Gert Pickel · Olaf Müller (Hrsg.) Church and Religion in Contemporary Europe Veröffentlichungen der Sektion Religionssoziologie der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie Herausgegeben von Christel Gärtner Winfried Gebhardt Matthias König Gert Pickel Kornelia Sammet Gert Pickel Olaf Müller (Hrsg.) Church and Religion in Contemporary Europe Results from Empirical and Comparative Research Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. 1st Edition 2009 All rights reserved © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2009 Editorial Office: Katrin Emmerich / Tanja Köhler VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften is part of the specialist publishing group Springer Science+Business Media. www.vs-verlag.de No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Registered and/or industrial names, trade names, trade descriptions etc. cited in this publication are part of the law for trade-mark protection and may not be used free in any form or by any means even if this is not specifically marked. Cover design: KünkelLopka Medienentwicklung, Heidelberg Printing company: Krips b.v., Meppel Printed on acid-free paper Printed in the Netherlands ISBN 978-3-531-16748-0 Content Gert Pickel and Olaf Müller Introduction – The Comparative Empirical View on Religion and Religiosity ................... 7 Siniša Zrinšak and Krunoslav Nikodem Why, at all, Do We Need Religion? Religion and Morality in Post-Communist Europe. .. 13 Tadeusz Doktór Religious Pluralism and Dimensions of Religiosity: Evidence from the Project Religious and Moral Pluralism (RAMP) ............................................................................. 25 Heiner Meulemann Religiosity in Europe and in the Two Germanies: The Persistence of a Special Case as revealed by the European Social Survey ......................................................................... 35 Kimmo Kääriäinen Religion in Finland and Russia in Comparative Perspective............................................... 49 Olaf Müller Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe: Results from the PCE 2000 Survey in Comparison ..................................................................................................................... 65 Gert Pickel Secularization as an European Fate? Results from the Church and Religion in an Enlarged Europe Project 2006 ...................... 89 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff Religious Oddities: Explaining the Divergent Religious Markets of Poland and East Germany .................................................................................................................... 123 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel Church-State Relations and the Vitality of Religion in European Comparison ................ 145 Erik Sengers European Exceptionalism: Lazy Churches, Pluralism, Adherence and the Case of the Dutch Religious Cartel ............................................................................................ 167 Hermann Denz Religion, Popular Piety, Patchwork Religion .................................................................... 183 Authors .............................................................................................................................. 203 Introduction – The Comparative View on Religion and Religiosity Gert Pickel and Olaf Müller 1. Religion and religiosity from an empirical and comparative perspective: research deficits and improvements In the last decades, a broad discussion about the “new” vitality of religion took place not only in public debates but also in the social sciences, accompanied by a renewed interest in possible explanations for the development of religious values and activities across the world. Not only the notion of a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996; Fox 2004) or the “return of religion” (Riesebrodt 2000) but also the study of relations between religion and politics (Norris/Inglehart 2004) reactivated broad debates about religion and religiosity (see Taylor 2007). Although a large body of empirical work was devoted to research on the revitalization of religion (for example in Central and Eastern Europe) or on the prospects of a continuing secularization (particularly in the Western world) during the last years, there is still need for further empirical research on these topics. This mainly stems from the fact that researchers often neglected the comparative perspective, and that in terms of methodology and theory, many studies either focus on a single country, or they refer relatively strictly to a specific theoretical position. Consequently, the results are not comparable with those derived from other case studies or with those applying alternative theoretical approaches. Generally, there are relatively few attempts to discuss the results of a single study in relation to the results of empirical studies which are based on different approaches and theories. It seems that the existence of different (self-proclaimed) “paradigms” in the sociology of religion (e.g., the secularization thesis, the individualization thesis, and the supply-side based rational choice approach) rather prevents the cumulative progress in the field of the sociology of religion instead of stimulating it. We rarely find a substantial and constructive exchange between these different approaches based on accurate empirical research. In order to shed light on whether we witness a general tendency towards secularization (Berger 1967; Wilson 1982; Bruce 1992, 2002; Dobbelaere 2002), whether we are faced with a process of individualization (Luckmann 1967; Davie 1994, 2001) nowadays, or whether religious vitality rather depends on the supply of churches and other religious organizations on the market (Iannaccone 1991; Stark/Bainbridge 1987; Stark/Finke 2000; Finke/Stark 2006), we need comparative empirical analyses. However, thus far, precisely such a systematic comparative view has been seldom applied. Ever since a number of large data sets containing survey data from many countries and from different points in time such as the European/World Values Survey, the International Social Survey Programme, or the European Social Survey have been become publicly available, the number of comparative 8 Gert Pickel and Olaf Müller empirical studies on religion and religiosity has increased during the last years. However, until now, the results have mainly been presented and discussed without systematically relating them to findings from other surveys. Of course, with this book, we will not solve all of the above-mentioned challenges of comparative sociological research on religion and religiosity today. But it is our hope that the book will help to narrow the gap between the theoretical discussions in the field on the one hand and the empirical work on the other hand to a certain extent. It seems sensible to first present recently conducted empirical comparative studies and to introduce the data sources upon which they are based. Thus, it is the main aim of the book to give the reader an overview of what is done in the field and to allow him or her to relate the findings to the theoretical assumptions and approaches discussed in the contemporary sociology of religion. Apart from this, the mere results presented in this book may also be of value in so far as they provide a more concrete picture of the situation of religion and religiosity in Europe today. 2. Underlying theoretical approaches: secularization, individualization, and the market approach In order to facilitate the attribution of the results presented in the subsequent chapters, the following explanations serve to briefly present the approaches currently most frequently discussed in the sociology of religion which serve to describe and explain religious change. First, the secularization thesis should be addressed. Proponents of this approach assume that modernisation has a negative impact on religion and religiosity. On the one hand, growing prosperity reduces feelings of vulnerability to existential insecurities, which are considered to be a key factor in driving religiosity (Norris/Inglehart 2004: 4f.). On the other hand, the social significance and plausibility of religion is undermined by processes of differentiation and the growing importance of science as a mode of world explanation (Wilson 1982; Berger 1967). Increasingly relegated to the private sector, “religion removes much of the social support that is vital to reinforcing beliefs (…) and encourages a de facto relativism that is fatal to shared beliefs” (Bruce 2002: 20). As a result, not only church membership and attendance rates decrease but more and more people no longer regard religion to be important in their lives (Bruce 2002: 41). A second position developed in contrast to the above-mentioned approach, also acknowledges the impact of modernization on religion but distinguishes between its effects on institutionalized, church-oriented religiosity on the one hand and individual, “private” religiosity on the other. Whereas the secularization theory asserts the decline in both forms, the individualization thesis expects – for exactly the same reasons outlined in the first approach – a decline in institutional forms and a privatization of religion but denies a decrease in personal religiosity. Instead, these processes are supposed to foster a pluralization of religion: people pick up ideas from different religious traditions and combine them to make up their own “patchwork” religiosity. Thus, religion may lose its significance at the societal level and may become more and more “invisible” but it remains a steady part of people’s lives (Luckmann 1967). Introduction 9 The third position of interest is the market approach. One issue that needs to be examined here is whether the degree of separation of church and state and religious pluralism affect the vitality of the religious field or not. Proponents of the market approach claim that the modern age is not necessarily diminishing religion but can even foster it, namely because it always falls short of its own (Finke/Stark 1988, 2006; Iannaccone 1991; Stark/Iannaccone 1994; Iannacone/Finke/Stark 1997; Warner 1993). According to them, it mainly stimulates religious productivity due to the economic principle of competition. The more pluralistic the religious field and the more market-oriented its organizational forms (and exactly this is assumed to happen in modern times), the more religious vitality is encouraged: under competitive conditions, the providers of religious services are forced to face the particular challenge of retaining their members and of attracting new members, responding to the needs of their clientele and offering efficient services. However, if one particular church holds a religious monopoly, its officials become indifferent and “lazy”; they lose their ability to be socially responsive. Much like in business, competition is good for religion, too. Besides, customers who are dissatisfied with a religious product in a pluralistic religious market can look for another religious product to better suit their needs, while their only alternative in a monopolistic religious structure is to turn away from religion altogether. The prerequisite for the creation of a pluralistic religious market is, according to the supporters of the economic market model, the strict separation of church and state (Chaves/Cann 1992; Iannaccone/Finke/Stark 1997; Fox 2008). Free and fair religious competition, they claim, can only develop under conditions, where the state allows the religious market free rein and refrains from favoring any religious group above the others. Only then new religious groups have access to the market and can compete with more traditional groups without incurring excessive start-up costs. And once the religious field has filled with a variety of religious products, the level of religious commitment will rise and religion will develop a vitality that it could not have achieved under monopolistic structures. 3. About the book The idea to publish this book was born several years ago but became more concrete in the year 2006. Looking back on many discussions at conferences and workshops as well as the existing literature, we increasingly came under the impression that many comparative empirical analyses had been carried out during the last decades on the one hand. On the other hand, these different studies and results hardly referred to one another. Consequently, we asked several colleagues working on such studies in different research programs to write about their current work in order to provide substantial information about the project itself, about the topics addressed and about the main results derived from the surveys they use. It is the aim of this book to show the enormous potential of empirical data we have at hand now and to present some good examples of how to use it. Although some articles refer to aggregate data, we are mainly interested in survey data. Finally, we present ten contributions, some of which use data from well-established, publicly available surveys, while others introduce smaller or newer projects. Siniša 10 Gert Pickel and Olaf Müller Zrinšak and Krunoslav Nikodem present results from the European Values Survey (EVS). Based on Rodney Stark’s study on the impact of images of God on morality (Stark 2001), they focus on the relation between religion and different social norms in Eastern and Western Europe. They show that religion, mediated by specific social circumstances and to a lesser degree in Eastern Europe, has a considerable impact on private issues (such as family and sexuality issues) but much less so on public issues (e.g., cheating on tax). Tadeusz Doktór draws on results from the Religious and Moral Pluralism project (RAMP). Pointing out the different effects religious pluralism can have on religiosity, he addresses one of the core questions of the market model of religion but also relates his findings to assumptions of the proponents of the secularization and individualization theses. Heiner Meulemann uses European Social Survey (ESS) data in order to prove the religious differences of Eastern and Western Germany in comparison to other European countries. He concludes that the gap between the two parts of Germany can still be described as the persistence of a special case: apparently, 15 years after the reunification, the differences between both parts of Germany have not decreased. Kimmo Kääriäinen compares the religious situation in Finland and Russia. He refers to the fact that both countries have developed along different paths since the beginning of the 20th century, which has resulted in a different situation of religion and religiosity today. Besides these differences, he also detects similarities: neither in Finland nor in Russia does religion serve as a normative structure for everyday life anymore. In both countries, religious institutions are not considered in a very positive light. However, in both Finland and Russia, popular religion still holds ground at the individual level. Olaf Müller presents results from the Political Culture in Central and Eastern Europe project (PCE 2000). With regard to the churchliness and religiosity among East Europeans, he concludes that one can neither claim a disappearance, nor a universal tendency towards religious re-vitalization. Whereas traditional forms of religiosity are found to have declined in many (but not in all) countries and particularly among the younger generation, the picture regarding “alternative” and “newer” forms seems to be more complex. He particularly stresses the impact of socialisation during childhood as an explanatory factor for the development of religiosity. Referring to the Church and Religion in an Enlarged Europe survey (C&R 2006), Gert Pickel discusses the question of whether the secularization thesis is outdated or still relevant to the explanation of the development of religiosity in Europe. According to him, secularization theory offers more explanatory potential than the other two approaches but contextual differences and path-dependency have to be included in the secularization theory. He considers arguments of the market approach or the individualisation theory to be helpful but only as an additional part of a complex secularization theory. An affinity to the market approach can hardly be ignored in the article by Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff. Their analysis of two “anomalies” of the market approach, Poland and Eastern Germany, shows that they can be explained if one includes the demand side in the approach. Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel concentrate on another question dealing with a core issue of the market model in asking whether a strong church-state relationship supports or hinders religious vitality. They also address a question pertaining to different views of the secularization and the individualization thesis: are we witnessing a remnant religiosity which differs from Introduction 11 traditional relations to the (Christian) churches? Although their results do not confirm any of these approaches in full, they find only little evidence for the validity of the market approach in Europe. Two further studies, which are not comparative but closely related to the topics addressed in this book, have also been included. Erik Sengers also refers to the market approach and points out the particular situation of the Dutch church. His main conclusion is, that religious pluralism does not necessarily lead to competition. In this respect, the ecumenical practice of the Dutch churches is considered to be counter-productive, precisely because it avoids competition and leads to decreasing religious vitality. Hermann Denz discusses some central claims of the individualization thesis and analyzes the relation of everyday magic and patchwork religiosity. According to him, a new kind of spirituality, which no longer draws on Christianity but rather on other religious models, is increasingly replacing traditional folk piety. This results in the fact that the current situation is characterized by a broad variety of spiritual forms adhered to by different social groups. As mentioned before, the book may be read in different ways. We are sure that every single chapter in this book will be of great value in itself to everyone interested in the topic of religion and religiosity today. However, we aim for the book to be more than the mere sum of its parts: the data bases and indicators used in this volume and the perspectives of the articles may differ – as some interpretations may do, too. But the questions addressed are the same or at least they are quite similar to each other. The theoretical framework provided above should help to relate the findings of this book to each other in terms of the current debates in sociology of religion. Last but not least, we consider the book as a plea for theory-driven, comparative, empirical work in the sociology of religion. Results, which are of relevance to the progress of scientific knowledge about the role of religion in the modern world can only be obtained on the basis of solid data, which has been carefully analyzed with an adequate methodology. We are aware of the fact that the quantitative approach we propose here faces many problems and difficulties. But this should by no means result in renouncing it altogether, mainly for the following three reasons: first, only comparative analyses can offer a more global view on the topics addressed. Second, in order to fulfil the proposition of comparability, we need quantitative research designs. Third, to us, quantitative comparative analysis seems to be the most appropriate way to produce results that are inter-subjectively revisable. Provided that in doing so, the good standards of comparative research are observed, an increasing use of this methodology would be very desirable for the future. Introductions usually conclude with acknowledgements and dedications. In line with this tradition, we would like to thank Wiebke Breustedt, who revised and translated most of the articles in this book and Ulrich Schmiedel, who do the formatting-work. We would like to dedicate this book to Tadeusz Doktór and Hermann Denz, who passed away all too soon. We miss them as colleagues and as friends. Gert Pickel and Olaf Müller 12 4. Literature Berger, Peter L. (1967): The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York. Bruce, Steve (2002): God is Dead. Secularization in the West. Oxford. Bruce, Steve (ed.)(1992): Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis. Oxford. Chaves, Mark/Cann, David E. (1992): Regulation, Pluralism and Religious Market Structure: Explaining Religion´s Vitality. In: Rationality & Society 4: 272-290. Davie, Grace (2001): Patterns of Religion in Western Europe: An Exceptional Case. In: Fenn, Richard K. (ed.): 264-278. Dobbelaere, Karel (2002): Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels. Brussels. Fenn, Richard K. (ed.): Sociology of Religion. Oxford. Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (1988): Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious Mobilization in American Cities. In: American Sociological Review 53: 41-49. Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (2006): The Churching of America 1576-2005: Winners and Losers in our Religious Economy. New Brunswick. Fox, Jonathan (2004): Religion, Civilization, and Civil War. Lanham. Fox, Jonathan (2008): A World Survey of Religion and the State. Cambridge. Huntington, Samuel P. (1996): The Clash of Civilizations. New York. Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1991): The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the Economics of Religion. In: Rationality and Society 3: 156-177. Iannaccone, Laurence R./Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (1997): Deregulation Religion: The Economics of Church and State. In: Economic Inquiry 35: 350-364. Luckmann, Thomas (1967): The Invisible Religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. New York. Norris, Pippa/Inglehart, Ronald (2004): Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. New York. Riesebrodt, Martin (2000): Die Rückkehr der Religionen. Fundamentalismus und der „Kampf der Kulturen“. München. Stark, Rodney (2001): Gods, Rituals, and the Moral Order. In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40: 619636. Stark, Rodney/Bainbridge, William Sims (1987): A Theory of Religion. New Brunswick. Stark, Rodney/Finke, Roger (2000): Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley. Stark, Rodney/Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1994): A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the „Secularization“ of Europe. In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33: 230-252. Taylor, Charles (2007): A Secular Age. London. Warner, Stephen R. (1993): Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States. In: American Journal of Sociology 98: 1044-1093. Wilson, Bryan (1982): Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford. Why, at all, do we need Religion? Religion and Morality in Post-Communist Europe1 Siniša Zrinšak and Krunoslav Nikodem 1. Revitalisation of religion in post-communism: causes and consequences Continuing debates about the secularization process in Europe, and particularly about the impact of secularization on different aspects of individual and social life, got one another dimension after 1989. Up to then officially atheist part of Europe collapsed and religion generally got new, previously unimaginable possibilities of public acting. This process, usually marked as revitalization process, started to dominate both social life and scientific researches. However, the story has been far from being clear. At least three parallel processes have been noticed and discussed..2 First, the revitalization of religion is clearly confirmed, at least on two basic grounds. The first one is connected with the role of Churches in public life. The pre-Communist time was not resurrected but (particularly dominant) Churches resumed much of their power lost after 1945. They re-established their official ties with states (in the case of the Catholic Churches by international agreements with the Holy See), they re-entered public schools, returned much of their properties and got big media attention. The second aspect was visible from the data on individual connections with Churches and/or religion. Although the base line was very different among different countries, they all noticed the trend of rising religiosity in the late 80s and early 90s. Although noticeable the revitalization trend did not occur in the same pace in different countries but, moreover, the striking thing is that differences in the level of religiosity among countries have remained so big, bigger than in Western Europe. Those who claim belonging to religious denomination range in 1999 from 97.6% in Romania and 95.7% in Poland through 70.0% and 57.7% in Bulgaria and Hungary respectively to only 33.5% and 24.8% in the Czech Republic and Estonia respectively. In the light of these data any speech about the revitalization for a large group of countries (even if it is, up to certain level, true) has become almost meaningless. Third and apart from the limited revitalization in some countries, many researches pointed out contradictory aspects of the new social life of religion. According to the existing sociological literature these contradictory aspects can be further subdivided in different branches. The majority of approaches paid attention to adaptation problem: Churches generally want to awake their pre-communist position what is hardly possible in changed modern world. Confused expectations from the public complicates the picture: at the same 1 2 Earlier versions of the paper were presented by S. Zrinšak at the ASR Annual Conference, San Francisco, 13-15 August 2004 and at the ISORECEA Conference, Budapest, 9-11 December 2004. This part of paper is based on numerous sources such as: Borowik/Babiski, 1997; Borowik, 1999; Borowik/Tomka, 2001; Marinovic/Jerolimov/Zrinšak/Borowik, 2004; Pollack, 2001; Tomka/Zulehner, 1999; Zrinšak, 2002; Zrinšak, 2004. 14 Siniša Zrinšak and Krunoslav Nikodem time the majority rejects political involvement and even public social role of Churches (epitomized in the phrase: priests should restrict their activities to Church buildings) but expect their involvement in public issues, such as rising poverty and inequality, rights of workers, etc. These contradictory expectations can be connected with very visible ideological (left-right) social division and debates about the proper role of Churches in modern world. The position of religious minorities in post-Communist Europe emphasizes the old dilemma: how to reconcile different social significance of certain religions with the principle of equality of all religions in a secular state. Third, expectation of quick secularization according to quick modernization of societies after 1989 and different social reforms they are undertaking is already shifting the scientific focus from the revitalization to further diminishing of social relevance of religion. Expected secularization will certainly shape future debates about consequential impacts of religion in secularized Europe. Yet, this debate is both possible and needed in the light of the fact that many post-Communist countries are already today more secular (atheist?) in comparison to many Western European countries. It is, however, very interesting that these consequential aspects have been up to now more revealed by theologians than sociologists from Eastern European countries. Starting from the normative approach they have rightly noticed that “new religiosity” does not in many cases mean the rise of “true believers”. New and welcomed public position of religion was immediately jeopardized by false believers and new threats coming from an increasingly secularized society. In communism so desperately dreamed liberty could be now even seen as a gift from a devil and the question spontaneously arises: why, at all, do we need liberty? 2. Gods, rituals and the moral order: the recent lesson by Rodney Stark What does it mean to be religious? What difference does it make? Rodney Stark (2001) questions a widespread belief that religion functions to sustain moral order, and particularly that it is only through participation in collective rituals that people are bound into a moral community. Stark’s work is based on four hypotheses he confirms in his analysis: 1. In many societies, religion and morality will not be linked; 2. This linkage will tend to be limited to more complex culture; 3. The effects of religiousness on individual morality are contingent on images of gods as conscious, morally-concerned beings; religiousness based on impersonal or unmoral gods will not influence moral choices; 4. Participation in religious rites and rituals will have little or no independent effect on morality. Correlation between religion and morality (i.e. three moral statements researched inside the 1990 World Values Study) showed that moral statements are more linked to the importance of God than to the Church attendance but also that this linkage is particularly weak in postcommunist Europe. The particular situation of Eastern Europe is explained in two following hypotheses: Why, at all, do we need religion? 15 1. Communist efforts to weaken the link between religion and morality will show up in substantially weaker correlations in the nonorthodox nations of Eastern Europe than found in Western Europe; 2. Within Eastern Europe, the more remote orthodox conception of God will result in correlations that are weaker in orthodox nations than in nonorthodox nations. In combination with the effects of Communist repression, this will result in a lack of any significant correlations between God and morality in the orthodox nations, except in Romania. If religion can not demonstrate its power to sustain moral order in post-Communist countries does it mean that we are facing long-standing and not easily shaken effects of Communist order? Has post-Communist revitalization no power to change significantly this effect? What, at all, does religion serve in post-Communist societies? 3. Religion and morality in post-communism: are non-existent ties still present in the late ‘90s? This paper does not have only intention to repeat Stark’s study nine years later (and see whether some important changes happened concerning the role of religion in societies) but also to question crucial findings that religion is not capable to sustain moral order in contemporary European societies, Western and Eastern. Stark’s analysis is based on the 1990 World Values Study data which focused eight post-Communist societies: Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, Russia, Bulgaria, Belarus and Romania. He restricted the analysis only on three moral statements that were judged as unjustified by a substantial majority in each nation: (1) buying something you knew was stolen, (2) failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked car, (3) taking the drug marijuana or hashish. The European Values Study 1999/2000 on which data is based this analysis embraced 14 post-Communist countries.3 Therefore, it can serve as a reliable source of data in two senses: it focuses a wider range of post-Communist countries a decade after 1989, a decade in which a new social position of religion could has demonstrated significant social effects. Moral statements which were included in these two researches (WVS and EVS) are not completely the same but are very similar which allows a kind of comparison. Beside that, it is not clear why only statements that are found unjustified by a substantial majority in each nation should be taken into consideration. Religion should / should not and can / cannot demonstrate its affect on different moral statements, whether they are embraced by majority or not – only, in that case, we are not talking about one and unproblematic moral community, but different moral communities that interact with other social divisions of each society. Based on the 1999/2000 EVS data from 14 Western and 13 Eastern European societies the following analysis will focus the linkage between both the Church attendance and the importance of God and six moral statements. The Church attendance is measured by the fourpoint scale from (1) never to (4) at least once a week. The importance of God is measured by the ten-point scale from 1 (absolutely not important) to 10 (very important). Six moral 3 For basic information about the research and data see: www.europeanvalues.nl Siniša Zrinšak and Krunoslav Nikodem 16 statements are also measured by the degree of justification at the ten-point scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always) and they embraced both statements which are judged as unjustified by a substantial majority and statements which substantially divide societies: - (1) claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to; (2) cheating on tax if you have a chance (3) taking the drug marijuana or hashish (4) married men/women having an affair (5) homosexuality (6) abortion The further analysis is based on two steps. First, it will show and discuss the level of acceptance of each statement in different societies. Second, it will analyze correlations between two measures of religiosity and 6 moral statements in each society. Also, we checked the significance of correlation with the regression analysis and discuss the results, although the results are not shown here mostly because of large number of issues and size of the tables. 4. Moral statements: religious and/or cultural norms? The table 1 shows the level of acceptance of different moral statements in 14 Western and 13 Eastern European societies by the mean value at the scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always). Table 1: Mean value of acceptance of different moral statements Western Europe4 Eastern Europe5 Catholic countries6 (1) Claiming benefit… 2.41 2.30 2.14 (2) Cheating on tax… 2.51 2.61 2.53 (3) Taking hashish 2.16 1.52 1.76 (4) Having affair 2.40 2.70 2.34 (5) Homosexuality 5.40 2.88 3.80 (6) Abortion 4.79 4.37 3.88 Graphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the same in more details for two statements, one for which differences between Western and Eastern Europe are the smallest (claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to) and one for which differences are the greatest (homosexuality). 4 5 6 Western Europe: France, Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Northern Ireland, and Ireland. Eastern Europe: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Catholic countries are those with more than 70% of Catholics: Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Lithuania, Poland and Croatia. Why, at all, do we need religion? Graph 1: 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Mean value of justification of the statement “claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to” on the ten-point scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always) in 14 Western European countries 3,38 FR 1,90 GB GER AUS IT 2,55 2,11 Graph 3: 2,34 2,44 2,74 SP POR NL 3,66 2,00 BEL DEN 2,40 2,29 SE FIN 2,13 1,89 N.IRL IRL Mean value of justification of the statement “claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to” on the ten-point scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always) in 13 Eastern European countries 3,18 EST 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2,17 2,39 1,98 Graph 2: 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 17 LAT LITH 2,36 POL 2,91 1,86 1,82 1,86 ROM BUL 1,69 CZ.R. SLVK HUN 2,29 2,82 2,83 SLV UKR 1,57 CRO RUS Mean value of justification of the statement “homosexuality” on the ten-point scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always) in 14 Western European countries 7,82 7,65 6,58 5,27 4,89 5,69 5,35 4,83 5,50 5,39 4,94 4,03 4,39 N.IRL IRL 3,19 FR GB GER AUS IT SP POR NL BEL DEN SE FIN Siniša Zrinšak and Krunoslav Nikodem 18 Table and graphs show some very interesting aspects of acceptance. Irrespectively of some country differences acceptance of the first four statements is generally low in all countries. Eastern Europeans are something more inclined to cheat on tax or to cheat their spouses but are less inclined to justify taking the drug marijuana or hashish. Differences are also not so big concerning abortion. Although this finding seems strange it should be noted that Communist regimes in the name of liberation of women allowed very liberal anti-abortion laws (except in Romania). The greatest and clear difference is shown in the case of homosexuality which is double more accepted in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. Graph 4: 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Mean value of justification of the statement “homosexuality” on the ten-point scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always) in 13 Eastern European countries 5,47 2,98 EST 4,91 4,61 2,89 1,89 1,88 1,44 LAT LITH POL CZ.R. SLVK HUN 1,9 ROM 2,6 2,4 2,19 BUL CRO RUS 2,34 SLV UKR Another interesting thing is the position of the Catholic countries. They differ in first four cases from both Western and Eastern Europe, but not substantially. Again, the greatest difference comes from the last two statements, which cover moral issues which usually the Catholic Church finds as very important for its moral teaching. Well, in the case of homosexuality, the Catholics countries are above the mean for Eastern Europe, what is clearly not the case for abortion. That proves that the Catholic countries have some distinctive traits, but it proves also the fact that the distinctiveness is mediated by social circumstances. In two cases there are big differences between the Western European Catholic countries and the Eastern European Catholic countries. For taking the drug marijuana or hashish the Western European Catholic countries have the mean value of 1.99, something lower from other Western European countries (2.24), but higher in comparison to whole Eastern Europe (1.52), and particularly the Eastern European Catholic countries (1.38). Very similar pattern occurs in the case of homosexuality where the Western European Catholic countries have the mean value (4.65) double higher than the Eastern European Catholic countries (2.39). Interestingly, that is not the same in the case of abortion where both Western and Eastern European Catholic countries have mean values very similar (3.94 and 3.69 respectively) what is indeed lower than in all other countries. Religion clearly affects justification of some moral norms. That is already visible from very crude analysis which notice differences between countries. However, some moral norms are found generally unjustified in almost all nations. Irrespectively of the long history in which religion played a role, it is obvious that some moral norms are today accepted whether or not individual is religious. They became cultural norms of the Western world. Why, at all, do we need religion? 4.1 19 Why and how is religion important? Religious differences between countries, noticed particularly in the case of the Catholic countries, should be visible also inside each country. Religious influence is here measured by the correlations between two measures of religiosity (Church attendance and importance of God) with all six moral statements. The higher the negative value the strongest is the impact of Church attendance or importance of God on rejection of each statement. Table 2: Pearson Correlations - Church attendance (1) Claiming benefit… France G. Britain Germany Austria Italy Spain Portugal Netherlands Belgium Denmark Sweden Finland N. Ireland Ireland -.127** -.072* -.076** -.078** -.060** -.077** -.001 -.061 -.081** -.001 -.014 -.202** -.149** -.183** Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Czech R. Slovakia Hungary Rumania Bulgaria Croatia Russia Slovenia Ukraine -.046 -.030 -.085** .068* -.056* -.049 -.108** .039 .021 .015 -.026 .064* .011 (3) (2) CheatTaking ing on hashish tax… Western Europe -.123** -.161** -.072* -.099** -.080** -.120** -.148** -.206** -.082** -.386** -.157** -.290** -.021 -.048 -.180** -.317** -.126** -.162** -.153** -.182** -.090** -.078* -.284** -.210** -.221** -.266** -.140** -.339** Eastern Europe -.106** -.077* -.068* -.066* -.149** -.145** -.096** -.237** -.054* -.036 -.113** -.177** -.163** -.070* -.007 -.019 -.033 .057 -.061 -.110** -.026 -.019 -.037 -.165** -.036 -.061* (4) Having affair (5) Homosexuality (6) Abortion -.197** -.117** -.181** -.223** -.290** -.288** -.106** -.233** -.205** -.032 -.114** -.243** -.154** -.228** -.217** -.103** -.163** -.250** -.263** -.346** -.067* -.245** -.172** -.149** -.154** -.168** -.176** -.314** -.262** -.166** -.365** -.389** -.407** -.445** -.208** -.357** -.324** -.197** -.230** -.346** -.386** -.340** -.083* -.054 -.235** -.158** -.119** -.304** -.198** -.117** .045 -.177** -.029 -.208** -.149** -.067* -.126** -.170** -.254** -.151** -.278** -.036 -.077* .112** -.160** -.044* -.188** -.033 -.169** -.134** -.367** -.374** -.301** -.461** -.174** -.183** -.040 -.329** -.149** -.342** -.189** ** Significant above 0.01; * Significant above 0.05; Catholic countries (with above 70% of Catholics) marked in italic Siniša Zrinšak and Krunoslav Nikodem 20 Two things stand out. The importance of God is generally better predictor of influence to moral statements than the Church attendance. The Eastern European countries have generally lower correlations than the Western European countries. These two conclusions resemble to conclusions Stark pointed out in his analysis. Table 3: Pearson Correlations – Importance of God (1) Claiming benefit… France G. Britain Germany Austria Italy Spain Portugal Netherlands Belgium Denmark Sweden Finland N. Ireland Ireland -.062* -.164** -.061* -.100** -.112** -.153** -.180** .037 -.024 .001 -.028 -.116** -.146** -.163** Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Czech R. Slovakia Hungary Romania Bulgaria Croatia Russia Slovenia Ukraine -.015 -.053 -.053 .081* -.074* -.070* -.118** .018 -.023 -.068* -.037 .064* -.062* (2) (3) Cheating Taking on tax… hashish Western Europe -.143** -.181** -.135** -.192** -.099** -.094** -.158** -.223** -.108** -.319** -.244** -.330** -.152** -.280** -.141** -.295** -.125** -.188** -.117** -.188** -.098* -.097* -.256** -.242** -.218** -.326** -.151** -.370** Eastern Europe -.093* -.083* -.091* -.075* -.144** -.113* -.107** -.180** -.142** -.050* -.149** -.219** -.172** -.119** -.003 -.117** -.109* -.036 -.163** -.209** -.035 -.030 -.037 -.165** -.087* -.112** (4) Having affair (5) Homosexuality (6) Abortion -.143** -.156** -.181** -.273** -.273** -.373** -.233** -.217** -.193** -.055 -.071* -.234** -.238** -.274** -.162** -.153** -.178** -.261** -.201** -.287** -.221** -.260** -.239** -.266** -.148** -.169** -.201** -.305** -.271** -.292** -.387** -.388** -.362** -.423** -.181** -.407** -.338** -.304** -.293** -.322** -.387** -.389** -.111* -.056 -.246** -.191** -.150** -.301** -.219** -.190** -.175** -.188** -.076** -.208** -.126** -.090* -.086* -.146** -.276** -.107** -.239** -.094** -.178** -.062 -.222** -.047* -.188** -.053 -.161** -.148** -.348** -.435** -.250** -.429** -.220** -.191** -.160** -.397** -.137** -.342** -.188** ** Significant above 0.01;* Significant above 0.05; Catholic countries (with above 70% of Catholics) marked in italic Six moral statements that encompass a wider range of very different moral areas show that there is no unique relation between religion and morality. First two statements (claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to and cheating on tax if you have a chance), particularly the first one, have significantly lower correlations than other statements. Concerning the Church attendance correlations are not statistically significant among four Western and eight Eastern European countries and concerning the importance of God among four Western and six Eastern European countries. When correlations are statistically significant they are very weak. However, this is not the case for other moral statements, and particu- Why, at all, do we need religion? 21 larly for attitudes toward homosexuality and abortion. Here, religion has a strong impact. For abortion, correlations are high and statistically significant for all countries, except in one case (correlation with the Church attendance for Bulgaria). Relations between religion and morality show also another interesting faces. Compared to previous data of general acceptance of different moral norms it is obvious that correlations are higher where and when some moral norms are not a part of social consensus in a particular country, or where particular religion pays much attention to it (abortion for example). General level of religiosity in each country should be also taken into account. The influence of the importance of God to claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to is statistically significant in all Catholic Western European countries and in two (although with lower correlation) of three Catholic Eastern European countries, but not in many other countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden or Belgium. That could not be taken as a ground for conclusion that in these countries moral norms are not accepted by majority. However, in cases where different opinions exist, religion can have more influences, and that is the case not only in countries with higher religious monopoly: the level of influence (measured by correlations) for five moral statements (except the first one) is in the Netherlands (where, for example, acceptance of taking the drug marijuana or hashish or homosexuality is much more widespread)7 equal to other, usually more religious societies. What to say about Eastern Europe? Correlations are generally lower than in Western Europe. There exist, of course, some important differences among post-communist countries. Correlations are very low and are not significant, especially in Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine. These are, at the same time, countries with the low level of religiosity. Although not impressively, correlations are something higher in Romania, a country with a very high level of religiosity. The Catholic countries of Eastern Europe (Lithuania, Poland, and Croatia) have something higher and more significant correlations in comparison to other countries. Clearly, important differences exist, but there is not a simple or clear pattern. The same can be said about the possible impact of Communism. The unique political system had important differences and did not result with same consequences concerning the position of religion or its possible influence. The marginal position of religion which generally did not have much possibility to enter the public domain certainly has had an impact on how today religion operates in society. Well, the marginality of religion was much higher in Russia than, for example, in Poland or Croatia. At the same time, there is an impact of post-communist circumstances, like an evident social anomy (Sztompka 1999). Cheating on tax is rejected as immoral behavior, but at the same time the majority believes that their compatriots cheat on tax in a large proportion and are inclined to do the same if they found it “personally constructive”, what can be understood as emergence of functional substitutes for lack of trust in major state institutions. Finally, as already noticed, the importance of God is better predictor than the Church attendance. Personal and more thoughtful relations to God can better underpin some moral statements. Does it mean that the Church attendance is irrelevant for moral community? There are at least two reasons which call for a negative response. First, the Church attendance and the importance of God are highly correlated. These two measures of religiosity 7 For taking the drug marijuana or hashish the mean value of acceptance is in the Netherlands 3.08, compared to 2.16 for the whole Western Europe. For homosexuality the values are 7.82 (the Netherlands) and 5.39 (Western Europe). 22 Siniša Zrinšak and Krunoslav Nikodem are not identical, but are usually interconnected. Second, the Church attendance is relevant measure of religiosity and can indicate different roles Churches play in a particular society. If Church gatherings are not so able to underpin moral community they are, particularly in some societies, still able to underpin social community what is, in a way or another, a significant factor in overall functioning of each society. Regression analysis (not shown here) mostly confirmed the correlation analysis. It also showed that religion simply does not play any role concerning attitudes toward claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to. The same can be said for cheating on tax. Correlations are in this case something higher, but R square is generally very low. Religious influence is higher in the case of other moral norms, the highest for abortion. Again, the importance of God is better predictor but in many countries both indicators of religiosity act in the same direction. For Eastern Europe percentage of explained variance is generally lower than for Western Europe. There are also noticeable exemptions. There are many cases where R square is higher than 10%, what means that religion has power in explaining negative attitudes toward some (im)moral behaviors. In the case of abortion that is true for 9 West European countries (Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, N. Ireland, Ireland) and 6 East European countries (Lithuania, Poland, Czech R., Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia). 5. Influence of religion on family/private life and public domain: an alternative explanation The analysis shows that religion has a different impact on moral attitudes: no impact on some public issues and significant on moral norms in the field of sexuality. It also shows that the impact largely depends on particular social circumstances in each country and that this impact can be, for those who remain religious, equally strong in countries with very different level of religiosity. The need for look on different social areas in order to understand the possible role of religion was recently underlined also by the work of Halman and Pettersson (1999). Two their conclusions are worth mentioning here. First is that the impact of religion is higher on private family issues than on public issues.8 On the other hand the level of religious involvement and the impact of religious involvement on private and public issues seem to be unrelated. Or, more clearly: “To the degree to which the social issues we have investigated (family values, and political values, respectively) are contested and disputed, they should be unrelated to religious involvement in countries where the religious involvement is comparatively high. On the other hand, in countries where the religious involvement is comparatively low, the situation must be reversed. In such a case, the religious involvement might be more easily related to a specific view on contested social issues” (Halman/Pettersson 1999:59). Although they focused different areas, both analyses suggest a distinction between public and private sphere. Religion is more important in private than public issues. Social 8 They analyzed acceptance of «non-traditional family values» (statements such as «whether or not children need both father and mother to grow up happily» etc.) and political views (such as «incomes should be made more equal» vs. «there should be greater incentives for individual effort» etc.). Why, at all, do we need religion? 23 community in contemporary Western societies is obviously based on some cultural norms that are accepted by majority. That does not mean that religion has nothing with these moral claims. But if one norm is accepted by majority, whether they are religious or not, religious differences become, of course, irrelevant. Religion still matters, at least in some private family issues, such as marriage, divorce, homosexuality, relations between parents and children etc. The impact of religion, mediated by specific social circumstances, is very visible even in highly secularized European societies. On the contrary, there are many societies where, for example, rejection of homosexuality is widely spread, and in these societies many irreligious people can share, again as a social / cultural norm, the same attitudes as those who are religious – that is the case in many Eastern European societies. It is obvious that inside these circumstances the impact of religion will be even smaller that in societies in which these issues are highly contested, irrespectively of the general level of their religiosity. We can certainly conclude that the link between religion and morality largely depends on overall social circumstances that effect general acceptance or rejection of a particular norm. As Stark suggested the importance of God is really more important as a predictor for acceptance / rejection for some norms than the Church attendance. But that should not be a base for any far-reaching conclusion. Although different, these two measures of religiosity are highly connected. The Church attendance (particularly in societies that still retain relatively high Church attendance) can have many social functions. Ireland, Poland, or Croatia, even Italy, are good examples. However, the problem still remains: what is the link between moral and social community? Some cultural norms, very important for society, are emancipated from religion. Religion still have a big impact, but on norms which are highly contested! Particularities about Eastern Europe are confirmed also in this analysis. Religion plays a minor role with concerning different moral norms in comparison to Western European countries. Is that a base for conclusion about social irrelevance of religion? At least three reasons suggest different answer. First and because of great differences among countries it is impossible to speak generally about Eastern Europe. There are different lines which divide former Soviet bloc of countries, not only Catholic-Orthodox division. Three additional factors are important: different experiences of prosecution of religion, differences in religious monopoly and differences in how religion act as a possible factor in social / national / language unity of each society. Therefore, in some countries correlation are really low, but in some other they resemble to those found in Western Europe. That does not want to suggest that communist prosecution of religion does not have an effect, but want to analyze possible consequences in the context of other important social factors. Second, general acceptance or rejection of one norm is important factor in analysis. If, for example, in Hungary the mean value of acceptance of homosexuality is only 1.44 (i.e. widespread rejection of homosexual behavior) it is then not reasonable to expect any important influence of religion in this case. Third, post-communist social circumstances must be taken into account. Social anomy and moral disorder are evident phenomenon, even if they are not in every case revealed inside the question of a general attitude toward one moral norm. That kind of anomy can have serious effect also on the role of religion in a society. Siniša Zrinšak and Krunoslav Nikodem 24 6. References Borowik, Irena/Babiski, Grzegorz (eds.) (1997): New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe. Krakow. Borowik, Irena (ed.) (1999): Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe. Krakow. Borowik, Irena/Tomka, Miklos (eds.) (2001): Religion and Social Change in Post-Communist Europe. Krakow. European Value Surveys, www.europeanvalues.nl Halman, Loek/Pettersson, Thorleif (1999): Differential Patterns of Secularization in Europe: Exploring the Impact of Religion on Social Values. In: Halman/Riis (eds.): 48-73. Halman, Loek/Riis, Jens O. (eds.) (1999): Religion in Secularizing Society. The European’s Religion at the End of the 20th Century. Tilburg. Marinovi-Jerolimov, Dinka/Zrinšak, Siniša/Borowik, Irena (eds.) (2004): Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation. Zagreb. Pollack, Detlef (2001): Modifications in the religious field of Central and Eastern Europe. In: European Societies 3/2: 135-165. Stark, Roger (2001): Gods, Rituals, and the Moral Order. In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 4: 619636. Sztompka, Piotr (1999): Trust. A Sociological Theory. Cambridge. Tomka, Miklós/Zulehner, Paul M. (1999): Religion in den Reformländern Ost(Mittel)Europas. Ostfildern. Zrinšak, Siniša (2002): Rôles, attentes et conflitts: la religion et les Eglises dans les sociétés en transition. In: Social Compass 4: 509-521. Zrinšak, Siniša (2004): Generations and Atheism: Patterns of Response to Communist Rule Among Different Generations and Countries. In: Social Compass 2: 221-234. Religious Pluralism and Dimensions of Religiosity: Evidence from the Project Religious and Moral Pluralism (RAMP). Tadeusz Doktór † 1. The RAMP-project The international research project ‘Religious and Moral Pluralism’(RAMP) was designed to study the religious and moral diversity in Europe and its social and political implications. The initiators of the Ramp-project, Wolfgang Jagodzinski and Karel Dobbelaere, have invited the collaborators from 15 countries, who for a few years worked on its preparation. On the basis of research interests and experiences of scholars involved in the project several theoretical approaches were discussed as a framework for formulating specific hypotheses and their operationalization. The first provisional questionnaire was designed in English and then translated in the different languages of the countries included in the study. After the return translation and pilot interviews some questions were modified and some dropped to fit an approximately 40-minutes interview consisting of core questions applied in all countries (unfortunately not in all cases) and a few country-specific questions at the end of the questionnaire. The questionnaire included several questions that have been used in other surveys to allow comparisons, but most of the questions were new. The details are specified in the Codebook ZA Nr. 3170 of the Central Archive for Empirical Research of the University of Cologne, involved in the planning and technical administration of the research as well as in cleaning of the data and making them available to other researchers (Dobbelaere and Riis, 2003). The fieldwork was carried out in 1997-99. The interviewees (aged 18 and over) were selected by means of random sampling. The data have been collected in eleven countries (four countries has been dropped because of the lack of funding the research on the national level): Belgium (French and Flemish collapsed into one data set) 1662; Denmark 606; Finland 786; Norway 503; and Sweden 1032 (these 4 were sometimes collapsed into 'Scandinavia' because of relatively small numbers); Britain 1466; Hungary 1000; Italy 2149; the Netherlands 1004; Poland 1134; Portugal 1000; (total 12,342). The data set contained more than 160 core variables and was supplemented by a few additional variables in some countries (the largest set of these variables was applied in Britain). In some national samples certain categories of the population were over-represented. By introducing weight coefficients the over-sampling was corrected for giving a representative picture of each country. On the basis of these data some country reports have been published as books in national languages (Gustafsson and Pettersson, 2000; Borowik and Doktór, 2001) or in English (Allievi et al., 2001) as well as several articles including special section in Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 13, 2002. The topics covered by these publications referred to various aspects of religious and moral pluralism such as religious syncretism (Dobbelaere et al., 2002), fundamentalism and New Age (Doktór, 2002; 2003), spirituality 26 Tadeusz Doktór (Barker, 2004), religious experience (Doktór, 2006), moral pluralism (Halmann and Petersson, 2002), attitudes towards charity (Reitsma et al. 2006) immigrants (Scheepers et al., 2002) and controversial religious groups (Doktór, 2003). I will address the problem of relationship between religious pluralism and religiosity, which constitutes one of the most important topics in the contemporary sociology of religion as represented by two approaches sometimes called paradigms. Among the representatives of the 'secularization paradigm' (Tschannen, 1992) religious pluralism is considered as one of the main factors contributing to the decline of religion or at least some of its manifestations. According to Peter L. Berger it erodes traditional stability, self-evidence, and taken for granted status of religion. ‘In the pluralist situation...the authority of all religions tend to be undermined’ (Berger, 1979: XI). Erosion of religious beliefs is therefore inevitable consequence of modernization and emerging pluralism of world-views as one of its main component. 2. Religious options In this new situation, when nothing could be taken for granted, modern man has three fundamental options in relation to religion: the deductive option (reaffirming a particular religious tradition in spite of modernity as in fundamentalism); the reductive option (changing religious tradition in such a way, which make it sensible in today's predominant modes of thought (as in liberal theology demythologizing sacred texts); or the inductive option, turning from external forms of authority to individual experience. ‘The inductive option is to turn to experience as the ground of all religious affirmations - one's own experience, to whatever extent it is possible, and the experience embodied in a particular range of traditions’ (Berger, 1979: 58). Berger clearly favors and argues for the merits of the inductive option as the most effective in modern times. Therefore religious pluralism do not necessarily lead to erosion of all dimensions of religiosity but affecting beliefs, inclines an individual to test their validity in a quasi empirical way and in this way may constitute fertile ground for religious experience. Similar interpretation of the role of religious pluralism has been proposed by another author representing the secularization paradigm - Thomas Luckmann. He also postulates its negative influence on religiosity but only for its institutional forms. Church religiosity is eroded by pluralism (together with structural differentiation) but this erosion gives birth to another noninstititionalized form of religion such as New Age. ‘The new, privatized, and, in a manner of speaking, invisible social form of religion can be best illustrated by certain diffuse recent developments usually collected under the same label: the ‘‘New Age’’ movement - which of course is anything but a movement in the accepted sense of a social movement, including the ‘‘new occultism’’, and various programs favoring the ‘‘spiritual’’ development of the individual. They are highly syncretistic. They gather diverse psychological, therapeutic, magic, and marginally scientific as well as older ‘‘esoteric’’ materials, repackage them, and offer them for individual consumption’ (Luckmann, 1999: 255-256). This view, that pluralism leads to erosion of at least certain forms or dimensions of religiosity, has been challenged by a different approach, sometimes treated as a competing para- Religious Pluralism and Dimensions of Religiosity 27 digm in the sociology of religion (Warner, 1993). According to this view, religious pluralism can be a stimulus for religious growth because diversified religious needs are more effectively satisfied in a free religious market and diverse religious groups are mobilized to greater evangelizing efforts in the situation of competition. Pluralism is seen here as a factor stimulating the growth of all forms of religiosity but especially those with higher level of tension with surrounding society, who can sustain higher level of religious commitment. Level of tension is here the axis of variation differentiating between such phenomena as fundamentalism and New Age on the basis of costs related to religious involvement. For Laurence Iannaccone (1997:152) “high cost, sectarian religion constitutes the purest case of collective religion. Sects demand exclusivity in order to limit free-rider problems, but thereby generate high levels of commitment and participation, which sustain high levels of benefits. Low cost, portfolio religion lies at the other extreme, offering private products on a fee-for-service basis. Individual consumers are free to diversify their consumption, mixing and matching religious commodities from numerous competing suppliers, but this leads to low levels of commitment, limited brand loyalty, and a weak sense of collective identity”. Fundamentalism as a form of sectarianism is, therefore, close to the high tension pole and New Age, as a portfolio religion, close to the low tension pole. According to Iannaccone (1997) fundamentalism may be defined in terms of sectarianism. Such concept stresses the religiously oppositional character of the explained phenomenon and its high level of tension with its surroundings, but is less ambiguously defined, and has a longer tradition in the sociology of religion as well as greater explanatory value: ‘Sects demand high levels of commitment and high rates of participation, require strict and distinctive codes of conduct, emphasize "particularistic" beliefs and practices (which distinguish their members from those of other religions and, presumably, make them superior to all others), and view secular society as corrupt, dangerous, and threatening. Sects emphasize “volitional membership” (personal conversion as opposed to membership through birth), and they attract a disproportionate share of their converts from among the less advantaged segments of society — ethnic minorities, the poor, and the less educated’ (Iannaccone, 1997: 104). Another strategy of religious risk reduction may be described, in terms of model derived from economy, as the portfolio diversification of assets (Iannaccone, 1995). Collective risk reduction strategy is used by sects and churches, whereas portfolio diversification is a strategy common to New Age. It reduces the risk of religious involvement in a single religion or class of religious acts in societies in which an access to a variety of religious and parareligious goods is possible. As a consequence of this risk reducing strategy appears a private religion with specialized sellers, no congregational structure, client/practitioner relationships, fee for service transactions, no brand loyalty, acknowledged diversification but less capable of generating high level of religious commitment. Both forms of religiosity flourish in the pluralistic situation due to the competition between different suppliers of religion. All theories mentioned here predict positive relationship between religious pluralism and at least some forms or dimensions of religiosity. In the case of Berger’s theory it will be religious experience, in the case of Luckmann’s - New Age type of spirituality. In the case of rational choice model proposed by Iannaccone all forms of religiosity will benefit 28 Tadeusz Doktór from religious pluralism in contrast to the secularization paradigm, where inductive option (religious experience) and New Age constitute an exception in the detrimental effects of pluralism on religiosity. The empirical testing of these predictions is usually done on the macrosocial and mesosocial level with inconclusive results. According to recent review of literature ‘sixtynine percent (133) of the published analyses report either a significant negative (86) or a null (47) relationship between religious pluralism and religious participation, while only 31% (60) report a significant positive relationship. The null findings were about evenly split between nonsignificant positive (26) and nonsignificant negative (21) coefficients’ (Chaves and Gorski, 2001: 264). The most common indicator of religious pluralism in the research on religious pluralism is Herfindahl index computed for countries or smaller units of analysis. In this study we will attempt to test these predictions using the measure of religious pluralism on the microsocial level. Tab. 1: How many of your closest friends have views on religion that differ from yours? Belgium Denmark Finland Great Britain Hungary Italy Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Sweden Total None of them less than half of them 29,9% 31,7% 35,8% 37,3% 24,0% 44,7% 25,2% 33,3% 39,4% 30,8% 43,5% 29,7% 16,3% 38,3% 21,2% 41,0% 69,1% 18,9% 35,9% 34,5% 20,1% 46,4% 34,5% 33,6% about half of more than half all of them them of them 19,4% 14,4% 4,6% 13,1% 10,0% 3,8% 16,0% 12,6% 2,7% 22,1% 14,5% 4,9% 14,9% 12,4% 2,4% 14,6% 9,1% 3,1% 22,1% 18,7% 4,7% 22,9% 12,9% 2,0% 6,6% 3,5% 2,0% 12,5% 12,7% 4,5% 14,7% 15,8% 2,9% 16,2% 12,2% 3,5% mean 2,32 2,09 2,25 2,41 2,08 1,99 2,57 2,34 1,50 2,15 2,35 2,17 Religious pluralism among friends aggregated at the country level correlates highly with Herfindahl index calculated on the basis of RAMP data (,56) and (,48) calculated on the basis of Barret data (1982) by Alesina et al. (2003) . Respondents from Poland, which is the least pluralistic country according to Herfindahl index (,17 and ,15 respectively) have the lowest number of friends with different religious views and respondents from Great Britain, which is the most pluralistic country (,76 and ,69) have the highest. Therefore, in a more pluralistic country the probability of having more friends with different religious views is higher, which means that this variable could be treated as a valid measure of religious pluralism. Religious Pluralism and Dimensions of Religiosity Tab. 2: Descriptive statistics of independent variables (frequency of religious experiences, spirituality, frequency of prayer, church attendance and biblical literalism) and religious pluralism. Variable Frequency of religious experiences Spirituality Frequency of prayer Church attendance Biblical literalism Religious pluralism 29 Frequency of religious experiences Spirituality Frequency of prayer Church attendance Means SD N 1,69 1,0 11742 3,79 2,0 11379 ,343** 3,52 2,8 12225 ,237** ,368** 2,42 1,9 12302 ,144** ,325** ,687** 1,80 ,7 11198 ,152** ,230** ,472** ,434** 2,17 3,1 10857 ,121** ,074** -,074** -,118** Biblical literalism -,095** ** Significance below 0,01; Notes to table 2: Church attendance - "Apart from ceremonies for birth, marriage or death, roughly how often do you attend religious services these days?" measured on the eight-point scales: "every day" (0), "more than once a week" (1), "once a week" (2), "at least once a month" (3), "a few times a year" (4), "once a year" (5), "less than once a year" (6), "never" (7). The direction of coding has been reversed. Frequency of praying - "About how often do you pray?" measured on the point-point scales: "every day" (0), "more than once a week" (1), "once a week" (2), "at least once a month" (3), "a few times a year" (4), "once a year" (5), "less than once a year" (6), "never" (7). The direction of coding has been reversed. Biblical literalism - consisting of three forced choice items: "The Bible records the actual word of God, so everything it says should be taken literally, word for word" (1), "The Bible was written by humans who were inspired by God, but not everything in it should be taken literally" (2), "The Bible is simply an ancient book of religious stories, historical events and moral teachings" (3). "I don't know" answers were excluded from the analysis and coding of answers was reversed. Spirituality - „Whether or not you think of yourself as a religious person, would you say that you have a spiritual life - something that goes beyond a merely intellectual or emotional life?”(with answer possibilities ranging from 1 - „definitely not” to 7 - (“definitely yes”) and „ I Don't know what you mean by "spiritual life"” (excluded from the analysis). All measures of religiosity are significantly and positively intercorrelated, but the highest correlation may be observed among two groups of variables. The first group is constituted by spirituality and religious experience and the second by frequency of prayer, church attendance and biblical literalism. This is further confirmed by the results of factor analysis with rotation oblimin, which resulted in the extraction of two factors representing these two groups of variables positively correlated with each other (,31). This seems to confirm the existence of two types of religiosity. The first one is collective, institutionalized and church oriented. The second one is noninstitutionalized, privatized and New Age oriented. They seem to reflect quite precisely typologies proposed by Luckmann (church and uninstitutionalized religiosity) and Iannaccone (collective and private religion). However, only in the case of church religiosity we may construct a scale on the basis of theses variables with a satisfactory reliability. In the case of uninstitutionalized religiosity, even after standardization of these variables, the Cronbach’s Alpha it is ,51 and does not reach satisfactory level of reliability. 30 Tadeusz Doktór In the case of collective or church religiosity the correlations with religious pluralism measured in the microsocial level are negative, whereas in the case of uninstitutionalized or private religiosity are positive. The results of the correlational analysis suggest confirmation of the secularization model in case of all variables and market model only in case of religious experience and spirituality. As these results may be influenced by the sociodemographical variables we will use regression analysis to control their possible influence. Tab. 3: Regression analysis with frequency of religious experiences, spirituality, frequency of prayer, church attendance and biblical literalism as dependent variables (simultaneous entry of predictors). Variable Community size Sex (female) Year of birth Highest level of education Friends with different religious views Rsq. Frequency of religious experiences Spirituality Frequency of praying Frequency of attendance Biblical literalism Beta ,054 ,088 -,080 ,076 Beta (n. s.) ,107 -,082 ,055 Beta -,071 ,209 -,182 -,125 Beta -,100 ,111 -,133 -,093 Beta -,066 ,084 -,045 ,110 ,072 -,028 -,080 ,036 ,025 ,117 ,072 -,173 -,052 ,059 Notes to table 3: All coefficients significant at ,000 level if not otherwise indicated. Sociodemographic variables: Sex (0=male 1=female), Year of birth (18 years and older), Education (1) incomplete primary, (2) primary completed, (3) incomplete secondary, (4) secondary completed, (5) university incomplete, to (6) university degree completed, Community size, measured on a scale from (1) 'less than 500 inhabitants' to (10) 'more than 1 million inhabitants'. Religious variables as specified above. Two types of religiosity are quite differently influenced by social position and religious pluralism. Having more friends with different religious views is positively related to the uninstitutionalized religiosity (frequency of religious experience and spirituality) and negatively related to biblical literalism and frequency of religious practices (less significantly in the case of prayer). Expectations based on Berger and Luckmann theories are therefore confirmed and based on the rational choice model are disconfirmed in relation to high cost and collective religion. Our results do not support the proposition that pluralism and participation are positively associated in a general way. Only in case of the most subjective and private forms of religiosity (religious experience and spirituality) this association may be confirmed. The results indicate also that a more favorable social position regarding education and size of community is conducive to greater frequency of religious experience (in case of spirituality it is only the education). It means that these forms of religiosity cannot be treated as compensators for less favorable social position. Expectations based on the rational choice theory are confirmed only in the case of biblical literalism, prayer and attendance (church religiosity). Therefore the models proposed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann have got confirmation in our results. Those who have more frequent religious experiences and consider themselves as spiritual are not socially deprived but are situated in a more modernized sectors of society and are living in a more religiously pluralistic social Religious Pluralism and Dimensions of Religiosity 31 milieu. Those who held more fundamentalistic beliefs and are more frequently attending church and praying are situated in the less modernized sectors of society (which confirms Berger and Luckmann predictions concerning the negative impact of modernization on church religiosity). At the same time it also confirms Iannaconne’s prediction concerning compensatory role of high cost and collective religion. In the case of literalistic biblical beliefs, attendance and prayer, the negative influence of education is stronger than the negative influence of pluralism. They are therefore relatively more significantly affected by social position than by religious pluralism in their immediate surroundings. But even after controlling for the effects of sociodemographic variables the significant negative effects of religious pluralism remains significant. This means that in case of these measures of religiosity, which may be described as most institutionalized and collectively produced, the influence of religious pluralism is negative. The reasonable explanation may be here the erosion of plausibility structures, which are no longer socially reinforcing religious beliefs and practices in the situation of religious pluralism. We should also consider the possibility that in the case of collective forms of religiosity the direction of causal relationship may be reversed due to tendency towards ‘homophily’ (McPherson/Smith-Lovin 1987) – to develop close social ties with others which are similar to us, especially strong among members of groups having a distinctive subcultural identity (Olson, 1993). Also the study, using RAMP questionnaire, conducted among Jehovah’s Witnesses in Poland (Borowik and Doktór, 2001) has shown that they have less friends having different religious views than respondents from the general population despite being surrounded by Catholics. On the other hand, Blum (1985) shows that the religious pluralism of the surrounding community also increases the religious pluralism of individuals' closest social ties. Probably both direction of relationship should be taken into account, but it is more probable, that the pluralism on the country level affects pluralism among friends on the microsocial level, being a necessary condition of having such friends. The positive influence of religious pluralism on uninstitutionalized forms of religiosity confirms the predictions based on all three theories, although it is related to different dimensions of religiosity and is differently explained. Berger’s interpretation emphasizes the role of religious experience as the empirical solution to the problem of uncertainty created by the situation of religious pluralism. Modern man is forced to test different religious ‘theories’ in a way quite common in science and that is why more modernized members of society and living in a more pluralistic milieu report more religious experiences. They are living in a less certain world in comparison to those living under a sacred canopy and are forced to make religious choices on the basis of their religious experiences. Berger is, however, not very specific on the results of these choice and we may assume that both traditional and nontraditional forms of religiosity could be chosen in that way. The bivariate correlation coefficients suggests that spirituality is a most common option, than prayer as the most individualized form of traditional religious practice and at he and the most collectively shared forms of religiosity such as biblical literalism and church attendance. 32 3. Tadeusz Doktór Conclusion Thomas Luckmann is more interested in uninstitutionalized religiosity as growing on the ruins of church religion. Religious pluralism contributes to its growth due to the process of internalization and generalization of different religious (and some nonreligious) beliefs with which one is confronted in a pluralistic situation. Some of these beliefs are used in a manner of bricolage for constructing individual world-view. They are usually labeled as spiritual to avoid particular religious connotations. As the conventional form of church religiosity is being replaced by new forms of invisible religion in the most modernized sectors of society, the social basis of church religiosity is shrinking and relegated to the structural peripheries of modern society. Religious experiences, although important for his theory, are not sufficiently described as part of this process except brief remarks about shrinking of the transcendence, which may imply diminishing of the role of religious experiences. This view cannot be supported in our findings. Spirituality is positively associated with the frequency of religious experiences, although the formulation of the question does not permit to make any conclusions about the scope of the transcendence involved. The measurement of spirituality is, however, a bit problematic. The analysis conducted by Eileen Barker (2004) indicates that the question used in RAMP may be understood very differently by each respondent. There are also national differences related to meaning of the term ‘spirituality’ in different languages, which is not understood by 18,1% of Hungarians, 13,5% of Poles and 12,0% of Portuguese’s. This may indicate the necessity of better operationalization of this concept in the future. Laurence Iannaccone emphasizes the differences between two strategies of risk reduction in relation to religion, more exactly elaborating upon collective than private forms. More important for him in this distinction are social position than religious pluralism. It is not entirely clear whether pluralism should contribute more to collective or to portfolio religion. But it seems that pluralism is a necessary condition for the existence of the portfolio diversification, whereas the collective religion may quite well function in a religiously monolithic society. Collective forms of religion demand exclusive participation, so pluralism may stimulate the competition between different suppliers of religion on the demand side, especially on the macrosocial level. In the case of private religion and the portfolio diversification strategy the effects of pluralism is stronger because both mechanisms are valid. Religious pluralism stimulates the competition between providers and supplies the necessary material for the individual construction of private religion, especially in the case of spirituality. Both spirituality (which is primarily a question of self-identity) and religious experience are those dimensions of religion which are least externalized and therefore to a lesser extent subject to social control and social learning. Because they are minimally externalized, they are not observed and sanctioned by others in the surrounding social milieu, especially by ones own close associates. More collective and externalized forms of religiosity follow a different pattern due to the influence of behavioral and cognitive factors. The most externalized forms of religiosity analyzed here are church attendance, prayer (at least partly, especially in its ritualized form involving bodily patterns), and beliefs which could be exchanged or disputed with others. In case of church attendance, which is the most behaviorally visible form of religious commitment and therefore most easily influenced by social reinforcement and control, the negative impact of religious pluralism among friends is the strongest. Religious Pluralism and Dimensions of Religiosity 33 In the case of prayer the influence of religious consensus among friends is also negative but weaker. Prayer may be practiced collectively but also in private, may have a more traditional and ritualized form as a repetition of sacred formulas in a special position of the body (usually in kneeling position) but also can have a more spontaneous form of a dialog with God. Therefore it is not so easily observed, sanctioned and controlled by others as in the case of church attendance. The belief in the literal interpretation of the Bible is also a subject of social reinforcement to the extent as it is collectively manifested. More important, however, are here cognitive influences of the social environment. Social consensus may help to sustain religious beliefs, whereas pluralism of beliefs may be detrimental, because it erodes their traditional stability, self-evidence, and taken for granted status (in the formulation of P.L. Berger (1979: XI) "in the pluralist situation...the authority of all religions tend to be undermined"). Both cognitive and social-behavioral influences are more important for ‘socially visible’ than for ‘socially invisible’ forms of religiosity. Socially visible and collectively shared convictions and behaviors constitute a relatively cohesive structure, in which all elements are closely interrelated. Cognitive consensus and social reinforcement help to sustain the whole structure. The lack of this sustaining influence in the situation of religious pluralism may result the erosion of this form of religiosity predicted by Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger. In the case of socially invisible and privatized form of religion, these social influences are not so detrimental. It does not form a cohesive structure but it is organized in a loose manner as a result of the individual bricolage. A particular element may be eliminated or changed to another one without serious consequences for the whole structure. A pluralistic situation may serve as a resource for the individual construction of a world-view in a manner of bricolage (Luckmann), help to use the strategy of portfolio diversification of assets, which minimize the risks related with the acceptance of particular religious beliefs (Iannaccone) or incline to use experimental-inductive strategy as a way of choosing the right one among many options (Berger). These three mechanisms are complementary and not mutually exclusive ways of coping with the pluralist situation, which may explain why religious pluralism as measured on the microsocial level may have negative consequences for some forms of religiosity and positive for the other. 34 4. Tadeusz Doktór References Alesina, A./Devleeschauwer A./Easterly W./Kurlat S./Wacziarg R. (2003): Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 82: 219-258. Allievi, S/Bove, G./Cappello, F. S./Cipriani, R./De Sandre, I./Garelli, F./Gasperoni, G./Guizzardi, G./Pace, E. (2001): Religious and moral pluralism in Italy. Padova. Barker, E. (2004): The Church Without and the God. In: Marinovic-Jerolimov/Zrinscak/Borowik (eds.): 23-48. Barret, D. (1982): World Christian Encyclopedia. Nairobi. Berger, Peter L. (1979): The Heretical Imperative. Garden City. Blum, T. C. (1985): Structural Constraints on Interpersonal Relations: A Test of Blau's Macrosociological Theory. American Journal of Sociology 91: 511-521. Borowik Irena/Doktór ,Tadeusz (2001): Pluralizm religijny i moralny w Polsce. Kraków. Carroll J./Wade Clark R. (eds.) (1993): Beyond Establishment. Louisville. Chaves, Mark./Gorski, P. S. (2001): Religious pluralism and religious participation. Annual Review of Sociology 27: 261–281. Dobbalaere, Karel/Riis, O. (2003): Religious and moral pluralism: Theories, Research Questions, and Design. In: Piedmont/Moberg (eds.): 159-172. Dobbelaere, K./Tomasi, L./Voye, L. (2002): Religious syncretism. In: Piedmont/Moberg (eds.): 221-244. Doktór, Tadeusz. (2002): Religious fundamentalizm. In: Piemont/Moberg (eds.): 205-220. Doktór, Tadeusz (2003): New Age and Fundamentalizm. In: Nembach (ed.): 233-248. Doktór, Tadeusz (2003): Factors influencing tolerance to new religious movements. In: Holm (ed.): 88-99. Doktór T. (2006): Religious experience, locus of control and moral orientations. In: Revay/Tomka (eds.): 49-72. Gustafsson, G/Pettersson, T. (Eds.)(2000): Statskirker og religiøs pluralisme - et nordisk paradoks. Stockholm. Halman, L./Pettersson, T. (2003): Moral pluralism in contemporary Europe: Evidence from the project religious and moral pluralism (RAMP). In: Piedmont/Moberg (eds.): 173-204. Holm N. G. (ed.)(2003): Archiv fur Religionspsychologie. Band 25. Gottingen. Iannaccone, L. R. (1995): Risk, Rationality, and Religious Portfolios. In: Economic Inquiry. 33/2: 285-295. Iannaccone L.R. (1997): Toward an Economic Theory of "Fundamentalism". Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 153: 100-116. Luckmann Th. (1990): Shrinking transcendence, expanding religion. Sociological Analysis 2: 127-138. Luckmann T. (1999): The Religious Situation in Europe. The Background to Contemporary Conversions. Social Compass. 46/3: 252-258. Marinovic-Jerolimov, D./ Zrinscak, S./Borowik I. (eds.) (2004): Religion and patterns of social transformation. Zagreb: Institute for Social Research. McPherson, J. Miller/Smith-Lovin L. (1987): Homophily in Voluntary Organizations. American Sociological Review 52: 370-379. Olson, D. V. A. (1993): Fellowship Ties and Transmission of Religious Identity. In: Jackson Carroll and Wade Clark Roof (ed.): 35-53. Piedmont, R.L./Moberg, D.O. (eds.) (2002): Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion 12. Leiden/Boston. Piedmont, R.L./Moberg, D.O. (eds.) (2003): Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion 13. Leiden/Boston. Reitsma, J./Scheepers, P./Te Grotenhuis, M. (2006): Dimensions of individual religiosity and charity: crossnational effect differences in European countries? In: Review of Religious Research. 47/4. Revay Edit/Tomka Miklos (eds.) (2006): Eastern European Religion. Budapeszt-Pilicsaba. Religiosity in Europe and in the Two Germanies: The Persistence of a Special Case – as revealed by the European Social Survey1 Heiner Meulemann 1. Design of research 1.1. Questions and hypotheses: persistence und special case Even more than a decade after unification, East Germans are less religious than West Germans – which mirrors the state-enforced secularization (Meulemann 2002: 76-91, 127) that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) shared with the remaining countries of the former Eastern bloc. In the following, two questions are examined: Is the lead of West over East Germany still the same today? And is the difference between West and East within Germany bigger than within Europe? In other words: Does the difference in Germany persist? And is Germany, as far as this difference is concerned, a special case within Europe? According to its Basic Law, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is a secular state: Article 4 grants the freedom of belief of the individual person; and according to article 140, a state church is not admitted and the freedom of religious communities is granted. Is it possible that a nation persists even if the institutional order is neutral and the people hold heterogeneous convictions as to religion and churches? Re-united Germany is a case in point to examine this question. If the integration of a secular state rests on shared political and economic beliefs, yet not necessarily on religious convictions, then the persistence hypothesis should hold: The West German lead over East Germany as for religiosity should continue to exist. In divided Germany, furthermore, shared national history, language and culture provided an exit option to nonconformists of either side. Up to the erection of the Berlin wall in 1961 (and less strongly even afterwards), someone who felt deprived and stifled by the politics of the GDR could flee into West Germany. But in this way, the confrontation between East and West was reinforced. During the fifties, when the Jugendweihe (a secular rite de passage between youth and adulthood) was introduced against the opposition of the Protestant Church, the GDR lost an educated, autonomous, and responsible elite experienced in leadership to the old FRG. People stayed selectively: the part which nonconformingly continued to support church and religion left the GDR; the part which conformingly endorsed the “scientific atheism” remained. The inner-German as well as the inner-European difference result from political repression; yet only in Germany the political repression of the East has elicited a homogenization of the populations in East and West according to qualification and mentality. In Europe as in Germany repression was at work, but in Germany demographic exchange was at work additionally. If so, the special case hypothesis should hold: The East-West-gap should be larger in Germany than in Europe. 1 Parts of this article have been published in German in Meulemann (2006). 36 1.2. Heiner Meulemann Four tests of the special case hypothesis The persistence and the special case hypotheses have been already confirmed in 21 countries of the European Social Survey (ESS; www.europeansocialsurvey.org) 2002 (Meulemann 2004). In the following, they will be examined again in 17 countries of the ESS 2004, of which all – with the exception of Estonia, which has only been surveyed in 2004 – have been surveyed in 2002 and 2004, and compared with the results of 2002. In 2004, the countries of Eastern Europe are: the Czech Republic (CZ), Poland (PL) and Slovenia (SLO) as Catholic countries, and a single Protestant country, Estonia (EST); the countries of West Europe are Austria (AU), Belgium (B), Spain (E), Luxembourg (L), and Portugal (P) as Catholic countries; Switzerland (CH) and United Kingdom (UK) as denominationally mixed countries; and Denmark (DK), Norway (N) and Sweden (S) as Protestant countries; and, finally, Greece (GR). West Germany (DW) is a denominationally mixed country, East Germany (DE) a Protestant country (Pickel 2003: 253). The special case hypothesis compares the difference between the two parts of Germany with the difference between the West and East European countries. Depending on the selection of European countries to be compared with the two Germanies, there are four tests of the special case hypothesis. First, the difference between West and East Germany is compared with the difference between all West and all East European countries (except West- and East Germany). This is called the global test. As among Eastern European countries denominationally mixed and orthodox countries where political repression has enforced secularization presumably with more success than in Catholic countries are not at hand, the yardstick of the European difference is underestimated such that the difference within Germany is easily overestimated. Therefore, second, the difference within Europe is enlarged by the omission of the most religious country of Eastern Europe, namely Poland, such that chances that the difference within Germany appears to be comparatively large are reduced. This is called the aggravated test. The global and the aggravated test are carried through for all countries of the ESS 2004; however, as soon as results for 2004 are compared with results for 2002, only those countries are included which have been surveyed at both time points; that is, Estonia is excluded. The special case hypothesis can be tested even more strictly, namely quasiexperimentally, if the country types of the two parts of Germany are compared also in Europe – that is denominationally mixed with Protestant countries. The difference within Germany, then, is compared with the denominationally mixed West European countries and the one Protestant East European country at hand, namely Estonia. This third comparison which is feasible only in 2004 is called the controlled test. Each of the three tests presented so far compare the impact of the recent dictatorships on religiosity between Germany and Europe. For this reason, they are summarily termed as the contemporary test of the special case hypothesis. Finally, the difference within Germany can be compared historically with the difference between Catholic and Protestant West European countries. The enforced secularization of Eastern Europe was given half a century to imprint its mark on the population. Yet the denominational divide within Western Europe which opened the path to secularization holds on since four centuries. Thus, the historical test of the special case hypothesis compares a planned experiment enforced to the people with a natural trend established by the Religiosity in Europe and the Two Germanies 37 people themselves. It compares the power of politics with the power of history. It moves a contemporary divide into the perspective of “longue duree”. It may immunize against the over-estimation of current concerns – yet also prove that recent events had extraordinary consequences. In order to examine the special case hypothesis, averages for the respective countries have been computed; the same weight of 2000 respondents was applied to each country, independently of the size of the populations or the samples. 1.3 Four measures of religiosity: church membership, service attendance, prayer, self-ascribed religiosity Religiosity can be defined as an attitude to the religious question, that is, the question where man and world come from and got to. As the churches used to answer this question in European history, church membership is the pre-condition for church practices of which two will be considered here: service attendance and prayer. Yet as no man – faithful to the churches or not – can ignore the religious question, diffuse religiosity which is geared to the religious question alone and not the answers of a church has to be considered besides church religiosity. It is surveyed by a question on self-ascribed religiosity. Church membership is a matter of official registration in some European countries, but not in all. A question valid for all countries, therefore, had to refer to the self-definition of the respondent: “Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?” The frequency of service attendance was surveyed thus: “Apart from special occasion such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?” Respondents could choose on a card between seven options “Every day” (with the highest value in the following computations), “More than once a week”, “Once a week”, “At least once a month”, “Only on special holy days”, “Less often”, “Never”. The frequency of prayer was surveyed thus: „Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?” Respondents could choose on a card between the same seven options as for church attendance. The self-ascribed religiosity was surveyed thus: “Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?” Respondents could choose on a scale with 11 values for “00 Not religious at all” to “10 Very religious” and numbers, but not names in between. This question was asked immediately after the question on church membership and before the question on service attendance and church prayer which might have inflated self-ascribed religiosity.2 2 In both waves the question on current church membership was immediately followed by a question on former membership which is not considered here. Furthermore, in the ESS 2002 there was a question on the importance of life domains one of which was religion. As this question was not repeated in 2004, it is also not regarded here (see Meulemann 2004: 67-69). The four questions on service attendance, prayer, importance, and self-ascribed religiosity form a single concept in 2002 and can be combined into an index (Billiet/Welkenhuysen-Gybels 2004). Together with the question on (current and former) membership they constitute the complete set of questions surveyed in both the first and the second wave. 38 2. Heiner Meulemann Results: church membership As in Germany church membership is registered officially, common practice of survey research is to survey registered membership and not – as in the ESS – the feeling of belonging to a church. In order to be able to examine the persistence hypothesis, the question on registered membership has been administered in the German national module of the ESS: „Of which church or religious community are you a member?” According to this question on church registration 19% of the West Germans, and 70% of the East Germans do not belong to a church in 2004, and 19% resp. 69% in 2002. These figures fit neatly together with those of other surveys between 1991 and 2000 where non-membership varies without a trend between 11% and 15% in West Germany, and between 65% and 71% in East Germany (Meulemann 2002: 117; Pickel 2003: 255). Non-membership, then, does not decrease in East Germany, and the difference amounts to 50 percentage points. Thus, the persistence hypothesis is confirmed. Figure 1: Church Membership in Germany and in Europe 2004 To examine the special case hypothesis we have to leave the question on church registration and to go back to the question on church membership which allows the comparison of Germany with the other European countries. The results are presented in figure 1. In West Germany, 69% consider themselves as belonging to a church, in East Germany 27%, which amounts to a percentage point differences of 42. These three figures are again presented in the first row of table 1. How this inner-German difference compares to the different innerEuropean differences is then presented in the following four rows of table 1. Religiosity in Europe and the Two Germanies 39 Table 1: Examining the special case hypothesis for church membership 2004 (in %) Germany Europe Europe without Poland Europe: Mixed vs. Protestant Western Europe: Catholic vs. Protestant West 69 64 64 61 69 East 27 48 33 23 48 .d 42 16 31 38 21 d(d) 26 11 4 21 d = difference, d(d) difference of differences In Western Europe 64% are members of a church, and in Eastern Europe 48% – a percentage point difference of 16. If one excludes Poland, the Eastern European average falls to 33% and the West European lead increases to 31 percentage points. If one compares denominationally mixed countries in Western Europe with Protestant countries in Eastern Europe, 61% are members in Western Europe, and 23% in Eastern Europe – a percentage point difference of 38. According to the first comparison, then, the West German lead is 26 percentage points larger than the West European lead; according to the second and third comparison, it is 11 and 4 percentage points larger. The special case hypothesis is confirmed according to the global, the aggravated, and the controlled test, that is, in every contemporary test. As the historical test refers only to the Western European countries, the averages of the Catholic and Protestant countries – 69% and 48% – are separated by a fatter line from the first three rows in this and in every following table. Even in the historical comparison, then, the special case hypothesis is confirmed: The enforced secularization was stronger by 21 percentage points in Germany than the denominational divide within Western Europe. The global and aggravated tests of the special case hypothesis have also been carried through in the ESS 2002. In 2002, 70% are member of a church in West Germany, and 30% in East Germany – a percentage point difference of 40. This inner-German difference exceeds the inner-European difference in the global test by 34, and in the aggravated test by 16 percentage points. Thus, the inner-German difference exceeds the inner-European difference in 2002 slightly stronger than in 2004. But this results from the fact that in 2002 Estonia, a country particularly distant to the church, has not been surveyed such that the yardstick for the inner-German difference, the inner-European difference, was somewhat smaller. If the global and aggravated test is carried through in 2004 without Estonia, the percentage point differences are exactly the same as in 2002. Furthermore, the historical test of the special case hypothesis has been carried through in 2002 with the same countries as in 2004. The inner German difference exceeds the inner-West-European difference by 15 percentage points, that is, almost as much as in 2004. Whichever of the three tests feasible at both time points are regarded, Germany remains a special case between 2002 and 2004: The losses of the churches are stronger in East Germany than in East Europe, and the recent political repression has left deeper traces than the denominational division. 40 3. Heiner Meulemann Results: service attendance The means of service attendance in each country 2004 are presented in figure 2 by the solid line between the two dotted lines. In West Germany, mean service attendance (2.51) is 0.84 scale points higher than in East Germany (1.67). Referring back to the most significant response category: In West Germany 32% „never“ attend services, and in East Germany 65%. These figures fit neatly together with those of the ESS 2002 and of other surveys between 1991 and 2002. Between 1991 and 2004, service attendance is roughly 45 percentage points higher in West than in East Germany. Thus, the persistence hypothesis is confirmed. Figure 2: Service attendance in Germany and Europe 2004: Means in total population (solid line), among members (upper dotted line) and non-members (lower dotted line) of churches To test the special case hypothesis, the inner-German difference has to be compared with the inner-European difference. This is presented in the upper third of table 2. As the comparison follows the same rules as in table 1, I will refer only to difference and to differences of differences, that is, to the last two columns of this and each following table. Religiosity in Europe and the Two Germanies 41 Table 2: Examining the special case hypothesis for service attendance in the total population and among members and non-members of churches: Means Total population Germany Europe Europe without Poland Europe: Mixed vs. Protestant Western Europe: Catholic vs. Protestant Members of churches Germany Europe Europe without Poland Europe: Mixed vs. Protestant Western Europe: Catholic vs. Protestant Non-members of churches Germany Europe Europa without Poland Europe: Mixed vs. Protestant Western Europe: Catholic vs. Protestant d = difference, d(d) difference of differences West East D d(d) 2.51 2.56 2.56 2.49 2.63 1.67 2.81 2.32 2.21 2.13 0.84 -0.25 0.24 0.28 0. 0.50 1.09 0.60 0.56 0.34 2.96 3.09 3.09 3.12 3.14 2.78 3.89 3.39 3.19 2.59 0.18 -0.80 -0,30 -0.07 0.55 0.98 0.48 0.25 -0.37 1.47 1.61 1.61 1.52 1.49 1.25 1.81 1.79 1.93 1.69 0.22 -0.20 -0.18 -0.41 -0.20 0.42 0.40 0.63 0.42 The lead of the West within Germany contrasts to the lag of the West within Europe: The average of West Europe is below the average of East Europe – yet above the average for East Europe without Poland. The inner-German difference exceeds the inner-European difference, with and without Poland, and the difference between denominationally mixed and Catholic countries by 1.09, 0.60, and 0.56 scale points. The special case hypothesis, thus, is confirmed in the global, aggravated and controlled test, that is, in each contemporary test. If one compares the inner-German difference with the difference between Catholic and Protestant West European countries, the special case hypothesis is confirmed in the historical test as well. The enforced secularization in Germany had an effect by 0.34 scale points stronger than the denominational divide within West Europe. Again two results hold: Churches have lost more impact in East Germany than in East Europe, and contemporary politics are stronger than history. Again, the global, aggravated, and historical test of the special case hypothesis can be compared with the ESS 2002. In 2002, the average service attendance in West Germany (2.56) is 0.81 scale points higher than in East Germany (1.75). The inner-German difference exceeds the inner-European difference in the global test by 1.30, in the aggravated test by 0.67 and in the historical test by 0.26 scale points. If one again applies the global and the aggravated test 2004 only in countries which have been surveyed in 2002 as well, differences in 2004 have almost the same amount as in 2002: 1.29 and 0.65. Again, tests of the special case hypothesis lead to the same results at both time points. Yet the tests so far are limited in one respect. The frequency of service attendance depends on church membership, and church membership varies – as figure 1 has shown – strongly between countries. The country differences of service attendance may be produced by the country difference of church membership. To tackle this problem, service attendance 42 Heiner Meulemann is considered separately for members and non-members of churches. The means for both groups are reproduced in figure 2 by the two dotted lines; and the computation to test the special case hypothesis can be followed up in the two lower panels of table 2. Even among the members and non-members of churches, service attendance is higher in West than in East Germany (0.18 and 0.22). Yet as the strong effect of membership on service attendance has been controlled, the difference is reduced. Of the difference in the total population of 0.84, only a quarter remains; three quarters are produced by the higher church membership in West Germany and by the higher service attendance of church membership in both parts of Germany. One may verify this by looking back at figure 2: The higher service attendance of church members more strongly determines the average of the total population in West Germany, and the lower service attendance of non-members more strongly determines the average of the total population in East Germany, such that the solid line shows a greater gap than the two dotted lines. Yet there remain differences which can no longer be accounted to the differences of church membership between the two parts of the country. The persistence hypothesis, then, is confirmed not only in the total population, but among members and non-members of churches as well. While controlling for church membership reduces the West German lead, the West European lag in the total population increases from -0.25 to -0.80 among members and remains among non-members with -0.20 roughly the same, such that the West German lead is bigger than the West European lag by 0.98 resp. 0.42 scale points. If Poland is taken out of consideration, the West European lead of 0.24 is transformed in a lag of -0.30 and -0.18, such that the West German lead is bigger than the West European lag by 0.48 and 0.40 scale points. If one compares denominationally mixed with Protestant countries, the West European lead of .28 transforms itself into a lag of -0.07, resp. -0,41, such that the West German lead is bigger than the West European lag by of 0.25 resp. 0.63 scale points. The special case hypothesis, then, is confirmed in the global, aggravated and controlled test. Finally, if one compares the inner-German difference with the difference of members resp. non-members between Catholic and Protestant countries of West Europe of 0.55 and -0.20, the special case hypothesis is not confirmed in the historical test: The West German lead is smaller than the inner-West-European differences by -0.37 among members, and larger by 0.42 among members – in sum: there is no difference. The global, aggravated and historical test of the special case hypothesis 2004 can be compared with 2002. In all three cases, the results are the same. In sum, the special case hypothesis fares slightly worse if membership in churches is controlled, than if it is not controlled. In each contemporary test the West-East-difference is larger in Germany than in Europe. Yet in the historical test both West-East differences are roughly similar: The contemporary events leave traces at least as deep as the “longue duree”. Religiosity in Europe and the Two Germanies 4. 43 Results: frequency of prayer The means of the frequency of prayer in the total population 2004 are presented in figure 3 by a continuous line. In West Germany, it is 1.61 scale points higher than in East Germany. Again with reference to the most significant response category: In West Germany 29% „never“ pray, in East Germany 69%. These figure fit neatly together with those of the ESS 2002 (28% and 68%) and those of surveys between 1991 and 1994 of between 25% and 28% in West, and of 70% and 75% in East Germany (Meulemann 2002: 118). The number of East Germans who „never“ pray does not shrink, and the difference stays at 40 percentage points. Thus, the persistence hypothesis is confirmed. Figure 3: Prayer in Germany and Europe 2004: Means in total population (solid line), among members (upper dotted line) and non-members (lower dotted line) of churches To examine the special case hypothesis in the total population, the inner-German differences are compared with the inner-European differences in the first panel of table 3. In each, except the controlled, test, the special case hypothesis is confirmed. But just as the frequency of service attendance the frequency of prayer depends on church membership. The means of the frequency of prayer among members and non-members of churches are presented in figure 3 by dotted lines; and the special case hypothesis is tested in the two lower panels of table 3. Of the differences between the total populations of the two Germanies, a third remains even when church membership is controlled for, such that the persistence hypothesis is confirmed. The special case hypothesis, however, is confirmed in the global and aggravated test only, yet no more in the controlled and the historical test. 44 Heiner Meulemann Table 3: Examining the special case hypothesis for frequency of prayer in the total population and among members and non-members of churches 2004: Means West East d d(d) Germany 3.42 1.81 1.61 Europe 3.37 3.09 0.28 1.35 Europe without Poland 3.37 2.35 1.02 0.59 Total population Europe: Mixed vs. Protestant 3.64 2.04 1.60 0. 0.01 Western Europe: Catholic vs. Protestant 3.42 2.47 0.95 0.66 Germany 4.13 3.46 0.67 Europe 4.23 4.73 -0.50 Europe without Poland 4.23 3.93 0,30 0.37 Europe: Mixed vs. Protestant 4.65 3.82 0.83 -0.16 Western Europe: Catholic vs. Protestant 4.16 3.28 0.88 -0.21 Members of churches 1.17 Non-members of Churches Germany 1 .82 1.23 0.59 Europe 1.85 1.60 0.25 Europa without Poland 1.85 1.57 0.28 0.31 Europe: Mixed vs. Protestant 2.06 1.52 0.54 0.05 Western Europe: Catholic vs. Protestant 1.74 1.72 0.02 0.57 0.34 d = difference, d(d) difference of differences If one compares the global, aggravated and historical tests between 2004 and 2002, the pattern of results is the same: the two contemporary tests are confirmed, yet the historical one is not. Germany remains a special case. In sum, the special case hypothesis fares somewhat worse if church membership is controlled. As for the global and the aggravated tests, the West-East difference remains bigger in Germany than in Europe. As for the controlled and historical tests, however, both WestEast differences are roughly the same. Religiosity in Europe and the Two Germanies 5. 45 Results: self-ascribed religiosity The means of self-ascribed religiosity in the total populations 2004 are presented by a solid line in figure 4. The West German lead of 2.41 scale points seamlessly continues the lead of 2.33 in 2002 and the results of similar surveys between 1991 and 2000 (Meulemann 2002: 120, Pickel 2003: 258). The persistence hypothesis is confirmed. The special case hypothesis is – as the dotted lines in figure 4 and first panel of table 4 show – confirmed in each contemporary test in the total population and among members and non-members. Figure 4: Self-ascribed religiosity in Germany and in Europe 2004: Means in total population (solid line), among members (upper dotted line) and non-members (lower dotted line) of churches If one compares the global, aggravated, and historical test between 2004 and 2002, the contemporary tests are confirmed at both time points, yet not the historical test, and the differences are very similar at both time points. As for the special case of Germany, nothing has changed between 2002 and 2004. In sum, the special case hypothesis fares only slightly less well, if church membership is controlled for, than if it is not controlled for. In each contemporary test, the West-Eastdifference is bigger in Germany than in Europe. In the historical test, however, both EastWest differences are similar. 46 Heiner Meulemann Table 4: Examining the special case hypothesis for self-ascribed religiosity in the total population and among members and non-members of churches 2004: Means West East d d(d) Total population Germany 4.75 2.34 2.41 Europe 4.80 4.39 0.41 2.00 Europe without Poland 4.80 3.66 1.14 1.27 Europe: Mixed vs. Protestant 4.90 3.47 1.43 1.98 Western Europe: Catholic vs. Protestant 4.77 3.96 0.81 1.60 Germany 5.66 5.40 0.26 Europe 5.90 6.40 -0.50 0.76 Europe without Poland 5.90 5.95 -0.05 0.31 Members of Churches Europe: Mixed vs. Protestant 6.06 5.93 0.13 0.13 Western Europe: Catholic vs. Protestant 5.73 5.13 0.60 -0.34 Germany 2.68 1.19 1.49 Europe 2.84 2.54 0.30 Europe without Poland 2.84 2.52 0.32 1.17 Europe: Mixed vs. Protestant 3.11 2.74 0.37 1.12 Western Europe: Catholic vs. Protestant 2.59 2.83 -0.24 1.73 Non-members of churches d = difference, d(d) difference of differences 1.19 Religiosity in Europe and the Two Germanies 6. 47 Summary and conclusion The analyses of church membership, frequency of service attendance, frequency of prayer, and self-ascribed religiosity strongly coincide. They can be summarized in three points. First, as expected by the persistence hypothesis, the West German lead in religiosity does not shrink. Second, as expected by the persistence hypothesis, the West-East lead is bigger in Germany than in Europe. This holds even when Poland – the most religious country of not only West Europe, but of Europe altogether – is excluded from the comparison, and the test whether Germany is a special case is aggravated. Furthermore, this holds predominantly – with the exception of the frequency of prayer – even when the religious type of the country is controlled for by comparing denominationally mixed countries in the West with Protestant countries in the East. Finally, this holds even if the inner-German difference is compared to the inner-West-European difference between Catholic and Protestant countries. Even if church membership is controlled for, the inner-German differences are, although no longer bigger, still as big as the inner-West-European differences. Thirdly, these results hold 2002 and 2004 in nearly the same way. In sum, the gap of religiosity between the two parts of Germany in 2004 can be still described as the persistence of a special case. Germany is a test of the thesis that the social integration of a secular state rests on the shared religiosity of its citizens – with a clearly negative result. The populations of the two former states now live 15 years together such that many of their political attitudes have assimilated to each other (mostly the East German attitudes to the West German ones), yet the religiosity of the East is still far away from the religiosity of the West. Whatever grants social integration and the validity of a shared social order, it is not religion. Religion is not the glue of a secular state. As the inner-German differences have been gauged by inner-European differences, the result that Germany is a special case cannot be explained by conditions which hold also in Europe. It must be explained by peculiarities of the German division which have reinforced the effect of the contrasting social orders of East and West. Paradoxically, the coexistence within a single country allowed the two populations to develop separate mentalities. On the one hand, it has given those parts of the population faithful to the church an opportunity to escape from the state inimical to the church, such that religion has lost more support than in countries where adherents of the church had to stay. On the other hand, it has forced the state to more strongly suppress the churches and the churches to more strongly appease to the state. Thus, while religiosity was the victim of political repression in East Germany as well as in East Europe, it suffered from demographical selection in East Germany alone. The historical and cultural bracket “Germany” has not mellowed, but acerbated the effect of the two contrasting social orders during the division of a single nation into two states. 48 7. Heiner Meulemann References Billiet, Jaak/Welkenhuysen-Gybels, Jerry (2004): Assessing Cross-National Equivalence in the ESS. The case of religious Involvement. Paper prepared at the European Conference on Quality and Methodology in Official Statistics. Mainz. Gärtner, Christel/Pollack, Detlef/Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika (eds.) (2003): Atheismus und religiöse Indifferenz. Opladen. Meulemann, Heiner (2002): Wertwandel in Deutschland von 1949–2000. Fernuniversität Hagen – Fachbereich Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften. Meulemann, Heiner (2004): Die Persistenz eines Sonderfalls. In: Van Deth (ed.): 55-76. Meulemann, Heiner (2006): Religiosität: Immer noch die Persistenz eines Sonderfalls. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 2006. 30/31: 15-22. Pickel, Gert (1998): Religiosität und Kirchlichkeit in Ost- und Westeuropa. Vergleichende Betrachtungen religiöser Orientierungen nach dem Umbruch in Osteuropa. In Pollack/Borowik/Jagodzinski (eds.): 55-85. Pickel, Gert (2003): Areligiosität, Antireligoisät, Religiosität. In: Gärtner/Pollack/Wohlrab-Sahr (eds.): 231- 246. Pollack, Detlef/Borowik, Irina/Jagodzinski, Wolfgang (eds.)(1998): Religiöser Wandel in den postkommunistischen Ländern Ost- und Mitteleuropas. Würzburg. Van Deth, Jan (eds.)(2004): Deutschland in Europa. Wiesbaden. Religion in Finland and Russia in a Comparative Perspective Kimmo Kääriäinen 1. Introduction Christianity has a history of more than a thousand years in both Russia and Finland. The spread of Christian influences to Russia is dated as early as the 8th and 9th centuries. Christianity in its Orthodox form began to spread more widely among the Slavs in the second half of the 10th century. The Grand Duchess Olga of Kiev is reported to have been baptised in Constantinople in the mid 950s. Her grandson, Vladimir, made Orthodoxy the official religion of his state in 988. The first Christian influences arrived in Finland towards the end of the first millennium, from both east and west. The western influences were stronger and by the beginning of the 14th century most of Finland was within the sphere of influence of Sweden and the Church of Rome. Both Russia and Finland therefore have a long history of Christianity. They also have a common history lasting for over a century in that Russia conquered Finland early in the 19th century. In 1809 Finland became a Grand Duchy of Imperial Russia. Although the head of state was the Orthodox Czar and not a Lutheran king, the Lutheran Church continued to be the state church of Finland. Finnish independence in 1917 marked a parting of the ways. It was also a parting of the ways for the development of religion of Finland and Russia. After the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia there began a deliberate eradication of religion. Church and state were separated from each other, likewise church and school. Religious instruction in schools was abandoned. Churches were closed, blown up or converted for “more practical” use. The fight against religion continued in varying degrees of cruelty right up to the end of the 1980s. In Finland the developmental path of religion was free to continue normally. Freedom of religion was only strengthened with the legislation of 1923, when an Act on the freedom of religion provided for the teaching of religion in schools and religious organisations were free to operate. 2. Religious change in Finland There is a very extensive body of material on religiosity among Finns. One part of this consists of official statistics. These are compiled by both Statistics Finland and the Church Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. For example, there are precise data on the membership of different denominations from the 1800s on. The Church has exact statistics on the numbers of those baptised, confirmed and married for an even longer period of time since for many years it was the Church which was responsible for keeping the population records. Ever since the 1950s there have been surveys measuring religiosity in Finland. More extensive data amenable to comparison has been available since the 1980s. The present article utilises the Finnish World Values data from 1981 to 2005 and the Kimmo Kääriäinen 50 Ecclesiastica and Monitor surveys conducted by the Church Research Institute and Gallup Finland.1 2.1. The institutional dimension and religious identity On the basis of its membership of religious denominations, Finland is the most Lutheran country in the world. In 2005 4.4 million Finns belonged to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. This corresponds to 83.2% of the population. The proportion of the population of the country that belongs to the Evangelical Lutheran Church has, however, gradually decreased. Fifty years ago it was ten percentage points higher. One per cent of Finns belong to Finland’s other national church, the Orthodox Church. Only one in a hundred belong to other registered religious denominations. Thus, in terms of membership figures, the Evangelical Lutheran Church does not compete against any other denomination, but only with religious non-commitment. 14.5% of Finns do not belong to any registered religious organisation and this number is increasing. Table 1: The population of Finland by denomination 1920-2005 Year 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 Lutheran % 98.1 96.3 95.9 95.1 92.4 92.4 90.3 87.9 85.1 83.2 Orthodox % 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 Other % 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.2 Unaffiliated % 0.03 1.5 2.0 2.7 5.5 5.2 7.8 10.2 12.7 14.5 Unknown 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0 0 0 Source: Statistics Centre. However, not belonging to a religious organisation does not necessarily mean not being religious or being opposed to religion. According to the World Values Survey 2005 as many as 40% of people not belonging to any religious organisation considered themselves religious. Forty-eight percent reported being non-religious and only 11% reported that they were atheists. Of all Finns 61% consider themselves religious, 36% consider themselves non-religious and 3% consider themselves atheists. Since 1981 the proportion of those considering themselves religious shows a slight increase. In all surveys between 1981 and 2005 there have been some 3% considering themselves atheists. Those considering themselves religious peaked in the survey of 2000 and was at its lowest in 1981. 1 For more detail on Finnish religiosity see Kääriäinen/Niemelä/Ketola 2005. Religion in Finland and Russia in Comparative Perspective 51 Table 2: Proportion of Finns considering themselves religious, non-religious and atheist 1981-2005 (%). Religious person Non-religious person Atheist N 1981 55 42 3 1,405 1990 59 38 3 1,280 1996 59 38 3 1,420 2000 67 30 3 1,027 2005 61 36 3 1,016 Source: World Values Surveys. Personal identity as Lutherans has decreased among the Finns. According to Churchmonitor 2004, 63% regard themselves as Lutherans. In 1996 the corresponding figure was 78%. Three out of four (73%) Finns consider themselves Christians, in 1996 the proportion was 80%. The proportion of those identifying themselves as Lutherans is especially low among young people. Only 44% of those under 25 consider themselves Lutherans, although there are almost as many who regard themselves as Christians as in other age groups, 67%. Only 55% of under 25-year-olds who regard themselves as Christians also consider themselves Lutherans. Lutheran identity increases with age in a distinctly linear manner among both men and women. 2.2. The importance of religion in life Finns can largely be located along a continuum according to what role religion plays in people’s lives. Atone extremity are those who consider religion very important and at the other extremity are those for whom religion has no meaning in life. Less than one fifth of Finns are located at their extremity. In between these are those considering religion fairly important or fairly unimportant. Two thirds of Finns are located here. The variations in the proportions of those considering religion important are slight between 1990 and 2005, but a slight rise in importance is discernible. The proportion of those for whom religion has no importance has diminished and the proportion of those considering religion extremely important has correspondingly increased. The most important reasons for belonging to the Church are Church ceremonies, baptism, confirmation, marriages and funerals, and the fact that the Church maintains the cemeteries. Nine out of ten members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland consider these important reasons for belonging to the Church. Church rites are also popular. Nearly all Finns (98%) have a Christian funeral, the vast majority of children are baptised and confirmation has remained uniquely popular. Table 3: Importance of religion among Finns 1990-2005 (%) Very important Fairly important Fairly unimportant Not important at all N Source: World Values Surveys. 1990 15 24 40 22 1,466 1996 14 32 37 17 1,487 2000 14 31 37 18 1,028 2005 18 28 40 15 1,012 Kimmo Kääriäinen 52 The main decreasing trend in Church rites is the decrease in the number those of choosing a Church wedding. There are two reasons for this: the proportion of young adults who have resigned from the Church has increased and they do not have the right to a Church wedding because one of the requirements for a Church wedding is Church membership. Another reason is the increase in divorces and second or third marriages. For the second or third marriage it is typical to choose a civil wedding even though the Lutheran Church of Finland allows church weddings for those who have earlier divorced. Table 4: Proportion of baptisms, confirmations and Church weddings 1970-2005 Proportion of newborn baptized 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 94.2 91.8 90.5 88.7 85.6 Proportion of 15-year-olds confirmed 98.3 92.5 92.2 90.4 87.9 Proportion of marriages in church 95.9 81.7 78.3 71.2 63.3 Source: Church Statistics, in Percent. Other important reasons for Church membership are the possibility of acting as godparents and that the Church maintains the Christian tradition of Church festivals and teaches the right life values to children and young people. Also, the work done by the Church in helping old people and the handicapped is often regarded as a reason for membership. Spiritual reasons are much less important for belonging to the Church. Only half of Church members consider the significance of the Church in reinforcing their faith an important reason for belonging to the Church. 2.3. The belief dimension Commitment to Church doctrine has declined among Finns. This is apparent, for example, among the numbers of those claiming to believe in a life after death and in the long term also among those claiming to believe in God “in the way the Church teaches”. What the Church has to offer in terms of teachings and doctrines is not felt to be particularly essential. The spiritual mission of the Church as a conveyor of a religious message is frequently felt to be of little significance. The social tasks of the Church are perceived to be much more important. According to the World Values Survey of 2000 one half of Finns believed in angels and Heaven. Every third respondent (33%) believed in the Devil and every fourth (25%) believed in Hell. The belief dimension also contains some evidence contrary to secularization. Since the mid 1970s there has hardly been any change in the share of those believing that some sort of God exists; only the number of those believing in God the way the Church teaches has decreased. The share of those who do not believe in any god at all, nor in any spirit or life force, has remained below ten percent. Religion in Finland and Russia in Comparative Perspective 53 Table 5: Finns' belief in God in 1976-2003 I believe in God as taught by Christianity I believe in God, but in a rather different way than what is taught by the Church I don’t really know whether I believe in God or not I doubt the existence of God I don’t believe in the existence of God Unable or unwilling to say N G 1976 51 22 G 1987 44 27 M 1995 41 28 G 2003 36 28 17 4 5 1 1,301 15 4 9 1 499 16 5 10 0 2,440 15 5 10 6 1,009 Source: Gallup (G) and Monitor (M) Surveys, in Percent. 2.4. The ritual dimension By European standards Finns are passive in their participation in religious occasions. Only 14% participate in religious occasions at least once a month. Of these less than half (6%) are extremely active, attending weekly or several times a week. The extremely active are generally women (60%) and fairly equally from all age groups except for those aged 18 to 25, of whom only 3% were extremely active in their attendance at religious occasions. Almost half of Finns (46%) are passive in their participation in religious occasions, attending religious ceremonies less than once a year. Most of them (73%) do, however, belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. There has been an increase in passivity since 1981, when only every third respondent reported attending religious occasions less than once a year or never. On the other hand the proportion of the extremely active and the active has remained as it was, being 11-14% in all surveys between 1981 and 2005. Table 6: Participation of Finns in religious occasions 1981-2005 Once a week or more often Once a month Only on special feast days Once a year Less often or never N 1981 4 9 29 25 33 1,233 1990 4 7 23 16 50 1,487 1996 4 7 20 23 47 1,498 2000 5 9 28 13 45 1,022 2005 6 8 23 17 46 1,011 Source: World Values Surveys. However, things look very different if one pays attention to private practices. There has been no notable change in the Finns’ prayer activity in the past twenty years. One out of four Finns is very active in praying, while about the same number of Finns never pray. The figures were almost the same 20 years earlier. From the perspective of the private practice of religion there is no indicator of a decline of religion. Kimmo Kääriäinen 54 Table 7: Finns' active prayer life 1982-2003 Prays daily Prays a few times a week More seldom Not at all in recent years Don't know N 1982 26 8 28 25 13 1,025 1991 29 10 29 25 7 941 2003 28 15 34 22 1 1,009 Source: Gallup Ecclesiastica, in Percent. All in all Finnish religiosity is characterized by slight religious participation in public, but by the private practice of religion, which is more active than the European average. For the Finns, religion is a private matter. The typical Finn practices religion, praying, for example, but not participating regularly in any religious events. Failure to attend religious events, however, may not be taken to indicate that religion does not occupy a prominent place in an individual’s life. Only a small part of Finns can be described as “irreligious”. The share of those in whose lives there is no place for religion has remained low in Finland. There are several “weak links” in Finnish religiosity: young people, men (especially young men) and the metropolitan area. These are all linked by a weaker sense of community than in other population groups. Young people differ from the rest of the population in being less religious. Christianity does not occupy the same position of authority among young people as among the older population. The metropolitan area differs from the rest of Finland in being more secularized. Commitment to religious organisations, doctrinal beliefs and religious observance are less than in the rest of Finland. The attitude to life of residents of the metropolitan area is also in many ways unfavorable to religion. Attitudes to communality are weaker than elsewhere. However, religious ceremonies still occupy a strong position in the metropolitan area. Church ceremonies seem to be the last link to the Church for those who feel alienated from it, as well as rites that give shape to life, which people have no desire to abandon, even though the Church is otherwise no longer of importance. 2.5. The moral dimension Finns’ moral views have changed in recent decades. As regards some questions measuring moral views, it is possible to study changes of attitude since the 1980s. The proportion of people who consider certain things to be wrong has declined during this period, but a marked vacillation is also apparent in moral views. Significant changes have taken place in the Finnish moral climate since the beginning of the 1980s. In 1981 moral views were on the whole stricter than later. The year 1990 clearly represents more liberal views. At that time people were living in the climate of the incipient economic boom of the late 1980s, when economic values and individualism were strongly stressed. The boom of the 1980s reinforced individualism, efficiency and the experience of control over one’s life. At the same time people began to relate more tolerantly to many previously forbidden things. The economic recession (partly caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was one of the main trade partners for Finland) at Religion in Finland and Russia in Comparative Perspective 55 the beginning of the 1990s rapidly altered the moral climate. The trend began to shift from controlling one’s life towards isolation, from efficient action towards consideration of the basic questions of life, and from individualism back towards a sense of community. With the recession moral issues also became more important. After 1990 Finns’ attitudes were primarily shaped by the demands of high civic morality. On many moral issues “a stricter line” than in the 1980s began to be followed. Table 8: The acceptability of various actions in the period 1981-2005. The proportion of those who would never accept the action in question (1 on the scale) Accept bribes Claim benefits Tax evasion Fare dodging Prostitution Suicide Homosexuality Abortion Euthanasia Divorce N 1981 84 65 66 82 65 69 56 30 42 18 1,233 1990 70 41 53 31 33 33 10 10 5 1,487 1996 83 64 57 62 38 48 38 19 16 8 1,498 2000 80 51 53 50 44 40 28 11 17 3 1,022 2005 73 56 56 54 39 36 20 14 13 5 1,011 Source: World Values Surveys; in Percent. Individualism, however, began to rise again after the mid-1990s. In 1996 there was still an atmosphere of uncertainty – in spite of the fact that the economy was growing and general economic optimism had increased. The recession had changed attitudes in a more communal direction. Tax evasion was condemned much more widely than in 1990, as were taking bribes and fare-dodging. The hardening of attitudes was also apparent in relation to abortion and suicide. By 2000 most moral views changed once again in a more liberal direction and in 2005 this trend continued in most moral issues. Although moral views have become more liberal, issues of social morality still reveal very strict moral principles. There can be observed substantially less moral pluralism and fragmentation of values than in the area of individual morality. Fairly broad agreement is perceptible on norms considered of central importance for the basic structure of society, those that maintain mutual trust and mutual respect among the Finnish people. However, on issues of private morality Finns’ views differ much more. How does religion influence Finnish morality? On many moral issues there are clear differences between different types of religiosity. The differences are mainly linear: the moral views of the most religious are stricter and those of the less religious more liberal. However, regarding social morality these differences can mainly be explained by age and gender. Nevertheless, religion influences family and sexual ethics, and issues relating to the beginning and end of life, such as abortion, euthanasia, divorce and casual sexual relationships. The interrelation of religion and morality in Finland, however, is a wider question than whether more religious people have a “stricter” morality than the non-religious. Due to the tradition of a homogenous culture, religion has for centuries influenced society in such a Kimmo Kääriäinen 56 way that social structures and legislation demonstrate many characteristics of the Lutheran ethos. Despite modernization and privatization, the Finnish system still emphasizes communal values. Finns are characteristically committed to the idea of equality and the defense of a comprehensive welfare society. Morality has its roots in the Lutheran ethos. Lutheran values are often held by those who in their everyday lives have left religious practices far behind and even relinquished church membership. 3. Religious change in Russia Since the beginning of the 1990s it has been possible to research religiosity among Russians with the help of sociological studies. The statistics presented in the present article are based on the results of an interview-based joint research project by the Academy of Finland and the Russian Academy of Sciences. The studies were conducted in the area of the Russian Federation in 1991 (N=1,961, 1993 (N=1,491, 1996 (N=1,667), 1999 (N=1,648), 2002 (N=1,541) and 2005 (N=1,650). The interviews of 1991 were conducted in January, that is, in the era of the Soviet Union and the Communist system. The research was nevertheless conducted in the area of the present Russian Federation and is therefore comparable to the data from later years. Since 1999 additional data for this project have also been collected from the Muslim areas of Russia. This present article utilises the core data on Russia, which makes possible a longer period of diachronic comparison.2 3.1. The institutional dimension and religious identity In Russia people are not registered members of the Russian Orthodox Church or other religious organisations in the same way as in Finland. All that is known about the religious organisations is the number of these registered, not the number of members they have. Estimates of the proportions of the various organisations are therefore based on surveys. Most Russians (79%) consider themselves Orthodox. Here being Orthodox is understood very vaguely, however. The majority of those calling themselves Orthodox classify themselves as “Christian in general”. Only a small minority are committed to official Orthodoxy, the Patriarchate of Moscow. Indeed, Orthodoxy is more a part of ethnic identity than a distinct religious conviction. This is further evidenced by the act that half of the atheists consider themselves Orthodox. It is typical in Russia that religion and ethnicity are connected. Thus ethnic Russians are expected to be Orthodox. Being Russian and Being Orthodox are inseparable. Likewise for the Tartars the “natural” religion is Islam, for the Burjaats it is Buddhism and for the Jews it is Judaism. Among these traditional religions in Russia there persists a widespread consensus on this approach. It is also considered to exclude competition between religions. In the data of 2005 Muslims accounted for 3% and Protestants for 1%. The proportions of Catholics, Jews and Buddhists did not account for even 1%. Fifteen per cent of respondents reported not belonging to any religion. The proportion of Muslims in the 2 For more detail on the religious situation in Russia see Furman/Kääriäinen 2006. Religion in Finland and Russia in Comparative Perspective 57 questionnaire studies was smaller than their actual share of the population of Russia. There is no exact knowledge on the number of Muslims since in Russia the term Muslim is extremely vague. Estimates for numbers of Muslims in Russia vary between a few million and 20 million. The figure is higher if the term “Muslim” is taken in an ethnic sense to refer to those peoples living in the area of the Russian Federation who have traditionally been within the sphere of Islamic influence, like the Tartars, Bashkirs and Caucasians. However, if we take as our point of departure the extent to which those of a certain nationality identify themselves as Muslims the estimate of the number of Muslims becomes much smaller. Yet in Russia it is typical to connect ethnicity and religion. Thus the weight of Islam is generally defined according to nationality not religion.3 There has been a rapid increase in the number of those considering themselves believers. On the other hand, the number of atheists has diminished dramatically. Soviet atheism was inextricably linked to Communist ideology and the Soviet system. With the collapse of these, millions of atheists disappeared. They did not however, become religious; most of them appeared to remain in the no man’s land between the atheist fraternity and the churches.4 The number of believers has more than doubled, while the number of atheists has remained at the same level since the collapse of Communism. In the early 1990s most of the believers were elderly women and almost all believers had a religious home background. Table 9: Degrees of religiosity in Russia 1991-2005 Believer Seeker Non-believer Atheist Cannot say N 1991 23 28 7 35 7 1,961 1993 32 28 30 5 4 1,491 1996 34 30 24 6 6 1,667 1999 40 30 22 5 2 1,648 2002 44 29 20 5 2 1,541 2005 53 24 14 6 3 1,650 Source: Academy of Finland and the Russian Academy of Sciences; in Percent. However, the situation in the 2000s has changed. Among the first post-Communist generation the number of believers has increased markedly. The age distribution among believers in 2002 was a ‘J’ curve: many believers in the younger age group (18-23 years), in the next age group clearly fewer and again many among the older age groups.5 Between 2002 and 2005, however, the age distribution evened out, while the number of believers increased most of all among those aged 30-49. The majority of believers continues to be women: two thirds of women (64%) consider themselves believers 41% of men. The majority of atheists continue to be men. Nevertheless only 9% of men consider themselves atheists, 3% of women. 3 4 5 Musulmane v postovetskom prostranstve 1997 On the reasons for the development see Kääriäinen (1998: 90-96) and Mitrokhin (1993: 9-10). On religiosity among young Russians see Turunen 2005. Kimmo Kääriäinen 58 3.2. The importance of religion in life Russians, too can be located along a continuum according to the role religion plays in their lives. At one extremity are those considering religion very important and at the other those for whom religion has no meaning in their lives. Those considering religion very important amount to 15% and those for whom it is not important at all amount to one fifth. In between these are those considering religion fairly important or fairly unimportant. Two thirds of Russians can be located here. Only a small increase in the proportion of those considering religion extremely important is discernible between 1991 and 2005. The increase in the number of those considering religion fairly important is more visible, likewise the decrease in the proportion of those for whom religion is not important at all. Table 10: Importance of religion among Russians 1991–2005 Very important Fairly important Fairly unimportant Not important at all Cannot say N 1991 11 20 6 30 33 1,961 1993 11 21 37 28 3 1,491 1996 11 21 38 27 3 1,667 1999 12 23 37 24 4 1,648 2002 10 26 37 25 2 1,541 2005 15 30 33 20 2 1,650 Source: Academy of Finland and the Russian Academy of Sciences; in Percent. 3.3. The belief dimension The number of those believing in God has increased markedly. In 1991 only every third (34%) respondent reported believing in God, in 2005 it was already two thirds (66%). The significant differences between the years 1991 and 1993 can partly be explained by the fact that in the last year of Communist power there may well have been pressure to give the “right” answers. However, the growth continued after 1993 and a clear increase was discernible in the period between 2002 and 2005. There has also been a notable increase in the proportion of Russians believing in traditional Christianity. Table 11: Belief in various phenomena in Russia 1991-2005 God Life after death The Devil Hell Heaven Transmigration of souls Astrology Magic N 1991 34 17 12 13 15 17 1,961 1993 46 25 28 24 25 21 1,491 1996 47 24 27 22 24 20 37 1,667 Source: Academy of Finland and the Russian Academy of Sciences; in Percent. 1999 59 24 32 26 29 21 42 43 1,648 2002 59 27 32 27 32 20 43 43 1,541 2005 66 31 38 36 39 22 42 45 1,650 Religion in Finland and Russia in Comparative Perspective 59 In all age groups those believing in God were in the majority. More than half of men also report that they believe in God. Regarding the more “dogmatic” objects of belief the difference between men and women is much greater and in these phenomena older respondents proved to be more religious than the others. Differences between age groups, however, have notably diminished compared to the early 1990s. The reason for this is not the “secularisation” of the older age groups, but rather that in the younger age groups a greater number have begun to hold traditional Christian beliefs. Non-Christian beliefs are extremely common among young people. Half of those under 30 years of age believe in magic and astrology. The proportion of those believing in these phenomena diminishes linearly with age. There are also clearly more women than men believing in these phenomena. Moreover, in the population as a whole the many traditional Russian folk beliefs (e.g. sitting down for a quiet moment before embarking on a journey) and fatalism (e.g. predestined future, horoscope at the time of birth affecting the entire lifespan) enjoy a strong position. In spite of an increase in belief in God and in other traditional Christian beliefs, the Russians conceptions of religion are distinctly eclectic. Instead of creating a uniform world view, Orthodoxy seems to offer some of the population some material with which to construct a world view. For the majority of Russians, the world view is composed of numerous partially contradictory elements: people believe in God, in astrology, in the transmigration of souls and in magic and numerous traditional Russian folk beliefs. 3.4. The ritual dimension The burgeoning of the number of churches operational in the 1990s did not initially affect regular attendance at church services. From 1991, the last year of Communist power, until 2002 regular attendance at services remained on the same level: only 6-7% of Russians participated in church services at least once a month. There was, however, some increase in occasional attendance at church services. By 2005 there was a clear increase in regular churchgoing while the decrease in the number of those never going to church continued. Table 12: Churchgoing in Russia 1991–2005 At least once a month A few times a year Once a year or less Never N 1991 6 8 27 59 1,996 1993 7 10 21 62 1,491 1996 6 20 25 49 1,667 1999 7 19 29 45 1,648 2002 7 19 31 43 1,541 2005 11 21 30 38 1,650 Source: Academy of Finland and the Russian Academy of Sciences; in Percent. Women and older age groups are clearly more active churchgoers than the others. In the 2000s especially, the younger age groups, however, have found their way to church much more often than before. In spite of this almost half of those under the age of 30 never attend church services. Between 2002 and 2005 the greatest increase in churchgoing occurred among those ages 30-49. There has also been an increase in the private practice of religion. Nevertheless Russians cannot be considered particularly active in saying their prayers even Kimmo Kääriäinen 60 though prayer is an important part of the Orthodox tradition. Of the entire population one fifth report praying daily, about one tenth report praying at least every week and one tenth at least once a month. Almost one half never pray. The differences between men and women in frequency of praying are considerable. Table 13: Frequency of praying in different age groups 2005 Daily At least once a week At least once a month A few times a year Once a year or less Never 18-23 10 10 24-29 11 8 30-39 11 9 40-49 16 13 50-59 17 14 60– 36 13 man 7 7 woman 28 15 total 18 12 5 4 10 11 8 5 5 10 8 17 10 48 16 5 56 15 6 49 9 3 48 14 5 42 8 4 34 12 6 61 12 4 31 12 5 45 Source: Academy of Finland and the Russian Academy of Sciences; in Percent. 3.5. The moral dimension In almost al the matters researched, Russians’ moral conceptions have become more liberal since the collapse of Communism. The only exception is attitudes to abortion, which have become somewhat more negative than before. The Russians are most opposed to the use of drugs and taking a car without the owner’s consent. These two things were already at the top of the list of what is not approved of in 1991 and were still there in 2005. The next most marked negative attitudes were to driving a car while under the influence of alcohol, homosexuality and prostitution. In almost all matters elicited Russians’ attitudes have become more liberal than in 1991 (and in 1993). Liberalisation was most apparent in the change in attitudes to homosexuality, accepting bribes, buying stolen goods and demanding social security without justification. Attitudes to drug taking also became more liberal. In matters pertaining to social morality the changes have been particularly marked with regard to accepting bribes, buying stolen goods, demanding social benefits without justification, tax fraud and fare dodging. These are indubitable affected by the fact that there have been radical changes in the social structures, social security and taxation systems compared to the last years of Communist power. In the area of individual morality changes have occurred especially in attitudes to homosexuality, sexual relations with minors, extramarital affairs and lying in one’s own interest. Attitudes to abortion, euthanasia and divorce, however, became somewhat more negative in the 2000s. Religion in Finland and Russia in Comparative Perspective 61 Table 14. Acceptability of various acts 1991-2005. The proportion of those Russians who would never accept the action in question (those selecting a grade of 1) Using drugs Taking other person’s car without permission Driving while under the influence of alcohol Homosexuality Prostitution Accepting bribes Suicide Buying stolen goods Sex with a minor Unjustified claims for social benefits Tax fraud Euthanasia Fare dodging Lying in own interest Extramarital affair Resisting the police Abortion Divorce 1991 91 91 81 83 74 83 61 77 58 59 48 43 50 46 46 33 18 15 1993 90 91 81 81 77 74 56 62 58 52 42 35 37 34 37 39 14 12 1996 84 84 72 72 63 66 53 57 45 47 31 30 23 32 36 31 12 8 1999 88 89 79 68 64 69 58 59 45 48 35 19 26 29 34 25 11 5 2002 85 84 76 65 61 63 56 53 42 38 31 23 25 25 28 22 14 8 2005 75 75 70 62 61 57 57 47 39 36 30 28 27 27 26 20 22 11 Source: Academy of Finland and the Russian Academy of Sciences; in Percent. Religious people are stricter than others in their moral conceptions. However, the differences can be largely explained by gender and age. Religion does have an effect on questions pertaining to sexual morality. Religion has a major effect on attitudes to sexual relations with minors and casual sexual relationships. Religion also has a clear effect on attitudes to prostitution and abortion, likewise on attitudes to euthanasia and divorce. 4. Conclusion In both Finland and Russia there is one mainstream church to which a significant majority (some 80%) of the respective populations belong or with which they identify. In Finland, however, the membership of the Lutheran Church has been in decline and Lutheran identity has weakened. In Russia the position of the Orthodox Church has strengthened, but the identity of Russians as Orthodox has remained vague. Most of the Russian Orthodox people consider themselves “Christians in general”. It is a characteristic feature of Russia compared to Finland that there is a considerable Muslim population in several republics – in some actually a majority. What Finland and Russia have in common is that in spite of a wide variety of religions, the support for other religious denominations is still minimal. In Finland the proportion of those considering themselves religious has remained fairly constant since the beginning of the 1980s and the number of atheists has remained small at a minority of three per cent. In Russia there has been a major increase in the number of believers and the number of atheists has dropped dramatically. Nevertheless the proportion of atheists continues to be twice that of Finland. In the values of life religion appears to have identical position in Finland and Russia. Less than a fifth of respondents consider religion to be very important, while at the other extreme there is also a fifth who do not 62 Kimmo Kääriäinen consider religion to be important at all. The majority are located somewhere in the middle of these. In Finland the strongest religious mainstay of the nation is Church rites. In spite of a slight decline in the number of those of the birth cohort to be baptised and a clear decline in the number of those married in church, Church rites continue to enjoy a very strong position. No comparable exact statistics are available from Russia, but Church rites are considered to be important. The rites of passage of the Communist era have not crushed the importance of Church rites. Belief in some kind of God is widespread in both Finland and Russia. However, the more dogmatic beliefs have weakened in Finland and strengthened in Russia. Belief in life after death and in Heaven continues to be more widespread in Finland than in Russia. On the other hand belief in the Devil and Hell is more widespread in Russia than in Finland. The public practice of religion is slight in both countries. In Finland the number of active practitioners has remained the same while in Russia there has been a slight increase. By European standards both countries are low on the list for public practice of religion. In the private practice of religion (praying) Finns, on the other hand, are clearly more active than Russians. Moral conceptions have become more permissive in both Finland and Russia. There is a similarity in that in both countries attitudes to drugs are negative, likewise in liberal attitudes to abortion and divorce. Clear differences are also discernible. In matters of social morality the Finns are more negative than the Russian in their attitudes to accepting bribes, demanding social benefits without justification, tax fraud and fare dodging.6 In matters of sexual ethics the Finns are decidedly more critical than the Russians with regard to extramarital affairs. The greatest difference between Finns and Russians, however, is in attitudes to homosexuality: two thirds of Russians consider homosexuality always wrong, in Finland only one quarter. The effect of religiosity on moral conceptions is very similar in Finland and Russia. At the beginning of the 20th century there was a parting of the ways of Finland and Russia. Thereafter Russia underwent a project for the annihilation of religion unprecedented in the history of the world. In less than twenty years of the halt in the struggle of religious people the religious situation in Finland and Russia appears by many yardsticks to be very similar. It is difficult to predict the future of religiosity in Russia, as there is no prior experience of such forcible secularisation.7 What is more common for Finnish and Russian religiosity in general is that those features of religion that involve religion as a normative structure perceived as imposed on people are not popular, whereas the aspects that prosper are those that serve the individual quest for meaning and value. It is not institutional religion that holds ground, but popular 6 7 When examining moral conceptions it should be born in mind that these are used to measure attitudes, not what people do or what the dominant practices in society are. This becomes clearly apparent with regard to accepting bribes. Clearly more than half of Russia are of the opinion that accepting bribes is never acceptable. Nevertheless on the 2006 Transparency International Corruption Index Russia was among the most corrupted countries in world with a grade 2.5. Finns were more strictly opposed to accepting bribes than Russians but the differences in attitudes are still small compared to the grades given and ranking of the countries on the Corruption Index. In 2006 Finland was the world’s least corrupt country (with Iceland and New Zealand) with a grade of 9.6. See Barker 1998. Religion in Finland and Russia in Comparative Perspective 63 religion emanating from people’s own needs and life situations. It partly also finds a channel for its expression within the sphere of institutional religion. 5. References Barker, Eileen (1998): State imposed secularism: Yet another dimension? In: Laermas/Wilson/Billeiet (eds.): 191210. Furman, Dmitri/Kääriäinen, Kimmo (2006): Religioznost´ v Rossii v 90-e gody XX – nachale XXI veka. Doklady Instituta Evropy RAN. No 173. Moskva. Kääriäinen, Kimmo/Niemelä, Kati/Ketola, Kimmo (2005): Religion in Finland – Decline, Change and Transformation of Finnish Religiosity. Publication 54. Tampere: Church Research Institute. Kääriäinen, Kimmo (1998): Religion in Russia after the collapse of communism. Religious Renaissance or secular state. Lewiston-Queenston-Lampeter. Laermas, Rudi/Wilson, Bryan/Billeiet, Jaak (eds.)(1998): Secularization and social integration. Leuven. Mitrokhin, Lev (1993): Post Communist Russia: Spiritual Renaissance and Religion. Russian culture at the threshold of the third millennium of Christianity. Moscow. Musulmane v postsovetskom prostranstve (1997): Religija i obshchestvo. Moskva–Kiev–München. Turunen, Maija (2005): Faith in the heart of Russia – The religiosity of Post-Soviet University Students. Kikimora Publications A 11. Helsinki. Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe: Results from the PCE 2000 Survey in Comparison Olaf Müller 1. Introduction “Religion and churches are the new champions after 1990” (Borowik/Tomka 2001a: 7). How should we interpret this statement, which reflects the essence of a publication entitled “Religion and Social Change in Post-Communist Europe” (Borowik/Tomka 2001b)? Has religion replaced Marxism-Leninism, which has long lost its hegemony as the “only true” (that is “scientific”) weltanschauung in communism? Is there indeed a religious revival, i.e. have the people in Central and Eastern Europe become more religious (cf. Tomka 2001: 12)? Or has religion merely reappeared after having survived in the underground during the communist period? More generally: to what extent are the churches and religion socially significant in post-communist countries today? It appears to be en vogue again to assume a rising relevance of religion. Of course, this does not only pertain to the region of Central and Eastern Europe. The notion of an overall decline of religion seems to be entirely outdated. In order to describe the development of religion worldwide, many scholars use terms such as desecularization (Berger 1999), deprivatization (Casanova 1994), respiritualization (Horx 1993), or resurgence (Robertson/Chirico 1985). Almost none of them would deny that processes of modernization such as functional differentiation and rationalization take place all around the world. However, many of them do not follow the thesis of the secularization paradigm that modernization automatically results in a decline in the social meaning of religion. According to some of them, the modernization process by its nature creates a steady demand for meaningful institutions, since it is linked to an increase in complexity and uncertainty (Hervieu-Léger 1990; Gabriel 1992). Confronted with the “pathologies” of individualization, people are still (and will always be) attracted to religious offers. In the course of functional differentiation these offers are increasingly provided for from outside the church (sects, cults, etc.; Berger 1990). However, even though they are not associated with the traditional churches anymore, the people do not lose their religiousness (Luckmann 1991). The proponents of the “new paradigm” (Warner 1996) of the religious market model even stress pluralization as a factor that enforces religiousness: the more religious institutions compete with each other, the better they are able to fulfil the demands of the people, and the more vital the religious scene will be (Iannaccone et al. 1997). From an empirical point of view, there are good reasons to presume neither the secularization thesis nor the competing approaches to be true. With regard to the United States, the secularization thesis may indeed be of less relevance. Despite the fact that the U.S. is one of the countries with the highest socio-economic development, it is still characterized by a vibrant religious marketplace (Iannaccone et al. 1997). However, the development in Western Europe seems to concur much more with the secularization thesis. Regarding the 66 Olaf Müller meaning of religion in everyday life in the 20th century, the signs of secularization can hardly be ignored (Dobbelaere 1993; Bruce 1996). All in all, it is not quite clear whether alternative or “newer” religions such as Buddhism, Zen, Yoga etc. can compensate for the decline in traditional (Christian) religion in Western Europe (Bruce 1996: 187ff.; cf. also Pollack 2000; Pollack/Pickel 2003). Maybe the question should not be, whether the United States or Western Europe should be considered as exceptional cases as geographical or cultural entities (Tiryakian 1993; Davie 2002). E.g., Europe’s diversity with regard to religion was clearly demonstrated by the discussion surrounding the Convention regarding the future of Europe. Neither does it seem to be a very adequate approach to assume Europe to be a homogeneous region nor probably the United States.1 When asking for the meaning of religion in modern times, we have to acknowledge these inner-European differences. Therefore, concerning our units of analysis, we have to distinguish between different socio-cultural areas and different points in time. This does not necessarily mean that we have to consider each country as a unique case, which is not comparable with others. Many cross-sectional case studies cover some of the above-mentioned questions. However, one of the most important aims of the social sciences is to look for general trends behind particular processes. In order to shed some light on the processes of the contemporary development of religion, a more systematic and comparative-empirical analysis is needed. Thus, researchers in the field of the sociology of religion have to identify national (regional) differences concerning the development of church adherence and religiousness, they have to analyze patterns of religious development in different parts of the world during different periods in time, they should describe processes of secularization, privatization, individualization, and re-vitalization in detail and they ought to determine why some trends occur in a certain socio-cultural environment and/or during a certain period of time, while others do not. Needless to say, it would be unrealistic to assume that we can provide definite answers to all or even one of these questions in this article. This paper is much more limited in scope. Geographically, we will not focus on the situation in America or Western Europe but on Central and Eastern Europe. Due to the breakdown of communism, we have the unique chance to re-examine some of the approaches, which were discussed with regard to Western Europe and North America during the last decades in this region. However, Eastern 1 Although the Europeans are aware of their Christian inheritance, there was a sharp dissent concerning the question as to whether a reference to God should be included into the preamble of the constitutional text. It would be too simple to characterize this dispute as a conflict between the churches on the one side and “secular” interest groups on the other. The opinions also differed at the regional level. With regard to the official statements at the national level, particularly France resisted including the terms “God” or “Christianity” in the preamble, whereas Spain, Poland, Ireland, Italy or Hungary suggested referring to them explicitly. Despite the fact that the Grundgesetz contains a reference to God, the German Länder couldn’t reach an agreement on this topic concerning the European constitution. Baden Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Brandenburg, Hamburg, Hesse, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony Anhalt, and Thuringia declared their will to include a phrase with regard to God as a source of truth, justice, the good, and beauty. Berlin, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland Palatinate, and Schleswig-Holstein preferred merely referring to the historical and ethical heritage of the Union (EMK 2002). Finally, the preamble of the draft Constitutional Treaty from June 13, 2003, which the European Convention submitted to the Thessaloniki European Council, refers to the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe” but does not explicitly mention the terms “God” or “Christianity” (European Convention 2003: 4; for a summary of the recent European debate cf. Zewell 2003). Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 67 Europe is not merely another European case. What distinguishes this region from the Western world is the fact that religion was seriously threatened by the former political regime. Almost all religious activities were suppressed, resulting in the disappearance of all forms of public religion, which has probably influenced the circumstances in the religious field today. Moreover, my perspective is also restricted with regard to the time period under scrutiny.2 Although we can only refer to data from the time after the breakdown of communism, we can make inferences about the situation and development in the religious field during the last decades. Following the theoretical debates among scholars of the sociology of religion, we felt the need to ask: where and how could religion survive during communism? Was religion revived in a substantial way when the repressions disappeared? How will religion develop in the future? As far as the level of analysis is concerned – and this is the third limitation of my paper – I will focus more or less on a micro perspective. I.e., I will not consider religion in general but I will rather study religiousness as an expression of individual beliefs and behaviour. Furthermore, the explanations provided at the end of the paper will not directly refer to those macro factors, which are usually discussed when we talk about factors that influence developments in the religious field.3 Instead, I will look for examples of general trends in modern societies such as modernization and individualization at the micro level, using socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education) or individual value patterns (carrier-oriented hedonism vs. duty-oriented humanism). I will also take familial religious socialization into account, as it is also a relevant factor, which was particularly important during the unfavourable conditions before 1989/90. I will begin with some notes concerning the theoretical framework as the basis of my analyses (chapter 2). After a brief chapter on my methodology (chapter 3), I will describe the state and development of church adherence and traditional (chapter 4) as well as “alternative” religiousness (chapter 5) in several countries after the breakdown of communism. Finally, I will ask how the current state and development of religiousness and church adherence can be explained from a micro-level perspective (chapter 6).4 2 3 4 Of course, the ideal design would be a direct analysis of whether and how the churches and religion could resist during the period before 1989/90 in different countries. Unfortunately, there are almost no reliable data from communist times available. There is a quite broad range of factors, which could be stressed here. Modernization theory-based secularization approaches would stress different socio-economic levels of development (cf. Wilson 1966; Bruce 1996), rational choice theorists would look at the level of competition on the supply side of the religious market (Iannaccone 1992; Iannaccone et al. 1997), socio-political approaches would try to explain the developments with reference to the role of church and religion as politically influential factors today as well as in the past (Martin 1978; Casanova 1994; Höllinger 1996), etc. The following ideas, conceptualizations and results are part of my Ph.D. project, which has been inspired by previous work done by and in collaboration with Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel (e.g. Pickel 1998; Pollack 1998; Müller/Pickel 1999; Pollack/Pickel 1999; Müller et al. 2003; Pollack/Müller 2003). 68 2. Olaf Müller Theoretical framework Depending on one’s own theoretical premises, one can distinguish at least three different developments in the religious field in contemporary Eastern Europe. Proponents of the secularization thesis assume that there is a tense relationship between religion and the modern world. Therefore, modern age is accompanied by a diminishing social significance of religion. Due to modern trends such as rationalization, socialization, and functional differentiation, sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols” (Berger 1990: 107; cf. also Lübbe 1965; Dobbelaere 1981 2000; Wilson 1982). It is not merely the (Christian) church, which suffers from a loss of its religious authority. According to Mark Chaves, all social structures that are legitimated by a supernatural principle are threatened in modern times (Chaves 1994: 756f.). Peter Berger even argued that religion is no longer essential for people’s interpretation of the world. In addition to a secularization of society and culture, he assumes that a “secularization of consciousness” is emerging (Berger 1990: 108). Scholars following a line of argument that I would call the privatization/individualization thesis, do not deny that institutionalized, church-oriented religion has become a marginal phenomenon in modern age. In correspondence with the secularization theory, functional differentiation is considered to be an important influential factor. However, they do not agree with the assumption of a general decline in the significance of religion: According to them, the “official religious models” of the formerly dominant churches are merely substituted by a kind of “private belief”. Religion continues to exist in a more “invisible” form. Due to its fundamental function for human beings, religion cannot disappear. In the words of the founding father of the privatization thesis, Thomas Luckmann: “The organism – in isolation nothing but a separate pole of ‘meaningless’ subjective processes – becomes a Self by embarking with others upon the construction of an ‘objective’ and moral universe of meaning. Thereby the organism transcends its biological nature. It is in keeping with the concept of religion to call the transcendence of biological nature by the human organism a religious phenomenon” (Luckmann 1991: 48f.). According to Luckmann, man himself is free to determine the shape and content of his own religion. The scope of such an individualized, private religiousness is virtually unlimited: it includes very traditional behavior (such as praying or reading the Bible), non-Christian, newer religious practices (Zen, Yoga, New Age), or even dedication to pop music or soccer (cf. Luckmann 1991; Krech 1999: 68). While secularization and privatization theorists assume a decline in institutionalized religion due to the process of differentiation of society, the proponents of the religious market thesis do not concur with them: they assume that there is a certain potential demand for all kinds of religion (including institutionalized forms) at the societal level. Pluralism is not considered to cause secularization. Quite the contrary – the more religious groups and organizations offer, the more they satisfy the existing demands, and the more people will engage in religious activities, etc. In short: competition stimulates the vitality of the religious scene (Iannaccone 1992; Iannaccone/Finke/Stark 1997). Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 69 Table 1: Religion in Central and Eastern Europe and theories of religious change secularization thesis Bryan Wilson Thomas Luckmann general incompatibility of modern age and religion; declining social significance of religion in general individual need for religion (anthropologic constant); religion becomes increasingly “invisible” (shift towards the private sphere); increasing religious syncretism and vagueness contemporary “early” Peter L. Berger proponents Steve Bruce basic assumptions privatization/ individualization thesis (re-)vitalization/ pluralization thesis Roger Finke Rodney Stark Laurence Iannaccone latent individual and social need for religion; competition increases effectiveness of the religious market relations and increases the level of religiousness Of course, the scenarios outlined above do not take account of all of the facets of the theories upon which they are based. Nor is it necessarily intuitive to distinguish three approaches. One might question whether the individualization/privatization thesis can be considered to be a distinct theoretical approach. Even the strongest defenders of the secularization theory never tire of emphasizing that secularization does not at all imply the extinction of religion (cf. Bruce 2002: 41ff.). Often, it is stressed that secularization at the individual level does not indicate more than a decline in church affiliation and church commitment (cf. Dobbelaere 2002: 190). From this point of view, processes of privatization and individualization of religion would not refute but rather confirm the secularization thesis.5 Other researchers go even further and stress primarily the declining significance of religion at the societal level when speaking about secularization. They consider individual beliefs and practices to be second-rate or even irrelevant indicators in evaluating the secularization process (cf. Wilson 1982: 149f.; Chaves 1994; for a summary see also Tschannen 1991: 410ff.). It is not always easy to determine whether such limitations are made for conceptual (theoretical) reasons, or whether it is merely a strategy to ward off empirically based criticism (cf. Finke/Stark 2003: 97). Nevertheless, there are good reasons to assume that there is a certain correlation between the significance of religion at the individual level and its social importance (cf. Bruce 2002: 3, 41ff.; Dobbelaere 2002: 167ff.; Pollack 2003a: 11f.). The same holds true for the interrelatedness of traditional, church-affiliated and “alternative” religiousness (cf. Pollack/Pickel 1999 2003; Pollack 2003b). Therefore, at least for analytical reasons, it would definitely make sense to integrate the level of individual beliefs 5 Insofar, Thomas Luckmann could indeed be called a secularization theorist (as done e.g. by Tschannen 1991). Luckmann himself, preferring the term “privatization”, seems to be reluctant to accept such a classification (cf. Luckmann 1996: 28). 70 Olaf Müller and church involvement into the concept of secularization (which has actually been done, cf. the multi-dimensional approaches by Dobbelaere [1981 2002] and Casanova [1994]).6 In addition to these remarks concerning the different understandings of secularization in the literature, I would like to clarify the concept of secularization as it is used in this contribution very briefly before presenting the empirical results of the paper: when I refer to secularization in the following, I use a rather strict concept, including the “secularization of consciousness”, i.e. the phenomenon that “an increasing number of individuals … look upon the world and their own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations” (Berger 1990: 108). Such a decline in private religiousness will be distinguished from a mere decline in church involvement, which I would rather characterize as privatization and/or individualization of religion. 3. Data and indicators The empirical data I use in this chapter mainly stem from the project Political Culture in Central and Eastern Europe (PCE 2000), funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) and the Volkswagen Foundation (Volkswagen Stiftung). This representative population survey was conceptualized by a research team under the auspices of Detlef Pollack at the European University/Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies in Frankfurt (Oder).7 It contains data from 10 Central and Eastern European countries and from East Germany, covering subjects such as political and social attitudes and values, attitudes towards the economic system, and last but not least religious values and attitudes towards the churches and religion. The field work took place in September/October 2000 and was coordinated by INRA Germany, Mölln.8 For reasons of comparison, I will also refer to data based on other international surveys (partly introduced in other chapters in this volume), such as the European Values Study (EVS), the World Values Survey (WVS), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), and the study Church and Religion in an Enlarged Europe (C&R 2006).9 In order to be able to observe whether a decline, a privatization, or a re-awakening of religiousness is indeed taking place, one has to distinguish at least two different dimensions of religion: a “traditional” religious dimension (including church adherence, participation in church life, and church-related religiousness), and a non-traditional (“alternative”) religious dimension (cf. Pollack/Pickel 1999; Pollack 2000). Within the spectrum of traditional relig6 7 8 9 Actually, this would not only challenge the defenders of the secularization theory but it would also question the “new paradigm”, which assumes that there has to be a constant (latent) demand for religious offers in any case. Wolfgang Jagodzinski and Andrew Greeley, the latter surely not considered to be a strong defender of the secularization approach, mention the dangers of supply-side models, which exclude such a scenario a priori: “on some occasions when the circumstances are right and the ruthless will is present, the demand for religious services can be lowered.” (Jagodzinski/Greeley 1998: 9; cf. also Jagodzinski 2000: 61). There are good reasons to keep this in mind especially with regard to the communist past in Central and Eastern Europe. Further members of the team were Gert Pickel, Jörg Jacobs and the author of this contribution. For further information (questionnaire, codebook, etc.) see the project web site at http://www.democraticvalues.eu.tf. For an introduction to the latter study see the contribution by Gert Pickel in this volume. Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 71 iousness, I distinguish between institutionalized and non-institutionalized religiousness (cf. Boos-Nünning 1972). I use church attendance and trust in church as indicators for traditional-institutionalized religion. Belief in God serves as an indicator of traditional-private religiousness. Although not directly linked to traditional religiousness, but rather indicating a general affinity towards religion, religious self-assessment and self-reported importance of religion for one’s life are used as additional variables in this section. To grasp the diffuse forms of religion that exist outside of the church is, however, much more difficult. I use belief in reincarnation (return after death), astrology/horoscopes, and faith healers as indicators of “older” forms of religiousness outside the church. Belief in the effects of magic/spiritualism/occultism, mysticism and New Age messages serve as indicators of “newer” forms of religiousness.10 4. Church adherence and traditional religiousness: revival or decline? Until now, proponents of the two “paradigms” currently discussed in sociology of religion, the secularization approach and the market model, have rarely attempted to test their models systematically and empirically with regard to Eastern Europe. After a cursory glance at the situation in Eastern Europe, the most prominent opponents, who engage in the secularization-rational choice controversy, consider their own theory to have been confirmed once more (or at least believe that the other approach has been refuted). Steve Bruce found some evidence for a correlation between the level of modernization and church participation in the Baltic region, which is in line with the secularization approach. Apart from this, he could not find any significant effect of the regime of state-regulation of religion or religious diversity, which contradicts important assumptions of the supply-side model (Bruce 2000: 41). In contrast, Rodney Stark highlighted growing church attendance rates and increasing numbers of believers in Hungary and Russia during the early 1990s, and thus accused secularization theory to be little more than “social scientific faith” produced by “wishful thinking” (Stark 2000: 58f., 61). Many other empirical contributions, which already exist on this topic, are characterized by two shortcomings: those written in the mid-1990s are naturally limited in their explanatory power simply because they can only refer to the situation during the early 1990s (cf. Toš 1994; Gautier 1997; Schühli/Müller 1997; Halman/Pettersson 2003). Others do not take more than one or two countries into account (Kääriäinen 1998; Kääriäinen/Furman 2000; Froese 2001; Lužný/Navrátilová 2001; Spousta 2002). As mentioned above, this is not the place and time to decide the controversy whether secularization theory or the rational choice approach fits Eastern Europe best.11 However, 10 11 From a historically oriented position, one could probably question such a distinction. E.g., mysticism has been part of all world religions since the very beginning. However, one should note that quantitativeempirical research is still in its infancy concerning the analysis of alternative religiousness. We derived our distinction from empirical exploration rather than from theoretical presumptions. Factor analyses have shown that magic, mysticism and New Age are considered to be relatively closely connected to each other, while the same is the case for the other three indicators we used in our survey (for the wording of the questions and the operationalization of the indicators see the annex). On a side note, there is of course no need to restrict oneself to these two possibilities: Miklós Tomka for instance questions the appropriateness of both approaches (cf. Tomka 1998). 72 Olaf Müller in the following, I will present at least some patterns related to this topic from a broader perspective, including comparisons across nations and time. Let us start by looking at the situation regarding traditional-institutionalized religion (church adherence) in Central and Eastern Europe (table 2). As far as this dimension of religion is concerned, our assumption that Eastern Europe can not be considered to be a homogeneous region is confirmed. There are some countries such as East Germany, the Czech Republic, but also Estonia to a certain extent, where church attendance and trust in church were very low in 2005/2006. On the other hand, in Poland, Romania, Croatia, Slovakia, and in most of the successor states of the Soviet Union, a vast majority of the people expressed a high degree of confidence in churches and religious organizations. Up to now, we have no more than a snapshot reflecting the state of religiousness and church adherence at the end of the millennium. However, almost nothing has been said about the situation before this point in time. Is the current situation in different countries merely a stage in a continuously declining trend, or is it a first step towards religious revival? Table 2: Church adherence in Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s church attendance1 trust in church2 early 2005/2006 2005 difference 1990/91 difference 1990s (1999/2000) (1999) c g Byelorussia 6 (15) +9 53 (71) +18 Bulgaria 9c 15i +6 30 61 +31 Croatia 41f 41k +0 (62) Czech Rep.* 11c 11h +0 40 (20) -20 k e Estonia 7 10 +3 54 (44) -10 East Germany 6b 9i +3 43 28 -15 Hungary 17a (18)h +1 56 (45) -11 Latvia 9c (15)g +6 64 (67) +3 c g Lithuania 28 (32) +4 73 (68) -5 Poland 76d 75i -1 84 72 -12 Romania 31c 46 i +15 72 88 +16 Russia 6c 12 i +6 65 67 +2 Slovakia* 40 c (43) h +3 50 (69) +19 Slovenia 35c 29i -6 39 34 -5 Ukraine (17)g 22i (+5) (67) 72 +5 Sources: a ISSP 1989, b ISSP 1990, c EVS/WVS 1990, d ISSP 1991, e Usust 1994 (quoted in Lehtsaar 1998: 415), f 1989 (quoted in Zrinšak 1999: 133), g EVS 1999, h PCE 2000, i WVS 2005, k C&R 2006; all figures for trust in church from EVS/WVS 1990/91, EVS 1999, WVS 2005; * figures before 1993 refer to Czech/Moravian and Slovakian region 1 percentage of those who attend religious services at least once per month 2 percentage of those who have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in church In order to answer these questions, we have to determine how the situation developed during the last years. It is of particular importance to compare it with the situation immediately after the breakdown of communism, when churches and religion were freed from political repression. The data that approximate this time period the best are mainly from 1990. If we now look at how church attendance rates have developed since the early 1990s, we can observe a considerable increase in Romania (+15 percentage points) and Byelorussia (+9). Taking the low level in absolute numbers into account, the rates have also increased re- Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 73 markably in Latvia, Bulgaria, and Russia (+6 each).12 In the Czech Republic, in Estonia, and in East Germany, church attendance rates have more or less remained as low as at the beginning of the 1990s. The same is true for Hungary and Poland – though one has to remember the higher starting level in these cases.13 In Slovenia, the number of regular church-goers dropped clearly from 35% to 29%. The development concerning the church attendance rates seems to be related to the public perception of the churches and religious organizations. At least to a certain degree, attendance rates also reflect the ability of the churches to adapt to the entirely new social situation they were faced with after the breakdown of communism. Compared to the situation at the beginning of the 1990s, the image of the churches has clearly improved in Bulgaria (+31 percentage points), Slovakia (+19), Byelorussia (+18), and Romania (+15). In contrast, churches have lost a lot of the credibility they gained a decade ago in the Czech Republic (-20), East Germany (-15), Hungary (-11), Estonia (-10), but also in Poland (-12). As stated above, church affiliation is merely one aspect of religiousness. If we look at the figures regarding traditional-private religiousness (table 3), we indeed see a slightly different pattern in some countries. Generally, belief in God seems to be widespread in Catholic and Orthodox countries. In Romania, Poland and Croatia, almost everybody states that they believe in God. In Slovakia, Byelorussia, Latvia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania, we still get rates of about 70% or more. In Hungary, Slovenia, Russia, and Bulgaria, believers still make up the majority. Contrary to church affiliation, the Orthodox countries resemble the Catholic countries in this case. The Czech Republic, however, is an exception worth mentioning. Together with East Germany, it can be characterized as widely de-christianized – or maybe even secularized. Not only do the Czechs and East Germans no longer believe in God: the majority of the citizens do not consider themselves to be religious. Furthermore, most of them do not regard religion to be important in their lives. However, beside the Czech Republic and East Germany, other factors raise some doubts with regard to the assumption of a general religious revival in Central and Eastern Europe. On the one hand, there are countries where we can not only observe an increase in the belief in God, but we can also make out an increasing number of people who call themselves religious while their responses reflect a growing importance of religion in their lives. This is obviously the case in Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Russia.14 On the other hand, there are some developments, which force us to think about the difference between the mere expression of belief (or non-belief), religiousness (or non-religiousness) and the significance the respondents accord to religion in their everyday lives. 12 13 14 Depending on the most recent data available, reference figures to the early 1990s are from 2005/2006 or from the late 1990s. Note that the differences refer to absolute changes according to percentage points. In relative terms, church attendance rates have increased by 100 % in Russia and by 60 % in Bulgaria and Latvia. Of course, although table 2 can be used as a first overview of the development during the 1990s, it does not reflect the process in detail. Unfortunately, especially for the beginning of the 1990s, reliable data are generally lacking for many countries. The problem becomes apparent, when we take a closer look at the situation in Hungary, for which such data are available. Whereas table 2 suggests almost no changes, the church attendance rate actually increased from 16 % in 1981 to 25 % in 1991, but then decreased constantly, eventually reaching the level of 1989 again in 2000 (WVS, ISSP). With little reservations, one can assume the same for Lithuania and Slovakia, both lacking data concerning belief in God for the early 1990s. 74 Olaf Müller Table 3: Traditional religiousness, 1990-1999 belief in God1 1990 1995 -97 1999 diff. religious self-assessment2 1990 1995 -97 1999 2005 diff. importance of religion3 1990 1995 -97 1999 Byelorussia 37 68 75 +38 41 70 +29 30 56 46 Bulgaria 37 60 59 +22 36 53 51 63 +27 28 43 48 Croatia 81 90 +9 71 85 +14 56 78 Czech Rep.* 35 38 43 +5 22 21 Estonia 46 42 -4 21 36 42 +21 19 28 22 East Germ. 33 27 30 -3 38 28 29 28 -10 30 16 17 Hungary 59 65 +6 57 59 +2 50 42 Latvia 18 67 72 +54 54 64 77 +23 26 37 34 Lithuania 73 69 -4 55 84 84 +29 43 54 57 Poland 97 96 -1 95 94 94 94 -1 89 84 84 Romania 89 93 +4 75 85 93 +18 75 79 Russia 35 60 61 +26 56 64 66 73 +17 34 41 46 Slovakia* 76 69 82 +13 41 57 Slovenia 55 64 63 +8 73 69 70 73 +0 44 43 37 Ukraine 65 71 +6 64 75 82 +18 56 Source: EVS/WVS 1990; WVS 1995-97; EVS 1999; WVS 2005 (importance of religion: Estonia C&R 2006); * figures before 1993 refer to Czech/Moravian and Slovakian region 1 percentage of those who believe in God 2 percentage of those who declare themselves to be a religious person 3 percentage of those who consider religion to be “very” or “quite important” in their lives 2005 diff. +16 51 +23 69 +13 -1 18 -1 23 -7 -8 +8 +14 86 -3 90 +15 48 +14 +16 43 -1 56 +0 Croatia and The first two indicators might say something about a very personal religiousness. At the same time, however, they should also be considered as indicators reflecting the group (believers or non-believers, religious or non-religious persons) that the respondent feels to belong to. Therefore, the fact that the number of people who declared themselves to be religious doubled in Estonia between 1990 and 1999, should not lead us to assume that religion is now of overwhelming importance to Estonians: with about one out of five respondents, the share of those who find religion to be important in their lives does not exceed the level at the beginning of the 1990s. Even larger are the discrepancies between the enormous increase in belief (+54) and religious self-assessment (+23) and the rather moderate numbers concerning the importance of religion for individuals’ lives (+8) in Latvia. In Hungary and Slovenia, the belief in God also increased slightly, but at the same time the number of persons who considered religion to be important decreased or remained stable.15 All in all, there is no reason to expect an overall revival of traditional religion in Central and Eastern Europe. This assumption is backed by the number of those who turned from being non-religious to being religious (chart 1). On the one hand, one can see that there is indeed a certain amount of such persons in all East European countries. 15 Miklós Tomka, resuming his own empirical research on religious change in East-Central Europe, raises quite similar doubts and questions: “There is a big increase in religious identifications and declarations but no comparable increase either in religious practice, or in behavior directed by faith. Also in beliefs there is much incoherence and uncertainty. Does religiosity mean basically the appropriation of an overarching cultural system, or rather of a cognitive orientation in contemporary Eastern Europe? Or is it simply an expression of socio-cultural adaptation and assimilation?” (Tomka 2001: 26f.) Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 75 Chart 1: Conversion to traditional religion in Western and Eastern Europe Source: ISSP 1998, * PCE 2000; percentage of those who express to believe in God now, but didn’t used to On the other hand, the figures for Western Europe raise doubts whether these changes are related to the fact that communist repression has disappeared. There seems to be a stable amount of about 5 to 10% who turned to religion during their lives in almost every country, regardless of the political situation in the past. There are only three significant exceptions: in Albania, Russia, and Latvia, the rate is considerably higher and encompasses about 25% or even more of the population. In these countries, a revitalization of religiousness can hardly be overlooked.16 Summing up our findings, we can neither claim a continuous decline, nor a general increase in church adherence and traditional religiousness in Eastern Europe. A major religious revival occurred in Russia and many of the other successor states of the Soviet Union, as well as in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia. In societies such as East Germany and the Czech Republic, however, church affiliation and traditional religiousness are very low. Apart from this, these developments have to be considered from different angles. Despite the fact that identification with religion and the church has increased in many countries since the breakdown of communism, some doubts remain with regard to the “substance” underlying such self-expressions. 16 Interpreting the abovementioned figures, one should always take into account the level of religiousness among the total population. E.g., the extraordinarily low rates of converts in Romania and Poland can simply be explained by the fact that the share of those having always believed in God mounts up to 90% and more. 76 5. Olaf Müller Religious “alternatives”: towards individualization? Yet, even in countries where the churches are weak and the population claims not to be religious in a traditional sense, religion must not necessarily have disappeared altogether. Thus, what about alternative religiousness? Are Eastern Europeans taking the same road towards de-traditionalized religiousness, as it is stated for Western Europe and North America (cf. e.g. Bellah 1985; Roof/McKinney 1987; Jagodzinski/Dobbelaere 1995; Heelas 1996; Wuthnow 1998; Roof 1999; Davie 2000)?17 A number of new religious movements tried to offer their services immediately after the fall of communism (cf. Barker 1997). However, did they really meet a great demand? Just a decade after the breakdown of communism, we still know (too) little in order to say much about the popularity of alternative religions in Central and Eastern Europe.18 Such estimates often refer to the spectrum of new religious movements operating in the country. Nevertheless, since the size of alternative religious groups does not exceed several dozens or hundreds of persons in many cases, the mere number of such organizations says little about their social significance. As far as available for Central and Eastern Europe, membership rates for new religious movements give little reason to assume a major increase. Even those groups backed by solid organizational resources, such as the Unification Church and the Mormons, do not have more than several hundred or a few thousand members. Jehova’s Witnesses have a considerable number of members, with 107.876 adherents reported for Poland, 66.211 for the former USSR, about 50.000 for Romania, and 27.800 for Hungary for the years 1992-1993 (Elliott et al. 1993). 19 However, isn’t it characteristic of those seeking alternative religious perspectives to avoid any dependence on organizational structures (Roof 1999; Heelas/Woodhead 2001; cf. also Luckmann 1991)? Thus, asking how many persons are affiliated with new religious movements might not be the adequate way to determine the popularity of alternative religions – not just because of “statistical” difficulties, but also based on theoretical assumptions. Keeping in mind that the following data are also limited in their meaningfulness to a certain degree, let us have a look at some results of the PCE study: the numbers shown in table 4 refer to the respondents’ self-reported affinity towards some elements commonly associated with alternative religious ideas (but not necessarily connected with concrete reli17 18 19 However, one should note that even for the Western world there is neither consensus concerning the actual significance of alternative religion, nor concerning its future prospects. The scene is considered to be very volatile: while some scholars believe that new religions are increasingly moving from the periphery to the mainstream of culture (cf. Hanegraaff 1996: 523, with regard to the New Age movement), others refer to the fact that the pioneers from the 1960s and 1970s – such as the Unification Church or the Jesus movement – are already going downhill again (Hunt 2003: 237). Although there are a considerable number of case studies dealing with new religiosity and new religious movements in post-communist Europe (cf. Borowik/Babinski 1997; Doktór 2003), there are almost no comparative analyses. A common problem with membership data is that the numbers are often obtained from the organizations themselves. It becomes apparent in the case of Hare Krishna e.g.: whereas the organization itself claims to have 150.000 followers in Poland and 700.000 in Russia, non-affiliated researchers estimate a membership of no more than 5.000 in Poland and 10.000-15.000 in Russia (Doktór 2003: 109; Elliot et al. 1993). On the other hand, of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that other groups choose exactly the opposite option and underreport their size or even foster secretiveness (e.g. depending on their official recognition as a religious group according to the law, etc.). Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 77 gious organizations). As mentioned above, I will differentiate between “older” and “newer” forms here. All in all, older forms such as the belief in reincarnation, in astrology/horoscopes, or in faith healer, are obviously more wide-spread in all countries than newer ones. They are particularly popular in Russia and Estonia. The figures are also considerably high in Hungary and Slovakia but not in Poland. The lowest acceptance of such old forms of religiousness outside the church was reported in East Germany. Compared to older forms of alternative religiousness, the affinity to newer forms is rather limited. Once again, Russia and Estonia report the highest figures - here, 12 to 25% of the people believe in magic phenomena, spiritualism, and occultism. In these countries, as well as in Hungary, only a minority of about 10% of the population is attracted to mysticism. The acceptance rate of twentieth-century phenomena such as New Age is even lower. Its popularity is highest in Slovenia, Russia, and Hungary, where 8% of the population adhere to it, whereas in all other countries only 2 to 4% of the respondents report that they believe in New Age. Table 4: Alternative religiousness in post-communist Europe old reincarnation astrology/ horoscopes new faith- healers mysticism magic/ spiritualism/ occultism New Age Bulgaria 20 (22) 18 (30) 20 (28) 3 (5) 4 (6) Czech Rep. 16 (25) 17 (46) 12 (31) 3 (8) 8 (20) Estonia 31 (22) 26 (35) 24 (25) 9 (17) 12 (20) East Germany 8 (11) 11 (30) 6 (18) 3 (7) 3 (11) Hungary 24 (17) 24 (25) 31 (24) 10 (10) 7 (6) Poland 11 (23) 8 (32) 27 (38) 4 (7) 4 (8) Romania 20 (15) 23 (31) 9 (18) 5 (11) 7 (15) Russia 27 (22) 47 (22) 49 (21) 14 (22) 25 (22) Slovakia 16 (28) 22 (47) 39 (45) 4 (15) 7 (20) Slovenia 16 (22) 17 (36) 16 (27) 4 (12) 6 (16) Source: PCE 2000; percentage of those who express to believe “very strongly” or “to a certain degree” (in parentheses: “a little bit”) 2 (4) 2 (4) 4 (6) 2 (5) 8 (7) 2 (5) 2 (5) 8 (12) 3 (7) 8 (13) All in all, one can certainly not call Eastern Europe a secularized region. However, the claim of a vital religious scene in Eastern Europe has to be qualified, too. Although religious statements are widely expressed in the majority of the countries under research, church and religion do not play a significant role in all countries – at least at the individual level, i.e. as far as their influence on the people’s lives and their public image are concerned. In most countries, only a minority of the population consider religion to be important in their lives. Only in Poland, Romania and Croatia, religion seems to be an integral part of the purpose of life for a vast majority of the population. Although there is some open-mindedness with regard to alternative religious offers from outside the churches, particularly concerning older phenomena such as astrology or faith healers, the impact of al- 78 Olaf Müller ternative religious offers seems to be too limited to proclaim a “spiritual revolution” (Heelas/Woodhead 2005) in Eastern Europe.20 6. Traditional and alternative religiousness: patterns and correlations Although I do not focus on developments at the macro level, I will come back to the “grand theories” mentioned at the beginning of this paper, and will try to relate my analyses to the central claims and assumptions of these approaches. Secularization theory centers on modernization. However, modernization of course means more than economic growth. With regard to its unfavorable effect on religion, other features such as increasing rationalization, functional differentiation, the fragmentation of society, etc. have been stressed in particular (Luckmann 1991; Berger 1990; Luhmann 1977). Since modernization is characterized by a general increase in the educational level and processes of urbanization, the (formal) level of education and the region where the respondents live could be useful indicators in order to analyse the effects of modernization at the individual level. Assuming that the younger generations are more influenced by recent modernization processes compared to the older generations (e.g. Inglehart 1977), it is sensible to differentiate between age cohorts. Based on a rather simple interpretation of the secularization thesis, one would expect the lowest rates of individual religiousness to occur among the yuppies. However, is this true for religion in general? The fact that organized (public) forms of religious behavior and individual (private) religiousness are drifting apart, is one of the central arguments of approaches that stress processes of individualization and privatization in the religious field (Berger 1990; Luckmann 1991). If there is a general individual need for religion (Luckmann 1991), maybe especially the younger, more educated reject organized, institutionalized forms of religion but remain religious without being members of the church. Do they practice religion in a rather “traditional” Christian way, or do they look for alternatives? Beside the fact that the scope of religious authority declines (Chaves 1994), who else is interested in individual, newer forms? In order to shed some light on these topics, I will use bivariate correlations. In table 5, we can discern evident relationships between socio-demographic features and traditional forms of religion. Elderly people, women, people with a lower level of education, and people living in rural areas tend to have a greater affinity to the church, its practices and belief systems than younger, male persons who have a higher degree of education, as well as people who live in urban areas. Or, the other way round: people who are considered to be bearers of the process of modernization are more likely to be distant from traditional forms of religion. However, the picture is quite different when we consider the alternative forms 20 Although some figures in table 4 seem to indicate a high popularity of alternative religions, one should not overrate these results. One should note that these numbers include the share of those who believe “to a certain degree”. Numbers in parentheses refer to those persons who express to believe “a little bit”, which actually implies a very weak degree of belief. Generally, it has to be questioned, to what extent such alternative forms of religion compensate for traditional religiousness. Additional analyses have shown that persons using alternative religion as a substitute to what is offered by the churches (rather than as additional elements), consider themselves to be by far less religious than “traditional” church-goers. Furthermore, they do not consider religion as important as do religious traditionalists. Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 79 of religion. With regard to these forms, the younger generations, the highly educated, and the inhabitants of the cities show a higher degree of religiousness. It is obviously the more ‘modern’ strata of society that is attracted by alternative religious offers. Similar patterns emerge if we look at the impacts of religious socialization during childhood on religiousness in adulthood. In all cases, people who are brought up in faith are more likely to go to church and to believe in God. This is quite different if we take into account the effect of religious socialization on acceptance of newer forms of religiousness outside the church. In the case of its older variant, the effect is still positive but very weak. Hence, these forms of religion have gained a certain independence from traditional religious socialization. As far as newer forms are concerned, religious socialization even has a negative effect. Newer forms indeed seem to be perceived as an alternative to the religious traditions and stand in contrast to them. Table 5: Religiousness, social structure and individualization denomination church attendance belief in God religious selfassessment alternative religiousness (old) -.23 .15 .08 -.04 alternative religiousness (new) -.21 .03 .07 -.08 Age .06 .07 n.s. .10 sex (female) .09 .10 .13 .16 education -.11 -.07 -.06 -.13 rural area .13 .11 .06 .11 religious socializa.58 .38 .40 .57 .02* -.07 tion individualism-.09 -.07 -.06 -.07 .08 .12 hedonism duty.04 n.s. .06 .08 -.06 -.06 humanism Source: PCE 2000 (cumulated analysis, including 11 countries); bivariate correlation (Pearson’s r); all coefficients significant at 0.01 level, except * 0.05, n.s. = not significant In the next step I will investigate the correlation between different forms of religion and effects of individualization.21 As expected, the correlation between traditional religiousness (belonging to a church, church attendance, belief in God, religious self-assessment) and the index of individualistic-hedonistic orientations (see the annex) is negative. But in terms of alternative forms of religiousness, the relationship is positive. I.e., the more people are willing to pursue an extravagant life, to work no more than necessary, and the more they are interested in a successful career, the less religious they are in traditional terms, but the more likely they are to adhere to alternative forms of religiousness. If we use an index for the sense of duty-humanistic orientation (see the annex), we results are exactly the opposite. This sense of duty-humanistic orientation tends to have a positive effect on traditional forms of religion while having a negative effect on alternative religious forms. 21 Following an approach developed together with Detlef Pollack elsewhere (Pollack/Müller 2003), I measure individualization at a semantic level of analysis. In order to do so, we developed an indicator for individualistic-hedonistic orientations. We use statements such as “I like to enjoy life and do not want to work more than necessary”, “My life should be unusual and extravagant” and “My main aim in life is to have a successful career and to earn as much as possible” as indicators for these individualistic-hedonistic orientations. 80 Olaf Müller To sum up, we can state that, on the one hand, phenomena of religious individualization and privatization are not completely absent in Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, we should not overestimate these tendencies. As has been observed before in traditionally religious countries, only a small share of the population is interested in these new forms of religiousness. However, as further analyses have shown (cf. Pollack/Müller 2003), new religiosity has not established itself as an alternative to traditional belief systems even in the more secularized countries. Therefore, it is also negatively affected by the decline in traditional religious forms. In these countries, new religious forms cannot compensate for the losses of traditional religiosity, so that processes of secularization and religious individualization go hand in hand. Furthermore, we know that the process of modernization as well as the activities of the communist regime has affected the development of traditional religiousness in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, it seems unwarranted to assume that the religious scene will revitalize automatically after new (and old) religious suppliers have entered the field. We know that alienation from the churches increasingly went hand in hand with a decrease in religious socialization within the families, causing a renunciation of “traditional” religion in general (cf. Müller/Pickel 1999; Müller et al. 2003). Thus, we notice a decline in traditional religion with regard to its public and private forms. However, we also observed some indications supporting the assumption that this does not necessarily signify the end of religion. In particular, the reasons for the changes in the belief of the younger generations, the better educated and the urban dweller, are of interest for future research. There seems to remain a considerable number of persons who do not want to call themselves Christians in a traditional sense any more. At the same time, they seem to remain religious – or at least “spiritual” – to a certain degree. 7. Conclusion Overall, the results show that we can neither claim that religion has disappeared in Eastern Europe, nor can we state that there is a universal tendency towards a religious revitalization in the region. Although religion is not a phenomenon that we found only among the elderly, our results indicate that in most East Europeans countries, we cannot expect a huge increase as far as traditional forms of religiousness are concerned. The decline in traditional religiousness becomes apparent when we consider church attendance rates but it can also be shown for private kinds of religiousness such as religious self-assessment. One main reason is the fact that communist rule increasingly interrupted the steady transmission of religious ideas from generation to generation. This process has advanced to a great extent in East Germany and the Czech Republic (to a certain degree, this would in turn support the central claim of the secularization theory concerning the general tension between the level of modernization and religion) but is also continuing to spread in many other countries. Due to the fact that the younger generations are mostly alienated from traditional religion, it is not unlikely that this trend will continue. Although it is true that especially the younger people are most receptive to alternative religious offers, one has to remember that it is still a minority, which is attracted to such phenomena. Furthermore, it is not quite clear whether such beliefs are of great importance to the individuals’ lives. In any Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 81 case, so far, there is not much evidence that the de-institutionalization of religion will be completely compensated for by an increase in individualized, syncretistic religiousness. In general, there are good reasons to avoid overly simple statements about the development of religion. Although we were able to observe some general patterns, we have to take into account additional factors related to the national context of a country (denominational distribution and tradition, modernization level, church-state relations, etc.). Although we should not exaggerate the processes of religious individualization, the question remains: what are the social causes of this tendency? We would suggest attributing this tendency to the features of the processes of a belated modernization, which countries of Eastern Europe are currently facing. In sum, as indicated above, in post-Communist countries the modern, urban, more highly educated strata of society tend to be in closer proximity to alternative religiosity, while elderly, less educated, people living in the countryside tend to adhere to more traditional forms of religion. Time (and further analyses) will show which one (if any) of the “grand theories” – the secularization thesis, the privatization approach, or the market model – will be able to explain the development concerning church adherence and religiousness in post-communist Europe most adequately. In order to provide better answers concerning the future development of religiousness in Central and Eastern Europe, we have to study generational differences in greater detail in particular. If we want to discern general mechanisms of how religiousness is transmitted, and if we want to determine how it changes over time, then a longterm longitudinal cross-country study representative of the general population would be the ideal design. Since the realization of such a project is unfortunately not to be expected in the short run, sociologists of religion ought to use the potential of the studies we have at hand more systematically and comparatively. 8. References Barker, Eileen (1997): But Who’s Going to Win? National and Minority Religions in Post-Communist Society. In: Borowik/Babinski (eds.): 25-62. Barker, Eileen/Beckford, James/Dobbelaere, Karel (eds.) (1993): Secularization, Rationalism, and Sectarianism. Oxford. Bellah, Robert/Madsen, Richard/Sullivan, William M./Swidler, Ann/Tipton, Steven M. (1985): Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. New York. Berger, Peter L. (1990): The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York (first published 1967). Berger, Peter L. (ed.) (1999): Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Washington D.C. Boos-Nünning, Ursula (1972): Dimensionen der Religiosität: Zur Operationalisierung und Messung religiöser Einstellungen. München. Borowik, Irena (ed.): Religions, Churches and the Scientific Studies of Religion: Poland and Ukraine. Kraków. Borowik, Irena/Babinski, Grzegorz (eds.) (1997): New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe. Kraków. Borowik, Irena/Tomka, Miklós (2001a): Preface. In: Borowik/Tomka (eds.): 7-9. Borowik, Irena/Tomka, Miklós (eds) (2001b): Religion and Social Change in Post-Communist Europe. Kraków. Brocker, Manfred/Behr, Hartmut/Hildebrandt, Matthias (eds) (2003): Religion – Staat – Politik. Zur Rolle der Religion in der nationalen und internationalen Politik. Wiesbaden. Bruce, Steve (1996): Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults. Oxford. Bruce, Steve (2000): The Supply-Side Model of Religion: The Nordic and Baltic States. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 39/1: 32-46. 82 Olaf Müller Bruce, Steve (2002): God is Dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford/Malden. Casanova, José (1994): Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago. Chaves, Mark (1994): Secularization as Declining Religious Authority. Social Forces 72/3: 749-774. Davie, Grace (2002): Europe: The Exceptional Case. Parameters of Faith in the Modern World. London. Davie, Grace (2000): Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates. Oxford/New York. Deth, Jan van/Scarbrough, Elinor (eds) (1995): The Impact of Values. New York. Dillon, Michelle (ed.): Handbook of the Sociology of Religion. Cambridge/New York Dobbelaere, Karel (1981): Secularization: A Multi-dimensional Concept. Current Sociology 29: 1-216. Dobbelaere, Karel (1993): Church Involvement and Secularization: Making Sense of the European Case. In: Barker/Beckford/Dobbelaere (eds.): 19-36. Dobbelaere, Karel (2002): Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels. Brussels. Doktór, Tadeusz (2003): New Religious Movements in Poland and Social Reactions to Their Presence. In: Borowik (ed.): 107-126. Elliott, Mark/Gembicki, Mary/Schindler, Bob (1993): Cult Membership Estimates for the Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe. East-West Church and Ministry Report 1/4: 5-6. Europaministerkonferenz der Länder (EMK) (2002): Stellungnahme der Deutschen Länder zum Stand der Beratungen im Konvent. Anlage zum Beschluss der EMK vom 5. Dezember 2002 zur Zukunft der EU. Berlin. European Convention (2003): Text of Part I and Part II of the Constitution. CONV 797/1/03, REV 1, VOLUME 1. Brussels. http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00797-re01.en03.pdf Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (2003): The Dynamics of Religious Economies. In: Dillon (ed.): 96-109. Froese, Paul (2001): Hungary for Religion: Interpretation of the Hungarian Religious Revival. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40/2: 251-268. Gabriel, Karl (1992): Christentum zwischen Tradition und Postmoderne. Freiburg/Basel/Wien. Gabriel, Karel (ed.) (1996): Religiöse Individualisierung oder Säkularisierung: Biographie und Gruppe als Bezugspunkte moderner Religiosität. Gütersloh. Gautier, Mary L. (1997): Church Attendance and Religious Belief in Postcommunist Societies. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 36/2: 289-296. Halman, Loek/Pettersson, Thorleif (2003): Differential Patterns of Secularization in Europe: Exploring the Impact of Religion on Social Values. In: Halman/Riis (eds): 48-75. Halman, Loek/Riis. Ole (eds)(2003): Religion in Secularizing Society: The Europeans’ Religion at the End of the 20th Century. Leiden/Boston Hanegraaff, Wouter J. (1996): New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought. Leiden. Heelas, Paul (1996): The New Age Movement: Celebrating the Self and the Sacralization of Modernity. Oxford/Cambridge. Heelas, Paul/Woodhead, Linda (2001): Homeless Minds Today? In: Woodhead/Heelas/Martin (eds): 43-72. Heelas, Paul/Woodhead, Linda (2005): The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion Is Giving Way to Spirituality. Malden/Oxford. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle (1990): Religion and Modernity in the French Context: For a New Approach to Secularization. Sociological Analysis 51: 15-25. Höllinger, Franz (1996): Volksreligion und Herrschaftskirche. Die Wurzeln religiösen Verhaltens in westlichen Gesellschaften. Opladen. Horx, Matthias (1993): Trendbuch, Band 1. Der erste große deutsche Trend-Report. München. Hunt, Stephen J. (2003): Alternative Religions: A Sociological Introduction. Aldershot. Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1992): Religious Markets and the Economics of Religion. Social Compass 39: 123-131. Iannaccone, Laurence R./Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (1997): Deregulating Religion: The Economics of Church and State. Economic Inquiry 35: 350-364. Inglehart, Ronald (1997): The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton. Jagodzinski, Wolfgang (2000): Religiöse Stagnation in den neuen Bundesländern: Fehlt das Angebot oder fehlt die Nachfrage? In: Pollack/Pickel (eds.): 48-69. Jagodzinski, Wolfgang/Dobbelaere, Karel (1995): Religious and Ethical Pluralism. In: Deth/Scarbrough (eds): 218-249. Jagodzinski, Wolfgang/Greeley, Andrew (1998): The Demand for Religion: Hard Core Atheism and “Supply Side” Theory. Unpublished manuscript. Chicago. Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 83 Kääriäinen, Kimmo (1998): Religion in Russia after the Collapse of Communism. Lewiston. Kääriäinen, Kimmo/Furman, Dmitri (2000): Religiosity in Russia in the 1990s. In: Kotiranta (ed.): 28-75. Kotiranta, Maria (ed.): Religious Transition in Russia. Helsinki. Krech, Volkhard (1999): Religionssoziologie. Bielefeld. Lehtsaar, Tõnu (1998): Religiöse Entwicklungen in Estland nach 1989. In: Pollack/Borowik/Jagodzinski (eds): 409-427. Luckmann, Thomas (1991): The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. New York (first published 1967). Luckmann, Thomas (1996): Privatisierung und Individualisierung: Zur Sozialform der Religion in spätindustriellen Gesellschaften. In: Gabriel (ed.): 17-28. Lübbe, Hermann (1965): Säkularisierung. Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs. Freiburg/München. Luhmann, Niklas (1977): Funktion der Religion. Frankfurt a.M. Lužný, Dušan/Navrátilová, Jolana (2001): Religion and Secularization in the Czech Republic. Czech Sociological Review 9/1: 85-98. Martin, David (1978): A General Theory of Secularization. Oxford. Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert (1999): Current Trends of Religiousness in Eastern Europe in Comparison to Western Europe: Does Socialization Matter? Paper presented at the 3rd ISORECEA conference, Budapest. Müller, Olaf/Pickel, Gert/Pollack, Detlef (2003): Wandel religiös-kirchlicher Orientierungsmuster und Verhaltensweisen in Osteuropa. In: Brocker/Behr/Hildebrandt (eds): 99-124. Pickel, Gert (1998): Religiosität und Kirchlichkeit in Ost- und Westeuropa. Vergleichende Betrachtungen religiöser Orientierungen nach dem Umbruch in Osteuropa. In: Pollack/Borowik/Jagodzinski (eds): 55-85. Pollack, Detlef (1998): Religiöser Wandel in Mittel- und Osteuropa. In: Pollack/Borowik/Jagodzinski (eds): 9-52. Pollack, Detlef (2000): Der Zusammenhang zwischen kirchlicher und außerkirchlicher Religiosität in Ostdeutschland im Vergleich zu Westdeutschland. In: Pollack/Pickel (eds): 294-309. Pollack, Detlef (2003a): Säkularisierung – ein moderner Mythos? Studien zum religiösen Wandel in Deutschland. Tübingen. Pollack, Detlef (2003b): Religiousness Inside and Outside the Church in Selected Post-Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Social Compass 50: 321-334. Pollack, Detlef/Borowik, Irena/Jagodzinski, Wolfgang (eds.) (1998): Religiöser Wandel in den postkommunistischen Ländern Ost- und Mitteleuropas. Würzburg. Pollack, Detlef/Müller, Olaf (2003): Religiousness in Central and Eastern Europe: towards Individualization? Paper presented at the 27th SISR/ISSR Conference, Torino. Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (1999): Individualisierung und religiöser Wandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Soziologie 28: 465-483. Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (2000) (eds): Religiöser und kirchlicher Wandel in Ostdeutschland 1989-1999. Opladen. Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (2003): Deinstitutionalisierung des Religiösen und religiöse Individualisierung in Ostund Westdeutschland. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 55: 447-474. Robertson, Roland/Chirico, JoAnn (1985): Humanity, Globalization, and Worldwide Religious Resurgence: A Theoretical Explanation. Sociological Analysis 46: 219-242. Roof, Wade Clark/McKinney, William (1987): American Mainline Religion. Its Changing Shape and Future. New Brunswick/London. Roof, Wade Clark (1999): Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion. Princeton. Schühly, Günther S.J./Müller, Ulrich (1997): Secularization in Eastern and Western Europe: Results from the ISSP 1991 Survey on Religion in 10 West and East European Nations. ZUMA Working Paper 97/04. Mannheim. Spousta, Jan (2002): Changes in Religious Values in the Czech Republic. Czech Sociological Review 38/3: 345363. Stark, Rodney (2000): Secularization, R.I.P.. In: Swatos/Olson (eds.): 41-66. Swatos, William/Olson, David (eds.) (2000): The Secularization Debate. Lanham Tomka, Miklós (1998): Coping with Persecution: Religious Change in Communism and in Post-Communist Reconstruction in Central Europe. International Sociology 13/2: 229-248. Tomka, Miklós (2001): Religious Change in East-Central Europe. In: Borowik/Tomka (eds.): 11-27. Toš, Niko (1994): Comparative Analysis of Religiousness in Central and East Europe. Religion in Eastern Europe 14/6: 1-25. Tiryakian, Edward A. (1993): American Religious Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 527: 40-54. 84 Olaf Müller Tschannen, Olivier (1991): The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 30/4: 395-415. Warner, R. Stephen (1993): Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States. American Journal of Sociology 98/5: 1044-1093. Wilson, Bryan R. (1966): Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment. Hammondsworth etc. Wilson, Bryan R. (1982): Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford. Woodhead, Linda/Heelas, Paul/Martin, David (eds) (2001): Peter Berger and the Study of Religion. London/New York. Wuthnow, Robert (1998): After Heaven: Spirituality in America Since the 1950s. Princeton. Zrinšak, Siniša (1999): Church and State in New Social Circumstances: The Croatian Story. In: Borowik (ed.): 119-135. Zewell, Rudolf (2003): Eine Beleidigung der Vernunft. Rheinischer Merkur no. 24, June 12. Annex: Description of indicators (I) Questions used in the descriptive part Church attendance: EVS/WVS: Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend the religious services these days? 1 More than once a week 2 Once a week 3 Once a month 4 Christmas/Easter day 5 Other specific holy days 6 Once a year 7 Less often 8 Never, practically never PCE: How often do you attend the religious services? Do you attend it... 1 Never 2 About once or twice a year 3 Several times a year 4 About once a month 5 2-3 times a month 6 Every week or more often ISSP: How often do you attend religious services? 1 Once a week (D-E 1990: Once a week or more; PL 1991: Nearly every week/Every week/More than once a week) 2 2-3 times a month (H 1989, D-E 1990: 1-3 times a month) 3 Once a month 4 Several times a year 5 Less frequently (H 1989: Less than several times a year; PL 1989: Once or twice/Less frequently) Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 6 85 Never C&R: How often do you attend the religious services? Do you attend it... 1 Every week or more often 2 2-3 times a month 3 About once a month 4 Several times a year 5 About once or twice a year 6 Less than once a year 7 Never Trust in church (EVS/WVS): Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? …The Church 1 A great deal 2 Quite a lot 3 Not very much 4 None at all Belief in God (EVS/WVS): Which, if any, do you belief in? …God 1 Yes 2 No (Don’t know) Religious self-assessment (EVS/WVS): Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are... 1 A religious person 2 Not a religious person 3 A convinced atheist Importance of religion (EVS/WVS): Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life. …Religion 1 Very important 2 Quite important 3 Not important 4 Not at all important 86 Olaf Müller Conversion to traditional religion (ISSP/PCE): Which best describes your beliefs about God? 1 2 3 4 I don’t believe in God now and I never have. I don’t believe in God now, but I used to. I believe in God now, but I didn’t used to. I believe in God now and I always have. Alternative/new religion (PCE): Apart from traditional religion people are also concerned with religious and supernatural questions. How is this with you, do you believe not at all, a little bit, to a certain degree or very strongly in ..., or don’t you know what this is? And what about ... Reincarnation (Return after death) Astrology/Horoscopes Faith healer Mysticism (e.g. Sufism/Cabbalism) Effects of magic/spiritualism/occultism The message of New Age (holistic way of thinking/”Age of Aquarius”) 0 1 2 3 4 I do not know what this is Not at all A little bit Yes, to a certain degree Yes, very strong (II) Indicators used for bivariate correlations: denomination: 0 = without denomination, 1 = respondent belongs to a denomination church attendance: 0 = less than once a month, 1 = once a month or often (from the PCE question; see I) religious self-assessment: 7 point scale (0 = extremely non-religious, 1 = extremely religious) from the PCE question: Would you describe yourself as religious? Would you say you are...? 1 Extremely religious 2 Very religious 3 Fairly religious 4 Neither religious nor non-religious 5 Fairly non-religious 6 Very non-religious 7 Extremely non-religious Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe 87 alternative religion – “old”: additive indicator, including belief in reincarnation (life after death), astrology/horoscopes, faith healer alternative religion – “new”: additive indicator, including belief in mysticism (e.g. sufism/cabbalism), effects of magic/spiritualism/occultism, the message of New Age (holistic way of thinking/”Age of Aquarius”) both are additive indexes from the PCE questions (see I), ranging from 0 (respondent doesn’t agree at all) to 1 (respondent agrees fully) Religious socialization: 0 = respondent was not brought up in faith by his parents, 1 = respondent was brought up in faith from the PCE question: Please tell me by using this scale, which ranges from disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, agree somewhat to agree strongly, what is your opinion about the following statements? My parents brought me up in faith. 1 2 3 4 Agree strongly Agree somewhat Disagree somewhat Disagree strongly age: age in years gender: 0 = male, 1 = female education: 0 = low, 1 = middle, 2 = high rural area: place of residence (0 = town, 1 = village) individualism-hedonism: additive index, ranging from 0 (respondent doesn’t agree at all) to 1 (respondent agrees fully) from the PCE question: Everyone identifies with certain ideas and principles, which might influence their way of life. Could you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly or find it hard to say? I like to enjoy life and do not want to work more than necessary. My life should be unusual and extravagant. My main aim in life is to have a successful career and to earn as much as possible. 1 2 3 4 Agree strongly Agree somewhat Disagree somewhat Disagree strongly 88 Olaf Müller additive index, ranging from 0 (respondent doesn’t agree at all) to 1 (respondent agrees fully) from the PCE question: duty-hedonism: Everyone identifies with certain ideas and principles, which might influence their way of life. Could you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly or find it hard to say? To have a sense of duty and self discipline are the most important character attributes one should have. I accept people the way they are. To help someone, without being asked, is natural to me. 1 2 3 4 Agree strongly Agree somewhat Disagree somewhat Disagree strongly Secularization as a European Fate? – Results from the Church and Religion in an Enlarged Europe Project 2006 Gert Pickel 1. Introduction – the persistence of an out-dated approach Since the controversial debate on the inclusion of religion in the preamble of the European Constitution at the latest, it has become obvious that ‚soft’ cultural differences persist in the joint European region even after the cessation of the ‚hard’ political differences between Western and Central Eastern Europe. On the one hand, countries such as Poland and Hungary pressed for the inclusion of the Christian notion of God in the European Constitution, on the other hand, other countries (such as France) tried to avoid such an explicit definition. This controversy may certainly be interpreted as an indication of the problems in determining the social relevance of religion in Europe in a general sense. However, it may also point to the relevance of an approach which has often been considered to be out-dated or refuted – the secularization theory. For many decades, secularization theory dominated the debate in the sociology of religion – first as an accepted model of explanation (see Berger 1967; Wilson 1982), later as a pattern of interpretation which was to be rejected (Casanova 1994; Luckmann 1967; Stark/Bainbridge 1987). Starting out from the French Enlightenment critiques of religion, the hypothesis developed that the process of modernization did not go well with religion. Rationalization, functional differentiation of society and the cessation of existential social threats appeared to continuously – and, as some assumed, inexorably - reduce the relevance of religion in society. Secularization theory particularly had an effect in Europe. Here in particular, empirical evidence of secularization processes was found repeatedly. Be it receding church attendance or decreasing membership numbers, diminishing belief in God, the devil or angels or the loss of influence of the Christian churches in matters concerning child rearing and politics – from the point of view of secularization theorists, all of these factors were signs of a process of a decreasing relevance of religion in society. This regional pattern did not come as a surprise as the most rapid processes of modernization took place in Europe and the largest number of advanced societies worldwide could be found in Europe. However, these conclusions were increasingly questioned. On the one hand, it was stated that a revival of religiosity or spirituality which did not take place within but rather outside the traditional Christian churches could be observed everywhere (Graf 2004; Riesebrodt 2001; Zulehner 2002). New religious movements or individualized forms of religiosity which no longer needed the ecclesiastic institutionalization of the ‚old’ popular churches were particularly popular. Furthermore, considering church attendance rates was assumed to hinder insights into the increase or stability of privatized religiosity (Luckmann 1967, 1991; Davie 2001). On the other hand, the inevitability of a secularization process was criticized with reference Gert Pickel 90 to the outer-European regions in general and with regard to the United States of America in particular. Didn’t the prevailing conditions of religion (in particular the political conditions) influence its vitality (Casanova 1994; Finke/Stark 1988, 2006; Iannaccone 1991; Stark 1999; Stark/Bainbridge 1987; Stark/Finke 2000)? And wasn’t the situation in Europe more of a historical special case which did not permit drawing such broad, sweeping conclusions? These points of view resulted in a broad debate during which alternative explanatory approaches such as the religious market model or the individualization thesis became more prominent. However, after years of frequently heated discussions we may conclude: even if we disagree with the premises and assumptions of the secularization theory, we cannot deny its continuing relevance for the debate in the sociology of religion. None of the proponents of the current approaches in the field can do without referring to the secularization theory (most of the time they do so by distancing themselves from it). At times it almost seems as if the objections raised against this theory alone facilitated the determination of the content of the alternative approaches (Casanova 1994, 1996; Luckmann 1967; Stark/Finke 2000). This raises the question whether this ‚old paradigm’ of explanation of the development in Europe may actually still be valid or whether it is – as its critics claim – an out-dated model. We can only answer this question if we consider the societal reality in Europe. Hence, in order to answer it, it is necessary to take meaningful empirical evidence into account. This entails three premises: First, we need to clarify what we mean by secularization in modern societies. Second, for the analyses, it would be helpful to bear opposing opinions or alternative models of explanations in mind as points of reference. Third, we need data which provide measures of secularization and include indicators of alternative explanations. The latter point is particularly controversial as the proponents of the conflicting explanations often point out the shortcomings of the data which are used to substantiate the secularization theory. This critique is in turn also raised by their opponents, which renders a matter-of-fact comparison difficult. This article strives to reconcile this problem without foregoing a comparative perspective or statements that pertain to the entire society. Thus, in the study on ‚Church and Religion in an enlarged Europe (C&R) 2006’, which was carried out for this purpose, we took into account indicators for all of the three potential models of explanation and strove to broadly grasp the phenomenon of secularization. 2. The theoretical prerequisites The main current debate in the modern sociology of religion is carried out predominantly between the proponents of three theoretical approaches, which provide different interpretations of the social development of religion. For a long period of time now, the secularization theory1 has been in the lead. It refers to the continuing correctness of the persistent loss of the social relevance of church and religion in modern societies (Berger 1967; Bruce 1 In the following, we will use the term secularization theory even though a variety of different approaches are subsumed under this expression. However, unlike the term secularization thesis suggests, this approach is much more than a simple string of theses due to its complexity. Secularization as an European Fate? 91 2002; Dobbelaere 2002; Pollack 2006a; Wilson 1982; Voas 2008). Despite all opposition – by the proponents of the two alternatives which will be presented shortly – the advocates of the secularization theory maintain the assumption that modernity or rather modernization and religion do not get along well. This tense relationship is a result of the processes of rationalization and functional differentiation inherent in modernization. 2 While the former undermines the credibility of religious explanations (Berger 1967; Wilson 1982) due to proliferating rational and scientific explanations, the latter results in an increasing loss of the function of religion. At the same time, religion is increasingly ousted from public life (privatization), is becoming less relevant in the everyday life of the people and the norms set by the religions decreasingly suceed in committing the members of society to them. In addition, the number of people who turn away from the social form of religion – the churches – is constantly growing as they no longer need it to alleviate existential problems and social hardship. Compared to the past, deprivation no longer presents such a threat to the citizens due to the increasing socioeconomic welfare of modern service societies – and thus the desire for security provided by religion wanes (Norris/Inglehart 2004). With a certain time lag, the above-mentioned „loss of the communal basis of religion“ (Bruce 2002: 19-21) may in the end actually lead to a decrease in faith and subjective religiosity in modernizing societies. 3 However, secularization theory does not consider the latter point to be the main issue to be explained. It is rather a forward projection consistent with its assumptions. The concept of the secularization theory is deduced from the situation in Europe, which serves to provide the main examples as evidence of the theory. Currently, the religious market model is probably the most relevant alternative explanatory approach4. It regards the situation in the USA as a prime example of the social development of religion and religiosity and points to a European peculiar path and the status of „Europe as an exceptional case“ (Davie 2001, 2002, 2008). According to its proponents (Iannaccone 1991; Stark/Finke 2000; Stark/Iannaccone 1994; Froese/Pfaff 2001), Europe as a special case merely distracts the attention from the generally valid relationship between religious supply and religious demand. In the market model, religious vitality – the main issue of the market model as well as secularization theory – is mainly determined by taking the services offered by the churches and the degree of regulation of this market by the state into account (Stark/Bainbridge 1987; Iannaconne 1991, 1992; Finke/Stark 2006; Fox 2008).5 The monopoly churches can no longer satisfy the continually widening interests of the individualized believers – and in the market model, every citizen is in some way an individualized believer. On the one hand, the religious choices they provide are too unspecific due to their popular church 2 3 4 5 Urbanization, bureaucratization and democratization, which also undermine the traditional influences of religion are mentioned as supplementary processes. It needs to be pointed out, though, that hardly any of the prominent secularization theorists (Wilson 1982; Bruce 2002) assume that religiosity will vanish entirely. Rather, they - in some instances a bit inconsistently – believe that a small amount of subjective religiosity will remain due to the inevitability of questions of meaning. However, this group will diminish in the course of advancing modernization and will be split up among several types of religious organizations (see Bruce 2002: 41-43). This led Warner (1993) to refer to this approach as the ‚new paradigm’ in the sociology of religion. In return, proponents of the secularization theory accused supporters of the market model of choosing an ‚exceptional case’ and argued that their research results depended on this selectively drawn sample. 92 Gert Pickel character, on the other hand, their dedication to the believers is decreasing, as they are not pressured by any exposure to competition (Stark/Bainbridge 1987). If the religious market continues to be limited to these established suppliers (churches), this will surely result in a decrease in the religious vitality of the citizens. This is particularly true in the case of the quasi monopoly churches, which are predominantly located in Europe. Competitors and competition6 on this religious market will revive religious vitality as the religious providers will then be forced to develop suitable choices and to attend to the believers after all. 7 The assumptions in which the market model crucially differs from secularization theory is that religious pluralism has a positive effect on religious vitality8, the fact that modernization does not necessarily lead to a loss of relevance of religion in society and that every individual is in search of a religious model in order to find an answer to the „ultimate“ questions of meaning.9 A third standpoint whose proponents also argue against secularization theory, differentiates between the developments on the personal level of faith and one’s commitment to the church (see Pollack/Pickel 2003, 2007). This approach, which is discussed in particular in the European realm under the term „Thesis of Religious Individualization“ (see Davie 1994, 2007), now has a number of supporters. As in the case of the market model, individual religiosity is conceived as an anthropological constant which is inherent in the nature of man (Luckmann 1967; 1991: 77-86). The social form of religion may lose importance, however, individual religiosity merely modifies its form (Luckmann 1991: 96-103), which does not necessarily have to manifest itself publicly. This results in the development of an ‚invisible religion’, which suggests a loss of faith, even though this does not occur. The new types of religiosity may take on entirely different forms than what we are accustomed to with respect to the hitherto common commitment to traditional churches. Secularization theory in turn is criticized for focusing too narrowly on questions related to the sociology of the church as well as a substantial concept of religion which is no longer in line with functionally differentiated modern societies. According to the critics, the tendentiously Christian substantial concept of religion particularly limits the scope to conventional religious phenomena and loses sight of the new forms. Thus, the false assumption of secularization does not come as a surprise. Without further ado, the proponents of the individualization thesis also concur with an inauspicious interpretation of the development of the 6 7 8 9 In certain cases, conflicts among religions or between religions and the state may serve as a substitute for competition (for example in the case of Northern Ireland or Poland) (see Froese/Pfaff in this volume). According to Iannaccone (1991, 1992, 1998) particularly the specific choices promise to be the most useful to religious seekers. A lot of the time, the religious seekers find that exclusive religious communities provide these advantages as they are more likely to avoid the problem of ‚free-riders’ who benefit as much as committed believers without investing a great deal of effort. This clearly constrasts Peter L. Berger’s assumption (1967: 127-154) that religious pluralization undermines the plausibility structures of the (in his case Christian) belief system and thus reduces religious vitality in the long run. Consequently, it is a rational choice approach which focuses exclusively on the supply side since – per definition - there is constant demand for religious explanations. It is thus referred to as the „supply-side approach“ (Stark/Iannaccone 1994). Stolz (2008: 7) as well as Froese/Pfaff (2005: 401-402) point out that regulations such as social control and political repression, can also affect the demand. This possible effect is not included as such in the basic model of the market approach and was added to a more broad rational choice perspective of religion only recently. Secularization as an European Fate? 93 integration of the church. But at the same time, they disapprove of assigning this loss of relevance to the subjective level of religiosity (see also Cipriani 2006: 126-127)10. In addition, they emphasize the development of new social movements, which in part take on the social functions of traditional religions. Apart from their different ways of explaining the developments, the proponents of the market model and the supporters of the religious individualization thesis mainly agree in one respect – they rebut the secularization theory as an unsuitable explanatory pattern of the development of religion in current societies. 11 They particularly feel uneasy about the inevitability of the decline of religion inherent in the secularization theory. Thus it is not entirely surprising that meanwhile they rather speak of a ‚return of religions’ (Riesebrodt 2001; Casanova 1994) or the „return of the religious or the gods“ (Zulehner 2002; Graf 2004) rather than concerning themselves any longer with the assumptions of the secularization theory. Still, the results of the empirical analysis of religion indicate secularization effects (Bruce 2002; Jagodzinski/Dobbelaere 1995; Norris/Inglehart 2004; Pollack/Pickel 2008; Voas 2008). However, the structure of the evidence is not entirely linear but is often interrupted by other explanatory factors or reflects path dependent developments. This in turn does not necessarily indicate that the secularization theory does not hold true but rather that the processes which it refers to are more complex. It may be necessary to differentiate the secularization theory with regard to its effects, as it consists of a whole range of assumptions and hypotheses on the one hand and closely refers to modernization theory on the other hand. Thus, it is necessary to elaborate the complexity of secularization empirically and to contrast the empirical results with the two alternative approaches. Such a procedure includes both observing secularization on different levels (Dobbelaere 1987, 2002; Casanova 1994: 19-39; 1996: 182-188) as well as specifying the premises of the secularization theory. Karel Dobbelaere (1981, 2002) differentiates between „societal secularization“, „organisational secularization“, and „individual secularization“. Individual secularization refers to the process of citizens’ growing dissociation from religion. This encompasses a slackening of the involvement in religious events as well as a decrease in or transformation of subjective religiosity12 (Dobbelaere 2002: 38-39, 137-140). Organizational secularization addresses the issue of a decline of religious societies in the course of rationalization. At the same time, it refers to the inner secularization of religion, in the sense of a change in the social form and the self- image of the churches. It thus focuses mainly on the organization of the church and its development. Societal secularization is to be conceived of as a conse10 11 12 The question remains, how large the difference between the core assumptions of the secularization theory – which refer to the loss of social relevance and less to personal religiosity – and the religious individualization thesis really are. Accordingly, in the scientific debates in Northern America, the individualization thesis is often perceived as a mere sub-type of the secularization theory. For several decades now, secularization theory has been severly criticized regarding the inevitability of the decline of the social form of religion as well as the fated (negative) link between religion and modernity (see Matthes 1967 for a summary). Dobbelaere (2002: 137) points to two possible trends: on the one hand, a general decrease in religious convictions and religious faith may occur, on the other hand, there is the option to recombine religious convictions – i.e. a transformation of individual religiosity. However, Dobbelaere also underlines that both processes, the former in the short run, the latter in the long run, contribute or lead to a loss of relevance of religion. 94 Gert Pickel quence of the functional differentiation of modern societies (Dobbelaere 2002: 45-46). Different subsystems fulfill functions in society, which were originally carried out by religion. In this respect, the role of social integration through norms and religious commandments has to be particularly emphasized. In modern societies, both constantly become less important for the citizens. Even when considering them separately, all three processes of secularization are associated and interact. Jose Casanova (1994: 19-39) begins his – as it turns out critical – considerations with a differentiation of secularization into sub-processes. He discerns the process of differentiation at the societal level, which manifests itself particularly in the relation between the church and the state, from the secularization assumption of a decrease in faith or a process of privatization of religion. He concludes that only the former process of differentiation of social spheres occurs in a truly continous manner, while the latter two processes he mentions are contingent on the historical constellations in certain regions and countries. Consequently, a perceivable growth of secularization is not the result of the interaction of the persistent tense relation between religion and modernity with an irrevocably progressing modernization. Instead, specific conditions serve to explain the processes.13 Both concepts share the conceptional differentiation of the secularization process. Bruce’s thoughts run along the same vein (2002: 4; Martin 1978 or Stolz 2007). This differentiation has to be taken into account in an empirical analysis.14 Consequently, the project ‚Church and Religion in an enlarged Europe’ presented here is based on the differentiation as suggested by Dobbelaere. At the current stage of the project, the organisational level of secularization has not yet been fully elaborated. In the article at hand, we will thus focus on the levels of individual and societal secularization.15 As the contentious issues between the three theoretical approaches presented here refer to these two levels (explanation of religious vitality, development of subjective religiosity), the suggested focus appears to be a viable solution for the empirical analysis. Accordingly, the research question of the article at hand reads as follows: Is the secularization theory able to provide explanatory patterns for the development of religious vitality or do its assumptions fail to stand up to an empirical test?. The extent of religious vitality is our main object of research.16 It comprises both the integration in church as well as religious beliefs. It is necessary to extend the term (which usually refers to religious prac- 13 14 15 16 With regard to the conditions, Casanova frequently falls back on conceptions of the market model, in particular on the relation between the church and the state. A more contemporary approach suggested by Jörg Stolz attempts to overcome the discrepancy between the different approaches in the sociology of religion with a model based on action theory, which combines the different theses (Stolz 2008, 2009). It differentiates the assumptions of the secularization theory and integrates additional explanatory indicators at the same time. Due to the fact that the secularization theory and the thesis of the individualization of religion can only be differentiated at the individual level, focusing on the level of individual secularization is advantageous. The discussion does not specifically differentiate between the integration in church and faith. Both are considered to be related in the market model as well as in the secularization theory. However, concerning the empirical analysis, actions are of greater interest to Northern American scientists’ research. This is in line with the reasoning of the rational choice approach upon which it is based. Secularization as an European Fate? 95 tices in the US) to the level of religious beliefs as it enables us to compare the theses of secularization and individualization.17 3. Case selection and measurement In order to answer the question posed in the introduction, a comparative study was connducted in selected European countries. The fieldwork was carried out by the commercial survey-instite IPSOS and coordinated by a project team at the European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder). The study comprised nine countries, namely Germany (West and East), Portugal, Ireland, Finland, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Croatia and Russia. The reference survey was carried out in the Fall of 2006. Since 2004, the Project ‚Church and Religion in an enlarged Europe (C&R)‘ has been financed by the Volkswagen Foundation. The joint directors of the project are Detlef Pollack (meanwhile University of Münster) and Gert Pickel (meanwhile University of Leipzig). Olaf Müller is the project coordinator.18 Our international project partners are: Helena Vilaca (Portugal), Marat Shterin (Russia), Miklos Tomka and Gergely Rosta (Hungary), Kati Niemelä and Kimmo Kääriäinen (Finland); Sinisa Zrinscak and Krunoslav Nikodem (Croatia); Karen Andersen and Tom Inglis (Ireland); Tadeusz Doktor † and Dorota Hall (Poland) and Eva-Liisa Jaanus (Estonia).The main idea of the study was to compare different countries with regard to their religious structures, the religious behavior of their citizens and their religious attitudes and thus test the relevance of the secularization theory against the two alternative explanatory approaches empirically. Unlike many of the articles on this topic (Bruce 2002b; Davie 1994; Froese/Pfaff 2001, 2005; Gill 2001; Iannaccone 1991) we will not focus on the development within a single country. Rather, we draw upon comparative criteria. In order to satisfy the principles of comparative research, the „Most-different-system-design“ (Przeworski/Teune 1970) was applied in selecting the countries under research. Thus, both Western and Eastern European countries were included in the analysis. The systematic selection serves to avoid fallacies with regard to generalizable developments, which occasionally occur in regional or single case studies (Lauth/Pickel/Pickel 2008: 58-79). For the benefit of focusing on a culturally homogeneous research area as well as for pragmatic reasons (limited resources), we did not take non-European countries into account.19 The criteria for selecting the countries are based on the findings in previous studies20 and conceptual considerations.21 The first criterion is the cultural-religious heritage of the 17 18 19 20 21 At the same time, we need to be aware of the fact that the core of the claim of the secularization theory refers to the loss of social relevance and not to an across the board assumption of the global disappearance of religion (Beckford 2003: 51). In March 2009 Anja Gladkich joins the team. This can be criticized from the point of view of the market model as we examine the special case of religious development by focusing on European states. However, Froese/Pfaff (2008) explicitly state that the market model holds true in Eastern Europe, which at least legitimates its limited test. See the article by Olaf Müller in this volume. In line with the conventional case selection rules in the comparative Social Sciences, the countries were selected on the basis of the independent variables. Gert Pickel 96 country, which arises from its religious-cultural tradition. This in turn is derived from the denominational orientation of the citizens and its historical roots. The idea behind this selection criterion is the assumption that the membership of the citizens in different denominations can cause differences regarding the religious vitality. A number of analyses (Haller 1988; Pickel 1998; Martin 1978) point to a higher ability of Catholicism to develop a commitment to the church among its members in comparison with Protestantism or the Orthodox Church for example. The second criterion is the political situation in the past 50 years. We assume that the actually existing socialism and its hostile orientation to religion has left its mark in the minds of the citizens. We find these differentiation criteria in part in David Martin’s thoughts (1978), which were complemented by some of the ideas of the author as published in previous articles (Pickel 1998). The third criterion is the degree of socio-economic modernization which is considered to be an indicator to designate secularization processes. The countries were selected due to the fact that each of them exemplifies a trend. However, it soon became apparent that we could not rigidly apply the “Most-different-systemdesign” due to the fact that the selection criteria overlapped. First, several of the ideal type combinations of the three selection variables do not occur in reality, second, the different general conditions (f.ex. the degree of modernization and socialist past) overlap and their effects are not independent of each other. Nevertheless, selecting the cases in this manner was helpful in carrying out a systematic comparative analysis. In addition to the countries which were selected as described above, Ireland (perpetual religiously charged conflict with Northern Ireland) and Poland (high historical confluence of the nation and its religion) were included as special cases. They complement the image of the European development.22 Chart 1: The sample collection Portugal Ireland West Germany Finland Poland Croatia Hungary Russia Estonia East Germany Cultural heritage (religious denomination) Catholic Catholic Mixed denominations Protestant Catholic Catholic Mixed denominations Orthodox Protestant Protestant Political heritage (Socialist experience) Socialist experience Socialist experience Socialist experience Socialist experience Socialist experience Socialist experience Level of socioeconomic modernization 23 12 18 14 35 47 38 63 41 (18) Source: Own composition. 22 In Croatia as well as in Russia, there is also a relatively high confluence of the local religious heritage and the nation. In both cases, it is not as pronounced as in Poland, but it is influential enough to be considered as an additional explanatory component. See the article by Zrinscak and Nikodem in this volume. Secularization as an European Fate? 97 In order to test the certainty of the three theoretical models in the sociology of religion, it is necessary to include different indicators with an informative value with regard to religious vitality. In particular with regard to the debate on the discrepancy between the individualization thesis and the secularization theory it is important to differentiate between those indicators that facilitate conclusions with regard to the integration in the church as well as indicators that are intended to measure the individual, subjective faith or the religiosity of the individual. 23 The validity of the secularization theory can only be tested against the individualization thesis with regard to the development of subjective religiosity, as both approaches more or less agree on the decrease in the commitment to the church. If the assumptions of the secularization theory hold true, then we should be able to observe a decrease in the bonding to the church as well as subjective religiosity. In a comparative perspective, both should be higher in countries with a lower degree of modernization than in countries with a high degree of modernization. In addition, we should be able to observe a negative relation between prosperity and religiosity on the individual level, as proponents of one branch of the secularization theory assume that an increase in material security causes a decrease in deprivation (Norris/Inglehart 2004; Stolz 2007). The latter causes high religiosity, as people do not seek solace in religion as much in fortunate social situations as when they experience existential threats to life. The relation between education (as a proxy of rationalization) and religiosity is quite similar. People with a higher degree of formal education should exhibit a lower degree of religiosity than people with a lower formal degree of education. We seek to determine the societal secularization through citizens’ attitude toward the differentiation of the different subareas of life. The segregation of religion and politics is of particular importance in this respect. From the point of view of the secularization theory, it is also of interest in how far the citizens approve of the supposed tension between ‚rational modernity’ (exemplified by the sciences) and religion. If they widely support such a discrepancy, which increases further with the level of modernization, then we may assume that an extensive societal secularization is taking place, which emerges from a process of social differentiation. 24 In order to consider the assumptions of the market model, we also seek to determine whether citizens want a religiously plural landscape in general. If this is not the case, then we may hardly expect that a growing number of religious choices will increase religious vitality. It would speak for the secularization theory if countries with a higher degree of pluralization had a rather low religious vitality or if their citizens became religiously inactive due to an increasing number of religious choices. Due to our focus on a limited number of countries, we can only test this claim to a certain degree, as it is located on the macrolevel of observation.25 23 24 25 According to Charles Y. Glock’s considerations (1954), these indicators belong to the sphere of religious rituals or rather religious practice or to the area of religious beliefs (see also Huber 2003). We deliberately excluded the public sphere as discussed by Casanova (1994, 1996). From the point of view of the secularization theory, public debates only give a limited account of the degree of secularization as they are led by the elite and are subject to cycles of media coverage which follow different rules. For research on this relation see the article by Pollack and Pickel in this edition as well as the analyses by Pickel (2009). Gert Pickel 98 4. Societal secularization We will begin with the indicators of societal secularization. Here, the loss of relevance of religious norms and the process of functional differentiation are at the heart of the matter. We would like to point out in particular the loss of social functions, which religion used to fulfill, as a prominent indication of secularization. It is interesting to see in how far this idea of a differentiation between religion and other spheres of life, which according to Dobbelaere (2002: 169-170) leads to a ‚compartmentalization’ (consciousness of securalization), is rooted in the minds of the people. Chart 2 shows that societal securalization is common to all European societies. The segregation of religion and politics or between the church and the state is rooted in the minds of the people of all the European states under research. According to the citizens, religion has no (or only little) place in politics and political decision making. The response styles in the countries hardly vary. It appears to be a basic constant in modern (European) societies. Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that the explicit inclusion of a reference to God in the preamble of the European Constitution was rejected by most of the citizens in our nine countries under research. The opinions on this issue strongly diverge between the Catholic and non-Catholic countries: In Croatia and Poland, there is a slim majority and in Portugal and Ireland a large minority which would approve of an explicit reference to God in the European Constitution while there are only small minorities in favor of this issue in the other countries. However, this also implies that even in countries with a predominantly positive disposition toward a reference in the constitution, usually half of the citizens (and thus a large number of the faithful and church members) oppose this political decision. Chart 2: Indicators of societal secularization Religion and Politics “Religious Leaders should not try to influence government decisions“ “The constitution of the European Union should make explicit reference to God” Religion and Science “Scientific Research should not be restricted by religious norms and values” “I can´t see any restrictions between science and religion” Religion and School “Education at school should be free from religion” “Religious symbols, such as crosses, should be forbidden in state schools” WG Port Irl Fin EG Pol Hun Cro Est Rus 70 75 67 62 70 73 68 73 80 75 27 48 46 22 20 51 39 58 18 37 72 68 62 82 74 58 77 69 88 87 58 47 50 46 46 58 55 42 49 60 42 31 30 34 60 27 29 36 64 42 31 27 20 11 55 16 13 30 28 33 Source: Own Calculations on “Church and Religion in an enlarged Europe” (C&R 2006); percent of positive answers (a lot + quite a lot). Secularization as an European Fate? 99 The citizens also have a clear position on the influence of religion on science. According to them, religious norms and values should not interfere with scientific research (Chart 2). Again, there are differences between Catholic and non-Catholic countries, however, there is no country with a majority which rejects the given statements. People least agree with them in the two special cases of religious vitality – Ireland and Poland. Science and religion are perceived as separate spheres. What is interesting is the fact that the contrast between religion and science postulated by the secularization theory does not appear to be a phenomenon which occur across societies in the eyes of the citizens. In practically all of the countries, the citizens almost equally divide into supporters and opponents of the phrase „I can´t see any restrictions between Science and Religion“. However, the opposition to the statement considerably increases when asking people who are not members of the church or people who are less religious (usually around 5 to 8 percentage points; see also Chart 3). While the differentiation between the functional spheres of religion, politics and science is apparently firmly rooted in the belief systems of the European citizens, the attitudes toward the influence of religion on the educational system are far from clear-cut. Not only are Estonia and East Germany the only countries where the majority of citizens favors a school education without religious elements, a strict segregation between the church and the state in the sense of keeping state schools clear of religious symbols, is approved of only to a very limited extent. Apparently, there is a common Christian cultural heritage and its transmission is generally regarded as beneficial, even though not all of the respondents are very closely committed to the church and religion. This is possibly one of the last bastions of religion apart from its own limited functional sphere. As in the case of the other indicators, the countries are distributed as usual when it comes to the assessment of the desired relationship between religion and school. In Catholic countries, there is a far more open-minded attitude toward the presence of religion in schools than in Protestant countries. Chart 3: Societal Secularization and religious vitality “Religious Leaders should not try to influence government decisions“ “The constitution of European Union should make explicit reference to God” “Scientific Research should not be restricted by religious norms and values” “I can´t see any restrictions between science and religion” “Education at school should be free from religion” Member of a Church Attendance at Church Belief in a personal God -.11 -.11 -.11 Belief, whether in God nor a higher being +.12 -.30 -.34 -.35 +.29 -.14 -.21 -.15 +.13 -.11 -.06 -.09 +.14 -.30 -.27 -.29 +.30 Source: Own Calculations on C&R 2006; pearsons correlations p < .001, - = no significant correlation. Gert Pickel 100 Upon examining the individual level and differentiating between faithful and religiously indifferent persons or church members and non-members, we find relations between the indicators for societal secularization and individual secularization. As we expected, proximity to religion and the church causes negative replies to questions regarding the separation of the different spheres of life. This relation only holds to a moderate extent with regard to fields where the general public is largely in consensus, such as the basic principle of the segregation of religion and politics or religion and science. These are phenomena which occur across societies, which hardly cause conflicts any longer. However, when it comes to concrete questions regarding the public relevance of religion, deep rifts run through the societies. Thus, almost all of the proponents of a reference to God in the European Constitution can be found among the groups of people who are integrated in the church. These groups in particular support an incorporation of religion in the school system. It is over this issue that societies polarize.26 In summary, we can conclude that societal secularization in the European realm has progressed to a large extent. This does not imply that there is no longer any potential for conflict. Rather, it depends on the specific areas in society. In cases where the influence of religion has endured, some of the groups who are integrated in church fight fierce rearguard battles. In the long run, we will most likely witness a progression in the differentiation of society and, subsequently, an increasing loss of the social relevance of religion as illustrated by the existing broad acceptance of a segregation of religion and politics or religion and science. This appears to be such a wide-ranging process that we can hardly make out any differences between the countries in this respect as to their degree of modernization. On the one hand, socio-economic differences may simply be too small to produce any perceivable variation, on the other hand, the respective differences are largely covered up by the dominant structures of influence of the cultural traditions. Thus, at the societal level, Catholic countries usually resist the secularization processes longer than Orthodox or Protestant countries. The question that follows is in how far this applies to individual secularization. 5. Religiosity 2006 – an indication of individual secularization? A preliminary look at the data on the individual significance of religion shows that, in general, it has not disappeared once and for all. In 2006, many people still considered religion to be an important part of their lives. However, there are considerable differences across Europe. In the Catholic countries (here exemplary: Portugal, Ireland, Croatia, Poland), religion’s importance in life persists. 75% of the Catholic population in Portugal, Ireland, Croatia and Poland consider religion to be an important part of their lives – in so far, this result contradicts the assumption of the loss of relevance of religion in society with regard to these countries. 26 We can find analogous results within the individual countries, however, the size of the groups varies in accordance with the relevance of religion in society in general. Secularization as an European Fate? 101 Chart 4: Importance of Religion 2006 WG Port Irl Fin EG Pol Hun Cro Est Rus “Religion is an important part of my life” 45 75 78 54 23 79 58 78 18 35 “God determines life” 25 65 44 40 13 47 50 51 14 28 Source: Own Calculations on C&R 2006; percent of positive answers (a lot + quite a lot). The situation is different in the comparative countries in the Protestant or Orthodox cultural realm. Here, more than half of the local population concede little to no importance to religion in their everyday lives. The combination of a Protestant heritage and a (more recent) socialist past appears to have had a particularly bad effect on the social relevance of religion. We find by far the lowest rates of those who regard religion as an important part of their lives among the population of East Germany as well as of Estonia. Even though the degree of relevance of religion in Western European states with a Protestant cultural history is also far behind the rate in Catholic states, it is nowhere near the rate resulting from the combination of Protestantism and Socialism. This pattern is confirmed by the second indicator presented in Chart 4 “God determines life”. The agreement with this statement is similarly distributed across the countries, however, the percentage rates are lower. In 2006, only one out of seven citizens in East Germany or Estonia agreed with this statement. Similarly, in West Germany and Russia, only every fourth person shared this point of view. Only Finland is out of line. As it is the only Protestant country in this analysis, just about half of the respondents perceived a divine influence on life. Both of the indicators presented in Chart 2 show substantial differences with regard to the social relevance of religion in a European comparison. However, we cannot deduce a strong indication of a progressing process of secularization from these numbers. On the one hand, religion is relatively firmly rooted in the European population, on the other hand, the different degrees of relevance of religion appear to be less the result of the differences in modernization than the denominational cultural heritage of the countries. This finding is not necessarily a fundamental objection against the secularization theory, as the latter points to a decrease in the social relevance of religion in the sense of a course of process and not a description of the state of affairs in the sense of a social relevance which no longer exists. Finally, as previously mentioned, none of the current main proponents (Bruce 2002a: 41-42; Wilson 1982: 150; Berger 1967) of the approach predict a disappearance of religion to this extent. However, supporters of the secularization theory assume in general that the loss of social relevance of religion has a negative influence on subjective religiosity, as it is deprived of its communal basis of socialization for example. This reference to the communal basis of religion points to one of the main starting points of every secularization debate: the declaration that church attendance rates and membership in religious organizations are decreasing (see for example Bruce 2002a: 3; Dobbelaere 2002: 137-140). A closer look reveals that in this instance, religion is in fact not disappearing. Apart from the two ‚problem cases’ of Estonia and East Germany, a broad culture of church affiliation (see Davie 1994) remains prevalent in the European realm. In Hungary and Russia (the latter can be considered to be an example for the entire Gert Pickel 102 Russian Orthodox region) as well as in Estonia and Croatia, we even find that membership rates have increased since 2000. In Russia, these changes have turned out to be particularly drastic. The abolition of the political repressions has led many people to return to the church in Eastern European countries – at least during the first years after the radical changes (see also Tomka et al. 1999). In Finland, Ireland and Portugal, the membership rates have remained rather stable during the past 15 years according to survey data. Only in Germany do we find a continuous decrease in church membership rates in our group of countries. With different data, we can make out a similar trend in Great Britain and the Netherlands as well – both states have a mixed denominational culture (see Pickel 2009: 14). The developments in East Germany should be emphasized: it is the only ‚Eastern European country’ which does not have a positive balance between those leaving and those joining the church. Here, the de-ecclasiasticalization appears to have passed a certain threshold, which prevents a revitalization of the participation in church. Chart 5: Integration in Church and religious practice Membership 2006 1999/2000 1990/1991 Attendance at church 2006 1999/2000 1990/1991 Frequency of prayer At least once a week Never Pilgrimage Yes, several times Yes, once No, never WG Port Irl Fin EG Pol Hun Cro Est Rus 81 83 89 92 92 89 96 96 96 88 88 88 29 29 35 96 96 96 78 67 65 95 89 - 45 25 35 74 51 43 10 11 12 17 21 23 34 35 43 4 4 4 3 3,5 3,5 33 33 38 8 8 14 16 20 - 3,5 3,5 3,5 4 3 3 39 26 55 16 79 10 30 22 17 65 69 3 48 20 52 11 15 57 32 33 9 6 85 25 19 56 17 20 63 1 1,5 97,5 3 2 95 16 17 67 10 8 82 38 16 46 0,5 2 97,5 4 2 94 Source: Own Calculations on C&R 2006; calculations for 1999/2000 means of the results of EVS 1999/PCE 2000; calculations for 1990/1991 means of the results of WVS 1990/ISSP 1990/1991 percent of positive answers (a lot + quite a lot); percent of positive answers (a lot + quite a lot); pilgrimage = “Have you ever taken part in pilgrimage”. However, membership rates are a relatively imprecise indicator for measuring religious vitality, as they hardly provide any information on the active involvement in church life, which is what actually produces religious social capital (Bruce 2002b). Thus, considering the church attendance rates appears to be a much more informative indicator, as it presupposed a minimum of active participation of the respective persons. Here, the empirical point of reference of the secularization theory becomes more evident, as the number of churchgoers in all Western European countries has continuously decreased independent of Secularization as an European Fate? 103 the level of this activity in the respective country. 27 Using the average annual rate of churchgoers28 as a benchmark, we find that Finland (which has the same values as Sweden or Norway) is the only country where the number of churchgoers have not decreased. This may be less due to Finland’s exceptional position than due to the already low attendance rate of four church services per year on average.29 It remains to be seen whether a lower threshold of integration in the church has been reached, as the average rates in Russia and East Germany are not considerably lower. Thus, a large number of church members hardly pursue any religious activities and they remain (often passive) church members out of tradition, due to their socialization or social desirability. As depicted in Chart 5, the churches’ hopes for a broad wave of return to religion with regard to religious activity were fulfilled only in part in the post-socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Even though we can assert an increase in membership rates in all Eastern European countries except for East Germany, if anything, the religious activities – measured in terms of church service attendance – decreased after an initial increase after the radical changes or stabilized at a relatively low level.30 Based on these results, we cannot speak of a broad revitalization of bonding to the church in Eastern Europe.31 This may possibly be due to an adjustment process during which the Eastern European countries adapt to ‚normality’. Consequently, the growth rates increase the level in the Eastern European countries to a degree which they - according to the secularization theory - would have reached due to their degree of modernization if it had not been for their socialist past. According to the assumptions of the secularization theory, they would join the common European process at this point. The distribution of church attendance as well as the frequency of individual prayer across the countries show a similar pattern to that of the membership rates.32 Poland and Ireland have the largest number of church service attenders, followed by Croatia, Portugal and Hungary, where at least about half of those questioned pray at least once a week. Again, the difference between Catholic and Protestant countries becomes apparent. In historically Catholic countries, the commitment of the faithful to their church in the sense of personal activities is generally higher than in Protestant, denominationally mixed or even 27 28 29 30 31 32 Ireland – the country which had the highest church attendance rates for decades - is characterized by the most prominent decrease. Without a doubt, this is also owing to the particularly high initial level, which allows for more variations than in less religiously vital countries. The aggregate indicator of average church attendance is more informative than the share of regular churchgoers as it also takes developments within the large group of peripheral church members into account. On the one hand, there is hardly any margin to the lowest level, on the other hand the marginal changes can hardly be measured. Due to missing valid survey data, we cannot sketch the return movement to the churches. We only have data for Hungary in 1981, which are at a lower level (attendance of eight church services per year). However, surveys carried out in non-liberal or undemocratic political regimes always have to be handled with care as social desirability biases cannot be entirely precluded. This contrasts with Zulehner’s (2002) and Tomka’s et al. (1999) statements. However, they link the developments of the differences to the different age cohorts and refer to different countries of observation. The fact that these patterns are in accordance with the number of participants in pilgrimages supports this observation, even if this indicator only contains a limited amount of significant information due to the fact that this activity is more meaningful for Catholics. Gert Pickel 104 Orthodox countries. If we define religious vitality as religious activity, Protestant countries in Europe report a rather low level of religious vitality. In order to verify the individualization thesis,33 it is necessary to consider personal religiosity, as it alone informs us about the validity or invalidity of a comprehensive loss of social relevance of religion according to Luckmann (1991). Maybe the commitment of the people to the church is decreasing – however, in the course of a change in the form of religion, they make out other possibilities to satisfy their anthropologically founded religious needs in private or outside the established churches. This approach is also relevant from the perspective of Protestantism, as it often refers to the individuality of the relationship with God. Consequently, low church attendance rates do not reflect a loss of social relevance of Protestantism but rather a measurement error which does not sufficiently take into account the particularities of Protestantism. However, this assumption does not hold against the data. Hence, in the Protestant countries, the statements on personal religiosity are indeed understood in an individualized sense in certain respects and the respondents state that they are religious in their own way rather than believing in the teachings of the church (Chart 6) of which they are a member. However, the percentage of those who are religiously indifferent or who categorize themselves as decidedly non-religious is (in part considerably) higher than in the non-Protestant countries of comparison. From the point of view of the cultural commitment power of denominations, we cannot but consider Protestantism to be at a disadvantage as opposed to Catholicism overall. Maybe Bergers’ (1967: 158) argument – which assumes that secularization is inherent and immanent in Protestantism – will prove to be true at least in part. Chart 6: Subjective Religiosity 2006 I am religious to the teachings of my church I am religious in my own way I can not decide, whether I am a religious person or not I am not religious WG 16 Port 46 Irl 34 Fin 20 EG 9 Pol 56 Hun 21 Cro 52 Est 14 Rus 21 61 7 45 2 56 4 58 10 34 4 39 3 59 6 37 4 41 11 49 14 16 7 6 12 53 2 14 7 34 16 Source: Own Calculations on C&R 2006; percent of positive answers (a lot + quite a lot). East Germany reports the largest percentage of those who profess to be non-religious, followed by Estonia. This is mirrored by the Catholic cultural realm. According to their replies, about half of the Portuguese, Croats and Polish are religious in accordance with the perceived rules of their church. This also implies that in a cross-country comparison, traditional religiosity is related to the organizational aspects of the church. Ireland deviates from the ‚Catholic’ pattern, as more of the faithful retain a distance to the teachings of the church without lapsing into religious doubts or rejection. Nevertheless, the Irish faithful cannot be 33 Individualization has to be understood as a general social phenomenon which pertains to entire societies and not individuals. It must not be confused with „egotism“ (Beck 2008: 123-124). Secularization as an European Fate? 105 judged to be less religious than the Portuguese faithful, for example, they simply seem to interact with their religion in a more individual manner. In West Germany, Finland, Russia and Hungary, the degree of individualized religiosity is even higher. Here, they represent vast majorities of the respective populations. Maybe, this result can be interpreted as an indication of an increase in the individualization of religious beliefs. These cross-country results are supported by another indicator of personal religiosity – the belief in God. In Estonia as well as in East Germany, the statement „a personal God exists“ - which is in line with the teachings of the Christian churches – was chosen by barely 14 per cent of the respondents. The majority of the East German citizens tend to consider themselves as atheists or regard themselves as non-religious.34 In Estonia, these two groups also comprise more than a quarter of the population – however, most of the Estonians believe in a higher being. Many people concur with this diffuse form of faith in most of the other European countries as well. In West Germany, they represent the largest group and even in Poland and Croatia, over 30 per cent profess such a general form of faith. In Portugal, we find the largest group of faithful who believe in a personal God. However, in Poland, Hungary and Croatia, still more than half of the population are also religious in a traditional sense. Overall, it seems that a tendency toward a more diffuse image of God is becoming apparent in many European countries. In Hungary and Croatia, there is a trend in the opposite direction. On the one hand, this may be due to a polarization between religious and nonreligious people in society, on the other hand, it may result from an increasing interlinkage between religion and nationalist ideas (Nikodem/Zrinscak 2008). Chart 7: Forms of Belief in God Belief in a personal God 2006 1999/2000 Belief in a higher Being 2006 1999/2000 Don´t know, whether God exist Don´t believe God exist I am an atheist WG Port Irl Fin EG Pol Hun Cro Est Rus 28 (38) -10 81 (79) +2 67 (67) 0 46 (47) -1 14 (17) -3 56 (65) -9 53 (42) +11 52 (38) +14 14 (18) -4 31 (27) +4 44 (36) +8 7 (12) 16 5 9 (15) -6 5 (3) 1 4 17 (23) -6 10 (7) 3 3 29 (34) -5 12 (11) 10 3 26 (16) +10 6 (9) 27 27 32 (23) +9 10 (5) 1 1 12 (17) -5 19 (18) 11 5 32 (51) -19 10 (7) 2 4 39 (45) -6 19 (20) 14 14 26 (32) -6 29 (31) 4 10 Source: Own Calculations on C&R 2006; calculations for 1999/2000 means of the results of EVS 1999/PCE 2000; percent of positive answers (a lot + quite a lot). 34 In practice, the differentiation between atheists and non-religious people has proven to be useful, as it reflects different positions (see Pickel 2000: 225-232). While atheists usually explicitly or even aggressively disapprove of any kind of religion, non-religious persons are simply not interested in it. The latter do not feel compelled to take on an active opposing position against Christians or believers of other religions. Gert Pickel 106 Can we conclude that the secularization theory is lacking validity and that the individualization thesis of religion is valid based on this evidence? Hardly. The observable increase in diffuse religious beliefs and the number of religiously indifferent people does not necessarily have to be interpreted as a consequence of individualization; it can also be conceived of as a preliminary stage to secularization (see Voas 2008: 39-41). The developments in Western Europe in particular consistently indicate a gradual process of a loss of faith which unfolds in line with the secularization theory. In Eastern Europe, the development is not as clear-cut: Here, we find both processes of an increase as well as a decrease among the groups of indifferent and non-religious people. Due to the fact that we can hardly expect to observe an increasing individualization in these countries at present35 and as the increase in the number of faithful is also accompanied in part by a revitalization with regard to church integration, the assumptions of the secularization theory appear to hold true more so than those of the individualization thesis. The fact that the distributions of the values of the indicators of church integration and subjective religiosity match to a rather high extent speaks for the secularization theory. However, the descriptive results can neither definitely confirm the secularization model nor can we use them to reject one of the two alternative explanatory models as too many factors were not taken into account. 6. Secularization, individualization, and the market model Let us try to find evidence to substantiate our evaluation. The individualization thesis according to Luckmann (1967) refers to the change in the forms of religion. Consequently, the statements which were analyzed in the preceding section should not suffice to refute this trend, as they fail to cover the main issue. Due to the fact that religiosity cannot disappear, other forms have to become more important in turn when the social relevance of the traditional model of interpretation of Christian religiosity decreases. One way to test this assumption is to examine forms of religiosity apart from the traditional view and that of the churches. If the individualization thesis is indeed correct, then we should be able to observe alternatives or substitutes in the form of alternative religiosity in countries where traditional religiosity is losing its social relevance. Chart 8 lists the distribution of a number of possible functional equivalents of traditional religiosity. However, the results clearly show that there is a rather low demand for these forms of religiosity. At most, a third of the citizens in one of the countries under research state that they have an affinity for one of the forms presented to them. More importantly, the distribution of the rates of agreement is skewed in a different direction than suggested by the individualization thesis. It is not the countries with a loss of relevance of traditional religiosity and bonding to the church which have the highest proportion of alternative religiosity but rather those countries with a strong Christian religiosity (Ireland, 35 Thus all of the indicators of individualization, self-fulfillment and post-materialism (Norris/Inglehart 2004: 18-21) had extremely low approval rates in the East European countries. This finding is plausible due to the local material problems and the low socio-economic welfare level compared to Western Europe. This raises the question as to why religious vitality remains so low in some Eastern European countries against this background. Secularization as an European Fate? 107 Portugal). Hence, if traditional religiosity is rejected, then most other forms of alternative religiosity are not accepted either. The consequences that arise from this observation are straigthforward: the selected forms of alternative religiosity do not serve as substitutes for traditional religiosity. Chart 8: Religiosity outside of Christianity I believe in … … Magic/Spirituality/ Occultism … Astrology/ Horoscopes … Amulets, Stones and Crystals could be helpful WG 12 Port 24 Irl 20 Fin 9 EG 8 Pol 8 Hun 12 Cro 13 Est 17 Rus 16 18 27 18 16 16 20 32 26 31 31 25 36 20 12 16 24 26 29 38 37 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. +.13 n.s. n.s. n.s. -.08 n.s. n.s. -.09 n.s. n.s. n.s. -.08 Correlation Belief in a personal God with… Magic n.s. +.07 Astrology n.s. +.07 Source: Own Calculations on C&R 2006; percent of positive answers (a lot + quite a lot). Even this interpretation does not suffice to reject the individualization thesis as Luckmann (1967) makes allowance for a whole range of additional possibilities for an „invisible religion“, which could not be taken into account in the survey at hand.36 According to him, many of these cannot be measured by means of survey research anyway. This may be true, nevertheless, the results as presented in Chart 8 raise certain doubts with regard to the validity of religiosity rooted in anthropology which only manifests itself via a change in form. It rather appears more plausible to allow for the possibility of religiously indifferent as well as non-religious persons who will find their place next to those whose religious beliefs truly transformed into a different kind.37 Another statement of the individualization thesis refers to the dissolution of sociostructural relations of religion in modern times which liberates the individual with regard to his religiosity in the end (Krüggeler/Dubach 1993). As a result of the loss of social relations and social control due to a separation from the social structure and the respective social environment, the individual is provided with the chance to believe what he chooses to believe. This line of thought reflects a basic assumption of the individualization thesis – the substitution of the social norm of „heteronomy“ with the new norm of „selfdetermination“. 36 37 Apart from the sphere of small and medium transcendencies in all its generality, soccer, art and other kinds of experience in everyday life are referred to. This spectrum eludes sufficient empirical testing, which is why it is more than slightly critized from different perspectives, as it renders it nearly impossible to find an intersubjectively agreed upon measure of religiosity. Thus, Dobbelaere (2002: 137) allows for both a loss of faith and a transformation. However, ultimately, he considers transformation to be more of a transitional period which is often followed by a loss of faith. Gert Pickel 108 Chart 9: Social structural Bases of Religiosity and Relations to Values Member Age (increasing Age) Sex (Women) Formal education (high education) Urban-rural (rural) Income (low income) Value orientations Law and order Extravagant life Prayer .08 Attend. Church .12 Magic Astrology Amulets .26 Belief in God .11 -.14 -.16 -.08 .08 .11 .18 .11 .07 .15 .15 -.11 -.08 -.13 -.16 - -.03 -.05 .03 .09 .05 .08 - - - .05 .09 .16 .12 .05 - .03 .06 -.05 .10 -.05 .18 -.10 .12 -.10 .09 -.14 .07 -.12 .03 -.14 Source: Own Calculations on C&R 2006; pearsons correlations p < .001, - = no significant correlation. Considering the results in Chart 9, we cannot detect a complete detachment of religious beliefs from social structures. Particularly in rural areas, older women with a lower degree of formal education and a comparatively low income, report the highest religious vitality – but they also believe in God the most. Even though the socio-structural foundation of religion may have gradually disintegrated in society over the last decades, the relation has not disappeared entirely. 38 The main indicators of modernization – a high degree of education reflecting a spreading rationalization as well as urbanization – have significant effects in all of the countries. In addition, the deprivation theory has to be take into account - it considers socio-economic welfare (another indicator of modernization) to be an important factor in reducing social deprivation among the people as well as the wish for compensation for all the suffering in the afterlife. Indeed, persons with a less advantageous social status have a comparatively close affinity for religion in all its forms. Like traditional forms of religiosity, alternative forms of religiosity are more popular among women – across all countries. The relation with age is remarkable. While the indicators of traditional bonding to the church and religiosity are more pronounced among older persons, apparently, alternative forms of religiosity appeal more to younger age groups. Maybe these truly are „newer“ forms of religiosity. However, the low agreement rates in Chart 8 as well as the positive correlation with conservative values or indicators of traditional Christian religiosity speak against classifying them as substitutes for Christian religiosity. If at all, then less of a change in form than a supplementation of religious forms is taking place in Europe. A third possibility of approaching the individualization thesis is to consider in how far accounts of values of self-fulfillment are positively related to alternative forms of religiosity. The idea behind this approach is that persons with stronger individualistic values 38 When the analyses were carried out separately for each of the countries under research, they yielded only marginally different results. Hence, we forego presenting them here. Secularization as an European Fate? 109 should differ with regard to their integration in church from persons with traditional values (measured by the item „preference for law and order“) but not concerning their subjective religiosity (Pollack/Pickel 2007). In comparison, people with individualistic values (measured by their tendency to lead an „extravagant life“) should rather have an affinity for new or alternative forms of religiosity. The results show a positive relation between traditional values and all types of religiosity and church integration as well as a negative relation between individualistic values and these forms. As in the previous results, there is no strong evidence for an assertion of the individualization thesis. However, this does not mean that there is no process of individualization at all. Nevertheless, (in Europe) the influence of individualization appears to be rather consistent with the process of secularization instead of serving as a substitute. Testing the relevance of the market model proves to be a bit more complicated at the individual level than testing the individualization thesis. The majority of the argumentational structure of the market model refers to the distribution of religious vitality and the macro level of observations (Iannaccone 1991; Stark/Iannaccone 1994; Fox 2008). So far, the European results (Pollack 2006b; Pollack/Pickel 1999; Pickel 2007) rather speak against the validity of the market model, at least within this region. Such a test is not very sensible with a limited number of countries. However, since recently, the merely supplyoriented market model has been complemented by the relevance of the regulation of religious demand particularly with regard to Europe (Froese/Pfaff 2005, see also in this volume Froese/Pfaff). The quintessence of these analyses is that this type of regulation was particularly effective in Eastern Europe and is responsible for the low degree of religious vitality in East Germany for example. In the survey at hand, we chose an approach which includes the demand aspect. It was assumed that an expanded religious supply or rather a stronger competition on the religious market would lead to an increase in religious vitality under the condition of the existence of a certain amount of interest on the demand side. Substantial groups in society would have to demand a greater plurality of religious providers in order for the market model to be successful. Simply put – those who are interested in a different religious persuasion should also plead for a larger variety of religious choices in the country. This reflects one of the core assumptions of the market model – the regulation of the religious market. A second indicator turns the direction of the argument with regard to these assumptions around. It was asked whether religious pluralism might even be a foundation of social conflicts. If people perceive such a conflict potential then we cannot expect them to approve of religious pluralism. The results in Chart 10 are fairly straightforward – in almost none of the European states chosen for the analysis do the citizens prefer a larger variety of possibilities in the religious realm. About three out of four persons consider religious plurality to be a cause of conflicts. Only in the Catholic countries of Ireland, Poland and Portugal, 20 per cent of the respondents voiced their support for a greater range of religious organisations and groups. Maybe this result indicates an interest in religious plurality in the presence of a religious monopoly. However, this result violates one of the basic assumptions of the religious market model – the influence of religious plurality on religious vitality – as countries with low religious vitality in particular report an exceptionally low demand for religious pluralism. Chart 10: Demand for religious variation Gert Pickel 110 „I would prefer a greater variation of religious organisations and groups in my neighbourhood, because then, I could choose between different demands“ „An increasing variation of religious groups is a cause of conflicts“ WG Port Irl Fin EG Pol Hun Cro Est Rus 10 27 36 10 7 22 17 17 13 7 72 73 58 65 69 49 65 58 75 74 Source: Own Calculations on C&R 2006; percent of positive answers (a lot + quite a lot). Thus it is not true that religiously inactive persons are looking for a new religious place in society. Rather, they seem to take on a general non-religious or an indifferent position at most. Even though this conclusion is susceptible to several counterarguments by supporters of the market model (conflict as a substitute for competition, internal plurality of the Catholic church, false assumption of an absence of religious interest), there appears to be only limited explanatory leeway for the religious market model in the European realm. 39 If most people are not interested in having a larger variety of religious choices, then it is not plausible – at least in the case of Europe - to assume that a relevant increase in religious groups leads to a rise in religious vitality. How about the secularization theory? One of its main assumptions is that the decline in the social relevance of religion is a slow but nevertheless continuous process. This is based on cohort-specific considerations as systematized by Ronald Inglehart (1979) in his theory of value change. It is not the individual as such whose bonding to the church and maybe even to religion decreases dramatically. Rather, it is a process which goes on for generations. Socialization plays a particularly important role in such a developmental process. Hence, we should be able to discern differences in socialization in the countries under research which correspond to the decrease in bonding to the church and subjective religiosity. These in turn should match the degree of modernization of the countries. Chart 11 reflects the powerful influence of religious socialization. Individual religious socialization highly corresponds to the degree of religious vitality, both at the micro and macro level. The transmission of religious knowledge, religious experience and religious practices thus represents an interface to the persistence of a vital religion. It is interesting to note that the number of those who think that their own children should be raised in faith is even a bit higher than the extent of their own respective socialization suggests. This reflects a certain openness to knowledge about religious beliefs which often constitute a country’s culture. However, we have to bear in mind that we cannot directly infer behavior from these positive statements. It is often subject to additional restrictions which are likely to reduce the number of those who actually expose their children to religion and faith. Chart 11: Religious Socialization in European comparison 39 Proponents of the market model would point out that we can only derive valid conclusions with regard to the utility of the model based on concrete observations in a plural or non-plural reality. However, this highlights a fundamental problem of the market model: it focuses on the supply side of the religious market while the religious demand is held constant. Due to the fact that economic rational choice models usually focus on the demand side, this seems to be a restriction which limits the utility of the model. Secularization as an European Fate? Socialization Parents brought me up in faith I think that it is important to bring up children in faith (own intention) Correlations Religious Socialization / own intention Religious Socialization / belief in God 111 WG Port Irl Fin EG Pol Hun Cro Est Rus 68 76 94 88 94 92 59 78 38 38 96 90 71 78 85 81 26 40 30 50 .51 .21 .50 .34 .26 .19 .46 .34 .58 .31 .49 .19 .51 .45 .63 .34 .55 .33 .51 .23 Source: Own Calculations on C&R 2006; percent of positive answers (a lot + quite a lot). The fact that socialization is highly relevant for the spreading of religious vitality is problematic with regard to the comparative analysis of religious vitality. Thus, in Eastern Europe, the „inertia“ of family socialization causes the revitalization effect to drag on over a longer period of time. In addition to religious beliefs, non-religious or indifferent mindsets are passed down as well. Consequently, it is even more difficult to identify for certain the conflicting dynamic developments of revitalization after 1989, due to the fact that both the cessation of political repression and secularization (which reflects increasing modernization gains) exist in parallel in Central and Eastern Europe. The majority of the results presented in this section supports the main assumptions of the secularization theory at least as regards individual secularization. There is only sporadic evidence for the assumptions of the indvidualization thesis. However, we were not able to finally and categorically disprove it. The results are more straightforward with regard to the utility of the religious market model: As opposed to North America, New Zealand or Australia, this model is of little use with regard to the development in Europe. Rather, longterm cultural traditions, such as Catholicism and Protestantism, appear to be relevant in explaining the variations in the trends in the development of religiosity and religious vitality. Maybe they determine the trajectories of secularization (see Norris/Inglehart 2004). 7. Bases of religious vitality What accounts for the differences in religious vitality in the countries under research? We already mentioned religious cultural traditions, political repression in the recent socialist past and modernization as the main driving force behind secularization. Let us try to systematize the observations we have made so far. When choosing our cases, we followed a comparative design which allows us to make qualified comparisons at the macro level. In accordance with a strict application of the secularization theory, which solely takes the level of socio-economic modernization into account, Western European countries should consistently lag behind Eastern European countries. Gert Pickel 112 Chart 12: A comparative view on the bases of religious vitality at the macro level WD Port Irl Fin OD Pol Ung Kro Est Rus State of modernization - / - - + + + + + + Political repression in the last decades (socialist) + + + + - - - - - - Religious-cultural legacy / + + - - + / + - - Prospected level of religious vitality 5 1 2 7 7 2 5 2 7 7 Level of religious regulation (Fox) 3 3 2 10 3 7 8 3 1 9 Integration in Church Subjective Religiosity 5 7 3 1 1 2 7 6 10 9 1 3 6 5 3 3 9 9 8 7 Societal Secularization (reversed in antisecularization) 7 4 2 6 9 1 5 2 10 7 Religiosity outside the Church 7 1 6 10 9 7 4 4 1 1 Indicators of religious vitality Source: Own Calculations; negative signs stand for a disadvantageous situation for religious vitality, positive signs stand for an advantageous situation; the level of religious regulation was taken from the „Religion and State“ data set by Jonathan Fox. Here, we show the overall degree of state interventions in the religious sphere and therefore the openness of the religious market. For a definition of the index see Fox/Tabory 2008: 251-255. Obviously, this is not the case. To be honest, we did not expect to find evidence for this assumption as we were already aware of the fact that political repression in Eastern Europe caused a unique kind of loss of religious traditions. With the data at hand, we cannot definitely say whether this process represents a kind of anticipated secularization or whether it has created a state which is unnatural considering the degree of secularization which may lead to an adjustment process in the Eastern European countries in the sense of a revitalization process. However, the results presented in Chart 12 suggest that it may be a good idea to take the best of both ideas. Thus we should jointly consider the different indicators. When combining our findings with the three basic conditions according to Martin (1978), a combination of modernization, political repression and protestant legacy should prove to be the worst preconditions of religious vitality in our cross-country comparison. These factors make up the first part of the following chart. Starting out from the (debatable) assumption that the first three observed factors (state of modernization, political repression, religious-cultural legacy) are weighted equally, we should arrive at a sorting – or ranking – as depicted in the row „prospected level of religious vitality“. Portugal should record the highest level, while countries such as Estonia, Russia, Finland and East Germany should report the lowest level of religious vitality. The actual order of the indicators of religious vitality for the countries under research is surprisingly close to the expected rank. Indeed, religious vitality is lowest in East Germany and Estonia. These countries also have the highest degree of societal secularization while Ireland, Portugal and Poland record the highest degree of religious vitality. The countries’ positions in the rankings do differ Secularization as an European Fate? 113 somewhat when comparing church integration and subjective religiosity, however, religious practices and religious beliefs highly correspond with each other. The religious-cultural legacy of a country is of great importance for religious vitality with regard to religious beliefs, church integration and societal secularization. While the Catholic countries succeed in committing their church members on a long-term basis, the Protestant churches fail to do so. Apparently, Protestantism was less able to oppose the politically enforced fight against religion in the socialist countries. One of the reasons may be that Protestantism is more strongly rooted in modern-day society. Another causal characteristic – which Protestantism shares with the Orthodox church – is the fact that they were less able to fight off political encroachments on the national level due to their organizational structure, which consists of regional churches. In this respect, Catholicism had an advantage due to the fact that its point of reference was in Rome – outside the socialist territory. The fact that processes of collective identity building combining a sense of national identity and religion occur in Catholic countries in particular also certainly matters. We can observe this in Ireland as well as in Poland and Croatia. These processes, which Bruce (2002a: 30-33) refers to as „Cultural Defence“, which could be regarded as a counter movement against comprehensive processes of globalization in accordance with Huntington’s assumptions (1996), apparently presuppose a closer individual relation to the churches than envisaged by Protestantism. While the religious-cultural heritage marks the starting point of religious vitality in a given country, the changes in religious vitality depend on other processes. The negative influences of rationalization and functional differentiation as propagated by the secularization theory have greatly advanced at the societal level. Even in countries with a high percentage of church members, religion is hardly accorded any influence on any other social spheres. We were not able to show whether this is directly related to a trend toward privatization. However, the communal basis of religion and the bonding to the church continue to decrease. This comes as no surprise, since people need religion less and less in order to explain the events in their surroundings. Thus it seems as if the decreasing social roots of religion would undermine subjective religiosity in the long run. In prosperous societies, religion is no longer necessary as a compensation for mundane problems (see Wilson 1982; Stolz 2007). This implies that increasing material wealth contributes to the loss of relevance of religion (see also Norris/Inglehart 2004).40 The determination of the dynamic effects of modernization proved to be difficult due to the fact that accelerated processes of modernization coincided with concomitantly decreasing ‚legacies’ of anti-religious socialist socialization in Eastern Europe after 1989. 40 This relationship is stated by the so-called deprivation thesis which originated with Marx (see Stolz 2007). Gert Pickel 114 Chart 13: Indicators of religious vitality – correlation analysis Member Parents brought me up in faith (own socialization) I think that it is important to bring up children in faith (own intention) I would prefer a greater variation of religious organisations and groups in my neighbourhood, because then, I could choose between different demands Prayer .49 Attend. Church .43 Magic .28 Belief in God .45 .53 .16 Amulets n.s. Astrology n.s. .41 .32 .48 n.s. n.s. .07 .14 n.s. .13 .23 .16 .18 .04 Source: Own Calculations on C&R 2006; pearsons correlations p < .001, - = no significant correlation. In order to enforce these rather long-term processes, socialization is of crucial importance. Chart 13 clearly reflects the transgenerational transmission of Christian religiosity. Whether it is integration in church or belief in God – a lack of religious socialization undermines the religious vitality of the citizens, which is clearly documented in Chart 13. This correlation holds for all European countries to the same extent. Therefore, the effect (a high or lower rate of religious vitality) of socialization on the macro-level depends from the distribution of the main socialization agents, the rate of religious parents in combination with the generational loss of religious vitality. We have thus identified the development process of religion. It is a long-term reduction in religious vitality – and probably an even slower decrease in religious beliefs – which goes on for generations. The key features of the secularization theory unfold their effect. However, this mainly refers to the interrelations, i.e. religious vitality only decreases if the processes of modernization, rationalization and differentiation progress. Whether the process does indeed assert itself highly depends on the context and could be faced with counteracting processes, namely the revival of a national identity or an increase in social inequality which deprives certain social groups of prosperity and thus renders possible a return to religious patterns of interpretation. The effects of religious regulations as emphasized by the market model are rather unsystematically related to the distribution of religious vitality. Precisely the countries with the lowest degree of religious vitality – Estonia and East Germany – regulate the least according to Fox’ (2008) index. The result is consistent with other results of our analysis pertaining to Europe. This could be related to the ideas on the regulation of the demand for religion, e.g. through political repression (Froese/Pfaff 2005: Stolz 2007).41 However, in order to determine its effect more precisely, it would be necessary to determine separate indicators for the regulation of demand besides the degree of religious vitality itself. Otherwise, we would run the risk of equating the dependent with the independent variable. It would certainly be interesting to contrast the anti-religious effects of the previous regime which were passed on through socialization with the demand, which decreased due to the regulations. 41 See the article from Froese/Pfaff in this volume. Secularization as an European Fate? 115 The cross-country pattern of the distribution of non-ecclesiastical religiosity also hardly lends itself to contributing to explanations of the developments on the macro level. While the results for Estonia and Russia seem to suggest a substitutional function, the records for Portugal and Ireland contradict this assumption. The utility of the individualization thesis in explaining religious vitality is rather low, first of all, due to the fact that there are hardly any differences between subjective religiosity and bonding to the church in the country rankings, second, because the values for the statements on non-ecclesiastical religiosity were rather low and third, because the top ranking positions of Estonia and Russia most likely result from cultural historical developments rather than a new movement toward individualization. 8. Summary – a contextualized theory of secularization Does the secularization theory contribute to an explanation of the development of religion in Europe despite all the criticism raised against it? This is the question we started out with at the beginning of the article. There are two parts to the answer: On the one hand, the secularization theory remains a helpful tool for structuring a content-oriented empirical assessment of religious development. Thus, both of the alternative approaches, the religious market model and the individualization thesis, define themselves by decidedly distinguishing themselves from the secularization theory, and in doing so, they refer to it. In addition, modernization effects, which are central to the process of a loss of social relevance of religion according to the secularization theory, continue to unfold their effects - at least in Europe. This is reflected by the dynamic effects of a progressing process of development or by the undeniable difference between socio-economically well-developed and less developed countries (see also Norris/Inglehart 2004). On the other hand, an explanation which is limited to modernization does not sufficiently do justice to the complex development of religious vitality. The comparative results at hand show that the different cultural development paths of the countries in particular are of great importance for the determinable degree of religious vitality. The denominational legacy of a country particularly affects the spreading and speed of a loss of religious traditions. While on the one hand, Catholic countries succeed fairly well in committing their church members, effectively oppose processes of secularization and successfully maintain religious vitality, the Protestant countries do not manage to do so to the same extent. Apparently, the rationality inherent in Protestantism42 (Berger 1967: 111-113; Bruce 2002a: 78) as well as their comparatively strong integration in terms of social policy through the regional churches seem to have unfavorable effects on the social relevance of Protestantism. Most of the Christian Orthodox churches are affected by similar problems. However, in countries where the majority of the population is Orthodox Christian, we often find a close connection between the concept of the nation and religion, which involves a revitalization of religion in association with an identity-building process in the course of an emerging 42 Here, I refer to the privatization of faith inherent in Protestantism as well as its abolition of rituals, which deprived Protestantism of its mysticism (see Berger 1967). 116 Gert Pickel nationalism. As the cultural path dependencies determine the initial level of religious vitality and the extent of the resistance against processes of secularization, we can hardly deny the fact that there is a dynamic process in Western Europe which can be described as a process of secularization (see also Müller/Pollack 2008; Norris/Inglehart 2004; Voas 2008). At the same time, it is necessary to apply the assumptions of the secularization theory correctly, as they predict that religion will loose its social relevance but will not disappear entirely. We do find such a trend when considering the data presented in this article: it manifests itself in a process of differentiation, which is spreading across Europe, which confines religion to its core areas. The fact that many approve of a separation of religion and politics and would like to see religion abstain from influencing other spheres reflects a high degree of societal secularization or „compartmentalization“ (Dobbelaere 2002). This is accompanied by a decrease in bonding to the church and decreasing membership as well as an increasing religious indifference at the individual level. Concerning religious indifference, we could point out the transformation of the forms of religion which now encompass different approaches to deal with transcendental issues. However, the fact that the number of people in Western European states who consider themselves to be non-religious is continuously increasing raises doubt as to the validity of such a theory of substitution. Maybe it would be sensible to believe the respondents’ statements regarding their own nonreligiosity instead of assuming (from outside) that they partly lack an understanding of what religiosity is. In Eastern Europe, it is more difficult to assess the situation. On the one hand, socialist repression of the church and the resulting ideological position against religion43 are additional factors in explaining regional differences in religious vitality. This complicates the identification of the degree of influence of the explanations based on the denomination and secularization theory. Thus, the processes of modernization, political repression and cultural legacy have partly counteracting or mutually increasing effects. While the tradition of regional churches of the Protestant churches in Eastern Europe provided a particularly inadvantageous basis for maintaining religious vitality especially under repressive circumstances, the Catholic churches probably managed to avoid political repressions better due to the fact that they had an external authority they could refer to in Rome. On the other hand, almost 20 years after the radical changes, the analysis of Eastern European countries suffers from an additional problem. A social change is occuring in the religious realm, whereby counteracting effects of a catch-up modernization (which subdues religious vitality) and the withdrawal of political repressions of the church and religion (which is favorable for religious vitality) intermingle. One could even argue that the Eastern European countries should report a far higher degree of religious vitality than they do given their degree of modernization. In comparison to the highly modernized Western European states, their level of modernization is – in part considerably - lower. Hence, according to the assumptions of the secularization theory, we would expect to find a more pronounced religious vitality, due to the fact that rationalization, differentiation 43 After all, socialist systems had to strive to fulfill the political goal of abolishing the superstructure of class differences. Secularization as an European Fate? 117 as well as existential security are given to a lesser extent compared to Western Europe. However, in most of the Eastern European states, the consequences of socialist repression have caused an unnatural situation of subdued religious vitality, which has slowly begun to disperse after the repressions ceased. In cases where the communal basis of the religions has not been destroyed as substantially as in East Germany or in parts of Estonia, the observable revitalization effects do not come unexpectedly. The slow elimination of socialization effects explain the long duration of this process. This development is counteracted by continuous increases in modernization, especially in the Eastern European EU-member states. When combining the two processes, there should be a peak, at which point the revitalization processes cease and the development joins the Western European trend toward secularization. In countries such as Slovenia (the most modernized country in Central Eastern Europe) and Poland (with it exceptionally high initial level of religious vitality), we find first indications that they have reached such a peak. The problem is that the two processes are hard to distinguish empirically, which renders difficult a clear determination of the development trends of religious vitality in Eastern and Central Eastern Europe. As if that were not enough, additional factors undermine or at least moderate the universality of the secularization processes in some of the countries. They may also be assigned to the cultural path dependencies. While religiously charged political conflicts cause an above average religious vitality in Ireland (and Northern Ireland), the confluence of religion and nation is increasingly coming to the fore in several Eastern European states. Both patterns form and maintain collective identity.44 Consequently, religion is a main resource for identity-building (Huntington 1996; Fox 2004), whereby it may be accorded social relevance in return. Examples in Europe include: Poland, Russia and Croatia, just to name two of the countries covered in this article.45 This account points to the fact that the secularization model by itself does not suffice in explaining the stock and development of religious vitality in Europe. In order to carry out an analysis which does justice to reality, it is obligatory to take the cultural and political path dependencies of the individual countries or groups of countries into account. These particularly include the historically evolved religious cultural heritage, the massive socialist political repressions but also patterns regarding the relevance of religion in society particular to the individual countries. Taking these path dependencies into account, the assumptions of the secularization theory can indeed be applied. The analysis should focus on the tension between modernity and religion and less on the assumption that secularization is irreversible.46 44 45 46 In this regard, Bruce (2002a) refers to processes of „Cultural Defence“ and „Cultural Transition“, which are decisive for identity-building processes at the national as well as at the group level and which maintain religious vitality at a high level. Proponents of the market model also regard conflicts as a feasible alternative to competition, when it comes to stimulating religious vitality. This also occurs in Lithuania and Serbia which were not included in our analysis. By now, even dedicated proponents of explanatory models based on modernization theory (Inglehart/Welzel 2005) take path dependencies into account. 118 Gert Pickel Thus, on the one hand, modernization can in part proceed in the opposite direction (modernization losses affecting an entire nation or a large social group in the course of rising social inequality)47, on the other hand, it can be impeded by counteracting factors (political repression, processes of identity-building and identity-determination, radical social change). At least from a European perspective, the secularization theory promises to be of greater assistance in explaining religious vitality than the market model, which is the preferred model in the USA. We only find scant evidence for the reliability of the hypotheses of the latter model in Europe. Attempts to explain the development in Eastern Europe also suffer from the fact that the assumptions upon which they are based are too vague, even though supplementing ideas which merely focus on the supply with considerations regarding the regulation of the demand has gained in substance. This neither implies that we should not take into account individual elements of the market model as supplementary influential factors in addition to the above-mentioned explanatory proposals nor that these elements cannot be of greater importance outside of Europe. On the contrary – we have to incorporate the basic assumptions which were specified in those regions in comprehensive empirical explanatory models. However, for comparisons in Europe, the market model appears to have a limited applicability, in particular because it neglects alternative contextual elements of cultural path dependencies even more so than the secularization theory. The same applies to the religious individualization thesis. This model only provides a limited amount of additional information for cross-country comparisons. Especially in Eastern European countries, which are most likely to report revitalization trends, increasing (subjective) religiosity is accompanied by a rise in participation in religious events. Thus, the differentiation between subjective religiosity and integration in the church as pointed out by the individualization thesis is more likely to occur in Western Europe. However, the level of faith has decreased even in this region, even though not to the same extent as in the societal sector of integration in the church. At present, we cannot say whether this represents a detachment of individualized religiosity from the socio-cultural basis or whether it is a delayed process. Due to the fact that the secularization theory is mostly concerned with the loss of social relevance of religion, this is only of limited interest from a cross-country comparative perspective. Regarding the trends in revitalization of religious vitality, the explanatory power of the individualization thesis remains limited as it considers new religious movements as substitutes for previous forms. We can hardly find evidence for such a development in Eastern Europe, instead, people seem to return to established forms of religion. All in all, establishing a „contextualized secularization theory“ as a frame of reference for empirical analyses has a lot to commend it. We can only advance the empirical interpretation of religious developments if we combine path dependencies with additional general socio-cultural explanatory models. This implies that we need to broadly incorporate the 47 Socio-economic modernization losses took place in Eastern Europe right after the radical changes for example. However, an increase in social inequality, which can partly result from globalization – and which is actually occurring in Eastern Europe - also furthers religious vitality. This argument is in line with the vitalizing effect of existential insecurities which the secularization theory touches upon. Secularization as an European Fate? 119 general conditions of religion – this request has been voiced frequently in the more recent literature on the sociology of religion (Bruce 2002; Norris/Inglehart 2004; Stolz 2007). Insisting on alternative standpoints and rejecting the secularization theory prematurely seems to obscure the perception of reality instead.48 9. References Berger, Peter L. (1967): The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York. Bergmann, Jörg/Hahn, Alois/Luckmann, Thomas (eds.) (1993): Religion und Kultur. Sonderheft der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Wiesbaden. Beckford, James A. (2003): Social Theory & Religion. Cambridge. Beck, Ulrich (2008): Der eigene Gott. Von der Friedensfähigkeit und dem Gewaltpotential von Religionen. Frankfurt/Main. BertelsmannStiftung (ed.) (2008): Religionsmonitor 2008. Gütersloh. Brocker, Manfred/Behr, Hartmut/Hildebrandt, Matthias (eds.) (2003): Religion und Politik. Wiesbade.n Bruce, Steve (ed.) (1992): Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis. Oxford. Bruce, Steve (1996): Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults. Oxford. Bruce, Steve (1999): Choice and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory. Oxford. Bruce, Steve (2002a): God is Dead. Secularization in the West. Oxford. Bruce, Steve (2002b): Praying Alone? Church-Going in Britain and the Putnam Thesis. In: Journal of Contemporary Religion 17/3: 317-328. Bruce, Steve (2006): What the Secularization Paradigm really says. In: Franzmann/Gärtner/Köck (eds.): 39-48. Byrnes, Timothy A./Katzenstein, Peter J. (eds.) (2006): Religion in an Expanding Europe. Cambridge. Casanova, Jose (1994): Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago. Casanova, Jose (1996): Chancen und Gefahren öffentlicher Religion. Ost- und Westeuropa im Vergleich. In: Kallscheuer (ed.): 181-211. Cherkaoui, Mohamed/Hamilton, Peter (eds.): Raymond Boudon. A Life in Sociology. London (in print). Cipriani, Roberto (2006): Secularization or „diffused religion“? In: Franzmann/Gärtner/Köck (eds.): 123-142. Chaves, Mark/Cann, David E. (1992): Regulation, Pluralism and Religious Market Structure: Explaining Religion´s Vitality. In: Rationality and Society 4: 272-290. Davie, Grace (1994): Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging. Oxford. Davie, Grace (2001): Patterns of Religion in Western Europe: An exceptional Case. In: Fenn (ed.): 264-278. Davie, Grace (2002): Europe: the Exceptional Case. Parameters of Faith in the modern World. London. Davie, Grace (2006): Religion in Europe in the 21st Century: The Factors to take into Account. In: Archive European Sociological 47/2: 271-296. Davie, Grace (2008): From Believing without Belonging to Vicarious Religion: Understanding the Patterns of Religion in Modern Europe. In: Pollack/Olson (eds.): 165-176. Denz, Hermann (ed.) (2002): Die europäische Seele. Leben und Glauben in Europa. Wien. Dillon, Michelle (ed.) (2003): Handbook of the Sociology of Religion. Cambridge. Dobbelaere, Karel (1987): Some Trends in European Sociology of Religion. In: Sociological Analysis 48: 107137. Dobbelaere, Karel (2002): Secularization: An Analysis on three levels. Brussels. Dogan, Mattei/ Kazancigil, Ali, (eds.) (1994): Comparing Nations. Concepts, Strategies, Substance. Oxford. Felling, Albert/Peters, Jan/Schreuder, Osmund (1987): Religion im Vergleich: Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Niederlande. Frankfurt a. M. 48 Stolz (2007) suggests an alternative approach, which is also integrative in a detailed model based on action theory. He starts out from the determination of religious beliefs and practices at the micro level and considers the developments at the aggregate level as consequences of the individual processes. Stolz also points out that the pronounced mutual isolation of the three main approaches in the sociology of religion is relatively unproductive. In his opinion, the future lies in integrative explanatory models which can be tested empirically. 120 Gert Pickel Fenn, Richard (ed.) (2001): Sociology of Religion. Oxford. Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (1988): Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious Mobilization in American Cities. In: American Sociological Review 53: 41-49. Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (2003): The Dynamics of religious economies. In: Dillon (ed.): 96-109. Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (2006): The Churching of America 1576-2005: Winners and Losers in our Religious Economy. New Brunswick. Fox, Jonathan (2004): Religion, Civilization, and Civil War. Lanham. Fox, Jonathan (2007): Do Democracies have Seperation of Religion and State? In: Canadian Journal of Political Science 40/1: 1-25. Fox, Jonathan (2008): A World Survey of Religion and the State. Cambridge. Fox, Jonathan/Tabory, Ephraim (2008): Contemporary Evidence Regarding the Impact of State Regulation of Religion on Religious Participation and Belief. In: Sociology of Religion 69/3: 245-272. Franzmann, Manuel/Gärtner, Christel/Köck, Nicole (eds.) (2006): Religiosität in der säkularisierten Welt. Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungsdebatte in der Religionssoziologie. Wiesbaden. Froese, Paul/Pfaff, Steven (2001): Replete and desolate markets: Poland, East Germany and the New Religious Paradigm. In: Social Forces 80: 481-507. Froese, Paul/Pfaff, Steven (2005): Explaining a Religious Anomaly: A Historical Analysis of Secularization in Eastern Germany. In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 44/4: 397-422. Gabriel, Karl (ed.) (1995): Religiöse Individualisierung oder Säkularisierung. Biographie und Gruppe als Bezugspunkte moderner Religiosität. Gütersloh. Gill, Robin (2001): The Future of Religious Participation and Belief in Britain and Beyond. In: Fenn (ed.): 279292. Glock, Charles Y. (1954): Toward a typology of religious orientation. New York. Glock, CharlesY./Stark, Rodney (1965): Religion and Society in tension. Chicago. Haller, Max (1988): Grenzen und Variationen gesellschaftlicher Entwicklung in Europa - eine Herausforderung und Aufgabe für die vergleichende Soziologie. In: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 13/4: 5-19. Huber, Stefan (2003): Zentralität und Inhalt. Ein neues multidimensionales Messmodell der Religiosität. Opladen. Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1991): The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the Economics of Religion. In: Rationality and Society 3: 156-177. Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1992): Religious Market and the Economics of Religion. Social Compass 39: 123131. Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1998): Introduction to the Economics of Religion. Journal of Economic Literature 36: 1465-1496. Iannacone, Laurence R./Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (1997): Deregulation Religion: The Economics of Church and State. In: Economic Inquiry 35: 350-364. Inglehart, Ronald (1997): Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton. Inglehart, Ronald/Norris, Pippa (2003): Rising Tide. Gender Equality and cultural Change around the World. Cambridge. Jagodzinski, Wolfgang/Dobbelaere, Karel (1993): Der Wandel kirchlicher Religiosität in Westeuropa. In: Bergmann/Hahn/Luckmann (eds.): 69-91. Kallscheuer, Otto (ed.) (1996): Das Europa der Religionen. Ein Kontinent zwischen Säkularisierung und Fundamentalismus. Frankfurt/Main King, Gary/Keohane, Robert O./Verba, Sidney (1994): Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton. Land, Kenneth C./Deane, Glenn /Blau, Judith R. (1991): Religious pluralism and church membership in American cities, 1906. In: American Sociological Review 56: 237-249. Landman, Todd (2000): Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. An Introduction. London. Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Pickel, Gert/Pickel, Susanne (2009): Methoden der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft. Eine Einführung. Wiesbaden. Luckmann, Thomas (1967): The Invisible Religion. The problem of Religion in modern Society. New York. Luckmann, Thomas (1991): Die unsichtbare Religion. Frankfurt/M.. Martin, David (1978): A General Theory of Secularization. New York. Müller, Olaf (2008): Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: Was There a Re-Awakening after the Breakdown of Communism? In: Pollack/Olson (eds.): 63-92. Secularization as an European Fate? 121 Müller, Olaf/Pollack, Detlef (2008): Wie religiös ist Europa? Kirchlichkeit, Religiosität und Spiritualität in Westund Osteuropa. In: BertelsmannStiftung (ed.): 167-178. Müller, Olaf/Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (2002): Werte und Wertewandel religiöser Orientierungsmuster in komparativer Perspektive: Religiosität und Individualisierung in Ostdeutschland und Osteuropa. In: Brocker/Behr/Hildebrandt (eds.): 99-12.5 Norris, Pippa/Inglehart, Ronald (2004): Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics worldwide. New York. Pickel, Gert (1998): Religiosität und Kirchlichkeit in Ost- und Westeuropa. In: Pollack/Borowik/Jagodzinski (eds.): 55-85. Pickel, Gert (2001): Moralische Vorstellungen und ihre religiöse Fundierung im europäischen Vergleich. In: Pickel/Krüggeler (eds.): 105-134. Pickel, Gert (2009): Säkularisierung, Individualisierung oder Marktmodell? Religiöse Vitalität im europäischen Vergleich. Leipzig (unpublished Manuscript). Pickel, Gert/Krüggeler, Michael (eds.) (2001): Religion und Moral. Entkoppelt oder Verknüpft? Wiesbaden. Pickel, Susanne/Pickel, Gert/Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Jahn, Detlef (eds.) (2003): Methoden der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft – Neue Entwicklungen und Diskussionen. Wiesbaden. Pollack, Detlef (1998): Religiöser Wandel in Mittel- und Osteuropa. In: Pollack/Borowik/Jagodzinski (eds.): 1152. Pollack, Detlef (2001): Modifications in the religious field of Central and Eastern Europe. In: European Societies 3/2: 135-166. Pollack, Detlef (2003): Religiousness Inside and Outside the Church in Selected Post-Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In: Social Compass 50: 321-334. Pollack, Detlef (2006a): Secularization revisited – eine Meistererzählung auf dem Prüfstand. Frankfurt/Oder. Pollack, Detlef (2006b): Explaining religious vitality: Theoretical Considerations andempirical findings in Western and Eastern Europe. In: Franzmann/Gärtner/Köck (eds.): 83-104. Pollack, Detlef (2008): Religious Change in Europe: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Findings. In: Social Compass 55: 168-186. Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (2000): The Vitality of Religion-Church Integration and Politics in Eastern and Western Europe in Comparison. Arbeitsberichte des Frankfurter Institutes für Transformationsstudien 13/00. Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (2007): Religious Individualization or Secularization? Testing hypotheses of religious change – the case of Eastern and Western Germany. In: British Journal of Sociology 58/4: 603-632. Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (2008): Religious Individualization or Secularization: An Attempt to Evaluate the Thesis od Religious Individualization in Eastern and Western Germany. In: Pollack/Olson (eds.): 191-220. Pollack, Detlef/Borowik, Irena/Jagodzinski, Wolfgang (eds.) (1998): Religiöser Wandel in den postkommunistischen Ländern Ost- und Mitteleuropas. Würzburg. Pollack, Detlef/Olson, Daniel (eds.) (2008): The Role of Religion in Modern Societies. New York. Przeworski, Adam/Teune, Henry (1970): The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. Mallabar. Sherkat, Darren/Ellison, Christopher (1999): Recent Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion”. In: Annual Review of Sociology 25: 363-394. Stark, Rodney (1999): Secularization, R.I.P. In: Sociology of Religion 60: 249-273. Stark, Rodney/Bainbridge, Roger (1987): A Theory of Religion. New Brunswick. Stark, Rodney/Finke, Roger (2000). Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley. Stark, Rodney/Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1994): A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the „Secularization“ of Europe. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33: 230-252. Stolz, Jörg (2007): Explaining religiosity: A general sociological model. Lausanne. Stolz, Jörg (2008): Secularization theory and rational choice. An integration of micro- and macro-theories of secularization using the example of Switzerland. In: Pollack/Olson (eds.): 249-270. Stolz, Jörg (2009): Gods and Social Mechanisms. New Perspectives for an Explanatory Sociology of Religion. In: Cherkaoui/Hamilton (eds.): (in print). Swatos, William H./Olson, Daniel V. A. (2000): The Secularization Debate. Lanham. Tomka, Miklos (1995): The Changing Social Role of Religion in Eastern and Central Europe: Religion´s Revival and ist Contradictions. In: Social Compass 42: 17-26. Tomka, Miklos (2006): Is conventional Sociology of Religion able to deal with differences between Eastern and Western European developments? In: Social Compass 53: 251-265. Tomka, Miklos/Zulehner, Paul M. (1999): Religion in den Reformländern Ost(Mittel)Europas. Wien. Tomka, Miklos u.a. (2000): Religion und Kirchen in Ost(mittel)Europa: Ungarn, Litauen, Slowenien. Wien. 122 Gert Pickel Voas, David (2008): The Continuing Secular Transition. In: Pollack/Olson (eds.): 25-48. Voas, David,/Olson Daniel V.A./Crockett, Alasdair (2002): Religious Pluralism and Participation: Why Previous Research is Wrong? In: American Sociological Review 67: 212-230. Warner, Stephen (1993): Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States. In: American Journal of Sociology 9/5: 1044-1093. Zulehner, Paul M. (2002): Wiederkehr der Religion? In: Denz (ed.): 23-42. Zulehner, Paul M./Denz, Hermann (1993): Wie Europa lebt und glaubt. Europäische Wertstudie. Düsseldorf. Zulehner, Paul M./Tomka, Miklos/Naletova, Inna (eds.)(2008): Religionen und Kirchen in Ost(Mittel)europa. Entwicklungen seit der Wende. Ostfildern. Religious Oddities: Explaining the Divergent Religious Markets of Poland and East Germany1 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff 1. Introduction Over the past two decades a new paradigm within the sociology of religion has been amassing empirical support and theoretical refinement (Finke/Stark 1992; Iannaccone 1991; Jelen/Wilcox 1998; Gill 1998; Stark/Bainbridge 1987; Stark/Iannaccone 1994) while also garnering its share of criticism (Bruce 1999; Chaves/Gorski 2001; Lechner 1989; Olsen 1999). This attempt at a general theory has been described as offering “supply-side” or “rational choice” explanations of religious change and proposes an alternative to the traditional family of secularization theories (Gorski 2000). Advocates of the new paradigm have attempted to garner empirical support through a wide-ranging series of studies of religiosity in Western Europe (Jelen/Wilcox 1998; Stark/Iannaccone 1994) North America (Finke and Stark 1992) and South America (Gill 1998). Critics have offered case studies that attempt to disprove the predictions of the new theory (Bruce 1999; Lechner 1989; Olsen 1999) and appear “tempted at this stage to bow to historians such as Hugh McLeod, who argue that sociological explanation for such a broad phenomenon as religion over such a broad range of countries is impossible” (Bruce 1999: 115). Is a general theory of religion possible and is the new theoretical paradigm in religion leading towards a plausible general theory? Skeptics cite exceptions to the new paradigm’s predictions as evidence of its folly (Chaves/Gorski 2001) while advocates of the new general theory concede flaws but encourage critics “to publish improvements and friendly amendments, to join us in the quest for clear and rigorous theories of religion” (Stark/Bainbridge 1987: 53). At this point, whether a general theory of religion is possible remains an article of faith. And this faith (for or against general theory) guides a researcher’s decisions in how to interpret apparent deviations from the predictions of the theory. This paper investigates two cases, Poland and East Germany, which appear to contradict the simple core hypothesis of the new theoretical paradigm but asks whether these cases should be considered evidence that disprove the theory or instances that require an expanded understanding of the proposed theory. Post-communist Eastern Europe is becoming a hotbed of religious transformation. With dramatic changes in regulations on religious activity, this area of the world seems best suited for testing a general theory proposing that religiosity is a function of competition. Prominent theorists of the new paradigm Rodney Stark and Roger Finke summarize a core of their theory with the following hypothesis: To the extent that [religious] pluralism or [religious] regulation are adequate inferential measures of [religious] competition, the over- 1 Previous version published in Social Forces 124 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff all level of religiousness will be higher where pluralism is greater or where regulation is lower (Stark/Finke 2000: 297). Countries throughout Eastern Europe have experienced dramatic changes in laws governing religious life within the last century. Communist ruling parties officially promoted scientific atheism, and to varying extents, tried to eliminate or at least heavily regulate religious practices and institutions. With the collapse of Communist rule, official discouragement of religion vanished. Churches again enjoyed greater institutional freedom and greater space was opened up for popular participation in religion. In this situation, Stark and Finke’s general hypothesis would predict increases in religiosity, which correspond to the dramatic reductions in religious regulation. Therefore, their general theory can be simply tested in Eastern Europe by tracing changes in religiosity over the period of time that religious restrictions were lessened. Table 1: Religious Change from 1990 to 1996 Belarus Bulgaria East Germany Estonia Hungary* Latvia Lithuania Poland Russia Slovenia % change in people who attend church weekly % change in people who believe in God + 3.0 + 1.7 - 8.4 NA + 9.4 + 1.6 NA - 9.1 + 0.3 + 0.6 + 17.4 + 11.4 - 10.3 NA + 9.8 + 6.0 + 23.1 NA + 2.8 + 4.0 % change in people who consider themselves religious + 25.2 + 19.4 - 8.9 +12.5 + 13.5 + 8.8 NA -4.4 + 16.3 + 1.6 Source: World Values Survey; *Hungarian data shows % change between 1981 and 1990. In total, there are twenty-one countries in Eastern Europe and areas of the former Soviet Union that would fit our criteria of lessening their religious regulations in the aftermath of communism.2 Various sources (newspaper articles, eyewitness accounts, and qualitative research papers) indicate that religiosity has grown in most of these twenty-one regions, but we wish to make a comparison using a common reliable source. Table 1 includes indicators of religiosity on a sample of ten of these former-communist regions. Countries included in the sample simply reflect the availability of reliable longitudinal data from the World Values Survey.3 Indicators of church attendance, belief in God, and self identification as “religious” prove ideal measurements of how religiosity responded to the effects of reduced religious regulation throughout Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. Based 2 3 The population from which the sample was draw is Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Ukraine. Although we utilize various sources of data that are specific to Poland and East Germany throughout the paper, we feel that the World Values Survey (WVS) is one of the only sources of data from which researchers can make sound cross-national comparisons of religious variables. The Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research oversees the translation and administration of the WVS and the data collected is widely used by prominent researchers in the social scientific study of religion. Religious Oddities 125 on the new paradigm, we would expect that all indicators of religiosity would increase between 1990 and 1996. Different levels of religious growth may reflect differences in religious laws and levels of religious pluralism within each country. We will leave the investigation into this possibility aside for the present and report that the general trend of these ten countries supports the new hypothesis; in other words, 80 % of the cases follow the predicted path of increased religiosity. Nevertheless, two countries (Poland and East Germany) clearly buck the trend and exhibit decreases in religiosity. How should we interpret the deviation of these cases? A recent review of various research in religion concludes that “[t]he empirical evidence contradicts the claim that religious pluralism is positively associated with religious participation in any general sense” (Chaves/Gorski 2001). This conclusion was derived from the finding that cases exist where religious pluralism is seemingly high yet religiosity remains low. Therefore, critics maintain that the presence of instances which repudiate the predictions of the new paradigm indicate its ultimate failure. If we follow the logic of Chaves/Gorski, we must conclude that Stark and Finke’s predictions also fail in Eastern Europe because Poland and East Germany exhibit unpredicted changes in religiosity. But in this instance, the prediction was correct in eight out of the ten countries. In addition, advocates of the new theoretical paradigm in religion accept that sometimes their theory will require “improvements” and “amendments” (Stark/Bainbridge 1987: 53). In fact, general theory is valuable to sociological and historical research because it “reveals anomalies that lead to new questions, and creates conditions under which existing theories can be supplanted by superior ones” (Kiser/Hetcher 1998: 785). Therefore, it appears more profitable to utilize the advances of the new paradigm to theorize why Poland and East Germany deviate from their predicted paths and test these ideas using available information. In this sense, our efforts can be used to further a theory that already receives a preponderance of empirical support. The logic of inquiry that we pursue is to confront postulates drawn from a general theory of religion with an empirical investigation of seemingly anomalous cases. These are cases in which outcomes differ markedly from the direction predicted by the theory but are not numerous enough to refute it. The detailed analysis of anomalies may permit an expansion of the general theory by developing auxiliary propositions consistent with the core postulates of the theory. In this way, as part of a progressive research agenda, the theory’s range of explanation can be extended (Bradshaw/York 1991; Emigh 1997; Lakatos 1978; Kohn 1987). 2. Deductive theory In order to account for the experiences of Poland and East Germany, a general theory needs to specify under what circumstances the relaxation of religious regulation does not result in increases in religiosity. In fact, Stark and Finke maintain that “under special circumstances, conflict can substitute for competition in generating high levels of religiousness” (Stark/Finke 2000). And other sociologists of religion have observed that religious communities may serve as “free social spaces” for certain marginalized groups and for social and political movements that can be employed towards achieving instrumental ends (Sherkat/Ellison 1999:374-375). These “free spaces” may be conceived of as refuges from sur- 126 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff veillance and control. They are spheres that are fully or partially autonomous from the dominant regime and provide opportunities for members to develop and disseminate heterodox ideas (Evans/Boyte 1986; Polletta 1999; Tilly 2000). Research on social movements has likewise found that religious communities may offer resources that assist marginalized groups and facilitate movement mobilization. The role of black churches in the U.S. civil rights movement is well known (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984), but religious organizations have also proven important resources in a host of other settings including the Middle East (Denouex 1993; Foran 1994; Kurzman 1994), Latin America (Gill 1998), and socialist Eastern Europe (Johnston/Snow 1998; Pollack/Rink 1995). In some cases where the cultural values, norms and ideologies of minorities, dissident groups or subject populations are substantially different from politically dominant groups, official culture or public institutions, they may well turn to churches and religious communities. Such “free spaces” may offer several advantages to marginalized or heterodox groups. They may offer members opportunities for authentic ideological expression, spiritual fulfillment and psychological relief in an otherwise hostile environment. Also, they may help to sustain group identities, as for example when ethnic communities are linked to confessional groups. Such free spaces may provide the only chance for people to express their needs openly or to voice their grievances against the dominant order of things. Finally, these spaces may be sites where information and ideology can be exchanged, injustice frames can be defined, and protest mobilized. Therefore, we might expect religiosity to increase under circumstances in which churches serve as “free social spaces” or the organizational bases for resistance to external repression. This is the general meaning of Stark and Finke’s hypothesis that “even where competition is limited, religious firms can generate high levels of commitment to the extent that the firms serve as the primary organizational vehicles for social conflict” (Stark/Finke 2000: 284). In turn, we would expect religiosity to decline when churches cease to organize various opposition movements. But what determines whether a church will serve as a “free social space” or organization of social or political resistance? This depends mainly on a church’s association with disenfranchised groups. For instance, segregation in the American South led African-Americans to form and maintain their own churches. Although Protestant Christian theology originated in Europe, all-black Baptist churches in the South absorbed African-American culture to become a important source of black identity and organization. Because opposition to communist rule in Eastern Europe was predominantly nationalistic, we would expect churches with prior ties to nationalism or national culture to be the primary venues for covert nationalist organization. At this point we will introduce the term national church to refer to any religious firm that is closely associated with a nation’s cultural identity. Steve Bruce (1999: 116) hypothesizes that “religious diversity prevents any one religion becoming closely associated with national identity.” Therefore, only churches that enjoy little or no religious competition can become identified with a national culture. This brings us to our first proposition based on Bruce’s insight: Proposition 1: Only a religious firm that enjoys little or no competition from other churches will tend to become a national church. Religious Oddities 127 Past research has shown that monopoly churches, those with little competition, tend to be weak (Iannaccone 1991; Stark/Iannaccone 1994). This means that although monopoly churches enjoy high membership rates, members tend to have low levels of commitment. Therefore, we would expect that national churches will tend to be weak due to their favored position within their religious economy. But we also know that social groups will attempt to utilize the resources of religious firms in times of social conflict (Denouex 1993; Foran 1994; Gill 1998; Johnston/Snow 1998; Kurzman 1994; Pollack/Rink 1995). In turn, the new paradigm predicts that religious commitment will increase when churches serve as centers of political or social opposition. Therefore, we will expect national churches to thrive during national conflicts through their association with and contribution to a concerted nationalist effort. But what are the specific circumstances under which a national church will unite with nationalist forces? We propose the following: Proposition 2: National churches will serve as organizational vehicles for national conflict only when they have institutional autonomy from the state. We expect nationalist forces to utilize the resources of a national church in times of crisis because the church is closely associated with the national culture. But Proposition 2 recognizes that a national church must offer additional resources to nationalist groups that are independent of state institutions. If there is no real differentiation between a national church and its state, nationalist forces will simply attempt to exploit state resources because the church can offer nothing in addition to them. Also, nationalists in opposition to a state’s regime will not have access to church resources if the church is part of the state infrastructure. In circumstances where a national church has no or little organizational autonomy from the state, we can think of it as a state church. State churches have no material basis for autonomy from the state; for instance, the Orthodox Church was unable to secure independence from state institutions throughout its history (Chirot 1985: 188; Ramet 1998: 230). It is therefore a state church. In contrast, the Catholic Church developed its own administrative apparatus so that it always maintained a certain level of autonomy from state institutions even under the most oppressive regimes. But the Catholic Church may serve as a national church in many countries when it becomes closely associated with national culture. In sum, Proposition 2 holds that national churches will only be useful to nationalist forces when they are not state churches. In accord with our stated propositions, we expect that national churches in Eastern Europe will gain committed members when they become an organizational source for nationalistic opposition to communism (Proposition 2). But they will lose members and commitment after the fall of communism because they will no longer function as free social spaces and will return to their former monopoly status (Proposition 1). Therefore, decreases in religiosity under these circumstances would be consistent with the general logic of the new paradigm. We will now analyze the circumstances within Poland and East Germany to determine whether the general theory with the addition of our propositions provides a convincing explanation for their post-communist decreases in religiosity. 128 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff 3. Case analyses 3.1 Poland Poland’s recent religious history appears to contradict the predictions of the new religious paradigm on a number of counts. First, religiosity in Poland reached phenomenal heights under conditions of little or no religious pluralism. Second, as religious pluralism grew slightly following the fall of communism, levels of religiosity dropped. Both facts directly oppose the general causal model proposed by the new religious paradigm. When compared to a small sample of other Christian countries around the world, the intensity of Poland’s religious life is apparent (see Table 2). We have picked the United States, Italy, and Hungary as comparisons to demonstrate the vigor of Polish religiosity. The levels of religiosity in these comparison countries show approximately what the new paradigm would predict based on their respective levels of religious pluralism. The United States is a country with high religious pluralism and accordingly exhibits some of the highest levels of religiosity in the world (Stark/Iannaccone 1994). However, a comparison of Poland and the United States on indicators of religiosity yield extremely similar results. In fact, the percentage of Poles who consider themselves religious (95.3%) even outnumbers the percentage of religious Americans (83.8%). In comparison to Catholicism in Italy, the Polish Catholic Church similarly experiences monopolistic influences in its religious economy. As predicted by the new paradigm, Italy shows lower levels of religiosity than the United States due to a less competitive religious market place. However, Poland clearly exhibits much higher religiosity than Italy especially in terms of the number of individuals who attend church weekly and feel that religion is a “very important” part of their lives. Table 2: 1990 Indicators of Religiosity % of population … Poland United States Italy Hungary … stating that religion is “very important” to them 52.5 53.5 30.7 23.2 …who consider themselves religious 95.3 83.8 84.5 56.8 …who believe in God 96.6 96.0 89.9 65.4 …who attend church weekly 65.2 65.2 37.9 20.7 Source: World Values Survey Presently, Hungary provides an example of levels of religiosity one might expect from a country emerging from a communist regime that enforced the teaching of scientific atheism. Although Hungary’s levels of religiosity have grown dramatically following the fall of communism, they began at very low levels due to the intense regulation of religion under communism. Levels of religiosity in Poland under communism distinctly differ from the experience of Hungary and most other Eastern European countries. We can theorize that the Polish Catholic Church’s success under communism is the result of its role as a vehicle of opposition to communism. But based on our propositions, it would only be able to successfully fulfill this role as a national church. And the close affiliation of Catholicism and Polish nationalism is well documented. The central fact in the development of modern Polish nationalism is the century of partition from 25 November 1795 to the end of World War I. The partition not only colored Poland’s attitude toward the Religious Oddities 129 outside world, but it cemented its bond with Roman Catholicism (Ramet 1998: 93). In addition to its national affiliation, an important fact emerges concerning the Catholic Church of Poland. Namely, it always retained independence from state control simply because Poland underwent so many national reincarnations throughout the past two centuries. In fact, Polish Catholicism was a constant throughout centuries of unsuccessful attempts to establish a stable Polish state. Gellner (1995: 3) observed that. Poles used Catholicism because their enemies and neighbors on either side were non-Catholic, therefore being Catholic was an excellent definition of being Polish, and of course provided an admirable rival counterstate…during the days of Communist rule. Communists failed to repress religion in Poland from the beginning of their rule. While the Soviet Union and other communist run countries of Eastern Europe immediately reduced religious activity, Poland retained high levels of faith (around 80%) during the entire post-WWII period (Borowik, 1994:41). Conflicts within the post-WWII Polish Catholic Church regarding its intimate connection to Polish nationalism were put to rest by the arrival of Soviet-style communism which ultimately “ensured the perdurance of oppositionist nationalism on the part of the Church” (Ramet 1998:100). Under communism, the Polish political environment bifurcated into essentially two distinct camps – the communists vs. the Catholics. Thus in Poland, after the Stalinist period and following the Gomulka government’s recognition of the national function of the Polish Catholic Church, two relatively equal partial systems were created. This statement may seem paradoxical considering the objective inferiority to which the church was subjected by the dominant political powers. But from the social point of view, it managed to mark out a part of the social environment within definite boundaries and establish itself as a macrosystem capable of contesting the state system on equal terms, both at the symbolic level and that of social mobilization. (Borowik 1994:136). The Polish communists faced a national church of unprecedented power that Poles considered a fundamental aspect of their cultural identity. Other Eastern European countries that were historically Catholic (namely, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) did not contain the same intensity of national Catholic identity as Poland and consequently the Catholic Church in these countries suffered much greater attrition under their communist regimes (Ramet 1998). Unlike most communist regimes of Eastern Europe, “Polish communists from the beginning ruled out as unrealistic any notion of drawing the Catholic Church away from communion with the Vatican” (Ramet 1998: 90). Therefore, we can identify a mechanism consistent with Proposition 2 that explains how “conflict can substitute for competition in generating high levels of religiousness”. Namely, due to the symbiosis of national and religious interests in Poland, the Catholic Church became an important vehicle to safely house political opposition to the communist regime.4 Religiosity soared in Poland because it embodied the only means for spiritual, nationalistic, political, and intellectual expression outside the dictates of communist ideolo4 National churches that did not serve as resources for communist opposition were churches that had no previous autonomy from state control, i.e. state churches. A clear example of this is the Russian Orthodox Church. Clearly, Russian culture identified with the Orthodox Church, but the Church had never attained institutional autonomy from the Russian State. It had been the “handmaid of the tsars” from 1721 to 1917 (Ramet 1998: 229). After the revolution, the Russian communists simply took control of the Orthodox Church like it did all other state institutions. In this sense, the Russian Orthodox could never serve as an opposition to communist rule and submitted accordingly. 130 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff gy. In fact, Maryjane Osa (1997: 339) argues that the Polish Catholic Church not only housed nationalist activists but actually helped to create the ideological position of Solidarity and “paved the way for a movement that transcends social boundaries.” Polish Catholicism became the “symbol of a solid nation against an atheistic communist regime” (Osa 1997:339). After the fall communism, the role of the Catholic Church changed. If we continue to test the hypothesis that conflict inflates religiosity, then we would expect that religiosity will decline in the absence of conflict. Table 1 indicates this decline in religiosity. A new spirit of democracy in Poland has left the Catholic Church in search of its political and national voice. Having dispelled communist rule, the public is less trustful and less obedient to the Church. In 1989, 87.8 % of Poles expressed confidence in the Catholic Church, but public confidence fell dramatically after the end of communism to 73.5 % in 1990 and again to 52.9 % in 1991 (Borowik 1994: 141). These changes in public opinion have surprised Church leaders who expected to be rewarded with political and legal power for their role in unseating communism. One Polish journalist explained that in seeking more political power the Catholic Church “burned its fingers, as we know, and it gave up part of these aspirations” (Time International 1999). With newfound freedoms of democratic rule, Poles embraced the ideology of democratic rights over the hierarchical traditions of their church. From a country that contains one of the highest percentages of faithful Catholics in the world, the findings in Table 3 are surprising. Table 3: Choice vs. Obedience Area of Choice Politics Birth Control Child Rearing Divorce Interruption of Pregnancy Everyone should choose for themselves what they believe to be appropriate 93.0 81.7 79.7 79.1 75.7 Everyone should be obedient to the Catholic Church Hard to say 3.4 15.4 17.6 18.1 20.3 3.6 2.9 2.7 2.8 4.1 Source: Borowik 1994 In 1994, Not only did overwhelming numbers of Poles (93%) favor individual choice over Church law on political matters but over three-fourths of the population believed that individuals need to decide for themselves whether divorce or the interruption of a pregnancy is appropriate. Church doctrines clearly take a back seat to individual choice even among the world’s most avid Catholics. By 1994, many Poles (44.4%) felt that the Catholic Church had amassed too much authority after communism (Borowik 1994). These data indicate that high religiosity in Poland was truly an expression of opposition to communist rule and that given the option Poles would prefer self-government to any other political or religious hierarchy. With the arrival of new democratic ideals, we would expect to see religious pluralism increase in Poland. After the fall of communism, very active proselytizing groups entered the Polish religious market. In a survey of 79 university students from Warsaw, 29 % of the students reported having a friend who was a Hare Krishna and 28 % reported personally knowing a Jehovah’s Witness (Mertus/Frost 1999). Now these numbers reflect a 131 Religious Oddities population (young and urban) that is most heavily recruited by these religious cults and therefore they are higher than we would expect for the general population. Nevertheless, other data confirm that both Jehovah’s Witnesses and Hare Krishnas are recruiting a substantial number of Polish citizens. Table 4: 1993 Membership in New Religious Movements Jehovah’s Witnesses Hare Krishna Mormons Scientology Children of God Baha’I Moonies Total Poland Romania Hungary 107,876 50,000 27,800 15,000* 900 200 1,500 1,100 5,000 85 601 123,861 50,801 55 200 35,655 Czech and Slovak Republics 25,435 900 59 26,394 Bulgaria 265 300 400 2,000 112 300 3,377 Source: East West Ministry Report 1993; * This number reflects the Hare Krishna’s own estimate of their size in Poland; but Hare Krishnas are notorious for over-estimating their size so we expect that the true number is far below this. In contrast, other religious cults sometimes underreport their size due to fear of persecution. Compared to other Eastern European countries, New Religious Movements in Poland have acquired substantially more adherents. On the other hand, mainline Protestant missionaries have been reluctant to pursue the opportunities of Poland’s newfound freedoms apparently daunted by the overwhelming size of the Polish Catholic Church. In fact, Poland has a lower proportion of Protestant missionaries for their population than any other Eastern European country for which we have data (see Table 5). Table 5: Protestant Missionaries in 1994 Country Estonia Hungary Bulgaria Czech Republic Population per Missionary 35,556 48, 545 110,000 118,506 Country Romania Albania Russia Poland Population per Missionary 140,667 259,452 293,149 493,506 Source: East-West Ministry Report 1994 In sum, the end of communist rule produced a new level of religious competition that had not previously existed in Poland. There is also evidence that proselytizing groups have met with moderate success even though mainline Protestant groups have not forcefully entered the Polish religious economy. Nevertheless, religiosity as a whole in Poland is on the decline. In keeping with the expectations of the new paradigm, one must conclude that the end of political repression (conflict) has had a greater negative impact on levels of religiosity in Poland than the positive impact of recent increases in religious pluralism. National conflict allowed the Catholic Church of Poland to attain the highest levels of religiosity in all of Europe. Nearly all (97.6%) of Polish adults surveyed in 1990 reported that they had been 132 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff raised in a religious household. Table 6 compares this number to other Eastern European countries and former Soviet states. Table 6: Percent of population raised in a religious home. Country Poland Slovakia Slovenia Hungary Lithuania E Germany % raised religious 97.6 77.3 74.6 69.0 66.0 48.1 Country Czech Republic Bulgaria Latvia Belarus Russia % raised religious 38.9 38.0 29.1 19.4 18.7 Source: World Values Survey 1990. Children growing up in Poland under communist rule universally were instilled with religious teachings and practices. And although we have seen recent decreases in the number of religious Poles and citizen’s confidence in the church, we cannot forget that “trust in the Church in Poland is near that given to the Church in religious institutions in Ireland (46.2%), Northern Ireland (41.3 %) and the USA (38.3%)” (Borowik 1994:248).5 Therefore, the decrease in the religiosity of Poland should be viewed as leveling out from excessive levels generated by the unique situation of the Church in the communist era. In this case, Poland is in fact returning to levels of religiosity expected by the new paradigm and not, as superficially appears, deviating from the predictions of the new paradigm. Poland’s excessive religiosity (with more than 95% of the population as steadfast Catholics) could not possibly increase even under the most active religious competition because it had reached a level of saturation. In the end, the Polish religious economy is returning to expected levels. In fact, we would predict an ongoing drop in religiosity unless new levels of religious pluralism appear. 3.2. East Germany Like Poland, East German religiosity has fallen since the end of communist rule. Will the East Germany case fit the same explanatory scheme presented above? We will first determine what characteristics are shared by both cases before outlining their obvious differences. Our analysis will focus chiefly on the Lutheran Church, the largest religious community in the former GDR and the one for which the most reliable data is available. Thomas Nipperdey (1989:16) notes that by the 19th century “[German] nationalism as a belief with socially integrating character increased; cultural Protestantism became national Protestantism.” The main nationalist parties in German politics in the 19th century through 1933 almost always claimed to be motivated by Christian cultural values against papism and atheistic socialism. Indeed, with the support of the Protestant nationalists, Bis5 Ireland’s religiosity resembles the very high levels of religiosity in Poland for similar reasons. Although the Irish Catholic Church holds a religious monopoly it still inspires awesome commitment with 80% of Irish going to church on a weekly basis (WVS). Stark/Finke (2000: 241) observe that “the celebrated Irish piety…arose subsequent to the Potato Famine, when the Catholic Church became a primary vehicle for Irish nationalism resisting external domination”. Religious Oddities 133 marck even launched a "Kulturkampf" against the Catholics. Right wing politics often had the blessing of Lutheran Church officials. After WWII, of course, the church renounced nationalism and its deep complicity in the Hitler regime. Still, the church in the GDR remained associated with "value-conservative" (Wertkonservativ) politics and bourgeois national culture. This accounts, in part, for the severe repression against the clergy in the 1950s who were accused of being agents of "Western imperialism" and "great German nationalism". Churchgoers throughout this period were always more likely to endorse unification as a desirable goal and many conservative Christians fled to the West in the years up to 1961. Those who remained endured the regime by retreating from its values into the church and the traditions of German culture (Flam 1998). Although the position of the churches remained politically marginal, they were tolerated as cultural “outsiders” in the GDR so long as they posed no direct threat to the state (Neubert 1996). After closer proximity to the state in the late 1960s, 1970s, and in the late 1980s the church began to steer a more independent course and to criticize the regime more directly (Nipperdey 1988). In response, the regime began to try to co-opt national heroes and issues as part of its new cultural orientation towards "Tradition und Erbe" (Tradition and Legacy). The state even officially endorsed the grand celebration of the "Lutherjahr" in 1983 (500 year anniversary of Luther's birth) in an effort to co-opt the national issue. This was incredible, because Luther had previously been denounced as a reactionary nationalist. Based on Proposition 2 we would expect that German nationalists would utilize their national church as a resource for anti-Communist organization. Although the overall level of popular religious involvement was much lower in the East German Lutheran Church than in the more independent-minded Polish Catholic Church, East German religious organizations were also able to shield cultural and political nonconformity under their roofs. And as East-West relations between the two Germanys improved in the 1970s additional space for independent church initiatives opened up. As a result, the churches in East Germany not only were the sole organizations independent of direct state regulation, they were also a significant source of social resources. Because ties of communication and financial assistance to Western churches and religious communities were preserved, East German churches had access to information and external sources of funding. As the dissident pastor Rainer Eppelmann explained: With the construction of the Wall, I know directly that the Lutheran Church established a regular network of contacts between Eastern and Western congregations...there were a few cases of congregations in which that was constant, where such contact was active for the whole period from 1961 to 1989.6 Direct Western assistance to the Lutheran Church over the forty years of GDR socialism was worth more than 2 billion deutschmarks (Maser 1995:318-319, 578). These funds replaced the church taxes and mandatory contributions that the churches had relied upon before the Communist era. The funds supported the salaries of clergymen, the upkeep of churches and the creation of a host of cultural and social welfare institutions under religious administration. In effect, religious involvement in East Germany was generously subsidized by West German contributions. Early in the dictatorship, the church was a refuge for conservative values, traditional culture, and for highly circumscribed forms of political dissent. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, pressure from rank-and-file church members, especially in the Lutheran Church, 6 See interview with Eppelmann, G.D.R. Oral History Project, Hoover Institution Archives, pp. 7-8 134 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff led to the growing engagement of religiously based groups in pacifist, environmental and human rights issues (Fricke 1984; Neubert 1998; Ramet 1991). Although Church officials attempted to contain this activity and to redirect it into less confrontational channels, successful mobilization by activists within the Church steadily increased the space within the organization that dissidents could occupy. Many young Church members were not necessarily deeply religiously because they mainly joined the Church as a way of getting involved in an alternative culture or else address social issues. Rostock pastor Joachim Gauck concedes that there was an element of opportunism in opposition groups’ relations with the Church because “Religious things could not be forbidden. Protest meetings would have been forbidden and so everything had a religious character”. 7 These subsidies and the goods they provided offered substantial incentives in a society in which all other significant financial and organizational resources were controlled by the socialist regime. This also meant that the church could be supported internally by voluntary contributions by members, rather than the state-imposed church taxes applied to registered Christians in West Germany. And because of its de facto autonomy as the largest religious organization and the greatest recipient of hard currency donations, the Lutheran Church offered alternative careers as clergymen or social workers for non-conformists, pacifists and dissidents who were unable to attend university or unwilling to work for the state. The churches also had sheltered spaces and resources that could be used by dissident or activist groups for holding meetings and producing newsletters and pamphlets. Indeed, by the late 1980s, the Lutheran Church had become a haven for politically minded social activists, environmentalists and pacifists (Ramet 1991; Neubert 1998). Young people, in particular, came to the church out of despair with mainstream society and the chance for freer, more genuine expression. For them, the church represented either a strategy of “inner emigration” or a chance to express voice against an unjust regime. Within the church-based alternative political culture, social movement activism, the publication of samiszdat newsletters and organizing protests became increasingly common by the late 1980s. In effect, the churches became the largest social niche in a “society of niches” (Nischengesellschaft) -- a society characterized by widespread withdrawal from public life and official culture. In accord with Proposition 2, we find that because German dissidents identified with the Lutheran Church they utilized the Church’s organizational resources to oppose communist rule. But based on the predictions of the new paradigm, we would also expect that religiosity would inflate during this period of conflict; this did not occur. In fact, religious membership dropped following the rise of communism. In 1964 only about 60% remained in a church and by 1989 only about 30% of the population remained within a church (Nowak 1996: 665-666). Why didn’t the East German Lutheran Church capitalize on national conflict like the Polish Catholic Church? First, the communists successfully weakened all church groups in East Germany. They vigorously implemented discrimination against active Christians, anti-clerical and atheistic propaganda, the imprisonment and harassment of active clergy, the suppression of the church-based youth movement, and the forced introduction of a socialist coming-of-age ceremony (Jugendweihe) in the place of Christian confirmation. All of these helped to dis7 See interview with Joachim Gauck, G.D.R. Oral History Project, Hoover Institution Archives p. 17. Religious Oddities 135 rupt the religious cultural milieu and depress identification with the churches (Maser 1999, 1996, 1992; Pollack 1994). By 1989 only about 15% of children were baptized in East Germany (Hartmann/Pollack 1998:32), marking a remarkable decline in what Iannaccone (1990) has called stocks of “religious human capital” (see also Table 5). At the close of the communist era a prominent religious scholar could declare that, “The territory of the former GDR is among the most de-churched and religiously de-socialized regions of Europe” (Nowak 1996: 665; see also Maser 1999). In order to persist with semi-autonomous status throughout the communist era, the Lutheran Church was forced to make dramatic concessions that may have weakened its standing as a champion of a national culture already discredited by the Nazi legacy. In 1969 East German Lutheran Churches were compelled to sever organizational ties with the Evangelical Church Association (EKD), the nation-wide Lutheran Church association, and form their own Union of the Evangelical Church in the GDR (BEK). Although this meant breaking off formal ties with their West German co-religionists, in practice the BEK was able to retain significant organizational autonomy within socialist society and valuable financial and personal ties with Western churches. In exchange, the Lutheran Church in the GDR agreed to comply with the political directives of the regime and the goals of socialist society. In 1971 the BEK promulgated the “Church in Socialism” doctrine that declared “we do not want to be a church alongside or against socialism, but a church in socialism” (Maser 1992:492). This controversial doctrine promised loyalty to the state in exchange for toleration. The doctrine became official state policy in 1978 when the Communist regime reached a formal agreement with the Church. Although the Polish Catholic Church cooperated with the communist regime in order to avoid overt antagonism, it never officially made concessions as damaging to its political independence as the “Church in Socialism” doctrine of East Germany. Although East Germany nationalists continued to use the Lutheran Church as a mechanism of underground opposition to communism, the official stance of the Lutheran Church drove away potential members who may have used church membership as an expression of national opposition to communism. Therefore, religiosity did not improve under communism as it did in Poland and the East German communist regime succeeded in co-opting the Lutheran Church just enough to undermine its legitimacy as a popular, patriotic alternative to communism. Although the East German Lutheran Church failed to generate the same kind of national religious fervor as the Polish Catholic Church, its experience resembles that of many of the main churches of Eastern Europe under communism (Ramet 1998). The Eastern European communists were generally successful at weakening mainstream churches and the Polish Catholic Church remains a unique case. And as argued above, the unique circumstances of the Polish Catholic Church under communism explain its current decreases in religiosity. But the East German drop in religiosity cannot be explained for the same reasons. According to the new paradigm we would certainly expect the East German religious economy to act like those of its Eastern European neighbors following the lifting of communist religious restrictions. Nevertheless, in the decade of the 1990s the Lutheran Church in the former GDR has lost about 1% of its membership per year (between 200-250,000 members), reaching a peak of 2.5% in 1992 – a rate percentage comparable to the worst years of communist repression of religions during the 1950s (Hartmann/Pollack 1998). That is not to say that there was no 136 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff increase at all in religious involvement, only that the increase failed to offset the attrition of members from the traditional churches. There is some evidence that as sanctions against religious participation disappeared and wider religious pluralism became available, a modest increase in religious activity among some East Germans occurred. In 1991, for example, about 30% of children in East Germany were baptized, about double the percentage in 1989 (Hartmann/Pollack 1998:32). Although the flight from the church has been partially offset by attracting new members, these replacements hardly undo the substantial attrition of membership. In 1991 the Lutheran Church in the former East Germany gained about 24,000 new members but lost about 82,000 (Hartmann/Pollack 1998). One might account for the decline in terms of the well-known out-migration of East Germans to the West, but the rate of leaving the Church is substantially higher than those leaving the new federal states of the East. The peak years of out-migration (1989-1992) are not identical to those of church membership decline (1992-1993) (Datenreport 1999:51; Hartmann/Pollack 1998:28). Moreover, out-migrants tended to be younger persons – in 1989-1990, for example the average age of an out-migrant was 27 years (Ramet 1991:304) – exactly those who were less likely to have been Church members in the first place. Protestant Church officials were fearful that they would soon be losing members to new religious movements, but these too have failed to win many converts in Eastern Germany. What then accounts for the seeming disinterest of East Germans in religion and their tendency – in contrast to other societies in the region – to sever ties to the church? East Germans clearly rate lower than many of their Eastern European neighbors in measures of religiosity, but how do they compare with the West Germans with whom they are now politically unified? Unified Germany does not exhibit high levels of religiosity – a 1996 church census, for example, found weekly attendance rates of 16% for German Catholics and 5% for Protestants (Datenreport 1999:173-5) – but even so church going rates are substantially lower in the former GDR. In West Germany, about 80% of the population are members of churches or religious communities, versus about 30% in East Germany. In 1996 63% of West Germans considered religion important to their well being while only about a quarter of East Germans thought the same (Table 7). Fewer than 25% of East Germans attend church at least once per month (Datenreport 1999:533). Indeed, fully 80% of East Germans aged 13-21 reported have no connection at all to the church, while only 10% of their Western counterparts reported no connection (Schafers 1998). Table 7: Change in Indicators of Religiosity for East and West Germany % of population … East Germany 1990 1996 West Germany 1990 1996 … stating that religion is “very important” to them …who consider themselves religious …who believe in God 15.5 6.2 37.7 27.4 36.3 27.4 13.3 4.9 12.6 15.3 64.6 63.0 77.6 70.5 17.9 13.5 Source: World Values Surveys 1990 and 1996. …who attend church weekly Religious Oddities 137 What accounts for the failure of pluralism to stimulate increased religious involvement after 1989? With the collapse of the Wall and a Western-led unification process, a new political and institutional order was imposed in the former GDR. Democracy and the market economy offered much greater room for individual freedom, personal choices, and the pursuit of personal interests. There was also much less certainty for ordinary people, who faced high unemployment rates and greater economic and social uncertainty. One might expect surging religious involvement. Yet with the end of the Communist dictatorship, many of the special political and social functions of the church in the GDR prior to 1990 that derived from its role as the only (semi) autonomous institution in a one-party state disappeared. The special position of the church as an alternative to the official institutions lost its salience, as did the selective incentives that it had offered disaffected GDR citizens. As in Poland, religious intensity may have declined as people who were involved with churches chiefly for political reasons or to register cultural disapproval of socialist society found other outlets for their interests or else were more satisfied with post-Communist conditions. Another factor may be that with the GDR’s dissolution and its merger with the Federal Republic religious life came under new forms of state regulation that had deleterious effects on religiosity. The Lutheran Church in the East (BEK) was dissolved and merged into the Evangelical Church Association (EKD) of the Federal Republic. In addition to the transfer of Western administrative norms and regulations to East German churches at a time when East Germans felt “colonized” by the unification process, churches and clergymen were now more integrated into a full range of social institutions that some East Germans opposed. Unification also meant compulsory religious instruction in the schools, pastoral duties in the military and a considerable rise in the income of the clergy. Unification of church structures proved more contentious and damaging for Lutherans than for the Catholic Church of the GDR which had never completely established independence from the international or German Catholic organization. But the most damaging feature of unification may have been the introduction of mandatory church taxes for registered members of recognized religious organizations under German federal law. While church membership in the GDR might have been politically costly in terms of career advancement, access to higher education and the like, it did not impose any direct economic costs on its members. Contributions to the church by congregants were entirely voluntary and a range of church activities was effectively subsidized by Western donations and subsidies. Following unification, however, East German churches fell under the same laws governing church membership that obtained in the FRG, namely that those people registered as members of an approved denomination must pay a stateadministered tax on their income that is used to support religious institutions and supports local congregations. This alone may be the most significant factor in accounting for the hemorrhaging of church membership, as potential adherents might be deterred from joining churches and marginal members provided with an incentive to resign their church membership rather than face mandatory taxation. Another factor that undercuts effective religious pluralism in post-Communist East Germany is that the German state administers religious affairs to a far greater extent than is the case in highly pluralistic religious economies. The state actively regulates which sects or religious communities can be officially registered and provides subsidies to support cultural and charitable activities by the recognized churches. Recently, this has provoked conflicts 138 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff with some new religious movements such as the Scientologists who found themselves prohibited from declaring themselves a religious sect in the Federal Republic. Likewise, government agencies and political parties have also made public efforts to protect the traditional churches (Protestant, Catholic) from competition with new religious groups and sects. This too, may have had the effect of dampening religious intensity by narrowing supply in the marketplace. A third factor in declining interest in religion may be that the moral standing of the churches was damaged by revelations of political wrongdoing after unification. Initially, the Lutheran Church was lauded for its role in helping to initiate the demonstrations that led the peaceful mass demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden and East Berlin and for helping to negotiate the Communist surrender of power. Some even spoke of the transition in East Germany as a “Protestant revolution” (Neubert 1990). However, investigations of political wrongdoing after 1990 revealed to the public that a significant number of clergymen cooperated with regime and served as Stasi-informants. Historians pointed out the ways in which church officials had generally attempted to obstruct the activities of church-based activist groups and how small the Christian activist milieu actually was (Dietrich/Schwabe 1994; Pollack 1994). In the city of Leipzig, a center of church-based dissent, less than ten percent of pastors harbored dissident groups – nearly the same percent that served as secret police informants (Findeis/Pollack/Schilling 1994: 254). The results of a 1992 survey of 385 East German Lutherans and 550 former and nonchurch members commissioned by the Association of Evangelical (Lutheran) Churches (EKD) to investigate declining religious involvement generally confirm our hypotheses (see Engelhardt et al., 1997). When those East Germans who left the church were asked to list their reasons, only 3% reported that they had found another religious conviction while 46% reported that they did not wish to pay church taxes (Engelhardt 1997: 400). East Germans were far more likely than their West German counterparts to report feeling no religious or spiritual attachments or to be convinced atheists (Engelhardt 1997: 413). Fewer East Germans also reported having had any exposure to new religious movements or Asian religions or interest in developing a new religious attachment. When asked to evaluate the role of the churches in the GDR about the same percentage (41%) admired the role of the church for supporting calls for political change as condemned it (39%) for being too accommodating to the state (416). Perhaps East Germans are avoiding churches because of a current infatuation with culturally alternative lifestyles. Yet, survey evidence shows that socialist values and collectivist political ideals remain strong in the East Germany (Datenreport 1999; Weil/Huffman/Gautier 1993). Instead, the existing low levels of religious human capital in East Germany at the end of the communist era (in 1989 the baptism rate was 15% according to Hartmann/Pollack 1998) help to account for why new religious movements have attracted so little interest in the former GDR. In addition, the Lutheran Church has undergone dramatic changes, many of which are distasteful to its traditional members. In the end, the East German religious marketplace is desolate, poorly serving a public disenchanted with the old and unfamiliar with the new. Religious Oddities 4. 139 Discussion The new paradigm’s approach to analyzing religion generally focuses its attention on the supply of religion, with special attention to the degree of religious pluralism, or diversity, and regulation in the religious marketplace. Where a wide range of religious goods provided by a variety of organizations and entrepreneurs are available, people are expected to be more religious. In times of strict regulation, people are expected to be less religious. Communists throughout Eastern Europe attempted to undermine religious belief and replace it with a faith in scientific atheism (Kaariainen 1989). Their success in coercing or convincing people to ascribe to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine can be measured, in part, by the levels of atheism throughout the 20th Century. Poland never had more that 3 percent of its population profess to being atheist at any time in the 1900s while East Germans have been getting progressively more atheistic since 1900; 9 percent of East Germans professed atheism in 1970 (Barrett 1988) and by 1996 over 25 percent of East Germans considered themselves atheists (World Values Survey). Differing rates of atheism in Poland and East Germany reflect the inability of the Polish State to assail the authority and independence of the Catholic Church compared to the GDR. It also suggests that the relative economic success and stability of the communist regime in the GDR, compared with the turbulence and repeated economic crises in Poland, may have undercut attachments to socialism and its official doctrine on religion (Ekiert 1996). Our analysis suggests changes in the supply of religious goods within East Germany and Poland after 1989 can account for the current drop of religiosity in both countries.8 With the collapse of communism and the transition to democracy a new political and institutional order came into effect. This system offered much greater room for individual freedom, personal choices, and the pursuit of material interests. In effect, this meant growing pluralism in social life. For Polish Catholics, newfound democratic freedoms replaced their former surrogate “free space” within the Catholic Church. In fact, surveys show that Poles have more trust today in their political institutions than the Catholic Church (Table 3). Because the Polish Catholic Church can no longer offer the same incentives for membership and commitment overall religiosity declines; the change in the supply explains the drop in religiosity. Although there is evidence of growing membership in new religious movements in Poland, this does not counterbalance the current drop in Catholicism. The levels of commitment to Catholicism were so high in Poland due to the Catholic Church’s role as the sole political, social and cultural alternative to communism, that these rates had nowhere to go but down following the fall of communism. As the new paradigm predicts, a monopoly church (national church) should not be able to retain high levels of commitment in the absence of conflict. In East Germany declining involvement in voluntary associations has not paralleled steeply declining religious involvement. Although there are some indications of an apparent erosion of social capital in Eastern Germany during the last decade when compared with 8 Our analyses do not rule out the possibility that shifts in demand also impact levels of religiosity; for instance, individuals may learn to dislike religion after years of instruction in atheism. Still, regulations on religious supply coupled with forceful anti-religious propaganda may be seen to produce anti-religious preferences or, in other words, shifts in demand. Therefore, we have decided to focus on what we see as the primary source of religious change, namely, the supply of religion. 140 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff the West (Datenreport 1999; Padgett 1999; Schwenk 1995), surveys indicate that after 1990 East Germans shifted their involvement from churches, political parties and social movement organizations to sports clubs, professional associations, and charitable organizations. Table 8: Change in East German Volunteer Membership Associations Church Sports Arts Union Political Party Environmental Professional Charity Other % active member in voluntary association 1990 8.5 11.2 3.6 10.3 5.7 1.9 2.5 4.3 3.7 1996 7.7 21.4 8.9 7.8 3.0 1.2 4.4 6.7 7.3 Source: World Values Surveys 1990 and 1996. Data from Table 8 suggest that churches are increasingly competing for membership with a host of new opportunities for personal fulfillment and recreational activities. Where once the churches offered the only opportunities for social involvement outside the supervision of the party, after 1989 a host of new ones became available. With the collapse of the communist regime, the churches lost their functions as social and political alternatives to the system. There appears to be a clear relationship between the introduction of the West German church tax policy to the East and the flood of church resignations. Nevertheless, there is an interesting paradox: Before 1989 Lutheran Church membership in the GDR was higher than after 1989, but there were very few new members. From the 1970s on no more than 5,000 new members per year entered the church. After 1989, however, while many more left the Church than entered it, the number of new members increased enormously, largely owing to the conversion or baptism of adults and their active entry into the Church (see Table 9). Table 9: Baptisms in the Lutheran Church in East Germany Year 1989 1991 1992 1993 Percent of Newborns Baptized 14.6 29.4 28.3 25.1 Source: Hartmann and Pollack 1998: 32. This had been a far more rare phenomenon before 1989. It is tempting for Protestant church officials in East Germany to blame declining membership on the legacy of socialism’s antireligious policies and rapid secularization. But we think that there is stronger evidence to support the hypothesis that the transfer of Western church regulations and institutions to the East, particularly the imposition of religious taxes and other policies undercut the freedom Religious Oddities 141 of religious choice. Some Protestant theologians blame a more individualistic orientation and moral relativism for declining interest in established churches. But owing to the low level of religious human capital stocks in East Germany, new religious movements have not found the former GDR particularly fertile ground for expansion. The best hope for the established churches in East Germany will be to continue to encourage new members and to provide new services to existing members to make the expense of church membership worthwhile. This will mean that the churches will have to respond to pressure to provide a religious message that resonates with East Germans and to become more entrepreneurial in the active cultivation of religious clienteles. 5. Conclusion Through the use of deductive methods and detailed case analyses this paper attempts to provide individual explanations of anomalous cases yet remain consistent with the new paradigm. Anomalies are opportunities to explore, revise and amend general theories thereby extending the explanatory range of the theory while still being consistent with the core proposition of the theory. In this instance, the new paradigm offers that religious commitment should grow when religious firms actively compete to offer the best incentives for membership. Under communism, churches were restricted in their activities and therefore were unable to freely recruit members; in addition, the communist state offered incentives not to participate in religious activities (Kaariainen 1989). Therefore, the new paradigm predicts that with the end of communist rule churches will successfully reassert their energies to increase membership. This appears to have occurred throughout most of Eastern Europe (Ramet 1998). The two cases analyzed in this paper do not follow this trend; religiosity drops in both. Ultimately, we conclude that this does not undermine the premise of the new paradigm because the dominant churches in both Poland and East Germany were not able to offer better incentives for membership in the post-communist era. Both the Polish Catholic Church and the German Lutheran Church are national churches in their respective countries. As such, we expected them (Proposition 2) to serve as sources of national opposition to communist rule. In both cases they did, although to varying degrees of success. The Catholic Church of Poland was synonymous with Polish nationalism under communism and subsequently spearheaded the Solidarity movement. This inflated levels of religiosity due to the popularity of Polish nationalism. Commitment to the Polish Catholic Church was replete under communism and the fall of communism removed an important incentive to Church membership, namely, the oppositional character of religious belief. The Polish Catholic Church can no longer offer social and political autonomy from communism in a post-communist world and we see religiosity dropping accordingly. Similarly, the Lutheran Church also lost some of its attractiveness after communism. Like the Polish Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church as a national church helped to oppose communist rule. Nevertheless, the devastation of WWII and acts of collaboration with the communist regime reduced the Lutheran Church’s effectiveness as a vehicle of opposition. Following communism we find that the reunification of East and West Germany has had an overall negative impact on East Germany Lutheran membership. Newly imposed 142 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff church taxes and various changes in church institutions have disenchanted traditional East German Lutherans. In addition, new religious movements have encountered resistance by officials and have been unable to make effective inroads to East Germans. This has left the East German religious landscape a desolate region. We expect that the replete religious market of Poland and the desolate religious landscape of East Germany will eventually approach one another. Polish Catholics have begun to investigate their new democratic freedoms and many may experiment with secular alternatives to religious commitment while East Germans may, with time, find incentives to examine the offerings of new religious movements and a renewed Lutheran Church. In the end, we see that the unique religious histories of Poland and East Germany can be better understood using the new religious paradigm and we expect both countries to follow trajectories consistent with the theory’s predictions. 6. References Barrett, James (1988): World Christian Encyclopedia. Borowik, Irena (1997): Institutional and Private Religion in Poland 1990-1994. In: Borowik/Babinski (eds.)(1997). Borowik, Irena/Babinski, Grzegorz (eds.)(1997): New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe. Krakow. Bradshaw, York/Wallace, Michael (1991): Informing Generality and Explaining Uniqueness: The Place of Case Studies in Comparative Research. In: International Journal of Comparative Sociology 32/1-2: 154-171. Bruce, Steve (1999): Choice and Religion. Oxford. Chaves, Mark/Gorski, Phillip (2001): Religious Pluralism and Religious Participation. Annual Review of Sociology. Vol. 27. Chirot, Daniel (1985): The Rise of the West. American Sociological Review 50/2: 181-195. Denouex, Guillaume (1993): Urban Unrest in the Middle East. A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran and Lebanon. Albany. Ekiert, Gregorz (1996): The State Against Society. Princeton. Elliott, Mark/Gembicki, Mary/Schindler, Bob (1993): Cult Membership Estimates for the Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe. East-West Church and Ministry Report. Vol. 1. No. 4: 5-6. Elliott, Mark/Bob Schindler/Yvonne Bedford-Adamski (1994): Non-indigenous Protestant Missionaries in Former Communist States of Eurasia. East-West Church and Ministry Report. Vol. 2, No. 1: 5. Engelhardt, Klaus/von Loewenich, Hermann/Steinacker, Peter (eds.)(1997): Fremde Heimat Kirche. Die dritte EKD-Erhebung über Kirchenmitgliedschaft. Gütersloh. Emigh, Rebecca Jean (1997): The Power of Negative Thinking. The Use of Negative Case Methodology in the Development of Sociological Theory. Theory and Society. 26/5. 649-684. Evans, Sara M/Boyte, Harry C. (1986): Free Spaces. The Sources of Democratic Change in America. New York. Findeis, Hagen/Pollack, Detlef/Schilling, Manuel (1994): Die Entzauberung des Politischen. Was ist aus den politisch alternativen Gruppen der DDR geworden? Interviews mit ehemals führenden Vertretern. Leipzig, Berlin. Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (1992): The Churching of America, 1776-1990. New Jersey. Flam, Helena (1998): Mosaic of fear: Poland and East Germany before 1989. New York. Foran, John (ed.)(1994): A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran. Minneapolis. Fricke, Karl-Wilhelm (1984): Opposition und Widerstand in der DDR. Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik. Froese, Paul (forthcoming): Hungary for Religion. A Supply-Side Interpretation of the Hungarian Religious Revival. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. Gellner, Ernest (1995): Marx’s Failure and Mohammed’s Triumph. In: The New Presence. March. Gorski, Phillip (2000): Historicizing the Secularization Debate. Church, State, and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ca. 1300 to 1700. In: American Sociological Review 65/1: 138-67. Gill, Anthony (1998): Rendering Unto Caesar. The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America. Chicago. Gill, Anthony (forthcoming): The Political Origins of Religious Liberty. Initial Sketch of a General Theory. Greenfeld, Liah/Martin, Michel (eds.)(1988): Center. Ideas and Institutions. Chicago. Religious Oddities 143 Hartmann, Klaus/Pollack, Detlef (1998): Gegen den Strom. Kircheneintritte in Ostdeutschland nach der Wende. Opladen. Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1991): The Consequences of Religious Market Structure. In: Rationality and Society 3/2: 156-177. Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1998): Introduction to the Economics of Religion. In: Journal of Economic Literature 36: 1465-1496. Jelen, Ted G./Wilcox, Clyde (1998): Context and Conscience. The Catholic Church as an Agent of Political Socialization in Western Europe. In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 37/1: 28-40. Kiser, Edgar/Hechter, Michael (1998): The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics. In: American Journal of Sociology 104/3: 785-791. Kohn, Melvin L. (ed.)(1989): Cross-National Research in Sociology. Newbury Park. Kohn, Melvin L. (1987): Cross-national Research as an Analytic Strategy. In: American Sociological Review. 52/6: 713-31. Kurzman. Charles (1994): A Dynamic View of Resources: Evidence from the Iranian Revolution. In: Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 17: 53-84. Lakatos, Imre/Worrall, John (ed.)(1978): The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge. Lechner, Frank J. (1989): Catholicism and social change in the Netherlands. A case of radical secularization? Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 28: 136-47. Maser, Peter (ed.)(1995): Rolle und Selbstverständnis der Kirche in den verschieden Phasen der SED-Diktatur. V/1 and V/2 in Materialen der Enquette-Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte der SED Diktatur in Deutschland’. Frankfurt/Main.. Maser, Peter (1992): Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschaften in der DDR. 1949-1989. Constance. McAdam, Doug (1982): Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. 1930-1970. Chicago. Meldgaard, Helle/Aagaard, Johannes (1997): New Religious Movements in Europe.Oxford. Morris, Aldon D. (1984): The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement. Black Communities Organizing for Change. New York. Neubert, Ehrhart (1998): Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR. 1949-1989. Berlin. Neubert, Ehrhart (1996): Widerstandigkeit im NS-Staat und im SED-Staat. Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 9/1: 43-69. Neubert, Ehrhart (1990): Eine protestantische Revolution. Berlin. Nipperdey, Thomas (1988): Religion and the Center. Reflections on German History. In: Greenfeld/Martin (eds.): 1-17. Nowak, Kurt (1995): Historische Wurzeln der Entkirchlichung in der DDR. In: Sahner/Schwendtner (eds.): 665669. Olsen, Daniel (1999): Religious Pluralism and US Church Membership. A Reassessment. In: Sociology of Religion. 60/2: 149-173. Osa, Maryjane (1997): Creating Solidarity. The religious foundations of the Polish social movement. In: East European Politics and Societies 11/2: 339-366. Padgett, Steven (1999): Organizing democracy in Eastern Germany. Interest groups in post-Communist society. New York. Pfaff, Steven (2001): The Politics of Peace in the G.D.R.. The Independent Peace Movement, the Church and Origins of the East German Opposition. In: Peace and Change 26/3: 280-300. Pollack, Detlef (1994): Kirche in der Organisationsgesellschaft. Stuttgart. Polletta, Francesca (1999): Free Spaces in Collective Action. Theory and Society 28: 1-38. Ramet, Sabrina P. (1998): Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia. Durham. Ramet, Sabrina P. (1991): Social Currents in Eastern Europe. Durham. Sahner, Heinz/Schwendtner, Stefan (eds.)(1995): Gesellschaften im Umbruch: 27. Kongreß der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie. Kongreßband II. Opladen. Schwenk, Otto G. et al. (1995): Ostdeutschland im Wandel. Lebensverhältnisse-politische Einstellungen. Opladen. Sherkat, Darren E./Ellison, Christopher G. (1999): Recent Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion. In: Annual Review of Sociology: 363-94. Stark, Rodney/Finke, Roger (2000): Acts of Faith. Berkeley. Stark, Rodney/Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1994): A Supply-side Reinterpretation of the ‘Secularization’ of Europe. In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33/ 3: 230-252. Stark, Rodney/Bainbridge, William Sims (1987): A Theory of Religion. New York. Statistisches Amt der DDR (1990): Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 35. Berlin. Statistisches Bundesamt (2000): Datenreport 1999. Bonn: Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung. Bonn. 144 Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff Swatos, William H. (ed.)(1994): Politics and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe. London. Tilly, Charles (2000): Spaces of Contention. In: Mobilization 5/2: 135-160. Time International (1999): No Longer Society’s Only Voice: The Polish Catholic Church faces new challenges following the collapse of communism. 153/17: 52. Weidenfeld, Werner/Korte, Karl-Rudolf (eds.)(1999): Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Bonn. Weil, Frederick/Huffman, Jeffrey/Gautier, Mary (eds.)(1993): Democratization in Eastern and Western Europe. Greenwhich. Church-State Relations and the Vitality of Religion in European Comparison Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel 1. Preliminary theoretical considerations If, thirty or forty years ago, a social scientist had tried to determine the social position and development prospects of religion and the churches in modern societies, he would probably have relied on the secularization theory. This theory assumes that the modern age and religion are in a strained relationship to each other, and that the more modern a society becomes, the less socially relevant are religion and the churches turn out to be. Industrialization, tertiarization – the growth of the service industry – urbanization, increasing prosperity, higher education levels, higher mobility, rationalization, cultural pluralism, individualization – all these factors and whatever other processes are normally viewed as being typical of modernity have, so say the secularists, a negative effect on the continued existence of religion. The secularization theory is increasingly being criticized by historians, sociologists and political scientists – and most significantly, by sociologists of religion. Their disapproval focuses on the one-track nature of the assumed correlation between modernization and secularization, on the reduction of religiosity to its institutionalized forms and on the inability of the secularization theory to recognize and accurately interpret reverse trends in the religious field, in other words processes where religion is gaining in significance. In the German-speaking world, for instance, sociologists of religion such as Thomas Luckmann (1963, 1967, 1991) and Karl Gabriel (1992) claim that what is happening in modern societies is not a loss of significance of religion, but rather a transformation of the form of religion and religiosity. They admit that the social integrative power of the traditional and institutionalized forms of religion, the Christian churches, is declining. But this, they say, is not loss of faith en masse, but rather evidence that the religious field has been expanding, so that nowadays one finds religion where it would not have been expected previously: in the cult of the individual, in sport, in tourism, in the entertainment industry, in psychocults or New Age, esoterism or occultism. For these sociologists, the traditional model of religion today is replaced by a new form of religion that is less institutional and more individual, privatized and largely syncretic in character. The English sociologist of religion Grace Davie (1994, 2004, 2006, 2008) coined the expression “believing without belonging” to describe this new form of non-institutionalized religion – a catchphrase now often used to describe religious orientation in the modern age. Others speak of religious individualization in order to determine the religious change occurring in modern societies (Krüggeler/Voll 1993). Similar arguments have been advanced by other European sociologists of religion – Danièle Hervieu-Léger (1990) in France, Michael Krüggeler (1993; Krüggeler/Voll 1993; Furseth/Repstad 2007) in Switzerland or Roberto Cipriani (1989) in Italy, to name a few – 146 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel who also note a greater diffusion of the religious field and reject the secularization theory. Danièle Hervieu-Léger (1990) feels that the modern age itself is productive for religion. Modern society, she claims, does more than merely give rise to religiously charged political utopias and individualistic religious forms focusing on modern values such as subjectivity and self-realization: between its utopias of endless progress and the limited character of its political, scientific and technological realizations, it inevitably leaves a gap that, again and again, is filled by religious ideas. Hardly any of the approaches of the sociology of religion currently discussed is still based on the secularization proposition, which used to be part of the classical repertoire of the sociology of religion. The weightiest criticism of the secularization theory, however, originated in the USA, not in Europe. Sociologists of religion such as Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (1988, 2006), Laurence Iannaccone (1991, 1992; Stark/Iannaccone 1994) or Stephen Warner (1993) claim that if the modern age is productive for religion, it is not only because it always falls short of its own projections, but also because its central principles are increasingly invading the religious field. The main principle that stimulates religious productivity, they say, is the economic principle of competition. The more pluralistic the religious field and the more market-oriented its organization, the more religious vitality is fostered: under competitive conditions, the providers of religious services are forced to face the particular challenge of retaining their members and of attracting new members, of responding to the needs of their clientele and offering efficient services. However, if one particular church holds a religious monopoly, its officials become indifferent and idle and lose their ability to be socially responsive. Much like in business, competition is advantageous to religion as well. Besides, customers who are dissatisfied with a religious product in a pluralistic religious market can look for another religious product to better suit their needs, while their only alternative in a monopolistic religious structure is to turn away from religion altogether. The prerequisite for the creation of a pluralistic religious market – according to the supporters of the economic market model – is the strict separation of church and state (Casanova 1994). Free and fair religious competition, they claim, can only develop under conditions where the state allows the religious market free rein and refrains from favoring any religious group above the others. Only then can new religious groups access the market and compete with more traditional groups without incurring excessive start-up costs. And once the religious field has filled with a variety of religious products, the level of religious commitment will rise and religion will develop a vitality that it could not have achieved under monopolistic structures (Stark/Bainbridge 1987). This totally reverses some of the classical assumptions of the secularization theory: rather than losing stability as a result of modernization, religion stands to profit from processes of modernization and pluralization as well as from the individualization accompanying it. It is therefore not a coincidence that supporters of the economic market model claim that cities have more religious vitality than rural areas. They see religion not as an entity safeguarded by tradition, handed down from generation to generation and tied to premodern times, something that processes of rapid social change can only adversely affect – in other words as a dependent variable – but rather as an independent variable capable of organizing itself, with the special resources needed to mobilize its adherents and ultimately not dependent on consumer demand. This concept postulates that religion is always in demand; the main point is that this demand must be satisfied, and that this is something com- Church-State Relations and Religious Vitality 147 peting religious providers are in a better position to achieve than a single, monopolistic religious group. The economic market model is a “supply-side approach” (Stark/Iannaccone 1994; Chaves/Gorski 2001) based on resource mobilization; it pays little attention to religious convictions and needs, to preferences – in other words to the demand side1 – and attaches great importance to incentive and opportunity structures and, quite along the lines of a rational-choice approach, to the social restrictions. The decisive difference between this model and the interpretation of religious change according to the secularization theory is that here the focus is not on the difference between modern and pre-modern but rather on the difference between state regulation and deregulation of the religious field. The reactions of Steve Bruce (1992; 1996; 1999, 2002), Frank Lechner (1997) and others have shown that this new economic model propounded by American sociologists of religion is being treated as a serious challenge to proponents of the secularization theory. Admittedly, a number of critical questions emerge at first sight. Is it really true that the clergy of denominations with a religious monopoly is more careless and less committed than the clergy of less established groups? Can it be empirically verified, for instance, that priests in the Catholic or Lutheran churches in Germany, in other words in religions supported by the state, are less committed than preachers and evangelists in smaller sects and religious groups in the United States, where there is a much stricter separation of church and state? Is state support of religious denominations always a negative factor, or can it also give these communities a rather significant advantage? David Martin (1996) demonstrates that, for religious monopolists, damage often begins with the loss of their competitive advantage, and that, until then, state support had actually been helpful. Therefore, the question that needs to be asked is: what are the effects of various degrees of state regulation of the religious field on the vitality of religion and the church? It is a question that can only be answered on an empirical basis. A second question is linked to the claim that religious pluralism and competition strengthen the religious vitality of a society, while the absence of plurality and competition in the religious field have a weakening effect. This claim contradicts the assertion of Peter L. Berger (1967; 1980), who has demonstrated that religious ideas and attitudes are easier to retain when they are socially supported and confirmed by a plausibility structure. According to Berger, people feel strengthened in their faith when they see that other people in their environment – neighbors, friends, family members, people who are important to them – think like them. In contrast, the pluralization of religious ideas and traditions relativizes individual religious convictions and ideologies and makes them lose their unquestioned plausibility, a particularly important factor in view of the non-empirical character of religious ideas. Monopolistic religious conditions are more favorable to the survival of unquestioned plausibility structures than religious pluralism. At the same time, there are several arguments in favor of the rational-choice theory, whose advocates claim that the coexistence of various religions and denominations forces the believers of any one group to be more self-assertive, to develop a better-defined profile and to make greater efforts to maintain their identity. Religious commitment is often higher in the minority situation of a diaspora than when the members of a particular denomination 1 Some (initial) ideas referring to the demand side of the religious market were discussed in new publications by Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff (see article in this volume and Froese/Pfaff 2005). 148 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel constitute a majority. Theoretically, pluralization should be regarded as being able to have either effect: weakening or strengthening religious activity. Here again, empirical work is needed to investigate the real effects of religious pluralization. The third issue that needs to be examined is whether the degree of separation of church and state and religious pluralism are the only factors that affect the vitality of the religious field, or whether other factors must be included in the explanatory model we want to build, for instance the proportional number of Catholics in a society, the relationship between religion and national identity, the degree of modernization – measured on the basis of education or prosperity levels, urbanization, tertiarization or technicization –, the degree of regional mobility, the extent and intensity of religious education in the families, etc. A single-factor model such as the one suggested by Iannaccone (1991) and Chaves/Cann (1992) can surely provide no more than a limited explanation for the sometimes complex, contradictory and ambiguous transformation processes in the religious field. This article therefore hopes to provide answers to the following three questions: 1. What is the influence of the degree of church-state separation on the mobilizing force of religion and the churches? 2. What is the effect of the extent of religious pluralization on the vitality of religion and the churches? Until now, the discussion on the influence of the state/church relation has centered on western industrial societies, particularly the USA. Reducing the great variety of possible patterns to only a few has had a significant effect on the results obtained so far. In order to extend this restricted view, we will leave out the USA, which is often used as an example for the strict separation of church and state and tends to predetermine the outcome of the studies whenever it is included. Instead, we want to encompass the countries of Eastern Europe in our considerations and draw an inner-European comparison. How the three questions are to be answered will be described in the following section. 2. Operationalizing the questions and the problems this entails Let the dependent variable of our investigation be defined relatively conventionally. We will measure the vitality of religion by looking first at the frequency of church attendance on Sundays as an indicator of church affiliation, then at trust in the church as an indicator of the acceptance of the church as a social institution, and finally at the dissemination of belief in God as an indicator of Christian religiosity. Variables to measure non-church and nonChristian religiosity could also be constructed, but the limited scope of this paper prevents us from looking into these aspects at this time. Consequently, we will not be able to measure the dissemination of more individualistic, syncretistic, and diffuse forms of religion, which necessarily include non-church and non-Christian religious practices and orientations, and can not make any statements about the validity of the individualization theory. However, we addressed the assertions of this theory and its validity in other publications (Pollack/Pickel 2000, 2007, 2008). As a first independent variable, we must develop a means of measuring the separation of church and state. This index can be based on the model proposed by Chaves/Cann (1992), however in our case it will not exclude central areas of state regulation of the reli- Church-State Relations and Religious Vitality 149 gious field such as school and university education, the military, and the police. These are areas where religious groups are often clearly subject to unequal treatment, and if it is indeed the privileged status of one or several denominations that prevents competition between them, then it is exactly this institutional preferential treatment that must be examined methodically. The extent of legal separation of church and state will be measured on the basis of the following five criteria, listed here with their respective valencies: a) b) c) d) e) the existence of a state church (2 points) the existence of theological departments in state colleges or universities (1 point) religious education in public (i.e. state financed) schools (2 points) the existence of military and/or prison pastoral care (1 point) tax preferences for the churches, financial support (2 points) In order to be able to assess the validity of the economic market model, we have to correlate indices covering the degree of the separation of church and state as well as indices measuring the degree of religious pluralization with indicators of religiosity. In order to do so, we first set up a catalogue with five criteria to determine the degree of the legal separation of church and state which takes into account the existence of a state church (1), the establishment of theological departments in state colleges or universities (2), the integration of religious education in the curriculum of public (i.e state-financed) schools (3), the permission of military and prison pastoral care (4) as well as the grant of tax preferences and financial support for the church (5). This list of criteria refers to the dimension of support of religion through state regulations instead of the dimension of restrictions, which is usually considered separately from the former dimension (Finke 1997; Fox 2008). While the former encompasses in how far religious groups are granted constitutional privileges and financial support, the latter dimension concerns the determination of administrative restrictions imposed by the state on religious convictions, practices and organizations. The reason why these two dimensions are considered separately pertain to the of the aim of the treatment of European and western democracies. The criteria listed above were assigned different values. The first criterion received 2 points since it comprises both the existence of a state church as well as the legal privileges of a national church or of churches which are closely linked to the history of the respective country. The third criterion also received two points since the question is not only whether public schools offer religious education but also, whether it is financed by the state. According two points to the fifth criterion can be justified with the fact that this criterion not only contains tax preferences for churches and religious communities but also financial support of churches based on contractually defined fiscal support as well as the payment of personnel costs of the church by the state. The index thus built comprises the main spheres of state regulation in the religious field, e.g. the education sector, the military and police sector or the legal sphere where the religious communities are often clearly treated unequally and thus limits their competition chances due to unfair methods. The authors of this article classified the values for the countries based on different sources. In particular Robbers’ (2001) publication as well as the classification of country 150 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel experts in the projects on “Political Culture in the New Democracies 2000“ as well as on “Church and Religion in an enlarged Europe 2006“ should be mentioned.2 Our second independent variable measures religious concentration. We take the percentage of the majority denomination in a country. By using the percentage of the majority denomination as an indicator of religious concentration, we measure the lack of religious pluralism and avoid using the problematic Herfindahl-Index, which tends to indicate a higher degree of pluralism when the various religious denominations are smaller. This has been convincingly shown by Voas/Olson/Crockett (2002). We also assume that the percentage of Catholics in a region will affect the vitality of the religious field, as Catholics traditionally display closer ties to church and faith than Protestants. This indicator represents long-term religious traditions at the macro-level, in other words at the level of cultural circles (Rokkan/Lipset 1967). Our fourth independent variable is a modernization index, as a number of empirical studies have shown that education, urbanization, increased prosperity etc. have an effect on church attendance and belief in God (Martin 1978; Bruce 1992). Our indicators for economic development encompass the countries’ gross domestic product per capita as well as the rank of the respective country in the Human Development Index, which not only includes the GDP but also other variables such as life expectancy and degree of adult literacy. Finally, we also have to assume that the religious education children receive in their families affects their acceptance of religious ideas and practices in adult life. The indicator for religious socialization represents the answer of respondents to the question of whether they had a religious upbringing. In determining the independent variables we, again, focus on those variables, which allow us to test the secularization theory and the economic market model, but not the individualization theory. Therefore, we include variables like the churchstate-relationship, the percentage of Catholics, the effects of religious socialization, and religious concentration as a manifestation of religious homogeneity or diversity, and variables measuring modernization. Of course, this does not imply that other indicators are not relevant for the capacity of religious communities and organizations to retain and attract people. Focusing on both of the above-mentioned approaches does not require including additional independent variables. In order to interpret the subjective survey data on which some of the indicators are based, we will draw on the results of the World Values Surveys between 1981 and 2002, the 1998 International Social Survey Program and the year 2000 study on “Political Culture in New Democracies (PCND)” carried out by the authors of this paper. Therefore, all of the comparative data sets included in this study are based on representative surveys and can be compared on the macro-level. Hence, the date of classification of the church-state index is the year 2000. However, due to the longevity of structural conditions it may reflect a certain consistency over time. 3. Overview of the distribution of the main variables Before we can analyze the influence of various factors on the differences in the degree of religiosity and church affiliation in Eastern and Western Europe, we should look at the 2 For results of these studies see the articles of Müller and Pickel in this volume. 151 Church-State Relations and Religious Vitality distribution of the variables. First, the dependent variables: the distribution of the frequency of church attendance, belief in God and trust in the church in Western and Eastern Europe. These data will also provide a brief overview of the situation of religion and the churches in Western and Eastern Europe in general.3 Chart 1: Indicators of religiosity and church affiliation – a comparison Italy Portugal Spain Ireland Belgium France Austria The Netherlands Germany (West) Great Britain Northern Ireland Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Greece Poland Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia Slovenia Croatia Germany (East) Estonia Romania* Bulgaria Russia USA Canada New Zealand Australia Japan Philippines Belief in God 1991 1998 /2000 86 88 92 92 86 97 95 86 72 65 62 87 71 65 80 87 81 79 97 95 73 65 60 56 63 64 76 91 97 95* 64 67* 32* 77* 61 61* 80 25 24* 47* 98* 66* 47 63* 94 92 76 70 69 65 43 100 94 Frequency of church attendance 1991 1998 2005 23 23 18 41 16 7 18 13 13 11 30 5 5 5 5 16 37 8 9 22 14 3 4 17 6 4 23 19 12 11 4 38 21 22 17 38 14 8 16 10 11 10 27 5 5 5 4 12 33* 8* 6* 20* 11* 15 3* 3,5* 17 6* 4* 21 16 11 11 4 31 20 17 15 35 11 6 12 8 10 9 27 4 4 4 4 12 33 3 5 20 12 16 3 3,5 17 6 4 21 17 9 10 4 30 Trust in Church 1991 1998 +27 -2 -14 -21 -8 -22 +23 +1 +6 +25 +5 +21 -3 -1 -38 -14 -14 -14 -22 -3 -23 +1 -3 +23 +1 -31 +8 -21 -31 -45 +67 +22 -8 +63 -24 +4 +28 -7 -8 0 -68 +64 Source: Authors’ calculations based on ISSP 1991, 1998; World Value Survey 1990-1991, 1995-1998, 2000-2006; * PCND-Study 2000; Belief in God = Belief in God in percent; Church attendance = number of Church attendances per year based on the population’s average; Trust in Church = ratio of people who trust in the Church subtracted by the ratio of people who do not trust in the Church, originally measured on a 5-point scale (only countries, which are classified regarding the separation of church and state) . 3 For reasons of immediate comparability, we only present results of countries with data on all categories of interest to our topic. 152 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel The first result that stands out when comparing church affiliation with the data on religiosity in Western and Eastern Europe is the greater diversity of the religious situation in Eastern Europe as compared to Western Europe. There is no Western European country where church attendance and belief in God are as low as in the eastern part of Germany, in the Czech Republic or, to some extent, Estonia. Chart 2: Criteria for the degree of legal separation between church and state (selected countries) 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 The integration of religious education in the curriculum of public (i.e. statefinanced) schools (subsidized by the state) (2) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 7 8 8 7 8 8 5 6 1 0 0 1 0/1 0/1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0/1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 0,5 1 1 1 1 0/1 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0/1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 7 3 5 5,5 2-5 3-4 1 3 2-3 5 4 3 4 Existence of the establishment of theoa State logical departChurch (2) ments in state colleges or universities (1) Italy Portugal Spain Greece Ireland Austria Belgium France Great Britain Northern Ireland Netherlands Germany Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Poland Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia Slovenia Croatia Estonia Romania Bulgaria Russia USA Australia Canada New Zealand Japan Philippines the permission of military and/or prison pastoral care (1) tax preferences for churches, financial support (2) sum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 6 5 6 8 5 5 5 2 6 6 Source: Authors’ composition, based on several sources and assessments by local experts. 153 Church-State Relations and Religious Vitality At the same time, Poland and Romania are among the European countries with the closest ties to church and religion. It is certainly correct to assume that the high degree of disaffection with the church in the eastern part of Germany or in the Czech Republic, for instance, is primarily due to the repressive church policies of the Communist regimes. Another conspicuous result of our comparison is that some Eastern European countries, in spite of decades of atheist indoctrination, have a considerable percentage of believers in God – Russia for instance, where the percentage of believers – after a surge in the late eighties (not shown here) – once again rose dramatically in the course of the nineties. Finally, we should note that among traditionally Catholic countries in Western Europe, those with the highest degrees of modernization are those where church involvement is the lowest. This becomes apparent when comparing the figures for church attendance and belief in God in Ireland, Italy and Portugal with the figures for France. Spain and Austria are in between. The same pattern can be observed in the Catholic countries of Eastern Europe, among which Hungary and Slovenia are more secularized than Poland or the Slovak Republic. Differences are even greater in countries that are, or used to be, mostly Protestant – for instance the Czech Republic or the former state of East Germany compared to Latvia or Estonia, or the highly developed Scandinavian countries. Chart 3: Selected countries – descriptions of the main control indicators 1998 Italy Portugal Spain Ireland Belgium France Austria Great Britain The Netherlands West Germany Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Greece GDP p.C. a 17990 13106 14129 18233 19443 19542 19075 18925 20353 17764 23826 18787 21981 18401 11212 HDI-rankb 21 31 11 17 7 2 13 14 6 (4) 3 10 18 11 25 Poland Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia Slovenia Croatia East Germany Estonia Russia Bulgaria Romania USA Canada New Zealand Australia Japan Philippines GDP p.C. a 6667 6467 8698 7592 12272 6530 11920 10112 4459 4856 2972 26619 20579 15233 20361 20534 2301 HDI-rankb 58 48 39 40 29 49 46 67 60 64 4 1 9 15 8 83 Source: Authors’ composition of results from the World Bank (Maddison)a, Human Development Report 1998b; 1998 was chosen as the point of reference, because the necessary questions were only included in the surveys in this year. GDP p.C. = Gross Domestic Product per Capita (Base Maddison World Bank-Data) (GDP p.C. calculated in International Geary-Khamis-Dollars); HDI = Human Development Index – Relative Position to countries of the world (higher rates indicate less prosperity) If we consider the degree of separation of church and state based on the indicator as defined by the authors as listed in Chart 2 for each of the European countries we immediately see that a high degree of secularization can go hand in hand both with a strict separation of church and state – like in France – and a high degree of regulation by the state – like in Norway, Sweden or Denmark. This is not only true for Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, 154 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel we can also observe that a low level of religiosity exists both in countries with a high and countries with a low regulation by the state as exemplified by Russia on the one hand and Estonia or the Czech Republic on the other hand. Chart 3 once again lists the variables presented above but also includes indicators of modernization and pluralization. There are clear differences in per capita GDP and Human Development Index figures between Eastern and Western Europe. We must take note of these differences when we look at the influence of modernization on religiosity and church affiliation, as there are both highly developed countries like Sweden or Norway and less developed countries like the eastern part of Germany or the Czech Republic among the more highly secularized countries. Nor does the degree of religious concentration have a particularly clear effect: it is high both in Poland and Ireland, where religiosity is high, as well as in Norway, where religiosity is low. These considerations lead us to the question that interests us most, i.e. the search for an explanation of the differences in religiosity and church affiliation. 4. Attempt at an explanation Looking at the figures for the gross domestic product per capita and the frequency of church attendance, we note that there is no overall correlation (chart 4). If we examine Eastern and Western Europe separately, however, we see a clear correlation in Western Europe, while the situation in Eastern Europe remains indistinct. At least for Western Europe, we can see that as economic prosperity rises, closeness to the church – measured on the basis of frequency of attendance – declines. In Eastern Europe, there is a negative correlation between belief in God, trust in church and modernization, but no correlation between frequency of church attendance and modernization. With Eastern Europe still in the process of catching up, it could be that modernization trends have not evolved enough for a clear pattern to emerge. It would seem that, in Eastern Europe, factors other than modernization processes have stronger effects on the religious field. One cannot fail to notice the positive correlation between religious socialization, religiosity and church affiliation. Respondents who had a religious upbringing have a stronger tendency towards religiosity as adults compared to those who were not bound to church and faith. But what about the two variables that interest us most: the influence of religious pluralism and the effect of the church/state relationship on the vitality of the religious field? Religious concentration does affect religiosity and church affiliation, but not in the expected direction (chart 4): higher levels of religious concentration increase the probability of church attendance rather than causing it to decline. This is true in Eastern Europe, at least. In other respects, the degree of religious pluralization has no significant effect. This may be due to the ambivalent effect of religious pluralization mentioned above: whenever homogenously religious societies open up, competition among the various religious groups increases, and this encourages them to expand their religious activities. However, in the process of pluralization, the various denominations may also tend to relativize one another, which may in turn cause them to loose influence. This effect is not unambiguous. In Europe as a whole, at least, religious denominations seem more likely to suffer than to benefit from processes of religious pluralization. The 155 Church-State Relations and Religious Vitality explanation that seems to apply in this case, more or less, seems to be that religious faith and religious practice, at least as far as the traditional churches are concerned, need social confirmation. Similar results were found by Roland Campiche (2002) in his analyses. Like other sociologists (Land/Deane/Blau 1991; Olson 1999), he found that high levels of religious pluralism could be equated with low church-attendance rates. And even as far back as 1992, Chaves/Cann were able to show that religious pluralism had no effect on church attendance if the analysis is controlled by the level of state regulation and percentage of Catholics. And Chaves and Gorski (2001) point out the broad variety of results dealing with the relationship between regulation and religious vitality. Chart 4: Indicators of Religiosity and their Reasons (Aggregate-Level) Europe (n=26) Church Attendance Church membership Belief in God Western Europe (n=15) Church Attendance Church membership Belief in God Eastern Europe (n=11) Church Attendance Church membership Belief in God Western countries (n=5) Church Attendance Church membership Belief in God GDP p.C. n.s. n.s. n.s. HDI n.s. n.s. n.s. Concentr. .43 .65 .36 Cath. pop. .74 .55 .62 Prot. pop. -.36 n.s. n.s. Herfi w nD n.s. n.s. n.s. Herfi wo nD -.37 n.s. n.s. C-S Rel. n.s. n.s. n.s. Fox Reg. n.s. n.s. n.s. -.54 n.s. -.62 -.66 -.48 -.79 n.s. -.63 n.s. .68 n.s. .73 -.58 n.s. -.62 n.s. -.50 n.s. n.s. -.58 n.s. n.s. -.53 n.s. n.s. -.50 n.s. n.s. n.s. -.54 n.s. n.s. -.60 .94 .92 .83 .86 .83 .70 n.s n.s. n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. -.55 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s n.s. n.s .76 .93 n.s. .80 .98 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. Source: Own composition; European Religion Aggregate File; coefficient is Pearson’s r-correlations, n in general > 10 cases; n.s. = no significant correlation. GDP p. C. = HDI = Concentr. = Cath. pop. = Prot. pop. = Herfi w nD = Herfi wo nD = C-S Rel. = Fox Reg. = Gross Domestic Product per capita (HDI 1998) Human Development Index (higher rates indicate less prosperity) Religious Concentration (Percent of the major denomination in the country) Percentage of Catholics in the population Percentage of Protestants in the population Herfindahl Index with no-Denomination as separate group Herfindahl Index without no-Denomination Church-State Relationship (1 no regulation - 8 complete regulation) Index of State Regulation of the Church (Fox 2008) All of this boils down to the question of the effect of state regulation on church affiliation and religiosity in the operationalization applied here. However, as depicted in Chart 4, the correlation is not significant. There are countries such as Russia and France, where there is a strict separation of church and state and where the rate of church attendance is nevertheless low, and there are other countries where the state does regulate the religious field strict- 156 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel ly but the rate of church attendance is also low. The most advantageous situation for religiosity and church affiliation seems to be when there is a medium degree of separation between church and state, as evidenced by the roof-shaped distribution of countries in Chart 5. But even this correlation is not perfect, as there are also countries with low church attendance rates in the middle range. We found similar results concerning the relationship between the church-state index on the one hand and the lack of denomination and belief in God on the other hand a similar picture (see Chart A1 and Chart A2 in the appendix). Chart 5: Church Attendance and Church-State Relations Source: Own composition; European Religion Aggregate File; Authors’ calculations based on ISSP 1998; Church attendance = number of Church attendance per year based on the population’s average; Index Church-State Relations see chapter 2. Rus = Russia Pol = Poland Slo = Slovenia CZ = Czec Republic H = Hungary EG = East Germany Nirl = Northern Ireland F = France It = Italy No = Norway Por = Portugal Ir = Irland WG = W Germany Rom = Romania Au = Austria J = Japan E = Spain USA = United States Den = Denmark Aus = Australia Swd = Sweden NZ = New Zealand Nl = the Netherlands Ph = Philippines UK = United Kingdom C = Canada Fin = Finland Using the pluralism index also does not produce any results which correspond to the market model (see Chart 4). When differentiating the countries in the analysis based on the share of Church-State Relations and Religious Vitality 157 the members in the largest denomination compared to the entire population, it becomes apparent that the larger the share of the confession of the majority, the higher the church attendance rate, church membership and belief in God. Unlike proposed by the market model, the integration in church and the intensity of faith do not decrease but rather increase when monopolistic confessional structures increase. Hence, not only do the empirical data not confirm the assumptions of the market model, they are nothing short of contradicting them. The market model is also not confirmed when we use the frequently applied Herfindahl-Index as a measure of religious pluralism. 4 This index measures the probability that two randomly chosen persons in a sample belong to different religious communities. The higher the index number on a scale from 0 to 1, the higher the probability. We apply two different versions of the index - one exclusively takes persons with a denomination into account, the other also includes those who do not have a denomination. In both cases, the correlation is usually not significant and when there is a correlation, it points to the opposite direction than the one suggested by the market model: church attendance rate does not increase with the degree of religious pluralism. Instead, the more plural the religious field, the lower the church attendance rate (see Chart 5). As mentioned above, the operationalization of religious pluralism proposed by Fox (2008) (see Chart 5) and in addition the one suggested by Norris and Inglehart (2004: 253pp.) do not produce any different results. In all cases, the degree of religious pluralism did not have a significant influence on the level of religiosity. The ineffectiveness of these indicators becomes apparent when contrasting individual countries. In Poland and Ireland, where the majority of the population is highly involved in church and believes in God, the degree of religious pluralism is as low as in Norway, Sweden or Denmark, where religious beliefs and practices are far less rooted in society. Much more so than the degree of religious pluralism, it is crucial whether the majority in the country is protestant or catholic. This is clearly reflected by the opposing signs in the columns, which measure the correlation between the indicators of religiosity and the degree of religious concentration (see Chart 4). Whenever the Protestant Church represents the major denomination, the religious monopoly has a negative effect on the vitality of religion; whenever the Catholic Church dominates, the opposite effect is the case. These results support Chaves/Gorski’s concerns (2001) regarding the relational assumptions proposed by the new market model paradigm. The results can be confirmed by an alternative index for the measurement of regulation by Fox (2008) (see Chart 6). This scatter plot also includes very sparse indications of a linear relation between the degree of regulation and religious vitality. If we only use Fox’s dimension of support of the church by the state, the results resemble the results as presented in Chart 5 even more closely.5 4 5 In the past years, the use of the Herfindahl-Index in order to measure religious pluralism has been sharply criticized from a methodological point of view (Voas/Crocket/Olson 2002). Since we use the HerfindahlIndex, we can only claim limited validity for the results. Due to a lack of convincing alternatives, scientists continue to apply it nevertheless (see for example Norris/Inglehart 2004: 96pp.). Analyses which broaden the realm of research beyond western states based on Jonathan Fox’s data for a set of 72 countries prove that the ‚non-relationships’ do not turn into linear relations (see Chart A3 in the appendix). 158 Chart 6: Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel Church Attendance and Regulation of the religious market Source: Own composition; European Religion Aggregate File; Degree of Regulation from the data set on “Religion and State” by Jonathan Fox (2008). Should we conclude that the relationship between church and state and the degree of religious pluralism have absolutely no effect on the vitality of the religious field? If we use the Chaves and Cann (1992) classification, we see a small effect on church attendance (see chart 7), namely that greater state regulation causes a decline in church attendance. More generally, we could also say: the closer a church is to the state, the more it can expect its social acceptance and integrative capacity to be diminished. At least in Europe, the reason does not seem to be that greater proximity of church and state leads to diminished competition between the churches and religious groups whose religious vitality rather tends to be weakened by pluralization processes (charts 4), but that this greater proximity increases the church’s closeness to political power, so that it is then identified with certain political interests. The relative effect of the degree of separation between church and state does not seem to be explained by the market model, which goes back to Adam Smith, but rather by a political argument formulated by Alexis de Tocqueville and elaborated later on by David Martin (1978). Church-State Relations and Religious Vitality 159 Chart 7: Church Attendance and Church-State Relations (Chaves/Cann) Source: Own composition; European Religion Aggregate File; Authors’ calculations based on ISSP 1998; Church attendance = number of Church attendance per year based on the population’s average; Index Church-State Relations see chapter 2 (Index by Chaves/Cann 1992). If the church is too closely associated with the state, it starts to be perceived as an institution of power, so that many, particularly the socially underprivileged, no longer consider it to represent their interests: the church then finds itself standing vis-à-vis the “people” as a quasi-state institution, and it can expect to experience the same mistrust as the state – though of course this does not stop people from placing great hopes in it, as they do in the state. Interlocking church and state functions need not necessarily do damage to the church, insofar as the church can use such interconnections to further its integration into society and to broaden its contact with society. And there is simply no reason why providing religious education in state schools or pastoral care in the army should have negative effects on church vitality. Such activities enable the church to play a role in society and to reach people in places it would normally not have access to. But links with state institutions will damage the church if it attempts to exert political or social power, if it interferes in political affairs, and is identified with the state. The contentual and institutional autonomy of religious denominations and their willingness to respect the functional autonomy of other social areas is therefore an important condition if they want to play a role in modern society. 160 Chart 8: Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel Religion and politics – a European comparison Italy Portugal Spain Ireland Belgium France Austria The Netherlands West Germany Great Britain North Ireland Sweden Denmark Norway Finland Greece Poland Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia Slovenia East Germany Estonia Romania Bulgaria Russia USA Canada New Zealand Australia Japan Philippines Religious leaders should not interfere with elections (votes) 1991 1998 2006 84 84 72b 81 83 75b 76 82 79a 85 85 87 74 77 85 77 68b 74 74 72 76 70 81b 84 68 78 68 70b 78 76 78 83b 69 82 76 76 71 80 74b 80 80 77b a 84 76a 74b 87 52 80 65 66 63b 81 72 73 74 74b 87 75b 64 67 Churches have too much power 1991 1998 45 (11) 48 (10) 27 (11) 45 (11) 38 (12) 45 (6) 30 (10) 42 (2) 34 (5) 23 (8) 23 (11) 48 (5) 47 (7) 28 (12) 31 (10) 37 (18) 44 (9) 23 (10) 15 (4) 26 (9) 32 (7) 61 (3) 14 (34) 27 (9) 34 (8) 7 (63) 23 (18) 17 (14) 36 (12) 60 (4) 23 (23) 13 (31) 29 (16) 48 (11) 47 (9) 10 (73) 22 (30) 23 (21) 28 (13) 19 (16) 32 (11) 58 (11) 34 (9) Source: Authors’ calculations based on ISSP 1991 and ISSP 1998; a = World Values Surveys 1995-1998; b = World Values Surveys 2003-2006; agreeing answers; residual answers „disagree“ and „neither- nor“; for „Churches have too much power“ in parenthesis „too little power“, residual category “quite right”. Political Influence = “Religious leaders should not interfere with elections”; World Values Surveys question = “Religious leaders should not influence vote”. A quick look at the evolution of religion and the churches in many Eastern European societies after 1989 shows that it is important to keep religion and politics as well as morality and religion, or law and religion separate in order to maintain the social efficacy of religious denominations. Misreading the new social circumstances after the collapse of Communism, a number of churches believed that the time had come for them to set themselves up as guarantors of social morality, to offer models of world interpretation involving obligations for the whole of society, and to get involved in politics. During the political and social upheavals of 1989/90, many Eastern Europeans expected that the churches would fill the social vacuum that had evolved and take on functions of social orientation. Church-State Relations and Religious Vitality 161 People in many countries had very high hopes regarding the social functions of the churches. They wanted the churches to take a stand on unemployment, on pollution, racial discrimination and other social injustices (Zulehner and Denz 1993: 23). Even in countries where religion had been quite irrelevant, such as Russia or East Germany, trust in the church was relatively high at that time (ISSP 1991). By now, most people, at least in the central part of Eastern Europe, follow patterns we know from Western Europe and reject any influence of the church on politics, the government or citizens’ behavior at the polls (see Chart 8). Even in a country as highly religious as Poland, it has done the Roman Catholic Church more damage than good to try to influence voters’ decisions at election time or to make moral pronouncements on how people should behave and expect them to be obeyed (Pollack 1998; 2001). Modern society is functionally differentiated, and churches, like other social actors, must respect the independence of non-religious areas. Under Communism, churches were able to take on functions that were directly political. At the time, every religious act was in fact a political act, as it deviated a priori from the norms and expectations of the repressive political system. Whether we are talking about believers in Poland going on a pilgrimage to the Virgin, or peace groups in the GDR standing in front of a church with candles in their hands, even the smallest deviation from what was politically expected could produce enormous political effects. At a time when Communist regimes were arrogating political power to themselves, the population actively wanted the church to take on political functions. With their public statements and their religious activities, the churches in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR became the attorneys of society vis-à-vis the dictatorial systems of state socialism. Nowadays, whenever churches want to respond to, or even represent, the interests of the people, they must keep a certain distance from politics. There is no need for them to keep out of social, economical or political issues altogether, but they must steer clear of any activity that could give rise to the impression that they had political interests of their own or, even worse, that they were siding with the state. This would make them a political party, and they would lose their attractiveness for many who hold different political views. The same can be observed in Western Europe. Countries in which the Roman-Catholic Church has held a monopolistic position for centuries were faced with the emergence of strong anti-clerical movements. As soon as the representatives of these movements came to political power, they prevailed in pushing the church back to the margins of society. This is what happened in laical France, which was characterized by the controversy between eccleciastical and anti-clerical forces for a long time and now embodies a rather low degree of religiosity and church affiliation. In other countries in which the church stood side by side with the people and supported them in their fight against external suppressors, and thus could take on the responsibility of preserving the national identity like in Ireland, the church became deeply rooted in society. Only in Poland does the church attendance rate and the percentage of believers match the figures for Ireland. In Germany and in many other Central European countries, the church has to struggle with the legacy of the state church. Only seldom in German history did people perceive the church as an institution siding with the population. This was the case during the revolutionary events of the political upheaval in 1989 in East Germany, when the church championed social change, protected the suppressed, and took on the role of a mediator between the communist regime which 162 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel was only interested in preserving its power and the people who intended for society to democratize. Immediately after the upheaval, trust in church decreased again. The church was then regarded as a victors’ institution supported by the West, which profited from the breakdown of Communism. 5. Conclusion Overall, the church benefits from its capability of avoiding visible proximity to political rule and its ability to represent the desires and interests of the poor, the excluded, the suppressed, in sum, people in need of help. It does, however, more harm than good if its activities provoke the impression that it is an institution with political power and great financial resources. The reputation and attractiveness of the church are decisively influenced not so much by the aspect of whether it competes with other denominations or religious communities, but by the question of whether it is able to avoid the image of an institution of power. Thus, too close a proximity to politics and people in power is rather harmful. However, this ability is easier to obtain under conditions of religious pluralism than when the church holds a religious monopoly. However, a large distance between the church and the state in itself does not seem to enhance the religious vitality of the people either. And why should it? If there are no manifest restrictions of the church, which were common in Socialist regimes, financial or legal support of the churches by the state is not problematic per se. It seems unfounded to assume that the members’ religious vitality will automatically decrease due to support by the state just as it seems unsubstantiated to believe that religious vitality can be increased by simply expanding the offers in the religious field. We may have to focus more on the demand side of religion and accept the fact that there are people who simply are not religious. Either the market model is broadened in this respect or its universal applicability will remain limited. Church-State Relations and Religious Vitality 6. 163 References Beckford, James/Luckmann, Thomas (eds.) (1989): The Changing Face of Religion. London. Berger, Peter L. (1967): The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York. Berger, Peter L. (1980): The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation. London. Bruce, Steve (ed.) (1992): Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis. Oxford. Bruce, Steve (1996): Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults. Oxford. Bruce, Steve (1999): Choice and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory. Oxford. Bruce, Steve (2002): God is Dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford. Campiche, Roland J. (2002): Does Individualization still Constitute the Paradigm of Religion in Post-Modernity? Paper, given at the conference “Europe and the invisible religion” Zurich January 18-19. Casanova, Jose (1994): Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago. Chaves, Mark/Cann, David (1992): Regulation, Pluralism and Religious Market Structure: Explaining Religion´s Vitality. Rationality and Society 4: 272-290. Chaves, Mark/Gorski, Philip (2001): Religious Pluralism and Religious Participation. In: Annual Review of Sociology 27: 261-281. Cipriani, Roberto (1989): ‘Diffused Religion’ and New Values in Italy. In: Beckford/Luckmann (eds.): 24-48. Cipriani, Roberto (2006): Secularization or „diffused religion“? In: Franzmann/Gärtner/Köck (eds.):123-142. Davie, Grace (1994): Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging. Oxford. Davie, Grace (2004): New Approaches in the Sociology of Religion: A Western Perspective. In: Social Compass 51/1: 73-84. Davie, Grace (2006): Religion in Europe in the 21st Century: The Factors to take into Account. In: Archive European Sociological 47/2: 271-296. Davie, Grace (2008): From Believing without Belonging to Vicarious Religion: Understanding the Patterns of Religion in Modern Europe. In: Pollack/Olson (eds.): 165-176. Dubach, Alfred/Campiche, Roland (eds.) (1993): Jede(r) ein Sonderfall? Religion in der Schweiz. Zürich. Basel: 93-132. Gabriel, Karl (1992): Christentum zwischen Tradition und Postmoderne. Freiburg/Basel/Wien. Finke, Roger (1997): The Consequences of Religious Competition: Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Change, in: Young (ed.): 46-65. Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (1988): Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious Mobilization in American Cities. American Sociological Review 53: 41-49. Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (2006): The Churching of America 1576-2005: Winners and Losers in our Religious Economy. New Brunswick. Fox, Jonathan (2004): Religion, Civilization, and Civil War. Lanham. Fox, Jonathan (2007): Do Democracies have Separation of Religion and State? In: Canadian Journal of Political Science 40/1: 1-25. Fox, Jonathan (2008): A World Survey of Religion and the State. Cambridge. Fox, Jonathan/Tabory, Ephraim (2008): Contemporary Evidence Regarding the Impact of State Regulation of Religion on Religious Participation and Belief. In: Sociology of Religion 69/3: 245-272. Franzmann, Manuel/Gärtner, Christel/Köck, Nicole (eds.) (2006): Religiosität in der säkularisierten Welt. Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungsdebatte in der Religionssoziologie. Wiesbaden. Froese, Paul/Pfaff, Steven (2001): Replete and desolate markets: Poland, East Germany and the New Religious Paradigm. In: Social Forces 80: 481-507. Froese, Paul/Pfaff, Steven (2005): Explaining a Religious Anomaly: A Historical Analysis of Secularization in Eastern Germany. In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 44/4: 397-422. Furseth, Inger/Repstad, Pal (2007): an introduction to the sociology of religion. Classical and Contemporary Perspectives. Aldershot. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle (1990): Religion and Modernity in the French Context: For a New Approach to Secularization, Sociological Analysis 51: 15-25. Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1991): The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the Economics of Religion. Rationality and Society 3: 156-177. Iannaccone, Laurence (1992): Religious Market and the Economics of Religion. Social Compass 39: 123131. Iannacone, Laurence R./Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (1997): Deregulation Religion: The Economics of Church and State. Economic Inquiry 35: 350-3. 164 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel Kallscheuer, Otto (ed.) (1996): Das Europa der Religionen: Ein Kontinent zwischen Säkularisierung und Fundamentalismus. Frankfurt/Main.. Krüggeler, Michael (1993): Inseln der Seligen: Religiöse Orientierungen in der Schweiz. In: Du bach/Campiche (eds.): 93-132. Krüggeler, Michael/Voll, Peter (1993): Strukturelle Individualisierung – ein Leitfaden durchs Labyrinth der Empirie. In: Dubach/Campiche (eds.): 17-49. Land, Kenneth C./Deane, Glenn/Blau, Judith R. (1991): Religious pluralism and church membership in American cities, 1906. In: American Sociological Review 56: 237-249. Lechner, Frank J. (1997): The „New Paradigm“ in the Sociology of Religion: Comment on Warner. In: American Journal of Sociology 103: 182-192. Luckmann, Thomas (1963): Das Problem der Religion in der modernen Gesellschaft: Institution, Person und Weltanschauung. Freiburg. Luckmann, Thomas (1967): The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. New York. Luckmann, Thomas (1991): Die unsichtbare Religion. Frankfurt/Main. Martin, David (1978): A General Theory of Secularization. New York. Martin, David (1996): Europa und Amerika: Säkularisierung oder Vervielfältigung der Christenheit – Zwei Ausnahmen und keine Regel. In: Kallscheuer (ed.) (1996): 161-180. Müller, Olaf (2008): Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: Was There a Re-Awakening after the Breakdown of Communism? In: Pollack/Olson (eds.): 63-92. Norris, Pippa/Inglehart, Ronald (2004): Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge. Pollack, Detlef (1998): Religiöser Wandel in Mittel- und Osteuropa. In: Pollack/Borowik/Jagodzinski (eds.): 9-52. Pollack, Detlef (2001): Modifications in the Religious Field of Central and Eastern Europe. In: European Societies 3: 135-166. Pollack, Detlef/Borowik, Irene/Jagodzinski, Wolfgang (eds.) (1998): Religiöser Wandel in den postkommunistischen Ländern Ost- und Mitteleuropas. Würzburg. Pollack, Detlef/Olson, Daniel V.A. (eds.) (2008): The Role of Religion in Modern Societies. New York. Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (2000): The Vitality of Religion-Church Integration and Politics in Eastern and Western Europe in Comparison. Arbeitsberichte des Frankfurter Institutes für Transformationsstudien 13/00. Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (2007): Religious Individualization or Secularization? Testing hypotheses of religious change – the case of Eastern and Western Germany. In: Britisch Journal of Sociology 58/4: 603-632. Pollack, Detlef/Pickel, Gert (2008): Religious Individualization or Secularization: An Attempt to Evaluate the Thesis od Religious Individualization in Eastern and Western Germany. In: Pollack/Olson (eds.): 191-220. Robbers, Gerhard (ed.) (2001): Staat und Kirche in der Europäischen Union. Baden-Baden. Rokkan, Stein/Lipset, Seymour Martin (1967): Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York. Sherkat, Darren E./Ellison, Christopher G. (1999): Recent Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion. In: Annual Review of Sociology 25: 363-394. Stark, Rodney/Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1994): A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the „Secularization“ of Europe. In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33: 230-252. Stark, Rodney/Bainbridge, Roger (1987): A Theory of Religion. New Brunswick. Stark, Rodney/Finke, Roger (2000). Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley. Stark, Rodney/Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1994): A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the „Secularization“ of Europe. In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33: 230-252. Stolz, Jörg (2007): Explaining religiosity: A general sociological model. Lausanne. Stolz, Jörg (2008): Secularization theory and rational choice. An integration of micro- and macro-theories of secularization using the example of Switzerland. In: Pollack/Olson (eds.): The Role of Religion in Modern Societies. New York: 249-270. Tomka, Miklos/Zulehner, Paul M. (1999): Religion in den Reformländern Ost(Mittel)Europas. Wien. Voas, David/Olson, Daniel V.A./Crockett, Alasdair (2002): Religious Pluralism and Participation: Why Previous Research is Wrong? In: American Sociological Review 67: 212-230. Warner, Stephen (1993): Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States. In: American Journal of Sociology 9/5: 1044-1093. Young, Lawrence (ed.) (1997): Rational Choice Theory and Religion: Theory and Assessment. London/New York: 46-65. Zulehner, Paul M.,/Denz, Hermann (eds.) (1993): Wie Europa lebt und glaubt: Europäische Wertestudie. Düsseldorf. Church-State Relations and Religious Vitality Appendix: Additional Charts Chart A1: Belief in God and Church-State Relations Source: Own composition; European Religion Aggregate File. Chart A2: No denomination and Regulation Source: Own composition; European Religion Aggregate File. 165 166 Chart A3: Church Attendance and Regulation (94 countries) Source: Own composition; Regulation Data by Fox (2008). Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel European Exceptionalism: Lazy Churches, Pluralism, Adherence and the Case of the Dutch Religious Cartel Erik Sengers 1. Ecumenical charter or church cartel? On April 22nd, 2001, an important ecumenical event took place. Cardinal Vlk, president of the Council of European Bishops and Metropolite Jérémie, president of the Council of European Churches, signed an Ecumenical Charter. In this charter, they committed themselves and their member churches to mainly two points. First, they declared to try to get a deeper common understanding of God’s revelation and to work on a more visible unity of European Christianity. Second, they declared to work together for the salvation of Europe, i.e. a social, peaceful, tolerant Europe and to cooperate with other religions, mainly Judaism and Islam (cf. www.cec-kek.org). In the subsequent months, this charter was signed in several other European countries, although the Dutch cardinal and primate Simonis with a deep sigh expressed his doubts about its worth when he signed the agreement in 2002 (Sengers 2003a: 160). Being a scholar researching the economics of religion, it was the commitment expressed under II.2. in the declaration that struck me most. It states: “We commit ourselves 1. to discuss our plans for evangelization with other churches, entering into agreements with them and thus avoiding harmful competition and the risk of fresh divisions; 2. to recognize that every person can freely choose his or her religious and church affiliation as a matter of conscience, which means not inducing anyone to convert through moral pressure or material incentive, but also not hindering anyone from entering into conversion of his or her own free will”. It is with this text that the European churches –explicitly- refrain from competition. It is an agreement that when closed in the commercial sector would be subject to annulment by the European cartel agency. Religious market theory states that the ‘consumption’ of religion, in other words the participation in religious organizations of any kind, will increase when the religious market is free and pluralistic. This thesis was successfully tested and proved, especially in the United States. For example, Christiano (1987) and Finke/Stark (1988) measured positive correlations between pluralism and religious adherence in American cities respectively around 1900 and in 1906. In 1996, Finke et al. proved the effect of religious pluralism on religious participation in the State of New York. An international comparison of fourteen European nations and four other western countries (Iannaccone 1991) showed that religious competition explained more then 90% of the variation in church attendance. And even in Sweden, research proved a positive correlation between pluralism, competition and adherence (Hamberg/Petterson 1994; Petterson/Hamberg 1997). But the relationship between pluralism and adherence is not always positive, especially not in Europe. In his international comparison between European countries, Canada and the US, Verweij (1998) did not find a positive relationship between pluralism and adherence, though a negative correlation between state control and adherence. On the other hand, Erik Sengers 168 Knippenberg (2005b: 203) points to the fact that the countries with a strict separation between church and state face the highest levels of secularization. For Switzerland, Stolz (2005) concludes a negative relationship between pluralism and levels of Christian religiosity, though a positive relationship with alternative spirituality. Halman/Draulans (2004) found on the basis of EVS-data a negative correlation between pluralism and adherence. And in the north of the Netherlands, the positive relationship between pluralism and adherence was absent (Batenburg et al. 1988), though Dutch Catholics –who live in a minority position in the northern provinces- show higher levels of adherence compared with their fellow Catholics in the southern provinces where the Catholic Church has a monopoly (Schepens 1999: 45-48). The Netherlands is a good example to discuss the theme of pluriformity and adherence. This country has a long tradition of religious freedom reaching back to the liberal constitution of 1848. Moreover, it has been pluralistic since the early days of the Reformation, being the birthplace of many religious organizations of the western world. But religious adherence is in decline since the Second World War and in some regions of the country even before this War. The rise of a religious cartel could explain this anomaly in religious market theory – and this problem in Dutch Christianity as well. A free and pluralistic economy only leads to more attachment when the participants on the market are willing to compete. If they do not, the functioning of the religious market is severely inhibited. I want to show the plausibility of this thesis with the help of the Dutch case. In the first paragraph, I will sketch the theory that a free and pluralistic religious economy leads to higher commitment. In the second paragraph, I will describe the Dutch religious market as free and pluralistic, but with a decline in adherence. In the third paragraph, I will bring three explanations for this lack of competition: the internal secularization of the churches, ecumenism, and the unwillingness to interact with the religious market. In the last paragraph, I will discuss the consequences of the Dutch case for religious market theory and the comparison between religion in Europe and the United States. The general conclusion will be that a free and pluralistic religious market does not automatically leads to higher commitment –as religious market theory supposes–, but only when the players on the market are willing to compete. 2. Religious market and adherence The thesis that a free and pluralistic religious economy leads to higher commitment starts from two important assumptions. The first assumption is that the market is composed of niches. Although every individual is different, groups of people may well share the same religious preferences: distinct religious needs, tastes and expectations on the basis of shared SES-characteristics, like sex, education, income, race, age and others. The second assumption is that the niches are relatively stable in time and place. The basic niche-variation in every society is based on the intensity of religion individuals prefer: some prefer a highintense religion, others a moderate or low-intense religion. If we combine the two assumptions –1. the market is composed of niches and 2. these niches are stable-, the following hypothetical distribution of religious niches arises: European Exceptionalism 169 Graph 1: a hypothetical distribution of religious niches moderate liberal ultraliberal conservative strict ultrastrict It is supposed that there are more people available for a moderate or conservative religion, while there are relatively few who want to adhere to an ultra liberal or ultra strict religion (Stark/Finke 2000: 195-198). When a religious market is free –this means: without state control-, it tends to be pluralistic. On a free religious market, every possible religious preference can be articulated and fulfilled. Thus, for the hypothetical distribution to become reality, it is necessary that no religious organizations are suppressed or gain a preferred status. According to the scale designed by Chaves and Cann (1992: 280), aspects of regulation can be: - if there is a single, designated state church if the state recognizes only a limited number of denominations if the state appoints or approves the appointment of church leaders if the state pays the salary of church personnel if there is a system of church tax if the state subsidizes the operating, maintenance or capital expenses for churches. Regulation severely inhibits religious organizations to offer the religious products some customers ask for. But when the market is free, every organization can offer religious products as it likes. The result is a pluralistic religious economy with several suppliers that all serve its own market niche (Stark/Finke 2000: 198). The thesis of religious market theory is that on a free and pluralistic market, adherence to religious organizations will be higher. The logic of this thesis lies in the nichecomposition of the market. The organizations on a free religious market are by definition supposed to take a competitive stand against each other. That means that they concentrate themselves on a specific niche and do their best to attract the population of that niche and moreover to keep them attached to the organization. Therefore, they have to be customeroriented and to offer their products for a low or at least competitive price (Stark/Bainbridge Erik Sengers 170 1996: 42). Through their diversity they can effectively and efficiently serve all the religious preferences possible on the religious market (Finke 1997: 52). The result is that more people’s preferences are met and consume religious products, or in other words participate in religious organizations. In a free market of religion therefore, because everybody can get the religion for the price he or she is willing to pay for, the general participation level will rise (Stark/Bainbridge 1996: 44; Stark/Finke 2000: 96). 3. Dutch religious market: free and pluralistic - decline of adherence 3.1. Free religious market The relationship between churches and the state is in the Netherlands not subject to special laws –even not in the constitution- or agreements like a concordat. In the modern Dutch state (since the revolutionary constitution of 1798), the relationship is arranged by four principles. The first principle is equality: all religious bodies in the Netherlands are considered to be equal and membership in a church can be of no advantage or disadvantage for an individual. The second principle is freedom. Citizens of the Netherlands are free in the individual and collective exercise of their faith, and the state will not interfere in this sphere. The third principle is the civil law. The operating of the churches, both in their internal as in their external functioning is limited by civil law. Though they have a special position within this, the general principles are applicable to them as well. Later, as a result of the mobilization of the Catholics and orthodox Protestants in Dutch society, a fourth principle was added to these three: the state has to promote participation of religious groups in society and to guarantee religious pluriformity. These principles do not mean that there is a separation of church and state, on the contrary: relationships between the churches and the state were very close between 1800 and 1980. The state arranged church membership administration, paid the clergy, financed church buildings and many religious social organizations, promoted modern theology in the early 19th century and suppressed orthodox tendencies, limited the freedom of processions for the Catholics, the King gave a new constitution the Protestant Church in 1815, and all was administered between 1800 and 1870 by two state ministries – one for the Catholics, one for the Protestants. It is only since 1985 that these bounds between church and state are less severe (see Sengers 2003a: 67-70, 129-131, 152153). If we follow the six points of Chaves and Cann, we can combine them in two remarks on the Dutch religious market: about the relation of the church and the state and about the financing of the church. As follows from the introduction above, there is no state church in the Netherlands. Some people believe the Protestant church still is the state church, but it was disestablished already at the end of the 18th century by the French revolutionary government and this situation was never reversed. Nevertheless, the equal position of the churches and their members in society was never for granted. Catholics were for a long time seen as secondary-class citizens that had no part in the modern Dutch (protestant) nation state. In parliament, both liberals and Protestants tried in fierce debates to limit the growing influence of Catholics on the state and society. And social discrimination caused lower intellectual and cultural levels of Catholics, what hindered their social participation European Exceptionalism 171 (Sengers 2003a: 100-101). Thanks to the emancipation of Catholics in their own circles, these differences were however lifted after 1960. Finally, the state does not appoint or approve church leaders, neither on a lower level (local priests or reverends), nor on a higher level (bishops, deacons). There is however some control of the state on the professional qualifications of clergy that works for example in the army and in prisons. On the financial aspect as well, relationships between churches and the state are almost absent. The state does not pay the salary of church personnel -except for the clergy in the institutions mentioned above-, there is no system of church tax and the state subsidizes in no way whatsoever the churches – except in the case of some monumental church buildings. The churches completely finance their operating through collects and fund raising actions. The most important of these is the national fund-raising action Church Balance. Supported by the same fundraising material, local congregations of five denominations (the Protestant Church in the Netherlands, the Roman Catholic Church, the Episcopal Church, the Mennonite Society and the Arminian Fraternity) motivate their members to donate money to the church. The Catholic Church collects about EUR 55 million with Church Balance, the protestant church around EUR 50 million. The state does however finance religious institutions in the social sphere. Religious primary and secondary schools (of every Christian denomination and non-Christian religion) are completely financed by the state. The same holds true for higher education, for example the two Catholic universities in Tilburg and Nijmegen, the Protestant university in Amsterdam and the theological and professional education both at state and private universities. But as these educational institutions in general are at a distance from the church, it cannot be said that in this case the church is being subsidized by the state. Slightly different the situation is in the case of broadcasting. Here, the state pays Christian churches and other religions, when they can prove they have a substantial membership in Dutch society, to use national mass media for religious programs. These programs are however broadcasted a few hours each week and not at prime time. 3.2. Pluralistic religious market The source book for religious pluralism in the Netherlands is the guide composed by Hoekstra and Ipenburg (2000). On 750 pages, hundreds of religious organizations, groups and movements are being described historically, theologically and organizationally. The third edition is however already outdated. To bring some order in the multitude of religious phenomena in the Netherlands, I will order them into four groups: mainline churches, out of mainline Christian churches, non-Christian world religions and new religious movements. There are two mainline churches in the Netherlands: the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Church in the Netherlands. The Protestant Church is a merger of three Protestant churches: the former public church Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk (NHK), a group that seceded from this church in the 19th century (the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland GKN) and the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, that formally united in 2004 (Sengers 2005a). The Catholic Church is the largest of the two with approximately 4.5 million nominal members (30% of the population). The Protestant Church has about 2 million nominal members (15% of the population). This statement 172 Erik Sengers might confuse some readers, as the Netherlands is generally supposed to be a protestant nation with Catholicism as a minority. But this is an image that since one century does not apply to reality. Since the Dutch war of independence 1568-1648, the Protestant Church was the public church in the Netherlands –not the state church- and its ideology shaped Dutch politics, society, culture and mentality. Catholicism as well as many other nonCalvinist groups were doomed to survive in the margins of Dutch society, not illegal but barely tolerated. As the Protestant church lost its primary position in Dutch society, the myth that Protestantism dominated Dutch society and culture was shaped (Van Eijnatten 1993). Catholic Church gratefully adopted this view, as it offered the opportunity to mobilize its members against the supposed protestant oppression (Thurlings 1971). So, the image was shaped that the majority of the Dutch adheres to Protestantism. But the truth is that since the census of 1910, the Catholic Church is the largest religious body in the Netherlands. Out of the mainline, a variety of Christian churches exist. We can group them in liberal, orthodox and immigrant organizations. On the liberal side we find some genuine Dutch groups with a centuries-old tradition. The Arminian fraternity is a liberal Calvinist church that originated out of the theological discussions that almost split the Dutch Republic in the 17th century. Actually, it has about 6,700 members. The Mennonite society was founded by the Dutch priest Menno Simonsz who converted to Anabaptism and led these into a more peaceful direction after the failed revolution in Münster. Today, they also have about 6,700 members. These groups closely collaborate with the modernist protestants of the Dutch Protestant League, founded in 1870 with about 8.000 members. The Episcopal Church resulted out of a 17th-century schism in the Catholic Church over the appointment of Bishops in the Dutch Mission. This Jansenist-influenced church nowadays has 6,000 members. At the orthodox side we find a variety of Calvinist churches that split off from the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland and again from each other. Five of these dominate the scene with altogether about 350,000 members. The newest groups in this section are the secessions from the GKN and NHK that claim to be the legitimate successors of these churches since their merging in 2004. Finally, several traditional protestant churches are active in the Netherlands, like the Baptists, Evangelicals, Pentecostals, Adventists, Methodists and Apostolical groups. Their membership varies and sometimes greatly per congregation, is difficult to establish and has a great overlap among each other and with other churches. The number of evangelical Christians (in different churches) was established between 500,000 and 860,000 (De Jong 2004). The Netherlands has been an immigration country for centuries and a safe haven for many who had been persecuted for their faith. Traditionally, foreign groups like the Armenians, Anglicans, Lutherans and the French Calvinists of the Église Wallone have found a place in Dutch society. With the immigration waves of the post-war period, new religious Christian groups entered the Netherlands. For example, several orthodox churches like the Russian, Coptic and Syrian Orthodox Church serve the religious needs of their ethnic group and exercise great attraction on Dutchmen as well. The Moluccan churches are a relict of the Dutch colonial expansion in Indonesia. The Hutterite churches are a separate case: they have existed in the Netherlands since the 18th century, but they experienced a growth during their mission among the slaves in Surinam in Latin America. As these people moved to Europe after the independence of Surinam, the Dutch Hutterites flourished and today have about 12,000 members. Finally we have to mention the European Exceptionalism 173 African Christian churches that started on the support of economic and political refugees (Ter Haar 1998; cf. Jansen/Stoffels 2008). From the non-Christian world religions we first have to mention the Jews. These immigrated in the 16th century from Portugal and Spain, and in the 19th century from Poland and Germany to the Netherlands. Today, they are grouped in three ecclesiastical bodies, one orthodox, one liberal and one Portuguese with respectively 5,100, 3,200 and 500 members (Solinge/De Vries 2001: 244). About 80.000 Hindus live in the Netherlands, descendants from Indian plantation workers that were hired from the British government to work in the Dutch West Indies. From there they moved to the Netherlands after Surinam independence. Since the 1960s, neo-Hindu groups like the Krishna Conscious Movement accompanied this group (Schouten 1999; Knippenberg 2005a: 95). Buddhism in the Netherlands is closely connected to the Chinese labor forces that immigrated to the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam to break the strike of port workers in 1910. This religion silently grew and was added with new groupings in the 1960s as well. Finally we have to mention Islam as an immigrant religion. Though the first presence of Islam as a result of the colonial ties with Indonesia was in 1932, Islam as a religion became visible due to immigrant workers after 1960 (Rath et al. 19906: 3-4). Three main ethnic groups can be distinguished: Moroccans, Turks and Surinam Muslims, with many different theological schools. Today, their number is estimated at 875,000 or 5,3% of the population (Van Herten/Otten 2007) but adequate membership statistics are not available. Finally, there is a range of new religious movements, usually small in numbers. Among the largest of them are the Jehovah’s Witnesses with app. 30,000 members and the Church of the Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) with about 8,000 members. Other movements like the Scientology Church and the Unification Church (Moonies) have a few hundred members each. Some religions in this section are not as new as implied, like the Freemasons or the Rosecrucians, while others like paganistic and wiccan groups claim to stand in a long historical tradition. If we focus on New Age religion explicitly, we meet a broad range of religious alternatives, connected with world religions like Buddhism or Hinduism, with European religious and philosophical traditions like theosophy, pantheism, gnosticism or esotericism, influenced by new technological developments as UFO’s, drugs or psychology, and focused on spiritual techniques like meditation or massage. Especially since the 1980s these ideas have found broader acceptance in Dutch society, but it is very difficult to estimate the adherence to these groups (Aupers/Van Otterloo 2000). 3.3. Decline The decline on the Dutch religious market can be exemplified in several ways. First, the membership of the mainline churches has declined severely since the 1980s. Especially the mainlince churches and the liberal non-mainline has suffered a loss of membership: most of all the Arminian and Mennonite church, then the two mainline protestant churches. The loss of the Catholic Church is relatively modest, though big in numbers. The rise of the Episcopal church between 1980 and 2000 needs further explanation; it is clear however that after 2000 the membership declined again. Only the orthodox reformed churches grew in this period, partly due to high birth rates. The growth however declined in the last years and one church experienced an absolute decline in membership. Erik Sengers 174 Table 1: membership of churches in the Netherlands 1960-2000 1960 1980 2000 Mainline Catholic 4,586,612 5,453,217 5,106,333 NHK 3,243,539 2,930,928 1,579,627 GKN 765,505 869,100 676,627 Lutheran 67,112 33,998 14,928 Out of mainline Arminian 20,696 12,166 5,445 Mennonite 62,928 22,500 11,776 Episcopal 10,580 6,113 6,873 Orthodox3 265,459 286,132 329,200 Source: church statistics; census, Becker/De Hart (2006) 30-31. 1 NHK, GKN and Lutheran united into Protestant Church in the Netherlands in 2004 2 There are serious reasons to assume that Episcopal membership data are incorrect 3 Membership statistics are available for four of the five orthodox reformed churches 2004/5 1980-2004/5 4,644,800 -14.8% 2,002,1551 -47.8% 5,460 9,600 6,001 334,997 -55.1% -57.3% -1.8%2 +17.1% But membership data tell only half of the story. More important then being registered in the church records is the participation in the organization and the adherence to central themes of the faith. If we look at these figures, we see more clearly the weakness of the mainline churches in Dutch society. Weekly church attendance declined among Catholics from 63% in 1970 to 8% in 1999, among Hervormden from 33% to 25% and among Gereformeerden from 81% to 45% (Becker/De Wit 2000: 24). Confirmation with traditional concepts of the Christian faith -like a personal God or life after death- is low to very low, especially among Catholics. Members of Christian churches have low levels of contact with the clergy and group cohesion (Dekker et al. 1997: 47-77). Also other data make clear how weak the adherence of the faithful to their church is. In the Catholic Church, only 60% of the respective cohort came up for confirmation and less than half of the Catholics participated with a financial donation in the Action Church Balance in the year 2000. The number of volunteers declined with 50,000 between 1987 and 1997 (Sengers 2003a: 14, 17) and again 20,000 between 2004 and 2006. The Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland also faced a decline in participation. In 1950, 3.0% of the baptized members made a public profession of their faith, in 1990 this figure had declined to 1.6% and the number of volunteers declined slightly from 30% to 27% between 1985 and 1990. The financial contributions remained slightly behind inflation. And many other points indicate that the salience of the gereformeerde faith and church was very low in 1990 (Dekker 1992: 127-160). From the other churches and groups named above, data are not available. Also among the non-Christian religions, religious participation is in decline. Data are available for Jews and Muslims. The Jews are more atheistic (“I don’t believe in God”) then the Dutch population as a whole (24 vs. 17%). 57% of the Jewish population states to be non-practicing and another 17% identify themselves as non-religious. Of the halachic Jews, only 38% is member in a religious congregation; among them, secularism is still higher then the total Dutch church population. Interesting though is that religion seems to increase among the younger generations (Van Solinge/De Vries 2001: 121-142). Although many people speak of a growth of religion among Muslims, research of the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau seems to indicate a trend towards secularization (Becker/De Wit 2000: 16-23; Phalet/Haker 2004: 3-16). Among the younger generations of Turkish and European Exceptionalism 175 Moroccan Muslims, only a small minority no longer identifies with Islam (and in fact with no religion at all). But about 1/3 of the Turks and ½ of the Moroccans never visits the mosque. These figures increase with education and participation on the labor market, and through time: participation in religious practices decreases. Identification with Islam seems mainly to be an ethnical and cultural component, not so much a religious component. A fourth indicator of the decline on the religious market is the low attraction of the new religious movements. Religious market theory supposes that when there are empty niches on the religious market, they will be filled with new organizations that will be able to attract those that are unchurched before. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Bureau investigated this thesis (Becker et al. 1997). As secularization in the Netherlands has been an ongoing process since the 1960’s, and the new religious movements drew great attention as well, the thesis that the Dutchmen en masse joined these new organizations was obvious. The SCP looked at several organizations at the ‘counter culture’, as it was defined, and measured if there was any sign of increase in membership or attachment. This however did not seem to be the case. The Dutchmen in general are familiar with the new age groups, the smaller Christian churches or with aspects of folk religion, and sometimes participate in them or use elements from it, but they do not join these organizations. Research of Need/De Graaf (2005) shows that religious change is very rare among church members: only 4.5% of the Dutch has switched his or her church membership and 2.6% has entered church membership after a conversion experience. A final indicator of declined participation on the religious market is the growth of unchurchedness or atheism if you like. It is estimated that 24.5% of the population is unchurched after having belonged to a church (Need/De Graaf 2005: 296). How large the proportion of the unchurched actually is depends on how the question of church membership is asked (Becker 2005: 61-62). Some publications mention 40% unchurchedness in the Netherlands, others mention 60%. That unchurchedness in Dutch society has increased is however clear. In 1960, 18.4% of the population indicated not to belong to a church, in 1985 this percentage had increased to 48.7 % (Knippenberg 1992: 238). For 1999, Becker and De Wit (2000: 24) report a figure of 63%. As there is still a very large secular potential among church members, it is to be expected that unchurchedness will increase in the near future. The image of the churches is relatively positive: almost no one wants the churches to disappear and the Dutchmen are quite positive about the influence of the churches on society, their social work, and they want the churches to play a role in social and ethical questions. But the trust in the churches is relatively low. With 38% saying to have trust in the churches, they are posed in the lower middle of a whole range of institutions. In European comparison, the Netherlands together with the Czech Republic show the lowest trust in churches. On the other hand, when asked if the churches ‘can be trusted’, they are second after science (Dekker 1997: 16, 36-38, 43; Bernts 2004: 21-26). As even the belief in a supernatural being has decreased since 1980 (De Graaf/Te Grotenhuis 2005), it can be expected that secularization not only affects the churches but organized and unorganized religion in general. Erik Sengers 176 4. Absence from competition The Dutch religious market is liberal, (extremely) pluralistic and yet in decline. This anomaly can be explained by a closer look at the organizations at the market. Then we can conclude that they do not grasp the opportunities the situation offers and instead choose to take a low-profile position on the religious market, for what they see as the benefit of the society as a whole. In a logical and historical order, I will describe first the internal secularization of (two mainline) churches, then the ecumenical cooperation on the religious market, third the absence of proper interaction with the religious market. The first explanation for the anomaly on the Dutch religious market might be the internal secularization of the main churches. Two detailed studies of the developments in the Catholic Church (Sengers 2003a: 139-162) and in the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (Dekker 1992) make this clear. In the Catholic Church, the focus turned from salvation in the afterlife to the presence of Christian faith in this world. The faithful were invited to connect the story of their own life with the story of God who acts with humanity, as shown in the Biblical stories. This vision was expressed in the common Sunday liturgy as in the festive rites des passages. Moral theology appealed to Christians to make the world more human, and in religious education children were no longer educated in the Christian faith but in all religions. The specific position of the Catholic Church in Dutch society was given up, and with it the whole organizational subculture that had separated Catholics from the rest of society. The Gereformeerde Kerken experienced a comparable development, though a little bit later. This church was traditionally characterized by a strong internal discipline, a high commitment to the faith and church, and a fixed view on the exclusivity of Christianity and Christians. After 1950 however, the influence of secular ideas increased, for example in the course of the centralization and professionalization of the (before highly decentralized) church structure. The status of the pastor diminished in de democratization movement and the position of the laity, of women and of churchwardens was higher valued. The strict discipline was no longer practiced, the second (catechetical) service on Sunday changed its character or was abolished anyway and the Last Supper was celebrated more often and with less restrictive conditions for participation. The uniqueness of the church and its unity were changed for pluralism and fluid boundaries, and the Gereformeerde Kerken started warm ecumenical contacts with other churches. The second explanation for the anomaly on the Dutch market is the absence of competition because of ecumenism. Table 2 summarizes ecumenical cooperation in six national organizations. The information makes clear how strong the religious cartel in the Netherlands is and how much the liberal groups dominate it. Ecumenical cooperation is present on almost every aspect of society, ranging from contacts with the government, membership and financial questions, and social issues like peace, Third World, the workplace and the mass media. About six churches are present in almost every ecumenical organization: the Catholic, Protestant, Arminian, Mennonite, Episcopal and Hutterite church. Together, these churches control about 90% of all organized religion in the Netherlands. On several aspects, like the Council of Churches and the contacts with the government, cooperation reaches almost 100%. Not only on a national level, also on local level churches intensely work together. Local communities regularly celebrate ecumenical services, some- European Exceptionalism 177 times with intercommunion as well. In newly built areas, even ecumenical church buildings are built where the confessions share the same church hall. Some of these communities practice an ‘ecumenical’ baptism. Pastorate for special groups like students, soldiers, in hospitals or for drug addicts is highly ecumenical. In charity or in societal presence in general, churches work together. There is a close cooperation in the theological education in some places. In the last years, ecumenical cooperation was extended to other religions as well (Sengers 2003a: 158-161). Table 2: ecumenical relations in the Netherlands Catholic Protestant Arminian Mennonite Episcopal Protestant modernist Orthodox reformed Evangelical Pentecostal Baptist Apostolic Adventist Hutterite Moluccan Eastern orthodox Jewish CIO X X X X X X X X X X SILA X X X X IKV X X X X X IKON X X X X RvK X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Kerkbalans X X X X X OIKOS X X X X X DISK X X X X X X X X X X X X X CIO: Interchurch Contact on issues with the Government www.cioweb.nl SILA: Interchurch Membership Office www.sila.nl IKV: Interchurch Peace Board www.ikv.nl IKON: Ecumenical Broadcasting Organization in the Netherlands www.ikon.nl (the Catholic Church, the orthodox Reformed together with Baptists and Evangelicals and the Jews have their own organizations) RVK: Ecumenical Council of Churches www.raadvankerken.nl Kerkbalans: Church Balance (fundraising) www.kerkbalans.nl OIKOS: Ecumenical Institute for Church and Developmental Co-operation www.stichtingoikos.nl DISK: Ministry of the Churches in the Industrial Society www.disk-arbeidspastoraat.nl Finally, my recent research (Sengers 2006) shows that mainline local church communities do not really interact with the religious market – even when they are connected to a renewal movement on the religious market. This is the conclusion of interviews with Catholic and Protestant pastors whose congregation participates in Willow Creek, the Alpha Course, the Open Church or the Neocatechumenal Way. If we focus on three themes borrowed from marketing research (mission, market research and target groups), it becomes clear how less local church communities are concerned that others participate in their activities. The sense of mission was relatively strong among all of them, although the mission of the Open Church-communities was either outdated (Catholic) or too complex to handle (as admitted Erik Sengers 178 by the Protestant pastor). Market research was totally absent by all of them. The pastors knew quite well what was going on in their neighborhood, but this was totally based on impressions, talks with local politicians or civil organizations, headmasters of schools, newspaper articles, etc. From this, they made their own picture that however was nowhere made explicit, validated or extended. Most of the congregations identified target groups, but their potential was not extensively used. For example, the protestant Open Church-minister said they had special attention for young people and socially excluded, but when asked for the (minimal) activities they developed she said that these were not an integral part of the congregation. The Catholic Alpha community identified young people as well, but these activities were totally delegated to a charismatic community in the area they cooperated with. Almost all communities identified the same target groups, namely the young and the old (or sick), a choice that in my opinion is a compromise between necessity and need and not on a creative investigation of the local population. The explicit reaction of some respondents, that when people want to participate they have to knock on the church door and for the rest the congregation follows its normal business, underlines the low competitive awareness of mainline Dutch churches. 5. Pluralism + freedom  (necessarily) competition The relationship between pluralism, religious freedom and adherence is not only a theoretical or a statistical enigma. At present, it is the focus of discussion among scholars in the sociology of religion about the social, political and cultural differences between Europe and the United States (e.g. Berger et al. 2008). Religious market theory states that a free religious market leads to pluralism and to higher levels of adherence, as the needs of as many groups as possible can be fulfilled. But this line of thought keeps implicit one step that must be made explicit: religious market theory supposes that pluralism also means competition, but this must not necessarily be the case. This idea was explained by the religious situation in the Netherlands. The Netherlands has been a pluralistic country since the early days of the Reformation, and pluralism has grown ever since. And since the modern period at least, it has had a relatively big freedom on the religious market, a freedom that has increased with the new constitution of 1983. But especially since the 1980s, and in some churches long before, adherence has declined and unchurchedness has grown. If we look closer on how these churches operate on the religious market, we can see why that is so: they do not compete with each other. They experienced internal secularization, they cooperate on a multitude of ecclesiastical, pastoral, political, and societal levels, and they do not communicate their message to the general public. In short: the pluralism on the religious market does not result in an impetus to improve the quality of the religious services and to promote the public to participate in it. It seems as if most Dutch churches are caught in a religious cartel that hinders a competitive position. The churches that are the most integrated in this cartel seem to suffer the most under the loss of membership. Research indicates that the relationship between freedom, pluralism and adherence might be positive in the United States, but only to a limited degree in Europe. Religious market theory usually explains this with the existence of state regulation on the religious market, or the enduring effects of it (Stark/Finke 2000: 228-236). But the Dutch case shows European Exceptionalism 179 that the situation is much more nuanced, and in many other European countries as well: at least since 1800, state regulation is no longer as strict as it was in the ancien regime, and even in that period religious pluralism was accepted to a certain degree. What makes Europe different from the United States is the mentality of the actors or suppliers on the religious market. In the US, it was clear from the beginning that there was a multitude of churches and religious organizations, that no state or governmental body would help them, and that they themselves would be exclusively responsible for their own survival (Finke/Stark 1997). This situation fosters a competitive mentality. In Europe, this mentality seems to be absent. The churches are focused on the society or nation as a whole and not on specific groups, are used to the idea that they are a respected dialogue partner of the government and many have the burden of social organizations and associations (cf. Righart 1986, Hellemans 1990). Churches in Europe, also when they are not the official church or state-supported, are closely connected to society – in fact: they are society and see themselves as the society. Their position is that of an oligopoly and it is the highest goal for newcomers (like Islam or Christian groups) to be part of that team. This situation, that is comparable to what Davie (2007) calls ‘vicarious religion’, does not foster a competitive mentality among religious organizations. We might even argue the other way round (compatible with findings that in Europe generally religious adherence is higher with less pluralism) that in Europe in the case of a monopolistic market adherence is higher because this church feels threatened by modernization, liberalization and pluralism on the market and thus works harder to sustain its position – creating higher adherence, whereas in a pluralistic market the churches seek a common ground for the sake of society and nation, thus refrain from competition and welcome newcomers in their midst – creating a lower adherence. This situation is however changing. Both in the Catholic and in the Protestant Church, new developments point in the direction of a higher level competition. In the Catholic Church, a new generation of bishops appointed since 1970 increasingly stresses the uniqueness of this Church. In the course of this policy, a strong emphasis is being put on the sacraments and the sacramentality of the church. This not only had consequences for the inner working of the Church -like a higher evaluation of the parish priest, a stronger centralization on the diocesan level, control on the correct celebration of the liturgy and catechetical information, and initiatives to foster (Roman) Catholic identity-, but also for the external contacts of the church. Ecumenical contacts came increasingly under stress, the church withdrew or threatened to withdraw from a range of organizations and far-going ecumenical practice on local level was punished (Sengers 2003b). This policy is fostered by a whole range of new religious movements in the Catholic Church, like the Neocatechumenal Way, Focolare, the Emmanuel Communities and many others (Winkeler 2004). In the Protestant Church, a whole range of new movements is active across denominational borders and thus in mainline Protestantism as well. Many of them have contacts with Anglo-American evangelical movements, like Willow Creek, the Purpose-driven church, the Church growth movement, the Alpha-Course (Sengers 2005b) and so forth. Their goal is to renew Christianity –Protestantism at the first place – and to transform people from the lukewarm church membership and from the unchurched into upright Christians. This policy brings them into great conflict with their mother church, and sometimes this also has consequences for the ecumenical contacts. In any way, these developments point in the direc- Erik Sengers 180 tion of a more competitive position of (parts) of the mainline churches, that over time might transform Dutch Christianity to a situation comparable to the US. These conclusions should not be understood as a plea to end ecumenical relations, neither in the Dutch context, nor in Christianity in general. Within Christian faith, the necessity to find the common ground of the Churches and to explain this with one voice in the world is experienced as a great mission and benefit. Unfortunately, the results from social scientific empirical and theoretical research point in a different direction, that ecumenical cooperation damages the position of the individual churches and the position of Christianity in general. This does however not mean that ecumenical relations should be ended, moreover that a new interpretation of ecumenism, namely as spiritual unity in organizational diversity –as was practiced in the antique church- must be sought. 6. References Arts, Wil/Halman, Loek (eds.)(2004): European values at the turn of the millennium. Leiden/Boston. Ammerman, Nancy (ed.)(2007) Everyday religion. Observing modern religious lives. Oxford. Aupers, Stef/Otterloo, Anneke van (2000): New Age. Een godsdiensthistorische en sociologische benadering. Kampen. Batenburg, R. et al. (1988): De invloeden van religieuze heterogeniteit op de traditionele religieuze paricipatie. In: Hak et al. (eds.)(1988): 73-104. Baumann, Martin/Behloul, Samuel M. (eds.)(2005): Religiöser Pluralismus. Empirische Studien und analytische Perspektiven. Bielefeld. Beck, Herman/Nauta, Rein (eds.)(1999): Over leiden. Dynamiek en structuur van het religieus leiderschap. Tilburg. Becker, Jos (2005): Church membership investigated 1950-2002. In: Sengers (ed.): 59-71. Becker, Jos and Joep de Hart (2006): Godsdienstige veranderingen in Nederland. Verschuivingen in de binding met de kerken en de christelijke traditie. Den haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau. Becker, J.W. et al. (1997): Secularisatie en alternatieve zingeving in Nederland. Rijswijk. Becker, J.W./Wit, J.S.J. de (2000): Secularisatie in de jaren negentig. Kerklidmaatschap, veranderingen in opvattingen en een prognose. Den Haag. Berger, Peter/Davie/Grace/Fokas, Effie (2008) Religious America, secular Europe? A theme and variation. Burlington. Bernts, Ton (ed.)(2004): Boodschap aan de kerken? Religie als sociaal en moreel kapitaal. Zoetermeer/Nijmegen. Chaves, Mark/Cann, David E. (1992): Regulation, pluralism, and religious market structure. In: Rationality and society 4/3: 272-290. Christiano, Kevin (1987): Religious diversity and social change. American cities 1890-1906. New York. Davie, Grace (2007)Vicarious religion. A methodological challenge. In: Ammerman (ed.): 21-35. Dekker, G. (1992): De stille revolutie. De ontwikkeling van de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland tussen 1950 en 1960. Kampen. Dekker, Gerard et al. (1997): God in Nederland 1966-1996. Amsterdam. Dijk, A.M.G. van (ed.)(1999): Hindoeïsme in Nederland. Achtergronden, geloofsbeleving en toekomstperspectieven van Surinaamse Hindoes in de Nederlandse samenleving. Budel. Eijnatten, Joris van (1993): God, Nederland en Oranje. Dutch Calvinism and the search for the social centre. Kampen. Finke, Roger (1997): The consequences of religious competition. Supply-side explanations for religious change. In: Young (ed.): 46-65. Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (1988): Religious economies and sacred canopies. Religious mobilization in American cities 1906. In: American Sociological Review 53: 41-49. Finke, Roger/Stark, Rodney (1997): The churching of America 1776-1990. Winners and losers in our religious economy. New Brunswick (3rd edition). Finke, Roger et al. (1997): Pluralism and religious participation. New York, 1855-1865. In: American Sociological Review 61: 203-218. European Exceptionalism 181 Graaf, Nan-Dirk de/Grotenhuis, Manfred te (2005): Afnemend geloof in God en toenemend geloof in een hogere werkelijkheid? Verklaringen van trends tussen 1979 en 2000. In: Mens en maatschappij 80/2: 143-158. Haar, Gerrie ter (1998): Halfway to paradise. African Christians in Europe. Cardiff. Hak, Durk et al. (red.)(1988): Sociologische verkenningen van het noorden. Verslag van het onderzoek onder lezers van het Nieuwsblad van het Noorden in 1988. Groningen: 73-104. Halman, Loek/Draulans. Veerle (2004): Religious beliefs and practices in contemporary Europe. In: Arts/Halman (eds.): 283-316. Hamberg, Eva M. and Thorleif Pettersson (1994) The religious market. Denominational competition and religious participation in contemporary Sweden. In: Journal for the scientific study of religion 33/3: 205-216. Hellemans, Staf (1990): Strijd om de moderniteit. Sociale bewegingen en verzuiling in Europa sinds 1800. Leuven: universitaire pers Leuven. Herten, M. van/Otten, F. (2007) Naar een nieuwe schatting van het aantal islamieten in Nederland. Bevolkingstrends. Statistisch kwartaalblad over de demografie van Nederland 55/3 : 48-53. Hoekstra, E.G./Ipenburg, M.H. (2000): Wegwijs in religieus en levensbeschouwelijk Nederland. Handboek religies, kerken, stromingen en organisaties. Kampen. Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1991): The consequences of religious market regulation. Adam Smith and the economics of religion. In: Rationality and society 3/2: 156-177. Jansen, M.M./Stoffels, H.C. (eds.)(2008) A Moving God. Immigrant churches in the Netherlands. Münster. Jong, Gert de (2004): Evangelische christenen in Nederland. Marktverkenning voor de commerciële christelijke radiozender Bright FM. Nijmegen. Knippenberg, Hans (1992): De religieuze kaart van Nederland. Omvang en geografische spreiding van de godsdienstige gezindten vanaf de Reformatie tot heden. Assen/Maastricht. Knippenberg, Hans (2005a): The Netherlands. Selling churches and building mosques. In: Knippenberg (ed.): 88106. Knippenberg, Hans (2005b): The changing religious landscape of Europe. Concluding remarks. In: Knippenberg (ed.)(2005): 201-207. Knippenberg, Hans (ed.)(2005): The changing religious landscape of Europe. Amsterdam. Need, Ariana/Graaf, Nan Dirk de: Zich bekeren en wisselen van kerkgenootschap in Nederland. Mens en Maatschappij 80/4: 288-304. Petterson, Thorleif/Hamberg, Eva (1997): Denominational pluralism and church membership in contemporary Sweden. A longitudinal study of the period 1974-1995. In: Journal of empirical theology 10/2: 61-78. Phalet, Karen/Haker, Frea (2004): Moslim in Nederland. Diversiteit en verandering in religieuze betrokkenheid. Turken en Marokkanen in Nederland 1998-2002. Den Haag. Rath, Jan et al. (1996): Nederland en zijn Islam. Een ontzuilende samenleving reageert op het ontstaan van een geloofsgemeenschap. Amsterdam. Righart, Hans (1986): De katholieke zuil in Europa. Het ontstaan van verzuiling onder katholieken in Oostenrijk, Zwitserland, België en Nederland. Meppel. Schepens, Theo (1999): Leiden als concurreren. Context en consequenties van competitie. In: Beck/Nauta (eds.): 39-56. Schouten, J.P. (1999) Hindoes in Nederland. Een overzicht. In: Dijk (ed.): 44-73. Sengers, Erik (2003a): „Al zijn we katholiek, we zijn Nederlanders”. Opkomst en verval van de katholieke kerk in Nederland sinds 1795 vanuit rational-choice perspectief. Delft. Sengers, Erik (2003b): “You don’t have to be a saint or a practicing Catholic…”. Higher tension and lower attachment in the Dutch Catholic Church since 1970. In: Antonianum 88/3: 529-545. Sengers, Erik (2005a): The Dutch, their gods and the study of religion in the post-war period. In: Erik Sengers (ed.): 7-20. Sengers, Erik (2005b): ‘Leading the world to church and Christ’. The use and success of the ALPHA-course in Dutch churches. In: Sengers (ed.): 143-162. Sengers, Erik (ed.)(2005): The Dutch and their gods. Secularization and transformation of religion in the Netherlands after 1950. Hilversum. Sengers, Erik (2006): Aantrekkelijke kerk. Nieuwe bewegingen in kerkelijk Nederland op de religieuze markt. Delft. Solinge, Hanna van/Vries, Marlene de (2001): De joden in Nederland anno 2000. Demografisch profiel en binding aan het jodendom. Amsterdam. Stark, Rodney/Bainbridge, William Sims (1996): A theory of religion. New Brunswick. Stark, Rodney/Finke, Roger (2000): Acts of faith. Explaining the human side of religion. Berkeley. Stolz, Jörg (2005): Wie wirkt Pluralität auf individuelle Religiosität? Eine Konfrontation von Wissenssoziologie und Rational Choice. In: Baumann/Behloul (eds.): 197-222. 182 Erik Sengers Thurlings, J.M.G. (1971): De wankele zuil. Nederlandse katholieken tussen assimilatie en pluralisme. Nijmegen. Verweij, Johannes Adrian (1998): Secularisering tussen feit en fictie. Een internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek naar determinanten van religieuze betrokkenheid. Tilburg. Winkeler, Lodewijk (2004): Stromingen in katholiek Nederland. Kampen. Young, Lawrence A. (ed.): Rational choice theory and religion. Summary and assessment. New York. Religion, Popular Piety, Patchwork Religion1 Hermann Denz † 1. Transition: the pilgrim and the patchwork religion The preceding article on “The Wanderer as a prototype of late modern religiousness“ ended by pointing out the character of the pilgrim. The working title of this article was “Patchwork religion – an old hat“. Thus the question arose how the three terms – pilgrim – hat – patchwork religion could be matched: they do so in the image of the pilgrim on the Road to Santiago de Compostela, one of the most important pilgrimages of the Middle Ages. One of the special features was the pilgrim’s hat with the deep sea scallop. The Road to Santiago de Compostela and the legends around it are themselves already part of a patchwork religion. The name of the apostle James (the Elder) is handed down in the New Testament (he was executed around 40 AD according to the Acts of the Apostles 12, 1-2), but we have little additional information. The rest is legend, in part older legends, which were connected with James. Furthermore, political considerations played a role – he was declared patron of the Reconquista. The golden age of pilgrimage was from the 11th to the 15th century and today, the Road to Santiago de Compostela is once again very popular – not in order to go to heaven but as a means to find oneself (annually, approximately 200000 pilgrims and 10 million tourists). 2. The hypotheses The starting hypothesis is: specific religiousness, in particular popular religiousness as it is being practiced, has always been a patchwork religion. There has always been a tense relationship between popular piety and ‘official catholicism’. However, many things have changed: not the relationship itself but rather the scope of the elements, their embeddedness in the ‘official religousness’ and the way they are being dealt with. Thus it is sensible to differentiate between a pre- and a postmodern patchwork religion – but only as modes of expression of the same phenomenon. Only in the last third of the 19th century did the importance of regional churches (in Central Europe) disappear to the benefit of roman centralism and greater uniformity. “Regarding the centuries-old history of Catholicism, the time period between 1850 and 1950 was an exceptional period. During these hundred years, the 1 This article is based on a research project of several years. The first research report was published in 2004: Denz, H., Tschaikner, M.: "Hexenglaube, Alltagsmagie und Naturheilkunde im Bregenzerwald". Within the framework of the project, 14 interviews on traditional everyday magic (Interviews A through Q) as well as 6 interviews on postmodern forms (Interviews R through W) were carried out and 7 mostly handwritten sources of varying lengths (Sources AA through GG) were collected. The interviews were low structured expert interviews (the interviews were preceded by a questioning of potential interview partners in order to identify the experts). For a number of theoretical and practical reasons, the feminine perspective is the focus of attention, which is why mostly women were interviewed. Hermann Denz 184 doctrine and practice of Catholicism matched to a previously unprecedented extent that was never again accomplished. ... Modern religious syncretism is probably very similar to the pre-modern situation of occidental Christianity“ (Altermatt 1995, p. 46).2 The first hypothesis: Catholic disciplining in the 19th century did not cause this patchwork religion to disappear – at least not in the rural region under investigation. The documents show that people were very careful not to let the inconsistencies grow too large. However, alternative religious magical practices continued unchanged. There was no period of exception between 1850 and 1950. The second hypothesis: The hypothetical statement that pre- and postmodern forms of popular piety (patchwork religion) truly are so similar should not be assumed to be true too hastily. Popular piety can differ greatly in detail, even if it appears to be similar. Sociology of religion is often tempted to label everything as esoteric, which does not fit into the common canon of religious beliefs and practices. However, practices that look similar can be related to very different meanings. Therefore, very attentive observations and a precise differentiation are necessary. Thus, we want to reflect on a phenomenology of ritual (and possibly magical) practices. 3. Patchwork religion = religion + a little something else “Grand churches and theology do not approve of deamons, magic and everything that is related to these things to a great extent. This holds for the present as well as for the individual epochs in church history. With popular religion however – which has always had a tendency to combine different teachings and cults and is indifferent towards dogmas – they have always enjoyed great popularity“ (Mathys 2002, S. 21; own translation). This statement will be discussed in depth along two dimensions: on the one hand, we cannot merely assume that popular religiousness and elite religiousness conflict with one another (see: Bachmann 2003; p. 33 for a discussion of this issue). On the other hand, the dominant religion has always attempted to describe the inferior, mostly more ancient belief systems as superstitio (according to Stowasser: conjuration, delusion, superstition, alien cult, superstitious customs) as opposed to the ‘true’ religion (Müller 2002). Apparently, a constituted church with a specialized caste of theologians is not necessary in order to differentiate between belief and superstition, as the Roman and Celtic examples prove (Müller 2002, pp. 35) The dominant religion simply is religion, superstition (often identified with magic), is what diverges from it. However, this has never prevented people from continuing to practice the ancient cults, as described in the Old Testament (for example the story of the golden calf). Nevertheless, it is not simply the elite who adhere to the new religion while the people follow the ancient cults, rather, most of the time, the relations are more complex. It was Aaron who had the golden calf made (Ex. 32, 1). As Moses’ brother he surely belonged to the ruling elite. That is to say: in the past, a patchwork religion usually resulted from the fact that beliefs and practices from older religions continued to be pursued within a newer religion as well. This idea determined the research on public piety for a long time. Surely, this is how patchwork religion appeared during the first 800 years of Christian missionary work. The 2 Translation by Editor. Religion, Popular Piety and Patchwork Religion 185 few means of communication and mobility (and thus control) alone led to many regional peculiarities of the churches. The people worshiped saints who had not been canonized, followed traditions that were practiced only in certain regions etc. “This, together with traditional customs, narratives and traditions results in a world view which is neither purely Christian nor heathen, as the belief that nature is inhabited by gods and ancestors was certainly not repressed after the introduction of Christianity. Instead, the newly introduced religion incorporated existing views as heathen rites were reinterpreted as Christian. Conversely, the people interpreted many Christian sets of belief in their own manner and integrated them into the existing world views“ (Lussi 2002, 14).3 Due to the growing mobility of people and ideas, a new type of patchwork religion gained greater importance: the combination of elements from different religious and spiritual systems. In Europe, this type attained greater significance from the 13th century on, as the texts of different origins (Egyptian, Jewish, Persian etc.; combined as a hermeneutic philosophy or magia naturalis) which had been brought to Spain by the Moors, were picked up in Europe (early Renaissance). It is this type, which today is usually called patchwork religion. However, the archaeological findings (in Rome, Pompeii etc.) suggest that this type of patchwork religion already existed 2000 years ago. Obviously, it only required mobility and means of communication. In the course of the analysis, both types of explanation will appear. However, they cannot always be easily distinguished or identified. We assume that patchwork religion presents itself differently, depending on the religion upon which it is based. The analysis only refers to Roman Catholic Christianity. The Orthodox Christian church, which has a much stronger mystical tradition, has a different structure. Its religious rites include remnants of many archaic cults (such as fire walking, animal sacrifices, sacrifices for the sea goddess) or it at least cultivates these remnants at the margins of its religious rites. Here, we focus first and foremost on Christian religion of Roman-Catholic origin, as the field study refers to an exclusively Catholic region, which remained almost completely untouched by the reformation – except for a small group of Anabaptists who were expelled immediately however (Bergmann 1848, Gismann-Fiel 1982), which shows that the Counter-Reformation was highly effective. Austere enlightened Protestantism offers little room for magical remnants of extrachristian religiousness. Due to absence of a veneration of the saints and a baroque Catholic celebration of rites (mass, processions, pilgrimages etc.), there are little possibilities for popular piety to cultivate extrachristian elements. Especially in the beginning of the reformation, this obviously caused great tension between the reformed ministers of the church and their perception of religiousness and the common popular piety (Haag et al. 2002). A study on the duchy of Württemberg (Dillinger 2003) confirms this finding. The study mainly refers to the attitude towards magic. The enlightened Protestantism handled common magic more pragmatically than Catholicism. Although casting evil spells was punishable by the death penalty (these regulations have been in force since the Roman law, in Austria, this paragraph was abolished only during the judicial reform by Josef II (1780-1790)), the teachings of the pact with the devil however were rejected. Considering the number of burnings of witches, however, the difference between Catholic and Protestant regions was apparently 3 Translation by Editor. Hermann Denz 186 not that large.Catholic-type patchwork religion as well was not always defined the same: where was the line between religio and superstitio? Several examples illustrate this point: in the refectory of the monastery St. Georgen in Stein on the Rhine, a zodiac is displayed on the wall (15th century); Austria’s most famous magical scroll is kept in the convent of St. Lambrecht (magical scrolls are collective amulets, which serve to protect their owners against all evil: Biermann 201); a famous traditional magical script, the “Wound-BlessingBooklet“ from Upper Austria was written by a ‘Honorable Johann Karel Ferdinant Gessel, priest in Schwannerstadt’ (Grabner 1987), in the ancient library of the Jesuit college in Innsbruck, there are four copies of the widely disseminated magical-religious booklet ‘Religious shield’; the new issue of the Rhenish-Westphalian Journal of Folklore tells of magic instructions in a missal manuscript (Neuheuser 2003).4 4. Further precision: religion and magic The differentiation between cult/magic and religion is highly problematic. There are no conclusive definitions, partially due to the fact that all concrete religions include magical elements. Two main differences lie in the assumptions about the world and the importance of rituals: according to magical thinking, man and nature, cosmos, forces etc. are considered to be a single entity, according to religious thinking they constitute two clearly separated worlds: the divine sphere and the worldly sphere with man and nature. And: “The belief of the magician in the supernatural effectiveness of his remedies, which is moreover shared by his clientele, ... is directly opposed to the submissive, offering and reverently worshiping attitude of ‘religious’ people“ (Petzold 1978, XI).5 A healer in Appenzell is aware of this problem, even though his attitude is rather unusual: “Those who serve in love, ignore themselves completely. He will realize what is written in the Lord’s Prayer, i.e. ‚’Thy will be done’ because ‘Thy will be done’ also includes the ability to accept that a recovery possibly may not always occur, that higher instances have decided differently and certainly wisely, even though we may not be able to see why.... If, according to the belief of the person at prayer, the spell aimed towards God ‘forces’ him to fulfill his wish, it is a magic spell; if God’s will is ‘free’, and if he, according to the belief of the praying person, is able to act the way he wishes, it is a prayer“ (Inauen 1995, pp. 65).6 However, if we apply this definition consistently, central elements of Christianity comprise magical features. Most likely, there is no religion in this strict sense which goes entirely without magical ideas. In any event, magical elements constitute a large part of popular religion. 5. The field study: on the history and topography of the Bregenz Forest The Bregenz forest has an interesting peripheral position, comparable with the Waldviertel (north of the Danube, i.e. outside of the Roman Empire), except for the fact that – topographically - it lies in the centre of the Roman/Christian cultural realm. After the conquests 4 5 6 For a compilation of popes who did magic themselves see: Tucsay 2003, pp. 81. Translation by the Editor. Tranlation by the Editor. Religion, Popular Piety and Patchwork Religion 187 by Tiberius and Drusus (14-16 A.D.), the Vorarlberg became part of the Roman Empire (province of Rätien). Until the beginning of the 7th century (600 founding of the diocese of Constance, 610 missionary work by Kolumban and Gallus), Vorarlberg had been moderately christianized, which does not mean however, that the ancient cults had disappeared entirely (Burmeister 1983, pp. 28). This development surely did not leave the Bregenz forest untouched, i.e. we may assume that pre-christian religious beliefs continued to prevail and were defended for a long time, as the legend of Merbod, Diedo and Ilga demonstrates: Diedo was forced to give up the monastery, Merbod was beaten to death. Around 830, Walahfrid still called the Bregenz forest „eremus vasta“ (Bilgeri 1976, 49). Scientific reasearch always assumed that it had not been settled: a thick forest, crossed by deep valleys, and on occasion and for short periods of time, it was used for hunting or as a refuge during war times. However, more and more findings have been found which suggest a a more continuous use: a stone hatchet from Damüls, several stone points, an analysis of pollen from Bezau, which points to the cultivation of cereal in pre-christian times, and other scattered findings.7 We must assume that the region has been settled continuously at least from the late Iron Age onwards. In particular since the middle of the 11th century, another development thrust began, which changed or rather superimposed existing structures (Niederstätter 2003). “In the Bregenz part of the region, a first impulse possibly originated from the earl’s family itself. According to oral tradition, the holy siblings Merbod, Diedo and Ilga, who are mentioned in relation with the founding story of Alberschwende, Andelsbuch and Schwarzenberg, belong to it" (Niederstätter 1998, p. 10; own translation).8 We will refer to this legend again in a later chapter. In this case, we may speak of a closed-off cultural realm (despite certain differences between the front and the back of the forest): the topography (Rapp 1924, p. 72, Bilgeri 1936, p. 4), history and economic situation are very homogeneous. Land seizure occurred fairly homogeneously, due to monasteries and earls, Christianity was more or less mandatory from the 11th century on. Day-to-day problems were very similar, dominated by agriculture and related to the exposure of the people to an inhospitable nature (there are hardly any large, even, agriculturally usable areas, the settlements are located on a medium altitude between 700 – 850 meters). 6. Early christianization and its traces By equating magic with paganism and deism, Christianity developed a special perspective (Tuczay 2003, 51). The problem with Christianity was not the fact that it did not incorporate a belief in magic but rather the fact that it did indeed include a belief in its effectiveness. The teachings of magic resulted from a conflict between beginning Christianity and its heathen environment (philosophy, deism, belief in demons, gnosis, teachings of magic) and the various Christian splinter groups (see for example Manichaeism) (in detail Daxelmüller 2001, 74-94). The most important theologian of that time is Saint Augustus, “for whom magical acts as such did not have any effect. More so, they were a sign of agreement and a means of communication between humans and the devil. The human being cannot 7 8 For a compilation of findings from the Stone Age see: Wischenbarth 2001. Translation by the Editor. 188 Hermann Denz evoke magic with his hocus-pocus but only the devil can“ (Decker 2003, 35, Tuczay 2003, 76; own translation).9 Albertus Magnus was a theologian from the Middle Ages who wanted to save the ‚magia naturalis’ (in detail see Daxelmüller 2001, 109-195; Decker 2003).10 During the course of their missionary work among people of another faith, Christian missionaries developed three strategies to confront traditional magical beliefs, which were evidently wide-spread among the people: Condemnation: In order to suppress magical beliefs and practices, they were related to the devil and thus condemned. In particular, a great number of devil sagas on magical places were told (for example on the Hirschberg, which probably used to be a Celtic shrine cave). The fact that the following statement was repeatedly made during the interviews also matches this patterns: magical practices are good when used for problem solving, however they are considered to be superstition when used for fortune-telling. A second strategy was to integrate the magical beliefs into Christian religion in order to make everyday magic compatible with Christianity: Thus, many traditional practices were interpreted as Christian (legends on hazelnut twigs, Good Friday eggs, magic spells etc. but also on locations, in particular the Ilga source) “From ca. 590 A.D. onwards, Christian crosses, images of the Holy Mary were offered to the pious, fearful people for worship at locations, where heathen idols had been located, where heathen gods had been worshiped near holy waters, where heathen cult stones had been revered, and where heathen festivities had been held“ (Haid 2002; 69; see also Kufner 1992; own translation).11 The third strategy consisted of tolerating that which could not be prevented. “Evidently, it was also tolerated when old relicts were not eliminated immediately when the pious people continued to adhere to ancient beliefs of their cult. ...Religous and cult-based beliefs related to rocks, sources, trees, fertility, protection and magic which were deeply rooted in the people have survived all modernisms and iconoclasms“ (Haid 2002, 70; own translation).12 In the course of time, however, many of these practices were detached from their spiritual background and are now being performed as ideologically neutral rituals which may even be interpreted scientifically (tasting of water, some rituals to fight warts etc.). This causes everyday magic in the Bregenz forest to appear to be very unspiritual and materialistic at times. This also enabled priests to practice this type of everyday magic (there are some priests who know how to use a pendulum very well, who can locate and defuse zones which are out of balance etc.). “Our ‚Wound-Blessing-Booklet’ from Upper Austria, which is an interesting example of the overlapping of Christian and magical elements and motifs, reflects very well the 9 10 11 12 „für den zauberische Handlungen als solche nichts bewirken konnten. Sie seien vielmehr ein Zeichen des Einverständnisses und ein Mittel der Kommunikation zwischen dem Menschen und dem Dämon. Nicht der Mensch mit seinem Hokuspokus, sondern nur der Teufel könne den Zauber hervorrufen“ (Decker 2003, 35, Tuczay 2003, 76). Albertus Magnus 1206 or 1193 – 1280. „Ab etwa 590 wurden also an Orten, wo früher heidnische 'Götzenstandbilder' standen, wo an heiligen Wassern heidnische Götter angebetet wurden, wo heidnische Kultsteine verehrt und heidnische Feste abgehalten wurden, christliche Kreuze, Marienbilder dem frommen verängstigten Volk zur Verehrung empfohlen“ (Haid 2002, 69; auch Kufner 1992) „Offenbar wurde auch geduldet, wenn alte Relikte nicht sofort ausgemerzt wurden, wenn das gläubige Volk weiterhin an alten Kultvorstellungen festhielt. … Zutiefst im Volke verwurzelte Glaubens- und Kultvorstellungen um Steine, Quellen, Bäume, Fruchtbarkeit, Abwehr und Zauber haben tatsächlich alle Modernismen und Bilderstürmereien überlebt“ (Haid 2002, 70). Religion, Popular Piety and Patchwork Religion 189 intention of its religious author to ‘defuse’ the magical components again and again through Christian symbols and prayers and to limit the magical part, which evidently originated from ancient literature on magic, as much as possible. (It) ... is an interesting example of the close coexistence of Christian and magical thinking, which has manifested itself in an unshakeable belief in healing through the centuries” (Grabner 1987, p. 123).13 The various miracle blessings also show that these magical beliefs were practiced without difficulty with and alongside Christian philosophy. Schneider goes one step further by regarding the close combination of magic and Christianity as a means of protection or dissociation of the healers themselves, i.e. he stresses the individual perspective more so than the institutional aspect: “However, the truly obvious emphasis on religiousness and the significant role of faith could also indicate that the healers felt a bit insecure because of their occupation as they were aware of the fact that they were working in a grey area between good and evil. Those who are convinced that humans can be healed with spells and rituals are also able to imagine that they can be used to wish someone harm” (Schneider 1993, 93; auch Inauen 1995, p. 67; own translation).14 7. Metamorphosis 1: the hazelnut In Celtic mythology, the hazelnut plays a big role (see for example z.B. Markale 1989, p. 88). “Not only was the hedge a physical border between the cultivated land and the nearly impassable primeval forest, it was also a metaphysical border. The kingdom of the wild animals, ghosts and forest monsters, elves and deities began behind the enclosure“ (Storl 2001, p. 193; own translation).15 The hazelnut is the connection to the otherworld: a dowsing rod to detect water, a means of protection against snakes, wild animals, illnesses and fire and lightning (Storl 2001, 194, 200). Bewitched cattle were beaten with hazelnut switches, with a hazelnut staff, one can beat a witch from afar. Magic rods were also made from hazelnut (Moses 1950). There is a story on a hazelnut twig functioning as a protection against lightning (interview D). The hazelnut twig must be cut between 11 and 12 o’clock on the day of the festival of ‚The Visitation’ (July 2nd). According to the legend, Mary and her child were caught 13 14 15 „Bei unserem oberösterreichischen 'Wund-Segen-Büchelein', das ein interessantes Beispiel für das Ineinandergreifen von christlichen und magischen Elementen und Motiven darstellt, lässt sich sehr gut das Bestreben seines geistlichen Autors erkennen, die zauberische Komponente immer wieder durch christliche Symbolik und Gebete gleichsam zu 'entschärfen' und den magischen Anteil, der eindeutig alter Zauberliteratur entstammt, möglichst einzuengen. (Es) ... ist ein interessantes Beispiel für das enge Nebeneinander christlichen und magischen Gedankengutes, wie es sich als Ausdruck eines unerschütterlichen Heilglaubens durch Jahrhunderte hindurch manifestiert hat“ (Grabner 1987, 123 f). „Die geradezu auffallende Betonung der Religiosität und der massgeblichen Rolle des Glaubens könnte aber doch auch ein Indiz dafür sein, dass die HeilerInnen wegen ihrer Tätigkeit eine gewisse Verunsicherung spüren, dass ihnen bewusst ist, sich in einem Grenzbereich von Gut und Böse zu bewegen. Wer davon überzeugt ist, dass durch Sprüche und Rituale Menschen geheilt werden können, kann sich auch vorstellen, dass dadurch jemandem etwas Schlechtes angewünscht werden kann. Die Nähe zu Vorstellungen von Schadenzauber und Hexerei ist jedenfalls gegeben“ (Schneider 1993, 93; auch Inauen 1995, 67 f). „Die Hecke war nicht nur eine physische Grenze zwischen dem kultivierten Land und dem kaum zu durchdringenden Urwald, sondern ebenso eine metaphysische Grenze. Hinter dem Gehege fing das reich der wilden Tiere, der Gespenster und Waldunholde, der Elfenwesen und Gottheiten an“ (Storl 2001, 193 f.) 190 Hermann Denz in a storm and the hazelnut bush protected them. “According to the legends, the Virgin Mother rested underneath a yew tree and a lime tree on her flight to Egypt and she found shelter from a bad storm underneath a hazelnut bush“ (Elsensohn 2001, 43, Elsensohn 2002, p. 38; own translation).16 The interviewee does so every year, “so as not to let this tradition die“. One time, lightning actually struck the house and destroyed the main fuse. The fuse box was attached to a wooden beam in the attic. According to the interviewee, it was a ‘miracle’ that the house did not burn down. She attributes this to the hazelnut twig. There is an additional legend which justifies the function of the hazelnut as a means of defense against snakes in a Christian manner: “One afternoon, baby Jesus had fallen asleep and the Virgin Mother was happy about this and said: ’My boy, have you fallen asleep? You are right, I’ll go to the forest to find strawberries for you in the meantime’. This is what she said and she left for the forest to the place where nice strawberries grow. When she wanted to pull one off, an otter jumped up against her and the Virgin Mother, badly scared, started back a bit but the otter hissed at her. The good Mother did not know what to do other than to hide behind a hazelnut perennial. Here she remained until the otter had crept away. When she saw this, she happily returned to the strawberry field and collected strawberries for baby Jesus. When here basket was full, she once again returned to the hazelnut bush and said to it: ‘As you protected me, you will protect others in the future’“17 (Die Haselrute 1950; own translation).18 16 17 18 „Unter einer Eibe und einer Linde habe die Muttergottes auf der Flucht nach Ägypten gerastet, heißt es in den Legenden, und unter einem Haselstrauch habe sie vor einem bösen Unwetter Schutz gefunden“ (Elsensohn 2001, 43, Elsensohn 2002, 38 f.). Saint Magnus (699-772) drove away snakes and dragons with a staff. This staff is still worshiped in Füssen today. „Twice a year on the day of the festival of Saint Magnus, the staff is removed in order to worship it and to bless the fields during their inspection. Magical powers are attributed to Saint Magnus’ staff. Whenever epidemics or vermin plagues prevailed or the harvest was threatened, it was lent out for blessings and travelled all the way to Tirol, the Black Forest and Switzerland. As it was damaged because of this – again and again, wooden splinters were cut off as relics - it was set in silver." (http://www.stmang.de/ wallfahrt/geschichte2.htm, 20.10.2003; own translation). Saint Magnus’ staff has not been analyzed, however, there is an oral tradition that it is made out of Hazelnut (information from Mr. Böhm, Füssen). “Der Stab wird zweimal im Jahr entnommen, am Magnusfest zur Verehrung und beim Flurumgang zur Segnung der Fluren. Dem Magnusstab werden wundertätige Kräfte zugeschrieben. Über Jahrhunderte wurde er, wenn Seuchen oder Ungezieferplagen herrschten oder die Ernte durch Unbillen bedroht war, für Segnungen entliehen und kam bis nach Tirol, in den Schwarzwald und die Schweiz. Da er dadurch sehr gelitten hat, es wurden auch immer wieder Holzsplitter als Reliquien abgeschnitten, faßte man ihn in Silber" (http://www.stmang.de/wallfahrt/geschichte2.htm, 20.10.2003). „Das Christkind ist an einem Nachmittag eingeschlafen gewesen, und die Mutter Gottes hat sich darüber gefreut und gesagt: 'Büble, bist du eingeschlafen? Du hast recht, ich geh' derweilen ins Wäldchen, dir Erdbeeren suchen.' So hat sie gesagt und ist in den Wald gegangen, wo die schönen Erdbeeren stehen. Aber wie sie eine brechen will, springt eine Otter gegen sie, und die Mutter Gottes, arg erschrocken, flieht ein Stück zurück, doch die Otter zischt ihr nach. Die gute Mutter weiß sich keinen anderen Rat, als sich hinter einer Haselstaude zu verstecken. Da bleibt sie stehen, bis sich die Otter wieder verkrochen hat. Wie sie das gesehen hat, ist sie herzlich froh zum Erdbeerplatz zurückgekehrt und hat die Erdbeeren für das Christkind gepflückt. Als das Krättlein ganz voll gewesen ist, hat sie den Haselbusch nochmals aufgesucht und zu ihm gesagt: 'Wie du mir jetzt Schutz gewesen bist, so sollst du es in Zukunft auch andern sein.“ (Die Haselrute 1950). Religion, Popular Piety and Patchwork Religion 8. 191 Metamorphosis 2: the sources When looking for even older traces of magical thinking, our interest increasingly focused on legends. Most sagas – at least in their traditional form – were invented in the 19th century. However, the legend of the three holy siblings Merbod, Diedo and Ilga actually appears to refer to the beginning of the settlement of the Bregenz forest. Merbod and Diedo probably were historical characters, Ilga is most likely a fictional character. Historical and archaeological findings show that the topographic references (the three villages as the starting point of settlement), the reference to a very early worship of Merbod, the reference to the descent of the three siblings (they are supposed to be descended from the lineage of the earl of Bregenz) surely contain a historic core of truth. In addition, old traditions are likely to exist in Alberschwende in particular due to its location on the border between the populated Rhine valley and the unsettled Bregenz forest and nearby a natural path to this uninhabited region. Due to the analogy to many Christian chapels in the Alpine region, it is likely that the legend is actually a Christian interpretation of an ancient shrine. A shrine (that is, a sacred source – the first church was built over a source) which is located in such an area could have existed long before the advent of Christianity (for Switzerland: Lussi 2002, p.14; for the Alpine region: Haid 1992; general information: Müller 2002, pp. 56). “One day, Ilga, Merboth19 and Diedo said good-bye to one another at a place on the Schwarzenberg which is now called Lorennen20; a source with superb water which does not freeze even during the coldest winter weather broke out of a rock on the ground.21 Ilga took water from this source in her apron and carried it to her hermit’s cabin, which she had recently set up for herself a half hours walk away from a church which was built later on, where she lacked water. However, a good quarter of an hour before reaching her hermit’s cabin, she spilled some of the water which she had already carried for three quarters of an hour; on this spot, a little source sprang up immediately which exists until today; she brought the rest of the water to her hermit’s cabin in her apron; there, she poured it on the ground and – lo and behold - a source with water was created, which exists until today; it is the famous source of Saint Ilga“ (Nelk 1844, 29; own translation).22 Ilga died on June 8th, 1115. Above her grave, a chapel was built and later on, a church was erected. Now back to historical facts and archaelogical findings: “Historically, Diedo’s existence is credible as a chapel is supposed to have been erected above his grave in Andelsbuch only a few years after his death – as verified by the chronicle of the monastery in Petershausen near Constance, where the monks came from. Historically, Ilga’s existence 19 20 21 22 Old spelling Today: Lorena, a transient area between Alberschwende and Schwarzenberg (1091m). According to another oral tradition, the water of the source is always cloudy because Ilga cried so much. „Eines Tages nahmen Ilga, Merboth und Diedo von einander Abschied auf jener Stelle des Schwarzenberges, welche jetzt Lorennen heißt, Abschied; da brach am Boden aus einem Gestein hervor eine Quelle vortrefflichen Wassers, welche auch bei der größten Winterkälte nicht gefriert. Ilga nahm aus dieser Quelle ein Wasser in der Schürze mit sich und trug es nach ihrem Einsiedler-Hüttchen, das sie sich oben, eine halbe Stunde von der nachmals erbauten Pfarrkirche, vor kurzer Zeit aufgeschlagen hatte, und wo sie Wasser vermißte. Aber eine starke Viertelstunde vor ihrem Einsiedler-Hüttchen verschüttete sie etwas von diesem Wasser, das sie bereits drei Viertelstunden weit getragen; da entstand an dieser Stelle sogleich ein Quellchen, das noch heut zu Tage zu sehen ist; das übrige Wasser brachte sie in ihrer Schürze bis zu ihrem Einsiedler-Hüttchen; dort goß sie das auf den Boden hin, und sieh, da entstand sogleich eine Quelle vortrefflichen Wassers, die bis auf den heutigen Tag zu sehen ist; es ist die berühmte Quelle der seligen Ilga“ (Nelk 1844, 29). Hermann Denz 192 cannot be proven. ... Merbod: Due to the fact that he is mentioned several times in the obituaries of the monastery, his story is convincing even though he must have been much younger than the siblings mentioned in the oral tradition.“ (Winder 1998, 4).23 According to the oral tradition, the churches in Andelsbuch and Schwarzenberg were built over the graves of Diedo and Ilga respectively, the Merbod chapel (actually the Wendelin chapel) in Alberschwende was built over Merbod’s grave. All three churches also keep corresponding relics. Alberschwende: “Thanks to their piety, the believers take a bit of water from this source and some soil from this place back to their homes in order to testify to the worship of the saints“ (Nelk 1844, 13; own translation).24 The soil is supposed to help with children’s fever. A statue of Saint Merbod with a club, where woodchips are cut off, is also located in this chapel.25 According to the legends, three sources are attributed to Saint Ilga. However, only the source near her hermitage is especially worshiped. A chapel was erected nearby, which many people visit even today. The water is supposed to help in general and with eye diseases in particular. Today, Diedo is not worshiped in a comparable manner anymore.26 9. The modern age between everyday magic and heresy “French historians like Delumeau describe the Christian Occident around 1500 as nearly being a land of missionary work. The peasant majority of the people in Old Europe lived in the countryside and were neither able to read nor write. Our knowledge of what the peasants truly believed and practiced is very fragmentary... The peasant rural population acknowledged the church’s authority, however, they cultivated a syncretic Christian faith, interwoven with elements originating from a natural religion“ (Altermatt 1995, p. 16; own translation).27 The analysis is complicated by the fact that this combination of elements highly varied between the different regions. More information is available on the urban population in the 15th century. Heide Dienst thus summarizes her research on Innsbruck as follows: “We may assume that people on all levels of society believed in magic and pursued magic practices. ... Our information unequivocally shows that magic was a part of 23 24 25 26 27 „Diedo ist geschichtlich glaubhaft, weil über seinem Grab in Andelsbuch wenige Jahre nach seinem Tod ein Kloster errichtet worden sein soll, wie es die Chronik des Klosters Petershausen bei Konstanz belegt, aus dem die Mönche kamen. Ilga ist geschichtlich nicht bestätigt. ... Merbod: Infolge mehrerer Erwähnungen in den Nekrologien des Klosters ist seine Geschichte glaubhaft, obwohl er viel jünger gewesen sein muss als seine in der Überlieferung genannten Geschwister" (Winder 1998, 4). „Die Frömmigkeit der Gläubigen nimmt etwas Wasser von dieser Quelle und etwas Erde von dieser Stätte mit nach Hause, um dadurch die Verehrung des Seligen zu bezeugen“ (Nelk 1844, 13). The club’s original is located in a rectory in Alberschwende. New clubs have to be made again and again, as woodchips are cut off even today. The statue’s club is a contact relic, as the new clubs always have to be touched with the original club (statement by the pastor of Alberschwende). Several old patterns occur with this worship of saints: in addition to the ritual worshiping of water, the number three appears twice: with the number of persons and with the three sources of Saint Ilga, the cutting off of woodchips and the dried mud used for its therapeutic properties. "Französische Historiker wie Delumeau bezeichnen das christliche Abendland um 1500 als BeinaheMissionsland. Die bäuerliche Mehrheit der Bevölkerung Alteuropas lebte auf dem Land und konnte weder lesen noch schreiben. Was die Bauern wirklich glaubten und praktizierten, wissen wir nur sehr lückenhaft. … Das bäuerliche Landvolk anerkannte zwar die kirchliche Autorität, pflegte aber ein mit naturreligiösen Elementen verwobenes synkretistisches Christentum“ (Altermatt 1995, 16 f). Religion, Popular Piety and Patchwork Religion 193 everyday life in the late medieval town of Innsbruck. Everyone had something to do with magic, from the archduke to the last day laborer. ... The fact that people believed in the effectiveness of magic and were afraid of their own as well as other people’s aggression on the one hand and knew on the other hand, that they would come into conflict with the church authorities (and soon with the secular authorities as well) as soon as this matter was raised, caused magic things, words and colors to be dealt with with a curious ambivalence“ (Dienst 1987, pp. 113; own translation).28 There were neither doctors nor drugs, the only remedies were herbs or magic, people depended on these alternatives. However, the situation could escalate quickly – the aide turned into a witch or sorceror.29 Research on the 17th and 18th century shows a much more liberal and pragmatic approach to combining Christian and magical elements – the climax of the witch-hunt was over. “In particular Catholicism of the early modern age with its offers for pastoral care talks which were supported by different actors allowed believers to choose in a goaloriented, contextually determined manner. However, occasionally, the choice turned out in favor of a specialist external to the church, a fortune teller for example. ... The fact that a person held two opposing beliefs does not seem to have been a problem for contemporaries of the early modern age. Rather, it seems to have been the rule. ... We can observe gentle transitions, combinations of elements and different methods instead of harsh differentiations between closed world views“ (Engels/v.Thiessen 2001, pp. 344; own translation).30 Renaissance with its urge to decode the secrets of the world (the Faustian quest for the true essence of life) brought about a decisive change in the way patchwork religion – in particular magic – was dealt with. On the one hand, alchemy was developed (wherefrom natural science evolved), on the other hand, belief in witches arose. The two main characters in Umberto Eco’s novel ‚The name of the Rose’ stand for these two convictions: the English Franciscan monk William of Baskerville stands for Enlightenment, the inquisitor Bernardo Gui stands for the opposing side. Both sides share the wish to discover a general explanatory pattern for the secrets of the world in order to gain power over it. Theologians from the Middle Ages developed devil, witch and demon theories from Augustinian demonology, centering around the pact of Thomas of Aquin with the devil. It 28 29 30 „Man kann davon ausgehen, dass Zauberglaube und Übung von magischen Praktiken in allen Schichten verbreitet war. … Magie zählte – das ist unserem Material zweifelsfrei zu entnehmen – zum Alltag in der spätmittelalterlichen Stadt Innsbruck. Mit Magie zu tun hatte jeder, vom Erzherzog angefangen bis zum letzten Taglöhner. … Die Tatsache, dass man einerseits an die Wirksamkeit der Magie glaubte und eigene wie fremde Aggressionen fürchtete, andererseits aber wusste, dass man damit mit der kirchlichen (und bald auch mit der weltlichen) Obrigkeit in Konflikt kam, kommen musste, sobald dieses Thema angesprochen wurde, bedingte die eigenartige Ambivalenz im Umgang mit magischen Dingen, Worten und Farben“ (Dienst 1987, 113 ff). Witch-hunts mostly occured in regional waves. Most of the time, a female outsider (seldom a male outsider) marked the beginning of a wave of persecution. Not until the witch-hunt escalated to include torture and forced denunciations (sometimes in order to solve social conflicts) did it extend to other circles – all the way to nobility (however, nobles were not allowed to be tortured). „Gerade der frühneuzeitliche Katholizismus mit seinem breiten, von verschiedenen Akteuren getragenen Seelsorgeangebot erlaubte den Gläubigen eine ziel- und kontextbestimmte Wahl, die allerdings mitunter auch zugunsten eines außerkirchlichen Spezialisten ausfallen konnte, etwa eines Wahrsagers. … Dass eine Person zwei einander widersprechende Glaubensformen vertrat, scheint für die frühneuzeitlichen Zeitgenossen kein Problem, sondern eher der Normalfall gewesen sein. … Statt scharfer Grenzen zwischen in sich geschlossenen Weltbildern finden wir sanfte Übergänge, Kombinationen von Elementen und den unterschiedlichen Methoden“ (Engels/v.Thiessen 2001, 344 ff). 194 Hermann Denz was reflected in theological discussions during the Middle Ages, the ‚Summis desiderantes’ (papal bull on witches) by Pope Innocent VIII (“Summis desiderantes“, 1484) and the ‚Malleus Maleficarum’ (Hammer of Witches) by Jakob Sprenger and Heinrich Institoris (1487). 31 “The new witch sect was an unrealistic proposal by learned jurists and theologians. Their work did not stop at the persecution of devil worshipers but they put their thoughts on paper in “scientific essays“ (Decker 2003, 43; own translation).32 Between 1546 and 1650, 17 witch trials were carried out in the Bregenz forest. Most of them ended with an execution. The belief in witches has been verified to have existed in the Bregenz forest until the 1980s. Everyday magic as it was practiced during the following centuries and as it can be observed today most likely evolved from 15th century alchemy (magia naturalis): orienting oneself with the help of the signs of the zodiac, transmission rituals, sympathetic faith, magic spells, numerology. Alchemy’s goal was to return to the roots of knowledge, to detect the sources of lost and forgotten wisdom once again (Borchardt 1990, 62). These sources were sought and found in Greek philosophy (Neo-Platonism), Egyptian-Hellenistic teachings of magic (Hermes Trismegistos), the Jewish teachings of the alphabet and numbers (Kabbala) and Arabic sources (Picatrix).33 Magical spells will be derived from all of these everyday practices as they have been very well documented. There is a tendency to attribute a very high age to these magic spells, or to assume that a continuous tradition exists from pre-Christian times.34 Empirical proof of the age of the magic spells indicates the following: the oldest proof for the ‘ThreeFlower-Blessing’ is from 1429, with regard to the others there is no such old proof, the earliest evidence is from the 16th or 17th century (Spamer 1958, 353). This is hardly surprising since the media among other things played an important role in handing them down through the ages: only after the invention of letter-press printing, texts could be produced and distributed in large numbers. Earlier on, handwritten recordings were much more rare and the fact that they were handed down depended on many circumstances. Thus, how the spells developed is mostly unknown. However it seems that they do not fall back on old traditions but that they developed from alchemy as it developed during early modern times. Their structure reflects the comprehension of the construction of the world. The assertion 31 32 33 34 According to recent research findings, the ‚Hammer of Witches’ was only written by Jakob Sprenger. For a compilation of the main papal documents on the inquisition and persecution of witches see: Gelmi 2000. „Die neue Hexensekte war eine Kopfgeburt gelehrter Juristen und Theologen. Sie beließen es nicht bei der praktischen Verfolgung der Teufelsdiener, sondern brachten ihre Gedanken in 'wissenschaftlichen Abhandlungen zu Papier“ (Decker 203, 43). Important people in this respect: Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), Johannes Reuchlin (1455-1522), Johannes Trithemius (1462-1516), Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486-1535), Paracelsus (1493-1541). Karl von Eckartshausen is a much later author who uses similar arguments. However, he includes elements from the era of Enlightenment. Two of his books are located in the museum of local history in Egg. Apparently, they were read in the Bregenz forest as well: "Aufschlüsse zur Magie aus geprüften Erfahrungen über verborgene philosophische Wissenschaften und verdeckte Geheimnisse der Natur" written by Karl von Eckartshausen, Munich, by Joseph Lentner 1791, "Aufschlüsse zur Magie, vierter Theil, der die Auflösung der höheren Geheimnisse der Magie enthalten" written by the Hofrathe von Eckartshausen, Munich, by Joseph Lentner 1792. „Es ist nun von verdienten Forschern festgestellt worden, daß unsere im Volk verbreiteten Beschwörungsformeln ein außerordentlich hohes Alter haben, daß wir in ihnen ein wertvolles, uraltes Erbteil aus heidnischer Vorzeit, ja aus der Entwicklungsperiode der Menschheit besitzen.“ (Seyfarth 1913, 71) Religion, Popular Piety and Patchwork Religion 195 that their structure is similar to the magic spells of Merseburg35 or the worm blessing is not convincing. The manuscript “A Variety of things for the Household“ (Source AA, ca. 1900) indicates the importance of magical thinking in the world view of the people in the Bregenz forest; it is simply a part of the solution for day-to-day problems.36 Page 4-6 6-8 8-19 19-25 26-31 31-33 33-35 35-37 37-38 38 39 40 41 42-47 45 46-47 48 Topic Star and Moon signs Rules for Good Friday Natural medicine Recipes (among them the production of beer, rum and egg liquor) Natural medicine in veterinary medicine Each tree, which is beaten when the ground is frozen dies off. Star and Moon signs Recipes (among them: elderberry wine; fig wine; currant wine) Magic spells: how to drive away impetigo, warts, styptic and scarlet skin disease Udder Water Production of soap and putty Signs of the Zodiac Units of measurement and conversion formulas Sour cherries with honey Production of shoe polish and Sidol, household repair products (putty for water containers, glas, wood) Moon and star signs for wood How to drill holes into glass, soldering water, bronze tincture, cure for fleas and bugs Ointments for scalds and impetigo The styptic spell in this manuscript reads: There are three lilies on the Lord’s grave, The first is called embers, The second blood And the third is called ‘it shall not go back and forth’. Then you name the name of the bleeding person and say: (name) this will help you, in the name of God Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Then pray to the five wounds of Christ who (added by the author) bled on the cross. If the bleeding person is not present, blow three crosses in each direction (Source AA, p. 36).37 For means of comparison - two more styptic spells which were also recorded in the Bregenz forest and which have a very similar structure: Three spotless roses are growing, 35 36 37 The first magic spell of Merseburg "Eiris sazun idisi, sazun hera duoder ... " is supposedly similarly structured to the so-called „Three-Women-Spell“. The second "Phol ende Uuodan vuron zi holza ... " might be similar to the structure of the saying "Unser Herr Jesus ging über Land". However, the comparison of the structures does not produce convincing results. In the course of my research, I came across two handwritten recipe collections from the 18th century (one from Tyrol, the other from Dornbirn/vorarlberg). In both texts, the illness ‘bewitched’ appeared among the different medicinal problems. An appropriate cure was listed as well (consecrated salt). „Es sind drei Ilgen auf Christi Grab, der erste heißt: Glut, der andere heißt Blut und der dritte heißt soll nicht mehr hin und her gehen. Dann nennt man den Namen des Blutenden und sprichts: den Namen es soll dir helfen, im Namen Gottes des Vaters und des Sohnes und des hl. Geistes Amen und betet die 5 Wunden Christi, der am (nachträglich eingefügt) Kreuz geblutet hat. Sollte die blutende Person in der Ferne sein, so bläst man 3 Kreuze in jener Richtung” (Quelle AA, 36 f.). 196 Hermann Denz (one) because of divine justice, one because of divine mercy, one because of divine love. If it is God’s will, may (first name and surname)’s blood persist. In the name of the Holy Trinity God Father, God Son, God Holy Spirit. Pray three times, pray the Lord’s Prayer three times as well as the holy belief. 38 Glory be to God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Pray and repeat the holy reverently (Source BB).39 Three blissful hours have come upon this earth. In the first hour, the Lord was born, In the second hour, the Lord died In the third hour, the Lord came alive again. Now I’ll name these three blissful hours and will staunch the flow of your (Name) blood and the fluid in your limbs. I will thus heal its injuries and wounds. In the name of etc. Repeat this formula three times (From another Household book from the Bregenz forest: Schwarz 1958, 69; this saying originated verbatim from the 7th book of Moses: 1950, 152).40 My wife mentioned another spell to me, which is a bit exceptional. She herself applied it successfully several times (Interview R): O blood, o blood, remain in the arteries as Jesus Christ remained loyal to his church. And then pray the Lord’s Prayer three times.41 The following instructions in this manuscript are a typical example of a transmission ritual against warts and pain: When you contract a facial skin disease, write the four letters INRI on a piece of paper. Cut this paper into three small pieces and take them with a spoonful of water or milk and pray the Lord’s Prayer five times with bent knees and the Ave Maria with open arms (You will never again contract it). (Source AA)42 38 39 40 41 42 The Creed. What is remarkable about this spell is the fact that it is the only one which contains the phrase „if it is God’s will“. It thus distances itself clearly from magic. Es sind drei Ros entsprungen, die (eine) aus göttlicher Gerechtigkeit, die eine aus göttlicher Barmherzigkeit, die eine aus göttlicher Liebe. So es Gottes Wille ist, so möge diesem oder dieser (Vor- und Zuname) das Blut bestehen. Im Namen der allerheiligsten Dreifaltigkeit Gott Vater, Gott Sohn, Gott Heiliger Geist. 3 mal beten dazu 3 Vaterunser und den heiligen Glauben. Ehre sei dem Vater und dem Sohne und dem heiligen Geist. Beten und immer das heilige Kreuzzeichen recht andächtig machen (Quelle BB). Es sind drei glückselige Stunden in diese Welt gekommen.In der ersten Stund' ist Gott geboren,in der anderen Stund' ist Gott gestorben,in der dritten Stund' ist Gott wieder lebendig worden.Jetzt nenne ich die drei glückseligen Stunden und stille dir (Name) damit das Gliedwasser und das Blut, dazu heile ich dessen Schaden und Wunden.Im Namen usw. Diese Formel ist dreimal zu sprechen. (aus einem anderen Bregenzerwälder Hausbuch: Schwarz 1958, 69; dieser Spruch stammt wörtlich aus dem siebten Buch Moses: 1950, 152). O Blut, o Blut bleib in den Adern wie Jesus Christus bei seiner Kirche geblieben ist. Und dann drei Vater unser beten. Wenn man die Überröte bekommt, soll man auf ein Papier die 4 Buchstaben schreiben INRI. Dieses Papier muss man in 3 Stücklein verschneiden und dann in ein Löffel Wasser oder Milch einnehmen und nach diesem mit gebogenen Knien 5 Vater unser und Ave Maria beten mit ausgespannten Armen (Man bekomme sie in seinem Leben nie mehr). (Quelle AA) Religion, Popular Piety and Patchwork Religion 197 Evidence for some additional magic spells can be traced back to the Bregenz forest: “Heaven’s blessing“ (a so-called “Carl’s blessing“43) and letters of protection (protection against all kinds of injuries). They were used during the 1950s in order to win a trial. This type of spell was very common from the 17th century onwards due to books such as the “Romanus booklet“, “Colomanus booklet“, the books of Moses or the “Religious Shield“. They were reprinted again and again and were changed more or less on occasion. The master copy of the version of the book which was found in the Bregenz forest was printed in 1914 in Munich (for a collection of different versions see: Spamer 1958, 342). The beginning of the Gospel according to John is part of the letter of protection. This combination was copied from this edition, however, the ‘Religious Shield’ also contains it. 10. Changes in the patterns of interpretation of traditional everyday magic During the 17th and 18th century in particular, Christian religion and magical practices were combined with early empirical scientific elements, chemical and phyiscal experiments or statistics (Engels/v.Thiessen 2001, 346). Researchers such as Newton, Kepler or Pascal naturally related scientific research to alchemy, astrology, mysticism etc. Likewise, natural healing and magic smoothly blended into one another or rather developed from one another. Many rules which were only justified with magic were proven scientifically later on. Thus, we can draw a triangle between our points of reference. This triangle contains the different elements of knowledge. The elements of knowledge can be analysed as different combinations of our three points of reference, which were referred to as Cult – Religion – Culture. Maybe the term ‘culture’ was not well chosen in this context as cults and religion belong to culture of course. However, in this context, ‘culture’ relates to knowledge which does not refer to anything transcendental but has been immanently and socially constructed. However, materialistic perceptions assume this to be true for cult and religion as well. Nevertheless, the possibly transcendental character was chosen to demarcate the difference according to the self-comprehension of the actors. This point of reference could also be called ‘Science’. Still, we would like to include not only analytically deduced knowledge or knowledge gained from scientific experiments but also knowledge gained through experience and field observations (country sayings, oberservations of the relation between agriculture and star constellations, animal observations, observations of the effect of plants and minerals in nature etc.) These things could be summarized under a very broad term of empiricism. 43 The Carl’s blessing usually began as follows: “This is a copy which Pope Leo sent to his brother Carolo (Geistlicher Schild 1647, 49, see also 7th Book of Moses; own translation. Original text: “Das ist eine Abschrift, die der Papst Leo seinem Bruder Carolo gesendet“). The Carl’s blessing, which was found in the Bregenz forest, refers to the Emperor Carl and the year 1905, which – historically speaking – is much more recent. “An urgent prayer for healing of all issues of concern. Mary, Mother of God, found in the year 1905 on the grave of our Lord. When Emperor Carl drew into battle, he received it as a gift from the Pope at that time and sent it to St. Michael in France. There, it may be admired on a shield, beautifully printed in golden letters (original text: "Ein kräftiges Gebet in allen Anliegen zur heil. Gottesmutter Christi gefunden im Jahre 1905 auf dem Grab unseres Herrn. Als Kaiser Karl zu Felde zog, erhielt er es vom damaligen Papste zum Geschenke, er schickte es dann nach St. Michael in Frankreich, wo es auf einem Schilde in goldenen Buchstaben wunderschön ausgedruckt zu lesen ist.") Hermann Denz 198 Cult Magical interpretation of the world Culture Empirical interpretation of the world Everyday magic Natural healing Popular Religion Religion Christian interpretation of the world The purpose of the image is twofold: concerning the description of the concept, it helps to classify the elements of knowledge in this triangle and thus enables us to develop a typology according to the content. On the other hand, the knowledge is based on a vague perception of evolution44 which has to be proven again and again in concrete social situations as it is merely hypothetical. Neither individually nor socially can we assume that a law-like and irreversible order exists. However, it does appear to be true that the emphasis of social common knowledge has typically shifted within the order cult-religion-culture. Using protection from lighting as an example, it becomes apparent how Christian as well as magical concepts are reinterpreted in order to correspond to the concepts of the modern rational world. At the same time, different concepts exist in parallel.45 - An elder bush to protect one’s house (predominantly magical notion) - Palm tree branches are the most common means of protection from lightling. In addition, consecrated water is also often sprinkled out of the window (Interview I), sometimes even in the shape of a cross (Interview F). When it hails, hailstones are 44 45 These notions are mentioned in the teachings of the three stages by Auguste Comte for example (Comte labels the three stages as follows: theological, metaphysical and positive, whereby he means positivistic) or in the teachings of the three stages by James George Frazer (here, the three stages are called: magic – religion – science). Other reinterpretations: Interpretation of incantations as radioactivity or magnetism, interpretation of a sacrifice to a source as a means to cultivate useful bacteria (after having cleansed a source, a piece of bread and cheese are left on the source). Religion, Popular Piety and Patchwork Religion - - - 199 placed into consecrated water in order to stop the hail (Interview P). “Fields can be protected from hailstorm and bad weather by adding lilies of the valley, small crosses and consecrated palm trees to the seed; or by setting up a lantern with a burning consecrated thunderstorm candle on the field. This also protects from witch’s spells (Moses 1950, p. 215) (Christian/magical notion).46 Good Friday eggs are placed on the roof ridge as protection from lightning (Interview E). Another tradition is to place Good Friday eggs in front of the house during a thunderstorm (Interview J). In general, Good Friday eggs are supposed to help with all sorts of things. A modern interpretation of the Good Friday egg is the notion that it protects from car accidents (Interview E, J) (predominantly magical notion). Another means to ward off lightning and violent thunderstorms is to ring the weather bell. In addition, a diverse range of processions through the fields as well as the ‘Weather blessing’ existed (all of these things are not characteristic of the Bregenz forest. Some of them still exist today) (Christian/magical concept). Houseleeks are also a means of protection from lightning: supposedly, lightning never hits a tree with houseleeks hanging from it (predominantly magical notion). First reinterpretation: burning palm tree branches supposedly change the oscillation of the air which causes such a disturbance of electromagnetism that lightning is prevented in consequence. Second reinterpretation: the hazelnut twig (or a piece of masterwort, Latin: Peucedanum ostruthium) acts as protection because a combination of three positively charged elements (wood from a ridge pole, masterwort or a hazelnut twig and a string of hemp to tie them together – all three of them are positively charged) results in a protection from lightning and negative radiation within a radius of 500 meters (from an interview. However, the interviewee referred to a former minister of the church in the Bregenz forest). Thus, the interpretation of the effect of the hazelnut twig first changed from a magical to a Christian notion (see the respective legends) and has recently changed to an empirical scientific notion. 11. Everyday magic and postmodern patchwork religion Hypothesis 1: Day-to-day problems which are supposed to be solved with the help of magical practices have changed completely due to economic and cultural changes. Earlier on, problems closely related to agriculture predominated, whereas now, relationship problems, identity crises, depressions etc. are prevalent. Hypothesis 2: Due to the fact that the Catholic church has lost power and meaning even in rural areas, agreeing with the church’s teachings, which was ensured by integrating magical elements into a Christian world view, is not relevant anymore. We may assume that a rather general religious world view will serve as a background (the self-definition as neo46 „Vor Hagelschlag und bösem Wetter schützt man die Felder dadurch, dass man Maien, Kreuzchen und geweihte Palmen in die Saat senkt; oder eine geweihte brennende Gewitterkerze in einer Laterne auf das Feld stellt, das schützt auch gegen Behexung“ (Moses 1950, 215 f). Hermann Denz 200 pagan, which some members of the witches’ movement perceive themselves to be, certainly does not exist in the Bregenz forest). Hypothesis 3: Due to the mobility of knowledge and people, the modern magical world view and magical practices no longer comply with traditional everyday magic of the Bregenz forest but rather conform to extra-Christian/extra-European spiritual systems. In order to test the hypotheses, we once again carried out several interviews. The main questions asked about a description of everyday magic, the question of the spiritual background behind magical practices, the relation to the Bregenz forest and to the traditional everyday magic of the Bregenz forest. Six women and one man (who takes on a very special role) were interviewed. He is a farmer, nowadays, however, he mostly works a healer. He is so famous that a book was written on him – a mixture between an autobiography and an interview (Fink/Herrmann-Badorek 1995). The demand is so great that he built extra rooms as waiting rooms and for his office, he has set office hours (Tuesdays to Fridays from 2 PM to 7 PM, Saturday mornings by arrangement) etc. A brief summary: in principle, all of the hypotheses hold true. The social profile of the group of persons has markedly changed. The women who used to maintain traditional everyday magic were mostly women who worked in agriculture. Nowadays, it is the educated middle class which follows this tradition. Modern farmers trust veterinarians and artificial fertilizer rather than magic, magic has emigrated to intellectual circles. Consequently, the types of problems which everyday magic is supposed to help solve have changed: relationships, meaning, new consciousness, peace, relation with nature (personal or humanity in its entirety). We can draw up a preliminary typology according to the spiritual background of the interviewees. All of them had a very autonomous perception of religion and spirituality, with or without an institutionalized relation to religion. - - - 47 48 Feminist religiousness: two of the interviewed women are members of the Catholic church, despite criticizing the patriarchic structures. In a very self-confident manner, they combine Catholic religiousness with new elements which do not comply with traditional theology (ideas from shamanism and natural religion etc.). They put them into practice in rituals some of which they have developed themselves.47 Critical church membership: three of the interviewees are members of the Catholic church while feeling more or less distant to it. They ask themselves more or less often, what the purpose of their membership is. Personal or possibly traditional ties cause them to remain members of the church, the spiritual background has been influenced strongly by other world views (for example: anthroposophy, different types of deism48). Religiousness without the Catholic church: two of the interviewees do not belong to any religious community (left the church or never were members). Their spiritual background is influenced by Buddhism or (Indian) shamanistic spirituality. The accompanying research on the women’s synod in Gmunden showed that this pattern of „traditional theology as well as non-traditional ideas“ was the pattern which was most common among the participants: Denz 1998. One of the interviewees referred to Neale Donald Walsch: Conversations with God. Religion, Popular Piety and Patchwork Religion 201 All of them give priority to the quest for a new type of spirituality, everyday magic is more a result of this quest. It is no longer Christianity but other religious models, which offer a religious framework, whereby everyday magic can be practiced within or at the border of these structures. These new religious models comprise extra-Christian religions or philosophies but also rather individually constructed combinations. In all of these cases, the crucial point is that a unity of spirituality and everyday magic can be constructed again as a new type of spirituality is discovered. These new world views have no place for traditional everyday magic in the Bregenz forest with its miracle blessings, spells etc. The pendulum is no longer used for dowsing but rather to find answers to different questions (for example pendulum dowsing of Bach’s flowers). Another typology is based on the type of practice. We can differentiate between four types: - Private magician Shaman Medium Healer Another differentiation is based on the question in how far magic is used for oneself or whether it is part of one’s working life. Rural everyday magic was integrated into the professional workday (blessings, protection, styptic, driving out illnesses etc.) as it was developed in order to help solve these problems. Nowadays, most of the time, one’s job and practices of everyday magic are strictly separated. The interviewees work in modern jobs in the service sector and only do everyday magic in their spare time. No one works exclusively as practitioners of magic: one of the interviewees works as a part-time counsellor, according to the male interviewee, however, magic is almost his main profession. This difference is not coincidental: female everyday magic is much more restricted to the private realm, male magic however is practiced much more in public. This is reflected by the fact that it took a while49 until I found out the names of female healers and media. 12. References Altermatt, U. (1995): Katholizismus: Antimodernismus mit modernen Mitteln? In: Altermatt/Hürten/ Lobkowicz (eds.). Altermatt, U./Hürten, H./ Lobkowicz, N. (eds.)(1995): Moderne als Problem des Katholizismus. Regensburg. Bachmann, A. (2003): "Allerhand gottloses abgöttisches Werckhen" Glaube – Aberglaube – Zauberei. Magie in der dörflichen Gesellschaft Württembergs des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts. In: Dillinger (ed.). Basler Papiermühle (ed.)(2002): Magie - Die geheime Macht der Zeichen. Basel. Bergmann, J. (1848): Die Wiedertäufer zu Au im innern Bregenzerwalde und ihre Auswanderung nach Mähren im Jahre 1585. In: Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Wien, Heft 3. Wien: 1-11. Biermann, G. (2001): Eine 'Zauberrolle' im Kärntner Landesarchiv. In: Carinthia 191: 231-251. Bilgeri, B. (1936): Die Besiedlung des Bregenzerwaldes in ihren Grundzügen. In: Alemannia – Zeitschrift für Geschichte, Heimat- und Volkskunde Vorarlbergs: Heft 1-6. Bilgeri, B. (1976): Geschichte Vorarlbergs. Vom freien Rätien zum Staat der Montforter, Bd. 1. Graz. Borchardt, F. L. (1990): The Magus as renaissance man. In: Sixteenth Century Journal (21): 58-78. 49 Only during the second year of our research! During the interviews, I learned that you have to prove to be an‚insider’ by using certain words or sentences. Certain things are not told to outsiders. 202 Hermann Denz Burmeister, K.H. (1983): Geschichte Vorarlbergs. Wien. Daxelmüller, C. (2001): Zauberpraktiken - Die Ideengeschichte der Magie. Düsseldorf. Decker, R. (2003): Die Päpste und die Hexen – Aus den geheimen Akten der Inquisition. Darmstadt. Denz, H. (1998): Weibliches Denken über Religiosität und Kirchlichkeit. In: Prüller-Jagenteufel (ed.): 37-48. Die Haselrute (1950): Unser Ländle 4/1 (Beilage zu "Jungösterreich" und "Berglandkinder"). Dillinger (ed.)(2003): Zauberer – Selbstmörder – Schatzsucher: Magische Kultur und behördliche Kontrolle im frühneuzeitlichen Württemberg. Trier. Elsensohn , F. (2001): Glockenklang und Geisterreiben. Hohenems. Elsensohn , F. (2002): Hexenplätze, Kinderbrunnen. Hohenems. Engels, I. von/Thiessen, H. (2001): Glauben – Begriffliche Annäherungen anhand von Beispielen aus der frühen Neuzeit. In: Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 28: 333-357. Fink, A./Herrmann-Badorek, I (1995): Lichtsaat. Altstätten. Gelmi, J. (2000): Wichtige päpstliche Dokumente zur Inquisition und Hexenverfolgung. In: Theologischpraktische Quartalschrift 4: 388-395. Gismann-Fiel, H. (1982): Das Täufertum in Vorarlberg. Dornbirn. Grabner, E. (1987): Magie und Heilglaube in einem oberösterreichischen "Wund-Segen-Büchelein" des 18. Jahrhunderts. In: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Volkskunde: 105-126. Haag, N./Holtz, S./Zimmermann W. (ed.) (2002): Ländliche Frömmigkeit: Konfessionskulturen und Lebenswelten 1500-1850. Stuttgart. Haid, H. (1992): Mythos und Kult in den Alpen. Wien. Kufner, L. (1992): Getaufte Götter. Heilige zwischen Mythen und Legenden. München. Inauen, R. (1995): För Hitz und Brand. In: Irniger (ed.): 47-70. Irniger, W. (ed.)(1995): Kräuter und Kräfte – Heilen im Appenzellerland: Herisau. Markale, J. (1989): Die Druiden – Gesellschaft und Götter der Kelten. München. Mathys, H.-P. (2002): Dämonen in der Bibel und im Christentum. In: Basler Papiermühle (ed.). Moses (1950): Das sechste und siebente Buch Moses. Braunschweig. Müller, F. (2002): Götter - Gaben – Rituale: Religion in der Frühgeschichte Europa. Mainz. Neuheuser, H. P. (2003): Eine Zauberanleitung in einer rheinischen Missalehandschrift. In: Rheinisch-westfälische Zeitschrift für Volkskunde 48. Nelk, T. (1844): Die drei seligen Geschwister Merboth, Diedo und Ilga. Lindau. Niederstätter, A. (2003): Neues aus dem "finsteren" Mittelalter: presentation 21 May. Bregenz. Niederstätter, A. (1998): Die Besiedlung des Bregenzerwaldes und seine wirtschaftliche und politische Entwicklung. In: Stöckler (ed.). Petzold, L. (ed.) (1978): Magie und Religion. Darmstadt. Prüller-Jagenteufel, V. (ed.)(1998): Frauen-Kirche-Feminismus. Graz/Wien. Rapp, L. (1924): Topographisch-historische Beschreibung des Generalvikariates Vorarlberg, Band V (Dekanat Bregenzerwald), Dornbirn. Schneider, I. (1993): Volksmedizin zwischen Tradition und Moderne. In: Schweizerisches Archiv für Volkskunde 89: 87-100 Schwarz, A (1958).: Alte Hausmittel und Heilsprüche. In: Vorarlberger Volkskalender: 68-71. Seyfarth, C. (1913): Aberglaube und Zauberei in der Volksmedizin West-Sachsens. Leipzig. Spamer, A. (1958): Romanusbüchlein: Historisch-philologischer Kommentar zu einem deutschen Zauberbuch. Berlin. Stöckler, B. (ed.): Aus der Wälder Geschichte. Dornbirn. Storl, W.-D. (2001): Pflanzen der Kelten. Aarau. Tuczay, C. (2003): Magie und Magier im Mittelalter. München. Wischenbarth, P. (2001): Steinzeitliche Funde in den Hochlagen Vorarlbergs. In: Jahrbuch Vorarlberger Landesmuseumsverein: 25-41. Authors Hermann Denz (1949-2008†), Dr. rer. soc. oec., was extraordinary Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology in the University of Innsbruck, Austria. His research focused on social integration especially regarding value change and emphasizing religion and religiosity. His numerous publications include Die europäische Seele – Leben und Glauben in Europa (2002) and Die Grundlagen empirischer Soziologie – Der Beitrag des qualitativen Ansatzes (2003). Tadeusz Doktór (1950-2007†), Ph.D., was Adjunct at the Institute of Applied Social Sciences at the Warsaw University, Poland. Major interest of his research was the sociology of religion concentrating on new religious movements in contemporary Poland. His numerous books and articles include Religious and Moral Pluralism in Poland (with I. Borowik: 2001) and Religious Innovations. Movements, Participants, Social Reactions (2002). Paul Froese, Ph.D., is Resident Scholar at the Department of Sociology at the Baylor Univesity in Washington, USA. His major interests include comparative historical research emphasizing religiosity and religion. He most recently wrote The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularization (2008) and is currently engaged in a project with Steven Pfaff concerning Sigh of the Oppressed Creature: Repression, Religious Substitution, and Religious Identification in East Germany. Kimmo Kääriäinen, Dr. theol., is Director of the Research Institute of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. His major research interests are religion, religiosity, and values with special regard to Russia. His recent publications include Ateismin jälkeen. Uskonnollisuus Venäjällä. Kirkon tutkimuskeskuksen julkaisuja 86 (2004) and Religion in Finland. Decline, Change and Transformation of Finnish Religiosity (with K. Niemelä and K. Ketola: 2005). Heiner Meulemann, Dr. phil., is Professor of Sociology at the University of Cologne, Germany. In his research he focuses on the sociology of youth laying special emphasis on religion and religiosity. He is author and publisher of numerous books and articles including Soziologie von Anfang an. Eine Einführung in Themen, Ergebnisse und Literatur (22006) as well as Wertwandel in Deutschland von 1949 - 2000 (2002). Olaf Müller, Dipl. Soz., is Research Associate at the Institute for Sociology at the University of Münster, Germany. He has contributed to numerous empirical research projects focusing the sociology of religion and social change. His most recent articles include Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: Was There a Re-Awakening after the Breakdown of Communism? In: Pollack/Olson (ed.) (2008): The Role of Religion in Modern Societies, 6392. 204 Authors Krunoslav Nikodem, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in the University of Zagreb, Croatia. His research focuses on empirical research on religion, laying special emphasis on the situation and development in Croatia. Genmanipulation und neue Spiritualität: Der Sinn des Lebens und des Todes im "posthumanen" Kontext. In: Covic/Hoffmann (ed.) (2007): Integrative Bioethik. Steven Pfaff, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Washington, USA, and Director of the Center for West European Studies at the Jackson School of International Studies. His research interest includes comparative and historical sociology as well as social movement and collective acts. Most recently he wrote Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of Leninism and the Revolution of 1989 (2006). Gert Pickel, Dr. phil., is Professor of Sociology of Religion at the Institute for Practical Theology in the University of Leipzig, Germany. His major areas of research include the theoretical and empirical sociology of religion as well as political sciences in international comparison. He has written and published numerous books and articles such as Einführung in die Religionssoziologie (2009) and Religion und Moral – Entkoppelt oder verknüpft (ed. with Michael Krüggeler: 2001) Detlef Pollack, Dr. theol., is Professor of Sociology at the University of Münster, Germany. His major research interests include the sociology of religion as well as new social movements. He has written and published numerous books including Säkularisierung – ein moderner Mythos? Studien zum religiösen Wandel in Deutschland (2003) and Osteuropas Bevölkerung auf dem Weg in die Demokratie. Repräsentative Untersuchungen in Ostdeutschland und zehn osteuropäischen Transformationsstaaten (ed. with Gert Pickel, Olaf Müller, and Jörg Jacobs: 2006). Erik Sengers, Dr., Assistant Prpfessor of Sociology of Religion at the Free University of Amsterdam, Netherlands. His major research interests include comparative sociology and the sociology of worship. He is author and editor of numerous books including The dutch and their gods. Secularisation and transformation of religion in the Netherlands after 1950 (ed. 2005) and „Al zijn we katholiek, we zijn Nederlanders“. Opkomst en verval van de katholieke kerk in Nederland sinds 1795 vanuit rational choice perspectief (2006). Siniša Zrinšak, Ph.D., is Professor of Social Policy at the Institute for Sociology in the University of Zagreb, Croatia. His research focuses on values, social policy, and religion laying special emphasis on Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republics. He is the author of numerous books and articles including Sociology of Religion. Croatian Experience (1999) and Anonymus Believers as a Sociological Challenge. In: Borowski (ed.) (2006): Religions, Churches, and Religiosity in Post-Communist Europe, 68-80.