Euroscepticism in the European Parliament

Abstract

The development of anti-EU sentiment is one of the most important features of the integration process over the last two decades. The ongoing economic, political and migration crisis has provided fertile ground for the galvanization of oppositions to the EU. Euroscepticism has progressively become embedded at the national and supranational levels and is now part of the mainstream. This chapter aims at understanding Euroscepticism at the European level. The first section places Euroscepticism within a broader historical context through an up-to-date review of the literature. The next section reviews the main conceptualizations and their shortcomings before explaining how Euroscepticism is defined in the framework of this book. It is argued that Euroscepticism should be seen as an anti-system opposition. The final section empirically examines who the Eurosceptic MEPs are between 2004 and 2016.

The development of anti-EU sentiment is one of the most important features of the integration process over the last two decades (Usherwood 2007a). The ongoing economic, political and migration crisis has provided fertile ground for the galvanization of oppositions to the EU. Euroscepticism has progressively become embedded at the national and supranational levels and is now part of the mainstream. Indeed, with the migration crisis, populist and Eurosceptic discourses have flourished, assimilating migrants, terrorism, and the free movement of persons and blaming the EU for the lack of border controls. The duration of the economic crisis has also provoked a blossoming of contestation against the EU (Conti 2016), presented either as an “alien” power imposing austerity measures on national democracies or as incapable of providing efficient solutions in times of financial and economic turmoil.

As a result, Euroscepticism has generated a great wealth of scientific studies. Since the late 1990s, the study of Euroscepticism has gradually become an established sub-discipline of European studies (Flood 2009; Mudde 2011). Scholars have sought to understand the complex nature of this phenomenon. They have proposed various typologies and classifications and examined the main factors explaining these oppositions to Europe. The literature has significantly enriched our knowledge of Euroscepticism and its determinants, notably through the analysis of the impact of ideological, strategic, institutional and contextual factors on attitudes towards European integration. However, it suffers from two shortcomings. Firstly, most studies focus on taxonomic issues, defining and categorizing parties according to their position vis-à-vis the European project (Harmsen 2010, p. 339). They overlook the behaviour of Eurosceptics once elected to parliamentary assemblies (Jensen and Spoon 2010). Secondly, with some recent exceptions, these studies focus on national parties and the national level with little consideration for the European level. While Euroscepticism is not a new phenomenon and the EP has served as a forum of expression for dissenting voices, Eurosceptic MEPs’ attitudes, motivations and strategies have been understudied so far.

This research seeks to address this gap. To do so, this chapter aims to define the concept of Euroscepticism such as it is understood here and to identify the Eurosceptics elected to the EP during the period under study (2004–2016). After placing Euroscepticism within a broader historical context, the next section will review the main conceptualizations and their shortcomings before explaining how Euroscepticism is defined in the framework of this book. Going back to the core idea behind Taggart’s first definition of the phenomenon and drawing on research on political opposition, Euroscepticism is seen here as an anti-system opposition. Such a definition allows for a connection between research on Euroscepticism on the one hand and on political opposition and the study of anti-system actors on the other. The final section empirically identifies the Eurosceptic MEPs since 2004.

1 Unpacking Oppositions to the EU: A Complex and Evolving Phenomenon

Euroscepticism is often presented as a relatively new phenomenon which emerged in the early 1990s and marked the end of the permissive consensus (Vasilopoulou 2013). Yet while the term is relatively new, the attitudes to which it refers, namely opposition to the European project, are as old as the project itself (Katz 2008). European integration has always been inherently controversial, and the EU has been shaped by disagreements between political actors on how to organize politics in Europe (Crespy and Verschueren 2009; Hooghe and Marks 1997). Indeed, the history of European integration, far from being linear and consensual, has gone through various crises, revealing the existence of diverging visions of the European project (Brack and Costa 2012; Giacone and Olivi 2007; Ross 2011).

1.1 The First Decades of Integration: The Golden Age of Permissive Consensus?

In the early 1950s, there was relatively widespread reticence among Western political elites to the establishment of a supranational institutional system. Similarly, one can consider that it is not so much out of conviction but out of interest that national leaders rallied around the idea of the European project. This was facilitated by the ambiguity surrounding the objectives of European integration. From the 1960s to the mid-1980s, Euroscepticism was somewhat stifled: the absence of major treaty revisions, market regulation and integration through the Europeanization of national legislation made the impact of the European Communities relatively unremarkable within national territories (Leconte 2010, pp. 100–101). Tacit approval prevailed in national public opinion. Attitudes towards the EU and integration were generally favourable but unstructured and largely marked by a follow-the-leader attitude (conceptualized as “permissive consensus “) (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Objections by political elites towards the European project remained peripheral—confined to the margins of the political system; temporary—such as the empty chair crisis in 1965; or sectoral—such as trade union opposition to specific policies. In the early days of European integration, members were appointed directly by their national parliaments; hence, there was an overrepresentation of large parties and representatives favourable to European integration, especially with the refusal of the French and Italian Communists to send representatives (Mény 2009, p. 35). But since the 1970s, the EP has provided a platform for parties critical of the integration process and, since then, the assembly is divided along two main dimensions: left/right and pro/anti-integration (Hix et al. 2007). During this first period, as opposition remained marginal and temporary, it attracted little interest from the academic world and, while early studies provided very detailed analyses of specific cases, they did not produce a theoretical framework with major explanatory value.

An initial rupture occurred within the context of the adoption of the Single European Act and the programme on the internal market . The apparent consensus among political elites as to both the economic and political benefits of integration was shattered by the emergence of a debate on the transformation of the European Economic Community and the regulation of the internal market (Usherwood 2007). In response to Jacques Delors’ ambitions to strengthen European economic and political cooperation, Margaret Thatcher’s speech in Bruges in 1988 revealed competing visions of the European project. From the mid-1980s, the development of the Communities provoked a debate on how the market should be regulated and organized: the programme on the internal market became then the starting point for the argument over the institutional configuration of the European system (Hooghe and Marks 1997, p. 6).

1.2 The Critical Turning Point in European Integration

It is the Maastricht Treaty however which undeniably marked a qualitative break. Although the thesis of a permissive consensus must be nuanced, there is no denying that this treaty’s negotiation and ratification campaigns constituted a “critical turn” for European integration, as opposition became more visible and diversified (Lacroix and Coman 2007). Symbolically, the treaty transformed the community into a Union and introduced European citizenship, triggering fears within public opinion about the erosion of national identity. Moreover, by transferring competencies such as currency and foreign policy to the EU, the treaty provoked opposition given the challenges which these transfers pose to national sovereignty and the implications on national redistribution policies of the economic prescriptions contained in the treaty (Verney 2011). It was also a key moment in the debate surrounding the development of the EU. Boundaries between what is national and what is supranational became increasingly blurred, and the forms of opposition were increasingly diversified. European citizens also became more aware of the scale and nature of European integration, marking the beginning of the politicization of Europe (Franklin et al. 1994). European issues are increasingly becoming “normal” political discussions, subject to debate in national political arenas and polarizing opinions. While studies have shown that the level of public support towards integration nowadays is quite similar to what it was in the 1970s, there is, however, a greater differentiation of attitudes towards Europe and a greater visibility of opposition within public opinion (Down and Wilson 2008). Hooghe and Marks (2009, p. 5) believe, therefore, that one can speak of a “constraining dissensus ”: the politicization of European issues has revealed the gap between citizens and elites, and the latter should now take a more reluctant public into account.

Previously a marginal phenomenon, Euroscepticism became more complex as it spread across the continent and the political landscape. It has since become a stable and embedded phenomenon in a majority of Member states (Harmsen 2005, p. 79). European elections since 1994 and the successive enlargements have broadened the spectrum of partisan positions towards the European project and consolidated the ranks of Eurosceptics within the EP. In parallel, the process of constitutionalization has generated a public debate on the nature and future of the EU, facilitating the mobilization of Eurosceptic actors (Trenz and De Wilde 2009). Since the pioneering article by Taggart (1998), literature seeking to understand Euroscepticism has grown exponentially (Flood 2009). There are, in that respect, ongoing debates and controversies regarding the respective importance of ideology and strategy and, to a lesser extent, of cultural and institutional factors.

A first approach relies on Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory to examine the relationship between ideological positions and attitudes towards the EU. The traditional cleavages can then be seen as prisms through which the parties respond to integration (Hooghe and Marks 2007; Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks et al. 2002). These studies demonstrate that the political family, combining historical divisions, provides a reliable and effective indicator of party position on integration (Marks and Wilson 2000). Specifically, two major dimensions structure party competition and help explain actors’ positions on European issues: the left/right economic cleavage and the GAL/TAN (Green-Alternative-Libertarian/Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist) dimension on non-economic issues such as the environment, lifestyle and values (Bartolini et al. 2012). Parties on the GAL side of the axis, such as the Greens, tend to be more pro-EU whereas parties on the TAN side, such as radical right , tend to be Eurosceptic (Marks et al. 2009).

Conversely, the authors of the “Sussex School” believe it is not so much ideology but strategy that explains parties’ positions on European integration. Euroscepticism is seen as the result of strategic calculations in the national competition. In other words, there is no linear relationship between the ideological position on the left/right cleavage and the party’s attitude towards European integration: “a party’s ideological position does not provide sufficient information to deduce its position on the EU” (Taggart 1998, p. 377). Several elements are then highlighted as explanatory factors: the characteristics of the national context and constraints arising from national institutions (Lees 2002; Usherwood 2007); the parties’ objectives (office-seeking, vote-seeking, policy-seeking) (Raunio 2007; Sitter 2001); the type of parties and their position in the party system (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002, 2008); and the dynamics of partisan competition (Batory and Sitter 2008). Euroscepticism, according to this approach, is mainly found among opposition parties as well as protest-based actors as a strategic resource in the party competition.

Other studies have attempted to go beyond this debate between ideological and strategic considerations by emphasizing not only institutional factors and political culture, national history, but also the perceptions of politicians and public opinion. The analysis of resistance to Europe is inseparable from the analysis of the political culture in which it operates (Lacroix and Coman 2007). Some authors have thus emphasized the influence of the history, context and identity of the nation state in which Euroscepticism has its roots (see a.o. Emanuele et al. 2016). Recent research has investigated the relationship between partisan positioning and the level of Euroscepticism in public opinion, demonstrating that this influence is reciprocal. Parties not only shape public opinion but also respond to the attitudes of citizens (Gifford 2008; Harmsen 2010; De Vries and Edwards 2009; Steenbergen et al. 2007).

Finally, researchers have recently emphasized the role played by the supranational context and the attitudes of European elites. The uncertain nature of the European project and the process of the EU’s constitutionalization provide fertile ground for the galvanization of opposition to the EU (De Wilde 2010). Moreover, the reluctance so far of European elites to engage in a debate with Eurosceptics is damaging to the EU’s legitimacy , especially since this position contradicts the EU’s ambition to become a democratic polity, attentive to its audience (citizens) (Usherwood and Startin 2013). European elites have not developed arguments to justify and discuss their positions towards European integration and therefore are not responsive to the normative challenge posed by Eurosceptics (Morgan 2005; Nivet 2016). Finally, the EU’s democratic deficit and lack of institutional structure for the expression of conflicting views not only strengthen Eurosceptic arguments but also harden their position.

1.3 Economic Crisis and Galvanization of Opposition

The window for institutional reform was just barely closed with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) when the economic and Eurozone crises reopened the debate on European integration and on the capacity and legitimacy of EU intervention in economic governance (Emanuele et al. 2016; Serrichio et al. 2013). The unpopular bailouts increased the Union’s visibility in the public sphere (Mudde 2014), leading to the emergence or resurgence of opposition to Europe in several Member states. Interest in Euroscepticism grew again although most works concentrate on electoral results analysis or propose an assessment of the potential dangers Eurosceptic parties could constitute (for instance Dye 2015; Ivaldi 2014; Harris 2014). There is a consensus to consider that European integration has now entered a new and more difficult phase of its existence, characterized by mass Euroscepticism, the rise of radical and populist parties and the mainstreaming of anti-EU rhetoric (Vasilopoulou 2013; Verney 2015). The European elections of May 2014 and the UK referendum on EU membership attest to these trends. Claims on the non-democratic nature of the EU and on the need for major reforms have become commonplace among mainstream parties (Abbarno and Zypruanova 2013) while we are also witnessing “a changing and more challenging media discourse with regards to portrayals of the EU” (Brack and Startin 2015). This context has provided particularly fertile ground for Eurosceptic actors over the last few years. Eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties, both left and right, experienced unprecedented success in the 2014 EP elections (Hobolt 2015), leading some commentators to speak of a “Eurosceptic storm in Brussels” (FT 26 May 2014). The radical right has never won so many seats in the EP, particularly with the victory of the Front National in France and the Danish People’s Party. These elections also saw the entry of neo-Nazi parties such as the German NDP and Golden Dawn in the EP. Furthermore, in 2015, for the first time since the short-lived “Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty ” group (2007), a radical right group was formed in the EP (called Europe of Nations and Freedom). The crisis context was also favourable to the radical left , particularly in Southern European countries which were most affected by the economic crisis. Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece have been particularly successful at the national and European levels. In the EP, the group of the radical left has increased from 35 to 52 MEPs. Against this backdrop, it is therefore more important than ever to analyse these dissenting voices within supranational institutions.

2 A Problematic Conceptualization

The diversification of negative reactions to European construction poses a real challenge to conceptualization; the term tends to be used as a generic concept that encompasses a disparate set of attitudes of opposition, reluctance and doubts towards European integration and the EU (Mudde 2011; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008). Sometimes it is used to describe any form of opposition to or critique of the process of European integration, whereas on other occasions, it implies an ideological position that structures parties’ stances on other issues. Like other concepts in political science such as populism, there is no commonly accepted definition but rather a series of different interpretations within the academic community.

The most influential conceptualization is undoubtedly the one proposed by Taggart (1998), which he refined with his colleague Szczerbiak (2000). This categorization distinguishes between two forms of Euroscepticism: soft and hard. Soft Euroscepticism covers cases where there is no principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where actors’ concerns towards one or more policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU (political Euroscepticism). It also covers cases where there is a perception that national interest is at odds with the trajectory of the EU (national interest Euroscepticism). Hard Euroscepticism refers to a principled opposition to the EU and European integration, which can therefore be observed among parties which believe their country should leave the EU or whose positions towards the EU can be equated with opposition to the entire project of European integration (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002).

Mudde and Kopecky (2002) believe that the overly inclusive definition of soft Euroscepticism may incorporate any disagreement with specific or general EU policies and that the boundary between these two forms of Euroscepticism is not easily identifiable. They propose therefore two different axes. The first relates to attitudes towards the general principles of integration that underpin the EU. This axis opposes Europhiles who support the ideas of European integration (institutionalized cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty and an integrated liberal market economy) and Europhobes who do not support or are opposed to one or more of these ideas. The second axis relates to attitudes towards the EU as political system. On the one hand, it separates EU-optimists who support the EU as it is and as it is developing (although they may be critical of some EU policies) and, on the other hand, EU-pessimists who do not support the EU as it is, are pessimistic about the direction of its development or believe that it does not match their idea of integration. Four categories result from these axes: Euro-enthusiast (Europhile and EU-optimist); Euro-pragmatic (Europhobe and EU-optimist); Eurosceptic (Europhobe and EU-pessimist) and Euro-reject (Europhobe and EU-pessimist).

These two main conceptualizations have attracted a number of criticisms. Both have been characterized as imprecise and failing to take into consideration the complex and dynamic nature of Euroscepticism (Krouwel and Abts 2007). Flood and Usherwood (2007) consider that both conceptualizations suffer from the same type of shortcomings: they propose a binary and simplistic opposition between Europhilia and Europhobia vis-à-vis an ideal of European integration, without taking into account the diverging visions of the integration process. Furthermore, if Taggart and Szczerbiak use the same label for parties holding very different views on the EU and European integration, Mudde and Kopecky use the term “Euroscepticism” to describe a single category, leading to some ambiguity. Mudde and Kopecky’s “Euro-pragmatic” has also been considered to be unrealistic and a priori contradictory while their “Euro-enthusiast” category has been criticized for being overly inclusive.

Despite an extensive literature, Euroscepticism remains an elusive and poorly defined concept which has become increasingly difficult to mobilize and operationalize (Harmsen 2010). The border between reformism and Euroscepticism is often blurry and difficult to draw precisely. If one accepts an overly inclusive definition, any actor might be perceived as being Eurosceptic from the moment they do not accept the EU unconditionally and want their preferences to be taken into consideration more (Usherwood 2005b). Moreover, while the concept remains marked by its roots in the post-Maastricht period and therefore takes on a radical dimension related to nationalism , much of the discourse is now more about qualified criticisms than the desirability of European integration (Harmsen and Spiering 2004). Another difficulty is that the term contains a strong normative charge, serving in some contexts to disqualify certain actors or political adversaries (Neumayer 2008; Ward 1996). Finally, not only do several conceptualizations coexist and come with their own labels, ¹ but a series of researchers, dissatisfied with the term, have created neologisms better suited to their object of study, be it euro-indifference for neutral positions (Delmotte 2007), euro-realism in the framework of the CEEC (Neumayer 2008), euro-cynicism, euro-ambivalence or euro-alienation for public opinion (Krouwel and Abts 2007; Van Ingelgom 2014) or even, resistances to cover a broader set of actors (Crespy and Verschueren 2009; Lacroix and Coman 2007). As noted by Roger (2007, p. 31), “the literature on reactions to European integration is facing a proliferation of ad hoc concepts, which follow from semantic confusion and poor categorizations”.

3 Euroscepticism as Political Opposition

In order to define Euroscepticism as it is understood here, it is essential to return to what constitutes the essence of the phenomenon: a posture of opposition. Indeed, as noted by Taggart (1998, p. 366), Euroscepticism is an opposition, whether qualified or principled, to the existing institutional reality.

Considering Euroscepticism not as an attitude of doubt, reluctance or an expression of critical reformism but as a form of political opposition against the status quo, that is to say, the European project, such as it is, makes it possible to delineate the contours of the studied population more precisely. But it also allows us to go beyond the “artificially maintained dichotomy between political science and European studies understood as an independent sub-specialty” (Costa et al. 2008, p. 533). Indeed, the concept of political opposition has been the subject of major theories in both comparative politics and political theory. Through their work, authors such as Dahl (1971), Kircheimer (1964), Sartori (1966), Schapiro (1965), Madariaga and Ionescu (1968) as well as Berger (1979) have contributed to a better understanding of political opposition, particularly parliamentary opposition in democratic regimes. Despite the normative biases and evolutionary perspectives of this literature, it has the merit of having promoted a binary distinction between so-called normal opposition and its deviant counterpart (Brack and Weinblum 2011). Thus, Kircheimer drew a distinction between classical or loyal opposition, which offers alternative political choices while recognizing the government’s right to be in power, and, on the other hand, opposition on principle, opposition not only to the government and its policies, but also to its legitimacy and the very foundation of the governance system. Similarly, Sartori distinguishes normal constitutional opposition from its anti-system form by affirming that “true opposition presupposes consent on the essentials, namely, the foundations of the community and the regime”.

However, this understanding of political opposition, as theorized by these authors, is not fully applicable to the EU. The existence of political opposition in the traditional sense of the term is essentially based on the identification of an executive against which this opposition is directed. But, the traditional pattern between majority and opposition is not easily identifiable at the European level (Helms 2008). The EU is one of those political systems where, according to Dahl (1999), “it is difficult to determine those who govern and those who oppose”. In addition, the EU lacks a fixed and institutionalized place from where opposition might be expressed. As a result of the absence of an executive with partisan coherence and the support of a majority of elected representatives, the EP is not structured by a permanent divide between majority and minority but rather by a juxtaposition of cleavages and a tendency to resort to the large majorities therein (Costa 2001; Neuhold and Settembri 2009). The structures and procedures of the EP do not allow the institution to play its role as a “site of opposition” in the classic sense of the term.

This work draws inspiration from the binary typologies outlined by the literature and suggests that Euroscepticism is a “deviant” form of political opposition, namely an anti-system opposition or principled opposition, directed against the system and the polity. Indeed, Euroscepticism is different from “normal politics”, from the classic opposition to public policy and denotes rather an opposition to the constitutive dimension of the EU (Magnette and Papadopoulos 2008; De Wilde and Trenz 2012). As noted by Neunreither (1998), the EU is different in this respect from the majority of its Member states: in the latter, the regime’s existence is no longer questioned, and the opposition tends to focus on public policy issues. ² Indeed, although the nation state no longer benefits from an undisputed status, the overall political structure is generally not questioned and the opposition focuses on policy choices, government priorities and certain constitutional issues.

Contrarily, at the supranational level, systemic and constitutional issues are numerous and recurring, especially now with the existential crisis the EU is facing. These issues are, moreover, seen as essential and problematic, particularly because of the lack of political finalité shared by a large majority of actors (Neunreither 1998). The EU’s lack of legitimacy , the uncertainties regarding its nature and the absence of channels for the expression of opposition are all sources of tension and conflict (Mény 2012). In the EU, the debate is not only about the type of fiscal, social, industrial or monetary policy but also about the territorial level where these policies are elaborated and the way in which decisions are made. In other words, “the conflict that underlies European integration concerns nothing less than the manner in which Europe should be organized politically” (Hooghe and Marks 1997, p. 7), and it is precisely on this dispute over the constitutive dimension that Euroscepticism is located. As noted by Hix and his colleagues (Hix et al. 2007), two main dimensions of conflict structure the EP debates: the traditional left/right axis and the pro/anti-EU divide. The latter cleavage is even becoming more salient since the Eurozone crisis (Otjes and van der Veer 2016). The EP resembles some national parliaments which have experienced situations of internal opposition to the regime. For instance, under the Fourth Republic, the French National Assembly was divided by a pro/anti-regime split comparable to the pro/anti-integration split in the EP. ³ Euroscepticism should not be understood as opposition to implemented policies or in reference to the left/right axis, but as a systemic opposition aimed at the integration process and the resulting political system.

Based on this literature, the concept of Euroscepticism will be used here to describe the attitudes of opposition to the European regime, its institutions, its legitimacy and the very foundations of the system of governance. MEPs who are opposed to European (political and economic) integration and/or to the EU as it is currently will be considered to be Eurosceptic. However, as a result of the heterogeneity and complexity of Euroscepticism, it becomes necessary to differentiate it both in nature and in degree. Combining the conceptualization of Taggart and Szczerbiak with the work of Mudde and Kopecky, Euroscepticism should be seen as a continuum ranging from a soft, or reformist, position to a hard, or principled, opposition (Fig. 3.1). We should bear in mind that this distinction is based not only on the degree of opposition but also on the target of this opposition. Relying on Mudde and Kopecky’s conceptualization, it is essential to distinguish actors opposed to the integration process and the general (political and economic) ideas and values underlying it ⁴ on the one hand and to the EU as a polity on the other hand.

Fig. 3.1

Euroscepticism as an axis of opposition

This definition has three major implications. Firstly, it relies on a more restrictive definition of Euroscepticism and to assume its radical nature, referring only to an opposition to integration and the EU and excluding any attitude of doubt, reticence or criticism towards EU policies. The aim is to distinguish Euroscepticism as an opposition to integration and/or the EU from other reactions that may be seen as the result of a normal politicization of European issues in a multi-level system (as traditional and normal opposition). Secondly, this definition allows for the inclusion of the study of Euroscepticism into the broader scope of research on opposition and in particular on anti-system actors found in other political systems. Finally, such a definition leaves aside any a priori regarding the motivations of parties who adopt a Eurosceptic attitude. Unlike the research of the schools of Sussex and North Carolina, this study does not examine the impact of the type of party or its position in the political arena on the degree of Euroscepticism, nor does it ambition to determine how ideology affects the actor’s position on the axis of integration. Here, the differentiation between actors is based on the degree and target of their opposition, without integrating the actor’s motivations for adopting a Eurosceptic attitude.

4 Who Are the Eurosceptic MEPs?

In order to apply this conceptualization and determine who the Eurosceptics were during the time frame of this research, several indicators are used. First, the voting behaviour of MEPs on key texts concerning the European project is analysed. The selection was then refined on the basis of their party affiliation and their discourse. Because there was no major report on European integration during the 7th and 8th parliamentary terms (respectively, 2009–2014 and 2014–2019), other elements, i.e. party affiliation, interviews with MEPs and the literature on Euroscepticism, were mobilized as well to identify Eurosceptic elected representatives.

4.1 A Two-Step Approach to Identifying Eurosceptic MEPs (2004–2016)

First, an exploratory analysis of the voting behaviour of all MEPs on key texts on the EU’s future and the European integration process was carried out to identify the Eurosceptics. Indeed, the voting behaviour is not only one of the most visible aspects of parliamentary activities but also the best way for MEPs to publicly and definitively express their positions (Scully 1999, 2005). Contrary to national party programmes, expert surveys, survey responses or media statements (Proksch and Lo 2012), voting is a real behaviour which publicly engages the MEPs. Moreover, these votes deal with particularly symbolic texts. These addressed the state and future of both the EU and European integration, the principles of this process and their implementation. ⁵ A recurring opposition to this kind of text is thus a good indicator of Euroscepticism (Bouillaud 2008).

During the 6th legislature (2004–2009), there were eight such texts: the EP resolution on the ratification procedures of the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the communication strategy around it ⁶ ; the Corbett/Mendez de Vigo report on a constitution for Europe ⁷ ; the resolution on the future of Europe sixty years after World War II ⁸ ; the Duff/Voggenhuber report on the period of reflection: structure, themes and framework of evaluation ⁹ ; the EP resolution on the next steps for the period of reflection and analysis of the future of Europe ¹⁰ ; the Baron Crespo/Brok report on the continuation of the constitutional process ¹¹ ; the Leinen report on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference ¹² ; and the Corbett/Mendez de Vigo report on the Treaty of Lisbon . ¹³

A principal component analysis was first conducted on the eight votes to determine if one could speak of only one dimension. Indeed, one could have considered that these texts are not all of the same nature but the results of this analysis show that a single dimension is detectable throughout these votes and that this dimension explains 81.5% of the variance. The component matrix and the Cattell scree test show that a single component can be extracted from the data: the eight votes refer to a single dimension and each vote is highly correlated with the extracted dimension. All of these votes represent thus a single dimension, interpreted as attitude towards EU integration.

For each of the texts mentioned above, the voting behaviour of each MEP was then encoded as follows: vote in favour (0), vote against (1), absent (missing value), ¹⁴ abstention (0.5). ¹⁵ The scores of each MEP were totalled to obtain an opposition scale ranging from 0 to 8. Any MEP who opposed at least half of these texts, or with a score of at least 4, was considered to be a Eurosceptic (see Fig. 3.2). This resulted in a group of 151 individuals during the sixth parliament. ¹⁶ MEPs who were absent more than half the time (163 individuals) were excluded from this initial selection and have been treated on a case-by-case basis depending on three factors: their voting behaviour when they were present and took a position, party affiliation and, if they took the floor, their discourse during the debate on the texts submitted to a vote. Twenty-one additional MEPs were added to the initial selection and were also considered Eurosceptics as a result of their negative attitude regarding these texts through their voting and party affiliation. In total, there were 165 Eurosceptic MEPs (out of 862 individuals) ¹⁷ in the European parliament during the sixth legislature, which is consistent with estimates by other researchers according to which Eurosceptics represented approximately 20% of the EP (Bouillaud 2008; Leconte 2010) (Fig. 3.2, Table 3.1).

Fig. 3.2

Scale of Euroscepticism

Table 3.1 Eurosceptic MEPs—6th legislature (2004–2009, opening session)

The 2009 and 2014 European elections changed the composition of the assembly considerably, especially within the Eurosceptic population. Indeed, some parties, such as the June List (Sweden) and “Europa transparent” (The Netherlands), lost all parliamentary representation while new parties like the Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid), the Finns (Perussuomalaiset—Finland), the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle - Italy) and Alternative for Germany (AfD—Germany) made their appearance in the EP. In the absence of votes similar to those of the 6th legislature, party affiliation, more precisely EP group membership, was used as an indicator. Although the choice of a group in the EP is sometimes dictated by domestic considerations and the founding charters often lack detail, even this lowest common denominator can give us information as to the stance of MEPs towards the EU. Indeed, MEPs adhere to the principles of their group’s charter and programme, and their parties choose to sit in groups whose political platform is closest to their programme, at least on the most salient issues (McElroy and Benoit 2010). Membership in group also helps to determine the MEP’s capacity for compromise on the issue of integration, some sitting in Europhile groups and others preferring to belong to a smaller but Eurosceptic group (Benedetto 2008). On the basis of an analysis of the EP groups’ platforms, MEPs belonging to EUL/NGL , EFD , EFDD, ECR as well as non-attached MEP from radical right parties and anti-EU groups can be identified as Eurosceptics. The European United Left/Nordic Green Left is opposed to the EU as it currently stands and to some of the values underpinning the integration process. Its members reject the economic values at the basis of European integration and strongly criticize the EU: “the confederal group of the European United Left is deeply committed to European construction but one of a different type than the one currently in place. (…) A different Europe which would wipe clean the democratic deficit as it is confirmed by the Maastricht Treaty and the monetarist and neoliberal policies that come with it. The EU is not a victim of the current economic, financial, environmental and global food crisis but one of its motors”. ¹⁸ Similarly, the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) and its successor, the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) group, as well as the Europe of Nations and Freedom group (ENF) display a strong opposition to the European project. Their members tend to be opposed to the idea of supranational integration, essentially in the name of the defence of national sovereignty . The EFDD states in its charter that it opposes further European integration that would exacerbate the present democratic deficit and the centralist political structure of the EU. It “favours an open, transparent, democratic and accountable cooperation among sovereign European states and rejects the bureaucratization of Europe and the creation of a single centralized European superstate”. ¹⁹ In a similar vein, members of the ENF group “reject any policy designed to create a supra-state or a supra-national model. The opposition to any transfer of national sovereignty to supranational bodies and/or European Institutions is one of the fundamental principle uniting Members of the ENF ”. ²⁰

In addition to these MEPs, members of the Swedish Green Party were also included (on the basis of interviews with these MEPs). A survey of the literature on Euroscepticism confirms this classification (esp. Barbieri 2015; De Sio et al. 2014; Hartleb 2011; Mudde 2014; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008) (Tables 3.2 and 3.3).

Table 3.2 Eurosceptic MEPs—7th legislature (2009–2014, opening session)

Table 3.3 Eurosceptic MEPs—8th legislature (2014–2019, opening session)

4.2 Patterns of Euroscepticism

The graph and tables in the previous section attest that the group of Eurosceptic MEPs is very heterogeneous, coming from a majority of Member states as well as covering the entire partisan spectrum. Recently, Usherwood (2014) rightly noted “in all the media hype, it has been forgotten that ‘Euroscepticism’ doesn’t really exist, at least in the sense of a coherent ideology. (…) The differences between Eurosceptic parties in the European parliament are as big as the range of ideologies represented in the chamber as a whole”. As shown by the analysis of their charters, some political groups strongly oppose integration and the EU while others are more moderate or solely focus on opposition to the EU. In order to differentiate them on the continuum explained previously, interviews were carried out with Eurosceptic MEPs. As explained, although the conceptualization of Euroscepticism corresponds to a single continuum, the work of Kopecky and Mudde should be borne in mind. More precisely, the distinction between opposition to European integration and the values underlying it and opposition to the EU and its institutions is very relevant, and MEPs were asked about their preferences on the two issues. On the basis of these interviews, three main positions could be found.

The first one is a principled opposition to institutionalized cooperation at the European level, be it economic or political, if it entails pooling or sharing sovereignty . It corresponds to hard Euroscepticism . These Eurosceptics are opposed to European integration and its basic ideals: “I am totally opposed to the whole concept. My own view is that I would be quite happy with a group of independent nation states trading and cooperating together” (interview with MEP15). They criticize the transfer of powers from the national to the supranational level, and most of them would advocate for an exit from the EU (what Mudde and Kopecky call isolationists). For them, the only desirable form of cooperation is purely voluntary and usually takes the form of a free-trade agreement although some are inspired by other forms of voluntary cooperation: “The European Union is an artificial political construction and it is failing. Here is something as a working model, the British Commonwealth, which is a loose association of people with a simple understanding who want to work together. (…) Why can’t we have a Commonwealth of Europe?” (Interview with MEP57). Their opposition is not restricted to the integration process as they are very hostile towards the EU and its institutions which are considered to be corrupt, antidemocratic and beyond reform. Therefore, they do not develop arguments or ideas to improve the institutional architecture of the Union: “There is no reform needed, we need to renegotiate the membership of our country to the EU and fight for sovereign states” (interview with MEP97). They view the EP as worthless, as lacking influence and are usually in favour of its disappearance although some of them would keep a deliberative forum, as long as it does not have any constraining power: “If it didn’t pretend to be a parliament, if we are talking about a body that occasionally meets to exchange views across Europe, possibly to reduce tensions, I have no objection to that as long as it is a forum, with no legislative powers” (Interview with MEP4).

A second position can be characterized as intergovernmentalism . These Eurosceptics are not opposed to their country participating in an institutionalized cooperation at the European level but this cooperation should be intergovernmental. Member states should be the centre of power: “we do not want the EU as it exists, The European project should be similar to what it was at the very beginning that is, a European cooperation between sovereign states, without a parliament and with a strong Council where states decide” (Interview with MEP85). They consider that the nation state is the irreplaceable framework for democracy and accept only a confederation or an intergovernmental Europe. They often consider that the integration process has gone too far and oppose any further transfer of power. Many of them believe that the integration process should be restricted to an internal market , without a level above the nation state: “my ideal Europe is actually to go back to the European Economic Communities. The only thing that brought prosperity is the internal market. Europe started as a market, it became an economic union and for us, it was enough” (Interview with MEP39). As far as the institutions are concerned, these Eurosceptics are in favour of reforms which would enhance the powers of Member states. They are opposed to the Community method as well as codecision and would give a permanent veto power to the Member states in the Council. Logically, they favour a weakening of the power of supranational institutions, especially the Commission and the EP. They would like powers to be transferred from the EP to the national parliaments, although they acknowledge the relevance of the EP as a forum for the defence of national interests: “Wouldn’t it be actually better if MEPs all together keep the parliament but the parliament was actually composed of national parliamentarians, and some of the Committee of the Regions, that would mean that there would be absolutely no feeling that this is being done to us because you would have a delegation of members from the Scottish parliament, the UK parliament, the Assemblée nationale in France actually sitting in the EP with very direct link to domestic politics” (Interview with MEP13).

A third stance refers to reformism or soft Euroscepticism. These MEPs tend to consider European integration as a necessary evil or an unwanted constraint and they oppose further integration without major reforms in the process: “I think the idea of European integration is natural, logical, necessary but we need to think about the form and content of this integration” (Interview with MEP42). They accept the principle of institutionalized cooperation, a more or less integrated market as well as the transfer of sovereignty to the supranational level but they would like to limit this kind of transfer. They criticize the so-called federal idea of Europe (European superstate or United States of Europe) but consider that supranational cooperation is needed, especially to deal with transnational challenges such as the environment, organized crime: “We are not opposed to the membership to the Union as such, it is not an ideological question or us. It’s rather that in our opinion, the EU should concentrate on those functions which bring added-value to everybody” (Interview with MEP75). For most of them, reflection is needed on the added value of the integration process and reform, and in a rather fundamental way, on the division of powers between the national and supranational levels. The EU should focus on common strategies and put more emphasis on subsidiarity. Regarding the EU, these MEPs concentrate their criticism on the lack of democracy , accountability and transparency of its institutions and decision-making process. They perceive the institutions as overly elitist and develop narratives to reform the way these institutions work: “For a start, I would make the Council of Ministers completely transparent, I mean they are the most secret organization in Europe, they meet in secret, they don’t produce minutes of their meetings. I would insist on complete transparency and openness for the Council. I would also insist that we have democratic elections for the European Commission and that we certainly don’t appoint Commissioners because they are not accountable to anyone at all now” (Interview with MEP60). At the same time, these Eurosceptics are usually positive towards the EP, seen as the only legitimate institution representing citizens and compensating the technocratic character of the Commission. As noted by this interviewee: “I fought against the Lisbon Treaty but not on these issues. I do hope the implementation of the treaty will enhance the role of the EP. If the EP has a stronger role, we are going in the right direction, towards more democracy in Europe” (Interview with MEP56). Nevertheless, they still consider that the EU needs major reforms, and enhancing the EP’s role is not enough.

5 Conclusion

Oppositions to Europe have proven to be particularly complex, underpinned by both strategic and ideological factors, and prone to change according to the national context as well as the developments of the EU itself. In other words, Euroscepticism is a moving target, very much like the EU (Kny and Kratochvil 2015). This has sparked lively discussions as to its conceptualization but to date, there still is no commonly accepted definition.

This chapter has provided an overview of these discussions and has positioned this research within the literature on Euroscepticism. By doing so, it highlighted the gaps this book intends to address. First, while most analysis concentrates on the national level, this study focuses on the supranational level. Combining the literature on Euroscepticism with research on political opposition, it is possible to consider Euroscepticism as a form of anti-system opposition, directed against the status quo, namely the European project. Euroscepticism therefore qualifies the attitudes of opposition to European integration and/or the EU. Unlike the work of scholars from the “Sussex school” or “North Carolina school”, the aim here is not to seek to uncover the causes of Euroscepticism. Rather, the objective is to understand how Eurosceptics perceive and carry out their representative mandate once elected to the EP and to explain the variation in this regard. On the basis of an analysis of MEPs’ voting behaviour, EP groups’ platforms and interviews, this chapter identified the Eurosceptics, and we can now turn to mapping their strategies.

Notes

• 1. For alternative typologies, see Flood and Usherwood (2007), De Wilde (2010), Vasilopoulou (2009).

• 2. There are, of course, exceptions as several European countries, including Belgium, Spain, Italy and the UK, have been faced with challenges and demands from autonomist or ethno-regionalist parties, questioning the legitimacy of state authority and demanding a major revision of the institutional structure of the state. See also L. De Winter, Gomez-Reino, P. Lynch, Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and the revival of the territorial cleavage, Barcelona, ICPS 2006.

• 3. H. Rosenthal and E. Voeten (2004) have indeed demonstrated that two dimensions structured the French National Assembly under the Fourth Republic: the left/right economic dimension and the pro/anti-regime dimension, provoking instability in the cabinets and the political regime.

• 4. It is particularly difficult to determine a priori precisely what European integration is. Indeed, on the one hand, the EU is rapidly evolving and stimulates constant debates over its nature and orientation. And, on the other hand, the actors may have varying interpretations of integration. Thus, we are not here to propose a definition of integration but to examine whether or not the opposition expressed is directed towards the integration process and its underlying values as perceived by the actors. For academic discussions on the meaning of integration, see: M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration. A Reader, Basingstoke, Palgrave McMillan, 2006. For a discussion of actors’ visions on integration and the EU, see also: O. Costa, P. Magnette, «Idéologies et changements institutionnel dans l’Union européenne. Pourquoi les gouvernements ont-ils constamment renforcé le Parlement européen?», Politique européenne, no. 9, 2003, pp. 49–75.

• 5. Interviews with MEPs confirmed that these texts were considered as symbols of integration and the synthesis of previous treaties reforming the EU.

• 6. Resolution on the Ratification procedures of the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and a communication strategy concerning this same treaty, 2004/2553(RSP), adopted 14 October 2004.

• 7. Opinion of the parliament on the treaty to establish a Constitution for Europe, 2004/2129(INI), adopted 12 January 2005.

• 8. Resolution of the European parliament on the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe (8 May 1945), adopted 12 May 2005.

• 9. The period of reflection: the structure, subjects and context for an assessment of the debate on the European Union, 2005/2146(INI), adopted 19 January 2006.

• 10. European parliament resolution on the next steps for the period of reflection and analysis on the Future of Europe, adopted 14 June 2006.

• 11. Report on the road map for the Union’s constitutional process (2007/2087(INI)), adopted 7 June 2007.

• 12. Leinen Report on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC): the European parliament’s opinion (Article 48 of the EU Treaty) (11222/2007 – C6-0206/2007 – 2007/0808(CNS)), adopted 11 July 2007.

• 13. Corbett/Mendez de Vigo Report «The Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community», 2007/2286(INI), adopted 20 February 2008.

• 14. For individuals who were absent during one to four of these votes, the missing value was replaced by the average obtained from the other votes.

• 15. It is of course impossible to determine the reasons justifying the attitude of an elected official on a particular vote. Following the example of R. Scully, we have thus coded abstention as midway between a positive and a negative vote (see Scully 1998). Indeed, we argue that through an abstention, an elected official, to some extent, takes a position. Rather than being absent for the vote, the official votes in an active manner, and this vote does not accept the proposed text without going so far as to oppose it. This may reflect a lack of knowledge of the dossier (for a new member) but especially a distancing from the group’s position without being disloyal. This is particularly the case for members of principal groups such as the EPP and the PES under the sixth legislature which have encouraged their members to vote in favour of the texts, considered to be fundamental. An abstention in this case may be seen as a refusal to accept a key text on integration and the future of the EU without going so far as a frontal opposition. This is why such an attitude was attributed a value of 0.5.

• 16. The discourse of elected officials during the debates related to these votes and the justification of their votes were analysed. This allowed me to capture their motivations as to their voting behaviour but also to ensure that I did not include any Europhile MEPs in the group.

• 17. It should be noted that the database covered all of the 2004–2009 legislature and due to the number of departures and arrivals during the legislature, there were 865 elected officials (and not 785).

• 18. Constitutional declaration of the EUL/NGL group, adopted on 14 July 1994, last consulted on 6 July 2016. Presentation of the EUL/NGL group [http://www.guengl.eu], last viewed on 6 July 2016.

• 19. EFDD charter, http://www.efddgroup.eu/about-us/our-charter, last viewed 6 July 2016.

• 20. Charter of the ENF group, http://www.enfgroup-ep.eu/charter/, last viewed 6 July 2016.

• 21. Lisbon Treaty was implemented, and Croatia became a member of the EU during the 7th legislature. As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, the number of MEPs increased by 18 MEPs, and Croatia elected 12 MEPs in 2013. The EP was temporarily constituted of 754 MEPs. Most of these new members were not Eurosceptic, except for an extra Austrian MEP from the BZÖ and an extra Dutch MEP from the PVV as well as two Eurosceptic Croatian MEPs (one seating in the ECR and the other in the EUL/NGL).