Meeting the expectations of a fragmenting world | EEAS

Meeting the expectations of a fragmenting world

HR/VP Blog - Russia’s war against Ukraine has reunited the transatlantic alliance while exposing differences with other parts of the world. There is a risk that this divide grows and turns into hard rift. While we continue to support Ukraine, we must do more to heed the legitimate expectations of the rest of the world.

 

Of poles and power: what world are we heading to?

It is not easy to capture today’s chaotic world with neat, mental schemes, for we see many developments and trends at the same time as I explained at the State of the Union conference in Florence:

First, there is the US-China strategic competition with growing clashes over trade, technology and security, as well as competing models of society and governance. In many ways, this is the main structuring force in the world today.

Second, we see the globalisation model of open markets, trade integration and inter-dependence being challenged by a model built around economic security, industrial policy and state intervention. Security considerations are eclipsing economic integration. Trust and optimism are giving way to distrust and pessimism. Some talk of a new Washington consensus.

We do not know whether our world will be bipolar or multipolar. Some are convinced we are heading towards two rival blocs, with different security and IT ecosystems and also different financial and payment systems etc. Others foresee a world of ‘complex multipolarity’, where alongside the US and China many states are asserting themselves, with key players hedging their bets and acting in transactional ways.

The future is unknown but we can try to shape it, taking into account the following:

  1. In this new world, new powers are emerging who have their own interests and viewpoints which they want to defend, including a desire to make the  multilateral system more representative. This is a normal and logical trend that we cannot avoid and should indeed welcome.

 

  1. The degree to which the world will be rules-based or power-based matters more than whether it is bipolar or multipolar. So as EU, we must always stress the imperative of having strong multilateral institutions and agreed, binding rules that govern the relations of all states, big or small. We should insist that democracy and human rights and respect for international law are in the interest of people everywhere, whether they live in existing or emerging powers.

 

  1. We must shape the future with the countries and the peoples in the emerging world, across Africa, the Indo-Pacific and Latin America. The choices they are making on their security arrangements, on how to fight climate change, on how they run their internet or the modalities for their exports of critical raw materials will shape the world as much as the decisions that Washington and Beijing will make.

 

Transatlantic revival and the expectations of a plural world

This is the backdrop for the third trend that we can observe: more transatlantic and G7 unity but within a fragmenting world.

It is striking to what extent Russia’s war against Ukraine has brought greater unity to, and even a revival of, the transatlantic alliance. The squabbles in 2021 over the manner in which the US withdrew from Afghanistan or how the AUKUS alliance came about are gone, never mind the rather fundamental clashes under the Trump administration.

The war against Ukraine has clarified what the US, Canada and Europeans have in common. In addition to what we do together for Ukraine, there has been a wider sense of renewal: a common sense of purpose and a willingness to pay the price to uphold the principles of the international rule of law, freedom and democracy, under attack by the revisionist powers.

Of course, as always, policy differences remain. Take the protectionist aspects of the Inflation Reduction Act or our clashes over the WTO or the different approaches to fighting climate change (subsidies vs. carbon pricing). But on the strategic issues we are moving in lockstep, at least with the Biden administration.

Regrettably, this transatlantic and G7 unity has been accompanied by a greater political divide with the emerging world. As David Miliband wrote in Foreign Affairs under the telling title ‘The world beyond Ukraine’:

 

Western conviction about the war and its importance is matched elsewhere by scepticism at best and outright disdain at worst.

 

He also stresses that the causes are deeper than how people see the war against Ukraine.

 

The gap between the West and the rest goes beyond the rights and wrongs of the war. Instead, it is the product of deep frustration—anger, in truth—about the Western-led mismanagement of globalization since the end of the Cold War.

 

The differences in perceptions of the war against Ukraine have their roots in different histories, geography, different policy priorities etc. We should discuss them in a serene manner, explaining also that we are mobilised to address the global consequences of a war we did not start nor want, as was stressed also at the last Foreign Affairs Council when we discussed the action plan on the geopolitical consequences of the Russian aggression.

But indeed, the issue goes deeper. There is a widespread sense among many in what some call the ‘Global South’ that the so-called ‘West has been missing in action and self-serving when it comes to a number of key issues which fall under the rubric of global justice: debt relief, climate finance, reform of the international financial institutions and, ultimately, seats and influence at the world’s top decision tables.

In all of this, a word on terminology is needed. The terms ‘the West’ and ‘the Global South’ are not really accurate and fitting to describe the new reality: ‘the West’ is a concept that dates from the Cold War and doesn’t allow for the many countries outside the North Atlantic alliance that do belong to and feel part of the democratic industrialised world (like Japan, South Korea etc).

Meanwhile, the use of ‘Global South’ projects a degree of unity on what is in reality a very diverse group with huge differences in conditions, aspirations and alignments. The fact that, for instance, the Saudi Foreign Minister told me his country belonged to the ‘Global South’ illustrates how far the term has been stretched. In any event, we all have every interest in using language that promotes the search for common ground and avoids bloc-to-bloc thinking.

Terminology aside, we must take the expectations and grievances of the emerging countries seriously. Not simply because we want their support for votes at the UN on Ukraine – although we will never stop making the argument that the war concerns and damages everyone given the principles at stake. But mainly because in this world there is a battle of narratives going on and, even more, a battle of offers.

We have a huge stake and interest in making sure that the international system remains predominantly rules-based and not power-based. That in turn requires demonstrating to hedging states and other partners that the system delivers for them; that it can be reformed to meet new challenges; and above all that equity and justice are concepts that we take seriously.

Much of the ‘fence sitting’ on the Ukraine war is not driven so much by any support for Russia’s destruction of Ukraine. Rather it is driven by perceived double standards and frustration that other issues do not receive the same sense of urgency and massive resources that have been mobilised for Ukraine.

At the Spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank, the dominant sentiment from developing countries ran roughly like this, and I paraphrase: “there was money to bail out your banks after the financial crisis; there was money to bail out your companies and citizens during the pandemic and again to cushion the impact of the rise in energy and food prices. But when we ask for money for debt relief or climate finance, you tell us there isn’t any left.”

The distinguished Indian diplomat Shivshankar Menon put the point sharply in Foreign Affairs earlier this year:

 

Alienated and resentful, many developing countries see the war in Ukraine and the West’s rivalry with China as distracting from urgent issues such as debt, climate change, and the effects of the pandemic.

 

One can debate this point and perhaps wish for greater solidarity by those who have been victims of power politics and imperialism in the past with the current victim of Russian imperialism, i.e. Ukraine. However, there is no point denying that there are unmet expectations and legitimate demands that we in the EU, together with our principal allies, must listen to and act upon.

The UN Secretary General Guterres has spoken along similar lines and it was striking that when he met EU leaders last March, the need to deliver on this global justice agenda was the first point he made. 

Time to deliver on global reform and justice

The coming weeks and months will feature a number of key meetings and summits where we will need to deliver. On 22-23 June there will be the Summit for a new global financial pact in Paris. There will be the SDG Summit and the Climate Ambition Summit in September during UNGA. And in December we will have the COP28 in the United Arab Emirates.

We need to think big and treat this whole sequence as a strategic continuum. We will need to come up with an integrated ‘offer’ on debt relief and Special Drawing Rights, reform, on access to private capital, on climate finance and, yes, also on reforms of the multilateral development banks and their decision-making structures.

As usual, the record of the EU and its member states is actually better than others and more than it gets credit for. We are and remain the first source of official development aid and humanitarian aid; we provide 30% of global climate finance; on debt relief we have been on the progressive wing inside the G20 and with the Global Gateway we are making concrete our commitment to work jointly on high-quality investments and connectivity.  

But of course it is still not enough. The needs and expectations outpace what we have done so far. We also need to better connect the dots inside the EU: decisions on all these issues are spread between different groups and policy communities (finance, development and climate ministers, the EU and member states, public and private sector etc). We will need to make a heroic effort to see the bigger picture, break down silos and bring people together. We discussed this at the last Foreign Affairs Council with Development Ministers and there was agreement that our credibility is on the line.

In international politics, perceptions and reputations matter, especially at a time when new centres of power are emerging. We need to pay more attention to how we, and our actions, are seen in many parts of the world.

We often say, quite rightly, that we want Ukraine to prevail and that we will do whatever it takes to get there. We need to make a similar level of commitment to prevail in the court of global public opinion. This is essential to build the necessary trust and solve the many global crises we all face.

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