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John Locke and Liberalism
di Michael P. Zuckert
John Locke is one of the preeminent names in the history of political
philosophy. He is often identified as the founder of the liberal tradition of
political thought and as the author of the most compelling case for
religious toleration. His achievements extend beyond moral and political
matters for he was the founder of modern empiricism, a doctrine of how
and what we can know, as well as being the author of important works in
economics, theology, and educational theory. His work remains influential
today, as is manifest in the revival of Lockean style political philosophy in
the late twentieth century by thinkers like John Rawls and Robert Nozick.
Locke lived in tempestuous times and often found himself very much
caught up in the tempests. The most obvious were the political tempests:
He lived though the two British revolutions of the seventeenth century, the
civil war of mid-century and the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89. His
father was on active participant in the former on the Parliamentary side;
Locke himself was much identified with the Whig Party before and during
the latter revolution because of his close relationship with the Earl of
Shaftesbury, the acknowledged leader of the Whigs in the post-Restoration
years. Locke was in exile in Holland when the Glorious Revolution came,
but his name is indelibly associated with it because he cast his Two
Treatises of Government as an effort «to establish the Throne of our Great
Restorer, our present King William», the ruler who supplanted King James
II as a result of the Glorious Revolution.
In those turbulent times Locke did not lead a cloistered life. It is a
matter of some controversy among scholars as to just how much Locke was
entangled in restoration era revolutionary plots, but his role as
Shaftesbury’s confidante, secretary, aide de camp guaranteed that he was
involved in some part of it. On two separate occasions he felt that his safety
required that he flee England for fairly extended periods on the continent,
once in France, and then in Holland.
Locke’s political writings must be seen to some extant as efforts to
respond to the issues underlying the political turmoil of the age. Those
conflicts were complex because they occurred along two dimensions — the
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strictly political or constitutional and the religious. The political dimension
concerned the relations between the powers of King and Parliament; the
religious dimension derived from the unsettled character of British
Christianity that followed on the Reformation. Locke wrote his Two
Treatises to settle the political side, and his Letter on Toleration to settle
the religious side.
Of course, to emphasize the relation between Locke’s writings and his
political context is not to reduce those writings to being merely partisan
statements with bearing only on the immediate situations. He attempted
to speak to the political conflicts of his time by presenting the truth about
politics and the political place of religion, truth that was valid for more
than this particular time and place. Locke was a political actor, but he was
also a philosopher, and examination of his writing’s bears out the view that
his philosophic and political activity were completely intertwined. It was
an era of turmoil and innovation in the philosophic world also. Locke was
a generation or so younger than the great innovators of modern
philosophy and natural science. Thus his work shows great debts to
Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and perhaps most of all, René Descartes,
pioneers of the new philosophy. Locke was also a great friend of Isaac
Newton, of Robert Boyle, one of the early practitioners of the science of
chemistry, and of Thomas Sydenham, one of the founders of modern
medical science. Indeed, so far as Locke can be said to have had a
profession it was as a physician, in which capacity he first met Shaftesbury,
an event that changed his life by lifting him out of the ivory tower
atmosphere of Oxford and replanting him in the Shaftesbury household.
Locke presented himself in his major work, An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, as a mere «under-laborer in clearing ground a
little, and removing some of the rubbish, that lies in the way to
knowledge». This is no doubt too modest, for his achievements in the
Essay are much greater than that, but his identification of his task is
helpful for getting a sense of the overall character of Locke’s corpus. The
“rubbish” he wished to remove is the the dominant scholasticism, what
Locke often refers to as the teachings of «the schools». Locke was a
partisan in the debate between the new philosophy of Bacon, Descartes,
and the others and the old scholastic philosophy tracing back to Thomas
Aquinas and Aristotle. Locke’s moral, political, and religions writings are
best understood as an effort to apply the new philosophy, as he understood
and developed it, to the practical affairs of human life.
Given that understanding of Locke’s efforts, it is surely not surprising
that his political philosophy has been controversial from the outset.
Because he expected controversy he published only a few of his writings
with his name on them, most importantly his masterwork, the Essay
Concerning Human Understanding. His Two Treaties, his Letter on
Toleration, his The Reasonableness of Christianity were all published
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anonymously. Nonetheless, all of these but the Two Treatises entangled
him in major controversies in his own time, most often with clergymen
who found his writings insufficiently orthodox. Locke’s later years were
spent, in large part, in producing long responses to the various clerical
attacks his work inspired. He was concerned that his works not be taken to
be so religiously heterodox as his critics claimed.
Locke remains controversial among scholars today, with the religion
issue still underlying much of the controversy. Ironically perhaps, the
terms of the debate have shifted since the seventeenth century, for now the
dominant view is that Locke is, perhaps above all, a religious thinker, a
Christian thinker. The dissenters from that orthodox view see Locke as a
more secular thinker. The controversies are probably more heated than
they need be, for when properly understand it becomes clear that Locke
straddles the divide between the scholars in a way that makes both sides
right.
Locke’s political philosophy is contained mainly in his Two Treatises
of Government, but others of his works, especially his Letter on Toleration
contain important supplementary materials. The Two Treatises was
published in 1690, shortly after the Glorious Revolution and ostensibly to
justify the replacement of James II as King by William III. According to
the prevailing scholarly consensus, Locke wrote most of the Two Treatises
perhaps a decade before he published it. The occasion, it is now believed,
was not the Glorious Revolution, but the agitation to prevent the openly
Catholic James from succeeding his brother Charles II as King. The leader
of this movement for Exclusion, as it was called, was Locke’s friend and
patron, the Earl of Shaftesbury.
The first of the Two Treatises was aimed against the work of Sir
Robert Filmer, strong partisan of the royalists in the political conflicts of
the day, who had argued in his book Patriarcha that kings ruled by divine
right. Of course that claim had been raised much earlier, by James I, for
example, but Filmer attempted to show that divine right monarchy was
established in the Bible. According to Filmer, God had appointed Adam,
the first father to mankind, king of all his descendents, with his monarchic
power descending to his next heir: Filmer put together the account of
Adam’s creation in Genesis with the widely accepted social fact that
children owed obedience to their fathers to create the theory that the
power of kings was the power of Adam, a power inherent in fatherhood.
Although the evidence is somewhat mixed, it appears that Filmer’s
doctrine had much influence in the years when the Exclusion Controversy
roiled the waters of British politics. The First Treatise was a
thoroughgoing and extremely effective critique of Filmer’s argument,
challenging, among other things, Sir Robert’s Biblical interpretations.
According to Locke’s subtitle, the First Treatise aimed to overthrow
«the False Principles and Foundation» of Filmer’s system. The second
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essay was meant to supply «The True Original, Extent, and End of CivilGovernment». The first was largely critical in character; the second more
constructive. Nonetheless, much of importance for understanding Locke’s
philosophy of politics is to be found in the First Treatise, a fact that speaks
strongly against the dominant practice of reading the Second Treatise
without the First.
1. Locke and the Liberal Tradition
Locke is the founder of the liberal tradition in political thought. What
can that mean? In the first instance it means that he asks a certain - novel question about politics and then answers it in a certain novel way. His
question comes to sight in the definition of political power with which he
opens his Second Treatise.
«Political power then I take to be a right of making laws with Penalties of
Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving
of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of
such Laws, and in the defense of the Commonwealth from Foreign Injury, and
all this only for the Public good (II3)».
Locke’s definition of political power contains many noteworthy points but
most striking because most jarring is his opening assertion: «Political
Power then I take to be a Right […]». This sounds strange in our ears
because we usually take political power to be a fact, not a “right.” Political
power, according to Locke, is a certain kind of power to coerce, to make
and enforce laws with the penalty of death and consequently all lesser
penalties as well. He highlights the harsh coercive side of political power
and by denoting it a right he brings to the fore the question: what makes
right this coercive power? Locke is not taking for granted the existence and
contours of political power. He demands at the outset a justification for its
very existence. It is for this reason that he begins his political
philosophizing by positing a state of nature, that is, a «state of perfect
freedom» and «a state also of Equality, wherein all the Power and
Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another». He posits a
condition in which human beings are subject to no law but the law of
nature and are «subject to no body (II 12)». The state of nature is a state of
anarchy, of no political power as Locke has defined it. Although there are
real life instances of the state of nature («all Princes and Rulers of
Independent governments all through the World, are in a State of Nature
[II19]»), the chief point of the state of nature is not to identify an actual
condition. It is to give us the baseline of no authority and to pose for us in
a particularly graphic way the question implied in the definition of political
power: whence come the right to exercise coercive power, especially the
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power to take the life of another?
Locke is, in the first instance, the founder of the liberal tradition
because he so clearly formulates the demand that the very existence of
political power as rightful coercion be justified. It might be objected to this
formulation that Locke merely follows Thomas Hobbes in positing a state
of nature and demanding an account of the genesis and justification of
political power from that beginning. This would be a fair objection, but
Hobbes is at best a proto-liberal, for from the starting point of absolute
freedom he generates the legitimacy of an absolute sovereign. Locke is a
liberal in the full sense because he generates from the condition of no-rule
only limited governmental power.
It is not only the conclusion of Locke’s argument that earns him the
title of father of the liberal traditions. There was something about the type
of argument he made that was significant as well. The immediate target of
his critical First Treatise was Robert Filmer, who, according to Locke,
rested his argument solely on «Scripture-proofs». In relying on the Bible
Filmer was by no means unique for the time; much of the serious political
thinking in the 17th century was, one might say, political theology, rather
than political philosophy. Although Locke engages in Biblical oneupmanship against Filmer, he rests neither his main critical weight nor his
constructive philosophizing there. In the First Treatise Locke identified
reason as mankind’s «only star and compass». To take guidance elsewhere
can carry man «to a Brutality below the level of the Beasts, when he quits
his reason (I58)». Locke is thus a rationalist and depends not on revelation
for understanding the “true original” of political life. Thus there are few
biblical citations in the Second Treatise. This is not to say that Locke is
hostile to revelation; he grants that it has a place in establishing truths that
transcend the powers of reason, but he is wary of so-called revelations that
induce irrational enthusiasm. To avoid enthusiasm he insists that reason
has a role in establishing the credentials of alleged revelations. Politics, he
believes, is well within the sphere of reason and thus, although he
occasionally looks to the Bible for confirmation of conclusions he draws on
the basis of reason, it is reason by which he “steers”.
Locke’s definition of political power highlights rightful coercion as
the decisive means of the political and at the same time he emphasizes the
limited ends for which that power exists: «for the Regulating and
Preserving of Property, and […] the defence of the common-wealth from
Foreign Injury, and all this only for the Publick Good». The definition of
the political thus points to a series of topics that together give Locke’s
political philosophy its particular texture: (1) On what basis does he posit a
state of nature as the proper beginning point? (2) What does he mean
when he specifies the «regulation and preservation of property» as (one of)
the chief ends of political life? and (3) How does he get from the state of
nature to rightful political power?
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2. The State of Nature and Natural Rights
Locke begins by positing a state of nature, a condition in which men
are not subject to political rule, but in which nonetheless have moral
guidance. «The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which
obliges every one (II6)». The Content of the law of nature derives from the
claim that «men being all the workmanship of one Omnipotent and
infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into
the world by his order and about his business, they are his property, whose
workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s
Pleasure». Certain limitations on what human beings may do to
themselves and others follow from the fact that they are God’s property.
The may not «destroy one another», for that would be a violation of God’s
property in men. A man may not even «quit his Station willfully» for the
same reason. That is, they may not «take away, or impair the life or what
tends to the Presentation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb, or Goods
of another (II6)». As God’s property men are morally obliged to respect
certain limits in their dealings with self and others. These limits in effect
establish rights to life, liberty, and property for all, rights which include the
immunity from others’ efforts to harm them. This “workmanship”
argument, on which Locke places much weight, should not be taken to be
an appeal to Biblical doctrine per se, although it obviously echoes
theological interpretations of the account of creation in Genesis. Locke
does not present it as a version of Genesis, however. Although he does not
attempt a rational proof for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient,
creating God in the Treatises, he does attempt such a proof in his Essay
Concerning Human Understanding and it is that rational argument that is
the backdrop for his assertions in the Second Treatise. That is, he is not
deviating from his affirmation of reason as our «only star and compass».
Locke is appealing here to a theological argument, but we need to
recognize the distinction, so commonplace in Locke’s time, between
Biblical and rational theology. Locke is appealing to an argument meant to
be one of rational theology.
We are God’s property, but Locke also affirms that «every man has
Property in his own Person. This nobody has any Right to but himself
(II27)». Which is it - are men God’s property or their own? What are we to
make of Locke’s apparent contradiction? We cannot answer those
questions unless we understands what Locke is saying when he declares
men to have «property in their own persons», or to be self-owners. Locke
is hereby stepping into a debate set off by his predecessor Thomas Hobbes,
w ho stipulated that by nature, or in the natural state, men possessed the
«right of nature», which is a «right of every man to everything», which,
Hobbes explains, includes a right even to one another’s bodies. This is no
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doubt an extensive doctrine of right, for it implies there is no wrong in
nature, i.e., no action or claim that can be raised that goes beyond one’s
rights. Hobbes intended that conclusion for he understood right to be a
liberty pure and simple, that is, a moral warrant or permission to do (or
not) as the right possessing agent chooses. With natural right so
understood it was but a short step for Hobbes from the state of nature to a
state of war, for all have a right to do to others whatever they please. Of
course, Thomas’ right to John’s body or life imposes no obligation on John
to recognize or give way to Thomas’s effort to exercise his right. John has
just the same right relative to Thomas and indeed has an incentive to
preemptively exercise his right against Thomas. Everyone has an incentive
and a right to preempt the hostile actions of others: the inevitable result is
war.
Many readers of Hobbes were put off by his doctrine of natural right;
some accused him of misusing the very concept of right. A right, it was
rejoined, is not merely a liberty, but it is a morally valid claim such that it
comes with a correlative duty in another to respect or recognize that right
in some way. Thus if Thomas has a right of free speech, others have a duty
or obligation not to interfere with Thomas in his exercise of his right. Or
more immediately to the point, if Thomas has a right to life, then others do
wrong if they take his life; they violate a duty, moral limitation imposed on
them by Thomas’s right. Right, as these critics saw it, is concomitant with
duty, if only the duty to forbear from interfering with the right holder in
his enjoyment of his right.
Locke affirm that men have property in themselves, and goes so far as
to call all the natural rights men possess “property”; he affirms, for
example, that man «[…] hath by nature a power, […] to preserve his
property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and
attempts of other men (II 87)». What are usually referred to as the objects of
rights - life, liberty, and estate - are referred to by Locke as property.
Unlike “right,” which has the ambiguity of meaning at work in the debate
between Hobbes and his critics, property is unequivocal. To affirm
property is to affirm that nobody else has a right, without the consent of
the owner, to seize, damage, or otherwise infringe on the property of
another. Thus Locke can say that the infringements by others on one’s
property are “injuries,” i.e., actions against rights, jura in the original
Latin. Although some scholars have identified the Hobbesean and Lockean
doctrine of rights, they are in fact quite different.
Lockean rights, whether derived from God’s ownership or from selfownership, thus have as correlates duties of forbearance on the part of
others. That means, among other things, that men do not have a natural
right to one another’s bodies. They have instead a moral immunity against
others using violence or otherwise impinging on their bodies. It is wrong
for others to coerce or interfere with the bodies (the platform of life), the
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actions (liberty), or the external goods (property) of others. Because men
have the basic natural rights and the correlative immunity from coercion,
the initial situation is rightfully conceived of as a state of nature, that is to
say, a state where there is no authority or political power as Locke has
defined it, for that is at core the right to use coercion even into death. The
state of nature then is an inference from the natural endowment with
rights, understood as derived either from divine or self-ownership.
Locke contradicts himself, or at least says something very puzzling
when he affirms both sorts of ownership, but the strange thing is that the
results - natural rights and the state of nature - are more or less the same
no matter which starting point one follows out. One of the most
characteristic and pervasive features of Locke’s political philosophy is just
this double track argument proceeding simultaneously from quite different
premises to the same conclusions. Because Locke proceeds on both tracks
through his Second Treatise, the scholars have divided into champions of a
theistic versus champions of a non-theistic Locke. Why Locke gave both
kinds of arguments is difficult to say simply on the basis of his political
writings. One would need to probe his epistemological and theological
writings to get insight into this difficult question. But our need is to
understand how Locke’s political doctrine flows from a convergence of the
two lines of augment.
3. Property
Since Locke uses the term “property” to describe all the natural
rights, his identification of «the Regulation and Preserving of Property» as
the purpose for which political power exists means that he understands the
purpose of government in the same terms as Thomas Jefferson used in the
American Declaration of Independence: «in order to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men». Contrary to what some have said
of Locke, he does not see government as exclusively serving the needs of
property and property owners, understood in the narrow sense of external
goods. Men form civil societies, Locke says, «for the mutual Preservation
of their Lives, Liberties, and Estates, which I call by the general, Name,
Property (II123)». All human beings are possessors of some property in this
extended sense.
Yet it is true that Locke is also deeply concerned with property in the
narrow sense and that concern is also reflected in his positing the
regulation and protection of property as the chief end of civil society.
Locke devotes an entire chapter of his Second Treatise to the topic of
property. This chapter is probably the best known part of the treatise and
seems to have been the part Locke took special pride in, for he commended
it above all else in the book
The chapter on property has attracted as much attention as it has
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because its main line of argument and its conclusions have been held to lay
the ground work for the theory of capitalism. The context for Locke’s
discussion is set by his polemical confrontation with Filmer, on the one
side, and more generally with the way property and political economy were
generally understood in the dominant Christian-Aristotelian tradition that
defined the reigning political culture.
Filmer had maintained that not only did God grant Adam and his
heir dominion over the rest of mankind, but that He had granted private
ownership to the non-human parts of the world to them as well. He rested
his claim in part on the authority of the Bible, but he also argued that no
other theory could account for the possibility of legitimate private
property. If, Filmer reasoned, the world was originally not Adam’s
property, but was common to all mankind, then no part of the world could
rightly come to belong to any individual. If the world were common
property to all, then the consent of all would be required to remove any of
it from the common and make it private. But that consent never was and
never could be achieved. Thus if the world were originally common, it
would always remain so. However, Adam as original proprietor could
authorize the transfers of ownership that eventually led to the distribution
of property of the modern age.
Locke put forward an array of arguments, some drawn from his
theistic, some from his non-theistic track. His first move, however, was to
reconceptualize the original commons as Filmer had spoken of it. Things
may be in common in two ways, as jointly owned or as unowned. Filmer
understood the hypothetical original commons as jointly owned; Locke
maintained that it is better understood as unowned, which leaves open the
possibility that parts of the commons can come to be privately owned. He
pointed out, secondly, that in order to survive men must appropriate goods
in the original commons, for a man must eat to live and in eating the food
«must be his, and so his, i.e., a part of him, that another can no longer
have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life
(II26)». This primitive act of appropriation must be understood as right, for
if we think the matter through via the workmanship argument we see that
in creating man God must have had a «design, that man should live and
abide for same time upon the Face of the Earth, and not that so curious
and wonderful a piece of workmanship […] should perish again, presently
after a few minutes continuance (I 86)».
Alternatively, if we think of men as self-owners and possessors of a
right to preservation, we can see that «every man has a Property [in] the
labour of his Body, and the work of his Hands». These «are properly his»;
when he mixed what is his, his labor, with what is unowned, the commons,
in the service of his preservation, he acts with right to make what was
unowned his. Mixing his labor not only legitimates his primitive
appropriation, e.g., digesting, but it generates the kind of exclusive claim
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that constitutes property, even if he collects items that he does not
immediately eat. «It being by him removed from the common state Nature
placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes
the common right of other men (II 27)». Thus Locke initiates his «labor
theory of property», which is meant to refute Filmer’s critique of the
possibility of private property on any basis other than his notion of an
original divine donation of the world to Adam.
Locke’s discussion of property was also addressed against traditional
notions of property, which, in various ways, set limitations on acquisition,
ownership, and use of property. Locke initially accepts such limitations. At
various moments in his account of the right to appropriate the fruits of the
earth and then to appropriate the earth itself he suggest that there is a
limit to what one may rightfully appropriate: that one take no more of the
fruits of the earth than «one can make use of to any advantage of life
before it spoils (II31)», and that of land “every man” can appropriate
through his labor «as much as he could make use of (II36)». The
limitations have a common theme and like much in Locke have a dual root.
Under the law of nature, i.e., the rules for treating others that are the
obverse of one’s natural rights, one may not directly or indirectly harm
others, unless there is a good reason, such as one’s own preservation
coming into conflict with theirs. One thus has a right to appropriate as
much of the external world as is useful to one, but not more, for to take
more than one can use is to put others at risk of (at least) indirect harm
gratuitously. This natural law duty has the advantage of being nearly selfenforcing, for both appropriating the fruits and cultivating the earth
requires the expenditures of hard labor. Rational men will not expend
labor to acquire goods that will spoil, i.e., be of no use to them. Thus the
«spoilage limitation» has a solid grounding in moral principle and in the
actual principles of human behavior. It is what Locke elsewhere calls an
“endowed” moral principle in being more than a mere moral dictate. It is a
natural law in an emphatic sense.
The most characteristic feature of Locke’s philosophy of property is
his demonstration that the limitations on the acquisition and possession of
property no longer have validity or force in civilized society. He
demonstrates this both as a matter of individual right and of the «publick
good». He had justified the initial appropriation of land on the ground
that the earth in its natural condition leaves men in a state of «penury»,
which requires of men that they labor. Over time they discover that labor
invested in cultivating the land is far more productive than labor expended
in hunting and gathering activities (II32). Indeed, cultivated land is one
hundred times more productive than uncultivated land, so the individual
who “encloses” or takes land out of the natural commons does no harm to
his fellows, for he, in effect, gives back to mankind ninety-nine acres for
every acre he cultivates. The one who takes is thus a benefactor.
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This is Locke’s perhaps most fundamental insight: what nature
supplies are «almost worthless» raw materials; human labor supplies most
of what is of value through its power to transform the given and make it
both more plentiful and more suited to human use. The solution to the
human problem, so far as there is a solution, lies in unleashing human
creative labor power to produce in order to overcome the various forms of
penury men face in the world. The fulfillment of human nature, so far as
there is a fulfillment, is the unleashing of human power to transform, to
make a world, for man is the making or transforming animal, the animal
with the power to overcome by negating the given and through that
negation to produce a “second nature” through positive productive action.
Such negation/production is in part in the service of need, the needs
associated with survival, but more than that is the expression of human
freedom and rationality itself.
In addition to a labor theory of property, Locke also has a labor
theory of value, not precisely the same as what Marx meant by that phrase
but a recognizable forerunner of it. As becomes clear as the argument in
chapter on property proceeds, once all the land is owned, labor is no longer
a title to property, but it remains the source of value, as explained above.
This is not to say, however, that labor in itself is the source of exchange
value. Locke sees that prices are the result of market forces - supply and
demand - and are not nor should they be, related directly to the labor
invested in goods. Market prices, what men in general are willing to pay
for goods, signal how the labor of individuals can be coordinated to
produce goods that are in the «publick good»; individual labor
uncoordinated with the labor and desires of others has no guarantee of
serving the public good.
The mechanism by which labor becomes of use, or greater use to
others is exchange. Locke outlines a two-stage process whereby the
spoilage limitation is overcome both as a moral and as a practical matter.
The first stage has to do with barter. If one can exchange the surplus one
has of one good, i.e., of what one has (or can have) over and above what
one can use without spoiling, for the surplus of another, one can rightly
acquire more than the spoilage limitation would otherwise allow. The
possibility of bartering, then both encourages and morally permits the
expenditure of more labor than life without barter would allow.
The decisive innovation, however, is money, for this can be stored
indefinitely with no threat of spoilage and thus it leads to an even greater
unleashing of human labor, for it, in effect, waives all limits on acquisition
by leading to an exponential increase in productivity.
One result of the invention of money, however, is the disappearance
of the commons. Men no longer have unowned land on which they can
hunt and gather for subsistence. The new system of private property
greatly advantages some over others, for some own land, while others are
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reduced to their self-owned bodies and labor-power, which they must sell
in order to survive. Locke sees this arrangement, so objectionable to
thinkers like Rousseau and Marx, as justified by the rights of the owners
but also by its service to all, including the non-owners. The creation of a
complex society with a complex division of labor, and great productive
power is of benefit for all, because, as Locke says, «a king of a large and
fruitful territory [in America, where there is no private property] feeds,
lodges, and is clad worse than a day labourer in England (II 41)».
Everybody benefits from the system of private property and the
regime of unlimited acquisition that money makes possible, at least in
theory. So far as that is not the case, Locke affirms a «right to charity»,
which «gives every Man a Title to so much out of another’s Plenty as will
keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise
(I42)». It is, of course, odd to speak of charity as a right, as Locke does, but
he does so because it is actually a manifestation of the inalienable right all
have to preservation. In support of this lingering natural right Locke
proposed a poor law, i.e., a limited safety net right to social support that
could, he thought, provide the means of subsistence to which the
unemployed have a right without sapping incentives to labor by creating
an incentive to dependency. To modern eyes Locke’s proposal looks harsh,
but its details are less important for today than the philosophic basis on
which Locke formulated his welfare scheme.
The system of private ownership serves the public good so far as it
allows freedom to acquire and use property. All (more or less) are better
off under this system than they would be without it, but the benefits are
differentially spread through society, which thus takes on a class character.
Some own much and can hire others to do the hard labor that produces
value; others must sell their labor to survive. Although Locke affirms that
all are better off, some are a good deal better off than others, and great
inequality comes to characterize society.
The regime of private property comes to have a particularly
prominent role to play in political life, as is visible in Locke’s definition of
political power. For one, Locke affirms almost unlimited power to
determine the uses of property - a freedom implicit in the very idea or
nature of property, but also on the whole necessary to the adjustment of
property use to markets and thus to the public good. But he does not
concede complete freedom. The natural limits that one not harm others
remains in effect always, and thus property is subject to regulation in order
to prevent it from doing harm. Thus Locke affirms that one aim of political
power is «for the Regulation […] of Property». On the other hand, the
great inequality concomitant on the property system introduces the strong
possibility of class conflict in which some, the owners, are tempted, and
may possess the resources to oppress the non-owners (i.e., threaten their
property in themselves), and in which the others, the non-owners may try
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to dispossess or redistribute the property of the owners. Both the claims of
individual natural right and the public good speak against either of these
outcomes and thus Locke affirms that the purpose of political power is also
the «Preserving of Property», meaning the preserving of the property
rights of all in both the narrow and broad senses for property in light of the
potential conflict between the two. Without government to «regulate and
preserve» both sorts of property, this institution of so great value to
mankind is vulnerable to abuses by both of the great classes formed
around ownership. Property is thus another great reason for the negation
or overcoming of the state of nature and the formation of civil government.
4. Political Power
Locke begins with the state of nature, i.e., the recognition that
because human beings are naturally rights possessors, they are not
naturally subject to political authority. But Locke is no anarchist; the point
of his political philosophy is to show how, despite the fact that men are
born free they came to be rightfully subject to political power and that this
subjection is for the good of all, i.e., the public good. Locke’s treatment of
the making of political society is framed by one major question and one
major claim. The question is this: «If Man in the state of Nature be so free;
[…] If he be absolute Lord of his own Person and possessions, equal to the
greatest, and subject to no Body, why will he part with his freedom?
(II123)». And the claim is this: «Men being […] by Nature, all free, equal
and independent, no one can be put out of his Estate, and subjected to the
Political Power of another without his consent».
When Locke asks why men leave the freedom and equality of the
state of nature he is asking why can men not live together without the
coercive institution of the state. As with many aspects of his political
philosophy he supplies a complex, two-stage answer. The state of nature, it
will be recalled, is a state in which men are «perfectly free» of all law and
all subjection, except to the law of nature. Locke assumes, first that these is
a law of nature, a set of moral rules, which is known to men, i.e.,
promulgated, and by which they are capable of regulating their behavior.
The existence and effectiveness of this law seems to distinguish Locke’s
version of the state of nature from Hobbes’s. In the latter case, the state of
nature is straightforwardly equivalent to the state of war, because the
moral mandate naturally governing men is the right of nature, which, it
may be recalled, mandates a right to everything, including each other’s
bodies. The two states are one because to act under the mandate of the
right of nature produces war, not as a deviation but as a fulfillment of the
natural moral guide to action. Locke, on the other hand, affirms natural
law as either the implicate of the workmanship argument or as the obverse
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of the basic rights concomitant with self-ownership. To war against others,
i.e., to use or threaten force against them, is a violation of the law of nature
and thus at least in principle Locke can distinguish the state of nature and
the state of war, the latter being the «use of force without right», and the
former the absence of that condition (II19,20).
Even assuming full knowledge of the law of nature, the state of nature
tends to degenerate into a state of war. The two states are often or even
normally coincident, but they are not conceptually identical. To show how
the state of nature typically degenerates into a state of war, i.e., to show
why men, even when they know the moral rule that should govern their
actions, cannot live well without the coercive authority of government,
Locke posits what he calls a «strange doctrine»: all men in the state of
nature possess the «executive power of the law of nature», which, is a
power to enforce the law on their own and others’ behalf (II 9, 13). In order
to be a law the law of nature must have some effective sanction in this
world; therefore someone must have an enforcement power. But since all
men are naturally equal in authority, this power, if it exists at all, must be
held by all equally. In the state of nature, then, there can exist two different
sorts of use of force: force without right; i.e., violations of the law of
nature, and force with right, i.e., attempts to punish and deter force
without right.
Even when men know the moral rule that is to govern their actions
they are tempted to use force without right. The discussion of property
supplies one set of reasons for the constant temptation to such violations.
Men live in a penurious world relative to their needs and desires, the
penuriousness of which can be overcome only with painful labor. Hence
there is a constant temptation to violate the labor and ownership claims of
others in order to acquire goods without labor. Other sorts of rivalries,
jealousies, and enmity may also provoke the use of force without right.
The naturally authorized response to these violations of the law of
nature is use of the natural executive power against the criminal. This
power is extensive and expansive. It extends to the right to inflict the
penalty of death, a penalty that may be imposed even if the transgressor
has only robbed, or even is merely perceived to be a threat to another. No
one is obliged to wait until the potential transgressor has made his attempt
on one’s life or goods. The attempt may be anticipated and the executive
power deployed preemptively.
Men, being naturally more concerned with their own survival and
that of their friends and family, will tend to overreact to transgressors and
potential transgressors; since it is difficult to know for certain whether
another has «enmity» towards one, and since it is dangerously risky to
estimate wrongly, men will tend to act preemptively more than is strictly
rational or warranted. However, this tendency will be greatly accentuated
by the dialectic of preemption: all will be aware that all others will be
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tempted to preempt and all will be even more likely to act preemptively to
preempt the preemptive actions of the others. This dialectic of preemption
more or less guarantees that the state of nature will degenerate into a state
of war. Indeed, perhaps the must striking fact about this state of war is that
in it legitimates acts of force against others will not be easily
distinguishable from illegitimate ones. Human beings, so self-favoring and
able to rationalize their own motives for action, will be able to deceive
themselves into thinking that transgressive actions are really preemptive
enforcement actions.
The end result is what Locke gently calls the great “inconvenience” of
the state of nature, the «inconvenience being that the basic rights, or
property in both narrow and extended senses, are “very insecure». So,
harsh as it may be to live under coercive government Locke shows that the
situation of men without it is worse than with it, especially if it is properly
constructed. Locke’s answer to his own question of why men leave the
state of nature is, then, that the absence of public coercive power leads to
an intolerable situation of rights insecurity.
If that is not bad enough, Locke also suggests that he has understated
the problem in his analysis of the dynamic leading from the state of nature
to the state. He had initially assumed that men know the law of nature,
but in a later recapitulation he denies that as well: «For though the Law of
Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet Men being
biased by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not
apt to allow it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their
particular Cases (II124)». Locke’s thought moves in two somewhat different
directions. The law of nature is «plain and intelligible to all rational
creatures». Yet it also must be studied to be known, and most men do not
study it, and therefore most are ignorant of it. If ignorant of it, they cannot
take it as the rule of their action. In the Treatise Locke expends little effort
explaining how the law of nature is known and why it requires study. He
addressed that question at length in his early (1662) manuscript on the law
of nature. Although he affirms the existence of this law, he concludes from
the empirical evidence that men are for the most part ignorant of it and
that, being secret and hidden it requires great effort to discover, effort than
men may have a natural law duty to undertake, but which, being ignorant
of the natural law, they do not undertake. In this early manuscript as well
in the Two Treatises Locke raises the serious question of whether the law
of nature is sufficiently promulgated to be binding and effective. If the law
of nature, i.e., the natural moral limitations on behavior, is not naturally
known, then all the more reason to suspect that the state of nature will not
be the potentially harmonious and peaceful state that human life
effectively governed by natural moral standards might be.
In sum, men cannot live without government because the alternative
- non-coerced or individually enforced guidance by natural morality - is
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ineffective and leads to a situation in which rights are extremely insecure.
«Thus Mankind, notwithstanding all the Privileges of the state of Nature,
being but an ill condition, is quickly driven into Society», for the sake of
securing their rights, or in Lockean language, preserving their property
(II127).
5. Consent
Men thus need political power, or authority, but given its natural
absence, how can they rightfully create it? Do not the same natural rights
that lead to positing a state of nature, the same rights that require
protection from government, also stand in the way of creating legitimate
political power?
The basic ingredient in the creation of government is the very same
executive power of the law of nature, which contributed to the state of
nature’s being so intolerable a condition. The executive power provides a
legitimate basis for political power, for it is a natural and rightful power to
coerce others, including a right to kill them, in order to protect property in
the extended sense. In terms of his narrative of the state of nature, when
men discover that they can not safely abide the state of nature, they come
together to pool their individual natural executive powers. They agree first
to form a society and resign up their executive powers to the community.
The individuals surrender their right to wield the executive power on their
own and according to their own judgment. The state that they create thus
acquires a «monopoly of legitimate coercion». The coercive power that
exists in the community is now exercised «by Men having Authority for the
community (II87,130)».
The process whereby the executive power is transferred to the
community is called by Locke compact; and it requires the unanimous and
individual consent of every would-be member. The compact actually has
two elements: first, the unanimous agreement to form a political society,
and then a unanimous agreement that the majority of the community will
have the power or right to establish a particular sort of government for the
community.
As we have seen, Locke emphasizes that the entire process occurs
according to the «consent of the governed», as Thomas Jefferson put it in
the American Declaration of Independence. Since no person is born
subject to another the only way in which subjection can be instituted is
voluntarily and consent is the means by which this is done. Unlike many of
the Whig thinkers who preceded him, Locke did not claim that the consent
of some group of «original compactors» was sufficient to bind their
descendents. The consent of each member, since each is free and equal, is
required to continually reconstitute the political society. Locke develops
two themes in his doctrine of consent. One concerns the content of
consent; the other means by which consent is given.
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Since political power is constructed from the natural executive power
of the members, this power must be given up: «the Power of punishing he
wholly gives up (II130)». Consent also disposes of the «Power […] of doing
whatsoever he thought fit for the Preservation of himself, and the rest of
Mankind». This power, each compactor «gives up to be regulated by Laws
made by the Society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the
rest of that Society shall require (II 129).» In other words in creating political
authority, men give up their original equality; in subjecting themselves to
be “regulated” by the laws of the society, they give up their original liberty.
In the abstract, Locke’s doctrine of the means of consent is largely
intelligible but many ambiguities and uncertainties surround the more
specific working out of the doctrine. Most members of political society,
with the exceptions perhaps, of naturalized citizens, have no recollection of
having given anything like explicit consent to being a member. Most were
indeed born into society and subject to the reigning authorities. Locke
raises the question: «Every Man, being […] naturally free, and nothing
being able to put him into subjection to any Earthly Power, but only his
own Consent, it is to be considered, what shall be understood to be a
sufficient Declaration of a Mans Consent, to make him subject to the Laws
of any Government (II119)». Locke’s discussion of this question permits of
no simple answer. The difficulty stems from the multitude of forms of
consent Locke allows, but the bearing of which he does not carefully sort
out. Thus he explicitly recognizes express consent, presumably taking an
oath or some related act; tacit consent, consent expressed in some lesser
way, or implied in some other overt act undertaken; constructive consent,
an imputation of consent (and the contents of consent) to men as what
“rational men” in that circumstance would or should consent to; and
finally, consent as consensus. All four of these meanings one at work in
different places in Locke’s theory, but careful readers have had a difficult
time sorting out which is in play where and, in particular, how to
understand his most thematic claims: nothing can put a man «into
subjection to any Earthly Power, but only his own Consent (II 119)».
6. Government
However we are to understand consent Locke is very explicit that
there are limits to what men may consent to, i.e., to the kind of
government they may subject themselves to. «But though Men when they
enter into Society, give up the Equality, Liberty, and Executive Power they
had in the State of Nature», the legislative power they create cannot «be
absolutely Arbitrary over the Lives and Fortunes of the People […] (II 135)».
In accord with his dual grounding of rights, Locke has a two-fold argument
to prove absolutism «impossible». On the one hand, «no Body can transfer
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to another more power than he has in himself; and no Body has an
absolute, arbitrary power over himself», a reference to the “workmanship
argument” and the limitations imposed on one’s power over oneself (II 135).
On the other hand, in a very striking example of Locke’s deployment of the
idea of constructive consent, he affirms that men, cannot be presumed to
have consented to absolute, arbitrary power in their governors, «for no
rational Creature can be supposed to change his condition with an
intention to be worse», which, according to him, an absolutist regime
would be (II131). Here is a very fine example of how Locke’s theistic and
non-theistic strands of argument land him in the exact same place.
Locke lays down quite flexible guidelines for the form of government
the majority of the society may settle on. The community may chose
among the various forms «as they think well», always accepting
absolutism. Not only will rational individuals create government in a form
of their choosing, but they will create a certain sort of government, what
we now think of as a liberal order. In the first place, rational actors will
understand that government is an artifact of their rational willing: as an
artifact they will realize it has been made or should be understood as
existing --for certain specific purposes, namely, to secure their preexisting
rights. Rational individuals will understand the shortcomings of the state
of nature that produce the radical insecurity of life without government.
Although there is a law to govern the state of nature this does not of its
own accord suffice. Though the law exists «yet men, being biased by their
interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow it as
a law binding to them (II124)». That is, the law is not known sufficiently.
Moreover, the system of self-enforcement means there is no disinterested
judge to apply the law to resolve controversies (II 125). Finally, with no
organized enforcement of the law, the naturally strong are able to ride over
the weak despite the law of nature (II 126). Rational individuals recognize,
then, the chief lacks of the state of nature as the absence of a legislative
authority to particularize and promulgate the law, an independent neutral
judge to resolve disputes under the laws, and a potent neutral executive to
enforce the law. From his doctrine of the state of nature Locke thus
generates the modern theory of separation of functions.
Rational individuals will thus form a political system containing
these three functions. Locke also concludes that rational individuals will
establish a government that separates the powers in different and
independent institutions (II143). The separation of powers is one device by
which rational actors attempt to assure that the government they establish
will serve the ends for which it exists. All «well-framed governments»
separate the legislative and executive powers (II 159). (Locke considers the
judiciary part of the executive but he does insist on a judiciary importantly
independent of the executive head).
Locke concludes that rationally constructed government implies not
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only separated powers, but limited power as well. That means in the first
instance legislative supremacy over the executive (II 149). It also means
limitations on the powers of the legislature. Although the core of the
limitations is substantive - protection of the rights of all and public good so
far as that is possible - the limitations Locke specifies are more formal than
substantive. The legislature must rule by standing public law not by
arbitrary decrees. The laws must apply equally to all (II142), including
especially the legislators themselves. Locke sees these two requirements
together as the best guarantee of good governance, or at least of
governance aiming at the public good (II138).
Although Locke is strongly in favor of legislative supremacy - the
legislative function is conceptually primary, and the legislature, possessing
the will but not the force of the community, is more safely entrusted in
practice with supremacy. Nonetheless, Locke also demonstrates that there
must be a large scope for independent action by the executive, which he
calls by the traditional name of prerogative. His it is not, however, the
traditional doctrine of prerogative (II 163). He defines the prerogative as a
«power to act according to discretion, for the publick good, without the
prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it (II 160)». Locke and
his rational individuals/social contractors recognize that it is not always
«necessary or useful to set precise bounds to […] power in all things
(II164)». Political life is too uncertain, too subject to unpredictable and
threatening contingencies for it to be entirely governed by rules and
procedures established in advance (II 160). Locke, a great champion of what
we have come to think of as constitutionalism, recognizes the limitations
to the aspiration to constitutionalism. At the same time he reminds of the
dangers of this kind of executive power freed from law and legislative
control. Although he generally seeks to control political power by law, he
recognizes that at the end of the day this cannot be entirely done. The
executive can appeal to the public good as justification for exercises of
prerogative, Locke is confident that if «this power» is «imployed for the
benefit of the community, and suitably to the trust and ends of the
government, [it] never is questioned (II 161)». When the prerogative is
questioned, there is «no judge on earth» to settle a dispute between the
executive and the legislature. The people themselves, in what Locke
quaintly calls the «appeal to Heaven» must judge though some extra-legal
means. Locke’s openness to revolution or the routinization of political
violence is a corollary of his attempt to develop a viable constitutionalism
marked by the maximum possible rule of law.
7. Revolution
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At the end of the Second Treatise Locke turns to the “end” in the
sense of the death of government. He surveys four circumstance or ways in
which civil government may come to an end: conquest, which is the
equivalent of «demolishing an House (II 175)»; usurpation, which occurs
when a person or persons other than those designated in the established
political order seize power, is also a kind of death for civil government,
because a usurper «hath no right to be obeyed», which means that
juridically there is no government (II198); tyranny, which Locke defines as
«the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to»
has the same fatal effects as usurpation (II 202). Finally, in a kind of
summary chapter Locke speaks of «the dissolution of government», a
chapter in which he lays out his well-known doctrine (usually misnamed
as) the right of revolution.
Locke’s position on “the end” of civil government follows seamlessly
from his clear rejection of the legitimacy of absolute arbitrary power and
his affirmation of institutionally and constitutionally necessary means to
the effectuation of non-arbitrary government. Government that goes
beyond its bounds is no government at all. When governments act beyond
their powers, they are using force without right, and thus, literally,
provoking a state of war with their citizenry. The citizens may then act as
they have a right to in a state of war - they may resist illegitimate authority
and act to establish new, legitimate government. When they do so, Locke
insists, they are not rebelling - it is the authorities who go beyond their
legitimate powers who reintroduce the state of war and who therefore
rebel - in Latin, re-bellare - bring back war (II226). Locke then denies that
he is a teacher of rebellion and disorder, as he strives to make resistance to
rulers more respectable than it had ever been.