17 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is a small contingent of approximately 1,300 peacekeepers and associated personnel tasked with observing the separation of Israeli and Syrian military forces in the Golan Heights. The peacekeeping force was deployed in June 1974, after a series of wars between Syria and Israel left the Golan Heights territory in dispute. UNDOF remains in place—its primary mandate generally unchanged since the initial deployment.

During the Six Day War from 5 to 10 June 1967, Israel first occupied the Golan Heights region at the expense of Syria. Syria, on the losing side of this war, would soon act to attempt to reclaim the lost territory. With the cooperation of Egypt, Syria launched a joint attack against Israel on 6 October 1973. As this was the day of Yom Kippur, the war has been alternatively known as the October War, or the Yom Kippur War. Initially, both Syria and Egypt were able to make gains against Israel’s military, which was unprepared for the attack. Within a matter of days, however, Israel managed to halt advances by Egypt from the Sinai and Syria from the Golan Heights, and began to press into the territories of each of the attacking states. In the case of Syria, Israel managed to move beyond the Golan Heights and deeper into Syrian territory.

As the conflict in 1973 mirrored the larger conflict between the Soviet Union (aligned with Syria) and the United States (aligned with Israel) during the Cold War, there was fear that it would spread into a wider, global war. On 22 October 1973, however, both the United States and the Soviet Union supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, aimed at ending the fighting. The risk of escalation to a superpower war and the era of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union facilitated the cooperation necessary to end the war. The Resolution requested “all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing … no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision.”¹ The conflict continued for two more days, but hostilities ceased on 24 October 1973 only eighteen days after the beginning of the war.

Although the fighting between Israel and Syria was halted, there was no broader agreement on what to do about the significant territorial gains that Israel had managed to make during the war. With a ceasefire in place, albeit a fragile one, efforts were made to reach such an agreement between Israel and Syria that would outline a more sustainable security arrangement between the two states. Both Syria and Israel later met in Geneva, and on 31 May 1974, the United States helped the two sides negotiate the terms of a “Disengagement Agreement,” which set forth a series of steps that would transform the Golan Heights into a demilitarized territory between the two parties.² As part of the arrangement, both sides agreed that a peacekeeping operation, UNDOF, would be deployed to the Golan Heights to ensure both sides were following the terms of this agreement. Although the Golan Heights would remain disputed territory between Israel and Syria, it was hoped that separating the two militaries and a peacekeeping force to observe whether both sides were honoring the agreement would lead to a more manageable ceasefire. The establishment of UNDOF coincided with the earlier creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) peacekeeping mission in the Sinai Peninsula, and the two missions would work together to prevent war between Israel and its neighbors. Indeed, the peacekeeping strategy supported by the superpowers and Secretary-General Waldheim was also similar to the one that avoided a major power war after the Suez Crisis when UNEF I was put in place. The United Nations Security Council approved the establishment of UNDOF with Resolution 350 on 31 May 1974.

The primary mission of UNDOF has been to help Israel and Syria uphold the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between the two states, which forms the basis of the current status quo in the Golan Heights. The terms of the agreement called for the creation of the “area of separation” and “area of limitation” between the two states. Two generally north–south demarcations were agreed to in the Golan Heights. The first demarcation, “Line A”, was the easternmost line the Israeli military could occupy. A second demarcation, “Line B,” was to the west of “Line A,”³ and was the westernmost line of Syrian occupation. The gap between the two lines was called the “area of separation,” which neither military was allowed to occupy.⁴ Only UNDOF peacekeepers are allowed to operate militarily within this area under the agreement, to observe that the military of either party does not cross each’s respective line. In addition to setting forth a physical separation between Israel and Syria, both sides agreed to an additional “area of limitation in armament” to the west of Line A and east of Line B respectively where certain types of military assets would be forbidden.⁵

Along with the terms of the agreement, Israel and Syria further agreed to the “Protocol to the Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syria Forces Concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,” which outlined the specific mandate for the peacekeeping mission that would observe the subsequent actions of Syria and Israel. Specifically, both parties agreed that “The function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) under the agreement will be to use its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and to see that it is scrupulously observed. It will supervise the agreement and protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation.”⁶ In conjunction with the Disengagement Agreement itself, the Protocol established the mandate of UNDOF that was approved by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 350 on 31 May 1974. UNDOF’s mission would be to monitor Israeli and Syrian personnel in the Golan Heights to be sure that neither side deployed military forces into the “area of separation” and that neither party mobilized certain types of military forces into their “area of limitation.”

In addition to setting forth the goals of the mission, the Protocol also empowered UNDOF with certain abilities, most importantly that UNDOF “will enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for its mission.”⁷ By agreeing not to disrupt the ability of UNDOF to access the area, both Israel and Syria ensured that UNDOF would be able to effectively carry out the observational character of its mission. Furthermore, UNDOF was allowed to establish bases within the Golan Heights region that would serve as the focal point of their operations. The main base of UNDOF, where its command is stationed is east of Line B at Camp Faouar. There is a further major base west of Line A called Camp Ziouani as of November 2013.

The Protocol also set forth certain limitations on UNDOF. First, UNDOF “will be mobile and provided with personal weapons of a defensive character and shall use such weapons only in self-defense. The number of the UNDOF shall be about 1,250, who will be selected by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”⁸ The limitation on the size and the capabilities of UNDOF further strengthened the “observer” status of the peacekeepers. Given these constraints, UNDOF would never be able to enforce the ceasefire agreement between the two sides if one or both sides decided to resume hostilities. Instead, UNDOF was allowed enough resources to observe, but not directly affect the course of the ceasefire through military action.

Second, the Protocol outlined limitations on which UN member states peacekeepers could be drawn from by stating that UNDOF peacekeepers “will be selected by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the parties from members of the United Nations who are not permanent members of the Security Council.”⁹ The initial troops for the UNDOF mission were drawn from the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), which had already been established in the Sinai. Beginning in June 1974, troops from UNEF II began traveling towards the Golan Heights to begin the process of observing the retreat of Israeli and Syrian forces from the boundaries set forth in the ceasefire agreement. UNDOF was in place by the end of June 1974 and consisted primarily of peacekeepers from four countries—Austria, Poland, Canada, and Peru—under the command of Brigadier General Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos of Peru. Israel and Syria withdrew forces in a series of stages, with UNDOF observing the military withdrawals and setting up facilities that would serve the mission. By the end of June 1974, the military forces of both sides had withdrawn as required by the agreement.

UNDOF cooperated with a number of other missions in the region, particularly at the initial stages of its deployment. Both UNEF II and UNDOF were established as a result of the 1973 War, and UNDOF relied on UNEF II for more than its initial peacekeepers. Throughout the 1970s, UNDOF received regular supply shipments from the UNEF II peacekeeping mission. A number of personnel were also assigned to UNDOF from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to aid in the peacekeeping mission. After Israel and Egypt negotiated a peace agreement in 1979, the UNEF II mission was no longer needed, requiring UNDOF to take on more responsibility for resupplying the mission. The cooperation with UNTSO continued after 1979, however, as personnel from UNTSO continued to be attached to the UNDOF mission over the coming decades.

Although both Israel and Syria generally followed the terms of the ceasefire by vacating territory, tension between the two was high during the initial years of UNDOF. This tension was illustrated by the deaths of nine peacekeepers from Canada who lost their lives when the plane in which they were traveling was forced down by ground fire while in Syrian airspace.¹⁰ A number of shooting incidents occurred as civilians moved back into the area from which all military personnel had withdrawn. UNDOF investigated each of these incidents (although troubling, none threatened the overall ceasefire).¹¹ In addition, early UNDOF reports note a number of potential violations of the agreement by aircraft.¹² Over time, however, as UNDOF established itself in the Golan Heights, the United Nations Secretary-General had fewer such incidents to report to the United Nations Security Council, even as regional wars erupted in the 1980s and 1990s. During these decades, UNDOF continued to fulfill its mission by patrolling the area between Lines A and B to observe that neither side was deploying military forces into the area.

Shooting incidents decreased steadily during the first years of the mission, but other challenges continued to plague UNDOF. First, numerous mines and unexploded ordinance remained in the Golan Heights as a result of the conflict, and these devices took the lives of a number of peacekeepers and civilians. Indeed, the first casualties of the mission were four Austrian peacekeepers who died as a result of a mine blast on 25 June 1974.¹³ UNDOF took steps to alleviate this threat by searching for and neutralizing these explosives in the areas it patrolled after 1974. Although regular reports to the Security Council noted the progress made in searching for these explosives, the reports also noted as late as the 2000s that such threats had never been fully resolved.¹⁴

Second, reports to the Security Council throughout the period of the mission noted that while both sides generally aided UNDOF in its mission to observe the ceasefire, neither side fully honored the “freedom of movement” required by the original agreement.¹⁵ Specifically, although UNDOF has generally been able to patrol and monitor the areas between Lines A and B where neither side was allowed to deploy its military, some areas to the west of Line A and east of Line B remained closed to peacekeepers attempting to observe that both sides were honoring the “area of limitation in armament” portions of the agreement.¹⁶ Secretary-General reports between the 1980s and 2000s note this as a continuing issue for the mission that was never fully resolved with either party.¹⁷

Given the length of the mission it is unsurprising that UNDOF underwent a number of changes in terms of contributing states. Although Austria remained the country from which the largest contingent of peacekeepers was drawn continuously from 1974 to 2013, a number of other countries, including Iran (beginning in 1975), Japan (beginning in 1996), Slovakia (beginning in 1998), the Philippines (beginning in 2009), and Fiji (beginning in 2013), have also made significant contributions to UNDOF since 1974. Through the many years of the mission, the size of UNDOF remained approximately between 1,100 and 1,300 troops, and continued to fulfill its observer mission in the Golan Heights despite the challenges noted above.

The ceasefire between Syria and Israel originally agreed to in May 1974 has held to the present day, but UNDOF has been challenged by the ongoing civil war in Syria. The area of the Golan Heights patrolled by UNDOF has not been spared the unrest that began in 2011 in Syria. The Secretary General noted that “in the latter part of the reporting period, anti-Government demonstrations in the Syrian Arab Republic spread to several villages in the area of limitation on the Syrian (Bravo) side.”¹⁸ Although initially characterized as unarmed resistance to the Syrian regime, within a few short months the anti-Assad rebellion became an armed effort to overthrow the government in Damascus.

Beginning in 2012, a number of dangerous events led to significant violations of the ceasefire agreement. In several incidents during 2012 and 2013, the Syrian military crossed to the west of Line B in an effort to defeat the anti-Syrian rebels operating in the area.¹⁹ Although none of these incidents led to a complete breakdown of the ceasefire between Syria and Israel, the presence of the Syrian military between Lines A and B significantly increased tension between the two sides and led to a number of incidents in which hostile fire from the conflict inside Syria landed to the west of Line A.²⁰ In other instances, UNDOF reported that Israeli troops had crossed over Line A into the demilitarized area east of Line A.²¹

The increased instability in the Golan Heights led to a number of dangerous incidents involving peacekeepers. On multiple occasions, UNDOF peacekeepers were stopped by groups of rebels, and in several instances a number of peacekeepers were held for several days.²² The fighting between the Syrian military and rebels and related activities disrupted the ongoing efforts of UNDOF to fulfill its mandate. On several occasions, rebels commandeered UNDOF vehicles and materials.²³ Despite the escalation of danger in the Golan Heights, UNDOF adjusted to the new situation in the area and the United Nations Secretary-General argued that UNDOF be allowed to continue its mission based on its six-monthly renewals of mandate.²⁴

The greatest challenge to UNDOF occurred during the summer of 2013, when fighting between the rebels and Syrian military between Lines A and B directly threatened the lives of UNDOF peacekeepers. On 6 June 2013 fighting between pro-Assad forces and the rebels in the area between Lines A and B resulted in UNDOF facilities coming under fire. In particular, in Camp Ziouani near Line A, two peacekeepers were injured as a result of the fighting.²⁵ Although UNDOF was able to re-establish its mission after these events, it led to the decision by Japan, Croatia, and Austria to pull troops from mission.²⁶ Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon eventually announced that those soldiers would be replaced by an increased contribution from Fiji in late 2013.²⁷

UNDOF has had a sustained and solid record of conflict management in patrolling the Golan Heights and separating Israeli and Syrian forces. Nevertheless, there are some notable gaps in conflict resolution. The Syrian civil war has had a particular impact on the area of peacekeeping deployment.

With respect to the immediate tasks in the operation’s mandate, UNDOF was successful in facilitating and supervising the ceasefire between Israeli and Syrian forces in the aftermath of the 1973 War. Both sides cooperated as the UN peacekeepers were deployed. Similarly, UNDOF was successful in its mission of disengaging the military forces of each side. Within a period of two weeks in June 1967, Israeli forces handed over large swathes of territory and Syria established civilian administration in designated areas. UNDOF was able to establish a buffer zone, separating the two sides, and inspected the area for improper troop or armament deployment.

More broadly, over forty years, UNDOF built up a fine record of conflict abatement, especially if one compares the incidence of violent conflict in the Golan area of operation deployment with other areas of Israeli–Syrian engagement. There has been no renewal of war in the Golan Heights area, even as Syria and Israel clashed in Lebanon in 1982 and Israeli fighter jets bombed Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007. At the level of violent conflict short of war, Israel and Syria clashed numerous times in militarized crises over the life of UNDOF. Yet these have been concentrated primarily in southern Lebanon. In contrast, the Golan area has been largely quiet, with few incidents and none involving the direct engagement of Syrian and Israeli military forces.

In general, UNDOF experienced few truly grave incidents during its long deployment. The most serious event in the early years was in November 1975 when Israeli soldiers shot and killed Syrian shepherds. This heightened tensions and brought Syrian allegations that Israel was increasing its troop strength near the border, but concerns over this incident soon passed. As of late 2013 UN peacekeepers suffered 43 casualties (little more than one per year) and most of these have been accidents. Members of the Iranian battalion came under fire from Israeli soldiers in November 1977, but that was perhaps the last significant episode until the advent of the Syrian civil war.

Despite the virtual absence of violence in the Golan Heights deployment area, UNDOF has not always been able to deter or halt minor violations by the parties in the course of monitoring the area. Lindley²⁸ identified five operational problems with the monitoring and regularized inspections carried out by UNDOF. First, he notes that UNDOF inspectors must rely on troop figures provided by Israeli and Syrian military officials and are not able to verify those numbers independently. Second, and on a related point, inspectors can only identify weapons that are visible and it is not always clear whether the parties are complying with demilitarization agreements. These limitations provide great opportunities to cheat, although there is no evidence that such violations are widespread.

Third, Lindley also points out that inspections occur on a regularized basis (bi-weekly) with no provisions for surprise inspections. Israel in particular has been accused of moving weaponry into prohibited areas and then moving the equipment back in time for the next inspection. Fourth, both parties have prevented UNDOF inspectors from going into certain areas, especially those used for intelligence gathering by the parties. Finally, Israeli and Syrian forces have committed what Lindley calls “permanent violations” by moving some troops and posts to prohibited areas in order to facilitate early warning in the event of attack. He also notes limitations in UNDOF technology for monitoring, such as equipment capable of detecting night-time movements. All in all, these are certainly failures on the part of UNDOF, but the violations have not been militarily significant and they have not induced the parties to stop cooperating on major mission goals such as maintaining the ceasefire.

With respect to conflict resolution, the presence of UNDOF has reduced tensions and stimulated some diplomatic efforts, but it has not led to a permanent settlement of differences. Early on, Syria attempted to withhold renewal of UNDOF’s mandate because of its dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in securing the return of the Golan to full Syrian sovereignty and the Palestinian question in general.²⁹ From the Syrian vantage point, nothing short of that return of territory will settle the conflict. Yet this has been complicated first by Israeli’s unilateral declaration in December 1981 annexing the Golan Heights to the Israeli state. Perhaps more seriously, the building of Israeli settlements in the Golan has complicated any peace plans that would restore Syrian control, whether in whole or in part.

There have been a series of negotiations designed to address the Golan Heights and Israeli–Syrian relations more generally. These included the Madrid conference in 1991, sponsored by Spain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, which sought a broader Arab-Israeli peace, as well as US-sponsored efforts the following year and in 2000. Later negotiations in 2008 were facilitated by Turkey acting as a mediator. Although there was great hope of an agreement in each case, the talks broke down and UNDOF continued its mission.³⁰ Although UNDOF has created an environment for negotiation, other factors have prevented a settlement from being achieved.

After its initial years, UNDOF settled into a stable pattern of activity for more than three decades. This has changed somewhat with the onset of the Syrian civil war beginning in 2011. As noted above, UNDOF’s mission has been complicated by the breakdown of Syrian authority in the Golan area and the fighting between government and rebel forces. UNDOF personnel have been kidnapped, been subject to attack (accidental and non-accidental) by multiple sides in the war, and have had equipment and weapons seized. On the other hand, the violence has not been a product of the Israeli–Syrian rivalry, the ongoing focus of UNDOF.

UNDOF is a long-standing UN peacekeeping operation. Much has changed in the four decades of its deployment, but its mandate of maintaining a ceasefire between Israeli and Syrian military forces has not. UNDOF is representative of a set of peace operations created during the Cold War. It was a traditional peacekeeping operation that separated two warring states along clearly defined lines of demarcation. Other than some limited humanitarian activities, it never assumed the more expansive roles that are now characteristic of peacebuilding missions. As with other traditional operations (for example, UNEF I after the Suez crisis and UNFICYP in Cyprus), it has been successful in limiting violent conflict, but less able to stimulate conflict resolution in the form of conclusive peace agreements. Such outcomes raise questions about the utility of these operations and the apparent tradeoff between peacekeeping and peacemaking.

The Syrian civil war posed fundamental challenges for UNDOF. As a traditional operation, it was not designed to keep the peace in a civil conflict, especially when some of the combatant groups were less supportive of the operation than have been the Israeli and Syrian states.