India remains the wild card in US-China security tussle in Asia

In highlighting Beijing’s territorial aggressiveness and singling out New Delhi for closer ties, the US is seizing on India’s swing-state status in the post-Cold-War strategic hexagon
India still maintains security ties with Russia and China but the troubled Sino-Indian relationship may yet be the critical determinant in shaping Asian security

C. Uday Bhaskar

Published: 9:15am, 18 Jun 2022

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The Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, which brought together defence ministers and senior officials from across the Indo-Pacific, was mainly dominated by the verbal sparring between the United States and China, and the war in Ukraine.

As alliance members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the US, Japan, India and Australia also acquired a degree of focus. This was more so since Japan and Australia were represented by their prime minister and deputy prime minister respectively – while India chose to send a serving three-star admiral. This contrast was an indication of how each nation perceived the security conference.

The most significant takeaway is that this year’s meeting was held in person after a two-year Covid-19 hiatus, enabling high-level and personal interactions on Asian and global security issues against a backdrop of considerable geopolitical turbulence engendered by the war in Ukraine.

It was the first time the US and Chinese defence ministers had met in person since President Joe Biden assumed office in January 2021 and amid increased tension in the bilateral relationship.

US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a “historic crisis”. He said that “Russia’s indefensible assault on a peaceful neighbour has galvanised the world. And [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s reckless war of choice has reminded us all of the dangers of undercutting an international order rooted in rules and respect.”

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China, US defence chiefs square off on Taiwan, Ukraine in first face-to-face talks

Framing the Ukraine crisis as a critical issue of global relevance, Austin raised three questions: “Do rules matter? Does sovereignty matter? Does the system that we have built together matter?”

The extrapolation to regional developments and the Indo-Pacific was axiomatic and Austin trained his sights on China and its military assertiveness – from Taiwan and the South China Sea to the high Himalayas. The allusion was that China is doing a Russia in staking its territorial claims.

Austin declared that the “stakes are especially stark in the Taiwan Strait”, even as he reiterated the long-standing US commitment to the one-China policy and “red lines” apropos of Taiwan’s independence and unification by force.

In response, Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe, who spoke the following day, projected Beijing as a force for stability and peaceful development in the region, adding that China is not a threat to its interlocutors. On the Taiwan issue, Wei reiterated that the island was part of China and warned: “If anyone dares to secede Taiwan from China, we will not hesitate to fight, we will fight at all costs.”

US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin (second from left) and his Chinese counterpart Wei Fenghe (second from right) meet at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 11. Photo: AP

Austin noted that China now “adopts a more coercive and aggressive approach to its territorial claims”. And, in an important statement of US intent, he said: “We will continue to support the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling [on the South China Sea]. And we will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows. And we’ll do this right alongside our partners.”

The reference to partners brings India into the picture and here the subtext is instructive. In his speech, Austin referred to US allies in the region (Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand) and said they represented “a profound source of stability” even as the US was “weaving closer ties with other partners”.

He added: “I’m especially thinking of India, the world’s largest democracy. We believe that its growing military capability and technological prowess can be a stabilising force in the region.”

Furthermore, while dwelling on China’s territorial assertiveness, Austin noted that “further to the west, we see Beijing continue to harden its position along the border that it shares with India”.

India recently observed the second anniversary of the June 15 Galwan Valley incident, when a fierce scuffle between Indian border troops and China’s People’s Liberation Army led to the loss of military lives on both sides for the first time in over three decades.

Yet in an anomalous development, while India is part of the Quad alliance and is committed to upholding the sanctity of territorial integrity, international law and freedom of navigation, it is also a partner to China and Russia in forums such as the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping.

India’s US-Russia balancing act makes for an uneasy Quad alliance

Even as the India-China territorial dispute continues to fester and the two armies are in wary proximity in the contested Ladakh region, with troop numbers maintained at high levels, New Delhi hosted a three-day SCO meeting this week on border management.

And, in a related development, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to join a virtual BRICS summit hosted by China on June 24. This summit will be the first meeting between the leaders of Russia, China and India since Moscow launched its war on Ukraine on February 24. What is seen as political dexterity by New Delhi is being interpreted as duplicity by its most severe critics.

One way of looking at the post-Cold-War strategic framework is as a six-node hexagon with the US and its allies – the European Union and Japan – as one orientation, and Russia, China and India on the other side. Blurry contour lines have become clearer, and China’s “no limits” strategic partnership with Russia, announced in Beijing just before the Ukraine war, is a case in point.

But even as US alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific have been denounced by China and Russia, the swing state in this strategic hexagon is India – which remains the key variable. The texture and content of the troubled Sino-Indian relationship may yet be the critical determinant that could soon shape Asian security.

Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar is director of the Society for Policy Studies (SPS), an independent think tank based in New Delhi