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On China
In this sweeping and insightful history, Henry Kissinger turns for the first time at book-length to a country he has known intimately for decades, and whose modern relations with the West he helped shape. Drawing on historical records as well as his conversations with Chinese leaders over the past forty years, Kissinger examines how China has approached diplomacy, strategy, and negotiation throughout its history, and reflects on the consequences for the global balance of power in the 21st century.
Since no other country can claim a more powerful link to its ancient past and classical principles, any attempt to understand China's future world role must begin with an appreciation of its long history. For centuries, China rarely encountered other societies of comparable size and sophistication; it was the "Middle Kingdom," treating the peoples on its periphery as vassal states. At the same time, Chinese statesmen-facing threats of invasion from without, and the contests of competing factions within-developed a canon of strategic thought that prized the virtues of subtlety, patience, and indirection over feats of martial prowess.
In On China, Kissinger examines key episodes in Chinese foreign policy from the classical era to the present day, with a particular emphasis on the decades since the rise of Mao Zedong. He illuminates the inner workings of Chinese diplomacy during such pivotal events as the initial encounters between China and modern European powers, the formation and breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Korean War, Richard Nixon's historic trip to Beijing, and three crises in the Taiwan Straits. Drawing on his extensive personal experience with four generation of Chinese leaders, he brings to life towering figures such as Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, revealing how their different visions have shaped China's modern destiny.
With his singular vantage on U.S.-China relations, Kissinger traces the evolution of this fraught but crucial relationship over the past 60 years, following its dramatic course from estrangement to strategic partnership to economic interdependence, and toward an uncertain future. With a final chapter on the emerging superpower's 21st-century world role, On China provides an intimate historical perspective on Chinese foreign affairs from one of the premier statesmen of the 20th century.
Since no other country can claim a more powerful link to its ancient past and classical principles, any attempt to understand China's future world role must begin with an appreciation of its long history. For centuries, China rarely encountered other societies of comparable size and sophistication; it was the "Middle Kingdom," treating the peoples on its periphery as vassal states. At the same time, Chinese statesmen-facing threats of invasion from without, and the contests of competing factions within-developed a canon of strategic thought that prized the virtues of subtlety, patience, and indirection over feats of martial prowess.
In On China, Kissinger examines key episodes in Chinese foreign policy from the classical era to the present day, with a particular emphasis on the decades since the rise of Mao Zedong. He illuminates the inner workings of Chinese diplomacy during such pivotal events as the initial encounters between China and modern European powers, the formation and breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Korean War, Richard Nixon's historic trip to Beijing, and three crises in the Taiwan Straits. Drawing on his extensive personal experience with four generation of Chinese leaders, he brings to life towering figures such as Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, revealing how their different visions have shaped China's modern destiny.
With his singular vantage on U.S.-China relations, Kissinger traces the evolution of this fraught but crucial relationship over the past 60 years, following its dramatic course from estrangement to strategic partnership to economic interdependence, and toward an uncertain future. With a final chapter on the emerging superpower's 21st-century world role, On China provides an intimate historical perspective on Chinese foreign affairs from one of the premier statesmen of the 20th century.
608 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2011
About the author
Henry Kissinger
235 books1,663 followersHenry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.
A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.
During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.
A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.
During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.
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October 19, 2011
Kissinger’s Ignorance about China
China is a complicated large country with a long history and civilization entirely different from Western ones. Chinese top leading group is a black box. Its operation is tightly kept confidential. For an autocracy like China, one cannot understand it without understanding its leaders. No wonder Western China watchers are frustrated in understanding China.
However, as a well-experienced diplomat who helped Nixon achieve rapprochement with China, Kissinger must be in a better position to see through Chinese leaders, since he has met all Chinese leaders since Mao many times. I, therefore, read through the book, but am greatly disappointed that Kissinger gives distorted images of and misinformation about China and Chinese leaders, especially Chinese madman Mao.
Having personally experienced Mao’s tyranny, my greatest worry concerning China is the potential emergence of another madman like Mao when China grows into a rival to America. The disaster that he may cause to Chinese and world people will be much more serious than Mao’s great famine and Cultural Revolution.
Kissinger, however, compared China’s rise now with that of Germany before World War I and believes if the state leaders then had known the consequence of the war, they would “have recoiled” from confrontation. So will China and America in the future, he concludes. he forgets World War II, which is much more relevant. Madmen Hitler and Tojo Hideki started the war because they were callous killers and their mad calculation made them believe they would win the war. Tojo was especially mad. He attacked America when compared with the giant of US economy, Japan’s was a dwarf.
Like Hitler, Mao Was a Callous Killer
In a speech in 1959, Mao gave the reasons why there was no Hungarian Revolution in China, saying that since the communist takeover “more than one million counterrevolutionaries have been killed. Hungary has not killed any counterrevolutionary. For the elimination of more than one million of the 600-odd million people, I think we shall shout hurrah for that.” The counterrevolutionaries referred to in his speech were mostly unarmed civilians put to death in peacetime. The terror lies in his pride and joy in the killing.
Mao’s Two Fits of Domestic Madness with Heavy Death Toll
Mao’s mad campaign the Great Leap Forward giving rise to a death toll of 20 to 40 million people is now well-known the world over. Frank Dikötter gives an astonishing, riveting, magnificently detailed account of it in his book Mao’s Great Famine.
Mao’s second fit of domestic madness the Cultural Revolution is even more famous. It was at first hailed in America as a campaign with lofty ideal. There were no statistics of the death toll and the number of victims. People who personally experienced it like me know that the number was enormous. People outside China now know the evils of the campaign when the truth has come out, but Mao’s misunderstood image as an idealist remains in the minds of quite a few people.
Mao’s Fits of International Madness
Mao told Soviet leader Khrushchev that he would fight a nuclear war to eliminate capitalism all over the world even if half of Chinese population–300 million then– died in the war. Taking into account of China’s poor economy and backward weapons then, Mao was much madder than Tojo Hideki. However, when I was studying in a university in Anhui, China in 1958, there was hot enthusiasm for communism among the students there. Some of my close classmates talked about Mao’s words and said in private (not openly to please Party cadres) that they admired Mao that he represented Chinese people in saying that we Chinese were willing to make the greatest national sacrifice for communism. Mao was able to make quite a few Chinese people as mad as him because elements of Maoism are deeply rooted in China’s popular culture for infection of his madness. That is China’s most serious problem.
Kissinger mentions that twice Mao brought the world to the brink of nuclear war in the two Taiwan crises in the 1950s, but he admires Mao’s shelling “diplomacy” and regrets that Mao’s “brilliant achievements” were not “balanced against the global impact of the crisis”. He invented China’s ‘traditional” “empty city stratagem” to gloss over Mao’s repeated fits of madness.
Kissinger Ignores Mao’s Export of Revolution
He quotes Mao's words to Snow in 1965 to prove, "the tangible impact of China on world revolution was largely ideological".
Though a well-informed diplomat, he regards as not “tangible” all the following Mao’s enthusiastic world revolution activities except Item 1:
1. Mao transferred 50,000 experienced troops with weapons to increase Kim Il-sung’s troops to 231,000 for invasion of South Korea and sent troops to fight against America to preserve North Korean communist regime.
2. Mao trained and armed Vietnamese communists, sent lots of military advisers to help drive away France and establish communist North Vietnam, and provided aids worth billions of yuan to help them take over South Vietnam.
3. Mao helped Khmer Rouge rise to power in Cambodia in 1975. Mao’s “ideal” of “purifying the society” inspired Pol Pot, resulting in the Killing Fields.
4. Mao provided substantial aids to communists and guerillas all over the world in spite of China’s own economic difficulties.
Mao, an Idealist?
Throughout his book, Kissinger strives to sell Mao’s image as an idealist. He says that of Mao’s four grand titles, Mao told him Mao only wanted to keep that of “Teacher” as if Mao was a loving teacher. Mao persecuted people but that was the punishment given by Mao the strict teacher for purifying his pupils, he hints.
However, Mao was not a loving but a cruel tyrannous teacher whose teachings you were not to trifle with. Non-acceptance of or doubting any of his teachings or instructions was a crime. One would be severely punished even if one revealed it only in one’s private diary. In 1970, Zhang Yihe, a common clerk then but a well-known writer now, wrote in her diary upon Mao’s promotion of his wife Jiang Qing the Chinese saying “When a man becomes immortal, even his hens and dogs become immortal, too”. She got a sentence of 20-year imprisonment for that. When I was in Shanghai then, persecution and imprisonment for dissent in people’s diaries were common phenomena.
Mao’s Cruel Persecution of Dissidents
In 1970, quite a few young dissidents including some Party members openly said that Mao’s Cultural Revolution deviated from Marxism after they had diligently studied Marxist classics. Mao carried out a nation-wide One Strike-Three Anti Campaign and according to official figure, by November 1970 arrested 280,000 dissidents labeled as “counterrevolutionaries”. Those young dissidents were brave and wanted an open debate with Mao, but Mao “purified the society” by cruel torture, imprisonment and execution.
Zhang Zhixin was a typical case. The tortures and death penalty she suffered and the cruelty of the Campaign can still be found on the Internet. My father was framed-up and arrested as a counterrevolutionary then. He told me that he heard noise of torture everyday when he was detained in a detention center in Shanghai for more than one year.
It is very clear that Mao’s “ideal” was not to “purify the society” but to establish his absolute authority. However, a man cruelly realizing such an “ideal” is normally regarded as a tyrant instead of idealist.
America’s ignorance about China
As a brilliant diplomat, in writing his book, Kissinger certainly consulted lots of American China experts’ writings. The plenty misinformation about China and failure to give information about present-day China and its leaders and people in his book reflect their ignorance too. I have no intention to find faults, but have to point out some to rouse American people’s awareness because the misunderstanding resulting from such ignorance may have catastrophic consequence.
Kissinger says that there were no official records of Chinese emperor holding “summit meeting” with other heads of state but foreign heads coming to present tribute to Chinese emperor as their overlord. On pages 6018–6020 of the official history entitled The Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government, Emperor Taizong of Tang met King Jieli of Tujue (the Turkic Khanate) and concluded a treaty with him in 626. That was quite an interesting event as Emperor Taizong who was quite sure that he could defeat Tujue’s one million invading troops then, gave Jieli gold and silk in order to make Jieli arrogant and unprepared so that he could conquer Tujue later. Three years later, his troops conquered Tujue.
Emperor Taizong was the greatest emperor and his Reign of Zhenguan, most famous in Chinese history. Ignorance of him after reading Chinese history is like ignorance of Napoleon Bonaparte after reading French history.
America Not on Alert
American brilliant scholar Samuel P. Huntington predicted in his well-known book "Clash of Civilizations" possible clash between Islamic and Western civilizations but America was not on alert. It failed to make thorough investigations when traces of Islamic terrorist attack were found months before 9.11. That reminds me of Pearl Harbor.
Will America fail to be on alert a third time when the scenario of the clash between American and Chinese civilizations described by Huntington in his book becomes a reality?
Kissinger mentiones China's sinocentric cosmology but glosses over Mao’s enthusiastic pursuit of leadership in world revolution, which was precisely a development of that cosmology. He mentions two recent books advocating sinocentric cosmology, but despite their being bestsellers, he treats them lightly, saying they are criticized in the Chinese press. If Americans believe him, they will not be on alert.
Deep-rooted Maoism, Rich Soil for the Emergence of another Mao
To prevent Kissinger’s book from giving world people a false sense of security, I have to make people see the possibility of the emergence of another Mao. As a profound understanding of Chinese culture and political system is indispensable for that, I have to give a short description and analysis though they are the topics for a special book.
If future Chinese leaders remain Confucianist-Marxist and pursue harmony in the world, China’s rise will be beneficial instead of troublesome to the world.
In his book, China’s singularity is a major topic, but Kissinger is ignorant about that. China’s singularity first of all lies in its always having a dominant ideology. When Confucianism had entirely lost its dominance and been denounced since 1919 and was criticized along with Lin Biao, ignorant of that, Kissinger mentioned it to Zhou Enlai and got furious response.
During the Cultural Revolution, there was renaissance of Confucianism among a new generation of talented intellectuals with moral integrity. Those in Shanghai joined Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai faction and served Jiang in carrying out a silent peaceful coup d’état they have planned for a long time, to substitute intellectuals’ dominance for uneducated workers’ and peasants’. Jiang’s Three Represents marks the success of the coup and develops Marxism to justify China’s pursuit of capitalism adjusted by Keynesian macroeconomic control.
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have added Confucianism to Jiang’s new Marxism and stressed harmony in order to overcome the conflict arising from the yawning rich-poor gap resulted from such capitalism. They are also trying to establish Mencius democracy of “putting people first”. However, their Confucianism-Marxism, though dominant at present, has a very short history and takes time to be so well established as to prevent the emergence of another Mao.
Another ideology, Maoism, the dominant ideology in Mao era, has its key elements such as egalitarianism, personality cult, sinocentric cosmology, enmity against intellectuals and cruelty in fighting for its goal deeply rooted in Chinese popular culture. Those elements prevailed in lots of peasants uprisings in Chinese history and in Mao’s mad pursuit of leadership in world revolution and the Cultural Revolution.
According to a survey in 2008, in 40 cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Wuhan, families who had Mao’s statutes or portraits for worship accounted for 11.5% of the total number of families there, exceeding by far those who worshiped Buddha, God of Wealth or local god of the land.
Mao Zedong Thought is in conflict with Confucianism-Marxism, but it remains the Party's guiding ideology and Mao remains China’s great leader in spite of the criticism of his errors.
With such rich soil for Maoism, the emergence of another Mao is quite possible in the future.
China’s Political System and Art for Being an Emperor
China has a long history of autocracy. In China, there have never been any definition, codes or rules whatever about the power of a top leader whether he has the title of emperor or not. In fact, even if there are some codes or rules, there is no institution or mechanism to enforce them. This makes a top leader’s position precarious.
Due to frequent usurp of sovereign power resulting in the demise of some ruling families, Han Fei (281?–233 BC), a Legalist master, wrote his famous classic entitled "Han Fei-tzu" to teach sovereigns the strategy, tactics, tricks and intrigues to maintain their authority. As such strategy, etc. were vital for sovereigns, they were further developed and called the art for being an emperor (diwangshu in Chinese) later. One of the most well-known examples was that of Liu Bei, the founding emperor of Shuhan Dynasty, characterized by establishing close affectionate bondage with talented generals and officials.
Han Fei gives the advice that a sovereign must keep all his officials in awe and maintain such awe by keeping a distance from everyone else including his family members, relatives and officials and trust no one. A sovereign will thus have no friends and lead a lonely life, but Qin Shihuang's application of Han's art proved that it was good in maintaining his iron rule though failed to ensure succession.
Around 134 BC, Confucianism was adopted as the dominant ideology. All the later dynasties exploited Confucian stress on loyalty and filial duty to consolidate emperor’s position and ensure succession. However, as Confucianism had been thoroughly denounced since 1919, when Mao became the sovereign of the CCP’s autocracy, his position was as precarious as Qin Shihuang's without Confucian loyalty to rely on.
Mao adopted Han Fei’s art as with no need for hereditary succession the art was perfect for him. That was why he rehabilitated Qin Shihuang who until then had been condemned for 2,000 years in Chinese history, and openly advocated Legalism in his later years. However, Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin’s personality cult greatly threatened Mao’s authority. Mao faithfully abided by Han Fei’s principles and took preemptive actions to remove his close friends and chosen successors Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao when he suspected that they had grown too powerful and might have usurped his power.
CCP’s Core System Facilitates Emergence of Mad Leaders
When Mao Dynasty ended and Mao’s successor was removed from power, Deng Xiaoping tried to set up a system of collective leadership to prevent the reemergence of Mao’s autocracy that had brought disasters to China, but that system did not work. Zhao Ziyang’s memoirs gives a vivid description that when Deng and other powerful elders had retired from the politburo, their successors in the politburo were top leaders only in name, but had no real power.
Moreover, Deng found the collective leadership ineffective in adopting hard measures to suppress Tiananmen Protests and maintain the Party’s rule. He realized that China’s political system since the communist takeover had been a core system with a core having the absolute authority like the emperor in a feudal dynasty but without hereditary succession and believed that such a system should be maintained. That was why when he had promoted Jiang Zemin to succeed him as the core of the Party leadership, he exhorted Jiang, “When Mao was alive, he had the final say and when I am alive, I have the final say. I will not rest at ease until the time when you have the final say.” Obviously, by “final say” Deng Xiaoping meant that the core should have absolute authority like Mao and Deng.
According to Zhao’s memoirs, in making a major decision, Deng Xiaoping consulted with other elders when Zhao was in office. However, after the Tiananmen Massacre, Deng began to act as the core and heeded no other elders’ views. When all the elders and quite a large majority of officials became conservative after Tiananmen Massacre, Deng Xiaoping conducted his famous Southern Tour to reinvigorate the reform alone. All others had to obey his instruction and Deng Xiaoping typically played his role as the core who has the power above all others and even above law and Party and state constitutions like Mao.
When Jiang Zemin has established his absolute authority as the core, the Party’s core system finally became mature.
In such a core system, in order to become the core and maintain the position as the core, one has to master and apply the art for being an emperor elaborated in "Han Fei-tzu" or Jiang Zemin’s art that is similar to Liu Bei’s, which is even more difficult as there is no special systematic book on it.
A madman interested in Han Fei’s art of tricks and intrigues has a better chance to gain the position of core. Therefore the probability that a future core applies Han Fei’s art must be greater than Jiang’s. With the rich soil for mad leader in China, by application of Han Fei’s art such a madman can easily become an absolute monarch and make China mad.
What is most worrisome is that in China’s core system, when the core is mad like Mao, no one can control or remove him!
Democracy, the Only Way Out
Only when there is real democracy in China can the emergence of another Mao be prevented and can another Mao be timely removed if he does emerge. Therefore, only then can Chinese people have a bright future and China’s neighbors and America rest at ease at China’s rise.
However what can Western countries do? They certainly are unable to impose democracy on China as they are doing now on Libya. First, they have to reinvigorate their economy and improve their people’s living standards. With examples of prosperity in their democracies, they can attract Chinese people to learn from their democracies.
Second, they shall keep on disseminating their ideal of democracy by every possible means among Chinese people. They shall continue to denounce China whenever it violates human rights. It seems not effective, but it indeed works. That was why those who persecuted dissidents recently ordered their victims not to contact foreign journalists.
On the contrary, in his book, Kissinger admonishes US current and future administrations to “substantially” balance “long-term moral convictions with case-to-case adaptations to requirements of national security”, i.e., in disseminating American values of democracy and human rights, they shall avoid offending China or they shall even turn a blind eye to the emergence of another Mao in China in order to prevent confrontation and achieve “co-evolution”. By so doing, America will fail to be on alert again and may suffer a third time perhaps much more severely.
China is a complicated large country with a long history and civilization entirely different from Western ones. Chinese top leading group is a black box. Its operation is tightly kept confidential. For an autocracy like China, one cannot understand it without understanding its leaders. No wonder Western China watchers are frustrated in understanding China.
However, as a well-experienced diplomat who helped Nixon achieve rapprochement with China, Kissinger must be in a better position to see through Chinese leaders, since he has met all Chinese leaders since Mao many times. I, therefore, read through the book, but am greatly disappointed that Kissinger gives distorted images of and misinformation about China and Chinese leaders, especially Chinese madman Mao.
Having personally experienced Mao’s tyranny, my greatest worry concerning China is the potential emergence of another madman like Mao when China grows into a rival to America. The disaster that he may cause to Chinese and world people will be much more serious than Mao’s great famine and Cultural Revolution.
Kissinger, however, compared China’s rise now with that of Germany before World War I and believes if the state leaders then had known the consequence of the war, they would “have recoiled” from confrontation. So will China and America in the future, he concludes. he forgets World War II, which is much more relevant. Madmen Hitler and Tojo Hideki started the war because they were callous killers and their mad calculation made them believe they would win the war. Tojo was especially mad. He attacked America when compared with the giant of US economy, Japan’s was a dwarf.
Like Hitler, Mao Was a Callous Killer
In a speech in 1959, Mao gave the reasons why there was no Hungarian Revolution in China, saying that since the communist takeover “more than one million counterrevolutionaries have been killed. Hungary has not killed any counterrevolutionary. For the elimination of more than one million of the 600-odd million people, I think we shall shout hurrah for that.” The counterrevolutionaries referred to in his speech were mostly unarmed civilians put to death in peacetime. The terror lies in his pride and joy in the killing.
Mao’s Two Fits of Domestic Madness with Heavy Death Toll
Mao’s mad campaign the Great Leap Forward giving rise to a death toll of 20 to 40 million people is now well-known the world over. Frank Dikötter gives an astonishing, riveting, magnificently detailed account of it in his book Mao’s Great Famine.
Mao’s second fit of domestic madness the Cultural Revolution is even more famous. It was at first hailed in America as a campaign with lofty ideal. There were no statistics of the death toll and the number of victims. People who personally experienced it like me know that the number was enormous. People outside China now know the evils of the campaign when the truth has come out, but Mao’s misunderstood image as an idealist remains in the minds of quite a few people.
Mao’s Fits of International Madness
Mao told Soviet leader Khrushchev that he would fight a nuclear war to eliminate capitalism all over the world even if half of Chinese population–300 million then– died in the war. Taking into account of China’s poor economy and backward weapons then, Mao was much madder than Tojo Hideki. However, when I was studying in a university in Anhui, China in 1958, there was hot enthusiasm for communism among the students there. Some of my close classmates talked about Mao’s words and said in private (not openly to please Party cadres) that they admired Mao that he represented Chinese people in saying that we Chinese were willing to make the greatest national sacrifice for communism. Mao was able to make quite a few Chinese people as mad as him because elements of Maoism are deeply rooted in China’s popular culture for infection of his madness. That is China’s most serious problem.
Kissinger mentions that twice Mao brought the world to the brink of nuclear war in the two Taiwan crises in the 1950s, but he admires Mao’s shelling “diplomacy” and regrets that Mao’s “brilliant achievements” were not “balanced against the global impact of the crisis”. He invented China’s ‘traditional” “empty city stratagem” to gloss over Mao’s repeated fits of madness.
Kissinger Ignores Mao’s Export of Revolution
He quotes Mao's words to Snow in 1965 to prove, "the tangible impact of China on world revolution was largely ideological".
Though a well-informed diplomat, he regards as not “tangible” all the following Mao’s enthusiastic world revolution activities except Item 1:
1. Mao transferred 50,000 experienced troops with weapons to increase Kim Il-sung’s troops to 231,000 for invasion of South Korea and sent troops to fight against America to preserve North Korean communist regime.
2. Mao trained and armed Vietnamese communists, sent lots of military advisers to help drive away France and establish communist North Vietnam, and provided aids worth billions of yuan to help them take over South Vietnam.
3. Mao helped Khmer Rouge rise to power in Cambodia in 1975. Mao’s “ideal” of “purifying the society” inspired Pol Pot, resulting in the Killing Fields.
4. Mao provided substantial aids to communists and guerillas all over the world in spite of China’s own economic difficulties.
Mao, an Idealist?
Throughout his book, Kissinger strives to sell Mao’s image as an idealist. He says that of Mao’s four grand titles, Mao told him Mao only wanted to keep that of “Teacher” as if Mao was a loving teacher. Mao persecuted people but that was the punishment given by Mao the strict teacher for purifying his pupils, he hints.
However, Mao was not a loving but a cruel tyrannous teacher whose teachings you were not to trifle with. Non-acceptance of or doubting any of his teachings or instructions was a crime. One would be severely punished even if one revealed it only in one’s private diary. In 1970, Zhang Yihe, a common clerk then but a well-known writer now, wrote in her diary upon Mao’s promotion of his wife Jiang Qing the Chinese saying “When a man becomes immortal, even his hens and dogs become immortal, too”. She got a sentence of 20-year imprisonment for that. When I was in Shanghai then, persecution and imprisonment for dissent in people’s diaries were common phenomena.
Mao’s Cruel Persecution of Dissidents
In 1970, quite a few young dissidents including some Party members openly said that Mao’s Cultural Revolution deviated from Marxism after they had diligently studied Marxist classics. Mao carried out a nation-wide One Strike-Three Anti Campaign and according to official figure, by November 1970 arrested 280,000 dissidents labeled as “counterrevolutionaries”. Those young dissidents were brave and wanted an open debate with Mao, but Mao “purified the society” by cruel torture, imprisonment and execution.
Zhang Zhixin was a typical case. The tortures and death penalty she suffered and the cruelty of the Campaign can still be found on the Internet. My father was framed-up and arrested as a counterrevolutionary then. He told me that he heard noise of torture everyday when he was detained in a detention center in Shanghai for more than one year.
It is very clear that Mao’s “ideal” was not to “purify the society” but to establish his absolute authority. However, a man cruelly realizing such an “ideal” is normally regarded as a tyrant instead of idealist.
America’s ignorance about China
As a brilliant diplomat, in writing his book, Kissinger certainly consulted lots of American China experts’ writings. The plenty misinformation about China and failure to give information about present-day China and its leaders and people in his book reflect their ignorance too. I have no intention to find faults, but have to point out some to rouse American people’s awareness because the misunderstanding resulting from such ignorance may have catastrophic consequence.
Kissinger says that there were no official records of Chinese emperor holding “summit meeting” with other heads of state but foreign heads coming to present tribute to Chinese emperor as their overlord. On pages 6018–6020 of the official history entitled The Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government, Emperor Taizong of Tang met King Jieli of Tujue (the Turkic Khanate) and concluded a treaty with him in 626. That was quite an interesting event as Emperor Taizong who was quite sure that he could defeat Tujue’s one million invading troops then, gave Jieli gold and silk in order to make Jieli arrogant and unprepared so that he could conquer Tujue later. Three years later, his troops conquered Tujue.
Emperor Taizong was the greatest emperor and his Reign of Zhenguan, most famous in Chinese history. Ignorance of him after reading Chinese history is like ignorance of Napoleon Bonaparte after reading French history.
America Not on Alert
American brilliant scholar Samuel P. Huntington predicted in his well-known book "Clash of Civilizations" possible clash between Islamic and Western civilizations but America was not on alert. It failed to make thorough investigations when traces of Islamic terrorist attack were found months before 9.11. That reminds me of Pearl Harbor.
Will America fail to be on alert a third time when the scenario of the clash between American and Chinese civilizations described by Huntington in his book becomes a reality?
Kissinger mentiones China's sinocentric cosmology but glosses over Mao’s enthusiastic pursuit of leadership in world revolution, which was precisely a development of that cosmology. He mentions two recent books advocating sinocentric cosmology, but despite their being bestsellers, he treats them lightly, saying they are criticized in the Chinese press. If Americans believe him, they will not be on alert.
Deep-rooted Maoism, Rich Soil for the Emergence of another Mao
To prevent Kissinger’s book from giving world people a false sense of security, I have to make people see the possibility of the emergence of another Mao. As a profound understanding of Chinese culture and political system is indispensable for that, I have to give a short description and analysis though they are the topics for a special book.
If future Chinese leaders remain Confucianist-Marxist and pursue harmony in the world, China’s rise will be beneficial instead of troublesome to the world.
In his book, China’s singularity is a major topic, but Kissinger is ignorant about that. China’s singularity first of all lies in its always having a dominant ideology. When Confucianism had entirely lost its dominance and been denounced since 1919 and was criticized along with Lin Biao, ignorant of that, Kissinger mentioned it to Zhou Enlai and got furious response.
During the Cultural Revolution, there was renaissance of Confucianism among a new generation of talented intellectuals with moral integrity. Those in Shanghai joined Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai faction and served Jiang in carrying out a silent peaceful coup d’état they have planned for a long time, to substitute intellectuals’ dominance for uneducated workers’ and peasants’. Jiang’s Three Represents marks the success of the coup and develops Marxism to justify China’s pursuit of capitalism adjusted by Keynesian macroeconomic control.
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have added Confucianism to Jiang’s new Marxism and stressed harmony in order to overcome the conflict arising from the yawning rich-poor gap resulted from such capitalism. They are also trying to establish Mencius democracy of “putting people first”. However, their Confucianism-Marxism, though dominant at present, has a very short history and takes time to be so well established as to prevent the emergence of another Mao.
Another ideology, Maoism, the dominant ideology in Mao era, has its key elements such as egalitarianism, personality cult, sinocentric cosmology, enmity against intellectuals and cruelty in fighting for its goal deeply rooted in Chinese popular culture. Those elements prevailed in lots of peasants uprisings in Chinese history and in Mao’s mad pursuit of leadership in world revolution and the Cultural Revolution.
According to a survey in 2008, in 40 cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Wuhan, families who had Mao’s statutes or portraits for worship accounted for 11.5% of the total number of families there, exceeding by far those who worshiped Buddha, God of Wealth or local god of the land.
Mao Zedong Thought is in conflict with Confucianism-Marxism, but it remains the Party's guiding ideology and Mao remains China’s great leader in spite of the criticism of his errors.
With such rich soil for Maoism, the emergence of another Mao is quite possible in the future.
China’s Political System and Art for Being an Emperor
China has a long history of autocracy. In China, there have never been any definition, codes or rules whatever about the power of a top leader whether he has the title of emperor or not. In fact, even if there are some codes or rules, there is no institution or mechanism to enforce them. This makes a top leader’s position precarious.
Due to frequent usurp of sovereign power resulting in the demise of some ruling families, Han Fei (281?–233 BC), a Legalist master, wrote his famous classic entitled "Han Fei-tzu" to teach sovereigns the strategy, tactics, tricks and intrigues to maintain their authority. As such strategy, etc. were vital for sovereigns, they were further developed and called the art for being an emperor (diwangshu in Chinese) later. One of the most well-known examples was that of Liu Bei, the founding emperor of Shuhan Dynasty, characterized by establishing close affectionate bondage with talented generals and officials.
Han Fei gives the advice that a sovereign must keep all his officials in awe and maintain such awe by keeping a distance from everyone else including his family members, relatives and officials and trust no one. A sovereign will thus have no friends and lead a lonely life, but Qin Shihuang's application of Han's art proved that it was good in maintaining his iron rule though failed to ensure succession.
Around 134 BC, Confucianism was adopted as the dominant ideology. All the later dynasties exploited Confucian stress on loyalty and filial duty to consolidate emperor’s position and ensure succession. However, as Confucianism had been thoroughly denounced since 1919, when Mao became the sovereign of the CCP’s autocracy, his position was as precarious as Qin Shihuang's without Confucian loyalty to rely on.
Mao adopted Han Fei’s art as with no need for hereditary succession the art was perfect for him. That was why he rehabilitated Qin Shihuang who until then had been condemned for 2,000 years in Chinese history, and openly advocated Legalism in his later years. However, Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin’s personality cult greatly threatened Mao’s authority. Mao faithfully abided by Han Fei’s principles and took preemptive actions to remove his close friends and chosen successors Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao when he suspected that they had grown too powerful and might have usurped his power.
CCP’s Core System Facilitates Emergence of Mad Leaders
When Mao Dynasty ended and Mao’s successor was removed from power, Deng Xiaoping tried to set up a system of collective leadership to prevent the reemergence of Mao’s autocracy that had brought disasters to China, but that system did not work. Zhao Ziyang’s memoirs gives a vivid description that when Deng and other powerful elders had retired from the politburo, their successors in the politburo were top leaders only in name, but had no real power.
Moreover, Deng found the collective leadership ineffective in adopting hard measures to suppress Tiananmen Protests and maintain the Party’s rule. He realized that China’s political system since the communist takeover had been a core system with a core having the absolute authority like the emperor in a feudal dynasty but without hereditary succession and believed that such a system should be maintained. That was why when he had promoted Jiang Zemin to succeed him as the core of the Party leadership, he exhorted Jiang, “When Mao was alive, he had the final say and when I am alive, I have the final say. I will not rest at ease until the time when you have the final say.” Obviously, by “final say” Deng Xiaoping meant that the core should have absolute authority like Mao and Deng.
According to Zhao’s memoirs, in making a major decision, Deng Xiaoping consulted with other elders when Zhao was in office. However, after the Tiananmen Massacre, Deng began to act as the core and heeded no other elders’ views. When all the elders and quite a large majority of officials became conservative after Tiananmen Massacre, Deng Xiaoping conducted his famous Southern Tour to reinvigorate the reform alone. All others had to obey his instruction and Deng Xiaoping typically played his role as the core who has the power above all others and even above law and Party and state constitutions like Mao.
When Jiang Zemin has established his absolute authority as the core, the Party’s core system finally became mature.
In such a core system, in order to become the core and maintain the position as the core, one has to master and apply the art for being an emperor elaborated in "Han Fei-tzu" or Jiang Zemin’s art that is similar to Liu Bei’s, which is even more difficult as there is no special systematic book on it.
A madman interested in Han Fei’s art of tricks and intrigues has a better chance to gain the position of core. Therefore the probability that a future core applies Han Fei’s art must be greater than Jiang’s. With the rich soil for mad leader in China, by application of Han Fei’s art such a madman can easily become an absolute monarch and make China mad.
What is most worrisome is that in China’s core system, when the core is mad like Mao, no one can control or remove him!
Democracy, the Only Way Out
Only when there is real democracy in China can the emergence of another Mao be prevented and can another Mao be timely removed if he does emerge. Therefore, only then can Chinese people have a bright future and China’s neighbors and America rest at ease at China’s rise.
However what can Western countries do? They certainly are unable to impose democracy on China as they are doing now on Libya. First, they have to reinvigorate their economy and improve their people’s living standards. With examples of prosperity in their democracies, they can attract Chinese people to learn from their democracies.
Second, they shall keep on disseminating their ideal of democracy by every possible means among Chinese people. They shall continue to denounce China whenever it violates human rights. It seems not effective, but it indeed works. That was why those who persecuted dissidents recently ordered their victims not to contact foreign journalists.
On the contrary, in his book, Kissinger admonishes US current and future administrations to “substantially” balance “long-term moral convictions with case-to-case adaptations to requirements of national security”, i.e., in disseminating American values of democracy and human rights, they shall avoid offending China or they shall even turn a blind eye to the emergence of another Mao in China in order to prevent confrontation and achieve “co-evolution”. By so doing, America will fail to be on alert again and may suffer a third time perhaps much more severely.
June 3, 2018
Kissinger is such a good writer it makes you forget he may have committed war crimes
July 11, 2011
First of all, the humorous aspects of the book:
1. Take a look at the cover itself! Kissinger's name seems slightly bigger than the actual title.
2. A disproportionate amount of the photos feature the distinguished author. "Here is the author talking with X," "Here is the author talking with 'Y,' and my favorite, "Here is the author playing ping-pong with one of his aides." Well I guess you are a regular guy after all!
So, Kissinger lives up to his reputation as being somewhat self-important.
With that out of the way, the book has a number of strengths:
1. Kissinger is an engaging writer. The book is easy to read.
2. From the mid 60's to today, his personal/professional relationships with many of the Chinese leaders give him unique insight and authority to speak on the issues confronting China and the U.S.
3. For someone like myself (basically ignorant about China) the book is informative and illuminating.
4. I would not call Kissinger an apologist for the Chinese point of view, but he does do a solid job of giving the Chinese perspective on various events and problems.
The Weaknesses:
1. In typical Chinese fashion, the book is very slow to actually get anywhere 'decisive.' He believes in continuing dialogue, negotiations, etc., but who doesn't? He has great explanatory power bur does little to advance his own synthesis.
2. He seems to go very easy on Mao. I don't put Mao on the level of the 20th century's worst autocrats like Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot. But that's not saying much. Kissinger always refers almost indirectly to the turbulence and atrocities of Mao's rule.
This made me wonder what he was doing, and then I had an idea. Perhaps Kissinger conceived of this book not so much as an argument, but as a last diplomatic mission. The book functions like a diplomat should - engaging, careful not offend either side, focus on dialogue, etc.
If true, that would sum up both the book's strengths and weaknesses.
1. Take a look at the cover itself! Kissinger's name seems slightly bigger than the actual title.
2. A disproportionate amount of the photos feature the distinguished author. "Here is the author talking with X," "Here is the author talking with 'Y,' and my favorite, "Here is the author playing ping-pong with one of his aides." Well I guess you are a regular guy after all!
So, Kissinger lives up to his reputation as being somewhat self-important.
With that out of the way, the book has a number of strengths:
1. Kissinger is an engaging writer. The book is easy to read.
2. From the mid 60's to today, his personal/professional relationships with many of the Chinese leaders give him unique insight and authority to speak on the issues confronting China and the U.S.
3. For someone like myself (basically ignorant about China) the book is informative and illuminating.
4. I would not call Kissinger an apologist for the Chinese point of view, but he does do a solid job of giving the Chinese perspective on various events and problems.
The Weaknesses:
1. In typical Chinese fashion, the book is very slow to actually get anywhere 'decisive.' He believes in continuing dialogue, negotiations, etc., but who doesn't? He has great explanatory power bur does little to advance his own synthesis.
2. He seems to go very easy on Mao. I don't put Mao on the level of the 20th century's worst autocrats like Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot. But that's not saying much. Kissinger always refers almost indirectly to the turbulence and atrocities of Mao's rule.
This made me wonder what he was doing, and then I had an idea. Perhaps Kissinger conceived of this book not so much as an argument, but as a last diplomatic mission. The book functions like a diplomat should - engaging, careful not offend either side, focus on dialogue, etc.
If true, that would sum up both the book's strengths and weaknesses.
February 20, 2022
This book on China-US foreign relations by America's iconic 20th century diplomat Henry Kissinger is as revealing as it is self indulgent. Kiss~ is his own proclaimed proponent of realpolitik, the pragmatic approach pioneered in the "Art of War". Steeped in ancient lore and modern myth he seems a sinophile as well. Invested in his own legacy he is drawn by historical gravity towards the inevitable return of the Middle Kingdom. From Three Kingdoms he quotes: "The empire long divided must unite".
In a lighting tour of China's past, Kiss~ touches upon the secular wisdom of Confucius, the military philosophy of Sun Tzu, wei qi board game strategies and Ming methods of barbarian management. 19th century imperial catastrophes such as the Opium Wars and the Boxer Rebellion put an end to the Qing Dynasty's heavenly mandate in 1912. The Chiang nationalist remnants of Republican China, too weak to win in WWII, lose the civil war to the Communists in 1949 and then run away to Taiwan.
Kiss~ turns a reverent and awestruck gaze towards Mao, the "poet and warrior, prophet", and the founder of a new empire. Mao thought the past needed to be eradicated to usher in the future. In dialectical opposition to Confucius, rather than restore a lost order Mao would fulfill a coming destiny by inciting social and political disorder. Haunted by a prior century of humiliation Mao stands up to the world, no longer European or Japanese imperialists, but now American and Soviet empires.
A new three way power play begins as the USA and USSR triangulate with the People's Republic. North Korea's Kim poised on his 38th parallel perch since '45 invites Stalin and Mao be part of his dream. Assured of Taiwan Mao balks but Stalin assents. In order to drive a wedge between the Chinese and Americans Stalin admonishes Kim: "If you get kicked in the teeth I won't raise a finger. You'll have to ask Mao for help." Three million died and yet the Kim dynasty persists until this day.
So on it goes, this cold war game, and where it ends nobody knows. From Kiss~ we learn that LBJ misread Mao, and was fooled into fighting the Soviet backed Vietcong. Kiss~ might have saved the day if not for his Vietnamization and carpet bombing Cambodia. In detente and rapprochement we sense the Tao of Kiss~ at work, while Nixon whispers from behind: "the ideas were all mine". Kiss~ advises Deng on how to lead China's reform, and then he doesn't complain about the Tiananmen storm.
Kiss~ invests early in a joint venture with the Communist Party as Mao rolls over in his crystal coffin. Kiss~ is now honored as an "Old Friend of the Chinese People". This is one of the few recent books that show Mao as he was, a man capable of leading China from ruin to world power and back again (a geopolitical opponent worthy of Kiss~). It is a personally gratifying but lengthy tale told by our venerable emissary to Peking. A word of caution, like Caesar in Gaul, read this missive with care.
In a lighting tour of China's past, Kiss~ touches upon the secular wisdom of Confucius, the military philosophy of Sun Tzu, wei qi board game strategies and Ming methods of barbarian management. 19th century imperial catastrophes such as the Opium Wars and the Boxer Rebellion put an end to the Qing Dynasty's heavenly mandate in 1912. The Chiang nationalist remnants of Republican China, too weak to win in WWII, lose the civil war to the Communists in 1949 and then run away to Taiwan.
Kiss~ turns a reverent and awestruck gaze towards Mao, the "poet and warrior, prophet", and the founder of a new empire. Mao thought the past needed to be eradicated to usher in the future. In dialectical opposition to Confucius, rather than restore a lost order Mao would fulfill a coming destiny by inciting social and political disorder. Haunted by a prior century of humiliation Mao stands up to the world, no longer European or Japanese imperialists, but now American and Soviet empires.
A new three way power play begins as the USA and USSR triangulate with the People's Republic. North Korea's Kim poised on his 38th parallel perch since '45 invites Stalin and Mao be part of his dream. Assured of Taiwan Mao balks but Stalin assents. In order to drive a wedge between the Chinese and Americans Stalin admonishes Kim: "If you get kicked in the teeth I won't raise a finger. You'll have to ask Mao for help." Three million died and yet the Kim dynasty persists until this day.
So on it goes, this cold war game, and where it ends nobody knows. From Kiss~ we learn that LBJ misread Mao, and was fooled into fighting the Soviet backed Vietcong. Kiss~ might have saved the day if not for his Vietnamization and carpet bombing Cambodia. In detente and rapprochement we sense the Tao of Kiss~ at work, while Nixon whispers from behind: "the ideas were all mine". Kiss~ advises Deng on how to lead China's reform, and then he doesn't complain about the Tiananmen storm.
Kiss~ invests early in a joint venture with the Communist Party as Mao rolls over in his crystal coffin. Kiss~ is now honored as an "Old Friend of the Chinese People". This is one of the few recent books that show Mao as he was, a man capable of leading China from ruin to world power and back again (a geopolitical opponent worthy of Kiss~). It is a personally gratifying but lengthy tale told by our venerable emissary to Peking. A word of caution, like Caesar in Gaul, read this missive with care.
August 29, 2023
این کتاب که توسط هنری کیسینجر در سال ٢٠١١ نوشته شده و توسط دکتر حسین راسی به فارسی ترجمه شده است، نقطه نظرات این دیپلمات کهنهکار امریکایی از مشاهدات و تفکرات خویش در مورد وضعیت رازآلود منطقه وسیعی از آسیا به نام چین را انعکاس میدهد. او در پی یافتن راز تداوم و یکپارچگی این واحد سیاسی در طول زمان است.
او در دهه ١٩٧٠ سفرهای متعدد محرمانه به چین داشت تا آنکه رییسجمهور امریکا ریچارد نیکسون در ١٩٧٢ رسما به پکن سفر کرد. پس از آن از ١٩٧٩ دنگ شیائوپنگ معمار درهای باز در چین به قدرت رسید و سپس در ١٩٨٩ اعتراضات شهری در چین برای نخستین بار مشاهده شد. کیسینجر در مورد اشغال میدان صلح آسمانی در پکن میگوید: اشغال میدان مرکزی حتی بهصورت مسالمتآمیز هر شهری به معنای آسیبپذیری حکومت آن کشور است. کیسینجر معتقد است که خیلی بعید است که چین قدرت اقتصادی خود را به قدرت نظامی تبدیل نکند.
او در دهه ١٩٧٠ سفرهای متعدد محرمانه به چین داشت تا آنکه رییسجمهور امریکا ریچارد نیکسون در ١٩٧٢ رسما به پکن سفر کرد. پس از آن از ١٩٧٩ دنگ شیائوپنگ معمار درهای باز در چین به قدرت رسید و سپس در ١٩٨٩ اعتراضات شهری در چین برای نخستین بار مشاهده شد. کیسینجر در مورد اشغال میدان صلح آسمانی در پکن میگوید: اشغال میدان مرکزی حتی بهصورت مسالمتآمیز هر شهری به معنای آسیبپذیری حکومت آن کشور است. کیسینجر معتقد است که خیلی بعید است که چین قدرت اقتصادی خود را به قدرت نظامی تبدیل نکند.
May 17, 2022
May 2022 ... I've read a few more chapters of Kissinger's brilliant book ... covering the next segment of my historical novel in progress
***
Kissinger is brilliant ... his portrayal of China through the lens of his own involvement is utterly fascinating ... I have reached his chapter on Mao; every sentence seems to contain another uniquely illuminating insight
one extract; more to come ...
... in his rebellion against China’s pervasive bureaucracy, Mao kept coming up against the dilemma that the campaign to save his people from themselves generated ever larger bureaucracies. In the end, destroying his own disciples turned into Mao’s vast enterprise.
***
Kissinger is brilliant ... his portrayal of China through the lens of his own involvement is utterly fascinating ... I have reached his chapter on Mao; every sentence seems to contain another uniquely illuminating insight
one extract; more to come ...
... in his rebellion against China’s pervasive bureaucracy, Mao kept coming up against the dilemma that the campaign to save his people from themselves generated ever larger bureaucracies. In the end, destroying his own disciples turned into Mao’s vast enterprise.
March 29, 2014
Although I don’t completely agree with the author, I thoroughly enjoyed this wonderful book about a country where I came from.
I was immensely impressed by the first-hand materials Kissinger possessed in writing this powerful book. Kissinger chooses wisely the starting point where to begin his account. People, even among the Chinese pay little attention to the literal meaning of the Chinese name of the country. Explaining the meaning of the two Chinese characters helps understand the people’s traditional belief and philosophy in dealing with other nations.
Kissinger cleverly picked some of the well know Chinese fables, historical events, and Chinese games to tell what he wanted to convey. The analysis of the impact of the Opium War in 1840, the Chinese classic the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and the board games Wei-chi was accurate and reliable. I enjoyed his account of Zhuge Liang’s (181–234) Empty Fort strategy and using it to interpret Mao’s handling of the superpowers.
Kissinger and his associates did a marvelous job in putting the Chinese classic writings in English. This is especial true with the subtleties of the language.
"The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been."
I was immensely impressed by the first-hand materials Kissinger possessed in writing this powerful book. Kissinger chooses wisely the starting point where to begin his account. People, even among the Chinese pay little attention to the literal meaning of the Chinese name of the country. Explaining the meaning of the two Chinese characters helps understand the people’s traditional belief and philosophy in dealing with other nations.
Kissinger cleverly picked some of the well know Chinese fables, historical events, and Chinese games to tell what he wanted to convey. The analysis of the impact of the Opium War in 1840, the Chinese classic the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and the board games Wei-chi was accurate and reliable. I enjoyed his account of Zhuge Liang’s (181–234) Empty Fort strategy and using it to interpret Mao’s handling of the superpowers.
Kissinger and his associates did a marvelous job in putting the Chinese classic writings in English. This is especial true with the subtleties of the language.
"The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been."
June 20, 2021
خلاصه این کتاب رو از پادکست بی پلاس شنیدم و با اینکه کل کتاب رو نخوندم اما واقعا برام جالب بود، هم کتاب کتابه خوب و جذاب و با اطلاعات آموزنده ای هست و هم اپیزود خوب و قوی بود و بررسی های جالبی درباره مسائل مطرح شده انجام داده بود
امیدوارم در آینده بتونم کل کتاب رو مطالعه کنم
امیدوارم در آینده بتونم کل کتاب رو مطالعه کنم
April 3, 2018
اگر بشود نامی فرعی برای این کتاب در نظر گرفت شاید یکی از بهترین عنوانها، «چین چگونه چین شد؟»، باشد.
هنری کیسینجر، دیپلمات کارکشته و مغز متفکر دیپلماسی، به سراغ چینی رفته است که صدای «خیزش»، «رشد» و «توسعه» آن شاید حالاحالاها در فضای نظام سیاسی بینالملل طنینانداز باشد. چینی که بود، جا ماند، رسید و اکنون آمده است که بماند و یکهتازی کند.
هنری کیسینجر در این کتاب قطور به بررسی تاریخ سیاسیِ چین میپردازد. کشوری که تاریخی غنی و سرشار، ملت و فرهنگی منحصر به فرد داشته و اکنون نیز در ردای یک بازیگر تاثیرگذار سیاسی و ابرقدرت جهانی خودنمایی میکند.
چین از معدود کشورهایی است که علیرغم تمام کاستیها و سختیها و رشد و زوالها تمدنش باقی ماند و به کتیبههای تاریخی نپیوست.
این کتاب، تاریخ و سرگذشت یک ملت است که زمانی در اوج اقتدار و امپراتوری خود به سر میبرد و خود را «مرکز جهان» میپنداشت اما همچون تمام امپراتوریهای تاریخ رو به اضمحلال گرایید. اما این چین با روم و یونان و عثمانی تفاوتی بسیار داشت. کشوری که حتی جنگهای داخلی و هرج و مرج هم نتوانست آن را به زیر بکشد.
از مقاومت و خاص بودن این سرزمین این را باید گفت که حتی ایدئولوژی مارکسیست-لنینیستی و کمونیسم نیز حریفش نشد و در نهایت نه فرهنگ و تاریخ چین و کنفوسیوسگرایی در کمونیسم، بلکه این کمونیسم بود که در تاریخ و فرهنگ چین و کنفوسیوسگرایی استحاله گردید.
حتی باید کمونیسم چینی را، که «مائو» بنیانگذارش بود و مائوئیسم ایدئولوژیاش، متفاوت از کمونیسم لنینیستی و شوروی در نظر گرفت.
این چین کمونیستی حتی به زیر چتر «برادر بزرگتر» خود، شوروی، نیز نرفت و در نهایت دشمن دورِ ایدئولوژیک (آمریکا) را بر دشمن نزدیکِ خود (شوروی) ترجیح داد و سمبل عملگراییِ کمونیستی در تاریخ شد. تقابل چین با شوروی و ائتلاف استراتژیک چین و آمریکا را میبایست نماد عملگرایی تاریخ جنگ سرد و پیروزی «استراتژی» بر «ایدئولوژی» قلمداد کرد.
علیرغم تمام خسرانها و فجایعی که مائو در دوران زمامداریاش، از «جهش بزرگ به جلو» گرفته تا «انقلاب فرهنگی» و از بین بردن تاریخ و فرهنگ کهن چینی، بر سر چین آورد اما این کشور و تمدن باز هم سرپا ماند.
جانشینان مائو اما فهمیده بودند که این کشور پهناور و پرجمعیت را نمیتوان با ایدئولوژی و «انقلاب همیشگی» به پیش راند و اینک وقت توسعه و عملگرایی است.
"بیش از ده سال پس از مرگ مائو، «انقلاب همیشگی» او دوباره ظاهر شده بود، اما این گونهی جدیدی از انقلاب همیشگی بود و پوشش تازه بر تن داشت: انقلاب مبتنی بر ابتکار فردی، و نه شور ایدئولوژیکی؛ ارتباط با دنیای خارج، و نه خودکفایی مطلق. این انقلابِ تازه به رهبری «دِنگ شیائوپینگ» (جانشین مائو)، که خود نیز روزی قربانی سیاستهای مائو شده بود، میرفت که چین را از ریشه متحول کند، درست همانطور که خواست «مائو» بود، اما درست در جهت عکس آن."
این کتابِ بسیار آموزنده در کنار بررسی تاریخ سیاستِ خارجهی چین، به رویکرد و سیاست خارجه دولتهای آمریکا، از پس از جنگ جهانی دوم تا اوایل ریاستجمهوری باراک اوباما، در قبال چین نیز میپردازد و در آن درسهای فراوانی از هنر و فنِ دیپلماسی، مفاهیم و جملات معنادار در سیاست خارجه و نیز نحوه تفکر و نگرش به نظام بینالملل برای خوانندگان، به ویژه دانشجویان روابط بینالملل، نهفته است.
فصل آخر نیز نگارنده به سراغ آینده روابط چین و ایالات متحده و تاثیرات این دو ابر قدرت بر نظام بینالملل میپردازد و از بایدها و نبایدها و بیمها و امیدها سخن میگوید.
*ترجمه این کتاب که توسط حسین راسی صورت گرفته و نشر فرهنگ معاصر آن را منتشر کرده است ترجمهای بسیار دقیق، روان و خوشخوان است.
هنری کیسینجر، دیپلمات کارکشته و مغز متفکر دیپلماسی، به سراغ چینی رفته است که صدای «خیزش»، «رشد» و «توسعه» آن شاید حالاحالاها در فضای نظام سیاسی بینالملل طنینانداز باشد. چینی که بود، جا ماند، رسید و اکنون آمده است که بماند و یکهتازی کند.
هنری کیسینجر در این کتاب قطور به بررسی تاریخ سیاسیِ چین میپردازد. کشوری که تاریخی غنی و سرشار، ملت و فرهنگی منحصر به فرد داشته و اکنون نیز در ردای یک بازیگر تاثیرگذار سیاسی و ابرقدرت جهانی خودنمایی میکند.
چین از معدود کشورهایی است که علیرغم تمام کاستیها و سختیها و رشد و زوالها تمدنش باقی ماند و به کتیبههای تاریخی نپیوست.
این کتاب، تاریخ و سرگذشت یک ملت است که زمانی در اوج اقتدار و امپراتوری خود به سر میبرد و خود را «مرکز جهان» میپنداشت اما همچون تمام امپراتوریهای تاریخ رو به اضمحلال گرایید. اما این چین با روم و یونان و عثمانی تفاوتی بسیار داشت. کشوری که حتی جنگهای داخلی و هرج و مرج هم نتوانست آن را به زیر بکشد.
از مقاومت و خاص بودن این سرزمین این را باید گفت که حتی ایدئولوژی مارکسیست-لنینیستی و کمونیسم نیز حریفش نشد و در نهایت نه فرهنگ و تاریخ چین و کنفوسیوسگرایی در کمونیسم، بلکه این کمونیسم بود که در تاریخ و فرهنگ چین و کنفوسیوسگرایی استحاله گردید.
حتی باید کمونیسم چینی را، که «مائو» بنیانگذارش بود و مائوئیسم ایدئولوژیاش، متفاوت از کمونیسم لنینیستی و شوروی در نظر گرفت.
این چین کمونیستی حتی به زیر چتر «برادر بزرگتر» خود، شوروی، نیز نرفت و در نهایت دشمن دورِ ایدئولوژیک (آمریکا) را بر دشمن نزدیکِ خود (شوروی) ترجیح داد و سمبل عملگراییِ کمونیستی در تاریخ شد. تقابل چین با شوروی و ائتلاف استراتژیک چین و آمریکا را میبایست نماد عملگرایی تاریخ جنگ سرد و پیروزی «استراتژی» بر «ایدئولوژی» قلمداد کرد.
علیرغم تمام خسرانها و فجایعی که مائو در دوران زمامداریاش، از «جهش بزرگ به جلو» گرفته تا «انقلاب فرهنگی» و از بین بردن تاریخ و فرهنگ کهن چینی، بر سر چین آورد اما این کشور و تمدن باز هم سرپا ماند.
جانشینان مائو اما فهمیده بودند که این کشور پهناور و پرجمعیت را نمیتوان با ایدئولوژی و «انقلاب همیشگی» به پیش راند و اینک وقت توسعه و عملگرایی است.
"بیش از ده سال پس از مرگ مائو، «انقلاب همیشگی» او دوباره ظاهر شده بود، اما این گونهی جدیدی از انقلاب همیشگی بود و پوشش تازه بر تن داشت: انقلاب مبتنی بر ابتکار فردی، و نه شور ایدئولوژیکی؛ ارتباط با دنیای خارج، و نه خودکفایی مطلق. این انقلابِ تازه به رهبری «دِنگ شیائوپینگ» (جانشین مائو)، که خود نیز روزی قربانی سیاستهای مائو شده بود، میرفت که چین را از ریشه متحول کند، درست همانطور که خواست «مائو» بود، اما درست در جهت عکس آن."
این کتابِ بسیار آموزنده در کنار بررسی تاریخ سیاستِ خارجهی چین، به رویکرد و سیاست خارجه دولتهای آمریکا، از پس از جنگ جهانی دوم تا اوایل ریاستجمهوری باراک اوباما، در قبال چین نیز میپردازد و در آن درسهای فراوانی از هنر و فنِ دیپلماسی، مفاهیم و جملات معنادار در سیاست خارجه و نیز نحوه تفکر و نگرش به نظام بینالملل برای خوانندگان، به ویژه دانشجویان روابط بینالملل، نهفته است.
فصل آخر نیز نگارنده به سراغ آینده روابط چین و ایالات متحده و تاثیرات این دو ابر قدرت بر نظام بینالملل میپردازد و از بایدها و نبایدها و بیمها و امیدها سخن میگوید.
*ترجمه این کتاب که توسط حسین راسی صورت گرفته و نشر فرهنگ معاصر آن را منتشر کرده است ترجمهای بسیار دقیق، روان و خوشخوان است.
December 13, 2018
On China, by Henry Kissinger, is an examination of Chinese history and diplomacy, coupled with the recent opening up of Chinese society to global forces and China's subsequent engagement with the global community. The book looks at Chinese history, politics, diplomacy and culture, while coupling these topics with China's geopolitical position. Kissinger offers insight into this topic due to first hand negotiations and experience during China's initial foray into diplomatic outreach, during the final few years of Mao Zedong's reign over Communist China.
The book begins with an examination of Chinese culture and how it relates to international diplomacy. China has historically considered itself the centre of the universe, in terms of its position of dominance in Asia. China sought to order itself and the states along its periphery, largely in terms of geopolitics. States in more extreme locale's, such as the Indian Kingdoms, Southeast Asian Kingdoms, and the nations of the Steppe, were often beyond direct military or political control. China, instead, created a radiating centre of states, in increasingly more autonomous systems of vassalage. States like Korea and Tibet would often exist in more permanent states of vassalage, while areas like tribal Kazakhstan and Japan might pay a form of lip service or slight tribute. China, as the sole power in Asia throughout much of history, thus ordered its universe around itself, with complex forms of ritual diplomacy, a strong and professional bureaucratic system, and a deeply rooted sense of historical tradition centered on the principles of Confucianism dominating its cultural narrative.
This all changed with the coming of European forces. China had long been beset by foreign invaders, such as the Mongols, and Manchus, to name a few. However, China often overcame these invaders through a process of Sinicization. New Empires would eventually succumb to Chinese traditions, as the easiest and most efficient way to rule over the often much more populous and sedentary Chinese lands was to adopt their systems of governance. This often led to the eventual incorporation of the ruling elite into the Chinese cultural system. However, European invaders cared only for trade and market access, as well as colonies, and brought there own universal world views based on Christianity, missionary zeal, and perceived cultural superiority. These norms were incompatible with existing Chinese conceptions of the Universe, and a clash was inevitable. China had been through periods of upheaval, collapse and decay before, and had a tradition of overcoming. However, the subsequent invasions of China by the British, French, and Japanese upset China's hegemony in Asia, and challenged its concept of the Universe. China needed to adapt, and in some ways did so.
This came about due to the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 - China's last Imperial dynasty. From that point onward, a Nationalist, and then Communist government controlled China - both quasi dictatorial states either aligned to the West (Nationalist) or the USSR (Communist). The Communist eventually took power in 1949, forming the government that controls China to this day. Even so, the makeup of modern China's government system has gone through many changes since then. Mao Zedong ruled over early Communist China with an iron fist, almost like a new Emperor. He sought to reorder Chinese society away from its traditional Confucius past. This was done through realignment, the disruption and destruction of the Mandarin bureaucracy, and a reorganization of China's traditional agricultural system. These policies were often violently destructive and most often reductive. Millions died in China's subsequent famines, and many leading technical and policy experts were purged from the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution.
However, a change that China did make under Mao was its slow reorientation away from the USSR. China and the USSR had a rocky relationship from the beginning - historical territorial frictions along the shared and porous border, coupled at historical animosity at Russia's traditional colonial claims to Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Port Arthur trumped ideological similarities between the two communist giants. China bid its time, and Mao held Stalin in some regard. Mao sent troops into Korea, for example, after some rocky diplomatic dancing between the two states. However, after Stalin's death, the relationship between China and the USSR began to fray. On paper the two were military allies, however, in practice they were clashing along frontier zones over territorial disputes. China thus sought to hedge its alliances and end its relative isolation in global diplomacy. The US was the natural choice; and the US was interested in courting China as well. A disruption of the Communist bloc would be ideal, and President Nixon was looking to wind down the Vietnam War and sought China's neutrality.
Kissinger details the negotiations in depth including the principle Chinese and American viewpoints, as well as some of the cast of characters involved. Kissinger then goes on to offer a brief analysis of the Deng Xiaoping era, in terms of the opening up of China in terms of its global interactions, the slow recognition of the PRC as the main Chinese government, the development of China and the Tiananmen Square incident. A small section is devoted to the growing rivalry with the US in terms of China's increasingly assertive foreign policy stance in terms of territorial claims, global economic participation, and erosion of US hegemonic practices. Kissinger has written a compelling and interesting book on China, and this is certainly an important viewpoint to read and consider. Recommended for China watchers, those interested in current events, and fans of history and politics.
The book begins with an examination of Chinese culture and how it relates to international diplomacy. China has historically considered itself the centre of the universe, in terms of its position of dominance in Asia. China sought to order itself and the states along its periphery, largely in terms of geopolitics. States in more extreme locale's, such as the Indian Kingdoms, Southeast Asian Kingdoms, and the nations of the Steppe, were often beyond direct military or political control. China, instead, created a radiating centre of states, in increasingly more autonomous systems of vassalage. States like Korea and Tibet would often exist in more permanent states of vassalage, while areas like tribal Kazakhstan and Japan might pay a form of lip service or slight tribute. China, as the sole power in Asia throughout much of history, thus ordered its universe around itself, with complex forms of ritual diplomacy, a strong and professional bureaucratic system, and a deeply rooted sense of historical tradition centered on the principles of Confucianism dominating its cultural narrative.
This all changed with the coming of European forces. China had long been beset by foreign invaders, such as the Mongols, and Manchus, to name a few. However, China often overcame these invaders through a process of Sinicization. New Empires would eventually succumb to Chinese traditions, as the easiest and most efficient way to rule over the often much more populous and sedentary Chinese lands was to adopt their systems of governance. This often led to the eventual incorporation of the ruling elite into the Chinese cultural system. However, European invaders cared only for trade and market access, as well as colonies, and brought there own universal world views based on Christianity, missionary zeal, and perceived cultural superiority. These norms were incompatible with existing Chinese conceptions of the Universe, and a clash was inevitable. China had been through periods of upheaval, collapse and decay before, and had a tradition of overcoming. However, the subsequent invasions of China by the British, French, and Japanese upset China's hegemony in Asia, and challenged its concept of the Universe. China needed to adapt, and in some ways did so.
This came about due to the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 - China's last Imperial dynasty. From that point onward, a Nationalist, and then Communist government controlled China - both quasi dictatorial states either aligned to the West (Nationalist) or the USSR (Communist). The Communist eventually took power in 1949, forming the government that controls China to this day. Even so, the makeup of modern China's government system has gone through many changes since then. Mao Zedong ruled over early Communist China with an iron fist, almost like a new Emperor. He sought to reorder Chinese society away from its traditional Confucius past. This was done through realignment, the disruption and destruction of the Mandarin bureaucracy, and a reorganization of China's traditional agricultural system. These policies were often violently destructive and most often reductive. Millions died in China's subsequent famines, and many leading technical and policy experts were purged from the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution.
However, a change that China did make under Mao was its slow reorientation away from the USSR. China and the USSR had a rocky relationship from the beginning - historical territorial frictions along the shared and porous border, coupled at historical animosity at Russia's traditional colonial claims to Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Port Arthur trumped ideological similarities between the two communist giants. China bid its time, and Mao held Stalin in some regard. Mao sent troops into Korea, for example, after some rocky diplomatic dancing between the two states. However, after Stalin's death, the relationship between China and the USSR began to fray. On paper the two were military allies, however, in practice they were clashing along frontier zones over territorial disputes. China thus sought to hedge its alliances and end its relative isolation in global diplomacy. The US was the natural choice; and the US was interested in courting China as well. A disruption of the Communist bloc would be ideal, and President Nixon was looking to wind down the Vietnam War and sought China's neutrality.
Kissinger details the negotiations in depth including the principle Chinese and American viewpoints, as well as some of the cast of characters involved. Kissinger then goes on to offer a brief analysis of the Deng Xiaoping era, in terms of the opening up of China in terms of its global interactions, the slow recognition of the PRC as the main Chinese government, the development of China and the Tiananmen Square incident. A small section is devoted to the growing rivalry with the US in terms of China's increasingly assertive foreign policy stance in terms of territorial claims, global economic participation, and erosion of US hegemonic practices. Kissinger has written a compelling and interesting book on China, and this is certainly an important viewpoint to read and consider. Recommended for China watchers, those interested in current events, and fans of history and politics.
June 10, 2016
I've always been interested in Kissinger's perspective on U.S-China relations since he had a front-row seat to its main events. This book really exceeded my expectations. Instead of just being a blow-by-blow of events (although it has that too) it offers a philosophical examination of China's history and how this shapes the worldview of its contemporary leaders.
Some of the most interesting parts of the book are at the beginning when he discusses the approach that Chinese leaders first took towards Westerners who had sought to come open up their country to trade. The haughty, regal self-assuredness that ended up rankling British emissaries led to their decision to open up China by force. At that time a Sinocentric worldview was the norm, and it was a violent centuries long experience to readjust to a world in which Western powers could challenge "All Under Heaven." Now, China has regained its place but the memory of that period of bullying and humiliation shapes much of China's calculations today.
In addition to being historically informed and full of interesting anecdotes, this is a delicately written and enjoyable book. It also contains thoughtful reflections on the nature of the global order, the respective importance of "values" and public opinion in shaping and constraining policy, and the resilience of Chinese culture in the face of repeated attempts to uproot it. I understand that some of the stuff in here may be viewed as essentializing by those with a more in-depth knowledge of Chinese culture (particularly Chinese themselves), but it made the concepts accessible and can be an introduction to greater study. Kissinger is obviously a troubling figure but he is a far greater intellect than any of our contemporary war criminals. This book is a must-read in my opinion.
Some of the most interesting parts of the book are at the beginning when he discusses the approach that Chinese leaders first took towards Westerners who had sought to come open up their country to trade. The haughty, regal self-assuredness that ended up rankling British emissaries led to their decision to open up China by force. At that time a Sinocentric worldview was the norm, and it was a violent centuries long experience to readjust to a world in which Western powers could challenge "All Under Heaven." Now, China has regained its place but the memory of that period of bullying and humiliation shapes much of China's calculations today.
In addition to being historically informed and full of interesting anecdotes, this is a delicately written and enjoyable book. It also contains thoughtful reflections on the nature of the global order, the respective importance of "values" and public opinion in shaping and constraining policy, and the resilience of Chinese culture in the face of repeated attempts to uproot it. I understand that some of the stuff in here may be viewed as essentializing by those with a more in-depth knowledge of Chinese culture (particularly Chinese themselves), but it made the concepts accessible and can be an introduction to greater study. Kissinger is obviously a troubling figure but he is a far greater intellect than any of our contemporary war criminals. This book is a must-read in my opinion.
March 25, 2016
کتاب از زبان و دیدگاه یک سیاستمدار عالیرتبه و باسابقه نوشته شده و این مهمترین ویژگی کتاب است: در این کتاب درمییابیم که یک دیپلمات چطور حرف میزند، چطور حرفهای دیگران را میشنود و خلاصه اینکه، آنچه که در رسانهها میشنوید از دید یک دیپلمات چه معنی و مفهومی دارد.
کتاب سرگذشت چین معاصر را از جنگ تریاک در قرن نوزده تا زمان ریاست جمهوری باراک اوباما، پوشش میدهد. با این حال، همه حوادث مهم را برنمیرسد؛ برای نمونه، الحاق هنگکنگ به سرزمین اصلی.
کیسینجر از میان همه مسائلی که یک کشور دارد فقط به دیپلماسی آن میپردازد و آن هم بیشتر در ارتباط با آمریکا و روسیه تا کشورهای دیگر و از این میان هم باز تنها به روش تصمیمگیریهای چین میپردازد (یعنی روند تصمیمگیریها را در آمریکا توضیح نمیدهد یا سیاستهای کلی آمریکا را راجع به منطقه آن قدرها که انتظار میرود روشن نمیکند.) با این وجود، در مقایسه با سایر کتابهایی که راجع به چین نوشته شده، که عمومن یا رویکرد تاریخی دارند و در نتیجه در پیوند تاریخ معاصر به عصر باستان در میمانند یا رویکرد اقتصادی دارند، نگاهی متفاوت دارد؛ برای کیسینجر رشد اقتصادی چین یک واقعیت بیرونیست که به هر ترتیب اتفاق افتاده. دلایلش را واکاوی نمیکند و از منظر او دلایل این رشد اقتصادی اهمیتی هم ندارند؛ مهم تأثیریست که روی دیپلماسی دو طرف میگذارد. در نتیجه رشد اقتصادی چین را در «بازار آزاد و سرمایهگذاری خارجی» خلاصه میکند، در حالی که دیپلماسیای که بر این رشد اتکا میکند و حوادث میدان تیانآنمن را رقم میزند، در چند صد صفحه میشکافد.
مسئله دیگر این است که، ایالات متحده همیشه متهم بوده که در عین اینکه شعار دموکراسی و حقوق بشر میدهد، ولی از رژیمهایی سرکوبگری هم حمایت میکند. یک نمونه این سیاست دوگانه را در سال ۱۹۸۹ و حوادث میدان تیانآنمن میتوان دید. کیسینجر در فصل مربوط به این واقعه بحثی را پیرامون همین سیاست دوگانه مطرح میکند که خواندنیست و به طور کلی این دوگانگی را توجیه میکند.
خواننده فارسیزبان، انگیزه دیگری هم برای خواندن این کتاب دارد: چینِ مائو یک نظام ایدئولوژیک و درگیر ضعف اقتصادی است که رابطه خود را با جهان خارج و به خصوص آمریکا قطع کرده و بعد از حدود ۲۰ سال میخواهد این رابطه را احیا کند. این اتفاق دقیقن در مورد ایران هم صادق است؛ یک نظام ایدئولوژیک که انقلاب آن شعار ضدیت با امپریالیسم غرب را فریاد میکرد و حالا بعد از سی و چند سال نشانههایی از گشایش در روابط دیپلماتیک دیده میشود. جالب اینکه این نشانهها و سرگذشت چین بسیار شبیه به هماند و حتی در این میان شخصیتهای چینی را میتوانیم نام ببریم که معادلی در ایران دارند.
ترجمه شیوا و روان است ولی با این حال بعضی کلمات مانند «پروسه» و «پرنسیپ» به شکلی استفاده شده که با فارسی امروز فاصله دارد.
کتاب سرگذشت چین معاصر را از جنگ تریاک در قرن نوزده تا زمان ریاست جمهوری باراک اوباما، پوشش میدهد. با این حال، همه حوادث مهم را برنمیرسد؛ برای نمونه، الحاق هنگکنگ به سرزمین اصلی.
کیسینجر از میان همه مسائلی که یک کشور دارد فقط به دیپلماسی آن میپردازد و آن هم بیشتر در ارتباط با آمریکا و روسیه تا کشورهای دیگر و از این میان هم باز تنها به روش تصمیمگیریهای چین میپردازد (یعنی روند تصمیمگیریها را در آمریکا توضیح نمیدهد یا سیاستهای کلی آمریکا را راجع به منطقه آن قدرها که انتظار میرود روشن نمیکند.) با این وجود، در مقایسه با سایر کتابهایی که راجع به چین نوشته شده، که عمومن یا رویکرد تاریخی دارند و در نتیجه در پیوند تاریخ معاصر به عصر باستان در میمانند یا رویکرد اقتصادی دارند، نگاهی متفاوت دارد؛ برای کیسینجر رشد اقتصادی چین یک واقعیت بیرونیست که به هر ترتیب اتفاق افتاده. دلایلش را واکاوی نمیکند و از منظر او دلایل این رشد اقتصادی اهمیتی هم ندارند؛ مهم تأثیریست که روی دیپلماسی دو طرف میگذارد. در نتیجه رشد اقتصادی چین را در «بازار آزاد و سرمایهگذاری خارجی» خلاصه میکند، در حالی که دیپلماسیای که بر این رشد اتکا میکند و حوادث میدان تیانآنمن را رقم میزند، در چند صد صفحه میشکافد.
مسئله دیگر این است که، ایالات متحده همیشه متهم بوده که در عین اینکه شعار دموکراسی و حقوق بشر میدهد، ولی از رژیمهایی سرکوبگری هم حمایت میکند. یک نمونه این سیاست دوگانه را در سال ۱۹۸۹ و حوادث میدان تیانآنمن میتوان دید. کیسینجر در فصل مربوط به این واقعه بحثی را پیرامون همین سیاست دوگانه مطرح میکند که خواندنیست و به طور کلی این دوگانگی را توجیه میکند.
خواننده فارسیزبان، انگیزه دیگری هم برای خواندن این کتاب دارد: چینِ مائو یک نظام ایدئولوژیک و درگیر ضعف اقتصادی است که رابطه خود را با جهان خارج و به خصوص آمریکا قطع کرده و بعد از حدود ۲۰ سال میخواهد این رابطه را احیا کند. این اتفاق دقیقن در مورد ایران هم صادق است؛ یک نظام ایدئولوژیک که انقلاب آن شعار ضدیت با امپریالیسم غرب را فریاد میکرد و حالا بعد از سی و چند سال نشانههایی از گشایش در روابط دیپلماتیک دیده میشود. جالب اینکه این نشانهها و سرگذشت چین بسیار شبیه به هماند و حتی در این میان شخصیتهای چینی را میتوانیم نام ببریم که معادلی در ایران دارند.
ترجمه شیوا و روان است ولی با این حال بعضی کلمات مانند «پروسه» و «پرنسیپ» به شکلی استفاده شده که با فارسی امروز فاصله دارد.
May 17, 2020
I am amazed by how deep an American could understand about China. This understanding was based on history and culture in addition to the current leaders that he was talking to, i.e., Mao, Deng, Jiang, and Hu. The book started with an impressive comparison between American and Chinese culture in two metaphors:
1. American exceptionalism is missionary. It holds that the United States has an obligation to spread its values to every part of the world. China’s exceptionalism is cultural. China does not proselytize; it does not claim that its contemporary institutions are relevant outside China. But it is the heir of the Middle Kingdom tradition, which formally graded all other states as various levels of tributaries based on their approximation to Chinese cultural and political forms; in other words, a kind of cultural universality. The Chinese never generated a myth of cosmic creation. Their universe was created by the Chinese themselves, whose values, even when declared of universal applicability, were conceived of as Chinese in origin. In the Chinese version of exceptionalism, China did not export its ideas but let others come to seek them. Neighboring peoples, the Chinese believed, benefited from contact with China and civilization so long as they acknowledged the suzerainty of the Chinese government.
2. If chess is about the decisive battle, Chinese chess (wei qi) is about the protracted campaign. The chess player aims for total victory. The wei qi player seeks relative advantage. In chess, the player always has the capability of the adversary in front of him; all the pieces are always fully deployed. The wei qi player needs to assess not only the pieces on the board but the reinforcements the adversary is in a position to deploy. Chess teaches the Clausewitzian concepts of “center of gravity” and the “decisive point”—the game usually beginning as a struggle for the center of the board. Wei qi teaches the art of strategic encirclement. Where the skillful chess player aims to eliminate his opponent’s pieces in a series of head-on clashes, a talented wei qi player moves into “empty” spaces on the board, gradually mitigating the strategic potential of his opponent’s pieces. Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.
As a Chinese that have spent the past ten years in the United States, I could not draw a better comparison.
Then, the book unfolds the historical moments of using China Cards to combat the Soviet Union, understanding the relationship between China and the Soviet Union during Korean war and Vietnam war, helping Nixon to get in touch with Mao, talking with Zhou, negotiating about Taiwan, etc. The Sino-China relationship was established and the rest is history.
Kissinger concluded that the relationship between China and United States would be coevoltuion rather than the ordinary operation of great-power rivalry or of ideology disagreement. However, such an effort may not necessarily be a success. In that case, the United States will defend its interests by traditional precepts. But the advocates of confrontation will not be vindicated by such an outcome. Those who inherit the ensuing conflict will still be obliged to produce a new and better world order when the crisis abates. In the end, history lauds not conflicts of societies but their reconciliations. What a visionary!
1. American exceptionalism is missionary. It holds that the United States has an obligation to spread its values to every part of the world. China’s exceptionalism is cultural. China does not proselytize; it does not claim that its contemporary institutions are relevant outside China. But it is the heir of the Middle Kingdom tradition, which formally graded all other states as various levels of tributaries based on their approximation to Chinese cultural and political forms; in other words, a kind of cultural universality. The Chinese never generated a myth of cosmic creation. Their universe was created by the Chinese themselves, whose values, even when declared of universal applicability, were conceived of as Chinese in origin. In the Chinese version of exceptionalism, China did not export its ideas but let others come to seek them. Neighboring peoples, the Chinese believed, benefited from contact with China and civilization so long as they acknowledged the suzerainty of the Chinese government.
2. If chess is about the decisive battle, Chinese chess (wei qi) is about the protracted campaign. The chess player aims for total victory. The wei qi player seeks relative advantage. In chess, the player always has the capability of the adversary in front of him; all the pieces are always fully deployed. The wei qi player needs to assess not only the pieces on the board but the reinforcements the adversary is in a position to deploy. Chess teaches the Clausewitzian concepts of “center of gravity” and the “decisive point”—the game usually beginning as a struggle for the center of the board. Wei qi teaches the art of strategic encirclement. Where the skillful chess player aims to eliminate his opponent’s pieces in a series of head-on clashes, a talented wei qi player moves into “empty” spaces on the board, gradually mitigating the strategic potential of his opponent’s pieces. Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.
As a Chinese that have spent the past ten years in the United States, I could not draw a better comparison.
Then, the book unfolds the historical moments of using China Cards to combat the Soviet Union, understanding the relationship between China and the Soviet Union during Korean war and Vietnam war, helping Nixon to get in touch with Mao, talking with Zhou, negotiating about Taiwan, etc. The Sino-China relationship was established and the rest is history.
Kissinger concluded that the relationship between China and United States would be coevoltuion rather than the ordinary operation of great-power rivalry or of ideology disagreement. However, such an effort may not necessarily be a success. In that case, the United States will defend its interests by traditional precepts. But the advocates of confrontation will not be vindicated by such an outcome. Those who inherit the ensuing conflict will still be obliged to produce a new and better world order when the crisis abates. In the end, history lauds not conflicts of societies but their reconciliations. What a visionary!
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January 22, 2024Through many millennia of Chinese civilization, China was never obliged to deal with other countries or civilizations that were comparable to it in scale and sophistication. Though China and Japan shared a number of core cultural and political institutions, neither was prepared to recognize the other's superiority; their solution was to curtail contact for centuries at a time. China acquired no overseas colonies and shared relatively little interest in the countries beyond its coast. It was for centuries the world's most productive economy and most populous trading area. The methods by which it was unified and periodically overturned and reunified again were occasionally brutal.
Chinese history witnessed its share of sanguinary rebellions and dynastic tyrants. With distinctive traditions and millennial habits of superiority, China entered the modern age a singular kind of empire: a state claiming universal relevance for its culture and institutions but making few efforts to proselytize; the wealthiest country in the world but one that was indifferent to foreign trade and technological innovation; a culture of cosmopolitanism overseen by a political elite oblivious to the onset of the Western age of exploration; and a political unit of unparalleled geographic extent that was unaware of the technological and historical currents that would soon threaten its existence.
The results of the interplay between Western overwhelming force and Chinese psychological management were two treaties negotiated, the Treaty of Nanjing and the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue. It provided the Britain for payment of a $6 million indemnity by China, the cession of Hong Kong and the opening of five coastal 'treaty ports' in which Western residence and trade would be permitted. This effectively dismantled the "Canton System" by which the Chinese court had regulated trade with the West and confined it to licensed merchants. Within the space of a decade, the Middle Kingdom had gone from preeminence to being an object of contending colonial forces.
Poised between two eras and two different conceptions of international relations, China strove for a new identity, and above all to reconcile the value that marked its greatness with the technology and commerce on which it would have to base its security. Mao's approach to preemption differed in the extraordinary attention he paid to psychological elements. His motivating force was less to inflict a decisive military first blow than to change the psychological balance, not so much to defeat the enemy as to alter his calculus of risks.
Ideology had brought Beijing and Moscow together and ideology drove them apart again. The Soviet Union regarded the Communist world as a single strategic entity whose leadership was in Moscow. It had established satellite regimes in Eastern Europe that were dependent on Soviet military and to some extent economic support. It seemed natural to the Soviet Politburo that the same pattern of dominance should prevail in Asia. In terms of Chinese history, cultural differences exacerbated latent tensions - especially since the Soviet leaders were generally oblivious of Chinese historic sensitivities.
As the 1960s progressed, even Mao began to recognize the potential perils of China were multiplying. Along its vast borders, China faced a potential enemy in the Soviet Union; a humiliated adversary in India; a massive American deployment and an escalating war in Vietnam; self-proclaimed governments-in-exile in Taipei and the Tibetan enclave of northern India; a historic opponent in Japan; and across the Pacific an American that viewed China as an implacable adversary. Sino-American diplomacy within a year moved from irreconcilable conflict to a visit to Beijing by a presidential emissary to prepare a visit by the President himself.
It did so by sidestepping the rhetoric of two decades and staying focused on the fundamental strategic objective of a geopolitical dialogue leading to a recasting of the Cold War international order. To Nixon, the opening of China was part of an overall strategic design not a shopping list of mutual irritations. Chinese leaders pursued a parallel approach. Invocations of returning to an existing international order were meaningless to them, if only because they did not consider the existing international system, which they had no hand in forming, as relevant to them. They had never conceived their security to reside in the legal arrangement of a community of sovereign states.
When Zhou wrote about reestablishing friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, he described an attitude needed to foster a new international equilibrium, not a final state of the relationship between peoples. What was sought, rather, was a world in which China could find security and progress through a kind of combative coexistence in which readiness to fight was given equal pride of place to the concept of coexistence.
Chinese history witnessed its share of sanguinary rebellions and dynastic tyrants. With distinctive traditions and millennial habits of superiority, China entered the modern age a singular kind of empire: a state claiming universal relevance for its culture and institutions but making few efforts to proselytize; the wealthiest country in the world but one that was indifferent to foreign trade and technological innovation; a culture of cosmopolitanism overseen by a political elite oblivious to the onset of the Western age of exploration; and a political unit of unparalleled geographic extent that was unaware of the technological and historical currents that would soon threaten its existence.
The results of the interplay between Western overwhelming force and Chinese psychological management were two treaties negotiated, the Treaty of Nanjing and the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue. It provided the Britain for payment of a $6 million indemnity by China, the cession of Hong Kong and the opening of five coastal 'treaty ports' in which Western residence and trade would be permitted. This effectively dismantled the "Canton System" by which the Chinese court had regulated trade with the West and confined it to licensed merchants. Within the space of a decade, the Middle Kingdom had gone from preeminence to being an object of contending colonial forces.
Poised between two eras and two different conceptions of international relations, China strove for a new identity, and above all to reconcile the value that marked its greatness with the technology and commerce on which it would have to base its security. Mao's approach to preemption differed in the extraordinary attention he paid to psychological elements. His motivating force was less to inflict a decisive military first blow than to change the psychological balance, not so much to defeat the enemy as to alter his calculus of risks.
Ideology had brought Beijing and Moscow together and ideology drove them apart again. The Soviet Union regarded the Communist world as a single strategic entity whose leadership was in Moscow. It had established satellite regimes in Eastern Europe that were dependent on Soviet military and to some extent economic support. It seemed natural to the Soviet Politburo that the same pattern of dominance should prevail in Asia. In terms of Chinese history, cultural differences exacerbated latent tensions - especially since the Soviet leaders were generally oblivious of Chinese historic sensitivities.
As the 1960s progressed, even Mao began to recognize the potential perils of China were multiplying. Along its vast borders, China faced a potential enemy in the Soviet Union; a humiliated adversary in India; a massive American deployment and an escalating war in Vietnam; self-proclaimed governments-in-exile in Taipei and the Tibetan enclave of northern India; a historic opponent in Japan; and across the Pacific an American that viewed China as an implacable adversary. Sino-American diplomacy within a year moved from irreconcilable conflict to a visit to Beijing by a presidential emissary to prepare a visit by the President himself.
It did so by sidestepping the rhetoric of two decades and staying focused on the fundamental strategic objective of a geopolitical dialogue leading to a recasting of the Cold War international order. To Nixon, the opening of China was part of an overall strategic design not a shopping list of mutual irritations. Chinese leaders pursued a parallel approach. Invocations of returning to an existing international order were meaningless to them, if only because they did not consider the existing international system, which they had no hand in forming, as relevant to them. They had never conceived their security to reside in the legal arrangement of a community of sovereign states.
When Zhou wrote about reestablishing friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, he described an attitude needed to foster a new international equilibrium, not a final state of the relationship between peoples. What was sought, rather, was a world in which China could find security and progress through a kind of combative coexistence in which readiness to fight was given equal pride of place to the concept of coexistence.
July 2, 2011
On China records the half century effort of Henry Kissinger and successive American governments to establish normal relations with the government of China. This vigorous and highly readable book lays out in detail every aspect of the diplomacy that brought the once hostile and renegade government of China to join the world economic order.
Kissinger spends the first three chapters in an extensive analysis of the political history of China. Key to understanding China's history is the most fundamental strategy of Chinese history, managing the barbarians. As an ancient political culture advanced far beyond its neighbors, China's basic stance was one of absolute superiority. Non-Chinese, that is, "barbarians", were merely to be managed, and could only approach China in an attitude of abject subservience. When faced with military threats beyond its immediate ability to control, China employed a number of strategies to neutralize and control its adversaries, with the eventual goal of reestablishing equilibrium. Unlike the Britain and the United States, China had never been an expansionist state: since Chinese culture was unique and non-transferable, there was no need to spread their own culture via political dominance. Relations with other nations thus became an exercise in management, with the primary goal being to minimize the presence and influence of any who came in contact with China.
Throughout the book, Kissinger traces the ways that the traditional structure of Chinese foreign relations has continued more or less unchanged through the millenia, up to and including the Mao and post-Mao era. Kissinger notes the continuity in China's managing the Soviet Union and the United States much as it had managed other "barbarians" in earlier eras. As always, the goal has been to maintain China's internal equilibrium by playing the barbarians off against each other. Every move in the twentieth century was geared to establish China's primacy in the region, without overstepping the boundaries of its own sphere of influence. China could therefore provide limited assistance to Viet Nam to keep the United States from achieving another beach head in Asia, but then turn around and attack Viet Nam a few years later to keep Hanoi from becoming a center of power in South East Asia.
Kissinger of course describes the historic opening of China to the United States in great detail, and provides a thorough analysis of his own role in process. More interesting, though, is Kissinger's discussions of his continued diplomatic efforts in the many years succeeding his positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations. Kissinger describes the Chinese approach to international diplomacy as being focussed around personal relationships. Because of the relationships he forged with Chinese leaders as China opened up to the United States, the Chinese government continues to use Kissinger as a liason, despite the fact that he has not had a position in the American government for decades.
Most interesting, therefore, is Kissinger's communications with the Chinese government in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square disaster. Kissinger had the unenviable task of explaining to the Chinese how American public opinion was driven by the core values of personal liberty and human rights. China, of course, viewed the incident as a purely internal matter, of no concern whatsoever beyond its borders. Kissinger worked with Deng Xiaoping to arrive at a mutually acceptable series of steps to ease tensions and keep the US and China on the same course of positive engagement. Kissinger's work here was surely of the same import as his initial work to open up China: his efforts insured that the US and China would remain engaged rather than backslide into hostility.
Those who are uncomfortable with Kissinger's brand of realpolitik point to this effort as evidence of his unconcern for human rights. Kissinger is very clear, however, on the need to balance American values with the realities of foreign policy:
"I respect those who are prepared to battle for their views of the imperatives of spreading American values. but foreign policy must define means as well as objectives, and if the means employed grow beyond the tolerance of the international framework or of a relationship considered essential for national security, a choice must be made. What we must not do is to minimize the nature of the choice. The best outcome in the American debate would be to combine the two approaches: for the idealists to recognize that priniciples need to be implememted over time and hence must be occasionally adjusted to circumstance; and for the "realists" to accept that values have their own reality and must be built into operational policies. Such an approach would recognize that many gradations exist in each camp, which an effort should be made to shade into each other. In practice this goal has often been overwhelmed by the passions of controversy."
Kissinger continues by quoting a 1992 statement from Premier Li Peng: "With regard to the three ares you mentioned, we can talk about human rights. But because of major differences between us, I doubt major progress is possible. The concept of human rights involves traditions and moral and philosophical values. These are different in China than in the West. We believe that the Chinese people should have more democratic rights and play a more important role in domestic politics. But this should be done in a way acceptable to the Chinese people."
To wrap up, Kissinger discusses an analogy that sees the US and China playing in the 21st century roles similar to Great Britain and Germany a century ago. Fortunately, though, Kissinger doesn't believe that history has to be repeated. Instead, he believes
"The appropriate label for the Sino-American relationship is less partnership than "co-evolution." It means that both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict. Neither side endorses all the aims of the other or presumes a total identity of interests, but both sides see to identify and develop complimentary interests."
To achieve this, Kissinger envisions the creation of a Pacific Community, to which the US, China, and other Pacific nations belong and in which they all have a vested interest.
This is a brilliant book, full of detail, but highly readable. Henry Kissinger's work to open up, develop, and maintain ties to the Chinese government over the last century will stand as one of the greatest acts of diplomacy in human history. Readers and historians are fortunate that he has been able to lay out for posterity the details of his role, philosophy, and accomplishments.
Kissinger spends the first three chapters in an extensive analysis of the political history of China. Key to understanding China's history is the most fundamental strategy of Chinese history, managing the barbarians. As an ancient political culture advanced far beyond its neighbors, China's basic stance was one of absolute superiority. Non-Chinese, that is, "barbarians", were merely to be managed, and could only approach China in an attitude of abject subservience. When faced with military threats beyond its immediate ability to control, China employed a number of strategies to neutralize and control its adversaries, with the eventual goal of reestablishing equilibrium. Unlike the Britain and the United States, China had never been an expansionist state: since Chinese culture was unique and non-transferable, there was no need to spread their own culture via political dominance. Relations with other nations thus became an exercise in management, with the primary goal being to minimize the presence and influence of any who came in contact with China.
Throughout the book, Kissinger traces the ways that the traditional structure of Chinese foreign relations has continued more or less unchanged through the millenia, up to and including the Mao and post-Mao era. Kissinger notes the continuity in China's managing the Soviet Union and the United States much as it had managed other "barbarians" in earlier eras. As always, the goal has been to maintain China's internal equilibrium by playing the barbarians off against each other. Every move in the twentieth century was geared to establish China's primacy in the region, without overstepping the boundaries of its own sphere of influence. China could therefore provide limited assistance to Viet Nam to keep the United States from achieving another beach head in Asia, but then turn around and attack Viet Nam a few years later to keep Hanoi from becoming a center of power in South East Asia.
Kissinger of course describes the historic opening of China to the United States in great detail, and provides a thorough analysis of his own role in process. More interesting, though, is Kissinger's discussions of his continued diplomatic efforts in the many years succeeding his positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations. Kissinger describes the Chinese approach to international diplomacy as being focussed around personal relationships. Because of the relationships he forged with Chinese leaders as China opened up to the United States, the Chinese government continues to use Kissinger as a liason, despite the fact that he has not had a position in the American government for decades.
Most interesting, therefore, is Kissinger's communications with the Chinese government in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square disaster. Kissinger had the unenviable task of explaining to the Chinese how American public opinion was driven by the core values of personal liberty and human rights. China, of course, viewed the incident as a purely internal matter, of no concern whatsoever beyond its borders. Kissinger worked with Deng Xiaoping to arrive at a mutually acceptable series of steps to ease tensions and keep the US and China on the same course of positive engagement. Kissinger's work here was surely of the same import as his initial work to open up China: his efforts insured that the US and China would remain engaged rather than backslide into hostility.
Those who are uncomfortable with Kissinger's brand of realpolitik point to this effort as evidence of his unconcern for human rights. Kissinger is very clear, however, on the need to balance American values with the realities of foreign policy:
"I respect those who are prepared to battle for their views of the imperatives of spreading American values. but foreign policy must define means as well as objectives, and if the means employed grow beyond the tolerance of the international framework or of a relationship considered essential for national security, a choice must be made. What we must not do is to minimize the nature of the choice. The best outcome in the American debate would be to combine the two approaches: for the idealists to recognize that priniciples need to be implememted over time and hence must be occasionally adjusted to circumstance; and for the "realists" to accept that values have their own reality and must be built into operational policies. Such an approach would recognize that many gradations exist in each camp, which an effort should be made to shade into each other. In practice this goal has often been overwhelmed by the passions of controversy."
Kissinger continues by quoting a 1992 statement from Premier Li Peng: "With regard to the three ares you mentioned, we can talk about human rights. But because of major differences between us, I doubt major progress is possible. The concept of human rights involves traditions and moral and philosophical values. These are different in China than in the West. We believe that the Chinese people should have more democratic rights and play a more important role in domestic politics. But this should be done in a way acceptable to the Chinese people."
To wrap up, Kissinger discusses an analogy that sees the US and China playing in the 21st century roles similar to Great Britain and Germany a century ago. Fortunately, though, Kissinger doesn't believe that history has to be repeated. Instead, he believes
"The appropriate label for the Sino-American relationship is less partnership than "co-evolution." It means that both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict. Neither side endorses all the aims of the other or presumes a total identity of interests, but both sides see to identify and develop complimentary interests."
To achieve this, Kissinger envisions the creation of a Pacific Community, to which the US, China, and other Pacific nations belong and in which they all have a vested interest.
This is a brilliant book, full of detail, but highly readable. Henry Kissinger's work to open up, develop, and maintain ties to the Chinese government over the last century will stand as one of the greatest acts of diplomacy in human history. Readers and historians are fortunate that he has been able to lay out for posterity the details of his role, philosophy, and accomplishments.
May 6, 2014
"On China" is authoritative, scholarly and dull.
Kissinger puts us on the Chinese History Interstate Highway beginning more than two millennia ago. We travel in fifth gear from the time of Confucius, the purpose of which is to give us China's position in the world from a Chinese person's point of view, and get off at the beginning of the nineteenth century. We then travel through that century, in stop-and-go traffic, as Great Britain attempts to take China over in somewhat the same fashion as it took over India. That last dynasty is on its last legs when we enter a black hole.
We come out of the black hole in the late 1940's. Sun Yat Sen? Japanese occupation? The People's Liberation Army has driven Chiang Kai-shek off the mainland and Mao Zedong is in charge and we travel through the next part of the story in a comfortable second gear.
From that point on, the book is about China's leaders rather than about China and that's why it is so dull. It could have been entitled "On Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping" It is all about how those three managed relationships with countries on their borders -- the Soviet Union, Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, with honorable mention to India and Japan -- and took advantage of the Cold War to enlist the help of the United States.
We then travel in third gear from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Deng's retirement to the present. That's it.
So, if that's what you care to read about, go ahead.
Kissinger puts us on the Chinese History Interstate Highway beginning more than two millennia ago. We travel in fifth gear from the time of Confucius, the purpose of which is to give us China's position in the world from a Chinese person's point of view, and get off at the beginning of the nineteenth century. We then travel through that century, in stop-and-go traffic, as Great Britain attempts to take China over in somewhat the same fashion as it took over India. That last dynasty is on its last legs when we enter a black hole.
We come out of the black hole in the late 1940's. Sun Yat Sen? Japanese occupation? The People's Liberation Army has driven Chiang Kai-shek off the mainland and Mao Zedong is in charge and we travel through the next part of the story in a comfortable second gear.
From that point on, the book is about China's leaders rather than about China and that's why it is so dull. It could have been entitled "On Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping" It is all about how those three managed relationships with countries on their borders -- the Soviet Union, Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, with honorable mention to India and Japan -- and took advantage of the Cold War to enlist the help of the United States.
We then travel in third gear from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Deng's retirement to the present. That's it.
So, if that's what you care to read about, go ahead.
February 28, 2012
First of all, I should probably say that I didn't finish the last hundred pages or so of this book. To be honest, I got bored. I loved that this book started out with a healthy dose of Chinese history, but I wasn't too keen on Kissinger's analysis of...well, anything. Don't get me wrong, I love the Analects as much as the next girl, but Kissinger's attempts to explain modern China using the game of "wei qi" and a handful of Confucuis' teachings did not have me convinced that Kissinger was doing anything but grasping at straws.
And once the book moved into post-1940s China, Kissinger started to wave the apologist flag, and I started to roll my eyes. Yes, Chinese culture is vastly different than our own. But I have no tolerance for the type of beefed-up cultural relativism that says the global community has to stay silent in the face of egregious human rights abuses just because conceptions of good governance differ across states.
Bottom Line: This book is extremely long, especially for being so thoroughly unentertaining. If you want to learn about Chinese history, read something by Jonathan Spence. If you want a feel for the social and political issues affecting modern China, read Out of Mao's Shadow by Philip Pan.
And once the book moved into post-1940s China, Kissinger started to wave the apologist flag, and I started to roll my eyes. Yes, Chinese culture is vastly different than our own. But I have no tolerance for the type of beefed-up cultural relativism that says the global community has to stay silent in the face of egregious human rights abuses just because conceptions of good governance differ across states.
Bottom Line: This book is extremely long, especially for being so thoroughly unentertaining. If you want to learn about Chinese history, read something by Jonathan Spence. If you want a feel for the social and political issues affecting modern China, read Out of Mao's Shadow by Philip Pan.
November 8, 2015
Wow. I had always known the name Henry Kissinger but wasn't intimately familiar with his work in the State department or what the general view of his legacy was until started doing some research ahead of reading 'On China', with him clearly being a controversial figure for his embodiment of 'realpolitik'. I will also caveat that I haven't studied Chinese history in too much depth so don't have many other perspectives to compare this against.
All that said, this book is incredible. Kissinger's command of the material, the history of China going back to the first formation of the Chinese state two millenia ago up through the Obama administration, is unbelievable. This book reads like a novel - it is a total page turner and is narrated so seamlessly that it sounds like someone simply recalling personal anecdotes throughout the whole book (which, incredibly, for a lot of the foundational events of China - U.S. relations covered in this book, largely are for Kissinger). Regardless of anyone's personal view on Kissinger, he clearly has a brilliant mind and conveys the incredible depth and complexity of the questions he and other statesman struggled with in the post-World War II world and how to best navigate that world. Kissinger clearly was a central player in the initiation and development of U.S. - China relations and his personal perspective of the meetings and conversations that helped open these relations for the first time are incredibly insightful.
And what a rich history for China. Again, I knew high level Chinese history from high school but this is an incredible overview not only of the facts of history but the common themes and what ties everything together. The evolution of two millenia of a closed, Confucian society first meeting the European / developed world in the 1800's and then the two centuries that followed - fighting colonial powers, tearing their society forward with the Cultural Revolution and an attempt to reject traditional Confucian values seen as driving China's weakness and vulnerability to colonial powers, wrestling with Communist ideology, and finally emerging as a power in the modern world, is absolutely fascinating.
I did not previously fully understand China's historical world view as the center of civilization (as the 'Middle Kingdom') and the implications that had on their interactions with foreigners. They also have the longest continuous social history on the planet, with a language that dates back thousands of years, which frames their long-term view and approach to current events, with current / recent behavior reflecting long-term history and trends much more so than we typically think of in the U.S. I didn't realize the extent to which China's historical perspective over centuries has been to be very self-reliant and that this largely shapes their perspective as they have entered the modern world over the last 60 years. China has never really pursued any form of territorial advancement (beyond their massive historical reaches), which helps frame their view of the Europeans when they showed up to 'break down the doors' to enter China in the 1800's and their interactions with foreign states since.
All in all, I would say this is a must read for anyone trying to understand China's 'rise' and how China will likely impact the modern world. Kissinger very articulately frames the key questions that will impact China's development, which in turn will have an outsized impact on the U.S.'s continued development and on their role in the world.
All that said, this book is incredible. Kissinger's command of the material, the history of China going back to the first formation of the Chinese state two millenia ago up through the Obama administration, is unbelievable. This book reads like a novel - it is a total page turner and is narrated so seamlessly that it sounds like someone simply recalling personal anecdotes throughout the whole book (which, incredibly, for a lot of the foundational events of China - U.S. relations covered in this book, largely are for Kissinger). Regardless of anyone's personal view on Kissinger, he clearly has a brilliant mind and conveys the incredible depth and complexity of the questions he and other statesman struggled with in the post-World War II world and how to best navigate that world. Kissinger clearly was a central player in the initiation and development of U.S. - China relations and his personal perspective of the meetings and conversations that helped open these relations for the first time are incredibly insightful.
And what a rich history for China. Again, I knew high level Chinese history from high school but this is an incredible overview not only of the facts of history but the common themes and what ties everything together. The evolution of two millenia of a closed, Confucian society first meeting the European / developed world in the 1800's and then the two centuries that followed - fighting colonial powers, tearing their society forward with the Cultural Revolution and an attempt to reject traditional Confucian values seen as driving China's weakness and vulnerability to colonial powers, wrestling with Communist ideology, and finally emerging as a power in the modern world, is absolutely fascinating.
I did not previously fully understand China's historical world view as the center of civilization (as the 'Middle Kingdom') and the implications that had on their interactions with foreigners. They also have the longest continuous social history on the planet, with a language that dates back thousands of years, which frames their long-term view and approach to current events, with current / recent behavior reflecting long-term history and trends much more so than we typically think of in the U.S. I didn't realize the extent to which China's historical perspective over centuries has been to be very self-reliant and that this largely shapes their perspective as they have entered the modern world over the last 60 years. China has never really pursued any form of territorial advancement (beyond their massive historical reaches), which helps frame their view of the Europeans when they showed up to 'break down the doors' to enter China in the 1800's and their interactions with foreign states since.
All in all, I would say this is a must read for anyone trying to understand China's 'rise' and how China will likely impact the modern world. Kissinger very articulately frames the key questions that will impact China's development, which in turn will have an outsized impact on the U.S.'s continued development and on their role in the world.
May 10, 2023
Despre China apare în 2011 și este scrisă în același stil cu Diplomația, din 1994; ar putea fi considerată chiar o continuare. Astfel că autorul pornește să descrie China prin prisma istoriei sale multimilenare, a imperiului în jurul căruia vecinii gravitau acceptându-i forța, iar inamicii se transformau la rândul lor conform tradițiilor chinezești. Imperiul și împăratul au devenit mult prea centrați pe sine și au neglijat restul lumii; tot universul era centrat în jurul împaratului, el „este o figură de importanță universală, care domneste peste Toate Câte Sunt Sub Cer”, și „China era civilizația însăși”.
Îmbătați de propriile tradiții, chinezii n-au luat parte la progresul care se petrecea în paralel în celelalte părți ale lumii, și când, spre sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea, civilizația europeană a ajuns ferm în imperiu, acesta a suferit de-a lungul secolului următor un șoc urmat de-o implozie a sistemului ierarhic tradițional mai ales când alte civilizații ale orientului au intrat în contact cu occidentul dezvoltat și au început să micșoreze decalajul tehnologic.
Următoarea etapă pe care Kissinger o dezvoltă este China post-revoluționară. China lui Mao Zedong este o țară plină de contradicții, chiar mai accentuate decât fusese Rusia bolșevică după revoluție. Mao este distrugătorul tradițiilor și totodată urmașul lor direct. Pe plan intern, programul lui Mao, de transformare fundamentală a civilizației chineze, conduce la momente de anarhie sângeroasă; pe plan internațional situația nu este mai pașnică. Noul imperiu comunist, devenit așa în 1949 după războiul civil purtat de comuniști împotriva naționaliștilor lui Chiang Kai-shek, se găsește în strânsoarea a altor două imperii cu tradiții bogate de forță: fratele ideologic de la nord-est, URSS și inamicul tradițional la vest, Statele Unite ale Americii.
Între cele două forțe, Mao va încerca să-și păstreze independența deplină refuzând o înfrățire deplină cu prietenul ideologic. Antitradiționalistul Mao va folosi din plin tradiția străveche chineză de a rămâne centrat pe identitatea străveche chineză și chiar și-n cele mai tulburi momente, va păstra o distanță ostilă și față de prietenul ideologic erijându-se chiar în liderul ideologic al lumii comuniste considerând că Rusia după Stalin intrase într-o epocă a revizionismului.
Conflictele repetate cu America (războiul Coreean și apoi cele două crize din Strâmtoarea Taiwan) și cu un stat asiatic prezentat ca o alternativă asiatică la comunism, India (conflictul sino-indian din 1962), a marcat și-o distanțare a Chinei față de Uniunea Sovietică; animozitatea istorică cauzată de pretențiile teritoriale ale rușilor asupra unor zone din nordul țării și a unor porturi i se mai adăuga și respingerea de către Mao a politicii sovieticii de conviețuire pașnică dintre sistemul comunist și cel capitalist. Dar China a reușit să se îndepărteze de toată lumea, singura țară cu care mai avea relații amiabile fiind Albania.
În anii 60, Mao ajunsese să înțeleagă că politica de sfidare și izolare a țării deveneau pericole reale pentru ea însăși — Marele Salt Înainte și Revoluția Culturală secătuiseră societatea chineză, o adusese în pragul colapsului — : „De-a lungul granițelor sale întinse, China avea de-a face cu: Uniunea Sovietică ca posibil adversar; India umilită; o prezență americană masivă în Vietnam și escaladarea războiului de acolo; guverne autoproclamate din exil — cel de la Taipei și cel stabilit în enclava tibetană din nordul Indiei; Japonia — un oponent istoric; în fine, de cealaltă parte a Pacificului, o Americă ce privea China ca pe un adversar inflexibil”. China rămânea protejată doar de seria de rivalități dintre aceste țări care le împiedicau să se ralieze împotriva ei.
Mao devenise conștient de pericolul dușmanilor din apropiere și a pus în practică un vechi îndemn negociind cu dușmanul din depărtare: „să negociezi cu țările aflate la mare distanță și să te lupți cu cele aflate în apropiere”. A profitat discret de demersul președintelui american Nixon, din ianuarie 1969, pentru a schimba publicului vechea paradigmă belicoasă la adresa Americii. Din 1967 Nixon manifesta un interes față de China astfel încât ea să nu rămână izolată de familia națiunilor. Chinezii s-au raportat tot timpul la sovietici; un atac sovietic împotriva țării n-a fost exclus niciodată. Trupele sovietice masate la graniță erau destul de convingătoare. Animozitățile dintre cele două state au înclinat în cele din urmă balanța spre o cooperare cu Statele Unite — America ar fi protejat China în cazul unui atac sovietic pentru că s-ar fi temut ca în urma unei victorii sovietice, imperiul comunist nou format ar fi fost copleșitor militar și economic blocului occidental. Nixon a înaintat teza, în 1969 că „Uniunea Sovietică reprezenta tăbăra cea mai periculoasă și ar fi împotriva intereselor americane dacă China ar fi zdrobită într-un război sino-sovietic”. În cazul unui război între cele două țări, America adopta neutralitatea însă înclina cât de mult posibil spre China.
Aici, Kissinger intervine cu experiența sa directă, fiind consilier pentru securitatea națională și devenind secretar de stat în administrația Nixon. Expunerea devine pe alocuri captivantă asemeni unui film politic despre conspirații globale. În vara lui 1969 forțele rusești se confruntă cu cele chineze pe răul Ussuri; ambasadorul Rusiei se plânge lui Kissinger că rușii ar fi fost atacați. Raportul ulterior consideră că rusia ar fi fost agresoarea. În realitate chinezii au stârnit lupta aprigă.
Începutul relațiilor dintre China și Statele Unite, marcat de anul 1971, este expus de Kissinger cu o atenție remarcabilă față de detaliile subtile ale diplomației celor două țări. În capitolul "Reluarea relațiilor: primele întâlniri cu Mao și Zhou" avem prezentat stilul diplomatic chinezesc în contact cu trimișii Casei Albe. Kissinger și echipa lui pregătesc în secret întâlnirea la nivel înalt dintre Mao și Nixon.
După douăzeci de ani de animozități, americanii iau contact cu o cultură diplomatică distinctă de cea obișnuită, a altor țări comuniste; aceasta datorită amenințării sovietice de la granița de nord a Chinei. Rezultatul amenințării a conturat începutul unei cooperări sporite șino-americane "acolo unde interesele se întâlneau" diminuând totodată diferențele inerente celor două sisteme. Cu toate acestea nu se întrevedea o pace permanentă, ci doar o reconfigurare a echilibrului global având ca urmare o posibilă armonizare a valorilor; ambele tabere își urmăreau interesele proprii și se foloseau una de cealaltă vis a vis de Moscova.
Față de monografia precedentă, Diplomația, cartea de față expune mai bine o strategie diplomatică; aici reiese mai ușor stilul diplomației, percepția mai bună asupra agenților aflați în negocieri. În Diplomația, Kissinger acoperă o perioadă mai mare de timp și o serie lungă de agenți istorici aflați într-o dinamică complexă. În cartea de față, China este actorul din prim plan și perioada temporală e mai scurtă. Prin urmare, atenția focalizată în direcția acesta prezintă mai multe detalii, multe trecute prin filtrul experienței proprii.
Un alt aspect deosebit de interesant al lucrării este că prezintă optica americană de echilibru de putere în plin război rece. Apropierea dintre americani și chinezi nu a rezolvat fobiile chinezilor. Scopul lor ancestral era de a stârni pe barbari unii împotriva celorlalți ca să fie dominați în cele din urmă. Dacă America se folosea de China pentru a doborî Uniunea Sovietică? Astfel că Mao a mers dincolo de strategia americană. Dacă scopul americanilor era de fapt scoaterea tăciunilor încinși rusești cu mână chinezească? Kissinger și administrația Nixon nu se gândeau la așa ceva.
Dar Kissinger nu consideră frica lui Mao neîntemeiată. "Era o strategie pe care Statele Unite puteau, teoretic, s-o adopte. Tot ce lipsea era un lider care să o elaboreze sau un public care s-o sprijine. Manipulările abstracte pe care le-ar fi presupus nu erau posibile în Statele Unite, și nici dezirabile; politica externă americană nu se poate baza niciodată doar pe politica de putere". Dar ideea de bază, a securității proprii, nu ar fi exclus o astfel de tactică. "Dar Washington nu putea ceda unei țări — oricât de importantă — dreptul de a hotărî tactica prin care înțelegea să-și garanteze securitatea".
Dar provocările dinamicii globale au făcut ca cele două tabere să sufere tensiuni între momente de cooperare. Odată cu căderea Uniunii Sovietice și, mai înainte, cu evenimentele din piața Tienanmen, din 1989, relațiile sino-americane au suferit schimbări. Reformele inițiate de Deng Xiaoping au dat aripi economiei chineze. Următorii conducători ai Chinei au amplificat progresul. China, după aproape două sute de ani, a redevenit o forță în regiune.
În finalul cărții, Kissinger întreprinde o analiză a situației în care, în ciuda asigurărilor chinezilor de a-și păstra nivelul de evoluție economică în parametrii pașnici, fără pretenții de dominare globală, ar putea, la un moment dat, să facă pași violenți spre eliminarea Americii din regiunea Pacificului și să înceapă să controleze regiunea din postura de hegemon.
Îmbătați de propriile tradiții, chinezii n-au luat parte la progresul care se petrecea în paralel în celelalte părți ale lumii, și când, spre sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea, civilizația europeană a ajuns ferm în imperiu, acesta a suferit de-a lungul secolului următor un șoc urmat de-o implozie a sistemului ierarhic tradițional mai ales când alte civilizații ale orientului au intrat în contact cu occidentul dezvoltat și au început să micșoreze decalajul tehnologic.
Următoarea etapă pe care Kissinger o dezvoltă este China post-revoluționară. China lui Mao Zedong este o țară plină de contradicții, chiar mai accentuate decât fusese Rusia bolșevică după revoluție. Mao este distrugătorul tradițiilor și totodată urmașul lor direct. Pe plan intern, programul lui Mao, de transformare fundamentală a civilizației chineze, conduce la momente de anarhie sângeroasă; pe plan internațional situația nu este mai pașnică. Noul imperiu comunist, devenit așa în 1949 după războiul civil purtat de comuniști împotriva naționaliștilor lui Chiang Kai-shek, se găsește în strânsoarea a altor două imperii cu tradiții bogate de forță: fratele ideologic de la nord-est, URSS și inamicul tradițional la vest, Statele Unite ale Americii.
Între cele două forțe, Mao va încerca să-și păstreze independența deplină refuzând o înfrățire deplină cu prietenul ideologic. Antitradiționalistul Mao va folosi din plin tradiția străveche chineză de a rămâne centrat pe identitatea străveche chineză și chiar și-n cele mai tulburi momente, va păstra o distanță ostilă și față de prietenul ideologic erijându-se chiar în liderul ideologic al lumii comuniste considerând că Rusia după Stalin intrase într-o epocă a revizionismului.
Conflictele repetate cu America (războiul Coreean și apoi cele două crize din Strâmtoarea Taiwan) și cu un stat asiatic prezentat ca o alternativă asiatică la comunism, India (conflictul sino-indian din 1962), a marcat și-o distanțare a Chinei față de Uniunea Sovietică; animozitatea istorică cauzată de pretențiile teritoriale ale rușilor asupra unor zone din nordul țării și a unor porturi i se mai adăuga și respingerea de către Mao a politicii sovieticii de conviețuire pașnică dintre sistemul comunist și cel capitalist. Dar China a reușit să se îndepărteze de toată lumea, singura țară cu care mai avea relații amiabile fiind Albania.
În anii 60, Mao ajunsese să înțeleagă că politica de sfidare și izolare a țării deveneau pericole reale pentru ea însăși — Marele Salt Înainte și Revoluția Culturală secătuiseră societatea chineză, o adusese în pragul colapsului — : „De-a lungul granițelor sale întinse, China avea de-a face cu: Uniunea Sovietică ca posibil adversar; India umilită; o prezență americană masivă în Vietnam și escaladarea războiului de acolo; guverne autoproclamate din exil — cel de la Taipei și cel stabilit în enclava tibetană din nordul Indiei; Japonia — un oponent istoric; în fine, de cealaltă parte a Pacificului, o Americă ce privea China ca pe un adversar inflexibil”. China rămânea protejată doar de seria de rivalități dintre aceste țări care le împiedicau să se ralieze împotriva ei.
Mao devenise conștient de pericolul dușmanilor din apropiere și a pus în practică un vechi îndemn negociind cu dușmanul din depărtare: „să negociezi cu țările aflate la mare distanță și să te lupți cu cele aflate în apropiere”. A profitat discret de demersul președintelui american Nixon, din ianuarie 1969, pentru a schimba publicului vechea paradigmă belicoasă la adresa Americii. Din 1967 Nixon manifesta un interes față de China astfel încât ea să nu rămână izolată de familia națiunilor. Chinezii s-au raportat tot timpul la sovietici; un atac sovietic împotriva țării n-a fost exclus niciodată. Trupele sovietice masate la graniță erau destul de convingătoare. Animozitățile dintre cele două state au înclinat în cele din urmă balanța spre o cooperare cu Statele Unite — America ar fi protejat China în cazul unui atac sovietic pentru că s-ar fi temut ca în urma unei victorii sovietice, imperiul comunist nou format ar fi fost copleșitor militar și economic blocului occidental. Nixon a înaintat teza, în 1969 că „Uniunea Sovietică reprezenta tăbăra cea mai periculoasă și ar fi împotriva intereselor americane dacă China ar fi zdrobită într-un război sino-sovietic”. În cazul unui război între cele două țări, America adopta neutralitatea însă înclina cât de mult posibil spre China.
Aici, Kissinger intervine cu experiența sa directă, fiind consilier pentru securitatea națională și devenind secretar de stat în administrația Nixon. Expunerea devine pe alocuri captivantă asemeni unui film politic despre conspirații globale. În vara lui 1969 forțele rusești se confruntă cu cele chineze pe răul Ussuri; ambasadorul Rusiei se plânge lui Kissinger că rușii ar fi fost atacați. Raportul ulterior consideră că rusia ar fi fost agresoarea. În realitate chinezii au stârnit lupta aprigă.
Începutul relațiilor dintre China și Statele Unite, marcat de anul 1971, este expus de Kissinger cu o atenție remarcabilă față de detaliile subtile ale diplomației celor două țări. În capitolul "Reluarea relațiilor: primele întâlniri cu Mao și Zhou" avem prezentat stilul diplomatic chinezesc în contact cu trimișii Casei Albe. Kissinger și echipa lui pregătesc în secret întâlnirea la nivel înalt dintre Mao și Nixon.
După douăzeci de ani de animozități, americanii iau contact cu o cultură diplomatică distinctă de cea obișnuită, a altor țări comuniste; aceasta datorită amenințării sovietice de la granița de nord a Chinei. Rezultatul amenințării a conturat începutul unei cooperări sporite șino-americane "acolo unde interesele se întâlneau" diminuând totodată diferențele inerente celor două sisteme. Cu toate acestea nu se întrevedea o pace permanentă, ci doar o reconfigurare a echilibrului global având ca urmare o posibilă armonizare a valorilor; ambele tabere își urmăreau interesele proprii și se foloseau una de cealaltă vis a vis de Moscova.
Față de monografia precedentă, Diplomația, cartea de față expune mai bine o strategie diplomatică; aici reiese mai ușor stilul diplomației, percepția mai bună asupra agenților aflați în negocieri. În Diplomația, Kissinger acoperă o perioadă mai mare de timp și o serie lungă de agenți istorici aflați într-o dinamică complexă. În cartea de față, China este actorul din prim plan și perioada temporală e mai scurtă. Prin urmare, atenția focalizată în direcția acesta prezintă mai multe detalii, multe trecute prin filtrul experienței proprii.
Un alt aspect deosebit de interesant al lucrării este că prezintă optica americană de echilibru de putere în plin război rece. Apropierea dintre americani și chinezi nu a rezolvat fobiile chinezilor. Scopul lor ancestral era de a stârni pe barbari unii împotriva celorlalți ca să fie dominați în cele din urmă. Dacă America se folosea de China pentru a doborî Uniunea Sovietică? Astfel că Mao a mers dincolo de strategia americană. Dacă scopul americanilor era de fapt scoaterea tăciunilor încinși rusești cu mână chinezească? Kissinger și administrația Nixon nu se gândeau la așa ceva.
Dar Kissinger nu consideră frica lui Mao neîntemeiată. "Era o strategie pe care Statele Unite puteau, teoretic, s-o adopte. Tot ce lipsea era un lider care să o elaboreze sau un public care s-o sprijine. Manipulările abstracte pe care le-ar fi presupus nu erau posibile în Statele Unite, și nici dezirabile; politica externă americană nu se poate baza niciodată doar pe politica de putere". Dar ideea de bază, a securității proprii, nu ar fi exclus o astfel de tactică. "Dar Washington nu putea ceda unei țări — oricât de importantă — dreptul de a hotărî tactica prin care înțelegea să-și garanteze securitatea".
Dar provocările dinamicii globale au făcut ca cele două tabere să sufere tensiuni între momente de cooperare. Odată cu căderea Uniunii Sovietice și, mai înainte, cu evenimentele din piața Tienanmen, din 1989, relațiile sino-americane au suferit schimbări. Reformele inițiate de Deng Xiaoping au dat aripi economiei chineze. Următorii conducători ai Chinei au amplificat progresul. China, după aproape două sute de ani, a redevenit o forță în regiune.
În finalul cărții, Kissinger întreprinde o analiză a situației în care, în ciuda asigurărilor chinezilor de a-și păstra nivelul de evoluție economică în parametrii pașnici, fără pretenții de dominare globală, ar putea, la un moment dat, să facă pași violenți spre eliminarea Americii din regiunea Pacificului și să înceapă să controleze regiunea din postura de hegemon.
September 14, 2013
It is a bit difficult to begin my review with 'I thought ...' for this aptly recently-released non-fiction published in 2012. Instead, I would think this highly informative book on historical, cultural and political China, one of the large countries in Asia in terms of its size and population, written by one of the great American diplomats in the 20th century should be a must for those interested in this amazingly magnificent country in the Pacific Rim; its history itself has dated back since some 3,000 years ago as evidenced by some ancient Chinese characters on the turtoise shell excavated and discovered some years ago. As far as I recall, in 1970's China was the most populous country in the world later confirmed by its 1982 population census exceeding 1 billion people (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_po...) while India followed with its 400 million; however, since some few years ago India has become the second populous country with its 1 billion.
Written brilliantly and scholarly with intensive analyses and innumerable references, this paperback would be worth reading presently as well as in the years to come since the author, Dr Henry Kissinger, was an international key man who famously worked with President Richard M. Nixon and his staff to surprise the world by arranging the unthinkable meeting between Chairman Mao and President Nixon in 1972 amidst the stifling Cold War and has long since been a formidable authority on Sino-American relations; moreover, he "is currently chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm". (p. iii)
As for those unfamiliar with this book, I would like to present its panoramic view by listing all 18 chapter titles preceded by a number denoting its chapter as follows: 1: The Singularity of China 2: The Kowtow Question and the Opium War 3: From Preeminence to Decline 4: Mao's Continuous Revolution 5: Triangular Diplomacy and the Korean War 6: China Confronts Both Superpowers 7: A Decade of Crises 8: The Road to Reconciliation 9: Resumption of Relations: First Encounters with Mao and Zhou 10: The Quasi-Alliance: Conversations with Mao 11: The End of the Mao Era 12: The Indestructible Deng 13: "Touching the Tiger's Buttocks": The Third Vietnam War 14: Reagan and the Advent of Normalcy 15: Tiananmen 16: What Kind of Reform? Deng's Southern Power 17: A Roller Coaster Ride Toward Another Reconciliation: The Jiang Zemin Era 18: The New Millennium
Written brilliantly and scholarly with intensive analyses and innumerable references, this paperback would be worth reading presently as well as in the years to come since the author, Dr Henry Kissinger, was an international key man who famously worked with President Richard M. Nixon and his staff to surprise the world by arranging the unthinkable meeting between Chairman Mao and President Nixon in 1972 amidst the stifling Cold War and has long since been a formidable authority on Sino-American relations; moreover, he "is currently chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm". (p. iii)
As for those unfamiliar with this book, I would like to present its panoramic view by listing all 18 chapter titles preceded by a number denoting its chapter as follows: 1: The Singularity of China 2: The Kowtow Question and the Opium War 3: From Preeminence to Decline 4: Mao's Continuous Revolution 5: Triangular Diplomacy and the Korean War 6: China Confronts Both Superpowers 7: A Decade of Crises 8: The Road to Reconciliation 9: Resumption of Relations: First Encounters with Mao and Zhou 10: The Quasi-Alliance: Conversations with Mao 11: The End of the Mao Era 12: The Indestructible Deng 13: "Touching the Tiger's Buttocks": The Third Vietnam War 14: Reagan and the Advent of Normalcy 15: Tiananmen 16: What Kind of Reform? Deng's Southern Power 17: A Roller Coaster Ride Toward Another Reconciliation: The Jiang Zemin Era 18: The New Millennium
September 13, 2017
خیلی از کیسینجر خوشم نیومد، بااینحال، فکر میکنم ربطی به شخصیتش نداره. بهقول ترجمهی آقای رأسی، احتمالاً «پرنسیب» آدمی دانشگاهی و سیاسی اینطوریه.
کتاب از جنگ تریاک شروع میشه و تا زمان اوباما ادامه پیدا میکنه. بیش از اونکه جزئیات اتفاقات برای نویسنده مهم باشه، روح حاکم بر اتفاقات مهمه. بههمینخاطر، من، که اساساً برای آشنایی مقدماتی با چین این کتاب را خریده بودم، شاید در بعضی از جاها چندان متوجه عمق حرفهای کیسینجر نمیشدم. بااینحال، برای همین آشنایی مقدماتی برای اتفاقات دوران معاصر چین خیلی خوب بود، بهخصوص از این جهت که برخلاف بسیاری از این نوع کتابها که از دوران آدم بنیبشر شروع میکنند و خیلی طول میکشه تا به وقایع معاصر برسند، فقط به همین دویست سال اخیر و مشخصاً به بعد از انقلاب فرهنگی پرداخته است.
این کتاب خواننده را با روح چین آشنا میکنه. خواننده متوجه میشه که چرا چین، علیرغم ابرقدرت بودنش، از نقشآفرینی سیاسی در مسائل بینالمللی سر باز میزنه. با روح حاکم بر چین در دوران پیش از استعمار آشنا میشه، که چندان هم با روح حاکم بر ایران متفاوت نیست. روحیهای که موقع مواجهه با غرب مشخصههاش بیشتر آشکار میشه.
این روزها که چین و هند درگیری مرزی جدیدی داشتند، این روزها که مسالهی میانمار هم بهوجود آمده، جالبه که از دیدگاه چینیها نسبت به منطقهی هندوچین و دیگر مناطق مرزی باخبر بشیم و هنری کیسینجر ما را در این زمینه یاری میکنه.
و از این جور حرفها.
ترجمهاش بدک نیست. شاهکار حتماً نیست. ولی وقتی کتاب دیگهی هنری کیسینجر، به نام «نظم جهانی» را سعی کرده باشید بخونید و از ترجمهی افتضاحش تعجب کرده باشید، قدر این ترجمهی خوب را خواهید دونست. آدم چطور میتونه در ترجمه به مرتبهی عزتالله فولادوند برسه؟
کتاب از جنگ تریاک شروع میشه و تا زمان اوباما ادامه پیدا میکنه. بیش از اونکه جزئیات اتفاقات برای نویسنده مهم باشه، روح حاکم بر اتفاقات مهمه. بههمینخاطر، من، که اساساً برای آشنایی مقدماتی با چین این کتاب را خریده بودم، شاید در بعضی از جاها چندان متوجه عمق حرفهای کیسینجر نمیشدم. بااینحال، برای همین آشنایی مقدماتی برای اتفاقات دوران معاصر چین خیلی خوب بود، بهخصوص از این جهت که برخلاف بسیاری از این نوع کتابها که از دوران آدم بنیبشر شروع میکنند و خیلی طول میکشه تا به وقایع معاصر برسند، فقط به همین دویست سال اخیر و مشخصاً به بعد از انقلاب فرهنگی پرداخته است.
این کتاب خواننده را با روح چین آشنا میکنه. خواننده متوجه میشه که چرا چین، علیرغم ابرقدرت بودنش، از نقشآفرینی سیاسی در مسائل بینالمللی سر باز میزنه. با روح حاکم بر چین در دوران پیش از استعمار آشنا میشه، که چندان هم با روح حاکم بر ایران متفاوت نیست. روحیهای که موقع مواجهه با غرب مشخصههاش بیشتر آشکار میشه.
این روزها که چین و هند درگیری مرزی جدیدی داشتند، این روزها که مسالهی میانمار هم بهوجود آمده، جالبه که از دیدگاه چینیها نسبت به منطقهی هندوچین و دیگر مناطق مرزی باخبر بشیم و هنری کیسینجر ما را در این زمینه یاری میکنه.
و از این جور حرفها.
ترجمهاش بدک نیست. شاهکار حتماً نیست. ولی وقتی کتاب دیگهی هنری کیسینجر، به نام «نظم جهانی» را سعی کرده باشید بخونید و از ترجمهی افتضاحش تعجب کرده باشید، قدر این ترجمهی خوب را خواهید دونست. آدم چطور میتونه در ترجمه به مرتبهی عزتالله فولادوند برسه؟
November 16, 2017
Аз тепърва ще продължа да се занимавам с тази книга, но във всеки случай - по-приятна ми е от "Дипломацията", както и по-интересна, може би задето "За Китай" се отнася до места, които пряко ме интересуват в момента.
November 16, 2023
Book 20 of 2023
Regardless of one’s thoughts on Kissinger—and I view him primarily as a blight on American history who made disastrous decisions in Cambodia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Chile, etc…—this was a fascinating book. Primarily, it’s about foreign policy and the Sino-American relationship. Kissinger explains what he believes to be Chinese foreign policy rationale, and lays out American foreign policy as it relates to China. I suppose that should be obvious, given that it was written by one of the most important diplomats in American history. Sometimes his description of American foreign policy is more speculative, primarily later in the book when he argues for the creation of a Pacific Community and discusses the challenges that might hamper that endeavor. For the most part, though, the American rationale behind dealing with China can be clearly understood because Kissinger was the architect of it.
He puts forth his ideas on how Chinese statecraft differs from that of America, using the board game Wei Qi as an analogy for how China has historically conceived of its relationship with other powers. He spent the most time in China’s Maoist period, noting that although Mao was publicly anti-intellectual his foreign policy drew more from China’s history than his public persona would let on—invoking historic Chinese practice of playing the barbarians off of each other, for instance.
One, of course, has to consider the author of the book when reviewing it. Henry Kissinger is generally self-important and does tend to speculate on the underlying motivations of the leaders he speaks to. That being said, he also spoke to all these leaders—Mao, Zhou, Deng, Jiang, Hu—and so he has a unique insight into China’s perspective that is important to study, in my opinion. The most fascinating aspect of these dialogues to me was the direct transcript of the conversation between Kissinger and these various statesmen. He goes to great lengths to contextualize and understand the Chinese point of view as well as to lay out the American one.
Important to note is Kissinger’s view of the world, because it informs his analysis. He is a “realist” when it comes to geopolitical issues. What that means is that American political, economic, and military interests are paramount when it comes to foreign affairs, and anything else is secondary. Of course, national interests are always going to be the concern of a nation, but the distinction with Kissinger is that he believes in reaching foreign policy agreements that do not hinge on disagreements over domestic issues like human rights. He posits this is the way that diplomacy has to be approached—that domestic politics and foreign diplomacy have to be separated, especially when dealing with China, which has the longest history of any country in the world, is exceptionally proud, and is not receptive to what it sees as western bullying. His diagnosis of the potential problems and solutions facing the two countries is based on this view.
His final analysis hinges on the inevitability of a bipolar world order, beholden to the interests of the United States and China in which smaller states (in the Pacific region) are compelled to play the two superpowers off of each other. He puts forth several ideas as to how the two can maintain cordial relations with one another, but leaves out a key component of the equation I think the U.S.-China relationship hinges on, today more than ever: Taiwan.
Of course, he discusses Taiwan throughout the book extensively, but he fails to bring it up in the final prescription. Taiwan is, of course, the most intractable issue between the two countries. The problem, as I see it, is that the United States policy of strategic ambiguity is ultimately doomed to fail. We continue to kick this can down the road, but someone will have to deal with it at some point. Over decades of revolution, reform, and development, the Chinese position on Taiwan has remained crystal clear—that being that the island is part of China and the leadership of the party does not necessarily rule out the use of force to reunify the two. If there is to be a major conflict between the United States and China (in the near future), Taiwan is almost certain to be the cause for it. I would have liked to see some sort of strategic analysis of the Taiwan issue at the end of the book, though perhaps Kissinger views the strategic ambiguity policy as viable for the foreseeable future.
Overall, I found this book interesting. Kissinger is historically the most important American envoy to China and so it’s necessary to understand his perspective on Sino-U.S. relations to better understand the situation as it stands today. Of course, he has a very specific interpretation of history and strongly held views on geopolitics, so he should not be treated as THE source on the relationship between America and China, especially now that the world has moved past him. Anyway, enough with the disclaimers. Interesting book. Worth a read.
Regardless of one’s thoughts on Kissinger—and I view him primarily as a blight on American history who made disastrous decisions in Cambodia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Chile, etc…—this was a fascinating book. Primarily, it’s about foreign policy and the Sino-American relationship. Kissinger explains what he believes to be Chinese foreign policy rationale, and lays out American foreign policy as it relates to China. I suppose that should be obvious, given that it was written by one of the most important diplomats in American history. Sometimes his description of American foreign policy is more speculative, primarily later in the book when he argues for the creation of a Pacific Community and discusses the challenges that might hamper that endeavor. For the most part, though, the American rationale behind dealing with China can be clearly understood because Kissinger was the architect of it.
He puts forth his ideas on how Chinese statecraft differs from that of America, using the board game Wei Qi as an analogy for how China has historically conceived of its relationship with other powers. He spent the most time in China’s Maoist period, noting that although Mao was publicly anti-intellectual his foreign policy drew more from China’s history than his public persona would let on—invoking historic Chinese practice of playing the barbarians off of each other, for instance.
One, of course, has to consider the author of the book when reviewing it. Henry Kissinger is generally self-important and does tend to speculate on the underlying motivations of the leaders he speaks to. That being said, he also spoke to all these leaders—Mao, Zhou, Deng, Jiang, Hu—and so he has a unique insight into China’s perspective that is important to study, in my opinion. The most fascinating aspect of these dialogues to me was the direct transcript of the conversation between Kissinger and these various statesmen. He goes to great lengths to contextualize and understand the Chinese point of view as well as to lay out the American one.
Important to note is Kissinger’s view of the world, because it informs his analysis. He is a “realist” when it comes to geopolitical issues. What that means is that American political, economic, and military interests are paramount when it comes to foreign affairs, and anything else is secondary. Of course, national interests are always going to be the concern of a nation, but the distinction with Kissinger is that he believes in reaching foreign policy agreements that do not hinge on disagreements over domestic issues like human rights. He posits this is the way that diplomacy has to be approached—that domestic politics and foreign diplomacy have to be separated, especially when dealing with China, which has the longest history of any country in the world, is exceptionally proud, and is not receptive to what it sees as western bullying. His diagnosis of the potential problems and solutions facing the two countries is based on this view.
His final analysis hinges on the inevitability of a bipolar world order, beholden to the interests of the United States and China in which smaller states (in the Pacific region) are compelled to play the two superpowers off of each other. He puts forth several ideas as to how the two can maintain cordial relations with one another, but leaves out a key component of the equation I think the U.S.-China relationship hinges on, today more than ever: Taiwan.
Of course, he discusses Taiwan throughout the book extensively, but he fails to bring it up in the final prescription. Taiwan is, of course, the most intractable issue between the two countries. The problem, as I see it, is that the United States policy of strategic ambiguity is ultimately doomed to fail. We continue to kick this can down the road, but someone will have to deal with it at some point. Over decades of revolution, reform, and development, the Chinese position on Taiwan has remained crystal clear—that being that the island is part of China and the leadership of the party does not necessarily rule out the use of force to reunify the two. If there is to be a major conflict between the United States and China (in the near future), Taiwan is almost certain to be the cause for it. I would have liked to see some sort of strategic analysis of the Taiwan issue at the end of the book, though perhaps Kissinger views the strategic ambiguity policy as viable for the foreseeable future.
Overall, I found this book interesting. Kissinger is historically the most important American envoy to China and so it’s necessary to understand his perspective on Sino-U.S. relations to better understand the situation as it stands today. Of course, he has a very specific interpretation of history and strongly held views on geopolitics, so he should not be treated as THE source on the relationship between America and China, especially now that the world has moved past him. Anyway, enough with the disclaimers. Interesting book. Worth a read.
August 30, 2023
My readings on China have continously referenced or recommended Henry Kissinger's book "On China" and I finally caved. Let me start by stating that Dr. Kissinger was brilliant. Period. No qualifiers needed. Despite any agreement or disagree in policy or philosophy, his intellectual capacity and equally deep amd broad understanding of world events shines through his book.
His understanding of Chinese history, the cultural and poltical contexts, and the personalities surrounding China in the 1960s-1990s is unrivaled in any western book I've read to-date. It was so fascinating to hear from a man who was in the room during these negotiations, a confidant of multiple presidents spanning parties and decades, on why certain policies were approached the way they were. He captures the nuances, the fears, the competing and aligned interests alike when he retells how figures like Nixon, Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Carter navigated the geopolitical issues. The book covers the Soviet Union's expansion, the second and third Vietnam war, nuclear weapons, international trade and much more.
If you want to better understand Sino-American foreign policy, you simply cannot afford not to read this book.
His understanding of Chinese history, the cultural and poltical contexts, and the personalities surrounding China in the 1960s-1990s is unrivaled in any western book I've read to-date. It was so fascinating to hear from a man who was in the room during these negotiations, a confidant of multiple presidents spanning parties and decades, on why certain policies were approached the way they were. He captures the nuances, the fears, the competing and aligned interests alike when he retells how figures like Nixon, Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Carter navigated the geopolitical issues. The book covers the Soviet Union's expansion, the second and third Vietnam war, nuclear weapons, international trade and much more.
If you want to better understand Sino-American foreign policy, you simply cannot afford not to read this book.
December 1, 2017
“On China” is a curious mixture of history, geopolitical analysis and self-serving memoir (concentrating mostly on the last two elements). Kissinger reviews some of the highlights of Chinese history; ancient and medieval China is covered quickly and superficially and the material is pretty much standard issue, but the level of detail increases after greatly from the opium war onwards and the book becomes much more interesting at that point. Kissinger makes the case that the Qing bureaucrats, in dire straits thanks to internal revolts, financial crisis and administrative decay, were not completely clueless or apathetic. Faced with determined, ruthless and far more technologically advanced European powers who had already overcome or overawed other great non-Western empires, Qing diplomats did their best to play European powers against one another and try to use (very limited) breathing space to try some fitful reforms, but the court was too far gone and the situation could not be salvaged, which led to 100 years of defeat, disorder, revolutions, famines and other disasters.
Kissinger, having worked with Zhou and Mao and their successors as partners in a world-altering initiative (US-Chinese rapprochement) keeps all criticisms of the CCP rather muted, while constantly highlighting their achievements and what he (enviously) regards as their diplomatic guile, patience and their special oriental “insight”. Given that any other posture would raise questions about how close Kissinger himself became to them and how much he tried to help them, this is not surprising, but it does make his assessments a bit suspect.
Anyhow, the second half of the book is really an account of “China and I”, with Henry popping in to save Mao from the Soviets (a threat that he, and the CCP as a whole) took very, very seriously), help Deng along as he starts China’s transition to capitalism and economic success and smooth over things when something mildly unpleasant like Tienanmen happens. In all, he made more than 50 trips to China, mostly as private citizen and/or unofficial emissary. This is certainly the most interesting part of the book and is full of insider quotes and anecdotes, including one where the Chairman is generously giving Taiwan a 100 years to come back to the motherland and a fawning Kissinger is telling him “it won’t take that long”. The complete amorality of the calculations of the PRC and Henry Kissinger is most obvious in the support both provided to the Khmer Rouge as they carried out their genocide in Kampuchea; Henry spends many pages explaining why this (and the Chinese “chastisement” of Vietnam in a limited punitive invasion) was necessary to prevent Vietnamese domination of South East Asia. Why that would be a core Chinese aims is easy to understand, but why the US should partner with them in this effort is not obvious, though Henry tries to present it as such. After the war, Deng tells K “if we had driven deeper into Vietnam in our punitive action, it would have been even better”. Kissinger: “it could be”!
The book is worth reading for the anecdotes and historical information. The geopolitical explanations are enlightening in that they show how these minds operate, but whether they operate for our benefit or not is an open question.
Kissinger, having worked with Zhou and Mao and their successors as partners in a world-altering initiative (US-Chinese rapprochement) keeps all criticisms of the CCP rather muted, while constantly highlighting their achievements and what he (enviously) regards as their diplomatic guile, patience and their special oriental “insight”. Given that any other posture would raise questions about how close Kissinger himself became to them and how much he tried to help them, this is not surprising, but it does make his assessments a bit suspect.
Anyhow, the second half of the book is really an account of “China and I”, with Henry popping in to save Mao from the Soviets (a threat that he, and the CCP as a whole) took very, very seriously), help Deng along as he starts China’s transition to capitalism and economic success and smooth over things when something mildly unpleasant like Tienanmen happens. In all, he made more than 50 trips to China, mostly as private citizen and/or unofficial emissary. This is certainly the most interesting part of the book and is full of insider quotes and anecdotes, including one where the Chairman is generously giving Taiwan a 100 years to come back to the motherland and a fawning Kissinger is telling him “it won’t take that long”. The complete amorality of the calculations of the PRC and Henry Kissinger is most obvious in the support both provided to the Khmer Rouge as they carried out their genocide in Kampuchea; Henry spends many pages explaining why this (and the Chinese “chastisement” of Vietnam in a limited punitive invasion) was necessary to prevent Vietnamese domination of South East Asia. Why that would be a core Chinese aims is easy to understand, but why the US should partner with them in this effort is not obvious, though Henry tries to present it as such. After the war, Deng tells K “if we had driven deeper into Vietnam in our punitive action, it would have been even better”. Kissinger: “it could be”!
The book is worth reading for the anecdotes and historical information. The geopolitical explanations are enlightening in that they show how these minds operate, but whether they operate for our benefit or not is an open question.
October 28, 2019
The atrocity committed by Mao and his proceeding communist party is well-covered topics by journalists and historians. Henry Kissinger adds valuable insight. It was really interesting to go through the dialog of Kissinger had with top Chinese politicians. He shows us a glimpse of the human side behind those Chinese leaders.
Kissinger has lots of historical insights and well-read. And as someone who has experienced the horror of Nazi Germany, I can see his passion behind his job as a diplomat. As much as it's criticized today, he sincerely believes the US leadership can bring world peace. Whether that is true or not, someone with such passion working side by side with a global leader feels to me much comforting. I appreciate such a person in power writes a first hand biography for us.
My general takeaway is how important the historical value of nations (China as the only cultural sovereignty and US as the ambassador of global democracy and freedom) in assessing the decision making of policymakers. That sounds far apart but idealists and pragmatists operate only in a different time horizon and they are both equally relevant. National interests involved go beyond immediate rational calculation.
PS: I sincerely hope China and US won't get into a conflict too in the 21st century.
Kissinger has lots of historical insights and well-read. And as someone who has experienced the horror of Nazi Germany, I can see his passion behind his job as a diplomat. As much as it's criticized today, he sincerely believes the US leadership can bring world peace. Whether that is true or not, someone with such passion working side by side with a global leader feels to me much comforting. I appreciate such a person in power writes a first hand biography for us.
My general takeaway is how important the historical value of nations (China as the only cultural sovereignty and US as the ambassador of global democracy and freedom) in assessing the decision making of policymakers. That sounds far apart but idealists and pragmatists operate only in a different time horizon and they are both equally relevant. National interests involved go beyond immediate rational calculation.
PS: I sincerely hope China and US won't get into a conflict too in the 21st century.
June 4, 2011
There are brilliant sections of this book. There is an interpretative history of modern China. There is insight into some of the key personalities. There is history of the relationship between the US and China which Kissinger personally developed and played a key role in over a long period of time.
What is strange though is that for someone who was always very cautious in his views, this is a strangely opinionated book without original opinions.
There is a very clear point of view and it almost reads like the China Daily. I was expected a book which was more balanced and thoughtful with more of Kissinger's original thinking.
There are two problems with the book:
- There is a fawning respect for the leaders of China -- Mao is related to Qin Shihuang and the the Chinese government point of view of Tiananmen incident is presented in a sympathetic light. There is mention of the horrific cost of some of Mao's campaigns but at the same time there is some pain to explain things from Mao's point of view.
- There is far too little about the future and overall on what Kissinger himself thinks about the issues.
What is strange though is that for someone who was always very cautious in his views, this is a strangely opinionated book without original opinions.
There is a very clear point of view and it almost reads like the China Daily. I was expected a book which was more balanced and thoughtful with more of Kissinger's original thinking.
There are two problems with the book:
- There is a fawning respect for the leaders of China -- Mao is related to Qin Shihuang and the the Chinese government point of view of Tiananmen incident is presented in a sympathetic light. There is mention of the horrific cost of some of Mao's campaigns but at the same time there is some pain to explain things from Mao's point of view.
- There is far too little about the future and overall on what Kissinger himself thinks about the issues.
July 11, 2016
Excited to expand my understanding of Chinese history, and America’s current diplomatic relationship with China, I bought a beautiful hardback first edition of On China by Henry Kissinger. Given that Kissinger has decades of diplomatic experience with China I assumed that he would be a great primary source to learn from.
He turned out to be a primary source: a grossly biased primary source. He writes about Mao with a reverence which made me nauseous. The little I knew about China included Mao Zedong’s rise to power as a Communist revolutionary, and how he caused the death of 40 to 70 million Chinese people through starvation, forced labor, and execution.
The only time Kissinger references these atrocities he brushes them off, as if Mao had to do what he did in order to make China an industrialized nation through the largest institutionalized murder of citizenry by its own government in recorded history.
I would not suggest this book as reading material to anyone who wants an honest informed explanation of history.
He turned out to be a primary source: a grossly biased primary source. He writes about Mao with a reverence which made me nauseous. The little I knew about China included Mao Zedong’s rise to power as a Communist revolutionary, and how he caused the death of 40 to 70 million Chinese people through starvation, forced labor, and execution.
The only time Kissinger references these atrocities he brushes them off, as if Mao had to do what he did in order to make China an industrialized nation through the largest institutionalized murder of citizenry by its own government in recorded history.
I would not suggest this book as reading material to anyone who wants an honest informed explanation of history.
April 9, 2022
Some parts were boring. The first part of the book gives a general overview on Chinese history from the ancient dynasties up to the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and the Mao years. The more interesting part of the book is when Kissinger himself appears, especially in the re-established contact between China and US in 1971 (when Mao was actually still alive!). This book gave me insights into the 70s, 80s and 90s, and how Sino-US relations have been shaped. Now I've a better understanding of the so-called "rivalry" between them, which some people perceive to exist, but also of the need for these two countries to have effective communication.
September 5, 2013
Kissinger may be a duplicitous murderous bastard, but he's an excellent analyst and while his ancient history is only so-so as far as I can tell from my other reading (eg. Needham), his takes on modern Chinese history is very interesting, and I learned a number of things I did not know before (I was shocked to learn that the Soviets at one point seriously considered pre-emptively attacking China's nuclear program and had reached out to the USA to ask whether the USA would be very upset about it?).
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