This book charts the rise and thought of Richard Dawkins from two perspectives: first as a recount of that part of the history of ideas that illustrates Dawkins' role in the intellectual rise of the New Atheism movement; and secondly as a theological argument that demonstrates that Dawkins has in many instances overstepped reason in his need to claim that the theory of evolution leads directly to a worldview that is necessarily atheist. Regarding the first perspective, McGrath's book is of interest to the religious historian. In the second perspective, the arguments McGrath posits for a theological rebuttal to Dawkins are, in the main, commonplace. The first chapter gives a reasonable overview of the rise of evolutionary theory with hints to the role of faith in both engaging with and celebrating this scientific process. The second chapter engages more deeply with the response of Christians to the idea of evolution, including some sane analysis on what Darwin's views on religion precisely were. It is here that McGrath accuses Dawkins of appropriating too much of his criticism of Christianity to arguments such as that of intended design. He writes, “Dawkin's assessment of the theological implications of Darwinism is excessively dependant on the assumption that Paley (or Paleyesque) approaches to the biosphere are typical or normative for Christianity. He also seems to assume that the intellectual case for Christianity rests largely, if not totally, upon an ‘argument for design,’ such as that proposed by Paley” (p. 71). The irony is, of course, the moment McGrath commits these words to paper, the Bush administration at the same time seem to demonstrate quite clearly that Intelligent Design is foremost on the minds of many Christians seeking to “prove” their faith. In this way, McGrath misses some of the purpose of Dawkins' arguments, suggesting the scientist knows more about the Christian world than the Christian, McGrath in this instance. Dawkins, however, is not beyond criticism. In chapter 3, McGrath rightly pulls him up on his very heavy‐handed use of the word “faith.” And it can be clearly and easily demonstrated that Dawkins speaks confidently of the field of theology with a lack of subtlety and many mistakes, but this does not mean that McGrath's arguments are ipso facto more impressive. He clearly rebuts Dawkins' claim that the theory of evolution leads automatically to an atheist viewpoint, but neither does it do Christianity's truth claims much good either. In chapter 4 McGrath unpicks Dawkins' meme idea in as much as the idea of God can be considered as a replicable idea that turns the divine into a mental contagion of sorts. This then reflects back on earlier statements of Dawkins that faith is a kind of mental illness. McGrath is right to signal that the pathologisation of faith and ultimate concerns such as “God” is to belittle a vital part of the human experience. McGrath notes that Dawkins pulls back from his memetic theory worried that he is extending his work into the realms of socio‐biology and this is a point worth considering. In their own way Dawkins and McGrath are using science and faith to negotiate a particular level of authority for themselves. Dawkins claims that the certainties of science can be extended into our comprehension of life, McGrath counters with the idea that as a science‐literate commentator on faith he can make theology an authentic centre of discourse in our secular world. In this both men trumpet flawed strategies. Perhaps McGrath wins this battle, however, for trumpeting the most flawed strategy. In chapter 5 he links the mysterious dimensions of the doctrine of the Trinity to the murky side of scientific speculation in the realm of Quantum Phenomena. He notes: [f]or an Orthodox Christian theologian, the Doctrine of the Trinity is the inevitable outcome of intellectual engagement with the Christian experience of God; for the physicist, equally abstract and bewildering concepts emerge from wrestling with the world of quantum phenomena. But both are committed to sustained intellectual engagement with those phenomena, in order to derive and develop theories or doctrines which can be said to do justice to them, preserving rather than reducing them. (p. 156) In this quotation, the theologian and the physicist are on equal footing, battling the mysteries of their equally justified disciplines. There is, however, one glaring problem with this parallel. The sort of intellectual engagement required of the physicist is quite different from that of the theologian. The intellectual grounds upon which the physicist speculates can be tested and, if found lacking, thrown out. The intellectual grounds upon which the theologian works is already an area of high speculation. The “orthodox” theologian being, by definition, a Christian who accepts the doctrine of the Trinity, can never throw out the foundational doctrine that defines his or her pursuit whether it be demonstrable or not (in fact the only sound demonstration of the doctrine of the Trinity so far has been its inability to be demonstrated). Thus we see at the end of this book McGrath doing what so many Christians have sought to do and that is appropriate the (mostly justified) aura of authenticity we find in the scientific method and append it to theological aims. In this book McGrath does a good job of condemning aspects of Dawkins' zealotry but in the process does much to condemn his own arguments as well.
Journal of Religious History – Wiley
Published: Dec 1, 2013