War 241 Karl Marx 69 West, the 26 John Mearsheimer 235 World government 457 Carolyn Merchant 404 David Mitrany 487 Featured thinkers Jean Monnet 496 Benedict Anderson 165 Hans Morgenthau 58 Thomas Aquinas 255 Arne Naess 404 Zygmunt Bauman 144 Terry Nardin 517 Ulrich Beck 144 Joseph Nye 215 Ben Bernanke 107 Sayyid Qutb 203 Jagdish Bhagwati 375 Roland Robertson 144 Murray Bookchin 404 Jeffrey Sachs 375 Hedley Bull 517 Edward Said 197 E.H. Carr 34 Saskia Sassen 144 Manuel Castells 144 Jan Aart Scholte 144 Noam Chomsky 228 Ernst Friedrich Schumacher 404 Karl von Clausewitz 245 Amartya Sen 375 Robert Cox 120 Vandana Shiva 404 Herman Daly 107 Adam Smith 85 Karl Deutsch 487 Anthony D. Smith 165 Jean Bethke Elshtain 428 George Soros 107 Cynthia Enloe 428 Joseph Stiglitz 468 Michel Foucault 17 Susan Strange 213 Milton Friedman 91 Thucydides 242 Francis Fukuyama 513 J. Ann Tickner 76 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi 261 Martin van Creveld 250 Marcus Garvey 185 Immanuel Wallerstein 100 Ernest Gellner 165 Kenneth Waltz 60 Susan George 375 Michael Walzer 258 Antonio Gramsci 71 Alexander Wendt 74 Hugo Grotius 334 Martin Wight 517 Ernst Haas 487 Woodrow Wilson 438 xviii L I S T O F I L L U S T R AT I V E M AT E R I A L Key events Multi-level governance 126 Hard, soft and smart power 214 World history, 1900–45 33 The accumulation of nuclear warheads by the The Cold War period 41 USA and the Soviet Union, 1945–1990 267 The post-Cold War period 49 Number of warheads held by nuclear powers, Crises of modern global capitalism 106 2010 (estimate) 270 Advances in communication technology 141 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 354 The Arab–Israeli conflict 202 A pond as an ecosystem 385 Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 249 The greenhouse effect 398 Major nuclear arms control agreements 274 Major international human rights documents 311 Tables Key examples of humanitarian intervention 320 Major development initiatives 377 Three generations of human rights 308 Major international initiatives on the Top ten and bottom ten countries in terms environment 387 of HDI rankings 365 History of the United Nations 447 Top ten and bottom ten countries in the GDI GATT/WTO negotiating rounds 472 and GEM league tables 430 History of the European Union 498 Competing models of global politics 460 Key regional organizations and groupings Figures of the world 485 Dimensions of global politics 3 Maps The billiard ball model of world politics 7 Cobweb model of world politics 8 Colonial holdings, circa 1914 30 Growth of the world’s population since 1750 28 Yugoslavia 167 Growth of membership of the United Nations, Global migratory flows since 1973 172 1945–present 37 Europe and EU membership 497 Preface The aim of this book is to provide an up-to-date, integrated and forward- looking introduction to international relations/global politics. It seeks to be genuinely global while not ignoring the international dimension of world affairs, accepting that ‘the global’ and ‘the international’ complement one another and are not rival or incompatible modes of understanding. In this view, global poli- tics encompasses not just politics at the ‘global’ level – that is, worldwide processes, systems and institutional frameworks – but politics at, and, crucially, across all levels – the worldwide, the regional, the national and the subnational. Such an approach reflects the fact that while, over an increasing range of issues, states interact with one another in conditions of global interdependence, they nevertheless remain the key actors on the world stage. The interconnectedness that such a global approach to politics implies never- theless brought challenges in terms of how the topics and issues considered in this book should be organized and presented. It may be a platitude to suggest that everything in world affairs now influences everything else, but it is difficult to deny that it contains a germ of truth. One of the implications of this is that it serves to thwart any attempt to divide the book into meaningful parts, as such sub-divisions would impose a compartmentalization of knowledge that would either be difficult to justify, or would constrain, rather than sharpen, under- standing. That said, the organization of chapters is certainly not random, but conforms to a logic that flows from a series of developing themes. These are outlined in the final section of Chapter 1. A particular emphasis has been placed on ensuring that topics and issues are fully and appropriately integrated, so that readers can grasp the links between the events, concepts and perspectives under discussion. This is done, in part, by extensive cross-referencing, which both avoids needless repetition and shows readers how and where they can extend or deepen their understanding. Theory and practice are also integrated in that, although there is a separate chapter that introduces the major theories of global politics, key theoretical approaches to major issues are flagged up in each chapter, with a stress on combining the major traditions of international rela- tions theory with a more multidisciplinary approach. Finally, the book contains a wide variety of pedagogical features, the nature and purpose of which are high- lighted in the following double-page spread. xix xx PREFACE GUIDE TO THE KEY FEATURES The pedagogical features found in this book allow important events, concepts and theoretical issues to be examined in greater depth or detail, whilst also main- taining the flow of the main body of the text. They are, moreover, designed to encourage readers to think critically and independently about the key issues of global politics. Each chapter starts with a Preview that outlines the major themes and a series of questions that highlight the central themes and issues addressed in the chapter. At the end of each chapter there is a Summary of its major points, a list of Questions for discussion, and suggestions for Further reading. Additional material is provided throughout the text in the form of glossary panels and boxed information. These boxes are comprehensively cross-referenced through- out the text. The most significant features are the following: A P P ROAC H E S TO . . . GLOBAL POLITICS IN ACTION . . . Approaches boxes GLOBALIZATION Global financial crisis 2007–09 outline important Realist view ism is invariably associated with the advance of liberal Events: The global financial crisis started to show its Realists have typically adopted a sceptical stance towards globalization, seeing it more in terms of inten- democracy, economic freedom breeding a demand for political freedom. For liberals, globalization marks a theoretical approaches effects in the middle of 2007 with the onset of the so-called ‘credit crunch’, particularly in the USA and watershed in world history, in that it ends the period the UK. However, this merely provided a background sifying economic interdependence (that is, ‘more of the same’) rather than the creation of an interlocking global economy. Most importantly, the state continues during which the nation-state was the dominant global actor, world order being determined by an (inherently to a central theme under to the remarkable events of September 2008, when global capitalism appeared to teeter on the brink of unstable) balance of power. The global era, by contrast, to be the dominant unit in world politics. Instead of being threatened by globalization, the state’s capacity for regulation and surveillance may have increased is characterized by a tendency towards peace and inter- national cooperation as well as by the dispersal of discussion, providing in the abyss, threatening to tip over into systemic failure. The decisive events took place in the USA. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-spon- rather than decreased. However, realists are not simply globalization deniers. In assessing the nature and significance of globalization, they emphasize that glob- global power, in particular through the emergence of global civil society (see p. 152) and the growing impor- tance of international organizations. each case realist, liberal sored mortgage corporations, were bailed out by Federal authorities; Lehman Brothers, the 158-year- old investment bank, succumbed to bankruptcy; the alization and the international system are not separate, still less rival, structures. Rather, the former should be seen as a manifestation of the latter. Globalization has Critical views Critical theorists have adopted a negative or opposi- and critical views of the insurance giant AIG was only saved by a $85 billion government rescue package; while Wachovia, the fourth largest US bank, was bought by Citigroup, been made by states, for states, particularly dominant states. Developments such as an open trading system, global financial markets and the advent of transna- tional stance towards globalization. Often drawing on an established socialist or specifically Marxist critique of capitalism, this portrays the essence of globalization theme or issue. absorbing $42 billion of bad debt. Banking crises erupted elsewhere, and stock markets went into freefall worldwide, massively reducing share values and not. The fact that stock markets around the world declined dramatically and almost simultaneously, wiping enormous tional production were all put in place to advance the as the establishment of a global capitalist order. betokening the onset of a global recession. Some of the sums off share values, bears testimony to the interlocking interests of western states in general and the USA in (Indeed, Marx (see p. 69) can be said to have prefig- panic went out of the banking crisis of September 2008 nature of modern financial markets and their susceptibility particular. Furthermore, realists question the notion ured much ‘hyperglobalist’ literature, in having high- when the US government promised to take all the danger- to contagion. This was the first genuinely global crisis in the that globalization is associated with a shift towards lighted the intrinsically transnational character of the ous debt out of the US banking system, making this the world economy since the ‘stagflation’ crisis of the 1970s, peace and cooperation. Instead, heightened economic capitalist mode of production.) Like liberals, critical biggest bailout in the history of modern finance. and it gave rise to the most severe falls in global produc- interdependence is as likely to breed ‘mutual vulnera- theorists usually accept that globalization marks a tion levels since the Great Depression of the 1930s. In this bility’, leading to conflict rather than cooperation. historically significant shift, not least in the relation- Significance: Debate about the significance of the global context, the international community mounted a response ship between states and markets. States have lost power financial crisis of 2007–09 is closely linked to disagree- that was genuinely global, reflecting high levels of interna- Liberal view over the economy, being reduced to little more than ment about its underlying causes. Was the crisis rooted in tional cooperation and a keen awareness of mutual vulner- Liberals adopt a consistently positive attitude towards instruments for the restructuring of national the US banking system, in Anglo-American enterprise ability. Coordinated and substantial cuts in interest rates globalization. For economic liberals, globalization economies in the interests of global capitalism. capitalism, or in the nature of the capitalist system itself? were speedily introduced (monetary stimulus); pressure to At one level, the crisis was linked to inappropriate lending increase tariffs and for a return to economic nationalism reflects the victory of the market over ‘irrational’ national allegiances and ‘arbitrary’ state borders. The miracle of the market is that it draws resources towards Globalization is thus viewed as an uneven, hierarchical process, characterized both by the growing polarization between the rich and the poor, explained by world- Global politics in action strategies adopted by US banks and mortgage institutions, the so-called ‘sub-prime’ mortgage market. These high-risk was resisted; economically advanced states agreed to boost domestic demand (fiscal stimulus); and vulnerable coun- tries – such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Latvia and their most profitable use, thus bringing prosperity to individuals, families, companies and societies. The attraction of economic globalization is therefore that it systems theorists in terms of a structural imbalance between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ areas in the global economy, and by a weakening of democratic accounta- boxes examine major loans to applicants with poor or non-existent credit histo- ries were unlikely to be repaid, and when the scale of ‘toxic debt’ became apparent shockwaves ran through the Ireland – were saved by unprecedented international bailouts, financed by the European Central Bank and the IMF. On the other hand, key vulnerabilities in the global allows markets to operate on a global scale, replacing the ‘shallow’ integration of free trade and intensified interdependence with the ‘deep’ integration of a single bility and popular responsiveness due to burgeoning corporate power. Feminist analysts have sometimes linked globalization to growing gender inequalities, events in global politics US financial system and beyond. At a deeper level, however, the ‘sub-prime’ problem in the USA was merely a symptom of the defects and vulnerabilities of the neolib- economy remain unchecked and unreformed. These include the fact that many countries (and, for that matter, many global economy. The increased productivity and inten- sified competition that this produces benefits all the societies that participate within it, demonstrating that associated, for example, with the disruption of small- scale farming in the developing world, largely carried out by women, and growing pressure on them to and reflect on how they eral capitalism that has taken root in the USA and the UK in particular, based on free markets and an under-regu- lated financial system. At a deeper level still, the crisis has enterprises) continue to suffer from substantial levels of indebtedness, storing up inflationary pressures and creating a pressing need for fiscal retrenchment (higher taxes or economic globalization is a positive-sum game, a game of winners and winners. Liberals also believe that glob- alization brings social and political benefits. The freer support their families by seeking work abroad, leading to the ‘feminization of migration’. Postcolonial theo- rists, for their part, have taken particular exception to contribute to our been interpreted as exposing serious imperfections not in a particular form of capitalism but in the capitalist system itself, reflected in a tendency towards boom-and-bust reduced public spending). Moreover, as countries emerge from the recession at different times and at different speeds, divisions within the international community have flow of information and ideas around the world both widens opportunities for personal self-development and creates more dynamic and vigorous societies. Moreover, cultural globalization, interpreted as a form of western imperialism which subverts indigenous cultures and ways of life and leads to the spread of soulless understanding of world cycles and, perhaps, deepening crises. There is, nevertheless, little doubt about the global impact of the financial crisis. Although the origins of the started to become more visible, particularly over the wisdom of fiscal stimulus. Finally, progress on the much vaunted ‘new Bretton Woods’, which would avoid similar from a liberal standpoint, the spread of market capital- consumerism. affairs. crisis may have been localized, its effects certainly were global financial meltdowns in the future, has been slow. G L O B A L AC TO R S . . . Debating . . . GOOGLE Is democracy a guarantee of peace? The ‘democratic peace’ thesis, supported by most liberals, suggests that democracy and peace are linked, particularly in Type of organization: Public corporation • Founded: 1998 Global actors boxes the sense that wars do not occur between democratic states. Realists and others nevertheless argue that there is nothing necessarily peaceful about democracy. Headquarters: Mountainview, California, USA • Staff: About 20,000 full-time employees Google (the name originates from matter of considerable debate. be sure that what we read on the consider the nature of key FOR AG A I N S T the mis-spelling of the word ‘Googol’, which refers to 10 to the Supporters of Google argue that in facilitating access to websites and Internet is true. (Note, for example, the way Wikipedia entries can be actors on the world stage Zones of peace. Much interest in the idea of a ‘democratic peace’ derives from empirical analysis. As democracy has spread, ‘zones of peace’ have emerged, in which military Democracies at war. The idea that democracies are inher- ently peaceful is undermined by continued evidence of wars between democratic and authoritarian states, some- power of 100) was founded in 1998 online data and information, hijacked for self-serving or mischie- by Larry Page and Sergey Brin, while they were students at Stanford Google has helped to empower citi- zens and non-state actors generally vous purposes.) Nor can we always be certain, when we ‘Google’ for a and reflect on their impact conflict has become virtually unthinkable. This certainly applies to Europe (previously riven by war and conflict), North America and Australasia. History seems to suggest thing that most democratic peace theorists acknowledge. Moreover, empirical evidence to support the thesis is bedevilled by confusion over which regimes qualify as University. The company’s remark- and has strengthened global civil particular piece of information, able growth derives from the fact that Google quickly became the society at the expense of national governments, international bureau- what the standpoint is of the website or blogger the search and significance. that wars do not break out between democratic states, although, as proponents of the democratic peace thesis accept, war continues to occur between democratic and ‘democracies’. If universal suffrage and multi-party elec- tions are the core features of democratic governance, NATO’s bombardment of Serb troops in Kosovo in 1999 world’s predominant search engine crats and traditional political elites. engine throws up. Linked to this is authoritarian states. and Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 (see p. 232) are (a tool designed to retrieve data and The oft-repeated truism that knowl- the fact that the Internet does not both exceptions to the democratic peace thesis. search for information on the World edge is power conventionally discriminate between good ideas Public opinion. Liberals argue that wars are caused by Moreover, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq both demon- Wide Web). In 2009, an estimated worked to the benefit of govern- and bad ones. It provides a plat- governments, not by the people. This is because it is citi- strate that democracies do not go to war only for 65 per cent of Internet searches mental bodies and political leaders. form for the dissemination not only zens themselves who are likely to be war’s victims: they purposes of self-defence. worldwide were made using Google. However, in the cyber age, easier of socially worthwhile and politi- are the ones who will do the killing and dying, and who Google has expanded rapidly and far wider access to news and cally neutral views but also of polit- will suffer disruption and hardship. In short, they have States are states. Realist theorists argue the factors that through a strategy of acquisitions information means that, for the first ical extremism, racial and religious no ‘stomach for war’. In the event of international make for war apply to democratic and authoritarian and partnerships, and it has also time, citizens and citizens’ groups bigotry, and pornography of conflict, democracies will thus seek accommodation states alike. In particular, the constitutional structure of a significantly diversified its products, are privy to a quality and quantity various kinds. A further danger has rather than confrontation, and use force only as a last state does not, and never can, alter the selfishness, greed which include email (Gmail), online of information that may sometimes been the growth of a ‘cult of infor- resort, and then only for purposes of self-defence. and potential for violence that is simply part of human mapping (Google Earth), rival that of government. NGOs, mation’, whereby the accumulation nature. Far from always opposing war, public opinion customized home pages (iGoogle), video sharing (YouTube) and social think-tanks, interest groups and protest movements have therefore of data and information becomes an end in itself, impairing the Debating boxes examine Non-violent conflict resolution. The essence of demo- cratic governance is a process of compromise, concilia- therefore sometimes impels democratic governments towards foreign policy adventurism and expansionism networking sites. As well as develop- become more effective in challeng- ability of people to distinguish tion and negotiation, through which rival interests or (European imperialism, WWI and perhaps the ‘war on ing into one of the most powerful brands in the world, Google has ing the positions and actions of government and may even displace between information, on the one hand, and knowledge, experience major controversies in groups find a way of living together rather than resorting to force and the use of naked power. This, after all, is the terror’ each illustrate this). Realists, moreover, argue that the tendency towards war derives less from the constitu- purpose of elections, parliaments, pressure groups and so tional make-up of the state and more from the fear and cultivated a reputation for environ- mentalism, philanthropy and posi- tive employee relations. Its unofficial government as an authoritative source of views and information about specialist subjects ranging and wisdom on the other (Roszak 1994). The Google generation may therefore know more but have a global politics and on. Not only is it likely that regimes based on compro- mise and conciliation will apply such an approach to suspicion that are an unavoidable consequence of inter- national anarchy. foreign policy as well as domestic policy, but govern- slogan is ‘Don’t be evil’. Significance: Google’s success as a from the environment and global poverty to public health and civil liberties. In this sense, Google and gradually diminishing capacity to make considered and wise judge- ments. Such a criticism is linked to highlight arguments for ments unused to using force to resolve civil conflict will be less inclined to use force to resolve international Peace by other means. Although the division of the world into ‘zones of peace’ and ‘zones of turmoil’ may be an conflicts. undeniable feature of modern world politics, it is far business organization cannot be doubted. Its widespread use and ever-expanding range of products other search engines have turned the World Wide Web into a democ- ratizing force. allegations that ‘surfing’ the Internet actually impairs people’s ability to think and learn by and against a particular Cultural bonds. Cultural ties develop amongst democra- from clear that the difference is due only, or even chiefly, to democracy. For example, patterns of economic inter- cies because democratic rule tends to foster particular dependence that result from free trade may be more has helped to turn Google from a noun into a verb (as in ‘to Google On the other hand, Google and the bewildering array of knowledge encouraging them to skim and jump from one piece of informa- proposition. norms and values. These include a belief in constitu- tional government, respect for freedom of speech and effective in maintaining peace amongst democracies than popular pressures. Similarly, it may be more significant someone or something’), with and information available on the tion to the next, ruining their guarantees for property ownership. The common moral that mature liberal democracies are wealthy than that young people sometimes being Internet have also been subject to ability to concentrate. Google may foundations that underpin democratic government tend they are either liberal or democratic. In this view, war is dubbed the ‘Google generation’. criticism. The most significant therefore be making people stupid to mean that democracies view each other as friends an unattractive prospect for rich states because they have However, Google’s impact on drawback is the lack of quality rather than better-informed (Carr rather than as foes. Peaceful coexistence amongst democ- little impulse to gain through conquest and much to fear culture, society and politics is a control on the Internet: we cannot 2008, 2010). racies therefore appears to be a ‘natural’ condition. from the possibility of defeat. PREFACE xxi Key theorists provide brief KEY THEORISTS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION biographical material of key CONCEPT Security Security is the deepest and most abiding issue in politics. At its heart is the ques- Manuel Castells (born 1942) A Spanish sociologist, Castells is especially associated with the idea of information society and communications figures or major thinkers, Security dilemma Security dilemma tion: how can people live a decent and worthwhile existence, free from threats, intimidation and violence? Security has usually been thought of as a particu- research. He suggests that we live in a ‘network society’, in which territorial borders and traditional identities have describes a condition in been undermined by the power of knowledge flows. Castells thus emphasizes the ‘informational’ basis of network society, and shows how human experience of time and space have been transformed. His works include The Rise some of these boxes group which actions taken by one actor to improve national security are larly pressing issue in international politics because, while the domestic realm is ordered and stable, by virtue of the existence of a sovereign state, the inter- national realm is anarchical and therefore threatening and unstable. For realists, of the Network Society (1996), The Internet Galaxy (2004) and Communication Power (2009). Ulrich Beck (born 1944) together a number of interpreted as aggressive by other actors, thereby provoking military as the most important actors in the international system are states, security is primarily understood in terms of ‘national’ security. As, in a world of self-help, all states are under at least potential threat from all other states, each state must A German sociologist, Beck’s work has examined topics as wide-ranging as the new world of work, the perils of globalization, and challenges to the global power of capital. In The Risk Society (1992), influential theorists in a counter-moves. This reflects two component dilemmas (Booth and have the capacity for self-defence. National security therefore places a premium on military power, reflecting the assumption that the more militarily powerful he analyzed the tendency of the globalizing economy to generate uncertainty and insecurity. Wheeler 2008). First, Individualization (2002) (written with his wife, Elizabeth) champions rights-based individualization against free-market individualism. In Power in the Global Age (2005), Beck explored how the strate- related area. there is a dilemma of interpretation – what are a state is, the more secure it is likely to be. This focus on military security never- theless draws states into dynamic, competitive relationships with one another, based on what is called the security dilemma. This is the problem that a mili- ULRICH BECK the motives, intentions gies of capital can be challenged by civil society movements. and capabilities of others tary build-up for defensive purposes by one state is always liable to be inter- in building up military preted by other states as potentially or actually aggressive, leading to retaliatory Roland Robertson (born 1938) power? As weapons are military build-ups and so on. The security dilemma gets to the very heart of A UK sociologist and one of the pioneers in the study of globalization, Robertson’s psycho- inherently ambiguous politics amongst states, making it the quintessential dilemma of international social view of globalization portrays it as ’the compression of the world and the intensification symbols (they can be either defensive or politics (Booth and Wheeler 2008). Permanent insecurity between and amongst of the consciousness of the world as a whole’. He has drawn attention to both the process of aggressive), there is states is therefore the inescapable lot of those who live in a condition of ‘relativization’ (when local cultures and global pressures mix) and the process of ‘glocalization’ irresolvable uncertainty anarchy. (through which global pressures are forced to conform to local conditions). Robertson’s key about these matters. However, the state-centric ideas of national security and an inescapable secu- work in this field is Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (1992). Second, there is a rity dilemma have also been challenged. There is, for example, a long-established ROLAND ROBERTSON dilemma of response – should they react in kind, emphasis within liberal theory on collective security (see p.440), reflecting the Saskia Sassen (born 1949) in a militarily belief that aggression can best be resisted by united action taken by a number of A Dutch sociologist, Sassen is noted for her analyses of globalization and international human migration. In The Global City (2001), she examined how cities such as New York, London and Tokyo Definitions of key terms confrontational manner, or should they seek to signal reassurance and states. Such a view shifts attention away from the idea of ‘national’ security towards the broader notion of ‘international’ security (Smith 2010). have become emblematic of the capacity of globalization to create contradictory spaces, charac- Furthermore, the security agenda in modern global politics has changed in a terized by the relationship between the employees of global corporations and the vast population of the low-income ‘others’ (often migrants and women). Sassen’s other works include The Mobility and explanations of key attempt to defuse tension? Misperception here may either lead to number of ways. These include, on the one hand, the expansion of ‘zones of peace’ in which the tensions and incipient conflicts implied by the security SASKIA SASSEN of Capital and Labour (1988) and Territory, Authority, Rights (2006). Jan Aart Scholte (born 1959) concepts are found in the an unintended arms race (see p. 266) or to national disaster. dilemma appear to be absent. Thus ‘security regimes’ or ‘security communities’ have developed to manage disputes and help to avoid war, a trend often associ- ated with growing economic interdependence (linked to globalization) and the A Dutch sociologist and globalization theorist, Scholte argues that globalization is best under- stood as a reconfiguration of social geography marked by the growth of transplanetary and supraterritorial connections between people. Although by no means a critic of the ‘supraterri- margin of the text.  International security: advance of democratization (see The Democratic Peace Thesis, p. 000). On the other hand, September 11 and the wider threat of terrorism has highlighted the emergence of new security challenges that are particularly problematical because Conditions in which the mutual torialism’ that globalization brings about, he highlights the tendency of ‘neoliberalist globaliza- they arise from non-state actors and exploit the greater interconnectedness of survival and safety of states is tion’ to heighten insecurities, exacerbate inequalities and deepen democratic deficits. Scholte’s secured through measures the modern world. International security may therefore have given way to main works include International Relations of Social Change (1993) and Globalization: A Critical JAN AART SCHOLTE taken to prevent or punish ‘global’ security. A further development has been the trend to rethink the Introduction (2005). aggression, usually within a concept of security at a still deeper level, usually linked to the notion of ‘human rule-governed international security’ (see p. 423). Interest in human security has grown both because the Zygmunt Bauman (born 1925) order. decline of inter-state war in the post-Cold War means that the threat from A Polish sociologist, Bauman’s interests range from the nature of intimacy to globalization, and  Security regime: A violent conflict now usually occurs within states, coming from civil war, insur- from the Holocaust to reality television programmes such as Big Brother. Sometimes portrayed as framework of cooperation rection and civic strife, and because of the recognition that in the modern world the ‘prophet of postmodernity’, he has highlighted trends such as the emergence of new patterns amongst states and other people’s safety and survival is often put at risk more by non-military threats of deprivation and exclusion, the psychic corruption of consumer society, and the growing actors to ensure the peaceful (such as environmental destruction, disease, refugee crises and resource resolution of conflict (see tendency for social relations to have a ‘liquid’ character. Bauman’s main writings include international regime, p. 67). scarcity), than it is by military threats. Modernity and the Holocaust (1994), Globalization (1998) and Liquid Modernity (2000). ZYGMUNT BAUMAN Focus boxes give either further insight into theoretical issues or provide Focus on . . . additional material about KEY EVENTS . . . International Relations: the ‘great debates’ topics under discussion. Advances in communication technology The academic discipline of International Relations  The second ‘great debate’ took place during the 1455 Gutenberg Bible is published, initiating the printing revolution through the first use of (frequently shortened to IR) emerged in the aftermath 1960s, and was between behaviouralists and removable and reusable type. of World War I (1914–18), an important impetus being traditionalists over whether it is possible to develop the desire to find ways of establishing enduring peace. objective ‘laws’ of international relations. 1837 The telegraph is invented, providing the first means of substantially superterritorial The central focus of the discipline has been on the  The third ‘great debate’, sometimes called the communication. study of the relations of states, and those relations ‘inter-paradigm debate’, took place during the have traditionally been understood primarily in diplo- 1970s and 1980s, and was between realists and 1876 The telephone is invented by Alexander Graham Bell, although the first telephone device matic, military and strategic terms. However, the liberals, on the one hand, and Marxists on the other, was built in 1861 by the German scientist Johann Philip Reis. nature and focus of the discipline has changed signifi- who interpreted international relations in economic 1894 The radio is invented by Guglielmo Marconi, with a transatlantic radio signal being received cantly over time, not least through a series of so-called terms. for the first time in 1901. ‘great debates’.  The fourth ‘great debate’ started in the late 1980s,  The first ‘great debate’ took place between the and was between positivists and so-called post- positivists over the relationship between theory and Key events boxes provide a 1928 Television is invented by John Logie Baird, becoming commercially available in the late 1930s and reaching a mass audience in the 1950s and 1960s. 1930s and 1950s, and was between liberal interna- tionalists, who emphasized the possibility of peace- ful cooperation, and realists, who believed in reality (see All in the mind? p. 75) This reflected the growing influence within IR of a range of new criti- cal perspectives, such as social constructivism, criti- brief overview of significant 1936 First freely programmable computer is invented by Konrad Zuse. 1957 The Soviet Sputnik 1 is launched, initiating the era of communications satellites (sometimes inescapable power politics. By the 1950s, realism had gained ascendancy within the discipline. cal theory, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, feminism and green politics. events or developments in a called SATCOM). 1962 ‘Third generation’ computers, using integrated circuits (or microchips), started to appear particular area. (notably NASA’s Apollo Guidance Computer). 1969 Earliest version of the Internet developed, in the form of the ARPANET link between the University of California and the Stanford Research Institute, with electronic mail, or email, being developed three years later. 1991 Earliest version of the World Wide Web became publicly available as a global information medium through which users can read and write via computers connected to the Internet. 1995 Digitalization is introduced by Netscape and the Web, substantially broadening access to the Internet and the scope of other technologies. The companion website features a password-protected instructor area plus a freely accessible student site including additional Global politics in action case studies, a searchable glossary of key terms, self- test questions, click through web links, update materials, and suggested additional reading. Acknowledgements Although this book has a single author, it is certainly not the product of a single person’s work. I have been especially fortunate in my publisher at Palgrave Macmillan, Steven Kennedy, who suggested that I should write the book in the first place and who has been closely involved at every stage in its production. He has been a constant source of enthusiasm, encouragement, good advice and good humour. Others who have made valuable contributions to the design and production of the book include Stephen Wenham, Helen Caunce, Keith Povey and Ian Wileman. In addition, feedback from Jacqui True, Garrett Wallace Brown and four other anonymous reviewers, who commented on the book at different stages, helped significantly to strengthening its contents and, some- times, its structure. Their often detailed and always thoughtful criticisms and suggestions not only improved the overall quality of the book, but also made the process of writing it more stimulating and enjoyable. Discussions with colleagues and friends, particularly Karon and Doug Woodward and Rita and Brian Cox, and with my brother David, helped to sharpen the ideas and argu- ments developed here. However, my most heartfelt thanks go, as ever, to my wife Jean, with whom this book has been produced in partnership. She took sole responsibility for the preparation of the typescript, and was a regular source of advice on both style and content. I would also like to thank her for enduring the sometimes considerable disruptions that work on this book caused to the normal pattern of our lives. This book is dedicated to my grandchildren, for whom (and for much else) I would like to thank my sons Mark and Robin, and my daughters-in-law Jessie and Helen. ANDY HEYWOOD Copyright Acknowledgements The author and publishers would like to thank the following who have kindly given permission for the use of pictorial copyright material (names in brackets indicate the subjects of photographs): Press Association, pp. 14, 16, 17, 20, 34, 43, 59, 69, 77, 91, 105, 107 (Ben Bernanke), 108, 131, 144, 192, 197, 200, 228, 232, 242, 245, 259, 261, 265, 292, 323, 335, 375, 380, 403, 404, 421, 443, 466, 504; Alamy, pp. 55, 255; Getty Images, pp. 58, 107 (Alan Greenspan), 153, 334, 408; Ohio State University, p. 74; xxii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xxiii Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, p. 60; The People’s History Museum, p. 71; Ann Tickner, p. 76; Library of Congress, pp. 85 (Adam Smith), 185 (Marcus Garvey), 438 (Woodrow Wilson); Immanuel Wallerstein, p. 100; Soros Fund Management LLC, p. 107 (George Soros); Dan Deitch, pp. 107 (Paul Krugman), 468; Herman Daly, p. 107; Robert Cox, p. 120; Roland Robertson, p. 144; A. Rusbridger, p. 144 (Saskia Sassen); Bill Brydon, p. 144 (Jan Aart Scholte); Grzegorz Lepiarz, p. 144 (Zygmunt Bauman); Naomi Klein, p. 146; David Gellner, p. 165; Benedict Anderson, p. 165; The Library of the London School of Economics and Political Science, p. 213; Tom Fitzsimmons, p. 215; John Mearsheimer, p. 235; Mary Kaldor, p. 250; Dvora Lewy, p. 250 (Martin van Creveld); Center for a New American Security, p. 250 (David Kilkullen); Jon R. Friedman, p. 258; Columbia Law School (photo by Jon Roemer), p. 375 (Jagdish Bhagwati); Susan George, p. 375; The Earth Institute, p. 375 (Jeffrey Sachs); Janet Biehl, p. 404 (Murray Bookchin); Rachel Basso, p. 404 (Carolyn Merchant); Vandana Shiva, p. 404; Courtesy of IDCE Department at Clark University, p. 428 (Cynthia Enloe); Jean Bethke Elshtain, p. 428; Courtesy of Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, p. 435; Audiovisual Library of the European Commission (© European Union, 2010), p. 496; Peter Haas, p. 487; International Political Science Association, p. 487 (Karl Deutsch); Francis Fukuyama, p. 513; Jon Chase/ Harvard Staff Photographer, p. 514; Mary Bull, p. 517 (Hedley Bull); Gabriele Wight, p. 517 (Martin Wight); Terry Nardin, p. 517. The author and publishers would like to thank the following who have kindly given permission for the use of other copyright material: Palgrave Macmillan and The Guilford Press, Map 7.1 Global migratory flows since 1973, which originally appeared as Map 1.1 Global migratory flows from 1973 in The Age of Migration, Castles and Miller, 2009. Palgrave Macmillan, Map 20.1 Europe and EU membership which originally appeared as Map of member states and applicant states of the European Union in European Union Enlargement, Nugent (ed.), 2004. Palgrave Macmillan, Table 19.1 Competing models of global politics, which origi- nally appeared as Table 12.1 Four models of international relations in International Organization, Rittberger and Zangl, 2006. Every effort has been made to contact all copyright-holders, but if any have been inadvertently omitted the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the earliest opportunity. This page intentionally left blank CHAPTER 1 Introducing Global Politics ‘Only connect!’ E. M. FORSTER, Howards End (1910) PREVIEW How should we approach the study of world affairs? How is the world best under- stood? World affairs have traditionally been understood on the basis of an interna- tional paradigm. In this view, states (often understood as ‘nations’, hence ‘international’) are taken to be the essential building blocks of world politics, meaning that world affairs boil down, essentially, to the relations between states. This suggests that once you understand the factors that influence how states inter- act with one another, you understand how the world works. However, since the 1980s, an alternative globalization paradigm has become fashionable. This reflects the belief that world affairs have been transformed in recent decades by the growth of global interconnectedness and interdependence. In this view, the world no longer operates as a disaggregated collection of states, or ‘units’, but rather as an inte- grated whole, as ‘one world’. Global politics, as understood in this book, attempts to straddle these rival paradigms. It accepts that it is equally absurd to dismiss states and national government as irrelevant in world affairs as it is to deny that, over a significant range of issues, states now operate in a context of global interdepend- ence. However, in what sense is politics now ‘global’? And how, and to what extent, has globalization reconfigured world politics? Our understanding of global politics also needs to take account of the different theoretical ‘lenses’ though which the world has been interpreted; that is, different ways of seeing the world. What, in particular, is the difference between mainstream perspectives on global politics and critical perspectives? Finally, the world stubbornly refuses to stand still. Global poli- tics is therefore an arena of ongoing and, many would argue, accelerating change. And yet, certain aspects of global politics appear to have an enduring character. What is the balance between continuity and change in global politics? KEY ISSUES  What is meant by ‘global politics’?  How has international politics been transformed into global politics?  What have been the implications of globalization for world politics?  How do mainstream approaches to global politics differ from critical approaches?  How has global politics changed in recent years in relation to the issues of power, security and justice? 1 2 GLOBAL POLITICS CONCEPT WHAT IS GLOBAL POLITICS? Politics What’s in a name? Politics, in its broadest Why ‘global politics’? What does it mean to suggest that politics has ‘gone sense, refers to the activity through which global’? And how does ‘global’ politics differ from ‘international’ politics? The people make, preserve term ‘global’ has two meanings, and these have quite different implications as far and amend the general as global politics is concerned. In the first, global means worldwide, having plan- rules under which they etary (not merely regional or national) significance. The globe is, in effect, the live. Politics is world. Global politics, in this sense, refers to politics that is conducted at a global inextricably linked to the phenomena of conflict rather than a national or regional level. There is no doubt that the global or and cooperation. On the worldwide dimension of politics has, in recent decades, become more signifi- one hand, the existence cant. There has been a growth of international organizations, some of which, like of rival opinions, different the United Nations (see p. 449), come close to having a universal membership. A wants, competing needs growing number of political issues have also acquired a ‘global’ character, in that and opposing interests guarantees disagreement they affect, actually or potentially, all parts of the world and so all people on the about the rules under planet. This particularly applies in the case of the environment, often seen as the which people live. On the paradigm example of a ‘global’ issue, because nature operates as an intercon- other hand, people nected whole, in which everything affects everything else. The same, we are often recognize that, in order to told, applies to the economy, where it is commonplace to refer to the ‘global influence these rules or ensure their enforcement, economy’ or ‘global capitalism’, in that fewer and fewer countries now remain they must work with outside the international trading system and are unaffected by external invest- others. However, politics ment and the integration of financial markets. For theorists of globalization, is an ‘essentially this trend towards global interconnectedness is not only perhaps the defining contested’ concept feature of modern existence, but also requires that traditional approaches to (Gallie 1955/56). It has been defined, variously, learning need to be rethought, in this case by adopting a ‘borderless’ or ‘trans- as the art of government, planetary’ approach to politics. as public affairs generally, However, the notion that politics – and, for that matter, everything else – has as the non-violent been caught up in a swirl of interconnectedness that effectively absorbs all of its resolution of disputes, parts, or ‘units’, into an indivisible, global whole, is very difficult to sustain. The and as power and the distribution of resources claim that we live in a ‘borderless world’, or the assertion that the state is dead (Heywood 2007). and sovereignty is irrelevant (Ohmae 1990, 1996), remain distinctly fanciful ideas. In no meaningful sense has politics at the global level transcended politics at the national, local or, for that matter, any other level. This is why the notion of global politics, as used in this book, draws on the second meaning of ‘global’. In this view, global means comprehensive; it refers to all elements within a system, not just to the system as a whole. Global politics thus takes place not just at a  Globalization: The global level, but at and, crucially, across, all levels – worldwide, regional, national, emergence of a complex web sub-national and so on (see Figure 1.1). From this perspective, the advent of of interconnectedness that global politics does not imply that international politics should be consigned to means that our lives are the dustbin of history. Rather, ‘the global’ and ‘the international’ coexist: they increasingly shaped by events complement one another and should not be seen as rival or incompatible modes that occur, and decisions that are made, at a great distance of understanding. from us (see p. 9) The approach we take in this book acknowledges that it is as absurd to dismiss states and national governments as irrelevant as it is to deny that, over a  The state: A political significant range of issues, states now operate in a context of global interde- association that establishes pendence. The choice of Global Politics as its title reflects the fact both that what sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders (see goes on within states and what goes on between states impact on one another to p. 114) a greater degree than ever before, and that an increased proportion of politics no INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 3 CONCEPT The worldwide Sovereignty Sovereignty is the principle of supreme and unquestionable authority, reflected in the claim by the state to be the sole author of The The laws within its territory. international regional External sovereignty (sometimes called ‘state sovereignty’ or ‘national sovereignty’) refers to the capacity of the state to act independently and autonomously on the The subnational world stage. This implies that states are legally equal and that the territorial integrity and political independence of Figure 1.1 Dimensions of global politics a state are inviolable. Internal sovereignty refers to the location of supreme power/authority longer takes place simply in and through the state. As such, it moves beyond the within the state. The confines of what has traditionally been studied under International Relations institution of sovereignty is nevertheless and allows for the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach that takes account developing and changing, of issues and themes from across the social sciences, in the process bringing a both as new concepts of wider range of debates and perspectives into focus. At the same time, however, sovereignty emerge particular attention is given to International Relations, as this is the field in (‘economic’ sovereignty, which most of the relevant research and theorizing has been done, especially in ‘food’ sovereignty and so on) and as sovereignty is view of theoretical developments in the discipline in recent decades. adapted to new circumstances (‘pooled’ sovereignty, ‘responsible’ From international politics to global politics sovereignty and so forth). In what ways has ‘international’ politics been transformed into ‘global’ politics, and how far has this process progressed? How have the contours of world poli- tics changed in recent years? The most significant changes include the following:  New actors on the world stage  Increased interdependence and interconnectedness  The trend towards global governance. The state and new global actors World politics has conventionally been understood in international terms. Although the larger phenomenon of patterns of conflict and co-operation  Authority: The right to between and among territorially-based political units has existed throughout influence the behaviour of others on the basis of an history, the term ‘international relations’ was not coined until the UK philoso- acknowledged duty to obey; pher and legal reformer, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), used it in his Principles power cloaked in legitimacy. of Morals and Legislation ([1789] 1968). Bentham’s use of the term acknowl- 4 GLOBAL POLITICS Focus on . . . International Relations: the ‘great debates’ The academic discipline of International Relations  The second ‘great debate’ took place during the (frequently shortened to IR) emerged in the aftermath 1960s, and was between behaviouralists and of World War I (1914–18), an important impetus being traditionalists over whether it is possible to develop the desire to find ways of establishing enduring peace. objective ‘laws’ of international relations. The central focus of the discipline has been on the  The third ‘great debate’, sometimes called the study of the relations of states, and those relations ‘inter-paradigm debate’, took place during the have traditionally been understood primarily in diplo- 1970s and 1980s, and was between realists and matic, military and strategic terms. However, the liberals, on the one hand, and Marxists on the other, nature and focus of the discipline has changed signifi- who interpreted international relations in economic cantly over time, not least through a series of so-called terms. ‘great debates’.  The fourth ‘great debate’ started in the late 1980s, and was between positivists and so-called post-  The first ‘great debate’ took place between the positivists over the relationship between theory and 1930s and 1950s, and was between liberal interna- reality (see All in the mind? p. 75) This reflected the tionalists, who emphasized the possibility of peace- growing influence within IR of a range of new criti- ful cooperation, and realists, who believed in cal perspectives, such as social constructivism, criti- inescapable power politics. By the 1950s, realism cal theory, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, had gained ascendancy within the discipline. feminism and green politics. edged a significant shift: that, by the late eighteenth century, territorially-based political units were coming to have a more clearly national character, making relations between them appear genuinely ‘inter-national’. However, although most modern states are either nation-states (see p. 164) or aspire to be nation- states, it is their possession of statehood rather than nationhood that allows them to act effectively on the world stage. ‘International’ politics should thus, more properly, be described as ‘inter-state’ politics. But what is a state? As  Behaviouralism: The belief defined by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, that social theories should be a state must possess four qualifying properties: a defined territory, a permanent constructed only on the basis of observable behaviour, population, an effective government, and the ‘capacity to enter into relations providing quantifiable data for with other states’. In this view, states, or countries (the terms can be used inter- research. changeably in this context), are taken to be the key actors on the world stage, and perhaps the only ones that warrant serious consideration. This is why the  State-centrism: An conventional approach to world politics is seen as state-centric, and why the approach to political analysis that takes the state to be the international system is often portrayed as a state-system. The origins of this key actor in the domestic realm view of international politics are usually traced back to the Peace of Westphalia and on the world stage. (1648), which established sovereignty as the distinguishing feature of the state. State sovereignty thus became the primary organizing principle of international  State-system: A pattern of politics. relationships between and amongst states that establishes However, the state-centric approach to world politics has become increas- a measure of order and ingly difficult to sustain. This has happened, in part, because it is no longer predictability(see p. 6). possible to treat states as the only significant actors on the world stage. INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 5 Focus on . . . The Westphalian state-system The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is commonly said to called ‘Westphalian system’ was based on two key mark the beginning of modern international politics. principles: The Peace was a series of treaties that brought an end to the Thirty Years War (1618–48), which  States enjoy sovereign jurisdiction, in the sense that consisted of a series of declared and undeclared they have independent control over what happens wars throughout central Europe involving the Holy within their territory (all other institutions and Roman Empire and various opponents, including the groups, spiritual and temporal, are therefore subor- Danes, the Dutch and, above all, France and Sweden. dinate to the state). Although the transition occurred over a much longer  Relations between and among states are structured period of time, these treaties helped to transform a by the acceptance of the sovereign independence of medieval Europe of overlapping authorities, loyalties all states (thus implying that states are legally and identities into a modern state-system. The so- equal). Transnational corporations (TNCs) (see p. 99), non-governmental organiza- tions (NGOs) (see p. 6) and a host of other non-state bodies have come to exert influence. In different ways and to different degrees groups and organizations ranging from al-Qaeda (see p. 295), the anti-capitalist movement (see p. 70) and Greenpeace to Google (see p. 142), General Motors and the Papacy contribute to shaping world politics. Since the 1970s, indeed, pluralist theorists have advocated a mixed-actor model of world politics. However, although it is widely accepted that states and national governments are merely one category of actor amongst many on the world stage, they may still remain the most important actors. No TNC or NGOs, for instance, can rival the state’s coercive power, either its capacity to enforce order within its borders or its ability to deal militarily with other states. (The changing role and significance of the state are examined in depth in Chapter 5.) Increased interdependence and interconnectedness To study international politics traditionally meant to study the implications of  Mixed-actor model: The the international system being divided into a collection of states. Thanks to theory that, while not ignoring sovereignty, these states were, moreover, viewed as independent and the role of states and national autonomous entities. This state-centric approach has often been illustrated governments, international politics is shaped by a much through the so-called ‘billiard ball model’, which dominated thinking about broader range of interests and international relations in the 1950s and later, and was particularly associated groups. with realist theory. This suggested that states, like billiard balls, are impermeable and self-contained units, which influence each other through external pressure.  Security:: To be safe from Sovereign states interacting within the state-system are thus seen to behave like harm, the absence of threats; security may be understood in a collection of billiard balls moving over the table and colliding with each other, ‘national’, ‘international’, as in Figure 1.2. In this view, interactions between and amongst states, or ‘colli- ‘global’ or ‘human’ terms. sions’, are linked, in most cases to military and security matters, reflecting the 6 GLOBAL POLITICS G L O B A L AC TO R S . . . NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS A non-governmental organization By 2000, over 1,000 groups had been academics. Operational NGOs, for (NGO) is a private, non-commercial granted consultative status by the their part, have come to deliver about group or body which seeks to achieve UN, with estimates of the total 15 per cent of international aid, often its ends through non-violent means. number of international NGOs demonstrating a greater speed of The World Bank (see p. 373) defines usually exceeding 30,000. If national response and level of operational NGOs as ‘private organizations that NGOs are taken into account, the effectiveness than governmental pursue activities to relieve suffering, number grows enormously: the USA bodies, national or international, can promote the interests of the poor, has an estimated 2 million NGOs; muster. Relief- and development- protect the environment, provide Russia has 65,000 NGOs; and Kenya, orientated NGOs may also be able to basic social services, or undertake to take one developing country operate in politically sensitive areas community development’. Very early alone, has about 2,400 NGOs coming where national governments, or even examples of such bodies were the into existence each year. The major the UN, would be unwelcome. Society for the Abolition of the Slave international NGOs have developed Nevertheless, the rise of the NGO Trade (formed by William into huge organizations. For has provoked considerable political Wilberforce in 1787) and the example, Care International, dedi- controversy. Supporters of NGOs International Committee of the Red cated to the worldwide reduction of argue that they benefit and enrich Cross, founded in 1863. The first offi- poverty, controls a budget worth global politics. They counter-balance cial recognition of NGOs was by the more than 100m dollars, Greenpeace corporate power, challenging the United Nations (UN) in 1948, when has a membership of 2.5m and a staff influence of TNCs; democratize 41 NGOs were granted consultative of over 1,200, and Amnesty global politics by articulating the status following the establishment of International is better resourced than interests of people and groups who the Universal Declaration of Human the human rights arm of the UN. have been disempowered by the Rights (indeed, some NGO activists There can be little doubt that globalization process; and act as a believe that only groups formally major international NGOs and the moral force, widening peoples’ sense acknowledged by the UN should be NGO sector as a whole now consti- of civic responsibility and even regarded as ‘true’ NGOs). A distinc- tute significant actors on the global promoting global citizenship. In tion is often drawn between opera- stage. Although lacking the economic these respects, they are a vital tional NGOs and advocacy NGOs: leverage that TNCs can exert, advo- component of emergent global civil cacy NGOs have proved highly adept society (see p. 152). Critics, however,  Operational NGOs are ones at mobilizing ‘soft’ power (see p. 216) argue that NGOs are self-appointed whose primary purpose is the and popular pressure. In this respect, groups that have no genuine demo- design and implementation of they have a number of advantages. cratic credentials, often articulating development-related projects; These include that leading NGOs the views of a small group of senior they may be either relief-orien- have cultivated high public profiles, professionals. In an attempt to gain a tated or development-orientated, often linked to public protests and high media profile and attract and they may be community- demonstrations that attract eager support and funding, NGOs have based, national or international. media attention; that their typically been accused of making exaggerated  Advocacy NGOs exist to altruistic and humanitarian objec- claims, thereby distorting public promote or defend a particular tives enable them to mobilize public perceptions and the policy agenda. cause; they are sometimes support and exert moral pressure in Finally, in order to preserve their termed promotional pressure a way that conventional politicians ‘insider’ status, NGOs tend to groups or public interest groups. and political parties struggle to rival; compromise their principles and ‘go and that, over a wide range of issues, mainstream’, becoming, in effect, Significance: During the 1990s, the the views of NGOs are taken to be deradicalized social movements. (The steady growth in the number of both authoritative and disinterested, impact and significance of NGOs is NGOs became a veritable explosion. based on the use of specialists and examined further in Chapter 6.) INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 7 CONCEPT Great power A great power is a state deemed to rank amongst the most powerful in a hierarchical state-system. The criteria that define a great power are subject to dispute, but four are often identified. (1) Great powers are in the first rank of military prowess, having the capacity to Figure 1.2 Billiard ball model of world politics maintain their own security and, potentially, to influence other powers. (2) They are assumption that power and survival are the primary concerns of the state. economically powerful International politics is thus orientated mainly around issues of war and peace, states, although (as Japan with diplomacy and possibly military action being the principal forms of state shows) this is a necessary but not a sufficient interaction. condition for great power The billiard ball model of world politics has two key implications. First, it status. (3) They have suggests a clear distinction between domestic politics, which is concerned with global, and not merely the state’s role in maintaining order and carrying out regulation within its own regional, spheres of borders, and international politics, which is concerned with relations between interests. (4) They adopt a ‘forward’ foreign policy and amongst states. In this sense, sovereignty is the hard shell of the billiard ball and have actual, and not that divides the ‘outside’ from the ‘inside’. In short, borders matter. Second, it merely potential, impact implies that patterns of conflict and cooperation within the international system on international affairs are largely determined by the distribution of power among states. Thus, (during its isolationist although state-centric theorists acknowledged the formal, legal equality of states, phase, the USA was thus not a great power). each state being a sovereign entity, they also recognized that some states are more powerful than others, and, indeed, that strong states may sometimes intervene in the affairs of weak ones. In effect, not all billiard balls are the same size. This is why the study of international politics has conventionally given particular atten- tion to the interests and behaviour of so-called ‘great powers’. The billiard ball model has nevertheless come under pressure as a result of recent trends and developments. Two of these have been particularly significant. The first is that there has been a substantial growth in cross-border, or transna-  Diplomacy: A process of negotiation and tional, flows and transactions – movements of people, good, money, informa- communication between states tion and ideas. In other words, state borders have become increasingly ‘porous’, that seeks to resolve conflict and, as a result, the conventional domestic/international, or ‘inside/outside’, without recourse to war; an divide is increasingly difficult to sustain. This trend has been particularly associ- instrument of foreign policy. ated with globalization, as discussed in the next main section. The second devel-  Transnational:: A opment, linked to the first, is that relations among states have come to be configuration, which may apply characterized by growing interdependence (see p. 8) and interconnectedness. to events, people, groups or Tasks such as promoting economic growth and prosperity, tackling global organizations, that takes little warming, halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and coping with or no account of national pandemic diseases are impossible for any state to accomplish on its own, government or state borders; transnational as distinct from however powerful it might be. States, in these circumstances, are forced to work ‘international’ and together, relying on collective efforts and energies. For Keohane and Nye (1977), ‘multinational’. such a web of relationships has created a condition of ‘complex interdepend- 8 GLOBAL POLITICS CONCEPT Interdependence Interdependence refers to a relationship between two parties in which each is affected by decisions that are taken by the other. Inter dependence implies mutual influence, even a rough equality between the parties in question, usually arising from a sense of mutual vulnerability. Figure 1.3 Cobweb model of world politics Interdependence, then, is usually associated with a trend towards cooperation ence’, in which states are drawn into cooperation and integration by forces such and integration in world as closer trading and other economic relationships. This is illustrated by what affairs. Keohane and Nye has been called the ‘cobweb model’ of world politics (see Figure 1.3). (1977) advanced the idea of ‘complex Nevertheless, such thinking can be taken too far. For one thing, there are parts of interdependence’ as an the world, not least the Middle East, where states clearly remain enmeshed in alternative to the realist military-strategic conflict, suggesting both that the billiard ball model is not model of international entirely inaccurate and that levels of interdependence vary greatly across the politics. This highlighted globe. For another, interdependence is by no means always associated with the extent to which (1) states have ceased to be trends towards peace, cooperation and integration. Interdependence may be autonomous international asymmetrical rather than symmetrical, in which case it can lead to domination actors; (2) economic and and conflict rather than peace and harmony. other issues have become more prominent in world affairs; and (3) military From international anarchy to global governance? force has become a less reliable and less A key assumption of the traditional approach to international politics has been important policy option. that the state-system operates in a context of anarchy. This reflects the notion that there is no higher authority than the state, meaning that external politics  Anarchy: Literally, without operates as an international ‘state of nature’, a pre-political society. The implica- rule; the absence of a central tions of international anarchy are profound. Most importantly, in the absence of government or higher authority, any other force attending to their interests, states are forced to rely on self-help. sometimes, but not necessarily, If international politics operates as a ‘self-help system’, the power-seeking incli- associated with instability and chaos. nations of one state are only tempered by competing tendencies in other states, suggesting that conflict and war are inevitable features of the international  Self-help: A reliance on system. In this view, conflict is only constrained by a balance of power, devel- internal or inner resources, oped either as a diplomatic strategy by peace-minded leaders or occurring often seen as the principal through a happy coincidence. This image of anarchy has been modified by the reason states prioritize survival and security. idea that the international system operates more like an ‘international society’ (see page 10). Hedley Bull (2002) thus advanced the notion of an ‘anarchical  Balance of power: A society’, in place of the conventional theory of international anarchy. condition in which no one state However, the idea of international anarchy, and even the more modest notion predominates over others, of an ‘anarchical society’, have become more difficult to sustain because of the tending to create general equilibrium and curb the emergence, especially since 1945, of a framework of global governance (see p. hegemonic ambitions of all 455) and sometimes regional governance. This is reflected in the growing impor- states (see p. 256). tance of organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 9 Fund (IMF) (see p. 469), the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see p. 511), the CONCEPT European Union (see p. 505) and so on. The growing number and significance Globalization of international organizations has occurred for powerful and pressing reasons. Globalization is the Notably, they reflect the fact that states are increasingly confronted by collective emergence of a complex dilemmas, issues that are particularly taxing because they confound even the web of most powerful of states when acting alone. This first became apparent in relation interconnectedness that to the development of technologized warfare and particularly the invention of means that our lives are nuclear weapons, but has since been reinforced by challenges such as financial increasingly shaped by events that occur, and crises, climate change, terrorism, crime, migration and development. Such decisions that are made, trends, nevertheless, have yet to render the idea of international anarchy alto- at a great distance from gether redundant. While international organizations have undoubtedly become us. The central feature of significant actors on the world stage, competing, at times, with states and other globalization is therefore non-state actors, their impact should not be exaggerated. Apart from anything that geographical distance is of declining else, they are, to a greater or lesser extent, the creatures of their members: they relevance and that can do no more than their member states, and especially powerful states, allow territorial borders, such them to do. as those between nation- states, are becoming less significant. By no means, Globalization and its implications however, does globalization imply that No development has challenged the conventional state-centric image of world ‘the local’ and ‘the politics more radically than the emergence of globalization. Globalization, national’ are indeed, can be seen as the buzz word of our time. Amongst politicians, for subordinated to ‘the instance, the conventional wisdom is that the twenty-first century will be the global’. Rather, it highlights the deepening ‘global century’. But what actually is ‘globalization’? Is it actually happening, and, as well as the broadening if so, what are its implications? of the political process, in the sense that local, national and global Explaining globalization events (or perhaps local, regional, national, Globalization is a complex, elusive and controversial term. It has been used to international and global refer to a process, a policy, a marketing strategy, a predicament or even an ideol- events) constantly ogy. Some have tried to bring greater clarity to the debate about the nature of interact. globalization by distinguishing between globalization as a process or set of processes (highlighting the dynamics of transformation or change, in common  Collective dilemma: A with other words that end in the suffix ‘-ization’, such as modernization) and problem that stems from the globality as a condition (indicating the set of circumstances that globalization interdependence of states, has brought about, just as modernization has created a condition of modernity) meaning that any solution must involve international (Steger 2003). Others have used the term globalism to refer to the ideology of cooperation rather action by a globalization, the theories, values and assumptions that have guided or driven single state. the process (Ralston Saul 2005). The problem with globalization is that it is not so much an ‘it’ as a ‘them’: it is not a single process but a complex of processes,  Globality: A totally sometimes overlapping and interlocking but also, at times, contradictory and interconnected whole, such as the global economy; the end- oppositional ones. It is therefore difficult to reduce globalization to a single state of globalization. theme. Nevertheless, the various developments and manifestations that are asso- ciated with globalization, or indeed globality, can be traced back to the underly-  Globalism: An ideological ing phenomenon of interconnectedness. Globalization, regardless of its forms or project committed to the impact, forges connections between previously unconnected people, communi- spread of globalization, usually reflecting support for the values ties, institutions and societies. Held and McGrew (1999) thus defined globaliza- and theories of free-market tion as ‘the widening, intensifying, speeding up, and growing impact of capitalism. world-wide interconnectedness’. 10 GLOBAL POLITICS The interconnectedness that globalization has spawned is multidimensional CONCEPT and operates through distinctive economic, cultural and political processes. In International other words, globalization has a number of dimensions or ‘faces’. Although glob- society alization theorists have championed particular interpretations of globalization, these are by no means mutually exclusive. Instead, they capture different aspects The term ‘international society’ suggests that of a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Globalization has been interpreted relations between and in three main ways: amongst states are conditioned by the  Economic globalization (see p. 94) is the process through which national existence of norms and economies have, to a greater or lesser extent, been absorbed into a single rules that establish the regular patterns of global economy (examined in greater depth in Chapter 4). interaction that  Cultural globalization (see p. 147) is the process whereby information, characterize a ‘society’. commodities and images that have been produced in one part of the world This view modifies the enter into a global flow that tends to ‘flatten out’ cultural differences realist emphasis on between nations, regions and individuals (discussed more fully in Chapter power politics and international anarchy by 6). suggesting the existence  Political globalization (see p. 118) is the process through which policy- of a ‘society of states’ making responsibilities have been passed from national governments to rather than simply a international organizations (considered in greater detail in Chapter 5). ‘system of states’, implying both that international relations Globalization: myth or reality? are rule-governed and that these rules help to Is globalization actually happening? Although globalization may be the buzz maintain international word of our time, there has been intense debate about its impact and signifi- order. The chief cance. No sooner had (roughly by the mid-1990s) academics and other social institutions that generate cultural cohesion and commentators seemed to agree that globalization was ‘changing everything’, social integration are than it became fashionable (in the early 2000s) to proclaim the ‘end of global- international law (see p. ization’, or the ‘death of globalism’ (Bisley 2007). The most influential attempt to 332), diplomacy and the outline the various positions on this globalization debate was set out by Held et activities of international al. (1999). They distinguished between three positions: organizations (see p. 433). The extent of social integration may  The hyperglobalists nevertheless depend  The sceptics heavily on the extent of  The transformationalists cultural and ideological similarity between and among states. The hyperglobalizers are the chief amongst ‘the believers’ in globalization. Hyperglobalism portrays globalization as a profound, even revolutionary set of economic, cultural, technological and political shifts that have intensified since the 1980s. Particular emphasis, in this view, is placed on developments such as the digital revolution in information and communications, the advent of an integrated global financial system and the emergence of global commodities that  Hyperglobalism: The view are available almost anywhere in the world. Indeed, hyperglobalism is often that new, globalized economic based on a form of technological determinism, which suggests that the forces and cultural patterns became creating a single global economy became irresistible once the technology that inevitable once technology facilitates its existence was available. The chief image of hyperglobalism is such as computerized financial captured in the notion of a ‘borderless world’ (discussed in more detail in trading, satellite communications, mobile Chapter 21), which suggests that national borders and, for that matter, states phones and the Internet themselves have become irrelevant in a global order increasingly dominated by became widely available. transnational forces. ‘National’ economic strategies are therefore virtually INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 11 Focus on . . . Definitions of globalization  ‘[T]he intensification of worldwide social relations  ‘The processes through which sovereign nation- that link distant localities in a way that local states are criss-crossed and undermined by transna- happenings are shaped by events occurring many tional actors with varying prospects of power, miles away and vice versa’ (Giddens 1990) orientations, identities and networks’ (Beck 2000)  ‘The integration of national economies into the  ‘A process (or set of processes) which embody the international economy through trade, direct transformation of the spatial organization of social foreign investment, short-term capital flows, relations and transactions’ (Held et al. 1999) international flows of workers and humanity  ‘A reconfiguration of social geography marked by generally, and flows of technology’ (Bhagwati the growth of transplanetary and supraterritorial 2004) connections between people’ (Scholte 2005) unworkable in a global context. Resistance to the dictates of global markets is both damaging – countries prosper to the extent that their economies are inte- grated into the global economy – and ultimately futile. Hyperglobalizers there- fore have a strongly positive attitude towards globalization, usually assuming that, in marking the triumph of markets over the state, it is associated with economic dynamism and growing worldwide prosperity. Nevertheless, hyperglobalism offers an unbalanced and exaggerated view of globalization, in at least two senses. First, it overstates the extent to which policy- makers have been dominated by ‘irresistible’ economic and technological forces, underestimating the importance of values, perceptions and ideological orienta- tions. Second, the images of the ‘end of sovereignty’ and the ‘twilight of the nation-state’ can be said to feature amongst the myths of globalization (some- times called ‘globalony’). Although states may increasingly operate in post-sover- eign conditions, in a context of interdependence and permeability, their role and significance has altered rather than become irrelevant. States, for example, have become ‘entrepreneurial’ in trying to develop strategies for improving their competitiveness in the global economy, notably by boosting education, training and job-related skills. They are also more willing to ‘pool’ sovereignty by working in and through international organizations such as regional training blocs and the WTO. Finally, the advent of global terrorism and intensifying concern about migration patterns has re-emphasized the importance of the state in ensuring homeland security and in protecting national borders. (The implications of glob- alization for the state are examined more fully in Chapter 5.) The sceptics, by contrast, have portrayed globalization as a fantasy and dismissed the idea of an integrated global economy. They point out that the overwhelming bulk of economic activity still takes place within, not across, national boundaries, and that there is nothing new about high levels of interna- tional trade and cross-border capital flows (Hirst and Thompson 1999). Sceptics have, further, argued that globalization has been used as an ideological device by politicians and theorists who wish to advance a market-orientated economic 12 GLOBAL POLITICS A P P ROAC H E S TO . . . GLOBALIZATION Realist view ism is invariably associated with the advance of liberal Realists have typically adopted a sceptical stance democracy, economic freedom breeding a demand for towards globalization, seeing it more in terms of inten- political freedom. For liberals, globalization marks a sifying economic interdependence (that is, ‘more of the watershed in world history, in that it ends the period same’) rather than the creation of an interlocking during which the nation-state was the dominant global global economy. Most importantly, the state continues actor, world order being determined by an (inherently to be the dominant unit in world politics. Instead of unstable) balance of power. The global era, by contrast, being threatened by globalization, the state’s capacity is characterized by a tendency towards peace and inter- for regulation and surveillance may have increased national cooperation as well as by the dispersal of rather than decreased. However, realists are not simply global power, in particular through the emergence of globalization deniers. In assessing the nature and global civil society (see p. 152) and the growing impor- significance of globalization, they emphasize that glob- tance of international organizations. alization and the international system are not separate, still less rival, structures. Rather, the former should be Critical views seen as a manifestation of the latter. Globalization has Critical theorists have adopted a negative or opposi- been made by states, for states, particularly dominant tional stance towards globalization. Often drawing on states. Developments such as an open trading system, an established socialist or specifically Marxist critique global financial markets and the advent of transna- of capitalism, this portrays the essence of globalization tional production were all put in place to advance the as the establishment of a global capitalist order. interests of western states in general and the USA in (Indeed, Marx (see p. 69) can be said to have prefig- particular. Furthermore, realists question the notion ured much ‘hyperglobalist’ literature, in having high- that globalization is associated with a shift towards lighted the intrinsically transnational character of the peace and cooperation. Instead, heightened economic capitalist mode of production.) Like liberals, critical interdependence is as likely to breed ‘mutual vulnera- theorists usually accept that globalization marks a bility’, leading to conflict rather than cooperation. historically significant shift, not least in the relation- ship between states and markets. States have lost power Liberal view over the economy, being reduced to little more than Liberals adopt a consistently positive attitude towards instruments for the restructuring of national globalization. For economic liberals, globalization economies in the interests of global capitalism. reflects the victory of the market over ‘irrational’ Globalization is thus viewed as an uneven, hierarchical national allegiances and ‘arbitrary’ state borders. The process, characterized both by the growing polarization miracle of the market is that it draws resources towards between the rich and the poor, explained by world- their most profitable use, thus bringing prosperity to systems theorists in terms of a structural imbalance individuals, families, companies and societies. The between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ areas in the global attraction of economic globalization is therefore that it economy, and by a weakening of democratic accounta- allows markets to operate on a global scale, replacing bility and popular responsiveness due to burgeoning the ‘shallow’ integration of free trade and intensified corporate power. Feminist analysts have sometimes interdependence with the ‘deep’ integration of a single linked globalization to growing gender inequalities, global economy. The increased productivity and inten- associated, for example, with the disruption of small- sified competition that this produces benefits all the scale farming in the developing world, largely carried societies that participate within it, demonstrating that out by women, and growing pressure on them to economic globalization is a positive-sum game, a game support their families by seeking work abroad, leading of winners and winners. Liberals also believe that glob- to the ‘feminization of migration’. Postcolonial theo- alization brings social and political benefits. The freer rists, for their part, have taken particular exception to flow of information and ideas around the world both cultural globalization, interpreted as a form of western widens opportunities for personal self-development and imperialism which subverts indigenous cultures and creates more dynamic and vigorous societies. Moreover, ways of life and leads to the spread of soulless from a liberal standpoint, the spread of market capital- consumerism. INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 13 agenda. The globalization thesis has two major advantages in this respect. In the first place, it portrays certain tendencies (such as the shift towards greater flexi- bility and weaker trade unions, controls on public spending and particularly welfare budgets, and the scaling down of business regulation) as inevitable and therefore irresistible. Second, it suggests that such shifts are part of an imper- sonal process, and not one linked to an agent, such as big business, whose inter- ests might be seen to be served by globalizing tendencies. However, although such scepticism has served to check the over-boiled enthusiasm of earlier glob- alization theorists, it is difficult to sustain the idea of ‘business as normal’. Goods, capital, information and people do move around the world more freely than they used to, and this has inevitable consequences for economic, cultural and politi- cal life. Falling between the hyperglobalizers and the sceptics, the ‘transformational- ist’ stance offers a middle road view of globalization. It accepts that profound changes have taken place in the patterns and processes of world politics without its established or traditional features having been swept away altogether. In short, much has changed, but not everything. This has become the most widely accepted view of globalization, as it resists both the temptation to over-hype the process and to debunk it. Major transformations have nevertheless taken place in world politics. These include the following:  The breadth of interconnectedness has not only stretched social, political, economic and cultural activities across national borders, but also, poten- tially, across the globe. Never before has globalization threatened to develop into a single worldwide system.  The intensity of interconnectedness has increased with the growing magni- tude of transborder or even transworld activities, which range from migra- tion surges and the growth of international trade to the greater accessibility of Hollywood movies or US television programmes.  Interconnectedness has speeded up, not least through the huge flows of elec- tronic money that move around the world at the flick of a computer switch, ensuring that currency and other financial markets react almost immedi- ately to economic events elsewhere in the world. LENSES ON GLOBAL POLITICS However, making sense of global politics also requires that we understand the theories, values and assumptions through which world affairs have been inter- preted. How do different analysts and theorists see the world? What are the key ‘lenses’ on global politics? The theoretical dimension of the study of global poli- tics has become an increasingly rich and diverse arena in recent decades, and the competing theoretical traditions are examined in depth in Chapter 3. This intro- duction, nevertheless, attempts to map out broad areas of debate, in particular by distinguishing between ‘mainstream’ perspectives and ‘critical’ perspectives. Mainstream perspectives The two mainstream perspectives on global politics are realism and liberalism. What do they have in common, and in what sense are they ‘mainstream’? 14 GLOBAL POLITICS Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) English political philosopher. Hobbes was the son of a minor clergyman who subse- quently abandoned his family. Writing at a time of uncertainty and civil strife, precip- itated by the English Revolution, Hobbes developed the first comprehensive theory of nature and human behaviour since Aristotle. His classic work, Leviathan (1651) discussed the grounds of political obligation and undoubtedly reflected the impact of the Civil War. Based on the assumption that human beings seek ‘power after power’, it provided a realist justification for absolutist government as the only alternative to the anarchy of the ‘state of nature’, in which life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. Hobbes’ emphasis on the state as an essential guarantor of order and security has led to a revived interest in his ideas since 9/11. Realism and liberalism can be viewed as mainstream perspectives in the sense that they, in their various incarnations, have dominated conventional academic approaches to the field of international politics since its inception. Realist and liberal theories have two broad things in common. In the first place, they are both grounded in positivism. This suggests that it is possible to develop objec- tive knowledge, through the capacity to distinguish ‘facts’ from ‘values’. In short, it is possible to compare theories with the ‘real world’, the world ‘out there’. Robert Cox (1981) thus describes such theories as ‘problem-solving theories’, in that they take the world ‘as it is’ and endeavour to think through problems and offer prudent advice to policy-makers trying to negotiate the challenges of the ‘real world’. Second, realist and liberal theorists share similar concerns and address similar issues, meaning that they, in effect, talk to, rather than past, one another. In particular, the core concern of both realism and liberalism is the balance between conflict and cooperation in state relations. Although realists generally place greater emphasis on conflict, while liberals highlight the scope for cooperation, neither is unmindful of the issues raised by the other, as is evidenced in the tendency, over time, for differences between realism and liber- alism to have become blurred (see Closing the realist-liberal divide? p. 65). Nevertheless, important differences can be identified between the realist and liberal perspectives. How do realists see global politics? Deriving from ideas that can be traced back to thinkers such as Thucydides (see p.242), Sun Tzu, author of The Art of War, Machiavelli (see p.55) and Thomas Hobbes, the realist vision is pessimistic:  Positivism: The theory that international politics is marked by constant power struggles and conflict, and a social and indeed all forms of wide range of obstacles standing in the way of peaceful cooperation. Realism is enquiry should conform to the methods of the natural grounded in an emphasis on power politics, based on the following assump- sciences. tions:  Power politics: An approach  Human nature is characterized by selfishness and greed. to politics based on the assumption that the pursuit of  Politics is a domain of human activity structured by power and coercion. power is the principal human  States are the key global actors. goal; the term is sometimes  States prioritize self-interest and survival, prioritizing security above all else. used descriptively.  States operate in a context of anarchy, and thus rely on self-help. INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 15  Global order is structured by the distribution of power (capabilities) among states.  The balance of power is the principal means of ensuring stability and avoiding war.  Ethical considerations are (and should be) irrelevant to the conduct of foreign policy. By contrast, how do liberals see global politics? Liberalism offers a more opti- mistic vision of global politics, based, ultimately, on a belief in human rational- ity and moral goodness (even though liberals also accept that people are essentially self-interested and competitive). Liberals tend to believe that the prin- ciple of balance or harmony operates in all forms of social interaction. As far as world politics is concerned, this is reflected in a general commitment to inter- nationalism, as reflected in Immanuel Kant’s (see p. 16) belief in the possibility of ‘universal and perpetual peace’. The liberal model of global politics is based on the following key assumptions:  Human beings are rational and moral creatures.  History is a progressive process, characterized by a growing prospect of international cooperation and peace.  Mixed-actor models of global politics are more realistic than state-centric ones.  Trade and economic interdependence make war less likely.  International law helps to promote order and fosters rule-governed behav- iour among states.  Democracy is inherently peaceful, particularly in reducing the likelihood of war between democratic states. Critical perspectives Since the late 1980s, the range of critical approaches to world affairs has expanded considerably. Until that point, Marxism had constituted the principal alternative to mainstream realist and liberal theories. What made the Marxist approach distinctive was that it placed its emphasis not on patterns of conflict and cooperation between states, but on structures of economic power and the role played in world affairs by international capital. It thus brought international political economy, sometimes seen as a sub-field within IR, into focus. However, hastened by the end of the Cold War, a wide range of ‘new voices’ started to influ- ence the study of world politics, notable examples including social construc- tivism, critical theory, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, feminism and green politics. What do these new critical voices have in common, and in what sense are they ‘critical’? In view of their diverse philosophical underpinnings and contrast- ing political viewpoints, it is tempting to argue that the only thing that unites these ‘new voices’ is a shared antipathy towards mainstream thinking. However,  Internationalism: The two broad similarities can be identified. The first is that, albeit in different ways theory or practice of politics and to different degrees, they have tried to go beyond the positivism of main- based on cooperation or harmony among nations, as stream theory, emphasizing instead the role of consciousness in shaping social opposed to the transcendence conduct and, therefore, world affairs. These so-called post-positivist theories of national politics (see p.64). are therefore ‘critical’ in that they not only take issue with the conclusions of 16 GLOBAL POLITICS Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) German philosopher. Kant spent his entire life in Königsberg (which was then in East Prussia), becoming professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg in 1770. His ‘critical’ philosophy holds that knowledge is not merely an aggregate of sense impressions; it depends on the conceptual apparatus of human understanding. Kant’s political thought was shaped by the central importance of morality. He believed that the law of reason dictated categorical imperatives, the most important of which was the obligation to treat others as ‘ends’, and never only as ‘means’. Kant’s most important works include Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784) and Metaphysics of Morals (1785). mainstream theory, but also subject these theories themselves to critical scrutiny, exposing biases that operate within them and examining their implications. The second similarity is linked to the first: critical theories are ‘critical’ in that, in their different ways, they oppose the dominant forces and interests in modern world affairs, and so contest the global status quo by (usually) aligning themselves with marginalized or oppressed groups. Each of them, thus, seeks to uncover inequal- ities and asymmetries that mainstream theories tend to ignore. However, the inequalities and asymmetries to which critical theorists have drawn attention are many and various:  Neo-Marxists (who encompass a range of traditions and tendencies that in fact straddle the positivist/post-positivist divide) highlight inequalities in the global capitalist system, through which developed countries or areas, sometimes operating through TNCs or linked to ‘hegemonic’ powers such as the USA, dominate and exploit developing countries or areas.  Social constructivism is not so much a substantive theory as an analytical tool. In arguing that people, in effect, ‘construct’ the world in which they live, suggesting that the world operates through a kind of ‘inter-subjective’ awareness, constructivists have thrown mainstream theory’s claim to objec- tivity into question.  Poststructuralists emphasize that all ideas and concepts are expressed in language which itself is enmeshed in complex relations of power. Influenced particularly by the writings of Michel Foucault, post-structural- ists have drawn attention to the link between power and systems of thought using the idea of a ‘discourse of power’.  Feminists have drawn attention to systematic and pervasive structures of gender inequality that characterize global and, indeed, all other forms of politics. In particular, they have highlighted the extent to which main- stream, and especially realist, theories are based on ‘masculinist’ assump- tions about rivalry, competition and inevitable conflict.  Postcolonialists have emphasized the cultural dimension of colonial rule, showing how western cultural and political hegemony over the rest of the INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 17 Michel Foucault (1926–84) French philosopher and radical intellectual. The son of a prosperous surgeon, Foucault had a troubled youth in which he attempted suicide on several occasions and strug- gled to come to terms with his homosexuality. His work, which ranged over the history of madness, of medicine, of punishment, of sexuality and of knowledge itself, was based on the assumption that the institutions, concepts and beliefs of each period are upheld by ‘discourses of power’. This suggests that power relations can largely be disclosed by examining the structure of ‘knowledge’, since ‘truth serves the interests of a ruling class or the prevailing power-structure’. Foucault’s most impor- tant works include Madness and Civilization (1961), The Order of Things (1966) and The History of Sexuality (1976). world has been preserved despite the achievement of formal political inde- pendence across almost the entire developing world.  Green politics, or ecologism, has focused on growing concerns about envi- ronmental degradation, highlighting the extent to which this has been a by- product of industrialization and an obsession with economic growth, supported by systems of thought that portray human beings as ‘masters over nature’. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN GLOBAL POLITICS Finally, global politics is an ever-shifting field, with, if anything, the pace of change accelerating over time. Recent decades have witnessed momentous events such as the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the September 11 terrorist attacks on the USA and the global financial crisis of 2007–09. While these and other events have changed the contours of global poli- tics, sometimes radically, certain features of world affairs have proved to be of more enduring significance. This can be illustrated by examining the balance between continuity and change in three key aspects of world politics:  Power  Security  Justice Power All forms of politics are about power. Indeed, politics is sometimes seen as the study of power, its core theme being: who gets what, when, how? Modern global politics raises two main questions about power. The first is about where power is located: who has it? During the Cold War era, this appeared to be an easy question to answer. Two ‘superpowers’ (see p. 38) dominated world politics, dividing the global system into rival ‘spheres of influence’. East-West conflict 18 GLOBAL POLITICS reflected the existence of a bipolar world order, marked by the political, ideo- logical and economic ascendancy, respectively, of the USA and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War has precipitated a major debate about the shifting location of global power. In one view, the fall of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union left the USA as the world’s sole superpower, meaning that it had been transformed into a global hegemon. Such a view also took account of the extent to which the USA was the architect, and chief bene- ficiary, of the process of globalization, as well as the possessor of enormous ‘structural’ power (see Chapter 9), its pivotal position within institutions such as the UN, the WTO, IMF and World Bank giving it disproportional influence over the frameworks within which states relate to one another and decide how things shall be done. However, alternative views about the shifting configuration of global power suggest that it is becoming more fragmented and pluralized. For example, power may have shifted away from states generally through the growing importance of non-state actors and the increased role played by international organizations. Furthermore, globalization may have made power more diffuse and intangible, increasing the influence of global markets and drawing states into a web of economic interdependence that substantially restricts their freedom of manoeu- vre. A further dimension of this traces the implications for global power of the rise of emerging states, such as China, India and Brazil, as well as the impact of a resurgent Russia, sometimes collectively known as the BRICs (see p. 477). In this view, the bipolar Cold War world order is in the process of being replaced by a multipolar world order. (The changing nature of global order is examined more closely in Chapter 9.) Power has also been pluralized through the capacity of new technology to alter power balances both within society and between soci- eties, often empowering the traditionally powerless. For example, advances in communications technology, particularly the use of mobile phones and the Internet, have improved the tactical effectiveness of loosely organized groups, ranging from terrorist bands to protest groups and social movements. Al- Qaeda’s influence on world politics since September 11 has thus been out of all proportion to its organizational and economic strength, because modern tech- nology, in the form of bombs and airplanes, has given its terrorist activities a global reach (see p. 20). The second debate is about the changing nature of power. This has, arguably, occurred because, due to new technology and in a world of global communications and rising literacy rates and educational standards, ‘soft’ power is becoming as important as ‘hard’ power in influencing political outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 9, soft power is power as attraction rather than coercion, the ability to influence others by persuading them to follow or agree to norms and aspirations, as opposed to using threats or rewards. This has, for instance, stimulated a debate about whether military power is now redundant in global politics, especially when it is not matched by ‘hearts and minds’ strategies. In addition, the near-ubiquitous spread of television and the wider use of satellite technology mean that pictures of devastation and human suffering, whether caused by warfare, famine or natural disaster, are shared across the globe almost instantly. This means, amongst other things, that the  Hegemon: A leading or behaviour of governments and international organizations is influenced as paramount power. never before by public opinion around the world. INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 19 CONCEPT Security Security is the deepest and most abiding issue in politics. At its heart is the ques- Security dilemma tion: how can people live a decent and worthwhile existence, free from threats, Security dilemma intimidation and violence? Security has usually been thought of as a particu- describes a condition in which actions taken by larly pressing issue in international politics because, while the domestic realm one actor to improve is ordered and stable, by virtue of the existence of a sovereign state, the inter- national security are national realm is anarchical and therefore threatening and unstable. For realists, interpreted as aggressive as the most important actors in the international system are states, security is by other actors, thereby primarily understood in terms of ‘national’ security. As, in a world of self-help, provoking military counter-moves. This all states are under at least potential threat from all other states, each state must reflects two component have the capacity for self-defence. National security therefore places a premium dilemmas (Booth and on military power, reflecting the assumption that the more militarily powerful Wheeler 2008). First, a state is, the more secure it is likely to be. This focus on military security never- there is a dilemma of theless draws states into dynamic, competitive relationships with one another, interpretation – what are the motives, intentions based on what is called the security dilemma. This is the problem that a mili- and capabilities of others tary build-up for defensive purposes by one state is always liable to be inter- in building up military preted by other states as potentially or actually aggressive, leading to retaliatory power? As weapons are military build-ups and so on. The security dilemma gets to the very heart of inherently ambiguous politics amongst states, making it the quintessential dilemma of international symbols (they can be either defensive or politics (Booth and Wheeler 2008). Permanent insecurity between and amongst aggressive), there is states is therefore the inescapable lot of those who live in a condition of irresolvable uncertainty anarchy. about these matters. However, the state-centric ideas of national security and an inescapable Second, there is a security dilemma have also been challenged. There is, for example, a long- dilemma of response – should they react in kind, established emphasis within liberal theory on collective security (see p.440), in a militarily reflecting the belief that aggression can best be resisted by united action taken confrontational manner, by a number of states. Such a view shifts attention away from the idea of or should they seek to ‘national’ security towards the broader notion of ‘international’ security signal reassurance and (Smith 2010). Furthermore, the security agenda in modern global politics has attempt to defuse tension? Misperception changed in a number of ways. These include, on the one hand, the expansion here may either lead to of ‘zones of peace’ in which the tensions and incipient conflicts implied by the an unintended arms race security dilemma appear to be absent. Thus ‘security regimes’ or ‘security (see p. 266) or to communities’ have developed to manage disputes and help to avoid war, a national disaster. trend often associated with growing economic interdependence (linked to globalization) and the advance of democratization. On the other hand, September 11 and the wider threat of terrorism has highlighted the emergence  International security: of new security challenges that are particularly problematical because they Conditions in which the mutual survival and safety of states is arise from non-state actors and exploit the greater interconnectedness of the secured through measures modern world. International security may therefore have given way to ‘global’ taken to prevent or punish security. A further development has been the trend to rethink the concept of aggression, usually within a security at a still deeper level, usually linked to the notion of ‘human security’ rule-governed international (see p. 423). Interest in human security has grown both because the decline of order. inter-state war in the post-Cold War means that the threat from violent conflict  Security regime: A now usually occurs within states, coming from civil war, insurrection and civic framework of cooperation strife, and because of the recognition that in the modern world people’s safety amongst states and other and survival is often put at risk more by non-military threats (such as environ- actors to ensure the peaceful mental destruction, disease, refugee crises and resource scarcity), than it is by resolution of conflict (see international regime, p. 67). military threats. 20 GLOBAL POLITICS GLOBAL POLITICS IN ACTION . . . September 11 and global security Events: On the morning of 11 September 2001, a coordinated series of terrorist attacks were launched against the USA using four hijacked passenger jet airliners (the events subsequently became known as September 11, or 9/11). Two airliners crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, leading to the collapse first of the North Tower and then the South Tower. The third airliner crashed into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Department of Defence in Arlington, Virginia, just outside Washington DC. The fourth airliner, believed to be heading towards either the White House or the US Capitol, both in Washington DC, crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after passengers on board tried to seize control of the plane. There were no survivors from any of the flights. A total of 2,995 people were killed in these attacks, mainly in New York City. In a videotape released in October 2001, responsibility for the attacks was claimed by Osama bin Laden, head of the al-Qaeda (see p. 295) organization, who praised his followers as the ‘vanguards of Islam’. Significance: September 11 has sometimes been ‘clash of civilization’ (see p. 190), even as a struggle described as ‘the day the world changed’. This certainly between Islam and the West. applied in terms of its consequences, notably the unfolding However, rather than marking the beginning of a new ‘war on terror’ and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq era in global security, 9/11 may have indicated more a and their ramifications. It also marked a dramatic shift in return to ‘business as normal’. In particular, the advent of global security, signalling the end of a period during which a globalized world appeared to underline the vital impor- globalization and the cessation of superpower rivalry tance of ‘national’ security, rather than ‘international’ or appeared to have been associated with a diminishing ‘global’ security. The emergence of new security chal- propensity for international conflict. Globalization, indeed, lenges, and especially transnational terrorism, re-empha- appeared to have ushered in new security threats and new sized the core role of the state in protecting its citizens forms of conflict. For example, 9/11 demonstrated how from external attack. Instead of becoming progressively fragile national borders had become in a technological age. less important, 9/11 gave the state a renewed signifi- If the world’s greatest power could be dealt such a devas- cance. The USA, for example, responded to 9/11 by under- tating blow to its largest city and its national capital, what taking a substantial build-up of state power, both at home chance did other states have? Further, the ‘external’ threat (through strengthened ‘homeland security’) and abroad in this case came not from another state, but from a (through increased military spending and the invasions of terrorist organization, and one, moreover, that operated Afghanistan and Iraq). A unilateralist tendency also more as a global network rather than a nationally-based became more pronounced in its foreign policy, as the USA organization. The motivations behind the attacks were also became, for a period at least, less concerned about not conventional ones. Instead of seeking to conquer terri- working with or through international organizations of tory or acquire control over resources, the 9/11 attacks various kinds. Other states affected by terrorism have also were carried out in the name of a religiously-inspired exhibited similar tendencies, marking a renewed emphasis ideology, militant Islamism (see p. 199), and aimed at on national security sometime at the expense of consider- exerting a symbolic, even psychic, blow against the ations such as civil liberties and political freedom. 9/11, in cultural, political and ideological domination of the West. other words, may demonstrate that state-based power This led some to see 9/11 as evidence of an emerging politics is alive and kicking. INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 21 CONCEPT Justice Realist theorists have traditionally viewed justice as a largely irrelevant issue in Cosmopolitanism international or global politics. Relations between states should be determined Cosmopolitanism literally by hard-headed judgements related to the national interest, not by ethical means a belief in a cosmopolis or ‘world considerations. Liberals, by contrast, insist that international politics and moral- state’. Moral ity should go hand in hand, amoral power politics being a recipe for egoism, cosmopolitanism is the conflict and violence. Traditionally, however, they have defended the idea of belief that the world ‘international’ justice based on principles that set out how nation-states should constitutes a single moral behave towards one another. Respect for state sovereignty and the norm of non- community, in that people have obligations interference in the affairs of other states, seen as guarantees of national inde- (potentially) towards all pendence and therefore political freedom, are clearly an example of this. Such other people in the thinking is also reflected in ‘just war’ theory (see p. 257). This is the idea that the world, regardless of use of violence through war can only be justified if both the reasons for war and nationality, religion, the conduct of war conform to principles of justice. ethnicity and so forth. All forms of moral However, the growth of interconnectedness and interdependence has cosmopolitanism are extended thinking about morality in world affairs, particularly through an based on a belief that increasing emphasis on the notion of ‘global’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ justice. The idea every individual is of of global justice is rooted in a belief in universal moral values, values that apply equal moral worth, most to all people in the world regardless of nationality and citizenship. The most commonly linked to the doctrine of human rights. influential example of universal values is the doctrine of international human Political cosmopolitanism rights (see p. 304). Such cosmopolitanism has shaped thinking on the issue of (sometimes called ‘legal’ global distributive justice, suggesting, for instance, that rich countries should or ’institutional’ give more foreign aid, and that there should be a possibly substantial redistribu- cosmopolitanism) is the tion of wealth between the world’s rich and the world’s poor. The utilitarian belief that there should be global political philosopher Peter Singer (1993) argued that the citizens and governments of rich institutions, and possibly countries have a basic obligation to eradicate absolute poverty in other countries a world government (see on the grounds that (1) if we can prevent something bad without sacrificing p. 457). However, most anything of comparable significance, we ought to do it, and (2) absolute poverty modern political is bad because it causes suffering and death. For Pogge (2008), the obligation of cosmopolitans favour a system in which rich countries to help poor countries stems not from the simple existence of authority is divided poverty and our capacity to alleviate it, but from the causal relationship between between global, national the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor. The rich have a duty to help and local levels (Brown the poor because the international order is structured so as to benefit some and Held 2010). people and areas at the expense of others. Similar ideas are implied by neo-colo- nial and world-system theories of global poverty, as examined in Chapter 15. Similarly, ideas have been developed about global environmental justice. These, for instance, reflect on issues such as protecting the natural environment for the benefit of future generations, the disproportionate obligation of rich countries to tackle climate change because they largely created the problem in the first place, and the idea that any legally binding emissions targets should be struc- tured on a per capita basis, rather than a country basis, so as not to disadvantage states with large populations (and therefore the developing world generally). These ideas are discussed further in Chapter 16. USING THIS BOOK Global politics is, by its nature, an overlapping and interlocking field. The mate- rial encountered in this book stubbornly resists compartmentalization, which is 22 GLOBAL POLITICS why, throughout, there is regular cross-referencing to related discussions that occur in other chapters and particularly to relevant boxed material found else- where. Nevertheless, the book develops by considering what can be thought of as a series of broad issues or themes. The first group of chapters is designed to provide background understanding for the study of global politics.  This chapter has examined the nature of global politics and considered the developments that make a global politics approach to world affairs appro- priate, as well as providing an introduction to contrasting mainstream and critical perspectives on global politics.  Chapter 2 examines the historical context of modern global politics, partic- ularly by looking at key developments in world history during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  Chapter 3 provides an account of the key theoretical approaches to global politics, thus considering mainstream theories and critical theories in greater depth, as well as the implications of global thinking. The next group of chapters discusses the various transformations that have occurred, and are occurring, as a result of the globalization of world politics.  Chapter 4 discusses the nature, extent and implications of economic global- ization, and considers, amongst other things, the crisis tendencies within modern global capitalism.  Chapter 5 examines the role and significance of the state in a global age, as well as the nature of foreign policy and how foreign policy decisions are made.  Chapter 6 considers the social and cultural implications of globalization and whether or not it is possible to talk of an emergent global civil society.  Chapter 7 examines the ways in which nations and nationalism have been shaped and reshaped in a global world, focusing on ways in which national- ism has been both weakened and strengthened.  Chapter 8 examines the politics of identity and the growth of cultural conflict in a global age, particularly in the form of challenges to the politico-cultural domination of the West, especially from political Islam. The following group of chapters considers the broad themes of global order and conflict.  Chapter 9 looks at the nature of global power and the changing shape of twenty-first century global order, as well as at the implications of such changes for peace and stability.  Chapter 10 examines how and why wars occur, the changing nature of warfare, and how, and how successfully, war has been justified.  Chapter 11 considers the nature and implications of nuclear proliferation, and examines the prospects for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.  Chapter 12 discusses the nature of terrorism, the various debates that have sprung up about its significance and the strategies that have been used to counter it. INTRODUCING GLOBAL POLITICS 23 The next group of chapters focuses on various issues to do with the theme of global justice.  Chapter 13 considers the nature and significance of international human rights, how, and how effectively, they have been protected, and debates about humanitarian intervention and its implications.  Chapter 14 addresses the issue of international law, in particular examining the changing nature and significance of international law in the modern period.  Chapter 15 considers the issues of global poverty and inequality, and also looks at development and the politics of international aid.  Chapter 16 focuses on global environmental issues, and examines the chal- lenge of climate change in depth.  Chapter 17 discusses feminist approaches to global politics and how gender perspectives have changed thinking about war, security and other matters. The final group of chapters considers attempts to address global or transna- tional issues through the construction of intergovernmental or supranational institutions.  Chapter 18 examines the nature and growth of international organizations, and looks in particular at the role and effectiveness of the United Nations.  Chapter 19 discusses the idea of global governance and examines its devel- opment in the economic sphere through the evolution of the Bretton Woods system.  Chapter 20 focuses on the causes and significance of regionalism, focusing especially on the nature and significance of the European Union.  Chapter 21 provides a conclusion to the book by reviewing and evaluating various images of the global future and reflecting on whether attempts to predict the future are ultimately futile. 24 GLOBAL POLITICS SUMMARY  Global politics is based on a comprehensive approach to world affairs that takes account not just of political developments at a global level, but at and, crucially, across, all levels – global, regional, national, sub-national and so on. In that sense, ‘the global’ and ‘the international’ complement one another and should not be seen as rival or incompatible modes of understanding.  ‘International’ politics has been transformed into ‘global’ politics through a variety of developments. New actors have emerged from the world stage alongside states and national governments. Levels of intercon- nectedness and interdependence in world politics have increased, albeit unevenly. And international anarchy has been modified by the emergence of a framework of regional and global governance.  Globalization is the emergence of a complex web of interconnectedness that means that our lives are increasingly shaped by events that occur, and decisions that are made, at a great distance from us. Distinctions are commonly drawn between economic globalization, cultural globalization and political global- ization. However, there are significant debates about whether globalization is actually happening and how far it has transformed world politics.  The two mainstream perspectives on global politics are realism and liberalism; these are both grounded in positivism and focus on the balance between conflict and cooperation in state relations, even though they offer quite different accounts of this balance. Critical theories, by contrast, tend to adopt a post-positivist approach to theory and contest the global status quo by aligning themselves with the interests of marginal- ized or oppressed groups.  Global politics is an ever-shifting field, with, if anything, the pace of change accelerating over time. Debates have emerged about the changing nature of power and the shifting configuration of global power, about whether national security has been displaced by international, global or even human security, and about the extent to which justice now has to be considered in cosmopolitan or global terms. Questions for discussion Further reading  How does ‘global’ politics differ from ‘international’ Brown, C. and K. Ainley, Understanding International politics? Relations (2009). A highly readable and thought-provok-  In what ways is the international dimension of ing introduction to the theory and practice of interna- politics still important? tional relations.  To what extent have non-state actors come to rival Hay, C. (ed.), New Directions in Political Science: Responding states and national governments on the world stage? to the Challenges of an Interdependent World (2010). A  Does interdependence always lead to cooperation series of astute reflections on the nature, extent and and peace, or can it generate conflict? implications of global interdependence.  Which definition of globalization is most persua- Held, D. and A. McGrew, Globalization/Anti-globalization: sive, and why? Beyond the Great Divide (2007). A comprehensive and  Has the impact and significance of globalization authoritative survey of contemporary political and intel- been exaggerated? lectual debates over globalization.  What are the key differences between mainstream Scholte, J. A., Globalization: A Critical Introduction (2005). An and critical approaches to global politics? excellent and accessibly written account of the nature of  Over what do realist and liberal theorists disagree? globalization and of its various implications.  To what extent has global power become more diffuse and intangible in recent years?  Why has there been growing interest in the notion Links to relevant web of ‘human’ security? resources can be found on  Does the idea of ‘global’ justice make sense? the Global Politics website CHAPTER 2 Historical Context ‘Happy is the nation without history.’ C E S A R E , M A R Q U I S O F B E C C A R I A , On Crimes and Punishments (1764) PREVIEW Politics and history are inextricably linked. In a simple sense, politics is the history of the present while history is the politics of the past. An understanding of history therefore has two benefits for students of politics. First, the past, and especially the recent past, helps us to make sense of the present, by providing it with a necessary context or background. Second, history can provide insight into present circum- stances (and perhaps even guidance for political leaders), insofar as the events of the past resemble those of the present. History, in that sense, ‘teaches lessons’. In the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush thus justified the ‘war on terror’ in part by pointing to the failure of the policy of ‘appeasement’ in the 1930s to halt Nazi expansionism. The notion of ‘lessons of history’ is a debatable one, however; not least because history itself is always a debate. What happened, and why it happened, can never be resolved with scientific accuracy. History is always, to some extent, understood through the lens of the present, as modern concerns, understandings and attitudes help us to ‘invent’ the past. And it is also worth remembering Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), then Premier of the People’s Republic of China, who replied, when asked in the 1960s about the lessons of the 1789 French Revolution, that ‘it is too early to say’. Nevertheless, the modern world makes little sense without some understanding of the momentous events that have shaped world history, particularly since the advent of the twentieth century. What do the events that led up to the outbreak of World War I and World War II tell us about the causes of war, and what does the absence of world war since 1945 tell us about the causes? In what sense were years such as 1914, 1945 and 1990 watersheds in world history? What does world history tell us about the possible futures of global politics? KEY ISSUES  What developments shaped world history before the twentieth century?  What were the causes and consequences of World War I?  What factors resulted in the outbreak of the World War II?  What were the causes and consequences of the ‘end of empire’?  Why did the Cold War emerge after 1945, and how did it end?  What are the major factors that have shaped post-Cold War world history? 25 26 GLOBAL POLITICS CONCEPT MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD The West From ancient to modern The term ‘the West’ has The beginning of world history is usually dated from the establishment of a two overlapping meanings. In a general succession of ancient civilizations in place of the hunter-gatherer communities sense, it refers to the of earlier times. Mesopotamia, located between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates cultural and philosophical in the area of modern day Iraq, is often portrayed as the ‘cradle of civilization’, inheritance of Europe, with three major civilizations arising there from around 3500 to 1500 BCE which has often been (Before the Common Era, notionally determined by the birth of Jesus) – the exported through migration or colonialism. Sumerian, the Babylonian and the Assyrian. The other early civilization devel- The roots of this oped in Ancient Egypt, along the course of the Nile, and this endured for around inheritance lie in Judeo- three and a half thousand years, only ending with the rise of the Roman Empire. Christian religion and the The two key features of these early civilizations were agriculture, which allowed learning of ‘classical’ for permanent settlement and the emergence of urban life, and the development Greece and Rome, shaped in the modern period by of writing, which occurred from around 3000 BCE (the earliest forms being the ideas and values of Mesopotamian cuneiform and Egyptian hieroglyphics). The beginnings of liberalism. In a narrower Chinese civilization date from the establishment of the Shang Dynasty in around sense, fashioned during 1600 BCE, corresponding to the emergence of the Bronze Age. After the Warring the Cold War, ‘the West’ States period, 403–221 BCE, China (see p. 251) was eventually unified under the meant the USA- dominated capitalist Ch’in (from which the name comes). The earliest civilization in South Asia bloc, as opposed to the emerged in the Indus River valley, in what is now Pakistan, and flourished USSR-dominated East. between 2600 and 1900 BCE. Ancient India, which stretched across the plains The relevance of the from the Indus to the Ganges, extending from modern-day Afghanistan to latter meaning was Bangladesh, began around 500 BCE with the birth of the ‘golden age’ of classical weakened by the end of the Cold War, while the Hindu culture, as reflected in Sanskrit literature. value of the former The period generally known as ‘classical antiquity’, dating from around 1000 meaning has been BCE, witnessed the emergence of various civilizations in the area of the brought into question by Mediterranean Sea. Starting with the growth of Etruscan culture and the spread political and other of Phoenician maritime trading culture, the most significant developments were divisions amongst so- called western powers. the emergence of Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome. Ancient Greece, often viewed as the foundational culture of western civilization, developed through the extension of Greek settlements throughout the eastern Mediterranean during the period 800–600 BCE, with colonies being formed in Asia Minor as well as in the southern parts of the Balkans. Ancient Rome flourished once the Roman monarchy was overthrown in 509 BCE, creating an oligarchic republic that developed into a vast empire, which extended from the eastern Mediterranean across North Africa and included most of Europe. However, the classical world gradually descended into crisis, reaching its height during the fifth century. This crisis was caused by the eruption of mounted nomadic peoples into the great crescent of ancient civilizations which stretched from the Mediterranean to China, ushering in the so-called ‘Dark Ages’. It affected not merely the Greeks and the Romans, but all the established civilizations of Eurasia. Only China coped successfully with the invaders, but even here their appearance saw a period of political fragmentation only ended by the Sui Dynasty in 589. Europe was affected by the ‘barbarian’ invasions, and later settlement, of the Germanic and Slav peoples during the fifth and sixth centuries, with a further wave of invasions coming in the ninth and tenth centuries from the Vikings, Magyars and Saracens. The most significant of these HISTORICAL CONTEXT 27 primitive nomadic peoples were, nevertheless, the Mongols, who emerged from the depths of Asia to create, between 1206 and 1405, an empire of unequal scope and range. The Mongol Empire stretched from the eastern frontiers of Germany and from the Arctic Ocean to Turkey and the Persian Gulf. Its impact on world history was profound. The political organization of Asia and large parts of Europe was altered; whole peoples were uprooted and dispersed, permanently changing the ethnic character of many regions (not least through the wide dispersal of the Turkic peoples across western Asia); and European access to Asia and the Far East became possible again. Rise of the West In a process which commenced around 1500, a single, originally European-based civilization became the world’s dominant civilization. Non-western societies increasingly came to model themselves on the economic, political and cultural structure of western societies, so much so that modernization came to be synonymous with westernization. This period started with the so-called ‘age of discovery’, or the ‘age of exploration’. From the early fifteenth century and continuing into the early seventeenth century, first Portuguese ships, then Spanish and finally British, French and Dutch ships set out to discover the New World. This process had strong economic motivations, starting with the desire to find a direct route to India and the Far East in order to obtain spices, and leading to the establishment of trading empires focused on tea, cane sugar, tobacco, precious metals and slaves (some 8 to 10.5 million Africans were forcibly transported to the Americas). The rise of the West nevertheless had  Modernization: The process though which societies become crucial political, socio-economic and cultural manifestations. ‘modern’ or ‘developed’, usually In political terms, the rise of the West was associated with the establishment, implying economic during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of sovereign states with strong advancement, technological central governments. This occurred particularly through the Peace of Westphalia development and the rational (1648), which brought an end to the Thirty Years War, the most barbaric and organization of political and social life. devastating war in European history up to the two world wars of the twentieth century. The advent of sovereign statehood fostered in Europe a level of social and  Feudalism: A system of political stability that favoured technological innovation and economic develop- agrarian-based production that ment. The socio-economic dimension of the rise of the West lay in the breakdown is characterized by fixed social of feudalism in Europe and the growth, in its place, of a market or capitalist hierarchies and a rigid pattern of obligations. society. This, most importantly, stimulated the growth of industrialization, which started in mid-eighteenth-century Britain (the ‘workshop of the world’) and  Renaissance: From the spread during the nineteenth century to North America and throughout western French, literally meaning and central Europe. Industrialized states acquired massively enlarged productive ‘rebirth’; a cultural movement capacities, which contributed, amongst other things, to their military strength. inspired by revived interest in classical Greece and Rome that The advance of agricultural and industrial technology also contributed to saw major developments in improving diets and rising living standards, which, over time, had a massive learning and the arts. impact on the size of the world’s population (see Figure 2.1). In cultural terms, the rise of the West was fostered by the Renaissance, which,  Enlightenment, the: An beginning in Italy in the late Middle Ages, reshaped European intellectual life in intellectual movement that challenged traditional beliefs in areas such as philosophy, politics, art and science. This, in turn, helped to fuel religion, politics and learning in interest in and curiosity about the wider world and was associated with the rise general in the name of reason of science and the growth of commercial activity and trade. The Enlightenment, and progress. which reached its height in the late eighteenth century, imbued western intellec- 28 GLOBAL POLITICS CONCEPT 7 Imperialism 6 Imperialism is, broadly, the policy of extending the power or rule of the 5 Population (billions) state beyond its boundaries, typically through the 4 establishment of an empire. In its earliest usage, imperialism was 3 an ideology that supported military 2 expansion and imperial acquisition, usually by drawing on nationalist 1 and racialist doctrines. In its traditional form, imperialism involves the 0 establishment of formal 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2010 political domination or colonialism (see p. 182), and reflects the Figure 2.1 Growth of world population since 1750 expansion of state power through a process of conquest and (possibly) tual life with a strong faith in reason, debate and critical enquiry. As well as settlement. Modern and more subtle forms of encouraging the idea that society should be organised on rational lines, this imperialism may contributed to the growth of scientific civilization and technological advance. nevertheless involve economic domination without the Age of imperialism establishment of political control, or what is called Europe’s influence on the rest of the world was substantially extended through neo-colonialism. the growth in imperialism, which intensified during the late nineteenth century with the so-called ‘scramble for colonies’, focused especially on Africa. By the outbreak of World War I, much of the world had been brought under European control, with the British, French, Belgian and Dutch empires alone controlling almost one-third of the world’s population (see Map. 2.1). The belle époque was accompanied by the establishment of levels of economic globalization that are comparable with those of the contemporary period. International trade, expressed as a proportion of the world’s aggregate GDP, was as great in the late nineteenth century as it was in the late twentieth century. Indeed, the UK, the world’s foremost imperial power during this era, was more dependent on trade than any contemporary state, including the USA (see p. 46). This period was also characterized by substantial cross-border migration  Belle époque : From the flows that peaked in the period between 1870 and 1910. Immigration into the French, literally meaning USA rose steadily from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, coming mainly ‘beautiful era’; a period of from Germany and Ireland, but also from the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, the peace and prosperity in Europe between the late nineteenth Scandinavian countries and Eastern Europe. Canada, Australia and South Africa century and the outbreak of also attracted large numbers of migrants from the poorest parts of Europe and WWI was seen as a ‘golden some parts of Asia. These relatively rapid flows of goods, capital and people were, age’. in turn, facilitated by technological advances in transport and communications, HISTORICAL CONTEXT 29 notably the development of steam-powered shipping, the spread of the railroads and the invention and commercial application of the telegraph. These made the nineteenth century the first truly universal era in human society (Bisley 2007). However, this period of what Scholte (2005) called ‘incipient globalization’ came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of World War I, which brought the ‘golden age of free trade’ to an end and led to a return to economic nationalism and a back- lash against immigration. In a warning for the contemporary global era, some have even interpreted the outbreak of World War I as a consequence of belle époque globalization, in that it brought the European states into conflict with one another as they struggled for resources and prestige in a shrinking world. THE ‘SHORT’ TWENTIETH CENTURY: 1914–90 Origins of World War I The outbreak of war in 1914 is often seen as the beginning of the ‘short’ twenti- eth century (Hobsbawm 1994), the period during which world politics was domi- nated by the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism, and which ended in 1989–91. World War I has been described as the most significant war in world history. It was the first example of total war, meaning that domestic popu- lations and the patterns of civilian life (the ‘home front’) were more profoundly affected than by earlier wars. The war was also genuinely a ‘world’ war, not only because, through the involvement of Turkey, fighting extended beyond Europe into the Middle East, but also because of the recruitment of armies from across the empires of Europe and the participation of the USA. WWI was the first ‘modern’ war, in the sense of being industrialized – it witnessed the earliest use of, for example, tanks, chemical weapons (poison gas and flame-throwers) and aircraft, including long-range strategic bombing. Some 65 million men were mobilized by the various belligerents, over 8 million of whom died, while about 10 million civilians were killed in the war itself or perished in the epidemic of Spanish influenza that broke out in the winter of 1918–19. WWI was precipitated by the assassination, in June 1914, of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, nephew of the Austrian Emperor, by the Black Hand, a group of Serbian nationalists. This precipitated declarations of war by Austria-Hungary  Empire: A structure of and Russia (see p. 177), which, thanks to a system of alliances that had been domination in which diverse constructed over the previous decade, led to a wider war between the Triple cultures, ethnic groups or Alliance (Britain, France and Russia) and the Central Powers (Germany and nationalities are subject to a Austria-Hungary). Other states were drawn into the conflict, notably Turkey single source of authority. (1914) and Bulgaria (1915) on the side of the Central Powers, and Serbia,  Total war: A war involving Belgium, Luxembourg, Japan (all in 1914), Italy (1915), Rumania, Portugal all aspects of society, including (1916), Greece and, most significantly, the USA (1917) on the side of the Allied large-scale conscription, the Powers. The eventual victory of the Allies was probably accounted for by their gearing of the economy to greater success, perhaps linked to their democratic systems, in mobilizing military ends, and the aim of manpower and equipment; by their earlier and more effective use of mechanized achieving unconditional surrender through the mass warfare; and, ultimately, by the entry of the USA into the war. However, there was, destruction of enemy targets, and remains, considerable debate about the origins of the war. The main causes civilian and military. that have been linked to the outbreak of WWI are the following: 30 GLOBAL POLITICS Austria-Hungary Denmark Great Britain Netherlands Portugal United States Belgium France Italy Norway Russia China Germany Japan Ottoman Empire Spain Map 2.1 Colonial holdings, circa 1914  The ‘German problem’  The ‘Eastern question’  Imperialism  Nationalism The ‘German problem’ draws attention to a phenomenon that has many and diverse interpretations. Realist theorists, who believe that the basic inclination of states towards the acquisition of power and the pursuit of national interest can only be constrained by a balance of power (see p. 256), argue that Europe’s insta- bility stemmed from a structural imbalance which had resulted from the emer- gence, through the unification of Germany in 1871, of a dominant power in central Europe. This imbalance encouraged Germany’s bid for power, reflected, for instance, in its desire for colonies (Germany’s ‘place in the sun’) and in growing strategic and military rivalry with Britain, especially in terms of naval power. Alternative interpretations of the ‘German problem’, however, tend to locate the source of German expansionism in the nature of its imperial regime and in the annexationist ambitions of its political and military elites. The most famous expression of this was in the writings of the German historian Fritz Fischer (1968), who emphasized the role of Weltpolitik, or ‘world policy’, in shaping Germany’s aggressive and expansionist foreign policy during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888–1918. This view, in effect, blames Germany (or at least its political leaders) for the outbreak of WWI, something which the Allies expressed through the ‘war guilt’ clause of the Treaty of Versailles (1919). The fact that WWI broke out in the Balkans and initially involved declarations of war by Russia and Austria-Hungary highlights the significance of the so-called HISTORICAL CONTEXT 31 A P P ROAC H E S TO . . . HISTORY Realist view utopian dimension, in that it emphasizes the possibility Realists believe that history tends to have an enduring of ‘perpetual peace’ (Kant) and suggests, following character. From their perspective, similarities between Fukuyama (see p.513) that the worldwide victory of historical eras are always more substantial than the liberal democracy would amount to the ‘end of history’. differences. In particular, power politics, conflict and However, the scope and degree of liberal optimism the likelihood of war (though, by no means, endless about the future has fluctuated over time. Whilst liber- war) are inescapable facts of history. History, if you alism flourished both in the period after WWI and like, does not ‘move forward’; rather, it repeats itself, following the collapse of communism in the early endlessly. This happens for at least three reasons. First, 1990s, it was distinctly muted in the post-1945 period human nature does not change: humans are self-inter- and also became so in the aftermath of September 11. ested and power-seeking creatures, given to lusts and impulses that cannot be restrained by reason or moral considerations. Changes in terms of cultural, techno- Critical views logical and economic progress do not change these The most influential critical approaches to history have ‘facts of life’. Second, history is shaped by self-inter- developed out of Marxism. The Marxist theory of ested political units of one kind or another. These history – often portrayed as ‘historical materialism – political units may take different forms in different emphasizes that the primary driving forces in history historical periods – tribes, empires, city-states, nation- are material or economic factors. In Marx’s view, states and so on – but their basic behaviour in terms of history moves forwards from one ‘mode of production’ rivalry (potentially or actually) with other political to the next, working its way through primitive commu- units never changes. Third, anarchy is an enduring fact nism, slavery, feudalism and capitalism and eventually of history, an assumption sometimes referred to as leading to the establishment of a fully communist ‘anarcho-centrism’. Despite long periods of domination society, history’s determinant end point. Each of these by various civilizations, empires, great powers or historical stages would collapse under the weight of superpowers, none has managed to establish global their internal contradictions, manifest in the form of supremacy. The absence of world government (see p. class conflict. However, communism would mark the 457) ensures that every historical period is character- end of history because, being based on common ized by fear, suspicion and rivalry, as all political units ownership of wealth, it is classless. Although orthodox are forced, ultimately, to rely on violent self-help. Marxists sometimes interpreted this as a form of economic determinism. Frankfurt School critical theo- rists, such as Robert Cox (see p. 120), have rejected Liberal view determinism in allowing that, in addition to the mate- The liberal view of history is characterized by a belief rial forces of production, states and relations among in progress: history marches forwards as human society states can also influence the course of history. achieves higher and higher levels of advancement. The Nevertheless, such essentially class-based theories have assumption that history moves from the ‘dark’ to the been rejected by poststructuralists, social construc- ‘light’ is based, above all, on a faith in reason. Reason tivists and feminists. Poststructuralists have often emancipates humankind from the grip of the past and followed Foucault (see p. 17) in employing a style of the weight of custom and tradition. Each generation is historical thought called ‘genealogy’, attempting to able to advance beyond the last as the stock of human expose hidden meanings and representations in history knowledge and understanding progressively increases. that serve the interests of domination and exclude In international affairs, progress involves a transition marginalized groups and peoples. Social constructivists from power-seeking behaviour, in which aggression criticise materialism in emphasizing the power of and violence are routinely used as tools of state policy, ideas, norms and values to shape world history. to a condition characterized by cooperation and peace- Feminists, for their part, have sometimes highlighted ful co-existence, brought about by economic interde- continuity, by portraying patriarchy (see p. 417) as a pendence, the emergence of an international rule of historical constant, found in all historical and contem- law and the advance of democracy. Such thinking has a porary societies. 32 GLOBAL POLITICS ‘Eastern question’. The ‘Eastern question’ refers to the structural instabilities of the Balkans region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These instabilities resulted from a power vacuum which occurred through the territo- rial and political decline of the Ottoman Empire, which had once covered the Middle East, much of south-eastern Europe and parts of North Africa. This meant that the Balkans, a region consisting of a complex pattern of ethnic and religious groupings which, by the late nineteenth century, were increasingly animated by nationalist aspirations, sparked the expansionist ambitions of two of Europe’s traditional great powers, Russia and Austria-Hungary. But for this, the assassination of the Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914 may have remained a localized incident. As it was, it led to war between Russia and Austria- Hungary, which turned into a continent-wide war and eventually a world war. Wider explanations of the outbreak of WWI have drawn attention to devel- opments such as the advent of imperialism and the impact of nationalism. As discussed earlier, the late nineteenth century had witnessed a remarkable period of colonial expansion and particularly a ‘scramble for Africa’. Marxist historians have sometimes followed V. I. Lenin in viewing imperialism as the core explana- tion for world war. Lenin (1916) portrayed imperialism as the ‘highest’ stage of capitalism, arguing that the quest for raw materials and cheap labour abroad would lead to intensifying colonial rivalry amongst capitalist powers, eventually precipitating war. However, critics of Lenin’s Marxist interpretation of WWI have argued that in interpreting imperialism as essentially an economic phenomenon he failed to take account of a more powerful force in the form of nationalism. From the late nineteenth century onwards, nationalism had become enmeshed with militarism and chauvinism, creating growing support for expansionist and aggressive foreign policies amongst both political elites and the general public. In this view, the spread of chauvinist or expansionist nation- alism both fuelled ‘new’ imperialism and created intensifying international conflict, eventually leading to war in 1914. Road to World War II World War I was meant to be the ‘war to end all wars’, and yet within a generation a second world war broke out. World War II was the world’s biggest military confrontation. Over 90 million combatants were mobilized with estimates of the war dead, including civilians, ranging from 40 to 60 million. The war was more ‘total’ than WWI, in that the proportion of civilian deaths was much greater (due to indiscriminate air attacks and the murderous policies of the Nazi regime, partic- ularly towards Jewish people), and the level of disruption to domestic society was more intense, with economies being restructured to support the war effort. The reach of warfare during WWII was also truly global. The war started as a European war with the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, leading, within days, to the UK and France declaring war on Germany. Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands were engulfed in war through Germany’s Blitzkrieg (‘lightning war’) attacks in 1940. In 1941 an Eastern  Chauvinism: An uncritical and unreasoned dedication to a Front opened up through the German invasion of Yugoslavia, Greece and, most cause or group, typically based crucially, Russia. The war in Asia was precipitated by the Japanese attack on the US on a belief in its superiority, as military base at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii on 7 December 1941, which also drew the in ‘national chauvinism’. USA into the war against Germany and Italy and resulted in fighting in Burma and HISTORICAL CONTEXT 33 KEY EVENTS . . . World history, 1900–45 1900–01 Boxer Rebellion in China 1933 Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War 1934 Mao Zedong begins the Long 1914 World War I begins March 1915 Armenian genocide 1935 Italy invades Abyssinia (Ethiopia) 1917 Russian Revolution creates world’s 1936 Germany reoccupies the Rhineland first communist state 1938 Anschluss with Austria 1919 Treaty of Versailles 1938 Munich Agreement 1922 Mussolini seizes power in Italy 1939 World War II begins 1929 Wall Street Crash (October); Great Depression begins 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour 1929 Stalin begins forced collectivization 1942–3 Battle of Stalingrad in Soviet Union 1942–5 Holocaust extermination 1930 Japan invades Manchuria campaign 1932 F.D. Roosevelt elected US President, 1945 End of WWII in Europe (May) and the New Deal starts against Japan (September) across much of south-east Asia and the Pacific. The war also spread to North Africa from 1942 onwards. The war in Europe ended in May 1945 with the capitulation of Germany, and the war in Asia ended in August 1945, following the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The factors that were decisive in determining the outcome of WWII were the involvement of the USSR and the USA. War against Russia forced Germany to fight on two fronts, with the Eastern Front attracting the bulk of German manpower and resources. Following the Battle of Stalingrad in the winter of 1942–3, Germany was forced into a draining but remorseless retreat. The involve- ment of the USA fundamentally affected the economic balance of power by ensur- ing that the resources of the world’s foremost industrial power would be devoted to ensuring the defeat of Germany and Japan. However, the origins of WWII have been a subject of even greater historical controversy than the origins of WWI. The main factors that have been associated with the outbreak of WWII have been:  The WWI peace settlements  The global economic crisis  Nazi expansionism  Japanese expansionism in Asia. 34 GLOBAL POLITICS E. H. Carr (1892–1982) British historian, journalist and international relations theorist. Carr joined the Foreign Office and attended the Paris Peace Conference at the end of WWI. Appointed Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics at the University College of Wales at Aberystwyth in 1936, he later became assistant editor of The Times of London before returning to academic life in 1953. Carr is best known for The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (1939), a critique of the entire peace settlement of 1919 and the wider influence of ‘utopianism’ on diplomatic affairs, especially a reliance on interna- tional bodies such as the League of Nations. He is often viewed as one of the key realist theorists, drawing attention to the need to manage (rather than ignore) conflict between ‘have’ and ‘have-not’ states. Nevertheless, he condemned cynical realpolitik for lacking moral judgement. Carr’s other writing includes Nationalism and After (1945) and the quasi-Marxist 14-volume A History of Soviet Russia (1950–78). Many historians have seen WWII as, in effect, a replay of WWI, with the Treaty of Versailles (1919) marking the beginning of the road to war. In this sense, the years 1919–39 amounted to a ‘twenty-year truce’. Critics of Versailles tend to argue that it was shaped by two incompatible objectives. The first was the attempt to create a liberal world order by breaking up the European empires and replacing them with a collection of independent nation-states policed by the League of Nations, the world’s first attempt at global governance (see p. 455). The second, expressed in particular by France and the states neighbouring Germany, was the desire to make Germany pay for the war and to benefit terri- torially and economically from its defeat. This led to the ‘war guilt’ clause, the loss of German territory on both western and eastern borders, and to the impo- sition of reparations. Although it set out to redress the European balance of power, Versailles therefore made things worse. Realists have often followed E.H. Carr in arguing that a major cause of the ‘thirty-year crisis’ that led to war in 1939 was wider faith in ‘utopianism’, or liberal internationalism. This encour- aged the ‘haves’ (the WWI victors) to assume that international affairs would in future be guided by a harmony of interests, inclining them to disregard bids for power by the ‘have-nots’ (in particular Germany and Italy). The second major factor that helped to foster intensifying international  Reparations: Compensation, tension in Europe was the global economic crisis, 1929–33. Sparked by the Wall usually involving financial Street Crash of October 1929, this highlighted both the higher level of intercon- payments or the physical nectedness of the global economy (through its rapid spread across the industri- requisition of goods, imposed alized world) and the structural instability of its financial systems in particular. by victors on vanquished The main political impact of the economic crisis was a rise in unemployment powers either as punishment or as a reward. and growing poverty, which, in politically unstable states such as Germany, invested radical or extreme political solutions with greater potency.  Autarky: Economic self- Economically, the crisis resulted in the abandonment of free trade in favour of sufficiency, often associated protectionism and even in autarky, the turn to economic nationalism helping to with expansionism and fuel the rise of political nationalism and international distrust. conquest to ensure the control of economic resources and However, the main controversies surrounding the origins of WWII concern reduce economic dependency the role and significance of Nazi Germany. Historians have disagreed about both on other states. the importance of ideology in explaining the outbreak of war (can German HISTORICAL CONTEXT 35 Focus on . . . Hitler’s war? The debate about Hitler’s personal responsibility for On the other hand, opponents of this view have WWII has been particularly intense. Those who emphasized the limitations of the ‘great man’ theory of subscribe to the ‘Hitler’s war’ thesis emphasize the history (in which history is seen to be ‘made’ by leaders clear correlation between the three aims he set out for acting independently of larger political, social and Germany in Mein Kampf (1924) and unfolding Nazi economic forces). Marxist historians, for example, have expansionism in the 1930s. Hitler’s ‘war aims’ were, drawn attention to the extent to which Nazi expan- first, to achieve a Greater Germany (achieved through sionism coincided with the interests of German big the incorporation of Austria and the Sudetan Germans business. Others have drawn attention to miscalcula- into the Third Reich); second, the expansion into tion on the part of both Hitler and those who sought eastern Europe in search of lebensraum or ‘living space’ to contain Nazi aggression. The chief culprits here are (achieved through the invasion of Russia); and third, a usually identified as a lingering belief in liberal interna- bid for world power through the defeat of the major tionalism across much of Europe, which blinded states- sea empires, Britain and USA. This view is also men generally to the realities of power politics, and the supported by the fact that Nazi Germany operated, in UK’s policy of appeasement, which encouraged Hitler effect, as Hitler’s state, with power concentrated in the to believe that he could invade Poland without precipi- hands of a single, unchallengeable leader. tating war with the UK and eventually the USA. aggression and expansionism be explained largely in terms of the rise of fascism and, specifically, Nazism?) and the extent to which the war was the outcome of the aims and deliberate intentions of Adolf Hitler. German foreign policy certainly became more aggressive after Hitler and the Nazis came to power in 1933. The Rhineland was occupied in 1936, Austria was annexed in 1938, the Sudetenland portion of Czechoslovakia was occupied and the rest of Czechoslovakia invaded in 1938–9, then Poland was invaded in September 1939. Moreover, the fact that fascist and particularly Nazi ideology blended social Darwinism with an extreme form of chauvinist nationalism appeared to invest Hitler’s Germany with a sense of messianic or fanatical mission: the prospect of national regeneration and the rebirth of national pride through war and conquest. Others, on the other hand, have argued that Nazi foreign policy was  Appeasement: A foreign dictated less by ideology and more by either geopolitical factors or by a political policy strategy of making culture that was shaped by the nineteenth-century unification process. From this concessions to an aggressor in perspective, there was significant continuity between the foreign policy goals of the hope of modifying its the Nazi regime and the preceding Weimar Republic (1919–33) and early political objectives and, specifically, avoiding war. Wilhelmine Germany, the turn to aggressive expansion in the 1930s being expli- cable more in terms of opportunity than ideology.  Social Darwinism: The However, unlike WWI, WWII did not originate as a European war which belief that social existence is spilled over and affected other parts of the world; important developments took characterized by competition or place in Asia, notably linked to the growing power and imperial ambition of struggle, ‘the survival of the fittest’, implying that Japan. In many ways the position of Japan in the interwar period resembled that international conflict and of Germany before WWI: the growing economic and military strength of a probably war are inevitable. single state upset the continental balance of power and helped to fuel expan- 36 GLOBAL POLITICS sionist tendencies. Japan’s bid for colonial possessions intensified in the 1920s CONCEPT and 1930s, in particular with the occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and the Third World construction of the puppet state of Manchukuo. In 1936, Japan joined with The term ‘Third World’ Germany and Italy to form the Anti-Comintern Pact which developed into a full drew attention to the military and political alliance, the ‘Pact of Steel’, in 1939 and eventually the parts of the world that, Tripartite Pact in 1940. However, expansionism into Asia brought growing during the Cold War, did tension between Japan and the UK and the USA. Calculating that by 1941 its not fall into the capitalist naval forces in the Pacific had achieved parity with those of the USA and the UK, so-called ’First World’ or the communist so-called and taking advantage of the changing focus of the war once Germany had ‘Second World’. The less invaded Russia in June 1941, Japan decided deliberately to provoke confronta- developed countries of tion with the USA through the pre-emptive strike on Pearl Harbour. By drawing Africa, Asia and Latin the USA into WWII, this act also effectively determined its outcome. America were ‘third’ in the sense that they were economically dependent End of Empires and often suffered from widespread poverty. The 1945 was a turning point in world history in a number of respects. These include term also implied that that it instigated a process of decolonization that witnessed the gradual but they were ‘non-aligned’, dramatic disintegration of the European empires. Not only did ‘end of empire’ the Third World often being the battleground symbolize the larger decline of Europe, but it also set in train, across much of on which the geopolitical Asia, Africa and the Middle East in particular, political, economic and ideological struggle between the developments that were going to have profound implications for global politics. First and Second Worlds The process whereby European control of overseas territories and peoples was conducted. The term was gradually dismantled had begun after WWI. Germany was forced to give up Third World has gradually been abandoned since its colonies and the British dominions were granted virtual independence in the 1970s due to its 1931. However, the process accelerated greatly after WWII through a combina- pejorative ideological tion of three factors. First, the traditional imperial powers (especially the UK, implications, the receding France, Belgium and The Netherlands) were suffering from ‘imperial over-reach’ significance of a shared (Kennedy 1989). Second, a decisive shift against European colonialism had colonial past, and economic development in occurred in the diplomatic context as a result of the ascendancy of the USA over Asia in particular. Western Europe and the capitalist West in general. US pressure to dismantle imperialism became more assertive after WWII and more difficult to resist. Third, resistance to colonialism across Asia, Africa and Latin America became fiercer and more politically engaged. This occurred, in part, through the spread- ing influence in what came to be known as the Third World of two sets of western ideas: nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. In combination, these created a potent form of anti-colonial nationalism across much of the Third World in pursuit of ‘national liberation’, implying not only political independ- ence but also a social revolution, offering the prospect of both political and economic emancipation. The end of the British Empire, which had extended across the globe and, at its greatest extent after WWI, extended over 600 million people, was particu- larly significant. India was granted independence in 1947, followed by Burma and Sri Lanka in 1948, and Malaya in 1957, with the UK’s African colonies achieving independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By 1980, when Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) achieved independence, the end of the British Empire had brought 49 new states into existence. Although the UK had confronted military resistance in Malaya and Kenya in particular, the logic of inevitable decolonization was accepted, meaning that the process was generally peaceful. This contrasted with French experience, where a greater determina- HISTORICAL CONTEXT 37 200 180 160 140 120 Members 100 80 60 40 20 51 75 117 144 159 184 192 0 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2006 Figure 2.2 Growth of membership of the United Nations, 1945 to present tion to retain her imperial status resulted in a prolonged and ultimately fruit- less war to resist Vietnamese independence, 1945–54, and the similarly fruitless Algerian War of Independence, 1954–62. The final major European empire to be dismantled was that of Portugal, which occurred following the overthrow of the military dictatorship in Lisbon in 1974. Africa’s final colony, Namibia (formerly known as South West Africa), achieved independence in 1990, once South Africa accepted that it could not win its war against national liberation forces. It may be possible to argue that the implications of decolonization were more profound than those of the Cold War, and it certainly had an impact over a longer period of time. In the first place, the early decades after WWII witnessed the most dramatic and intense process of state construction in world history. European decolonization in the Third World more than tripled the membership of the UN, from about 50 states in 1945 to over 150 states by 1978 (see Figure 2.2). This meant that the European state-system that had originated in the seventeenth century became a truly global system after 1945. However, the end of empire also significantly extended the reach of superpower influ- ence, highlighting the fact that decolonization and the Cold War were not sepa- rate and distinct processes, but overlapping and intertwined ones. The developing world increasingly became the battleground on which the East–West conflict was played out. In this way, the establishment of a global state-system, and the apparent victory of the principle of sovereign independ- ence, coincided with a crucial moment in the advance of globalization: the absorption of almost all parts of the world, to a greater or lesser extent, into rival power blocs. This process not only created a web of strategic and military interdependence but also resulted in higher levels of economic and cultural penetration of the newly independent states. 38 GLOBAL POLITICS Finally, the achievement of formal independence had mixed consequences CONCEPT for developing world states in terms of economic and social development. In the Superpower case of the so-called ‘tiger’ economies of East and southeast Asia and many of the First used as ‘super- oil producing states of the Gulf region, high levels of growth were achieved, power’ by William Fox banishing poverty and bringing wider prosperity. Despite the political upheavals (1944), the term of the Mao period in China, 1949–75, steady levels of economic growth laid the indicates a power that is foundation for the subsequent transition to a market economy and rising greater than a traditional growth rates from the 1980s onwards. However, many other areas were less ‘great power’ (see p. 7). For Fox, superpowers fortunate. Across what started from the 1970s to be called the ‘global South’ (see possessed great power p. 360), and most acutely in sub-Saharan Africa (the ‘Fourth World’), wide- ‘plus great mobility of spread and sometimes acute poverty persisted. power’. As the term tends to be used specifically to refer to the USA and the Rise and fall of the Cold War Soviet Union during the Cold War period, it is of If the ‘short’ twentieth century was characterized by the ideological battle more historical than between capitalism and communism, 1945 marked a dramatic shift in the inten- conceptual significance. sity and scope of this battle. This occurred through an important transformation To describe the USA and in world order. Although badly shaken by WWI and having experienced the Soviet Union as superpowers implied that economic decline relative in particular to the USA, Europe and European powers they possessed (1) a had been the major forces shaping world politics in the pre-1939 world. The global reach, (2) a post-1945 world, however, was characterized by the emergence of the USA and predominant economic the USSR as ‘superpowers’, predominant actors on the world stage, apparently and strategic role within dwarfing the ‘great powers’ of old. The superpower era was characterized by the their respective ideological bloc or sphere Cold War, a period marked by tensions between an increasingly US-dominated of influence, and (3) West and a Soviet-dominated East. The multipolarity (see p. 230) of the pre- preponderant military WWII period thus gave way to Cold War bipolarity (see p. 216). capacity, especially in The first phase of the Cold War was fought in Europe. The division of Europe terms of nuclear that had resulted from the defeat of Germany (the Soviet Red Army having weaponry. advanced from the east and the USA, the UK and their allies having pushed forward from the west) quickly became permanent. As Winston Churchill put it in his famous speech in Fulton, Missouri in 1946, an ‘iron curtain’ had descended between East and West, from Lübeck in Northern Germany to Trieste in the Adriatic. Some trace back the start of the Cold War to the Potsdam Conference of 1945, which witnessed disagreements over the division of Germany and Berlin into four zones, while others associate it with the establishment of the so-called ‘Truman Doctrine’ in 1947, whereby the USA committed itself to supporting ‘free people’, later instigating the Marshall Plan, which provided economic support for the rebuilding of war-torn Europe in the hope that it would be able to resist the appeal of communism. The process of division was completed in 1949 with the creation of the ‘two Germanys’ and the establishment of rival military alliances, consisting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, in 1955, the Warsaw Pact. Thereafter, the Cold War became global. The Korean War (1950–53) marked the spread of the Cold War to Asia following the Chinese Revolution of 1949. However, how did the Cold War start in the first place? There is a little controversy over the broad circumstances that led to the Cold War: in line with the assumptions of realist theorists, superpower states provided an irresistible opportunity for aggrandizement and expansion which made rivalry between the world’s two superpowers virtually inevitable. In the case of the USA and the Soviet Union, this rivalry was exacerbated by their common HISTORICAL CONTEXT 39  The notion of a ‘cold war’ suggests a condition of ‘neither war nor peace’. However, to describe US–Soviet relations during this period as a ‘war’ (albeit a ‘cold’ one) is to suggest that levels of antagonism between the two powers were so deep and impas- sioned that they would have led to direct military confrontation had circumstances allowed. In practice, this only applied to the first, most hostile, phase of the so- called Cold War, as tensions began to ease after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The idea of an enduring ‘cold war’ may therefore have been shaped by ideological assumptions about the irreconcilability of capitalism and communism. Deconstructing . . . ‘COLD WAR’  The Cold War was supposedly ‘cold’ in the sense that superpower antagonism did not lead to a ‘fighting war’. This, nevertheless, remained true only in terms of the absence of direct military confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union. In respect of covert operations, so-called proxy wars and conflicts that were clearly linked to East–West conflict (Korean, Vietnam, the Arab–Israeli wars and so on) the Cold War was ‘hot’. geopolitical interests in Europe and by a mutual deep ideological distrust. Nevertheless, significant debates emerged about responsibility for the outbreak of the Cold War, and these were closely linked to the rivalries and ideological perceptions that helped to fuel the Cold War itself. The traditional, or ‘orthodox’, explanation for the Cold War lays the blame firmly at the door of the Soviet Union. It sees the Soviet stranglehold over Eastern Europe as an expression of long-standing Russian imperial ambitions, given renewed impetus by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of world-wide class struggle leading to the establish- ment of international communism. A ‘revisionist’ interpretation of the Cold War was nevertheless developed that attracted growing support during the Vietnam War (1964–75) from academics such as Gabriel Kolko (1985). This view portrayed Soviet expansionism into Eastern Europe as defensive rather than aggressive, motivated essentially by the desire for a buffer zone between itself and a hostile West, and a wish to see a permanently weakened Germany. Various ‘post-revisionist’ explanations have also  Buffer zone: An area, state been developed. Some of these acknowledge the hegemonic ambitions of both or collection of states located between potential (and more superpowers, arguing that the Cold War was the inevitable consequence of a powerful) adversaries, reducing power vacuum that was a product of the defeat of Germany and Japan as well as the likelihood of land-based the exhaustion of the UK (Yergin 1980). Alternative explanations place a heavier attack in particular. emphasis on misunderstanding and missed opportunities. For example, there had 40 GLOBAL POLITICS Debating . . . Was the Cold War inevitable? There is always a tendency to read inevitability into historical events: they happened because they had to happen; history has a predestined course. In the case of the Cold War, this debate has raged with a particular passion, because it is linked to rival theories about the factors that drive world politics. Is history shaped by irresistible political or ideological forces, or is it, all too often, a product of misperceptions and miscalculations? YES NO Dynamics of bipolarity. Realist theorists have argued that Western misperceptions about the Soviet Union. The the Cold War is best understood in terms of power poli- Cold War was not dictated by either bipolarity or ideol- tics and the nature of the international system. In this ogy, but came about through a process of mistake, view, states are primarily concerned with their own miscalculation and misinterpretation. Both key actors survival and therefore prioritize military and security blundered in missing opportunities for peace and coop- concerns. However, their ability to pursue or maintain eration; instead, escalating misperception created a power is determined by the wider distribution of power mentality of ‘bombs, dollars and doctrines’ that made within the international system. What made the Cold mutual suspicion and ingrained hostility seem unavoid- War inevitable was that after WWII the defeat of able. Western misperceptions about the Soviet Union Germany, Japan and Italy and the long-term decline of were based on the assumption that Soviet foreign policy victorious states such as the UK and France created a was determined by ideology rather than territorial secu- bipolar world order in which the USA and the Soviet rity. The Soviet Union’s primary concerns were perma- Union had predominant influence. The shape of global nently to weaken Germany and to create a buffer zone of politics in the post-WWII era was therefore clear. ‘friendly’ states in Eastern Europe. However, by 1946–7, Bipolarity meant that rivalry and hostility between the US policy analysts were starting to see the creation of the USA and the Soviet Union was inevitable, as each sought Soviet bloc as either an expression of deep-seated to consolidate and, if possible, expand its sphere of influ- Russian imperial ambitions or as a manifestation of the ence. This led to growing enmity between a US-domi- Marxist-Leninist doctrine of worldwide class struggle. nated West and a Soviet-dominated East. A world of Key figures in the Truman administration came to multiple great powers had given way to a world domi- believe that they were confronting a Soviet Union bent nated by two superpowers, and peace and cooperation on pursuing world revolution, and increasingly acted between these superpowers was impossible. accordingly. The ideological ‘long war’. An alternative version of Cold Soviet misperceptions about the West. The Soviet Union, War inevitability portrays ideology as the irresistible particularly under Stalin, was influenced by a deep driving force. In this view, the Cold War was essentially distrust of the West, borne out of inter-war fears about an expression of the global ideological struggle between ‘capitalist encirclement’. Paralleling western mispercep- capitalism and communism that emerged in the nine- tions, Soviet leaders believed that US foreign policy was teenth century but assumed more concrete form after the guided more by ideological considerations, particularly Russian Revolution of 1917. Antagonism between capi- anti-communism, rather than by strategic concerns. talism and communism derives from the fact that they Thus, the USA’s rapidly reducing military presence in represent incompatible modes of economic organization; Europe (US forces from 3.5 million in May 1945 to in effect, competing visions of the future. The Cold War 400,000 the following March, and eventually to 81,000) was therefore a battle between the capitalist West and the had little or no impact on Soviet policy-makers, who communist East, the USA and the Soviet Union being failed to understand that the USA genuinely wanted merely the instruments through which it was fought. The cooperation after WWII, albeit on its own terms. The Cold War, thus, became inevitable once fascism had been mutual interest that the Soviet Union and the USA had vanquished in 1945, leaving global politics to be struc- in establishing a possible long-term relationship (based tured by East–West conflict. on a shared desire to reduce their defence burden and plough resources instead into domestic reconstruction) thus proved to be insufficiently strong to contain the drift towards fear and antagonism. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 41 KEY EVENTS . . . The Cold War period 1945 United Nations created (June) 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic 1967 Six Day War bomb attacks (August) (see p. 265) 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 1946 Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials begin 1969 Apollo 11 lands on the moon (see p. 335) 1971 Communist China joins the UN 1947 Truman Doctrine announced (April) 1973 Oil crisis 1947 Marshall Plan introduced (June) 1977 Economic reforms begin in China 1948–9 Berlin Blockade/Airlift 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran 1949 Soviet atomic bomb explosion 1980 Soviet Union invades Afghanistan (August) 1980–8 Iran–Iraq War 1949 Chinese Revolution (October) 1985 Gorbachev becomes Soviet leader 1950–53 Korean War 1989 Berlin Wall falls (November 9) (see 1955–75 Vietnam War p. 43) 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary 1990 CSCE meeting formally ends the 1961 Berlin Wall is erected Cold War (November) 1961 Yuri Gagarin first person in space 1991 Collapse of the Soviet Union (December) been early signs of hope in President Roosevelt’s belief in peaceful co-operation under the auspices of the newly-created United Nations, and also in Stalin’s  Brinkmanship: A strategy of distinctly discouraging attitude towards Tito in Yugoslavia and Mao in China. escalating confrontation even The Cold War was not a period of consistent and unremitting tension: it went to the point of risking war through ‘warmer’ and ‘cooler’ phases, and at times threatened to become a ‘hot’ (going to the brink) aimed at war. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was probably the moment at which direct persuading an opponent to back down. confrontation between the superpowers came closest to happening. The fact that this exercise in brinkmanship ended peacefully perhaps demonstrated the effec-  Mutually Assured tiveness of the condition of Mutually Assured Destruction in preventing Destruction (MAD): A tension between the superpowers developing into military confrontation. condition in which a nuclear However, the bipolar model of the Cold War became increasingly less accurate attack by either state would only ensure its own destruction, from the 1970s onwards. This was due, first, to the growing fragmentation of the as both possess an invulnerable communist world (notably, the deepening enmity between Moscow and second-strike capacity. Beijing), and second, to the resurgence of Japan and Germany as ‘economic 42 GLOBAL POLITICS superpowers’. This was reflected in the emerging multipolarity of the 1963–71 period and, more clearly, to the era of détente between East and West, 1972–80. Détente nevertheless ended with the advent of the ‘Second’ Cold War in 1980, which was a product of the Reagan administration’s military build-up and more assertively anti-communist and anti-Soviet foreign policy. However, when the Cold War came to an end, the end was dramatic, swift and quite unexpected. Over 70 years of communism collapsed in just two years, 1989–91, and where communist regimes survived, as in China, a process of radical change was taking place. During the momentous year of 1989, communist rule in Eastern Europe was rolled back to the borders of the Soviet Union; in 1990 the CSCE Paris Conference formally announced the end of the Cold War; and in 1991 the Soviet Union itself collapsed. Nevertheless, debate about the end of the Cold War is mired in as much ideological controversy as the debate about its origins (see p. 218). The range of factors that have been associated with the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War include the following:  The structural weaknesses of Soviet-style communism  The impact of Gorbachev’s reform process  US policy and the ‘Second’ Cold War  Economic and cultural globalization. Some have argued that the collapse of communism was an accident waiting to happen, the inevitable outcome of structural flaws that doomed Soviet-style regimes to inevitable collapse more effectively than the contradictions identi- fied by Marx as the fatal flaw of the capitalist system. These weaknesses were of two kinds, economic and political. The economic weaknesses were linked to the inherent failings of central planning. Centrally planned economies proved to be less effective than capitalist economies in delivering general prosperity and producing modern consumer goods. Eruptions of political discontent in 1980–91 were thus, in significant measure, a manifestation of economic backwoodsness and expressed a desire for western-style living standards and consumer goods. The political weaknesses derived from the fact that commu- nist regimes were structurally unresponsive to popular pressure. In particular, in the absence of competitive elections, independent interest groups and a free media, single-party communist states possessed no mechanisms for articulating political discontent and initiating dialogue between rulers and the people. There is little doubt that, in addition to economic frustration, the popular protests of the 1989–91 period articulated demand for the kind of civil liberties  Détente: (French) Literally, and political rights that were seen as being commonplace in the liberal-demo- loosening; the relaxation of cratic West. tension between previously Although structural weaknesses may explain communism’s susceptibility to antagonistic states, often used collapse they do not explain either its timing or its swiftness. How did economic to denote a phase in the Cold War. and political frustration accumulated over decades spill over and cause the down- fall of regimes in a matter of months or even weeks? The answer lies in the impact  Perestroika: (Russian) of the reforms that Mikhail Gorbachev introduced in the Soviet Union from 1985 Literally, ‘restructuring’; used in onwards. There were three key aspects of the reform process. The first, based on the Soviet Union to refer to the introduction of market reforms the slogan perestroika, involved the introduction of elements of market compe- to a command or planned tition and private ownership to tackle the long-term deficiencies of Soviet central economy. planning, drawing on earlier experiments in ‘market socialism’, particularly in HISTORICAL CONTEXT 43 GLOBAL POLITICS IN ACTION . . . Fall of the Berlin Wall Events: On November 9, 1989, a weary East German government spokesman announced that travel restrictions would be lifted. Flustered and subjected to further question- ing, he then stated that this would take effect ‘immediately’. The effect of the announcement was electric. Inspired by the heady excitement that had been generated by the collapse of communist regimes in Poland and Hungary and by weekly mass demonstrations in Leipzig and, on a smaller scale, in other major East German cities, West and East Berliners rushed to the Wall. A euphoric party atmosphere rapidly developed, with people dancing on top of the Wall and helping each other over in both directions. By the the EU (see p. 505) and, to some extent, NATO. Also in morning of November 10, the dismantling of the Berlin 1990, representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the Wall, the chief symbol of the Cold War era, had begun. military faces of East–West confrontation, met in Paris Over the following days and weeks, the borders between formally to declare an end to hostilities, officially closing the two Germanies and the two parts of Berlin were the book on the Cold War. Finally, in December 1991, the increasingly opened up. Just as the fall of the Berlin Wall world’s first communist state, the Soviet Union, was offi- had been inspired by events elsewhere in Eastern Europe, cially disbanded. it, in turn, proved to be a source of inspiration. Communist rule collapsed in Czechoslovakia in December, and in For Francis Fukuyama, 1989 marked the ‘end of history’, in Romania rioting first forced the Communist leader that the collapse of Marxism-Leninism as a world-histori- Ceaus¸escu and his wife Elena to flee by helicopter, before cal force meant that liberal democracy had emerged as they were captured and summarily executed on Christmas the sole viable economic and political system worldwide Day. (for a fuller discussion of the ‘end of history’ thesis, see pp. 512–13). For Philip Bobbitt (2002), the events precipi- Significance: The fall of the Berlin Wall was the iconic tated by 1989 marked the end of the ‘long war’ between moment in the momentous year of 1989, which liberalism, fascism and communism to define the consti- witnessed the Eastern Europe Revolutions that effectively tutional form of the nation-state. Nevertheless, some rolled back the boundaries of communism to the borders have questioned the historical significance of 1989, as of the Soviet Union and ignited a process of reform that represented by the fall of the Berlin Wall. This has been affected the entire communist world. 1989 is widely, and done in two ways. First, it is possible to argue that there is with justification, viewed as one of the most significant significant continuity between the pre- and post-1989 dates in world history, ranking alongside 1648 (the birth periods, in that both are characterized by the hegemonic of the European state-system), 1789 (the French position enjoyed by the USA. Indeed, 1989 may simply Revolution), 1914 (the outbreak of WWI) and 1945 (the mark a further step in the USA’s long rise to hegemony. end of WWII and the beginning of the Cold War). The Second, 1989–91 may have marked only a temporary momentum generated in 1989 led directly to a series of weakening of Russian power, which, as Russia emerged world-historical events. First, Germany was reunified in from the crisis years of the 1990s and started to reassert 1990, starting a process through which Europe would be its influence under Putin, led to the resumption of Cold- reunified through the subsequent eastward expansion of War-like rivalry with the USA. 44 GLOBAL POLITICS Yugoslavia. However, economic restructuring under Gorbachev had disastrous consequences: it replaced an inefficient but still functioning planned economy with one that barely functioned at all. The second aspect of the reform process involved the dismantling of restrictions on the expression of opinion and politi- cal debate, under the slogan of glasnost. However, glasnost merely gave a political voice to Gorbachev’s opponents – hard-line communists who opposed any reforms that might threaten the privileges and power of the party-state elite, as well as radical elements that wished to dismantle the apparatus of central plan- ning and communist rule altogether. Gorbachev thus became increasingly isolated and retreated from ‘reform communism’ into more radical changes, including the formal abandonment of the Communist Party’s monopoly of power. The third, and crucial, aspect of Gorbachev’s reforms was a new approach to relations with the USA and Western Europe, the basis of which was the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine. Its replacement, the so-called ‘Sinatra doctrine’, allowing the states of Eastern Europe to ‘do it their way’, meant that Gorbachev and the Soviet Union refused to intervene as, one after another, communist regimes collapsed in 1989–90, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall. Alternative explanations of the end of the Cold War draw attention away from internal developments within the Soviet Union and the communist bloc in general, and focus instead on the changing context within which communism operated. The chief external factors contributing to the collapse of communism were the policies of the Reagan administration in the USA and the advance of economic and cultural globalization. The Reagan administration’s contribution to this process was in launching the ‘Second Cold War’ by instigating a renewed US military build-up in the 1980s, particularly in the form of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) (the so-called ‘star wars’ initiative) of 1983. Whether intended or not, this drew the Soviet Union into an arms race (see p. 266) that its already fragile economy could not sustain, helping provoke economic collapse and increase the pressure for reform. The contribution of economic globaliza- tion was that it helped to widen differential living standards between the East and the West. While the progressive internationalization of trade and investment helped to fuel technological and economic development in the US-dominated West from the 1970s onwards, its exclusion from global markets ensured that the Soviet-dominated East would suffer from economic stagnation. Cultural global- ization contributed to the process through the spread of radio and television technology, helping ideas, information and images from an apparently freer and more prosperous West to penetrate the more developed communist societies, particularly those in Eastern Europe. This, in turn, further fuelled discontent and  Glasnost: (Russian) Literally, bred support for western-style economic and political reforms. ‘openness’; used in the Soviet Union to refer to freedom of expression within the context of a one-party communist THE WORLD SINCE 1990 state. A ‘new world order’?  Brezhnev doctrine: The The birth of the post-Cold War world was accompanied by a wave of optimism doctrine, announced by Leonid and idealism. The superpower era had been marked by East–West rivalry that Brezhnev in 1968, that Warsaw Pact states only enjoyed extended across the globe and led to a nuclear build-up that threatened to destroy ‘limited sovereignty’, justifying the planet. As communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, and Soviet power was in possible Soviet intervention. retreat both domestically and internationally, President Bush Snr. of the USA HISTORICAL CONTEXT 45 proclaimed the emergence of a ‘new world order’. Although the idea of a ‘new’ world order often lacked clear definition, it undoubtedly expressed quintessen- tially liberal hopes and expectations. Whereas the Cold War had been based on ideological conflict and a balance of terror, the end of superpower rivalry opened up the possibility of ‘liberal peace’, founded on a common recognition of inter- national norms and standards of morality. Central to this emerging world order was the recognition of the need to settle disputes peacefully, to resist aggression and expansionism, to control and reduce military arsenals, and to ensure the just treatment of domestic populations through respect for human rights (see p. 304). As ‘end of history’ theorists such as Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1991) argued, all parts of the world would now irresistibly gravitate towards a single model of economic and political development, based on liberal democracy. The post-Cold War world order appeared to pass its first series of major tests with ease, helping to fuel liberal optimism. Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 led to the construction of a broad western and Islamic alliance that, through the Gulf War of 1991, brought about the expulsion of Iraqi forces. The disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, which precipitated war between Serbia and Croatia, saw the first use of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) (renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994) as a mechanism for tackling international crises, leading to hopes that it would eventually replace both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Although the CSCE had been effectively sidelined by superpower hostil- ity since its creation at the Helsinki Conference of 1975, it was the CSCE heads of government meeting in Paris in November 1990 that produced the treaty that brought a formal end to the Cold War. However, the early promise of interna- tional harmony and co-operation quickly proved to be illusory as new forms of unrest and instability rose to the surface. Stresses within the new world order were generated by the releasing of tensions and conflicts that the Cold War had helped to keep under control. The existence of an external threat (be it ‘international communism’ or ‘capitalist encirclement’) promotes internal cohesion and gives societies a sense of purpose and identity. To some extent, for instance, the West defined itself through antagonism towards the East, and vice versa. There is evidence that, in many states, the collapse of the exter- nal threat helped to unleash centrifugal pressures, usually in the form of racial, ethnic and regional tensions. This occurred in many parts of the world, but in particular in eastern Europe, as demonstrated by the break-up of Yugoslavia and prolonged bloodshed amongst Serbs, Croats and Muslims. The Bosnian War (1992–5) witnessed the longest and most violent European war in the second half of the twentieth century. Far from establishing a world order based on respect for justice and human rights, the international community stood by former Yugoslavia and, until the Kosovo crisis of 1999, allowed Serbia to wage a war of expansion and perpetrate genocidal policies reminiscent of those used in WWII.  Capitalist encirclement: Nevertheless, these early trends, hopeful and less hopeful, in post-Cold War world The theory, developed during history were abruptly disrupted by the advent of global terrorism in 2001. the Russian Civil War (1918–21), that capitalist states were actively engaged in 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’ attempts to subvert the Soviet Union in order to bring down For many, the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington (see communism. p. 21) were a defining moment in world history, the point at which the true 46 GLOBAL POLITICS G L O B A L AC TO R S . . . THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Type: State • Population: 309,605,000 • Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita: $47,702 Human Development Index (HDI) ranking: 13/182 • Capital: Washington DC The United States of America was nineteenth century. By 1900, the tional terrorism. The launch of the established as a federal republic in USA had overtaken the UK as the ‘war on terror’ as a response to 1787, through the adoption of the world’s leading industrial country, September 11 also highlighted the US Constitution. It was formed by producing around 30 per cent of the limits of US power and was, in 13 former British colonies that had world’s manufactured goods. some senses, counter-productive. founded a confederation after the However, burgeoning economic Although the invasions of 1776 War of Independence. The power was only gradually expressed Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in nineteenth century was character- in international self-assertiveness, as 2003 were quickly successful in ized by the establishment of the the USA abandoned its traditional removing the targeted regimes, both territorial integrity of the USA as it policy of isolationism. This process wars developed into protracted and exists today. By 1912 all 48 states of was completed in 1945, when the highly complex counter-insurgency the continuous land mass of the USA emerged as a superpower, wars that proved to be difficult to USA had been created (Hawaii and commanding unchallengeable mili- ‘win’ in the conventional sense. Alaska were added in 1959). The tary and economic might and exert- Moreover, the general tendency of USA is a liberal democracy (see p. ing influence over the whole of the the Bush administration towards 185) comprising: capitalist West. The USA’s rise to unilateralism and in particular its global hegemony came about both approach to the ‘war on terror’  The Congress, composed of the because the collapse of the Soviet damaged the USA’s ‘soft’ power (see House of Representatives and Union in 1991 left the USA as the p.216) and bred resentment, partic- the Senate (two senators repre- world’s sole superpower, a hyper- ularly within the Muslim world. The sent each state, regardless of size) power, and because of close links need to work within a multilateral  The presidency which heads the between the USA and ‘accelerated’ framework in a more interdepend- executive branch of government globalization (so much so that glob- ent world has been recognized by  The Supreme Court, which can alization is sometimes viewed as a shifts that have occurred in US nullify laws and actions that run process of ‘Americanization’). US foreign affairs under President counter to the Constitution power in the post-Cold War era was Obama since 2008. Perhaps the bolstered by massively increased most significant challenge to US As the US system of government defence spending, giving the USA an power, however, is the rise of so- is characterized by a network of unassailable lead in high-tech mili- called emerging states, and particu- constitutional checks and balances, tary equipment in particular and, as larly China. Warnings about the deriving from federalism and a its response to September 11 decline of US hegemony date back separation of powers between the demonstrated, making the USA the to the 1970s and 1980s, when events legislature, executive and judiciary, it only country that can sustain mili- such as defeat in the Vietnam War is susceptible to ‘government grid- tary engagements in more than one and economic decline relative to lock’. For example, treaties need to part of the world at the same time. Japan and Germany were inter- be both signed by the president and However, US power has a para- preted as evidence of ‘imperial over- ratified by the Senate, and although doxical character. For example, reach’. The rise of China is the president is the commander-in- although the USA’s military domi- nevertheless much more significant, chief, only Congress can declare war. nance cannot be doubted, its politi- in that it perhaps suggests the emer- cal efficacy is open to question. gence of a new global hegemon, Significance: The USA’s rise to September 11 thus demonstrated with China set to overtake the USA global hegemony started with its the vulnerability of the USA to new in economic terms during the economic emergence during the security threats, in this case transna- 2020s. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 47 nature of the post-Cold War era was revealed and the beginning of a period of unprecedented global strife and instability. On the other hand, it is possible to exaggerate the impact of 9/11. As Robert Kagan (2004) put it, ‘America did not change on September 11. It only became more itself ’. A variety of theories have been advanced to explain the advent of global or transnational terrorism (see p. 284). The most influential and widely discussed of these has been Samuel Huntington’s (see p. 514) theory of a ‘clash of civilizations’. Huntington (1996) suggested that twenty-first century conflict will not primarily be ideological or economic but rather cultural, conflict between nations and groups from ‘differ- ent civilizations’. In this light, September 11 and the so-called ‘war on terror’ that it unleashed could be seen as evidence of an emerging ‘civilizational’ struggle between the West and Islam. Such a view suggests that the origins of global terrorism lie in arguably irreconcilable tensions between the ideas and values of western liberal democracy and those of Islam, particularly Islamic fundamental- ism. Islamic fundamentalists wish to establish the primacy of religion over poli- tics. However, the view that global terrorism is essentially a religious or civilizational issue ignores the fact that radical or militant Islam developed in the twentieth century in very specific political and historical circumstances, linked to the tensions and crises of the Middle East in general and the Arab world in particular. The key factors that have contributed to political tension in the Middle East include the following:  The inheritance from colonialism  Conflict between Israel and the Palestinians  The ‘curse’ of oil  The rise of political Islam Political instability in the Middle East can be traced back to the final demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. This led to the establishment of UK and French ‘mandates’ (trusteeships) over Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and what became Iraq. Western colonialism had a number of debilitating implications for the region. It bred a sense of humiliation and disgrace, particularly as it led to the dismantling of traditional Muslim practices and structures including Shari’a law; it resulted in political borders that reflected the interests of western powers and showed no regard for the facts of history, culture and ethnicity; and authoritarian and corrupt government was installed, based on pro-western ‘puppet’ rulers. Although the mandates were gradually given up during the 1930s and 1940s, western influences remained strong and the inheritance of colonialism was difficult to throw off. The establishment, in 1947, of the state of Israel was perceived by the surrounding newly-independent Arab states as an extension of western colonial- ism, the creation of a western outpost designed to weaken the Arab world, defeat in a succession of Arab–Israeli wars merely deepening the sense of frustration and humiliation across the Arab world. The political and symbolic impact of the ‘Palestine problem’ – the displacement of tens of thousands of Palestinian Arabs after the 1948 war and establishment of ‘occupied territories’ after the Six-Day War in 1968 – is difficult to overestimate, particularly across the Arab world but also in many other Muslim states. In addition to breeding a festering sense of resentment against western influences that are seen to be embodied in the state of Israel, it also made it easier for corrupt and complacent military dictatorships to 48 GLOBAL POLITICS come to power and remain in power, knowing that they could always use the issue of Israel and Palestine to mobilize popular support. On the face of it, the idea that the possession of the world’s largest oil reserves could be a source of political tension and instability strains credibility. However, oil can be viewed as a ‘curse’ on the Middle East in at least two senses. First, in providing regimes in the Middle East with a secure and abundant source of revenue, it reduced the pressure for domestic political reform, thereby helping entrench complacent and unresponsive government. Oil revenues were also sometimes used to build up extensive military-security apparatus, which were used to repress political opponents and contain discontent. Monarchical autoc- racy and military dictatorship thus remained deeply entrenched in the Middle East. The second drawback of oil was that it guaranteed the continuing involve- ment in the Middle East of western political and corporate interests, concerned to ensure access to oil resources and, until the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) succeeded in tripling the price of crude oil in the early 1970s, keeping oil prices low. Together with the fact that the Middle East was also an important arena for Cold War antagonism, this helped to fuel anti-westernism and sometimes, more specifically, anti-Americanism. While anti-westernism was expressed during the 1960s and 1970s in the form of Arab socialism, from the 1980s onwards it increasingly took the form of religious fundamentalism. Political Islam, a militant and uncompromising form of Islam that sought political and spiritual regeneration through the construction of an Islamic state, gained impetus from the potent mix of national frustration, political repression, cultural disjunction and the social frustrations of both the urban poor and young intellectuals in the twentieth-century Middle East. In its earliest form, the Muslim Brotherhood, it moved from being a non-violent, puritanical movement to one that increasingly advocated violence in order to resist all ‘foreign’ ideolo- gies and construct a pure Islamic state. The profile and influence of political Islam was substantially strengthened by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which brought the hard-line Shia cleric Ayatollah Khomeini (see p. 192) to power (see Iran’s ‘Islamic’ Revolution, p. 200). Thereafter, radical Islamic groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah (‘Party of God’) tended to displace secular-based groups, like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in leading the struggle against Israel and what was seen as western imperialism. Al-Qaeda (see p. 295), which emerged out of the Islamic fundamentalist resistance fighters who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 1979–86, has developed into the foremost exponent of global terrorism, increasingly mounting direct attacks on US targets. Through 9/11, al-Qaeda not only demonstrated the new global reach of terrorism but also that in the twenty-first century war can be fought by non-state actors, including loosely-organized terrorist networks, as well as by states. After 9/11, the USA’s approach to the ‘war on terror’ quickly started to take shape. Its opening act, launched in November 2001, was the US-led military assault on Afghanistan that toppled the Taliban regime within a matter of weeks. Because the Taliban was so closely linked to al-Qaeda and had provided Osama bin Laden and his followers with a base, this war attracted broad international  Autocracy: Literally, rule by a single person; the support and became only the second example in which the United Nations concentration of political power endorsed military action (the first one being the Korean War). Influenced by the in the hands of a single ruler, ideas of neoconservatism (see p. 226), the strategy of the Bush administration typically a monarch. was geared to a larger restructuring of global politics, based on the need to HISTORICAL CONTEXT 49 KEY EVENTS . . . The post-Cold War period Jan–Feb 1991 Gulf War 1999 Kosovo War 1992 Civil war breaks out in 2001 September 11 terrorist former Yugoslavia attacks on the USA (see p. 21) 1993 European Union created October 2001 US-led invasion of April–July 1994 Rwandan genocide Afghanistan September 1994 Apartheid ends in South 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq Africa 2008 Russia invades Georgia 1996 Taliban seize power in (August) (see p. 232) Afghanistan September 2008 Global financial crisis 1997–8 Asian financial crisis deepens address the problem of ‘rogue’ states (see p. 224) by promoting democracy, if necessary through pre-emptive military strikes (see p. 225). In January 2002, President Bush identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as part of a ‘axis of evil’, later expanding this to include Cuba, Syria and Libya (later dropped from this list). However, it was becoming clear that ‘regime change’ in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was the administration’s next objective, supposedly providing the basis for the larger democratic reconstruction of the larger Arab world. This led to the 2003 Iraq war, fought by the USA and a ‘coalition of the willing’. Although the initial goals of military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq were speedily accomplished (the removal of the Taliban and the overthrow of Saddam and his Ba’athist regime, respectively), the pursuit of the ‘war on terror’ became increasingly problematical. Both the Afghan and Iraq wars turned into protracted counter-insurrection struggles, highlighting the difficulties involved in modern asymmetrical warfare (discussed in Chapter 10). Despite improve- ments to the security position in Iraq in particular, the establishment of civic order and the longer-term processes of state-building and even nation-building have proved to be complex and challenging. Moreover, the US policy of using military intervention in order to ‘promote democracy’ was widely viewed as an act of imperialism across the Muslim world, strengthening anti-westernism and anti-Americanism. The fear therefore was that the ‘war on terror’ had become counter-productive, threatening to create, rather than resolve, the clash of civi- lizations that was fuelling Islamist terrorism. Shifts in the Bush administration’s approach to the ‘war on terror’ were evident from 2004 onwards, especially in attempts to increase the involvement of the UN, but more significant changes occurred after President Obama came to office in 2009. These involved, in the first place, a reduced emphasis on the use 50 GLOBAL POLITICS of military power and a greater stress on building up the USA’s ‘soft’ power (see p. 216). A phased withdrawal of US troops from Iraq was started and Iraqi forces assumed responsibility for security in towns and cities in May 2009. Important overtures were also made to the Muslim world in general and, more specifically, to Iran (in view of its strengthened influence, not least over Iraq, and the belief that it was trying to acquire nuclear weapons), calling for a strengthening of cross-cultural understanding and recognizing the mistakes of the past. The Obama administration’s strategy also attempted to give greater attention to the causes of terrorism and not merely its manifestations, addressing long-standing sources of resentment and grievance, most importantly through bolder interna- tional pressure to resolve the Palestinian problem. Shifting balances within the global economy There is no settled view about exactly when the modern phase of ‘accelerated’ globalization began. The idea that economic globalization (see p. 94) was happen- ing was only widely accepted during the 1990s. However, the origins of contem- porary globalization can be traced back to the general shift in economic priorities following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system (see p. 446) of ‘fixed’ exchange rates during 1968–72. The shift to floating exchange rates led to pressures for greater financial deregulation and converted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see p. 469) and the World Bank (see p. 373) to the ideas of the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ (see p. 92), under which many parts of the developing world were encouraged to adopt ‘structural adjustment’ programmes, based on the rigorous (and sometimes disastrous) application of free-market policies. The emphasis on free-market priorities was most eagerly embraced during the 1980s by the Reagan administration in the USA and the Thatcher government in the UK. In this context, the collapse of communism, in 1989–91, had profound economic implications. Together with China’s opening to foreign investment, it dramatically widened the parameters of international capitalism, transforming the western economic system into a genuinely global one. Nevertheless, ‘shock therapy’ market-based reforms had very different consequences in different parts of the post-communist world. In Russia, for example, they led to falling living standards and a steep decline in life expectancy, which provided the basis for a drift back towards authoritarian rule under Putin after 1999. However, the balance has continued to shift within the new global economy. Economic globalization was intrinsically linked to the growing economic domi- nance of the USA. US influence over the IMF, GATT (replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see p. 511) in 1995) and the World Bank has been decisive in wedding these institutions to free-market and free-trade policies since the 1970s. As with the UK in the nineteenth century, free trade in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has provided the USA with both new markets for its goods and sources of cheap labour and raw materials. By 2000, the USA controlled over 30 per cent of global economic output. The emergence of the USA as the most significant actor in the global economy was linked to the burgeoning power of transnational corporations (TNCs) (see p. 99), major firms with subsidiaries in several countries, which are therefore able to switch production and investment to take advantage of the most favourable economic and fiscal circum- stances. By the turn of the century, TNCs accounted for 70 per cent of world trade, HISTORICAL CONTEXT 51 with nearly half of the world’s biggest 500 corporations being based in the USA. However, the benefits of global capitalism have not been equally distributed. In particular, much of Africa has suffered rather than benefited from globaliza- tion, a disproportionate number of Africans remaining uneducated and under- nourished, with the population also suffering disproportionately from diseases such as AIDS. The impact of TNCs on Africa has often, overall, been negative, leading, for example, to a concentration of agriculture on the production of ‘cash crops’ for export rather than meeting local needs. Other parts of the world have either suffered from the increased instability of a globalized financial system or have experienced declining growth rates through an unwillingness fully to engage with neoliberal or market reforms. The heightened instability of the global economy was demonstrated by the financial crisis in Mexico in 1995, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 which affected the ‘tiger’ economies of Southeast and East Asia, and the Argentine financial crisis of 1999–2002 which led to a severe contraction of the economy. Twenty-first century trends in the global economy have perhaps been domi- nated by the rise of new economic powers, the most important of which are China and India. In this light, the most significant development of the post-1945 period may turn out to be, not the rise and fall of the Cold War, or even the establishment of US economic and military hegemony (see p. 221), but the process of decolonization that laid the basis for the emergence of the superpow- ers of the twenty-first century. If the nineteenth century was the ‘European century’, and the twentieth century was the ‘American century’, the twenty-first century may turn out to be the ‘Asian century’. Since around 1980, when the effects of the transition from a command economy to a market economy started to become apparent, China has consistently achieved annual economic growth rates of more than 9 per cent. In 2009, China overtook Germany to become the world’s third largest economy, and, if growth rates persist, it has been estimated that it will eclipse the economic might of the USA by 2027. Indian growth levels since the 1990s have only been marginally lower than those of China. The emergence of India as a major economic power can be traced back to the economic liberalization of the 1980s, which gave impetus to the expan- sion of the new technology sector of the economy and stimulated export-orientated growth. In many ways, the global financial crisis of 2007–09 (see p. 108) both reflected and gave further impetus to the shift in the centre of gravity of the global economy from West to East. Not only was this crisis precipitated by a banking crisis in the USA, and has brought, some argue, the US model of enterprise capitalism into question, but evidence of early economic recovery in China and India showed the extent to which these countries and some of their small neighbours’ economies have succeeded in ‘de-coupling’ themselves from the US economy. 52 GLOBAL POLITICS SUMMARY  The ‘modern’ world was shaped by a series of developments. These include the final collapse of ancient civi- lizations and the advent of the ‘Dark Ages’; the growing dominance of Europe through the ‘age of discovery’ and, eventually, industrialization; and the growth of European imperialism.  WWI was meant to be the ‘war to end all wars’ but, within a generation, WWII had broken out. The key factors that led to WWII include the WWI peace settlements, the global economic crisis of the 1930s, the programme of Nazi expansion, sometimes linked to the personal influence of Hitler, and the growth of Japanese expansionism in Asia.  1945 is commonly seen as a watershed in world history. It initiated two crucial processes. The first was the process of decolonization and the collapse of European empires. The second was the advent of the Cold War, giving rise to bipolar tensions between an increasingly US-dominated West and Soviet-dominated East.  Cold War bipolarity came to an end through the Eastern European revolutions of 1989–91, which witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was a result of factors including the structural weakness of Soviet-style communism, the impact of Gorbachev’s reform process, the advent of the ‘Second Cold War’ and the wider implications of economic and cultural globalization.  ‘Liberal’ expectations about the post-Cold War period flourished briefly before being confounded by the rise of forms of ethnic nationalism and the growth of religious militancy. This especially applied in the form of 9/11 and the advent of the ‘war on terror’, which has sometimes been seen as a civilizational struggle between Islam and the West.  Power balances within the global economy have shifted in important ways. While some have linked globaliza- tion to the growing economic dominance of the USA, others have argued that the global economy is increas- ingly multipolar, especially due to the rise of emerging economies. Questions for discussion Further reading  Why and how was Europe a dominant influence in Cowen, N., Global History: A Short Overview (2001). A the pre-1900 world? sweeping account of global history from the classical era through to the modern era.  In what sense, and why, was Germany a 'problem' following its unification in 1871? Hobsbawm, E., Globalization, Democracy and Terrorism  Was WWII really a re-run of WWI? (2008). A short and lucid account of major trends in modern world history, taking particular account of devel-  Would WWII have happened without Hitler? opments in the Middle East.  Was rivalry and tension between the USA and the Spellman, W., A Concise History of the World Since 1945 Soviet Union inevitable after 1945? (2006). An authoritative analysis of world history since  Did the Cold War help to make the world more the end of WWII. peaceful and stable or less? Young, J. W. and G. Kent, International Relations Since 1945:  Did anyone ‘win’ the Cold War? A Global History (2004). A comprehensive account of  Why did hopes for a ‘new’ world order of interna- international developments during the Cold War and after. tional co-operation and peaceful co-existence prove to be so short-lived?  Was 9/11 a turning point in world history?  Is China in the process of eclipsing the USA as the most powerful force in global politics? Links to relevant web resources can be found on the  Does history ‘teach lessons’, and is there any Global Politics website evidence that we learn from them? CHAPTER 3 Theories of Global Politics ‘Mad men in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.’ J . M . K E Y N E S , The General Theory (1936) PREVIEW No one sees the world just ‘as it is’. All of us look at the world through a veil of theo- ries, presuppositions and assumptions. In this sense, observation and interpretation are inextricably bound together: when we look at the world we are also engaged in impos- ing meaning on it. This is why theory is important: it gives shape and structure to an otherwise shapeless and confusing reality. The most important theories as far as global politics is concerned have come out of the discipline of International Relations, which has spawned a rich and increasingly diverse range of theoretical traditions. The domi- nant mainstream perspectives within the field have been realism and liberalism, each offering a different account of the balance between conflict and cooperation in world affairs. Why do realists believe that global politics is characterized by unending conflict, while liberals have believed in the possibility of cooperation and enduring peace? And why have realist and liberal ideas become more similar over time? However, from the 1980s onwards, especially gaining impetus from the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, a series of new theoretical voices have emerged. These ‘new voices’ have substantially expanded the range of critical perspectives on world affairs, once dominated by the Marxist tradition. How have theories such as neo-Marxism, social constructivism, poststructuralism, feminism, postcolonialism and green politics cast a critical lens on global politics, and how do they differ from one another? Finally, the emergence of globalization has posed a series of new theoretical challenges, most significantly about the moral and theoretical implications of global interconnectedness. How is it possible to ‘think globally’? Does global interconnectedness require that we re-think existing theories, or even abandon theoretical paradigms altogether? KEY ISSUES  Why have realists argued that world affairs should be understood in terms of power and self-interest?  Why do liberals believe that world affairs are biased in favour of inter- dependence and peace?  How have critical theorists challenged mainstream approaches to global politics?  In what ways have critical theorists questioned the nature and purpose of theory?  What are the empirical and moral implications of global interconnect- edness?  Do theoretical paradigms help or hinder understanding? 53 54 GLOBAL POLITICS MAINSTREAM PERSPECTIVES The key mainstream perspectives on global politics are realism and liberalism. As the discipline of international relations took shape following World War I, it drew particularly heavily on liberal ideas and theories, especially about the desir- ability of conducting international politics within a framework of moral and legal norms. From the late 1930s onwards, such liberal ideas were subject to increasing criticism by realist theorists, who highlighted what they saw as the inescapable realities of power politics. This established international relations as a ‘divided discipline’, a battleground between liberalism and realism, with the latter increasingly dominating the academic study of the subject from 1945 onwards. However, this so-called first ‘great debate’ within IR (see p. 4) has refused to stand still. By the 1970s, new versions of realism and liberalism had appeared, and, over time, the differences between these mainstream traditions have been blurred. Realism Realism (sometimes called ‘political realism’) claims to offer an account of world affairs that is ‘realistic’, in the sense that it is hard-headed and (as realists sees it) devoid of wishful thinking and deluded moralizing. For realists, global politics is, first and last, about power and self-interest. This is why it is often portrayed as a ‘power politics’ model of international politics. As Hans Morgenthau (see p. 58) put it, ‘Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintain- ing and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action’. The theory of power politics is based on two core assumptions (Donnelly 2000):  People are essentially selfish and competitive, meaning that egoism is the defining characteristic of human nature.  The state-system operates in a context of international anarchy, in that there is no authority higher than the sovereign state.  Egoism: Concern for one’s The core theme of realist theory can therefore be summed up in the equa- own interest or wellbeing, or tion: egoism plus anarchy equals power politics. Some have suggested that this selfishness; the belief that one’s formulation betrays a basic theoretical fault line within realism, dividing it into own interests are morally superior to those of others. two distinct schools of thought. One of these – classical realism – explains power politics in terms of egoism, while the other – neorealism, or structural  Classical realism: A form of realism – explains it in terms of anarchy. However, these alternative approaches realism that explains power reflect more a difference of emphasis within realism rather than a division into politics largely in terms of rival ‘schools’, as the central assumptions of realism are common to most realist human selfishness or egoism. theorists, even though they may disagree about which factors are ultimately the  Neorealism: A perspective most important. on international politics that The key themes within realism are as follows: modifies the power politics model by highlighting the structural constraints of the  State egoism and conflict international system;  Statecraft and the national interest sometimes called ‘new’ or  International anarchy and its implications structural realism.  Polarity, stability and the balance of power THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 55 Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) Italian politician and author. The son of a civil lawyer, Machiavelli’s knowledge of public life was gained from a sometimes precarious existence in politically unstable Florence. As a servant of the republic of Florence, he was despatched on diplomatic missions to France, Germany and throughout Italy. After a brief period of imprison- ment and the restoration of Medici rule, Machiavelli retired into private life and embarked on a literary career. His major work The Prince, written in 1513 but not published until 1531 and seen as the classic realist analysis of power politics, drew heavily on his first-hand observations of the statecraft of Cesare Borgia. The Disourses, written over a twenty-year period, nevertheless portray him as a republi- can. The adjective ‘Machiavellian’ (fairly or unfairly) subsequently came to mean ‘cunning and duplicitous’. State egoism and conflict In basing their theories of politics on a pessimistic, but allegedly ‘realistic’ model of human nature (see p. 56), classical realists have worked within a long and established tradition of thought, which can be traced back to Thucydides’ (see p. 242) account of the Peloponnesian War, and to Sun Tzu’s classic work on strat- egy, The Art of War, written at roughly the same time in China. Other significant figures included Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes (see p. 14). Machiavelli’s theory of politics was based on a darkly negative model of a changeless human nature. In his view, humans are ‘insatiable, arrogant, crafty and shifting, and above all malignant, iniquitous, violent and savage’. On this basis, Machiavelli argued that political life is always characterized by inevitable strife, encouraging political leaders to rule through the use of cunning, cruelty and manipulation. Hobbes’s thinking was also based on a pessimistic view of human nature. He argued that humans are driven by non-rational appetites: aversions, fears, hopes and desires, the strongest of which is the desire for ‘power after power’. As no single person or group is strong enough to establish dominance, and therefore a system of orderly rule, over society – a condition that Hobbes referred to as a ‘state of nature’ – an ongoing civil war developed between all members of society. Life in this ‘state of nature’ would thus be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. According to Hobbes, the only way of escaping from the barbarity of such a society would be through the establishment of a sovereign and unchal- lengeable power, that is, by the creation of a state. How did such thinking shape the understanding of international politics? In the first place, as realists accept that no form of world government (see p. 457) can ever be established, it meant that politics is conducted within what is, in effect, an international ‘state of nature’. The international arena is therefore dangerous and uncertain, with order and stability always being the exception rather than the rule. Second, whereas Machiavelli and Hobbes were primarily concerned to explain the conduct of individuals or social groups, realist interna-  State of nature: A society devoid of political authority tional theorists have been concerned, above all, with the behaviour of states. and of formal (legal) checks on Realists view states as coherent and cohesive ‘units’, and regard them as the most the individual. important actors on the world stage. Realists’ theories of international politics 56 GLOBAL POLITICS A P P ROAC H E S TO . . . HUMAN NATURE Realist view be justified, either on the grounds of self-defence or as Human nature is the starting point for much realist a means of countering oppression, but always and only analysis, so much so that classical realism has some- after reason and argument have failed. By contrast with times been portrayed as ‘biological realism’. Influenced the realist image of humans as ruthless power-maxi- by thinkers such as Hobbes and Machiavelli, realists mizers, liberals emphasize that there is a moral dimen- have embraced a theory of human nature that has sion to human nature, most commonly reflected in the three main features. First, the essential core of human doctrine of human rights. This moral dimension is nature is fixed and given, fashioned by ‘nature’ (biolog- grounded in a strong faith in reason and progress. ical or genetic factors) rather than by ‘nurture’ (the Reason dictates that human beings treat each other influence of education or social factors generally). with respect, guided by rationally-based rules and prin- Second, instinct ultimately prevails over intellect. ciples. It also emphasizes the scope within human Human beings are driven by non-rational appetites: beings for personal development – as individuals aversions, fears, hopes and desires, the strongest of expand their understanding and refine their sensibili- which is the desire to exercise power over others. ties – and thus for social progress. Intellect and reason may guide us in pursuing these appetites, but they do not define them in the first Critical views place. Third, as human beings are essentially self- While both realists and liberals tend to believe that seeking and egoistical, conflict between and amongst core aspects of human nature are unchanging and them is an unavoidable fact of life. For classical realists, fixed at birth, critical theorists generally view human this human egoism determines state egoism, and nature as ‘plastic’, moulded by the experiences and creates an international system that is inevitably char- circumstances of social life. In the nurture–nature acterized by rivalry and the pursuit of the national debate, they therefore tend to favour nurture. This has interest. Hopes for international cooperation and even two key implications. First, it suggests a unifying ‘perpetual peace’ are therefore a utopian delusion. vision of humans as social creatures, animated by a However, assumptions about human nature are common humanity and, therefore, cosmopolitan peripheral within neorealism, in which rivalry and moral sensibilities. Critical theorists, for example, are conflict is explained in terms of the structure of the often willing to go further than liberal international- international system rather than the make-up of indi- ists in endorsing a ‘one world’ vision, grounded in the viduals and therefore of states. ideas of global justice. The second implication of ‘plas- ticity’ is that it highlights the extent to which Liberal view economic, political or cultural structures shape human Liberals have a broadly optimistic view of human identities, wants and perceptions. As Marxists have put nature. Humans are self-seeking and largely self-reliant it, social being determines consciousness. For social creatures; but they are also governed by reason and are constructivists and poststructuralists, this may suggest capable of personal self-development. This implies, on that there is no such thing as ‘human nature’, in the the one hand, that there is an underlying and unavoid- sense of a set of abiding tendencies or dispositions able tendency towards rivalry and competition among that apply in all circumstances and all societies. individuals, groups and, in the international arena, Feminists usually embrace an androgynous model of states. However, on the other hand, this tendency human nature, implying that women and men share a towards rivalry is contained by an underlying faith in a common human nature and that gender differences harmony of interests (conflicts can and should be are socially and culturally imposed. Difference femi- resolved) and by a preference for resolving conflict nists nevertheless hold that there are deep-rooted, and through discussion, debate and negotiation. Liberals perhaps even essential, differences between women therefore typically deplore the use of force and aggres- and men, such that men are disposed to competition sion; war, for example, is invariably seen as an option and domination while women are naturally sympa- of the very last resort. In this view, the use of force may thetic and peaceful. THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 57 are thus firmly state-centric. Third, and crucially, the fact that states are composed of, and led by, people who are inherently selfish, greedy and power- seeking means that state behaviour cannot but exhibit the same characteristics. Human egoism therefore determines state egoism; or, as Morgenthau (1962) put it, ‘the social world [is] but a projection of human nature onto the collective plane’. Just as human egoism leads to unending conflict amongst individuals and groups, state egoism means that international politics is marked by inevitable competition and rivalry. As essentially self-interested actors, the ultimate concern of each state is for survival, which thereby becomes the first priority of its leaders. As all states pursue security through the use of military or strategic means, and where possible seek to gain advantage at the expense of other states, international politics is characterized by an irresistible tendency towards conflict. Statecraft and the national interest Although realism is often associated with the attempt to understand interna- tional politics from an objective or ‘scientific’ standpoint, it also acknowledges the important role played by statecraft. For example, in his analysis of the ‘twenty-years crisis’ that came between WWI and WWII, E. H. Carr (see p. 34) criticised the leading figures at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919–20 (see p. 59) for allowing ‘wishing’ to prevail over ‘thinking’. By neglecting the impor- tance of power in international politics, they had set the world on an inevitable course to further conflict. Morgenthau (1948) similarly placed an emphasis on the ‘art of statecraft’, arguing that the practical conduct of politics should nevertheless be informed by the ‘six principles of political realism’, spelled out as follows:  Politics is governed by objective laws which have their root in human nature.  The key to understanding international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.  The forms and nature of state power will vary in time, place and context but the concept of interest remains consistent.  Universal moral principles do not guide state behaviour, although this does not rule out an awareness of the moral significance of political action.  Moral aspirations are specific to a particular nation; there is no universally agreed set of moral principles.  The political sphere is autonomous, meaning that the key question in inter-  Statecraft: The art of national politics is ‘How does this policy affect the power of the nation?’ conducting public affairs, or the skills associated with it; statesmanship. The key guide to statecraft in the realist tradition is a concern about the national interest. This concern highlights the realist stance on political moral-  National interest: Foreign ity. Realism is commonly portrayed as essentially amoral, both because of its policy goals, objectives or image of humans as lustful and power-seeking creatures and because of its insis- policy preferences that tence that ethical considerations should be strictly excluded from foreign policy supposedly benefit a society as a whole (the foreign policy decision-making. However, a normative emphasis also operates within realist equivalent of the ‘public analysis, in that the requirement that state policy should be guided by a hard- interest’) (see p. 130). headed pursuit of the national interest suggests, ultimately, that the state should 58 GLOBAL POLITICS Hans Morgenthau (1904–80) German-born, US international relations theorist. A Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany, Morgenthau arrived in the USA in 1937 and started an academic career which led to him being dubbed the ‘Pope’ of international relations. Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (1948) was highly influential in the development of interna- tional relations theory. He set out to develop a science of ‘power politics’, based on the belief, clearly echoing Machiavellian Hobbes, that what he called ‘political man’ is an innately selfish creature with an insatiable urge to dominate others. Rejecting ‘moralistic’ approaches to international politics, Morgenthau advocated an emphasis on ‘realistic’ diplomacy, based on an analysis of balance of power and the need to promote the national interest. His other major writings include Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (1946), In Defence of the National Interest (1951) and The Purpose of American Politics (1960). be guided by the wellbeing of its citizens. What realists reject, therefore, is not nationally-based conceptions of political morality, but universal moral princi- ples that supposedly apply to all states in all circumstances. Indeed, from a realist perspective, one of the problems with the latter is that they commonly get in the way of the pursuit of the former. Calculations about the national interest, more- over, offer the surest basis for deciding when, where and why wars should be fought. Although realism is commonly associated with the idea of endless war, realists have often opposed war and aggressive foreign policy. In their view, wars should only ever be fought if vital national interests are at stake, the decision to wage war being based on something like a cost–benefit analysis of its outcomes in terms of strategic interests. Such thinking, for example, led Morgenthau and most US realists (except for Henry Kissinger, who was the National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford, 1969–77) to oppose the Vietnam War. Realists have also been amongst the most trenchant critics of the ‘war on terror’ (see p. 223), thirty-four leading US realist scholars having co-signed an advert in the New York Times opposing war against Iraq as the US military build-up was happening in the autumn of 2002. Anarchy and its implications From the 1970s onwards, new thinking within the realist tradition started to emerge, which was critical of ‘early’ or ‘traditional’ realism. The key text in this process was Kenneth Waltz’s The Theory of International Politics (1979). For Waltz (see p. 60), theories about international politics could be developed on ‘three levels of analysis – the human individual, the state and the international  Systems theory: An system’. In this light, the defect of classical realism was that it could not explain approach to study that focuses behaviour at a level above the state, which is a limitation of any endogenous, or on works of ‘systems’, ‘inside-out’, theory (one which explains behaviour in terms of ‘the inside’, the explaining their operation and development in terms of intentions or inclinations of key actors) (see Structure or agency? p. 72). Using reciprocal interactions amongst systems theory, neorealism, or, more specifically, ‘structural realism’ explains component parts. the behaviour of states in terms of the structure of the international system. As THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 59 GLOBAL POLITICS IN ACTION . . . Paris Peace Conference 1919–20 Events: In the aftermath of World War I, representatives of the Allies (the leading figures were President Wilson (see p. 438) of the USA, Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of France, and Lloyd George, the UK Prime Minister) met in Paris in January 1919 to arrange a peace treaty with Germany. The result of this was the Treaty of Versailles, signed in June 1919, with a further series of treaties later being signed with the other defeated powers. Two main motivations lay behind these treaties. The first, articulated by Wilson and set out in his Fourteen Points (a peace programme announced in a speech to Congress in January 1918) was the desire to institute a new international order, achieved through a ‘just peace’ that would banish power politics for of Versailles, the League of Nations stood by powerless to ever. This resulted in the redrawing of the map of central stop it. Liberal statesmen and theorists had ignored the and eastern Europe in line with the principle of national most basic fact of international relations: as all states are self-determination, leading to the creation of new states ultimately driven by self-interest, only power can be a such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Wilson’s constraint on power; a reliance on law, morality and inter- major contribution to the Versailles conference, however, national institutions will be of no avail. The wider accept- was the creation of the League of Nations. However, the ance of such an analysis in the aftermath of WWII helped other major motivation, expressed in particular by to assure the growing ascendancy of realist theories over Clemenceau, was to punish Germany and strengthen liberal theories within the discipline of international rela- French security. This led to the large-scale disarmament of tions. Germany, the loss of German territory and the distribution On the other hand, liberal internationalists have of its colonies as ‘mandates’ to various Allied powers, and pointed to the inconsistent application of liberal principles the imposition of the ‘war guilt’ clause. at the Paris Peace Conference. The Treaty of Versailles was never properly a ‘liberal peace’. This was both because it Significance: Just twenty years after the Paris Peace left many nationalistic conflicts unresolved, and some- Conference, the world was plunged once again into total times worsened (especially though the loss of German warfare, World War II bringing even greater carnage and land to France and Czechoslovakia) , and because, in suffering than World War I. What had gone wrong? Why important respects, the desire to punish and permanently had the ‘just peace’ failed? These questions have deeply weaken Germany took precedence over the quest for a divided generations of international relations theorists. just peace. Arguably, the seeds of WWII were thus sowed Taking their lead from E. H. Carr, realist theorists have not by a reliance on ‘utopian’ principles, but by the fact often linked the outbreak of war in 1919 to the ‘idealist’ that Versailles was in many ways a ‘victors’ peace’. The or ‘utopian’ ideas of the Paris peacemakers. By believing ‘mistreatment’ of the defeated stored up massive griev- that WWI had been caused by an ‘old order’ of rampant ances that could only, over time, help to fuel hostile and militarism and multinational empires, they placed their aggressive foreign policies. What is more, the much faith in democracy, self-determination and international vaunted League of Nations never lived up to its name, not organizations. In particular, they had failed to recognize least because of the refusal of the world’s most powerful that power politics is not the cause of war but the major state, the USA, to enter. In that sense, the Paris Peace way in which war can be prevented. When Germany, Conference produced the worst of all worlds: it strength- blamed (with dubious fairness) for the outbreak of WWI, ened the currents of power politics in Europe while re-emerged as a major and ambitious military power, persuading the victorious powers that power politics had breaking, in the process, many of the terms of the Treaty been abolished. 60 GLOBAL POLITICS Kenneth Waltz (born 1924) US international relations theorist. Waltz’s initial contribution to international rela- tions, outlined in Man, the State, and War (1959), adopted a conventional realist approach and remains the basic starting point for the analysis of war. His Theory of International Politics (1979) was the most influential book of international relations theory of its generation, establishing Waltz as the successor to Morgenthau in the discipline. Ignoring human nature and the ethics of statecraft, Waltz used systems theory to explain how international anarchy effectively determines the actions of states, with change in the international system occurring through changes in the distribution of capabilities between and amongst states. Waltz’s analysis was closely associated with the Cold War and the belief that bipolarity is more stable and provides a better guarantee of peace and security than does multipolarity. such, neorealism is an exogenous, or ‘outside-in’, theory (one in which the behaviour of actors is explained in terms of ‘the outside’, the context or structure in which they operate) of global politics. In shifting attention from the state to the international system, it places an emphasis on the implications of anarchy. The characteristics of international life stem from the fact that states (and other international actors) operate within a domain which has no formal central authority. But how does this shape behaviour? And why, according to neorealists, does international anarchy tend towards conflict rather than cooperation? Neorealists argue that international anarchy necessarily tends towards tension, conflict and the unavoidable possibility of war for three main reasons. In the first place, as states are separate, autonomous and formally equal political units, they must ultimately rely on their own resources to realise their interests. International anarchy therefore results in a system of ‘self-help’, because states cannot count on anyone else to ‘take care of them’. Second, relationships between and amongst states are always characterized by uncertainty and suspicion. This  Self-help: A state’s reliance is best explained through the security dilemma (Booth and Wheeler 2008). on its own capacities and Although self-help forces states to ensure security and survival by building up resources, rather than external sufficient military capacity to deter other states from attacking them, such support, to ensure security and actions are always liable to be interpreted as hostile or aggressive. Uncertainty survival. about motives therefore forces states to treat all other states as enemies, meaning  Security dilemma: The that permanent insecurity is the inescapable consequence of living in conditions dilemma that arises from the of anarchy. Third, conflict is also encouraged by the fact that states are primarily fact that a build-up of military concerned about maintaining or improving their position relative to other capacity for defensive reasons states; that is, with making relative gains. Apart from anything else, this by one state is always liable to discourages cooperation and reduces the effectiveness of international organiza- be interpreted as aggressive by other states (see p. 19). tions (see p. 433), because, although all states may benefit from a particular action or policy, each state is actually more worried about whether other states  Relative gains: The position benefit more that it does. Although such neorealist thinking had a profound of states in relation to one impact both within and beyond the realist tradition, since the 1990s realist theo- another, reflected in the ries have often attempted to fuse systems analysis with a unit-level approach, distribution of benefits and capabilities between and giving rise to what has been called ‘neoclassical realism’ or ‘post-neorealism’ amongst them (see p. 436). (Wohlforth 1993; Zakaria 1998). THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 61 Polarity, stability and the balance of power However, the fact that states are inclined to treat other states as enemies does not inevitably lead to bloodshed and open violence. Rather, neorealists, in common with classical realists, believe that conflict can be contained by the balance of power (see p. 256), a key concept for all realist theorists. However, while classical realists treat the balance of power as a product of prudent statecraft, neorealists see it as a consequence of the structural dynamics of the international system, and specifically, of the distribution of power (or capacities) between and among states. In short, the principal factor affecting the likelihood of a balance of power, and therefore the prospect of war or peace, are the number of great powers (see p. 7) operating within the international system. Although neorealists believe that there  Polarity: The existence is a general bias in the international system in favour of balance rather than imbal- within a system of one or more ance (see To balance or to bandwagon? p. 236), world order is determined by the significant actors, or ‘poles’, changing fate of great powers. This is reflected in an emphasis on polarity. which affect the behaviour of Neorealists have generally associated bipolar systems with stability and a other actors and shape the reduced likelihood of war, while multipolar systems have been associated with contour of the system itself, determining its structural instability and a greater likelihood of war (see p. 63). This inclined neorealists to dynamics. view Cold War bipolarity (see p. 216) in broadly positive terms, as a ‘long peace’, but to warn about the implications of rising multipolarity (see p. 230) in the  Offensive realism: A form post-Cold War era (discussed in more detail in Chapter 9). Realists, nevertheless, of structural realism that disagree about the relationship between structural instability and the likelihood portrays states as ‘power maximizers’, as there is no limit of war. For so-called offensive realists, as the primary motivation of states is the to their desire to control the acquisition of power, if the balance of power breaks down (as it tends to in international environment. conditions of multipolarity), there is a very real likelihood that war will break out (Mearsheimer 2001). Defensive realists, on the other hand, argue that states  Defensive realism: A form tend to prioritize security over power, in which case states will generally be reluc- of structural realism that views states as ‘security maximizers’, tant to go to war, regardless of the dynamics of the international system placing the desire to avoid (Mastanduno 1991) (see Offensive or defensive realism? p. 234). attack above a bid for world power. Liberalism  Neoliberalism: A perspective on international Liberalism has been the dominant ideological force shaping western political politics that remodelled thought. Indeed, some portray liberalism as the ideology of the industrialized liberalism in the light of the West and identify it with western civilization itself. Liberal ideas and theories had challenge of realism, particularly neorealism; it a considerable impact on the discipline of international relations as it took shape emphasizes the scope for following WWI, although they drew on a much older tradition of so-called cooperative behaviour within ‘idealist’ (see p. 62) theorizing which dates back, via Kant’s (see p. 16) belief in the international system while the possibility of ‘universal and perpetual peace’, to the Middle Ages and the not denying its anarchic ideas of early ‘just war’ thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas (see p. 255). character. Marginalized during the early post-1945 period due to the failure of the liberal-  Democratization: The inspired Versailles Settlement and the ascendancy of realist thought, liberal ideas transition from nevertheless attracted growing attention from the 1970s onwards, often in the authoritarianism to liberal form of so-called neoliberalism. This largely stripped liberalism of its idealist democracy, reflected in the trappings. The end of the Cold War (sometimes seen as the ‘liberal moment’ in granting of basic freedoms and political rights, the world affairs), the growing impact of globalization (see p. 9) and a new wave of establishment of competitive democratization in the 1990s each gave liberal theory additional impetus. elections and the introduction The central theme of liberalism in all its forms is the notion of harmony or of market reforms. balance amongst competing interests. Individual, groups and, for that matter, 62 GLOBAL POLITICS states may pursue self-interest but a natural equilibrium will tend to assert itself. CONCEPT At a deeper level, competing interests complement one another; conflict is never Idealism irreconcilable. Just as, from a liberal perspective, natural or unregulated equilib- Idealism (sometimes rium tends to emerge in economic life (see Approaches to global political called ‘utopianism’) is an economy, p. 87), a balance of interests tends to develop amongst the states of the approach to international world, disposing liberals to believe in the possibility of peace and cooperation. politics that stresses the Nevertheless, it is important to note that the liberal paradigm is not clearly importance of moral distinct from realism, as both of them share certain mainstream assumptions values and ideals, rather than power and the about how international politics works. Most significantly, both liberals and pursuit of the national realists accept that world affairs are shaped, in significant ways, by competition interest, as a guide to amongst states, implying that the international system is, and perhaps must foreign policy-making. always remain, decentralized. The difference, nevertheless, is that liberals assume Idealism is essentially a that competition within this system is conducted within a larger framework of variant of liberal internationalism: it harmony. This inclines liberals to believe in internationalism (see p. 64) and to reflects a strong optimism hold that realists substantially underestimate the scope for cooperation and inte- about the prospects for gration within the decentralized state-system. international peace, The key themes within liberal theory are as follows: usually associated with a desire to reform the international system by  Interdependence liberalism strengthening  Republican liberalism international law (see p.  Liberal institutionalism 332) and embracing cosmopolitan ethics. However, idealism is not Interdependence liberalism co-extensive with liberalism: idealism is Liberal theories about interdependence (see p. 8) are grounded in ideas about broader and more trade and economic relations. Such thinking can be traced back to the birth of nebulous than liberalism, commercial liberalism in the nineteenth century, based on the classical and modern liberal economics of David Ricardo (1770–1823) and the ideas of the so-called theorizing has often disconnected from the ‘Manchester liberals’, Richard Cobden (1804–65) and John Bright (1811–89). idealist impulse. Realists The key theme within commercial liberalism was a belief in the virtues of free have used the term trade. Free trade has economic benefits, as it allows each country to specialize in pejoratively to imply the production of the goods and services that it is best suited to produce, the deluded moralizing and a ones in which they have a ‘comparative advantage’. However, free trade is no less lack of empirical rigour. important in drawing states into a web of economic interdependence that means that the material costs of international conflict are so great that warfare becomes  Paradigm: A related set of virtually unthinkable. Cobden and Bright argued that free trade would draw principles, doctrines and theories people of different races, creeds and languages together in what Cobden that help to structure the process of intellectual enquiry. described as ‘the bonds of eternal peace’. Not only would free trade maintain peace for negative reasons (the fear of being deprived of vital goods), but it  Commercial liberalism: A would also have positive benefits in ensuring that different peoples are united by form of liberalism that shared values and a common commercial culture, and so would have a better emphasizes the economic and understanding of one another. In short, aggression and expansionism are best international benefits of free trade, leading to mutual benefit deterred by the ‘spirit of commerce’. and general prosperity as well The stress on interdependence that is basic to commercial liberalism has as peace amongst states. been further developed by neoliberals into what Keohane and Nye (1977) called ‘complex interdependence’, viewed, initially at least, as an alternative theoretical  Free trade: a system of model to realism. Complex interdependence reflects the extent to which trade between states not restricted by tariffs or other peoples and governments in the modern world are affected by what happens forms of protectionism. elsewhere, and particularly by the actions of their counterparts in other coun- THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 63 Focus on . . . Neorealist stability theory: the logic of numbers? From a neorealist perspective, bipolar systems tend On the other hand, multipolar systems tend to be towards stability and strengthen the likelihood of inherently unstable, for the following reasons: peace. This happens for the following reasons:  A larger number of great powers increases the  The existence of only two great powers encourages number of possible great-power conflicts. each to maintain the bipolar system as, in the  Multipolarity creates a bias in favour of fluidity and, process, they are maintaining themselves. perhaps, instability, as it leads to shifting alliances  Fewer great powers means the possibilities of great- as great powers have external means of extending power war are reduced. their influence.  The existence of only two great powers reduces the  As power is more decentralized, existing great chances of miscalculation and makes it easier to powers may be more restless and ambitious while operate an effective system of deterrence . weak states may be able to form alliances in order  Power relationships are more stable as each bloc to challenge and displace existing great powers. is forced to rely on inner (economic and military) resources, external (alliances with other states Such thinking was most prevalent during the Cold War, or blocs) means of expanding power not being when it was used to explain the dynamics of the super- available. power era. Since then, it has become less fashionable to explain stability and conflict simply in terms of the structural dynamics of the international system. tries. This applies not only in the economic realm, through the advance of glob- alization, but is also evident in relation to a range of other issues, including climate change, development and poverty reduction, and human rights (see p. 304). Such a view suggests that realism’s narrow preoccupation with the mili- tary and diplomatic dimensions of international politics, the so-called ‘high politics’ of security and survival, is misplaced. Instead, the international agenda is becoming broader with greater attention being given to the ‘low politics’ of welfare, environmental protection and political justice. Relations between and amongst states have also changed, not least through a tendency for modern states to prioritize trade over war and through a trend towards closer coopera-  High politics: Issue areas tion or even integration, as, for instance, in the case of the European Union. that are of primary importance, Nevertheless, there has been disagreement amongst interdependence liberals usually taken to refer to about the significance of such trends. So-called ‘strong’ liberals believe that defence and foreign policy qualitative changes have taken place in the international system which substan- generally, and particularly to matters of state self- tially modify the impact of anarchy, self-help and the security dilemma, creat- preservation. ing an irresistible tendency towards peace, cooperation and integration (Burton 1972; Rosenau 1990). ‘Weak’ liberals, on the other hand, have come to accept  Low politics: Issue areas neorealist assumptions, particularly about the implications of international that are seen not to involve a anarchy, as the starting point for analysis, thereby highlighting the extent to state’s vital national interests, whether in the foreign or the which modern realist and liberal theory sometime overlap (Axelrod 1984; Stein domestic sphere. 1990). 64 GLOBAL POLITICS CONCEPT Republican liberalism Like classical realism, the liberal perspective on international politics adopts an Internationalism ‘inside-out’ approach to theorizing. Larger conclusions about international and Internationalism is the global affairs are thus derived from assumptions about their basic elements. theory or practice of politics based on Although liberalism’s stress on peace and international harmony contrasts cooperation between sharply with the realist belief in power politics, the two perspectives are united states or nations. It is in viewing states as essentially self-seeking actors. Each state therefore poses at rooted in universalist least a potential threat to other states. However, unlike realists, liberals believe assumptions about that the external behaviour of a state is crucially influenced by its political and human nature that put it at odds with political constitutional make-up. This is reflected in a tradition of republican liberal- nationalism, the latter ism that can be traced back to Woodrow Wilson (see p. 438), if not to Kant. emphasizing the degree While autocratic or authoritarian states are seen to be inherently militaristic to which political identity and aggressive, democratic states are viewed as naturally peaceful, especially in is shaped by nationality. their dealings with other democratic states (Doyle 1986, 1995). The aggressive However, internationalism is compatible with character of authoritarian regimes stems from the fact that they are immunized nationalism, in the sense from popular pressure and typically have strong and politically powerful that it calls for armies. As they are accustomed to the use of force to maintain themselves in cooperation or solidarity power, force becomes the natural mechanism through which they deal with the among pre-existing wider world and resolve disputes with other states. Liberals, moreover, nations, rather than for the removal or hold that authoritarian states are inherently unstable because they lack the abandonment of national institutional mechanisms for responding to popular pressure and balancing identities altogether. rival interests, and are so impelled towards foreign policy adventurism as a Internationalism thus means of regime consolidation. If the support of the people cannot be ensured differs from through participation and popular consent, ‘patriotic’ war may provide the cosmopolitanism (see p. 21). Liberal only solution. internationalism derives In this light, liberals have seen democracy as a guarantee of peace (see p. 66). from a commitment to The democratic peace thesis resurfaced with particular force in the aftermath individualism (see p. 150), of the collapse of communism, notably in the writings of Francis Fukuyama (see and is reflected in support p. 513). In Fukuyama’s view, the wider acceptance of liberal-democratic princi- for free trade and economic ples and structures, and the extension of market capitalism, amounted to the interdependence as well ‘end of history’ and also promised to create a more stable and peaceful global as a commitment to order. Liberals have claimed empirical as well as theoretical support for such construct, or strengthen, beliefs, especially in the fact that there has never been a war between two demo- international cratic nation-states (even though wars have continued to take place between organizations. democracies and other states). They have also associated the general advance of democratization with the creation of ‘zones of peace’, composed of collections of mature democracies in places such as Europe, North America and Australasia, as  Republican liberalism: A form of liberalism that opposed to the ‘zones of turmoil’ that are found elsewhere in the world (Singer highlights the benefits of and Wildavsky 1993). Nevertheless, republican liberalism has also been drawn republican (rather than into deep controversy, not least through the growth of so-called liberal interven- monarchical) government and, tionism and the idea that democracy can and should be promoted through mili- in particular, emphasizes the link tarily imposed ‘regime change’. This issue is examined in more detail in Chapter between democracy and peace. 9, in association with the ‘war on terror’.  Democratic peace thesis: The notion that there is an intrinsic link between peace Liberal institutionalism and democracy, in particular The chief ‘external’ mechanism that liberals believe is needed to constrain the that democratic states do not go to war with one another. ambitions of sovereign states is international organizations. This reflects the THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 65 Focus on . . . Closing the realist–liberal divide? Although realism and liberalism are commonly insights, recognizing the counter-balancing forces of portrayed as antithetical theories of international poli- conflict and cooperation, has been championed, since tics – the one emphasizing egoism, power and conflict; the 1960s, by theorists who subscribe to the notion of the other, morality, peace and cooperation – the differ- ‘international society’ (see p. 10), sometimes seen as ence between them has tended to fade over time. One the ‘English School’ of international relations. This view of the characteristic features of neoliberals is an modifies the realist emphasis on power politics and acceptance of certain neorealist assumptions, making international anarchy by suggesting the existence of a them, for instance, happier than ‘traditional’ liberals to ‘society of states’ rather than simply a ‘system of explain state behaviour in terms of self-interest and to states’, implying that international relations are rule- accept that the international system is essentially governed and that these rules help to maintain inter- anarchical. Similarly, most modern realists are ‘weak’ or national order. The chief institutions that generate ‘hedged’ realists, in that they accept that international cultural cohesion and social integration are interna- politics cannot be explained exclusively in terms of tional law, diplomacy and the activities of interna- power, self-interest and conflict. The so-called ‘neo–neo tional organizations. Hedley Bull (2002) thus advanced debate’ has therefore become an increasingly technical, the notion of an ‘anarchical society’, in place of the rather than foundational, debate. conventional realist idea of international anarchy. The idea that international politics is best International society theory can be seen as a form of explained in the light of both realist and liberal liberal realism. ideas of what is called liberal institutionalism. The basis for such a view lies in the ‘domestic analogy’, the idea that insight into international politics can be gained by reflecting on the structures of domestic politics. Taking particular account of social contract theory, as developed by thinkers such as Hobbes and John Locke (1632–1704), this highlights the fact that only the construction of a sovereign power can safeguard citizens from the chaos and barbarity of the ‘state of nature’. If order can only be imposed ‘from above’ in domestic politics, the same must be true of international politics. This provided the basis for the estab- lishment of the rule of law, which, as Woodrow Wilson put it, would turn the ‘jungle’ of international politics into a ‘zoo’. The League of Nations was the first, if flawed, attempt to translate such thinking into practice. The United Nations  Liberal institutionalism: (see p. 449) has attracted far wider support and established itself as a seemingly An approach to study that permanent feature of global politics. Liberals have looked to such bodies to emphasizes the role of establish a rule-governed international system that would be based on collective institutions (both formal and informal) in the realization of security (see p. 440) and respect for international law. liberal principles and goals. Modern neoliberals have built on this positive approach to international organizations, practising what has been called ‘neoliberal institutionalism’.  Rule of law: The principle Distancing themselves from the cosmopolitan dreams of some early liberals, that law should ‘rule’ in the they have instead explained growing cooperation and integration in functional sense that it establishes a framework within which all terms, linked to self-interest. Institutions thus come into existence as mediators, conduct and behaviour takes to facilitate cooperation among states on matters of common interest. Whereas place. neorealists argue that such cooperation is always difficult and prone to break 66 GLOBAL POLITICS Debating . . . Is democracy a guarantee of peace? The ‘democratic peace’ thesis, supported by most liberals, suggests that democracy and peace are linked, particularly in the sense that wars do not occur between democratic states. Realists and others nevertheless argue that there is nothing necessarily peaceful about democracy. FOR AG A I N S T Zones of peace. Much interest in the idea of a ‘democratic Democracies at war. The idea that democracies are inher- peace’ derives from empirical analysis. As democracy has ently peaceful is undermined by continued evidence of spread, ‘zones of peace’ have emerged, in which military wars between democratic and authoritarian states, some- conflict has become virtually unthinkable. This certainly thing that most democratic peace theorists acknowledge. applies to Europe (previously riven by war and conflict), Moreover, empirical evidence to support the thesis is North America and Australasia. History seems to suggest bedevilled by confusion over which regimes qualify as that wars do not break out between democratic states, ‘democracies’. If universal suffrage and multi-party elec- although, as proponents of the democratic peace thesis tions are the core features of democratic governance, accept, war continues to occur between democratic and NATO’s bombardment of Serb troops in Kosovo in 1999 authoritarian states. and Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 (see p. 232) are both exceptions to the democratic peace thesis. Public opinion. Liberals argue that wars are caused by Moreover, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq both demon- governments, not by the people. This is because it is citi- strate that democracies do not go to war only for zens themselves who are likely to be war’s victims: they purposes of self-defence. are the ones who will do the killing and dying, and who will suffer disruption and hardship. In short, they have States are states. Realist theorists argue the factors that no ‘stomach for war’. In the event of international make for war apply to democratic and authoritarian conflict, democracies will thus seek accommodation states alike. In particular, the constitutional structure of a rather than confrontation, and use force only as a last state does not, and never can, alter the selfishness, greed resort, and then only for purposes of self-defence. and potential for violence that is simply part of human nature. Far from always opposing war, public opinion Non-violent conflict resolution. The essence of demo- therefore sometimes impels democratic governments cratic governance is a process of compromise, concilia- towards foreign policy adventurism and expansionism tion and negotiation, through which rival interests or (European imperialism, WWI and perhaps the ‘war on groups find a way of living together rather than resorting terror’ each illustrate this). Realists, moreover, argue that to force and the use of naked power. This, after all, is the the tendency towards war derives less from the constitu- purpose of elections, parliaments, pressure groups and so tional make-up of the state and more from the fear and on. Not only is it likely that regimes based on compro- suspicion that are an unavoidable consequence of inter- mise and conciliation will apply such an approach to national anarchy. foreign policy as well as domestic policy, but govern- ments unused to using force to resolve civil conflict will Peace by other means. Although the division of the world be less inclined to use force to resolve international into ‘zones of peace’ and ‘zones of turmoil’ may be an conflicts. undeniable feature of modern world politics, it is far from clear that the difference is due only, or even chiefly, Cultural bonds. Cultural ties develop amongst democra- to democracy. For example, patterns of economic inter- cies because democratic rule tends to foster particular dependence that result from free trade may be more norms and values. These include a belief in constitu- effective in maintaining peace amongst democracies than tional government, respect for freedom of speech and popular pressures. Similarly, it may be more significant guarantees for property ownership. The common moral that mature liberal democracies are wealthy than that foundations that underpin democratic government tend they are either liberal or democratic. In this view, war is to mean that democracies view each other as friends an unattractive prospect for rich states because they have rather than as foes. Peaceful coexistence amongst democ- little impulse to gain through conquest and much to fear racies therefore appears to be a ‘natural’ condition. from the possibility of defeat. THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 67 down because of the emphasis by states on ‘relative’ gains, neoliberals assert that CONCEPT states are more concerned with absolute gains. Instead of constantly engaging International in one-upmanship, states are always willing to cooperate if they calculate that regime they will be better off in real terms as a result. Although neoliberals use such arguments to explain the origins and development of formal institutions, A regime is a set of principles, procedures, ranging from the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see p. 511) and the norms or rules that International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see p. 469) to regional economic blocs govern the interactions of such as the European Union (see p. 505), they also draw attention to more infor- states and non-state mal institutions. In this, they embrace what has been called ‘new’ institutional- actors in particular issue ism, which defines institutions not so much as established and formal bodies, areas within international politics. As such, they are but, more broadly, as sets of norms, rules and ‘standard operating procedures’ social institutions with that are internalized by those who work within them. This explains the stress either a formal or within neoliberal theory on the role of international regimes. informal character. Examples of regimes include treaties, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES conventions, international agreements Mainstream perspectives on international politics and world affairs have been and international challenged by a growing array of critical perspectives, many of which have only organizations. These now gained prominence since the late 1980s. Although these perspectives are often operate in a wide variety very different from one another, they tend to have two broad things in common. of issue areas, including economics, human rights, The first is that, with the exception of orthodox Marxism and most forms of the environment, green politics, they have, in their different ways, embraced a post-positivist transport, security, approach that takes subject and object, and therefore theory and practice, to be policing, communications intimately linked (see All in the mind?, p. 75). As Robert Cox (1981) put it, and so on. The greater ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’. The second similarity is significance of regimes reflects the growth of related to the first, and this is that critical perspectives seek to challenge the interdependence and the global status quo and the norms, values and assumptions on which it is based. recognition that In exposing inequalities and asymmetries that mainstream theories ignore, crit- cooperation and ical theorists therefore tend to view realism and liberalism as ways of concealing, coordination can bring or of legitimizing, the power imbalances of the established global system. absolute gains to all parties. Regimes may Critical theories are thus emancipatory theories: they are dedicated to over- even provide a network throwing oppression and thus consciously align themselves with the interests of of regulatory frameworks exploited groups. Being politically engaged, it is sometimes difficult to reconcile which, taken collectively, critical theories with the tradition of dispassionate scholarship, although critical resemble a form of global theorists would argue that this highlights the limitations of the latter rather than governance (see p. 455). of the former. The key critical perspectives on global politics are as follows:  Marxism, neo-Marxism and critical theory  Absolute gains: Benefits  Social constructivism that accrue to states from a  Poststructuralism policy or action regardless of their impact on other states  Feminism (see p. 436).  Green politics  Postcolonialism  Post-positivism: An approach to knowledge that questions the idea of an Marxism, neo-Marxism and critical theory ‘objective’ reality, emphasizing instead the extent to which Marxism has traditionally been viewed as the principal critical or radical alter- people conceive, or ‘construct’; native to mainstream realist and liberal thinking, although its impact on the world in which they live. academic theorizing was always limited. However, Marxism is a very broad field, 68 GLOBAL POLITICS which encompasses, as far as international theory is concerned, two contrasting tendencies. The first of these gives primary attention to economic analysis, and is mainly concerned with exposing capitalism as a system of class oppression that operates on national and international levels. This applies to classical Marxism and to most forms of neo-Marxism. The second tendency places greater emphasis on the ideological and cultural dimension of oppression, and has come to embrace a post-positivist, and therefore post-Marxist, mode of theorizing. This applies to what has been called ‘critical theory’, as influenced by the ideas of Gramsci (see p. 71) and the so-called Frankfurt School. From classical Marxism to neo-Marxism The core of Marxism is a philosophy of history that outlines why capitalism is doomed and why socialism and eventually communism are destined to replace it. This philosophy is based on the ‘materialist conception of history’, the belief that economic factors are the ultimately determining force in human history. In Marx’s view, history is driven forward through a dialectical process in which internal contradictions within each ‘mode of production’, reflected in class conflict, lead to social revolution and the construction of a new and higher mode of production. This process was characterized by a series of historical stages (slavery, feudalism, capitalism and so on) and would only end with the estab- lishment of a classless communist society. For Marx, capitalist development nevertheless always had a marked transnational character, leading some to regard him as an early ‘hyperglobalist’ theorist. The desire for profit would drive capitalism to ‘strive to tear down every barrier to intercourse’ and to ‘conquer the whole earth for its market’ (Marx 1973). However, the implications of viewing capitalism as an international system were not fully explored until V. I. Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism ([1916] 1970). Lenin portrayed imperialism as an essentially economic phenomenon, reflecting domestic capi-  Neo-Marxism: An updated talism’s quest to maintain profit levels through the export of surplus capital. and revived form of Marxism This, in turn, would bring major capitalist powers into conflict with one another, that rejects determinism, the primacy of economics and the the resulting war (WWI) being essentially an imperialist war in the sense that it privileged status of the was fought for the control of colonies in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Such think- proletariat. ing was further developed by later Marxists, who focused on the ‘uneven devel- opment’ of global capitalism.  Uneven development: The Interest in Marxism was revived during the 1970s through the use of neo- tendency within a capitalist economy for industries, Marxist theories to explain patterns of global poverty and inequality. economic sectors and countries Dependency theory, for example, highlighted the extent to which, in the post- to develop at very different 1945 period, traditional imperialism had given way to neo-colonialism, some- rates due to the pressures times viewed as ‘economic imperialism’ or, more specifically, ‘dollar imperialism’. generated by the quest for World-systems theory (see p. 367) suggested that the world economy is best profit, competition and economic exploitation. understood as an interlocking capitalist system which exemplifies, at interna- tional level, many of the features that characterize national capitalism; that is,  Dependency theory: A structural inequalities based on exploitation and a tendency towards instability neo-Marxist theory that and crisis that is rooted in economic contradictions. The world-system consists highlights structural imbalances of interrelationships between the ‘core’, the ‘periphery’ and the ‘semi-periphery’. within international capitalism that impose dependency and Core areas such as the developed North are distinguished by the concentration underdevelopment on poorer of capital, high wages and high-skilled manufacturing production They there- states and regions. fore benefit from technological innovation and high and sustained levels of THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 69 Karl Marx (1818–83) German philosopher, economist and political thinker, usually portrayed as the father of twentieth-century communism. After a brief career as a university teacher, Marx became increasingly involved in the socialist movement. Finally settling in London, he worked for the rest of his life as an active revolutionary and writer, supported by his friend and lifelong collaborator, Friedrich Engels (1820–95). At the centre of Marx’s work was a critique of capitalism that highlights its transitionary nature by drawing attention to systemic inequality and instability. Marx subscribed to a teleological theory of history that holds that social development would inevitably culminate in the establishment of communism. His classic work was the three-volume Capital ([1885, 1887, 1894] 1969); his best-known and most accessible work, with Engels, is the Communist Manifesto ([1848] 1967). investment. Peripheral areas such as the less developed South are exploited by the core through their dependency on the export of raw materials, subsistence wages and weak frameworks of state protection. Semi-peripheral areas are economically subordinate to the core but in turn take advantage of the periph- ery, thereby constituting a buffer between the core and the periphery. Such thinking about the inherent inequalities and injustices of global capitalism was one of the influences on the anti-globalization, or ‘anti-capitalist’, movement that emerged from the late 1990s onwards (see p. 70). Critical theory ‘Critical theory’ (often called ‘Frankfurt School critical theory’, to distinguish it from the wider category of critical theories or perspectives) has developed into one of the most influential currents of Marxist-inspired international theory A major influence on critical theory has been the ideas of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci (1970) argued that the capitalist class system is upheld not simply by unequal economic and political power, but by what he termed the ‘hegemony’ of bourgeois ideas and theories. Hegemony means leadership or domination and, in the sense of ideological hegemony, it refers to the capacity of bourgeois ideas to displace rival views and become, in effect, the ‘common sense’ of the age. Gramsci’s ideas have influenced modern thinking about the nature of world or global hegemony. Instead of viewing hegemony in conventional terms, as the domination of one military power over another, modern neo-Gramscians have emphasized the extent to which hegemony operates through a mixture of coer- cion and consent, highlighting the interplay between economic, political, military and ideological forces, as well as interaction between states and international organizations. Robert Cox (see p. 120) thus analyzed the hegemonic power of the  Hegemony: The ascendancy USA not only in terms of its military ascendancy, but also in terms of its ability or domination of one element to generate broad consent for the ‘world order’ that it represents. of a system over others; for The other key influence on critical theory has been the thinking of the Marxists, hegemony implies ideological domination (see p. Frankfurt School, a group of Marxist-influenced theorists who worked at the 221). Institute of Social Research, which was established in Frankfurt in 1923, relo- 70 GLOBAL POLITICS G L O B A L AC TO R S . . . THE ANTI-CAPITALIST MOVEMENT Type: Social movement There is general agreement that the Significance: It is very difficult to within a political and intellectual birth of the anti-capitalist move- make judgements about the impact climate that is different from the ment (also known as the ‘anti-glob- of social movements because of 1980s and 1990s, and the anti-capi- alization’, ‘anti-corporate’, their typically broad, and some- talist movement has contributed ‘anti-neoliberal’, ‘global justice’, times nebulous, cultural goals. It significantly to this. ‘alter-globalization’ movement) can would be absurd, for example, to Criticisms of the anti-capitalist be traced back to the so-called write off the anti-capitalist move- movement have sometimes been ‘Battle of Seattle’ in November 1999, ment as a failure, simply because of damning, however. Most seriously, when some 50,000 activists forced the survival, worldwide, of the it has been condemned for its the cancellation of the opening cere- capitalist system. Proponents of the failure to develop a systematic and mony of a World Trade anti-capitalist movement argue that coherent critique of neoliberal glob- Organization meeting. This it is the nearest thing to a counter- alization or failure to outline a ‘coming-out party’ for the anti-capi- hegemonic force in modern global viable alternative. This reflects both talist movement provided a model politics, its role being to expose and the highly diverse nature of the for the ‘new politics’ of activist- contest the discourses and practices anti-capitalist movement and the based theatrical politics that has of neoliberal globalization. It is fact that its goals are not commonly accompanied most subsequent rightfully described as a ‘movement incompatible. While a minority of international summits and global of movements’, in that the inequali- its supporters are genuinely ‘anti- conferences. In some respects, the ties and asymmetries generated by capitalist’, adopting a Marxist-style anti-capitalist movement exists on ‘corporate’ globalization are multi- analysis of capitalism that high- two levels. One level is strongly ple. The anti-capitalist movement lights its inherent flaws, most activist-orientated, and consists of a therefore provides a vehicle groups and supporters wish merely loosely-knit, non-hierarchically through which the disparate range to remove the ‘worst excesses’ of organized international coalition of of peoples or groups who have capitalism. Similarly, the anti-capi- (usually young) people and social been marginalized or disenfran- talist movement is divided over movements, articulating the chised as a result of globalization globalization itself. While some, concerns of environmental groups, can gain a political voice. In that such as nationalists, cultural trade unions, religious groups, sense, the movement is a demo- activists and campaigners for the student groups, anarchists, revolu- cratic force, an uprising of the rights of indigenous people, object tionary socialists, campaigners for oppressed and seemingly powerless. to globalization in principle, a large the rights of indigenous people, and The anti-globalization movement proportion of the movement’s so on. On the other level, the anti- can be credited with having altered supporters wish only to break the capitalist movement is expert-orien- thinking on a wide range of link between globalization and tated, focused on a number of transnational issues, even with neoliberalism (see p. 90), attempt- leading authors and key works, and having reshaped global political ing to establish a form of alternative involving, through their influence, a agendas. This can be seen in a globalization, or ‘alter-globalization’. much wider range of people, many heightened awareness of, for Another serious division within the of whom are not directly involved in example, environmental issues, and anti-capitalist movement is between activism but sympathize generally especially global warming, the fail- those who link global justice to with the movement’s goals. Leading ings of market-based development strengthened regulation at a figures (but by no means ‘leaders’) and poverty-reduction strategies, national and global level, and anar- include Noam Chomsky (see p. and so forth. UN conferences and chist elements who distrust govern- 228), Naomi Klein (see p. 146) and bodies such as the WTO, the World ment and governance (see p. 125) in Noreena Hertz (2002). Bank and the IMF now operate all its forms. THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 71 Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) Italian Marxist and social theorist. The son of a minor public official, Gramsci joined the Socialist Party in 1913, but switched to the newly-formed Italian Communist Party in 1921, being recognized as its leader by 1924. He was imprisoned by Mussolini in 1926, and remained incarcerated until his death. In Prison Notebooks (1970), written between 1929 and 1935, Gramsci sought to redress the emphasis within orthodox Marxism on economic or material factors. Rejecting any form of ‘scientific’ determinism, he stressed, through the theory of hegemony, the importance of polit- ical and intellectual struggle. Gramsci insisted that bourgeois hegemony could only be challenged at the political and intellectual level, through a ‘counter-hegemonic’ struggle, carried out in the interests of the proletariat and on the basis of socialist principles, values and theories. cated to the USA in the 1930s, and was re-established in Frankfurt in the early 1950s (the Institute was dissolved in 1969). The defining theme of critical theory is the attempt to extend the notion of critique to all social practices by linking substantive social research to philosophy. Leading ‘first generation’ Frankfurt thinkers included Theodor Adorno (1903–69), Max Horkheimer (1895–1973) and Herbert Marcuse (1989–1979); the leading exponent of the ‘second genera- tion’ of the Frankfurt School was Jürgen Habermas (born 1929). While early Frankfurt thinkers were primarily concerned with the analysis of discrete soci- eties, later theorists, such as Cox (1981, 1987) and Andrew Linklater (1990, 1998), have applied critical theory to the study of international politics, in at least three ways. In the first place, critical theory underlines the linkage between knowledge and politics, emphasizing the extent to which theories and under- standings are embedded in a framework of values and interests. This implies that, as all theorizing is normative, those who seek to understand the world should adopt greater theoretical reflexivity. Second, critical theorists have adopted an explicit commitment to emancipatory politics: they are concerned to uncover structures of oppression and injustice in global politics in order to advance the cause of individual or collective freedom. Third, critical theorists have questioned the conventional association within international theory between political community and the state, in so doing opening up the possibil- ity of a more inclusive, and maybe even cosmopolitan, notion of political iden- tity. Social constructivism Social constructivism has been the most influential post-positivist approach to  Theoretical reflexivity: An international theory, gaining significantly greater attention since the end of the awareness of the impact of the Cold War. The constructivist approach to analysis is based on the belief that values and presuppositions that there is no objective social or political reality independent of our understanding a theorist brings to analysis, as well as an understanding of the of it. Constructivists do not therefore regard the social world as something ‘out historical dynamics that have there’, in the sense of an external world of concrete objects; instead, it exists only helped to fashion them. ‘inside’, as a kind of inter-subjective awareness. In the final analysis, people, 72 GLOBAL POLITICS Focus on . . . Structure or agency? Is global politics best explained in terms of ‘structures’ willed behaviour of human actors. These theories have (the context within which action takes place) or in an ‘inside-out’ character: they explain behaviour in terms of ‘agency’ (the ability of human actors to influ- terms of the intentions or inclinations of key actors. ence events)? A variety of approaches to global politics These theories are therefore endogenous. Examples have a structuralist character; that is, they adopt what include ‘classical’ realism, which holds that the key to can be called an ’outside-in’ approach to understand- understanding international relations is to recognize ing. The nature of these contexts varies, however. that states are the primary actors on the world stage Neorealists (sometimes called structural realists) and that each state is bent on the pursuit of self-inter- explain the behaviour of states in terms of the struc- est. Liberals are also inclined towards ‘inside-out’ theo- ture of the international system, while Marxists rizing, in that they stress the extent to which states’ emphasize the crucial impact of international capital- foreign policy orientation is affected by their constitu- ism, sometimes seen as a ‘world-system’ by neo- tional make-up (and particularly whether they are Marxist theorists. Even liberals recognize the limitations democratic or authoritarian). Although intentionalism imposed on individual states by the complex web of has the advantage that it reintroduces choice and the economic interdependence into which they have been role of the human actor, its disadvantage is that it is drawn, particularly by the forces of globalization. One ‘reductionist’: it reduces social explanation to certain of the attractions of structuralism is that, by explaining core fact about major actors, and so understates the human behaviour in terms of external, or exogenous, structural factors that shape human action. In the light factors, it dispenses with the vagaries of human volition of the drawbacks of both structuralism and intentional- and decision-making, allowing theories to claim scien- ism, critical theorists in particular have tried to go tific precision. Its disadvantage, though, is that it leads beyond the ‘structure versus agency’ debate, in to determinism, which rules out free will altogether. acknowledging that, as no neat or clear distinction can Alternative theories that stress agency over struc- be drawn between conduct and the context within ture subscribe to intentionalism or voluntarism, which which it takes place, structure and agency both influ- assigns decisive explanatory importance to the self- ence each other (Hay 2002). whether acting as individuals or as social groups, ‘construct’ the world in which they live and act according to those constructions. People’s beliefs and assump- tions become particularly significant when they are widely shared, especially when they serve to give a community or people a sense of identity and distinc- tive interests. As such, constructivist analysis highlights the missing dimension to the ‘structure–agent’ debate in global politics. Constructivism stands, in a sense, between ‘inside-out’ and ‘outside-in’ approaches, in that it holds that interactions between agents and structures are always mediated by ‘ideational factors’ (beliefs, values, theories and assumptions). These ideational factors affect both how agents see themselves and how they understand, and respond to, the structures within which they operate. However, this implies that social constructivism is not so much a substantive theory, or set of substantive theo- ries, as an analytical tool, an approach to understanding. One of the most influential formulations of social constructivism was Alexander Wendt’s (see p. 74) assertion that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 73 This implies that state behaviour is not determined, as neorealists assert, by the structure of the international system, but by how particular states view anarchy. While some states may view anarchy as dangerous and threatening, others may see it as the basis for freedom and opportunity. An ‘anarchy of friends’ is thus very different from an ‘anarchy of enemies’. What is at stake here is not the objec- tive circumstances that confront a state so much as a state’s self-identity and how it views its fellow states. This can also be seen in relation to nations and nation- alism. Nations are not objective entities, groups of people who happen to share a common cultural heritage; rather, they are subjective entities, defined by their members, through a particular set of traditions, values and sentiments. Constructivist analysis highlights the fluidity of world politics: as nation-states (see p. 164) and other key global actors change their perception of who or what they are, their behaviour will change. This stance may have optimistic or pessimistic implications. On the one hand, it leaves open the possibility that states may transcend a narrow perception of self-interest and embrace the cause of global justice, even cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, it highlights the possibility that states and other international actors may fall prey to expansion- ist and aggressive political creeds. However, critics of constructivism have argued that it fails to recognize the extent to which beliefs are shaped by social, economic and political realities. At the end of the day, ideas do not ‘fall from the sky’ like rain. They are a product of complex social realities, and reflect an ongoing relationship between ideas and the material world. Poststructuralism Poststructuralism emerged along side postmodernism, the two terms some- times being used interchangeably. Poststructuralism emphasizes that all ideas and concepts are expressed in language which itself is enmeshed in complex rela- tions of power. Influenced particularly by the writings of Michel Foucault (see p. 17), poststructuralists have drawn attention to the link between power and systems of thought using the idea of discourse, or ‘discourses of power’. In crude terms, this implies that knowledge is power. However, in the absence of a univer- sal frame of reference or overarching perspective, there exist only a series of  Postmodernism: An competing perspectives, each of which represents a particular discourse of intellectual tradition that is power. Such a view has sometimes been associated with Jacques Derrida’s based on the belief that truth is ([1967] 1976) famous formulation: ‘There is nothing outside the text’. always contested and plural; sometimes summed up as ‘an Poststructural or postmodern thinking has exerted growing influence on inter- incredulity towards national relations theory, especially since the publication of Der Derian and metanarratives’ (Lyotard 1984). Shapiro’s International/Intertextual (1989). Poststructuralism draws attention to the fact that any political event will always be susceptible to competing interpre-  Discourse: Human tations. 9/11 is an example of this. Not only is there, for poststructuralists, irre- interaction, especially communication; discourse may ducible debate about whether 9/11 is best conceived as an act of terrorism, a disclose or illustrate power criminal act, an act of evil, or an act of (possibly justified) revenge, but there is relations. also uncertainty about the nature of the ‘act’ itself – was it the attacks themselves, the process of planning, the formation of al-Qaeda, the onset of US neo-colo-  Deconstruction: A close nialism, or whatever? In such circumstances, the classic poststructuralist reading of philosophical or other texts with an eye to their approach to exposing hidden meanings in particular concepts, theories and various blindspots and/or interpretations is deconstruction. Critics, however, accuse postmodernism/ contradictions. poststructuralism of relativism, in that they hold that different modes of 74 GLOBAL POLITICS Alexander Wendt (born 1958) German-born international relations theorist who has worked mainly in the USA. Wendt is a meta-theorist who has used constructivist analysis to provide a critique of both neorealism and neoliberalism. He accepts that states are the primary units of analysis for international political theory, but urges that states and their interests should not be taken for granted. The key structures of the state-system are ‘inter- subjective’ rather than material, in that states act on the basis of identities and inter- ests that are socially constructed. Wendt therefore argues that neorealism and neoliberalism are defective because both fail to take account of the self-understand- ings of state actors. Wendt’s key writings include ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’ (1987), ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’ (1992) and Social Theory of International Politics (1999). knowing are equally valid and thus reject the idea that even science can distin- guish between truth and falsehood. However, since the 1980s, positivist approaches to international politics have been subject to criticism from a range of so-called ‘post-positivist’ approaches. These include critical theory, constructivism, poststructuralism and, in certain respects, feminism. What these approaches have in common is that they ques- tion the belief that there is an objective reality ‘out there’, separate from the beliefs, ideas and assumptions of the observer. As we observe the world, we are also in the process of imposing meaning upon it; we only ever see the world as we think it exists. Such an approach leads to a more critical and reflective view of theory, which is seen to have a constitutive purpose and not merely an explana- tory one. Greater attention is therefore paid to the biases and hidden assump- tions that are embodied in theory, implying that dispassionate scholarship may always be an unachievable ideal. Postmodern thinkers take such ideas furthest in suggesting that the quest for objective truth should be abandoned altogether, as all knowledge is partial and relative. Feminism Feminist theories have influenced the study of global politics in a number of ways (True 2009). So-called ‘empirical’ feminist have challenged the ‘sexist’ exclusion of women and women’s issues from conventional analysis. From this point of view, conventional approaches to international politics focus almost exclusively on male-dominated bodies and institutions - governments and states, transnational corporations (TNCs) (see p. 99) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (see p. 6), international organizations and so on. The role of women, as, for instance, diplomats’ wives, domestic workers, sex workers and suchlike, is therefore ignored, as are the often international and even global  Gender: A social and cultural processes through which women are subordinated and exploited. ‘Analytical’ distinction between males and females, usually based on feminists, such as J. Ann Tickner (see p. 76), have exposed the extent to which stereotypes of ‘masculinity’ and the theoretical framework of global politics is based on gender biases ‘femininity’ (see p. 416). that pervade its key theories and concepts, drawing at times on the ideas of THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 75 Focus on . . . All in the mind? What is the relationship between theory and reality? However, since the 1980s, positivist approaches to Do theories merely explain the world, or do they, in a international politics have been subject to criticism sense, ‘construct’ the world? Conventional approaches from a range of so-called 'post-positivist' approaches. to global politics, as reflected in realism, liberalism and These include critical theory, constructivism, poststruc- orthodox Marxism, have been based on positivism tualism and, in certain respects, feminism and post- (sometimes called naturalism or rationalism). structualism. What these approaches have in common Positivism is grounded in the assumption that there is is that they question the belief that there is an objec- such a thing as reality – a world ‘out there’ – and that tive reality ‘out there’, separate from the beliefs, ideas our knowledge of it can be built up through repeatable and assumptions of the observer. As we observe the experiments, observations and deductions (that is, by world, we are also in the process of imposing meaning the use of scientific method). The world therefore has a upon it; we only ever see the world as we think it solid or concrete character, and knowledge can be exists. Such an approach leads to a more critical and ‘objective’, untainted by feelings, values or bias of any reflective view of theory, which is seen to have a kind. Enthusiasm for constructing such a ‘science of constitutive purpose and not merely an explanatory international politics’ peaked in the 1960s and 1970s one. Greater attention is therefore paid to the biases with the emergence, most strongly in the USA, of and hidden assumptions that are embodied in theory, behaviouralism. From a positivist perspective, theories implying that dispassionate scholarship may always be have a strictly explanatory purpose: they are devices for an unachievable ideal. Postmodern thinkers take such explaining the world, and can be shown to be either ideas furthest in suggesting that the quest for objective ‘true’ or ‘false’, depending on how far they correspond truth should be abandoned altogether, as all knowledge to reality. is partial and relative. constructivism and poststructuralism. The dominant realist paradigm of ‘power politics’ has been a particular object of criticism. Feminists have argued that the theory of power politics is premised on ‘masculinist’ assumptions about rivalry, competition and inevitable conflict, arising from a tendency to see the world in terms of interactions amongst series of power-seeking autonomous actors. Analytical feminism is concerned not only to expose such biases, but also to champion alternative concepts and theories, for example ones linking power not to conflict but to collaboration. Feminist theories and the implications of gender-based analysis are examined in greater detail in Chapter 17. Green politics Green politics, or ecologism, has had an impact on international theory since issues such as ‘limits to growth’ and the ‘population time bomb’ came on the political agenda in the 1970s. However, interest in it has increased substantially since the 1990s as a result of growing concern about climate change, often viewed as the archetypal global issue. The central theme of green politics is the notion of an intrinsic link between humankind and nature, sometimes linked to the ‘Gaia hypothesis’ (see p. 392) developed by James Lovelock (see p. 77). Green politics nevertheless encompasses a wide range of theoretical positions, with 76 GLOBAL POLITICS J. Ann Tickner (born 1937) A US academic and feminist international relations theorist. An exponent of stand- point feminism, Tickner has exposed ways in which the conventional study of inter- national relations marginalizes gender, whilst also being itself gendered. Her best known book, Gender in International Relations (1992a), highlights the biases and limitations of the masculinized, geo-political version of national security, demon- strating that it may enhance rather than reduce the insecurity of individuals and showing how peace, economic justice and ecological sustainability are vital to women’s security. Although she argues that gender relations shape the search for knowledge, Tickner’s ultimate goal is to transcend gender by overcoming gender inequality. Her other works include ‘Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation’ (1988) and ‘Feminist Perspectives on 9/11’ (2002). quite different implications for international affairs and global politics. Mainstream or reformist green thinking attempts to develop a balance between modernization and economic growth, on the one hand, and the need to tackle environmental degradation, on the other. Its key theme is the notion of ‘sustain- able development’ (see p. 390), which, by linking environmental to economic goals, has exerted considerable influence on development theory, particularly in the global South. Radical green theorists nevertheless go further. Some, for instance, argue that the balance between humankind and nature will only be restored by radical social change. For ‘eco-socialists’, the source of the environmental crisis is the capitalist economic system, which ‘commodified’ nature and draws it into the system of market exchange. ‘Eco-anarchists’ advance an environmental critique of hierarchy and authority, arguing that domination over other people is linked to domination over nature. ‘Eco-feminists’ advance an environmental critique of male power, suggesting that domination over women leads to domination over nature. ‘Deep ecologists’, for their part, argue that only ‘paradigm change’ – the adoption of a radically new philosophical and moral perspective, based on radical holism rather than conventional mechanis- tic and atomistic thinking – will bring an end to environmental degradation. This, in effect, treats nature as an integrated whole, within which every species has an equal right to ‘live and bloom’ (Naess 1989). The nature and implications  Deep ecology: A green of green politics are discussed more fully in Chapter 16. ideological perspective that rejects anthropocentrism and gives priority to the Postcolonialism maintenance of nature; it is associated with values such as The final critical perspective on global politics is postcolonialism (see p. 194). bio-equality, diversity and Theorists of postcolonialism have tried to expose the cultural dimension of decentralization. colonial rule, usually by establishing the legitimacy of non-western and some- times anti-western ideas, cultures and traditions. In one of the most influential  Holism: The belief that the whole is more than a collection works of postcolonial theory, Edward Said (see p. 197) developed the notion of of parts; holism implies that ‘orientalism’ to highlight the extent to which western cultural and political understanding is gained by hegemony over the rest of the world, but over the Orient in particular, had been recognizing the relationships maintained through elaborate stereotypical fictions that belittled and amongst the parts. demeaned non-western people and culture. Examples of such stereotypes THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 77 James Lovelock (born 1919) UK atmospheric chemist, inventor and environmental thinker. Lovelock was recruited by NASA as part of its team devising strategies for identifying life on Mars, but he has subsequently worked as an independent scientist for over 40 years. He adopts a holis- tic approach to science which rejects disciplinary distinctions and emphasizes instead interconnectedness. Lovelock is best known for the ‘Gaia hypothesis’, which proposes that the earth is best understood as a complex, self-regulating, living ‘being’. This implies that the prospects for humankind are closely linked to whether the species helps to sustain, or to threaten, the planetary ecosystem. Lovelock was also the first person to alert the world to the worldwide presence of CFCs in the atmosphere. His chief works include Gaia (1979) and The Ages of Gaia (1989). include images such as the ‘mysterious East’, ‘inscrutable Chinese’ and ‘lustful Turks’. The cultural biases generated by colonialism do not only affect, and subjugate, former colonized people, however. They also have a continuing impact on western states, which assume the mantle of the ‘international community’ in claiming the authority to ‘sort out’ less favoured parts of the world. In this view, humanitarian intervention (see p. 319) can be seen as an example of Eurocentrism. Forcible intervention on allegedly humanitarian grounds and, for that matter, other forms of interference in the developing world, such as international aid, can therefore be viewed as a continuation of colonialism by other means. The ideas and theories of postcolonialism are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 8. THINKING GLOBALLY The acceleration of globalization from the 1980s onwards not only contributed to a reconfiguration of world politics; it also brought with it a series of new theoret- ical challenges. Not the least of these was the problem of conceptualizing the emerging condition of global interconnectedness, in which politics is increasingly enmeshed in a web of interdependences that operate both within, and across, worldwide, regional, national and subnational levels. How is it possible, in other words, to ‘think globally’? And what are the implications of global thinking? Three challenges have emerged in particular. The first concerns the difficulties that global interconnectedness poses to empirical understanding: how can we make sense of a world in which everything affects everything else? The second concerns the normative implications of global interconnectedness: have wider social connec- tions between people expanded the moral universe in which we live? The third concerns the value of theories or paradigms: does interconnectedness mean that instead of choosing between paradigms, we should think beyond paradigms?  Eurocentrism: The application of values and theories drawn from European Challenge of interconnectedness culture to other groups and peoples, implying a biased or To what extent can established theories, both mainstream and critical, engage distorted viewpoint. in global thinking? In many ways, this is indicated by the degree to which they 78 GLOBAL POLITICS are able to address the issue of globalization. The picture here is mixed. As far as realism is concerned, its core focus on unit-level analysis, taking the state to be the primary actor on the world stage, puts it starkly at odds with most of the claims made about globalization, especially the idea of an interlocking global economy. Thus, insofar as realists have addressed the issue of globalization, it is to deny that it is anything new or different: globalization is ‘more of the same’, a game played by states for states. The much vaunted ‘interdependent world’ is thus largely a myth, from a realist perspective. Liberals and neo-Marxists, on the other hand, have both been able, if not eager, to incorporate the phenomenon of globalization into their thinking. For liberals, the advent of globalization fitted in well to long-established ideas about economic interdependence and the virtues of free trade. Much ‘hyperglobalist’ theorizing, indeed, is based on liberal assumptions, especially about the tendency of the market to achieve long-term equilibrium, bringing with it both general prosperity and widening freedom. Adam Smith’s (see p. 85) image of the ‘invisible hand’ of market competition can therefore be seen to provide the basis for a market-based, and unashamedly positive, model of global interconnectedness. Marxist and neo- Marxist theorists, similarly, found no difficulty in addressing the issue of glob- alization; Marx, after all, may have been the first economic thinker to have drawn attention to the transnational, and not merely international, character of capitalism. For neo-Marxists, economic globalization was really only a mani- festation of the emergence of a capitalist world-system, or global capitalism. However, this image of globalization was clearly negative, characterized by growing divisions between ‘core’ areas and ‘peripheral’ areas. Thus, as debate emerged in the 1990s over the benefits and burdens of growing global inter- connectedness, these debates wore an essentially familiar face. Pro-globalization arguments drew largely from the pool of liberal ideas, while anti-globalization arguments were based significantly, though by no means exclusively, on neo- Marxist or quasi-Marxist thinking. However, some argue that the challenges of global interconnectedness defy all established theories, and, in effect, require the development of an entirely new way of thinking. This is because the rise of complex forms of interconnectedness make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to think any longer in conventional terms of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. In an interdependent world, the relationships between two or more factors, processes or variables are characterized by recip- rocal causation, or mutual conditioning. Thus, if A, B and C are interdependent, then any change in B will result in a change in A and C; any change in A will result in a change in B and C; and any change in C will result in a change in A and B (Hay 2010). However, complexity does not stop there. The fact that any change in A changes not just B and C but also A itself, means that it becomes difficult to think in terms of ‘A-ness’, ‘B-ness’ or, indeed, in terms of ‘thing-ness’ in any sense. As such, complex interconnectedness arguably challenges the very basis of reasoning in the western tradition, which dates back to Aristotle’s asser- tion that ‘everything must either be or not be’. While this dualistic, or ‘either/or’ approach to thinking implies that the world can be understood in terms of linear, causal relationships, complex interconnectedness perhaps calls for an alternative holistic, non-dualistic and therefore non-linear, approach to under- standing. Eastern thinking in general, and Buddhism in particular (by virtue of its stress on oneness, grounded in the belief that all concepts and objects are THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 79 ‘empty’ of own-being) (Clarke 1997), are often seen as archetypal examples of a CONCEPT non-dualistic thinking; other attempts to think beyond ‘either/or’ distinctions Chaos theory include ‘fuzzy thinking’ (Kosko 1994), deep ecology (Capra 1996) and systems Chaos theory emerged in thinking (Capra 2003). But where does non-linearity or non-dualist thinking the 1970s as a branch of lead us? One of its key implications is that, as patterns of causal relationships mathematics that sought become increasingly difficult to identify, events take on a random and seemingly an alternative to linear arbitrary character. This is highlighted by chaos theory, which describes systems differential equations. whose behaviour is difficult to predict because they consist of so many variables Linearity implies a strong element of predictability or unknown factors. Chaos tendencies may, for instance, be evident in the inher- (for example, how a ent instability of global financial markets (Soros 2000) and in a general tendency billiard ball will respond towards risk and uncertainty in society at large (Beck 1992). to being hit by another billiard ball). In contrast, chaos theory examines Cosmopolitanism the behaviour of non- linear systems (such as Global interconnectedness does not merely challenge us in terms of how we weather systems), in understand the world, but also, perhaps, in terms of our moral relationships. which there are such a The advance of globalization has undoubtedly had an ethical dimension, in that wide range of variable it has renewed interest in forms of cosmopolitanism (see p. 21), often expressed factors that the effect of a change in any of them through growing interest in ideas such as global justice or world ethics (Dower may have a 1998; Caney 2005). As the world has ‘shrunk’, in the sense of people having a disproportionate, and greater awareness of other people living in other countries, often at a great seemingly random, distance from themselves, it has become more difficult to confine their moral effect on others. The obligations simply to a single political society. The more they know, the more classic example of this is the so-called ‘butterfly they care. For cosmopolitan theorists, this implies that the world has come to effect’: the idea that the constitute a single moral community. People thus have obligations (potentially) mere flap of a butterfly’s towards all other people in the world, regardless of nationality, religion, ethnic- wing could cause a ity and so forth. Such thinking is usually based on the doctrine of human rights. hurricane to occur on the Pogge (2008) broke this rights-based cosmopolitanism into three elements. It other side of the globe. believes in individualism, in that human beings, or persons, are the ultimate unit of moral concern. Second, it accepts universality, in the sense that individuals are of equal moral worth. Third, it acknowledges generality, in that it implies that persons are objects of concern for everybody, not just their compatriots. Other forms of moral cosmopolitanism have also been advanced, however. O’Neill (1996) thus used the Kantian notion that we should act on principles that we would be willing to apply to all people in all circumstances to argue that people  Cultural relativism: The have a commitment not to injure others and that this commitment has a univer- view that matters of right or wrong are entirely culturally sal scope. Singer (2002), on the other hand, argued that the ethics of globaliza- determined, usually implying tion demand that we should act so as to reduce the overall levels of global that it is impossible to say that suffering, thinking in terms of ‘one world’ rather than a collection of discrete one culture is better or worse countries or peoples. than another. Moral cosmopolitanism also has its critics, however. One the one hand,  Communitarianism: The radical critics of cosmopolitanism reject ideas such as global justice or world belief that the self or person is ethics on the grounds that it is impossible to establish universal values that are constituted through the binding on all people and all societies. This cultural relativism is often used to community, in the sense that argue that human rights in particular are essentially a western ideal and there- individuals are shaped by the fore have no place in non-western cultures. From a broader perspective, communities to which they belong and thus owe them a cosmopolitanism is often contrasted with communitarianism. From the debt or respect and communitarian perspective, moral values only make sense when they are consideration (Negal 2005). grounded in a particular society and a particular historical period. This implies 80 GLOBAL POLITICS Debating . . . Do moral obligations extend to the whole of humanity? At the heart of the idea of global justice is the notion of universal rights and obligations stretching across the globe, establishing ‘justice beyond borders’. But what is the basis for such thinking, and how persuasive is it? YES NO Humans as moral creatures. The core feature of cosmo- Morality begins at home. Communitarian theorists argue politan ethics is the idea that the individual, rather than that morality only makes sense when it is locally-based, any particular political community, is the principal grounded in the communities to which we belong and source of moral value. Most commonly, this is asserted which have shaped our lives and values. The simple fact through the doctrine of human rights, the notion that is that people everywhere give moral priority to those people are entitled to at least the minimal conditions for they know best, most obviously their family and close leading a worthwhile existence. These rights are funda- friends and, beyond that, members of their local commu- mental and universal, in that they belong to people by nity and then those with whom they share a national or virtue of their humanity and cannot be denied on cultural identity. Not only is morality fashioned by the grounds of nationality, religion, cultural identity or distinctive history, culture and traditions of a particular whatever. The doctrine of human rights therefore implies society, but it is difficult to see how our obligations can that there is but a single ethical community, and that is extend beyond those who share a similar ethical frame- humankind. People everywhere are part of the same work. moral universe. The agency problem. The idea of universal rights only The globalization of moral sensibilities. The narrowing of make sense if it is possible to identify who is obliged to moral sensibilities just to people within our own society do what in relation to the rights-bearers. If moral obliga- is increasingly unsustainable in a world of increasing tions fall on individual human beings, there is little that interconnectedness. Transborder information and they, as individuals, could do in the event of, say, a communication flows, particularly the impact of televi- natural disaster or a civil war. If our obligations are sion, mean that the ‘strangeness’ and unfamiliarity of discharged through states and national governments, people and societies on the other side of the globe has there is the problem that states have different capabilities. reduced substantially. News reports and especially Citizens’ and states’ obligations may therefore become pictures of, for instance, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami little more than a reflection of the wealth and power of provoked massive outpourings of humanitarian concern their society. If universal obligations only make sense in a in other parts of the world, helping to fund major context of world government (see p. 457), in which programmes of emergency relief. Globalization therefore global justice is upheld by supranational bodies, this has an important, and irresistible, moral dimension. creates the prospect of global despotism. Global citizenship. Moral obligations to people in other The virtues of self-help. Doctrines of universal rights and parts of the world stem, in important respects, from the obligations are invariably used to argue that rich and fact that we affect their lives. We live in a world of global successful parts of the world should, in some way, help cause and effect. Purchasing decisions in one part of the poor and less fortunate parts of the world. However, such world thus affect job opportunities, working conditions interference is often counter-productive: it promotes and poverty levels in other parts of the world. Whether dependency and undermines self-reliance. Perhaps the we like it or not, we are morally culpable, in that our main obligation we owe other peoples and other societies actions have moral implications for others. Such thinking is to leave them alone. This may result in short-term draws on the utilitarian belief that we should act so as to moral costs but longer-term ethical benefits, in the form achieve the greatest possible pleasure over pain in the of societies better able to protect their citizens from world at large, each person’s happiness or suffering suffering and hardship. State sovereignty may therefore counting equally. A basic moral principle for ‘citizens of make good moral sense as well as good political sense. the world’ would therefore be: do no harm. THEORIES OF GLOBAL POLITICS 81 that human beings are morally constituted to favour the needs and interests of those with whom they share a cultural and national identity. On the other hand, moderate critics accept that universal values such as human rights may make moral sense, but they nevertheless object to the priority that they are accorded within moral cosmopolitanism (Negal 2005). In this view, although the desire, for example, to reduce overall levels of global suffering may be laudable, this is accepted as an unreliable, indeed unrealistic, guide for day-to-day moral reason- ing, which will inevitably be shaped by more personal and local concerns. Cosmopolitan ethics, therefore, may exist, but only on the basis of a ‘thin’ sense of moral connectedness, rather than the ‘thick’ sense of moral connectedness that emerges within nations and local communities (Walzer 1994). Paradigms: enlightening or constraining? Does an interconnected or interdependent world require that we abandon discrete academic disciplines and self-contained theories? Do we have to learn to think across paradigms, or perhaps beyond paradigms (Sil and Katzenstein 2010)? As Thomas Kuhn (1962) put it, a paradigm is ‘the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by members of a given community’. Kuhn’s key insight was that the search for knowledge is always conducted within a particular set of assumptions about the ‘real world’, a position that implies the constructivist conclusion that all knowledge is, and can only be, framed within a specific paradigm. Such a view suggests that understanding is advanced through ‘paradigm shifts’, as an established paradigm breaks down and a new one is constructed in its place. The value of paradigms is that they help us to make sense of what might otherwise be an impenetrably complex reality. They define what is important to study and highlight important trends, patterns and processes. However, paradigms may also become prisons. Paradigms may limit our perceptual field, meaning that we ‘see’ only what our favoured paradigm shows us. Moreover, paradigms tend to generate conformity amongst students and scholars alike, unable, or unwilling, to think outside the currently dominant (or fashionable) paradigm. The field of global politics accentuates these draw- backs because it is, by its nature, multifaceted and multidimensional, straining the capacity of any paradigm, or, for that matter, any academic discipline, to capture it in its entirety. But where does this leave us? Certainly, given ‘globalizing’ tendencies, distinc- tions between international relations and political science have become increas- ingly difficult to sustain, as have distinctions between either of these and economics, cultural studies, sociology, anthropology and so on. Similarly, it is highly unlikely that a single paradigm – be it realism, liberalism, constructivism, feminism or whatever – is going to constitute the final word on any particular theme or issue. These paradigms, anyway, will be more or less relevant, or more or less persuasive, in relation to some issues rather than others. In considering paradigms, then, it is as unhelpful to merely select a theoretical ‘box’ within which to think, as it is to adopt an ‘everything goes’ approach to theorizing that simply leads to incoherence. Paradigms, at best, are a source of insight and understanding, valuable lenses on the world, but it is important to remember that no paradigm is capable, on its own, of fully explaining the almost infinitely complex realities it purports to disclose. 82 GLOBAL POLITICS SUMMARY  The realist model of power politics is based on the combined ideas of human selfishness or egoism and the structural implications of international anarchy. While this implies a strong tendency towards conflict, blood- shed and open violence can be constrained by the balance of power. The key dynamics in the international system flow from the distribution of power (or capacities) between and among states.  The central theme of the liberal view of international politics is a belief in harmony or balance. The tendency towards peace, cooperation and integration is by factors such as economic interdependence, brought about by free trade, the spread of democracy and the construction of international organizations. However, over time, liberalism (or neoliberalism) has become increasingly indistinct from realism.  The key critical perspectives on global politics are Marxism in its various forms, social constructivism, post- structuralism, feminism, green politics and postcolonialism. In their different ways, these theories challenge norms, values and assumptions on which the global status quo is based. Critical theorists tend to view realism and liberalism as ways of concealing, or of legitimizing, the global power asymmetries.  Many critical theorists embrace a post-positivist perspective that takes subject and object, and therefore theory and practice, to be intimately linked. Post-positivists question the belief that there is an objective reality ‘out there’, separate from the beliefs, ideas and assumptions of the observer. Reality is therefore best thought of in ‘inter-subjective’ terms.  Increased levels of global interconnectedness, linked to accelerated globalization, has brought a series of new theoretical challenges. These include the difficulties that complexity poses to conventional linear thinking, the possibility that the world now constitutes a single moral community, and reduced value of theoretical paradigms. Paradigms may bring insight and understanding, but they may also limit our perceptual field. Questions for discussion Further reading  Does all politics boil down to power and the Bell, D. (ed.), Ethics and World Politics (2010). An excellent pursuit of self-interest? volume that discusses general perspectives of world poli- tics and important ethical dilemmas.  To what extent is realism a single, coherent theory?  How do realists explain periods of peace and Burchill, S. et al., Theories of International Relations (2009). A stability? systematic and comprehensive introduction to the main theoretical approaches in the study of international rela-  Why do liberals believe that world affairs are char- tions. acterized by balance or harmony? Capra, F., The Hidden Connections (2003). A thought-provok-  Is the ‘democratic peace’ thesis persuasive? ing analysis of human societies, corporations, nation-  Are states concerned more with relative gains or states and global capitalism from the perspective of with absolute gains? systems theory.  Do mainstream theories merely legitimize the Jackson, R. and G. Sørensen, Introduction to International global status quo? Relations: Theories and Approaches (2007). An accessible,  Is all knowledge ultimately socially ‘constructed’, lucid and comprehensive introduction to the complexities and what may this imply? of modern international thought.  Which of the critical perspectives on global politics is most ‘critical’?  Can any established theory cope with the chal- lenges of complex interconnectedness? Links to relevant web  Does it make sense to think of the world as a resources can be found on single moral community? the Global Politics website CHAPTER 4 The Economy in a Global Age ‘Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation … All that is solid melts into air.’ K . M A R X and F. E N G E L S , The Communist Manifesto (1848) PREVIEW Economic issues have long been at the centre of ideological and political debate. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the core battleground in poli- tics was the contest between two rival economic models, capitalism and socialism. This nevertheless culminated in the victory of capitalism over socialism, registered in particular through the collapse of communism. As the market, private property and competition were accepted worldwide as the only viable ways of generating wealth, capitalism became global capitalism. However, capitalism did not cease to be politically contentious. In the first place, capitalism is not one system but many: different forms of capitalism have taken root in different parts of the world. How do these capitalisms differ, and what are the implications of these different forms of socio-economic organization? Moreover, a particular form of capitalist develop- ment has gained global ascendency since the 1980s, usually dubbed neoliberalism. What have been the chief consequences of the ‘triumph’ of neoliberalism? A further development has been a significant acceleration in the process of economic global- ization, usually associated with the advance of neoliberalism. Has neoliberal global- ization promoted prosperity and opportunity for all, or has it spawned new forms of inequality and injustice? These questions have become particularly pressing in the light of a tendency towards seemingly intensifying crisis and economic instabil- ity. Are economic crises a price worth paying for long-term economic success, or are they a symptom of the fundamental failings of global capitalism? KEY ISSUES  What are the main types of capitalism in the modern world?  Why has neoliberalism become dominant, and what are its chief impli- cations?  How can economic globalization best be explained?  To what extent has the modern world economy been ‘globalized’?  Why does capitalism tend towards booms and slumps?  What have recent economic crises told us about the nature of global capitalism? 83 84 GLOBAL POLITICS CAPITALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM Capitalisms of the world The origins of capitalism can be traced back to seventeenth-century and eigh- teenth-century Europe, developing in predominantly feudal societies. Feudalism was characterized by agrarian-based production geared to the needs of landed estates, fixed social hierarchies and rigid patterns of obligation and duties. Capitalist practices initially took root in the form of commercial agriculture that was orientated towards the market, and increasingly relied on waged labour instead of bonded serfs. The market mechanism, the heart of the emerging capi- talist system, certainly intensified pressure for technological innovation and brought about a substantial expansion in productive capacity. This was reflected in the ‘agricultural revolution’, which saw the enclosure of overgrazed common land and the increased use of fertilizers and scientific methods of production. Nevertheless, the most significant development in the history of capitalism  Capitalism: A system of came with the industrial revolution, which developed from the mid-eighteenth generalized commodity century onwards, first in the UK but soon in the USA (see p. 46) and across production in which wealth is much of Europe. Industrialization entirely transformed societies through the owned privately and economic advent of mechanized and often factory-based forms of production, the increas- life is organized according to market principles. ing use of the division of labour and the gradual shift of populations from the land to the expanding towns and cities. In the process, industrialization  Market: A system of massively expanded the productive capacity of capitalism, enabling industrial commercial exchange shaped capitalism to emerge by the mid-nineteenth century as the dominant socio- by the forces of demand and economic system worldwide. The development of industrial capitalism also supply, and regulated by the price mechanism. marked a key phase in the evolution of the world economy, in that it resulted in the export of capital from Europe to North America, South America and Asia,  Division of labour: The also leading to a sharpening of the division of labour between states and between process whereby productive different regions of the world. In these ways, as discussed later, the foundations tasks become separated and of modern global capitalism were laid during the late nineteenth century. more specialized in order to promote economic efficiency. However, capitalism does not constitute just a single socio-economic form, but a variety of socio-economic forms (Brown 1995; Hall and Soskice 2001). It is  Capital: In a general sense, possible to identify three types of capitalist system: any ‘asset’, financial or otherwise; Marxists used the  Enterprise capitalism term to refer to accumulated wealth embodied in the ‘means  Social capitalism of production’.  State capitalism.  Social democracy: A moderate or reformist brand of Enterprise capitalism socialism that favours a balance between the market and the Enterprise capitalism is widely seen, particularly in the Anglo-American world, as state, rather than the abolition ‘pure’ capitalism: that is, as an ideal towards which other capitalisms are inevitably of capitalism. drawn (Friedman 1962). The home of enterprise capitalism is the USA and, despite its early post-1945 flirtation with Keynesian social democracy, the UK.  Marketization: The Nevertheless, the principles of enterprise capitalism have been extended far beyond extension of market relationships, based on the Anglo-American world through the impact of economic globalization (see p. commercial exchange and 94), which has gone hand-in-hand with the advance of marketization. Enterprise material self-interest, across the capitalism is based on the ideas of classical economists such as Adam Smith and economy and, possibly, society. David Ricardo (1772–1823), updated in the form of neoliberalism by modern THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 85 Adam Smith (1723–90) Scottish economist and philosopher, usually seen as the founder of the ‘dismal science’ (economics). After holding the chair of logic and then moral philosophy at Glasgow University, Smith became tutor to the Duke of Buccleuch, which enabled him to visit France and Geneva and to develop his economic theories. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) developed a theory of motivation that tried to reconcile human self-interestedness with unregulated social order. Smith’s most famous work, The Wealth of Nations (1776), was the first systematic attempt to explain the work- ings of the economy in market terms, emphasizing the importance of the division of labour. Although he is often viewed as a free-market theorist, Smith was nevertheless aware of the limitations of the market. theorists such as the Austrian economist and political philosopher, Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992) and Milton Friedman (see p. 91). Its central feature is faith in the untrammelled workings of market competition, born out of the belief that the market is a self-regulating mechanism (or, as Adam Smith put it, an ‘invisible hand’). This idea is expressed in Adam Smith’s famous words: ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest’. In the USA, such free-market principles have helped to keep public ownership to a minimum, and ensure that welfare provision operates as little more than a safety net. US businesses are typically profit-driven, and a premium is placed on high productivity and labour flexibility. Trade unions are usually weak, reflecting the fear that strong labour organizations are an obstacle to profit maximization. The emphasis on growth and enterprise of this form of capitalism stems, in part, from the fact that productive wealth is owned largely by financial institutions, such as insurance companies and pension funds, that demand a high rate of return on their investments. The undoubted economic power of the USA bears testament to the vigour of enterprise capitalism. Despite clear evidence of relative economic decline (whereas the USA accounted for half of the world’s manufacturing output in 1945, this had fallen to less than one-fifth by 2007), the average productivity of the USA is still higher than Germany’s or Japan’s. The USA clearly enjoys natural advantages that enable it to benefit from the application of market principles, notably a continent-wide domestic market, a wealth of natural resources, and a ruggedly individualist popular culture, seen as a ‘frontier ideology’. Enterprise capitalism also has serious disadvantages, however. Perhaps the most significant of these is a tendency towards wide material inequalities and social fragmenta- tion. This is demonstrated in the USA by levels of absolute poverty that are not found, for example, in Europe, and in the growth of a poorly educated and socially-dependent underclass. Social capitalism Social capitalism refers to a form of capitalism that took root in much of central and western Europe. Germany is its natural home but the principles of social 86 GLOBAL POLITICS capitalism were adopted in various forms in Austria, the Benelux countries, Sweden, France and much of Scandinavia (van Kersbergen 1995). This economic form drew heavily on the flexible and pragmatic ideas of economists such as Friedrich List (1789–1846), an influential theorist of economic nationalism. The central theme of this capitalist model is the idea of a social market: that is, an attempt to marry the disciplines of market competition with the need for social cohesion and solidarity. This is reflected in an emphasis on long-term invest- ment rather than short-term profitability. Business organization in what has been called Rhine-Alpine capitalism also differs from Anglo-American capital- ism in that it is based on social partnership. Trade unions enjoy representation through works councils, and participate in annual rounds of wage negotiation that are usually industry-wide. This relationship is underpinned by comprehen- sive and well-funded welfare provisions that provide workers and other vulner- able groups with social guarantees. The strengths of social capitalism were clearly demonstrated by the ‘economic miracle’ that transformed war-torn Germany into Europe’s leading economic power by the 1960s. High and stable levels of capital investment, together with a strong emphasis on education and training, particularly in voca- tional and craft skills, enabled Germany to achieve the highest levels of produc- tivity in Europe. However, the virtues of social capitalism are by no means universally accepted. One of its drawbacks is that, because it places a heavy stress on consultation, negotiation and consensus, it tends to lead to inflexibility and makes it difficult for businesses to adapt to market conditions (for example, economic globalization and intensified competition from East Asia, Latin America and elsewhere). Further strains are imposed by the relatively high levels of social expenditure required to maintain high-quality welfare provision. These push up taxes and so burden both employers and employees. Whereas support- ers of social capitalism insist that the social and the market are intrinsically linked, its critics argue that social capitalism is nothing more than a contradic- tion in terms. State capitalism The term ‘state capitalism’ has been defined in a number of ways. For instance, Trotskyites used it to highlight the tendency of the Soviet Union under Stalin to use its control of productive power to oppress the working class, in a manner similar to capitalist societies. However, in its modern usage, state capitalism is more commonly used to describe capitalist economies in which the state plays a crucial directive role. These are often non-liberal capitalist societies. Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguished between ‘liberal market economies’, in which firms coordinate their activities on the basis of competitive market arrangements, and  Social market: An economy ‘coordinated market economies’, which depend heavily on non-market arrange- that is structured by market ments. Some aspects of state capitalism could be found in post-1945 Japan. This principles and largely free from was the model that the East and south-east Asian ‘tigers’ eagerly adopted, and it government interference, has influenced emergent Chinese capitalism as well as, in some respects, Russian operating in a society in which cohesion is maintained through capitalism. a comprehensive welfare The distinctive character of state capitalism is its emphasis on co-operative, system and effective welfare long-term relationships, for which reason it is sometimes called ‘collective services. capitalism’. This allows the economy to be directed not by an impersonal price THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 87 A P P ROAC H E S TO . . . GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY Realist view the state leaves the economy alone, and the market is Realist economic theory is firmly rooted in, and some- left to manage itself. Economic exchange via the times seen as being synonymous with market is therefore a positive-sum game, in that greater ‘economic nationalism’ or ‘mercantilism’. Mercantilism efficiency produces economic growth and benefits takes the state to be the most significant economic everyone. The global economy is thus characterized by actor, highlighting the extent to which economic rela- co-operation as trading and other economic relation- tions are determined by political power. In this view, ships promise to bring mutual benefit and general markets are not ‘natural’ but exist within a social prosperity. This further implies a positive view of context largely shaped by the exercise of state power. As economic globalization, which is seen as the triumph the state system is anarchical, the global economy tends of the market over ‘irrational’ impediments such as to be characterized by conflict as states compete with national borders. Such thinking has been taken furthest each other for power and wealth in a zero-sum game. by neoliberalism (see p. 90). Since Keynes (see p. 105), The classic mercantilist strategy is to build up a state’s however, an alternative tradition of liberal political wealth, power and prestige by developing a favourable economy has recognized that markets can fail or are trading balance through producing goods for export imperfect, in which case they need to be managed or while keeping imports low. The chief device for achiev- regulated on a national and global level. ing this is protectionism. Defensive mercantilism is designed to protect ‘infant’ industries and weaker Critical views economies from ‘unfair’ competition from stronger Critical approaches to the economy have been domi- economies, while aggressive mercantilism aims to nated by Marxism, which portrays capitalism as a strengthen the national economy in order to provide a system of class exploitation and treats social classes as basis for expansionism and war. The global economy the key economic actors. As class allegiances are taken has thus been fashioned by the interests of the most to be more powerful than national loyalties, political powerful states, sometimes through neo-colonialism economy always has an international dimension, in the but also through free trade arrangements that force Marxist view. In modern economic circumstances, the weaker states to open up their markets. For some real- interests of the capitalist class, or bourgeoisie, are ists, a stable world economy requires the existence of a increasingly identified with those of transnational single dominant power, as implied by hegemonic corporations (see p. 99), which are widely seen as more stability theory (see p. 229). powerful than national governments, economics having primacy over politics. Capitalism therefore has inher- Liberal view ently globalizing tendencies, an unceasing desire to Liberal economic theory is based on the belief that expand regardless of national borders. The global individuals, as rationally self-interested creatures, or economy is nevertheless characterized by conflict, stem- ‘utility maximizers’, are the key economic actors (utility ming from the oppressive nature of the capitalist maximizers act to achieve the greatest pleasure over system itself. For some Marxists this is expressed pain, calculated in terms of material consumption). In through imperialism (see p. 28) and the desire to secure this light, businesses are an important means of organ- raw materials and cheap labour. However, some neo- izing production and thus of generating wealth. In line Marxists, following Wallerstein (see p. 100), have inter- with the deeper liberal belief in balance or harmony preted global capitalism as a world-system, which is amongst competing forces, the key idea of economic structured by an exploitative relationship between so- liberalism is that an unregulated market economy called ‘core’ areas and ‘peripheral’ ones, and specifically tends towards long-run equilibrium (the price mecha- between transnational corporations and the developing nism, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, brings ‘supply’ world. Others have adopted a neo-Gramscism and ‘demand’ into line with one another). From the approach that stresses the role of hegemony (see p. perspective of classical liberal political economy, this 221), highlighting the extent to which economic power implies a policy of laissez-faire (see p. 103), in which and political power operate in tandem. 88 GLOBAL POLITICS mechanism, but through what have been called ‘relational markets’. An example of this is the pattern of interlocking share ownership that ensures that there is a close relationship between industry and finance in Japan, enabling Japanese firms to adopt strategies based on long-term investment rather than on short- space or medium-term profit. Firms themselves provide the social core of life in state capitalism. Workers (particularly male workers in larger businesses) are ‘members’ of firms in a way that does not occur in the USA or even social market Europe. In return for their loyalty, commitment and hard work, workers have traditionally expected lifetime employment, pensions, social protection and access to leisure and recreational opportunities. Particular stress is placed on teamwork and the building up of a collective identity, which has been under- pinned by relatively narrow income differentials between managers and workers. The final element in this economic mix is the government. Although East Asian levels of public spending and taxation are relatively low by international stan- dards (often below 30 per cent of GNP), the state has played a vital role in ‘guiding’ investment, research and trading decisions. The model here was undoubtedly the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which oversaw the Japanese ‘economic miracle’ in the post-1945 period. The Japanese version of state capitalism appeared to be highly successful in the early post-1945 period, accounting for Japan’s ability to recover from war- time devastation to become the second largest economy in the world, and helping to explain the rise of the Asian ‘tigers’ (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and so on). However, Japan’s slowdown during the 1990s (the ‘lost decade’) and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 cast a darker shadow over state capitalism, highlighting its inflexibility and its failure to respond to the ever- changing pressures of the global economy. Moreover, a price had to be paid for Japan’s economic success, in terms of heavy demands on workers and their fami- lies. Long hours and highly disciplined working conditions can mean that indi- vidualism is stifled and work becomes the centrepiece of existence. In these circumstances, China (see p. 251) has become the standard-bearer for state capi- talism, having consistently achieved growth rates of about 10 per cent since the late 1980s, and having become the second largest economy in the world in 2010. China’s mixture of burgeoning capitalism and Stalinist political control has been remarkably effective in delivering sustained economic growth, benefiting from a huge supply of cheap labour and massive investment in the economic infra- structure. Russia’s conversion to state capitalism occurred in the aftermath of the chaos and dislocation of the 1990s, when ‘shock treatment’ market reforms were introduced under Boris Yeltsin. From 1999 onwards, Vladimir Putin acted to reassert state power in both political and economic life, in part in order to wrest power back from the so-called ‘oligarchs’, newly-rich business magnates who had been criticized for siphoning off wealth out of the country and for contributing to the 1998 Russian financial crisis. A key aspect of Putin’s economic strategy was to exploit Russia’s vast energy reserves, both as a motor for economic growth and to give Russia (see p. 177) greater leverage over neigh- bouring states and, indeed, over much of Europe. The strength of state capital- ism derives from its pragmatism and flexibility, strong states being able to pursue economic priorities with a single-mindedness, even, at times, ruthless- ness, that liberal democracies cannot match. Major infrastructural projects and THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 89 Focus on . . . A Chinese economic model? What is the source of China’s remarkable economic many other industrial minerals that an ever-expanding success since the introduction of market reforms in the economy desperately needs. late 1970s? Is there such as thing as ‘capitalism with Nevertheless, the legitimacy of China’s ‘market Chinese characteristics’? China’s economic model has a Stalinism’, and the allegiance of its fast-growing middle number of clear features. First, with a population of 1.3 class and business elite, is closely linked to China’s billion, and with a historically unprecedented shift in ability to keep expanding its GDP. A variety of factors people from the countryside to fast-expanding towns threaten the Chinese economic model, or are forcing and cities, particularly on the eastern coast, China has China to develop a new economic model. These include benefited from a seemingly inexhaustible supply of the fact that since the mid-2000s there have been cheap labour. Second, in common with Japan and the signs of wage inflation in China, suggesting that cheap Asian ‘tigers’ before it, China has adopted an export-led labour may not be in inexhaustible supply and putting growth strategy founded on manufacturing industry at risk China’s ability to undercut the rest of the world and the goal of becoming the ‘workshop of the world’. in manufacturing goods. An over-dependence on export Third, a high savings ration means that, unlike the markets creates the need to boost domestic consump- USA and many western economies, investment in tion levels in China, particularly demonstrated by the China largely comes from internal sources. This not global economic recession in 2008–09. However, only suggests that the Chinese banking system is more increased domestic consumption may ‘suck in’ more robust than those of the USA, the UK and other imports, reducing China’s currently strongly positive western states, but it also allows China to lend trade balance. Another threat derives from China’s one- massively abroad. Such lending keeps China’s currency child policy, which is starting to become counter- cheap in relation to the US dollar, thereby boosting the productive as the size of China’s working-age competitiveness of Chinese exports. Fourth, economic population is projected to fall sharply in the coming success is underpinned by interventionist government, decades. The most serious challenge that China faces is, which, amongst other things, invests heavily in infra- nevertheless, that there may be a fundamental contra- structure projects and gears its foreign policy towards diction between the nature of its economic system and the goal of achieving resource security, guaranteeing its political system (as discussed further in Chapter 9). the supplies of oil, iron ore, copper, aluminium and economic restructuring can thus be pursued more easily, and the vagaries of capital and currency markets have a reduced impact on economic decision- making. Some have even speculated that what has been called the ‘Beijing consensus’ (Ramo 2004) may be in the process of displacing the ‘Washington consensus’ (see p. 92). However, the major weakness of state capitalism is the contradiction between economic liberalism and non-liberal political arrange- ments. For example, critics have argued that China’s version of state capitalism, based on a blend of market economics and one-party communist rule, is ulti- mately unsustainable, in that a widening of economic freedom must, sooner or later, generate pressure for a widening of political freedom (Hutton 2007). State capitalism will only constitute a viable alternative to western-based capitalist models if it is possible for market economics to prosper in the long term in the absence of political liberalism. 90 GLOBAL POLITICS CONCEPT Triumph of neoliberalism Since the 1980s, however, economic development has, to a greater or lesser Neoliberalism extent in different parts of the world, taken on a neoliberal guise. Neoliberalism Neoliberalism reflects the ascendancy of enterprise capitalism over rival forms of capitalism, its (sometimes called neoclassical liberalism) is chief belief being a form of market fundamentalism. The ‘neoliberal revolu- an updated version of tion’ was, in fact, a counter-revolution: its aim was to halt, and if possible reverse, classical liberalism and the trend towards ‘big’ government and state intervention that had characterized particularly classical much of the twentieth century, and especially the early post-1945 period. The political economy. Its chief academic exponents of neoliberalism were Hayek and Friedman. A central central theme is the idea that the economy works object of their attack was Keynesianism and the ‘tax and spend’ policies that best when left alone by they claimed were responsible for the ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s (a combination of government, reflecting a economic stagnation, and therefore rising unemployment, and high inflation (a belief in free market general rise in the price level). The neoliberal solution was to ‘roll back’ the fron- economics and atomistic tiers of the state and to give full, or at least a much fuller, rein to market forces. individualism. While unregulated market The earliest experiment in neoliberalism was in Chile. Following the CIA- capitalism delivers backed military coup that overthrew Salvador Allende in 1973, the newly- efficiency, growth and installed General Pinochet introduced sweeping market reforms on the advice of widespread prosperity, a group of US and US-trained free-market economists, the so-called ‘Chicago the ‘dead hand’ of the boys’ (reflecting the influence of Milton Friedman and the ‘Chicago school’). state saps initiative and discourages enterprise. In Their influence subsequently spread to Brazil, Argentina and elsewhere in South short, the neoliberal America. During the 1980s, neoliberalism was extended to the USA and the UK, philosophy is: ‘market: in the forms of ‘Reaganism’ (after President Reagan, 1981–89) and ‘Thatcherism’ good; state: bad’. Key (after Prime Minister Thatcher, 1979–91), with other countries such as Canada, neoliberal policies include Australia and New Zealand quickly following suit. The wider, and seemingly privatization low public spending, deregulation, irresistible, advance of neoliberalism occurred during the 1990s through the tax cuts (particularly influence of the institutions of global economic governance and the growing corporate and direct impact of globalization. During the 1980s, the Word Bank (see p. 373) and taxes) and reduced International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see p. 469) were converted to the ideas of welfare provision. The what later became know as the ‘Washington consensus’, which was aligned to the term neoliberalism is also used to describe modern economic agenda of Reagan and Thatcher and focused on policies such as free developments in liberal trade, the liberalization of capital markets, flexible exchange rates, balanced international relations budgets and so on. After the Eastern European revolutions of 1989–91, such theory that have blended thinking informed the ‘shock therapy’ transition from central planning to free- liberal and realist market capitalism in states such as Russia, Hungary and Poland, while free- thinking (as discussed in Chapter 3). market reforms were extended to many developing states through the imposition of ‘structural adjustment’ programmes (see p. 371). Economic globalization supported the advance of neoliberalism in a number  Market fundamentalism: of ways. In particular, intensified international competition encouraged govern- An absolute faith in the market, ments to deregulate their economies and reduce tax levels in the hope of attract- reflected in the belief that the ing inward investment and preventing transnational corporations (TNCs) (see market mechanism offers p. 99) from relocating elsewhere. Strong downward pressure was exerted on solutions to all economic and social problems. public spending, and particularly welfare budgets, by the fact that, in a context of heightened global competition, the control of inflation has displaced the  Keynesianism: A theory maintenance of full employment as the principal goal of economic policy. Such (developed by J. M. Keynes (see pressures, together with the revived growth and productivity rates of the US p. 105) or policy of economic economy and the relatively sluggish performance of other models of national management, associated with regulating aggregate demand capitalism, in Japan and Germany in particular, meant that by the late 1990s to achieve full employment. neoliberalism appeared to stand unchallenged as the dominant ideology of the THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 91 Milton Friedman (1912–2006) US academic and economist. A trenchant critic of Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’, and close associate of Friedrich Hayek, Friedman became professor of economics at the University of Chicago in 1948, founding the so-called Chicago School. Friedman also worked as a Newsweek columnist and a US presidential adviser. He was awarded the Nobel prize for economics in 1976. A leading exponent of monetarism and free- market economics, Friedman was a powerful critic of Keynesian theory and ‘tax and spend’ government policies, helping to shift economic priorities during the 1970s and 1980s in the USA and the UK in particular. His major works, Capitalism and Freedom (1962) and, with his wife Rose, Free to Choose (1980) had a considerable impact on emergent neoliberal thinking. ‘new’ world economy. Only a few states, like China, were able to deal with neolib- eral globalization on their own terms, limiting their exposure to competition by, for instance, holding down their exchange rate. Implications of neoliberalism The apparent global ‘triumph’ of neoliberalism has provoked considerable debate. For neoliberals and their supporters, the clearest argument in favour of market reforms and economic liberalization is that they have worked. The advance of neoliberalism coincided not only with three decades of growth in the USA and its renewed economic ascendancy (firmly burying, for example, predictions that had been widely made in the 1970s and 1980 that the USA was about to be eclipsed by Japan and Germany), but also three decades of growth in the world economy. In this light, neoliberalism was based on a new growth model that has clearly demonstrated its superiority over the Keynesian-welfarist orthodoxy of old. At the core of the neoliberal growth model are financial markets and the process of ‘financialization’. This was made possible by a massive expansion of the financial sector of the economy, explaining the growing importance of Wall Street, the City of London, Frankfurt, Singapore and elsewhere. In the process, capitalism was turned into ‘turbo-capitalism’, benefiting from greatly expanded monetary flows that were seeking an outlet in increased investment and higher consumption. Although this process involved a considerable growth of pubic and often private debt, this was thought to be sustainable due to the underlying growth that the debt fuelled. Other key features of the neoliberal growth model were a deeper integration of domestic economies into the global economy (and so an acceleration of economic global- ization, see p. 94), the shift in many of the leading economies from manufactur- ing to services, and the enthusiastic introduction of new information  Financialization: The technologies, often seen as the growth of the ‘knowledge economy’ (see p. 93). reconstruction of the finances of businesses, public bodies and Neoliberalism, nevertheless, has its critics. They have, for example, argued individual citizens to allow that in rolling back welfare provision and promoting an ethic of material self- them to borrow money and so interest (‘greed is good’), neoliberalism struggles to maintain popular legitimacy raise their spending. as an economic doctrine because of its association with widening inequality and 92 GLOBAL POLITICS Focus on . . . The ‘Washington consensus’ The term the ‘Washington consensus’ was coined by  Tax reform (cutting personal and corporate taxes) John Williamson (1990, 1993) to describe the policies  Financial liberalization (the deregulation of financial that the international institutions based in Washington, markets and capital controls) the IMF and the World Bank, and the US Treasury  Floating and competitive exchange rates Department, had come to favour for the reconstruction  Trade liberalization (free trade) of economies in the developing world. Based on the  Openness to foreign direct investment ‘orthodox’ model of ‘development as modernization’  Privatization and drawing on the ideas of neoliberalism, the essence of the Washington consensus was ‘stabilize, privatize In the light of a backlash against such policies, and at and liberalize’. In its longer version, the Washington times their failure, an ‘augmented’ Washington consen- consensus favoured the following: sus has emerged that also stresses policies such as legal/political reform, anti-corruption, labour market  Fiscal discipline (cutting public spending) flexibility and poverty reduction. social breakdown. This led to a modification, although not a rejection, of the ‘neoliberal revolution’ in countries such as New Zealand, Canada, and the UK during the 1990s, and even to a reappraisal of neoliberal priorities in the USA under President Obama from 2009 onwards. Moreover, the limitations of neoliberalism as a programme for development were exposed by the failure of many ‘shock therapy’ experiments in market reform, not only in the pioneering case of Chile, but also in the disappointing outcomes of many structural adjust- ment programmes in the developing world. In cases such as Russia, the growth of unemployment and inflation, and the deep insecurities unleashed by the ‘shock therapy’ application of neoliberal principles created a backlash against market reform and led to strengthened support for nationalist and authoritarian movements. A further problem is that neoliberalism’s ‘turbo’ features may have less to do with the dynamism of the market or technological innovation than with the willingness of consumers to spend and borrow and the willingness of businesses to invest, making this economic model particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of financial markets and the shifts in consumer or business confidence. This is examined in greater depth later in this chapter in association with the crises of capitalism. In the view of Robert Cox (1987) (see p. 120), neoliberalism, or what he calls ‘hyper-liberal globalizing capitalism’, is rooted in major contradictions and struggles, meaning that its dominance is destined to be challenged and eventu- ally overthrown. These contradictions include the ‘democratic deficit’ that is generated by the ‘internationalization of the state’ (the tendency of the state to respond to the dictates of the global economy rather than public opinion), the growing pressure to protect the environment from the ravages caused by relent- less economic growth, and the surrender of state authority to corporate finan- cial and economic interests. A still darker interpretation of neoliberalism has THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 93 Focus on . . . A ‘knowledge economy’? How meaningful is the idea of a ‘knowledge However, the image of the knowledge economy economy’? A knowledge economy (sometimes called may be misleading. In the first place, modern techno- the ‘new’ economy, or even the ‘weightless’ economy) logical advances linked to ICT may be nothing new: is one in which knowledge is supposedly a key source rapid and advanced technological change has always of competitiveness and productivity, especially been a feature of industrial capitalism. Moreover, the through the application of information and communi- link between the wider use of ICT and productivity cation technology (ICT). Knowledge economies are growth has been questioned by some commentators. sometimes portrayed as the economic expression of For example, the boost in productivity rates in the USA the transition from an industrial society to an informa- from the mid-1990s onwards may have been linked to tion society. Proponents of the idea of a knowledge factors other than investment in ICT, and there is little economy argue that it differs from a traditional evidence that the increased use of ICT has boosted economy in several ways. These include that, as knowl- economic growth in other economies. Finally, knowl- edge (unlike other resources) does not deplete with edge-based production is largely confined to the devel- use, knowledge economies are concerned with the oped North, and it is difficult to see wider access to ICT economics of abundance, not the economics of as the key development priority in the South. Africa, for scarcity. They substantially diminish the effect of loca- example, may lag some 15 years behind US levels of tion (and thereby accelerate globalization), as knowl- personal computer and Internet penetration, but it lags edge ‘leaks’ to where demand or rewards are highest, more than a century behind in terms of basic literacy so disregarding national borders. Finally, they imply and health care. Clean water, anti-malaria programmes, that profitability and high productivity are essentially good schools and non-corrupt government are far linked to ‘up-skilling’ the workforce, rather than to the higher priorities for the world’s poor countries than acquisition of ‘hard’ resources. improved access to mobile phones and the Internet. been developed by Naomi Klein (2008). In highlighting the rise of ‘disaster capitalism’, she drew attention to the extent to which the advance of neoliberal- ism has been implicated in ‘shocks’, states of emergency and crises of one kind or another, thus suggesting that the USA’s foreign policy adventurism, from the overthrow of Allende to the ‘war on terror’, has been linked to the spread of neoliberalism. For many, the 2007–09 global financial crisis (see p. 108), discussed later in the chapter, exposed the underlying weaknesses of the neolib- eral model. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION Causes of economic globalization How can the emergence of economic globalization best be explained, and how far has it progressed? There is nothing new about economic globalization. The development of transborder and transnational economic structures has been a central feature of imperialism (see p. 28), and, arguably, the high point of economic globalization came in the late nineteenth century with the scramble of 94 GLOBAL POLITICS European states for colonies in Africa and Asia. Nevertheless, modern and past CONCEPT forms of globalization differ in important ways. Earlier forms of globalization, Economic sometimes seen as ‘proto-globalization’, usually established transnational globalization economic organizations on the back of expansionist political projects. Regardless of their spread and success, empires never succeeded in obliterating Economic globalization refers to the process boundaries and borders, they merely readjusted them to the benefit of politically whereby all national dominant powers, often establishing new boundaries between the ‘civilized’ economies have, to a world and the ‘barbarian’ one. In the case of the contemporary phenomenon of greater or lesser extent, globalization, in contrast, the web of economic interconnectedness and interde- been absorbed into an pendence has extended so far that it is possible, for the first time, to conceive of interlocking global economy, The OECD the world economy as a single global entity. This is the sense in which economic (1995) thus defined life has become ‘borderless’ (Ohmae 1990). globalization as ‘a shift The modern globalized economy came into existence in the second half of from a world of distinct the twentieth century. It was a product of two phases. The first phase, which national economies to a lasted from the end of WWII to the early 1970s, was characterized by new global economy in which production is arrangements for the management of the international financial system in the internationalized and post-war period which became known as the Bretton Woods system (discussed financial capital flows in Chapter 19). Through a system of fixed exchange rates, regulation and freely and instantly support, Bretton Woods aimed to prevent a return to the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ between countries’. economic policies that had contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s However, economic globalization should be and, in the process, helped to fuel political extremism and aggression. Together distinguished from with the Marshall Plan, which provided US financial aid to Europe, in particular internationalization. to support post-war reconstruction, and the wide adoption of Keynesian The latter results in economic policies aimed at delivering sustained growth, the Bretton Woods ‘shallow integration’, in system underpinned the so-called ‘long boom’ of the post-1945 period. In that increased cross- border transactions lead substantially expanding productive capacity and helping to fashion a to intensified consumerist form of capitalism, it laid the basis for the later ‘accelerated’ interdependence between economic globalization. national economies, Nevertheless, the collapse of Bretton Woods in the 1970s (see p. 466), allow- while the former marks a ing major currencies to float instead of staying fixed, initiated the second phase qualitative shift towards ‘deep integration’, as in the development of globalized capitalism. The Bretton Woods system had territorial borders are been based on the assumption that the world economy consisted of a series of transcended through the interlinked national economies: its purpose was to guarantee economic stability construction of a at the national level by regulating trading relations between and amongst consolidated global nation-states. However, the breakdown of the system weakened national marketplace for production, distribution economies, in that the shift from fixed to floating exchange rates exposed and consumption. national economies to greater competitive pressures. As a result, and in conjunc- tion with others factors, such as the growing significance of transnational corporations, national economies were increasingly drawn into a web of inter- connectedness. This economic interconnectedness achieved truly global dimen- sions in the 1990s thanks to the collapse of communism in eastern Europe and elsewhere and the opening up of the Chinese economy. However, although there  Internationalization: The may be broad agreement about the events through which the global economy growth of relations and came into existence, there is much more debate about the deeper forces and movements (for instance, of underlying dynamics that helped to shape, and perhaps determine, these events. goods, money, people, These debates reflect competing perspectives on global political economy and messages and ideas) across borders and between states, contrasting positions on whether economic circumstances are best explained by creating higher levels of structural factors, such as the organization of production, or by the free choices interdependence. made by economic actors, be these states, firms or individuals. THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 95 In practice, complex economic developments such as the emergence of the global capitalist system are best explained through the dynamic relationship between structures and agents (O’Brien and Williams 2010). The most influen- tial structuralist explanation of the emergence of a global economy is the Marxist argument that capitalism is an inherently universalist economic system. In short, globalization is the natural and inevitable consequence of the capitalist mode of production. As Marx (see p. 69) put it in the Grundrisse ([1857–58] 1971), the essence of capitalism is to ‘pull down every local barrier to commerce’ and, ‘to capture the whole world as its market’. This occurs because the underly- ing dynamic of the capitalist system is the accumulation of capital, which, in turn, creates an irresistible desire to develop new markets and an unquenchable thirst for new and cheaper economic resources. According to Marxists, just as imperialism in the late nineteenth century had been fuelled by the desire to maintain profit levels, the acceleration of globalization from the late twentieth century onwards was a consequence of the end of the post-1945 ‘long boom’ and the onset of a global recession in the 1970s. Although liberals fiercely reject the critical Marxist view of capitalism, they nevertheless accept that globalization is fuelled by an underlying economic logic. In their case, this is linked not to the impulses of a capitalist enterprise but, in essence, to the content of human nature, specifically the innate and rational human desire for economic betterment. In this view, the global economy is merely a reflection of the fact that, regardless of their different cultures and traditions, people everywhere have come to recognize that market interaction is the best guarantee of material security and improved living standards. This is particularly expressed in the doctrine of free trade and the theory of competitive advantage, examined more closely in Chapter 19. As far as explaining when and how this inclination towards ‘globality’ started to be realized, liberals often emphasize the role of technological innovation. Technology, needless to say, has long played a role in facilitating transborder and even transworld connections between peoples – from the introduction of the telegraph (1857), to the tele- phone (1876) and the wireless (1895), the development of the aeroplane (1903), television (1926) and the liquid-fuelled rocket (1927), and the introduction of containerization in sea transport (1960s and 1970s). However, advances in infor- mation and communications technology (ICT) – notable examples include the invention of optical fibres in the late 1960s, and the introduction of commercial silicone chips in 1971 and of personal computers (PCs) in 1981 – have played a particularly important role in spurring progress towards globalization, especially by facilitating the development of global financial markets and the global administration of corporations. In the view of so-called hyperglobalists, global- ized economic and cultural patterns, in effect, became inevitable once technolo- gies such as computerized financial trading, mobile phones and the Internet became widely available.  Mercantilism: An economic Nevertheless, the global economy is not the creation of economic and tech- philosophy, most influential in nological forces alone; political and ideological factors also played a crucial part. Europe from the fifteenth Realist theorists, reviving the ideas of mercantilism, have countered the liberal century to the late seventeenth century, which emphasizes the and Marxist idea that globalization represents the final victory of economics state’s role in managing over politics by emphasizing that in crucial ways the global economy is a product international trade and of state policy and institutional regulation. Far from having sidelined states, guaranteeing prosperity. globalization may, in certain respects, be a device through which powerful states, 96 GLOBAL POLITICS and especially the USA, have achieved their objectives. For example, the USA was instrumental in both the creation of the Bretton Woods system and its collapse. In this sense, globalization may be a response to the relative decline of the US economy in the 1970s and 1980s, the shift towards a more open and ‘liberalized’ trading system being a means of widening opportunities for US-based transna- tional corporations, thereby underpinning the health of the US economy. Indeed, much of this was achieved through, rather than in spite of, the institu- tions of economic governance that were constructed in the post-1945 period. The disproportionate influence that the USA exerts over the World Bank and the IMF, and the role played by the USA in transforming the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the more strongly pro-free-trade World Trade Organization (WTO), demonstrates the extent to which economic globalization was structured in line with US priorities, laid out through the Washington consensus. Finally, these developments also have an ideological dimension. Unlike, for example, nineteenth-century imperialism, twentieth- and twenty-first-century globalization has not been brought about through coercion and explicit politi- cal domination. While liberals may argue that ‘globalization by consent’ – reflected, for example, in an eagerness of states to join the WTO – reflects an underlying recognition of mutual economic benefit, critical theorists, who emphasize that the benefits of globalization are unequally shared, argue that this consent is manufactured through the spread of pro-market values and a culture of consumerism and materialism. In this view, the progress of economic glob- alization is underpinned by the advance of the ideology of neoliberalism which preaches both that there is no viable economic alternative to the global capital- ist system and that the system is equitable and brings benefit to all. How globalized is economic life? Is economic globalization a myth or a reality? Have national economies effec- tively been absorbed into a single global system, or has nothing really changed: the world economy remains a collection of interlinked national economies? Two starkly contrasting positions are often adopted in this debate. On the one hand, hyperglobalists present the image of a ‘borderless’ global economy, in which the tendency for economic interaction to have a transborder or transworld character is irresistible, facilitated, even dictated, by advances in information and communication technologies (which are not now going to be disinvented). On the other hand, globalization sceptics point out that the demise of the national economy has been much exaggerated, and usually for ideological purposes: economic globalization is portrayed as advanced and irre- sistible in order to make a shift towards free market or neoliberal policies appear to be inevitable (Hirst and Thompson 1999). However, the choice between the model of a single global economy and a collection of more or less interdependent national economies is a misleading one. This is not to say that  Consumerism: A there is no such thing as the global economy, but only that this image captures psychological and cultural phenomenon whereby personal only part of a much more complex and differentiated reality. The world happiness is equated with the economy is better thought of as a ‘globalizing’ economy than as a ‘global’ consumption of material economy: modern economic life is increasingly shaped by processes that have a possessions (see p. 149). regional and global, and not merely national, character. However, the signifi- THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 97 cance of national, regional and global levels differs markedly in different economic sectors and types of activity, and, of course, in different parts of the world. Economic globalization is certainly not an ‘even’ process. Global inter- connectedness has nevertheless increased in a number of ways. The most important of these include the following:  International trade  Transnational production  Global division of labour  Globalized financial system An increase in international trade has been one of the most prominent features of the world economy since 1945. Over this period, international trade has, on average, grown at double the rate of international production. Worldwide exports, for instance, grew from $629 million in 1960 to $7.3 trillion in 2003. Such trends were facilitated by the widely accepted link between trade and economic growth, exemplified by the success of export-orientated economies such as Germany and Japan from the 1950s onwards and the ‘tiger’ economies of East and south-east Asia from the 1970s onwards, and by a general trend towards free trade, punctuated briefly by a revival of protectionism in the 1970s. One of the novel features of international trade in the contemporary world economy is the increasing proportion of it that takes place within the same industry rather than between industries (which significantly heightens price competition) and the rise of so-called intra-firm trade, made possible by the rise of TNCs. The growth of trade within firms, rather than between sepa- rate, individual firms, is one of the clearest signs of intensifying globalization. On the other hand, sceptics argue that trends in international trade are not a strong indication of the extent of globalization. For instance, there is little differ- ence between modern levels of international trade and historical ones, and, with the exception of intra-firm trade, international trade promotes ‘shallow’ integra- tion and greater interdependence, rather than a single globalized economy. Moreover, it is questionable whether the modern trading system has a truly global reach, in that around 80 per cent of world trade continues to take place between or among developed states, and most of this takes place within partic- ular regions – in particular North America, Europe, and East and southeast Asia – rather than between different regions. The issue of transborder production is closely linked to the growing impor- tance of TNCs, which have come to account for most of the world’s production and around half of world trade. Such corporations take advantage of global sourcing, through their ability to draw raw materials, components, investment and services from anywhere in the world. Crucially, they also have the advantage of being able to locate and relocate production in states or areas that are favourable to efficiency and profitability – for example, ones with cheap but rela- tively highly skilled sources of labour, or low corporation taxes and limited frameworks of workers’ rights. Such trends, however, stop well short of a fully globalized system of production. Not only do most TNCs maintain strong links to their country of origin, and therefore only appear to be ‘transnational’, but moreover production continues overwhelmingly to be concentrated in the developed world. 98 GLOBAL POLITICS Further evidence of economic globalization can be found in a strengthened global division of labour. Although this falls short of establishing a single, world labour market (as only an estimated 15 per cent of the world’s workers are considered to be genuinely globally mobile), clearer patterns of economic specialization have become evident. In particular, high technology manufactur- ing has increasingly been concentrated in the developed world, while for many poorer states integration into the global economy means the production of agri- cultural goods or raw materials for export. Neo-Marxists and world-system theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein (see p. 100) have argued that economic globalization is an uneven and hierarchical process, a game of winners and losers, which has seen economic power concentrated in an economic ‘core’ at the expense of the ‘periphery’. These disparities also, to some extent, reflect differing levels of integration within the global economy, core areas or states being more fully integrated into the global economy, and thus reaping its benefits, while peripheral ones remain outside or at its margins. The global financial system is often portrayed as the driving force behind economic globalization, even the foundation stone of the global economy. The global financial system was brought into existence through two processes. The first was the general shift towards deregulated financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s that followed the move to floating exchange rates with the collapse of Bretton Woods. This allowed money and capital to flow both within and between national economies with much greater ease. Then, in the 1990s, the application of new information and communication technologies to financial markets gave financial transactions a genuinely supraterritorial character, enabling transborder transactions to be conducted literally at ‘the speed of thought’. An example of this is the emergence of transworld money, reflecting the fact that currencies have lost their national character in that they are traded across the globe and have values that are determined by global market forces. In 2001, approximately $4 trillion – a figure greater than the entire annual GDP of the USA – was traded each day in global currency markets. The impact of finan- cial globalization on the stability of national economies as well as global capital- ism has, nevertheless, been a matter of considerable debate. Finally, it is important to remember that the conventional debate about the extent to which economic life has been globalized is conducted within narrow parameters, established by what is treated as productive labour and who are considered to be economically active. Despite the collapse of communism and the wider retreat of socialism, significant non-capitalist, or at least non-commer- cial, economic forms persist in many parts of the world. Feminist economists in particular have drawn attention to the vast, informal, ‘invisible’ economy that relies on unpaid labour, predominantly performed by women, in areas such housework, childcare, care for the elderly and small-scale farming. Especially important in the developing world, this economy operates on lines of exchange and material arrangements that are entirely outside global markets. It may, nevertheless, be responsible for feeding a substantial proportion of the world’s population. For example, although home gardens managed by women occupy only 2 per cent of a household’s farmland in eastern Nigeria, they account for about half of the farm’s total output. In Indonesia, 20 per cent of household income and 40 per cent of domestic food supplies come from home gardens (Shiva 1999). An awareness of the significance of this ‘invisible’ economy has THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 99 G L O B A L AC TO R S . . . TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS A transnational corporation, or world’s leading 200 TNCs have rate taxation), low levels of TNC, is a company that controls parent companies that are based in economic and financial regulation, economic activity in two or more just three countries – the USA, available supplies of cheap or well- countries. The parent company is Germany and Japan – and 90 per skilled labour, weak trade unions usually incorporated in one state cent are based in the developed and limited protection for labour (the ‘home’), with subsidiaries in world. rights, and access to markets prefer- others (the ‘hosts’), although ably composed of consumers with subsidiaries may be separately incor- Significance: TNCs exert enormous high disposable incomes. This porated affiliates. Such companies economic power and political influ- creates a relationship of structural are now generally referred to as ence. Their economic significance is dependency between the state and transnational corporations rather reflected in the fact that they TNCs whereby states rely on TNCs than multinational corporations – as account for about 50 per cent of to provide jobs and capital inflows TNCs as opposed to MNCs – to world manufacturing production but can only attract them by provid- reflect the extent to which their and over 70 per cent of world trade. ing circumstances favourable to corporate strategies and processes TNCs often dwarf states in terms of their interests. transcend national borders rather their economic size. Based on a Defenders of corporations argue than merely crossing them. comparison between corporate sales that they bring massive economic Integration across economic sectors and countries’ GDP, 51 of the benefits and that their political and the growing importance of world’s 100 largest economies are influence has been much exagger- intra-firm trade has allowed TNCs corporations; only 49 of them are ated: TNCs have been ‘demonized’ to operate as economies in their countries. General Motors is broadly by the anti-globalization movement. own right, benefiting from equivalent in this sense to Denmark; From this perspective, TNCs have geographical flexibility, advantages Wal-Mart is roughly the same size as been successful because they have in product innovation and the Poland; and Exxon Mobil has the worked. Their two huge economic ability to pursue global marketing same economic weight as South benefits are their efficiency and their strategies. Africa. However, economic size does high level of consumer responsive- Some early transnational corpo- not necessarily translate into politi- ness. Greater efficiency has resulted rations developed in association with cal power or influence; states, after from their historically unprece- the spread of European colonialism, all, can do things that TNCs can dented ability to reap the benefits the classic example being the East only dream about, such as make from economies of scale and from India Company, established in 1600. laws and raise armies. What gives the development of new productive However, the period since 1945 has TNCs their strategic advantage over methods and the application of new witnessed a dramatic growth in their national governments is their ability technologies. The consumer respon- number, size and global reach. The to transcend territory through the siveness of TNCs is demonstrated by number of powerful companies with growth of ‘trans-border’, even ‘trans- their huge investment in research subsidiaries in several countries has global’, communications and inter- and development and product inno- risen from 7,000 in 1970 to 38,000 in actions, reflected, in particular, in vation. Critics nevertheless portray a 2009. Initially, the spread of transna- the flexibility they enjoy over the much more sinister image of TNCs, tional production was a largely US location of production and invest- arguing that they have accumulated phenomenon, linked to enterprises ment. TNCs can, in effect, shop excessive economic power, unac- such as General Motors, IBM, Exxon around looking for circumstances ceptable levels of political influence, Mobil and McDonalds. European that are conducive to profitability. and created a ‘brand culture’ that and Japanese companies quickly They are likely to be drawn to states pollutes the public sphere through followed suit, extending the TNC or areas that can offer, for instance, the proliferation of commercial phenomenon across the global a stable political environment, low images and manipulates personal North. About 70 per cent of the levels of taxation (especially corpo- preferences. 100 GLOBAL POLITICS Immanuel Wallerstein (born 1930) US sociologist and pioneer of world-systems theory. Influenced by neo-Marxist dependency theory and the ideas of the French historian Fernand Braudel (1902–85), Wallerstein argues that the modern world-system is characterized by an international division of labour between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’. Core regions benefit from the concentration of capital in its most sophisticated forms, while peripheral ones are dependent on the export of raw materials to the core, although fundamental contra- dictions will ultimately bring about the demise of the world-system. Wallerstein also traces the rise and decline of core hegemons (dominant powers) to changes in the world-system over time, arguing that the end of the Cold War marks the decline, not triumph, of the US hegemony. Wallerstein’s key works include the three-volume The Modern World System (1974, 1980, 1989), Geopolitics and Geoculture (1991) and Decline of American Power (2003). increasingly influenced the development strategies embraced by the United Nations and the World Bank, not least because of a realization that conventional, market-based development strategies can undermine the ‘invisible’ economy. Such issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 15. GLOBAL CAPITALISM IN CRISIS Explaining booms and slumps The tendency towards booms, slumps and crises within a capitalist economy does not fit easily into classical liberal political economy. Economic liberalism is largely based on the assumption that market economies tend naturally towards a state of equilibrium, demand and supply coming into line with one another through the workings of the price mechanism – Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. However, the history of capitalism, at both national and international levels, does not bear out this image of equilibrium and stability. Instead, capitalism has always been susceptible to booms and slumps, even violent fluctuations and crises. As early as 1720, the collapse of the so-called South Sea Bubble (wildly speculative trading in the South Sea Company, a UK joint stock company granted a monopoly to trade in Spain’s South American colonies), caused finan- cial ruin for thousands of investors. One factor that appears to be linked to economic fluctuations is war. Many of the most dramatic historical episodes of sustained deflation came in the aftermath of war. A sustained economic depression followed the American War of Independence, and, after the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) ended the Napoleonic Wars, Europe experienced decades of deflation, in which industrial  Deflation: A reduction in investment was costly and many firms went bankrupt. In the mid-nineteenth the general level of prices, linked to a reduction in the century, the wars of unification in Italy and Germany, and the American Civil level of economic activity in War, each produced immediate speculative bubbles, which then collapsed, the economy. leading to widespread bankruptcies and stock market crashes. WWI led to a brief THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 101 Debating . . . Does economic globalization promote prosperity and opportunity for all? As the ideological battle between capitalism and socialism has (apparently) been consigned to the dustbin of history, political debate has tended to focus instead on the impact of economic globalization. Should economic globalization be welcomed and embraced, or should it be resisted? FOR AG A I N S T The magic of the market. From an economic liberal Deepening poverty and inequality. Critics of globaliza- perspective, the market is the only reliable means of tion have drawn attention to the emergence of new and generating wealth, the surest guarantee of prosperity and deeply entrenched patterns of inequality: globalization is economic opportunity. This is because the market, thus a game of winners and losers. Critical theorists competition and the profit motive provide incentives for argue that the winners are TNCs and industrially work and enterprise and also allocate resources to their advanced states generally, but particularly the USA, while most profitable use. From this perspective, economic the losers are in the developing world, where wages are globalization, based on the transborder expansion of low, regulation is weak or non-existent, and where market economics, is a way of ensuring that people in all production is increasingly orientated around global countries can benefit from the wider prosperity and markets rather than domestic needs. Economic globaliza- expanded opportunities that only capitalism can bring. tion is therefore a form of neo-colonialism: it forces poor countries to open up their markets and allow their Everyone’s a winner. The great advantage of economic resources to be plundered by rich states. globalization is that it is a game of winners and winners. Although it makes the rich richer, it also makes the poor The ‘hollowing out’ of politics and democracy. Economic less poor. This occurs because international trade allows globalization diminishes the influence of national countries to specialize in the production of goods or governments and therefore restricts public accountability. services in which they have a ‘comparative advantage’, State policy is driven instead by the need to attract with other benefits accruing from the economies of scale inward investment and the pressures generated by inten- that specialization makes possible. Similarly, transna- sifying international competition. Integration into the tional production is a force for good. TNCs, for instance, global economy therefore usually means tax reform, spread wealth, widen employment opportunities and deregulation and the scaling back of welfare. The alleged improve access to modern technology in the developing link between global capitalism and democratization is world, helping to explain why developing world govern- also a myth. Many states that have introduced market ments are usually so keen to attract inward investment. reforms and sought to integrate into the global economy Economic globalization is thus the most reliable means have remained authoritarian if not dictatorial, conform- of reducing poverty. ing to the principles of state capitalism. Economic freedom promotes other freedoms. Economic Corruptions of consumerist materialism. Even when globalization does not just make societies richer. Rather, economic globalization has succeeded in making people an open, market-based economy also brings social and richer, it is less clear that it has improved, still less political benefits. Social mobility increases as people are enriched, the quality of their lives. This is because it able to take advantage of wider working, career and promotes an ethic of consumerism and material self- educational opportunities, and the ‘despotism’ of custom interest. Cultural and social distinctiveness is lost as and tradition is weakened as individualism and self- people the world over consume the same goods, buy expression are given wider rein. Economic globalization from the same stores and enjoy similar working practices is thus linked to democratization, the two processes coin- and living conditions. This is particularly evident in the ciding very clearly in the 1990s. This occurs because development of a ‘brand culture’, which pollutes public people who enjoy wider economic and social opportuni- and personal spaces in order to create a culture of ties soon demand greater opportunities for political unthinking consumerism, even managing to absorb participation, particularly through the introduction of radical challenges to its dominance by turning them into multi-party elections. consumer products (Klein 2001). 102 GLOBAL POLITICS reconstruction boom in 1919, before a collapse of the major western economies in 1920–21, with the Great Depression coming a decade later. In the post-1945 era, the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam both produced inflationary surges, which initially reduced and then increased interest rates, which, in turn, created surges and declines in industrial investment. Linkages between war and economic performance stem from a variety of factors: the cost of financing unproductive military activity, the disruption of commerce, the freezing of capital movements, the cost of reconstruction, and so on. However, other explanations of booms and slumps locate their source within the nature of the capitalist system itself. The classic example of this is found in Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Marx was concerned not only to high- light the inherent instability of capitalism, based on irreconcilable class conflict, but also to analyze the nature of capitalist development. In particular, he drew attention to its tendency to experience deepening economic crises. These stemmed, in the main, from cyclical crises of over-production, plunging the economy into stagnation and bringing unemployment and immiseration to the working class. Each crisis would be more severe than the last, because, Marx calculated, in the long term the rate of profit would fall. This would eventually, and inevitably, produce conditions in which the proletariat, the vast majority in society, would rise up in revolution. Whatever its other advantages, the Marxist image of ‘deepening’ crises of capitalism, leading irresistibly towards the system’s final collapse and replacement, has proved to be unsound. By contrast, capitalism has proved to be remarkably resilient and adaptable, capable of weathering financial and economic storms of various kinds, while also achiev- ing long-term growth and expansion. This has occurred not least through the fact that capitalism’s capacity for technological innovation has far outstripped Marx’s expectations. Few therefore continue to see the tendency towards boom- and-bust cycles as a fatal flaw within capitalism, still less as a precursor of social revolution. Amongst the most influential of non-Marxist theories were those developed by the Austrian economist and social theorist, Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950). Building on Marx’s theory of the capitalist business cycle, Schumpeter (1942) argued that capitalism existed in a state of ferment he dubbed ‘creative destruc- tion’, with spurts of innovation destroying established enterprises and yielding new ones. The notion of creative destruction captures both the idea that it is entrepreneurs who drive economies, generating growth and, through successes and failures, setting business cycles in motion, and the idea that innovation is the main driver of wealth. However, Schumpeter himself was pessimistic about the long-term prospects for capitalism, arguing that the human and social costs of periodic slumps and the stifling of dynamism, creativity and individualism through the growth of elitism and state intervention would ultimately lead to capitalism’s demise. Developments in the post-1945 period, and especially in the age of accelerated globalization and ‘turbo-capitalism’ nevertheless suggest that Schumpeter seriously underestimated capitalism’s sustained appetite for creative destruction. More conventional academic economists tend to explain boom-  Business cycle: Regular and-bust cycles in terms of the factors determining business investment and its oscillations in the level of business activity over time, effects on the level of GDP. In such views, levels of business investment are inher- sometimes called a ‘trade ently unstable because of factors such as the multiplier effect (the exaggerated cycle’. impact of spending and investment as it ripples through the economy) and the THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 103 accelerator principle (the hypothesis that levels of investment vary with changes CONCEPT to the rate of output). Laissez-faire Laissez-faire (in French Lessons of the Great Crash meaning literally ‘leave to do’) is the principle of The greatest challenge that international capitalism has faced was posed by the non-intervention in Great Depression of the 1930s, which was precipitated by the Wall Street Crash economic affairs. It is the of 1929. From 1926, the USA experienced an artificial boom, fed by a rash of heart of the doctrine that the economy works best speculation and the expectation of ever-rising share prices. Average share prices when left alone by increased nearly 300 per cent between 1924 and 1929. However, in 1929 confi- government. The phrase dence in the economy suddenly evaporated when signs appeared that the sale of originated with the goods was starting to decline. On 24 October 24 1929 (‘Black Thursday’), a panic Physiocrats of ensued on the stock market as 13 million shares changed hands in a single day. eighteenth-century France, who devised the On 29 October, 16 million shares were sold. Banks subsequently failed, major maxim ‘laissez faire est businesses started to collapse and unemployment began to rise. As a severe laissez passer’ (leave the economic depression in the USA spread abroad, affecting, to some degree, all individual alone, and let industrialized states, the Great Crash became a Great Depression. However, what commodities circulate was the relationship between the Great Crash and the Great Depression? Do freely). The central assumption of laissez- financial crises have to develop into economic crises? faire is that an The Wall Street Crash is relatively easy to explain. As J. K. Galbraith argued in unregulated market tends his classic The Great Crash, 1929 ([1955] 2009), it was just ‘another speculative naturally towards bubble’, albeit on an historically unprecedented scale. It was, he argued, an ‘escape equilibrium. This is into make believe’, fuelled by the belief that it is possible to get rich without effort usually explained by the theory of ‘perfect and without work. That stock market crises have an impact on the ‘real’ economy competition’. From this is not a surprise, given the fact that falling stock values inevitably lead to a decline perspective, government in business and consumer confidence, reducing the funds available for invest- intervention is seen as ment as well as domestic demand. However, does a recession have to become a damaging unless it is fully-fledged depression? In the case of the Great Crash, two key mistakes were restricted to actions that promote market made. First, in view of a strong belief in ‘rugged individualism’ and the doctrine competition, such as of laissez-faire, the Hoover administration responded to the Wall Street Crash by checks on monopolies keeping public spending low and trying to achieve a balanced budget. Not only and the maintenance of did this mean that the unemployed had to rely mainly on private charity (such as stable prices. soup kitchens) for survival, but it also meant that, in withdrawing money from the economy, it helped to deepen, rather than cure, the crisis. This lesson was most crucially taught by Keynes (see p. 105), whose The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money ([1936]1963) challenged clas- sical economic thinking and rejected its belief in a self-regulating market. Keynes argued that the level of economic activity, and therefore employment, is deter- mined by the total amount of demand – aggregate demand – in the economy. This implied that governments could manage their economies through adjust- ing their fiscal policies, injecting demand into the economy in times of recession and high employment by either increasing public spending or reducing taxation. Unemployment could therefore be solved, not by the invisible hand of capital- ism, but by government intervention, in this case by running a budget deficit, meaning that the government literally overspends. The first, if limited, attempts to apply Keynes’s ideas were undertaken in the USA during Roosevelt’s ‘New  Recession: A period of general economic decline that Deal’, but even then Roosevelt was unwilling to move away from the idea of a is part of the usual business balanced budget, helping to explain why the Great Depression ran throughout cycle. the 1930s and only ended with the increase in military spending after the 104 GLOBAL POLITICS outbreak of WWII. Only in Germany did the Depression end earlier, and that was because rearmament and military expansion from the mid-1930s onwards served as a form of ‘inadvertent Keynesianism’. The second lesson of the Great Crash was that its economic impact was substantially deepened by the general trend towards ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies. In a context of economic decline, states in the late 1920s and through the 1930s took steps to maximize their exports while at the same time minimiz- ing their imports. This was done in a variety of ways. First, fiscal deflation, through either or both reduced government spending and raised taxes, was used to reduce the demand for imports. The problem with this, as pointed out earlier, was that reduced levels of aggregate demand would affect the domestic economy just as much as it would affect imports. The second strategy was devaluation, in the hope that exports would become cheaper for overseas customers, while imports would become relatively more expensive, and less desirable. However, although countries that devalued earlier tended to recover from the Depression more quickly than the later devaluers did, competitive devaluations had a net deflationary effect and so deepened the economic crisis. Third, governments raised tariffs on imports, in the hope of protecting domestic industries and reducing unemployment, a policy that even Keynes favoured. However, the overall impact of beggar-thy-neighbour policies was self-defeating, and only served to deepen and prolong the Great Depression. Countries cannot maximize their exports while minimizing their imports, if all countries are trying to do the same thing. It was largely in an attempt to prevent the international economy being damaged in the post-1945 period by such policies that the Bretton Woods system was set up. However, some economists questioned the extent to which beggar-thy-neighbour policies contributed to the Great Depression, arguing that  Beggar-thy-neighbour policies: Policies pursued at the decline in international trade during the 1930s was more a consequence of the expense of other states the economic crisis than its cause. that are believed to be in their own country’s short-term national interest; most Modern crises and ‘contagions’ commonly used to describe protectionism. During the early post-1945 period, western governments widely believed that the instabilities of the business cycle had been solved by the application of  Devaluation: A reduction in Keynesian principles, which seemed to offer a means of counteracting the the value of a currency relative tendency towards booms and slumps. However, the belief in Keynesianism to other currencies. declined after the ‘stagflation’ crisis of the 1970s, hastened by the subsequent  Casino capitalism: A form revival of laissez-faire thinking in the guise of neoliberalism. This nevertheless of capitalism that is highly did not cure, but rather accentuated, the fluctuations within the capitalist volatile and unpredictable system, intensifying its tendency towards creative destruction. This is an impor- because it is susceptible to tant aspect of the development of a so-called ‘risk society’. In particular, greater speculatively-orientated lifts in instability was a direct result of the tendency towards ‘financialization’. finance capital. Financial markets are always susceptible to fluctuations and instability as a  Contagion: The tendency of result of speculative bubbles. However, the emergence of a globalized financial investors, alarmed by a crisis in system has accentuated these tendencies, by leaving states more vulnerable and one part of the world, to exposed to the vagaries of global markets. This has created what Susan Strange remove money from other (1986) dubbed ‘casino capitalism’. Massive amounts of ‘mad money’ surge parts of the world, thereby spreading panic well beyond around the world, creating the phenomenon of financial contagion. Such insta- the scope of the initial bilities have been further accentuated by the fact that most modern financial problem. growth has occurred in the form of purely money-dealing currency and security THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 105 John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) British economist. Keynes’s reputation was established by his critique of the Treaty of Versailles, outlined in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919). His major work, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money ([1936] 1963), departed significantly from neoclassical economic theories, and went a long way towards establishing the discipline now known as macroeconomics. By challenging laissez-faire principles, he provided the theoretical basis for the policy of demand management, which was widely adopted by western governments in the early post- WWII period. The last years of his life saw him devoting much of his efforts to shaping the nature of the post-war international monetary order through the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, including the IMF and the World Bank. exchanges, such as so-called ‘hedge funds’, which are linked to profits from future, rather than actual, production, and ‘derivatives’, the value of which depend on the price of an underlying security or asset. Thus, although global financial flows can create artificial booms and slumps, as well as reap massive rewards for global speculators, they are, in a sense, one step removed from the performance of ‘real’ economies. The tendency for financial bubbles to form has also been linked to a ‘bonus culture’ that took root to varying degrees in banks and financial institutions across the world. The payment of massive bonuses incentivized short-term risk-taking, making banks and financial institutions more insecure and even vulnerable to collapse once the bubble burst. The economic instability of casino capitalism and its tendency towards financial crises has been demonstrated since the mid-1990s in Mexico, in East and south-east Asia, Brazil, Argentina and elsewhere. The Asian financial crisis was the most significant and far-reaching such crisis before the global financial crisis of 2008. The Asian crisis started in July 1997 when speculators in Thailand, anticipating that the government would have to devalue its currency, the baht, sold strongly, thereby turning their expectations into a reality. This led to a classic financial contagion, as similar speculative attacks were then mounted against Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea, with Hong Kong, Taiwan and even China in danger of being drawn into the turmoil. As governments used up their entire foreign exchange reserves, economic output fell, unemployment increased and wages plummeted. At the end of 1997, the whole of south-east Asia was in the throes of a financial crisis that threatened to disrupt the stability of the entire global economy. Financial stability and, more gradually, economic recovery were brought about by the provision of bail-out funds by the IMF to Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. However, this occurred at the cost of the liberaliza- tion of their financial systems, and therefore a reduction in domestic economic control. By contrast, Malaysia, which had resisted IMF pressure and instituted capital controls, was successful in preventing further rapid transborder capital flows. The crisis also demonstrated the disjuncture between the performance of financial markets and that of the ‘real’ economy, in that the Asian financial crisis occurred despite higher growth rates across much of East and south-east Asia between the early 1960s and the 1990s, and especially in the ‘tiger’ economies. 106 GLOBAL POLITICS KEY EVENTS . . . Crises of modern global capitalism 1994–95 The Mexican economic crisis begins with the sudden devaluation of the Mexican pesos and has an impact elsewhere in Latin America (the ‘Tequila effect’). 1997–98 The Asian financial crisis starts in Thailand with the collapse of the baht but spreads to most of south-east Asia and Japan, where currencies slump and stock markets crash. 1998 The Russian financial crisis sees the collapse of stock, bond and currency markets in a context of falling commodity prices in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. 1999–2002 The Argentine economic crisis begins with a loss of investor confidence in the Argentine economy in a context of falling GDP, leading to a flight of money away from the country. 2000 The Dot-com crisis sees the bursting of the ‘dot-com bubble’ after dramatic speculative rises in IT-related stocks since 1998. 2002 The Uruguay banking crisis witnesses a massive run on banks amid concerns about the Uruguayan economy linked to Argentina’s economic meltdown. 2007–08 The US sub-prime mortgage crisis precipitates the global financial crisis. 2007–09 The global financial crisis (see p. 108) The global financial crisis of 2007–09 is widely seen as the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression. It also highlighted deeper and more serious instabilities in the global economy, particularly in countries that had taken financial deregulation furthest and were carrying an increased burden of public and private debt. This time, however, contagion was not merely regional but global in effect. For George Soros (2008), the credit crisis, which turned into a global financial crisis and then a global economic crisis reflected the failure of the ‘market fundamentalism’ that underpinned previously dominant neoliberal economic thinking. Instead of responding rationally and on the basis of perfect knowledge to ensure that resources are allocated to their most profitable use, Soros highlighted a supposed ‘new paradigm’ in which asset prices are not only driven by market fundamentals but also affect them. Deregulated financial markets therefore allowed a ‘super-bubble’ to develop over a period of some 25 years, taking the form of massive, and ultimately unsustainable, debt. When this super-bubble burst, many of the financial instruments (bonds, securities, derivatives and so on) that had been traded in very large volumes were suddenly revealed to be almost valueless. Such an analysis suggests that the most appropriate response to the financial crisis would be the establishment of new frameworks of financial regulation, on both national and global levels. Responses to the financial crisis are discussed at greater length in Chapter 19. THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 107 KEY CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THEORISTS George Soros (born 1930) A Hungarian-born stock market investor, businessman and philanthropist, Soros has been a critic of the market fundamentalist belief in natural equilibrium. He particularly emphasizes the role of reflexivity (the tendency for cause and effect to be linked, as actions ‘bend back on’ themselves) in showing why rational-actor economic models do not work. Soros’s main works include Open Society (2000) and The New Paradigm for Financial Markets (2008). Paul Krugman (born 1953) A US economist and political commentator, Krugman’s academic work has primarily focused GEORGE SOROS on international economics. A neo-Keynesian, he has viewed expansionary fiscal policy as the solution to recession. Krugman criticized the Bush administration’s tax cuts and widening deficit as unsustain- able in the long run. His best-known works include The Conscience of a Liberal Dan Deitch © 2010 (2007) and The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (2008). PAUL KRUGMAN Ben Bernanke (born 1953) A US economist and Chairman of the US Federal Reserve since 2006, Bernanke was instrumental in managing the USA’s response to the 2007–09 global finan- cial crisis. Bernanke’s academic writings have focused largely on the economic and political causes of the Great Depression, highlighting, amongst other things, the role of the Federal Reserve and the tendency of banks and financial institu- tions to cut back significantly on lending. Bernanke’s main work is Essays on the Great Depression (2004). BEN BERNANKE Herman Daly (born 1938) A US ecological economist, Daly is best known for his theory of steady- state economics. This suggests that perpetual economic growth is neither possible nor desirable. Daly champions qualitatively-defined ‘development’ over quantitatively-defined ‘growth (‘more of the same stuff’), and favours rich countries reducing their economic growth to free up resources and ecological space for use by the poor. His key works include Steady-State Economics (1973) and (with J. Cobb) For the Common Good (1990). See also Joseph Stiglitz (see p. 468) HERMAN DALY 108 GLOBAL POLITICS GLOBAL POLITICS IN ACTION . . . Global financial crisis 2007–09 Events: The global financial crisis started to show its effects in the middle of 2007 with the onset of the so-called ‘credit crunch’, particularly in the USA and the UK. However, this merely provided a background to the remarkable events of September 2008, when global capitalism appeared to teeter on the brink of the abyss, threatening to tip over into systemic failure. The decisive events took place in the USA. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-spon- sored mortgage corporations, were bailed out by Federal authorities; Lehman Brothers, the 158-year- old investment bank, succumbed to bankruptcy; the insurance giant AIG was only saved by a $85 billion government rescue package; while Wachovia, the fourth largest US bank, was bought by Citigroup, absorbing $42 billion of bad debt. Banking crises erupted elsewhere, and stock markets went into not. The fact that stock markets around the world declined freefall worldwide, massively reducing share values and dramatically and almost simultaneously, wiping enormous betokening the onset of a global recession. Some of the sums off share values, bears testimony to the interlocking panic went out of the banking crisis of September 2008 nature of modern financial markets and their susceptibility when the US government promised to take all the danger- to contagion. This was the first genuinely global crisis in the ous debt out of the US banking system, making this the world economy since the ‘stagflation’ crisis of the 1970s, biggest bailout in the history of modern finance. and it gave rise to the most severe falls in global produc- tion levels since the Great Depression of the 1930s. In this Significance: Debate about the significance of the global context, the international community mounted a response financial crisis of 2007–09 is closely linked to disagree- that was genuinely global, reflecting high levels of interna- ment about its underlying causes. Was the crisis rooted in tional cooperation and a keen awareness of mutual vulner- the US banking system, in Anglo-American enterprise ability. Coordinated and substantial cuts in interest rates capitalism, or in the nature of the capitalist system itself? were speedily introduced (monetary stimulus); pressure to At one level, the crisis was linked to inappropriate lending increase tariffs and for a return to economic nationalism strategies adopted by US banks and mortgage institutions, was resisted; economically advanced states agreed to boost the so-called ‘sub-prime’ mortgage market. These high-risk domestic demand (fiscal stimulus); and vulnerable coun- loans to applicants with poor or non-existent credit histo- tries – such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Latvia and ries were unlikely to be repaid, and when the scale of Ireland – were saved by unprecedented international ‘toxic debt’ became apparent shockwaves ran through the bailouts, financed by the European Central Bank and the US financial system and beyond. At a deeper level, IMF. On the other hand, key vulnerabilities in the global however, the ‘sub-prime’ problem in the USA was merely a economy remain unchecked and unreformed. These include symptom of the defects and vulnerabilities of the neolib- the fact that many countries (and, for that matter, many eral capitalism that has taken root in the USA and the UK enterprises) continue to suffer from substantial levels of in particular, based on free markets and an under-regu- indebtedness, storing up inflationary pressures and creating lated financial system. At a deeper level still, the crisis has a pressing need for fiscal retrenchment (higher taxes or been interpreted as exposing serious imperfections not in reduced public spending). Moreover, as countries emerge a particular form of capitalism but in the capitalist system from the recession at different times and at different itself, reflected in a tendency towards boom-and-bust speeds, divisions within the international community have cycles and, perhaps, deepening crises. started to become more visible, particularly over the There is, nevertheless, little doubt about the global wisdom of fiscal stimulus. Finally, progress on the much impact of the financial crisis. Although the origins of the vaunted ‘new Bretton Woods’, which would avoid similar crisis may have been localized, its effects certainly were global financial meltdowns in the future, has been slow. THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL AGE 109 The full implications of the credit crunch and the global financial crisis will take many years to unfold. For some, they amount to the end, or at least the beginning of the end, of neoliberal globalization, marking the dramatic failure of its financially-based growth model. Others, nevertheless, suggest that the crisis demonstrates the underlying resilience of the global economy, and empha- size that periodic instability is a price well worth paying for three decades of growth. However, there is general agreement that the crisis will hasten shifts in the balance of power within the global economy, just as the Great Depression, even though it originated in the USA, ultimately brought about a transfer of economic hegemony from the UK to the USA. The USA is widely seen to have been damaged by the crisis of 2007–09, its economy being in need of substantial reorganization and redirection in the light of the defects revealed in US-led neoliberal capitalism. On the other hand, under President Obama the USA assumed a leading role in efforts to tackle the global recession, with no other state, including China, being able or willing to assume global leadership in its place. China, nevertheless, is likely to emerge from the financial crisis in a rela- tively stronger position, having demonstrated the robustness of its banking system, certainly by comparison with those of western states, as well as the extent to which it has de-coupled from the US economy. However, the Chinese and US economies are symbiotically linked, in that China’s growing dominance in manufacturing goods has been underpinned by a cheap currency based on buying US dollars. Capital therefore flowed from East to West: in 2007, the USA borrowed around $800 billion from the rest of the world, while China ran a current account surplus of $200 billion, much of it lent to the USA. In many ways, the future shape and direction of the global economy, and, indeed, the nature of twenty-first century world order (examined in Chapter 9), will depend on whether the US–Chinese relationship remains symbiotic, or whether it breaks down as distrust and rivalry intensify. 110 GLOBAL POLITICS SUMMARY  Capitalism is a system of generalized commodity production in which wealth is owned privately and economic life is organized according to market principles. Enterprise capitalism, social capitalism and state capitalism nevertheless differ in relation to the balance within them between the market and the state.  The advance of neoliberalism reflects the ascendance of enterprise capitalism over rival forms of capitalism. While supporters of neoliberalism claim that, in association with economic globalization, it is a reliable vehicle for generating global growth, its critics have associated it with widening inequality, financial crises and political ‘shocks’ of various kinds.  Economic globalization is the process whereby all national economies have, to a greater or lesser extent, been absorbed into an interlocking global economy. However, there have been major debates about the extent to which economic life has been globalized as well as about the impact, for good or ill, of economic globalization.  Despite its global success, capitalism has always been susceptible to booms and slumps. While Marxists have explained these crises in terms of an inherent tendency of capitalism towards over-production, Schumpeter drew attention to the business cycle, stemming from the disposition within capitalism towards ‘creative destruction’.  Modern crises and ‘contagions’ have derived from the trend, implicit, some argue, in neoliberal globalization, in favour of ‘financialization’. This has created what has been dubbed ‘casino capitalism’, a highly volatile and unpredictable economic system that allows speculative bubbles to develop and then collapse, their impact extending, potentially, across the world.  The origins of the global financial crisis of 2007-9 are hotly disputed, with disagreement about whether the crisis was rooted in the US banking system, in Anglo-American enterprise capitalism, or in the nature of the capitalist system itself. The crisis may have accelerated important shifts in global power, but it is far less clear that it will result in a major shift in favour of national or global financial regulation. Questions for discussion Further reading  What are the major strengths and weaknesses of Gamble, A., The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the enterprise capitalism? Politics of Recession (2009). A lively, readable and authori- tative analysis of the nature and implications of the post-  To what extent is capitalism compatible with a 2007 global financial crisis. comprehensive welfare provision?  Is state capitalism a contradiction in terms? Harvey, D., A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005). A concise and critical examination of the origins, spread and effects  Does China have a coherent economic model? of neoliberalism.  To what extent are neoliberalism and economic O’Brien, R. and M. Williams, Global Political Economy: globalization linked? Evolution and Dynamics (2010). A lucid and comprehen-  What are the chief drivers of economic globaliza- sive introduction to global political economy. tion? Ravenhill, J. (ed.), Global Political Economy (2008). A compre-  Is the idea of a global economy a myth? hensive and well-organized text in which leading experts  Are transnational corporations a force for good or examine the major issues of global political economy. for ill?  Is capitalism inherently unstable and crisis-prone?  What does the 2007–09 global financial crisis tell Links to relevant web us about the nature of the modern world resources can be found on the economy? Global Politics website CHAPTER 5 The State and Foreign Policy in a Global Age ‘Traditional nation-states have become unnatural, even impossible units in a global economy.’ K E N I C H I O H M A E , The End of the Nation State (1996) PREVIEW The state has long been regarded as the most significant actor on the world stage, the basic ‘unit’ of global politics. Its predominance stems from its sovereign jurisdic- tion. As states exercise unchallengeable power within their borders, they operate, or should operate, as independent and autonomous entities in world affairs. However, the state is under threat, perhaps as never before. In particular, globalization, in its economic and political forms, has led to a process of state retreat, even fashioning what some called the post-sovereign state. Others, nevertheless, argue that condi- tions of flux and transformation underline the need for the order, stability and direction that (arguably) only the state can provide is greater than ever. Are states in decline, or are they in a process of revival? Globalizing trends have also had implications for the nature and processes of government. Once viewed as ‘the brains’ of the state, controlling the body politic from the centre, government has seemingly given way to ‘governance’, a looser and more amorphous set of processes that blur the distinction between the public and private realms and often operate on supranational and subnational levels as well as the national level. Why and how has government been transformed into governance, and what have been the implications of this process? Finally, foreign policy is important as the mecha- nism through which usually national government manages the state’s relations with other states and with international bodies, highlighting the role that choice and decision play in global politics. How are foreign policy decisions made, and what factors influence them? KEY ISSUES  Is sovereignty statehood compatible with a globalized world?  Have nation-states been transformed into market or postmodern states?  In what ways, and why, has the state become more important?  To what extent has national government given way to multi-level governance?  Is the concept of foreign policy any longer meaningful?  What is the most persuasive theory of foreign policy decision-making? 111 112 GLOBAL POLITICS STATES AND STATEHOOD IN FLUX States and sovereignty The state (see p. 114) is a historical institution: it emerged in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe as a system of centralized rule that succeeded in subordinating all other institutions and groups, temporal and spiritual. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is usually taken to have formalized the modern notion of statehood. By establishing states as sovereign entities, it made states the principal actors on the world stage. International politics was thus thought of as a ‘state system’. The state system gradually expanded from Europe into North America, then, during the nineteenth century, into South America and Japan, becoming a truly global system in the twentieth century, largely thanks to the process of decolonization in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. In the twenty-first century, statehood appears to be more popular and sought-after than ever before. In 2009, the United Nations recognized 192 states, compared with 50 in 1945, and there are a number of ‘unrecognized’ states waiting in the wings, including the Vatican (the Holy See), Taiwan, Kosovo and Northern Cyprus. The list of potential candidates for statehood is also impressive: Palestine, Kurdistan, Quebec, Chechnya, Western Sahara, Puerto Rico, Bermuda, Greenland and Scotland, to name but a few. However, what is a state, and what are the key features of statehood? States have a dualistic structure, in that they have two faces, one looking outwards and the other looking inwards (Cerny 2010). The outward-looking face of the state deals with the state’s relations with other states and its ability to provide protection against external attack. The classic definition of the state in international law is found in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State (1933). According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, the state has four features:  A defined territory  A permanent population  An effective government  The capacity to enter into relations with other states According to this view, the political existence of the state is not dependent on its recognition by other states. Even without recognition, the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit (Article 3). The inward-looking face of the state deals with the state’s relations with the individ- uals and groups that live within its borders and its ability to maintain domestic order. From this perspective, the state is usually viewed as an instrument of domination. The German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) thus defined the state in terms of its monopoly of the means of ‘legitimate violence’. Joseph Schumpeter (1954) complemented this definition by pointing out that the state also has a fiscal monopoly, in its monopoly of the right to tax citizens. In view of the state’s dual structure, what can be called ‘statehood’ can be seen as the capac- ity to both protect against external attack and maintain domestic order, and to do them simultaneously (Brenner 2004). T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 113 However, although not explicitly mentioned in the Montevideo Convention’s list of state features, nor in Weber’s notion of a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, the underlying character of the state is established by a single core characteristic: sovereignty. In the final analysis, states are states because they are capable of exercising sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders, and so are autonomous and independent actors. In the billiard ball model of world politics, adopted by realist theorists, states are the billiard balls that collide with one another while sovereignty is the hard and impenetrable outer shell of the ball which enables it to withstand the impact of the collision. The first major theorist of sovereignty was the French political philosopher Jean Bodin (1530–96). He defined sovereignty as ‘the absolute and perpetual power of a common wealth’. In his view, the only guarantee of political and social stability is the existence of a sovereign with final law-making power; in that sense, law reflects the ‘will’ of the sovereign. For Thomas Hobbes (see p. 14), the need for sovereignty arose from the self-seeking and power-interested nature of human beings, which meant that, in the absence of a sovereign ruler – that is, in a ‘state of nature’ – life would degenerate into a war of all against all, in which life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. He therefore defined sovereignty as a monopoly of coercive power and advocated that it be vested in the hands of a single ruler (whether this was a monarch, his preferred form of government, or an oligarchic group or even a democratic assembly). However, in line with the dual structure of the state, sovereignty can be understood in internal or external senses. The concept of internal sovereignty refers to the location of power or authority within a state, and has been crucial to the development of state struc- tures and systems of rule. Where, within a political system, should final and ulti- mate authority be located? Early thinkers, as already noted, were inclined to the belief that sovereignty should be vested in the hands of a single person, a monarch. Absolute monarchs described themselves as ‘sovereigns’, and could, as did Louis XIV of France in the seventeenth century, declare that they were the state. The most radical departure from this absolutist notion of sovereignty came  Sovereignty: The principle of absolute and unlimited in the eighteenth century with the Swiss political philosopher Jean-Jacques power; the absence of a higher Rousseau’s rejection of monarchical rule in favour of the notion of popular authority in either domestic or sovereignty. For Rousseau, ultimate authority was vested in the people them- external affairs (see p. 3). selves, expressed in the idea of the ‘general will’. The doctrine of popular sover- eignty has often been seen as the basis of the modern theory of democracy,  Internal sovereignty: The notion of a supreme inspiring, amongst other things, the liberal-democratic idea that the sole legiti- power/authority within the mate source of political authority is success in regular, fair and competitive elec- state, located in a body that tions. Nevertheless, some liberal thinkers warn that the concept of internal makes decisions that are sovereignty is always tainted by its absolutist origins, arguing that the idea of an binding on all citizens, groups absolute and final source of authority is difficult to reconcile with the reality of and institutions within the state’s territorial borders. diffused power and pluralist competition found within the modern democratic state. A state may, however, be considered sovereign over its people and territory  External sovereignty: The despite the fact that there may be disputes or even confusion about the internal absolute and unlimited location of sovereign power. This is the notion of external sovereignty. authority of the state as an External sovereignty defines a state’s relationship to other states and interna- actor on the world stage, implying the absence of any tional actors. It establishes the state’s capacity to act as an independent and higher authority in external autonomous entity in world affairs. As such, it is the form of sovereignty that is affairs. of crucial importance for global politics. External sovereignty, for example, 114 GLOBAL POLITICS provides the basis for international law (see p. 332). Not only does the United CONCEPT Nations (UN) operate according to the principle of sovereign equality, allowing The state all states equal participation in international relations through membership of The state is a political the General Assembly, but, most importantly, external sovereignty guarantees association that that the territorial integrity and political independence of each state is inviolable. establishes sovereign Similarly, many of the deepest divisions in world politics involve disputed claims jurisdiction within to external sovereignty. The Arab–Israeli conflict, for instance, turns on the ques- defined territorial tion of external sovereignty. The Palestinians have long sought to establish a borders. In political theory, the state is homeland and ultimately a sovereign state in territory claimed by Israel (includ- usually defined in ing territory occupied since the Six Day War of 1967); in turn, Israel has tradi- contrast to civil society: tionally seen such demands as a challenge to its own sovereignty. it encompasses Nevertheless, the notion of external sovereignty has been the subject of institutions that are growing controversy, with questions being raised about both its moral implica- recognizably ‘public’ in that they are responsible tions and its practical significance. Moral concerns have been raised because for the collective external sovereignty appears to allow states to treat their citizens however they organization of please, including, possibly, subjecting them to abuse, torture and perhaps even communal life, and are genocide (see p. 326). There is therefore tension between the principle of external funded through taxation sovereignty and the doctrine of human rights (see p. 304), and indeed any global (the institutions of government, the courts, or cosmopolitan standard of justice. This tension has been particularly evident in the military, nationalized relation to the issue of humanitarian intervention (see p. 319), as discussed in industries, social security Chapter 13. Concerns about the practical significance of external sovereignty system, and so forth). In have also become more acute. In a sense, the disparity in power between and international politics, amongst states has always raised questions about the meaningfulness of sover- however, the state is usually defined from an eignty, powerful states being able, sometimes routinely, to infringe on the inde- external perspective, and pendence and autonomy of weaker states. However, a range of modern so embraces civil society. developments have put states under pressure perhaps as never before, leading to In this view, a state is predictions about the ‘end of sovereignty’ and even the ‘twilight of the state’. The characterized by four most important of these are linked to the advance of globalization (see p. 9). features: a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective The state and globalization government and sovereignty. This means, The rise of globalization has stimulated a major debate about the power and in effect, that a state is significance of the state in a globalized world. Three contrasting positions can be equivalent to a country. identified. In the first place, some theorists have boldly proclaimed the emer- gence of ‘post-sovereign governance’ (Scholte 2005), suggesting that the rise of globalization is inevitably marked by the decline of the state as a meaningful actor. In the most extreme version of this argument, advanced by so-called hyperglobalists, the state is seen to be so ‘hollowed out’ as to have become, in effect, redundant. Realists, on the other hand, tend to deny that globalization has altered the core feature of world politics, which is that, as in earlier eras, sover- eign states are the primary determinants of what goes on within their borders, and remain the principal actors on the world stage. Between these two views, however, is a third position, which acknowledges that globalization has brought about qualitative changes in the role and significance of the state, and in the nature of sovereignty, but emphasizes that these have transformed the state,  Governance: Broadly, the rather than simply reduced or increased its power. various ways in which social life is coordinated, of which It is very difficult to argue that the state and sovereignty have been unaffected government is merely one (see by the forces of globalization. This particularly applies in the case of the territo- p. 125). rial jurisdiction of the state. The traditional theory of sovereignty was based on T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 115 A P P ROAC H E S TO . . . THE STATE Realist view have been less willing than realists to view the state as Realists tend to view states from the outside; that is, the dominant global actor, usually adopting instead a from the perspective of the international system. Above mixed-actor model of world politics. Indeed, liberals all, they take states to be unitary and coherent actors; have generally accepted that globalization has been indeed, they are commonly portrayed as the basic marked by the decline of the state (and perhaps the ‘units’ of the international system. Their unitary and transition from nation-states to ‘postmodern’ or cohesive character derives from the fact that, regardless ‘market’ states), as power has shifted away from the of their domestic make-up, state leaders speak and act state and towards, in particular, global markets and on behalf of their respective states and can deploy their transnational corporations (TNCs) (see p. 99), but also populations and resources as they wish or choose. State to individuals. Furthermore, liberals insist that the behaviour is determined by a single, overriding motive constitutional and political make-up of the state has a – ‘the wish to survive’ (Waltz 2002) – although realists crucial impact on its external behaviour. In particular, disagree about whether this implies merely a defensive republican liberals argue that democratic states are desire to avoid invasion and attack or an aggressive inherently more peaceable than non-democratic states wish to maximize power and achieve domination (see (Doyle 1986). Offensive or defensive realism? p. 234). The social, constitutional, political and social composition of the Critical views state is therefore irrelevant to its external behaviour. In Critical theorists reject both realist state-centrism and this sense, the state is a ‘black box’. Neorealists in liberal assertions about the retreat of the state, but they particular insist that states differ only in terms of their do so in different ways. Neo-Marxists and post-Marxist ‘capabilities’, or power resources (there are great powers theorists may have abandoned the orthodox Marxist (see p. 7), minor powers and so on). All realists never- belief that the (capitalist) state is merely a reflection of theless agree that the state is the dominant global actor; the class system, but they continue to argue that state hence they adopt a state-centric view of global politics. structures and, for that matter, world orders are For example, from a realist perspective, globalization grounded in social relations. The mutual dependence and the state are not separate or, still less, opposing between markets and states has in fact intensified as a forces: rather, globalization has been created by states result of globalization, leading to what Cox (1993) and thus exists to serve their interests. Other actors called the ‘internationalization of the state’. Social thus only exert influence to the extent that the state constructivists deny that the state has a fixed and allows. objective character; rather, the identity of the state is shaped by a variety of historical and sociological Liberal view factors, and these, in turn, inform the interests of the Liberals believe that the state arises out of the needs of state and its actions. Wendt (1999), for example, distin- society and reflects the interests of individual citizens. guished between the social identity of the state (shaped So-called social contract theory suggests that the state by the status, role or personality that international was established through an agreement amongst citizens society ascribes to a state) and its corporate identity to create a sovereign power in order to escape from the (shaped by internal material, ideological and cultural chaos and brutality of the ‘state of nature’ (a stateless, factors). Feminist theorists have been ambivalent about or pre-political, society). The core role of the state is the state. While liberal feminists have believed that it is thus to ensure order by arbitrating between the possible to reform the state from within, by increasing competing individuals and groups in society. The state female representation at all levels, radical feminists thus acts as a referee or umpire. This implies that have highlighted structural links between the state and changes in the structure of society can and will alter the system of male power, believing that the state has the role and power of the state. Liberals, as a result, an intrinsically patriarchal character. 116 GLOBAL POLITICS the idea that states had supreme control over what took place within their borders, implying that they also controlled what crossed their borders. However, developments such as the rise of international migration and the spread of cultural globalization (see p. 147) have tended to make state borders increasingly ‘permeable’. This can be seen in the growth of cross-border communications and information flows through, for instance, radio, satellite television, mobile tele- phones and the Internet, which occur both at a speed and in quantities that defy the capacity of any state to detect them, still less effectively control them. Most of the discussion about the changing nature and power of the state has never- theless concerned the impact of economic globalization (see p. 94). One of the central features of economic globalization is the rise of ‘supraterritoriality’, reflected in the declining importance of territorial locations, geographical distance and state borders. An increasing range of economic activities take place within a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae 1990). This is particularly clear in relation to financial markets that have become genuinely globalized, in that capital flows around the world seemingly instantaneously, meaning, for instance, that no state can be insulated from the impact of financial crises that take place in other parts of the world. It is also evident in the changing balance between the power of territorial states and ‘de-territorialized’ transnational corporations, which can switch investment and production to other parts of the world if state policy is not conducive to profit maximization and the pursuit of corporate interests. Globalization, furthermore, has been closely associated with a trend towards regionalization, reflected in the growing prominence of regional trading blocs such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). If borders have become permeable and old geographical certainties have been shaken, state sovereignty, at least in its traditional sense, cannot survive. This is the sense in which governance in the twenty-first century has assumed a genuinely post-sovereign character. It is difficult, in particular, to see how economic sovereignty can be reconciled with a globalized economy. Sovereign control over economic life was only possible in a world of discrete national economies; the tendency of national economies to be incorporated to a greater or lesser extent into a single globalized economy renders economic sovereignty meaningless. As Susan Strange (1996) put it, ‘where states were once masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many issues, are the masters over the governments of states’. However, the rhetoric of a ‘borderless’ global economy  Supraterritoriality: A can be taken too far. For example, there is evidence that, while globalization may condition in which social life have changed the strategies that states adopt to ensure economic success, it has transcends territory through by no means rendered the state redundant as an economic actor. As discussed the growth of ‘transborder’ and later in this section, states retain a vital role in bringing about economic ‘transglobal’ communications modernization. At the very least, there is a growing recognition that market- and interactions. based economies can only operate effectively within a context of legal and social  Economic sovereignty: The order that only the state can provide. Moreover, although states, when acting absolute authority which the separately, may have a diminished capacity to control transnational economic state exercises over economic activity, they retain the facility to do so through macro frameworks of economic life conducted within its regulation, as provided by the G-20, the World Trade Organization (WTO), (see borders, involving independent control of fiscal and monetary p. 511) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)(see p. 469). policies, and over trade and The power and significance of the state has undoubtedly been affected by the capital flows. process of political globalization (see p. 118). However, its impact has been T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 117 G L O B A L AC TO R S . . . GROUP OF TWENTY Type: International economic forum • Established: 1999 • Membership: 20 countries The Group of Twenty (G-20) Significance: In its early years, the inclusion and representativeness Finance Ministers and Central Bank G-20 was a relatively peripheral may indicate the emergence of a Governors was established in 1999 body, certainly less significant than new institutional world order that in response both to the financial the G-8. This, however, changed better reflects current economic crises of the late 1990s and a with the outbreak of the global realities and thereby enjoys greater growing recognition that key emerg- financial crisis in 2007–09 (see p. global legitimacy. By comparison, ing states were not adequately 108). Developed states, recognizing the G-8, the IMF, the World Bank included in the core of global that their economic fate depended and the UN (through the Security economic discussion and gover- largely on a globally-coordinated Council) concentrate global deci- nance. There are no formal criteria response to the crisis, were eager to sion-making in the hands of just a for G-20 membership and the join with developing states, and saw few states. The G-20 has, neverthe- composition of the group has the G-20 as the forum for doing less, also attracted criticism. First, its remained unchanged since it was this. The G-8, by contrast, suddenly prominence may be temporary and established (Argentina, Australia, appeared to be hopelessly anti- specifically linked to the peculiarities Brazil, Canada, China, France, quated, particularly as it excluded of a global financial crisis in which Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, the emerging economies of China, developed and developing states Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, South Africa, Mexico and recognized that they were ‘in the South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, Brazil. The G-20’s growing stature same boat’. Developing a globally- the UK, the USA and the EU). The was underlined by the fact that the coordinated response over issues group includes most, but not all, the global response to the crisis largely such as climate change and world leading economies in the world, emerged out of its Washington and trade, where the interests of the thereby comprising, collectively, London summits, in November developed and developing worlds around 90 per cent of world GNP, 2008 and April 2009 respectively. At often diverge, may be much more but factors such as geographical the heart of this response was the difficult. Second, the G-20, even balance (members are drawn from agreement by G-20 members to transformed into a permanent body, all continents) and population contribute $500 billion to a remains toothless. It castigates coun- representation (about two-thirds of programme of global reflation. A tries judged to be behaving irre- the global population is repre- start was also made on reforming sponsibly, condemns weak financial sented) also played a major part. the institutions of global economic regulation at national and global Like the G-7/8 (see p. 465), the G-20 governance by the agreement to levels, and takes a stance on matters operates as an informal forum to expand the IMF’s borrowing such as bankers’ bonuses, but it lacks promote dialogue between finance programme and by urging that the capacity to impose its will, still ministers, central bankers and heads voting shares on the IMF and the less to punish transgressors. Third, of government, with no permanent World Bank be rebalanced to boost although the G-20 clearly provides location and no permanent staff of the representation of the developing better representation than the G-8, its own. However, at its Pittsburgh world. At the Pittsburgh summit, it its membership is selected arbitrarily Summit in September 2009, heads was decided that the G-20 would and excludes some rich states and all of government agreed to provide the replace the G-8 as the main forum the world’s poorest states. The G- G-20 with wider resources and a for promoting international 20’s key players are also firmly permanent staff. Within the G-20, economic cooperation. wedded to a mainstream economic each member has one voice, regard- The rise of the G-20 has been philosophy that favours the market less of its economic strength or heralded as marking a potentially and globalization, albeit a more population size. historic shift. Its high degree of regulated form of globalization. 118 GLOBAL POLITICS complex and, in some ways, contradictory. On the one hand, international CONCEPT bodies such as the United Nations (see p. 449), the EU (see p. 505), NATO (see Political p. 253) and the WTO have undermined the capacity of states to operate as self- globalization governing units. It is clear, for instance, that membership of the EU threatens state power, because a growing range of decisions (for example, on monetary Political globalization refers to the growing policy, agricultural and fisheries policies, and the movement of goods and importance of people within the EU) are made by European institutions rather than by international member states. The range and importance of decisions that are made at an inter- organizations. These are governmental or supranational level has nevertheless undoubtedly increased, organizations that are forcing states either to exert influence through regional or global bodies, or to transnational in that they exert influence not within operate within frameworks established by them. The WTO, for instance, oper- a single state, but within ates as the judge and jury of global trade disputes and serves as a forum for nego- an international area tiating trade deals between and among its members. Such tendencies reflect the comprising several states. fact that in an interconnected world, states have a diminishing capacity to act However, the nature of alone, because they are increasingly confronted by challenges and threats that political globalization and its implications for the have a transnational if not a global dimension. state varies depending on On the other hand, political globalization opens up opportunities for the whether it is modelled on state as well as diminishing them. Working through international organizations the principle of and regimes (see p. 67) may expand the capacities of the state, allowing them to intergovernmentalism continue to extend their influence within a globalized and interconnected world. (see p. 459) or supranationalism (see p. This occurs when states ‘pool’ their sovereignty. The notion of pooled sover- 458). Intergovernmental eignty has been most explicitly developed in relation to the EU, but could just international as well be applied to any other international organization. By ‘pooling’ sover- organizations provide a eignty, member states transfer certain powers from national governments to EU mechanism that enables institutions, thereby gaining access to a larger and more meaningful form of states, at least in theory, to take concerted action sovereignty. In this view, sovereignty is not a zero-sum game: the pooled sover- without sacrificing eignty of the EU is at least potentially greater than the combined national sover- sovereignty. Supranational eignties that compose it, because, in this case, a regional body is able to exert bodies, on the other hand, greater influence in a globalized world than the member states could if each are able to impose their acted individually. will on states. Most commentators nevertheless accept that State transformation political globalization lags markedly behind Globalizing tendencies have not only cast doubt over the continued relevance of economic and cultural the principle of state sovereignty, but also, arguably, reshaped the nature and role forms of globalization. of the state itself. As a historical institution, the state has undergone a variety of transformations. The rise of nationalism from the early nineteenth century onwards led to the creation of the nation-state (see p. 164), which allied the state  Pooled sovereignty: The as a system of centralized rule to nationhood as a source of social cohesion and combined sovereignty of two or political legitimacy. Thereafter, the quest for national self-determination became more states; ‘pooling’ the principal motor behind state construction (as discussed in Chapter 7). For sovereignty implies gaining access to greater power and much of the twentieth century, the state was characterized by its expanding influence than state/national social and economic role. The most extreme example of this was the develop- sovereignty. ment of collectivized states, which attempted to bring the entirety of economic life under state control. The best examples of such states were in orthodox  Collectivized state: A state communist countries such as the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe. that seeks to abolish private enterprise and sets up a States in the capitalist world nevertheless also demonstrated a marked tendency centrally planned, or ‘command’ towards economic and social intervention, albeit of a more modest kind. In their economy. case, this involved the adoption of Keynesian strategies of economic manage- T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 119 ment and a strengthening of social protection, leading to the development of the welfare state. The ability to deliver prosperity and to protect citizens from social deprivation thus became the principal source of legitimacy in most states. Since the 1980s, however, many commentators have drawn attention to the progressive ‘hollowing out’ of the state, giving rise, allegedly, to a new state form. This has been variously described as the ‘competition’ state, the ‘market’ state (Bobbitt 2002) and the ‘postmodern’ state (Cooper 2004). The most common explanation for this has been the changed relationship between the state and the market that has been brought about by the pressures generated by economic globalization. This is reflected in the general trend towards neoliberalism (see p. 90), most dramatically demonstrated by the transition from collectivized to market-based economies in former communist countries during the 1990s, but it was also evident, to some degree, across the globe through the adoption of policies of privatization, deregulation and the ‘rolling back’ of welfare provision. Globalization can be seen to have promoted such developments in at least three ways. First, a greater exposure to global markets has encouraged many countries to adopt strategies designed to attract foreign capital and inward investment, namely policies of financial and economic deregulation. Second, intensified foreign competition forced countries to keep wage levels low and to promote labour flexibility, which meant scaling down welfare costs and other impedi- ments to international competitiveness. Third, TNCs acquired growing influ- ence at the expense of the state, by virtue of the ease with which they are able to relocate production and investment in a globalized economy if state policy is insufficiently responsive to corporate interests. However, the changed relationship between markets and states may not simply mean a reduced role for the state but, rather, a different role for the state. The state may have been transformed, not eclipsed altogether (Sørensen 2004). Robert Cox (see p. 120) has argued that the growing global organization of production and finance had transformed conventional conceptions of govern- ment and society, leading to the ‘internationalization of the state’. This is the process whereby national institutions, policies and practices become little more than an instrument for restructuring national economies in line with the dynamics of the global capitalist economy. Although this implies that states have lost substantial power over the economy, the process of economic globalization nevertheless requires a political framework that is provided by the state, notably in the form of the ‘military-territorial power of an enforcer’ (Cox 1994). In the modern global economy, this role has largely been assumed by the USA.  Welfare state: A state that Bob Jessop (2002) described the advent of a more market-orientated state in takes prime responsibility for terms of a move away from the ‘Keynesian welfare national state’, towards what the social welfare of its citizens, he called the ‘Schumpeterian competition state’. The competition state is a state discharged through a range of that aims to secure economic growth within its borders by securing competitive social security, health, education and other services advantages in the wider global economy. Competition states are distinguished by (albeit different in different the recognition of the need to strengthen education and training as the princi- counties). pal way of guaranteeing economic success in the new technology-dependent economy, and this approach was adopted by the Asian ‘tiger’ economies from the  competition state: A state 1970s onwards. Although they attempt to increase market responsiveness by that pursues strategies to ensure long-term promoting entrepreneurialism and labour flexibility, competition states are also competitiveness in the aware of the need to combat social exclusion and bolster the moral foundations globalized economy. of society. To some extent, the advance of the competition state is evident in a 120 GLOBAL POLITICS Robert Cox (born 1926) Canadian international political economist and leading exponent of critical theory. Cox worked in the International Labour Organization (ILO), before, in the early 1970s, taking up an academic career. Cox adopted a ‘reflexive’ approach to theory, in which theories are firmly linked to their context and subject. In his seminal work, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (1987), he examined the relationship between material forces of production, ideas and insti- tutions in three periods: the liberal international economy (1789 –1873); the era of rival imperialisms (1873–1945); and the neoliberal world order (post-1945). His writing examines issues such as the implications of globalization and the nature of US global hegemony, in part to highlight the prospects for counter-hegemonic social forces. Cox’s other major writings include (with H. Jacobson) The Anatomy of Influence (1972), ‘Social forces, states and world orders’ (1981) and (with Timothy J. Sinclair) Approaches to World Order (1996). wider shift from so-called ‘demand-side’ economics (which encourages consumers to consume, by, for instance, Keynesian reflation) to ‘supply-side’ economics (which encourages producers to produce, by, for example, improved education and training, labour flexibility and deregulation). The notion of the ‘postmodern state’ has been associated in particular with the writings of Robert Cooper (2004). In Cooper’s analysis, the post-Cold War world is divided into three parts, each characterized by a distinctive state struc- ture – the ‘pre-modern’, ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ worlds. The postmodern world is a world in which force has been rejected as a means of resolving disputes, order being maintained instead through a respect for the rule of law and a willingness to operate through multilateral institutions. Security in such a world is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and, above all, a recognition of mutual vulnerability. The states appropriate to such a world, ‘postmodern’ states, are more pluralist, more complex and less centralized than the bureaucratic ‘modern’ states they have replaced, and they also tend to be less nationalistic, allowing, even encouraging, multiple identities to thrive. Postmodern states are characterized by both the wider role played by private organizations in the processes of governance and the fact that government’s role is increasingly orientated around the promotion of personal development and personal consumption. As Cooper (2004) put it, ‘Individual consumption replaces collective glory as the dominant theme of national life’. In terms of their external orientation, postmodern states are distinguished by their unwarlike character, reflected in the application of moral consciousness to international relations and a rejection of the balance of power (see p. 256) as unworkable in the post-Cold War era. On this basis, the only clear examples of postmodern states are found in Europe, with the EU perhaps being an example of a post- modern proto-state. However, the plight of the state is most serious in the case of the ‘pre-modern’ world. Cooper portrayed this as a world of post-imperial chaos, in which such state structures as exist are unable to establish (in Weber’s words) a legitimate T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 121 monopoly of the use of force, thus leading to endemic warlordism, widespread CONCEPT criminality and social dislocation. Such conditions do not apply consistently to Failed state the developing world as a whole, however. In cases such as India, South Korea A failed state is a state and Taiwan, developing world states have been highly successful in pursuing that is unable to perform strategies of economic modernization and social development. Others, never- its key role of ensuring theless, have been distinguished by their weakness, sometimes being portrayed domestic order by as ‘weak’ states, ‘quasi-states’ or ‘failed states’. Most of the weakest states in the monopolizing the use of world are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, classic examples being Somalia, force within its territory. Examples of failed states Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These states in recent years include fail the most basic test of state power: they are unable to maintain domestic Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, order and personal security, meaning that civil strife and even civil war become Liberia and Somalia. almost routine. Failed states are nevertheless not just a domestic problem. They Failed states are no often have a wider impact through, for instance, precipitating refugee crises, longer able to operate as viable political units, in providing a refuge for drug dealers, arms smugglers and terrorist organizations, that they lack a credible generating regional instability, and provoking external intervention to provide system of law and order, humanitarian relief and to keep the peace. often being gripped by The failure of such states stems primarily from the experience of colonialism, civil war or warlordism. which, when it ended (mainly in the post-1945 period) bequeathed formal polit- They are also no longer able to operate as viable ical independence to societies that lacked an appropriate level of political, economic units, in that economic, social and educational development to function effectively as separate they are incapable of entities. As the borders of such states typically represented the extent of colonial providing for their ambition rather than the existence of a culturally cohesive population, postcolo- citizens and have no nial states also often encompassed deep ethnic, religious and tribal divisions. functioning infrastructure. Although Failed states are thus failed, postcolonial states. Nevertheless, colonialism does relatively few states not, on its own, explain the weakness or failure of the postcolonial state. Other collapse altogether, a sources of state failure include internal factors, such as the existence of social much larger number elites, backward institutions and parochial value systems which block the transi- barely function and are tion from pre-industrial, agrarian societies to modern industrial ones, and exter- dangerously close to collapse. nal factors, notably the impact of TNCs and neo-colonialism. Return of the state Discourse about the state in the early twenty-first century has been dominated by talk of retreat or decline. State sovereignty is routinely dismissed as an irrele- vance and states are viewed as dinosaurs waiting to die. The reality is more complex, however. Realist and other state-centric commentators argue that the impact of globalization in its economic, cultural and political forms has always been exaggerated: states remain the decisive political actors. Nevertheless, a number of developments in recent years have helped to strengthen the state and to underline its essential importance. What explains the return of the state? In the first place, the state’s unique capacity to maintain domestic order and protect its citizens from external attack has been strongly underlined by new security challenges that have emerged in the twenty-first century, notably those linked to transnational terrorism (see p. 284). This underlines what Bobbitt (2002) viewed as a basic truth: ‘The State exists to master violence’; it is therefore essentially a  Warlordism: A condition in ‘warmaking institution’. The decline in military expenditure that occurred at the which locally-based militarized end of the Cold War, the so-called ‘peace dividend’, started to be reversed in the bands vie for power in the late 1990s, with global military expenditure rising steeply after the 9/11 terrorist absence of a sovereign state. attacks and the launch of the ‘war on terror’. The USA with its massive military 122 GLOBAL POLITICS budget has been the principal determinant of the current world trend, but mili- tary spending has also grown significantly in China, France, the UK, Russia and elsewhere. Moreover, many countries have taken steps to strengthen the inviola- bility of the state as a territorial unit by imposing tighter border controls. Counter-terrorism strategies have often meant that states have assumed wider powers of surveillance, control and sometimes detention, even becoming ‘national security states’. Second, although the days of command-and-control economic management may be over, the state has sometimes reasserted itself as an agent of moderniza- tion. The myth of neoliberalism is that prosperity and growth are purely a result of the dynamism of the market. In fact, market economies can only operate successfully in conditions of legal and social order that only states can guaran- tee. This applies particularly in the case of the rule of law and the enforcement of property rights, without which economic activity would end up being deter- mined by threats, bribes and the use of violence. Beyond this, however, modern- izing states develop and implement strategies to ensure long-term economic success. ’Competition states’ do this by improving education and training in order to boost productivity and by providing support for key export industries. States such as China and Russia each modernized their economies by making significant concessions to the market, but an important element of state control has been retained or re-imposed (these developments are examined in more detail in Chapter 3 in relation to state capitalism). On a wider level, the state’s vital role in economic affairs was underlined by the 2007–09 global financial crisis (see p. 108). Although the G-20 may have provided states with a forum to develop a coordinated global response, the massive packages of fiscal and other interventions that were agreed were, and could only have been, implemented by states. Indeed, some have seen the crisis as marking the watershed between three decades of anti-statist neoliberal globalization and a new era of regulated glob- alization, in which states, through international organizations or sometimes acting alone, play a more active economic role. Finally, there has been a growing recognition of the role of the state in promoting development. This is reflected in an increased emphasis on state- building as a key aspect of the larger process of peace-building (see p. 445). The provision of humanitarian relief and the task of conflict resolution become almost insuperably difficult in the absence of a functioning system of law and order. The wider acceptance of humanitarian intervention since the early 1990s has meant that ordered rule is often provided, initially at least, by external powers. However, this does not constitute a long-term solution. As examples such as Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, externally-imposed order is only sustainable for a limited period of time, both because the economic and human cost to the intervening powers may be unsustainable in the long-run, and because, sooner or later, the presence of foreign troops and police provokes resentment and hostility. Foreign intervention has therefore come, over time,  State-building: The to focus increasingly on the construction of effective indigenous leadership and construction of a functioning building legitimate national institutions, such as an army, a police force, a judi- state through the establishment of legitimate ciary, a central bank, government departments, local administration, a tax institutions for the formulation collection agency and functioning education, transport, energy and healthcare and implementation of policy systems. The process of state-building is nevertheless often profoundly diffi- across key areas of government. cult. T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 123 Focus on . . . Problems of state-building Why is the process of state-building often so difficult? tion of ‘good governance’, with the eradication of What challenges does successful state-building have to corruption being a key goal. However, the democrati- overcome? At least three significant challenges stand zation that ‘good governance’ implies may make the out. The first is that new or reformed institutions and task of state-building more difficult, not least by structures have to be constructed in a context of often bringing ethnic and other tensions to the surface and deep political and ethnic tension and endemic poverty. by exposing the flaws and failings of emergent institu- For example, in Afghanistan, a country in which no tions. Finally, state-building may involve the imposi- internal or external power has ever long held sway, tion of an essentially western model of political there are 50 ethnic or sub-tribal groups, 34 languages organization unsuited to the needs of developing and 27 million people, together with widespread countries that are more accustomed to traditional internecine feuds and counter-feuds. The task of devel- tribal models of governance in which interdependent oping a unifying national leadership in such a context is groups are united by a shared ethnic identity. If the therefore highly problematical. western assumption that the state is a universal insti- Second, indigenous leadership and new institutions tution, the only viable alternative to chaos and brutal- need to enjoy a significant measure of legitimacy. This ity, is unfounded, then the task of state-building may is why state-building is invariably linked to the promo- be doomed. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE From government to governance Changes to the role and significance of the state have also had important impli- cations for the nature and functioning of government. Government refers to the formal and institutional processes which operate at the national level to main- tain order and facilitate collective action. Its central feature is the ability to make  Good governance: collective decisions and the capacity to enforce them. Since the 1980s, however, Standards for the process of it has become increasingly fashionable for international theorists and political decision-making in society, analysts to talk more in terms of ‘governance’ (see p. 125) rather than ‘govern- including (according to the UN) ment’, with terms such as ‘global governance’ (see p. 455), ‘good governance’ and popular participation, respect ‘corporate governance’ becoming commonplace. The so-called ‘governance turn’ for the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, in the study of international and domestic politics has been a consequence of a consensus orientation, equity variety of developments. At the heart of these is the growing redundancy of the and inclusiveness, effectiveness traditional notion of government as a hierarchy or collection of hierarchies. For and efficiency, and Max Weber (1948), hierarchy, in the form of what he termed bureaucracy, was accountability. the typical form of organization in modern industrialized societies. It was typi-  Hierarchy: An organization fied by the existence of fixed and official areas of jurisdiction, clear laws or rules, that is based on graded ranks and a firmly ordered hierarchy based on an established chain of command. The and a clear and usually top- virtue of such a command-and-control system was supposedly its rationality: down authority structure. bureaucratization, according to Weber, reflected the advance of a reliable, 124 GLOBAL POLITICS Debating . . . Is state sovereignty now an outdated concept? State sovereignty has traditionally been viewed as the core principle of the international system. However, while some argue that globalization and other developments have changed the international system fundamentally, others suggest that the basic contours of the international system remain essentially unchanged. YES NO Permeable borders. State borders, the traditional guaran- Myth of the ‘borderless world’. The image that world tee of territorial sovereignty, are permeable in that they politics is dominated by transnational processes that have increasingly been penetrated by external forces. elude state control is, at best, a gross exaggeration. For These include international tourism and the movement example, national economies have not simply been of knowledge and information via the Internet. Global absorbed into a ‘borderless’ global economy, as much financial markets and transnational capital flows mean more economic activity takes place within state borders that economic sovereignty has become redundant. If the than it does across state borders. Furthermore, it is conventional domestic/international divide is increas- misleading to suggest that globalizing trends necessarily ingly difficult to sustain, states are no longer meaningful disempower states. Instead, states choose to engage in the territorial units. global economy and do so for reasons of national self- interest. Rise of non-state actors. States are no longer the only, or necessarily the dominant, actors on the world stage. States remain dominant. Although states are merely one Transnational corporations (TNCs) wield greater finan- actor amongst many on the world stage, they remain the cial power than many states, and can effectively dictate most important actor. States exercise power in a way and state policy through their ability to relocate production to an extent that no other actor can. In particular, using and investment at ease in a globalized economy. Non- the administrative processes of government and relying governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Greenpeace on unchallengeable coercive power, their control over and Amnesty International exert global influence. And what happens within their territories is rarely challenged. state security is as likely to be threatened by global terror- Only a tiny proportion of states, those classified as ‘failed’ ist organizations such as al-Qaeda as it is by other states. or ‘weak’ states, have effectively lost control over what happens within their borders. Collective dilemmas. In modern circumstances, states are increasingly confronted by collective dilemmas, issues Pooled sovereignty. The advance of political globalization that are particularly taxing because they confound even and the emergence of a framework of global governance the most powerful of states when acting alone. Quite have not brought about an erosion of sovereignty. Rather, simply, global problems require global solutions. An they expand the opportunities available to states, particu- increasing range of issues have acquired a collective or larly for achieving the benefits of cooperation. even global character – climate change, terrorism, International organizations are bodies that are formed by transnational crime, pandemic diseases, international states, for states; they are invariably used by states as tools migration and so on. Only international organizations, to achieve their own ends. Indeed, by working together, not supposedly sovereign states, can tackle these. states are able to pool their sovereignty, gaining greater capacity and influence than they would have possessed International human rights. Respect for state sovereignty working alone. has been eroded by the growing belief that there are stan- dards of conduct to which all states should conform as Enduring attraction of the nation-state. There seems little far as the treatment of their domestic populations is likelihood that states will lose their dominance so long as concerned. Such a view is usually based on a belief in they continue to enjoy the allegiance of the mass of their human rights (see p. 304), and the idea that the funda- citizens. As most states are nation-states, this is ensured mental individual rights are morally superior to the by the survival of nationalism as the world’s most potent state’s right to independence and autonomy. This is ideological force. Rival doctrines such as cosmopoli- evident in shifts in international law (examined in tanism and allegiances based, for instance, on religion, Chapter 14), and in the wider acceptance of humanitar- culture or ethnicity are of minor significance compared ian intervention (see p. 319). with nationalism. T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 125 predictable and, above all, efficient means of social organization. Bureaucracies CONCEPT or hierarchies thus developed in the military and the police, in schools and Governance universities, and throughout the modern state in the growth of government Governance is a broader departments and executive agencies. Similarly, the emergence of capitalist term than government. economies generating pressure for greater economic efficiency made large-scale Although it still has no corporations the dominant form of business organization in the twentieth settled or agreed century. definition, it refers, in its The shift from government to governance is a political reflection of the wider sense, to the various ways through advent of more fluid and differentiated societies (as discussed in Chapter 6). which social life is co- Top-down authority structures have, in this context, been exposed as ineffec- ordinated. Governance is tive, unresponsive and perhaps redundant. The advent of governance thus therefore a process (or a parallels economic trends which have seen a transition from ‘Fordist’ models complex of processes), its of business organization, based on large-scale mass production, to ‘post- principal modes including markets, hierarchies and Fordist’ ones (see p. 137) that emphasize flexibility, innovation and decentral- networks. Although ized decision-making. Pressure to adjust the way governments behave and government may be governing is carried out came from a variety of sources. These include the involved in governance, it fiscal crisis of the state that was precipitated by the end of the ‘long boom’ and is possible to have the down-turn of the global economy in the 1970s. Whereas sustained ‘governance without government’. Governance economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s had underwritten, in developed soci- is typified by a blurring of eties at least, an expansion in the welfare and social responsibilities of the state, the state/society helping to strengthen faith in the efficacy of government, reduced tax revenues distinction (private created a mismatch between people’s expectations of government and what bodies and institutions government could actually deliver. Governments had either to reduce popular work closely with public ones) and the expectations of government or to find new and more imaginative ways of involvement of a number delivering government services more cheaply and efficiently. A further set of of levels or layers pressures were generated in the 1980s and 1990s by the ideological shift (potentially local, towards free-market or neoliberal priorities. Pursued most radically through provincial, national, Reaganism in the USA and Thatcherism in the UK but affecting almost all regional and global). The processes through which societies to some degree, this set out to dismantle ‘big government’ in the belief international affairs are that the economy worked best when regulated by market forces and that the coordinated are individual should be liberated from the tyranny of the ‘nanny state’. Economic increasingly referred to as globalization has also played a major role in this process. The integration of ‘global governance’. national economies to a greater or lesser degree into a single global economy has exposed all countries to intensified competitive pressures, creating a ‘race to the bottom’ as governments seek to attract or retain private investment by cutting taxes, deregulating economic life and promoting more flexible labour markets. How have governments adapted themselves in the light of these circum- stances? The shift to a governance mode of governing has been evident in at least three, albeit related developments. First, the role of government has been rede- fined and in some senses narrowed. Instead of ‘rowing’ (that is, administering and delivering services), the tasks of government have increasingly been confined to ‘steering’ (that is, setting targets and strategic objectives). This, in part, acknowledges the inefficiency and unresponsiveness of traditional public administration by comparison in particular with private businesses or ‘third sector’ bodies such as charities, community groups and NGOs (see p. 6). In the USA, where such ideas were born and most enthusiastically embraced, the shift in responsibility for ‘rowing’ has been described as ‘reinventing government’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Second, there has been a significant blurring of the 126 GLOBAL POLITICS distinction between government and markets and thus between the public and private realms. This has happened in a variety of ways: for example, through the ‘contracting out’ of public services or full-scale privatization, by the growth in public–private partnerships and the introduction of ‘internal markets’ in public service delivery, and by the introduction into the public sector of private sector management styles and structures through the so-called ‘new public manage- ment’. Third, there has been a shift from hierarchies to networks within the processes of government, which has led Castells (1996) to proclaim the emer- gence of a ‘network state’ alongside the ‘network society’ and the ‘network corpo- ration’. For instance, the tasks of developing and sometimes implementing policy have increasingly been transferred from hierarchical departments to policy networks, as networks have proved to be particularly effective in facilitating the exchange of and co-ordinating social life in a context of increasing complexity. Multi-level governance The transition from government to governance is reflected not only in the more complex ways through which social life is now co-ordinated within modern societies – for example, through a wider role for markets and networks and the weakening of the public–private divide – but it is also evident in the ‘stretching’ of government across a number of levels. In other words, government can no longer be thought of as a specifically national activity which takes place within discrete societies. This has led to the phenomenon of ‘multi-level governance’. Policy-making responsibility has both been ‘sucked up’ and ‘drawn down’, creat- ing a complex process of interactions (see Figure 5.1). The ‘sucking up’ of policy- making responsibility has occurred through the advent of political globalization and the growing importance of regional and global governance, as discussed earlier. The ‘drawing down’ of policy-making responsibilities reflects a process of  Policy network: A decentralization. For much of the twentieth century, most states exhibited a systematic set of relationships between political actors who share a common interest or general orientation in a particular area, typically cutting International organizations Democracy across formal institutional arrangements and the divide between government and non- governmental bodies.  Multi-level governance: A National government pattern of overlapping and interrelated public authority that stems from the growth, or growing importance, of supranational and subnational Devolved bodies bodies.  Decentralization: The Local government expansion of local autonomy through the transfer of powers and responsibilities away from national bodies. Figure 5.1 Multilevel governance T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 127 distinct trend towards centralization, largely as a consequence of their expand- ing economic and social roles. Central government has clear advantages over peripheral bodies in terms of its ability to manage the economy and deliver a widening range of public services, not least because of its significantly greater fiscal capacity. However, since about the 1960s this trend has often been reversed, giving way to a countervailing tendency towards localization. In many cases, this has been reflected in the growth or strengthening of peripheral or sub- national political bodies. For example, on achieving independence in 1947, India adopted a US-style federal system rather than a UK-style unitary one. As part of its transition to democratic government following the death of General Franco in 1975, Spain adopted a system of devolution, which led to the creation of 17 autonomous communities, each based on an elected assembly invested with broad control of domestic policy. In 1982, France developed its strategy of ‘func- tional regionalism’ into a fully-fledged system of regional government, based on 22 directly elected regional councils. In the UK, the introduction of devolution in the late 1990s led to the creation of a Scottish Parliament, a Welsh Assembly and a Northern Ireland Assembly, and the emergence of a form of quasi-feder- alism (see p. 128). Although localization may appear to be the antithesis of globalization, the two processes are closely, and perhaps intrinsically linked, as reflected in the notion of ‘glocalization’ (Robertson 1992). One of the key driving forces of local- ization has been the rise of cultural and ethnic politics, itself linked to the declin- ing purchase of classical nationalism. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, secessionist groups and forms of ethnic nationalism sprang up in many parts of western Europe and North America. This was most evident in Quebec in Canada, Scotland and Wales in the UK, Catalonia and the Basque area in Spain, Corsica in France, and Flanders in Belgium. It created pressure for political decentralization, and sometimes, precipitated major constitutional upheavals. Similar manifestations of ethnic assertiveness were evident among the Native Americans in Canada and the USA, the Aboriginal peoples in Australia, and the Maoris in New Zealand. Other examples of localization include the tendency towards religious revivalism, through which Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Jews and even Buddhists have ‘gone local’ to reaffirm their faith through the adoption of fundamentalist beliefs and practices, and the stress within the anti-capitalist movement (see p. 70) on the politics of protest and political activism, reflected in the slogan: ‘Think globally, act locally’.  Localization: A trend that favours the local as the basis Localization, in its cultural, economic but especially in its political form, has for political action, cultural had profound implications for the process of governance, making the policy identity or economic process yet more fragmented and decentralized. The EU provides the best organization, usually associated example of multi-level governance, operating as it does through complex with the growing importance of processes involving sub-national as well as national and supranational levels sub-national governance. and actors. Local authorities and devolved bodies often bypass national govern-  Devolution: The transfer of ments and seek direct representation in Brussels, strengthening their involve- power from central government ment in EU-level economic planning and infrastructure development. to subordinate regional or Moreover, since the late 1980s the idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ has taken provincial institutions that have root, as regional and provincial levels of government have lobbied for, and no share in sovereignty; their responsibilities and powers benefited from, the direct distribution of aid from the European Regional being derived entirely from the Development Fund. Over time, regional aid has eclipsed agriculture as the centre largest single area of EU spending. 128 GLOBAL POLITICS CONCEPT FOREIGN POLICY Federalism End of foreign policy? Federalism (from the The making of foreign policy has traditionally been regarded as one of the key Latin foedus, meaning ‘pact’, or ‘covenant’) features of international politics. It reflects the importance of statecraft as an refers to legal and activity through which national governments manage their relations with other political structures that states and international bodies. Indeed, foreign policy-making has sometimes distribute power between been thought of as a noble activity, seen as ‘high’ politics in that it deals with two distinct levels of issues of sovereignty and security – in fact, the very survival of the state – as government, neither of which is subordinate to opposed to the ‘low’ politics of economics and other less important state activi- the other. Its central ties. However, recent developments have called the concept of ‘foreign policy’ feature is therefore the into question, certainly casting doubt on the conventional notion of foreign principle of shared policy as a discrete activity, engaged in at a senior political level and involving sovereignty. ‘Classical’ formal diplomatic interactions between and amongst states. These pressures federations are few in number: the USA, have came from various directions. In the first place, the emergence of neoreal- Switzerland, Belgium, ism in the late 1970s appeared to suggest that foreign policy, and indeed the Canada and Australia. wider process of decision-making in international politics, was simply no longer However, many more relevant. In the view of Kenneth Waltz (see p. 60) and others, state behaviour states have federal-type could essentially be explained through the power balances that shape the inter- features. Most federal, or federal-type, states were national system. As systemic factors were seen as decisively important, little or formed by the coming no role discretion was left to foreign policy actors, such as heads of government, together of a number of foreign ministers, defence ministers, leading diplomats and so forth. The ‘logic established political of anarchy’ explained everything. communities; they are Further pressures have been generated by the advance of globalization and often geographically large and may have culturally the growth of ‘complex interdependence’ (see p. 8). These developments dramat- diverse populations. ically widened and deepened the scope of the interactions between and amongst Federalism may states. As the distinctions between home and abroad, inside and outside, and nevertheless also have an ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics became perhaps hopelessly blurred, the divide between international dimension, ‘foreign’ politics and ‘domestic’ politics became increasingly difficult to sustain. providing the basis, in particular, for regional If the notion of ‘the foreign’ is meaningless, can foreign policy any longer exist? integration, as in the case The matter was made yet more problematical by the fact that globalizing trends of ‘European federalism’ have also been associated with the advent of post-sovereign governance and the (discussed in Chapter 20). burgeoning importance of non-state actors: TNCs, NGOs, terrorist groups, international organizations and so on. At the very least this meant that foreign policy can no longer be thought of simply as ‘what states do to, or with, other states’.  Shared sovereignty: A Nevertheless, the study of foreign policy remains a worthwhile activity, for at constitutional arrangement in least two reasons. First, although the foreign/domestic divide may have become which sovereignty is divided blurred, it has not been rendered redundant. The simple fact is that the world is between two levels of still more separated into distinctive communities than it is a single, homogeniz- government, each exercising supreme and autonomous ing entity (Hill 2003). How these communities attempt to manage the relations control over a specific range of between and among them therefore continues to be an interesting and impor- issues. tant issue. Second, foreign policy highlights the crucial interplay between struc- ture and agency, emphasizing that events can neither be explained entirely  Foreign: (from the Latin foris through ‘top-down’ systemic pressures nor entirely through ‘bottom-up’ indi- meaning ‘outside’) Dealing or concerned with another vidual decision-making (see Structure or agency? p. 72). In so doing, foreign country, area or people; implies policy underlines the crucial significance of a sphere of decision, choice and strange or not familiar. intentionality within global politics. T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 129 CONCEPT How decisions are made The making of decisions, and specifically of bundles of decisions, is clearly Foreign policy central to the policy process. Although policy-making also relates to the acts of Public policy lays out initiation and implementation, the making of decisions and reaching of conclu- courses of action for government and its sions is usually seen as its key feature. However, it may be difficult to establish various agencies. Foreign how and why decisions are made. In foreign policy-making a levels-of-analysis is policy refers, broadly, to commonly adopted, in line with the three levels at which Waltz (1959) analyzed attempts by governments the causes of war: to influence or manage events outside the state’s borders, usually, but not  The level of the individual decision-maker (involving personal priorities, exclusively, through their psychological and cognitive dispositions and so on) relations with foreign  The nation-state level (involving the nature of the state, type of govern- governments. Foreign ment, bureaucratic structure and so on) policy-making involves the establishment of  The systemic level (involving power balances within the international goals and the selection of system, the web of state interdependence, dynamics of global capitalism and means to achieve them. so on) In view of the increased interpenetration of Nevertheless, a number of general theories of political decision-making have domestic and foreign been advanced. The most important of these are rational actor models, incre- affairs in modern global politics, the term mental models, bureaucratic organization models, and cognitive processes and ‘external relations’ is belief-system models. sometimes preferred to foreign policy, allowing for interactions that take Rational actor models place on multiple levels and which involve Decision-making models that emphasize human rationality have generally been multiple actors. At the constructed on the basis of economic theories that have themselves been derived very least, the realm of from utilitarianism. Developed by thinkers such as Anthony Downs (1957), foreign policy can no these theories are usually based on the notion of so-called ‘economic man’, a longer be confined simply model of human nature that stresses the self-interested pursuit of material satis- to relations between foreign faction, calculated in terms of utility (use-value; the balance of pleasure over ministers/ministries or pain). In this light, decisions can be seen to be reached using the following between national procedures: diplomatic services.  The nature of the problem is identified.  An objective or goal is selected on the basis of an ordering of individual preferences.  The available means of achieving this objective are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness, reliability, costs and so on.  A decision is made through the selection of the means most likely to secure the desired end. This type of process assumes both that clear-cut objectives exist, and that human beings are able to pursue them in a rational and consistent manner. The best example of such an approach to decision-making is found in the use of cost–benefit analysis in the making of business decisions. In line with the goal of profit maximization, business people make decisions that will ensure the least possible cost and the greatest possible benefit, both calculated in monetary terms. Realist theorists make similar assumptions about decision-making in 130 GLOBAL POLITICS international politics. In their view, foreign policy is guided by a single overrid- CONCEPT ing goal: the pursuit of vital national interests, understood, at minimum, as National interest ensuring state survival, and beyond that the pursuit of power to enable the state In broad terms, the to achieve its national ambitions. This may be dictated by system-level pressures national interest refers to (as neorealists suggest) or by egoistical pressures that operate in and through the foreign policy goals, state itself (as classical realists argue); either way, it implies that the role of indi- objectives or policy vidual decision-makers is largely restricted to the selection of the best means of preferences that benefit a achieving a pre-determined end. society as a whole (the foreign policy equivalent The rational actor model is attractive, in part, because it reflects how most of the ‘public interest’). people believe decisions should be made. Certainly, politicians and others are The concept is often strongly inclined to portray their actions as both goal-orientated and the vague and contested, product of careful thought and deliberation. When examined more closely, however. It is most however, rational calculation may not appear to be a particularly convincing widely used by realist theorists, for whom it is model of decision-making. In the first place, in practice, decisions are often defined by the structural made on the basis of inadequate and sometimes inaccurate information. Such implications of difficulties encouraged Herbert Simon (1983) to develop the notion of international anarchy and ‘bounded rationality’. This acknowledges that, as it is impossible to analyze and so is closely linked to select all possible courses of action, decision-making is essentially an act of national security, survival and the pursuit of power. compromising between differently valued and imprecisely calculated outcomes. For decision-making Simon described this process as ‘satisficing’. The second problem with rational theorists, the national actor models is that they ignore the role of perception: that is, the degree to interest refers to the which actions are shaped by belief and assumptions about reality, rather than strategies and goals by reality itself. Little or no importance is thus attached to individual and pursued by those responsible for the collective psychology or to the values and ideological leanings of decision- conduct of foreign policy, makers. although this may mean that it degenerates into mere rhetoric. Incremental models Alternatively, it may refer Incrementalism is often portrayed as the principal alternative to rational deci- to foreign policy goals that have been endorsed sion-making. David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom (1963) termed this through the democratic model ‘disjointed incrementalism’, neatly summed up by Lindblom (1959) as the process. ‘science of muddling through’. This position holds that, in practice, decisions tend to be made on the basis of inadequate information and low levels of under- standing, and this discourages decision-makers from pursuing bold and innova- tive courses of action. Policy-making is therefore a continuous, exploratory process: lacking overriding goals and clear-cut ends, policy-makers tend to operate within an existing pattern or framework, adjusting their position in the light of feedback in the form of information about the impact of earlier deci- sions. Indeed, incrementalism may suggest a strategy of avoidance or evasion, policy-makers being inclined to move away from problems, rather than trying to solve them. Lindblom’s case for incrementalism is normative as well as descriptive. In addition to providing a perhaps more accurate account of how decisions are made in the real world, he argued that this approach also has the merit of  Incrementalism: The theory allowing for flexibility and the expression of divergent views. ‘Muddling that decisions are made not in the light of clear-cut objectives, through’ at least implies responsiveness and flexibility, consultation and but through small adjustments compromise. However, the model is clearly best suited to situations in which dictated by changing policy-makers are more inclined towards inertia rather than innovation. It circumstances. thus explains the foreign policy trends of pro-status-quo states more easily T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 131 GLOBAL POLITICS IN ACTION . . . The invasion of Iraq 2003 Events: On 20 March 2003, the USA and its allies (a ‘coalition of the willing’) began an invasion of Iraq. The initial invasion forces consisted of 250,000 US forces, 45,000 UK troops and small contingents from Poland, Australia and Denmark. The USA launched a combination of air and ground assaults that were designed to instil ‘shock and awe’, as well as to ‘decapitate’ Iraq’s military and government by killing Saddam Hussein and leading figures within his Ba’athist regime. What was dubbed ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ emphasized a new way of thinking about warfare, as advocated by the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. This envisaged the use of more mobile and flexible conventional forces with a larger role being played by special operations troops. By 9 April, US Marines had arrived in Baghdad and the Ba’athist regime had fallen within the ‘neocon’ project for remodelling the Middle (even though Saddam himself remained in hiding until East, as discussed below). December). Amid great fanfare, President George W. Bush Individual, small-group and ideological factors may declared an end to combat operations on 1 May, unveiling each have played a significant role in explaining the deci- a banner on an aircraft carrier stationed off San Diego, sion to invade Iraq. On a personal level, George W. Bush California, that read: ‘Mission Accomplished’. Nevertheless, had repeatedly said in the late 1990s that among his aspi- by the end of the summer 2003 there was evidence of a rations in life was to ‘take out’ Saddam Hussein. The moti- growing insurgency in Iraq which drew the USA and its vations behind this may have included the fact that he allies into a bloody and profoundly complex counter- regarded the survival of Saddam as ‘unfinished business’ insurgency war. left over from the 1991 Gulf War, when his father, President Bush Snr, refused to pursue fleeing Iraqi troops Significance: The reasons for the 2003 invasion of Iraq over the border once they had been expelled from Kuwait. have been the subject of much debate and speculation, in There was, furthermore, evidence of ‘groupthink’ amongst part, because the Iraq War was a ‘war of choice’ not a ‘war Bush’s most senior advisers. Key figures such as Dick of necessity’. Moreover, the two key justifications for war Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle provided by President Bush – that the Saddam regime had served in the Bush Snr administration and were drawn possessed weapons of mass destruction and had to be from the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party, disarmed, and that Saddam’s Iraq had links with al-Qaeda which urged the USA to assume military and diplomatic and was therefore implicated in the 9/11 attacks – fail to leadership in the new unipolar world. For neocons, ‘regime stand up to close examination. In the case of the former, change’ in Iraq would be the first step in democratizing the the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had found Middle East, promoting peace and stability in a notoriously no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of Iraq’s unstable part of the world. Such beliefs were the ‘glue’ that nuclear weapons programme in three months of inspec- bound together George W. Bush’s senior team, meaning tions, and no such evidence came to light after the inva- that a number of important misperceptions went relatively sion took place. In the case of the latter, no serious unchallenged. These included a tendency to exaggerate the attempt was made to substantiate alleged links between threat that Saddam’s Iraq posed to regional stability and, Saddam’s Iraq and al-Qaeda before or after the invasion. indeed, world peace; to over-estimate the efficacy of US This, nevertheless, does not mean that the invasion of Iraq military power and particularly its new approach to cannot be explained in rational actor terms, but only that warfare; to under-estimate the dangers of getting ‘bogged the real objectives behind the invasion were either down’ in Iraq, especially given its complex religious and unstated (oil and US energy security) or were only alluded ethnic make-up; and to fail to recognize the need to plan to as part of the wider case for war (the role of Iraq carefully for the post-Saddam Iraq. 132 GLOBAL POLITICS than those that seek to revise or overturn the status quo. For example, incre- mental appears to explain the policy of appeasement, pursued by the UK and increasingly also France in the 1930s. This involved giving in to hostile demand from Hitler’s Germany in the hope of avoiding war, but ended up emboldening Germany, if only by convincing Hitler that the western powers would never act to prevent Nazi expansionism. On the other hand, Nazi expansionism itself, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1942, and, for that matter, more recent examples, such as the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, can hardly be described as incremental adjustments. Neorealists would further argue that the different foreign policy strategies of status-quo states and revi- sionist states can better be explained by the larger balance of power (see p. 256) than by an inclination amongst certain policy-makers to ‘muddle through’. Finally, incrementalism places little or no emphasis on the role of beliefs and values, which may, for instance, have been a crucial factor driving foreign policy decision-making in Nazi Germany (see Hitler’s war? p. 35). Bureaucratic organization models Both rational actor and incremental models are essentially ‘black box’ theories of decision-making; neither pays attention to the impact that the structure of the policy-making process has on the resulting decisions. Operating on the nation-state level, bureaucratic or organizational models try, on the other hand, to get inside the black box by highlighting the degree to which process influences product. This approach was pioneered by Graham Allison (1971) in his examination of US and USSR decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Two contrasting, but related, models emerged from this study. The first, usually called the ‘organizational process’ model, highlights the impact on decisions of the values, assumptions and regular patterns of behav- iour that are found in any large organization. Rather than corresponding to rational analysis and objective evaluation, decisions are seen to reflect the entrenched culture of the government department or agency that makes them. The second theory, the ‘bureaucratic politics’ model, emphasizes the impact on decisions of bargaining between personnel and agencies each pursuing differ- ent perceived interests. This approach dismisses the idea of the state as a mono- lith united around a single view or a single interest, and suggests that decisions arise from an arena of contest in which the balance of advantage is constantly shifting. Although these models undoubtedly draw attention to important aspects of decision-making, they also have their drawbacks. In the first place, the organiza- tional process model allows little scope for political leadership to be imposed from above. It would be foolish, for example, to suggest that all decisions are shaped by organizational pressures and perceptions, for this would be to ignore the personal role played by, say, George W. Bush in initiating the ‘war on terror’, or Hitler’s influence on Germany’s decision to invade Poland. Second, it is simplistic to suggest, as the bureaucratic politics model does, that political actors simply hold views that are based on their own position and on the interests of the organizations in which they work. Although the aphorism ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’ may often be applicable, personal sympathies and individual goals cannot be altogether discounted. Finally, to explain decisions T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 133 Focus on . . . Perception or misperception? How are mistakes made in foreign policy? In particular, A further source of misperception stems from why do foreign policy-makers sometimes misinterpret distorted images that actors have of themselves and of or misunderstand the situations they are dealing with? others. At one level, misperception is unavoidable Rational actor models of decision-making imply that because of the security dilemma (see p. 19), which policy blunders, when they occur, are primarily a conse- systematically encourages policy-makers to over-esti- quence of inadequate or defective information. If deci- mate the aggressive intent of potential enemies, inter- sion-makers are able accurately to assess the costs and preting defensive actions as hostile ones. An benefits of potential actions, they will usually select exaggerated or distorted image of an opposing leader, the one that best advances the national interest. Sadly, regime, people or ideology can significantly increase the history of international relations, and especially the the scale of misperception, leading either to over-reac- frequency of war (which must damage the national tion (for example, the escalation of the Cold War) or, at interest of at least one side in the conflict), does not times, under-reaction (appeasement). Misperception is bear out this image of careful reasoning and dispas- particularly common amongst small groups, where it sionate choice. A variety of factors that operate at the may take on the characteristics of ‘groupthink’ (Janis individual and small group levels of analysis may 1982). This certainly occurs due to a tendency for increase the likelihood of misperception. For example, leaders to select close advisers whose views correspond time pressures often force policy-makers to ‘rush to to their own, creating a tightly-knit ‘in group’. Small judgement’, meaning that they may be disinclined to groups, further, are prone to develop a sense of their consider new or ‘inconvenient’ information and place own intellectual and moral superiority, sustained by unreasoned faith in information that supports a stereotypes of their critics as weak, evil or stupid. preferred course of action. Such pressures are exacer- Potential deviants within small groups often remain bated in a world of 24/7 news and current affairs, in silent, rather than voicing their doubts or counter-argu- which political leaders are expected to adopt a position ments, as the strength of the group stems, in part, from on major events almost as soon as they happen. Crisis an illusion of unanimity. Collective psychology thus situations also compound such problems, meaning that inclines members to demonstrate their loyalty and policy is formulated in an atmosphere that is stressful commitment to a chosen path, rather than to ‘rock the and emotionally charged. boat’. entirely in terms of black box considerations is to fail to give any weight to the external pressures that emanate from the broader political, economic, cultural and ideological context. Cognitive processes and belief-system models Models of decision-making that place an emphasis on the role of cognitive processes and beliefs highlight the degree to which behaviour is structured by perception. What people see and understand is, to an extent, what their concepts and values allow them, or encourage them, to see and understand. This tendency is particularly entrenched because, in most cases, it is largely unconscious. Although decision-makers may believe that they are being 134 GLOBAL POLITICS rational, rigorous and strictly impartial, their social and political values may act as a powerful filter, defining for them what is thinkable, what is possible, and what is desirable. Certain information and particular options are therefore not appreciated or even considered, while other pieces of information and other courses of action feature prominently in the calculus of decision-making. Indeed, Kenneth Boulding (1956) underlined the vital importance of this process by pointing out that, without a mechanism to filter information, deci- sion-makers would simply be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of data confronting them. However, there are different views about the origin and nature of this filter- ing process. Robert Jervis (1968, 1976), for instance, drew attention to evidence of consistent misperception (see p. 133) on the part of decision-makers in inter- national affairs. In his view, this stemmed largely from ethnocentrism. The inclination of Anthony Eden and the UK government to view General Nasser as a ‘second Hitler’ during the 1956 Suez Crisis, and the tendency of the USA in 1959 to regard Fidel Castro as a Marxist revolutionary, may be examples of this phenomenon. Irving Janis (1982), on the other hand, suggested that many deci- sions in the field of international relations could be explained in terms of what he called ‘groupthink’. This helps to explain how and why contrary or incon- venient views may be squeezed out of consideration in the decision-making process. Radical theorists, constructivists and feminists have each, in their different ways, highlighted the important role played by beliefs in the formulation of foreign policy. Radical theorists have tended to argue that senior policy-makers, both at a state level and within international organizations, are influenced by ideological biases that favour the interests of dominant economic and social groups. Capitalist economic structures are therefore seen as ‘natural’ and bene- ficial, meaning that free trade, market reforms and globalization are viewed in positive terms, with alternatives to them seldom being seriously considered. For Marxists, this is a reflection of ruling class ideology. Constructivists regard foreign policy-making as an intersubjective world, shaped more by ideas and identities than by supposedly objective facts. The interests that guide foreign policy do not therefore emerge out of the systemic pressures of the interna- tional system or from the nature of the state, but are fashioned by ideational processes at either a domestic or international level. In short, ideas and identi-  Ethnocentrism: A mode of ties determine interests. Feminists, for their part, may argue that a preponder- understanding in which the ance of men amongst policy-makers ensures that the ‘glue’ of politics is actions or intentions of other groups or peoples are provided by patriarchal ideas and values. This results in policy biases that help understood through the to sustain a system of male power, as discussed in Chapter 17. application of values and theories drawn from the observer’s own culture or experience.  Groupthink: The phenomenon in which psychological and professional pressures conspire to encourage a group of decision-makers to adopt a unified and coherent position. T H E S TAT E A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y I N A G L O B A L A G E 135 SUMMARY  The state has four key features: a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Its core feature, however, is sovereignty, the principle of absolute and unlimited power. There are nevertheless internal and external dimensions of sovereignty.  Globalization has widely been seen to curtail state sovereignty, creating ‘post-sovereign governance’. In particular, economic sovereignty has been compromised by transborder trading, capital and other flows. Some believe that such developments have transformed the nature of the state, giving rise to the ‘competi- tion’ state, the ‘market’ state or the ‘postmodern’ state.  Contrary to the ‘declinist’ literature, there is growing evidence of the return of state power. This has occurred as a response to new security threats, the increasing use of the state as an agent of economic modernization and through an emphasis on state-building as a means of promoting development.  Changes in the environment in which the state operates have also, many claim, meant that government is being displaced by governance, implying a shift away from command-and-control and towards coordination. This trend has been associated with the ‘stretching’ of government across a number of levels, giving rise to multi-level governance.  The making of foreign policy has traditionally been regarded as one of the key features of international poli- tics, reflecting the importance of statecraft. However, some question whether foreign policy is any longer meaningful given factors such as the structural dynamics of the international system and the advance of globalization.  A number of general theories of foreign policy decision-making have been advanced. The most important of these are rational actor models, incremental models, bureaucratic organization models and cognitive processes and belief-system models, although they are not necessarily incompatible. Questions for discussion Further reading  In what sense does the state have a dual structure? Hay, C., M. Lister and D. Marsh (eds) The State: Theories and  Why is sovereignty regarded as the core feature of Issues (2006). An insightful collection that examines the nature of the state and the issue of state transformation. the state?  What are the major threats to external sovereignty? Pierre, J. and B. G. Peters Governance, Politics and the State (2000). A useful introduction to the nature and signifi-  Is the notion of ‘post-sovereign governance’ mean- cance of governance. ingful?  What are the implications for the state of the Smith, S., A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds) Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (2008). A collection of authorita- growth of international organizations? tive writings on the theory and practice of foreign policy.  To what extent have globalizing tendencies reshaped the nature and role of the state? Sørensen, G. The Transformation of the State: Beyond the Myth of Retreat (2004). A systematic analysis that  Is the ‘return of the state’ a myth or a reality? stresses the state’s continued importance in world affairs.  In what ways does governance differ from govern- ment?  Is foreign policy-making best understood on an individual, national or systemic level?  How has neorealism challenged the traditional conception of foreign policy? Links to relevant web  Why is it so difficult for foreign policy actors to resources can be found on the make rational and balanced decisions? Global Politics website CHAPTER 6 Society in a Global Age ‘There is no such thing as society. There are only individual men and women, and their families.’ M A R G A R E T T H AT C H E R , interview, 1987 PREVIEW The study of international politics has conventionally paid little attention to social forces or social factors. ‘States’ rather than ‘societies’ were viewed as the principal actors on the world stage, and relations between and amongst them were thought to be determined by strictly political considerations (linked to power and security), not to sociological ones. In some ways, the advent of globalization accentuated this disregard for ‘the social’, as hyperglobalists in particular portrayed globalization as a strictly economic, or even technological, phenomenon. Both such views, however, fail to recognize the extent to which institutions such as the state and the economy are embedded in a network of social relationships, which both help to shape political and economic developments and are, in turn, shaped by them. Indeed, modern societies are changing as rapidly and as radically as modern economies. Key shifts include the changing nature of social connectedness, espe- cially in the light of the rise of so-called post-industrial societies and the massive growth in communications technology. Are ‘thick’ forms of social connectedness being replaced by ‘thin’ forms of connectedness? Furthermore, the advance of cultural globalization is reshaping social norms and values, especially, but by no means exclusively, in the developing world, not least through the spread of consumerism and the rise of individualism. What are the major drivers of this process, and is it leading to the spread of a global monoculture? Finally, the growth of transnational groups and global movements has led some to suggest that social relations and identities are in the process of being reshaped through the emergence of what has been dubbed ‘global civil society’. Is there such a thing as global civil society, and what are its implications for the future shape of global politics? KEY ISSUES  What have been the social implications of the emergence of post- industrial societies and the communications revolution?  Why have risk and insecurity become such prominent features of modern society?  How, and to what extent, has globalization altered social norms and cultural beliefs?  Why have NGOs and social movements grown in recent years?  Is global civil society a force for good or for ill? 136 SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL AGE 137 CONCEPT SOCIAL CONNECTEDNESS: THICK TO Fordism/post- THIN? Fordism What is a society? All societies are characterized by regular patterns of interac- Fordism and post-Fordism tion; a ‘society’ is not just a collection of people who happen to occupy the same are terms that are used territorial area. Societies are fashioned out of a usually stable set of relationships to explain the economic, political and cultural between and among their members, involving a sense of ‘connectedness’, in the transformation of form of mutual awareness and at least a measure of cooperation. Warring tribes, modern society by for instance, cannot be viewed as a ‘society’, even though they may live in close reference to the changing proximity to one another and interact regularly. However, societies may exist on form and organization of a number of different, and interconnected, levels. At a national or domestic level, production. Fordism refers to the large-scale particular countries are often referred to as societies, drawing attention to the mass production capacity of a shared culture and political allegiances to inculcate a common methods pioneered by sense of identity. Theorists of the so-called English School have argued that Henry Ford in Detroit in society also has an international dimension, in that shared norms and values and the USA. Using regular patterns of interaction among states have created what they call ‘inter- techniques widely imitated until the 1960s, national society’ (see p. 10). At a still higher level, some have suggested that Ford relied on society has acquired a global dimension, in the form of ‘world society’ (Burton mechanization and highly 1972) or ‘global civil society’ (see p. 152), as discussed in the final main section regimented production of this chapter. line labour processes to However, the nature of society, and therefore of social connectedness, has produce standardized, relatively cheap products. changed significantly over time. Mainly applying to national or domestic soci- Post-Fordism emerged as eties, modern society appears to be characterized by a ‘hollowing out’ of social the result of the connectedness, a transition from the ‘thick’ connectedness of close social bonds introduction of more and fixed allegiances to the ‘thin’ connectedness of more fluid, individualized flexible microelectronics- social arrangements. Many aspects of these changes are associated with the social based machinery that gave individual workers and cultural implications of globalization, which are examined in the next main greater autonomy and section, but other aspects of it are linked to developments such as the advent of made possible post-industrial society, the emergence of the ‘information age’, and a tendency innovations such as sub- towards uncertainty, insecurity and risk. contracting and batch production. Post-Fordism has been linked to decentralization in the From industrialization to post-industrialism workplace, social and Industrialization has been the most powerful factor shaping the structure and political fragmentation, and a greater emphasis character of modern societies. It has contributed to a dramatic increase in on choice and geographical mobility through the process of urbanization (by the early 2000s, individuality. most of the world’s then 6.3 billion people had come to live in towns and cities rather than in rural areas). The advance of industrialization also changed the structure of society, with the emergence of social class as the central organiz- ing principle of society. Class divisions replaced the fixed social hierarchies of more traditional societies, usually linked to land ownership. In the process,  Social class: Broadly, a however, the nature of social connectedness changed. One of the most influen- group of people who share a tial attempts to covey this transition was undertaken by the German sociologist similar social and economic Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936). Tönnies distinguished between Gemeinschaft, position, based either on their relationship to the means of or ‘community’, typically found in traditional societies and characterized by production or on the income natural affection and mutual respect, and Gesellschaft, or ‘association’, the and status of their occupational looser, artificial and contractual bonds typically found in urban and industrial group. societies. 138 GLOBAL POLITICS Nevertheless, class solidarity remained a significant feature of most industrial societies, even though liberals and Marxists offered quite different accounts of the nature of class inequality (the former highlighted individual differences such as ability and the willingness to work, while the latter drew attention to struc- tural divisions related to property ownership). Class loyalties, nevertheless, usually structured political allegiance: ‘blue-collar’ (or manual) workers gener- ally supported left-wing parties, and ‘white-collar’ (or non-manual) workers usually supported right-wing parties. However, a further shift occurred from the 1960s onwards through the emergence of so-called post-industrial societies. One of the key features of such societies has been the process of de-industrial- ization, reflected in the decline of labour-intensive heavy industries such as coal, steel and shipbuilding. These tended to be characterized by a solidaristic culture rooted in clear political loyalties and, usually, strong union organization. By contrast, the expanding service sectors of the economy foster more individualis- tic and instrumentalist attitudes. Post-industrial societies are therefore charac- terized by growing atomism and the weakening of social connectedness. Piore and Sabel (1984) interpreted these changes as part of the shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist era (see p. 137). The eclipse of the system of mass production and mass consumption, the chief characteristic of Fordism, has produced looser and more pluralized class formations. The shrinkage of the traditional working class has led to the development of so-called ‘two-thirds–one-third’ societies, in which the two-thirds are relatively prosperous, a product of a marked tendency towards social levelling associated with mass education, rising affluence and consumerism (see p. 149). J. K. Galbraith (1992) highlighted this tendency in pointing to the emergence in modern societies, at least amongst the politically active, of a ‘contented majority’ whose material affluence and economic security encourages them to be politi- cally conservative. In the process, debate about the nature of social inequality and poverty in modern societies has shifted from a concern about the working class and has focused instead on what is fashionably (but controversially) called  Post-industrial society: A the underclass. The underclass suffers less from poverty as it has been tradi- society based on service industries, rather than on tionally understood (deprivation of material necessities) and more from social manufacturing industries, and exclusion, reflected in cultural, educational and social impediments to meaning- accompanied by a significant ful participation in the economy and society. growth in the white-collar workforce. New technology and ‘information society’  Atomism: The tendency for society to be made up of a Technological change has always been closely linked to social change. For collection of self-interested and example, the introduction of industrial technology, through innovations such as largely self-sufficient steam power and the mechanization of heavy industries (iron and steel), led to individuals, operating as rapid population growth and greatly increased social and geographical mobility, separate atoms. in the process significantly altering patterns of family, friendship and working  Underclass: A poorly relationships. This has certainly also applied to developments in information defined and politically and communications technology, from the birth of printing through to what are controversial term that refers, sometimes called the three modern information revolutions. The first of these broadly, to people who suffer involved the development of the telegraph, telephone and radio; the second from multiple deprivation (unemployment or low pay, centred on television, early-generation computers and satellites; while the third poor housing, inadequate witnessed the advent of the so-called ‘new’ media, notably mobile phones, cable education and so on). and satellite television, cheaper and more powerful computers, and, most SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL AGE 139 A P P ROAC H E S TO . . . SOCIETY Realist view ‘international society’ and believing that interactions Realist theorists have given very little attention to among states and non-state actors tend to be struc- society, in any sense of the term. This reflects the fact tured by principles, procedures, norms or rules, often that the focus of their attention falls on the state, which leading to the formation of international regimes (see they view as a ‘black box’, in that internal social, politi- p. 67). cal, constitutional and, for that matter, cultural arrangements are irrelevant to its behaviour in the Critical views global system. As realists view states as robust, Critical approaches to society have been significantly autonomous units that are capable of extracting influenced by social constructivism. Constructivists resources from society and imposing their will on have placed sociological enquiry at the centre of global society, foreign policy is determined first and foremost politics by emphasizing that identities and interests in by considerations of power and security. Moreover, world affairs are socially constructed. Social, cultural relations between and amongst states are essentially and historical factors are therefore of primary interest ‘strategic’ rather than ‘social’: the international system in affecting the behaviour of states and other actors. is characterized by competition and struggle, not by Whereas mainstream theorists view society as a ‘strate- regular patterns of social interaction that develop gic’ realm, in which actors rationally pursue their through the emergence of norms, shared values and a various interests, constructivists view society as a willingness to cooperate. ‘constitutive’ realm, the realm that makes actors who or what they are, shaping their identities and interests. Liberal view However, constructivism is more an analytical tool that The liberal view of society is based on individualism emphasizes the sociological dimension of academic (see p. 150). Liberals thus regard society not as an enquiry than a substantive social theory, as advanced, entity in its own right but as a collection of individuals. for instance, by neo-Marxists and feminists. To the extent that society exists, it is fashioned out of Whereas orthodox Marxists explained society in voluntary and contractual agreements made by self- terms of the class system, viewing the proletariat as an interested human beings. Pluralists, nevertheless, have emancipatory force, neo-Marxists such as Frankfurt drawn attention to the role of groups in articulating critical theorists have tended to place their faith in the diverse interests within society. However, whether ‘counter-cultural’ social movements, such as the society is understood simply as a collection of self- women’s movement (see p. 415), the green movement interested individuals or as a collection of competing and the peace movement. In this view, global civil groups, liberals hold that there is a general balance of society in general, or the ‘anti-capitalist’ movement (see interests in society that tends to promote harmony and p. 70) in particular, has sometimes been seen as a equilibrium. This harmony is largely brought about counter-hegemonic force. Feminists, for their part, through the state, which acts as a neutral arbiter have analyzed society primarily in terms of gender amongst the competing interests and groups in society, inequality, seeing all contemporary and historical soci- so guaranteeing social order. This task also has implica- eties as being characterized by patriarchy (see p. 417) tions for foreign policy, which may therefore be shaped and female subordination. However, there is significant by the different groups in society and the political disagreement within feminism about matters such as influence they can exert. In this way, liberals accept that whether patriarchal society is shaped by biological or foreign policy decision-making may be society-centred, cultural factors, and the extent to which gender and by contrast with the realist model of state-centrism. class hierarchies are linked. From the perspective of Liberals have typically welcomed the emergence of green politics, society is either understood in mechani- global civil society, seeing this as a way of pluralizing cal terms, reflecting the disjuncture in conventional power and making intergovernmental decision-making society between humankind and nature, or it is under- more considered and popularly accountable. They also stood in terms of ‘social ecology’, reflecting natural tend to assume that interactions among states have a harmony both amongst human beings and between significant social component, favouring the notion of humans and nature. 140 GLOBAL POLITICS importantly, the Internet. The third information revolution has concerned the technologies of connectivity, and has been particularly significant. The extraordinary explosion that has occurred in the quantity of information and communication exchanges has marked, some argue, the birth of the ‘informa- tion age’ (in place of the industrial age), with society being transformed into an ‘information society’ and the economy becoming a ‘knowledge economy’ (see p. 93). The emergence of the ‘new’ has given huge impetus to the process of glob- alization. Indeed, hyperglobalists subscribe to a kind of technological deter- minism, in that they argue that accelerated globalization became inevitable once such technologies became widely available. The clearest evidence of the globalizing tendencies of the new media is that national borders have become increasingly permeable (if not irrelevant) as far as communications are concerned. While the industrial age created new mechanisms for communicat- ing at a national rather than a local level (via national newspapers, telephone  Internet: A global network of networks that connects systems, radio and television services and so on), the technologies of the infor- computers around the world; mation age are by their nature transnational – mobile phones, satellite televi- ‘virtual’ space in which users sion and the Internet (usually) operate regardless of borders. This, in turn, has can access and disseminate facilitated the growth of transborder groups, bodies and institutions, ranging online information. from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (see p. 6) and transnational  Connectivity: A computer corporations (TNCs) (see p. 99) to international criminal organizations and buzzword that refers to the global terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda (see p. 295). Not only do states strug- links between one device gle to control and constrain groups and organizations that have transborder (usually a computer) and structures, but they also have a greatly reduced capacity to control what their others, affecting the speed, ease citizens see, hear and know. For instance, although states such as China, Burma and extent of information exchanges. and Iran have, at various times, tried to restrict transborder communications via mobile phones and the Internet, the pace of technological change is very  Information society: A likely to weaken such controls in the longer term. In 2000, US President Bill society in which the crucial Clinton famously likened China’s attempts to control the Internet to trying to resource is nail Jell-O to the wall. knowledge/information, its primary dynamic force being Not only have information societies brought about a historically unprece- the process of technological dented change in the scope of social connectedness (even giving it, at times, a development and diffusion. transborder character); they have also altered the nature of social connectedness. More people are connected to more other people, but in different ways. One of  Technological the most influential attempts to explain this was advanced in Manuel Castells’ determinism: A theory of history in which technological (1996) notion of the ‘network society’. Whereas the dominant mode of social innovation and development is organization in industrial societies had been hierarchy, more complex and assumed to be the principal pluralized information societies operate either on the basis of markets (reflect- motor of social, economic or ing the wider role of market economics as well as the impact of economic glob- political change. alization (see p. 94)) or on the basis of looser and more diffuse networks.  Network: A means of co- According to Castells, businesses increasingly function as ‘network corporations’. ordinating social life through Many TNCs, for instance, are organized as networks of franchises and loose and informal relationships subsidiaries. Similar trends can be witnessed in social and political life. For between people or example, hierarchical bodies such as trade unions and pressure groups have organizations, usually for the increasingly lost influence through the emergence of network-based social purpose of knowledge dissemination or exchange; movements, such as the anti-globalization movement and the environmental connections among a number movement, and even terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda have adopted a of computers to share network form of organization. The increased use of the ‘new’ media in general information and hardware. and the Internet in particular, especially facilitated by search engines such as the SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL AGE 141 KEY EVENTS . . . Advances in communication technology 1455 Gutenberg Bible is published, initiating the printing revolution through the first use of removable and reusable type. 1837 The telegraph is invented, providing the first means of substantially superterritorial communication. 1876 The telephone is invented by Alexander Graham Bell, although the first telephone device was built in 1861 by the German scientist Johann Philip Reis. 1894 The radio is invented by Guglielmo Marconi, with a transatlantic radio signal being received for the first time in 1901. 1928 Television is invented by John Logie Baird, becoming commercially available in the late 1930s and reaching a mass audience in the 1950s and 1960s. 1936 First freely programmable computer is invented by Konrad Zuse. 1957 The Soviet Sputnik 1 is launched, initiating the era of communications satellites (sometimes called SATCOM). 1962 ‘Third generation’ computers, using integrated circuits (or microchips), started to appear (notably NASA’s Apollo Guidance Computer). 1969 Earliest version of the Internet developed, in the form of the ARPANET link between the University of California and the Stanford Research Institute, with electronic mail, or email, being developed three years later. 1991 Earliest version of the World Wide Web became publicly available as a global information medium through which users can read and write via computers connected to the Internet. 1995 Digitalization is introduced by Netscape and the Web, substantially broadening access to the Internet and the scope of other technologies. near-ubiquitous Google (see p. 142), has also led to a boom in social networking and massively expanded popular access to information. Although the impact of such developments cannot be doubted, their social implications remain a matter of considerable controversy.  World Wide Web: A hypertext-based system that Risk, uncertainty and insecurity gives users of the Internet access to a collection of online Although the ‘thinning’ of social connectedness has had profound implica- documents stored on servers tions, the widening of its scope may be no less significant. People are exposed around the world; often simply as never before to influences (people, events and processes) that are beyond the called WWW or the Web. parameters of their face-to-face interactions, based on family, friends, work 142 GLOBAL POLITICS G L O B A L AC TO R S . . . GOOGLE Type of organization: Public corporation • Founded: 1998 Headquarters: Mountainview, California, USA • Staff: About 20,000 full-time employees Google (the name originates from matter of considerable debate. be sure that what we read on the the mis-spelling of the word Supporters of Google argue that in Internet is true. (Note, for example, ‘Googol’, which refers to 10 to the facilitating access to websites and the way Wikipedia entries can be power of 100) was founded in 1998 online data and information, hijacked for self-serving or mischie- by Larry Page and Sergey Brin, while Google has helped to empower citi- vous purposes.) Nor can we always they were students at Stanford zens and non-state actors generally be certain, when we ‘Google’ for a University. The company’s remark- and has strengthened global civil particular piece of information, able growth derives from the fact society at the expense of national what the standpoint is of the that Google quickly became the governments, international bureau- website or blogger the search world’s predominant search engine crats and traditional political elites. engine throws up. Linked to this is (a tool designed to retrieve data and The oft-repeated truism that knowl- the fact that the Internet does not search for information on the World edge is power conventionally discriminate between good ideas Wide Web). In 2009, an estimated worked to the benefit of govern- and bad ones. It provides a plat- 65 per cent of Internet searches mental bodies and political leaders. form for the dissemination not only worldwide were made using Google. However, in the cyber age, easier of socially worthwhile and politi- Google has expanded rapidly and far wider access to news and cally neutral views but also of polit- through a strategy of acquisitions information means that, for the first ical extremism, racial and religious and partnerships, and it has also time, citizens and citizens’ groups bigotry, and pornography of significantly diversified its products, are privy to a quality and quantity various kinds. A further danger has which include email (Gmail), online of information that may sometimes been the growth of a ‘cult of infor- mapping (Google Earth), rival that of government. NGOs, mation’, whereby the accumulation customized home pages (iGoogle), think-tanks, interest groups and of data and information becomes video sharing (YouTube) and social protest movements have therefore an end in itself, impairing the networking sites. As well as develop- become more effective in challeng- ability of people to distinguish ing into one of the most powerful ing the positions and actions of between information, on the one brands in the world, Google has government and may even displace hand, and knowledge, experience cultivated a reputation for environ- government as an authoritative and wisdom on the other (Roszak mentalism, philanthropy and posi- source of views and information 1994). The Google generation may tive employee relations. Its unofficial about specialist subjects ranging therefore know more but have a slogan is ‘Don’t be evil’. from the environment and global gradually diminishing capacity to poverty to public health and civil make considered and wise judge- Significance: Google’s success as a liberties. In this sense, Google and ments. Such a criticism is linked to business organization cannot be other search engines have turned allegations that ‘surfing’ the doubted. Its widespread use and the World Wide Web into a democ- Internet actually impairs people’s ever-expanding range of products ratizing force. ability to think and learn by has helped to turn Google from a On the other hand, Google and encouraging them to skim and noun into a verb (as in ‘to Google the bewildering array of knowledge jump from one piece of informa- someone or something’), with and information available on the tion to the next, ruining their young people sometimes being Internet have also been subject to ability to concentrate. Google may dubbed the ‘Google generation’. criticism. The most significant therefore be making people stupid However, Google’s impact on drawback is the lack of quality rather than better-informed (Carr culture, society and politics is a control on the Internet: we cannot 2008, 2010). SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL AGE 143 colleagues and so on. For Zigmunt Bauman (2000), the combination of the thinning and widening of social connectedness has changed every aspect of the human condition. Society has moved away from a ‘heavy’ or ‘solid’, hard- ware-based modernity to a ‘light’ or ‘liquid’ software-based modernity. What he calls ‘liquid society’ is characterized by the new remoteness and un-reacha- bility of global processes coupled with the unstructured and under-defined, fluid state of people’s everyday lives. This has, moreover, led to a substantial increase in the levels of uncertainty and insecurity in society: when everything is short-lived and nothing stands still, people feel anxious and are constantly on alert. At a general level, the widening of connectedness fosters, in itself, greater risk, uncertainty and instability, because it expands the range of factors that influence decisions and events. As chaos theory (see p. 79) suggests, as more things influence more other things, not only do events have more far-reaching consequences but these consequences become more difficult to predict. An interconnected world thus assumes a random, unstable, even crisis-prone character. Ulrich Beck (2006) has taken this analysis further by suggesting that the prevalence of risk in modern societies reflects the transition from the ‘first modernity’, the period during which, at least in the West, the state could be relied on to provide democracy, economic growth and security, to the ‘second modernity’, a world ‘beyond controllability’. One of the consequences of the emergence of what he calls ‘risk societies’ is the growth of ‘tragic individual- ization’. In industrial societies, political conflict was defined by the distribu- tion of ‘goods’, typically goods or resources that were supplied by government, such as benefits, subsidies, jobs, healthcare and pensions. In risk societies, by contrast, political conflict is defined by the distribution of ‘bads’ – risks, threats or problems. Furthermore, these ‘bads’ are usually not natural catastrophes but created hazards; examples include pollution, industrial waste that is not easily disposed of, nuclear radiation, resource depletion and BSE (so-called ‘mad cow disease’). Modern society is replete with ‘manufactured’ risks and instabilities of various kinds. The spread of industrialization and the dismantling of regula- tory frameworks has created a range of environmental threats which do not respect borders and, indeed, may affect the entire world. Amongst the most obvious of these are the chemical pollution of rivers and lakes, ozone deple- tion, acid rain and climate change (examined in Chapter 16). The advance of economic globalization also means that economic conditions and livelihoods in one part of the world can be more easily affected by events that occur, or decisions that are taken, in other parts of the world. This applies, for instance, to investment or relocation decisions that are made by TNCs, and to the wider, and almost instantaneous, impact of stock market crashes in the globalized financial system (examined in Chapter 5, in connection with the crises of capi-  Tragic individualization: talism). Furthermore, levels of personal safety and security have been under- The condition in which the mined by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the growth in global individual, through the failure terrorism (see p. 284). Wider access to chemical and biological weapons and to of science, politics and other nuclear weapons has dramatically increased the threat to civilian populations expert systems to manage risk, is forced to cope with the of armed conflict between or within states, while terrorism, by its nature, poses uncertainty of the global world a threat that is unpredictable and seemingly random. by him or herself. 144 GLOBAL POLITICS KEY THEORISTS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION Manuel Castells (born 1942) A Spanish sociologist, Castells is especially associated with the idea of information society and communications research. He suggests that we live in a ‘network society’, in which territorial borders and traditional identities have been undermined by the power of knowledge flows. Castells thus emphasizes the ‘informational’ basis of network society, and shows how human experience of time and space have been transformed. His works include The Rise of the Network Society (1996), The Internet Galaxy (2004) and Communication Power (2009). Ulrich Beck (born 1944) A German sociologist, Beck’s work has examined topics as wide-ranging as the new world of work, the perils of globalization, and challenges to the global power of capital. In The Risk Society (1992), he analyzed the tendency of the globalizing economy to generate uncertainty and insecurity. Individualization (2002) (written with his wife, Elizabeth) champions rights-based individualization against free-market individualism. In Power in the Global Age (2005), Beck explored how the strate- ULRICH BECK gies of capital can be challenged by civil society movements. Roland Robertson (born 1938) A UK sociologist and one of the pioneers in the study of globalization, Robertson’s psycho- social view of globalization portrays it as ’the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole’. He has drawn attention to both the process of ‘relativization’ (when local cultures and global pressures mix) and the process of ‘glocalization’ (through which global pressures are forced to conform to local conditions). Robertson’s key work in this field is Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (1992). ROLAND ROBERTSON Saskia Sassen (born 1949) A Dutch sociologist, Sassen is noted for her analyses of globalization and international human migration. In The Global City (2001), she examined how cities such as New York, London and Tokyo have become emblematic of the capacity of globalization to create contradictory spaces, charac- terized by the relationship between the employees of global corporations and the vast population of the low-income ‘others’ (often migrants and women). Sassen’s other works include The Mobility SASKIA SASSEN of Capital and Labour (1988) and Territory, Authority, Rights (2006). Jan Aart Scholte (born 1959) A Dutch sociologist and globalization theorist, Scholte argues that globalization is best under- stood as a reconfiguration of social geography marked by the growth of transplanetary and supraterritorial connections between people. Although by no means a critic of the ‘supraterri- torialism’ that globalization brings about, he highlights the tendency of ‘neoliberalist globaliza- tion’ to heighten insecurities, exacerbate inequalities and deepen democratic deficits. Scholte’s main works include International Relations of Social Change (1993) and Globalization: A Critical JAN AART SCHOLTE Introduction (2005). Zygmunt Bauman (born 1925) A Polish sociologist, Bauman’s interests range from the nature of intimacy to globalization, and from the Holocaust to reality television programmes such as Big Brother. Sometimes portrayed as the ‘prophet of postmodernity’, he has highlighted trends such as the emergence of new patterns of deprivation and exclusion, the psychic corruption of consumer society, and the growing tendency for social relations to have a ‘liquid’ character. Bauman’s main writings include Modernity and the Holocaust (1994), Globalization (1998) and Liquid Modernity (2000). ZYGMUNT BAUMAN SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL AGE 145 GLOBALIZATION, CONSUMERISM AND THE INDIVIDUAL Social and cultural implications of globalization Globalization is a multidimensional process. Although it is often understood primarily in economic terms, linked to the establishment of an interlocking global economy, its social and cultural implications are no less important. Human societies, for instance, have traditionally had clear territorial foundations. People knew and interacted with others within their community and, to a lesser extent, with people from neighbouring communities. In short, geography and distance mattered. Globalization, however, has led to the rise of ‘supraterritoriality’ or ‘deterritorialization’ (Scholte 2005), through which the constraints traditionally imposed by geography and distance have been substantially overcome. This process has occurred, most obviously, through improvements in the technologies of communication and transport. However, not only have mobile telephones, the Internet and air travel revolutionized our understanding of space, they have also transformed our notion of time, particularly through seemingly instantaneous information flows. In this light, David Harvey (1990, 2009) associated globaliza- tion with the phenomenon of ‘time/space compression’, meaning that, for the first time, human interaction could take place outside the restrictions of both space and time. Time/space compression alters people’s experience of the world in a variety of ways. For instance, it means that the speed of life is increasing, as, quite simply, events, transactions and travel happen more quickly. The process of cultural globalization (see p. 147) has sometimes been seen to  Deterritorialization: The process through which social be yet more significant. In this view, the essence of globalization is the process spaces can no longer be wholly whereby cultural differences between nations and regions are tending to be ‘flat- mapped in terms of territorial tened out’. Such an approach to globalization links it to cultural homogeniza- places, territorial distance and tion, as cultural diversity is weakened or destroyed in a world in which we all territorial borders. watch the same television programmes, buy the same commodities, eat the same  Time/space compression: food, support the same sports stars, follow the antics of the same ‘global celebri- The idea that, in a globalized ties’, and so on. The chief factors fuelling cultural globalization have been the world, time and space are no growth of TNCs, and especially global media corporations (such as AOL-Time longer significant barriers to Warner, News Corporation, Viacom, Disney, Vivendi Universal and Bertelsmann communications and AG), the increasing popularity of international travel and tourism, and, of interaction. course, the information and communications revolution.  Homogenization: The Many commentators portray cultural globalization as a ‘top-down’ process, tendency for all parts or the establishment of a single global system that imprints itself on all parts of the elements (in this case world; in effect, a global monoculture. From this perspective, cultural globaliza- countries) to become similar or tion amounts to a form of cultural imperialism, emphasizing that cultural flows identical. are between unequal partners and are used as a means through which powerful  Cultural imperialism: The states exert domination over weaker states. Some therefore portray cultural glob- displacement of an indigenous alization as ‘westernization’ or, more specifically, as ‘Americanization’. The image culture by the imposition of of globalization as homogenization is at best a partial one, however. foreign beliefs, values and Globalization often goes hand in hand with localization, regionalization and attitudes, usually associated with consolidating or multiculturalism (see p. 174). The fear or threat of homogenization, especially legitimizing economic and/or when it is perceived to be imposed ‘from above’, or ‘from outside’, provokes political domination. cultural and political resistance. This can be seen in the resurgence of interest in 146 GLOBAL POLITICS Naomi Klein (born 1970) Canadian journalist, author and anti-corporate activist. Klein’s No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (2000) is a wide-ranging critique of lifestyle branding and labour abuses, and discusses emerging forms of resistance to globalization and corporate domination. It has been described as ‘the book that became part of the movement’ but has had wider significance in provoking reflection on the nature of consumer capitalism and the tyranny of brand culture. In Disaster Capitalism (2008), she drew attention to the extent to which the advance of neoliberalism has been implicated in ‘shocks’, states of emergency and crises of one kind or another. Klein is a frequent and influential media commentator. She lives in Toronto but travels widely throughout North America, Asia, Latin America and Europe, supporting movements campaigning against the negative effects of globalization. declining languages and minority cultures as well as in the spread of religious fundamentalism. Nevertheless, the two main ingredients of cultural globaliza- tion have been the spread of consumerism (see p. 149) and the growth of indi- vidualism (see p. 150). Consumerism goes global Cultural globalization has most commonly been associated with the worldwide advance of a culture of consumer capitalism, sometimes seen as ‘turbo- consumerism’. One aspect of this has been what is called ‘Coca Colonization’, a process first highlighted by French communists in the 1950s. Coca Colonization refers, on one level, to the emergence of global goods and global brands (Coca Cola being a prime example) that have come to dominate economic markets in more and more parts of the world, creating an image of bland uniformity.  Brand: A symbolic construct, typically consisting of name, However, at a deeper level, it also captures the psychological and emotional logo or symbol, which conveys power that these brands have come to acquire through highly sophisticated the promise, ‘personality’ or marketing and advertising, allowing them to become symbols of freedom, image of a product or group of youthfulness, vitality, happiness and so on. It is therefore a manifestation of what products. Marxists have called commodity fetishism. Consumerism has become one of  Commodity fetishism: The the key targets of modern anti-corporate criticism, highlighted by Naomi Klein, process whereby commodities amongst others, and it has been particularly emphasized by the green move- are invested with symbolic and ment, as discussed in Chapter 16. social significance, allowing In one of the most influential accounts of trends in global consumerism, them to exert sway over Benjamin Barber (2003) portrayed the emerging world as a ‘McWorld’. McWorld human beings. is tied together by technology, ecology, communications and commerce, creating  McDonaldization: The a ‘shimmering scenario of integration and uniformity’ in which people every- process whereby global where are mesmerized by ‘fast music, fast computers, fast food – with MTV, commodities and commercial McIntosh and McDonald’s pressing nations into one commercially homoge- and marketing practices neous theme park’. Alongside and reflecting such developments has been the associated with the fast food industry have come to increasing standardization of business organizations and practices, commonly dominate more and more referred to as ‘McDonaldization’. Underpinning the emergence of McWorld has economic sectors (Ritzer 1993) been the seemingly relentless spread of materialist values, based on the notion of SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL AGE 147 an intrinsic link between wealth and happiness. For many, these trends have a CONCEPT markedly western, and more specifically American character. The ‘westerniza- Cultural tion’ model of cultural globalization derives from the fact that the West (see p. globalization 26) is the home of consumer capitalism and industrial society, and is backed up by the belief that the ethic of material self-seeking is a specifically western value, Cultural globalization is the process whereby stemming as it does from western liberalism. The ‘Americanization’ model of information, cultural globalization reflects the disproportionate extent to which the goods commodities and images and images that dominate modern commerce and the media derive from the that have been produced USA, meaning that the world is being taken over not just by consumer capital- in one part of the world ism but by a very particular US model of consumer capitalism. enter into a global flow that tends to ‘flatten out’ The trends associated with cultural globalization have by no means been cultural differences universally condemned, however. For many, the advent of consumer culture and between nations, regions access to a wider range of goods and cultural products have broadened oppor- and individuals. Cultural tunities and provided an alternative to the narrow parochialism of traditional globalization is closely societies. Cultural globalization may, for instance, be compared favourably with linked to and emerged in association with insular nationalism. However, most interpretations of cultural globalization economic globalization have been critical or pessimistic. At least three main lines of attack have been and the communication adopted. First, cultural globalization has been seen to serve the interests of and information economic or political domination. In this view, cultural globalization has been revolution. However, driven by the dominant interests in the new globalized economy – TNCs, the cultural globalization is a complex process that West generally and the USA in particular – and its role has been to shape values, generates both appetites and lifestyles so as to ensure market penetration and the ascendancy of homogenization, or global capitalism. Second, cultural homogenization has been condemned as an cultural ‘flattening’, and assault on local, regional and national distinctiveness. A world in which every- polarization and diversity. thing looks the same and everyone thinks and acts in the same way is a world The latter may occur both because cultural without a sense of rootedness and belonging. Third, consumerism and material- products spread more ism have been condemned as a form of captivity, a form of manipulation that easily if they adapt to distorts values and denies happiness. local traditions and understandings, and because the perceived Rise of individualism domination by foreign ideas, values and The trend towards ‘thin’ social connectedness and the pressures generated by lifestyles can create a globalization have combined in modern societies to place greater emphasis on cultural backlash, fuelling the individual and, arguably, less emphasis on community. In many parts of the the rise of ethnic, world, the notion of ‘the individual’ is now so familiar that its political and social religious or national movements. significance, as well as its relatively recent origins, are often overlooked. In the traditional societies, there is typically little idea of individuals having their own interests or possessing personal and unique identities. Rather, people are seen as members of the social groups to which they belong: their family, village, tribe, local community and so on. Their lives and identities are largely determined by the character of these groups in a process that changes little from one generation to the next. The rise of individualism is widely seen as a consequence of the establishment of industrial capitalism as the dominant mode of social organiza- tion, first in western societies and, thanks to globalization, beyond. Industrial capitalism meant that people were confronted by a broader range of choices and  Community: A principle or social possibilities. They were encouraged, perhaps for the first time, to think for sentiment based on the collective identity of a social themselves, and to think of themselves in personal terms. A peasant, for example, group, bonds of comradeship, whose family may always have lived and worked on the same piece of land, loyalty and duty. became a ‘free man’ and acquired some ability to choose who to work for, or 148 GLOBAL POLITICS Focus on . . . Consumerism as captivity? Is consumerism a source of personal gratification, even advertising techniques that allowed the manipulation self-expression, or is it a form of manipulation and of needs by vested interests were creating a ‘one- social control? The idea of consumerism as captivity dimensional society’. Modern marketing techniques would strike many people as simple nonsense – after have massively expanded this capacity for manipula- all, no one is ever forced to shop! The desire for wealth tion, not least through the development of a ‘brand and the pleasure derived from material acquisition are culture’ (Klein 2000). The core theme of anti- widely viewed as nothing more than an expression of consumerism is that advertising and marketing in their human nature. What is more, such thinking is backed myriad forms create ‘false’ needs that serve the inter- up by perfectly respectable social and economic theory. ests of corporate profit, often, in the process, under- Utilitarianism, the most widely accepted tradition of mining psychological and emotional well-being. By moral philosophy, assumes that individuals act so as to creating ever-greater material desires, they leave maximize pleasure and minimize pain, these being consumers in a constant state of dissatisfaction calculated in terms of utility or use-value, usually seen because, however much they acquire and consume, as satisfaction derived from material consumption. The they always want more. Consumerism thus works not global spread of consumerist ethics is therefore merely through the satisfaction of desires, but through the evidence of deep-seated material appetites on the part generation of new desires, keeping people in a state of of humankind. constant neediness, aspiration and want. This is borne Nevertheless, critiques of consumerism can be out by the emerging discipline of ‘happiness econom- traced back to the Marxist notion of ‘commodity ics’ which suggests that once citizens enjoy fairly fetishism’ as a process through which objects came to comfortable living standards (generally an annual have sway over the people who own or hope to income of around $20,000), more income brings little, acquire them. For Herbert Marcuse (1964), modern if any, additional happiness (Layard 2006). maybe the opportunity to leave the land altogether and look for work in the growing towns or cities. As individuals, people were more likely to be self- seeking, acting in accordance with their own (usually material) interests, and they were encouraged to be self-sufficient in the sense of taking responsibility for their economic and social circumstances. This gave rise to the doctrine of economic individualism. However, there is deep disagreement over the implications of the spread of individualism. For many, the spread of individualism has profoundly weakened community and our sense of social belonging, perhaps implying that society in its conventional sense no longer exists. For instance, academic sociology largely  Economic individualism: arose in the nineteenth century as an attempt to explore the (usually negative) The belief that individuals are social implications of the spread of industrialization and urbanization, both of entitled to autonomy in which had encouraged increasing individualism and competition. For Tönnies, matters of economic decision- this had led to the growth of so-called Gesellschaft-relationships, which are arti- making; economic individualism is sometimes taken to be ficial and contractual, reflecting the desire for personal gain rather than any synonymous with private meaningful social loyalty. Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) emphasized the degree property and implies laissez- to which the weakening of social codes and norms had resulted in the spread of faire (see p. 103). ‘anomie’: that is, feelings of isolation, loneliness and meaninglessness, which, in SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL AGE 149 Durkheim’s ([1897] 1997) view, had led to an increase in the number of suicides CONCEPT in industrial societies. Similar misgivings about the rise of individualism have Consumerism been expressed by modern communitarian thinkers, who have linked the growth Consumerism is a of egoism and atomism to a weakening of social duty and moral responsibility. psychological and cultural As people are encouraged to take account of their own interests and their own phenomenon whereby rights, a moral vacuum is created in which society, quite literally, disintegrates. personal happiness is Robert Putnam (2000), for instance, has highlighted the decline of social capital equated with the in modern societies, reflected in the decline of community activity and political consumption of material possessions. It is often engagement, including voting and party membership. A particular source of associated with the communitarian concern has been the so-called ‘parenting deficit’, the failure of emergence of a modern parents concerned about their own enjoyment and well-being to ‘consumer society’ or of adequately control or socialize their children, resulting in a general decline in ‘consumer capitalism’. civility and a rise in levels of delinquency and crime. Consumer capitalism was shaped by the On the other hand, liberal theorists in particular have viewed rising individ- development of new ualism as a mark of social progress. In this view, the forward march of individ- advertising and marketing ualism has been associated with the spread of progressive, even enlightened, techniques that took social values, notably toleration and equality of opportunity. If human beings advantage of the growth are thought of first and foremost as individuals, they must be entitled to the of the mass media and the spread of mass same rights and the same respect, meaning that all forms of disadvantage or affluence. A consumer discrimination, based on factors such as gender, race, colour, creed, religion or society is one that is social background, are viewed as morally questionable, if not indefensible. All organized around the modern industrial societies have, to a greater or lesser extent, been affected by consumption rather than the spread of such ideas, not least through changing gender roles and family the production of goods and services, a shift that structures that have resulted from the spread of feminism. The link between has important socio- individualism and the expansion of choice and opportunity has also been high- economic and cultural lighted by the spread in modern societies of social reflexivity (Giddens 1994). implications. Whereas This has occurred for a variety of reasons, including the development of mass ‘productionist’ societies education, much wider access to information through radio, television, the emphasize the values of discipline, duty and hard Internet and so on, and intensified cultural flows within and between societies. work (the Protestant However, social reflexivity brings both benefits and dangers. On the one hand, it work ethic, for example), has greatly widened the sphere of personal freedom, the ability of people to consumer societies define who they are and how they wish to live, a tendency reflected in the emphasize materialism, increasing domination of politics by so-called ‘lifestyle’ issues. On the other hedonism and immediate rather than delayed hand, its growth has coincided with a strengthening of consumerism and mate- gratification. rialist ethics. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the advance of individualism or, for that matter, the erosion of community. Individualism has been embraced  Social capital: Cultural and most eagerly in the Anglophone world, where it has been most culturally palat- moral resources, such as able given the impact of Protestant religious ideas about personal salvation and networks, norms and trust, that the moral benefits of individual self-striving. By contrast, Catholic societies in help to promote social cohesion, Europe and elsewhere have been more successful in resisting individualism and political stability and prosperity. maintaining the ethics of social responsibility, reflected in a stronger desire to  Social reflexivity: The uphold welfare provision as both an expression of social responsibility and a tendency of individuals and means of upholding social cohesion. However, the best examples of successful other social actors to reflect, anti-individualist societies can be found in Asia, especially in Japan, China and more or less continuously, on Asian ‘tiger’ states such as Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. This has led to a the conditions of their own actions, implying higher levels debate about the viability of a set of so-called ‘Asian values’, and especially those of self-awareness, self- associated with Confucianism (see p. 195), as an alternative to the individualism knowledge and contemplation. of western liberal societies. In addition, the image of modern societies being 150 GLOBAL POLITICS increasingly dominated by ‘thin’ forms of social connectedness is undermined by CONCEPT evidence of the resurgence of ‘thick’ social connectedness in many societies, Individualism especially in the form of identity politics (see p. 186) and linked to the growing Individualism is the belief importance of culture, ethnicity and religion in world affairs. The notion of an in the supreme emerging global monoculture may therefore be a myth, as globalization may be importance of the associated as much with the rise of ethnic nationalism and religious fundamen- individual over any social talism (see p. 193) as it is with the spread of consumerism and self-seeking indi- group or collective body. vidualism. Barber (2003), indeed, argued that the rise of McWorld is As such, individualism has two key implications. symbiotically linked to the emergence of militant Islam, or ‘Jihad’, the latter First, each individual has being, in part, a reaction against the imposition of foreign and threatening a separate, indeed western cultural and economic practices. The growing importance of culture unique, identity, and religion in global politics is examined in more detail in Chapter 8. reflecting his or her ‘inner’ or personal qualities. This is reflected in the idea of individuality, and is GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY linked to the notion of Explaining global civil society people as self-interested and largely self-reliant The advance of globalization, and the progressive ‘de-territorialization’ of creatures. Second, all economic, cultural and political life, has gradually weakened the idea that society individuals share the same moral status as should be understood merely in domestic or national terms. If societies are fash- ‘persons’, irrespective of ioned out of a usually stable set of relationships between and among their factors such as race, members, involving mutual awareness and at least a measure of cooperation, it religion, nationality, sex has sometimes been suggested that one of the consequences of globalization has and social position. The been the emergence of ‘transnational’ or ‘world’ society (Burton 1973; Buzan notion that individuals are of equal moral worth 2004). However, the extent to which societal identities have been, or are in the is reflected in the idea of process of being, established across the global population as a whole should not rights, and especially in be over-stated. A perhaps fruitful way of thinking about the transnational dimen- the doctrine of human sion of society is in terms of what is called ‘global civil society’ (see p. 152). Interest rights (see p. 304). in the idea of global civil society grew during the 1990s, as a mosaic of new groups, organizations and movements started to appear, which both sought to challenge or resist what was seen as ‘corporate’ globalization and articulate alternative models of social, economic and political development. This happened against a backdrop of the spread of demands for democratization around the world, in the aftermath of the Cold War, and in the light of the intensifying process of global interconnectedness. In some cases, these groups and organizations rejected glob-  Individuality: Self- fulfilment achieved though the alization altogether, styling themselves as part of an ‘anti-globalization’ move- realization of one’s own ment, but in other cases they supported a reformed model of globalization, distinctive or unique identity or sometimes seen as ‘social democratic’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ globalization. qualities; that which The development of emergent global civil society can best be explained distinguishes one person from through the theory of countervailing power, as developed by J.K. Galbraith all other people. (1963). In this view, emergent global civil society is a direct reaction to the  Countervailing power: The perceived domination of corporate interests within the globalization process. theory that concentrations of The rise of global civil society is therefore part of a backlash against the triumph power tend to be temporary of neoliberalism (see p. 90). This helps to explain the ideological orientation of because they stimulate most of these new groups and movements, which broadly favour a global social oppositional forces and the emergence of rival centres of justice or world ethics agenda, reflected in a desire to extend the impact and effi- power; often used to explain cacy of human rights, deepen international law (see p. 332) and develop citizen challenges to corporate power. networks to monitor and put pressure on states and international organizations SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL AGE 151 Debating . . . Is globalization producing a global monoculture? The dominant image of globalization is that it tends to ‘flatten out’ cultural differences, advancing sameness and dimin- ishing difference worldwide. However, modern societies have also exemplified a strong tendency towards diversity and pluralization. FOR AG A I N S T Globalization as homogenization. One aspect of global- Globalization as hybridization. Cultural exchange is by ization is universalization: the dispersal of objects, no means a top-down or one-way process; instead, all images, ideas and experiences to people in all inhabited societies, including economically and politically powerful parts of the world. For example, economic globalization ones, have become more varied and diverse as a result of and the rise of TNCs have led to the emergence of ‘global the emergence of a globalized cultural market place. So- goods’ (Starbucks coffee, Barbie dolls and so on). The called reverse cultural flows reflect the growth of ‘hybrid- spread of communications technologies, such as televi- ity’ or creolization (the cross-fertilization that takes place sion, film, radio and, of course, the Internet, has homog- when different cultures interact). In return for Coca enized global cultural flows and led to the creation of Cola, McDonalds and MTV, developed states have ‘global celebrities’ (such as Britney Spears and David increasingly been influenced by non-western religions, Beckham). And English is well on its way to becoming food (soy sauce, Indian curry spices, tortillas), medicines the dominant global language – about 35 per cent of the and therapeutic practices (acupuncture, yoga, Buddhist world’s mail, telexes, and cables are in English, approxi- meditation), sports (judo, karate, kick-boxing) and so on. mately 40 per cent of the world’s radio programmes are in English, and about 50 per cent of all Internet traffic Return of the local. The globalization-as-homogenization uses English. thesis is undermined by the extent to which globalization either adapts to local circumstances or strengthens local ‘Americanization of the world’. For many, the globaliza- influences. In developing states, for instance, western tion-as-homogenization thesis conceals a deeper process: consumer goods and images have been absorbed into the advance of westernization and, more especially, more traditional cultural practices through a process of Americanization. Global sameness reflects the imposition indigenization (through which alien goods and practices of a dominant economic, social and cultural model on all are adapted to local conditions and needs). Examples parts of the world. The rise of an increasingly homoge- include the Bollywood film industry and the Al-Jazeera nized popular culture is underwritten by a western television network (see p. 204). The process of cultural ‘culture industry’, based in New York, Hollywood, borrowing by which local actors select and modify London and Milan. Western, and more specifically US, elements from an array of global possibilities has been norms and lifestyles therefore overwhelm more vulnera- described by Robertson (1992) as ‘glocalization’. ble cultures, leading, for instance, to Palestinian youths wearing Chicago Bulls sweatshirts. The economic and Cultural polarization. Where economic and cultural cultural impact of the USA is also reflected in the globalization have imposed alien and threatening values ‘McDonaldization’ of the world, reflecting the seemingly and practices, a backlash has sometimes been provoked, unstoppable rise of American-style consumer capitalism. resulting not in homogenization but in polarization. This can be seen in Barber’s (2003) image of a world culture Global liberalization. A third version of the homogeniza- shaped by symbiotic links between ‘McWorld’ and ‘Jihad’. tion thesis highlights a growing worldwide ascendancy Similarly, Samuel Huntington (see p. 514) dismissed the of liberal ideas and structures. In economic terms, this is idea of a global monoculture in proclaiming, instead, the reflected in the global trend in favour of free markets and emergence of a ‘clash of civilizations’. This suggested that free trade. In political terms, it is evident in the spread of with the end of the Cold War, global politics had moved liberal democracy, based on a combination of electoral out of its western phase, its centrepiece increasingly democracy and party competition. In cultural and ideo- becoming interaction between the West and non-western logical terms, it is reflected in the rise of individualism, civilizations as well as among non-western civilizations. an emphasis on technocratic rationalism, and the devel- Key civilizational conflict would thus occur between the opment of the doctrine of human rights into a cosmo- USA and China and between the West and Islam. politan political creed. 152 GLOBAL POLITICS (Kaldor 2003). The growth of such groups has also been facilitated by the emer- CONCEPT gence of a framework of global governance, which has both provided civil Global civil society groups with sources of funding and given them the opportunity to society engage in policy formulation and, sometimes, policy implementation. Other factors include the wider availability of advanced ICT to facilitate transnational The term ‘civil society’ refers to a realm of communication and organization; and the development of a pool of educated autonomous groups and professionals in both developed and developing countries who, albeit in differ- associations that operate ent ways and for different reasons, feel alienated by the globalized capitalist independently of system. government. Global civil The so-called Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 is often cited as society thus highlights a realm in which the earliest evidence of a functioning global civil society. The formation of the transnational non- World Social Forum in 2001 gave the global civil society sector a greater sense of governmental groups and focus and organizational direction, enabling it to challenge its great capitalist associations interact. rival, the World Economic Forum. In this sense, global civil society has emerged These groups are as a third force between TNCs and international organizations, representing typically voluntary and non-profitmaking, setting neither the market nor the state. However, the concept of global civil society them apart from TNCs. remains controversial. A neologism of the 1990s, the idea of global civil society However, the term global quickly became fashionable, being used by world leaders and policy-makers as civil society is complex well as by political activists. But is it a reality, or merely an aspiration? and contested. In its Participation in global civil society, for instance, is restricted to a relatively small ‘activist’ version, transnational social number of people. None of its groups yet constitutes a genuine mass movement, movements are the key comparable, say, to the trade union movement or the mass membership of polit- agents of global civil ical parties of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, there society, giving it an are doubts about the degree of interconnectedness within global civil society: is ‘outsider’ orientation and it one thing or a number of things? In particular, there are differences between a strong focus on humanitarian goals and the two main actors within global civil society: transnational social movements cosmopolitan ideals. In and NGOs. its ‘policy’ version, NGOs are the key agents of global civil society, giving Transnational social movements and NGOs it an ‘insider’ orientation and meaning that it Transnational social movements, sometimes called ‘new’ social movements, overlaps significantly developed during the 1960s and 1970s against the backdrop of growing student with global governance radicalism, anti-Vietnam war protest and the rise of ‘counter-cultural’ attitudes (see p. 455). and sensibilities. Key examples included the women’s movement, the environ- mental or green movement and the peace movement. These movements attracted the young, the better-educated and the relatively affluent, and typically embraced a ‘postmaterialist’ ethic (see p. 154). They tended to be more concerned with quality of life issues and cultural change than with social advancement in the traditional sense. Although they articulated the views of different groups, they nevertheless subscribed to a common, if not always clearly defined, ideology, linked, broadly, to the ideas of the New Left. From the outset, these movements had a transnational, even global, orientation. This reflected the fact that, in many cases, support for them spills naturally across borders (for  New Left: A current in leftist example, the women’s movement) and also that, given the nature of their thought that rejected both concerns, national divisions are seen as part of the problem rather than as part orthodox communism and of the solution (for instance, the peace movement and the green movement). social democracy in favour of a new politics of liberation based Such tendencies were accentuated by the development, from the 1990s on decentralization and onwards, of a new wave of social movement activism, with the emergence participatory democracy. of what has variously been called the anti-globalization, anti-capitalist, anti- SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL AGE 153 GLOBAL POLITICS IN ACTION . . . The Rio ‘Earth Summit’, 1992 Events: The UN Conference on Environment and Development, more widely known as the Earth Summit, was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, during 3–14 June 1992. The Rio Earth Summit was unprecedented for a UN conference, in terms of both its size and the scope of its concerns. Some 172 countries were represented at Rio, 108 by their head of state or government. This made the Earth Summit the largest gathering of state leaders in history. In addition, some 2,400 repre- sentatives of NGOs were present, and about 17,000 people attended a parallel NGO ‘Global Forum’. Almost 10,000 on-site journalists helped to convey the Summit’s message around the world. With the involvement of about 30,000 people in total, the Earth Summit was the largest environmental conference ever held. The Earth Summit resulted in two international agreements, tion or anti-capitalist protests, forging a link between Rio two statements of principles, and an action agenda on and the 1999 ‘Battle of Seattle’, for example. worldwide sustainable development: Second, the Earth Summit influenced the scope and focus of all subsequent UN conferences. It did this by  The Convention on Biological Diversity squarely acknowledging the interrelationship between  The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) global issues. Human rights, population control, social  The Principles for the Sustainable Management of development, gender justice and environmental protection Forests could no longer be viewed as discrete challenges, but had to  The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development be addressed holistically. Third, the Earth Summit marked  Agenda 21 (the UN’s programme of action from Rio). an important step in the development of global environ- mental policy, particularly in relation to climate change. The Significance: The Rio Earth Summit was important in at FCCC may not have committed states explicitly to freezing least three respects. First, it was a watershed in terms of the or reducing their CO2 emissions, but it obliged them to burgeoning influence of global civil society. The Earth stabilize these at 1990 levels from 2000 onwards. Rio thus Summit was the first global conference to take place in a paved the way for the introduction of legally binding context of mass activism and heightened NGO involve- targets in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, Rio’s empha- ment. As such, Rio contributed to two separate develop- sis on sustainable development ensured that thereafter the ments. One was the greater assertiveness of NGOs, environment and economic development would no longer reflected in attempts in later conferences not merely to be treated separately. provide advice and make proposals, but to attempt to drive However, the outcomes of Rio have also been criti- policy agendas, even at times substituting for state officials cized, exposing differences between ‘insiders’ in the and political leaders in the process of policy formulation. processes of global governance and civil society The Earth Summit thus prepared the way for other, larger ‘outsiders’, particularly radicals in the green movement. conferences, such as the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Not only were the targets set at Rio modest and not Conference on Women, which involved 189 governments legally binding, but many of the agreements made in Rio and some 2,100 NGOs. The second development was that regarding fighting poverty and cleaning up the environ- Rio provided a template for future activist struggles, ensur- ment have not been realized. Progress was hampered both ing that from then onwards major conferences and interna- by the multiplicity of views and interests represented (an tional summits would be accompanied by demonstrations ironic drawback of the scope and size of the conference) and popular protests. In this respect, the Rio Earth Summit and by tensions between the developed and the develop- was something akin to a rehearsal for later anti-globaliza- ing worlds over responsibility for tackling climate change. 154 GLOBAL POLITICS corporate or global justice movement. This loose and ideologically diverse CONCEPT ‘movement of movements’ has been in the forefront of the so-called ‘new poli- Postmaterialism tics’, stressing decentralization and participatory decision-making and embrac- Postmaterialism is a ing a more innovative and theatrical form of protest politics. Examples of this theory that explains the have included the ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999, in which mass demonstrations nature of political against the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see p. 571) degenerated into concerns and attitudes in violent clashes between the police and groups of protesters, and other similar terms of levels of anti-capitalism protests that now regularly accompany meetings of groups such economic development. It is loosely based on as the WTO, the OECD and the G-20 (see p. 117). Abraham Maslow’s As such, transnational social movements represent the ‘outsider’ face of (1908–70) ‘hierarchy of global civil society. Their ‘outsider’ status is largely a result of the nature of their needs’ (see p. 354), which ideological and political goals, which are radical rather than mainstream, and so places esteem and self- are generally incompatible with those of conventional policy-makers at both actualization above material or economic national and global levels. Their use of ‘outsider’ strategies, such as marches, needs. Postmaterialism demonstrations and protests, is a way of attracting media attention and of assumes that conditions turning potential supporters into activists. However, ‘outsider’ status also places of material scarcity breed massive limitations on the policy impact of global social movements. Insofar as egoistical and acquisitive they have influence, it is more in terms of bringing about a wider and more values, meaning that politics is dominated by nebulous shift in values and cultural awareness. This can clearly be seen in rela- economic issues. tion to the environment movement and the women’s movement. The anti-glob- However, in conditions of alization movement, though much younger, has already contributed to a widespread prosperity, politico-cultural shift in terms of attitudes, particularly amongst young people, individuals express more towards free trade practices and consumerist values. interest in postmaterial or quality of life issues. Many, nevertheless, view NGOs as the key actors within global civil society, These are typically their advantage being that they are institutionalized and professionalized ‘insid- concerned with morality, ers’. There can be little doubt that major international NGOs and the NGO political justice and sector as a whole now constitute a significant group of political actors on the personal fulfilment, and global stage. Advocacy NGOs have had a variety of high-profile successes, often include feminism, world peace, poverty reduction, constraining the influence of TNCs and altering the policy direction of national racial harmony, governments and international organizations. NGO pressure during the UN’s environmental protection Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 contributed to a treaty to control the emissions of and animal rights. greenhouse gases. The International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, a network of more than 14,000 NGOs working in 90 countries, was effective in 1997 in getting the agreement of some 120 states to ban the production, use and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, negoti- ated by the OECD and aimed at liberalizing foreign investment and reducing domestic regulation, was pushed off the political agenda by a sustained NGO campaign.  Self-actualization: Personal As NGOs have been accepted as key policy-makers, policy influencers and fulfilment brought about by the even policy implementers, they have developed into ‘tamed’ social movements. refinement of sensibilities; self- actualization is usually linked to The price for their participation in the process of global governance has been the the transcendence of egoism adoption of more mainstream or ‘responsible’ policy positions. This trend is and materialism. reflected in the fact that distinctions between NGOs and governments and inter- national organizations, and between NGOs and TNCs, have become increasingly  New politics: A style of blurred. Not only do NGOs have formal rights of consultation within interna- politics that distrusts representative mechanisms and tional organizations, being accepted as a source of specialist advice and infor- bureaucratic processes in favour mation, but NGOs and international organizations will often work together in of strategies of popular formulating and carrying out a range of humanitarian projects. Many NGOs are mobilization and direct action. also part-funded by government – Médecins Sans Frontières (known in English SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL AGE 155 as Doctors without Borders), for example, receives almost half its funding from governmental sources. Indications of the growing links between NGOs and TNCs can be found, for instance, in the fact that the World Economic Forum now embraces representatives of leading NGOs, and that a ‘revolving door’ has developed through which TNCs demonstrate their commitment to corporate social responsibility by employing former NGO leaders and specialists. Globalization from below? Has global civil society contributed to a reconfiguration of global power? Does it represent an alternative to top-down corporate globalization, a kind of bottom-up democratic vision of a civilizing world order, or ‘globalization from below’? Optimists about global civil society argue that it has two main advan- tages. First, it provides a necessary counter-balance to corporate power. Until the 1990s, the advance of TNC interests met little effective resistance, meaning that international organizations in particular fell too easily under the sway of a neoliberal agenda committed to free markets and free trade. Transnational social movements and NGOs help to ensure that such interests and ideas are checked, challenged and scrutinized, not (necessarily) to block corporate interests or inhibit economic globalization, but to strengthen the global policy-making process by bringing more views and voices to the table. Second, emergent civil society is often seen as form of fledgling democratic global politics. This has occurred because civil society bodies have articulated the interests of people and groups who have been disempowered by the globalization process, acting as a kind of counter-hegemonic force. Similarly, by introducing an element of public scrutiny and accountability to the workings of international bodies, conferences, summits and the like, global civil society functions as a channel of communica- tion between the individual and global institutions. However, emergent global civil society also has its critics. In the first place, the democratic credentials of NGOs and, for that matter, social movements are entirely bogus. For example, how can NGOs be in the forefront of democratiza- tion when they are entirely non-elected and self-appointed bodies? Large memberships, committed activists and the ability to mobilize popular protests and demonstrations undoubtedly give social movements and NGOs political influence, but it does not give them democratic authority, when there is no mechanism for testing the weight of their views against those of society at large. Second, the tactics of popular activism and direct action, so clearly associated with social movements and certain NGOs, have also attracted criticism. For instance, the violence that has accompanied many major anti-capitalist protests has, arguably, alienated many potential supporters, giving the entire movement an image of recklessness and irresponsibility. A final criticism is that NGOs and social movements distort national and global political agendas through their  Direct action: Political fixation on gaining media attention, both as the principal means of exerting action taken outside the pressure and in order to attract support and funding. This, nevertheless, may constitutional and legal framework; direct action may lead them to making exaggerated claims in order to ‘hype’ political issues, and to range from passive resistance indulge in knee-jerk protest politics, aided and abetted by a mass media desper- to terrorism. ate for ‘impact’ stories in an age of 24/7 news and current affairs. 156 GLOBAL POLITICS SUMMARY  Societies are fashioned out of a usually stable set of relationships between and among their members. However, the ‘thick’ social connectedness of close bonds and fixed allegiances is giving way to the ‘thin’ connectedness of more fluid, individualized social arrangements. This reflects the impact of post-industrialism and the wider use of communication technology.  The thinning and widening of social connectedness has been associated with a general increase in risk, uncer- tainty and instability. The risks and instabilities of modern society include growing environmental threats, economic crises due to an increase in economic interconnectedness and the emergence of new security threats.  Cultural globalization is the process whereby information, commodities and images that have been produced in one part of the world enter into a global flow that tends to ‘flatten out’ cultural differences between nations, regions and individuals. It is often associated with the worldwide spread of consumerism and the rise of individualism.  The image of an emerging global monoculture has nevertheless been challenged. Diversity and pluralization have increased in modern societies due to factors such as the adaptation of cultural products to local tradi- tions and understandings to facilitate their spread and because of the backlash against the perceived domi- nation of foreign ideas, values and lifestyles.  The rise, during the 1990s, of a mosaic of new groups, organizations and movements which sought to chal- lenge ‘corporate’ globalization has been interpreted as the emergence of global civil society. However, global civil society has been interpreted differently depending on whether transnational social movements or NGOs have been viewed as its key agents.  Supporters of global civil society argue that it has effectively reconfigured global power, providing a kind of ‘bottom-up’ democratic vision of a civilizing world order. Critics, on the other hand, have questioned the democratic credentials of social movements and NGOs, condemned their use of direct action, and accused them of distorting national and global political agendas. Questions for discussion Further reading  What makes a society a society? Bauman, Z., Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty  Why has social connectedness become ‘thinner’? (2007). An examination of the changing human condition in the light of the emergence of ‘liquid’ or ‘light’ moder-  Is cultural globalization really just a form of nity. cultural imperialism? Beck, U., World at Risk (2009). A discussion of the nature of  Is individualism the enemy of social solidarity and modern society that considers the multiple manifesta- cohesion? tions of ‘world risk’.  Do Asian values offer a viable alternative to Cohen, R. and P. Kennedy, Global Sociology (2007). A rich western individualism? and diverse analysis of contemporary issues and the  Has the network society substituted ‘virtual’ dynamics of social change. communities for real communities? Keane, J., Global Civil Society? (2003). An exploration of the  Have new forms of communication altered the contradictory forces currently nurturing or threatening the global distribution of power? growth of global civil society.  Does consumerism liberate people or enslave them?  Are NGOs little more than self-serving and unac- countable bodies? Links to relevant web  To what extent can global civil society be viewed resources can be found on as a democratizing force? the Global Politics website CHAPTER 7 The Nation in a Global Age ‘Nations are the irreplaceable cells of the human community.’ F R A N J O T U D J M A N , Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (1981) PREVIEW Nationalism has, arguably, been the most powerful force in world politics for over 200 years. It has contributed to the outbreak of wars and revolutions. It has been closely linked to the birth of new states, the disintegration of empires and the redrawing of borders; and it has been used to reshape existing regimes as well as to bolster them. The greatest achievement of nationalism has been to establish the nation as the key unit for political rule, meaning that the so-called nation-state has come to be accepted as the most basic – and, nationalists argue, the only legiti- mate – form of political organization. However, the character of nationalism and its implications for world politics are deeply contested. Has nationalism advanced the cause of political freedom, or has it simply legitimized aggression and expansion? Nevertheless, modern nations are under pressure perhaps as never before. Globalization is widely seen to have weakened nationalism as territorial nation- states have been enmeshed in global political, economic and cultural networks, and significantly increased international migration has led to the development of transnational communities, giving a growing number of societies a multicultural character. Is nationalism a political force in retreat? Can nationalism survive in a context of hybridity and multiculturalism? Finally, despite frequent predictions to the contrary, there is evidence of the resurgence of nationalism. Since the end of the Cold War, new and often highly potent forms of nationalism have emerged, often linked to cultural, ethnic or religious self-assertion. Nationalism has also re- emerged as a reaction against the homogenizing impact of globalization and as a means of resisting immigration and multiculturalism. How can the revival of nationalism best be explained, and what forms has it taken? KEY ISSUES  What is a nation? How is nationalism best understood?  How, and to what extent, has nationalism shaped world politics?  Is nationalism inherently aggressive and oppressive?  Is nationalism in the process of being displaced by transnationalism or multiculturalism?  Why has nationalism resurfaced since the end of the Cold War?  Does contemporary nationalism differ from earlier forms of national- ism? 157 158 GLOBAL POLITICS CONCEPT NATIONALISM AND WORLD POLITICS The Nation Modern nations and the idea of nationalism were born in the late eighteenth Nations (from the Latin century; some commentators see them as a product of the 1789 French nasci, meaning ‘to be Revolution (Kedourie 1966). Previously, countries had been thought of as born’) are complex ‘realms’, ‘principalities’ or ‘kingdoms’. The inhabitants of a country were phenomena that are ‘subjects’, their political identity being formed by allegiance to a ruler or ruling shaped by a collection of dynasty, rather than any sense of national identity or patriotism. However, the cultural, political and psychological factors. revolutionaries in France who rose up against Louis XVI did so in the name of Culturally, a nation is a the people, and understood the people to be the ‘French nation’. Nationalism was group of people bound therefore a revolutionary and democratic creed, reflecting the idea that ‘subjects together by a common of the crown’ should become ‘citizens of France’. Such ideas, nevertheless, were language, religion, history not the exclusive property of the French. In the early nineteenth century a rising and traditions, although all nations exhibit some tide of nationalism spread throughout Europe, exploding in 1848 in a series of degree of cultural revolutions that affected the mainland of Europe from the Iberian peninsula to heterogeneity. Politically, the borders of Russia. During the twentieth century, the doctrine of nationalism, a nation is a group of which had been born in Europe, spread throughout the globe as the peoples of people who regard Asia and Africa rose in opposition to colonial rule. themselves as a ‘natural’ political community, usually expressed through the desire to Making sense of nationalism establish or maintain However, nationalism is a complex and deeply contested political phenomenon. sovereignty. In the most simple sense, nationalism is the belief that the nation is, or should Psychologically, a nation is a group of people who be, the most basic principle of political organization. But what is a nation? In are distinguished by a everyday language, words such as ‘nation’, ‘state’, ‘country’ and even ‘race’ are shared loyalty or often confused or used as if they are interchangeable. The United Nations, for affection, in the form of instance, is clearly misnamed, as it is an organization of states, not one of patriotism, although national populations. It is common in international politics to hear references to people who lack national pride may still ‘the Americans’, ‘the Chinese’, ‘the Russians’ and so on, when in fact it is the nevertheless recognize actions of these people’s governments that are being discussed. In the case of the that they ‘belong’ to the UK, there is confusion about whether it should be regarded as a nation or as a nation. state that comprises four separate nations: the English, the Scots, the Welsh and the Northern Irish (who may, indeed, constitute two nations, Unionists viewing themselves as British, while Republicans define themselves as Irish). The Arab peoples of North Africa and the Middle East pose very similar problems. For instance, should Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Syria be treated as nations in their own right, or as part of a single and united Arab nation, based on a common language (Arabic), a common religion (Islam), and descent from a common Bedouin tribal past? Such difficulties spring from the fact that all nations comprise a mixture of objective and subjective factors, a blend of cultural and political characteris- tics. On the most basic level, nations are cultural entities, collections of people bound together by shared values and traditions, in particular a common language, religion and history, and usually occupying the same geographical area. From this point of view the nation can be defined by objective factors:  Patriotism: Literally, love of people who satisfy a requisite set of cultural criteria can be said to belong to a one’s fatherland; a psychological attachment of nation; those who do not can be classified as non-nationals or members of loyalty to one’s nation or foreign nations. Such factors certainly shape the politics of nationalism. The country. nationalism of the Québécois in Canada, for instance, is based largely on T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 159 language differences between French-speaking Quebec and the predominantly English-speaking rest of Canada. Nationalist tensions in India invariably arise from religious divisions, examples being the struggle of Sikhs in the Punjab for a separate homeland (Khalistan), and the campaign by Muslims in Kashmir for the incorporation of Kashmir into Pakistan. Nevertheless, it is impossible to define the nation using objective factors alone. All nations, to a greater or lesser extent, are characterized by cultural heterogeneity, and some to a high degree. The Swiss nation has proved to be enduring and viable despite the use of three major languages (French, German and Italian), as well as a variety of local dialects. Divisions between Catholics and Protestants that has given rise to rival nationalisms in Northern Ireland have been largely irrel- evant in mainland UK, and have only marginal significance in countries such as Germany. The cultural unity that supposedly expresses itself in nationhood is there- fore difficult to pin down. It reflects, at best, a varying combination of cultural factors, rather than any precise formula. This emphasizes the fact that, ulti- mately, nations can only be defined subjectively, by their members. In the final analysis, the nation is a psycho-political entity, a group of people who regard themselves as a natural political community and are distinguished by shared loyalty and affection in the form of patriotism. The political dimension of nationhood is evident in the difference between a nation and an ethnic group. An ethnic group undoubtedly possesses a communal identity and a sense of cultural pride, but, unlike a nation, it lacks collective political aspirations: it does not seek to establish or maintain sovereign independence or political autonomy. The psychological dimension of nationhood is evident in the survival of nationalist aspirations despite the existence of profound objective difficulties, such as the absence of land, small population or lack of economic resources. Latvia, for example, became an independent nation in 1991 despite having a population of only 2.6 million (barely half of whom are Lats), no source of fuel and very few natural resources. Likewise, the Kurdish peoples of the Middle East retain nationalist aspirations, even though the Kurds have never enjoyed formal political unity and are presently spread over parts of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Confusions over the factors that define the nation are nevertheless compounded by controversy over the phenomenon of nationalism. Is national- ism a feeling, an identity, a political doctrine, an ideology or a social movement? Or is it all these things at once? Moreover, how can the emergence of national- ism best be explained: is it a natural phenomenon, or has it somehow been invented? Since the 1970s, students of nationalism have increasingly fallen into two great camps: primordialists versus modernists (Hearn 2006). Primordialism  Ethnic group: A group of portrays national identity as historically embedded: nations are rooted in a people who share a common cultural and historical identity, common cultural heritage and language that may long predate statehood or the typically linked to a belief in quest for independence. All nationalists, in this sense, are primordialists. The common descent. dominant themes of primordialism are:  Primordialism: The theory that nations are ancient and  People are inherently group-orientated and nations are a manifestation of deep-rooted, fashioned this. variously out of psychology,  National identity is forged by three key factors: common descent, a sense of culture and biology. territorial belonging, and a shared language. 160 GLOBAL POLITICS  To describe a collection of people as a nation is to imply that they share a common cultural heritage. In that sense, all nations are myths or illusions, as no nation is culturally homogeneous (the Japanese being perhaps the closest thing to an exception in this respect). Nations, in that sense, are ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’. Deconstructing . . . ‘NATION’  The assumption that people are members of a nation suggests  Nations appear to be cohesive entities, which act as that national identity is the prin- organically unified wholes. This gives rise to what is cipal form of collective identity. called ‘methodological nationalism’, an approach to Other sources of collective iden- understanding in which discrete nations are taken to tity – based, for instance, on be the primary global actors. In practice, this apparent social class, gender, ethnicity or cohesiveness is achieved only by the fact that the religion – are thus of secondary leading actors on the world stage are states or govern- importance, especially as each of ments, which legitimize their actions by claiming to these has transnational or sub- act on behalf of ‘the nation’. To refer to, say, ‘the national implications. Chinese’, ‘the Russian’ or ‘the Americans’ as global actors is therefore deeply misleading.  Nations are historical entities: they evolve organically out of more simple ethnic communities.  Nationalism is characterized by deep emotional attachments that resemble kinship ties. Such views can be traced back to the writings of the German philosopher Johann Herder (1744–1803), who argued that each nation possesses a Volksgeist, which reveals itself in songs, myths and legends, and provides a nation with its source of creativity. The implications of Herder’s culturalism is that nations are natural or organic identities that can be traced back to ancient times and will, by the same token, continue to exist as long as human society survives. Modern commentators have advanced similar ideas. Anthony Smith  Volksgeist: (German) (see p. 165), for instance, highlighted the continuity between modern nations Literally, the spirit of the people; the organic identity of a and pre-modern ethnic communities, which he called ‘ethnies’. This implies that people revealed in their culture nationalism is a variant of ethnicity (see p. 175), modern nations essentially and particularly their language. being updated versions of immemorial ethnic communities. T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 161 By contrast, modernist approaches to nationalism suggest that national iden- tity is forged in response to changing social and historical circumstances. In many cases, modernism links the origins of nationalism to the process of modernization and, in particular to the emergence of industrialization. Although different modernist theorists place an emphasis on different factors, modernism can be associated with three broad themes:  The emergence of industrial and capitalist economies weakened traditional social bonds and generated new social tensions, so creating a need for a unifying national identity.  States often play a key role in forging a sense of national identity, implying that the state predates and in a sense ‘constructs’ the nation.  The spread of mass literacy and mass education contributed significantly to the construction of national identity. Ernest Gellner (see p. 165) thus stressed that while premodern or ‘agro-liter- ate’ societies were structured by a network of feudal bonds and loyalties, emerg- ing industrial societies promoted social mobility, self-striving and competition, and so required a new source of cultural cohesion (as discussed in Chapter 6). This new source of cultural cohesion was provided by nationalism, which, in effect, means that nationalism invented the nation, not the other way round. Although Gellner’s theory suggests that nations coalesced in response to partic- ular social conditions and circumstances, it also implies that the national community is deep-rooted and will be enduring, as a return to premodern loyal- ties and identities is unthinkable. Benedict Anderson (see p. 165) also portrayed modern nations as a product of socio-economic change, in his case stressing the combined impact of the emergence of capitalism and the advent of modern mass communications, which he dubbed ‘print-capitalism’. In his view, the nation is an ‘imagined community’, in that, within nations, individuals only ever meet a tiny proportion of those with whom they supposedly share a national identity (Anderson 1983). If nations exist, they exist as imagined artifices, constructed for us through education, the mass media, and the process of polit- ical socialization. Marxists, such as Eric Hobsbawm (1992) tend to view nation- alism as a device through which the ruling class counters the threat of social revolution by ensuring that national loyalty is stronger than class solidarity, thereby binding the working class to the existing power structure. A world of nation-states Nationalism has helped to shape and reshape world politics for over 200 years. However, the nature of its impact has been the subject of considerable debate. Nationalism is a chameleon-like ideology, capable of assuming a bewildering variety of political forms. At different times, it has been progressive and reac- tionary, democratic and authoritarian, liberating and oppressive, aggressive and peaceful, and so on. Some, as a result, distinguish between good and bad nation- alism, dispensing altogether with the idea of nationalism as a single, coherent political force. The liberating or progressive face of nationalism is evident in what is often seen as classical political nationalism. Classical nationalism dates back to the French Revolution, and embodies many of its values. Its ideas spread 162 GLOBAL POLITICS A P P ROAC H E S TO . . . NATIONALISM Realist view and cultural unity. Liberals nevertheless view national- Realists do not generally place an emphasis on nation- ism and internationalism (see p. 64) as complementary, alism as such. In their view, the crucial stage in the not conflicting, principles. The most prominent forms development of the modern international system was of liberal internationalism are support for free trade to the emergence of sovereign states in the 1500–1750 promote economic interdependence, making war so period (particularly through the 1648 Peace of costly it becomes almost unthinkable, and the Westphalia), rather than the transformation of these construction of intergovernmental or supranational states, from the early nineteenth century onwards, into bodies to ensure an international rule of law. nation-states through the advent of nationalism. The international system is thus, more accurately, viewed as Critical views an inter-state system. Despite this, realists have tended Critical views of nationalism have been developed to view nationalism in broadly positive terms. From within the Marxist, social constructivist, poststruc- the realist perspective, nationalism is a key auxiliary turalist and feminist traditions. For Marxists, national- component of state power, a source of internal cohe- ity is an example of ‘false consciousness’, an illusion sion that consolidates the external effectiveness of a that serves to mystify and confuse the working classes, nation-state. By interpreting state interests (generally) preventing them from recognizing their genuine inter- as ‘national interests’, realists recognize nationalism as a ests. In particular, in emphasizing the bonds of nation- force that sustains international anarchy, limits the hood over those of social class, nationalism serves to scope for cooperation between and among states, and distort, and conceal, the realities of unequal class implies that universal values, such as human rights (see power and prevent social revolution. Social construc- p. 304), are defective. tivists have been particularly critical of the primordial- ist image of ‘fixed’ ethnic and national identities, Liberal view emphasizing instead that the sense of national belong- Liberals have long endorsed nationalism. Indeed, in ing is ‘constructed’ though social, political and other nineteenth-century Europe in particular, to be a liberal processes. They therefore tend to argue that nations are meant to be a nationalist. Liberal nationalism is a prin- fashioned by nationalism itself, sympathizing with Eric cipled form of nationalism, based above all on the Hobsbawm’s (1983) image of nations as ‘invented notion of national self-determination, which portrays traditions’. the nation as a sovereign entity and implies both Poststructuralist and postmodernist approaches to national independence and democratic rule. Although nationalism tend to suggest that at the heart of the liberal nationalists, like all nationalists, view the nation nationalist project is a narrative, or collection of narra- as a ‘natural’ community, they regard nations as essen- tives. The story of the nation is told by history books, tially civic entities, based on the existence of common works of fiction, symbols, myths and so on, with partic- values and political loyalties. This makes their form of ular importance being given to a foundational myth nationalism tolerant and inclusive. From the liberal that locates the origins of the nation in a time long ago perspective, the nation-state (see p. 164) is a political and imbues the nation with special qualities. Feminist ideal, representing the goal of freedom and the right of theories of nationalism build to these ideas by empha- each nation to fashion its own destiny. Self-determina- sizing the gender dimension of national identity. The tion, moreover, is a universal right, reflecting the equal- nation is often depicted as female – as the ‘motherland’ ity of nations (at least in a moral sense) and implying rather than the ‘fatherland’ – a tendency that draws that liberals aim not merely to achieve sovereign state- from an emphasis on women as the (biological) repro- hood for their particular nation but to construct a ducers of the nation and as symbols of the nation’s world of independent nation-states. Liberals argue that values and culture (usually emphasizing the home, such a world would be characterized by peace and purity and selflessness). On the other hand, when the harmony, both because nation-states are likely to nation is constructed as masculine, this often links respect each other’s rights and freedoms, and because national identity to heroism, self-assertion and aggres- no nation-state would wish to endanger its own civic sion, tending to conflate nationalism with militarism. T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 163 Focus on . . . The two nationalisms: good and bad? Does nationalism embrace two, quite distinct tradi- language and history, political allegiances and civic tions? Does nationalism have a ‘good’ face and a ‘bad’ values may simply be incapable of generating the face? The idea that there are, in effect, ‘two nation- sense of belonging and rootedness that gives national- alisms’ is usually based on the belief that nationalism ism its power. has contrasting civic and ethnic forms. What is often By contrast, ethnic nationalism is squarely rooted called civic nationalism is fashioned primarily out of in ethnic unity and a deep sense of cultural belonging. shared political allegiances and political values. The This form of nationalism is often criticized for having a nation is thus an ‘association of citizens’. Civic nation- closed or fixed character: it is difficult, and perhaps alism has been defended on the grounds that it is impossible, for non-citizens to become members of the open and voluntaristic: membership of the nation is nation. Nationalism therefore acquires a homogenizing based on choice and self-definition, not on any pre- character, breeding a fear or suspicion of foreigners and determined ethnic or historical identity. It is a form of strengthening the idea of cultural distinctiveness, often nationalism that is consistent with toleration and interwoven with a belief in national greatness. Ethnic liberal values generally, being forward-looking and nationalism is thus irrational and tends to be tribalistic, compatible with a substantial degree of cultural and even bloodthirsty. On the other hand, its capacity to ethnic diversity. Critics, however, have questioned generate a closed and fixed sense of political belonging whether civic nationalism is meaningful (Kymlicka may also be a virtue of ethnic nationalism. ‘Ethnic’ or 1999). Most citizens, even in a ‘civic’ or ‘political’ ‘cultural’ nations tend to be characterized by high levels nation, derive their nationality from birth, not choice. of social solidarity and a strong sense of collective Moreover, divorced from the bonds of ethnicity, purpose. quickly through much of Europe and were expressed, for example, in the emer- gence of unification movements in the Italian states and the Germanic states in particular, and through the growth of independence movements in the Austro- Hungarian empire and later in the Russian empire and the Ottoman empire. The ideas and aspirations of classical European nationalism were most clearly expressed by the prophet of Italian unification, Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–72).  Civic nationalism: A form Perhaps the clearest expression of classical nationalism is found in US President of nationalism that emphasizes Woodrow Wilson’s (see p. 438) ‘Fourteen Points’. Drawn up in 1918, these were political allegiance based on a proposed as the basis for the reconstruction of Europe after WWI, and provided vision of a community of equal a blueprint for the sweeping territorial changes that were implemented by the citizens, allowing respect for Treaty of Versailles (1919). ethnic and cultural diversity that does not challenge core Classical nationalism has been strongly associated with liberal ideas and civic values. values. Indeed, in nineteenth-century Europe, to be a nationalist meant to be a liberal, and vice versa. In common with all forms of nationalism, classical nation-  Ethnic nationalism: A form alism is based on the fundamental assumption that humankind is naturally of nationalism that emphasizes divided into a collection of nations, each possessed of a separate identity. the organic and usually ethnic unity of the nation and aims to Nations are therefore genuine or organic communities, not the artificial creation protect or strengthen its of political leaders or ruling classes. The characteristic theme of classical nation- national ‘spirit’ and cultural alism, however, is that it links the idea of the nation with a belief in popular sameness. sovereignty (see p. 3), ultimately derived from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 164 GLOBAL POLITICS (1712–78) idea of the ‘general will’. This fusion was brought about because the CONCEPT multinational empires against which nineteenth-century European nationalists Nation-state fought were also autocratic and oppressive. Mazzini, for example, wished not A nation-state is an only to unite the Italian states, but also to throw off the influence of autocratic autonomous political Austria. Woodrow Wilson, for his part, wished not only that the constituent community bound nations of Europe should achieve statehood but also that they should be recon- together by the structed on the basis of US-style liberal republicanism. The central theme of this overlapping bonds of form of nationalism is therefore a commitment to the principle of national self- citizenship and determination. Its goal is therefore the construction of a nation-state. nationality, meaning that political and cultural This form of nationalism has had profound implications for world politics. identity coincide. Nation- From the early nineteenth century onwards, the seemingly irresistible process of states thus reflect nation-state formation transformed the state-system, reconfiguring political Mazzini’s goal: ‘Every power, ultimately across the globe, and giving states an internal cohesion and nation a state, only one state for the entire sense of purpose and identity they had previously lacked. This was, nevertheless, nation’. Most modern a complex process. Although primordialists, such as Anthony Smith (1986, states are nation-states, 1991), tend to view pre-modern ethnic communities as a kind of template for in that, thanks to modern states, nation-state formation changed nationalism every bit as much as classical nationalism, the nationalism changed the state-system. Nationalism was an important compo- nation has come to be accepted as the basic nent of the 1848 revolutions that spread across Europe, from the Iberian penin- unit of political rule. sula to the borders of Russia (see p. 177). However, nationalist movements were However, the nation- nowhere strong enough to accomplish the process of nation-building alone. state is more a political Where nationalist goals were realized, as in Italy and German (both were finally ideal than a reality, as all unified in 1871), it was because nationalism coincided with the ambitions of states are, to some degree, culturally and powerful states, in this case Piedmont and Prussia. The character of nationalism ethnically heterogeneous. also changed. Nationalism had previously been associated with liberal and However, the term progressive movements, but was increasingly taken up by conservative and reac- ‘nation-state’ has (often tionary politicians and used to promote social cohesion, order and stability, or, incorrectly) become a as discussed in the next section, projects of imperial expansion. synonym for the ‘state’ in much public, and some During the twentieth century, the process whereby multinational empires academic, discourse. were replaced by territorial nation-states was extended into Africa and Asia. Indeed, in a sense, nineteenth-century European imperialism (see p. 38) turned nationalism into a genuinely global creed by generating anti-colonial or ‘national liberation’ movements across much of the developing world. The inde- pendence movements that sprang up in the inter-war period gained new impetus from the conclusion of WWII. The over-stretched empires of the UK, France, the Netherlands and Portugal crumbled in the face of rising nationalism. India was granted independence in 1947. China (see p. 251) achieved genuine unity and independence only after the 1949 communist revolution. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the political map of Africa was entirely redrawn through the process of decolonization. Africa’s last remaining colony, Southwest Africa, finally became independent Namibia in 1990. The last stage in this process was the collapse of the world’s final major empire, the Russian empire, which was brought about by the fall of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet  National self- Union in 1991. determination: The principle The image of a world of sovereign nation-states nevertheless remains mislead- that the nation is a sovereign ing. In the first place, despite the collapse of major empires, significant unresolved entity; self-determination implies both national nationalist tensions persist. These range from those in Tibet and the predomi- independence and democratic nantly Muslim province of Xingjian in China to Chechnya and elsewhere in the rule. Russian Caucasus, the Kurds in the Middle East and the Basques in Spain. Second, T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 165 K E Y T H E O R I S T S I N N AT I O N A L I S M Ernest Gellner (1925–95) A UK social philosopher and anthropologist, Gellner made major contributions to a variety of academic fields, including social anthropology, sociology and political philosophy. The most prominent figure in the modernist camp in the study of nationalism, Gellner explained the rise of nationalism in terms of the need of indus- trial societies, unlike agrarian ones, for homogeneous languages and cultures in order to work efficiently. Gellner’s major writings include Legitimation of Belief (1974), Nations and Nationalism (1983), Culture, Identity and Politics (1987) and Reason and Culture (1992). ERNEST GELLNER Anthony D. Smith (born 1933) A UK academic and one of the founders of the interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies, Smith has been partic- ularly concerned to transcend the debate between crude primordialism and modernism. Although his work does not contain a comprehensive explanation for the emergence and character of nationalism, it explores the ethnic origins of nations as well as the historical forces that help to fashion nationalism’s various forms. Smith’s key works include Theories of Nationalism (1972), The Ethnic Origin of Nations (1986) and Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (1995). Benedict Anderson (born 1936) An Irish academic who was brought up mainly in California, Anderson’s main publica- tion on nationalism is the celebrated Imagined Communities (1983). He views nation- alities and nationalism as cultural artefacts of a particular kind, defining the nation as an ‘imagined community’, in the sense that it generates a deep, horizontal comradeship regardless of actual inequalities within the nation and despite the fact that it is not a face-to-face community. Anderson’s other publications in the field include The Spectres of Comparison (1998) and Under Three Flags (2005). BENEDICT ANDERSON nation-states are inherently imperfect, as none is ethnically and culturally ‘pure’ and all rely, to some degree, on political circumstances to maintain themselves in existence. This can be illustrated by the rise and fall of Yugoslavia. Finally, given that nation-states are, and are destined to remain, unequal in terms of their economic and political power, genuine national self-determination remains elusive for many. This is a tendency that has been further compounded by the advance of globalization (see p. 9) and the erosion of state sovereignty. Nationalism, war and conflict However, nationalism has not merely supported liberating causes, related to the achievement of national unity and independence. Nationalism has also been 166 GLOBAL POLITICS expressed through the politics of aggression, militarism and war. In many ways, expansionist nationalism is the antithesis of the principled belief in equal rights and self-determination that is the core of classical nationalism. National rights, in this context, imply, not respect for the rights of all nations, but the rights of a particular nation over other nations. The recurrent, and, many would argue, defining, theme of expansionist nationalism is therefore the idea of national chauvinism. Derived from the name of Nicholas Chauvin, a French soldier noted for his fanatical devotion to Napoleon and the cause of France, chauvin- ism is underpinned by the belief that nations have particular characteristics and qualities, and so have very different destinies. Some nations are suited to rule; others are suited to be ruled. Typically, this form of nationalism is articulated through doctrines of ethnic or racial superiority, thereby fusing nationalism and racialism. The chauvinist’s own people are seen as unique and special, in some way a ‘chosen people’, while other peoples are viewed either as weak and inferior, or as hostile and threatening. An extreme example of this can be found in the case of the German Nazis, whose ‘Aryanism’ portrayed the German people (the Aryan race) as a ‘master race’ destined for world domination, backed up by viru- lent anti-Semitism. From this perspective, the advance of nationalism is associated not so much  Militarism: The achievement with balance or harmony amongst independent nation-states as with deepening of ends by military means; or rivalry and ongoing struggle. Some, indeed, argue that nationalism from its the spread of military ideas and values throughout civilian inception was infected with chauvinism and has always harboured at least society. implicit racist beliefs, based on the assumption that it is ‘natural’ to prefer one’s own people to others. In this light, nationalism may appear to be inherently  Chauvinism: An irrational oppressive and expansionist. All forms of nationalism may thus exhibit some belief in the superiority or form of xenophobia. The aggressive face of nationalism became increasingly dominance of one’s own group or people; it can be applied to a prominent from the late nineteenth century onwards, as European powers nation, an ethnic group, a indulged in the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the name of national glory and their gender and so on. ‘place in the sun’. Aggression and expansion were also evident in the forms of pan-nationalism that developed in Russia and Germany in the years leading up  Anti-Semitism: Prejudice or to WWI. The build up to WWII was similarly shaped by nationalist-inspired hatred towards Jewish people; Semites are by tradition the programmes of imperial expansion pursued by Germany, Japan and Italy. descendants of Shem, son of Nationalism can therefore be seen as a major contributory factor explaining the Noah. outbreak of both world wars of the twentieth century. Nor was this form of nationalism extinguished in 1945. The break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s,  Xenophobia: A fear or for example, led to a quest by Bosnian Serbs to construct a ‘Greater Serbia’ which hatred of foreigners; pathological ethnocentrism. was characterized by militarism and an aggressive programme of ‘ethnic cleans- ing’.  Pan-nationalism: A style of nationalism dedicated to unifying a disparate people through either expansionism or political solidarity (‘pan’ means all or every). NATIONS IN A GLOBAL WORLD One of the ironies of nationalism is that just as it was completing its greatest  Ethnic cleansing: A accomplishment – the collapse of the world’s final remaining empires – the euphemism that refers to the nation-state was being undermined by forces within and without. This has led forcible expulsion of an ethnic group or groups in the cause of some to talk of a ‘crisis of the nation-state’, or even the ‘twilight of the nation- racial purity, often involving state’. These forces are many and various. They include the tendency for genocidal violence. economic globalization (see p. 94) to diminish the state’s capacity to function as T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 167 GLOBAL POLITICS IN ACTION . . . The rise and fall of Yugoslavia Events: Yugoslavia (‘Land of Southern Austria Austria Slavs’) was formed in the aftermath of Hungary Hungary WWI. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenia Romania Romania Slovenes, a heterogeneous country consist- Croatia ing of Slovenia, Croatia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro but dominated by A Yugoslavia A Bosnia Herzegovina Serbia, was formed in 1918. It was renamed d r d r Serbia Yugoslavia in 1929. However, it fragmented i i a a under Nazi occupation during WWII. The t t Montenegro i i c c ‘second’ Yugoslavia (the Federal People’s S S Republic on Yugoslavia) was formed in 1946 e e Macedonia Italy a Italy a under Josip Tito, the head of the Partisan Albania Albania Army of National Liberation. In this incar- nation, Yugoslavia included six constituent Greece Greece republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and 1946–91 Post-2006 Slovenia, and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). The formal break- up of Yugoslavia occurred in the context of Yugoslavia relatively prosperous and independent in rela- the fall of communism and collapse of the Soviet Union. It tion to the Soviet Union. began with the secession of Slovenia in 1991, which was Finally, it would be misleading to interpret the final quickly followed by declarations of independence by break-up of Yugoslavia simply in terms of deeply ingrained Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. By 1992, all historical, religious or ethnic identities that were always, that remained within Yugoslavia was Serbia and sooner or later, going to express themselves in rivalry, Montenegro. Montenegro nevertheless declared independ- hatred and the quest for self-determination. The forms of ence from Serbia in 2006, and Kosovo declared its ethnic and political nationalism that emerged in (contested) independence from Serbia in 2008. Yugoslavia in the 1990s did so in very particular circum- stances. Most importantly, the collapse of the Soviet Significance: The history of Yugoslavia provides insight Union destabilized the Yugoslav balance of power, bringing into the nature of nationalism and national identity. In the the dominance of Serbia into question. In Serbia itself, first place, Yugoslavia was always a bogus nation-state, Slobodan Milosˇevic´ had risen to power in the late 1980s created artificially by external powers at the Paris Peace by exploiting Serbian nationalism, particularly by declaring Conference (see p. 59). Its creation reflected not so much support for Serbs in Kosovo. The collapse of Yugoslavia common cultural bonds amongst southern Slavs but gave Serbian nationalism an increasingly aggressive and rather the dominance of Serbia as a regional power and ethnically-based character, leading to war against Croatia, the relative weakness of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia- the Bosnian Civil War (which witnessed the worst Herzegovina, which were all part of the decaying and massacres in Europe since WWII) and the military occupa- defeated Austro-Hungarian empire and feared absorption tion of Kosovo, only ended by the 1999 US-led bombing into either Austria or Italy. Second, the relative success of campaign. The secessionist nationalism that erupted the ‘second’ Yugoslavia (1946–91), during which religious particularly in western Yugoslavia from 1991 onwards and ethnic diversity rarely gave rise to nationalist or reflected both a perception of Serbia’s weakened position secessionist tensions, bears out the extent to which and an awareness that western European states no longer nationhood is dependent on political factors. Aside from had territorial pretensions. Further, the success of the use of repression, Tito skilfully exploited the myth of a European integration meant that for the Slovenes, Croats federal alliance of Slav peoples. ‘National’ unity was also and others the prospect of leaving Yugoslavia and aligning maintained by the external success of the Yugoslav state themselves with Europe was increasingly attractive. in situating Yugoslavia geopolitically between the Cold Indeed, in the light of the fate of the Soviet Union, it War powers of the Soviet Union and the USA, making became irresistible. 168 GLOBAL POLITICS an autonomous economic unit (examined in Chapter 4) and the trend for CONCEPT cultural globalization (see p. 147) to weaken the cultural distinctiveness of the Racialism nation-state (discussed in Chapter 6). However, potent threats also stem from an Racialism is, broadly, the upsurge in international migration and the growth of hybridity and multicul- belief that political or turalism in most, if not all, modern societies. These developments have, amongst social conclusions can be other things, shed a particular light on the notion of identity, raising questions drawn from the idea that about whether national identity is in the process of being displaced by rival humankind is divided into forms of identity, linked, for instance, to ethnicity, culture and religion (these biologically distinct races. Racialist theories themes are discussed further in Chapter 8). are thus based on two assumptions. The first is that there are A world on the move fundamental genetic, or Migration has been part of human experience throughout history. Indeed, species-type, differences amongst the peoples of settlement (which was brought about by the emergence of agriculture, some the world (a highly 8,000 years ago) is of relatively recent origin, human societies having been fluid unlikely claim in the light communities of hunters and gatherers that can now be traced back for over 3 of modern scientific million years. The development of substantial villages, and subsequently towns knowledge). The second is and cities, did not put an end to migration, however. The early empires of the that these genetic or racial differences are Hittites, the Phoenicians and the Greeks, for example, reshaped the culture of reflected in cultural, much of Europe, parts of North Africa, the Near East and Central Asia between intellectual and/or moral the third and the first millennia BCE. This process is reflected most strikingly in differences, making them the distribution of the closely related languages of the Indo-European group, politically and socially which embraces both Sanskrit and Persian at one end, and such European significant. In political terms, racialism is languages as Greek, Latin, French, German and English at the other. The Vikings, manifest in calls for racial Magyars and Saracens invaded much of northern and central Europe in the segregation (such as ninth and tenth centuries, the Vikings also establishing settlements in Iceland, apartheid, or ‘apartness’, Greenland and Newfoundland. European expansion overseas started in the in South Africa), and in sixteenth century with the Spanish invasion of Mexico and Peru, followed by the doctrines of ‘blood’ superiority or inferiority colonization of North America, mainly by the British. Hardly any nation in the (for example, Aryanism world, in short, can claim always to have lived where it does now. and anti-Semitism). Migration has occurred for a variety of reasons. Until early modern times, as the examples above demonstrate, migration was usually a consequence of conquest and invasion, followed by settlement and colonization. In cases such as the USA (see p. 46), Canada, Australia and throughout Latin America, conquest and settlement led to the emergence of nations of immigrants, as native peoples were reduced to the status of marginalized minorities through the combined impact of disease, repression and discrimination. Mass migration has also been a forcible process, the best examples of which were the slave trade and the system of indentured labour. An estimated 40 million people in the Americas and the Caribbean are descended from slaves, who, between the mid-sixteenth and mid- eighteenth centuries, were captured in Africa and transported, via Europe, to work in the expanding sugar and tobacco plantations of the ‘New World’. Indentured workers, derogatorily known as ‘Coolies’ and living in conditions little different from slavery, were taken from China and India in the nineteenth century to work in the various British, French, German and Dutch colonies  Race: A group of people who (supposedly) share the same around the world. Some 37 million people were sent abroad under such circum- physical or biological stances, and, although many of those who had left India returned once slavery characteristics, based on was abolished, modern-day Indian communities in the Caribbean and East common descent. Africa are mainly composed of descendants of indentured labourers. T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 169 Debating . . . Is nationalism inherently aggressive and oppressive? Is nationalism as a whole, in principle, defensible? While some argue that its association with expansionism and oppres- sion exposes deep and dark forces that are intrinsic to nationalism itself, others argue that nationalism, in the right circumstances, can be peaceful and socially enlightened. YES NO Nationalism as narcissism. All forms of nationalism are Nationalism and freedom. Nationalism is a chameleon based on partisanship, a preference for one’s own nation ideology. Its character is determined by the circum- over other nations, underpinned by the belief that it has stances in which nationalist aspirations arise and the special or unique qualities. Nationalism is thus the (highly diverse) political causes that it articulates. When enemy of universal values and global justice. In promot- nationalism is a reaction against the experience of ing self-love within the nations of the world, it encour- foreign domination or colonial rule, it tends to have a ages each nation to restrict its moral concerns to its own liberating character and is linked to the goals of liberty, people, and to believe that their interests somehow justice and democracy. Committed to the principle of outrank those of any other people. Nationalism is thus self-determination, nationalism has been an anti-expan- inherently chauvinistic and embodies, at minimum, a sionist and anti-imperialist force that has expanded potential for aggression. The only question is whether freedom worldwide. Moreover, self-determination has national chauvinism is explicit or implicit, and therefore powerful implications for the domestic organization of whether aggression is overt or latent. political power, implying equal citizenship and demo- cratic accountability. Negative integration. National identity is forged not only through the belief that one’s own nation is unique or Civic nationalism. Nationalism only becomes intolerant ‘special’, but also through negative integration, the and oppressive when the nation is defined in narrowly portrayal of another nation or race as a threat or an ethnic or racial terms. Some nations, however, are very enemy. Nationalism therefore breeds off a clear distinc- clearly ‘political’ nations, constructed out of allegiances tion between ‘them’ and ‘us’. There has to be a ‘them’ to to particular values and civic ideals rather than on the deride or hate in order to forge a sense of ‘us’. This basis of cultural homogeneity. The forms of nationalism tendency to divide the world into an ‘in group’ and an that develop in such cases are typically tolerant and ‘out group’ means that nationalism is always susceptible democratic, managing to sustain a remarkable degree of to dark and pathological forces. As a necessarily homoge- social harmony and political unity against a background nizing force, all forms of nationalism harbour intoler- of sometimes profound religious, linguistic, cultural and ance, hostility and racist tendencies. ‘True’ nationalism is racial diversity. National identity can therefore be inclu- therefore ethnic nationalism. sive, flexible and always evolving, adapting itself to changing political and social circumstances. Nationalism and power. Nationalism is invariably associ- ated with the quest for power and therefore leads to Cultural belonging. The central benefit of nationalism is rivalry and conflict rather than cooperation. The nation- that it gives people a sense of cultural inheritance, a sense alism of the weak draws from a sense of powerlessness of who or what they are, binding them together and and subjugation, a desire to assert national rights and promoting sociability. Nationalism’s success in this identities in the context of perceived injustice and respect helps to explain why citizenship and nationality oppression. However, it is a delusion to believe that the are invariably overlapping ideas. The ‘inner’ benefits of quest for power is assuaged once a nation achieves sover- nationalism, which help to promote political stability and eign statehood. In established states and even great social cohesion, are not always, or necessarily, associated powers, nationalism is strongly linked to self-assertion, as with projects of expansionism, conquest and war. The national identity is remodelled around aggrandizement link between nationalism and militarism is therefore and the quest for ‘greatness’. strictly conditional, and tends to occur in particular when nationalist sentiments are generated by interna- tional rivalry and conflict. 170 GLOBAL POLITICS Focus on . . . International migration: are people pulled or pushed? Theories of migration can be divided into those that example, through the imposition of immigration quotas emphasize the role of the individual and those that and controls) or by reducing its benefits (for example, highlight the importance of structural factors. In prac- by restricting immigrants’ access to social security and tice, it is highly likely that these factors interact, as imposing work restrictions). individual decision-making cannot be understood sepa- Structural theories stress the degree to which rately from the structural context in which it takes social, economic or political factors influence, or deter- place. mine, individuals’ actions. Migrants are therefore either Individual theories stress the role of individual ‘pushed’ from their country of origin (by factors such as calculation in making migration decisions, influenced chronic and acute poverty, political unrest and civil by the pursuit of rational self-interest. This is an strife), or they are ‘pulled’ to their country of settlement economic model of migration, which relies on a kind of (by the need of expanding economies for additional cost–benefit analysis. It implies that migration occurs labour, particularly in relation to jobs the domestic because people are ‘pulled’ by an awareness on the part population is unwilling, or, through lack of skills, unable of potential migrants that its likely benefits will to fill). From this perspective, migration can best be outweigh its possible costs. In this view, migration can contained by strategies such as a reduction in global be contained by increasing the cost of migration (for inequality and the spread of stable governance. Other migrants, however, have travelled by choice for economic reasons, albeit ones that have sometimes involved considerable privation and hardship. This applies to the voluntary mass migration from Europe to the Americas from the mid-nineteenth century until the outbreak of WWI, which involved, for example, the migration of about a million Irish people escaping the potato famine of 1845–47 and over 3 million people from the German territories fleeing from rural poverty and periodic crop failures. A final reason for migration has been religious or political persecution. The classic example of this was the Jewish diaspora, which was initiated by Roman repression in Judea and involved the expulsion of Jews in the Middle Ages from England, France, Spain, Portugal and many of the German cities. Emigration from Europe to North America, both in the colonial period and in the late nineteenth century, also often reflected a desire to escape from religious persecution on the part of groups of Puritans, Nonconformists of various kinds, Catholics and Jews. Such international flows, however, have become a particular feature of the modern world. The idea that the modern period is an ‘age of migration’ high-  Diaspora: (from the lights not only the intensification of cross-border migration in what has come to Hebrew) literally, dispersion; be a hyper-mobile planet, but also the growing significance of migration in implies displacement or economic, social, cultural and political terms (Castles and Miller 2009). The dispersal by force, but is also global age, in other words, is defined just as much by transnational and trans- used to refer to the transnational community that border population flows as by flows of money, goods and other economic arose as a result of such resources. How and why have migratory patterns changed in recent years? In the dispersal. first place, there has been a significant acceleration in the rate of migration since T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 171 the 1970s which peaked in the early 1990s. The two main reasons for this were the growing number of refugees (reaching around 18 million by 1993), which resulted from war, ethnic conflict and political upheaval in areas ranging from Algeria, Rwanda and Uganda to Bangladesh, Indo-China and Afghanistan, and the collapse of communism in eastern Europe in 1989–91, which created, almost overnight, a new group of migrants as well as sparking a series of ethnic conflicts, especially in former Yugoslavia. Second, international migration has come to be more closely associated with economic factors and developments, particularly those linked to economic glob- alization. Although economic migrants do not match in number the peak flows that have been precipitated by war and political upheaval, the advance of glob- alization has been one of the reasons for the steady growth in migration since the 1970s. In the early post-1945 period, many European governments deliberately recruited workers from abroad to help in the process of post-war reconstruction and economic redevelopment. The UK and France, for example, looked to their former colonies in the Caribbean and North Africa respectively, while Germany recruited so-called ‘guest workers’ from Turkey and Yugoslavia. The onset of globalization has intensified pressures for international migration in a variety of ways. These include the development of a genuinely global labour market for a small but growing number of high-paid and high-profile jobs, and the fact that the restructuring that globalization has fostered both creates a range of skill needs that the domestic population cannot meet and, where turbulence has caused insecurity and hardship, enlarged the ranks of those looking for, or needing to find, new economic opportunities. In a world that does not respect borders for the movement of money and goods, it becomes increasingly difficult, and perhaps impossible, to restrict the free movement of workers. Transnational communities and diasporas Modern migration flows have had significant implications for the domestic poli- tics of states. These include the development in many societies of communities bound together by transnational, rather than national, allegiances. There is, of course, nothing new about scattered communities that have nevertheless main- tained their cultural distinctiveness and resisted pressure for assimilation. The Jewish diaspora, which can be traced back to the eighth century BCE, is the classic example of a transnational community. Ironically, the remarkable resilience of Judaism and the Hebrew language in the absence of a Jewish home- land can be significantly explained by a history of discrimination and persecu- tion through various forms of anti-Semitism. Other examples include the Armenians, many of whom have been forced into exile by successive invasions and conquests, dating back to the Byzantine Empire. However, many argue that the emergence of transnational communities is one of the chief features of the modern, globalized world (Basch et al. 1994). An increase in international migration does not in itself create new, transna-  Assimilation: The process tional social spaces: for transnational communities to be established, immigrant through which immigrant groups must forge and, crucially, sustain relations that link their societies of communities lose their cultural distinctiveness by adjusting to origin and of settlement. This is made easier in the modern world by a variety of the values, allegiances and developments. Whereas, say, Irish emigrants to the USA in the nineteenth lifestyles of the host society. century had little prospect of returning home and only a postal service to keep 172 GLOBAL POLITICS Canada sia From A Europe To North America USA North China Asia Atlantic Ocean India To North America To Fr Ja Africa om pa So n ut hA m er Pacific ica Ocean South Pacific America Ocean To Australia Indonesia Indian Ocean South From South America Australia Atlantic Ocean New Zealand Note: Arrow dimensions give only rough indication of the size of movement Map 7.1 Global migratory flows since 1973 Source: Castles and Miller (2009). them in touch with friends and family, modern communities of Philippines in the Gulf states, Indonesians in Australia and Bangladeshis in the UK benefit from cheaper transport and improved communications. Air travel enables people to return ‘home’ on a regular basis, creating fluid communities that are bound neither by their society of origin nor their society of settlement. The near-ubiquitous mobile phone has also become a basic resource for new immi- grants, helping to explain, amongst other things, its increasing penetration of the developing world, including the rural parts of Asia and Africa. Transnational communities, moreover, are bound together by a network of family ties and economic flows. Migration, for example, may maintain rather than weaken extended kinship links, as early immigrants provide a base and sometimes working opportunities for other members of their families or village who may subsequently emigrate. Similarly, modern international migration often serves as a means of maintaining one’s family from a distance as emigrants send much of their earnings home in the form of ‘remittances’, benefiting both their fami- lies and the domestic economy, especially through an injection of much-needed foreign exchange. It is estimated, for instance, that in 2002 the 7 million Filippines working overseas sent home over $8 billion, amounting to over $400 per month on average. The idea of a transition from territorial nation-states to deterritorialized transnational communities should not be over-stated, however. The impact of  Transnationalism: Political, modern migration patterns, and of globalization in its various forms, is more social, economic or other forms that transcend or cut across complex than is implied by the simple notion of transnationalism. In the first national borders. place, the homogeneous nation that has supposedly been put at risk by the emer- T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 173 gence of transnational communities is always, to some extent, a myth, a myth CONCEPT created by the ideology of nationalism itself. In other words, there is nothing Transnational new about cultural mixing, which long pre-dates the emergence of the hyper- community mobile planet. Second, transnational communities are characterized as much by difference and division as they are by commonality and solidarity. The most A transnational community is a obvious divisions within diaspora communities are those of gender and social community whose class, but other divisions may run along the lines of ethnicity, religion, age and cultural identity, political generation. Third, it is by no means clear that transnational loyalties are as stable allegiances and and enduring as nationalism. Quite simply, social ties that are not territorially psychological rooted and geographically defined may not be viable in the long term. Doubts orientations cut across or transcend national about the enduring character of transnational communities are raised by the borders. In that sense phenomenon of return migration, often stimulated by improved political or they challenge the economic circumstances in the country of origin. For example, there has been a nation-state ideal, which general tendency for people to return to Asia, notably China and Taiwan, to take clearly links politico- advantage of improving economic prospects since the 1980s. Finally, it is cultural identity to a specific territory or misleading to suggest that transnationalism has somehow displaced nationalism ‘homeland’. Transnational when, in reality, each has influenced the other, creating a more complex web of communities can hybrid identities. Hybridity or ‘creolization’, has thus become one of the major therefore be thought of features of globalization, and it is best examined in relation to the phenomenon as ‘deterritorialized of multiculturalism. nations’ or ‘global tribes’. However, not every diasporic community is a Hybridity and multiculturalism transnational community, in the sense that its Perhaps the most significant implication of increased international migration members retain since the final decades of the twentieth century has been that social and cultural allegiances to their country of origin. diversity has reached such a level that the idea of a return to the monocultural- Nevertheless, ism of the traditional nation-state (always more of myth than a reality) has been transnational accepted as impracticable, if not unthinkable. The tipping point in this respect communities typically probably came around the 1990s. More and more societies thus accepted and have multiple even (although with different degrees of enthusiasm) embraced their multicul- attachments, as allegiances to their tural characters, abandoning the politics of assimilation or strategies of volun- country of origin do not tary repatriation. Multiculturalism proclaims the idea of ‘togetherness in preclude the formation of difference’ (Young 1995), taking particular account of cultural differentiation attachments to their that is based on race, ethnicity or language. Multiculturalism not only recognizes country of settlement, the fact of cultural diversity, but it holds that such differences should be creating a form of differentiated citizenship. respected and publicly affirmed. Although the USA, an immigrant society, has long been a multicultural society, the cause of multiculturalism in this sense was not taken up until the rise of the black consciousness movement in the 1960s. Australia has been officially committed to multiculturalism since the 1970s, in recognition of its increasing ‘Asianization’. In New Zealand it is linked to a recog- nition of the role of Maori culture in forging a distinctive national identity. In Canada it is associated with attempts to achieve reconciliation between French- speaking Quebec and the English-speaking majority population, and an acknowledgement of the rights of the indigenous Inuit peoples.  Hybridity: A condition of Multiculturalism, however, is a broad term that encompasses a range of social and cultural mixing; the ambiguities as well as different approaches to the challenge of diversity. The term has been derived from cross-breeding between ambiguity that lies at the heart of multiculturalism is reflected in the tension genetically unalike plants or between, on the one hand, the idea of ethnic belonging and the embrace, even animals. celebration, of diversity on the other. Multicultural theorists highlight the 174 GLOBAL POLITICS importance of ethnicity as a basis for identity. Multiculturalism can be seen as a CONCEPT form of communitarianism, in that it focuses on the group and not the individ- Multiculturalism ual, seeing an individual’s self-worth as being inextricably linked to respect and Multiculturalism is used recognition for the beliefs, values and practices of his or her ethnic community. as both a descriptive and The advance of multiculturalism has therefore gone hand in hand with a normative term. As a campaigns for minority rights, sometimes called ‘special’ or ‘polyethnic’ rights. descriptive term it refers These are rights that acknowledge and seek to protect a community’s ethnic to cultural diversity distinctiveness, and affect matters such as dress, language, schooling and public arising from the existence within a society holidays. In states such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, they extend to of two or more groups special representation or territorial rights for indigenous peoples. However, at whose beliefs and the same time, multiculturalism proclaims the supposed benefits of cultural practices generate a mixing and hybridity, the value each community derives from living within a distinctive sense of society characterized by cultural difference. Cultures can thus learn from and collective identity, usually linked to racial, ethnic or enrich each other, widening cultural opportunities and strengthening inter- language differences. As a cultural understanding. The result is a kind of ‘mix-and-match’ multiculturalism normative term, that operates in tandem with cultural globalization to create deeper levels of multiculturalism implies social and cultural mixing in modern societies, blurring national distinctiveness a positive endorsement in the process. of communal diversity, based either on the right There are, moreover, competing models of multiculturalism, offering differ- of different cultural ent approaches to how diversity and togetherness can be reconciled and provid- groups to respect and ing rival views on the complex relationship between multiculturalism and recognition, or on the nationalism. Liberal multiculturalists tend to stress the importance of civic alleged benefits to the unity, arguing that diversity can and should be confined to the private sphere, larger society of moral and cultural diversity. leaving the public sphere as a realm of integration. Moral, cultural and lifestyle Multiculturalism, in this choices can thus largely be left to the individual, while common political or civic sense, acknowledges the allegiance help to bind people together. In this view, multiculturalism and importance of beliefs, nationalism are compatible, even creating a new, possibly twenty-first century values and ways of life in model of national identity in the form of multicultural nationalism, which establishing self- understanding and a balances cultural diversity against a common citizenship. Insofar as this destroys sense of self-worth for the link between nationality and ethnicity, it is very clearly based on a form of individuals and groups civic nationalism. However, conservatives, who argue that stable and successful alike. societies must be based on shared values and a common culture, argue that nationalism and multiculturalism are fundamentally incompatible. In this view, human beings are limited and dependent creatures, who are naturally drawn to others similar to themselves but, by the same token, fear or distrust people who are in some way different. Multicultural societies are therefore inherently frac- tured and conflict-ridden: suspicion, hostility and even violence between differ- ent ethnic communities are not products of intolerance, ignorance or social inequality, but are a simple fact of social psychology. Ethnic and cultural diver- sity are therefore the implacable enemy of national unity and political stability. The record of multicultural societies nevertheless suggests that there is nothing natural or inevitable about inter-ethnic conflict or hostility. This can be seen in relation to the revival of ethnic nationalism in the late twentieth century (discussed later in the chapter), but it is also evident in the close relationship between ethnic conflict and socio-economic divisions. In a sense, communal tensions have always been as much about social class as they have been about ethnicity: different ethnic groups tend to occupy differing positions within the economy and enjoy different levels of economic and social security. In some respects these economically based ethnic tensions have become more acute in an T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 175 age of globalization. This has happened in at least two ways. First, as Amy Chua CONCEPT (2003) argued, in many developing countries, the increased concentration of Ethnicity wealth in the hands of those in a position to exploit the benefit of global markets Ethnicity is the sentiment has often allowed small ethnic minorities to acquire hugely disproportional of loyalty towards a economic power. Examples of such ‘market dominant’ economic minorities distinctive population, include the Chinese in much of south-east Asia, Indians in East Africa and, cultural group or though in a less extreme form, the Ipos in West Africa. In such circumstances, territorial area. The term widening economic divisions have provoked growing hostility and racial preju- is complex because it has both racial and cultural dice on the part of ethnic majorities, which are increasingly expressed in overtones. The members violence, creating what Chua called a ‘world on fire’. The second way in which of ethnic groups are economic and ethnic tensions intermingle is in developed countries, where often seen, correctly or ethnic minorities are usually confined to marginal, low status and low income incorrectly, to have occupations. Such circumstances are usually linked to discrimination and other descended from common ancestors, meaning that forms of structural disadvantage, and have led to civil unrest and even rioting they tend to be thought amongst ethnic minority youths. Examples of this occurred in various parts of of as extended kinship the UK in 1981, in Los Angeles in 1992, in Queensland, Australia in 2004, and groups, united by blood. across much of France in 2005. More commonly, however, ethnicity is understood as a form of cultural identity, albeit one that operates at a NATIONALISM REVIVED deep and emotional level. As the twentieth century progressed, there were growing predictions of the An ‘ethnic’ culture decline of nationalism, even of the construction of a ‘post-national’ world. Not encompasses values, traditions and practices only had the barbarism and destruction of WWII created a distaste for nation- but, crucially, it also gives alism as an ideology seemingly inherently linked to expansionism and conflict, people a common but increasing cross-border cultural, economic and population flows appeared identity and sense of to render the sovereign nation-state redundant. Surely political identity was in distinctiveness, usually by the process of being redefined, even though it was unclear whether the successor focusing on their origins and descent. to nationalism would be multiculturalism, transnational communities, cosmopolitanism or whatever? The reality, however, has been very different. Nationalism has demonstrated remarkable resilience and durability: in the twenty-first century the overwhelming mass of people across the globe accept that they belong to a nation, and nationality continues to retain an unrivalled position as the basis for political allegiance. Indeed, in a number of ways, there has been a resurgence of nationalism. How and why has this happened? Primordialists, of course, may argue that the survival of nationalism simply bears out the truth of their theories: nationalism cannot be a dying doctrine because ethnic communities have not, and cannot, die out. Modernists, for their part, follow Gellner in explaining the rise of nationalism in the late twentieth century in terms of the simultaneous spread of industrial capitalism around the globe. However, resurgent nationalism has a number of manifestations, and therefore a number of underlying causes. Its main manifestations are an increase in national self-assertion in the post-Cold War period, the rise of cultural and ethnic nationalism, and a backlash against globalization. National self-assertion in the post-Cold War period The Cold War period certainly did not witness the eclipse of nationalism. However, during the Cold War, nationalist conflict took place within a context 176 GLOBAL POLITICS of East–West rivalry and the ideological antagonism between capitalism and communism. For example, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1978–79 was the only large-scale conventional war waged between one revolutionary Marxist regime and another (Anderson 1983). The end of the Cold War, and the declining significance of ideology as an organizing principle of global politics, nevertheless provided opportunities for the resurgence of nationalism as a modernizing force. This certainly happened in East and south- east Asia, where ‘tiger’ states such as Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan very deliberately used nation-building as a strategy for economic success in a global context. Although globalization may provide new and challenging circum- stances for nationalism, such examples also show how globalization can gener- ate new opportunities for redefining nationhood and national identity. Singapore is a particular example of this. Lacking the ethnic and cultural unity of a conventional nation-state, Singapore has nevertheless become possibly the most globalized state in the world. Basic to this process have been attempts by the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) to inculcate civic nationalism by instill- ing a sense of pride in the public institutions of the state as well as patriotic pride in the populace itself, in part by generous investment in technologically glossy public amenities. Civic nationalism thus helps to legitimize authoritar- ian rule and ensure social control, which, in turn, attracts foreign capital, thereby maintaining the growth levels that underpin patriotic pride and state allegiance. National self-assertion has also become a strategy of growing significance for powerful states, especially in the light of the fluid nature of world order in the post-Cold War world. Nationalism has thus once again proved its capacity for investing the drive for economic and political development with an ideological impetus based on a vision of strength, unity and pride. For instance, China’s remarkable economic revival has been accompanied by clear evidence of rising nationalism. This has been apparent in the greater pressure that has been brought to bear on Taiwan to prevent moves towards the declaration of formal independence, in a firm and sometime forcible response to independence move- ments in Tibet and Xinjiang, and sometimes in the growth of anti-Japanese sentiment. The Beijing Olympics of 2008, as well as a host of other engineering and technological achievements, have been used to instil patriotic pride at home and to project an image of China abroad as advanced and successful. Rising nationalism in India, particularly Hindu nationalism, led to the establishment of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in 1998. The BJP government intensified pressures to develop nuclear weapons, achieved in 1998, which have since remained hugely popular within India as a symbol of great power status. In the case of Russia, nationalism has been significantly more prominent since the rise of Vladimir Putin in 1999. Most clearly demonstrated by the aggressive resurgence of the war in Chechnya, resurgent nationalism has also been evident in the form of so-called ‘fuel nationalism’, the use of price adjustments and restrictions on the flow of Russian gas and oil to exert control over fuel-depend- ent neighbouring countries, and in a firmer and more combative stance adopted towards the West in general and the USA in particular, not least through the 2008 Georgian War (see p. 232). T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 177 G L O B A L AC TO R S . . . RUSSIA Type: State • Population: 141,927 • GDP per capita: $15,738 • HDI ranking: 71/182 • Capital: Moscow The Russian federation was formed third largest empire in history, which have been fuelled by globaliza- as a result of the break-up of the stretching from Poland in Europe to tion and the expansion of the world Soviet Union on 31 December 1991. Alaska in North America. Russia’s economy. This leaves the Russian This happened in the context of the ascendancy to world power dates economy vulnerable to a downturn collapse of communism across the from the 1917 Russian Revolution in world commodity prices, especially Soviet bloc during 1989–91, and the establishment of the Soviet as customs duties and taxes from the strengthening nationalism within Union (founded in 1922) as the fuel and energy sector account for the non-Russian Soviet republics world’s first communist state. The nearly half of the federal govern- and growing opposition to commu- Soviet Union played a decisive role in ment’s revenues. In some respects, nist rule within Russia itself. Under the allied victory in WWII, emerging commodity-driven growth has Yeltsin in the 1990s, drastic in 1945 as a superpower (see p. 38), undermined the long-term prospects economic reforms led to a reduction by virtue of its military might and of the Russian economy, because it in living standards, soaring infla- control over the expanding commu- has slowed the pace of economic tion, industrial decline and financial nist world. The political basis for the diversification and concealed other instability. The rise of Vladimir revival of Russian power after the structural weaknesses. The 2007–09 Putin, first as prime minister in chaos and instability of the 1990s was global financial crisis hit Russia 1999, later as president, and after laid by a combination of strong particularly hard because it led to a 2008 as prime minister once again, government, resurgent nationalism drop in oil prices, so reducing capital has been associated with strength- (linked not least to the Chechen in-flows and leading to a 16 per cent ened political leadership, economic War) and the use of the state as a fall in industrial production in 2008 recovery and the emergence of ‘elec- modernizing tool. These develop- alone. Further concerns about toral authoritarianism’. Russia is an ments have nevertheless been under- Russian power stem from the possi- illiberal democracy with the follow- pinned by economic recovery, based bility that ‘electoral authoritarianism’ ing major institutions: on Russia’s abundant supply of may ultimately prove to be an unreli- natural gas, oil, coal and precious able basis for modernization. In this  The State Duma, a 450-member metals. This has been used both to view, if strong government persists it lower house of the legislature, boost industrial and agricultural will be ultimately at the expense of and the Federal Council, the investment and to exert leverage over economic flexibility and moderniza- upper chamber which contains neighbouring states (Russia’s ‘near tion, and if pressure for liberal demo- two members from each of the abroad’) and Europe generally. cratic reform becomes irresistible, the 59 federal units. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia result may be a long period of politi-  A semi-presidential executive, (see p. 232) was widely interpreted as cal and social instability. A final comprising the prime minister, marking Russia’s re-emergence as a threat to Russia is the changing polit- who heads the Council of global power. A further dimension of ical and economic complexion of Ministers, working alongside a Russian influence is the fact that its eastern Europe, due to the expansion directly elected executive presi- enormous nuclear arsenal means that of the EU (see p. 505) and NATO (see dent. it is the only state capable of threat- p. 253). Russia’s strategic interests ening the USA with destruction. may thus remain more regional than Significance: Russian power Nevertheless, Russian power global, focusing on attempts to stems, in large part, from its vast size. should not be overstated. In the first ensure that its ‘near abroad’ and, in It is the largest country in the world, place, Russia’s emergence as a particular, countries such as Ukraine, almost twice the size of the USA. By ‘resource superpower’ has been Georgia and the former Soviet the eighteenth century, the Russian significantly linked to hikes in the republics of central Asia do not fall Empire had been established, the price of oil, natural gas and minerals outside its sphere of influence. 178 GLOBAL POLITICS Rise of cultural and ethnic nationalism There is evidence that although globalization may have weakened forms of clas- sical nationalism, based on a nation-state ideal that is increasingly difficult to sustain in an age of ‘borderless’ economic flows, it has strengthened cultural and ethnic forms of nationalism. If the conventional nation-state is no longer capable of generating meaningful collective identities, particularist nationalisms based on region, religion, ethnicity or race may develop to take its place. Such tendencies can be traced back to the 1960s when secessionist groups and forms of cultural nationalism sprang up in many parts of western Europe and North America. This was evident in Quebec in Canada, Scotland and Wales in the UK, Catalonia and the Basque area of Spain, Corsica in France and Flanders in Belgium. It created pressures for political decentralization, and sometimes precipitated major constitutional upheavals. Similar manifestations of ethnic assertiveness were found in the emergence of black nationalism in the USA and amongst the Native Americans in Canada in the USA, the Aboriginal peoples in Australia, and the Maoris in New Zealand. In the latter two cases, at least, this has brought about a major reassessment of national identity. Ethnic nationalism became significantly more prominent after the end of the Cold War. What is sometimes called ‘new nationalism’ (Kaldor 2006) led in the 1990s to a series of wars in former Yugoslavia, which also featured programmes of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and the worst massacres in Europe since WWII. A number of new nation-states were created but other states that have emerged from this process have been subject to deep ethnic rivalries and tensions. For example, Bosnia has effectively been divided into ‘ethnically pure’ Muslim, Serb and Croat areas, while Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 precipitated acute tensions between its Serb minority in northern Kosovo and the majority Muslim population. Other examples of ethnic assertiveness include secessionist uprisings in Chechnya and elsewhere in the Caucasus and the genocidal bloodshed that broke out in Rwanda in 1994, when between 800,000 and one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered in an uprising by militant Hutus. Rising ethnic nationalism in the post-Cold War period has been explained in terms of the tendency of communist rule and East–West rivalry to drive reli- gious, ethnic and national identities underground, only for these to rise dramat- ically to the surface once the suppressing factors were removed. However, the process is more complex and, in some senses, deep-seated. Smith (1995) high- lighted three components that explain why nationalism resurfaced in the late twentieth century. The first is what he called ‘the uneven distribution of ethno- history’, meaning that under-privileged or relatively deprived communities have been drawn to emulate more powerful nations who are able to celebrate their identity without fear. The second is the ability of nationalism to call on the ‘deep resources’ of religious belief to legitimize rule and mobilize populations, helping to explain the parallels that exist between ethnic nationalism and religious  Cultural nationalism: A fundamentalism. Finally, the idea of an ‘ancestral homeland’ has remained, and form of nationalism that places will continue to remain, a potent symbol. This highlights the fact that the quest primary emphasis on the regeneration of the nation as a for self-determination can never be fully achieved in a world of unequally distinctive civilization rather powerful nations. (Ethnic nationalism is examined further in Chapter 8 in than on self-determination. connection with the rise of identity politics.) T H E N AT I O N I N A G L O B A L A G E 179 Anti-globalization nationalism While certain forms of nationalism have developed as a means of allowing states to manage the globalization process, nationalism has more commonly devel- oped as a reaction against globalization, as a form of resistance. Nationalism has often prospered in conditions of fear, insecurity and social dislocation, its strength being its capacity to represent unity and certainty. The forms of nation- alism that develop in such circumstances tend not to be orientated around estab- lished nation-states but, instead, provide opportunities for generally right-wing parties’ movements to mount campaigns against conventional politics. This has been most apparent since the 1970s in the rise of far-right anti-immigration parties, which tend to define national identity in terms of a ‘backward-looking’ and culturally and perhaps ethnically ‘pure’ model. Such parties have become a feature of politics in many European states. The National Front in France, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, has attracted growing elec- toral support since the 1980s for a platform largely based on resistance to immi- gration. In 2002, Le Pen gained 5.8 million votes (18 per cent) and got through to the run-off stage in the presidential election. In Austria in 2000, the Freedom Party, under the leadership of Joerg Haider, won 27 per cent of the vote in the general election and became a member of the coalition government. The Northern League in Italy, which campaigns against immigration and advocates autonomy for that part of northern Italy they call Padania, has served in a coali- tion government under Silvio Berlusconi. Vlaams Blok, which campaigns both against immigration and in favour of Flemish independence, has become a major force in Belgian politics. In the Netherlands, Pim Fortuyn’s List, a far-right party formerly led by Pim Fortuyn, who was assassinated in 2002, preaches against the dangers of immigration and calls for the assimilation of Muslim immigrants in particular into a political culture of western liberalism. The main anti-immigration parties in Scandinavia are the two Progress Parties in Norway and Denmark, and the Danish People’s Party which broke away from the Progress Party in 1995. Anti-immigration nationalism has not been confined to Europe, however. It is articulated, for instance, in Australia by the One Nation party, which openly rejects the Australian government’s commitment to multi- culturalism. 180 GLOBAL POLITICS SUMMARY  Nationalism is a complex and deeply contested political phenomenon. This stems in part from the fact that all nations comprise a blend of cultural and political, and objective and subjective, characteristics. Nationalism has also been a cross-cutting ideology, associated with a wide range of doctrines, movements and causes.  From the perspective of primordialism, national identity has been seen to be rooted in a cultural heritage and language that may long predate statehood or the quest for independence. From the contrasting perspective of modernism, national identity is forged in response to changing social and historical circumstances, espe- cially linked to industrialization.  The liberating ‘face’ of nationalism is reflected in the reconfiguration of the world into a collection of nation- states, based on the principle of self-determination. However, it oppressive ‘face; is evident in a common link to the politics of aggression, militarism and war. While some argue that nationalism is inherently aggressive and oppressive, others suggest that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalisms.  Nationalism in the modern world has been weakened by an upsurge in international migration which has led to the growth of hybridity and multiculturalism in most, if not all, societies. Migratory flows have led to the formation of transnational communities and the diasporas that some believe provide an alternative to conventional nations.  Multiculturalism not only recognizes the fact of cultural diversity, but it holds that such differences should be respected and publicly affirmed. This, however, has created widespread debate, not least about the extent to which cultural diversity can be reconciled with political cohesion.  Nations and nationalism have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Indeed, nationalism has revived in that it has been used to underpin state self-assertion in a ‘de-ideologized’ post-Cold War period. It has also re- emerged in the forms of cultural and ethnic nationalism, and it has provided a vehicle through which the transformations brought about through globalization can be challenged and resisted. Questions for discussion Further reading  How can nationality and ethnicity be distinguished? Castles, S. and M. J. Miller The Age of Migration:  Are nations simply nothing more than ‘invented’ or International Population Movements in the Modern World (2009). An up-to-date and comprehensive assess- ‘imagined’ communities? ment of the nature, extent and dimensions of interna-  Why has the nation-state been such a successful tional population movements. political form? Parekh, B. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and  To what extent is nationalism a single doctrine? Political Theory (2000). An influential and closely argued  Is nationalism inherently oppressive and destructive? analysis of multiculturalism from a pluralist perspective.  Is increased international migration an inevitable Pryke, S. Nationalism in a Global World (2009). An explo- consequence of economic globalization? ration of the complex relationship between globalization  Do transnational communities constitute a viable and nationalism. alternative to conventional nations? Spencer, P. and H. Wollman Nationalism: A Critical  Are multiculturalism and nationalism compatible? Introduction (2002). An accessible study of nationalism  Is the trend towards multiculturalism to be that surveys both classical and contemporary approaches welcomed or resisted? to the subject.  How and why has nationalism revived in the post- Cold War period? Links to relevant web  Does nationalism have a future in a globalizing resources can be found on world? the Global Politics website CHAPTER 8 Identity, Culture and Challenges to the West ‘Identity is the theft of the self.’ E S T E E M A RT I N PREVIEW The end of the Cold War, and particularly developments such as September 11 and the ‘war on terror’, has altered thinking about global order and the balance between conflict and cooperation in world affairs in an important way. In addition to – and, some would argue, in place of – a concern with shifting power balances between and among states, global order appears to be increasingly shaped by new forces, especially those related to identity and culture. Some even argue that culture has replaced ideology as the key organizing principle of global politics, reflected in the growing significance in world affairs of factors such as ethnicity, history, values and religion. How can this trend towards so-called ‘identity politics’ best be explained, and what have been its implications? Most importantly, does the increasing impor- tance of culture mean that conflict, perhaps conflict between different civilizations, is more likely, or even inevitable? The growing salience of culture as a factor affect- ing world affairs has been particularly evident in relation to religion. Not only has there been, in some cases, a revival in religious belief, but more radical or ‘funda- mentalist’ religious movements have emerged, preaching that politics, in effect, is religion. To what extent has religious revivalism, and especially the trend towards religious fundamentalism, affected global politics? Finally, issues of identity, culture and religion have played a particularly prominent role in attempts to challenge and displace the politico-cultural hegemony of the West. The process through which former colonies have tried to establish non-western and sometimes anti-western political identities has affected Asia, but it has been especially crucial in the Muslim world, encouraging some to talk in terms of a civilizational clash between Islam and the West. What is the basis for conflict between Islam and the West, and can this conflict be overcome? KEY ISSUES  Why has identity politics become a prominent feature of world affairs?  Has culture displaced ideology as the organizing principle of global politics?  Is there an emerging ‘clash of civilizations’?  How important is religion in modern global politics?  Is conflict between Islam and the West unavoidable?  How has the West sought to deal with the ‘Muslim question’? 181 182 GLOBAL POLITICS CONCEPT RISE OF IDENTITY POLITICS Colonialism Westernization as modernization Colonialism is the theory Modernization has traditionally worn a western face. Western societies have or practice of establishing control over foreign conventionally been portrayed as ’developed’ or ‘advanced’ societies, implying territory and turning it that they offer a model that will, over time, be accepted by all other societies. This into a colony. Colonialism view was fostered by the economic, political and military ascendancy that is thus a particular form European states established from the sixteenth century onwards, underpinned of imperialism (see p. 28). by the expansion of trade, leading to the industrial revolution, and the spread of Colonialism is usually distinguished by colonialism. From the nineteenth century onwards, European ascendancy devel- settlement and economic oped into the ascendancy of the West (see p. 26) generally, through the growing domination. As typically importance of former colonies, most notably the USA. By the end of the nine- practised in Africa and teenth century, some nine-tenths of the entire land surface of the globe was south-east Asia, colonial controlled by European, or European-derived, powers. government was exercised by a settler The philosophical and intellectual roots of western civilization lie in Judeo- community from the Christian religion and the rediscovery in early modern Europe of the learning of mother country who classical Greece and Rome, which provided the foundation for the scientific were ethnically distinct revolution of the seventeenth century and subsequent technological advances. from the native During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, political, economic and cultural population. In French colonialism, colonies life in Europe was deeply permeated by liberal ideas, so much so that liberalism were thought of as part has sometimes appeared to be indistinguishable from western civilization in of the mother country, general. Influenced by the Enlightenment, liberal thinkers preached the values meaning that colonial of individualism, reason, freedom and toleration. This form of liberalism was peoples were granted boldly universalist: it implied that human history would be marked by the formal rights of citizenship. In contrast, gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal principles and institutions. Progress, in neo-colonialism involves short, was understood in strictly liberal terms. economic domination What were the features of this western model of modernization? without direct political Westernization had significant economic, political and cultural implications. In control, as, for example, economic terms, it meant the growth of a market or capitalist society. in so-called US ‘dollar imperialism’ in Latin Capitalism, based as it was on private property and competition, stimulated an America. unprecedented level of economic dynamism, underpinned by an ethic of indi- vidual self-striving. This gave rise to industrialization and urbanization, as well as new patterns of social stratification, based on a rising middle class, brought about through the expansion of business and the professions, and an increas- ingly factory-based working class. From a western perspective, market capitalism is the only reliable mechanism for generating wealth and widespread prosperity. The political face of westernization took the form of the advance of liberal  Enlightenment, The: An democracy. The key feature of such a system is that the right to rule is gained intellectual movement that through success in regular and competitive elections. In this way, a competitive reached its height in the and market-based economic system was complemented by an open and plural- eighteenth century and istic political system. Such economic and political arrangements have very challenged traditional beliefs in religion, politics and learning in particular implications for the culture (see p. 188) of western societies, however. general in the name of