(DOC) Nietzsche, Philosophy, and the Overman | Roy Angeles - Academia.edu
Nietzsche, Philosophy, and the Overman Ads by Google John of Godwww.MiraclesOfJohnOfGod.com Visit John of God Abadiania, Brazil Send photos and letters to John Inspirational Bookevesincantation.com/InspirationBook Eve's Incantation Is a Wonderful Book To Inspire Women - Buy Now! Purpose of life humanpurpose.org Most important topic that we can ever discuss. In his four-part book entitled Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883-1885), Friedrich Nietzsche puts forth the concept of the Overman as the new goal for humanity. Instead of relying on old, Christian values, man must, for Nietzsche, create a new morality under which he decides to live. This new morality is encompassed in the figure of the Overman. However, Nietzsche does not simply call for a new morality, but a new structure to morality -- that is to say, he calls for a new way of thinking about morality. The Overman, then, represents a free spirit whose occupation is to re-think morality in our everyday lives. Re-thinking morality, for Nietzsche, results in re-thinking what it means to be human, since humanity has always been based on a concept of morality which regulates social practices. Thus, to overcome the morality which regulates social practices is to overcome humanity. What is the Overman? Before discussing the characteristics of the Overman, there are two misconceptions which I wish to clear up about this Nietzschean concept: The Overman is not an impossible goal or ideal. Most people take the Overman to be an unachievable goal which we must all strive to become. This interpretation does little to differentiate the Overman from both Christianity and Enlightenment ideals. The Overman does not take the place of God or Jesus or the rational, objective person; he does not become an impossible figure who man must mimic or exemplify. Rather, for Nietzsche, the Overman is a being who can become actualized, who can become real in this world. He isn't other-worldly, but deals directly with the forces of life itself. The Overman is not the figure of the Self-interested Individual. A common interpretation of the Overman is that he is a self-interested being who only cares about becoming more and more powerful. This take, no doubt, is related to Nietzsche's conception of the Will to Power -- that every will seeks to grow stronger and to dominate over all over wills. For Nietzsche, the self-interested individual who comes out of the Classical age and into the nineteenth century becomes a replacement for God. For much of modernity, reason and rationality in the social, political, and economic spheres translates into self-interestedness: the rational person is the one who looks out for himself over others. For Nietzsche, the Overman dislodges reason and rationality from this concept of self-interestedness, and brings these concepts to a less individualistic perspective. Given that these two misconceptions do not hold for Nietzsche's conception of the Overman, I will explain the main characteristics of the Overman. The Overman, for Nietzsche, is a goal for humanity. Nietzsche often says in Thus Spake Zarathustrathat the Overman shall become the new goal for humanity to achieve, one which involves the self-overcoming of man. Nietzsche's idea of goal, however, needs to be qualified. Normally, we think of goals as ideal points at which we want to achieve a certain state of being (e.g. happiness, fitness, quitting smoking, making a certain salary). They serve as reference points for determining whether or not we are improving in life. This idea of the goal, for Nietzsche, makes up the general formula of morality: "Do this, don't do that -- and then you'll be happy! Otherwise..." (TOI 176). A man, for example, sets out a goal to be able to run a mile in less than six minutes, and trains diligently to achieve this goal. While training, he believes that he has improved his running, since he sees that he is getting closer and closer to reaching the six minute mark. As we see with this example, we tend to think of improvement and reaching our goals as effects that we create in following a certain procedure or training or method. For Nietzsche, however, the opposite is true: the goal is not a reference point for determining how much we have improved or whether we have reached the goal; instead we are the reference points for the goal. Or, to put it differently, instead of our actions producing improvement, rather improvement produces our actions. This reversal may sound somewhat absurd, but it does follow a logic. To use the example of the man who wants to run the mile under six minutes, Nietzsche's primary concern with the man would be -- what is motivating him? What makes him want to achieve this goal? Is it for fame? Social empowerment? Pride? Love for running? His drive to reach this goal, whatever it may be, is not disconnected from his physiology; indeed, it is inextricably linked to it. What he knows he can do, what is impossible for him to do, what causes him bearable and unbearable stress, what makes him comfortable -- all this goes into determining his training, his actions. He prefers certain training procedures and is not free to do other ones. His training, procedures, actions, diets -- all of this is determined by his body's drives, not least of which includes his drive towards achieving success in the mile run. For the question comes up: why the mile run, and not the two or three or four mile run under six minutes? His body, his physiology, determines, albeit unconsciously, the goals he wishes to achieve and the actions he puts forth to achieve these goals. To be sure, the goal and the drive to achieve the goal are inseparable. Thus, rather than the goal being our reference points for determining if we are improving, we become the reference points for the goal-drive. In order to achieve the goal, certain physiological conditions are required -- i.e. body type, desires, tolerabilities, bodily actions (i.e. the actual running), etc. We constitute, for Nietzsche, these physiological conditions. In this way, we are the goals for the goal; the goal always implies a multiplicity of goals, a multiplicity of beings who must be "fit" to achieve the goal towards which we are driving. However, the goal itself is not simply an end in itself: we are driving towards the goal as a bridge towards power, success, happiness, etc. But always towards somethings else. We see then that the goal holds three characteristics for Nietzsche: The goal as a bridge for our desires or drives, and not an end. The goal as having multiple goals (us), that is, multiple bridges, and thus, implying multiple drives. The goal as producing these goals, these drives, these bridges. The Overman encompasses these three characteristics for humanity. The Overman is a bridge for man, a will that wills towards power. But the Overman isn't a singular man; he is represented by a multiplicity of people. He is not a single type of person, but requires many types of people. The Overman produces himself, creates himself, in order to become himself. He is the self-creating being who sees himself as the goal through which one achieves the goal. That is to say, although he is the goal, he is not the goal, for his goal is to keep producing goals, to keep producing types of people who will become him, and will use him in order to produce more goals. It is an endless cycle of goal-producing. Finally, Nietzsche believes that this endless cycle of goal-producing is life itself. Life, for Nietzsche, needs to move towards life in order to be life, that is, in order to become itself. A life which moves towards death (i.e. seeing goals as ends) does not become life, but rather becomes death. The Overman, therefore, is the ultimate life affirming being. The goal of humanity is to affirm life. This task -- to affirm the endless cycle of producing goals -- is, for Nietzsche, the new task of philosophy. Works Cited: Friedrich Nietzsche.     Thus Spake Zarathustra. Tr. Walter Kaufman. (New York: Penguin Books, 1978).      Twilight of the Idols. The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings.      Tr. Judith Norman. Ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,     2005).  http://markb287.hubpages.com/hub/Nietzsche--Philosophy--and-the-Overman