Introduction and Historiography

The kingdom of Sicily, which included the namesake island and the southern part of the Italian peninsula, was one of the most active theatres of internal crusades fought within Christendom. The main reason for this is probably that the kingdom of Sicily was, since the Norman conquest, a papal fief, and the papacy claimed the right to choose its rulers and remove unworthy ones. Another reason is more geopolitical; the kingdom of Sicily’s position, in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea and close to the Balkans and North Africa, was extremely important for any expedition aimed at the Holy Land and its control was considered an essential precondition for a successful crusade.Footnote 1

The kingdom of Sicily saw the beginnings of holy wars against the political enemies of the papacy and the first uses of crusading indulgences to that end. It was a laboratory for the development of the internal crusades. For these reasons, a thorough analysis of the phenomenon of political crusades cannot disregard the central position of the kingdom. This peculiarity was noticed by David Abulafia, who highlighted the kingdom’s role while also providing a short but comprehensive overview of the historiography on the political crusades since Hippolyte Pissard’s seminal 1912 book.Footnote 2 In particular, Abulafia showed how the preluding events, while not constituting proper crusades as such, contributed to developing the idea of holy war against the political enemies of the Church.Footnote 3

There have been, indeed, several references to the kingdom of Sicily in broader works on the political crusades. After a chapter dedicated to the political crusades in the thirteenth century by Joseph Strayer, which offered an initial analysis of their particularities compared to crusades against the Muslims,Footnote 4 the study of crusading against Christian powers was taken up more thoroughly by Norman Housley. Housley referred extensively to the kingdom in his examination of crusading against Christians. He analysed both the early developments, where he argued that it was the territorial disputes of the Church in the kingdom which led to the first grant of crusading indulgence,Footnote 5 and the full-blown crusades that followed the struggle between the papacy and Frederick II and originated from the papal-Angevin alliance, which were characterised by the granting of crusading indulgences, as well as preaching, the taking of the cross, the crusade vow, and so forth (Map 3.1).Footnote 6

Map 3.1
A map of Italy marks 15 places, including Basilicata, Principato, Sorrento, Naples, and Apulia. Sardinia is to the west, beyond the Tyrrhenian Sea. Sicily in the southwest, includes Palermo, Caltabellotta, Messina, and Syracuse. Mediterranean Sea is to the west, and Ionian Sea is to the east.

Southern Italy and Sicily [after Norman Housley, The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades Against Christian Lay Powers, 1254–1343 (Oxford, 1982), p. 258]

Full size image

However, since Abulafia’s article, no study has specifically analysed the use of the political crusades in the kingdom of Sicily and the latter’s central role in the development of this particular form of crusading. It should also be noted that in Italian scholarship, in particular, the crusades in the kingdom of Sicily (but this could be said also of the political crusades in generalFootnote 7) have rarely attracted attention, often as a result of the idea that political crusades ought not to be considered “proper” crusades.Footnote 8 One of the few exceptions is a recent article by Giuliano Milani, which focuses, in particular, on the crusade against Manfred, the illegitimate son of Frederick II Hohenstaufen, and its impact on factional conflicts in the Italian cities in the late Middle Ages.Footnote 9

This chapter will follow a chronological order to outline the different types of holy wars and crusades that targeted southern Italy and Sicily, from the Normans in the twelfth century to the war of the Sicilian Vespers, which ended in 1302, and its following developments. The wars against Roger II in 1135 and Markward of Anweiler in 1199 and the invasion of the kingdom known as the War of the Keys in 1228 will be considered first as they were the conflicts where crusading against Christians first developed in this region.

The crusade against Frederick II was the turning point. After that, when the papacy appointed Charles I of Anjou as king of Sicily, the alliance between the papacy and the House of Anjou, based on the common interest in the kingdom of Sicily, led and shaped politics in Italy. The spiritual weapons available to the papacy were crucial for the positive outcome of their political and military actions. The papacy used the crusade effectively to support the Angevins and to defeat the last heirs of the Hohenstaufen—against Manfred in 1266 and against Conradin in 1268. The crusade provided Charles with the support he needed to conquer the kingdom of Sicily, attracting many supporters from both France and Italy.Footnote 10 The situation which arose after the revolt of the Sicilian Vespers forced the papacy to use this weapon again, against the new enemies, the kingdom of Aragon and the Sicilians. Papal propaganda aimed to label the targets of the political crusades as rebels against the Church. In this perspective, the Sicilians and Peter III of Aragon were clearly rebels, as was Manfred, who ruled Sicily against his feudal lord’s will.

The crusades during the war of the Vespers aimed to maintain the integrity of the kingdom of Sicily in favour of the Angevins, the champions of the Church, but they failed miserably, in particular in attracting the participation of the Guelph cities of central and northern Italy. During the war of the Vespers, and also increasingly in the fourteenth century, the political crusades became an instrument to identify the political enemies of the Church. These crusades were also a necessity, as the popes lacked a large and structured army and, therefore, had to request aid from the whole of Christianity.Footnote 11

The Origins of Crusades against Christians

At the end of the eleventh century, the different attitude of the Church towards violence after the reform and, more importantly, the launch of the First Crusade to Jerusalem provided the papacy with the valuable authority to determine when a war was just and holy.Footnote 12 Naturally, when the political and territorial interests of the papacy were directly involved, the justice and holiness of a war were generally more likely to be asserted.

Therefore, the kingdom of Sicily, and the relationship between its rulers and the papacy, had a key role in the origin and development of the idea of a crusade against Christians. Besides Pope Leo IX’s campaign in Civitate in 1053,Footnote 13 these origins can be traced back to the early twelfth century, to the struggle between Innocent II and the Norman ruler of Sicily, Roger II, due to his support of the antipope Anacletus II. Innocent aimed to elevate the conflict against Roger to the status of holy war, with the justification that Roger employed large contingents of Muslim troops. The council of Pisa in 1135 officially declared that all those who fought against Roger were granted the same remission of sins as those who joined the expeditions to Jerusalem under Urban II.Footnote 14 As Housley remarked, the indulgence alone did not constitute a full crusade because we do not know if people had to formally make a vow and take the cross to obtain the indulgence. This indulgence was probably part of the wider papal propaganda against Roger.Footnote 15 The concrete results obtained do not seem to have been particularly beneficial to the papal cause either. It is nevertheless significant that the Church had started to offer crusading indulgences for wars against its political enemies.

However, Innocent’s successors did not follow his example. For instance, Alexander III excommunicated Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa but never proclaimed a crusade against him, even during the most furious phases of their struggle. The fact that the use of the crusade was ruled out against Barbarossa demonstrates again the importance of the kingdom of Sicily for the development of the idea of crusade against Christians. The kingdom was not, in fact, directly threatened in that conflict, and the pope did not need military aid, since he had the support of the Lombard League.Footnote 16

This changed towards the end of the century when the German adventurer Markward of Anweiler threatened the kingdom and, therefore, the papal domains. Markward tried to take advantage of the minority of Frederick II, whose kingdom was currently under the regency of Pope Innocent III, young Frederick’s tutor. Markward claimed to be in possession of the testament of Henry VI—Frederick’s deceased father—which named him Frederick’s tutor and regent of the kingdom.Footnote 17 Similarly to Roger II, Markward was usurping the papal rights to the kingdom of Sicily and Innocent was extremely quick in proclaiming the crusade and in granting the same indulgence “as for the Holy Land” to those who fought against him.Footnote 18 However, the crusade did not have a military impact, or rather, it did not have the time to fully develop because Markward conveniently died in 1202, resolving the situation. Thus it may be questioned to what extent the struggle between Innocent III and Markward of Anweiler was indeed “the first political crusade,” as it has been commonly called.Footnote 19 Firstly, it did not have the chance to become an active crusade because, although it was proclaimed, it never actually materialised. Secondly, it is not clear, from the limited evidence at our disposal, whether the full “machinery” of crusading, besides the grant of indulgences, was deployed: i.e. whether there was preaching for the campaign, whether the participants took the crusade vow, whether the sign of the cross was adopted, and so on.Footnote 20

The Crusades against the Hohenstaufen and the Arrival of the Angevins

The last case of a proto-crusade involving the kingdom of Sicily is the so-called War of the Keys. This war was the first conflict between the papacy and Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen. It was caused by the emperor’s repeated delays in launching a promised crusade to regain Jerusalem and led to an invasion of southern Italy by a papal army. The invasion proceeded despite the fact that Frederick did eventually depart for the Holy Land in 1228.Footnote 21

Although this invasion was not preached as a crusade, it had several similarities with a crusade. First, it was mainly funded through church tithes collected in northern Europe, and second, the language used by Pope Gregory IX in his accusations against Frederick resembled the vocabulary of the crusades.Footnote 22 However, the pope only threatened to treat Frederick as a heretic and promised remissions of sins at the very end of the conflict, when it was, perhaps, too late to reverse the momentum against Frederick.Footnote 23

The papal invasion of the kingdom of Sicily forced Frederick to return early from the Holy Land, where he had recovered Jerusalem without shedding blood. This resulted in a peculiar situation where the crusaders (crucesignati), who were wearing the cross in Frederick’s army, fought against those of the pope, who wore the Keys of St Peter (clavigeri), thus giving the war its name.Footnote 24 Frederick’s return quickly turned the military situation in his favour, repelling the invasion and forcing the papacy to seek a peace treaty in 1230.

This did not mean the end of the struggles between the papacy and Frederick II, which indeed were resumed with even greater ferocity ten years later. Following a second excommunication in 1239, Pope Gregory IX launched a crusade against Frederick in 1240. This crusade was mainly fought in northern Italy and did not directly involve the kingdom of Sicily; therefore, it is not addressed here but in another chapter in this volume.Footnote 25 Yet, it is significant to note that the crusade against Frederick II became an important precedent for the use and legitimacy of the crusades against Christian powers. Therefore, it is not surprising that, after Frederick II’s defeat and death, his closest allies and relatives were also targeted by the crusades.

Once again, the kingdom of Sicily was central in this development. After the deaths of Frederick in 1250 and of his son and heir, Conrad IV, in 1254, Manfred took control over the kingdom of Sicily, first as regent for the infant Conradin, Conrad’s son, and then as a self-proclaimed king. At first, the papacy tried to settle the conflict diplomatically, in the hope that the illegitimacy of Manfred’s claims over the kingdom would be widely acknowledged among the European powers and the kingdom’s subjects themselves; Pope Innocent IV had, indeed, already started negotiations with Henry III of England to grant his son, Edmund, the kingdom of Sicily.Footnote 26

Pope Alexander IV, Innocent’s successor, took matters further by launching the first crusade against Manfred between 1254 and 1255. This crusade was mostly preached in England, where it aimed to provide support to Edmund in his conquest of the kingdom from Manfred, and in the kingdom of Sicily itself, to hinder Manfred’s ability to raise internal support. Yet, it was largely unsuccessful; the crusading armies, which consisted of a few Englishmen, were defeated by Manfred, who even managed to be crowned King of Sicily at Palermo in 1258.Footnote 27 However, these defeats were somewhat counterbalanced by the Guelph victories in northern Italy against Ezzelino da Romano, a Ghibelline lord, former ally to Frederick II and a supporter of Manfred.Footnote 28

Manfred was, in fact, directly involved in the complex situation of factional conflict in central-northern Italy and supported, to his own advantage, the Ghibellines in Tuscany and Lombardy. This, in exchange, afforded him support from his father’s allies and prevented him from standing isolated against the papacy. In 1260, the Ghibellines of Siena with the crucial support of Manfred’s troops defeated the Guelphs of Florence in the battle of Montaperti and the new Ghibelline regime in Florence expelled the Guelphs. By 1261, almost the whole of Italy supported Manfred or was under his direct control.

The election to the papal throne of the Frenchman Jacques Pantaleon, named Urban IV, in 1261 radically changed the situation. The new pope abandoned the essentially failed negotiations with the kingdom of England and turned decidedly to his homeland, the kingdom of France. There he offered the kingdom of Sicily to Charles, count of Anjou and Provence and brother of King Louis IX of France. It was immediately clear that Charles was more willing and able than Edmund to join the crusade and take the kingdom of Sicily from Manfred. Charles’ name and origin allowed papal propaganda to draw from the Carolingian tradition and outline a continuity of relationships between the House of France and the papacy since Charlemagne’s age.Footnote 29 Moreover, Charles had already started to gain control of some territories in the Italian peninsula by crossing the Alps and invading southern Piedmont.Footnote 30 This allowed him to gradually establish relationships with the Italian towns and especially the Guelph parties within them. From the outset, the Angevin expedition to southern Italy constituted a crusade as it was preached as such and indulgences were granted.Footnote 31 It was preached in France, Provence, and, of course, Lombardy, Tuscany, and the Papal States. The crusade call was decisive in providing Charles with the support he needed to conquer the kingdom of Sicily, attracting many supporters from both France and Italy.Footnote 32

The balance of power soon shifted from the Ghibellines to the Guelphs while many supporters in the north started to abandon Manfred. Only the Tuscan Ghibellines remained loyal to him, but the crusade had convinced many bankers from Florence and Siena to side with the Guelphs, and therefore Charles, and to invest in the successful Angevin conquest of the kingdom of Sicily. Giuliano Milani has shown how the papacy granted these bankers absolutions from excommunication, in exchange for their defection from Manfred and the Ghibellines, and for their financial and political support of the crusade and Charles.Footnote 33

The support of the Tuscan bankers hugely contributed to the success of the crusade and, at the same time, the success of the Angevins was decisive for the Tuscan Guelphs to regain control over their towns, in particular Florence. Therefore, differently from the previous crusades and holy wars in southern Italy, there was a larger support and direct involvement from central-northern Italy. The reason for this is that the crusade against Manfred was not perceived as a struggle that only concerned the Church and its interests; instead, it acquired a wider meaning because Manfred was allied with the Ghibellines, who still controlled large parts of central-northern Italy, and Charles presented himself as the champion of the Guelphs. The Guelphs, therefore, saw in the crusade and in Charles’ expedition the opportunity to gain control over their towns and oust the Ghibellines.

Pope Urban IV’s death in 1264 did not change things. His successor, Clement IV, also a Frenchman, launched another crusade against Manfred in 1265 and crowned Charles King of Sicily in Rome in January 1266. A crusading army, which also contained Guelph troops from northern Italy, joined him there and soon invaded the kingdom, defeating and killing Manfred in the battle of Benevento on 26 February. Manfred’s support collapsed, and Charles soon took control of the whole kingdom.Footnote 34

The last crusade against the Hohenstaufen was preached in 1268 against the young Conradin, Conrad IV’s son, who attempted to invade Italy and regain the kingdom of Sicily. Another crusade was proclaimed at the same time against the Muslim colony of Lucera, in Apulia, which rose against the Angevins in support of Conradin. Conradin was defeated in Tagliacozzo in August 1268 and then executed in Naples in October. Lucera held out for a little longer, but eventually fell to the Angevins in August 1269.Footnote 35 For the following thirteen years Angevin control over the kingdom of Sicily—and, in part, over the rest of Italy—was maintained thanks to the alliance with the papacy and the crusades. However, the revolt of the Sicilian Vespers, in March 1282, followed by the Aragonese invasion and occupation of Sicily, rocked the region and required further papal intervention and more crusades in support of the Angevins. This time, however, crusades were not preached in order to conquer the kingdom but to defend it and maintain its integrity.

The War of the Sicilian Vespers and the Crusades: Papal Support of the Angevins

Before analysing the situation, it might be helpful to provide a brief overview of the events and dates of these crusades. During the first three years of the war of the Sicilian Vespers (1282–1285), the collaboration between the papacy and the Angevin monarchy was at its peak. Throughout those years, the shock of the revolt and the Aragonese occupation of Sicily required a strong and quick response. In 1282, Pope Martin IV excommunicated Peter III of Aragon, the Sicilians, the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos and the Ghibelline leaders Conrad of Antioch and Guido da Montefeltro.Footnote 36 Initially, Martin hoped for a diplomatic solution and did not proclaim a crusade. The crusaders, reported by Bartholomew of Neocastro, who participated in the siege of Messina (1282) during the first Angevin counterattack, were probably already there in preparation for Charles’ planned campaign against the Byzantine Empire, which was to depart from Messina later that year.Footnote 37 Charles attempted to portray this campaign as a crusade, although the pope never proclaimed it as such.Footnote 38 This hypothesis is also confirmed by Saba Malaspina’s account.Footnote 39

The crusading indulgence to those who fought against Peter of Aragon and the Sicilians was instead granted in 1283, when it became clear that Peter would not easily abandon Sicily and after Charles and Peter had arranged a duel (not appreciated by the Church) to decide the fate of Sicily.Footnote 40 Two parallel crusades, aimed at two different objectives, developed: one aimed at the reconquest of Sicily by the Angevins, and another aimed at the kingdom of Aragon. Later that year, the pope deposed Peter and deprived him of his kingdom, which was assigned to the son of the king of France, Charles of Valois.Footnote 41 This was the moment when the crusade against Aragon actually began. The deposition released the subjects from their obligations to the sovereign and allowed any Christian kingdom to attack Aragon. Yet the rest of Europe answered coldly to this call to crusade and, understandably, only the king of France was really interested in it. The invasion of Aragon started in 1285 and resulted in a complete humiliation for the French, resulting in the death of King Philip III that year.Footnote 42 The Aragonese crusade suffered from very limited participation because it primarily suited the king of France and was mostly preached in his lands.Footnote 43 The only support outside of France came from Mallorca—whose king opposed Peter of Aragon—and, occasionally, from some Genoese families, such as the De Mari.Footnote 44 The Aragonese superiority at sea was decisive and, after the French retreat of 1285, there were no more important military actions in Aragon, although the excommunication and the deposition of the king remained in place until 1295, when Charles of Valois finally renounced his claims to the kingdom.Footnote 45

Meanwhile, the crusade to Sicily was not successful either. The Aragonese army even landed in Calabria and threatened the very existence of the Angevin kingdom on the mainland. Once again, the Aragonese fleet led by Roger of Lauria was far superior and consistently defeated the Angevins. In 1284, during one of these battles, Charles the Lame, heir to the Angevin throne was captured near Naples and brought first to Sicily and then to Aragon.Footnote 46 In 1285, all the main characters of that period (Charles of Anjou, Pope Martin IV, Peter of Aragon, and Philip III of France) died and a new phase of the war began. The papacy had to take control of operations in the kingdom of Sicily due to Charles II’s captivity and the new pope, Honorius IV, was willing to continue the war effort. This phase of the war should no longer be considered a crusade because the pope did not issue new crusade bulls.Footnote 47 However, Honorius continued to assign ecclesiastic tenths collected in many areas to the war in Sicily.Footnote 48 This same policy continued at the beginning of Nicholas IV’s pontificate,Footnote 49 while he was also negotiating for Charles II’s release.Footnote 50 After his coronation, the papal will to continue the war clashed with Charles’ intention to abandon a conflict so expensive in terms of both finances and lives. However, after the crusade was renewed, the possibility of peace soon became unlikely.Footnote 51

In 1289, the Siculo-Aragonese armies advanced in Calabria and moved against Gaeta, in the northern part of the kingdom. The presence of crusaders engaged in the siege of Gaeta to help the Angevins is attested by Bartholomew of Neocastro, who also mentioned Guelphs from other parts of the Regno, Tuscany and Lombardy.Footnote 52 The collection of the tithes destined for the negotium Siciliae, that is the crusade in support of the Angevins, continued and was reiterated many times throughout this period in various regions of Italy.Footnote 53 Meanwhile the crusading indulgence for those fighting James of Aragon (Peter’s successor) and the Sicilians in Gaeta was renewed twice (in 1290 and 1291)Footnote 54 and the general crusade was renewed again during Nicholas’ pontificate in 1291.Footnote 55

With the election of Pope Boniface VIII in 1294, the papal political initiatives regarding Sicily increased. The treaty of Anagni (1295), promoted by the pope, was supposed to end the war but it failed. The treaty provided for a peace between James of Aragon and Charles II of Anjou, and the return of Sicily to the Angevins in exchange for the lifting of James’ excommunication, the renunciation of Charles of Valois of the Aragonese crown, and the right for James to invade Sardinia and Corsica. However, the Sicilian barons did not accept this treaty and proclaimed James’ brother Frederick (III) as king of Sicily. In accordance with the terms of the treaty, James of Aragon and Charles II joined their forces to gain control of Sicily. The papacy supported them; three new crusades were declared by Boniface against Frederick III of Sicily in 1296, 1299, and 1302, and tenths were collected in central-northern Italy.Footnote 56 This helped the Angevin recovery of Calabria, but Frederick and the Sicilians resisted all attacks on the island until peace was agreed at Caltabellotta in 1302. This peace acknowledged the status quo and granted Frederick the title of King of Trinacria (i.e. the island of Sicily) until his death, while the Angevin dynasty would nominally keep the kingdom of Sicily—in reality, southern Italy—and was supposed to regain the island only at Frederick’s death.

Leaving aside all the individual events of these wars and crusades, it is rather significant that, during twenty years of war, the crusade against the Sicilians was declared at least six times by four different popes and yet it accomplished nothing, as was the case with crusading against Aragon. The fact that the crusade was renewed so many times in a short period demonstrates, ex contrario, that it was widely unsuccessful, despite being continuously funded by church tenths collected throughout Italy and in parts of France. In particular, it seems that these crusades were almost ignored by the Guelph cities of central-northern Italy which did not provide the support that both the papacy and the Angevin kings expected and needed.Footnote 57

Housley’s seminal book showed the importance of the Guelph role in the Italian crusades, especially those against Manfred and the Ghibellines. However, the crusades launched in the context of the war of the Sicilian Vespers should not be considered in the same way. It is not easy to track precisely the composition of the crusading armies in Sicily and, consequently, the presence in them of militias from the Guelph cities of the north, yet, it is possible to argue that their presence and effectiveness was not decisive. With the exception of some phases of the war (especially the first three years and the siege of Gaeta), the lack of evidence of armies from the Guelph cities of northern Italy suggests that the Sicilian crusades were not met with high levels of enthusiasm in those regions, despite being preached and financed almost continuously throughout the twenty years of their duration. It was probably to justify this that the Guelph chronicler Salimbene de Adam reported instead that a crusade was not preached due to the deaths of Charles I and Martin IV—which we know is not true, as the crusade had already been preached for years by that point.Footnote 58

Housley remarked on the Guelphs’ role in the Italian crusades, mentioning the evidence of the wide response to the preaching against Manfred or the Visconti of Milan and, at the same time, the presence of Guelph crusaders at the siege of Gaeta.Footnote 59 However, given the abundance of evidence on the crusading armies from the Guelph cities in these crusades, the scarcity of evidence regarding the Sicilian crusades stands out. This seems to suggest that the crusades related to the war of the Vespers (including the crusade in Aragon) were a complete failure in northern Italy. One reason for this could be that, despite the various papal attempts to trace the Sicilian war back to the struggle against Frederick II and the Hohenstaufen, it was probably perceived by the Guelphs as a private matter of the Church and its Angevin allies.Footnote 60 Moreover, it is significant to note that the Italian cities continued to favour overseas crusades. For instance, in 1290, when Pope Nicholas IV had resumed preaching the Sicilian crusade, 600 men from Parma took the cross and went to the Holy Land to defend Acre.Footnote 61 One might argue that the crusade against Manfred concerned in particular the kingdom of Sicily and Charles of Anjou, and yet received a large response in northern Italy; but in that case the struggle against Frederick II was more recent and Manfred really exemplified his legacy. In addition, Manfred was supported by the Ghibellines; therefore, especially in Tuscany, the Guelph exiles supported Charles so that they could defeat their enemies and regain control of their cities. This is, indeed, what happened in Florence.

Therefore, there is no evidence of any crusading army from the Guelph towns of northern Italy in the Sicilian crusade outside the years 1282–1285 and the siege of Gaeta (1289). These two exceptions can be explained by the influence the Angevin monarchy had on the Guelphs while Charles I was alive—for the former—and by the serious threat the kingdom of Sicily was facing—for the latter. Despite the several renewals of the crusade during the 1290s, no other expedition from northern Italy was sent in response to the call. The difference between the crusades launched during the war of the Vespers and those against Manfred lies probably in what was at stake for the Guelphs.

After Charles I’s death, during Charles II’s captivity and during his reign, the connections between the city-republics and the kingdom of Sicily diminished; therefore, the Guelph cities, although they did not question the alliance with the Angevins, must have felt less involved in the problems of the kingdom of Sicily. In addition, the Guelph front was not cohesive anymore and there were internal struggles and splits. Instead, as long as Charles I was alive, there was a response to the crusade from some Guelph cities, albeit not widespread. As Paolo Grillo recently summarised, this is true for both Guelphs and Ghibellines. The Aragonese reference to the Hohenstaufen—although certainly authentic for the family connections and the several former Hohenstaufen supporters who fought for them—was, in this period, more propaganda than an actual political plan. The real consequence of the war of the Vespers—and, indirectly, the cause of the failure of the crusades launched during the war—was to distance the Angevins from their interests in northern Italy and force them to focus on the reconquest of Sicily, and this, indirectly, caused the failure of the crusades launched during the war.Footnote 62

However, not surprisingly, evidence of militias sent by the communal institutions in Charles’ aid can be found only from Florence and Bologna, perhaps the most radical pro-Angevin, Guelph cities. According to Giovanni Villani, Florence sent 600 men—simply described as “knights” or “young nobles”—to help Charles immediately after the revolt of the Vespers, so it is debatable whether they should be considered crusaders because this was before the preaching of the crusade.Footnote 63 In any case, they could later benefit from the indulgence and participated in the siege of Messina.Footnote 64 It is not clear what happened to this army in the following phases of the war, but, according to the later fifteenth-century history of Leonardo Bruni, they were soon dismissed by Charles himself and sent back to Florence, but Bruni did not provide a reason for this.Footnote 65 In the following years of the war, no evidence exists of other armies sent from Florence to Sicily or even spontaneous groups of crusaders. When Charles II (1289) was released from his captivity, he passed through Florence and an army was assembled to escort him around Tuscany, but they did not follow him to the kingdom of Sicily, probably because the threat from the Ghibellines of Arezzo was strong.Footnote 66 Although they did not send armies, Florence continuously backed the crusading effort through the financial support of their bankers to the papacy.Footnote 67

There also is evidence of a militia sent to Sicily from Bologna. In this case, the chronicles report that 400 men were sent in 1284, soon after the naval battle of Naples where Charles II was captured.Footnote 68 As with the Florentines, it is unclear if they were crusaders, but, at that time, the crusade had already been declared and probably preached, so they could well have been. Yet, we do not know anything else about this militia, such as its role in the war of the Vespers, or whether some of its members successfully returned to Bologna. This lack of information, however, suggests that the expedition was not successful and might explain also why no other expedition to Sicily followed, despite the other crusading calls. Instead, the crusade to Acre (1290) obtained a good response, such as in Parma where, according to one chronicler, 600 Bolognese joined 10,000 other Italians who went to the Holy Land.Footnote 69 While these numbers are probably overestimated, the fact is itself significant. This demonstrates once again that, at least in northern Italy, the Sicilian crusade was not perceived to be as important as the “proper” crusades to the Holy Land. Despite the preaching, it seems that in most regions of northern Italy, the common mentality continued to prioritise the crusades against the Muslims and most people would rather face a long and uncertain journey than fight in Sicily, perhaps also with the prospect of greater fortunes.

Bologna, however, did not fail to demonstrate its support to the Angevins and the Sicilian crusade through other means: a resolution approved with a large majority by the Council of the Popolo in 1293 established that the Commune would send 4000 gold florins to Charles II for the passagii generalis (i.e. the crusade) faciendi in partibus Sicilie.Footnote 70 Regarding other cities, the evidence of armies sent to Sicily is scarce. We know for sure from Bartholomew of Neocastro, who was an eyewitness, that crusaders from Tuscany and Lombardy participated at the siege of Gaeta (1289) to help Charles II soon after his coronation, but not much else.Footnote 71 Also Giovanni Villani reported that other cities in Tuscany and Lombardy sent help to Charles, but he did not give details.Footnote 72 In both these cases, the reference to Lombardy might also include the crusaders from Bologna. According to the author of the Annales Placentini Gibellini, who reported this with a touch of irony, Charles sought help in Lombardy, but he did not obtain any from Piacenza.Footnote 73

After the Peace of Caltabellotta (1302): The Fading of the Sicilian Crusades

Frederick III’s resounding political victory, obtained with the peace of Caltabellotta, after having successfully faced both Angevin and Aragonese armies, and the international acknowledgement of his possession of Sicily, was not enough for him. His ties with the Ghibellines became apparent and this was clear since his coronation, when Frederick demanded to be recognised as Frederick III. This was a direct reference to the Hohenstaufen tradition because he was actually the second king of Sicily named Frederick, but the previous was the emperor Frederick II. This choice became the evident “manifesto” of Frederick’s political idea to restore the Hohenstaufen legacy, remembered with nostalgia in Sicily, in the name of his mother Constance, daughter of Manfred. Moreover, this choice met the prophetic beliefs, present in Sicily, regarding a “third Frederick” who would restore the Holy Roman Empire and rule the world.Footnote 74

This ideological reference to the Ghibelline and Hohenstaufen tradition was soon accompanied by concrete choices in foreign politics. In the early years after the peace, Frederick’s support of the Italian Ghibellines did not go beyond hospitality to the exiles and some trade licences, because he was not ready to resume the war.Footnote 75 The new King of the Romans Henry VII of Luxembourg, and the preparations for his arrival in Italy, offered Frederick the right occasion to return as a protagonist on the international stage. Although initially Henry dealt carefully with the parties and tried to act as a pacificator in harmony with Pope Clement V and King Robert of Anjou (Charles II’s successor) and, therefore, refused to negotiate with Frederick, he was soon overwhelmed by the complexity of the Italian situation and sought Ghibelline support. When, as a result, Robert became Henry’s main opponent, it was natural for Henry to turn towards Frederick.

After a brief negotiation, they agreed on an alliance in early 1312. It established that Frederick would send troops to serve with Henry while Henry committed to defend and support Frederick against anyone except the pope and the king of France, notably excluding Robert.Footnote 76 Frederick was also appointed imperial admiral and the emperor ordered the maritime republics of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa to obey him.Footnote 77 This deal, although sanctioning the resurgence of the war and the end of the good relationships with the papacy and the Guelph cities, was met with the Sicilians’ general favour. Ideology certainly played a key role in the alliance between Frederick and Henry; both the recall of the Hohenstaufen tradition and the obedience Frederick felt he owed Henry as Holy Roman Emperor were important in this alliance, but there were also practical reasons.Footnote 78 Frederick has often been criticised by historians for the decision to bind himself to the Ghibellines’ fate and doom Sicily to a destiny of poverty and irrelevance, but, at that time, this was the logical choice to make.Footnote 79 His overarching goal was to give Sicily a legitimate, stable reigning dynasty, with the favour of the Sicilians and a bond with a glorious past. Robert of Naples and the treaty of Caltabellotta itself, which established that, at Frederick’s death, Sicily would return to the Angevins, threatened this aim. The alliance with Henry and the Ghibellines offered two advantages for Frederick; it led to the encirclement of Robert, by threatening attacks from both south and north, and above all, it ruled out any alliance between Robert and Henry, which was a real possibility at that time.

With Henry’s sudden death in 1313, the dream of a strong Ghibelline league, an alternative to the Guelph-Angevin hegemony, came to an end. Yet, Frederick had the opportunity to become the leader of the Ghibellines and continue the fight; he learnt about the emperor’s death on his way to Pisa and decided to continue his trip and reach the rest of the Ghibellines anyway. There Pisa offered him the signoria of the city and all the Ghibellines and imperial troops were willing to follow him and proceed with Henry’s plan to attack the Guelphs in Florence and Siena and, afterwards, Robert of Naples himself. Frederick, however, worried about Sicily, which was now open to Robert’s attacks, refused and returned to his kingdom. He continued to help the Ghibellines financially, but the war against the Angevins resumed and Sicily suffered several attacks in the following years, so this became Frederick’s main concern. He managed to obtain a peace and continued to support the Ghibelline lords of Milan, Verona, and Mantua, but he never found the opportunity to overturn the balance of power in their favour and jeopardise Robert’s domination, not even when the emperor Louis IV of Bavaria arrived in Italy in 1327.Footnote 80 That expedition failed, as had Henry’s before, and Frederick continued to be considered an enemy of the Church. When he died in 1337, the dream of restoring the Hohenstaufen legacy and reuniting the kingdom of Sicily died with him.Footnote 81

During this period, the political action of the papacy against its enemies strengthened. This was due to the transfer of the papacy to Avignon, which forced it to strongly reaffirm claims to rule in central Italy, but also to the Ghibelline recovery that followed Henry VII’s expedition. The use of the crusade became a crucial part of this political action.Footnote 82 Under Pope John XXII (1316–1334), the use of the political crusade in Italy against the enemies of the Church reached its peak. Following Henry’s intervention, Ghibelline regimes were established in Milan, Verona, Mantua, Lucca, and the central area of the Papal States. The main focus of papal politics under John XXII became, therefore, northern Italy, while setting aside the Sicilian issue. In fact, no crusade was declared against Frederick of Sicily during John’s papacy, despite the extensive use he made of that weapon in northern Italy. This, along with other quarrels regarding the political action in Lombardy, slowly distanced the pope from Robert of Anjou, who instead made repeated attempts to regain Sicily.Footnote 83

In the 1320s the disagreements between Robert of Anjou and Pope John XXII had increased.Footnote 84 This is because John’s use of the crusade did not entirely meet Robert’s needs, who, instead, would have preferred a renewal of the Sicilian crusade. During the crusades against the Ghibellines in northern Italy, Robert maintained the control of the military operations in lieu of the papal legates, but these engagements diverted his attention from the possibility of regaining Sicily. Robert asked John to declare a crusade against Sicily several times and even resided in Avignon between 1319 and 1324, trying to influence the pope, but he obtained nothing.Footnote 85 The pope, instead, acted as a territorial lord himself. Frederick of Sicily was no longer an immediate threat to the papal domain, unlike the Ghibelline lords of the north, and so the crusades in southern Italy faded.

Conclusion

Even though it would be arbitrary to draw a direct, continuous development from the early twelfth-century campaigns to the full-blown crusades of the fourteenth, it appears clear that the kingdom of Sicily was central in this development.Footnote 86 The peculiarity of the relationship between the kingdom and the papacy certainly played a key role and gave the papacy reasonable motives to declare a holy war.

The use of granting indulgence to those who fought in these wars—which was a key trait of the crusades, but not adequate to define one alone—was established through several phases. In the early phases, i.e. the wars against Roger II, Markward of Anweiler, and the War of the Keys, the indulgences were not always granted at the beginning of the war, while the full machinery of crusading, such as preaching, taking the cross and the crusade vow, was not always present. In these cases, indulgences were more an attempt, often desperate, to gain an advantage in the war rather than the main tool of the campaign. This is, therefore, the main reason why these wars have been considered more proto-crusades, rather than fully realised crusades.

This changed after the crusade against Frederick II. The following wars that were declared by the papacy, and fought mostly by the Angevins, against the kingdom of Sicily were all fully fledged crusades because they involved the grant of indulgences at the very beginning, along with other associated mechanisms, including full-scale preaching and the taking of the cross and of the crusade vow by participants. However, the effectiveness of these crusades varied. While those against Manfred and Conradin were very successful and, indeed, decisive in helping Charles I’s conquest of the kingdom, the crusades that followed the revolt of the Sicilian Vespers, against the Sicilians and Aragon, were not as effective. This shows that papal proclamation and the grant of indulgences were not enough to incite large support, but, instead, local political dynamics and current needs played a key role in the choice to join a crusade against a Christian power. This is also suggested by the different responses the crusades overseas had in comparison with those against Sicily.

However, despite their failure, the crusades waged in the kingdom of Sicily provided the papacy with an effective political weapon, useful for promoting and justifying a war, in a way comparable to but different from the previous crusades against Frederick II and Manfred. Those crusades were still integrated in the context of the ideological clash with the Empire and were able to gather supporters from northern Italy more easily because their outcome would directly impact the cities themselves. The Sicilian crusades, and even more those declared in the fourteenth century by the Avignon papacy, became instead a political instrument aimed to manage power in the papal territories (and wherever the pope claimed sovereignty or authority), and identify and persecute enemies in a period when the Papal States were becoming one of the regional powers active in Italy.