Keywords

In this chapter, the ideological and philosophical underpinnings of Nigeria’s foreign policy, with the view to identifying its contexts, focus and character, are identified and discussed. These ideological and philosophical backgrounds may have been responsible for a strong African appeal and may have guided Nigeria’s conception and occupation of specific roles in Africa since independence. The philosophical and ideological underpinnings are rooted in the historical experience of the country.

Foundations of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Nigeria has had an interesting foreign policy transition because of the changing nature of its statehood. As a colonial territory, its immediate affinity was with Britain, as it had much less ties to African countries. However, there was a natural closeness to Anglophone African countries which was inevitably so because the British organized their colonies in a web of socio-economic and political existence with little or no choice for the Africans. At independence, with a common unsavory colonial experience alongside other African countries, and with strong historical traditions on its side, Nigeria opted to take on the gauntlet of an African “redeemer” in the face of the vestiges of foreign domination. From civilian to military dispensations, Nigeria remained committed to its belief. It is important to examine the historical factors that shaped the conception of roles by Nigeria and the reasons for this strong pro-African sentiment.

Colonial Heritage

Colonialism had a strong influence in the conduct of foreign relations of modern states, including Nigeria. From the fifteenth century, European conquests and expansion radically altered the institutions and systems of nearly all the world, creating a somewhat homogeneous socio-political culture. Britain was a key player in European colonialism. For Nigeria, it carried on through the British Colonial Office in London Nigeria’s external relations from the time Nigeria acquired a legal personality in 1914. The merger was done principally to promote the national interest of the British colonialists. The country did not have the capacity to enter into and conduct independent foreign relations because of its colonial status (Adeniran, 1985). As the British government decolonized, it created a loose association between itself and all its former colonies called the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly British Commonwealth) to perpetuate the old colonial ties. The Commonwealth originally started with the British colonies in North America. In an attempt to prevent Canada from declaring independence like the United States had done in 1776, and to avert a possible American encroachment in Canada, Britain granted Canada a dominion status with power over the control of its internal affairs within the framework of the British Empire. Thus, the British North American Act of 1867 facilitated the emergence of the Commonwealth of Nations. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Irish Free State along with Britain constituted the original members of the Commonwealth. As early as 1897, they began informally consulting on matters of common interest. In 1921, the Imperial Conference described the Dominions as autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Imperial Conference of 1930 approved a report on how to formalize this new status. The statute of Westminster of 1931 gave full legal recognition to it and the British Commonwealth properly replaced the British Empire (Harris, 1975; King, 1996).

The old Commonwealth therefore symbolized the triumph of British imperialism. According to Harris (1975: 34–48), the colonial origins of the organization indicate that it was not meant to serve the indigenous peoples, but symbolized instead, a defeat of their interests. In addition, security and strategic concerns rather than development priorities dominated its formation. The Commonwealth states, because of their involuntary membership, would support the former colonial masters on any global issue. For instance, when Britain declared war on Germany in 1939, members of the Commonwealth joined and fought on the British side. The membership of India at independence in 1947 altered the composition and transformation of the Commonwealth from a white homogeneous group of five nations to a new multiracial experiment in international cooperation (King, 1996: 72). Three principal features of the group were discernible at this rate, namely: the common colonial experience of members; the stranger factor because of racial and cultural diversity for which the head of Commonwealth, Britain had to give cohesion; and multiple economic and social opportunities arising from such diversity.

Colonial heritage and the arrangement described above have played a fundamental role in Nigeria’s behavior toward other nations since it joined the comity of independent nations. When it joined the Commonwealth, Nigeria associated itself with the challenge of developing new cooperative relationships among nations. Its choice of participation in the Commonwealth has been driven more by the fact that the organization is considered a viable vehicle for pursuing selected foreign policy concerns. Because of its historical importance on the continent, Nigeria is considered a strategic partner in the Commonwealth and the country too sees the organization as a potential avenue to realize its national objective of post-colonial economic transformation and a vehicle to becoming a major voice in the global system (King, 1996: 72–73).

Apart from the colonial heritage of the Commonwealth, the colonial system itself helped in shaping Nigeria’s foreign policy and conception of roles to occupy in Africa. Colonialism was generally harsh, exploitative and discriminatory in nature. The common cruel experiences of colonialism united the Africans and broke geographical and ideological borders as platforms emerged from all corners to fight the common enemy. British colonial system, like the Belgian and French, was particularly divisive. Although the British created a platform for which administrative convenience and economic exploitation could be facilitated, they rather instituted a system that would break any meaningful bond across the boundaries that could spark off a common challenge from the continent (Ikime, 1985). The evil nature of colonialism and its negative effect on African unity and progress thus constituted another major influence on the international behavior of Nigeria and its disposition toward Africa at independence. Nigeria after independence took up the task to purge Africa of all forms of colonialism, because of the legacies of division, disunity and conflict, which negate the principle of African solidarity and collective progress that the founding fathers of Nigeria wished the continent.

An investigation into the colonial heritage in the foreign policy and role conception of Nigeria would be incomplete without identifying the expansion of British influence from the Southwest to the North-central and Northern Nigeria in the second half of the nineteenth century. That spread has constituted a landmark geographical factor shaping Nigeria’s external relations. The need to protect British traders and missionaries in West Africa led to the appointment of John Beecroft as the British Consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra in 1849. In 1851, Lagos was attacked over the issue of slave trade by the British imperial forces, which led to the signing of the unequal treaties in 1852 between the British government representatives and King Akintoye for the safety of British interests and putting a stop to the slave trade. In 1861, Lagos was invaded and annexed by Britain with the King, Dosunmu dethroned. This forceful annexation was immediately followed by the conquest of the hinterland and the formation of the Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria, which were amalgamated in 1914 (Adeyemo, 2002).

The significance of this historical fact is that foreign policymaking powers were delegated to the Governor of Nigeria beginning from the 1914 merger. The Secretary for Colonies delegated such powers to the Governor, who through the 1922 Clifford Constitution to the 1946 Richards Constitution had absolute powers to conduct external relations for Nigeria without consultation with the people. Even when there was power sharing between the Federal and Regional Governments from 1951 to independence in 1960, the executive still had absolute power in foreign policymaking (Frankel, 1975; Idang, 1973). Hence, a foundation by colonial experience had been laid for the Chief Executive and political leaders to have ultimate answer to the questions of role conception, assumption and performance as far as Nigerian foreign policy is concerned. From independence to the 2000s, policy decisions and policy failures or successes were attributed to political leaders and their groups, with the categorization of such policy regimes according to the administration in power, for instance “Gowon’s foreign policy”, “foreign policy of the Shagari administration” or “Obasanjo’s diplomacy”.

Colonial heritage still plays a significant role in Nigeria’s foreign policy today, particularly its policy toward Africa. Nigeria saw and offered itself as the protector of African post-independence sovereignty. It was not clear what the role conception was during or at the twilight of colonialism. The task of foreign policy was exclusive for the Colonial Governor; and the nationalists, no thanks to the divide-and-rule system, were sectionally and ethnically divided but bound and loyal to British overlords. The roles conceived in Nigeria at the time were British roles in consolidating their colonial rule in Africa (Ade-Ajayi, 1980). However, it later became clear from speeches by nationalists that succeeded the British authorities that Nigeria would wish to occupy roles of leadership and voice for the continent. Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa had challenged Ghana’s claim to leadership in Africa when he openly opposed Nkrumah’s radical approach to African union, declaring that Nigeria was too big to follow the course of Ghana or any other nation in the continent for that matter. Balewa had also contended that Nigeria had a more pragmatic approach to post-independence unity in Africa that Ghana should rather identify with (Balewa, 1963). Nnamdi Azikiwe had made the famous declaration that Nigeria had the “manifest destiny” to lead the African continent in view of its vast human, material and natural resources, a combination that no other nation in the continent possessed (Azikiwe, 1961). This role mentality resonated in the foreign policies of Gowon, Muhammed/Obasanjo, Shagari and Obasanjo’s civilian administration, which would be examined in the next chapters.

Ideological Foundations

Ideology engenders political unity and minimizes potential social incohesion. This is because it constructs a psychological and social bond that would make a nation unshakeable in the face of external threats or divisive influences. Such a state would have a behavioral pattern which would make its actions or reactions predictable, and be guided or have a prism by which the group or state determines its world of reality and knows what to approve or disapprove (Northedge, 1976), and by extension, what to conceive as national roles and what not to conceive as national roles. King (1996: 33) views ideology rather as “a major instrument for coping with the stranger element within and among nations”. By inference, ideology, described by Northedge (1976: 46) as a prevailing political orthodoxy or political traditions of a state, closes up social distance and minimizes conflict between groups and nations. Conversely, competing ideologies would create social incohesion, which would make the state vulnerable to external influences and manipulations.

With a high degree of heterogeneity, Nigeria succumbed to competing ideological influences, each playing a part in the posture that Nigeria has taken in world affairs. However, these ideologies have combined to provide a guide to foreign policy or national role conception (King, 1996: 33–51). A number of ideological orientations, which included capitalist/liberal democracy shortly after independence and Pan-Africanism, have informed its western bent and Africa-centered policies, respectively. These have guided Nigeria’s foreign policy across ages. Incidentally, Nigeria probably for obvious multi-ethnic, multi-faith and even multi-class cleavages has not been able to evolve a distinct home-grown ideology.

Nigeria’s foreign policymakers have often on paper resisted ideological labels, contending that no political leader should impose any singular colonial, religious, ethnic or party ideology. Instead, a collective commitment to a set of integrated ideas, values, beliefs and ideals has been advocated. However, the foreign policymaking has always been characterized by the ideological and cultural orientations of policymakers or the political group(s) in power. This eclectic understanding of ideology in national life recognizes the importance of several ideological orientations that have influenced the Nigerian people and politics. It emphasizes the functional value of ideology. The strains of political thought that have influenced Nigeria’s foreign policymakers since independence have been nationalism, Pan-Africanism (Apter & Coleman, 1962) Marxism (Zartman, 1983), or rather “radicalism”, and capitalism (Schatz, 1977).

Nationalism

Nationalism is the most prevalent ideology in Nigerian foreign relations. Nationalism is the ideology of freedom from oppression (Apter & Coleman, 1962: 89; Sithole, 1959) which seeks to create and maintain the nation-state as the ideal political forum (Chatterjee, 1988). The nation-state is regarded as the political unit that enhances the integration of the masses of different peoples into a common political entity, guarantees individual equal rights and political freedoms and provides for the general welfare of the people. Thus the appeal of nationalism has always been that of securing Nigeria’s neighborhood for the purpose of its own corporate existence, and the liberation of African states from colonialism, apartheid and internal conflicts (Kohn, 1954), such as in the case of Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Sudan, and Sao Tome and Principe.

The nationalist fervor in Nigeria’s foreign policy was manifest from independence, when the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa declared that,

In formulating its policy for the conduct of foreign affairs, the Federal Government recognizes that its primary duty is to safeguard and promote the interests of the Federation and its citizens. (Balewa, 1964: 23)

The problem with nationalist sentiments is that the heightened awareness it evokes may channel the people’s attention to differences that could divide as well as similarities and aspirations that can unite. Nationalism can enhance or undermine the stranger factor. This dual possibility makes it both a particularistic and universalistic force (Idang, 1973: 21–25). The range of diversity in Nigeria since amalgamation makes it susceptible to the stranger element that may magnify by nationalism. For instance, the emphasis on a shared ethnicity or ethnic nationalism among the Igbo aided the attempted secession of Biafra in 1967. This had also resulted in many interethnic conflicts and communal clashes, such as the 1987–1990 Dzango-Katarf crisis in Katsina, Ife-Modakeke clashes of the 1980s to early 2000s, the Andoni-Ogoni conflict of the mid-1990s, the Ijaw-Urhobo-Itsekiri conflicts of all time and the Tiv-Jukun (Zaki-Biam) violence of 2003, the Fulani herders-farmers clashes between 2016 and 2022, among others. This particularistic sub-nationalism threatened a fundamental objective of foreign policy, which is the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state. However, the universalistic nationalism (or Pan-Africanism) was more evident in the early years of Nigeria’s independence, which was central in national role conceptions in its Africa policy. This externalization of its nationalism had found expression in its belief and tacit support for the Pan-African union called the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its transformation into African Union in 2001, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the drawing of the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, creation of New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in the early 2000s, African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in the 2000s. While the sub-nationalist phenomenon ravaged the homefront and nearly negated the first rule of foreign policy—preservation of the state—successive governments in the 1990s and 2000s did not allow this to reflect in Nigeria’s international behavior, as it vigorously assumed roles of mediator, arbitrator, conciliator and peacekeeper during this period, with the aim of sustaining the fragile African statehood. The efforts have included the peacekeeping and peace-enforcement initiative through the ECOMOG initiative in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, and its active participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, post-genocide Rwanda, DRC and Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau between 1990 and 2022. It also resulted in unilateral settlement of disputes in Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and the restoration of democratic rule in Sao Tome and Principe.

The specific targets of universalistic nationalism in Nigeria that have shaped its conception of roles to occupy in Africa since independence are colonialism, racism and imperialism (Smith, 1979). The political and economic strangulation of Africans by the colonial powers was also characterized by the practice of cruel racial discrimination. DuBois (1965) had described the phenomenon thus:

There was no Nazi atrocity- concentration camps, wholesale maiming of and murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of childhood-which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long been practicing against colored folks in all parts of the world. (DuBois, 1965: 23)

Opposition to such multifaceted oppression constituted a basic element of African nationalism. African nationalism is also directed at maintaining political independence and engendering economic development, all of which resonated in Nigeria’s Africa policy at independence. Balewa had declared in a speech:

We are seeking not only political but economic independence. It is not our intention to be at the mercy of more powerful states because we need their financial support; so we must have a healthy economy. (Balewa, 1964: 33)

By colonial creation, most African states have within their boundaries peoples from a variety of cultural backgrounds. The intrinsic value of nationalism in Africa, unlike in Europe, was therefore to unite diverse groups with ancient socio-cultural barriers. On the continent, it functions both as an instrument of intrastate and interstate unity (King, 1996: 36). A member of the First Republic Nigerian House of Representatives once observed that,

The nationalism of Nigeria is in fact, internationalism in the sense that, within our borders, Nigeria is a kind of nation of nations, who, if they were confined within their borders, would make larger nations than at least eight of the European countries. In trying to weld all these peoples together into one nation, we are trying in Nigeria to do what on the African level; we would like to do continentally. (Apter & Coleman, 1962: 72)

A common thread in almost all the foreign policies of Nigerian political leaderships from independence to 2007 has been the similarity in a universalistic conception of nationalism. Murtala Mohammed had said that the independence of Zimbabwe was tantamount to the independence of Nigeria, and that any African nation still suffering colonization or racism in form of apartheid was a “slap” on Nigeria’s face as the greatest black nation on earth (Mohammed, 1975). In addition, General Obasanjo in his first time as military head of state had amplified this perspective when he declared that Nigeria considered the racial and social prejudices in the Southern African society as an affront and a challenge to Nigeria’s position as a liberator of the continent from all external oppression (Obasanjo, 1976). Furthermore, the Buhari, Babangida and Obasanjo (civilian) administrations also stressed a universalistic nationalism. Gambari, Buhari’s foreign affairs minister had disclosed that Africa was to constitute the area of primary concern. A pattern of concentric circles could be discerned in Nigeria’s attitude and response to foreign policy issues within the African continent and the world at large (Gambari, 1986).

In spite of the changes in the African situation from apartheid and colonialism, Nigeria’s nationalistic foreign policy still resonated in new challenges of drought, hunger, diseases and cooperation. For instance, Babangida’s universalistic nationalism was clearly Africa-centered:

African problems and their solutions shall constitute the premise of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Self-sufficiency and constructive cooperation in Africa shall be Nigeria’s primary concern. (cited in Adeyemo, 2002: 125)

Despite Nigeria’s many international problems during the reign of General Abacha, the regime continued Nigeria’s universalist nationalism in at least the West African region. While addressing the Nigerian diplomatic community in 1994, Abacha had underlined a strong African nationalism by simply stating: “The problems of Africa are Nigeria’ problems” (Abacha, 1994); a declaration President Obasanjo reiterated when he declared, “we thank God for giving us the capacity to fight for the cause of Africa, and its freedoms from bad domestic leadership” (Obasanjo, 2001). This disposition must have informed the eventful Nigerian diplomatic terrains in Africa at the time, which culminated in the co-founding of NEPAD, APRM and AU.

Nigeria’s consistency in a universalist nationalist tradition is significant. It is therefore pertinent to conclude that the commonalities of colonial hardship, racial discrimination, imperialism and the new challenges of ethnic and sectarian conflicts, drought, poverty, diseases and democracy, among others have compelled policymakers in Nigeria to accord priority to the African cause in definition of roles to assume in from independence to date.

Pan-Africanism

The second major ideological influence on Nigeria’s foreign policy is Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism has a lot of semblance with nationalism (Apter & Coleman, 1962: 89–90). In this case, it is related to universalistic nationalism that has been discussed. The galvanizing factors in Pan-Africanism include racial slavery, racism, colonization, neo-colonial exploitation and apartheid. Pan-Africanism seeks unity among African peoples at home and in the Diaspora and their advancement (Padmore, 1971). Unlike nationalism, Pan-Africanism originated outside Africa. W.E.B. DuBois, an early exponent of Pan-Africanism from the West Indies, succinctly put the idea of the ideology across viz:

The idea of one Africa to unite the thought and ideas of all the native peoples of the Dark Continent belongs to the twentieth century and stems naturally from the West Indies and the USA. Here various groups of Africans, quite separate in origin became so united in experience and so exposed to the impact of new cultures that they began to think of Africa as one idea and one hand. (DuBois, 1965: 71)

A caveat to the realization of the objectives of Pan-Africanism lies in its operationalization: if it must work, then Africans in Africa had a greater role to play than those in the Diaspora. Hence, African nationalist leaders assumed the dominant roles in the early years of the movement. It became the popular instrument of struggle for national independence (Padmore, 1971: 128). In Nigeria, leaders like Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe led the movement. Using his West African Pilot newspaper, Azikiwe popularized the ideals of the Pan-Africanist movement around the continent. At the instance of Azikiwe, a group of West African newspaper editors published the Atlantic Charter and Africa in which they called for self-determination by Africans. They called on the US President F.R.D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to apply clause 3 of the Atlantic Charter to Africa. This clause provided for the right of all peoples to choose their own governments (Padmore, 1971: 131).

Pan-Africanism is itself both an ideology and a foreign policy of state. This is because it is universalistic and when operationalized, involves the engagement of the international public by a state. However, it has also been adapted to consolidate internal unity and development. Some African politicians during and after colonialism localized Pan-Africanism to have a masses appeal for political legitimization and control. They used the universal ideas of self-government, freedom and independence from colonial rule as a catalyst for organizing political movements and building political parties with national outreach. Nkrumah’s Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in Ghana and Kenyatta’s Kenya African National Union (KAU) are a few examples. In the case of Nigeria, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) led by Azikiwe was formed (King, 1996: 38). Azikiwe later became the first President of Nigeria in a Westminster Abbey type of government that succeeded the colonial regime. No wonder then that when Nigeria differed from Ghana in the Pan-African deal to create a “United States of Africa” in the 1960s, it was the Nigeria-Africa policy idea of Azikiwe, which proposed a peaceful or evolutionary approach to African unity that prevailed as the policy decision over Ghana’s radical and militant proposition.

Pan-Africanism, like nationalism, rubbed much on Nigeria’s foreign policy from Balewa (1960–1966) to Obasanjo (1999–2007). The manifestations were not significantly different from what has been identified as the ramifications of a universalist nationalism. This has manifested on an African scale. Nigeria’s posture in Africa and role in engendering peace, progress, unity and development up to the 2000s have been a Pan-Africanist foreign policy. The 2000s have particularly shown this, in view of the Obasanjo economic diplomacy in Africa, and the NEPAD and APRM initiatives.

Marxism

Zartman (1983) posits that Marxism was one of the ideological undercurrents of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Citing the Murtala-Obasanjo example, he argues that although the regime may not have a Marxist orientation by virtue of the fact that the military in colonial and post-colonial African state does not exhibit such ideology, its corrective and reformist tendencies after African independence showed some form of extremism that was Marxian in nature (1983: 56). Marxism is alien to a political system designed by the burghers of the British colonial system. However, as Zartman asserts, Marxism played a prominent role in the young foreign policy of Nigeria from independence. This recalls the point earlier made about the fact that several ideological leanings characterized Nigeria’s foreign policy. Marxism is an attractive ideological system for peoples in developing countries. Its analysis of human oppression and theory of social change culminating in liberation of the masses from poverty, ignorance, class oppression; relief from exploitation and an equitable share of national resources were reassuring to the groups that were laidback. Marx’s view of history is that economic determinism and resultant dialectic materialism characterize human societies, which inevitably leads to class-consciousness and conflict (Feurer, 1959: 6). He however offers hope when he concludes that such era “ended either in a revolutionary reconstruction of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes” (1959: 7).

The Marxist perspective of history stresses the temporary nature of oppression and the ability of the oppressed to change their condition. This is attractive to the nationalists and Pan-Africanists as it endorses anti-colonial struggles of all kinds, including neo-colonialism. In addition, the ideology recognizes the need to upturn the status quo in the state and ownership of production means. When the oppressed take control of both apparatuses, the state would cease to be the “product of the irreconcilabilities of class antagonisms” (Lenin, 1963). The vitriolic opposition of Marxism to European imperialism was apparently a wake-up call in Africa to take over power from the colonial oppressors and the local or petit-bourgeoisie.

As earlier said, it will not be appropriate to say that Nigeria’s foreign policy has ever been Marxist or that it ever transitioned to socialist or communist, even if some scholars allude to the radicalism of some of the regimes in matters of Africa’s interest to Marxism. There had not been any particular leadership that had a leftist or Marxist bent. However, there have been liberal, centrist and social welfarist elements in the opposition parties during democratic rule or in certain military quarters, whose agenda in government had had populist tendencies. The social welfarist leaning (which is sometimes taken as socialist) was exhibited in the Aminu Kano and Awolowo political groups in the First and Second Republics, and in the Gideon Orkar military group that attempted to remove Babangida’s capitalist regime in a bloody coup in 1990 (Williams, 1990). However, the radical approach and support for liberation struggles in the socialist states of Angola and Mozambique by the Murtala-Obasanjo regime in the 1970s, and probably the anti-western posture of the Abacha administration in the mid-1990s, may have accorded Nigeria some Marxist label. The so-called Marxist fervor, which took the form of radicalism, resonated in Nigeria’s Africa foreign policy at some points. According to some scholars, the policymakers had sought the radical Marxist ideals in tackling local and African problems, simply because it was radical and nonconformist. For instance, its policy of support in the liberation struggles of “Marxist” or communist states as Angola, Mozambique or capitalism-exploited Zimbabwe, and armed struggle in Southern Africa had elements of Marxist extremism. Funding, harboring and training armed groups or militants in Southern Africa took the shape of communist struggles in Latin America.

Military rule also sometimes adorned radical postures that smacked of Marxian revolutionary movement, with an antagonistic disposition to any external interference to African or regional issues. The Murtala-Obasanjo and Abacha regimes demonstrated this tendency. The idea from late 1970s to nationalize foreign companies which government took over and the indigenization policy meant to give government some control over productive forces that affected general welfare were Marxist-oriented (Akinsanya, 1983). While this has been described as Marxist, government itself had claimed that the act was in tandem with its mixed economy policy. Again, the adoption of certain Marxist-like principles is also borne out of the fact that government or public ownership of the economy’s key sectors is the only nationalist alternative to foreign control since local capitalists do not have substantial capital to withstand their external competitors.

Liberal Capitalism

Liberal capitalism has also been identified to have underlined Nigerian external behavior. The entrenchment of market forces in Nigeria during colonialism was to have a long-lasting influence on Nigeria’s foreign policy. Britain was a great capitalist nation with the mission from the eighteenth century, to invest excess capital abroad, seek new markets to export surplus goods and acquire sufficient raw materials outside Europe to cater for the huge demands of industrialization (Hobson, 1967). Indeed, capitalism had fired up the tempo of imperial policy and colonization, which gave Lenin the impetus to posit that imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism (1970). In the event of these industrial and colonial policies, the Tubman Goldie-led Royal Niger Company (which became the first example of multinational company in West Africa) was formed in Nigeria. Thus laid was a strong capitalist foundation.

In colonial Africa, foreign capitalists rode on the backs of their home-governments to eliminate local competitors, establish monopolies and thrive on a system of slave and forced labor (Gutkind & Wallerstein, 1976). Capitalism thus manifested the exploitative and greedy nature of colonialism. Although capitalism was cruel, its principles of individual freedom, and non-interference by government, which were contradictory to its cruel manifestations, were utilized by Africans to oppose colonialism. Precolonial and colonial Nigerian societies had thrived on private enterprise. This was supposed to be in tandem with capitalist principles that hold sacrosanct the value of self-interest. The colonial policy to engage government in control was thus a double-standard measure.

At independence, the government of Nigeria did not hesitate to build the fabrics of its economy on native and modern capitalism, namely private enterprise. More importantly, the influence of capitalism is evident in the foreign policy of the country. Some of the manifestations of a capitalist foreign policy have been the indigenization policy and industrial policy encouraging collaboration between local and foreign investors, abolition of excess taxes, allowance of duty-free raw materials for production of export goods, and a reduction of the corporate income tax (Federal Ministry of Industries, 1990).

Capitalism has been more evident in Nigeria’s Africa policy from the 1990s. Successive administrations have placed more emphasis on encouraging African states to explore opportunities for greater economic collaboration with the bigger capitalist states for the purpose of meaningful strides in economic development. This idea is premised on the fact that it is only when African economies become viable enough that they can keep any appearances of imperialism at an arm’s length. The tricks or strategies to reach that height of economic independence lie in what would be learned by such collaboration.

The capitalist orientation was enormous and largely became the prism by which Nigeria conducted relations with the extra-African community. This should elicit some deep reflection. Apparently, Nigeria has a pool of ideological orientations from which it could pick the appropriate instrument to deal with a particular issue, nation or continent. Nationalism offered a galvanizing force to create a great Nigerian nation on whose broad shoulders African states can lean. Pan-Africanism has been the platform on which it creates a bridge with the Diaspora and attempts to forge a cross-continental unity. Marxism compels compassion to “set the captives” of the ex-metroples free; and here is capitalism with which the country can reach out to the developed market economies in an attempt to attain economic greatness in Africa.

Social and Cultural Foundations

Socio-cultural orientations of Nigeria have greatly influenced its foreign policy and conception of roles to fill in Africa. The social and cultural roots of Nigerian foreign policy lie in the ethnic composition of the polity, huge cultural and religious diversity and the influence of the nationals from immediate neighboring countries (Saliu, 2006a, 2006b). Nigeria is made up of over 300 ethnic groups and has a rich cultural heritage. In addition, it is a multi-faith society (Marshall, 2009; Olupona, 1992). The multiplicity of ethnic groups since the 1914 amalgamation gives Nigeria a distinct image in the black world, as the most culturally diverse and yet most nationally cohesive in Africa. Among the groups are also many ethnic elements shared with neighboring countries such as Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. By this, Nigeria’s disposition to its neighbors is measured, peaceful and plays out in friendship, good neighborliness and open borders (Ate & Akinterinwa, 1992), until before COVID-19 when the Buhari civilian administration closed all the borders for about two years. This good neighborliness factor played a role in the neighboring states’ attitude toward Nigeria several times, notably during the Civil War of 1967–1970, when the states around it supported refused to recognize the breakaway Biafra Republic. They also did not align with France, their former colonial master that wanted Nigeria’s disintegration (Stremlau, 1977). The social and cultural affinities coupled with the good gestures of its immediate neighbors have informed its giving the neighbors top priority in its foreign policy “concentric circles” (Saliu, 2005).

Nigeria is strengthened by this cultural diversity and despite of its own many local ethnic troubles; it intervenes in African states threatened by ethnic and civil strife. This multinational and cultural strength has also inspired the country to take the lead in bringing together all peoples of African descent for international cultural festivals, notable of which was the biggest ever Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977.

Nigeria is the most populous black country in the world. Consistently from the 1960s, Nigeria has maintained a lead in population. In the 1962 Census, its population was put at about 55 million. The Census of 1991 figured out over 100 million people, and the 2006 Census puts Nigeria at over 140 million in population (NPC, 2009). The population size is considered by policymakers to have naturally placed Nigeria in the position of a leader in the black world. This self-belief is tenable because demography is considered as a typology or another dimension of power. In proper terms, population size and quality are now considered a measure of another kind of power: demographical power or put differently, the power of numbers (Goldstein, 2001). Some war analysts consider size or number important in war. The size of an army for instance facilitates remobilization and reconnaissance, and inspires fear in the enemy camp (Madiebo, 1980; Waltz, 1959). The size of Nigeria has been instrumental in its role conception and foreign policy from independence. Policymakers draw inspiration from the overwhelming population size because they view Nigeria as so endowed to naturally become the major voice of Africa and the entire black world (Akinyemi, 2005).

Economic Foundations

The economic power or potentials of a state have always given it a leverage in the comity of nations, which in Henderson’s view (2005) could ennoble the state, make it awe-inspiring, increase its voice, enhance its bargaining power or even earn for it enviable role in the international system. The power of oil in the Middle East, for instance, has strengthened the foreign policies of the states and given them not just confidence and a loud voice, but a big stature so much that major powers cannot afford to ignore them. The United States (US) for instance redefined its policy in the Persian Gulf because of the enormity of oil resources that have two symbolisms for the US: its major source of energy and the threat or potential of the Gulf countries to convert oil wealth (power) to unbearable military power (Rosati, 2006). This has been the case with Iran, which seemed to either be patronized or targeted by the US: from the ban on the Iranian President from the UN General Assembly in New York in 2008, President Barack Obama’s declaration of willingness to sit down for talks without preconditions with Iran’s Ahmadinejad (Chossudovsky, 2009), to Trump’s hard-line posture and attack on the convoy of an Iranian General in 2020. In 2008, the American Far-Right and some other sections of the society had expected the ban in view of President Ahmadinejad’s defiance of international condemnation to stop the acquisition and development of nuclear arms.

Nigeria has been the economic powerhouse in West Africa and has shifted positions between the first and second in Africa as the largest economy. With a GDP of not less than $170 billion and as high as $450b annually, it contributes at least 50% of the GDP of the West African region. The GDP per head could be between $692 and $2204 (Macrotrends, 2023). Nigeria has either been the twelfth or eighth largest producer of petroleum in the world. It has the tenth largest petroleum reserves and as of April 2006 became the first African country to fully pay off its debt, estimated at approximately $30 billion, owed to the Paris Club (Onyearu, 2008).

These developments (aside the humongous and horrific security issues in the last 13 years) had made Nigeria, in many respects, one of the most attractive business environments in the world, a fact demonstrated by its substantial trade relationships with the US, China, UK, Russia, France, Japan and the Middle East, these being the major economies in the world. With a booming industry in telecommunications with more than 222 million mobile phone subscribers, it has the fastest growing market in the world, having overtaken South Africa (Premium Times, 2023; Onyearu, 2008: 2).

Nigeria is also endowed in two other economic ways namely, its agricultural prosperity and its size that makes it a viable international market. These factors have made the country strategically positioned in the external community and have been central in the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria. However, the exploitation of these minerals, especially petroleum and natural gas, has been entirely in the hands of western multinational companies and some private individuals exploiting it, putting Nigeria in a weak position. Secondly, the country depends largely on petroleum revenue for growth and development. The petroleum revenue accounts for 6.9% of the GDP. As the production of oil increases or decreases, that of the other minerals steadily decline and no substantial effort has been made to reduce the imbalance. Thirdly, since a substantial quantity of the minerals is unexplored and unexploited, there is no way of assessing their actual and potential amount and worth for planning purposes. Consequently, although Africa has been the cornerstone and centerpiece of its foreign policy, Nigeria’s external trade record shows clearly that there has been very little trade and economic interaction between it and other African countries. For instance, Nigeria’s trade relations with other African countries from 1974 to 1983 were quite small in comparison with the value of its global trade (Adigbuo, 2005). In recent years, 9% of Nigeria’s world exports have been to the rest of Africa. The main destinations are ECOWAS, CEN-SAD countries, South Africa, Egypt and Cameroon (Tralac, 2020).

Precolonial Nigerian economy was self-sufficient for the survival of the autonomous states and kingdoms at the time. The self-reliant precolonial economy was disorganized by the advent of British imperialism. The impact of the nineteenth-century Industrial Revolution on Europe and the resulting British imperial interests in Africa caused a shift from the slave trade to the establishment of a “legitimate” market for its industrial goods and a quest for raw materials (Shaw, 1983). The imperial economic needs led to a shift from food production to cash crops needed to feed British industrial concerns. This led to the transportation of Nigerian cash crops like cocoa, palm oil, rubber and groundnuts, to mention but a few, to Britain. To facilitate the trade, the British currency was introduced into the Nigerian market. The immediate outcome of these measures was the conscious integration of the Nigerian economy into the world capitalist system. To further strengthen the imperial economic stronghold in Nigeria, the Limited Liability Act of 1862 was introduced to encourage the influx of British firms. By 1920, British trading companies like the United African Company (UAC), United Trading Company (UTC), Paterson Zochonis (PZ) and John Holt had already dominated the Nigerian market. The formation by these foreign firms of a trade organization called West African Merchants reinforced their dominance in the import–export market and virtually eliminated the indigenous traders. Long before Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the country had been reduced to a cash crop-producing estate in which the British Colonial Office determined what should be produced, their prices and their export. This made Nigeria a British economic appendage divorced of any industrial development, technologically deficient and without capital accumulation in the country. The situation remained the same with the discovery of oil. There has even been a severe dependence on oil and associated dependence on Western corporations, investments, technology and skills (Adigbuo, 2005: 135).

On the economic foundation of colonies, what Hatch (1970) terms the economic undercurrents of British imperialism, certain new economic features appeared in the African colonies, but the basic fact of economic dependence had not altered. In some ways, indeed, it was strengthened. As colonial governments were commanded by the metropolitan powers to pay their own administrative expenses, thereby encouraging the production of cash crops to provide export revenues, so not only “commercial profits but government revenues themselves came to depend on prices determined outside the continent”. Moreover, he emphasizes, as political power involved control in economic legislation and regulation, colonial governments often under orders from their masters in European capitals could subordinate the “interests of their subjects to those of the merchants, manufacturers and financiers of Europe. It was no objective of colonial rule to undermine the foreign dependence of colonial economies or to replace them by independent, self-propelling economies” (Hatch, 1970: 203).

Hatch (1970: 204) further emphasizes that, when the British government first used its diplomatic and military weapons to establish political control over Nigeria, a number of economic factors shaped the decision. With the attainment of independence, this economic dependence substantially constrained Nigeria’s range of foreign policy choices and subsequently affected its performance in Africa. Nigeria as a peripheral appendage became subservient to and dependent on Britain and other advanced capitalist states for its economic survival. This dependency syndrome eventually killed innovation, reshaped consumption in tune with what obtains in the advanced capitalist societies and predisposed the discrimination against home-produced goods by Nigerians. All inherited colonial ideas, social structures and political institutions have tended to reinforce and therefore perpetuate this economic way of life. The dominance of Nigeria’s external trade by Britain and member countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) from the early 1960s is obvious. Even by the mid-1960s 70% of Nigerian imports came from Western countries, while 90% of the nation’s exports went to the West. The Soviet Union’s share of the trade was merely 4% of imports and 1% of exports. The rest of the world accounted for 25% of imports and less than 10% of exports (FOS, ; Akindele, 1986). The Western stranglehold on Nigeria’s foreign trade was made possible and reinforced by Western domination of external investments in the country.

While the post-colonial economic wealth, abundance of mineral resources, huge market potentials and rich agricultural environment have brought their own blessings for a comfortable leadership role in Africa, the colonial economic foundation rather had negative consequences for Nigeria’s foreign relations. An inevitable consequence was the heavy dependence of Nigeria’s economy on the fortunes of the west. The Nigerian leadership believed that the most effective means of achieving national economic and social development objectives was to develop the economy along Western lines (Adigbuo, 2005: 136). It can be argued that Nigeria’s contribution to the liberation efforts in Africa would have been more far-reaching had Nigeria not been situated in the same ideological camp as forces and nations responsible for the territory’s economic and political subjugation and had it not been helplessly tied to the aprons of the former colonial masters as the African countries it wanted to lead.

Economic interdependence always constitutes a setback toward effective role assumption, as it erodes independent decisions of states. For Nigeria, the problem of its economic dependence on the western nations continues to affect the country’s policy in Africa. For instance, the Nigerian government was in a terrible dilemma in contemplating economic sanctions against the west on some cases like the Southern African liberation struggles, since according to them it would be against the Nigerian national interest to do so (Adigbuo, 2005: 138; Nnoli, 1978). Nigeria was wary of initiating policies that were likely to trigger sanctions from its western friends who definitely discountenanced certain lines of action against South Africa. Nigeria from the 1980s to 2006 had taken the face-off with Cameroon over Bakassi with a diplomatic disposition and had been cautious not to appear as an imperialist in West or Central Africa, probably more because of France’s likely reaction.

The implication of all the above is the crossroads these would spell for policymakers in conceiving national roles to play and policies to formulate at such dicey and delicate moments, in spite of the ennoblement of its enormous economic wealth. However, the economic capacity of Nigeria still inspires the kind of foreign policy made. Indeed, aside the diplomatic ingenuity behind the historic leadership roles played which have accorded honor to Nigeria on the African continent, the wealth of the country has also been a factor for the aggressive and capital intensive roles in West Africa and the entire continent in the 1990s and 2000s. Nigeria under Babangida, Abacha and Obasanjo pursued peacekeeping and conflict resolution missions that cost Nigeria over tens of billions of dollars. The country also could afford to give loans to other African states, including Ghana and Sao Tome between 2001 and 2005 (Akinbola, 2006).

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Objectives

The US State Department (2023) defines foreign policy objectives as “how a country uses different strategies to guide its relationships with other countries and international organizations”. It can also be described, as “the state of affairs that a state feels is most important in its national interest in a particular situation” (Said et al., 1995). Holsti views foreign policy objectives as an image of a future desirable condition that governments aspire to bring about by wielding influence abroad (1987).

There are traditionalist and non-traditionalist views of foreign policy objectives. The traditional foreign policy objectives conform most of the time to the realist typology namely, security, autonomy, wealth, status and prestige. The non-traditionalist view is related to a state’s foreign policy orientations and specifically its national roles. These normally include promoting value-based objectives, such as social justice, human rights, majority rule and support for military actions for independence or any other positive end. Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives took into account both the traditionalist realist view and the non-traditionalist liberal model, conforming more to Holsti’s three-level analysis of short-, medium- and long-term foreign policy objectives (1987: 233).

The Nigerian foreign policy objectives are derived from Chapters 2, Sect. 19 and Sub-sections A-E of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999: 13). And they clearly stated as follows:

  1. i.

    promotion and protection of the national interest;

  2. ii.

    promotion of African integration and support for African unity;

  3. iii.

    promotion of international cooperation for the consideration of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all manifestations;

  4. iv.

    respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and

  5. v.

    promotion of a just world economic order.

The first objective is open-ended as it is not clear what the country’s national interest is. This has been discussed in Chapter 2. There is no document in which such interests are clearly spelt out or broken down. The United States has its national interests clearly stated in several public documents, including the documents of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID, 2006). National interest begins with a democratic process by bringing together representatives from a cross-section of society, including the elected representatives, civil and public servants, legal professionals, university and higher institution scholars, businessmen, military, artisans, market women and all other stakeholders, to a roundtable to articulate national interest. National interest should not be the duty of government alone, or a group of political party loyalists, or military dictators. The task of the congregants would be to look at issue from their own perspectives, as the sum-total would be aggregated to come up with what is all encompassing and “national’ in outlook. Such articulated interests would be documented and would include interests that would be both domestically and internationally pursued. Indeed, whether domestic or foreign interests, all the nation would do in its foreign policy would be to put up an external attitude, relationship and policies that would work toward the realization of the national interest. For now, Nigeria is far from this, and this may have explained bungled diplomacies, and non-strategic role conceptions in some cases.

The second objective has a dual role, which is the promotion and active involvement in integration of African nations. The African cause coming just after the objective of ambiguous protection of Nigeria’s national interest shows the place of importance Africa occupies in the Nigerian worldview. It is instructive to note that the concentric circle approach to foreign relations is vividly discernible in the five major objectives of Nigerian foreign policy. The first objective shows the commitment to Nigeria, the second objective encapsulates the second and third concentric circles committing Nigeria to West Africa and the continent, respectively, and the third, fourth and fifth objective underlines Nigeria’s fourth concentric circle, which is a commitment to the world.

Apart from the Constitution, the objectives are also evident in public speeches or addresses of political leaders. At independence, Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives declared by the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa were properly speaking, African policy. The declaration was full of innuendos of responsible national role conceptions. The goals included:

  • The termination or eradication of all forms of colonialism or colonial rule in Africa.

  • Eradication of racial/apartheid policy in Southern Africa, most especially Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

  • Commitment to functional cooperation with a view to promoting African unity.

  • Promotion of peace in Africa and the world.

  • Promotion of human dignity, especially the dignity of the black man.

  • Promotion of economic development and redressing the existing disequilibrium in the international political and economic system.

It is pertinent to mention here that the second goal depicting the concern for and the subsequent practical steps to create an apartheid-free Southern Africa was the defining moment for national role conceptions in Nigeria-Africa relations after independence. Nigeria, for the first time, identified, clearly defined and effectively occupied significant roles in the Southern Africa regional struggles.

Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives were reinforced by the recommendations of the military-appointed Adedeji Committee on the Review of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy. These objectives not only served Nigeria’s national interest, but were also a guideline that Nigerian functionaries conformed to, and regarded as their national role conceptions or principles. It is uncertain whether Nigeria appreciates the limits of its power in its conscious effort to be an effective leader of Africa. Aluko (1981) cautioned against two particular errors based on economic and psychological misperceptions, namely:

To cast for Nigeria a role in world affairs that is clearly beyond our means [and] the psychological error made by most Nigerians in and outside government that because of the size, population, and the agricultural and mineral resources in the country we are destined to lead Africa. (Aluko, 1981: 56)

Aluko may be right on the thesis of error of judgment. Nevertheless, Nigerians in and outside government pride themselves as “giant” because of these fortunes of nature, and remain essentially boosted by these factors as they articulate national interests and conceive foreign roles in Africa.

Basic Principles of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

The objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy are informed by a national creed or principles that Nigeria firmly upholds as a sovereign nation. Such principles, like King (1996: 45) posits, are consistent with the ideological framework previously examined. The conception of national roles, formulation of policies and conduct of external relations are thus inextricably controlled by these basic principles. The principles have been declared, discussed or analyzed at various times (Adeyemo, 2002: 94–95; Balewa, 1964:56–58; Garba, 1977; King, 1996: 45–51; Obasanjo, 1976). The fundamental principles are geared toward protecting and advancing the so-called national interest. The principles include:

  • Respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of nation-states.

  • Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

  • Promotion of African unity through functional cooperation.

  • Elimination of colonialism and racism and the promotion of world peace.

  • Non-alignment in the Cold War struggle between superpowers and their allies.

The first principle, respect for territorial integrity of sovereign states is informed by the idea that Nigeria’s ability to defend its own sovereignty is strengthened when states respect each other’s territorial integrity. Respect for territorial integrity assumes added importance in Africa where arbitrary and artificial boundaries created are subject to dispute, to engender continental and national stability. Balewa had opined that such boundaries

should be respected and, in the interest of peace, must remain the recognized boundaries until such time as the people concerned decide of their free will to merge into one larger unit. We shall discourage any attempts to influence such communities by force…since such interference could only result in unrest and…harm to the future of this great continent. (Balewa, 1964: 56)

Ethnic groups in Nigeria are by colonial design cut into other geographical entities surrounding the country. For example, the Yoruba of the Southwest are divided between Benin and Nigeria. The Efik-Ibibio, Ejagham and Ogoja peoples also straddle the borders along Nigeria and Cameroon; just as the Hausa-Fulani, Shuwa Arabs and Kanuri in the North also straddle the borders along Nigeria-Niger and Nigeria-Chad. Thus, using ethnicity as a basis for national identity would, for Nigeria, spell doom, and as such, Nigeria has since the OAU Cairo Resolution of 1964, remained committed to respecting the borders around it (Zdenek, 1977). This respect has earned for Nigeria trust from smaller neighbors that there are no expansionist intentions (King, 1996). Cameroon is the only exception, as it had from the 1980s to the 2000s strongly insinuated Nigeria’s planned military and political expansion. This suspicion was fueled by Nigeria’s diplomatic and military row with Equatorial Guinea, the controversy over ownership of the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula, and the surreptitious and underground French incitement against Nigeria’s restless attitude in the Bights of Benin and Biafra (Oguntuase, 2014).

The second principle, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states complements the first. Non-interference is not the same as non-intervention. Interference itself literally means an unwelcome involvement of an external or a second party in the national affairs of a sovereign state. Intervention, however, is an acceptable development in international politics to help a state restore peace or to save a nation from an internal crisis that is becoming externalized or a huge humanitarian concern (Pogoson, 2006). The global community and African Union’s presence in Sudan is, for instance, the case of intervention which the United Nations tacitly sanctions (UN Charter, 1945). The case of interference, however, has been the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 with the purported mandate to “Free Iraq and establish a democratic government of the people” (Rosati, 2006). The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an undue interference and basically a pursuit of its own strategic interests.

The principle of non-interference is one that Nigeria has not been able to fully enforce in the face of the overriding interest of the major powers, especially when African states cheaply seek help from the powers in tackling domestic issues. For instance, Hissene Habre deflated the Kano Accord of 1979 establishing a Transitional Government of National Unity in Chad in the face of national crisis when he quit the peace arrangement to pursue a cause of toppling the entire regime. Habre sought and got the aid of the US, Egypt, Sudan and France to topple the transitional government of Weddeye in 1982. Weddeye courted and got Libya’s Gaddafi to oust. Habre to restore himself in 1983, and thereafter, there started a wild goose chase between the two as one party overthrew the other with the help of foreign nations (King, 1996: 47). Chad had thus become a client state. Nigeria became concerned because Chad, by its clientele disposition to major powers, posed a serious security risk to its Nigerian neighbor. The same goes for Benin, Cameroon and Niger, who had France’s military presence and looked up to that colonial power over every little domestic problem. It was only recently that the Nigerien military seized power, sacking the democratically elected government and sensitizing the populace on the need to kick French troops out of Niger and keep French neo-colonial control off the land (Kulkarni, 2023).

However, Nigeria upholds this principle of non-interference as it relates to its African counterparts. It has not had a case of undue interference in the affairs of other African states. However, it has intervened at critical moments on many occasions. Among such instances were the unilateral and subsequent multilateral intervention in the Liberian crisis from 1990 to the restoration of democratic rule in 2005, the engagement of the Sierra Leone warlords from 1994 to the eventual stabilization of the hitherto fragile democracy in that country in 1999. Other cases of Nigeria’s legitimate intervention were the resolution of the political crisis in The Gambia by the Obasanjo administration, containment of the military attempt to dislodge the democratic government of Sao Tome and Principe, and the diplomatic resolution of the Togo and Congo crises in the early 2000s.

The third principle, African unity, like the first and the second stems from the nationalist and Pan-Africanist ideological orientation of its foreign policy. Promotion of African unity as a cardinal principle of Nigerian foreign policy is a cause to be approached committedly but pragmatically—for, as Balewa put it—an understanding of one another by Africans is the first practical step to be taken before political union (Balewa, 1964: 159). This cautious disposition to African unity had characterized Nigeria’s contribution to the creation of the OAU in 1963.

Nigeria’s African unity principle was tested when the Civil War that erupted over the secession of Igboland or “Biafra” in 1967 nearly tore it apart. The government of the day fought resiliently with the firm resolve to keep Nigeria together as an indivisible entity. After the war, Nigeria played a central role in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. This symbolized the fact that Nigeria believes in continental unity through functional cooperation. Nigeria also stood firmly behind Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in their liberation struggles and wrested them from the western clutches and chessboard used to perpetuate internal division. The support is borne out of the fact that the nation realizes that an unstable and a hostile international environment has to be confronted headlong if the agenda to build unity is to be realizable. The statement made by Balewa in the 1960s about Nigeria’s own agenda for African unity which other nations, including Ghana, should identify with seemed prophetic, as the Obasanjo administration from 1999 charted a new course and led the new vanguard for African unity. The efforts manifested in the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 1999, which replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The repositioning of the African organization was considered important to meet the many new challenges of the continent, including war and conflict, hunger, poverty, diseases, global warming, neo-colonialism, democracy, globalization and more (Obasanjo, 2001).

The fourth principle, elimination of all appearances of colonialism and racism is again premised on its ideological background of nationalism and Pan-Africanism. One of the manifestations of racial hatred and discrimination was the evil of colonialism. Both pose a serious threat to African and black progress and unity. Nigeria thus considers itself burdened by the role to, like Balewa said “do anything towards the liberation of African countries” (1964: 161) and with the responsibility to, according to Shagari (1979) “bring about the…rapid emancipation and development of all of the countries of Africa” and “ensure that all the oppressed peoples of Africa regain their freedom and dignity”. The last phrase “oppressed peoples regain their freedom and dignity” suggests that Africa would face “colonialism after colonialism” or like most Global South scholars have often put it, “neo-colonialism” which is meant to perpetuate and accomplish the long-range objective of colonialism which is political and economic servitude (Ake, 1983; Rodney, 1972). The successive political leaderships in Nigeria continued the crusade to end or at least discourage re-encroachment of colonialism through new strategies such as foreign aid, and cultural and ideological instruments. The Abacha regime was particularly anti-west, and carried out sweeping reforms in the main sectors of the domestic economy, while the Obasanjo administration attempted to promote a level-playing field with western economies through equal partnerships and foreign direct investment (Saliu, 2006b). On the African platform, the Babangida, Abacha and Obasanjo administrations led the debt reduction crusade to deflate neo-imperialism that was crystallized by the debt overhang (Saliu, 2006b: 124). Not all these efforts however meant that there were no other contradictions that still kept Africa in the economic and political gridlock of the developed nations. African states still had foreign partners with whom there was economic understanding and from whom they still got grants and loans. Some other African states were still tied ideologically, militarily and economically to their former colonial masters. Even Nigeria that was championing the course of total emancipation from neo-colonialism was still guilty of taking facilities from the Breton Woods and subjecting itself to the conditionality from the financial cartels (Akinyemi, 2008).

Non-alignment is the fifth major principle guiding Nigeria’s foreign policy. Fresh from independence, this was the primary norm guiding the foreign policy. Non-alignment as a principle is the idea by a group of states not to take sides during the Cold War, with either of the feuding ideological powers. It is distinct from neutrality in that it implies an active participation in international affairs, but such participation would not go beyond mediation and reconciliation levels in the face of East–West conflict. The judgment of issues would be based on their merits rather than from predetermined positions. For Nigeria, the “power-show” and ideological rivalry between the US and Soviet Union was considered irrelevant to the advancement of its national interest (Aluko, 1973). In the Niger coup of July 2023, Nigeria led other West African countries in ECOWAS to issue a deadline for the coup plotters to leave without which force to remove them was not ruled out. This action precipitated a reaction from Niger and three other countries military-led nations, which seemed to be having the backing of Russia. There is a popular perspective that while the four West African allies were in the Russian camp, ECOWAS seemed to be acting a script from France, US and UK, the old leaders of the capitalist bloc. Non-alignment was thus compromised by both Nigeria and the feuding African nations over the Niger coup. Niger and West Africa thus appeared to be the new battleground for the furtherance of the old Cold War objectives.

Nigeria favors the principle of non-alignment because it makes it more assertive and boosts its foreign policy objective of being a regional power. The principle discourages dependency in foreign policy by asserting the right to define and exercise options in international affairs free of ideological impediments, and helps in the shattering of unhealthy colonial ties and orients the country to develop new relations toward developing countries with whom Nigeria would likely share a wider scope of common concerns. However, several scholars perceived that Nigeria was not as non-aligned as it claimed on paper. The Balewa administration was considered to pursue pro-west and anti-east policies. These pro-west images were possibly a result of Nigeria’s colonial experience, during which educated Nigerians were socialized into western values (Philips, 1964). In addition, Nigerians were nurtured in all aspects of western life, albeit primarily of the British variety, during the colonial period. The policy actions commonly cited to substantiate the claim that Balewa was pro-west were summarized by Anglin (1977) as “delaying the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; imposing restrictions on the size of the Soviet mission in Lagos, on travel to Soviet bloc countries (especially for study), and on the importation of communist literature; discouraging Soviet bloc aid and trade; proposing a ‘two-China’ policy and supporting India in its dispute with China”. The other reasons he outlined were Balewa’s conclusion of a defense pact with Britain, permitting the establishment of “secret NATO radio station” in the country, refusing to attend the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, adopting a policy of silence on Cuba and Berlin and the resumption of US nuclear tests. The other policies were collaborating with the neo-colonialists in the Congo and opposing the creation of a union of African states (Anglin, 1977: 248).

Though the Balewa administration later reversed some of these policies, the initial anti-communist policies created doubts as to its sincerity in the espousal of a non-aligned policy on East–West issues. The amended policies included lifting the bans on travel to the USSR and on Soviet literature. The defense pact with Britain was abrogated following a series of domestic protests. Trade and cultural links with Eastern European countries were marginally opened. Following the Nigerian Civil War, it is reasoned that the state learnt a lesson about the danger of relying on one power bloc or on the same group of countries. The Nigerian government quickly discovered that the traditional suppliers of arms, the UK and its allies, were not reliable: the US absolutely refused to sell arms to the Nigerian government during the war (Ogunbadejo, 1976). The “Biafrans” had succeeded in manipulating the west by an effective propaganda instrument that Nigeria was carrying out acts of genocide on them. In addition, Britain and its allies had their own interests: for these two reasons, they were not in a position to respond positively to all of Nigeria’s military support requests. Hence, Nigeria had to turn to the Soviet bloc for assistance, which came immediately. With the backing of Soviet Union, the concepts of dependence and non-alignment took on new significance for Nigerian leaders. The west was unreliable and the east was helpful (Adigbuo, 2007; Aluko, 1981). The two scenarios created here demonstrate the weakness of the non-alignment principle in Nigeria’s foreign policy and the risk of inconsistencies this portended in national role conception.

The principle of non-alignment formally characterized the foreign policies of the regimes up to 1993. In practice, it was rather the opposite. For instance, the Murtala-Obasanjo regime, despite the non-aligned posture, identified more with socialist states and openly confronted the capitalist world. The Shagari and Babangida administrations embraced western states and the latter even put up an economic diplomacy that would engage western investments in the domestic economy. The Abacha regime effectively ended the era of alignment with the west, as it began to show a bias for the isolated nations of the Middle East and socialist bloc from 1995 (Fawole, 2004; Saliu, 2006b). However, Obasanjo’s administration identified with the cause of non-alignment, but by this time, there had been a momentous questioning surrounding the continued relevance of non-alignment in the face of a globalization orchestrated by the west, and more controversial was whether the nations had ever been truly non-aligned. The nature of capitalist economic development from the 1990s to date of some of the founding fathers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), such as Indonesia and Egypt; and the socialist economic development of Yugoslavia and Tanzania further raised the need for a refocusing of the NAM (Goldstein, 2006; Ojo & Sesay, 2001).

Character of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Nigeria’s foreign policy has always been characterized by some basic elements namely: secure neighborhood and good neighborliness, the African centerpiece, and a rather ironical political realism that exhales through soft power. These three show an intrinsic paradox in Nigeria’s role perception. Promoting good neighborliness and secure neighborhood may be central in accomplishing the national objective of regional peace and thus creating an auspicious business and economic environment for national development. The African giant or big brother posture, which sounds like realpolitik, actually plays out or is earned by soft power such economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy (music and film entertainment) and expanding Nigerian communities in most countries of Africa. However, the perception of Africa as cornerstone of its foreign policy would—and indeed has—engender(ed) the conception of national roles that may not be in agreement with its national interest. For instance, the copious financial, material, economic and military aid to other African states in the midst of domestic economic and security crisis is, to say the least, harmful its national interest. A quick discussion of these features would follow.

Secure Neighborhood and Good Neighborliness

Five basic policies that a state may adopt toward its immediate neighbors have been identified (Blake & Barck, 1966). These are: neutrality, alliances, annexation, expansion and good neighborliness. Nigeria has had the option to adopt the expansionist or annexation policy, particularly at those times when its neighbors were troublesome and terrorizing its border communities, but it chose good neighborliness instead. Nigeria’s neighborhood has Cameroon bordering it to the east, Benin to the west, Niger to the north, Chad to the northeast and Equatorial Guinea just below the Bight of Biafra on the Atlantic Ocean to the south. Although not sharing boundaries with them, Togo, Ghana and Burkina Faso can also be viewed as immediate neighbors because of geographical propinquity. However, all the neighbors sharing land borders with Nigeria are former French colonies. France is not a trusted ally and often uses those neighbors to watch Nigeria and keep it in check. A former British colony with huge economic and military potentials with an ambitious Africa-centered policy cannot be trusted with smaller and poor Francophone countries around it. Although smaller and poorer with weak economies and military, they have important resources. Benin (cotton), Cameroon (oil) and Niger (uranium) are too precious to leave at the mercy of Nigeria and its foreign partners.

Being distinct from Nigeria in colonial heritage and ideological orientations, and owing allegiance to their former masters, the immediate neighbors could compromise Nigeria’s security. A peculiar example is the unique neighborliness Cameroon offers. By the defeat of Germany in the First World War, its colonies, including Cameroon were handed over to western colonial powers victorious in the war. By an international agreement, Cameroon was divided into two with the British and French taking the parts. Britain had western Cameroon, which was administered along with Nigeria, and the French got the eastern region. At independence, a controversy over the status and control of British and French Cameroon resulted in a UN referendum in 1961. Southern Cameroons voted to join French Cameroon while Northern Cameroon chose to remain in Nigeria. The wish by northern British Cameroon to remain in Nigeria was granted, making Nigeria to integrate a good number of Cameroonians (Aluko, 1981: 281). However, Nigeria-Cameroon relations have not been the best as the relics of British–French colonial and ideological feud still remains.

Given this background, Nigeria believes that being good to and maintaining a cordial relationship with its neighbors is the surest way to earn their trust, confidence and ensure its own security. Nigeria’s national security is thus premised on good neighborliness (Fulani, 1989). The good neighborliness disposition of Nigeria is further reinforced by the Civil War experience, when none of its immediate neighbors allowed the use of their territories for anti-Nigerian or pro-Biafran activities. Of particular interest was Cameroon, which could have encouraged the secessionist Biafra to use its territory. Rather, it allowed the Nigerian military to use its territory to sandwich Biafra (Ogunsanwo, 1986).

Nigeria believes that a safe neighborhood would ensure a safe statehood (Arikpo, 1975; Bulama, 1997). As such, Nigeria has been committed to securing the West African neighborhood. It has been contributing to regional peace and security, occupying crucial roles in helping among others, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger and Chad to stabilize their democracies or engage in conflict management.

One last footnote about good neighborliness and secure neighborhood: Nigeria and these immediate neighbors share socio-cultural links and historical experience in some cases. The example of Cameroon has been discussed. For instance, Southwestern Nigeria, Southern Benin, Southeastern Togo and Southeastern and central Ghana belong in the same Kwa-speaking group which include Fon, Yoruba, Adja, Bariba, Asante, Fante, Twi, Ewe, to mention a few. The entire region is also characterized by similar African traditional religion, Christianity and Islam. The ethnic, linguistic and religious factors are natural unifying forces that have been instrumental in a peaceful West African sub-region. Nigeria’s good neighbor policy is based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of neighbors and commits the country to respect the sovereign equality, independence and territorial integrity of neighboring states. The policy calls for cooperation among the neighbors on economic, political and security problems of common concern. Every regime has been committed to this policy since independence (King, 1996: 105).

It is pertinent to state that this good neighborliness character is central to the subject matter of this study. The character has informed the role conception of policymakers and the role assumption of Nigeria in Africa.

The Africa Centerpiece

The African philosophical saying that a wise elder cannot be present and a child would derail seems to be etched in the foreign policy thinking of Nigerian policymakers. Blessed with political, economic, military, human and material resources in abundance, the political leaders see no reason not to help needy African nations (Obiozor, 1996). Yakubu Gowon had declared that Nigeria,

Is fortunate in having the resources potential in men, material and money to lay a solid foundation for a socio-economic revolution in black Africa. The uncompromising objective of a rising economic prosperity in Nigeria is the economic independence of the nation and the defeat of neo-colonialist forces in Africa. (Folarin, 2010: 67)

There is a consensus that Nigeria’s foreign policy is Africa-centered. Africa as centerpiece simply means the well-being of the continent occupies the core or most important place in the diplomacy of Nigeria. This welfare of Africa ranges from liberation to unity, security, conflict management, good healthcare, stable and prosperous economy, democracy and good governance.

The Africa as the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy is the major focus of this study. It is the reason that the study is carried out in the first place. The research is interested in knowing the extent to which Nigeria’s foreign policymakers bore this in mind before conceiving roles to fill in Africa and the extent of pursuit of that Africa policy. There is a manifest curiosity to see how the rhetoric of the Africa cornerstone played out. The Africa-centered focus is informed by a policy orientation that assumes that Nigeria’s security can be subverted by extra-African powers acting with the cooperation of fellow African states. It also assumes that functional cooperation and unity among African states can curtail or neutralize interference in the internal affairs of African states and promote the achievement of common security and development goals. The foreign policy orientation also assumes that an unstable Africa is inimical to Nigeria’s ability to foster progressive economic, political and social development (King, 1996: 139).

The general conceptions of roles in Africa thus boldly demonstrate the Africa-centeredness of Nigeria’s foreign policy. These roles are embossed in the foreign policy objectives and behavior namely: to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of African states torn by civil crisis, oppose big power entanglements in crises within or among African states, support the UN and African Union (AU) (formerly OAU) peacekeeping forces in Africa with the aim of conflict resolution, and to provide moral, material and political support for African liberation struggles against colonial or neo-colonial regimes (Idang, 1973: 45). The methods of and commitment to occupying these roles and realizing the objectives have varied with different administrations. However, the question is, have there been changes to the roles and objectives to suit the dynamics and prevailing circumstances at each period?

Have there been new role conceptions, particularly from 1985 to 2022 in view of the evident new manifestations in international relations in Africa—ethnic nationalism and religious schisms culminating in civil wars, insurgencies, democratic dictatorship, return of military rule, jihadism and terrorist movement, food crisis, debt overhang, internal colonialization, intra-African slave trade, human/child and girl trafficking, child-soldering, corruption, drug-peddling, etc.? Have the role conception in Africa policy been dynamic (interactional with emerging scenarios)? Or have they been static with merely new approaches (old conceptions expressed in “dynamic” rhetoric) or new ways of handling same old things? Are their new roles and foreign policy(ies) to fix the new problems? Did Nigeria eventually fail? Why? When? How?

Africa Big Brother or “Giant of Africa” Posture

The second feature, African centerpiece has consistently played out, if not in leaders’ rhetoric, is in some action. Big Brother sounds good and presents a picture of an elder that is around to help. But “Giant of Africa” is that appellation that many fellow Africans rather find disturbing and doubtful of Nigeria’s true intentions of the government and wherever its citizens are. It contrasts sharply with good neighborliness, as someone who calls himself a giant in the midst of friends and strangers is sending fears around. But Nigeria backs this realpolitik-like posture up with economic largesse, functional cultural relations, and a political economy that tends to lift its African neighbors and others. The irony of it all is that “Giant of Africa” is a self-acclaimed appellation that Nigerians drive down the throats of their African counterparts top instil fear, but in practice, the government deploys soft and not hard power in dealing with fellow African states. In reality, Nigeria, the fourth best military in Africa, can do more if it uses military force. The option is available, but it has always chosen the path of peace with its neighbors, no matter the provocation.

Some scholars have argued that Nigeria’s overwhelming financial, human and material resources commitment to Africa is a manifestation of political realism, that is, its ambition to become recognized as a regional power (Hoffman, 1996). The irony here is that political realism deals more with the pursuit of selfish/national interest with minimal or maximal resources—the end justifies the means. Has Nigeria utilized the resources well to secure its core interest or just to earn respect as a big spender and wealthy nation?

Other scholars (Moyosore, 1990; Obiozor, 1996) have not been this cynical about the country’s proactive roles in Africa, contending that its natural and historical endowments coupled with the intense contributions and sacrifices for Africa’s progress since independence have naturally earned Nigeria honor and the leadership position on the continent. Yet, a few writers (Akinyemi, 2005; Meier, 2002; Soyinka, 1997) share the sentiment that the “giant of Africa” mentality is obsolete because the period Nigeria deserved the appellation may have been over. Now, it is contended, the name “giant of Africa” is self-imposed, undeserved and laughable because the glory has faded with the plethora of domestic problems and downslide in the economy. Such sentiment also harbors the fear that the aspiration by policymakers to earn that appellation at all costs has probably been responsible for the stretching of the economy to its elastic limits which has done more harm than good to national interest. Nigeria should thus, rather face the homefront, revitalize the economy, pursue a citizen-based diplomacy in Africa and naturally re-earn its place of pride (Ajayi, 2006; Onyearu, 2008).

Whatever sentiment is expressed, or whatever the controversy in literature, Nigeria’s foreign policy in Africa demonstrated the three features discussed, including good neighborliness, African centerpiece and giant of Africa disposition. The three represent a blend of realism and idealism, which distinguishes Nigeria from other ambitious nations in contemporary international system.

Nevertheless, the last argument that Nigeria may have become a faded power through its dramatic or inactive foreign policies along the lane is the central focus of this book. From Chapter 4, we shall be identifying the trajectory and foreign policy actions (roles) that lifted Nigeria in Africa, and those ones that ended its hegemony. Chapters 5 to 7 will be dealing exclusively with the task of identifying the leadership, the period and the behavior that changed the tide.

Determinants of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

There are internal or domestic and external or international environments within which Nigeria’s foreign policy operates. These are factors that shape or the determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Every state has these factors conditioning its foreign policy. The domestic factors in Nigerian foreign policy include—but not limited to—military, state of security, geography, economy, political parties, leadership, ruling elite’s perception and attitude, public opinion, ideology, pressure and interest groups, Nigerian Constitution and the Nigerian Civil War. The external determinants include colonialism, racism-apartheid, Pan-Africanism, Cold War and non-alignment, international law and world opinion, climate change, and the intentions of other states.

Domestic Factors

  1. 1.

    Military:

    The military secures the borders and wards off external aggression. Again, the organization can be used for territorial expansion. The life span and preservation of a country are as good as the strength of its armed forces. Ranked 36th in the world and 4th in Africa the 2023 global firepower index report (Arogbonlo, 2023), Nigeria seems adequately prepared against external aggression. There have been setbacks in the counterterrorism and insurgency since 2011, which explains why it dropped one place in Africa and the world, but the military is still a big boost to Nigeria’s stature as a powerful state.

    Militarily weak nations do not pursue ambitious foreign policies; in fact, their voices are not as loud as the stronger nations. The first determinant of national strength is the military capacity of the state. As we have seen in some African states such as Niger, Mali, Central African Republic and Mozambique between 2010 and 2023, weaker states even open up their territories for stronger ones to maintain their military bases. This is with the thin hope that they would either be protected, or benefit by way of training and weapons acquisition, thus mortgaging their sovereignty. Conversely, stronger nations pursue ambitious foreign policies. The United States, Russia, Germany, Britain and China have always pursued very ambitious foreign policies in view of their military capabilities. Nigeria’s foreign policy has been ambitious regionally; but its military might is dwarfed in the global context by the level of technological and economic advancement that now go along with military innovations. Even as it is the fourth best in Africa, other factors, such as leadership and domestic strife, have discounted the stature and capabilities of the armed forces.

  2. 2.

    State of Security:

    The security of a state is in the hands of law enforcement agencies. Sometimes, the military is drafted to keep the internal order and stability of a state. A peaceful, safe place is attractive to local and foreign investors. Nigeria has suffered religious conflicts, ethnic and communal clashes, herders-farmers conflicts, insurgency, terrorist movement, banditry many times. These have given it a bad press, and dissuaded business and tourism and ultimately development.

  3. 3.

    Infrastructure:

    The state of social and physical infrastructure is a major determinant of foreign policy. Stable electricity, usable roads, good healthcare, an efficient telecoms sector, functioning and affordable internet resources, good schools will create an auspicious business environment, boost the tourist industry and the image of the country. The parlous state of infrastructure in Nigeria is killing tourism and investment, as transnational companies are closing down or relocating to neighboring Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. It is also encouraging a high rate of emigration to other countries far and near, in search of better standards of life.

  4. 4.

    Geography:

    The geographical factors influencing Nigeria’s foreign policy include location, size, population, climatic conditions, soil, topography, natural resources and national boundaries. The geographical propinquity between Nigeria and its immediate neighbors naturally engenders external relations that closely affect them. These could be aid, cooperation, conflict, hostility, fear, suspicion, intimidation or even outright territorial expansionism.

    Nigeria’s population size has changed upwardly since 1963, reaching 100 million as of 1991‒1993, over 120 million by 2006 (NPC, 2009) and surpassing 200 million by 2022 (Worldometer, 2023). As the most populous African state, Nigeria’s foreign policymakers have been consistently passive and cautious about African political unity partly because many African states may not be willing to surrender their hard-won sovereignty and partly because Nigeria as the “giant” in size and population would not want to get all these lost in a political union.

    Climate has imposed restrictions on the types of crops that can be grown in particular areas and their impact on international trade and national economy. Cocoa, rubber and palm produce in the south and groundnuts, millet and cotton in the north have acted as sources of external revenue for Nigeria, which, before oil, was its main lubricant for an ambitious foreign policy. Availability and distribution of natural resources, including oil, have boosted Nigeria’s stature, posture and roles in global politics (Adeyemo, 2002: 59).

  5. 5.

    Economy:

    Oil since the 1970s has been the major driver of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Oil is an important factor in the foreign policies of many states, whether you are a producer or not. Every nation consumes it and as such it is an unavoidable resource (Soremekun, 2003). States that have oil have earned an enviable image because of the universal importance of petroleum. States without oil still need oil and so cannot do without the oil producers, and since alternative sources of energy are still growing and have not reached the entire world, petroleum products are still the main sources of energy. This has accorded the oil producers with a lot of bargaining power and leverage to influence political decisions. Nigeria belongs in this elite group. Coupled with its agricultural richness and its huge market potentials for the world, Nigeria possesses the economic power to run an ambitious foreign policy.

    Hitherto however, the agricultural viability of the country with about 70% of its total national revenue coming from agriculture and 75% of its people into cultivation, Nigeria was a major supplier of cocoa, rubber, palm produce, timber, groundnuts and cotton. These were the sources of wealth in the colonial and early post-colonial days and Nigeria made impact in Africa and the world. The discovery of oil however changed the situation. Nigeria lost its agro culture and became a major buyer of food from Asia, Europe, US and West Africa (Mhinro, 1988).

    Economic decline owing to endemic corruption, mismanagement, political instability and poor economic policies rendered Nigeria poor and dependent on foreign aid and investment for any major reconstruction or development project. The country thus became hugely indebted and emerged as a rentier-state, a situation that western states, particularly Britain exploited to their advantage. Nigeria’s ambition and role to oversee an independent, strong and indivisible Africa were thus weakened by this metamorphosis (Ake, 1983).

  6. 6.

    Politics:

    The factors here include political system, federal structure, political parties, political instability and military rule. Until 1999, political parties in Nigeria were formed along ethnic or sectional lines (Madiebo, 1980). The ethnic factor has remained a formidable domestic factor in the policy process in Nigeria. The ethnic diversity manifesting in political disunity made institutions vulnerable as there was lack of consensus on issues on the homefront, which created foreign policy instability. Nigeria found it difficult to speak with one voice on foreign policy issues. Adeyemo (2002: 64) gives an account of the 1961 incident when the Eastern Nigeria Premier, Michael Okpara, declared in New Delhi, India that Nigeria would favor the formation of a third power bloc of Afro-Asian nations at a time when the Federal Government was clearly opposed to any form of power bloc. In 1965, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) led government of Balewa refused to recognize Israel—a state recognized as far back as 1947 by the UN—when the Israeli already had an embassy in Lagos and when the other political parties from the Christian south accorded Israel full recognition. These inconsistencies created confusion about Nigeria’s stand on certain international issues. Also, it gave the country the reputation of speaking with too many voices on external issues. Another problem was the different ideological orientations of the political parties. During the First Republic, the ruling NPC was capitalist, Action Group (AG) was welfarist, and the NCNC and Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) embraced socialist principles and rhetoric. Hence, both the East and West led by the AG and NCNC, respectively, looked toward the socialist bloc, while the North and the government at the center governed by NPC were pro-west.

    Like the scenario above, the loose federal structure had influence on Nigeria’s foreign policy. There were four regions in Nigeria with enormous powers. These included the East, West, North and Mid-West. The Constitution empowered them to enter into treaties or nullify those already entered into by the Federal Government. The regions were also empowered to have their own exclusive foreign relations. But for the adjustment on and customization of Nigerian federalism by the military government, the state system that succeeded regionalism would have had certain powers to embark on foreign relations exclusively. The new federal structure from the 1970s created a cohesive foreign policy machinery and outlook (Ogwu, 1986). From four regions, it became 12 states, then 19 states, and then 21 states, 30 states and now 36 states and a federal capital, with the states losing powers and relevance by each creation.

    Military rule and political instability have same thing in common. There is an interface between the two that could destroy the policy process. First African military coups are characterized by the removal of existing political structures, institutions and traditions. Then there is a rule by decrees and soon after there would be another coup that would follow the same process. The implications are legion. A charade of political instability follows, which rubs significantly on foreign policy process. One treaty entered into by a previous regime is discarded or disregarded by a new military junta. There are many instances, but of interest was the case of General Yakubu Gowon who, away to represent Nigeria at the OAU Summit in Kampala-Uganda in 1975, heard the news of his own overthrow in a military takeover (Oluleye, 1985). That marked the end of Gowon’s foreign policy, policy statements made or some agreements reached on behalf of Nigeria at that summit. In military rule, decisions or policies could also be made by the military command without any resort to public opinion or parliament for proper policymaking process. The military did whatever it considered right with national interest defined from a parochial perspective. The good aspect of military rule and foreign policy in Nigeria was that its foreign policy was Afrocentric, as it seemed to understand the African centerpiece, more than democratic government. Its arbitrariness was also a blessing in disguise. Because of the absence of democratic encumbrances and its dispatch about decisions, military regimes acted swiftly without any challenges or delays. No wonder, Nigeria’s foreign policy during military rule before 1985, despite some flops, was on the overall a success story (Fawole, 2003). Some successes were achieved too from 1985 to 1999, but there were acts, internal dynamics and foreign policy mishaps during that period and beyond, that had far-reaching negative effect on Nigeria’s leadership and hegemony in Africa.

  7. 7.

    Leadership:

    The foregoing discourse points to leadership as a deciding factor in all cases of foreign policymaking and implementation, success or failure. The leadership style, orientation, ideological leaning, experience and political or personal will are important. All of these also have an overall impact on the quality of political leadership. The 1960s and 1970s have been described as the best years of Nigeria’s external relations. This can be attributed to the quality of leadership of the time. The lowest times of Nigeria’s international relations were the period 1993–1998. That can also be attributed to (bad) leadership. The years between 2007 and 2022 were critical in Nigeria’s international relations. Poor leadership at home is reflected in the country’s diplomacy and posture in global politics. The conception of roles to play in Africa or the lack of it depends on the political leadership.

  8. 8.

    Ruling Elites Ideology:

    This is also related to leadership and politics discussed above. The ruling elite in Africa—Nigeria inclusive—wield enormous influence and power in the foreign decision-making and relations of their countries. Indeed, the personal or group interest of those individuals translates to the national interest of those states (Aluko, 1981: 10). It is even believed that the field of foreign relations is the exclusive preserve of the President or Head of State. Whenever there is a change of government therefore, it is assumed that there has been a change in the external behavior of the state (Aluko, ibid). Therefore, the ideology of such leaders would influence their foreign policies. For example, where rulers have religious extremist leaning, they will likely pursue foreign policies that will promote an influx of such ideas into the country. Between 1987 and 1999, extreme religious views, organizations and activities in Northern Nigeria doubled. By 2000, Sharia had become the official legal system in most northern states, and by 2015, jihadists had taken over most of Northeast Nigeria. On the other hand, where leaders are radical or influenced by Marxist views, one can expect a radical stance on global issues from their states. Murtala Muhammed, who stood up in obstinacy and defiance to western influences in Africa, is a typical example. But where the rulers are conservative with aristocratic background like Balewa, a moderate and cautious foreign policy can be expected (Adeyemo, 2002: 69).

  9. 9.

    Pressure and Interest Groups:

    In the introductory discussion of this study, one of the three basic assumptions of role theory mentioned was role expectations of the public/society: about what roles policymakers should play in the policy process and role expectations of Nigeria in Africa. Pressure and interest groups belong in this category. They are organized associations that operate to obtain favorable policies from the government. Any pressure group should have numerical strength, financial resources, knowledge (Opene, 1983), people in government, or possess disruptive instruments as strike action, riot, etc. to get government to its side.

    Pressure groups and public opinion have a lot in common. Pressure groups hold and voice out opinions in most cases to make themselves heard. The groups could be professional organizations, labor unions, media, student bodies and so forth. The groups exert influence on government and affect foreign policy formulation in Nigeria (Ojo, 1999). For instance, the demonstration by the student body in Lagos against the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact in 1960 resulted in a quick revocation of the pact (Ajibola, 1978). The Christian community, to stop the idea of taking Nigeria to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), mounted pressure on the Babangida regime. Also the enormous pressure on the Abacha regime by pro-democracy activists, National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), oil workers, academic staff and labor union, among others, affected both the domestic and external environments of Nigeria’s foreign policy and its international relations at the time. Abacha started a “transition to civil rule program”, sought new allies in the face of western disapproval of his regime’s human rights records, and was consequently isolated. In the 2000s, business moguls and the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria mounted pressure on the Obasanjo administration to liberalize the economy and place more power on local entrepreneurs to create an atmosphere for them to favorably compete with the foreign investors in the oil, manufacturing and telecoms sectors (Business Day, 2008).

  10. 10.

    Nigerian Constitution:

    The most credible source of foreign policy objectives and by extension the greatest influence and guide to the foreign policy of a state—at least during civilian rule—is its constitution. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states in clear terms what the roles or foreign policy behavior should be. The Constitution also outlines the roles of the policymakers in the business of the state.

  11. 11.

    Level of Technology:

    Nowadays, the global system is driven by technology, and nations with technological advancement control the world. The technological innovations vary, from transportation devices, communication, telecommunication, construction, to warfare devices, technologically advanced nations effortlessly rule the world and have better bargaining power and leverage in global politics. The coronavirus pandemic of 2020 has led to more innovativeness in technological advancement, with the educational and business landscapes witnessing revolutionary innovations. The traditional technological powers have been US, China, Japan, Germany, Russia and Switzerland; however, other countries are fast catching up, with India and the “Asian Tigers” showing more progress. Some nations deliberately pursue high-power calibrated weapons in order to command some awe and respect in the global system. Nigeria is a low-level technology country with technology not too much of a factor in its foreign policy.

External Factors

  1. 1.

    Colonial Heritage/Legacy

    Colonial heritage has been exhaustively discussed. Colonial heritage has bequeathed to Nigeria its set of allies, its policy orientation, political ideology and where its post-colonial external loyalty would tilt. Its natural allies would be the countries that have the same lingua franca of English language and similar colonial experience. Hence, members of the Commonwealth would be its immediate economic and social partners.

  2. 2.

    Cold War and Non-Alignment

    Cold War seems to be playing out in different ways in recent years. The war in Ukraine and political crisis in Niger/West Africa in July 2023 have had Russia, US and their allies seemingly using those two incidents as proxy wars and for the pursuit of mutually antagonistic goals, which are reminiscent of the old Cold War era. Nigeria’s leadership of ECOWAS and role in the crisis in Niger was supposed to be neutral. However, a popular opinion, which may be far from the fact, is that Nigeria was pandering toward western powers and their stakes in Republic of Niger.

    While the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) now has little influence in the contemporary foreign policy of Nigeria, it was influential in the 1970s. As a principle of foreign policy of states, members of NAM believed in a policy of independence based on peaceful co-existence, non-participation in military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact), support for liberation movements and refusal to allow the Great Powers establish military bases on their soil (Idang, 1973: 231). These principles played out in Nigeria’s foreign policy behavior during the old Cold War. However, as identified earlier, the principles were ignored at some points. For instance, the Balewa government was not true to its word about non-patronage of either bloc when it banned all socialist literature and was hostile to Soviet Union but maintained a close relationship with the western powers even to the point of signing the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact (Aluko, 1981: 173). The multiple contradictions in the NAM principles from the 1970s to the 2000s as evident in the policies of member-states made it to pale into oblivion.

  3. 3.

    Intentions of Other States or Principle of Reciprocity

    The realistic assessment of the intentions of other states with which Nigeria interacts constitutes an important variable conditioning Nigeria’s foreign policy and external relations. Generally, this principle of reciprocity requires that a nation would treat other states based on how those states treat it or its own citizens. The problem with this principle is that Nigeria could go to war or be in conflict with another state if it lacks the capacity to identify that state’s intentions. In contrast, the country may trust a wrong nation if it fails to know that nation’s true intentions. However, if a nation can identify the intentions of other states, this would, definitely, determine its policy toward them.

    This approach played out in Nigeria’s “citizen-centered” diplomacy in 2007. Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ojo Maduekwe, proposed it. It is an example of foreign policy based on the intentions of other states. The principle holds that Nigeria would relate to any nation, exactly the way the country relates to it, and that it would treat foreign nations the way they treat its own citizens (Onyearu, 2008: 2). Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Yar’Adua may thus be departing from or redefining the traditional Africa-centered diplomacy by putting Nigeria in the heart of Afrocentrism, through a citizen-centered foreign policy to suit the prevailing circumstances. Citizen-centered diplomacy died with the exit of Maduekwe from the ministry. Between 2008 and 2022, Nigerian citizens had suffered harassment, humiliation, racial profiling, extra-judicial killing and all sorts in host countries of even at transit ports, with the government having no will or policy in place to stem the tide. Government had even been hit by this low in diplomacy when its high commission was invaded and partially damaged by hoodlums in Ghana (Aworinde, 2020).

    Other external determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy include international law and world opinion, international organizations such as the UN, AU (OAU), ECOWAS, OPEC; policies of the superpowers, and global climate change, global or regional terrorism, and other regional or sub-regional problems. These external factors are systemic in nature as they are international issues, events or actions that necessarily precipitate reactions from Nigeria.

Implementation of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Under military rule, all democratic institutions meant to formulate and implement foreign policy are absent. The constitution is suspended, the structures are sacked and the institutions dissolved or weakened. Foreign policymaking and implementation become the exclusive tasks of the military head of state and the high command. This is particularly so because of the hierarchical nature or stratification of the military with a top-down flow of power. The head of state may engage whomsoever he wishes for implementation of the policies. There is therefore the fusion of roles in foreign policymaking. The perception, conception and infusion of roles at the foreign policy formulation stage, and the performance of roles and execution of foreign policies become the tasks of the military ruler and his cabinet. Most times, the foreign policy behavior (roles) of Nigeria is actually the extension of the individual attitude and disposition of the head of state. The group factor which the role theory stresses also comes to play because the head of the military junta thinks and acts in line with his group (military) background and his actions are in fulfillment of his military traditions and objectives (Fawole, 2003; Jemibewon, 1978).

The military principally follows the institutional structure of external relations (except the constitution and legislative bodies, which are suspended) and engages the civilians and foreign policy institutions directly in the course of foreign policymaking and implementation. Policy and research centers such as the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Development Policy Center (DPC), Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), universities, civil service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and non-governmental institutions constitute a pool from which military governments get their personnel, ideas and strategies for external relations performance or policy implementation.

In a democratic dispensation, the formulation and implementation of foreign policy are shared responsibilities. But the constitutional head of a foreign policy process is the President. In reality however, the President is constrained by the group factor: his cabinet (particularly his kitchen cabinet), his political party, the legislature and the electorate. The three basic characteristics of the “role” thesis namely, perception of policy leaders of the roles they occupy in policymaking, expectations of the society/public about the roles the policymakers should occupy, and interpretation of the roles occupied by the policymakers, come to active play. This is at the local level or domestic environment of foreign policy. At the external level, the three features—perception of leaders about roles Nigeria should occupy in Africa, expectations of the citizens and the international public about roles a big country like Nigeria should play, and the interpretations of the roles Nigeria occupies in Africa by the leaders—also come to play.

Policy implementation is vested in the Executive organ of the government. The first stage in foreign policy implementation is what has been referred to as persuasive explanation (Gambari, 1989a, 1989b; Olusanya & Akindele, 1990). This is a crucial stage and this stage is also crucial to this study because that is when national roles already identified at the formulation stage are performed. Very clear explanation is required at this level because of the sensitive tasks, including the pursuit of national interest (a role set) and carrying out of policy objectives (that is the national behavior, a more delicate role set) (Adigbuo, 2005: 34). The consequences of a poor communication at this definition, policy explanation and performance stage may be dire. Another task at this stage is to identify and explain the instruments of policy from among inducements or rewards, deprivations, threat, force, diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, conciliation and the use of good offices. Others include exchange of visits by heads of state and top government functionaries, foreign and technical aid.

In the implementation of foreign policy, the MFA is the most important apart from the Presidency. The ministry started as the Nigerian Foreign Service in 1957, with a division of it created in the Prime Minister’s Office for the purpose of dealing with matters relating to Commonwealth and Foreign Relations. Following the attainment of independence, the Balewa administration created the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations to handle Nigeria’s foreign affairs (Adeyemo, 2002: 95). Balewa combined the duties of external affairs with his official duties until the appointment as minister of Jaja Wachukwu in 1962 (1964: 96).

Table 3.1 below shows the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) by 1966. Note that the bureaucracy was strictly occupied by career diplomats and civil wants. From 1966 however, the military brought in the political; appointee, the Commissioner for External Affairs, to head the ministry.

Table 3.1 Organogram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1960–1972
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There is, as shown in Table 3.1, a foreign policy bureaucracy headed by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry. The ministry was made up of trained or career diplomats from whom the MFA, ambassadors or envoys, and Special Advisers were sometimes appointed. In the organizational structure of the ministry as of 1960–1972, closely following the Permanent Secretary was the Head Administration (Overseas Communication Services) and the next was the Head Africa coming ahead of other heads, which underscores the priority given to African matters (Olusanya & Akindele, 1990: 56).

The Nigerian foreign policy bureaucracy has served (and continues to serve) as an important mechanism for the implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy goals and objectives. During the First Republic, it was difficult to ascertain with any precision the role played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the degree of influence exerted by the Foreign Minister. The Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, took a personal interest in the formulation and execution of policy. Aluko observes that for the first ten months of independence, the Prime Minister remained his own Foreign Minister. In addition, the Prime Minister preferred policy papers on foreign relations from the Cabinet Office to those emanating from the External Affairs Ministry (1981). This style was similar to what obtained for most of the years of the Obasanjo era (999 to 2007). Although he had several foreign affairs ministers, including junior ministers and a long list of personnel in his foreign policy bureaucracy, Obasanjo exerted control. Moreover, through shuttle diplomacy, he performed implementation roles than anyone else.

Under the military regime, however, activism and dynamism in foreign policy created a more visible role for the Ministry. The Minister (then referred to as Commissioner) of External Affairs had a lot of policymaking authority. Okoi Arikpo and Joseph Garba (both External Affairs Commissioners) enjoyed pre-eminence in foreign policymaking and execution. This was also true of Nwachukwu (1988–1993), Tom Ikimi (1995–1998), (Adeyemo, 2002: 96) and Olugbenga Ashiru during the reign President Goodluck Jonathan.

The MFA (called Minister of External Affairs—MEA at the time) was the President’s principal assistant for the formulation and execution of foreign policy and conduct of diplomacy. Professor Ishaya Audu—the Minister of External Affairs—assumed a central role in Nigeria’s foreign policy and international affairs. He made public pronouncements on crucial international problems affecting Nigeria and worked closely with his Ministry. The presidential system of government in operation between October 1979 and December 31, 1983, pointed to an enhanced role not only for the Ministry of External Affairs, but also for other Ministries and agencies like the Defense Ministry and Information Ministry. Furthermore, under the 1979 Constitution, the Senate was empowered to give its advice and consent to nominees for ambassadorial appointment.

Table 3.2 shows the restructuring in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighting the major departments and ranks in the Ministry from 1972 to 1979, before the military quit the political stage.

Table 3.2 Organogram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972–1979
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is charged primarily with the duty of managing Nigeria’s foreign relations with the outside world through carefully thought-out, formulated and well-coordinated foreign policy. The duties have been classified into four broad categories, including political, economic, consular and administrative (Adeyemo, 2002: 98). These duties cover representation, protection of Nigeria’s nationals abroad and the pursuit of trade and investment interests (MFA, 2007). The ministry also serves as clearing house for negotiations and conclusions of various bilateral and multilateral economic agreements and protocols. Even where it relinquishes certain duties to other relevant arms or bodies of government due to the technical nature of the issue, it remains responsible for the background information, political advice and follow-up actions (Adeyemo, 2002: 99). The ministry also serves as an advisory body to the President or Head of State on external affairs matters.

Table 3.3 is the organogram of a more broadened Ministry showing major restructuring and the expansion of the offices of political appointees, including Junior Minister or Minister of State.

Table 3.3 Organogram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs up to 1992–2001
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The major ranks in the MFA involved in the implementation of policy objectives were the Honorable Minister of Foreign Affairs (HMFA), Director-General (DG); Deputy Director-General (DDG), International Economic Cooperation Department (IECD); Assistant Director-General (ADG), and Bilateral Economic Cooperation Department (BECD). Others were ADG, Multilateral Economic Cooperation Department (MECD); ADG, Trade and Investment Department (TID); and two Deputy Assistant Directors-General (DADGs) for each department (MFA, 2007).

The Nigerian Foreign Service has witnessed a rapid growth over the years. For example, in 1960, there were few Nigerian Diplomatic Missions, but the Nigerian Civil War (1967–January 1970), many Missions were opened in order to disseminate war propaganda. In 1979, there were 79 Nigerian Missions abroad. Under the Presidential System of government or during the Shagari administration (October 1979–December 31, 1983), the Nigerian Missions abroad were increased from 79 to 92 (in 1982) for political reasons or patronage. However, several of the Missions were closed down during the Buhari/Idiagbon regime due to worsening economic situation in Nigeria. By 1984, four Missions were closed by the Babangida administration due to economic considerations. The Babangida administration from 1985 brought its own innovations into the Nigerian Foreign Service and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, creating more departments and units to cater for Nigeria’s ambitious power politics and economic diplomacy (Akinyemi, 2005). Twists and turns in the Ministry, the need for capacity to meet prevailing challenges and political considerations of the groups in power were compelling factors in the several cases of organizational restructuring of the Ministry. The military exit of 1999 also prompted certain overhauling. The Obasanjo administration carried out reforms in the Nigerian international scene as he restructured the entire Foreign Service. What was noticeable as from 2001 was a bloated foreign policy bureaucracy, which was deemed necessary because of the dire straits in Nigeria’s external relations which needed to be straightened then (Lamido, 2002).

Table 3.4 shows the very recent changes in the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This shows a bloated foreign policy bureaucracy, which is a legacy of President Olusegun Obasanjo.

Table 3.4 Additions to the Structure of the MFA as at 2007
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Table 3.4 shows few but very significant changes in the structure of the ministry. By the restructuring as shown above, two junior ministers or Ministers of State are now to assist the ministry. Also very significant is that the junior ministers, unlike before the civilian dispensation, would now be subordinate to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, who should originally be the head of the organization.

The changes over the years in the structure of the ministry were not just routine. The major aim has been to make the Foreign Service more effective in the formulation, articulation (in the absence of the National Assembly, especially the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Armed Forces Committee), and implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives (Aminu, 2008). Although the ministry is the official machinery for implementing Nigeria’s foreign policy matters, some relevant Home Ministries such as the Federal Ministries of Education, Finance, Information, Defense, Internal Affairs, Trade and Industries, Sports, Agriculture, Culture and Tourism, among others, are also involved in the process of formulating and implementing Nigeria’s foreign policy decision.