Introduction

In the last chapter, the universal sign, ‘The Founding Fathers’ and its variants were found to be accompanied by universalizing national group signifiers. However, these universal signs were also found contextualized with either particularistic candidate or issue signifiers and frequently by both, in every instance they were encountered in the dataset. These findings led us to conclude that candidates attempt to define their (often contradictory) positions or candidacies as sacred. When this happens, it was argued, there is a limited political contestability because contradictory positions are presented in absolute, non-negotiable terms (i.e. terms defined by their accord with the civil religious sacred).

In this chapter, we will investigate two more important civil religious signs, those indexing the sacred texts of the ACR—the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence . As with the last chapter, we will first see how these signs fit as referent objects within the ACR tradition through a brief review of American cultural history. We will then continue to an empirical investigation of these signs using our dataset. This examination will reveal that these signs are used in a very similar manner as those previously investigated. Specifically, we will see the signs explored here (like those examined in the previous chapter) are also generally contextualized according to the three-part pattern represented in Fig. 4.1. That is, we find them contextualized with (1) civil religious signifier(s); (2) candidacy and/or issue signifier(s); (3) national group unity signifier(s).

Constructing a Narrative

In order to understand the position of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution within the ACR, we will be well served by examining a short re-construction of American history.

In the reconstruction of any history, one must present a narrative weaving together distinguishable events and signs (i.e. one must link them together in a logical, relational and discernable manner). Events can be understood as the particular arrangement of all the signifiers present and available, for perceiving agents, within the Lebenswelt , during a determined temporal span.Footnote 1 Events are ephemeral. Fields of perception are constantly changing in an unrelenting state of flux. But through the process of cognizing, individuals can and do make arbitrary distinctions signifying temporal periods and many of these distinctions (e.g. epochs, stages, steps, times, eras, episodes, moments, days, minutes, weeks, seconds, etc.) have levels of intersubjective validly. Some type of temporal distinction such as the ones just listed (including the arrangement of signifiers in the Lebenswelt during that temporal classification) can be understood as an event.

The act of constructing a historical narrative automatically implies editorial decisions on at least two accounts. First, one must choose and define the particular events and associated signs which are to be include and second, one must determine a way for those events and signs to relate to each other (i.e. one must determine how to connect them or fit them together so as to tell a cohesive and understandable story about them).

Since events are ephemeral, if one wishes to do this, one must do so based on two types of source material: through direct experience (i.e. perception) of the particular fields of perception that the event is composed of or through recorded representations and cultural artifacts of the fleeted fields of perception which compose the event.Footnote 2 These can be used separately or in combination with each other.

The way one can and ultimately does (re)construct a history is predicated on two factors: the signifiers one perceives in the Lebenswelt and the structure and makeup of one’s Weltanschauung . As we saw in Chap. 2, the empirical connections of objects in the Lebenswelt impact the mental association of objects in the Weltanschauung, which help determine how those objects are understood. Simultaneously, the arrangement of mental objects in the Weltanschauung helps to determine what sense can be made of material objects in the Lebenswelt. For the first part, this means the history one (re)constructs is, in part, a matter of how one encounters and perceives events, in the Lebenswelt (i.e. as signifiers within a field of perception). As we just saw these could be experienced directly, through experiencing representations of something fleeted, or both. For the second part, this means fitting the signifieds which correspond to the signifiers within a field of perception into one’s Weltanschauung and being able to make sense of them given the present availability of connections of stored mental objects (signifieds).

The facts of individual biographies (experiencing different fields of perception and the same fields of perception from unique perspectives) and the resultant unique structures of individual Weltanschauungen mean that no history can or will be (re)constructed in exactly the same way by any two individuals just as we saw in Chap. 2 that no two definitions of objects can be exactly the same for two individuals. This means that there can be no definitive narrative of American history and there can be no definitive location of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution in that history.

Given this, the previous statement about reconstructing a short American history in order to understand the place of these documents in the ACR seems counterintuitive. However, as we also saw in Chap. 2, individuals within a common community often experience the same fields of perception (though from slightly different perspectives). The encountering and perception of signifiers in similar contexts helps to shape the points of structural similarity between individual Weltanschauungen. This means, then, that there should be some degree of structural similarity (i.e. similarity in the ways stored signifieds relate to other store signifieds) between the various individual Weltanschauungen of the American people or at least a good portion of them. This structural similarity between the individual Weltanschauungen of the individuals gives us some confidence that one can construct an intersubjectively valid history. This would be a more or less familiar story or narrative (i.e. a recognizable composition of signifiers capable of portraying some intersubjective meaning from one person to another) which would ultimately be defined idiosyncratically but, nevertheless would be identifiable, comprehensible, understandable, and cognizable for different agents. This story could only be based on an archetype or ideal form and could never exist in definitive form as we have just seen.

It is, then, the construction of an intersubjectively valid history, not the reconstruction of a definitive history which can aid us in our endeavor of revealing the place of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution within the ACR. How useful the reconstruction is depends on whether or not, or the degree to which the narrative is identifiable, recognizable, comprehensible, understandable and cognizable to the reader. In other words, the story is useful to understand the place of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to the extent that the reader is able to recognize it as an understandable history. To help ensure that the history presented below is understandable, it is drawn, largely from already existing, recorded narrative accounts which demonstrate wide agreement on the relative arrangement of important signifiers.

The Constitution and Declaration of Independence in the ACR

The narrative begins like this: Puritans established colonies in the Americas, in order to enjoy the freedom to live as they believed God wanted and intended them to live. Generations later, the founding fathers were convinced that their government was not allowing them to live as God intended by depriving them of certain God-given rights. So, they organized and among other things wrote and promulgated a treatise, the Declaration of Independence .

This essay did several things. First, it outlined some ideas that were held to be basic God-given rights meant for the enjoyment of all. This, in turn meant the delineation of basic principles which the authors believed they were entitled to and according to which they desired to live. Second, it enumerated the ways in which their government was inhibiting their ability to enjoy the rights God intended them to enjoy. Third, it justified a revolutionary act of independence on the grounds that their government was not allowing them to live according to how God intended, i.e. according to God’s law and God’s legal dictates expressed in the law of nature.

In the words of that essay, it was argued that “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” And that “[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of [the] ends” of the “self-evident” “truths” of “all men [being] created equal [and being] endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights [such as] Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” “it is the Right [and “duty”] of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government.”

As we can see, the essay laid out some basic divine principles which the authors argued were granted by a creator god and were the entitlement of all men (equality, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness). Since the authors were unable to live according to these principles (i.e. not as their god intended) under their current government, they were intent on forming a new state and a new civitas which would be in accord with the fundamental, universal, absolute, essential truth of what they saw as the divine law. From this, we can see the Declaration of Independence is “explicit in its theological underpinnings” (Fairbanks, 1994–1995, p. 554) and understand how “the key premises of the Declaration had set out the essentials of an American creed or civil theology” (Semonche, 1998, p. 15).

The argument in the Declaration of Independence provided a rationale and a basis of legitimation for the endeavor of establishing sovereign independence—legal disassociation of the colonies from the British government and the institution of a new government.Footnote 3 While this is relatively obvious, another consequence of independence was the psychological disassociation for the people of the nascent (newly self-identified or newly beginning to self-identify) political community from their connection to the old political community. In turn, this required a disassociation of one from one’s sense of self, to the extent that that sense of self was understood in terms of one’s place within one’s political community.

The extent to which one identified his or her self as belonging to a political community would be, of course an idiosyncratic matter. But, at any rate, the act of legal disassociation required some re-organization of the connections between the signified ‘self’ and ‘community,’ in one’s universe of stored signifieds (i.e. one’s Weltanschauung ). It also entailed a redefinition of one’s community. Likely this would have meant for many a re-organization of ‘self’ or the self-aware self—‘the ego’ and the existing totemic objects of the former political community.Footnote 4

In short, because of the act of revolution which the Declaration of Independence called for, the ‘self’ and the group (i.e. the civitas) needed to be redefined. It caused one to redefine, change or alter their ego (their sense of self) and their sense of group or community. There needed to be a re-association of signifieds in the individual’s Weltanschauung and there also needed to be a re-systemization, a collective re-association. That is, the development of new structural similarities amongst the individual Weltanschauungen of individuals (a realignment of the Volksweltanschauung ) was necessary. Part of this realignment required new totemic objects with which the new political community could self-identify. The Declaration of Independence provided a convenient totem for this requirement because of its association in the Lebenswelt with the American moment of origin.

The American moment of origin has several features most origins of a civitas do not. First, it has an identifiable and relatively specific moment of origin. Of course, this moment is an event and thus an arbitrary distinction; but, nonetheless it is a distinction which can be and is often made. Secondly, the moment of origin was undertaken in a self-conscious way. There was an identifiable human intention to create a new civitas. Third, there are contemporary representations of that moment of origin. Finally, the event was, at least in part, framed according to the belief in divine, universal principles to which the civitas would adhere. As G. K. Chesterton notably stated, “America is the only nation in the world founded on a creed”Footnote 5 (quoted from Mead , 1964, p. 198).

The Declaration of Independence : corresponds temporally with the origin of the American civitas; records and thus provides a representation of part of the event, reveals a human intention to create the new civitas; and outlines the belief in divine, universal principles to which the civitas would adhere. For these reasons, the document provides a convenient sign to represent the American moment of origin—the origin of the American civitas and consequently the civitas itself. As Ball states: “The American story of origins is told as though the republic originated in the Declaration of Independence” (Ball, 1989, p. 2294). Because of its association with the origin of the American civitas and all that entailed theologically, the Declaration of Independence emerged as a “hallowed relic” (McDonald, 1999, p. 172)—a new totemic object for the individual to orientate their sense of self and their attachment to the group. Indeed, to this day, Independence Day , one of the most (if not the most) important public holidays in the United States commemorates and celebrates the formal adoption of this document and the act it represents. It is a civic holyday commemorating the formal adoption of this totemic object.Footnote 6

If we continue the narrative of American history from the creation and adoption of the Declaration of Independence , it would proceed with an account of a war fought and won by the American founding fathers to ensure they could live according to the divine principles which their god intended them to live by and which they articulated in the Declaration of Independence. Subsequently, an American Constitution was written as James Madison (the chief architect of the document) put it, through the inspiration and guidance of “a finger of the Almighty hand” (quoted in Semonche, 1998, p. 32).Footnote 7

In this narrative, the “Constitution appears to have grown out of the Declaration of Independence ” (Ball, 1989, p. 2285) in an organic way. This is because the Constitution ostensibly “represents the will of the whole people” (Semonche, 1998, p. 49) who were dedicated to the divine rights and principles outlined in the Declaration of Independence. As Semonche (1998) puts it, the Constitution is seen as being “‘deliberately planned’ to embody the basic theology” (p. 194) of the Declaration of Independence. In this way, the Constitution can be seen as codifying or expressing higher (i.e. divine) law (Riemer, 1980, p. 142; Semonche, 1998, p. 35). Ball (1989) even goes so far as to argue that understanding the Constitution as the realization of the Declaration’s theology “is the accepted, even mandatory, rhetorical starting point” for legal arguments for the legal protection of individual rights in the United States (p. 2294).

According to American civil religious theology as presented in the Declaration of Independence , the will of a divine, creator god provides certain rights for people—equality, life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. People freely enter into a contract with each other establishing governments for the purpose of ensuring their God given rights. It is for this purpose governments exist.

In order to ensure that the new government’s actions would be in accord with divine law, the framers of the Constitution included mechanisms of accountability. This way, the government would be accountable to the people, so they could ensure governmental authority remained consistent with divine, ultimate law. Accountability of this type is enshrined in at least two Constitutional concepts.

First, there are protections of individual rights and limitations on government power. These include several means of redress, if the government violates divine law (e.g. courts, freedom of public expression, freedom of the press, the right to assemble, the right to bear arms, etc.) and a distribution of power among separate branches of government. In this way, the Constitution can be seen as a sacred document in the ACR because it protects the people’s God given rights and seeks to ensure God’s will is done. While, the Constitution formally obtains its authority from the people, it is only legitimate to the extent that it is coterminous with the will of God. That is, it is only legitimate to the extent that it “secure[s] the Blessings of Liberty,” as its preamble states.

The second mechanism of accountability found in the Constitution is the mandate for elections. Elections ensure accountability by providing for periodic changes in government make-up. If the people find the government acting in a way that is contrary to God’s will, they are free to replace it through elections. In this way, they can help ensure that the system remains in accord with divine will.

According to Semonche (1998), “The Constitution ’s embodiment in the American faith structure, its civil religion, is what gives it such cultural importance” (p. 35). This embodiment gives the Constitution a sacred dimension, in the American context (Levinson, 1988; Perry, 1988). It makes it a “totem” or “fetish” object for the American “tribe” (Lerner, 1937, p. 1294) and an object of its “worship” (Lerner, 1937, p. 1295). Indeed, the Constitution is so sacred for the American people, oaths to it replaced the religious oaths public officials took in prior socio-political orders (Semonche, 1998, p. 23). Article VI, paragraph 3 states that:

The Senators and Representatives…and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution ; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.

In the American civil religious context, then, belief in the Constitution is a higher value than piety to any sectarian religious creed.

As was stated above this narrative of American history and the place of these documents in it is not a definitive narrative because such a thing does not and cannot exist. Nevertheless, Lerner (1937), Detweiler (1962), Bellah (1967), Bennett (1975), Riemer (1980), Levinson (1988), Perry (1988), Ball (1989), Maier (1997), Semonche (1998) and McDonald (1999) all provide historical narrative scenarios similar to the one (or parts of it) just presented. Each of them suggest the apotheosis of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and their role as totem objects in the United States. Furthermore, although, they differ somewhat in terms of when this actually occurred, they do agree that over time the Declaration of Independence and Constitution emerged as the holy and authoritative writ of the American national faith. The accord between these scholars lends evidence to the familiarity of an American historical story which places these documents as important and sacred referent objects within the American civil religious tradition. We will now proceed to analyze the signs which index these sacred documents as part of that tradition.

Summary of Findings

In total, signs indexing these sacred documents of the ACR were revealed 69 times, in the dataset. Of that the Constitution was invoked 53 times and the Declaration of Independence 16 times. The Constitution was indexed 18 times in the nomination acceptance speeches, 38 times in the debates and one time in the victory and concession speeches, while the Declaration of Independence was referenced eight, seven, and one times in these categories respectively. Similar to what we saw in the last chapter, each of these scared document signifiers were contextualized with either an issue signifier or a candidacy signifier and in 45 of the 69 cases (65.2%) they were contextualized with both. In 52 of the 69 cases (73.4%) the American civil religious signifier was contextualized with an issue signifier again bringing to question Chapp ’s (2012) assertion that American civil religious discourse lacks “issue content” (p. 50).Footnote 8

As was the case with the filial piety signs, in the last chapter, the sacred document signs are also frequently contextualized with a group unity signifier. This was encountered in 57 of the 69 cases (82.6%). The findings in this chapter then reveal even further consistency in the pattern of contextualization represented in Fig. 4.1 which includes: (1) the civil religious signifiers; (2) a candidate and/or issue signifiers; (3) and a group unity signifiers.

The table in Appendix F provides a full list of each use of a sacred document signifier found in the dataset, along with the various issues, candidacy and group unity signifiers with which they were contextualized.

The findings derived from our dataset are also in accord with the assessment above which argues that the Declaration of Independence and Constitution are important and sacred referent objects within the ACR tradition. We can clearly see that these documents are treated with the special deference one would expect totem objects to be. For example, the Constitution has “majesty” (Carter , 1976, Nomination Acceptance). It is “a great, unbelievable Constitution” (Kerry , 2004, Third Debate) which contains “the greatest First Amendment rights in the history of mankind” (Kemp, 1996, VP Debate). The Constitution and the Declaration of Independence are America’s “most sacred documents” (Reagan , 1980, Reagan-Anderson Debate). These documents contain principles which are “preach[ed]” (Kennedy, 1960, Second Debate) like the “basic moral and philosophical principles” (Carter, 1976, Nomination Acceptance) that guide the country including “the sacred right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (Reagan, 1984, Nomination Acceptance) which are found in the Declaration of Independence. Moreover, the need and importance of maintaining the integrity of the Constitution frequently emerges. This is so important that one must take an “oath” (Ford, 1976, Nomination Acceptance; Gore , 2000, Third Debate) or “swear” (Bush, 2000, Nomination Acceptance; Mondale, 1984, Nomination Acceptance) to “preserve, protect, and defend” it (Mondale, 1984, Nomination Acceptance). It must be: “protect[ed]” (Kennedy, 1960, Second Debate), “guarantee[ed]” (Carter, 1980, Nomination Acceptance; Kennedy, 1960, Forth Debate; Romney, 2012, Nomination Acceptance), “uph[e]ld” (Ford, 1976, Nomination Acceptance; Kennedy, 1960, Nomination Acceptance; Kerry, 2004, Nomination Acceptance) and “respect[ed]” (Dole, 1996, Nomination Acceptance; Kerry, 2004, Second Debate, Third Debate). It must not be: “violate[d]” (Ferraro, 1984, VP Debate; Gore, 2000, Third Debate), “depart[ed] from” (Carter, 1976, Second Debate), “undo[ne]” (Kerry, 2004, Third Debate), “hinder[ed]” or “inhibit[ed]” (Reagan, 1984, First Debate), “tamper[ed] with” (Kerry, 2004, Second Debate) and one cannot “ignore it, violate it, or replace it” (Dole, 1996, Nomination Acceptance). Making sure that the integrity of the Constitution is ensured is a “great responsibility” (Kennedy, 1960, Forth Debate) and implies “commitment” (Carter, 1976, Second Debate). Finally, not only do these documents need to be supported and maintained, they also require an element of faith in them. One should ‘believe in’ them (Anderson, 1980, Reagan-Anderson Debate; Clinton , 1996, Nomination Acceptance; Clinton, 1996, Second Debate).

Qualitative Examples

An examination of some qualitative examples of the use of signs indexing the Constitution and Declaration of Independence will further reveal that these civil religious signifiers are used in a similar fashion as those explored in the previous chapter. For example, in the second debate of 1960 Kennedy states:

There is a very strong moral basis for this concept of equality of opportunity. We are in a very difficult time. We need all the talent we can get. We sit on a conspicuous stage. We are a goldfish bowl before the world. We have to practice what we preach. We set a very high standard for ourselves. The Communists do not. They set a low standard of materialism. We preach in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution , in the statement of our greatest leaders, we preach very high standards; and if we’re not going to be s- charged before the world with hypocrisy we have to meet those standards. I believe the President of the United States should indicate it.

In this passage, we can see that Kennedy invokes both the Constitution and Declaration of Independence .Footnote 9 In brief, his argument is that through these documents the nation ‘preaches’ a ‘very high standard’ which serves as an example internationally and which can be posed in contradistinction to the standard of materialism offered by the communists. The standard which is preached according to Kennedy is one of equal opportunity.

The religious terminology here is obvious. The signifier ‘preaches’ carries much more weight than would for example ‘advocates’ or ‘promotes’ because it connotes the sacred. To use the language from the second chapter, the signified which corresponds to the signifier ‘preaches’ is likely to be located in the Weltanschauung in a way which relates it to the sacred because it is often associated with i.e. contextualized with religious signifiers (Preacher, Bible , The Word, The Gospel).Footnote 10 It is frequently used with these sectarian religious types of signifiers and almost exclusively so.

By linking these documents to the signifier ‘preaches,’ Kennedy is helping to define them in a sacred way. Actually, it would be more accurate to say that he is perpetuating the documents being generally defined in a sacred way. As we have just seen there is a long history of connecting these documents to the civil religious sacred. Nevertheless, Kennedy’s doing so here serves as a gentle nudge compelling the perceiving agent to understand this group of signifiers according to the familiar patterns. In other words, he is encouraging the perceiving agents to rely on cognitive economics and compelling her or him to use existing, pre-established and well-worn connections—connections to the sacred.

In this passage, we also see that Kennedy expressly links these sacred documents and the issue of equality of opportunity to the sacred through his contextualization of their signifiers. For Kennedy, equality of opportunity is a principle that has been enshrined in the holy writ. Since these documents are beyond reproach, so too must the principle of equality of opportunity which Kennedy reads out of them. In this sense, Kennedy is being an American civil religious fundamentalist. He is calling for adherence to what he sees as an essential belief which he justifies by arguing that the principle is taken from the civil religious scriptures. As we saw in Chap. 1, these civil religious holy texts are justified through their accordance with God’s will as revealed in natural law and understood through the human capacity for reason.Footnote 11

Additionally, in this context, Kennedy states that he believes that the President should indicate that the principle is an important one in order to provide an international example. His expression of a personal belief introduces a personal signifier pointing to himself as a candidate. In the passage, then, we see the combination of an issue signifier (equality of opportunity), a signifier indicating himself and thus his candidacy and civil religious signifiers (the Constitution and Declaration of Independence ).

Finally, we can see that he also includes the group unity signifiers ‘we’ and ‘our’ rounding out the familiar three-part pattern we saw in the last chapter and which is expressed in Fig. 4.1. It is ‘We’ who ‘preach’ indicating that all Americans are bound by these documents and their principles. By extension, then, Kennedy’s conclusions about equality of opportunity which he reads out of those documents should be the conclusions of all Americans. Essentially, Kennedy is making a claim that he is able to divine the true meaning of those sacred texts and translate that into an issue position which is the correct one for the entire civitas. As a priest of the American civil religion, Kennedy is indicating that he knows what is right and good for the nation and he knows what the truth of its sacred scripture is.

In this passage, Kennedy attempts to read something out of the Constitution and Declaration of Independence in order to link himself and an issue position to the American civil religious sacred. Other uses of these civil religious signifiers, however, are less issue driven. For example, Carter states:

I see an America on the move again, united, a diverse and vital and tolerant nation, entering our third century with pride and confidence, an America that lives up to the majesty of our Constitution and the simple decency of our people. This is the America we want. This is the America that we will have. (Carter , 1976, Nomination Acceptance)

Whereas Kennedy reads a specific issue position (pro equality of opportunity) out of the documents, in this passage Carter simply asserts the ‘majesty’ of the Constitution . However, in this passage we still see the familiar trilateral connection. Carter links a civil religious signifier (the Constitution) to himself (I see) and a host of group unity signifiers (our third century, our Constitution, our people, we). In this brief passage, Carter brings his candidacy for President to the foreground by articulating (an admittedly vague) vision of the future with him at the Presidential helm. Effectively Carter attempts to define himself and thus his candidacy in the civil religious sacred by suggesting that he has the theological perspective the nation needs. Like the examples of the use of American civil religious signifiers we previously examined, Carter, in priestly fashion, indicates the nation is not on the right track. Notice how he says “on the move again,” suggesting that America is stalled and thus not moving in the right (or any) direction. He then offers an alternative (himself) which is in accord with the ACR—an alternative that “lives up to the majesty of [the] Constitution.”

As was the case in our examination of “The Founding Fathers” and its variants, signs referencing the sacred documents of the ACR are also used to support contradictory positions. The issue of abortion illustrates this well. For example, Anderson , in the 1980 Reagan -Anderson debate states:

I also think that that unborn child has a right to be wanted. And I also believe, sir, that the most personal intimate decision that any woman is ever called upon to make is the decision as to whether or not she shall carry a pregnancy to term. And for the state to interfere in that decision, under whatever guise, and with whatever rationale, for the state to try to take over in that situation, and by edict, command what the individual shall do, and substitute itself for that individual’s conscience, for her right to consult her rabbi, her minister, her priest, her doctor—any other counselor of her choice—I think goes beyond what we want to ever see accomplished in this country, if we really believe in the First Amendment: if we really believe in freedom of choice and the right of the individual.

In this selection of text, Anderson is clearly demarcating his position. He uses the personal signifiers “I…think” and “I…believe” bringing his candidacy into the context explicitly. He links these candidate signifiers with issue position signifiers (prochoice) and rounds out the familiar trilateral contextualization with his use of the civil religious signifier “the First Amendment.” For Anderson, if “we” believe in the First Amendment as “we” should (i.e. as pietistic devotees of the American civil faith should) then “we” should also be supportive of a woman’s right to choose.

As with the passage from Kennedy above, Anderson here is being an American civil religious fundamentalist deriving his theological position (and subsequently his issue position) from the sacred text. For him, the answer to the contentious social issue of abortion is clarified by the holy writ and if one ‘really believe[s]’ in the Constitution or specifically the First Amendment of the Constitution then one will ultimately have to be on the side of prochoice, which is, in Anderson’s formulation a sacred “right.”

Not surprisingly, not all theologians of the ACR agree with Anderson . Take Reagan for example. In the first debate of 1984, he states:

I believe that until and unless someone can establish that the unborn child is not a living human being, then that child is already protected by the Constitution , which guarantees life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to all of us.Footnote 12

In this passage, Reagan marks out his anti-choice stance on the issue using the issue signifiers “unborn child…protected” and the personal signifier “I believe.” Like Anderson , Reagan finds clarity to the issue in the holy script of the ACR. It is found in the Constitution and indirectly the Declaration of Independence (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness). Furthermore, he uses the group signifier “us” which re-enforces the collective national devotion to this sacred writ, reminding the audience that these texts are all Americans’ sacred texts. The conclusion is that since the sacred texts are everyone’s so too should be Reagan’s preferred policy position.

Discussion

As was the case with our examination of the signs of filial piety, this investigation of signs indexing the sacred texts of the ACR reveal a contextualization of profane candidate and issue signifiers with civil religious signifiers as was predicted by the theory presented in Chap. 2. This further lends evidence to the argument that these speakers are attempting to define these profane signifiers as sacred. It also supports the assertion made in the second chapter of politics being a matter of definition. Specifically, we see the candidates trying to define their positions or candidacy as something sacred (or at least consistent with the sacred) according to the civil religious faith.

Additionally, like in the last chapter, we can see that this type of sacred signifier is also used in attempts to define contradictory issue stances. In this chapter, we saw the civil religious sign “the Constitution ” being used to define both anti-choice and prochoice issue stances in much the same way we saw “the Founding Fathers” being used to try to define the role of government in society in the examples from the last chapter.

There appears to be real differences in the connections between the signifieds that correspond to ‘abortion’ and ‘the Constitution ’ within the Weltanschauungen of Anderson and Reagan suggesting once again that defining objects is at its roots an idiosyncratic phenomenon. Although we cannot gauge the internal workings of these two politicians’ minds from the data we are working with we can minimally, safely say that there are real differences in the connections made between the signifiers ‘abortion’ and ‘the Constitution’ as articulated and made available in the Lebenswelt by them.Footnote 13

Finally, this examination of civil religious signifiers indexing the sacred texts of the ACR again reveals the limited nature of political contestability when civil religious signs are employed to help define issue positions and candidates. Since the speakers contextualize their particularistic issue positions or selves with the universalized American civil religious sacred they effectively posture themselves as in accord with the sacred and position those with differing standpoints as heretics. As was discussed in the previous chapter, this leaves little room for resolution at least not in the realm of public political discourse. Though as we will see in the next chapter, there is room for some type of resolution through institutional politics.

Essential Meaning

In the next chapter, we will begin to address the issues of particularistic interest contestation and resolution in-depth. However, this inquiry into the sacred texts of the ACR reveals something striking about the way these documents (particularly the Constitution ) are generally spoken about which has important implications for the issue of contestability and is thus worth exploring here. Specifically, the examination of these civil religious signs showed that the Constitution is ubiquitously held (at least rhetorically) to contain some essential quality or qualities. That is to say, it is spoken of in a way which suggests that the speaker believes it to have a permanent, definite, absolute, unalterable and identifiable essence (as in an essential meaning or truth) at its core. This is expressed in different ways. For example, this essence is sometimes referred to as the Constitution’s “vision” (Carter , 1976, Second Debate; Gore , 2000, Concession), what it “stands for” (Carter, 1976, Second Debate), what it “says” (Bush, 2004, Second Debate) or the “meaning” it has (Carter, 1976, Second Debate).Footnote 14

What these things express, is an idea that one, definite, definitive, true and essential meaning can be divined or extracted from the sacred text. This essential meaning is seen as the sacred truth of the document that is unambiguously, self-evidently available for anyone who just looks at the documents correctly. Through simply reading the text one can “understand” (Dukakis, 1988, Nomination Acceptance) or ‘interpret’ (Bush, 1984, VP Debate, 1988, Second Debate, 2000, First Debate; Bush, 2004, Second Debate; Dole, 1996, Nomination Acceptance; Kerry , 2004, Second Debate) its true and essential meaning.Footnote 15

However, many political commentators, from our dataset, allege (formed almost exclusively as straw man arguments) that individuals (primarily judges) purposely ignore the sacred truth of the Constitution for political (i.e. profane) motives. In John Edwards ’ words, it is argued that individuals are using the Constitution as “a political tool” (Edwards, 2004, VP Debate).

Many examples of this sort of argument can be found in our dataset including: “We want justices who will interpret the Constitution , not legislate it” (Bush, 1984, VP Debate); “what I would do is appoint people to the Federal Bench that will not legislate from the Bench, who will interpret the Constitution” (Bush, 1988, Second Debate); judges should “strictly interpret the Constitution and not use the bench to write social policy” (Bush, 2000, First Debate); “My litmus test for judges is that they be intolerant of outrage, that their passion is not to amend but to interpret the Constitution” (Dole, 1996, Nomination Acceptance); judges should use “a strict interpretation of the Constitution” (Kerry , 2004, Second Debate); “I want to make sure we have judges who interpret the Constitution of the United States according to the law” (Kerry, 2004, Second Debate); and “We’ve got plenty of lawmakers in Washington , D.C. Legislators make law; judges interpret the Constitution” (Bush, 2004, Second Debate).

In all these examples, there is at least an implied accusation that individuals are at best ignoring or more maliciously, deliberately circumventing the essential truth of the Constitution in order to advance political ends. In other words, there is an accusation that the sacred or universal is being violated for profane or particular purposes. What is significant about this is that these are more than mere policy disagreements. They are allegations that intolerable sacrilege is being committed.

Though most of the accusations were (as we see from the examples provided above) levied against straw men there was one example, in the dataset, where an accusation was levied against a specified person. In the third Presidential debate of 2008, Senator McCain states:

Senator Obama votedFootnote 16 against Justice Breyer Footnote 17 and Justice Roberts on the grounds that they didn’t meet his ideological standards. That’s not the way we should judge these nominees. Elections have consequences. They should be judged on their qualifications. And so that’s what I will do. I will find the best people in the world—in the United States of America who have a history of strict adherence to the Constitution . And not legislating from the bench. (McCain , 2008, Third Debate)

In this excerpt, McCain accuses the then Senator Obama of putting politics above the Constitution by opposing Samuel Alito ’s and John Roberts ’ nomination confirmation for the Supreme Court because of his “ideological standards.” In this, McCain is revealing the common (though completely erroneous) assumption that there is (and thus normatively should be) something in the Constitution which is above ideology, and above politics. This something is, of course, what we have been referring to as it’s essential (sacred) truth.

We can comfortably say that this is a completely erroneous assumption because as we have seen in Chap. 2 all cognitive meaning formation is a dialectical process which involves both the material substances available in the Lebenswelt and the idiosyncratic structure of one’s individual Weltanschauung . This means that meaning is not, nor can it possibly be ‘held’ in a text. Nor can it be self-evident. In order for any sense to be made of it, the text needs to be internalized. That is, the signifiers which comprise the text must be transformed into signifieds which are then fitted into one’s Weltanschauung. To borrow from Nietzsche , the text cannot speak for itself, but stands “mute to the world” (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 86). It waits for internalization and inevitable idiosyncratic definition.

Any sign one may offer as representing the essential truth of the Constitution (e.g. freedom, democracy, justice, the people, equality, equality of opportunity, popular sovereignty, due process, civil liberties, civil rights, majority rule, minority rights, free commerce, etc.) can only stand, in the Lebenswelt , as a signifier devoid of any meaning waiting for definition. So, while many in the society may agree that any one of these signs (or even all of them) reference the essential truth of the document, each will have her or his own definition of that sign or signs. This, then undermines and falsifies the idea that an essential truth can and does exist, let alone could be divined or extracted from the document.

The lesson to take away from this is that these discursive fights played out in public political discourse are fights over a fiction. They fight ostensibly over a singular, absolute truth which does not and cannot exist. In essence, each person claims that she or he knows the truth and is in accord with the sacred, while her or his political opponents are ignorant of or maliciously obfuscating the truth. This is to effectively say that one’s political opponents are sacrilegious villains or at least misguided heretics.

Furthermore, there is something terribly ironic about these appeals to an essential sacred truth to the Constitution —a truth that stands above politics—and the decrying of political uses of the Constitution. First, the Constitution is by its very nature a political tool. This is true not just of the Constitution of the United States of America but of all constitutions. They serve to structure how a group is to contest politics. They structure what is and is not permissible in the contestation over public policy decisions. In a constitutional democracy, the whole political-social order is predicated on the premise that one and all must use the constitution as a tool for the contestation of politics.

Second, in the final analysis, the very act of saying that the Constitution should not be used as a political tool is to do exactly that, to use it as a political tool. When one does this, she or he expresses the idea that there is one essential and absolute truth provided for in the document (which is represented in the sign “the Constitution”) and simultaneously infers that she or he knows and supports that truth (i.e. is faithful to the sacred). By extension it also infers that those with differing issue or policy positions (i.e. political opponents) do not support or even defy the truth and sacredness of the document. That is, it infers that they are heretics and that if one is a faithful civil religious devotee one must reject their heretical position(s). This is, one could argue, not just a political move but the ultimate political move because it attempts to forever close off discussion and permanently define one policy or issue position as the only true, sacred, correct, righteous and proper position. In short, it seeks to foreclose the opposition.

The notion that civil religious signs have one singular, universal and sacred truth is not unique to “The Constitution .” If we go back to the signs we examined in the last chapter, we see that there is also an expressed assumption that “The Founding Fathers” and its variants represent one universal, essential and sacred truth. For example, in our dataset, we can see that this sacred truth has been referred to as: what “the Founders of our Nation meant” (Carter , 1980, Nomination Acceptance), the “vision” of the revolutionary founders (Bush, 2000, Nomination Acceptance; Ford, 1976, Nomination Acceptance); the revolutionary “spirit” (Dukakis, 1988, Nomination Acceptance); “Our nation’s founding commitment” (Bush, 2004, Nomination Acceptance); the “ideals” of our founding (Nixon , 1960, Nomination Acceptance; Obama , 2012, Nomination Acceptance); the “founding premise” (Bush, 2000, Nomination Acceptance); “the promise of our founding” (Obama, 2012, Victory); “the way the framers” of the Constitution intended our government to be (Perot , 1992, First Debate); the founding “principle(s)” (Carter, 1980, Concession; Obama, 2012, Victory; Reagan , 1984, Victory; Ryan, 2012, VP Debate); and the founding fathers’ “dream” (Carter, 1976, Nomination Acceptance; Gore , 2000, Third Debate; Obama, 2008, Victory; Reagan, 1984, Nomination Acceptance).

The dataset is, in fact, abounding with expressed assumptions that civil religious signs have one universal, absolute, essential and sacred truth. Kerry ’s 2004 nomination acceptance speech offers a final illustrative example. In it, he states: “tonight we have an important message for those who question the patriotism of Americans who offer a better direction for our country…they should remember what America is really all about” (Kerry, 2004, Nomination Acceptance). In this passage, Kerry invokes the sign “America” (an obvious totemic object), assuming or at least articulating an assumption that it has one true and definite meaning—what it is really about. Of course, as any true theologian of the American civil religion (and one who seeks to translate that theological purity into elected office), Kerry claims to know what that true meaning is and attempts to define “America” according to his definition.

American civil religious signs and totemic objects are generally treated as if they have one and only one true and essential meaning. There is, then, a constant fight (played out in public political discourse) over what that meaning is. This fight—the politics of the sacred—is very important. As Chap. 3 has shown, most in society and certainly those engaged in public political discourse agree that these are the signs which are the most important, critical or central for society and this has been the case for at least the last 50 years of American public political discourse. Therefore, if one is able to shift or shape the definition of one or all of these objects in the Volksweltanschauung of the people, in a way which corresponds to his or her political agenda, that agenda would seem inviolable and sacrosanct. It would be shielded in sacredness.

Summary

After first theorizing the place of signs referencing the sacred texts of the ACR within the American civil religious tradition, this chapter has shown that like the signs examined in the previous chapter we see a frequent pattern in the way they are contextualized in the Lebenswelt . In sum, we see a three-part contextualization consisting of (1) civil religious signifier(s); (2) candidacy and/or issue signifier(s); (3) national group unity signifier(s). Since these findings are strongly in line with what we previously encountered, we can proceed with some confidence as to their generalizability. There is a consistent pattern of attempts to connect particularistic (i.e. profane) issue and candidacy signifiers to civil religious signifiers and group unity signifiers—that is, to connect the profane signifiers to universal sacred, totemic signifiers. This is so pervasive that we might say it is the modus operandi or at least one modus operandi of American public political discourse. It is a ubiquitous narrative form.

By forming these types of contexts, candidates are effectively fighting over an essential truth. They are attempting to define that essential truth. However, as we have just seen, an essential, absolute and universal truth for any of these signs is unobtainable and impossible given the nature of cognitive meaning formation. Nevertheless, this does not discourage those involved in public political discourse from trying. In the next chapter, we will examine what this means for the contestation over the sacred in the realm of public political discourse and how that contestation is played out in the development of public policy and public law.