The Federalist Papers

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The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the federal form of government proposed under the document. The Papers argued against the existing confederated structure under the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing system that needed fully replaced. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.[1][2]

All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.[2]

Background of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Aritcles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.[2]

The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution. They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.[3][1][2]

Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed amended, not replaced.[3][1][2]

Full list of Federalist Papers

The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

The Federalist Papers
Number Subject Author
No 1 General Introduction Hamilton
No 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence Jay
No 3 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
No 4 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
No 5 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
No 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States Hamilton
No 7 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) Hamilton
No 8 The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States Hamilton
No 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Hamilton
No 10 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't) Madison
No 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy Hamilton
No 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue Hamilton
No 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government Hamilton
No 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered Madison
No 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Hamilton
No 16 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
No 17 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
No 18 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
No 19 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
No 20 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
No 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation Hamilton
No 22 Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't) Hamilton
No 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union Hamilton
No 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Hamilton
No 25 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) Hamilton
No 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Hamilton
No 27 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
No 28 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
No 29 Concerning the Militia Hamilton
No 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation Hamilton
No 31 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
No 32 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
No 33 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
No 34 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
No 35 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
No 36 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
No 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government Madison
No 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed Madison
No 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles Madison
No 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained Madison
No 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution Madison
No 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered Madison
No 43 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) Madison
No 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States Madison
No 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered Madison
No 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared Madison
No 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts Madison
No 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other Madison
No 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention Hamilton and Madison
No 50 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered Hamilton and Madison
No 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Hamilton and Madison
No 52 The House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
No 53 The House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
No 54 The Apportionment of Members Among the States Hamilton and Madison
No 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
No 56 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
No 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation Hamilton and Madison
No 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered Madison
No 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Hamilton
No 60 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
No 61 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
No 62 The Senate Hamilton and Madison
No 63 The Senate (con't) Hamilton and Madison
No 64 The Powers of the Senate Jay
No 65 The Powers of the Senate (con't) Hamilton
No 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Hamilton
No 67 The Executive Department Hamilton
No 68 The Mode of Electing the President Hamilton
No 69 The Real Character of the Executive Hamilton
No 70 The Executive Department Further Considered Hamilton
No 71 The Duration in Office of the Executive Hamilton
No 72 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered Hamilton
No 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power Hamilton
No 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive Hamilton
No 75 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive Hamilton
No 76 The Appointing Power of the Executive Hamilton
No 77 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered Hamilton
No 78 The Judiciary Department Hamilton
No 79 The Judiciary (con't) Hamilton
No 80 The Powers of the Judiciary Hamilton
No 81 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority Hamilton
No 82 The Judiciary Continued Hamilton
No 83 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury Hamilton
No 84 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered Hamilton
No 85 Concluding Remarks Hamilton

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Footnotes