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geography

AND

DEVELOPMENT

THIRD EDITION

GEOGRAPHY

AJVD

DEVELOPMENT

A WORLD REGIONAL APPROACH

Edited by

JAMES S. FISHER

University of Georgia

Merrill Publishing Company
A Bell & Howell Information Company
Columbus Toronto London Melbourne

Published by

Merrill Publishing Company
A Bell & Howell Information Company
Columbus, Ohio 43216

This book was set in Garamond.

Administrative Editor: David C. Gordon
Developmental Editor; Wendy W. Jones
Production Coordinator; Constantina Geldis
Art Coordinator: Ruth A. Kimpel
Cover Designer: Cathy Watterson
Text Designer: Cynthia Brunk
Photo Editor: Terry L. Tietz
Photo Assistant: Gail Meese

Copyright © 1989, 1984 by Merrill Publishing Company.
All rights reserved. No part of diis book may be
reproduced in any form, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopy, recording, or any information
storage and retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher. “Merrill Publishing
Company” and “Merrill” are registered trademarks of
Merrill Publishing Company.

Cover: Background — Tunisian carpet, Gafsa pattern.
Photo © Wolfgang Kaehler. Mali, Djenne. Mosque built
out of mud brick construction. Traditional African
architectural style.

This book was previously published under the title
Essentials of Geography and Development: Concepts and
Processes, second edition.

Acknowledgments for figures and photographs appear
on pages 691-695.

The Goode’s Homolosine Equal-Area Projection base
maps in this text are used by permission of The
University of Chicago Committee on Geographical
Studies. Goode Base Map Series copyright © The
University of Chicago.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 88-62548
International Standard Book Number: 0-675-20942-0
Printed in the United States of America
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 — 92 91 90 89

CONTRIBUTORS

Leonard BeiT>'

Florida Ailantic Univereitj'

David L Clawson
University of New Orleans

Louts DeVorsey, Jr
University of Georgia

James S. Fisher
University of Georgia

Don R. Hoy
University of Georgia

Douglas L Johnson
Claric University

Clifton \V Pannell
University of Georgia

Roger L. Thiede

University ofWisconsln — Eau Claire

Jack F. Williams
Micht^ State University

Increasing dev'clopmenr In faraway pbces is leading
to a more interdependent world Rapid advances Jn
transponanon technology and clecrrotiic communi-
cation are speeding up commercial, cuKural, eco-
nomic, and political (nteraalon among countries and
regions One outgrowth of these changes is a global
economy, which depends on dte efficient exchange
of raw materials and manufaaured goods ail over the
world Another consequence is the international im-
pact of local politics Foe example, because of polU-
fcal and economic linkages, unrest In the Middle East
affects Africa, Europe, ihe USSR, ppjn. snd the
United States In a serise, this movement toward glo-
bal Interdependence has made our w’orld smaller
and the study of it even more exciting. It certainly has
underscored the need to study differences in pljysl-
cal and human geography from place to place.

CoU^e students are in a unique poshlon to in-
crease their understanding of the world and lo use
^at knowledge to benefit themselves and others.
Through the study of world regional geography we
begin to comprehend the Issues Involved in the pur-
suit Of world peace, preserv-ation of the environment
Improved health, and higher levels of living In fact'
the Association of American Geographers, the Na-

lional Geographic Society, and the National Council
for Geographic Education have devoted significant
resources and efTori to improving geographic aware-
ness Even the United States Congress has cited geo-
graphic education as critical to our increasingly In-
terdependent world

Ihis third edition of Gcogrqpfty Dei^lop-
metu A World Regional ApprocteJ} is dedicated to
college students who are seeking a better under-
standing of this complex and challenging world It is
written for boUi majors and non-majors and does not
require an extensive background in geography. We
have retained the basic regional structure of tlie sec-
ond ediiion, and our multiple-author approach per-
mits each region to be discussed by one or two
scholars who are experts in that area. Though our
fields of expertise vary, we arc united in our ded-
ication to expanding geographsca) awareness. The
differing perspectives on geography and develop-
merit that emerge add strength to our overall pre-
sentation. while differences in writing sq-le have
smoothed out through the expertise of Sarah K.
Myers, former &}'nor of Geogretphicai Review and
Wr president of the American Geographical So-

viii

PREFACE

Geograpljy and Development opens with four
chapters that consider geography as a discipline,
population and resources, physical and cultural ele-
ments of the environment, and the world condition
as it relates to human development. Eight additional
parts — with twenty-four chapters — follow, orga-
nized within a regional framework. Our treatment of
Japan has been expanded in this edition to reflect
Japan’s leadership role in the world’s economy. In
addition, the chapters on Latin America have been
completely rewritten; and the introduction to Mon-
soon Asia has been expanded to examine die evolv-
ing development process within South, Southeast,
and East Asia. Widiin this regional framework stu-
dents are introduced to basic geographical concepts
and die essential geography and development of our
world.

Aldiough we encourage use of diis text as an en-
tity, its organization allows a variety of teaching strat-
egies. As time requires, sections treating historical or
environmental considerations, die contemporary^ de-
velopment process, or specific regions can be selec-
tively emphasized or deleted. In a two-quarter or
two-semester sequence die book facilitates consider-
ation along continental or regional divisions or along
rich world-poor world (developed-developing) lines.
The suggested furdier readings can then be used to
supplement the text, and table and figure references
can encourage students to pursue external data
sources and analysis.

Geography and Development: A World Regioiial
approach contains numerous features that are de-
signed to assist and stimulate students.

1 More than one hundred full-color maps have
been rendered by a professional carto-
graphic studio, incorporating the latest
boundary and name changes.

2 Specially-chosen color photographs have
been carefully integrated into tlie text and
help communicate the personality of individ-
ual regions.

3 Valuable tables, graphs, and charts also sup-
plement textual material.

4 Every' chapter includes a short essay on a
topic of special regional significance, such as
population growtli, environmental prob-
lems, food production, migration, manufac-
turing, or distinctive regional features.

5 Each of the nine parts opens with a brief
statement of intent and emphasis for the re-
gions under consideration.

6 Selected terms are presented in boldface
type in the text, identified as a group of key
terms at the end of each chapter, and conve-
niently defined in a glossary at the end of the
book.

7 Each part ends with a list of further readings
for students who wish to deepen and
broaden tlieir understanding of particular
topics.

8 A special feature (Appendix A) provides in-
formation on map projections and scale. We
are grateful to Phillip Muehrcke, professor of
geography at tlie University of Wisconsin
— Madison and former president of tlie
American Cartographic Association, for his
clear explanation of dais complex subject.

9 Measurements throughout the text are given
in both English and metric equivalents. A
convenient table of conversion faaors is also
found in Appendix B.

10 Appendix C includes a table of selected na-
tional data so that students can compare
countries and regions.

For die instructor, a number of supplements are
available — an instruaor’s manual, a computerized
test Ixink, slides, and transparencies. (Please contaa
the publisher for more information.)

Our ultimate hope is diat this book, in concert
with teachers and other sources, will help students
develop a better appreciation of die fascinating ge-
ography of our world.

ACKNOWI.EDGMENTS

The authors have been blessed widi the help of nu-
merous reviewers during die preparation of diis
third edition of Geography and Developmettt. Tlie
suggestions and comments of these individuals have
been indispensable. Two interesting feaaires of dteir
comments should be noted. First, many of dieir sug-
gestions have addressed the needs of contemporary'
students who are seeking an understanding of our
world. Second, the somedmes polar perspectives of
die reviewers on regional problems in the mid-East,

preface

internaaoml trade, population growtJi and deveJc^
ment, environmental degradation, cultural value sys-
tems, and other issue-laden topics have served tt>
retinnd us of the variety of valid opinions on world
problems and the consequent difficulty in solving
them Reviewers and colleagues who should be spe-
cially thanked include Robert O Bixby, St Cloud
State University, Michael E Bonme, University erf Ar-
izona, Jon S Brand, Orange Coast Coffege, Mark S
Chamews, University of Southwestetn Louisiana,
James F Fr^tnan, University of Northern Iowa, Gary
C Goodwin, Suffolk Community College. James C
Hughes, Slippery Rock University, Gordon Lewih-
wajie, California State Uniwrsit)’ — Northndge, Ian
M Matley, Michigan State University, Joan E Miller,
Illinois State Universit)’. Darrell E Napton, Southwest
Texas State University, David J Nemeth, Central
Michigan University, Allen G Noble, University of
Akron, Benjamin F Richason, Jr , Carroll College,
'S'olf Roder, Unn’ersity of Cincinnati, Gregory S
RDse» The Ohio State Umvecsity, Annapurna Shaw,
Arizona State University, Steven L Stover, fcmsas

State University, Richard Uiack, University of Ken-
tucky, Bob J Walter. Ohio University, and William D
Walters, Jr Illinois State University

Neither original nor revised editions are accom-
plished by autliors working in isolation owe
dianks to numerous people for encouragement and
tangible effort on behalf of our project Specifically,
we express gratitude to Le Bradham, Audrey Hawk-
ins, and Dorothy Osborn of the Department of Ge-
ography at the University of Georgia In addition, the
team effort of Merrill Publishing Company was a con-
stant and valuable source of support, encourage-
ment, and occasional necessary nudging Our regard
for this te^ is enormous Specific members include
David Gordon, Wendy Jones, Bruce Johnson, Terry
Tietz, Connie Geldis, Cindy Brunk, Mary Benis, Ruth
Kimpel, and Cathy Watterson

Finally, to those more than occasionally neglected,
our families and friends, we give heartfelt thanks for
your patience, endurance, and support

/a/nes S Fisher

CONTENTS

PART ONE

BASIC CONCEPTS AND DJEAS 1

James S Fisher ami Don R. Hoy

Geography: An Exciting Discipline 5

7>2e fiTOJuuon <?/ G«?g«ph{’ A

Contnbutions of the Greeks A I The Dark Ages 6 I
The Renaissance and the Age of Discovery 6 \
Modem Geography 7
The Subdivisions of Geography 7
Geography and Other Disciplines 8
Careers in Geography 9

Education 10 t Business 12 1 Government 12
Geography and Development 13

People 13 i Environment 13 I Culture 13 I
History 14 1 Box Development 14
Two Worlds 15

The Rich World 16 i The Poor World 16

People and Resources Z1

People 22

The Impact of the Agricultural Revolution 23 i From
AP 1 to 1650 23 I From 1650 to the Present 24 I
The Industrial Revolution 24 I Distribuuon and
Density of Population 24 I Models and Theories of
Population Qiange 27
The Resource Concept 32

Some Definitions 32 I Resources and Culture 33 I
Box Demographic Transition for Deieloped and
Deieit^ing Countries 36 t of Resources 37 I
Technocratic Theory 38
Summary Population Prospects 39

Physical and Cultural Components
of the Human Environment 43

Elements of the Physical Environment 44

CUtnam 44 1 Temperature and Plant Growth 45 !
Climatic Classification 47 I Soils 49 ! Landforms
53 I Minerals 56 I Use of the Environment 57
Humanity and Culture 59

xii

CONTENTS

Box: Environmental Problems 60 I The Groutli of
Culture 6l I Early Primary Culture Heartlis 62 i
Secondar)' Culture Heartlis 63 i Europe as a Culture
Hearth 63 I Special Elements of Culture 66

Social and Political Organization 67

Bands and Tribes 68 ! Territorial States 69 I
Nation-States 69 I Problems of State Development
69 I Multinational Alliances 70

Economic ActiNaty 71

Economic Organization and Modernization 72 I
Trade Relationships 74

Summar}': A Complex but Critical Relationship 75

Rich Countries and Poor Countries:

An Overview 79

Tlie Widening Gap 80

Trends in Per Capita GNP 80 I Trends in
Agricultural Production 80 I Trends in Industrial
Production 82 1 Box: The Green Revolution 84

Measurements of Wealth 86

Per Capita GNP 87 I Per Capita Inanimate Energy'
Consumption 87 I Percentage of Labor Force in
Primar)’' Activities 87 I Otlier Measures 89

Characteristics of Ricli Regions and Poor Regions 90
The Rich World 91 I The Poor World 93

Theories of Development 103

Control Theories 103 I Colonialism and Trade
103 I Circular Causation 105 I Rostow’s Stages 105

Summar}^ An Unequal World 106
Further Readings 106

PART TWO

ANGLO-AMERICA 111

James S. Fisher

Anglo-America: The Bases for
Development 113

Physical Geography 114

Land Surface Regions 114 I Climatic Regions 117 I
Vegetation Patterns 120 I Distribution of Soils 121

Resources for Industrial Gro^\n;h and Development 122
Energ)' and Power 122 I Metals 126
Early Settlement 128

New England 128 1 The Southern Colonies 128 I
The Middle Colonies 130 I The Lower St, Lawrence
Valle)'' 130 I Southern Appalachia 130

Demographic Characteristics 131

Population Growth in the United States 131 I
Population Growtli in Canada 132 I Low Population
Growtla and the Future 132 I Population
Distribution 133 I Population Redistribution 135 I
Box: Population Mobility 136

Transportation and Development 139

Summar)': Resources for Anglo-American Development
141

Anglo-America: Economic Growth
and Transformation 145

Anglo-American Agriculture 146

Availability of Agricultural Land 146 I Agricultural
Regions 146 I Commercialized Agriculture 149 I
Continuing Agricultural Adjustments 150 I
Agricultural Productivity 151 I A Paradox: Productive
Agriculture and Farm Problems 152

Anglo-American Manufacturing 153

The Evolution of Manufacturing in die United States

153 I Manufacturing in the Anglo-American Coreland

154 I The Soudiern Economic Revolution 157 I
Soudiern Manufacturing Regions 159 I Tlie Growth
of Manufacturing on die West Coast 159 I Canadian
Industrial Growdi 160 I The Distribution of
Canadian Manufacturing l6l

Industrialization and Urbanization 162

Box: Economic Restructuring 162 I Present and
Future Regions 163 I Some Urban Problems 164

Summary: Continued Growdi and Transformation
165

Anglo-America: Problems in a
Developed Realm 169

Income Disparity and Regional Problems 170
Appalachia 171 I Odier Problem Areas 173
Black America 174

Box: Appalachian Unemployment 175
Hispanic America 178

Canadian Identity and Unity 180

French Canada 180 I Canada and the United States
181

Summary: Canada and die United States in Retrospect
181

Further Readings 182

CONTENTS

part three

TVESIERN EUROPE 186

Louts De Vorseyjr

Western Europe: A Varied Home for
Humanity 18^

Western Europe. Center of the Land Hemisphere 190
Maiwime Onentatton 190

The Conunental Architecnire of Western Europe 192
Box The Etgblb Wonder of the World 194 I The
Northwestern Highiands 19S 1 The Great Eurapeart
Plain 198 I The Central Uplands 199 I The Alpine
Region 200

The Climates of Western Europe 201

Marine Climate 201 I Dry Summer, Subtropical
Climate 202

Summary The Small but Habitable Continent 20i

Western Europe: Landscapes of
Development 207

European Culture 208
Language In Western Europe 210
The Trend Toward Unity 213

The European Communities 213 I Box Closing (be
Gap The Eurotunnel 214 1 The European
Parliament 214
Population Panems 216

Population Distribution 2l6 I Populauon Change
Through Time 216 I Demographic Transformation
218

Patterns of Industctalization 219

Locational Shifts m Industry 219 1 Recent Industrial
Development 220 I Tariffs and Boundaries as
Locational Faaors 220
Panems of Agriculture 221
Mediterranean to/j'culrure 221 \ Dairy farming
224 I Mixed Livestock and Crop Farming 225
The Partem of Urbanization 226

Early Cities 226 f Industrialization and
Contemporary Urbanizadon 227 I Suburbanization
229

Summary A Developed Region’s Movement Toward
Umty 231

Western Europe; fHuitinational
Groupings to Meet Modem
Challenges 235

The Eotcqjean Community 236

Feder^ Itepubhc of Germany 238 I France 241 1
Beve Eurobarometer An Eye on Europe 244 1 Italy
244 ( The pJetherlands 246 I Belgium 247 (
Luxembourg 247 1 The United Kingdom 248 i
Ireland 249 I Denmark 250 1 Greece 251 i
Spain 252 I Portugal 253
The European Free Trade Association 254

Austria 254 1 Iceland 255 I Norway 255 I Sweden
255 1 Switzerland 256 I Finland 257
SummaG' A. Ututed States of Europe’ 258
Further Readings 258

PART EOI3R

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE

SOVIET UNION 263

Roger U Tbietie

Eastern Europe: The Lund

Between 265

Phi'slcal Diversity 267
Cukurai Diversity 269

Varieties of Language 269 1 Rattems of Religious
Heritage 270 I Bat 130 years of Boundary ClMnges
in the Shatter Belt ill
Pr^ulation 275

Distribution 275 I Population Growth 275 I Urban
Populauons 276

Levels of Economic Dev’clopmem 277
Agriculture 278

ColVecdvHauon 278 1 The General State of
Agncultute 279 1 Types of Agricultural Produciion
279

Industry 280

The Resource Base 280 \ InduSKial Growth 282 1
The location of Industrial Aaivity 282
Summary; An Uncertain Future 283

xiv

CONTENTS

The USSR; Land and People 287

Natural Regions 288

Tundra 288 I Taiga 289 I Mixed Forest 290 I
Broadleaf Forest 290 I Steppe 290 I Desert 290 I
The Subtropical South 290 i Box: Trati^orrning
Nature: Changing the Flow of Soviet Rivers 291 I
Mountain Areas 294
Landform Regions 294

The European USSR 294 I Siberia 295 I ICazaklistan
and Cent^ Asia 295
Population 295

Formation of a Multinational State 295 i Political
Territorial Units 297 I Etlinic Composition 298 I
Ethnic Demographic Differences 300 1
Demographic Characteristics 300 I Distribution of
Population 302 I Urbanization 302

Summary: The Vast Empire 304

The USSR: Economic Activity 507

The Soviet Approach 308
Planned Development 309
Economic Reforms 309

Box: The Soviet Consume^' 310

Industrial Resources 312

Energy Resources 312 I Metallic Ores 314
Industrial Regions 315

The Center 315 i The Ukraine Industrial District
315 I Leningrad 316 I The Mid-Volga r\rea 317 I
The Urals 317 I Siberia 318

Agriculture 318

Agriculture and Soviet Development 318 i The
Permanent Crisis 320 I Agricultural Regions 321
Summary': The USSR of the Future 323
Further Readings 324

PART FIVE

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/NEW
ZEALAND 327

JackF. Williams

Japan: Physical and Human

EesotHTces 329

Resources: Compensating for Scarcity 331

Location and Insularity 331 I A Temperate Land
335 1 A Crowded Land 334 1 A Maritime Nation
334 I Agricultural Resources 335 I Mineral
Resources 337

Human F'ecources: Tne Hybrid Culture 339

The Emergence of the Japanese 339 I Box: The
Oytsia'eJS: Minorities in Japan 340

.Summary Japanese Achiet'ement in a Land of Scarcity-

Japfirt: The Economic Giant 345

Japans First Tmnsfonnation: Rising to Power 346
The Gror%'tii of Industry- and Empire 346 I The
Grow th of Agriculture and Populau'on 347

Japan's Second Transformation: Rising from the Ashes of
Vv'ar 349

Tine Role of the United States 349 I The
Development Strategy- of die Japanese 349 I The
Zaihatsii 350 ! Ttie Double Struaure of the
Economy 351 I Population Stabilization 351 I The
Grov.ih of Cities and Industry 351

The Consequences of Japan, Incorporated 354
Regional Imbalances 354 1 Urban Ills 355 I
Pollution of the Environment 356 I Social Problems
357 I Rural Problems 357 I Foreign Trade and Aid:
int'crnational 111 Will 358 i Box. From Otomogo to
Toyota 361

Japan’s Ihird Transformation: Charting a New- Course
364

Sumniaiy: Japan’s Second Century- of Economic
Development 364

Ausfc'Aii'A sEtd New Zealand:

Xsois'doti and Space 367

Australia 368

A Vast and .Arid Continent 368 I The Shortage of
Arable Utnd 371 I Settlement and Population
Growth 371 I Box: Frontiers: Australia's Northivest
374 i An Urbanized Society- 374 I The Bases of
Australia’s Economy 375

CONTENTS

Ne^’Ze^and 378

A Pastoral Economy 379 I 7lie Need for Industry
and Dnersificaiion 379

Summary: A Unique Lexation and New Diteoioos 383
Further Readings 381

part six

LATIN AMERICA 385

Daiid L Clawson and Don R. Hoy

Latin America’s Heritage:

Eountlations and Processes of

Change 387

The Ibenarv Heritage 388

The Moorish Era 389

TTie Colonial Period 390

The Spanish Conquest 390 I Economic Reladonships
391 J Social Organization 392
The Era of Independence 394

Box.- Multicolored Maize and the Creen Reioluhon
395

Modem Latin Amenca 396
Demographic Change 396 I UrbanlzaUon 397 I
Social Change 398 I Economic Change 399 I The
Laun American Debt Crisis 401
Summary A Region in Need of Change 404

Latin American Regions:

The North 407

Mexico 408

A land of Re\-oluUons 409 1 National Unity 409 I
AgricuJtural Do'e/opment 410 l Mining 4li i
Industriallauon and Urbanization 411 I Many
Mexicos 413
Central America 416

Historical land Use 4l6 f Bananas 417 I Sew
Coffev Prodtiaton in latin America 418 I Economic
I^tlopmenc 420 I The Nations of Central Ameria

TheCanbbean 422

Cuba 423 1 Puerto Rico 425 i Hispaniola, The
Dominican Republic and Haiti 425 I Jamaica 426 I
Belize 426 J Guyana. Sutinaem, and French Guiana
426

Summary: The Struggle for National Identity’ 427

Latin American Regions: South
America 429

Andean South America 430

Venezuela 430 I Cohenba 433 I ^xiador 436 {
Box- Abtlirdtnal Life Zones in the Andes 437 I Peru
440 I Bolivia 442
Southern South America 444

Qiile 444 I Argenuna 446 I Uruguay 448 I
Paraguay 448
Brazil 449

The Slewing Giant 450 1 Boom and Bust Cycles

450 I land of Contrasts 45! ■ The Regions of Brazil

451

Summary Unfulfilled Resource Potential 457
Flirther Readings 457

PART SEVEN

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 46l

Ixonard Berry and Douglas L Johnson

Africa; East and "West 463

The Lea« Developed Nations 464

Ennronmental Characteristics 467 I Subsistence
Aamues 468 I Modem Agricultural Encla\-es
468 I Box: Drought in Africa 470 1 The Industrial
Sector 471 { Links with the Intemaiioml Trading
Networit 471 I The Sahelian Least De\’eloped
Nauons 471 I Vest African Humid Least Developed
Nations 472 I East African Least Dev’deped Nations

473

Inteitnediaie Nations 474
Countries with Dominant Smgle-Sector Resources

474 I Countries wnh Diversified Resources 478
Summary: Regions at Risk 480

xvi

CONTENTS

Central and Southern Africa 483

The Colonial Legaq^ 484
The Resource Base 484
The Physical Environment 486
Economic Systems 486

West Central Africa 487

Zaire; Minerals and Hydroelearic Power 487 I
Gabon: Timber, Petroleum, and Mining 488

Central Africa 488

Zambia: The Copper State 488

Southern Africa 489

Zimbabwe 489 I Botswana 490 I Republic of South
Africa 490
The Islands 491

Box: Apartheid and Race Relations in Southern Africa
492 I Madagascar 492

Summary: Development Potential Hindered by Internal
Strife and A^^artheid 494

PART EIGHT

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA 497

Douglas L. Johnson and Leonard Berry

The Mediterranean Crescent 499

North Africa and the Middle East; Common Themes and
Regional Diversity 500

Ethnic Complexity 500 I Religion 500 I Aridity
500 I Crossroads Location 500 1 Contrasts 502

Overall Features of the Mediterranean Crescent 502
Box: The Reassertion of Islamic Values 504

Large States, Integrated Economies 507

Features of Similarity 507 I Features of Diversity
508 I Turkey: Unrealized Potential 508 I Egypt; Gift
of the Nile 512 I Algeria: A Maturing Economy 513
Small States, Unique Economies 515

Israel: Resurrected Homeland 517 I Lebanon: A
Crisis of Identity 518 I Palestine: A People Struggling
for a Flome 520 i Jordan: A Precarious Kingdom
520 I Syria: An Expanding Agriculture 520

Summary: Conflict in the Crescent 521

The Gulf States 525

Regional Characteristics 526
Box: The Gulf War 530

Development and the Petroleum Economy 532
Internal Investment of Petroleum Income 532 I
Petrodollar Investment Overseas 533

The Impact of Oil 533

Changing Power Relationships 533 I Changing Social
Conditions 534 I Changing Political Allegiances 535

Summary: Oil, Development, and Traditional Values 536
Further Readings 537

PART NINE

MONSOON ASIA 539

Clifton W. Pannell

Monsoon Asia: An Overview 54l

Environment; Tlie Basis for Human Occupancy' 542
Tlie Monsoon and the Rliyahm of the Seasons 545
The Cultural Basis 549
Processes of Development 549

Box: A Tale of Three Asian Cbildrett 550
Summar)': A Panorama of the Less Developed World 552

South Asia: Past and Present 555

Origins and Cultural Diversity 556

Religion and the Det'elopment of Indian Civilization
556 I Box: South Asiati Strife and Conflict 558 I
British Rule and Its Impact 560 I Religion and the
Hindu Caste System 561 I Linguistic Variety 561 I
Tlie Impact of Diversity on Territory' 563

South Asian Environments as a Resource Base 563
Tlie Peninsular Massif 563 I The Northern
Mountains 563 I The Indo-Gangetic Plain 565 I
Mineral and Land Resources 565

Argiculture in Soutli Asia 566

Arable Land and the Environment for Agriculture
566 I Traditional Indian Agriculture and the Village
566

CONTENTS

XvU

Indan figficuUucal De^ielopment and che Dilemma of
Growah 569

The Boserup Thesis 569 I India’s Green Re\-oluiion
570 I India’s Abilic)’ to Feed Itself 571
Population and Population Growth 571

Birth-, Death, and Growth Rates in India 571 1
Popiilauon Growth and India's Future 572 I
Disinbuuon of the Population 572
Centralized Planning and Economic Growth in India 573
Agricultural Investment Versus Industrial
Development 573 1 The Industrial Economy 575 1
Planned Industrtilizailori, 1947 to the present 575 I
Industrial Regions 575 I Growth-Pole Theory 577
India's Transpionation Networks 5T7

Railroads 577 1 The Highway- Si’stem 578 I Air
Transportation 578 I Transportation and
Development 578

Urban India Contrasting Points of View 578

Calcutta and Bombay 579 I Metropolis Versus Town
579

Pakistan 580

The New Pakistan 580 I Jammu and Kashmir 580 1
Growth and Progress 581
Bangladesh 582

The Delta Environment 582 I Prospects for
Economic Growth 582
Sri Lanka 584

land and Environment 584 I Technological Backlash
584 I Contemporary Patterns of Development 585
Afghanistan 586

The Phj-sical Basis of LivelihcxKl 586 I Afghan
Society 588 I The Changing Economy 588 I
Economic Development and the Fu-e-Year Plans
588 I The Soviet Invasion and Recent Political
Problems 588

Summary; Prospects for Development 589

The Origin and Development of
Chinese Civilization 593

The North China Culture Hearth 594

Ancient China 594 I Loess Land and the Ph^-slcal
Em-ironmem 594 1 Bat The Dyjiastic Qvfe in
Ornux 595 1 The Huang He and Loess 597
Difiiision out of the North China Hearth 599

The Landsetpes and Environments of South China
600 I TTic Outer, Non-Chmese Regions 601
The Three Chinas 601

Social and Political Unity' 601

*016 Adminisifatn-e Structure 601 I The Chinese
language 602 I Confucian Soaal Order 602
The Impact of the Vest 602

Qilna's Re\t)luuon and the Rise of Chinese Communism
603

Summary Tradition and Progress in Conflia 604

China and Its Neighbors: Changing
Societies and EconooUes 607

China’s Population 608

Peculation Growth 608 ( Communist Policies 608 I
\ 0 here the People Are 610
Chitu’s Changing Social Patterns 6 U

The Traditional Panem 611 I Soaety m the New
China 6 tl

The Agricultural Economy 613

Traditional Agriculture 613 I The Modernization of
AgncuVtwte 6 IJ I Ctop Regions and Crop 'types
615 I Ctommunes 615 I The Production
Responsibility System 615
IMvjsuialiiaiicm and Rconotnte Otowth 6\7
Contemporary Patterns of Industrialtaauon 618 I
Paths to Modernization 618 I Industry, Cities, and
Transponauon 619 1 Regional Inequality A
Conunuing problem 619 I Box China’s ^>ecial
Econonxte Zones 621 I Oil A Promising Opportunity
for Development 621 I Future Trends 622
Chrna’j Rrmland 622

Hong Kong 622 I Taiwan 625 I The Two Koreas
626

Summary The New Era 629

Southeast Asia: islands and

Mainland 633

Geopaphfcal Outlines and Patterns 635

Areal Organization 635 I Marine Location and
Accessvbdity 635 I Mainland Souiheast Asia 636 I
Archipelagic Southeast Asia 636
Tropical Environments as Specialized Ecos>-stems 636
EBects of Equatorial and Tropical Locauon 637 I a
F ragile Emironment 637 1 Challenge of the Tropics
638 I Shilling Culuvation 639 I Paddy-Rjce
Agriculture 639 I Commeraal Apiculture 639

xviii

CONTENTS

Mineral Resources 641
Rapid Population Growth 643
Regional Disunity 643

Insurgency in Southeast Asia 643 I Efforts to Forge
Regional Unity 645 I Cultural Pluralism 645 I The
Chinese in Southeast Asia 645 I Box: ASEAN: The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 646

The Primate City: A Southeast Asian Dilemma 648
Primate Cities and Modernization 648

Stagnation, Transformation, and Growth 648
Burma 648 I Thailand 649 I Kampuchea
650 I Vietnam 650 I Malaysia and Singapore 651 I
Indonesia 652 I The Philippines 653

Summary: Implications for Growth 654
Further Readings 654

Appendix A: Map Scale and Projeaions 656

Appendix B: Conversion Factors for Some Widely Used
Measures 665

Appendix C: Selected National Statistics 666

Glossary 674
Credits 691
Index 697

GEOGRAPHY

AND

DEVELOPMENT

Tliis political map reveals a highly
compartmentalized world. The nu-
merous political entities range in
size from the colossal USSR to
minute but significant countries
such as Singapore, Malta, or
Grenada. The names of these politi-
cal entities evoke images of differ-
ent environments, peoples, cultures,
and levels of well-being. However,
the political boundaries tliat segre-
gate five billion inhabitants do not
clearly reveal the underlying geo-
graphic complexities of our world.
Numerous otlier sets of boundaries
could be imposed: boundaries
which delineate multinational alli-
ances, boundaries which classif^’
economic and agricultural environ-
ments, and boundaries which out-
line tlie myriad peoples, languages,
and ideologies that affect our daily
lives. Unraveling the complexities of
our world requires intelleaual at-
tention to many questions relating
to geography. This map and the
chapters tliat follow are intended to
begin the student on a journey to-
ward understanding our exciting
and complex world.

Antarctica

BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDEAS

T his book is de-
signed to provide
an introduction
so riorld geography by
highlighting various geo-
graphical concepts. Our
purpose IS to acquaint
\-ou the v.orld in
t\hich we all live and to
organize this knowledge
within a regional frame-
work of economic de\el-
opment, broadly
defined

The word ffefe/qp-
snesU IS used in a vanet>-
ofwaj’s Basically, it
means a progressive
change for the better.
Economic det-elopment
signifies a process of con-
tinual improvement m
the quality of life. As we
shall see, economic de-
velopment can be mea-
sured in several SNays,

using income, energy'
use, emplo>Tnent, or
other indicators Such
measures must be kept in
perspective, however, for
they tell us little about
other aspeas of an area, a
nation, or a people. For
example, differences in
income may reflea dififer-
ences m cultural goals
and values

An extended discus-
sion of development is
included m chapter 1
Chapter 2 provides an
overview of population
and the resource con-
cept In chapter 5 we
consider the natural on-
vironment, primarily
from die standpoint of
resources, and we attend
to elements of culture,
especially iliose (hat in-
fluence development.

If ames A. Michener, the noted American novelist,
is a staunch supporter of geography. He believes
that his novels — including Hawaii, Caravaiis,
'~Tbe Covmant, Centennial, Chesapeake, Poland, and
Texas — enjoy great success because he fixes them
firmly within a regional geographic context. He re-
lies heavaly on geographic works when he does re-
search for his novels.

Geography provides much more than an inter-
esting context for good novels, however. Corpora-
tions employ geographers and use geographic prin-
ciples to aid in locating new manufacturing plants
and retail stores, because a good location can lower
costs and increase profits. A stock brokerage firm
employs a geographer to monitor weather condi-
tions in the Midwest in order to anticipate the vol-
ume of the harvest. Based on predicted supply fig-
ures, the company’s brokers can advise their clients
to buy or sell animal and grain futures and stocks
related to agriculture. Geography also provides an
exciting perspective and methodolog}' for under-
standing the character of our contemporary world.
Understanding of the complex problems of world
food supply, the environment, political antagonisms,
or economic development is greatly enhanced by the
application of geographic principles and techniques.

THE EVOLUTION OF GEOGRAPHY

These modern examples of geography and geogra-
phers illustrate only a fraction of the field’s broad
character and great utility. Geography is an old dis-
cipline with a rich and varied heritage. Its solid foun-
dation rests on the works of ancient scholars, who
recorded the physical and cultural characteristics of
lands near and far. Although the study of geography
apparently evolved in many civilizations, the Greeks
made the most enduring contributions. In fact, the
term geography comes to us from the Greek geo
(“the earth”) and graphos (“to write about or to
describe”).

Contributions of the Greeks

The early Greeks studied formidable geographic
problems. Herodotus, called by some the father of
geography, placed historic events in their geographic
setting in his famous Historia, which he wrote in

approximately 480 b.c. He both described and ex-
plained the physical and human geography of his
day. Aristotle (384-322 b.c.) discussed earth pro-
cesses such as temperature, wind, alluvial deposi-
tion, and vulcanism in his Meteorologica. Both au-
thors were concerned with explanations of the
processes by which filings occur.

Herodotus and Aristotle were not unique, for
other Greek scholars were concerned about the size
and shape of the earth and its relationship to the rest
of the cosmos. How, they wondered, does one show
where places are and what people do in the various
parts of the world? The Greeks did not answer all of
their own questions, but they provided a perspective
for seeking the answers.

Another Greek, Eratosthenes (276?- 196? b.c.),
lived in Alexandria, Eg^pt, and, among other things,
measured the earth’s circumference. He had learned
that only on one day of the year (the Northern Hemi-
sphere’s summer solstice) does the noon sun shine
directly dowm a well near what is now the city of
Aswan. On fiiat special day Eratosthenes measured
the noon sun’s angle at Alexandria, some 500 miles
(805 kilometers) north of Aswan, and found that the
sun’s ray was not vertical there but cast a shadow of
7.2° from a pole projecting straight up from the earth.
He reasoned that the sun’s rays are parallel to each
other and applied the geometric rule that when a
straight line intersects two parallel lines, the alternate
interior angles are equal (Figure 1-1). Therefore,
file distance between Aswan and Alexandria of 500
miles (805 kilometers) is equal to a 7.2° arc of the
earth’s surface. Eratosthenes fiien computed the
value of 360° and estimated the earth’s circumfer-
ence at 25,200 miles (40,572 kilometers). (The
earth’s circumference at the equator is actually
24,901.5 miles [40,091.4 kilometers].)

Eratosthenes and other Greeks recognized the
need for maps to show the relationships betw^een
one place or region and another. They needed a
means of locating themselves on the earth and of
describing their location to other people. To visual-
ize their challenge, place a mark on a smooth, uni-
form ball and then tr^^ to describe the position of the
mark. Fortunately, the earth rotates around an axis
that intersects the surface at two known points — the
North Pole and the South Pole. With these points the
Greek geographers established a reference line, the
equator, halfway between the poles and anofiier line

geography, an exciting DISCIPUNE

Early cakulatlotioC the earth’s drcutoference. About 200 the Greek Erato^^cnes

measured the earth's circumference aith a considerable degree of accuracy By careful observe
lion and spphauon of simple geomerrv, he computed the earth's circumference to be 25.200
miles (40,572 kilometers), quite close to its aaual 24,901 5 miles (40.091 4 kilometers)

from pole to pole They dre^’ a grid of latitude and
longitude lines from these geographic reference
points, permitting any point on earth to be located by
5ust owo numbers. The location of Washington, DC,
for example, is 38‘’50’ N, TT^OO' \V

The Greeks’ next step was to use the geographic
grid to construa a map whereby all or part of the
earth could be reduced to a two-dimensional plane
and the relative positions of places and regions could
be established ’The Greek geographers — indeed, all
geographers down through the ages — were partic-
ularly fond of maps, and maps became the hallmark
of geography.

Ptolemy (ca a.d. 150) was one of the early map-
makers. He designed a map of the world and com-
piled the location of 8,000 known places, using a
coordinate system Howe\’er, this early w’ork of the

Greeks was not flawless Christopher Columbus, for
instance, accepting Ptolemy’s view of the w’orld,
thought be had sailed to Asia when he reached Amer-
ica

Geography thrived during Greek and Roman
times. New lands were discovered, and inventories of
their resources and characterisucs had great practical
importance. One compiler was Strabo (64 b.c.-ad
20). whose Geograpby was a description of the
known wxirld The accomplishments of geographers
such as Herodotus, Ptolemy, Strabo, and Hipparchus
established them as leading figures in their society.
Collecuvely, their most enduring contribution was
the development of a scholarly approach that empha-
the imponance of describing the world, view-
ing the world from a spatial perspeaive, and employ-
ing a holistic approach that recognized the

BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDEAS

interdependence of elements of that world. Geogra-
phy’s position was one of acclaim until the Roman
Empire began to decline.

The Dark Ages

Geography — indeed, all the sciences — stagnated
and fell into disrepute in the West during the Dark
Ages, which lasted from approximately a.d. 500 to
1000. A dogmatic Christianity based on literal inter-
pretation of biblical passages replaced free intellec-
tual inquiry. The advances in geographic knowledge
that the Greeks had made were rejected. Even world
maps became unreal distortions of tlie once-known
world.

Concurrent with the Dark Ages in Europe was a
golden period of Arab civilization, and it was the
Arabs who preserved much of the Greek and Roman
geographic legaq^. The Arabs themselves were for-
midable geographers and continued the tradition of
mapmaking and recording data on maps. Tliey also
traveled widely and left copious notes of their jour-
neys. Ibn-Batuta (1304-1368) recorded his travels
throughout the Arab world in nortliern Africa and
southern Asia and beyond into northern China. The
Arabs also maintained interest in the physical earth
and in the processes that created differences be-
tween one place and another. Avicenna (980-1037),
for example, was one of the first to understand some
of the processes by which mountains are built and
destroyed.

The geographic knowledge thus acquired b)- the
Arabs was eventually diffused across the Mediterra-
nean Sea to Spain and the great library at Toledo.
Europe also rediscovered classical knowledge
through the Crusades, through an interest in trade,
and through Greek scholars who fled westward to
escape the Turks during the fifteenth centur>'.

The Renaissance and the Age of
Discovery

The Renaissance and the Age of Discover}’' witnessed
a resurgence of geography and other sciences. New
routes to the Orient were needed, and a new era of
the geographer-explorer began. Renaissance geogra-
phers were much like their forebears; they devised
better maps, described the physical and cultural
characteristics of foreign lands, and tried to under-

stand the processes that created differences and sim-
ilarities from one place to another. Explorers under
the aegis of the world’s first geographic institute,
founded in 1418 by Prince Henry of Portugal, and
otliers such as Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand
Magellan led in developing new routes to the outside
world and new information about the world.

The revelations of these geographic voyages of
discovery had a profound impact in Europe. Scholars
began to question age-old concepts in light of die
discoveries in odier parts of the world. An age of
scientific reasoning began, witli experimentation and
the testing of hypotheses. In the natural sciences new
explanations were presented that challenged old
ideas about the origin of continents and oceans, the
formation of landforms, and the evolution of plants
and animals.

After die early explorers came scientific
travelers — students of natural histor}^ — who sought
evidence of and explanation for the varied world
around them. Among diese was the great German
geographer Alexander Von Humboldt (1769-1859).
Von Humboldt traveled widely in Europe and Latin
America. His curiosity, careful observation, and
broad background of stud\' in botany, physics, chem-
istty', Greek, archaeolog}', and geolog}' allowed him
to synthesize information from a variety of fields into
a coherent geographic analysis. His most celebrated
work, Kosnios, was published in 1793.

Karl Ritter (1779-1859) was a contemporary of
Von Humboldt. He first studied geography as a basis
for understanding histor}' but eventually found that
geography itself could provide an understanding of
the human dimension of the world. His great work.
Die Erdkimde, though never completed, included
nineteen volumes on Africa and Asia. Ritter is gener-
ally recognized as having held the first chair of ge-
ography in Germany — at the University of Berlin in
1820.

By the middle of the nineteenth centur}' geogra-
phy was a respected discipline in European univer-
sities, and geographical societies served as important
meeting places for scholars of all disciplines who
were interested in the world around them. From
Europe the age of geography spread to tlie far cor-
ners of the world.

In the United States, geography found a fertile
environment in which to grow. People were eager
for knowledge about their countr}’, especially tlie

r.EOGRAPHY: AN EXCITING DlSClPLmE

frontier zones. Geographical literature was particu-
larly popular. In 1852 the American Geographical
Society was forrned, followed by the National Geo
graphic Society (1888) and the Association of Amer-
ican Geographers (1904) Geography as an academic
field of study began to flower m the latter part of the
nineteenth century, and in the subsequent hundred
years it spread from a few centers to almost every
major college and university m the nation

The mainstream of 'Western geographical thought
is correctly traced to the ancient Greeks, but other
great centers of geographical thought existed as well
We have already noted the importance of Arab ex-
plorers and scholars. Ancient China, too. was a tnaior
center of geographical scholarship and exploration
Chinese travel books date from as long ago as 1000
BC Although Chinese geography did not eclipse the
work of Greek scholars during the classical period, it
thrived from the fifth to the fifteenth century. In that
millennium Chinese geographers traveled through
southern Asia, the Mediterranean, and western Bu-
rope They established human geography, com-
pleted regional studies m and outside China, studied
geomorphic processes, and wrote geographical en-
cyclopedias

Modem Geography

Modern has grown beyond a simple de-

scription of the earth Today’s geographers not only
describe through words, maps, and statistics, they
also attempt to explain why things are disinbuted
over the earth as they are. Modern geography is best
characterized as the study of distributions and rela-
tionships among different distributions (e g , the dis-
tribution of economic activities or per capita m-
come) and the resultant regional features. Modern
geograpli}' remains true to its hencage, yet n has
vastly improved its ability to explain the world It
looks at our world by following four iradiiKms.

1 the way in which things are organized m area
(spatial distnbuuon)

2 the relationship between people and the land
that supports them

3 the study of regions, including analysis and
explanation of why things are distributed as
they are

4 tile study of the ph>-sical earth, perhaps the
oldest of all geographic traditions'

Interestingly, the focus of each of these traditions
IS evident in Ae work of the early Greek scholars.
The spatial tradition— with its concern for dis-
tance, geometry, and movement — can be seen in the
work of Ptolemy The writings of Hippocrates were
concerned with the relauonship of human health to
the surrounding environment — a theme common to
die man-land traction Similatly, the asea stnd-
ies tradition — with its concern for the nature of
places and for understanding the “where” of
places — is evident in Strabo’s Geogf/zphy. Lastly, the
earth science tradition as a study of the earth and
us environments is identifiable in the work of Aris-
totle and his students.

THE SUBDtVlSlQNS OF GEOGBAPHV

Geography has many branches Its principal subdivi-
sions are

1 physical and human geography

2 systematic and regional geography

Physical geographers study the environment from
the viewpoint of distribution and process Landform
geographers, or geomorphologisis, are concerned
with the location of terrain features and with the way
in which thcae features have acquired iheir shape
and form. Geomorphologists may study the impact of
stream deposition m a floodplain, the effect of wind
erosion in a dry land, or the formation of coral reefs
around a tropical island Biogeographers are inter-
ested in the distribution of plants and animals, the
way they live together, the processes (both natural
and people-induced) that affect the biological earth,
and the effect of changes on human life. Climatolo-
gists study the long-term characteristics of the atmo-
sphere and climatic differences created by tempera-
ture or energy and moisture conditions in various
parts of the earth Physical geography has blossomed
m recent years, with an emphasis on the interdepen-
dence of people and the physical earth Such con-
temporary problems as ozone depletion, acid rain,
desertification, and rain-forest removal are of partic-
ular interest to physical geographers

Human geographers study various aspects of our
occupancy of the earth Urban geographers examine
the location and structure of cities in an attempt to

BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDEAS

explain why urban areas are distributed as they are
and to account for the pattern of distribution within
cities. Urban geographers are interested in the pro-
cess of urban growth and decline, in the types of
activities carried out in cities, and in the movement
of goods and people within urban settings. Cultural
geographers examine the way in which groups of
people organize themselves and study such cultural
institutions as language and religion, as well as social
and political structures. Economic geography in-
volves the study of systems of livelihood, especially
the distribution of such activities and explanations
for that distribution. Economic geographers are con-
cerned witlt analysis of natural and cultural resources
and with their utilization.

Historical geography, the study of past landscapes
and changes, is an example of systematic, or topical,
geography. How' did the people of the Great Plains
organize themselves in 1870, as compared with their
organization in 1920? Wliat past characteristics have
persisted, and what effect do they have on present-
day distributional patterns? Michener used the geo-
graphic approach of sequential occupancy as the or-
ganizing theme of some of his novels. He described
the geography of an area during different periods,
gradually building an image of how it is organized
today. Historical geography tlius adds depth percep-
tion to time, which can explain present patterns and
their reasons for being. Systematic geographers nor-
mally study one aspect of the field — landforms, eco-
nomic activities, or urban places, for example.

Another method of geographic study is regional
geography. Regional geography involves tlie analysis
of environmental and human patterns within a single
area and organizes a wide variety of facts into a co-
herent form in order to explain how' a region is
organized and how it functions. A regional geogra-
pher, in essence, is an expert on a particular area of
the world and applies systematic approaches to an
understanding of tlaat area (Figure 1-2).

All fields of geography, though tliey deal with di-
verse sets of phenomena, share the geographic view-
point; that is, all geographers analyze spatial arrange-
ments (distributions) and search for explanations of
patterns and interrelationships among these and
other phenomena. All geographers rely on maps as
analytical tools, and many have added computers and
remote-sensing techniques to aid in recording and
analyzing data.

GEOGRAPHY AND OTHER DISCIPLINES

The discipline of geography bridges the social sci-
ences and the physical sciences, and it possesses
many characteristics that are similar to those of its
sister fields. Yet geography is also unique; its primary
focus is spatial, which means that geographers look
at the world from a distinctive point of view. For
example, botanists are concerned primarily with
plant growth, plant structure, propagation, and tax-
onomy. Geographers look at the distribution of
plants and analyze why groups of plants are distrib-
uted as they are. As part of this analysis, geographers
are concerned with the processes of plant growth,
plant distribution, interrelationships among plant
groups, and the environmental attributes (including
human beings) tliat help or inhibit their survival.

Economists are interested in die production, dis-
tribution, and consumption of goods and services.
They study how people choose to use resources to
earn a livelihood, investigating such topics as the
costs and benefits of resource allocation, the causes
of changes in the economy, die impact of monetary'
policies, the workings of different economic systems,
the problem of supply and demand, and business
q'cles and forecasting. Geographers are also inter-
ested in how people earn their livelihood, but geog-
raphers look at w'here the economic acdvity takes
place and at the reasons for that location. Economic
geography is concerned wdth the economic s^'stems
by which people sustain themselves, especially the
spatial and environmental relationships that shape
economic systems.

In bodi of diese examples the relationship be-
tween geography and its sister disciplines is obvious.
The same t)pe of relationship exists between geog-
raphy and odier social and physical sciences, some of
which are illustrated in Figure 1-3. What must be
kept in mind is diat each discipline views the world
from a different perspective. Furdiermore, all fields
of learning are linked, but geography’s linkages are
panicularly extensive, making it a sjmthesizing, inte-
grating field. It sjmthesizes knowledge in many dis-
ciplines and puts tliis Icnowledge into a geographical
context. For instance, a geographer who studies the
growing of wheat on the Great Plains or the Argen-
tine pampas needs information on the climate, soils,
and landforms of tlie region (die physical sciences),
as well as knowledge of the farmers’ cultural charac-

ncuREi^a

La Paz, BolWa’s capital dty at 12,000 feet on the AlMpIano. This high plateau wiihui ihe
Andean mountatrj ^^tem iHuscrates the harsh envtfonments to ^vhich nanlond has adapted
study of earth environments is another of the four tradiuons m geograrfuai sAolanhio
The 21,000-foot high Mt. lllimam Is in the bacJtground

leristics, the transport network, the costs of wheat
farming, especiaJJy in relation to other econonuc op^
portuniiies, and a host of other socioeconomic fac-
tors (the soaal sciences)

Geography and history are similar in that both are
integrating disciplines History, however, Uses a
chronologital framework (lime) in studyir^
changes, whereas geography’s perspeaive is choro-
logic (place) Neither history nor geography can be
studied effecUt'ely without a knowledge of the other,
I^ah Bov\'man. former president of Johns Hopkins
unhersity, said that "a man [or woman] is not edu-
cated who lacks a sense of time (histocy) and plat®

[geography]”^ By integrating informauorv irv a re-
gional conte-xt, the geographer pulls together knowl-
edge shared with a variety of disciplines into a single,
all-encompassing, coherent picture.

CAREERS IN GEOGRAPHY

Afodem geographers differ from their forebears in
emphasizing explanation (“Why is it there’”) rather
than description (‘Where is it?") This shift in em-
phasis has increased geographers’ uulity in solving
many problems of our contemporary world The re-

BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDEAS

FIGURE 1-3

The scope of geography. Geogra
phy is an integrating and synthesiz-
ing discipline. This diagram shows
that geography interrelates with
many fields of study, including the
sciences, engineering, social sci-
ences, and humanities.

suit has been employment in roles such as market
analysts, urban or regional planners, cartographers,
and environmental analysts.

Education

Traditionally, many geographers have been em-
ployed as high school teachers or university profes-
sors. Yet there is evidence that the geographic edu-
cation provided American students is inadequate.
Eighty-one percent of the respondents in a recent
public poll believe that geography is an essential sub-
ject for high school students. No comparable sur\'ey
exists for geography’s role at the university level, but
numerous educators and laypersons have decried
the geographic ignorance of college students. Mar-
ion J. Levy, Jr., a sociologist at Princeton University,
stated that “almost any test of geographical literacy

would separate American students from students
trained abroad, and the same may be said of the \'ast
majority of American faculty members.’’^ Bob
Wcdrich, a columnist for the Chicago Tribune, re-
cently lamented the lack of geographic training at tlie
college level.

Based on the disquieting reports of geographic short-
comings, it is not unrc“asonabIc to suspect that some
people still think the world is flat. But without class-
room motivation, it is unlikely they ever will ques-
tion what happens when the oceans splash over tlic
edge.'

The 1987 Southern Governors Conference called
for the teaching of geography as a required part of
school curricula. The National Governors Confer-
ence echoed the same concern. In fact, a joint reso-
lution of Congress declared November 15 to 21,

CEOGRAPtn' AN EXCITING DlSClPUNt

1987, as national Geography Awareness Week. The
resolution speaks of the obvious need for geographic
education and calls geographic instruction mtical in
our increasingly interdependent wxirld

Whereas an Ignorance of peoprapliy. foreign
languages, and cultures places the United States at a
disad\'antagc with other countries in matters of busi-
ness, politics, and the cmironment.

Whereas the United States is a nation of w orldwidc
insolsemcnts and global Inilucnce, the responsibili-
ties of which demand an understanding of the lands,
languages, and cultures of the world, and

Whereas rutional attention must be focused on ihc
integral role tltat knowledge of world geographx
pla)-s in preparing citizens of the United States for
the future of an increasingly interdependent and tn-
terconnecicd world ’

Specific examples of these concerns come easily
to mind. First is our economic interdependena*
(Figure 1 -4). Because the need is growing for prod
ucK and materials that arc not available m suffiaem
quantities wnltln our national borders, we arc Itavmg
to rely increa-singly on foreign soura*s For instance.

mudt of die petroleum, nickel, bauxite, tin, and iron
that w’e use comes from other countries.

Second are environmental concerns As our pop-
ulation grows and our levels of living inaease, pres-
sure on our natural resources ts mounting Tlie tn-
terrcljuonships between humankind and the
environment h.i\e been a traditional part of geogra-
phy Now. more titan ever, it is critical for us to un-
derstand die environmental results of our aaions
and to find wav-s to reduce and avoid damage to the
environment

Tlilrd i-. pohiical and social Interdependence Not
Only are we increasingly interdependent for prod-
ucts and materials, but we arc also affected by polit-
ical and social condiiioas m other countries For ex-
ampic, m recent vears large numbers of immigrants
have entered die United States from Cuba, Haiti,
Mexico, and Southeast .Asia .Many of these immi-
grants have come beause of adverse conditions in
their home countries and because of perceived op-
portunities in this nation Tlie Impact of this migra-
tion ts great. Without know ledge of the geography of
our own o.)uniry and of other countries tlvat affect u.s.
we Imv little hope of understanding such migrailoas

nGunEi-4

Burning off natural gas in Qatar,
one of the Persian Gulf states.

Oil wealiJi h.ti ivsun-U the gulf
suicv of economic and political sig
nificmcc in norld a/Tairs

BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDEAS

or establishing policies to deal effectively with such
events. The role of geographers as teachers must
expand greatly as we become culturally, politically,
and economically more interdependent.

Business

Applied geography is another subdivision of the dis-
cipline. Geographers apply their perspective and
skills in the business world in many waj'S. Many firms
use geographers for location analysis, because evert'
business has special problems of location. A grocer)'
store chain deciding to increase its retail outlets in a
city wants to know where new stores should be lo-
cated. Should tliey be opened in tlie centra! ciU' or
the suburbs? Selecting the location may involve a
market analysis of potential customers, an anah'sis of
traffic flott', and an assessment of any competitor’s
ability to attract the firm’s potential customers. Fur-
thermore, tlie grocer)' store chain may wish to estab-
lish an outlet at a location that w'ill prove profitable at
some fiiture date, such as near a major highwa)- in-
terchange, rather than at the present point of maxi-
mum profit. The applied geographer must then study
trends in neighborhood characteristics, including
patterns of gtm'th and decline, projected road con-
struction, and a host of other variables. Similar tech-
niques are used for the location of factories and ser-
vices.

The work of Joseph A. Russell of tlie Unit'ersit)- of
Illinois illustrates another w'a)' in which geography
has been applied to business. The Ford Motor Com-
pany hired Russell as a consultant to demonstrate
how a geographer could provide a valuable sen'ice
to the company. Russell decided to map the relative
sales positions of Ford, General Motors, and Chrx’sler
cars of comparable price. He placed these data on a
United States map (by county) and found that the
relative sales positions varied regionally; that is, in
some parts of the countr)' Chevrolet sold more than
Ford, which sold more than Chr)'sler, but in other
regions the relationship was different.

Ford officials were surprised that such sales data
had never before been mapped, and perusal of Rus-
sell’s map led to many questions. Why, for instance,
did the relative sales position show' distinctive re-
gional differences? What was Ford doing right to out-
sell its competitors in some areas? What was it doing

wrong w'here competitors outsold it? Russell helped
Ford answer the fundamental geographic ques-
tions — Where is it? and Why is it there?

Later, Russell worked w'ith Ford to assess the geo-
graphic influences that affect dealerships. He ana-
lyzed die location of dealerships in relation to traffic
flow and pointed out that, in cities, serv'ice and repair
business is increased if the dealership is located on
the right side of the street for customers w'ho are
driving to w'ork. Such a location is further enhanced
if public transportation facilities are nearby and if
access to die garage is easy.

Other geographers w'ho are employed in business
concentrate on area analysis. They study die growth
potential of a market area and assist in planning for
industrial development, resource-use opportunities,
and transportation lines. Or they may utilize the skills
of both the natural sciences and die social sciences in
assessing the impact of new' construedon, in order to
avoid detrimental repercussions. Such snidies are es-
pecially vital in determining environmental impacts.

.Man)' geographers specialize in die study of for-
eign areas, and their knowledge of die cultural, hu-
man, and physical characteristics of diese places can
provide iiwaluable information on market opportu-
nities, resources, location sites, and the problems of
conducting business in such locations. Still other ge-
ographers cany out specialized studies for busi-
nCsSses, such as weather forecasting for specific agri-
cultunil crops or anal)’ses of ilie supply of specific
labor skills. Others may sen'e as atrtographers, travel
agents, or consumer beliaviorists. among many pos-
sibilities.

Government

Geographers hold many kinds of governmental po-
sitions on ail levels. On die local level many are
urban or regional planners, charged with facilitating
orderly residential, business, and industrial growdi.

On the national level geographers are employed
in literal!)' dozens of different npes of positions.
Many use dieir cartographic skills or remote-sensing
techniques to map and analyze numerous types of
activities. A few ser\'e the U.S. Department of State as
science or geographic attaches in the Office of die
Geographer or as foreign ser\'ice officers. Many oth-
ers w'ork as intelligence specialists or research ana-

GEOGR.<Pm^ AN EXCITING DISCIPUNE

l\-5is for \-arious agencies or depanments or for ihe
US. Congress Some are employed b\ saemtfic
agencies, such as the iVationaf Science Foundation or
the US Geological Sur\e>’ Geographers also w'ork
for the Agenc\’ for Imernaiional De\ clopmeni, -where
ihej assist foreign counines in iniii.ifing and carrj
out such programs as resource analj-sis. regional de-
\'e!opmem, urban reconsiruaion, and economic
gronth

On the international le\-el many geographers
norkon imentor^’ anah-sis for socioeconomic deiel-
opment purposes Agencies of die United Nations,
the 'X’orld Bank, and the lmer-<\jnerican Oe\'clap-
ment Bank employ geographers to measure natural
and human resources m snrious parts of the world

GEOGRAPm* AND DE^'ELOWfENT

It IS an tncreasingly trite but accurate truism that the
world is getting smaller Not only arc we coaswnih
bombarded with news of such places as Iran, Lelxt-
non, India, China, Nicaragua. Switzerland, and Japan,
but ev^cs In tliese and o^er countries influence our
daily lists When the Organization of Petroteum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) increa.sed crude oil prices
fivefold during the i970s. the public wa.s quickl>
atvakened to the degree of our reliance on other
countries to supply our needs A co/Tec crop failure
In Brazil, the deNelopmem of a new liigli-jielding
variet}’ of wheat, the dMCOtvo' of a chcmtal process
for making plasuc, an outbreak of lasea pe.sts. and
scores of other events all maieriall) affea our lifc-
st)les As world population grows and .standirds of
living improve, the level of international interdepen-
dence also increases. Consequently, w e arc forced to
know something about the world in which we live fn
order to exert some influence on our fate
Our concern in tins book is knowledge about eco-
nomic achievement. A great disparit>' in maierial
well-being exists among the world's societies. With a
more intimate world brought about by better com-
munication and transportation, knowledge of how’
others Ine is at our fingenips. Countries that are
economically less fortunate often wish to emulate
their materially richer neighbors but may he frus-
trated in their attempts by cultural, economic, and
political constraints The disparit>' in economic

achievement is widening, and the social and political
ramifications are manifold The reasons for this dis-
parity provide the focus and theme of this book.

Until recently, economic development was basi-
caUy a Western concept llo-wever, VX’estem ideas of
materialism are spreading ntdely throughout the
world, with other cultures accepting modem tech-
nolog) in order to support development. Penetration
of Western ideas and technologv’ into other cultures
Ivas often led to disruption and conflia. Not only are
traditional economic patterns altered, but new-
modes of beliavior and Interpersonal relations are
established In addition, because few nations be-
come completely Westernized, internal cultural and
economic dllTerenccs luve often intensified To ap-
prcaatc the process of economic development, we
should examine four elements ilvat contribute to it

People

Tlie first fiiaor In economic devviopment is people,
their numbers, growih rates, and distribution Im-
proved .saniuttion and medical science have lowered
death rates slurpl) and luve caused a rate of popu-
lation growth so great that it coaMiuites a population
explosion Where birthrates have not decreased to
baiincc the lower death rales, economic advances
and improved vvell-lx'ing may be difficult to achieve

EnvJronjncnt

Tlic natural environment provides the stage for de-
velopment and the materials used in economic ac-
mities. Some environments are rich in resources that
can be used for economic gain A well watered allu-
vial plain coupled with a long growing season pro-
vides nianyopponunities for produaive agriculture
Similarly, highly mineralized areas wuh easily ex-
tractable ores offer other means of Iivehhorxi Con-
vcrscl)*. areas with steeply sloping land, thin soils,
moisture deficiency, or few minerals are relatively
poor for cropping and present obstacles to devclon-
ment, *

Culture

The way in which a .society organizes itself in terms
of beliefs, customs, and life-syles greatly influence.s

DEVELOPMENT

evelopment is die process by which die political, social, and, es-
|l P pecially, economic structures of a countr)^ are improved for the
puipose of assuring the well-being of its populace. The results of
dds process are highly varied when viewed from a global perspective. Ex-
tremely limited development is eas}' to spot: human productivity is low, la-
bor is concentrated in agriculture, masses of people live in poverty, food
supplies are inadequate, and health problems abound. The other extreme of
de\-elopment is easy to recognize, too: people are well fed, life expectant
is comparatively long, health is good, and wealda is abundant. Numerous
other attributes can also be identified at the exiremes of development. Not
all countries exldbit one extreme or the other. Most fall in between, along a
continuum. Therefore, ^-hen we look at the level of development of a spe-
cific place, we always see it in comparison with odier places.

De\'elopment ctm be measured in many ways. One of die most com-
mon approaches is the measure of national productivity known as gross
national product (GNP). On the accompanying graph (Figure A) each
black' dot represents the per capita GNP of a countn^, creating a range of
Si 00 to slightly more dian $19,000. Aldiough countries are positioned all
along die continuum, the\’ are concentrated at the lower end of the scale. A
fev' countries ha\'e achieved the middle range; even fewer are found at the
upper end of die scale. Clearly, according to diis one measure, the world
has rich countries and poor countries.

Odier terminolog)’ is also used to distinguish between diose who are
well off and diose who are not. One common classification, based on eco-
nomic systems and achievements, divides our globe into First World, Sec-
ond World, and Third World countries. The First World refers to die well-off
capitalist countries and is comprised of the United States and Canada, the
countries of Western Europe, Japan, and Australia. The Second World con-
sists of the economically well-off countries widi centrally planned
economies — the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. The
Third World includes the remaining and largely poorer countries of Latin

bodi die direction and die degree of economic de-
velopment (Figure 1-5). One feature of Western cul-
ture is materialism. The Protestant work ethic is an
example of our material concern for wealth as an
index of success. Aldiough not Western in tradidon
or culture, Japan has a similar work ethic, Other cul-
tures do not place so high a priority on material
advantages.

The character of economic organization has a
more direct influence on development. Some cul-
tures (including certain Western cultures) have an

economic structure diat is ill designed for die effec-
tive use of modern technolog)^ or a social and eco-
nomic system so rigid that die human resource base
is constrained in its efforts to develop. Other, more
flexible systems are able to adapt to new ideas and to
accept technolog}^ relatively easily.

History

That the past is a key to die present and a guidepost
to die future is well demonstrated in the evolution of

• GNP Per Capita: World

• GNP Per Capita: Regions

• GNP Per Capita: Countries

s m e ?

1-^5 1

J A , » t t

10 20 30 40

50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 UO 150 160 170 180 190

Per Capita GNP (Huttdreds of Dollars)

FIGURE A

Per capita GNP In dollars. Most owintnw ot the «pon a P« opiia itvswe suhvon
tially beloxt that of the relatinrlv rich countrt«

America, Asia, and Mnca ObviousI). some of the rich oil e\poncrs do not
fu easily mto any of these three ciiepones

Another fretjuently used cltssification distinguishes among Mages of
deselopment Deselopcd countries are idcnufied as those that ha\e
acliiesed a higli level of physical and matcnal %scll.bemg fequh'aleni lo the
First and Second World countries) Countries « tth a lo« le\el of physical
and material well-being arc often referred to as desuloping, less developed,
lea-st developed, or wudetdeseloped Other classsshcauorvs exist, too — such
as the have* and the Imve-nocs or the advatitaged and ilie disadvantaged
NX'hatevcr the classincaiion scheme, ilie essential point is that an easily
recognizable difference exists among die world’s peoples some are rcla-
inel)' rtc/i, masses of others arc relatively ptx>r.

economic aaivit)- and the world's I’arious cultures.
Economic development js not a shon-ierni process.
In most nations that are now undergoing rapid
change or that have attained a litgh lev el of economic
wellbeing, the necessary foundations or preretjui'
sites for economic development were laid decades,
even centuries, ago. Tlie cornerstones of Europe’s
Industrial Revolution, which began in the middle of
the eighteenth centur>', were formed during the Re-
naissance, with beginnings in Roman and Greek
times and even earlier. A more recent example is

Taiwan, where many of the fotmd.itions for the is-
land’s remarkable growth were (aid in the early part
of this century.

’TWO WORLDS

Our tlieme— development— supports our dividing
the wxirld into two broad t>pc.s of regions (see box
above) Tlie rich regions, whicii we coasidcr first in
this text, are Anglo-Amenca, Western Europe, East-

BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDEAS

FIGURE 1-5

Bird of Paradise head dress and
face painting worn for ceremo-
nial purposes in New Guinea. As

economic development has spread,
traditional cultures have become
fewer and smaller.

ern Europe and the Soviet Union, Japan, and
Australia-New Zealand. The poor regions are Latin
America, North Africa and the Middle East, sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia, China and its neighbors,
and Southeast Asia.

The Rich World

Each regional unit of this book includes a historical
perspective, an examination of the physical basis for
development, and discussions of culture, economic
structure, and the present patterns, trends, and pros-
pects of development. Our emphasis, however, var-
ies from region to region. The high standard of living
in Anglo-America is viewed in light of the varied and
bountiful physical resource base (Figure 1-6). Pov-
erty pockets and cultural conflicts are also indicated.
The chapters on Western Europe have a greater ac-
cent on historjf, to explain the region’s multiplicity of
nation-states and its advanced technological attain-
ments. The section on Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union contains an analysis of Communist develop-
ment theory and an appraisal of the drive for rapid
economic growth in the Soviet Union. Japan’s status

in die rich w'orld is unique, and w^e must view Japa-
nese gro-^ah, in spite of a poor natural endowment,
from die perspective of blended Western and local
culture traits.

The Poor World

In the poor w^orld Latin America is viewed from the
perspective of cultural pluralism, societal attitudes to
the resource base, and rapid population growth. The
African and Middle Eastern regions, truly diverse,
have a recent histor)' of colonialism, and the many
newly independent nations still struggle for self-
identity, which is expressed in different ways (Figure
1-7). The Arab-Israeli conflict and die oil-rich states
present another aspect of the development process.
Finally, in Monsoon Asia (South Asia, China and its
neighbors, and Southeast Asia) our emphasis is on
the origin of different cultures and die relationship
of economic organization to various cultural aspects.
We pay special attention to the roles of die monsoon
wind system and religion in South Asia and to die
contrasts between traditional and Communist China.

GEOGRAPHY. AN EXQTING DISCIPLINE

HGURE 1-6

The Central city of Vancouver,
Brlthh Columbia, Canada, as
viewed from Coal Harbor. In-
tense urbanization is a process that
accompanies economic develop-
ment

nGUREl-7

A woman tramparting harvested
gnln along the fijot trail of a
small village on the Ttanskei
Coast (east) of South Africa.

Poor regions often show a notable
Iscfc of infrastructure development
Area studies, focusing on particular
areas, is >ct a third tradition in geo-
gtaphicd schoUtihip

BASIC CONCEPTS ANDm ^

KEY TERMS area studies tradition

chorologic

chronological

development

earth science tradition

geography

gross national product

human geography
man-land tradition
physical geography
regional geography
spatial tradition
s}^stematic geography

ENDNOTES I William D. Pattison. “The Four Traditions of Geogr^phY” Journal of Ge-

ography 63 (May 1964): 211-216.

2 Quoted in Alfred H. Meyer and John H. Strietelmeyer, Geograplo^f in
World Societ}' (Philadelphia;}. B. Lippincott, 1963), 31.

3 Marion }. Lew. Jr., yVem York Times, 12 Nov. 1961.

4 Bob Wedrich, Chicago Tribune, 6 Nov. 1980.

5 U.S. Congre.ss. joint resolution. Geography Aivareness Week, 100th Con-
gress, Isi session, 1987.

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'v f/

or most of humankind’s existence, the world s
population remained relatit'eh' small, but over
JiL die past hundred \-ears it has increased so dra-
matically that the phrase population explosion is
commonly used to describe the growth. Rapid and
sustained increase in population may place a strain
on the capacity of a society to fulfill the material
needs and aspirations of its members. To counter-
balance increased demand, society's pixiduciive ca-
pacit)’ must be expanded by the development of new
resources and the accelenited exploittition of present
resources (see chapter opening photo)- However,
even if production capacity matches pojiuhition
growth, previous!}’ minor problems such as pollu-
tion, interpersonal and group rivalries, or occasional
scarcity of goods ma}’ become serious. In tiddition,
new situations mav challenge basic and traditional
societal \ alues and wais of lifo The society itself may
collap.se iir be drasticalh altered

PEOPLE

At the dawn ol the Agricultural Revolution, some
■’,000 to 1 0,00(1 \'ears agta, the world's population
probably nun’ibered about 5 million (l-igure 2-1).
Plant cultivation and animal domestictuion, however,
heralded a long and sustained period of poinilation
growah. Population clusters, tit first cianfined to aretis
of agricultural innot'aiion, later siiretid till over the
world, along w-ith the diffusion of agriculture. In a
few places, such as Ausinilia. the diffusion process
was delayed until the coming of European coloni.sts
Today, only in polar zones, remote dn’ lands, and
other harsh environments do small and dwindling
numbers of people still live b}- the age-old occupa-
tions of hunting, fishing, and gathering.

FIGURE 2-1

World population growtli (in millions). I-or iikxm oj human
hi.stoiy the world held relatively few people. In the la.si -iOO
N’ears, however, the number of people ha,s expanded greath- and
at an increasingly rapid rate. The term popiikuion cxph^iou i>.
often used to de,scribc thi,s rapid growah.

The Population Explosion
Rich World Poor World

Reoion

1 Year 2000
Population
{in miilions)

World

Angi.a-Amoi''ca

296

4.8%

j Eu.'cpe

507

S.STo

I USSR
{

312

5.1%

L.ltin Arnf;fic-a

537

8.7%.

Aitico

880

14,3%

India -

1013

16.5Ti

China

1200

19.4%

Olhor Asia
and Oconma

1414

23.0Ti

World Population (In billions)

PEOPLE AND RESOimCES

The Impact of the Agricultural
Revolution

Tlie Agricultural Revolinion led lo many fundamental
changes No longer did people depend on naiurc
alone, domestic crops and animals far surpassed
iheir nild cousins in unlit)’ Tlius. many more people
could li\e close!)- together at a higher level of exist-
ence. Villages grev.'. and a new social order was cre-
ated to resolve the increasing conllicis brought about
b> more people Using together
bfe nus sometshat easier and more secure Per-
manent homes, ^-en substantial houses, replaced the
crude huts or ca\es that had served as temporart
lodgings Many tools and other large and small lux
unes svere acquired— for example, a chair, a table,
and a bed, which had presiously been vmpraaical
because of the rnigraior)- nature of life Indetxl, ma-
terialism may hate had Us true beginning with the
development of agriculture Possessions could be ac-
cumulated and pxssed on to new- generations
As production increased, a sense of secuntv in-
creased, too Surpluses could be stored for an cmcr-
genc)’ In addition, village life offered proicaion
from hostile groups. Permanent forufie,ttions and
many defenders discouraged outside attempts to
capture and control the agriculturists. Of course, de-
fense was not alway's successful Tor iast.incc. after
obuming horses from the Spanish, the hunting and
gathering Plains Indiaas of the United St.itcs were
more than a match for the sedentary agricultural In-
dians along the eastern margin of the Plaias And the
Romans did lose their agricultural tributary regions
to more primitive northern and c*astem tribes
Increased population, production, and inicipcr-
sona! contaa created a need for group aai'on and led
to numerous .secular leadership organizations A po-
litical organi7.ation was established to settle disputes,
govern, and provide leadership for collective aaion
m w-arfare and in such public worK.s as irrigation,
drainage, and road building The formation of a
priestl)’ class helped to formalize religion Religious
leaders frequently were the holders of botli philo-
sophical and praaical knowledge, often serving as
medical men and weather forecasters In the Ma>'an
civilization of southern Mexico and Guatemala, for
example, priests developed an agnculiural calendar
based on the progression of the sun, the planets, and
the stars-, it prediaed the beginning of wet and dry'

seasons and told farmers when to prepare the land
for planting to take full advantage of the seasonal
rams As increased produaion per w-orker provided
nvore than a family unit needed, a portion of the
bbor force was freed not only for government and
religioas aaivities but also for activities such as pot-
ten* making, meiallurgy. or weaving

Tfom A.D. 1 to 1650

At the beginning of the Christian era, world popula-
tion totaled little more than 260 milhon, of which
about 2S0 million were in the Old \%’orld Most of
these people lited within three great empires the
Roman Empire, around the fringe of the Mediterra-
nean Sea and northward into Europe, the Han d)*-
nasty of China, which extended into Southeast Asia,
and the Mauryan Empire of northern India In these
empires the simpler political, economic, and social
org-aniz-nions of agricultural villages vied with die
more complex, integrating struaures of the empires
and the nmxly created cities Urbanism beame a way
of life

Uftwn life meant specialization of labor, city
dwellers became dependent on farmers for food and
filler Howes or. ernes were the focal point of national
life Tlie riches of the countryside and tribute front
afar were concentrated in the cities. Like a magnet
the)* drew people to their core Aas nourished, and
education wus available to those w ho could pay for n
Tlic best lawyers and doaors praaiced m the cities
Oovemment employed Increasing numbers of peo-
ple to construa and maintain sewage lines, roads and
streets, and irrigation systenu. In all, the aaivities of
these empire ciiie,s were not much different from
those of a modern metropolis

Empires and cities fostered regional specializ-i-
uon Badtec th*an producing all that it needed, each
pan of the empire traded what It produced in surplus
and recened in turn what it did not produce or could
produce only with difficulty. To be sure, regional
specialization wus not fully developed, but the con-
cept was recognized and used Rome, for example,
exported Arreiine pottery, wines and oils, metalware,
gloss, perfume, and gold. In return, Rome imported
wlveat from Egypt and Nonh Africa, cattle and bides
from Sialy. metals and li\*e.stock from Spain, .sl,ive.s
and fur from Germany, and even rare spices and
gems from India

BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDRAS

The people of the New World probably numbered
only about 10 million at the beginning of the Chris-
tian era. The Agricultural Revolution, which was con-
centrated in Mesoamerica (Central Mexico to Hon-
duras) and the Andes Mountains of Peru and Bolivia,
did not affea the area as a whole.

By 1650 the world’s population had grown to
more than 500 million, despite interruptions of fam-
ine, plague, and warfare. Most of the growth was in
and around the preexisting centers, with gradual ex-
pansion of the populace into areas that had been
sparsely settled. Productive capacity expanded with
improved technolog>' and new resources. Urbaniza-
tion became more pronounced, although agriculture
remained the base of livelihood.

From 1650 to the Present

Since 1650 the world’s population has increased
more and more rapidly. It took 1,650 years for the
population to double from 260 million to 500 mil-
lion. However, by 1850 the population had doubled
again and was estimated at 1,175 million. Within the
next hundred years the population doubled a third
time, reaching 2 billion. By 1975 it had doubled
again, to 4 billion. During this relatively short period
of 325 years a second revolution, die Industrial
Revolution, made an impact on humankind, the
results of which are still incomplete. The world now
has more than 5 billion people and prospects for a
continued rapid increase in the foreseeable future.

The Industrial Revolution

Countless innovations have characterized the Indus-
trial Revolution, ranging from the development of
the steam engine to interplanetary flight. By the be-
ginning of the nineteenda centur)- the age of inven-
tion had arrived, and each new idea seemed to
spawn many others. The muscle power of people
and animals was replaced by inanimate power: the
steam engine, the water turbine, and the internal
combustion engine.

In the agricultural sector the use of the tractor and
its attachments made farmers so productive in some
parts of the world that only a small part of the labor
force was needed to supply an abundance of food. To
be sure, other scientific advances — such as im-

proved, higher-yielding seed and the application of
fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides — have also
contributed substantially to this productivity.

Inanimate energy greatly facilitated the growth of
cities. More raw materials from agriculture, mining,
and forestr)^ combined with new energy sources,
spurred industrialization. Since the eighteenth cen-
tury especially, innovations in energy and manufac-
turing have made factory workers many times more
productive. Manufactured products have become rel-
atively less expensive and more readily available.
Craftsmen and small guilds have gradually given way
to modern factories, where workers primarily tend
machines. The Industrial Revolution brought about
large-scale factor}'^ production, which drew larger
numbers of people to the cities to work in the fac-
tories. These cities, small and large, then became
sendee, financial, educational, governmental, whole-
sale, and retail centers. Many cities grew several
times over (Table 2-1).

As tlie Industrial Revolution has continued and its
effects have spread, urban growth has increased. The
revolution, which began in Western Europe, moved
quickly to Anglo-America and other areas where Eu-
ropean colonists settled. It moved more slowly into
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, soutliem Europe,
and Japan. Since the end of World War II, however, at
least some aspects of die Industrial Revolution have
had an effect almost everywhere.

Distribution and Density of Population

As Figure 2-2 shows, the world’s population dis-
tribution and density (number of people per unit
area) show strong ties with the past. Three principal
centers of dense population are readily apparent: the
Indian subcontinent, eastern China and adjacent ar-
eas, and Europe. China and India represent old areas
of large populations based on an early start in the
Agricultural Revolution and in empire building. To-
day, at least half of the world’s population lives in
southern and eastern Asia. In these areas agriculture
and village life are important facets of society. Yet
modern cities, with dieir service and manufacturing
functions, are also present. Population density in In-
dia and China varies considerably, usually in associ-
ation with the relative productivity of the land. On
the coastal and river plains, where alluvial soils are

PEOPLE AND RESOURCES

rABlE£-l

Population growth (In millions) Year

of selected dues. City 1600 1B50 1900 1950 1980 2000

New Yorit

OlIOO

0.70

11.9

222

London

oboo

—

1.8

10.3

12.7

To)(yo

1000

2.30

200

26.1

Pans

0500

1.10

2.7

6.3

9.9

123

Moscow

0300

0 40

1.0

8.1

106

Buenos Aires

0040

010

104

140

Shanghai

0300

040

120

192

Chicago

—

003

1.7

6.1

7.6

9.3

Calcutta

0600

—

19.6

Berlin

0200

0 40

1.9

2.9

Mexico City

0100

030

0.3

159

31 6

Rio de Janeiro

0040

030

0.8

10.7

19 4

Detroit

0 02

Cairo

0300

0 40

2.3

164

Washington. DC

0003

00*

1.5

Lagos

—

2.9

Kinshasa

—

0.2

9.1

Sources. W S Woytinsky and E $ V/oy^nsky. Wortd Popu/atxm and Production Trends Bna OutJOOk
(New Yo<V. Twentieth Century Fund. 1953). IVortd Population Situation In 1970 (New Yortt: United Na-
Bofta. 1970), Oefli£>ar8phicY*a/t)ool( (New Yortt. United Nabons. 1982), anas D.BrwnandJ F,
WiiliaiTis. C«esor'nenivtf(NewYorli Harper i Row. 19S3)

nch and P-Titer is abundant, rural densities of 2,000
people per square mile (772 per square kilometer)
are not uncommon AisTiy from p.ell-v.:atered low*
lands like ihe Huang He or Yangue s-allc^'s. densUies
diminish but ma)- stili be In the range of 250 to 750
people per square mile (97 to 290 per square kilo-
meter)

Europe's high population densiq* can be traced
badt to tedinological de\elopmems In the Middle
East that were adopted by the Greeks and Romans
and were expanded by the Industrial Revolution.
Further increase in the European population is
readily associated with developments In technology.
Many of the high-densit)' areas in Western Europe are
urban regions associaied n'lth coai/iefds or adiunta-
geous v.’ater transponation, re\'eaUng the importance
of these assets in the Industrial Revolution (Figure
2-3). Even though Europe’s population densiq- is
high, it is significantly less than that of the Indian and
Chinese areas Moreov'er, agriculoira! villages and ag-
riculture itself are overshadowed In Europe mod-
ern metropolises and manufaauring

Secondary centers of high population density are
more numerous The northeast quadrant of the
United States and the adiacent Canadian area are con-

sidered by some a principal cluster, although total
population numbers are smaller than those of Eu-
rope and far less than those of East Asia Nonetheless,
in many respects— rate of utbanbawon and employ-
ment, for instance — diis region closely resembles
the European paiicm. High densiues also occur in
Africa, along the Guinea Coast and the Nile River and
in the eastern highlands, but the total number of
people involved in each cluster is relatively small.
Similarly, around major urban centers of Latin Amer-
ica and in the old A«ec, Majxtn, and Inca realms,
small but locally dense populaiion centers are com-
mon Other podeets of high density are found in Asia.
Java, the Malay Peninsula, and parts of the Middle
East.

Most of the rest of the v.-orld’s land surface (80
percent) Is more sparsely inhabited. Many of these
areas have serious environmental problems —
coldness, dryness, rugged terrain— that hare kept
them from being made produaive. The sparse pop-
ulations of other areas, such as some of the humid
tropics of South America and Africa, are not so easj*
to explain, especially because similar environments
In Asia are densely settled It is temptit® to relate
population density to the broad phplcal patterns de-

BASIC CONCEPTS ANDIDFaq

HGURE 2-2

World population distribution.

The world’s population is unevenly
distributed. Three large areas of
dense population are China, die
Indian subcontinent, and Europe.
Most of die sparsely populated areas
have environmental handicaps such
as ariditv’ or mountainous terrain.

scribed in chapter 3, and indeed some writers have
done so. Yet a correlation between population and
physical environment is an oversimplification. Tech-
nolog}^ and political organization are cultural factors
to be considered, as are other aspects of culture, sucli
as desired family size and economic organization.

PEOPLE AND RESOURCES

Models and Theories of Population
Change

Overall, ihe growth rate for the world's popuJaijojj
15 1.7 percent a year, but this growth is by no means
uniform One explanation of the varied growth pa-

tera Is the theory of demographic transforma-
Uon, which js based on four populauan stages
(figure 2-4). Stage 1 postulates an agrarian society
niicre blrtlteatcs and deatft rates are iiigli, creat-
ing a stable or \ er)- slowly growing population Pro-
dtfoivtty per person is limited. Urge families or

BASIC CONGER'S A^ir^

FIGURE 2-3

Overlooldng the Rhine River in
Basel, Switzerland. The Rliine and
otlier rivers of Europe ser\’ed as
major transport arteries during Eu-
rope's development process. Spatial
organization is a fourth tradition in
geographical scholarship.

many births are an asset, particularly since life e.x-
pectanq' is low and security depends on family mem-
bers, including young children. Nonagricultural em-
ployment opportunities are few, and technolog)- is
stagnant or nearly so.

In Stage II die cultural custom of large families
persists, and die birthrate remains high. The death
rate, however, drops dramatically because of better
sanitation and medical treatment and because of

greater productivity. Productivity may increase in the
agricultural sector, but more imponant is die advent
of alternative economic activity resulting from indus-
trial iy.aiion. With indust ly come urbanizxition and la-
bor .speciitlization. The principal feature of Stage II is
rapid population increase.

Numerous countries remained in Stage I until
World War II. In the postwar i-ears, hou'ei-er, death
rates all over the world were greatly reduced. Several

PtOPLF. ANT> RESOURCi:S

nCtRE 2-4

Model Of drmoRmphk tramfomutlon. 7111: »li.TT*vr4r*“>-
tra.'sdiXT?u!i>^» is >»i ilic lunv^'-w ciperkTKC It
mJ\ n>< rcret^eTS «Hji »i51 lufTVo clyrfclxrrf C'peoilh m
fXKi furtTpr^i cul'urr are*'- The avsunn> mnutf^
rx-^l iif ninl l.k ^kish Imh a-nl slrtcli f*n aM

r»i pt'pvlxs'ei »tth inctra'cd »o>l

uiMtaS'^’n. ^^lp dcatJi rase iV.\li>r» crrxioc a n»v!i
lK»n cf pnmth \s iJ*e p'p^iUsvm Km^oo

rweuttunu^ thebinltfTe a!vi»Jc^ljsci urtiUfk (nnh anJ
tlc^ ntes fuu!5' fyrs'*‘* pT^U^Ti f«i

African countries Ivnv nuwl into Sujjc II «n1) in
roceni lieaJcs. ti mu't bo rcinonibofed Out l<n\cr
diatii ntes.^iUch Itnu comfibuto.1 lo (xstof jx>pu*
Lulon grooith. ''Ill decline evvti more in the future v>
dut even Idabor rites of popul.uion pnnMb are
\i\seV' filiiopla. Guinea, and liurkin .1 Vavi ffi'innetW
I'ppor Volta) prcnide illustnnioiis of countries In
preovrly that Jliuatlofi

Stape III i-s cluracierlrcd l)^' ainilnucd urUrnla
lion. indusuUloation, and oilier ixiinomlc iirmb
bejtun in preMous staRos IXmoRraplilc condn>cm>,
hemwer. sh(?^- a sipnlficant ciungc Tlio lilnhmic
begins to drt^ mpidJv. as small f.iniilics become
more prevalent, ’Uk shift toward ?.nviU families nviv
be related lo ihe faa tlui children in an tirlun en%i
ronment are Keneral/i' economic lUhiliiics railier
dun asstTLs In StaRc Itl tl\e population coniinues to
Rrosv, but at an ewr-shmins p.ice

SURc I\’ finds the population Rronth rate stable or
Increasing ten* slonly. Bmhraies and death rates arc
Ion-. The population Is now urlianlred. and birth con*
irol is in general use. Popu!.ition den'in' mav lx.*
quite high Countries such is Argentina and dillc
mm- be considered to l>c In Stage III; the tlmcof ihclr
complete transformation to Stage W remains an open
question Vinually all of the countries in Western
Europe are in Suigc T\'. as are the United States, Can-

.nb, and J.ip.in. countries ili.it exhibit a Etj«>pe3n
style of mdustriahration and uritanization
* Tlicdiiriailn of predicting ex.-ictly nhen a country
nill cnicr a particular st.igc is illustrated b> the
Umted Slates birthrates reached a scry hns le\e!
during the 1950s (ccMuparablc to cummi rates) Init
then acccfcraicd sturply during the postsvar years,
creating gronih conditions cqun'alcm to liiose in
biage lU iVatli rates can Ixr reduced cimitol of
disease, ptxipcr diet, and sanitation elTorts, hut birth-
rates arc vxTiokigicil phenomena ilut are strongly
InHuenccd b) adtural \ahie ssMems

Hie demographic transformation nuxlcl is fused
on analysis of furojxr’s c«pericncc u ith urIxiniTation
and indu'trUljAition Other areas niih difTerem ail
lures may not foilin' the European example precise-
Ivfseefxixonpp Jh-S”) Ifihemodellsvaltd.how-
eiVf. population grmith in nuny pans of the n-orld
mill si<n\ dmn^ as St.ige ill and Mage l\' are a*3chctl
II and ulten p(>pu).nion growtli "ill lx; reduced or
stabili/ed ts. t'f a>urse. iinWmmii (I'lgure 2-5)

Ttie MalilnisUn theory* is aixxher theory of
pojMiljiion clunge tlut lU' reeci'Xtl "idespread at-
tention and lus numcfous aihxKatcs Tlionxvs
.Malihus. an rng!i'hm.in. first presented hts theory fh
l*TW. he lxis<x| jt tin prcmilses

1 Ifumans tend to reprodua* pmlifically. Utai is.
geometrically— '2. •». 8. 16, 32

2 Ttie cap.icliv to prtxlua* hxxl and filxtr ex-

pands more sloM.lv.tlut Is. aruhmetloUv — 2.
5. •». 5. 6 '

■Oius. poj>ul.nuiii "lU csa.’vd fixxl supply unless

populuion growth is cliecked by vKriety If growtli
amtimics. surplus |X)piiLtiloits will lx: reduced h>
xvit. dv-cise, ;tnd (.\m\ne

If wv pUx .\l.althus’s idea on a gniplt. three stages
of tlx; relationship iKiween popul-ttion and prtxluc-
Uonfx*c«me'app,\rentiV)gun.‘2-6.p 32) Inhiage).
Imratn iKxsis are not .is great is productive cap.j(r}n
lly Stage II. pi-ixluctive cap.iciiy and increased hunun
needs are roughly esiual In Suge HI. ix>pul.tt\on lus
gnwn to the point "here its ntxxjv cm no longer Ik;
met.

Vtlten Stage III occurs, die ixipuUtlon dies off. and
"x* cannot lie sure uhjf foJ/o"^ One IdcM /s
Stage HI Is simply a tejxnition of Stage 11, "hh alter-
nating jx*rio(,K of growth and die-stff. rqtresemevl Iw
cuftx* (a) In Eigua* 2-6 Another Idea is ih.it the

B/VSIC CONCEPTCANH~n^

FIGURE 2-5

World population grOT\'tli rates.

Tliere are great diflerence.s in popu-
lation characteristics from one pan
of the tvorld to another. Areas of
the world that are highly urbanized
and ha\'e advanced economies ha\’e
low hinh- aiul death mtes and con-
setiuen.tly low rates of population
growtli. Areas that are les,s iirban-
izeil and less economirally
adwtnced have high birthrates, de-
clining death rites, and moderiteh
to rapidh growing populations
(Fi\)m Popitknioii Ocuii SlkYi
[Washington. DC l’o|Hil.ition Refer-
ence Bureau. 198S| )

i-Iic-oii is so ju tMt (hat Stage 1 is reproduceti, as rep-
tv.sciited by (hi. .Malthus's theoretical die-otT has not
occurred, possibly because of tlie enormous in-
crease in production a.ssociaied with the Industrial
Kevoluiion, .MttUhus assumed that people would rc-
icet lainli control on moral grounds, and he txiuid
not. ol courseA lore.see the impact of the Industri.i!
Revolution, l-or the past few decides, however, neo-
idakhustans (present-day advocates of Malthus)

PEOPLE AND RESOURCES

have argued that the population-production crisis
has merely been dela)’ed and disaster may yet striJ^.

Karl Marx viewed the population question differ-
ently and saw the Malthusian perspective as simply a
possible rationale for exploiting the masses Accord-
ing to Marxist philosophy, economic and social ben-
efits can be enhanced only by an increase m the
labor force. So-oHed overpopulation and popula-
tion pressure are seen as imperfecuons of the capi-

talistic economic system, not as an actual excess of
people. He saw the basic problem as the control of
resources by a capitalistic system, not as population
per se Communist nations still espouse Marx’s view
of population from an ideological standpoint, but
some— Otina, for example— also aalvely encour-
age family planning, and others— the Soviet Union
and East Germany— have low biohrates because of
demographic pressures

Time !>•

FIGURE 2-6

Malthusian tlieory. The Malthusian theory can be illustrated
by a three-part diagram. In Stage I the needs of the population
are less than production capacity. In Stage II, however, the in-
crease in population is so great tliat need soon exceeds produc-
tion capacity. For a while the population continues to grow by
using surpluses accumulated from the past and overexploiting
the soil resources. Eventually, the pressure on the resource
base is too great, and the population begins to die off. Stage 111
may be a continual repetition of Stage II (a) or a return to Stage
Kb).

ITie Marxist idea that increasing population can
lead to greater prosperity conflicts with Maltliusian
thought. Malthus painted a dark future for human-
kind without population controls. Marxists believe
that population growth can lead to greater produc-
tivity if resources are adequately developed and dis-
tributed. Both theories suggest that the balance be-
tween population and resources (produaive
capacity) is central to the development process. The
idea of demographic transformation likewise relates
population grovyth to resources but measures them
in terms of economic activity.

Others also believe that population growth is ben-
eficial. Ester Boserup, for example, has argued that
the stress of increasing demand stimulates change in
traditional agricultural systems.^ Once the transfor-
mation is well under way, die rate of population
growth will decline in response to modernization.
Boserup ’s thesis is an interesting contrast to the neo-
Malthusian view of population gromh.

The fact remains, however, that the population of
the world is large and that increasing numbers of
people live in the poor world, or the developing
nations (Figure 2-7). Figure 2-8 illustrates dramat-
ically the changing population proportions and

BASIC CONCEPTS ANDm^

projects their continuation into the twenty-first cen-
tury. Famine, starvation, and disease are not uncom-
mon now, even if they are localized. Both the current
suffering of individuals and the specter of what could
occur on a more widespread scale require that we
assess our potential for supporting the millions more
to come.

THE RESOURCE CONCEPT
Some Definitions

The resource concept contains three interaaing
components: resources, obstacles, and inert ele-
ments. A resource is anything diat can be used to
satisfy a need or a desire; it is a means to an end. An
obstacle is anything that inhibits die attainment of a
need or desire — the opposite of a resource. Inert
elements in our surroundings neither help nor
hinder that attainment.

If a man needs to walk from point A to point B, his
legs are a resource that he can use to satisfy that
need. If point B lies acro.ss a river and beyond some
low hills, the river and the hills inhibit his walking
and are obstacles for him. If the man drives a car, the
river becomes a formidable obstacle. Neither the hik-
er’s doctorate in astrophysics nor the arable land
across which he passes helps or hinders his walking;
they are inen elements.

However, for the man’s brother, a local farmer,
resources may include seed and fenilizer. The river
also becomes a resource for the farmer because he
can use it for irrigadon; it is no longer an obstacle.
Tlie hills may be obstacles to the farmer’s plowing;
however, minerals located in diose hills may be the
basic resource of a nearby miner.

These simple examples suggest several points.
First, resources are not just material objects. Knowl-
edge is a resource: our farmer has to know when and
how to tend crops. Skill and organization are also
resources, which are necessary'^ for the exploitauon
of die mineral deposit in our example. Other non-
material resources include inventiveness, good gov-
ernment, useful education, cooperation, and ade-
quate social order.

Furthermore, material resources are not just nat-
ural resources. The farmer’s and the miner’s tools
are culturally derived. Even the farmer’s seeds and
plants are culturally modified. In fact, most material

FIGURE 2-8

Population growth in developed
and developing regions:
1750-2100. An increasingly large
share of the world population is
found in developing regions, a situ-
ation that can be expected to con-
tinue w'ell into the next centuiyr
(Adapted with permission from Tho-
mas \V. Merrick, with PRB staff,
■‘W'orld Population in Transition,"
Population Btillctm 41, no. 2 [April
1986, Washington, DC; Population
Reference Bureau], 4.)

Year

1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100

Year

lively structure the lives and attitudes of its members.
These cultural controls affect the way in which re-
sources are viewed.

Those few groups who still live by hunting, hsh-
ing, or gathering look at nature in terms of how man\'
useftil plants and animals it produces. They are not
concerned about soil qualitt', growing setison, or
rainfall, even though these factors bear on natural
production. Hunters, fishers, and gatherers probably
do not even recognize the differences in clay depos-
its, some of which other groups use as raw materials
for making bricks or pottery. However, hunters, fish-
ers, and gatherers do view as resources obsidian and
other rock deposits from which they can fashion
hunting, fishing, and cutting tools; cultures that have
metal instruments would consider these deposits to
be of little significance. Similarly, various plants used
for making mats and containers are also resources.

whereas Western cultures may think of these same
plants as weeds.

Perhaps e\'en more important is the role that cul-
ture plays in directing economic activity; resources
are basicalh’ an economic concept. Some cultures,
such as tliat of the Bedouin of tlie Middle East and
several Asian cultures, are less materialistic than
ours. The accumulation of wealth is not a primaiy
goal for them, and their economic organization is
structured to pro\dde little more than their basic
needs. In other cultures social, political, and eco-
nomic organization is such tliat large portions of the
population have little or no opportunity to develop
resources. Cultural controls inhibit the application of
technology and limit individual opportunity.

In almost all cultures certain economic activities
are socially more acceptable than odiers. Cultural
attitudes tend to direct individuals to use different

PEOPLE AND RESOURCES

sets of resources The Bedouin of the Arabian Desert
are nomadic herders because their culture considers
herding die highest occupation one can have The
existence of large quantities of petroleum under the
land means little to them, and they are not overawed
by the possibility of becoming oasis agriculturists,
e\-en though water and good soil may be available
and the life of a farmer may be more secure In the
United States urban-oriented, white-collar employ-
ment IS the goal of most Americans Many students
come to college to prepare themselvies for these jobs
because of parental arid peer pressure, a form of
cultural control Our population is so large and di-
verse, hov.’ever, that a wide range of economic activ-
ities and opportunities exist

One of the major fallacies surrounding the re-
source concept IS that resources are static of fixed in
amount The Agricultural Revolution and the indus-
trial Revolution are excellent examples of mukiple-
resource innovation A simple stick becomes a re-
source when used to poke, pry, or shake trees and
bushes for food With discov’ery that the stick can
also be used as a planting tool, its function as a re-
source is increased In like manner, the rich coal
deposits of western Penns>\vania were not resources
before the Europeans arrived because the Indians of
the area made no use of coal

It IS not difficult to comprehend that nonmacenal
resources can be constantly created New ideas and
better organization have no limit We can also see
that material resources foat can be replen-
ished — such as trees, crops, animals, soils, and
rivers, which are known as flow resources
— can be used repeatedly and tan be improved
NX'hat may be more difficult to understand is Uiat
fond resources, often called nonrenewable re-
sources, can also be created. Examples of fund re-
sources are nonreusable minerals such as coal or
petroleum

Technological advances can result in the creation
of fund resources in two major waj'S First, a need
may be found for a formerly unused mineral or el-
ement. For example, uranium had no use until
atomic power was developed Manj’ elements were
inert until high-temperature technolog) created a
need for them Only in this century were techniques
petfeaed for extraaing nitrogen from tlie atmo-
sphere, giving rise to an important segment of the
fertilizer industr)'. And the early phases of the Indus'

trial Revolution led to the use of iron in conjunaion
with other metals to produce steel

A second, and perhaps more important, means of
creating fond resources m the past hundred years
has been the inclusion of low-quality mineral depos-
its in the fund-resource base Prior to the advent of
mass traosport and suitable processing equipment,
only the richer mineral deposits could be mined
economically However, these deposits represent
only a small portion of the total amount of any min-
eral in the earth’s crust (Figure 2-9) Once the tech-
nology' became available to mine low-quality depos-
its, th^' became resources For example, most of the
world's Copper is produced from ores containing
less than 3 percent copper. Taconite, a low quality
ore previously considered worthless, has become
the basis of continued exploitation in the famous
Mesabi Range m nonheastern Minnesota, following
the depletion of its rich iron ores Another example
of expanded mineral-fund resources is petroleum,
much of which could not be obtained without nu-
merous advances in dnllmg technology

Technology has also expanded the agricultural re-
source base in several ways For example, the
amount of land that is arable has been increased
through improved seeds and mechanized cropping
By seed seleaion and crossing (hybridization), new
varieties of crops have been developed that are more
tolerant of drought or that can mature in a shorter
lime In ihe United States corn can now be raised
farther west and farther north than was feasible fifty
years ago. and wheat is now grown m areas where
only 15 inches (381 millimeters) of rain falls every

High Quality
Resources

Medium Quality
' ,, Resources

HGURE2-9

Resource pyramid. Tlie pyramid concept applies to all types
of resources land, minerals, fish, people, crops Most of the re-
sources vie use are high quality As lechnologv impros'es, de-
mand increases, or depletion occurs, v,e use more medium-
and lon’-qualuv resources

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION FOR DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

demographic transition shown in Figure 2-4 is a model that illus-
f « trates nicely the experience of most European countries to date. The
..Mr., model in Figure A distinguishes between the experience of today’s
developed and developing countries. Several observations are appropriate.

The death rate in today’s developed countries began a slow but signifi-
cant decline during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and
then accelerated that decline during the late nineteenth century. We should
notice two things. First, the period of time required for the lowering of the
death rate was longer for developed than for developing countries. Second,
by the time the death rate began its rapid decline for the developed coun-
tries, the birthrate also began its decline; but the same is not true for today’s
developing countries. The result is that the developed countries overall
never had the explosive gromh rates of today’s developing countries (rates
of 1.75 to 2.50 percent a year versus 3 to 4 percent a year, respectively). The
European countries also had a safety valve in the form of migration oppor-
tunities, which are not readily available in today’s high-growth countries.
The slow rate at which the death rate declined (death control) in the devel-
oped countries was a function of the need to discover, invent, and diffuse
medical technology'. In today’s world reducing the death rate is less a matter
of discovery' or invention and much more a matter of diffusion of medical
technology'.

In addition, we should understand that today’s developed countries
experienced a long Stage II and III during which major economic develop-
ment was occurring. By comparison, today’s developing countries were
thrown into high growth rapidly (sometimes in a decade or two); they have
not experienced economic growth at a similar rate, but they are experienc-
ing population grow'th rates in excess of any'thing known before. Further-
more, the base population to which these high growth rates are applied is
larger; it includes more than 80 percent of the world’s population. And the

year. In addition, mechanization of agriculture per-
mits the farmer to cultivate what was formerly non-
arable land. By using power-driven equipment, one
farmer can cultivate several hundred acres so that the
total area farmed provides an adequate income, even
tliough each acre may yield a small return. In the
United States and Canada the expansion of arable
land by means of mechanization is w'ell det'eloped.
In other areas, such as China, similar land is little

used despite the great need for it. The role of ex-
panding knowledge and education can hardly be
overestimated in creating and expanding the re-
source base.

Fund resources can also be expanded by an in-
crease in demand. If the demand for a particular item
grows, creating higher prices, new resources are de-
veloped. Large quantities of petroleum in oil shales
and tar sands have not been exploited because less-

FIGURE A

Tbe demographic traositlon for
developed and developing
Countries. The demographic expe
nence has not been the same for all
countries Striking differences are
evident for developed and develop-
tng countries (Adapted by permis-
sion from Vx '^orld Deitlopment
Report 1982 INew York. Oxford
University Press, 3982}, 26 )

Rate of Population Increase e Birthrate - Death Rate

Note Crude birth* and death rates The projected increases in death rates after about
1980 reflect the nsing proportion of Older people in the population
•Includes indostnalized countnes. the USSR, and Eastern Europe

model for developing countries is open ended— we do not know how long
their high-growih phase will continue. Given the diversity in culture, physi-
cal resources, and current level of economic and political organization of
developing countnes, we might want to consider the implications of this
population situation for the economic development process, regionally and
in the world at targe.

expensive oil is available from other sources If pe-
troleum prices rise again, extraaion of these oil re-
serves may become profitable

loss of Resources

Just as demand can create resources, a decrease in
demand can reduce resources. Steel cuning instru-

ments ha\^ largely replaced the need for stone and
obsidian tools Synthetic rubber has decreased the
need for natural rubber. Artificial heating and the faa
that we live and work mainlY indoors have decreased
our need for heavy woolen clothing In addition, pro-
^^vity increases in a crop xviihout a significant
change in demand may cause marginal producers to
withdraw from that aaivity. Similarly, the develop-
ment of a new produa or the discovery of a new

BASIC CONCEPTS ANplr^

mineral deposit may lead to die disuse of other prod-
ucts or mines.

Resources can also be lost through use. Each drop
of oil or ga.'^oline burned and each morsel of wheat
or corn eaten represent a decrease in resources. On
the other hand, some resources are lost if they are
not used. A tree that is allowed to decay means lost
pulp or lumber, and unharvested crops are a lost
resource, although diese may fertilize the soil and
feed wild animals.

Unfortunately, resources are also destroyed by im-
proper use. Poor farming techniques lead to erosion
and soil depletion. Factories and cities may discharge
harmful chemicals and setvage into rivers, destroying
aquatic life and ruining wafer quality for those down-
stream. \X''ar destroys not only people — the most im-
portant resource — but also buildings, bridges, and
odier material resources.

Tedinociatic Theory

A number of authorities have observed the great
technological advances made during the ongoing In-
dustrial Revolution and have derived what is often
called the teclinocratic tlieory. This optimistic the-
or>' directly counters that formulated by Malthus
(compare Figures 2-6 and 2-10). Technocrats ac-
cept the Malthusian population-growth curve but as-
sume an increase in productive capacity (resources)
at a rate that is greater than population grovrth. To
support tlieir contention, technocrats point to the
expansion of the resource base during the past four
hundred years and to die increase in the standard of
living within Western cultures. Technocrats believe
that technology' will continue to expand, supporting
still greater populations.

Neo-Malthusians admit that the Industrial Revolu-
tion has postponed the day of disaster (Figure 2-11).
They maintain, however, that the expansion of pro-
ductive capacity cannot continue indefinitely; when
population groiMli surpasses capacity, Malthus’s pre-
diction will be fulfilled. Neo-Malthusians suggest thit
in such areas as India, Bangladesh, and parts of Airica
the notions of Malthus may yet be pro\en. Ban-
gladesh, for example, which has 110 million people
and is growing at 2.7 percent per year, will double its
population again in 25 years or so. This large poou-

FIGURE 2-10

Technocratic theory. The technocratic theory assumes the
same population curve as the Malthusian theory. What is differ-
ent is the rate at which productive capacity is assumed to grow.
If productive capacity increases faster than the population,
higher standards of living are possible.

lation occupies an area scarcely larger than many
American states (Figure 2-12); the country may or
may not be near the limits of its physiologic den-
sity (persons per unit of arable land). We do not

nCURE 2-11

Neo-Mal&usian theory. The neo-Malthusian theory is a re-
cent refinement of classical Malthusian thought. It takes into
account the great technological advances of the Industrial Revo-
lution but argues that these rapid advances in productive capac-
ity cannot be maintained.

nCURE 2-12

The Bangladesh Jute market.

This heavily populated countr>- is
mainly dependent on agnoilture or
the processing of industrial raw ma
tenals such as jute Countries o\-erly
dependent on primary produoion
tend to exhibit low income lei-els

have a good sense of lhel^•orld’scaro^ngcap3Clr>• for mand of future populaiions is mind boggling if we

population Estimates range from less than 8 billion assume that many counines will succeed in achieving
people to more than 40 billion The resource do- their goals for economic development

SUMMARY: POPULATION In all likelilioocl the world’s population will continue to grow in the near
PROSPECTS future B)' the year 2000 more ilian 6 billion people are e\peaed to be liv-

ing on the earth By the year 2020 dial number will top 7 billion if current
growth rates are sustained A few daring forecasters estimate a world popu-
lation of 51 billion by the year 2100 Such long-range prediaions, however,
must be viewed with great caution

Predictions of resource de\t:lopmcnt arc not easy’ to make because
there is no way to determine what resources will be created Tlie Food and
Agriculture Orginizaiion of the United Nations believes that the technologv
now’ exists to adequately feed and clothe the world’s population for many
decades Tlie problem is that the technology’ may not be av’ailable where it
IS most needed

BASIC CONCEPTS ANplr^

KEY TERMS

Agricultural Revolution

birtlirate

death rate

demographic transformation
flow resource
fund resource
growth rate
Industrial Revolution

Maltliusian theory
neo-Malthusian
physiologic density
population density
population distribution
population explosion
resource concept
technocratic theory

ENDNOl'E

1 Ester Boserup, We Conditions of Agiicultural Growth (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Co., 1968), 11-27.

n some parts of the world people live well; in
[C] other parts life is a constant struggle. Three
i:i. principal factors affect the level of living in an
area: the number of people and dieir rate of increase;
the physical environment; and the political, educa-
tional, economic, and social systems in place. This
chapter focuses on the physical emaronment and on
human cultural systems.

It must be recognized tliat socieu' has an overrid-
ing economic concern; survival is based on some
form of production, and production necessarily in-
volves a relationship with the environment. The na-
aire of tliis relationship depends on the skills and
resources that a society accumulates and on the value
system that motivates it. For example, the way we in
the United States use a desert environment differs
substantially from the way the Bushmen of Africa do.

Using the environment means modifying it, and
modification can bring problems. Our recent expe-
riences with water and air pollution and power i)rob-
lems sometimes encourage us to think that landscape
modification and environmental problems are new
phenomena, but that notion is inaccurate. Ancient
Middle Eastern inhabitanis had culturally induced
environmental problems; for example, increased sa-
linity of soils (high salt content), a result of irrigation
practices, ultimately made many agricultural lands
useless and contributed to the decline of some Me-
sopotamian civilizations,

Thus, landscape modification is as old as hu-
mankind. In fact, most, if not all, landscapes are not
natural but are cultural, shaped and formed as soci-
eties have occupied and used the surface of the earth.
Culture is part of die environment, jtist as the ph\-.s-
ical world is, and it is essential to an understanding of
the condition of the human race in various regions of
die world.

ELEMENTS OF THE PiiYSICAL
ENVIRONMENT

The numerous components of the ph)'sical
environment — roclcs, soils, landforms, climate, veg-
etation, animal life, minerals, and water — are inter-
related. Climate is partially responsible for \^ariations
in vegetative patterns, soil formations, and land-

forms, for instance; and organic matter from vegeta-
tion affects soil development. Environmental ele-
ments are all part of a large ecosystem that often
exists in a delicate balance. Recognizing the relation-
ships among natural processes is vital, as is recog-
nizing that humans interfere with them. The human
race is the most actii'e agent of environmental
change on the surface of the eardi.

Climate

Climate is of direct importance in our efforts to
produce food and industrial crops. Agricultural pro-
duction in great quantities is basic to the entire hu-
man race. Each plant has specific requirements for
optimum grov\'th. Some plants, such as rice, need
substantial amounts of moisture; others, like wheat,
are more uderant of drought. Coffee requires a year-
round growing season; it does best in the tropics at
elevations that pro\'ide cooler temperatures. Hu-
mans haw modified the charaaer of many plants, yet
climatic differences ensure great geographic varia-
tion in crop cultivation.

The most imponant climatic elements are precip-
itatioit and temperature. Precipitation is moisture
that has been removed from die atmosphere and h.is
dropped onto the surface of the earth. Rainfall is the
most common t\pe of precipitation, but the solid
forms — snow, sleet, and hail — are also significant.
Melting snow has ralue as a source of water for
.streams or as soil moisture that can be used in later
.sea.stm.s. Sleet and hail are normally loailized, but
they can atuse enormous damage and economic
lo.sses.

As the map of precipitation (Figure 3-1) show’s,
the rainy areas of the world are the tropics and the
middle latitudes. In the latter areas precipitation is
particularly hea\y on the wxxstern (windward) .sides
of continents. The eastern (leeward) sides of mid-
latitude continents may be less rainy but may still
receive .suflicient precipitation to be considered hu-
mid regions, particularly if exposure to major water
bodies (moisture sources) is favorable. In Figure
3-1 die eastern United States and Canada or Ea.st
Asia illustrates such a condition.

In contrast, the interiors of continents such as Asia
or North America and the areas on leeward sides of
mountains experience moisture deficienq'. In addi-

PHYSICaTaND CULTUKAL ro^ONENTS OF THE HURtAN B^ROI^IENT

tion, some subtropical areas — northern Africa, Aus-
tralia, northern Chile and Peru, nonhwestern Met-
ico, and the southwestern United States — ha\’e only
meager amounts of ram (Figure 3-2, p 48) Subsid-
ing air and divergent wind patterns, along with cold
offshore waters, reduce the likelihood of precipita-
tion

The map of average annual precipitation is
useful for analyzing the distribution of human acuv
ities Areas of meager rainfall normally are not
heavily populated (see Figure 2-2 for populauon
distribution) Exceptions, such as the Nile Valley or
southern California, require an exotic, or enema),
water supply Some areas of very high rainfall and
high temperatures contribute to other environmen-
tal conditions that are difficult to overcome —
namely, infertile soils in tropical r^jons

Seasonal rainfall patterns are as important to land
use as yearly rainfall touils are Most equatorial areas
receive a significant amount of rainfall m every sea-
son Tropical wet and dry regions have a disnna
rainy season (summer) and an excessively dr>' sea-
son Although temperatures are high enough for the
growing season to be year-long, that advantage is
panly offset by the seasonality of the rainfall Dry
subtropical climates also experience distina sea-
sonal variations, except that summers are dry and
winters have the maximum rainfall

Variability’ of precipitation is the amount received
in a given year, expressed as a percentage of an an-
nual average that is derived from a thirty- or fifty-y^ear
record of precipitation The greatest variability is ex-
perienced in areas of minimal rainfall Unless a spe-
cial source of water is ai’ailable, settlement in dry
areas is limned Transitional areas (steppes, savan-
nas) between humid and dry regions, however, are
frequently important settlement zones in which the
production of staple foods (grains) is significant Un
der normal conditions the Great Plains of the United
States, the Black Earth Region of the Soviet Union,
the North China Plain, and the Sahel (on the south-
ern edge of the Sahara) are significant food-
producing regions Unfortunately, these and similar
areas have experienced repeated droughts and over-
exploitation A recent example is the Sahel, where
thousands have died of starvation Drought and fam-
ine emphasize the danger of dependence on such
transitional areas

The human suffering associated with prolonged
drought has encouraged the study of subhumid en-
vironments and the process by which their produc-
tivity IS lessened Deterioration of the ecosystem, es-
pecially of soils and vegetation, occurs as a result of
bodi drought and the nature of human activities
Overpopulation may encourage grazmg or culiiva-
uon practices that have long term detrimental effects
on the environment — particularly during periods of
recurring drought

Data on annual amount, seasonality, and variabil-
ity of rainfall reveal much about the utility of an en-
vironment However, the moisture actually available
also depends on temperature conditions High tem-
peratures mean great potential for evaporation and
plant transpiration, or a high cvapotranspiration
rate An unfavorable relationship between precipita-
tion and ev'apotranspirauon means that not enough
moisture ts available for plant growth Deserts rep-
resent the extreme cases of this moisture-
temperature relationship

Temperature and Plant Growth

Perhaps the most important aspect of temperature Is
the length of the £rost-free period* which is related
primarily to latitude but also to altitude and the lo-
cation of large bodies of n^ter The modifying influ-
ence of water on temperature is evident in marine
locations growing seasons are longer than would
normally be expected at those latitudes A compari-
son of northwestern Europe with similar latitudes in
the Soviet Union or eastern Nortli America offers an
example (Figure 3-3, pp 50-51)

Winter temperatures are significant, too Many
mid-lautude fruit trees require a specific dormancy
period, with temperatures below a certain level Cold
temperatures (chill hours) are necessary to assure
v'ernaJization, or activation of a new' flowering cycle

The photoperiod (the length of the day, or the
aaive period of photosymrhesis) and daily tempera-
ture range during the growing season also affect
plant growth Some plants, like barley, require a long
daily photopenod to flower or set seed, others, such
as soj^jeans or nee. are favored by shorter photope-
riods Each plant variety has a specific range of daily
Ion' and high temperatures, called cardinal temper-
atures, widiin which plant growth proceeds most

BASIC CONCEPTS ANdIt^

FIGURE 3-1

World mean annual precipita-
tion. Precipitation v:iries greatly
from one part of the world to .an-
otlier. Moreover, there is consider-
able TOriabiliU' in precipitation from
one vear to the next. Variability is
usually greatest in areas of limited
precipitation.

rapidly. Cardinal temperatures are knoxsat for most
plants. The numerous varieties of wheat, for exam-
ple, have cardinal temperatures that range from a
low of 32° to 4l°F (0° to 5°C) to a high of 87° to 98°F
(31° to 37°C). Optimum temperatures for most rari-
eties of M'heat are beru'een 77° and 88°F (25° and
31°C). Aldiough less-dian-optimum conditions do
not mean that a particular crop cannot be cultimted,
depanurcs from the optimum reduce tlte efficient

IKia.

INDIAN . A OCSAU

Hf ■ iw» isr

r<- NJ COflAt SPA ,

^ f"»te at Cl

wth uhich that crop is produced. Effiaency, trans-
lated into cost per unit of produaion, is a major
concern in commercial agriculture.

Climatic Classification

Figure 3-3 shov.-s the global distribution of climates.
Climatic classification is based on temperature
and prccipiDtion conditions (Table 3-1, p. 52). Al-

though conditions ma>’ \ar)’ rsiihin a climatic region,
a generalized classification system is useful for com-
paring the characteristics of different areas Res’iew of
the map reveals a close relationship among latitude,
continental position, and climate. The locauonal sim-
ilanty' of humid subtropical climates in the United
Stales, China, and Argentina is one example.

The distinction between dry and humid climates
is fundamental to classification. However, a single

BASIC CONCEPTS ANDn^

FIGURE 3-2

Camel herders at a Saharan
desert oasis. This barren landscape
illustrates the extreme subtropical
desert conditions.

specific precipitation limit cannot be used to sepa-
rate the tvi^o. Areas are classified as desert or steppe
if the potential for evaporation exceeds actual pre-
cipitation. In the mid-latitudes deserts normally re-
ceive less than 10 inches (254 millimeters) of pre-
cipitation; steppes or semiarid regions, between 10
and 20 inches (254 and 508 millimeters). For classi-
fication as a dry climate the limits of precipitation are
lower in the higher latitudes and higher in the lower
latitudes. For instance, 25 inches (635 millimeters) of
precipitation in the higher middle latitudes may pro-
vide a humid climate and forest growth; that same
amount in tropical areas may result in a semiarid,
treeless environment.

The highland climates shown on Figure 3-3 fea-
ture variable temperature and rainfall conditions.
Along with the other controls of climate — such as
latitude, marine exposure, prevailing winds, and at-
mospheric pressure systems — elevation is a major
factor. Precise conditions depend on elevation and
on position within mountains. Even tliough many
mountainous areas are sparsely settled and provide a
meager resource base for farmers, highland settle-
ment is important in Latin America, East Africa, and
Indonesia.

Vegetation patterns are closely associated with cli-
mate, as is readily evident in the major distinction be-
tw'een grasslands (herbaceous plants) and forests
(woody plants). Grassland vegetation (Figure 3-4,
pp. 54-55) is associated witli areas of moisture defi-
cienq' (steppes and deserts) or with areas of extreme
seasonal variation in precipitation (savannas); how-
ever, humans have extended grasslands in numerous
areas by the use of fire and extensive grazing, so that
this kind of vegetation is now found in various envi-
ronmental realms. The ver)'^ cold areas (tundra) are
also treeless, because the growing season is short or
nonexistent and because permafrost, or permanently
frozen subsoil, is present. Forest growtli usually re-
quires a minimum rainfall of 15 to 20 inches (381 to
508 millimeters), depending on evapotranspiration
rates, and is associated with humid climates.

Natural vegetation is that which would be ex-
pected in an area if vegetation succession were al-
lowed to proceed over a long period without human
interference. The phrase must be used carefully, be-
cause landscapes have been modified for so long that
few areas of truly natural vegetation remain. Most
vegetative cover is part of a cultural landscape and is
therefore a reflection of human activity.

PirVSlCAL AND CULTURAL COMPONtyTS or TllE HUMAN CNV1RONMCNT

Vegeiaiion is not only a direct source of food for
humankind but also an indirea source through the
animal life diat it supports Wild plants ssere oiaamlv
the most significant biotic element \Mth which hu-
mans dealt in earlier millennia Our ancestors mwvd
easily across grass<o\vred plants and mingled with
each other, but dense forests funaionod as barriers,
isolating culture groups and providing refuge for
those who wanted to remain apart Tlie grasslands
south of the Saliam Desen wx‘re a cultural transition
zone, with features of Ixvih African and Arab culuirtn*
However, the equatorial rain forests wvre effectiw
barrieni. because travel through them was diiTiaift
and other emnronmentnl factors, including piK>r
soils and diseases, were avsociated with them

forests haw lx*en rcmovxxl from 'tisi areas in
mid-btitude Asia, North America, and turope (see
broadleaf and mltcd braidlcaf and coniferous for-
ests in figure S**’!) Ovxr the cenumos inctea>cs m
population and dunges In agricultural technologt-
have placed great demands on these environments,
tvith their favorable temperature, vail, and moisture
conditions Tlie trtx*s luve had to Ik* cleared v> ilut
field agriculture could expand (figure 3-5, p %)
The remaining forests— high Uittudo amlferous for-
esisand tropical rain forests— still e\isf. not so much
Ixxausc people Itave sticm-n proteaisx* ctmeem hut
because the forests are lcs.s accessible or contain
other (ess desirable environmental features Tropical
ram forests, for instance, do not lend themselves to
permanent settlement or to brge -scale modem agri-
culture because the soils arc ptxir

In countries like Ilrazil, rapid population growth
and die need for spaa* (nve stimulated forest clear-
ing Some people view the e%p;inslon of hrazUian
settlements in the /\ma/on rain forest with great
hope— as a source of national pride and unity for
Brazilians, a means of casing population pressure,
and a source of new economic nealdi Others view-
these as shon-term gaias dtat may damage tlw forest,
the soils, the streams, and the atmosphere I Ustory Is
r^Iete with axamptes in whicli short-term or Imme-
diate need liis clouded our vision in matters of en-
vironmental Stewardship

Our attitudes toward natural vegetation hm* a*-
cently begun to change dramatically. Increasingly we
are recpgnizing that vegetation is significant in many
a^peas of life and that It Is related to ocher compvs-

nenLsofour environment, such .as soil and air Torest
vegetation Isccomes more critical as our numbers
grow and as we cortsumc ever-greater amounts of
lumlvcr and paper Susiaincd->icld forestry —
fiarvcstmg no more t/ian tfie annual growi/i rate of
trcx*s can repbee— is lK*coming more common as
wv realize that wasteful use results in greater re-
source problems

Forests are utilized for many purposes other dian
the wxxxl they provide In more aflluent counirics
they are prized recreation areas ForcMs also help to
prevent erosion, which not onlv dcstrovs land but
also fcads to the silting of rivers, streams, and rcscr-
vtvlrs And forests contribute to Hocxl prevention bv
reducing water ninoff

Soils

In order to grow, plants need nutrients as well as
moisture and energy from the iun Nutrients are de-
rived from minerals in the eanb and from humus
organic ntitenals added to the soil h) vegetation Tlie
nuirlwjis iJni vjjJ conbins dtTsend on die Ktnd of
ruck hang beneath u. live slope of ilte land, the veg-
etative cover, tile miCToorgamsnvs within the soil,
and Its age

Tliree proawvcs are paniailarly imporum in the
formation of soil and ganitly affcci jis supply of nu
tflcnis and thcref<>re its fertllic) latcrizatlon, pod'
zollzation, and calcification Uienzjtion is a prtv
cess by which infertile soils arc formed In the tropio.
Hie plentiful rainfall k-jches d\e soil, dut is, w dvs.
solves the soluble minerals in the soil and carries
them away Unfortunately, the stjluble minerals that
are removed— calcium, phosphorous, poash, and
nitrogen — are among the most fniponant plant nu
irlents lasoluble ctJmptjundj. of aluminum and iron
remain, but ilicse elements alone produa* mfenlle
soils In addition, decomposed organic material,
which could prtjvide nutnems. is minimal Ixxause of
rapid Iwcterial action aided by the warm, moist con-
tlitioas and by the microorganisms in the .soil After a
few vearv of use, soils in areas of hlgli rainfall and
high tc-mperature-the iropial and subtropical hu-
mid rcgKm-s — show a marked decrease in fenillty
^/oll/ation ocairs in higli latitudes, or cold, hii-
mid climates where .seasonal temperature variations
are dlsilnalvx*. Normal leaching is less, either Ik*-

cause rainfall is less or because the ground is frozen
during part of the year. However, poorly decom-
posed organic material, such as that from pine nee-
dles, combines with water to form weak, acidic so-
lutions that remove aluminum and iron from the soil,
as well as soluble minerals. What remains are large
amounts of silica, which is low in fertility. Podzoliza-

uon gives way to laterization as the tropics are ap-
proached '

Calcification occurs on ^the drier margins of hu-
mid regions and in dry areas. Reduced leaching, in
response to limited precipitation, leads to greater
accumulations of humus^ and calcium carbonate.
Some soils formed under these conditions are very

fertile but, paradoxically, often remain less produc-
th-e because of the very moisture deficiency that fa-
vored their formation.

Residual soils are those that formed where they
are found. They reflect local environmental condi-
tions and are strongly influenced by laterization,
podzolization, or calcification Some soils, however,

TABLE 3-1

Characteristics of world climate types.

Climate

Location by Latitude
(continental position
if distinctive)

Temperature

Precipitation
in Inches per Year
(millimeters per year)

Tropical rainy

Equatorial

Warm, range* less than

5° F; no winter

60+ (1,523+); no distinct
dry season

Tropical wet and dry

5°-20°

Warm, range* 5°-15° F;
no winter

25- 60 (635- 1,523); summer
rainy, low-sun period dry

Steppe

Subtropics and middle
latitudes (sheltered
and interior continental
positions)

Hot and cold seasons;
dependent on latitude

Normally less than 20
(508), much less in
middle latitudes

Desert

Subtropics and middle
latitudes (sheltered
and interior continental
positions)

Hot and cold seasons;
dependent on latitude

Normally less than 10
(254), much less in
middle latitudes

Dry summer

30°-40° (western and

Warm to hot summers;

20-30 (508-761); dry

subtropical

subtropical coastal
portions of continents)

mild but distinct winters

summer; maximum
precipitation in winter

Humid subtropical

0°-40° (eastern and
southeastern subtropical
portions of continents)

Hot summers; mild but
distinct winters

30-65 (761-1,650):
rainy throughout the
year; occasional dry
winter (Asia)

Marine west coast

40°-60° (west coasts
of mid-latitude
continents)

Mild summers and mild
winters

Highly variable,

20-100 (508-2,538);
rainfall throughout the year;
tendency toward winter
maximum

Humid continental

35'’-45° (continental

Warm to hot summers;

20-45 (508-1,142);

(long summer)

interiors and east
coasts, Northern

Hemisphere only)

cold winters

summer concentration;
no distinct dry
season

Humid continental

35°-45° (continental

Short, mild summers;

20-45 (508-1,142);

(short summer)

interiors and east
coasts, Northern
Hemisphere only)

severe winters

summer concentration;
no distinct dry
season

Subarctic

46°-70° (Northern
Hemisphere only)

Short, mild summers;
long, severe winters

20-45 (508-1,142):
summer concentration;
no distinct dry
season

Tundra

60° and poleward

Frost anytime; short
growing season, vegetation
limited

Limited moisture, 5-10
(127-254), except at
exposed locations

Ice cap

Undifferentiated

highland

(see Figure 3-3)

Polar areas

Constant winter

Limited precipitation,
but surface accumulation

•The difference in temperature between the warmest months and the coldest months.

PHYSIOL AND CULTURAL COMTONENTS OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMEOT

are transported and have charaaeristics that bear lit-
tle relauonship to local environmental conditions
Alluvium IS soil that is transported and deposited by
v.- 3 ter, loess, by wind Alluvium and loess, along with
soils formed from some volcanic materials, are
among the exceptionally fertile soils of the world In
humid areas thet’ are often the most preferred for
culovacion, but in excessively dry areas they ma>’ re-
quire great amounts of labor or capital for irrigation.

Humans have modified soils m many ways, some-
times improvmg mherently poor soils, sometimes
repoituag the damage done bv depletion, ecoston,
and other forms of misuse The addition of chemical
or organic fertilizers overcomes the declining fetiil-
it>' that results from prolonged use The addition of
lime reduces acidiq’, a soil condition that is detri-
mental to many plants Terraces pre\-ent erosion or
aid in distribution of irrigation water Crops that
place a senous drain on soil nutrients can be routed
with less-demanding plants or with leguminous
plants, which have the capabihr>’ of adding rather
than removing nitrogen. Fields themselves can be
rotated, with some plots allowed to lie fallow, or test,
for some >ears between periods of cultwation so that
fertility builds up again through lutural processes.
Farmers tn many areas of the United Sutes have in-
stalled tile drains to remove excess moisture from
poorly drained areas Other drainage techniques
have been used in Asia and Europe to bring into use
soils that otherwise would be unproductive

Efforts to reduce soil destrucuon or improve fer-
ulicy involve expenditures of labor or capiul, but the
long-term needs of society require that we accept the
costs of mamiaming the environment Unfortunately,
people are not always willing or able to bear such
costs, particularly when short-term profits or imme-
diate surviiul are the mam concern An exploitive
approadi leads to mxximum return with minimal
input over a short period, but it often results in the
rapid destruaion of one of our most basic resources.

An experience in the United Sutes illustrates the
environmental damage and human hardship that re-
sult from less-than-cautious use of resources The
years between 1910 and 1914 are often referred to as
the golden )ears of American agnculture because of
the high prices that farmers received for agricultural
commodities Prices continued to be favorable

through World Wat 1 and into the 1920s High prices
and abov^-average rainfall encouraged farmers on
the w'estern margin of the Great Plains to convert
grassland into wheat fields Then came several years
of severe drought, which coincided with the depres-
sion of the 1930s The unprotected cultivated lands
were heavily damaged by wind erosion, and the
fiurmers suffered terribly Many of them moved away,
abandoning their land Banks faded, and some whole
towTis were desened *

A traditional method of soil classification dev’el-
oped b^' the U S Department of Agriculture in 1938
used genetic similarities (similarities of origin) to
identify soil groups More recently, a Comprehensive
Soil Classification System, or set of soil orders (the
7th approximation), was developed on the basis of
similarity of soil properties Table 3-2 (p 57) pro-
vides a description of the major soil groups and or-
ders, the correspondence between the two classifi-
cations IS only genera) Figure 3-6 (pp 58-59)
shows a highly generalized distribution of the soil
orders, which can be compared with Figures 3-3
and 3-4 to develop an Impression of the various
environmental realms that are available for human
use Soils share a generally close association with
climate and vegeution, because climate is Intricately
related to the evolution of vegetation and to the for-
mation of soil It IS useful to compare sev’eral world
regions with similar locational attributes, using Fig-
ures 3-3. 3-4, and 3-6 — for example, the south-
eastern United States and southeastern China

Landforms

The surface of the earth is usually divided into four
categories of landforms.

1 plains, with little slope or local relief (varia-
tions in elevation)

2 plateaus, or level land at high elevations

3 hills, with modetate to steep slopes and mod-
erate local relief

4 mountains, with steep slopes and great local
relief

Plains are the landform that is used most widely
for seidement and ptoduaion, when other environ-
mental diaracteristics permit. Large areas of land

BASIC CONCEPTSANrrT^

FIGURE 3-4

World vegetation regions. The
distribution of vegetation closely
corresponds to climatic patterns. A
map of vegetation can be used to
study an area's agricultural potential
since crops and natural vegetation
use the satne environmental ele-
ments for grov/tl).

with little slope or relief are most suitable for agri-
culture, and humans have been agrarian beings for
tliousands of years, producing food by cultivating
crops. In addition, ease of movement over plains,
particularly those with grassland vegetation, has fa-
cilitated exchange with other societies. Not all ex-
change is peaceful, of course: the features of plains
tliat contribute to their utility in peacetime can be

«ons w-crc rissoclatwl plains. Those plaias itui
crhibli llmircd scfflcment and utilization are (cs.s de-
sirable for climatic rcasoas

JIvlls and mountains ofTcr quite a different habitat.
In mountainous regions .small lusins and sullen's Ik*-
come the focus of settJement. Because iltese areas
are dtfhculi to penaraie, their Isolation may lead to
Uie formation of dlstJna cultures. Although such ar-

handicaps in ■^■anlme. With few natural banicis to
afford proteaion, plains are easily os’errun, as s!toss-n
by the mechanized armies that moved rapidly across
the plains of Europe during World War 11.

The great densities of population occur in areas
ss’here intensive agriculture is praaiced or in regions
^tiere industrial and commercial activity is concen-
trated. The early high-density agricultural popub-

BASIC CONCEPTS AND~n^

FIGURE 3-5

The slasli-and-bum technique,
which continues to be used in
clearing forests for agriculture.

Ihis scene is from Costa Rica, but
similar forest clearing occurs in
many tropical areas.

eas do provide security from attack, they may also
e-xhibit economic disparity in comparison with more
favored regions.

Major differences and even conflicts between
highland and lowland inhabitants are common and
are part of regional history in many parts of tiie
world. Unifying a country that incorporates these
contrasting environments and cultures remains diffi-
cult. Separatist movements are an expression of
these differences, and isolated highland areas pro-
vide excellent bases for guerrilla armies. The
mountain-dwelling Kurds of Iran and Iraq have been
troublesome to tlie governments of both these states;
in Burma the Karen of the Shan plateau have raised
Communist and indigenous insurrections against a
government that is controlled by the lowland river-
plain majoriqc

Minerals

Today’s politically and economically powerful coun-
tries have built up their industrial structures by pro-
cessing large quantities of minerals. Such countries
require huge amounts of fossil fuels (coal, petro-
leum, and natural gas). Any countr)^ that wants to be
considered a modern, industrialized nation must ei-

ther possess such resources or acquire them. To
date, neither nuclear energ}'^ nor hydroelectricity has
surpassed fossil fuels in importance. Nuclear energ)'
as yet contributes only minute quantities of power,
and hydroelectricify' generally has only local impor-
tance, providing a small portion of a nation’s total
power needs.

The use of petroleum and natural gas has in-
creased rapidly in all industrialized areas since
World War II, particularly in the United States. This
trend has given tliose less developed countries with
oil wealth a special importance in international pol-
itics, an importance far greater than their size or
military strength could provide. Although huge
quantities of coal are available — especially in the
United States, tlie Soviet Union, and China-
petroleum is now being used for expansion needs
and as a substitute for coal because petroleum and
natural gas are cleaner and contribute less to air pol-
lution. Whether the increasing cost of petroleum will
generate a reverse trend — that is, a move back to
coal — is not yet clear.

Iron, aluminum, and copper are the most impor-
tant metallic minerals used in industry. Others are
chromium, copper, zinc, lead, gold, and silver. Non-
metallic minerals such as nitrogen, calcium, potash.

pm-SlrAL AND CUITURAI. COMPONtNTS Or TOE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT SI

TABLE 3-2

World soil t)pes.

Soil

Group

Tih

Approximation

Location

Features

Tundra

Podioric

Inoeptisois

Spodosols and histosois

Higb tabtudea

High latitudes

Often poorty drained permafrost

Severely leached, addic. infertile, poorly decom-
posed organic trvalertat; lepuwea lime and tertitlier
if It is to be used

Gray-brown podzolic

AtTiaols

Middle latitudea

Slightly addic to basic, good humus accuniulation;
uselul H well-managed and (erblued

hed-yenow podzofic

Utisois

Subtropical latitudes

Severe leaching, kw m nutrients, less-ihan-moderate
fertility; requires careful management

latosofic

Oldsols

TropicBS tabtudea

Severe ieachif>g. low In tuiWeftis. less-ihan-moderate
leitlity; requires careful management

Chemczeraic

Afollisots

Middle lattudes

Good organic content, good nutrient supply, highly
fertile soils

Grumusot'C

Vartisots

Troptealand
subtropical latitudes

Moderate humus and nutrient supply, difficult to
manage because of wot dry cfimafic conditions

Oeserbe

Andisois

Subtropical arxj
middle labtudea

Low organic content but high nutrient content except
for nitrogen: lertilo sdls, possiWa salt-accumulation
problem when irrigated

AlIiMal

Enhjola

VanaWo

Deposited by water, good nutrient content, fertile

Bog

HistoMia

Vartayo

Poorty drained, poor material. Jifficuft to uw

Mountain

Mountain soiia

Vanapfo

Highly varied types

Noe 'n« coffwoo w n ee of e<« N>9 clusfoation tyiiems a vtfi] orey oi a ge'wreJcted tev«f A more oeta^ed oesofMn of tne Kri groups
a touTKi In ffw U S Dwartment of AgnoAure. Sods anOlUert Ytartoek cl AffioAn. fpM (WtiMn^ton. K Covetrmnl Prtntini} OfTca. 1&38)
A deuied O w c r ^po o n of ffa tornpreneraTrt •oi)<Uui^t»n lysiem is louna n u S De^annwnt cd Agncunure, Sod CoA$«rva»n Serrtca. Sof
Tuaiemf A Basic Sysfem of Sod CiiJ*«caU3n ter Wateng vta teterpreong seA Surveys, AgncOtur* Handbook no *x

and phcK^lmc ate used (at (eallUcc Salt. liuUduiR
stones, lime, sulfur, and sand arc other commonly
used nonmetallic minerals
Future discos-erics of significant mineral deposits
in pans of the svorld that arc currently nonproducing
may greatly affea our esnluation of the Indasirlal
potenttal of such areas At ptoent, iKmvs-ec, a crude
balance of power exists bctwven the United States
and the Sosnet Union Tlie povsvr and position of
these two nations In world society arc based on tlicit
effeaivc use of industrial and powx-r resources. Eu-
rope is a close third, but li Is somewhat more sail-
nerable because Its supplies of petroleum are limited
and It is politically fragmented Japan is clearly soil-
nerable Ixxausc its industrial siruaurc depends
hea\ ily on imported resources. I lowcsxT, llic centers
of power could one day shift, based on ness ly des’cl-
oped resources for Industrial produaion.

Use of die Emicoamcul

Tiuec coaslderations are of ihe utmost Importance
in our use of the cnvlronmeni Ftrst, our challenge Is
to as-old cnslronmenial deterioration at a time sshen
inacaslng popul.ition and c-xpccuilorts are placing
csxr-greater demands on It Tlsc problems of human
need, drought, famine, osxTgrazlng, and ensiron-
mental degradation in ihc Sahel Illustrate the tlin-
gerous cycle Nonuse is not vhe solution, nor is en-
s-lronmcntal destruaion VCliat is necessary Is
iniclUgcnt use of die environment, sshlch will nec-
essarily l>e costly, it will also l>e elusive, complicated

by the sarled nature of the environment, aliout s\ hich
wx‘ .still have so much to learn

Second, we must understand ihat the environ-
ment cannot be separated from tlic ailtvire of the
soclci)* diat uses it, and scKietics differ. Mothations,

BASIC CONCEPTS AND T i^

FIGURE 3-6

World soil regions. Soil regions
shown globally are highly general-
ized. The general correspondence
witli climate and vegetation regions
does allow identification of broad
environmental realms available for
human use.

ARCTIC OCEAN

Tropic of Cancot

PA am

140 * 130 ’

j I Oxisols

I I Ultisols

I I AHisols

I I Spodosols

I I Mollisols

n Aridisols
I I Inceptisols

.-.-1 Mountain soils

C>'

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

Eqialor j).

Tropic of Capricorn

v<&-.

^ "/fs'

attitudes, accumulated technology, and economic
and political organization — all of these cultural con-
siderations greatly affect the use of the environment.

Third, we must have long-range plans for using
the physical environment. Our attitudes and imme-
diate real concerns seldom encourage us to formu-
late plans tliat consider the needs of humankind for
more than two or three generations to come. This
limited temporal perspective is not surprising, but it

PHYSICAL AND CULTURAL

COMPOr^NTS OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT _ _

IS uUimately unacceptable if the envlroiunenl is to
support humanity far into the future (see box on pp
60 - 61 )

HUMANITY AND CULTURE

Humans are unique among living cieatures- they can
accumulate learned behavior and transmit it to suc-

cessive generations. These behavior patterns hus’e
helped to assure sustenance and preserve the social
order With this accumulation of learned behavior
(culture), humans make decisions and create life-
styles Some behavior is based on a society’s own
earlier experiences (inherited culture), other ac-
tions are based on the experiences of other societies
With which that one society has had coniaa (dif-
fused culture) The entire set of elements that

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

he impact of expanding world demand for space and increased pro-
•] ductivity is evident in three major environmental problems: the de-
JjL sertification of the Sahel; the clearing of tropical rain forests in Bra-
zil; and the creation of acid rain in the United States and Europe. Each
problem exerts a different pressure on the environment, but each stems
from human needs and wants.

The Sahel (“border”) is the semiarid southern margin of the African
Sahara. It includes pans of Senegal and Mauritania in West Africa and ex-
tends eastward to Ethiopia across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and the
Sudan. Rainfall is scant in the Sahel, but not too scant to prevent its occu-
pancy by humankind. The drier northern margin is used for grazing; the
wetter southern margin, for grazing and cultivation. A dangerous combina-
tion of drought and increased population pressure has caused the erosion
and destruction of grazing land and cropland, sometimes to the point of
rendering it useless. In some areas sand dunes have replaced
once-productive land — hence, the term desertification.

In areas where technological advances in agriculture are limited, in-
creased population pressure may induce the expansion of cultivation and
grazing into even more marginal areas. With the addition of recurring
drought, the pressure on land resources becomes unbearable. The land de-
teriorates, food is in short supply, and people starve or migrate to other
areas. The need for assistance is massive.

Brazil is a newly industrializing country with the potential of becom-
ing one of the world's industrial giants. Its development program includes
tlie building of highways in the vast but sparsely populated Amazon Basin
(40 percent of Brazil’s area; 4 percent of its population). The Transamazo-,
nian Highway is intended to lead to the establishment of farms, to the build-

identifies a society’s life-style — values, language, tech-
nology — also comprises its culture.

Another way of viewing culture is as a hierarchy of
traits, complexes, and realms. A culture trait is the
way a society deals with a single artifact — for exam-
ple, how people plant seeds. A culture complex is
a group of traits that are employed together in a
more general activity, such as agricultural prrduc-
tion (Figure 3-7). A culture realm is an area in
which most of the population adheres to numerous
culture complexes. Not all world regions have easily
definable culture realms. Some have transitio'" zones
benx^een realms, zones in which numerous distinct

cultures have met and clashed. Even within a single
political unit, cultural pluralism is frequendy evident
and adds to die difficulty of achieving national unity.

A culture hearth is a source area where a cul-
ture complex has become so well established and
advanced that its attributes are passed to future gen-
erations within and outside the immediate hearth
area. No single hearth exists, as was once thought.
Rather, several different hearths contribute to culture
and become the basis for advancement over much
larger areas.

Societies advance at uneven rates and along dif-
ferent paths. For example, the Bantu culture of west-

ing of power plants and industries, to forestry’ — and to Brazil’s secure occu
pauon of Its national space Widespread clearing of the Amazonian rain
forests IS lalong place — on environmental disaster m tlie making, according
to some ecologists If too much rain forest is cut down, the climate may be-
come nririner and drier and may destroy the sensitive tropical soils Brazil’s
challenge is to wisel>’ incorporate this \’ast, vital, but ecologically delicate
environmental realm into its aggressive program of national de\’elopment
The United States is a major industrial producer, the exemplification
of the developed world As such, it is a massive consumer of coal-powered
eneig)’ and a user of petroleum-based fuels for transportation. It is also a
major processor of meuls and a producer of chemical goods A by-product
of all this industrial aamty in the United States, as in Europe, is acid rain
Particles of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide that escape into the
atmosphere combine with water vapor lo form weak solutions of sulfuric
acid and nitric acid High-altiiude winds carry' the and solution over great
distances, but sooner or later it falls to earth as ram, fog. or snow

Acid ram is produced in the high-densit>’, urban-industrial regions of
the United States and Europe The ''dump'’ areas are often downwind and
may he higtvet-altuude forests artd lakes, such as the Aduondacks, which ate
popular recreation areas In some p^rts of the US and southeastern Canada,
so much acid ram has fallen that trees are d>ing and lakes can no longer
sustain fish Southern Nortvay seems to be Europe’s mam dump area
These three examples show that environmental misuse can occur at
any level of economic dev-elopmem societies m all phases of development
are vulnerable Around the world both the w’lU and the tvay to reduce envi-
ronmental destruction must be fostered if the larger populations of the fu-
ture are to be served well

em Africa advanced more rapidly than did that of the
Bushmen or Hottentots of southern Afnca Aitd the
culture complexes of food production in China and
Europe during the nineteenth century involved dif-
ferent traits. Cultural distinaiveness is not necessar-
ily a difference m level of achievement, it n»ay be
merely a difference m land

The cumulative nature of cultural evolution, its
chnamic quality, the unevenness with which it oc-
curs, and its different orientations all contnbute to
fundamental and intriguing variations among the
more than 5 billion people of our concemporaty
world

The Growth of Culture

Most of the major human accomplishments have oc-
curred dunng the past few thousand years, a short
Ume span when measured against the 2 million j’ears
or so that hominids (the family of humanlike beings)
have occupied the earth By the lime the long Pale-
olithic period, or Old Stone Age, ended approxi-
mately 10, (XX) years ago, people had spread over
most of the habitable portions of tlie earth, although
low population densities were prevalent. Cultural ac-
txjmplishmecws included the use of fire (perhaps ilte
most significant achievement), the making of stone

:■ v;!'', tlic of slicker'^ 'Pie Ncolitnic

vi, or Nc.v .-V.’!.', 'a ' i'lic!'! foHov.x'-.!, marlicd

ihi: o:'.o ’.’f liiioiaiikind’"- d'-r/ciop-

nicri'ial rev./hi!!-. ?:!•• « hvr j pt-rifx! of severai t'lou-
sr.vd Near- 'lie fd-Ui <:;*d'i!p hctv.vsjn hiinunkind and
the envuosanen; datnpcvl hut fundamentaUy,

a-^ new iueh!vdetiu> v;cve developed Mom pc<tpie
>!5ifted frotn direct loe of rlii- envir ainio!: bv hum-
inp. n>hinp. and iMihenn;; to indirer use of it
through v'.irinu'- or'icrns of

Early Primary- Culture Hcanlis

11k' Middle E'im contaiticd one o', tive 'vvorlir;- fotv-
r.ioM ctikare he.tnlts Knrnvn ;tj, the Fertile Cr-'-Morc.
xIk' reytson acaiaily ennsi'^ted of scvcr.d. fi-anh- d;.;’
were to each other {Vittwe 3-v. ro o-'-f-ot

The ctirliest domestication of plants seems to have
taken place in nearby hill lands; and by 10,000 years
ago agricultural villages appeared in the Mesojxtw-
inian lowlands associated with the Tigris and Eupli-
rates river valleys. From the fourth millennium ac
on, civilizations, city-states, and empires flourished in
tb.is area, .'\mong other major achievements these civ-
ilizations codified laws, used metals, used the wheel,
c.stablished mathematics, and contributed several of
the -world's great religions (Zoroastrianism, Jud.iisni,
Chrisrianiry, and Islam).

Anonher of Uie world’s great culture hc‘arilvs de-
veloped in the Indus Valley of Pakistan, where a ma-
ture ci\i!i/.ation e.xisted by 2500 B.c. Tlie exchange of
ic-e.''; arid materials w'ith Mesopotamia began early
arid continued over a long period, from 3000 n.c. lo
1000 Much of tliis exchange of culture was by w.iy
uf ancient Persia (now Iran). The nvo hearths may

PH^ICAiT and cultural components OF^E Himi^ ENVIRONMENT

ev’en have attracted migrant peoples from the same
areas The Indus Valley experienced repeated inva-
sions and migrauons of people from nonh’westem
and central Asia, with each new invasion bringing an
infusion of racial and cultural traits The Indus and
the adjacent Ganges Valley were the source area for
cultural traits that eventually spread throughout In-
dix Significant contributions of this culture h^rib
were made rn literature, architecture, metalnxirtang,
and cit>’ planning Philosophy evolved, which later
contnbuted to Hinduism, and the idea of living the
sinless and good life may have been transferred to
the Middle East, where it was Incorporated mto Ju-
daism and later into Christianitj’

The valley of the middle Yellow River, or Huang
He, and its tributaries served as a hearth for the ev-
olution of Chinese culture China undoubtedl}’ ben-
efited also from contacts with other areas, despite
great distances and physical barriers separating it
from other hearths Wheat and oxen, part of the
North China agricultural complex, may have had
Middle Eastern origins The nee, pigs, poultry, and
water buffalo found m China originated in Southeast
Asia Nevertheless, the cultural achievements accu-
mulated since early Neolithic times, as well as the
peculiarly Chinese traits maintained even after con-
tact with other areas, clearly suggest that an original
culture emanated from this hearth Crop domestica-
tion, village settlement, distinoive architecture, early
manufacturing, and metalworking were in evidence
at the time of the Shang d>Tiasty (1700 bc) Chinese
culture spread into South China and northeastward
into Manchuria, Korea, and, es'entually, Japan
Each of the early primary culture hearths appears
to have had mdependent accomplishments, yet each
was also a recipient of ideas and commodities from
other areas Nonetheless, each hearth was able to
maintain a distinct identity, which was transferred to
succeeding generauons or to invading or conquered
peoples who were eventually assimilated and accul-
lurated

Secondary Culture Hearths

Two areas in the Americas began to develop around
1500 Bc and served as culture hearths for major
civilizations The first was in northern Central Amer-
ica and southern Mexico (later the Mayan oviliza-
tiQn) and extended to cenuai Mexico (later the Aztec

avilizanon) This large Mesoamerican region sup-
ported a sizable sedentary population and was char-
acterized by cities, poliucal-celigious hierarchies, use
of numeric systems, and domesticauon of maize,
beans, and cotton

The Middle Andean area of Peru and Boliv'ia was
the site of the second American culture hearth The
Inca avilizauon advanced more slowly than its Mid-
dle American counterpart, but by the sixteenth cen-
tury' A.D It had developed irrigation, worked metals,
domesticated the white potato, established complex
political and social systems, set up a transportation
network, and built an empire

These culture hearths are considered secondary
because the resulting civilizations never evolved into
lasting culture realms The Latin American culture
realm as we non' know it clearly has mixed origins
indigenous American and European

Areas in West Africa, the Ethiopian highlands, and
central Asia were also secondary culture hearths
The Bantu language family seems to have had ns
source area in West Africa The Ethiopian highlands
were a secondary domestication center for wheat,
millets, and sorghums. Centra! Asia was a domestica-
tion center for grains, too, and n was certainly a trade
tome along which ideas and commodities were ex-
changed among major civilizations, such as those of
the Middle East and China.

Europe as a Culture Hearth

Europe was another important culture hearth, but it
must be viewed in a different perspective from that
used with the other hearths. First, it flow-ered much
later than the civilizations of the Middle East, south-
ern and eastern Asia, and Latin America. Second, the
Industnal Revolution associated with Europe af-
feaed vitnially all pans of the earth Many of our
contemporary' global problems have origins in the
confrontauon between modern European culture
and die traditional systems found elsewhere This
confrontation does not necessarily imply a deliberate
attempt to erase traditional ways of life. However, the
adjustments involved in transition to the European
system have frequently been difficult

Europe has a Mediterranean and Middle Eastern
heritage. Technology such as the wheel, plow agri-
culture, social concepts, and religions are of Middle
Eastern origin; friey spread through the Mmoan

Siwioa AND Cm-TUSArcOMPONENTror THE HUMAN ENVjRONmNT

Barbarian invasions disrupted the Roman Empire,
and several centuries of limited progress follovtcd,
known as the Dark Ages (the period from the fall of
the Roman Empire m a.d. 476 to approximately
1000) A long period of slow agricultural change then
stimulated the Renaissance and, indirealy, the Indus-
trial Revolution

By the thirteenth century, agricultural and manu-
factured goods were commonly traded aloi^ the

routes that crossed Europe In addition, the Crusades
(from the late eleventh century through the four-
teenth century) led to new contacts and stimulated
thought and interest in learning Between the fif-
teenth and the twentieth centuries, the Europeans
extended their influence and culture around the
world, spurred by internal competition and a new
interest m science, exploration, and trade They ex-
plored, traded, conquered, and claimed new' temto-

BASIC CONCEPTS ANDm^

ries in tlie nam6 of their homelands. Modern Euio-
pean states emerged with the capability of extending
their power over other areas. European people re-
settled in newly discovered lands of the Americas,
southern Africa, Australia, and New Zealand.

These activities have been aptly described as a
European explosion. J. E. Spencer and W. L. Tho-
mas argue that the European explosion has stimu-
lated a process of cultural convergence.^ Their
thesis is that isolated cultures are largely relics of the
past, widi assimilation or extinction as tlteir not-so-
different options, and tliat political organization,
food production, industrialization using inanimate
sources of power, and consumption are becoming
more similar. This blending of races and cultures is
almost certain to continue, with the technological
aspects of European culture being die most readily
accepted. Languages, religions, and attitudes adjust
more slowly and frequently become die sources of
friction from which conflicts arise.

This argument does not assert that the contribu-
tions of traditional cultures will be discarded or that
they will totally disappear. Rather, large and viable
culture complexes will be modified by cultural
blending. Japan provides a good example of how
European traits can be accepted in modified form.
Neither does the argument for convergence assert
diat regional disparities in economic, social, and bi-
ological conditions will cease. Indeed, the world
bears out the old axiom that “the rich get richer and
the poor get poorer.” Acceptance of the European
way of doing things means that particular areas will
have unique and great value because of tlieir location
and their material and human resources; other areas
will not be so favored. Even in the United States
regional disparity has long been a fact of life and is
a continuing problem, as evidenced in the relative
poverty of Appalachia.

Some people look at the world and see rich and
superindustrial powers continuing to widen the gap
between the haves and the have-nots. Among the
underdeveloped nations, these people recognize a
few countries that are progressing but see most fall-
ing further behind as tlieir populations continue to
grow at unprecedented rates. Most certainly, re-
gional disparity will remain a problem. Conditions
inherent in modern political and economic
systems — and in human nature — preclude simple
solutions to these problems of adjustment.

Special Elements of Culture

Language Language is a set of meanings given to
various sounds used in common by a number of
people; it is the basic means by which culture is
transferred from one generation to the next. The
relative isolation in which societies evolved led to
the formation of a great number of languages, fre-
quently with common origins but without mutual
intelligibility.

Linguistic differences may function as barriers to
the exchange of ideas, the acceptance of common
goals, or tlie achievement of national unity and alle-
giance. Most members of most societies are not bi-
lingual and do not speak the language of neighbor-
ing societies if it is different from their own.
Sometimes linguistic differences are overcome
dirough a lingua franca, a language that is used over
a wide area for commercial or political purposes by
people with different mother tongues. Swahili is the
lingua franca of eastern Africa; English, of India; and
Urdu, of Pakistan.

In many countries that acquired their indepen-
dence after World War II, the political leadership has
found achievement of national unity and stability dif-
ficult. Internal problems and conflict frequently
stem, in part, from cultural differences, of which lin-
guistic variation is often one. Tlie situation in East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (now
Pakistan) is a case in point. From 1947 to 1972 these
tw'o regions functioned as one political unit. Political
leaders sought to promote a common culture and
common goals. They deemed a single national lan-
guage necessaiy, even tliough several mother
tongues were in use. Bengali, the language of East
Pakistan, was derived centuries ago from Sanskrit; it
provided East Pakistanis with a unifying cultural ele-
ment. West Pakistan, on the other hand, contained a
number of languages: Baluchi, Pashto, Punjabi, Sin-
dhi, and Urdu, the lingua franca. Tlie problem result-
ing from diis linguistic diversity was just one of the
many tliat eventually led to ^e establishment of
Bangladesh as a separate and independent state. Lack
of a common language witliin a country is a factor in
pluralistic societies, and tliat pluralism frequently
produces political instability or hinders develop-
ment. Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland are note-
worthy' because they have partially overcome the
problem of linguistic pluralism.

PHYSICAL AND CULTU^ COMPONENTS OF THE HOMAN ENYiRONNlbo'

Religion Religions have their origin in concern
for comprehension and security, concerns that seem
as old as humankind Animism, the worship of natu-
ral objects believed to have souls or spirits, ^"as
among the earliest forms of religion It includes rit-
uals and sacrifices to appease or pacifj' spirits, but u
usually lacks complex organization Most animistic
religions ^ere probabl)’ localized, certainly, the few
that have survived are found among small, isolated
culture groups. The more important contemporary
religions are codified, organized m hierardncal fash-
ion, and institutionalized to assure the transfer of
basic principles and beliefs to other people, includ-
ing following generations
Modem religions can be classified as either ethnic
or universalizing Ethnic religions originate in a par-
ticular area and involve people with common cus-
toms. language, and social vnews. Examples of etlinlc
religions are Shintoism (m Japan), Judaism, and Hin-
duism (in India) Universalizing religions are those
considered b)' their adherents to be appropri-
ate— indeed. desirable — for all humankind Bud-
dhism, Chrlstianic>’, and Islam all had ethnic origim
but have become universal over the centuries, is
they lost their association with a single etlmic group
Religions spread from one people to another
through proseljiizing, not only by missionaries but
also by traders, migrants, and the military- Prosely-
tizing is often considered a responsibility' of those
who praaice one of the universalizing religions
Religious ideology has had a great Impaa on civ-
ilization. Sacred structures contribute to the mor-
phology', or form and structure, of rural and urban
landscapes. Centuries ago the spread of citrus-
growing throughout the Mediterranean lands was di-
realy related to certain Jewish observances in which
citrus was required for the Feast of Booths Religious
food restriaions account for the absence of swme In
the agricultural systems of Jew’ish and Muslim peo-
ples in the Middle East. The Hindu taboo on meat
eating, a response to respect for life, has the opposite
effect- an overabundance of cattle that require space
and feed while returning only limited material ben-
efits (manure, milk, or draft power). In the United
States the economic impact of religion is seen in
taxation policies (organized churches are usually ex-
empt from taxation), institutional ownership of land
and resources, work taboos on specified days (blue
laws), and attitudes tow’ard materialism and work

One implied funaion of religion is the promotion
of culniral norms. The results may be positive soci-
eties do benefit from the stability that cohesiveness
and unity of purpose bring Unfortunately, conflict
also arises frequently from differences that have re-
ligious underpinnings, such differences may evoke
intolerance, suppression of minorities, or incompat-
ibility' among different peoples. Examples include
warfiire between Catholics and Protestants m North-
ern Ireland, the panition of the Indian subcontinent
in 1947 as a response to differences between Hindus
and Muslims, and the Crusades of the Middle Ages, m
which Christians attempted to wxest the Holy Land
from Islamic rule

Political Ideology Political ideologies also have
major implicatioas for socieu'il unity, stability, and the
use of hnd and resources Political ideologies, Ivow-
ever, need not be common to tlie majority of a pop-
ulation People may be apathetic, or iliey may be
powerless to resist the imposition of a system of
rules and decision making Oligarchies (exercising
control by small groups) or, m some instances, dic-
tators have been guided by a particular philosophy
and. by imposition, have made their thinking basic to
the funaioning of society

Most modem governments assume some respon-
sibility for the well-being of the people m their state
Some socialist governments assume complete con-
trol over the allocation of resources, the inve,stment
of capital, and even live use of labor, individual de-
cision making is quite limited under these circum-
stances. in otlier societies governments assume re-
spoasibility for providing an environment m which
individuals or corporations may own and decide on
the use of resources

National and economic development programs
reflea differences m political systems. Socialistic
governments take an approach that is different from
that of capitalistic countries Tliese differences are
treated in the chapters on Anglo-America, the Soviet
Union, India, and China.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Political organizations are control mecliantsms that
spring from the common bonds of a few families or
of millions of people. The promotion of specified

B^IC CONCEPT?7g j^

behavior patterns and institutions is deemed neces-
saiy to stimulate tiiose common bonds. The respon-
sibilities of political organizations include resolution
of conflicts bem^een and within societies and control
o\'er tlie distribution, allocation, and use of re-
sources. The ability to execute tltese functions in a
satisfactoty^ manner depends not only on those in
autlrorit}' and on the political system used but also on
die unit}', support, or passivity of die people.

Bands and Tribes

The band is the simplest and formerl}' the mo.st com-
mon political organization; it has alway's existed. A
band usually consists of no more than a few dozen
people who occupt' a loosely defined territoiy within
which game, fish, insects, and vegetable matter are
gadiered Tlie community functions on a cooperative
basis: no individual can direct group activity for long
without voluntan’ cooperation. There are neidier ex-
clusive rights to resources and territor}' nor concen-
tration of power in the hands of a specified number
of persons. Groups of this soit are aptly called shar-
ing societies. Probabl}’ no more than 100,000 mem-

bers of sharing societies remain, scattered over
mote and isolated pans of the earth (Figure 3-91
Contact between these societies and more advanV
groups leads to extinction of the former. Of the fe*^
groups that have sur\dved, the Bushmen of the Kah
hari, the Motilon of Venezuela, and the Jivaro of Ec-
uador are examples.

Increases in population density and advances in
technologic (agricultural production) require a more
specific allocation of resources and space. A focus of
autliority and ranking of position evolve in which
community structure is based on kinship; elders or
heads of extended families lead and direct tribal ac-
tivity. Hundreds, or even thousands, of people may
be included in such a kinship-structured tribe
Boundaries may be either vaguely or specifically de-
fined, depending on external pressures, trespass by
neighbors, or colonial imposition. The Ibo of Nigeria
are an ethnically related group that was subdivided,
prior to European penetration of Africa, into hun-
dreds of patrilineal clans or lineages, each with a
specific ten itor}'. The Ibo are just one of the many
tribal groups that Nigeria must unify in its effon to
build a modern state.

FIGURE 3-9

A family unit belonging to tlie
Panare Indian tribe in the Gui-
ana Highland of Venezuela.
Small traditional societies reside in
the low-densiw tropical areas of tlie
world. A bow-and-spear technolog}'
characterizes this group.

PtrVSlCAL AND CUUmAL CQNiPQNENTS OF THE HUMAN ENVmONMENT

Territorial States

With an increase in population, size of lerriioty
needed, and economic specialization, a more formal
organization becomes necessary’ The focus of power
becomes more distinct, auihorit)- js channeled
through a larger hierarchy, and society’ becomes
more straufied The importance of kinship as a me-
dium for organization disappears The sate emerges
as a speafically defined territory, occupied by a peo-
pie nith a distinct bond to the area (sense of terri-
tory’) It IS organized politically, if not economically,
and It controls the entire territory’ and all of the peo-
ple in It Thus, the state includes territory, people,
and an organizational system In this situation the
terniory is the state, and the people are the compo-
nents, rvhereas In lesser forms of political organiza-
tion the society is the state, and the territory is of
secondary importance in terms of ideniiry
City-states were among the earliest of states, but
expansion based on conquest led to the formation of
empires Premdustnal states emerged in the Meso-
potamian. Indus, and Nile t-alleys, in ancient China,
and probably in sub-Saharan Africa The Inca and
Anec cndlizations of the Americas provide more re-
cent examples. The difficulties in controlling diverse
peoples t\nh i-aried languages, religions, and econ-
omies were frequently beytjnd the capabilities of
early governments Traditional transponation sys-
tems, of course, further handicapped control Dis-
ruption and breakup of such states were frequent
The evolution from inbes lo modem stales w-as a
long, slow process m Europe The emergence of En-
gland, France, Norway, and Russia, among other
states, during the later Middle Ages signified that lo-
cal differences in language, religion, and feudal or-
ganization had been overcome sufficiently lo permit
territories to be combined, but not on a continent-
wide basis. The aatioa-state was to become die
model for much of the world.

The modem state is a produa of the Industrial
Revolution The increasing complexity of industrial
societies entails more complex organizations for
maintaining order, assuring communication, provid-
ing protection, and promoting the common culture.
Inaeased mteraaion and interdependence of indi-
I’lduals also lead to allegiances to the larger organi-
zation rather than to kin or individuals Nationalism
is one result of industrialization and urbanization of

society Intense loyalty’, long direaed to a state orga-
nization occupying a specified territory, leads to the
formation of a nation-state

Nadon-States

The nation sute and its territory are occupied by a
people who have a high degree of cohesiveness,
common goals, and a culture that is transferred from
generation to generation by a common language and
wJio maintain a loyalty' to ^e Jat^r political ot^ni-
zation An emotional attachment is experienced that
IS not hindered by linguistic, ethnic, racial, or reli-
gious distmaions Such conditions are most difficult
to acliiev'e, but Japan presents an excellent example,
with its high lev’el of national unity Yugoslavia rep-
resents the other extreme, a multinational state con-
sisimg of several national groups. Although the
naijon-.siate may be recognized as desirable from the
standpoint of achieving stability, few states exist with-
out traits that detraa from complete nauonal unityr or
allegiance

Problems of State Development

The existence of the modern state should not be
taken to mean that states evolved along a single, well-
defined path Indeed, strong tribal tendencies and
even remnant band societies still exist within the
boundaries and organizational structure of modern
states (Figure 3-10) Internal confrontation between
tribal loyalues and modern states is one of the basic
problems of the dev’eloping world, even though po-
litical leaders strive to enhance the stability' and via-
bility of the modem state in the world community of
nations Tribalism in conflia w’lth modem state struc-
ture IS not a sign of inherent backw’ardness but rather
the outgrowth of imposition of state organization on
an existing tribal political struaure or across existing
tribal boundaries.

Africa provides perhaps the most appropriate ex-
amples. When the new’ African states acquired their
independence, they’ quickly’ became aware, some-
times by inoleni experience, of the difficulty’ in forg-
ing stable political units from a dual heritage. On the
one hand were “Europeanization," modernization,
and lemional definition from the colonial era, on
the other, the indigenous heritage of a great variety

BASIC CONCEPTSAM^j ^

Modern state boundary j j Band territory

precisely defined indefinitely bounded

FIGUKE 3-10

Contemporary political systems. Tribal and band identic
weakens and disappears as tire modern state develops and gams
strength. The process of modern state development mar- recimre
a transition period of many generations before it is completed

of tribal groups witli poorly defined territorial
boundaries, linguistic differences, and variations in
cultural achievement and acculturation under the
Europeans. We should not hat'e been surprised by
the civil strife and secessionist attempts witltin Zaire
during die 1960s or the Ibo attempt to secede from
Nigeria and form dieir ovvti state, Biafra, also during
the 1960s. More currently, Chad, Uganda, and Angola
face similar problems.

We must guard against the notion that instability
or divisiveness is characteristic only of recently in-
dependent and developing nations. Racial antago-
nism, for example, has been a problem in Malaysia,
Uganda, Peru, and the United States. A strong culture
group that extends control over a weaker group
rarely makes social, econom.ic, or political equaliza-
tion a priority. Instead, it may form a stratified societi'
and impose a lower order or position on the W'eaker
members, using physical traits as a mediod of iden-
tification. Sometimes it is formal!)' aided by agencies
and laws of die state, such as die poliq^ of apardieid
in South Africa. When formerly subsenient popula-

tions rule newly independent states, reverse discrim-
ination may be the charge. This reversal of roles has
been a stimulus for the migration of Asians out of
East Africa in recent years.

The implicit suggestion that uniformity of religion
ensures the unity necessary for political stability
should also be avoided. Religious unity did lead to
die creation of Pakistan in 1947. However, social and
economic differences, combined with the physical
ft- agmentadon of die state’s territory, ultimately led to
the disintegration of Pakistan and the formation of
Bangladesh in 1972.

Multinational Alliances

Tlie formation of multinational alliances among
states for the promotion of common goals is not a
recent phenomenon. Military alliances have been
most common, usually widi the objective of provid-
ing mutual aid and protection in the event of militap'
attack from a specified source. A contemporary ex-
ample is die Nordi Atlantic Treaty Organization,
which was founded in 1949.

Alliances have also formed around other con-
cerns. European countries diat used to be competi-
tive and independent are now trying interdepen-
dence and cooperadon as a means of adiieving
progress. The motivation for the European Eco-
nomic Community (Common Market) W'as a shared
concern for die economic growth of Western Eu-
rope. The goal of die tw^elve nations that comprise
the Common Market is economic integration; spe-
cific programs and policies have been created to as-
sure economic development and prosperity for all of
the member nations. The assumption is that one
large economic unit can be more effective tlian nu-
merous small ones. Similarly, die Soviet Union and
the Eastern European countries have formed the
AX'arsaw Pact, a military^ alliance, and die Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, an economic union.
The Organization of African Unity was formed in
1963 to promote self-government and progress
throughout Africa. Nonedieless, an important ques-
tion remains: Can the national interests of individual
countries be best met through the framework of
large economic units or through separate economic
arrangements?

PHYSICAL AND CULTURAL COMPONENTS OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY parel Textile manufacturing and apparel manufac-

turing are both secondary activities.

Economic acuvities are those in which human beings Economic activities in which a service is per-

engage to acquire food and satisfy other v.-ants These formed are classified as tertiary acU^ty (Figure

are the most basic of all activities and are found 3-11) Wholesaling and retailing are tertiary aaivi-

wherever there are people Economic activity is di- lies hy which primary and secondary products are

vided into sectors. Primary actlWty involves the di- made available to consumers Other tertiary aaivities

rect harvesting of the earth's resources. Fishing off include governmental, banking, educational, medl-

the coast of Peru, pumping oil from 'wells m Ubya, cal, and legil services, as well as journalism and the

extracung iron ore from mines in Minnesota, and arts

growing wheat m China are all examples of primary The service economy of highly developed coun-

produaion The commodities that result from these tries has become so large and complex that a fourth

acuvities acquire a v’alue from tlie effort required in seaor — focusing on quatemaryactivity — issome-

production and from consumer demand. times included Institutions and corporations that

The processing of commodities is classified as provide information are in the quaternary seaor.
secondary activity In this seaor Items are m- Transportation is a special kind of economic ac-

creased In \alue by changing their form to enhance nvit>' that is vital, m highly developed form, to mod-

iheir usefulness Thus, a primary commodity such as em commercial societies An efficient transportation

cotton Is processed into fabric or one of numerous $}5tem reduces the significance of distance and

other products. Fabric is cut and assembled as ap- greatly inaeases the feasibility’ of exchanging re-

nGURE3-ll

An early morning floadng market outside Bangkok, ThaUand. Food imrknine systems
are teniary economic activities nwKeung systems

BASIC CONCEPTSAmT^ ^

sources and goods. A poorly developed transporta-
tion system, on the other hand, may reduce exchange
and require self-sufficienc\'. The extent of transpor-
tation development in whatever form (automobiles,
airplanes, trains, ships, or pipelines) reveals much
about an area’s economic organization and produc-
tion system.

Ever)' economic activity, including transportation,
involves the creation of wealth. The value of primar)'
commodities increases as die)' are transported to lo-
cations where they are needed (place utility). Value
is also added by processing (form utility). Each move
toward a market or an additional manufacturing
stage adds more value to the items involv'ed, al-
though value does not increase equally widi each
step in die process. The prirnan' sector does not
usually produce great wealth for the society’ at large;
most of die final value of a product comes from sec-
ondar)', tertian', and transportation activities.

Economic Organization and
Modernization

Numerous factors contribute to the specific manner
in which economic activity’ is organized and accom-
plished. First, many facets of our physical -^'orld affect
our decisions regarding economic activity'. Second,
the environment may be used in v'arious ways, de-
pending on w'hat technology is available. Third, many
other economic, social, and political conditions in-
fluence our decisions. For example, location relative
to existing markets— degree of accessibility’ — may
encourage or preclude some forms of production.
Furthermore, long-established systems of land ten-
ure may maintain an uneven allocation of the land
resource. In addition, governments aid economic
production by assuring the proper infrastructure (in-
cluding credit systems, roads, and education) or
hinder it by suppressing attempts to make necessary'
adjustments in the economic system (e.g., die re-
moval of political or economic trade restrictions or
the promotion of agrarian reform). Traditions and
attitudes have also worked as both positive and neg-
ative forces in the functioning of economies.

Two extremes of economic organization are rec-
ognized: the traditional system and the modern com-
mercial system (Figure 3-12). In the traditional
subsistence economy a family or small band en-
gages in both die production and the limited pro-

cessing required for local consumption. Groun
members function as producers, processors, and
consumers of their own commodities. Self-
sufficiency and sharing are the distinctive features
Other than the Bushmen of Africa and the Campa of
Peru, true subsistence societies are almost nonexis-
tent today. Few people are so isolated that they do
not engage in some kind of exchange, even if only
occasionally.

No country has a purely subsistence economy.
Even in a country that is obviously less developed
some people engage in subsistence aaivity, some
produce and exchange on a reciprocal or barter ba-
sis, and others are clearly in an exchange or money
economy. Countries form a continuum between the
extremes of a traditional subsistence economy and a
modem commercial economy. Although the pre-
cise location of a given country' on the continuum is
difficult to pinpoint, certain economic characteristics
indicate the level of modernization attained.

Employment by Sector One indicator of mod-
ernization is the distribution of the labor force
among the sectors of economic activity. In tradition-
ally oriented countries tlie majority' of the labor
force — as much as 80 percent in many African
countries — is engaged in primary' production, espe-
cially agriculture. A society' tliat is restricted largely to
the primary' activities generally has limited wealdt; in
other words, per capita gross national produa for
traditional economies is low. (Exceptions like oil-
rich Kuwait come to mind, of course.)

In modernized economies a high proportion of
the labor force is employed in secondary and terdary’
actix’ities. The primary' sector may involve less than
10 percent of the labor force when extreme levels of
industrialization and tertiary' activities are reached.
Concentration in processing and sendees means
greater national income and has implications for the
internal distribution and activity' of the population.
Urbanization is a corollary' to economic develop-
ment.

Per Capita Energy Consumption In traditional
societies production input is largely labor applied to
land — that is, agriculture. Modernized societies sub-
stitute capital for labor; industry is automated and
agriculture is mechanized. This shift to capital-
intensive production is based on the use of inam-

CULTURAL COMPONCNTS TttE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

nGURE3-12

Economic or;;anlz3tlon. Evotu
uon from a traditional societ) Into a
modem soaw requires «es'eral
fundimcncal changes The affected
tnsututioos include the basis of ex
change, settlement panems. tcchnol
cp utilization, po^'er deselopmcnt.
and tade and ptoductiun ss-stetns

Subsistence

Rectptocsl

Peasant

Exchange

Commodify sfianng

Barter

Minor exchange

Full comrnerciat

No urban too

tor capital

Major urban

5 Simpte technology

Village settlement

development

3 Animate power

pattern

Complex

2 (muscle)

Mixed iraditionai

technology

Localized economy

and modem

Inanimate power

tethnolog'es

Regional

Limited regional

spedafization

specialization

1 Gatnenrg

Commercial

« Nomadtcherding

agncuHure

S. Shilling agncuhure

Commercia' fishing

^ Labor-intensive

Ccmmerciat grazing

0 subsistence

Commercial torestry

5 agneutture

Manutaaunng and

•0

commerce

mate po^cr sources Therefore, per oplta cneri:>’
consumpiion is another good indicator of the extent
of modernization

Division of Ubor and Regional Specialization
Djtision of labor reaches a high leteJ in modem
countries It w es'ident at local levels, wlicrc menv
bers of a communin’ perform a variei>’ of tasks. With
increased modernization ft is also evident at the re-
gional level Regional specialization exists nhen
atexs produce goods sstth svltlch thv.7 have a panic-
ufar advantage or which arc not produced elsewlterc
and then contribute their specialized produaion to
the larger economic svsicm Vtlicn division of labor
and regional specialization occur nationally, ihcj- arc
another good indicator of modernization

Regtoivs that are engaged in .specialized produc-
tion illustrate the principle of comparative advan-
tage Comparative advantage may stem from climate,
soils, labor, power, capjwl and enterprise, traaspor-
tation, institutional structure, or some combination
of these faaors VCluievcr the advantage, the area
gains by specializing fn one product and trading for
other commodities that it needs Occasionally an
area produces goods with wliich it has no distina
advantage but may have the least disadv'amagc. ^Tieat
produaion In the Great Plains of Uie United States
illustrates this point. Wheat produaion becomes

economically fca.slble In die Great Plains when other
areas tlvit could provide wheal more efficiently
choose not 10 do so because altemathe possibilities
>ield a higlier return

Urban Corclands The presence of a multip[c<it>’
corcland is a fourth Indicator of modcmiation Ef-
ficiency is increased and savings are reafizetl when
the secondary- and tertiary- aaivlties that dominate
modem soclet>’ arc close to each otiicr; hence, ilie
bisls for cUlcj^ "rtie United States and Canada, Euro-
pean countries, die Soviet Union, and Japan all have
urban-industrial corelands Numerous neighlxir-
Ing cities, a lilgh population density, a high propor-
tion of the nation's manufaaunng output, and high
standards of living charaaenze such corelands
Corelands .also fiinaiort as national educational, fi-
nancial, political, and cultural centers. A disiinaive
feature Is the liigh level of commercial and social
fntcraction among die urban centers that make up
the corcland Less-modernized countries often liave
only one malor city, tlic “primate city," which func-
tions xs the corcland and attains a size dtspropor-
tlonate to other urban centers.

Urban-industrial corelands have penpiieraJ eco-
nomic regions, called extended hinterlands, which
do not exlilblt features of a coreland but W'lticii do
have clear funalonal tics to it. Tlie extended iiimer-

land niav be located entirely within tlic country of
tlie corekmd, or it may include other regions of the
world.

Trade Relationsliips

The traditional trade relationship between corelands
and their outh'ing regions re\’eals the difierences be-
tween core and pcripheiy and is similar to colonial
trade relationships Corelands are suppliers m;ut-
ufactured goods. Internal exch-ange aiui trade with
other corelarids of the world are at high levels. Some
manufactured goods tlou tri less indusu'iali/.ed hin-
terlands. but the volume is far smaller becau.sc ol
limited commercial market dex'elopmciti. Tlie hin-
terlands are suppliers of rau materials, energt' luels.
rutd food products lor the corclands. which often
cannot supply all of their high, ix'r capita needs. Fig-
ure 3-13 iilu.strates the trade relatit)nship between
rural areas that specialize in primaty production and.
urban rogion.s that specialize in secondaiy anti ter-
tiaiy activities. The relatutnshij'' is the same, whether
liie exchange is domestic or iniernautmal.

Such rclation.ships often favor urban-industrial
core.s — and therein lies a problem Bec.iu.se the
value of primaty goods does iK)t generalh iuv'rease
as rapidly a.s that of secondaiy goods, ihe iikelihoot!
of regional income di.sparity is great. And if the e.x-
change is between countries, balance-of-jraMnent
problems may result for the less det eUipetl regions
Countries that supph- primaiy goods to indusin-
alized regions outside their own terruorv .il.so face
competition, price fluctuations, or i:)tdiiica! prc'-sures
over which they can exert little Cvmtrol. Funliermiire.
these countries often have few cusiomers sn depemi
heavily on two or three comntodiiies for most of
their exchange revenues. They face severe economic
problems if trade is disrupted. I'hus, a dependcni
relationship may be created for the hinterland coun-
tries, which may handicai? their development etfcris.

More-traditional countries often suOer lri>m the
problem of a dual economy. One pan of the econ-
omy concentrates on the commercial pnxluoion of
primaty^ goods, many of which may flow to an exter-
nal coreland. The other part of the econonty has a
traditional structure — and most of the population.
Economic dualism is commonly reflected in distinct
regional differences and in shaip differences be-

BASIC CONCEPTSAlirtT^

f.lodemized country or blocks of countries with
distinct urban-industrial corelands

Traditional country or countries without
multiciiy urban-industrial corelands

\ Typo 1. High volume. Diversified Irade
including primary and secondary goods

Type 2. Moderate volume. Primary goods (food,
industrial raw materials, and mineral fuels) to
urban corelands. Reverse How ol secondary
goods

Type 3. Minimal or nonexistent trade

ncicur. y-15

Intcniational trade tlow types. Pcirolcum account' for a
l.iigv proporiiun of iincnurkmal irade, retrolaim How is pri-
rn.tnh rfuni (r.idirional c(Hintne.s to urb.in‘indu,strial enrebnek

twuen url'iai’t and rural areas; it can contribute to
internal .social and political disunity.

■!'raditiv)n;il trade relationships are changing, par-
iicuiarly in les,s atlranced countries that have pro-
greswd u> the jnoint of estal'tlishing a manufacturing
have. .X’ewly industrializing countries — such tis Bra-
zil, Ktirea, or Taiwait — -have become significant e.v-
porters of nvanulactured goods, sometimes witli the
encouragement c>f multinational corj:)oration.s that
are based in the corelands of the developed world.
Tin's .vlnTt in traditional trade flow's is an attribute ofa
comi)Iex global economy, in which high levels of
internaiiontil trade and investment become increas-
ingly important to a wider array of countrie;;.

SUMiiAKV: A COMPLEX
BUT CRITICAL
relationship

Every human population, at all tiroes, has needed to evaluate the economic
potential of its inhabited area, to organize its life about its natural en'rtron-
ment in terms of the <ifilU available to it and the values which it accepted In
the cultural mise en valeur [exploitation) of the environment, a deformation
of the pristine, or prehuman, landscape has been initiated that has increased
with the length of occupation, growth in population, and addition of skills
Wherever men live, they have operated to alter the aspect of the earth, both
animate and Inanimate, be it to their boon or bane ^

In our study ot various world regions we will examine Euohet the re-
lationship of people and environment It will become evident that some
peoples have attained a high level of well-being whereas others experience
deprivation and lack the basic necessities of life. We do not mean to suggest
that all IS well with modernized soaeties or to point out the woes of less
progressive countries Although the latter are charaaerized by poverty,
health problems, dual economies, and regional disparities, the former have
formidable problems, too. The hi^ level of per capita consumption in
modernized soaeties requires immense quaniiues of material and powr
resources, so much that jt is almost frightening to think of modern socierj’
as a model for the remainder of the world In addition, space, quality Imng,
and suitable air and water are being demanded just when life-styles are
placing increased pressure on our total environment

This chapter has Bacused on physical environments and the cultural systems
by which people maintain their relationships with those environments Carl
O Sauer has addressed several important points relative to this topic

aad rain

evapotranspiration rate

alluvium

fossil fuel

average annual precipitation

frost-free period

band

inherited culture

calcification

landscape modification

climate

laierization

climatic classification

loess

cultural convergence

modem commercial economy

culture complex

multinational alliance

culture hearth

nation-state

culture realm

natural vegetation

culture trait

podzohzation

desertification

primary activity

diffused culture

quaternary aaivity

dual economy

regional disparity

ecosystem

regional specialization

European explosion

secondary aaivity

ENDNOTES

tertian' activity

traditional subsistence economy

trilDC

urban-industrial coreland

1 In his novel Ccnteimia! (New York: Random House, 1974), James A.
Michener vividly descrilies the occupying of the western Great Plains
and the problems that farmers faced when they attempted to use the
land, John Steinbeck’s novel The Grapes of Wrath (New York; Viking
Press, 1939) portrays what happened to the larmers of the we,stern Great
Plains during the depressioii and drought years of the 1930s.

2 I. H. Spencer and W I- Thomas, hnrodiicUig Cultural Geography (New
York: John Vi'iley Sons, 19 3). 1H5-205.

3 Carl O. Sauer, “The Agency of Man on the Earth,’’ in Reacliugs in Cul-
tural Geography, eds. Philip 1.. Wagner and Mar\’in W, Mikesell (Chicago;
University of Chicago lYcss. 1962). 539.

RICH COUNTRIES
AND POOR
COUNTRIES: AN
OVERVIEW

THE ’RIDENING GAP
MEASUREMENTS OF T^T^UTI!

CHARACTERISTICS OF RICH REGIONS
AND POOR REGIONS

THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT

ver the past diirty years the gap between
1^, rich countries and poor countries has in-
creased, and the chances are good that it
wili widen even more. Statistical data illustrate some
of the general dimensions of this disparity.

THE WIDENING GAP

Treads ia Per Capita GNP

Per capita gross national product (GNP) is widely
considered to be one of the best indicators of eco-
nomic well-being.^ Since tlie end of World War II,
almost every' country has shown an increase in per
capita GNP. Because of inflation, however, that gain
has not resulted in greater purchasing power in
many cases, and effective buying pcwer has even
decreased in some nations.

Figure 4- 1 graphically demonstrates the increas-
ing disparity betv'een selected rich countries and
poor countries. Ethiopia, representative of many
African nations, has increased its per capita GNP at an
average annual rate of less than 1 percent over the
past twenty years. In fact, during the 1980s Ethiopia’s
GNP actually decreased somewhat. India is only
slightly better off, with an average increase of about
1.7 percent per year. These represent some of the
world’s poorest countries; for them even a 3 percent
increase per year means only a few dollars more. In
contrast, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the
United States have enjoyed average yearly increases
of 6 to 10 percent. In absolute numbers the gains of
the rich nations are startling in comparison with
those of the poorer nations.

This growing difference is also evident when we
compute a country^’s per capita GNP as a percentage
of the per capita GNP of the United States (Table
4-1); the lower the percentage, the greater the ex-
isting GNP gap. We have used the United States as a
base measure because of its image as a rich country,
but we could just as well have used Japan or a
wealthy European country. The countries included
in Table 4- 1 were selected to represent the several
world regions and differing development experi-
ences.

First, we should note that most countries in what
we think of as the well-off world decreased the gap
between their GNP and that of the United States dur-

ing the seventeen-year period; that is, their percent-
age of the U.S. GNP increased from 1968 to 1935
Japan, most Western European countries, Australia
and the USSR show an improved status. The notable
exceptions in Europe are Poland and Hungaty, Most
countries of the poor world, however, show an in-
creasing gap or, at best, minuscule improvement.
This group includes the Latin American countries
and most of the countries in Africa and Asia.

Two types of countries tliat were once clearly in
tlie poor group show marked improvement in these
statistics. The first type is the rich oil exporters. Saudi
Arabia illustrates well the ability of such countries to
narrow the gap. The second type is the newly indus-
trializing countries (NICs), represented in Table 4-i
by Brazil tint! South Korea. Again, the countries in-
cluded in the table are only examples of varied de-
velopment experiences, but we should not forget the
relative positions identified here and in Figure A in
the box in chapter 1 (p. 15).

Trends in Agricultural Production

Part of the explanation for the widening gap beween
rich countries and poor countries lies in different
levels of agricultural productivity. Of the world’s
three principal cereals the trend in yields per unit of
land area is demonstrated in Figure 4-2. These three
crops are widely cultivated and represent an impor-
tant element in the diet of most of the w'orld’s peo-
ple. A three-year moving average was used to calcu-
late the data depicted in the graphs; it reduces the
effects of weather and show's broad trends more
clearly'. Figure 4- 2a suggests great variability in
wheat yields, reflecting a variety of factors. In the
United States and Australia producdon per areal unit
is low' because w'heat is grow'n mainly in dty lands
that are not well suited for high yields. However,
mechanization permits farmers to cultivate large ar-
eas, so production is feasible even though yield pet
unit is low'. In France and Hungary' w'heat is raised
under humid climatic conditions that favor high
yields. In the jjoor nations production is not mech-
anized, but W'heat is generally grow'n in areas tliat are
more humid than the w'heat-growing regions of the
United States or Australia.

The contrast between rich countries and poor
countries is more striking w'hen we look at die yields

RICH COUNTRIES AND POOR COUNTRIES AN OVERVIEW

FIGURE 4-1

Per capita gross national prod-
uct in U.S. dollars for selected
(a) rich countries and (b) poor
countries. Most of the world’s
countnes haw increasing per capita
GNPs The increase for rich coun-
tries, however, is much greater than
It IS for poor nauons (From Arthur
S Banks, comp , Cross Polity Time
Senes Data [C^bndge, MA MIT
Press, 1971], Population Data Sheet
[Washington, DC PopulMion Refer
ence Bureau, 1983 and 1987] )

(a) 19S0 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1976 1982 1985

Year

(b) 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1985

Year

of maize (corn) or paddy rice per land unit. Yields
have not changed much in the poor nations since
1951. Howet’er, in the rich nations technological in-
novations have been more widely applied seed has
been improved, fertilizers and pesticides are used
more e-vrensively, and management techniques are

better. These technological innovations have not
been used as widely in the poor nations Even
thou^ Mexico and the Philippines are centers for
researdi on maize and rice, respectively, cultivation
of new varieties of these plants has made a significant
impaa in few countnes (see box on pp. 84-85).

BASIC CONCEPTS ANDm^

TABLE 4-1

Per capita gross natioaai prod-
uct (GNP) of selected countries
as a percentage of the per otpite
GNP of tlie United States.

Per Capita GNP
(in dollars)

Percent of U.S. GNP

Country

1968

1985

1968

1985

NORTH AMERiCA

United Slates

3,980

16,400

100.0

AFRICA

Algeria

220

2,530

5.5

15.4

Ghana

170

390

4.3

2.4

Kenya

130

290

3.3

1.8

Central African Republic

120

270

3.0

1.7

Zimbabwe

220

650

5.5

4.0

ASIA

Saudi Arabia

360

8,860

9.1

54.0

India

100

250

2.5

1.5

Indonesia

100

530

2.5

3.3

China

310

2.3

1.9

South Korea

180

2,180

4.5

13.3

Japan

1,190

11,330

29.9

69.1

EUROPE

Norway

2,000

13,890

50.3

84.7

Germany

1,970

10,940

49.5

66.7

Poland

880

2,120

22.1

12.9

Hungary

980

1,940

24.6

11.8

Spain

730

4,360

18.4

26.6

Italy

1,230

6,520

30.9

39.8

LATIN AMERICA

Guatemala

320

1,240

8.1

7.5

Jamaica

460

940

11.6

5.7

Peru

380

960

9.5

5.9

Brazil

250

1,640

6.3

10.0

Argentina

820

2,130

20.6

13.0

OCEANIA

Australia

2,070

10,840

52.0

66.1

USSR

1,110

7,400

27.9

45.1

Figure 4-3 chans the recent changes in per capita
agricultural and food production. In poor nations
per capita production has increa.‘;ed, which is no
mean feat when we recall that the rate o* population
growth in poor nations is two to three times the rate
in most rich nations. Long-term security is far from
assured, however. In the poorer countries most peo-
ple are involved in producing food for local con-
sumption. And even though we can be sure that pop-
ulation will continue to increase for years to come,
we cannot be certain of the earth’s carrying capacity
or of our ability to continue to increase production.
In addition, the gains achieved have been highly vari-

able from place to place, as pointed out in the box on
pages 84-85. Most have resulted from progress in
selected Asian regions; Africa continues to lag.

Trends in Industrial Production

Another indicator of the widening gap between rich
countries and poor countries is industrial produc-
tion. Although data on manufacturing are not as com-
plete as data on agriculmre, we can draw some gen-
eral conclusions.

Most poor countries have a limited industrial sec-
tor; industry usually contributes less than 10 percent

Pounds Kilograms

per

Acre Hectare

tb)

■ ■■I Australia
M MB M Brazil

— • — France

— i_. — Honduras

— — — Hungary

India

~ — Japan

— • — Kampuchea
■ Mexico

•—MM Philippines

-..M USSR
-- — United States

Pounds Kilograms

per per

Acre Hectare

Year

(c)

FIGURE 4-2

Yields of major food gr^ns for selected nations: (a) wbeac. (b) maize (coni)i (c)
paddy rice. Grams form an important element in the diet, wheat, maize (comX and nee are
the most widely used grams The data points In these graphs were caloibted with a moving
average, wWch lessens the effeaof fluctuations in individual years and is useful In showing
long-term trends. For a three-year moving average the values fiar three consecutive years are
totaled and dmded bj’ three, and the result is assigned to the middle year, (From Produenon
yetnixxik (Rome- Umied Nauons, 19861 )

HIE GREEN RliVOLUTION

he success of some countries (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Mexico) in significantly improving wheat, rice,
J'S- maize, and sorghum yields in selected agricultural regions can be
attributed to tlie Green Revolution. This term refers to a number of interna-
tional research efforts that seiwe as models for cooperative efforts but also
illustrate tlie difficidty of solving complex food problems.

The Green Revolution grew out of a joint research effort between
Mexican and U.S. scientists during the 1940s. Supported by the Mexican gov-
ernment and the Rockefeller Foundation, these scientists first focused on
wheat and maize, in I960, witli additional support from the Ford Founda-
tion, a second internationa'i researdn center, rVie iTaemtrnona'i ’Kice Researcli
Institute (IRRI), was established in die Philippines. Now, several
international agricoltural research centers exist, but none have been more
successful than the IRRI and Mexico’s Centro International de Majoramiento
de Maize y Trigo (CIMM\T).

The basic goiil of diese research efforts has been to improve food out-
put and reduce hunger. In simplest terms they have developed high-yield
varieties of grains (FPi^^s) in which fewer calories are stored in the stem and
more, in the grain, die part that is eaten. Success has not come easily, but
increased food output can be considered significant, even if localized.

Over many years, plant-breeding efforts by the research institutes had
to be repeated and expanded to develop seed varieties that resisted disease
(rust) and pests and were suited to many localized environments. Consider-
ation even had to be given to taste preferences. The HYVs have required
additional irrigation, more fertilizers, better land preparation, and improved
tending of crops. Consequently, countries that adopted the seed not only
had to make die new varieties grow but also found it necessary to improve
education, transportation, storage, and marketing procedures (all infrastruc-
ture consideration.^)-

The limited but important achievements of the Green Revolution illus-
trate several important points. First, agricultural enterprise, even if largely
subsistence, is pan of a larger system composed of cultural, economic, and
environmental elements. Changing one component of that system may re-
quire or generate numerous additional changes. In the case of HYVs, farm-
ers needed more capital, better information, and greater labor input. Often
die larger and better-off farmers adapted more easily, leading to die charge
that the Green Revolution, although successful, led to greater disparity
among farmers and even increased rural-to-urban migration — bodi of
wliich are common phenomena in developing countries.

A second point to remember is diat rapid innovation and change may
not benefit everyone. Some people find it impossible to adapt to new ways,
so differences increase as development takes place.

Third, the requirement for increased output signals a different
approach to food problems, which has emerged in many parts of the world

•Paddy (unhulied nee) Note The pomts plotted afe lh;ee-year moving average

nCtHEA

Agrteultu/al pfoductittcy
lncrea»cs In PunMb. IndU* Tlw
Cnm R£^T)(ulk>n jn runjjbKu
been quite »u<rtssful. but achicie
mnu ha$ bem luwd on mon dun
IRV seed. The aRrtculwnl irtivsTw
fiutkm bxtuded icnitt^ise

menu, price incwines. road im
provrmenu. markci dC'elopmcni,
and cdier Infei^ruaunl aid.
(^rtiajsed b%- pcrmV-v^lon frrim TIx’
iri3ff<;//Jrtefcy;menr Report tVHJ
(VewVork. oirf^ord C'nfvvnltv hwv
19R2U6)

during ihf past stwraJ decades Jn iJte nJnetccntJi and carle twx'nticilt ceniu-
cics output wus usually Increased by expanding ihe amount of land in pro-
duaion In iJie Green RtnoJufion «e arc uime^ing a mucli greater empha-
sis on improved technologv and imeavit^' of production. wUh greater input
{xjr areal unit expeacd to jleld greater output

Despite It-s attendant problems, the Green Revolution lias helped mil-
lions of petiplc produce more food and literally avoid starvation Mexico
and India have (kvo succe.s.\ful witli wheat India and Bangladesh have
also made imponam strides wnh rice, both have In-eome at least tempo-
rarily scIf-sutTicicnt m food grams Qilna Is using h>t)rid sorghum, and I I\Vs
arc also used »n the Philippines, Indonesia, Tvt^cy, and Braril

TlK- graplts in Figure A lUusirate the achievement with wheal and rice
In Punjab, India Again, success m Punjab has required ntore tlun die adop-
tion of nevv seed. H Im aKi meant an almost total transformailon of the ag-
ricultural ^■stem

Tile world food problem has not lieen solved Although India U noted
for its success, mllHoas of Indians still lack the land, resources, or know-
how’ to improve Uicir productivity’. As a matter of faa, India's per capita
food output Is estimated to be lower now :h.nn it nus at the turn of the
twcntietlt century; bui, of course, India’s population hxs tripled since then
In addition, miUiuas of Africaas continue to wuJk tJic fotxJ (igfitropc, and In
many countries Uie urban pooc suffer from hunger. Additional positive re-
.suits from the Green Revolution will require improved national restxtrch
efTorts, now a gpal of the Iniecnattonal research organlradon, and greater
regional cooperation, which Is not easily acliicved

FIGURE 4-3

Per capita food production for
ricli and poor countries. An in-

tiex number relates die production
o( a specific year to that of the base
period if the index number is 110,
It means th.at production (in this
cise per c.ipita production) is 10%
prettier than a “.as in the base pe-
riod (in this case Ac-

cording to the data depi'-ied heie,
total food ptoduciioii continues lo
.shov.- a yap herx-een nc.^, or devel-
oped .ind poor, o: developing,
countries, ' rrum Pniuuntoa Ycar-
hooh ibome. Lnlteu N.a'Jo''.s l98ol )

Year

of tlie GNP. In the rich world, howet'er, manufactur-
ing is veiT important, characteristically providing 15
to 25 percent of the GNP, For many years the relative
growth rate of industrial production was about the
same in poor countries and in rich countries, but in
recent years the groxvih rate has been higher in poor
countries (Figure 4-4). However, we must interpret
this change carefully. Even though tlie rate of growtli
is faster in poor countries, the absolute increase in
production is much higher in rich rountries because
they have a much larger industrial base to begin with.
In addition, much of diis indusu-ial progress is con-
centrated in die small group of NICs that form the
upper der of det'eloping countries. Moreover, die
industrialized countries of the world are experienc-
ing an economic restructuring in which die tertiary'
sectors of their economies have become the grov. 4 h
sectors.

MEASUREMENTS OF T/EALTH

Most authorities on economic development distin-
guish the rich countries from the poor countries by

120

110

100
n

.n 90
E

^ 60
X

■a

£ 70

60
50

70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84

Year

FIGURE 4-4

Industrial production for rich and poor countries. Index
values of industrial production do not show the widening gap
as clearly as agricultural values did. However, we must remem-
ber that industrial production in poor nations is limited, so that
slight increases loom large in relation to the base, which in this
case is 1970 values. One of the principal economic goals among
poor nations is to become more industrialized. (From Statistical
Yearbook [New York: United Nations, 1985].)

wen COUNTRIES AND POOR CQUNTRJKS AN OVERVICVr

one or more of tliree measures per capita GNP, per
capita consumpiton of inanimate energy', and per-
centage of labor force in primary’ actnities. Of these
measures, per capita GNP is the most widely used,
but it must be used with caution Per capita data are
averages, obtained by di\nding a total national
\alue— in this case ss-ealth generated — by a total na-
tional population In many poor nations a\-erage s'al-
ues do not apply to large segments of the population,
because svealth is concentrated in the hands of a fcR'.
Per capita figures, therefore, are generally higher
than the aaual produaivit^- of the malont>' of die
popubce. In the rich nations per capita vtilucs are
more meaningful becaase s\-calth is more spread out
A second caution concerns the faa iliat GNP values
are only estimates, es-en with the best of accounting
procedures Thus, sve should discount minor vana-
lions ^\hen we compare nations. Finally, per opiia
GNP values are so lov.' in many poor naiioas —
Ethiopia, for example— ’that die surMiul of (he vist
maiorit)’ of their people seems impossible U’e must
assume, therefore, tlut the aaual per capita wealth
generated is higher than is reported or its nature Ls
much different from that of the rich nations ^ Low-
«Iue foodstuffs produced in a subsistence economy
may account for some of die differential

Per Capita GNP

V’e have already compared per capita GNP bctss-ccn
seleaed rich and poor nations from a historical per-
specus-e (see Figure 4-1 and Table 4- 1 ) sK-hen we
turn to the current pattern of per capita GNP on a
norld scale (Figure 4-5, pp. 88-89), regionallration
Is stttbng Areas of high per apiia GNf> (>3,000 or
more) include the United States and Canada, parts of
Latin America, most of Europe, the Soviet Union, Is-
rael, several of die major oil-exponmg Countries. Ja-
pan, Australia, and New Zealand. Much of Latin Amer-
ica. parts of the Middle East, and Taln-an and Mala^-sla
haw per capita GNPs bemx-en 11,000 and $3^)00.
Countries with a per capita GNp of $500 to $1 ,000 are
fCT.’, and ihe>’ are widely dispersed throughout Latin
^erica, Africa, and Asia Tlie poorest areas, with
uN'Ps of less than $500, are in southern, southeast-
ern, and eastern Asia and in southern and central
Africa ifaiti has the loosest GNP m Latin America.

Per Capita Inanimate Energy
Consumption

One of the charaaeristics of the Industrial Rev’olu-
tkm has been a shift from animate power (human or
beast) to inanimate energy (mineral fuels, hydroelec-
trIcity, and, more recently, nuclear poss-erXFigure
4-6, p 90) The degree to w hich a country is able to
supply manimate energy from internal sources or to
impon fuel is an important indicator of the applica-
tion of modern technolog)’ and, consequently, of
produaivity And just as per capita GNP is a measure
ofproductiviq- in terms of value, perapita inanimate
cnergv' u-sc Is a measure of produalon In terms of
power c-xpended.

Encig)' consumption is closely related to eco-
nomic aaKiq- Low per capita energs' consumption is
associated waih subsistence and other forms of non-
mcchanized agricultural economies, high per capita
energ}- ose is associated mih industrb/ized societies
Intermediate lesels of cnerg>- use cluraaerlze re-
gioas that luve aspects of both industrialtred urban
centers and more traditional nonmcchanlzed rural
areas. The distribution of per capita inanimate en-
ergy consumption Is shown in Figure 4-7 (pp. 92-
93) Its simlbrip’ to tliai of per capita GNP (sec Flg-
ua* 4-5) can be noted b>' comparing the two maps

Percentage of Labor Force in Primary
Actlritics

Countries In which a large pan of ilte labor force is
engaged in prlmar)- aajvitics do not produce much
Income and use rcIaiJwIy small amounts of poner
per capita. Conversely, countries with strong second-
aiy and icniarj’ components usually haw greater per
capita GNPs and consume more energ\’ Tlie use of
(liii indtaior— ptreenuge of labor foro; In priman-
aaiviilc5(mamly ajinculiurc)— is based on these re-
lationshlps

Countries in which primaiy produaion Ls domi-
nant offer limited opportunities for labor specializa-
tion, especially If the economy depends on subsis-
tence agriculture. In which the \ust majorit)’ of effort
must be dedicated to producing local food needs. In
theory, at least, labor specialization and produaion
dwerslty are basic to economic growth Pfospeas for
higli levels of individual produaion are diminished

BASIC CONCEPfSANn j^

FIGURE 4-5

World per capita GNP. Per capita
gross national product is considered
tJie best single measure of
economic well-being. High per cap-
ita CNPs are closely associated with
areas of European culture and v.-ith
oil-exporting countries. Israel, Ga-
bon, and Japan also have high val-
ues. Lo\\' per capita GNPs are associ-
ated with soutliern, soutlieastern,
and eastern Asia and pans of Africa.
(From Population Data Sheet
[Washington, DC; Population Refer-
ence Bureau, 1988].)

if workers must not only grow the crops but also
process, transport, and market them, in addition to
providing their own housing, tools, and clotliing.

Of all the primary' activities, agriculture is by far
tlie most important. Roughly 98 percent of the
priman'-sector labor force in die world is involved in
agriculture; about 1 percent is engaged in hunting

and fishing, and the other 1 percent, in mining. Con-
sequently, a map showing the distribution of the la-
bor force in agriculture (Figure 4-8, pp 94-95)
gives a good representation of the dominance of pri-
mary occupations. The broad pattern of that distri-
buuon IS similar, in the inverse, to the distnbuilons
of per capita GNP and energy consumption

Other Measures

Although GNP, energy, and agricultural labor force
are most often used to identify rich countries and
poor countries, other measures are occasionally em-
ployed. Two of these that measure quality of’life are
life expectancy and food supply. The life-expectancy
measure would seem to be the ultimate indicator of

development. Because some cultures are less mate-
rialistic than others, the standard measures of wealth
may mask some important cultural attributes of a
society. All cultures, however, place a value on the
preservation of life, even though in some instances
the technological and resource capability of assuring
reasonable life expectancy is limited. Life expectanc/
is, at least in part, a measure of the end result of
economic activity; it tells how well a system functions
to provide life support. An additional factor in life
expectancy is death control, through disease eradi-
cation and improved sanitation. A country whose in
habitants can expect a life span of only forty years has
failed in its most important function. Figure 4 9 (pp.
96-97) shows the levels of life expectancy through-
out the world and correlates generally with the otiter
maps we have examined in this chapter.

Two measures of food supply are also fundamen-
tal. The number of calories available is an indicator

of dietar)' quantity, and protein supply is an indicator
of dietary quality. Adequate quantity is considered at
least 2,400 available calories per person per day. Ad-
equate protein supply is attained if at least 60 grams
of protein are available per person per day. Figure
4-10 (pp. 98-99) depicts the deficiency or inade-
quac)- of caloric intake in various large areas of the
world. These same areas are also commonly defi-
cient in protein supply.

CHAEACTERISTICS OF RICH REGIONS
AND POOR REGIONS

We can now combine the various measures of rich
and poor countries into a single map and identify
some broad regional patterns (Figure 4-11, pP'
100-101). This map is, of course, highly generalized,
so tliat some rich nations — Israel, for example—

rich countries anp poor countmes an overview

lumped with poor countries, and some poor
countries — such as Albania — are included In the
rich regions. Some countries are classified as rich by
aU measures, and many are classified as poor in all
A number of countries, however, fall among
the rich in some categories and among the poor in
others. All along the continuum from ver>’ nch to
^e^>’ poor countries are found In various suges of
transition to a more dei'eloped status

The correlation Is strong between rich areas and
populations of predominantly European origin This
finding should not surprise us much, given the fact
that industrialization and modernization began in
Europe, Anglo-America by its very* name implies Eu-
ropean roots tatin America, a poor region, also has
a European connotation, but pans of it hai’e been
greatly influenced by Indian or African cultures as
well Mexico, northern Central America, and Andean
South America have large and \nable Indian culture
components. Howe\-er, where people of European
tradition do form the dominant population (A^en-
Una, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela), the measure-
ment Indicators tend toward the rich end of the con-
Unuum. The populaUons of Australia and New
Zealand are also European. Among the rich regions
Japan is something of an exception, for n Is inily
non-European. The poor regions— Latin Ameria.
North Africa and the Middle East, Africa south of ihe
Sahara, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia—
have no common cultural background. Diversity' of
populadon, cu/ture, and history is, In fact, the rule.

Hie Rich World

We have already noted several characteristics of rich
countries: high per capita GNP and energy use, a
smaS ffiirt of the labor force in primary activities and
a consequent emphasis on secondary and tertiary
occupations, a longer life expectancy, and a belter
and more abundant food supply. In addition, rich
countries have a low rate of population growth To a
large degree these countries have attained Stage IV of
the demographic transformation discussed in chap-
ter 2.

Economic Characteristics The most basic eco-
nomic characteristic of the rich world Is the wide-
spread use of technology (Figure 4-12, p. 102) The
fruits of the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions
are widely applied, and new techniques are qulddy

adojMed and diffused New technologies mean new
resources and the opportunity for still greater gen-
eration of wealth Advanced technology also leads to
increased labor productivity and the crearioo. of an
Improved infrastructure, which includes support fa-
dlities such as roads, communications, energy and
water supply, sewage disposal, credit institutions,
and even schools, housing, and medical services
These support facilities are necessary for accelerated
economic activity and for specialization of produc-
tion, which further enhances productivity.

The hetni’ dependence of rich countries on min-
erals further differentiates them from poor coun-
tries Not only are we in an iron-and-steel age, but we
are also in a fossil-fuel age, a cement age, a txjpper-
and-aluminum age — the list is almost endless To a
greater and greater degree, rich countries are im-
porting these minerals from poor countries; heavy
reliance on imponed oil Is a conspicuous example of
this interdependence Rich countries tend to expon
manufactured goods and, in some cases, food and
Impon raw materials This practice has led to trade
surpluses for most rich countries because their ex-
ports have Increased substantially in price and to
trade deficits for many poor coumries because the
price of raw materials has increased more slowly
(with the exception of petroleum) The rich coun-
tries gain further revenues by banking and investing
in poor countries This remoial of w-ealth has en-
couraged some poor countries to nationalize or ex-
ert greater control over foreign investments.

New technologies, hi^ produalvity’, and a favor-
able trade balance result In higher personal and cor-
porate incomes. Consequently, Individuals need to
spend only a part of their income for food and shel-
ter; other income can be used for services, products,
and savings The more money spent, the more de-
mand there Is for economic growth; and money
saved is usually Invested in industries and busi-
nesses. For entrepreneurs (organizers who gather
together labor, financing, and all those otlier things
necessary to construct an effective economic aaiv-
ity), rich countries offer numerous infrastructural ad-
vantages.

Cultural CharacteiisUcs The Bvrop&an herlage
shared by many rich countries Is cultural. So are the
attitudes and v’alue systems that are refleaed in eco-
nomic p^zformance. Followers of the Judeo-
Christian ethic consider the desire to work an im-

BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDFaq

FIGURE 4-7

World per capita inanimate en-
ergy' consumption. Per capita en-
ergy' consumption is a measure of
development that gives us an idea
of the use of technolog)’ Most
forms of modern technologv' use
large amounts of inanimate energy'.
Countries tliat use small amounts of
inanimate energy must rely princi-
pally on human or animal power.
(From Statistical Yearbook [New
York: United Nations, 1985j )

portant attribute; the accumulation of material things
becomes a representation of and reward for work
performance. Success and peer respect are mea-
sured largely by wealtli. Japan does not have a strong
Judeo-Christian tradition, but Japan’s w’ell-known
cultural attitude toward work and success is similar
to the European example.

/Another cultural attribute of rich nations is the
importance attached to education. Education is en-

rich countries and poor countries an OVERVUaW "

hanced by the communications infrastructure, and
new ideas spread quickly. Also, education is geared
partly toward economic adv’ancement disciplines
such as engineering, geography, economics, agron-
omy, or chemistry have obvious direa applicability
to resource development. An educated populace is
an extremely important resource, a population that Is
educated and urban more readily accepts chan^
And acceptance of change means that technology is

more easily adopted, new products and services are
welcomed, and the mobile population can more
readily take advantage of opportunities in other areas
of the country.

The Poor World

We have already learned that poor nations are char-
aaerized by low per capita GNP and energy use, a

BASIC CONCEPTS AND

HGURE 4-8

World percent of labor force in
agriculture. The percentage of the
labor force in agriculture shows tlie
degree of economic diversip' in a
nation. If a large percentage of the
population is engaged in agricul-
tural pursuits, manufacturing and
sen'ices are limitedly developed.
Conversely, if only a small percent-
age of the labor force is in agricul-
ture, manufacturing and services are
well represented (From Production
Yearbook fRorne- linit-.-d Nations,
1985] ,)

^ *>

^CTtC OCEAN ••

:?x>=. \ r'

/ -■ . r — -v.

I \ A

:N be

ATLANTIC

T.’Oii \ n! Cancsr ’'S'-

OCEAN

.. .

ISO- 120’ 110’ 100- 90-

■j

□ More than 80% _ . , _ . 1

Tropic of Capricorn /

1 ~i 60-80% i

j I 40-60% II

CZl 20 -40% 7

n Less than 20% LV

high proportion of tlte labor force in primary' pur-
suits, a relatively short life span, and a diet often
deficient in quantity and/or quality.

Population Characteristics Poor countries also
have a high rate of population growdi, tlie result of a
continuing high birthrate and a declining death rate
(see Figure 2-5). As a consequence, tine age struc-
ture of tlie population of a poor countty is different

^CH cow^res ANP POOR counttuesan OVgtVI^

from that of a rjcb country. Figure 4-13 (p. 102)
illustrates this difference graphically by means of
population pyramids In poor countries a large
segment of the population is outside the most pro-
duaive age group; fully 40 percent of the peculation
IS less than fifteen years old. In a sense, ihm, per
capita comparisons are unfair because all people ate
counted equally, yet in poor nations a smaller pan (8
percent less) of the population is made up of mamte

laborers A large youthful population also foretells
continued rapid population gro^-ih.

In addition, a youthful population reduces the
ability of women to engage in economic activities,
because they must tend the young Moreover, wom-
at’s status In the diverse cultures of most poor coun-
tries excludes them from many occupations. In the
rural sector, women may work with men in the fields
durit^ periods of peak labor requirement. Much of

BASIC CONCEPTS

FIGURE 4-9

World life expectancy at birth.

Life expectancy is a measure of how
well a nation is able to care for its
population. Long life expectancy is
closely associated with the other
indicators of developed nations.
(From Population Data Sheet
[Washington, DC: Population Refer-
ence Bureau, 1988].)

their time, however, is spent in the home and i
pursuit of fuel wood and water. While at homf
women may engage in some craft industry, such t
weaving for household use and for sale in the loa
market. Many rural women in the poor world play
pivotal role in marketing the family’s surplus on
daily or weekly basis. In the cities women find en
ployment as domestics, secretaries, or, more n
cently, industrial workers. For many illiterai

rich countries and poor COUNTKIES AN 0\^V1EW

^x3men, hon-e\er, these last t«o opportunuies are
not a\'ailable.

Cultural Characteristics The literaq' rate m
poor countries is generally low. Most rural inhabit-
ants cannot read or ^rite or do so at minimal lev'ek.
Literaq* is more pre\alent in cities, but large num-
bers of urban poor still lack an efFeai%'e command of
the written word The inabilq’ to read excludes a

large mass of the population from learning new- tech-
nologies and from engaging in more remunerative
occupations Despite some major campaigns to im-
pro'^e literaq’, many countries have made little head-
wa}' in this area

Most poor world cultures are consen’auve and
resistant to change, thereby presenung a fundamen-
tal paradox. These cultures, by and large, wish to
presen-u their customs and mores, yet thej- want to

HGURE 4-10

World dally per capita food sup-
plj-. Food supply is a measure of
well-being in the most basic sense.
In \arious large areas of the world
people have inadequate diets, as
measured by caloric intake. (From
Production Yearbook [Rome; United
Nations, 1985].)

partake of the material benefits that Western society
enjoys. Economic development leads to cultural
change, to the possible destruction of traditions, and
to the acquisition of new behavior patterns. The fam-
ily sometimes loses part of its cohesiveness; villages
become subservient to larger urban centers; labor
specialization and regional specialization lead to
commercialization of the economy; and loyalties to
the local community give way to national allegiances.

srCH COUNTR3ES AND POOR COUNTOIES. AN OVERVTE g.

These changes and others are almost inevipble when
economic development takes place. Most poor coun-
tries are now somevs’here along the continuum of
economic development, and disruption is tiiaracter-
istic, caused by conflict between old and new ways of
life.

Cultural pluralism occurs when two or mote
ethnic groups exist within a single country, Eadi
group tus Lis own insututions, language, religion.

life-s^le, and goals. In some places these ethmc
groups Itve apart; in others they are intermingled In
both cases, however, joint aaion for development is
difficult if the differences among the groups are great
or if mutual antagonism exists In fact, opposing
gc^ may lead to inaction, and attempts to ilter the
status quo may cause conflict. Conflia between old
and new ways may also accentuate preexisting cul-
lural differences.

100

BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDfa s

FIGURE 4-11

World rich and poor regions.

The preceding maps, whicii mea-
sure different aspects of develop-
ment, ha\e similar distributional
patterns. This map generalizes tliose
maps by dividing the world into
rich and poor regions.

Numerous examples of unresolved or sharp dif-
ferences are found in die poor world. Rural people
in various parts of Africa cling to tlieir traditional
ways of life, but many cit)' dwellers have adopted the
Western economic sj'stem and cultural goals. In parts
of southeastern Asia, national unity is weak because
life is oriented to die village and edinic groups are
diverse. In Latin America cultural pluralism is evident
in areas w’here die Indian population is large. Cul-

^ COUNTMES AND POOR COUKTOIES AN OVg VlEW

tural pluralism does not preclude economic de\’el-
opment, but it can create additional stress and obsta-
cles to interregional and tntraregional cooperation

Economic Characteristics Countries in the poor
uorld share many economic traits. Most have a dual
economy, one pan organized for domestic comump-
tion and another for export trade. All nations, of
course, produce for both internal and external mar-

kets, but in rich nations fanners or factory workers
produce the same items for both'markets and rarely
know whether they are consumed locally. In the
poor world, however, producers for the local market
supply only that market, and different producers pro-
vide for the expon trade. Domestic producers gen-
erally use anuquated techniques and are often
subsistence-oriented. Export producers frequently
have access to technological innoi^dons and the

FIGURE 4-12

Women factory 'workers assem-
bling instruments in Minsk,
USSR. A well-developed manufac-
turing sector (secondary' activity) is
characteristic of economically devel-
oped countries.

means to incorporate them. In fact, the export sector
has often obtained its investment capital from tlie
more developed industrial corelands. It is fully
within the market economy and must remain com-
petitive with rivals. Domestic producers do not have
tlie same incentives or the same capabilities.

Anoilier charaaeristic of poor countries is a pri-
mary reliance on flow (renewable) resources, prin-
cipally those related to agriculture. This orientation,
however, does not necessarily mean that the people
live in ecological balance witli tlieir surroundings. In
many regions increasing population pressures, cou-

nGURE4-13

Population pyramids for rich
and poor countries. Population
pyramids illustrate set'eral demo-
graphic features. They show the
proportions of the total population
by age group and by gender. Rich
countries are shown to have a
greater proportion of their popula-
tion in the most produaive age
group; poor countries have a much
greater potential for rapid popula-
tion growth because a large part of
the population is young. Thus eco-
nomic growth in poor countries
must be at high levels just to keep
up with population growth. (From
United Nations Population Division,
Population Bulletin no. 14, 1983.)

6420246 864202468

Male Female Male Female

Percent of Total Population

RICH COUNTRIES AND POOR COUNTIUES AN OVERVIEW

pled With scacfc technology, have led to e^qjloitation
of agricultural resources to a point that soil depletion
and erosion have become serious problems. Yet
there are exceptions: in parts of China, where dense
populations have lived for hundreds of years, agri-
cultural resources have actually been improved
Fund resources — for example, minerals — are
important export commodiues in many poor coun-
tries, but they usually enter the domestic market in
the form of finished goods imported from nch na-
tions Such commodities earn few dollars as ej^rts
but are expensive when imported as finished goods
Fmished goods and food products are the main im-
ports of poor nations, raw materials and agricultural
products are their principal exports
Poverty is widespread in the poor world The vast
majority of the populace is m the lower class, with a
small upper class controlling the economic and po-
litical Ide. The middle class is embryonic in most
poor countries, in some it is growing as urbanization
progresses Limited income for the large bulk of the
population results from several faaors low levels of
productivity, .a limited infrastructure, lack of applied
technology, and social and economic structures that
are not designed to facilitate economic development
High levels of unemployment and widespread un-
deremployment also contribute to low incomes be-
cause few alternative occupations are open to most
of the labor force Low incomes mean little savings,
and what accumulated wealth does exist is in the
hands of die upper class, often unavailable for invest-
ment m new activities

THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT
Control Theories

A number of theories have been advanced to explam
^y some nations are ndi and others are poor No
theory is accepted by eveiyone, and some theories
are strongly opposed One of the earliest theones is
enwonmenial determlnlsni, which received
considerable attention during the 1920s and l^Os
but has heen largely discredited since then The most
effecuve proponent of this theory was Ellsworth
Huntington (1876-1947), who wrote or coauthored
twenrj'-eight books, including The Pulse of Asia and
Maifi^nngs of Civilization. The premise of environ-

fliencal determinism is that the physical environmeni
controls or channels what people do Mid-latitude
climatic regions are said to be more sumulating for
economic activity than polar or tropical climates are.
The maps of economic dev'elopment do show more
ndi nations in mid-launide locations and more poor
nations in the tropics

Another control theory is cultural determin-
ism. Acojrding to this theory, which is currently
quite popular, a person's range of action is deter-
mined largely by culture Certainly, parental guid-
ance and peer pressure are strong influences that are
reinforced by customs, mores, and laws If the cul-
ture emphasizes a work ethic, most members of that
society will work. Conversely, if the possession of
worldly goods is not among a culture’s priorities,
economic performance measured in such terms will
probably be low (Figure 4-14) Some previously
cited examples illustrate group emphasis on eco-
nomic activities that are not panicul^ly producdve-
the Mayan maize culture, the Bedouin nomadic herd-
ing, and the adherence to subsistence-onented vil-
lage life and ethnic unity by numerous groups in
southeastern Asia

One could easily combine these two control the-
ories and conclude that harsh environments and cul-
tural handicaps work together to assure a vicious
cycle of poverty. However, this simplisuc view over-
looks the fact that many people may be achieving at
low levels merely because they have not had the
opportunity to do otherwise

Coloninlism and Trade

Mercantilism is the philosophy that governed trade
between ma« mother countries and their colonies
after 1600 Under mercantilism the colonies supplied
raw materials and foodstuffs needed by the mother
country. The mother country, in turn, used its colo-
nies as a market for finished products and other sur-
pluses. To assure that the colonies did not compete
with the mother country, they were prohibited from
produang products that the mother country had in
abundance. Moreover, the colonies could trade only
with the mother country. This arrangement obvi-
ously worked to the advantage of the mother country
and severely limited the economic options of the
t»lonies.

104

BASIC CONCEPTSANnl ?^

FIGURE 4-14

New Guinea men carving out a
canoe with primitive tools.

Transpon technolog>' is a major part
of die infrastructure impacting eco-
nomic development, and a great
range of transport technologies re-
mains in use.

Numerous adherents support colonialism and,
more recently, the effects of foreign trade as related
explanations for the uneven distribution of wealth.
Colonialism in the traditional sense of the word is
largely a thing of the past. In the years immediately
after World War 11, most colonial powers gave up, or
were forced to give up, their possessions. However,
many of die trade relationships and patterns of that
era have been retained — to the disadvantage, it is
argued, of many less developed countries, which suf-
fer from economic dependency on the more devel-
oped regions of the world. Dependency theory
holds that tiiis economic dependency is die root

cause of underdevelopment. A more extreme form
of this notion is die imperialist theory, in which
the dei^eloped world is seen as deliberately control-
ling the less developed world.

But underdevelopment is not that simple. The dis-
advantage of less developed countries in the tradi-
tional trade relationships cannot be denied. How-
ever, some less dev^eloped countries were never
totally controlled as colonies; others have been in-
dependent for many years. We must examine indi-
vidually each country's precolonial, colonial, and
postcolonial experiences if we are to understand its
place in today’s interdependent world.

men COUOTRIES AND POOR COUNTIES AN OVERMEN

105

Circular Causation

Another economic concept is circular causation,
which results in eidier a downward or an upward
spiral An example of the downward spiral is a farm
family that barely produces enough to feed itself, it
has little or no savings. If a minor crop failure re-
duces the harvest, the family has nothing to fall back
on. Its members have less to eat, so thej- work less,
produce Jess, and have even less to eat The upward
spiral can also be illustrated by a farm family. Perhaps
the family produces only enough to feed itself but, by
good fortune, obtains some capital to buy fenihier,
which increases crop yields The family eats better,
works harder to produce more, and sells the surplus,
thus increa.sing its capacit)- to buy more fertilizer and
impros’ed seed. The tJieory’ is equally applicable to
groups and nations

Rostov’s Stages

V!'alt Rostow compared historical economic data and
came up with the idea that there are fiie stages of
economic growth.^ In the first stage traditional so-
ciety* exists Most workers are in agriculture, have
fimiied saiings, and use age-old produaion meth-
ods Indeed, all of the charaaenstics of a truly poor
sociew are exhibited

“Preconditions for takeoff" are established in the
second stage This stage may be miuated internally by
the awakening in the population of a desire for a
higher standard of living or e:<iemally by forces that
intrude into the region In either case produaion
increases, perhaps only slightly but enough to cause
ftindamental changes in aiurudes, and individual and
national goals are altered

Takeoff occurs in the third stage, when new tech-
nologies and capital are applied to greatly increase
produaion Manufaauring and teniaO’ aamties be-
come increasingly imponani and result in migration
froni rural areas to bustling urban agglomerations.
Infiasirucuiral facilitie.s are improved and ejtpanded.

During dus stage political power is transferred from
the landed aristocracy’ to an urban-based power
structure

The fourth stage is the "drive to maturity," a con-
tinuation of the processes begun m the prei’ious
stage Urbanization progresses, and manufacturing
and ser\’ice aaivities become increasingly important
The rural sector loses much of ns population, but
those who remain produce large quantities w’lth
mechanized equipment and modem technology.

The final stage is high mass consumption Per-
sonal incomes are high, and abundant goods and
services are readily available Individuals no longer
worry about securing the basic necessities of life and
can devote more of their energies to noneconomic
pursuits

It IS difficult to place a specific country in Rostow’s
stages Furthermore, m large countries different re-
gions may exhibit different levels of development
Ne\’enheless, we can speculate on the positions of
some countries withm this model For example, In
the United States people of European descent were
never really in the first, or traditional, stage The
country’ was settled and developed by people from
areas In Europe in which preconditions for takeoff
already existed The United States approached take-
off by the 1840s, and by 1865 it began its drive to
maturity — achieved, according to Rostow, by 1900
Although development was achieved rapidly, great
regional variations persisted

The United States. Japan, Canada, Australia, and
West Germany are now m the stage of high mass
consumption Countries m central Africa, however,
still erfubii the traits of traditional societies Coun-
tries like Kenya (in East Africa) or Nigeria (in West
Africa) can be considered as having preconditions
for takeoff Examples of countries in the takeoff stage
include Mexico, Argemma, Brazil, and Venezuela in
Latin America; Spain and Portugal in Europe, and
South Korea in East Asia. The Soviet Union and most
countries of NVestern Europe are in the driv’e to ma-
turity. No time frame can logically be specified for
passage through the stages of the Rostow’ model

c.ui..iwa

SUMMARY; AW UNEQUAL
WORLD

A wide range of rich nations and poor nations spans the globe. Most poor
nations are undergoing economic development, but the gap between the
poor world and the rich world is widening. However, we must remember
that economy is only one aspect of culture, and to assign purely economic
causes to development or to a lack of development may be misleading.
Nonetheless, the various indicators and theories discussed in this chapter
will serv'e as useful measures of development as we examine specific re-
gions and nations in the chapters to come.

l£EY TERMS

circular causation
cultural determinism
cultural pluralism
dependenq’ theorv'
environmental determinism
GNP gap

imperialist theory'
mercantilism
poor countiy'
population pyramid
rich country'

stages of economic grow'th

ENDNOTES

1 Gross national f3roduct is the total value of all goods and services pro-
duced and provided during a given year. GNP estimates are subject to
some error, particularly in nations where a significant part of the popu-
lation is engaged in subsistence aaivities. Such aaivities are often under-
valued or are not reported.

2 GNP is often under\'alued in poor regions because pan of the economy
is not commercialized. Barbering is just one example. In rich areas pro-
ceeds from the barber trade are figured into the GNP. In poor areas,
where barbering is done at home, no contribution to the GNP is
acknowledged. In general, transactions in which money is not
c.xchanged are not included in the GNP.

3 Wait W, Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Noji-Commimist
Manifesto, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

FURTHER READINGS Akinbotie. Ade. “Population E.\plosion in Africa and Its Implications for Economic

Development.”7ot/;7OT/ of Geography 76 (1977); 28-36. Examines the repercussions
of rapid population grow'th on economic development in underdeveloped areas.

Baker, J. N. L. The Histoiy of Geograp/^'. Nes\' York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1963- A
brief but interesting review of the growth and development of geography as a field.
See also in this listing Fu.son’s A Geograpfy of Geograpljy.

Brown, Lester R. The Twenty-Ninth Day>: Acco77tmodatmg Human Needs and Num-
bers tn the Earth’s Resources. New York; \V. W. Norton & Co., 1978. A treatment of
world ecological, economic, and social q’stems from an environmental perspective.

Brown, Lester, et al. State of the World, 1987. New York: W. \V. Norton & Co., 1987.
One of an annual series by die World Watch Institute, widi each volume containing a

RICH COUNTRIES AND POOR COUNTRIES AN OVERVIEV

107

coffection of papers treating contemporary world problems and issues such as envi-
ronmental issues, technological impacts, energy problems, and food supply
Chang, Jen Hu "The Agncultuial Potential of the Humid Tropics ’’ Geographical Re
view 58 (1968) 333-361 A stiU valuable eitploration of problems inherent in the
uubzation of a specific environmental realm

Chrlcote, Ronald H Tbeones (^Development and Underdevelopment Boulder, CO
Westview Press, 1984 A review of classical and contemporary mterpretaiions of the
process and causes of development and underdevelopment
Cuff, David J "The Economic Dimension of Demographic Transition "Journal of
Geography 11-16 A bnef discussion of the relationship of demographic

transformation stages to economic acttvi^

Dalton, George, ed Economic Development and Social Change Garden Ciiy, NY.
Natural History Press, 1971 The impact of development from colonial times to the
present, traced through case studies

Detwyler. Thomas R., ed Man’s Impact on Emironment New York McGraw-Hill
Book Co , 1971 A volume about how people modify the envttonment
Economic Development and Cultural Change A journal established to study the role
of economic deieJcpmeni as an agent of cultural change, containing numerous atti
cles worthy of examination

Fuson, Robert H A Gec^pljy of Geography. Dubuque. lA W C Brown, 1969 A
good companion to Baker’s The History ofCeograpljy (listed earlier)

Grossman. Larry "Man Environment Relationships in Anthropology and Geografrfiy ”
Annals, Association of American Ceograpbers 67 (1977) 17-27 A good philosophi-
cal discussion of the man-environment refauonshjp as examined by geographers
since 1900, with lengthy' and useful references

Johnston, R. J , and Peter j Taylor, eds A World m Cnsis» Geogmpbicn/ Pei^iecht’e
New York Blackwell. Ip86 A collection of papers ireaung contemporary problems
from the geographic perspeaive

McKnight, Tom L Pl^sical Geoff-afiiy. A landscape Appreciation 2d ed Englewood
Cliffs, NJ Prentice-Hall. 1987 An mtroduaory textbook treating the entire spectrum
of physical geogr^hy.

Meadows, Donella H, Dennis L Meadow'S.Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens
III The Limits of Groulb A Report for the Oub of Rome's Project on the thedicamenl
o/MankindJIewyotk. Universe Books. 1972 A sobering neo-Malthusian discussion
of the rare between population growth on the one hand and technology and oollu
non on the other ^

Kamil, S^OTore J Carms m Washington, DC: Association of American

Ptof^sional oppominities for geographers, tvnt-

SSU^er tase bound moJera geog.

totsim ff A,mdj M G Kfeinpenning ne Tlnrd World m Perspeave Tototva NI
Ro™ s Altahdd 19B5 An eaedlen. and eatensn^ review ofZccncep^STn
^eielopmera, the tonil agnculiural and urban industrial components Indods a

gocafcvemew of retoed tfieory. case snidies on Edu„pia,,„dia!^ura a^^^^^

AA-onCommirnMAfamyiao 2d
ecL Cambridge. Cambridge Univetsilg Press, 197) An esammanon of economic de
selopment as a process airf of d,e several stages through which a sonei, must pass

108

BASIC CONCEPTSAWrT^

Scientific American 243 (September 1980): 1-247. An entire issue devoted to eco-
nomic development, including a projection of the world economy in 2000.

Selingson, Mitchell A., ed. Tlje Gap Betioeen the Rich and the Poor. Boulder, CO:
Wesmew Press, 1984. A collection of m^enty-nine papers treating the definition of
tlie income tmd well-being gap, explanations for the gap, empirical studies of the
gap, and ctise studies by countnc

Simon, Julian L. The Ultimate Resource. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1981. A discussion of human resources as die ultimate resource for the solution of
contemporan’ and fiiture problems.

Smith, Da\ id M. \i%ere the Grass Is Greener: Liimg in an Unequal World. Middlesex
England: Penguin Books, 1979. A review of the problem of inequality among and
widiin nations, treating measurement and pattern as well as causes and
consequences.

Spencer,/. E., and W” L. Thomas. Introducing Cultural Geography. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1973. An introduction to cultural geography, written from a historical
perspective.

Strahler, Alan H., and A. Straliler. Elements of Physical Geography. 3d ed. New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1984. An introductory’ textbook dealing with the entire spectrum
of the ph\’sical environment.

Thomas, William L, ed. Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1956. An old but classic work on the results of the man-
environment relationship.

United Nadons. Depanment of Economic Affairs. Demographic Yearbook. New York:
United Nations, 1948- An annual compendium of useful populadon data, including
total population, population growth rates, urban-rural ratios, birdis, deadts, life ta-
bles, and population movements.

United Nations. Depaitment of Economic and Social Affairs. Statistical Yearbook. New
York: United Nations, 1948- Annual statistics on a w’ide range of topics. Particularly
useful data on economic activities, including agriculture, forestry', fishing, mining,
manufacturing, energy use, made, transportation and communications, consumption
of selected items, and national accounts.

United Nations. Food and Agriculture Organization. Production Yearbook. Rome:
United Nations, 1946-. i\n annual compendium of agricultural statisdcs, including
area han ested, y’ields, and total production by country'. Also includes data on prices,
{testicide tmd feitilizer consumption, and farm machinery'.

Wood, Harold A. “Tow’tird a Geographical Concept of Development.” Geographical
Revieiv 67 (1977): 462-468. The major areas of concern in any development
program — needs, territory, efficient transportation, emdronmental harmony, and
quality' of life — examined at local, regional, national, and multinational levels.

P Jt, -rr-xT!-! r-tv'p-r

L'niJ

Jatnt'S S. H5;l:‘er

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PMII

n die process of
■ settlement and de-
Jlti, veiopment both die
United States and Can-
ada have marshaled the
rich resources of an
enoiinous domain. As a
Jesuit, these two nations,
which together cohiprise
•njiglo-America, are tvi^o
of the ricliest and most
highly developed coun-
tries in die world.

. -In chapters we e.K^

amine the generous re- ,
. source endowment that

has provided, diis turied

and useful set of envi- ■ '■■
ronmems for, develop'-,
ment. Few peoples in;
the .world have been so '
fortunate as to have at
dieir. disposal such ’ . '
bountiful agricultural ' ’
resources, materials for ■
ihdustri^ and resources

ANGLO-AMERICA

for power. Ironically, the
economic s^-siem is now
.so large that it requires
ma6.sive imponation of
materials The people
who directed
Anglo-American setde-
ment and de\'elopment
came from other lands,
places wliere the pro-
cess of change and mod-
emizaiion was already
under way. As develop-
ment in Anglo-America
progressed, native Amer-
icans were dispossessed,
and natives of Africa
were coerced into labor.
The ongoing nature of
that development Is evi-
dent m demographic
change and redistribu-
tion of population.

Chapter 6 emphasizes
the es'oluiion of agricul-
tural and industrial s^'s-
lems. The highly produc-
tive agricultural s>'stem.s
evolved on an abundant
resource foundation, but
not without cost to land
and people. The indus-
trialization of the United
States and Canada oc-
curred first m a concen-
trated coreland but now
c.\hibits dispersion and
internationalization In-
deed, the economic

problems faced by these
two countries reflea in
large pan the interna-
tionalization of econo-
mies on a worldwide
scale and the rapid de-
velopment diat IS occur-
ring in \'arious other
parts of the world
Chapter 7 should
serve to warn that devel-
opment per se does not
preclude serious and

intricate problems The
chapter deab with in-
come dispariij-, regional
lag, difficulties experi-
enced by minorities,
such as blacks and His-
panics in the United
States and the French in
Canada, and relation-
ships between the
United States and Can-
ada as economically in-
terdependent neighbors

nglo-America consists of the United States
/Ml and Canada, which togetlier cover more than
..ii. M«14 percent of the world’s land surface. Their
large size implies that the two countries can marshal
a great variety of resources to support their 272 mil-
lion people, most of whom are clustered in the east-
ern United States and in the neighboring areas of
Canada.

Anglo-America has attained a high level of eco-
nomic and technical development. By virtue of its
size, population, and economic, social, and political
achievements — as well as the problems that go
along with those achievements — Anglo-America is
an excellent example of the development process.
This chapter explores the bases for development in
Anglo-America; physical geography, resources, settle-

ment, demiography, end transportation. All of diese
considerations are a prelude to die subsequent dis-
cussions of the ups and downs of economic growth
and transformation and consideration of die prob-
lems associated v/ith Anglo-American development.

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY

The initially small populations that developed the
United States and Canada had the advantage of an
immensely rich environment. In fact, they and their
successors have often used this environment as
though it contained an endless supply of resources.
Tlie two countries, particularly the United States,
now consume vast quandties of resources and by all
indicadons will continue to do so. Although it would
be foolish to thinlc that Anglo-American attainments
have been based solely on a rich and bountiful en-
vironment, it would be equally unrealistic not to rec-
ognize that land, v/ater, minerals, and numerous
other environmental features have provided great
advantages for the complex and interacting pro-
cesses diat make up development.

Land Siirfece Regions

The physical geography of Anglo-America is highly
varied, and that variation has affected the ways in
which the land has been settled and used. Land sur-
faces have aided or inhibited agriculture, for exam-
ple, and have functioned as both barriers to and
routes for movement. We should take a brief look at
each of the nine land surface regions (Figure 5- 1).

Coastal Plain The Coastal Plain, bordering Anglo-
America from Cape Cod to Texas, is of recent origin
and is composed of sedimentary materials. No major
topographic features inhibited travel or settling, but
some portions of the plain were given less attention
as habitats for early settlement because of infertile
soils or poor drainage. The sandy pinelands, or Pine
Barrens, of Georgia, for example, are infertile; the
Dismal Swamp, the Okefenokee Swamp, and the Ev-
erglades are typical of areas that are poorly drained.
But the Coastal Plain has productive areas, too: the
black-soil prairies of Texas and Alabama and the al-
luvial Mississippi Valley have some of the best soils in
the Soutli.

Appalachian Highlands Tlie Appalachian High-
lands cover a vast area that extends from Newfound-
land to Alabama. Though the highlands have a com-
mon geologic histor)^ they contain distina
topographic regions: the Piedmont, the Blue
Ridge Mountains, tlie Ridge-and-Valley area, the Ap-
palachian Plateau, and the New England section.

The Piedmont is a rolling upland plain that forms
die eastern margin of the Appalachians from Penn-
sylvania south. The Blue Ridge Mountains are distin-
guished by their relative height: in their wider south-
ern portion (in Georgia, North Carolina, and
Tennessee) some peaks rise more than 6,000 feet
(1,829 meters) above sea level.

The Ridge-and-Valley area is a strikingly crinkled
landscape of long, parallel ridges and valleys that
extends from New York to Alabama. The Great Val-
ley, the most distinctive, runs all the way from north-
ern New' York to Alabama. Tlie Hudson Valley, the
Cumberland Valley, the Shenandoah Valley, the Val-
ley of East Tennessee, and the Coosa in Alabama are
some of the local names applied to parts of the Great
Valley, names taken from some of the numerous riv-
ers diat provide drainage (Figure 5-2). Other valleys
are neidier as continuous nor as wide.

Tlie westernmost portion of die Appalachian
Highlands, despite the name Appalachian Plateau,
has been severely eroded into hill lands and moun-
tains, especially in West Virginia. Other areas, such as
the Cumberland Mountains in Tennessee, retain fea-
tures that are characteristic of plateaus.

The New England section is a nordiward exten-
sion of die Piedmont, Blue Ridge, and Ridge-and-
Valley areas but differs from its counterparts in hav-
ing been strongly impacted by glaciadon. The New

114

ncniE5-i

l«xJ turface of Anglo-Amcricx The pfn'siopraphlc dntrsm* of

VicTva— tcwhcT »»ih dinu:e. vtgcuDon. and »otlt— proMdn hi;;^ %'vxd emlroo-
ncTSiI reaJrvo and ruturoJ revnirccs-

115

116

ANGLO-AMKRt p^

FIGURE 5-2

Apple orchards of the Shenan-
doah Valley, a segment of the
Great Valley that extends from
Alabama to New York.

England section extends from the submerged coastal
zone to die interior White Mountains of New Mamp-
shire and Maine and the Green Mountains of Ver-
mont.

Tire southern Appalachian Highlands have had a
peculiar role in the evolution of the social and eco-
nomic geography of lire United Stales The highlands
lie close to all of die early European settlements, yet
many parts have remained isolated and have lagged
culmrally. The physiographic character of die area
has variously hindered population movement, influ-
enced die direction in which settlers traveled, con-
tributed to isolation, and functioned as a roadway for
settlers. Some of the nation’s finest coal resources
exist within the Appalachian Highlands, }'ef the area
has long had some of the most severe economic
problems in die United States.

Interior Highlands The Interior Highlands have
a geologic history, structure, and physiography sim-
ilar to thosd of the Appalachian Plateau and the
Ridge-and-Valley regions. The Arkansas River Valley
separates the northern Ozark Plateau from the Oua-
chita Mountains to the south. A similarit)' in culture
and problems further relates die southern Appala-
chians and Interior Highlands.

Interior Plains One of the largest continuous
plains areas of the w’orld, the Interior Plains, extends
from the Mackenzie Valley of nordiern Canada to
central Kentucks' and Tennessee in the soudieastand
Oklahoma and Texas in the soudiwest. Beause
much of the area north of the Ohio and Missouri
rivers has experienced continental glaciation, glacial
landscape features — such as moraines, dll plains,
former glacial lake beds, and disarranged
drainage — are common.

Except for the western portion, die Great Plains,
much of the Interior Plains is at low' elevations. The
eastern edge of the Great Plains is 2,000 feet (610
meters) abo\’e sea level. Elevation gradually in-
creases to the west, reaching 4,000 to 5,000 feet
(1,219 to 1,524 meters) at the border of die Rock\'
Mountain system.

From a topographic standpoint the vast Interior
Plains provide one of the most favorable settings in
the world for agriculture. How'ei'er, great variations
in climate limit agricultural use in die drier w'estem
and colder northern segments of the region.

Nortii American. Cordillera Not long ago, geo
logically speaking, great mountain-building pro-
cesses disturbed parts of w'estern Anglo-Anierica and

AKCLOAMERfCA. THE BASES FOR DEVELOPMENT

117

formed the North American Cordillera The results
are high elections and a mixture of landforms Por-
tions of the Rocky Mountains, such as the Front
Ranges of Colorado, consist of intrusions of materials
from deep within the earth that displaced and up-
lifted the sedimentary layers of rock near the surface
The Canadian Rockies are formed of folded and
faulted sedimentary materials. North and northwest
of the Rockies are the Mackemue, the Richardson,
and the Brooks ranges Altogether these ranges form
a mountain system that extends from Alaska to the
southwestern United Slates Small settlements have
been established In the many valleys and basins
within the sj'stem

Interior Plateaus 'West of the Rocky Mountains he
the Interior Plateaus The essential character of this
region is that of a level upland elevations are usually
in excess of 3.000 feet (914 meters) How'ev'er, nota-
ble exceptions are found in Alaska’s Yukon Plain and
in California’s Death Valley, -which is 282 feet (86
meters) below sea level The Basm-and-Range seg-
ments of Utah, Nevada, and California are character-
ued by faulted mountain ranges that are half buried
in alluvial debris

The Colorado Plateau of Colorado and Arizona
reveals the geologic history of the area Many layers
of sedimentary rock that now lie between 9,000 and
11,000 feet (2,743 and 3353 meters) above sea level
have been exposed by the Colorado River, which has
cut the Grand Canyon and provided spectacular ev-
idence of the great depth of the underlying sedimen-
tary rode In the Columbia Plateau of eastern Wash-
ington, Oregon, and Idaho, formerly active
volcanoes and fissure flows have deposited thick lay.
ers of lava, and the Snake River has cut a canyon
through the Java that rivals the Grand Canyon in
splendor.

Pacific Coastlands The Pacific Coastlands are a
system of mountains and valleys extending from the
Alaska Peninsula southward along the Canadian coast
to southern California In the far north this region is
formed by the Alaska Range of Alaska and the Coastal
Mountains of Canada Along the western margin of
the United States are the Coast Ranges, another chain
of mountains with parallel ridges and valleys. The
linear charaaer of these ranges becomes less distma

in Oregon and is totally absent in the Olympic Moun-
tains of Washington

Several lowland areas separate the Coast Ranges
ftom the Sierra Nevada and the Cascades. The Great
Valley of California, a fertile alluvial trough, is one of
die most productive agricultural regions of the
United States The Cascades and the Coast Ranges
enclose die productive Willamette Valley and the
Puget Sound Lowland

The Coastal Mountains of Canada are
discontinuous — they form islands off the Canadian
coast — and the lowlands are submerged The low-
lands reappear only in Alaska, as basins south of the
Alaskan and Aleutian ranges

Canadian Shield Northern and northeastern Can-
ada are covered by the huge Canadian Shield, which
nearly encircles Hudson Bay and extends southward
to the United States, forming the Superior Upland of
Wsconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan Continental gla-
ciation has given the Canadian Shield a relatively
smooth surface— as well as thin soils, stony surfaces,
and areas with no soil at all Lakes, marshes, bogs,
and swamps are characteristic of many parts of the
shield. Although its utility for agriculture is limited,
the Canadian Shield has provided a wealth of furs,
timber, and minerals

Hudson Bay Lowland The Huefeon Bay towfand
IS a sedimenuiry region along the southern margin of
the bay The lowland is a forested plain with little
variation in eJei-ation. Like the Canadian Shield it has
experienced little development.

Climatic Regions

Anglo-Amenca exhibits the variety of climates one
would expea on a large continent that extends from
subtropical to polar latitudes (see Figure 3-3). The
eastern portion of the continent shows a strong lati-
tudinal influence in the sequence of climates from
humid subtropical, to humid continental (warm
summer and cool summer varieties), to subaraic, to
polar. The most imponant differences among these
dimates are the shorter and cooler summers and the
ioftger and more severe winters as one proceeds
northward from the Gulf of Mexico The interior
West, which is remote from major moisture sources

118

ANGLO-AMF.Rir^

and sheltered from prevailing winds by major high-
lands, is dominated by dry climates (desert and
steppe). Along the coast from California to Alaska is
a subtropical-to-high-latitude West Coast sequence:
dry summer subtropical, to marine west coast, to
subarctic, to polar climates. Tlris sequence is similar
to that of Western Europe (see Figure 3-3), except
that in Anglo-America the highlands are more effec-
tive in preventing tlie penetration of these humid
climates into the interior.

Precipitation Patterns Anglo-America has two
humid regions (Figure 5-3). One extends irom
die Adantic as fer north as Hudson Bay and south-
ward to die Texas Gulf Coast. The general pattern is
one of decreasing precipitation with increasing dis-
tance from coastal areas. Although the souiltern Ap-
palachians receive somewhat more rainfall tJian ad-
jacent areas do, diey are not an effectn’e barrier to
the moisture-laden winds from either dtc Atlantic
Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico. Maritime air masses
from these water bodies are the moisture source for
areas far inland.

The second humid region covers a smaller area
along the West Coast, from southern Maska and the
Aleutian Islands to California (the Sierra Nevada).
The great variations in precipitation are a reflection
of elevation and exposure to rain-bearing winds. Lo-
cadons at lower elevations in sheltered positions re-
ceive much less rainfall.

A region of low precipitation (less than 20 inches
[508 millimeters] a year) extends from die Northwest
Territories of Canada to die southwestern United
States. In the far north it spreads from Alaska to
Greenland, but w^e normally do not think of this area
as dry because its evapotranspiration rate is so iowi
The agricultural potential of the immense Interior
Plains is considerably reduced by the deficienq’ of
moisture over die Great Plains.

The distribution of precipitation is of mtijor im-
ponance not only to agricultural activities but also to
many functions of urban-industrial societies Tne fact
that most Anglo-Americans live in areas v'h.;re pre-
cipitation is plentiful does not preclude w^ter prob-
lems, for these are precisely the areas where the
greatest amounts of water are consumed. One of the
difficulties with which people in die northeastern
United States have to contend is adequate and proper
development of water resources for municipal, in-

dustrial, and recreational use — present and
fijture — without increased pollution.

Tlie water problems of the Southwest are differ-
ent. A high proportion of the more limited water
resources is used for irrigation and therefore com-
petes with urban-industrial w'ater demand. The im-
portance of W'ater in meeting both areas of need is
illustrated by the long histor)' of legal disputes be-
tw-een California and Arizona and between the
United States and Mexico for the rights to Colorado
River w'ater.

As a societs' proceeds from an underdeveloped to
a highly developed condition, tlie transformation of
the economic system greatly reshapes the demand
for water. Water needs increase with population
growth, both for direct consumption and for agricul-
ture. Even more significant, how'ever, is the growth
of water needs associated witli industrial expansion.
Industrial societies use immense quantities of w'ater
as a solvent, waste carrier, and coolant. In recent
years less than 10 percent of the w'ater removed from
surface sources (streams, rivers, or lakes) in the
United States has been for domestic use. More than
half has been for industrial use. The remainder, ap-
proximately 40 percent, has been used for irrigation.

Temperature Regimes Because heat from the
sun determines how' much energ>’ is available for
conx’erting nutrients and w'aier into \'egetable matter,
temperature is a major factor in agriculture. Temper-
atures in Anglo-America show' as much regional con-
trast as precipitation does; thus, agriculture wies
widely. In many parts of the soutliern United States,
it is so w'arm that the growing season is more titan
200 days long, w’hich allow’s the production of a great
number of subtropical crops (e.g., cotton, peanuts,
citrus, and even sugarcane). The lengdi of the grow-
ing season decreases with Itigher latitudes so that
much of Canada and Alaska is not suitable for agri-
cultural production.

Temperature regimes also depend on altitude.
The effect of higher altitude is particularly noticeable
in fine w'estern portion of the continent: the more
severe minimum-temperature regions are in the
Roclw Mountains. The highlands of western Canada,
as well as tlie tliin soils and poorly drained glaciated
areas of die east, further detract from the utilitj'ofdie
Canadian environment for agriculture.

FIGim 5-3

Annua] precipitation In AngIo>Amerlca. A major humid region covers the eastern half of
Anglo-America A second, much smaller humid region is found along die nestem coast. Much
of the western intenor between the two humid regions is moisture dehacriL

120

ANGLQ-AMFRTr ,\^

Large bodies of water affect temperature regimes,
too. The marine influence is reflected in the long
growing seasons associated with coastal zones, par-
ticularly the West Coast of the United States.

Vegetation Patterns

A narrow band of treeless tundra extends across the
far northern portion of Anglo-America from Green-
land to Alaska (Figure 5-4) and pushes southward
into the highland areas of Alaska and northwestern
Canada (see also Figure 3-4).

South of the tundra from Ne't\4'oundland to Alaska
is a vast coniferous, or boreal, forest, — chiefly
spruce, fir, and pine. This American forest, like the
similar taiga of the Soviet Union, is one of the largest
forest expanses remaining in the world, even though

the southern margins and the areas adjacent to wa-
terways have been intensively exploited. The boreal
forest then gives way to deciduous forest through a
broad transitional zone of white and yellow birch
poplar, and maple (broadleaf species) in the humid
eastern half of the continent.

Most of the northeastern United States was origi-
nally covered by a vast deciduous forest of oak
elm, hickory, beech, and maple; in less fertile areas
pines dominated. That deciduous forest is perhaps
the most modified vegetation region in Anglo-
America. Its very existence suggested to early Euro-
pean settlers that the climate and soil resources
would be advantageous, once the trees were re-
moved. The forest extended much farther south than
is generally realized: the Piedmont used to be cov-
ered by immense hardwoods. They are gone

HGURE 5-4

The treeless tundra in winter near the Arctic Circle in Canada’s Northwest Territory.

Daylight hours are short, and winter temperatures may reach (“46**C)

ANGLO AMERICA. TllE BASES TOR DEV'g-QPAIEVr

121

non’— repjacecJ by pines through natural processes
or planting Such reestablished forests are indeed
pan of the American cultural bndscape.

The grasslands of interior Anglo-America change
from tail-grass prairies on the eastern margin of the
Great Plains to short grasses on the drier ss-esiern
margin At the time of European senlement, the prai-
rie extended eastward be^-ond the Great Plains into
Ior\a, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio Frequent "oak
openings," forests interrupted by expanses of prai-
rie, characterized the transition zone betw’een the
forest lands of the East and the grasslands of the
West This eastward extension of the prairies may
liave been caused by the Indians' repeated use office
to bum forests to improve their domain or game
habitaL

Although the presence of grasses instead of trees
indicates moisture deficiency, the grasslands of inte-
rior Anglo America can be used for agriculture Ex-
cellent soils are commonly associated with praines
because limited precipitation and rich organic mat-
ter are important faaors m the formation of ferule
Soil. Of course, drought is alw.'ays a risk; and even
ranching Is hazardous, for overgrazing has fre-
quently damaged natural grasslands, which are then
replaced by woody shrubs such as sagebrush or mes-
quite.

Distribution of Soils

Tire spatial distnbuiion of soils corresponds with ch-
nutic and vegetative panems. The association is n«
UneqTected, since dimare and vegeaaon are intri-
cately involved in soil-forming processes The alfisol
and ultisol, mollisol, and entisol soils are most sig-
nificant to Anglo-American agriculture because they
are found in areas where other constraints — such as
temperature, precipitation, and lopograpliy — are
not severe (see Figure 3-6). The fertility of the
alfisol soils, w hich merge with mollisols to the w’esi,
plus ihe favorable topograph}', the moderate grow'-
ing season, and ihe reliable rainfall combine to make
the area between central Ohio and Nebraska one of
the world’s most productive agricultural regions

The mollisol soils of the Great Plains of the United
States and Canada are perhaps even more fertile, as
measured by nutrient content, but the}’ are less pro-
duaive because of limited precipitation and recur-
ring drought. Utilization of these sods requires farm-

ing systems that incorporate drought-resistant crops
(wheat), grazing sj’stems based on pasturage, or ir-
rigation

The ulttsols of the South have been severely
leached and require substantial amounts of fertilizer
if they' are to remain producuve. Many problems of
southern agriculture, how’ever, are not inherent in
the soils but are the result of farming methods In the
htlly Piedmont the planting of row crops year after
year accelerated severe erosion, w’hich contributed
to the eventual abandonment of crop agriculture in
many areas But the South is also blessed with some
exceptionally good soils, not only the black-soil belts
of Texas and Alabama and the alluvial Mississippi
Valley, but also the limestone valleys of Appalachia.

Early use of Anglo-American soil resources was
often destructive for several reasons. Settlers under-
standably had the feeling that space was unlimited
and that expansion of settlement and population
could go on forever Consequently, soils suffered
from poor farming techniques and became unpro-
duaive. In older areas of senlement east of the Ap-
palachians. much land had cycled m and out of ag-
ricultural use by the lime of the Civil War. Elsewhere,
by the 1930s large areas show’ed the damaging effects
of sod erosion by water and wind Destruction also
resulted from overgrazing and from cropping land
that was subjea to drought. Almost no major agricul-
tural region of the United States or Canada was im-
mune.

Since the 1930s the Sod Conservation Service in
the United States and comparable agencies in Canada
have promoted both the removal of submargina!
land from agriculture and the use of improved agri-
cultural methods. It Is important to recognize, how’-
ever. that during most of the period since the 1930s,
Anglo-American agricultural problems hav’e been re-
lated to suiplus production and low’ prices From the
standpoint of land needed for food production, pop-
ulation pressure has been low-, thus, programs could
be implemented that removed land from produaion
or reduced the intensity of produaion without being
detrimental to the larger economic sj'stem Few' areas
of the world have been in such a position However,
dunng the 1970s agricultural surpluses diminished
in the United States and an Increased intensity of use
then became evident on farm land. Soil erosion again
became a major concern of those familiar with land-
use pcoblerns.

122

ANGLO-AMtotp;^

RESOURCES FOR INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
AND DEVELOPMENT

Energy and Power

As societies proceed through the various phases of
industrial development, they become increasingly
dependent on inanimate sources of power, for both
domestic use and industry. The experience of the
United States illustrates the importance of an ade-
quate power base for development. Power can be
purchased, but only at increasingly high prices and
with potentially detrimental effects on a balance of
payment. Limits on available power resources are an
index of a nation’s potential \ailnerability.

Coal Coal was tlie source of power for the indus-
trial expansion of the United States. Even before
World War II, however, coal’s relative contribution to
the energy supply was decreasing as supplies of pe-
troleum and natural gas were developed. Coal now
provides less than one-fourth of the nation’s energy
supply (Table 5-1). Petroleum and natural gas are
considered cleaner than coal and are preferred for
heating and industrial use. The production of coal
has alternately decreased and increased, depending
on the price and availability of other energy re-
sources.

The major coal-producing states are Pennsylvania,
West Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois, and Wyoming
(Figure 5-5)' Large quantities of coal are available in
the western states, but production is handicapped by

TABLE 5-1

Power consumption in Anglo-Ajtnerica by source.

Power Source

Percent Contributed

United States
(1985)

Canada

(1982)

Coal

23.0

14.1

Petroleum

42.0

46.9

Natural gas

25.0

24.2

Water

5.1

10.4

Nuclear

4.9

4.4

Total

100.0

Sources: Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1987 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987);
and Canada Yearbook, 1985 (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics
1985).

the small local need and the great distances to major
eastern markets. The advantage of coal from states
such as Wyoming, however, is that it contains less
sulfur and can be extracted through lower-cost strip-
mining techniques. Tremendous quantities of bitu-
minous coal remain — enough to meet the energy
needs of the United States for several hundred years
Tills may be a comforting thought, but use of such
coal is not easily accomplished. Most coal is used in
generating electrical power; the rest serves mainly as
industrial fuel. Use for home heating or transporta-
tion would require costly conversion efforts and the
application of new and expensive technology.

Canadian coal reserves are also large, but coal is
less important as a source of power there (see Table
5- 1). Most of the reserves are in two maritime prov-
inces (New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) and two
prairie provinces (Alberta and Saskatchewan), far
from the major area of use (tlie urban-industrial re-
gions of Ontario and Quebec). Canadians find it
more practical to import coal from the Appalachian
region of the United States. Another result of the
unfavorable location of Canadian coal is that Cianada
has placed a correspondingly greater emphasis on
petroleum (which costs less to transport) and water
as power sources.

Environmental concerns increasingly affea the
feasibility of using various resources. Coal is a prime
example. How much low-sulfur coal is available de-
pends on economical means of removing sulflirous
pollutants from high-sulfur coal or using western
coal. Any effort to expand die use of coal as a source
of powder will be affected by the restrictions and reg-
ulations placed on industries and individuals to con-
trol air quality and by concern for the scarred land-
scapes created by open-pit coal mining.

Oil and Gas Petroleum and natural gas provide
more than two-thirds of die power that is used in the
United States (see Table 5-1). Presently, the major
regions of oil and natural gas production are in Okla-

HGURE 5-5

Coal and iron ore in Anglo-America. Major coalfields are
found in many parts of Anglo-America, but the far western
United States and eastern Canada show deficiencies. The Appala-
chian fields were major contributors of power for United States
industrial expansion during the late nineteenth century.

123

124

ANGLO-AMRRi r^

homa, Louisiana, Texas, Wyoming, California, and
Alaska (Figure 5-6). The development of production
in Alaska’s Nortli Slope has catapulted that state into
prominence as a source of petroleum for domestic
use.

The largest single use (52 percent) of petroleum
is for automotive fuel. Approximately 13 percent is
used for heating; 26 percent, as an industrial raw
material (road oil or lubricants, for example), in pet-
rocliemical industries (producing ammonia, carbon
black, synthetic rubber, plastics, and synthetic fibers),
and as industrial fuel.

The future of oil and gas in die energ)- picture of
the United States and Canada is difficult to assess.
One reason is that the United States is both a tnajor
producer and a major consumer. iMrhougli the U.S.
production and consumption of coal have been al-
most equal until recently, die same cannot be said of
petroleum. For the past few years the United States
has produced approximately 16 percent of the
world’s petroleum, but it has accounted for nearly 23
percent of the world’s demand, or about 4.5 billion
barrels a year. U.S. demand is sure to increase in the
long tain, even diough it declined modestly in the
early 1980s.

The term proven reserves refers to oil that ac-
tual drilling has shown to be available and that can be
removed at a given cost widi existing technology. In
die United States the ratio of proven reseives to pro-
duction has been approximately 9:1 in recent )-ears.
Tliis ratio does not mean that the countiy will run out
of petroleum in nine years; it is merely a measure of
our working inventoiy. Present estimates of proven
and unproven reserves indicate that more than 500
billion barrels of oil remain, about half of which is
currently recoverable. The recovery rate is likely to
increase, and continued new information on the
Alaskan oil reserves will require upv-ard adjustment
of these figures. Thus, depending on die level of
consumption, enough oil is beneath the surface to
last for some decades.

Nevertheless, oil imports account for nearly 28
percent of the oil consumed in the United States.
Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Mexico, Venezuela, Algeria,
and Canada are major suppliers. Tlie extent to which
the United States relies on foreign oil will depend on
price, which increased greatly during the 1970s, and
on domestic and foreign availability, as other coun-

tries also seek larger quantities of oil. The slight de-
crease in dependence on imported oil that occurred
during the early 1980s may or may not continue. No
one really knows how much of the decrease was
caused by consen^ation efforts or by repeated down-
turns in the national economy.

Canada, though not one of the world’s oil giants
does produce significant quantities of oil and natural
gas in the prairie provinces of Alberta and Saskatch-
ew'an. OnK' in recent years, however, have oil ex-
pons to the United States become significant.

The most familiar source of petroleum is the vast
resen'oirs that lie beneath the land or the sea. But
petroleum is also found in oil shales and in tar sands.
The solid organic materials associated with other
minerals in the shale formations of Utah, Colorado,
and Wyoming (the Green River formation) represent
one of the world’s largest deposits of hydrocarbons;
the cnerg\' potential is immense. The contribution
that these resources make to tlie energt’ supply by
the year 2000 may be limited, but advances in tech-
nology' or changes in the price of petroleum could
change their role dramatically. The technology’ for
extracting oil from shale exists, but shale oil cannot
compete in cost with other types of energy'. More-
over, even if shale oil were necessary' and economi-
cally feasible to use, enormous environmental prob-
lems would have to be overcome. Vast quantities of
rock would ha\'e to be processed, and restoration
policies that minimize environmental destruaion
would be significant factors in any decision regard-
ing large-scale production. Tlie process of extraaing
oil from shale also requires a great deal of water, a
rather scarce commodity in the Green River forma-
tion.

Tar sands along the Athabasca River in Alberta also
contain enormous quantities of oil. Realization of this
potential, hou’ever, requires unprecedented capital
investment in new technologies. Nevertlieless, con-
sortiums involving numerous firms are developing

FIGURE 5-6

Petroleum and natural gas in Anglo-America. Tlie United
State.s and Canada have had tiie adrantage of large oil and gas
supplie.s. Ne\ enhele.s.s, the level of development, the substitution
of oil and gas for coal, and the high per capita consumption have
made the cost and .awtilabiliy of oil a significant issue, particularly
for the United States. The availability of power resources remainsa
long-term concern for many developed countries.

n General area ot
sedimentary
formations
favorable to oil
■ Producing oil field

n Natural gas supply

126

ANGLO-AMFRir ^

tliese tar sands, and the current modest production
may increase significantly in the fumre.

Waterpower Water can be used to generate elec-
trical power; so can coal, oil, or gas. Waterpower
pro'ddes 70 percent of the electricity in Canada but
only 12.4 percent in the United States. The reason for
this striking difference is simple: Canada has a great
deal of water and relatively little coal. W'aterpower
has contributed direcdy to the massive Canadian alu-
minum industr}f. Aldiough the use of water as a
source of power is liltely to increase somewhat, the
total percentage of power thus prowded, electrical
and odter, will probably continue to decline. The
Columbia River Basin, the Tennessee River Valley
and soudiern Piedmont, and the St. LavTence Valley
are all areas where waterpower generation is pro-
portionately high (Figure 5-7).

Nuclear Power The use of nuclear power in-
creased rapidly during the 1970s but declined by

1980, as did the use of petroleum and gas. Whether
nuclear power will become a major energy source in
the future is uncertain. Much depends on continued
advances in nuclear technology, the cost of alterna-
dve fuels, the need for and cost of foreign oil and
environmental concerns. Events such as those asso-
ciated with Three Mile Island and Chernobyl will
encourage reassessment of continued expansion of
nuclear power. Thus, the extent to which uranium
and thorium will be used for energy purposes in the
future is difficult to predict. In any case the supply of
uranium in the United States may not be enough to
meet a large, long-term demand.

Metals

The United States provides an excellent example of
how iron ore (complemented by coal) underlay in-
dustrial development in the nineteenth and early
m^entieth centuries. The United States is both a major
producer (6 percent of the world total) and a major

HGURE 5-7

Tlie Grand Coulee Dam on the
Columbia River in Washington.
Tltis location is at the northern ex-
tremitv’ of the Interior Plateaus. The
hydroelearic power generated by
this facility has aided the growth of
the aluminum industn' in the Pacific
Northwest.

angloamerica the bases for development

127

consumer (8 percent of the world total) of iron ore
Despite recent subsututions of aluminum, iron re-
mains the metal that is consumed in greatest quan-
tity

Iron Ore More than 70 percent of the iron con-
sumed in the United States comes from the take
Superior area, especially the great Mesabi Range (see
Figure 5-5), which has been yielding up its riches
since 1890 Other significant domestic sources in-
clude the Adirondack Mountains of New York and
the area around Birmingham, Alabama Many iron
ore deposits are scattered through the western states,
notably Texas, Wyoming, Utah, and California Dis-
tance from major United States markets, however,
dictates that these ores be used in the smaller steel
centers of Gtlifomfa and Utah

During the 1940s high-grade ores (ores with an
iron content of 60 percent or more) became less
readily a\'ailable in the United States; over the next
two decades dependence on foreign ores grew. To-
day, about half of the imported ore normally comes
from Canada, which, considering the siae of its pop-
ulation, must be considered one of the mineral-rich
nations Canadian ore is available In the Lake Supe-
rior district at Steep Rock Lake, Ontario, and major
deposits have been developed m Labrador. High-
grade ores are also available from Venezuela and
many other places. The development and subse-
quent improvement of the St. Lawrence Seaway and
the consiruaion of large ore carriers have cut trans-
portation costs and have thereby made the use of
higher-grade foreign ores more feasible
Almost half of the iron ore used in the United
States during the 1970s came from foreign sources,
but by the late 1980s foreign sources provided only
a little more than one fourth One explanation for the
decrease is that technological advancements now al-
low the use of ores such as taconite, a very hard rock
With low iron content. The taconite Industry has ex-
panded rapidly in Minnesota and Michigan, partially
in response to favorable tax concessions Recent de-
clines in the steel industry undoubtedly also account
for reduced dependence on foreign ores.

Aluminum During the past three decades alumi-
num has become an extremely useful and much
sought-after metal (Figure 5-8). It is used exten-

nGUR£5-8

Aluminum Ingots. Neither Canada nor the United States has
modi bauxite, ihe ore of aluminum, but both have developed
major aiuminum industries based on the use of hj-droelectnc
and other po^-er sources

128

siveiy in the transportation and construction indus-
tries and for consumer products. Although alumi-
num is a common earth element, its occurrence in
the form of bauxite, which can be used in manufac-
turing metal, is limited. The United States produces,
mostly in Arkansas, only about 10 percent of the alu-
minum ore that it needs; it consumes almost 37 per-
cent of the world’s processed aluminum. Canada, in-
terestingly, is the world’s third-ranking aluminum
producer and number-one exporter, yet the Cana-
dian industry is based totally on the processing of
imported ores and on the use of substantial local
hydroelectric power. Most of the world’s aluminum
ore resen^es are in tropical, underdeveloped coun-
tries (in the Western Hemi.sphere, Jamaica, Surinam,
and Guyana) and in Australia. Again, greater alumi-
num independence for tlte United States will depend
on whether technology- improves to the point that
lower-grade domestic ores are feasible to use.

EARLY SETTLEMENT

The Anglo-American environments ha\-e been used,
and often misused, by numerous peoples with dif-
ferent cultural heritages and experiences. The New
World experience, a relatively short one when mea-
sured against Old World cultures, did not ha\e its
beginnings in a single location. At least four early
European settlements ser\-ed as source areas for cul-
tural imprints that ha\'e lasted to the present
(Figure 5-9). Early exploration of Anglo-America
was carried out by the Spanish, the Portuguese, the
French, and the English. The Spanish were the first to
establish a permanent colony; St, Augustine, Florida,
in 1565. Except in the southwestern United States,
though, the Spanish were never able to establish a
viable societyTrom which settlement and diffusion of
culture could proceed inland.

The first permanent settlements from which dis-
tinctive American culture traits evolved were the En-
glish Jamestown colony, established in 1607. and the
French settlement at Quebec, established in 1608.
Soon afterward came the Plymouth colony, founded
by the English in 1620, and Dutch settlements in New
York, starting in 1625. Germans and Scandinavians
also made their appearance, but tlte English cultural
imprint was by far the most profound and lasting.
The English came in great numbers and, over all.

ANGLO-AMFRrra,

exercised tlie greatest control in the development
process. Their dominance, however, should not
keep us from recognizing the value of native Amer-
ican, African, Asian, and other European peoples
(such as the French in Quebec) in Anglo-American
culture.

More than a century- passed before the initial core
areas of settlement w-ere occupied effectively. During
the early phase of settlement distina contrasts
among the colonies began to emerge. Ultimately-
these differences contributed to significant regional
variations within Anglo-Aunerica.

New England

.Agricultural efforts were necessary- to sustain the set-
tlers in New England, but no special crop provided
great wealth or formed die basis for trade, as tobacco
did in die southern colonies. Instead, New England-
ers accumulated wealth through fishing, trade, and
forestry-. The white pine forest provided lumber for
shipbuilding and trade. Codfish from the offshore
banks u-ere another resource that could be traded.
These resources, plus tlie wealth generated by their
exchange, became a source of capital and established
C(MTimercialism e-arly in the Northeast. By the late
cigineenth century- aipital was available for industrial
grt>wih, and nonagricultural pursuits were already a
tradition. Waterpower potential in mechanical
form — the watenvheel — was sub.stantial, and the ca-
pacity for ocean shipping of raw materials and man-
ufacitired goods existed. Shortly after independence,
the budding industries of New England began to ex-
hibit a di.stinctive regional charaaer.

The Soutliern Colonies

From die start die colonies in the South differed
from those in New England. Tobacco became a com-
mercial crop almost immediately; indigo, rice, and
cotton were added later, as settlements were ex-
tended southward at various coastal points. Vi'here
commercialism was feasible, the plantation— a dis-
tinct agrarian system in a spatial, social, and opera-
tional sense — began to evolve. Indentured and slave
labor led to a distinaion between labor and manage-
ment. particularly when it was applied on a large
scale. Tlius emerged the commercial plantation,
larger than family- size, with dii-isions beween labor

nCURE 5-9

Early Anglo-American setHe-
meot areas. lo these four areas
culture traits evolved and were later
difiused to other parts of Anglo-
Amenca.

129

ANGLO-ANIEKirji

130

and friana.uemeru. distinction^, and attendant

f4ir!n> of orgaaiotiott and huiiding hiycyat. In con-
trast, many ittland scttders. hamjKTeti by their lack of
a.cccss to ’A'.ucr, svcrc subsistence fanners.

ba'-ic sectiottal dirferences ttj^peared early in
North America. One dilTerence was attitude toward
tarjJTs for cxtmmercitilly oriented sc.nitherner.s, ag-
riculture was the source of wealth. Because the rnar-
Ket.s for agricultural prcjduct.s were in Europe, south-
ern [^rfxlucer.s wanted no tariff .system that might
initihii the mcn’cmcnt of their .source of wealth.
.Ncmhern industrial producer.s, on the otiier hand.
sc.tnght larifTs to protect their young indu.strie.s An-
csther dilTerence ttro.se over the socitiiiy .stratified .so-
ciety that evoh'eci in the South along with tlic eco-
nomic .s\-.stem based on .slave labor.

i'he pktntation .system wa.s e.stabli.shed from Tidc-
nnter \‘irginia fthe lou'er Che.sapeake Bar' ttrea) to
Maryland and souihwird from Virginia to Georgia at
c’arioii.s cotcstal poinrs. Inland from Tidewater and
coastal agricultural colonics, tind beyond ea.sy water
routes, \vere .smaller, free-labor firms (run by yeo-
man farmers), ptirticulatiy on the North Carolina and
N'irginia Piedmont, Wiien tin improved cotton gin be-
came avtiilable after 1800, both the \’eoman-farmer
culture and the plantation culture spread throughout
the lower South. Tlic plantation system generally
prevailed in the choice aretis for agricultural settle-
ment.

llie Middle Colonies

New ^'ork ;ind Penn.sylvania, together with portions
of New jersey and Maryland, made up tlte third early
settlement core. This core ttrea contrasted with both
New l-jigland and the southern colonics; it was not a
irttnsiiion zone, either in a ailtural or an economic
.■-ense.

A variety of peoples settled the middle colonies:
English. Dutch, Germans, Scots-Irish, and Swedes.
Neither the cash crops of the South nor the lumber-
ing and fishing tictivitics of New England were sig-
nifictini sources of income. Newrtheless. the area
beettme an important American source region for
both people and ideas. The settlers vslro moved
southward into the Appalachians ;tnd v. esiward aiong
the Ohio Valley and on into die Midwe.sr c.amc from
ilie middle co]onie.s. And with them into tire .Midwest
they took ilie s\-stem of fattening hogs and cattle on

Indian maize, which we call corn. Tliese .settlers
made tools, guns, and wagons; and tliey worked the
deposits of iron ore tliat tliey found in eastern Penn-
sylvania,

The Lower St. Lawrence Valley

The English were also important settlers in Canada
but were not the sole cultural influence even though
they liave dominated Canada since 1763. In faa, the
United State.s has also functioned as a source area for
Canada. The French, however, spread themselves
over \'ast areas as fur trappers, traders, and mission-
aries; but only in the lower St. Lawrence Valley be-
tween Montreal and Quebec, where tliey settled as
farmers, did they make a lasting cultural imprint.
Their descendants, though now more urbanized, still
give a distinctive French charaaer to the entire Prov-
ince of Quebec.

Southern Appalachia

Southern Appalachia, from Virginia and West Virginia
southward (including the Blue Ridge Mountains and
the Ridge-and-Valley region), functioned as a second-
aiy settlement area. The region was settled during
tiie early eighteenth century by descendants of the
Scots-Irish, Germans, and English who peopled the
middle colonies. They moved southward along the
Piedmont and the Appalachian valleys and westw'ard
to the plateaus of eastern Tennessee, Kentuck)', and
western Virginia. These settlers carved out small sub-
sistence farms as slaveless yeoman farmers, contrib-
uting traits that still distinguish southern Appalachia
from the rest of the lower South: small farms and a
population that is almost totally white.

Yet another culture evolved in the more isolated
portions of Appalachia. The remote coves and valleys
were not affected by improvements in transporta-
tion, except when transport was necessaij' to remove
a special resource, such as lumber or coal. Tlie relict
status of the mountain culture can be seen in Eliza-
bethan speech and music, in the use of distinaive
suffixes attached to place names (such as cove, gap,
or hollow), and in mountaineer attitudes. Poverty
and low levels of education have long been vexing
problems.

Southern Appalachia functioned as a source area
for the Interior Highlands of Arkansas and Missouri

ANGLO-AMERICA. THE BASES FOR DEVELOPMENT

131

and for the hill country of central Texas ’ By the
middle of the nineteenth centur>' the population of
Appalachia had increased so much that out-migration
became necessary The surplus populauon found ref-
uge m areas that were somewhat similar to their
home environment and provided isolation for a cul-
ture that the people w’ere not eager to change

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

The populauon of Anglo-America grew slowly in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, e\-en in New-
England and the Chesapeake Bay area, where English
mterests and aamty’ were most intense In 1776 the
United States included only about 3 million people,
Canada did not have that many people unul almost a
hundred years later The early size differential be-
h^’een the populations of the United States and Can-
ada was established and maintained largely because
of differences m net migration (in-migration minus
out-mlgratlon)

Population Growth in the United States

The rapid population growth experienced by the
United Slates ^er 1800 was a response to high birth-
rates, declinmg mortality, and immigration Al-
though exact figures are not available, birthrates and
death rates in the rarly nineteenth century may have
exceeded 5 percent and 2 percent per year, respec-
tively. A century later (durmg the 1930s) the birthrate
had decreased to 1 8 percent per year, but it rose
sharply after World War II, possibly as compensation
for wartime delays in family growth and in response
to postwar economic prosperity. The birthrate
reached a new high of 2.7 percent per year during
the baby boom of 19-46 to 1965 Then came a birth
dearth, as the birthrate dipped to a historic low of
1 5 percent per year during the mid-1970s When the
baby boomers themselves reached childbearing age,
a modest upturn took place, but by the late 1980s the
birthrate was returning to all-time lows (Table 5-2)
The declining population growth rate of the past
century has not been in exaa correspondence with
the changes in birthrates Reduced mortality r^es
have also had an effea The decline in infant mortal-
ity and the extension of life expectancy’ bej'ond sev-

enty years mean that more people are alive at any
given time.

Immigration has been another important factor in
the growth of the United States Approximately 47
million people have immigrated to the United States
since 1820 The immigrants not only enlarged the
population as they came but also mcreased the base
for future growth Recent legal immigration has been
at the rate of about 400,000 persons a year and has
accounted for about 26 percent of the population
growth during the 1980s The precise extent of illegal
immigration is not known, of course, but m 1978
government officials estimated that 8 to 12 million
illegal aliens were living m the United States An es-
timated 500,000 illegal immigrants enter the country
every year.

Even though the rate of population growth has
declined from more than 3 percent per year in the
early mnereenth century to less than 1 percent per
year in the late 1980s, the increments m population
are not small Between the natural rate of increase
and legal immigration, the United States grew by ap-
proximately 2 million people a year even during the
1980s

TABLE $-2

Demographic features of Anglo-America in 1987.

United States

Canada

Popufabon

243,800,000

25,900,000

Birthrate (%)

1.6

1.5

Death rate (%)

Natural incraase (%)

Legal immigrahon rate (%)

0 2'

0 5t

Emigration rate (%)

-t

0 3t

Sources Population Data Sheet, J988 (Washington, DC Population
Reference Bureau, 1908}, Bureau of the Census, Sfaftstca/AOstracf
ol the Untea States, J987 (Washington, DC Government Pnmmg Of-
fice. 1987), and Canada Yearbook, 1985 (Ottawa- Dominion Bureau
of Statistics. 1905)

Note PopuiatiOT growth rates are determined by birthrate and death
rate differentiate and by net Immigration Despite the 9 percent rate
suggested h«e. population growth in the United States averaged
more than 1 percent per year dunng the 1970s and early 1980s The
higher rate results from the compounding eHect during the multiyear
period and from Illegal immigration
’Estimated percentage for 1985
tEshmaied percentage for 1983

»An accurate emigration rale for the United States is not known; how-
ever. if IS estimated to be negligibte In the nahonal population equa-

132

:^GLO-AMEI)irA

Population Growth in Canada

The Canadian demographic experience has been
generally similar to that of the United States insofar
as birthrates and mortality rates are concerned, but
not immigration. Much of Canada is not favorable for
settlement, so it has attracted far fewer immigrants
than the United States has. As a result, roughly a tenth
as many people live in Canada as in the United States.

Canada grew mainly by natural increase between
1867, when the population numbered about 3.5 mil-
lion, and 1900. But even its natural increase was lim-
ited somewhat because of a low fertility rate, a result
of the migration of young Canadians to the United
States. Net migration was negative during most of this
early period. After 1900, however, a large influx of
immigrants arrived from Europe, raising fertility
rates and slowing die decline of birthrates. Like the
United States, Canada e.xperienced ti low birthrate
during the depression and a sharp rise after World
War II, despite urbanization and indu,siriali/.ation.
Tire Canadian baby boom was ;ilso followed Ity a
decline in the birtlirate duriitg the late 1960.S and
early 1970s.

Immigration to Canada has exceeded 9 million,
but emigration is estimated at t)\'cr 6 million: many
immigrants have returned to ilieir countries of origin

or have moved on to the United States. Positive net
migration ha.s aided Canadian population growth
during only two periods; ilie first three decades of
tliis centurv' and the years after World War ll. The
greatest growth took place during die 1950s, the re-
sult of high birthrates, a larger population base, and
positive net migration. Canada continues to receive
more than 100,000 immigrancs a year and to lose
approximately 50,000 through emigration. Net mi-
gration currently accounts for 24 percent of Canadian
population growth.

Ion' Population Gronth and the Future

'fltc United Siate.s, Canada, and some tliirty other
highly developed nations :irc experiencing hhiori-
cnlh- low binhnnc.s. In most of the rest of the world,
however. Ijinhrntcs arc high and death rates are low.

Zero population growth w'ill probably not oc-
cur in the United Slates or Canada for some years, if
ever, llie U.S. Bureau of Census projca.s future pop-
uhition in several growilt series, 'rite lowest series
projects zero growth by the year 2017. Tlie more
likely scentirio is the middle scries, with a projeaed
population of 268 million in the year 2000 and 305
million in 2030. 'lire total population of die United
States, like that of any other country wtdt rapidly

Percent of Total Population

FIGURE 5-10

United States population pyramids. Population pynuTiid.s for tlie Uniictl Si.ate.s .since 7 ‘>00
exemplify the changing age and .se.x structure of a countty that has gone ihroucli demographic
transition. Predictions regarding future demographic conditions must be treated with cuition
however. (Adapted from Charles F. Westoff, "Tlie Population of the Developed Countries "
Scientific American 231 {1974] and U.S. Bureau of the Population Profile of the Uniter!

States; 1980 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981 J.)

yiPlO-AMERlCA. THE BASES FOR DEVELQP^^ENT

reduced binhraies, will probably fluauate around a
base level or will grow at a modest rate. The present
youthful population, e\’en with lowered fertility
rates, has the potential to create another small baby
boom simply because of the large number of people
involved Even now, approximately 3 7 million births
occur each year.

Reduced birthrates affect the age structure of a
population (Figure 5-10) By 2030 more than 21
percent of the U.S population may be over the age of
65, and there will be fewer young people The chang-
ing age structure has numerous economic and social
implications, but experts disagree on whether these
changes will prove troublesome Will the propor-
tionately smaller youthful population mean piossible
labor shortages, especially for particular industries’

133

some industries experience dramatic market de-
clines’ Will educational msututions have an oversup-
ply of facilities and personnel’ Will the facilities re-
quired and the cost of caring for a disproportionately
la^ older populauon place a disturbingly high tax
and Socitd Security burden on the economically ac-
tive population’ Or will this new age struaure allow
an immense improvement and solid attack on some
of the economic and social problems currently fecmg
the Unued States’

Population Distribution

Most of the population of the United States lives east
of the Mississippi River (Figure 5-11 and Table
5-5) Tlie greatest concentrations are in the north-

lOne dot represents I
poo OOP people

ncURES-ll

DbtribuOofi of Anglo-American

o^c«nion ot Anglo-American popuUUon. Tlie unevwinessofpopuhnon in the United
^es and C^da reHects numerous influences, including naoiral em-ironments. earh- setUe
m™ le,,ls of and Indusmal po»,h, and ong^ng

ANGLO AMPRita

TABLE 5-3 . , ,

Population of die United States (in Uiousands) by region and

race, 1980.

Nation,

American

Indian,

Eskimo,

Asian

and

Pacific

Regions,
and Divisions

Total

White

Black

and Aleut

Islander

Other

United States

226,504

188,340

26,488

1,418

3,500

6,756

Northeast

49,136

42,328

4,848

559

1,321

New England

12,348

11,585

474

185

Middle Atlantic

36,788

30,742

4,374

478

1,136

North Central

58,853

52,183

5,336

248

389

695

East North Central

41,669

36,138

4,547

105

302

574

West North Central

17,184

16,044

788

142

121

South

75,349

58,944

14,041

372

469

1,521

South Atlantic

36,943

28,647

7,647

118

260

268

East South Central

14,662

1 1 ,699

2,868

West South Central

23,743

18,596

3,525

231

168

1,221

West

43,165

34,884

2,261

719

2,081

3,218

Mountain

11,368

9,958

268

363

679

Pacific

31,796

24,926

1,992

356

1,982

2,538

Source: Bureau of the Census, R&co of tho Population by Slatos: 1980 {Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981).

Note: Because tfieso figures have been rounded, the sum of tho subtotals may not equal the total.

ensiern cjuadrani of the countr)^ the area bounded by
tile Mississippi and Ohio rivers, the Atlantic Ocean,
and the Great Lakes. Population densities are .some-
what lower in the South, except in growth areas like
the Piedmont and South Florida, Most of the West
Coast population is clustered in lowland areas, such
as the Los Angeles Basin, the Great Valley of Califor-
nia, the valleys of the Coa.stal Ranges in the vicinity of
San Francisco and Oakland, and the Willamette Val-
ley and Puget Sound Lowland. The remainder of the
western United States is sparsely populated, particu-
larly west of the 100th meridian. Exceptions are the
higher population den.sitie.s around oases like Phoe-
nix, Arizona, and Salt Lake Ciiy, Utah.

Given the harsh environments of the Canadian
north, it is not surjirising that most Canadians live
within 200 miles (322 kilometers) of the United
States border. The prairie provinces arc the only sig-
nificant exception. If it were not for the interruption
caused by the sparse population on the barren Ca-
nadian Shield immediately north of Lake Superior,
the distribution might be described £is a long cast-
we.st ribbon, north of which lies most of the vast,
almost-empty Canadian .space. More than 60 percent
of Canada’s population lives on the Ontario Penin-
.sula and in the St, Lawrence Valley of southern Que-

bec. The maritime provinces contain approximately
9 percent of the population; the prairie provinces,
about 17 percent (Table 5-4). Tlie al ready-populous
urban-industrial areas of Quebec and Ontario have
been experiencing positive net migration, whereas

TABLE 5-4

Population of Canada (in thousands) by province or ter-
ritory, 1981, and population change, 1976-1981.

Nation,

Province, or Territory

Population

Population
Increase (%)

Canada

24,342

5.9

Newfoundland

568

1.8

Prince Edward Island

123

3.6

Nova Scotia

847

2,3

New Brunswick

696

2.8

Quebec

6,438

3.3

Ontario

8,625

4.4

Manitoba

1,026

0.5

Saskatchewan

968

5.1

Alberta

2,238

21.7

British Columbia

2,744

11.3

Yukon

6.0

Northwest Territories

7.4

Source: Canada Yearbook, 1985 (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Siatis
tics, 1985).

anglo-america. the bases for development

135

the hinterlands are losing people — the common pat-
tern in industrial societies An important exception is
Alberta, which has experienced significant growth
since the 1970s In response to the development of
petroleum resources

Population Redistribution

Redistribution of the population began even before
the initial settlement of the more habitable parts of
the United States and Canada was complete. TTie shift
from an agrarian society to an industrial sodety
started early in the nineteenth century. Industrial
grov.th, particularly during the second half of the
nineteenth century, was the basis for ma]or urban

growth This growth has contmued during the twen-
tieth century but now is spurred more by the expan-
sion of tertiary activities than by industrial growth
Urbanization has been the dominant settlement
process for more than a century.

The northeastern quarter of the United States led
the country in urban growth for many years More
than 50 percent of the northern population svas clas-
sified as urban in 1900. Now, urban population ex-
ceeds 80 percent in some northern states (Table
5-5) Even many people classified as rural are such
only in residence, since most rural dwellers work in
an urban setting The West Coast and the Southwest
have also become highly urbanized. The South and
the Great Plains (including the Canadian segment)
urbanized more slowly, as one would expea of areas

TABLE 5-5

Population of the United States
(In thousands) by residence
and race, 1980, and population
change, 1970-1980.

Population

Area

Number

Percentage

Change (%}

Tota! Population

Standard metropolitan statistical areas 1 69 4

74 8

+10.2

Central cities

67 9

30 0

+01

Outside central cities

101.5

44 8

+182

Nonmetropolitan areas

57.1

252

+1S.1

Total

226 5

100 0

+11.4

Standard metropolitan statistical areas

Whiles

138 0

73 3

+3 3

Central cities

47.0

250

-11 5

Outside centrat olies

91.0

48.3

+13.1

Nonmetropolitan areas

50 3

26.7

+13 9

Total

1663

100 0

+60

Standard metropolitan statistical areas

Blacks

21.5

81.1

Central cities

153

57.8

Outside central cities

23.3

+42.7

Nonmetropolitan areas

189

+6.5

Total

26.5

100 0

+17.3

AH Others

Standard metropolitan statistical areas 9 9

Central cities

Outside central aties

36.6

+321.4

Nonmetropolitan areas

1 8

153

+153.7

Total

11.7

100 0

+305 0

POPULATION MOBILITY

eographical mobility is a long-standing and significant part of the
American and Canadian experience. Among the many major popula-
tion movements of the past century are (1) the east-west flow of
settlers occupying national space; (2) immigration; (3) rural-urban migra-
tion; (4) black migration from the rural South to the cities of the North; (5)
the post-\Vorld War II movement from central cities to suburbs; and (6)
the prewar and postwar migration to West Coast states. Several of these
movements involve interregional migration. Figure A shows the net result of
interregional migration for 1983 to 1984. Population flows normally include
movement botii into and out of a region, and the net result may have a sig-
nificant impact on regional population dynamics, especially now that grot^
by natural increase has been greatly reduced.

Note: Values are in thousands.

O Represents a flow from abroad and is not a net figure.

O Represents a flow from one region of the United States to another.

HGURE A

Mobilitj": net interregional migration of population, 1983 to 1984. Each year more than
3 million people normally move among tlie four major regions of the United States. During
recent years the outflow has been greatest out of the Midwest and into the South. Movement
from abroad is also a major contributor to current population dynamics. (Adapted from the
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Geographical Mobility: March 1983 to
Mardj 1984, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, no. 407.)

ANGLO-AMERTCA- THE BASES FOR DEVELOPMENT

137

with an agrarian orientation In recent decades, how'-
e\’er, urban groM.th in the South has been substantial
as the region has shifted away from agriculture to-
industry

The people of the United States and Canada con-
tinued to concentrate in urban areas after World War
U The most rapid population gto^^th occurred in the
larger metropolitan areas Another significant move
ment, the shift of people from the larger central cities
to the suburbs, meant that the amount of space oc-
cupied by urban areas also increased

During the 1970s two reversals of long-standing
patterns in population grov.th became evident, and
no one knows whether the trends are permanent
The basis for the reversals may hax-e been established
earlier Fust, evidence suggests that the post-World
War II era of rapid urbangrortth may be ending The
share of total population classified as urban remains
at about 76 percent Howet'er, many central ernes are
losing population, as are 54 of the 277 mecropohtan
areas The metropolitan areas that are losing popu-
lation are located m the urban industrial region ad-
jacent to the Great takes Nonmetropolitan regions
have experienced population gronth rates that, even
though modest, have exceeded those of metropoli-
tan areas (see Table 5-5) Also, the smaller metro-
politan areas (those with fetver than 100,000 people)
have grown at rates that were higher than those of
the large centers The most rapid metropolitan
growth has occurred in the South and the West

Urban growth js slowing down because the natu-
ral rates of population growth have decreased dra-
matically and, more important, net migration pat-
terns have reversed Four factors seem to have
caused this change in migration patterns: (i) people
move away from large metropolitan areas when they
retire, (2) large urban centers have an unfavorable
ft’iage, (3) some people are culturally predisposed to
living in nonmetropolitan areas, and (4) new eco-
nomic aaivity has shifted to small metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan areas.

The shift in growth from metropolitan to nonm&^
ropolitan areas may herald a significant new
pattern— or it may not New urban centers may sim-
ply be springing up in new places What is clear is
that in recent years the growth of metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan areas has slowed substantially in
the Northeast and the Midwest but continues at or

above the national norm in the South and the West
This regional distinaion reflects the economic
growth still being experienced by the South and the
West (see box on p 136)

The second major reversal m population growth
patterns involves interregional migration In the past
the South, the Great Plains, and much of the interior
West experienced a net migration loss, particularly
from rural areas More recently, population has de-
clined m much of the Coastal Plain from Vii^inia to
Texas, m the middle and lower Mississippi Valley, in
the Great Plains from the Canadian border to central
Texas, and m portions of the Mountain West It is
dtffiaili to generalize about Appalachia much of the
region has lost population, but some of it has gamed
population — particularly the Piedmont and the
fbdge-and-VaJJe)' areas oi eastern Tennessee, north-
western Georgia, and northeastern Alabama

Regional patterns are clear. The West Coast of the
United States has experienced great population
growth during this century, but many interior parts
of the West, which have always been sparsely popu-
lated. have lost people because of local economic
conditions Traditional agrarian areas have also been
regions of population decline Meanwhile, urban ar-
eas have gained in population Growth has slowed,
though, in the older urban-industrial areas around
the Great Lakes— the so-called Snow Bek— which
long experienced population growth from natural
increase, immigration, and rural-io-urban migration.
Urban growth is especially marked m the Sun
Belt— the Piedmont, the southern Ridge-and-Valley
area, intermittent areas of the Gulf Coast from south-
ern Florida to Texas, and the Far West and Southwest
In short, people are moving to expanding urban
regions outside the Northeast and North Central
states and to rural areas near metropolitan centers. In
addition, many areas that have remained dispropor-
traniwely rural-^such as pans of the Coastal Plain,
Appalachia, the Midwest, the Great Plains, and the
West— are no longer losing people rapidly. Recent
net mtgntion has fevored population growth in both
the South and the West (Table 5-6), however, very
new data suggest that net migration to the West may
be near zero. These rapid and continuing
t^ges m the distribution of population indicate
ttat Anglo America has not yet evolved a mature set-
tlement landscape (Figure 5- 12)

138

ANGLQ-AMPRTr ^

TABLE 5-6

Interregional migration in the
United States (in thousands).

Northeast

Midwest

South

West

1965-1970

In-migration

1,273

2,024

3,124

2,309

Out-migration

1,988

2,661

2,486

1,613

Net migration

-715

-637

+638

+696

1975-1980

In-migration

1,106

1,993

4,204

2,838

Out-migration

2,592

3,166

2,440

1,945

Net migration

-1,486

-1,173

+ 1,764

+893

1980-1984

In-migration

1,863

2,924

5,469

3,516

Out-migration

2,594

4,268

3,848

3,061

Net migration

-731

-1,344

+1,621

+455

Sources: Bureau of (he Census, Geographical Mobility: March 1975 to March 1980 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office) and Geographical Mobility: March 1980 to March 1984 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office).

FIGURE 5-12

Urban regions of the United States, 1980 ■and 2000. The continued growth of metropoli-
tan regions suggests further evolution of megaiepohtan areas, not only in the Nortliettst but
also along the margins of the Great hikes and the West Coast.

ANGLO-AMEIUCA. TIIE BASES FOR DEVELOPMENT

139

TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Development in nineteenth-century Anglo-America
was rooted m the Industrial Revolution The market
expansion that coincided with the revolution sumu
lated the commercialization of agriculture, w4iich
prompted more and better transpon systems and nu-
merous technological inventions and improvements,
which in turn had far-reaching effects For example,
Eli Whimey’s cotton gm reduced the labor required
for the removal of seeds from cotton, and much of
the lower South was settled as the cultivation of cot-
ton became economically feasible However, nothing
has had a greater effect on resource use and life-style
than the changes m nineteenth- and W'entieth-
century transportation

A transport system with the capability of moving
great quantities of materials at reiauvely low cost has
been essential to the uulization of resources for in-
dustrialization m both the United States and Canada
Frequent changes in technology have lowered the
cost and increased the feasibility of moving goods
and have also altered the significance of many places
Until tlie 1830s overland wagon transport and water
transportation by raft, barge, and sailing vessel were
the major means of movement The great cost adv'an-
tage of water transport had a profound effect on early
settlement, for both those people inclined toward

agriculture and those with a commercial bent. By the
early nineteenth century, water transportation had
increased even more in importance, panicularly in
the interior portions of Anglo-America.

With the development of steam power, the utilit>’
of the Ohio-Mississippi and other river s>’5tems grew
appreciably In 1825 the Ene Canal signaled the be-
ginning of a canal-building era The cost and time
required for shipping goods from Buffalo to New
York Qty' via the Erie Canal and the Hudson River
were reduced from $100 a ton and twenty days to $5
a ton and five da>'s The Erie Canal allowed efficiently
produced agricultural commodities from be>'ond the
Appalachians to be marketed in the East Later, con-
necting canals on the Great Lakes complemented the
Erie Canal and facilitated the movement of grains,
forest products, and minerals

As a result of improved transportauon, commer-
cial aaivmes were extended far inland, drawing on
new and rich resources The value of New England as
an agricultural resource area, which was not rich to
begin with, declined Production there concentrated
on Specialized commodities. The vast new hinter-
land, by way of the Ene Canal and the Hudson River
Valle)', centered on New York (Figure 5 - 13 ) and
gave that city a distina edge over other eastern cities,
particularly Boston

FIGURE 5-13

Tbe Brooklyn Bridge and the
New York skyline. Ne^ York's
rise to urban prominence was re-
lated to its location at the mouth of
the Hudson River and its excellent
harbor

FIGURE 5-14

Major rail routes and inland waterways of Anglo-America. Of great advantage to the
United States has been a s>'stem of natural waterways, coastal and interior, which have been
linked by rails and have contributed much to the economic integration of a large resource-rich
area.

140

ANGLO AMERICA. THE BASES FOR DEVELOPMENT

The railroad era began even before the short ca-
nal boom ended. Although occasionally competitn'e
with canals, railroads generally complemented water
transportation and greatly increased the significance
of the Great Lakes as an interior waterway By the
middle of the nineteenth century, new focal points
had been idenufied Rail networks focused on se-
leaed coastal ports New York grew much faster than
Philadelphia or Boston The networks also con-
verged on interior ports, such as Chicago and St
Louis.

The rails conneaed farm, forest, and mineral re-
source areas with ports and cities Continued im-
provements in rail technology made long haul trans-
portation feasible and allowed raw materials to be
concentrated at a few seleaed points Railroads con-
tributed to the opening of agricultural land in the
West and the tapping of copper, lead, and zinc de-
posits in the Far West Grains were moved to and
from ports Coal was hauled to Great Lakes pons and
inland cities, and iron ore went from Great Lakes
ports to Pittsburgh and other inland cities

By the late 1860s a major turning point was
reached in the seleaive growth of urban-industrial
centers, which would not have occurred without im-
proved transportation Transportation technology'
provided special focus on seleaed ciues, most of
'Ahich were located by water (Figure 5-14) Over
the next half century, massive urban and industrial
grot^-th proceeded in those selected cities, and major
or national transportation routes were established
among them Some port facilities declined in impor-
tance; a fet\’ became centers of attention

Railroads are still important as long-haul freight
carriers, but they’ have lost a large part of their func-
tion as a carrier of passengers and short-haul freight
Both automotive and air transport have captured pas-

senger traffic, and the highway system has become
extremely important in the movement of freight
However, the national routes and flows established
dunng the railroad era have been essentially main-
tained during the automotive and air era so that
large, established centers have continued to grow

The settled portions of the United States and Can-
ada contain intensive netw’orks of paved roads. In the
United States these range from paved county roads to
the limited-access mterstate highway system The
present highway system has a seleaive effea in lo-
calized areas but does not reroute national flows.
Instead, the system aids in the integration of existing
economic regions

In recent decades international waterway's have
received renewed attention The compleuon of im-
provements in the Sc Lawrence Seaway in 1959 ex-
tended the Great Lakes system from the western end
of Lake Superior and the southern end of lake Mich-
igan to the Atlantic Ocean via the St. Lawrence and
the New York State Barge Canal (formerly the Erie
Qnal) The Great Lakes are thus important not only
as an internal waterway but also as an international
water route connecung cities such as Toronto,
Hamilton, Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago with Eu-
rope A canal-river system also connects Chicago, the
most Important inland urban-industrial concentra-
tion in the United States, with the Mississippi and its
numerous tributaries (see Figure 5-14) The water-
ways are used for massive movements of gram, coal,
iron ore, and petrochemicals — that is, for bulk com-
modities Waterways, m effea, surround the highly
urbanized and industrialized northeastern United
States and penetrate inland more than 2.000 miles
(3^20 kilometers) along the southern border of Can-
ada, giving the continental portions of each country
major transportation advantages

SUALMAKY; RESOURCES The United Slates and Canada are large countries with great quantities of
FOR ANGLO-AMERICAN basic resources. Hovv’ever, Anglo-Amenca also has a large population that
DEVELOPMENT consumes materials at high per capita rates The great resource base and the

ability' to use it ha\-e contribtued to both a high material level of living and a
primary power position in world society. Maintaining this position requires
continued high consumption of resources.

The \^ried climatic and soil regions of Anglo-America allow diversified
agricultural production of food and Industrial raw materials Not only are
domestic needs met, but large quantiues of agricultural commodities (e g ,

142

ANGLO-AM^CA

wheat, soybeans, cotton) are normally available for export. Such exports
significantly affect the balance-of-trade position of both the United States and
Canada.

Anglo-America is also well endowed with industrial resources. How-
ever, many decades of high-level consumption and higher demand levels
have put increasingly strenuous pressure on domestic resources. The result
has been an increase in dependence on foreign materials and fuel. Even if
programs aimed at saving energ}^ are successful, they will probably only
slow the rate at which consumption increases.

Tlie dependence of the United States on foreign sources for basic
needs has been, to a substantial degree, economic. Technology or politics
may decrease this dependence, but it is also possible that dependence on
foreign areas may increase. Underdeveloped areas are increasingly demon-
strating a desire to control the production, processing, and price of their
own resources — such as bauxite in Jamaica or oil in Venezuela — even
when developed nations are the ultimate consumers. This trend will mean
higher prices for those resources. It may also provide the United States with
an incentive for domestic exploration and development of the technology'
needed to use lower-grade domestic materials.

The Canadian situation is somewhat different. Canada is deficient in
high-grade coal, except in the maritime provinces and British Columbia, but
it can obtain coal for its industrial needs from the United States with relative
ease and at lov’ cost. In otlier respects Canada is rich in minerals. However,
Canada must determine die degree of dependence its economy should
place on primary' production, with petroleum and metals a significant part
of that effort. In addition, Canada must decide the extent to which tlie much
smaller Canadian population should allow the neighboring industrial giant
to draw' on Canadian petroleum, gas, copper, iron ore, nickel, and other
metals, as well as forest resources.

ICEY TERMS baby boom

birth dearth

coniferous (boreal) forest
cultural imprint
cultural landscape
deciduous forest
grow'ing season
humid region
immigration

net migration

plantation

prairie

proven reserve
tariff

topographic region

urbanization

zero population growth

ENDNOTE

1 Terry' G. Jordan, “The Imprint of the Upper and Lower South on Mid-
Nineteenth Century' Texas,” Annals, Association of American Geogra-
phers 57 (1967); 667-690.

ANGLO-AMERICA:
ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND

TRANSFORMATION

ANGIO-AIIERICAN AGRICULTURE
ANGLO-AMERICAN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND
URBANIZATION

ommercial economic activity began in
b ,. /vnglo-America shortl\' after it was settled by
"■"'..^'’Europeans. Wherever transportation wjis
suitable — which usually meant accessible by
water — commercialism rapidly became the norm.
Agricultural commodities, lumber, furs, and fish
w'ere produced ancftor gatlaered for exchange. Pri-
man’ production and tertiaty’ activities (trade) were
important long befcire the settlement of North Amei-
ica was complete and before manufacturing became
significant. Agriculture quickly became the economic
mainstay, and it remained so for more than two cen-
turies.

Shortly after independence die growah of popula-
tion, domestic markets, and transportation stimu-
lated menufaxturing in the United States. Much of
that industrial e -tpansion in the middle and late nine-
teenth centuiy was based on domestic needs and
potential, whereas earlier commerce had been more
externally oriented.

A complete change in economic emphasis oc-
curred beoveen 1850 and 1950. Today few Anglo-
Americans are farmers; in the United States only 3
percent of workers are employed in agriculture; in
Canada only 4.3 percent (Table 6,1). About 20 per-
cent and 18 percent, respectively, are employed in
manufacturing. Most of die rest are engaged in the
distribution of goods or the provision of services.
Since the turn of the centun'^ and particularly after
World War 11, the tertiary' sector has become the
dominant source of employment and the basis for
continued urbanization. Employment changes illus-
trate die transformation from an agrarian society to
a highly developed urban-industi’iai society.

TABLE 6-1

Emplo^’ment percentages by economic sector in .<\ngio-
America

Economic Sector

United States
(1985)

Canada

(1984)

Primary

3.9

7.3

Agriculture

3.0

4.3

Other primary

0.9

2.7

Secondary

26.0 .

23.1

Manufacturing

19,5

17.9

Construction

6.5

5.2

Tertiary

70.1

69.6

Sources: Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1987 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987) and
Canada Handbook (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau ol Statistics, 1986).

ANGLO-AMERICAN AGRICULTURE

Availability of Agricultural Land

Anglo-American agriculture evolved in a large and
rich environment. Of the total land area of the United
States, approximately one-fifth is classified as crop-
land, not all of which is cultivated in any given year.
Pasture and rangelands, also part of the food-
producing resource base, make up about 29 percent
of the land area. Put another way, almost 5 acres (2
hectares) per person exist for production of agricul-
tural goods, either foodstuffs or industrial raw mate-
rials. Obviously, these agricultural land resources are
substantial, relative to the population.

Only 4.4 percent of the land in Canada is in crop-
land and pasture, primarily because so much of the
land lies in far northern latitudes. The Canadian pop-
ulation, however, is considerably smaller than that of
tlae United States, so the ratio of agricultural land to
people is much tlie same (4.6 acres [1.8 hectares] per
person). The export of primary' commodities, which
include farm products (wheat in particular), is im-
portant to the Canadian economy despite the small
proportion of total land area used for agriculture.

The figures cited here are based on land actually
used for production in recent years and do not in-
clude land that might be added by clearing forests or
draining wetlands. Both countries have experienced
a decline in agricultural land use in marginal areas
diat are not essential for food supply, areas that were
settled during earlier expansion periods when agri-
culture was tlie dominant economic activity. Much
additional land that is not now being used for agri-
culture could be converted into cropland. For exam-
ple, in the lower Mississippi Valley and the Southeast,
50 million acres (20 million hectares) are considered
convertible from woodland and pasture to cropland.

Agricultural Regions

The largest expanse of highly productive land in
Anglo-America is that part of the Interior Plains
known as the Corn Belt (Figure 6-1). This region,
which extends from central Ohio into Nebraska, Isa
vast area of moderately rolling to flat, glaciate
plains, highly suited to mechanized agriculture. The
outstanding climatic conditions are the reliable rmn
fall and a moderately long growing season. 6
alfisols and mollisols are among the best of Ang o
American soils. Tliis favorable combination o ea

146

«\'r.[n-A.MEliirA ECONOMIC GRp-CTH AND Tl!ANSfOI»™ON

tures pro\ides a resource base that can be used for
the production of a great ranety of grains, forage
crops, vegetables, and livestock.

Individual farmers, hone\'er, tend to specialize in
one or mo aanities, and the single most important
crop throughout the region is com — hence, the

name Com Belt Some com is produced as a feed
gram and is marketed commercially. In other in-
stants it is used to fatten cattle and hogs on the
forms where the grain is grown Farms that specialize
in fattening In-estock are referred to as feedlot farms
Farms that produce com for commercial markets

148

.ANGLOAMpRi ri

commonly include other cnjps, .such :is ,so\ be:ins and
wheat. Otlier productiim .systems include tiaiiying
and vegetttblc growing.

The natural advantage.s ol the Corn belt are en-
hanced by the location of tmnsjwnation route.s aiul
urban-indu.strial districts, N'ariou'- parts of the region
lie benveen or adjacent to the great inland waterways
of the Ignited States and Canada. ;ind the area i" laced
with a dense network i>f railroad'-. Tiu* gt'oe! trans-
port system makes it ca.sy for Corn bell farmers to
market their efiicientiy produced commodities in
nearbv eastern markets and even in lar-di.st.mt na-
tion.s.

Surrounding this superlative agricultur.il region
are several others ih.it .ire not tjuite so ptodunne. A
daiiying and genera! f.irming region extemls from
New England and Nova scotia atioss C„tn.!d.i's (On-
tario Peninsula and the Cireat Likes state-- to ^ilnne-
soia. Akieh ol this v.l.ur\ region h.is a t.lecKf.-d ad’vau-
tage hec.suse of its location ncNt to one oi the i.irgest
urban regions in the world The humid. -.uti.
mors are favorable for forage crops .md teed ;.:r.i!n->
To the nonh. though, the environment tie-.omes
harsh, the growing season short, .iiui tiie soils tlun
and infertile The Canadian section of the reg.ion :s
narrow in latitudinal extent and represents .s ii.uisi-
tion to the nonagni.ultnr.il notthert) la.ndiS

The Northeast, where .Anglo-.Vuenc.in aei i- nltuie
had its beginnings, does not provide stub Luge ex-
panse.s of favorable terrain .uk! fertile st.g.s prodn--.
tive land — the Conncstieut Willev. the ! luiison ■-'al-
ley, and the limestone soil of Lancaster t:ountv in
.southeastern Penn.sylv.tnia — is the exteption Tire
topography of the N'orthea.st is generally hilh tc-
mountainous, and the .sidls .are thin and. in m.iriv
places, infertile.

A.S better interior lands became accessible, north
eastern farmers found it necessaiy to specia.h/c in
die production of items that were needetl in nearby
cities, in order to nrake good use tvf their one gre.u
advantage: proximity to growing northeastern mar-
kets. Thus evolved both the vegetable and [>oultrv
production of the Delmarva Peninsula and New jer-
sey and the daiiying of New England, New York, and
Pennsylvania. These commodities are of high value
but require great capiitil input, are expensive lo
tran.sport, and are sometimes perishable.

Closeness to urban centers can :ilso bring di.sati-
vantages, such as high taxes, pressure to rclcKate. or

complaints from urban neighbors about farm fxior.s
and noises. .Although tigricuhurc maybe profitable in
.such a setting, it is tilso unstable. Over the p.ist se\..
eral decatlcs a great deal of fitrmland ha,s been lost to
rapidly expanding urban areas, and the aammon as-
.sumption that urban growih is the only rcas-on for
(hat los'- is incorren. Ear more land hres lx‘en made
idle or h.is been shiftetl to less intensive usefsudias
gra/.ing or forestiyj simply beatuse farming has no:
been pn>tit;ible.

The .southern Ctiited .States, from .Mjuthern .M.irv-
l.ind and A’nginia fi Texas, has varied and variable
re.-onrees for .tgriciiluirc (Eigure 6"2). Lirgc sec-
tions o! hill land m the App.ilachians. tile 0?arks, and
tin.- s< ■util have s!o;ur> that are tixi .steep for .sustained
use as cn iplaruf W here farming deves take place, it is
s.'ften tju.i'-i'Suivsistt.-nce. Other areas", such as die
Piedmont, h.tve been used for agriculture during fa-
vor.il'-le evt'nomic iveritKis. such as witen co'ioa
praes were high, Init the land has deierirvr.ited vitli
contiiuicd rovv-trup pritdiiaion. .A Uny coastal areas
o! swamp .utd sandy pine barrens are not .suited in
inti-ir-ive agriculture either.

S iuii- subregions of the South, hovvever. are e.x-
i,es'’;io!-ia!lv go. k! agf icultur.i! ri'sourcc areas Ixcausc
uf tiieir (•gxvgr.ipliy. .soils, and subtropical environ-
ment Tlt-e,se subregions include the limc«tone val-
levs tg .\p,)ul.nhi.i. the Nashville and Blucgraxs Ixt-
sius. the alluvi.il Mississippi \'allt.y, and the black-.soil
belts of .\lab.inia and Texas.

E.ititung in the Somh is diverse, with many differ-
ettt spci ialties in different areas {see Eigure 6-Ij
Toba.vvo. p-eamii.s, rice, .sugareatte, citrus, .soviveans.
poultry, and e.inle are among the many imixanant
farni pro-duas Lotton. which used i<> be so imp.vr-
taut across much of the lower South, is now pro-
duced m.iiiily in the western seaor ol tite
South — the .Missi.ssippi Valley (Tenne.ssec. .Arkuisv?.
Mtxsissippi. and l.ivuisiana), the Oxrsial Plain of
Te.xas. tin: lower Rio (Irande \alley. and the High
PI. tins of Te.xas — and in the far western .states of.Ar-
i.-ona and California.

Earmers in the Cireat Plaitts of the United Swies
and the prairie province.s of Canada fAll'x.’rta.
S;isk;nchewan. iind Manitoha) face reairrent
drought, and even normal rainfall may mean witter
deliciencie.s. Wheat farming, sometimes diversified
to include livestock (u.sually cattle), is charaaeri.'tic
vif the wetter part.s of the plains state.s and proviae^’-'s

ANGLO AMERICA. ECONOMIC GROW! AND imNSFORMATION

149

nGURE6-2

Tobacco field and bams in west-
ern North Carolina. Tobacco, in-
tensively grown, remains a maior
crop In the Carolinas, Georgia, Vir
ginla, Tennessee, and Kentucky, usu
ally on smalt farms

The drier margins are given over almost exclusively
to cattle raising Areas such as the Sand Hills of Ne-
braska, ’which ate stabilized sand dunes that do not
hold moisture well, and the rolling Flint Hills of Kan-
sas are devoted to specialized ranching

Only where irrigation water is available is the pat-
tern of dry farming and ranching broken Irrigation
allows the high plains of Texas to funaion as one of
the major cotton-producing regions of the United
States. In addition, eastern Colorado produces sugar
beets and com for nearby livestock-finishing farms
similar to those in Illinois and Iowa. Among the
plains states Nebraska and Kansas have shown par-
ticularly great increases in irrigation The plains are
food-surplus areas, and much of what is produced is
transported elsewhere to meet domestic and inter-
national needs The products of the Canadian Great
Plains provide the greatest compeuuon for United
States farm output in the international marketplace.

The produai\nt>’ of the plains states is somew’hat
hampered by dry conditions and distance from east-
ern markets, but areas farther 'ivest are downn^t
handicapped Most of the West is not suited to farm-
ing because of rugged terrain, aridity, or inaccessi-
hiiit)’ and is used e.xtensively as grazing land TTie
exceptions to this generalization are extremely im-
ponant, howei'er. Aside from the Pacific Nort^*est

(northern California, western Oregon, and Washing-
ton), agriculture, when it is earned on at all, is m-
tensive at oasis locations The valleys east of the Cas-
cades, the Snake River plains, the Salt Lake oasis, and
California's Imperial Valley, Los Angeles Basin, and
Great Valley are some of ^e areas with highly pro-
duaive agriculture Farmers in these areas make use
of fertile soils, level terrain, and national transport
systems that allow them to market their products in
the East, but they are utterly dependent on irrigation
■Ihese conditions have made California the most di-
versified and most productive agricultural area m
either the United States or Canada (Figure 6-3)

The Pacific Northwest has a humid climate and is
therefore less dependent on irrigation. The Puget
Sound Lowland and the Willamette Valley contain a
produan-e agricultural industry that includes dairy
products, other livestock products, grains, orchard
crops, and berries

Commercialized Agriculture

Tiie commercial emphasis of Anglo-American agri-
culture began early. Tobacco was the first successful
venture; but nee, indigo, and cotton followed as col-
onies t\ere established southward along the Atlantic
Coast Frontier farmers were generally subsistence

150

ANGLO-AMKRTri|

FIGURE 6-3

Orange groves in the Los Ange-
les Basin of southern California.

Much of the citrus and other or-
chard crop production has been
displaced by massive urban gro-nth
during the post-World \X^ar II years.

oriented, although they might also have produced
items such as livestock, which could be driven to
markets. Later, the urbanization and industrialization
of Europe stimulated tlie expansion of agriculture
oriented toward various parts of the world, including
Anglo-America. During the nineteenth centun' the
expansion and improvement of rail transportation
alloM^ed Anglo-American settlers to participate in an
expanding commercial system.

As a result of better transponation and more wide-
spread settlement, land with greatly x^aiying capabil-
ities became accessible for many kinds of produc-
tion, enabling the principle of comparative
/advantage to operate. Comparative advantage
means that some locations are clearly better for the
production of one or more items than other loca-
tions are. If transportation is adequate for commer-
cial exchange, regional specialization will result.
Farmers who have an advantage in several forms of
production will choose the form tiiat provides the
greatest return. They may concentrate on one or tM'o
crops or on some combination of crops and live-
stock. Farmers in areas witli no advantage may con-
centrate on producing items that are ignored by oth-
ers. Thus, areas specialize in limited types of
production, either because of advantage or by de-

fault, and contribute their products to the larger eco-
nomic system through exchange.

Continuing Agricultural Adjustments

Aldiough Anglo-America is one of the world’s major
agricultural regions, it is still young; and change can
be expected in any area that has been settled rapidly
for agricultural purposes. For example, the corn-and-
livestock region of tlie Midwest uses a system of grain
production and cattle fattening that originated in the
East, where lean cattle driven from frontier areas to
market areas were fattened before they were slaugh-
tered. Now' more and more cattle are fattened in the
Great Plains, and more than half of the catde that are
fattened in the Midwest are actually raised there.
Also, grain production and cattle fattening are now
specialized functions on separate farms. That system
spread westward along the Ohio Valley and into the
Midw'est, which is an excellent area for the produc-
tion of feed grains.

Cotton production offers another example of
change. Cotton acreage in the southeastern United
States declined because of the boll weevil, govern-
ment production controls and acreage reductions,
soil erosion, and the need for better production

ANGLO^^^tERICA■ ECONOMIC GRQWH AND

151

methods. Cotton production has since concentrated
on the better lands of the Mississippi Valley and has
shifted westward

Change has also followed initial settlement pat-
terns, which were not permanent in many parts of
Anglo-America Farmers settled in the hills of Appa-
lachia, where the steep slopes were easily eroded
They also occupied the western edge of die Great
Plains, where drought meant disaster In the early
nineteenth century, agriculture retreated in many ar-
eas, including the uplands of New England, where
temperatures are cool and soils are poor Through
the years we have withdrawn our agricultural efforts
from some lands to concentrate on other, better
lands. Land clearing for cropland e;^ansion coniin-
ues a'en now in the Mississippi Delta.

The agricultural labor force has changed, too
During the nmeteenth century a substantial immi-
grant and native-born population was aswilable as a
/afaor force. Later, however, urfaan-induscriaf growth,
combined with the availability of land for ownership,
made farm labor for hire scarce m most regions
other than the South Labor saving devices, such as
mechanical reapers, which were developed m the
nineteenth century, were significant tedtnofogical
advances even before the power re%'otutiofi tn agri-
culture. The growing industrial capacity of Anglo-
America created a supply of implements

Mechanization of agriculture involves more
than just the substiruuon of capital for labor, al-
though that in itself often requires difficult adjust-
ments Mechanization frequently means operational
reorganization, larger capital expenditures, and
greater scale of production Mechanization or other
technological improvements usually help only those
^ho have enough land or money to make the re-
quired adjustments. From time to tune many people
have found it impossible to make the necessary
changes and have not survived as farmers (Figure
6-4). For those who can find other Jobs, the move
away from farming is not necessarily bad. a shift of
inefficient and low-income formers into other aarv-
ities can benefit the larger economy. The problem is
that not all famters have been able to find satisfaaory
alternatives Large numbers of poor tenant fanners
^d form laborers have migrated to the aties since

1920s, ill prepared for city life, jobs, stresses, and
the urban discrimination that may affea both blacks
and poor whites

Percent

Year

ncURE 6-4

Uoitcd Slates farm population as a percent of totaf popu-
laUon. The percentage of the United Sutes population living
on farms has conunuily decreased This deaease results both
from increased mechanization and other advances in Jamuig.
methods and from the growth of urban centers with their diver-
sity of economic oppomimiles (From US Bureau of the Cen-
sus, SiaitstKal Abstract oj tbe United Slates, 1987 )

Agricultural Productivity

Anglo-American agriculture is extremely productive.
The hi^ degree of regional specialization involves
the produaion of many crops, using the best re-
sources for a particular aop. By world standards the
yields per land unit rank high for many commodities
(see Figure 4-2). Furthermore, produaivity has in-
creased greatly during the past three decades, includ-
ing major increases per land unit and per person
(Table 6-2)

This increased production has several causes, one
of which IS mechanization Although mechanization
may help to ruse yields per unit of land, this is not
always the case, and a more Important result is an
increase in output per worker. With the aid of ma-
chinery, one person can do the work of many (Figure
6-5) Other significant causes of increased produc-
tivity are improved seed and plant rarieties, more
effecdve ferUhzers, new pesticides, and chemicals for
comrollmg diseases and weeds Indeed, rapid
progress IS now being made in developing hybrid
wh^ts that will probably signal a great increase m
yield and produaion similar to that which occurred
with com over a number of previous decades. Ge-

152

ANGLO-AKiKRrA

TABLE 6-2

Average agricultural productiv-
ity in the United States.

Product

sj' j ^Ljaiggs

1935-1939

1950-1959

1980-1984

Corn for grain

Bushels per acre

26.1

39.4

101,4

Hours required per 100 bushels

108.0

34.0

3.0

Cotton

Pounds per acre

226.0

296.0

524.0

Hours required per 500-pound bale

209.0

107.0

5.0

Wheat

Bushels per acre

13.2

17.3

36.2

Hours required per 100 bushels

67.0

27.0

7.0

Sources: Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974 (Washington, DC: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1974) and Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1987
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987).

HGURE 6-5

A turkey farm in Virginia. Poultn- raising is a major agricul-
tural aaivity near the large northeastern urban markets.

netic engineering can be expected to contribute fur-
ther dranges.

A Paradox: Productive Agriculture and
Farm Problems

As is frequently true in times of rapid change and
innovation, many adjustments are required of farm-
ers who wish to participate in improved production
metliods. As noted earlier, many farm laborers who
were no longer needed because of mechanization or
farm reorganization have migrated to cities; this has
been particularly true in the South, where the land-
less farm population was once large. Some farmers,
on the other hand, remain marginal producers with
low incomes, usually in marginal farming areas. They
contribute litde to the national agricultural economy,
for most agricultural output comes from a small
number of farms tliat are large and capital intensive.
Marginal farmers will not necessarily contribute
more if food demand increases; their shortage of
capital and land may prevent their increased partic-
ipation even if they are needed.

Farm problems are not restricted to marginal
farmers, however. American agriculture has become
capital intensive, and in many cases that capital is
borrowed. Farmers who are not skilled managers are
vulnerable to variations in weadier and to fluctuating
commodit}'^ prices on national and international mar-
kets. Most farmers are independent producers who
can exert little control over the weather or the mar-
kets.

ANGLO-MIERICA. economic growth and TRANSFORMAnON

153

ANGLO-AMERICAN MANUFACTURING

Manufacturing activities are basic to the rnodem
Anglo-American economies In the United Stai« al-
most 20 million people are now employed m man-
ufacturmg, m Canada more than 2 million These
individuals and the great numbers of people re-
quired for the disinbuuon of goods and the provi-
sion of services form the basis for the massive ur-
banization in Anglo-America

The proportion of the total labor force employed
m manufacturing has decreased as relati'.’ely faster
grorvih has occurred in tertiary activities, a charac-
teristic of developed societies Manufacturing, how-
ever, remains basic to the stability of the American
economy. Approximately 21 percent of the income
of the United States is direcdy derived from manu-
facrunng. but even more imponant is the great num-
ber of employment opportunities provided In the
tertiary realm as goods are distributed to consumers
and services are provided for manufacturers and oth-
ers

The Evolution of Manufaccuring In the
United States

Industry developed first in southeastern New En-
gland and the Middle Atlantic area from New York
City to Philadelphia and Baltimore, fwo of the early
American settlement cores Before the railroad era
began, access to water offered great transportation
advanti^es, and industrial pow’er was available m the
form of mechanical waterpower. As mentioned in
chapter 5 , New England had become an agricultural
area out of necessity, even though its soils and slopes
were basically poor for agriculture However, capital
had been accumulated from other pursuits, such as
lumbering, fishing, and ocean shipping Thus, peo-
ple who sought financial backing for new industrial
activities could find entrepreneurs with capital and a
venturesome spirit The surplus rural populations of
New England, suffering from the economic compe-
tition of newly opened land in the interior, also fa-
cilitated industrial growth during the nineteenth cen-
tury. Tliese people readily gave up farming for work
in the texule mills, leather and shoe faaories, and the
machine-tool Industry, all of which dominated New
England industry b}' 1900.

Shipfauiidmg, food processing, papermaking and
printing, and ironworking were other early indus-
tries of New England and the middle colonies Iron-
workii^ became important m eastern Pennsylvania,
although the iron industry was scattered and local-
ized in numerous communities Prior to the steel age
iron ore and charcoal (from hardwood trees) were
the basic components of ironworkmg Because of the
cost of transporting the bulky, heavy components,
many small iron deposits were used in conjunaion
with local hardwood forests New technology would
change that in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Rostow's early, or traditional, stage of economic
development (see chapter 4) never really existed in
Anglo-Amenca for many people of European de-
scent, who were from areas where preconditions for
takeoff existed. The United States and Canada were
created by British and other European peoples who
were already in transition. The traditional feudal so-
ciety was decaying m Europe, and the concept of
individual worth was emerging: democratic Ideals
were taking root Capitalism was developing, as those
with excess wealth diverted funds into new trade,
iransponaiion, power -supply, and manufacturing en-
terprises. Thus, the people who built Anglo-Amenca
brought the United States to the takeoff stage by the
1840s and Canada by the 1890s. In both cases, how-
ever, independence was necessary before industrial
growth could be pursued without the constraints of
mercantilism

The takeoff began an era of great industrial ex-
pansion, aided by railroads that made possible the
movement of materials over great distances and gave
areas and places an entirely new locational signifi-
cance The railroads themselves became a major
market for steel, which was available from the 1850s
on

By 1865 the United States was experiencing a
drive to maturity, which was to be achieved by 1900.
Ehiric^ tlus time the Improvements In railroads, con-
tinued immigration, and an extremely favorable
population-resource balance aided growth The im-
mense growth of industry was direcdy responsible
for urbanization. Although the bulk of industrial
growth during this formative period from 1840 to
1900 took place in the northern states, the southern
lag was not simply southern indifference to industri-
alization. The regional differences discussed in chap-

154

ter 4 dated from the days of early settlement and led
die Southern colonies to develop a commercial ag-
ricultural system, v.'hich was financially and socially
rewarding for a select group ■who tended to invest
daeir economic surplus in more land.

New England and die Middle Atlantic area devel-
oped traditions in nonagricultural as well as agricul-
tural pursuits. When railroads became the backbone
of die transportation system and the dominant mar-
ket for steel, specific northern locations took on new
meaning and \'alue. For example, eastw^ard move-
ment of goods from the interior b)’ way of the Mo-
hawk Valiev and the Hudson Ri\’er strengdiened die
focus on New 4'ork Cit\'. Furthermore, the new' and
growing steel industries required great quantities of
coal and iron ore. As die bituminous coalfields of
Appalachia and the iron ore deposits of the Mesabi
Range increased in importance, the locations wdth
uuliti' became diose between die coal and the iron
ore; Pittsburgh, at die junction of the Monongahela
and Alleghem' rivers, and Cleveland, Erie, and Chi-
cago, among others, on the Great Lakes. Railroads
complemented die laltes by moi'ing coal w'estward
and northward to meet iron ore that w^as moving
eastward by w'ater. The areas between the Appala-
chians tuid die lakes and along die periphen’ of the
lakes gained importance in the assembly of materials
for production. As die process of growth proceeded,
the agricultural goods of die rich interior -were
moved easus'ard to market and sdmulated domestic
industn' in die market area.

The Soudi, remote from the new' national trans-
ponation routes, continued to produce agricultural
goods for external markets. To some extent, die
South was like a colonial appendage. Manufacturing
did exist in the antebellum and postbellum South,
but it never achieved the rate of growtli or the dom-
inance diat it did in die North. After die Civil War
(1861-1865), w'hen the w'eakness of southem indus-
tr\' was eitdent, odier conditions made a reversal of
die traditional economy even more difficult. The
Soudi had embraced an agrarian philosophy that
many of its leaders continued to advocate even after
die w'ar.

Thus, regional variations w'ere grt it bi'the 1930s,
W'hen the process of economic development was
w'ell into its maturitit The nordieastern quaner of die
United States had evolved as a major urban-industrial
region, cliaracterized by numerous specialized

_ANGLQ-AMFRir^

urban-industrial districts interspersed among agri-
cultural regions. The industrial coreland was an area
of relatively high urbanization, high industrial out-
put, high income, immense internal exchange, and
interaction. The Soudi was a region of low urbaniza-
tion, limited industrial growdi, and poverty for great
numbers of wdiites and blacks in overpopulated rural
areas.

Manufacturing in the Anglo-American
Coreland

The Anglo-American manufacturing region is a large
area diaf consists of numerous urban-industrial
districts, w'ithin which distinct industrial specialties
can be identified (Figure 6-6). Altogedier, this core-
land contains almost 53 percent of the manufacturing
capacity' of the United States and Canada and the
majority of die Anglo-American market. The comple-
nientaity' transportation system of water, roads, and
railroads, made even stronger for manufacturing dis-
tricts along die St. Lawrence Seaway, provides great
advantages for both assembling materials and distrib-
uting finished products.

Measured by employment, southern New England
is one of die most industrialized areas in the United
States. The distrirt’s prominence is based on the
nineteenth-centur>' growth of the textile, leatlier-
w'orking, and machine-tool industries. In the tii'enti-
eth century', however, the region has sulfered some
severe economic problems. Any area that depends
on one or a few' products risks severe economic con-
sequences if competition arises in the form of more
efficient producers. In addition. New England and
the significance of its location changed with indus-
trial maturity'. New England is a high tax area, has
highly unionized labor markets, and relies on im-
ported resources for power. Moreover, population
increases fardier west have adversely affected New
England’s location relative to national markets; east-
ern New' England is now peripheral in some re-
spects. And die area’s once-dominant industries have
moved to die Soudi, where labor costs are lower.
New England has compensated for this loss by em-
phasizing high-value products — such as electronic
equipment, electrical machineiy', firearms, machin-
ery, and tools — which can widistand high transpor-
tation, pow'er, and labor costs. The region’s success

FIGURE 6-6

ftUnulacturiQg regions and districts of Anglo-Amerlca. Indusinal re^ons and districts
show as much vanecy in specialties as agriculture does The industry spenalnes cf each region
or distria reflea the influences of markets, materials, labor, power, arid histone forces

156

ANGLO-MlF.Rirj ,

in attrncting senice activities has also aided its trans-
formation to a modern economy. Above all. New En-
gland illustrates how tlte industrial structure of a re-
gion can change, not always by conscious choice.

Metropolitan New ^'ork contains tlie largest man-
ufacturing complex in tire United States. The citys
location at tire nroutlr of tire Hudson River, its func-
tion as tire nrajor port for the rich interior, and its
own huge population have combined to generate
and support almost 5.5 percent of all manufacturing
in the United States, lire tendency is toward diversi-
fied nranufacnrring, including printing, publishing,
machinen’ nraking, food processing, metal fabricat-
ing, and petroleum refining. A heat^ concentration
of garment manufacturing and a lack of primary' met-
als processing also characterize industry in greater
New' York.

Steel industries are prominent in tliree manufac-
mring districts. Inertia, immense capital investments,
and linkages tvith other industries once assured con-
siderable locational stability for such industries. But
now' each of these regions is undergoing major in-
dustrial change. The first district is tlie area between
Baltimore and Philadelphia, Betlilehem, and Harris-
burg, Pennsyh’ania. A massive steel-producing capac-
ity exists near all of tliese cities and supports ship-
building (along the Delaw'are River and die
Chesapeake Bay) and many other machinery' indus-
tries. The steel industn' has expanded here because
of proximitt’ to large eastern markets (odier manu-
facturers of fabricated metals and machinery') and
accessibility to external w'aterways. Tlte importance
of waterw'ay accessibility has grow'n as dependence
on foreign sources of iron ore has increased.

The second major steel district is a large triangle
with points at Pittsburgh and Erie, Pennsyh'ania, and
Toledo, Ohio. It is the oldest steel-producing center
in die United States. Its initial advantage, as men-
tioned earlier, was derived from its location between
die Appalacliian coalfields and the Great Lakes, by
w'ay of which iron ore came from die Superior
Ranges, especially' in northern Minnesota. The loca-
tional advantage of Pittsburgh and its steel producing
suburbs has diminished, however. Nowy South Amer-
ican iron ore is shipped to East Coast works, and
Canadian ore comes by w'ay of die St. Law'rence Sea-
way and the Great Lakes. The eastern steel district
(Baltimore-Philadelphia) is closer to eastern markets
and to foreign ores; and Detroit and Chicago are

more easily reached by Canadian ore and are closer
to midw'estern markets.

The area around the soudiwestern shore of Lake
Michigan (including Gary', Indiana; Chicago, Illinois-
and Milwaukee, Wisconsin) has a vast ai-ray of
machinery'-manufacturing plants diat are supplied by
the massive steelworks nearby. The steel industries
of Chicago and Gary have benefited from a superb
location: ore moving southeastward across the Great
Lakes meets coal from Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Ken-
tucky', and West Virginia. By the late nineteendi cen-
tury', Chicago had become a major transportation
center: railroads met and complemented freighters
making the soudiern Lake Michigan area an excellent
site for assembling materials and distributing manu-
factured products. The St. Lawrence Seaway has sim-
ply given renewed importance to the location, for
now Chicago and other inland cities can funaion as
midcontinent ports from which ships can sail in al-
most a Great Circle route to Europe. (A Great Circle
route is the shortest distance between two points on
the surface of the eartli.)

Southern Michigan and neighboring parts of Indi-
ana, Ohio, and Ontario are distinguished by their
emphasis on automotive production, both parts and
assembly. These industries are linked not only to tlie
Detroit steel industry but also to steel manufacturers
in the Chicago area and along tlie shores of Lake Erie
(cities such as Toledo, Lorain, and Cleveland, Ohio).
The automotive industry serves as a huge market for
major steel-producing districts on either side of the
international border.

Major problems have jeopardized the vitality of
manufacturing in the Anglo-American coreland since
the 1970s. First, manufacturers of steel and automo-
biles have faced intense competition from foreign
producers, whose labor costs are lower and whose
equipment is more modern. The resulting economic
and social stress has been felt throughout the indus-
trial community because the steel and automotive
industries are integrated into an entire complex of
industries. Second, recurring national recessions and
economic fluctuations have created economic envi-
ronments in which it has been difficult for these in-
dustries to remain competitive. Third, social prob-
lems have plagued the coreland: questions of
residential quality, social conflict, air and water pol-
lution, urban water supply, and the need to govern
and integrate numerous adjoining political units.

ANGLO AMERICA. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TRANSFOIftiATION

157

All of these problems have resulted in the re-
structuring of industry and the spatial ad) ustment of
manufacturing Some industries have grown and oth-
ers have declined In the process regional changes m
the manufacturing share of total employment have
been evident Some regions have increased, others
have decreased (Table 6-3) Regional variations
have become particularly notable during the 1970s
and 1980s, as many of the states within tire Anglo-
American manufacturing region have experienced
absolute declines in manufaauring emplo>Tner«
(Figure 6-7) However, even in areas of increased
manufacnititvg employment, the comcihuuott of
manufacturing to total nonagncultural employment
has decreased, providing further evidence of the
overall shift to a sen’ice economy (Table 6-4) The
percentage of workers in the serr’ice seaor of the
economy has grown in every region, accounting for
much of contemporary metropolitan expansion

The Southern Economic Revolution

The beginning of the economic ret'oluiion m the
South is difficult to pinpoint. It probably started m
the 1880s, with the New South advocates who be-
lieved that industnalizauon was necessary for the re-
vitalizauon of the region Thus, although the recent
increase in the southern (and western) share of man-
ufacturing in the United States has resulted from
both the absolute decline of manufacturing in the
industrial coreland and the real growth experienced
in the South, these events are really the continuation

of a process of industrial dispersion that has been
under way for many decades

The first major manufacturing aaivity to become
distinctly identified with the South was the textile
industry', which had evolved as a dominant force in
the nineteenth-cenmry industrial growth of New En-
gland By the early twentieth century, however, the
industrial maturity of New England was reflected in
high wages, unionization, costly fringe benefit pro-
grams, high power costs (imported coal), and obso-
lete equipment and buildings The old New England
textile plants closed, and new ones were established
ui the South Because the textile industry did not
grow on a niuionwide basis after 1920, this regional
shift has benefited one region at the expense of an-
other Firms m the South found a major advantage in
the quantity of labor that was available at a relauvely
low’ cost the agrarian South had a surplus of landless
rural people willing to switch from farming to man-
ufaauring Other advantages were a better location
with respea to materials used (cotton), lower cost of
power, and lower taxes By 1930 more than half of
the nation's texule industry was located m the South
At the present time more than 90 percent of cotton,
75 percent of syntheuc fiber, and 40 percent of
woolen textiles are of southern manufacture
Southern industrialization has maeased, particu-
larly since World War II, but with distina differences
In addition to the labor-onemed textile and apparel
industries, material-oriented pulp and paper, food
processmg. and forest industries have grow-n rapidly
In Texas and Louisiana petroleum refining and pet-
rochemical industries ha\’e contributed much to Gulf

TABLE 6-3

Regional share of United States manufacturing, in percent.

Region 1899 1929 1954 1967 1977 1982 1984

New England 18.1

Middle Atlantic 34.1

East North Central 22.8

West North Central 5.6

South Atlantic 9.7

East South Central 3 8

West South Central 2 4

Mountain 0 9

Pacific 2 6

124 90 B1

29 0 26 6 226

28 8 28 6 28.7

54 60 62

103 11.0 129

43 45 5.7

34 45 56

1 2 1.1 1.6

5.3 68 10 6

71 7 5 7.6

16.7 17.4 16 8

25 3 22.5 22 1

66 66 68

14.3 15 2 15.7

67 64 67

7.3 8.5 8 0

2.4 2.8 3 0

116 13 1 13.3

■ “"f ' rfMoMSeWM (WasHnglon. DO- Govammsnt Pfctmg oite, va.oo,
^Bureau Of the Census, Sfa&sfica/ Afisfracfo/ me UmfedS/afes, (WasMngloa DC. Government Printing Office, 1987J ^ ’

Note Because these figures have been rounded, the sum of the pans may not equal 100 0 percent

158

:^GLO-AMR Ry^

FIGURE 6-7

Manufacturing emplojment
shifts, a major part of recent
economic development. Ttie in-
dustrial coreland li.TS experienced a
decline in manufacturing employ-
ment as the Soutit and \X’est have
expanded.

I ^1 States totally or partially within the -3 27 Employment change (in thousands)

' tradit.onai American manufacturing region

Coast industrial expansion. The economic transfor-
mation has now reached a stage where the Soutli
itself provides a significant regional market, which
generates furtlier industrial grovih because of pop-
ulation growtli and the needs of the existing industry’.
The automotive industry’ is a good example: automo-
bile assembly plants have been built in Louisville,

Adanta, and Dallas to seiwe regional markets. The
transformation from an agrarian life-style to an urban
one has brought higher incomes and new consump-
tion patterns that have greatly increased the market
importance of a formerly rural populace. Approxr
mately 30 percent of the nation’s manufacturing is
now located in die South.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TRANSfORMAHON

159

TABLE 6-4

Manufacturtnjg employment In
relation to oonagricultural em-
ployment In the United States,
by region.

Division

i 1967

1 1985

Empkryrnent in
i Mantifadunr^
(in Tbousands)

Percentage
of Total
Nonagricultural
Einployment

Employment in
Manufacturing
(in Thousands)

Percentage
ot Total
Nonagncuiwrat
Employment

New England

1.564

36 4

1.470

24 2

Middle Atlantic

4.325

32 2

3,104

East North Central

5,116

36 9

4,213

West North Central

1,226

24 3

1,315

180

South Atianiic

2,559

27.2

3,079

184

East South Central

1,130

32 0

1,322

24 6

West South Central

1,107

20 2

1,565

153

Mountain

321

137

612

120

Paatic

2.065

247

2.617

162

Sources Bureau ot the Census. StaOsbcai Absffacr of the United States, 1Q6B (Washington, DC- Gov-
ernment Pnnting Office. 1966) and Bureau d tfia Census, Stebstica/ Abstract of the United States. 1987
(Washington, DC Government Pnnung Office. 1987)

Soufiiem Manufiicturing Regions

A distinctive manufacturing region coincides with
much of the southern Piedmont and the neighboring
parts of Alabama This region— from Danville, Vir-
ginia, to Birmingham, Alabama— is charaaerized by
light industry, rexules, apparel, food processing, and
furniture. The chief attraction has undoubtedly been
the availability of suitable labor at costs below indus-
try wage scales elsewhere As an industrial region the
Piedmont is quite unlike the core districts of the
Anglo American manufacturing region Much of its
Industry is in snuU cictes, towns, ^d— not
infrequently — rural areas Atlanta and Birmingham
are two major exceptions As time passes, however,
Urbanization is transforening die once-rural Pied-
mont

The Gulf Coast is another southern manufacturing
region, a serves of dvswncdy sepame vndws.ttval nodes
between Mobile, Alabama, and Corpus Christi, Texas
Petroleum, natural gas, salt, sulfur, and agricultural
products form the base for much of the regions in-
dustry and recent growth Its coastal location is an-
other great advantage, for both imponing raw mate-
nals and exporting finished products. Industrial
aomues include petroleum refinmg, petrochemi-
cals, and other chemicals, aluminum smelting and
teftrung, using ores from Jamaica and Guyana and
power from iocal natural gas; processing of sugar
and rice, and steel manufactunng based on local and
imported ores

The Birmingharri-Gadsden, Alabama, steel indus-
try started because of a unique circumstance coal,
iron ore, and limestone are all available nearby. Long
the major steel region of the South, the area is now
experiencing a decime in production The Coastal
Plain IS also not without industry Pulp and paper
industries and pine plywood industries have ex-
panded greatly since World War Ii, mainly because
the pme forests grow rapidly on the plain Atlanta
and Dallas-Fon Worth are noted as centers for man-
ufaaunng aircraft and assembling automobiles, but
they are not typical of southern industrial centers
Their growth is more the result of their function as
regional centers

The Growth of Manufacturing on the
West Coast

Approximately 13 percent of all manufactunng in the
United States is located on the Pacific Coast (Figure
6-8) The largest single concentrauon is in greater
Los Angeles, where food processing and aircraft, de-
fense, petrochemical, and apparel manufacturing are
dominant. The growing Hispanic population has be-
come a major source of labor for the large apparel
mdustry.

The produCTmty of California's agnculmre and
commeroal fishing stimulated the food-processing
acuvmes that became the scare’s first major industry
and were dominant unul the 1940s. World War II

160

ANGLO-AMF.RT r^^

FIGURE 6-8

Oil refineries and petro chemicals, part of the Southern California industrial com'
plex.

then generated tlie defense industries, aircraft man-
ufacture, and shipbuilding; and defense has contin-
ued to be a major employer in tlie Los Angeles area
in tlie postVi'-ar decades. In addition, automobiles,
electronic parts, apparel, and petrochemicals have
achieved importance in California’s industrial
structure. Much of its early industrial growth was
based on local material resources and rapidly grow-
ing local markets. Since die 1950s, however, indus-
tries that serve national markets have grown enor-
mously. California, particularly southern California,
has received large numbers of migrants from other
parts of die United States. And industries, especially
diose in which material and power costs are not
high, have followed die migrants.

Manufacturing in the Pacific Northwest includes
food processing (dair}^, fruit, vegetable, and fish
products), forest-products industries, primary metals
processing (aluminum), and aircraft factories. The
emphasis, however, is on the processing of local pri-

maiA' resources and die use of hydroelectric power
from the Columbia River s^'stem. The region’s great
distance from eastern markets and the smaller size of
local markets have inhibited its growth.

Canadian Industrial Growth

Secondary' activities (manufacturing) are as impor-
tant in Canada as diey are in the United States (see
Table 6-1). In fact, Canadian manufacturing is
closely integrated with that of the United States, as
indicated by bodi trade flows and die high level of
U.S. investment in Canadian industr>'.

The takeoff period in Canadian economic devel-
opment began in die 1890s and coincided with an
immense boom in economic growdi. The relatively
late start — takeoff began in die United States in the
1840s — was probably caused by several factors: (1)
die harsh physical environment attracted few'er im
migrants; (2) political independence came later, so

ANGLO-AMERICA. ECONO.vnC GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION

161

efforts to industrialize were less concened until late
in the nineteenth century, and (3) economic ties with
the United Suites were limited until thM country ap-
proached maturity, which then stimulated Canadian
development

Canadian industry and expons have been closely
tied to the production and processing of staples first,
fishing and furs, later, wheat, forest products, and
metals A maturing of the Canadian economy since
World War 11 has reduced the dommance of primary
commodities, panicularly in Ontario, but that never-
theless remains an identifying feature of the Cana-
dian economy. Wheat, primary metals (raw or par-
tially processed), forest products, oil and its refined
products, and tourism are still the major dollar earn
ers

Early twentieth-century growth was a response to
markets and capital m the United States, and Cana-
dians feared that their location would make them
simply a supplier of materials for the United States,
an economic colony Consequendy, tariffs were
adopted to encourage manufaaunng and exporta
tioti, thereby assunng primary produaion and sec-
ondary processing in Canada Some Canadians have
argued that the tariff policy has resulted in higher
prices for commodities they consume and, therefore,
in a lower lev'el of living However, tariffs have forced
the use of Canadian resources, human and material,
by stimulating manufacturing at home, which has at-
traaed an immense investment of capital in the Ca-
nadian economy by United Sutes and other foreign
companies In 1987 the United States and Canada
agreed to work toward a reduaion of trade re-
straints If the agreement succeeds, totally free trade
should exist by 1999 and should lead to greater trade
between the two countries

The Distribution of Canadian
Manufacturing ''

The St Lawrence Valley and the Ontario Peninsula
form the industrial heart of Canada and adjoin the
industrial core of the United States, which produces
79 percent of the nation’s output. The Canadian area
may be thought of as the northern edge of the Anglo-
American industrial core, specializing in the produc-
tion and processing of materials from Canadian
mines, forests, and forms

Montreal contains approximately 13 percent of
Canadian industry In some ways it parallels New
Yorkaty Both produce a v’anety of consumer items
(diiefly foodstuffs, apparel, and books and maga-
zmes) intended for local and national markets Both
function as significant ports for international trade.

Outside Montreal the Canadian mdustrial struc-
ture is more specialized The immense hydroeleanc
potential of Quebec is a major source of power for
industries along the St Lawrence River and has pro-
vided the basis for Canada's importance in the pro
duction of aluminum The Saguenay and St Maurice
rivers, tributaries of the St Lawrence, have provided
power for aluminum refining and smelting at Alma,
Arvida, Shawinigan Falls, and Beauharnois Bauxite is
shipped in from Jamaica and Guj'ana Because Can-
ada’s produCTion of aluminum far exceeds ns con-
sumption, It IS a leading exporter The aluminum
industry illustrates Canada’s role as a processor and
supplier for other nations, using both national and
international resources in that role Other metal-
processing industries located near production cen-
ters deal with copper and lead ac Flirt Flon and No-
randa. nickel at Sudbury’, and magnesium at Haleys.

The valleys of the St. Lawrence and its tributaries
are also Canada's major area of pulp and paper man-
ufacturing, with the boreal forests providing the re-
source b^e Canada is the world’s leading supplier
of newsprint, most of which is sent to the Umted
States and Europe

Outside Montreal and its vicinity the most intense
concentration of industry’ is found in the golden
horseshoe, which extends from Toronto and
Hamilton around the western end of Lake Ontario to
Si Cathannes This region produces most of Cana-
da’s steel and a great variety of other industrial
goods, such as automobile parts, assembled automo-
biles, elearical machinery, and agricultural imple-
ments It is one of the most rapidly growing indus-
trial districts in Canada, partly because more than 60
percent of C^ada’s market is found along the south-
ern edges of Ontario and Quebec provinces, and
industry appears to be increasingly market oriented

Gmada’s high protective tariff was another reason
for the growth of industry in the golden horseshoe
The tariff was iniually important when foreign capi-
tal, especially from the United States and Great Brit-
ain, was invested in industries that processed Cana-

ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING

he term postindustrial society refers to the recent and extensive
economic and social changes that have enveloped the United States
isi. and Canada. These changes include the rapid growth of employment
in traditional service activities and information services, along with a de-
emphasis on manufacturing. Some people have even labeled this restruaur-
ing of employment by economic sector as “deindustrialization.” Several
points should be understood regarding the nature of this transformation.

First, this post-1950s era is not the only time the economy of the
United States has been restructured rapidly. As Table A reveals, the shift
from employment in primary activities (largely agriculture) to employment
in the secondary, teniary^ and quaternary sectors was extensive during the
first lialf of this century', illustrating the classic transformation from an agrar-
ian society' to an industrial one. A second structural shift has occurred since
1950, especially since 1970, as the primary and secondary^ sectors have given
way in relative and absolute terms to die tertiary^ and quaternary^ sectors.
Now the economy of Anglo-America is dominated by employment in the
service and information sectors.

The first restructuring generated widespread rural-urban migration
and massive urban growdi. One impact of the second transformation has
been selective urban grov.Tj[i and decline, as older industrial centers struggle
to transform their economies while odier cities dirive with the growth of
sendees.

A second point to remember is that the emergence of a postindustrial
economy does not mean that manufacturing wall disappear. Tlie growth and

dian resources for foreign use. It has become even
more important as Canadian industry' has matured
and has sought to serve expanding Canadian mar-
kets. Foreign companies have found it necessary to
locate in Canada to avoid tariffs; they have tended
to locate in larger Canadian industrial centers —
Windsor, Hamilton, Toronto, and Montreal — or
close to the city containing die parent United States
firm. For example, many Detroit firms with subsid-
iary operations in Canada have located immediately
across the river in Windsor.^ Had the tariffs not been
imposed, Canadian industry would probably be even
more oriented to the processing of primary' materials
dian it is. The economic integration of Canada and
the United States is further suggested by the fact that
each is the other’s most important trading partner, a
relationship not unlike that of the members of Eu-
rope’s Common Market.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND
URBANIZATION

The industrial growoli of the United States and Can-
ada during the late nineteenth century' and the early
twentieth century' stimulated employment in tertiary'
activities. New' industrial jobs have a mviltipUer ef-
fect because tiiey generate employment opportuni-
ties in the sen'ice activities tiiat support the new
w'orkers. Employment expands in wholesaling, re-
tailing, education, government, the professions, and
a host of other urban-oriented activities. Thus, sec-
ondary' and tertiary' activities expand, and the cumu-
lative growtii may generate even more new' industryj
research and development activity', and additiona
service activities because a larger market exists.

Secondary' and tertiary' aaivities are more eco
nomical when they are clustered in towns and cities.

162

decline cf industry will be selective in both the United States and Canada;
but resources, huge markets, and modern technologies will assure that man-
ufacturing remains a significant component of the economy of
Anglo-America

Third, this continuing evolution of the Anglo-American economic sys-
tem includes a global Interdependence in which international trade is
fundamental to economic health Indeed, manufacturing itself is developing
a global structure through the expiansion of multinational corporations

TABLE A

Shifts In the economic sectors of the United States labor force
(values In percent of total).

Year

Primary

Secondary

Tertiary

Quaternary

1910

31 1

363

177

149

1920

32 5

320

17.8

17.7

1930

204

353

19B

24 5

1940

154

37.2

22.5

249

1950

11 9

383

190

30.8

348

17.2

420

1970

286

21.9

46 4

1980

225

28 8

48 6

Source Compiled from Oarvel Bell. The Sodal Framewont of the Information SooieV>’' Ih ed M L. Der*
touzos and Joel Moses The Compufer Agt A Twenty-Yeaf Vi»w. (Cambndge. MA MIT Press, 1 979).
\63-21i

he groMth of these aaivuies, therefore, has been
le basis for tremendous urban e-xpansion Manufac-
irmg aamties were probably the principal catalj-st
ir urban grotvih until the 1920s, but in the past fift>’
ears tertiary’ growth has become the major stimulus
luring the 1970s and 1980s, in particular, net growth
1 emplotment has been entirely m die semce sec-
)r. The United States and Canada have also expen-
nced an enormous increase m informauon services,
ow called quaternary’ aaiv’ities (see box above)

Tlie rural population of the United States in 1900,
■hen industrialization was well under way, was 46
iillion, or 60 percent of the total population By
985 the rural populauon had grown to 56 million
lut was only 24 percent of the total population Fur-
hermore, as was mentioned in chapter 5, the vast
aajority of rural residents are nonfarmers who live
a rural areas and small towns but work in urban

areas. They send their children to school and shop m
urban areas, they are urban in almost everything ex-
c^t residence Only 5 4 million people who live in
rural parts of the United States are actually farmers
At the same time rural-urban migration and the nat-
ural Increase of population in aiies has sw’elled the
urban population to almost 180 million in the United
States and to 16 million in Canada

Present and Future Regions

From the standpoint of population, both the United
States and Canada consist of a number of urban re-
gions, many of which adjoin each other and continue
to intensil)’ and increase. Figure 5-12 shows the
present urban regions of the United States and the
urtxm regions projeaed for 2000 Urban develop-
ment is so widespread in some areas as to justify’ the

163

164

: ^GLO-AM EmrA

use of die term megalopolis. Megalopolitan areas
include numerous cities diat are next to each other
or are in such proximity diat dieir boundaries are
almost indistinguishable. The interaction betu'een
these high-density centers becomes so great that
single-city identification is almost impossible, >’et ad-
ministrath^ely diis is ho'^\' diey continue to function.

Jean Gottmann first used the term megalopolis to
describe the massive urban region beween north-
ern Virginia and southern New Hampshire," The
core of the northeastern megalopolis is formed by
die cities of Washington, Baltimore. Philadelphia,
New York, and Boston. Togedier with a host of
nearby cities, diey comprise a giant urban region
widi more dian 40 million people. The northeastern
megalopolis also contains massive industrial com-
plexes with much of the nation’s manufacturing ca-
pacity- and die nadon’s most intense market concen-
tration.

Gotmiann’s designation of die nonheasiern meg-
alopolis as the "Main Street and crossroads of the
nadon" implies a fimctional significance for the re-
gion far bei’ond that of manufacturing.* Indeed, it is
a center of political and corporate management and
decision making. The ports — particularly New York
City' but also Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and
odiers — are die focal points of international and na-
tional trade, as well as the major termini of inland
railroad and high\\-a\’ systems. Furtherniore, the iia-
don's most prestigious financial and educational cen-
ters are located in the region, which indeed func-
tions as “do^-ntown USA."

Even agriculture in and near a megalopolis ha-S a
distinctive character. Dain- products, \-egetables,
poultry', and other specialty- items are produced in
quantity' for the nearby markets. iMthough produc-
tion costs are high, transponation costs are low.
Farmers occupy land diat is high in value because of
its potential urban use, not its inherent food-
producing capacity-. Farmland, like recreational land,
faces tremendous pressure from spreading urban ar-
eas. Thus, proximity' to urban regions brings farmers
some advantages but also brings problems. High
taxes and inflated offers from developers lead to re-
duced numbers of farms, even highly productive
ones.

The eastern megalopolis may extend from soudi-
ern Virginia to southern Maine by die year 2000. Tlie
projection for 2000 also shows a Great Lakes niega-

lopolitan region connecting with the eastern mega-
lopolis. The Great Lakes megalopolitan region is al
ready well advanced and by 2000 may be a major part
of a ma.ssive urban-industrial coreland that extends
from Wisconsin and Illinois to die Atlantic Coast A
series of less intense but nonetheless distinct urban
regions will extend along the Piedmont and into
northern Georgia and northern Alabama. Florida the
Gulf Coast, and the rapidly growing California meg-
alopolis bem-een San Diego and San Francisco are
other extended urban regions.

Some Urban Problems

All of these urban regions must deal witli cenain
common problems, one of which is administrative.
The actual city-, in a funaional sense, remains subdi-
vided into many independent political units. Govem-
nicins tiy- to proi’ide services and maintain jurisdic-
tion over the inner city-, while numerous suburbs
attempt the same for themselves. Frequently commu-
nity administrative functions overlap diose provided
by county go\-ernnients. Consolidation of sen-ices
and government remains a major issue in urban re-
gions. Planning and problern solving in urban areas
are complicated by differences bem-een cities and
suburbs. Economic, social, and racial segregation
leave communities with unequal abilities to generate
funds for the provision of sendees. Tlie problem be-
comes panicularly acute in central cities thate.xperi-
ence in-migration of poor whites, blacks, and in
some cases Asians and out-migration of more pros-
perous blacks and whites. Consolidated urban polit-
ical regions, or political boundaries that coincide
with real cities, would pros'ide a more equitable tax
base. Not surprisingly, however, tliat idea is often
opposed. Among the few cities tliat have attempted
such solutions are Nashville, Tennessee, and Jackson-
ville, Florida.

Population is one aspect of urban groxsth; expand-
ing land area is another. Cities and suburbs continue
to absorb substantial amounts of land. In many places
urban groxx-tli has taken place so rapidly that plan-
ning has failed to prevent unsightly development and
traffic congestion. Farmers who, witli some frustra-
tion, view themselves as hax-ing been on the land fiRt
find a new life-sty’le, system of land use, and tax scale
invading their domain. Altliough some suffer the

ANGiaAMERlCA. ECONOMIC GRO\'^'TH AND TRANSFORMATION

165

figure 6-9

“Alphabet aty” on the lower
east side of New York, Inner acy
dea%’ IS a major problem for many
large urban centers m the United
States

consequences of dev’clopers' prices with tongue in
cheek, others genuinely resent being squeezed from
some of the nation’s best agricultural land Some
people belie\-e that it is essential to protea farmland,
accordingly, New Jersey has enaaed legislation to
preserve its better agricultural lands
Our seeming cultural predisposition to empha-
size the new and to spread ourselves out^'ard from
old aties suggests that some urban problems may
intensify The economic base of many centrat

cities — and even of some metropolitan areas —
conunues to weaken (Figure 6-9) Many cities are
losing population, yet areas next to them, smaller
cities, and even remote rural areas are growing
Thus, we are experiencing the problems of growth
and decline at the same time. Indeed, a major Anglo-
American dilemma is whether to restore central cit-
ies or to neglea them benignly and thus allow the
ev’olution of new urban forms and the dispersion of
population and economic activity

SUMMAKY: CONTINUED In this chapter we have emphasized the role of agriculture and manufactur-
GROWTH AND ing in the development of Ae United States and Canada Both of these fun*

Transformation damental economic aaivitles have played an integral part in shaping the

geography of Anglo-America, as is evident in the wealth created, the
resources used, and the rural and urban landscapes. Even while these two
economic seaors continue to evolve, however, we see their comparative
importance dimmish as economic restruaunng emphasizes the growth of
services The result is a reshaping and expansion of the urban landscape,
unemployment m some areas ndth growth in others, and a redistribution of
population. Many other changes are continuing in the United States and
Canada Indeed, their economic systems, like those of other countries, are
becoming part of a global economy. The problems encountered by these
highly developed countries and contemporary changes confirm that eco-
nomic development is an ongoing process

KEY TERMS agrarian society

central city

comparative advantage
drought
economic base
economic integration
global interdependence
golden horseshoe
industrial structure
initial advantage

mechanization

megalopolis

multinational corporation
multiplier effect
New Soutli
pine barren
postindustrial society
restructuring
urban-industrial distria
urban-industrial society

BNDNO'iliS 1 Michael Ray, “The Location of United States Manufacturing Subsidiaries

in Canada,” E'cowow/c Geography Al (1971): 389-400.

2 Jean Gottmann, Megalopolis: We Urbanized Nonheastem Seaboard of
the United States (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1961).

3 Ibid., 7-9.
i

ANGLO-AMERICA:
PROBLEMS IN A
DEVELOPED REALM

INCOME DISPAIUTY AND REGIONAL
PROBLEMS

BUCK AMERICA
HISP.VNIC AMERICA
CANADIAN IDENTITl’AND UNiTi’

ven rich and developed countries like the
United States and Canada have significant and
sometimes pressing problems. We have al-
read}' discussed the complexities of supplying and
using enormous quantities of resources. Unbalanced
economic growth, ineffective integration of various
regions into a national economy, and the social, eco-
nomic, and political situations of minority groups are
other fundamental problems w'ith vdiich the United
States and Canada must deal.

INCOME DISPARITY AND REGIONAL
PROBLEMS

Large numbers of people have not been able to ac-
quire the material benefits of the average Ariglo-
American. Exactly how many poor people live in
Anglo-Zanerica depends, of course, on how povert}’^
is defined. In general, about 14 percent of the United
States population can be considered poor (Table
7-1). More than a quarter of these people are black;
according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, almost a
third of the nearly 29 million black Americans live in
poverty. Although this proportion is higher than the
proportion of w'^hites who live in poverty', the actual
number of poor whites is double that of poor blacks.

At one time the poor in the United States were
almost equally divided between metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan areas. Currently, however, almost
two-thirds of all poor people live in metropolitan
areas. Most, but not all, of these persons are concen-
trated in central cities. Poor people often make up a
smaller proportion of the total metropolitan popula-
tion than that of the poor of nonmetropolitan areas
but the metropolitan poor are more intensely con-
centrated and frequently live in ghetto communities
Poor people in nonmetropolitan areas are scattered
about and are therefore less visible, adding to their
problems with employment and services.

Not surprisingly, the greatest concentrations of
poor people live in the larger states of California,
Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.'
Numerous poor are also found throughout the
southern Coastal Plain from Virginia to Texas and in
the upland South, particularly the Appalachian Pla-
teau and the Ozarks. Rural poverty is not limited to
the South, although it is most widespread there. Ar-
eas of rural poverty can also be found in New En-
gland, the upper Great Lakes (Michigan, Wisconsin,
and Minnesota), the northern Great Plains, and the
Southwest.

It is unwdse to assign a simple, single cause or
solution to a problem that exhibits such variation in

TABLE 7-1

Povertj' in the United States, by
residence and race, 1985.

Residence

Percentage of Families Below Poverty Level*

White

Black

Spanish Origin

Region

Northeast

8.0

26.3

36.9

North Central

9.0

32.9

20.4

South

9.5

29.3

23.4

West

9.6

19.5

22.8

In metropolitan areasf

5.8

25.4

19.3

In central cities

7.9

28.5

23.8

Outside central cities

4.6

17.3

13.2

Outside metropolitan areasf

8.9

35.4

21.6

All areas

9.1

28.7

25.5

Source: Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1987 (Washington, DC; Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1987).

Poverty level is determined by the consumer price index and varies with size of family, number of chi,
dren, and age of the householder. The income cutoff at 125 percent of poverty level in 1985 was
$10,989 for a family of four; 11.4 percent of all families were below the poverty level in 1985. Thenuto-
ber of persons in poverty in 1986 was 14 percent of the United States population.
fPercentages are for 1980.

170

anglo-anerica. problems in a DEVELOPET) realm

171

social, economic, and ph>'slcal settings Certainly ra-
cial biases and cultural attitudes have created im-
mense barriers for blacks, Mexican-Americans,
American Indians, and Appalachian whites m both
rural and metropolitan areas Not only have these
biases had a direct effect on employment opportu-
nities, but they have also contributed to unequal ed-
ucation and training

However, other factors have also contnbuied lo
povert)’ For example, in portions of Appalachia, ag-
riculture has been the basic activity slnre the area
was first settled. Elsewhere agriculture has evolved
into a commercial and profitable enterpnse, but iso-
lated Appalachian farmers with small farms and poor
land have not been able to adjust to modern waj-s
Like people m other areas, they have slipped into
poverty as they faded to modemiae — a mafor prob-
lem in any dynamic and changing society.

Another fector that has contributed to income
disparity Is an imbalance in the supply of and de-
mand for workers with particular qualities and
skills— a problem with spaual implications For m
stance, In the nineteenth and twentieth centunes
large parts of the South had relatively dense rural
populations where agriculture remained labor-
intensive and agricultural workers rarely earned
more than low or modest incomes In other parts of
the country, urban-industrial growth was rapid, and
workers d^eloped skills that provided them w»th
higher Incomes. The result is distina regional vana
tions in income, with greater proportions of the total
southern population living in poverty.

Regional differences m income often prompt
workers to migrate from poorer areas to richer ones
Unfortunately, rnany such migrants are inadequately
prepared to achieve an urban life that is materially
rewarding Few of them can succeed when faced
with Imle money or few skills to begin with, life m
crowded ghettos, and deep social biases

Ihe changing significance of places, the reduced
need for specific kmds of resources, and the decline
in particular kinds of economic aaivities have also
contributed to unemplo)'ment and po%’eny. New En-
gland has experienced a decline m ns once-
dominant textile industry. Miners from Pennsylvania
to Kentucky have seen their jobs disappear as mines
were automated and the demand for coal feuled to
increase. Farmers in the South have witnessed a de-

clining and changing agricultural scene with major
implications for farm laborers, tenants, and owners
And the industrial restructuring currendy in progress
has left many urban factory workers without jobs
because the demand for their particular skills has
lessened

The result of such changes is often pockets of
economic problems, if not widespread poverty Mi-
gration may concentrate poor people in cities, but
many residual farmers, miners, and unwanted factory
laborers — unable to adjust to a changing society —
also exist in poverty. Any solution to poverty is usu-
ally for more complex than merely moving from one
place to another

Appalachia

Appalachia is an excellent illustration of the prob-
lems of poverty and the approaches to soluuons For
some people Appalachia brings to mind beautiful
mountain forests, rushing streams, isolated coves,
upper valleys with picturesque farmsteads, hillside
orchards, and prosperous farms on valley floors fe-
vered With soils formed on limestone bedrock,
Otlter people envision homespun mountain folk
with little formal education, Imng a life of Isolation
and poverty Indeed, by the 1960s the Appalachian
region was one of several in the United States that
lagged far behind the national norm

The prcAilems of Appalachia arose from its isola-
tion and inability to participate in the moderniaation
and commercialization of agriculture. The prosperity
of the coal mining era was short-lived, and it brought
more wealth to other regions than to Appalachia it-
self After 1940 mining rapidly became automated
and coni^ntrated on fewer mines, leaving behind
unemployed people and scarred landscapes Lum-
bering operauons that removed the w'ealth and
beauty of an area in just a decade or two can be
viewed in much the same way. Both the physical and
the human ecology of the region ha\’e been severely
affeaed Soil erosion, the scars of strip-mining, flood-
ing worsened by poor agricultural techniques, and
the removal of forest vegetation from watersheds
were major problems e\ en before the twentieth cen-
tuf}'. Poverty, low expectations, violence, and stagna-
tion ha\^ been a way of life in Appalachia for gener-
ations (Figure 7— y)

172

: ^GLO-Aj\lE m^rA

FIGURE 7-1

A family in povcftj' near CJiarleston, ’'R'cst Mrginia. People in po\'em’ are found in Ijotli
rural and urban settings. Earning a li\ ing remains diflicult for many families in Appalachia.

As presented in chapter 5, Appalachia consists of
uplands that extend front the maritime pro\'inces of
Canada to central Georgia and Alabamti, including
se\'eral distinct physiographic regions. The area with
severe economic and social problents is usual h' con-
sidered to be restricted to the Appalachian Plateau,
tlie Ridge-and-Valley area, tind the mountain areas
south and west of the Mohaw'k and Hudson river
valleys. But die hard-core problem area does not
coincide exactly with die physiographic region. Fig-
ure 7-2 shows die Appaladiian corridor, or prob-
lem area, as defined by die Appalachian Regional
Commission.

The Appalachian Regional Commission adminis-
ters die funds allocated under die Appalachian Re-
gional Development Act of 1965, v'hich provided for
a concerted effort to eliminate povert)-. The greatest
emphasis thus far has been on highway ; dei’elop-
ment, to lessen isolation. One reason diat early sub-

sistence farmers in the more remote sections of Ap-
palachia could not adjust to commercial agriculture
was their poor resource base; another was their dis-
tance from markets. Although lumber and coal re-
sources were han'ested in Appalachia, the profitable
markets were elsewhere. Coal and lumber stimu-
lated the dex^elopnient of transportation, but only to
the degree necessary^ to haul the products out of the
region. Outside companies controlled die resources,
so profits flowed to other regions, not to Appalachia.

The concept of circular causation and grovdi v®
introduced in chapter 4. If advantages can initiate a
process of circular causation, disad\mntages can do
die same, but in reverse. In Appalachia isolation, po^■
erty^ low education levels, and limited incentive hare
fed on each other and have led to further problems.
Some believe diat improvements in transportation
will stop the cy'cle of poverty’’ by stimulating oco
noniic growth; diey argue that industry' will locate

ANf^LO ANiERiCA; PROBLEMS IN A DEVELOPED REALM

173

Appabchiaa region of (be United States. The Appalachian
region has long been an area of economic and social problems
It should be recognized, ho«ecer, that such a region Is not uni
form, some portions are areas of growth and economic
progress, and other portions ooniinue to lose populaiion. One
of the most persistent and severe problem areas has been the
Kentucky andU’esc Viigmia portion, sshere the declining need
for coal miners contributed maior problems after U’orkl \*’ar II
Renesied demand for coal in response to higher oil prices has
brought modest relief to ponions of Appalachia

near highw’ay’s and that^palachia’s potential for rec-
reation and tourism can be exploited Other people
view the problem differently Thej’ behet'C that the
interior of Appalachia is disadtantaged by both his-
tory and location, and ihe>' do not consider transpor-
tation development a panacea These people see the
greatest potential for growth and economic improve-
ment in the cities on the edges of the region, where
interaction with other cities or population regions is
more likely. Isolated Appalachian communities have
onij’ a small, scattered, unskilled or wrongly skilled
Ubor supply and can easily become ovenndusinal-
ized relative to their labor supply, even where low-
^age, labor-intensive industry is involved

Most of the urban growth centers are, in faa, pe-
ripheral to the Appalachian corridor The northern
edge, in Pennsylvania and New York, is relatively
prosperous. So Is the peripheral Piedmont, betw’een
Virginia and Alabama Highways may simply help
some of the corridor people leave for the more ad-
vantageous periphery and may not really change con-
ditions within the corridor. Despite all of the efforts
expended on the development of the Appalachian
region, n continues to lag behind the national econ-
omy per capita income in Appalachia is about 81
percent of the national lev’el (see box on p. 175) Not
unexpectedly, the effectiveness of this type of re-
gional planning effort is being debated, and some
think Uiat agencies like the Appabchian Regional
Commission should be abolished

Nevertheless, by 1980 the commission was able to
cue substantial progress in improving conditions in
Appalachia In addition to more than 1,700 miles
(2,757 kilometers) of highway impros’ements, man-
ufacturing had increased, per capita Income had
risen modestly (although not to national norms), and
health care Itad improved notably (Table 7-2) In-
fant mofiality was down from 27.9 deaths per 1,000
births in 1963 (not unlike the rates In some poor
countries) to 1 1 4 m 1 982. Out-migration had ceased
in some areas, and reverse immigration had led to
population growth

Unforiunaiely, some indicators also suggested that
certain pans of Appalachia had declined es’en fur-
ther As structural change occurs in the economy of
the United States, manufacturing is no longer a major
growth seaor, and employment in low-skilled, labor-
intensiv'e industries has declined The mte'rior, or
hard<ore, segments of Appalachia that have been
struggling to become industrialized may find that a
very difficult task as the national economy shifts aw’ay
from industry’ toward services.

FURTHER READINGS

The processes of immigration and settlement have affected the two
nations differently. The larger population of the United States has aided in
die accumulation of greater wealth through the processing and use of the
nation’s resources. The United States, however, is now consuming on such a
scale that the cost and availability of basic goods may well encourage or re-
quire the limitation of growth, or even stabilization. On the other hand, the
economic sluggishness of the Anglo-American economies during the early
1980s and the problems of economically moribund communities suggest
that limiting growth may be difficult or unwise.

For less populous Canada greater economic independence and inter-
nal industrial growth may require domestic population growth and expan-
sion. The value of population growth for developing and using resources is
e\'en now reflected in Canadian immigration policies. Although stabilization
may be necessary for some large and developed countries, substantial eco-
nomic development may occur for others in the context of population
growth and increasing demand.

The internal problems of both countries include the need to integrate
minority groups into the larger society. As the United States and Canada
progressed, entire regions as well as minority groups lagged in the acquisi-
tion of wealth and position within the system. Effective means are now
needed to incorporate the pockets of poverty into the larger economy.

American society will have to make other adjustments, too. North
Americans are becoming even more urban, although the form of urban ar-
eas may differ from that of the past. The large urban formations— the mega-
lopolitan regions discussed in chapter 6 — may require new approaches to
government and planning. These are such highly integrated urban systems
tliat many needs such as water, transportation, revenue, and recreation facili-
ties must be planned witliin a regional framework that extends far beyond
the traditional political city.

Appalachian corridor
black migration
borderland
English Canada

French Canada
Hispanic
income disparity
poverty

Annals, Association of American Geographers 62 (1972): 155-374. A special issue
devoted entirely to the regional geography of the United States.

BirdsaJl, Stephen S., and John \V. Florin. Regional Landscapes of the United States
and Canada. 2d ed. New- York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981. A basic regional textbook
covering tfie physical, economic, and social aspects of the United States and Canada.

Blackbourne, /knthony, and Robert G. Putnam. The Industrial Geography of Canada.
New' York: St. Manin’s Press, 1984.

M ^O-A-MERICA: problems in a developed realm

183

Borchen, R. “American Metropolitan Evolution ” Geographical Renew 57
(1967) 301-332 Adassicworic descnbmg American metropolitan e\olution in the
context of changing iran^iort cedinol<^

Brunn, Stanley D , and James O Wheeler, eds V:>e Amencart Metropolitan System
Present and Putin e New York Halsied Press. V H Winston, 1980 Acollealonof
writings on the contemporary metropolitan s^-stem

Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract of tlx United States Washington, DC Gov-
ernment Printing Office A \'ery useful annual publication

Bureau of Mines Mineral Facts and Problems Washington, DC Government Printing
Office An annual publicauon with information on the resource position of Anglo-
Amenca

Canada Yearbotdi Ottawa Dominion Bureau of Siatisucs An annual publication of
statisucs with narratives on Canada's resources, history, insttmiions, and social and
economic conditions

Clark, David Posi-lrtdustnal America A Geographical Perfective New York Meth-
uen, 1985 Describes the economic system evolving with the shift to a service econ-
omy

Economic (jsoff-afdjy AS {\97l) 1-134 A special issue enotled “Contributions to an
Understanding of Black America "

Fisher, James S . and Ronald L Miichelson “Forces of Change in the American Settle-
ment Pattern,’’ Geograpbteal Revteui 71 (1981) 298-310 A discussion of the varied
forces contributing to shifts in population and American settlement.

Garreau, Joel The Nine Nations of North America Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1981 A
popular descripoon of nine idenufiable regions in North Amenca, based on eco-
nomic and social considerations

Gottmann. Jean Megaltfohs The Urbanized Nortixastem Seaboard Of the United
States Oitnbfidge. MA. MfT ft-ess, 1961 A classic description of America’s first mega-
lopohtan region

Gregor, Howard F "The Large Industnalized American Crop Farm A Mid-Latitude
Plantation Variant " Geographical Reineiv 60 (1970) 151-175
Hart. John Fraser The Look of dx Land Englewood Cliffs, NJ Prentice-Hall, 1975 A
good syinhesis of the origins and character of the American landscape

■ Loss and Abandonmeor of Cleared Farmland in the Eastern United States ”

Annals, Assoc«ai/;on of American Geo^ziphers 58 (1968) 417-440
Lloyd, William J 'Understanding late Nineteenth-Century American Ciues ”
Geographical Reiiew 71 (1981) 460-471

Malcolm, Andrew H The Canadians New York Time Books, 1985.

Memig, Donald W The Sftapmg Amenca A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years
offiistory Vol l,A/fa«/£cAwertcci. 1492-1800 New Ha%-en Yale University Press
1986

Morrill, Richard L, and Ernest H Wohlenberg The Geography of Poverty m the
United States New York AfcGraw-Hill Book Co, 1971

Nostrand, Richard L ‘The Hispanic-American Borderland Dehmitation of an Ameri-
can Culture Region "Annals, Association of American Geograp/xrs 60 (1970)
638-6(51

Nojelle, Thiero' J . and Thomas M Stanbeck. The Economic Tran^ormation of
American Cities Totowa, NJ Rowman and Allanheld, 1984 Treats the impaa of the
North American eomomic transformation on cities.

Paterson, J. H. North America: A Geography of Canada and the United States '
New '^'ork: Oxford Universiw Press, 1984. A standard textbook on Canada and il'*'^
United States, organized with a topical and regional framework.

Phillips, Phillip D., and Stanley D. Brunn. “Slow Growtli: A New Epoch of Arner'
.Metropolitan Evolution." Geographical Revieiv 68 (1978); 274-292. A discussio
tlie likely impact of slow' population growth on metropolitan evolution. A good"c°
panion paper to die Borchert paper cited earlier.

Pred, Allan. “Industrialization, Initial Advantages, and American Metropolitan
Growtli.” Geographical Review 55 (1965); 158-185. A good discussion of the bask
for die location of early American urban-industrial centers.

Raitz, Karl B., et al. Appalachia: A Regional Geography. Boulder, CO- Weswiew p
1984. ’ ’

Smith, Everett G., Jr. “America’s Richest Farms and Ranches.” Annals, Association of
Ametican Geographeis 70 (1980): 528-541. ’

White, C. Langdon, Edwin J. Foscue, and Tom L. McKnight. Regional Geography qf
Anglo-America. 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985. A standard textbook
organized according to a regional framework.

Zelinsky, Wilbur. Tlje Cultural Geography of the United States. Englewood Cliffs, M-
Prentice-Hall, 1973. A short but excellent treatment.

“North America’s Vernacular Regions.” Antials, Association of American Ge-
ographers 70 (1980): 1-17.

Louis De Vorsey, Jr.

ne tiling tliat see ultramodern hydro- '
pi* tte\ er fails to foils skimming commut-
impress Noitli ers along the Thames
/\merican visitors to Eu- , River to their high-tech
rope is the way in which jobs in a world center of ^
European life and land- financial decision male-;' ' ;
scapes incorporate ele- ; • ing. A few steps farther
ments of the past into on one can purdiase a
the patterns of the colorful London tabloid .

present. Standing near newspaper (boasting the '
the tmeient Tower of world’s largest daily cir- >;
London, built by William culation) at a newsscind
the Conqueror, one can built against the ruins of- ;

WESTERN EUROPE

a Roman tempJe dating
back to the time of the
Caesars In the country-
side die visitor can drive
a luxuriouslv’ appointed,
computer-monitored
European "road
machine" along roads
that have been altered
litde since Roman engi-
neers laid them out.
Traces of rebct fields
established bj’ Iron Age
Celtic farmers lie next to
modem, highly mecha-
niaed farms that are vert-
able food faaorfes Ev-
equhere in vresrern
Europe the landscape
bears eloquent
testimony to tlie fact that
die present is but die
past flowing into die
fiimre.

North Americans can
learn much from the
Western European heirs
to sudi a long and rich
heritage of cultural and
economic development.
Some experts suggest
diat the forces of mod-
em economic develop-
ment mav' be leading
toward a world culture
paaern that strongly re-
sembles Western
Europe's urban-
mdustrialized culture.

which began ro take
form two centuries ago
Right or wrong, this is a
challenging notion
Tliroughout their
long cultural evolution,
tile peoples of Western
Europe have created
ncli and varied land-
scapes On one level
these landscapes provide
the fascinating visual
panoramas diat captivate
visitors from other coun-
tries On anodier level
these landsapes can be
studied as metaphorical
documents, for tbev re-
veal many things about
the people who shaped
them and gav'e them
their distinctive charac-
ter. How have Western
Europeans assessed and
evaluated the unique
pht-sical attributes of
their homelands, which
are outlined and dis-
cussed in chapter 8’ This
is the crucial question
addressed in cliapter 9
The facets of die Euro-
pean experience iliat are
presented and discussed
help us understand the
geographical
con.sequences of devel-
opment in our own
country as well as the

rest of the world
Cliapter 10 under-
takes a revnew' of the
many mdivndual coun-
tries and national econo-
mies that make up West-
ern Europe today. It
quickly becomes dear,
after reading this chap-
ter, that modern Western
Europe is on the verge
of an unprecedented
economic, geographical,

and political
integration— -an integra-
tion of histone political
entitles that promises to
have a profound impact
on people all over the
world Western Euro-
pean affairs are the
concern of all, particu-
larly the people of
North America and the
rest of the developed
world

W estern Europe is home to more than 360
million of the earth’s most productive and
prosperous people (Figure 8-1). The
many political units they inhabit cover an area tliat is
much smaller than either the United States or Can-
ada: only 3 percent of the eartli’s total land surface is
occupied by Western Europe. Moreover, many of the
most populous and advanced countries of Western
Europe are at the same latitude as the thinly popu-
lated northern portion of Canada. How have so many
people managed to create such productive and com-
fortable life-styles in this relatively small and north-
erly region? The answer is not simple.

Because of their high state of development, West-
ern Europeans often appear closer to being the mas-
ters of their physical environment dian do the people
of any other great culture region (see box on pp.
194-195). Industrialization and urbanization cause
modern Europeans to feel the effeas of many ele-
ments of their physical environment in less direct
and more subtle ways.

WESTERN EUROPE: CENTER OF THE
LAND HEMISPHERE

By moving far into space, astronauts and cosmonauts
have been able to gain a unique view of our planet;
they have seen and photographed it, one hemi-
sphere at a time. If a photograph were taken from a
space station directl)' above the small X on the map
of West Germany in Figure 8-2, it would reveal the
most important hemisphere of all, the Land Hemi-
sphere. This half of the earth’s surface contains
about 90 percent of the inhabited land area and
about 94 percent of the total population and eco-
nomic production of the world.

As a result of their central location in the Land
Hemisphere, Western Europeans enjoy relatively
easy contact with almost the entire habitable world
and its resources. This advantageous location began
to take on significance in the fifteentli century, when
Europeans mastered the art and technology of distant
oceanic navigation and when world sea-lanes to the
New World, Africa, India, and East Asia began to func-
tion as circulation routes for people, materials, prod-
ucts, and ideas. The colonial empires of many West-
ern European nations were partly a reflection of
Europe’s centrality and early technological prowess.

Later, the advent of railroad technology opened up
the vast continental interiors and enlarged the world
network that focused on Western Europe.

Today, long-range aviation and high-speed oce-
anic commerce further emphasize the tremendous
significance of the centrality of Western Europe,
Western Europeans have consistently been in the
forefront of commercial aviation. Count Ferdinand
von Zeppelin of Germany organized the world’s first
commercial airline in 1910 with his famous airships,
or Zeppelins, as the lighter-than-air craft were
known. By 1 919 the first regular international airmail
serN'ice had been established between London and
Paris. British Overseas Airways began the first regu-
larly scheduled jet airliner service in 1952. Thus, it is
not surprising that the British and French combined
to develop the world’s first supersonic commercial
airliner, the sleek Concorde.

The Arctic Ocean basin is becoming increasingly
imponant in world geopolitics. As the Soviet Union
and Canada establish tlieir international legal and
strategic positions there, the northeast and northwest
passage sea routes are cenain to be used more and
more for world shipping. These historic arctic sea-
lanes to tlie north of Eurasia and Nortli America rep-
resent significant shortcuts between Western Europe
and tlie markets of Japan, China, and the west coast of
North America. Soviet icebreakers have already dem-
onstrated their ability to reach the North Pole during
the summer. It seems safe to predict that die central-
ity of Western Europe will become even more im-
portant as transportation technologies such as sub-
mersible oil tankers and cargo-carrying lighter-than-
air craft are perfected in die years aliead.

MARITIME ORIENTATION

Western Europe, viewed from a continental perspec-
tive, forms a ragged Atlantic fringe on the vast Eur-
asian landmass. Its sheltered coasts and many har-
bors provided an almost perfect setting for the
development of maritime-oriented economies as tlie
Europeans extended their world trade and political
linkages during the past five centuries. Because of its
irregular and fragmented outline. Western Europe
has a higher ratio of coastline to total land area than
any other major culture region has.

190

HGURE 8-1

Countries and principal cities of Western Europe. Western Euk^ is composed of many
countries Most are small in area, but some have large populations Home of Western culture
and the Industrial Revolution, this region plays a m3)Oc role in weald affairs

FIGURE S-2

V^’estcri! Europe, the center of the Land Hemisphere and a worldwide colonizer. The
impnet of Western European culture has been so great that die phrase “European explosion” is
used to charaaerize the region’s influence in many parts of the world. Western European
countries used dicir colonies as sources of raw materials and as markets for mother-country
products

Only a small handful of the countries in Western
Europe lack direct ocean access, and no part of West-
ern Europe is far from the sea and its challenges.
Numerous seas, gulfs, and bays — including the Nor-
wegian, North, Baltic. Mediterranean, Adriatic, Lig-
urian, and Aegean seas; the Gulf of Botlinia-, and the
Bay of Biscay — pro\’ide Western Europeans with
matchless opportunities for ocean-borne contacts
;ind trade. No yvonder flags of the Western European
nations are commonplace in ports the world o\^er.

THE CONTINENTAL ARCHITECTUKE OF
WESTERN EUROPE

Tire term continental architecture is somewhat
unusual. It includes the arrangement of landforms
— such as plains, uplands, and mountains— that
make up the physical framework, or skeleton, on
which Western Europeans have built their Ian
scapes. At first glance the physical map of Europe
might seem complicated and confusing
8-3). However, extensive areas share certain Ian

nGURE8-3

S«l«itd physical features and physiographic regions of U'estem Europe. Most of
Western Europe’s population lives in the ferule Great European Ham and other losvbnd areas
Jtanyofthe region’s minerals, hov.e\'er, are located In the Central Inlands and the Northwest-
^ Highlands The Alpine Mountains are a hindrance to nordi south transport and sene as a
dimatic barrier

193

THE EIGHTH WONDER OF THE WORLD

W n his widely read text Geograplyy of Europe, Jean Gottmann writes,

Ip “Sweat has flowed freely to bring European landscapes to their present
Mr. shape.” In this single sentence Gottmann captures much of the essence
of a major theme in the human geography of this important culture region.
For centuries the work of mastering Europe’s namral environment was ar-
duous and depended largely on human and animal muscle power. Peasants
spent long hours plowing and fertilizing sterile soils to make them produc-
tive. Along die coastal fringes of the Nortli Sea, countless generations strug-
gled to drain land and keep it dry enough for cultivation. The vast oak for-
ests that once covered much of the nortliern half of Europe presented yet
another challenge. Hardy axmen gradually turned small clearings into open
fields for die mixed farming s)'stem that eventually came to dominate this
region.

The work of mastering die powerful environmental forces of Western
Europe condnues even today, with increasingly larger projects and increas-
ingly more sophisticated techniques and equipment. An excellent example
is found on the Thames River, which flows through London. A litde down-
stream from the city die Thames Barrier, the world’s largest movable flood
barrier, is now operating to ensure that a catastrophic tidal surge — a huge
surge of water forced upstream by the tide — will not flood the streets and
subways of the heart of London. A brochure distributed at the
w'ell-equipped visitors’ center next to the barrier proclaims it the eighth
wonder of the world.

London has been subject to tidal flooding for much of its long histog'.
In 1089 the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle recorded a surge tide; “On the festival
of St. Martin die sea flood sprung up to such a height and did so much
harm as no man remembered diat it ever did before.” In 1236 another ob-
server reported that “men did row with wdierries in the midst of Whitehall’s
great palace.” Over the centuries flood levels have risen; data from the eigh-
teenth centuiy onward indicate that flood depths have increased at the rate
of about 2 feet (0.6 1 meters) per century^

forms, a fact that will help us understand the diverse
human and economic patterns of modern Western
Europe.

Western Europe occupies a portion of each of the
four great physiographic subdivisions of Europe;

1 the Northwestern Highlands

2 the Great European Plain

3 the Central Uplands

4 the Alpine mountain system of southern
Europe

The divisions follow a general west-to-east trend
across Europe (Figure 8-3). This orientation con-
trasts sharply with that of Anglo-America, w’here the
major physiographic divisions are aligned from
north to south.

The west-east orientation in Europe has had a pro-
found influence on the region’s development. For
one thing it has allowed marine climatic influences
to penetrate relatively easily into much of Western
Europe. If a lofty range of mountains, such as the
Rockies, had crossed Europe from north to south, the

194

In 1953 that same North Sea tidal surge that created such havoc m the
Netherlands also inundated much of the east coast of England More than
300 people drowned, 100 of them along the lower reaches of the Thames
In the 1970s and early 1980s wammg posters on London’s subtvay platforms
told people what to do during a flood alert and mapped those parts of tlie
city ^at were m danger of flooding The direa costs of such a flood, had it
occurred m modem London, might well have topped $7 billion

The risk of floods has mcreased (1) because the les'el of the sea is ns-
ing gradually all over the wxirld, (2) because the continental plate on which
England lies is tilting toward the souilieast, and (3) because London i5
slowly sinking as the great weight of its buildings compresses and compacts
the underlying clay soils If a storm surge should coincide with a high tide,
the risk of flood is even greater, and this continuing threat cannot be pre-
dicted To make matters worse, when the Thames estuai>' was dredged so
that larger ships could enter it, the channel was unintentionally streamlined,
and the upstream rush of the tidewaters was accelerated

Officially put into operation in 1986, the barrier took more than a de-
cade to construa Planning even required the creation of an exact scale
model of the Thames's 60-mile (97-kilometer) course from its estuary to the
udal limit upstream from London The barrier consist of enormous movable
steel gates set between concrete piers that house the machinery to raise and
lower the gates When the barrier is not m use, the floodgates lie In sub-
merged precast concrete sills set m the bed of the river Ships can pass
right over the gates and between the piers, and the normal ebb and flow' of
the tide are not affeaed But if a tidal surge appears likely, the floodgates
can be raised to form a temporary' dam, or barrier, higher than the 1953
high-tide level A safe and secure London now- boasts the eighth wonder of
the world, where the threat of catastrophic floods lurked only a few’ years
ago.

penetration of these influences would hav'e been se-
verely limited, and Western Europe would have de-
veloped in a far different way. If the Alps and the
Northwestern Highlands had formed a continuous
barrier from the Mediterranean to the Arctic, West-
ern Europe might today be part of the underdevel-
oped world Such an alignment in the northerly lat-
itudes of Western Europe would certainly have
created a far more severe climate there, resulting In
a greatly narrowed range of agricultural opportuni-
ties and extremely difficult transportation Great is

the significance of basic geographic panems to hu-
man economic development.

The Northwestern Highlands

The Northwestern Highlands include Iceland and
Norway, much of Sweden, a large portion of the Brit-
ish Isles and Finland, and the Breton Peninsula in
northwestern France. Generally speaking, the area is
underlain by very hard and geologically ancient
rocks In a few' areas like Iceland, volcanism is still

195

196

WSTERN Eim nop

actively building masses of igneous rock. Cragg)'',
hilly uplands and windswept plateaus dominate the
landscape there (Figure 8-4). Isolation and rugged-
ness, plus the cold climate and exposure to gale-
force winds, create many serious problems for the
people of tliat region.

Several thousand years ago the climate in this part
of the world was much colder than it is today. Annual
snovkfalls accumulated on highland surfaces and
failed to melt in tlie cool summers. Gradually, the
great thickness of the accumulating snou^fields led to
the formation of continent-sized glaciers. These pon-
derous masses flowed slowly but relentlessl)’ from
the higher elevations toward the sea. Because of the
incredible weight of the ice that accumulated over
many centuries, the glaciers ground and gouged the
land over which they flowed. As a result of glacia-
tion, many areas in the Northwestern Highlands
have almost no soils and exist as vast stretches of
barren rock that continue to defy human attempts to
put them to productive use. These landscapes go a
long way toward explaining why many Icelanders,
Norw^egians, and other northern Europeans have tra-
ditionally turned to the sea and its resource potential
in an effort to find a rich and rewarding way of life.
Certainly the location of some of die world’s most
productive fishing grounds just off tlte coasts of these

countries has encouraged fishing rather than farming
as a way of life. °

Other visible relics of the glacial heritage of the
Northwestern Highlands are the vast areas of marsh-
land and countless lakes that dot the landscapes of
much of Ireland, Sweden, and Finland. The many
lalces serve as reservoirs for producing hydroelec-
tricity, the region’s chief source of power. Except for
some United Kingdom coal, fossil fuels (petroleum
and coal) are almost entirely absent from the geo-
logically ancient Northwestern Highlands. Conse-
quently, hydroelectric power installations have
played a significant role in industrial development
there (Figure 8-5). Norway and Sweden are among
the world’s leading producers of hydroelectricity.

Still otlter reminders of the glacial heritage are the
deep ^ords that characterize the coast of northwest-
ern Europe. These glacially excavated, now-flooded
valleys allow the sea to penetrate deeply into the
land. In Scodand and Norway the stark beauty of the
fjords has become the basis for a thriving and prof-
itable tourist trade.

The agricultural potential of the Northwestern
Highlands is severely limited by rugged topography,
thin and infertile soils, remoteness, and the exces-
sively cloudy, wet, cool climate. Consequently, agri-
culture is largely restricted to grazing sheep and cat-

nCURE 8-4

A small cottage on a remnant
lava field in Iceland, where vol-
canism remains active. Wind-
swept and hilly upland.s charaaerize
much of the Northwest Highlands,
of which Iceland is a pan.

figure 8-5

wurcw In Western Europe. The gbcul heritage of the Northwestern Hi^ands
ts limned economic opponunities, but glacial scounng has created a landscape wih hy-
In the United Kingdom and adjacent nonhnestem Europe thidt,
ban W ^ hat's provided the energy source for modem manuiactunng and ur-
thc p!^ southern Europe is power defkieni. relying largely on hydroelec-

b'g increasta I n^ountain system Throughout Wesicrn Europe atomic power is becom-

198

TOternI^

tie. In more sheltered inland locations the grass
cover is replaced by hardy coniferous foiests, tlie
westernmost extent of the great taiga forest bell that
girdles subarctic Eurasia from the North Sea to the
Sea of Okhotsk (see Figure 3-4). Trees are grown as
a crop to provide the raw materials for a host of
forest-related industries, such as paper-and-pulp
manufacturing, lumbering, and construction. Large
segments of the national economies of Norway, Swe-
den, and Finland are based on such industries; in
fact, Sweden and Finland consistently rank as Eu-
rope’s first and second most important exporters of
both lumber and wood pulp.

In addition, metallic minerals are found in some
of the ancient rock masses of the highlands and fre-
quently support important mining operations. By far
the best Imown of Lhese mining centers is nortli of
tire Arctic Circle near the Swedish cities of Kiruna
and Gallivare Ilre.-^e ulnamodern cities have been
built to support the mining of one of the world’s
great deposits of high-grade iron ore. Such cities in
the interior of the Ntiitliwesiern Highlands are tire
exception rather than the rule, however; this region
is one of Europe’s most thinly settled areas. Little in
the habitat of the Northwestern Flighlands encour-
ages people to settle there in large numbers. It is
largely a land dominated by glaciers, rugged uplands,
quiet crystal lakes, rushing rivers, and dark forests
that yield their wealth grudgingly to a small but hardy
population.

The Great Europeasi Plain

South of the Northwestern Highlands, the Great Eu-
ropean Plain stretches eastward from the Pyrenees
Mountains to the Ural Mountains. In most places the
plain is a broad, gently rolling lowland, but in West-
ern Europe it narrows considerably and is inter-
rupted by semienclosed bodies of water, such as the
English Channel, the North Sea, and die Baltic Sea.
Generally, the Great European Plain is underlain by
geologically younger rocks, including man)’ sedi-
mentar)' layers. Most of those sedimentary rocks are
relatively soft and weather more easily than the
harder crystalline rocks of the adjacent highlands.
The land has a softer look, even where local folding
and warping have thrust up ranges of hills. These
hills are only moderately high, but they have consid-

erable local importance because their soils and pre
cipitation rates are different from those of the sur-
rounding lowlands. On the whole, the region has
presented a stimulating degree of challenge rather
than impenetrable barriers (Figure 8-6). The area is
also richly endowed with a wide range of resources
The Great European Plain in Western Europe is one
of the world’s most populous and highly developed
regions.

During glacial periods part of this region was cov-
ered by the continental ice sheets that flowed down
from the Northwestern Highlands. Wherever the gla-
ciers stopped moving, die}' deposited great quanti-
ties of rock, sand, and soil. As a result, the topogra-
phy, drainage, and soils in these areas are more
varied and complex than they are in areas that the
glaciers did not reach. These differences contribute
to the agricultural variety tltat marks much of the
Great European Plain today.

As Figure 8-3 shows, tlie Great European Plain is
bounded bt' seas to the nortli and high land to the
south. Many large rivers — the Seine, the Rhine, the
Ems, and die Weser — flow across the region in a
northwesterly direction. Tliese rivers have provided
the people of Western Europe widi natural travel and
trade routes. The Great European Plain itself has
seiwed as Europe’s major west-east route. Today, the
highways, railway's, rivers, and canals of the Great
European Plain are integrated into one of the world's
most efficient transportation netw'orks. Unlike the
great Plains of Nordi America, the Great European
Plain supports a productive web of urban and indus-
trial activities.

Many of the world’s greatest cities and industrial
centers have grown up in die Great European Plain.
One of the most fundamental reasons for their
growth has been die proximity of coal deposits (see
Figure 8-5). As a fuel resource coal had only local
significance for a very' long time. Not until die middle
decades of the eighteenth century' did it become a
factor that changed the lives of large numbers of
Western Europeans. During that period the steam
engine w'as perfected, and coke was used in blast
furnaces to process iron ore in large quantities.

The agricultural potential of the Great European
Plain in Western Europe is immense. In Denmac'
and die Netherlands, for example, almost 75 percent
of the total land area is used for some form of

^TERN EUROPE A VARIED HOME FOR HUMANITY

199

figure 8“6

Fannstead and farmland on a
polder In Zealand Province of
the Nedierlands. A ship is visible
in the dunnel behind the dike
Much of the NetherLmda is below
sea level, reclamation of this seg
mem of the North European Pbin Is
an engineenng manel

cuJtural aaivicy. Tlie range of crops is also broad,
including most of the tcmperate-cIimate foods and
fibers knosiTi today. The generally mild, moist cli-
mate contributes to the agricultural potential, rain-
M. although not heavy, is evenly distributed
throughout all sea.sons of the year, and temperatures
are moderate in summer and winter
In terms of almost everj- faaor needed to support
intensive development, the Great European Plain of
Western Europe is well endowed and ha.s allowed
modem, technologically advanced societies to
emerge there in large degree. In this habitat alert,
invenme, and energetic populations have been able
to create some of the world’s richest and most varied
We-st>les.

The Central Upland5

The Central Uplands are an interrupted zone of hilly
and rugged plateau surfaces that cross the central
pan ofEurope generally south of the Great European
Plain They are composed of geologically ancient
rocks and resemble portions of the Appalacliian
Mountains of the United States Like the Appalachians
tend to be rounded, only moderately high, and
heavily forested.

Many of Europe's great rivers flcjw through the
Central Uplands in deep valley’s that make movement
across the region difficult Most transportation routes
and important settlements are located in these val-
leys. and they form the chief focus for life In the
Central Uplands.

The Central Uplands are not as produaive or as
densely populated as the Great European Plain is, but
they' are important for their extensive and varied
mineral deposits Mining and metalworking had an
early start in this region; coal was found near the
surface where the river valleys passed from the Cen-
tral Uplands to the Great European Plain The Ruhr
Valley, in West Germany, is typical of this coal-
producing zone and traditionally nmks among the
world's greatest mining and industrial regions

Neither are the Central Uplands as well suited to
agricultural enterprises as the Great European Plain
is Much of the upland terrain is rugged and steeply
sloping Temperatures are cooler, and rainfall is
more abundant. But die cool, wet conditions favor
the growing of grass and other fodder crop,s for
herds of grazing animals The densely populated in-
dustrial regions in and around the margins of the
Central Uplands are ready markets for livestock
produas

200

The Alpine Region

The Alpine region, which stretches across the south-
ern flanlc of Europe, is characterized by high moun-
tains, rugged plateaus, and steeply sloping land. Parts
of three major peninsulas — the Iberian, the Italian,
and the Balkan — are included in this region, as are a
number of Mediterranean island groups.

Geologically, the lofty, folded Alps are relatively
young. In many respects they are similar to the Rocky
Mountains of the United States. Like the Rockies the
Alps have many peaks that rise more than 10,000 feet
(3,048 meters) above sea level; some top 15,000 feet
(4,572 meters) (Figure 8-7). Breaks in the Alpine
system are few but extremely important. These
passes, or lower portions of the mountains, have
served as traditional focal points for routes connect-
ing northern Europe with the Mediterranean Basin.
Certain of these Alpine passes — such as the Brenner,
St. Bernard, and St. Gottliard — have been among the
most important routes of human movement in all
history. Today, highway and railroad tunnels speed
travelers under the passes in comfort at all seasons.
And pipelines carrt' oil from ports on the Mediterra-
nean Sea to the industrial regions of central Europe
tlrrough the same historic Alpine passes that saw tlie
march of Caesar’s armies.

People who live in the Alpine region are fre-
quently reminded of the area s geological youth
Earthquakes, a symptom of geologic activity, are
common. Volcanic activity, too, is a sign of geologic
unrest and youihfulness. In the Italian province of
Tuscany, volcanic hot springs and steam geysers are
tapped to provide geothermal energy for industrial
use.

Industrial activity in southern Europe is concen-
trated in such centers as Barcelona, Spain; Marseilles
France; Genoa, Turin, and Milan, Italy; and Athens'
Greece. These centers are located on coastal plains
or in enclosed lowland basins within the Alpine re-
gion. Because coal and petroleum are largely lacking
in this part of Europe, the rapidly flowing rivers of
the Alps have been extensively used to produce hy-
droelecU’icity (see Figure 8-5).

High elevations, tliin soils, and steep slopes se-
verely limit agriculture in large areas of the Alpine
region. In some places, however, agriculture flour-
ishes. Vineyards, orchards, and olive groves lend a
distinctive character to the agricultural landscapes
along the soutlnern flank of Europe, and the propor-
tion of people engaged in agriculture is far higher in
tltis region of Western Europe than it is in the three
regions to the north. For example, only about 2 per-
cent of tlie labor force in the United Kingdom is

FIGURE 8-7

The spectacular Alpine land-
scape of Switzerland. The geolog-
ically young and loft)' Alps are sce-
nic, but provide a difficult
environment for agricultural activit)’.
Mountain pastures may be used for
the grazing of cattle during summer.

WESTERN EUROPE A VARIED HOME FOR HUMANTIY

201

employed in agriculture In Greece, on the other
hand, more than 30 percent of the labor force is
engaged in forming Tlte Alpine region is quite dif-
ferent from the three other physiographic divisions
that make up Western Europe It is a region of tre-
mendous challenge, frequent disappointment, and
somKimes disaster

THE CLIMATES OF WESTERN EUROPE

The Alps can be viewed as a climatic divide To the
north, most of the heavily inhabited area enpys a
temperate and moist marine climate (Figure 8-8)
South of the Alps is the dramatically different dry
summer subtropical climate The marine climate in
the north normally produces a lush, green landscape
Ireland’s nickname. Emerald Isle, emphasizes this
characterisuc regional greenness (Figure 8-9).
South of the gleaming glaciers and snowfields that
crown the towering Alps, the summer landscape
changes rapidly to the browns and yellows of
parched Mediterranean fields and the purple-gray of
mountains.

When the ancient Romans left their Mediterranean
homeland to conquer most of Western Europe, they
found a strange and hostile world It is easy to sym-
pathize with Tacitus, who wrote m about a.d 100
“The climate in Britain Is disgusting from the fre-
quency of rain and fog “ He did find, however, that
"the cold IS never severe ’’ Countless millions of vig-
orous and productive humans have flourished in
both ofWestern Europe’s climatic regions in the past,
and the>' continue to flourish in both It would be
unwise to say, as some have, that one of the climates
is superior to the other. They are simply different,
and thus provide different challenges and opportu-
niues for the people who live in them

Marine Climate

The marine climate owes its essential characteristics
of moderate temperatures and abundant moisture to
the Atlantic Ocean, which lies to the west of Europe.
Water heats up and cools off more slowly than land
does, consequently, it has a moderating influence on
climate In addition. Western Europe lies in the por-
tion of the earth in which the wind usually blows
from the west, being thus affeaed by conditions that

FIGURE B-8

Cllnuies of Western Europe with average monthly tem-
perature and precipitation in selected cities. Climate and
weather conditions m Western Europe vary markedly between
the north and die south. The moderating Influence of the ocean
is felt espeoaily in the north In the south, rainfall ls less, and
both rainhiH and temperatures vary much more from season to
season

onginate over the Atlantia Furthermore, die surface
waters of the Atlantic are warmer than one might
expect from their latitude, for they receive a great
drift of warm, tropical water that is pushed in a clock-
wise direaion by the prevailing winds of the North-
ern Hemisphere. This warm water forms the Gulf
Stream along the coast of the United Slates from Flor-
ida to Maine. Off the Canadian provinces of Nova

202

HGURE 8-9

Fudv goats, local mascots in
Counn' Kem-, western Ireland.

Emerald Isle is an npi nickitame for
the lush green landscapes of Ire-
land, which are produced by the
marine climate.

Scotia and Newfoundlatid, die Gulf Stream spreads
out into a broad area of relatii'ely v>'arm water that
drifts eastward — the North Atlantic Drift. Thanks
to prevailing westerh' winds and the North Atlantic
Drift, nordwestern Europe has mild, moist winters
and cool, moist summers. The climate of Dublin t\p-
ifies the conditions that prewail oi'er much of mari-
time W'^estern Europe north of dae Alps (see Figure
8-8). Faitlier inkmd, winter temperatures are low'er,
and summer conditions are generally w'armer and
less cloudy.

Dr}’^ Summer Subtropical Climate

The soudiern margins of Europe share a climate that
is common to the Mediterranean Basin and is thus
often called the Mediterranean chmate. It is charac-
terized b)^ clear, dn-, hot summers and moderately
moist, mild winters. Dr\' summer subtropical climate
is also found in California, central Chile, southern-
most Africa, and soudiern Australia.

The Mediterranean lies close to the thirtieth par-
allel of nordi latimde, which marks die approximate
center of the belt of relatively high pressure know'ii

as the subtropical high. In summer diis belt of desert-
making high pressure shifts a few degrees to tlie
north and covers the Mediterranean Basin, When it
does, it brings die clear, sunny skies and diy air that
are found over the Sahara to die south. In winter the
subtropical high pressure belt shifts a few' degrees to
the soudi, and die Mediterranean Basin is influenced
by die marine air masses and q'clonic disturbances
of die prevailing westerly wind belt. These marine air
masses and storms bring cloudy skies, cooler tem-
peratures, and moisture to provide die winter rains
common to the region. The city of Nice is represen-
tative of die pattern of hot, dr)' conditions tliat char-
acterize Mediterranean summers (see Figure 8-8).
This seasonal drought during June, July, and August
is far more important to plant life than is tlie fact that
Nice receives slightly more rain dian Dublin does m
an average year.

The result of this w'et-dr)' climadc rh)'thm is seen
in almost ever)' aspect of die landscape in the sout i
ern part of the Alpine region of Europe. The summer
drought is extremely hard on many plants tliat are
common elsew'here in Europe. Tiius, the natural
etation of die Mediterranean Basin is made up o

^PESTERN EUROPE A VARIED HOME FOR HUMANITV

203

nOURE 8-10

Agricultiml labor In the vine-
yards of Andalusia, Spain. The
dry summer subtropical climate dis-
courages grov'ang many of the crops
common in more northern parts of
Europe Olives, grapes, and wheat,
however, are very adaptable to the
Mediterranean environment and are
common elements in the agncul
rural sj'stems of southern Europe

plant species that resist excessive evaporation and
loss of moisture. Some have thickened stems or bark,
thorns, waxy coatings, small leaves, or hairy fibers
Succulent (water-storing) plants such as caaus also
do very well there.

Human life is geared to the alternation of wet and
dry seasons, too. Farmers plant and tend crops dur-
ing the winter and spring and harvest them in early
summer (Figure 8-10) Fruit and other deep-rooted
tree crops such as olives are well adapted and form
an important part of the Mediterranean agricultural
scene. Olives are so representative of the region that
their cultivation limits are taken by some as the limits
of the dry summer subtropical climatic region Wheat

probably originated in this area of the eastern Med-
iterranean and remains the chief grain crop of the
dry summer subtropical region. The moisture of the
M^iterranean winter is ideal for the germination
and growth of wheat, the aridity of the summer, for
Its maturation and harvest.

The reliably sunny summer weather of Mediterra-
nean Europe has become one of the region’s greatest
economic assets. It is the basis of a flourishing tourist
industry that provides a great deal of income. Hun-
dreds of thousands of prosperous Western Europe-
ans from the nonhetn industrial centers enjoy their
yearly v-acaiions in the sun and blue waters of unpol-
luted stretches of Mediterranean coast

SUMMARY; THE SMALL
BUT HABITABLE
CONTINENTAL SETTING

This chapter has shown how several of the more significant aspects of the
location and physical geography of Western Europe are related to the re-
gion’s rich and vaned life-styles. On the whole, our view has been continen-
tal rather than regional or local This view has been necessary for an intro-
duction to Western Europe, but it has not permitted us to deal direaly with
the meaning of the rarious patterns and elements to individual Western Eu-
ropeans. For an understanding of Western Europe and its position in our
unfolding modem world, recogniuon of human responses is essenual. In
his introduaion to die splendid book Europe from the Atr, Sal\^dor Madar-
iaga, one of Europe’s most respected humanists, writes of the continent’s
having a "landscape of quality, not of quantity, rich in nuances and

204

WESTERN EURO PP

tensions,. . .where humanity has achieved clear definition not only in the

individual but also in the nations. . . .

In the following chapters we will investigate how the Western Europe-
ans have molded and modified their portion of that “landscape of quality'”
in response to their aspirations and assessment of its potential.

I^^TERMS

climatic divide
continental architecture
fjord

geopolitics

glaciation
Land Hemisphere
North Atlantic Drift
volcanism

ENDNOTE

1 Emil Egli and Hans Richard Muller, Europe from the Air, translated from
the German by E. Osers (London: George D. Harrap, 1959), 47.

WESTERN EUROPE:
LANDSCAPES OF
DEVELOPMENT

EUROPEAN CULTURE
LANGUAGE IN WESTERN EUROPE
THE TREND TOWARD UNITY
POPULATION PATTERNS
PATTERNS OF Drt)USTRIALIZATlON
PATTERNS OF AGRICULTURE
THE PATTERN OF URBANIZATION

'^-T'rrT’T'estern Europe is a world culture hearth, a
■ I / place from which fundamental changes in

'v human life have flowed. Europe flowered
m.uch later than the other world culmre hearths did,
but it has spawned profound and far-reaching
changes. It is ironic but important that, historically,
prowess in the art of warfare gave Europeans their
favorable edge. .AJ! too often the civilizing fruits of
European culture were thrust on traditional societies
at s%vord point or in the shadov.’ of cannon barrels.
Thus, it is not surprising diat many of the world’s
most serious contemporary' problems continue to re-
sult from the tensions generated as an exploding
European culture, particularly its technology, con-
fronts traditional non-European societies around the
globe.

Terry Jordan has gone so far as to suggest that the
world is in the process of being Europeanized in
numerous, fundamental ways. European culture may
one day be vrorld culture, as regional differences
fade in an increasing acceptance of the European w'ay
of iife.^

EUROPEAN CULTURE

Europeanization is increasingly visible in the ma-
terial and tangible aspects of life, even in the farthest
corners of the inhabited world. An acculturated
bulldozer-driving or radar-operating Eskimo of the
polar North now has more in common with his
American, Canadian, Danish, or Russian co-workers
than with his tradition-bound ancestors, who w'ere
hunters. As an obsen'er at Thule, Greenland, noted,

Within a generation or two the Polar Eskimo hunting
culture may die slovdy through attrition. Or the out-
side world of technology' may finally engulf it. Re-
cently, a major oil discovery' was made on EUesmere
Island, just west of Thule. Two mining companies
are planning explorations on Peary Land, north of
Thule. . . .No longer wiU Thule be the farthest of
lands.^

Similar accounts could be written about the Be-
douin of the oil-rich Old World deserts or about the
Stone Age Indian tribes of Latin America’s rain
forests — in faa, about primitive and traditional so-
cieties around the world. What is it about the Euro-
peans and their culture that continues to make them
such a potent force for world change? Many geogra-

phers and other scholars have sought to answer that
question. Although none has been entirely success-
ful, their attempts can be helpful in understanding
Western Europe, one of the most influential of the
world’s developed regions.

Jordan has defined the European culture area as
Old World areas in which the people

1 have a religious tradition of Christianity

2 speak one of the related Indo-European lan-
guages

3 are Caucasian

To these three basic traits Jordan has added ten
more that he finds necessary in forming a detailed
areal definition of present-day Europe.

1 a well-educated population

2 a healthy population

3 a well-fed population

4 birthrates and death rates far below world
averages

5 an average annual national income per capita
far above the world average

6 a predominantly urban population

7 an industrially oriented economy

8 market-oriented agriculture

9 an excellent transportation system

10 nations that are old

Most of these additional traits of Europeanness
are also key traits of the developed or rich nations of
the world. By evaluating the countries of Europe in
terms of these traits, Jordan produced a map of their
Europeanness similar to that in Figure 9-L Interest-
ingly, almost all of the countries with the highest
degree of Europeanness are in Western Europe. If
we accept Jordan’s criteria, it follows that a country’s
degree of Europeanness is positively associated with
modern technological development and widespread
wealth for its citizens. By this reasoning, Spain ap-
pears to be less European than Italy. As we might
expea, many people disagree with that conclusion.

The total area of Western Europe is only about a
third of that of Canada, yet it is divided into eighteen
fully autonomous and independent countries, plus
five microstates; Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco,
San Marino, and Vatican City. No wonder Western
Europe appears to be politically fragmente •

208

W.<rrERN EUROPE lANDSCAPES OF DEVELQPMEhfT

nGURE9-l

Tnits of Europcaxmess and core areas. European cultural diaractensucs are most highly
developed in Western Europe However, many European cultural traits have be«i spread
acroa ihe earth, and some audionties believe that other cultures will eventually be replaced by
a modified European culture Core areas have played an important role In the growth of many
of Europe’s modem states (Adapted from J G Pounds and S S Ball, “Core-Areas and the De
velopment of the European States System," AntuUs, AssociAtton of Ammcan Geogr<y)hers 54
(1964) 24)

210

WESTERN Rimn pp

Whether tin's pattern of political fragmentation has
played a role in the emergence of Western Europe as
a developed region can be only partially determined,
but even partial answers are of value in suggesting
modes of tlaought and lines of inquiry for further
exploration.

In many ways individual countries have served as
cultural cradles for the various national groups in
Western Europe. Until a little over a century ago,
when steam pov^er was put on wheels to create the
first rail transportation systems, the great majority of
people spent their lives almost witliin walking dis-
tance of their birthplaces. Even modest ranges of
hills helped to define natural regions, or compart-
ments, where distinctive patterns of living, working,
and speaking developed in relative isolation. In the
period before the Industrial Revolution, however,
slow impr'jvements in transportation and communi-
cation gradually brought many of these
neighborhood-like regions together to form larger
groupings.

The larger groupings then adopted patterns of liv-
ing that became q^^ical within particularly influential
regions called core areas (Figure 9-1). For exam-
ple, the characteristically English way of life origi-
nated in southern England and gradually spread over
much of the British Isles. Similarly, the French pat-
tern of life and culture first developed in the fertile
region drained by the Seine River and its tributaries.
According to Norman J. G. Pounds,

A core-area must have considerable advantages in
order to. . .perform [its] role. Simply put, it must
have within itself the elements of viability. It must
be able to defend itself against encroachment and
conquest from neigiiboring core-areas, and it must
have been capable at an early date of generating a
surplus income above the subsistence level, neces-
sar}'^ to equip armies and to play tlie role in contem-
porary power politics that territorial expansion nec-
essarily predicts.^

The formation of nation -stales as we know them
today is a relatively recent development in human
organization. In the period that followed the with-
drawal of the Roman Empire from Western Europe,
the major language groups evolved along several
paths, which eventually led to the present political
and language patterns. Certain states, like Portugal
and Spain, unified early and led the Western Euro-

peans to a position of world influence through ex-
ploration. Some, such as Germany, remained uncon-
solidated and divided until only a little more than a
century ago. Others, like France, grew through the
efforts of strong kings, whereas Switzerland grew by
the voluntary association of small regions--the
Swiss cantons, or counties — into a confederation
Whatever their eventual structure, the many coun-
tries of Western Europe represent the will and am-
bitions of their citizens. The political fragmentation
that has characterized Western Europe in the past
several centuries has had a profound influence on
the lives and activities of the millions of people in the
culture area (Figure 9-2). Tlieir differences have re-
sulted in an exceptional degree of variety in the ways
in which local resources have been developed.

LANGUAGE IN WESTERN EUROPE

Language is one of the most vital elements in any
culture. Language is unique in being the vehicle of
communication not only between the individuals
and groups that make up a society but also between
one generation or age and another. Many experts
hold that language, of all the elements of culture,
most distinguishes one people from another. Histor-
ically, it certainly has functioned that way in Western
Europe.

The map of European languages. Figure 9-3, il-
lustrates the linguistic mosaic that characterizes
Western Europe. In most of the area people speak
languages that evolved from an ancestral tongue
known as Indo-European. Most linguists believe that
the roots of modern European languages began to
form about 5,000 or 6,000 years ago, when the orig-
inal Indo-European-speaking group began to split up
and move west into Europe.

As a result of their relative isolation, regionally
detached groups served as cores within which the
Indo-European language began to change. A Ger-
manic core developed in the area of Denmark and
southern Scandinavia. In the area north of the Car-
pathian Mountains of Eastern Europe two Slavic
cores came into being, one interior and one touch-
ing on the Baltic Sea. Thanks to the great power an
extent of the Roman Empire, a small Romance lan-
guage core in Italy spread widely across Mediterra-
nean Europe. Some languages, like Greek, resiste

^'ESTBRN EUROPE- LANDSCAPES OF DEVELOPMENT

211

noURE 9-2

Tannasaari. a aiaaO Hanlsb
(own on die Gulf of Finland
west of HelslnkL Finland occupies
a border location between Western
Europe and the Sonet Union and
therefore has pursued its interna
tional relauonships with caution

replacement by laun and survived in their core ar-
eas Celtic, which had developed In a core centered
in the Rhine Valley from Switzerland and Austria to
the Low Countries (now the Benelux countries
— Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), did
not fare as well Today Celtic languages survive only
In rugged refuge areas along the Atlantic fringe of
Europe,

In addition to providing a rich commentary on the
historic migrations of people into and across West-
ern Europe, careful study of the map of European
languages is indispensable to an understanding of
current and future events Many of the flash points of
Western Europe — the places where politick ten-
sions often erupt into violence— hav’e linguistic
hoses. In nonhem Spam, for example. Basque-
speaking extremists belong to a violent group called
Basque Homeland and Liberty This group uses ter-
rorism to achieve its goal of independence for the
Basque region. Political activities in Spain are impos-
sible to comprehend without an appreciation of the
Basque problem, a legacy from the repressn’e re-
&me of the dictator Francisco Franco, vviio nded
from 1939 until 1975. Among other things, Franco
Outlawed the use of the Basque language

In France, also, political affairs are deeply influ-
enced by problems associated mch regional Jinguis-

Uc minorities In the north 700,000 Breton speakers
occupy' die western portion of Brittany Flemish, a
dialea of Dutch, is spoken by a much smaller group
m the area near the Belgian border As Figure 9-3
shows, Basques live on both sides of the Pyrenees
Mountains, about 750.000 of them are citizens of
France. Fortunately, the Basques m France have
never suffered the repression that their relatives in
Spam ha\« Jn France both the Basque and Breton
groups have their orm neu’spapers and literature In
addition, Catalan, a dialect of Spanish, is the mother
tongue of about 200,000 French citizens living near
the Mwiiterranean end of the Pyrenees. And Corsica,
the birthplace of that great figure of French history
Napoleon Bonaparte, has about 175,000 Italian
Speakers There, too. terrorist bomb blasts occasion-
ally emphasize the demands of a separatist move-
ment. Finally, Alsatian, a dialea of German, is the
mother tongue of thousands of French people in the
historic Rhineland and eastern fronuer zone
Many other potoitia! flash points exist m Western
Europe aose study of Figure 9-3, with particular
attention to those areas where linguistic and political
boundanes do not coincide precisely, will reveal sev-
eral of them. Areas with strong ethnic and historical
ties to one country but under the political rule of
anoAer are called Irredentas m pohucal geogra-

Mb.

Scelanoic

Faroese

English

(insh).;;;^ i

W^English '^anx

")>?

Cymru "

(Welsh) '

v/'V r ' ( b '

'•="•' f Utvran

English

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Spanish

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INDO-EUROPEAN LANGUAGE FAMILY
SUBFAMILIES

GERMANIC SUBUNIT A

^Greek

URALO-ALTAIC LANGUAGE FAMILY
SUBFAMILIES

ROMANCE

I GERMANIC SUBUNIT B

j SLAVIC SUBUNIT A
Polish
Slovak
Lusattan
Ukrainian
Slovene
Bulgarian
Macedonian

I CELTIC
Erse (Irish)
Gaelic (Scottish)
Cymru (Welsh)
Breton
Manx

Romansch j SLAVIC SUBUNIT B

Friulian L___J

□ HELLENIC
Greek

Friulian
Romanian
Vlach

BALTIC

Latvian

Lithuanian

Czech

Croat

Bosnian

Serbian

Russian

Byelorus

SEMITIC LANGUAGE

MALTESE

Maltese

BASQUE LANGUAGE

FINNIC

Finnish

Karelian

Vepse

Estonian

I UGRiC
Hungarian

TURKIC

Turkish

WESTERN EUROPE LANDSCAPES OF DEVELOPMHJT

213

phy. A political policy direaed toward the restoration
of such areas to the ethnically related country is
termed irredentism. In the past, great wars were
sparked by attempts to include such political pockets
within the boundaries of many "parent” countnes, a
problem not resiriaed to Western Europe. Although
major warfare among the modem states of Western
Europe IS unlikely now, age-old linguistic tensions
and flash points have not totally lost their signifi-
cance If they are not handled carefully by majority
goi’emments, they could slow or stop the trend to-
ward greater European cooperation and unity

THE TREND TOWARD IWHY

Since World War II the leaders and people of West-
ern Europe have increasingly recognized the advan-
tages of greater unity, particularly in such areas as
economic development and military defense If and
when union does occur, the pattern of political frag-
mentation that has charaaerized Western Europe for
so long may change drastically Many observers be-
lieve that a true United States of Europe is already
evolving Many others are equally convinced that the
roots of European nationalism reach deep and unit}*
is more imaginary than real In a memorable speech
delivered at Zurich University m 1946, Britain’s char-
ismatic wanime leader, Winston Churchill, called for
the creation of a

European Family, .with a structure under which It
can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. . We
must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this
way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able
to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life
worth livmg

Churchill s was only one of countless voices that
urged unification of Europe in die dark days that
followed the havoc of World War II. A sense of com-
mon misfortune developed into a resolve that Eu-
rope must never again experience the indiscriminate

noURE 9_3

of Europe. Few pans of the world exhibit ihe
mulaphcicy of languages that mark Europe. Of particular impor-
tance in Western European affairs are the flash points, where
^ lucal boundanes cut across language regions In these places
^ m tensions, built up among Iinguisuc minonues, often
‘^vplnche farm of pofmcai extremism or violence

horror of modern warfare. Along with this resolve
grew a conviction on the part of many European
leadem that the traditional nauonal frameworks of
the European states were too narrow Europe, many
believed, must be revived in an economic frame-
work of sufficiently large scale to allow it to compete
with the world's superpowers, the United States and
the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most important force toward unity
was the highly successful European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), whidi included France, West
Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux states The
ECSC was organized to ensure, among other goals,
that the full potential of the Ruhr coal supplies in
West Germany and the Lorraine iron ore deposits in
France would be realized as the vital steel industry of
Western Europe was rebuilt Industrial and eco-
nomic interdependence replaced traditional rivalry.
The economies of modernized, large, efficient mills
and mines brought benefits to the workers in both of
these imponani industrial regions as production and
profits soared

The European Communities

U was no comadence that the membeis of ECSC
became the founders of the current drive for West-
ern European unity—the European Economic
Community (EEC), or Common Market The long-
standing tradition of a customs union among the
Benelux countries (Belgium and Luxembourg since
1921. the Netherlands since 1947) was coupled to the
obvious success of the ECSC m the J 950s In 1955 the
governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands urged the member states of the ECSC to
take a new step along the road lorvard European
integration They stated that “the establishment of a
united Europe must be sought through the develop-
ment of common institutions, the progressive fusion
of national economies, the creation of a large com-
mon market and the progressive harmonization of
social policies

In an effort to further the positive achievements of
the ECSC, the foreign ministers of the six member
oountties charged a committee headed by Paul-
Henn Spaak of Belgium to look into the possibilities
for increased integraUon In 1956 the Spaak commit-
tee presented its report, which formed the basis for
negotiauons leading to treaties that established two

CLOSING THE GAP: THE EUROTUNNEL

This fortress built by nature for herself
against infection and the hand of war;

This happy breed of men, this little world;

Tliis precious stone set in the silver sea,

X^Tiich ser\'es it in the office of a wall.

Or as a moat defensive to a house.

Against the env>' of less happier lands;

This blessed plot, this earth, this realm,
this England.

—William Shakespeare, King Richard n

Shakespeare wrote these immortal lines, the English Channel
/ was in truth a defensive moat that had kept England safe from
v ' V Europe’s frequent broils and destructive wars for centuries. And
thus it settled succeeding generations, discouraging invasion schemes by
Spanish kings, French emperors, and German fiihrers.

In times of peace, however, tlie need to cross the often-stormy 20-mile
(32.2'kilometer) stretch of water to reacli tlie Continent has been an incon-
venience at best and a serious economic handicap at worst. Notorious for its
fogs, tlte Channel can be impassable for extended periods. Consequently,
export orders that depend on tight deliver}^ deadlines can be lost, and thou-
sands of tourists can waste precious hours or days of their vacations waiting
for cross-Channel car ferries to resume fog-delayed service. In addition, as
ocean-going shipping in tlie world’s busiest sea-lane continues to increase,
the potential for collisions beween ferries and ships in the Channel will
soon reach unacceptable levels.

After tile United Kingdom joined the European Economic Communit)',
British producers often found tliat tliey were at a disadvantage in competing

additional European communities: die European
Atomic Community (Euratom) and die European
Economic Communin’ (Common Market, EEC). Both
treaties were signed by the six in March 1957 and
came into force on January 1, 1958. As die term sug-
gests, Euratom was organized to ensure an integrated
approach to the development and use of nuclear en-
ergy^ in the community. Collectively these diree legal
entities — the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), the European Economic Communitv (EEC,
or Common Market), and the European Atomic En-
ergy^ Community (Euratom) — comprise die Euro-
pean Community.

No^^^ay^ Denmark, Ireland, and the United King-
dom actively began to seek membership in 1972. The
Norwegians voted against the move, but die others
completed membership negotiations and became
full-fledged European Community members in 1973
(see box above).

The Exiropean Parliament

In 1979 the citizens of these nine wealthy countries
took part in the world’s first truly international elec-
tion when they voted for die members of the Euro-
pean Parliament The European Parliament exer-
cises democratic control over die executive and
administrative institutions of die EEC. Its creation
was not easy. During the 1960s bitter pardsan polit-
ical battles and even riots took place as the European
community countries moved from traditional and
strongly nationalistic policies tow'ard the ideal of eco-
nomic and political unity. Neverdieless, as the 1970s
opened, die economic success of die European uni-
fication was clear to all.

The European Parliament does not sit in continu-
ous full session; many of its members are also
elected representatives in die national parliaments o
dieir home countries. Instead, die European Par ia

214

with firms on the Continent, they were penalized because the Channel
formed an obstacle m the flow of products to and from the Continent
Continent-based producers felt the same disadvantage as they tried to mar-
ket their products in Great Brituin

Not surprisingly, the centunes-old idea of a cross-Channel bridge or
tunnel came under increasingly serious discussion in the 1970s Bridge ad-
vocates lost out because many people believed that a bridge would repre-
sent an unacceptable hazard for the increasing shipping in the Channel This
left the way open for tunnel advocates to promote the idea of what was
popularly termed a "chunnel” betw’een Great Britian and France.

Exhaustive engineering and feasibility studies resulted in a consensus
to build a railroad tunnel, and the Eurotunnel is now under construction
When It IS completed, motorists wll drive their cars onto specially designed
shuttle trains in Folkstone, England, or Calais, France, and be whisked under
the Channel in approximately 35 minutes The shuttles will be brightly lit
and well ventilated, and attendants will provide information and assistance
Two locomoiwes, one at each end of the half-mile-long (0 8-kilometer) shut-
tle train, will reach speeds of up to 100 miles (I6l kilometers) an hour dur-
ing the journey Commercial vehicles will be accommodated on larger
freight shuttles

In 1983 the existing air and surface cross Channel services carried 46
million passengers By the year 2003 that number is expeaed to more than
double, to 94 million When the Eurotunnel begins carrying traffic, sched-
uled for 1993. travelers will be able to plan on a journe>’ lime of 3 hours
between London and Pans and 2 hours and 45 minutes between London
and Brussels Shakespeare’s metaphorical moat will still be girding
England’s continental flank, but it will no longer serve as a serious barrier
to the ongoing mtegraiion of Europe

ment is in session for one week every month, on the
average The full sessions are important, but they
constitute only a small pan of the parliament’s work
As in the U S Congress, much of the work is carried
on in specialized standing committees and political
party groups Full sessions alternate between the Eu-
ropean Parliament headquarters in Luxembourg and
the Palace of Europe in Strasbourg, France. Much
work is also earned on in Bnissels, Belgium, where
parliamentary committees conduct their meetings
During the 1980s the EEC grew to a total of twelve
member states Greece was accepted for member-
ship in 1980, and Spam and Portugal joined six years
later. Turkey will become the thirteenth member
when satisfaaory terms of entry are concluded
Although the European Parliament does not enjoy
all of the powers that the national parliaments of its
member states enjoy, it is steadily increasing its role
in managing the affairs of the EEC. In the normally

crucial area of budget, for example, it has the last
wxird on all EEC items that are classified as
nonobli^tory — about a quarter of all funds appro-
pnated The parliament also has the power to rejea
the EEC’s budget as a whole and thus force a new
one to be drawn up and proposed

Memories of the bitter 1960s have faded, and a
new generauon is experiencing the personal saiisfac-
uon of moving easily from one EEC member country
to another with only a simple identification card, not
a formal passport. For travel outside the EEC, a dis-
unaive European passport is used Since 1985 most
member states have been issuing the burgundy-red
document entitled “European Community,” which
also gives the name of the bearer’s home country.
After a long period of introduction, this symbol of
European identity has become an important icon m
furthering the ideal of a true United States of Eu-
rope.

215

216

POPULATION PATTERNS

Aithough the pattern of population distribution in
Western Europe is less familiar dian the political pat-
tern, it is ev-en more important to an understanding
of this highly developed region. Where people
choose to live and to center their activities results
from the complex interaction of a vA'ide range of hu-
man and physical factors. It might even be argued
that knowing where and how the people of any area
live is well along the road to understanding the area’s
physical geography and cultural histoiyy as well as
the people’s way of life.

In chapter 8 environmental conditions were said
to have a significant effect on the pattern of popula-
tion. For example, the rather harsh environments of
die Northwestern Highlands have not attracted the
vast numbers of people that the richly endowed
Great European Plain has. Not that modern Western
Europeans are merely passive pawns who move in
response to dieir environments; quite the
contraiy — they are probably closer to being the
masters of their physical environment than are the
people of many other great culture regions of the
world. Still, it is true that most human decisions of a
spatial nature reflect to some extent the physical en-
vironment.

Population Distribution

Aldiough Western Europe by world standards is
densely populated, its 360 million inhabitants are un-
e\'enly distributed within their homelands. As the
map of population density, Figure 9-4, shows, north-
ern Europe and the Alps have sparse populations. On
die other hand, the Great European Plain, particu-
larly near industrial areas, has a veiy^ high population
density. Belgium and the Netherlands, two of West-
ern Europe’s most densely settled countries, are in
die plain. The Po Valley and neighboring parts of
northern and central Italy are also densely settled.
So, too, are die areas that flank die Rhine River from
Switzerland northward. Odier densely populated ar-
eas include the central lowlands of Scotland, por-
tions of central England, die London Basin, the
Rlione-Saone corridor in soudiern France, and
coastal Portugal and Spain. These areas of dense, pro-
ductive population help to form the economic and
political muscle of Western Europe.

Population Change Through Time

The distribution of the population of Western Eu-
rope has changed significantly through time. At the
beginning of the Christian era, about 2,000 years ago
the areas of densest population lay along the Medi-
terranean Sea. There, in southern Spain, France, Italy
and Greece, the great classical empires of Greece
and Rome developed flourishing agrarian econo-
mies and an urban focus. In those days most of Eu-
rope north of the Alps was thinly peopled.

Table 9- 1 summarizes the population change by
region from a.d. 1 to the present. We should notice
the lowered population totals during the first ten
centuries of the Christian era. After the decline of the
Roman Empire, with its well-integrated economic
system, Europe suffered a long period of economic
collapse, famines, epidemics, and invasions of bar-
barians from the north and east. The toll in human
life was enormous. In the 700s the great Muslim em-
pire of the Middle East and North Akfrica conquered
the Iberian Peninsula and threatened to overrun
Western Europe. The term Dark Ages is used to
identify this period of Western European histoty,

Population gradually began to grow again as rel-
ative stability returned to Europe. By 1340 it had
reached 57 million, double what it was at the begin-
ning of the Christian era. However, in 1348 disaster
struck in the form of the Black Death, as the bu-
bonic plague was called. In the next two years about
a quarter of all Europeans died of plague. From 1348
to 1379 England’s total population dropped from an
estimated 5.7 million to 2 million, more than a 50
percent decrease in the course of one lifetime. It is
not at all surprising to find many people today using
these five-hundred-year-old statistics in discussions
and debates concerning the best policies for com-
batting the spread of the viral infection known as
AIDS. Many health workers predict that similar disas-
trous death tolls could result if effective aaion to
stop the spread of AIDS is not taken at all levels in
societies around the world.

Wars have also contributed to high death rates in
Western Europe. The barbarian invasions yielded a
net decline in total population, and the Hundmd
Years’ War added to the toll in the period following
the first outbreaks of bubonic plague. Between 1618
and 1648 the Thirty Years’ War once again made the
ravages of battle a factor in overall population
growth.

nCUKE 9-4

Density of Europe’s population. Western Europe is one of the worlds most densely popu
lated regions Unlike densely populated China and India, Western Europe's pofHjlation is prl-
manly urban and enjoys a high level of living

218

^VESTCRNig ^

TABLE 9-1 , . ^ ^

Estimated popuLation of Western Europe, a j. 1 to 1987 (selected years).

Year

Total

Fcpu'alio^

(rr.Tlo.ns}

British

isles

France,

Benelux

Iberia, Italy,
Greece

Scandinavia,

Rnland,

Iceland

West Germany
Austria,
Switzeriand

1 Million

5 'b of Total

Millions

% of Total

Millions

% of Total

Millions

% of Total

Millions

% Of Total

27 0

0.3

1.1

6.6

24.4

16.5

61.2

0.3

1.1

3.3

12.2

350

13.9

0.3

1.6

5.2

27.5

10.0

52.9

0.2

1.1

3.2

16.9

600

13 2

0.7

5.3

3.1

23.5

7.2

54.5

0.2

1.5

2.0

15.2

SOO

22.0

1.2

5.4

4.9

22.3

11.6

52.7

0.3

1.4

4.0

18.2

1000

25.9

1.5

5.S

6.1

23.6

14.1

54.4

0.4

1.5

3.8

14.7

1200

27.7

2.3

7.7

9.8

26.0

17.6

46.7

0.5

1.3

6.9

18.3

13ZG

57.3

5 3

9.S

18.9

33.0

21.0

36.6

0.6

1.0

11.2

19.6

1400

43.2

—

'i5Q0

■13.1

3.9

9.1

16.2

37.6

15.1

35.0

0.6

1.4

7.3

16.9

1650

7 0

9.2

30.0

39.5

26.0

34.2

2.0

2.6

11.0

14.5

1700

so.s

7.9

S.S

27.2

33.9

26.0

32.4

4.5

5.6

14.7

18.3

17c.'0

35 C

9.8

10.2

32.2

33.3

30.8

31.9

5.6

5.8

18.2

18.8

■!£20

132.3

21.0

15.9

35.7

27.0

42.0

31.7

6.3

4.8

27.3

20.6

19G0

39.2

16.7

54.9

23.3

70.5

30.0

11.7

5.0

58.8

25.0

i53v

2SC.0

50 0

17.8

60.0

21.4

80.0

28.6

15.0

5.4

75.0

26.8

1950

324 5

60.5

18.6

71.5

22.0

99.0

30.5

16.5

5.1

77.0

23.8

1SS7

355.5

60.3

17.0

80.5

22.6

116.7

32.8

22.8

6.4

75.2

21.2

Sr'jrcss: Tea>’ G. Jordan, T.ie European Cullurs Area: A Systematic Geography (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) and 1987 World Population Data
Sheet (Wasn^nglon, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 1986).

Demographic Transformation

W'iLh the Peace of \X’estphalia in 1648. Europe
achieved relative peace and stabilitv’. Families were
large, tvitli an average of sLx to eight children sharing
in the labor associated ts'itlt die almost-universal ag-
ricultural way of life. In addition, die Black Deadi
disappeared tts a scourge during diis period. From
1650 to 1"50 the population of Western Europe grew
by 20 million, so that on the eve of die Industrial
Revolution the total population was appro.ximately
100 million. The year 1750 is a momentous date for
another reason: it marlts die point at which Western
Europe began its demographic transformation (see
chapter 2). Figure 9-5 presents the actual popula-
tion statistics for England and ''Xgles in die form of
die demographic transformation model (compare
Figure 2-4).

Stage I is characterized by radier static population
groi\th brought about by die high death rates diat
counterbalanced the liigh birdirates of the still tradi-
tional agrarian wai' of life in early eigliteendi-centuri^
England and Wales. At one point in the late 1730s die
birdirate 't\as about 3.9 percent, and die death rate
was also 3.9 percent. As a result there was no natural

Birth- and Death Rates Population

(percent) (in millions)

HGURE 9-5

Demographic transformation of England and Wales. «
model of demographic transformation appears as Figure 2-
Here we see not a theoretical diagram but a representation o,
what has actually happened. In fea, the idea for a demograp uc
transformation model was based on the analysis of Western u
ropean birth- and deatli rates.

\PESTERN EUROPE lANDSCAPES OF DEVELOPMENT

219

increase in the population in that year. By 1750
a clear trend of continuing high birthrates accom-
panied by sharply dropping death rates shows that
England and Wales had entered Stage II of their
demographic transformation, with the consequent
acceleration of total population A huge surplus of
births over deaths could have spelled disaster for the
traditional agricultural society, but in Western Eu-
rope it coincided with the Industrial Revolution and
the opening of overseas empires and other emigra-
tion opportunities Rather than disaster, the surplus
provided the substance of Europe's most important
export of all times — people Western European ex-
plorers and colonizers, followed by immigrants, car-
ried their culture to the far comers of the world and
set in motion processes of change that are still going
on.

By 1880 the population of England and Wales had
grov-Ti to approximately 26 million, and a noticeable
decline in the birthrate had begun. The urban-
industrial ts’ay of life had come of age, and attimdes
toward femily size were changing (Stage HI) Chil-
dren were no longer viewed as economic assets,
child labor laws were enaaed, and formal eduation
became widespread More w’omen joined the work
force and sou^t freedom from the burdens of nu-
merous pregnancies and large families The result
was a shift toward smaller families, with a sharp drop
in birthrates At the same time growing affluence and
improved medical knowledge and health care
brought about an equally sharp decline in death
rates.

These trends, which began in England and Wales,
diffused across Europe from west to east until, by the
1930s, most of the nations of Europe were clearly m
Stage IV of the demographic transformation

PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

E. Willard Miller once observed that “the Industrial
Revolution was largely a revolution in energy con-
sumption, and coal predominated as the source of
energy for mechanical power until after World War
1.’ A pattern of Industrial coalescence in the vicinity
of easily worked coal deposits began in the United
Kingdom and spread to the rest of Western Europe in
the nineteenth and early tw’entieth centuries.

Locational Shifts in Industry

Figure 9-6 shows the coalescence and spatial shift
that took place in the iron and steel industry of south
Wales. An impressively large charcoal-iron industry
was flourishing in the mid-eighteenth century with
no relationship to the coal seams that underlay the
region The charcoal-iron industry of 1750 was so
large, m faa, that the supply of wood was growing

FIGURE 9-6

Industrial coalescence In soulhem Wales. The Industrial
Revotuuon broughi many changes to Western Europe One
change »as the gradual coalescence of manufacturing around
coalfields. The histonca] change in the distributional pattern of
iron and steel plants in south Wales Illustrates this coalescence.

220

short, and the industr}' was beginning to drift to tlie
rugged and still-forested valleys of western Wales
and tlie interior. The map for 1750 shows this dis-
persed pattern quite clearly. South Wales is just one
of countless areas in Western Europe where such
spatial shifts in economic activity have occurred over
the centuries.

As is often the case, developments that took place
some distance away from the shrinking woodlands of
south Wales were responsible for the spatial shift of
ironworking shown on the 1839 map. These devel-
opments took place in Shropshire, the border county
to the nortli, where a Quaker ironmaster named
Abraham Darby made an important technological
brealrthrough at blast furnaces he had built between
1755 and 1758. There, near Coalbrookdale on the
upper Severn River, Darby produced pig iron that
could be converted to tough bar iron with plentiful
coke radier titan with increasittgly expensit'e char-
coal.

Darb)''s successful experiments with coke as a
blast-furnace fuel were studied by other ironmasters
and led to die widespread adoption of die new tech-
nique. By die end of the eighteenth centur>' almost
no charcoal was being used in the blast furnaces of
south Wales. The occurrence of coal, iron ore, and
limestone in proximity to one another became the
crucial factor in the location of iron industr)’. The
1839 map show's a distinct clustering of ironworks on
die northeastern outcrop of the coalfield near easily
mined deposits of iron ore and limestone.

In modern times the Welsh iron and steel industry
has become increasingly dependent on imported
coal, iron ore, and scrap steel for its operations. This
shift in die supply of raw materials has resulted in a
peripheral pattern, with most steelworks being lo-
cated near harbors. These locational shifts have had
a profound effect on botJi the people and the envi-
ronment of Wales. There, as in many of Western Eu-
rope’s older industrial regions, derelict buildings
and mine-head works, spoil heaps, and serious sub-
sidence, or land settling, often blight the landscape.
In recent decades these problems have been inten-
sified by world economic conditions, wdiich often
favor imported iron and steel over locally produced
supplies. High unemployment rates are a major con-
cern. So, too, are the many once-flourishing ports
that have been outmoded by tlie shift to increasingly
larger cargo carriers and tankers.

Recent Industrial Development

Coal has played a much less significant locational
role in countries and regions more recently indus-
trialized. Italy and Sweden are among the best ex-
amples of industrialization in the absence of local
supplies of coal. In both countries hydroelectricity a
more recently perfected energy source, has played a
strong role in industrial location.

In Italy about three-quarters of all manufacturing
takes place in the north, in the Po Valley. Within this
region no single factor accounts for the industrial
pattern. Most industrial materials must be brought
into die area from outside, thus giving a distinct ad-
vantage to cities that are well served by transpona-
tion facilities. Often these are very' old places, like
Turin and Milan, w'ith rich cultural traditions. The
availability of inexpensive hydroelectric power over
wide areas means that diere is more choice in the
location of industries.

Similar conditions prevail in central Sweden, be-
tw'een Stockltoim on the Baltic and Goteborg on the
Atlantic, In this lake-studded area of Sweden, as on
Italy’s northern plain, a diversity of light industrial
activities blends urban and rural landscapes with a
greater degree of visual harmony dtan is usually
found in the older and more concentrated, coalfield-
oriented industrial belts of die United Kingdom,
France, Belgium, and Germany (Figure 9-7).

Untapped sources of hydropower are bound to be
developed rapidly w'herever they exist in Europe.
One reason is tliat coal-fired electricity-generating
plants create problems of international air pollution
and acid rain. Another is tire development of inex-
pensive superconductors. Western Europeans can be
expected to devise innovative programs to maximize
their access to tiiis source of power that is almost
problem-free.

Tariffs and Boundaries as Locational
Factors

Anodier set of locational factors that was tradition-
ally important to Western European industrializa-
tion — tariff policies and international boundaries,
aspects of the political fragmentadon discussed
earlier — now seems to be declining in significance.
High tariff walls, which were widespread in Western
Europe before World War II, encouraged the deve

U'ESTEfiN EUBQPE MND5CAPES OF DEVELOPMENT

221

FIGURE 9-7

The BW corporatft headquarters in Munich, West Ger-
many. Bi\W symbolizes not only affluence, but also the global
economic system fostered by international trade and investment

opment of a broad range of industries within each
European country. Many of these industries had rel-
advely inefficient plants that could not have com-
peted with larger foreign producers The>' were k^i
^ive through the protection of high tariffs, which
forced the price of imponed goods to higher levels
than 7,-ovjld otherwise have existed
As a result of import duties and tariffs, a faaory
ocated near an international political boundary ot-

ten suffered a distinct disadvantage because the
boundary aaed as a barrier to the distribution of
products With the great addition to the cost of the
feaocy’s products at the boundar>', their competitive
position in the market of the neighboring country
was lowered Also, fears of mtasion or battle damage
m times of confiia made border-zone locales less
attractive m the past.

These prcAslems are greatly minimized in present-
day Western Europe The EEC member states now
form one economic unit, thanks to the elimination of
barriers to the movement of raw materials, labor,
capital, and finished goods The other important in
lemanonal trade group m Western Europe, the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association (EFTA), is sum-
briy dedicated to removing artificial obstacles to
commerce Norway, Sweden, Finland. Iceland, Swit-
zerland, and Austria make up the EFTA, In addition,
a fund that it set up m 1575 to help finance industrial
development continues to operate m Portugal, even
though that country no longer belongs

PATTERNS OF AGRICULTURE

Despite Western Europe’s high state of industrial and
associated det'elopmem, agriculture remains the
dominant form of land use. Cultural feaors and phys-
ical environmental condiuons have Interaaed to pro-
duce extremely varied patterns of agricultural aaiv-
ity. Tliree fairly distinctive r>pes of agricultural
systems can be identified Mediterranean polycul-
ture, dairy forming, and mixed livestock and crop
farming Each system dominates and characterizes
the area in which it is located (Figure 9-8)

Alediterranean Polyculture

The region dominated by the Mediterranean poly-
culture system forms a foirly continuous ribbon
along the Mediterranean coast Agriculture in this
area has an ancient heritage. Since very early times
w-beat has been grown through the moist, mild win-
ter season to provide a harvest in the spring Several
drought-resistant, deeply rooted vines and trees,
ticularlygrape and oJive. also charaaerized classical
Mediterranean landscapes. In many respects agricul-
toral aaiidues m the Mediterranean Basin resemble
those in California, where a similar climatic condi-

“'■VC iCELANO

•i .

J Mediterranean polyculture
I I Dairy farming

! . i Mixed livestock and crop farming -.5

[ j Grazing, local subsistence,

or nonagricuitural

...

i '/ ' { R%i/

■Ef '■ ? t '( • [ .?

■ r* ^ A -I ■ ^ O'

/Pv ' ■' ^

I r^:7tsy^ jron Curiain

/IRELAND' 1^ j
UNlTED'i

,|' /‘-KINGDQM ,VOnTH SEA

vE>7> ^ r\j

rE ' E '

■ r? v ^ , -'jC V' r

wxEW8<^|bl>^ERMANY ' A

.■■’■■ .. i •’ATRAr^CE
r xv.f A / L

< SPAINy-

-J AUSTRIA ;

iTZERLANDJI-u echten steih / . i

,\ 500 1,030 KILOMETERS-

• ■’ r’‘“p“7'v V

,000 MILES ' - . ‘ _ ( ■

iV: 'WVv

y rv

* ,1 • .. JS’

HGURE 9-8

Agricultural regions of Western Europe. Altfiough Western Europe is a center of industri-
alization, agriculture has alwaj-s been an important activity. Today, most of Western Europe’s
agricultural aaivities are highly productive and intensive. Of necessity this map is highly gener-

222

WESTERN EUROPE LANDSCAPES OF DEVELOPMENT

223

Don praails Most of the activity is extremely labor
intensive (Figure 9-9). For countries like Portv^al,
Spain, Italy, and Greece, the resulting high propor-
uon of the total labor force engaged in agricultural
pursuits is shouTi in Table 9-2
Recent developments in the Mediterranean poly-
culiute region have resulted from acceleraung spe-
cialization and commercialization, in response to the
huge market in the industrialized and urbanized
countries to the north Improved transportation fa-
cilities make it possible for Mediterranean growers
to speed highly perishable fruits and early vegetables
to the affluent markets of Britain, France, BeneJux,
Germany, and Scandinav’ia

One notable trend has been the specialization of
uhole districts m one or a few crops Within the
French Mediterranean belt, for example, vast areas
haie been turned into a huge sea of vines, so dom-
inant are the Nlnej-ards Along the Mediterranean bell
in coastal Spam, irrigated citrus orchards present a

similar scene Olive trees, too, dominate broad areas,
lending a distinctive gray-green appearance to the
landscape Early tomatoes are cultivated extensively
for the northern European market, as are perishable
melons, apritx>ts, and table grapes Tobacco, another
labor-intensive crop, is another important source of
income, particularly in Italy and Greece.

Goats and sheep have traditionally provided the
milk for the region’s famous cheeses In some moun-
tainous areas large flocks are still maintained by
small numbers of herders who follow a seasonal
herding rhythm called transhumance Transhu-
mance involves the grazing of animals in high moun-
tain pastures during dry Mediterranean summers
and in the lower areas during moist winters, when
grass flourishes

The future of Mediterranean agriculture appears
bright, since the farmers enjoy a considerable advan-
tage over other subtropical producers m the world
The>' are close to the rich and growing markets of

nGUKE9_9

ISS. *1’ COM of

e Canary Islands form one of Spain s seventeen autonomous roT nf n»ow»es

224

^^^^ESTERN EURo pf

TABLE 9-2

Distribution of Western Euro-
pean labor force (by percentage
of national employment).

Economic Sector

Country

Primary

Secondary

Tertiaiy

West Germany

5.6

41.0

53.4

France

7.6

32.0

60.4

Italy

11.2

33.6

552

Netherlands

4.9

28.1

67.0

Belgium

3.0

29.9

67.1

Luxembourg

4.2

33.4

62.3

United Kingdom

2.6

32.4

65.0

Ireland

16.0

28.9

55.1

Denmark

7.1

26.8

66.0

Greece

28.9

7.4

43.7

Spain

16.9

32.1

50.9

Portugal

23.9

33.9

42.2

Austria

9.0

38.1

52.9

Iceland

23.0

43.0

34.0

Notv/ay

7.2

27.8

65.0

Sweden

4.8

29.9

65.3

Switzerland

6.6

37.7

55.7

Finland

11.5

31.9

56.5

Source: Basic Statistics of the Community (Luxembourg: Statistical Office of the European Communities,
1987).

urbanized northern Europe, and local industrializa-
tion promises to increase steadily and provide grow-
ing markets within the region. However, a history of
deforestation and exploitive farming has resulted in
serious soil-erosion problems. Conservation mea-
sures such as terracing and reforestation are receiv-
ing strong support from government and private
agencies.

Dairy Farming

As the map of Western European agriculture indi-
cates, a considerable area to die north of die Medi-
terranean is devoted to dairy farming, which is usu-
ally associated with rich urban populations of the
Western World. The daily belt stretches from the
British Isles and the Breton Peninsula along the
shores of the North and Baltic seas to Finland (Figure
9- 10). A second large area of dairying has developed
in the Alps of France, Switzerland, and Austria. These
dairy belts are located in some of the cloudiest and
coolest portions of Western Europe. Although many
field crops, such as wheat, often fail to mature or
suffer from fungus attacks under these conditions,
hay and a number of other fodder crops flourish. In
the rugged Alpine terrain the steep, grass-clad slopes
can be grazed or cropped for hay with little or no
clanger of soil erosion.

The long tradition of dairy farming in northern
Europe is clearly evidenced in the fact that almost
ever)’ major breed of dairy cattle originated there.
The breeds carry names that indicate their origin: the
large brown Swiss from Schw)'z Canton in central
Switzerland; the popular Jersey and Guernsey breeds
from the small islands in the English Channel, near
the coast of France; and the Holstein from Schlesvig-
Holstein, in northern Germany. Colonists who tra^’-
eled overseas in recent centuries carried these and
otlaer, less well known breeds with them. Herds of
these distincdy nortliern European animals are now
a familiar sight in New Zealand and Australia, as well
as in the United States and Canada.

Tlie nature and intensity of dairying vary some-
what from region to region in northern Europe. Den-
mark, for example, has developed a strong spedal-
ization in the production of butter. Almost one-fifth
of the butter in international trade originates in Den-
mark. Skim milk, a by-product of butter produfflon,
is used to fatten pigs, which in turn are utilized in the
production of world-famous Danish ham and bacon.
In the Netherlands much grazing takes place on Ian
reclaimed from the sea, land where the water tab e is
too high for the cultivation of many crops. There,
specialization in the production of cheese and con
densed and powdered milk allows the Dutch to
port much of -their output to markets throughout e

WESTERN EUROPE LWDSCAPES OF DEVELOt^iaff

225

nGURE9-10

Cheese carriers in Alkmaar,
Netherlands. This is a large mar
tec area for cheese and ocher dairy
products to be exported v.-orldttide

world In the United Kingdom much fluid milk is
produced but is marketed locally for human con-
sumpuon Posters urging Britons to “Dnnka Pinta
Day are fam^har sights in Bnghnd
Because the most densely settled urban and in-
dustnal areas of Western Europe are so close, dairy
fenning will m all likelihood conunue to be a vital
agricultural activity Changes will occur as dairy
farms become larger and as the mechanizauon and
specialization of the industry increase

Mixed Livestock and Crop Farming

The intensive crop specialization of the Mediterra-
n^ pojyculture region is generally separated from
the animal-dommaied dairy farming belts to the
north by a broad zone in which a mixed form of
riming duraaenzes the landscape Environmental
conditions there fecilitate a wide range of agricul-
tural activities, and the agricultural landscape is ex-
tremely mixed and varied (Figure 9-11). Divereity in
e area is also promoted by political fragmentation,
^ich discouraged the evolution of vast r^onal
belts of agricultural specialization such as those
tound in the United States and Canada, the Soviet
Union, and Ausiralia

Mixed livestock and crop forming Is based on the
subsistence femiing s^'stems that evolved during me-
dieval times Crops came to dominate the scene with
fenile, easily tilled soils like the loess lands that
stretch across northern France to central Germany.
Livestock assumed significance in valley areas with
heavy clay soils or in cool, moist uplands. Swine
were particularly important among Germanic
groups!, who grazed them m herds m heavily forested
areas Soil feniliiy was maintained by rotating crops
and spreading aninaai manures In many respects the
medieval forming scene was one that would have
delighred modem ecology-conscious conservation-
ists

As populauon pressure increased in postmedieval
Europe, this tradiiicmal way of agriculture began to
change New high-yielding crops, such as the white
potato and maize (com), were introduced from the
New World Each found an important niche in the
agn^lturaJ system of Western Europe The potato
was ideally suited to the cool, moist conditions of the
n^, jind maize grew well in the sunnier conditions
of the midsouth

Table 9-3 illustrates a stribng change that is oc-
curring in Western European mixed agriculture—
the rapidly dedining importance of small forms

226

FIGURE 9-11

A woman knitting while transporting firewood to the
Italian village of Torcento near the Western Alps. Despite
the high level of living experienced by most Europeans, there
remain considerable numbers of poor people in rural areas,
particularly in southern Europe.

There were dramatic drops in the percentages of
traditional, small, family-operated farms between
I960 and 1984 in highly developed countries like
France, Belgium, and Germany, where mixed live-
stock and crop farming are widespread. Western Eu-
ropeans will have many adjustments to make, as ag-
riculture ceases to be a way of life for many and
becomes a technologically complex form of business
enterprise.

THE PATTERN OF URBANI2ATI0N

Urbanized societies dominate the Western European
scene today. Such societies, in which the majority of
people live in towns and cities, result from a recent
step in humanity’s social evolution. Modern cities
form large and dense agglomerations and involve
their inhabitants in a degree of human contaa and
social complexity never before witnessed. Few peo-
ple seem to comprehend fully either tine newness of
such great urbanization or the speed with which this
process has taken place. In the words of Kingsley
Davis,

Before 1850 no society could be described as pre-
dominantly urbanized, and by 1900 only
one — Great Britain — could be so regarded. Today,
only 65 years later, all industrial nations are highly
urbanized, and in the world as a whole the process
of urbanization is accelerating rapidly.’

Not that cities as such are new to Western Europe;
they are not. What is new is the overwhelming influ-
ence of the form and function of cities, which have
become the norm in modern Western European so-
cieties.

Early Cities

The city of tlie classical age was first introduced into
Europe by the ancient Greeks and Phoenicians as
they spread their commercially oriented civilizations
around the Mediterranean Basin. The Romans car-
ried the urban form of life deep into Western Eu-
rope, founding new cities in their conquered prov-
inces to the west, east, and nordi.

With tlie fall of the Roman Empire, Europe expe-
rienced a period of urban decline. Commerce fell oS
sharply, and the subsistence societies that arose in
the wake of Roman withdrawal had little need for
cities. Some commercial towns reverted completely
to agricultural villages; others were abandoned and
forgotten. A few witli considerable religious or p(>
litical significance survived the Dark Ages. By an
large, though, the urban way of life ceased to be a
dominant feature of the Western European scene un
til the Middle Ages, when commercialism becamf

important again. ,

During the Middle Ages many of the mori un^
Roman towns were revived and once more became
centers of urban commercial activity. Many

WESTERN EUROPE lANDSCAPES OF DEVELOPMEOT

227

TABLE 9-3

Percentages ofEuropean Com*
munlty farms un^ei 25 acres
(10 hectares) In size.

Country

1^0

1975

1984

West Germany

France

Italy

Netfierlands

Belgium

Luxembourg

United Kingdom

—

frefand

Denmark

Greece

—

Spain

—

Portugal

Soufce Basic StsOstcs of (he Communffy, 24tt\ ed (Luxembourg Statistical Office of the European
Communities, 1987)

towns were established, both Inside and outside the
limits of the old empire Often the new towns grew
up around a fortified preurban core, where a feudal
lord or ecclesiastical authority assured a degree of
security and protection As the towns grew, they
sought and gained political autonomy, spelled out m
formal charters from the rulmg prince of the area

These medieval cores still exist in many Western
European towns, and the narrow streets of the cores
cause tremendous problems for automobile users A
stucfy of 141 West German cities indicated that well
over three-quarters of the total urban street mileage
IS too narrow for safe two-way traffic m any signifi-
cant amount The pressure to create parking lots and
wider streets is growing In addiuon. m some areas
sudi as Florence and Rome in Italy and Athens in
Greece, air pollution, primarily resulting from auto-
uiobile exhaust, is threatening priceless works of art
and sculpture as well as ancient marble temples
Coping with the automobile is one of the major
problems facing most Western European city author-
ities Pollution and congestion are the unwanted b>’-
producis of Western Europe’s love affair with the
automobile.

Industrialization and Contemporary
Urbanization

Indiwirialization brought the present pattern of ur-
banization to the people of Western Europe. In about
J8M only 10 percent of the people in England and
wales vi-ere living m cities of 100,000 or more. Hus
proportion doubled to 20 percent in the next forty
years and doubled again in another sixt>’ years By

1900 the British were an urbanized society, the first
in the modern world

The population of Western Europe as a whole Is
increasing only slowly now. Its urbanized popula-
tion, on the o^er hand, is growing rapidly In five
countries — Iceland, the United Kingdom, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Spam — nine out of ten citizens
live In urban senings (Figure 9-12) Only Portugal,
where 30 percent of the population Is urban, fells
below the world average of 43 percent

Unfortunately, much, if not most, of the urban ex-
pansion has taken a heav>’ toll on the environment.
Since World War II careless and unenlightened plan-
ning and the hasty building of shoddy high-rise apart-
ment buildings have scarred the urban fabric of cities
across Western Europe. In addition to the spread of
housing, offices, and faaory buildings, expansion has
spawned vast networks of roads, power lines, rail-
roads, and other needed facilities The rapid urban
sprawl has brought many social problems that can be
linked to the breakup of neighborhoods and the deg-
radation of the urban environment.

Western European political leaders, academics,
and journalists are now aware of these problems, so
It IS not surprising to find concern for the quality of
urban life high on public agendas The period be-
tween Nfarch. 1987, and March. 1988, was proclaimed
the European Year of the Environment to give a truly
international focus to increasingly serious environ-
mental problems and to their solutions In the words
of a document outlining the EEC's commitment to
the Year of the Environment and its or^'n fourth en-
vironmental aafon program for the 1987-1992 ne
nod, ^

FIGURE 9-12

Western European urbanization. Western Europe is one of the world’s most highly urban-
ized regions. Thts map refleas the percentages of the total population living in areas defined as
urban by the countries indicated.

228

WESTERN EUROPE UNDSCAPES OF DEVELOPMENT

229

The environmental problems we know today have
their origins in urban, industrial and agricultural de-
velopment that has been over-intensive and often
anarchic Scarce resources have been wasted, and
there has been an accumulation of pollution, nui-
sances and technological risks which threaten our
health and surroundings®

Suburbanization

Much of the urbanization in contemporary Europe is
actually suburbanization Modem trends m urban
living in Europe, as m other areas of the developed
world, are bringing about decreasing population
densities in central ernes As a result, ever -Increasing
amounts of rural and agricultural land are being con-
verted to urban uses In England and Wales, for ex-
ample, only about 5 percent of the total land area was
classified as urbanized m 1900, by 1972 fully 1 1 per-
cent of the land was urban This slow but inexorable
process is continuing to change Britain’s famed
“green and pleasant land” to an urbanized, built
over, and paved landscape To most Britons urban
Izaiion is a disconcening prospea, to say the least In
the Netherlands and West Germany the situation is

even worse By the year 2000 a quarter of the Neth-
erlands will be urbanized, the total for West Ger-
many will be about 18 percent (Figure 9-13)

The sprawling suburbs so common in Anglo-
America are now increasingly obvious features in
Western Europe, as more and more agricultural land
disappears before the bulldozers’ onslaught In
France urbanization is officially considered “the
mam problem in environment plannmg” nationally.
Between 1954 and 1962 France’s total populauon
rose by 8 1 percent, but its urban population rose by
13 8 percent Figure 9-14 shows the distribution of
FrenA population in the years 1851, 1946, and 1962
and as it has been projected for the year 2000
In their national plannmg to cope with the in-
creasing urbanization of the Paris region, French of-
ficials have adopted a scheme to encourage growth
in seleaed peripheral ciues, designated as regional
metropolises (Figure 9- 1 5) Great effort is being put
into equipping these cities with high-level facilities in
research, higher educauon, medical care, govern-
ment, culture, and communications, in an attempt to
counterbalance the lure of Pans, France’s prmcipal
city These cities should soon be functioning as full-
scale regional metropolises

FIGURE 9-13

Romerberg Square, also known
as the Intemadonal Budding
Center, In Frankfurt, West Ger-
tnany. To the left of the center of
the picture is Old Town Hall (with
the scairstepped roof line) Europe's
continued urbamzittion and subur
biinizaaon often impact on histone
ones and landscapes ui less than
desirable ways

FIGURE 9-14

Populations of urban and rural France and Paris. Western
Europe is becoming increasingly urban. In this chart the
changes in the rural and urban populations of France illustrate
the urbanization process since 1851- Paris, the primary city of
France, has shown spectacular gro^nh. It is predicted that an
ever-increasing proportion of France’s population will be urban.
(From Sendee de Press et d'Information, Prance, Toimi and
Country Environment Planning [New York: Ambassade de
France, 1965).)

Population
(in millions)

Paris region.population
Urban population
Rural population

41.6

36.5

7.2

27.4

1.9

6.4

15.1

20.1

46.2

8.5

20.2

17.5

72.0

14.0

50.0

8.0

1851

1946

1962

2000

Year

FIGURE 9-15

Regional metropolises of France
and tlieir spheres of influence.
In an effon to diminish the popula-
tion growth of Paris and to spread
urban economic activities to other
cities, French officials have devised
a plan to encourage grovrth in se-
lected regional centers. These re-
gional centers receive special aid to
stimulate their growtli. (From Ser-
vice de Press et d’Information,
France, Town and Country^ Envi-
ronment Planning [New York: ^dm-
bassade de France, 1965].)

230

WSTERN EUROPE lANDSCAPES OF DEVELOPMENT

SUMMARY: A Some of the chief qualities that characterize the people of Western Europe

DEVELOPED REGION’S are similar to the major soaoeconomic traits used in defining the devel-
MOVEMENT TOWARD oped, or rich, countries of the world Early technological and political

unity achievements allowed the Europeans to reach out over the world’s oceans

in the Age of E:q)loration and the centuries that followed. That exploration
led to economic explomtion, the planting of colonies and the buildmg of
empires on all habitable continents

The same technological and polmcal achievements that favored the
Western Europeans in their overseas accomplishments were important at
home Industnalization and urbanization, along with mechanized agriculture
and a revolution in transportation tedinology, changed the face of the conti-
nent The modem countries of Western Europe exhibit the history of their
economic and social development m their landscapes

Unbndled competition among the countries of Western Europe for
control of area and resources led w warfare and destruction In the twenti-
eth century two devastaung world wars erupted in a single lifetime In the
aftermath of World War II it was almost universally recognized that far more
could be gamed through peaceful cooperation than through continued com-
petition Beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community and sev-
eral other postwar cooperative organizauons, the countries of Western Eu-
rope began moving toward the goal of economic and political integration
The momentum toward integration is real and increasing There can be no
doubt that a more integrated Western Europe will play a more important
role in shaping world affairs

KEY TERMS

Black Death
core area
Dark Ages

European Economic Community
European Free Trade Association
European Parliament
Europeanization
Europeanness

irredenta

microstate

Middle Ages

nation-state

suburbanization

iranshumance

United States of Europe

1 Terry G Jordan, The European Culture Area A Systematic Geography
(New York- Harper & Row, 1973). 15

2 Fred Bruemmer, “The Northernmost People,” Natural History 83 (Feb-
ruary 1974) 33.

3 Norman J G. Pounds and Sue S. Ball, “Core-Areas and the Development
of the European States S>-stem," Annals. Assodaiion of American Geog-
raphers 54 (1964) 24

4 S Patijn, Landmarks m European Unity (Leiden, Netherlands: A W Si-
jthoff, 1970), 29.

Ibid, 93.

E. Willard Miller, ^ Geography of Manufacturing (EnglewnoH rUff x.
Prentice-Hall, 1962), 130. ^

Kingsley Davis, “The Urbanization of the Human Pooulatinn ” c.- ...
American 213 (September 1965), 41. ’

Service de Presse et d’Information, France, Toim and Countrv
nm^t Planning (New York: Ambassade de France, 1965), 14

WESTERN EUROPE:
MULTINATIONAL
GROUPINGS TO
MEET MODERN
CHALLENGES

odern economic and political realities sug-
1%/B gest that the countries of Western Europe
XV Xk fall into W’O groupings.

1 tire uv'elve full members of the European Eco-
nomic Communit)' (EEC), also knoum as the
Common Market or simply the European
Communit}- (EC): Belgium, Denmark, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany (West Gennany),
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
die Netherliinds, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom

2 die sLx states of die European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA); Austria, Finland, Iceland,
Nor^'a}’, Sweden, and Switzerland

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The tvrelve member states that make up the Euro-
pean Communin' stretch from Portugal to Greece on
the south and to Ireland, the United Kingdom, and
Denmark on the north (Figure 10-1). Together
these twelve countries form die world’s richest mar-
ket, widi a total population of more than 320 million.
The EC's population is affluent and larger than that of
either die United States or the Soiiet Union. In terms
of world trade the European Community is easily the
world’s biggest importer and exporter, accounting
for more dian one-diird of all world trade. It is sec-
ond only to Canada as the largest trading partner of
the United States. In recent years about one-fifth of
all imports purchased by the EC have come from the
United States, and about 1 1 percent of the EC’s ex-
ports have gone diere.

As for steel, die most basic industrial produa, the
European Communin' countries produce consider-
ably more than eidier the United States or the Soviet
Union. The m'elve also lead the world in the produc-
tion of several important agricultural commodities,
such as hogs, w'ine, milk, butter, and cheese. Three
times more w'heat is han'ested in an average year in
the European Community' than in Canada. Moreover,
the EC produces about 3 million more passenger
cars than does the United States or Japan in an aver-
age year. To help move dieir extraordinarj' volume
of foreign trade, the EC countries support a merchant
fleet diat is more than ten times as large as that of the

United States. (Of course, much United States com-
merce is carried by U.S.-owned vessels registered in
foreign countries, such as Liberia, so the real differ-
ence is somewhat less dramatic.) All of these statistics
provide some basis for an appreciation of the tre-
mendous significance of the European Communitv
in diese days of sharpening economic competition
(see box on pp. 244-245).

Since World War II, individual mobility and mass
communications have provided young Europeans
w'ith many more shared experiences than ever be-
fore. Eurovision, an international television broad-
casting organization, makes possible the transmis-
sion of important events to audiences throughout
Western Europe simultaneously. Furthermore, most
of the elements of modern popular culture cross
boundaries with ease in modern Europe. As men-
tioned earlier, people who live in the EC do not need
passports to visit other member countries; and
border-crossing formalities and requirements have
been greatly lessened throughout Western Europe,
making it simple for hordes of tourists to travel
about, supporting an increasingly important tourist
industry'. In addition, most European Community'
governments have joined in plans and programs for
large-scale y'outh exchanges that are deliberately de-
signed to help break down the psychological barriers
created by the intense nationalism of the past.

Historians, geographers, and other EC academics
are cooperating with this movement by producing
school textbooks with European rather than nation-
alistic stress and interpretation. European schools in
Brussels and Luxembourg have worked to develop
truly European curricula and outlooks, and their
rapid growth and commendable results have led to
the adoption of that basic idea in many other cities.
To encourage pupils to approach their studies on a
European rather ^an a national basis, a great deal of
time is devoted to reading and speaking other Euro-
pean languages.

As we briefly review each European Community
country', w'e should keep in mind always tliat tlie
roots of nationalism and individuality' do mn deep in
Western Europe. And an understanding of those
roots is essential to an understanding of the role o
Western Europe in today’s w'orld — and tomorrotts
(Table 10-1).

236

ASTERN EUROPE- MULTINATIONAL GROUPINGS TO MEET MODERN CHAUENGE^

•tC ICELAND -'i

[ I European Communily

r " j European Free
' Trade Association

//C"

SWEDEN^

r /

•§^eLANOf J NOfItHseA

7uNiTeo3 7^*^

l4rf

r SPAIN y*

( _ 'O'

ncuMio-i

Multinational gtoupings of Western Europe. Twelve Euit^^ean nations have joined
together m an economic union called the European Community Another economic union is
the European Free Trade Assoaation, which includes northern Scandmavian countries and Ice
tand, Switzerland, and Austria A number of microstates stUl exist and have special functions
tnd relationships with neighboring countries

WESTERN EllR nnp

238

TABLE 10-1

Selected characteristics of major Western European countries.

Country

Total Area

Utilized Agricultural Areas
(in thousands of hectares)

Wooded Areas
(in thousands of hectares)

Total

Labor Force
(in thousands)

Square

Miles

(in thousands)

Square
Kilometers j
(in thousands)

Arable

Land

Permanent

Crops

Permanent

Grassland

West Germany

249

7,271

181

4,566

7,360

27,304

France

210

544

17,907

1,332

12,206

14,618

23,331

Italy

116

301

9,147

3,491

4,954

6,086

22,982

Netherlands

867

1,127

293

5,732

Belgium

764

640

613

4,113

Luxembourg

154

United Kingdom

244

7,017

11,567

2,273

27,243

Ireland

1,090

4,612

327

1,282

Denmark

2,614

221

493

2,971

Greece

132

2,925

1,027

5,271

5,755

3,893

Spain

195

505

15,651

5,010

6,646

12,511

13,388

Portugal

2,906

864

761

2,968

4,442

Austria

1,445

1,986

3,221

3,335

Norway

125

324

855

—

8,330

2,064

Sv/eden

174

405

2,995

—

620

26,424

4,424

Switzerland

391

1,609

1,052

3,201

Finland

130

337

2,335

—

130

23,321

2,590

Source; Basic Statistics of the Community, 24th ed. (Luxembourg: Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1987).

Federal Republic of Germany

Few Americans old enough to drive an automobile
need to be reminded tliat West Germany is a highly
developed, industrialized country that ranks among
the world’s leading economic powers. Mercedes
Benz, BMW, and Porsche cars regularly set the high-
tech standard of motoring excellence; and the Volk-
swagen, in one guise or another, remains a fixture on
America’s roads and highways four decades after its
introduction.

After the Allied powers — chiefly the Soviet Union,
Britain, die United States, and France — defeated
Germany in World War II, it was divided into occu-
pation zones administered by the military authorities
of the four chief allies. The original plan had been to
treat Germany as a single unit for economic pur-
poses. But differences between die Soviet Union and
the Western Allies increased after the war; and in
1948 the Soviets withdrew from the four-power gov-
erning organizations of Germany and its former cap-
ital city, Berlin, which had also been divided. Berlin
was cut off from the area under Allied control, for it

is deep within the Soviet-controlled zone (Figure
10 - 2 ).

As the differences between the Soviet Union and
the United States and its allies crystallized into what
became known as the Cold War of the late 1940s,
1950s, and early 1960s, two separate and distinctive
political units were formed: West Germany and East
Germany (more properly, the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Democradc Republic of Germany,
respectively). Winston Churchill struck a prophetic
note in a telegram he sent to President Truman in the
spring of 1945:

An iron curtain is drawn down upon their [the
Russian] front. We do not know what is going on
behind. There seems little doubt that the whole of
the regions east of the line Lubeck-Trieste-Corfu v'iU
soon be completely in their hands. To this must be
added the further enormous area conquered by the
American armies between Eisenbach and Elbe, whi
will I suppose be occupied, when the Americans re
treat, by the Russian Power.'

After Churchill used the term iron curtain id ^
speech he delivered in Fulton, Missouri, in 19 U

StstfRN EUROPE MULTINATIQ^ GROUPINGS TO MEET MODERN CH.m£NGES

figure 10-2

MlUtary forces participating In
NATO exercises In West Ger*
many. A maior miliiarv presence
remains in Western Europe in re
sponse CD the cold war chat e\ol\ed
bere-een ihe East and the U'est

became a household t\ ord. So too did Cold War Not
unul the 1970s did the tensions that so seriously di-
vided Europe and the world for three decades begin
10 disappear.

On tlte economic side West Germany made a re-
cover)’ after World War II that can only be termed
miraculous It has experienced periods of business
recession, but high levels of employment and a sta-
ble currenc)’ have been maintained more success-
fully in W'est Germany than in most other developed
countries During the first ten years of the European
Community, the gross national produa of West Ger-
manv grew at the impressive average annual rate of
66 percent

The steady productivity of the coal industry con-
tributed to the early good health of West Germany’s
economy Nevertheless, like all members of the EC,
West Germany is a net imponer of energy; and its
dependence on foreign energy sources, largely pe-
troleum, remains at high levels (Table 10-2) Natural
gas, winch is also being used in growing quantities, is
being imported from the nearby Netherlands; and
agreements have been reached with the Soviet
Union to purchase large amounts of natural gas from
that source. Table 10-3 shows how West Germany
me«s Its large energy requirements

The major industries of W'est Germany are steel
and iron, chemicals, machiner)', electrical equip-

240

WESTERN

TABLE 10-2

Dependence of the European Community o

West

Year Germany France Italy Netherlands

n foreign energy^ sources (percentages of total supply).

Belgium

Luxembourg

United

Kingdom

Ireland

Denmark

Greece

Spain

Portugal

1960

9.6

41.0

58.1

50.9

32.6

99.8

1961

12.8

43.7

62.8

49.6

35.8

99.4

1962

17.7

44.3

68.1

58.6

40.9

99.5

1963

22.4

52.6

70.2

63.2

49.4

99.7

26.3

71.9

98.0

1964

27.2

54.1

71.5

65.8

54.7

99.7

1965

32.6

55.0

73.5

62.8

59.3

99.3

1969

42.8

63.8

78.2

47.7

73.5

99.3

43.8

73.0

99.6

1970

47.9

71.0

81.8

42.3

81.8

99.2

45.1

76.1

100.0

83.5

1971

50.6

73.1

81.8

26.2

84.6

99.5

49.5

80.5

100.0

82.3

1973

54.8

78.0

83.0

6.3

86.4

99.6

48.2

80.7

99.6

91.4

1974

51.1

82.3

83.1

-9.1

91.2

99.4

50.2

82.2

99.5

96.6

1975

55.0

73.8

79,1

-24.8

84.7

99.5

43.2

84.6

99.1

68.3

1980

58.1

81.3

90.4

4.8

89.2

99.6

5.7

81.7

98.7

85.3

1981

51.5

70.1

85.0

5.2

77.7

99.2

-6.4

72.5

95.6

77.6

81.3

91.1

1982

51.7

66.9

85.6

13.9

80.8

99.0

-11.3

65.0

89.2

67.1

70.1

91,9

1983

51.1

61.5

80.5

7.0

73.9

98.7

-17.8

61.9

85.6

65.4

68.8

89.8

1984

49.6

60.7

85.0

10.6

70.9

98.9

-11.3

57.3

85.1

64.5

63.2

93.4

1985

50.2

57.2

83.9

5.2

71.3

99.0

-15.1

54.0

79.6

64.5

60.6

90.0

Source; Sss/c Statistics of the Conmunify, 24lh ed. (Luxembourg: Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1987).

ment. and automobiles. The industrial sector of the
German economy requires approximately one-third
of all die foreign oil that is imported; transportation,
about one-fourdi; and residential-commercial uses,
approximately one-third. The remainder is con-
sumed as a nonenerg}' raw material, Cleaidy, reliance
on imported oil represents die most serious direat to

the continued development of the West German
economy.

Anodier topic of great significance in any discus-
sion of West Germany is that of large-scale migration
since World War II. At die end of that conflict the
political boundaries of each central European coun-
try'- w^ere redrawn, and more than 82,000 square

TABLE 10-3

Energy' sources as percentages
of total energy consumption in
the European Community. 1984.

Country

Petroleum

Coal

and

Lignite

Natural Gas

Nuclear Energy

Tidal,
Hydro, and
Geothermal
Energy

West Germany

41.8

33.5

15.8

8.9

0.7

France

45.8

12.6

26.4

1.9

Italy

61.1

10.6

20.5

3.2

4.2

Netherlands

35.5

11.1

51.2

1.6

0.5

Belgium

40.7

24.5

17.5

16.7

0.1

Luxembourg

32.6

48.2

9.2

0.0

10.0

United Kingdom

45.6

23.8

22.6

■ 7.4

0.3

Ireland

47.0

29.5

22.6

0.0

0.7

Denmark

62.4

34.0

0.6

0.0

2.6

Greece

64.3

32.1

0.5

0.0

2.9

Spain

57.6

2.9

3.0

8.7

4.2

Portugal

86.6

3.6

0.0

8.7

Source: Basic Statistics of the Community, 24th ed. (Luxembourg: Statistical Office of the European
Commu.nities, 1987).

\i^STERrr EUROPE MULTINATIONAL GROUPINGS TO MEET MODE^ QiALLENGES

241

miles of territor)’ passed from German to Polish or
Soviet administration A human fide was set in mo
Don tens of thousands of Poles moved vi-est to avoid
Soviet control, and Germans moved west to escape
control by Poland or to escape from the Soviet
zone of occupation, which is now East German) The
hardships and misery of those unfortunate displaced
persons stimulated massive relief efforts by the
United States and several other countries m the dark
da)? that followed the Allied \ictory over Hitler's
army

West Germany absorbed several million Germans
from the Communist east, and its economy began to
boom In 1961 that wesrrv'ard flow of labor and talent
was senously slow’ed by the erection of the Berlin
Wall The robust economy was producing increased
demands for labor, though, so West Germans began
a s>'5tematic recruitment of foreign workers First It-
aly was tapped, dien Spam and Ponugal Ultimately
other Mediterranean countries, especially Yugoslav
and Turkey, supplied workers for 'X'est German
laaones and construction projects (Figure 10-3)
By the early 1970s between 2 million and 3 mil-
lion guest Tvorkefs, as they were euphemistically
termed, made up more than 10 percent of the West
German work force. The majorit)- of these workers
w-ere men, but before Jong many of them were
joined by their families. Sewn ghenolike conditions
were appearing m German industrial centers, w'here
the foreign wtarkers, often in the lowest-paid jobs,
clustered with their families

As the Oil embargo of 1973 began to cause a slack-
ening of industrial produaion and economic aciinty,
the foreigners were among the first to lose their jc^s
How’ei’er, rather than return to their villages in Yu-
goslavia or Turkey, many opted to remain m the in-
dustrial centers where they had earlier been in de-
mand Needless to say, a wide range of problems
emerged to vex German industrial leaders, local gov’-
ernment officials, the out-of-work foreigners and
their families, and officials of the German govern-
ment and the gov'ernments of the home countries
from which the workers had been recruited By 1S)80
the proportion of foreign workers had dropped to
just under 8 percent, but their concentration in
inner-city enclaves had not changed significantly

Foreign workers and the problems assoaaied
With them are not unique to Germany. In 1980 about
6 5 percent of the work force in the United Kingdom,

82 percent of the work force in Belgium, and 16 5
percent of the work force m Switzerland were made
up of foreigners Without a doubt, the problem of
integrating these workers and their families into the
larger societ)’ around them stands as a major chal-
lenge for Western Europeans in the last decades of
the twentieth century Tbe demographic realities of
aging populations and shrinking birthrates, coupled
with the unwillingness of most Western Europeans to
do menial jobs or undertake hard physical labor,
ensures that some foreign labor w/ill be essential
ITius. when it comes to guest workers, not only Ger-
many but much of Western Europe is on the horns of
a dilemma

West Berlin Countless Germans living m both
West Germany and East Germany still regard Berlin
as the rightful national capital and believe that it will
ultimately be restored to its former position. At
present, however. East Berlin functions as the cap
iial of the Democratic Republic of Germany, whereas
■West Berlin is an enclave o! West Germany deep
inside CommuniSKontfolled East Germany West
Germany’s poliiical capita) is the small city of Bonn,
on the Rhine River

West Berlin has a population of almost 2 million
and coiers an area of 186 square miles (482 square
kilometers), sharing a 28-mile (45-kiIometer) bound-
ary with East Berlin The Communist regime con-
struaed the Berlin Wall along this boundary in l96l
to keep East Germans from moving to the econom-
ically more attractive West This infamous structure
has come to symbolize the lack of personal hbert)'
that charaaenzes life in the Socialist states of Eastern
Europe

France

Almost four-fifths the size of Texas. France is the
largest Western European country and the fulcrum of
the European Communitv' This counir)’ combines
great natural wealth with a central location and is
endowed with a wide vanet)’ of terrain, two-thirds of
w4iidi IS nearly level or gently rolling

Without doubt France has exercised the strongest
influence on the European Communin’ to dare
Somewhat unique among the major industrial coun-
tries of Western Europe, France boasts an imponant
agricultural sector w’ith substantial domestic re-

FIGURE 10-3

Guest worker flows. This map shows die principal source regions and destinations of ^X^est-
ern Europe’s major post-World War II influx of guest workers.

242

U-ESTERN EUROPE NtULTINATIONAL GROUPINGS TO MEET MODERN CHALLENGES

243

sources of primary raw materiak. a diversified and
modem industrial plant, and a capable labor force
The gross national product of France usually ranks
fifth in the world, and per capita GNP is equally im-
pressive Just under 10 percent of French exports are
destined for sale in the United States

France is amply provided with such raw materials
as iron ore, soft coal, bauxite, and uranium, and its
hydroelectric power sources are well developed
(Figure 10-4) As a result, France stands as one of
Western Europe’s major suppliers of metals and min-
erals and an important producer of iron ore and
bauxite In addition, it possesses large deposits of
antimony, magnesium, pyrites, tungsten, and certain
radioacu^’e minerals.

In recent years France has emerged as a leader in
the peaceful use of nuclear energy It has been said,
with some rhetorical exaggeration, that France has
four reasons to succeed m using this controversial
energy source first, it has no oil, second, it has no
coal, third, it has no gas, fourth, it has no choice
When the 1973 oil crisis hit, the French government
opted for nuclear electric-generating plants The na-
tional elearic company was given the mandate to
initiate a nuclear energy development program that
could meet the country’s needs by 1990 According
to French experts, the price of unported oil would
now ha\’e to be less than $5 00 a barrel in order for

oil-fired plants to compete with nuclear generators.
And there is little likelihood that the price of oil will
ever drop to that low figure.

When French nuclear experts are queried about
the pcMenoal for an accident like the one at Cherno-
byl. in the Soviet Union, they are quick to point out
that their country’s reactors are based on a different
technology Like most reactors in the United States,
French plants are enclosed in a confinement build-
mg that IS designed to contain any accidental release
of radioaaive material At worst, they claim, accidents
in France would be of the type experienced at Three
Mile Island in Pennsylvania, rather than the Cherno-
byl disaster that spread dangerous radioaaivity over
a vast area The rest of the world hopes the French
experts are correa

Historically one of the world’s leading manufac-
turing countries, France is active in all major
branches of industrial acuvity. French aluminum and
chemical industries rank among the largest in the
world, as do the mechanical and eleancal sectors In
addition, the French automobile industry produces
more than 3 million vehicles a year. And the elec-
tronics, telecommunications, and aerospace indus-
tries have all contributed to the present high level of
technological development that characterizes much
of French industry Military use of atomic energy, as
well as certain civilian applications, has also achieved

EUROBAROMETER: AN EYE ON EUROPE

^ ^he European Community keeps an eye on itself through Euroba-
bj rometer, a report of the results of biannual opinion polls of the
J4> man-in-the-street in Western Europe. In the words of the 1972 Politj.
cal Affairs Committee of tlie European Parliament, “Opinion polls are a cru-
cial source of feedback. . . .Your Committee hopes that the Executive will
expand these opinion polls into a regularly and systematically used instru-
ment.” The committee’s recommendations won unanimous approval: the
first sun^ey was conducted in 1973, and Eurobarometer was born in 1974.
Since then, sur\^eys have been conducted every April and October. In 1980
they w^ere extended to include Greece; in 1985, Spain and Portugal.

The findings reported in Eurobarometer are used in a number of im-
portant ways.

1 Institutions of the European Community use diem as a basis for
formulating policies and sounding out public feelings. The Euro-
pean Parliament and Commission use them to investigate public
awareness and views of their roles and operations.

2 Findings widi promise of general interest are often reported by
journalists and broadcasters.

3 National bureaucracies, political party organizations, professional
associations, trade unions, and other interest groups make exten-
sive use of findings diat are of particular interest to them.

4 Social scientists now anal^^e die voluminous collection of interna-
tional data on a wide array of issues. They can trace shifting atti-
tudes toward the same issues in different countries.

an impressive lei'el of sophisdcation. France joined
widi the United Kingdom in producing die first su-
personic commercial jet air transport, the Concorde.
In 1965 France launched its first eaith-orbiting satel-
lite and has pursued an active space research pro-
gram, widi rocket-launching facilities in French Gui-
ana. In spite of increasing criticism from odier
countries in die Soudi Pacific region, France main-
tains a nuclear weapons test facilit}- on Mururoa atoll
in French Polynesia.

Italy

Compared widi many^ other Western European coun-
tries, Italy has been poorly^ endowed by' nature. Much
of die country^ is unsuited for modern farming be-

cause of mountainous terrain or an unfavorably dry'
climate. It has no significant deposits of coal or iron
ore, and most other important industrial mineral de-
posits are widely dispersed and generally of poor or
indifferent quality. Deposits of natural gas, found in
die Po Basin after World War II, are the country's
most important mineral resource, but the gas supply
is being rapidly depleted and does not constitute a
long-term energy' supply'. As a result of these natural
deficiencies, Italy must import most raw materials for
manufacturing. Low levels of productivity in agricul-
ture and in certain industrial sectors as w'ell as the
need to upgrade die skill of much of the labor force
have also been obstacles to Italian development.

The south of Italy', a region know'n as the Mezzo
giomo (Land of die Midday Sun), is one of the major
regions of underdevelopment in the European Com

5 Individuals and groups can suggest questions and issues to be in-
corporated into future Eurobarometer surveys

In one recent survey Europeans were asked, “Which of the ideas or
causes in the following list are sufficiently worthwhile for you to do some-
thing about, even if this might involve some risk, or giving up other things’"
The answers were as follows-

Cause

Percentage

Respondents

Sexual equality

Proteaion of the environment

World peace

Struggle against poverty

Our country's defenses

My religious faith

The unification of Europe

Freedom of the individual

Human rights

Revolution

None of these

It is heanening to find that the cause of world peace stands out above all
other causes in the minds of most Europeans. We might wonder how Item
5 would have fared, had Euroban)meter been funaioning in 1914 or 1939.

munity It includes the Italian peninsula south of
Rome and the islands of Sicily and Sardmia — an area
the Size of Pennsylvania and Delaware There a rug-
ged landscape, poor soils, and Mediterranean cli-
mate have had a most profound impaa on the nature
of the Italian economy. Only 15 percent of that vast
area is considered level enough for cultivaiion; 50
percent is categorized as hilly, and the remainder is
mountainous (Figure 10-5)

Unfortunately, the mountains of the Mezzogiomo
are not high enough to ensure year-round snow ac-
cumulations As a result, the rivers arc dry for long
periods of the year, flowing only during the moist
Mediterranean winter season Ironically, winter is trf-
ten a period of flooding, waterlogged fields, and se-
rious soil erosion. Irrigation schemes are diffiouk
and exceedingly expensive m the area.

Although It still lags, the Mezzogiomo is now mak-
ing economic progress. The effects of massive invest-
ments made since World War 11 m regional agricul-
tural improvement schemes and industrial
development are beginning to be felt It will be a
long time, however, before the Italian south begins
to equal the north in terms of productivity and pros-
perity People are still leaving the area at a disturbing
rate in search of a better life.

Conditions are considerably different in northern
iQly. There the economy— essentially one of private
enterprise— has flourished The names of corporate
giants Iflce Fiat and Olivetti are household words in
Nortii America, where the fashionable shoes and
clothing of innumerable smaller Italian firms also
find a ready and profitable market Despite a severe
economic recession in 1971 and the relative stagna-

245

246

FIGURE 10-5

Lemon and grape production along tlie rugged coast
south of Naples, Italy. Although these and other crops are
adaptable to the drj’ summer subtropical climate, much of pen-
insular Italy provides poor agricultural resources. The soutliern
portion of Italy, tlie Mezzogiorno, provides a classic example of
regional lag in the development process.

lion of the early 1970s, Italy normally ranks seventh
among the world’s most important industrial pow-
ers.,

As Table 10-2 indicates, Italy is even more de-
pendent on foreign energy sources than France is.
Especially disturbing for Italians is die oveiw^helm-

ingly important role that oil plays in meeting their
energy requirements (see Table 10-3).

The Netherlands

With 1,106 people per square mile (427 per square
kilometer), the Netherlands is the most densely pop.
ulated country^ in Western Europe— even more
densely populated than Japan. For centuries the
Dutch have been energetically adding to their low-
lying territory dirough land reclamation and drain-
age schemes. Dike building appears to have begun
about A.D. 1000 in the extensive tidal marshes of the
southern Netherlands. The dikes protected land that
lay above the low-tide level. Sluice gates, which al-
lowed surplus water to drain out of ditches at low
tide, were closed to keep out the incoming tidal flow'.
However, the protected lands tliat resulted, known as
polders, were still subject to periodic flooding
when storms occurred during high tides. Not until
windmills, and later steam-driven pumps, were per-
fected could the Dutch begin to create agriculturally
productive polders in areas diat lay below sea level.

In 1953 tlie Dutch suffered a severe disaster when
storm winds of up to 100 miles (l6l kilometers) an
hour drove the waters of the Rliine-Meuse-Schelde
river system across farmlands and towns. An esti-
mated 1,800 people died, and another 100,000 had to
be evacuated. The flood damage was conservatively
estimated at more than S500 million. To prevent a
recurrence of such a flood, tlie Dutch constnifled
the immense Delta Project, which consists of four
huge sea dikes to close most of the mouths of the
Rliine-Meuse-Schelde distributary' system.

Many obsen'ers of the Netlierlands speak of the
Dutcli Miracle. They are properly impressed by the
fact that the Dutch have created almost 40 percent of
their country' by diking and draining polders. Tliere,
more than any'where else in Europe, it is appropriate
to speak of a human landscape. Productive agricul-
tural enterprises flourish on much of the redaime
land, and in many areas new towns and industria
areas have been developed.

The Dutch economy is characterized by prhate
enterprise, but the central government plays a strong
role. A limited base of natural resources— pdw^l
gas, oil, and coal — plus the country’s strategic oca
tion, has led to an economy fliat is unusually cp®
dent on foreign trade. Industry' is modernize an

Astern Europe multinational groupings to meet modern challenges

247

characteristically competitive; it is backed bv a dili-
gent and highly skilled labor force and a vigorous
and adaptable business community The Netherlands
boasts that direct United States investment amounts
to almost $600 per capita of Dutch population, well
over twice the average for the European Community
as a whole and higher than the per capita figure for
any other European country

Although agriculture is almost completely mod
ernized and is characterized by high crop yields, it
pla)-s a small role in the o^'erall Dutch economy As
an industry, agriculture relies heavily on imports,
particularly livestock feed. The livestock industry ac
counts for about two-thirds of the total farm output
The Netherlands is the most efficient dairy and live
stock producer in the European Community Expan
Sion in this sector has taken place as a result of the
market community’s agricultural policy, which favors
efficient producers

In recent years economic sectors in the Nether-
lands have continued to show the kind of postindus-
tnal shifts that characterize older developed societies
throughout the rich world The percentage of the
labor force engaged in primary pursuits dropped
slightly, from 6 5 percent m 1974 to 60 percent in
1984 The manufacturing seaor registered an even
greater decline, from 34 7 percent in 1974 to 27 6
percent m 1984. Service, including government em-
ployment, rose from 58 9 to 66 4 percent m the same
decade

Belgium

The Kingdom of Belgium has long been at the geo-
graphical and cultural crossroads of Western Europe
Today, Belgians are sharply divided along eihnolin-
guistic lines French-speinng Walloons live m the
southern half of the countr>’, the Flemish, wdio
speak a dialect of Dutch, live m the north Continued
e.vistence as a unified state may well depend on how
successful the central government is in allowing each
national group to achieve the almost complete au-
tonomy it demands

Belgium emerged from World War U much less
damaged than its neighbors The immediate postwar
era saw rapid reconstruction, liberalization of trade,
and high economic growth rates Then the pace
slackened, however, until 1958, when the establish-
ment of the European Community brought a new

surge m the Belgian economy. Confidence in the
opportunities that the Common Market provided for
Befeian producers led to bold new investments in
manufaourmg plants and equipment.

Agnculture plays a relatively minor role in the
Belgian economy. In recent years agriculture has
been responsible for less than 3 percent of the GNP,
and It employs roughly the same percentage of the
labor force Livestock and poultry raising are the
dominant agricultural activities, although the tradi-
tional crops — sugar beets, potatoes, wheat, and
barley — still form an important part of the rural
scene

Widi Its crossroads location and its dense concen-
tration of industry and population, Belgium has
pla^-ed an impressive role in international trade. The
country’s industries contribute $50 billion in exports
and about 33 percent of the total GNP Belgium does
not, however, possess any significant stores of natural
resources, so it must import most raw materials, as
well as fiiel, machinery, transportation equipment,
and about one-fourth of its food The country’s de-
velopment and prosperity are largely the product of
Its highly skilled labor force and its managerial ex-
pertise The cornerstone of Belgian Industry remains
the iron and steel and the metal-fabncating seaors.

Luxembourg

Closely linked with Belgium m an economic union
for more than half a century, tiny Luxembourg is
similar to its larger neighbor in many ways Germany
violated the neutrality of both nations durmg World
War I and World War II, both nations are staunch
charter members of the Norfli Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) The government of each coun-
uy IS a constitutional monarchy However, Luxem-
bourg has no kmg, rather, its executive power is in
the hands of the hereditary grand duke and a cabinet
Internally, Luxembourg is divided into 126 com-
munes, each administered by an elected council in a
system closely patterned after that of Belgium.

A high level of industrialization provides the in-
habitants of this Rhode Island— sized country with
one of the highest per capita GNPs in the European
Community Despite large-scale attempts to diversify,
Luxembourg s industrial scene is dominated by iron
and steel, which accounts for about half of the coun-
try’s total industrial production In recent years steel

248

WESTERN EUROPE

output has declined to 4 million tons annually, still a
real feat for a counm- of only 366,000 people.

Agriculture absorbs about 4 percent of the labor
force, mosdy in small-scale livestock raising and
mixed farming. Tlie vinej'ards of tlie Moselle ^^alley
pro\4de the ra\\' material for a profitable wine indus-
tr}', and Luxembourg’s excellent dn.' white wnes are
exported -uidely.

A surprisingly large number of workers are en-
gaged in Luxembourg’s flourishing financial activi-
ties. The countrj’ has more than sLxt\' large banks,
making it one of the world’s important financial cen-
ters. Trading in multinational corporate securities is
an important feature of Luxembourg’s active com-
mercial and financial sector. Favorable tax treatment
by the government has encouraged many large hold-
ing companies to establish tlieir headquarters in Lux-
embourg.

The United Kingdom

The terms United Kingdom (UK) and Britain are
used s^Tion^mously to refer to die United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which consists
of England, "Wales, Scodand, and Northern Ireland
(sometimes called Ulster). Britain has the oldest in-
dustrialized economy in the world. In the eighteendi
centun' die island-based British gained masten^ of
the seas and established an empire scattered oi’er all
the continents. Tlie empire was enlarged and rein-
forced in die nineteenth cenain', and Britain became
die supreme world power. Hon^ever, changing
world conditions, punctuated by tv\'o cosdi' world
wars, severe!}' weakened Britain’s position in die
as-entiedi centurs’-. Bem^een the wars and since World
War II, many of die British colonies gained dieir po-

litical independence; and the old empire gave way to
the Commonwealth of Nations, a loose political, cul-
tural, and economic association of the United King-
dom and many of its former colonies. Of the 49
member countries in the Commonwealth, 44 are in
the developing world.

When die European Community was formed, sev-
eral Western European countries did not join ini-
tial!}', fearing a division between the countries that
were in it and those that remained outside. Britain, in
particular, was faced with several problems because
of its long-standing connections with the Common-
wealth. It tried to interest the original “Inner She”
countries in forming a European Industrial Free
Trade Area (EIFTA). However, the six were suspi-
cious of Britain’s motives and feared that EIFTA was
just a device to sidetrack the development of the
European Community. The United Kingdom insisted
on retaining its national autonomy and Common-
wealth economic preferences.

Seven countries — Austria, Denmark, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom — formed the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA), or “Outer Seven,” during the 1960s.
Britain, with more than half of EFTA’s total popula-
tion and almost 60 percent of its total production,
clearly dominated tlie organization.

By tlie mid-1960s it was becoming obvious that
Britain’s brightest economic prospects lay with the
European Community, rather than with the Com-
monwealtli and EFTA. As Table 10-4 shows, trade
with die Commonwealth was declining, whereas
trade with Western Europe w^ increasing. Once the
European Community was cr}'stallized, it would pro-
duce a formidable barrier to British imports. For ex-
ample, German cars sold in France and French cars

TABLE 10-4

Destinations of exports from the
United Kingdom (jpercentages).

Year

British

Commonwealth

Western Europe

United States

European

Economic

Community

European

Free Trade
Association

Other

Total

1958

1960

1965

1966

Source: Basic Statistics of the Community, 15th ed. (Luxembourg: Statistical Office of the European
Communities, 1977).

WESTERN EUROPE MULTINATIONAL GROUPINGS TO MEET MODERN CHALLENGES

249

sold in Germany would not be subjea to any import
dut>'; British cars sold to European Community coun-
trie5, on the other hand, would be sutvect to then-
common external tariff Also, it was obvious dial
Commonwealth countries were intent on rapidly de-
veloping their own industnal sectors and would no
longer be considered ready markets for British
goods. In 1973 Britain and Denmark left the EFTA
and, with the Republic of Ireland, joined the Euro-
pean Community.

Leaders in both the UK and the European Com-
munity’ enthusiasucally hailed Britain’s entry They'
saw it as a step that could greatly increase the security
and stability of the European Community and the
prosperity and quality of life for the peoples of ’West-
ern Europe. Certainly, the present twelve EC nations
are a more diverse and impressn’e economic unit
than were the original six

The most notable feature of Britain’s economy ts
the Importance of industry, services, and trade It
ranks fourth In world trade behind the united States,
West Germany, and Japan It takes about 6 percent
and contributes more than 5 percent of the world's
exports. In its share of invisible world trade (such as
financial services, civil aviation, travel, and overseas
investment), Britain ranks second, behind the Untied
States

Coaf, the paramount energy source for the early
Industrialization of Britain, declined in importance
durmg the twentieth century, and an alarming reli-
ance on imported petroleum developed Dunng the
mid-19dQs, however, huge deposits of petroleum
and natural gas were discovered under the bed of the
North Sea (Figure 10-6). In 1972 natural gas from
the North Sea fields accounted for 88 percent of all
^ available in the UK More than half of all gas sold
in Britain is for industrial and commercial uses; the
remainder goes to domestic consumers (Figure
10-7)

Reliable sources of energy are imperative if Bnt-
ain and other Western European countries are to
maintain and improve their standards of living The
stakes are high: astronomical sums must be invested
in exploration and production now as a guarantee
dtat future economic development will be possible
in Wescem Europe The energy crunch brought
about by the boycott of Arab petroleum-producmB
nations in 1973 to 1974 and the 1979 revolution in
Iran have made this faa painfully obvious

For Britain, the future outlook for energy produc-
tion seems bright With the pumping of the first pe-
troleum from the offshore Argyll field in 1975, Brit-
ain moved into the ranks of producing nations
Within five years Britain had become self-sufficient in
petroJeum, and by the end of the decade it had
loined the list of important oil-exporting nations (see
Table 10-2) Although speculation about the future
(S hazardous, it is clear that an energy renaissance has
taken place in the world’s senior developed country.
It nrtll be mteresting to see how this rebirth affects
the day-to-day lives of the people of Britam and West-
ern Europe and the world at large

Ireland

The Irish Republic occupies about five-sixths of the
island of Ireland, once entirely controlled by En-
gland. The northern portion of the island is occupied
by the sue counties that make up Northern Ireland,
which is still an integral part of the United Kingdom
Unlike predominantly Protestant Northern Ireland,
the Irish Republic is about 94 percent Roman Cath-
olic. In recent years Northern Ireland has been em-
broiled in a bmer civil dispute that often erupts into
bombings and street warfare.

English is the common language in Iceland, but
the Irish form of Gaelic, currently encouraged by
the government of the Irish Republic, is spoken in
some places; both English and Irish are official lan-
guages After a century of decline, Irish is showing
signs of growth Insh-speaking schools have become
popular in several urban areas, for example, and
highway directional signs are printed in English and
Irish

Ireland is notably Jacking in most industrial natu-
ral tesouTces Unul very recently, -what industrial de-
velopment it did have was oriented primarily toward
the domestic market. Now efforts are being made to
accelerate industrial development. To this end Ire-
land’s entqr into the European Community was seen
as a great boon.

Not surprisingly, agriculture remains a major fac-
for in national development schemes. However, ag-
ricultural output has failed to keep pace with indus-
try growth in recent years, even though exports are
still largely agricultural.

yffiough Ireland’s economic links with the Umted
Kingdom are close, it adheres scrupulously to a pol-

250

WESTERN EUROPE

FIGURE 10-6

North Sea oil and gas areas. The

North Sea petroleum deposits now
being developed provide substantial
energy supplies to Western Europe.
Dependable energy resources are
especially critical to areas of indus-
trial activity and to densely popu-
lated areas with high levels of living.

iq^ of political independence from its large and more
affluent neighbor. In recent years Irish troops have
served with distinction in a number of United Na-
tions peace-keeping operations around the globe.
However, Ireland remains outside NATO, and in
1969 the prime minister stated that Ireland’s interna-
tional policy — like that of Sweden, Austria, and
Switzerland — was neutrality. This position was reaf-

firmed when Ireland joined the European Commu-
nity in 1973.

Denmark

Long an agriculturally dominated economy, Den-
mark shifted its emphasis to industry about thirty
years ago. In 1964 industrial exports outstripped ag-

VCT-STERN EUROPE MULTINATIONAL GROUPINGS TO MEET MODERN QIALLEXGES

251

nCURE 10-7

An oil rig being towed to Nor-
way’* Statljord field In die North
Sea. The huge deposits of petro-
leum and natural gas beneath the
North Sea hate been of great ben-
efit to Britain and Nortt-ay and of
rtiue to Germany, the Neth
crlands. and Denmark, In an other-
»lse oil and-gas-deficient Europe

ricultural sales for the first time. In recent >-ears in-
dustrial products have accounted for about 60 per-
ttWLoCOecucnaik'stioul export ttade Now, nvoce than
one-fourih of all Danish workers are engaged in in-
dustnal pursuits, and manufacturing contribuies
about 30 percent of the GNP
Denmark is poorly endowed nith fuel resources
Some low-grade iron ore is found in the south, but
on the ^bole Denmark depends on imports for ns
pnndpal industrial raw materials.

One of the reasons for the successful posnvar de-
'elopmeni of the Danish economy Im been its
adaptabiliw, nbich has resulted in a wide range of
compemive specialized products. Danes boost of be-
ing able to one-up their trading partners — selling
fine smoking pipes In England, rthisket’ in Scotland,
chesting gum in the United States Europe's two larg-
est breweries are located in Denmark, and Danish
beer is sold widely throughout the world Clearl)*,
Denmark’s one reallv important domestic raw' mate-
na! is its skilled labor.

The most e-xtensive use of Denmark’s 16,633
square miles (43.043 square kilometers) of territory
remains agticultucal And by Car the largest pQcUoa of
the agricultural land is cultivated for animal food-
stuffs Nmer>' percent of the farm gross income de-
rives from animal production, chiefly butter, cheese,
bacon, beef, %eal, poultry, and eggs.

Greece

Greece, the ancient cradle of democrac)' and Euro-
pean culture, became the tenth member of the Eu-
ropean Community’ on January 1, 1981. Along with
Spain and Portugal, Greece had applied for member-
ship in the 1970s, when all three southern countries
emerged from long dictatorships. In responding to
iheir requests for admission, the European Commis-
sion, the executive arm of the European Community',
stated

When Greece, Pomigal, and Spain, newly emerging
as democratic States after a long period of dictator-

252

VCTLSTERN EUROPE

ship, asked to be admitted to the Community, they
were making a commitment which is primarily a po-
litical one. Tlicir choice i,s doubly significant, both
reflecting the concern of these three new democra-
cies for their owi consolidation and protection
against the return of dictatorship and constituting an
act of faith in a United Europe, which dcmonstmtc.s
diat the ideas inspiring the creation of the Commu-
nity have lost none of their vigour or relevance.'

Thus, political concerns ratlier than ccotioinic factors
were crucial to the membership of Greece. Spain,
and Ponugal.

The European Community's focus on politics was
probably a good thing, because the level of eco-
nomic development in Greece wa.s lower than it was
in other European Community countries, l or exam-
ple, only 8.4 percent of the EC labor force wis en-
gaged in agriculture, whereas well over a tiiird of all
Greek workers tvere involved in agrarian activities.
Greece’s location and long maritime tnidition, how-
ever, give the natirtn an impre.s.sive .strength in com-
merce. Wlieti Greece joined the European Commu-
nity, its merchant fleet comprised alntost 10 percent
of the world's total: with the Greek licet the Euro-
pean Community gained control of approximately
15,000 of the world’s 70.000 large merchant siiips.

Greece's fabled natural l,>eauty anti plea'^ant Meti-
iterranean climate have combined with rea.son:tb!e
prices and good facilities to provide the coitntjy'.s
chief source of foreign exchange; tourism. .More than
7 million tauri.st.s visited Greece in 1980. (wringing in
the equivalent of $1.8 billion in foreign currenc)'.
The increased stability and ea.ve t)f travel that mem-
bership in the European Community guarantee.s
should make tourism an e\'en more important ele-
ment in the Greek economy in the years tihead.

Spain

Spain, about equal in size to the states of Arizona and
Utah combined, is a large countiy by European stan-
dards. Negotiations for Spain's entrance into the Eu-
ropean Communin' began during the 1960s and cul-
minated in full membership in the mid-1980s. With
Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Greece as mem-
bers, tile European Community is the major force in
die Mediterranean Basin. Such a presence will surely
have a profound inipaa on the countries of Northern

/\friai and the Middle East that share the .shores of
this great inland sea.

Spain's entr>' into the European Communin’ be-
came po.s.sible when long-time diaaior Francisco
Fninco died in 1975. With General Franco’s death,
Princejuan Carlos de Borbdn y Borhdn assumed the
position of king and chief of state. Political freedom
\sas restored, and in 1977 Spain held its first elec-
tions stnex.* 1936. 11ie Spani.sh Cories, or parliament,
has proven itself to be an efiectiw branch of govern-
ment.

Spain lias not only adopted democratic govem-
tiietii. but has also experienced significant changes in
its economy. Hie proteaive, centralized economic
policie.s folltjwed during Franco's diaaiorship were
unworkable in the open society of the late 1970.S, and
competitive economic forces took their place. A\-
Uiougii high energx' cosi.s and world economic un-
cenainties pose enorntous problems, the ouikxikfor
Spaiti’.s economic growth is promising: and cntiy
into the European Community assurers that the coun-
ir%'‘s long-term tievt-lopmeni aspirtiiiori-s will be
more easily achieved.

In recent years nnire than h.ilf of Spain’.s expons
have gone to tlic countries of the European Coniniu-
tiity, anti 'alitit.'.'^t -lO percent of its imi’xins iiave come
from the community. Traditionally, about two-thircb
tif Spains agricultural exjxins have gone to theCom-
jiion Market ttrea <if Europe. Crops and products t>p-
ica! of file .Mediterntnean — .such as citnts faiiis.
wine, fre.sh vegetables. s<jylx.‘an oil, olives, olive oil,
and nuts — form a ttvafor pan of those e.xjxirts.

British control of Gibraltar is a frequent bone of
cosiieiiiiun between Britain and .Spain in Eurojxtan
Community meetings. Gibraltar is a .sm;i!l mountain-
otis petiinsula ominiandiiig one of the world's most
siraiegicttlly imponant sea-lane.s, the Strait of
Gibraltar, connecting the Atlantic Ocean and the
Mediterrane;in Sea. Knowi as Tiie Rock, Gibraltar
w.ts taken from Spain by the British during the War of
Spani.sh Succe.ssion in 1704, Gibraltar is clearly a
relic of colonialism and something of an embarrass-
tnent to the Briii.sh, However, tJie residents of
Gibraltar, known as Gibraltarians, voted nearly unan-
imously in a 1967 referendum to retain their political
ties to the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, as Spain’s
economy and politiail climate improve, the position
of the Gibraltarians may soften, and the Gibraltar
question may become more amenable to a solution

WESTERN EUROPE MULTINATIONAL GROUPINGS TO MEET MODERN CHMj^GES

253

satisfactory to all three groups involved Certainly
Spain’s membership in the European Commuruty
should help to speed that solution

Portugal

In size Portugal resembles the state of Indiana, but in
population It is almost twice as large, Indiana has
approximately 5-5 million citizens, and Portugal,
more than 10 million The northern portion of the
country is rugged and mountainous, the area south
of the Tagus River is largely rolling plains Thanks to
Its position fronting the Atlantic Ocean, most of Por-
tugal has a more moist and temperate climate than is
found m the Mediterranean Basin to the east (Figure
10-8) The combination of terrain and climate al-
lows almost half of Portugal's total land area to be
utilized for agricultural purposes, and almost 90 per-
cent of that area is classified as arable land, on which
crops, orchards, and vineyards can be developed
Althou^ the percenuge of the work force en-
gaged in agriculture has declined in recent decades,
from 42 percent in I960 to 24 percent m 1985, Por-
tugal sull lags behind most other EC countries in this
respect However, the industrial and service sectors
have shown the increases that usually accompany
economic development m the modem world In
I960, for example, the industrial work force ac
counted for only 21 percent of the total, whereas

ncURE 10-8

Azenhas do Mar, Portugal, a
coastal resort area on the Atlan
tfc. The Ru/d clunare, scenic land-
scapes, and rich cultural heritage
have made tourism a maior eco-
nomic activity throughout southern
Europe

today approximately one-third of the workers are
employed in the industrial seaor. The shift into the
service sector has been equally dramatic, with more
than 42 percent of W’orkers engaged m service func-
tions In 1985

Portugal is one of Europe’s oldest countries its
modem roots go back to a.d 1140, when Alfonso I
became king The present-day boundaries were
drawn in 1249, after a long period devoted to expel-
ling the Moors During the Age of Discovery, Portu-
guese explorers pushed to almost every part of the
world and laid the foundations for a great territorial
empire in Africa. Asia, and South America (where
they colonized Brazil) In the 3970s Portugal fought
expensive wars in a futile effort to retain its African
colonies m places like Angola and Mozambique The
drain of these wars on the Portuguese economy was
disastrous and ultimately led to die downfall of the
diaatona) regime ol Antonio Salazar, who had been
in power since the 1930s Recently, Portugal reached
an agreement wuh the government of the People’s
Republic of China whereby Macao, a Portuguese col-
ony for more than four centuries, will be returned to
Chinese control in 1999, just two years after Britain
returns nearby Hong Kong.

In 1974 Portuguese voters chose an assembly to
draft a democratic consumuon and thereby launched
the country on its present path of represenutive par-
liamentary government. This accomplishment was

254

WUSTf-RN EUROPE

crucial to the Portuguese in 1977. when their gov-
ernment sought entiy into the European Comimi-
nit>'. The European Commission, in recommetuling
the eventual acceptance of Pt'trtugal. noted that cle-
mocraq’ was an established fact there.

The comnuinity cannot leave Portugal out of the
process of European integration. . . . 'Hie resulting
disappoinlnient would be politically ver>' grave and
the source of .seriou.s difficulties. 'Hie accession of
Portugal, which set its face firmly towards Europe
almo.st as soon as its deniocraq- w:e. restored, can
on!)' .strengthen the European ideal.

Fortugai. with Sjxtin, entered the Europe.iri Gaiintts-
nity in 19<%. Clearly. I^irtugai's lnng,-term future .itul
economic development will he ciu.sely tieti to tliat of
the e,\[)anded luiropean Community.

THE EUROPEr\N FREE TRADE
ASSOCIATION

The ETTA is composed of .Austri.'i, Icelaiui, Norw.iv,
Sweden, and .Swiixerlami. \s‘iih Einia.nd an as^ocIate
member. The orgamzatioit exists to encourage tlic
free trade of industrial product.s among tiie m.x coun-
trie.s involved. .‘V.s such, tite EIHA constitutes an im-
portant pan of the economic integration tiv.tt li.is
been taking place in Western luirojve since the end of
World War 11, I'ree-irade .agreements lietween iiC
and El'TA countries ha.ve pronu^ied a growth oi trcaae
for the benefit of all concerned, 7'iie mo.st iinpoa.m;
outcome of these agreemetns is die civ.ition of a
free-trade xone for industrial products throughout
W estern Europe. In the words < if the .Stockla »Im Ccnj-
vention, which esiablisiicd the HITA in 19 ^ 0 . rhe
ElTA’s objectives .are

To promote. . .a sustained expansimi of economic
activity, full employmem, increased pr^iductiviiy ami
the rational use of resources, financial stability and
continuous improvement in living stamlards;

To secure that trade between member states takes
place in conditions of fair competition;

To avoid significant disparity between memtier states
in conditions of supply of raw materials proiiuced
within the area of the Association; and

To contribute to the luirmonious development and
expansion of world trade and to the progrc.ssive re-
moval of barriers to it.

W'e ntnv turn to ;i brief discussion of each of the
.six countries tliat make up the EITA. As Figure 10- J
sliows, they (lank the heart of the Oirnmon Market to
the cast and north.

Austria

Tile people of .Austria speak Gennan. and about 90
percent of them .are H<iman Catholic. Two small but
significant ethnic minority groups exist; some 20,000
Slit'.'cnes in liie region Irno'Aai as Carinthia in .soiith-
cetitra! .Austria and stime 2S.00D Croatians in Burgen-
land. on the lioider svitli Hungaix-, Tnese groups
.‘■cpve :is rcmuiu'er.'- of the day.s liefore World War 1
wh.cn Ausirsa was tiie center of titc great .-\ustro-
nung.in.'iis Empire, which controlled a va.si nuiliina-
tion-il terntorc in Etirope.

■Ahmo; all of .-Austria's terrain i.s either hilly or
mt'-untairnuo Tiie Alps dominate the southern and
western jiiovinctw '.ind pnnidc an important b.'isis
for the coun'tr’s thriving tciurist imiuoiy. .Asa result
of iiMonea! f.ictors atui uneven terrain, .Austrian
farms .He Mil.!!! and fragmented Conserjuently, farm
]n'oJuct.s tend to be rckitiwly expesisive. .-Agriail-
tutv '' '-hare of the narion.i! economic output has de-
clined steadily, it is now less than o percent of the
ga\"'S domestic pro.iua.

.Ausin.i's moNt important trading [xtrtners are
tnembet'.s of the EC, wliieh take almost 60 percent of
it.s exports. Ei 'I'.A c< 'untries i.ike alxHif 27 percent. On
the inijxnt .side the EX,’ accounts for more than 60
jicrccnt ;inv.' the EdT.A, ;!ppro>;ima{eiy 20 jiercent. In
adsiicitm, tnivle with Eastertt E.uro|ie is significant,
•witii sxmte 10 percent of .Austrian e.xport.s going to
the tfommunis; bloc and ab-out 10 percent of Aus-
trian imports Coming from that area.

Austria is in a str.itegic posiritm. both geographi-
c.illy anil economically, betw-een tlie E;!.st and the
West, During the .-Allied occupation after World AVar
H. .Au.stria was retiuircil to lieliwr gotni.s worth more
tiian J 150 million, plus 10 million tons of petroleum,
to tiie Soviet I'nion. In 1955, wlien all occupation
forces were withdrawn ami .Austria once more be-
came a sovereign state, its parliament p;t.s.sed a law-
making the countn- perpetually neutral in ititenia-
tional affairs. .As a result, .Ausiria actively pursues j^ol-
icies that tire best described as bridge-building to the
E:i.st, Tiie.se policies are designed to increase contact
with Eastern Europe tintl the Soviet Union at all lev-

vrF»;TERN EUROP^ MULTINAtToNAL groupings TO MEET MOD^M_CHULENGES

255

els. /n (his v.ny t^Je Austrians beliew rhe>- can make a
contribution to the easing of East-'?i’est tensions far
bes-ond vs (lat might otheru ise be possible fora coun-
ta' V, ith such a small population

Iceland

Iceland is an island countrv’ slightly smaller m area
than the state of Kentucky’ Located on an aane \ol-
canic summit to the east of Greenland and immedi-
ately south of the Araic Circle, Iceland wtis one of the
most remote countries of Western Europe until the
advent of modern air transportation Tliank}. to the
relativ’ely -svarm wtiiers of the North Atlantic Drift (see
Figure 8-3). Iceland’s lowland chmaie is surpris-
ingly mild Summers are damp and cool, winters are
V er>’ windy, but temperatures are relatively mild For
example, Re^kiavik, the capital, has an average tern
perature of 52° F { 1 T C) in Julv and 30° F ( - 1° C) tn
Januaiy

Iceland s population of 242,000 is made up of a
remarkably homogeneous gn^up. descendants of
Norwegian and Celtic peoples who hrsi colonued
the island late in the ninth centun and earh m the
tentli centuiy The modern Icelandic lango.ige is re
puted to have changed relativelv little since the
twelfth century and thus to be ser\ cloj>e to the Ian
guage spoken b> the Vikings

Cliief among the resources on whicli Icelanders
havebuiltiheir prosperous economv aretish Indto
elearicitv , and geothermal energy The main agricul
tural products are (ivestock, hav, fodder and cheese
The work force numbers close to 1 13.000 and is a|
most entirely literate — Iceland boa.sts one of the
highest literacy rates in the world As might be ex-
pected, a fairh high percentage of the work force is
engaged in primary economic aaivities, espeaalK
agriculture and the all-imponant fislienes About 30
percent of Iceland's exports go to the EC, and -m-
Oflier 10 percent are purcli»u>ed by EPTA partners
Tlie United States is also a Urge aisiomer, taking
Some 28 percent of Iceland n e.xports More dtan
three-founhs of the expoas are products of the
highly developed Icelandic fishing industry

During W’orld ^X■a^ II Iceland was oarupjttJ b\
Dritoh and American iniliury forces After the svar
Iceland became a ch.irter member of NATO Duong
the early 1950s. at the request of NATO, the United
htate-' and Icelaml agreed that the United States

should assume responsibilitv for Iceland s defense
Since then Iceland has been die onlv ^5^TO country
without its own military’ forces

Norway

Like Iceland, Norway is a northern land Almost a
tliifd of Its 1,100-mile (1,771-kilomeier) length is
north of the Arctic Circle Even its southernmost
point, at Undesnes, reaches only as far south as
the approximate latitude of Juneau, Alaska Roughlv
the si7e of New’ Mexico and large by European stan-
dards, Norway suffers from a lack of land suitable for
agriculture In fact, only 4 percent of Norway's total
area of 125,181 square miles (324,219 square kilo-
meters) iS suitable for farming About a quaner of ilae
country is forested, and an amazing 72 percent is
classified as mountainous, with bogs, glaciers, and
barren rock w'astes (Figure 10-9)

Adding to the difficulty of developing such terrain
IS the character of Norway's coasts, which are deep
fjords Fjords, as we nienttoned in chapter 8, are
steep-sided valleys dug by glaciers and now? flooded
bv the sea Where Norway is narrowest, the fjords
virtually ait it into segments, so there is no contin-
uous land route from the southern part of the coun-
try to Its northern provinces The far-flung towns and
settlements of northern Norway can be reached only
bv airplane, ship, or— with difficulty — highway-ferry’
links

Norwav s chief natural resources are fish, timber,
hydroelectric power, and — in recent years — oil and
natural ga* from the North Sea fields Offshore oil
w-a-s discovered in the 1960s, and developnient began
in the 1970s Tltanks to the rapid rise in oil prices,
Norway’s economv has enjoyed a considerable boost
from this new and technologically demanding indus-
trv In 1980 about one founh of the value of a)] Nor-
wegian e.>q)ons came from oil and gas that were sold
abroad A pohev of moderate production ha.s been
adopted 10 assure that petroleum will remain an im-
ponant part of tlte Norwegian economy for many
decades

Sweden

Sweden shares die Scandinavian pemn-sula with Nor-
wav and, like its neighbor, is a long and narrow coun-
try If Sweden were superimposed on a map of the

256

WESTERN EUROPE

FIGURE 10-9

The rugged Norwegian coast.

This area provides little land suit-
able for settlement or agriculture. It
is characterized by numerous rug-
ged islands, deep ^ords, and barren
rock surfaces.

United States, it would spread from the southern tip
of Florida to Washington, DC, a distance of slightly
less than 1,000 miles (1,610 kilometers). Although
Sweden lies in approximately the same latitude as
Alaska, the warming influences of the Nordi Atlantic
Drift help to provide much of its southern half witli
a climate like that of New England. Winter days are
noticeably short; the sun sets at about 3:00 p.m. during
Stockholm’s midwinter weeks. Midsummer days,
though, are long.

Sweden’s per capita GNP consistently ranks
among the three or four highest in die world, higher
than that of Canada. As might be expected, Sweden is
basically an industrial country. Agriculture and for-
estry combined contribute only about 5 percent of its
annual GNP, and in recent years only about 5 percent
of the work force has been employed in agriculture.
Extensive forests, rich deposits of iron ore^ and hy-
droelectric power, along with a highly literate and
well-trained population, are the basic resources on
which Sweden has built a productive economy. As a
leading trading nadon, Sweden exports more than 50
percent of its industrial output. The chief markets for
Sweden’s wood products, iron ore, machinery, met-
als, bearings, ships, instruments, and automobiles

are Norway, die United Kingdom, Denmark, and Fin-
land.

An important social problem in Sweden is one
that is beginning to concern many rich countries: the
adjustments required as increasing numbers of citi-
zens reach retirement and join the over-65 age
group. Life ex-pectanq', a good measure of develop-
ment, is more dian 75 years in Sweden. Just what
social institutions and programs will best suit the
increasing ranks of senior citizens is a quesdon that
all developed countries will need to answer in the
future. Without doubt, Sweden’s soludons to the
problem will be studied closely by leaders and plan-
ners in ever}'’ countr}' of die rich world.

Switzerland

Switzerland — in the heart of Western Europe and
bounded by West German}^ Liechtenstein, Austria,
Italy, and France — has traditionally controlled die
major routes betw^een soudiern and northern Eu-
rope. The modern countr}^ of Switzerland traces its
roots back to 1291, when three county-sized districts
called cantons signed the Eternal Alliance that
bound them together in resistance to foreign rule.

WESTERN EUROPE MULTlNAnONAL GROUPINGS TO MECT MODERN CH^IENGES

257

Through time other cantons joined the confedera-
uon, and in 1848 a federal constitution, pamally
modeled on the US Constitution, was adopted.
Svnss neutrality nas guaranteed by the great powers
of Europe early in the nineteenth century, and at
present Switzerland is a staunchly neutral country
composed of several distina ethnic groups

Reflecting this ethnic diversity, Switzerland has
four national languages Romansh. based on Latin, is
spoken by a small Swiss minority that lives in the
iOpine valle)-s of the southeast Italian is the language
of Ticino Canton in the south The western cantons
speak French And finally. German is the language of
approximately two-thirds of all Swiss The highly de-
veloped urban-industrial core of the country is m the
German-speaking region

After World War II Switzerland was one of the few
Western European countries whose economies w-ere
virtually unscathed Since most industrial raw mate-
rials must be imported, the Swiss concentrate on
those products containing high labor and skill inputs,
such as watches and precision instruments The>’ also
make specialized quality products like chemicals,
pharmaceut/cals, cheese, and chocolate, as well as
items that do not lend themselves to mass produc-
tion, such as power generators and turbines

The small domestic market can consume only a
limited portion of the industrial output, so Switzer-
land depends on the w'ofld economy for its prosper-
ity. Exports — along with Switzerland’s highly devel-
oped tourist industry, international banking, and the
insurance and transportation industries — form the
foundation for one of the world’s highest standards
of living

Only the belief that membership m the EC would
be incompatible w-ith its traditional strict neutrality
keeps Switzerland outside the European Commu-
nity. The countries of the Common Market provide
well over two thirds of Switzerland’s imports and
buy half of the Swiss exports Uke the other EFTA
members, Switzerland cannot escape a future closely
tied to the fortunes of the European Community

Finland

'The Finnish name for Finland is Suomi, which means
“land of marsh" — a good description of the heavily

glac^ted, lake-strewn landscape that comprises most
of the country. lake neighboring Sweden and Nor-
way, Finland is a northern land, with about one-third
of ns 724-mile (1,166-kilometet) length wnhin the
Arctic Circle U shares lengthy land boundaries with
Sweden tmd Norway in the north and the Soviet
Union m the east

Until 1809, when Finland w’as conquered by the
Russians, it was closely associated with Sweden
Swedish is still an official language, and about 6 per-
cent of the population of Finland speak it as their
mother tongue From 1809 until 1917 Finland was
conneaed with the Russian Empire as a grand duchy
Then, taking advantage of the Bolshevik Rei’olution
m Russia, the Finns declared their independence in
1917 During the tense period that preceded World
War 11, the Soviet Union requested that Finland sur-
render territory north of Leningrad and permit the
Soviet navy to establish a base on the coast of the
Gulf of Finland m exchange for territory m eastern
Karelia The Finns refused In late 1939 Soviet troops
invaded Finnish lerritory, and the Soviet air force
bombed several Finnish cities After a number of bat-
tles the Finns were forced to accede to the demands
of the Soviet Union

At the conclusion of World War 11, Finland’s terri-
torial losses amounted to 17,800 square miles
(46,102 square kilometers), roughly the area of Mas-
sachusetts and New Hampshire combined The en-
tire population of the lost territories chose to move
to Finland rather than become Soviet citizens Not
surprisingly, relocating and integrating those 400,000
displaced Finns n'as an enormous challenge. To ex-
perience a problem of comparable magnitude, the
United States would have to lose 12 percent of its
total area while accommodating a sudden influx of
16 million immigrants On top of this the Soviet
Union exaaed a huge indemnity, which the Finns
were forced to pay in ships, machinery, and other
manufoctured goods. In the face of these monumen-
tal crtistacles, the economy of Finland made a spec-
tacular recovery in the postwar decades

Finland’s future development and prosperity will
depend on its continued ability to secure foreign
markets for its exports m an maeasingly competitive
world Its membership in the EFTA is one important
means to this end.

258

WESTERN EUROPE

SUMMARY: A UNITED Practically all of Western Europe is accounted for in the memberships of

STATES OF EUROPE? either the European Community or the European Free Trade Association. It

is tempting to predict that this trend toward increasing political and eco-
nomic integration will continue and will bring about their merger into one
grand United States of Europe. Unfortunately, the political realities of the
last decade of the twentieth century make such an expansion unlikely in the
foreseeable future.

Even though the European Community remains open in principle to
all democracies in Europe, there are strong forces that will keep the EFTA
countries and the countries of Eastern Europe from becoming members.
Rather than a merger of the EC and the EFTA, the outlook for Western Eu-
rope is one of close cooperation between the groups as economic and so-
cial improvement in their people's lives is sought. In the case of the Euro-
pean Community countries, these goals will be approached through the
creation of a single, or true, common market, whereas EFTA members will
strive to remove trade barriers for the common good. These developments
in Western Europe will become increasingly important to the rich and poor
worlds alike.

KEY TERMS

Berlin Wall

guest worker

cantons

iron curtain

Cold War

Mezzogiorno

Dutch miracle

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

East Berlin

(NATO)

Eurobarometer

polder

Flemish

Ulster

Gaelic

Walloon

Gibraltar

West Berlin

ENDNOTES 1 Winston Churchill, telegram to Harry S. Truman, 12 May 1945, Naval

Aide Files- Box 7, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

2 Commission of the European Communities, The Second Enlargement of
the European Community (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications
of the European Community, 1979), 5.

FURTHER READINGS Beaujeu-Garnier, }. France. New York: Longman, 1976. A noted geographer’s exami-

nation of the diversity of the French landscape, with an analysis of the future of
French regional planning.

Berger, John, and Jean Mohr (photographs). A Seventh Man: Migrant Workers in Eu-
rope. New York: Viking Press, 1975. An intensely subjective view of the problems of

MULTINATIONAL GROUPINGS TO t>^EET MODERN gLMLENGES

259

Europe’s guest tvorkers m the early 1970s, tshen the movement t^a5 at its height,
that forces the reader to thti& cf the human beings behind the official statistics
Burienshaw, D , M Baternan, and G J Ashworth 77->i? Ci^’ /n West EutX)pe New \orl^
John Wiley & Sons, 1981 An ewieUent review of the region’s urban geography
Chandler, T J, and S Gregory, eds The Otmate of tlye Enlisf) Isles tondon long
man, 1976 An overview of diiitatological factors that incorporates the findings of
broad researA uiio a descnption of the cIuiumic regimes of the British isles
Chapman, Keith North Sea OtlandGas A Ceographtcal Per^ectue North Pomfret,
VT David & Charles. 1976 An informanve assessment of the first decade of exploita-
tion of the North Sea hydrocarbons

Clout, H The Regioiutl Problem tn Western Europe London Cambridge University
press, 1976 A slim volume that idenufies some of the regional problems of Western
Europe

Commission of the European Cdmmuniues Europeans and Their Holidays Washing
ton, DC ComiTussion of the European Communities, Office of Press and Public Af-
fairs, 1987 An offset copy of a report based on a survey of a large, representative
sample of the adult popuJaiions of the twelve EC press and public affairs offices in
Washington

ETTA Bulletin A magazine style periodical including informative but specialized arti
cles published in English. French, German, and Scandinavian versions by the EFTA
Press and Information Service

EFTA Secretariat The European Free Trade Association Geneva EFTA 1986 A 160-
page compendium gmng a hill account of the EFTA and its contribution to Euro-
pean economic integration

Findley, Allan, and Paul White West European Population Change Dover, NH
Cfoom Helm, 1986 A thorough exploration of the recent dynamics in Western Eu-
rope* population changes and the charting of a probable future for the region
Hudson,, Ray, David Rhmd, atwl Helen Mounaey AU Allas of EEC affairs New York
Methuen, 1984 A very informative source of information that extends far beyond
maps alone and contains lengthy discussions on niany aspects of the European Com-
munity

Jones, Peter “The Geography of Dutch Elm Disease in Bncain ’’ Transaaions. Instt
tute of British Ceograpl^ers 6 (15>8I) 324-334 Tracing the spread of a new strain of
Dutch elm disease, which has killed the vast majority of elms in southern Britain in
the past tw ency years and has thus destroyed an important and traditional compo-
nent of many rural English landscapes

Knox, Paul L The Ceogv^ry of Western Europe A Socio-Economic Survey Totowa,
NJ Barnes & Noble. 1984 A small text ofiering an excellent continuation of and
elaboration on several of the themes muoducsd vn these chapters
Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel Tmes of Feast, Times of Famine A History of Climate
since tlx Year 1000 Translated by- Batbara Bray Garden City, NY. Doubledav', 1971
A fascinaung reconaruaion of climatic fluctuations m Europe and their effea on the
human commuraiy

Mellor, Roy E The Two Germames A Modem Geogrnpb}' London Harper & Row,
1978 A lucid and highly readable study conuasung the separate geographical devel-
opments of these once-umfied states, whose centrality on the Comment makes an
understanding of their problems ess^uai

Pxxton.John A Dictionary Ox European Communities New’York. Sl Martin's
Press, 1982 A valuable tool for any detailed study of the EC

260

WESTERN EUROPE

Riley, R C., and G. J. Ashworth. Benelux: An Economic Geography of Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975. An analysis of the
economic transformation of the Benelux nations, with specific reference to the sig-
nificance of governmental decisions in the process of regional development.

Salt, John, and H. Clout, eds. Migration in Post-War Europe-. Geographical Essays.
London; Oxford University Press, 1976. A discussion of the effects of the emerging
patterns of migration in Europe, which remains the migratory continent par excel-
lence.

Sloan, Stanley. NATO’s Future. Washington, DC; National Defense University Press,
1985. A skillful attempt to assess NATO’s role in a world of rapid technological and
political change.

Sundquist, James L. Dispersing Population: What America Can Learn from Europe.
Washington, DC; Brookings Institution, 1975. An analysis of the national population
policies of five of the European nations in the hope that American planners will gain
useful information from the collective experiences of these European nations.

astern Europe
j py and die Soviet

Union are part of
the European culture
realm. They share many
characteristics witli West-
ern Europe, such as a
Christian tradition, a
dominance of
Indo-European
languages, and Caucasian
racial features. However,
other significant features

distinguish this region
from Western Europe
and justify its consider-
ation as a distinct entit>'.

The Soviet Union is a
world supeqaower. It is
the largest countr^^ in
the world in area and
the third largest in pop-
ulation. Even though the
majority' of its people
are of European ances-
try', it includes many dif-

EASTERN EUROPE AND
THE SOVIET UNION

ferent races and reli-
gions Ik economic, po-
litical, and military influ-
ence h felt by the wiiole
wrld Clearly, the criti-
cal role of the So\iet
Union in the present
and the future under-
scores our need to knon-
more about it
For all intents and
purposes, Eastern Eu-
rope has become part of
the So\iec sphere since
the end of World War II
So\iet-st>Ie political and
economic s>'stems ssere
iasUcuted in Eastern Eu-
rope, .ind tiJC)' remain
intact, although not iden-
tical to the Sos'iet model
Soviet dominance is
Itself a dL'tinguishing
characteristic of Eastern
Europe. c\en though the
degree of So\‘iet influ-
ence vanes among the
eijdit counine* of the
region Marxist ilieories.
modified not only by
Ritvsian Communist lead-
ers from Lenin to Gor-
baches* but aI^o by East-
ern European
theoreticians and bu-
reaucrats, have been ap-
plied to the economic
deselopmem throughout
the region Marx's ideas

aaually emanated from
Western Europie and also
had an impact on the
political and economic
progress of that region,
hcm-e\er. the Soviet and
East European variants
developed quite differ-
entW Rather than be-
coming part of an essen-
tially democratic
process, as Marxism did
in the West, instead it
was used in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Eu-
rope (as well as in Cuba,
Ethiopia, China, and
otlter pans of the svofld)
lo justjl)' ihe iJgbiJv con
trolled dictatorships dtat
v,x)u!d lead tltose coun
tries from economic
backwardness to mod-
ernization and material
plenw Tlie Soviet
model, in which the cen-
tral government controls
vimially all investment
cipital and operates
tlirough an exienshe
centralized planning sys-
tem. has been offered to
die developing world as
an alternative to Western
strategies, which emplia-
st/e the role of private
enterpri'e in increasing
mduscnal and agricul-
tural produaion

In chapter 1 1 we dis-
cuss die gec^rapliical
bases of Eastern Europe
and look at how iK posi-
tion between the West
and iJie Soviet Union has
affcaed its development
We also examine the
region ‘s cultural and
environmental cliaraaer-
istic. and consider the
varving responses of the
eight countries to their

political and economic
needs Chapters 12 and
13 deal witli the Soviet
Union, first with Its
phvsical and ailtural
geography and the
complexity of its popula-
tion. Tile second chapter
examines its economic
geography and the dis-
lincuve Soviet approach
to development
problems

orld War 11 abruptly altered the course of
\ \ political, economic, and social develop-

\. \- ment in Eastern Europe. Soviet-trained
Communists stepped into positions of leadership.
Leftist groups, often with support from the Soviet
army, established satellite people’s republics or
people’s democracies. Within three years of the
end of the war, Soviet-style institutions existed in all
eight Eastern European countries. To use Winston
Churchill’s expression, an iron curtain was drawn
between East and West, dividing Europe into two
parts (see chapter opening photo). Eastern Europe
became a buffer zone, a stretch of land separating
the Soviet Union from Western Europe (Figure
11-1), a land between the West and the USSR, yet a
land largely under Soviet influence.

The Communist party became the sole political
party in this new Eastern Europe. Land, industries,
banks, and all but the smallest commercial establish-
ments were nationalized. Traditional churches came
under close government supervision and control as
the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist philosophy became the
basic ideolog)" that affected virtually every aspect of
life.

A primary objective of these new governments
was economic reconstruction and industrial devel-
opment. The ideological goal was to create a Com-
munist society in which there was no private prop-
erty and in which the people owned all the means of
production: all people would “give according to
their ability and take according to their need.” Soviet
Marxist dogma specified a transitional period of so-
cialism, during which the remnants of the former
economic, political, and social systems would be
eliminated and the state would own all the means of
production. Tlie Communist parties of Eastern Eu-
rope were to direct these new command
economies — that is, centrally controlled and
planned economies — under Moscow’s guidance.

Dissent soon arose in Soviet-dominated Eastern
Europe. The Communist-nationalist leader of Yugo-
slavia, Marshal Tito, became increasingly resistant to
Soviet meddling in Yugoslav affairs, and the Soviet
leader Joseph Stalin responded by expelling Yugo-
slavia from the world Communist movement in 1948.
This action allowed Yugoslavia to follow an indepen-
dent path of socialism, one that has involved many
economic and cultural contacts with the West. Some-

time later, dissent took a different form in Albania.
The process of de-Stalinization under Nikita Khrush-
chev and the revision of many of Stalin’s practices in
the Soviet Union led to Albania’s withdrawal from the

Soviet bloc.

In subsequent years the six remaining
satellites — East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungar^^ Romania, and Bulgaria — were able to fol-
low more distinctive and independent ways within
the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union recognized that
there were “different paths to the building of Com-
munism.” Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria
were evenmally able to introduce economic reforms
that the Soviet Union had considered too Western for
its own tastes. Poland ended the collectivization of
agriculture, and many millions of Poles acknowledge
the authority of the Catholic church, especially as it
speaks through the voice of Pope John Paul II, the
first pope of Polish origin. In addition, Romania re-
fused to join the Soviet-led boycott of the 1984 Sum-
mer Olympics and has also spurned the Soviet Union
in other, more critical matters — by recognizing the
state of Israel and balking at plans that would lead to
the greater integration of the Eastern European econ-
omies in the Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance (CMEA, or Comecon).

CMEA is a supranational organization consisting of
several Soviet-dominated countries that have joined
forces to solve certain common economic, cultural,
or political problems. It is designed to promote and
coordinate increased cooperation among the Soviet,
East German, Polish, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian,
Romanian, and Bulgarian economies. Cuba, Viemam,
and Mongolia are also members of CMEA, and Yu-
goslavia is an associate member. Unlike the Euro-
pean Economic Community, which consists of equal
partners, CMEA is dominated by the Soviet Union.
The foreign trade of the six Eastern European mem-
bers of CMEA is largely with the Soviet Union and
otlier CMEA states.

Soviet leaders still consider Eastern Europe vital
to the national interest of the USSR. Soviet troops are
stationed in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary. Although the Soviet Union is willing to
accept some expression of independence from the
“people’s democracies,” it will not tolerate a chal-
lenge to its political control of Eastern Europe. Proof
of this policy can be seen in the Soviet invasions of

266

EASTERN EUROPg- THE lAND BEPR’EEN

267

FIGURE 11-1

Nations and ma)of cities of East-
ern Europe. Eastern Europe has
often been called a shatter zone
because many ethnic groups hat-e
sought sovereignt>’ over the areas
included As a consequence the re-
gion has a history of poliucal Insta
bility and conflia

Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in
Its pressure on the Polish government to outlaw the
independent labor union, Solidarity

There are two essential keys to understanding
Eastern Europe Caught between the East and the
West for centuries, today it is under strong Soviet
influence In addition, it is an area of great environ-
mental, cultural, and economic diversity, in spue of
Its moderate size (one-third the area of Western Eu-
rope) This chapter examines the outside pressures
placed on Eastern Europe, the nature of its Internal
diversity, and the interaaion of these faaors

PHYSICAL DIVERSITY

The landforms of the northern part of Eastern Eu-
rope <»nirasi sharply with those of the central and
southern pans (Figure 11-2) In the north is the
low-lying Great European Plain, narrow in the north-
west, wide in the nonheast. Most of East Germany
and Poland he in this plain, which is drained by the
Elbe, the Vistula, and a number of other rivers. Cen-
tral and southern Eastern Europe are regions of hills
and mountains separated by fertile plains Notewor-
thy among the relief features of this area are the low

eastern EUROPE THE LAND BETWEEN

the longest periods of snow cover in Eastern Europe
Ntfesietn East Germany, on the other hand, lies withm
the marine climatic region, summers are cool, win-
ters are moderate, and precipitation is adequate The
map of climatic regions of the world presented ear-
lier (see Figure 3-3) illustrates Eastern Europe’s po-
sition bettveen marme Western Europe and conn-
nental USSR.

Central and soiithern sections of Eastern Europe
experience warmer summers and mild winters The
warm to hot summers and adequate preapitation of
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and eastern Yugoslavia
provide an ideal growing season for a wide variety of
crops, from wheat to tomatoes and grapes The Black
Sea beadles of Bulgaria andBomaniaare crowded vn
the summer with tourists from both east and west
Even more popular, however, are the resorts of
coastal Yugoslavia Spectacular mountain scenery
meets the blue waters of the Adriatic and combines
with a dry summer subtropical, or Mediterranean,
climate and a more open Yugoslavian societ>' to pro
vide a pleasant escape for northwestern Europeans
The summers there, as in most of Albania also, are
hot and dry, and the winters mild and wet In the
higher elevations of the Yugoslavian Dmanc Alps,
snow and cold lemperaruies bring a genuine winter
season In fact, the Yugoslavian city of Saraievo, only
about a hundred miles from the Adriatic coast, was
the site of the 1984 Winter Olympic games

CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Eastern Europe is a region not only of considerable
environmental variec>' but also of great cultural di-
versity Political unity has been difficult to achiere m
Eastern Europe, leaving the region always wide r^ien
to invaders from (he west, east, and south The term
shatter belt is often applied to Eastern Europe be-
cause it describes a region of great internal variety
and cociftia, beset by pressures from the outside that
lead to frequent political divisions and boundary
changes (see box on pp 272-274)

Varieties of Language

All of the peoples of Eastern Europe except the Hun-
garians and small Turkish minorities speak a lan-
guage that belongs to the large and varied family of

Indo-European languages Nonetheless, a clear mea-
sure of the cultural diversity' of Eastern Europe is the
mulupliaty of languages spoken there (Figure
11-3)

The nujonty of Eastern Europeans speak one of
the Slavic languages, winch are divided into three
subgroups The eastern Slavic languages — Russian,
Ukrainian, and Belorussian — are spoken in the So
vier Union, the western and southern Slavic lan-
guages are found in Eastern Europe Polish, Czech,
and Slovak, which prevail in northern Eastern
Europe, are the major Slavic languages of the west-
ern subgroup Southern Slavic languages — Serbo-
Croatian, Slovene, Macedonian, and Bulgarian —
ate spoken vn the B'aikans

The non-Slavic Indo European languages of East-
ern Europe are German, Romanian, a Romance lan-
guage related to Italian and French but with strong
Slavic influences; Albanian, probably the oldest of the
Indo-European tongues spoken in Europe, and Ro-
many, the language of the gypsies Romany, interest-
ingly, does not belong to the European branch of the
Indo-European languages it originated m India, the
location from which the ancestors of the original
gl-psies migrated into Eastern Europe in the four-
teenth century.

The non-Indo-European languages of Eastern
Europe include Hungarian (orMagytir) and Turkish
Turkish speakers and the gypsies are found largely in
the southern Balkans Bulgaria, in particular, has a
Turkish minonty of 800,000 people. During the
1980s the Bulganan government embarked on a
campaign to Bulgarize the Turks by forcing them to
adopt Bul^ian names The Bulgarian government
has been intent on ridding itself of the descen-
dants of those Turks who ruled Bulgaria for 500
years, even claiming that scientific anthropological
research pro’es beyond a doubt that the Bulgarian
brain is pure and unconiaminated As unbelievable
as It may sound, the implication is clear: there are no
Turks in the country, only Bulgarians who speak
Turkish

Although Small minorities of various language
groups are found m all of the Eastern European
countries, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, and Albania are dominated by speakers of
die lan^age for which the country is named Czech-
oslovakia has two large language groups Czedi
speatefs predominate in the western pan of the

270

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

FIGURE 11-3

Language patterns In Eastern
Europe. Tlie large number of dif-
ferent languages in Eastern Europe
illustrates the region's ethnic diver-
sity. Cultural differences such as
language and religion inhibit politi-
cal stabilii}' and, consequently, eco-
nomic dev’elopment.

countT}'; Slovak speakers, in the east. Yugoslavia is a Patterns of Religious Heritage

multilingual state, witli Serbian, Croatian, Slovene,

Macedonian, Albanian, and Hungarian as ofTicial Ian- Even greater complexity is added to die map of cul-

guages. The ethnic complex in Yugoslavia is so sig- tural diversit)' when traditional religious affiliations

nificant that some experts contend that there is not are considered. Although the Marxist governments

one Communist Party in Yugoslavia, but eight repre- have imposed restrictions diroughout Eastern Eu-

senting diis nationality mosaic. rope, religions continue to e.xist. Tliere, as in odier

Lithuanian ,

Polish

Belorussian

German

c G
Czech

Ukrainian

Hunfiarlan /

Italian^

Croatian

Romanian

6 ^

Serbian

S { Bulgarian
Ry ,

0 100 “OTKM

INOO-CUnOPEAN FAMILY
OF LANGUAGES

Gr»ek

... ^ y ' ’ •

i Turkish

‘ ‘ ' “■ ■■ i Y

■ JS' . rX

□ SLAVIC GROUP , ,

Western Slavic Inngusces j GERMANIC GROUP } BALTIC GROUP

P Polish ^ C GetrtiAn ‘ Latvian

C Crrch Danish Lithuanian

S SlovaV Smedish Rjr Romany

^ Lusallan j [ GROUP URALIAN FAMILY

j j South Slavic languages R Romanian OF LANGUAGES

* ' Slovene I Italian

j j South Slavic languages

* ' Slovene

‘ Latvian

Lithuanian
Ry Romany

URALIAN FAMILY
OF LANGUAGES

Serbo-Cto.alian

Macedonian

Bulgarian

[ ~] ILLYRIAN GROUP

A Afbanifln

□ j 1 HELLENIC GROUP

Eastern Slavic languages > 0,

Ru Russian
Da Belorussian

U Ukrainian (Bold letters on ihe map indicate where a

aignllicant minority o( each language is found.)

r ! UGRIC GROUP
^ ' H Hungarian

ALTAIC FAMILY
OF languages

j ~| TURKISH GROUP
' T Turkish

FASTCRN EUROPE. THE tAND BET^BN

271

tegions of the world, religious traditions haw been
an important element m the formation of national
character and in the development of antagonism
among cultural groups

Not only are the three branches of Qmstiamty
— Roman Catholicism, Protestanusm. and Eastern
Orthodoxy — found m Eastern Europe, but the Is-
lamic heritage is also prevalent m Albania and pans
of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria The Jetvish population,
howeter, is only a fraction of t\’hat it was before
World War II and the Nazi driw to exterminate the
Jews Numerically, Eastern Europeans who profess
religious beliefs are predominantly Roman Catholic,
the majority of Poles. Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians,
and Croats are Roman Catholic (Figure 11-4) Prot-
estant minorities are found in Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, Romania, and Yugoslavia The East German
population has an overwhelmingly Protestant tradi-
tion, Lutheranism

The second largest religious group m the region
is the Eastern Orthodox Christians Orthodoxy is pre-
dominant among the Serbs, Macedonians, Bulgars.
and Romanians. Roman Catholicism v-as brought to
Eastern Europe by missionaries from Rome, Ortho-
doxy came from Constantinople (Istanbul), the seat
of Eastern Chnstianit)’ In addition. Orthodox mis-
sionaries brought the alphabet and consequently a
written language for the people they com'erted

Today, that link between religion and wTiuen lan-
guage continues. The language of the Serbs, Mace-
donians, and Bulgars is written in the Cyrillic alpha-
bet, as are the eastern Slavic languages The
Romanians, although traditionally Orthodox in faith,
use a Roman or Latin alphabet derived from their
pre Christian Latin heritage On the other hand, the
Roman Catholic cultural areas of Eastern Europe and
the Protestant areas (once Roman Catholic) use the
Laun alphabet Consequently, although the Serbs and
the Croats speak the same language (Serbo-
Croatian), they use different alphabets. That is, the
Serbs, principally of Orthodox heritage, use the
Cyrillic alphabet, whereas the Catholic Croats use
the Latin alphabet

It is difficult to get information on the strength of
religion m Eastern Europe; however, a survey in the
British journal 77;e Economist in 1986 pointed to nu-
merous signs that religion is surviving m the region,
in Poland it is more than surviving; it is thriving As
many as 60 percent of the Poles are practicing dieir

religion, and the church has never been stronger. In
other countries the religious role is not so dramatic,
but there are signs of growing religious interest Re-
ports are heard of secret religious practices m Alba-
nia (the world’s only atheisuc state), 150,000 people
in Romama attended Billy Graham revivals, and 52
percent of the young people in Yugoslavia desalbed
themselves as religious, compared to 33 percent
twenty years ago These are just some of the signs
that religion is persisting in the region despite the
odicial wish that it w’ould disappear ^

nCURE 11-4

A baroque Rotnaa Catholic church In CiechoslovaJcIa.
Despite government restrictions religion continues to be an Im-
pottant part of the culniral milieu m several Eastern European
countries Roman Catholicism is predominant among the several
rebgious traditions of Eastern Europe

130 YEARS OF BOUNDARY CHANGES IN THE
SHATTER BELT

he expression shatter belt describes the political instability of a re-
I I gion. In particular, it describes the inability' of Eastern Europe to re-
sist tlie greater militar}' and political power of its past and present
neighbors, especially tlie Ottoman Empire, German}', Austria, and Russia.

Culmral fragmentation has added to the weakness of Eastern Europe.
In addition to creating a political vacuum tliat imdted outside inten'ention,
the patchwork of ethnic groups has created conflia tlirough irredentist
policies. As introduced in chapter 9, irredentism exists when one countr}'
claims the territor}’ of anodier country' on the excuse that members of the
first country's etiinic group live in the second country' and should be united
witli dieir national kin. Tlie term bredentism is derived from the Italian
word iiredenta, which means “unredeemed” or “unfulfilled.” As modern
Italy w'as being fonned in die late nineteenth century', the term w'as used to
call for die acquisition of Italian-speaking areas that were not yet part of the
new nadon. In Eastern Europe the call of irredentism has frequendy been
heard; it has been used by Germans, Poles, Russians, Hungarians, Roma-
nians, Bulgarians, Serbians, and odiers. Consequent!}', diroughout much of
modern history' die boundaries of Eastern European countries have changed
frequently. The map at right shows die principal changes betw'een 1815 and
1945.

Widi the exception of the tiny kingdom of Montenegro and some
small German states in the north, die Eastern Europe of 1815 was domi-
nated by four great powers: Prussia and Russia controlled the north; Austria,
the center; and die Ottoman (Turkish) Empire, die soudi. Over the next
century' the most notable changes occurred in die Balkan Peninsula, where
Turkish power declined rapidly. The frequent changes in polidcal bound-
aries that took place in the Balkans throughout the nineteenth and early
m entiedi centuries led to a new polidcal-geographical term. Balkaniza-
tion, meaning the breakup or fragnientadon of a once-large political unit
into numerous smaller ones. Parts of diis old Ottoman Empire were
absorbed b}' Austro-Hungaty', whereas odier former Turkish lands were
made into new states, such as Romania and Bulgaria. In die nordi die Ger-
man Empire ■v\'as formed in 1871 by die consolidation of Prussia and other
German states; Russia increased its territory' only slightly.

The defeat of Germany and Austro-Hungary' in World War I signaled
furdier upheaval in die political boundaries of Eastern Europe. The Austro-
Hungarian Empire was dissolved, and die diree independent states of Aus-
tria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary' were created in its stead. Odier territories
formerly' held by the empire became parts of new or expanded indepen-
dent countries. A new Poland was created from German, Russian, and Aus-
trian lands. Romania gained lands from Hungary', and die new kingdom of
Yugoslavia t\'as formed by uniting Serbia ■u'idi other soudiern Slavic
territories.

^NORWAY ) A (9

' -7 »

|0ENMW«' ,, '< •"“ (

» “ A

■\ r PRUSSIA

J i^-fp>^i5^AXONYC BEPUBLI'

*v^ \ % \ \ OTTOMAN

, ^ X X \

KJ \) " AAft j

V f \ 't ''VMONTENEOBO

W-S«»

'NORWAY ) X p

-7'"

£e™»iik'’ -«* (

'rt'^S’''’-' 7 A

'sr

RUSSIAN

EMPIRE V ^

EMPIRE

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN VX

c”

ru r~^

V ‘ V MONTE- S )

IitaA%

t¥nfit'tl*n \ 1

ROMANIA r

BliLGARIA K

VURKB^

273

In 1919 the expression of national independence in Eastern Europe
reached heights that had not been previously known in modern times. The
four powers that had earlier dictated the fate of Eastern Europe either were
in abeyance or had been removed from the scene. Russia remained but was
in chaos in the aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Not only did
Russia lose territor}'^ to Romania and Poland, but its Baltic lands were di-
vided into the independent states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The independence that swept across Eastern Europe was to last fewer
than tv^enty years. The Nazis sought revenge for the defeat of Germany in
World War I and attempted to gain control over all of Europe. First with the
threat of force, then by invasion, Germany began its temporary domination
of Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union, initially an ally of Germany, annexed
parts of Romania and Poland as well as the Baltic states. However, Adolf Hit-
ler’s uncontrolled appetite for land and power soon ended this uneasy alli-
ance, and the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. Germany’s inability to
withstand the force of the Russians in the east and the United States and
Great Britain in the west led to its near annihilation, and once again bound-
aries were redrawn.

The Soviet Union emerged from World War II as the unquestionably
dominant force in Eastern Europe and turned the region into a vast buffer
zone between itself and the West. Soviet leaders oversaw the establishment
of political regimes throughout the region that were modeled on its own
ideology and organization. The major boundary changes — which remain to
this day — were drawn at the expense of Germany and the advantage of the
Soviet Union. The eastern Polish boundary was shifted westward, but Poland
was compensated for lost land by the acquisition of German territory; the
Oder and Neisse rivers became the new boundary^ between Polish and Ger-
man lands. In addition, the German territoiy'^ of East Prussia was divided be-
tween the Soviet Union and Poland, and the Soviets turned their occupation
zone in Germany into the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).
Moscow also acquired the eastern tip of Czechoslovakia, thereby giving it a
strategic foothold in die Hungarian Plain. And finally, the Baltic states were
reincorporated into the Soviet Union, and the part of Romania called Bessa-
rabia was annexed by the USSR.

eastern EUROPE- THE lAND BhiWEEN

275

Religious and other cultural differences, along
with fears of political and economic domination,
have led to nationalistic clashes, particularly in Yu-
goslavia In addiuon to the age-old conflict among
the Slovenes, Serbians, and Croatians, the wish of
Yugoslav Albanians for greater autonomy and the
fears of the minority Serbs that the Albanians wall
dominate them recently led to a number of serious
riots The possibility exists that a loosening of the
tightly controlled governments of Yugoslavia and
se\’eral other countries of Eastern Europe could rea-
waken old cultural enmities.

POPULATION

The total population of the eight Eastern European
countries is about l40 million, or about half the pop-
ulation of the Soviet Union The most populous of
these states is Poland, with almost 38 million people
It Is the sixth largest country in Europe (following
West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, France,
and Spain), whereas Albania, with slightly more than
3 million people, is less populated than all other
European countries except Iceland, Malta, and Lux-
embourg (Table 11-1)

Distribution

The distribution of the population throughout the
region is highly N-ariable (Figure 11-5) The largest
area of high population density is found in southern
East Germany, northwestern Czechoslov’akia, and

TABLE 11-1

PopuktloD of Eastern European countries, 1989

Nation

Population
(n millions)

Polish People's Republic

380

Soaaftst Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

236

Soaalist Republic ol Romania

230

German Democratic Republic

166

Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

156

Hungarian People's Republic

106

People’s Republic of Bulgaria

Socialist Republic of Albania

3.1

&XITW rtWd Pcpufason Dasa Sheet. 1983 (Wastvngtoo, DC. Popu-
“Jw Re'efenee Bureau. 1988)

southernmost Poland A smaller high-density zone
surrounds Budapest, Hungary. Moderate population
densities are found in much of the remaining Great
European Plain, the Wallachian Plain, the Hungarian
Plain, and adioining areas In southern Czechoslova-
kia. northeastern Yugoslavia, and southeastern Ro-
mania Lower population densities prevail in the
mountainous areas that cover much of Yugoslavia,
Albania, and Bulgaria, as well as in the Carpathians

Population Growth

Much of World War II was fought on Eastern Euro-
pean soil As a result of military and civilian losses
and migration, the postwar population of Eastern Eu-
rope was 10 percent less than the prewar populauon
Dunng the early postwar years the population in-
creased at generally high rates, except In East Ger-
many Large numbers of East Germans migrated to
the West unul the Berlin Wall was built.

With the exception of Albania, the countries of
Eistem Europe fit into the last stage of demographic
transformation low birthrates, low death rates, and
low rates of natural increase (1 percent or less per
year) Hungary has attained zero population gro^.
the number of deaths slightly exceeds the number of
births Albania’s high birthrate (2.7 percent) and low
death rate (0 6 percent) result m an annual rate of
population growth of 2 1 percent This figure has
been slowly declining during the last decade but is
still comparable to that m many countries in the de-
veloping wxirld, such as Mexico (2 4 percent), Chad
(2 0 percent), and India (2 0 percent)

Ideologically, the txiuntries of Eastern Europe
subscribe to the Marxist theory of population growth
This theory’ contends that population growth can
only enhance economic benefits to the population as
long as the economic system has created an even
distnbution of resources Some early postwar poll-
aes, such as subsidies to families and the availability
of day-care centers, affirmed the Marxist pronaial
philosophy. However, other goverruneni policies op-
erated to slow the rate of population growth For
example, the role of women was changed in the new
order. Women were needed in the growing labor
force and gamed rights to increased education and
training In addition, liberalized birth controls were
enaaed that greaUy increased the availability of abor-
tions. These faaors, along wtth a family’s need for the

276

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

HGURE 11-5

Eastern Europe’s population.
Population distribution in Eastern
Europe is quite uneven. Population
densit)' is higher in the north than
in the south and higher in the
plains than in the uplands.

woman’s income and tlie shortage of adequate hous-
ing, helped to reduce the birtlirate.

By the mid-1960s the governments of East Ger-
many, Czechoslovakia, Hungary’, Romania, and Bul-
garia feared that dropping growth rates would lead
to an inadequate labor supply. Western industrial
economies see zero population growth as an ideal to
be w'orked tow^ard, but the Eastern European coun-
tries tend to rely more heavily on human labor re-
sources because they are not as highly automated
and mechanized as their Western neighbors. There-
fore, population policies w'ere modified in Eastern
Europe to encourage an increase in the birdirate.
These measures included the restricted availability' of
abortions, increased subsidies for families, extended
maternity' leave, and improved social w'elfare pro-
grams. Even so, the countries of Eastern Europe con-
tinue to experience declining growth rates as they
become more urban and industrial and as their peo-

ple demand better living conditions and more con-
sumer goods.

Urban Populations

Eastern Europe is less urbanized than Western Eu-
rope. In Western Europe the urban population aver-
ages more tlian 80 percent of die total populadon,
w'hereas in Eastern Europe the urban population av-
erages about 60 percent of the total population. The
reladvely low'er proportion of city' dwellers reflects
die greater predominance of agriculture as a way of
life in Eastern Europe and die smaller role of indus-
trial and seri'ice activities in die economy (Figure
11 - 6 ).

Levels of urbanization vary ft'om country' to coun-
try. East Germany is one of the more urbanized states
in Europe: 77 percent of its people live in cities. At
the other end of the scale is Albania, where 34 per-

K^RN EUBOPE THE^l^ BETWEEN

277

FIGURE 11-6

A business district in the city of
BudapesC The signs accurately re-
flea increasing trade inside and out
side Eastern Europe In recent years
Urbanization In Eastern Europe,
boBCTw, IS less intense than it is in
■Western Europe, reflecting Eastern
Europe’s greater dependence on
agnculnii^ acunues

cent of die people live in cities With the exception of
Portugal, Albania Is the least urbanized country' m
Europe The level of urbaruzauoa in other Eastern
European countries ranges from 46 percent in Yu-
goslavia to 74 percent in Czechoslovrdua

Seven Eastern European cities have a population
of more than one million Budapest, Bucharest, War-
saw, East Beilin, Prague, Belgrade, and Sofia Except
for Belgrade these cities — along with Tirane,
Albania — are good examples of primate cities Pri-
mate dues are disproportionately large when com-
pared with other cities (generally, more than twice as
large), and the>' dominate the economic, cultural,
and polmcal life of their country. They tend to be
found in less developed countries, where the scarcer
capital and resources are usually more geographi-
cally concentrated.

The Communist regimes of Eastern Europe place
a high priorit)’ on industrial growth As a conse-
quence, urban development proceeded biisWy after
World War II. Existing ciues uere reconstruaed and
expanded, and several neu’ industrial towns -were
built The new touns include Eisenhunenstadt (iron

and steel) in East Germany, Nowa Huia (iron and
steel) in Poland, Viaoria (chemicals) in Romania,
and Havirov (mining) near the city of Ostrava in
Czechoslovakia

LEVELS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The emphasis on mdustrialization in Eastern Europe
has meant a concentration on heavy industry, manu-
facturing of producer goods (used in the produaion
of other commodities), and dei’elopment of mineral
resources and energy. Before World War II only Ger-
many and Czechoslovakia had well-developed indus-
tnal sectors. Today, despite considerable progress in
industrial produaion — and in agriculture as
well — Eastern Europe still has the least industrial-
ized and poorest economic landscape of Europe.

The lei’els of economic dei’elopment and of living
are \Tiried This diversity is most evident when the
fhe dey-elopment criteria discussed in chapter 4 are
applied to the re^on, particularly the three standard
indicators — per capita GNP, per capita consumption

278

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

of energ\^ and percent of die labor force in agricul-
ture. The m'o supplementary' measures — daily food
supply and life expectanq- — are more uniform.

The three standard measures suggest that the term
developed needs qualification for some of the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe. In the mid-1980s per capita
GNP for die region ranged from a high of about
$7,100 for East Germany to a low of $800 for Albania.
Reliable figures are not available for Romania, al-
though many economic specialists view it as lying
Midi Albania for the tide of poorest country' in all of
Europe. The other five countries in Eastern Europe
were distributed between the two extremes in two
groupings. The first consisted of Czechoslovakia
($5,800) and Bulgaria ($4,150); the second, Yugosla-
via ($2,300), Poland ($2,070), and Hungary ($2,010).
By way of comparison, per capita GNP was $17,500 in
die United States and $7,400 in the Soviet Union.

Per capita energy' consumption is also relatively
low in Eastern Europe, and employment in agricul-
ture is reladvely high, when compared widi Western
Europe. Thus, most of the Eastern European coun-
tries are still transitional, or developing: they belong
neidier to the rich world nor die poor world. This
description is most apt for Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and
Poland (Figure 11-7). Albania and Romania, how-
ever, have flirdier to go to reach the status of devel-
oped nations.

AGRICULTURE

The historical legacies, physical environments, and
local reactions to Soviet policies have all contributed
to the creation of a diverse agricultural landscape. At
die end of World War II much of Eastern Europe
suffered from chronic rural overpopulation. In the
northern and central sections the existence of large
estates and the shortage of good agricultural land for
the peasants were major problems. In the Balkans,
though, agriculture was only at a subsistence level
and was carried out on small, highly fragmented
farms.

Collectivization

Numerous attempts at land reform were made
throughout Eastern Europe before World War II.
None could compare, however, with the drastic
changes that were attempted after the postwar social-
ist regimes were established. Large estates were na-
tionalized, and the land was redistributed among the
peasants. The next step was the collectivization of
agriculture: land was consolidated into either large-
scale, Soviet-style state forms or collective (com-
munal) farms. The central governments funded and
directed the state farms; the farmers were responsi-
ble for operating the collective farms, within the
framework of state directives.

HGURE 11-7

Village housing in an agricul-
tural area south of ICrakow in
Poland. Tlie contras: beween rural
and urban life remains sharp in
much of Eastern Europe.

eastern EUROPE THE LAND BETWE^

279

The objectives of colleaivization m Eastern Eu-
rope were the same as those in the Soviet Union A
pure Marxist-Leninist form of agricultural organi 2 a-
tion was intended to make it easier to control this
important sector of the economy and thereby ftali-
tate the enactment of industrial development pro-
grams The amount of food available for the growing
number of industrial workers was expeaed to in-
crease, for large-scale agricultural uitte were ex-
pected to be more productive because of greater
mechanization and specialiaation of labor

The results of collectivization have been mixed
Resistance to it has been widespread, particularly m
Poland and Yugoslavia, where most of the arable land
is sull in private hands In the other countries It has
proved much more durable and successful All of
Albania’s farms are in the socialist seaor (state farms
and colleaive farms). In East Germany, Czechoslo-
valua, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria the socialist
seaor controls 84 to 92 percent of the agricultural
land

The General State of Agriculture

On the whole, agriculture plays a larger role in the
economy of Eastern Europe than it does in Western
Europe One indicator Is the percentage of the labor
force that is employed In agricultural pursuits ^ As
expected, the lowest propomons of farm workers
are encountered in the most industrialized and
wealthiest states: East Germany and Czechoslovakia,
Agriculture is more mechanized in these two coun-
tries than in the rest of the region, but agricultural
equipment is still in short supply Levels of produc-
tivity in both East Germany and Czechoslowloa re-
main below the standards of Western Europe, and
neither is self-sufficient in foodstuffs A shortage of
form labor and a lack of work incentives have also
limited agricultural production.

In Hungary 13 percent of the labor force is em-
ployed in agriculture — far less than existed twenty-
five years ago Hungary has long been important as
an agricultural producer, and it remains a net ex-
porter of farm goods. Of all the countries with a
predominantly socialized agricultural organization,
Hungary’ has gone the furthest in allowing collectives
to make their own production decisions. In Hungary,
howe\’er, the growth of agricultural production Iw
suffered from poor financial incentives for die farm-
ers

Poland, as we noted, is dominated by private farm
holdings, but the private fanners are closely regu-
lated by the central government Poland does not
produce enough food to rneet its own domesdc
needs, so food must be imported

The four Balkan states — Romania, Bulgaria, Yugo-
slavia, and Albania — are more agricultural than the
northern Eastern European states, with the possible
exception of Poland In Albania mote than six out of
every ten workers are engaged in agriculture. In Ro-
mania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, as well as Poland,
about 30 percent of the work force is in agriculture.
Romania and Bulgaria are net exporters of foodstuffs
In Yugoslavia, as in Poland, the majority of farms are
m private hands, the country is generally self-
sufficient m food, but during yekrs of poor harvest
some food must be Imported Compared with
pre- World War II agricultural production, the Bal-
kan states have made substantial gains Despite these
improvements, though, both per capita and per area
productivity in the Balkans remain among the lowest
in Europe

Types of Agricultural Production

The cooler northern section of Eastern Europe —
East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia — Is a
major grain-growing region. Rye and wheat are the
principal bread grains. In addition, emphasis on in-
dustn^ crops — sugar beets, oils, and fiber
plants — has increased in the north. And the impor-
tant staple, potatoes, is widespread throughout the
region Vegetable and fruit growing is prominent
near urban areas

A shortage of meal has been a chronic problem in
the northern agriaiJcural zone The area planted with
fodder crops has increased but is still not enough to
meet the needs of the meat and dairy industries.
Oiitleand hogs are the pnncipal livestock in this part
of Eastern Europe.

In the southern part of Eastern Europe, the prin-
apal gram-growing regions are the Hungarian and
Wallachian plains Wheat and maize are the most im-
portant grains there and in other parts of Yugoslavia,
^bania, and Bulgaria However, emphasis has been
placed on the cultivation of industrial crops, most
notably sugar beets Bulgaria is Eastern Europe’s ma-
|or producer of cotton, tobacco, and vegetables. Bul-
g?uia, Romania, and Hungary all export vegetables,

280

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

botli fresh and processed, principally to the Soviet
Union and northern Eastern Europe. The dry sum-
mer subtropical climate of Yugoslavia and Albania
produces a variety of specialized crops such as citrus,
olives, and vegetables. Vineyards, primarily for wine
grapes, are a significant feature of the dry summer
zone of Yugoslavia, the Hungarian Plain, and parts of
Romania and Bulgaria. Livestock production has en-
countered the same difficulties in this part of Eastern
Europe that are encountered in the north, largely
because of an inadequate feed base. However, the
raising of sheep for both meat and wool, partially

FIGURE 11-8

Mineral resources and indus-
trial districts of Eastern Europe.

Eastern Europe has three principal
industrial districts: the Saxony dis-
trict of East Germany, the Silesia-
Moravia district of Poland and
Czechoslovakia, and the Bohemian
Basin in Czechoslovakia. All of these
industrial centers are located on or
near coal deposits and have access
to other nearby minerals.

reflective of the area’s Islamic heritage, is an impor-
tant phase of the livestock industry in the four Balkan
states.

INDUSTRY

The Resource Base

Eastern Europe is not well endowed with industrial
resources (Figure 11-8). It is deficient in energy
resources, iron ore, and other minerals. The few re-
sources that do exist are unequally distributed. More-

Industrial district

□

Petroleum

Zinc

Important industrial city

Natural gas

Bauxite

Warsaw

National capital

Uranium

Chromium

Major hard coal deposit

Iron ore

Nickel

Minor hard coal deposit

Copper

Tin

Lignite and brown coal

Lead

Potash

E^STTRN EUROPE- THE LAND BETWEEN

281

over, many of them are of inferior quality and are
expensive to utilize.

The only substantial deposit of high-quahty coal is
the Silesian-Mora\aan field Most of this deposit lies
in Poland, but a small part extends into Czechoslo
vakia Poland, therefore, produces more coal than
any other Eastern European country A high-quality
coalfield of secondary importance is found in west-
ern Czechoslovakia, and small deposits dot the re-
gion Low-qualiry coals, used for the production of
electnaty and for domestic healing, are widely scat-
tered throughout Eastern Europe With the excep-
tion of the East German lignite fields, these fields are
small

There is also a shortage of oil and natural gas in
Eastern Europe Romania's Ploesu field has the oldest
commercial oil well m the world However, the total
reserves of Romania — the Ploesii field, the nesv'er
Baau field in the eastern part of the country, and
other scattered small deposits — are expeaed to last
only a few more years at present rates of producuon
(Figure 11-9) Albania is now a smalt exponer of
petroleum products, and Yugoslavia produces some
petroleum, but, like the other Eastern European

countries with very little or no oil production, it is
dependent on imported petroleum and gas. Oil and
^ consumption is increasing throughout Eastern
Europe, so dependence on foreign sources, particu-
larly die Soviet Union, will inevitably become
greater.

Hydroelectric potential is also limited in Eastern
Europe, except for the Balkan states At present there
IS little developed hydroelectric power, and most
plants are quite small The potential for development
of hydroelearicity is greatest in Yugoslavia, where
extensive construction is under way to greatly in-
crease eleanc output

Because good quality energy resources are so
scarce, the countries of Eastern Europe have ex-
pressed widespread interest in nuclear power. Cur-
rently, generation of electricity by nuclear power is
still limited, but it is expeaed to increase Uranium,
the fuel for nuclear power, is mined m much of the
region, but details of production are closely guarded
secrets

Ferrous and nonferrous metals are also In short
supply in Eastern Europe. Most critical is the limited
amount of iron ore. Even Poland, which has the larg-

FIGURE 11-9

Hie PloesU oil field In Romania,
one of the world’s oldest com-
mercial oil fields. This field is not
expeaed to sene as a ma)or fiiel
source in the future Eastern Europe
B not well endowed with oil or nat-
ural gas

282

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

est iron and steel industry in Eastern Europe, must
rely on the Soviet Union for iron ore. Yugoslavia is in
the best overall position; even though most of its
metallic deposits are relatively small and production
is limited, it possesses a wide variety of raw materials,
including iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, chromium,
and bauxite. Among the most important metallic ores
and metals in other Eastern European states are
bauxite in Hungary, chromium in Albania, and cop-
per and tin in East Germany. The most noteworthy of
the region’s nonmetallic minerals are sulfur in Po-
land and potash in East Germany. In both countries
these minerals provide the raw materials for chemi-
cal industries.

Industrial Growth

The greatest strides made in the economic develop-
ment of postwar Eastern Europe have been in man-
ufacturing, and the greatest gains have been posted
by the least industrialized countries, particularly Bul-
garia. Although the gap between the richer and
poorer industrial states has been narrowed. East Ger-
many and Czechoslovakia remain the most industri-
alized countries.

In the early postwar years, emphasis was on in-
creasing production. However, tight centralized
management of the economy often resulted in inef-
ficiency, waste of raw materials, and low levels of
labor productivity. Since the mid-1960s, concern
over production efficiency has increased. Govern-
ments have become cost-conscious and have at-
tempted, with the notable exceptions of Albania and
Romania, to reduce central direction and increase
the profits of industry. As a consequence, growth
rates have generally been lowered, but efficiency has
been improved. Hungary has been more successful
than any of the other Soviet satellites in reforming its
economy. Plant managers and labor unions have
been given genuine decision-making powers, and
many Hungarians are prospering in their own small
businesses. Even in orthodox Bulgaria, reforms in
the late 1970s led to less central planning and a re-
duction in state subsidies, with the intention of mak-
ing firms pay their own way.

The Soviet Union initially viewed many of these
reforms with great suspicion. In the 1980s, however,
under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the So-
viet Union itself has tried to initiate some of the same

praaices that were implemented earlier in parts of
Eastern Europe. Economic reform, reduced central
planning, and less price fixing by the state, along with
greater frankness and openness in Soviet society, are
some of the signs of Soviet glasnost (a Russian word
meaning “frankness” or “openness”). The leaders of
Czechoslovakia and East Germany, long devoted fol-
lowers of the traditional Soviet style of tight central
control, now find themselves even more conserva-
tive than the present Soviet leadership as they resist
the reforms that are working their way into the Soviet
Union.

Yugoslavia has gone the furthest in reducing cen-
tralized control over industry. It has attempted to
establish a Western market-type economy in place of
the Soviet-style economy, in which prices are set ar-
bitrarily. Plant managers and workers in Yugoslavia
have a greater decision-making role, and their re-
forms have reduced waste and made Yugoslavian in-
dustry more competitive with the industries of West-
ern Europe. The Soviet Union has condemned
Yugoslavia for being nonsocialistic.

The Location of Industrial Activity

Soviet and Eastern European Marxists contend that
capitalism involves the exploitation of humankind by
humankind and therefore the exploitation of one re-
gion by another region and the uneven distribution
of economic activity. Theoretically, according to
Marxists, equal and balanced regional economic de-
velopment throughout a country is possible only in a
planned socialist society that has eliminated capital-
ism. Consequently, Eastern European planners have
tried to stimulate the development of backward areas
such as eastern Poland and the Slovakia area of
Czechoslovakia. Even though efforts to decentralize
industrial activity have met with some success, the
older, established centers have continued to grow
and still dominate the industrial geography of the
region.

A large industrialized area extends from Western
Europe across the northern part of Eastern Europe,
including all of East Germany, western Poland, and
western Czechoslovakia. The concentration of indus-
try is particularly great in the Silesian-Moravian dis-
trict of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Bohemian
Basin of Czechoslovakia, and the Saxony district of
East Germany (see Figure 11-8). The Silesian-

eastern EUROPE THE LAND BETWE^

Moravian district used to be Germany’s second-
largest heavy-mdusinal region After World War II,
however, Poland acquired most of Silesia, and a
small secuon was given to Czechoslovakia Silesia
IS Poland’s major heavy-industrial distria, based on
local coal resources. In addition to coal mming and
the production of iron and steel, manufacturing in-
cludes agncultural machinery, machine tools, and
various chemicals The Czech section of Silesia is
centered m the city of Ostrava, the nation’s iron and
steel center.

The Bohemian Basin in western Czechoslovakia is
also an iron- and steel-producmg distna.with small
coal mines being worked In the area Czechoslova-
kia's capital city, Prague, is located within the basin
and is Czechoslovakia’s largest city and center of in-

283

dustnal production. Industry in Prague is diversified
and mcludes important chemicals, foods, and ma-
dunery.

Tlie highly urbanized Saxony district of East Ger-
many contains that country’s greatest concentration
of industrial production Some iron and steel are
produced, but the region is highly diversified and is
ftimous for its manufacture of chemicals, textiles, and
engineering products

Manufacturing outside the principal industrial re-
gion IS chiefly in the large cities Tor example, ciues
like Berlm, Warsaw, Budapest, and Belgrade are ma-
jor focal points of diverse industries. Other centers of
production are generally smaller and are often asso-
ciated with the location of a raw material (such as the
chemical industries at Ploesti)

SUMMAKV: AN Eastern Europe has come a long way since the iron curtain was drawn Yu-

UNCERTAIN FUTURE goslavia has gone the furthest in establishing relationships with the West.

Westerners may travel m Yugoslavia with relative ease, and Yugoslavians are
permitted to migrate to Western Europe to hold temporary )obs. In addition,
more than Communist parties elsewhere, the Yugoslav Communist party has
relaxed its grip on the economy and the society, yet the party is still the
sole legal, political force Yugoslavia’s future course depends on the ability
of us poliucal leaders to hold the diverse elements of country together
without the popular Marshal Tito, who died in 1980. Latent internal ethnic
hatreds and boundary disputes with Albania and Bulgaria could threaten the
security and economic progress of Yugoslavia

Albania remains tightly within the grasp of a conservative Stalinist
Communist party Although the government has recently opened the door
to a trickle of outsiders, Albania is sull the most closed society in Europe.
Romania, too, is controlled by a strong dictatorship, and the Romanian peo-
ple saw the quality of their lives decline during the 1980s.

The SIX CMEA countries are closely tied to the USSR, although they are
increasingly at variance with Sovi« policies. Attitudes toward the Soviet
Union range from that of Bulgaria, which has proposed becoming part of
the USSR, to those of the defiant Polish workers, whose independent trade-
union movement has directly challenged Communist party rule and Soviet
domination

Economic realities guarantee a continuing close relationship between
the CMEA countries and the Soviet Union Eastern Europe still depends on
the So^^et Union for the raw materials, capital goods, and credit that are
essential for their economic growth. At the same time the decrease in the
rate of economic development and the rising expectations of the people of
Eastern Europe have heightened their interest in greater contacts with the
West The CMEA countnes want technology and capital from the industrial-
ized west, and increased markets in the West could stimulate production at

284

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOX^ET UNION

home. Progress in this direction depends on detente, a relaxation of
strained relationships, between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Warmer relations between the two would probably result in greater Western
contacts with the CMEA countries. Particularly meaningful in this respea is
the trend toward improved relations between East Germany (one of Mos-
cow’s most loyal allies) and Western states, notably West Germany.

The economic welfare of the Eastern European peoples depends on
tlie ability and desire of their governments to bring about changes necessaty
for greater economic efficiency and progress. The changes themselves must
have the tacit approval of the Soviet Union and will reflect changes within
the Soviet Union itself as well as changes in Soviet poliq'’ toward satellites.
Eastern European reformists probably do not expect great changes to come
about quickly; they like to repeat the story of similar expeaations in a dif-
fetynt era. More than a hundred years ago, after Russia was defeated in the
Crimean War, a new tsar, Alexander II, came to the throne. He wanted to
modernize and restructure parts of the Russian economy and society, so he
instimted a number of reforms. Anxious to benefit from this reform-minded
attitude, a delegation from Russian-controlled Poland went to the tsar to
share their ideas of reform for Poland. His reply was, “Stop dreaming!” — a
reply diat many Eastern Europeans believe the present Soviet leadership
could have made. Eastern Europe will change, but not all that much or all
that fast.

KEY TERMS

Balkanization
buffer zone
Bulgarize
collective farm
collectivization
command economy

Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA)

Cyrillic alphabet
detente

glasnost

irredentist poliq’’
Mag>^ar

people’s democracy
people’s republic
primate city
shatter belt
Soviet bloc
state farm

ENDNOTES 1 “God in Gorbachev’s Backyard,” Tloe Economist 299, no. 7441 (12 April

1986); 53-54.

2 Use of the percentage of the labor force employed in agriculmre over-
emphasizes the contribution of agriculture to the economy. In terms of
dollar value added to the GNP, Eastern European farmers are only one-
third to one-half as productive as industrial workers are.

he Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is
huge. It lies in two continents: the western
L quarter of the country is part of Europe, the
eastern three quarters is in Asia. The Soviet Union
occupies one-sixth of the earth’s land surface, ex-
cluding Antarctica — a marked contrast to the size of
other European states. It measures 6,000 miles (9,660
kilometers) from the Baltic Sea to the Bering Straits.
At its maximum north-south extent, it is almost as
long as the United States is wide — approximately
2,900 miles (4,669 kilometers). Indeed, it is two and
a half times as large as the United States, and it
stretches across eleven time zones.

For many people the physical magnitude of the
Soviet Union evokes an image of unlimited raw ma-
terials just waiting to be exploited. For others it
brings to mind a picture of vast tracts of virgin lands
awaiting settlers. The Soviet Union is, in fact, well
endowed with tlie raw materials it needs to maintain
its status as a world power, but that endowment does
not assure the development of those natural re-
sources. Many of the raw materials are in remote
areas, and tlieir exploitation requires a large capital
investment, which die government may be unable or
unwilling to pay.

Other features of the physical environment also
play a critical role in die economic development of
the Soviet Union. Much of the land is considered
inhospitable for settlement and unsuitable for agri-
culture because it is too cold, too wet, or too dr)^
Soviet planners have suggested, discussed, and even
undertaken many schemes to change the negative
features of the landscape. Some of their ideas are as
basic as irrigation systems and die draining of
marshes; others have been grander, such as planting
extensive belts of trees to change die climate of the
steppe and the semidesert. Still others have been
extremely grandiose and impractical, such as dam-
ming the Bering Straits to modify die climate of die
Pacific Coast. Among the most enduring of the plans
put forth have been the ideas to divert water from die
northern part of the country to the southern dry parts
(see box on pp. 291-293).

NATURAL REGIONS

The magnitude of the Soviet landmass and its high
latitudinal location are important elements in die se-
vere continental climates that dominate die countr)'.

The southernmost part of the USSR lies at approxi-
mately 35° N latitude — about the same as Memphis,
Tennessee. However, Moscow is farther north than
Edmonton, Canada. More than 75 percent of the So-
viet Union lies north of the 49th parallel, the ladtude
of much of the northern boundary of the United
States.

A useful device for studying the physical environ-
ment is the natural region (Figure 12-1). Natural
regions are essentially vegetation zones with related
general climatic and soil characteristics. The term
natural region can be misleading, though, as can the
term natural vegetation, which we met in chapter 3.
Large parts of the Soviet Union have been altered by
humankind and thus are not in a natural, or primor-
dial, state.

Tundra

The nordiernmost natural region of the USSR is the
tundra. Tliis zone, together wddi tundra conditions
diat exist elsewhere in the mountains, covers about
13 percent of the Soviet Union. The mean tempera-
ture of the tundra’s warmest month, depending on
location, falls benveen 50° F (10° C) and 32° F (0° C).
Tlie very short growing season and poor soils result
in sparse vegetation, characterized by such hardy
plants as reindeer moss, lichens, and shrubs. The
tundra is treeless because of tlie limited heat re-
ceived in the high latitudes, the high winds, and the
presence of permafrost (permanently frozen
ground tliat restricts root growtli).

Needless to say, the tundra, with its bleak, cold
climate, is tlie natural region tliat has been least af-
fected by humans. However, as contamination from
the Chernobyl nuclear accident is detected even in
tliis remote area, we are reminded that no place is
really safe from the impact of technology. The few
w'ho have penetrated tliis inhospitable region in-
clude people stationed at military posts, widely scat-
tered indigenous tribes, hunters, trappers, and min-
ers.

Taiga

Forests cover almost half of the Soviet territory. They
are divided into three natural regions: the vast taiga,
or coniferous forest, of the north; the mixed forest of
the European part of tlie Soviet Union; and die
broadleaf forest of die far east.

288

USSR. lAND AND PEOPLE

FIGURE 12-1

VegetailoQ regtons of di« USSR. The Sotct Union «s so large that ii contains many different
envHronments. That environmental diversity provides an opportunity to grow many different
tvpcs of crops, and the large area enhances the possibility of a vaned mineral reswrce base
Mudi of the USSR, however, Is looted at high ladtudes and is biUe used

The taiga lies south of the tundra. It covers the
northern half of the European USSR and most of
Siberia, that vast landmass that lies between the Ural
Mountains in the iv’est, the Pacific Ocean in the east.
Central Asia in the south, and the Arctic Ocean in the
north. The climate of the taiga is primarily subaroic.
Interestingly, lov,er temperatures hav’e been re-
corded in the taiga than in the tundra. As the frigid air
settles in the mountain vallej'S, the thermometer
plummets. Temperatures as low as 90° below zero F
(“63° C) have been recorded in Verkho>'ansk in
northeast Siberii In faa, this part of the world has
recorded the lowest temperature on the globe out-

side of Aniarcuca. Taiga summers are shon and cool
In general, the growing season is less than a hundred
daj-s, so agriculture is very limited Although conif-
erous forests cov'er most of the taiga, extensive
swamps and meadows are interspersed among them
in many places.

The dominant soib of the taiga are the spodosols
Grajish in color and leached of many nutrients, these
soils are inferule and highly acidic. Areas of perma-
frost co\'er Nirtually all of eastern Sibena except the
extreme southeast. In western Siberia only the north-
ern ponion of the uiga is affeaed b)* these large
areas of frozen soils In addition to retarding root

290

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

growth, permafrost can contribute to excessive wa-
terlogging of the topsoil in the summer. Waterlog-
ging can make soil move sideways and can cause
havoc for railroad lines, roads, pipelines, and even
buildings if they are not firmly anchored in the fro-
zen subsoil.

Under Soviet programs nomadic native groups of
the region are turning to more sedentary forms of
herding and some agricultural pursuits. The tradi-
tional wealth of the taiga — timber, fur-bearing ani-
mals, and precious metals — is still significant. How-
ever, newly developed industrial resources, such as
the oil and gas fields in northwestern Siberia, are
growing in importance.

Mixed Forest

Betv'’een the taiga and the grasslands of southwestern
Russia lies a triangular-shaped region of mixed co-
niferous and deciduous broadleaf forests. From
north to south, deciduous trees more and more dis-
place the conifers and eventually take over com-
pletely.

Temperatures and the length of the growing sea-
son increase toward the south, but precipitation de-
creases, and the native forest cover thins as the open
meadows increase. This region has been culturally
modified more than any other in the country. Cen-
turies of settlement have resulted in the clearing of
land for agriculture and cities. The longer growing
season and the less acidic and more fertile alfisol
soils make the mixed forest more suited to agricul-
ture than the taiga is.

Broadleaf Forest

The third forest region is the broadleaf forest of the
southern part of the far eastern Soviet Union. This
region has cold, dry winters and hot, humid sum-
mers. The vegetation is mostly broad-leaved decidu-
ous trees of Asiatic origin, with some conifers and
open, grassy meadows.

Steppe

The steppe zone of the Soviet Union consists of two
subregions: the forest steppe, a region of transition
from the forested land to the north; and the treeless,
grassy, true steppe. The forest steppe is characterized

by woods separated by extensive grasslands. In the
true steppe, trees grow only in the river valleys, and
grasslands stretch as far as the eye can see. The soils
of the forest steppe are more leached than they are in
the true steppe, where higher temperatures and
higher evaporation rates reduce the effectiveness of
precipitation. Consequently, in the true steppe the
buildup of humus and minerals in the topsoil is
greater, producing rich, fertile mollisol soils. The
soils are also called chernozems (“black earth” in
Russian).

The entire steppe zone is important for agricul-
ture. Conditions for farming are best in the forest
steppe, where the soil is fertile and precipitation is
generally sufficient and reliable. In the true steppe,
arid conditions and variability of precipitation in-
crease the risk of drought.

Desert

South of the steppe, principally in the trans-Volga
area (the land east of the Volga River in the southern
USSR), aridity increases until true desert conditions
exist. Precipitation in the desert is generally less than
10 inches (254 millimeters) a year, and very hot, dry
conditions prevail in the summer. Winters are cold.
The vegetation of the desert consists mostly of
clumps of grass and xerophytic plants that can store
moisture; there are large expanses of bare earth,
rock, and sand. In widely scattered oases and along
the few rivers that flow through the desert, a rich
plant life is supported on alluvial soils.

Large parts of the desert are used for grazing live-
stock. The cultivation of crops is limited to areas that
are watered by streams or irrigation projects.

The Subtropical South

Two small but important natural regions are the hu-
mid subtropical zone along the east coast of the
Black Sea and the dry summer subtropical zone
along the south coast of the Crimean Peninsula. The
Crimean Mountains help to protect die narrow
coastal region of the peninsula from the severe cold
winds of the north. The mild climate and the mois-
ture from the Black Sea contribute to a varied agri-
culture, including nuts, fruits, and vineyards. The
Crimea is a famous resort area. Old palatial resi-
dences of the wealthy, including the czars’ former

transforming NATURE: CHANGING THE FLOW OF
SOVIET RIVERS*

A fundamental problem by Soviet leaders and planners is the

basic geographic fact that many of the country's rivers flow north-
ward Approximately 85 percent of the water in Soviet rivers emp-
ties into the Arctic or Pacific oceans after flowing through areas of sparse
population and limited agricultural potential Most of the remaining 15 per-
cent of the water is earned south into the Black, Azov, Caspian, or Aral seas,
passing through areas of actual or potential agricultural value. Thus, the
north has enough water, but the south does not

The insufficiency of water in the southern Soviet Union has an impact
on both agriculture and settlement U is also leading to another problem,
one that involves the Caspian and Aral seas These large, inland bodies of
water are located in largely desen environments, and they are slowly drying
up This problem Is espeoally senous for the Caspian Sea not only does the
dropping water level threaten the suitability of that sea for water transporta-
tion, but the increased salinity and higher temperatures threaten the habitat
of its sea life. Of particular imponance Is the beluga sturgeon, the source of
the world-famous Russian black caviar, a major Soviet export (Figure A)
Ironically, the problem of the Caspian Sea has been intensified by the
success of Soviet economic policy and technology the Volga River, the ma-
jor supplier of water to the Caspian Sea, has been dammed extensively.

Thus, the solution to one problem— building dams for hydroelectric
power — has intensified an environmental problem, which must await an-
other technological answer If another “solution" Is found, what new prob-
lems may be created’

To increase the flow of the southern rivers, ihe Soviets have proposed
two enormous projects that would reverse part of the flow of numerous
rivers One projea involves the rivers west of the Ural Mountains in the
nonhem pan of the European USSR, the other, rivers m western Siberia
(Figure B) The first projea would increase the flow of the Volga River. An
extensive system of canals, reservoirs, dams, and pumping stations would
divert pan of the flow of rivers such as the Pechora and Northern Dvina
into the Volga It would thus raise the water level of the Caspian Sea, supply
irrigation water for the south, and improve water transportauon in the
north Eventually, the annual water flow from the Volga might even exceed
that of the Mississippi River

The second proposal concerns rivers that are east of the Urals. This
projea, like the other, includes a number of alternative ideas. In essence, it
would Involve the construcuon of enormous reservoirs and a canal up to

*The American geograplier WiiUp Middin has written extensively on Soviet water diversion
projects For two excellent accounts of these propets see “The Status of North-South Water
Transfer Pro)ects Before Their Abandonment In 1985-86," Soi lel Geography Retteto and Trans
lotion 27, no 5 (May ipgy) 287-329 and "Soviet Water Diversion Plans Implications for Ka-
zakhstan and Central Asia," Central Asum SUney 1. no 4 (1983) 9-43

291

nGURE A

Fishing on the Volga River for
sevruga for caviar.

1,550 miles (2,495 kilometers) in length — almost the distance from Minne-
apolis to Miami. This canal would carry waters of the Ob River and its tribu-
taries into the arid and semiarid lands of Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

These proposals have been bandied about for many years, and West-
erners have frequently asked how realistic they are. Are the Soviets serious
about them? Work on the northern European plan has actually begun, but
the western Siberian plan has never gone beyond the design stage. In spite
of the enormous benefits of these projects, critics within the Soviet system
are easy to find. The problems associated with the proposals are numerous.
First of all, Soviet leaders have been increasingly conscious of the need to
curtail extravagant expenditures, and the economic reforms of party leader
Mikliail Gorbachev include a more careful use of resources.

Another difficulty is the potential for ecological disruption and even
disaster. How would the diversion of waters affect the habitat of fish in the
northern rivers? The flooding required for the enormous reservoirs would
certainly dislocate much agricultural and industrial development as well as

292

HGOREB

Flans to revefse Soviet rivers.

These projects would divert water
horn the Pechora, the northern Dvi-
na, and the Ob over systems and
would entail enormous cost, as well
as considerable ecological and cut
rural impaa The projects are cur-
rently in abeyance but may well be
revived m later years to deal with
the lowering Caspian water level
and the need for imgaaon w-ater in
central Asix

settlements. Perhaps most serious, some scientists contend that the
decreased amount of fresh -water flowing into the Arctic Ocean would lead
to climatic changes that could affea the entire Northern Hemisphere In
addition, some Soviet scholars are upset that the flooding, especially in the
European USSR, would cause mcalculable losses to the country’s heritage
because churches and other histone monuments would be destroyed

After much vacillauon, the Soviet Council of Ministers and the Central
Committee of the Communist party decreed in mid-1986 that work on the
European projea be halted and chat die design studies for the western Sibe-
ria projects be discontinued as well Instead, emphasis is to be placed on
water conservation, reconstruction of smaller irrigauon projects, increased
red^auon of northern lands, and detailed investigation of long term water
needs for Ae sou*. The problems of the Caspian Sea remain, but the solu-
lon ^ m a hoped for 15 to 20 percent reduction of water consump-
uon by all water users and in smaller-scale projects that do not have the
numerous disadvantages of the large-scale plans

293

294

palace at Livadia, have been turned into rest and va-
cation hotels for So\iet workers and bureaucrats.

The humid subtropical area is also a favorite va-
cation spot This area is renovimed for its specialized
agriculture: tea and citrus fruits are the most impor-
tant crops. The moisture-laden vinds from the sea
bring large amounts of precipitation. In addition, the
soils are quite fertile and support a luxuriant vege-
tation.

Mountain Areas

The climate, soils, and vegetation of the mountain
regions are diverse, reflecting the location of the
mountains, their local relief, and, most important,
tlieir altitude. Many \'alleys, foothills, and meadows of
the mountain s}-stems in central Asia and the Cauca-

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SONTET TINTn N

sus support relatively large populations on produc-
tive agriculmral lands.

LANDFORM REGIONS
The European USSR

In addition to the features of the natural
regions — climate, soil, and vegetation — it is impor-
tant to be familiar with the shape of the land — its
mountain ranges, hills, and level plains — to fully ap-
preciate the potential of the land for development.
Most of the European USSR is in the Great European
Plain (Figure 12-2). Usually called the East Euro-
pean Plain or the Russian Plain in the Soviet Union, it
covers a vast area from the Arctic Ocean to the Black
Sea and from the Eastern European countries to the

FIGURE 12-2

Landfbrm regions of the USSR- The surface of the So\iet Union is e.xtremely \’aried. Most of
the European pan of the countr}’ is charaaerized by rolling plains with small, scattered uplands
and mountain areas. In Siberia and Central Asia ■v’ast lowlands, uplands, and extensive mountain
landscapes create a complex landform map, which, as it does in the European USSR, helps to
shape the maps of Soviet population and economic geography.

THE USSR. LAND AND PEOPLE

295

Ural Mountains Most of the plain is Jess than 650 feet
(198 meters) above sea level and is quite flat, with
extensive sections of Icrw, rolling hills. On the Kola
peninsula low mountains reach levels just above
3,900 feet (1,189 meters). There, and on the lands
adjoining Finland, repeated glaciation has left a land-
scape containing tens of thousands of lakes and small
rivers. Mountains also border the plain in the south
The Carpathian Afountains bnefly pass throu^ the
Ukraine in the soutlwest On the Crimean Peninsula
short and relauvely low mountain ranges, no higher
than 5,068 feet (1,545 meters), help to proteCT the
coastal resorts from the firigid northern air

The Greater Caucasus Mountains, which stretch
from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, provide sim-
ilar protection for the humid subtropical region of
resorts and specialized agriculture at the eastern end
of the Black Sea. The Caucasus are actually two
ranges. The spectacular, snow-capped, northern
Greater Caucasus ate the higher In this range is Ml.
Elbrus, at 18,510 feet (5,642 meters) the highest peak
in all of Europe. The lower Lesser Caucasus are
shared with Turkey and Iran The East European
Plain ends in the east at the Urals, a chain of ancient,
greatly eroded, low mountains best known as the
tradiuonal boundary between Asia and Europe. The
Urals are extremely important to the Soviet econ-
omy, for they contain a multitude of ores suitable for
mining

Siberia

Beginiung immediately beyond dve Urals, im-
mense West Siberian Lowland stretches eastward for
more than 1,000 miles (1,610 kilometers) The low-
land is so flat that from north to south, a distance of
more than 1,200 miles (1,932 kilometers), elevation
varies by no more than 400 feet (122 meters)

The Ob River and its tributaries dram most of the
West Siberian Lowland. They flow slowly and broadly
across this flat land into the Arctic Ocean Spring
thaws affect the upper, or southern, courses of the
rivers first, while downstream the rivers are aiU fro-
zen. As a result, thousands of cubic feet of water spill
over onto the level land, contributing to the prob-
lems of developing and settling the region

Two of the other great rivers of Siberia (and the
world) are the Yenisey and the Lena The Yenisey
marks the boundary between the West Siberian Low-

land and the Central Siberian Pbteau (Figure 12-3).
The Lena approximates the border between the Cen-
tral Siberian Plateau and the complex mountain sys-
tem dominates most of eastern Siberia. The pla-
teau is an upland, most of which is more than 1,600
feet (488 meters) above sea level Rivers have cut
deep gor^ into the plateau, which help to give the
area great potential for hydroelectric development.
Superlatives are appropriate here, the Angara River,
whidi drains the world's deepest lake, Lake Baikal, is
dammed by two of the world's largest dams.

Kazakhstaa and Central Asia

South of the West Siberian Lowland is the Kazakh
Upland, a rough, hilly country. Large parts of western
Kazakhstan and pans of Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan are included in the Turan Lowland. Toward the
center of the lowland the Aral Sea is fed by two exotic
rivets (rivers that flow through an arid environment),
the Amu-Dar’>*a and the Syr-Dar’ya, which come from
the mountains of centra! Asia These mountains
— which !ie along the Soviet borders with Iran, Af-
ghanistan, and China — contain the highest mountain
peaks in the Soviet Union. Appropriately, they are
named Communism Peak (24,590 feet [7,495
meters]) and Lenin Peak (23.405 feel (7,134 meters])

POPULATION

With a populauon of approximately 286 million, the
USSR is the thud moeii populous counuy in the world
(after China and India) The size and nature of the
peculation are important to Soviet economic devel-
opment, and an understanding of the most significant
population charaaeristics contributes to our appre-
ciauon of the spatial distribution of the economy as
well as the nation’s present and potential economic
and political problems.

Formation of a Multinational State

The present Soviet state is the result of an eight-
hundred-year-long process of growth by the small
duchy of Muscovy The princes of Moscow, later czars
of Russia, were able to expand their territory by over-
coming scores of different peoples along the bor-
ders The expansion of Russia through Siberia is sim-

FIGURE 12-3

A Siberian landscape in the fell with an isolated fermstead. Most agricultural settlement
is now organized within the framework of collectives or state farms. Independent farmsteads
such as this are found only in remote locations.

ilar to the westward expansion of the United States.
The desire for furs, land, and minerals, especially
gold, enabled a militarily superior Russia to over-
come the many small, scattered indigenous tribes of
the region.

The expansion of Russia into central Asia, the Cau-
casus, and even parts of Europe is the Russian equiv-
alent of European colonialism. However, instead of
crossing the seas to the Americas, Africa, or Asia — as
Portugal, Great Britain, France, and other European
states had to do — Russia just had to extend its con-
trol over neighboring territory and create a large,
contiguous empire. But, unlike the European pow-
ers, Russia has been able to hold onto its colonial
conquests, and today the USSR is a country of more
than one hundred ethnic groups. These peoples vary

widely in language, history, religious tradition, phys-
ical characteristics, and geographic distribution. As
discussed earlier, the presence of different ethnic
groups within a state is frequently a threat to tlie
unity and even the existence of the state. But the
Soviet Union has maintained a tightly controlled
state, with little apparent conflict among its diverse
ethnic groups.

To minimize potential ethnic conflict, the Soviet
Union not only uses the all-pervasive power of the
central state but also employs a government struc-
ture that does allow a few ethnic rights. These rights
vary, depending in part on the group’s size, culture,
and economy. Among the rights are the use of native
languages in schools, courts, places of business,
newspapers, and books; maintenance of ethnic cus-

THE USSR. lAND AND PEOPLE

toms (but with se\’ere limitations on religious prac-
tices), and, for fifty-three of the groups, a politically
recognized territory. However, the laws, customs,
and acts of the ethnic groups cannot conflict with the
dictates of the central government

That central government, which is synonymous
with the national Communist party, is controlled by
the largest ethnic group m the country — the Rus-
sians Although some of the customs and traditions of
other ethnic groups are protected. Russificatloa, a
process of cultural and economic integration, has
continued throughout the Soviet period Russians
have migrated into other ethnic areas and are now
the major population group in many In addition,
Russian is a required language for all students
throughout the country.

Political Territorial Units

The highest level of political territory in the Soviet
Umon is the Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) Ac-
cording to the Soviet constitution, the USSR is a fed-

eral state formed by a voluntary union of “equal So-
viet Socialist Republics ” In faa, the union is anything
but voluntary: it was formed by Bolshevik force (see
chapter 13) Among the many rights the constitution
bestows on an SSR is the right of secession, however,
m reality no SSR is allowed to leave the union, for
such a move would indicate “bourgeois nationalist
tendencies.” Rough guidelines for the formation of a
socialist republic include a population of more than
1 million, locauon on the periphery of the country,
and a majority population of the ethnic group for
which the republic is named The fifteen existing
republics represent large ethnic groups (Table 12-1
and Figure 12-4), how'ever, they do not represent
the fifteen largest population groups

Thitty-ei^t other ethnic groups have administra-
tive units of lesser status The peoples of these units
have various rights of language and custom but are
subordinate to the laws of the SSR m which they are
located — and to Moscow 'Where there are no signif-
icant ethnic groups, the territory is divided into ad-
ministrative districts

TABLE 12-1

The fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics.

[ Area |

SSR

Common Name (Capital

Square

Miles

{in thousands)

Square

Kilometers I
(m thousands)

. Population

1 (in thousands)

Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic

Russia Moscow

6,592

17,075

145,311

Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Kazakhstan Alma-Ata

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Ukraine Kiev

Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic Turkmenistan Ashkhabad
Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Uzbekistan Tashkent

Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Belorussian Minsk

Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic Kirgizia Frunze

Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic Tadzhikstan Dushanbe

Azerbaidzhan Soviet Socialist Azerbaidzhan Baku

Republic

Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Georgia Tbilisi

Ulhuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Lithuania Vilnius

Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Latvia Riga

Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Estonia Tallinn

Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic Moldavia Kishinev

Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic Armenia Yerevan

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Soviet Union Moscow

1.049

233

B.649

447

208

199

143

Source USSR Central Statistical Committee, Narodnoye. 373. Khozyaystm SSSR Za tef (Moscow. Rnansy i Statistika. 1987)

16,244

51,201

3,361

19,026

10,078

4,143

4,807

6.811

5,266

3,641

2,647

1,556

4,185

3,412

281,689

298

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

ATLANTIC
\ ■ ^OCEAN I

U.'- ^ to

Muri^ansk

OMInSK-" }

• •'^>♦^ ^vMo^cow"
‘ «

i>Vi-^C-e„,k r

( Hkh

. M ^ fX ISonn R .;-Kuib73^ev •-SverdlovsI.

"^v ' T ® • ^ Vdlgograd ( ^'Ik^s J

"-':.l:iW .X^- ^•'

C3e\jr:^-?^* •

:B:fir'’^'

SSR boundary

SIBERIA Regional name
Ukraine SSR name

O City with more than 1 million inhabitants

o City with 500,000 to 1 million inhabitants

• City with 100,000 to 499,999 million inhabitants

FIGURE 12-4

Soviet Socialist Republics and selected cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Po-
litically the Soviet Union is divided into socialist republics, most of which are in the west. Most
of the nation’s major cities are also in the western fourtli of the country.

Ethnic Composition

Ethnic composition by language groups is shown in
Figure 12-5. The eastern Slavs — Russians, Ukraini-
ans, and Belorussians — speak languages that belong
to the Indo-European family. This group is tlie largest
in the USSR, with 72 percent of the country’s popu-
lation; the Russians alone comprise 52 percent of the
total population. Russians predominate in the central
and northern European USSR, Siberia, and Kazakh-
stan, but they are found throughout the Soviet Union
and are important even as minority groups, espe-
cially in cities (Figure 12-6). Other ethnic groups

representing the Indo-European family of languages
include Latvians and Lithuanians in the Baltic region,
Armenians in the Caucasus, and Tadzhiks (an Iranian
people) in central Asia.

Almost 40 million people in the USSR speak a
language that belongs to the Altaic family of lan-
guages. This family includes the many Turkic groups,
with a predominantly Islamic heritage. These groups
live principally in central Asia, the middle Volga Val-
ley, and the Caucasus. The Uralian family of lan-
guages has a relatively small representation in the
USSR (about 5 million speakers). It includes several
groups of people in northern European USSR and

□DID

0 3W «0KllOM6T£BS

mOO-SUnO?EI>N O* UkHCUhCEE

SLAVIC GROUP
R ftulS an
U Ukrainian
Seierussian

OTHER INDO-EUROPEAN LANOUAOES
Latv an

Moldavian

Tadzhik
G German

ALTAIC FAMILY OF LANGUAGES

I I TURKISH GROUP
Uzbek
Kirgiz
Kazakh

O OTHEIk ALTAIC GROUPS
Kalmyk

Buryai and eihera

□ CAUCASIAN FAMILY OF UNOUAGES
Oeeigian

I I URAIUN FAMILY OF LANGUAGES
Fumiah

Karelian

Mon^>l^lan and others

Paleo-Sibanan

Eskimo

Aleula

Kets

□

Sparsely settled/unlnhabiled

HGURE 12-5

Major language groups of die USSR. Society in the Sonet Unxm is often Msefy charaaer
ized as monolithic This map of languages shows that there » considerable culnual diversity in
the USSR.

300

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

FIGURE 12-6

School chil dren in Baku, Azer-
baidzhan SSR, on the Caspian
Sea. The Azerbaidzhanians are a
Turkic people and Muslim. The chil-
dren evidence racial and ethnic
traits of both the lighter Slavic (Rus-
sian) peoples and the darker Azer-
baidzhanians.

western Siberia, most prominent of which are the
Estonians and their close relatives, the Finns and the
Karelians.

Jews form the sixteentli-largest ethnic group in
the Soviet Union, They are predominantly urban and
live mostly in the European USSR. Moscow’s attempt
to establish a Soviet homeland for the Jews in the far
east, the Jewish Autonomous District, has not been
successful in attracting the Jewish population. Less
tlian 7 percent of the population in that district is
Jewish.

The patchwork of nationalities also includes die
numerous Caucasian peoples in the Caucasus, of
whom the Georgians are the most noteworthy; Mon-
gols; Koreans; and the many small, indigenous tribes
of Siberia, such as the Eskimos.

Ethnic Demographic Differences

The Slavs, Baltic peoples, and other modern Euro-
pean culture groups have passed into diat stage of
demographic transformation in which birthrates,
death rates, and rates of natural growth are low.
Other ethnic groups, with a more tradidonal and
agricultural life-style, maintain higher birthrates,
which, with low death rates, result in faster popula-
tion growth. Ethnic groups in central Asia, the Cau-

casus, and Siberia have a higher rate of populadon
growth than do the Slavs and other European groups.
In 1959 the eastern Slavs comprised about 76 percent
of the country’s population, whereas in 1979 they
made up 72 percent. The proportion of Russians de-
clined from 55 to 52 percent during the same period.

At the present rates of populadon growth, the Rus-
sians will be a minority by the year 2000. This fact, in
itself, does not mean diat the Russian grip on the
country will be lessened; it does mean, however, that
the handful at the top of the Communist hierarchy
must be prepared to deal with ethnic discontent.
Anti-Russian riots and demonstrations have occurred
in Kazakhstan, central Asia, and the Baltic states; nu-
merous underground national movements exist; and
discrimination and maltreatment of minorides in the
armed forces are reported to be widespread. Al-
though the security of the state is not yet threatened,
ethnic tensions will further test the system.

Demographic Characteristics

In spite of the variations in population growth among
the diverse ethnic groups, Soviet demographic char-
acteristics overall have passed from a stage of high
birthrates and death rates to a stage of low birthrates
and death rates. In 1913 the birthrate was 4.5 percent;

THE USSR. lAND AND PEOPLE

301

ncm’ it is 2 0 percent. The death rate for this same
period ^'•ent ftx>m 2.9 percent to 1 0 percent The
resultant rates of natural increase were 1 6 percent in
1913 and 1.0 percent now life expeaanq- in Euro-
pean Russia at the end of the nineteenth century was
ihirty-one )-ears for men and thirty-three years for
women Modernization has added greatly to the life
span of the average Soviet citizen, but life expectancy*
is still much lower in the USSR than it is m the United
States A male child bom in the So\iet Union can
expea to li\e sLxty-four years-, in the Untied States,
se\ enty-one years. The life expectancy for a female is
setenty-ihree years In the Soviet Union and seventy-
eight years in the United States VChat is especially
worrisome to Soviet authorities is that tliese figures
represent no improvement from a high m die late
1970s of sixty-four and seventy-four for men and
women, respeanely Alcoholism and inadequate
health care are major faaors in the relatitely low life
expectancy*, especially for men
Figure 12-7 shows the distribution of the So\iei
population by sex and age in 1970 This population
pyramid is a wluable tool for demonstrating certain
demographic charaaeristlcs One striking feature of
the postwar Soviet population is the imbalance In
male and female populations A population of 95 to
99 males for every 100 females is considered normal,

the Soviet Union has 87.6 males for every lOO fe-
males Howe\'er, that abnormal male-female ratio is
confined to the older age groups, refleaing not only
the longer life expectancy of women but also'the
destruaive effects on men, in particular, of war. rev-
olution, and the civil strife that accompanied collec-
tnization of agriculture m the 1930s. This difference
IS slowly being reduced as the population ages. In
1970 there were 189 million more women than
men, by 1986 the difference W’as only 170 million In
less than two generations the ratio should be normal
The shortage of males has necessitated the use of
females m many occupations, including heavy labor
(Figure 12-8) Furthermore, Communist theory ad-
vocates the use of women in the labor force as a
means of increasing produaion and promoting
equality Howev-er, the availability of latior is also
affeaed by variations in the birthrates During World
War 11 the birthrate dropped sharply, Uterefore, se-
vere labor shortages appeared in late 1950 s and
early 1960s. To remedy this deficit, the Soviet gov-
ernment adopted a number of policies, such as short-
ening the period of secondary schooling by one year
and requiring students to interrupt their studies to
work where manpower deficiencies existed

During the 1960s the number of young workers
entering the labor force steadily increased, however,

nGURE 12-7

USSR popuUcloa pyramid. A
pcpulauon p)Tamid is a useful de
vice to iliustraie certain
demographic charaaerisdcs. The
SoMet Union has a )-outhful popula
lion, but the number of children
under five j-ears is smaller than that
of the Iminediatet)- older age
groups Also, the effects of war and
revoiuuon are apparent In the older
agi groups, where the female popu
iauon Is Significantly larger ihan the
male

Age

Male

Female

75*

70-74

r-t

population

60-€4

, 1

55-59

t ,

60-54

45-49

, L ■_

40-44

35-39

30-34

[ ,

25-29

20-24

, 1 !

15-19

vJ ^

— 1

10-14

•L

5-9

• 1— ,

Under 5

1 t > » 1-11 1 1 1 1 1 ■ I 1 1 , 1 I , , , , i ,

12 10 8 6 4 8

2 4 6

10 12

Percent of Total Population

302

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SO\'IET UNION

FIGURE 12-8

An automobile factory worker in Kamas. Women play a
major role in die industrial and professional labor force be-
cause of die smaller male population, which continues to reflea
the enormous human losses suffered during World War U and
earlier \-ears of ciiil strife,

die lower birthrates in die 1960s generated furdter
labor shortages in the 1980s. The decline in the birdi-
rate in die 1960s resulted primarily from the reduced
number of women bom during die war years and
entering dieir prime childbearing years during the
1960s. Odier faaors affecting the birdirate include
the high proportion of women in die labor force,
severe shortages of housing, and die attiilabiliU' of
abortions and various forms of contraception.

Although die Soiiet Union dieoretically accepts
the Marxist position regarding population gro'utli,
which -utis discussed in chapter 2, it does not ha\^e a
clearly defined pronatal poliq*. Bachelors and diild-
less couples pay an additional income tax, and
aw'ards and monetary' stipends are given to modiers
■uidi four or more diildren. Hot\'ever, the stipends
are small, so they are not a real incentive for large
families. In addition, die availability of government-
prodded contraceptive dedces and abortions, to-
gedier ’«adi numerous economic factors, encourages
small femilies. Dedining birthrates and prospective
labor shortages have stimulated government discus-
sions of a more forceful pronatal poliq', but die
problem is not simple. In regions such as Kazakh-
stan, central Asia, and the Caucasus, die grotstli rate
needs to be reduced; in die urban, industrialized
Slade and Baltic regions, the population and labor
supply are not gro-ning fest enough. Encouraging

population growth in some areas and discouraging it
in others is trick)^ especially in view of the many
nationalities involved.

Distribution of Population

The Sodet population is unevenly distributed
(Figure 12-9). In the w'estem Ukraine, rural popu-
lation densities are higher than 250 per square mile
(100 per square kilometer), whereas large tracts of
tundra and desert are drtually unpopulated. Almost
three-fourdis of the Soviet population lives in the
European USSR, w'hich contains only about one-
fourth of the national area. \Xtithin that area most
densities of at least 25 people per square mile (10
per square kilometer) occur soudi of the 60th paral-
lel. The areas of highest population density are in the
soudwestem Ukraine, the lowdands of the Caucasus,
and die vicinity of industrial regions and large cities,
sudi as die eastern Ukraine, the Moscow' area, and
die middle Volga lands.

Outside die European part of the countr)', the
heaviest population concentrations are found in die
foodiills and valleys of the central Asian mountains,
along principal rivers, and in irrigated areas. Sat-
tered places wddi population densities exceeding 25
people per square mile (10 per square kilometer)
are found in the soudiem portions of Siberia, where
the Trans-Siberian Railw'ay has contributed to agri-
cultural and industrial development. Throughout
most of die taiga, tundra, and desert zones, however,
densities are 2 people or fewer per square mile (1
per square kilometer).

Urbanization

Despite increasing industrialization and commercial-
ization in czarist Russia, only 18 percent of the pop-
ulation lived in cities in 1913 (Table 12-2). Not until
the Soriet Union embarked on an all-out program of
industrialization in die late 1920s did urban growth
become significant By 1940 the urban population
had nearly doubled, to 33 percent of the total pop-
ulation. World War II temporarily slow'ed die pace of
urban growth, but by die early 1960s as many people
lived in cities as in rural areas. Since 1913 the urban
population has increased more than sixfold w'liile the
rural population has declined by 35 million.

nGURE12-9

Distribution of Soviet population. Population disiribwton in the USSR Is uneven Most of
the people Ine in the European tvest, leaving much of the nonh ami east sparsely sealed

The distribution of cities, like that of the popula-
tion as a tvhofe, is unev'en throughout die Soviet
Union Most of the large citie.s — those s\'ith a popu-
lauon of 100,000 or more — are in the European

USSR (Figure 12-4) In Siberia, as we noted, large
cities are concentrated primarily in die southern part
of the region, along or near the Trans-Siberian Rail-
way Of the twent>’-two Soviet cities with more than a

TABLE 12-2

Growth of (he urban population

Urban

Bural

of the Soviet Union. 1897-1987.

Population

Year

(m thousands)

(in thousands)

Percent Urban

1897

18.400

106.200

1913

28,500

130,700

1940

63,100

131,000

1959

100,000

106.800

1961

107,900

108.400

1970

136,000

105,700

1979

163,600

98,800

1987

187,600

95.600

Sources- USSR Central Statisdcal Committee, Namdnoye. 373. Khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 let (Moscow:
Finansy I Statistika, 1987), and USSR Centra Statistica) Comminee. Narodnoye Wjoryaysfvo SSSR v
1975 p (Moscow Slatistika, 1976), 7.

304

million people, four — Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tashkent,
and Alma-Ata — are in Siberia or central Asia;
four — Perm, Sverdlo\'sk, Chelyabinsk, and Ufa — are
in the Urals; and the remaining fourteen lie west of
or on tlie Volga River. Population and urban patterns
clearly suggest tlie dominant role of tlie western sec-
tions of tire Sowet Union in die economic life of die
country'.

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIEfui^

With this basic understanding of the physical and
human geography of the USSR, it is possible to turn
now' to die issues of Soviet economic development
— specifically, how' governmental policies, resource
distribution, and the phj'sical environment have
helped shape die agricultural and industrial geogra-
phy of the Soviet Union.

SUMMARY: THE VAST Not only is die Soviet Union large, but it also has diverse environmental and
EMPIRE human resources. Know'ing the nature and distribution of diose resources is

vital to an understanding of the economic geography of the country'. For
example, the qualiw of soil, die length of the grow'ing season, die aiailabil-
it)- of water, and the shape of die land all contribute to the character of So-
viet agriculture, as do the cultures of the people.

The mixed forest and the steppe zones of die w'estern Soviet Union
are die largest, most densely settled parts of the country'. These regions are
die home of die Slavic peoples: the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians.
Here die Russian Empire, predecessor to the Soviet state, w'as created; and
from here it expanded into die vastness of die Siberian taiga and tundra,
through the desert of Kazttkhstan and central Asia to die high mountains of
die south. More dian one hundred different ethnic groups w'ere brought
under Russian control.

Retaining effective control over diis edinic mosaic — w'idi its diverse
cultures, demographic patterns, and tradidonal ways of life — is one of die
major tasks of the Soviet state. Tight central control was used as Soi'iet lead-
ers follow'ed a course of Marxist-Leninist development, w'hich places die
highest priority on transforming die country into a modern industrial econ-
oni)'. Only recently, under the leadership of Mikliail Gorbachev, has control
been loosened soniew'hat.

KEY TERMS

cliernozem
natural region
permafrost

Russification

Soviet Socialist Republic

THE USSR:

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

SOMET COMS
PIANNED DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC REFORMS
im>USTRIAL RESOURCES
INDUSTRIAL REGIONS
AGRICULTURE

TT" n 1913 the Russian Empire celebrated the tliree
j hundredth anniversary' of the Romanov dy'nasty.
J.-.L Amid the great pomp Czar Nicholas II, autocrat
of all the Russians and numerous other peoples,
seemed little concerned about the growing under-
currents that spread through his vast domain. How-
ever, within only four years his large empire would
be involved in a disastrous war and two revolutions,
he would be forced off the throne, and he and his
family would be sent to their deaths. Tlie events that
shaped the Rtussian Empire and led it to self-
destruction are fascinating and involved. Suflke it to
say that the government — the czar and the
bureaucraq’ — failed to understand the need,s of the
country' and tlie people. That government un-
willing and unable to enaa change to save the .sys-
tem.

At tlie beginning of the iwemieih century' some 80
percent of the Russian people were peasants, the vast
majority of whom had too little land to feed their
families adequately'. Tliey were deeply in debt and
found it impossible to break the chains of poverty.
Industry’ was growing nipidly; the 1 890s are generally
recognized by economic historians as the decade of
the Russian Industrial Revolution (see cliapter open-
ing photo). Russia was still over\vhelmingly agricul-
tural in 1913 , but it was also the fifth largest industrial
country' in the world in total industrial output (al-
though only ninth in per capita production). Unfor-
tunately', the minority industrial workers were not
much better off economically than the majority peas-
ant population.

Time and again during the course of modern Rus-
sian history, movements, uprisings, and revolLs oc-
curred that demanded more freedoms for the peo-
ples of the empire. All were doomed to failure; the
moribund autocraq' was unyielding. World War I fi-
nally provided the stage on which the Russian state
collapsed. The empire, technologically and militarily
inferior and laced with bureaucratic and political in-
competence, could not stand up to tlie militaq beat-
ings inflicted by the Central Powers or to the peo-
ple’s cries for “land, peace, and bread."

In February 1917 the czar was forced to al^dicate,
and a group of Constitutional Democrats a.ssumcd
control of tlie government. That government did not
move decisively enough, however; it remained
bogged down in war, and the ]3eople’s demands
went unheeded. A small group of Marxists, called

Bolsheviks, took advantage of the situation.^ With a
ven- effective organization under the astute leader-
ship of Vladimir Lenin, these Communists led a small
group of soldiers and sailors in revolt and toppled
the nine-month-old democratic government, Tlie
Communist, or October, Rer'olution w'as the begin-
ning of :i bloody civil wtir that eventually led to a
Bolshevik victory and the establishment of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922.

THE SOMET APPROACH

llie word soviet mean.s “council” in Russian. Tie
new government w'a.s to consist of many soviets of
workers, soldiers, and peasants under the leadership
and control of a small group of elite Communist
pany members. Actually, throughout most of Soviet
histoq this leadership has been more or less con-
centrated in the liands of one man — Lenin, Stalin,
Khrushchev. Brezhnev, Gorbachew.

Tlie .Soviets contend that the key to their eco-
nomic development lies in the application of the
principles of social and economic development ex-
pounded by Karl Marx, a nineteentii-centun- German
intelleciti:il. Simply .stated, that doarine contends
that capitalism is a natural stage in the ciei'clopment
of societies. 1 lowever, the capitalist stage, like all pre-
vious stages, is dtKimed to destruaion because a
handful of the wealthy (the capitalists) exploit die
many workers (the proletariate) by underpaying
them for their labor. The Communist revolution oc-
curs when these workers overthrow the capitalists
and establish a society vsith no exploitation. Accord-
ing to the theon-, the formerly exploited workers
then ow'n all the means of production and live in
perfect harmony with one another.

Ironicilly, the first .successful Communist revolu-
tion took place in Russia, a state where capitalism wis
not full}’ developed and a state, therefore, that was
not ready for revolution, according to Marx. Bolshe-
vik leaders did ttcknowledge Russia's situation but
declared that tlie dictatorship of the Communist
party w’ould lead the backvard countr}' through eco-
nomic development and eventually to communism.
The countn’ has I’et to rt^ch that stage.

The most significant achievement of the Soviet
Union during its first sei’ent}' years of existence has
been its rapid industrial development. In fact, indus-

308

•fflE USSR. ECONOMIC Acnvnv

309

trialization has progressed to the point that the USSR
has emerged as a major world power, second only to
the United States The Soviet Union points with great
pride to its success in working totvard its nvo prin-
cipal goals (1) surpassing the United States in the
produaion of goods, thereby becoming the world’s
greatest economic power, and (2) raising the Soviet
standard of living to the highest level Past accom-
plishments give the Soviet leaders confidence of suc-
cess in achievmg the anticipated growth They be-
lieve that they will prove their system superior to any
of the capit^ist varieties As many poor nations
search for ways to raise their ovm standards of living
and attain hi^er levels of modernization, the Soviet
economic system does offer an alternative to the
Western capitalistic system, and some poor nations
have adopted it.

PLANNED DEVELOPMENT

The Soviet Union has a command economy, that is,
an economy in which virtually all investment income
IS controlled by the Communist party leadership and
Its government functionaries The government plans
and directs the economy through a centralized
decislon-making process The mammoth state plan-
ning agency, following party direaives. works out
detailed plans for the economy, including annual
produaion goals for more than 70,000 items and
prices for 200,000 goods and services Plans are de-
vised for five-year periods and for each year within
the period

The complexities of these vast economic blue-
prints invariably lead to numerous problems Fre-
quently, overoptimistic production goals must be re-
duced, In addition, because the targets are usually
expressed m quantity of produaion, the Soviet econ-
omy has been faced with perennial problems involv-
ing wasted resources, inefficient use of labor, and
poor-qualit>’ goods.

However, despite these and many other short-
comings, the Soviet Union has achieved notable suc-
cess m its overall economic growth This growth has
largely resulted from the development of heavy in-
dustry’ and from industries that are associated with
the rnilitary. Seaors of the economy such as agricul-
ture and light industry (notably, consumer goods)
have suffered from low’ rates of investment Official

Soviet statistics substantiate this point, if the values of
producer goods, agricultural products, and con-
sumer goods each equaled 1 in 1940, then present
values are 3 3 for producer goods, 2 7 for agricultural
goods, and only 1 3 for consumer goods (see box on

pp 310-311)

ECONOmC REFORMS

The Soviet economy, its planning, and its administra-
tion are neither a chaotic mess nor a model of per-
fection The Soviet leaders, like their counterparts in
the satellite states of Eastern Europe, are attempting
lo inctease economic efficiency and reduce waste
However, unlike the governments of Hungary and
Bulgaria, which have permitted some decentraliza-
tion, the Soviet leadership has been reluctant to
loosen its hold on the economy by allowing greater
decision making on the farm or in the factory and
mine Nonetheless, concern over decreasing rates of
economic growth — which have characterized the
1960s. 1970s, and 1980s — has prompted the Soviet
leaders to search for ways to increase the efficacy of
their economic planning and administration Their
usual approach has been to develop better and more
scientific means of direaing the economy — for ex-
ample, using mathematical models and computers.
In effea, the government has increased central con-
trol over industry' m order to better meet plan ob-
jeaives

Soviet planners are trying to reduce material
waste and increase economic productivity by ex-
pressing produaion goals not in quanutative terms
but m terms of cost and profitability of produaion
The mid- and late 19805 have seen economic reforms
previously unheard of in the Soviet Union Under
party secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, new policies have
been proposed glasnost (openness, frankness),
demokratizatsiya (democratization), and pere-
stroika (restructuring). These reforms call for ex-
posing corruption, incompetency, and inefficiency in
the Soviet economy. Soviet faaories are now ex-
peaed to turn out bener-quality products that will
sell The profit principle — that the value of products
should exceed the cost of their produaion — has
been introduced in some of the state-run industrial
firms. Thus, through glasnost, problems should be
exposed; by means of demokratizatsiya, more

THE SOVIET CONSUMER

he cornerstone of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the ability of the
state to provide the people with everything they need. The Soviet
J'lL system falls far, far short of meeting this goal. When the thrust of
economic development was on increasing coal and steel production, laying
more railroad lines, and fulfilling similar basic industrial needs, the govern-
ment did not have too much difficult}^ giving its citizens a basic diet, mini-
mal clothes, and a roof over tlteir heads. However, as the demands of Soviet
consumers have grown, the government has found it impossible to keep up.

A major goal of the USSR has always been to surpass the production
levels of the West — a nearly impossible goal as the living standards of the
West continue to rise and become increasingly sophisticated. The Soviet in-
ability to match the availability of consumer goods in the West poses a real
threat to that system. As John Kenneth Galbraith expressed it, “Of all the
threats to planning in die Soviet System as it now exists, none quite rivals
the impact of Western living standards — not those of Madison Avenue, to be
sure, but those of die average middle-class household in Bremen, West Ger-
many, or Worcester, Massachusetts.”*

A tremendous ambiguity exists in the Soviet Union. On the one hand,
die society has enormous industrial capacity and spends billions on sophisti-
cated space programs and high-tech militar}' materiel. On die other hand,
die society faces food shortages, and long lines of customers wait padently
to buy even a pair of shoes. As Robert V. Daniel put it, the Soviet Union is a
“paradox of industrial plenty in the midst of consumer poverty'. ”t Further-
more, many of the consumer goods that are available are shoddy; they tend
not to work for long, if they work at all. Time Magazine Quly 1987) cited a
shocking statistic; 40 percent of die 28,056 fires reported in Moscow in 1986
were caused by faulty television sets.

Some consumer prices in the Soviet Union are subsidized, which
means diat they are low and may not have changed in decades. As Table A
shows, in Moscow items such as a loaf of bread, a head of cabbage, or bus
fare cost less than or the same as die)' do in Washington, DC, in terms of
the amount of work time required for the purchase. Odier items, however,
are far beyond die reach of die average Soviet citizen. Overall, a Soviet
worker must work three times as long as the average American worker even
to attain such basics as weekly food needs. The Soviet citizen pays about
112,700 for a compact car and $1,100 for a color television set. These prices
may not seem too bad, but die average wage earner in the Soviet Union
maltes only $318 a mondi, so a television set represents almost four months’
work.

*John Kenneth Galbraith, “Can the Russians Reform? The Soviet Economy: Prospects for Change,
Haipet-'s Oune 1987): 55.

fPaul Kennedy, “What Gorbachev Is Up Against," Atlantic MoiJtbly 259, no. 6 Qune 1987): 32-

310

Abjea pov’ertj' does not exist in the So\iet Union no one is starving,
naked, or Ining in ibe streets The problem is that Soviet standards of con-
sumption and material well-being fall far below those of the 'West Medical
care is free, but complaints about its quality run rampant Housing is
mexpenshe — only a few dollars a month — but its quality and quanuty are
appalling The Soviet government s« the standard at 9 square meters of liv-
ing space per capita, that is, each person was supposed to have a room ap-
proximately 10 feet by 10 feet to live in By the late 1970s the average living
space was 8 2 square meters, below e\^n cramped legal minimum Fur-
thermore, an estimated 20 percent of Sonet city dwellers live in communal
apartments, with one or more families occupying a single room of an apart-
ment that was ongmally intended to house only one family In its entirety In
such arrangements all of the families share the bathroom and the kitchen.

The Soviet Union will prolwbly not be able in the foreseeable future
to match the West in the availabilit>’ of consumer goods, but most experts
believe that the lot of Soviet consumers will improve The extent will de-
pend on the leaders' willingness to enact changes that stimulate consumer
pfoduaion

TABLE A

A comparison of carmicncr costs in the Soviet Union and the United States, based on
the work time required of an avenge Industrial worker to earn the purchase price
of various goods and services.

Item

Work Time Required

Moscow

Washington

One toat ot rye bread

11 min.

IS min.

One chicken

189 min.

18 min.

One grapefruit

112 min

6 min

One liter of rtiiffe

20 min.

4 mm.

One liter ot red wine

257 min

37 min

One head of cabbage

7 min.

Three ounces ol tea

36 min

10 min

One car wash

139 min.

40 min.

One bar of soap

17 min.

3 min

Bus fare for two mtes

3 min

7 min.

One hour of babysfttmg

279 min.

44 min.

One first-class postage stamp

3 min.

2 min.

A man's haircut

34 min.

62 min.

One pair of jeans

56 hrs

4 hrs.

One pair of men's shoes

37 hrs.

6 hrs.

A washing machine

177 hrs

37 hrs.

Source. Radio Free Europe/Radio liberty, as reported Ui the New York Times, 28 June 1987, sec 4
Note The data were gathered In Ortober 1988

311

312

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

people — from workers to managers — should play a
bigger role in the economy; and witli peresU'Oika,
institutional changes should be made, such as allow-
ing the market to have some say in determining
prices. All of these changes are designed to
strengthen the socialist economy, of course.

A significant shift in Soviet economic polio’’ is an
increased willingness to forsake a traditional policy
of autarky — economic self-sufficiencj’ — in favor of
increased cooperation with Western industrial na-
tions. This change im’olves not only expanded trade,
such as grain purchases, but also the exchange of
technical information and even Western investment
in the development of new industries to which the
Soviets are reluctant to commit tlieir capital.

INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES

A critical factor in Soviet industrialization and eco-
nomic development is tlie countn-’s rich and diverse
natural resource base. The Soviet Union ranks
among the world’s leaders in resen’es of oil, natural
gas, coal, iron ore, timber, copper, and chromium.
Application of the Soviet model of development in
another countn’, however, necessitates adjustment
because no developing countn' can boast such a rich-
ness of resources to assist in modernization.

Unfortunately, much of the resource potential of
tlie Soviet Union lies in remote sections of the coun-
try’, accessible to market areas only at tremendous
cost. Transportation may involve long and expensive
hauls b)’ railroad; it may even be necessan' to build
transportation facilities to reach the site of die de-
posits. In addition, many deposits are located in a
harsh environment, making it difficult to attract
workers. The costs of building required housing and
transportation facilities and die mining operations
themselves may push expenditures beyond practical
economical levels.

Energy Sources

The most significant development in die Soviet fuel
industr}’ in recent decades has been the growth of oil
and gas production. Soviet petroleum production
has more than quadrupled since I960, and gas pro-
ducdon has increased tenfold. At the same time the
output of coal has grown by only 30 percent, and the

production of wood as a fuel has declined by one-
third. Today, the Soviet Union is die world’s largest
producer of both petroleum and coal, and it vies with
the United States as the leading supplier of natural
gas.

Approximately half of Soviet oil comes from Sibe-
ria, and virtually all of this Siberian oil comes from
West Siberian fields (Figure 13-1). Most of the
gro^ih in Soviet petroleum production since the
early 1970s has come from diese extensive deposits.
However, produaion is hampered by the harshness
of the environment, especially permafrost, which
complicates drilling and laying of pipelines. West Si-
berian oil moves by a growing pipeline network,
w'hich also serves die countr\’’s second most impor-
tant petroleum-producing area, the Volga-Urals
fields, sending oil to eastern Siberia as well as to
major industrial and urban centers of the European
USSR and Eastern Europe.

Most notable among the remaining oil-producing
areas of the Soviet Union are several fields in the
vicinit)’ of the Caspian Sea and scattered deposits in
the Ukraine and nordiern European Russia (Figure
13-2). Recently discovered deposits along the upper
reaches of die Lena River in eastern Siberia will also
help to meet future petroleum needs.

Natural gas has become increasingly important in
die energi’ program of the Soviet Union. Estimates
give the USSR as much as 40 percent of the world’s
gas resen’es, and the Soviet government has placed a
high priorirt’ on developing them. With an increased
output of natural gas, die Soviets will be able to sub-
stitute gas for petroleum in heating and thus save the
scarcer oil for transportation and industrial uses. Ex-
panded production will also mean more gas for ex-
port by pipeline to Eastern Europe and Western Eu-
rope. Sales in the latter area are especially important,
for diey provide the Soviets with Western currenq’
for the purchase of niudi-needed Western technol-
og>^

Several United States companies have expressed
interest in die Siberian fields and have proposed fi-
nancial and technical assistance in exchange for gas.
Japan has also indicated an interest in Siberian gas,
but diese deposits are especially important to West-
ern Europe, where diey are expected to account for
as much as 40 percent of namral gas consumption in
the near future. Approximately one-diird of Soviet
natural gas conies from die West Siberian fields.

nCURE 13-1

rcsounes oj the USSR. Ttxe Soviet Union » JKh to tnroenb Hie)\-qua)ity coal m
the Donets and Kuznetsk basms and near Karaganda, hydroelectric power akxig the Volga
River, and oil and gas produaion around the Caspian Sea and in the Volga Urals fields provide
abundant energy Most of the nauon’s metals are found in the west and along the southern
fringe of the country

Other important fields are in the Ukraine, the north-
ern Caucasus, central Asia, and the southern Urak
The Soviet Union is the leading coal producer in
the world, and its coal reserves (about a third of the
ViXtrld’s proven reserves) rank among the world’s
largest. At present rates of consumption, U is esti-
mated that Soviet coal wall last for almost 8,000 years
More than 93 percent of these reserv’es are in Soviet
Asia, the majority in Siberia Coal production, how-

ever, is concentrated in the western USSR. Soviet
Europe (including the Urals) accounts for about 60
percent of the extraaed coal. The Donets Basin, in
the southern steppes, produces on its own 35 per-
cent of the total Soviet output. The Kuznetsk Basin is
the Soviet’s second major source of coal, meeting
local needs and shipping coal as far west as the Urals.
Soviet goals for their tw’elfth five-year plan, 1986 to
1990, call for increased production of Siberian coal.

314

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SO\aET UNTPim

HGURE 13-2

The Baku oilfield on the Caspian Sea. Tlie Baku area is one
of the Soviet Union's older produaion sites but has now been
surpassed in imponance by the West Siberian and \'olga-Urals
fields.

The lower-grade fuels (peat and oil shale) are lo-
cally significant as energ\’ sources for small tliermal
electric stations. Witli die increasing availability of
natural gas and petroleum, these less efficient fuels
are losing their comparative cost advantages.

Most electricity in the Soviet Union is generated
by diermal stations that utilize peat, coal, oil, or gas.
Atomic power plants produce about 10 percent of
the countrj'^’s electrical energit Eventually, 25 per-
cent of all electricity is to be generated by nuclear
power. However, the disaster in die spring of 1986 at
the Chernobyl plant in the Ukraine has forced the
government to radicall)’ alter some of its plans.

Only about 15 percent of all electricity generated
in the Soviet Union comes from hydroelectric sta-
tions, in spite of die fact that the hydroelectric po-
tendal is enormous, estimated at twice that of the
United States. A major handicap is location: about 70
percent of this potential lies within Siberia, far from
die centers of demand. Consequently, the Soviets
have focused most of their attention on thermal and
nuclear stations in the w^estern part of the countty,
even though die 1986- 1990 plan originally called for
increased thermal and hydroelectric output in Sibe-
ria.

Hydroelectric potential is more fully developed in
the European USSR, particularly along die Volga and
its tributary', the Kama. The construction of hydro-
elearic stations and their necessary' resen'oirs has
converted these rh'ers into a string of large lakes. The
hydroelectric stations supply electricity to cities
along die Volga as yy'ell as to the Urals and the Mos-
coyy' area. Since I960 hydroelectric capacity has also
expanded in die Caucasus and central Asian moun-
tains.

Metallic Ores

An ample and diverse base of metallic resources
complements the nation’s energy' resources. How'-
ever, tungsten, tin, and aluminum resources, espe-
cially bauxite, are in short supply. Soviet iron ore
resery'es are die largest in die w'orld (according to
Soy'iet estimates), representing 40 percent of all
knoyy'n resery'es. The most important of the produc-
ing iron ore deposits are in die yy'est, w'hereas the
majority of die knoyy'n resery'es are in Siberia and
Kazakhstan. Approximately 50 percent of die iron ore
extracted in die Soy'iet Union comes from deposits in
die Ukraine. Those ores supply ±e countty’s largest
concentration of ironyy'orks and steelyy'orks in die
Ukraine as yy'ell as other factories in yv'estern USSR
and in Eastern Europe. The second major area of
iron ore mining is in the Urals.

The Soviet Union possesses a ys'ide array of other
mineral ores. Manganese, nickel, chromium, and
odier ferroalloys are abundant. Tlie most important
deposits are those that are accessible to die principal
steel-producing centers. The Soy'iets are second to
the United States in copper production and claim
that tiieir resery'es are the largest in die yy'orld. The
Soy'iet Union is also a major producer of lead, zinc,
gold, silver, and platinum.

TttE USSR. ECONOMIC ACTIVnV

315

INDUSTRIAL REGIONS

In a command economy, planning for regional dis-
tnbuuon and de\-elopment of industries is a major
task, which is compounded by the nation s large area,
the unequal distribution of natural resources, and
the diversity of ethnic groups at different stages of
economic development From the start of the indus-
trialization program, the Soviets have attempted to
disperse their industrial produaion beyond the lim-
its of the European part of the country, for ideolog-
ical as vvell as strategic reasons The goal of rapid
industrialization was to build "socialism in one coun-
try," to use Stalin's phrase The Soviet Union was
then to be able to withstand any attack from the West-
ern capitalist powers, which Stalin believed to be
imminent The development of industrial produaion
in tiie militarily more defensible areas, the eastern
portions of the country, seemed advisable With
much fanfare the Soviets embarked on expansion of
the Urals industrial base and the development of the
Kuznetsk metallurgical base
World War II was the greatest stimulus to in-
creased industrial produaion in the eastern poruon
of the country. The Soviets did not have much
choice, for German occupation controlled 40 per-
cent of the population of the European USSR and the
bulk of heavy industry (62 percent of the coal pro-
duction and 58 percent of the steel produaion) Be-
tween 1940 and 1943 industrial produaion in-
creased 3 4 times in western Siberia After World War
n the west was reconstructed, and it regained Its
dominant position in industrial produaion, although
not quite at its prewar level

Even though Soviet economic planning polities
emphasize the b^anced distribution of economic ac-
tivities, including the development of less economi-
cally advanced areas, those policies also stress pro-
duaion that IS close to raw materials and markets to
minimize transportation costs, development of spe-
cialized forms of produaion m areas best suited for
them, and creauon within each region of adequate
produaion to meet the basic needs of the people
Regional development polic)’ seems to favor in-
creased industrial investment m the west, particu-
larly in medium-sized cities in areas with large bbor
supplies. Siberian development is also slated to con-
tinue at a rate slightly higher than the national aver-
age. The high cost of anraaing and sustaining labor
in the east means that dev'elopment there will be

more technological than labor intensive There are
SIX areas of prime industrial significance: the Center
(the Moscow' area), the Ukraine, Leningrad, the mid-
Volga. the Urals, and Siberia (Figure 13-3)

'The Center

The Center— with the USSR's most populous and
largest industrial city, Moscow — owes its industrial
prominence to a number of factors, including a large
market, an ample supply of labor both trained and
unskilled, and excellent transportation to all parts of
the country Elearic lines from Volga power stations
and gas and oil pipelines from the Ukraine, north
Caucasus, the Volga-Urals fields, central Asia, and
western Siberia supply the Center with important
sources of enetg>’ All of these faaors assure the ar-
ea’s continued prominence in industrial produaion,
although ns share of total industrial output may
slowly decline

The industrial resource base of the Center is
weak Energy resources of brown coal and umber
are inferior, small iron ore deposits exist, as do phos-
phorus for fertilizer and some fauifding materials
However, texule manufacturing is prominent.
Around Moscow 30 percent of all industrial workers
are employed m the manufaaure of linen, cotton,
wool, and silk fabrics Other major industries Include
metals, machine construaion, engineering indus-
tries, chemicals, food processing, and woodworking

The Ukraine Industrial District

The Ukraine industrial distria is the principal heavy
manufacturing area The availability of coal, iron ore,
and ferroalloys facilitates major iron and steel pro-
duaion, including heavy machine construction, and
a coal-based chemical industry’. The largest concen-
tration of Cities within this industrial area is on the
coalfields of Donets Basin

The industrial resource base of the Ukraine ex-
tends beyond its coal and iron ore, however Energy
resources are supplemented by gas fields to the
north and by the gas and oil fields of the nonhem
Caucasus The base of raw materials also includes
such minerals as salts, potash, mercury, and brown
coal Furthermore, the high produaivity of agricul-
ture within die distria and throughout the southern
steppes of the western European USSR has siimu-

316

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNIOm

FIGURE 13-3

Industrial regions and selected cities of the USSR. Industry in the Soviet Union is concen-
trated in six regions. Except for the Moscow area, these regions are also areas with abundant
local energ\- supplies. Industry' is oriented toward capital goods, although in recent years pro-
duction of consumer goods has been increased.

lated die development of extensiv^e food-processing
industries and the production of agricultural equip-
ment.

The two largest cities of the Ukraine — Kiev and
Kharkov — are on the nortliern margins of the Ukrai-
nian manufacturing area. Kharkov is important in the
production of heavy machiner}'; IQev, capital of the
Ukraine, is a diversified industrial city, producing
nachiner}', textiles, and processed foods. To die
loudiwest is the diversified industrial pon of Odessa.

Leningrad

Leningrad, the second largest Soviet city, is the coun-
try’s principal port. Czar Peter the Great planned and
built the city in the early eighteenth centuty as a
symbol of the new Russia he was creating. St. Peters-
burg, as the city was originally called, became the
imperial capital. It was the country’s window to the
West — its most important contact with a moderniz-
ing Western Europe.

THE USSR. ECONONUC ACnVIlY

Today, Leningrad occupies a posiuon similar to
that of Moscow, it is in a region with a deficient
resource base. Except for hydroelectric stations, lo-
cal energy resources are limned to peat deposits and
oil shales. Leningrad’s industries include machine
tools, equipment for hydroelectric plants, and ship-
building The city’s highly skilled work force is one
of the best m the Soviet Union

The Mid-Volga Area

The industrial strength of the mid-Volga industrial
area rests primarily on its extensive energy r^
sources It not only contains one of the major
petroleum-producing areas of the Soviet
Union-^the Volga-Urals fields — but also has impor-
tant gas fields and surplus hydroelectric power gen-
erated by some of the country’s largest dams During
World "War il this area experienced rapid industrial
and population growth It was situated east of the
battle lines but close enough to supply needed w'ar
materiel to the front Smce the late 1950s, industrial

317

production has increased faster in the Volga area
than m the Soviet Union as a whole (Figure 13-4)
The mid-Volga area has several other advantages,
m addition to its fuels and hydroelearic power It is
connected by the Volga River and its tributaries to
large areas of the western Soviet Union. The Volga
River system is the nation’s major w’ater route, car-
ty'ing more than 60 percent of all freight transported
by nver ^essibility by water, rail, and pipeline not
only has stimulated development of the mid-Volga’s
energy resources but also has allowed the expansion
of industrial activities as a whole. One major example
IS the large automotive plant buvli at Tolyatti as a joint
venture with Fiat, the Italian firm The plant is to
produce 600,000 cars a year, 48 percent of the
planned yearly Soviet automobile output

The Urals

In terms of overall industrial production, the Urals
rank third, behind the Center and the Ukrainian in-
dustrial distna Urals industry depends chiefly on

FIGURE 13-4

Blerlorussia, a oew city with
emphasis oa the chemical in-
dustry. The Urge oil and gas re
sourcm provide an excellent basis
for peuochemlcal Industries

318

MSTI-RN i-:i.M^oi»E AND 'mE so\’iirrn^

the rich and varied ktcal mineral deposits. In addi-
tion to its important iron and steel indiistty, the area
is Imown for smelting and rehning of copper, zinc
refining, and the production of alumina and refining
of aluminum.

Sverdlovsk, a major railroad center, is the largest
of the Urals cities. Machine construction, especially
for the mining industr\’, dominates the area, and fer-
rous metallurgN’ is also proniinent.

Siberia

The Siberian manufacturing region lie.s between the
Ob ;ind the "i'enisey ri\'ers in western Siberia The
rich coal deposits of the Kuznetsk Ikisin :iitd the hy-
droelectric power of the region are m.ijor re.istans
for indiKstrial development in this area 'Ihe region
includes a complex of metallurgical Industrie'’ in the
Kuzaieisk Basin and sevenil cities outside the basin,
including Novosibirsk, the largest city in ail of Siln.--
ria. Novosibirsk is a major transportation center, it is
on the Trans-Siberitin Raiinxid and the (.)h Riwr h is
also a major industrial city, producing metttllurgieal
products, machines, foods, and textiles

Siberia as a whole has great industrial potential,
but high transportation costs, as well as iugh [inKtuc-
lion costs and a shortage of workers, h.ive slowevi
development. Hecent Soviet governments, including
Gorbachev's, have stressed renewing anei moderni/.-
ing existing indu.siiy in the west Ncvenheles>. .Sibe-
rian development will not be neglected, limphasjs
there will be on industries that u.se large amounts of
energ)-, given the area's energy suiplus. Also, more
processing of Siberian minerals and lumber will be
carried on at the resource location to reduce irans-
portatiott costs, :ind more effort will be made to de-
velop those industries thtit will provide the specilic
goods that Siberia needs. An indication of Siw iet will-
ingne,ss to invest in Siberia is the l,99()-mile-long
(3,204-kilometer) Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) Raii-
road. Completed in 1984, the BAM begins west t)f
Ltike Baikal, several hundred miles north of the
Trans-Siberian Railroad, and runs to the Amur River
in the far east (see Figure 13-3). The Soviets are alsr^
building a railroad to Yakutsk from the B.-VM and the
Trans-Siberian Railroad (Figure 13-5). The project is
expected to take ten years.

AGRICULTURE

Soviet agriculture has not experienced the .same .suc-
cess that Soviet industry has, partly because of the
harsh environment and partly beciuse economic
policies have [placed more emphasis on indu.strial
development than t)n agricultural de\-elopmcnt.
From the late 1920s to the early 1950s, agricultural
oiuisut barely kept pace with population growth.
Since the early 1950s, howtwer. the produaion of
agricultural giiocLs (both crops and live, stock) has
grown almost three times as fast as the population
ha.''

.Nonethele.-’S, .S<iviet fann production still lags l>c-
hmd that of the 1,'nited State.s. For eveiy ;\inerican
farm worker, the S'oviet Union h;is eight. About 23
percent of ilie Soviet labor ftirce is engaged in agri-
culture. in the Uniteil States, that figure is about 2
percent Furthermore, the area sowar to crops i.s 73
percent greater in the I 'SSR titan in the United States,
yet Soviet crop str<.iduci ion is only 80 percent 3.s great
. 1 '’ tliat u!' the Uniie\l States. Overall, the average
Americait kirmcr is ten times more produaive itum
tile .'ivenigc Soviet filmier. One Soviet agricultural
worker grows enough finitl to feed eight fellow cit-
izen'', one United Slates farmer grows enough fcxxl
to feed tiiiy two .Amerieans.

Agriculture and .Soviet Development

Ihe decision in the kite 1920.s to embark on an all-
out [’rogr.im of nipid industrialization necx'ssit.atcd
the co!leciivtz.;ition of agriculture. The major factors
m the decision to ci iliectivize were po!iiic.il as well iv;
economic

1 Tiic peiisain class represented a c-apiialisi or
liitcnt capitalist element that was irleologically
unacceptable to the regime.

2 It would be more enicicni to control the ikxls-
antry on huge farms than in smaller units.

3 I3y forcing the peasants into large collectives,
agricultural price.s and wages could be con-
trolled at low levels, to allow capital to accu-
mulate for industrial expansion.

4 This control would facilitate the How of food-
siulTs to the cities to feed the grow’ing indus-
trial labor force.

THE USSR. ECONOMIC ACTIvnV

319

FIGURE 13-5

The Trans-Siberian express. Rail
joaiis Itn'e plared a maior role in
the economic organizauon of this
huge and resource rich countr>’ The
rail srstem of Sibena is being ex
panded to faalnaie de%-elopmern of
the mineral resources of that re-
gion

5 Large-scale units could be mechanized to in-
crease agricultural productivity' and to free la-
bor for the growing industrial activities

In response to colleaivization, war raged tn the
countryside. A second Bolshevik res-olution took
place, and millions of people were killed bvestock
herds were decimated, as many peasants slaughtered
their animals rather than surrender them to the new
collectives Tlie Soviet economy was in chaos By
1940, howe\-er, the power of the central government
prevailed and virtually all peasant households were
part of the collective agricultural economy. The gov-
ernment had won.

Two forms of farm organization emerged the col-
leaive farm and the state farm, both of which were
introduced m chapter 11. A collective farm is a group
of workers who are responsible for seeing that state
produaion quotas are met (Figure 13-6) After the
quotas are fulfilled and the needs of the colleaive
farm are satisfied (capital for farm repairs, taxes, and
seed for the next season), the remaining crop is di-

vided among the workers as their share of the profit
The peasants are, therefore, residual claimants to the
farm’s production The state farm workers, on the
other hand, are paid a set wage, and the total cost of
the openwion is underwritten by the state.

Needless to say, it cost the government more to
operate the state farms than the collectives The col-
leaive system was greatly favored by the Stalin re-
gime, but Its efficiency suffered because of the gov-
ernment’s fixed lower prices for agricultural
products The capital thus provided for operating the
colleai\-es was insufficient and failed to provide
work incenuves In addition, the state’s investment in
fenilizers, machinery, and other necessary techno-
logical improvements for the colleaives was woe-
fully inadequate All of these faaors contributed to
SK^nant agricultural produaion through the early
1950s and a hard life for farm workers, especially
those on colleaives.

Hie critical difference between survival and star-
vauon was the private seaor of Soviet agriculture
— colleaive and state farm workers and some Indus-

320

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

FIGURE 13-6

An older collective ferm in the
southern Urals. The overwhelm-
ing majority of Soviet agriculture is
organized witliin the framework of
collective or state farms.

trial workers who were permitted to raise products
on plots of 0.5 to 1.25 acres (0.2 to 0.5 hectares). In
1953 private plots took up only about 4 percent of
the cultivated land in the Soviet Union but produced
72 percent of the potatoes, 48 percent of the vegeta-
bles, 52 percent of the meat, 67 percent of the milk,
and 84 percent of the eggs. For collective farmers the
free-market sales of products from these private plots
generated the majority of their income. Today the
private plots produce about 25 percent of all food-
stuffs and 30 percent of all meat and poultr)' on less
than 3 percent of the country’s farmland.

The Permanent Crisis

The present leaders of tlie Soviet Union, like Leonid
Brezhnev and Nikita Khrushchev before them, inher-
ited an agricultural problem that some Western crit-
ics have called tlie USSR’s permanent crisis. The
dire condition of agriculture at the time of Stalin’s
death forced his successors to turn their attention to
the needs of the agricultural economy. An expansion
of cultivated lands in the dry steppes of the trans-
Volga region resulted initially in a significant in-
crease in agricultural production. This virgin-
and-idle-lands program brought 116 million acres

(46.4 million hectares) of new land under cultivation,
mostly in western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan.
Because annual precipitation tliere ranges from 16
inches (406 millimeters) in the north to 9 inches
(228 millimeters) in die south, those are marginal
farming areas. Andcipated production levels have not
been attained, but actual producdon varies from year
to year. Nevertheless, die increased area devoted to
wheat has freed land in die moister areas of die Eu-
ropean USSR for odier crops.

During die Brezhnev regime the Soviets adopted
a more tolerant attitude toward private plots, further
increased purchase prices from the collecdves, and
introduced a guaranteed minimum wage for collec-
tive farm workers. Prices of machinerj'^ and fertilizers
were reduced, and the state recognized die right of
collective farms to participate more in the planning
procedure. The last half of the 1960s was marked by
notable success in Soviet agricultural production:
output increased by 23 percent from 1965 to 1971- In
more recent years, however, diere have been signs
that die condition of agriculture is failing to improve
further. The year 1983 was considered good in Soviet
agriculture, but still the country was not self-
sufficient in food. Party leader Gorbachev has called
for increased output from the private sector, claim-

THE USSR. ECONOMIC ACTlVnY

321

ing that competition from that seaor is essential m
senmg the forces of socialism into motion
The need of the Soviet government to import
large quantities of grain underscores the faa that
Soviet agriculture is sull beset by numerous prob-
lems Despite increased wages the average collecuve
farmer makes less per year than the average indus-
trial worker or even the average state farm employee
Soviet agriculture suffers from inadequate mechani-
cal equipment and deficient storage and transporta-
tion facilities. The more productive young workers
leave the farms because of low salaries, restricted
opponunities for advancement, and scarce ameni-
ties, which are available in ciues Furthermore, cen-
tral decision making in the Soviet system contributes
to Interference by party bureaucrats and inefficient
use of agricultural resources

In 1950 Soviet agricultural output was about 60
percent of that of the United States. Now, Soviet farm
producuon Is 80 percent of American produaion,
but it must feed 40 million people more than U S
agriculture must feed Since the early 1970s Soviet
agricultural plans have called for production levels
equaling those of the United States However, the
prospects of meeting this goal are remote, the gap
between the American farmer and the Soviet farmer
IS ]ust too great

Agricultural Regions

Soviet agriculture suffers from the institutional re-
straints of Its organization and from physical environ-
mental handiops. It is possible, of course, that im-
proved strains of plants, land improvement
programs such as irrigauon, or even domes with con-
trolled environments will someday reduce the neg-
ative effects of nature on Soviet agriculture But it is
also true that even with similar environment con-
ditions, Anglo-American agricultural producthity
surpasses that of the Soviet Uruon Although the land
area of the Soviet Union is two and one-half times as
iarge as that of the United States, its area suitable for
^Top cuUivauon is only one-third greater — only
about 11 percent of Soiiet ierntor>' is arable.

Figure 13-7 shows generalized zones of agncul-
tural use in the Soiiet Union The areas wnth no ag-
nculture or wnth widely scattered small farms clearly
the naaioruy of SoNiet land. Areas that ajre too

cool and that have poor soils cover the northern
European USSR and virtually all of Siberia. Further-
more, the bulk of central Asia is desert Added to
these nonagricultural zones are the mountains of the
Caucasus region and central Asia The remaining area
comprises the agricultural zones of the Soviet Union,
but even there, some parts are too cool, too moist, or
too dry In the United States such areas would be
judged marginal for agriculture.

The Soviet agricultural zones lie mainly south of
60“ N latitude in the European part of the country
and south of 57“ N latitude in Siberia In the south the
agricultural area is limited by high evapoiranspira-
lion rates

In Figure 13-7, Zones I and II represent the fer-
tile "triangle,” or that part of the Soviet Union with
the greatest agricultural potential. Zone I, bordering
the southern limit of the taiga forest from the Baltic
to the Urals, is an area of mixed agriculture. Dairying
and swine production are major activities. Flax (for
linen) and hardier grains, such as rye and oats, do
well in the short, moist summers Potatoes, long a
staple of the European Soviet diet, are a principal
crop, and numerous other vegetables are also raised
there.

In the southern part of Zone I the amount of
cropped land mcreases. Grains (rye, oats, barley, and
wheat) in addiuon to potatoes, flax, and hemp (for
coarse cloth and rope) are charaaeristic. Dual-
purpose (milk and meat) cattle are raised exten-
sively. The far eastern seaion of this zone has a prod-
uct mix that is similar to that of the more southerly
parts of the European USSR, it includes wheat, sugar
beets, Iwestodt, and rice.

Zone II is the USSR’s principal large-scale grain-
producing area. The northwestern parts of this zone
cover most of the northern Ukrame, as well as north-
ern Moldai'ia and adjoining parts of the Russian Re-
public. Precipitation is generally adequate, and tem-
peratures are higher and soils are better than they
are in the Baltic states or in the bulk of Russia These
factors have helped to create a very important region
of surplus food produaion, specializing in sugar
beets, wheat, com, bailey, rye, oats, and potatoes

The semiarid southern and eastern sections of
Zone II have ferule moUisols and are especially fa-
mous for the large-scale wheat farms that produce
most of the country’s grain Winter wheat is grown
togely in the European section, whereas spring

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIEriiNTnM

''Hi

STjOn -> >

' a:

■■ . ■

AfiCnc OCEAN

'.W

eg.

V , .1

A A

'’ ' ’ Si--'-/--'/'

E,-!;:/ S>blitL’n

'■ ■ '■'■ 0p0tyAyA-fri ':A- v N

300 600 M)LES

0 300 600 KILOMETERS

AGRICULTURAL ZONES

r~i I DIVERSIFIED AGRICULTURE

Dairying, flax, potatoes, miik and

meat livestock, swine production,
grains (rye, oats, barley, wheat)

[', li; J LARGE-SCALE WHEAT PRODUCTION
Wheat, corn, barley, oats, rye,
sugar beets, sunflowers, milk and
meat livestock, sheep

ZONES OF LITTLE OR NO AGRICULTURE

I III I URBAN TRUCK FARMING [111 TUNDRA-very little agriculture;

^ Milk, potatoes, eggs, crops require protection (hothouses);

chickens, vegetables grazing for reindeer

IV 1 HUMID SUBTROPICAL SPECIALIZED [ ] TAIGA— agriculture widely scattered in

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION small areas serving local needs

Tea, subtropical fruits, vineyards j— j oRVLANDS-extensive grazing of sheep and

I cattle; some scattered irrigated agriculture

I V Cotton, fruits, vineyards, sheep, wheat

[HI MOUNTAINS

FIGURE 13-7

Agricultural zones of the USSR. Agriculture in the Soviet Union is confined largely to the
southwest quarter of the nation. Since World War II, attempts have been made to expand the
area of crop production into the dt^' lands east of tlie Caspian Sea and into western Siberia.

wheat dominates in the east. Corn has become an
increasingly important crop in tlie more humid west,
and plantings have expanded into the drier steppes
to the east. Sunflowers for oil are another major
crop, particularly in tlie western sections. A variety of
grains and other crops (sugar beets, potatoes, flax,
and barley), along with milk and meat livestock and
sheep, round out the agriculture of this zone.

In addition to the zones surrounding urban areas
(Zone III), where fruits, vegetables, eggs, milk, and

chickens are produced for city dwellers, two zones
are noted for their specialized crop production. One
is tlie trans-Caucasus (Zone IV), where citrus crops
and tea thrive in the well-watered, protected western
portion of the area. In the drier eastern portion, tea
is grown along with cotton and rice in irrigated re-
gions. Zone V, the irrigated valleys of the eastern
Caucasus and central Asia, is the principal cotton-
growing area of the Soviet Union. Rice, the staple
food of central Asia, is also a major crop in this zone.

the USSR. ECONOMIC ACnVITY

323

SUMMARY: THE USSR OF At present the USSR's posiuon as a major world power is unshakable. The
the future development of Soviet economic streng^ has indeed been impressive. Many

people claim that this growth has taken place not because of but in spite of
the Soviet poliocal system The almost single minded drive toward industrial
and military development, the abundance of raw materials, and the use of
Western iechnolog\> ha\e enabled the country to achieve high levels of eco-
nonuc growth But progress has been costly. Natural resources have been
nested, and labor has not been used efficiently Most important, persona!
liberu’ and material well-being haw been sacrificed for the state's develop-
ment plans

Tlie Soviet Union faces a number of problems, the first of which is a
slowing of Its economic growth In the past, efforts to remedy this difficulty
have focused brgely on reducing waste and developing a more efficient
economy, not on fundamental organizational changes However, the unprec-
edented reforms of the late 1980s promise to bring about significant eco-
nomic and social changes Gfnsuost has been accompanied by a cultural
thaw that allows greater expression by wntefs, musicians, and artists None-
theless, many Western skeptics believe that the Soviet Union will never be
able to enact meaningful economic changes as long as the Communist part^’
leadership retains such a tight hold on Soviet society' Those who hold com-
fortable positions— including w'orkers who accept paychecks for hnle
wotk— may feel threatened by economic reforms and a democtauzauon
that will demand more and better work from them.

Tlte shortages and consequent high prices of raw- materials, particu-
larly energy resources, that have slowed Western industrial growth have had
less effea on the Soviet Union Its rich natural resource base puts the USSR
In an enviable position Not only can it provide for us own economic
growth, but It can also make the Soviet Union an important supplier of raw
materials for deficient industrial states This situation cannot help enhancing
the USSR s polmcal and economic position in the w’orld However, to maxi-
mize this potential, the Soviet Union needs Western technological assistance
Thus, there occurred m the early 1970s what some observers viewed as a
major turning point in Soviet economic strategy', expanded commercial rela-
tions with ibe United States and other industrialized Western nations The
full impact of these new trade agreements may be fell in the near future
Strong suspicions linger, however, that the real Soviet objeaive is the ex-
pansion of Its economic pow-er for political and military purposes

Agriculture remains the major bottleneck in the Soviet economy. De-
spite significant improv'ements In production during the past decade, Soviet
agriculture fails to provide the quantity and quality of foodstuffs promised
by tlie government Frequent crop foilures require that food be imported.
The ability of the USSR to increase its output of foodstuffs is important for
boili Its own well-being and that of a food deficient world

.324

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SO\TET

KEY terms"

Bolshet'iks

perestroika

demokratizatsiy'a

permanent crisis

fertile triangle

private plots

glasnost

soviet

1 Bolshevik is the Russian word for “majority'.” In reality', tliis so-called ma-
jority was a minority' composed of Russian Marxists.

FURTHER READl^'GS Berg, L S. Natural Regions of the USSR. New York; Macmillan, 1950. The classic study

of Soviet landscape zones by an eminent Soriei geographer.

Bergson, .'\bram, and Herbert S. Le\ine. 77xt Soiiet Economy: Toward the Year 2000.
London; George Allen & Unwin, 19S3. A focus on long-term prospects for the
grov\tli of the Soviet economy, with contributions from more than twenty scholars,
most of whom are economists.

Besemeres, John F. Socialist Population Politics.- Tlje Political Implications of Demo-
graphic Trends in the USSR and Eastern Europe. White Plains, N\': M, E. Sharpe,
1980. /\n examination of the Marxist vieix' of population as well as a study of current
population policy and demographic trends and their impaa on politics, ethnic rela-
tions, social issues, and foreign rehttions in Poland, ’Jugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.

Carcroft, James, ed. The Soviet Union Today: An Interpretive Guide. Chicago: Educa-
tion Foundation for Nuclear Science, 1983. An e.samination of the So\iet emiron-
ment, hi-story. economy, politics, armed forces, society', culnire, and technology, Mth
contributions from twenty-six Soviet specialisLs.

Cole, J. P. Geography of the Soviet Union. Boston: Butterworths, 1984.

Demko, George, and Roland J. Fuchs, cds. Geographical Studies on the Soviet Union:
Essays in Honor of Chauncy D. Hanis. Department of Geography, Research Paper
no. 211. Chicigo: University of Chicago, 1984. Tliineen essays by eminent geogra-
phers who are .specialists on the Soviet Union. Includes essays as diverse as ‘The
Urban Nenvork of Later Medieral Russian” and “The Development of Siberia: Re-
gional Planning and Economic Society'.”

Fischcr-Galati, Stephen, ed. Eastent Europe in the 1980s. Boulder, CO; Wesuiets"
Press, 1981. A collection of articles by Eastern European experts, surt’ey'ing recent
industrial, agricultural, political, cultural, and educational developments.

Goldman, Marshall I. USSR in Crisis.- Tlje Failure of an Economic Systetn. New York:
W'. W'. Norton, 1983. Reviev.’s the USSR’s economic strategy' for development and the
reasons that die system has faltered.

Howe, G. Meh'y'n. Tlje Soviet Union: A Geographical Study. 2d ed. Estover, United
Kingdom; Macdonald and Evans, 1983.

Ivaiser, Robert G. Russia.- The People and the Power. New York: Adieneum Publishers,
1978.

Litdejohn, Gan'. A Sociology of the Soviet Union. New York: St. Martins Press, 19S6. A
Western view of Soviet society'.

TTtE USSR. ECONOMIC ACTIVnY

325

Lydoiph, Paul E Ceo^af^' ibe USSR 3d ed New York. John Wiley & Sons, 1977.

A discussion of Soviet geography, organized according to the country's nineteen ma-
jor economic regions

Geogreipb); q/" tbe USSR, Toptcal Analysts Elkhart Lake, Misty Valley Pub-
lishing, 1979 An excellent topical treatment of So%aet geography, with an emphasis
on economic aspects of die USSR. Shoa updated supplements irregularly published
Mellor, Roy E H Eastern £«rqpe A Geograpljy of tbe Cotnecon Countries Ne^

York Columbia Umversity Press, 1975

Nagorski, Andrew Reluctant Farewell An American Reporter's Candid Look Jnside
tbe Soviet Union New York Henry Holt, 1987

Parker, W H A Htstcmcal Geo^aphy of Russia Chicago Aldme, 1968 The historical

geographical development of the Russian Empire and the Soviet state

Pounds, Norman j G Eastern Eurt^ Chicago Aldme, 1969

Schopflin, George, ed The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe New York Facts on

File, 1986

Shoemaker, M Wesley Tbe Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1985 Washmgton,

DC Skye, 1985

Smith, Alan H Tbe Planned Economies <f Eastern Europe New York Holmes &
Meier, 1983 A good book to begin one's study of the economies of the Sovtet-bloc
countnes Explains the basis of the system, provides good historical background, in-
tegrates the developments withm alt six countries m its discussion, and is easily read
by noneconomisis

Smith, Hedrick. The Russians New York Ballantine Books, 1976
Soviet Geography Revtetv and Translation Washington, DC V H Winston and Sons,
in cooperation wnh the American Geographical Society, lp6l- Translations of Soviet
articles on geography, research articles by Western scholars (primarily from the
United States), and extensive notes on economic and geographic developments An
inraluable source for studying and teaching Sonet geography.

Vie Soviet Union 2d ed Washington, DC Congressional Quarterly, 1986 An excel-
lent reference book for the Soviet Union

Symons, Leslie, ed Tbe Soviet Union A Systematic Geogrcphy Totowa, NJ Barnes &
NoWe.l9^

U S Congress Joint Economic Committee Soviet Economy in a Time of Change
Washington, DC Government Printing Office, 1979 A two-volume, comprehensive
collection of scholarly articles on the past, present, and future performance of the
Soviet economy

Willis, David K. Kiass How Russians Realty Live New York St Martin's Press, 1985.
Yanomtch, Murray, ed The Social Stniaure cf the USSR Recent Studies Armonk, NY:
M E Sharpe, 1986 A collection of studies by Soviet scholars that is interesting for
Western readers because it provides an opportunity to view Soviet social Issues
through Sonet eyes

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/
NEW ZEALAND

J apan, Australia, and
New' Zealand are ihe
outliers of the so*
caned Dev-eloped World.
Far removed In distance
from the major centers
of world power and
wealth — North America
and Europe— Japan and
Australia/New Zealand
have developed in com*
pletely different geo-
graphical settings, in ut-
terly different cultural
environments, and with
different economic S)fi-
terns and problems from
iJiose of die major potv'-
ers Yet Japan In the
north and Australia/New
Zealand in die south
share somediing very
important, they- are die
only rich natioas in the
Pacific

Oecaase of their isola-

tion from Nortlt America
and Europe and their
relatively small size (in
area or population), text-
book discussion of both
japan and Australia''New
Zealand is often rele-
gated 10 subordinate
parts of larger chapters,
as if neither really mat-
tered titat much in un-
derstanding world |>ai-
terns of re>ource.s anil
development TIilv text
obviousK ukes a differ-
ent approach Because of
Jap.in s enormous eco-
nomic importance m the
world today, we devote
two chapters to that na-
tion alone Japan has
achieved disttnaion for
iLs extraordinary indus-
trial prixluaivity’ and its
key role in international
trade and finance Like-

wise, aUhouglt Australia
and New Zc*alind ac-
count for a tiny fraaion
of the world’s people,
ihcir large colleaive
land area and rich re-
sources, among oilier
faaors, wtirram st*paraie
coasideraiion Australia
and Nctv' Zealand have
achieved levels of wealth
With no significant in-
dustrialization.

J ^apan is the only non-Western county to be
>1 counted among the rich nations. A number of
otlier states — including the Asian nations of Tai-
wan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong
Kong — have made remarkable progress in die past
two decades, but none of them can yet be classified
as truly rich. In addition, some oil-producing nations
in the Middle East have high per capita incomes, yet
they are not truly rich in the sense of development
because they still show many signs of underdevelop-
ment.

Japan is clearly a rich nation, whatever the .stan-
dard used. Its GNP is over $1.5 trillion, second only
to that of die United States; and per capita income is
more than $10,000. Japan is among the world’s top
producers of automobiles, iron and steel, electron-
ics, transport equipment, and a v'ariet)' of other in-
dustrial manufactures. Japanese products, btisine.ss-
men, and tourists have become ubiquitous. One has
only to travel in Japan to see the physical signs of

affluence: a modern, thriving society with well-
dressed, w^el 1-fed people. The nation is a key mem-
ber of important international financial and eco-
nomic organizations, and many nations of Asia and
other parts of the world depend on Japan for man-
ufactured goods as well as investment capital. Japan
has succeeded so well diat unflattering expressions
such as Japan Incorporated and economic imperi-
alism, have sometimes been directed at Japanese ef-
forts from many parts of the w'orld. Japan is without
question an economic giant in w'orld affairs today,
playing ti role far out of proportion to its population
and resource base.

Tlte fact that Japan is the only non-W^estern nation
to reach such a high stage of affluence — tlie fifth or
high-mass-consumption stage in Rostow’s model
(.see chapter 4 ) — makes the Japanese experience
unique in the histoiy of the modern world. It is all
the more exceptional when view'ed in relation to tlie
countr)’'s physical resources.

HGURE 14-1

Japan’s location off the east
coast of Asia. Japan is formctl by
an island arc 1,400 miles long. The
inset map illustrates Japan's latitudi-
nal position in comparison with that
of the eastern United States.

330

lAP.AN Pm'SlCAl AND HUMVN RESOURCES

331

RESOURCES: COMPENSATING FOR
SCARCITY

Japan might be used to dispro\e the old Uaeory of
emironmental determinism (see chapter 4) the Jap-
anese' ha\-e succeeded seemingl> in spite of the nat
un! emironment and poor resource endov-Tnent
Yet a closer analj-sts re\’eals a more complex siiua-
Lon The Aurious elements that make up that nation’s
phi-sical en\ironment — location, size, topography,
climate, soils, arable land, mineral resources — ha\-e
had positiA'e as s\ el! as negative effects on Japans
de\elopment. In short, the Japanese have made the
best possible use of what ihe>’ ha\'e, and ihe> have
shopped in the rest of the world for what the) lack

Location and Insularity

Japan's unique role in East Asian civilization can be
aitnbuied in part to the nation’s relatne isolation off

nGim£i4-2

Japan's coreUnd and selected
cities. Japan is an Island nation,
often compared lo the Uniied King
dom. In the past, Japan's insular lo-
cation presided a natural barrier to
ouBide forces, in the modern
’i'orld. It coninbuies to accessibility
since ocean transport U the least
expens^e to mote goods

the east coast of Asia (Figure 14-1) The country
consists of four mam islands — Hokkaido, Honshu,
Shikoku, and Kyushu — plus many lesser islands
They stretch in an arc about 1,400 miles (2,254 kilo-
meters) long, from around 31" to 45" N latitude
(Figure 14-2) Japan also includes other islands The
Ryukyu Islands, of which Okinawa is the most im-
portant, conunue southward from Kyushu in another
arc to almost 24" N latitude; the Ogasawara, or Bonin,
Islands run southward below central Honshu (see
Figure 14-3)

The development experience and historical roles
of Japan are sometimes compared with those of the
Bntish Isles, but in fact the two are quite different
For one thing Japan has been more isolated than
Britain The Strait of Tsushima, which separates Japan
from the Korean peninsula. Is 115 miles (185 Idlo-
meiers) wide, whereas the Strait of Do\’er, between
France and Great Bntain, is only 21 miles (34 kilo-

JAP/W AND AUSTOM.LVNEVi:^ Za»iL\Nn

FIGURE 14-3

Japanese Empire before M'orkl War 11. The Empire included the Kuril Isltntb, T.iiw'.m, Sa-
klialin, and Korea. Japan also established Manchuria .^s the Maitchukiio I'rotcctorate after 1931,
aitliough Japan had controlled Port Anhur .since 1903 and thus had long e.xcned inlluence in
this region of China. The Mariana Islands, Ctroline l.slands, Truk Island.s. and .Marshall Islands
were mandtiied to Japan by the i.eague of Natitias after World War 1. Prior to defeat in WorUl
War 11, Jap.an also controlled much of North China and vinually all of Southeast Asia. (Ad.ipted
from Teikoku’s Complete Atlas of Japan [Tokao: Teikokai-Shtnn Co., 1985). 8.)

meters) wide. The adcTintagcs of tliis isolation liave
been several. On the one hand, Japan has had natural
protection from invaders; unlike Britain it has never
been successfully invaded. The Mongols tried twice,

in 127-1 and 1281, but failed. On the other hand, the
relative proximity to China enabled Japan to adopt
many aspects of Chinese culture on a largely volun-
tar\' and selective basis. The Japanese then adapted

tAPAN PirVSlGM AND HUNt.\N RESOURCES

333

those fnno%'ations to tltcir o%\-n situation to create a
truly unique and brilliant ailture
Both Britain and Japan arc similar. ho^\v\-er. in
having attempted to overcome the resource iimitn
tions of their small national temtones b\ huilding
overseas empires. Tite Japanese empire, acquired
mostly by conquest bem ecn the late nineteentli cen-
rur)' and the end of World War II. once stretched
from Sakhalin in the north to the Dutch Cast Indies
(see Figure 14-3) Japan still claims the stiuthem
Kuril (ChLshima) Islands northeast of Hokkaido,
which were occupied by ilie Soviet Union near the
end of the war.

A Temperate Land

Japan's long latitudinal sweep within the temperate
7one. combined with its insularitv', gives the country
a bcncriciai climate, one that is roughly comparable
to that of the East Coast of Anglo-Amcrica from N'ew-
England to northern Florida (Figure 14-4) Tlie cli-
mate IS inllucnced prlmarilj’ by the monsoonal pat-
terns of mainland Asia (see chapter 24), but it is
moderated by the surrounding seas and warm ocean
currents Thus. Japan (las no real dr\' season, w hereas
Korea and Nonh China, which are at the same lati-
tude, frequently suffer from drought. Rainfall is suf-

nCCR£l4-4

CUoutlc regions and fttMl-free
[njapan, J.ipins climoic Ls
simtbr lo iha of the dMcm L'niteU
Sa-es, ncfpi ihai jjpan ctpcncncw
more modcfMc «-c3iher The suf
rounding auve Icrv-er icmpen
lures tn Uk summer and warmer
lempersures In ihe winter Rainfall
Is more alTundani, and much of ja
pan «n|<jss a long growing scavoa

334

JAPAN AND AUSTRALLVNEW ZEALANn

ficient throughout the year for crop gro'^tli: it ranges
from about 40 inches (1,015 millimeters) a year in
Hokkaido and tlie Inland Sea area to more titan 100
indies (2,538 millimeters) a year in tlie wettest sec-
tions of die soudi. There is a general progression
from long, cold winters and short, mild summers in
Hokkaido to long, hot summers and short, mild win-
ters in subtropical Kyushu. Likewise, die growing
season ranges from around 150 days in Hokkaido to
more dian 260 dal's in Knisliu.

A significant dividing line runs roughly along the
37di parallel. Soudi of die line, double-cropping is
possible — usually paddy rice in flooded fields dur-
ing die summer and a dri’ crop in die winter. Nordi
of die line, die winters are usually too long to permit
double-cropping. This division has been reflected in
Japan’s historical development: settlement nordi of
die line, in nordiern Honshu and Hokkaido, came
much later dian it did in central and southern Japan.
Even today, most of Japan’s population lives south of
37° N latitude. The northern lands remain less
densely populated, with larger farms, fewer cities,
and less industn*. Hokkaido is still a frontier region
in Japan, with a much less developed appearance
dian diat of the southern parts of die countn,'.

A Crowded Land

Compared widi the odier great world pow'ers, Japan
is small — a mere 143,619 square miles (371,973
square kilometers), wiiicli is slightly smaller than
California. In comparison widi the nations of W^est-
ern Europe, Japan is smaller dian France but larger
dian the British Isles, Itah', or a combined East Ger-
many and West Gerniam'. Japan’s land problem
stems from having too many people on too little
land.

Compounding that problem is die rugged nature
of Japan’s terrain. Its islands are die summits of im-
mense submarine ridges thrust up from the floor of
the Pacific Ocean. The island chain is part of the
unstable orogenic (mountain-making) zone that en-
circles die Pacific Ocean. The Japanese islands rise
abruptly from the deep w'aters of die Pacific on die
east and die Sea of Japan on die w'est. Japan has
hundreds of volcanoes (10 percent of die w'orld’s
acdve volcanoes), and eardiquakes are a serious nat-
ural hazard.

In such a geologic setting, low, level lands are in
short supply. Only 25 percent of die total land area
has slopes of less dian fifteen degrees. The other 75
percent of the land is too steep for culdvation and
has litde other utility for human occupanq'. What
level land does exist is found in narrow' river valleys
and alluvial coastal plains separated from one an-
odier b\' stretches of nigged hills. Thus, Japan’s more
dian 122 million people are concentrated in a land
area slightly smaller dian the state of Indiana. The
real population density per square mile of arable
land is more dian 5,800 (15,022 per square kilome-
ter), one of the highest densities in die world. Even
die densitt’ per unit of total land area, w'hicli comes
to over 840 (2,176 per square kilometer), is ten times
higher than diat of die United States. Japan is one of
die most crow'ded nations in the w'orld (Figures
14-5 and 14-6).

The Japanese have been able to support such a
dense population because they adopted from Cliina
quite early in dieir history an intensive form of irri-
gated agriculture. This type of agriculture, which is
found in many parts of Asia, is almost like gardening
and produces high yields per land unit.

A Maritime Nation

In preniodern times land communication w'as diffi-
cult in Japan, and die surrounding seas proiided
links among the islands and along the coast, as w'ell
as contact with the outside w'orld. Most of Japan’s
population sdll lives close to the sea, w'hicli has al-
w’ays played an important role in Japan’s national life.
The rugged coasdine has countless bays and inlets,
the most important of which is die great Inland Sea,
W’hicli separates Honshu from Shikoku and Ky’ushu
(see Figure 14-5).

Fishing long ago became a major activity of the
Japanese. Stimulated by the shortage of land for live-
stock raising, die fishing industry is sdll one of tlie
country’s most important activides. Dependence on
seafood w'as also a consequence of Buddhism, w'hidi
early became die major religion of Japan. The Japa-
nese continue to obtain a major share of die protein
in their diet from fish and other sea products, niudi
of W'hicli conies from aquaculaire — the raising or
grow'ing of seafood products, such as shellfish and
seaw'eed — along the coast. In modern dnies die fish-
ing industry' has become a global enterprise, w'itli

TAPAN PHYSICAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

335

FIGURE l4-5

population distribution in Ja-
pan. Population density in Japan is
e'ctremely high, but especially so
vihen measured as physiological
density, or as persons per unit of
arable land. Much of Japanese land
is mountainous and unusable for
agriculture The large population,
agriculmral needs, and massive ur-
banization provide great land use
pressures

vessels roaming the four corners of the world m
search of seafood for Japan’s large population Japan
is one of the few countries that still hunts whales, in
spite of intense pressure from world environmental
and conservation groups

It IS not surprising that the Japanese became sig-
nificant shipbuilders early in their history With the
coming of industrialization at the close of the nine-
teenth century, they intensified their efforts even
more Their shortage of domestic supplies of raw
materials was an added stimulus As a result, Japan
became one of the major maritime powers of the
world by the time of World War I, a positron it holds
to this day. In fiia, m the post-World War 11 era
Japan surged ahead as the leading shipbuilder in the
world Although the shipbuilding industry is not as
strong today because of competition from other,
lower-cost Asian producers (especially South Korea),
the Japanese merchant fleet remains one of the

w'orld’s largest. Access to the sea, for fisbmg and
transport of trade goods, remains vital to the physical
survival of Japan

Agricultural Resources

Forests still cover more than 65 percent of Japan’s
land area, one of the highest proportions of any of
the world’s rich nations Unlike the Chinese, who
wrere not particularly conservation-minded through
most of their long history, the Japanese have treated
their forest lands with great care, in spite of high
population density and demand for agricultural land.
Their response has been due partly to the fact that
die forests are found primarily on the steeper slopes,
which are unsuited to agriculture, and partly to the
importance of wood products in the Japanese cul-
ture. Even today, the majority of the Japanese prefer
to live in detached wooden houses (although eco-

336

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALAND

HGURE 14-6

Pedestrian traffic in Tokyo. Tlie Tok\’o metropolitan region contains nearly 28 million peo-
ple, the largest urban concentration in the world.

nomic necessity forces a growing proportion to live
in apartment blocks). Wood and charcoal are also
important domestic fuels, and the great relative im-
portance of hydroelectric power and the need for
abundant irrigation water for growing paddy rice
have long encouraged tlie Japanese to respect tlie
role of forested watersheds. Still, the demand for
forest products far exceeds domesdc production,
and such products are among the major imports of
Japan (see chapter 15 ).

Preservation of the forests has helped to protect
Japan’s valuable water resources. However, the rivers
are not witliout problems. Because of their short-
ness, steep gradients, and relatively small drainage
basins, the rivers are often subject to flash flooding

and landslides after heavy rains. Such rains are often
associated with t)phoons, which may strike Japan
several times a year, particularly in late summer.

Witliin tlie limited areas suitable for agriculture,
the most important resource is, of course, the soil.
Japan’s soils are not particularly good, partly because
of tlieir intensive use for so many centuries and
partly because of the country’s geologic and topo-
graphic character. The most important soils are the
alluvial deposits on floodplains, deltas, and alluvial
fans. They are die most productive soils and are used
primarily for rice cultivation (Figure 14- 7). Japans
high productivity in agriculture is direcdy dependent
on large inputs of chemical and organic fertilizers,
plus ver)'^ careful cultivation techniques.

lAPAN PHYSICAL AND HUMAN RESOORCES

337

FIGURE 14-7

Japanese &nn workers thresh-
ing rice. Even though the Japanese
hrtn populauon has diminished,
agncutaice suU exhibits consider-
able labor intensity Mechanization
is common m the form of small
tillers, traaors, and threshers

Mineral Resources

Japan lost the resource lottery for minerals, the coun-
try IS practically devoid of significant deposits As a
result, the Japanese have had to rely overwhelmingly
on imported raw materials for their industrial devel-
opment Japan’s present dependency on imports
ranges from 100 percent for such meuls as alumi
num and nickel to 55 percent for line Japan must
import virtually all of Its iron ore and petroleum,
most of its cobng coal, and almost all of its copper
Among the important raw materials needed for in-
dustry, the country is self-sufficient only in limestone
and sulfur.

Demand for all kinds of raw materials has mush-
roomed in the postwar period Raw materials (inter-
preted in the broadest sense to include foodstuffe,
minerals and metals, and fuels) now account for
more than 50 percent of Japan’s total imports, more
than 40 percent of Japanese investment overseas is to
secure raw materials. Foreign trade thus assumes
special importance for Japan, when compared with
other major industrial countries such as the United
States and the Soviet Union, which are far more self-
sufficient The desire to secure permanent sources of
raw materials was one of the reasons for Japan’s im-
perial expansion earlier in this century. And although
military force is not the answer, Japan considers it

essential to maintain secure overseas sources of raw
materials

Japan’s energy resources illustrate the country's
dependency The primary energy source until the
J950S was coal With the expansion of the economy
after lhat, the increased demand for energy came to
be met mainly by petroleum (Figure 14-8). Since
the two oil crises of the 1970s, however, conservation
efforts have reduced petroleum consumption by
substituang other forms of energy As a result, the
total volume of imported crude oil declined, in spite
of falling oil prices In ilie mid-198Ds Nonetheless, oil
remains Japan’s largest single import commodity, ac-
counting for more than 15 percent of total imports
And Japan still spends approximately $20 billion a
year for oil, thus remaining hostage to the volatile
world oil economy. The bulk of Japan’s oil is im-
ported from Persian Gulf producers, with the United
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia now dominant sup-
pliers (replacing Iran and Kuwait) However, the
share of oil obtained from the Middle East has fallen
to less than 70 percent as other sources — including
Indonesia, Malaysia, and China — have grown in im-
portance

Coal remains Japan’s second major source of en-
erg>', most of it imported from Australia and the
United States-, and hydropower continues to provide
about 5 percent of energy needs The biggest gain

338

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALAND

HGURE 14-8
Japan’s changing energy
sources. Japan has few local energ>"
resources. All of the petroleum and
much of the coal used in Japan
must be imponed. Indusm' is the
principal user of energy' in Japan. By
1990 it is expeaed that Japan’s de-
pendence on oil will be somev.Jiat
reduced. (From Statistical Hand-
book of Japan 1987 [Toky'o; Statis-
tics Bureau, Management and Coor-
dination Agenq'], 41.)

Year

has been in nuclear power, which rose from almost
nothing in the early 1970s to around 10 percent of
Japan’s total energ}^ consumption in the mid-1980s.
In spite of opposition from some environmentalists,
Japan remains committed to further expansion of nu-
clear energy, which accounted for 26 percent of elec-

tricity generation in 1986 and is projected to reach 60
percent by the year 2030. Table 14-1 clearly reveals
the extreme dependence of Japan on foreign sup-
plies of natural resources, especially when compared
with the United States, West Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom.

TABLE 14-1

Natural resources: Import dependency and world trade share for selected countries, 1985.

Resource

Degree of Import Dependency
(percentage)*

Share of World Trade
(percentage)

Japan

United

States

West

Germany

France

United

Kingdom

Japan

United

States

West

Germany

France

United

Kingdom

Energy

83.1

11.9

50.1

59.5

-12.4

14.2

13.6

7.3

6.6

2.9

Coal

81.4

-11.5

-0.8

49.0

-1.6

28.5

0.5

3.7

7.0

1.7

Oil

99.8

33.3

95.1

96.8

-44.4

17.3

20.4

8.8

7.4

3.2

Natural gas

94.2

4.3

65.5

77.4

26.1

12.4

13.2

19.3

11.3

6.2

Iron ore

99.7

16.0

97.8

61.0

97.4

40.1

12.9

13.0

4.3

4.8

Copper

96.5

18.1

99.8

99.4

99.8

25.0

8.9

14.0

7.2

6.5

Lead

78.1

25.1

85.9

97.2

97.5

8.1

20.1

13.9

5.9

5.6

Zinc

55.6

73.9

70.4

84.1

97.6

4.1

39.0

9.5

4.1

8.3

Tin

98.3

99.6

100.0

25.3

30.3

15.5

5.9

3.5

Aluminum

100.0

82.3

100.0

-100.0

100.0

28.0

13.0

10.3

6.9

2.9

Nickel

100.0

95.7

100.0

15.1

24.7

14.0

8.4

7.5

Wood and lumber

64.3

1.2

20.7

68.6

12.2

18.7

16.9

7.0

4.6

6.3

Source: Japan 1987: An International Comparison (Tokyo: Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs), 67.
*A negative value indicates a surplus of the percentage amount shown.

lAPAN PHYSICAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

339

HUAJAN RESOURCES: THE HYBRID
CULTURE

If the national character and social attitudes of a po)
pie are critical to the development of a modem
nation state, then the Japanese excel in this regard
Foreigners wriung about and admirmg the economic
miracle of Japan, however, sometimes convey the
impression that the Japanese are some kind of supe-
rior race, lacking the flaws that bedevil lesser nations
In fea, die Japanese are not without their weak-
nesses

No attempt to understand Japan would be com-
plete without some examination of the nature of
Japan's human resources, particularly from the
perspective of ethnic composition, cultural develop-
ment, and social characteristics Much is made of the
homogeneity of Japan’s people The Japanese them-
selves are fond of stressing this as one of their supe-
rior attributes (Figure 14-9) Certainly the Japanese
are a far more homogeneous people than the plu-
ralistic Anglo-Americans, and Aeir high degree of
racial and cultural homogeneity has been a source of
strength, because it has helped to foster a sense of
national identity. Unity and purpose have been crit-
ical to the success of Japan's modernization m the
past Century.

Yet homogeneity Is far from complete and has
been achieved by forcing conformity on all who de-

FIGURE l4-9

AJapancsc family la ihdr small
home, Many In Japan have adopted
Western cuituiai ■waji, but differ-
ences between traditional and mod-
em Japan may appear as genera-
tional features

viate from socially accepted norms Japan does have
ethnic ^d cultural minorities (see box on pp
340-341) More than three-quaners of a million Ko-
reans and some 250,000 Chinese live in Japan, largely
as a Ipgary of the colonial era And a few thousand
Ainu remain A much larger cultural minority — the
burakumin, or social outcasts — is a legacy of Ja-
pan's feudal past These ethnic and cultural minori-
ties still tend to be treated badly by the Japanese
majonti' and employment opportunities are often re-
stricted to the most menial of tasks. The basic ethno-
centnsm of the Japanese is also held to be a prmcipal
fturtor in the difficulties Japan sometunes has in for-
eign relations, particularly with nearby Asian neigh-
bors such as Korea and China

The Emergence of the Japanese

The Japanese achies’ed some distmaive linguistic
and ph>-sical identities two thousand years ago Jap-
anese is a polysyllabic, highly inflected language,
Similar to Korean and the Altaic languages of north-
ern Asia The written form of Japanese continues to
use a large number of Chinese characters but is very
different from Chinese In fan, language was one of
the faaors that helped Japan preserve Its cultural
disimaiveness.

THE OUTSIDERS: MINORITIES IN JAPAN

yrapan’s human resources and culture are not as homogeneous as popu-
[ I lar mtths would suggest. Ethnic and social minorities make up approxi-
mately 4 percent of die population, or roughly 5 million people. Tlie
"ethnic minorities consist of Koreans, Chinese, Okinawans, Ainu, and foreign
residents. The social minorities are composed of the burakumin, handi-
capped persons, and children of interracial ancestry.

Japan’s often-lauded cultural homogeneity has been obtained at the
price of racism and discrimination against any deviants — ethnic or
social — from die cultural/social mainstream, even against those who are
physically impaired. The Japanese regard themselves as a unique people,
witli a culture and a histon' completely different from that of odier races.
They sometimes refer to themselves as the Yamato people, in reference to
the Yamato Plain around Kyoto, where the Japanese culture and state devel-
oped in centuries past and from which the ancestry' of die imperial family is
derived. Tiiere is a strong current in Japanese society to presen'e die purity
of die majority', or Yamato, .strain. Anyone else is automatically an outsider
and can never hope to be fully accepted in the mainstream. Tlie 1947 con-
stitution expre.ssly prohibits discrimination in political, economic, or social
relations because of race, creed, sex, social status, or family origin. How-
ever, that United States- imposed provision h:is been unable to fundamen-
tally alter many centuries-old attitudes and practices.

Among die ethnic minorities the Koreans are the group that is the
largest and diat suffers most. Numbering more than 800,000, the Koreans
first came to Japan during the colonial occupation (1910 to 1945), when
diousands were forcibly brought or enticed to move to Japan as low-cost
laborers. By die end of W'orld War II, some 2.5 million Koreans were living
in Japan. Those who chose to remain after die war w'ere deprived of citizen-
ship by the 1952 peace treaty- widi the United States, wJien die Japanese gov-
ernment declared them aliens.

Birth in Japan does not guarantee citizenship even today, and die gov-
ernment makes it veity' difficult for Koreans to obtain citizenship, although
most of diem have Japanese names, speak die language fluend)', and have
attempted to integrate into Japanese society'. Tlie Koreans remain mired at
the lower end of die economic ladder, victims of social and economic dis-
criminadon. The Koreans are heavily concentrated in ghettos in die Kinki
(Kyoto-Osaka) area and in places such as Saiwaku, in the industrial city' of
Kawasaki south of Tok}'o, where they struggle to make a living and to sur-
vive in a hostile environment.

The Ainu w'ere among die earliest inhabitants of Japan. Racially differ-
ent, they, too, were treated as aliens by the Yamato Japanese. The Ainu have
been reduced by warfare, disease, and — since die turn of die centuty' — a
low birthrate. Fewer than 25,000 Ainu remain, almost all of whom live in a

few parts of Hokkaido Island Tlie Ainu ha\'e been heavily assimilated into
Japanese culture, but a few, like the Amencan Indians, struggle to maintain
some of their ethnic and cultural identity

The Okinawans, in die Ryukyu Islands south of Kyushu, were not polit-
ically incorporated into Japan unul early in the seventeenth century, even
though they are of basically the same stodc as the majority Japanese. Isolated
from the main islands and speaking a variant form of Japanese, the
Okinasvans have been treated as second-class auzens, sort of Japanese hill-
billies, ever since Their position is reflected in a lo^’er standard of living,
lower educational levels, and various forms of discrimination

Even foreign residents in Japan, sudi as Filipinos and Thais, who are
in Japan only temporarily as low-cost workers or in other capacities, suffer
all sorts of restrictions and discrimination Indeed, there is strong opposi-
tion to allowing large-scale labor migrauon to Japan, despite the fact that the
labor force is shnnlang as the population ages and despite increasing Japa-
nese disdain for low-wage menial labor Foreigners within the country, in-
cluding Americans, are — at best — tolerated as a necessity of Japan's global
economy

The largest and most abused social minority in Japan is the burakii-
mm They are physically indistinguishable from odter Japanese; they have
the same racial and cultural origins Howev’er, somewhat like India’s un-
touchables, Japan's biirakumin have been discriminated against for centu-
ries because of their past assoaauon with the slaughtering of animals and
similar occupations In Buddhism and Shintoism, the two major religions of
Japan, these activities are regarded as polluting and defiling Thus, a subclass
of Japanese have been branded forever as unfit for association with the ma-
jority "pure” Japanese This discrimination was formalized and legalized
during the Edo period (1600 to 1868), and u is still deeply entrenched in
Japanese society despite government and private efforts to root it out.

Most of the burakumm, who number between 2 and 3 million, live in
ghettos scattered throughout the country. Denied access to better-paying
jobs, housing, and other benefits of Japan's economic miracle, they eke out
a living at the bonom of the socioeconomic ladder. Many burakiimin try to
hide their origin and quietly integrate into the mainstream of sociecj', but
they are usually found out when background chedcs are made for marriage
or emplovTnent.

Resistance by minoriues through such aaions as lawsuits, sometimes
with the support of enlightened Japanese, is beginning to crack the sj^stem
and bring some improvement But some people argue that discrimination
will never disappear completely, given the cultural attitudes of the Japanese
majorit)’.

341

342

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALAND

Although the Japanese are a basically homoge- Southeast Asia through diffusion along coastal south-
neous group today, many racial strains have been ern China (Figure 14-10).

blended into the people over a long period. Neo- The primary racial infusion into the Japanese

lithic peoples inhabited the islands for several mil- stock came from Mongoloid peoples who migrated

lennia. They were hunters, fishermen, and gatherers, from tlie mainland, via the Korean peninsula, starting

with only partially Mongoloid racial features. The with the Han dynasty (206 b . c . to a . d . 220). With them

Ainu were another important element in the ere- came paddy-rice agriculture and the use of bronze

ation of tlie modern Japanese. A proto-Caucasoid and iron. Domesticated animals — such as horses,

people who inhabited much of northern Japan, the cattle, and pigs — also came via this route. During

Ainu are still found in small numbers on the island of succeeding centuries the settlers gradually moved

Hokkaido. The Ainu influence is believed to account farther easoiv^ard along the margins of the Inland Sea.

for the faatliatsomejapanese today have more facial This area provided the optimum environment — in

and body hair than do Koreans or Chinese. Otlier terms of climate, soil, fishing, and water transporta-

traits may have been acquired from peoples of tion — for the development of Japan’s culture hearth.

nGURE 14-10

Origin and spread of Japanese
culture. Many of Japan’s cultural
characteristics originated in China,
but Japan’s insular location
ultimately fostered the development
of a distinctive culture. The Japanese
culture hearth first began to form
along tlie Sea of Japan and the Strait
of Tsushima; it then spread to die
Inland Sea area, especially the Yam-
ato Plain, and eventually nordm’ard
to the Kanto Plain (Tokyo).

;)2- 150- nj uF-

Paleollthlc and\ 'V Iv

proto-Neolfthtc \

K f

/ TT

Caucasoid Ainu / \

d Neolllhlc \ )

jolold groups r- \ (

/ Sea of

r i ^

,,JV f A

OCEAN

5 /k China

China or'~ Ay

elements Sea

iY' r

J \ 0 150 300MI. 3^

/ /? ^ 0 150 300 KM. / y

sW rb

Sea of

^ I KANTO,

'^y^PLA.tr

' X 'v

!st centers of
lese culture

ire hearth

PACIFIC

OCEAN

East ^

China ®

l^PAN. Pm^lCAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

345

By the eighth century' the focus of political and cul-
tural power had centered around the Yamato Plain
at the eastern end of the Inland Sea Nara for a shon
time and then Kyoto for more than a thousand years
were the polmcal capitals of Japan, which went
through se\-eral centuries of borrowing and adapting
from Chinese civilization The Japanese acquired
much from China Confucian v'alues, Buddhism, the
emperor system (diluted to preserve the power of
Japanese clans), city design, architecture, art. music,
and language, among others
As the Japanese settlements mo^’ed northward
through Honshu, they encountered the very different
Amu The clash of cultures and the demand for land
resulted in military struggles along the frontier that
were similar to the clashes between European set-
tlers and American Indians Most of the Ainu re-
treated to Hokkaido As the Japanese reached north-
ern Honshu m the ninth century’, they found

themselves in a forested environment with a much
cooler climate and few directly usable land re-
sources Clearing the land for agriculture was diffi-
cult, and the shorter growing season prevented a
high population density' Consequently, the develop-
ment of Japan focused on the area south of about the
37th parallel

During the Tokugawa period (1615 to 1868) the
focus of power shifted further eastw’ard to Tokyo
(then called Edo) in tlte Kanto Plain Today, Japan’s
core area remains in essentially the same region in
which the nation's foundations were laid and in
which Its early growth took place This core is a belt
between approximately 34® and 36® N latitude, from
Tokyo on ffie east to Shimonoseki at the western end
of Honshu and encompassing the Inland Sea The
major share of Japan’s population, cities, industry’,
and modem economy are still concentrated in this
zone (see Figure 14-2)

SU5LMARY: JAPANESE
ACHIEVEMENT IN A
LAND OF SCARCITY

Japan is a very’ rich nation — indeed, it is the only non-Western country to
have achieved such an overall high level of economic well-being Deficient
in good agricultural land, lacking in the minerals essentia! to industrial de-
velopment, and simply shon of space. Japan nevenheless presents the world
with a spectacular economy The Japanese have done so by honing their
human resources into remarkable and efficient achievers

The basic charaaer of the Japanese has been shaped by a variety of
forces over a long period of time Homogeneity is one of the attributes of
Japanese society that is redded as a major contributor to the success of
Japanese development Within that homogeneity’ Confucianism and
Buddhism played major roles in instilling the virtues of self dental, stressing
responsibilities and obligations of the individual w’lihin a clearly defined
social hierarchy, putting the interests of the group aliead of the washes of
the individual These social charaaenstics helped to unify the nation behind
its leaders, who could count on the total commitment of the people to
whatev’er goals were set forth Although the unparalleled affluence of recent
years is beginning to weaken some of those social characteristics, at least in
the eyes of critics, the Japanese remain one of the most vigorous and pur-
poseful societies in the wtwld

key terms Ainu

burakumin
double<roppLng
Inland Sea
Japan Incorporated

Kanto Plain
Tokugawa period
Yamato people
Yamato Plain

JAPAN: THE
ECONOMIC GIANT

JAPAN’S FIRST TRANSFORMATION:
RISING TO POWER

JAPAN’S SECOND TRANSFORMATION:
RISING FROM THE ASHES OF WAR

THE CONSEQUENCES OF JAPAN
INCORPORATED

JAPAN’S THIRD TRANSFORMATION:
CHARTING A NEW COURSE

S n 1868 a group of young Japanese revolutionar-
ies overthrew the feudal Tolaigawa dynasty’.
They were responding to die challenge posed
by the arrival of the Americans under Commodore
Matthew Perry' in the 1850s. Following that rei’olu-
tion and the Mei|i Restoration, a series of shock
wav’es reverberated throughout Japan and led to die
beginning of Japan’s transformation into a modern
nation.

Over the next hundred years Japan was physically
transformed almost beyond recognition, yet many of
the basically feudal characteristics ofjapanese society
were retained. 7’oday, Japan still e.xliibits a curious
mixture of the traditional and the Western. Out-
wardly it is perhaps the most Westernized nation in
Asia, but inwardly it remains firmly rooted in its own
cultural traditions.

In a manner of speaking, Japan has gone through
three transformations since the Mciji Restoration
in 1868. The first consisted of modernization and
industrialization in the late-iiineteenth century’, with
a move to heavy' industry' and militarization that
reached its peak with World War II. Tlie second
transformation was the reconstruction and return to
international power in the postw-ar period. The third
transformation, now in its formative stages, involves
the search for new' directions in a w'orld of increasing
competition and discontent w'ith past strategies (sec
chapter opening photograph).

JAPAN’S FIRST TRANSFORMATION:

RISING TO POWER

The Japanese experience illustrates the kind of co-
operation and balance needed between goi'ernment
and people in the economic development of a na-
tion. Japan’s leaders recognized the military' superi-
ority of tlie West. They also saw w'ith alarm how' w'ide-
spread was the foreign influence in China because
that country' had failed to respond adequately to the
challenge of the West. Japan’s leaders were deter-
mined tliat a similar fate should not befall their coun-
try.

Tlie Japanese adopted a pragmatic step-by-step ap-
proach and achieved spectacular and rapid results.
Witliin a mere fifty years the leaders had created a
sound and modernized economy, and Japan

achieved a position of national security' and interna-
tional equality. Tliis achiev’ement was due in pan to
the government’s provision of a proper environment
for development. Feudal restrictions w'ere removed
from trade w’ithin the country' and from individual
activities. Sound currency', a banking sy'stem, reason-
able taxation, and efficient government w'ere pro-
vided. In addition, the government took a direct role
in development by pioneering many industrial fields
and encouraging businessmen to move into new'and
rislcy’ ventures. The go\'ernment also helped fund
many ventures, providing private entrepreneurs w’ith
aid and pri\’ileges. Active cooperation between gov-
ernment and big business w’orked w’ell in Japanese
.society and continues to be a basic charaaeristic of
the economy.

The role of the people w'as equally important in
making the transformation a succe.ss. Thousands of
individual Japanese responded to new' economic op-
portunities, and in the long run this prirate initiative
was the driving force behind Japan's economic mod-
ern iz.'tt ion.

A critical aspecT of the process, however, was die
emphasis, during the first two decades of the Meiji
period, on developing the traditional areas of die
economy; agriculture, commerce, and cottage indus-
try. qiiere was no attempt to build modern industry
immediately and directly on a weak loc’al economy,
as many developing nations in the posnvar period
have mistakenly tried to do.

According to the Rostow' model, Japan passed
from the tniditional-society stage (the Tokugawa era
up to the 1850.S) to preconditions for takeoff, begin-
ning W'ith the Meiji period and continuing through
the remainder of the century as the foundations for
later growth were laid.

The Growtli of Industry and Empire

The modern industries that w'ere deemed important
by the Japanese government were tliose on w'hich
military' pow'er depended. 1-Ience, the government
led the tvay in developing shipbuilding, munitions,
iron and steel, and modern communications. Tlie
first railroad w'as built between Toltyo and Yokohama
in 1872. At tlie same time, as tlie need for importing
raw' materials grew', export industries w'cre encour-
aged, particularly silk and textiles.

346

lAPAN THE ECONO.NUC GIANT

347

At. the end of the nineteenth century, the oountiy
still had a small industrial base. In a quantitative
sense Japan’s takeoff period did not begin until after
the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 Then industry blos-
somed Between 1900 and the late 1930s, the pro-
duaion of manufactured goods increased more than
nvelvefold Export trade grew twentyfold in the same
period, with manufactured goods accounting for
most of the increase The Japanese excelled at pro-
ducing inexpensive light industrial and consumer
goods more cheaply than many other countries — an
approach to production that has continued to serve
the Japanese well Foreign markets, howei'er, played
a less important role in this export strategy than is
commonly believed Japan’s economic growth m the
early twentieth century was largely self-generated
Two decisive es’ents that shaped the course of Ja-
pan’s development m the twentieth century were its
viaones over China m 1895 and over Russia in 1905
These two wars had a number of consequences For
one thing, they started Japan on a course of imperial
conquest that ended m the disaster of World War II
This course was partly an imitauon of the colonial
practices of modern Western nations It w-as also
partly a quest for secure sources of raw materials and
markets for industrial goods As a result of the two
wars, Japan’s territory was greatly expanded It con-
trolled Taiwan, Korea, and parts of China, including
Manchuria By the end of World War I, Japan was a
fully accepted imperial world power

The Growth of Agriculture and
Population

A significant change that accompanied the modern-
ization of Japan after 1868 was an upsurge in popu-
lation growth During the latter half of Toku^w^
rule, Japan’s population had stabilized at about 33
million Between 1868 and 1940, however, Japan
provided a classic illustration of the interaaion of
economic and demographic faaors, the demo-
graphic transformation. As mdustrializanon and ur-
banization proceeded, both birthrates and death
rates declined Population began to mctease, but the
rate averaged only about 1 5 percent per year up to
1940 Nonetheless, that grow^ rate was suffiaeni to
more than double the population, to )ust over 73
million, by 1940.

At the close of the Tokugawa era in 1868, about
four-fifths of the labor force was engaged in agricul-
ture, forestry, or fishmg From 1868 to the present,
the rural population has declined steadily in propor-
tion to the urban population, even though it did not
start declining in absolute terms until just before
World War II Today, agricultural workers constitute
only about 10 percent of the total labor force

Several important trends marked Japanese agri-
culture in the last century’ First, production in-
creased rapidly up to World War I, the result of im-
proved farmmg methods that mcluded more
effiaent imgation, bener crop strains, pest control,
and, above all, the lavish application of fertilizers
Agriculture succeeded m supplying all but a small
pan of the increased demand for nee that accompa-
nied the population growth and the rise m per capita
consumption As Japan’s population continued to ex-
pand, however, the country's ability to feed itself de-
cluied steadily As a result, reliance on the colonies of
Taiwan and Korea for nee and other foodstuffs in-
creased

The declining self-sufficiency m rice stimulated
considerable spatial expansion of agriculture (Figure
15-1). Much of the agricultural land that is now
farmed m northern Honshu and Hokkaido —
including the terraced hillsides so common in these
regions — was brought into cultivation ducir^ this
penod The influence of the United States on agri-
cultural expansion is still evident today m the north
farms in Hokkaido often specialize in dairying and
are ten times the national average in size

A second trend was that the gap betw'een urban
and rural standards of livmg increased as industrial-
ization progressed Even at the turn of the twentieth
century, liie average Japanese farm was extremely
small Produamty depended on heavy labor input
on uny, fragmented fields Moreover, the number of
tenant farmers increased greatly after 1868 and w'as
not substantially reduced until after World War II,
W’hen a <x>mpu!sory land-reform program was initi-
ated during the Amencan occupation

Another important development arising from the
pre-World War 1 period was a grow'ing tendency for
rural people to seek part-time emplo>'ment in sec-
ondary' economic acuvities Rice alone could not sus-
tain an acceptable standard of livmg Consequently,
many ftirmers raised silkworms, and large numbers
of rural people, especially young girk, w-orked in silk

348

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/NEW ZFAI AMn

FIGURE 15-1

Land utilization in Japan. Nearly
75 percent of Japan is unusable for
agriculture. Farms on Honshu,
Shikoku, and Kyushu remain small
and intensively worked, with rice
the dominant grain crop. Agricul-
ture in less densely populated Hok-
kaido, a middle latitude environ-
ment, is less intensive, and farms
are commonly larger than tJiey are
in the remainder of Japan.
Self-sufficiency in agriculture has
not yet been achieved in Japan.

140' 'v "

‘ ^Wakkanai

C-o.i n

ShrmonosGkib'^-<«_ ; ' '

^ V ••

Jagaia'kfNr-P y SMkoku

\ o / Kyushu

. ■ ■ ? V V'Abufalsu
Yamagawa ^

'<*<. PACIFIC

•Kcsonnuma
jlshrnomakl OCEAN

! Honshu

■■ >.• <VTO!.ika

too

zoo MILES

30’

' 0

130'

100

200 KILOMETERS

140’

33‘

LAND

UTILIZATION

SPECIALTY CROPS

Double-cropping: paddy rice
domlnanl wiih wheal and
barley as dry crops

j Forest dominant v/ilh some
posture and wasteland

Apples

Tea

Single-cropping: paddy rice

crops In paddy fields

Tobacco

Single-cropping, chiefly
wheal, barley, and oals

Citrus fruit

4-(

Major fishing port

mills (Figure 15-2). This movement out of agricul-
ture into industry was hastened by tlie depression of
the 1930s. The transfer of workers from agriculture
to industry and from niral to urban trades kept in-
dustrial wages down. And low wages, combined witli
technical improvements during this period, enabled
Japanese industry to remain competitive in world
markets.

From World War I to the late 1930s, Japan went
through the drive-to-maturity stage of development.

Agriculture receded in relative importance as sec-
ondary’ and tertian^ activities expanded dramatically.
Textile and food-processing industries gradually
gave way to hea\y industry^ especially as Japan mili-
tarized in the 1930s. The war years, between 1937
and 1945 , saw a rev'ersal of sorts, as Japan’s economy
was geared to the war effort and austerity' and short-
ages cliaracterized personal consumption. Japans
extreme \ailnerability' — its lack of domestic raw
materials — doomed the nation to eventual defeat.

lAPAN THE ECONOMIC GIANT

349

mURK 15-2

A member of a form family tending silkworms. E’an time
nonagficulnjtal aamties is common for farmers m Ja-
pan, but not recent m origin Raising silkworms has long been
an occupauon of rural people, and more contemporary indus-
tries fm-e also become major cmploj-ers of farm labor

JAPAN’S SECOND TRANSFORMATION;
RISING FROM THE ASHES OF WAR

Wien Japan surrendered in August 1945, the nation
^■as prostrate. Destruaion from the war had been
catastrophic, especially in urban and industrial areas.
The nation, stripped of its empire, consisted only of
the main archipelago, and the future of the 72 mil-
lion Japanese seemed bleak indeed
Within a decade Japan was thriving Most of the
ph\-sical destruction of the war n-as erased, and the
nau’on nas soon well on its way to regaining a posi-
tion of economic might in Asia and the world. In a

manner of speaking, Japan had gone through a com-
pressed repetition of the takeoff and drive-
to-maturity stages. The war had been a terribly costly
mistake, but Japan soon made up for lost time
This revival is attributable in substantial part to the
resilient fiber of the Japanese people The physical
destrucuon of war does not destroy the inherent
qualities of a strong society Japan, like Germany m
1918 and 1945, still had a solid base of educated,
technically proficient people Its able administrators
and entrepreneurs were eager to seize the reins and
rebuild the nation just as fast as the American occu-
pation authorities w’ould allow The cold w^r m the
late 1940s and the fall of China to the Communists in
1949 led the United States to return control of the
government to the Japanese much faster than might
otherwise have been the case The United States
needed a suong Japanese ally, so it played a critical
role in rebuilding Japan

The Role of the United States

American assistance took several forms. Financial aid
was espeaaily critical immediately after the war It
consisted of billions of dollars in foodstuffs, military
procurement orders during the Korean War
(1950-1953). and other aid. Of even greater long-
range benefit was the open-door policy for Japanese
exports to the United States. By the late 1980s the
United States was buying almost 40 percent of Japan’s
total exports. Another benefit was rtuUtary protection
b>' the United States, which enabled Japan to spend
less than 1 percent of its annual GNP for defense.
Also beneficial was American technology. With their
own industry nearly leveled to the ground, the Jap-
anese bought American technology at bargain prices
and revitalized that industry. This gave them a com-
petitive adv’antage over many other countries, includ-
ing the Umted States, whose plants and technology
were much older and could not be replaced so eas-
ily-

Uie Development Strategy of the
Japanese

The policies of the Japanese government and busi-
ness community’ were probably even more impor-
tant than the American role. Close cooperadon be-
twTeen gov’emment and busmess continued, grew,

350

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/NEW

and remains the pattern today. Cooperation is par-
ticularly important in financing the modernization
process. Banking credit is backed by the government
and makes heav>^ capital investment possible. The
Japanese economy was geared to a high-growth-rate
strategy that relies on large increases in productivity
to provide surpluses to pay back capital debts. High
rates of personal savings give the banks more money
to loan out, and banks are more patient than stock-
holders, so Japanese firms are able to concentrate on
long-range strategies and research. Commercial
banks lend out a high percentage of tlieir funds with
the backing and guidance of ±e government-run
Bank of Japan. Two-thirds of the capital requirements
of the average Japanese company are met by loans
from banks, only one-tliird by stock; the reverse is
the system in the United States.

The Japanese strategy has worked. The GNP grew
at an average rate of almost 9 percent per year in the
1950s, more than 11 percent in the 1960s, and more
than 10 percent in the 1970s. The maturing of the
economy by the 1980s caused the growth rate to slow
down to around 4 percent per year during the de-
cade, but this rate was still higher than the grotvth
rates in most industrialized countries.

To a far greater degree than has occurred in the
United States, the Japanese government has guided
the economy; yet Japan’s system is far from a cen-
trally planned, command-type economy like that of
the Soviet Union. Growth industries are determined
and supported with generous assistance of many
kinds, including high depreciation allowances, inex-
pensive loans, subsidies, and low taxes. The results of
research carried out in government laboratories are
turned over to companies for commercial develop-
ment.

As Japan’s economy has grown during the past
century, its industry has gradually progressed from
labor-intensive light industrial production to capital-
intensive heavy industry. Textiles and food process-
ing, which had dominated until the war years, shrank
rapidly in importance after 1950. At that time the
government stimulus shifted to iron and steel, pet-
rochemicals, machinery, automobiles and other
transportation equipment, precision tools, and elec-
tronics. Heavy industry’s share of total industrial pro-
duction passed the 50 percent mark around 1965. In
iron and steel alone Japan surpassed France, Great
Britain, and West Germany in the early 1960s to be-

come the world’s third-largest steel-producing na-
tion. It moved ahead of the United States in the early
1970s and is now second only to the Soviet Union in
steel production. Japan remains the world’s largest
exporter of steel, a remarkable accomplishment for a
country with almost no coal and iron ore resources
of its own.

Although the Japanese government does all it can
to help industries that have a potential for growth, it
has little sympathy for industries that have lost their
comparative advantage. The attitude is that uncom-
petitive industries should not be subsidized, thereby
freeing some of the resources of those industries for
more efficient enterprises. The transfer of resources
from less efficient to more efficient sectors is a key
ingredient of economic progress.

During the 1950s and 1960s, especially, Japan was
quite protectionist in raising tariff barriers against
foreign products. Foreign investment in Japan was
also restricted. The rationale for this policy was that
Japan’s economy was too weak to withstand uncon-
trolled imports and foreign investment. That position
had been eroded substantially, if not totally, by the
late 1980s. Actually, the tariff and foreign-investment
barriers began to fall in the mid-1970s, and Japan is
now a much more open country economically, al-
though probably still not enough to satisfy foreign
critics completely. Much of the frustration of foreign
companies trying to do business in Japan stems from
their difficulty in penetrating the complex marketing
system, and that difficulty often stems from ignorance
of the Japanese and their culture.

The Zaihatsu

Corporate structure has also played a key role in
Japan’s development. When any traditional countrj'
industrializes, it experiences a shortage of capital,
skilled labor, and technical resources. To obtain
rapid growth, resources must be concentrated. Be-
cause there was no model of socialist development
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
for Japan to follow, it was logical for the concentra-
tion of resources to fall into private hands. Hence,
the zaibatsu, or financial cliques, emerged out of
the close relationship between government and
business. By the 1920s ihe. zaibatsu — particularly the
big three of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo-
controlled a large part of the nation’s economic

lAPAN THE ECONOMIC GIANT

351

po^er. The zaibatsii worked through vertical and
horizontal integration of the economy, thus, a sjt^Ie
zaibatsit might have control of an entire operation,
from obtaining raw materials to retailing the final
product The nearest equn’alent in the West is a giant
conglomerate or multinational corporation

The zaibatsu were efficient and provided the en
trepreneurial strength that led to modemiaation Al-
though monopolistic tendencies existed, the impor-
tance of foreign markets and raw materials helped to
keep zaibaisii prices competitive Also, »?en though
much of the nauon’s wealth became concentrated
within a few immensely rich and powerful families,
enough profits from industry filtered down to estab-
lish a substantial and growing Japanese middle class

Efforts by the United States occupation authorities
to break up the zaibatsu were not very successful
Many reemerged after the occupation Tltese cliques,
joined by many other giant corporations outside the
zaibatsu system, played a vital role in Japan’s second
transformation

The Double Structure of the Economy

The resurrection of the zaibatsu has not surprised
the Japanese, a peculiar double structure has long
characterized the economy Basically, the structure
consists of a handful of giant combines, thousands of
tiny workshops, and relatively few medium-sized
firms This structure liad fully emerged by the 1930s
and n'as, m part, the result of a split technology
The leaders of modern industry' followed Western
technology, the owners of small shops were rooted
in the traditional w’ays of old Japan

Because of large outlays for ach'anced techniques,
tlie giant, modernized companies have succeed^ in
great!)' increasing the produaivicy of their labor
force, The medium-sized and small firms have rela-
uvely little capital outlay and rely on cheap labor
(such as women and part-time workers) to make
their products competitive TJie relationship be-
tween the mo lei’els of this economic hierarchy is
close The larger companies job out substantial parts
of their producuon to the smaller firms because it is
less expensive that way.

In the postwar period rapid mdusinal growth, ac-
companied by a sharply decreased rate of popoJauon
growth, has caused a decline of workers in small
industries and agriculture Wages are rising, e\-en in

the small firms, and the double structure of the econ-
omy IS diminishing. Nevertheless, about 70 percent
of Japan's labor force is still employed by small and
medium-sized firms, only about 30 percent works in
the large fimis.

Population Stabilization

The rising standard of living of the Japanese in the
postwar period can also be attributed to the gradual
stabilization of population growth In 1945 Japan
faced the specter of becoming so densely populated
that the quality of life would deteriorate seriously To
control population growth, the government passed a
Eugenics Protection Law in 1948, legalizing abortion
Efforts w'ere also made to spread birth-control prac-
tices, and public education stressed the advantages of
small families Other faaors— mcludirtg more years
of education, later marriages, and the tw’o-child
fiimily — also contributed to a steady decline m the
rate of population growth

Alihou^ the total population of Japan now tops
122 million, the annual growth rate has fallen to
barely 0 5 percent, one of the lowest rates in the
world. Thus, the age structure of Japan’s population
has changed significantly since 1950, with a sharp
decline in the youthful age group and a large in-
crease m the over-65 age group (Figure 15-3) The
total population is expeaed to peak at approximately
136 million in about the year 2013

The Growth of Cities and Industiy

One of the most dramatic dei’elopments of the post-
war era, and one with profound consequences for
Japan, has been the rapid increase m urbanization
and Its concemrauon in a small fraaion of the coun-
try In 1950 there were 62 million farm households,
almost the same number that existed during the early
Meiji era. By 1986 that number had declined to 4 3
million Farm population as a percentage of the total
populauon declined from 85 percent early in the
Meiji penod to about 50 percent in 1945. In the late
1980s It fell to barely 11 percent. Urban population,
in turn, increased. E\en as late as I960, the urban
population accounted for less than half of the popu-
lation, today that figure is around 80 percent Thus,
Japans transformation to a predominantly’ urbanized
nation has taken place relatively recently.

352

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALANn

Age 1950

1986

Males

10 . 6 %

Females

68.5%-

I il' 1 ■ I " -h I L

2040

H 24.

1% h

57.8%-

■£ ■'1 1

■ ■ 1

■

1' 20.9%' • - 1 1

- 18.1% - ■, :

64202466420246

Aged Population
(65 and over)

Productive

Age

Population

(15-64)

Childhood

Population

(0-14)

Million

Million (projection)

FIGURE 15-3

Japan’s changing population pyramid. The percentage of Japan’s population under fifteen
years of age has been declining and will continue to do so for some time. The older popula-
tion, on the other hand, will continue to increase for many years, as it does in highly devel-
oped countries with low rates of population increase and low death rates.

A Striking characteristic of the urbanization in Ja-
pan is the concentration of tliat urban population in
a small portion of the country, in cities scattered
tlirough the core area from I'htakyushu/Shimonoseki
at the western end to Tolryo in the east. In between
are scores of smaller cities, such as Hiroshima,
Okayama, Oita, Takamatsu, Tsu, and Shizuoka.

The urban concentration is most intense in three
huge urban nodes, which are gradually coalescing
into what is called the Tokaido megalopolis
(Figure 15-4), named after an old post road that ran
tlirough the region in pre-Meiji times. The three
nodes are Tokyo-Yokohama, Nagoya, and Osaka-
Kobe-Kyoto. Today, approximately 52 million peo-
ple, or about 43 percent of Japan’s total population,
live in these three nodes. The Tokyo metropolitan
region has 27.8 million; ±e Nagoya region, 8 million;
and the Osaka region, 15.9 million. Thus, well over
half of Japan’s urban population is located in this
megalopolis. If migration and natural population
growth rates continue, 80 million Japanese will live
in die Tokaido megalopolis by the year 2000, making
it one of the largest urban concentrations in the
world (Figure 15-5).

The remaining 69 million Japanese are found pre-
dominantly in other cities scattered throughout the
core region. Tlie few significant cities outside the
core region include Sapporo and Hakodate on Hok-
kaido; Sendai and Niigata in northern Honshu; and
Toyama, Fukui, and Maizuru on the Sea of Japan side
of Honshu. All of these cities are relatively small.
Southern Shikoku and southern Kyushu have no ma-
jor cities, at least in terms of industrial activity.

Fortunately, the growth rate in the central cities of
the Tokaido megalopolis has slowed almost to a
standstill. In the past two decades the trend has been
for the fastest growdi to occur in the suburbs and
satellite cities of the major metropolitan centers, a
pattern analogous to the urbanization in the United
States in recent years. Of course, this trend further
contributes to urban sprawl, which raises major
problems for a land-shy nation.

In Japan, as in most developed countries, indus-
trialization and the declining need for farm labor
provided the major stimulus for urbanization. In Ja-
pan’s case, however, an important additional factor
was the desire of Japan’s business interests and gov-
ernment to concentrate industry, especially heav}^ in-

THE economic GIANT

353

nCOBE 15-4

Urban and industrial patterns of
Japan, of Japan's Industrial
activity is concentrated on the
southern coast of Honshu, paiucu
farly in the three regions of Tofc>T3
Yokohama. Nagoya, and
Osaka Kobe-K^oto These three
conurbations constitute the Tokaido
megalopolis

dustry, in a few areas, most of them near the coast
Concentration was useful to take advantage of econ-
omies of scale, and location near the seashore made
it cheaper to handle large quantmes of imported raw
materials, such as iron ore, coal, and oil Much of the
postwar development of industry occurred on re-
clamied land built along the shoreline of the Inland
Sea and the Pacific coast of the core region

In addition, the Japanese developed kombinats,
or groups of closely interrelated and integrated fec-

tories clustered around one or more large-scale core
factones These complexes are designed so that the
products of one faaory can be easily and efficiently
used by the others. Most of the kombinats produce
chemicals and petrochemicals and t>pically include a
petroleum refinery; others specialize in iron and
steel or other products The kombinats allow huge
amounts of bulky raw materials to move direaly
from ships into the production process, thus elimi-
nating more expensive land transport. In turn, fin-

354

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/NE^^ 2EAI.A Nn

FIGURE 15-5

An urban scene in Tokyo, the
world’s largest metropolitan
area. Population density is
extremely high, traffic congestion is
intense, and living space per person
is limited.

ished products for export can be loaded directly
onto ships. These kombmats have made a major con-
tribution to Japan’s industrial competitiveness. Un-
fortunately, the kombinats have also tended, at least
initially, to be located close to major population cen-
ters, so they became primary causes of air and water
pollution.

The pattern for light and small-scale industij' is
somewhat different; access to overseas sources of
raw materials and coastal sites is not as important a
locational factor in their development. Hence, these
types of industry are more widely distributed in both
urban and rural areas. Indeed, the striking incidence
of part-time farming in the agricultural sector was
made possible, in part, by the distribution of industrj'^
in rural areas, where farmers could commute daily
between farm home and nonfarm job. Many small
towns and nonurban centers around the country
have industrial plants that form important bases for
local economies. This situation is less prevalent,
however, in die northern part of die countr}^ where
die environment for industrial development remains
less attractive dian it is in the soudi.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF JAPAN
INCORPORATED

By die 1970s, if not before, Japan had begun to real-
ize the price it was paying for the development strat-
eg)^ it had pursued since World War II: emphasis had
been on growth in die GNP and on making Japan
number one in the world, at die expense of social
welfare, die environment, and relations widi other
nadons. Japan had achieved an economic miracle,
but the cost was proving to be high.

Regional Imbalances

Ever)'- countr}' in the world has regional imbalances
in its distribution of population and levels of devel-
opment. However, especially sharp contrasts
emerged in Japan, widi its rapid industi'ialization and
urbanizadon in die 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s that had
concentrated in the core region, especially in tlie
Tokaido megalopolis. Tlie population and modern
economy were increasingly concentrated on the out-
ward, or Pacific, side of the nation, at die expense o

lAPAN THE ECONOMIC GIANT

355

the inner side, which looks toward the Sea of Japan
HoWoido, northern Honshu, that part of Honshu fac-
ing the Sea of Japan, southern Shikoku, and southern
K>-ushu, all tended to lose population as massive
movement lo^sard the core took place. In the late
1970s and 1980s, efforts to overcome environmental
pollution in the core region started to take effect and
included the relocation of some mdustry to under-
developed parts of the country Thus, the gap be-
tween the modem, industrialized, urbanized,
densely populated core and “backwoods” Japan be-
gan to narrow. However, the contrast between the
two halves of the country is still striking

Urban Ills

An assortment of urban ills was another by-produa
of rapid economic growth. One problem was caused
by the advent of the automobile society in the 1960s
Cars have enhanced Japan’s prosperity fully 10 per-
cent of the labor force now works in auto-related
jobs However, Japan lacks the space and facilmes to
adequately accommodate its automobiles, and their
impact on the environment, especially the urban en-
vironment, has been devastating Traffic congestion,
noise, parking problems, accidents, air pollution —
all have escalated rapidly. The government has at
tempted to deal with auto related problems by test-
ing drn’ers stringently, enacting what are probably
the world’s strictest auto-emission controls, and
building freew’ays and elevated roadwa>’s

Nonetheless, in spite of improvements, the prob-
lems persist. More than 48 million motor vehicles
Tivre in use in Japan by 1985 Japan's race of owner-
ship of passenger cars, which stood at 23 per 100
people in 1985, is still smaller than that of most major
developed countries and well below the 54-per-lOO
figure for the United States Howe\'er, Japan’s cars are
crammed into a much smaller space, with far fewer
roads (Figure 15-6).

To accommodate huge urban populations, the
Japanese government has developed some of the fin-
est public transportauon sj'stems in the world In fact,
Tolq o functions as well as it does principally because
of the superb public transport sj'stem, which

fortunately — rarely malfunaions. Nonetheless,
demand for public transportation far exceeds capac-
ity dunng rush hours, so commuter trains are

HGURE15-6

Japanese poUcewoman directing traffic in busy Tokyo,
The tradiuonal roles of Japanese women are slowly changing,
reflecting Increasing Western influence

crowded to unbelievable levels, which would never
be tolerated in most devetoped W'estera countries.

Other problems have also arisen in the cities.
Probably the most critical now is the skyrocketing
cost of land and housing The peculiar policy of tax-
ing farmland in urban areas at very low rates has
helped push the price of land up: the cost of land in
Japan’s major ernes increased ninetyfold between
1955 and 1985 As a consequence, the average
middle-class family has to make do with a uny apart-
ment or a house that is far smaller than the average
home in the United States In Tokyo, with the worst
conditions, the aN’erage home was only 724 square
feet (67 square meters) m the mid-1980s. The aver-
age for all of Japan was 896 square feet (83 square
meters), compared with an average of 1,458 square

356

JAPAN AND australia/new ZEAf ANrn

feet (135 square meters) in die United States. In ad-
dition, only 80 percent of die homes had flush toilets;
only 84 percent had private badiing facilities. Critics
have derided the Japanese for having to live in
“rabbit hutches”; affordable, good-quality housing
remains a critical social and economic issue.

Most foreigners are also struck by the seemingly
unplanned, often unaesthetic appearance of Japan’s
cities, especially Tolq^o. Postt^-ar reconstruction
failed to correa the lack of zoning and planning. In
addidon, the eclectic way in which the Japanese have
adopted architeaural styles and superficial Westem-
izauon somedmes gh'es their cides a radier bizarre
appearance. TJiere is also a relative lack of green
space — parks and recreation areas. Yet, on the pos-
itii'e side, Japan’s cities are renovned for their low
crime rates and general civility of life, despite intense
crowding and other problems.

Pollution of the Environment

Of all of Japan’s problems, one of die most infamous
by the late 1960s ^'as emironniental pollution. Until
then, Japan had done less than any other major in-
dustrial nation to protect its natural environment
from the effects of uncontrolled industrial develop-
ment. The most serious aspects were air and water
pollution. Traffic police had to breadie pure oxj'gen
periodically while on duty in Tokv'o’s crowded
streets. Factories, intermingled •vlth houses, emitted
huge amounts of pollutants, leading to an increase in
lung diseases. Organic mercuty-^ poisoning was wide-
spread, as were cases of itai itai (literally “ouch,
ouch”) disease, or cadmium poisoning. And re-
ported cases of the effects of air and v^^ter pollution
on human health were believed to be merely the tip
of die iceberg.

The Japanese government finally recognized the
seriousness of the problem and officially declared
certain areas to be dangerous to human health. Every'
city and prefecture in Japan was affeaed to some
degree. Growing public protest forced the govern-
ment to start taking aaion in the early 1970s, follow-
ing a hv'o-pronged attack. One approach was the cre-
ation of a national Environment Protection Agena' in
1970, along with the allocation of billions of dollars
for fighting pollution. Measures enaaed included the
emission-control standards for cars already referred

to, plus toughened pollution-control measures for
industry'. Significant improvements were made by
the 1980s. For example, the Sumida River, which
flow's through Tokyo and used to be know'n as a
stinking sewer, cleared up to the point that fish were
returning to it. In addition, fishing as an economic
activity has begun to reappear in Tokyo Bay. And Mt.
Fuji is visible from Toky'o more than twice as many
day's a y'ear as it was in 1970. Visitors can also see
improvement in the quality of air and the general
cleanliness of the urban environment. The cleanup is
far from complete, but the Japanese have certainly
made great progress.

Tlte other approach was to try' to shift polluting
industries out of congested urban areas, especially
die core region. This plan, first suggested by the
prime minister in 1972, called for financial incentives
to lure industry' out of the core region and to make
the new industrial areas more desirable places to
live. Major improvements in highw'ay and railway
transportation w'ere to accompany the creation of the
new' industrial zones. For example, a multibillion
dollar tunnel was constructed between the islands of
Honshu and Hokkaido to facilitate linkages with the
north, although there are doubts about its cost-
effectiveness (Honshu and Kyushu were already con-
neaed by bridge).

Problems arose in association with this relocation
plan. A w'ave of land speculation swept Japan after the
plan was announced. There were also complaints
that the plan would merely spread pollution around
the country', and many rural people did not want
polluting industry' in their area. In addition, enticing
private business to relocate proved difficult. The goal
for the period, 1974 to 1985, was a reduction of 30
percent in the total area occupied by factories in the
congested urban areas of the core region. In addi-
tion, 70 percent of the total land area allocated for
new' industrial building was to be located in nets'
industrial zones outside urban areas. These goals
have not been met, although some progress has been
made. Kombinats, for example, are now located as
far north as Muroran on Hokkaido. Japan’s difficulties
in relocating industry' highlight the multitude of ob-
stacles that must be overcome by any country' dealing
w'ith free-market forces. It is probable that substan-
five relocation of industry will prove to be an illuswe
goal for Japan.

tAPAN THE ECONOMIC GIANT

357

Social Problems

Other problems in Japan are less tangible but no less
important Many stem from the vast social changes
tlut have spread through Japan since World War II
Included are the breakdown of the family, the in-
creasing independence of children from parental au-
thority, the rising desire of young married couples to
live apart from their parents and relatives, and juve-
nile delinquency and crime in general (although soil
much below the levels of de\-eloped Western coun-
tnes) Other changes are reflected m the increased
freedom of women in a society where women’s hb-
erauon has been slow to develop, the trend toward
pursuit of happiness at the expense of the work ethic,
and the neglect of older people in a society where
social security has alw'ays been provided by the fam-
ily, not the government By the year 2040 the over-65
age group is projected to account for 24 percent of
Japan's people Most of these problems are insepa-
rable aspects of industrialization and urbanization in
almost any country, but in Japaxi they have taken on
their own special nature

Social inequality is also considerable m Japan, as a
result of the double structure of the economy Em-
ployees in the larger firms, the top 30 percent of the
labor force, reaped the greatest benefits from Japan's
growth through the 1970s A paternalistic relation-
ship between workers and management was very
strong in the larger businesses Workers tended to
stay with a firm for life and to identify with a partic-
ular company rather than with a skill If a person’s
skill became obsolete, the company would provide
retraimng with no loss in pay. Unions, thus, did not
resist new technology, and employers, in turn, had
freedom to shift workers from one job to another,
investing huge sums in training without worrying
that workers would leave the company Labor mobil-
ity was thus extremely low. The large companies re-
warded their employees’ absolute loyalty and hard
work With lifelong security, relatively modest sala-
ries, and gerierous fringe benefits. Those benefits
brought the level of living for these workers up to a
le^’el that was comparable to that of workers In the
United States And the ability of Japanese manage-
ment to extract extraordmary hard work and devo-
tion from employees in the high-growth years of the
1950s to 1970s drew foreign admiration and

spawned a new field of study, Japanese management
techniques

For the maiority of Japanese workers, however, 70
percent or so, life was not so dependable. Their job
security and fringe benefits were far poorer. Indeed,
the high savings rate of the Japanese is sometimes
attributed to the lack of a social security s>’5tem and
tt) the uncertainty of employment for most workers
Thus, many critics have regarded the Japanese system
as one that exploits labor.

In the 1980s this management/labor system began
to show cracks The general slowdown in the econ-
omy forced some companies to resort to layoffs Un-
employment edged upward to almost 3 percent by
the late 1980s, a histone high for Japan Lifetime em-
ployment became less guaranteed, even in the large
corporations Labor mobility was also on the rise,
partly because of young workers’ increasing dissatis-
faaion with the demands that society placed on
them These cracks in the system should not be ex-
aggerated. however. The double structure still basi-
cally exists in the Japanese economy and is likely to
remain there for the foreseeable future Whether the
inequality inherent in that system can be corrected is
problemauc.

Rural Problems

Rural areas have not escaped the effects of modern-
uation, eidier For poUucid and social reasons, farm-
ing has been one of the last sectors of the economy
to modernize. The farmers’ namral conservatism was
reinforced in the late 1940s by the land-reform pro-
gram that awarded tenant farmers the small plots
they had tilled for generations. These smallholders,
farming an average today of only 3 acres (1.2 hea-
ares), have been loyal supporters of the postwar con-
servatiw governments. In return, Japan has offered
its formers higher government subsidies and support
prices for their rice crop than any other country in
Asia has These policies have contributed to the high
food prices that urban consumers pay. A paradoxical
Situation now exists Japan has the highest rice yields
per unit of land in Asia, but its rice is seven times
more expensive to produce than rice that is grown in
the United States.

Even with all of this assistance, farming is still not
profitable enough to sustain a Japanese farm fomily

358

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/NEwI^au^

that uses large amounts of chemical fertilizers and
mechanization. By 1986 only 15 percent of farm fam-
ilies were engaged in full-time farming; 70 percent
earned the major portion of tlieir incomes from non-
agricultural activities. Agriculture has reached the
point where further gains in productivity can be
achieved only by removing marginal farmers from
the land and consolidating landholdings through
such measures as cooperative farming or larger pri-
vate farms. However, progress along these lines has
been slight, because farmers are reluctant to part
with tlteir land — unless tliey are fortunate enough to
be in the path of urban-industrial sprawl.

Japan’s food situation has been furtlier compli-
cated by changes in diet. Food habits have been
partly Westernized, e.specially in the large cities
(Figure 15-7). The Japanese have developed a liking
for items such as beef and otlier meats, dairy prod-
ucts, sugar, and tropical fruits, as well as products
made from wheat and soybeans. However, the coun-
tr)' cannot produce sufficient quantities of these com-
modities to meet die demand for them. As' a result,
imports of foodstuffs have risen dramatically. Japan’s
self-sufficiency in total food supply had fallen to 71
percent by 1986, with wheat, soybeans, and livestock
feed being die principal imported agricultural com-
modifies. Ironically, rice is produced in surplus, and
die government has great problems storing it or try-
ing to dispose of it.

die system is essential, at least for rice farmers, for
three main reasons: (1) agriculture is not only an
economic activity, but is also part of the nation’s cul-
tural heritage and must be protected as such; (2) the
nation needs to protect its food security, for Japan
could not be assured of adequate supplies of rice at
reasonable prices if it switched to reliance on im-
ports; and (3) paddy land, once converted to other
uses, could not be changed back to rice cultivation if
the need arose.

On the other hand, critics of subsidization argue
that (1) Japan is predominantly urbanized and indus-
trialized, and the farmers must accept that change;
(2) the issue of food security is a false one because
Japan’s effective exporting will provide the money
and ability to buy whatever imported foods are
needed; and (3) subsidization is an admission that
Japan has lost its comparative advantage in rice pro-
duction (the same is true with cattle raising and
dairying), and the nation should not prop up an in-
efficient sector of the economy.

Foreign Trade and Aid: International 111
Will

Another problem that emerged with Japan’s success
was a rising tide of antagonism toward its foreign
trade, aid, and investment policies. Japan’s exports

FIGURE 15-7

The familiar golden arches, pro-
viding evidence of changing di-
ets and tastes among the Japa-
nese people. Tire Japanese, not
self-sufficient in food, subsidize and
protect their traditional farmers,
thereby contributing to high prices
for many food products.

lAPAN THE ECONOMIC GIANT

359

FIGURE 15-8

Japanese balance of trade in
United States dollars. Japan’s im
ports and exports remained crudely
balanced dirough the 1970s During
the 1980s. however, the value of ns
exports soared above the value of
Its imports, creating tension among
many of Japan s trade partners
(From Japan 1987 M Interna
tionai Companson (Tokyo Japan
Institute for Social and Economic
Affairs. 1987))

Still account for only slightly more than 13 percent of
the GNP, a smaller figure than tiut of many countries
of Western Europe The total volume of eicpofts,
however, has risen enormously because of the high
growth tales of the economy In 1986 Japan's total
foreign trade came to J336 billion, exports ac-
counted for $209 billion, and imports, $127 billion
The trade surplus of $82 billion was the highest ex'er
The gap between exports and imports had steadily
Widened in the 1980s, bringing increased prosperity
to Japan but creating problems m its relations with its
trading partners (Figure 15-8).

This problem is most critical with the United
States In 1986 Japan’s trade imbabnce with the
United States was a whopping $51 billion, or 61 per-
cent of the total trade surplus for Japan. Clearly, the
United States market is essential to the long-range
health of the Japanese economy, but protectionist
demands in the United States have greatly strained
United States-Japanese relations Critics sometimes
contend that the United States has become an eco-
nomic colony of Japan, it supplies Japan with food-
stuffs and raw materials and, in return, buys vast
founts of tnanufectured. goods The trade imbal-
ance with Japan is also one of the major contributing
faaors to the huge budget deficits that have plagued

the U S economy m ihe 1980s Ai the same time
Japan has become a major investor in the United
States, helping to pay for the budget deficit.

The European Community has not been happy
With Japanese trade either and has used various mea-
sures to resirla Japanese imports — •with limited suc-
cess Similar complaints have been raised by other
major trading partners of Japan, particularly m East
Asia and Southeast Asia Japan is the top source of
imports for China, South Korea, Indonesia, Taiw’an,
Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore (Figure 15-9),
and Japan has a trade surplus with all of these coun-
tries except Indonesia. The problem is complicated
by memories of wartime atrocities committed byjap-
anese military forces, memories that have been re-
vived by the sometimes undiplomatic behavior of
Japanese businessmen and tourists who have
flooded these countries

Japan has also set up overseas operations in these
countries It is profitable to move labor-intensive in-
dustries there, such as assembly plants for electronic
goods, because labor costs are much lower than they
are in Ji^Jan Although many benefits accrue to these
countries, Japanese investments have met with
mixed responses Some critics who espouse the no-
tion of economic nationalism contend that Japan has

FROM OTOMOGO TO TOYOTA

N o industry better tjpifies the extraordinary success of Japan’s post-
t\’ar transformation into an economic giant than the motor vehicle
industry Probably few people have heard of the Otomogo, Japan’s
first mass-produced car back in the early 1920s Probably few have not
heard of Toyota, the General Motors of Japan, the country’s largest cotpora-
tion, and the world’s Ibuith-largest In fust the past tu'enty years Japan has
emerged as one of the top m’o motor vehicle producers, vying for first
place with the United States This industry illustrates well the principle of
comparative advantage and an international division of labor

Japanese entreptenents started experimenting with cars around 1902,
about the same time as Henry Ford and others in the United States How-
ever. the industry had a slow stan m Japan. Domestic cars could not com-
pete with imported ones, espeaally those from the United States. The auto
industry was not then competitive because Japan’s machine-building indus-
try was inadequately developed and the domestic market, in terms of pur-
chasing pon-er, was limited In 1923 the Kamo earthquake destroyed much
of Japan’s automobile-producing capacity, and the government then began
imporung Model-T Fords. Ford and General Motors established subsidiary
plants in Japan m 1925 to 1926 to assemble trucks and passenger
cars — using parts imponed from the United States Imports into Japan aver-
aged 15,000 to 16,000 cars a year by the 1930s Japan’s domestic auto indus-
try' was then diverted, under government direaion, to the production of
trucks for the miliury Modest civilian production continued, mainly by the
rwo major companies. Toyota and Nissan (the laner was one of the zctibaisii
of that ume) Foreign manufacturers were forced to stop production In Ja-
pan in 1940

After World War II, truck production was the first to revi\’e, espeicially
swch the stimulauon provided by Korean War procurements Domestic auto
produaion resumed in 1952, although production w'as small and was lim-
ited mainly to taxis In the early 1950s Japanese auto manufacturers devel-
oped joint ventures with some European producers and borrowed thcir
technology by buymg patent nghts, a common tactic in postwar Japanese
reindustrializatjon In the mid-1950s the Japanese government, through its
Ministry of International Trade and Industry’ (MITI), targeted automobiles
(and motor vehicles as a whole) as an industry with a high growth potential
MITI did all it could to help domesuc producers, by restnaing vehicle im-
ports and foreign investment in Japan and by giving technical advice and
financial assistance to auto companies. The whole motor vehicle indu.^try
took off in the early 1960s

The go\-emment’s income-doubling plan, which aimed to make 1970
per capita income twice that of I960, was hugely successful and led tc» a
surge In domestic demand for autos Foreign markets also grew rapidly, es-
pecially In the United States but also in the European Community. By 1970
Japanese car manufacnirers, with shrew’d foresight, saw’ the potential for

361

TABLE A

Japanese motor vehicle production (in thousands of vehicles).

Year

Automobiles

Motorcycles

Trucks

Buses

Total

1955

4.8

68.8

1970

3,179

3,803*

2,064

47.0

9,093.0

1985

7,647

4,647

4,545

80.0

16,919.0

Sources; Japan 1987: An International Comparison (Tokyo: Japan Institute for Social and Economic Af-
fairs) and Statistical Handbook of Japan, 1987 (Tokyo: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordinalion
Agency).

'Figure is a 1975 estimate.

small, well-designed, fuel-efficient cars, and an industrial legend was begun.
By the 1980s a mystique had developed around Japanese vehicles, even
though the qualip' gap betw'een American and Japanese cars had
significantly narrowed — vanished, some might argue — by then.

The growth in Japanese production of motor vehicles has been phe-
nomenal (Table A). Automobiles increased from just 20,000 in 1955 to more
tlian 7.5 million by 1985; trucks, from 44,000 to 4.5 million; buses, from
fewer tlian 5,000 to 80,000; and motorcycles totaled more than 4.5 million.
More than 90 percent of these vehicles were produced by tlie “big five”
auto companies: Toyota (45 percent of production), Nissan (27 percent),
Honda (10 percent), Mazda (6 percent), and Mitsubishi (4 percent). By 1987
Japan had achieved equality witli the United States in automobile produc-
tion, if not in total motor vehicle production (Table B). In 1986 Japan pro-
duced almost a quarter of all the cars in world production, as did die
United States. In total exports, however, Japan was far ahead of any odier
nation, widi 4.5 million vehicles sold abroad (58 percent of its total produc-

TABLEB

Passenger cars: Production, exports, and imports, 1985—1986 (in thousands of
vehicles).

Country

Production

Exports

Imports

1985

1986

1985

1986

—

United States

8,185

7,827

704

648

4,398'

Japan

7,647

7,810

4,427

4,573

West Germany

4,167

4,311

2,568

2,586

1,312

France

2,632

2,773

1,539

1,551

989

Italy

1,389

1,652

453

603

802

Spain

1,230

1,282

762

721

147

Soviet Union

1,260

—

Canada

1,078

1,062

884

894

1,067*

United Kingdom

1,048

1,019

240

201

1,072

World total

32,449

33,064

Source; Japan 1988: An International Comparison (Tokyo: Japan Institute for Social and Economic
Affairs).

'Figure is for 1985.

'*‘i >

tion) In 1985 Japanese sales of motor vehicles overseas amounted to$43
billion (20 percent of Japan’s ocports)

Tlie automobile has become a major means of private transportation
in Japan Cars, along with trucks and buses, contributed to the decline of
Japanese railroads, in a pattern reminiscent of that in the postwar United
States Thus, the motor I'ehicle industry has acquired the same vital role m
Japan’s economy that it has in tlie United States

The industn' is not without its problems, though Japan is beginning to
feel the pinch of competitors who are chipping away at the country’s com-
paratne advantage, |ust as the United States has felt it since the early 1970s
Newer and lower-cosi producers, such as South Korea, are making some of
the smaller Japanese autos increasingly uncompetitive m world markets,
forcing Japan to move upscale to larger and higher-priced cars

The basic problem is that, with the world auto industry currently turn-
ing out more than 33 million vehicles a year, there is a surplus production
capacit)- of at least 5 million cars, half of which is in Europe Even with the
surplus, however, automobile produaioo is an attractive industry' for many
countries because of its multiplier effea on oiher sectors of the economy
Consequently, new auto plants and new companies continue to be created
around the world, and autos have become one of the most competitive in-
dustries, where comparative advantage is put to the acid test

Japan s auto exports lo the United States have become a politically ex-
plosive issue Beause Japan needs the United States market to sustain the
produaion capacit> of its auto industry', it is now’ opening up assembly
plants in the United States that use parts imponed from Japan The Japanese
hope that this approach will offset proteaionist trends m the United States
and will assure market access By the early 1990s it is estimated that Japa-
nese manufaaurers will have the capacity to turn out a million cars a year
m United States plants In addition, Japanese companies are forming cooper-
ative or joifii-venture arrangements with United States car manufacturers
Similar linkages are also being formed with European carmakers One
authoritative prediction is that by 1995, one m three cars in Europe will be
wholly or partly of Japanese design or will feature major Japanese compo-
wewts Japatv ts also focmvng lovnt vewiuces in a wurobet of other courarres,
such as South Korea, Taiwan, and China Linkages with foreign producers
have uken on a new’ significance in the 1980s, as the auto busmess becomes
more and more internationalized and decentralized With an international
division of labor, cars are increasingly assembled from parts produced in a
number of countries and various locales within countries

For the rest of this century, at least, Japan is likely to remain at the top
in world auto producuon and certainly in exports But the country’s contin-
ued dominance of this vital industry wall require Ute utmost attention to styl-
ing, quality, and price in a brutally competitive environment That attention,
in turn, will require the unique strength of the Japanese management and
produaion s>«tem in the large automobile companies of Japan’s dual
economy.

363

364

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEAUNn

succeeded in creating economically what it failed to
create militarily during World War II: the so-called
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperit\’ Sphere. That is, Japan
is the headquarters of an Asian economic system that
depends on Japanese capital and leadership. The
other Asian countries, in a neocolonial relationship,
provide die cheap labor, raw materials, and markets
for industrial manufactures. Aldiough the Japanese
deny this allegation, there is no escaping the fact that
die economies of the countries of East Asia and
Southeast Asia are increasingly ded to Japan.

Even in the realm of foreign aid, Japan often reaps
more criticism than praise. Although Japan has been
more generous in recent years than the United States
in terms of aid as a percentage of GNP, critics com-
plain that die relatively harsh terms of aid agree-
ments de the economies of die recipient countries
ev'en more tiglidy to the economy of Japan.

JAPAN’S THIRD TRANSFORMATION;

CHARTING A NEW COURSE

As Japan heads toward the di'enry-first century^, inter-
nal and external pressures, many of which we have
discussed, as well as the natural evolution of the
coundy'’s economy and society, are causing the Jap-
anese to seriously reassess their goals. For many
years people have been saying diat Japan needs to
rethink its national strategic and improve its interna-
tional image. That process is under way.

Important structural changes are taking place in
the economy, changes diat are forcing the nation and

its leaders to alter their course. A number of indus-
tries that thrived in past decades are now declining,
and the government is assisting them to diversif)' and
phase out activities that are no longer competitive
internadonally. These “sunset industries” include
shipbuilding, textiles, some chemicals (especially
petrochemicals), and aluminum smeldng. Other in-
dustries are fully mature and are also encountering
difficulty; they are being forced to retrench. The most
important of these is iron and steel, which faces in-
creasing pressure from Third World producers such
as South Korea. Japan will remain a major force in
world steel production and exports, but at a reduced
level. The automobile industry, although still strong,
has also suffered from various problems (see box on
pp. 361-363).

To maintain their competitiveness, the Japanese
are pursuing a number of strategies. First, to placate
U.S. protectionists, they are moving plants to the
United States. Second, Japan is making it easier for
U.S. manufacturers to invest in Japan and market
products there. The decline in the value of the dollar
has lowered the price of goods from the United
States and is having a definite impact on Japanese
imports, which are rising faster than exports. Third,
the Japanese government is stimulating industrj' to
move faster into high-tech areas, where Japan an
maintain a comparative advantage. These new high-
growiJ-i-potential areas include microelearonics,
biotechnology', new materials, and optoelertronics.
For example, the Japanese are already giving the
United States competition in the development of so-
called supercomputers.

SUMMARY: JAPAN’S
SECOND CENTURY OF
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT

We have charted Japan’s economic development through two major eco-
nomic transformations. The first, the late-nineteenth-century transformation
from a feudal state into an industrial one, culminated in the disastrous expe-
rience of World War II. The second transformation was Japan’s postwar in-
dustrial recovery' and expansion into a w'orld economic power. The third
transformation is now' beginning, as a restructuring of the Japanese econ-
omy by sector.

These three transformations should be viewed as separate phases of a
single, ongoing process of development. The third transformation, in fact, is
simply recognition by Japan tliat its modern economy is maturing and it an
no longer be expected to maintain the phenomenal growth rates of pa.st
decades. Moreover, as heavy' industry' assumes a naturally decreased impor-
tance, the economy' shifts increasingly toward a service orientation, just as it

JAPAN THE ECONOMIC GIANT

has in the United States Sentiment is strong within Japan for greater atten-
tion to domestic <»nsumption, in order to reduce the drive for exports The
government is also being encouraged to spend more money on social u-el-
fare, improve housing, develop social security, and take other measures that
will enhance the quality of life rather than simply increasing the GNP In
other words, some Japanese are questioning the goal of being number one
in the world

These processes take time, of course, so Japan’s huge trade surplus is
not going to turn around OA-emight Even when the trend is finally reversed,
Japan will remain a formidable economic giant in world affairs From that is
likely to follow a much greater political and possibly military role in the
next century

KEY TERMS itai itai

kombinats
Meiji Restoration
split technology’

three transformations
Tokaido megalopolis
zaibatsu

secret of development in Australia and
' New Zealand lies in the successful transplan-
J-5. tation of Western society and economy to un-
developed territories that, by accidents of geography
and history', had been largely unknown and un-
touched by the peoples of Asia.

Although Australia and New' Zealand differ greatly
from each other in size and physical environment,
they share many charaaeristics of historical develop-
ment and economic circumstances. Both were estab-
I lished in the late eighteenth century as British colo-
nies for w'hite settlers. Both have large land areas in
proportion to their populations, high standards of
living, and much closer cultural ties with the United
Kingdom and the United States than with most Asian
countries. Both developed prior to World War II as
supermarkets for Britain; that is, they provided many
of the foodstuffs that Britain and the British Empire
needed. That function is still important today, but it is
no longer dominant. New' Zealand remains the more
pastoral and agriculturally based of the two coun-
tries: its high level of living depends on abundant
production of dairy products, meat, wool, and other
animal and forest products (see chapter opening
photo). Australia’s wealth is more diversified, with
rich deposits of metals, coal, and natural gas; a boun-
tiful agricultural assortment of meat, dairy products,
W'ool, w'heat, and sugar; and, increasingly, industrial
manufacmres.

Australia and New Zealand both depend on trade
with industrialized nations to maintain their high
standards of living. For many decades this trade w'as
direaed primarily toward Great Britain and the Brit-
ish Commonwealth. Because of preferential tariff
treatment and other trade privileges, as well as ex-
clusion elsewhere and a lack of real markets in
nearby Asia, it was profitable for Australia and New
Zealand to market their products thousands of miles
away. Since World War II, however, and particularly
since Britain entered the European Common Market,
the overseas relations of Australia and New Zealand
have undergone a metamorphosis. Ties w'ith the Brit-
ish have gradually weakened, w'hereas those with the
United States, Japan, East Asia, and — to a lesser
extent — other countries of Asia have assumed new
importance.

AUSTRALIA

A Vast and Arid Continent

Much of Australia’s development experience is re-
lated to the continent’s physical environment, partic-
ularly its isolation, vasmess, aridity, and topography.
With almost 3 million square miles (7.8 million
square kilometers), including the offshore island of
Tasmania, Australia extends for 2,400 miles (3,864
kilometers) from Cape York in the north at IT S
latitude to the southern tip of Tasmania at 44° S lat-
itude; it extends about 2,500 -miles (4,025 kilometers)
from east to west (Figure 16-1). Although this land
area is approximately equal to that of the lower fort}'-
eight states of the United States, Australia’s popula-
tion is far smaller — just under 16 million. On the
basis of population, Australia is actually one of the
smaller countries of the world. However, even
though Australia’s average density of population is
low, its people are concentrated in a relatively small
part of the continent.

Only 11 percent of Australia gets more than 40
inches (1,015 millimeters) of rain a year; two-thirds
receives less than 20 inches (508 millimeters)
(Figure 16-2). Five major natural regions are distin-
guished on the basis of climate and relief. The core
region is the humid highlands, which extend in a belt
400 to 600 miles wide (644 to 966 kilometers) along
the east coast. In addition to Tasmania, the narrow
and fragmented coastal plains along the base of the
highlands are the only part of Australia that is not
subjea to recurrent drought, and most of the nation’s
population, major cities, agriculture, and modern in-
dustrial economy are concentrated in this coastal
fringe. In the southwestern corner of Australia and in
a band along the eastern portion of the southern
coast, the climate is Mediterranean, or dry summer
subtropical. These areas have the second major con-
centration of population, particularly around the cit-
ies of Perth and Adelaide, but the total population is
still sparse.

The three other natural regions have various dis-
advantages for human settlement, and land use is
confined largely to mining and livestock raising, with
a very low po

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