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Summary

Japan and South Korea face the combined threat of an increasingly assertive China and a progressively more destabilising North Korea, not to mention a Russia which has resumed its role as a Pacific power. The US has enhanced its engagement with its East Asian partners in nuclear planning and consultation mechanisms. The prospects of indigenous nuclear weapons acquisition by Japan and South Korea, though, cannot be ruled out.

Introduction

In 2021, after Prime Minister Fumio Kishida came to office, Setsuko Thurlow, an atomic bomb survivor and well-known anti-nuclear weapons activist, urged him to sign the newly-negotiated Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).1 She blamed the Japanese government for seeking continued protection from the very weapons that had been twice used on its soil by the very power that now guaranteed Japan’s security. She urged Prime Minister Kishida to sign the treaty and lead the campaign against nuclear weapons.

Japan however did not sign the TPNW and the nuclear umbrella of the United States remains intact.  The nuclear programme of North Korea continues to churn, with little to no oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Russia, the world’s largest nuclear-armed state, continues to threaten the deployment of tactical weapons against Ukraine. China modernises its arsenal and refuses to participate in arms control talks until the US and Russia reduce their arsenals first.2

Kishida’s hesitation to sign the TPNW and commit to a non-nuclear stance reflects the threat perception held by East Asian democracies such as Japan and South Korea, as they face the combined threat of an increasingly assertive China and a progressively more destabilising North Korea, not to mention a Russia which has resumed its role as a Pacific power.

Evolving Nuclear Policy

Historically, Japan and South Korea were early adopters of norms against nuclear proliferation. Japan is a signatory to all major international treaties relating to nuclear weapons (with the exception of the TPNW), as is South Korea. However, in the immediate post-war period, both had very divergent views on nuclearisation. Japan aligned itself closely to a staunchly negative stance towards nuclear weapons, while South Korea attempted to actually pursue its own domestic nuclear weapon, even as both were protected by the extended nuclear deterrence umbrella of the US.

After 1945, as Japan slowly recovered from the war, its new constitution forbade it from possessing and maintaining any war-making capacity other than the bare minimum required for national defence. The US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty (called the Nichibei Anpo in short in Japanese), guaranteed the security of Japan by posting on Japanese soil a substantial number of forces who would, it was assumed, provide the offensive edge in the event of a conflict with the emerging Communist bloc.

Nuclear weapons were part of the bargain, though there was significant hesitation on the part of the Japanese to reveal the existence of nuclear-armed forces in Japan. This instinct was further confirmed in 1954, after the Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon No. 5) incident, when there was a huge outcry in Japan against the US and Russia’s ongoing nuclear weapons tests. This led then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato to declare the cornerstone of Japan’s stance on nuclear weapons: the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Under these, Japan would not allow possession, production or storage of nuclear weapons (by the US) on its soil.

Since then, despite the constant transit of US nuclear-armed submarines across Japanese waters, as well as the presence of the nuclear-powered US Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan continued to maintain that its territory would remain free of nuclear weapons. It was partially these assurances which enabled it to become the only NPT non-nuclear signatory to possess the complete fuel cycle facilities necessary to reprocess uranium control rods from civil reactors into the high-yield variety capable of producing nuclear weapons. 

South Korea had a different trajectory, one which led it to attempt to produce its own nuclear weapon in the 1970s. After independence from Japan, the Koreans were immediately embroiled in the Cold War due to the presence of Soviet and US troops along the 38th parallel bisecting the country. The Soviet-supported state, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), then invaded the weaker and less developed south, which under US control had become the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1950, leading to the Korean War. This three-year conflict, which ended with the division of the country in 1953, resulted in the new ROK finding itself adjoining a Communist dictatorship that was perpetually attempting to destabilise it. Therefore, the military junta in power at the time under President Park Chung Hee decided that despite US security guarantees, the presence of US troops on Korean soil, and the extended deterrence provided by the nuclear umbrella, the ROK needed to have its own weapon3 .

In 1970, US President Richard Nixon’s declaration that the US would withdraw its troops from the Korean peninsula caused the South Koreans to set up the Weapons Exploration Committee4 , which explored ways of obtaining, processing and manufacturing enough high-yield plutonium to make weapons. The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 further heightened Korean anxiety, and hastened the development project. However, by 1975, the US, which had caught wind of the secret programme, pressured France to refuse to supply the necessary equipment, and the programme was shut down, though sporadic efforts continued till 19795 . By 1975, the ROK had signed the NPT, and placed its nuclear facilities under the IAEA inspection mechanism.

In 1991, President Roh Tae-Woo emulated Japan’s example and issued the Five Non-Nuclear Principles: the ROK would not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.6 At the same time, the US removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the South led to gradual public support for a nuclear deterrent of its own culminating in the present majority support for hosting nuclear weapons on its soil.

Altered Threat Perception

North Korea’s rapid nuclearisation, and the rise of China to great power status have altered these countries’ threat perception. It was already well-known that North Korea possessed the wherewithal to manufacture nuclear weapons. In the 1970s and 1980s, Abdul Qadeer Khan started a network that explicitly (with the connivance of the Pakistani government) marketed nuclear fuel processing equipment and expertise that could only have been used in a nuclear weapons programme to North Korea.7 North Korea’s march to nuclearisation continued, and in 2006 it tested its first nuclear weapon. Despite United Nations sanctions, the North continued to develop its nuclear capability further, leading to the persistent missile tests that have become such a common sight today.

The initial response to North Korea’s tests were to conduct dialogue. The Six-party Talks8 , comprising the US, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China and Russia, were intended to convince the North to give up its weapons in exchange for food aid, security guarantees and international recognition. However, the North Korean regime’s insistence on US forces being withdrawn from East Asia entirely, and its refusal to subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection, doomed the talks to failure. Since then, North Korea has made increasingly belligerent threats of annihilation towards South Korea followed by repeated missile tests as well as further nuclear tests in 2009, 2013, 2016 (twice) and 2017.

A far more concerning threat, however, comes from China. After developing a nuclear weapon in 1964, China quickly developed thermonuclear weapons with the assistance of the Soviet Union, and in 1967 conducted its first test of that more dangerous weapon. Since then, it has maintained a strategic arsenal of more than 400 weapons. While China has signed the NPT as a nuclear weapon state, it has not signed the CTBT. China maintains a No First Use (NFU) policy, though statements by Foreign Ministry officials in recent times have indicated that NFU may be waived against certain opponents, such as India and Japan. Another concern altering threat perceptions is the fact that an aggressive China under President Xi Jinping has recently declared significant expansion of its nuclear assets, after refusing to participate in US–Russia talks on reducing the nuclear weapon stockpiles held by both countries.9

Japan and the ROK have responded cautiously to the security threats and provocations emanating from North Korean missiles tests and Chinese excesses. The barrage of missile tests last year by North Korea, continuing well through this year, have necessitated fundamental realignment in the traditional security structures the ROK and Japan have long relied on. The strategic documents released by Japan and the ROK in December 2022 and June 2023 respectively have amply reflected these realignments in light of acute provocations from the North as well as the systemic challenge posed by China.

Japan’s Response to Contemporary Security Challenges

Japan faces several regional and extra-regional security threats as reflected in the National Security Strategy (NSS) document. Chinese military activities in the Indo-Pacific region, both normatively and empirically, have “become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community.”10 With the ambition of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, China has increased its defense expenditure and has embarked on enhancing and modernising its nuclear and missile capabilities.

China has intensified unilateral activities in East and South China Sea as well as Sea of Japan altering the status quo in and around Senkaku Islands in the Sea of Japan. The issue of Taiwan also inextricably impacts the security dynamics of Japan. Evidently, a missile entered Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) when a missile launch demonstration was conducted by China during Taiwan Strait crisis last year. Hence, China presents a long term, credible and enduring security threat.

On the other hand, North Korea presents an immediate security threat in terms of missile and nuclear provocations. There have been instances of cruise and ballistic missile tests conducted by North Korea including some of the missiles being launched over Japanese territory or falling within the EEZ of Japan setting off evacuation alarms across Japan. In yet another provocative steps to enhance its offensive military capabilities, North Korea made a failed attempt to launch first military surveillance satellite in June this year. Earlier in March 2023, before the ‘Freedom Shield’ joint exercise between South Korea and the US, North Korea warned in a statement that if the US took military action against the North’s strategic weapons test, it would be seen as ‘declaration of war’. Further, Kim Yo Jong, the sister of the North Korean leader, stated that “the Pacific Ocean does not belong to the dominium of the US or Japan.”11

The taboo of not threatening the use of a nuclear weapon appears to be diluting, which will have an inevitable impact on East Asian security dynamics. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons has continuously been issued in the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war. The importance that the Sea of Okhotsk plays in Russian strategic nuclear forces doctrine further multiplies their activities in Northern Japan. Joint naval drills and joint flight of strategic bombers with China appears to be yet another challenge, further amplifying the insecurity among the regional states.

In order to address these challenges, Japan has prioritised the US–Japan alliance as the core of their strategy. Further, Japan’s recently unveiled National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy provide for reinforced capabilities including counterstrike and reconsideration of US-conceived integrated deterrence.  Dramatic advancement in missile-related technologies including hypersonic weapons have rendered Japanese ballistic missile defences insufficient. It is for this reason that the NSS 2022 proposes adoption of counterstrike capabilities in effective coordination with missile defense systems. In what the document calls ‘flexible deterrence option’, it clarifies that first strike is impermissible. To advance these objectives, Japan is slated to increase its defence budget to 2 per cent of GDP by 2027. 

The challenge for Japan can be summarised in 2 Ds—deterrence and disarmament. Under Prime Minister Kishida, who hails from Hiroshima, the government’s solemn commitment to disarmament is quite conspicuous. His government’s aggressive approach towards disarmament is shaping both governmental and non-governmental discourses. On one hand, Kishida spearheaded the establishment of the 15-member International Group of Eminent Persons for a world without nuclear weapons.12 In February 2023, the group convened their second meeting which recommended three main action points—reinforcing and expanding norms; concrete measures on nuclear risk reduction; and revitalising the NPT’s review process.13

Kishida also took a group of most industrialised G7 members (including Ukrainian President Volodmyr Zelenskyy) to Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park as a part of 2023 G7 Summit schedule. To set the discourse against the use of threat of nuclear weapons, as a part of G7 outcome documents, ‘G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament’ was also released.14

At the same time, Japan’s reliance on the United States’ extended nuclear deterrence presents a dichotomous situation wherein the US nuclear umbrella cannot be diluted due to its regional security implications, while the discourse around effectuation of disarmament must also be continued. Amidst the advancing nuclear and ballistic missile tests, including missiles launched by Beijing and Pyongyang last year in and over Japanese territory, Washington’s deterrence commitments have become more important than ever before for Tokyo.  

South Korean Response to Contemporary Security Challenges

The security threat from Pyongyang is more acute in Seoul. Traditionally, under the US security umbrella, South Korea has increasingly found the alliance architecture insufficient to deter the North’s provocations. Since last year, North Korea has conducted over 120 cruise and ballistic missile tests as a response to the trans-Pacific alliance between the US and its East Asian partners. In past years, the North Korean threat of deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and preemptive nuclear strikes has further strengthened the multi-dimensional US-ROK security alliance. Besides the threat of North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction, convergence of strategic interest between China and Russia, as also the unfolding great power competition between the US and China, present eminent challenges for South Korean security interests.

Acknowledging the emerging threats—including the adverse impact of the Russia–Ukraine War, the Yoon Suk Yeol Administration came up with a new National Security Strategy (NSS) in June 2023. The document underlines the solidification of extended nuclear deterrence in the ‘Washington Declaration’15 which entailed the establishment of a Nuclear Consultation Group, deployment of US strategic assets and commitment to extended nuclear deterrence. It further details a South Korean ‘three axis system’ to tackle North Korean nuclear and missile threats based on three stages of confrontation—preemption, defense strategies and retaliatory strategy (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Strategies to Address North Korean nuclear and missile threats16

These are Kill Chain strategy, Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) respectively. Kill Chain strategy aims to preemptively destroy North Korean nuclear and missile assets in case of clear indication of their intention to use nuclear weapons. Hence, it relies upon sophisticated surveillance and reconnaissance assets, along with precision strike capabilities. KAMD is a complex, multi-layered defence system that is designed to detect and intercept various types of missiles. KMPR aims at punitive massive retaliation with overwhelming force in order to deter North Korea and convey that the repercussion of its first strike would be so overwhelming that any perceived benefits from a first nuclear strike would be outweighed.

Conclusion

The presence of the US extended nuclear deterrence to Japan and South Korea has ensured stability in the East Asian region for decades. However, deterrence has increasingly been diluted ever since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea in 2006. While domestic debates on nuclear weapons gained urgency given Chinese and North Korean provocations, South Korean President in January 202317 called for the deployment of US nuclear weapons or development of an indigenous nuclear weapon capability. The US has responded by enhancing engagement and integration of its East Asian partners in nuclear planning and consultation mechanisms. With increasing North Korean nuclear and missile threats, and Chinese nuclear force modernisation, the prospects of indigenous nuclear weapons acquisition by Japan and South Korea cannot be ruled out.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Mainichi Shimbun, “A-bomb survivor Setsuko Thurlow hopes Japan's new PM can lead nuclear disarmament debate”, The Mainichi, 6 October 2021.
• 2. Gabriel Dominguez, “G7 adopts Kishida’s vision for a nuke-free world, but disarmament likely elusive”, The Japan Times, 20 May 2023.
• 3. “South Korea Special Weapons”, GlobalSecurity.org.
• 4. Ibid.
• 5. Ibid.
• 6. Ibid.
• 7. Molly MacCalman, “A.Q. Khan Nuclear Smuggling Network”, Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 111.
• 8. Xiaodon Liang, “The Six-Party Talks at a Glance”, Arms Control Association, January 2022.
• 9. “China”, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
• 10. “Japan’s National Security Strategy 2022”, Government of Japan, p. 9.
• 11. “Kim Jong Un’s sister warns: ‘Pacific Ocean not dominium of the US or Japan’”, The Indian Express, 7 March 2023.
• 12. “Members of the International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2 December 2022.
• 13. Manpreet Sethi, “Lending a helping hand to the first NPT PrepCom for the Eleventh Review Conference”, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, 24 July 2023. 
• 14. “G7 Leader’s Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament”, 19 May 2023.
• 15. “Washington Declaration”, The White House, 26 April 2023. 
• 16. Compiled by the authors from “The Yoon Suk Yeol Administration’s National Security Strategy: Global Pivotal State for Freedom, Peace and Prosperity”, Office of the President Republic of Korea, June 2023.
• 17. Abhishek Verma, “The Washington Declaration and US-South Korea Relations”, Commentary, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), 10 May 2023.

The Russian S-70 Okhotnik (Hunter) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) was reportedly used on the Ukrainian battlefield on 27 June 2023, where it struck Ukrainian military facilities in the regions of Sumy and Kremenchuk.1 This is an important development in the war since it showcases Russian capability to move beyond tactical and ad-hoc equipped drones like Orlan-10, Lastochka, Forpost-R and Orion,2 commercial Chinese quadcopters (DJI and Air series)3 and the Shahed and Mohajer series loitering munitions (LMs) imported from Iran,4 to staking a major technological claim in the form of a UCAV. In the short term, Russia will still depend on Iranian expertise in LMs given that a manufacturing plant has been set up inside Russia.5 The successful strikes by the S-70, with the option of manned–unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with the Su-57 fighter jet, provide the country with a deployable option, still under development by other powers like the US and the UK.

The Okhotnik project has been in the making since 20116 and has been envisaged as a “loyal wingman” for the Su-57.7 A loyal wingman is a UCAV which, using onboard AI, can collaborate with manned fighters and is seen as being significantly low-cost than its manned counterpart.8 This expands the tasking and deployment options for the pair (at the very least one UCAV and one manned fighter are being considered but the numbers of UCAV can increase depending on the cognitive load on the pilot). The project is being jointly developed by Sukhoi and Mikoyan as a sixth-generation heavy UCAV.9 A sixth generation air vehicle has parameters like onboard data fusion and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, advanced stealth airframes, advanced variable cycle engines and integration of directed energy weapons (DEW).10 Two prototypes have been developed so far, the first one with a circular exhaust and the latter with a more square-shaped one to increase stealth.11 Two more are under development and these are supposedly similar to the ones which will finally undergo serial production.12

The design of the S-70 is that of a ‘flying wing’, similar to that of the F-117 Nighthawk, the RQ-170 and the Shahed-136.13 Okhotnik’s first autonomous flight testing, which included a flight time of around 30 minutes, alongside an Su-57, was conducted on 27 September 2019.14 The Su-57 has been used as a flying laboratory for testing the Hunter’s avionics. Unguided bombs were tested in 2021,15 followed by the test-firing of Kh59 Mk2 precision guided munition (PGM) in May 2022.16 The current version of Su-57 is a single-seat fighter but a twin-seater variant has been flight-tested with the Hunter where the co-pilot will be exclusively responsible for controlling and monitoring the UCAV, with the pilot performing his/her basic functions.

Certain other developments in this project merit attention. When operationally ready, each Su-57 will command up to four S-70s.17 Already, four Su-57s have been used to conduct suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) in Ukraine on 9 June 2022.18 The interesting part was that all four were “linked to a single information network to destroy air defense systems through automatic communication systems, data transmission, navigation and identification in real-time”.19 The Okhotnik has also been trialed with the Mig-29.20 In a standalone mode, it may also be deployed on the still-in-development Project 23900 Ivan Rogonov helicopter carriers, each of which has a capacity to accommodate 4 S-70s.21 Russian analysts have also dubbed the S-70 the world’s first “outer space” drone.22

Manned–Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)

The Okhotnik’s strikes in Ukraine can act as proof of concept for the MUM-T concept, under development in a number of countries including India. MUM-T has been defined differently by different armed forces across the world. While the US Army Aviation Centre (USAACE) defines MUM-T as “synchronized employment of soldier, manned and unmanned air and ground vehicles, robotics, and sensors to achieve enhanced situational understanding, greater lethality, and improved survivability”,23 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s standardisation agreement (STANAG) calibrates five levels of interoperability (LOI) between manned and unmanned platforms,24 with the first being indirect receipt of UAV-related data, going up to level five which relates to the control and monitoring of the UAV along with launch and recovery functions.25

In India, the Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) is meant as an umbrella term for a combination of manned and unmanned assets which can reduce human casualties, perform air-to-air and air-to-ground strikes from a standoff distance and also act as atmospheric satellites for high altitude surveillance.26 The initial prototypes are being tested on the Jaguar aircraft and will later be fitted on the Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) acting as the “mothership”.27

Similar projects are being developed in the US (collaborative combat aircraft or CCA)28 , Australia (air teaming system or ATS)29 and the UK (Project Tempest).30 Within the US, a number of parallel programs are in progress. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is field testing the Skyborg program with the Kratos’ X-58 Valkyrie.31 The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is moving ahead with the air combat evolution (ACE) program,32 and in a simulation featuring a US Air Force (USAF) pilot competing with an AI pilot under the AlphaDogFight program, had shown that AI could beat human pilots in number of fighter manoeuvres and targeting actions.33 There were obviously some caveats and one could say that the dice was loaded in favour of the AI. However, even granting those advantages to the AI, the performance has been nothing short of impressive and heralds the future of air combat.

MUM-T, when implemented during conventional combat scenarios, offers the advantage of combining the strengths of manned and unmanned aircrafts, while complementing each other’s shortfalls. The UCAV can be sent ahead in a dense air defence (AD) environment to scout for targets, perform SEAD and force the adversary to reveal its surface to air missile (SAM) sites. This data, most of which is computed within the UCAV using edge processing, can be sent back to the manned fighter, already at standoff range, and used for conducting air and ground attacks. The UCAV, when equipped with either air-to-air or air-to-ground (AAM/AGM) missiles can also act as a ‘flying magazine’ for the manned fighter, increasing the inventory and range of the aircraft.

With the number of unmanned platforms under the pilot’s control increasing and the unmanned platforms themselves carrying LMs, similar to what is envisaged in the CATS program, the pilot now has the opportunity to conduct what this writer calls “simultaneous multi-roles” (SMRs) where the capabilities of the manned fighter will increase manifold. At the same instant, the pilot can engage air targets, perform precision bombing against pin-point high value targets and saturate the battlefield with LMs and conventional unguided bombs.

Air combat is likely to undergo a major change with the entry of UAVs of all shapes and sizes. Countries which can proactively take advantage of this phase of air combat evolution are likely to have a greater edge over their adversaries. As the Okhotnik trials and later operational use shows, the combination of the human mind and computational strength of microchips, integrated into a single system, has the potential to impose on the adversary a major decision dilemma regarding the system to be countered and can act as a combined arms offensive in the air.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Vijainder K. Thakur, “Russia ’s S-70 Okhotnik Heavy Stealth Drone Starts Bashing Ukrainian Forces As Kyiv Desperately Awaits F-16s”,  The EurAsian Times, 1 July 2023.
• 2. Jeffery Edmonds and Samuel Bendett, “Russia ’s Use of Uncrewed Systems in Ukraine. Russia ’s Use of Uncrewed Systems in Ukraine”, CNA, March 2023.
• 3. Jacob Fromer and Nikkei Staff, “Special Report: Russia Buying Civilian Drones from China for War Effort”, Nikkei Asia, 1 July 2023.
• 4. Tim Lister, “The Iranian Drones Deployed by Russia in Ukraine are Powered by Stolen Western Technology Research Reveals”, CNN, 28 April 2023.
• 5. “Russia Assembles Iranian Drones for Use Against Ukraine”, The Moscow Times, 4 July 2023.
• 6. “Russia’s Attack Drone Prototype to Start Test Flights This Year- Source”, TASS, 8 July 2018.
• 7.   Thomas Newdick and Tyler Rogoway, “Russia Unveils Stealthier Version Of Its S-70 “Hunter” Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle”, The Drive, 14 December 2021.
• 8. Tim Fish, “Uncrewed Ambitions of the Loyal Wingman - Airforce Technology”, Airforce Technology, 1 November 2022.
• 9. Vladimir Karnozov, “MiG and Sukhoi to join forces on Russian UCAV”,  Flight Global, 11 August 2011.
• 10.   Kelsey D. Atherton, “What to Expect From the US Air Force ’s Sixth-Generation Fighter Jet”, Popular Science. 20 May 2023.
• 11. Joseph Trevithick, “Russia ’s‘Hunter‘ Flying Wing Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle is a Big Beast”, The Drive, 21 May 2019.
• 12. Newdick and Rogoway, “Russia Unveils Stealthier Version Of Its S-70 “Hunter” Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle”, no. 7.
• 13. Joseph  Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Full Analysis Of The First Flight Of Russia ’s ‘Hunter‘ Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle”,  The Drive,  13 August 2019.
• 14. Thomas Newdick, “Russia ’s Okhotnik Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Tests Air-To-Air Missiles: Report”,  The  Drive, 2 December 2020.
• 15. Stefano D’Urso, “The Russian S-70 Okhotnik UCAV Struck Ground Targets With Unguided Bombs During Weapons Testing”, The Aviationist, 14 January 2021.
• 16. Maya Carlin, “Russia ’s S-70 Stealth Drone Is (Almost) Ready to Hunt”, 19FortyFive , 21 June 2022.
• 17.   “Russia ’s New Su-57 Fighters to Each Command Four Stealthy Okhotnik Attack Drones”, Military Watch Magazine, 5 June 2021.
• 18. Gaston Dubois, “The Sukhoi Su-57 in Combat Operations over Ukraine”, Aviacionline, 9 June 2022.
• 19. “Россия применила на Украине истребители Су-57, сообщил источник”, РИА, June 2022.
• 20. Sakshi Tiwari, “Russia ’s S-70 Stealth Attack Drone Accompanied By MiG-29 Fighter Jet Spotted Flying In A Formation”, The EurAsian Times, 23 July 2023.
• 21. Ryan White, “Russian Navy’s Project 239000 LHDs Taking Shape in Kerch”, Naval Post, 2 March 2021.
• 22. Parth Satam, “World ’s 1st Space Drone? Russian Historian Says S-70 ‘Hunter ’ Can Reach Outer Space; US Experts Skeptical”, The EurAsian Times, 27 December 2022.
• 23. “What is Manned-Unmanned Teaming”, BAE Systems, 27 July 2023.
• 24. Mario Monteiro Marques, “STANAG 4586 –Standard Interfaces of UAV Control System (UCS) for NATO UAV Interoperability”, NATO-OTAN.
• 25. Livio Rossetti, “Manned-Unmanned Teaming: A Great Opportunity or Mission Overload?”, The Journal of the JAPCC, January 2020.
• 26. Atul Chandra, “HAL Unveils Ambitious Air-teaming System Centred on Tejas”,  Flight Global, 4 February 2021.
• 27. Rahul Udoshi, “HAL Showcases Upgraded Jaguar MAX Combat Aircraft”, Janes, 26 February 2023.
• 28.   John A Tirpak, “Collaborative Combat Aircraft Will Join the Air Force Before NGAD”, Air & Space Forces Magazine, 29 March 2023.
• 29. Bradley Perett, “Design of Boeing ’s Loyal Wingman Gives Clues about Performance and Roles”, The Strategist, 18 November 2021.
• 30. “The UK ’s Tempest ’s Unmanned ‘Loyal Wingmen’ To Be Carrier Capable”, UASweekly.com, 19 February 2019.
• 31. “Kratos, USAF Complete Successful XQ-58A Valkyrie Skyborg Flight Series”, Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, 18 July 2022.
• 32. Ryan Hefron, “Air Combat Evolution (ACE)”, DARPA, 28 July 2023.
• 33. Patrick Tucker, “An AI Just Beat a Human F-16 Pilot In a Dogfight — Again”, Defense One, 26 July 2023.

Seven technology companies including Microsoft, OpenAI, Anthropic and Meta, with major artificial intelligence (AI) products made voluntary commitments regarding the regulation of AI at an event held in the White House on 21 July 2023.1 These eight commitments are based on three guiding principles of safety, security and trust. Areas and domains which are presumably impacted by AI have been covered by the code of conduct. While these are non-binding, unenforceable and voluntary, they may form the basis for a future Executive Order on AI, which will become critical given the increasing military use of AI. 

The voluntary AI commitments are the following:

1. Red-teaming (internal and external) products to be released for public use. Bio, chemical and radiological risks and ways in which barriers to entry can be lowered for weapons development and design are some of the top priorities. The effect on systems which have interactions and the ability to control physical systems needs to be evaluated apart from societal risks such as bias and discrimination;
2. Information sharing amongst companies and governments. This is going to be challenging since the entire model is based on secrecy and competition;
3. Invest in cybersecurity and safeguards to protect unreleased and proprietary model weights;
4. Incentivize third party discovery and reporting of issues and vulnerabilities;
5. Watermarking AI generated content;
6. Publicly report model or system capabilities including discussions of societal risks;
7. Accord priority to research on societal risks posed by AI systems; and
8. Develop and deploy frontier AI systems to help address society’s greatest challenges.2

The eight commitments of US’s Big Tech companies come a few days after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the first time convened a session on the threat posed by AI to global peace and security.3 The UN Secretary General (UNSG) proposed the setting up of a global AI watchdog comprising experts in the field who would share their expertise with governments and administrative agencies. The UNSG also added that UN must come up with a legally binding agreement by 2026 banning the use of AI in automated weapons of war.4

The discussion at the UNSC can be seen as elevating the focus from shorter term AI threat of disinformation and propaganda in a bilateral context between governments and Big Tech companies to a larger, global focus on advancements in AI and the need to follow certain common standards, which are transparent, respect privacy of individuals whose data is ‘scraped’ on a massive scale, and ensure robust cybersecurity.

Threat posed by AI

Lawmakers in the US have been attempting to rein in the exponential developments in the AI field for some time now, since not much is known about the real impact of the technology on a longer-term basis. The reactions to the so-called danger of AI have been polarizing, with some even equating AI with the atom bomb and terming the current phase of growth in AI as the ‘Oppenheimer moment’5 , after the scientist-philosopher J. Robert Oppenheimer, under whom the Manhattan Project was brought to a fruitful conclusion with the testing of the first atomic bomb. This was the moment that signaled the start of the first nuclear age—an era of living under the nuclear shadow that persists to this day. The Oppenheimer moment, therefore, is a dividing line between the conventional past and the new present and presumably the unknown future.

Some academics, activists and even members of the Big Tech community, referred to as ‘AI doomers’ have coined a term, P(doom), in an attempt to quantify the risk of a doomsday scenario where a ‘runaway superintelligence’ causes severe harm to humanity or leads to human extinction.6 Others refer to variations of the ‘Paperclip Maximiser’, where the AI is given a particular task to optimise by the humans, understands it in the form of maximising the number of paperclips in the universe and proceeds to expend all resources of the planet in order to manufacture only paperclips.7

This thought experiment was used to signify the dangers of two issues with AI: the ‘orthogonality thesis’, which refers to a highly intelligent AI that could interpret human goals in its own way and proceed to accomplish tasks which have no value to the humans; and ‘instrumental convergence’ which implies AI taking control of all matter and energy on the planet in addition to ensuring that no one can shut it down or alter its goals.8

Apart from these alleged existential dangers, the new wave of generative AI9 , which has the potential of lowering and in certain cases, decimating entry barriers to content creation in text, image, audio and video format, can adversely affect societies in the short to medium term. Generative AI has the potential to birth the era of the ‘superhuman’, the lone wolf who can target state institutions through the click of his keyboard at will.10

The use of generative AI in the hands of motivated individuals, non-state and state actors, has the potential to generate disinformation at scale. Most inimical actors and institutions have so far struggled to achieve this due to the difficulties of homing onto specific faultlines within countries, using local dialects and generating adequately realistic videos, among others. This is now available at a price—disinformation as a service (DaaS)—at the fingertips of an individual, making the creation and dissemination of disinformation at scale, very easy. This is why the voluntary commitments by the US Big Tech companies are just the beginning of a regulatory process that needs to be made enforceable, in line with legally binding safeguards agreed to by UN members for respective countries.

Military Uses of AI   

Slowly and steadily, the use of AI in military has been gaining ground. The Russia-Ukraine war has seen deployment of increasingly efficient AI systems on both sides. Palantir, a company which specialises in AI-based data fusion and surveillance services,11 has created a new product called the Palantir AI Platform (AIP). This uses large language models (LLMs) and algorithms to designate, analyse and serve up suggestions for neutralising adversary targets, in a chatbot mode.12

Though Palantir’s website clarifies that the system will only be deployed across classified systems and use both classified and unclassified data to create operating pictures, there is no further information on the subject available in the open domain.13 The company has also assured on its site that it will use “industry-leading guardrails” to safeguard against unauthorized actions.14 The absence of Palantir from the White House declaration is significant since it is one of the very few companies whose products are designed for significant military use.

Richard Moore, the head of United Kingdom’s (UK) MI6, on 19 July 2023 stated that his staff was using AI and big data analysis to identify and disrupt the flow of weapons to Russia.15 Russia is testing its unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) Marker with an inbuilt AI which will seek out Leopard and Abrams tanks on the battlefield and target them. However, despite being tested in a number of terrains such as forests, the Marker hasn’t been rolled out for combat action in ongoing conflict against Ukraine.16

Ukraine has fitted its drones with rudimentary AI that can perform the most basic edge processing to identify platforms like tanks and pass on only the relevant information (coordinates and nature of platform) amounting to kilobytes of data to a vast shooter network.17 There are obviously challenges in misidentifying objects and the task becomes exceedingly difficult when identifying and singling out individuals from the opposing side. Facial recognition softwares have been used by the Ukrainians to identify the bodies of Russian soldiers killed in action for propaganda uses.18

It is not a far shot to imagine the same being used for targeted killings using drones. The challenge here of course is systemic bias and discrimination in the AI model which creeps in despite the best intentions of the data scientists, which may lead to inadvertent killing of civilians. Similarly, spoofing of the senior commanders’ voice and text messages may lead to passing of spurious and fatal orders for formations. On the other hand, the UK-led Future Combat Air System (FCAS) Tempest envisages a wholly autonomous fighter with AI integrated both during the design and development phase (D&D) as well as the identification and targeting phase during operations.19 The human, at best, will be on the loop.

Conclusion

The military use of AI is an offshoot of the developments ripping through the Silicon Valley. As a result, the suggestions being offered to rein in the advancements in AI need to move beyond self-censorship and into the domain of regulation. This will be needed to ensure that the unwarranted effects of these technologies do not spill over into the modern battlefield, already saturated with lethal and precision-based weapons.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Mohar Chatterjee, “White House Notches AI Agreement With Top Tech Firms”, Politico, 21 July 2023.
• 2. “Ensuring Safe, Secure and Trustworthy AI”, The White House, 21 July 2023.
• 3. Farnaz Fassihi, “U.N. Official Urge Regulation of Artificial Intelligence”, The New York Times, 18 July 2023.
• 4. Ibid.
• 5.   Catherine Bauer, “Movie Director Christopher Nolan Warns of AI’s ‘Oppenheimer Moment”, NBC News, 22 July 2023.
• 6.   Edelman Gary Grossman, “AI  Doom, AI Boom and the Possible Destruction of Humanity”, Venture Beat, 4 June 2023.
• 7. “Squiggle Maximizer (Formerly “Paperclip Maximizer)”, Lesswrong, 25 July 2023.
• 8. Nick Bostrom, “Ethical Issues in Advanced Artificial Intelligence”, 2002.
• 9. “What is Generative AI”, McKinsey & Company, 19 January 2023.
• 10. Willian Beard, “Russia’s Cyber Strategies”, University of Hawai‘i, 2 December 2021.
• 11. Jeffery Dastin, “Ukraine is Using Palantir’s Software for ‘Tageting,’ CEO Says”, Reuters, 2 February 2023.
• 12.   Andrew Tarantola, “Palantir Shows Off an AI That Can Go to War”, Engadget, 26 April 2023.
• 13. “AIP for Defence”, Palantir, 25 July 2023.
• 14. Andrew Tarantola, “Palantir Shows Off an AI That Can Go to War”, no. 12.
• 15. “Britain’s M16 Chief Says His Spies are Using AI to Disrupt Flow of Weapons to Russia”, The Hindu, 19 July 2023.
• 16. Ellie Cook, “How Russia’s ‘Marker’ Combat Robots Could Impact Ukraine War”, Newsweek, 18 January 2023.
• 17. “The War in Ukraine Shows how Technology is Changing the Battlefield”, The Economist, 3 July 2023.
• 18. Darian Meacham and Martin Gak, “Does Facial Recognition Tech in Ukraine’s War Bring Killer Robots Nearer?”, Open Democracy, 30 March 2022.
• 19. Akshat Upadhyay, “Civil-Military Fusion for Emerging Technologies in India”, Synergy, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 2023.

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Summary

It is essential for the government to convey to the countries hosting separatist Khalistani elements that they cannot simultaneously have good relations with India while allowing anti-India separatist movements on their soil. India will also have to build a constructive and sustained engagement with the Sikh diaspora, dispel the misinformation propagated by the Khalistani separatists and showcase the sense of contentment prevailing in Punjab.

Introduction

Khalistani separatist activities in Western countries have been on the rise. On 2 July 2023, the Indian Consulate in San Francisco was set on fire (causing minor damage) by a group of pro-Khalistani separatists. In another incident, ‘Sikhs for Justice’, a separatist organisation, put out posters instigating the radical elements to kill Indian top diplomats in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. The advertising poster of the rally featured a tagline ‘Kill India’. These posters were in response to the death of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in June 2023 in British Columbia, Canada, with separatists charging Indian agencies as responsible for the killing. In addition to these two incidents, Khalistani supporters in Brampton, Canada carried out a 5-km long parade which displayed a float depicting the assassination of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Khalistani militants. 

Intensification of Khalistani Activities Overseas

Although such incidents have taken place intermittently in the last two decades, the Khalistani activities overseas have intensified in last couple of years. Besides the attacks on state symbols, the separatists’ activities across major Western countries broadly include attacks on temples and consulates, and coordinating referendums for a separate State of Khalistan in multiple countries.

Attacks on Religious Symbols

In October 2022, Khalistan separatists and Indian supporters, approx. 400–500 in numbers clashed in Mississauga, Ontario, on the eve of Diwali. While one group waved the Indian flag, the other carried the Khalistan flag and shouted anti-India slogans. In January 2023, in a series of incidents, three Hindu temples (ISKCON, BAPS Swaminarayan Mandir and Shri Shiva Vishnu Temple) in Australia were defaced and anti-India slogans were sprayed on the walls. Similar incidents have been reported intermittently in Australia, with the most recent incident happening just before Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited that country in May 2023. Similarly, Canada has witnessed several incidents related to the defacement of Hindu temples, often with the slogan ‘Khalistan Zindabad, Hindustan Murdabad’ sprayed on the walls.

Referendum for separate State of Khalistan

Besides these events, the ‘Sikhs for Justice’ conducted its ‘Referendum 2022’ for separate State of Khalistan in the UK, Canada, the US and Australia, where a sizable Sikh population reside. Canada witnessed participation of 1 lakh people out of total population of 5 lakh. This does reflect the failure of separatists to garner full support for their agenda. The Indian diaspora have been vehemently opposing the activities of the Khalistanis. During the referendum in late January 2023 in Australia, a scuffle broke out between Khalistanis and pro-India supporters at the voting site, Federation Square, Melbourne.1

Attack on Indian High Commission and Consulates

The Khalistanis have also targeted Indian consulates in a coordinated manner. In February 2023, the separatists in Australia targeted the Honorary Consulate in Brisbane and installed the Khalistani Flag inside the premises. In a similar incident in March, pro-Khalistani protesters stormed the Indian consulate in San Francisco, raised Khalistani slogans and installed two pro-Khalistan Flags inside the consulate premises. On 19 March, a group of Khalistan separatists vandalized the Indian High Commission in London, taking out the Indian flag and tried to replace it with the Khalistan flag.

Activities inside India

The Khalistani separatists have been trying hard to reignite the Khalistani separatist movement in India as well. Two major incidents which saw active involvement of Khalistan elements were the farmers’ agitation in 2020 and the emergence of Amritpal Singh as an advocate of a separate state of Khalistan. As intelligence reports have suggested, the farmer’s protest did witness the involvement of declared terrorist organisations operating from abroad.2 The incident of 26 January 2021, when protesting farmers entered the vicinity of the Red Fort and hoisted Nishan Sahib Flag, gives more credence to such reports. The US-based banned pro-khalistani group, Sikh for Justice, announced the reward of USD 350,000 (INR 25 million) for unfurling ‘Khalistani Flag’ at the Indian parliament.3

In case of framers protest, it was later established that Amritpal Singh visited the protesting sites to lay the grounds for his separatist activities a year later. In February 2023, at an incident in Ajnala, thousands of Amritpal’s supporters broke through the police barricades and secured the release of Lovepreet Singh Toofan, an aide of Amritpal Singh. In an attempt to appeal to the separatists sentiments in the state and revive the issue of Khalistan, Amritpal also imitated Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. He was finally arrested on 23 April. His arrest provided another rallying point for the overseas Khalistan separatists to intensify their propaganda. On 19 March 2023, Indian High Commissioner to Canada had to cancel an event in British Columbia as nearly 200 protestors gathered in front of the venue entrance (some wielding swords) to protest against the arrest.

West’s reluctance and refusal to act

That multiple Khalistan separatist organisations and individuals could spearhead such an anti-India campaigns as discussed above, indicates the unwillingness of the Western countries, especially Canada, to act against these separatist elements.

During the period of the Punjab militancy in the 1980s, the behaviour of the Western camp led by the US was guided by the then prevailing international systemic order reflected in the Cold War dynamics. India at the time was perceived as a Soviet-leaning state, and therefore belonging to the enemy bloc. The end of the Cold War and the opening up of the Indian economy for outside investors altered the perception of the Western countries about India’s ideological leanings.

Further, the attack on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the subsequent war on terror led these countries to crack down on terrorist organisations. However, two decades since, vote bank politics appears to have influenced these Western countries, explaining their tolerance towards anti-India activities by the Khalistani separatists on their soil. When confronted by India, the Western countries hide behind the veil of their so-called democratic credentials, and highlight the principles of ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘peaceful protests’. Hence, Khalistanis are allowed to protest peacefully.

However, lately, the inaction of Western countries and their unwillingness to rein in the Khalistani separatists in their respective countries have been straining their relations with India, especially for countries like Canada.

Khalistan factor in Canadian politics

Canada is home to the second-largest Sikh population in the world, after India. In terms of their population, they form more than 2 per cent of the total population of Canada, with nearly 8,00,000 people. They are also the fastest-growing and fourth-largest religious community in Canada. Over the years, Canada has seen several phases of Sikh migration. They have now developed into a robust and economically flourishing community. Earlier in the 1980s, Canada had provided sanctuary to several dreaded terrorists, including Jagjit Singh Chauhan and Talwinder Singh Parmar, among others. Presently also, several ‘designated terrorists’ like Arshdeep Singh Gill alias Arsh Dalla of Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF) are residing in Canada. As stated earlier, while Canada’s actions during the 1980s were guided by Cold War dynamics, its present actions are influenced purely by vote bank politics.

In the 2019 Canadian federal election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party got 157 votes, 13 short of a majority. Hence, they had to form a coalition government with the ‘New Democratic Party’ led by Jagmeet Singh Dhaliwal, a pro-Khalistan leader. Jagmeet has, in the past, made provocative statements in favour of Khalistan and the human rights situation in Kashmir. Out of 338 seats in the Canadian parliament, Sikhs are elected on 18 seats which speak of their political influence. The Trudeau-led government is under political compulsion to not antagonize their coalition partners. 

Trudeau has been restrained in confronting the Khalistan separatists’ anti-Indian activities. His soft peddling on the Khalistan issue was quite evident when, in the aftermath of the 'Kill India' posters incident, he stated that “We have an extremely diverse country, and freedom of expression is something that we have. But, we will also make sure that we are pushing back against violence and extremism in all its forms.”4  

Khalistani Activities in Other Countries

The Khalistan activities are not only limited to Canada. The influence of terrorist organisations like Sikh for Justice extends to the section of Sikhs residing predominantly in the UK, the US and Australia.

Khalistan separatists’ foothold has been prominent in the UK. The Sikh community got established in the UK almost immediately after India’s independence. It was in the UK that the first overseas Sikh organisation, ‘Sikh Home Rule Movement’, was formed under the leadership of Sardar Charan Singh Panchi. The movement was organised to take up the grievances of the Sikh community with the authorities in the UK. Later on, the Sikh Home Rule Movement was taken over by separatist leader and self-proclaimed President of Khalistan, Jagjit Singh Chauhan, who moved to the UK in 1970. 

Presently, more than 520,000 Sikhs reside in the UK, comprising nearly 0.88 per cent of the total population. They are the fourth largest religious community in the UK. The Canadian Sikh separatists and organisations like Sikhs for Justice have a presence among the Sikhs in the UK, as well. Recently, a report released by the UK Government reflects the increasing influence and subversive actions of some pro-Khalistan elements.5 Unfortunately, the UK government appears to react slowly to the activities of the Sikh separatists as was evident from the March 2023 incident in which the Khalistan separatists stormed the Indian High Commission in London and removed Indian National Flag. The Sikh separatists continued to protest with impunity days after this incident.

Khalistan activities have also intensified in the US, home to some of the designated terrorist organisations and individuals in India. During the 1980s, Khalistan activities thrived under successive US Administrations. As per reports, in 1971, The New York Times carried an advertisement of the declaration of a separate state of Khalistan by Jagjit Singh Chauhan. This advertisement was reportedly funded by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The driving force behind US behaviour was the Cold War dynamics and the US-Pakistan strategic alliance against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Over 500,000 Sikhs reside in the US, amounting to 0.2 per cent of the total population. Although the Sikh population is not substantive numerically, it does have a connection with the Sikh separatists of Canada as can be evidenced by the fact that within four month, the Indian Consulate in San Francisco witnessed two incidents of arson by the Khalistani separatists. The so-called Khalistani flag was also installed inside the Consulate premises. In recent years, Australia has also witnessed several anti-India activities by Khalistani separatists as discussed in pervious sections. 

All the above incidents reveal that the Khalistan sympathisers and anti-India elements operate from these Western countries with impunity.

Indian Government’s Response

The Indian Government is consistently taking up the matter with respective governments, highlighting concerns about the adverse impact their inaction will have on bilateral relationships. For example, in July 2023, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said, “We have requested our partner countries like Canada, the US, the UK and Australia, where sometimes Khalistani activities happen, not to give space to Khalistanis. Because their radical, extremist thinking is neither good for us nor them nor for our relations.”6  

The Indian Government is taking these concerns seriously and trying to convey them in high-level bilateral discussions as well. For instance, after the Brampton incident, Jaishankar expressed his long-standing concern regarding pro-Khalistan activities in Canada and blamed the Canadian government for playing vote bank politics. On 6 July 2023, he denounced Canada for propagating violence in the name of freedom of expression. In a statement, Jaishankar said,

“It is a matter of concern that freedom of expression and speech is once again being misused by anti-India elements based in Canada and elsewhere… Let me make the larger point that the issue is not about freedom of expression but its misuse for advocating violence, for propagating separatism and for legitimizing terrorism.”7

India strongly urged Canadian Government to take appropriate action against the anti-India ‘Khalistan Freedom Rally’, which was to be conducted on 8 July 2023. In a media interaction, the External Affairs Ministry termed the posters inciting violence against diplomats as “unacceptable” and condemned them in the strongest terms.8  

National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met his British counterpart on 7 July 2023 and took up the matter of intensified activities by Khalistan separatists. At the 5th India-UK Home Affairs Dialogue,9 the Indian Government reiterated their concern regarding the Khalistan issue and the misuse of UK’s asylum status by the pro-Khalistani elements to aid and abet terrorist activities in India. The security breach at the Indian High Commission in London was also discussed.

It is important to note that in response to the inaction of the UK Government against Khalistani separatists in the London incident, New Delhi removed the outer security cover of the British High Commission and High Commissioner’s residence. India was compelled to take such an action to strongly communicate to the British Government the need to take the security of the Indian High Commission in London seriously.

The Indian Government has issued similar statements to express its displeasure about the arson incident at Indian consulate in San Francisco. India also firmly denounced the vandalism of temples in Australia. While rejecting the so-called Khalistan referendum as a politically motivated exercise by extremist elements, the government requested the Australian authorities to “ensure the safety and security of the members of the Indian community and their properties.”10

Conclusion

The Government of India has vigorously communicated its concerns regarding Khalistani activities to the highest political authority in these countries. India’s constructive engagement with the Western governments did bear some positive results. However, more needs to be done. The Khalistanis are intensifying their activities abroad, and given that the host countries seem to be looking the other way, India needs to redouble its effort to prevent the reoccurrence of such incidents.  It is essential for the Government to effectively convey to the host countries that they cannot simultaneously have good relations with India while allowing anti-India separatist movements on their soil. At the same time, India will also have to build a constructive and sustained engagement with the Sikh diaspora, dispel the misinformation propagated by the Khalistani separatists and showcase the sense of contentment prevailing in Punjab.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Khalistani supporters, Indians clash in Australia; 2 arrested”, The Tribune, 30 January 2023.
• 2. “‘Khalistanis’ have infiltrated farmers protest, will show IB reports: Centre tells SC”, The Indian Express, 12 January 2021. 
• 3. “Punjab: Timeline (Terrorist Activities) 2021”, South Asia Terrorism Portal.
• 4. “Trudeau says Canada has freedom of expression, India argues it must not be misused by Khalistanis”, Deccan Herald, 6 July 2023.
• 5. Sriram Lakshman, “Report asks UK government to investigate Khalistani Extremism”, The Hindu, 27 April 2023.
• 6. “Ties will be hit: EAM on Khalistan Poster Targeting envoys in Canada”, The Tribune, 3 July 2023. 
• 7. “Transcript of Weekly Media Briefing by the Official Spokesperson (6 July 2023)”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 6 July 2023.  
• 8. Ibid.
• 9. “5th India UK Home Affairs Dialogue”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Homes Affairs, Government of India, 12 April 2023.  
• 10. Rezaul H. Laskar, “Probe, punish them’: India tells Australia on attacks by pro-Khalistan groups”, Hindustan Times, 2 February 2023.