ANDREJ KOTLJARCHUK In the Shadows of Poland and Russia The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the mid-17th Century. S Ö D E RTÖ R N D O C TO R A L D I S S E RTAT I O N S 4 In the Shadows of Poland and Russia The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the mid-17th Century Andrej Kotljarchuk Södertörns högskola 2006 Södertörns högskola S-141 89 Huddinge 2006 ISBN 91-89315-63-4 Södertörn Doctoral Dissertations: 4 ISSN 1652-7399 Södertörn Studies in History: 3 ISSN 1653-2147 Cover illustration: Map of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Fragment. Tomasz Makowski. Amsterdam. 1613. To the memory of the Minsk historical school liquidated during the Soviet Communistic terror of 1930-1940 Dr. Lean Babrovic Dr. Andrej Burdziejka Prof. Alaksandar Cvikievic Prof. Paval Charlampovic Prof. Zmicier Dauhiala Prof. Vasil Druzczyc Dr. Ihnat Dvarczanin Dr. Anton Hrynievic Prof. Usievalad Ihnatouski Dr. Mikalaj Kaspiarovic Dr. Vaclau Lastouski Dr. Mikalaj Laudanski Dr. Siarhiej Mialieszka Prof. Mikalaj Szczakacichin Dr. Alhierd Szlubski Dr. Chviedar Zabiella Contents List of maps ................................................................................................. vii List of figures.................................................................................................ix Abbreviations.................................................................................................xi Acknowledgements..................................................................................... xiii 1 Introduction ................................................................................................1 1.1 Foreword .............................................................................................1 1.2 On practical matters ............................................................................4 1.3 Theoretical Framework, Choice of Method and Aims of the Thesis ..5 1.4 Previous research ................................................................................9 1.5 Presentation of sources......................................................................22 2 Separatism and policy of Poland ..............................................................27 2.1 The Grand Duchy of Lithuania after the union of Lublin .................27 2.2 The Radziwiáá faction: Protestant Unity and Counter-Reformation..45 2.3 Commercial aspects of Lithuanian-Swedish relations ......................61 2.4 Relations between Sweden and the GDL..........................................67 2.5 Contacts between the Protestants of Lithuania and Sweden .............76 2.6 The Radziwiáá faction and Swedish geopolitics ................................80 2.7 Conclusions.......................................................................................87 3 Forward Looking Security: Sweden’s Approach .....................................91 3.1 The Declaration of Kơdainiai, August 17, 1655................................91 3.2 The Birth of the Sweden-Lithuania federation: the Union of Kơdainiai, October 20 1655 ...........................................................121 3.3 The Role of the KU in changing the balance of power in the region: coverage of Union in Europe .........................................................138 3.4 Swedish Lithuania and its government ...........................................143 3.5 The Anti–Swedish uprising in Samogitia and decline of the Kơdainiai Union .............................................................................................161 3.5.1 Motives behind the uprising and its first stage. .......................161 3.5.2 The Swedish ”Drang nach Samogitia” ....................................165 3.5.3 The Jesuits and Muscovy ........................................................168 3.5.4 From Rebellion to Chaos and Civil War .................................174 v 3.6 The Samogitian Entrance and Exit from Swedish Protection .........178 3.7 Conclusions.....................................................................................182 4 The Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a contested territory..........................185 4.1 Paradoxes of War: Three Lithuanian Dukes and One Hetman .......185 4.2 The Importance of Russian Lithuania to the Swedish–Russian conflict ...........................................................................................193 4.2.1 Negotiations between Russia and the Lithuanian nobility ......200 4.2.2 The Role of the Lithuanian nobility at the start of the Russian– Swedish war.......................................................................................209 4.3 Radziwiáá’s Lithuania: the Compact of Radnot and the 1657 siege of Brest ...............................................................................................214 4.4 The Ukrainian – Russian conflict over Belarus ..............................236 4.5 The Issue of Belarus and Lithuania in Swedish–Ukrainian relations ... ..................................................................................................243 4.6 Ukrainian attempts to unite the Pinsk district .................................252 4.7 The Place of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Swedish diplomacy, 1658–1661...................................................................257 4.8 Conclusions.....................................................................................264 5 General Conclusions...............................................................................269 5.1 The post-war crisis in the GDL ........................................................269 5.2 The Exile and Decline of Protestantism ...........................................272 5.3 The post-war identity of the GDL nobility.......................................279 5.4 The European crisis: The case of the GDL ......................................283 5.5 Lithuania and Sweden after the European Crisis .............................287 Maps............................................................................................................291 Figures ........................................................................................................297 Appendices..................................................................................................313 Bibliography ...............................................................................................325 Unpublished sources ..............................................................................325 Published sources ...................................................................................326 Literature ................................................................................................330 Unpublished PhD dissertations and articles ...........................................345 vi List of maps Map 1. Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its administrative, geographical and religious divisions, 1654-1667 ................................................... 292-293 Map 2. Swedish military operations and zones of control in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 1655-1657.............................................................. 294-295 vii List of figures Figure 1. Text of the Kơdainiai Union between Lithuania and Sweden. 1655. Original. F. 1. RA...............................................................................297 Figure 2. Swedish order of “the name of Jesus”. Award from Karl X Gustav to Janusz Radziwiáá. Livrustkammaren (Royal Armoury of Sweden). ............................................................................................................298 Figure 3. Swedes enter Kơdainiai. Józef Brandt. 1899...............................299 Figure 4. Kơdainiai. The view on the town. Napoleon Orda. 1875. ...........299 Figure 5. The map of the Kaunas district and southern Samogitia. 1656. Georg von Schwengeln. RA...............................................................300 Figure 6. Plan of Hrodna. 1655. KA. Sveriges krig, 05:35. First publication. ............................................................................................................301 Figure 7. Parade of the Swedish-Transylvanian-Cossack coalition forces led by Karl X Gustav and György II Rákóczi. 1657. Erik Dahlberg. KA. Historiska planscher 1657. No. 5. ......................................................302 Figure 8. Plan of Brest. 1657. Erik Dahlberg. KB. Photo by Marie Persson. First publication. ................................................................................303 Figure 9. Panorama of Brest. 1657. Erik Dahlberg. KB. Photo by Marie Persson. First publication. ..................................................................304 Figure 10. The bell. A gift from the Swedish Lithuanian Society to the Lutheran Church of Kơdainiai to the memory of the 1655 Union. 1929. Ladled out by Bergholtz Klockgjuteri AB in Stockholm. Photo by Vydas Beþelis.....................................................................................305 Figure 11. Monument of Janusz Radziwill in Kơdainiai. 2005. Julius Urbanaviþius. .....................................................................................305 Figure 12. Jan Kazimierz Vasa. King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania. 1660. Unknown painter.....................................................306 Figure 13. Janusz Radziwiáá. Grand Hetman of Lithuania, Palatine of Vilnius and Duke of Biržai. 1652. Unknown painter. National Art Museum of Belarus. Fragment. .............................................................................306 Figure 14. Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. Duke of Slutsk. 1654. Unknown painter.307 Figure 15. Wincenty Gosiewski. Field Hetman of Lithuania. 1651. Daniel Schultz................................................................................................307 Figure 16. Paweá Sapieha. Palatine of Vitsebsk. 1665. Unknown engraver. Fragment. ...........................................................................................308 ix Figure 17. Karl X Gustav. King of Sweden, Grand Duke of Lithuania in 1655-1656. According to: Fowler, John. 1656. The history of the troubles of Suethland and Poland, which occasioned the expulsion of Sigismundus the Third, King of those kingdoms, with his heirs for ever from the Suethish crown. London P. 1...............................................308 Figure 18. Bengt Skytte. Viceroy of the Swedish King in Lithuania in 16551656. Lorentz Pasch. 1793. Riddarhuset. Photo by Göran Mörner....309 Figure 19. Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. Governor General of Samogitia and surrounded districts of Lithuania in 1655-1656. 1649. Mathias Merian. ...............................................................................................309 Figure 20. Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov, Grand Duke of Lithuania and Autocrat of Belarus in 1655-1667. 1664. ....................................310 Figure 21. Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Hetman of Zaporozhian Cossacks. 1651. Willem Hondius. ................................................................................311 Figure 22. György II Rákóczi. Prince of Transylvania. 1648. Unknown painter.................................................................................................311 x Abbreviations AGAD Archiwum Gáówne Akt Dawnych (Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw) AR Archiwum Radziwiááów (Radziwiáá’s Archives) in AGAD BA Belaruski arkhiu. Vol.3 : 1. (XV-XVIII). Mensk. 1930. Menskia akty (Belarusian Archives, Acts of Minsk) BAN Biblioteka Akademii Nauk v St. Peterburge (Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg) BEF Belorussia v epokhu feodalisma. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov. Vol. 2. S serediny XVII veka do XVIII veka. Minsk, 1960 (Belarus in the era of feodalism) CL Biblioteka Czartoryskich, Muzeum Narodowe w Krakowie (Czartoryskich Library at the National Museum in Kraków) GDL Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia and Samogitia KA Krigsarkivet (Military Archives of Sweden) KB Kungliga biblioteket (Royal Library-National Library of Sweden) KKVKL Krestoprivodnaya kniga shliakhty Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1655 g. Pamiatniki istorii Vostochnoi Evropy. Istochniki XV-XVII vv. Vol. IV. Ed. Hieronim Grala. MoskvaWarszawa, 1999 (Oath book of the GDL nobility to the Tsar of Muscovy) KU Union of Kơdainiai between Sweden and the GDL, 1655 LM Metryka Litewska. KsiĊga wpisów nr 131. Opracowaá Andrzej Rachuba. Warszawa, 2001 (“Lithuanian Metrica”, Book of Records no. 131 from the State Archives of the GDL) LMAB Lietuvos Mokslǐ Akademijos Biblioteka (Library of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences) LVIA Lietuvos Valstybinis Istorijos Archyvas (Lithuanian State Historical Archive) xi MSR Mikalojaus Kazimiero Šemetos ”Reliacija”. 1994. Senoji Lietuvos literatnjra. Knyga 2. Vilnius (The 1657 Relation of Mikoáaj Szemet) NHAB Natsyjanalny Histarychny Arkhiu Belarusi (National Historical Archive of Belarus) OiRwP Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce. Vol. 1-48. Warszawa, 19561998 (Renaissance and Reformation in Poland) PSB Polski Sáownik Biograficzny (Polish Biographical Dictionary) PSZRI Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii. Poveleniem gosudaria imperatora Nikolaia Pavlovicha sostavlennoe. Sobranie pervoe. S 1649 po 12 dekabria 1825 goda. Vol.1. 1644-1675. St. Petersburg. 1830 (Complete Collection of the Russian Empire Law) VL Prawa, Konstytucye y Przywileie Krolewstwa Polskiego, Wielkiego XiĊstwa Litewskiego y wszystkich prowincyi naleĪących. Volumen Quartum (4). Ab anno 1641 ad annum 1668. 1859. St. Petersburg (Laws, Constitution and Acts of Poland-Lithuania) RGADA Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Russian State Archives for Old Records in Moscow) RA Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden) UBK Universaly Bohdana Khmelnytskoho. Kyiv, 1998 (Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s Edicts) UUB Uppsala universitets bibliotek (Uppsala University Library) xii Acknowledgements My debt to the colleagues is enormous and may be gauged by anyone who glances at my bibliography. My greatest obligation is to Prof. David Gaunt who supervised the doctoral dissertation and with whom I have the honour of working. Without his inspiration I doubt if I would have written about the 1655 Union between Sweden and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. David Gaunt read this book in many drafts and have given much invaluable criticism, wise counsel and friendly encouragement, saved me from many errors. I am also grateful to my former professor Alexander S. Mylnikov (d. 2003) in St. Petersburg who, when I was a young undergraduate, stimulated my interest in Scandinavian history and provided my first scholarship to Sweden. My thanks are due to a large number of scholars and friends in many countries for their most valuable help during all stages of the work. They include colleagues from Belarus: Dr. Henadz Sahanovich, Dr. Ales Zhlutka, Dr. Ihar Lalkou, Dr. Viktor Temushev, Andrei Radaman and Anatol Minkovsky (Minsk); Sweden: Dr. Piotr Wawrzeniuk, Dr. Leos Müller and Maria Söderberg; Poland: Prof. Andrzej Rachuba and Prof. Henryk Lulewicz (Warsaw) and Prof. Ryszard Radzik (Lublin); Lithuania: Dr. Rimantas Žirgulis (Kơdainiai), Dr. Vaida Kamuntaviþienơ, Nerijus Prekeviþius (Kaunas) and Dr. Linas Eriksonas (Vilnius); Russia: Dr. Nikolai V. Nikolaev (St. Petersburg) and Dr. Alexander Tolstikov (Moscow); Dr. Hanno Brand (Groningen), Mikalaj Packajeu (London) and Prof. András Zoltán (Budapest). It is a pleasure to thank the many other people in Sweden, Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine who have given me advice and hospitality. The archivists and librarians in many countries provided me a generous assistance in making available material in their care, thanks all of you. I wish to thank the Swedish State Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies that funded my PhD. It is a pleasure to express thanks, for help of various practical kinds, to the staff of BEEGS–CBEES, in particular Lena Arvidson, Nina Cajhamre, Dr. Helene Carlbäck, Prof. Thomas Lundén, Dusko Topalovic and Erika Vikström-Szulc. I also thank the organisers of international workshop “The Dynamics of Economic Culture in the North– Sea and Baltic Region, ca 1200-1700,” participation in which has enabled me to combine research with productive discussions. I am greatly indebted to those who have read and commented my doctoral dissertation in whole or in part, and particularly to Prof. Jan Glete (Stockxiii holm University), Prof. Andrzej Zakrzewski (Institute of the History of Law, Polish Academy of Sciences), Dr. Leos Müller and Prof. Stellan Dahlgren (Uppsala University), Dr. Madeleine Hurd and Vytautas Petronis (Södertörn University College). I wish also to thank Anders Bäckström and Magnus Sandgren from the Södertörn Publishing Committee for their technical assistance. Lastly, I offer the full measure of my thanks and affection to my loving wife Katja and son Arsenij, to whose most generous kindness I owe a great debt of gratitude. xiv 1 Introduction 1.1 Foreword Substantially my doctoral thesis is devoted to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the country that ceased to exist 200 years ago, and to its unsuccessful union of 1655 with Sweden. Why did I fix upon this topic? We are living in a time when historical interest in union projects in Europe has grown considerably. After the recent enlargement of EU in 2004, the western part of the historical Grand Duchy of Lithuania (all Lithuania, eastern Poland and southern Latvia) joined Sweden (an EU member since 1995) as a common political, juridical, economic and cultural space. At the same time, the eastern part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Belarus and northern Ukraine) for various reasons found itself outside of this process. Nevertheless, the new historical science in Belarus and Ukraine, which arose after 1991, is seeking ways to recover “the European consciousness ” within post-Soviet society. 350 years ago, on October 20, 1655, in Kơdainiai, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia and Samogitia (hereafter the GDL) and Sweden signed an agreement to establish a common federative state. The Union resulted in the adoption of three principle documents. First, the State Union between Sweden and Lithuania. 1172 members of the Lithuanian political nation signed the treaty. Second, the public declaration to the European community by the Lithuanians, giving the reasons for breaking the union with Poland and joining Sweden. Third, on October 23, 1655, the Lithuanian Advisory Council led by Bengt Skytte, viceroy of the Swedish king in Lithuania, was inaugurated. These events influenced international relations in 17th century Europe since they changed the old geopolitical balance. The main legal points of the Kơdainiai Union (hereafter the KU) were the national breach with Poland and the establishment of a Swedish-Lithuanian union in which the GDL aspired to return to international relations as a self-governing subject. The KU meant a new Baltic choice for the GDL. Sweden considerably expanded its Great Power position by adding the territories of Lithuania and Belarus to its Eastern Baltic provinces (Karelia, Ingermanland, Estonia, Livonia and Pomerania). Later Polish historians – the main source of historical interpretations of the Swedish- Lithuanian Union - created a negative image of the KU as a treacherous and insignificant episode, with no important conse1 quences. As a result, Polish historians interpret the connection of the Lithuanian political nation with Sweden as a betrayal of national interests. They portray the KU as a forced, insignificant and short-term action taken under the extreme conditions that prevailed during the Second Northern War. The Polish historical school predestined this approach to western historiography. In reality, this union was a result of strong separatist dreams among the Lithuanian and Ruthenian Protestant elite, which, if implemented, would have changed the balance of power in the Baltic radically. Most Swedish historians view the GDL from the Polish perspective, according to which Lithuania was a Polish province that rebelled against the legitimate ruler. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is not seen as a union between two states but as a single Polish state. Therefore, the Swedish historical descriptions that treat the relations between Sweden and the Commonwealth see simply as the relations between Sweden and Poland. Thus, in Western political history of Eastern Europe, the GDL is usually hidden in the shadows of Poland and Russia. The KU was of great importance to the Polish national memory as a historical symbol of the highest treason. Because of the writings of the Nobel Prize winning author Henryk Sienkiewicz (1905), the image of a treacherous Lithuania is familiar to every Polish school child. A Polish nobleman Zahloba – the hero of Sienkiewicz’s novel ”The Deluge” – condemns the Janusz Radziwiáá’s decision to change to the side of Sweden in this way: “Traitor! Super-traitor!”1 The union between Sweden and the GDL is also an important part of the historical consciousness of present-day Lithuania and Belarus. For them, the treaty is a proof of their right to independence and statehood. Therefore, the task of this thesis is to bring new light and a new interpretation to the issue, through discovering new historical sources. This work attempts to avoid the competing nationalist understanding (Polish, Lithuanian or Belarusian) of the KU. I think the more important is to put the research in the GDL proper and provide a historiographical review of what has been written on the KU. Today, Janusz Radziwiáá is still considered an apostate in Polish history. However, in present-day Lithuania, Radziwiáá, despite his Calvinist confession, is one of the most popular national heroes. A brigade of the Lithuanian army bears his name. To honour the 350th anniversary of the KU with Sweden a monument of the grand hetman, who considered his motherland to be the multicultural Grand Duchy rather than ethnic Lithuania, was erected in Kơdainiai. The structure of the thesis conforms with the intention to analyze the Swedish-Lithuanian Union at Kơdainiai and to reveal its political, economic 1 Grala, Hieronim. 2004. “Non-Empire”. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Polish national memory. Ab Imperio. No 4. Available on Internet: http://abimperio.net 2 and religious preconditions and repercussions. The author tries to place the revolt and the union in the context of a general European crisis, its consequences for the GDL and Sweden. The author shows the role of the GDL in the eastern politics of Sweden and in changes in the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe in the middle of the 17th century. My debt to previous historians is presented in chapters two and five, although I offer some new points. Chapters three and four are based on archival and other primary sources. To reveal the tradition of close political, economic and religious relationships that joined political elites of the GDL and Sweden – the question that present-day historians fail to touch upon - is the aim of the second chapter. The first section of that chapter is devoted to the GDL in the first half of the 17th century, the growth of Lithuanian separatism and its effect on the Polish-Lithuanian federation. An attempt is made to outline the role of the GDL in the eastern geopolitics of Sweden in the 1650s. The third chapter treats the KU between Sweden and Lithuania and the reasons for its failure. Based on new sources, a number of new conclusions can be drawn. Apart from new arguments, I present some unknown facts. The geographical analysis of the political and religious adherence of the signers of the KU proved that Radziwiáá’s Protestant political faction played the first fiddle in the alliance with Sweden. The systematic investigation of the situation in the Swedish zone of the GDL presents new material, as does a sustained effort to explain the role of Russia in the anti-Swedish uprising. Chapter four attempts an integrated examination of the position of the GDL in the middle of the 17th century. I describe the orientation and collaboration of different political factions, as well as ethnic and religious groups within the Lithuanian elite towards neighbouring powers that laid claim to its land. The attempts to legitimate the control of the Lithuanian territory on behalf of Sweden, Poland, Russia, the Ukrainian Hetmanate and Transylvania have also been examined. The GDL played a central role in the conflict of the great powers and in the changing international situation in Eastern Europe. The new themes are as follows: • Bogusáaw Radziwiáá’s attempts to establish a small semiindependent state as a Swedish protectorate • The 1656 treaty at Radnot between Sweden, Transylvania, Prussia and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá and its consequences for PolandLithuania. • Sweden – Transylvania – Ukraine – Radziwiáá siege of Brest in 1657 and the conflict between the allies for the city • The role of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Swedish diplomacy The main historiographic question that I will try to discuss is the short and long-term consequences of the general crises of the GDL. 3 1.2 On practical matters Proper nouns within the Lithuanian political nation are written in the three main scripts: Polish, Cyrillic, and Latin. I have rejected the use of modernized versions of those names, as is popular in modern Lithuania and Belarus, and have instead used the historical (so-called Polish) forms of proper nouns, as this is the usage is most common in the sources from the 17th century. The names of some well-known persons from Eastern and Northern Europe are given in compliance with the rules of their modern national languages. Geographical names are given in the form and script they have in their present-day locations in Lithuania, Belarus, Poland, Russia and Ukraine. This makes their localization much easier. In cases when the historical and present-day geographical names differ both versions are given. For this reason, the names of the settlements in Livonia, Courland, Prussia and Transylvania are given in two versions. With certain exceptions, e.g. well-known surnames, the Cyrillic script of Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian names and titles is rendered by a simplified version of the US Library of Congress system. Almost the entire administrative vocabulary of the GDL political system is translated into corresponding or similar English terms in use at that period of time (see also appendix III). The name of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia and Samogitia (the full official name) appears in three variants in its most popular abbreviated form – the GDL (known in contemporary Latin, Polish and Ruthenian sources as MDL, W.X.L or ȼɄɅ) and also as the Duchy or simply as Lithuania. All of these have historical meanings and do not refer to the smaller territory of the present-day Republic of Lithuania. The federation appears in this text as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Poland-Lithuania, or simply the Commonwealth (the English translation of the most usual 17th century name of the state: Rzeczpospolita). The language and culture of the East Slavic people of the Commonwealth were different from Muscovites of Russia and these are therefore termed Ruthenians. This term appears in 17th century English sources. Two maps made with the assistance of Dr Viktor Temushev are appended to the thesis. The first “The Swedish military operations and zones of control in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 1655-1657” illustrates the period of active Swedish operations. The second ”The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its administrative, geographical and religious divisions, 1654-1667” has been drawn because it is hard to find a reliable map of the 17th century GDL. There are numerous mistakes in the available 17th century GDL maps in modern Belarusian, Lithuanian and Polish editions. As a rule, earlier historical maps do not denote the provinces of the GDL, the main religious centres and the hereditary principalities of the Radziwiáás. Inaccuracies in the earlier maps include incorrect borders between the GDL and Courland, and the 4 western border with Poland, and inaccuracies in some administrative boundaries. 1.3 Theoretical Framework, Choice of Method and Aims of the Thesis In 1935 the French intellectual historian Paul Hazard published his classic book “La Crise de la conscience européenne” which probably for the first time considered the 17th century as a century of general crisis and fundamental change.2 In the 1960s and 1970s a group of historians of early modern Europe debated the causes of the general crisis of the 17th century. In view of the great number of wars, rebellions and civil wars that occurred from Portugal to Ukraine in the middle of the century,3 such prominent historians as Trevor Aston, Eric Hobsbawn, Hugh Redwald Trevor-Roper, Geoffrey Parker, Lesley M. Smith, Niels Steensgaard and Roland Mousnier argued that a general crisis did indeed take place in 17th century Europe, especially at mid-century.4 However, each scholar had a different (economic, political, religious or cultural) explanation for the crisis. Some saw it primarily as an economic crisis, other as a political crisis. Other scholars rejected this theory completely. For example, the Dutch historian Ivo Schöffer questioned how one could speak of a general crisis at a time when Holland was experiencing its golden age.5 Even from Swedish point of view it is difficult to perceive this period as a crisis. Sweden rose into a Great Power in that time. The historians of the political aspects of the general crisis, particularly Trevor-Roper, advanced two theses. First, previous researchers had regarded this question from the point of individual nations, without making comparisons. By contrast, Trevor-Roper stressed that “the middle of the 17th century was a period of revolutions in Europe. These revolutions differed from place to place, and if studied separately, seemed to rise out of particular, local 2 Hazard, Paul. 1935. La crise de la conscience européenne: 1680-1715. Vol. 1-3. Paris. Among them were: the Bohemian revolt against the Habsburg Empire (1618-21); the Puritan revolution in England (1640-1660); the French Fronde (1648-1653), the palace revolution in Holland (1650); the revolt of Portugal (1640-68), the revolts of Catalonia (1640) and Andalusia (1641); the revolt of Naples and Palermo (1647); the Scotish rebellion and civil war between Scotland and England (1644-47); the Peasant revolt in Switzerland (1652-1653); the Cossack revolt of Ukraine (1648-59); the breaking of the Poland-Lithuanian union by the Lithuanian separatists and its attempt to unite with Sweden (1655-57); the war of Ducal Prussia with Poland (1656-57); the aggression of the Ottoman Empire against its vassal Transylvania (1657-60); and Stenka Razin’s revolt in Russia (1670-71). 4 Crisis in Europe 1560-1660. Ed. Trevor Aston. New York, 1965; The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century. Ed. Geoffrey Parker. London, 1978. 5 Schöffer, Ivo. 1978. Did Holland’s Golden Age Coincide with a Period of Crisis. The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, p. 83-109. 3 5 causes; but if we look at them together they have so many common features that they appear almost as a general revolution.”6 Second, the historians pointed out that the character of the political crisis in Europe in the middle of the 17th century, was interpreted by contemporaries as “universal”.7 Considerable effort has been given to refining the term “crisis”. According to Trevor-Roper, the general crisis “was a crisis not of the constitution nor of the system of production, but of the State, or rather, of the relation of the State to society.” However, “different countries found their way out of that crisis in different ways.”8 At the same time, argues John H. Elliott and A. Lloyd Moote, the problem at issue did not concern nationalism, as it is understood today. Rather, it was a conflict between ”Patria” and ”State”, which the historians then defined as the struggle of the native local community and its leading elements against the central power, for the recognition of their own legal system or/and independence.9 Researchers who focused on the political aspects of the general crisis attempted to define the most prevalent types. Thus, Perez Zagorin established five distinct types: • Provincial, regional and separatist rebellion by regional elites/native nobility and societies or dependent realms against their monarchies, or against foreign centres. • Kingdom-wide civil war against the Royal power based on noble and aristocratic leadership and involving the entire society. • Conspiracy and coup, limited to the action of aristocratic elites. • Agrarian rebellion by peasants and their allies against state authority and/or landlords. • Urban revolts by plebeian social groups against urban patricians or by urban communities against external royal/state authority.10 In case of the GDL, I deal with several types of the crisis, which, however, were complicated by external aggression by a number of states. The balance of power approach, developed by political scientists, is an important theoretical background for this thesis. In this sense it puts the subject of thesis in context of new diplomatic history. According to those who analyze the balance of power in the early modern period of Europe, ”the Great Powers have been traditionally distinguished from other states and 6 Trevor-Roper, Hugh Redwald. 1965. The General Crisis of the seventeenth century. Crisis in Europe 1560-1660, p. 59. Parker, Geoffrey; Smith, Lesley M. 1978. Introduction. Historians and the “General Crisis”. The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, p. 1-25. 8 Trevor-Roper, The General Crisis of the seventeenth century, p. 95. 9 Moote, A. Lloyd. 1978. The preconditions of revolution in Early Modern Europe: did they really exist? The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, p. 142-143. 10 Zagorin, Perez. 1982. Rebels and Rulers, 1500-1660. In two volumes. Cambridge University Press. Vol. I, p. 41. 7 6 viewed as the dominant actors in international politics.”11 Generally, minor states were viewed as marginal, in the context of the alliances created by the Great Powers in the 17th century.12 Thus, small powers were rated as the passive objects of Great Power policy, rather than as full and active subjects of international relations. The terminology of balance of power emerged as a distinct discourse in the 17th century as a result of the European political system, which was established by the peace of Westphalia (1648) and became a recognized norm of international law in the treaty of Utrecht (1713).13 The researchers in this school examine the development of those attempts that were made to preserve or change the geopolitical balance between the Great Powers, as a consensus among the major powers over territorial alterations. At the same time, the re-distribution of power among a set number of Great Powers led to the systematic eclipse of the smaller states.14 So historical research focused on relations between the Great Powers, and so called ”lesser powers”, ”ally states”, ”minor allies” or “semi-independent states” remained on the periphery of research interest. For example, the classical picture of the international relations during the Second Northern War (1655-60) is that of a sphere of action constituted by many Great and Regional Powers: Sweden, Russia, Poland, Denmark, the Habsburg Empire, Holland and France. The new perspective undermines the important role that lesser actors played, not least because of their role in balancing relations among Great Powers. Support or lack of support of lesser actors could determine the final outcome of conflicts between Great Powers. My aim is to focus on several lesser actors at that time. Among these were: • The Orthodox Ukrainian Hetmanate (under the autonomy of Russia, then Poland and then Russia again) • Protestant Transylvania (a vassal of Ottoman Empire), • Protestant Ducal Prussia (a vassal of Poland) • Protestant Courland (a vassal of Poland) • Protestant–Catholic ”Lesser” Livonia (a condominium of PolandLithuania) • Multiconfessional Grand Duchy of Lithuania (in a federation with Poland). 11 Levy, Jack S. 1983. War in the modern great power system, 1495-1975. The University Press of Kentucky, p. 2. 12 Luard, Evan. 1992. The balance of power. The system of international relations, 16481815. London, p. 256-263. 13 Duchhardt, Heinz. 1997. Balance of power und Pentarchie: internationale Beziehungen 1700-1785. München, p. 9-23. 14 Teschke, Benno. 2003. The myth of 1648. Class, geopolitics, and the making of modern international relations. London, New York, p. 236-237. 7 At that time, each of these states had its own geopolitical interests. They were disloyal towards their formal rulers and collaborated with foreign Great Powers against their central power. I am going to show that all of these minor states played a significant role in international relations of Eastern Europe in the mid-17th century. For example, on December 6, 1656, Sweden signed with their non-Catholic allies the secret Compact of Radnot concerning the future partition of Poland-Lithuania. It was the first partition treaty in the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Researchers of early modern international relations simplify the picture by concentrating on the point of view of the Great Powers. I think it important to highlight the role of small states in the changes of the balance of power in the Eastern Baltic, in particular, and the whole of Eastern Europe in general. The GDL and other semi-independent minor states of the region are the focus here. From this point of view the following questions have of importance: • Was the GDL’s role essential in changing the geopolitical situation in the Eastern Baltic? • What roles were played by the different groups of Lithuanian nobility in foreign policy of the Regional Powers? The foreign policy of minor powers can be viewed as if they were active and equal players in the international arena, with their own geopolitical interests. This allows us to bring to the interpretation of early modern international relations a deeper level of comprehension. The main method of research used here is the system analysis approach. A case study of the European crisis is the main objective. First, this is a system research of the crisis in which the GDL was placed in the mid-17th century through its elite’s contacts with Sweden. Second, this is an attempt to place this crisis within a wide geographical field and within the context of global changes in the political situation of the states adjoining the GDL. Practically, no one has previous examined the crises in the GDL and made systemic use of the European crisis school theory. A set of questions can be formulated as follows: • What social reasons brought the Lithuanian elite to attempt to breach the federation with Poland and unite with Sweden? • What role did the GDL play in Swedish foreign policy at that time? • What aims did the Protestant faction of the Radziwiáás have for the union with Sweden? • What motivated different groups of the Lithuanian nobility to betray Poland? • What projects to legitimate their power over the GDL did the occupation powers have? 8 • What short-term and long-term consequences did the general crisis of the 17th century have for Lithuania and Belarus? 1.4 Previous research The Polish historians provided the first appraisals of the KU already at the end of the 17th century. Up to the beginning of the 20th century, works by Jan Wawrzyniec Rudawski and Wespazjan Kochowski were considered definitive works on the subject of Polish historiography. Here I refer to Rudawski’s History of Poland from the death of Wladyslaw IV to the peace at Oliwa, or the history of the reign of King Jan Kazimierz, 1648 to 1660 (1672-1674),15 and Kochowski’s History of Poland climacter secundus and the wars with Sweden, Transylvania and Muscovy from 1655 to 1661 (1688).16 According to these historians, the KU was an act of treachery towards Polish national interests. They both blamed Janusz Radziwiáá and Lithuanian Protestants and held them responsible for the military catastrophe of 16541657. According to these authors, Janusz Radziwiáá was the main apostate in the history of Poland-Lithuania. However, both books lacked precision. For example, the authors knew little about the KU and believed the preliminary declaration of the Lithuanian estates in August 17, 1655 to be the final document of the union with Sweden, rather than the first step. They used inaccurate Polish copies of the August Declaration, in which it was dated August 18, 1655. Rudawski and Kochowski did not know about the antiSwedish uprising in 1656. As has been discussed by Lithuanian researcher Antanas Tyla, all these inconsistencies were uncritically accepted by generations of Polish historians.17 The Radziwiáás’ court historian Samuel Przypkowski was the first to express the view of Lithuanian separatists.18 At the end of 1655, probably in Kơdainiai, his work ”Apologia of His Lordship Prince Janusz Duke of Radziwiáá” came out anonymously.19 Przypkowski defended Radziwiáá and 15 Rudawski, Jan Wawrzyniec. 1855. Historja polska od Ğmierci Wáadysáawa IV aĪ do pokoju oliwskiego, czyli dzieje panowania Jana Kazimierza od 1648 do 1660 r. Vol. 1-2. Ed. Wáodzimierz Spasowicz. Petersburg –Mohylew. 16 Kochowski, Wespazjan. 1840-1859. Historya panowania Jana Kazimierza. Ed. Edward RaczyĔski. Vol. 1-3. PoznaĔ. 17 Tyla, Antanas. 1984. Kơdainiǐ sutarties vertinimas XVII a. – 1940 m. istoriografijoje. Lietuvos TSR Mokslǐ Akademijos Darbai, Serija A. Vol. 2 (87), p. 59-71. 18 Chmaj, Ludwik. 1927. Samuel Przypkowski na tle rządów religijnych XVII wieku. Kraków, p. 53. 19 [Przypkowski, Samuel] Apologia pro illustrissimo ac celsissimo principe Janussio duce Radvilio, Sacri Romani Imperii PRINCIPE, DUCE BIRSARUM et DUBINCORUM &c. 9 the Protestants from the accusation of high treason, basing his defence on Lithuanian law. In the author’s opinion, the king of Poland, Jan Kazimierz, was the one to be blamed for the catastrophic situation in which the GDL ended up in 1655. The king, as leader of the army, failed to defend the country. Furthermore, he fled from it disreputably. Thus the monarch failed to keep his promise, made before the GDL, to defend their Patria. In these circumstances, the Lithuanian administration had full authority to make its own decisions. In Przypkowski’s opinion, the union with Sweden was the only means by which it was possible to defend the unoccupied rest of the Duchy. Przypkowski pointed out that the Lithuanian estates made this decision, not Radziwiáá alone. The nobility was willing to join Sweden, but claimed that Janusz Radziwiáá had made the decision. Przypkowski emphasized that the discussion of the union agreement was carried out in public, not in secret. The senators and dignitaries had discussed the provisions. Most of the GDL’s nobility, including the Catholics led by the bishop of Samogitia, had signed the union with Sweden. Przypkowski’s work was unpopular among early modern Polish-Lithuanian historians, because of its anti-state rhetoric and most modern historians ignored it. During the Russian Empire, some historians of the GDL began to criticise the negative appraisal of the KU which dominated Polish historiography. In 1840, the Lithuanian-Polish Calvinist nobleman Valerian KrasiĔski published in exile a history of Reformation in Poland-Lithuania. The author disagreed with the Polish historians who blamed the Lithuanian Protestants for “the Kơdainiai treason”. KrasiĔski emphasized that the union with Sweden was signed by majority of the Catholic nobility, including the bishop of Samogitia. He used this fact to draw a new sort of conclusion. According to KrasiĔski, the nature of the KU, which he erroneous believed took place on August 16 1655, “was purely political and not religious and was brought about for the separate interest of the Lithuanians, and not of the Protestants.” The decision of Lithuanian nobility to accept the protection of Swedish king was thus not apostasy, but the only possible Realpolitik decision in the conditions of Russian and Ukrainian occupation of most part of Lithuanian territory and the submission of Great Poland to Karl X Gustav.20 In 1859, Edward Kotáubaj, a Lithuanian Tatar noble, published a biography of Janusz Radziwiáá. He defended his hero from the criticism of Polish historians. He wrote that the accusation that Radziwiáá had deliberately surrendered Vilnius was unjust. Kotáubaj admitted that Radziwiáá, as a leader of the Protestants, was in touch with Sweden before the war. However, these contacts seemed quondam PALATINO VILNENSI, et EXERCITUUM Magni Ducatus Litvaniae SUPREMO GENERALI. 61 pp. CL, no 11615.I. 20 Krasinski, Valerian. 1840. Historical Scetch of the Rise, Progress and Decline of the Reformation in Poland. In two volumes. London. Vol. II, p. 276-277. 10 purely religious in character. In Kotáubaj’s opinion, the Catholic reaction of the first half of the 17th century, supported by the kings of Polish Vasa dynasty, forced the Radziwiáá faction to sever its relations with Poland and conclude a union with Sweden. Thus, the first reason for the union with Sweden was the religious oppression of the Lithuanian Protestants. The second reason was the invasion of the GDL by Russia and Ukraine. Poland failed to help Lithuania against the Russian and Cossack aggression. The Polish king Jan Kazimierz had fled abroad. In these conditions the political governing body of the GDL decided to accept the protection of the Swedish king. According to Kotáubaj, this was a necessary and morally justified act. The historian emphasized that Polish authors treated Janusz Radziwiáá as a traitor and the main instigator of the KU only “because he was a dissident.” Kotáubaj admitted that there was a group of Lithuanian nobility that was against the union with Sweden. However, this group, unlike the Radziwiáá faction, did not have a viable program for saving the duchy from the crisis.21 The modern Polish view on the KU is expressed by Ludwik Kubaáa, in a work published in 1913. In his opinion, the Union between Sweden and Lithuania was not equal, but implied submission. Kubaáa characterized the Lithuanian separatists and their leader, Janusz Radziwiáá, only negatively. According to him, Radziwiáá was “a traitor who had led many nobles in Lithuania into treachery.” From his point of view Radziwiáá cared only about personal gain and not about the security of the Duchy. Kubaáa claimed that the nobility of Lithuania was strongly dissatisfied with the union with Sweden. However, that applied only to the parts of the nobility that favoured Poland or Russia. Kubaáa also repeated an early-modern myth about the destruction by the Swedes of the Roman Catholic churches in Lithuania. This is a myth, which is based on folk legends and literary images dating from 18th century. Kubaáa’s portrait of the death of Janusz Radziwiáá is fantastic. The author believes that Radziwiáá preferred to poison himself. Before death he cried out to Satan. Thereafter, he invited in the Catholic priest and told him: “I do not want to die as a traitor.”22 The sources provide no evidence for this scene. In 1935, the Polish historians Wáadysáaw KonopczyĔski and Kazimierz Lepszy published in Vilnius the documents of the KU, together with several related sources.23 This edition was marred by many errors. The authors did not print the final agreements made in October 1655, and erroneously believed that the final act took place on August 18, 1655. The publication of the names of the signatories also contained a number of mistakes. Hence, this edition received a crushing but fair review by the Lithuanian 21 Kotáubaj, Edward. 1859. ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa. Wilno-Witebsk, p. 200-212. Kubaáa, Ludwik. 1913. Wojna szwecka w roku 1655-1656. Lwów, p. 86-93. 23 KonopczyĔski, Wáadysáaw and Lepszy, Kazimierz. 1935. Akta Ugody Kiedanskiej 1655 roku. Ateneum WileĔskie, Vol.10, Wilno, p. 173-224. 22 11 professor Adolfas Šapoka.24 Despite its inaccuracies, this edition became the basis for many historians’ publications on the topic. For example, David Kirby wrote: ”In Lithuania, the hetman Janusz Radziwill signed an act of submission on 18 August: De la Gardie’s army occupied most of Samogitia.”25 In the 1970s and 1980s, in Poland, a discussion assessing of the matter of KU took place between Tadeusz Wasilewski and Henryk Wisner. The KU was described by Wasilewski as a betrayal of national interests. He stressed the principal role of the Lithuanian Protestants in all the events.26 In his biography of Janusz Radziwiáá, written for the Polish Biographical Dictionary, Wasilewski claimed that Radziwiáá was the greatest traitor in the history of Poland-Lithuania.27 Henryk Wisner is the only Polish historian writing on our topic who has good knowledge of Swedish sources. This enabled Wisner to comprehend the problem of the KU more extensively. According to him, the Union with Sweden was a forced and short-term measure taken under the extreme conditions of the Second Northern War. During the war with Russia, and given the military weakness of Poland, a portion of the Lithuanian elite accepted Swedish protection. Wisner criticized the traditional Polish view, which he termed “the black legend of Radziwiáá.” He noted that the KU had wide support among the Lithuanian nobility, and was not taken on the initiative of Radziwiáá alone. Unlike Wasilewski, Wisner saw no religious basis for the union with Sweden. The Catholics voluntarily signed the union, which guaranteed the rights of the Roman Catholic, Uniate and Orthodox Churches. Moreover, no mention was made of the Protestant confessions.28 In a later work, Wisner compared the KU with the 1655 act of submission to the king of Sweden by Great Poland’s nobility at UjĞcie. Concerning the content of the KU, Wisner recognized that it was to be a federation of two states and not an unequal submission to Sweden. He remarked, however, that as a result of the KU “the GDL had not even a shadow of sovereignty.”29 24 Šapoka, Adolfas. 1940. Dơl prof. KonopczyĔskio paskelbtǐjǐ 1655 m. Kedainiǐ sutarties dokumentǐ. Lietuvos praeitis. Vol.1. Kaunas, p. 305-306; Šapoka, Adolfas. 1990. 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ sutartis arba švedai Lietuvoje 1655-1656 metais. Vilnius, p. 51, 67-68, 74-78, 111 etc. 25 Kirby, David. 1990. Northern Europe in the Early Modern period. The Baltic world 14921772. London and New York, p. 186. 26 Wasilewski, Tadeusz. 1973. Zdrada Janusza Radziwiááa w 1655 r. i jej wyznaniowe motywy. OiRwP. Vol. 18. Warszawa, p. 125-147. 27 Wasilewski, Tadeusz.1987. Radziwiáá, Janusz. PSB, vol. XXX/1, p. 125. 28 Wisner, Henryk. 1970. Dysydenci litewscy wobec wybuchu wojny polsko-szwedskiej (1655-1660). OiRwP. Vol. XV, p. 130-144; Wisner, Henryk. 1981. Rok 1655 w Litwie: pertraktacje ze Szwecją i kwestia wyznaniowa. OiRwP. Vol. XXVI, p. 83-103 29 Wisner, Henryk. 2000. Janusz Radziwiáá 1612-1655. Wojewoda wileĔski. Hetman wielki litewski. Warszawa, p. 213. 12 Other Polish historians developed Wisner’s point of view. They stressed that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a federation of two equal states and thus the GDL could follow its own geopolitical interests. These historians point to the long tradition of separate agreements between Sweden and the GDL.30 Andrzej Rachuba made important contributions by researching the attitudes of the pro-Polish Lithuanian nobility towards the union with Sweden.31 However, most present-day Polish historians still regard the KU as “an evident act of apostasy breaking all the provisions of the Lublin union.”32 At the same time, Polish researchers consider the 1569 Lublin union of Lithuania and Poland in exclusively positive terms. In their opinion, the voluntary joining of Lithuania and Belarus to Poland cleared their way to Western civilization and opened the door to “a higher” Polish culture to them. A weak point in most Polish historians’ work related on our topic is their neglect of Swedish archives. They restrict themselves to a limited type of sources. Very few Polish historians have investigated the social conditions of the KU, the subsequent political events and the KU’s more far-reaching consequences. Very few considered the events against the background of the 17th century international crisis as a system, working only on its separate national aspects. Perhaps the only historian who fully studied an aspect of the general crisis (in this case, demographic) in the GDL after 1667 was Józef Morzy.33 The national Belarusian and Lithuanian historiographies that arose at the beginning of the 20th century gave new impetus to the interest in the KU. They started to compare the 1569 Lublin union with Poland with the 1655 KU with Sweden. The Lublin union was viewed negatively, as the domination of Poland, and the end of independent Lithuanian or Belarusian political culture. The KU, on the contrary, was accepted as a positive event.34 The 30 Wójcik, Zbigniew. 1994. The separatist tendencies in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 17th century. Acta Poloniae Historica. Vol. 69, p. 55-62; Matwijów, Maciej. 1990. Koncepcje polityki Janusza Radziwiááa w latach 1648-1655. Proba interpretacji. Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. No 1108. Historia LXXV, p. 33-42; Rachuba, Andrzej. 2002. Wielkie KsiĊstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1569-1763. Warszawa. 31 Rachuba, Andrzej. 1994. Konfederacja wojska litewskiego w Wierzboáowie w 1655. Miscellanea historico-archiwistica. Warszawa. Vol. IV. p. 13-31; Rachuba, Andrzej. 1977. Paweá Sapieha wobec Szwecji i Jana Kazimierza (IX 1655-II 1656). Acta Baltico-Slavica. Vol. XI, p. 81-107. 32 Królikowski, Bohdan. 2000. WĞród Sarmatów. Radziwiááowie i pamiĊtnikarze. Lublin, p. 41. 33 Morzy, Józef. 1965. Kryzys demograficzny na Litwie i Biaáorusi w II poáowie XVII wieku. PoznaĔ. 34 For the Belarusian opinion see: Bohdanovich, Maksim. (1915). Belorusskoe Vozrozhdenie. Bahdanovich, Maksim. Zbor tvorau. Minsk, p. 254-265; Lutskevich, Anton. (1918). Ab dziarzhaunym budaunitstve. Belaruskaya dumka XX st. Warszawa. 1998, p. 7-8. For the Lithuanian opinion see: Šlinjpas, Jonas. 1905. Lietuviǐ tauta senovơje ir šiandien. Vol. 2. 13 contrast “bad union-good union”, which viewed the union with Sweden as an alternative to the Polish or Russian connection, meant that the KU started to play a significant role in the works of Lithuanian and Belarusian historians. Moreover, interpretations of the unions with Poland and Sweden were energetically adapted to modern national movements. In 1910, the first history of Belarus in the Belarusian language appeared, in Vilnius. The author was the Lithuanian nobleman Vaclau Lastouski, a leader of the Belarusian national movement. He claimed that the Union of Lublin was involuntary. According to Lastouski, the aim of Polish politicians had been to incorporate Lithuania and Belarus into the Polish state rather than to unite the GDL with Poland, as an equal partner. As a result, the GDL became a dependent colony of Poland, something that also led to the cultural polonization of the Ruthenian nobility.35 In contrast, the KU was highly appreciated: The dream of independence of Lithuania from Poland was again born in the minds of the magnates and Lithuanian princes again. Janusz Radziwiáá with his supporters suggested passing Lithuania under the guardianship of Swedish king on the same conditions as it was hitherto united with Poland. It was the last attempt of the Belarusian-Lithuanian nation to break loose from dependency on Poland, an essential national thought of building an independent Lithuanian sovereign entity.36 Another historian and prominent figure of the Belarusian national movement wrote: The political concept of the GDL resting upon retention of its independence living in peace with one neighbour [Poland] and struggling against the other [Muscovy] turned out to be erroneous. The gist of the error lay in the fact that this, so called, peaceful neighbour [Poland] expressed the same desire to grasp Belarus. When the falseness of this GDL’s foreign policy became obvious a new concept appeared: successful struggle against Muscovy and Poland necessitates resting upon Sweden in the form of the alliance with it. This Scandinavian direction in the international policy of Belarus [sic!] was realized in the mid-17th century. It was a strong action, since Sweden at that time played a key role in international relations. Janusz Radziwiáá and his cousin Bogusáaw represented this new Belarusian political course [sic!]. However this course was insufficiently popular in the society and therefore failed.37 Plymouth, p. 133-134; Alekna, Antanas. 1925. Lietuvos istorijos pradžiamokslis su 15 paveikslǐ ir 2 žemơlapiais. Kaunas, p. 46. 35 Vlast [Lastouski, Vaclau]. 1910. Karotkaya historya Belarusi z 40 rysunkami. Vilna [Vilnius], p. 45-52. 36 Ibid., p. 81. 37 Szkalienok, Mikola. 1941. Bielarus-Litva-Kryvia. Szkalienok, Mikola. Belarus i susedzi. Biaáystok, 2003, p. 63-64. 14 Lithuanian historians made valuable contributions to the study of the KU. In 1928, Povilas Gronskis (Paul Gronski) published an article in ”Revue historique” which has relevance to our topic. The author examined juridical aspects of the KU, emphasizing the equality and mutual obligations of the federation partners. He was also the first to analyze the general political situation in the GDL in 1655, treating among other things the claims of the Russian tsar to possession of Lithuania and Belarus. He noted that in 1655 the Lithuanian political nation had three options: to remain faithful the king of Poland even if he abandoned the country to its fate, to seek for mutual consent with Muscovy, or to turn to Sweden for protection in the hope of winning the war against the Muscovites and of liberating the GDL. Gronskis was very critical in his evaluation of the results of the 1569 Lublin union with Poland. In his view “the decomposed organism of the dualistic PolishLithuanian Commonwealth disintegrated on its own. In the hope of preserving the territorial integrity of the GDL and of saving it from conquest by the Muscovite army, Grand Hetman Radziwiáá started negotiations with the commander-in-chief of the Swedish army Magnus De la Gardie and concluded in result the KU.” According to Gronskis, the KU was not an act of treason but rather the only logical step from the point view of Realpolitik. “The power holder Janusz Radziwiáá believed that with the acceptance of a real union with Sweden, the GDL could organize its existence more efficiently than it did as part of the dualistic system of the Commonwealth.” If, from the point of view of the Poles, this agreement was treason, the grand hetman, on the contrary, viewed it as a way to protect the interests of his country. Radziwiáá hoped that Swedish protection would save Lithuania from anarchy, making it possible to live in peace, to develop economically as the south-eastern part of the large Swedish Empire, in the conditions of an equal union in which Lithuania would be guaranteed prosperity, religious tolerance and civilization. However, following in the steps of earlier historians, Gronskis mistakenly considered the 17 August declaration a final act of the union and gives the date as August 18, 1655. Therefore, his conclusions rested upon the declaration of the GDL’s estates of August 17, 1655, the provisions of which were in fact different from the final acts of the KU. The author wrongly asserted that the text of KU “accentuated the special status of Janusz Radziwiáá.” The exact origin of the copy of the August Declaration, which was published by Gronskis, is unknown.38 One non-Scandinavian historian who used sources in the National Archives of Sweden was the Lithuanian Professor Adolfas Šapoka. In 1933 he received a scholarship at the University College of Stockholm and in 1939 38 Gronski, Paul (Gronskis, Povilas). 1928. Le traité Lituano-Suédois de Keidany (18 aout 1655). Revue historique. Vol. 159. p. 291-304. 15 he published the first results of his work in an article.39 However, his wellresearched monograph “The Union of Kơdainiai of 1655 and Swedes in Lithuania, 1655-56” remained in manuscript form for many years and was published in Lithuanian relatively recently.40 Šapoka wrote his work in the form of day-by-day narration, starting at the end of 1655 and proceeding through the spring of 1656. The social pre-conditions for the idea of Swedish-Lithuanian union are not treated. The author began his monograph with the Russian and Ukrainian attack on the Commonwealth, and the diplomatic contacts between the Radziwiáá faction and Sweden at that time. His story ends in the spring 1656, though the pro-Swedish party within the Lithuanian nobility existed until end of 1657, and the Swedish policy in Lithuania was actively continued. Šapoka regarded the KU as an attempt by the Lithuanian estates to keep their country intact in the face of a military crisis. He showed that the attitude of the nobility towards the union with Sweden differed from the very beginning. The character of Swedish politics in the occupied zone is viewed negatively. The author argued that this policy became the main reason for the anti-Swedish uprising. Finally, Šapoka admitted, “the consequences of Kơdainiai political acts were felt in the GDL for a long time after 1656.” However, he ended his narrative with “the sense of political events around the alliance of the GDL and Sweden seemed to have cleared up.”41 His ethnic Lithuanian-centric view limited geographical range. Šapoka was primarily interested in the ethnically Lithuanian regions. The events in the Ruthenian lands of the GDL are treated only fragmentarily. Unlike previous Polish historians, the author proved that the KU had been signed in behalf of the whole Duchy and was not a conspiracy of the Radziwiáá family. The KU was supported by wide circles of the Lithuanian nobility. The Swedish sources reveal to the historian the essential role of Boguslaw Radziwiáá in Swedish-Lithuanian relations, a fact that Polish historians ignored. Nevertheless, Šapoka limited his Swedish archival research mostly to the collection “Militaria.”42 The author did not investigate many other collections and early modern imprints available in the National Archives of Sweden, the Royal Library of Sweden and the Uppsala University Library. Neither were important publications such as the protocols of the Swedish Parliament and the Council of the Realm utilized.43 Owing to the contemporary political situation, the author was unable to familiarize himself with the relevant archives 39 Šapoka, Adolfas. 1939. Jonušas Radvila ir Švedija. Židinys. No 8-9, p. 214-229. Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ sutartis arba švedai Lietuvoje 1655-1656 metais. 41 Ibid., p. 177. 42 RA. Militaria. Krighistoriska handlingar. Karl X Gustafs tid. Polska kriget 1655-60. Vol. M. 1304. 43 Svenska Riksrådets protokoll. Ed. Walfrid Enblom. Vol. 17, 1657. Stockholm, 1929; Sveriges Ridderskaps och Adels Riksdags- protokoll. Vol. 6. 1656-1658. Stockholm, 1877; Sveriges Ridderskaps och Adels Riksdags- protokoll. Vol. 7. 1660. Stockholm, 1881. 40 16 of Poland (Warsaw, Wilno/Vilnius, NieswieĪ/Niasvizh and Kraków), Belarus (Minsk) and Russia (Moscow and St. Petersburg). A large number of new works, including previously unknown archives and hand-written materials have been published since Šapoka’s monograph. This makes it possible to view our topic in a different way. Šapoka lithuanized all proper names. This restricted the scientific use of the publication, especially by foreign historians. During the Soviet era, Lithuanian historians Antanas Tyla and Bronius Dundulis contributed substantially to the study of our topic. Tyla published a number of articles on different aspects of Swedish–Lithuanian political contacts.44 He discovered a number of unknown sources relating to the Swedish occupation zone and the anti–Swedish uprising in Samogitia in the archives of the Lithuanian Republic. However, his conclusions rested upon previous historiography and upon Šapoka’s unpublished manuscript. In 1977, Dundulis issued a monograph entitled “Intervention of Swedish feudal lords to Lithuania in the 17th –18th centuries” in which he argued according to the stock phrases of the Soviet school.45 Very little research has been done on the KU in modern Belarus. After the extermination of the Minsk historical school during the Stalin terror (19301940), research on the political history of the GDL stopped in Belarus.46 Only after 1991 have historians in independent Belarus returned to the topic. In 1995, Henadz Sahanovich published “The unknown war, 1654-1667”, which immediately became an academic bestseller. The author examined Russia’s war against the GDL and the catastrophic consequences this war had for Belarus. This book confronts the traditional theses of tsarist and Soviet historiographies and shows that the main front in Russia’s 1654-67 war against the Commonwealth ran through the territory of Belarus, rather than Ukraine, as was previously believed. A few pages in this book are devoted to the KU and the collaboration of the Lithuanian nobility with Sweden. These are based on Polish research.47 The same Belarus researcher was the first to study the split of the nobility during the war of 1654-67 into supporters of Russia or Poland, and the role of this cleavage in the political decentraliza44 Tyla, Antanas. 1976. Sukilimas Lietuvoje prieš švedǐ okupaciją 1656 m. Lietuvos TSR Mokslǐ Akademijos Darbai, Serija A. Vol. 4 (57), p. 61-72; Tyla, Antanas. 1978. Keidanskaya uniya 1655 g. mezhdu Velikim Kniazhestvom Litovskim i Shvetsiei. Skandinavskii sbornik (Skrifter om Skandinavien). Vol. XXIII. Tartu, p. 68-80; Tyla, Antanas. 1979. Kơdainiǐ unijos opozicija (1655-1656 m). Lietuvos TSR Mokslǐ Akademijos Darbai, Serija A. Vol. 2 (67), p. 67-84. 45 Dundulis, Bronius. 1977. Švedǐ feodalǐ Ƴsiveržimai i Lietuvą XVII-XVIII a. Vilnius. 46 Lindner, Rainer. 1999. Historiker und Herrschaft: Nationsbildung und Geschichtspolitik in Weissrussland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. München; Kotljarchuk, Andrej. 2000. The Tradition of Belarusian Statehood: a War for the Past. Contemporary Change in Belarus. Baltic and Eastern European Studies. Vol. 2. Södertörns University College, p. 41-72. 47 Sahanovich, Henadz. 1995. Neviadomaia vaina 1654-1667. Minsk, p. 47-51. 17 tion of the Lithuanian elite.48 Vasil Mialeshka studied the civil war that was waged between different groups within the Lithuanian nobility during 165558 against the background of the Second Northern War. 49 The first Scandinavian historian who paid attention to the contacts between Sweden and the GDL in the mid-17th century was Samuel von Pufendorf. In 1667 he became professor of history at the Swedish university of Lund – a new university established in the centre of what, up until 1658, had been the Danish province of Scania. In 1677 Pufendorf obtained the position of “Royal historiographer of Sweden.” His research resulted in “The introduction to the history of Sweden” (Inledning till Swänska historien) published in 1688. After his death, his classic biography of Karl X Gustav appeared. There, Pufendorf touched upon the 1655 KU, the uprising in Samogitia and the 1657 siege of Brest. The strength of his work lies in his extensive use of Swedish archives.50 However, Pufendorf failed to distinguish between the August Declaration (which were erroneously dated August 15, 1655) and the final KU. This work has been the starting point for many researchers and was finally translated from the Latin to Swedish.51 In 1883, Fredrik Carlson published his history of Sweden under the reign of Karl X Gustav.52 He referred to new archival sources, but Sweden’s policy towards the GDL remained peripheral to his interests. Carlson did not analyze the social preconditions of the KU, not did he understand the specifics of the GDL in the Polish-Lithuanian federation. He saw only one reason why the Lithuanian nobility supported the union with Sweden: the crisis brought on by the war. An article written by Nils Edén, the political leader of Sweden between 1917 and 1920, contained similar information and gave many examples of the separatist politics of the Lithuanians towards Poland. Among his sources was the report of the Swedish diplomat Johan Meyer (1654) according to which “the separatist and pro-Swedish feelings were very strong among the nobility of Lithuania.” However, Edén failed to understand the meaning of these remarks.53 In 1903, a dissertation by Manfred Carlon concerning the Swedish-Russian war of 1656-58 appeared. The au48 Sahanovich, Henadz. 2000. Shlakhta Belarusi pamizh Maskvoi i Karonai abo voiny XVII st. yak faktar detsentralizatsyi. Nash Radavod. Vol. 8. Hrodna- Biaáystok. 49 Mialeshka, Vasil. 1995. Hramadzianskaya vaina na Belarusi (1655-1658). Profesor Henryk àowmiaĔski. ĩycie i dzielo. PoznaĔ, p. 135-154. 50 Pufendorf, Samuel. 1696. De rebus a Carolo Gustav Sveciae rege gestis commentariorum, libri septem elegantissimis tabulis aeneis exornati cum triplici indice. Norimbergae. 51 Franzén, Frans Michael. 1859. Minnesteckningar öfver utmärkte svenske statsmän, hjeltar, lärde, konstnärer och skalder. Vol. II. Stockholm, p. 129-134; Pufendorf, Samuel von. 191315. Samuel von Pufendorfs sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder. Vol. 1-7. Stockholm. 52 Carlson, Fredrik Ferdinand. 1883. Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset. Sveriges historia under Carl den tionde Gustafs regering. Stockholm. 53 Edén, Nils. 1906. Grunderna till Karl X Gustafs anfall på Polen. Historiskt Tidskrift. Vol. 26, p. 5-45. 18 thor pointed out that the conflict over Lithuania was the main reason for the Swedish-Russian war.54 In 1891, Carl Wibling presented research on the diplomatic relations between Sweden and Transylvania between 1655 and 1660.55 In 1920 Georg Wittrock published a work in which he examined the position of Sweden’s allies during the Swedish war against Poland.56 Unfortunately, the alliance between Sweden and the GDL was outside the scope of his research. In 1938, Per Sandberg published a short piece of research on the KU.57 He used several previously unknown Swedish sources concerning the course of the negotiations. The role of Protestantism in uniting the Swedes and the Lithuanian separatists was noted. Sandberg emphasized the role of Boguslaw Radziwill in the negotiations. However, following Gronskis, Sandberg erroneously mistook the August declaration of 1655 for the final act of KU and gave no dates for the agreement. Sandberg’s study remained unknown to most historians and had little influence on subsequent Swedish historiography. Georg Landberg heightened the level of understanding of the nature of the KU in his history of late 17th century Swedish international relations. Landberg was probably the first Swedish historian to correctly date this event: “in 1655 the Lithuanian nobility signed on 20th of October in Kơdainiai the direct union with Sweden.” He also mentioned the existence of the preliminary plan for the KU, which was circulating within the Radziwiáá faction. In regard to the reasons for the KU, Landberg stressed that the Radziwill faction, like the Swedes, was Protestant. However, Landberg’s treatment of the KU and the subsequent political relations is short and incomplete.58 In the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s a number of works on Swedish-Ukrainian political contacts were published by a Swedish historian of Ukrainian origin, Bohdan Kentrschynskyj.59 He introduced many new sources that relate to our topic. However, the role of the GDL in Swedish-Ukrainian contacts was beyond the scope of the author’s interests. In 1967, Arne Stade defended a thesis devoted to the analysis of Erik Dahlberg’s diary as a source for the history of Swedish wars during the reign 54 Carlon, Manfred. 1903. Ryska kriget 1656-1658. Lund. Wibling, Carl. 1891. Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy II. Lund. 56 Wittrock, Georg. 1920. Karl X Gustaf i Polen. Krigsmålet och allianserna. Karolinska förbundets årsbok. Stockholm, p. 4-49. 57 Sandberg, Per. 1938. Fördraget i Kedainiai mellan Sverige och Litauen. Planerna på en svensk-litauisk union. Baltisk revy: en årsbok. Lund, p. 42-51. 58 Landberg, Georg. 1952. Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia. 1648-1697. Stockholm, p. 92. 59 Kentrschynskyj Bohdan. 1956. Karl X Gustav inför krisen i Öster 1654-1655. Stockholm. Karolinska förbundets årsbok, p. 8-147; Kentrschynskyj, Bohdan. Mazepa. Stockholm. 1962; Kentrschynskyj, Bohdan. 1966. Ukrainska revolutionen och Rysslands angrepp mot Sverige 1656. Karolinska förbundets årsbok, p. l 7-86. 55 19 of Karl X Gustav. The author critically examened Dahlberg’s notes concerning his participation in the siege of Brest in 1657.60 Stade pointed to Dahlberg’s inaccuracy in dating the events, inaccuracies that he explained by pointing out that that Dahlberg wrote his notes a good deal after the events had taken place. In my opinion Stade’s interpretation is reasonable, since Dahlberg’s maps over Swedish military activity in the GDL contain a number of mistakes in the designation of Lithuanian and Belarusian localities. In Belarus, Ales Bely used Dahlberg’s diary as a valuable source.61 In 2000, Peter Englund published a comprehensive work on Swedish foreign wars n in the mid-17th century. Analyzing the war waged by Sweden in PolandLithuania, Englund concentrated on the Polish campaign. He pays little attention to the KU, or to Sweden’s policy in Lithuania.62 The author interpreted the KU against the background of the Duchy’s military predicament: “between the Russian Scylla and the Swedish Charybdis.” Englund is the first to mention the systematic propaganda campaign led by Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie in 1655 aiming to win over the Lithuanian nobility to the Swedish side. Englund believed that if the KU had been realized, Sweden would have gained more territory than it had done during the previous 200 years of Swedish expansion in the Eastern Baltic. Nevertheless, he erroneously regarded the 1655 August Declaration as the final act of KU and did not analyze the situation, which evolved in the Swedish zone of Lithuania after the union. Englund examined the 1657 Swedish siege of Brest, the largest town in the west of the GDL. He also pointed out the role that Sweden’s ally, Protestant Transylvania, played in that event. On the whole, Englund’s book contributes a good deal to military history. However, the political, religious and economic aspects of the relationship between the GDL and Sweden need further consideration. Finally, in 2001, Stellan Dahlgren prepared the documents of the KU for publication, adding his own commentary and wrote two related articles. Unfortunately these works have not yet been published.63 Over the last ten years, Russian historians have published a number of important works. In 1994, Lev Zaborovskii published the diplomatic acts between the GDL and Russia during the Second Northern War, adding a 60 Stade, Arne. 1967. Erik Dahlbergh och Carl X Gustafs krigshistoria. Stockholm, p. 194198. 61 Bely, Ales. 1999. Nieviadomya epizody ”nieviadomai vainy”, abo vaennyja dzieianni Shvetsyi suprats Vialikaha kniastva Litouskaha u 1656-1657 hadakh vachyma Eryka Dahlberga. Spadchyna. Vol. 3, p. 114-129. 62 Englund, Peter. 2000. Den oövervinnerlige. Om den svenska stormaktstiden och en man i dess mitt. Stockholm, p. 211-213, 223, 453-479. 63 Dahlgren, Stellan. 2001. Documentes related to the Swedish-Russian diplomatic negotiations 1655-1657. Manuscript, 2001. 20 foreword and a commentary.64 He had previously published a monograph on Russian foreign policy, using a large number of sources to examine the diplomatic relations in Eastern and Northern Europe in 1654-60.65 Boris Floria used new Russian archival sources in his studies of the policy of Muscovy during the anti-Swedish uprising in Samogitia.66 Elena Kobzareva researched the 1655-61 Russian policy in Eastern Baltic.67 Tɚtiana Yakovleva wrote a comprehensive monograph on Ukrainian diplomacy in the second half of the 1650s.68 Ukrainian historians also wrote a number of works analysing the 1654-1661 Cossack policy and reviewing Ukrainian-Swedish relations.69 In 1979, the Finnish historian Rainer Fagerlund made the greatest Western contribution to the study of our topic.70 This military historian used a number of previously unknown sources from the National Archives of Sweden. He noted the milestones in the negotiation process between the GDL and Sweden, identified the number of garrisons and soldiers in the Swedish zone of Lithuania, and provided information on the anti-Swedish uprising. Fagerlund also studied the tax books of the Livonian General Government for the Swedish part of Lithuania during the period of 1655-1656, which are in the Estonian Historical Archives.71 In 1993, Robert Frost wrote a monograph devoted to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Second Northern War. So far, it is the only English research which reviews the KU.72 Apart from summing up most of the principal historiography, Frost found a number of interesting sources in the Polish archives. He drew important conclusions about the different political groups within the Lithuanian nobility who fought with each other. Frost emphasized the long negotiation process between the GDL and Sweden. He pointed out that the final act of the union was signed on October 20, 1655, not August 17. Since he concentrated on 64 Zaborovskii, Lev. 1994. Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia vo vremia polskogo Potopa (1655-1656). Dokumenty, issledovanie. Moskva. 65 Zaborovskii, Lev. 1981. Rossia, Rech Pospolitaya i Shvetsiya v seredine VXII veka. Iz istorii mezhdunarodnych otnoshenii v Vostochnoi i Yugo-Vostochnoi Evrope. Moskva. 66 Floria, Boris. 2003. Ot potopa do Vilna. Russkaya politika po otnosheniiu k Rechi Pospolitoi v 1655-1656. Kwartalnik Historyczny, Rocznik CX, no 2, p. 25-49. 67 Kobzareva, Elena. 1998. Diplomaticheskaya bor’ba Rossii za vykhod k Baltiiskomu moriu v 1655-1661. Moskva. 68 Yakovleva, Tetiana. 1998. Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII stolittia. Prichini i pochatok Ruini. Kyiv. 69 Hrushevsky, Mykhailo. 1997. Istoria Ukrainy-Rusi. Vol. IX. Chastina druha; Lipinsky, Viacheslav. 1920. Ukraina na perelomi 1657-1659. Wien; Chukhlib, Taras. 2003. Hetmany i monarkhy. Ukrainska derzhava v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh 1648-1714. Kyiv. 70 Fagerlund, Rainer. 1979. Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna 1655-1660. Operationer och krigsansträngningar på en bikrigsskådeplats under Carl X Gustafs krig. Åbo. 71 Fagerlund, Rainer. 1981. Kontribution, försträckning och kaduck: svensk krigsfinansiering i Östersjöprovinserna 1655-1661. Historiskt tidskrift för Finland. Vol. 66, p. 321-337. 72 Frost, Robert I. 1993. After the Deluge. Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War 1655-1660. Cambridge, p. 48-52. 21 Poland, the 1656-1661 events in Belarus and Lithuania are covered fragmentarily. Practically all previous historiography has concentrated on the 1655 KU, but has failed to examine in detail the in-depth reasons behind the KU, its immediate consequences and its far-reaching results. Most previous research has approached the wars in mid-17th century GDL from a military rather than a political point of view. Moreover, few historians have examined the events pertaining to the GDL in detail. Most have concentrating on the wars of that period, giving only fragments of the overall international picture and politics. Most historians have interpreted the KU as a basically tactical reaction to the disastrous 1654-55 war. They saw no strategic social (geopolitical, economical, religious) preconditions, or consequences of the KU. Few placed the events in the GDL within the context of the general crisis and the balance of power approach. Many important aspects have not been studied much. Among them are: • commercial aspects of Lithuanian-Swedish relations • Swedish geopolitics towards the GDL • contacts between the Protestants of Lithuania and Belarus, and Sweden • Swedish Lithuania and its government • Radziwiáá’s Lithuania project • the 1656 Compact of Radnot • The GDL in Swedish-Ukrainian diplomacy • the 1657 siege of Brest • the 1657 Swedish–Ukrainian treaty of Korsun 1.5 Presentation of sources The archival base of this research rests upon the holdings of the National Archives of Sweden (Riksarkivet). Some Polish historians believe that during the peace agreement in Oliwa, Sweden handed over its treaties with the collaborators to Poland.73 However this does not apply to treatises on collaboration with the GDL, and none of the acts of KU were delivered to Poland. The original Lithuanian documents of the KU have not been found. Logically, they should be stored in the “Radziwiáá Archives”, most of which were kept in Belarus in the castle of Niasvizh up to the end of 1942. When the collaborationist “Committee of Belarusian Self-Help” decided to move the archives to Minsk, representatives of the Polish intelligentsia managed to 73 Kulecki, Michal. 1999. Kilka uwag na marginesie rejestru slachty litewskiej przysiegajacej wiernoĞü carowi Aleksemu Michajáowiczowi w 1655 r. KKVKL, p. 29-30. 22 come to an agreement with the Nazi administration in Belarus to remove the archives to Warsaw. It is now a separate part of the Polish Central Archives of Historical Records (AGAD). However, this collection is meagre on our topic. More important is the “Correspondence of Bogusáaw Radziwiáá” as well as section V containing the letters to Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. However, these collections are also fragmentary and none of the original letters from Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to the Swedish government are available, even as copies.74 The main Polish depository of the Lithuanian political acts is also in the Central Archives of Historical Records. However, the archive’s “Swedish Collection” contains only a bad copy of the Lithuanian declaration of August 17, 1655, and a few copies of letters written by Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie and King Karl X Gustav.75 In my opinion, the ambassadors of the Lithuanian nobility who acted against Sweden and established the confederation of Wierzboáow/Virbalis gave these documents to the king of Poland Jan Kazimierz in 1655. Apart from the collections of the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, I used the materials from manuscript collections in the Czartoryskich Library at the National Museum in Kraków. Some useful archival materials are in Belarus. The National Historical Archives in Minsk keep part of the “Radziwiáá Archives” and the Polatsk’s and Ashmiany’s acts.76 In the Lithuanian State Historical Archives in Vilnius and the department of manuscripts of the Library of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences house interesting materials, which date back to the time of the Swedish rule in Lithuania.77 However, Antanas Tyla has already cited most of them.78 Cooperation between Lithuanian and Swedish archivists have resulted in a very helpful catalogue of the historical documents from the Lithuanian archives that relate to Sweden. However, only one concerns my topic.79 There might be a reason for scarcity of sources in Polish, Lithuanian and Belarusian Archives – after the wars in mid-17th century, those Lithuanian magnates, nobles and clergy who collaborated with Sweden probably destroyed many dangerous documents. The Russian documents from Moscow and St. Petersburg Archives and manuscript collections concerning Lithuania and Sweden of 1654-1667 were also consulted.80 The National Archives of Sweden contain a large number of records that pertain to our topic. The original acts of KU and the documents related to it 74 AGAD. AR, dz. IV, teka 4, koperta 46. Listy Bogusáawa Radziwiááa; AR. Dz V. Sygn. 9646-9678. 75 AGAD. Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie. Dz. Szwedzki. 76 NHAB. Fond 694. Sprava 19; Fond 1823, Vopis 1, Sprava 1; Fond 1775. 77 LVIA. Fond 1276. Ap.1. B. 1196; LMAB. Fond 233. B. 93. 78 Tyla, Sukilimas Lietuvoje prieš švedǐ, p. 61-72; Tyla, Keidanskaya uniya 1655 g, p. 68-80. 79 Körner, Sten and Tamulynas, Alfonsas. 1994. Litauen-Sverige. Visby. 80 BAN. RGADA. Fond 79. 23 are stored in the ”Militaria.”81 The reason they are not in the diplomatic state series might be that the KU was never ratified, and therefore the texts were excluded from the collection of official treaties. Apart from the abovementioned collection, which has been studied by many researchers (Adolfas Šapoka, Stellan Dahlgren and others), there are a considerable number of previously unused records in the fonds of RA. These include about 60 letters from Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Karl X Gustav, Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie and Adolf Johan av Pfalz, written in 1655-57.82 These materials made possible a new assessment of Bogusáaw’s role in the relations between the GDL and Sweden; in particular, one can now challenge Polish historians’ thesis of a passive role played by Bogusáaw Radziwiáá in the union with Sweden.83 Ten letters by Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, including an previously unknown letter from 1650, gives evidence of the good relationship between Lithuanian separatists’ leader and the Swedish administration of Livonia long before the crisis of 1655.84 Many important records can be found in the “Esplunda arkiv.” These archives include the correspondence between Lithuanian officials and clergy and Bengt Skytte, the head of Swedish civil administration in Lithuania.85 The collection “Livonica II” has been important for my research since it contains the correspondence between the king of Sweden and the leaders of the civil and military administrations of Livonia and the Swedish zone of the GDL.86 Significant sources, which highlight the role of the GDL in diplomatic relations between the Ukrainian Hetmanate and Sweden, are kept in “Diplomatica Muscovitica Cosacica.“87 A number of important treaties and diplomatic documents devoted to the relations between Sweden and the Commonwealth are available in the collection of “Diplomatica Polonica” and ”Originaltraktater med främmande makter.” Among unexpected windfalls was the discovery of a letter from Field Hetman Paweá Sapieha to Magnus De la Gardie, which provided evidence for the decision of this pro-Polish leader to join the KU and switch to Swedish protection.88 81 RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. RA. Skrivelser till Konungen Karl X Gustaf. Vol. 47 (Radeke-Rosen). Fürst Bogislaus Radzivill; RA. De La Gardieska samlingen. Skrivelser till Magnus De la Gardie. Ser. C: I. E 1531; RA. E 309. Bogusáaw Radziwiáá till Adolf Johan av Pfalz. 83 Wasilewski, Tadeusz. 1979. Zarys dziejow Bogusáawa Radziwiááa. Radziwiáá, Bogusáaw. Autobiografia. Warszawa, p. 48-49. 84 Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. June 8, 1650. Vilnius. Latin. RA. De La Gardieska samlingen. Skrivelser till Magnus De la Gardie. Ser. C: I. E 1531. 85 RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20. Brev till Bengt Skytte. 86 RA. Livonica II. Vol. 77. Generalguv. i Livland till K. MAJ:T 1655-56. 87 RA/2113/2113.2. Diplomatica Muscovitica Cosacica. Vol. 1. Förhandlingar emellan Sverige och kosackerna 1655-1719. 88 Paweá Sapieha to Magnus De la Gardie. December 5, 1655. Brest. Polish. RA. De la Gardieska samlingen. Skrivelser till Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. Ser. C:1. E 1543. So.Scarinio. 82 24 A number of sources relating to the topic have also been discovered in the Royal Library of Sweden. These are unique Swedish and English early modern imprints,89 letters90 and graphic materials.91 Many previously littleknown Swedish maps of the GDL and plans of its cities, from the time of the Second Northern War, are preserved in the Military Archives of Sweden.92 A collection of Swedish diplomatic documents is stored in “Palmskiöld Collection” of the University Library in Uppsala.93 A search revealed some leaflets, newspaper publications and documents concerning the relations between the GDL and Sweden in other libraries and archives in Western Europe. They include the public declaration of Lithuania to European countries, translated into different languages, with explanations of the motives for breaking with Poland and joining Sweden, and publications on the condition of Protestant post-war refuges in France, England, Holland and Brandenburg-Prussia.94 89 KB. Sacrae Regia Majestatis Regnorumque Sveciae Senator Ac Thessaurarius, Generalis Gubernator Livoniae, Ducatus Samogithiae Cum Adjacentibus districtibus..Lithvaniuam..Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie. Riga. February 13, 1656.. F 1700. Fol. Kungsskrivelser. 1 pp; Accords Puncta, so Bey Übergebung der Stadt und Scholsses Brescie Litevski. An Jhr. Königl. Mytt. zu Schweden und Jhr. Fürstl. Durchl. Zu Siebenbürgen/geschlossen. Jm Jahr 1657. Dat im Feld-lager bey Brescie den 16 Maji/st. n. Anno 1657. 4 pp. MFref Sveriges krig. R 12, ex. A, no. 625; Revers der Waywoden und Ständen/deß Gros-Hertzogthumbus Littauen von wegen der Huldigung, Treu, Untertänigkeit, den Königen und Königreich Schweden ewiglich zu lassen und zu halten. 1656. Hamburg. KB. Sv:s Förh 840, p. 13-16; Radzivil, Janusius. 1645. Ad epistolam Synodi Warsawiensis... sicut & ad subsequutum Sacrae Regiae Majestatis ad eosdem dissidentes eodem in negotio diploma, Ordinum evangelicorum responsio. Londini. 173 E e Syntagma confessionum fidei. 90 Skrivelser till Carl Gustaf från Hetmanen Bohdan Chmielnicki. 1655. F. D. Sv. 835 A; Radziwill, Boguslaw. Furste. Brev till Bengt Oxenstierna. 1656, 1659. I. Ep. o. 1. 91 KB. Dahlberg, Erik. Plan of Brest (Briestie). Handrit, vol. 41:16b, no. 10782; Panoramic picture of Brest. Handrit, vol. 41:13a, no 10778. 92 KA. Krigen mot Polen och Ryssland 1655-1657 samt mot Brandenburg 1658-1660 Maps no. 0425:05:036-044; Detaljplaner efter Erik Dahlberg 0426:007:008; Geometrisch Plan der Statt Brzesche in Littawen, wie solche von dem Polnischen Ingenieur Bonell vor der Eroberung in Grundt geleget, Nebenst des Gen:Quart: Leutnampt Dahlbergs Desseing wegen fortificirung selben Ohrts, Welcher auf Ihr Königl: Maij. zu Schweden 1657, 0406:17:001:001; Plan of Drysviaty 1655, 0406:17:002:001; Plan of Polatsk 1655, 0406:17:010:001; Plan of Hrodna 1655, 0425:05:035; Grundtriss der Stadt Brische in Littauwen Wie solche Anno 1657 den 11 Maÿ von Ihr Königl. Maÿ: zu Schweden belagert und den 13 Dito erobert worden, 0425:05:139 and 0426:009:008. 93 UUB. Palmskiöldiske Samlingen (Palmsk) 95. Vol. VIII. Acta Sveco-Polonica; Palmsk 98. Acta Sueco-Turcica. Vol. XI. 94 Schriftelijck renversael ende Verklaringe der Laths-Heeren ende Staten van’t Groot Vorstendom vander LITTAUW, Van Trouwe ende Onderdanigheyt aende Koningen ende aen’t tRijck van SWEDEN. Amsterdam, 1655. Royal Library of Netherlands. No. T. 4398; Punti proposti dal Gentilhuomo Suedese inuiato a Polacchi. 1655. Bibliothèque Nationale de France; Département des manuscrits. Ms.fr.n.a.9819, p. 357; An act of the Nobility and Estates of the Great Ducedom of Lithuania, whereby they fro ever oblige themselves to yield Fidelity and Subjection to the Kings and Kingdom of Sweden. Mercurius Politicus. November 15 - November 22, 1655. No 284. P. 5757-5760; Gilbert, Eleazar. 1641. Nevves from Poland. Wherein is declared the cruel practice of the Popish Clergie against the 25 Publications of Swedish,95 Polish-Lithuanian,96 Russian,97 Ukrainian,98 Vatican99 and Transylvanian sources,100 and diplomatic correspondence were widely used. Diaries, memoirs, documentaries and portraits of the participants of the events are also of importance.101 This information has been compared, where possible, and has been re-checked, using information from official sources. Protestants, and in particular against the Ministers of the city Vilna, in the great Dukedom of Lithuania, under the Government of the most illustrious Prince, Duke Radzivill. London; Krainski, John de Kraino. 1677. A relation of the distressed state of the Church of Christ, processing the Protestant religion in the Great Dukedom of Lithuania. Presented to the view of all compassionate Christians. London; A letter giving an Account of the Present state of the Socinians. Königsberg, 1681. 95 Klemming, Gustaf. 1881. Samtida skrifter rörande Sveriges förhållanden till fremmande magter.Vol.1. 1483-1658. Stockholm; Sveriges Ridderskaps och Adels Riksdags- protokoll. Vol. 7. 1660. Stockholm, 1881; Sveriges traktater med främmande makter. Vol. 5:2. 16351645. Stockholm, 1909. By unknown reasons the volume that should be devoted the reigh of Karl X Gustav never been published; Svenska Riksrådets protokoll. Ed. Per Sondén.. Vol. 16, 1654-1656. Stockholm, 1923; Swedish diplomats at Cromwell’s court, 1655-1656. The missions of Peter Julius Coyet and Christer Bonde. Translated and edited by Michael Roberts. London, 1988. 96 VL; BA; BEF; LM. 97 PSZRI; Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia; KKVKL. 98 UBK 99 Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia. Vol. III (1596-1696). Ed. August Theiner. Romae 1863; Codex Mednicensis seu Samogitiae dioecesis. Ed. Paulus Jatulis. Roma, 1989. Vol. II. 100 Sziláfyi, Sándor. 1890-1891. Erdély és az északkeleti háború, levelek és okiratok. Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale. Acta et documenta. Vol. 1- 2, Budapest. 101 Jakuba Michaáowskiego wojskiego Lubelskiego a pózniéj kasztelana Bieckiego ksiĊga pamiĊtnicza. 1864. Kraków; Erik Dahlberghs dagbok. I urval och med inledning av Alf Åberg. 1962, Stockholm; Radziwiáá, Bogusáaw. 1979. Autobiografia (1620 –1667). Warszawa; Pomniki memuarnaj litaratury XVII st. 1983. Minsk; Pasek, Jan Chryzostom. 1987. PamiĊtniki. Ed. Roman Pollak. Warszawa; Polotskii, Simeon. Virshi. 1991. Minsk; MSR; Gordon, Patrick. 2000. Dnevnik [Diary] 1635-1659. Moskva. 26 2 Separatism and policy of Poland 2.1 The Grand Duchy of Lithuania after the union of Lublin The early modern history of the GDL is not well known and usually forms a minor part of general histories of Polish history. By the mid-17th century the Grand Duchy was so split into rival political factions that it is possible to describe the situation as a civil war wrapped inside an international war between Poland, Russia, and Sweden. This chapter intends to describe the major territorial, political, religious and social divisions within the Grand Duchy because they are important for dissecting the complicated and quickly changing political conflicts that took place in the middle of the century. Three factors are of foremost importance. The first is the geographic situation that separated the Grand Duchy into populations speaking Slavic and Baltic languages. The second is the religious split into Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, Arian, Uniate and Greek Orthodox Churches. The third is the political fragmentation into power-holders formed around the leading magnate families with their own territorial support, particularly that of the Radziwiáá family. The chapter also deals with the half-century long build-up of Lithuanian and Swedish contacts that resulted in the Act of the KU in 1655 and the offering of the Lithuanian throne to the King of Sweden. One of the main theses of my research is that this union did not come unexpectedly only because of an acute crisis, but rather was a result of nearly a half-century of deepening relationships between Lutheran Sweden and the Protestant faction in the GDL. Although this was primarily a Protestant connection, the KU itself had the support of nobles from many confessional backgrounds. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia and Samogitia was an independent state between the 13th century and 1569, when the federation with Poland was created in Lublin. After the treaties of Deulino (1618) and Polyanovo (1634) with Russia, and the formation of Smolensk palatinate (1618), the territory of the GDL covered 300,000 sq km. Thus, the Duchy territory constituted about one third of the whole territory of the Commonwealth.102 102 Mączak, Antoni. 1986. The Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania in the Seventeenth Century- an Essay in Interpretation of Space. Economy and culture in the Baltic 1650-1700. Papers of the VIIIth Visby Symposium. Visby, p. 7-20. 27 The GDL embraced the whole territory of modern Belarus, most of modern Lithuania (excluding the Klaipơda/Memel region), parts of modern Poland (the eastern part of the Biaáystok voevodship), Russia (the western part of Smolensk region, the district of Starodub in the Bryansk region, the district of Sebezh in the Pskov region and the district of Velizh in the Great Novgorod region) and Ukraine (the Dubrovitsya district in the Rivne region).103 In 1654, the population of the GDL (excluding the Smolensk palatinate) was 3,500,000, giving a density of 16 persons per sq km.104 Thus, the GDL had more than twice large population as Sweden. People of different ethnic groups inhabited the country: East Slavs (Ruthenians) and Balts (Lithuanians and Samogitians) comprised the majority of the population.105 In addition, there were Jews, Poles, Lithuanian Tartars and Germans. The political elite consisted of the Lithuanian (both Lithuanian and Samogitian) and the Ruthenian nobility. Although they were linguistically different, both elite groups were known as Lithuanians. At this time, the term had a political rather than an ethnic meaning. According to the 1588 Statute, only Lithuanian (including Samogitian) and Ruthenian nobles by origin could hold state office within the Duchy.106 The Ruthenian lands formed the largest part of the GDL, and the official language was Ruthenian.107 The use of the Ruthenian language in the Lithuanian state and local documentation reflects the predominance of the Ruthenian-speaking population.108 Until the beginning of the 17th century, Ruthenian was the lingua franca for the multiethnic nobility. Contemporary historians noted that, in the native vernacular of the Lithuanian nobility: Several Italian and Latin words intermix with its present language. As likewise most of the noble families, who the vulgar sort are altogether Slavonic.109 This Slavic Ruthenian language was differed from popular dialects. However, in its phonetic and morphological features, it was the old Belarusian 103 See the map no.1. Entsyklapedyia Vialikaha kniastva Litouskaha. Vol. 1. Minsk, 2005, p. 57. 105 During the 19th and beginning of the 20th century two modern national projects (Belarusian and Lithuanian) began on the soil of the former GDL. A small number of representatives of the gentry took part in these movements. See: Snyder, Timothy. 2003. The reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999. New Haven - London, p. 13-102. 106 The 1588 Statute of the GDL (chapter 3, article 12): Statut Vialikaha kniastva Litouskaha 1588. Minsk. 1989, p. 118. 107 Ibid., p. 140. 108 Backus, Oswald. 1963. The problem of Unity in the Polish-Lithuanian State. Slavic Review. Vol. 22, no. 3, p. 422. 109 Connor, Bernard. 1698. The history of Poland. London, p. 306. 104 28 language.110 In Muscovy the Ruthenian language was know as ”Belarusian” or ”Lithuanian.”111 A standard Lithuanian language did not yet exist. Lithuanian books were published in various dialects and the centre of Lithuanian culture was Ducal Prussia rather than the GDL.112 The Lithuanian language was used only occasionally by the administration. For example, in 1639– 1641, only two decrees of King Wáadysáaw IV Vasa were published in Lithuanian, directed towards the ethnic Lithuanians of Prussia.113 After the union with Poland, the Lithuanian estates adopted the Polish model of political and territorial administration. Between 1625 and 1667, the GDL consisted of 24 districts and 8 palatinates.114 Every district had its own dietine: that is, an political assembly of the local nobility. The Samogitian and Lithuanian ethnic regions were: • Vilnius palatinate (the Vilnius and Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz districts), • Duchy of Samogitia (an autonomous prefecture), • Trakai palatinate (the Trakai, Kaunas and Upytơ districts). The mixed Lithuanian-Ruthenian regions were: • Vilnius palatinate (the Braslau, Lida and Ashmiany districts), • Navahradak palatinate, • Trakai palatinate (the Trakai and Hrodna districts). The Ruthenian regions were: • Minsk palatinate, • Polatsk palatinate, • Vitsebsk palatinate, 110 Some Lithuanian historians see Ruthenian or Belarusian (last term used from the 17th century) language as ”a dead chancery Slavonic language.” According to philologists this language was alive and similar to dialects and modern literary Belarusian. See: Zhuravskii, Alexander. 1978. Delovaya pismennost v sisteme starobelorusskogo yazyka. Vostochnoslavianskoye i obshchee yazykoznanie. Moskva, p. 185-191; Lazutka, Stanislovas and Gudaviþius, Edvardas. 1983. Pervyi Litovskii Statut. Paleograficheskii i tekstologicheskii analiz spiskov. Vol.1. Vilnius, p. 181; Lazutka, Stanislovas. 1997. JĊzyk Statutów Litewskich i Metryki Litewskiej. Lithuania, vol. 22-23, p. 26-33. 111 McMillin, Arnold B. 1977. A History of Byelorussian Literature. Giessen; Dubavets, Siarhej and Sahanovich, Henadz. 1994. Starazhytnaya Litva i suchasnaya Lietuva. Z historyja na “Vy”. Zbornik artykulau. Minsk. 112 Kiaupa, Zigmantas, Kiaupienơ, Jnjratơ and Kunceviþius, Albinas. 2000. The History of Lithuania Before 1795. Vilnius, p. 301-303. 113 Prnjsijos valdžios gromatos, pagraudenimai ir apsakymai lietuviams valstieþiams. Sudarơ P. Pakarklis, redagavo K. Jablonskis. Vilnius, 1960. Ʋkl. 2 tarp, p. 58-59. 114 Unlike the palatinates, Samogitia was divided not into districts but in 29 bailiffs. 29 • Brest palatinate, • Mstsislau palatinate. A large part of the GDL had a mixed ethnic character. For example, in the mid-17th century, the nobility regarded Ashmiany as an ethnically Ruthenian district. Modern Lithuanian historians consider this district ethnically Lithuanian. Nevertheless, when in 1663 during the war a detachment of nonlocal nobility was passing through Ashmiany near the village of Jushkevichy, they hired a local peasant called Shostak (a Ruthenian name) as their guide. After a conversation with him in Ruthenian, the ethnically Lithuanian soldiers started to communicate with each other in their native tongue, hoping that the peasant would not discern their intention to kill him. However, the peasant did understand Lithuanian and fled.115 This fact indicates that this district, like many others, contained a mixed bi-lingual Slavonic – Baltic population. After 1569, the territory of the GDL included four large geographical provinces: “Lithuania” (the Vilnius, Trakai, Navahradak and Minsk palatinates), “Belarus” (Polatsk, Vitsebsk and Mstsislau), “Samogitia” and “Polesie” (the Brest palatinate). As of 1632, the geographical region Belarus embraced the single Orthodox or ”Belarusian” eparchy where the Orthodox religion dominated. The capital Vilnius (Wilna/Vilna/Vilne/Wilde) was a multicultural city situated on the ethnic border between Ruthenians and Lithuanians. In 1596, the city had 15 Orthodox Ruthenian churches, 14 Catholic churches, one Lutheran and two Reformed churches, and several synagogues.116 Vilnius was the traditional centre of local German, Jewish, Lithuanian, Polish and Ruthenian cultures. Most other large cities had a similar multi-ethnic and multi-confessional structure. Swedish observes understood that the Slavic population dominated in Lithuania. Johan Botvidius, wrote in his book: “Slavonic is the common language for Croatians, Bohemians, Dalmatians, Poles, Lithuanians, Muscovites and Ruthenians.”117 Early modern historians stated that the GDL consisted of two ethnic parts: ”Lithuania properly so called and Lithuanic or White Ruthenia.”118 Thus, the historical Lithuania had a different structure, which evolved into the presentday Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Belarus through a complicated process.119 115 Grodzkaia kniha. Ashmianski grodzki sud. June 20, 1663. NHAB. Fond 1775, vopis 1. sprava 25 F, 1204 -1204a. 116 Kotljarchuk, Andrej. 1998. Pravoslavnaya tserkov’ v Velikom kniazhestve Litovskom. Vestnik Belorusskogo pravoslavnogo ekzarkhata. Vol.1. Minsk, p. 7-25. 117 Bothvidi, Johannes Gothos. 1620. Theses de qvaestione utrum Muschovitae sint Christiani. Holmiae [Stockholm], p. 3. 118 Connor, History of Poland, p. 303, 325. 119 Kraucevic, Alexander. 2000. Stvarennie Vialikaha kniastva Litouskaha. Rzeszów; Snyder, The reconstruction of Nations, p. 14-104. 30 Robert I. Frost argued that the Commonwealth’s political life after the Union of Lublin was based on a triangle of political forces: the king, the magnates and the nobility. The king could be regarded not only as the head of state but also as the head of his own political faction, with a marked interest in a strong central government.120 Before the Union of Lublin, the Jagiellonian Rulers (1385-1572) had different legal positions in Poland and the GDL. In Lithuania they were powerful hereditary monarchs. In Poland they were elected kings and remained subordinate to the law and the nobility (the Diet). After the establishment of the elected monarchy (1569-73), the Polish model was shared by both parts of federation. The king of the Commonwealth nominated all 35 Lithuanian senators. The law mandated the king to personally select one of four candidates that the Lithuanian nobility proposed to fill state and district positions. Each state senator possessed “an assignment” – a large piece of land with peasants that the kings granted to new senators. Thus, the king could reward his supporters politically and economically. The GDL played a very important financial role for the king and his treasury. Between 1632 and 1654, 30 per cent of the income to the royal treasury came from the GDL.121 Apart from that, the king possessed enormous landed estates and was, hence, one of the richest Lithuanian feudal lords. As a rule, royal estates were leased to the political supporters of the king.122 The 17th century Lithuanian nobility made up at least 10-11 per cent of the whole population. Lords (Pany) belonged to the magnate group. They traced their descent to the royal dynasties: the Lithuanian Gediminas dynasty and the Ruthenian Rurikids as well as to the high Lithuanian officials. Despite the equality of all noblemen, declared after the union with Poland, the notion lord applied in Lithuania, unlike Poland, to the elite within the nobility. It distinguished the magnates from the rest of the nobility. The political importance of the magnates rested upon three foundations: • belonging to an elite family which historically assumed the highest positions in the ruling hierarchy • the possession of great landed estates (20 or more settlements) including local nobility settled according to the right of lease. • important state office. 123 120 Frost, Robert I. 1986. “Initium Calamitatis Regni”? John Casimir and monarchial power in Poland-Lithuania, 1648-1668. European History Quarterly. No. 16, p. 181-207. 121 Filipczak-Kocur, Anna. 2003. Rozkryty czy ubogi król Wáadysáaw IV? Dwòr a Kraj. MiĊdzy centrum a peryferiami wáadzy. Materiaáy konferencji. Ed. Ryszard Skowron. Kraków, p. 353-375. 122 Lulewicz, Henryk. 1984. Elita polityczno-spoleczna Wielkiego KsiĊstwa Litewskiego w poáowie XVII wieku. Unpublished PhD thesis. Warszawa, p. 60-61. 123 Ibid., p. 15-34. 31 The families of Lithuanian lords dominated the political life. A system of clientage kept the lower nobility in a position of dependency. After the union with Poland, the GDL did not witness any organised movement of the nobility against the magnates similar to that which occurred in Poland. Most noblemen were connected to a neighbouring lord, either through profitable service on the latter’s estate or holdings, through protection at the royal court, or by support in seeking local office.124 However, the power of the magnates was not unquestioned. The ordinary nobility had their own instruments and were sometimes able to organize and to protect their interests from the magnates by using the dietinies.125 The Lithuanian ordinary nobility sent 48 members to the House of Commons of the Diet, elected at the local dietinies (two from each district).126 However, on the whole the local nobility lived rather a quiet life, primarily defending the interests of the home district. Within the boundaries of the district, old established families dominated. For example, in the district of Orsha, the families of local princes dominated. They were the descendents of the medieval Drutsk principality. Among them were Drucki (with the domain of Drutsk), Lukomski (Lukoml), Podbereski (Padbiarezze) and HolowczyĔski (Halouchyn). The representatives of these Ruthenian families held in their hands all high local offices during the entire 17th century.127 Similarly, in the Lithuanian district of Kaunas, the local noble families dominated public life.128 The four Lithuanian Roman Catholic bishops (nobles by birth), who had senator status, also belonged to the political elite. The bishop of Vilnius was nominally the highest state officer and titled “Primate of Lithuania.” First, the bishops were the instruments of Vatican policy. Second, in accordance with tradition, they led the dietines of Vilnius, Smolensk, Samogitia and Brest. Third, the bishops administered tremendous latifundia and possessed considerable financial resources. In 1649, the landed estates of the Vilnius bishopric brought in 100,000 zloty annually.129 The state discriminated against non-Catholic bishops politically. The Orthodox bishop of Belarus, 124 Kiaupa, History of Lithuania, p. 262. Vasiliauskas, Arturas. 2001. Local Politics and Clientage in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 1587-1632. Unpublished PhD thesis. King’s College. London. 126 KamiĔski, Andrzej. 1983. The szlachta of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and their Government. The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe. Ed. Ivo Banac and Paul Bushkovitch. New Haven, p. 18. 127 Kaminski, Mikhail, Nasevich, Valiantsin. 1993. Arshanski pavet. Entsyklopedyya Historyi Belarusi. Vol.1, p. 190-192; Nasevich Valiantsin. Drutskae kniastva i kniazi drutskie. Drutsk letapisny. Drutskae Evangelle. Minsk, p. 49-76. 128 Sienkiewicz, Witold. 1989. ”Trakty”, ”okrĊgi”, ”koáa”, ”pola”, ”rody”, ”okolice” jako jednostki terytorialno-osadnicze w Wielkim KsiĊstwie Litewskim w XVII wieku. LituanoSlavica Poznaniensia III. Studia Historica. PoznaĔ, p. 233-262. 129 Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 41, 58. 125 32 the six Reformed superintendents, the Lutheran superintendent and the four Uniate bishops could not be elected members of the Senate. Thus, they were excluded from central political life and were politically passive. The urban population of the GDL before the crisis of the mid-17th century made up 15 per cent of the population.130 However, the GDL’s townspeople in general were not politically active. Only Vilnius had the right to send three ambassadors to the Diet. As was mentioned above, the GDL political nation was multi-ethnic. A similarly structured political elite could be found elsewhere in early modern Europe. For example, the political elite of Transylvania included three ethnic groups: Hungarians, Szkelers and Germans. The nobility of Bohemia consisted of Czechs and Germans. After the union with Poland, a considerable number of Polish nobles entered into the service of Lithuanian magnates, and sometimes made up an important part of the local nobility.131 According to contemporary publicists, the Ruthenians lived in all districts except Samogitia.132 For example, one branch of the old Ruthenian Prince family of the Puzyna had settled down in the district of Upytơ. During the 17th century, this branch of the family converted to Calvinism and assimilated with its ethnically non-Slavic neighbours.133 Another branch of the Puzyna, which settled among the Ruthenians, resisted polonization and preserved its East Slavic identity. In mid-17th century, the head of this branch, Afanasiusz Puzyna, became Orthodox bishop of Lutsk. Later, members of the Puzyna family would take part in three different national movements (Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian). Jonas Puzinas became a prominent Lithuanian archaeologist. Another example is the ethnic Lithuanian family of Giedroyc. Two members of this family became prominent activists of both Lithuanian and Ruthenian culture. Melchior Giedroyc (Merkelis Giedraitis) was Roman Catholic bishop of Samogitia (1576-1609). He re-established Catholicism in his diocese after the Reformation and is considered a great ethnic Lithuanian patriot. However, Melecjusz Giedroyc (Mialecij Hiedroyc) was the superior of the Orthodox monastery in Polatsk (1632-1654) and became the prominent spiritual leader of Belarus. The Samogitian nobility was ethnically close to the Lithuanian, but preserved some particularities and self-awareness. The Samogitians guarded their particularism and even rebelled several times, for instance in 1418, 130 Kiaupa, History of Lithuania, p. 256. Topolska, Maria. 1987. ĝrodowisko twórcze w Wielkim KsiĊstwie Litewskim w XVI wieku. Studia nad gospodarką, spoáeczeĔstwem i rodziną w Europie póĨnofeudalnej. Ed. Jerzy Topolski and Cezary Kuklo. Lublin, p. 195-216. 132 Ivanoviþ, Marija. 1998. XVII a. Lietuvos lenkiškos knygos. Kontrolinis sąrašas. Vilnius, no 642, 643. 133 Liedke, Marzena. 2004. Od prawosáawia do katolicyzmu. Ruscy moĪni i szlachta Wielkiego KsiĊstwa Litewskiego wobec wyznaĔ reformacyjnych. Biaáystok, p. 232. 131 33 against the GDL. In 1441, Samogitia acquired a special legal position as a semi-independent prefecture or duchy within the GDL, with the right for the nobility to elect their own starosta. The Samogitian nobility appealed to the king, asking him to decree that “the starosta of Samogitia should be only a Samogitian not a Lithuanian or Ruthenian.”134 After the 13-14th centuries, the Ruthenian nobles were ruled by the ethnic Lithuanian dynasty of Jagellonians, which resulted in the transition of the Ruthenian elite to their jurisdiction. The nobility of Pinsk (the former Turau – Pinsk Principality of the Kyiv Realm) held that they “together with their towns” voluntarily had accepted the rule of Lithuania, and that their Principality was divided into the districts of Lithuania since the last Rurikid, Duke Fedor Jaroslavovich, died without heirs.135 The early modern identity of the Ruthenians was formed during their struggles against Muscovy. Russia’s lengthy wars against Lithuania (1492-94, 1500-1503, 1507-08, 1512-22, 1534-37, 1632-34) had contributed to a negative image of Muscovite Russians among Lithuanian Ruthenians. During the wars with Moscow, the Orthodox Ruthenian population and the clergy were loyal to Vilnius.136 Up to the mid-17th century, the Lithuanian and Muscovite Orthodox religious rites were different. The long separation of the Churches since 1415 had caused this difference. Whereas the Moscow Patriarchate elaborated a specific sequence of religious ceremonies and rites (the two-finger sign of the cross, different duration of divine service and liturgical order), the Ruthenian Orthodox Church, which remained under the jurisdiction of the ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, preserved the original Greek tradition. In Ruthenian chronicles, the Muscovites were often treated as “foes” and “enemies.”137 A typical Ruthenian nobleman of 17th century Lithuania was the vice-judge of Navahradak Fedor Jewáaszewski – a Calvinist convert, born in an Orthodox family. He was one of the best writers of early modern times. He wrote his memoirs in old Belarusian. The Protestant Jewáaszewski was closely connected to ancient Orthodox culture. He was educated in “a Ruthenian school since no other school was available in our land.”138 His father Mikhail was the Orthodox bishop of Pinsk. Jewáaszewski regarded himself as a Lithuanian, using the word in a political rather than an ethnic sense. He was proud of great Lithuanians of Ruthenian origin, and always tried to contrast his Lithuanian culture to that of Poland.139 134 Jakstas, Joseph. 1963. How Firm was the Polish-Lithuanian Federation. Slavic Review. Vol. 22/3, p. 445-446. 135 Korshunov, Alexander. 1965. Afanasiusz Filipowicz. Zhizn’ i tvorchestvo. Minsk, p. 99. 136 Krom, Mikhail. 1995. Mezhdu Rus’u i Litvoi. Zapadnorusskie zemli v sisteme russkolitovskikh otnoshenii kontsa XV–pervoi treti XVI veka. Moskva. 137 Marzaljuk, Ihar. 2002. Nasha ”Kieuskaya” i ”Litouskaya” spadchyna. Spadchyna. No 5-6. 138 Pomniki memuarnai litaratury, p. 32. 139 Ibid., p. 44. 34 In the mid-16th century, the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Lithuanian political nation began to consolidate around a theory of the Roman origin of the Lithuanian nobility. Legend had it that 500 noble families of Rome escaped to Lithuania during the reign of Nero, and founded the first state there. This conception united the gentry’s three ethnic groups and constituted a response to the Polish theory of Sarmatism. The Rome legend became popular and was recorded in state chronicles written in Ruthenian and Latin.140 In 1582, in Königsberg, Maciej Stryjkowski, a Polish noble in Lithuanian service, published a book entitled “Chronicle of Poland, Lithuania, Samogitia and all Ruthenia.”141 He emphasized that Lithuanian statehood had grown out of the Kyiv Realm. In his opinion, accordingly, the GDL was a state combining two ethnic communities of nobles (Lithuanians and Ruthenians) who shared historic roots.142 However, some ethnic Lithuanian intellectuals were suspicious and hostile to the greater Ruthenian nobility. One of them, Michalonis Litvani, wrote in his treatise (1550), published in Basel in 1615, that the Ruthenian people (populis Ruthenicis) were at lower cultural level than the Lithuanians. He also wrote that the official Ruthenian language (idioma Ruthenum) was alien to the Lithuanians. The latter, being of Rome origin, ought to use Latin.143 Many ethnic Lithuanian scholars opposed the use of Ruthenian in public life, and argued for a change to Latin or Lithuanian.144 In 1624, in Lubcha, the Calvinist Samuel Dovgird published his “Genealogy or Essay of the Lithuanian Grand Dukes”, a compilation in Polish. His patriotic preface, he addressed to the nobility “the sons of the GDL.” Dovgird asserted that only the ethnic Balts could be considered true Lithuanians. The Ruthenian nobility should not be part of the Lithuanian nation, nor enjoy full noble privileges. Dovgird stressed that the Lithuanian language contains thousands of Italian words (inherited from the patricians of Rome) and many German words (from the peasants’ ancestors, the glorious Goths). The join140 Suchocki, Jerzy. 1987. Geneza liteswkiej legendy etnogenetycznej. Aspekty polityczne i narodowe. Zapiski Historyczne. Vol. 52, p. 27-66. Kiaupienơ, Jnjratơ. 2001. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Grand Dukes of Lithuania in the 16th century: reflections on the Lithuanian political nation and the Union of Lublin. The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, c. 1500-1795. Ed. Richard Butterwick. Palgrave, p. 82-92. 141 Stryjkowski, Maciej. 1985. Kronika polska, litewska, Īmudzka i wszystkiej Rusi. Vol. 1-2. Warszawa. Under “all Ruthenia” Stryjkowski meant both the Polish (Ukraine) and Lithuanian (Belarus) Ruthenia. 142 Kiaupa, History of Lithuania, p. 292-293. 143 “The Ruthenian language is foreign to us Lithuanians, that is Italians originating from Roman blood. This is clear from our half-Italian language and from old Roman customs which have only recently disappeared from us.”: Michalonis Litvani. 1615. De Moribus Tartororum, Lituanorum et Moschorum: Fragmina X, Multiplici Historia Refert, Basileae, p. 23-25; Michalon Litvin. 1994. O nravakh tatar, litovtsev i moskvichei. Moskva. 144 Dini, Pietro U. 1999. The dispute among Vilnius humanists regarding Latin, Lithuanian and Ruthenian. Historiographia Linguistica. Vol. XXVI:1/2, p. 23-36. 35 ing of Lithuania and Ruthenia contaminated the old Lithuanian language with Slavic. According to Dovgird, Lithuania had expanded its borders from the very beginning, by waging wars with the Poles, Ruthenians, and Muscovites. The struggle with the Ruthenians was especially successful. Initially, Lithuania had been subordinate to the Ruthenian princes. Later, however, the Lithuanian nobility had risen and subjugated Ruthenia. The following metaphorical lines illustrate the rise of Lithuania at the expense of Ruthenia: At first Lithuania was weak, It had to render tribute in brooms to Ruthenian princes... However afterwards, instead of the brooms it had given to Ruthenia It took back in gold. A Ruthenian submitted to a Lithuanian and always bowed before him.145 From the other side, in 1621, a Calvinist noble of Slutsk, Jan Kazimierz Paszkiewicz, composed a patriotic verse in honour of the Ruthenians: Poland is flourished with the Latin language Lithuania blossoms with the Ruthenian tongue One cannot do without the first in Poland Without the second one you will be a fool in Lithuania It is significant that Paszkiewicz’s verse was written on the margins of the Statute – Lithuanian code of laws in Ruthenian, and the main symbol of Lithuania’s independence from Poland.146 However not Ruthenian or Latin, but Polish was “the main enemy” for the native scholars. After 1620, the majority of books were published “according to the will of many people” in Polish. Many books began to be printed with parallel texts: in native Ruthenian or Lithuanian, and Polish. A native Ruthenian and Lithuanian literature developed through the efforts of individuals. An important part of GDL nobility’s mentality was the contrast “ancientmodern.” When issuing decrees, the Grand Dukes often added the formula “the old traditions must be inviolable and novelty does not have to be introduced.” In this formula, old customs were considered the best bearers of proper order. Novelty, on the contrary, was regarded as a risk to society. From this point of view, the 1569 Lublin union with Poland, the Brest Church union of 1596 and the Protestant Reformation had broken the conventional sequence of things and could cause opposition, because they were 145 Daugirdas, Samuelis. 2001. Genealogija, arba Trumpas didžiǐjǐ Lietuvos kunigaikšþiǐ. Vilnius, p. 66. 146 Statut Vialikaha kniastva Litouskaha, p. 28. 36 new.147 For example, the magnate Mikoáaj Hlebowicz explained his conversion from Calvinism back into Catholicism (1633) as follows: “Protestant religion is not old and it was not more maiorum, and the late King Jogaila did not introduce it and my grandfather did not adhere to it either.”148 The Commonwealth was a state that was disintegrating. The non-Catholic political elites of Lithuania, Royal Prussia, Ducal Prussia, the Ukrainian Hetmanate, Courland, and the Polish-Lithuanian Livonia all had constant separatist aspirations, which caused the many civil wars and domestic conflicts of the 17th centuries.149 The bonds that connected the two members of the federation were not strong: Poland and Lithuania had a jointly elected ruler (the King and Grand Duke) and parliament (the Diet). After 1569, the Lithuanian nobility kept on convoking their general dietine, which was named “convocation general.”150 The state institutions of army, treasury, tax collection, courts of appeal, coinage, customhouse and frontier guards all functioned separately in Poland and Lithuania.151 The political nation of the Commonwealth included diverse ethnic groups and, what was more important at that time, different denominations of Christianity.152 Lithuania had also kept its own separate legal system, which was based on the 1588 Statute, published in Ruthenian and later in Polish.153 The Commonwealth had two different official languages: Latin was used in Poland and Ruthenian (written with Cyrillic script) in Lithuania. Because of this, the editor of the 1588 Statute, the Chancellor and Ruthenian magnate Lew Sapieha, wrote in his address to all of the estates: Every nation should be ashamed not to know its own laws, especially for us who use our native language in which we record the laws and at any time we can take advantage of it to defend ourselves from injustice.154 147 Krom, Mikhail. 1994. ”Starina” kak kategoriya srednevekovogo mentaliteta (po materialam Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo XIV-nachala XVII vv). Mediaevalia Ucrainica. Vol. 3. Kiyv, p. 68-85. 148 Marzaliuk, Ihar. Terminaliohia etnichnai historyi Bielarusi XIV-XVII st: nablizhenne da realiiau tsi stvarenne novykh mifau? Histarychny Almanakh. Vol. 9. Hrodna, p. 25. 149 Gaunt, David. 2001. Kinship: thin red lines or thick blue blood. Family life in early modern times, 1500-1789. Vol. 1. New Haven and London, p. 265-277. 150 Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 3. 151 Kiaupienơ, Jnjratơ. 1997. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania in East Central Europe or once again about the Lithuanian-Polish Union. Lithuanian Historical Studies. Vol. 2. Vilnius, p. 68. 152 KamiĔski, The szlachta of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, p. 17-45; Friedrich, Karin. 2001. Nobles, burghers and the monarchy in Poland-Lithuania: the case of Royal Prussia, 1454 –1772/93. The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, p. 93-115. 153 Okinshevich, Leo. 1953. The law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Background and Bibliography. New York. 154 Statut Vialikaha Kniastva Litouskaha, p. 17. 37 The main political problem was the religious split of the elite of the two states of the confederation. On the eve of the unification, Lithuania had become a Protestant country. The majority of its ruling council was made up of Protestant magnates. Out of 28 members: 17 were Protestants, 9 were Orthodox and only 2 were Catholics (both of them bishops).155 Negotiations for the union with Poland took place during the war between the GDL and Muscovy. In 1562, the army of Tsar Ivan the Terrible captured Polatsk, the strategic centre of the Duchy. The Baltic trade was irrupted, which caused a general economic crisis. According to some researchers, the critical need of military aid from Poland compelled the Lithuanian elite to agree to the union on terms so favourable to Poland. According to one of the clauses, the very name of the GDL was to be abolished, changed into “New Poland.”156 The Polish political nation (Poles, Ukrainian Ruthenians and Germans) had a considerable preponderance in the new, common Diet. The GDL was limited to at the most 71-88 representatives: 25-35 senators, 44-48 noblemen from the districts and 2-3 townsmen from metropolitan Vilnius. At the same time, 225-248 deputies (112-121 senators and 113-127 ambassadors from nobility and towns) represented Poland. This enabled Poland to dictate its terms on the legislative level.157 According to Article III of the Lublin union, “The Kingdom of Poland and the GDL are a single indivisible whole and hence, not two separate states but the Commonwealth which from the two states joined into one nation.” Separate elections and coronations of the king and grand duke had to be abolished. Poles and Lithuanians had equal rights to purchase land in both states. Warsaw, being geographically closer to Lithuania than Kraków, became the capital of the Commonwealth.158 The price of the Union with Poland proved high for the GDL. Poland annexed a number of previously Ruthenian territories (Podlasie, Volhynia and Kyiv). As Vasil Druzhchyts noted, the annexation of these territories on behalf of Poland made it impossible to regard Lithuania and Poland as a single state.159 The 1588 Statute formed the legislative basis for the struggle of Lithuania against the political domination of Poland. The articles of the Statute ignored the provision of the Union of Lublin concerning the standardization of Lithuanian laws with the Polish, and which recognized the GDL’s independence from Poland. The Poles were regarded as foreigners who were not allowed to buy landed es- 155 Ivanova, Ludmila. 1997. Refarmatsyiny rukh na Belarusi. Belaruski histarychzny chasopis. No 2, p. 58. 156 Rachuba, Wielkie KsiĊstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym Rzeczypospolitej, p. 41. 157 Ibid., p. 169-171. 158 Druzhchyts, Vasil. 1925. Palazhenne Litouska-Belaruskaj dziarzhavy paslia Lublinskaj vunii. Pratsy Belaruskaha Dziarhaunaha Universyteta, no. 6-7, p. 216-251. 159 Ibid, p. 221. 38 tates in the GDL, hold office or take part in the political life.160 The text of the Union with Poland was not included in the text of the Statute, and the Union was mentioned only once, indirectly.161 Thus, the Lithuanian political elite continued to regard the GDL as an independent state, a full member of the federation with Poland. Different views on the federation held by Poles and Lithuanians brought on political conflicts. Contrary to the provisions of the Lublin Union, the Lithuanians made the kings of Poland swear a special oath to the Grand Duke of Lithuania. This was done by Stefan Batory in 1573 and in 1587 by Sigismund III Vasa.162 On the arrival of Wáadysáaw IV Vasa in Vilnius in 1648, the magnates arranged the king should enter their capital as “Grand Duke of Lithuania.” When Wáadysáaw suddenly died in the Lithuanian town of Merkine, Janusz Radziwiáá argued with the Poles that the heart of the king ought to be buried in Lithuania. This caused a sharp dispute between Poles and Lithuanians, and Palatine Mikoáaj Abramowicz, suggested the forceful prevention of the transportation of king’s body back to Poland.163 The other conflict concerning the delimitation of the new border between Lithuania and Poland began after 1569. Despite the work of a joint “Brest Commission”, the border was not defined, which caused a number of conflicts between Polish and Lithuanian landowners.164 The GDL had its own mint in Vilnius and later in Brest.165 There was an attempt to introduce a single monetary system, intended to equalize the Lithuanian and Polish coins. However, this attempt failed, and until the end of the 17th century, payments were made in accordance with different rates. Polish coins were 20 per cent lower in value than Lithuanian coins.166 According to Anna Filipczak-Kocur, the Lithuanian resistance to Polish taxation was caused by issues, which had little to do with fiscal policy. Rather, they were meant to demonstrate the Duchy’s sovereignty.167 The GDL had its own army, led by two hetmans (the grand and the field), with 18,000 soldiers.168 The Polish army was not allowed to enter the bor- 160 Lazutka, Stanislavas. 2001. Litouskiya statuty ikh stvaralniki i epokha. Kraj. No. 1-2. Lappo, Ivan. 1930. Uravnenie prav Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Korony Polskoj v 1697 g. Zapiski Russkogo Nauchnogo Instituta v Belgrade. Vol. I. Beograd, p. 53-67. 162 Druzhchyts, Palazhenne Litouska-Belaruskaj dziarzhavy, p. 225-226. 163 Wisner, Janusz Radziwill 1612-1655, p. 88, 94. 164 Michaliuk, Dorota. 2001. Pamezhnyia sprechki pamizh Karonai i Vialikim kniastvam Litouskim u 16-17 stst na prykladze Melnitskai i Berastseiskai zemliau. Histarychny Almanakh. Vol. 5, p. 23-53. 165 Riabtsevich, Valentin.1995. Numizmatika Belarusi. Minsk, p. 190-198. 166 Ibid., p. 196. 167 Filipczak-Kocur, Anna. 1999. Poland-Lithuania before partition. The rise of the fiscal state in Europe, c. 1200-1815. Oxford, p. 469-471. 168 Wisner, Henryk. 1973. Wojsko Litewskie poáowy XVII wieku. Studia i Materiaáy do Historii WojskowoĞci. Vol. XIX/1. Warszawa, p. 94-101. 161 39 ders of Lithuania without permission.169 Even the Lithuanian Jewish community sought independence from Poland. In 1623, at a convocation in Brest, the Jews announced the formation of a Jewish council independent of Poland and named “Vaad [Council] of Lithuania.”170 Different views on the character of the Lublin Union also affected international relations. In their relations with France, Polish diplomats presented Lithuania as an ordinary province of the Polish state with no interests other than those of Poland.171 The Lithuanians often did the same thing when presenting their Duchy while failing to mention Poland. For example, in the case of the murder a Swiss subject on the territory of Lithuania (1644), Switzerland appealed only to the GDL. Switzerland referred to the Polish King Wáadysáaw IV exclusively as the Lithuanian King.172 The prospect of a joint Polish-Lithuanian foreign policy was one of the main arguments in favour of the Union. Nevertheless, after the union, the GDL preserved its previous monopoly on diplomatic relations with Muscovy. It was still the Lithuanian Chancellor who controlled from Vilnius diplomatic relations between Warsaw and Moscow.173 Owing to its exclusive diplomatic contacts, Lithuania’s Muscovite policy could often develop in ways contrary to Polish interests. In 1587, the Lithuanian ambassadors conducted separate negotiations with Muscovy concerning the possible choice of the last of the Rurikids Fedor Ioannovich, the Prince of Moscow as Grand Duke of Lithuania. That resulted in acute protests from Poland.174 Additionally, the GDL claimed the right to continue its independent relations with Sweden. When King Sigismund III Vasa lost the Swedish throne (1599), all the Polish-Lithuanian rulers of the Vasa dynasty (Sigismund III, Wáadysáaw IV and Jan II Kazimierz) tried to maintain their claims to Sweden and continued to style themselves ”King of Sweden.”175 As known Jan Kazimierz’s claim to the Swedish throne was one of the pretexts for Sweden’s invasion of Lithuania and Poland in 1655. The First Northern War between the Commonwealth and Sweden (1600-1629) revealed the first grave contradictions in the international interests of Lithuania and Poland. The dependence of the GDL on Eastern Baltic 169 VL, p. 233. Vishnitser, Mikhail. 1991. Litovskii Vaad ili Vaad glavnykh evreiskikh obshchin Litvy. Evreyskaya Entsiklopedia, vol. 10, Moskva, p. 303-309. 171 Lalkou, Ihar. 2000. Aperçu de l’histoire politique du grand-duché de Lithuanie. Paris: L’Harmattan, collection Biélorussie. 172 Lappo, Uravnenie prav Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo, p. 56. 173 Wojcik, The separatist tendencies in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, p. 56-57. 174 Tikhomirov, Alexander. 1998. Vneshenepoliticheskii mekhanizm i organizatsiya diplomaticheskoi sluzhby Rechi Pospolitoi i Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo v 1569-1795. Belorusskii zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii. No. 3. 175 Frost, Robert I. 2001. Obsequious disrespect: the problem of royal power in the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth under the Vasas, 1587-1668. The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, p. 159-160. 170 40 market stimulated Lithuanian interest in maintaining friendly contacts with neighbouring Sweden.176 After Sweden’s capture of Riga (1621) the Lithuanians – unlike the Poles – did not want to continue the war with Sweden. Oswald Backus believed that this divergence was probably based on the unwillingness of the GDL Protestants to fight against Sweden.177 The special position of Lithuania resulted in two separate agreements with Sweden (1622 and 1627), which were clear manifestations of Lithuanian separatism. These steps provoked a sharp negative response from the Polish side. Poland considered Lithuania’s separate agreements to be political betrayals. No wonder that the European image of Lithuania was similar to that of Scotland: The Great Duchy of Lithuania called by the inhabitants Litwa, the subject to the King of Poland as Scotland to the King of England, yet is a different Nation from the Kingdom.178 Lithuanians’ feelings about Poland were highly ambivalent. Some Lithuanian and Ruthenian intellectuals viewed polonization in Lithuania as a cultural threat to their native languages, and composed patriotic texts to support their mother tongue. Among them were the Lithuanians Mikaloiu Dauksza and Melchior Giedroyc, and the Ruthenians Wasyl CiapiĔski and Jan Kazimierz Paszkiewicz.179 The height of negative attitudes towards Poland appeared in an anonymous work by a Ruthenian nobleman. It was called “Melieszko’s speech at the Diet.” This work was popular among nobles.180 The author critically compared the social order of independent Lithuania during the reign of Sigismund August (1548-1568) to the social order of the Polish– Lithuanian federation during the reign of Sigismund III Vasa (1589-1632). The author claimed that the GDL, during its era of independence, had known no Polish language and European innovations. Nonetheless, it had prospered and been well able to defend itself. The last king from the Lithuanian dynasty of Jagellonians, Sigismund August, “disliked cunning Poles and liked Lithuania and our Ruthenia, and we liked him in return.” The author believed that the union with Poland had gained Lithuania. The country had lost Livonia and had been subject to repeated crises. All of Lithuanian troubles were the fault of the Poles, “who are only good at speaking Polish to us and are bad at service, and can only put on high-heeled boots and charm girls or 176 Rowell, Stephen. C. 2000. The wood and the trees: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Baltic identity, c. 1500-1600. Ships, Guns and Bibles in the North Sea and the Baltic States, c. 1350 - c. 1700. Ed. Allan Maginnes, Thomas Riis and Frederik Pedersen. Tuckwell Press, p. 72. 177 Backus, The Problem of Unity in the Polish-Lithuanian State. Slavic Review, p. 424. 178 Connor, History of Poland, p. 302. 179 Stone, Daniel. 2001. The Polish-Lithuanian state, 1386-1795. Seattle, p. 107-108. 180 Lastouski, Vaclau. 1926. Historya belaruskai (kryuskai knihi). Sproba paiasnitselnai knihapisi ad kantsa X da pachatku XIX stahodzdzia. Kaunas, p. 446-449. 41 drink beer from a big bowl.”181 Ruthenian intellectuals also revealed their negative attitudes towards the political separation of their people, which had occurred when Poland annexed the Ukrainian part of Ruthenia. A doctor of philosophy from Mahileu, Tomasz Iewlewicz, published in 1625 a poem entitled “Labyrinth”. It was about the fall of the Ruthenian nation, and pointed out that people in Lithuanian Belarus and Polish Ukraine constituted a single Ruthenian nation.182 In the 17th century, both Ruthenian churches (the Uniate and Orthodox) retained their common hierarchies. Their structures were not divided, and covered the whole Poland-Lithuania. The process that divided the Ruthenian consciousness, and thus gave rise to the Belarusian and the Ukrainian consciousness, started only in the mid-17th century. The formation of different identities was dependent on the development of a specific social category that was atypical of Belarus but characteristic to the Ukraine: the Cossacks. The negative image of the union with Poland was popular within the Lithuanian elite. In 1609, Lew Sapieha wrote to Krzysztof II Radziwiáá: It is well known how they [the Poles] view this praise union. They would gladly make from our country Volhynia [in 1569 Volhynia was incorporated by Poland]. Generally we do not feel well with them since they would gladly make us their vassals, especially those of them who come from the smithy of that deceased [King Stefan Bathory] who called openly us Lithuanians a hostile race.183 In 1616, Grand Hetman Jan Chodkiewicz wrote to Krzysztof II Radziwiáá: ”for a long time the Poles have been searching for a quarrel between the great families of Lithuania, aiming to govern Lithuania in accordance with their own intentions.”184 In 1617, in a letter to Krzysztof II, the Protestant nobleman Stanislaw Pukszta Klawgielowicz expressed himself on this subject as follows: The Poles are talking about changing the union in a different way. They want Lithuania to be an ordinary palatinate of Poland like Volhynia, Podille or Royal Prussia, with common laws, treasury, army, official seal, since there is no use in this union for the Poles.185 In 1635, Janusz Radziwiáá wrote to his father Krzysztof II that during the negotiations with Sweden at Altmark/Stary Targ, the Poles had forgotten that 181 Vlast, Karotkaya historya Belarusi, p. 65-68. Iewlewicz, Tomasz. 1625. Labirynt. Kraków. Spadchyna. No 2. 1999, p. 83-109. 183 Szkialonak, Belarus i susedzi, p. 259. 184 KsiĊcia Krzysztofa Radziwiááa hetmana polnego Wielkiego KsiĊstwa Litewskiego sprawy wojenne i polityczne. 1621-1632. ParyĪ, 1859, p. 687. 185 Augustyniak, Urszula. 2001. Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiááa (1585–1640). Miechanizmy funkcjonowania patronatu. Warszawa, p. 35. 182 42 Livonia belonged jointly to Lithuania and Poland. He stressed that “Poles bargain about our skin as though they own it.”186 A sharp conflict took place in 1636. At the senators’ meeting in Vilnius, Krzysztof II Radziwiáá interrupted Polish vice-chancellor Piotr Gembicki’s speech on the policy towards Muscovy, and blamed Poland for dictating the methods used in the diplomacy with Russia. The king tried to close the meeting. However, Radziwiáá insisted on taking the floor. Finally, Grand Marshal of Poland Lukasz OpaliĔski informed the senate that the King did not give Radziwiáá the permission to speak. Infuriated, Radziwiáá started to shout: “To deny Palatine of Vilnius the right to speak in Vilnius! This is the way the Poles treat the Lithuanians in Lithuania itself. The matter does not concern the talk between Radziwiáá and OpaliĔski here but Palatine with Marshall. Let the senate explode but we will retain our liberty. Lithuania will never submit to despotic rule by Poland.” Janusz Radziwiáá supported his father and started to shout at the Polish senators: “I believe that there will be a time when we Lithuanians will throw all Poles out of our windows.”187 This remark referred to the famous Prague defenestration of 1618, when the Czech Protestants threw the German Catholic Habsburg governors out of the windows. The Lithuanian elite realized that the ultimate aim of Poland was a complete amalgamation of Lithuania with Poland, including the annihilation of its equal and independent status. In 1645, another conflict took place. At the Diet, the Poles, following their national interests, by a majority vote made a resolution to turn over the town of Trubchevsk to Russia. Since 1618, this town on the border between Lithuania and Muscovy had belonged to the GDL. The Lithuanians interpreted the resolution as “dishonour and evil for the Lithuanians done by the Polish deputies.” The conflict was settled only after Poland gave Lithuania the towns of Loeu and Lubech. A payment of 170,000 thousand zloty was made to the owners of Trubchevsk, the princes of Trubecki. Most of the family preferred to remain in Lithuania. However, the podkomorzy of Starodub, Jerzy Wigunt Trubecki, decided to switch loyalty to Muscovy. During the occupation of the GDL, he served as a Russian general under the name of Yurii Trubetskoy.188 In the final century of Lithuanian independence, the family of Radziwiáás dominated the country politically and economically. In 1587-1625, the court biographer of the Radziwiáás, Salomon RysiĔski, published a number of epitaphs in Latin for the family mausoleum in Kơdainiai. In these epitaphs, RysiĔski ambitiously showed the Protestant branch of the Radziwiáás as the 186 Janusz Radziwiáá to Krysztof II Radziwiáá. September 9, 1635. GdaĔsk. Polish. Zycie Janusza Radziwiááa, no. 42. 187 Kotáubaj, Zycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 49. 188 PamiĊtniki Filipa, Michaáa i Teodora Obuchowiczów (1630-1707). Ed. Andrzej Rachuba and Henryk Lulewicz. Warszawa, 2003, p. 221-226, 601. 43 historical rulers of the GDL. They were styled “Grand Dukes” and the “glory of Lithuania.”189 Indeed, after the Lithuanian dynasty of the Jagellonians had died out, the Radziwiáás became the most prominent and powerful family in Lithuania and enjoyed more influence than the Polish royal family Vasa. However, during the reigns of the Vasa kings the political position of the Radziwiáás fluctuated strongly. Taking advantage of their privileges, above all the right to nominate senators, all the three kings had menacingly built up their party of royalist.190 In the 1640s, great changes in the structure of the Lithuanian political elite took place. During this time, a considerable number of senators, who were Protestant and Orthodox by faith and sons of independent Lithuania by tradition, died. As a result of the royal policy, the junior representatives of Catholic noble families took over their positions.191 Thus, the wealthiest magnate, Janusz Radziwiáá, lacked senator status until 1647. He had to be elected to the Diet every time as the ambassador of the ordinary nobility. To weaken the positions of the Radziwiáá faction, King Jan Kazimierz began to construct his “Court faction.” His method was as follows: he would nominate as senators, and to other among the highest military and state positions, and simultaneously grant landed estates, to members of the middle range Catholic nobility, the nobility that was not among the top elite and did not previously have senator or count status. Thus, the king’s favourites became Wincenty Gosiewski, Krysztof Pac, Teodor Lacki, Aleksander PolubiĔski and Filip Obuchowicz. Simultaneously, many of the leaders of the Court faction married court ladies of Queen Ludwika Maria. Jan Kazimierz also took the unprecedented step of splitting the Lithuanian army into two divisions: one became the left, and the other the right wing. On August 18 1654, the king appointed Field Hetman Gosiewski commander of the left wing division, and by this step removed Grand Hetman Radziwiáá from the general command.192 In 1652, Jan Kazimierz, in defiance of one of Radziwiáá’s protégés, denied Jan GruĪewski the position of vice-judge over Samogitia. Instead, the king appointed to this position the only Catholic out of four applicants. This caused a sharp response from Radziwiáá, who wrote a letter to Polish Chancellor Andrzej LeszczyĔski stating this was a violation of the principle of religious liberties, and a matter of discrimination against Lithuanian Protestants in favour of the Catholics. These were not isolated events.193 Three years later, GruĪewski became the propagandist for the 189 Risinskis, Saliamonas. [RysiĔski, Salomon]. 2000. Trumpas pasakojimas apie garsiouosius šviesiausiojo didiko Biržǐ ir Dubingiǐ kunigaikšþio Kristupo Radvilos žygius. Vilnius. 190 Rachuba, Andrzej. 2002. Palitychnyia hrupouki u VKL (1569-1732). Spadchyna. No. 5-6. 191 Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 5-6. 192 Rachuba, Andrzej. 2003. Boje Jana Kazimierza o LitwĊ w latach 1656-1668. Sukces stronnictwa dworskiego w walce z opozycja. Dwòr a Kraj. MiĊdzy centrum a peryferiami wáadzy. Ed. Ryszard Skowron. Kraków, p. 415-432. 193 Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 177-178. 44 Swedish protection over Samogitia. In 1653, a member of the Ruthenian middle nobility and a convert to Catholicism, Filip Obuchowicz, was nominated to the position of Senator and Palatine of Smolensk. This royal appointment provoked a sharp response from Janusz Radziwiáá. In a letter to Bogusáaw Radziwiáá, he wrote with bitterness that the king systematically granted high positions on the basis of loyalty to the Crown rather than reasoning from noble tradition, thus violating the century-old order of Lithuania. He added that, as was well known, ”the father of the grandfather of the newly senator worked in Mazyr as an iceman.”194 Thus, in response to the royal policy that was meant to split the Lithuanian elite, the Protestant magnates blamed Poland for wanting to dominate the GDL. Some researchers state that the formation of a single Lithuanian political nation probably was completed as early as the end of the 16th or the beginning of the 17th century. It unified the Lithuanian, Ruthenian and Samogitian nobility in a common historical and state tradition.195 In my opinion, the 17th century Lithuanian nobility was still only weakly integrated. It was still separated by political, religious and ethnic barriers. As a result, during the crisis of the 17th century, different groups within the Lithuanian nobility made several attempts to break the union with Poland, and to replace it by a union with some other state, hostile to Poland.196 2.2 The Radziwiáá faction: Protestant Unity and Counter-Reformation Religious dissidents such as the Bohemian Brethren (Hieronymus of Prague) visited the GDL as early as 1420. Between 1523 and 1546, twenty young Grand Duchy magnates attended Martin Luther’s lectures at the University of Wittenberg.197 The Protestant Reformation in the GDL started under the guise of Lutheranism, and was inspired by neighbouring Prussia and Livonia. The first Evangelical church was founded in Žeimelis (Samogitia) in 1540. In 1555, a Lutheran church was established in Vilnius. 198 In 1553 194 Ibid., p. 74 . Suchocki Jerzy. 1963. Formowanie siĊ i skáad narodu politycznego w Wielkim KsiĊstwie Litewskim póĪnego Ğredniowiecza. Zapiski historyczne. Vol. XLVIII. Z. 1-2, p. 31-77; Tereskinas, Arturas. 2000. The imperfect body of the community: Formulas of noblesse, forms of nationhood in the seventeeth-century Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Unpublished PhD thesis. Harvard University. 196 Backus, The Problem of Unity in the Polish-Lithuanian State, p. 423; Wojcik, The separatist tendencies in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, p. 55-62. 197 Malek, Jerzy. 1996. Polscy i litewscy studenci na uniwersytecie królewieckim. Polska i jej wschodni sąsiedzi od Ğredniowiecza po wspóáczesnoĞü. ToruĔ, p. 179. 198 Merchyng, Henryk. 1986. Zbory i senatorowie protestancy w dawnej Polsce: przyczynki do dziejów terytorialnego i i chronologicznego rozwoju i upadku reformacji w 195 45 Duke Mikoáaj Radziwiáá the Black converted from Catholicism to Lutheranism, in Brest and founded there the first Lutheran parish on Ruthenian soil. Conversion to Protestantism became very popular among the Catholic and Orthodox gentry. At the end of the 16th century, the Reformation spread in Belarus.199 The district of Braslau, close to Courland and Livonia, became the centre of the Reformation in northern Ruthenia. Here, the Protestant nobility, led by the local families of Mirski, Kimbar and Puciata, retained power throughout the 17th century. Andrej Kurbski, a Muscovite political refugee in Lithuania, wrote about the essential dissemination of Lutheranism among the Ruthenian nobility.200 Protestantism proved attractive to the Orthodox nobility because of its closeness to some of the principles of Orthodoxy: absence of celibacy among the regular parish clergy, divine service in the vernacular tongue, communion of believers with both sacraments, and the essential role of the laity. In 1547, in Königsberg, Marcin MaĪvid (Martynas Mažvydas), a refugee from Lithuania, issued a short Lutheran Catechism, the first book ever published in Lithuanian.201 In 1562, Simon Budny, supported by the Radziwiáá family, in Niasvizh published a Lutheran Catechism in Ruthenian – the first book to be published in the territory of modern Belarus. In 1572, the Protestant nobleman Wasyl CiapiĔski published the New Testament in the Ruthenian language, in his own typography and with a patriotic introduction dedicated to his native culture.202 In 1590 at Königsberg, the Lutheran scholar Jano Bretkuno (Jonas Bretknjnas) translated the Bible into Lithuanian.203 In 1653, the first Calvinist Catechism and psalms in Lithuanian were published in Kơdainiai.204 This edition was prepared by the two superintendents, Jan Borzymowski and Samuel Minwid, and was sponsored by Janusz Radziwiáá.205 From the very beginning, the Reformation had an elite nature. It developed mainly as the Church of nobles. The Union of three Protestant denominations of nobility was proclaimed as a Jednota Litewska (Lithuanian Unity) in Vilnius, in 1578. This institution united the Major Church (Calvinists) and Rzeczypospolitej. KrasiĔski, Walerjan. Zarys dziejów powstania i upadku reformacji w Polsce. Vol. 2. Warszawa. 199 Paþkajeu, Mikalaj. 2001. Evangelical Altar Furnishings in Belarus (16th –19th centuries). Belarusian Chronicle. No. 18, p. 10-14. 200 Hrushevsky, Mykhailo. 1995. Istoria Ukrainy-Rusi, vol. VI, Kyiv, p. 422-425. 201 The first Lithuanian book and its cultural context: Martinus Mosvidius' Catechismus, 1547. Ed. Saulius Žukas. Vilnius, 1996. 202 Kniha Belarusi. Zvodny katalah. 1517-1917. Minsk, 1986, no 12. 203 Range, Jochen. 1992. Bausteine zur Bretke-Forschung. Paderborn. 204 For more details concerning the usage of Lithuanian language by the Reformation movement: Lukšaitơ, Inga. 1970. Apie lietuviškǐ reformatǐ knygǐ plitimą Lietuvoje XVII a. Vilnius. 205 Knyga nobažnystơs krikšþioniškos 1653. Faksimilinis leidinys. Vilnius, 2004. 46 the Minor Church (the Lithuanian Brethren, also known as the Arians or Socinians or Anti-Trinitarians or Unitarians). The Lithuanian Unity also included and supported about 20 Lutheran parishes led by its own superintendent. The Lithuanian Unity was organized into six districts: three of them within the present-day Lithuania, and three of them in the Belarusian area. In the first half of the 17th century, the Calvinist congregation of Lithuanian Unity included six large districts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. District of Vilnius (with the Reformed Cathedral in Vilnius) District of Navahradak (Slutsk) District of Podlasie (Zabludów) District of Belarus (Kojdanava) District of Samogitia (Kơdainiai) District of Trans-Wilia (Biržai) 206 The “Council of curators general” ruled the unity. The Council included twelve persons: six Reformed superintendents and six laymen nobles, “secular seniors”, elected from the districts. Under the decision of the Lithuanian Unity in 1638, Janusz Radziwiáá was officially recognized as their Chief Protector.207 Around the year 1600, 260 Evangelical churches were active in the GDL.208 There were, at that time, more Protestant congregations than Catholic parishes in the Vilnius bishoprics.209 However, 92 per cent of the Evangelical churches were in western and northern parts of the Duchy. To the east of Minsk, in the districts that made up about 40 per cent of the territory, only ten churches were founded. Owing to Catholic opposition, the Protestants did not succeed in establishing their own university. Nevertheless, in 1625, the synod of the Lithuanian Unity decided to set up two high gymnasiums. Kơdainiai became an educational centre for students from the territories that were ethnically Lithuanian (Vilnius, Trans-Wilia and Samogitia). The Slutsk gymnasium became a centre for Ruthenian students (Navahradak, 206 Lukšaitơ, Inga. 1999. Reformacija Lietuvos Didžiojoje Kunigaikštystơje ir Mažojoje Lietuvoje. Vilnius; Kriegseisen, Wojciech. 1996. Ewangelicy Polscy i Litewscy w Epoce Saskiej. Warszawa, p.102-107. 207 Gilbert, Eleazar. 1641. Nevves from Poland. Wherein is declared the cruel practice of the Popish Clergie against the Protestants, and in particular against the Ministers of the city Vilna, in the great Dukedom of Lithuania, under the Government of the most illustrious Prince, Duke Radzivill. London. 208 The Polish Brethren: documentation of the history and thought of Unitarianism in the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth and in the diaspora, 1601-1685. Edited, translated and interpreted by George Huntston Williams. The proceedings of the Unitarian historical society. Vol. XVIII. 1978-79. Cambridge, Mass., p. 373-374. 209 Kosman, Marceli. 1977. Programme of the Reformation in the grand Duchy of Lithuania and how it was carried through (around. 1550-around.1650). Acta Poloniae Historica. No. 35, p. 27 (25-50). 47 Podlasie and Belarus).210 In Reformed editions, Janusz Radziwiáá was styled “Primate of Lithuania” in an analogy to the title of the leader of the Roman Catholic Church – the bishop of Vilnius.211 Apart from Vilnius, all the districts of the Lithuanian Union and around 50 per cent of its churches were located in private cities and towns owned by Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. The Radziwiáás also acted as the guardians of Reformed, Arian and Lutheran congregations outside their possessions. For instance, Janusz Radziwiáá was the patron of the Reformed church in Polatsk.212 Lithuanian Protestant centres supported by Janusz Radziwiáá were situated in: • Kơdainiai with a gymnasium, a printing house, two Reformed churches (one of them for Scots) and one Lutheran church. • Biržai with a school, and one Reformed and one Lutheran church. • Ruthenian Protestant centres supported by the Radziwiáás were situated in: • Slutsk with a gymnasium, two Reformed and one Lutheran church. Unlike in Western Europe, the religious conflicts between the Protestants of various denominations in the GDL were insignificant. During the counterreformation, they established a unified organization and encouraged ecumenist collaboration. On March 2 1570, by the concord of Vilnius, the Reformed and Lutheran Protestants constituted themselves as a political union.213 In 1616, in Vilnius, the similar terms was signed by the Calvinists and the Arians.214 The synods of Orla (1633) and Wáodawa (1634) agreed to preserve the alliance between all three Evangelical dominations, as well as to maintain good relations with Orthodoxy.215 It is not surprising that the Lutheran and Reformed ministers took part in joint worship services, for example in WĊgrow.216 In Kơdainiai the Reformed pastor Jan Okielewicz also 210 Monumenta Reformationis Poloniae et Lithuaniae. Akta synodów prowincjonalnych Jednoty Litewskiej 1611-1625. Wilno, 1915, p. 92-98. 211 Knyga nobažnystơs krikšþioniškos, p. 10. 212 Ivanova, Ludmila. 1992. Iz istorii reformatsiinnoi tserkvi v Polotske XVI-XVII vv. Navukovaya kanferentsya Historya i arkheolohya Polatska i Polatskaj zemli. Tezisy dakladau. Polatsk, p. 25-27. 213 Williams, George. 1978. Protestants in the Ukraine during the period of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Harvard Ukrainian Studies. No 2(1), p. 42. 214 Tazbir, Janusz. 2000. Prace wybrane. Vol. 1. PaĔstwo bez stosów i inne szkice. Kraków, p. 223. 215 Radzivil, Ad epistolam Synodi Warsawiensis; Jørgensen, Jordt. 1942. Ökumenische bestrebungen unter den Polnischen Protestanten. Bis zum jahre 1645. København, p. 366. 216 Wyszomirski, Tomasz. 1959. Z przeszáoĞci zboru protestanckiego w WĊgrowie w XVII i XVIII wieku. OiRwP. Vol. IV, p. 137-154. 48 served as a preacher for the Arians.217 A Lutheran, Jan Lange, was the head of the Calvinist publishing house in Lubcha. The radical Protestants, the Lithuanian Brethren, suffered the strongest persecution during the counter-reformation, or the “Catholic reaction” as they called it. The followers of this sect denied the divine nature of Jesus and the Trinity. The Arians made up the so-called “Minor Church” of the Lithuanian Union. The Arian congregations were situated mainly in the districts of Hrodna, Podlasie (Zabludów), Ukmergơ, Samogitia (Kơdainiai and Tauragơ) and Navahradak (Navahradak and Lubcha).218 In Poland, Sweden, England and the Dutch Republic the Arians were oppressed by other Protestant confessions. In Lithuania, by contrast, they were supported. The Arians of Ukraine and Volhynia continued to consider themselves associated with Lithuania, despite the fact that the Union of 1569 transferred them to Poland.219 Their leader, the podkomorzy of Kyiv, Jerzy Niemirycz, considered the Radziwiáás the main protectors of all Arians. As the owner of the village of Katiliškơs near Vilnius (with an Arian congregation), Niemirycz was also a member of the Lithuanian political nation and took part in the Duchy’s politics.220 Peter Block has argued that most of the Lithuanian Brethren were not ethnic Lithuanians, but rather of Belarusian (Ruthenian) or Polish origin.221 After the destruction of the Polish Arian centre Raków (1638), the Lithuanian district of Hrodna and Podlasie became a new home for the Polish Arian families of Lubieniecki and Przypkowski.222 These included Samuel Przypkowski, the intellectual leader of Arianism; Gabriel Lubieniecki, who later served as Radziwiáá’s diplomat to Sweden; Wáadysáaw Lubinecki, a diplomat in the Transylvanian service, and Stanisáaw Lubieniecki, the main war correspondent of Karl X Gustav in Poland.223 On the lands of the Radziwiáás, the Arians held offices and had patrimonies. In Ukmergơ, this movement was led by the marshal of the district, Jan MierzeĔski – the head of Radziwiáá’s diplomatic service and founder of the Arian congregation in 217 Kosman, Programme of the Reformation, p. 35. Ibid., p. 34. 219 Letter from the Arian synod of Ukraine and Volhynia (1638) to Krzysztof II Radziwiáá. The Polish Brethren: documentation of the history and thought of Unitarianism, doc. XXI. 220 LM, no. 185. 221 Brock, Peter. 1998. Antitrinitarians in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania against nonresistance, 1583. East European Quarterly. Vol. 32. No. 1, p.1-8. 222 Tazbir Janusz. 1968. Arianie w Biaáymstoku i okolicach. Studia i materiaáy do dziejów miasta Biaáegostoku. Vol.1, 81-105; Tazbir Janusz. 1989. Bracia polscy w sáuĪbie Radziwiááów w XVII wieku. Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica. Vol. III. Warszawa - àódĨ, p. 141158. 223 Tazbir, Janusz. 1961. Stanisáaw Lubieniecki, przywódca ariaĔskiej emigracji. Warszawa; Jørgensen, Jordt. 1968. Stanisáaw Lubieniecki. Zum Weg des Unitarismus von Ost nach West im 17. Jahrhundert. Göttingen; Kowalik, Janina. 1981-82. Stanisáaw Lubieniecki. Företrädare för socianerna och svensk korrespondent. Karolinska förbundets årsbok, p. 148-173. 218 49 Kơdainiai. Andrzej Wiszowaty, the grandson of the founder of the sect Fausto Socini, was a preacher in the town of Filipów near Trakai. It is not by chance that these north-western districts of Lithuania became a key arena of Swedish policy in 1655. Naturally, the Lithuanian Brethren were among the most energetic supporters of the Swedes. The Lutheran Church of Lithuania played an important role in Radziwiáá policies. Janusz Radziwiáá was the patron of the Lutheran churches of Kơdainiai, Biržai, WĊgrow and Obrytki.224 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá was a leading protector of the new Lutheran parishes in Slutsk and Nejdorf.225 Lutherans made up a small but well-organized church, headed by their own bishop. About 1654, 22 Lutheran congregations existed in Samogitia and in the western districts, namely in Vilnius, Kơdainiai, Biržai, Kaunas, Vištytis, Slutsk, Tauragơ, Hajtsunishki, Žeimai, WĊgrow, Nejdorf, Sáowatycze, Zamoscie, Šaukơnai, Alkiškiai, Saloþiai, Gaurơ, Nemunơlio Radviliškis, Žeimelis, Skuodas, Virbalis, Panemunơ - Gelgaudiškis and Šventoji. The patrons of the Vilnius Lutheran Cathedral were Livonian nobles: a castellan of Wenden/CƝsis, Mikoáaj Korff, and the vice-colonels Eberchard Puttkammer and Johann Ottenhausen.226 Mikoáaj Korff, the former ambassador to Denmark and a member of the commission for the peace treaty with Sweden, was a close companion of Janusz Radziwiáá.227 Puttkammer was one of the most intimate clients of Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. Among the Lutherans of Lithuania were the representatives of the local ethnic groups (Lithuanians, Ruthenians and Samogitians), as well as Germans and Poles. Therefore, a Lutheran pastor had to know at least two languages: Polish and German. In the beginning most pastors were Germans, later, the number of native pastors increased. In the 17th century, the superintendent position was occupied by two successive Lithuanians: Samuel Dambrowski and Jan Malina. The period of their administration was the golden age of Lithuanian Lutheranism. Several new churches were built (Nejdorf in 1624, Kơdainiai in 1629, Hajtsunishki in 1633 and Slutsk in 1653), and Lutheran printing flourished. In 1640 Jan Malina codified the Lutheran service.228 But the Lutherans did not have a publishing house or gymnasium of their own. Their pastors were educated in the Reformed gymnasiums. Thus, during the counter-reformation, not only did the Lutheran church preserve its position, but even expanded it 224 Kriegseisen, Ewangelicy Polscy i Litewscy, p. 74. Schultz, Edmund. 1902. Kronika zboru ewangelicko-luterskiego Nejdorfskiego. Zwiastun Ewangeliczny. Available on Internet: http://www.luteranie.pl/lublin/historia/neudorfkronika.htm 226 Adamowicz, Adam. 1855. Die evangelisch-lutherische Kirche zu Wilna: Eine Chronik. Wilna, p. 53. 227 Kotarski, Henryk and PrzyboĞ, Adam. 1968. Korff Mikoáaj. PSB. Vol. XIV/1. P. 71-72. 228 Malina, Jan. 1640. Porządek obrzĊdów zwyczaynych koĞcioáa AugustaĔskiej Konfessyi. Wilna. 225 50 somewhat among the local population. This paradoxical situation was possible only because of the Radziwiáás’ support. After the Union with Poland, Lithuania remained a Protestant country, as far as its ruling elite was concerned. In 1572, Protestants prevailed among the Lithuanian Senators (16 senators or 73 per cent). Thus, Protestants and Orthodox Senators (3) made up 86,5 per cent of the Lithuanian part of the Senate. Only three Senators were Roman Catholics, among these, two were bishops, since the Catholic church’s position was guaranteed by law. In 1588, a new edition of the Lithuanian Statute was adopted. Article 3, chapter 3, which was “about preservation of peace and harmony of all our citizens in spite of different understanding of Christianity and of church rites”, approved of full equality and the protection of all Christian faiths. The Lithuanians also referred to the tragedy of the religious wars of Western Europe (e.g. massacre of St. Bartholomew’s day in France), and guaranteed tolerance to all Christians: “In our country there exist large differences in the understanding of Christianity. Thus, we want to prevent any conflicts and wars between our people, which we so clearly observe in other kingdoms. Therefore, we have decided for this reason to forever keep the peace in the country and not spill human blood in our churches.229 Eleazar Gilbert, minister to Janusz Radziwiáá and preacher to the Scotish congregation in Kơdainiai, wrote about the tradition of tolerance that existed in Lithuania, and which was unusual in Europe: The great City of Vilna or the Wilde, the metropolis of Lithuania… This Great City aforesaid, is the Tribunal, or place of Justice for the said Great Dukedom of Lithuania, having a great University, of almost an in numerous multitude of students who resort thither for learning, and education, especially in the Romish Religion, from all places and corners of the Kingdom. There be also therein many Religious professed and tolerated, where unto also belong many Churches and places of Divine worship, as a Synagogue to the Jews, where of there be many thousands in this City; a Ruthenian Church to the Rusins; a Mahometan Church to the Tartarians; a Church to the Lutherans; all which doe enjoy their exercises of Religion without trouble or interruption and strong Church which belonged to the Protestants, whom they call Calvinists by the name of “Zbor” or Congregation. There are two churches, the one Polish, and the other Dutch [German], within the heart as it were or middle of the City belonged three ministers, the two Polish ministers were, Master Balthazar Labenski, and a Master John Yeurski, the Dutch minister Master Andreas [Andreas Welsius], who were assisted by George Hartlibius, Rector of the Protestant College. Ministers were in great repute, and much frequented by Protestant Noblemen and Gentlemen, who resorted unto their Sermons in great Assemblies, from all places of the country.230 229 230 Statut Vialikaha kniastva Litouskaha 1588, p.112-113. Gilbert, Nevves from Poland, p. 6-8. 51 In 1569, the Union of Lublin with Poland was contracted; the same year, the Jesuits came from Poland to Lithuania, and founded their first college in Vilnius. The counter-reformation had started. One of its aims was the recatholization of the elite. Between 1580 and 1654, sixteen Jesuit colleges were founded. In the Ruthenian area, which was mostly Orthodox, the Jesuits opened several colleges: 1585 in Polatsk, 1586 in Niasvizh, 1616 in Orsha, 1623 in Brest, 1625 in Hrodna, 1645 in Minsk and 1648 in Vitsebsk.231 Alarmed by the mass conversion of the Orthodox nobility to Protestant denominations, the Orthodox Church hierarchy opted for unification with the Roman Catholic Church. In 1596, in Brest, the new Uniate or GreekCatholic Church was created. King Sigismund III Vasa, the Jesuits and the Catholic magnates supported this action. As a result, after losing its bishops to the new Uniate Church, Orthodoxy was outlawed. All Orthodox congregations had to convert to Greek Catholicism. This forced conversion was unsuccessful, however. Theremaining part of the Orthodox Church was relegalized, in 1632, after a political struggle fought by the Orthodox nobility. The Ruthenian Reformed nobility contributed two of the first leaders of the new Uniate Church: the metropolitans Adam (Ipaci) Pociej and Jósef Rutski. Both of them converted from Calvinism to Catholicism and both of them became very active critics of Reformation. However there were few Greek Catholic noblemen. Only two Orthodox noble families (Tryzna and Tyszkiewicz) adopted the Greek Catholic faith. The main protector of the Uniate faith was Lew Sapieha – a great Ruthenian magnate who had converted from Calvinism to Roman Catholicism.232 A number of Ruthenian magnates followed Sapieha’s example. The main reason for this was royal policy. The king Sigismund Vasa began openly to discriminate against nonCatholic magnates, awarding giving senatorial positions exclusively to Catholics. In 1632, the last year of his reign, all of the Lithuanian senators were elected within the Catholic elite. During the reign of the more tolerant king Wáadysáaw Vasa, their number was slightly reduced.233 However, the policy of Crown resulted in the loss by Protestants the control over the Duchy. The solidly Orthodox palatinate of Smolensk, which was captured from Muscovy in 1618, became the field for the royal administration’s experiment with counter-reformation in the GDL. In accordance to the 1623 prerogative of the King, only Roman Catholic and Uniate churches were permitted on the territory of Smolensk. This decree resulted in strong oppression of the 231 Topolska, Maria. 2002. SpoáeczeĔstwo i kultura w WKL od XV do XVIII wieku. PoznaĔ Zielona Góra, p. 138. 232 Tyszkowski, Kazimierz. 1922. PrzejĞcie Lwa Sapiehy na katolicyzm w 1586 roku. Reformacja w Polsce, vol. 2. No. 5/6-8, p. 186-201. 233 Lulewicz, Henryk 1977. Skáad wyznaniowy senatorów Ğwieckich Wielkiego KsiĊstwa Litewskiego za panowania Wazow. Przegląd Historyczny. Vol. LXVIII, Z. 3, p. 425-445. 52 Orthodox Church. The 1632 legalization of the Orthodox Church did not apply to Smolensk. Under the royal decree, all Eastern Slavic people were placed under the jurisdiction of the Uniate archbishop of Smolensk and, as a result, a number of civil conflicts between the Greek Catholics and the Orthodox broke out. Part of the Orthodox clergy, nobles and peasants fled to Russia.234 The bulwark of Catholicism built by the royal administration along its eastern borders caused great concern to the non-Catholic nobility in other parts of Lithuania. The example of Smolensk made clear to them what might be in store through the royal policy of confessionalization.235 The spread of Luther’s teachings among the non-German population made the Catholics feel uneasy. To prevent its spread, the Jesuits published a large number of satires criticizing Lutheran pastors (their marriages, their relationship to Orthodoxy).236 The Jesuit academy in Vilnius also published sets of anti-Protestant polemic literature.237 These included publications with such expressive titles as “A Calvinist god”.238 In reply, the Lithuanian Union published a book in which it proved that the Pope was antichrist.239 In 1611, the students of the Jesuit academy attacked the Reformed Cathedral, and burned the archives and library. On November 16 1611, the Ruthenian Arian, Jan Tysziewicz, who refused to swear an oath in the name of the Trinity, was executed in Warsaw. In 1609, a mob of Catholic fanatics destroyed the mosque in Trakai.240 In 1618, the authorities closed the Arian congregation in Navahradak. 241 In 1632, the Diet outlawed the building of new Protestant churches on royal territories.242 In 1637, the bishop of PoznaĔ, Jerzy Szoádrski, prohibited Janusz Radziwiáá’s personal prayers during the Diet.243 In 1638, a mob of Catholic zealots destroyed Reformed churches in Polatsk and Navahradak.244 The Protestants responded with radical counter-measures. In anonymous leaflets, the Radziwiáás appealed to the Protestants, asking for 234 Floria, Boris. 2000. Uniina Tserkva na Smolenshchyni v 20–30 rokiv XVII stolittia. Kovcheh. Naukovy zbirnyik iz tserkovnoi istorii. No. 2. Lviv, p. 85-98. 235 Monod, Paul Kléber.1999. The power of Kings. Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 15891715. New Haven and London, p. 121-126. 236 Witanie na pierwszy wiazd z Królewca do Kadáubka Saskiego WileĔskiego Ixa Her N. Lutermachra: na wáasne kleynoty Lutermachra. Wittenberg [Vilnius]. 1642. 237 Ivanoviþ, Lietuvos lenkiškos knygos, no 297, 298, 299, 444, 573-578. 238 Becanus, Marcin. 1639. CzyĞciec kalwinistów. Wilna; Becanus, Marcin. 1640. Bóg kalwiĔski. Wilna; Cnoglerus Quirinius. 1603. Szczyra ewangelia hersztow zborowych. Wilna. 239 Mornay, Phillipe de. 1608. Jasne y dowodne pokazanie, tak z Pisma ĝwiĊtogo iako z starodavnych doktorow Īe papieĪ ktory stolicĊ PaĔstwa Rzymskiego opanowal nie est Gáową powszchnego koĞcioáa alie iĪ iest Antykrystem, ktory wszytek urząd Pana Jezu Chrysta wniwecz obrociá. Wilna. 240 Topolska, SpoáeczeĔstwo i kultura w WKL, p.198. 241 Kosman, Programme of the Reformation, p.35. 242 Kriegseisen, Ewangelicy Polscy i Litewscy, p.19. 243 Kotáubaj, ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 52. 244 Tazbir, Janusz. 1957. Nietolerancja wyznaniowa i wygnanie arian. Polska w okresie drugiej wojny pólnocnej 1655-1660. Warszawa. Vol. 1, p. 249-250. 53 open opposition to Catholic clergy.245 In 1648, the Catholic majority of the Diet attempted to introduce a law excluding those who did not acknowledge the Trinity from the pax dissedentium – that is, the Arians. This motion failed only due to Protestant opposition. Jewáaszewski compared the tolerant 16th century with the intolerant 17th century. He called the former “the golden age” and noted that in those days difference in faith gave no cause for hostility among the Lithuanian nobility.246 The closing of the Vilnius Reformed Cathedral in 1640, constituted a political defeat for the Protestants, and a victory for the Court faction. The Calvinist clergy were falsely accused of shooting at the towers of a Catholic church. This provoked a massacre of the Vilnius Protestants. The Lithuanian tribunal established a committee of inquiry. It was half Catholic and half Protestant. The bishop of Vilnius, Abraham Wojna, and the greatest Catholic magnate, Kazimierz Leon Sapieha, led the Catholic faction. Each faction prepared opposing solutions. The king supported the Catholics. A royal decree dated May 26 1640, marked the political defeat of the Radziwiáás. For the first time, the Grand Duke decided “to prohibit and abolish all kind of exercise of the Protestant religion, private and public, from that place forever, as also the names Zbor, or Congregation, their Schools likewise use of their Religion, School or Hospital within the walls of the Regal City of Wilde.”247 The Protestant clergymen were sentenced to death, including George Hartlib (the brother of a prominent Protestant leader, Samuel Hartlib). The degree of tolerance changed radically. Vilnius became “a city for sumptuous Churches, faire buildings, multitude of people, frequency of commerce, and in word, abundance of all good things except liberty of conscience and true Religion.”248 The Catholic students started to attack the Protestant ministers openly in the streets. With the approval of Bishop, Abraham Wojna, they forcibly removed the pastors’ cassocks.249 King Wáadysáaw Vasa asked Wojna to punish the perpetrators. However, Wojna refused. He answered: “How can I punish our students, when it is my vocation to extirpate heresy by every means. The Pope has sent me solemn thanks that heresy was ejected from Vilnius during my rule.”250 The Catholics blamed the palatine of Vilnius, Krzysztof II Radziwiáá, for encouraging the Protestants to attack objects sacred to the Catholics.251 Unable to withstand this defeat, Krzysztof II soon died. A great number of Prot245 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiááa, p. 202-203. The memoirs of Theodore Jeulasheuski, assessor of Navahrudak (1546-1604). Ed. Alexander Nadson. Journal of Byelorussian Studies. Vol. 1, no. 4, p. 269-348. 247 Gilbert, Nevves from Poland, p. 15-16. 248 Ibid., p. 8. 249 Tazbir, PaĔstwo bez stosów i inne szkice, p. 230. 250 Hillar, Marian. 1994. From the Polish Socinians to the American constitution. A Journal from the radical Reformation. A testimony to Biblical Unitarianism. Vol. 4, no. 3, p. 25-57. 251 Kotáubaj, ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 62-69. 246 54 estant nobility and clergy were present at his funeral ceremony in Vyžuonos. The funeral became a symbol of Protestant unity. The ambassadors of Protestant Courland, Prussia and Transylvania attended the funeral. Sweden was represented through the Lutheran Church of Riga. On the other hand, Poland and the Lithuanian Catholic magnates ignored the funeral. Even the dead man’s relatives, the Catholic branch of the Radziwiáás, did not attend the funeral.252 The death of his father made 27-year old Janusz Radziwiáá (1612-1655) the new leader of the opposition. He started his education in Vilnius Protestant School, where he was taught by the Swede Laurentius Horn. He subsequently enrolled in the gymnasiums of Kơdainiai and Slutsk. In 1628-33, Radziwiáá made a grand tour of Europe. Starting in 1628, he studied at the Lutheran university of Leipzig where he was elected “illustrious rector”. In 1631, he took part in Holland’s war against the Habsburg Empire. In 1632, he studied at the University of Leiden. In 1633, Radziwiáá was PolishLithuanian ambassador to Holland and England.253 The second most powerful Protestant leader was a cousin of Janusz – Bogusáaw Radziwiáá (1620-1669). He was born in Danzig/GdaĔsk, becouse he belonged to the family of the political refugee Janusz Radziwiáá Senior, and was baptized in the Lutheran church. Prince Bogusáaw had German, Lithuanian and Ruthenian roots, which connected him to the royal dynasty of the Jagellonians and to many royal houses of Europe. His mother was Elisabeth Sofia Hohenzollern von Brandenburg. Radziwiáá’s relation with the dynasty of Hohenzollern, which was Calvinist (after 1613), had raised the international ambitions of the Radziwiáá magnate family. They were among Europe’s Protestant rulers. In 1620, the Swedish king Gustav II Adolf married Maria Eleonora Hohenzollern (the mother of the Swedish queen Kristina) and in 1626, the Prince of Transylvania, Gábor Bethlen, married Katarina Hohenzollern. The Swedish king Karl X Gustav, the great elector of Prussia Friedrich Wilhelm and the French king Louis XIII were all relatives of Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. After the death of his father in 1620, Bogusáaw became one of the richest magnates of Lithuania. He owned the Duchy of Slutsk, inherited from his father’s first wife Sofia, the Orthodox Ruthenian Dukenessa. However, despite his high birth, his wealth, and his access to European aristocracy, he was never awarded the position of Lithuanian senator. Eager to take part in the political life, Bogusáaw Radziwiáá had to contend himself with being elected ambassador by the nobility of one of the local districts. To deny Radziwiáá a senatorial position was not only a social 252 Kmita, Jan. 1641. Process pogrzebu s. pamiĊci JaĞnie OĞwieconego XiąĪĊcia… Chrzysztopha Radziwiááa woiewody WileĔskiego hetmana wielkiego W. X. L. administratora Mohilewskiego, Bystrzyckiego etc. Lubcza. 253 Kotáubaj, ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 4-26 55 offence. The royal administration was also violating the traditions of the GDL, established during its era of independence, when the wealthiest magnates were automatically granted positions in the senate. Between 1637-1648 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá and a retinue of Protestant youth made three grand tours of Europe. He visited Germany, Holland, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Belgium and Sweden several times. As a representative of the European aristocracy, Radziwiáá was presented to the kings of France and England, and to the rulers of a number of German principalities. At the same time Karl Gustav, the future Crown Prince of Sweden, also made his grand tour of Europe.254 Most likely, the two princes met each other during these tours. Be that as it may, Sweden as one of the great powers of Europe, and a neighbour of Poland-Lithuania, it played an important role in these international contacts. In 1635 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá was present at the diplomatic negotiations between Sweden and Livonia. In 1637, he visited the Swedish port of Stettin/Szczecyn, where he met Governor Sten Bielke.255 As a 17-year old, Bogusáaw enrolled in Swedish service under the command of General Carl Gustaf Wrangel. He took part in the Swedish campaign against the Habsburg Empire and fought in the battle of Tribsees (November 11, 1637). In 1642 he enrolled as a volunteer in Holland’s war against Spain. Here, the Prussian officer Georg von Waldeck, the future Commander-in-Chief of Prussia, served under his command.256 The grand tour thus not only gave Radziwiáá formal academic education, but also substantial military experience. The Radziwiáás’ studies in Protestant countries provided them with language skills, but more importantly, with useful contacts to many of Europe’s leading political figures.257 For example, in Heidelberg, Krzysztof II fraternized with the elector of the palatinate of the Rhein, Frederick IV. During his stay in Altenburg, Radziwiáá became friendly with Christian of Anhalt. Christian was known to be one of the instigators of a strong Protestant alliance against the Catholic coalition and had achieved limited success with the formation, in 1608, of the Evangelical league. Later, Christian of Anhalt became a leader of the Czech army at the famous Battle of the White Mountain. In his instructions to young Janusz and Bogusáaw, Krzysztof II advised them to establish good contacts with Europe’s Protestant rulers, especially with the house of Pfalz. In Kơdainiai, Bogusáaw Radziwiáá had begun the good work, by studying together with his relative Christian, the duke of Sile- 254 Losman, Arne. 1984. Tre Karlars studier. Tre Karlar. Karl X Gustav, Karl XI, Karl XII. Stockholm, p. 14. 255 Radziwiáá, Autobiografia, p. 20, 122, 199. 256 Ibid., p. 22-27, 125. 257 Janusz Radziwiáá could speak and write in Polish, Ruthenian, Lithuanian and Latin. Bogusáaw – in French, German, Polish, Latin and Ruthenian. 56 sia.258 During his stay in Groningen, Utrecht, Paris and London (1642-1648) Bogusáaw established good personal contacts with many Protestant leaders, including William II, Prince of Orange. In 1645, the Swedish ambassador in Warsaw, Axel Sparre, wrote to Stockholm and described Bogusáaw Radziwiáá as “cut out for big tasks, and a real leader of the Lithuanian youth.”259 By the mid-17th century, Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá owned about fifty private towns with hinterlands in the GDL. This totalled about 30,000 households in 171 landed estates. Each Radziwiáá was equal in wealth to the richest Catholic magnate, Kazimierz Leon Sapieha. Together their wealth considerably exceeded his. In his testament, Bogusáaw wrote that, in case of his death, all his estates would go to Janusz Radziwiáá. The basis of the economic might of Bogusáaw was the Duchy of Slutsk, with the towns of Slutsk and Kapyl. According to his administrator Jan Sosnowski, all estates of Bogusáaw Radziwiáá provided him with an annual income of 330,000 zloty annual. This surpassed the income of the Polish king from Lithuania. Among the other towns owned by Bogusáaw Radziwiáá were: Daliatychy (the district of Navahradak), Kojdanava and Smaliavichy (the district of Minsk), Zhuprany (Ashmiany), Sialets (Brest), WĊgrow in Podlasie, Paširvintis (the district of Kaunas), and the counties of Bar and BraĔsk in Poland. The core of Janusz Radziwiáá’s possessions was made up of the Duchy of Biržai and the town of Kơdainiai, where the Prince’s main castles were located. The possessions of Janusz were located in Samogitia (Kơdainiai and Tauragơ), the district of Upytơ (duchy of Biržai, Nemunơlio Radviliškis, Naujamiestis and Saloþiai), the district of Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz (Vyžuonos, Alanta, Papilys, Svedasai, Salos, Vyželiai, Salamiestis, Vidiškiai, Šetekšnos and Janušava), Dubiningai (the district of Vilnius), and in the district of Hrodna (Zabáudów, Orla, Biaáystok-Dojlidy and Sobolewo), the district of Navahradak (Lubcha, Astashyn and Uselub), the district of Lida (Belitsa, Dakudau, Arlova) and the county of Kamianets in the district of Brest. In the eastern districts, Radziwiáá owned only two towns (Nevel and Sebezh). Actually, the Radziwiáá property formed a state within the state, the territory of which equalled that of Belgium. In terms of the number and profitability of their landed estates (of at least 600,000 zloty of annual income), the Protestant branch of the Radziwiáás surpassed all other magnates, and the king, in possessions. Most of the Radziwiáás’ possessions were in the north and in the west of the country. This geographical factor would be of importance during the political events of 1655-1661, because these regions were occupied by Sweden. The tremendous possessions of the Radziwiáás provided the basis for both their economic and political influence. By far the greatest proportion of their landed estates or 91 per cent was distributed be258 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiááa, p. 269. Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 170. 259 57 tween Protestant nobles. Of 97 landed estates owned by Janusz Radziwiáá, 88 were in the hands of managers, and of 74 landed estates owned by Bogusáaw Radziwiáá, 68 were rented by managers.260 The nobles of Slutsk and Biržai were vassals dependent on the Radziwiáás. They did not have the right to take part in the dietines and the Lithuanian Statue did not define their legal rights. In the 17th century, after the disappearance of the Arian (Kiszka) and Lutheran (Talwosz) families, the Calvinist Radziwiáás were the main protectors of the three Evangelical denominations. Protestantism became an additional ideological basis of the Radziwiáá political faction. The synod of the Lithuanian Union met annually in closed sessions, during which pastors and nobles discussed religious and political affairs. This meant that the Protestant nobility was the most well-organized and well-informed confessional group, with good international contacts. The Protestants were given the opportunity of elaborating their national position almost every year. The contemporary Catholic and Orthodox nobility led isolated political lives in the various districts. They lacked a common assembly. This factor gained significance during the crisis of the mid-17th century. The political factions within the nobility were, in most districts, further divided by confessions, into two groups: the Catholic and the ProtestantOrthodox. The Protestants refused to assemble in Catholic churches. The dietines of Lithuania, unlike those of Poland, took place in secular public buildings. In case of sharp confrontation between the two parties, meetings were held in separate buildings, as had been the case in Vitsebsk.261 Through the Protestants and the Orthodox Radziwiáás selected the ambassadors to the Diet. In 1648, the Radziwiáá party was represented at the House of Commons by eight persons, all of whom were Protestants (Jerzy Wolan, Jan GruĪewski, Stefan Cedrowski, Stefan Frąckiewicz Radziminski, Krzysztof Potocki and Wáadysáaw LeszczyĔski) or Orthodox (Bohdan OgiĔski and Michal Stetkiewicz).262 Eight non-Catholic senators, out of a total of 35 Lithuanian senators, represented the Lithuanian opposition in the Senate. The Calvinists were: the palatine of Vilnius, Janusz Radziwiáá; the castellan of Polatsk, Jan Sosnowski; and the castellan of Vitsebsk, Tomasz Kossakowski. The one Lutheran was Mikoáaj Korff, the castellan of Wenden/CƝsis. These were supported by four Orthodox senators: the castellan of Trakai, Aleksander OgiĔski; the castellan of Navahradak, Samuel Statkiewicz; the castellan of Minsk, Mikoáaj CzetwertyĔski; and the palatine of Brest Maksymilian Brzozowski.263 260 Rachuba, Andrzej. 1997. Sprawa dóbr Radziwiááów BirĪaĔskich w latach 1655-1662. Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica. Vol. VII. Warszawa, p. 52 note 4. 261 Rachuba, Wielkie KsiĊestwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym, p. 87-88. 262 Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 308-309. 263 Lulewicz, Skáad wyznaniowy senatorów, p. 439. 58 In the year of 1654, about 50 Protestant noble families had served the Slutsk-Biržai Radziwiáás.264 These included families such as the Calvinists: Cedrowski, Billikowicz, Blinstrub, Dawidowicz, DĊbski, Dunin-Rajecki, Kimbar, Káokocki, Komorowski, Marcinkiewicz, Mirski, Oziemblowski, Prozor, Puciata, Sakowicz, Siesicki, Sluszka, StryĪka, WazyĔski, Wizgird, Wolan, Wysocki, Zienowicz; the Arians: Lubieniecki, MierzeĔski, Grek, Przypkowski, SiciĔski; the Lutherans: DĊbowski, Eperyesz, Ottenhausen, Nonhardt and Puttkammer; and the Orthodox family of OgiĔski and Bychowiec. Strong ties united the Radziwiáás and the Lutheran Livonian clans of Korff and Holzschuer and the Ukrainian Arian clan of Niemirycz. Representatives of the above-mentioned families made up the backbone of the Radziwiáá party, and played key roles in political combinations with Sweden. A small number of Catholic nobles were also Radziwiáá clients. The most important of these was the Roman Catholic bishop of Samogitia, Piotr Parczewski. He came from the petty nobility, and owed his entire career to Janusz Radziwiáá.265 It is no accident, that Parczewski later supported the KU. In general, the Radziwiáás were well able to gather talented people around them. These included the court’s Ruthenian scribe, Krzysztof Arciszewski, later admiral of the Dutch fleet in Brazil.266 Tolerance was the main principle of the Radziwiáá policy. They encouraged Jewish merchants to settle in their towns, and issued a number of decrees guaranteeing them all rights.267 In these cities, Jews could be elected to the city magistrate and be members of Christian guilds, a phenomenon unique to the Commonwealth. The Jewish artisans and merchants of Kơdainiai and Slutsk established their own guilds, which enjoyed all rights, including the right to bear arms.268 Because of this tolerant policy, Kơdainiai and Slutsk soon housed some of the largest Jewish communities. Kơdainiai became the Jewish centre of Samogitia. The Radziwiáás conducted a conscious policy of supporting the Protestant refugees from Western Europe. After 1615, the Scottish Calvinists accepted a proposal made by Radziwills, and hundreds immigrated to the GDL. They settled primarily in Kơdainiai and Slutsk.269 A great number of Dutch and 264 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiááa, p. 71-123, 186-295. Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 185 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiááa, p. 152. 267 Bardach, Juliusz. 1991. ĩydzi w BirĪach radziwiááowskich w XVI-XVIII wieku. Przegląd Historyczny. Vol. 81. Z. 1-2, p. 199-220. 268 Hrytskevich, Anatol. 1975. Chastnovladelcheskie goroda Belorussii v XV-XVIII vv. Minsk, p. 120-121; Vishnitser, Litovskii Vaad, p. 303-309; Mares, P. 1991. Zhmudz. Evreyskaya Entsiklopedia, Vol. 7, p. 603-604; Kejdany. Vol. 9, p. 410-411; Slutsk. Vol. 14, p. 392-393. 269 Hans, Nicholas. 1958. Polish protestants and their connections with England and Holland in the 17th and 18th centuries. The Slavonic and East European review. No. 37, p. 212. 265 266 59 Germans from the Rhein lands also settled in the GDL. 270 The DutchGerman Lutheran colony of Nejdorf was protected by Bogusáaw Radziwiáá.271 The promotion of this type immigration had two purposes. First, the emigrants consolidated the Protestant faction. Second, Western emigrants could help the Radziwiáás to establish immediate contact with other European Protestants, primarily with Scottish separatists, many of whom were officers in the Swedish army. The Radziwiáás’ extensive net of international contacts was illustrated by their patronage of well-known Scottish scientists such as John Johnstone. In 1640, Johnstone held the chair of medicine at the University of Leiden, where he tutored many students from the GDL. In 1633, he published his life’s work, the Thaumatographia naturalis - an encyclopaedic compendium of the knowledge of the natural sciences, which the author dedicated to Bogusáaw and Janusz Radziwiáá.272 The Scottish colonists in Kơdainiai initiated international trade with Königsberg, Riga, Stockholm and Amsterdam. Very soon, this small town had turned into a prosperous city, with 4,000 inhabitants, 500 houses, 6 churches of different faiths, the Protestant gymnasium, 6 markets, employing more than 300 artisans.273 In 1653, Janusz Radziwiáá signed the “Articles of the town of Kơdainiai”, which granted the town autonomy.274 Thus, Kơdainiai became the capital of the dissidents and an important political, economic and religious centre of the Duchy. In 1647, a new conflict erupted between the Catholics and the Protestants. It ended again with Radziwiáá’s defeat. Bishop Abraham Wojna accused Radziwiáá of conniving at the destruction of a roadside cross in Svơdasai. Despite the fact that a local Catholic priest condemned this as unjust, Radziwiáá lost the case and had to pay 1,000 zloty. He was also compelled to build a stone Catholic church in Svơdasai, and to allow public Catholic processions in Kơdainiai.275 As a result of repressions, in 1654 only about 100 Protestant churches had survived in Lithuania, compared to the historic high of 260. However, this figure is still high, when compared to Poland, where scarcely 21 Protestant congregations survived, from a high of 80 in 1591.276 270 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiááa, p. 61. Schultz, Kronika zboru ewangelicko-luterskiego Nejdorfskiego 272 Ionstoni, Iohannis [Johnstone, John]. 1633. Thavmatographia natvralis: in classes decem divisa: in quibus admiranda coeli, elementorum, meteororum, fossilium, plantarum, avium, quadrupedum, exanguium, piscium, hominis. Amstelodami [Amsterdam]. 273 Žirgulis, Rimantas. 2002. Three hundred years of multiculturalism in Kơdainiai. A case study. The peoples of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Ed. Grigorijus Potašenko. Vilnius, p. 130-140. 274 Radziwiáá, Janusz. 1653. Puncta miastu KieydaĔskiemu od JaĞnie OĞwieconego XiąĪĊcia JegomoĞci pana woiewody WileĔskiego hetmana polniego W. X. Litt. Kiejdany. 275 Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 212-213. 276 Kosman, Programme of the Reformation, p. 48. 271 60 The royal policy of Catholic confessionalization destabilized the situation in the eastern districts. Even after 1632, Orthodox divine services in many Belarusian towns had to be held in secret.277 Despite this oppression, the Orthodox nobility of Lithuania, unlike the Ukrainian Cossacks, did not decide on secret contacts with Muscovy. The status of Russia as Lithuania’s traditional enemy prevented that. However, in their search for patronage, the Orthodox clergy of Belarus did initiate closer contacts with Russia. Moscow became the place where the Orthodox priests could collect money.278 Some of them even settled there. For example, in 1626, without the knowledge of the royal administration, Józef Kurcewicz, the Orthodox bishop of Brest, fled to Russia, where he was immediately given the high position of metropolitan of Suzdal.279 These emigrants gave the Kremlin exaggerated accounts of the persecution of the Orthodox in Belarus and Lithuania, and of their wish to become subjects of the only independent Orthodox monarch in the world – the tsar.280 2.3 Commercial aspects of Lithuanian-Swedish relations Since its foundation in 1201, Riga had carried on a prosperous trade with Polatsk and Vitsebsk. In 1229, these two Belarusian cities signed a commercial agreement with Riga and Gotland concerning free trade along the Dzvina/Daugava/Düna River.281 In the middle of the 13th century, Polatsk and Vitsebsk joined the GDL. However, both towns retained a high degree of autonomy.282 Between the 13th and the 16th centuries, Polatsk housed a Hansa trade office.283 After 1562, a considerable number of Polatsk merchants moved to Riga. The Ruthenian merchants traded in the old market on the right bank of the Daugava, next to the St Nicholas Orthodox Church, which under the control of the bishop of Polatsk. Polatsk-Riga official 277 Kempa, Tomasz. Prawosáawie i unia we wschodnich województwach WKL w koĔcu XVII w. Biaáoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne. No. 32, p. 38. 278 Viise, Michelle. 2001. Ruthenian Orthodoxy and the Roman state: Afanasiusz Filipowicz’s Ⱦɿɹɪɿɭɲ. Krakowsko-WileĔskie studia Slawistyczne. Kraków. Vol. III, p. 215-260. 279 Chodynicki, Kazimierz. 1934. KoĞcióá prawosáawny a Rzeczpospolita Polska. Zarys historyczny 1370-1632. Warszawa, p. 446. 280 Floria, Boris. 1996. Konflikt miĊdzy zwolennikami unii i prawosáawia w Rzeczypospolitej (w Ğwietle Ĩródeá rosyjskich). Barok. Historia-Literatura-Sztuka. Vol. III/2, p. 26-27. 281 Sveriges traktater med främmande magter. Vol. 1. 822-1335. Stockholm, 1877, p. 146175. 282 Sahanovich, Henadz. 2002. Narys Historyi Belarusi. Minsk, p. 142. 283 Hildebrand, Herman. Das deutsche Kontor zu Polozk. Baltische Monatsschrift. 1873; Sahanovich, Henadz. 1998. Polatsk i niametskaya kaloniia na Dzvine. Belarusian Historical Review. Vol. 5, p. 3-26. 61 documents reveal the importance of the trade between Polatsk and Riga for the Lithuanian and Belarusian economy.284 According to Georg Jensch, the GDL shipped most of its goods to Swedish Riga, for further export. This gave the Riga port the same importance for the GDL as the Danzig port had for Poland, ”a trade window to Europe”, through which export goods (grain, flax, timber) were delivered. Riga burghers became the principle creditors of the Lithuanian magnates.285 In the first half of the 17th century, the GDL had about 600 urban centres. Up to a third of them traded with Riga. Riga was the centre of the export of goods from the eastern and northern districts.286 The Dzvina basin, which included Polatsk, Vitsebsk, Braslau, Druja, Drysa and Dzisna, was of prime important to Riga.287 Riga’s commerce extended to northern Lithuania and Samogitia: Biržai, Ukmergơ, Anykšþiai and Šiauliai.288 No wonder that these territories were the object for the Swedish policy. It was quite common for Ruthenian merchants to have large sums of Swedish currency. For instance, the testament of Jakub Khadyka (1626), who was not the richest merchant of Polatsk, included 347 crowns.289 The merchants of Mahileu, the largest city in Belarus, had commercial contacts with Riga via Polatsk.290 Contacts with Riga resulted in the foundation of a Protestant parish in Mahileu.291 However, the main trade aim for Mahileu was Moscow, to which Ruthenian merchants delivered a wide range of European goods. This economic connection helps explain why Mahileu collaborated with Russia in 1654-1661. In 1562, Riga became a Lithuanian protectorate. As of 1582, the city was incorporated into the Commonwealth. While Riga belonged to the Commonwealth, the Lithuanian nobility did its best to establish the direct export of their products to Europe via Riga. The nobility’s commerce, the mercatura nobilium, was the object of Riga merchants’ complaints to the Commonwealth. However, the Lithuanian magnates also lobbied in their own interests, especially those who held state positions in Livonia. The merchants of Riga were discontented with high customs duties in Lithuania. Riga’s merchants paid three different kinds of duties: “old”, “castle” and “in284 Khoroshkevich, Anna. 1977-1989. Polotskie gramoty XIII-nachala XVI vv. Vol. I-IV. Moskva. 285 Jensch, Georg. 1930. Der Handel Rigas im 17. Jahrhundert. Ein Beitrag zur livländischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte in schwedischer Zeit. Riga, p. 65-73. 286 Melton, Edgar. 1998. The Russian peasantries, 1450-1860. The Peasantry of Europe. From the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth centuries. Ed. Tom Scott. Longman, p. 227-268. 287 Adashchik, Fedor. 1969. Torgovye sviazi goroda Vitebska s Rigoi v 17-18 vv. Sovetskoe slavianovedenie. Materialy konferentsii istorikov-slavistov. Minsk, p. 572-580. 288 Dorosenko, Vasilii. 1979. Riga und sein Hinterland im 17. Jahrhundert. Hansische Studien. Vol. 4. Weimar, p. 155-172. 289 Riabtsevich, Numizmatika Belorussii, p. 194. 290 Meleshko, Vasilii. 1988. Mogilev v XVI- seredine XVII veka. Minsk, p. 130-135. 291 Marzaliuk, Ihar. 1998. Mahilou u XII-XVIII st. Minsk, p. 106. 62 creased” duty. Goods travelling long the Dzvina River encountered seven customhouses (Kreutzburg/Krustpils, Dünaburg/Daugavpils, Drysa, Dzisna, Polatsk, Vitsebsk and Surazh). Theoretically, Swedish merchants were to pay customs duties at only one customhouse, but the Lithuanian governors made them pay several times.292 The Polatsk magistrate let Riga merchants travel only as far as Polatsk, but not farther, not to the remote districts.293 For these reasons, the merchants of Riga were interested in removing custom barriers and gaining direct access to the entire Lithuanian and Belarusian market. Bronius Dundulis has argued that economic interests provoked the First Northern War between Poland-Lithuania and Sweden in 1600-1629. Control over the port of Riga would enable the Lithuanian nobility and merchants to trade with the European countries with maximum profits.294 Even during the war, the nobility continued to trade with Riga.295 As of 1621, Sweden controlled Riga. It was the largest city in the Swedish Empire. When Riga became part of Sweden, the economic interests of Vilnius and Warsaw in the Baltic expanded. For the GDL, Swedish control of Riga entailed a return to the pre-1561 situation, when Lithuania had no influence over the Riga market. In 1622, in order to pressure the pro-Swedish Riga merchants, King Sigismund III forbade all trade between the Commonwealth and Riga. The trade prohibition caused an economic crisis within the GDL. The problem of how to sell agricultural goods and timber arose. Owing to the forced transfer of trade from Riga to the Prussian port of Königsberg/Kaliningrad and to Memel/Klaipơda, the price of salt and herring rose dramatically. The extraordinary assembly of the Lithuanian senators in 1624 drew Warsaw’s attention to the fact that the prohibition of trade with Riga harmed Lithuania more than it did Sweden. As a result, ”our eastern districts are strangled without trade with Riga, our people cannot purchase bread and other necessary things or have to pay threefold price for them and our peasants are unable to pay a tax.”296 This sharp criticism from the Lithuanian magnates was ignored by Poland. Moreover, in spite of the Lithuanian protest, the 1626 Diet prohibited trade with Riga via the ports of Ducal Prussia. The dietine of Vilnius regarded the prohibition of commerce with the Baltic as a disaster. During the session of the Lithuanian senators, it was decided it would be better to terminate the union with Poland than to remain without trade with 292 Jensch, Der Handel Rigas, p. 71. Doroshenko, Vasilii. 1985. Torgovlia i kupechestvo Rigi v XVII veke. Riga, p. 89-92. 294 Dundulis, Bronius. 1977. Švedǐ feodalǐ Ƴsiveržimai Ƴ Lietuvą XVII-XVIII a. Vilnius; Dundulis, Bronius. 1985. Lietuvos kovos dơl Baltijos jnjros. Vilnius. 295 VL, p. 12. 296 Tyla, Antanas. 1987. Bor’ba litovskikh i shvedskikh feodalov iz-za Livonii v kontse XVInachale XVII veka: politicheskie i ekonomicheskie posledstvia dlia Litvy. Avtoreferat dissertatsii. Vilnius, p. 32. 293 63 Riga.297 A separate Lithuanian agreement in the castle of Baldone with Sweden in 1627 ensured, among other things, the resumption of trade between the GDL and Sweden. However, Polish protests stopped this agreement from coming into effect. In 1628, in order to put economic pressure on Poland-Lithuania, King Gustav II Adolf issued an edict prohibiting Swedish shipping and trade with Lithuania and Courland.298 As a result, in 1628, only 18 ships entered the harbour of Riga - as compared to 400 before the war.299 The continuation of the war meant economic collapse. In a letter dated December 20 1628, addressed to the dietiny of Slonim, Krzysztof II Radziwiáá complained about the Commonwealth’s shut-down of ports. He believed that it resulted in more harm to the GDL than to Sweden. Moreover, he warned the nobility that the continuation of the war would result in “losing forever the trade with the Dutch who may turn to Muscovy.” 300 The port of Riga played a considerable role in the economy of the Radziwiáás. Janusz Radziwiáá owned two towns in the Dzvina region: Nevel and Sebezh. His father, Krzysztof II, was the first in the Ruthenian lands to start the profitable breeding of Dutch domestic animals (cows and pigs), which were imported through Riga.301 The Radziwiáás also initiated a new type of business: they rented their ships to merchants.302 To provide efficient navigation to Riga, the Radziwiáás financed a project to clear the riverbed of the Dzvina and to build a canal.303 With the beginning of the First Northern War, the Radziwiáás had to re-orient their commerce to Danzig, which was more remote. This proved far less profitable. In 1628, during a meeting in Riga on war-prisoner exchange between Lithuania and Sweden, Krzysztof II Radziwiáá and Jakob Pontusson De la Gardie discussed the economic situation. Radziwiáá emphasized that the Lithuanian main problem was the high cost of salt, which had to be imported via faraway Kraków. He noted that only an armistice would allow the resumption of profitable trade with Riga, and cheaper salt. He suggested that the Swedes consider means of stopping the delivery of salt from Kraków. In Radziwiáá’s opinion, such as step would force the Lithuanian nobility to support peace with Sweden more resolutely.304 Finally, the armistice reached between the Commonwealth and 297 Ibid., p. 33. Nos Gustavus Adolphus, dei gratia, Svecorum, Gothorum, Vandalorumqve Rex…per ullos Polonici juris portus, professos eosdem hostes Nostros. Stockholm, 1628. 299 Doroshenko, Torgovlia i kupechestvo Rigi, p. 120. 300 KsiĊcia Krzysztofa Radziwiááa hetmana polnego, p. 586. 301 Siekierski, Maciej. 1994. Landed wealth in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: the economic affairs of prince Nicholas Christopher Radziwill (1549-1616). Acta Baltico-Slavica. Vol. XXI, p. 229-230, 250. 302 Mączak, The commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, p. 12, 19, note 14. 303 Jensch, Der Handel Rigas, p. 66. 304 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiááa, pp. 56-57, note 131. 298 64 Sweden in Altmark/Stary Targ in 1629 allowed trade along the Dzvina/Daugava to resume.305 As Artur Attman has argued, the motives behind Swedish expansion were partly economic in nature: Sweden’s goal was to acquire control over all the Baltic trade.306 In 1651 a state college of commerce was founded. This step illustrated the awakening of state interest in the development of Swedish trade.307 The primary task of the Swedish government in Livonia was to increase the business of the Riga port, in order to increase the amount of taxes collected. The Swedish policy did not fail. Within a year after the signing of the armistice in Altmark, Riga admitted 189 merchant ships. In 1631 this figure increased to 319. In 1654, the trade of hemp reached its peak. In 1648, the highest number of ship timber sales was recorded; in 1650, the greatest delivery of salt and herring.308 At the same time, other cities of the Swedish kingdom established trade with the GDL, among them Stockholm, Gothenburg and Stettin/Szczecin. Mainland Sweden delivered to Lithuanian and Belarusian markets via Riga iron, steel, non-ferrous metals and salt.309 The trade in grain played a minor role in Riga’s economy, comprising only 10 per cent of sales. However, Riga was the main trading centre in the Baltic in hemp, hempseed, flax and flaxseed.310 The GDL was the main supplier of hemp, and the sole supplier of hempseed to Riga. The merchants rated ”a clean, high quality” Ruthenian hemp higher than that of the Muscovite hemp. The Ruthenians, who delivered hemp to Riga, bought it from peasants of Belarus. Samogitian peasants delivered flax, another important article in Riga’s export.311 Thus, trade was profitable both for Riga’s merchants and the Lithuanian nobles, merchants and farmers. The merchants of Riga, who had a monopoly of trade with Belarus, called themselves “merchants to the Ruthenians” (reussische händler). The concept of “the Russians” (die reussen) denoted, in Riga, the Belarusian merchants of Lithuania. In documents, Russian merchants were termed Muscovites. The Lithuanian noblemen were called Herr or von Adel. Riga’s trade with Lithuanian magnates was realized through lords’ agents, the so-called factors. Lithuanian Jews stood apart from those mentioned above. It is significant that well-off Riga merchants owned trading stations in Lithuania where 305 Sveriges traktater med främmande magter, vol. 5:1, p. 353. Attman, Artur. 1985. Swedish aspirations and the Russian market during the 17th century. Göteborg: Vetenskaps- och vitterhets-samhället, p. 40-41. 307 Böhme, Klaus-Richard. 1994. Building a Baltic Empire. Aspects of Swedish Expansion, 1560-1660. In quest of trade and security. The Baltic in power politics 1500-1990. Vol. 1. 1500-1890. Västervik, p. 201. 308 Doroshenko, Torgovlia i kupechestvo Rigi, p. 122-129, 173, 194. 309 Ibid., p. 124, 137, 143-144, 163, 167. 310 Dunsdorf, Edgars. 1947. Merchant shipping in the Baltic during the 17th century. Contributions of Baltic University. No 40. Pinneberg, p. 30. 311 Doroshenko, Torgovlia i kupechestvo Rigi, p. 126-127. 306 65 they stored ship timber and ash, which had been obtained in payment of Lithuanian magnate’s debts.312 Between 1640 and 1654, about 100 merchants were engaged in wholesale trade with hemp and timber. The Ruthenian guild of merchants had the key positions in Riga’s magistrate.313 The guild of merchants which conducted trade with northern Lithuania took second place. In 1654, this group numbered 99 merchants. They termed themselves ”merchants to Lithuanian farmers” (littauische bauernhändler). These two groups of merchants were the most influential in economy and politics of the City of Riga. Swedish Riga was the main port for vitally important goods to Lithuania and Belarus. Salt and herring ranked first among these. The Lithuanian economy was more dependent on trade with Riga than Riga was dependent on the GDL. Polatsk’s merchants complained that merchants of Riga violated old privileges by annually introducing new extraordinary taxes and raised customs duties, cut into merchant profits.314 The 1647 Diet, in accordance with the interests of the Lithuanian nobles, tried to transfer the trade with Riga to domestic borders. They adopted a law whereby ”Inhabitants of Lithuania were not to deliver grain and everything that was grown at home and merchant goods farther to Riga but had to accumulate them in Dünaburg, our port city, for the merchants of different nations to come from Riga and to buy our goods and sell theirs.”315 However, this article never achieved practical importance. The wealth of the OgiĔski depended on the trade with Riga. The family owned a number of landed estates around Vitsebsk, which were rich in ship timber. The OgiĔskis floated ship timber to Riga down along the rivers Luchosa and Dzvina. The family’s symbol of prosperity was their palace, built in Vitsebsk in 1650 – for centuries, the city’s largest building.316 Descendants of ancient Polatsk merchants, the noble family of Korsak also carried on a large-scale trade with Riga.317 At the same time the southern Samogitia and western Lithuanian districts carried on trade with Europe via Königsberg. In the Duchy of Slutsk, Bogusáaw Radziwiáá planned a canal between the rivers Nioman/Nemunas and Sluch, in order to connect the Dniapro and Nioman rivers and the Black Sea with the Baltic Sea. Radziwiáá’s advisor, Gustav de La Valleé, dreamed of establishing a manufactory in Slutsk. It was to manufacture arms that could 312 Ibid., p. 41-42, 80-87, 211-212. Ibid., p. 185, 197, 205. 314 Dounar-Zapolski, Mitrafan. 1994. Historyia Belarusi. Minsk, p. 218-219. 315 VL, p. 57. 316 Khmialnitskaja, Lena. 1995. Rod fundatarau i metsenatau. Ahinskiia. Vitsebski sshytak, no.1, p. 42-47. 317 Doroshenko, Torgovlia i kupechestvo Rigi, p. 42, 61, 89,129. 313 66 be exported via Kyiv to the east and through Königsberg to the west.318 In Radziwiáá’s opinion, this type of project would increase his ducy’s political importance vis-à-vis Prussia, Sweden and Ukraine. In the 1630s and 1650s, a fairly influential group of Lithuanian nobles and merchants was interested in increasing trade with Swedish Riga. Sweden was interested, on its side, in expanding its control of the Düna/Daugava/Dzvina and Nemunas/Nioman trade routes. On this, Riga represented Sweden’s interests. It is no accident that those who guided Swedish policy in Lithuania and Belarus at that time came from Riga’s merchant families. These included Colonels Fabian Berens and Otto Velling, Governor of Braslau Johan Ulenbrock, Tax-Officer Hans Wittmacher, and the diplomats Mikael Horst, Gotthard Velling and Johan Meyer von Lilienthal. The Livonian nobility also had considerable interests in Lithuania. Those so interested included the families of the Taubes and the Yxkull/Üxkülls. Many members of these families served as officers in the Swedish army in Lithuania, and took active part in establishing the KU. 2.4 Relations between Sweden and the GDL In order to interpret the political relation between Sweden and the GDL and the status of Livonia, I will return to the 13th and 16th centuries. Between 1054 and 1230, the Principality of Polatsk, formerly part of the Kyiv Realm, was an independent state ruled by Rurikids. This state embraced the lands of the Slavic Kryvichy tribe and controlled some Baltic and Finish tribes in, what is today, southern Latvia and eastern Lithuania. Polatsk had quite extensive international contacts. For example, the Princess of Polatsk, Sophia was married to a king of Denmark, Valdemar I the Great. The chronicle of Arnold of Lübeck termed Prince Valdemar of Polatsk King of Ruthenia. The independence and strength of Polatsk was due to its control of an important part of the Baltic trade route, along the Dzvina River to Livonia.319 In the Livonian, that is non-Slavic basin of Daugava, Polatsk controled two castles: Gersika/Jersika and Kockenhusen/Koknese, as well as lands at the mouth of Daugava (Dünamünde). There, the Slavic vassals of Polatsk ruled. In the 1230s, these towns and lands, after military conflicts between Riga and Polatsk, came into possession of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order and the town of Riga. The transition was consolidated by the marriages between the German knights and Ruthenian Princesses. Gersika was acquired by the 318 DybaĞ, Bogusáaw.1996. Projekt budowy manufaktury zbrojeniowej w dobrach Radziwiááowskich. Europa Orientalis. Polska i jej wschodni sąsiedzi od Ğredniowiecza po wspóáczesnoĞü. ToruĔ, p. 289-292. 319 Kotljarchuk, Andrej. 2002. Shvedy u historyi i kultury belarusau. Minsk, p. 1-58. 67 Order after the marriage of the daughter of a local prince, Vsevolod/Wicewaldus, to the knight Konrad von Maindorf. Kockenhusen was transferred to the Order after the marriage of the daughter of Prince Viachka/Vetseka and the knight Dietrich von Kockenhusen.320 In the 1240s, Polatsk became a part of the GDL, and up to the 16th century it was the largest city in Lithuania. Using Polatsk’s history, the Lithuanian nobility could make historical claims on Livonia. In 1512 the Lithuanian Council of Lords wrote to the grand master of the Livonian Order and reminded him that Livonia was known to belong to Polatsk “Polatsk’s state had its borders as far as the Baltic Sea is and your city Riga is located in the former Polatsk land, and we were forced to give these lands to your Order.”321 Common interest in the east of the Baltic pushed Sweden and Lithuania in to their first attempt to create a federation. At that time, Sweden was in personal union with Denmark, under the terms of the 1397 Union of Kalmar. Lithuania was in personal union with Poland of the 1385 Union of Kreva. Thus, during the reign of Grand Duke Alexander (1492-1506) and the regency of Sten Sture (1497, 1501-1503) and Svante Nilsson (1504-1511) in Sweden a federation between two states was highly possible. Between 1492 and 1506, the GDL was out of personal union with Poland. Both Sweden and Lithuania also shared a common enemy – Muscovy. Plans to elect the Grand Duke Alexander, as the King of Sweden were seriously discussed during the Swedish-Lithuanian negotiations.322 On October 4 1562, the Duke of Finland Johan Vasa married 12-years older Lithuanian Princess Katarina Jagellonica. The wedding ceremony took place in Vilnius. By this alliance Duke Johan hoped to strength the political and military cooperation between both countries. The central government of Sweden did not accept the independent politics of Johan and King Erik XIV sentenced him in 1563 to a death penalty for the high treason.323 In the 16th century, the territory of the independent confederation of Livonia had diminished. After 1560 Sweden started territorial expansion to the east of the Baltic. At the same time the GDL regarded Livonia as the most important object of its international politics. Apart from Sweden and the GDL, Russia, Denmark and Poland also had great interest in Livonia.324 However, my task is to analyse the Swedish–Lithuanian aspect. 320 Sahanovich, Polatsk i niametskaia kaloniia na Dzvine, p. 3-26. Varonin, Vasil. 1998. Political system of Polatsk voivodship in the first half of the 16th century. Belarusian Historical Review. Vol. 5, p. 59. 322 Biskup, Marian. 1979. Sveriges plats i Jagellonernas politik kring sekelskiftet 1500. Scandia. Tidskrift för historisk forskning. Vol. 45:2, p. 223-264. 323 Östergren, Stefan. 2005. Sigismung: en biografi över den svensk-polske monarken. CuD Polen, p. 15-17. 324 Kirchner, Walther. 1954. The rise of the Baltic question. Newark; Mollerup, Walter. 1880. Danmarks forhold til Lifland fra salget af Estland till ordensstatens opløsning: (1346-1561). Kjøbenhavn. 321 68 During wars with Russia, the Livonian nobility sought Lithuanian or Swedish protection. On August 31 1559, in Vilnius an agreement was signed according to which Grand Duke Sigismund August took the Livonian Order, the archbishopric of Riga and the estates of Livonia under his protectorate. In response, in June 1561, Sweden assumed protection over Reval/Tallinn and did not hide its interest in taking the whole Livonia. This step hastened the Lithuanian attempt to incorporate Livonia before the Swedes did. On November 28 1561 the Livonian Order took the oath Pacta Subjectionis, to Grand Duke Sigismund August, and received the Privilegium, which determined the new status of Livonia within Lithuania. The Livonian Order was abolished. The king appointed a Protestant, Mikoáaj Radziwiáá the Black, governor of Livonia. The 1561 pact was ratified in the castle of Riga. According to an early modern Livonian historian: Great Duchy of Lithuania and Livonia signed the Pacta Subjectionis in Wilna on a Diet the 28th of November 1561. Prince Nicolas Radzivill came from the King of Poland to Riga and delivered to the States of Livonia the Authentic Patents of their Agreement from the King.325 The annexation of Livonia by Lithuania was the result of a difficult military situation that Livonia faced in confrontation with expansionist countries like Russia, Sweden and Denmark.326 Grand Master Gottard Kettler received the title of Duke of Courland and Semigalia, and in 1563, the wish of the Livonian nobles was granted and he was also appointed Governor of Livonia, replacing Radziwiáá. German Baltic barons preserved most of their former rights and privileges. That was the last international success of independent GDL. The incorporation of solidly Lutheran Livonia allowed the Protestant elite of Lithuania to hope for an extension of the Reformation to their own country.327 The early modern historians of Lithuania regarded the incorporation of Livonia as a well-grounded and historically justified step – ending the long-term struggle against the German knights.328 The Lithuanians considered Livonia “the only and necessary shield of the GDL from overseas attacks from the Baltic Sea.”329 In 1563, Sweden attempted to force Riga and Livonia took its side. The provisional governor of the Riga bishopric, Christoffer von Meklenburg, 325 Blomberg, Carl Johan. 1701. An account of Livonia, with a relation of the rise, progress, and decay of the Marian Teutonic order: The several revolutions...to the present time, with the wars of Poland, Sweden and Muscovy. London, p. 99-101. 326 Pallin, Johan. 1860. Underhandlingen mellan Sverige och Lifland, 1554-1560. Uppsala, p. 23. 327 Stancelis, Vigintas. 2000. The annexation of Livonia to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: historiographical controversies. Lithuanian Historical Studies. Vol. 5, p. 37. 328 Wiiuk Koialowicz, Alberto. 1669. Historiae Litvanae. Antverpiae, p. 437-438. 329 Rowell, The Wood and the Trees: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Baltic Identity, p. 67. 69 declared that he would accept Swedish vassalage, but had been arrested by the Lithuanian authorities.330 In their turn, the Muscovite troops of Ivan the Terrible attacked Livonia several times, provoking the local barons to accept the Russian protection. In order to consolidate and defend its positions in Livonia, the GDL took several radical steps. In 1566, the deceased Gottard Kettler was replaced by the Ruthenian magnate Jan Chodkiewicz Senior, now unexpectedly appointed Governor of Livonia. Chodkiewicz was conferred full powers: he had authorized to appoint local authorities and to distribute landed estates. On December 25 1566, in Hrodna, the Lithuanian Diet decided to establish the everlasting union between the GDL and Livonia. As a result, Southern Livonia and Riga were converted into the Ducatus Ultradunenis. This duchy was to form an integral part of the GDL. This act was a major change in the status of Livonia, which had been a buffer state between the GDL and Sweden. In response to the annexation of Livonia, Sweden attacked and captured two Lithuanian fortresses in Livonia: Weissenstein/Paide and Karkus/Karksi. Competition between the GDL and Poland over Livonia had existed from the very beginning. As the Lithuanian political elite saw it, Livonia had joined the GDL. From the Polish point of view, Livonia was to be under its protection. The desire to take control over Livonia was one of Poland’s strategic goals in negotiating the Union of Lublin. The Union declared that Livonia belonged to both Lithuania and Poland, but the legal status of Livonia remained unclear. The short period of Lithuanian domination in Livonia ended in 1582. The success of the Commonwealth in the war against Russia resulted in its regaining control over Livonia (the agreement with Russia was signed on January 15 1582, in Yam Zapolski near Pskov). However, the resumption of the Commonwealth’s control over Livonia was combined with the increasing domination of Poland. The 1582 Diet adopted the ”Constitution of Livonia.” It established a new administrative division of Livonia, after the Polish model, and founded a Catholic bishopric of Riga. The privilegium of Sigismund August was not mentioned. The administrative revolution of Poland in Livonia caused the Lithuanian nobility a complete loss of political power. Poles occupied all key positions in Livonia. The counter-reformation also got under-way. At the 1586 Diet, the Lithuanians, discontented with the Polish domination, demanded the incorporation of Livonia into Lithuania. There were other compromise plans, which would have divided Livonia between Poland and the GDL. In the end, in 1589, 330 Bergengrün, Alexander. 1898. Herzog Christoph von Mecklenburg letzter Koadjutor des Erzbistums Riga: ein Beitrag zur livländischen und mecklenburgischen Geschichte. Reval, p. 128, 155-156. 70 after a lengthy polical deliberating by a special committee, Livonia was admitted as a condominium of Lithuania and Poland.331 In 1600, the First Northern War started between Sweden and the Commonwealth.332 This war lasted nearly 30 years (with armistices in 1611-1617, 1618-1621, 1622-1625 and 1627).333 In starting this war against Sweden the Lithuanian nobility knew that the Livonian barons’ loyalty to the Commonwealth was doubtful. The Polish king’s plan to wage war was unpopular with the Lithuanian nobility. Of all Lithuanian districts, only the two that bordered Livonia (Braslau and Upytơ), supported the war.334 The fiscal balance between Poland and Lithuania remained relatively stable between the Union of Lublin and the start of the war. At the beginning of the 17th century, the balance had usually been that Poland contributed 2.5 times as much as the GDL: 30,100.000 zloty for Poland, and 12,200.000 zloty for Lithuania. However, during the war, fiscal pressure on the GDL increased dramatically. Between 1600 and 1611, six extraordinary tax bills were passed in Lithuania. The tax revenues were used for the war in Livonia. As a result, the Lithuanian treasury spent 6, 400.000 zloty for the war during these 11 years, as opposed to the 2,700.000 contributed by Poland. After 1611, the Polish treasury made only irregular and limited contributions towards the military expenditure in Livonia. The cost of the war against Sweden was, thus, primarily covered by the Lithuanian budget.335 The first phase of the war (1600-1611) was a military success for the Commonwealth. In 1605, in a decisive battle waged near Kirkholm/Salaspils, the Lithuanian army, led by Jan Karol Chodkiewicz, defeated King Karl IX. For this reason several panegyrics were published in Vilnius. They eulogized the triumphal victory of Lithuanian arms over Sweden, and predicted a quick reconquest of all Livonia.336 The author of the most well-known panegyric, Carolomachia, was Laurencyus Boye, a Catholic emigrant from Sweden.337 However, the third and the final phase of the war (1617-1629) brought victory to Sweden. Each new offensive in Livonia (1617, 1621, 1625) consolidated the position of Gustav II Adolf. Unlike 331 UrzĊdnicy inflanccy XVI-XVIII. Spisy. Ed. Krysztof Mikulski and Andrzej Rachuba. 1994. Kórnik, p. 5-12; Dziarnovich, Aleh. 2003. In nostra Livonia. Vol.1. Minsk, p. 40-60. 332 Herbst, Stanisáaw. 1938. Wojna inflancka 1600-1602. Warszawa; Norberg, Axel. 1974. Polen i svensk politik 1617-26. Stockholm; Norrman, David. 1978. Sigismund Vasa och hans regering i Polen (1587-1632). Stockholm; Ungern-Stenberg, Paul. 1914. Urkunden zur Geschichte des schwedisch-polnischen Krieges aus den Jahren 1600-1627. Riga. 333 Sveriges traktater med främmande magter. Vol. 5:1. 1572-1632. Stockholm, 1903, p. 225226, 227, 229, 308, 312-314, 347-358. 334 Radaman, Andrei. 2004. Soimikavaia ukhvala shliakhty Braslauskaha paveta ad 19 snezhnia 1600 hoda u kantekstse vainy Rzeczpospolitej abodvukh narodau z Shvecyai (16001629). Braslauskiia chytanni VI. Braslau, p. 80-88. 335 Filipczak-Kocur, Poland-Lithuania before Partition, p. 470-472. 336 Ivanoviþ, Lietuvos lenkiškos knygos, no. 199, 200, 569-570, 623, 679. 337 Index Librorum Latinorum Lituaniae Saeculi Septimi Decimi. 1998. Vilnius, no. 106. 71 Sweden, Poland-Lithuania did not have a navy. In 1621, the port of Riga and half of the Daugava River waterway came under Swedish control. Thus, the GDL’s economy was cut off from Riga and the Baltic. In 1625, Sweden transferred its military operations to the north of Lithuania. There the Swedes established their winter quarters.338 On September 7 1625, the Swedes captured the fortress of Biržai.339 Sweden’s Lithuanian campaign caused political, economic and military chaos in the GDL, and gave rise to an acute crisis with Poland. Many Lithuanian nobles expressed opposition to the war, and, in their dietines, advocated a peaceful solution to the conflict.340 Since the Polish king Sigismung III Vasa did not recognize Gustav II Adolf Vasa as king of Sweden, correspondence between the two countries had to be carried out by senators. The Swedes consistently treated the Polish senators differently from the Lithuanians. The Lithuanian army was the main opposition force in Livonia. For this reason, nearly all the correspondence between Sweden and the Commonwealth was conducted via Lithuanian senators. Thus, Krzysztof II Radziwiáá was in direct correspondence with Jacob De la Gardie and King Gustav II Adolf.341 This relationship made a separate agreement possible. On June 25 1622, the Lithuanian army, led by Krzysztof II, forced the Swedish garrison of Mitau/Jelgava to surrender. When the commander of the garrison, Anders Eriksson, arrived in the headquarters of the Swedish army, he reported that Radziwiáá wanted to negotiate a peace treaty. In response, Chancellor of Sweden Axel Oxenstierna wrote a letter in which he invited Radziwiáá to negotiate peace, or for an armistice.342 On August 10 1622, ignoring commands given by the king, Radziwiáá and several Lithuanian commissars signed an armistice with Sweden in Mitau/Jelgava. Under the terms of the armistice, Sweden took possession of Riga. Only Lithuanian senators and high officers signed the armistice on behalf of the Commonwealth. Most of these were Protestants: the Calvinist Krzysztof II Radziwiáá Arian Jan Kiszka, the Calvinist Hieronim Woááowicz, the Lutheran Gottard Tiesenhausen, the Calvinist Maciej Wiesioááowski, the Calvinist Bartolomeusz WazyĔski. Only Aleksandr Gosiewski represented the Catholic magnates. Several influential politicians represented Sweden: Jakob De la Gardie, Per Banér, Axel Oxenstierna, Joakim Berndes, Henrik Fleming and Ludvig 338 Wisner, Janusz Radziwiáá, p. 267. KsiĊcia Krzysztofa Radziwiááa hetmana polnego, p. 596. 340 Tyla, Antanas. Obsuzhdenie otnoshenii so Shveciei na seimikakh VKL v 17 veke. VIIȱ vsesouznaya konferentsiya po izucheniiu istorii,ekonomiki, yazyka i literatury Skandinavskikh stran i Finlandii: tezisy dokladov. Petrozavodsk, p. 81–83. 341 Wisner, Henryk. 1972. Król i KsiąĪĊ. Konflikt miĊdzy Zygmuntem III Wazą i Krzysztofem Radziwiááem. Rocznik Biaáostocki. Vol. XI, p. 79. 342 Wetterberg, Gunnar. 2002. Kanslern Axel Oxenstierna i sin tid. Vol. 1, Stockholm, p. 326. 339 72 Taube.343 In the course of the long talks, the political elites of Lithuania and Sweden came to know each other, entering into personal contacts. Young Janusz Radziwiáá had also been in Mitau, and welcomed Jakob De la Gardie with an oration.344 32 years later, Janusz Radziwiáá would start a new round of negotiations with Swedish politicians. The key figure among these would be a son of Jacob De la Gardie; Magnus. During the negotiations, Radziwiáá welcomed Gustav II Adolf to Biržai. The signing of the agreement and the Radziwiáás’ welcome to “the main enemy of Poland” produced negative reactions from the Polish side. The king of Poland wrote to Radziwiáá, saying that he had badly harmed the federation. Radziwiáá answered with an explanatory note, the “Justification on the letter of His Majesty” but received no response.345 In Poland, the immediate response to these events was expressed in a poem entitled “The treacherous welcoming of Gustav II Adolf, the king of Sweden, by Krzysztof II Radziwiáá, at that time the field hetman of Lithuania.” The poem accused Radziwiáá of high treason.346 As a result, Warsaw dismissed Radziwiáá from his command of the army in Livonia. At the same time, Salomon RysiĔski, one of Radziwiáá’s clients, wrote a panegyric, eulogizing the treaty between Lithuania and Sweden: The Swedish king, as well as his Court is astonished The Radziwiáá’s palace seems luxury in their eyes The Lithuanians’ courage causes respect in the hearts of foreigners Thir respectful image, and their swords and shields were hardened by Mars The Swedes wished to fraternize with their respected neighbour. Court artists employed by the Radziwiáás painted a picture entitled “The Welcome of Krzysztof Radziwiáá to Gustav II Adolf in the palace of Biržai.”347 Krzysztof II publicly suggested that the king of Poland stop the war and abandon his claims to the Swedish throne.348 On January 19 1627, in the castle of Baldone, the GDL signed a new armistice with Sweden. Again, Poland was ignored. Four Lithuanian officers signed this agreement: Mikoáaj Korff (a future signer of the KU), Gedeon Rajecki (whose son signed the KU), Walter Plettemberg and Marcin Kar343 Fördrag mellan Sverige och Polens högste militarbefälhafvare om vapenvila till den 1 maj 1623. Lägret vid Mitau 1622, augusti 10. Sveriges traktater med främmande magter. Vol. 5:1, p. 312-314. 344 KsiĊcia Krzysztofa Radziwiááa hetmana polnego, p. 405. 345 Wisner, Król i KsiąĪĊ, p. 69-70. 346 Pelne zdrady witanie z Gustawem krolem szwedzkim Krysztopha Radziwilla na ten czas Hetmana Polnego Litewskiego. CL. Sygnatura 2064 (IV)/65, p. 55-56. 347 Kotljarchuk, Shvedy u historyi, p. 199-200. 348 Tyla, Bor’ba litovskikh i shvedskikh feodalov, p. 33. 73 liĔski. Jakob De la Gardie, Gustav Horn and Franciscus Bernhard represented the Swedish side. This armistice led to a conflict between Poland and the GDL, for the Polish army continued its operations against Sweden. This armistice violated one of Sigismund III’s international obligations. He had promised Spain not to sign an armistice with Sweden.349 The Lithuanian senators explained to the king of the Commonwealth why they had signed the armistice “without the knowledge and permission of His Majesty King of Poland and Polish estates”, but they did not send him a copy of the treaty. The Lithuanians criticized the decisions of the 1626 Diet, which had decided to proceed with the war and to prohibit trade through Riga. In their opinion, Poland-Lithuania would not be able to defeat Sweden, since it lacked a navy. Further, the Lithuanian army in Livonia had only 2,000 troops – against 14,000 Swedish troops. The armistice furthermore enabled to resume trade along the Dzvina, despite the Polish king’s forbidding trade with Riga. It was agreed to stop hostilities in Livonia. Swedish troops were obliged to withdraw from Biržai. One of the terms enjoined the contracting parties to do their best to persuade the monarchs of Poland and of Sweden to enter into peace negotiations. Infuriated, Sigismund III wrote that the armistice meant “the beginning of a harmful partition of Lithuania and Poland and a violation of the principles of the power of the Diet and King.” The Castellan of Kraków, Jerzy Zbaraski, bluntly wrote to the Lithuanians that the agreement reached in Baldone ”means a violation of the union of Lublin that combines into one Poland and Lithuania.” The dietines of Poland ordered their ambassadors to ask Lithuanian Chancellor Lew Sapieha who gave him the power, which belongs to the Commonwealth. At the same time, the dreadful military and economic situation compelled the dietines of Lithuania to support the agreement.350 In the spring of 1627 Krzysztof Radziwiáá appeared before the dietine of Navahradak. He affirmed that he believed that the agreement of Baldone was not illegal. On the contrary, it was entirely legitimate, since was in accordance with Lithuanian interests. He pointed out that Poland had not asked Lithuania for permission when it signed an agreement with Walachia.351 In a letter to the deputies of the Lithuanian Assembly in Slonim Radziwiáá noted that he had always advocated peace with Sweden “and have never been the initiator of the war, on the contrary [he had] written and asked for peace, warning that continuation of war would do harm to the Republic.”352Finally, on September 26 1629, in Altmark/Stary Targ, Sweden and Poland-Lithuania signed an armistice for the next 6 years. This armistice 349 Ibid., p. 32-34. Wisner, Henryk. 2001. Rozejm w Baldenmojzie (1627). Lietuva ir jos kaimynai. Nuo normanǐ iki Napoleono: straipsniǐ rinkinys. Vilnius, p. 266-277. 351 KsiĊcia Krzysztofa Radziwiááa hetmana polnego, p. 575. 352 Ibid., p. 571. 350 74 decided the fate of Livonia.353 The largest part of Livonia found itself under Sweden’s control. The Commonwealth annexed a small part to the south of the Aivieksta River. This Polish-Lithuanian Livonia, or the so-called Inflanty, included only eight towns: Dünaburg/Daugavpils, Rositten/RƝzekne, Kreslaw/KrƗslava, Kreutzburg/Krustpils, Marienhausen/Viƺaka, Ludsen/Ludza, Schwanenburg/Gulbene and Volkenburg/Padebešu. The armistice provided for free commerce along the Daugava River.354 On September 12 1635, Sweden and the Commonwealth signed a new treaty in Stuhmsdorf/Sztumska WieĞ, extending over a 26 - year period, to July 11 1661. This agreement reconfirmed the articles of the Altmark agreement, first of all the division of Livonia and the free trade along the Daugava River.355 In return for the tolerance of the Catholic faith in Royal Prussia, tolerance of Evangelical faiths in Poland-Lithuania was agreed upon.356 Between 1561 and 1654, Livonia’s political nation went through processes of transition. Until 1607, there had been a policy of discrimination against the Livonian barons. In 1607, in the shadow of war with Sweden, the Constitution of Livonia III had given the Livonians an equal status with the Polish and Lithuanian nobility. However, dual vassalage status was preserved in Livonia. Both Poland and Lithuania nominated candidates to offices. These included offices which had existed only in Lithuania, never in Poland. The taxes from Livonia were delivered to the Lithuanian and Polish treasuries, in turn. The political nation of Polish-Lithuanian Livonia included three groups of nobility (Livonian, Polish and Lithuanian) and five ethnic groups (the Germans, Poles, Lithuanians, Ruthenians and Samogitians) and a number of confessions. Livonia elected six ambassadors to the Diet, two from each political nation: the Poles, Lithuanians, and Livonians. However, the geographical proximity of Livonia to Lithuania encouraged reciprocal integration. Many Livonian barons integrated into the Lithuanian political structure. However, they preserved their Lutheranism and their close contacts with relatives on the Swedish side. During the same period, many Lithuanians arrived in Livonia and adjusted to the Lutheran environment. Several Livonian castles became the patrimonial seats of Lithuanian families. Among these were Neuermühlen/Adaži and Runneburg/Rauna, domains of the Biaááozor and the Rajecki families respectively.357 353 Fördrag mellan Sverige och Polen om stillestånd på sex år. Altmark, 1629 september den 16/26. Sveriges traktater med främmande magter. Vol. 5:1, p. 347-358. 354 Ibid., p. 353-354. 355 Fördrag mellan Sverige och Polen om stillestånd under 26 år. Stuhmsdorf, 1635 september den 2/12. Sveriges traktater med främmande magter. Vol. 5: 2. 1572-1632. Stockholm, 1909, p. 333-348. 356 Ibid., p. 349-350. 357 UrzĊdnicy inflanccy XVI-XVIII, p. 5-12; Dziarnovich, In nostra Livonia, p. 40-60. 75 Both Lithuania and Sweden regarded Livonia as a subsidiary land. However, Jürgen Heyde has argued that the economic and political position of the barons was superior to that that enjoyed by barons in the Commonwealth or in Sweden.358 The question of the relative position of the Livonian nobility in the Commonwealth and Sweden remains disputable, and requires further research. The Livonian nobility in the Swedish Empire preserved all their old rights and privileges.359 There is evidence that many Lithuanian-Livonian nobles allied themselves with Sweden during the Second Northern War and took an active part in the KU. The Livonian political nation, as of 1629 (partially from 1561), was divided between two hostile states: Poland-Lithuania and Sweden. The border was established and families divide by force. Nevertheless, family and property relations survived. Therefore many Livonians supported the unification under the patronage of a single monarch. On the other hand, the barons formed the political group that played the role of natural intermediary in relations between Sweden and Lithuania. 2.5 Contacts between the Protestants of Lithuania and Sweden The Reformation movement in the GDL was encouraged by the example of neighbouring Livonia and Courland. As of 1622, Swedish Riga was the main trade partner of Samogitia. It was not by accident that merchants, not nobles, laid the foundation of Protestant parishes in Ruthenian cities, while, among the ethnic Lithuanians, it was the farmers who were Protestants. After the division of Livonia, the barons played an important part in the Lithuanian Reformation. After 1632, the Swedish university in Dorpat/Tartu became the Livonian centre of education. The representatives of families such as the Korff, Puttkammer, Tiesenhausen, Römer, Nonhardt, Plater and Ottenhausen moved to Lithuania, founded new Lutheran churches and adjusted to the social environment of the Lithuanian elite.360 On the other hand, many Lithuanian and Ruthenian nobles who served and lived in Livonia insistently held on to Protestantism. Among these were the families of Wysocki, Rajecki, Kossakowski, SiciĔski, Kolenda, Korsak, and Jewáaszewski.361 The 358 Heyde, Jürgen. 1998. Zwischen Kooperation und Konfrontation: Die Adelspolitik PolenLitauens und Schwedens in der Provinz Livland 1561-1650. Zeitschrift für OstmitteleuropaForschung. Vol. 47:4, p. 544-567. 359 Loit, Alexander. 1994. Sverige och Lettland: förbindelser genom tiderna. Stockholm, p. 9; Naber, Jaak. 1995. Motsättningarnas Narva. Statlig svenskhetspolitik och tyskt lokalvälde i ett statsreglerat samhälle, 1581-1704. Uppsala, p. 43. 360 Kiaupa, History of Lithuania, p. 264; Adamowicz, Die evangelisch-lutherische Kirche zu Wilna, p. 53. 361 UrzĊdnicy inflanccy XVI-XVIII. Spisy. 76 representatives of these families energetically supported the KU. The Lithuanian Protestants had a tradition of relations with Riga. Initially, and up until 1578, the Grand Dukes agreed to the archbishop of Riga’s authority over Lithuanian Lutherans. These contacts did not end in the 17th century. In 1604, the magistrate of Riga sponsored the publication, in Vilnius, of a antiCatholic polemic work entitled “Apologia”.362 Against the background of the Catholic reaction, the Protestant nobility started seeking an influential foreign defender. They considered King Gustav II Adolf the Protestant guardian of Europe. On April 30 1632, Sigismund III Vasa died quietly in Warsaw. On November 6 1632, Gustaf II Adolf Vasa was killed in the battle at Lützen, while fighting to protect the Evangelical Church in Germany. However, during the six months between the decease of Sigismund and the death of Gustaf II Adolf, the Lithuanian Protestants seized the opportunity afforded by the election of a new king of the Commonwealth. The King of Sweden gave his support. In May 1632, a number of Lithuanian senators, led by Krzysztof II Radziwiáá, and ignoring Poland, sent an embassy to Johan Skytte, Governor of Livonia.363 As a result of these negotiations, Prince Wáadysáaw Vasa, who needed the support of the Lithuanian Protestants for his candidature, signed an agreement with Gustaf Adolf that guaranteed the privileges of the Protestants, including the old right to serve as senators.364 As the new king, Wáadysáaw IV partly redeemed his promises. He ended the oppression of the Protestants and legalized the Orthodox Church. The resumption of tolerance was celebrated in the Lutheran church of Vilnius.365 In 1621, Piotr Nonhardt, the starosta of Orsha, published a book entitiled “Christian Postilla.” This book became extremely popular among Lithuanian Lutherans and was re-published twelve times. The author was Samuel Dambrowski, the superintendent of Lithuania and Samogitia. In the preface to the second edition, Nonhardt wrote that the edition was devoted “to the saintly memory of Her Majesty, at our Lord’s mercy the Princess Anna Vasa, patroness of our Church and the pet of the church of Augsburg confession.” The Swedish-born Princess Anna (1568-1625) was the patroness of the Lutheran Church in Lithuania. Her father was King Johan III Vasa and her mother was Katarina Jagellonica. As a zealous member of the Catholic Church, Katarina Jagellonica had secretly tried to bring up her children as 362 Krowicki, Marcin. 1604. Apologia wiĊksza, to iest: Obroná náuki prawdziwey y wiáry strodawney krzeĞciaĔskiey. Wilna. 363 Wisner, Henryk. 1997. Kilka uwag o Wielkim KsiĊstwie Litewskim poáowy XVII wieku. Lietuvos Valstybơ XII–XVIII a. Vilnius, p.315. 364 Szelągowski, Adam. 1899. Ukáady królewicza Wáadysáawa i dysydentów z Gustawem Adolfem w roku 1632. Kwartalnik Historyczny. Vol. XIII, p. 683-733. 365 Triumph po spokoyney electiey Naiasnieyszego Wladislawa Zigmunta krola Polskiego y Szwezkiego, Wielkiego X. Litewskiego w Wilnie w kosciele Confess. Auspur. 1632. Lubcza. 77 Catholics. Nonetheless, her daughter Anna was a faithful Lutheran. As of 1589, Anna Vasa lived in Poland-Lithuania. King Sigismund and the Jesuits hoped to convert her to the Catholic faith and to marry her off to a member of a Catholic dynasty, in order to gain political benefit. However, Anna never married, and remained a Lutheran to her dying day. After her death in 1625, her body was left unburied for eleven years, owing to obstacles raised by the Catholic Church. Finally, on July 16 1636, she was buried in the Lutheran cathedral of Thorn/ToruĔ. None of the Polish Royal family attended her burial.366 The funeral turned into a powerful demonstration of Protestant unity. The Radziwiáás headed the ceremony and about sixty pastors from Lithuania followed the coffin.367 Immediately after the funeral, Krzysztof II Radziwiáá sent his ambassador Adam Reinhold to France. In Paris, Reinhold handed Hugo Grotius, ambassador of Sweden in France, a memorandum relating the story of the funeral of Anna Vasa. The memorandum also pointed to a sharp deterioration of the Evangelical position after her death.368 On September 4 1644, the Lithuanian Protestants arranged a synod in Orla, led by Janusz Radziwiáá. The subject under discussion was the treatment of the royal proposal to arrange an ecumenical colloquium in Thorn/ToruĔ. The Lithuanian Protestants decided not to take part in ”the Catholic colloquium”, but sent two priests as observers. A detailed narrative of the synod of Orla, written by Radziwiáá, was published in 1645 in London.369 The following year, a Swedish delegation visited Lithuania. Heinrich Hein, the rector of Dorpat University and professor of Swedish and Roman law, and Johannes Georgii Gezelius, professor of Greek, headed this delegation.370 Gezelius was an advisor to Erik Oxenstierna, Governor of Estonia. He was also an expert in Eastern problems and publisher of the Lutheran catechism in the Latvian language. The visit resulted in direct negotiations between Lithuanian and Swedish Protestants. The University of Leiden in Holland was a place where Swedish and Lithuanian nobles met informally. This university was one of the main educational centres for the Protestants of Northern and Eastern Europe. The University admitted about 50 Swedish students annually.371 At the same time, Leiden was the main university centre for graduates of the Slutsk and Kơ366 Lindkvist, Sven. 1996. Anna Vasa: polsk nutid och svensk historia. Kungliga Vitterhets historien och antikvitetsakademiens årsbok, p. 131-135. 367 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiááa, p. 23. 368 Lalkou, Ihar. 1999. Gallia Albaruthenensie abo piats stahodziau belaruskaj prysutnastsi u Frantsyi. Spadchyna. No.2, p. 86. 369 Radzivil, Janusius. 1645. Ad epistolam Synodi Warsawiensis, Londini. KB. RaritetsKammaren. Syntagmatis Confessionum Fidel, p. 11-30. 370 Skutil, Jan. 1993. Jan Komenský mezi Stockholmem a Lešnem v letech 1642-1650. Acta Musei Moraviae. Vol. LXXVIII, p. 204. 371 Frängsmyr, Tore. 2000. Svensk idéhistoria. Bildning och vetenskap under tusen år. Vol. I, 1000-1809. Stockholm, p. 81. 78 dainiai gymnasiums. Between 1630 and 1654, about 30 Lithuanians attended the Leiden University.372 In 1651, Bengt Skytte travelled to Transylvania with the consent of prince Karl Gustav av Pfalz, the future king of Sweden. On the way, Skytte contributed to the widening of Swedish contacts with Lithuanian Protestants. The mission’s goal was the creation of a wide anti-Catholic coalition. György II Rákóczi of Transylvania supported close contacts with the Radziwiáás, the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Lithuanian-Polish and Czech Brethren (through Johann Amos Comenius).373 Rákóczi informed Skytte that he had learned that Poland planned a war against Sweden, in order to attack Livonia and capture Riga. Rákóczi promised to help Sweden in a war against Poland, should it become necessary, in all possible ways.374 During the course of negotiations, Skytte discovered the existence of an Eastern European Protestant cooperation network. He probably made the acquaintance of several Lithuanians. Foremost among these was Rákóczi’s diplomat, Daniel Lomski, a Calvinist noble from Belarus.375 Skytte, considered an expert on Eastern Europe, and in 1655 was appointed by Karl X Gustav to be the head of the Lithuanian Advisory Council. Janusz Radziwiáá kept in touch with Sweden through the European intellectuals Johan Amos Comenius and Samuel Hartlib. One of Comenius’ close disciples was Wáadysáaw Dorohostajski, a Lithuanian magnate.376 Another Lithuanian Calvinist noble, Ambrozi Kochlewski, the client of the Radziwiáás, became Comenius’ secretary. Georg Hartlib, a brother of Samuel Hartlib, served as the rector of the Protestant school in Vilnius.377 Comenius, Hartlib and John Durie were, at this point, the spiritual leaders of Protestant Europe. They dreamed of a single unified Church between the Lutheran and Reformed branches, under the patronage of the Swedish Crown.378 The GDL was given a significant place in these plans. The interest in Lithuania was caused by the existence, there, of a church organization, which united Protestants of all denominations. This was seen as a prototype for a future, unified Protestant Europe.379 Sweden had been interested in the preparation of plans for a great Evangelical Alliance that would serve as a counterweight to 372 Hans, Polish Protestants and their Connections with England and Holland, p. 213- 216. Runeby, Nils. 1963. Bengt Skytte, Comenius och abdikationskrisen 1651. Scandia. Tidskrift för historisk forskning. Vol. 29:2, p. 360-382. 374 Olofsson, Sven Ingmar.1957. Efter Westfaliska freden. Sveriges yttre politik 1650-1654. Stockholm, p. 205-206. 375 Sziláfyi, Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale. Vol. 2, p. 72-73. 376 Hans, Polish Protestants and their Connections with England and Holland, p. 200. 377 Skutil, Jan Komenský mezi Stockholmem, p. 195, 203. 378 Westin, Gunnar. 1932. Negotiations about Church Union. John Durie, Gustavus Adolphus, Axel Oxenstierna. Uppsala. 379 Batten, J. Milton. 1944. John Dury. Advocate of Christian Reunion. Chicago-Illinois, p. 18-19. 373 79 the Catholic counter-reformation.380 The brother of Karl X Gustav, Adolf Johan av Pfalz, was a supporter of this unification of Protestants.381 The idea of founding the colony of Antilia – a land where all Protestant refugees could live together – made up a considerable part of Comenius’s, Hartlib’s and Durie’s philosophy. Hartlib, the central figure in the proposal of a utopian brotherhood, had many correspondents among the Lithuanian Lutherans.382 One of the projects was to found the colony in one of the Radziwiáás’ cities. In another project, the colony of Antilia was to be established on the island of Rune in the Riga Bay, under the protectorate of Jakob De la Gardie.383 Comenius, Hartlib and Durie kept in touch with the Lithuanian and Swedish political and intellectual leaders. Among these were Krzysztof II and Janusz Radziwiáá, Jakob and Magnus De la Gardie, Johan and Bengt Skytte, Axel Oxenstierna and Louis de Geer. Thus, prior to the 1655 war, the Swedish political elite was well-informed on the situation in the GDL. As it will be seen, Hartlib and Comenius would provide Europe with information on the KU. 2.6 The Radziwiáá faction and Swedish geopolitics The Radziwiáá faction long deliberated how to solve the problem of Poland’s domination of Lithuania. There were two possibilities: either to give the throne to a foreign king, preferably a Calvinist, or to marry the Polish king to a Protestant Princess. During the First Northern War the Radziwiáás elaborated a plan to replace King Sigismund with Jean-Baptiste Gaston, duke of Orleans, the son of the French King Henri IV. They started by secretly sending two ambassadors to France: Piotr Kochlewski and Krzysztof Arciszewski.384 This mission ended in a disaster.385 In 1635-36, the Radziwiáás also failed in their campaign to marry young King Wáadysáaw to the Calvinist Princess Elizabeth, the daughter of the last Protestant ruler of Bohemia, Frederick V, the Winter King.386 After Wáadysáaw‘s death, the Radziwiáá faction conspired to install either the Calvinist Prince of Transylvania, Rákóczi, or his son Sigismund, on the Polish-Lithuanian throne, with the 380 Wordsworth, John. The National Church of Sweden, p. 289-290. Batten, Advocate of Christian Reunion, p. 170-178. Dickson Donald R. 1998. The Tessera of Antilia: utopian brotherhoods and secret societies in the early seventeenth century. Leiden, p. 152-153. 383 Eriksonas, Linas. 2000. The lost Colony of Scots: Unravelling overseas connections in a Lithuanian town. Ships, Guns and Bibles in the North Sea and the Baltic States c. 1350 - c. 1700. East Lothian, p. 173-178. 384 KsiĊcia Krzysztofa Radziwiááa hetmana polnego, p. 591-593. 385 Wisner, Król i KsiąĪĊ, p. 79-98; “Spisek orleaĔski” w latach 1626-1628. Ed. Urszula Augustyniak and Wojciech Sokoáowski. 1990. Warszawa. 386 Kotáubaj, ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 45. 381 382 80 help of the Ukrainian Cossacks.387 However, none of these projects came to fruition. Krzysztof II Radziwiáá established contact with King Gustav II Adolf. Radziwiáá hoped that the king of Sweden would be elected the successor to the throne of Poland-Lithuania after the invalid Sigismund, who was still alive. Radziwiáá hoped to accomplish this with the help of the Lithuanian Protestants and the Cossacks. The negotiations were conducted through intermediaries in Biržai and Riga, in an atmosphere of secrecy. The representatives in Riga who headed the Swedish party were the mayor of the city, Johan Ulrich, and Didrik Taube. Lithuania was presented by the Radziwiáás’ clients: the starosta of Brest Piotr Kochlewski, the starosta of Biržai Krzysztof Skrobowicz and the vice-starosta of Biržai Gregorz Koskull. Krzysztof II, Gustav II Adolf, Governor Johan Skytte and Chancellor of Sweden Axel Oxenstierna were kept well informed on the course of the negotiations. The proposals of the Lithuanians were radical. Radziwiáá was proposing to rebel against Poland in order to put Gustav II Adolf on the throne, should a political solution prove impossible. In case of defeat Radziwiáá asked for political asylum in Sweden for himself and his family.388 However, this plan failed and the Polish Prince Wáadysáaw Vasa became ruler of Poland-Lithuania from 1632 to 1648. In November 1648, contrary to wishes of the Radziwiáá faction, the former Jesuit bishop Jan Kazimierz Vasa was elected king of Poland-Lithuania. This event forced the radicalisation of the Protestant political program. A new model for Lithuania’s political future emerged. Its core was the possibility of a union between Lithuania and Sweden. This idea became widespread among Lithuanian separatists, and became known to the Swedish leaders as well. At the end of 1648, the Councillor of the Council of the Realm Bengt Skytte advised General Governor of Finland Per Brahe, “to keep an eye on Poland [the Commonwealth], where one or another party will seek our assistance, for example, even at present, the best people of Lithuania are secretly searching for our agree to separate Lithuania and Poland and to incorporate it to Sweden.”389 Skytte cautiously mention no names, but it is clear that the matter concerned the Radziwiáá faction. Janusz Radziwiáá maintained secret contacts with Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, General Governor of Livonia. The Radziwiáás, being aware of the dangerous nature of their plans, used ambassadors who reported orally. That might be the reason why the National Archives of Sweden house only one 387 Khavanova, Olga. 2000. The foreign policy of the principality of Transylvania in the context of international relations in the middle of the 17th century. Russkaja i Ukrainskaya diplomatiya v Evrazii. Moskva, p. 135-136. 388 Wejle, Carl. 1901. Sveriges politik mot Polen, 1630-1635. Uppsala, p. 15-39. 389 Bengt Skytte to Per Brahe. November 27, 1648. Swedish. RA. Skoklostersamlingen II. Fol. Vol. 21. E 8147. 81 pre-war letter from Radziwiáá to De la Gardie. In 1650, Radziwiáá thanked De la Gardie for the letter delivered by the Swedish envoy Christopher Lanhiar, “who told me the news and gave best regards and the evidence of fraternal feelings.” Radziwiáá looked forward to seeing De la Gardie soon in Livonia and declared himself a true advocate of peace between PolandLithuania and Sweden, “the result of which our nations enjoy peace against the background of conflicts within Christendom.” Radziwiáá stood for “everlasting friendship between the two kingdoms” and declared himself always ready to do Sweden a favour. He treated De la Gardie rather informally, as “my dear friend”, emphasizing their personal relations.390 The Duke of Courland, Jacob Kettler, who also established a secret relationship with Stockholm from Warsaw. Thus, Radziwiáá often used Kettler as a middleman in his relations with Sweden.391 In 1622-1654, the way in which the Swedish state advanced to the borders of Lithuania was observed. In 1622, Riga and most of Livonia became Sweden’s territory. As a result, Sweden and the GDL now shared borders in Livonia. In 1629-35, Sweden controlled the Memel/Klaipơda region in Ducal Prussia, which bordered Samogitia. In 1645, the island of Ösel/Saaremaa passed from Denmark to Sweden. As a result of the 1648 peace treaty of Westphalia, Sweden received Pomerania and could now, if it wished to, invade Poland-Lithuania from two sides: via Riga and via Stettin. Swedish activity in Lithuanian Samogitia and Livonia had been spurred by an ideology, which could be termed “the Gothicism approach.” According to the legend of Olaus Magnus’s map Carta marina (1539), the Samogitians (samogeti) and Livonians (livoni) originated from the old Gothic tribes. They were thus relatives of the Swedes. From this point of view, Sweden’s propagandists could maintain that “We have the right to be there.” Between 1622 and 1654, Sweden stocked up with basic knowledge of its southern neighbour. In 1626, Andreas Bure prepared and published a map, “The Northern Circle and new detailed survey.” Part of this map was devoted to Lithuania, with a precise geographic description of river valleys – one of the best maps made in the 17th century.392 In 1642, at the University of Dorpat/Tartu, the Swedish historian Johannes Petrejus published a dissertation entitled “The History of the Polish Kingdom”, which included a large amount of material on Lithuanian relations with Livonia.393 390 Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. June 8, 1650. Vilnius. Latin. RA. De La Gardieska samlingen. Skrivelser till Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. Ser. C: I. E 1531. 391 Kotáubaj, ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 204; Wasilewski, Zdrada Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 128. 392 Orbis Arctoi nova et accurata delineatio auctore: Andrea Bureo Sueco, 1626. Ed. by Herman Richter and Wilhelm Norlind. Lund, 1936. 393 Petrejus, Johannes Junecopensis. 1642. Regni Poloniae Historia. Dorpati. 82 According to Axel Oxenstierna, the Baltic possessions of PolandLithuania were the main targets of Swedish expansion. Oxenstierna’s concept of “Dominium maris Baltici” implied, primarily, Swedish domination over the Baltic ports: from Danzig to Riga, including the Royal and Ducal Prussia, Samogitia, the northern part of Lithuania and southern Livonia.394 However, Warsaw opposed these plans. The Polish kings controlled all these lands.395 Between 1649-1654 Radziwiáá sent several times his ambassadors to arrange contacts with the Ukrainian leaders, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Chancellor Ivan Wyhowsky, as well as with the Prince of Transylvania, György II Rákóczi. In Radziwiáá’s opinion, the Cossacks, just like the Protestants, could be a powerful political force, and, like the Protestants, they were dissidents.396 His main intention was create a league of the non-Catholic small states of Eastern Europe. To put his plan into practice, Radziwiáá used a political marriage. Vasile Lupu, the ruler of Moldavia, played a key role in Radziwiáá’s plans to establish this league. A strong strategic move towards fulfilling this plan was the marriage of Janusz Radziwiáá to Maria Lupu, the daughter of Vasile. Supported by the Orthodox priest Leonty Szycik Zaleski and the Protestants Wáadysáaw Sicinski, Johann Ottenhausen, Hrehory Mirski and Jan MierzeĔski, Radziwiáá agreed with Lupu on this marriage. Through the mediation of Transylvania, the marriage also gained the approval of Ibrahim I the Mad, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, to whom Moldavia was a vassal. Parthenius II, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, also gave his blessing to the marriage of an Orthodox Princess to a Protestant Duke. On February 5 1645, in the capital of Moldavia Iaúi, the wedding ceremony took place. Petro Mohyla, the Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ruthenia, carried out the ceremony in accordance with Orthodox ritual. The Lithuanian Protestants, Hrehory Mirski and Jan MierzeĔski, were the masters of ceremony. Many Lithuanian nobles and the ambassadors of Poland, Prussia-Brandenburg, Transylvania, Walachia, Ukrainian Hetmanate, Courland, and the Patriarchate of Constantinople attended the wedding.397 Petro Mohyla celebrated the mariage also in the Sofia Cathedral of Kyiv and the Orthodox Church published Mohyla’s speech under the title “Devotional speech on the occasion of Radziwiáá’s marriage.“398 394 Ahnlund, Nils. 1946. Svensk Östersjöpolitik under det tidigare 1600-talet. Forum navale. No. 7. Uppsala, p. 3-15. 395 Olofsson, Efter Westfaliska freden. Sveriges yttre politik, p. 188-189. 396 Matwijów, Koncepcje polityki Janusza Radziwiááa w latach 1648-1655, p. 37. 397 Kotáubaj, ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 77-81; Kentrschynskyj, Bohdan. 1965. Rebeldiplomati och vasallaaktivism i Östeuropa vid 1600-talets mitt. Karolinska förbundets årsbok, p. 20. 398 Padokshyn, Semion. 2000. Uniia, Dzuarzhaunasts, Kultura. Filasofska-histarychny analiz. Minsk, p. 87-88. 83 The marriage of Janusz Radziwiáá and Maria Lupu had great international importance. The ceremony itself demonstrated the political unity of the small semi-independent non-Catholic states. By means of marriage, Radziwiáá, who was already one of the richest Lithuanian magnates, the highest Lithuanian civil authority (palatine of Vilnius), and the leader of the Protestants, also became the main patron of the Orthodox population. The news of Radziwiáá’s marriage echoed through Scandinavia and Muscovy as a example of the growing understanding between Protestant and Orthodox leaders in Eastern Europe.399 At the same period of time, on April 4 1651, Sigismund, the son of Rákóczi, was married to the Calvinist Princess Henrietta Mary, the daughter of Frederick V, the Winter King of Bohemia and of Elizabeth Stuart. In the fall of 1652, in Iaúi, a marriage took place between Roksana Lupu, the daughter of the Moldavian ruler, and Tymish Khmelnytsky, the elder son of the Ukrainian Hetman Khmelnytsky.400 In March 1654, before Russia started its war against Poland-Lithuania, Radziwiáá sent his ambassador Wáadysáaw Lubieniecki to Rákóczi with secret proposals.401 Radziwiáá believed that it was time to start a joint war against the king of Poland. Rákóczi was to set out from Transylvania, capture Kraków, and then ascend to the Polish throne. At the same time, Radziwiáá, together with loyal Protestants, would start a rebellion in Lithuania. Radziwiáá asked Rákóczi for 100,000 ducats to pay for the services of nobility.402 Also, Radziwiáá suggested that Rákóczi establish good relations with the Cossacks, and seek Swedish assistance, in order to create a panProtestant league. These proposals show how far the Radziwiáá faction was willing to go in its anti-Polish plans. Rákóczi listened to Radziwiáá’s advice.403 At the end of 1654, a Transylvanian embassy led by Konstantin Schaum was sent to Sweden. The new King, Karl X Gustav, received Schaum. During his three months’ stay Schaum consulted with a number of Swedish leaders.404 Comenius was a middleman between Transylvania and Sweden. At the end of December 1654, he visited Stettin where he informed Swedes that Rákóczi was willing to enter into an anti-Polish alliance with Sweden. With the help of his friend, Johannes Matthiae, bishop of Strängnäs, Comenius tried to persuade Karl X Gustav to declare war on Poland, to be 399 Oparina, Tatyana. 1998. Ivan Nasedka i polemicheskoe bogoslovie kievskoi mitropolii. Novosibirsk, p. 235. 400 Semenova, Ludmila. 2000. Danubian Principalities in the context of international relations of the 5th decade of the 17th century. Russkaya i Ukrainskaya diplomatiya v Evrazii. Moskva, p. 117. 401 Puncta nomine illustrissimi principis Radzivilii serenissimo Transylvaniae principi proponenda et specialiora quaedam. Sziláfyi, Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale. Vol. 1, p. 310-315. 402 Wasilewski, Zdrada Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 129-130. 403 Zaborowskii, Rossia, Rech Pospolitaya i Shvetsia, p. 53-54; 76-77. 404 Khavanova, The foreign policy of the principality of Transylvania, p. 139. 84 waged with the help of Lithuanian opposition.405 Simultaneously, Rákóczi’s ambassador, a Ruthenian noble named Daniel Lomski, met with Khmelnytsky. In 1654, Janusz Radziwiáá presented a political declaration entitled “Consideration of joint defense of the GDL.” This document was presented to the Polish king and senators in Hrodna.406 An urgent political alliance between the Commonwealth and Sweden for the common defence of the GDL against Muscovy was its main military aim.407 After Russia invaded Polatsk and Vitsebsk in the summer of 1654 resulted in the separation of Riga from its natural hinterland. Riga’s commerce declined and this worried the Swedish administration in Livonia.408 On November 14 1654, the commercial manager of Livonia Joan Weidenhayn (known also as Johan von Weidenhaijn) sent an analysis to Stockholm, with a proposed solution to the emerging problem. The key question Weidenhayn sought to answer was: What is in store for Riga’s trade if Muscovy permanently occupies Polatsk and Vitsebsk? He suggested to trade with Lithuania without middlemen, the rejection of annual credits to Ruthenian merchants and nobles, and the building of a canal. Weidenhayn warned the Swedish authorities that Stockholm’s inactivity might cause Lithuania’s commercial re-orientation to Königsberg. That would entail Riga’s economic collapse.409 In 1654, after Russia and Ukraine had invaded Belarus, Janusz Radziwiáá entrusted a client, the starosta of Biržai Krzysztof Dowgiaááa StryĪka, to initiate cautious negotiations with Adolf Johan av Pfalz about the Swedish protection over Lithuania.410 On December 3 1654, Stockholm received the first report from from Danzig/GdaĔsk written by Johan Meyer von Lilienthal. Lilienthal was a secretary of Sweden’s ministry of commerce. He was sent to the Commonwealth unofficially, to pick up information on the domestic situation. Meanwhile, Lilienthal reported on a strong separatist mood in Lithuania “where the nobility does not support the king of Poland and everybody discusses the proposal of separation of Lithuania from the Crown.”411 On December 30 1654, Karl X Gustav, instructed General Governor of Livonia Gustaf Horn, to keep a close watch on the situation in Lithuania, where various political groups were seeking Swedish protection, 405 Göransson, Sven. 1956. Den Europeiska konfessionspolitikens upplösning 1654-1660. Religion och utrikespolitik under Karl X Gustav. Uppsala - Wiesbaden, p. 79. 406 Zaborovskii, Rossia, Rech Pospolitaya i Shvetsya, p. 98. 407 Wójcik, Zbigniew. 1991. Wielkie KsiĊstwo Litewskie wobec Szwecji, Rosji i powstaĔ Kozackich. Przegląd Wschodni. Vol.1. Z. 3, p. 578-579. 408 Fahlborg, Birger. 1932. Sveriges yttre politik 1660-1664. Stockholm, p. 42. 409 ”Der Vorschlag zur Verbesserung des hiesigen Handels und der Schiffbauerei, vom königlichen Hofrat und Kommerzdirektor Joan Weidenhayn”: Jensch, Der Handel Rigas, p. 129. 410 Wasilewski, Radziwiáá Janusz. PSB, vol. XXX/1, p. 213. 411 Edén, Grunderna till Karl X Gustafs anfall på Polen, p. 26. 85 “for example, the Lithuanian vice-chancellor Sapieha [Kazimierz Leon Sapieha] had already implied that he was ready for secret negotiations with Sweden.”412 In December of 1654, the Swedish Council of the Realm discussed the war with the Commonwealth. Chancellor Erik Oxenstierna emphasized the possibility of finding support from within the Commonwealth and to allying with one of the subjects of Poland-Lithuania.413 According to Oxenstierna: “there might be those who will ask His Majesty for protection or propose an alliance. Therefore, the king, beginning from this very moment, has to take all such probabilities as guide to action.” Per Brahe supported Oxenstierna’s thesis: “It follows that the king will act wisely if he takes under His Majesty’s patronage those who are seeking for it.”414 Oxenstierna mentioned neither names, countries or cities. However, in my opinion, Oxenstierna was referring primarily to Lithuania, although Arne Stade’s opinion, that Oxenstierna primarily was referring to Dünaburg/Daugavpils, is an alternative.415 A Livonian Dünaburg was indeed mentioned by Oxenstierna as a recipient of military aid. But this was just a small town. The future political alliance between Sweden and some part of the Commonwealth most probably concerned either the GDL or the large cities of Royal Prussia. Oxenstierna’s proposal, when viewed in the light of Meyer’s reports and the ongoing contacts between Lithuanian magnates and Stockholm, seems to refer to the GDL. If so, the breach of the Polish-Lithuanian union and Lithuania’s alliance with Sweden was not as ad-hoc and not so much a shortterm response by Lithuanian elite to the military catastrophe of 1655 as is asserted by many Polish historians. The long-term political contacts between the Lithuanian opposition and Sweden illustrated by the later high dynamics of the signing of the 1655 Union in many respects. Lithuanian separatists’ contacts outlined Sweden’s position on the issue of war against Poland. It is note-worthy that, in the summer of 1655, Sweden started war against Poland-Lithuania on two fronts, not only from Pomerania, but also from Livonia. The existence of a strong Lithuanian anti-Polish opposition, in my opinion, induced Sweden to take this additional risk. 412 Karl X Gustav to Gustaf Horn. December 30, 1654/January 9, 1655. Stockholm. Swedish. RA. Riksregistraturet. Vol. 296. 1654, E 00607 16/17, F. 2207-2208. 413 Svenska Riksrådets protocoll. Ed. Per Sondén. Tredje serien. Vol. XVI. 1654-1656. 1923, p. 2-36; Landberg, Hans. 1968. Decemberrådslagen 1654: Karl X Gustav, rådet och rustningsfrågan. Karolinska förbundets årsbok, p. 63. 414 Svenska Riksrådets protocoll. Vol. XVI., p. 29, 31. 415 Stade, Arne. 1973. Geneza decyzji Karola X o wojnie z Polską w 1655 r. Studia i Materiaáy do Historii WojskowoĞci. Vol. XIX, cz. 2. Warszawa, p. 41, note 98. 86 2.7 Conclusions The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was in a state of disintegration. The non-Catholic political elite of Lithuania, Royal Prussia, Ducal Prussia, the Ukrainian Hetmanate, Courland, and Livonia had constant separatist aspirations, which had caused many early modern civil wars and domestic conflicts. The 17th century GDL was neither politically nor culturally and religiously integrated with Poland. The bonds which connected Lithuania and Poland were weak, and even after the Lublin Union the Grand Duchy had kept its own, separate legal system, as well as other institutions such as its own army, treasury, tax collection, courts of appeal, coinage, customhouse and frontier guards. Different views on the union of Lublin held in Poland and in Lithuania had caused many political conflicts between the two, and had affected international relations. Internationally, Poland presented Lithuania as an ordinary province of the Polish state, with no interests separate from those of Poland. Lithuania, by contrast, stressed its equal status in its federation with Poland. The elite of Lithuania had very strong and separate political identities, which were opposed to those of the Polish elite. After the Union with Poland, Lithuania remained a Protestant country with regards to its ruling elite. In the final century of Lithuanian independence, the family of Radziwiáás dominated in the country politically and economically. Protestantism became the ideological basis of the Radziwiáá political faction. However, during the reigns of the Vasa kings, the political position of the Radziwiáás fluctuated strongly. Taking advantage of their privileges, especially their right to nominate senators, the Polish kings had built up their court party of Catholic royalists in Lithuania. As a result of royal policy, representatives of Catholic noble families had taken over many offices formerly held by Protestants. During the Catholic counter-reformation, the Protestants suffered much persecution. The case of the closing the Vilnius Reformed Cathedral marked the political defeat of the Radziwiáás and the victory of the royal Catholic faction. The attempts of the Polish elite to dominate Lithuania were opposed by Lithuanian Protestants. The Protestants realized that Poland’s ultimate aim was an amalgamation of Lithuania with Poland, which would entail the annihilation of its equal and independent status. From the very beginning, the Lithuanian Reformation had an elite nature; it developed as the movement of nobles. The Protestant structure united three Evangelical denominations: Calvinist, Lutheran and Anti-Trinitarian. The leaders of the Protestant faction were the richest and most powerful magnates Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. The Radziwiáá property formed a state within a state, with a territory that equalled that of Belgium. The Radziwiáás’ great possessions were the basis for their economic as well as their political influence. The overwhelmingly greatest part of their landed estate was distributed among their 87 Protestant clients. The city of Kơdainiai became a cultural, economic and political centre of the Lithuanian Protestants. Annually, the synod of the Lithuanian Union met in closed sessions, in which the Protestant faction discussed its affairs. Because of this, the Protestant nobility was the most well-organized and well-informed confessional group within the Lithuanian elite, and had good international contacts. At the same time, the political life of the Catholic and Orthodox nobility was restricted to local districts. They could therefore not create a common political platform. This factor became significant in the mid-17th century crisis. Swedish Riga played an important role in the economy of Lithuania and Belarus. This Eastern Baltic trade centre was the main port for vitally important imports to the GDL. The motives behind Swedish expansion had been partially economic: Sweden’s goal was to acquire control over all Baltic trade. A fairly influential group of Lithuanian nobles and merchants was interested in increasing commerce with Sweden and the Baltic. Sweden was interested in expanding its of along the Daugava and Nemunas/Nioman trade routes. It is no accident that the men who guided Swedish policy in Lithuania and Belarus at that time came from merchant families of Riga. Many members of these families served as officers in the Swedish army, and took an active part in establishing the Swedish-Lithuanian Union. The First Northern War in Livonia caused political, economic and military chaos in the GDL, and gave rise to an acute crisis in Lithuanian relations with Poland. The Lithuanian nobility openly opposed the war, and signed several separate treaties with Sweden, without the Polish knowledge. The 1654 Russian agression against Lithuania resulted in the separation of Riga from its natural hinterland. On this point, Sweden’s interests in Lithuania was represented by Riga. The royal policy of Catholic confessionalization destabilized the situation in the GDL. A considerable part of the Lithuanian nobility – that is, the Protestants and Orthodox – felt discriminated. Accordingly, they were not loyal to the Polish king. Their seeking a solution to their own problems by finding a new non-Catholic suzerain seemed quite natural under those conditions. The 17th century Lithuanian nobility was not a well-integrated group. It was separated by political, religious and ethnic barriers. As a result, during the mid-17th century crisis, different groups within the Lithuanian political nation repeatedly attempted to abrogate the union with Poland and replace it by a union with some other state. It might be Sweden, Muscovy or Ukrainian Hetmanate, depending on the interests of the group. In response to the Catholic reaction, the Lithuanian Protestant nobility began looking for an influential foreign defender. They considered the Swedish king the best candidates for the Polish-Lithuanian throne. For a long time, the Radziwiáá faction deliberated on how to solve the problem of Poland’s domination of Lithuania. The Lithuanian opposition established strong contacts with Swedish leaders and the intellectual elite of Protestant 88 Europe. Janusz Radziwiáá maintained secret contacts with Swedish administration of Livonia. At the same time, prior to the crisis of 1655, Swedish political leaders had considerable information about the situation in the neighbouring Lithuania, especially about the strong separatist tendencies of the Protestant faction, led by the Radziwiáás, and its wish to break with Poland and unite with Sweden. The long-term political contacts between the Lithuanian opposition and Sweden influenced the construction of the 1655 Swedish–Lithuanian union in many respects. 89 3 Forward Looking Security: Sweden’s Approach 3.1 The Declaration of Kơdainiai, August 17, 1655 As of 1653, Russia was actively preparing for the war against the Commonwealth. Firearms were purchased from Holland, from German principalities and from Sweden. Political propaganda was spread. On May 15 1654, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov declared war. In the first campaign of Russia and its ally Ukraine was to capture Belarus, including the towns of Smolensk, Mstsislau, Mahileu, Orsha, Homel, Rechytsa, Polatsk and Vitsebsk. Russia would gain control over a considerable part of the Rivers Dzvina and the Dniapro basins, the waterways to the Baltic and the Black seas. From a military and commercial point of view, this meant that Russia could gain a direct and convenient waterway to Sweden and the Ottoman Empire. Under this plan, two Muscovite armies and a brigade of Ukrainian Cossacks were to enter the GDL. The main army, made up of 41,000 soldiers and led by the tsar, marched from Vyazma towards Smolensk, Mstsislau and Mahileu. The 13,000 soldier-strong northern army, led by Vasilii Sheremetev, advanced from Velikie Luki to Sebezh, Polatsk and Vitsebsk. Commanded by Field Hetman Ivan Zolotarenko, 20,000 Ukrainian Cossacks moved from Novhorod-Siverskyj towards Starodub, Homel and Rechytsa.416 Thus, the invading army consisted of more than 64,000 soldiers, whereas the Lithuanian army, led by Janusz Radziwiáá, had only 12,000 soldiers.417 The 1654 campaign ended in Lithuania’s defeat. Radziwiáá defeated the Muscovite troops at Shklou (August 12, 1654). However, 11 days later the Lithuanian army under his command suffered a crucial defeat at Shepialevichy (August 24 1654), losing 2,000 soldiers and all its cannons. It retreated from Belarus to Minsk. On August 28 1654, the population of the second largest GDL city, Mahileu, voluntarily opened the city gates and the tsar entered the capital of Belarusian eparchy. The townspeople gave a ceremonial welcome to the tsar. On June 29 1654, Polatsk, the third largest city of 416 Krol, Piotr. 1999. Belaruskaya kampaniia 1654 h. Belarusian Historical Review. Vol. 6:12, p. 7-32. 417 Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p. 11; For the maps on Russian military activity in the GDL see: Entsyklapedyia Vialikaha kniastva Litouskaha. Vol. 1. Minsk, 2005, p. 374. 91 Lithuania, surrendered. On September 23 1654, after a long siege, Smolensk surrendered. Already during the siege, Samuel Drucki SokoliĔski, the podkomorzy of Smolensk and the Ruthenian duke of Drutsk, secretly got in contact with the tsar. He spread propaganda among the soldiers and local population that advocated a surrender to Russia. After this, SokoliĔski, at the head of Smolensk nobility, swore an eternal oath of loyalty to the tsar. On November 17 1654, Muscovite-Ukrainian detachments assaulted Vitsebsk. After that, 200 local noblemen and 1,000 merchants and priests swore everlasting fealty to the tsar. At the end of 1654, only two towns of Belarus remained unconquered: Stary Bykhau on the river Dniapro, and Velizh on the Dzvina River. Radziwiáá’s political formula, “with Sweden against Muscovy”, failed to find Warsaw’s support.418 After that, he decided to use the Duke of Courland to secretly contact Swedish politicians, probing the possibility of a separate agreement between Lithuania and Sweden. The Ukrainian colonel, Anton Zhdanovich, who during 1654 was a captive in Radziwiáá’s headquarters, reported later to the tsar that “Radziwiáá with the whole of Lithuania wants to sell himself to the Swedish king.”419 However, at the beginning of 1655, Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá stated their intention to liberate Belarus themselves. They therefore suspended separate contacts with Sweden. In January 1655, the Lithuanian army launched a counter-offensive from Stary Bykhau. At the beginning of February, Mahileu was besieged. Radziwiáá sent a letter in which he suggested that the Cossacks come over to his side. Separate detachments were sent to liberate Vitsebsk and Dzisna. In the beginning, the Mahileu siege was a success. On the night between February 4 and 5, a regiment of Belarusian Cossacks led by Konstanty PokáoĔski switched to the Lithuanian side. The GDL troops captured the suburbs. However, the city dwellers remained loyal to the tsar and, continuing to support the Russian garrison, they refused to surrender. Realizing that he was unable to defend the GDL on his own, Radziwiáá sent Krzysztof Dowgiaááa StryĪka a letter on March 20 1655. Radziwiáá thanked StryĪka for maintaining confidential contacts with Sweden and requested him to be prudent in maintaining these contacts. Radziwiáá hoped that Sweden would approve of his idea of crowning Karl X Gustav king of Poland-Lithuania. He was quite confident that the election of the Swedish king to the Polish throne could not fail, since most Lithuanians backed him. He expected Karl X Gustav to restore the liberties of the Calvinists, Lutherans, Orthodox and Arians, and, in case of success, raise the political influence of the Protestants and push the Jesuits into the background. In Radzi418 Zaborovskii, Rossia, Rech Pospolitaya i Shvetsya, p. 98; Kentrschynskyj Karl X Gustav inför krisen i Öster, p. 48-49. 419 Wasilewski, Zdrada Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 133. 92 wiáá’s opinion, it was essential that Sweden give a helping hand to the Lithuanian Protestants: “so that Our Lord would forgive them for their consent to place the Czechs and Silesians under antichrist [Papal] control.” Radziwiáá further asked the Swedish king for 3,000 soldiers, to be placed under his own command. He hoped that “the king and his court favour us.” He also believed that the Duke of Courland would ensure the neutral status of Livonia. Finally, he wanted StryĪka to deliver all these propositions in absolute secrecy, since there might be Polish spies even in the court of Courland.420 On April 7 1655, Janusz Radziwiáá sent a letter to the nobility of Slonim. In this document he emphasized that the GDL withstood the enemy alone, without help from Poland. Thus, Poland had violated the provisions of the Union of Lublin. The Union had been costly to the Lithuanians: “in exchange for the union Poland took away Ukraine from us, and we will ever bear that in mind.”421 Here, for the first time, Radziwiáá openly declared that the union between Lithuania and Poland had become meaningless. On June 6 1655, the ambassador of Prussia Johann von Hoverbeck, who was present at the Diet, informed the Great Elector Friedrich Wilhelm: “Lithuania is so scared of Muscovy, that it agrees to accept the Swedes. The bishop of Vilnius is also inclined towards negotiations with them and is in correspondence with Duke of Courland and ready to admit him [Karl X Gustav] as future king.”422 At the beginning of May 1655, the Lithuanian army called off the abortive siege of Mahileu and withdrew to the west, to the Biarezina River. On May 24 1655, Russia and Ukraine started a second military campaign. This offensive aimed at capturing central and western districts and Vilnius, the capital. Their final goal was the abolition of the GDL as a sovereign power. The main army, led by the tsar, marched from Smolensk towards Minsk and Vilnius. It was backed by the Ukrainian brigade, with Zolotarenko at its head. The southern army, which was under the command of Aleksei Trubetskoi, marched from Bryansk towards Stary Bykhau-Slutsk-NavahradakHrodna-Brest. The northern army, led by Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin, advanced from Pskov to Polish-Lithuanian Livonia and to Braslau and Velizh. The fourth force, with Dmitrii Volkonskii at its head, advanced towards Pinsk from Kyiv. The alliance totalled about 100,000 soldiers. The Lithuania army had fewer than 10,000 soldiers and could not rely upon Polish reinforcements. On July 3 1655, Minsk fell. At the end of July 1655, the Muscovite-Ukrainian army approached the vicinity of Vilnius.423 In July 1655 King 420 Janusz Radziwiáá to Krzysztof Dowgiaááa StryĪka. March 20, 1655. Polish. Mahileu. Kotáubaj, ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 133-134. 421 Frost, After the Deluge, p. 43-44. 422 Kubaáa, Wojna szwecka, p. 52. 423 Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p. 26-40. 93 Jan Kazimierz withdrew the Polish detachments sent to help the Lithuanian army.424 The Lithuanians found themselves in a desperate situation, which required some extraordinary solution. Russian success against the Commonwealth put Sweden on the alert. Early in 1654, the Swedish ambassador in Moscow, Johan de Rodes, informed Karl X Gustav that on the eve of the war against Lithuania, the tsar had comported himself as if he were a new Alexander the Great, and was likely to cast an eye over the Baltic.425 In 1654, Stockholm sold Russia 4,000 muskets instead 20,000 as it had promised.426 In early September 1654, Russia invaded Lithuanian-Polish Livonia.427 After that Karl X Gustav received alarming news from the General Governor of Livonia, Gustaf Horn. Horn informed him that after the recent defeat of Radziwiáá at Shapialevichy, the war had burst out on Sweden’s borders. The nobles of Lithuanian Livonia crossed the border and asked Swedish authorities to protect them from the Russian invasion. Sweden decided to fortify its defence in its part of Livonia. A number of detachments from Finland relocated to Livonia.428 At the end of 1654, Sweden sent spies to Lithuania to gather information. The Lord Chief Justice Per Brahe ordered Gustaf Horn to monitor the situation in the GDL and Lithuanian Livonia, and to maintain good relations with their inhabitants and encourage the nobility to accept Swedish protection. Horn had to avoid all confrontation with Russia, but also prevent the Russians from capturing Dünaburg/Daugavpils at any price.429 In April 1655, the tsar’s army approached Dünaburg and lay siege to the territory that was protected by Sweden. After unsuccessful siege, Russia withdrew its troops to Ludsen/Ludza. However, the threat of Russian invasion of the rest of Livonia still remained.430 Sweden’s interest in Lithuania and its part of Livonia was given by its geopolitical plans for the Baltic. The establishment of a Swedish protectorate over Lithuania would strongly consolidate Swedish position in Prussia and Courland. That would also reduce Russia’s potential influence in Prussia and Courland, by depriving Muscovy of a common border with those territories and depriving it of an outlet to the Baltic coast. Samogitia played a particular role in Swedish plans.431 It was an important thoroughfare that could connect Swedish Livonia with Ducal Prussia. For this reason, the main 424 Tyla, Keidanskaya uniya, p. 71. Stade, Geneza decyzji Karola X Gustawa, p. 47. Åsard, Bengt. 1977. Upptakten till Karl X Gustafs anfall mot Polen 1655. Karolinska förbundets årsbok, p.21. 427 Tersmeden, Lars. 1980. Carl X Gustafs strategi i kriget mot Polen 1655. Militärhistorisk Tidskrift. No 2, p. 6. 428 Edén, Grunderna till Karl X Gustafs anfall på Polen, p. 23-24; Åsard, Upptakten till Karl X Gustafs anfall mot Polen, p. 25. 429 Stade, Geneza decyzji Karola X Gustawa, p. 51. 430 Tersmeden, Carl X Gustafs strategi i kriget mot Polen, p. 11. 431 Ibid., p. 8. 425 426 94 army, led by Karl X Gustav, had from the beginning planned to invade the Commonwealth from Livonia by marching into Lithuania. However, that plan was abandoned and on July 24 1655, the main forces attacked western Poland from Stettin. The main reason for this change was the fear of direct contacts of the Swedish troops and the king with the Russian troops in Lithuania led by the tsar.432 On May 31 1655, Karl X Gustav had ordered Gustaf Horn to start the invasion of Lithuania. Horn was directed to seize Biržai and Kaunas and to shield Courland and Livonia from Russia.433 However, owing to the Russian war build up, the king rescinded the order a few days later. After a delay, ordered by the king, the Livonian army led by Gustav Adolf Lewenhaupt marched from Swedish Kockenhusen/Koknese to cross the Commonwealth border on June 29 1655. On July 10 1655, the Swedish army took Dünaburg/Daugavpils. This offensive was the beginning of five years of the Second Northern War between Sweden and Poland-Lithuania. Colonel Samuel Komorowski, under Radziwill’s command, was in charge protecting Dünaburg. However, he surrounded the castle and then withdrew to Lithuania.434 Because of the threat of armed conflict with Russia, the Swedes stopped their advance. They left Vice-Colonel Willichman with a garrison and retreated to Swedish Livonia.435 The local barons voluntarily accepted Sweden’s protection.436 Senator Mikoáaj Korff, later a co-signer of the KU, applied for Swedish trusteeship over all his estates. However, the Swedes rejected this proposal, for Sweden did not want a conflict with Russia, which regarded the GDL as its territory.437 On June 1 1655, the king appointed a new General Governor of Livonia Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. He had previously that position. The king ordered De la Gardie to prepare for the offensive in Lithuania. According to the plan, the Livonian army was to occupy the north of the GDL with the cities of Biržai and Kaunas. It would also taking possession of water- and land routes connecting Vilnius with Samogitia. De la Gardie was also to send a detachment from Dünaburg to Braslau on the Dzvina River in order to 432 Tersmeden, Lars. 1973. Karola X Gustawa plan kampanii polskiej 1655 roku. Powstanie planu i jego przeprowadzenie. Studia i Materiaáy do Historii WojskowoĞci. Vol. XIX. Cz. 2. Warszawa, p. 101. 433 Tersmeden, Carl X Gustafs strategi i kriget mot Polen, p. 11. 434 Geometrisk Carta Dünaburg uti Polska Litauen efter den ritning Konung i Polen den men belägrad af Ryssarne i Medio Marti 1655, undsatt af Polska Generalen Samuel Comerofski [Lithuanian Colonel Samuel Komorowski] och omsider af Svenska Fältmarskalken Gref Gustav Leijonhufvud d. 1 juli samma år kringränd och den 9 därpå följande intagen sedan Polske Generalen var slagen på flyckten. Ritat av Carl Nathanael Klercker. UUB. Lav. och akv. tuschritningar. No. 57308. 435 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, Vol. 2, p. 87. 436 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 31-32. 437 Kubaáa, Wojna szwecka, p. 86. 95 secure reliable defensive positions in Livonia and on that river route to Riga. Another detachment was to occupy the bishopric of Pilten and the Baltic coast of Samogitia. Kaunas was to become the administrative centre of Swedish occupation. De la Gardie was instructed carry out a peaceful defensive occupation of Lithuania, rather than an aggressive one. According to Karl X Gustav, “the Lithuanians are entirely inclined in Sweden’s favour, especially Janusz Radziwiáá and some of the noblemen.” Therefore, De la Gardie was to try to reach an agreement with them about the conditions of Swedish protection. Should the nobles oppose them, Lithuanian peasants were to be promised liberties from nobles, so as to win them over to the Swedish side. To be on the safe side, De la Gardie had to occupy the most important castles and collect provisions for the Swedish army.438 On July 23 1655, Magnus De la Gardie arrived in Riga. On the same day he sent his first report to the Lord Chief Justice Per Brahe, a leading figure of Sweden during the king’s campaign in Poland. De la Gardie informed Brahe about the easy conquest of Dünaburg and the extreme discontent of Russia, whose army, quartered only 5 kilometres from the city, had previously vainly tried to capture that city.439 Following royal instructions, De la Gardie immediately sent Ruthenian merchants who traded in Riga to Radziwiáá, for negotiations. For security reasons, De la Gardie sent the message by word of mouth, emphasizing that he had been empowered by the king to enter into negotiations.440 On August 1 1655, he reported to Karl X Gustav that Radziwiáá and Sapieha had willingly agreed to accept the Swedish protection. He stressed that the contact with Lithuanian senators was established through the Ruthenian merchants of Vilnius. Following the king’s instructions, De la Gardie started spreading propaganda among the Lithuanians, in order to persuade them to accept Sweden. But he warned that the admission of the Swedish army into Lithuania would inevitably provoke a negative Muscovite reaction.441 Thus Sweden was planning on a voluntary transition of the unoccupied part of Lithuania to Sweden. This would enable Sweden, when negotiating with Muscovy, to refer to the free will of Lithuanian estates. On July 28 1655, the Ruthenian merchants arrived in Vilnius and delivered De la Gardie’s proposals. On the same day, Janusz Radziwiáá and the Roman Catholic bishop of Vilnius, Jerzy Tyszkiewicz, sent an official letter 438 Karl X Gustav to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. July 2/12, 1655. Latin. Stockholm Royal Residence. RA. Vol. M. 1304; Konopczynski, Wáadysáaw and Lepszy, Kazimierz, Akta Ugody Kiedanskiej 1655 roku, p. 173-174; Tersmeden, Carl X Gustafs strategi i kriget mot Polen, p. 12-14. 439 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 231. 440 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, Vol. 2, p. 89. 441 Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie to Karl X Gustav. August 1, 1655 /July 22, 1655. Riga. Swedish. RA. Livonica II. Vol. 77. Generalguv. i Livland till K. MAJ:T 1655-56. 96 to De la Gardie requesting Swedish military assistance against Russia. The letter was signed by both the temporal and the ecclesiastical authorities: the foremost senator of Lithuania, the palatine of Vilnius Janusz Radziwiáá, and the foremost ecclesiastical senator, the bishop of Vilnius Jerzy Tyszkiewicz. The Duke of Slutsk, Boguslaw Radziwiáá, joined them as well. These men wrote that ”their Fatherland” was in a critical situation, and that the enemy threatened its capital. The office-holders of Lithuania asked Sweden to render assistance to the Commonwealth, and to help the Lithuanians defend Vilnius. Such a measure would create good conditions for peaceful negotiations between Poland-Lithuania and Sweden.442 The signatories spoke, on behalf of the Commonwealth, about the fate of Poland-Lithuania. They asked only for military aid. The same day, a letter with similar information was sent by Janusz Radziwiáá to the Polish senator Jan LeszczyĔski.443 However, on the same day but without Tyszkiewicz’s knowledge, Janusz and Boguslaw Radziwiáá wrote a different letter to De la Gardie, with it they enclosed a memorandum. Letter and memorandum were sent to Riga with Gabriel Lubienecki, who was also given the powers to sign an treaty. 444 Janusz Radziwiáá still kept in touch with the Polish king. On July 28, he wrote a letter to Jan Kazimierz. In it he informed the king that the Muscovites had forced their way across the Biarezina River and occupied Minsk, and were advancing towards Vilnius. He des-informed the king of Poland that the Swedes already were marching towards Biržai and Kaunas. Thus, in the hetman’s opinion, “if Muscovy besieges Vilnius and the Swedes encircle Kaunas, and Trakai, so the rest of the Duchy will find themselves in the hands of Muscovy and Sweden, and it will be impossible to take it back. In this situation we can ask for revenge only from the Lord.”445 As we see Radziwiáá failed to mention his appeal to the Swedish king. He further secured himself by giving the false news that the Swedish army was already invading the GDL. On August 1 1655, in response to three royal letters, Radziwiáá wrote a new letter to the Polish king. He described the situation as critical, wrote about the occupation of Dünaburg by the Swedes, but again he omitted any word on his contacts with Sweden.446 On August 3 1655, the envoy Andrzej Scipio del Campo brought Janusz Radziwiáá a letter from the king. Jan Kazimierz wrote about the capitulation 442 Janusz Radziwiáá, Jerzy Tyszkiewicz and Boguslaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. July 28, 1655. Vilnius. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E. 1531. 443 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 45. 444 Janusz Radziwiáá and Boguslaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. July 28, 1655. Vilnius. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E. 1531. 445 Janusz Radziwiáá to King and Grand Duke Jan Kazimierz. July 28, 1655. Vilnius. Polish. CL. 2105/IV/2. F. 329-330. 446 Janusz Radziwiáá to King and Grand Duke Jan Kazimierz. August 1, 1655. Nemơžis. Polish. CL. 2105/IV/2. F. 317-320. 97 of Great Poland to Sweden at UjĞcie on July 25 1655, and ordered him at all costs to conclude an armistice with the tsar and the Ukrainian Cossacks, and then to transfer the Lithuanian troops to Livonia for use in the war against Sweden. Thus, instead of reaching an agreement with Sweden, the Polish king proposed war.447 On the same day, the first Swedish appeal to the GDL population was published in Riga. In it, De la Gardie informed the population that, owing to the proven hostility of the Polish king, the Swedish army was advancing on Lithuania and would remain there for an indefinite time. The king of Sweden would ensure the safety and protection of all Lithuanian estates, localities and peasants, promised not to destroy manors, and promised to grant religious freedom. At the same time, he warned he would treat all opponents as enemies.448 Thus, Sweden’s invasion of Lithuania could begin before negotiations were started. On August 2 1655, De la Gardie’s ambassador, the Riga merchant Mikael Horst, arrived in Biržai. Here, the local starosta Krzysztof StryĪka agreed to the wish of the Radziwiáás and nobility, and accepted the domination of Karl X Gustav. Horst had De la Gardie’s appeal to the GDL population, which was supposed to be used for propaganda. On August 5 1655, Ambassador Gabriel Lubienecki brought the abovementioned letters of July 28 1655 to Riga, with a memorandum enclosed according to which the Radziwiáás agreed with Karl X Gustav’s proposal, that they accept the GDL under his authority, and offer him and his successors the title of Grand Duke.449 That was an act of treason to Poland. In De la Gardie’s opinion, the Radziwiáás’ proposals, but not the letter written together with the bishop of Vilnius, suited Swedish policy. Therefore De la Gardie rejected “the proposals of the bishop of Vilnius”, but used the memorandum as a base upon which to start negotiations with Lubienecki.450 On August 10 1655, De la Gardie and Lubienecki, acting “as ambassador plenipotentiary of Janusz and Boguslaw Radziwiáás”, signed the first Conditions under which the Radziwiáás would accept Swedish protection. De la Gardie admitted that the discussion of the conditions had been disputable. For example, the ambassador had been sceptical about the meaning of the term “Lithuania under the rule of the Swedish king”, and had offered the more diplomatic term ”protection.” The conditions did not mention the position of the Lithuanian estates, but referred to the Radziwiáás as leaders of the Lithuanian political body. The Conditions promised that an final treaty would be reached. The Radziwiáás accepted that Karl X Gustav would be 447 Tyla, Kơdainiǐ sutarties vertinimas XVII a, p. 63. SACRAE REG. MAJEST. REGNORUMQUE Senator..NOS MAGNUS GABRIEL DE LA GARDIE Vniversis ac singulis M. Ducatus Lithvaniae Ordinibus Civitabus, ac Incolis. Dab in Arce Rigensi, die 24 Julii, Anno 1655. KB. F. 1700. Fol. Kungsskrivelser. 1 pp. 449 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 47-49. 450 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder. Vol. 2, p. 89. 448 98 Grand Duke and recognized his power over the GDL. They promised to be faithful to the Swedish king and to his successors forever. The hetman agreed to place his army under the command of the Swedish generals. He did not object to the stationing of Swedish troops in Lithuania, nor to transferring the castle of Biržai and other strategically important castles to Sweden. For its part, Sweden promised to safeguard Radziwiáás’ and his followers’ lands (at least those unoccupied by the Russia and Ukraine), and guaranteed religious freedom, trade security and to keep discipline among the Swedish troops. Articles 4, 8 and 9 of the first Conditions ensured the special privileges for the Radziwiáá family, including the dignity of using the title Princes of the Holy Rome Empire and their rights to Niasvizh, a town belonging to the Catholic branch of the family.451 On August 10 (July 31) 1655, De la Gardie signed two documents, which were printed and distributed to Lubienecki and officers of the Livonian army before their march to Lithuania. Both documents revealed the secret preparations for the treaty between the GDL and Sweden. The first document was De la Gardie’s response to the request made by Bishop Tyszkiewicz and Princes Radziwiáás.452 De la Gardie wrote that he had learned from the letter of Lithuanian administration about the critical situation in which their Patria was in and understood that they needed help. Owing to the peace, the army of the Swedish king was marching into the territory of the Polish king. However, because the Lithuanians had asked the king of Sweden for help, his army would enter Lithuania not as an avenger but as a saviour. Sweden would give a helping hand only if all Lithuanian estates agreed to the postulated conditions. In case of their rejection, the Lithuanians would be regarded as foes. The second document presented the Conditions revised by Swedish side. According to these Swedish Conditions, the whole territory of the GDL was to be put under Swedish protection. It was logical that the new version omitted both the privileges and the name of the Radziwiáás and left only the provisions concerning the fate of the GDL.453 Under the preamble the Governor General of Livonia on behalf of the Swedish King accepts the Lithuanian nobility, townsmen and ordinary people under the Swedish power. The king promised them kind treatment and guarantied to defend them against enemies. However, for this to take effect, everyone was asked to sign the subse451 Konopczynski and Lepszy, Kazimierz, Akta Ugody Kiedanskiej, p. 182-183. Responsum Illustrisimi ac Excellentisimi Domini, Domini MAGNI GABRIELIS de la Gardie…ad Reverenisimum, Celsisimos et Illustrisimos Episcopum Vilnensem, Bogislaum & Janissium, Duces Razivilios &c, &c. Arce Rigensi [Riga], die 31. Julij, Anno 1655. RA. Vol. M. 1304. Print, 1pp. 453 SACRAE REG. MAJEST. REGNORUMQUE SVECIAE SENATOR AC THESAURARIUS, GENERALIS Ducatus Livoniae...NOS MAGNUS GABRIEL DE LA GARDIE ...Vniversis acsingulis M. D. Lithvaniae ordinib. Dab. Arce Rigensi, [Riga], die 31. Julij, Anno 1655. RA. Vol. M. 1304. Print, 2pp. 452 99 quent articles at the stated time. Under the first article, all signatories should recognize the Swedish king and his successors as their Grand Dukes. Under the second article, the Lithuanian army was to join the Swedish troops. Under the third article, the Lithuanian estates were to provide financing and provisions to the Swedish army while it was based in Lithuania. Under the forth article, the Biržai castle passed to the authority of the Livonian General Governor or his representative. Article 5 identified the rights of the Swedish king to all royal landed estates of Lithuania. Under article 6, the Governor General, on behalf of the king, was placed in charge of and given the task of protecting the Lithuanian people who had signed the treaty provisions. He also promised to defend their estates against Russians and Cossacks. In Article 7 the Governor General guaranteed religious freedom, which was to be ratified by the king of Sweden. Under Article 8, the army was forbidden to plunder and destroy the cities and castles under its protection, and guaranteed the safety of commerce with neighbouring countries. In Article 9 the Governor General guaranteed the rights, liberties and status of all signatories to the agreement, and he promised to include Lithuanian representatives in future negotiations between Poland-Lithuania and Sweden. Article 10 proclaimed that the above-mentioned conditions were signed by Magnus De la Gardie. Under article 11, all those who rejected the conditions were to be regarded as enemies of their fatherland, and their landed estates and property were to be confiscated. Karl X Gustav deeply appreciated the terms advanced by De la Gardie. In a letter to De la Gardie the king wrote that “I cannot even find words to estimate the dutifulness and caution with which you, my sweet brother-in-law, has signed the agreement with the Radziwiáás ” and requested the original text, for further consideration.454 While the conditions were being discussed, Russia and Ukraine assaulted Vilnius on August 8 1655. It seemed that Lithuanian magnates and nobility would be forced to accept the Swedish conditions without reservations. However, that did not happen. On August 11, Lubienecki, after having been awarded with a gold chain with the miniature of Karl X Gustav, started for Lithuania with the terms to be ratified.455 On August 14, Lubienecki arrived in Žeimiai, to meet Janusz Radziwiáá. However, on August 15, in his response to De la Gardie Radziwiáá did not mention the Swedish edition of Conditions at all. Cautiously and in general terms, he thanked De la Gardie for the warm reception given his ambassador and emphasized that he would try to win the consent of Lithuanian nation for Swedish protection. Two days would suffice for that, and he was sure of gaining the consent of the Lithuanian nobility, but it was unlikely that the bishop of Vilnius and other senators have time to come to Kơdainiai, with such short notice. Nevertheless, 454 455 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 35. Konopczynski and Lepszy, Akta Ugody Kiedanskiej, p. 182. 100 Radziwiáá wanted the Swedish army to enter Lithuania as soon as possible and to reinforce Kaunas. He encouraged the Swedes to enter Lithuania as the land of their king.456 On August 16 1655, the discussion of the Swedish terms was being conducted in the headquarters of the Lithuania army, which was encamped between Kơdainiai and Josvainiai. Army commanders and office-holders were engaged in discussions at the palace of General Mikoáaj Judycki, 12 km from Kơdainiai.457 On August 17 1655, twelve articles of the Declaration were signed. 458 This Declaration was a reply to the Swedish Conditions of August 10 1655. When one compares the Swedish Conditions with the Declaration of Kơdainiai, it becomes clear that the original Swedish terms had been essentially revised and expanded by the Lithuanians. These changes are presented in the table below. Changes that benefited the Lithuanian army and estates are in bold-face. Table 1. (adopted translation from Latin to English) 1 Conditions August 10, 1655. Declaration of Kơdainiai, August 17, 1655 Governor General of Livonia [Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie] on behalf of the Swedish King took the Lithuanian nobility, townspeople and ordinary people under his Royal power. The king promises them kind treatment and guaranties defence from all enemies. However, to put this into effect, everyone is asked to sign the following articles at the stated time. The nobility and other estates of the GDL owing to the threat of invasion and being out of military assistance and protection of the King of Poland, had to join one of the parties, namely the King of Sweden and remain in inviolable fidelity and obedience to the king of Sweden as Grand Duke of Lithuania and Our Lord, authenticating this document by our signatures and seals on our behalf and on behalf of our successors, so that his Excellency [De la Gardie] on the royal behalf shall sign it, and on behalf of the king of Sweden shall make a promise that in due time it will be ratified and approved [together with] written by His Excellency below terms and supplemented by us in accordance with our present situation. 456 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 58. Wasilewski, Zdrada Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 137. 458 Nos Proceres et Ordines Magni Ducatus Lithvaniæ infrascripti notum testatumqve facimus. Quandoqvidem in hac Status Nostri per potentiam hostilem oppressione, et ab armis ac protectione Serenissimi Poloniæ Regis infelici avulsione, fatalis qvædam et prorsus inevitabilis necessitas nos urgeat, nec alius conservandi Status nostri modus supersit, qvam ut alterutri bello Nos prementium parti adhærere et res ac fortunam Nostram committere cogamur; Sacræ autem Regiæ Majestatis Serenissimi ac Potentissimi Principis ac Domini Domini Caroli Gustavi Svecorum, Gotthorum, Vandalorumque Regis. RA. Vol. M. 1304. 19 pp. Original. Text is on F.1-7. Signatures are on F. 7-19. F. 20 is empty. 457 101 2 The GDL’s army shall be placed under trusteeship of the Swedish king and shall join the Swedish detachments All armed forces shall be placed under trusteeship of the Swedish king and shall join the Swedish detachments without detriment to the king and the Polish Kingdom. 3 The GDL’s estates shall make calculating so that the royal Swedish army, which by now is entering Lithuania, will be provided with food and money. All the estates of the GDL shall make calculating so that the royal Swedish army, which by now entering Lithuania, will be provided with food and money. However, ruined and destroyed districts, as well as the depressed state of the districts should be taken into account: first payment of debts to the Lithuanian army and its garrisons, including subsidies for money and food allowances for our army and detachments. 4 The castle of Biržai will pass under the authority of His Excellency the Royal General Governor or his representative The castle of Biržai could be pass under the authority of His Excellency the Royal General Governor or his representative, only on condition that it shall be given back as soon as the war ends. 5 All rights of the Swedish king to the royal landed estates of the previous Kings and Grand Dukes of Lithuania should be recognize. All royal privileges and rights in royal landed estates, as well as the patronage rights of the king of Sweden shall valid as it used to be for the Kings of Poland and Grand Dukes of Lithuania, with reservation, in accordance with the statutes, laws and traditions of the GDL, first of all, the full rights of the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Church of both rites [Orthodox and Uniate] their privileges and traditions, as well as the rights to landed estates of the Knights of Malta. 6 The General Governor, on behalf of the Swedish king takes under its guardianship the Lithuanians, who signed the conditions and guarantees the safety of those estates that have not been occupied by the Muscovites and Cossacks. The Guardianship and protection of the royal Governor General acting on behalf of the Swedish king, over all belongings, movables and real estate in the GDL, which has not been yet occupied by the Muscovites and Cossacks are accepted with gratitude, provided that the king shall guarantee restitution of all occupied lands, including those in the occupied territories of Livonia [LithuanianPolish], to their original owners after the liberation. 7 The General Governor guarantees the religious freedom in the GDL which will be ratified by the Swedish king. The promise of religious liberties in the GDL is also accepted with many thanks. However in accordance with the Lithuanian law, privileges, rights, immunities, customs and habits of persons and property of all religious structures in each 102 region must be respected. First of all the prerogatives of the Roman Catholic Church, their senator dignity and jurisdictions of the Orders, respect and honour must be inviolably preserved and invariably kept. 8 It has been promised to prohibit the Swedish army to plunder and destroy cities and castles under their protection, as well as safety of commerce and relations with neighbouring countries have been guaranteed. We, Lithuanians also accept the promise of security and safety of internal and external trade routes and demand that the Swedish soldiers observe military discipline. 9 The Governor General promises the rights, liberties and status to all signatories of the document and promises to accept Lithuanian representatives in future negotiations between Poland and Sweden Admitting that fate has willed, that by Divine Intent it happened that the GDL passes under the authority of the king of Sweden, the Lithuanians demand guarantees that the GDL shall not be incorporated into the Kingdom of Sweden, but instead will be combined on the same terms as it has hitherto been united with the Kingdom of Poland, Nation with Nation, Senate with Senate, Nobility with Nobility will have equality in everything. Both nations shall preserve their own rights, statutes and traditions. The Lithuanians demand that the place of the Diets for both nations of the common federation will be [geographically] acceptable for both sides. And first of all, the Swedish king let promise to return the GDL and its people everything that has been lost and taken away during the war, and the Lithuanian nation promises to do its best to assist in this. 10 The conditions are validated by signature and seal of Magnus De la Gardie The Lithuanian nation approves of the present conditions and signs with their own hand, provided that possibility to sign them at any time are given to those who are not present here, and that they will be not treated as enemies within that time. 11 All those who reject the above-mentioned conditions will be regarded as Patria’s enemies and their landed estates and property will be confiscated The estates accept the inclusion in the treasury of the Swedish king the property of those who broke away or refused to sign the terms established by mutual consent by both parties. They demand compensation for the landed estates of owners who were deprived of property by Muscovy at the expense of confiscated property of enemies or the royal landed estates. However, those who oppose should not be treated as enemies, otherwise many of 103 them will switch from the Muscovite side. Also, they want His Excellency, on behalf of the Swedish king, to inform the Grand Duke of Muscovy and all his troops that the GDL has passed under the guardianship of the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden and demand that Muscovites stop all hostile activities against the GDL, refrain from besieging and if they have already besieged cities or castles, to raise the siege. Muscovy should withdraw its troops from all the districts on this side of the river Dniapro and restrain the Cossack raids. If the Muscovites keep on ruining the GDL or keep cities or fortified castles under siege, the Swedish troops together with the Lithuanian army shall set out against Muscovy and defend the towns that have accepted the protection of Sweden. If the king of Sweden will peace and negotiations between two Kings and Kingdoms [Sweden or Poland] take place, the GDL shall be admitted to those negotiations together with Poland. After a future peace with Poland, those who have sworn loyalty to the King of Sweden shall have the choice of selecting side [Sweden or Poland] and the right to sell their landed estates and property. If during negotiations Sweden concedes anything to Poland, the similar should be conceded to the GDL. However if it happens that the Kingdom of Poland ends this war by signing the treaty on the worse terms than the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, we do not agree to recognize them freely, only if a common Diet by the mutual consent of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden and the Estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania decided to do it. The requirements of the Lithuanian estates and army, in their revised treaty with Sweden, differs from the Swedish Conditions in the following ways: 1. Russian aggression and the absence of Polish military help forced the GDL to seek an alliance with Sweden, which was formerly regarded a hostile country. 2. The GDL’s army will not wage war against Poland 3. Swedish troops in Lithuania will be provisioned only after the payment of the Lithuanian army. 104 4. The castle of Biržai will be returned to Lithuania after the war. 5. The king of Sweden will guarantee all the liberties of the nonProtestant Christian dominations: the Catholic Church of both faiths, the Orthodox Church and the rights of the Knights of Malta. 6. Sweden will liberate the districts of Lithuania and Polish-Lithuanian Livonia that are occupied by Russia and by the Cossacks. 7. Four Roman-Catholic bishops will retain senator dignity. 8. Instead of Lithuanian subjugation to Sweden, the countries will conclude a state union, as a federation of equal partners. 9. The Swedish administration will inform Russia of Lithuania’s transition to the authority of Karl X Gustav. 10. Sweden was to deliver an ultimatum to Russia and Ukraine, demanding that they promptly evacuate its troops to the east of the Dniapro River. 11. In case of a Russian and Ukrainian refusal to do this, the combined Swedish-Lithuanian army will wage war against them. 12. Lithuania will be admitted as equal partner in any future negotiations between Sweden and Poland. 13. Lithuanians, who do not support the union with Sweden, will be given time to make their final decision and will have the right to leave the Swedish Lithuania after the conclusion of peace between Sweden and Poland. In order to understand the support given, and socio-economic background, to the proposed Declaration, let us analyze the list of the cosignatories. A total of about 550 nobles from different districts signed the document. Lithuanian army commanders and officers were the first to affix their signatures. The Declaration opened with the signature and the great seal of the Grand Hetman Janusz Radziwiáá. After him followed Wincenty Gosiewski, the field hetman of the Lithuanian army and a general of the second division. After them came Senator Eustachy Kierdej Radziwonowicz, a castellan of Samogitia. Then came the suffragan bishop of Vilnius and the chancellor of the Lithuanian treasury, Jerzy Biaááozor, as a representative of the Catholic Church, who affixed only his private seal. Then came more officers of the Lithuanian army: Standard-Bearer of Lithuania and the starosta of Homel and Prapojsk, Colonel Zygmunt Sluszka; a head of the military transport of Lithuania and the starosta of Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz, Colonel Samuel Komorowski; the Starosta of Ashmiany, Adam Sakowicz; the Starosta of Mazyr, Wáadysáaw Chalecki; the Standard-Bearer of Trakai, Marcjan OgiĔski; the General of the artillery, Mikoáaj Judycki; the Standard-Bearer of Smolensk, Jan Chrapowicki; the Starosta of Gulbinơ, Captain Hrehory Podbereski; Colonel Ernst Jan Korff; Captain Kazimierz Tyszkiewicz; ViceColonel, and head of the German regiment, Johann Ottenhausen; the Deputy Cupbearer of Ashmiany, Stefan Billikowicz; the Captain of Lithuanian Cos105 sack regiment, Aleksandr MierzeĔski; the Esquire Carver of Trakai, Jan Bychowiec; Vice-Colonel Maciej Gosiewski; Captain Samuel Wysocki; Earl Michaá Pac, who signed as a son of the Palatine of Trakai; Captain Abraham Josaphat Krayski; Colonel Konstanty PokáoĔski, and Captain Piotr Lacki. After them came six Livonian officers in Lithuanian service. Among these, Tobias Poppell and Johan von Brodsassen signed the Declaration. After the officers came the signatories of the district officials of Upytơ, Ukmergơ and Samogitia. Ten administrators of Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz, the political area dominated by the Radziwiáás’, appended their signatures. Jan MierzeĔski, a close companion of Radziwiáá and Marshal of that district, was the first to append his signature and seal. Then followed the Standard-Bearer and Colonel Eliasz Komorowski; the Land Judge Stanisáaw Biaááozor; the Esquire Carver Saáomon Dawidowicz; Earl Hieronim Pac a son of the palatine of Trakai; the Vice - Esquire Carver Kazimierz Dowmont Siesicki; and Scribe of Wiákomierz Andrzej KaczyĔski. The group of administrators of Upytơ was led by the Standard-Bearer Stanislaw DĊbski; the Castle Judge of Vilnius, who was, however, a citizen of Upytơ, Andrzej Kurbski; Land Judge Paweá Marcinkiewicz; Vice-Judge Wáadysáaw Mleczko; Wáadysáaw SiciĔski; the Castle Scribe of Upytơ Jan Jarosáawki Kurbski; the Captain of Eišiškes Jan de Parius Kolniki Kolecki; and the Treasurer of Upytơ Michaá WoámiĔski. The Samogitian nobility signed the Declaration under the rubric “On behalf of the Duchy of Samogitia with reservation of the special rights and privileges of our Duchy.” This reservation was meant to emphasize the special status of Samogitia and the independent position of their nobility vis-àvis the Radziwiáás. The Standard-Bearer of Samogitia and bailiff of D. Dirvonơnai, Jan GruĪewski, headed the list. After him came the bailiff of Josvainiai Wáadysáaw Wojna, the bailiff of Pajnjrys Hieronim Kryspin Kirszensztein, and a son of the Samogitian castellan Wáadysáaw Eustachy Kierdej Radziwonowicz. Refugees, office-holders and nobility from different districts made up a separate list. A group from Ashmiany consisted of about twenty persons. The other nobles came from most of the remaining districts: Vilnius, Mazyr, Smolensk, Starodub, Braslau, Rechytsa, Mstsislau, Vitsebsk, Orsha, Navahradak, Hrodna, Polatsk, Lida and Minsk. Among the high dignitaries were Kazimierz Marcin Masson, Official General of the Carmelite Order in Lithuania; the Standard-Bearer of Kaunas, Mikoáaj Skorulski; the Scribe of the Lithuanian treasury and Vice-Castellan of Starodub, Samuel Kocioá; the Vice-Castellan of Vilnius, Jerzy Despot Zienowicz; the Land Judge of Mazyr Piotr, Jan Podbipiata; the Esquire Carver of Navahradak, Olbrycht DĊbowski, and others. The interests of the noblewomen were also represented. For example, the Standard-Bearer of Polatsk, Kazimierz Korsak, signed on behalf of a rich Samogitian landowner, “milady Aleksandra Klonowska-RadzimiĔska, widow of the palatine of Brest.” Korsak, the rep106 resentative of the ancient family of rich merchants of Polatsk, unexpectedly added on the last page, that he moved under Swedish protection, and signed the Declaration “by my own hand, because his property and landed estates are in Polatsk in the Muscovite’s hands, and at the time being here a refugee.” The majority of influential participants (official, military, and local administrators) were Protestants and clients of Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáás. Among these were Zygmunt Sluszka, Samuel Komorowski and his brother Eliasz Komorowski Adam Sakowicz, Wáadysáaw Chalecki, Jan Chrapowicki, Ernst Jan Korff, Johann Ottenhausen, Jan MierzeĔski and his brother Aleksandr MierzeĔski, Samuel Wysocki, Salomon Dawidowicz, Kazimierz Dowmont Siesicki, Stanislaw DĊbski, Paweá Marcinkiewicz, Wáadysáaw SiciĔski, Michaá WoámiĔski and Olbrycht DĊbowski. Orthodox nobles closely connected to the Radziwiáás also signed the Declaration. Among these were Marcjan OgiĔski, Jan Bychowiec, Konstanty PokáoĔski and Andrzej Kurbski. They determined the contents of Article 5, which guaranteed the rights of Orthodox Church and made Karl X Gustav the protector of the Belarusian eparchy. The presence of the Belarusian Colonel Konstanty PokáoĔski excited a strong protest from the Samogitian nobility. This was because the Cossacks of PokáoĔski, on their way to Kơdainiai, had robbed the Catholic church in Zapyškis. Only the authority of Radziwiáá forced the nobility of Samogitia to accept the presence of this Cossack leader. 459 On the day after the agreement, Radziwiáá sent De la Gardie the original of the Declaration through his ambassador Lubienecki. He included a list of Sweden’s most reliable Lithuanian allies: ”comrades and friends who can be relied upon and who can be recommended to the King owing for their great services and warm feelings towards the latter, the best of whom is Jan MierzeĔski.”460 Radziwiáá’s list included 22 persons: Jerzy Tyszkiewicz, Roman Catholic bishop of Vilnius Jerzy Hlebowicz, Starosta of Samogitia Krzysztof Potocki, Esquire Carver of Lithuania Hrehory Mirski, Chief Guardian of Lithuania Zygmunt Sluszka, Standard-Bearer of Lithuania Samuel Komorowski, Head of military transport of Lithuania Adam Sakowicz, Starosta of Ashmiany Jan de Mierzen MierzeĔski, Marshal of Wiákomierz 459 Wisner, Janusz Radziwiáá, p. 210. Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. August 18, 1655. Kơdainiai. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E. 1531. 460 107 Jerzy Niemirycz, Podkomorzy of Kyiv Wáadysáaw Chalecki, Starosta of Mazyr Jan Chrapowicki, Standard-Bearer of Smolensk Gabriel Hulewicz, Standard-Bearer of Chernihiv Andrzej Kurbski, Castle Judge of Vilnius Saáomon Dawidowicz, Esquire Carver of Wiákomierz Jan Bychowiec, Esquire Carver of Trakai Olbrycht DĊbowski, Esquire Carver of Navahradak Ernst Jan Korff, Colonel Johann Ottenhausen, Vice-Colonel Aleksandr de Mierzen MierzeĔski, Captain of Lithuanian Cossack regiment Samuel Juszkiewicz, Captain of the Hungarian cavalry Samuel Wysocki, Captain of the infantry regiment Krzysztof StryĪka, Deputy Cupbearer of Upytơ With the exception of the bishop of Vilnius and the starosta of Samogitia, most of the persons on this list were Protestants and prominent in the Lithuanian opposition. Thirteen administrators from this list signed the Declaration. The non-Protestant nobles on the list were related to the Radziwiáás. Some of people listed failed to sign the agreement because they were not present in the military camp near Kơdainiai. However, there were many high officials who were afraid to sign the agreement due to the political risk involved or refused to do it by political reason. Among them was a large group of Samogitians including the Catholic bishop of Samogitia, Piotr Parczewski, Senator Jerzy Hlebowicz, the Starosta of Josvainiai Aleksander Judycki, and the Notary of Lithuania Jan Stankiewicz. 461 All of them were Catholics. One of the main initiators of negotiations with Sweden, Bishop Jerzy Tyszkiewicz, had received a letter from the Polish king on August 4 1655. He accordingly declined to support the alliance with Sweden. Following the instructions of the Polish king, he instead appealed to the field hetman of Ukraine Ivan Zolatarenko, proposing an armistice. The ambassadors of the Habsburg Empire agreed to serve as intermediaries. Tyszkiewicz asked Zolatarenko to stop military operations. On August 5, Tyszkiewicz sent similar proposals to the Russian voivode, Jakov Cherkasskii.462 After Vilnius had been occupied, Tyszkiewicz left for Prussia. He refused to come to Kơdainiai, instead appointing Jerzy Biaááozor and Jerzy Woááowicz as his plenipotentiaries.463 After signing the Declaration, Radziwiáá sent a copy to Tysz461 Wisner, Rok 1655 w Litwie: pertraktacje ze Szwecją, p. 94. Ibid., p. 89. 463 Tyla, Keidanskaya uniya 1655, p. 74. 462 108 kiewicz, which included the “Response” of De la Gardie. Radziwiáá asked the bishop to sign the Declaration, and to arrive to Lithuania for further negotiations. Special emphasis was laid on the fact that the Declaration guaranteed all liberties of the Catholic Church.464 However, the bishop refused. From Prussia he replied that he regarded the agreement as premature and that he was unwilling to abrogate the union with Poland on the basis of Swedish promises: ”by this surrender we are dissolving the Holy Union with Poland, whose inviolability was sworn by our ancestors; those of us who sign will be branded for eternity with the mark of destruction for betraying our loyalty to our King and our Fatherland.”465 Evidently, Tyszkiewicz considered Poland-Lithuania to be his homeland. Radziwiáá felt that his homeland was first Lithuania. Radziwiáá regarded the union with Poland as an instrumental alliance undertaken by independent Lithuania. Tyszkiewicz, by contrast, felt that “a Holy Union” linked the two states forever. For Tyszkiewicz, the union with Sweden would represent capitulation and high treason. For Radziwiáá, it just established a new Union in order to create a new federation on the model of the one which it replaced. Finally, as we will see below, Radziwiáá regarded as the true “betrayers of Patria,” those Lithuanians who were against the alliance with Sweden. These diametrically opposite views reflect the contradictions, which were characteristic among the Lithuanian leaders in their varying estimation of the Declaration. Why did Radziwiáá include Tyszkiewicz and Hlebowicz in his list of the supporters of the idea of Lithuanian-Swedish federation? First, he was trying to show the Swedish politicians that Catholic senators also supported the Swedish side. Second, Radziwiáá reckoned that the course of events and his personal influence would eventually compel the Catholic senators to join the Union. In the meantime, the fact that not all of the senators accepted the Union would make Sweden understand that the alliance had influential opponents. This would make the Swedish politicians support the Radziwiáá faction and more readily accede to their requirements. Some of the Catholic officials of Lithuania, who owed their careers to the Polish king, also signed the Declaration. Most of them belonged to the court faction established by Jan Kazimierz. Wincenty Gosiewski, the main deputy of the king in Lithuania, was among the first to sign the document. Then came General Mikoáaj Judycki, who emphasized in his signature that he was “a knight of Malta.” Obviously, he had managed to introduce a supplement concerning the privileges of the Malta Knights. Other opponents of the Radziwiáás included the officers Hrehory Podbereski, Kazimierz Tyszkiewicz, Maciej Gosiewski, Michaá and Hieronim Pac, Samuel Kocioá, Piotr 464 465 Kubaáa, Wojna szwecka, p. 395 note 47; Wisner, Rok 1655 w Litwie, p. 93. Frost, After the Deluge, p. 50. 109 Lacki, Hieronim Kryspin Kirszensztein and Stanisáaw Orda also signed the Declaration. This influential group of royalists, headed by Gosiewski, probably was able to formulate pro-Polish clauses in the Declaration that were disadvantageous to the Swedes. These clauses were primarily concerned with the denial of the Lithuanian army to wage war against Poland, and the demand that the Swedes guarantee the senator status of the Catholic bishops. Thus, an analysis of the list of the signatories shows that the Declaration took the form of a compromise between the opposition led by the Radziwiáás and the party of royalists headed by Gosiewski. As for the Radziwiáás, they also hoped to advance their own interests through the treaty with Sweden. For the Radziwiáás, the treaty meant the end of the Polish domination in Lithuania. At the same time, the Lithuanian party of royalists would lose its political influence. Hopefully, political power over the country would revert to the Radziwiáás. This was emphasized in Janusz’s letter to Boguslaw Radziwiáá of August 26, 1655: “At last, your excellence the Prince, the power was established which will save the GDL and our family and which I directed so that no one in Lithuania will dare make a sound of protest against us any more.”466 One cannot agree with Povilas Gronskis who regarded the Declaration as an agreement which promoted only the interests of Radziwiáá, not those of the entire country.”467 In fact, a close analysis of the document shows that Radziwiáá personally was not given any special status in the Declaration. His name is mentioned only once, in article 4, which provides the terms of the cession of Biržai to Sweden. It was impossible leave out the name of Radziwiáá in this case, since Biržai was his private property, and only he could give his consent to such a transfer. Therefore, the article that Gronskis maintained showed the role of Radziwiáá was actually formulated solely in accordance with judicial practice. The essential role in preparing, and the final realization of the Declaration, belonged to the entire political and religious opposition, not to Radziwiáá alone. However, Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá were indeed the leaders of that opposition. The Protestants were the most radical supporters of the proposed union. However, the Catholics regarded the union as a temporary military necessity, needed in the war against Muscovy. The Protestants hoped for the complete rupture of the union, and affiliation with the Swedish Crown. The majority of ordinary signatories were Catholics, who were the largest confessional group within the Lithuanian nobility. However, the Protestants had confidential contacts with Sweden prior to the Declaration, and they had prepared the August Conditions and the Declaration. Finally, it was the Protestants who prevailed among the Lithuanian authorities in Kơdainiai. For the ordinary nobleman, who was largely indifferent to his politi466 467 Jakuba Michaáowskiego wojskiego Lubelskiego, p.766. Gronski, Le traité Lituano-Suédois de Keidany, p. 298-299. 110 cal career, and who could always allude to modus vivendi, to be an official signatory to the Declaration was meant a risky step, which could end his future career in the service of the Polish king. Despite the fact that the agreement did not specifically mention the Protestants’ rights, it was clear that membership in a Protestant state inevitably would mean the domination of the Protestant nobility in Lithuania. For them the Declaration meant a historical victory, since it returned the GDL to the situation before 1569, when the government of the independent Duchy was made up of Protestants. The August Declaration, which most historians consider a treaty between the GDL and Sweden, and several regard, as the final act of the KU,468 is neither. This Declaration is the Lithuanian estates’ response to the first Swedish proposals. Agreeing in principle to recognize Karl X Gustav as a new Grand Duke, the Lithuanians nevertheless imposed a number of new terms and amendments. The Declaration was signed on behalf of the army and three Lithuanian districts. The Lithuanian signatories, however, acted on behalf of the entire state. The act combined a military convention between two armies and the conditions under which the GDL would be placed under Swedish power. From the Polish point of view, the Declaration was an act of treason since it violated the provisions of the Lublin Union. Under article 1 of chapter 3 of these provisions, Lithuania had no right to separate diplomatic relations without Poland’s knowledge.469 However, according to the 1588 Lithuanian Statute, the GDL was an independent power and had the right to pursue its own foreign policy. Thus, the Union with Sweden was in accord with Lithuanian legislation. Traditionally, Polish historians treat the August Declaration as the “capitulation of Lithuania to Sweden,” and compare it to the 1655 capitulation of Great Poland to Sweden at UjĞcie.470 The Declaration of Lithuania was a military convention for co-operation between Lithuanian and Swedish armies, however, rather than a capitulation. The army and the estates proposed an equal union between two states. The design of the future federation was to be similar to that of the 1569 Lublin Union. The Lithuanians were counting on autonomy, on having their own legislative body and judiciary, as well as religious freedom and noble privileges. The geographical distance between the GDL and mainland Sweden would give the leaders of Lithuania the opportunity to arrange its own political life. This was an opportunity to end the Muscovite-Cossack occupation, to save the country from the crisis, and to ensure future stable development within the Baltic Swedish Empire. When they allowed the confiscation of the lands of those nobles who re468 KonopczyĔski and Lepszy, Akta Ugody Kiedanskiej, p. 173-224; Sandberg, Fördraget i Kedainiai, p. 42-51; Gronski, Le traité Lituano-Suédois de Keidany, p. 291-304. 469 Gronski, Le traité Lituano-Suédois de Keidany, p. 300. 470 Wisner, Janusz Radziwill, p. 199. 111 jected the Swedish alliance, the Lithuanians made it clear that they could see no other way out. The text of the Declaration was thus a compromise between the first and the second divisions of the Lithuanian army, between Radziwiáá and Gosiewski, the Protestants and the Catholics, the Samogitian nobility and the central authorities. One could say that each party contributed different parts of the Declaration, and interpreted its future differently. The main thing that Sweden gained was the right to occupy Lithuania, which, in its turn, released the Swedish army from the need to wage war against the GDL. It also gained Sweden the co-operation of the GDL army. This was appreciated by De la Gardie, in his letter to Lewenhaupt: ”I think it will be all right if we get in touch with the Radziwiáás before entering Lithuania so as to get their consent.”471 This letter demonstrated the difference in the Swedish approach to the protection over Lithuania and Poland. For Poland, the most important aspect of the matter concerned the Swedish attack on Poland, the Swedish occupation of a considerable part of its territory, and the subsequent capitulation of several palatinates to Swedish domination. For Lithuania, it was a question of preliminary talks concerning the protection over the whole territory, and the subsequent peaceful entry of the Swedish army. Additionally, in exchange for Swedish protection, the Lithuanian estates recognized Karl X Gustav as their Grand Duke, with the power to appoint officials. As Grand Duke, Karl X Gustav obtained royal possessions and won the right to distribute clerical benefices and res caduca manors. Janusz Radziwiáá was content with the Declaration. On August 25 he wrote: “We signed the articles with the Swedish king on very good terms, preserving our liberties. Their army is on the way to Lithuania. Two ambassadors have been sent to the tsar with the demand to withdraw his troops beyond the eastern bank of the Dniapro River.”472 On August 18 1655, English newspapers published information about an important victory for Protestantism, since Radziwiáá had established close relations with Sweden, relations which were to be consolidated by the marriage of his daughter Anna Maria to Adolf Johan, the brother of Karl X Gustav. According to the newspaper the Jesuits were now trying to sow dissension among the Lithuanian Catholics who had joined Radziwiáá, emphasizing that he was a heretic who did not keep the Faith and who violated his promises. Moreover, the “Jesuits believed it would be better to place Lithuania in Muscovite hands than to join with Sweden.”473 471 Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf Lewenhaupt. August 10, 1655. Riga. Swedish. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. M. G. De la Gardies Koncepter. Ser A: I. E 1220. 1655 juni-juli. 472 Kubaáa, Wojna szwecka, p. 395, note 52. 473 Göransson, Den europeiska konfessionspolitikens upplösning, p. 85. 112 However, just before the discussion of Swedish proposals, the military situation took a turn for the worse. On August 16 1655, Russian troops captured Kaunas. On August 18 Hrodna fell. Meanwhile, Radziwiáá wrote letters to De la Gardie and Lewenhaupt, analysing Swedish-Lithuanian relations. On August 18 1655, he wrote that the draft of the agreement was signed despite the obstacles that stood in the way of signing it: first of all the hesitation of many nobles. However, once these nobles had seen the need for military assistance from the Swedish king, they had signed. Radziwiáá admitted that the terms of the Swedish Conditions had been greatly modified and wrote that his ambassador Lubienecki was bringing two documents. One was the text of the Declaration, which included a number of new terms: among them – returning the castle of Biržai after the war. Nevertheless, Radziwiáá hoped that Swedes understood the complexity of the situation and would make concessions and “then the Lithuanians are ready to do their best to serve their new king.”474 In a letter to Lewenhaupt, Radziwiáá suggested that the Swedish and Lithuanian armies join forces as soon as possible. He asked that the Swedish soldiers behave themselves with discipline during the campaign, so as to make “a good image for our inhabitants.” In Radziwiáá’s opinion “delay in the forces joining will make it easier for the enemies to advance, and will also be followed by new hardships, since it favours internal enemies and turns away the supporters.” He appealed to the Swedish general to try hard to stop the aggression of the Muscovites, at least for a short time. Radziwiáá was sure that only a joint campaign in Lithuania would consolidate the alliance, “since it will persuade those Lithuanians who hesitate to accept the power of the king, but who will follow him if new territories in the heart of the Duchy are reconquered and in this case we will manage to stop the aggression.”475 In a letter dated August 26 to Bogusáaw Radziwiáá, Prince Janusz viewed the results of the negotiations with Sweden with optimism. He wrote that the 8,000-man-strong Swedish army, led by De la Gardie, had entered Lithuania and camped in Biržai. However, all civil administration remained in the hands of Radziwiáá’s constables. Another 8,000-man-strong Swedish army was on the Livonian front against Russia. Radziwiáá asserted that Lewenhaupt, “an illegitimate child of King Gustav II Adolf”, had promised to send 12,000 Swedish soldiers to serve under Radziwiáá’s command. He believed that Sweden was preparing a counter-offensive and soon would send the army by sea, in order to attack Muscovy from the rear. Nonetheless, the letter’s tone was uneasy. First, Radziwiáá expressed discontent that Bogusáaw 474 Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. August 18, 1655. Kơdainiai. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E. 1531. 475 Janusz Radziwiáá to Gustav Adolf Lewenhaupt. August 26, 1655. Kơdainiai. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E. 1531. 113 was still in Podlasie, and had not returned to Lithuania. Janusz informed his cousin that he, to be on the safe side, had brought all his movable possessions and his family to Tauragơ, on the border with Prussia. Second, Radziwiáá included a list of all possible enemies of the KU. Third, Radziwiáá again wrote about the critical situation created by the Russian occupation. The grand hetman emphasized that the tsar was still idling away his time in Vilnius, and that Hetman Zolotarenko was in Kaunas. At the same time, Radziwiáá believed that the Ukrainian field hetman would be glad to switch to the Swedish side, “but cannot disobey his rulers” [Khmelnytsky and tsar Aleksei]. Not knowing the position taken by Bogusáaw, Janusz asserted that he had no earlier contacts with the Swedes, but was forced to sign an agreement owing to the critical circumstances that arose “when the Muscovites captured our capital, which has never happened to Poland,” emotionally adding that “let the devil take my soul if I have been preparing this beforehand.” Finally, in Radziwiáá’s opinion, signing the Declaration would still allow his faction to reject the Union with Sweden if the need arose: “however it is not the end yet, we can be saved, but we have a choice to reject.”476 On August 26 1655, Jan MierzeĔski wrote Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. He sent him a copy of the Declaration through Samuel Przypkowski. MierzeĔski emphasized that the terms proposed by the Swedes had been amended by the Lithuanians and had been signed by the army and the nobility. He informed that the Lithuanians had handed over Biržai to the Swedes. He mentioned the local nobility’s initial discontent when a 12,000-man-strong Swedish army entered the GDL and camped at Nemunơlio Radviliškis. The nobles also expressed their discontent in Biržai, by refusing to comply with Swedish demands for horses for their dragoons. MierzeĔski feared that the Swedes would discover “our weakness and buy us for a trifling sum.”477 At that time Lubienecki carried three letters to Riga from the commanders of the Lithuanian army: Janusz Radziwiáá, Wincenty Gosiewski and Samuel Komorowski. The latter begged Karl X Gustav to give him the position of field hetman of Lithuania. Radziwiáá reiterated a demand first made in the memorandum of July 28 (about the Prince of the Holy Rome Empire etc.). Radziwiáá also rejected the idea of establishing a compact, hereditary Dukedom. He asked only that the rights of all his lands and towns be confirmed. However, the list of his property was long. It included, apart from his own lands, several royal landed estates such as Hrodna. In the case of res caduca, all Radziwiáá’s lands were to come into the possession of the Swedish Crown. In his letter, Gosiewski asked for the income from several royal landed estates in compensation for the lands that Muscovy had captured from him. After Radziwiáá’s death, Gosiewski was to become the grand het476 477 Kotáubaj, ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 387-388. Ibid., p. 400-401. 114 man. Sweden was to place 6,000 soldiers under his direct command. Gosiewski demanded the right, in accordance with his wish and “owing to a different Faith [Catholicism]” to leave the Swedish Lithuania in the future and take all his property and sell his lands. In addition, Gosiewski asked for new high offices and landed estates for his clients. He named Jerzy Biaááozor, who was to be appointed Bishop of Samogitia, despite the fact that Bishop Parczewski still occupied this position, since Parczewski had not cosigned the Declaration. He proposed that Michaá Pac be granted the position of Vice-Chancellor of Lithuania. Šapoka noted that there was no accord between Radziwiáá and Gosiewski. Their actions were not coordinated. Some of the landed estates listed by Gosiewski were also found on the list composed by Radziwiáá. One of Radziwiáá’s clients (Komorowski) asked for the office that had been taken by Gosiewski. Gosiewski himself had an eye on his chances of replacing Radziwiáá as grand hetman.478 On August 10 1655, De la Gardie ordered Lewenhaupt, the commander of the Livonian army, to occupy the northern districts of the GDL: “Lithuania is decaying under Muscovite occupation, the Poles are weak and their army is unable to help them. In these conditions Princes Radziwiáás together with the dignitaries are asking for Swedish allegiance. In this connection, I ask you, my brother, to march into and occupy those Lithuanian territories that are free from Muscovy.”479 On August 14 1655, the army marched from Swedish Livonia to Lithuania.480 The army was comprised of 13,700 soldiers, of which 6,415 were to serve in garrisons. The field army of Sweden in Livonia accordingly amounted to 7,200 soldiers (2,700 cavalry, 4,000 infantry and 500 dragoons) with 44 canons and 5 mortars.481 The Lithuanian army was similar to the Swedish forces that were advancing. It amounted to about 10,000 soldiers: 3,100 soldiers in Radziwiáá’s division, 3,000 soldiers in the division led by Gosiewski, 800 dragoons led by Bogusáaw Radziwiáá and 3,000 cavalry from the gentry’s levy.482 However, even when combined, the Swedish and Lithuanian troops were obviously insufficient to launch an offensive against Russia and Ukraine. According to De la Gardie’s strategic plan, the main part of the Livonian army was to cross the Daugava River near Kockenhusen and march in the direction of Nemunơlio Radviliškis, a Radziwiáá borough that border Courland. Having camped there, the Swedish troops were to advance towards 478 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 71-73. Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf Lewenhaupt. August 10, 1655. Riga. Swedish. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. M. G. De la Gardies Koncepter. Ser A: I. E 1220. 1655 juni-juli. 480 Tersmeden, Carl X Gustafs strategi i kriget mot Polen, p. 29. 481 Ibid., p. 16. 482 Wismer, Jan. 1973. Armé och finansväsen i Polen under kriget med Sverige 1655-1660. Carl X Gustaf - studier 5. Polens krig med Sverige 1655-1660. Krigshistoriska studier. Kristianstad, p. 94. 479 115 Biržai and Kaunas. Kaunas was to be the main base of the Swedish army. The vanguard of the Swedish army stopped in Nemunơlio Radviliškis. From there, on August 17 1655, Colonel Thäler marched with 800 soldiers towards Biržai. The fortress starosta, Krzysztof StryĪka, yielded this fortress, which was known as “the lock of northern Lithuania,” without opposition. The Swedes left Colonel Johan Urqvard’s regiment there.483 Safe-conducts were published in Riga. In these, De la Gardie, on behalf of the Swedish king, guaranteed protection of the families and lands of those nobles who wished to sign this document. There were blanks in which the name of the addressee, his district and the date were to be entered. For example, on August 18 1655, in Žagarơ, a local nobleman named Aleksander Grabowski acquired such a safe-conduct. A Swede, Gustav Müller, signed the form on behalf of De la Gardie.484 The document cost each noble from 100 to 350 thalers, which was a high price. This, naturally, undermined the image of Sweden as a generous ally. When Lewenhaupt started his campaign, Vilnius was already occupied by Russia. On August 16 1665, the Russians seized Kaunas. This circumstance forced the Swedes to change their plan. Wishing to avoid armed conflict with Muscovy, the avant-garde of the Swedish army occupied only Nemunơlio Radviliškis and Biržai, far from the front-line of the Muscovite army. At the end of August the main Swedish army fell back. De la Gardie explained to Radziwiáá why he had to change the plan of the campaign as follows: “My heart is bleed when I think that at the time when we had such great confidence in [obtaining] the whole of Lithuania, the dishonest invader was already here. The Muscovite offensive causes us great losses. Unfortunately our growing indecision and sluggishness gave rise to such difficulties.”485 However, the Swedish army conducted two other campaigns in Lithuania and Courland. Already on August 5 1655, General Jakob Casimir De la Gardie’s division occupied the bishopric of Pilten in Courland. The barons of Pilten accepted Swedish supremacy and the Swedes appointed Vilhelm Muhl Governor of Pilten. On August 20 1655, Vice-Colonel Martin Schultz marched with 200 cavalry from Pilten to Samogitia, and occupied Palanga – a Lithuanian town on the Baltic coast. De la Gardie ordered Schultz not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the local nobility, but to patronize those who expressed the wish to sign the Conditions, and to enrol Lithuanian nobles in Swedish service. However, Schultz lost his way and instead of arriv- 483 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 35. SACRAE REG. MAJEST. REGNORUMQUE SVECIAE....Vniverlis ac singulus hasce lecturis..Nos Regio cum Exercitu Lithvaniam ingredi coegit, Ita cum Alexander Grefborski literas securitatis pro se suisq; Bonis et familia. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. M. G. De la Gardies Koncepter. Ser A: I. E 1221, augusti. 485 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 239-240. 484 116 ing at Palanga, he found himself in the small town of Heiligen Aa/Šventoji on the border between Lithuania and Courland.486 De la Gardie also ordered to occupy the border district of Braslau. On August 24, 117 dragoons led by Captain Johan von Ulenbrock appeared in Dünaburg/Daugavpils and via Plusy entered Braslau on August 25 1655.487 The occupation of the Braslau region was strategically important for Sweden. It prevented Russia from a possible invasion of neighbouring Livonia and Courland. Sweden also gained control over the central part of the waterway along the Daugava River. In his report “Relation wass in der mir aufgetragener Commission nach Breslow, Ikazno und Druien expediret”, Ulenbrock informed De la Gardie of his progress. After arriving in Braslau, he called a meeting of the local Ruthenian nobility, who gathered in the church. Appearing before the nobility, Ulenbrock proposed that they side with Sweden in accordence with the Swedish Conditions rather than those of the August Declaration. Ulenbrock emphasized the threat for the district posed by Muscovy. He promised that Sweden would help them defend themselves. After listening to the Swedish proposal, the director of the dietine, the podkomorzy of Braslau Krzysztof Mirski, a Calvinist, asked for two days in order to discuss it among the nobles. On August 28, about 50 local nobles signed three printed copies of the Swedish Conditions from August 10. Some nobles wrote their signatures twice.488 The main list of the signatories contained a preamble where special emphasis was laid on the fact that the district accepted Swedish protection in accordance with the decisions of other districts of Lithuania. Signing the preamble “as the leader of the knights”, Krzysztof Mirski stressed that the decision was made by all the administrators of the district “under the provisions of the Conditions for the validity of which they put their signatures.” Among the signatories were Castellan Andrzej Kimbar, the chamberlain of Lithuania Feliks Pac (until 1653, starosta of Braslau), Land Scribe Jan Szostakiewicz, Vice-Starosta Krzysztof Kossakowski, Standard-Bearer Wáadysáaw Kimbar, Sword-Bearer Stefan Puciata, Treasure Aleksander CzapiĔski, Vice - Esquire Carver Wáadysáaw Puciata, the son of the palatine of Minsk Zygmunt Rudomina 486 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 33-34; Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 62. Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 2, p. 90; Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 35. 488 SACRAE REG. MAJEST. REGNORUMQUE SVECIAE SENATOR AC THESAURARIUS, GENERALIS Ducatus Livoniae...NOS MAGNUS GABRIEL DE LA GARDIE ...Universis ac singulis M. D. Lithvaniae ordinibus.....Nos Nobilis Districtus Braslauiensis Anno millesimo sexcentesimo quingucgesimo guinto Die Vigesima Octava Mensis Augusti, congregati in Castro Judiciorum Sacrae Regiae Maiestatis Braslauiensis. Puncta et Conditiones S. R. M. Sueciae ad nos oblata per Exellentissimum et Magnificum Dominum Joanem ab Ulenbrock Commissarium et Capitaneum S. R. M. Confirmando statui spirituali, quam saeculari Palatinatum ac Discrictum Magni Ducatus Lituaniae manum nostra subscripsimus et sigillis nostris communivimus: RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 487 117 Dusiacki, the Deputy Cupbearer of Braslau and Duke Wáadysáaw OgiĔski, Land Judge Sebastian Mirski, Duke Krzysztof Swirski, Duke Bohdan OgiĔski, Konstanty Rudomina Dusiacki, Stanisáaw Chmielnicki, Kazimierz Samson Podbereski, Konstanty Statkiewicz and Jan Gasztovt. As mentioned above, the district of Braslau, was a centre of non-Catholic nobility. Among the signatories were many Protestants from the local families of Kimbar, Mirski and Puciata. The Protestants also included Kazimierz Samson Podbereski and Krzysztof Kossakowski. Three signatories represented Orthodoxy (OgiĔski, Statkiewicz and Chmielnicki). Ulenbrock noted that “the commandant of the castle” had played in bringing the negations to a successful conclusion. He had been the first to sign the agreement, and had kept encouraging the nobility to sign it.489 Analysis shows that he was Andrzej Kimbar. Nobles who were refugees from Navahradak, Ashmiany, Polatsk and Vitsebsk made up a separate list among those who swore the oath of allegiance to Sweden. A Protestant nobleman Samuel Kozaryn from Navahradak, who was hiding in Braslau from the Muscovite invasion, headed this list.490 Three Roman Catholic priests from Braslau also signed the Swedish conditions, on a separate list. They added the comment that they had signed the agreement with the consent of Bishop Tyszkiewicz, and styled Karl X Gustav the Grand Duke of Lithuania.491 The ceremonial signing of the Conditions took place at the castle of Braslau. After that, the Swedish commissar invited to a banquet and ball. Ulenbrock proposed a toast to the health of the new Grand Duke of Lithuania, Karl Gustav. He ordered a cannon salute in order to indicate to the Russians that the district had passed under the Swedish control. Having signed the conditions with the local nobility, the Swedish soldiers marched west in the direction of Drysviaty and Pelikany, and east towards Ikazn and Druja. The Swedish regiment in Druja stopped on the bank of the Dzvina River in the suburb of Sapezhyn.492 There the town authorities signed the Conditions. One of them, Ivan Kharlampovich, signed the document in Cyrillic.493 Thus, if the Lithuanian military officers and the nobles of three other districts had signed the conditions in their own new version, the nobility of Braslau accepted the original Swedish terms without any additional conditions. This allowed the Swedish party to believe that the entire Lithuanian nobility, in more auspicious conditions, would have signed the original requirements, rather than those of the revised Declaration. On August 20 1655, Bengt Skytte arrived in Riga. Both De la Gardie and Skytte had landed interests in the Eastern Baltic. De la Gardie was born in 489 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 77. RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 491 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 78-79. 492 Kotljarchuk, Shvedy u historyi i kultury belarusau, p. 78-79. 493 “ȱɜɚɧ ɏɚɪɥɚɦɩɨɜɢɱ ɥɚɜɧɢɤɴ ɫɚɩɟɠɢɧɫɤɿ ɪɭɤɨɸ ɫɜɨɟɸ.” RA . Vol. M. 1304. 490 118 Tallinn/Reval, and had grown up in Livonia (Riga) and in Stockholm. His father, General Jakob De la Gardie, was also born in Tallinn. The son of a French emigrant, he had become the first governor of Swedish Livonia. The mother of Magnus De la Gardie, Ebba Brahe, belonged to the old Swedish aristocracy. Magnus De la Gardie was a grandgrandson of the Swedish king Johan III Vasa. His wife Maria Eufrosyne Pfalz was the sister of King Karl X Gustav.494 Magnus De la Gardie had already served as governor of Livonia. It was, thus, natural that he should be given in 1655 a second assignment in the same position. Bengt Skytte, the viceroy of the Swedish king in Lithuania, was a son of Johan Skytte, a tutor to King Gustav II Adolf. Johan Skytte served as a governor of Livonia and founded there the university of Dorpat/Tartu. Bengt Skytte had grown up in Livonia and was educated in the universities of Dorpat and Uppsala. His mother, Maria Neaf, was Scottish by origin. In 1640, Bengt Skytte was made a rector illustrious of the Dorpat University. Therefore, both De la Gardie and Skytte had good knowledge of Lithuania. They had met many Lithuanians in Riga and had made personal contacts with several of them. Skytte was entrusted with signing the agreements on the transition of Courland and Lithuania to Swedish protection. He rejected the terms of the August Declaration and suggested that De la Gardie start new negotiations with the Lithuanian estates. Apparently De la Gardie’s envoy, Mikael Horst, was the only Swedish observer at the Declaration of Kơdainiai. On August 28 1655, Horst left Kơdainiai for Riga. In a letter that Horst delivered to De la Gardie, Radziwiáá proposed new plans regarding the union. However, he decided to convey all information orally, through Horst, making De la Gardie confident that he could trust Horst’s words. 495 Following king’s instructions, on September 1 1655, De la Gardie and Skytte sent Karl X Gustav a detailed, half-ciphered message explaining the Lithuanian Declaration. They described the progress of the negotiations and the operations of the Swedish army, copied the articles of the Declaration, and emphasized that a number of the Lithuanian demands, including the dominant one, i.e. the Swedish obligation to wage war against Russia, were unacceptable. They informed that the commanders of the army, Radziwiáá and Gosiewski, who, however, had divergent opinions, had signed the Declaration.496 De la Gardie and Skytte realized that the Declaration meant that Radziwiáá had cast his political lot with Sweden. Skytte noted that “Radziwiáá is in a very good mood, since all the work with the Lithuanians goes through him.” Nevertheless, unlike De la Gardie, Skytte considered that in future Radziwiáá’s power 494 Fåhraeus, Rudolf. 1936. Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. Stockholm. Bengt Skytte to Magnus De la Gardie. August 31, September 8-16 and September 17, 1655. RA. De la Gardieska samlingen. E 1558. 496 Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie and Bengt Skytte to Karl X Gustav. September 1/August 21, 1655. Riga. Swedish. RA. Livonica II. Vol. 77. Generalguv. i Livland till K. MAJ:T 1655-56. 495 119 would have to be constrained. In his opinion, it would be a good idea to dismiss Radziwiáá from his position as grand hetman, and place all the Lithuanian detachments under the direct command of Swedish generals. As compensation, the king might propose to appoint Janusz Radziwiáá to the position of Lithuanian Duke ad exemplum of the duke of Courland. This new status would distinguish and separate Radziwiáá from the Lithuanian nobility. This, in turn, would give rise to antagonism. Thus would the Swedes rule Lithuania according to the principle: divide et impera.497 On September 3 1655, the agreement with Lithuania was on the agenda of the meeting of the Swedish Council of the Realm. Having received the report on the negotiations, the senators expressed their appreciation of “the treaty, which the treasurer of Sweden [De la Gardie] signed with the bishop of Vilnius and the Radziwiáás in Lithuania on behalf of the Swedish king.”498 From this we can see that the treaty under discussion was the Conditions of August 10, since the bishop of Vilnius is known to have no connection with the Declaration of August 17. On September 10 1655, in the castle of Bauske, a meeting took place in which Skytte and De la Gardie discussed the further course of negotiations. There were two main obstacles: first, the divergence of opinions about Swedish protection among the Lithuanians themselves; and second, the Lithuanian demand that the Swedes commence operations against Russia.499 At the very beginning of the negotiations, in the memorandum of July 28 1655, the Radziwiáás had continually told De la Gardie that their main condition for signing the union would the promise of Swedish help to regain the territories occupied by Muscovy and Ukraine.500 The Lithuanian nobility asked the Swedish king to ratify the agreement on the terms of the estates. However, as Stellan Dahlgren noted, the August Declaration was never ratified by Sweden. The main reason for this was Lithuania’s refusal to wage war against Poland. A number of the counter-conditions that the Lithuanians put forward to the Swedes caused further discontent. First, there was the demand that Sweden issue an ultimatum to Russia demanding that it withdraw from the Lithuanian territories along the Dniapro River. The nobility agreed to the Russian occupation of only part of Belarus (Smolensk and parts of Mstsislau, Vitsebsk and Rechytsa districts), so as to form a new border along the Dniapro River. Sweden also disliked the demand that it join Lithuania in a war against Russia. The demand of restitution of Lithuanian property in Livonia, which was occupied by Sweden did not accord with the interests of Stockholm. The desire of the Lithuanian nobility to see the future state as a federation of equal countries was not shared by the Swedish lead497 Sandberg, Fördraget i Kedainiai mellan Sverige och Litauen, p. 48. Svenska Riksrådets protokoll. Vol. 16, 1654-1664, p. 265. 499 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 35-36. 500 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 51. 498 120 ers. Sweden did not want Lithuania to take part in future Swedish–Polish negotiations as an equal partner. The Declaration meant to ensure senator positions for the four Catholic bishops further alarmed Sweden. Hence, further negotiations and trials were in store for both parties, as they attempted to reach what would be a fragile alliance. 3.2 The Birth of the Sweden-Lithuania federation: the Union of Kơdainiai, October 20 1655 After August 17, the geopolitical situation changed drastically. While the position of Sweden had grown considerably more powerful, the pro-Swedish party in Lithuania had weakened. Bogusáaw and Janusz Radziwiáá had lost part of the troops. Russia and Ukraine firmly controlled most part of the GDL, including the capital and the largest cities. On September 8 1655, the Commonwealth’s capital Warsaw surrendered to Sweden. By early October, the capital of Polish Crown, Kraków, had fallen to Sweden. The Swedish army controlled a considerable part of Poland and the northern part of Lithuania. Thus, Ducal Prussia and Courland, both vassals of Poland, now found themselves within the territory controlled by Sweden. PolandLithuania was on the verge of collapse. In these conditions, the Swedish politicians had all the opportunity they needed to dictate their will to the Lithuanian separatists. On the other hand, after the Declaration of Kơdainiai, Russia realized that to refuse to enter into political dialogue with the Lithuanian leaders had been a mistake. August 24, 1655 the tsar sent his ambassador Vasilii Likhariov to the camp of the Lithuanian army. Likhariov arrived to Kơdainiai on August 30 with a charter from the tsar proposing that Radziwiáá and Gosiewski accept Russian protection in exchange for the preservation of their status and estates and a guarantee of religious freedom.501 As of September 3 1655, Tsar Aleksei styled himself Grand Duke of Lithuania and Autocrat of Belarus.502 Early in October the starosta of Ashmiany, Adam Sakowicz, initiated political consultations with Muscovy, most probably on Radziwiáá’s orders.503 As a result, the faint possibility that the Lithuanian army might pass to Russian control made the Swedes uneasy.504 Radziwiáá tried to take advantage of the situation to put pressure upon the Swedes in debates related to the future of the union. 501 Zaborovskii, Lev. 1978. Russko-Litovskie peregovory vo vtoroi polovine 1655 g. Slaviane v epokhu feodalisma. K stoletiiu akademika Vladimira Pichety. Moskva, p. 209-210. 502 PSZRI, no 164, p. 369-370. 503 Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia, p. 80-84. 504 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p. 91. 121 On August 23 1655, part of Lithuanian army (over 2,000 soldiers) formed an anti-Swedish confederation in Virbalis/Wierzboáow. The signatories emphasized, “Having seen the undisguised treachery of Radziwiáá and his agreement with Sweden, we remain faithful to our king and shall struggle with the enemies.” Wincenty Gosiewski was recognized as the only chiefcommander of Lithuania from then on. Four Catholic officers led the confederation: Kazimierz ĩeromski, Stanisáaw Lipnicki, Samuel Kmicic and Konstanty Kotowski. According to Rachuba, the Pac clan initiated the revolt.505 The confederation sent four ambassadors to the Polish King: Jerzy Judycki, the marshall of Rechytsa; Captain Krzysztof JeĞman Synkowski and Captains Samuel Kmicic and Stanisáaw Szczygielski. All of them were Catholics. On September 8 1655, they arrived at the headquarters of King Jan Kazimierz in Wolbórz.506 The meeting resulted in three official documents issued by the king. These declared that Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá were traitors. Their estates were to be forfeited, and given to faithful Lithuanian officers.507 At the end of 1655 and the start of 1656, the leaders of the confederation and the pro-Polish magnates Wincenty Gosiewski, Krzysztof Pac and Jerzy Hlebowicz were given a number of Radziwiáá’s landed estates and rights overr the lands of his collaborators.508 The king’s decision was unprecedented and unlawful. The Lithuanian Statute forbade the king to confiscate the estates in cases of betrayal, unless a Court had established the betrayal and the forfeiture approved by the Diet. For this reason, after the peace with Sweden in Oliwa (1660) Bogusáaw Radziwiáá managed to recover all the confiscated lands. Wisner noted that Jan Kazimierz applied such unlawful policy only to Lithuania. In Poland and Ukraine the king confiscated none of the estates of the local collaborators with Sweden.509 The desertion of the confederates weakened Janusz Radziwiáá and his prestige in Swedish eyes. Only 2,700 soldiers remained under his command.510 At the end of August 1655, Radziwiáá named four main enemies that impeded the realization of the union with Sweden. The first enemy was the Polish king and his court. The pro-Polish detachments of the palatine of Vitsebsk Paweá Sapieha and the gentry’s levy of Brest, as well as the faction of Pac, were the second. The third adversary was the Polish soldiers in Lithuania. Finally, there were the Lithuanian officers, “traitors” according to Radziwiáá, who had created the confederation of Virbalis and declared war 505 Rachuba, Konfederacja wojska litewskiego w Wierzboáowie, p. 13-31. Tyla, Kơdainiǐ unijos opozicija p. 67; Wisner, Janusz Radziwiáá, p. 203; Frost, After the Deluge, p. 51. 507 AGAD. AR. No. 1302. 508 Rachuba, Sprawa dóbr Radziwiááów BirĪaĔskich, p. 51-67. 509 Wisner, Janusz Radziwiáá, p. 203. 510 Ibid., p. 208. 506 122 on Sweden and on Radziwiáá’s faction.511 Radziwiáá worried about the confederates, who threatened to devastate his property and to kill his clients. In a letter to Bogusáaw Radziwiáá, Janusz asked him to stop the confederates from joining the Polish king. He proposed that his cousin arrest the rebellion’s leaders, among whom, in the hetman’s opinion, Kmicic and Kotowski were the most dangerous. In another letter, Radziwiáá ordered Mikoáaj Harasimowicz, the starosta of Zabáudów, to destroy “the traitors who raised the revolt in my army” if they came to the town. Radziwiáá consulted the local pastor Pandlewski. He suggested that they gave the rebels dead drunk, so that the townsmen could kill them in their houses at night, or poison their beer.512 In the middle of September, after Gosiewski’s role in establishing the confederation was clear, Samuel Komorowski arrested him on Radziwiáá’s order and with the consent of the Swedes.513 At the same time Radziwiáá urged De la Gardie to arrange a joint campaign against Russia. He told him that Muscovy had raided the Duchy of Biržai, had plundered them and had threatened them with complete devastation. Also “the Muscovites sent crack cavalry from Kaunas and Hrodna to ruin our land by fire and sword.” Radziwiáá noted that “this would not have happened if Swedish aid had been offered in proper time.” Therefore, in the hetman’s opinion “the only way to retain the remains of the GDL is a wide campaign to stop the enemy.”514 In September 1655, Swedish Royal Councillor Schering Rosenhane worked out the final objectives of Sweden in the war on behalf ofr Karl X Gustav. According to his plan Courland, Lithuanian-Polish Livonia and “possibly Lithuania” were to be taken from Poland by Sweden.”515 On September 10, 1655 Karl X Gustav ordered De la Gardie to redislocate the headquarters of the army to Lithuanian Pasvalys. After that De la Gardie himself with 16 regiments was to advance to Augustów on the border with Prussia. Once there, he was to defend this region from a possible Russian invasion and to communicate with the main Swedish army in Poland.516 However, De la Gardie could not leave Lithuania before the end of October due to ongoing negotiations with Lithuanian estates. On September 17, Skytte and Lewenhaupt together with 2,000 soldiers arrived in Pasvalys. To get there, the army marched through neutral Courland, 511 Janusz Radziwiáá to Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. August 26, 1655. Polish. Kơdainiai. Jakuba Michaáowskiego wojskiego, p. 764 - 766. 512 Janusz Radziwiáá to Mikoáaj Harasimowicz. August 26, 1655. Polish. Kơdainiai. Jakuba Michaáowskiego, p. 767 - 768. 513 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 113. 514 Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. September 1655. Kơdainiai. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E. 1531. 515 Wittrock, Karl X Gustaf i Polen. Krigsmålet och allianserna, p. 43. 516 Tersmeden, Carl X Gustafs strategi i kriget mot Polen, p. 38. 123 thus infringing on its neutrality.517 In Pasvalys, Swedish diplomacy scored a new success. On September 20, 1655 Skytte signed an agreement with Duke Jacob Kettler regarding the position of Courland in a war between Sweden and Poland. Courland abandoned its neutrality and agreed to admit the Swedish army on its territory.518 When Skytte left for Lithuania, De la Gardie hoped that “he will arrive during the daytime and the discontented Lithuanian estates and the army who now do not realize all the difficulties will more adequately understand its present position.” On September 18 1655, Skytte wrote De la Gardie that the Lithuanians were willing “to swear an oath immediately.” However, the conclusion of the negotiations delayed. The nobility was scared of Radziwiáá’s possible domination in the country. The leader of the opposition was the land judge of Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz Stanisáaw Biaááozor who will not sign the KU. According to Skytte, a large number of nobles was in favour of the union on the Swedish terms, but against the consolidation of the Radziwiáás’ power.519 Janusz Radziwiáá opposed the idea of simple Swedish protection, and struggled for the equal union between Lithuania and Sweden. On September 22, Skytte wrote De la Gardie that Radziwiáá’s position impelled the union and he worked out a plan accordingly to reduce his influence.520 On September 28, De la Gardie together with 7,000 soldiers arrived in Pasvalys. At the same time all the nobles were invited to Kơdainiai to sign “the conditions of the protection.” On October 1, the Livonian army led by Lewenhaupt marched from Pasvalys via Samogitia to Veliuona on the Nemunas River and started to build a fortress and bridge there.521 On October 6, Radziwiáá sent De la Gardie two letters. In the first he asked him to expedite a long-awaited arrival in Kơdainiai and informed that he had already sent his ambassador Wilhelm Korff who would orally communicate the details of the actual state of affairs. Radziwiáá emphasized that the delay in the arrival of troops had an unfavorable effect on the prestige of the Swedish king.522 In the other letter, Radziwiáá informed him, “that he is happy to receive a message that the matter is coming to its close and that the king is ready to ratify the treaty.”523 On October 10, Gosiewski passed a message 517 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 52. Fördrag angående Kurlands ställning under kriget mellan Sverige och Polen. Pasvalys. September 20, 1655. German. RA. Originaltraktater med främmande makter. No 3. 519 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 113. 520 Tyla, Keidanskaya uniya, p. 77; Wisner, Janusz Radziwiáá, p. 210. 521 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p. 93. 522 Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. October 6, 1655. Kơdainiai. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E. 1531. 523 Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. October 6, 1655. Kơdainiai. Latin. RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20, no. 38. 518 124 through Skytte to De la Gardie, too, about the readiness for negotiations.524 However, De la Gardie declined Gosiewski’s proposition. Gosiewski promised on his word of honour, not to try to escape and not to intrigue against Sweden, but rather patiently to wait for Karl Gustav’s decision.525 On October 8, the Swedish troops led by De la Gardie demonstratively marched to Kơdainiai.526 De la Gardie stayed in the town from October 10 to October 21. Here he realized that the situation was not as favourable as it might have seemed. The Lithuanian leaders refused to sign an agreement incorporating the GDL into Sweden. Nevertheless, he managed to get things moving, and after four days of stubborn confrontations the first document of the union, a public declaration, was finished. On October 15, this declaration was published in Kơdainiai, in Latin and German, in 500 copies. The copies were immediately distributed among the nobles. On October 20, the Lithuanian nobles signed the two main documents of the KU: an act of the state union with Sweden and a public declaration to the European states explaining the reasons for breaking with Poland and joining Sweden. On October 23, a third document was signed, establishing an Advisory Council for governing Swedish Lithuania, consisting of noble deputies and headed by Bengt Skytte. Thus, “the everlasting union of Lithuania with Sweden” was signed. The Swedish side was represented by De la Gardie and Skytte. Lithuanian magnates and nobles signed on behalf of the whole Duchy. The subscribers noted that after adopting the Conditions in August of 1655 now the final document had now been made. Unlike the August Declaration, the act of the KU was not divided into articles. It was a shorter document. The key provisions were: • The Union with Sweden was declared “everlasting”, legal for all the successors of the original signers. King Karl Gustav (and his heirs) were validated as Grand Dukes of Lithuania. All previous unions and treaties with the Polish king were revoked. • The elections of the grand dukes and kings “in the way it was at the time of Union with Poland” was to be repealed. The future Swedish kings were automatically recognized as the hereditary grand dukes of Lithuania. Only in case of interruption of the royal dynasty, was the Lithuanian political nation to partake in elections, but without equal voting rights together with the estates of the 524 Wincenty Gosiewski to Magnus De la Gardie. October 10, 1655. Kơdainiai. Latin. RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20, no. 44. 525 Testimony of Wincenty Gosiewski. October 21, 1655. Kơdainiai. Latin. RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 526 Tyla, Keidanskaya uniya, p. 76. 125 • • • • • • 527 Swedish Kingdom. Thus, the Lithuanian nobility gave up their old right to elect the grand duke. The GDL and Samogitia, (the latter having a special status), preserved their autonomy and separate legal system. Any changes initiated by the Swedish king had to be resolved on at a common Diet. The GDL retained its religious freedom, including all the rights of the Roman Catholic, Uniate and Orthodox Churches and all congregations. The senatorial status of Roman Catholic bishops was guaranteed. The king of Sweden was declared temporal patron of all church property and of the clergy. The GDL army submitted to the king of Sweden. The gentry’s levy was also to be transferred to his command. The king had the right to use the army and the gentry’s levy at his own discretion against all nearby enemies, but not overseas. In case of emergency, the Lithuanian army could be sent overseas with a limited number of soldiers. The king of Sweden had all prerogatives to make peace or to declare war. The Lithuanian political nation agreed that the royal residence was to be placed outside the Duchy. Therefore, direct administration in the GDL was in the hands of a royal viceroy for Lithuania. A special paragraph was devoted to relations with Poland. The GDL agreed to wage war with Poland together with Sweden and in case of war between the two kingdoms the GDL will support Sweden and if Poland starts a war against the GDL, Sweden will assist the GDL. A special paragraph was devoted to the Livonian barons: “those Livonians who in accordance with residence permit became Lithuanians will have the same rights and liberties as the true Lithuanians, as it was hitherto in the GDL.” Finally, the two parties pointed out that the act of union was temporary and should be ratified by the king of Sweden: “All separate articles of the agreement can not be appealed against or suspended by the Pope in Rome, Bishops or other Catholic church authorities or by diets, resolutions or other authorities. Only the king of Sweden had the right to demand from Lithuanian estates alterations if he found them necessary. However, in case the king wishes no changes, all this remains lawful, valid and eternal.” 527 Nos Magni Ducatus Lithuaniæ Proceres et Ordines, Universis et singulis has inspecturis et lecturis ad perpetuam rei memoriam notum testatumque facimus Quandoquidem in summa status nostri Magni Ducatus Lithuaniæ per potentiam hostilem oppressione et ab armis et protectione Serenissimi Poloniæ Regis Ioannis Casimiri avulsione fatalis et inevitabilis necessitas Nos urserit, ut Serenissimi ac Potentissimi Principis Domini Domini CAROLI GUSTAVI. RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 31 pp. Original document. Text: F.1-7. Signatures: F. 7-31. 126 One seen that compared to the August Declaration, Sweden had made considerable progress. With the exception of consenting to the Catholic bishops being senators, all the provisions that non-counter to Swedish interests had been deleted. The demand that Sweden should start a war against Russia and Ukraine to liberate the occupied Lithuanian territory was removed. The Lithuanians no longer claimed an equal union and asked to preserve the right of the GDL autonomy under a Swedish protectorate. Consequently, Lithuania also abstained from the right to act as an equal partner in future negotiations with Poland. The demand that tax-money first to be paid to the GDL’s army was also deleted. After the transfer of many Lithuanian Catholic officers to the Polish side, the rights of the Malta Order were never again mentioned. For the first time in its history, the GDL agreed to wage war against Poland. Moreover, the Lithuanian nobility denied the Polish Vasa dynasty the right to the title of Grand Duke of Lithuania. The Polish Vasas were replaced by the Swedish dynasty of Pfalz. The existing procedure of election of the king was to be abolished, in accordance with the Swedish legal tradition. As is well-known, Sweden had a hereditary monarchy since 1544. However, most of the nobility responded negatively to the abolition of the ancient right to elect the king/grand duke, as well as compulsion to wage war against Poland.528 The grand duke would reside outside of Lithuania. However, the administrative system was changed. From now on, the Swedish king would appoint his special viceroy. The first and only viceroy was Bengt Skytte. His new rank combined the status of the GDL with the eastern Baltic provinces of Sweden, which were administrated by the general governors. The nobility of Lithuania was not incorporated directly into the noble estates of Sweden (as had happened to the nobles of Ingermanland after 1617 or those of Scania after 1658).529 The status of the Lithuanian nobility was similar to that of the native barons of Swedish Livonia and Estonia. However unlike these provinces, the Swedish nobles were not allowed to take office or own estates in the GDL. Sweden guaranteed the religious freedom and the rights of the three non– Protestant Christian religions. Thus, the religious question in Kơdainiai was being solved in a spirit of tolerance. Here Sweden completely agreed with the principles of the Radziwiáás. The fact that the text of KU does not contain the rights of the three Protestant denominations is hard to explain. There was no need to give special guarantees to those of the Augsburg confession in a new land of the Swedish Empire. However the Calvinist Church was not tolerated much in Sweden, and the Arians were outside the law. This proba528 MSR, p. 86, 90. Rosen, Jerker. 1966. Statsledning och provinspolitik under Sveriges stormaktstid. Från Sveriges stormaktstid. Lund, p. 122-159. 529 127 bly explains why none of six Reformed superintendents signed the KU. However, different Protestant elites among the Commonwealth subjects achieved a high level of cooperation between the Calvinists and the Lutherans. Proofs of such mutual cooperation were the GDL; the Polish–Lithuanian Livonia; Ducal Prussia, where a Calvinist dynasty ruled a Lutheran country; Danzig, where a Calvinist City Council ruled a mainly Lutheran town; and Courland, with its mixed Reformed–Lutheran political elite. Both Janusz Radziwiáá and Duke of Courland Jakob Kettler were energetic supporters of the Calvinist– Lutheran alliance.530 That probably gave the Lithuanian separatists reason to believe in the possibility of continued co–existence between the Calvinist and Lutheran nobility under Swedish supremacy. The appointment of Karl X Gustav as protector of the Orthodox Church presaged far–reaching consequences. The tsar, who on September 8 1655 had declared himself Grand Duke of Lithuania and Autocrat of Belarus, had similar pretensions. Because of this, the article created potential rivalry between Sweden and Russia for the sympathies of Orthodox believers. In the Declaration, the Lithuanian estates recognized the Swedish protection in the zone that was free from Russian and Ukrainian occupation. The KU stated that the entire GDL would be united with Sweden, no parts was excepted. But on October 23, when the Advisory Council for Lithuania, was created, it included representatives only from the five districts already controlled by Sweden. That contradicted the spirit of the KU. This was probably the reason that Janusz Radziwiáá did not sign the act establishing that council, but the leader of anti-Radziwiáá opposition Stanisáaw Biaááozor was the first to sign that document. In total 1,172 representatives of the Lithuanian political nation signed the union with Sweden. The act opened with the signatures and great seals of the palatine of Vilnius, Janusz Radziwiáá, and the Roman Catholic bishop of Samogitia, Piotr Parczewski. After them followed the suffragan bishop of Vilnius Jerzy Biaááozor who signed on behalf of Bishop Jerzy Tyszkiewicz. In the opinion of Tyszkiewicz, the example set by religious leaders such as Parczewski and Biaááozor had a decisive influence on the Catholic nobility’s willingness to sign.531 Tyszkiewicz himself refused to take Sweden’s side, and immediately reported to Petro Vidono, the Nuncio of Vatican in PolandLithuania, that he was always opposed to the KU. He affirmed that Parczewski and Biaááozor were persuaded by Radziwiáá and had been tricked into signing the Union through his ruse. However, Tyszkiewicz accused the bishop of Samogitia, Parczewski, of asking the Swedish king that he be ap530 Bues, Almut. 2001. Das Herzogtum Kurland und der Norden der polnisch-litauischen Adelsrepublik im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. Möglichkeiten von Integration und Autonomie. Giessen, p. 264-268. 531 Wisner, Rok 1655 w Litwie, p. 97-98. 128 pointed Bishop of Vilnius, while he, Tyszkiewicz, was still alive.532 As a result of this letter the Vatican had planned to bring a case against Parczewski, who “illegally signed the Union with Sweden and announced himself Bishop of Vilnius.”533 Only because of the forthcoming anti-Swedish uprising (April, 1656) and Parczewski’s taking the side of rebels a trial did not started.534 Field Hetman Gosiewski was already under arrest and refused to sign the KU. General Mikoáaj Judycki also refused to sign and was arrested.535 Thus, together with Radziwiáá and Parczewski the KU was signed only by five senators: the castellan of Samogitia, Eustachy Kierdej Radziwonowicz, the palatine of Wenden/CƝsis Mikoáaj Korff and the castellan of Dorpat/Tartu Wilhelm Holtschuer. The number of senators increased from 2 to 5 compared to the August Declaration, but Radziwiáá and Swedish leaders still failed to attract the majority of Lithuanian senators. There were objective reasons to this. Many senators were refugees in Poland or Prussia. Many of them remained on their estates in the zone of Russian occupation. Some magnates, led by Paweá Sapieha, had fled to Brest where they had pledged allegiance to the king of Poland. The number of office-holders and military officers who signed the KU different from that, which signed the August Declaration. Then, many highranking officers either took the Polish side or returned to their estates in the Russian zone of occupation. Among them were Konstanty PokáoĔski, Maciej Gosiewski, Adam Sakowicz, Wáadysáaw Chalecki, Marcjan OgiĔski, Jan Bychowiec, Michaá and Hieronim Pac, Piotr Lacki, Hieronim Kryspin Kirszensztein, Samuel Kocioá, Jerzy Despot Zienowicz and others. However, Šapoka made misstake when he wrote that the number of officers and officeholders who signed the KU did not increase over the number who signed the August Declaration.536 Despite some losses, Radziwiáá had managed to extend the representation of pro-Swedish office-holders and high-ranking officers. The increase in numbers was due to his assembling all his clients, including many office-holders of Samogitia and fugitives from the RussianUkrainian zone of occupation. Among the high-ranking persons of Lithuania who signed the KU were: the Notary of Lithuania Jan Stankiewicz, the Chief–Guardian of Lithuania Hrehory Mirski (Protestant, from now P), the Treasurer of Braslau Aleksan532 Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia. Vol. III (1596-1696). Ed. August Theiner. Romae 1863, p. 497. 533 Pope Alexander VII to the Nuncio Petro Vidono. February 12, 1656. “De processu fabricando contra ep. Petrum Parczewski qui a parte Suecorum se stetisse asseritur. Codex Mednicensis seu Samogitiae dioecesis. Ed. Paulus Jatulis. Roma, 1989. Vol. II, p. 284-286. 534 Kamuntaviþienơ, Vaida. 2003. Vyskupo Jurgio Bialozoro (apie 1623-1665) politinơ veikla. Soter. Religijos mokslo zurnalas. No. 9 (37). Kaunas, p. 281-294. 535 Kotáubaj, ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 205. 536 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 112. 129 der CzapliĔski (P), the Marshal of Lida Teofiá Dunin–Rajecki (P), the Marshal of Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz Jan MierzeĔski (P), the podkomorzy of Samogitia Aleksandr RadzimiĔski (P), the Standard–Bearer of Wiákomierz and Colonel Eliasz Komorowski (P), the Esquire Carver of Samogitia Jan Szostowicki, the Treasurer of Minsk Jan de Parius Kolniki Kolecki(P), the Castle Judge of Vilnius Paweá Danilewicz (P), the Esquire Carver of Wiákomierz Saáomon Dawidowicz (P), the Standard–Bearer of Kaunas Mikoáaj Skorulski (P), the Standard–Bearer of Samogitia and the Bailiff of D. Dirvonơnai Jan GruĪewski (P), the Land Judge of Upytơ Paweá Marcinkiewicz (P), the Judge of Samogitia Wiktor Mleczko, the Bailiff of M. Dirvonơnai Albert WazyĔski (P), the Vice–Esquire Carver of Kaunas Kazimierz Dowmont Siesicki (P), the Castle Judge of Vilnius Andrzej Kurbski, the Standard–Bearer of Upytơ Stanislaw DĊbski (P), a son of the palatine of Minsk and Captain Jerzy Dunin–Rajecki (P), the Vice–Judge of Samogitia Piotr RybiĔski (P), the Deputy Cupbearer of Samogitia Aleksandr Woyniat, the Land Scribe of Samogitia Adam Stankiewicz, the Huntsman of Samogitia Adam Niewiardowski, the Captain Konstanty Odachowski (P), the Land Scribe of Wiákomierz Hektor Oziemblowski (P), the Treasurer of Upytơ Michaá Kazimierz Dezegrza WoámiĔski (P), the Vice–Castellan of Upytơ Konstanty Soááohub Dowoyna, the Vice–Castellan of Wiákomierz Chwalibóg Lwowicz (P), the Vice–Castellan of Samogitia Otto Tiesenhausen (P), the Starosta of Gulbinơ and Captain Hrehory Podbereski, the Esquire Carver of Brest Paweá Zaranek Horbowski (P), the Deputy Cupbearer of Samogitia Gabriel Sipowicz, the Treasurer of Trakai Wáadysáaw KarĊga, Colonel Wilhelm Korff (P), the Esquire Carver of Upytơ Wáadysáaw SiciĔski (P), the Vice–Esquire Carver of Upytơ Kazimierz Biaááozor, Colonel Ernst Korff (P), Vice–Colonel Johann Ottenhausen (P), the Depity Cupbearer of Kaunas Stanisáaw Oziemblowski (P), the Starosta of Starodub Samuel Abramowicz (P), the mostowniczy of Polatsk Jan Meráo (P), a son of the palatine of Minsk Gedeon Dunin–Rajecki (P), the Deputy Cupbearer of Navahradak Gregorz Blindstrub z Towtwiáa (P), the Esquire Carver of Wenden/CƝsis Aleksander Brzozowski (P), the Vice–Judge of Braslau Wáadysáaw Puciata (P), the Vice–Judge of Upytơ Wáadysáaw Jan Mleczko, the Deputy Cupbearer of Upytơ Krzysztof StryĪka(P), a son of the castellan of Samogitia Wáadysáaw Eustachy Kierdej Radziwonowicz, the Starosta of Tyrkszlewa Hieronim WazyĔski (P), the Huntsman of Starodub Hieronim Biaákowski (P), Lieutenant Sebastian Sagayááo (P), Captain Gregorz Tyszkiewicz, the Treasurer of Wiákomierz Aleksander Sawgowicz (P), Captain Ludwik Górski (P), the Scribe of Wiákomierz Andrzej KaczyĔski (P), Captain Stefan Podlecki (P), the podkomorzy of Wiákomierz Bogusáaw KamieĔski (P), Captain Stanisáaw Orda, the Esquire Carver of Samogitia Stefan Billewicz (P), the Castle Scribe of Kaunas Jan Wizgird (P), the Esquire Carver of Minsk Andrzej Kossakowski (P), the Land Scribe of Upytơ Zygmunt Szukszta (P), the Deputy Cupbearer of Ashmiany Stefan Bielikowicz 130 (P), the piwniczy of Lithuania Stefan PrerzchliĔski, Captain Mikoáaj Koryzna (P), the Sword–Bearer of Samogitia Daniel Chrząstowski (P), the Deputy Cupbearer of Vaukavysk Piotr Kublicki, the Esquire Carver of Mstsislau Jan Jodkowski (P), the Sword–Bearer of Wiákomierz Rafaá Zawisza (P), the Standard–Bearer of Polatsk Kazimierz Korsak (P) and the Deputy Cupbearer of Kaunas Jerzy CzapliĔski. Thus, the total number of officials and high–ranking officers increased from 45 to 75, compared to those of the Declaration of August 17. Among them, 53 nobles marked as (P) belonged to the Radziwiáá faction. Together with the senators, the Protestants of Lithuania comprised 70,5 per cent of all the GDL officials. Among them were practically all the leaders of the Lithuanian Union, the directors of its synods, including Janusz Radziwiáá, Teofiá Dunin-Rajecki, Gedeon Dunin-Rajecki, Krzysztof StryĪka, Gregorz Blindstrub and Aleksander Sawgowicz.537 Unlike the August Declaration, a large group of Livonian barons signed the KU: senators Mikoáaj Korff and Wilhelm Holtschuer, the vice-castellan of Samogitia Otto Tiesenhausen, Colonels Wilhelm Korf, Ernst Korff and Johann Ottenhausen, Officers Reinholt Tiesenhausen, Wilhelm Grothusen, Christian Korff, Christoffer Bucholtz, Wilhelm Taube, Wilhelm von Berk, Heinrich von Buttler, Nicolas von Fitingoff, Nicolas Schultte, Cristoffer von Trotten, Otto von Trotten, Otto von Linden, Wilhelm von Linden, and Johan von Brodsassen. Lutheran barons took an active part in signing the KU. A pro–Polish witness wrote about the energetic participation of Livonians and their fraternization with the Swedes.538 It is not surprising that the text of KU now contained a special paragraph devoted to the rights of the Livonian barons who were based in Lithuania. Several Lithuanian pastors, such as Kasper Lachnicki, the Reformed preacher of Kơdainiai, also signed. Among the signatories were several noblewomen (Anna Unichowska, Magdalena Szabielska, Sebastiana Modzelewska and Michalina Chrąstowska). The signing of the KU was done in the palace of Radziwiáá. The London newspaper “Public Intelligencer” informed its readers that a thanksgiving service for the KU took place “in the Lutheran Church.”539 This seems to be incorrect, because the Lutheran church of Kơdainiai was a small wooden building compared with the Reformed church. Thus, the celebration was most probably held in the large stone building of the Kơdainiai Reformed Cathedral, built in 1652 by Janusz Radziwiáá. This Cathedral was the largest Reformed church in the whole Lithuania. A solemn party was also held in the Radziwiáá palace. Radziwiáá was the first to speak in Latin on behalf of the GDL. Bengt Skytte spoke on behalf of Sweden. Then Mikoáaj Korff 537 Liedke, Od prawosáawia do katolicyzmu, p. 194 -196. MSR, p. 80. 539 Public Intelligencer. November 5 - November 12, 1655. P. 85. 538 131 spoke on behalf of Livonia. Finally, Jan GruĪewski spoke in French on behalf of Samogitia.540 While Korff was speaking, the balcony of the second storey fell down.541 There were many people on the balcony. No one was killed but many were injured (including De la Gardie). This incident was interpreted by the attending nobility as a sign of “the coming downfall of the Swedes.”542 Finally, Radziwiáá hosted a ball in his palace.543 There De la Gardie awarded Radziwiáá with the highest Swedish medal – “the Order of the Name of Jesus.”544 A church service during a day of thanksgiving (tacksägelsedag) including the reading of the public declaration on of the Lithuanian estates was celebrated on October 31, 1655 in Riga and all Livonia,545 but not in Stockholm or other cities of mainland Sweden. This shows the regional character of the KU in the eyes of the Swedish leaders. At the same time, Sweden’s progress in Poland was celebrated in 1655 twice, with a day of thanksgiving in Stockholm and in all cathedrals of the Lutheran bishoprics.546 Meanwhile, in Moscow, during a divine service in the Kremlin, the Patriarch of Antioch and All the East Makarious condemned the heretic Radziwiáá, and asked the Lord “to inflict infirmity and disease on the Lithuanian hetman.”547 The city of Riga became the new administrative centre for the inhabitants of Swedish Lithuania. In Riga, the nobles were “looking for the truth” against the actions of Swedish soldiers.548 In Riga, the Swedish administration issued letters of immunity and granted property to their allies. De la Gardie functioned as “Governor General of Samogitia and the neighbouring districts of Lithuania,” granted immunity to a Ruthenian nobleman Mikoáaj Wottowicz for a land estate of Zajnau near Braslau.549 The Lithuanian Protestants made up a majority of the officers of the Radziwiáás. During the negotiations, and after signing the KU, De la Gardie granted considerable property to the most trusted officers. Some of them even obtained part of the royal possessions. For this reason, De la Gardie obtained inventories of four royal landed estates (Šiauliai, Alytus, Hrodna and Mahileu).550 All of the known 18 recipients of award belonged to the 540 MSR, p. 106. Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, p. 91. 542 MSR, p. 106. 543 MSR, p. 100- 106. 544 Dahlberg, Anne-Marie. 1996. Royal splendour in the Royal Armoury. Stockholm, p. 73. 545 Kubaáa, Wojna szwecka, p. 90-91. 546 Forssberg, Anna Maria. 2005. Att hålla folket på gott humör. Informationsspridning, krigspropaganda och mobilisering i Sverige 1655-1680. Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, p. 298. 547 Wisner, Janusz Radziwiáá, p. 206. 548 MSR, p. 132. 549 Körner and Tamulynas, Litauen-Sverige, no 31, p. 33-34. RA. Militaria, M 1305. 550 Annerstedt, Claes. 1894. Uppsala Universitets biblioteks historia intill år 1702. Stockholm, p. 88-99. 541 132 Radziwiáá faction, 16 of them were Protestants.551 However, only part of the granted estates was under Swedish control at that time. On September 25 1655, Janusz Radziwiáá was granted the royal landed estate of Šiauliai, which would give him 200,000 zloty of annual income. The Arian noble Jan MierzeĔski obtained the county of Prenai in the district of Kaunas, while an estate in Poland granted another Arian, Gabriel Lubieniecki, who was a Polish noble by birth. The chief-guardian of Lithuania the Calvinist Hrehory Mirski, received two estates near Upytơ, the starosta of Biržai and the Calvinist Krzysztof StryĪka received the county of Joniškis, and the Orthodox Prince Andrzej Kurbski was given an estate and the position as the marshal of Upytơ. All possessions distributed were to be freed from the billeting of Swedish soldiers. At least five donations were made of property that was in the Russian occupation zone or in disputed districts like Hrodna, Ashmiany and Lida. Thus, the Colonel and Lutheran Wilhelm Korff was granted the estate of Tausinjnai, which was in the Russian zone. Bogusáaw Radziwiáá¨s colonel and the Lutheran noble Eberchard Puttkammer was given the town of Masty in the district of Hrodna. Vice-colonel and Lutheran noble Johann Ottenhausen was granted the estate of Dudy near Ashmiany in the Russian zone. Bogusáaw Radziwiáá’s captain and the Calvinist noble Samuel Wysocki received the estate of Harasimovichy in the district of Hrodna. Janusz Radziwiáá’s captain and the Arian Aleksandr MierzeĔski, was granted the estate of Nemunaitis, which had previously belonged to “the enemy of Sweden” Captain Stefan Niewiarowski. The extensive and generous Swedish donations to their Lithuanian allies raise following questions: • What was the aim of so wide distribution of manors to the allied Lithuanian nobility, considering the background of ”the reduction” introduced in 1655 by Karl X Gustav, when the state confiscated previous donations to the nobility?552 • Did the donations reflect Swedish leaders’ serious and permanent plans concerning the future of Lithuania, meant to get the support of the local Protestants? • Or did they mean that the Swedes did not place trust in the longterm success of the KU, and consequently started making purely tactical promises – that is, “playing with Lithuanians”? There is no exact answer. The last hypothesis is most likely, because the foreign policy of Stockholm of that time was based on avoiding war with 551 552 Wasilewski, Zdrada Janusza Radziwiááa i jej wyznaniowe motywy, p. 141-146. Dahlgren, Stellan. 1964. Karl X Gustav och reduktionen. Stockholm. 133 Russia. However, the awards could have had an important propagandistic meaning for Lithuanians. The Swedes could have used them to maintain their ally’s faith that Sweden would eventually liberate the territories occupied by Russians and thus put the KU into effect. The mechanism of the union itself was in accordance with the tradition of Poland’s subjects. There are several examples of similar unions, like those established by the treaties of Poland with Ukraine, Ducal Prussia, Courland, and Livonia. During its history, Lithuania had concluded a number of unions with Poland (Kreva 1385, Vilnius–Radom 1401, Harodla 1413, Mielnik 1501 and Lublin 1569) and Livonia (Wenden 1562). Sweden also had sufficient previous experience of unions with other states and the incorporation of new territories. Among them were the union with Denmark-Norway (Kalmar 1397) and incorporation of Estonia (1561), Ingermanland and Karelia (1617), Northern Livonia (1629), Ösel/Saaremaa, Gotland, Halland, Jämtland and Härjedalen (1645) and Pomerania (1645). The progress of Sweden in Lithuania determined the fate of Courland and Ducal Prussia, which found themselves surrounded by Swedish-ruled territory and was forced to take the Swedish side in a war against Poland. On March 1 1656, Skytte informed De la Gardie that the Duke of Courland agreed to accept the protection of Sweden. In January of 1656, Oliver Cromwell, the Lord Protector of England, saw Karl X Gustav as the sovereign of all Eastern European lands, as far as the Caspian Sea.553 De la Gardie and Skytte were content with the results of the KU. In a ciphered report to Karl X Gustav they maintained that “now as the treaty has been signed the Swedish king has free hands in Lithuania such as the Lithuanian nobility have never before allowed to their grand dukes.” However, at the same time, it was emphasized that only a part of the GDL, “Samogitia and districts of Ukmergơ, Upytơ, Braslau with a part of the Kaunas” had accepted the Swedish power. In a letter to the king they had not mention other part of Swedish Lithuania, namely Radziwiáá’s duchy of Slutsk. The nobility of Slutsk, being within the Russian zone of occupation, could not come to Kơdainiai. Nevertheless, Slutsk remained under Swedish protection for two years (August 1655 – August 1657), longer than any other Lithuanian city.554 In October 1655, following Radziwiáá’s orders, the city’s governor, William Petersson, refused to surrender the fortress to pro-Polish Lithuanians.555 Swedish Slutsk became a safe haven for local Ruthenians, Jews and Scots, and refugees from all over Belarus. When the situation in the overpopulated city became critical, Bogusáaw Radziwiáá sent a special 553 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 267-269. RA. Militaria, vol. 1305, doc.1. 555 AGAD. AR. Dz. V. Teka 355. No. 17. 554 134 decree placing the Jews under his protection and forbidding the townspeople to harm the Jewish people.556 The Swedish governors emphasized that the Union had many enemies. Among the latter was Muscovy, whose army was close to the Swedish zone, and the pro-Polish Lithuanian regiments led by Paweá Sapieha.557 On the other hand, the lack of clarity of the political future of Lithuania as part of Sweden worried De la Gardie. After the agreement, he admitted that the Swedish king did not send him “any further special instructions about what to do in Lithuania.”558 On October 25, De la Gardie, Skytte and Janusz Radziwiáá met in Veliuona on the Nemunas River for consultations. First, they made a definite decision to deprive Field Hetman Gosiewski of his power and to keep him under arrest. Following De la Gardie’s orders, Radziwiáá moved his army of 2,000 soldiers closer to Poland, in order to occupy Podlasie. This was also meant to attract on the Swedish side the soldiers of Sapieha and to defeat the confederates of Virbalis. Not satisfied with his departure from Lithuania, Radziwiáá wanted to have all the taxes in the GDL placed at his disposal. He was refused this “since nothing would be left for the Swedish king’s business.” On October 30 1655 the Swedish army of 7,000 soldiers, led by De la Gardie, crossed the Nemunas at Veliuona and advanced into Poland. In November 1-15, 1655 on the way to Poland the Swedish army passed the northern-western part of the GDL. The route was as follows: Veliuona– Gelgaudiškis–Slavikai–Kudirkos Naumiestis–Virbalis–WiĪajny–Bakaáarzewo. The Swedish troops moved along the western coast of the River Nemunas and along the border with hostile Ducal Prussia.559 According to De la Gardie, ”the march from Lithuania was not so simple, since the enemy’s soldiers had encircled the Swedes from all sides. On the right-hand side was Prussia, on the left and ahead there was Russia in Kaunas and the second hostile Lithuanian division to the north.”560 To remain in the GDL in these conditions the entire army was perilous. However, 7,538 soldiers remained in Lithuania, of those 6,000 were recruits.561 The viceroy Bengt Skytte and the major general Henrik Thurn were empowered to govern Lithuania. However, on November 10 1655, Karl X Gustav appointed Marshal Lewenhaupt commander of all armed forces in the GDL.562 This decision was later con556 Degiel, Rafaá. 2000. Protestanci i Prawosáawni. Patronat wyznaniowy Radziwiááów birĪaĔskich nad Cerkwią prawosáawną w ksiĊstwie sáuckim w XVII w. Warszawa, p. 66. 557 Magnus De la Gardie and Bengt Skytte to Karl X Gustav. October 31, 1655. Veliuona. Swedish. Cipher. RA. Livonica II. Vol. 77. Generalguv. i Livland till K. MAJ:T 1655-56. 558 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 36-37. 559 KA. Sveriges krig. 0425:05. Krigen mot Polen och Ryssland 1655-1657 samt mot Brandenburg 1658-1660. Maps no. 036-044. 560 Tersmeden, Carl X Gustafs strategi i kriget mot Polen, p. 46, note 197. 561 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 252. 562 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 121-133. 135 fuse the local nobility, who did not fully understand who was governing their country. As of October 3 1655, the senators faithful to the Polish king, including the palatine of Trakai Mikoáaj Pac, the palatine of Navahradak Piotr WiaĪewicz, the palatine of Smolensk Filipp Obuchowicz, the marshal of Lithuania Krzysztof Zawisza and the palatine of Mstsislau Jerzy Drucki Horski, came together to meet with Sapieha in Brest. They brought their private detachments and the gentry’s levy. On October 27 1655, this group of senators initiated an appeal to the nobility to assemble in Brest for a Diet “to jointly discuss the future of the Republic.”563 At the end of November 1655, Paweá Sapieha decided to join the Swedish side. In a letter to De la Gardie, Sapieha wrote that he, together with his division and the nobility of Brest, would accept the embassy of the Swedish king. Sapieha wrote that his army had beaten a large Muscovite army near Brest [at Skoki]. After that, “the nobility summoned a dietine which accepted the protection of Sweden and sent to Karl X Gustav an ambassador who represented the army and the nobility of Brest.”564 In a week’s time, negotiations between the ambassador of Sapieha, Konstanty Kotowski, and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá’s diplomat Benedykt Olszewski, were under way in Warsaw. During the audience of Kotowski with the king of Sweden Karl X Gustav agreed to take the palatinate of Brest under his protection.565 On November 20 1655, a Swedish squadron, led by Cornet Wilcke, visited Brest. He delivered two letters from Karl X Gustav to Sapieha, in which the king offered his protection.566 At the same time, the Swedish ambassador came to Brest all. It was the starosta of Slonim Jan Fryderyk Sapieha. He set off to inform Andrei Urusov, the commander of Muscovite army in Polesie, that Brest had accepted Sweden’s protection. Sapieha wanted De la Gardie “to be a witness before the king about his great services as army commander.”567 According to Bogusáaw Radziwiáá, in return for switching to the Swedish side, Sapieha tried to persuade Karl X Gustav to give him the landed estate of Šiauliai – the largest royal estate in Swedish Lithuania, which had already been donated to Janusz Radziwiáá.568 Sapieha’s change to the Swedish side caused Janusz Radziwiáá anxiety. On December 4 1655, Radziwiáá informed De la Gardie that Sapieha had at last come out openly in opposition to Muscovy and Poland, and that rebellious soldiers “changed their minds and accepted the allegiance of the king of Sweden.” 563 Rachuba, Paweá Sapieha wobec Szwecji, p. 84-86. Paweá Sapieha to Magnus De la Gardie. December 5, 1655. Brest. Polish. RA. De la Gardieska samlingen. Skrivelser till Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. Ser. C:1. E 1543. 565 Rachuba, Paweá Sapieha wobec Szwecji, p. 87. 566 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. November 24, 1655. Bocki. French. Ibid. 567 Paweá Sapieha to Magnus De la Gardie. December 5, 1655. RA. Ser. C:1. E 1543. 568 Radziwiáá, Autobiografia, p. 137. 564 136 Radziwiáá emphasized that the Swedish control over all the Lithuanian districts free from Russian occupation was in conformity with Karl Gustav’s interests. However, Radziwiáá reminded to the Swedes that he is the ChiefCommander of the Lithuanian army and suggested that Sweden place Sapieha’s soldiers under his command. 569 On November 20 1655, in reaction to the military progress of Russia, the district of Hrodna agreed to accept the KU. Thirty nobles, who assembled at a dietine, sent Aleksander Bratoszewski to De la Gardie. In their appeal, they asked the king of Sweden to put Hrodna and the district under his protection, and save them from the tyranny. The Esquire Carver of Lithuania Krzysztof Potocki, the main initiator of that dietine, was the first to sign the declaration. This influential Protestant noble also appeared in Radziwiáá’s list of Sweden’s most faithful allies. Apart from Potocki, two officials appended their signatures: the deputy cupbearer of Wenden/CƝsis and the Calvinist noble Salomon RysiĔski Junior and the land scribe of Hrodna, Stanisáaw Sopocko.570 However, Sweden was unable to take Hrodna under its control, because the Russian occupation zone separated Hrodna from Swedish Lithuania. Given this, sending the Swedish army to Hrodna would inevitably provoke war with Muscovy. Moreover, the local nobility consisted primarily of Catholics faithful to the king of Poland. Meanwhile, the Swedish army dominated the territory of northern Lithuania, Janusz Radziwiáá and his division withdrew from the Duchy, leaving, behind the country only gentry’s levy, that of Samogitia. The Swedes distrusted the Lithuanians and hoped “to hold them in leash with the help of numerous garrisons.”571 The Lithuanians feared the Swedish army. Even Radziwiáá moved his family and his most valuable property to Tauragơ close to the Prussian border.572 The KU had rapidly become useless to Sweden, since the Swedish army had controlled the north of the Duchy since August 1655. Swedish soldiers treated Lithuania as an invaded country. The Lithuanian nobility realized that they had been excluded from power. The Advisory Council for Swedish Lithuania had very little influence and functioned as a consultant, in order to fulfil Swedish interests. Thus, the KU lost its significance for both parties. The situation of mutual distrust made the future of Swedish Lithuania problematic. At the beginning of January 1656, Erik Oxenstierna proposed to Karl X Gustav his own vision of the purposes of the war against PolandLithuania. According to his conception, the war was aimed at incorporating 569 Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. December 4, 1655. Rajgród. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E. 1531. 570 RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 571 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3. Stockholm, p. 92. 572 Kotáubaj, ĩycie Janusza Radziwiááa, p. 387. 137 the whole of Livonia, Courland and only Samogitia in Lithuania.573 On December 26 1655 Janusz Radziwiáá wrote De La Gardie a final letter from Podlasie. Radziwiáá admitted that a number of magnates refused to support the KU. He complained of poor health, which kept him from saving this problem himself. He suggested a plan which would solve this problem, and which involved Swedish assistance.574 However, during the night of December 30/31, 1655 Janusz Radziwiáá died at his castle of Tykocin. The unknown for doctors illness from which Radziwiáá had suffered for two months was the real reason for his death. However, his associates suspected that Jesuits were poisoning the grand hetman.575 A Minsk Protestant, Jan Cedrowski, who had found a refuge on the territory of Swedish Lithuania, wrote in his diary that Radziwiáá “was obviously poisoned.”576 The combination of conflicts of political ambitions and the old hostility between the Catholic families of the Pac, Sapieha and Gosiewski on the one hand, and the Protestant family of the Radziwiáá on the other, nullified Sweden’s attempts to create a wide anti-Polish coalition. As is well known, the Swedish leaders refused to give political power to the Radziwiáás. Moreover, the latter were displaced from Lithuania. By sacrificing the Radziwiáás, Sweden was trying to attract a wider circle of the nobles and magnates. However, owing to the contradictions between the Lithuanian magnates, the Swedish plan to create a united pro-Swedish party failed. Having received from King Jan Kazimierz, at the end of January 1656, the highest civil and military positions of the palatine of Vilnius and grand hetman, Paweá Sapieha and his army switched back to the Polish side once and for all.577 In April 1656, Wincenty Gosiewski escaped Swedish captivity in Prussia and also joined the king of Poland.578 These two Lithuanian generals headed the antiSwedish resistance. 3.3 The Role of the KU in changing the balance of power in the region: coverage of Union in Europe The KU had the potential to change the balance of power in the whole of Eastern Europe and in the Baltic in particular. After October 20 1655, almost all the coast of the Baltic Sea was within the borders of the Swedish Empire. The Baltic became “an inland lake of Sweden.” In the east of the Baltic, an 573 Wittrock, Karl X Gustaf i Polen, p. 14-15. Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. December 26, 1655. Tykocin. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E. 1531. 575 Wasilewski, Radziwiáá Janusz. PSB, vol. XXX/1, p. 214. 576 Pomniki memuarnai litaratury, p. 132. 577 Rachuba, Paweá Sapieha wobec Szwecji, p. 104-107. 578 Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 230. 574 138 entire territory under Swedish control appeared. It stretched from Finland through Ingermanland, Estonia, Livonia, Courland, the north of Lithuania, Great Poland, and Royal Prussia as far as to Swedish Pomerania and Bremen. Only the City of Danzig and Ducal Prussia remained as an enclave outside of Swedish control. De la Gardie ordered Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to deploy their troops in Podlasie. As a result, the borders of Ducal Prussia were challenged by the first and the second Swedish armies, now reinforced with Lithuanian detachments. Sweden’s military strength increased sharply, and the Prussian political position grew far weaker. It was the KU that enabled the change of Ducal Prussia to Sweden’s ally, and the union became the acme of the Swedish policy Dominium Maris Balticum. The Swedish Empire had reached the zenith of its might. Thanks to the KU, Lithuania (unlike the Ukrainian Hetmanate) remained on the map of Europe until 1795. Only the alliance with Sweden prevented incorporation of the GDL into the Muscovite state. The KU made the future of Russian policy very complicated. The Muscovites had not expected the Swedes, who had once been their allies in a war against the Commonwealth, to turn into potential enemies. A Russian-Swedish conflict became inevitable. As of 1655, Russia had to compete for political domination in the GDL with Sweden, Poland, and Ukraine. Formal legal grounds helped the Lithuanians break its 250 - year old federation with Poland. As of 1569, the GDL had become an object of international policy. The Lithuanian separatists’ dreams of restored independence could be realized. Unlike the Polish elite, who had simply submitted to Karl X Gustav, the Lithuanian nobility had managed to create a political co-operation, which made a federation with Sweden possible. The foundation for this alternative had been laid during the diplomatic negotiations that had preceded the arrival of the Swedish army. To provide international legitimacy to the KU, about 1060 nobles and clergy added a public declaration. The declaration was aimed at the European states and explained the reasons, purposes and character of the union.579 A short version of this declaration had been published earlier (October 15 1655) as special brochure, in both Latin and German.580 In a month’s time the declaration of the union was translated into Dutch and was published in Amsterdam.581 Holland’s unease over Sweden’s success in Lithuania and 579 Nos Magni Ducatus Lithuaniae Proceres et Ordines. RA. Militaria. M. 1304, 22pp. Procerum & Ordinum Magni Ducatus Lithvaniæ Literæ Reversales De Fide, Subjectioneq; Regibus & Regno Sveciæ æternum præstanda. Der Herrn und Stände Des GroszFurstenthumbs Littawen Endlicher Revers, Dardurch Sie sich und ihre Nach-kommen An Ihrer Königl. May:t und die Cron Schweden zu Ewigen Zeiten verbunden und unterthänig gemacht. Datum Keidani, d. 15 Oct. Anno 1655. KB Sv:s förh.839. 581 Schriftelijck renversael ende Verklaringe der Laths-Heeren ende Staten van’t Groot Vorstendom vander LITTAUW, Van Trouwe ende Onderdanigheyt aende Koningen ende aen’t tRijck van SWEDEN. Amsterdam, 1655. Royal Library of Netherlands. No. T. 4398; KB. Sv:s Förh. 841. 580 139 Samogitia had an economic basis. Dutch merchants had their own business network east of the Baltic. The largest number of merchant vessels in the port of Riga was Dutch.582 The Dutch were the main suppliers of herring and textiles to the GDL. The burghers of Riga did not have their own fleet. Therefore, Dutch ships delivered the export goods from the GDL to Western Europe.583 Taking advantage of the protectorate over the GDL, Swedish merchants might out Dutch trade from that region. At the beginning of 1656, the public declaration of the KU was published in Hamburg. This city was, at that time, one of the main information centres of Europe. From there, news about the KU was spread to all countries. For some reason, Kaunas was wrongly identified as the city where the union had been signed. The pro-Swedish nobility of the GDL declared: We, the palatines and estates of the GDL, bring to remembrance, awareness and belief of everybody and everyone who should see and read this: after the Muscovites invaded and submitted most of the GDL, our sweet home.... on our behalf and on behalf of our successors we, with good intentions and voluntarily, of our free will and in accordance with well–weighed counsel, firstly – reject guardianship and obedience to Jan Kazimierz, the King of Poland, abolish and relieve him from all his rights on the GDL announcing them invalid. After that we make a solemn promise and acknowledge under oath of our fidelity and faith, virtue and conscience that we and our successors together and separately from this very time and in all future time accept his Majesty the king of Sweden as our lawful king and the Grand Duke of the GDL, our Lord, as well as all future Kings of Sweden. We are determined to keep up the oath and fidelity, virtue and obedience forever and inviolably…For this we shall reject any alliances, treaties, friendly relations with any monarch, king, prince or community as well as any other authority, its land and citizens. And those, being in force up to now, we announce severed. And we shall consider only those treaties and unions and relationships, which His Majesty and all future kings of Sweden will regard as such; and we shall hold enemies those whom they call or shall announce as such. We guarantee that under these conditions, concluded between His Majesty the king and us ourselves, and signed by the palatines and estates of the GDL everything will be observed constantly and inviolably, personally and with seals. Kawen. October 1655. 584 According to the 1573 constitutional law of Poland-Lithuania (Articuli Henriciani), the nobility was released from its oath of fidelity to the monarch if the king did not fulfil his duty to protect the country. In due course, the nobility of Lithuania started to interpret this law as a right to military and po582 Dunsdorf, Merchant shipping in the Baltic during the 17th century, p. 19-20. Doroshenko, Torgovlia i kupechestvo Rigi, p. 55-56, 67- 76, 165. 584 Revers der Waywoden und Ständen/deß Gros-Hertzogthumbus Littauen von wegen der Huldigung, Treu, Untertänigkeit, den Königen und Königreich Schweden ewiglich zu lassen und zu halten. 1656. Hamburg. KB. Sv:s Förh 840, p. 13-16. 583 140 litical opposition to a ruler who did not fulfil his obligation to protect the Duchy.585 Hence, the public declaration proclaimed that because the King of Poland had failed to do his duty, the Lithuanian nobility abolish all his rights on the GDL announcing them invalid. In October 1655, Catholic newspapers wrote about the KU. The Italian editions considered that the treaty of the GDL with heretical Sweden could be justified by the need to defend the country against the Muscovite invasion. Religious motives were also taken into consideration. For instance, a newspaper of Milan explained that religious preferences persuaded the inhabitants of Lithuania to sign the union with Sweden “since this province, unlike other provinces in Poland, is inhabited mostly by the Calvinists, Lutherans and Arians.”586 Since the beginning of the war, France had played the role of energetic arbitrator between the Commonwealth and Sweden.587 A copy of the August Declaration is kept in the National Library.588 England, a Swedish ally, was another important channel of news about the KU. On August 23 1655, the ambassador of Sweden in London, Christer Bonde, wrote to Karl X Gustav that political circles in Britain knew about Janusz Radziwiáá’s decision to seek confederation with Sweden: “I enclose a copy of a letter of a particular friend of Prince Radziwiáá to one of his intimates here, which sufficiently indicates how discontented he is, and that it seems not improbable that he might be brought to seek Y. M.’s protection, always supposing that he has not done so already, which I hope may be the case.”589 On November 8 1655, the London newspaper Mercurius Politicus wrote: “Count Magnus de la Gardie hath concluded the Treaty of Protection with the States of Lithuania, with much satisfaction on both sides; so that being now under his Majesties tuition, they are ready to assist him in the affairs of Prussia, or any other.”590 On November 23 1655, Bonde wrote that, during an audience with Oliver Cromwell, he had informed Cromwell “of the agreement with Lithuania,” according to which Hetman Radziwill and the estates of the country had incorporated Lithuania in a union with Swe585 KamiĔski, Andrzej. 2000. Historia Rzeczypospolitej wielu narodów, 1505-1795. Lublin, p. 19-20. 586 Drob, Janusz. 1993. Obieg informacji w Europie w poáowie XVII wieku. W Ğwietle drukowanych i rĊkopiĞmiennych gazet w zbiorach watykaĔskich. Lublin, p. 173-174. 587 Lalkou, Ihar. 1998. Rukapisnyia krynitsy Natsyianalnai bibliateki Frantsyi pa historyi znosinau pamizh Frantsyia i Vialikim kniastvam Litovskim u novy chas (XVI-XVIII st). Athenaeum. Commentarii Historiae et Culturae. Vol. I. Minsk, p. 15-37. 588 Nos Proceres et Ordines Magni Ducatus Lithvaniæ infrascripti.. ac Potentissimi Principis ac Domini Domini Caroli Gustavi Svecorum, Gotthorum, Vandalorumque Regis. Bibliothèque Nationale de France. Département des manuscrits. Ms.fr.n.a.9819, p. 188-194. 589 Swedish diplomats at Cromwell’s court, 1655-1656. The missions of Peter Julius Coyet and Christer Bonde. Ed. Michael Roberts. London, 1988, p. 122. 590 Mercurius Politicus. November 1 - November 8, 1655. P. 5738. 141 den.591 At the same time, another London newspaper, the Public Intelligencer, related the main news coming from Swedish Stettin/Szczecin: His Excellency Count Magnus de la Gardie hath concluded at Keidan the Treaty with the States of Lithuania, Whereby they have submitted under the Swedish protection, which hath given great content to both parties, so that they have had a public thanksgiving for it in the Lutheran Church; and the said Count Magnus hath been nobly entertained by Prince Radzivil, and by whole Nobility; afterwards he went to his Army, which lay within five miles of that place. Those of Lithuania have joined themselves with us, and have made a Bridge over Niemen.592 On November 22 1655, Mercurius Politicus published a translation of the public declaration of the KU under the title “An act of the Nobility and Estates of the Great Dukedom of Lithuania, whereby they for ever oblige themselves to yield Fidelity and Subjection to the Kings and Kingdom of Sweden.”593 Again the main point was that union with Sweden had been undertaken on behalf of the whole country: “We the Nobility and Estates of the Great Dukedom of Lithuania.” Thus, English newspapers emphasized that the agreement, which provided for a union of the GDL with Sweden on terms of equal rights, was approved “with much satisfaction on both sides.” The matter concerned the Duchy as a whole, but the Protestant background of the union was also given emphasis. Johan Amos Comenius, impressed by the achievements of Sweden in Poland and Lithuania, wrote a panegyric addressed Karl X Gustav, with a foreword by Samuel Hartlib. This was published in London in February 1656. Addressing Karl X Gustav, Comenius emphasized, “Lithuania that suffered a lot after its joining Poland, turned into your power and protection King by its own will.”594 Thus, at the end of 1655 and the beginning of 1656, Lithuanian and Swedish political leaders fulfilled their task of spreading positive information about the KU in Europe. The Polish view on the union remained unknown to the international community. However, modern European historians view the KU as a temporary and little-known act of submission with minimal consequences.595 This is not accurate: the KU gained great international attention, and news of it echoed throughout the whole of contemporary Europe. 591 Swedish diplomats at Cromwell’s court, p. 204. The Public Intelligencer. November 5 - November 12, 1655. P. 85. 593 Mercurius Politicus. November 15 - November 22, 1655. No 284. P. 5757-5760. 594 Comenius, Johann and Hartlib, Samuel. 1656. Panegyricus Carolo Gustavo Magno Suecorum, Gothorum, Vandalorumque Regi, incruento Sarmatiae victori, & quaquâ venit liberatori, pio, felici, augusto. Heroi afflictis in solatia, regibus in exemplum, nato. Londini, p. 2. 595 Kirby, Northern Europe in the Early Modern period. The Baltic world 1492-1772, p.186. 592 142 3.4 Swedish Lithuania and its government The third and last term of the union was signed in Kơdainiai on October 23 1655. This document inaugurated the Lithuanian Advisory Council, led by the Swedish viceroy Bengt Skytte. One representative of the ecclesiastical estate and three nobles from each district were selected. Neither the act of the union nor the text of the public declaration had mentioned the Council. European newspapers of that time said nothing about the pro-Swedish administration, even though various aspects of the KU, as we have seen, were covered in some detail. The act that inaugurated the pro-Swedish Council has remained unknown for most modern historians. Šapoka found this document in the National Archives of Sweden, and was the first historian to mention its existence. However, he could not study the contents of the document thoroughly. In his monograph, Šapoka reproached the Polish historians KonopczyĔski and Lepszy for inaccuracy in their rendering of the texts of the KU. But he too misspelled some names, and mistook the public offices of some signatories. Moreover, according to Šapoka, the nobles signed this document by order of the districts in which they resided. This is incorrect, since the nobility signed the document at random, for practical reasons. For example, several nobles from Ukmergơ signed on different days. Šapoka erroneously asserted that Hektor Oziemblowski, the land scribe of Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz, appears in the Council as the land judge. He misspells Michaá Woráowski from Kaunas as Mykolas Vozlovskis.596 The preamble of this document stated that ”the nobility and estates of Lithuania inform everyone and bear witness that an extraordinary situation in the state necessitates taking emergency measures, since the rescue of the Fatherland is a most fundamental thing. Therefore, acceding to the request made by Bengt Skytte [followed by Skytte’s title], the viceroy of the Swedish king, they appoint their plenipotentiaries in the persons of Jerzy Biaááozor from the ecclesiastical estate and 14 other persons, so that they could meet in case of need and solve and approve everything that might save them and their Fatherland in accordance with the law and Statute of the Duchy, and the absence of one or two of them will not matter much.”597 Thus, the council was established as an emergency and provisional Lithuanian government, for the duration of the war, in order to work together with the Swedish authorities. It was supposed to make decisions in accordance with the Lithuanian law. Then the plenipotentiaries selected were listed: 596 597 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 117-118. It is a mistake, because in reality 15 nobles, three from each district, there were elected. 143 For the clerical estate: Jerzy Biaááozor. Suffragan Bishop of Vilnius From the district of Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz: Eliasz Komorowski. Standard-Bearer Kazimierz Siesicki. Vice-Esquire Carver Hektor Oziemblowski. Land Scribe From the district of Braslau: Wáadysáaw Puciata. Vice-Judge Piotr Rudomina Dusiacki. Esquire Carver Hrehory Podbereski. Starosta of Gulbinơ. From the district of Kaunas: Jan Wizgird. Castle Scribe Paweá Prozor Michaá Woráowski From the district of Upytơ: Paweá Marcinkiewicz. Land Judge Michaá Kazimierz Dezegirza WoámiĔski. Treasurer Wáadysáaw SiciĔski From the duchy of Samogitia: Jan Mikoáaj Stankiewicz. Notary of Lithuania Albert WazyĔski. Bailiff of M. Dirvonơnai Wilhelm Korff. Starosta of Orla and the owner of Šaukơnai About 450 nobles from different districts signed this document. The Land Judge of Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz Stanisáaw Biaááozor, the Standard-Bearer of Upytơ and the Protestant noble Stanislaw DĊbski and the Castle Scribe of Upytơ, and the Orthodox Prince Jan Jarosáawski Kurbski were the first to sign this document. After them came the large group of Samogitians: the Land Scribe of Samogitia Adam Stankiewicz, the Vice-Esquire Carver of Samogitia Gabriel Sipowicz, the Deputy Cupbearer of Samogitia Aleksandr Woyniat, the Huntsman of Samogitia and the royal secretary Jan Blindstrub z Towtwiáa, the royal Vice - Cupbearer Ludwik Widlika Gorski. After them Stefan Podlecki, Laurentius Biaááozor and Albrycht Dowgiaááo put their signatures. Several nobles signed on behalf of their illiterate companions. For example, Samuel Zosteyka Woytkiewicz noted that he “signed the act also for his relative, a very old and illiterate man Mikoáaj Zostejka Woytkiewicz and for his comrade Jan Goliniewski who is illiterate too.” 144 The names, which head the list of signatures are completely different from those of the KU’s main act and its public declaration. Magnates, bishops and men of the middle nobility, among which Radziwiáá’s clients mainly prevailed, had approved the first and the second documents of the KU, but not the last document. None of the senators, bishops and magnates had signed the treaty inaugurated the Lithuanian Advisory Council. The signatories of the Advisory Council had all put their names to the KU act. However, they were far from being the first. The Council was planned as a provisionel government because of the need to find support among the ordinary nobility, rather than among the magnates. This illustrates the Lithuanian nobility’s struggle for its rights against the magnates. Traditional historians assert that, unlike Poland, Lithuania was a country where the magnates dominated the decisions of the noble dietines. However, Arturas Vasiliauskas’ recent research showed that Lithuanian politics were not so simple. The lesser nobility had their own instruments of power, and were able to organize themselves and protect their interests against the magnates.598 This document probably confirms this. While the agreement was being signed in Kơdainiai, serious discord arose between Radziwiáá and the common nobility. The latter were discontented with the high status attributed to Radziwiáá during his negotiations with Sweden.599 He had headed the negotiation process, and De la Gardie considered him Lithuania’s key political figure.600 Radziwiáá had proposed to Skytte an aristocratic Council of Lords as the future government of Lithuania.601 Radziwiáá of course knew that Sweden, in 1634, had accepted a new constitutional reform, the so-called “form of rule” which had considerably expanded the domestic rights of the Swedish aristocracy. Skytte, who originated from a bourgeois family, did not support Radziwiáá’s project. In Sweden, Skytte was known as an advocate for the political rights of the ordinary nobility.602 However, an analysis of the list of the Council members shows that Radziwiáá had preserved his influence over that institution. On the base of the research by Urszula Augustyniak,603 it is possible to show that the Protestants and the clients of Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá had obtained a majority of the Council. Among these were Eliasz Komorowski, Kazimierz Siesicki, Hektor Oziemblowski, Wáadysáaw Puciata, Jan Wizgird, Paweá 598 Vasiliauskas, Local Politics and Clientage in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 1587-1632. Wisner, Rok 1655 w Litwie, p. 97. 600 Magnus De la Gardie and Bengt Skytte to Karl X Gustav. October 21, 1655. Vilainiai. Swedish. Code. RA. Livonica II. Generalguv. i Livland till K. Maj:t 1655-1656. Vol. 77. 601 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 93. 602 Rystad, Göran. 1955. Johan Gyllenstierna, rådet och kungamakten. Studier i Sveriges inre politik 1660-1680. Lund. 603 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiááa, p. 71 - 81, 123, 186, 295. 599 145 Prozor, Paweá Marcinkiewicz, Wáadysáaw SiciĔski, Albert WazyĔski and Wilhelm Korff. Thus, out of all the 16 members, 10 were clients of the Radziwiáás. Only a few Catholics, who were not Radziwiáá’s clients, can be regarded as his opponents. This applies to Jan Stankiewicz, Jerzy Biaááozor, as well as to the popular commanders Hrehory Podbereski and Piotr Rudomina Dusiacki. Thus, the Council represented a compromise between the magnates and nobility, and between the Protestant and the Catholic nobility. The main idea was to create a legitimate local power structure. The territory of the Swedish administration in the GDL embraced the whole of Samogitia, the districts of Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz, Upytơ, Braslau and Kaunas (the northern part). The towns of Slutsk and Kapyl together with the Duchy of Slutsk were also under Swedish protection. The part of the GDL that belonged to Sweden was small compared to the territory occupied by Russia and Ukraine. Hence, in the opinion of De la Gardie, it was easy to control.604 The Swedish army in the GDL included national (Swedish, Finish and Livonian) corps, as well many mercenary regiments of Scots and Germans. In the winter 1655-56, the Livonian Swedish army included 7,538 soldiers (4,108 cavalry, 2,896 infantry and 580 dragoons). Of these, 3,520 soldiers in 76 detachments stayed in winter quarters in Lithuania. 32 detachments were located in Samogitia, 12 in the district of Ukmergơ, 10 in Upytơ, 9 in Braslau and 8 in the northern part of the Kaunas district (see map no. 2).605 In the beginning of April, the total number of soldiers encamped in the GDL grew, encompassing 8,040 soldiers in 124 detachments.606 After the union, 1,600 Lithuanian cavalrymen reinforced the Swedish troops. Colonel Ernst Johan Korff became their commander. Korff’s promotion in the Swedish service had been rapid. He had made a brilliant career, and by spring of 1656 he had become General-Major.607 The Livonian Lutheran clan of the Korffs, which was integrated into the Lithuanian political nation, enjoyed De la Gardie’s full confidence.608 Until May 1656, there were two regiments of the Swedish-Lithuanian cavalry led by Ernst Jan Korff and Wilhelm Korff. They retreated to Courland only after the anti-Swedish uprising.609 Apart from the cavalry led by Korffs, the Lithuanian nobles made up most of the regiment under the command of Colonel Harald Igelström. Captain Jan Ering, a German from Lithuania, was its commander. The Swedes did not have a very high opinion of this regiment. The Governor of Riga, 604 Magnus De la Gardie to Per Brahe. April, 8 1656. Riga. RA. Skoklostersamlingen. E 8141. “Inquarteringen aff Armeen over Littouu.” Šiauliai. February 13, 1656. RA. Militaria 1305. 606 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 40-43. 607 Ibid., p. 63. 608 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 93. 609 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 63. 605 146 Christer Horn, stated that that Igelström’s regiment consisted of “bad officers and defective Lithuanians.”610 Bogusáaw and Janusz Radziwiáá were in Podlasie in order to defend the communication zone between Lithuania, Poland and Ducal Prussia, which was strategically important to Sweden. In the winter of 1655-56, two regiments led by Bogusáaw Radziwiáá quartered there. In February 1656, a Swedish regiment led by Colonel Fabian Berens was put to his disposal. In Podlasie (Rajgród and Tykocin) Janusz Radziwiáá quartered with 2,000 soldiers. De la Gardie distrusted Radziwiáá’s soldiers and was against their return to Lithuania since “they were unreliable, consisting of foreigners and strangers recruited from no one knows where.”611 As mentioned above, the Swedish administration had rejected Radziwiáá’s request that he be allocated taxes from the Swedish zone of occupation. Nevertheless, in accordance with the spirit of negotiations with Sweden, the Lithuanian nobility expected that the taxes collected would be primarily used to finance their soldiers and castles. Their hopes were disappointed. Early in December 1655, De la Gardie promised Radziwiáá that the Swedish army would not establish winter quarters in the GDL. It was, he promised, to leave for Sweden, and only local detachments would remain in Lithuania. 612 However, this promise was never fulfilled. The Polish king quickly responded to the formation of a pro-Swedish opposition by passing several laws. During 1655-57, Janusz Radziwiáá and practically all of his influential clients were deprived of their estates and public offices.613 Among those punished were: Jan Ering, Johann Ottenhausen, Hrehory Mirski, Tobias and Samuel Puciata, Jerzy Niemirycz, Krzysztof Mirski, Stefan Cedrowski, Jan MierzyĔski, Wilhelm Korff, Krysztof Stryszka, Jan Cedrowski, Olbrycht DĊbowski, the Starosta of Slutsk Sebastian Petelczyc, and many others.614 All these steps were illegal, since Jan Kazimierz was unauthorized to seize estates and remove nobles from their positions. Most of the confiscated estates were in territory controlled by either Sweden or Russia. These confiscations and removals remained, as yet, on paper. Instead, the king of Poland awarded the confiscated estates to, and appointed to the offices, those Lithuanian officers and officials who had remained faithful to him. He noted that “the property of traitors compensated the blood of the Lithuanian patriots, who were faithful to the Crown”615 Thus, Jan Kazimierz attracted a number of the Lithuanians to the Polish side. 610 Ibid., note 92. Ibid., note 74. 612 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 134. 613 LM, no. 71, 82, 165, 303, 437. 614 Ibid., no. 16; 21, 29; 86; 100; 185; 299; 303; 334; 373; 457; 459; 460; 544. 615 Ibid., no. 833. 611 147 Inhabitants of the Swedish part of Lithuania who swore loyalty to Karl X Gustav also became subject to the Polish repressions. They lost all their property by the king’s order. Among these were the merchants and druggists who helped the Swedish army, such as Fryck Hannus, Jakub Máynarek, Hanus Furyson from Samogitia, Krystian Regwald and Jan BreĪyna from Kaunas, Tomasz Tschenschef from Kơdainiai, Tomasz Gibel, Afanasi Kazmanczuk and Jerzy Dames from Vilnius, Jan Majus from Ukmergơ and Wasyl Kostrowicki from Minsk.616 Almost all those punished were Protestants, although some of them were Orthodox (Kazmanczuk). The Lithuanian Lutherans also suffered. By order of Jan Kazimierz, for his close cooperation with the Swedes and Radziwiáá and as “traitor to the Republic, to the Crown and the Holy Roman Catholic Church” Pastor Chociszewski lost all his property in Lida.617 In 1656, the Lutherans of Kaunas Paweá Meierach and Jakub Szemefelc lost their property since “they of their own will offered their services as ambassadors to the king of Sweden, where they dared to ask to transfer the St Paul’s Catholic cathedral to the Lutheran congregation and had bad intentions on our neighbours Catholics and our faithful nationals.”618 Very little is known about the activity of the Advisory Council, since the uprising in Samogitia (April–May, 1656) paralyzed its activity. The first assembly of the deputies took place at Žagarơ, on November 27-28 1655. There, Lithuanian deputies, together with Skytte and Lewenhaupt, decided on the placement of the Swedish garrisons in the GDL. Apart from that, the Council reached some important decisions in favour of the GDL nobility. The Swedish soldiers were not allowed to billet at the nobles’ houses. Provisions were supposed to be exacted by Swedish soldiers only against written receipts, which were then to be taken into account when taxes were paid. Taxes were to be collected by both Swedish and Lithuanian officials. A special taxation body, representing both parties, was established. The Swedish Royal Inspector Adolf von Rosenthal and the Lithuanian Treasurer of Starodub Jan Ciundziewicki led the tax committee. The committee included also the Swedish Royal Auditor Valerius Transebe and the Lithuanians Jerzy Biaááozor (for the Vilnius bishopric), Gabriel Sipowicz (for Samogitia), Konstanty Soááohub Dowoyna (for Upytơ) and àawryn Poczobut (for Ukmergơ).619 At Žagarơ the Lithuanian noble and clerical estates agreed to pay the new Grand Duke the three types of tax. First, was the pobór áanowy – an extraordinary military tax, which was paid during the war by the nobility and clergy from the all types of landed possessions: royal, noble and clerical. Second, 616 Ibid., no. 56, 106, 303, 316, 360, 506, 652, 703, 754, 864. LM, no. 203. 618 Ibid., no. 214. 619 RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20. Brev till Bengt Skytte, no. 169-170. 617 148 was the podatek podymne – an ordinary royal tax, which was paid since 1629 by the nobility, clergy, townspeople and farmers. And third the contribution in natural was introduced mainly in Samogitia for the provisioning of the Swedish troops. The plenipotentiaries agreed that the five Lithuanian districts under Swedish supremacy would contribute totally the tax of 110,000 thalers, which was an enormous amount to them, to their new ruler Karl X Gustav for the year of 1655.620 This agreement evoked the first conflict between the Lithuanians and the Swedes. The KU was signed at the end of October, and the Lithuanians expected the payment for 1655 to be levied only for November and December of 1655, or possibly even to be postponed until the beginning of the next year. However, submitting to Swedish pressure, the Council decided to collect taxes for the entire year of 1655. Many had already paid their taxes for the year of 1655 into the Lithuanian treasury. Naturally, the nobility challenged this decision. The Swedes did not seem to be willing to share the most important aspect of power-fiscal power. Instead of planned 100,000 silver thalers, the Swedish government collected in the GDL for the year of 1655 only 62,653 thalers. Therefore, in 1656 the tax pressure increased dramatically and only in the three first months of the year the Swedes collected in Lithuania 185, 233 thalers out of the 243,522 thalers, which they expected to collect for the whole year of 1656. This tax was paid by five districts and was much heavier than 300,000 thalers by all the 24 districts of the GDL paid to the Polish king. The Swedish administration rejected the redistribution of most of the royal estates among the loyal nobles, understandably regarding them as profitable for the Swedish Crown. In December 1655, in order to fill the Swedish treasury, a new customs duty, the so-called “Lithuanian excise-duty”, was introduced. This duty was to be paid by all Lithuanians, although, in accordance with its traditional privileges, the nobility was exempted. A new Swedish central customhouse for Lithuania was created in Biržai. The Swedish customs for Samogitia and northern Lithuania collected 32,603 silver thalers during three months of 1656 compared with 8, 880 thalers for the whole of the year of 1655. Naturally such a hard taxation was a shock to the population of Lithuania, which hoped to coexist with Swedes on the terms of equal union and not colonial oppression.621 The Swedish army caused another problem. Power in Swedish Lithuania was not in the hands of the civil administration. The country was ruled mainly by a military administration. De la Gardie and Skytte visited Lithuania only occasionally. They governed the area from the outside, from Riga or Courland. Meanwhile, thousands of Swedish soldiers were quartered in 620 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 141-142. Fagerlund, Rainer. 1981. Kontribution, försträckning och kaduck: svensk krigsfinansiering i Östersjöprovinserna 1655-1661. Historiskt tidskrift för Finland. Vol. 66, p. 321-337. 621 149 Samogitia and Lithuania. The Lithuanians had only one alternative to paying taxes, which was to have Swedish soldiers billeted in their homes, where these would eat and sleep for free – a harsh alternative. As a fiscal–military state, Sweden used a system of contribution and mercenary regiments. The system of contribution was first put into use during Sweden’s wars in Germany in 1618-1648. It was also tested by the Swedish administration in Lithuania in 1655-56.622 The accumulated experience of organizing logistics on foreign territory was extensive within the Swedish administration. Military entrepreneurs expected large-scale rewards through contributions, tax collections, a share of confiscated enemy estates and property and sometimes through plunder.623 The Lithuanians did not understand that the Swedes put costs of mobilizing and provisioning the army on the Lithuanian budget. In accordance with their standard practice, the Swedes assigned these costs to the local inhabitants. That was the main reason for the local sabotage of tax collection. This established practice posed an unresolved problem for the Swedish administration. As soon as the Swedish troops had entered the GDL, conflicts arose. In August 1655, one of the most influential nobles, Aleksandr RadzimiĔski, the podkomorzy of Samogitia, complained about the misbehaviour of the Swedish soldiers to De la Gardie. He described a night raid led by Vice-Colonel Martin Schultz who burst into his estate and took his horses and household goods. In the midst of the raid, RadzimiĔski’s wife had a miscarriage.624 De la Gardie did not reply. Therefore, signing the KU, RadzimiĔski made a second complaint. He wrote: “that the insult and humiliation I and my wife suffered from Martin Schultz made him seek justice.”625 In September 1655, two Lithuanian nobles killed a Swedish courier.626 Another Lithuanian nobleman in Swedish service, Jan Blindstrub, arrested them. Janusz Radziwiáá personally expressed his deep concern over the Swedish army in a letter to De la Gardie: Certain incidents flood our fervent intentions with cold water, make people hesitate and can ruin even that which was initiated with great success. Thus I was informed, among other things, that a certain detachment of the Swedish army attacked the house of a resident of Samogitia, the most respected man of our noble estate Aleksandr RadzimiĔski, the podkomorzy of Samogitia. 622 Nilsson, Sven. A. 1990. De stora krigens tid: om Sverige som militärstat och bondesamhälle. Uppsala, p. 178-196. 623 Glete, Jan. 2002. War and the state in early modern Europe. Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as fiscal-military states, 1500-1660. London, p. 208-210. 624 Aleksandr RadzimiĔski to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. August, 1655. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelserlser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. 625 Aleksandr RadzimiĔski to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. October 20, 1655. Kơdainiai. Latin. Ibid. 626 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 140. 150 The latter was forced to sign a receipt in which he bound himself to pay the Swedish soldiers redemption of 15,000 of imperials by a specified date. Moreover, the Swedes kidnapped well-off people, primarily women, and demanded ransom: To this terrible incident was added another one: the same assaulters captured near Palanga and took away Ms. Wojna, a widow of an innkeeper of Lithuania; Ms. Korsak, a widow of the podkomorzy of Polatsk; as well as Ms. Billewicz. Detailed description of this is rendered in the documents written by him and delivered in copies and translation to Mr. Horst. It is difficult to say what impression such unexpected and disgraceful actions made on the people who trusted in the guardianship of the King of Sweden. Radziwiáá demanded, “that for the sake of the authority of His Royal Majesty, those who captured the above-mentioned people be severely punished to compensate the terrible insult. And that would be an evidence that Karl X Gustav is not privy to that disgraceful actions.” He advised De la Gardie to make a list of Lithuanian estates in which the Swedish soldiers were supposed to find quarters and to categorically forbid violent acts. Radziwiáá stated that a considerable number of nobles had made complaints. He expressed his concern about the future status of his own domains in Biržai and Samogitia.627 De la Gardie shared Radziwiáá’s concern. On November 14 1655, he wrote to the king that the decision to withdraw all experienced ”old” regiments from Lithuania and to leave newcomer recruits was mistaken since these detachments were problematic, and included unruly soldiers.628 Thus, the main supporters of Swedish policy, the Radziwiáás, became discontented with the policy in Swedish Lithuania. There is a noteworthy letter from Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to De la Gardie complaining about Swedish taxation. In it he told De la Gardie that his policy contradicted the view of the king of Sweden: I feel that those not numerous landed estates that my relatives [Maria Radziwiáá and Anna Radziwiáá] own in Samogitia, and from the incomes of which they can survive in the catastrophes of this time are under threat and are burdened by various military actions. But His Majesty assured me that this is not in accord with his intentions, and that he would like to preserve for us the free use of our lands, and namely that, he wrote to His Excellency [De la Gardie] in his notice to my letter. I would like to add to this my lines, to implore You, and namely this I will do, with the help of your prestige and influence to assist in releasing now and later on the legal estates of my cousins from quartering by soldiers and other super-burdens on behalf of the soldiery, 627 Janusz Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. September 27, 1655. Kơdainiai. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. 628 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 38. 151 so that they could have certain means for living in the conditions corresponding to their blood. Indeed, on the back of the Radziwiáá’s letter, Karl X Gustav wrote an order directing the release of the lands of the Radziwiáás from the above-mentioned burdens.629 This was done, and Swedish troops did not camp again on Radziwiáá’s estates. The sole exception was the castle of Biržai, which had passed under Swedish control according to the previous agreement. Whereas the Swedish administration actively encouraged all forms of taxation to pay for its army, Russia, on the contrary, freed the population in the occupied territories of Belarus and Lithuania from paying taxes for two or three years.630 On December 17 1655, De la Gardie declared that the form of tax collection had been completed. Nevertheless, many taxpayers had not yet paid their taxes. Therefore, strict measures had to be taken, to force the inhabitants to pay.631 As a result, De la Gardie and Skytte were swamped with letters complaining about the Swedish officers’ harshness when collecting taxes and contributions.632 For example, a future leader of the antiSwedish uprising Aleksander Judycki complained about the behaviour of the Swedish soldiers. He wrote to Skytte that after parting with him he had been unable to contact Skytte via letters. However, a commissar had arrived at his mansion in the county of Josvainiai and, acting as if he had Skytte’s consent, demanded provisions. Judycki asked for confirmation that this order had really come from Skytte, but a Swede refused. Judycki asked to be allowed to send Skytte a person who would assure His Excellency about the sad state of his manor.633 Apart from the conflicts between the Lithuanian nobility and the Swedish army, there arose drastic contradictions between influential local allies of Sweden and other nobles over the distribution of landed property. For example, on November 18 1655, the widow of the palatine of Brest, Aleksandra Klonowska z RadzimiĔskich, wrote a letter to Skytte. She noted that “she found a refuge from the Muscovite invaders in Samogitia, where she owned several villages as a present of the kings, predecessors of Karl X Gustav for the services of her husband and her own merits before the Patria.” Despite 629 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. January, 18 1656. Schippenbeil/SĊpopol. French. On the back page Karl X Gustav to De la Gardie. Swedish. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. 630 Hardzeeu, Maxim. 1999. ”Pod chas nebespechenstva od Moskvy”. Aktovaya kniha polatskaha mahistratu za 1656-57 iak krynitsa pa vyvuchenniu vainy 1654-1667. Belarusian Historical Review. Vol. 6:1-2, p. 202-221. 631 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 140-142. 632 RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531; RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20. Brev till Bengt Skytte. No 36, 155, 157, 159, 160, 169, 170. 633 Aleksander Judycki to Bengt Skytte. November 11, 1655. Josvainiai. Latin. RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20, no. 159. 152 this, Colonel Ernst Johan Korff had confiscated three villages.634 She begged Skytte for protection, and that he order Korff to give back the villages. The relation between the Swedes and the clergy of Lithuania was also an important issue. For unknown reasons, the Reformed superintendent of Samogitia, Jan Borzymowski, did not take part in the Kơdainiai negotiations. The primate of the Lutheran Church, and superintendent of Lithuania and Samogitia Jan Malina fled in the summer of 1655 from Vilnius to Ducal Prussia. He could not take part in the negotiations with Sweden. In exile, Malina wrote a work entitled Excidium Lithuaniae, in which he bemoaned the destruction of the country. In 1655–56, Sweden occupied only 6 out of 24 districts of the GDL. However, these included the majority of Protestant congregations (about 70 out of 100). Among them were the following: 1. Reformed: • Samogitia: Beržai, Gơluva, Grinkiškis, Gruzdžiai, Kơdainiai, Kelmơ, Krasnagališkơ, Kurtuvơnai, Kurkliai, Linkuva, Slabada, Mankiškiai, Mantviliškis, Pašušvys, Plonơnas, Raseiniai, Šiluva, Šilơnai, Šventoniškis, Švobiškis, Viduklơ and Žeimelis. • Braslau: Braslau, Ikazn and Uklia. • Upytơ: Biržai, Nemunơlio Radviliškis, Naujamiestis, Papilys, Panevơžys, Beinorava. • Ukmergơ/Wiákomierz: Alanta, ýedasai, Deltuva, Janušava, Pamnjšis, Panoteriai, Salamiestis, Salos, Svơdasai, Šetekšnos, Vidiškiai, Vyželiai and Vyžuonos. • Slutsk: Slutsk, Kapyl, Pahost and Litvinovichy. 2. Lutheran: Kơdainiai, Tauragơ, Gaurơ, Skuodas, Šventoji, Šaukơnai, Žeimelis, Alkiškiai, Virbalis, Panemunơ and Gelgaudiškis (Samogitia); Biržai, Saloþiai and Nemunơlio Radviliškis (district of Upytơ); Žeimiai and Vištytis (Kaunas); Slutsk and Zamoscie (Duchy of Slutsk). 3. Antitrinitarian: Kơdainiai and Tauragơ Thus, Sweden controlled the most Protestant part of the Duchy. For reasons of security, the Swedes preferred to set up garrisons in Protestant towns such Gruzdžiai, Grinkiškis, Skuodas, Šventoji, Panemunơ, Biržai, Nemunơlio Radviliškis, Raseiniai, Braslau, Ikazn, Gruzdžiai and Krasnagališkơ. The largest Swedish garrisons were at the two castles in the Protestant Biržai and Panemunơ on the Nemunas River (belonging to the Lutheran nobleman 634 Aleksandra Klonowska z RadzimiĔskich to Bengt Skytte. Ibid., no. 157. 153 Krzysztof Eperyesz). This weakened the trust between the Swedes and local Protestants, who now had to pay extra in order to accommodate an army in the locality. On March 14 1656, in Biržai the synod of the Reformed Church of Lithuania and Samogitia took place. In their address to De la Gardie the Protestant priests and nobles thanked for the Swedish protection and declared that they would remain in inviolable fidelity and obedience to Karl X Gustav. However, they asked De la Gardie as the Governor of Lithuania to protect Evangelical parishes of the GDL from the high contributions and to grant immunity for the most important Protestant centres.635 The Uniate and Orthodox bishops were also in exile, either in Ducal Prussia or in Poland. They could not collaborate with Sweden. Hence, the only ecclesiastical power, which preserved its leadership in Swedish Lithuania was the Roman Catholic Church. The Swedish leaders recognized the political influence of the Catholic Church and treated it mildly. However, the attitude of the ordinary Lutheran soldiers towards the Catholics was naturally hostile. On November 29 1655, the prior of the Dominican cloister at Raseiniai, Krzysztof Kurowicz, complained to Skytte about the behaviour of Swedish soldiers. The Catholic priest reminded Skytte that he had once been a guest at the cloister, and complained that the soldiers “are constantly staying at cloister and are doing it much harm demanding food which both he and the cloister lack.”636 In December 1655, Skytte asked Bishop Parczewski for permission to conduct Lutheran services for the Swedish soldiers in the Catholic churches of Samogitia, “until our own churches will built in.”637 This request was a political mistake on part of the Swedish administration. Lutheran services in Catholic churches provoked the hostility of the local Catholic population towards “the heretical” Swedes. In February 1656, Swedish soldiers killed two Catholic priests for unknown reasons. This action led to the anti-Swedish altitudes among the Catholic clergy. Bishop Parczewski had sent a protest to the Swedish military command.638 At Christmas 1655-56, Jerzy Biaááozor, member on the Advisory Council, complained to Skytte about the Swedish soldiers in the clerical landed estates. He noted that almost all the priests of the Vilnius diocese had addressed him. The misfortunes were caused by Swedish mercenaries who repeatedly demanded requisitions from clerical landed estates, despite the fact that these estates were freed from taxation in accordance with the KU. In this connection, Biaááozor asked Skytte to approve an official document of 635 Humillima postulate Synodica per Trans-Wilia et Samogitiae. March 14, 1656. Biržai. Latin. RA. Militaria 1304. 636 Krzysztof Kurowicz to Bengt Skytte. November 29, 1655. Raseiniai. Latin. RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20, no. 116. 637 Dundulis, Bronius. 1977. Švedǐ feodalǐ Ƴsiveržimai Ƴ Lietuvą XVII-XVIII a., p. 62-63. 638 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 149-150. 154 protection, the draft of which had just been sent by Biaááozor.639 Bishop Parczewski addressed a complaint to De la Gardie, asking him, for the third time, to order his Colonel Jacob Skott (a Swedish-Livonian noble of Scotish origin) to withdraw from the bishop’s estate of Pavandenơ. This village had belonged to the marshal of Samogitia [Chryzostom Woáodkiewicz], but in accordance with the right of res caduca, it had passed into the possession of the king of Sweden. This was, in Parczewski’s opinion, a ”mistake,” since Pavandenơ had already been granted to him before the war. Parczewski also asked De la Gardie to release his other lands from the billet of Colonel Erik Kruse’s regiment. The bishop demanded a guarantee of all the rights of the clergy in his diocese, because according to the Advisory Council in Žagarơ, the Catholic clergy be freed from the quartering of soldiers.640 The Swedish leaders partially responded to bishop’s appeal. Then settled the matter of the estate of Pavandenơ in favour of Parczewski.641 The soldiers were prohibited from wilful actions while they were collecting provisions.642 On December 31 1655, Janusz Radziwiáá died. The loss of the leader of the Lithuanian separatists undoubtedly weakened the pro-Swedish faction. On January 17 1656, Tyszkiewicz, the main clerical opponent of the KU, died. After his death, the Swedes, acting without the approval of the Vatican, appointed Jerzy Biaááozor bishop of Vilnius. Skytte addressed the faithful in the Vilnius diocese. He asked them “to show their respect to the administrator and not to appoint a new hierarch, as well as not to accept clerics from Muscovite side, since Lithuanians have already promised to serve and to be faithful to the Swedish king, and it is impossible to serve two masters.”643 On March 25 1656, Jerzy Biaááozor was inaugurated in his new position. He promised “allegiance to the King of Sweden.” The new leader of Vilnius diocese sent a long memorandum to De la Gardie, demonstrating the loyal attitude of the Catholic Church to the new Lutheran administration. Biaááozor asked, in accordance with the KU, to be maintained in the position of spiritual leader of the Lithuanian Catholics. However, he complained about the behaviour of the soldiers. According to Biaááozor, the Swedish universals, written in German against soldiers’ violence, did not say a single word about the clerical estate, though it was strongly oppressed by the soldiers. Biaááozor noted that there indeed was a mention of the matter in a Latin universal, but not all soldiers understood Latin. Therefore, he asked that a provision be 639 Jerzy Biaááozor to Bengt Skytte. December 22, 1655. Ramygala. Latin. RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20. No. 160. 640 Parczewski’s complaint to De la Gardie. December 29, 1655. RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 641 Piotr Parczewski to Magnus De la Gardie. March 14, 1656. Latin. RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 642 RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 643 Bengt Skytte to the believers of the Vilnius deocese. February 14, 1656. Latin. Biržai. RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 155 added, safeguarding the clergy and its possessions, since the clergy enjoyed the same privileges as the nobility and almost all Catholic clergymen came from noble families. He further requested the right to free celebration of Catholic services in private buildings in Riga during his visits and the visits of the Catholic nobles. Biaááozor raised a question: to whom should the money (2,178 gold florins) from the real-estate taxes of the Vilnius bishopric for 1655 be given? Since Biaááozor had paid two-years of real-estate tax in advance, he asked to be released from paying taxes for 1656 and 1657. His fifth request was that his rights to the estates of Lanþinjnava and Taujơnai near Ukmergơ be confirmed. They were granted him by Swedish king and had previously belonged to the enemy Stanisáaw Masalski, who had left for Muscovy. Biaááozor further asked to be freed from army quartering on his estate Grinkiškis and the town of Pasvalys, which had been granted by the Swedish king. Finally, Biaááozor wrote that ”in his towns of Ramygala and Panevơžys, the Swedish soldiers quartered led by Ludvig Taube. He gave him provision and money. However, Taube was going to leave Ramygala and instead of his soldiers the Lithuanian detachment led by Captain Jan Ering was supposed to come. The detachment of the latter does not have a single good German but consists entirely of our very wilful Lithuanian soldiers.” Therefore he asked Skytte if it was possible that he be sent Swedish regulars instead of Lithuanians.”644 In response to Biaááozor, De la Gardie, on February 24 1656, forbade the Swedish soldiers under threat of martial punishment to extort money from or perpetrate violence against the Catholic clergy.645 On January 1 1655, Biaááozor informed Skytte that he, together with his cousin Stanisáaw Biaááozor and some of deputies of the Advisory Council, would arrive at the assembly to Biržai for its second session. Other influential nobles from the districts of Ukmergơ, Braslau and Upytơ were also to come, apart of Samogitia.646 Samogitia had, in fact, ignored this assembly. It convened its dietine in Raseiniai in early February 1656. A member of the Advisory Council, Jan Stankiewicz, was the chairperson. The dietine sent two ambassadors with a resolution, which had been adopted, to Marshal Lewenhaupt, as “Instruction to Lewenhaupt given to the Vice-Esquire Carver of Samogitia, Gabriel Sipowicz, and the Starosta of Kvơdarna Michaá Woyna, the ambassadors of the district and town judges and all the nobility convoked at the dietine of Samogitia.” In the beginning, the nobility showed its obedience to the new administration. The nobility admitted that 644 Memoriale Georgoi Biallozor Custode Prelato et Administratore Epat. Vilnensis. 1656. RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 645 Carlon, Ryska kriget, p.20. 646 Jerzy Biaááozor to Bengt Skytte. January 1, 1655. Ramygala. Latin. RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20, no. 155. 156 to the benefit of all nobles the royal auditor of Sweden Valerius Transebe had finally arrived and stayed in Raseiniai. However, the rest of the document illustrated deep discontent with Swedish rule. The ambassadors demanded that Lewenhaupt discipline the soldiers and make them respect the laws and customs of the country, and the decision of the Council at Žagarơ. First, contrary to the decision of the assembly, the Swedish soldiers were billeted in nobility’s houses everywhere, to the discomfort of their owners. This contradicted to the traditional rights of the nobility. Second, the Council of Žagarơ stipulated that if a soldier took more provisions than required, the surplus would be credited against the taxes. This had not happened, and the ambassadors asked that it be put into effect. Third, the clerical estates, especially the Jesuit Colleges of Kražiai and Pašušvys, had to feed the Swedish soldiers an amount that was equal to that exacted from the royal landed estates, which contradicted the law and custom of Samogitia. The nobility stressed that the Riga financier Hans Wittmacher (a future founder of the Swedish National Bank) had unlawfully hindered tax collection in Samogitia, “which was entrusted to Gabriel Sipowicz, who has a corresponding document confirmed by the all members of the Advisory Council.”647 The Samogitians maintained that not only did the officials in charge and the inspector collect the taxes, but that the Swedish Colonel Johan Pleitner also extorted taxes from certain nobles, causing confusion about the amount of taxation. Therefore, “to avoid mistake in calculation,” the ambassadors insisted that this dual collection be ended. The ambassadors had already informed the viceroy Skytte that the soldiers who had been sent to recover money from delinquent tax-payers by force of arms even did harm to those who had already paid the taxes, something they could confirm with documents. Therefore, the ambassadors asked for an order entrusting the collection of taxes from delinquent taxpayers solely to Lithuanian tax collectors or court marshal, in accordance with the laws and customs of the country. Apart from that, the document contained complaints made by high-ranking noblemen. The Treasurer of Starodub and head of the Swedish-Lithuanian tax committee Jan Ciundziewicki complained about the Swedish Quartermaster Filip Rosenstein and Over-Lieutenant Gunnar Igelsson. The Swedish officers ignored Skytte’s order. They had loosed wild soldiers on Ciundziewicki’s house, and beaten his brother and his wife, and had 647 A talented financier Hans Wittmacher was born in Riga in 1611. His father was a Dutch merchant, his mother Anna Bielska came from the Ruthenian family of Lithuania. During 1655-56 Wittmacher made an excellent carrier in Lithuania under the command of De la Gardie. On November 30, 1656 De la Gardie recommended Wittmacher to Karl X Gustav with idea to creat the National Bank. Wittmacher moved to Stockholm and founded the Stockholms Banco, today known as Riksbanken - the first National Bank in the world. He was ennobled and died under name Johan Palmstruch, see: Svenskt Biografiskt Handlexikon. Vol. II, Stockholm, 1906, p. 268. 157 caused much harm to his peasants. Therefore, he insisted on the restoration of justice. Samuel Juszkiewicz had already lodged a complaint against the Swede Johan Wiberg for entering his manor of Biržanơnai by force, though after the KU this estate had been granted to Juszkiewicz by the king of Sweden. In this case, Skytte confirmed Juszkiewicz’s right. However Wiberg continued to threaten Juszkiewicz with his return. Therefore, the ambassadors demanded that such actions and threats be punished and that Lewenhaupt be informed about other ongoing suits. The Samogitians asked Lewenhaupt to order the auditors to speed up helping the offended.648 They were vexed by the fact that many Swedish officers, not the local officials, collected taxes.649 This was against the principles of the KU, which considered the union as a federation of two equal partners. However, even the native tax collectors had problems collecting taxes. On December 16 1655, a Swedish-Lithuanian tax-officer for Ukmergơ, àawryn Poczobut, wrote to Skytte that the local nobles sabotaged the tax-collection and asked to issue a special complementary edict.650 Another tax-officer in Upytơ, Konstanty Soááohub Dowoyna, reported to Skytte about the successful results of taxation for the year 1655. In this case conflicts had arisen between him and the Swedish officers. Soááohub wrote that Colonel Johannes Gardemeister had come to him with an order from Lewenhaupt urgently demanding thousands of thalers for payment of the Swedish soldiers. Soááohub asked for Skytte’s advice about what he should do. 651 Dissatisfaction with the harsh tax regime spread. On February 8 1656, the nobility of Upytơ sent a response to Skytte. They had assembled in a dietine at Biržai and had sent two ambassadors: Hieronim Puzyna, the marshal of the district, and Mr. Butkiewicz, with complaints and claims.652 The confusion of the financial policy is demonstrated in an appeal to the Lithuanians dated February 23 1656, and signed by Governor General of Livonia, Samogitia and the surrounding districts of Lithuania. De la Gardie wrote that “since the time the army of Sweden entered Lithuania and Samogitia, their inhabitants contributed to it both with innumerable sums of money and different kinds of provisions including ordinary and special taxes to support the army. To make accurate calculations of these contributions I see no other way than to oblige local officials and representatives of the nobility to do this.” Realizing the inefficiency of the Advisory Council, De la Gardie tried to arrange the local diets of the nobility. He called on the nobility of 648 February 2, 1656. Raseiniai. RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. MSR, p. 98, 132. 650 àawryn Poczobut to Bengt Skytte. December 16, 1655. Latin. RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20, no. 169. 651 Konstanty Soááohub Dowoyna to Bengt Skytte. December 28, 1655. Linkuva. Latin. RA. Esplunda arkiv. Vol. I:20, no. 170. 652 February 8, 1656. Biržai. RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 649 158 Samogitia and the districts of Ukmergơ, Braslau and Upytơ to arrange dietines not later than April 1 1656 (March 20 in the old Swedish calendar) and to discuss with the Swedish commissars all the problems related to the Swedish rule. Samogitia and Lithuania were to make lists of their payments and give them to the royal commissars in the specified towns.653 Following De la Gardie’s orders, the head of the Swedish administration in the district of Upytơ, Major Theophil Bolten, waited in Panevơžys during one week for the assembly, but in vain.654 No response came from Samogitia and Braslau. Only the nobility of Ukmergơ gathered for a dietine. They decided to send their ambassador, Jerzy Kosialkowski, who was a knight of Bogusáaw Radziwiáá, to De la Gardie. A declaration of ”Nobility of the neighbourhood of Anykšþiai in the district of Ukmergơ to Magnus Gabriel de La Gardie” was signed by more than 30 nobles, it stated that We are aware of the fact that the person we are writing to is the Head of our country and represents the Swedish king. Therefore, we want His Excellency to know about our misfortunes and aspirations. Our land along the Sventoji River has fallen into disuse because of the Muscovite raids, the stampede of Lithuanian soldiers and due to the absence of the nobles who were at the negotiations in Kơdainiai. So we had not been able to harvest what we planted. Some of our estates had been plundered by the Enemy, some had been burnt and many of our relatives have been killed, some of them perished when our houses were set on fire. Thus, appealing to the Lord as the witness, we would say that we had nothing to pay taxes from. The nobles continued that they gladly welcomed Swedish detachments in Anykšþiai to defend them, despite the fact that few of them could share the costs. If possible, they would be very glad if the delivery of provisions could be cut down to once a year. They humbly asked that they be allowed to deliver the provisions to Biržai as they had done before, which would free them from any additional payments that the local Swedish soldiers might demand.655 This declaration demonstrates the Lithuanian discontent with Swedish fiscal rule, which did not take into account the desperate economic situation, which had resulted from the war. The appeal also shows the absence of coordination between the Swedish high command and separate Swedish detachments, the latter of which demanded extra provisions and money from the local population. 653 Sacrae Regia Majestatis Regnorumq, Sveciae Senator Ac Thessaurarius, Generalis Gubernator Livoniae, Ducatus Samogithiae Cum Adjacentibus districtibus Lithvaniuam..Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie. Riga. February 13, 1656. Print. KB. F 1700. Fol. Kungsskrivelser. 1 pp. 654 Theophil Bolten to Magnus De la Gardie. April 8 1656. Panevơžys. German. RA. De la Gardieska samlingen. E 1350. 655 RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 159 Swedish civil and military authorities viewed Lithuania as a conquered country. The heads of the civil administration, De la Gardie and Skytte, were unable to control the actions of the Swedish army. The army treated the GDL as an occupied country, and demanded more food and money. A crisis occurred in February 1656 when Sweden decided to withdraw its troops from Prussia and to base them in Samogitia. The number of Swedish troops in winter quarters increased dramatically from 120 to 160 detachments.656 On April 7 1656, in a message to Karl X Gustav, De la Gardie warned that the Lithuanians had become “almost enemies” and he was afraid that “one day they would follow the example of Poles.”657 Having realized his mistake, De la Gardie reduced the number of troops in Lithuania to 124 companies.658 Trying to save the situation politically, De la Gardie planned a general meeting of the Advisory Council and the Lithuanian Diet for May 4, 1656 in Biržai, “to discuss the question of heavy taxes together with all the Lithuanian estates.”659 The Swedish Council of the Realm received a report from De la Gardie in which he informed the Council about the forthcoming meeting at Biržai, where he planned to ask the local deputies to help solve the problems caused by the war.660 On April 18, De la Gardie left Riga for Lithuania. The Advisory Council members (their number is unknown) gathered at Biržai, and waited humbly for De la Gardie until May 5. After that Jerzy Biaááozor sent a letter saying that the term of the assembly had ended and that they assumed that the representative of the Swedish king had more important things to do. They would leave, he wrote, since they had not received any additional news from him.661 Šapoka has argued reasonably that the members of the Council could have waited longer, but that the antiSwedish uprising made them depart earlier than planned.662 The Advisory Council established after the KU managed to hold only one full session, and failed to become an important organ of government. When the anti-Swedish uprising began, the Council members split into different camps. Some of them remained loyal to the Swedes. Others switched back to the Polish side. A third group sought contact with Muscovy. However, the formation and activity of the Advisory Council, as well as other pro-Swedish activities, show that the KU was more than a mere conspiracy of Radziwiáá. It had wide social support. 656 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 41. Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie to Karl X Gustav. April, 7 1656. Riga. RA. Livonica II. Generalguvernör Livland till Kungliga Majestät 1655-1656. Vol. 77. 658 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 41. 659 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 287, note 3. 660 Svenska riksrådets protokoll. Vol. 16, p. 442. 661 Jerzy Biaááozor to Magnus De la Gardie. May 5, 1656. Biržai. Latin. RA. Militaria. Vol. M. 1304. 662 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 157. 657 160 3.5 The Anti–Swedish uprising in Samogitia and decline of the Kơdainiai Union In 1656 the Lithuanians rose up in Arms and killed all the Swedes, that were in Winter–quarters among them. Bernard Connor, 1698 3.5.1 Motives behind the uprising and its first stage. The anti-Swedish uprising of 1656 changed the balance of power in the Baltic to the detriment of Sweden. The uprising had wide European repercussions, and an account of it was included in the historical works of the 17th century.663 Swedish and Polish historians consider the uprising as part of an all-Polish anti-Swedish resistance. Landberg, for instance, held that a wellorganized resistance movement in Poland encouraged the rebels.664 Actually, in the opinion of the nobility, inhabitants of Lithuania had been prevented from getting correct information on events in Poland by Swedish vigilance.665 Podlasie, which was controlled by Swedes and by Radziwiáá, effectively separated Lithuania from Poland. Fagerlund wrote that as early as the end of March 1656, “the uprising has become an accomplished fact” in the eyes of the Swedish administration.666 The uprising had, however, caught the Swedes unaware and caused panic on the local level. Polish historians tend to downplay the scale and level of independence of the uprising in Lithuania. Instead they emphasize the weakness of Swedish power in the GDL. Codello asserted that rebellion against the Swedes encompassed all of Poland and Lithuania and that “the treasury of Radziwiáás caused condemnation by the whole society of Lithuania.”667 In fact, there were provinces in Swedish Lithuania where the resistance was insignificant (Braslau). The Radziwiáás were not alone: a considerable part of the local nobility continued to acknowledge allegiance to Sweden, and opposed their own compatriots. OchmaĔski holds that the key role in organizing the uprising belonged to Field Hetman Gosiewski.668 However, the army led by 663 Pufendorf, Samuel. 1696. Samuelis liberi baronis de Pufendorf De rebus a Carolo Gustav Sveciae rege gestis commentariorum, libri septem elegantissimis tabulis aeneis exornati cum triplici indice. Norimbergae; Connor, History of Poland, p. 131. 664 Landberg, Georg. 1952. Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia. 1:3, 1648-1697. Stockholm, p. 93. 665 MSR, p. 134. 666 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 45. 667 Codello, Aleksander. 1966. Wydarzenia wojenne na ĩmudzi i w Kurlandii 1656-1660. Przegląd Historyczne. Vol. 57, p. 49. 668 OchmaĔski, Jerzy. 1982. Historia Litwy. Wrocáaw, p. 129. 161 Gosiewski came to Lithuania after the uprising. The rebels got in touch with Warsaw in June-July 1656, but at first Poland did not give them any concrete assistance. In the edict of September 16 1656 King Jan Kazimierz praised the Samogitians for defeating the Swedes through their own strength and resources.669 The spontaneous anti-Swedish uprising did not gain the support of regular troops or of official leadership. How the uprising was organized, as well as the motives of its leaders, are questions still under dispute. The details of the uprising and the first steps of its organization need to be thoroughly examined. Pufendorf remarked that a complex of causes provoked the rebellion: • • • • • Heavy taxes Jesuit propaganda Distrust between Protestants and Catholics Rumours of the death of Karl X Gustav Support of Muscovy.670 A similar set of causes was listed by Skytte in a report to Karl X Gustav dated May 6 1656.671 A little-known Lithuanian source singled out three main reasons for the uprising. The author, Mikoáaj Szemet, had signed the KU, but later became an insurgent and wrote this detailed report to the Polish king. To him the primary reason of the uprising was political. Sweden had failed to respect the conditions of the KU. Szemet wrote that Sweden was obliged to wage war with Russia, in order to regain the lost territories of the GDL. Instead the Swedes had quartered their troops in Samogitia and northern Lithuania. As a result, the nobles had perceived the real intentions of the Swedes was a capture of the GDL: A Swede does not support us in the struggle against Muscovy Instead, they wilfully occupies the nobles’ homesteads Slavery rather than freedom rebelled against a new power.672 In Szemet’s opinion, the cost of quartering the Swedish army was another cause of the nobles’ discontent. Indemnities were imposed on nobles’ manors. This had led the Samogitia gentry levy to refuse Swedish service and to leave for their homesteads. Finally, Szemet pointed out, the heavy tax burden was the main motive for the dislike of Swedish rule.673 669 Tyla, Antanas. 1976. Sukilimas Lietuvoje prieš švedǐ, p. 67. Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p.190. 671 Carlsson, Alfred Bernhard. 1912. Sverige och den östereuropeiska krisen. Ett betänkande af Bengt Skytte om den svenska politiken. Historisk tidskrift, p. 113. 672 MSR, p. 76, 188. 673 MSR, p. 52-54, 76, 98, 132. 670 162 On April 22 1656, De la Gardie informed the king of Sweden of the start of the Lithuanian uprising.674 The uprising probably began some time between the 18th and 21st of April. It had started with the slaughter of many Swedish soldiers. The revolt had been well prepared and well coordinated: The artful action of the Lithuanians lay in their decision to attack the Swedish soldiers scattered in Lithuania on one fixed day. The gangs of nobles and peasants attacked and wiped out the soldiers, which was a complete surprise for them.675 The centre of the uprising was in Samogitia, where 2,650 soldiers or 75 per cent of all Swedish troops were encamped.676 The attack was strong and unexpected, and the shock was intense. The first report asserted that the entire Swedish army seemed to have been slaughtered. When the panic died down, the Swedes found that they lost many soldiers, but not all of them. This was reported in a letter written by Skytte to De la Gardie: “Thank goodness, the big cloud has passed and I should admit luckily for us, as Colonel Harald Igelström estimates our losses in all places to 1,000 cavalry.677 One or two companies of Erik Kruse, 3 companies of Johan von Rosen and 4 companies of Gotthard Vilhelm von Budberg were lost.”678 Skytte wrote that the uprising had, from the very beginning, “a universal and strong character with the participation of both nobles and ordinary people.”679 Six days prior to the uprising, someone had warned the Swedish cavalry led by Ludvig Taube about preparations for an uprising. It may have been Bishop Biaááozor who warned Taube.680 At first Taube, decided to heed his warning and move his soldiers security in Biržai castle. Nevertheless, Taube was quite confident of the insignificance of the resistance movement, and of the rebels’ limited forces. Therefore, when Taube learned that a rebel unit was moving towards them, he made up his mind to engage them in battle. As a result of this battle, most of Taube’s squadron of dragoons were destroyed on May 1. Only 80 Swedish cavalrymen reached the gates of Biržai.681 674 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 45-46. Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p. 190-191. 676 Tyla, Sukilimas Lietuvoje prieš švedǐ, p. 65; Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 43. 677 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 287. 678 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 48; Pufendorf, sju böcker, p. 190-191. Pufendorf added also three regiments of Colonel Hans Christoffer Buttler, but according to Fagerlund these regiments were already under the command of Johan von Rosen. 679 Bengt Skytte to Magnus De la Gardie. April 28, 1656. Mitau/Jelgava: Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 287, note 3. 680 Tyla, Sukilimas Lietuvoje prieš švedǐ, p. 68. 681 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p. 191. Biaááozor was completely faithful to Sweden up to the end of the rebelion and betrayed Sweden in favour of 675 163 The causes of the rebellion were discussed during the session of the Swedish Council of the Realm on June 21 1656. It was the first issue on the agenda, which was evidence of its importance. According to the proceedings, “the Council of Riga, summoned on account of the situation in Lithuania, has already discussed this problem and sent a report about the reasons for the revolt in Lithuania.” The report stated that the uprising was caused by the mistake of Swedish officers who, first, had scattered their soldiers over the whole country in accordance with the principle “go there, where there is more bread”. Second, however, they had failed to control the soldiers, who had started to rob the population: “As known in accordance with the orders, our soldiers and cavalrymen were quartered by 5-6 persons in the [Lithuanian] villages that constituted 30-40-50 houses. For this reason the officers were rare visitors there, and the soldiers felt at ease to plunder the population. The peasants started complaining, but their complaints fell short and did not reach the commanders.”682 On the one hand, De la Gardie accused himself of causing the outburst of the rebellion. In his address to the Council of the Realm, De la Gardie noted that the Lithuanians’ complaints about the Swedish soldiers were justified, but the neglect of our ask of food had made the soldiers take desperate measures.683 On the other hand, De la Gardie accused military officers of spreading the soldiers throughout the country without his knowledge. Actually, the officers had informed De la Gardie about this measure. For instance, Colonels Conrad von Yxkull-Gyllenband and Wilhelm Yxkull reported De la Gardie that they had to scatter the soldiers about the villages because of a refusal to deliver of foodstuffs.684 According to De la Gardie, the officers were not insensitive to public opinion. In the end, Lewenhaupt arrived too late to Samogitia. He was unable to fulfil De la Gardie’s order that he quarter the army only in one location.685 Wisner has suggested as a hypothesis, that the officers of Hetman Sapieha organized the revolt.686 The first Lithuanian information on the revolt was a proclamation signed by Colonel Jan Lisowski, on April 26 1656, at Virbalai near Skuodas. In this leaflet, Lisowski appealed to the Samogitians to take up arms against the Swedes. Lisowski asserted that he had the approval of Poland later. After that Jan Kazimierz “for great services rendered to us and the Republic” granted Biaááozor the town of Panơvežys and favoured him with senate position of the bishop of Smolensk. 682 Svenska Riksrådets protokoll, vol. 16, p. 499. 683 Relation to the Swedish Riksråd from Magnus De la Gardie. May 21, 1656. Riga. RA, Livonica II. Volym 80; Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 46-47. 684 Conrad von Yxkull-Gyllenband to Magnus De la Gardie. March 4, 1656. Veliuona. German; Wilhelm Yxkull to Magnus De la Gardie. March 28, 1656. Šedeikoniai. German. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. E 1604. 685 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p. 191. 686 Wisner, Dysydenci litewscy wobec wybuchu wojny polsko-szwedskiej, p. 139. 164 Sapieha and King Jan Kazimierz, who had ordered him to impose a levy on the Samogitians in order to start the expulsion of the Swedes.687 The first leader of the confederacy of the insurgents was Aleksander Judycki, a colonel of Sapieha. Judycki deliberately refused to sign the KU and had been arrested for this by Radziwiáá. However, later, for unknown reasons, Skytte set him free. The 1659 Diet was to reward Judycki, as the leader of the uprising, and for enlisting the recruits and guarding the Samogitian borders against the Swedes. Moreover, the first peasant unit to take part in the uprising came from Josvainiai. Tyla has suggested that the organizer of that unit was Judycki, who, at that time, fulfilled the duties of Starosta of Josvainiai.688 The local nobility disapproved of Judycki because he was of non-native descent, so he was forced to resign in favour of Wiktor Mleczko, a Samogitian by birth. Swedish authorities identified another insurgent, Samuel Juszkiewicz, who was, as discussed above, discriminated against by the Swedish officer Johan Wiberg. It seems that the enthusiasts of the revolt were the noblemen whose lives had been directly affected by the Swedish authorities. Contemporary Polish sources identified a bailiff of Pajnjrys, Hieronim Kryspin Kirszensztein, as the organizer of the rebellion.689 This man was also considered to be the leader of the uprising by De la Gardie, who called him “Crispin.”690 The Catholic, Kirszensztein had refused to sign the KU, and had fled with his family to Königsberg. But after signing the agreement between Sweden and Brandenburg-Prussia (January 17, 1656), the authorities of Prussia had forced all Lithuanian refugees to swear allegiance to Sweden. Kirszensztein had again refused to swear an oath, and had escaped to Samogitia. His movable goods were confiscated by decision of a Lithuanian, pro-Swedish committee in Prussia. Kirszensztein’s carreer started with the uprising. For his services, Jan Kazimierz presented him with stone houses in Kaunas that belonged to the local Lutherans, who were “traitors”. Somewhat later, Kirszensztein was appointed the marshal of Kaunas.691 He finished his long life (he died after 1681) as the grand treasurer of Lithuania, a position that gave him control over finances.692 3.5.2 The Swedish ”Drang nach Samogitia” Those Swedish soldiers who survived the slaughter assembled in Šiauliai, the location of the Swedish general headquarters, under the command of 687 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 160. Tyla, Sukilimas Lietuvoje prieš švedǐ, p. 66. 689 Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Kórnik. Doc. 755. 690 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 48, note 129. Fagerlund could not attribute this person. 691 LM, no. 214. 692 Augusiewicz, Sáawomir. 2001. Prostki 1656. Warszawa, p. 43-44. 688 165 Lewenhaupt. Šiauliai had transferred first to Janusz Radziwiáá and after his death back to Karl X Gustav. It was, therefore, a fairly safe place. From there, the Swedish army retreated to Joniškis on the border with Courland along the strategic route from Šiauliai to the capital of Courland. Having realized that the uprising was very serious, De la Gardie decided to return to Riga in order to bring back additional forces. After levying 1,550 volunteers in early May, De la Gardie led an army to Courland. He advanced to Bauske, to join Lewenhaupt, who, with the higher officers, came to attend the meeting. The Swedish leaders consulted at the castle of Annenburg/Emburga, in order to work out the strategy to repress the insurgents “so that the Swedish army could safely withdraw from Lithuania.”693 The last quote shows that the Swedes were already planning to withdraw their troops. This strategic plan made the future status of Swedish Lithuania very vague. Following the decisions reached during the consultation, De la Gardie relieved Lewenhaupt of his position and sent him to Riga. De la Gardie personally led the army. After combining with the garrison of Joniškis, the Swedes had a total of 3,000 soldiers. Following the information that an intelligence officer had provided about the concentration of insurgent forces in the vicinity of Šiauliai, one decided to give a decisive battle there. De la Gardie gave a number of infantrymen horses, and dedicated one day to teaching these newly-made hussars how to ride.694 During the night of May 8 1656, 1,200 hussars and 220 infantrymen, led by De la Gardie, arrived at Šiauliai. The town was empty. According to Pufendorf, all the citizens had abandoned the town, following the “black cowls” – Catholic priests. On the same day, the Swedes encountered 300 insurgents and defeated them. The insurgent leader, the Jesuit priest Niewiarowski, was killed.695 The Swedes quickly retook Samogitia. They had soon penetrated to the rebels’ fort, 15 km southwest of Šiauliai in the area between the villages of Gitariai, Maskiai, Raizgiai and Šventupiai.696 Having found out the location of the insurgents, De la Gardie gave orders for a decisive battle. The Swedes took the fortress by storm and captured one cannon and the field-kitchen. The rebels were punished ”with fire and sword” and many of them were killed.697 The Samogitians estimated the size of the Swedish army as encompassing 4,000 soldiers. However, in Szemet’s opinion, it was not a Samogitian defeat. Rather, what had taken place was a heavy battle in which both sides had suffered great losses. Many natives were killed, but the Swedes also lost 300 soldiers.698 After the battle, De la Gardie ordered the destruction of four villages near the fortress as punish693 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p.190-191. Ibid. 695 Ibid., p. 191. 696 Tyla, Sukilimas Lietuvoje prieš švedǐ, p. 69. 697 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p. 191. 698 Ibid., p. 191; MSR, p. 168-174. 694 166 ment for their support of rebellion. All villages and noble mansions around were to be burned ”so that terror crept into everybody in Lithuania.”699 In the bailiwick of Telšiai, the Swedes burnt 25 villages because their inhabitants had taken part in the revolt. These destructions are described in post-war sources: “there were only the ashes left from the villages where once were houses and belongings; many farmers were killed, others were captured and taken overseas, in slavery.”700 The next task was to do away with the mass peasant irregulars, which were assembled 15 km to the east of Šiauliai. The peasant army had been disposed in defensive positions close to the village of Kutiškiai (Gujszki in the Swedish sources). The Swedes easily captured 2,000 peasants. 500-600 of them were sent to build earthworks to defend Riga. Others were “let free to tell everybody about the crushing defeat of the uprising, all the rest lost their heads.” The uprising seemed to have been definitively put down.701 On an average, 31 per cent of all households in Samogitia had been ruined. In the Šiauliai area this figure was 39 per cent. Jurbarkas, where there had been heavy battles as well, suffered a loss of 55 per cent of its households. At the same time, the county of Kvơdarna, which was far from the centre of the uprising, lost only 7 per cent of its homesteads. 702 Mass participation of peasants in a political uprising is a rare occurrence in early modern Eastern Europe. The nobility was known to have a negative attitude to peasants in the insurgent units. The Samogitian nobility had also opposed their peasants’ participation in the uprising, in order to keep their workers. Hence, the field hetman of Poland Stefan Czarniecki, in his order of March 20 1656, had to threaten the nobles with death unless they let their peasants take part in the uprising against Sweden. From the military point of view, to use peasants in open military actions against the regular army was sheer madness. Captain Samuel Juszkiewicz, for instance, recruited many local peasants for the revolt and later lost them all.703 De la Gardie’s ultimate goal was to put an end to the insurgency in other places. The army marched to Šeduva. But the rebels retreated to the territories controlled by Russia, in accordance with the negotiations in Kaunas. Not wanting to provoke the Russians, De la Gardie withdrew to Joniškis. From Joniškis, the Swedes headed for Biržai. On May 15 1656, De la Gardie left Biržai for Riga, after reinstating Lewenhaupt as chief-commander. From Riga, De la Gardie made a last attempt to find a political solution to the problem. He appealed to the “village constables, dignitaries and to all the 699 MSR, p. 178. Morzy, Kryzys demograficzny na Litwie i Biaáorusi, p. 66-67. 701 Report by Magnus De la Gardie to the Swedish Council of the Realm. May 21, 1656. Riga. RA, Livonica II. Vol. 80. 702 Morzy, Kryzys demograficzny na Litwie i Biaáorusi, table 22, 33, 37. 703 Tyla, Sukilimas Lietuvoje prieš švedǐ, p. 70. 700 167 inhabitants of Samogitia, the districts of Upytơ, Ukmergơ, Kaunas and Braslau in Lithuania,” and expressed his joy over the victory the rebels who had forgotten their oath to Sweden. He promised complete amnesty to those insurgents who would lay down arms, but annihilation for the obstinate. He hoped to convince to the nobility that the Swedes realized the inadequacies of their government in Lithuania, and that they would improve it. All estates and classes were summoned to a sitting of the Lithuanian Diet at Biržai, planned for June 3 1656, in order “to discuss the proceedings of the land in conference.”704 De la Gardie was even thinking of granting the Lithuanian peasants liberties, in order to gain mass support.705 Lewenhaupt had to stamp out the resistance in Samogitia. Despite having a large army, the Swedes took control only over Biržai. The rest of Swedish Lithuania was outside Swedish influence. At the end of May 1656, a new rebel unit appeared in the vicinity of Biržai. Under existing conditions, to spread the army out in many garrisons would mean losing the war with the partisans. Sabotage of the food supply prevented locating the army in one place. Swedish efforts to solve the problem politically were in vain. The Swedes failed to regain control over Lithuania. In late May, a garrison of 600 soldiers led by Captain Gustaf von der Pahlen was left in Biržai. The rest of army withdrew to Nemunơlio Radviliškis, on the border with Courland. The soldiers camped on the Courlandish side of the river Nemunơlis. On June 25 1656, the decision was reached to withdraw the army from the GDL, except for the garrisons in Biržai, Braslau and Druja. The town of Kegums on the river Daugava on the road to Riga, was chosen for the Swedish camp.706 This location enabled the Swedes to control the border between Lithuania, Courland and Livonia, and in addition, the routes to Riga. Consequently, on the eve of the war with Russia, Sweden retained only three garrisons in the GDL, which were to be used as a base. 3.5.3 The Jesuits and Muscovy The purpose of this section is to discuss some historic facts previously overlooked, which underlay the organization of the uprising. In my opinion, Russian influence was the main external incitement for the revolt. The defiant anti-Swedish position of most of the Catholic clergy also played an important role during the first stage of the uprising. Polish historians have concentrated on the religious causes of the uprising, emphasizing that the oppression of the Catholic Church by Sweden was the main motive for the uprising. According to Kubaáa, Sweden and its allies had conducted a bloody 704 LMAB. Fond 233. B. 93. F. 269. Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p. 192. 706 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 47. 705 168 reign of terror against the Catholic clergy, and confiscated their possession. He also claimed that Radziwiáá had forbidden the Catholic priests to wear their clerical garbs outdoors.707 Indeed, many documents complain Swedes about repressions of the Catholic Church.708 In the mid-19th century, the Rector of the Catholic Seminary in Varniai, Motiejus Valanþius, asserted that the Swedes drove the disciples of the Jesuit College of Kražiai out of the college and looted the library.709 However, an anti-Swedish witness of the events did not stress the role played by religious oppression. For him, “the tyranny of the Swedes together with their Finns” against the nobles had caused the rebellion.710 The idea that the Swedish government would strongly oppress the Catholic Church during the war seems illogical. As is known, the KU had guaranteed the rights and freedoms of both the Roman Catholic and the Uniate churches. Here the religious policy of Sweden was different from that of Muscovy. The activities of the Uniate Church in the territories invaded by Muscovy were suppressed, and Roman Catholic activity was strongly restricted. However, the KU stated that all church estates had to be under the supremacy of the king of Sweden. The Swedish officers quartered their soldiers in the buildings of the Jesuits and the Catholic diocese of Samogitia for a simple reason. They could do this without asking for the permission of the nobility. Swedish detachments were located in the biggest Jesuit centres, Kražiai and Pašiaušơ, in the home estates of the bishop of Samogitia in Girkalnis and Viduklơ, as well as in numerous other manors. The quartering of troops certainly gave rise to strong discontent among the clergy, since it restricted their incomes by the Swedish crown. Thus, there were economic reasons for the Catholic Church’s dislike of Swedish domination. The clergy could not imagine a future within the structure of a Lutheran Sweden, in which Catholicism was outlawed. After the KU, De la Gardie and Skytte reported to Karl X Gustav that despite the fact that the bishop of Samogitia had signed the treaty, the Catholic clergy kept spreading propaganda against Sweden.711 Carlson asserted that the main instigators of the uprising were the Jesuits with their strong anti-Swedish propaganda.712 There is no source that shows that the clergy fixed the day for the slaughter of Swedish soldiers. But it is obvious that only the clergy would have been able to coordinate this type of action. Neither the nobility nor the peasants could move freely around the country. In the Swedish Royal “Relation 707 Kubaáa, Wojna szwecka, p. 92, 316. Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 152, 161-162. 709 Tyla, Sukilimas Lietuvoje prieš švedǐ, p. 63. 710 MSR, p. 152, 170. 711 Magnus De la Gardie and Bengt Skytte to Karl X Gustav. Kơidaniai. October 21, 1655. RA. Livonica II. Generalguvernör Livland till Kungliga Majestät 1655-1656. Vol. 77. 712 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 287. 708 169 on estates of Sweden” (1660), the Catholic Church was accused of directly organizing the revolt. Swedish authorities attributed the key role in preparing the uprising to the bishop of Samogitia Parczewski, who, in their opinion, sabotaged Radziwiáá’s plans of the union with Sweden. The intrigues of the bishop became clear, when many Swedish soldiers, who had been quartered and scattered about the country, found themselves among the rebels and were unexpectedly slaughtered.”713 Some details of Catholic propaganda are given by a 17th century source: In the year of 1656 the Lithuanians organized a big slaughter of the Swedish soldiers. They were encouraged by the Clergy who from their pulpits explained to them in their dialect that “The swine are well tied, and are fit to be slaughtered.” They obeyed them and started cutting the Swede’s throats as treacherous truce-breakers.714 In their sermons, the priests incited the peasants, using a Samogitian dialect that was incomprehesible to the Swedes. The Catholic clergy also took an active part in the insurgents’ military campaign. According to the Samogitian dietine of 1659, the Jesuits “by their own levies assisted in casting off the Swedish yoke. One of these levied a well-armed detachment that stood guard at the border with Courland.”715 The priests even led some of the insurgent detachments. The peasants among insurgents were Catholics. The first battles took place on the land of the Samogitian diocese. While only 19 per cent of the ruined farms belonged to nobles, the diocese of Samogitia lost 49 per cent of its farms. 716 Lithuanian historians Šapoka and Tyla, who have done research on the uprising, have ignored the role played by the Russians. The existence of Swedish Lithuania impeded Russian plans. After occupying most of the territory of the GDL, Muscovy expected to exclude the Lithuanian question from its negotiations with Poland. Samogitia was the largest administrative unit of Lithuania outside Russian influence. Two weeks prior to the uprising, the head of the Russian administration, Danila Myshetskii, sent an ultimatum to Skytte that “when the new green grass grows, not a single Swedish soldier must stay in Lithuania.” In a letter dated April 13 1656, which was a week before the uprising, Skytte informed De la Gardie about this ultimatum.717 What did the Swedes view as a sombre but general prophecy turned out to be exact information about preparations for the uprising, which Moscow had 713 Relation till ständerna av statssekretaren Edvard Ehrensteen. Sveriges Ridderskaps och Adels Riksdags- protokoll. Vol. 7.. Bilaga A, p. 172-173. 714 Blomberg, Carl Johan. 1701. An account of Livonia, with a relation of the rise, progress, and decay of the Marian Teutonic order, p. 164. 715 Tyla, Sukilimas Lietuvoje prieš švedǐ , p. 66. 716 Morzy, Kryzys demograficzny na Litwie i Biaáorusi, table 29, 50. 717 Carlon, Ryska kriget, p. 19. 170 received directly from the Samogitian nobles. The Swedes suspected Russia of coordinating the actions of the insurgents. During punitive expeditions against the rebels, the insurgents easily crossed into the zone controlled by Russia. The Swedes had to keep far from the border. Being aware of the preparations by Muscovy for a war against Sweden, the Swedes believed that “Muscovy wanted us to be entrapped” in order to blame Sweden for aggression against Russia.718 Recently published archival materials on contemporary Russian policy reveal the role played by Moscow in organizing the anti-Swedish uprising.719 September 6 1655, ambassador Fedor Rtishchev reported to the tsar that he had met with the starosta of Samogitia, Jerzy Hlebowicz, who had informed him that “he might try to persuade Samogitia not to yield to the Swedish King, but gain a foothold under your sovereign hands.” As a result, the Samogitian nobles received an official document with the proposal “of seeking for our Tsar’s grace.”720 Altogether, within the period between October 1655 and April 1656 the Russian authorities received at least three letters in which several Samogitian nobles complained about Swedish oppression. The ambassador to Karl X Gustav, the Pskov merchant Konstantin Ivlev informed the tsar about the intentions of Samogitians to excite a rebellion against Sweden, with hopes of receiving assistance from Russia: “if your tsar could send us at least 1,000 soldiers over the River Neris, all Samogitia would cede to Your Tsar’s Majesty, and no matter how many Swedes there were in Samogitia, we could beat them all.” This information resulted in a special mission headed by Vasilii Likharev. One of its main tasks was to hand over another of the Tsar’s official documents to Jerzy Hlebowicz. In it, the tsar promised all kinds of support and proposed that the Samogitian officials accept a Russian protectorate. It should be noted that Russia knew that Samogitia was already part of the Swedish kingdom at this time. As noted by Floria, given contemporary conditions the open offer of Russian support could have been a major argument convincing the Samogitians to favour an uprising.721 The Samogitian nobility received an explicit signal that Russia would not back up Sweden in the hostilities against the insurgents. On the contrary, Muscovy expressed interest in subverting the government of Swedish Lithuania. The instructions given to Likharev were a sign of Muscovy’s new policy, the purpose of which was to engage in open confrontation with Sweden over Lithuania and Samogitia. Zamyatnya Leontiev led the next Muscovite embassy. It left Moscow for Vilnius in March 1656. The Russian ambassador was directed to meet with 718 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p. 190, 192. Floria, Ot potopa do Vilna, p. 25-49. 720 Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia, p. 40-41. 721 Floria, Ot potopa do Vilna, p. 39. 719 171 the palatine of Trakai, Mikoáaj Pac, and inform him about a forthcoming Russian attack against Sweden. The Russians proposed a levy of 2,000 Samogitian noblemen for the war with Sweden. Leontiev had to convince Pac and Hlebowicz to come to Vilnius to swear an oath to the tsar. In Vilnius, Leontiev also met with the ambassador of Samogitia, Mikoáaj Szemet, who would be one of the future leaders of the uprising. Szemet gave a detailed report on that meeting. The aim of the Samogitians was to persuade Russia that Sweden had broken the peace treaty with Muscovy and would soon wage war against the Russians. According to Szemet, his information made a strong impression on the Russians, who promised him support from the tsar. At the same time, the Muscovite authorities of Vilnius refused to give the Swedish envoy an audience.722 Russian sources show that Szemet was interested in the tsar’s proposal that a Samogitian army be levied against Sweden.723 At the same time, Prince Andrzej Kurbski, the grandson of Andrei Kurbski (a notorious political refugee, who had fled from Moscow to Lithuania during the times of Ivan the Terrible) switched to the Russian side. As the descendant of a Muscovite family, he promised to swear fealty to the tsar and to sweep away all Swedish garrisons in Samogitia at his own expense. Another Orthodox prince, Marcjan OgiĔski, who had paid allegiance to Muscovy, led the insurgent unit.724 According to De la Gardie Russian support was a main motive for the revolt.725 On June 1 1656, the tsar received a letter written by Mikhail Shakhovskii. Shakhovskii reported that before the uprising, their leaders had visited him in Kaunas. These were the notary of Lithuania Jan Stankiewicz, his brother, the scribe of Samogitia Adam Stankiewicz and several other noblemen. They swore allegiance to the tsar and were allowed to bring their families into the Russian zone.726 A Catholic, Jan Stankiewicz, signed the KU and was appointed the commissar of the Swedish Council for Samogitia.727 However, he switched to the insurgent side and became a close follower of the Polish king. On the eve of the uprising, the Samogitians knew that Russia would soon attack Livonia and Braslau on its way to Riga. Therefore, they would have to free themselves from the Swedes through their own efforts in order to avoid a Russian invasion and in order to take control themselves. Most of Swedish Lithuania was already outside Swedish control before the Russian-Swedish war. The small garrisons in Biržai, Braslau and Druja were the exceptions. 722 MSR, p.186-190. Floria, Ot potopa do Vilna, p. 43. 724 MSR, p. 164, 186. 725 Magnus De la Gardie to Karl X Gustav. April 28, 1656. Riga. RA, Livonica II Generalguvernör Livland till Kungliga Majestät 1655-1656. Vol. 77. 726 Floria, Ot potopa do Vilna, p. 47. 727 RA, Militaria. Vol. 1304. 723 172 The insurgents seized the opportunity and on June 24 1656, they besieged Biržai.728 As of August 1656, they controlled most of former Swedish Lithuania. Some of nobles had already sworn allegiance to the tsar. Therefore, Russia decided not to invade Samogitia. Instead Russia decided to concentrate on the Livonian direction, while maintaining political contacts in order to convince the local nobility to accept a Russian protectorate. Many Russian officers were sent to Samogitia to enrol the nobles in the tsar’s service.729 On the way to Livonia, the Russian troops occupied the district of Braslau, which was controlled by Sweden. The local Ruthenian nobles reoriented themselves to Moscow very quickly. On July 20-21 1656, they visited the headquarters of Tsar Aleksei. Among them were signatories of the KU, and two members of the Advisory Council for Swedish Lithuania: the Protestants Wáadysáaw Puciata, Krzystof Mirski and Tobiasz Puciata; the Orthodox Aleksander Masalski and the Catholic Piotr Rudomina Dusiacki. On July 22 1656, the tsar, who entitled himself “Autocrat of Belarus”, issued a decree “On Prevention of the Braslau nobility from all troubles.” The tsar ordered to his soldiers ”not to ravage the Braslau nobles, not to burn their villages, not to kill their people and not to capture them, not to beat and rob them, not to take the food and forages from people without paying.”730 Soon the collaborators with Russia were pronounced by the Polish king to be traitors and deprived of their property.731 Russia quickly invaded Livonia, and on August 22 1656 it started the siege of Riga. This progress decided the fate of Swedish Lithuania. The aggression of Muscovy against Sweden ensured the victory of the revolt in Samogitia since, Russia’s switch to the camp of Sweden’s enemies, and undisguised aggression, meant that “owing to the Russian menace the Swedes left the Lithuanians alone not responding to a single action of theirs.”732 At the same time Russia would avoid all conflicts with the Samogitian nobility in order not to spoil Russia’s negotiations with Poland.733 On November 3 1656, Russia and Poland-Lithuania signed an anti-Swedish security pact at Nemơžis. Three days later, the commissars of the Polish king informed the Samogitian nobility of this pact, noting that Russia had given the Lithuanian army free passage through the Russian occupation zone. The case in point was the troops of Hetmans Gosiewski and Sapieha. Their main objective had 728 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p.162. Floria, Ot potopa do Vilna, p. 39. 730 PSZRI. No 183, p. 390-391. 731 For example, the landed estates of Krzystof Mirski was passed to ”a great patriot” Colonel Samuel Kmicic. LM, no. 299. 732 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p. 192. 733 Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p. 59. 729 173 been the capture of Biržai, the only fortress of Lithuania still in Swedish hands.734 3.5.4 From Rebellion to Chaos and Civil War The act of Confederation is the first news of organized resistance to Sweden. On May 23 1656 this act was announced by colonel Aleksander Judycki in Grinkiškis. In the name of King Jan Kazimierz and Grand Hetman Sapieha, Judycki called upon the nobles of Samogitia to gather in Josvainiai in order to do away with the Swedes. Judycki knew that some patriotic noblemen were on the way to Josvainiai. In Judycki’s opinion all traditional formalities had to be forgotten. The confederates warned that, in the difficult time for the Patria, those who would not assemble at Josvainiai or those who would not die for the Republic and the Holy Catholic Church would be treated as enemies of Fatherland. On June 3 1656, 153 insurgents signed the next act and appointed commanders. On the same day, the Diet of Swedish Lithuania was to have been convoked in Biržai. Judycki was appointed General of the Confederation. The other leading positions were given to Samogitians: Wiktor Mleczko Mikoáaj Szemet, Jan Szostowicki, Jan Stefan Billewicz, and Jan GruĪewski. All of these, except Judycki, had previously signed the KU. On June 6, the act was solemnly registered in the court book of Raseiniai. However, only a small number of the nobles who had decided on open opposition signed their names. This shows that many noblemen were frightened by the prospect of failure. On June 17 1656, Jan Kazimierz addressed an edict to the Samogitians. He called on them to fight against Sweden. He ordered them to seize Biržai, and appointed Wiktor Mleczko head of the resistance movement until regular troops could arrive. On June 24 1656, the confederates besieged Biržai, but failed to capture the strong castle.735 On July 20 1656, Mleczko called upon the nobility to join the rebellion and to join him at Biržai. This had no effect. The nobility stayed at home. In September 1656 the noble levy returned home from Biržai.736 The other rebel units’s cruelty to local peasants was one of the motives for this. For example, the peasants of Rnjdaiþiai, Genaiþiai, Macinþiai and Šinjpariai (in present-day Klaipơda and Kretinga districts) complained that in 1656 the Lithuanian unit of Gerhard Wilhelm Stinghoff had robbed them. The partisans had carried away 58 horses, 8 cows and 1,626 zloty in cash.737 734 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 175-176. Ibid., p. 159-163. 736 Akty izdavaemye Vilenskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov. 1909. Vilna. Vol. 34, p. 80-89. 737 Morzy, Kryzys demograficzny na Litwie i Biaáorusi, p. 76-77. 735 174 A number of noblemen simultaneously claimed to be leaders of the rebellion and sent letters to Jan Kazimierz. The king took advantage of the occasion to send nominations and donating estates to the insurgents. Jan Kazimierz conferred the rank of “Colonel of Samogitia” on his favourite, the member of the court faction Teodor Lacki, for his great services during the uprising.738 At the same time, the same rank was given to Kryspin Kirszensztein and Szemet. As soon as Sapieha learned that the Swedish army had withdrawn from Samogitia, he started to re-distribute the territory among his officers. As of autumn 1656, chaos reigned in former Swedish Lithuania. The reason lay in conflicts between the two Lithuanian divisions of Sapieha and Gosiewski. The conflict was over food distribution. Sapieha controlled the district of Brest. Gosiewski’s troops, however, did not have their own territory to take provisions from. Because of this, Jan Kazimierz tried to support Gosiewski. This was illegal, since such matters fell under the jurisdiction of the Grand Hetman Sapieha. The officers quarrelled among themselves and oftenrequisitioned food from the same farms. Confrontations between insurgent units broke out. Moreover, the Confederation refused to accord some units any recognition whatsoever. On June 21 1656, Sapieha sent an edict to Samogitia in which he warned the local nobility against providing food to Gosiewski’s soldiers, and telling them not to obey his edicts. In September 1656, Sapieha addressed several more edicts, in which he appropriated food for the units of his division. In response Gosiewski informed the Samogitians of his intention to arrive with his troops as plenipotentiary hetman of the king. After that, Sapieha issued a new edict, which declared all Gosiewski’s orders invalid. He ordered the arrest of Gosiewski’s officers, and punished them severely. In response, Gosiewski began to threaten the local nobles. On November 7 1656, upon arriving in Virbalis, he proclaimed that the nobility had made a mistake in refusing to give the food to his soldiers, since his activity in Samogitia had been approved by the decision of the king and the senate. On November 30 1656, in Raseiniai, Gosiewski convened the dietine of Samogitia. During the dietine, the participants tried to clear up the question of provisions the army. They did not reach an agreement. Gosiewski described the situation as critical. Some officers lacked military discipline. Something had to be done, as, owing to heavy levies, the peasants were ready to riot.739 Thus, the situation in Samogitia after the Swedish withdrawal was far from stable. In these conditions a renewed Swedish offensive would theoretically have been a success. But Sweden was involved in its war with Russia, and so could not seize this opportunity. This assured the victory of the 738 739 Augusiewicz, Prostki 1656, p. 41. Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 159-174. 175 insurgents. At the end of December 1656, the 2,000 regular troops led by Gosiewski besieged Biržai again. The garrison of Biržai included 190 Swedes, 200 soldiers of the Radziwiáás, and 200 mercenaries from Courland. The promised relief support from Riga never arrived. At the start of the siege, the Lithuanians and Germans deserted. The Swedish soldiers alone remained to face the enemy. They were in a depressed mood and had hardly any food. As a result January 24 1657, Biržai capitulated. The Swedes withdrew to Riga taking their arms and eight cannons. No Swedish detachment remained in Lithuania.740 Polish historians consider the uprising “a rebellion of Samogitian nobility against Sweden”, but that is not quite correct. Many local nobles supported Sweden and served in the Swedish army. Among them the Lithuanian cavalry led by Wilhelm Korff and Ernst Jan Korff. Their soldiers fought against the rebels.741 Before the uprising, Mikoáaj Wysocki, one of the noted Protestants of Samogitia, entered Swedish service. His cousins, Johan and Ludvig Wisocki-Hochmuth were the Swedish officers.742 Radziwiáá explained De la Gardie Wysocki‘s wish to be the Swedish officer: Captain Mikoáaj Wysocki showing his determination to be on king’s side though the confederates called on him and his company to switch to their side, however told me that he wanted to make his way to Samogitia to place himself under the command of Your Excellency.743 For his collaboration with Sweden, the king of Poland denounced Wysocki as “a traitor” and gave his patrimony to the energetic rebel Teodor Lacki.744 The Lithuanian clan of Wysocki remained in Sweden and were introduced into the Swedish House of Nobility. King Jan Kazimierz admitted that many native nobles supported the Swedes. He mentioned that among the Samogitians there were those who supported the enemy and fought against the Commonwealth. These had to be punished.745 Szemet also mentioned that many nobles supported the Swedish side.746 Among them were several members of the Advisory Council. The fate of its members from Samogitia is symbolic. The Catholic Jan Stankiewicz is known to belong to the organizers of the rebellion. Nothing is 740 Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol. 3, p. 192. Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 63. 742 Their father Jan Wysocki (Johan Wisotzki) moved to Sweden from Lithuania during the First Northern War. Lieutenant Johan Wisocki Junior was married with Proscowia Aminoff from Ingermanland, a Swedish noblewomen of Russian origin. 743 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. March 3, 1656. Tykocin. French. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. 744 LM, no 108. 745 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 163. 746 MSR, p. 134. 741 176 known about Albert WezyĔski. However, Wilhelm Korff remained faithful to Sweden. A Colonel of Lithuania and a count of Courland, Korff ranked among the closest companions of the Radziwiáás. He was also the starosta of Orla – an important center of Protestantism in Ruthenia. In Samogitia Korff owned the village of Šaukơnai (20 km from Šiauliai) and was therefore a member of the Samogitian gentry. His mansion was a centre for Lutheranism. As a result of the uprising, Korff withdrew together with his soldiers to Courland, where he wrote to Bogusáaw Radziwiáá about the insurgents’ destruction of Šaukơnai and the Lutheran church there: Samogitian nobles, my neighbours, my last home estate Šaukơnai has been robbed. The furniture and household things have been taken away. The remains of the deceased in the church of Augsburg confession have been taken out of their graves. The church–house has been burnt and different cruelties have been done, saying that I am Radziwiáá’s companion, threatening that my mansion will be confiscated soon on their demand as belonging to a traitor.747 Soon Jan Kazimierz presented his faithful officer Krzysztof Szukszta with “Šaukơnai belonging before to the rioter Korff.”748 A royal order tells us about the fate of another follower of Sweden, Colonel Gothard von Buddenbrock, a Lutheran German in the Lithuanian army. He was a client of Janusz Radziwiáá and rented his town of Tauragơ. According to Sapieha’s officers, von Buddenbrock was “an obvious traitor” who had actively collaborated with Sweden and had fought against the insurgents. “Many local nobles who were going to our army were beaten, others were brutally murdered by him.” King Jan Kazimierz was aware that the rebels were demanding the property of pro-Swedish nobles, and that they, without waiting for the royal approval, plundered their estates. 749 Thus, the events of the anti-Swedish rebellion could also be viewed as a civil war. This civil conflict also showed some traits of a religious war between the Catholics and Protestants. Some Protestants switched to the Polish side. However, the general situation could be interpreted as a conflict between the pro-Polish Catholic and the pro-Swedish Protestant groups within the Lithuanian nobility. 747 Augustyniak, Dwór i klientela Krzysztofa Radziwiááa, p. 205-206. LM, no 373. 749 LM, no 186; Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p.162. 748 177 3.6 The Samogitian Entrance and Exit from Swedish Protection One of those who took an active part in the stormy events wrote “The Address on the Samogitian Entrance and Exit from Swedish Protection.” The author, Mikoáaj Szemet, belonged to a well-known family and was among the signatories of the KU. Afterwards, he took the Polish side and became one of the main figures in the anti-Swedish resistance. The document was written in 1657, but published only in 1994.750 The apologia of the former Swedish collaborator is a unique source. This memorial lays out the view and opinion of the nobility about Swedish domination, the motives for their rejection of collaboration with Sweden and for siding with Poland. The relation is written in the form of an address to, Jan Kazimierz, who is styled as “By God’s mercy the King of Poland, Grand Duke of Lithuania, Swedish, Gothic and Vandal Hereditary King.” Szemet described the KU as ”a misfortune.” He declared Jan Kazimierz as the true king of Sweden, and admitted that the KU was an act of treachery.751 The desperate military position of Samogitia had forced them to switch to the Swedish side. According to Szemet, Radziwiáá convinced the Samogitians that the Union was the only solution since the “Poles have already taken the Swedish side. Governors of its provinces together with bishops came to Sweden. There is no king in Poland. He fled to Silesia. Muscovy on the one hand, and the Swedes, on the other, threaten us. No one can help our Samogitia. There is no one to rely upon. Therefore, we yielded to the enemy.”752 He noted that Radziwiáá took advantage of misunderstandings between Samogitia and Lithuania.753 He stressed that the weak Samogitians had to sign the KU after the aristocracy and priests.754 In that way, Szemet downplayed the role of the Samogitian nobility, who were only obeying the highest authorities. Szemet portrayed the process of preparing the KU in dark colours. He explained that the initiators, with Radziwiáá at the head, and the Swedes had sat in a Protestant church “until darkness covered their dirty deeds and insincere acts.”755 He introduced various mystic occurrences. When De la Gardie was reading a speech, the floor tumbled down under him and he fell over and injured his leg badly: “by that omen the day of shameless Kơdainiai slavery 750 MSR, p. 38. MSR, p. 38, 40, 48, 68, 70, 74, 102. 752 MSR, p. 42, 44. 753 MSR, p. 74. 754 MSR, p. 100. 755 MSR, p. 102. 751 178 was complete.” According to Szemet, this symbolized the speedy demise of Swedish power.756 Szemet reproduced the text of the KU, but refused to analyse the text. For him, it was “the copy of shameless Pacts with the domination of Sweden or vassalage in slavery.” Szemet pointed out that he had decided to add the text of the accord exclusively “as keepsake for the descendants” and as a warning against possible treachery in the future.757 The main aim of the KU was “treason to the King and Poland.”758 Szemet held that the Swedes had failed to observe conditions laid down by the KU, since “instead of protecting Lithuania they directed their troops to Poland.”759 His refusal to analyse the text is quite logical, as any attempt at an analysis would spoil his description of the KU as an exceptionally negative and illegitimate phenomenon. By refusing to touch on the contents of the articles, he was able to present the image of KU as an act of occupation.760 The author asserted that owing to the treachery of the aristocracy, they were made slaves: “due to that Swedish protection, freedom was lost. Instead of freedom, slavery arose.”761 The narrative illustrates the regional allegiances of the Samogitian elite. Distinguishing Samogitia as an autonomous country, the author tried to create a new image of Samogitia as an equal member of the Commonwealth, just like Lithuania and Poland. This fell short of reality, but perhaps reflected the separatist dreams of the nobles for a higher status for Samogitia after the war. Therefore, in contrast to treacherous Lithuania, Szemet created the image of faithful Samogitia, portrayed as the main support of the Polish king. There were the Samogitians who had pressed the Swedes to change the articles concerning the rights of the Catholic Church.”762 The author’s separatism led to an emphasis of the border as a national boundary between Samogitia and other palatinates of Lithuania.763 Actually, it was a mere administrative boundary. The anti-Swedish uprising is portrayed as a general uprising of the Samogitians against foreign oppressors. 764 The role of Lithuania and its gentry’s levy is pushed into the background. These signals were fully understood by Poland. In a letter by Jan Kazimierz (June 30, 1657), “the Duchy of Samogitia” appeared, but Lithuania was not even mentioned.765 Szemet regarded the Samogitian relations with Poland as a feudal law relation between vassal and suzerain. Moreover, Szemet treated King 756 MSR, p. 106. MSR, p. 116 -126. 758 MSR, p. 86, 124. 759 MSR, p.188. 760 MSR, p. 50. 761 MSR, p. 54, 76. 762 MSR, p. 44. 763 MSR, p. 132. 764 MSR, p. 54, 76. 765 MSR, p. 182-183. 757 179 Jan Kazimierz as ”the legal and hereditary king of Sweden.”766 The Samogitians accepted the Swedish proposal only because they did not have correct information about what had happened with their monarch. Having signed the KU, the Samogitians found itself in a dramatic situation: “it was impossible to serve to two lords at the same time, Swedish or Polish and we had to wage war on the Poles and on the King.”767 Szemet regarded the KU as embodying the authoritarian essence of the Swedish royal model, which was contrary to the native republic’s tradition of electing the king.768 One of the aims of Szemet’s narrative was to inform the Polish king “about the defenders and betrayers of the Fatherland.” The author noted many participants in the anti-Swedish uprising.769 At the same time, his list of traitors is as short as possible. He mentioned only three names: Janusz Radziwiáá, Jan MierzeĔski, and Gabriel Lubieniecki.770 All the abovementioned nobles were already known in Warsaw as undisguised supporters of Sweden. The author asserted that many nobles had energetically collaborated with Sweden, but gave no names.771 Radziwiáá, who was dead, could serve as the ideal traitor. Radziwiáá, “a black sheep in a glorious family”, was, according to Szemet, the only senator who supported Sweden.772 He used all his influence to further the idea of the union among the Samogitians, in order to come to power.773 This portrayal satisfied everybody: from the Polish king to the former collaborators. Afterwards, this idea turned into a myth perpetuated by many Polish historians. It is significant that Szemet did not say a single word about Bogusáaw Radziwiáá, who was alive when the apologia was being written. The reason is obvious. Bogusáaw still had strong influence. In 1657, in Polatsk, the Ruthenian writer Symeon Poáocki (Samuel Piotrowski) wrote a poem dedicated to the tsar. His “Desperation of the Swedish king”, written in a pro-Russian spirit, has a typology similar to the apologia written by Szemet. Poáocki informed the tsar about the experience of Swedish policy in Lithuania. The main negative character was Karl X Gustav. The tsar, on the contrary, appeared as a true Grand Duke of Lithuania and a future king of Sweden. The poem named the main reasons for the failure of his policy in the GDL. These were the underestimation of Poland’s military power and the impossible dream of Karl X Gustav to become lord of two countries: 766 MSR, p. 48, 64, 84, 140. MSR, p. 48, 84, 86. 768 MSR, p. 90. 769 MSR, p. 190. 770 MSR, p. 72, 106. 771 MSR, p.68, 74, 134. 772 MSR, p. 40, 100. 773 MSR, p. 40, 42, 52, 74, 94, 100, 116-126. 767 180 It was my mistake to underestimate the Poles Even their Lithuania was captured Janusz Radziwiáá was our accomplice Together with all Samogitian people Who called us their King And then slaughtered my soldiers Not only that the Samogitians themselves denied their oath of allegiance But the Muscovites were pushed around. I dreamed of being a master of the two countries Therefore Lithuania had to be mine But wishing to take what belongs to others I lost my own Muscovites burnt Livonia Tatars burnt Pomerania That is God’s retribution. 774 Symeon Poáocki showed a negative attitude to the KU and to Janusz Radziwiáá, but he was restrained in his criticism of Boguslaw Radziwiáá. Szemet also tried to make sense of the role played by Protestantism and Catholicism in the KU. He abstained from specific criticism of the Protestants for their strong position in Samogitia. However, in his version, the Evangelical Church becomes the basic instrument of treason and it is the church that betrayed the Patria. Strong anti-Protestant rhetoric is heard in his narration of the KU ceremony. The author pointed out that all the main traitorous events occurred in the Protestant Cathedral: The documents of the agreement were carried from the Court to the Protestant Cathedral. With triumph marches the crowd to the Cathedral having the signatures with them. In their Cathedral they drank to the health of the new Sovereign. Late at night they were enjoying themselves until dismal darkness covered their amusements and dishonest deeds.775 To emphasize the heresy of the event, Szemet invented the legend of God’s punishment of the betrayers: “the lightning struck the Cathedral.” His portrayal of the fraternization of the native Protestants with the Livonians, Finns and Swedes also referred to this topic.776 Catholicism, by contrast, is portrayed as a national patriotic religion. He stressed that the Catholic nobles had resorted to armed rebellion in order to defend the Catholic religion: “our ancient holy faith.” Szemet asserted that 774 Polotskii, Virshi, p. 203. MSR, p.100-102. 776 MSR, p. 80. 775 181 only under the pressure of the Samogitians did a special article, guaranteeing all the rights of the Catholic Church, appear in Kơdainiai. Acknowledging that the KU was signed by Catholic hierarchs, Szemet nonetheless refrained from mentioning the well-known name of the Bishop of Samogitia Parczewski, who had served the new monarch. But in telling the story of the rebellion, he pointed out that Parczewski had raised a detachment of insurgents at his own expense.777 3.7 Conclusions The anti-Swedish uprising had negative consequences for Sweden and the pro-Swedish party of Lithuania. First, Samogitia was returned to the Commonwealth control. It became a strategic base for the Lithuanian army. Braslau was occupied by Russia. The loss of Samogitia meant the failure of Swedish policy not only in Lithuania, but also in Courland and Prussia. The zone of Swedish control, which had stretched from Livonia to Great Poland, disappeared. This seriously impeded communication between Swedish Livonia and the main troops led by Karl X Gustav. It also had consequences for the course of Russian-Swedish war. Pressure on Courland, which had been an enclave surrounded by Swedish territories, was reduced. The Lithuanian troops led by Gosiewski started a military campaign from Samogitia against Courland and Ducal Prussia, in order to force these countries to take the Polish-Lithuanian side. In the course of the uprising, the Protestant nobility was subjected to repression, and lost its political influence. After the summer of 1656, only Slutsk remained under Swedish protection. After the uprising, the pro-Swedish party realized that the undertaking of the KU had failed. Sweden lost during the uprising 1,700 of its soldiers. This was a hard blow. After the retreat from Lithuania, the rest of the army was “disarmed and starving.”778 As a result of the rebellion, the Swedish army of Livonia became powerless just before the Russian attack. After the first stage of the Russian-Swedish war and the rapid Russian occupation of Livonia, Sweden attempted to reach a reconciliation with Russia. If Sweden again used force in Lithuania, it would provoke a new conflict with Muscovy. Thus, only two political factions supported the resumption of Swedish control over Lithuania: Riga, and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. On September 25 1656, Radziwiáá was ordered by Karl X Gustav to take all his regiments from Podlasie to Riga to help defend it against a Russian invasion.779 However, in a battle at Prostki, on October 8 1656, the Radziwiáá–Swedish 777 MSR, p. 196. Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, note 137. 779 Svenska Riksrådets protokoll, vol. 16, p. 638. 778 182 troops were attacked and defeated by the Lithuanian army led by Gosiewski and the Crimean Tatars with Subchan Ghazi Aga at the head. Radziwiáá, General Israel Ridderhielm and many of the Swedish officers under his command passed into Tartar captivity.780 Many Swedes remained in Crimea for 20 years. De la Gardie admitted that Lewenhaupt’s decision to withdraw the troops from Lithuania had been a mistake.781 On November 14 1656, the Swedish Council of the Realm discussed Riga’s City Council’s request that the Swedish army be once again sent to Lithuania. The merchants of Riga promised to provide the troops with all necessary provisions (fur-coats and boots), and to fortify the cavalry. They “wanted that Magnus De la Gardie at the head of prepared corps to march off towards Biržai to make Lithuania calm down again.”782 As we can see, their own commercial interests gave the merchants of Riga a strong interest in the re-establishment of Swedish control. Radziwiáá and his faction made up another interested party. He expressed his hopes that Sweden would soon resume its control over Samogitia and northern Lithuania.783 However, the new circumstances meant that the efforts of Riga and Radziwiáá to get Sweden to attempt to re-establish control over Lithuania met with no response. 780 Wittrock, Georg. Marienburg och Labiau. Karolinska förbundets årsböcker. Stockholm, p. 89-90. 781 Magnus De la Gardie to Karl X Gustav. June 1, 1656. Riga. RA, Livonica II. Generalguvernör Livland till Kungliga Majestät 1655-1656. Vol. 77. 782 Svenska Riksrådets protokoll, vol. 16, p. 687. 783 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. September 30, 1656. Wagenschos. French; Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. November 17, 1656. Brandenburg/Ushakovo. French. RA, De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. 183 4 The Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a contested territory 4.1 Paradoxes of War: Three Lithuanian Dukes and One Hetman In the second half of 1655 a paradoxical situation arose in the GDL. Four rulers simultaneously claimed the position of the legitimate Grand Duke of Lithuania. Moreover, each was trying to verify this right legally and to gain the Lithuanian nobility’s support. According to the August Declaration, the estates of Lithuania accepted Karl X Gustav as Grand Duke of Lithuania. The KU verified this clause. Karl X Gustav was not only installed as Grand Duke of Lithuania, but all the future kings of Swedish Pfalz dynasty were to inherit this title. Finally, the public declaration to the European community recorded that the union abolishes submission and obedience to the Polish Vasas dynasty. Only the Swedish kings and their successors will be accepted as Lithuanian dukes. This document had very serious consequences for Swedish foreign policy, since it uncovered a potential conflict, first of all with Russia. In fact, the title problem initiated a Russian-Swedish conflict which resulted in war of 16561658. On August 20 1655, De la Gardie sent a letter to Vasilii Sheremetiev, the Russian voivode of Polatsk, and to Yakov Cherkasskii, the voivode of the Vilnius corps. In this letter he said that Lithuania had passed under the protection of Sweden. The fact that the Lithuanian office-holders and officers had accepted the Swedish protection shocked the Russian leaders. Only on September 11 1655 Russia did respond to Sweden. Cherkasskii expressed his discontent with the entry of the Swedish army into the territory of Lithuania, and also sent a complaint about Janusz Radziwiáá, who ”unlawfully styled himself as Hetman of the Swedish king in Lithuania, whereas the tsar is the only sovereign of Lithuania.”784 During the autumn of 1655, la Gardie and Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin, the voivode of Pskov, exchanged protests regarding the rights of both countries to different parts of the 784 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 59. 185 GDL.785 Muscovite diplomats blamed Karl X Gustav for “derogation” of the tsar’s title, accused him of unlawful seizure of Lithuanian territory, which belonged to Russia, and charged him with hostile propaganda against Russia.786 The Lithuanian nobles played a particular role in the Russian-Swedish conflict. Two days after the Declaration of Kơdainiai, during the talks between the Russian ambassador Vasilii Likhariov and Janusz Radziwiáá, Likhariov remonstrated against the Swedish title of Radziwiáá with regard to Karl X Gustav: You, Radziwiáá, wrote to our boyars and voivodes as the grand hetman and palatine of Vilnius under the king of Sweden. In addition, the tsar’s boyars and voivodes are amazed with that, since the GDL and the city of Vilnius, as you know, never belonged to the Swedish king, Vilnius was allways the possession of the Polish king. Moreover, owing to the falseness of the latter, our sovereign, the tsar took this city under his protection. In addition, henceforth Vilnius and Lithuanian towns are under our sovereign, the tsar… and the Swedish king will not quarrel with our tsar.787 In response, Radziwiáá noted first: the army of the tsar had invaded Lithuanian territory and terrorized the population. Second, the Polish king had rendered the Lithuanians no military help. Therefore, the estates of their own accord had asked for the Swedish king’s protection. According to Radziwiáá, the king of Sweden took great interest in the proposal and expressed his wish to take the GDL under his protection, guaranteeing all liberties. The alliance with Sweden had been freely entered into; no force had been involved. In Radziwiáá’s opinion, the choice of Sweden as a new political partner of Lithuania was in full accord the customs and laws of the Duchy. Therefore, his title was valid and well grounded. In the end, Radziwiáá insulted the ambassador, remarking that the tsar did not own the whole territory of the Duchy. In the course of subsequent talks, Radziwiáá resolutely refused to style the tsar “sovereign of Lithuania,” noting that “the tsar seized the Lithuanian capital on his own, ignoring the will of our estates.” 788 It was not so easy for the Muscovite elite to grasp the right to possession of the new territories. At first, Russia regarded Belarus as an integral part of Lithuania. For example, on July 28 1654, the tsar issued a first decree entitled “On the introduction the denominations of Polatsk and Mstsislau to my title since our boyars and voivodes seized these Lithuanian cities.”789 Belarus 785 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 37. Kovalenko, Gennadii. 1999. Kandidat na prestol. Iz istorii politicheskikh i kulturnykh sviazei Rossii so Shvetsiei XI-XX vv. St. Peterburg, p. 93-94. 787 Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia, p. 25, 115. 788 Ibid., p. 30. 789 PSZRI. No 134, p. 349. 786 186 was not mentioned. However, after getting in touch with the local Orthodox clergy, the notion “Belarus” quickly acquired a new political meaning. On August 20 1655, in the writ of protection given to the monastery of Kutsejna, the tsar was styled as “All Great and Little and White Russia [Belarus] Autocrat.”790 On September 1 1655, the Patriarch of Moscow Nikon gave his blessing to the tsar’s styling himself ”Grand Duke of Lithuania.”791 Nikon himself added to his title the name “Patriarch of Belarus”, paying no attention to the fact that the newly annexed territories were already under the jurisdiction of Kyiv metropolitan.792 That could not but create a conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In his turn, after pronouncing Karl X Gustav Grand Duke of Lithuania, De la Gardie assumed a new title himself. He signed his orders as “General Governor of Livonia, Duchy of Samogitia and surrounding districts of Lithuania and Chief-Commander in Lithuania.”793 On September 3 1655, (year 7164 according to the Russian calendar), the tsar issued a decree: “On titling the Tsar as Grand Duke of Lithuania, and Autocrat of Belarus.” This was Moscow’s official reaction to the recognition of the Swedish king as Grand Duke of Lithuania. The fact that the tsar’s decree appeared a month after the invasion of the Lithuanian capital was a tardy response to the initiative of Sweden, which had tried to consolidate its rights on the GDL legally. However, the Russian argument was quite different: “ We, the Sovereign, Our Tsar’s Majesty took the capital Vilnius from the King of Poland, the old possession of Rus Sovereigns, as well as invaded and captured many other cities and towns including the whole Belarus.”794 Apart from God’s will, Russian propaganda was based on a historical argument. The Romanov dynasty had treated Belarus as the ancestral land of the Rurikids. Muscovy regarded the capital, Vilnius, where many Ruthenians lived, as “a primordial Russian city”, in which ”the second-grade Lithuanian dynasty of the Gediminians reigned against the will of the natives.”795 In a decree adressed to Lithuanian senators, the tsar stated that “it was God’s mercy that we reinstituted the originall tsarist patrimony in Smolensk and many other cities and towns and the whole territory of Belarus, as well as Lithuanian capital Vilna, the possession of our Orthodox ancestors, Grand Dukes of Rus.”796 The separation of Belarus itself from the Lithuanian terri- 790 PSZRI. No 136, p. 350. Soloviev, Sergey. 1990. Istoria Rossii s drevneishikh vremen. Moskva, vol. 10, p. 623. 792 Mironowicz, Antoni. 2001. KoĞciól prawosáawny w dziejach dawnej Rzeczypospolitej. Biaáystok, p.154. 793 Sacrae Regiae Majestatis Regnorumq. Riga. February 13, 1656. Print. KB. F 1700. Fol. Kungskrivelser. 794 PSZRI. No 164, p. 369-370. 795 Floria, Boris. 1978. Russko-polskie otnosheniya i politicheskoe razvitie Vostochnoi Evropy vo vtoroi polovine XVI-nachale XVII veka. Moskva, p.14-20. 796 Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia, p. 72. 791 187 tory meant that the tsar regarded the incorporation of this geographicalreligious province into Russia as definite.797 Here, Sweden and Russia acted in a similar way. Separating Samogitia or Belarus from the GDL, both Great Powers declared incorporation of those provinces to their states. However, whereas Sweden had designed a political alliance, Muscovy chose to use force. Therefore, even the pro–Russian nobles of Lithuania showed their discontent with the tsar’s adoption of the title of Grand Duke, which he did without the Lithuanian consent. In “a humble petition” to the tsar (June 1656), the nobility of Minsk accepted the tsar as “Autocrat of Belarus”, but did not style him Grand Duke of Lithuania. Instead of this, a new diplomatic form appeared. The tsar styled himself as “Possessor of Lithuania.”798 While agreeing that the tsar had the right to Belarus, the nobility still refused to grant him the title of Grand Duke, implying that what he had seized by force had to be approved by a treaty. The news about the new title of the tsar soon reached Sweden. In a letter to Karl X Gustav dated August 29 1655, the tsar, being aware of the Declaration of Kơdainiai, wrote that after the invasion of Vilnius he became Sovereign of Lithuania and called the country “our hereditary Dukedom of Lithuania.” He congratulated the Swedish king on his victories in Courland and Prussia, but not in the GDL.799 When on October 1 1655, the Swedish embassy to Moscow arrived in Novgorod, the ambassador Gustav Bielke received a letter from the tsar. In it, Aleksei styled himself Grand Duke of Lithuania. Bielke interpreted this as “an extraordinary step which makes him reflect closely”, since it hindered Sweden’s plans. He immediately informed Karl X Gustav about this.800 In December 1655, Karl X Gustav received a letter from the tsar in which Aleksei styled himself “Grand Duke of Lithuania and Autocrat of Belarus.” However, the king flatly refused to accept this new addendum to tsar’s title.801 On January 29 1656, the king of Sweden sent a special memorandum to the tsar discussing the situation in Lithuania. This document was entered the Swedish Royal register as “to Grand Duke of Russia with regard to his new titling.” Karl X Gustav suggested that Aleksei ”order your boyars to cease the offences on the country of Our Royal Majesty and not to rape our king’s land [the GDL], small towns and cities, which belong to our king. As well I ask to punish your boyars for the listed unlawful violent acts.” Karl X Gustav stressed that several cities in Lithuania, which were under Swedish pro797 Maltsev, Alexander. 1974. Rossia i Belorussia v seredine XVII veka. Moskva, p. 105. BA, no. 121. 799 Floria, Ot potopa do Vilna, p. 26-27. 800 Dahlgren, Stellan. Den svenska ambassaden till Ryssland 1655-1658. Unpublished article, p. 10, note 42. 801 Nordwall, John. 1890. Svensk-ryska underhandlingar före freden i Kardis (1658-61). Uppsala, p. 3. 798 188 tection, had been illegally attacked by the Russian troops. These included Slutsk, Orla, Brest and Jurbarkas. All of these towns were situated outside the zone of the Swedish control formed by the KU. Thus, the king of Sweden demonstrated to the tsar who was the real ruler over the western districts. However, Karl X Gustav did not contest the tsarist right to Belarus. In consequence, the king of Sweden proposed to the tsar of Russia that both sides send commissars to discuss a temporary demarcation line in the GDL.802 The question of titles was highlighted for the huge Swedish embassy led by Gustav Bielke in Moscow. Official documents presented by the ambassadors to the tsar missed a most essential detail: the Swedes had omitted his title of Grand Duke of Lithuania. In response to a Muscovite protest, the ambassadors explained that the rapid changes had caught them unaware. Actually the ambassadors lied. Bielke had been in Riga until the middle of September 1655 and was well informed on talks between the Radziwiáás and De la Gardie. Bielke informed Karl X Gustav on August 20 1655 that “the whole of Lithuania, apart from the territories already invaded by Muscovites, chooses your protection.”803 Bielke strongly objected to sending a courier in order to get Karl X Gustav’s new instructions in regard to the issue of the tsar’s new title. In response, a head of Russian Foreign Service, Almaz Ivanov, declared that there would be no negotiations with the Swedes unless the question of new title of the tsar was solved. Russian diplomats demanded the death penalty for the burgomaster of Rewal/Tallinn, who in a letter to the tsar had omitted the title Grand Duke of Lithuania.804 The tsar refused to accept new letters from Karl X Gustav unless they contained the right titles.805 In Moscow, the Swedes tried to avoid the Lithuanian question by focusing Russia’s attention on the common enemy – Poland. They explained that the question of titles was the Swedish king’s prerogative. However, Boyar Nikita Odoevskii asked the Swedish commissars why Karl X Gustav, contrary to the tsar’s interests, had allowed Radziwiáá to proclaim him the grand duke when the tsar had already seized Lithuania and Belarus. In new instructions to Bielke, dated January 24 1656, Karl X Gustav wrote that in order to advance in the negotiations he could agree to call the tsar Grand Duke of the largest part of Lithuania and proposed that Russia join Sweden in a partition of the Duchy. At the same time, the Swedish king maintained his right to a considerable part of Lithuanian territory. 802 Karl X Gustav to the Grand Duke of Muscovy. January 29, 1656. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E1367. 803 Dahlgren, Stellan. Documentes related to the Swedish-Russian diplomatic negotiations 1655-1657. Unpublished article, p.10. 804 Floria, Ot potopa do Vilna,p. 35. 805 Carlon, Ryska kriget, p. 23. 189 Another conflict broke out on March 17 1656. In a letter to Karl X Gustav, Tsar Aleksei angrily noted that he had received a letter from De la Gardie in which Karl X Gustav was titled Grand Duke of Lithuania. In such conditions, further negotiations were out of the question. The tsar resolutely demanded the withdrawal of all Swedish troops from the GDL.806 The proPolish nobles of Lithuania played a significant role in stirring up the conflict. Early April 1656, Mikoáaj Szemet, as the ambassador of Samogitia met the Russian Zamyatnya Leontiev in Vilnius. The aim of his embassy was to convince Russia that the Swedes were preparing to wage war in order to conquer the Russian part of the GDL. Szemet brought important evidence: the edicts of Skytte published in Riga to the Lithuanian nobility. In these, Karl X Gustav titled Grand Duke of Lithuania. According to Szemet, in these documents the Swedish king had promised the Lithuanians that he would soon wage war against Muscovy and restore all occupied lands. Szemet also showed duplicates of the letters between the Radziwiáás and Sweden, which demonstrated their anti-Muscovite orientation. The main ambition of the Swedish king was ascribed as being “to reign over the whole Sea – the Baltic.”807 At the same time, Russian politicians fought against the pro-Polish elite of Lithuania for the tsar’s new title. In December 1655, the tsar sent a letter to Paweá Sapieha and other Lithuanian senators. He noted, “Because of your evil actions God granted us, the Tsar, to seize the whole Belarus and the capital Vilnius, as well as many palatinates and cities of the GDL. Thanks to the Mighty Lord, glorified in Trinity, we, the Tsar, became sovereign of All Belarus and Lithuania. Why you still style Jan Kazimierz, the Polish king, as Grand Duke of Lithuania?”808 Russia’s positioning “Belarus” as a separate part of the GDL also provoked a reaction from Poland–Lithuania. In their letter to the tsar, the senators for the first time in history titled the king of Poland as ”King of Belarus”, too. That provoked a strong objection from the tsar: “and you write to me the Tsar and in your letter style Jan Kazimierz as king of Belarus. None of the previous kings and the present king ever styled themselves like that. And you had better title the Tsar in the way as it is given by Our Lord from on high, as we style ourselves in our tsar’s official documents.”809 Muscovy connected “the bloodshed in Lithuania” with the Lithuanian refusal to accept the new title. Since then, the notion of Belarus as a separate land has entered the political lexicon.810 806 Dahlgren, Den svenska ambassaden till Ryssland, p. 18. A copy of this letter in RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E 1367. 807 MSR, p. 186-188. 808 Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia, p. 70-71. 809 Ibid. 810 VL. No. 804, 1081. 190 The dispute over the title between Russia and the Commonwealth culminated during the negotiations at Nemơžis (August–October 1656). Before the talks, Russia would legitimate its right to the GDL. The tsar declared to the nobility that he would never cede Belarus and Lithuania to Poland and ordered the nobility to send their ambassadors to Nemơžis in order to participate in the negotiations. The noble representatives had to assert that they wished the tsar alone to be Grand Duke of Lithuania.811 To win acceptance of the tsar’s new title, Muscovy agreed to give Poland some of the western districts of Lithuania. However, Belarus was to be annexed to Russia forever. The Commonwealth ambassadors resolutely rejected those proposals. Therefore, in the Russian original of the armistice of Nemơžis (November 3 1656), Tsar Aleksei is termed “Grand Duke of Lithuania”, but in the PolishLithuanian original, this title is missing.812 The Ukrainian Hetmanate also became involved in the conflict about who would rule the GDL. During the first Lithuanian campaign, the Cossack relations with Russia were idyllic. After the invasion of Vilnius, the tsar and the field hetman of Ukraine Ivan Zolotarenko had organized a triumphal entry to the city. While this was going on, the tsar demonstratively stopped at the royal palace and Zolotarenko at the palace of Radziwiáá. However, General Hetman of Ukraine, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, later gave Russia to understand that he had his own rights to the Orthodox territories of Lithuania. After the death of Zolotarenko, Khmelnytsky appointed a new field hetman for Lithuania. He chose the influential Colonel Ivan Nechaj, his son-in-law. Khmelnytsky’s edict diplomatically reminded to Ukrainians that the Cossack army intended to do “ the tsar favours henceforth.” But, at the same time, the hetman gave Nechaj the title “Zaporozhian Colonel of Belarus”, and explicitly outlined the territory of the Ukrainian portion with the districts of Rechytsa, Orsha and Mstsislau.813 After that the tsar stressed that Hetman had illegally appointed Nechaj “to be Autocrat of Belarus, since an autocracy in the Russian language implies a sovereign power and Nechaj sounds thievish. And he had better avoid writing such an indecent title, since in Belarus by God’s mercy, We have a sovereign power and We, the legal Autocrat of Belarus, Tsar.”814 In the spring of 1656, the Swedish ambassadors in Ukraine informed Karl X Gustav that Khmelnytsky was not going to abandon his claim on the whole territory of Ruthenia “where Greek Orthodox Faith exists 811 Soloviev, Istoria Rossii, vol.10, p. 633. Floria, Boris. 2004. Ukrainskii vopros na peregovorakh pod Vilno v 1656 godu. Ukraina i sosednie gosudarstva v XVII veke. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii. St. Peterburg, p. 160-173. 813 UBK, no. 112. 814 Hrushevsky, Mykhailo. Istoria Ukrainy-Rusi. Vol. IX. Chastina druha. Available on Internet: http://litopys.org.ua/hrushrus/iur.htm 812 191 and the Ruthenian tongue is spoken.”815 That meant that all the eastern and southern districts of Lithuania were within the sphere of the Cossack’s claims. King Jan Kazimierz also kept his title of Grand Duke of Lithuania. On September 8 1655, the king of Poland received an embassy of the Lithuanian officers led by Samuel Kmicic. They informed him of the betrayal, headed by Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. At the same time, they let the king know that the leaders of the royal faction, Gosiewski and Pac, had remained faithful to Poland despite of the pressure exerted on them. As a result King Jan Kazimierz in his capacity of Grand Duke of Lithuania issued an order in which Radziwiáá’s actions were denounced as “parricide.” All his enormous estates were now to pass to the faithful Lithuanian officers, which was in contradiction to the Statute of the GDL.816 Jan Kazimierz emphasized that the same fate was in store for other traitors.817 To gain the support of Paweá Sapieha, who was wavering between Karl X Gustav and Tsar, the Polish king granted him the highest possible position: palatine of Vilnius and Grand Hetman. This step persuaded Sapieha to switch to Poland.818 Receiving new information (sometimes erroneous), Jan Kazimierz, still in his capacity of Grand Duke of Lithuania, denounced parricides. He confiscated the landed estates of, and sometimes imprisoned, all known allies of Sweden. He did the same to Lithuanian nobles who were allied to Russia,819 or to Ukraine.820 The king gave their estates to faithful Lithuanians.821 As far as titles affected the relations between Sweden and Poland, Karl X Gustav remained fairly passive, leaving the claim to the title of Grand Duke of Lithuania to future negotiations. The main reason for Swedish passivity was the fact that the KU failed to be put into practice. Thus in 1655 the GDL became the conflict arena of the four countries: Poland, Sweden, Russia and the Ukrainian Hetmanate. Each of them counted upon the political support of local nobility. 815 Kentrschynskyj, Mazepa, p. 80, 86. Rachuba, Sprawa dóbr Radziwiááów birĪaĔskich, p. 52. AGAD. AR II. No. 1302. 818 Rachuba, Pawel Sapieha wobec Szwecji, p. 107. 819 LM, no. 32, 58, 232, 295, 303, 316, 444, 520, 593, 604. 820 Ibid., no. 64, 94, 123, 152, 154, 174, 175, 376, 397, 418, 421, 523. 821 LM, no. 16, 21, 29, 46, 56, 60, 71, 73, 82, 86, 100, 106, 108, 124,131, 108, 165, 176, 185, 186, 193, 203, 213, 214, 229, 299, 302, 334, 360, 373, 392, 437, 457, 459, 474, 506, 518, 544, 609. 816 817 192 4.2 The Importance of Russian Lithuania to the Swedish–Russian conflict Russian and Swedish scholars have investigated the issue of Russian agression and the subsequent Russian–Swedish conflict. In Kentrschynsky’s opinion, Stockholm’s unilateral contacts with the Cossacks prompted Muscovy to attack Sweden.822 However, most researchers believe that the complex status of the GDL and the reluctance of both Muscovy and Sweden to abandon their claims to Lithuania were the key factors behind the RussianSwedish War.823 The aim of the present research is to trace the role of the Lithuanian nobility in this conflict and to examine Russia’s attempts to create its own political party in Lithuania in order to challenge Sweden. In 1655, Russian plan envisioned two possible options for Lithuania. In accordance with the first, the whole Duchy was to be incorporated by Russia. At worst, the western part would stay with Poland, the northern part would be annexed by Sweden, while Belarus would be Russian.824 In any case, Muscovy could not do it without the Lithuanian nobility’s support, or at least the support of a large part it. According to Muscovite foreign policy, all Ruthenian lands were to be recovered from Poland, because they were part of its historical (Kyiv Realm) and religious (Orthodoxy) inheritance.825 During first campaign of 1654, the tsar appealed to the Orthodox population of the GDL as “the sons of our mother, the Greek Orthodox Church.” Thus, the tsar emphasized the religious nature of the war. The purpose was to annihilate the Catholics and to take the Orthodox population under his protection, as had already happened in Ukraine. The tsar promised well-being for all the Orthodox, and insisted on their separation from the Catholics, “by both, belief and appearance: tufts of hair had to be cut and let the sheep be separated from the goats. All those who before our arrival voluntarily swear fealty to us and remain faithful to us, will safeguard their homes and estates against pillage, as we strictly warned our soldiers not to affect you.” This appeal found its followers. The local Orthodox clergy and merchants helped Muscovy take a number of towns.826 On July 22 1654, a Ruthenian noble named Konstanty PokloĔski arrived at the tsar’s camp near Smolensk. He appeared as a delegate of the Orsha nobility. He suggested the formation of a military-administrative unit with the name ”the Belarusian Host” on the model of the Zaporozhian Host. The local nobility would administrate its territory. PokloĔski promised to form 822 Kentrschynskyj, Ukrainska revolutionen, p. l 7-86. Carlon, Ryska kriget; Kobzareva, Diplomaticheskaya bor’ba Rossii za vykhod k Baltiiskomu moriu. 824 Abetsedarskii, Lavrentii. 1978. Belorussia i Rossia v XVI-XVII vv. Minsk, p. 173. 825 Budovnits, Iosif. 1947. Russkaya publitsistika XVI veka. Moskva-Leningrad, p. 167-187. 826 Maltsev, Rossia i Belorussia v seredine XVII veka, p. 48-49. 823 193 the army out of nobles, and to help the tsar conquer the whole Duchy. The tsar agreed to his proposals and sanctioned the formation of a collaborationist army. He granted PokloĔski the title “Colonel of Belarus.” This was one of the earliest instances of the use of the concept ”Belarus” for political purposes.827 Very soon, PokloĔski convinced the defenders of besieged Mahileu to open the gates. Then, he levied nobility and citizens to form his own Cossack brigade and took control over a considerable part of Belarus. For his services to Russia, PokloĔski was given the town of Chavusy.828 PokloĔski refused to sign his official letters to the tsar in the conventional form used by all Muscovy governors – “Your slave”.829 He declined the Ukrainian proposal, which had asked him to join the hetman. He revealed the contents of the offer, thus compromising the Cossacks. Soon, the conflicts between PokloĔski and Zolotarenko overstepped the bounds of diplomacy. The Belarusian and Ukrainian Cossacks began to fight each other. Zolotarenko ordered the capture and death of “the false colonel of Belarus.”830 Thus, Muscovy had another problem. On the night of April 5 1655, the Lithuanian army led by Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá besieged Mahileu. PokloĔski’s brigade went into action, but suddenly he and all his soldiers joined the Lithuanian troops. Withdrawing from Mahileu Radziwiáá confirmed PokloĔski’s title of “Colonel of Belarus” and ordered him to defend the centre of the country. The terms by which PokloĔski justified his “home-coming to the side of Patria,” might be an interesting source in reconstructing how the Ruthenian nobles viewed Muscovite policy. In an appeal to the merchants of Mahileu, the Orthodox clergy and the Russian voivodes, PokloĔski gave the following reasons for his conversion. First, he found that instead of the liberties promised them, the Orthodox population was subjected to “robberies of Christian houses, tyranny of wives and daughters as it used to be in Tartar times.” Second, instead of the promised donations and offices, many Ruthenian nobles were exiled to Siberia (Tobolsk) and Kalmykia.831 The Orthodox clergy of Belarus had fallen into slavery to Russian hierarchs.832 In the Russian occupation zone, Orthodoxy was declared as the one and only indivisible loyal faith. The tsar made it unequivocally clear that he would not tolerate Uniates, Catholics, Protestants, or Jews, and that only 827 Panuceviþ, Vaclau. 2000. Sviaty Jazafat, arkhiiapiskap polatski. Polatsk, p. 160-161. Maltsev, Rossia i Belorussia v seredine XVII veka, p.155-157. 829 Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p. 32. 830 Ibid., p. 31-32. 831 Concerning the Lithuianian-Ruthenian nobles in Siberian exile see: Leshchanka, Ryhor. 1982. Belarusy-peraselentsy u Sibiry (kanets XVI-XVII stst.). Vestsi AN BSSR. No 5, p. 7989; Nikitin, Nikolay. 1991. Tobolskaya ”Litva” v XVII veke. Gorod i gorozhane Rossii v XVII-pervoi polovine XIX v. Moskva, p. 54-69; Rezun, Dmitrii. 1993. ”Litva” Kuznetskogo ostroga. Kazaki Urala i Sibiri v XVII-XX vv. Ekaterinburg, p. 41-51. 832 Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p. 37. 828 194 Orthodox believers could be the true subjects of Russia.833 The tsar would restore the former rights of Ruthenian Orthodoxy, which had been lost during the Catholic counter-reformation. Whereas the attitude towards the activities of the Roman Catholic Church was tolerant, at least west of Biarezina River, the Uniate Church was outlawed.834 The tsar closed the Uniate churches and gave their abbey estates to the Orthodox Church. In addition, the regime encouraged the non-Orthodox nobility to convert to Orthodoxy. The nobles who adopted “the ancient and veritable Christian faith” were granted offices and estates. The neophytes did not risk exile to Siberia.835 Patriarch Nikon tried to impart a religious aspect to Russia’s war against Lithuania. In his decrees, the goal was portrayed as war against Uniates. In place of the Uniate archbishop of Smolensk (Andrzej KwasniĔski Záoty), Nikon nominated the Orthodox bishop Filaret, the former bishop of Russian Suzdal. As a result, Záoty fled to Pinsk, where the Lithuanian troops led by Sapieha were stationed. Thus, the episcopacy of Smolensk, cut off from the Muscovite Patriarchy since 1618 and then catholized by Polish authorities, was returned to the Russian jurisdiction. In the end of 1655, the Uniate archbishop of Lithuania, Gabriel Kolenda, joined Sweden. The Uniate archimandrite of Mstsislau, Paweá Korsak, fled to Prussia, where also swore allegiance to Sweden.836 The Russian voivode in Vilnius, Shakhovskii, was ordered to take the relics of the founder of the Uniate Church, Józef Welamin Rutski (d. 1637), to Russia. No doubt such treatment caused the growth of anti-Muscovite resentment among the Uniate clergy, townspeople and peasants. After the death of Metropolitan Józef Horbacki (in 1653), the Orthodox Church of Belarus had been without a leader, since the king of Poland had failed to nominate a new bishop. On March 13 1656, Moscow appointed Kalikst Rytorajski as the bishop-administrator of Polatsk. This was the first step in granting the wishes of the Belarus population. The new primate of Belarus was not Russian by origin. He came from the GDL. Following Nikon’s instructions, Rytorajski launched an energetic campaign against the Catholics. He put an ultimatum to the Uniate clergy. The clergy was either to adopt Orthodoxy or leave the Russian occupation zone. At the same time, Muscovite clergymen poured into Belarus.837 The parishes of the Orthodox Church split between those faithful to Russia and those who backed Sweden or Ukraine. The archimandrite of Slutsk, Teodozy Wasilewicz, sided with 833 Pendzich, Barbara. 1998. The burghers of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the war of 1654-1667: resiliency and cohesion in the face of Muscovite annexation. Unpublished PhD thesis. Georgetown University. 834 Maltsev, Rossia i Belorussia v seredine XVII veka, p. 94. 835 Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p. 28-29. 836 Ibid., p. 46. 837 Ibid., p. 73. 195 Sweden.838 The dominant position of the Muscovite Church adversely affected the previously tolerant relations between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholics. For example, the Catholic nobles of Ashmiany complained that Bishop Rytorajski had closed a Catholic church in Valbarovichy and had exiled the priests to an unknown place.839 In 1657, Nikon raised Rytorajski to Archbishop of Belarus for his succes in converting of Uniates. Here Nikon exceeded his jurisdiction, which created a conflict with Kyiv. The Metropolitan of Kyiv, Sylwestɟr Kossów joined the Patriarch of Constantinople in a protest to Nikon.840 Continuing to break historic precedents, Nikon kept challenging the clergy of Belarus.841 An Orthodox noble from Mstsislau, Jan Oleszkiewicz, objected to the submission of the Belarusian Church. He wrote: The fact that Moscow Patriarch obliges Lithuanian Orthodox clergy to swear to serve him and thus to deny the holiest Patriarch of Constantinople makes the Ruthenian nobility feel sad, for this reason we rejected the Union with the Catholic Church because we wanted to preserve our fidelity to our Patriarch in Constantinople, who was conferred on us by Lord.842 The main apologist for the tsar’s policy became an Orthodox writer Symeon Poáocki. On the occasion the visits of tsar to Polatsk, he arranged a number of public ceremonies. Declamations in verse, written by Poáocki , glorified Aleksei as Grand Duke of Lithuania. Poáocki asserted that Aleksei had been already chosen grand duke, and termed the Russian monarch “Tsar of Lithuania” as well. The Tsar’s destiny was to overcome all enemies, and suppress the faithless Protestants and Catholics. Poáocki regarded the seizure of Ruthenian lands as a just historical step intended to transfer all the Orthodox population from the rule of a Catholic king into the ward ship of an Orthodox monarch. Poáocki predicted that the title of Grand Duke would be followed by titles such as the king of Poland and the king of Sweden. He shaped the idea of religious war against “heretical Sweden” in order to demonstrate to the world the greatness of Orthodoxy.843 Landownership was a great concern to those Lithuanian nobles who found themselves under Russian occupation. The voivodes informed the tsar that the local nobility will serve the tsar not to lose their former estates.844 To reduce pro-Swedish sympathy, the tsar ordered a register made over those 838 Soloviev, Istoria Rossii, vol.10, p. 613. Maltsev, Rossia i Belorussia v seredine XVII veka, p. 160. 840 Mironowicz, Antoni. 2001. KoĞcióá prawosáawny w dziejach dawnej Rzeczypospolitej. Biaáystok, p. 154-158. 841 Panuceviþ, Sviaty Jazafat, arkhiiapiskap polatski, p.163. 842 Soloviev, Istoria Rossii, vol.10, p. 612. 843 Polotskii, Virshi, p. 39-41. 844 Mialeshka, Hramadzianskaya vaina na Belarusi, p.142. 839 196 noble estates that were located along the border to the Swedish zone. The estates belonging to nobles who had sworn fealty to Karl X Gustav were confiscated. The confiscated manors created the state fund of confiscated estates. 845 However, Russia did redistribute these estates among the faithful nobles. Only a few nobles were granted lands. In April 1656, the tsar donated the town of Mikulichy to the Orthodox Prince Samuel OgiĔski.846 Some estates passed into the possession of the Orthodox Church. Russia’s refusal to widely redistribute confiscated estates made the nobility feel uneasy. This uncertainty created distrust between the new Russian administration and the nobility. In 1657, the nobility of Polatsk and Vitsebsk, on the occasion of the possible election of the tsar as the Polish king, remonstrated with the Russians. They were discontented with the new governors, who violated their rights, took peasants in the captivity, accepted bribes and did not honour the tsar’s decree that the Belarus nobility be exempt from pillage.847 Another problem that faced Muscovy was the Duchy of Slutsk, an enclave under Swedish protection inside the Russian zone. A strong Slutsk garrison not only controlled the city and its neighbourhood, but also made devastating raids on Minsk. The Russians interpreted these raids as hostile actions by the Swedes, although there was not a single Swedish soldier in Slutsk. The problem was a serious one: the Slutsk garrison weakened Russian control over the central districts and made it difficult to deliver provisions to the Russian garrisons. The voivode of Minsk, Fedor Arseniev, was certain that ”Sweden” would soon attack Minsk. He asked the tsar to send him additional forces “to defend against the attack of the Swedes.”848 However, the tsars’ soldiers were fighting Sweden in Livonia. Therefore, the position of Russia in the centre of the Duchy was fragile. Consequently, the tsar ordered that a gentry’s levy from Barysau be sent to fight against ”the Swedish Slutsk.”849 Thus, a new civil conflict broke out. The practice of the mass removal of skilled artisans and nobility into Russian captivity gave rise to negative feelings toward the Russians. In 1655, in Moscow, there were two settlements of the GDL captives numbering about 2,000 houses.850 The tsar’s regime had no clear policy concerning captives: now and then the tsar forbade Muscovite soldiers to take captives, but sometimes he ignored his own prohibition. Hence, many of the voivodes illegally sent local peasants to their private estates in Russia. None of the voivodes 845 BA, no. 121, 130, 138. Maltsev, Rossia i Belorussia v seredine XVII veka, p.142-143, 146. 847 Ibid., p.149-151. 848 BA, no. 120, 122. 849 BEF, no. 106. 850 Hrytskevich, Valiantsin. 1993. Belaruska-ruskiya peraselenni u XIV-XVIII st. Spadchyna. Vol.3, p. 31-38. 846 197 were punished for that, even after complaints from the local nobility.851 All this created an atmosphere of anarchy. Pufendorf, when he compared the political structure of the Swedish and Russian zones, noted that the nobles’ liberty was the main obstacle to effective Swedish administration, because “the Lithuanians were not able to combine freedom with obedience and therefore, excited rebellion.” Russia, on the contrary, “drew a sword and destroyed all those who were in its way, thus ensuring stable domination.”852 However, Russian domination depended also on the nobles’ loyalty. Without their support Russia was unable to control the occupied land. At the end of 1654, the Kremlin established new ministries to administrate the conquered territories: “Office of the GDL” and “Office of Smolensk.”853 New governing bodies increased the number of so-called “offices of regions” which carried on the administration of subordinates: the Office of the Kazan Khanate and the Office of Siberia. The office of Smolensk established a very profitable trade with Riga.854 During the war, Russia established a trade office in the town of Kasplya. It was aimed at Riga’s markets. Among the agents of the tsarist administration were Belarusian merchants and nobles. The author of the project was Ordin–Nashchokin. When the Swedish-Russian war broke out, that profitable trade stagnated. However, it quickly recovered after the armistice at Valiesar of 1658. Thus, Russia replaced Lithuania in the trade with Riga. The Kremlin’s plans for a Baltic fleet, says a lot about the scale of trade. In 1662, after the peace with Sweden, Russia, who still controlled Belarus and Livonia, asked the Duke of Courland to build it a merchant navy.855 Domination over Belarus thus corresponded to Muscovy’s economic interests. However, Russia lacked information on Swedish policy. The Moscow historian Elena Kobzareva thinks that the Kremlin rulers often acted on contradictory and incomplete information, since they were often deceived by incorrect information from the Lithuanian nobility, widespread rumours, translations from foreign newspapers, and information from Archangelsk merchants.856 One of the problems hindering clear communication between the new administration and the local Ruthenian population was the multiethnic staff of the Russian army. For example, the garrison of Minsk was entirely made up of Tartars and Mordvinians, who did not speak any Slavic.857 Long-lasting occupation of the GDL and preparation for war against Sweden 851 Maltsev, Rossia i Belorussia v seredine XVII veka, p.186-189. Pufendorf, sju böcker om konung Carl X Gustafs bragder, vol.3, p. 190. Office of the GDL. RGADA. Fond 144; Office of Smolensk. RGADA. Fond 145. 854 Doroshenko, Torgovlia i kupechestvo Rigi, p. 46. 855 Ibid, p. 273-274. 856 Kobzareva, Elena. 2000. Documents from Russian State Archives of old acts on the conflict between Sweden and Russia in the 5th decade of the 17th century. Russkaya i Ukrainskaya diplomatiya v Evrazii. Moskva, p. 74-75. 857 BA, no. 126. 852 853 198 had undermined Russia’s finances. At the end of 1655 Russia had to implement a currency reform, and for the first time issued a copper kopeck with the face value of a silver kopeck. In the GDL, Russian soldiers paid with copper money. This caused strong discontent among the natives, who sent numerous complaints to Moscow and. In asked the tsar for permission to refuse the copper money as a means of payment. 858 Far-off Moscow became Lithuania’s highest judicial authority, which complicated the practice of settling disputes. During the negotiations between Russia and Poland–Lithuania, in Nemežis, the Lithuanian nobility started to return to their landed estates in the Russian zone. After the uprising in Samogitia, many Protestant nobles also left these territories for Russian Lithuania. Jan Cedrowski, a Protestant from Minsk, noted, “In April of 1656, Samogitia raised its voice against the Swedes, so my wife, children and I had to leave Samogitia for home and reached it on May 28. As soon as I got home I started to plough the field to sow spring crops and vegetables.” 859 As we can see, Cedrowski’s estate had not been confiscated by Russia. As an ambassador of Minsk Cedrowski had an audience with the tsar in Druja in June 1656, just before a Russian campaign against Sweden. To Cedrowski’s satisfaction, the tsar met all the requests of the Minsk nobility. A petition to the tsar drew a typical portrait of a collaborator. Krzysztof Uniechowski wrote that he had served as a Lithuanian colonel. However, “for the love to Orthodoxy my wife, children and I left for your service, tsar, hand and foot.” Russia rewarded him with the post of the standard-bearer of Minsk. Uniechowski inspected the nobility and made a list of those who had served the Swedes. In June 1656, Jan Kazimierz’s ambassador, the marshal of Orsha Piotr Galimski, left Moscow for Warsaw. On the way, he summoned a Minsk dietine and denounced Uniechowski as a traitor and ordered the nobility to elect a new standardbearer. As a result, Uniechowski complained to the tsar that the nobility of Minsk “abused me, your slave, and dishonoured me.” The local Russian administration did its best to protect a loyal nobleman.860 On July 21 1656, twenty representatives of the Minsk nobility composed a petition to the tsar. Recognizing him as the autocrat of Belarus, the nobility complained about the Russian voivode. He had violated their ancient privileges and forced them into manual labour. Three ambassadors were sent to the tsar, who at that time was taking part in the Swedish campaign. All of them were non-Catholics: the Orthodox Jerzy Stetkiewicz and the Calvinists Jarosz Mackiewicz and Jan Cedrowski. Tsar, who needed the political and 858 Ibid., no. 133. Pomniki memuarnai litaratury, p. 128-129. 860 BA, no. 129. 859 199 military assistance of the Lithuanian nobility, satisfied all their demands.861 He ordered the voivode of Minsk to distribute all the estates belonging to the supporters of Sweden among the loyal nobility.862 The Lithuanian nobility treated Ukraine badly. In their letters to the tsar, they complained, “the Ukrainians force us to become Cossacks and, by it, to betray Your Worship the Tsar.” The conflict between the Ukrainians, Belarusian Cossacks and the Lithuanian nobles led to open war between them. The tsar sent the Minsk gentry levy to challenge the Cossack leader Dyonizy Muraszka.863 As of the spring of 1657, a civil war broke out in the central districts of the Duchy, between detachments of nobles loyal to the tsar and the Cossacks.864 The Russian administration failed to protect the nobles’ estates from Cossack raids. This worsened the relations between the nobility and Russia, and affected diplomatic relations between Russia and Ukraine. Thus, Russia became a hostage to its own policy. During the 1654 and 1655 campaigns, the Russian army ravaged a number of districts. Many peasants hid in the forests. The townspeople either emigrated or scattered throughout the neighbourhood. The Belarusian merchants’ trade with Russian cities ceased and Russian garrisons were short of provisions. 865 In addition, in 1657, a plague epidemic broke out. Thus, even loyal groups realized the danger of Russian domination. The Bishop of Belarus Kalikst complained to the voivode Ivan Khovanskii that his raids had wiped out Polatsk and ruined the vital Baltic trade.866 The voivode Shakhovskii would have to promise benefits to townsmen if they were to return to the deserted Vilnius.867 4.2.1 Negotiations between Russia and the Lithuanian nobility The KU posed considerable obstacles to the Russian plans to establish domination over the GDL. Therefore, right after the August Declaration, the ambassador Vasilii Likhariov paid a visit to Janusz Radziwiáá. He proposed that the hetman recognize Russian power in exchange for the preservation of his offices and estates, and guarantees for religious liberties.868 However, Radziwiáá expressed his strong doubts over whether Muscovy would actually 861 Ibid., no. 130, 121. Dwa pamiĊtniki z XVII wieku. Jana Cedrowskiego i Jana Floriana Drobysza Tuszynskiego. Ed. Adam PrzyboĞ. Kraków, 1954, p. 11-12. 863 BEF, no. 114. 864 Mialeshka, Hramadzianskaya vaina na Belarusi, p. 135-154. 865 Razdorskii, Aleksei. 2002. Materialy tamozhennykh knig 1649/50-1679/80 gg. o torgovykh operatsiyakh belorusskikh kuptsov v Viazme. Belorusskii sbornik. Vol. 2. St. Peterburg, p. 161. 866 Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p. 71. 867 Ibid. 868 Zaborovskii, Lev. 1978. Russko-Litovskie peregovory vo vtoroi polovine 1655 g. Slaviane v epokhu feodalisma. K stoletiiu akademika Vladimira Pichety. Moskva, p. 209-210. 862 200 guarantee religious liberty. He mentioned that even the Belarusian Orthodox had been forced into a second baptism and that the Muscovites had destroyed the Catholic cathedral in Smolensk. As a Calvinist, Radziwiáá was concerned about Russia’s intolerance in religious matters. As for entering the tsar’s service, he added, “I have never been a slave before and I do not want to be slave now.”869 Russia’s first concrete action against the KU was the tsarist order of October 29 1655, to voivode Semion Urusov. He was to make a list of the Lithuanian nobility who recognized the tsar as new Grand Duke of Lithuania. The efforts of the Muscovite governors resulted in November 1655 in the drawing up of the “Oath book of the GDL nobility to the Tsar of Muscovy”. Here, 2,058 nobles and clergymen swore allegiance to the tsar.870 The number of those who pledged allegiance to Muscovy exceeded the number, which had signed the KU. Moreover, Russia gained the allegiance of a considerably greater number of more districts (12 districts, plus special representatives of 5 districts) compared with the KU (5 districts plus special representatives of 7 districts). The nobility recognized the tsar as their Grand Duke and promised to be “under his sovereign hand forever.” In return, the tsar promised to keep everlasting liberties granted by the Polish kings. Moreover, those who had sworn fealty to the tsar were promised offices and landed estates.871 The offcialls preserved their former rank, and had the prospect, moreover, of gaining additional rank within the Russian political structure. However, absolutist Russia and democratic Poland-Lithuania had sophisticated but different systems of appointments to state office. Even if they corresponded in name, they differed in content. Russian scribes did not understand the system of public office existing Lithuania, and so often misidentified them. Some of the signatories obtained Russian military ranks. For example, the podkomorzy of Lida, Jakub Kuncewicz, became marshal of three districts at the same time: Lida, Hrodna and Navahdradak. Most important for the nobility was that, in exchange for fealty, they could use their own landed estates. The Catholic nobility were not restricted in the confession of their faith. The desire of the Russian administration to obtain as many supporters as possible resulted in not only Orthodox clergy, but also Catholic priests being allowed to swear fealty to the tsar. Nevertheless, the document failed to delineate the most essential thing: the future status of the GDL. An analysis of the list of signatories shows that the majority were petty nobles, who had surrendered to the occupation. Despite Russian efforts, the act lacked wide political support. Few senators or 869 Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia, p. 27-30. KKVKL. 871 Ibid., p. 51-52. 870 201 officials had signed. Despite the fact that Muscovy occupied most of Lithuania, including the capital, only three senators signed the act: the palatine of Trakai and a Catholic magnate, Mikoáaj Pac, the castellan of Navahradak and an Orthodox magnate, Samuel Statkiewicz, and the palatine of Navahradak and an Orthodox magnate, Piotr WiaĪewicz, who delegated the signing of the document in his absence.872 As for central officials, only three pledged allegiance: the chamberlain of Lithuania Feliks Pac (who also signed the agreement with Sweden), the huntsman of Lithuania Mikoáaj Dolmat Isajakowski, and the cupbearer of Lithuania Eustachy Woááowicz. The list contained very few local authorities. For example, on behalf of Minsk, only Krzysztof Woáodkowicz, (who originated from the OrthodoxProtestant family), swore an oath. As Wasilewski has noted, the list of signatories was short on representatives of the nobls who had served under the command of Radziwiáá and had withdrawn into the Swedish zone.873 Thus, Russia failed to to gain the support of a considerable number of officials, most of whom either remain faithful to Poland or switched to Sweden. Whereas the Swedes regarded the KU as incomplete, and had never negotiated with low-status nobles, the Russian political strategy was different. Russia reached an agreement with all interested representatives, entrusting high positions to petty nobles such as PokloĔski. Might was more important for Moscow than legal rights. Karl X Gustav hesitated over whether to accept the title of Grand Duke of Lithuania, which had been delegated to him by a considerable part of the Lithuanian elite. The king of Sweden waited for a political solution to Lithuania’s status in future negotiations with Russia and Poland. Tsar Aleksei, on the contrary, after capturing Vilnius, declared himself Grand Duke and started a diplomatic war against Sweden and Poland for the right to the title. The conflict between Moscow and Stockholm migh have been sharpened by the fact that Russia, according to the ”Oath Book”, also had taken under its protection nobles from districts which were already controlled by Sweden, namely Samogitia, Podlasie, Kaunas and Braslau. In agreements reached with Sweden, the key role was played by the Lithuanian Protestants. Russia enjoyed the support of a considerable number of Orthodox nobles. 22 representatives of the Orthodox clan of the Statkiewicz, headed by Senator Samuel Statkiewicz, swore Russia fealty. The leader of another Orthodox magnate family, Prince Jan OgiĔski, also swore loyalty to the tsar.874 The fact that he was the only representative of the OgiĔski clan on the list can be easily explained: most of the OgiĔskis pledged allegiance directly to the tsar in Vilnius. 872 KKVKL, f. 162v; 163v; 154v. Wasilewski, Tadeusz. 1999. WstĊp. KKVKL, p. 9-15. 874 Muscovite scribers spelled his name in Belarusian as Ahinskoj, KKVKL, f. 96. 873 202 The Orthodox nobility of Belarus provided many signatures. For example, for Orsha, the list included the following: the Captain of Orsha Filon Butkiewicz, Konstanty Pietuch, Aleksander Protasowicz, Bohdan PrzysoszyĔski, Ostafi Sáawokawicz, Bohdan Szczetrawa, Wasyl Uhlin, Jan Wopsawicz, Wasyl Worotyniec, Osip Woskowski and the noblewoman Anastazja ĩycka. From Polatsk: Iwan Kissarzewski, Nikodem Korsak, Michaá Mirski, Mikoáaj Rahoza and Prince Jarosáav Drucki SokoliĔski.875 Mstsislau: Wasyl Kuszelski, Aleksy Sudyáowski, Bohdan and Fiodor Woák, Trofim Zaborski. Orthodox noblemen from other districts also signed the act, including the esquire carver of Trakai Jan Bychowiec who had previously signed the KU and whom Radziwiáá had considered one of the most faithful supporters of Sweden. Prince Dymitr PolubiĔski and Jerzy Kossów from Vitsebsk were also represented.876 Among the other Orthodox nobles who pledged allegiance were Ostafi Kossów, Iwan Chreptowicz, Paweá Woááowicz, Mirosáaw Rahoza, Iwan Ometo, Piotr Soáonina, Iwan Zemáa and Atanazy Paszkowski. Even the Protestant Ruthenian kin of OlĊdzki was on the list. The act also included the signatures of Lutheran nobles Stefan Tiesenhausen and Walter Korff – the son of Senator Mikoáaj Korff, who had signed the KU. This gives evidence of the dramatic re-orientation of the GDL nobility from Sweden to Russia during the fateful months of 1655.It would be wrong to assert that only the Orthodox nobility deserted in favour of Russia. The Catholic nobles, who represented the largest confessional group, made up the majority of those who signed both of the acts of Russian and Swedish domination. However, the factor of belonging to “the betrayal Muscovite faith” became a part of Polish political terminology.877 Russia conducted negotiations with various groups of Lithuanian magnates who were beyond Swedish control. Having captured Vilnius the tsar issued a charter. In it he suggested that the Lithuanian nobility and clergy pledge allegiance to Muscovy, “and if they want to live in peace, and if they, the bishops and hetmans, and all nobles send ambassadors to ask our Tsar humbly for his Tsar’s favour to be accepted and agree to be with all the Duchy in our Tsar hands forever. And if they fail to send ambassadors, they will be to blame for the damage we will do.” 878 The tsar’s appeal found a response. In October–November 1655, negotiations between Russia and the nobility of Ashmiany took place. Two Ruthenian Protestant noblemen headed the Lithuanian embassy, namely Starosta of Ashmiany Adam Sako875 His brother Samuel Drucki SokoliĔski was the first nobleman of Lithuania, who on his free will swore an oath to the tsar. 876 The brother of Jerzy Kossów was Sylwester Kossów, an Orthodox metropolitan of Kyiv. 877 Kulecki, Michaá. 1997. WygnaĔcy ze Wschodu. Egzulanci w Rzeczypospolitej w ostatnich latach panowania Jana Kazimierza i za panowania Michaáa Korybuta WiĞniowieckiego. Warszawa, p. 193. 878 Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia, p. 20. 203 wicz and Piotr Rola. To give additional proof of their loyalty, they composed documents in Cyrillic Ruthenian. To give weight to their mission, the noblemen stressed the importance of the results of the negotiations for other districts, “that all keep an eye on us.” In the address to the tsar, they stated that Aleksei had, as “ruler of all states, autocrat and successor, seized Lithuania, the glorious people of which had never been conquered, under his strong, great, mighty hand and captured the capital Vilnius and many towns and cities.” However, “afterwards, when Lithuania had already been captured, some of our nation accepted the protection of the Swedish Kingdom, namely Samogitia, Ukmergơ and Upytơ with some senators including Hetman Radziwill at the head.”879 The Ruthenian nobility emphasized the negative characteristics of Swedish protection, emphasizing that “they, having a different language and custom from that nation [Samogitians] will talk about good things with boyars of the tsar.” The negotiation records are of interest first of all because they show how the nobility viewed the future of the GDL within a Russian state. First, the nobility dreamed of an equal federation based on the principles of the Lithuanian–Polish union: “as it was with Poland, it would be good with Muscovy now and that Lithuanian nation would have the same rights with the nation of Muscovy in all.” Smolensk was chosen as a suitable common capital for the new federation. In the intervals between the dietines, four magnates and four noblemen, who were close to the tsar, were to take part in the Boyar Duma. The old Lithuanian lands of Ukraine and Volhynia, which had been “taken by the Poles,” were to be returned. The tsar was to preserve the dietines, the independent Lithuanian legal system and the laws. The ambassadors promised that the GDL would fight against Poland together with Muscovy. However, the Lithuanian army would not take part in campaigns abroad. The tsar had to guarantee the religious liberties of non–Orthodox confessions. The nobility asked the tsar not to send their detachments to serve in faraway Siberia, since such service more closely resembled exile.880 The terms proposed to the tsar by the Ruthenian nobility of Lithuania were thus quite similar to the principles laid down in the KU. That was quite natural, since the Lithuanians was oriented to the continuation of its own political system. The Muscovite rulers agreed to practically all the terms, especially since played no role in the absolute monarchy. Only the proposals concerning confession were strongly amended or rejected. The Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches were allowed, but only in the west of the Duchy. The Uniate Church was to be abolished. All the territory to the east of the Biarezina River was to become completely Orthodox. It is probable that the Russian leaders saw the Biarezina River as a natural border separat879 880 Ibid., p. 80-84. Ibid. 204 ing the other territories of Lithuania from Belarus, the destiny of which was to remain eternalle a part of the Muscovite state. In his response to the proposals of the Ashmiany nobility, the voivode Semion Urusov showed his appreciation of their refusal to continue in or enter Swedish service and their willingness to serve the tsar. However, when the nobles asked for permission to attack the Swedish detachments, Urusov said no, adding that Russia and Sweden would soon conclude an agreement to divide up the GDL. In the end, in November 1655, Adam Sakowicz swore allegiance to the tsar as a leader of Ashmiany. The tsar satisfied nearly all the demands, but interpreted them according to his own political vision. In response to the request of the nobility that they be allowed to summon a dietine, for example, the tsar replied that he was not against the dietines. However, they could be scheduled only with his permission. When asked about maintaining permanent noble representatives in the Kremlin, the tsar replied that this would be pointless since the nobles were allowed to come to Moscow with their petitions any time they wished. The senators were, however, promised positions in the Boyar Duma. 881 On December 6 1655, Semion Urusov and Jakub Kuncewicz signed a special agreement. Russia agreed to most of the Lithuanian nobility’s articles including the rights to estates, independent courts and religious liberties. Defence from Sweden was also provided for. To the request that all the districts occupied by Sweden “that belonged to the Dukedom from our forefathers” be recaptured, Urusov replied that the tsar was making everything ready for the next campaign, and when he was ready he would ask the faithful Lithuanian nobles to meet his army half-way. Thus, in December 1655, Russia was already considering war with Sweden. However, there were questions, which Muscovy failed to answer. These concerned the convocation of the Diet, the rights to freely elect the Grand Duke, the release of prisoners from Russian captivity, and guarantees of the ”ancient rights of the Lithuanian Tartars and the Jewish population.”882 That a large number of Lithuanian nobles collaborated with Muscovy is shown by the following example. In 1655, the Vitsebsk nobles who had refused to swear allegiance to Russia were exiled to Kazan, summoned a dietine there. At that dietine, it was bitterly acknowledged that a majority of the Vitsebsk nobles had pledged allegiance to the tsar. Therefore, a full list of traitors had to be drawn up.883 In December 1655, the palatine of Trakai, Mikoáaj Pac, took the initiative of heading a pro-Russian government and addressing the tsar. On February 881 Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia, p. 80-102. Ibid., p. 103-106. 883 Kraushar, Aleksander. 1893. Sejmiki polskie w Kazaniu 1655-1663. Kwartalnik Historyczny. Vol. VII, p. 630-642. 882 205 12 1656, his ambassador, Hieronim Lipski, delivered two documents to the tsar. Not knowing which title to give the tsar, Pac gives him the peculiar title “Yours Serene Highness, Gracious Tsar”, going on to say that the Lithuanians “praise God that He gave us the tsar, so strong and just, like Alexander the Great.” Terming the tsar sovereign of Lithuania and part of the world, Pac thanks him for taking the GDL under his protection. On behalf of all the senators Pac warns the tsar not to deal separately with individual noblemen and not to conclude any separate agreements with them. In Pac’s opinion, it would be better to convoke a Diet in Vilnius, in order to work out the principles of Lithuania’s annexation. In a letter in which Pac called Urusov his “kin brother”, he asked the voivode to convince the tsar of his loyalty and expressed regret over the withdrawal of Russian troops from Trakai. Pac asked him to send the army as soon as possible to defend Trakai against Sweden. He also wanted the tsar to give him the title of hetmanship, with the right to summon dietines and impose levies on the nobility. Pac wrote on behalf of the senators. The Muscovite diplomats justifiably asked the ambassador what party he represented: Pac alone, or the whole of Lithuania. The ambassador’s reply was incoherent. The ambassador stated that the key figure in Lithuania was the palatine of Trakai (when, in fact, the palatine of Vilnius held a higher rank). As for the senators, he had in mind both those who had already sworn allegiance to the tsar (Samuel Statkiewicz and Piotr WiaĪewicz), and those who would like to do so (Jerzy Hlebowicz and Wincenty Gosiewski).884 In February 1656, Boris Frazinov informed the tsar that he had made 161 nobles of Minsk “swear fealty on the Bible.” At the same time, he added that Minsk had been burned to ashes and looted, and was completely empty.885 At the beginning of 1656, the Russian administration received a number of messages attesting to the drastic growth of anti-Swedish sentiment among the nobility of Swedish Lithuania.886 This gave Russia hope for support from the nobility there. Negotiations with the Lithuanian magnates and nobles who gave their assurances of fidelity made Russia feel confident of a stable rear in case of war against Sweden. Indeed, no rebellion or hostile act against Russia was recorded for the area, despite the fact that the main force of its army had been withdrawn in the period between June and October 1656. In February 1656, Moscow sent two missions to the GDL. Following the order of the tsar, the ambassadors completed talks with loyal senators about the terms of transition to Russian allegiance, and tried to persuade Hetman Sapieha to join Muscovy. The letter to WiaĪewicz contained the tsar’s request that the senator “urge all senators and governors to accept his tsar’s high 884 Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia, p.106-110, note 184. BA, no. 117. 886 Floria, Ot potopa do Vilna, p. 37-39. 885 206 hand.” At the same time, Muscovy again promised to return all their landed estates to the magnates and promised to place Lithuanian senators on the same footing as boyars. The tsar agreed to donate new landed estates to Sapieha to replace those that had been destroyed. In a charter sent to Mikoáaj Pac the tsar proposed that he levy an army of 2,000 nobles to take part in the war against Sweden. The tsar invited Pac to meet him in Smolensk, where the tsar planned to consider the question of his hetman position and the terms for convoking the Lithuanian Diet.887 Both Russian and Lithuanian leaders viewed the future of the GDL from the viewpoint of the political system, which existed in their own states. Lithuanian senators saw themselves as delegates of ”a democratic” Boyar Duma and dreamed of the possibility of influencing the tsar. The Lithuanian nobility saw their future in a federation with a common Diet in the new capital – Smolensk.888 The nobility pictured their delegates fighting democratically for their interests. The choice of Smolensk as a capital was in accordance with the Commonwealth model, when neutral Warsaw, not Kraków, was chosen to become the capital of the new state. Russia, however, treated Lithuania from the point of view of an autocracy. The GDL was to be incorporated just like the Kazan Khanate, which formed a regular part of the centralized tsardom. The tsar saw no need for Lithuanian public activity. The Russian elite did not understand the sophisticated political system of the noble republic of Lithuania. For example, when Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin met Adam Sakowicz, the former seriously asked the latter if it was possible for the Lithuanian senators to elect the king without convoking the Diet.889 A mental abyss existed.890 In this sense, Russian leaders were less able than Swedes and Poles to offer the Lithuanian elite a promising future within the federation. After a series of significant victories in the Russian invasion of Livonia, negotiations in Nemežis started. The head of the Lithuanian-Polish delegation was the starosta of Minsk, Krzysztof Zawisza. He was followed by the bishop of Vilnius, Jan Dowgiaááo Zawisza, the referendary of Lithuania Cyprian Paweá Brzostowski and the starosta of Páock, Jan KrasiĔski, who was the only commissar of Poland.891 The Russian delegation was led by Nikita Odoevskii. The delegation of the Habsburg Empire acted as arbitrator. During the first round of negotiations Odoevskii insisted on integrating the GDL 887 Ibid., p. 39-42. Under the protection of Soviet Russia the Belarusian Socialist Republic was proclaimed in Smolensk in 1919. This city was also proposed in 1999 for the capital of Russia-Belarus federation. 889 Kobzareva, Documents from Russian State Archives of old acts, p. 73. 890 KamiĔski, Andrzej Sulima. 1993. Republic vs. Autocracy: Poland-Lithuania and Russia, 1686-1697. Cambridge. Massachusetts. 891 PSZRI. No 192, 193. 888 207 into Russia as the main condition of the armistice. The Polish king had to give the tsar the whole Lithuania. The Lithuanian–Polish ambassadors suggested a peace treaty directed against Sweden rather than the incorporation of the GDL into Russia. Moreover, Zawisza warned Poland that the Lithuanians would accept Tsar Aleksei as their Grand Duke if the Poles failed to agree to a peace. This treaty would help resolve some vexed questions, including the restitution of confiscated estates.892 As far as territory was concerned, the Lithuanian ambassadors agreed only to cede Smolensk. After long disputes, the Muscovite ambassadors received new instructions from the tsar. Russia consented to the partition of the GDL. The districts to the west of the Biarezina River were to be Polish. The districts to the east of the Biarezina, where an Orthodox population predominated, were to be Russian “for good.” However, this proposal was unacceptable for Lithuanians.893 An armistice was signed at Nemežis on November 3 1656. The tsar was to be recognized as the successor of Jan Kazimierz. This provision was to be approved by the next Diet. After the victory over Sweden, the tsar promised to return alienated lands, starting with those in Livonia. The Orthodox nobility could be nominated to positions in any governing body, “as it used to be in the old times of the Lithuanian grand dukes.” The favoured position of the Orthodox Church was to be restored. The Uniate Church was abolished. This treaty was a stupendous achievement of Polish–Lithuanian diplomacy. Because of Sweden, a military alliance between those century-old enemies, Lithuania and Poland on the one hand, and Russia on the other, had achieved. In 1657 the Lithuanian magnates blamed Russia for not meeting the commitments of Nemežis, since “Russia stopped fighting with Sweden”. In 1658, in Brest, Denis Astafiev and Paweá Sapieha conducted negotiations on Lithuania joining Russia. Astafiev asked Sapieha if it was true that Lithuanians had fallen out with Poles. Sapieha answered “no”, explaining that during their long period of co-existence the Poles and the Lithuanians had married each other and had exchanged landed estates. Nevertheless, Sapieha did not preclude the possibility of a separate agreement with Russia. He pointed to the necessity of preparing such an agreement in secret, in order not to be condemned for high treason. Sapieha added that only nine senators knew about the plan, and advised Russia not to get in touch with Mikoáaj Pac, whom he characterized as a political adventurer. Sapieha claimed that in the case of the recognition of the tsar as Grand Duke, Podlasie and Volhynia should be returned to Lithuania.894 892 Frost, After the Deluge, p. 89. Rachuba, Andrzej. 2003. Rokowania w NiemieĪy w 1656 roku w aspekcie teorii wojny sprawiedliwej. Ot drevnej Rusi k Rossii novogo vremeni. Sbornik statei k 70-letiu A.L. Khoroshkevich. Moskva, p. 502-503. 894 Soloviev, Istoria Rossii, vol.10, p. 39 - 41. 893 208 4.2.2 The Role of the Lithuanian nobility at the start of the Russian–Swedish war In his instructions to the embassy in Moscow dated August 31 1655, Karl X Gustav expressed his hopes that the tsar would focus on central Lithuania, and not raises any claims to the Swedish zone, especially as Russia had agreed to a cease-fire after the capture of Vilnius.895 Therefore, when the Russians asked the Swedes the vexed question of whether the latter would defend the Lithuanian territories, the interpreter Johan Rosenlindt gave an unambiguous reply – “yes”.896 The king advised the ambassadors that they should negotiate with Russia on establishing a preliminary border between the Swedish and Russian zones. During 1655-56, Sweden suggested four alternatives to establishing the border. The first one divided the GDL into two equal parts. The eastern part, including Polatsk, Vitsebsk and Barysau was to be incorporated into Russia. In the south, the border was to pass along the rivers Sluch and Haryn, so that the Duchy of Slutsk passed to Sweden. Thus, the territory of Brest and the Navahradak palatinates, and the district of Hrodna was to be incorporated into Sweden. According to the last plan, the border was to run near Dokshytsy on the north and Sialets on the south, so that a large western part with the capital Vilnius would be a part of Sweden.897 The fact that Sialets was proposed as a boundary town reveals the obvious influence of Bogusáaw Radziwiáá (this town belonged to him).898 In 1656, Colonel Georg von Schwengeln, the chief of the Savolax Dragoon regiment in Lithuania and a famous cartographer, made a map of the Kaunas region and southern Samogitia.899 That map included detailed information about Muscovite military activity and the disposition of hostile Lithuanians led by Kryspin Kirszensztein. This map would help Sweden delimit its border with Muscovy along the Nemunas River. However, the work of the committee that was to regulate territorial controversies on the border of Samogitia and Kaunas, which had been established on De la Gardie’s order, also failed to reach any positive results. General Adjutant Konrad Yxkull and Major Henrik von Alfendel, sent to Virbalis, failed to reach an agreement with the Russians on the procedure of regulating the border.900 All attempts to delimit Lithuania failed. Russia was the first to withdraw from this project. It is probable that the partition of Lithuania was understood by each party as the loss of the political support of the local nobility. 895 Kentrschynskyj, Ukrainska revolutionen, p. 69. Kentrschynskyj, Karl X Gustav inför krisen i Öster, p. 97, note 27. 897 Kentrschynskyj, Ukrainska revolutionen, p. 77. 898 Kobzareva, Documents from Russian State Archives of old acts, p. 55-61. 899 Litauen. Kowno 1600-talet. RA. Kartor och ritningar utan känd proveniens. No. 594 (2025:20); Köhlin, Harald. 1949. Georg von Schwengeln and His Works, 1620-1645. Imago Mundi. Vol. 6, p. 67-72. Köhlin wrongly attributed this map about 1628. 900 Carlon, Ryska kriget, p. 14. 896 209 The KU stirred up the hopes of a quick liberation, by Sweden, from occupation by Russia and Ukraine. The city of Orsha rose in rebellion against the Muscovite garrison.901 In October 1655, De la Gardie wrote the king that relations with Russia caused no anxiety. There were no conflicts with its army, which was quartered in Kaunas, since the tsar had ordered his voivodes to treat the Swedes well. However, two weeks later, Urusov sent De la Gardie a letter in which he demanded that the Swedes term the tsar “Grand Duke of Lithuania”, and made it clear that the whole territory of the Kaunas district and Samogitia belonged to the tsar. Urusov refused to accept De la Gardie’s letters if he failed to give the tsar his new title.902 In the course of negotiations in Moscow the Swedish delegation expressed its concern over Russia’s control of Polatsk and Vitsebsk, since it implied control over the trade route from Lithuania to Riga. Another reason for Swedish concern was the fact that the above–mentioned cities could be used by Muscovy as a base from which to assault Livonia.903 When Russia decided on war with Sweden, the question of the Lithuanian nobility’s loyalty gained overwhelming significance. Relying on the Lithuanian nobility’s fidelity, Russia could start a full-scale re-deployment of its army along the border with Livonia. The position of the nobility in the Swedish zone also had importance. The nobility of Braslau became the ballon d'essai. 850 Swedish dragoons in eight detachments were quartered in the district.904 The control of Braslau and Druja enabled the Swedes to protect the trade route across Livonia to Riga, and defense Dünaburg from the rear. De la Gardie ordered the Swedish commandant of Braslau, Johan von Ulenbrock, to fortify his positions. However, in January 1656, the voivode of Rositten/RƝzekne, Ordin–Nashchokin urgently demanded that Swedish troops be withdrawn from Braslau since the inhabitants had sworn the fealty to the tsar. Ordin–Nashchokin also referred to the Swedes’ hostile actions at the castle of Druja. Russia kept its soldiers in Druja. Its detachment took up a position in Zadruiaskaia slabada/Piedruja.905 The city itself was under Swedish control, and a detachment of 117 cavalry was encamped in the suburb of Sapezhyn, in the Bernadine cloister. Tiny Druja became the main cause of the war. On order of De la Gardie, a committee was established in Braslau for the regulation of the frontier. Colonel Leonard Fitinghoff and assessor Albrecht von Bylow headed the committee. The relations with Swedish administration was complicated by the fact that Braslau’s nobles knew neither German nor Swedish or Latin. This made it difficult to communicate. The Russians reported to Moscow 901 Panuceviþ, Sviaty Jazafat, p. 164. Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 120, 129. 903 Kentrschynskyj, Karl X Gustav inför krisen i Öster, p.108. 904 Inquarteringen aff Areen over Littouu. Šiauliai. February 13, 1656. RA. Militaria 1305. 905 Tkachou, Mikhail. 1991. Zamki i ludzi. Minsk, p. 34. 902 210 that the nobility of Braslau intended to join Russia owing to its language problems with the Swedes.906 Naturally, Muscovy spread propaganda urging the local nobility to switch to its side.907 Following the decision of the dietine of August 28 1655, the Braslau district decided to accept Swedish protection. However, later, the treaty with Muscovy was signed. Among those who had sworn fealty to Russia from Braslau we find many who had been collaborators with Sweden. These had now re–oriented themselves, at least temporarily, to the Russian side. Among these were Aleksander CzapiĔski, Tobiasz Puciata and the member of the Swedish Advisory Council, Piotr Rudomina Dusiacki.908 The main supporter of Russia in Braslau was Sebastian Mirski who collaborated with Ordin-Nashchokin.909 At the same time OrdinNashchokin threatened the nobles who were on Swedish service with retaliation. In the winter of 1656, Russian troops made several armed assaults on the district of Braslau. About 40 Swedish soldiers were killed.910 In response De la Gardie instructed the soldiers in Braslau to treat the local population with caution, to keep discipline in the army and to punish those nobles who had entered Swedish service and then switched to the Russians. In March 1656, Russia decided on war with Sweden. The Swedish ambassadors in Moscow were blamed for Sweden’s hostile policy in Lithuania, and for violating the eternal peace that had been signed at Stolbovo in 1617. In response, on March 23 1656, Sweden advanced its claims, all of which concerned the GDL. Swedes told that despite Swedish awareness of status of Slutsk, Aleksei Trubetskoi had besieged the city and burned its neighbourhood areas to ashes. In October 1655, Russian troops, despite a protest by Radziwiáá, captured his town of Orla. The Sweden’s main claims were based on events in Braslau. There, Russians had killed several soldiers agitated against Sweden and gained the support of several nobles, who had formerly pledged allegiance to Karl X Gustav.911 In March 1656, the Russian ambassador in Copenhagen, Danila Myshetskii, proposed an anti–Swedish alliance between Russia and Denmark, and informed King Fredrick III about the Russian–Swedish conflict over the GDL. According to Myshetskii, the Swedes, breaking the peace with Russia, had gone on to conquer a number of Lithuanian districts and to collect taxes from a population, which had already pledged its allegiance to the tsar. In Myshetskii’s opinion, Karl X Gustav had an obvious goal: “to be the only master of the Varangian Sea” – the Baltic.912 906 Kobzareva, Documents from Russian State Archives of old acts, p. 65. Carlon, Ryska kriget, p. 14. 908 KKVKL, f. 157, 170. 909 RA. Militaria M 1305. 910 Kobzareva, Documents from Russian State Archives of old acts, p. 62-63. 911 Ibid. 912 Soloviev, Istoria Rossii, vol.10, p. 631-632. 907 211 On March 19 1656, Skytte wrote to De la Gardie that he was sceptical about the rumours about an impending Russian offensive. However, he advised De la Gardie not to irritate the tsar on the issue of titles. Nonetheless, after alarming news from Moscow, Karl X Gustav ordered new detachments to Livonia. As of the beginning of April, Russia systematically violated the border with Sweden, and the Swedish embassy in Moscow was arrested. 913 On May 17 1656, Russia declared war on Sweden. The Lithuanian elite played a significant role in encouraging this act. Gosiewski expressed his intent to pledge allegiance to the tsar, but only if Russia solved “the problem of Sweden and Radziwiáás first.”914 The Ashmiany ambassador, Piotr Rola, misled Russia about Sweden’s preparations for war. He handed the Russians a copy of the protection letter written by Skytte. 915 This letter guaranteed the safety of estate near Vitsebsk, which was under Russian control. The letter accordingly testified to Sweden’s aggressive designs. In December 1655, the Office of Foreign Affairs of Moscow received a copy of the KU, translated into Polish. An unknown translator had falsified the original text, and adding a number of changes in order to give the text a pronounced anti–Russian character.916 In the light of that translation, Karl X Gustav’s refusal to recognize the tsar’s new title, and to cede the Swedish part of Lithuania to him, could be interpreted from quite a different viewpoint. Moscow found out that the Swedish king and his successors had been recognized as grand dukes of Lithuania. From that moment on, Russian-Swedish encounters along the border were interpreted as Stockholm’s attempts to create a base for assault.917 Muscovy believed that the Swedes wanted to keep Braslau in order to attack Polatsk and Vitsebsk. Skytte became one of the activists for peace with Muscovy “at any price.” In a report to Karl X Gustav dated May 6 1656, he suggested that the king recognize the tsar’s new title and cede Braslau, Ukmergơ and Kaunas to Russia. According to Skytte, the Lithuanian nobility had already risen in arms and these lands were outside Swedish control. Therefore, the abovementioned districts had no value for Sweden. Sweden expected to keep only Samogitia, whose territory was important from a geopolitical point of view, and, if possible, to hold its positions in Upytơ on the border of Courland. If the king wanted to join Russia in a campaign against Poland, he first had to put down the uprising in the GDL. This was a difficult task; therefore, it would be better give the rebellious districts to Russia, thus preserving 913 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 322. Kobzareva, Documents from Russian State Archives of old acts, p. 58. 915 RGADA. Fond 79. Opis 1. 1655. L.14. 916 Zaborovskii, Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossia, p.126-127. 917 Floria Ot potopa do Vilna, p. 32. 914 212 peace.918 Acting, probably, under the influence of Skytte’s ideas, Karl X Gustav adopted a new policy. In a letter to the tsar dated June 14 1656, he promised to punish those Swedes who had initiated encounters with Russian troops in Lithuania. Moreover, the king declared that “I have never been seeking for any other way but alliance and eternal peace. Therefore, I give my consent in respect to the titles of Your Majesty.” In the language of diplomacy, this meant that Sweden agreed to to make peace with Russia, by sacrificing Lithuania.919 But it was too late. All of Lithuania and the PolishLithuanian Livonia was the Muscovite goal in that war. The tsar’s headquarters were in Polatsk. According to Russian strategic plans, the main army, led by the tsar, was to attack Livonia. The campaign aimed at: • removal of Sweden from Lithuania • conquest of Livonia • seizure of Riga in order to get rid of Swedish domination in the east of Baltic • acquiring control over the trade route along the Daugava River. The Russian administration received a number of messages, which testified that the nobility in the Swedish zone had taken side against Sweden.920 This indicated that Russian policy would find support. The negotiations with the Lithuanians, allowed Russia to hope that it would have a stable rear in case of a campaign against Sweden. The nobility of Belarus took an active part in the war. On the siege of Riga, the Belarusian cavalry in the Russian troops made up 8,000 sables.921 Belarusian townsmen worked in the captured Livonian towns.922 On July 10 1656, after a long period of preparations, the main body of the Russian army (Swedish sources say about 90,000 soldiers) led by the tsar marched from Polatsk to Livonia. Dünaburg was taken by assault on August 31, 1656. At the same time, the second Russian army advanced in the north of Livonia and besieged Dorpat/Tartu. A third front was opened in Ingermanland.923 Poáocki advised the tsar to turn Livonia into an Orthodox province and begin by transforming the Lutheran churches, which he called “stinking pagan temples”, into Orthodox churches. On August 14 1656, the Russians captured Kockenhusen/Koknese. This first city of the Swedish Crown was 918 Carlsson, Alfred Bernhard.1912.Sverige och den östeuropeiska krisen 1656. Ett betänkande af Bengt Skytte om den svenska politiken. Historisk tidskrift, p. 110-113. 919 Nordwall, Svensk-Ryska Underhandlingar före freden i Kardis, p. 2-3; Carlon, Ryska kriget, p. 22-23. 920 Floria, Ot potopa do Vilna, p. 37-39. 921 J. G. Sparwenfeld’s diary of a jorney to Russia 1684-87. Ed. Ulla Birgegård. 2002. Stockholm, p. 224, 226. 922 Abetsedarskii, Belorussia i Rossia XVI-XVII vv, p.172. 923 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 324-327. 213 taken with demonstrative harshness – most of the defenders were killed. The city was renamed Tsarevich Dmitriev and an Orthodox church replaced the Lutheran one.924 Thus, Russia demonstrated its ambitions to annex Swedish Livonia forever. On August 22 1656, the tsar besieged Riga. After Russia had seized Dorpat, Poáocki foretold the tsar’s domination of the entire Baltic, and advised him to continue across the sea and occupy mainland Sweden, arguing that “Holy Theotokos will sooth the waves and the wind of Baltic Sea for you.”925 However, Russia had no fleet. The Swedish navy supplied Riga with all that was necessary to make the siege ineffectual. October 2 1656, the Swedish troops, led by De la Gardie, had defeated the Russian army. Having lost 8,000 soldiers, the tsar lifted the siege of Riga and retreated to Dünaburg. Russia’s dreams of subduing Sweden had been buried. 4.3 Radziwiáá’s Lithuania: the Compact of Radnot and the 1657 siege of Brest And in all this, my only ambition is to serve His Majesty the King of Sweden and to save my Patria Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Karl X Gustav, November 10 1655 In 1655 Sweden and Russia entered into negotiations on the partition of the GDL. Therefore, during the first consultations between the Radziwiáás and De la Gardie at the end of July, the Radziwiáás made provisions for the creation of their hereditary principalities in case Sweden and Russia divided the Duchy. According to their proposals, which Lubieniecki delivered to Riga in July 1655, “if there is a change of regime in Lithuania”, two hereditary principalities belonging to the Radziwiáás were to be created in the country.926 The Duchy of Bogusáaw was to cover “the palatinates of Navahradak, Minsk and Podlasie including all the territories no matter where they were, in Poland or Lithuania.” The palatinate of Brest and the districts of Hrodna and Vaukavysk were incorporated into Janusz’s duchy. The principalities were supposed to be constructed in accordance with the model of the principalities of the Holy Roman Empire. The Radziwiáás obtained all legal rights in accordance with the regalia and rights of German Princes, including the right to coin money. De la Gardie commented on the project, saying that if the Radziwiáás wished to have their own hereditary principalities, including the 924 PSZRI. No 189. Polotskii, Virshi, p. 33-39. 926 Cautiones et conditiones concernentes protectionem Sacrae Regiae Maejstatis Sueciae. Akta Ugody Kiedanskiej, p. 4-7. 925 214 right to mint coins, they were to send their ambassadors to the Swedish king. De la Gardie believed the king would meet their requirements.927 As negotiations proceeded, it became clear that Stockholm was not ready to enter into a conflict with Moscow. Therefore, the Radziwiáás waived the question of establishing their own principalities. Šapoka has remarked on the temporary character of that first project, and pointed out that those in Lithuanian–Swedish negotiations, “claims to single out the Radziwiáás separate states appeared for the first and last time.”928 Indeed, the negotiations in Kơdainiai were concerned exclusively with the fate of the entire GDL. Polish historians emphasize the idea of the Radziwiáás’ principalities, treating them as presaging the GDL’s partition.929 Such an interpretation is aimed at discrediting the Radziwiáás’ policy as insincere and non-patriotic from its inception. After the Declaration of Kơdainiai, De la Gardie promised Bogusáaw Radziwiáá land in the Swedish Lithuania, as a reward for the negotiations, on the condition that they be “free from enemies”. Apart from his own lands, Radziwiáá was to obtain the royal landed estates of Brest and Kobryn. Bogusáaw was also supposed to take control of Podlasie. De la Gardie was not sure that Sweden would manage to capture the county of Babrujsk in Belarus as well as the county of Bar, which lies “on the remote borders of Ukraine.” Therefore, the Swedish king instead promised Radziwiáá Strasburg/Brodnica (a former estate of Anna Vasa) and Golup in Royal Prussia.930 There was no longer any discussion of a separate Radziwiáá principality. After Janusz Radziwiáá’s death and the rebellion in Samogitia, the need for a hereditary state under a Swedish protectorate became urgent to Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. According to his plans, the future state would consist of the palatinates of Brest and Navahradak, as well as bordering Podlasie, which together constituted. These territories were outside Russia’s control. They were inhabited by many Protestant nobles, and Radziwiáá had good reason to expect their political support. The centre of the new principality was to be Slutsk. But to establish this state, the above-mentioned territories needed to be conquered first. One of the main parts of the new state was Podlasie. Here, Radziwiáá owned the town of WĊgrów and the county of BraĔsk. After his cousin’s death, he also obtained Tykocin, Rajgród, Sokolów Podlaski, Stara WieĞ and Augustów on the Polish side and Lithuanian Orla, Zabáudów, Biaáystok– Dojlidy, Niewodnica, Sobolew and Suprasl. All these towns were centres of either Protestantism or Orthodoxy. The Podlasie district of the Lithuanian 927 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 54. Ibid., p. 53. 929 Wisner, Janusz Radziwiáá, p. 193-194. 930 Akta Ugody Kiedanskiej, p. 24-25. 928 215 Unity consisted of seventeen parishes with the cathedral in Zabáudów. Many landed estates in the neighbourhood belonged to Protestant nobles.931 His position as the starosta of BraĔsk gave Bogusáaw the right to influence the political combinations that controlled Polish Podlasie. In November 1655, the nobility of the Polish Podlasie elected him their marshal at a dietine in Tykocin, and signed a petition asking for Sweden’s protection. Radziwiáá was the first to sign the petition as “Marshal of Podlasie.”932 Radziwiáá’s next step was to ensure the Podlasian nobles’ goodwill towards the Swedish army. In a letter to De la Gardie he wrote: Recently I moved in here to be present at the dietine of Podlasie’s nobility, which I summoned as Governor of this palatinate. After presenting the dangers facing it [the district]. The dietine resolved to send a delegation to Your Excellency to inform You about the results of the current discussions…Thus, on behalf of this district, the only one which determined to ask for His Majesty’s patronage, despite having their own army, I implore You, be gracious to spare it [the district] as long as it is possible, as it, by the way, will be considerably ruined on the other bank of the River Narew, where the passage of the army of Your Excellency is inevitable. Knowing that freedom was always the inheritance of these people, You would produce an impression of your magnanimity if you saved their lands.933 The Arian noble Mikoáaj Lubieniecki (his wife Helena was the sister of the pro-Swedish Ukrainian leader Jerzy Niemirycz) and the Calvinist Andrzej Komorowski were ambassadors to De la Gardie. On December 9 1655, in Warsaw, they signed the act of Sweden’s annexation of Podlasie.934 That was the only palatinate in Poland in which the inhabitants freely accepted Sweden’s protection before its army arrived. But in the southern part of Podlasie, a strong Catholic party led by the podkomorzy of Drohiczyn, Jerzy Monvid Irzykowicz, stood in Radziwiáá’s way. Michaá Kazimierz Radziwiáá, the cupbearer of Lithuania and only male Catholic within the Radziwiáá kin, backed this faction. As an owner of the local town of Biaáa Podlaska, he had interest in Podlasie. At the end of 1655, Irzykowicz, together with several other nobles, signed a memorandum under the interesting title “Reflection over why His Grace Prince Bogusáaw Radziwiáá cannot become the marshal of Podlasie.”935 First, the nobles emphasized that Radziwiáá “is a native Lithuanian and they [Podlasians] are the sons of the Polish Crown.” Second, he could not defend the GDL from Muscovy and the Cossacks, and therefore, would not be able to 931 Tazbir, Arianie w Biaáymstoku i okolicach, p. 81-105. AGAD. Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie. Dz. Szwedzki. Mkf no 31978. 11b. No. 69. 933 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. November 7, 1655. SuraĪ. French. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. 934 Siedlecki, Jan. 1991. BraĔsk Bogusáawa Radziwiááa 1653-1669. Biaáystok, p. 48. 935 Radziwiáá, Autobiografia, p. 190-193. 932 216 defend Podlasie either. Third, the nobles asserted with pride that “Podlasians are Catholics and Prince Bogusáaw is an Evangelic.” Besides, he was the brother of the Swedish king’s aunt. In the nobles’ opinion, the Prince thirsted for fame and, like his cousin, dreamed about princedom. This was why he wanted to become “Prince of Podlasie.” The confederates thought Radziwiáá’s election as “Marshal of Podlasie” was illegal, since it lacked the consent of all the nobility, and as he had corrupted his advocates through luxurious banquets. The text includes a very interesting historical argumentation. Slavic speaking nobles asserted that they, as well as all Podlasians, were the ancestors of the Jatvingians (the ancient Baltic tribe which in the 10–12th centuries occupied Podlasie). Therefore the nobility, following the example of their ancestors, wanted to be their own masters, not “the Radziwiáá boyars.”936 The nobles collected together a levy and began the systematic destruction of Radziwiáá’s domains. In February 1656, they captured and plundered Bielsk and BraĔsk. From 1656 to the end of 1657, Podlasie witnessed civil war between the supporters and opponents of Sweden.937 This region played an important strategic role for the Swedish army. Control over it enabled the Swedes to communicate between the Livonian army, the Swedish zone in Lithuania, and the Swedish troops in Ducal Prussia and in Poland. From Podlasie, Radziwiáá supplied grain and food to the Swedish garrison in Warsaw. Sweden had two strong garrisons in Tykocin and Rajgród, with soldiers who obeyed Radziwiáá.938 However, Radziwiáá failed to seize the whole territory of Podlasie. The sole and unassailable place in the GDL remained Slutsk. Isolated from Swedish Lithuania, the garrison of Slutsk successfully controlled the principality. In order to capture the whole territory of the Navahradak palatinate Radziwiáá ordered the commandant of Slutsk, Adam Wallax, to occupy Niasvizh, Mir and Liakhavichy. On December 3 1655, the detachments from Slutsk seized Niasvizh – the capital of the Catholic branch of the Radziwiáá kin. The garrison, led by captain Jakub Robak, was camped in the castle. Mir was taken after several days and Stanisáaw Skarbek was appointed its commandant.939 Thus, Radziwiáá took control over nearly the whole palatinate of Navahradak. To take Brest was a third goal of Radziwiáá. In August 1655, De la Gardie promised Bogusáaw Radziwiáá this strategically important town with its castle on the Bug River. But in September 1655, Lithuanian division led by Sapieha occupied the town. Radziwiáá informed De la Gardie about Russia’s plans to capture Brest, emphasizing that “the advance of the Muscovites 936 Radziwiáá’s boyars were his vassal nobles without political rights. Siedlecki, BraĔsk Bogusáawa Radziwiááa, p. 49-53; Wasilewski, Zarys dziejow Bogusáawa Radziwiááa. Radziwiáá, Autobiografia, p. 57-67. 938 Siedlecki, BraĔsk Bogusáawa Radziwiááa, p. 49-50; 939 Wasilewski, Zarys dziejow Bogusáawa Radziwiááa, p. 55. 937 217 towards Brest is a reality.”940 By doing this, Muscovy could separate the Swedish army in the GDL from the army of the Swedish king in Poland, and expand Russian influence to Podlasie. To avoid this, Radziwiáá contacted Sapieha, whose troops controlled Brest. On November 20 1655, in order to avoid the Russian occupation Sapieha accepted the Swedish protection. This raised Bogusáaw Radziwiáá’s hopes that he might be able to seize the whole territory of the palatinate, with Swedish help. He asked De la Gardie “to send a Swedish detachment of three or four hundred horsemen, with a smart officer at the head to Bielsk or to Kleszczeli, so that I could be able to make them [Russians] change their minds and understand that Podlasie and palatine of Brest belong to the Swedish king, and that there is no point in expecting anything here.”941 At the same time Radziwiáá informed the Muscovites, who were close to Brest, that the townspeople and nobles were already the subjects of Sweden and demanded that the Russians withdraw.942 To defend his domain of Sialets near Brest, “the only one remaining in safety in Lithuania,” Radziwiáá asked the Swedish authorities to send safe conducts, noting that: Safe conducts of Your Excellency are held in respect by them [Muscovites] and they [safe conducts] could protect an innumerable number of inhabitants and unfortunate refugees from Lithuania, who fled here before owing to the behaviour of these Barbarians. Therefore, I implore You Excellency not to deny the request of help from the inhabitants of this province and with its exhausted nobles, who rush out here not to be subordinate to those unwelcome people [Muscovites].943 Radziwiáá suggested that De la Gardie communicate officially with the Russians, to make them clearly understand that Brest belonged to Sweden. Instead, on January 29 1656, Karl X Gustav wrote a letter to Tsar Aleksei and declared that Brest was Swedish. The king protested over the actions of the tsar, who despite the notification had sent the voivode Andrei Urusov to capture Brest, and, when he failed, had allowed the Russian soldiers to plunder the vicinity “making a lot of harm in our land.”944 However, in early 1656, Sapieha joined Poland’s side. King Jan Kazimierz again took control of Brest. Radziwiáá had to do some quick thinking if he were to re-assert his influence there. Brest had never belonged to the 940 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. October 12, 1655. Tykocin. French. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. November 24, 1655. Bocki. French. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. 942 Ibid. 943 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. November 14, 1655. Tykocin. French. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. 944 Karl X Gustav to the Grand Duke of Muscovy. January 29, 1656. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. E1367. 941 218 sphere over which he had political influence. Rather, it was Sapieha who traditionally controlled the Brest dietine.945 Radziwiáá could only count on the support of some of the local nobles. These included the Protestant nobility, which was grouped around the prince. For example, the well-off Arian family of the Grek, whose hereditary nest Dobrynka, was very close to Brest.946 Another influential local Protestant family, the Kochlewski, supported the Reformed church in Nurzec.947 The Radziwiáá estates of Sialets and Starae Sialo were also close to Brest. The podkomorzy of Brest, Wáadysáaw LeszczyĔski, were the protector of the Lutheran colony Nejdorf.948 However, these settlements were isolated and there were few Protestants in the area. Therefore, Radziwiáá decided to conquer Brest and the district by force. In order to help him, the commander of Swedish troops in Mazovia, General Adolf Johan av Pfalz, placed Colonel Fabian Berens and his regiment at Radziwiáá’s disposal at the end of February 1656. This force included 12 detachments of cavalry and 6 regiments of dragoons. After assembling in Tykocin, a united army marched towards Brest. On April 3 1656, Radziwiáá’s forces defeated a Lithuanian regiment led by Samuel àukomski, and seized Kamianets. After that, Radziwiáá captured Vysokae and Vouchyn, and approached Brest. During this triumphal campaign, Radziwiáá captured the Palatine of Brest Maksymilian Brzozowski, as well as the Esquire Carver of Brest Pawel Horbowski Zaranek and many of Sapieha’s officers.949 One of Radziwiáá’s detachments was sent to Sialets, to secretly bury the corpse of Janusz Radziwiáá in the local Reformed church.950 But Radziwiáá did not dare to attack Brest, which had a powerful fortress with a strong garrison. Hence, the prince decided to resort to political means. Hoping to entice the Brest nobles to take his side, Radziwiáá sent them a letter in which he proposed that the defenders lay down their arms and open the gates. He argued that the nobles were wrong in supporting the “weak confederates of Sapieha.” Radziwiáá bluffed, threatening the city with a powerful Swedish army that was supposedly soon to arrive, having already crossed the Bug River. He argued that it would be better for the nobles to surrender the fortress to him, a Lithuanian official, “than to some Swedish general.”951 The reply from the Brest nobles left Radziwiáá no hope. The nobles said that they regarded Radziwiáá’s campaign as “an invasion of our palatine by an alien army” and emphasized that “it is a great honour for us to give our lives for Our Lord, the king of Poland, and freedom.” The nobles declared that a Catholic town 945 Wasilewski, Zarys dziejow Bogusáawa Radziwiááa, p. 40. Tazbir, Arianie w Biaáymstoku i okolicach, p. 88. 947 Kriegseisen, Ewangelicy Polscy i Litewscy, p. 111. 948 Schultz, Kronika zboru ewangelicko-luterskiego Nejdorfskiego. 949 Wasilewski, Zarys dziejow Bogusáawa Radziwiááa, p. 58-60. 950 Šapoka, 1655 metǐ Kơdainiǐ, p. 135. 951 Radziwiáá, Autobiografia, no 15. 946 219 should never submit to Protestants. “Our Lord himself, the protector of the Holy Church, favours the struggle with the enemies of the Motherland.”952 Aggrieved, Radziwiáá had to retreat from Brest back to Podlasie. At the same time, Sapieha’s Colonel Samuel Oskierka dislodged the Radziwiáá garrisons from Niasvizh and Mir. On May 8 1656, Oskierka, with the help of the gentry levy from Podlasie and Mazovia, besieged Tykocin. However, on July 8 1656, Radziwiáá, supported by the Swedish general Robert Douglas, triumphantly raised the siege of Tykocin. Thus, Radziwiáá failed to take control over Podlasie, Brest and Navahradak on his own. His only remaining hope was to get diplomatic and military help from Sweden. Having learned about the crisis between Sweden and Russia and fearing a possible treaty between Sweden and Poland, Radziwiáá begged the Swedes “to support my interests and to state in the clauses of a possible agreement the possibility of returning and taking possession of all my land estates both in Ruthenia and in Lithuania.”953 Among the conditions that Sweden put forward in order to make peace with Poland was the article concerning the formation of Radziwiáá’s separate state, including Podlasie.954 In response, Jan Kazimierz, who wanted to deprive Radziwiáá of political influence, removed him from the position of the starosta of BraĔsk. The position was handed over to the king’s ally Jerzy Hlebowicz.955 The victory of the Swedish army over the Polish-Lithuanian troops in a three-day July battle near Warsaw gave Radziwiáá new hopes.956 Two of his regiments fought on the Swedish side. Bogusáaw himself saved the life of Karl X Gustav in the battle, by shooting the Lithuanian nobleman Jakub Kowalewski.957 On July 24 1656, Radziwiáá issued a new order to the garrison of Slutsk. It was to capture two towns belonging to Michaá Kazimierz Radziwiáá, namely Niasvizh and Liakhavichy.958 At the same time, Radziwiáá’s embassy, led by an Orthodox merchant named Samuel Stefanowicz, left Slutsk for Ukraine. Stefanowicz carried “Instruction to the Hetman of Ukraine and Zaporozhian Host.” Radziwiáá asked Khmelnytsky to defend Slutsk and the Duchy from “Poles, others enemies and the people of Muscovy.” Among other things, he asked him to secure the trade between Slutsk 952 Ibid., no 16. Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. May 5, 1656. Königsberg. French. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. 954 Punti proposti dal Gentilhuomo Suedese inuiato a Polacchi. 1655. Italian. Bibliothèque Nationale de France; Département des manuscrits. Ms.fr.n.a.9819, p. 357. 955 Siedlecki, BraĔsk Bogusáawa Radziwiááa, p. 50-51. 956 Carlbom, J. Levin. 1906. Tre dagars slaget vid Warschau den 18-20 juli 1656 samt de föregående mindre fältslagen 1655 och 1656: med planscher, karta och bataljplaner: ett 250års minne. Stockholm; Nagielski, Mirosáaw. 1990. Warszawa 1656. Warszawa. 957 Augusiewicz, Prostki 1656, p. 77. 958 AGAD. AR, dz. IV, teka 4, koperta 46. Listy Bogusáawa Radziwiááa. No. 47, p. 62-63. 953 220 and Ukraine and supply the city with Ukrainian grain.959 In response the hetman issued two edicts placing Slutsk under his protection.960 The nobles of Navahradak concluded a defence treaty with the Ukrainian Colonel Nechaj.961 Thus, Radziwiáá managed to take control over Navahradak with the Cossack help. On September 13–14 1656, in Prussian Frauenburg/Frombork, a sitting of the Swedish Council of the Realm took place with Karl X Gustav, Johan Oxenstierna, Gustaf Stenbock, Carl Leijonhufvud, Lorentz von der Linde and Wilhelm Taube attending. The search for new allies against Russia and Poland was the main topic. The discussion resulted in a resolution to seek to form a large coalition of the non-Catholic countries in Eastern Europe, with Sweden at the head. The coalition could comprise Brandenburg–Prussia, Ukraine, Transylvania and the Lithuanian territory controlled by Radziwiáá. Sweden regarded this alliance as a response to Poland, which had just created an anti-Swedish league composed of Russia, the Habsburg Empire, Holland and Denmark.962 On November 3 1656, Poland–Lithuania and Russia signed the armistice in Nemơžis. In additional discussion, it was emphasized that the allies would struggle against “their common enemy, the Swedish king and his Prussian elector.”963 The Swedes managed to get hold of the full text of this agreement via their Lithuanian agents.964 On July 11 1656, in order to meet the conditions of the agreement of Marienburg with Sweden (June 25 1656), Ducal Prussia declared war on Poland-Lithuania.965 In response, the Lithuanian army led by Gosiewski, and reinforced by its ally, the Crimean Tatars, started regular raids into the Prussian territory. From their base in Samogitia, they plundered the ethnic Lithuanian population of Prussia and its Lutheran churches. The goal was to impel Elector Friedrich Wilhelm to withdraw his support of Sweden.966 As a result, according to the armistice between Lithuania and Ducal Prussia signed in Virbalis on November 8 1656, Prussia withdrew from the war for three months.967 On December 1 1656, Poland and the Habsburg Empire 959 AGAD. Ibid. No. 49, p. 68-71. UBK, no. 136, 148. 961 UBK, dodatok II no. 19, 20. 962 Svenska Riksrådets protocoll, vol. XIV, p. 739. 963 PSZRI., no 193, p. 411. 964 Literae Unó cum Protocollo Commissariorum Plenipoteutium Regis Poloniae super Tractatu qui Medictoribus Sac. Caes. Majest. Ferdinand III legatus Alegretti ab Alegrettis & Johannis Theodor de Lorbach, cum Moschorum Czar Commissariis Plenipotentiariis, habitus & conclusus est Vilnae in Magno Ducatu Lithuaniae d. 3. Novembris, Anno 1656. 16 pp. Klemming, Gustaf. 1881. Samtida skrifter rörande Sveriges förhållanden till fremmande magter. Vol. 1. 1483-1658. Stockholm, p. 130. 965 Opgenoorth, Ernst. 1971. Friedrich Wilhelm, der grosse Kurfürst von Brandenburg: eine politische Biographie. Vol. 1, 1620-1660. Göttingen, p. 331-337. 966 Augusiewicz, Prostki 1656, p. 138-146. 967 Ibid., p. 190. 960 221 signed a treaty at Vienna. According to this treaty, the Habsburg Empire 4,000 soldiers to Poland for the war with Sweden.968 Jan Kazimierz hoped to come to an agreement with the Ukrainian Cossacks through compromises. 969 Thus, the Swedish diplomacy faced a difficult problem. Sweden had to form an anti–Polish coalition as quickly as possible. Radziwiáá played a significant role in the preparation of the new coalition. He maintained regular contacts between Khmelnytsky and Sweden. Through Jerzy Niemirycz, the leader of the Ukrainian Protestants and a general in Swedish service, Radziwiáá regularly communicated also with the prince of Transylvania, György II Rákóczi. That Radziwiáá took an active part in the formation of the coalition is evidenced in his letter dated July 24 1656, to Jan Gross, the commandant of Slutsk. Radziwiáá mentioned optimistically that he expected an alliance of Sweden with Prussia, Transylvania and Ukraine that would allow for the relief of Slutsk.970 Intensive consultations resulted in a military pact concerning the future partition of the Commonwealth. The pact was signed on December 6 1656, in Radnot/Iernut.971 It included Transylvania and Sweden, signing on behalf of their non–Catholic allies. On the Swedish side, Celestin Sternbach and Gotthard Velling signed the treaty. On the Transylvanian side, the pact was signed by János Kemény and Mihály Mikes. Moreover, the ambassadors of Ducal Prussia, and Radziwiáá, had taken part in the negotiations. An alliance between Protestant Sweden and Transylvania was quite natural. Karl X Gustav had maintained friendly relations with Rákóczi as far back as 1651, when Bengt Skytte was sent on a mission to Transylvania.972 Concurrently, Rákóczi had kept in close contact with Ukraine and the Radziwiáá faction.973 The articles of the pact consisted of the first detailed plan to wipe Poland– Lithuania off the map of Europe, by partitioning its territory between Sweden, Transylvania, Prussia, Radziwiáá and Ukraine.974 In accordance with the pact’s first article, Sweden and Transylvania concluded “an everlasting alliance” between both rulers and their followers. The allies of both countries, including Prussia, Ukraine and Radziwiáá, promised, in joined the treaty, to 968 Frost, After the Deluge, p. 78. Pernal, Andrew. 1981. The Expenditures of the Crown Treasury for financing of diplomacy between Poland and the Ukraine during the reign of Jan Kazimierz. Harvard Ukrainian Studies. No 5, p. 102-120; Pernal, Andrew. 1983. The initial step towards the Union of Hadiach. Canadian Slavonic Papers. No 25, p. 284-300. 970 AGAD. AR, dz. IV, teka 4, koperta 46. Listy Bogusáawa Radziwiááa. No 47, p. 62-64. 971 Nowadays Radnot is a small town of Iernut in Romania (Mureú region). 972 Runeby, Bengt Skytte, Comenius och abdikationskrisen, p. 360-382; Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 5-8. 973 Velychenko, Stephen. 1983. Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Rakoczi of Transylvania during the Polish election of 1648. Journal of Ukrainian Studies. No. 8, p. 3-12. 974 For Transylvanian copy of the treaty see: Sziláfyi, Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale. Vol. 2, p. 191-196 ; Swedish text: Foedus inter S. R. M. tem Sveciae & Principem Transylvaniae 1656. UUB. Palmsk 98. Acta Sueco-Turcica. Vol. XI. No 26, p. 201-220. 969 222 engage in “the alliance against King Jan Kazimierz and those who directly or indirectly support or assist him, or those who resist this alliance, making no exception for anybody.” Articles 5 and 6 planned the future of the GDL after its partitioning. Sweden was supposed to take Samogitia, the districts of Kaunas, Ukmergơ, Upytơ and Braslau, as well as parts of the Polatsk and Vitsebsk districts along the Dzvina River. Swedish pretensions here included control over the economic hinterland of Riga. Additionally, the whole territory of Podlasie [Lithuanian and Polish], and Polish – Lithuanian Livonia were to be Swedish. Radziwiáá was to acquire the palatine of Navahradak “with everything that belonged to it before, wherever it was located, by the right of the sovereign.” Transylvania was to receive the palatinate of Brest. The future of Belarus, which was already occupied by Russia and Ukraine, was not mentioned. From Poland, Sweden was to take the palatinates of Kujawy, Royal Prussia, Kaszuby and Pomerania, as well as part of the palatinates of Páock and Mazovia, adding Courland and Semigalia. The Great Elector of Brandenburg–Prussia was to receive the palatinates of LĊczyca, Kalisz, PoznaĔ (Great Poland) and Sieradz together with the WieluĔ land, “as it has been agreed upon before.”975 As is well known, in accordance with an agreement reached in Labiau/Polessk on November 20 1656, Karl X Gustav had appointed Friedrich Wilhelm the sovereign of Ducal Prussia and granted him several Polish territories in order to keep him in alliance with Sweden.976 Transylvania was to be given all of the remaining lands except for Ukraine: “Everything that remains in Little and Great Poland and belongs to the crown of Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, apart from the territories that have been listed before or the territories to be excluded by the content of the next article.” Thus, Transylvania would gain Little Poland with Kraków, and most of Mazovia including Warsaw, Podille, Galicia and Volhynia with the towns of Lviv and Lutsk and Brest in Lithuania.977 After difficult negotiations, Sweden guaranteed Rákóczi the title King of Poland.978 Article 6 illustrated the controversies that existed concerning the future borders of Ukraine. It noted that Karl X Gustav “was willing to preserve Ukraine for the Cossacks”, whereas Rákóczi “rejecting neither the alliance with the Cossacks nor their territories, reckons that under such a state of affairs his future position in Poland might be injured. Therefore, it was decided to leave it as now until the future negotiations.” Podlasie was the sub975 These lands was promised to Ducal Prussia according to the treaty of Marienburg between Brandenburg-Prussia and Sweden from June 25, 1656: Kubaáa, Wojna szwecka, p. 334. 976 Frost, After the Deluge, p. 79. 977 Robert I Frost states mistakenly that the title of Lithuanian Grand Duke was guaranteed Rákóczi together with the most part of the GDL: Frost, After the Deluge, p. 85. 978 Wittrock, Karl X Gustaf i Polen, p. 32-33. 223 ject of much controversy between Sweden and Transylvania. Sweden demanded “the whole Podlasie on both banks of the Bug River,” but Transylvania protested. As a result, the allies decided to leave the solution of this problem to future negotiations. In Article 10, the Protestant allies promised to carefully strengthen “the Evangelical Church by taking the appropriate steps”, as well as to treat the Orthodoxy of the Ukrainian Cossacks tolerantly. Finally, the compact provided “for unrestricted trade between both parties in accordance with ancient custom.” In the spring of 1657, Sweden and Transylvania planned a joint campaign against the Commonwealth in order to partition it. The participation of Radziwiáá and the Ukrainian Hetman, who had felt offended in Radnot, was problematic. Prince Bogusáaw had been badly wounded on October 8 1656, in a battle at Prostken/Prostki, and had been the prisoner of the Crimean Tartars. He was released to the Swedes after their victory over the Lithuanian army at Filipów, on October 22 1656.979 After his release, Bogusáaw went to Prussia. His two regiments suffered great losses. This had sharply reduced his political influence and international authority. Two ambassadors, Jan MierzeĔski and Stefan Niemirycz, defended Radziwiáá’s interests in Radnot.980 However, he obtained only one of the three parts of his envisioned state, namely the palatine of Navahradak. The other territories he had wanted, such as Podlasie, were given to Sweden. The palatine of Brest was given to Transylvania. Giving Radziwiáá Navahradak did not solve any problems, since it was virtually in his hands already. The Duchy of Slutsk comprised the large part of the palatinate. The local nobility, which included many Protestant and Orthodox believers, were powerful supporters of Radziwiáá’s plans. The decision to make a separate state out of the palatine attracted the local nobility. It would allow the ordinary town of Navahradak – an ancient residence of Grand Dukes and the residence of Orthodox metropolitan of Lithuania – to resume its former capital status. Nevertheless, Bogusáaw was utterly displeased with the meagre results of the Radnot compact. MierzeĔski protested against the conditions. He referred to the Kơdainiai treaties, and demanded that Podlasie and Brest should be included in the state of Radziwiáá.981 From March 1657, MierzeĔski conducted intensive negotiations in Elbing/Elbląg with the Swedish diplomats von Schlippenbach and Matthias Björnklou. The key issue was the inclusion of Brest and Podlasie in Radziwiáá’s principality. MierzeĔski referred to the July agreements of 1655 with De la Gardie. Björnklou agreed to the claims to northern 979 Relation om Svenska armens seger ofver Litthauerna under Fältherre Gontzewski vid Philippowa, October 22/12, 1656. RA. Militaria, 1295. 980 Wasilewski, Tadeusz. 1976. Jan MierzeĔski. PSB. Vol. XXI/1, p. 19. 981 Bely Ales. 2001. Radnotski dahavor 1656. Entsyklapedyia historyi Belarusi. Vol. 6. Minsk, p. 69. 224 Podlasie and promised to allocate Brest to the Radziwiáá state in the future.982 After that additional concession, Radziwiáá did send his own regiment with Colonel Eberchard Puttkammer at the head, to Karl X Gustav. In spite of the relatively small number of Puttkammer’s troops, Sweden was still interested in their participation in the Lithuanian campaign, because most of the Radziwiáá soldiers were natives by origin and were familiar with local conditions. The Ukrainian Cossacks gained almost nothing in Radnot. Before the pact Khmelnytsky sent his ambassadors, Ivan Kovalyvsky and Ivan Hrusha, to Transylvania. The ambassadors’ instructions included a Ukrainian proposal for a treaty to defend both countries and the Orthodox and Calvinist religions “from the cunning Poles who gather different nations for our perdition.” The hetman reported that Russia and Poland were expected to sign an armistice soon. According to Khmelnytsky, “we attentively watch the forthcoming result of this combination, the key condition is, that it does not harm the Swedish king.” Ukrainian–Swedish relations were important aspects of the instructions. Khmelnytsky noted that a treaty with Transylvania was possible only if it did not contradict Swedish interests, adding that “His Majesty, the king of Sweden personally can witness that neither at the present time nor earlier did he ever know evil from us, and that we mean well, because there were no hostile actions from him against us.”983 In this way, the hetman probably hoped to entice Sweden to join the agreement too. He hoped that his ambassadors could meet with the embassy of Karl X Gustav. On September 17 1656, Ukraine and Transylvania signed a defence pact. The pro– Muscovite faction of the Cossack elite reacted negatively, but nevertheless, the treaty was ratified in October 1657.984 Rákóczi recognized the claims of Ukraine to the eastern palatines of Poland, and southern Lithuania, and ”all towns beyond the Vistula River inhabited by Ruthenian people.”985 But in Radnot, Transylvania rescinded its earlier promise to Ukraine to renounce its own claims to the Ruthenian lands. Discontented, Khmelnytsky demanded new consultations. Sweden also insisted that the Cossacks join the pact.986 At the end of September 1656, in the Transylvanian town of Szamosújvár/Gherla, a consultation between the Ukrainian diplomats Kovalyvsky and Samijla Bahdanovich, and the representatives of Transylvania and Sweden, took place.987 Both Karl X Gustav and Rákóczi showed interest in getting military support from the Cossacks, but they did not want to ex982 Jan MierzeĔski to Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. March 30, 1657. AGAD. AR, dz. V, sygn 9646. NR MKF 65/498-65/531, p. 39-42. 983 UBK, no. 135, 133. 984 Khavanova, The foreign policy of the principality of Transylvania, p. 142. 985 Narysy z istorii dyplomatii Ukrainy. Kyiv, 2001, p. 153. 986 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 39. 987 Samijla Velichko. Litopis. Vol.1. Kyiv, 1991, p. 197, note 587. 225 pand the borders of the Hetmanate.988 The allies felt that the strengthening of Ukraine’s status would be harmful to the interests of Transylvania and Sweden in Poland. Therefore, the conflict around the Ruthenian possession could not be solved. Nevertheless, on February 10 1657, Khmelnytsky issued an edict sending the Cossack army to help Transylvania and Sweden against Poland.989 Karl X Gustav considered the compact of Radnot as his great diplomatic success.990 While otherwise Swedish affairs were going badly, the king felt lucky to have organized a potentially strong military alliance, one that might change the situation in favour of Sweden. The Protestant sides agreed to the first plan of the partition Poland–Lithuania, and took energetic steps to realize it. The local elites of the Commonwealth; that is, Ducal Prussia, Ukraine and Radziwiáá’s faction in Lithuania, found themselves in the ranks of the coalition. This gives evidence of a serious centre–periphery conflict between the royal government and the provinces of Poland-Lithuania. Radziwiáá was one of the main instigators of the rupture of the union between the GDL and Poland. Modern Polish research pays little attention to the compact of Radnot and its religious aspects. One exception is Janusz Tazbir, who deals with the role of Radziwiáá is. He writes: Historians today continue to disagree about the political or religious motives, which led Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to surrender Lithuania to the Swedes in 1655, but contemporaries remembered that the magnates who signed the treaty of Radnot in 1656 were Calvinists. The treaty provided for the partition of the Commonwealth among Sweden, Brandenburg, Transylvania and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá.991 Following the compact of Radnot, the allies started a new military operation in Poland–Lithuania in February of 1657 in order to partition it once and for all. On April 1 1657, Karl X Gustav joined Rákóczi and the Ukrainian Cossacks in the village of ûmielów, not far from the former Arian centre Raków. Rákóczi led an army of 24,000 Transylvanians. Generals Ferenc Ispán, Péter Huszár and János Kemény headed the divisions. Colonels Anton Zhdanovich (called Antonio Sdanowitz in Swedish sources) and Ivan Fedorovich Bohun commanded the Ukrainian corps of 6,000 Cossack cavalry.992 Karl X Gustav took personal command over the 7,000 Swedish– 988 Narysy z istorii dyplomatii Ukrainy, p. 152. UBK, no. 150. 990 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 36. 991 Tazbir, Janisz. 1982. The fate of Polish Protestantism in the seventeenth century. A Republic of Nobles. Studies in Polish history to 1864. Ed. Jan Fedorowicz. Cambridge University Press, p. 207. 992 Erik Dahlberghs dagbok. I urval och med inledning av Alf Åberg. 1962, Stockholm, p. 7883. Scottish officer on the Swedish service Patrick Gordon calculated the number of 989 226 Prussian troops. Generals Adolf Johan av Pfalz, and Jerzy Niemirycz; and Colonel Johan Benedikt von Schönleben led the 4,000 Swedish troops.993 Jerzy Niemirycz, who had been the leader of the Ukrainian Protestants, since the beginning of the Second Northern War joined the Swedish side.994 This rich magnate was a skilled officer and an expert in Polish and Russian military tactics. He had published a doctoral thesis on this topic in Paris. As a radical Protestant, all roads to the highest posts had been closed to Niemirycz in Poland. In the Swedish army, he at once received the rank of General and fought on Karl X Gustav’s side against Poland for three years. The 800 horsemen in Radziwiáá’s regiment under the command of Colonel Puttkammer were integrated into the Swedish army. Radziwiáá, who had been wounded badly in the battle at Prostki, could not take part in the campaign. However, he directed intense diplomatic activities to support his claims to Brest from Prussia. After seizing central Poland, the allies marched towards Lithuania. Karl X Gustav chose WĊgrów, a Protestant centre in Podlasie, as his headquarters. Here the army of coalition was reinforced by the Swedish troops led by General Jacob Kasimir De la Gardie and the Prussian division of 3,000 soldiers headed by Georg von Waldeck. In WĊgrów the allies received news of the forced crossing of the Bug River by Polish–Lithuanian troops and their advance on Brest. The commanders of the alliance decided to follow them. The tactical scheme of the campaign was to annihilate the 12,000-man-strong army led by Hetmans Sapieha and Stanisáaw Potocki. In Brest, the Lithuanian–Polish troops were supposed to join the division of Gosiewski. The quick advance of the Swedish troops frustrated these plans. The Lithuanian troops withdrew from Brest to Slonim.995 The strategic aim of the operation was to liquidate Jan Kazimierz’s headquarters in Lithuania. Sapieha concentrated the Lithuanian army in Brest. On January 27 1657, his troops seized the last local Swedish garrison in Tykocin, and crushed the defending soldiers. The commanders of Tykocin, the Swedish Colonel Didrik von Rosen, and Lithuanian Colonel Johan Otthenhausen were both killed.996 From now on, Jan Kazimierz controlled a sizeUkrainian Cossacks in 6000 men: Gordon, Patrick. 2000. Dnevnik [Diary] 1635-1659. Moskva, p. 114. Contemporary Ukrainian historians operate with a doubtful number of 20,000 Cossacks. 993 Pufendorf, Samuelis liberi baronis de Pufendorf De rebus a Carolo Gustav, p. 259-261; Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 44-45; Jacobson, Gustaf. 1926. Sveriges historia till våra dagar. Sjunde delen. Stockholm, 1926, p. 315; Carlson, Sveriges historia, p. 357-358. 994 Niemirycz, Georgus. 1632. Discursus De Bello Moscovitico. Parisiis. 995 Relation öfver ett och annatt hwad som passerat åhr wiid Konlig. Maij:tz Armeé, uppe uthi Påland och Littowen ifrån d. sista Martij in till den 8 Maji A:o 1657. Handlingar til uplysning af swenska krigs-historien. Vol. 1. Stockholm, 1787, p. 55-61. 996 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 106; LM, no. 29. 227 able territory that combined Samogitia with Brest and Podlasie. In March of 1657, a convocation of the Lithuanian senators faithful to the Polish king was summoned in Brest. They sent an embassy to Jan Kazimierz and asked him to consolidate the anti–Swedish coalition in the future and to keep peace with Russia.997 Sweden planned to capture of Brest and thereby gain control of the main lines of communication between Lithuania, Mazovia, Poldlasie, Prussia and Ukraine. In the case of a prolongation of the war with Russia, “the enemy who had contacts with Cossacks”, control of Brest was of significance.998 As Karl X Gustav noted later, the Brest campaign could not fail since “no city could withstand us. Taken together we were too strong for them.”999 The allied troops marched through Grodzisk and crossed the Bug River at KrzemieĔ. There, Karl X Gustav ordered General Gustav Otto Stenbock to march from Prussia to Brest with cannons, the military transport and field– kitchens.1000 On May 7, the allies seized Ostrozany and Siemiatycze. To keep the campaign secret, the soldiers marched by night. The coalition troops entered the GDL and advanced on Brest via Milejczyce and Tokary. On May 9 the allies captured their first GDL town – Vysokae. On the same day, Erik Dahlberg arrived in the neighbourhood of Brest with a detachment of dragoons, in order to examine the fortification and to draw a plan of the city. In Dahlberg’s words, the outward appearance of the defences struck him: “Brest was a good and mighty fort with powerful walls and a strong garrison.”1001 The siege would require preparation. In addition, each of the allies, apart from Sweden, had put forward their own claims to the city. Brest, situated on the border of Lithuania and Poland, between the Bug and Mukhavets Rivers, held an exceptional political and commercial position. It was the first Ruthenian city of Lithuania to gain the Magdeburg Rights (1390). After 1566 Brest was the capital of one of the richest and most populated regions. It was the only 17th-century Lithuanian city in which a Diet was held in 1653. In 1553, the starosta of Brest, Mikoáaj Radziwiáá the Black, started the Protestant Reformation from here. After the Counter– Reformation, many Protestant congregations still survived in the region: four common Lutheran–Reformed parishes (Brest, Nejdorf, Sáawatycze, WĊgrów), twelve Calvinist churches (Jamna, Nepakojchytsy, Sialets, Starae Sialo, Wáodawa, Sokolów Podlaski, Siemiatycze, Orla, Nurzec, Rusków, Dokudów, Wilanowo) and an Arian congregation in Dobrynka. Thus, Brest had significance for the Lithuanian Protestants. As mentioned above, Radzi997 Rachuba, Wielkie Ksiestwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym, p. 304. Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 49. 999 Relation till ständerna av statssekretaren Edvard Ehrensteen. Sveriges Ridderskaps och Adels Riksdags- protokoll. Vol. 7.Bilaga A, p.119. 1000 Carlson, Sveriges historia, p. 358, note 1. 1001 Erik Dahlberghs dagbok, p. 80-81. 998 228 wiáá dreamed of making the city part of his own state. But under the Radnot compact, Brest was to be given to Transylvania. The historical claims of Transylvania were based on the plans of Rákóczi: Brest was to become part of a future Greater Hungary. In the 13th century, Brest formed part of the principality of Galicia and Volhynia, vassal to the Hungarian Crown. In 1349–1351, the Hungarian King Louis I the Great occupied Brest. In the 1370s, the Lithuanian Orthodox Prince Fedor of Brest accepted vassalage to the Hungarian Kingdom. In 1370 –1382, Louis I was also King of Poland. As a result of the personal union at Kreva between Lithuania and Poland (1385), the daughter of king Louis I Jadwiga accepted the Grand Duke of Lithuania Jogaila, laying the foundation of the Jageiellonian dynasty that reigned in Poland–Lithuania.1002 The Ukrainian Cossacks also claimed Brest. Brest was the city where, in 1596, the Uniate Church was formed. This church was hated by the Cossacks. During the Catholic reaction, seven Catholic monasteries and a Jesuit College had been founded in the city. However, the Ukrainian elite continued to consider Brest an integral part of their Cossackdom, since it was a town, which spoke mainly Ruthenian. As we shall see below, the Ukrainians insisted on this thesis during the negotiations with Sweden. For the Cossacks, the Brest St. Simon Orthodox monastery with the tomb of beauteous Afanasiusz Filipowicz had great symbolic value. Lithuanian Catholic nobles murdered this charismatic leader in 1648, because of his collaboration with the Cossacks. Therefore, the Ukranian Cossacks were eager to place the city under the banner of Orthodoxy once again. Brest was also the capital of the Lithuanian Vaad, the Jewish self–government. This was “a red cloth”, irritating the Cossacks who persecuted the Jews.1003 On May 11, the allied troops besieged Brest. After the first bombardment, the garrison raised a white flag.1004 The castellan of Brest, Malcher Sawicki, offered to exchange emissaries. Two Lithuanian nobles and a German mercenary made up Brest’s embassy, which was headed by Hrehory Wojna. Three Lithuanian nobles in Swedish service negotiated on behalf of Sweden: Niemirycz, Puttkammer and an unknown captain serving under Radziwiáá. At the last moment, Karl X Gustav decided to replace this captain with Erik Dahlberg, who was supposed to talk to the German mercenaries. Dahlberg managed to examine the walls and to find a place suitable for assault. He intimidated the soldiers by saying: ”you have to know that 80,000 [sic!] of the Hungarians and Cossacks are at the Swedish king’s disposal. Should you dare to shoot they will slaughter Brest to the last soul in an hour’s time.”1005 1002 Bely, Nieviadomya epizody ”nieviadomai vainy”, p. 128-129. Cygielman, Shmuel Arthur. 1997. Jewish autonomy in Poland and Lithuania until 1648. Jerusalem. 1004 Gordon, Dnevnik, p. 116. 1005 Erik Dahlberghs dagbok, p. 83-85. 1003 229 On May 16 1657, Brest signed the conditions of its surrender. The text of treaty: “Articles of the agreement on the city and fortress of Brest’s transition to the King of Sweden and the Prince of Transylvania” was published.1006 Under the first article, the city surrendered itself to the king of Sweden and the prince of Transylvania, preserving all its secular and ecclesiastical rights. According to Article 7, Brest would remain under Transylvanian control. The garrison had to leave the city in three days’ time after signing the agreement, and the Prince of Transylvania appointed the town’s major. Articles 2, 3, 4, and 8 relate to the conditions of the surrender. The soldiers were to be freed with their standards and muskets. To avoid acts of revenge against “the Polish soldiers of Brest”, 300 Swedish horsemen were to guard the retreating garrison “as far as the pond.” Articles 5 and 6 sorted out the winners’ relationship to the local nobility. The Swedish king and the Transylvanian prince guaranteed the personal security and protection within the city to those nobles faithful to them. The nobles who agreed to serve Sweden or Transylvania were offered positions. On May 19, the garrison with “2,300 robust soldiers, 1,000 city militia and the Jewish irregulars” came out the city to meet the king of Sweden.1007 The text of the conditions of surrender did not include articles pertaining to Radziwiáá’s claims, or those of the Cossacks. As noted by Dahlberg, “under the agreements Brest was given as a possession to Rákóczi.”1008 The Hungarian garrison was quartered in the city, and Colonel András Gaudi was appointed governor. Brest became Transylvania’s main base in Lithuania. To conquer the rest of the district, the allies then occupied Kobryn.1009 On May 23, a team of Swedish artists and cartographers headed by Dahlberg completed a plan of the city and two city panoramas. In 1696, Pufendorf published one of the pictures under the title “Siege of Brest.”1010 Detailed plans of the city with a legend, and a panorama of the city from the left bank of the Bug River, were not printed. I found both in the collections of the Royal Library of Sweden.1011 The plan of the city shows the large Lutheran church, the “Pfarr Kirche”, located in the southern part of old city. This is a valuable document which shows that there existed a Protestant 1006 Accords Puncta, so Bey Übergebung der Stadt und Scholsses Brescie Litevski. An Jhr. Königl. Mytt. zu Schweden und Jhr. Fürstl. Durchl. Zu Siebenbürgen/geschlossen. Jm Jahr 1657. Dat im Feld-lager bey Brescie den 16 Maji/st. n. Anno 1657. 4 pp. KB. MFref Sveriges krig. R 12, ex. A, no. 625. 1007 In Lithuania the Jews were the members of the urban militia and had their own weapon: Stukalich, Vladimir. 1894. Belorussia i Litva. Ocherki po istorii gorodov Belorussii. Vitebsk, p. 30; Borovoi, Samuil. Evreiskie khroniki XVII stoletia. Moskva-Jerusalem, p. 21-27, 66. 1008 Erik Dahlberghs dagbok, p. 85. 1009 LM, no. 451. 1010 Pufendorf, Samuelis liberi baronis de Pufendorf De rebus a Carolo Gustav. 1011 Dahlberg, Erik. Plan över Briestie. KB. Handrit., vol. 41:16b, no. 10782; Briestie. Handrit., vol. 41:13a, no 10778. 230 church in Brest.1012 The Polish engineer Bonell made another detailed plan of the Brest fortress, according to Dahlberg’s command.1013 A great problem facing Karl X Gustav was the lack of discipline within the allied armies. The soldiers treated the Brest area as a conquered enemy land. The Ukrainian Cossacks, who, according the Swedes, “unlike Rákóczi did not follow our advice at all,”1014 caused particular trouble, killing Catholics, Protestants and Jews. For instance, they destroyed the Lutheran church in Nejdorf. Then also brought 70 local colonists to Sáawatycze, where they were executed despite the fact that the colonists ”swore to the Orthodox Church as the only Evangelical truth, but nevertheless were killed by Cossacks who thought that after their departure they would revert to Lutheranism again and for this reason they ought to be put to death.” The Ruthenians of Sáawatycze helped the Cossacks torture the Lutherans.”1015 In 1658, Sáawatycze received “freedom from taxes for four years, because of the ruins left after the campaign of enemy armies: Swedish, Hungarian, Moldavian, Walachian and Cossack.”1016 Transylvanian detachments launched a reign of terror against the Brest nobles, especially the clients of Sapieha. The Hungarians razed Sapieha’s estate in Bocki to the ground, and decapitated ten nobles there. Many other nobles shared their fate.1017 The regiments of Sweden also joined in the plundering. Scottish mercenaries plundered Sapieha’s domain in KodeĔ near Brest. Finnish soldiers led by Colonel Berens plundered Drohiczyn and its neighbourhood.1018 Only Puttkammer, as representative of Lithuania, tried to stop the plundering and marauding. He complained to General Jacob Kasimir De la Gardie about the Swedes’ atrocious behaviour in Brest. The king interrogated the captain of the Scottish detachment, but the officer denied all the accusations. Karl X Gustav became so infuriated that he slashed the captain’s head with a sable and had him jailed.1019 The new military regime mistreated the population, causing nobles and citizens to hate it. But it still had a few supporters. On September 3 1657, the Polish king deprived “the noblemen Piotr Grek and Krzysztof Piekarski who collaborated with Gaudi and the Hungarians in Brest” of all their landed estates.1020 Both of these Lithuanian nobles came from a well-off Protestant 1012 Swedish graphic materials are an unique source for the history of Brest oldtown which was destroyed in 1833-42, because of the construction of the Russian fortress. 1013 KA. Krigen mot Polen och Ryssland 1655-1657 samt mot Brandenburg 1658-1660. 0406:17:001:001. 1014 Tersmeden, Armia Karola X Gustawa-zarys organizacji, p. 159. 1015 Schultz, Kronika zboru ewangelicko-luterskiego Nejdorfskiego. 1016 LM, no. 293. 1017 Gordon, Dnevnik, p. 167-169, 172-173. 1018 Ibid., p. 170. 1019 Ibid. 1020 LM, no. 60. 231 family. The Calvinist Andrew Achterlonim, a Scottish officer in Lithuanian service, was Gaudi’s secretary in Brest. This treachery lost him all his estates in Lithuania.1021 The nobles who remained loyal to Poland were rewarded at the expense of the collaborationists. For instance, “for keeping faithful to the Republic”, Stanisáaw Przetocki was presented with a mansion in Brest taken from the Swedish collaborator “barber Hans”.1022 The Polish king confiscated a manor from the traitor Jan Kissarzewski, and donated it to Bolesáaw Dziatkowski for his courage in “defending Brest with might and main with his soldiers and paying no attention to the danger kept them intact when the enormous army of Rákóczi and the Swedes attacked.”1023 The king also rewarded a Uniate, Jan Hieronim ĩaba, who refused to collaborate with the new authorities. He fled to Sapieha with a number of nobles.1024 Another nobleman, Ostafi Tyszkiewicz, was appointed the podkomorzy of Brest for “following the example of his ancestors in refusing the Swedish protection.”1025 Handing over Brest to Transylvania caused conflict within the Radnot coalition. Zhdanovich complained to Khmelnytsky that the Hungarians had maltreated the Cossacks. The envoy of Sweden to Ukraine, Johan Hildebrandt, noted in his diary that Zhdanovich refused to obey General Kemény, and that the Cossacks and Transylvanians distrusted each other.1026 Dahlberg and Pufendorf noted the same thing.1027 The Cossack Council warned the Transylvanian ambassador Ferenc Sebesi that “taking possession of Ruthenian lands to the east of the Vistula River is out of the question.”1028 Sebesi wrote: “Cossacks stir up trouble. They show their discontent that our Prince Rákóczi occupied Brest since they consider everything to the east of the Vistula to belong to them.”1029 Disregarding the interests of Transylvania, Zhdanovich started independent agitation to incorporate the eastern part of the Brest palatinate. Already on May 24 1657, Pinsk was turned into a Hetman protection.1030 In his turn, Radziwiáá did his best to assume control over Brest. He wrote a letter to Adolf Johan av Pfalz concerning Brest. Radziwiáá blamed the Swedes for doing nothing to save his castle of Tykocin. As a result, it had 1021 LM, no. 518. Ibid., no. 229. 1023 Ibid., no. 959. 1024 Ibid., no. 327. 1025 Ibid., no. 374. 1026 Yakovleva, Tetiana. 1998. Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII stolittia. Prichini i pochatok Ruini. Kyiv, p. 201. 1027 Erik Dahlberghs dagbok, p. 88; Pufendorf, Samuelis liberi baronis de Pufendorf De rebus, p. 264. 1028 Narysy z istorii dyplomatii Ukrainy, p. 153. 1029 Khavanova, The foreign policy of the principality of Transylvania, p. 145. 1030 UBK, no 22, p. 375-376. 1022 232 been captured and totally destroyed by Sapieha. He was now very worried about the fate of Brest. He had been informed by Chancellor Ivan Wyhowski that Khmelnytsky had also decided to join the Swedish campaign in Lithuania, and had sent his Cossacks to Brest.1031 In his instructions to Niemirycz, Radziwiáá asked the latter to persuade Karl X Gustav to deliver the city over to him.1032 As a result of an agreement between Radziwiáá and the hetman of Ukraine, on April 26 1657 Khmelnytsky issued an order in which he forbade the Cossacks “to harm, violate or rob in the domains of His Excellency Prince Bogusáaw Radziwiáá, namely Sialets, WĊgrów and Starae Sialo.”1033 During the siege of Brest, Radziwiáá sent its inhabitants a letter in which he proposed delivering the city into Puttkammer’s possession. On July 4 1657, on hearing the news of the withdrawal of the Swedish army to fight against Denmark, Radziwiáá wrote to Karl X Gustav. He demanded that the king ordered the Governor of Transylvania to hand Brest over to him. Radziwiáá pointed out that Khmelnytsky, who was also against Transylvanian control of Brest, supported his position. Bogusáaw also asked permission to arrange for a campaign from Brest against Slutsk. The king would have to send the regiment of Puttkammer to Slutsk, “my regiment” as Radziwiáá put it. A Swedish division, led by Gustav Otto Stenbock, was to join Puttkammer. The Great Elector of Brandenburg–Prussia guaranteed the financing of the campaign.1034 Karl X Gustav did not answer Radziwiáá’s proposals. Sweden refused to hand Brest over to Radziwiáá, thus avoiding conflict with militarily powerful Rákóczi, in order to benefit a weaker ally. The Slutsk campaign also failed. Sweden’s refusal was grounded on the following reasons. First, a war with Denmark necessitated switching the strategic focus of Sweden’s policy to the west. Second, the Slutsk campaign could antagonize Russia. At a time when Sweden was fighting a defensive war against Russia in Ingermanland, a new Lithuanian campaign could result in opening a second front in the war. Third, the Swedes knew that Radziwiáá was steadily losing political support in the GDL. A final reason was a plague epidemic that raged the GDL at the end of May of 1657.1035 After Karl Gustav’s refusal, Radziwiáá abandoned his plans to create his own state under Swedish protectorate. In accordance with a plan formulated by Karl X Gustav, several Swedish troops and the Ukrainian Cossacks were to withdraw from Brest and march to Ducal Prussia. There, they were to convince Friedrich Wilhelm to remain 1031 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá till Adolf Johan av Pfalz. February 4, 1657. Königsberg. French. RA. E 309. 1032 Wasilewski, Zarys dziejow Bogusáawa Radziwiááa, p. 73-74. 1033 UBK, no. 155. 1034 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Karl X Gustav. July 4, 1657. Preüschmark/Prezmark. French. RA. Skrivelser till Konungen Karl X Gustaf. Vol. 47. Fürst Bogislaus Radzivill, no 29. 1035 AVAK. Vol. 10. Ch. II. Akty Vilenskogo magistrata i magdeburgii. Vilna, 1879, no. 52. 233 in the alliance. Stenbock’s army was to stay near Brest as defence against the Lithuanian army. Having learned that Karl X Gustav withdrew from Brest, Rákóczi declared that owing to the threat posed by the Crimean Tartars he would return to Transylvania, leaving only a detachment in the city. 1036 On May 24 1657, the main part of the Swedish army, led by Karl X Gustav, withdrew from Brest and quartered in Ostrozany. There, Karl learned that Denmark had attacked Sweden and that on May 14 a Habsburg–Polish treaty on joint defence had been signed. These events made Sweden change its strategy. The king decided to withdraw from the territory of Poland– Lithuania for the time being.1037 On May 27 1657, the last Swedish detachment headed by Dahlberg, left Brest. The Swedish withdrawal changed the geopolitical balance entirely to the favour of the anti-Swedish coalition. The participation of Sweden’s allies in the Brest campaign caused strong political crises in Eastern Europe. The Ukrainians’ participation drastically worsened relations between Khmelnytsky and the tsar. Tsar Aleksei protested to Rákóczi. He asked him ”why you together with my enemy Karl attacked Lithuania, which belongs to us.”1038 In June 1657, an embassy of Muscovy led by Vasilii Buturlin arrived in Chyhyryn, the capital of Ukraine. Buturlin complained that Cossacks had fought on the side of Russia’s enemy, and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Cossack army from Brest. At the same time, Ukraine was invaded by the hordes of the Crimean Khanate, who was an ally of Poland-Lithuania.1039 Khmelnytsky had to make excuses to the tsar for his participation in the Swedish coalition. Russian pressure resulted in the Colonel Zhdanovich being accused of “revolt” and sentenced to death for the Brest campaign. Only the sudden death of Khmelnytsky saved his life. Pressure from Russia and the Crimean Khanate forced Ukraine to withdraw from the war on the Swedish side. At the same time, General Niemirycz left Swedish service and returned home.1040 On June 22 1657, the Polish–Lithuanian troops led by Potocki and Aleksander PoáubiĔski encircled the retreating Transylvanian army in Galicia. Transylvania capitulated at Chorny Ostriv near Lviv. The Hungarian garrison had to retreat from Brest.1041 At the same time, Transylvania was invaded by the Ottoman Empire, which had found its vassal too independent. The 1036 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 51-52. Kungl. Svea Livgardes historia. Band III:2. 1632 (1611)-1660. Bertil Barkman, Sven Lundkvist och Lars Tersmeden. Stockholm, 1966, p. 306; Carl X Gustaf-Studier 5. Polens krig med Sverige 1655-1660. Krigshistoriska studier. Ed. Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer. Kristianstad. 1973, p. 378-380. 1038 Kubaáa, Wojna brandenburgska i najazd Rakoczego, p. 200. 1039 Ibid., p. 201-211. 1040 Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII stolittia, p. 125-126, 201213. 1041 Sziláfyi, Sándor. 1874. Okmánytár II. Rákóczy György: diplomacziai összeköttetéseihez. Budapest, p. 552-559. 1037 234 country surrendered. This resulted in a civil war between Rákóczi’s followers and opponents. Seeking political support, Rákóczi turned to Russia in 1659. But on June 7 1660, he died of wounds after another defeat inflicted by the Turkish army. His daring ambition of becoming king of Poland had depended on Sweden’s victory. It caused political collapse in Transylvania and frustrated the dream of a united Greater Hungary.1042 After the failure in Brest, Radziwiáá terminated his cooperation with Sweden. On August 10 1657, he wrote what, to our knowledge, would be his last letter to Karl X Gustav. In it, he briefly informed him of his decision to enter into Brandenburg–Prussia service.1043 On September 19 1657, Brandenburg– Prussia and Poland–Lithuania signed an agreement at Wehlau/Znamensk, according to which Jan Kazimierz granted amnesty to Bogusáaw Radziwiáá, who now promised to join the anti-Swedish coalition. On October 14 1657, the Diet of Ducal Prussia voted on a proposal of Friedrich Wilhelm, to elect Radziwiáá its General Governor. On November 6 1657, in Bromberg /Bydgoszcz, Radziwiáá signed an anti-Swedish agreement with Poland– Lithuania on the behalf of Prussia.1044 Radziwiáá’s political defeat over Brest had caused the final reconsolidation of the Lithuanian elite in support of Poland. In November 1657, in Kamianets, a special Lithuanian committee started to investigate the surrender of Brest and the treason of the nobles who had accepted Transylvanian protection. Jerzy Hlebowicz and Krzysztof Zawisza headed the committee. The committee suggested to the king that all the nobles who were accused of collaborating with Sweden and Transylvania were to lose their landed estates.1045 Thus, by the autumn of 1657, Sweden had lost all its allies in Eastern Europe. Transylvania and Ukraine now sank into political turmoil. They could no longer function as Swedish allies. Brandenburg–Prussia agreed to join Poland in waging war against Sweden. The Radziwiáá faction in Lithuania was forced into the camp of Sweden’s enemies. In October 1657, the Lithuanians started a successful campaign against Sweden in Livonia.1046 In 1658, Radziwiáá joined them. The main force of the Swedish army withdrew from the Commonwealth because of the ongoing war with Denmark. The Habsburg Empire joined the war on the Polish side. Russia maintained its armistice with Poland–Lithuania, and continued the fight with Sweden over Ingermanland. Swedish attempts to form a coalition of the small non1042 Khavanova, The foreign policy of the principality of Transylvania, p.146-148. Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Karl X Gustav. August 10, 1657. Königsberg. French. RA. Skrivelser till Konungen Karl X Gustaf. Vol. 47. Fürst Bogislaus Radzivill. No 24. 1044 Wasilewski, Tadeusz. 1987. Radziwiáá Bogusáaw. PSB. Vol. XXX/1, p. 168; Jacoby, Jörg. 1959. Boguslaus Radziwill: der Statthalter des grossen Kurfürsten in Ostpreussen. MarburgLahn. 1045 Rachuba, Wielkie Ksiestwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym, p. 304, 342:22. 1046 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 117. 1043 235 Catholic countries had failed, and the compact of Radnot was a futile parenthesis. The question of how to interpret the events of 1657 is topical in present–day Belarus. Official historians accuse the Swedes of destroying Brest. They “captured poorly fortified Brest, the city was plundered and most of its houses burnt.”1047 Actually, Brest was put to the torch by the Russian troops in January of 1660. There were witnesses who stated that after the assault led by Ivan Khovanskii, “Brest was ruined to the last building, burnt and fell into oblivion.”1048 Nevertheless, today the historical blame for the destruction of Brest has been placed on Sweden. This suits the current official view of Belarus as a country that has always suffered from aggression of the western armies, but never from Russia.1049 4.4 The Ukrainian – Russian conflict over Belarus Our goal is to unite in one state all old Ukraine or Ruthenia, where the Greek Orthodox faith existed and the Ruthenian language is spoken Khmelnytsky In order to save the Cossack state, which grew up within the borders of the Commonwealth in the 1640s after a Cossack revolt, Hetman Khmelnytsky decided to accept the Muscovite protectorate. On January 18 1654, the treaty between Ukraine and Muscovy was ratified in Pereiaslavl. According to this agreement, Tsar Aleksei took “Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian army including the towns and lands under his high sovereign hand.” Immediately, the tsar styled himself “Autocrat of All Great and Little Russia.” Actually, Ukraine, or Little Russia, as the Muscovites put it, was a Russian dependency in name only. Under the Pereiaslavl agreement, the hetman reserved the right to conduct an independent foreign policy. Pursuing the Cossack interests, Khmelnytsky met foreign embassies and signed agreements with Poland, Crimean Khanate, Transylvania, Sweden and Bradenburg–Prussia. Thus, the Ukrainian Hetmanate acted as a semi– independent state.1050 1047 Brest. Puteshestvie skvoz’ veka. 1999. Minsk, p. 10. Morzy, Kryzys demograficzny na Litwie i Biaáorusi, p. 74-75, table 44. 1049 Kotljarchuk, Tradition of Belarusian Statehood, p. 41-72. 1050 Torke, Hans-Joachim. 1992. The unloved alliance: Political relations between Muscovy and Ukraine in the seventeenth century. Ukraine and Russia in their historical encounter, p. 46-47. 1048 236 Ukraine entered the GDL as a war-time ally of Russia for its own reasons. Khmelnytsky styled himself “duke of Kyiv and Ruthenia.”1051 Although Kyiv has a very definite location, the diffuse term “Ruthenia” could encompass all territories of Poland–Lithuania where the Ruthenian language was spoken. The Ukrainian field hetman Ivan Zolotarenko conducted an independent policy in Belarus and Lithuania. He advised the GDL garrisons to take the Cossacks’ side and he ignored the Muscovites. Conflicting territorial claims to the Belarusian districts of the GDL laid the foundation for a Russian– Ukrainian confrontation. When in 1654 the Ukrainian Cossacks occupied the first Lithuanian district of Starodub, 188 families of local Ruthenian nobility recognized the Zaporozhian hetman as governor. In return they were accepted into the Cossack starshyna and allowed to keep their lands.1052 A Lithuanian nobleman Piotr Zabieááo became the Cossack colonel of Starodub regiment and led his soldiers against the GDL. A 20,000-man-strong Cossack army occupied a sizeable portion of the Duchy. This portion included, besides Starodub, Rechytsa, Homel, Chavusy, Zhlobin, Prapojsk, Rahachou, Babrujsk, Chachersk and Novy Bykhau. The Cossack leaders demanded that the tsar reward them with Belarusian lands and towns for their assistance in the war. But the Kremlin was unwilling to strengthen the position of the Ukrainians. Instead of Belarusian lands, Zolotarenko received Borzna and Hluhiv towns on the Russian–Ukrainian border. 1053 On November 17 1655, Zolotarenko was killed at the siege of Stary Bykhau. Khmelnytsky appointed Colonel Ivan Nechaj as a new field hetman for Belarus and Lithuania. Khmelnytsky delimited the territory under Ukrainian control to the districts of Rechytsa, Orsha, and Mstsislau, including the towns of Mahileu and Homel.1054 Meanwhile, a Russian garrison already controlled Mahileu, the largest town of Lithuania after Vilnius, and the residence of the only remaining Orthodox bishop. Maintaining their claim on Mahileu, the Ukrainians showed their discontent over the fact that the Orthodox Church of Belarus had been forced to submit to the Moscow patriarchy. Nechaj was in immediate conflict with Russia. His colonel, a Lithuanian nobleman named Macej StariĔski, refused to hand over Chavusy to Russian control. Nechaj wrote to the defenders of Stary Bykhau and warned them not to surrender to Russia, but rather to ask for the hetman’s protection. He started to build in Belarus a new administration unit similar to that of Ukraine. This resulted in the formation of “a Belarusian Host” in 19 regiments. He also began to recruit the local population into the army. Muscovy 1051 Kentrschynskyj, Mazepa, p. 80. Subtelny, Orest. 1986. Domination of Eastern Europe: native nobilities and foreign absolutism, 1500-1715. Québec, p. 44. 1053 Abetsedarskii, Belorussia i Rossia XVI-XVII vv, p. 172. 1054 UBK, no. 112. 1052 237 tried to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukrainian problem. Under pressure from Russia, Khmelnytsky was forced to agree to set up a joint court of inquiry to smooth over the contradictions in the GDL. Colonel Zhdanovich and the Muscovite captain Nikita Sivtsov headed the court of inquiry. The Ukrainian officers signed an appeal in which they complained about the activities of the Russians. An illustrative case was that of a Lithuanian nobleman, Fiodor Konstancinowicz. After switching to Ukrainian service, his regiment had been moving ahead to join the Cossack army. But on the way to Kopys it was attacked and defeated by Muscovites, since Konstancinowicz had refused “to serve the tsar and supported the hetman.”1055 Zhdanovich forbade Nechaj to use the title “Colonel of Belarus,” though Nechaj replied that Khmelnytsky himself had actually given him this title.1056 However, Russia failed to liquidate the Cossack’s administration in Belarus. 1057 In March 1657, the mightiest fortress, Stary Bykhau, which had withstood two-and-a-half years of Russian siege, accepted the patronage of Ukraine. As soon as the Russians ended their siege, the city surrendered to Hetman. Khmelnytsky issued “The edict of his Excellency Hetman to Stary Bykhau for establishment there as the free port of Lithuania.” All Ukrainians were informed that “by God’s will, the nobles and the inhabitants of Stary Bykhau entirely and faithfully threw themselves on our mercy and kept an oath not to surrender the fortress to anyone else, but to transfer it to the full ownership of the Zaporozhian Host.”1058 Khmelnytsky decided to enlist the services of Kyiv merchants and to found a centre for Ukrainian trade with the Baltic in Stary Bykhau.1059 The success of Ukrainian foreign policy was the reason for the Muscovites’ great discontent. But the Russians avoided a direct conflict with Ukraine. The presence of an allied Cossack army was advantageous to Russia. Yet it kept on ignoring Ukrainian claims to Belarus. However, after the armistice with Poland–Lithuania at Nemơžis, the Ukrainian military presence lost some of its significance for Muscovy. This made Khmelnytsky anxious. Moreover, the Lithuanian ambassadors showed the Muscovite delegation an intercepted letter from Karl X Gustav to Khmelnytsky. This letter gave further evidence of the separatist policy of Ukraine towards Russia.1060 Khmel1055 Ibid. Morzy, Kryzys demograficzny na Litwie i Biaáorusi, p. 68. Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p. 64; Horobets, Viktor. 1998. Bilorus kozatska: Polkivnik Ivan Nechaj ta ukrainski zmahannia za Pivdenno-Skhidnu Bilorus (1655-1659). Kyiv. 1058 UBK, no. 154. 1059 Velychenko, Stephen. 1991. Cossack Ukraine and Baltic Trade 1600-1648: some observations on an unresolved issue. Ukrainian Economic History. Interpretive essays. Ed. Iosyf Koropeckyj. Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 167-170. 1060 Hrushevsky, Istoria Ukrainy-Rusi, vol. IX:2, available on Internet: http://litopys.org.ua/hrushrus/iur.htm 1056 1057 238 nytsky sent an embassy led by Roman Haponenko to Nemơžis. However, the Russians asked Khmelnytsky’s diplomats to “leave the room of negotiations.”1061 The treaty between Russia and Poland forced Ukraine to seek an alliance with Sweden. In an irate letter to the tsar, Khmelnytsky compared Muscovite treatment of Ukraine to that of Sweden: Swedes are honest people; when they pledge friendship and alliance, they honour their word. However, the Tsar, in establishment an armistice with the Poles and in wishing to return us into their hands, has behaved most heartlessly with us.1062 Muscovy lost the propaganda war for the support of the Ruthenian population. The democratic slogans of the Ukrainians were more popular. In A Ukrainian detachment freed a hundred people who were in Russian captivity. Responding to the protest of the voivode Vasilii Sheremetev, the Cossack captain Vasyl Kukin noted “those captives were not slaves but Christian peasants seeking to be rescued.”1063 In April 1655, the Cossacks released Lithuanian soldiers who were be taken from Shklou prison to Smolensk. Some of the Muscovites were killed.1064 Nechaj enlisted ordinary volunteers and even local nobles in the Cossack army. As a result of the mass cossackfication of Belarus, the Ukrainian army was reinforced with local Cossack units. The officers were chosen from local Orthodox merchants and officials. Among these were the brothers Dyonizy and Andrzej Muraszka.1065 Andrzej Muraszka, a merchant of Mahileu, was an active member of the local Orthodox brotherhood.1066 Some nobles also obtained quick promotion in Cossack service. Macej StariĔski became Colonel of Chavusy, Andrzej Chmara became Colonel of Minsk,1067 and Iwan Mickiewicz became Captain of Navahradak.1068 Cossack units devastated the landed estates of the Catholic nobles and clergy. Nechaj ordered the peasants of Belarus to only provide bread to Ukrainian detachments, and prohibited supplying it to “the tsar’s treasury.”1069 Muscovy protested. In its turn, the Lithuanian nobility was discontented with the Russians’ inability to protect them from the Cossacks. As a 1061 Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII, p.180-183. Subtelny, Orest. 1994. Ukraine. A history. Toronto - Buffalo - London, p. 137. 1063 Morzy, Kryzys demograficzny na Litwie i Biaáorusi, p. 84. 1064 Hrushevsky, Istoria Ukrainy-Rusi, vol. IX:2, available on Internet: http://litopys.org.ua/hrushrus/iur.htm 1065 Mialeshka, Hramadzianskaia vaina na Belarusi, p. 145-146. 1066 Spisok bratstva pri tserkvi Bogoiavlenia Gospodnia Mogileva (1634-1734). Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi. Vilna. 1871, vol. 5, p. 125-126. 1067 LM, no. 421. 1068 UBK, Dodatok II, no. 20, 274. 1069 BA, no. 138. 1062 239 result, the Russian Office of Estates was swamped with Lithuanian letters of complaints. The nobles complained that “most of our peasants were enrolled in Zaporozhian Host and wandered around Minsk together with those very Cossacks beating and pillaging us and our wives and children.”1070 The Russian administration was unable to solve the Cossack problem, because most of their detachments were fighting against Sweden. Fearful of losing the noble’s support, the voivodes sent soldiers to some estates to protect them. Apart from this, the Russian authorities tried to make the nobles who had sworn allegiance to Muscovy oppose the Cossacks. Tsar Aleksei ordered the gentry levy of Minsk and Ashmiany to capture Cherven/Ihumen in order to protect this region from the Cossacks who were led by Muraszka.1071 Thus, local Belarusian Cossacks and the nobility unleashed a civil war. In the struggle over Belarus, Ukraine was relying on the support of the GDL Orthodox nobility. The main ally of Ukraine among the magnates was Michaá Statkiewicz, the son of Senator Samuel Statkiewicz. Michaá Statkiewicz was a well-known sponsor of the Orthodox Church.1072 As ambassador of Mstsislau, Statkiewicz signed the electoral act of King Jan Kazimierz (1648) and demanded that it include guarantees for the “Eastern Greek Orthodox faith.”1073 For his public support of Khmelnytsky, Statkiewicz was denounced by the king of Poland as “a traitor of motherland.”1074 Statkiewicz backed Ukraine not only because of a common faith but also because of matrimonial relations. The Cossack family relations of Wyhowsky also came from the Ruthenian nobility. The Wyhowsky domain, Vyhovy, was located on the border of the Lithuanian Pinsk and the Polish Ovruch districts. Chancellor Ivan Wyhowsky was married to Alena Statkiewicz. She was a daughter of the Lithuanian Senator Bohdan Statkiewicz. Ivan Wyhowsky’s brother, Kostiantin, married the daughter of an another Lithuanian Orthodox nobleman named Iwan Meszczeryn. This deputy cupbearer of Smolensk was a rich man who owned many landed estates around Mstsislau. The family of Meszczeryn was one of the most influential Lithuanian Orthodox families and had close contacts with Ukraine. Iwan Meszczeryn had seven sons and four daughters. All his sons were given a Western education in the Jesuit College of Smolensk.1075 Dymitr Meszczeryn, the esquire carver of Smolensk at the beginning of the war publicly switched to the Cossacks’ side and was denounced as ”a traitor of the 1070 Mialeshka, Hramadzianskaia vaina na Belarusi, p. 145-147. BEF, no 114. 1072 On the cost of Statkiewicz ”The New Testament and Psalms” was published in Ruthenian in 1652. It was the most expensive Orthodox edition in the GDL: Kniha Belarusi, no. 160. 1073 VL, p. 87. 1074 LM, no. 157, 376.151 1075 Wasilewski, Tadeusz. 1975. Iwan Meszczeryn. PSB. Vol. XX/1, p. 469-470. 1071 240 Republic.”1076 Another of his sons, Jan Meszczeryn, became a monk and archimandrite of Chernihiv. In 1657, he was one of the main candidates for the position of the metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ruthenia. He took part in preparing the 1658 Hadiach Union between Ukraine and Poland. In 1659, Jan Meszczeryn, Kostiantin Wyhowsky and Jerzy Niemirycz were representatives of Ukraine in Warsaw. Because of the political crisis in Ukraine, Jan Meszczeryn moved back to the Lithuanian side in 1660. He renounced his clergy position, and took part in the liberation of Belarus from Russia as an officer.1077 At the end of 1656, Michaá Statkiewiczs died. After that, Ivan Wyhowsky claimed the right to inherit all his landed estates in Belarus and Lithuania. At the same time Danilo Wyhowsky, who was married to Khmelnytsky’s daughter Katerina, became colonel of Bykhau. Kostiantin Wyhowsky became colonel of Pinsk and Turau.1078 While talking to the Muscovite ambassador Fedor Buturlin Ostafi, Wyhowsky mentioned that the Wyhowsky family was interested in the district of Orsha, since the Statkiewicz’s estates were located there and the wife of Chancellor of Ukraine belonged to that family. Ivan Wyhowsky directed his demands to Buturlin. He claimed all Statkiewicz’s lands in the GDL. Muscovy rejected this claim. In August 1657, in Moscow, the embassy of the new hetman Ivan Wyhowsky headed by Colonel Paweá Tetera asked again for the Statkiewicz lands in Belarus. The Kremlin said no again. Aggrieved, Wyhowsky declared that as long as he was alive he would never surrender his wife’s domains to the nobility of the GDL.1079 Ukraine’s alliance with Sweden in the Brest campaign had an adverse effect on Russian–Ukrainian relations. Just when Russia and Poland–Lithuania were signing an armistice under which the tsar would become the future Polish king, the Cossack army was engaging in a war against Poland– Lithuania as an ally of Muscovy’s enemy. The pro-Polish party in Lithuania used this to set Russia at loggerheads with Ukraine. Paweá Sapieha asserted that “Khmelnytsky’s falsehood has been revealed and he is willing to swear allegiance to the Swedish king.”1080 He pointed out that Russia could not control the actions of its vassal and that this violated the Nemơžis armistice. In the autumn of 1658, according to its own interests, Ukraine abrogated the confederation with Russia and according to the Hadiach union joined the Polish side. In his declaration to the Commonwealth dated September 18 1658, Hetman Wyhowski promised Poland–Lithuania that he would remove 1076 LM, no. 397. Wasilewski, Jan Meszczeryn, p. 470-471. 1078 Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII, p. 114 1079 Ibid., p.151-152. 1080 Ibid. P.197-198. 1077 241 all Cossacks from Belarus after victory in the war against Muscovy.1081 Rivalry over Belarus became the reason for the 1658-1659 war between Russia and Ukraine. This war had two fronts. In Ukraine, the Russian troops and pro-Muscovite Cossacks were used in an offensive against Wyhowsky. At the same time, Nechaj’s army started hostilities by attacking Russia in Belarus. Ukraine was initially successful in its war for the east of the GDL. The Cossacks dislodged the Russians from a number of towns.1082 In September 1658, Jan Kazimierz informed the nobility of Lithuania about the Hadiach union and called upon local nobles to join Nechaj. He promised those nobles who joined the Ukrainian army privileges and rewards.1083 The king appointed Nechaj a colonel of the Commonwealth and gave him vast territories in Belarus as a life–time possession, including Chavusy, Cherykau and the county of Babrujsk.1084 Thus, Warsaw met some of the demands made by the Cossack elite. Most of the Ruthenian nobles who had once been loyal to Muscovy now sided with Ukraine. A gentry levy of Orsha switched to Nechaj. In 1659, many native Belarusian officers of the Cossack detachments were awarded by the Diet for their campaign against Russia. Among them were Dyonizy and Andrzej Muraszka, Korneliusz Draniewski and Ewdox Draniewski.1085 A Ruthenian nobleman, Sulikowski, told the Russians under torture that the hetmans Wyhowsky and Sapieha intended to unite their forces, and “come to an agreement with Sweden” to march on Smolensk. Frightened Russians immediately forwarded the alarming news to the tsar.1086 The Russian–Ukrainian conflict reawakened the relations between Ukraine and Sweden.1087 In his search for international support, Wyhowsky sent four letters to Karl X Gustav in October 5-8 of 1658. He reminded the king of the Swedish–Ukrainian treaty at Korsun and explained that Muscovy had forced him switch to the Polish side.1088 Jerzy Niemirycz, Karl X Gustav’s former general, also wrote a letter. Congratulating the Swedish king for his success in Denmark and focussing on European policy, Nemyrucz explained the reasons for breaking with Russia and asked Sweden to protect Ukraine.1089 At the start of the war against Russia, Wyhowsky asked Adolf 1081 Kubaáa, Ludwik. 1922. Wojny duĔskie i pokoj Oliwski 1657-1660. Lwów. No. XXIV. Bulvinskii, Andrii. 1998. Ukrainsko-Rossijska vijna 1658-1659. Avtoreferat disertatsii. Kyiv, p. 13-14. 1083 Mialeshka, Hramadzianskaya vaina na Belarusi, p. 151. 1084 Morzy, Kryzys demograficzny na Litwie i Biaáorusi, p. 70. 1085 VL, p. 319. 1086 BEF, no 118. 1087 Kommissya Hadiacka. VL, p. 297-307. 1088 Ivan Wyhowsky to Karl X Gustav. October 5 and 8, 1658. Latin. Bohaczka. RA/2113/2113.2. 1089 Georgus [Jerzy] Niemirycz to Karl X Gustav. October 11, 1658. Latin and German. Bohaczka. RA/2113/2113.2. Diplomatica Muscovitica Cosacica. Vol. 1. 1082 242 Johan av Pfalz for help.1090 Niemirycz also sent a letter to Adolf Johan. He complained about the “heavy yoke put by the Muscovites on the Cossacks” and provided information about the joint Polish–Ukrainian campaign against Russia. He urged Sweden to make peace with Poland, so as to join the struggle against the common enemy – Muscovy, “since namely this is dictated by the reason of war.”1091 However, Sweden was already negotiating with Russia and declined an alliance with Ukraine. Karl X Gustav sent Wyhowsky and the Cossack council only a letter of mutual support.1092 On December 20 1658, Sweden and Russia signed the armistice of Valiesar. This allowed Muscovy to send additional forces to Belarus in the spring of 1659. A Russian army led by Grigorii Kozlovskii was intended to destroy the Ukrainian troops and establish complete Russian control. In their proclamations to the population of Belarus, Russian officers argued that “Cherkassy [Ukrainians] caused the tsar and his army much harm including riots and bloodshed, so in the towns of Lithuania these can be none apart from the people of tsar.”1093 In May 1659, the Russian army captured Mstsislau. On May 17, a siege of Stary Bykhau started and in December 1659, this last Ukrainian fortress was conquered. Colonel Nechaj was captured and his officers were executed. Under the new agreement at Pereiaslavl in 1659, the Ukrainian Hetmanate lost its right to conduct an independent international policy, abandoned its claims to Belarus and agreed to allow Russian garrisons in the six largest towns. Having lost the right to independent international policy, Ukraine gradually became Moscow’s vassal. At last Russia was rid of its dangerous rival in its struggle for Belarus. 4.5 The Issue of Belarus and Lithuania in Swedish– Ukrainian relations Since the rule of Gustav II Adolf, Sweden had tried to establish alliances with the Cossacks. In 1626, Alexander Rubin, a Russian merchant in Swedish service, was sent as ambassador “to Belarus and to Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks” (till Hvita Ryssland samt till de Zaporowke och Donske Kosackerna). His task was to arrange for “the assistance of the Cossacks for a war against Poland.1094 1090 Chukhlib, Hetmany i monarkhy, p. 81-82. Kot, Stanisáaw. 1960. Jerzy Niemirycz. W 300-lecie Ugody Hadziackiej. ParyĪ, p. 44. 1092 Karl X Gustav to Ivan Wyhowsky and the Cossacks. November 8, 1658. Latin. RA/2113/2113.2. Diplomatica Muscovitica Cosacica. Vol. 1. 1093 Pamiats. Historyka-Dakumentalnaya khronika Bykhauskaha raiona. Minsk, 1990, p. 5051. 1094 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 8. 1091 243 The idea of a Swedish–Ukrainian military alliance was formulated in a letter written by a political emigrant in Swedish service, the former vice– chancellor of Poland Hieronim Radziejowski. On May 30 1652, he wrote to Khmelnytsky from Stockholm that in accordance with the war plan against the Commonwealth, the Swedish troops would strike in the east of the GDL from Livonia. At the same time, Ukraine would attack the south of Belarus. The allies were to meet at Mahileu.1095 When Russia and Ukraine started the war against the Commonwealth, Khmelnytsky still had not succeeded in involving Sweden in an anti-Polish coalition. Russia stood in the way of the negotiations. In April 1655, Muscovy detained a Ukrainian ambassador who was returning from Stockholm. In a letter to the Russian tsar Khmelnytsky justified his contacts with Sweden as follows: “we have been arranging friendly contacts with the Swedish Queen [Kristina], so that the Swedes would be on our side against our enemies, the Poles.” Ukraine sent another embassy to Stockholm. However, the Kremlin detained it as well, and sent it back to Kyiv explaining that as long as Russia and Sweden were exchanging large embassies, the hetman should avoid sending his own embassies to Sweden.1096 Ignoring that warning, on September 15 1655, Field Hetman Zolotarenko sent his ambassador, Ivan Petrovich (from the town of Svislach near Hrodna), to the Swedes. Zolotarenko proposed that Karl X Gustav enter into a treaty and promised assistance. He titled himself ”Hetman of the Belarusian Host.” The embassy succeeded, but on the way home Petrovich was murdered near Trakai and all the letters disappeared. The Ukrainians justifiably suspected that Muscovites lay behind the assassination of their ambassador.1097 Nevertheless, the Ukrainian–Swedish contacts received international publicity. The London newspaper Mercurius Politicus wrote in the beginning of December 1655 that “the General of the Second Brigade of Cossacks who are in Lithuania hath sent Deputies to Warsovia, to Treat with the grand Chancellor of Sweden [Erik Oxenstierna].”1098 Note that translations of English press notices, transported from Archangelsk to Moscow, were one of the Kremlin’s main sources of international information. 1099 Ukraine’s independent policy in Lithuania and Belarus attracted Sweden’s attention. After Zolotarenko’s ambassador’s talks with Oxenstierna, the Swedish chancellor noted that although the tsar considered Belarus his pos1095 Kersten, Adam. 1988. Hieronim Radziejowski. Studium wáadzy i opozycji. Warszawa, p. 330-339; Kaczmarczyk, Janusz. 1996. Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Peremyshl - Lviv, p. 293-294. 1096 Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII, p. 154. 1097 Hrushevsky, Istoria Ukrainy-Rusi, vol. IX:2, available on Internet: http://litopys.org.ua/hrushrus/iur.htm 1098 Mercurius Politicus. November 29 - December 5, 1655, p. 5792. 1099 Kobzareva, Documents from Russian State Archives of old acts, p. 74. 244 session, the Cossack hetman disputed the claim. Swedish leaders decided to take advantage of the conflict. In 1655 Karl X Gustav corresponded with Khmelnytsky intensively. Some of the letters fell into a Russian spy’s hands. In the opinion of Gustav Bielke, the ambassador in Moscow, this had been one cause of the Russian–Swedish war.1100 Karl X Gustav did not hide the fact that he was in contact with Khmelnytsky. On the contrary, the Swedish king emphasized his close relations with the Cossacks and made use of them as an argument to pressure Muscovy. In January 1656, the king wrote to his ambassadors in Moscow that “the Cossacks are seeking our protection. Nevertheless, we did not give our consent to accept them, allowing them to be in the confederation with Grand Duke of Muscovy so far.”1101 Naturally, the Russians learned of the contents of the letter. But the hetman made it know that Ukraine had no claims within the Swedish occupation zone in Lithuania. Khmelnytsky wrote that the ”Cossacks mean no harm to the towns where you, the king, have raised Swedish standards.”1102 Thus, in the struggle over the GDL, the parties had no conflicting interests and that made compromise possible. At the end of November 1655, Khmelnytsky’s ambassador visited Erik Oxenstierna in Warsaw. A Greek, Abbot Daniel Atheniensis, represented the Ukrainians. He brought his scribe, the Italian Marco Tarsi. The hetman proposed that Karl X Gustav accept Ukraine as a Swedish vassal state. Khmelnytsky promised him the faithful service of the entire Zaporozhian Host.1103 He even promised that if “the Muscovites do not stop their aggressive plans against Your Majesty without any just reason, then we will march at the Swedish side.”1104 But Ukraine was unfortunate. Abbot Daniel proved to be an international adventurer, and in the course of negotiations with the Swedes he pursued on his own interests. He suggested that Sweden should support the struggle of the Greeks against the Ottoman Empire and asked that the Swedes should send him 2,000 soldiers and ten ships. These were to make a landing and start an anti–Turkish uprising on the Peloponnesus peninsula. At the same time, he interested the king in creating a Muscovite– Ukrainian–Venetian–Transylvanian–English coalition under Swedish leadership. Daniel switched to Swedish service and Karl X Gustav ennobled as 1100 Kentrschynskyj, Karl X Gustav inför krisen i Öster, p. 99. Kentrschynskyj, Mazepa, p. 101-102. 1102 Ibid., p.101. 1103 Instruktion för grekiske abboten Daniel gifven af Chmielnicki. Oktober 1655. Italian. RA/2113/2113.2. Diplomatica Muscovitica Cosacica Vol. 1. Residente Daniel Olivebergs depescher 1655-1658. 1104 Skrivelser till Carl Gustaf från Bohdan Chmielnicki. October 11, 1655. Latin. KB. F. D. Sv. 835 A. 1101 245 Daniel Oliveberg de Grecani.1105 Ukraine and Sweden, however, failed to reach an agreement in 1655. In Carl Wibling’s opinion, Sweden did not care to establish a protectorate over Ukraine for fear of angering Muscovy.1106 On May 17 1656, the Russian–Swedish war started and Sweden therefore became Ukraine’s formal enemy, since Ukraine was Muscovy’s ally. Now there began a period of secret contacts. Khmelnytsky and Karl X Gustav corresponded with each other regularly. Karl X Gustav wrote to Khmelnytsky that the tsar had started an unprovoked war against Sweden and invaded Livonia. Karl X Gustav added that Muscovy had probably discovered Zolotarenko’s contacts with him while in Lithuania and that might be one of the reasons for Russian aggression.1107 On August 19 1656, Karl X Gustav informed Erik Oxenstierna that “Abbot Daniel, the ambassador of the Cossacks came to me and told that the hetman is waiting for my embassy and is ready to attack Russia or Poland, whatever I need; however I have not decided yet, I am still waiting for response from Poland’s Court.”1108 After the Russian–Polish armistice at Nemơžis, the need to establish a Swedish protectorate over the Ukrainian Hetmanate became acute for Stockholm.1109 But the Swedish leaders regarded the Ukrainians first of all as “Cossack religious fighters, who were under no one’s control.”1110 The instigator of the project for a Swedish protectorate was Erik Oxenstierna. His key argument was “having admitted the Ukrainian autonomy, Cossack freedoms and privileges it was necessary to create the mechanisms of control so that Cossacks will not be wilful and dangerous for a new sovereign as it was before for King of Poland Jan Kazimierz.”1111 The contact persons of Khmelnytsky in his negotiations with Karl X Gustav were Boguslaw Radziwill and Jan Gross, the commandant of Slutsk.1112 Radziwiáá’s political ambition here was to separate the Ukrainian Cossacks from Russia. He wrote to the chansellor of Ukraine Wyhowsky that he had learned about the hetman’s conflict with Muscovy. He also asserted that the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host enjoyed the Swedish king’s favour. It would therefore be good if the hetman and chancellor would send a letter to Karl X Gustav. If Wy1105 Wittrock, Karl X Gustaf i Polen, p. 17-18. Moving of Oliveberg to the Swedish side and his abandoment of the clergy status aroused suspicions among the Cossacks: Hrushevsky, Istoria Ukrainy-Rusi, vol. IX:2, note 8. 1106 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 29. 1107 Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII, p. 154, 157-160. 1108 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 339, note 1. 1109 Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, p. 95. 1110 Svenska Riksrådets protocoll, vol. XIV, p. 739. 1111 Erik Oxenstiernas instruktion för Daniel Oliveberg. January 2, 1655. Latin. RA/2113/2113.2. Diplomatica Muscovitica Cosacica Vol. 1. Residente Daniel Olivebergs depescher 1655-1658. 1112 Bohdan Khmelnytsky to Jan Gross. July 23, 1656. Chyhyryn. Polish, in: Fedoruk, Jaroslav. 1996. Universaly ta listy Bohdana Khmelnytskoho. Ukraina moderna. no. 1, p. 142143. 246 howsky wanted to be on the safe side, Radziwiáá could be arbitrator. In order to convince Wyhowsky that Sweden was serious about accepting Ukraine under its protectorate, Radziwiáá quoted a statement supposedly made by Karl X Gustav during a conversation with him: The King of Sweden personally told me that he has no desire to unite with the Polish king and has not any contact with him as it disaccords with Cossacks’ interests. Therefore, the hetman will soon receive a letter from the Swedish king with precise proposals. 1113 Ukraine responded to the proposal in September 1656, and Radziwiáá sent back a Cossack ambassador with a letter from Karl X Gustav to Khmelnytsky.1114 But Russia knew about the contacts too. During a tête–a–tête with Khmelnytsky, Vasilii Lopukhin reproached the hetman for maintaining secret contacts with the Swedish king. Khmelnytsky partially admitted that the reproach was justified. He said that ”a German from the Swedish Governor came from Slutsk and asked for bread, but we refused, since without the tsar’s will we did not dare.”1115 The question of an alliance with Ukraine was on the agenda at the session of the Swedish Council of the Realm held on September 13–14 1656, in Prussian Frauenburg/Frombork. The king asked: Shall we negotiate with the Cossacks? Or shall we hope to reach an agreement with the Poles, after patiently proceeding with our negotiations?1116 As a result, Karl X Gustav decided that an alliance with the “mighty Cossacks would be better than seeking for friendship with the Poles.”1117 European intellectuals such as Comenius and Hartlib supported the idea of a Swedish protectorate over Ukraine. Impressed by Sweden’s victories over Poland, Comenius wrote a panegyric honouring Karl X Gustav. Calling him “a present–day Moses and David,” Comenius proposed that Sweden “colonize the rich lands of Ukraine (Ukrainae), which are even nearer than Holland’s India, and found a New Protestant Order for all Europe to follow.”1118 However, the Ukrainian Hetmanate had its own conditions to pose concerning its acceptance of a Swedish protectorate. The key question was whether Sweden would legitimate the Cossackdom and recognize its future borders. In a letter to Karl X Gustav the Swedish ambassador Celestin Stern1113 AGAD. AR, dz. IV, teka 4, koperta 46. Listy Bogusáawa Radziwiááa. No 49, p. 68-71. Wasilewski, Radziwiáá Bogusáaw. PSB,vol. XXX/1, p. 166. Hrushevsky, Istoria Ukrainy-Rusi, vol. IX:2, available on Internet: http://litopys.org.ua/hrushrus/iur.htm 1116 Svenska Riksrådets protocoll, vol. XIV, p. 739. 1117 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 29. 1118 Comenius, Johann Amos. 1656. Panegyricus Carolo Gustavo, p. 12; Trevor-Roper, Huge. 2001. The crisis of the seventeenth century. Religion, the Reformation, and social changes. Liberty Fund. Indianapholis, p. 264. 1114 1115 247 bach wrote: “Khmelnytsky’s main ambition is the creation of an independent state.”1119 Sternbach advised Karl X Gustav to promise Khmelnytsky part of the GDL, namely Belarus, and the duke’s title.”1120 In November 1656, a Swedish embassy led by Jakob Törnesköld left Tykocin for Chyhyryn, in order to negotiate with “Hetman Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian militia.” Gotthard Velling (also known as Vellingk) and Daniel Oliveberg also left for Ukraine, in order to advise Törnesköld. The ambassadors had a draft of the agreement between Karl X Gustav and Khmelnytsky, including instructions from the Swedish king containing 37 items.1121 When Törnesköld, for unknown reasons, failed to reach Chyhyryn, Velling took over the leadership of the mission.1122 Karl X Gustav offered Ukraine autonomy and international status on par with that of Courland. Sweden recognized the integrity of the Ukrainian state. The hetman of Ukraine was to have the right to have his own army, but not more than 40,000 soldiers. The army was, further, to enter the Swedish service on request. Sweden guaranteed the ancient freedoms and rights of the Greek Orthodox faith in all Ruthenian territories. In Swedish eyes, the territory of the Ukrainian state was restricted to the lands already controlled by Khmelnytsky: the former Polish palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav and Chernihiv. Thus, Sweden rejected Ukraine’s claims to the Ruthenian lands in Lithuania. The king planned considerable restrictions on the power of Ukrainia’s secular and ecclesiastical authorities. After Khmelnytsky’s death, the Council of Ukraine was supposed to select three candidates for a new hetman’s position. From these, the Swedish king had the right to choose one, appoint him hetman, and send a bulawa. The election of the metropolitan of Kyiv, the primus of the Ruthenian Church, was also subject to the Swedish king’s approval.1123 It is interesting that Russians presented very similar conditions after Khmelnytsky’s death in August 1657. In Muscovy’s opinion, to acknowledge the legitimacy of a new hetman of Ukraine meant that the tsar approved his candidature. Selection of the Kyiv metropolitan was to be sanctioned by the patriarch of Moscow. The regular army was limited to 40,000 soldiers.1124 An important Swedish demand concerned the GDL. Karl X Gustav wanted to have the Cossack army prevent Russian troops from the crossing the Biarezina River into the western palati1119 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 29 Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII, p. 202-204 Proectum Foederis inter S. R. M. et Chmielnicki pangendi. September 30, 1656. Latin. RA/2113/2113.2. Diplomatica Muscovitica Cosacica Vol. 1; Memorial för statssekreteraren Jakob Törnesköld och krigsrådet Gottard Veling vid kommissionen hos ”Generalen Chmielnicky und Zaporowia militien”. September 25, 1656. German. Ibid. 1122 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 30. 1123 Wittrock, Karl X Gustaf i Polen, p. 19-21. 1124 Bulvinskii, Ukrainsko-Rossijska vijna 1658-1659, p. 12 1120 1121 248 nates. Accepting this condition was an exceedingly risky step for the Hetmanate, since it would inevitably lead to a direct conflict with Muscovy.1125 Sweden proposed a number of terms that were unacceptable to the Cossacks. The influence of Jerzy Niemirycz led to the inclusion in the text of article concerning the expansion of Protestantism in Ukraine.1126 Protestant cathedrals were to be founded in each big city.1127 This was unrealistic, and was sharply condemned. However, the main obstacle became Stockholm’s rejection of Cossack claims to all Ruthenian lands. As a result, the Council of Ukraine grew indignant. Having translated the instructions and found that everything Velling had said was true, the Ukrainian starshyna refused to proceed with the negotiations.1128 The Swedes blamed the embassy’s failure on Velling’s incompetence.1129 During the negotiations, the Ukrainian leaders outlined the borders of their state in reference to the borders of the Kyiv Orthodox metropolitan, as it had existed before the Union of Brest (1596). As Velling put it, the Cossacks claimed “all old Ukraine or Ruthenia wherever the Greek faith exists or existed and the Ruthenian language is spoken.”1130 The Cossacks explained to the Transylvanian ambassador that this was a matter of restoring old borders, which actually did not exist because of the triumph of the Uniate Church in Lithuania.1131 This meant that the geopolitical interests of the Cossackdom comprehended most of the GDL and the eastern part of the Polish Crown. The next phase in the relations between Sweden and Ukraine was directly connected to the Brest campaign. On April 8 1657, after integrating the Cossack and Transylvanian troops with the Swedish army at Zawichost, a joint parade of coalition forces led by Karl X Gustav and Rákóczi took place.1132 After the parade, Karl X Gustav wrote to Khmelnytsky and described to him the Swedish interests in the Commonwealth. The Swedish zone of interest was identical with those zones listed in Radnot. However, Karl X Gustav did not mention the plans of the other allies. He wrote that Sweden agreed to consider Ukrainian claims on all Ruthenian lands as “satisfaction to the Ukraine for the alliance.”1133 In Brest, Karl X Gustav and the Swedish generals had the opportunity to talk with the Cossack leaders directly and the parties articulated their positions more explicitly. Ukraine failed to obtain Brest. 1125 Wittrock, Karl X Gustaf i Polen, p. 20. Williams, Protestants in the Ukraine. Harvard Ukrainian Studies. 2(1), p. 41-72; 2(2), p. 184-210. 1127 Wittrock, Karl X Gustaf i Polen, p. 20. 1128 UBK, p. 25. 1129 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 61. 1130 Narysy z istorii dyplomatii Ukrainy, p. 152-153. 1131 Ibid. 1132 Carlson, Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfalziska huset, p. 356, note 2. 1133 Karl X Gustav to Bohdan Khmelnytsky. April 10, 1657. Latin. RA/2113/2113.2. Diplomatica Muscovitica Cosacica. Vol. 1. 1126 249 The city and the district were handed over to Transylvania. However, Sweden realized that an understanding with Ukraine would be impossible without recognizing its claim to the Ruthenian lands of the GDL. At the end of May 1657, a new Swedish embassy led by Gustaf Lilliecrona under the instructions of Karl X Gustav set off for Chyhyryn.1134 The main task was to break the alliance between Ukraine and Russia. Therefore, Lilliecrona immediately stated that if the hetman waged war upon Muscovy, Sweden would recognize the Cossack claims to Belarus “as far as Smolensk.” This long–awaited promise came too late. At the same time, a Russian embassy headed by Fedor Buturlin was also visiting Chyhyryn. When Karl X Gustav withdrew his army from the Commonwealth, Khmelnytsky did not dare to wage war against Muscovy. Buturlin expressed the tsar’s discontent with Ukrainia’s policy in the GDL. He demanded that the hetman present Karl X Gustav with an ultimatum demanding reconciliation between Sweden and Russia.1135 As a consequence, the first round of Swedish–Ukrainian negotiations came to nothing. Lilliecrona was detained in Chyhyryn. However, on June 21 1657, Niemirycz suddenly arrived in Chyhyryn with letters to Khmelnytsky from Karl X Gustav and Rákóczi. After Khmelnytsky’s death and the retreat of Sweden from Poland–Lithuania, Niemirycz switched sides, entering into the service of the new Hetman Wyhowsky (both originally were from the same palatinate).1136 At last, on October 6 1657, in Korsun, an agreement between Sweden and the Cossack state was signed. Of the three Ukrainian commissars who signed this treaty, two commanders, Niemirycz and Bohun, headed the pro– Swedish party and had personal certificates as evidence of their services to Sweden during the siege of Brest. The third commissar, Ivan Kovalyvsky had contacts with Swedish diplomats. Nevertheless, this agreement on military cooperation could hardly be called successful. Of two pages of text, only one concerns concrete actions. The two sides agreed to support each other in a defensive war, excepting the ”Grand Duke of Muscovy”. Peace between the Zaporozhian Host and Sweden was declared. Finally, it was decided that all remaining questions would be solved in the course of future negotiations.1137 On October 8 1657, the three above-mentioned commissars signed an appeal to Sweden containing eight additional articles of the treaty. The first article repeated Ukraine’s refusal to wage a war against Russia. Under the second article, the Zaporozhian Host and the Cossacks were recognized as “a free political nation subject to no one.” In the third article, 1134 Memorial för Gustaf Lilliecrona till Chmielnicky. Latin. April 25, 1657. Ibid. Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII, p. 211-213. 1136 Ibid., p. 247-249. 1137 Förbundstraktat mellan Sverige och de Zaporogiske Kosackerna. Korsun. October, 6 1657. RA/2113/2113.2. Diplomatica Muscovitica Cosacica Vol. 1. Förhandlingar emellan Sverige och kosackerna 1655-1719. 1135 250 Ukraine claimed Ruthenian lands in Lithuania, namely the palatinates of Brest and Navahradak “as far as the river of Biarezina” as compensation for the alliance.1138 The claims on these territories must have been discussed with the Swedish ambassadors beforehand. At that time, the hostile Lithuanian army controlled the palatinate of Brest. Most of the palatinate of Navahradak belonged to Radziwiáá, who already changed over to the side of Sweden’s enemy, Brandenburg – Prussia. However, if the treaty had been put into effect Ukraine would have gained control over all Ruthenian lands in the GDL. On October 26 1657, the same three commissars sent a letter to Karl X Gustav mentioning that the key term of the alliance with Sweden was still the refusal to engage in a war against Muscovy.1139 This condition was obviously accepted due to Russian pressure, and showed the strong position of the pro-Moscow party and the weakness of pro-Swedish faction among the Cossack leaders. From the very beginning, Sweden’s plan had been to use the Cossacks in a war against Muscovy. This dream failed. The Swedish embassy then sought to use Ukraine in a war against Poland. But Muscovite pressure had forced the Cossack Council to promise Russia not to wage war against Poland. Moreover, the pro-Moscow party of the Cossacks, led by Colonels Martyn Pushkar and Jakiv Barabash, became strongly opposed to the Korsun agreement, and launched a civil war.1140 This deprived the Korsun pact of practical importance.1141 The withdrawal of the main Swedish army to Denmark resulted in the loss of Ukrainian interest in becoming a Swedish protectorate, and Wyhowsky started to move towards a Ukrainian–Polish alliance.1142 In 1659, the Cossack hetman issued a political manifesto explaining the reasons for the Union with Poland and for breaking with Russia. In Wyhowsky’s opinion, Ukraine had fulfilled all the signed agreements it had entered into with Sweden, “with Her Majesty Queen Kristina and His Royal Majesty King Karl X Gustav.” Muscovy’s protectorate failed to fulfill the hopes of Ukraine, since Moscow did not keep its promises and was trying to force the Cossacks into submission.1143 1138 Puncta pactorum ex parte Arme et Excellentissimus Pri[moris] Generalissimi Exercitus Zaporouianor Excellentissimo Pro Legato Serenissima ac potenssuima Regis Suetia proposita a Commissaryi Exercitus Zaporouiani. Corsuni [Korsun]. October 8, 1657. Latin. RA. Ibid. 1139 Niemirycz, Kovalyvsky and Bohun to Karl X Gustav. October 26, 1657. Latin. Korsun. RA. Ibid. 1140 Kort Relation om then store fäldt drabbning som emellan Wichowski och then Russiske fäldherre Puska Rencka föreluppt. Stockholm, 1658. 1141 Wittrock, Karl X Gustaf i Polen, p. 22. 1142 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 62. 1143 Apanovych, Olena. 1993. Hetmany Ukrainy i koshovy otamany Zaporozkoi sichy. Kyiv. Available on Internet: http://exlibris.org.ua/apanowicz/wyhowski.html 251 4.6 Ukrainian attempts to unite the Pinsk district An interesting episode in the political fight over the GDL is the attempt to incorporate the district of Pinsk into the Ukrainian Hetmanate. Lipinsky and Hvozdik–Pritsak have analyzed the Ukraine aspect of this question.1144 There is a need to examine the question from the viewpoint of the GDL. On January 10 1657, Kmelnytsky issued a universal on a joint Ukrainian– Transylvanian campaign against the Commonwealth. The hetman guaranteed the rights of all those among the Lithuanian population who welcomed the Cossack troops. Khmelnytsky’s universal was entered into the Register of Minsk’s town court.1145 On May 24 1657, Zhdanovich, as “deputy of His Excellency Hetman”, announced the extension of the Ukrainian protectorate over the district of Pinsk. He wrote, in Ruthenian, that this step was justified by the advance of Ukrainian and Transylvanian troops towards Pinsk, and asserted that the “inhabitants of the Brest palatinate informed me that they would like to accept the hetman’s protection.” Pinsk’s ambassador to Zhdanovich was Kazimierz Wojna, the notary of Pinsk. Vice–starosta Wáadysáaw Wojna entered Zhdanovich’s universal into the registers of the Pinsk court.1146 On July 1 1657, the ambassadors of Pinsk, the Marshal of Pinsk, àukasz Jelski, and the Esquire Carver Adam Spytek, swore an oath of loyalty to Ukraine in Chyhyryn. Owing to the fact that “our Patria the GDL has been almost destroyed by the armies of different enemies” the nobility had decided that Pinsk would accept Cossack protection. But how was the transfer of the Pinsk district to the Cossackdom realized? The political nation of Pinsk swore allegiance to the hetman. The rights of “both Greek and Roman faiths” were guaranteed. ”The Uniate Church and other alien faiths [Protestantism] that are unacceptable and offensive to us and the Zaporozhian Host” were to be abolished. The Uniate clergy was allowed to join the Orthodoxy. The text of allegiance refers to the Polish kings, but there is not a single word indicating that Pinsk was a part of the Polish state. Lithuania figured as ”our old motherland”. The “Zaporozhian Host” or “Ukraine” appeared as a new dominion. The tsar was mentioned only implicitly. The nobility also promised its assistance in convincing other districts of Lithuania to join the Ukrainian Hetmanate.1147 1144 Lipinsky, Viacheslav. 1920. Ukraina na perelomi 1657-1659. Wien, p. 220-254; Hvozdik-Pritsak, Larysa. 1999. Ekonomichna i politichna vizyja Bohdana Khmelnytskoho ta ii realizatsyja v derzhavi Vyjsko Zaporozke. Kyiv. 1145 UBK, no 150. 1146 UBK, dodatok II, no 22, p. 375-376. 1147 Jurament ich mciow panów obywatelów PiĔskich wykonany hetmanowi Bohdanowi Chmielnickiemu 20 czerwca roku 1657. Hvozdik-Pritsak, Ekonomichna i politichna vizyja Bohdana Khmelnytskoho. 252 On July 8 1657, Khmelnytsky signed an universal titled “Guarantees to the nobility of Pinsk.”1148 Several aspects are worth noting. Khmelnytsky styled himself “Hetman General of His Tsar’s Majesty Zaporozhian Host.” Thus, while ignoring the Pinsk nobles, Khmelnytsky emphasized his ties to Russia. According to him: “God wished that we join Tsar.” The Catholic nobility was ensured religious freedom: they and their descendants would never be forced to accept Orthodoxy. The rights of the Roman Catholic Church and its schools were also guaranteed. However, “the sects” (Protestantism) and the Uniate Church were to be abolished. Orthodox churches and property taken by force by the Catholics had to be returned. The jurisdiction of the hetman was to comprise, apart from Pinsk, “the districts of Mazyr and Turau.” Actually, the nobility of Mazyr did not take part in the negotiations. The district of Turau did not exist at that time, being as yet part of Pinsk. However, in the medieval times, there was an autonomous Turau–Pinsk principality, a vassal of the Kyiv Realm. Until 1596, Turau was the residence of an Orthodox bishop. This makes the Ukrainian interest in Turau understandable. The hetman created a new Cossack unit: the Pinsk–Turau regiment, led by Colonel Kostiantin Wyhowsky. The allegiance of Pinsk to Ukraine was registered in Chyhyryn and in Kyiv. Using historical rhetoric that referred to the glorious past of the old Kyiv Realm and of Orthodoxy, Ukraine justified its new state borders. Prior to the 1569 union, the district of Mazyr had belonged to the Kyiv palatinate. Under the union with Poland, the nobility of Mazyr decided, of their own free will, to be part of Lithuania. Because it was far from the centre of the state, Mazyr had remained a region with a predominately Orthodox population. This population actively supported the war of the Cossacks against Poland in 1648–1651.1149 Under the agreement, the Pinsk nobility would obtain more freedom than it had previously. In Lithuania, the king decided on the positions of local authority. The hetman allowed the free election of local officials. Pinsk was to leave Lithuania and join Ukraine “for ever.” It was a Ruthenian region, where the Orthodox Church had managed to preserve some of its institutions and to keep contact with Kyiv. The nobles called themselves “Non–Uniate Ruthenians” and protected Orthodoxy.1150 Some Pinsk nobles, such as Ivan Bruaka and Michaá Krzyczewski, became Cossack colonels.1151 A noble of Lithuania, Krzyczewski, led the Ukrainian army in war against Lithuanua. In July 31 1649, at Loeu, after a decisive battle, Janusz Radziwiáá defeated the Cossack army and Krzyczewski died. An unknown painter painted his post1148 UBK, no 167. Mialeshka, Vasil. 1993. Antyfeadalnaya vaina 1648-1651 na Belarusi. Entsyklapedya Historyi Belarusi. Vol. 1. Minsk, p.133-135. 1150 Korshunov, Afanasiusz Filipovich, p. 128-130. 1151 Lipinsky, Ukraina na perelomi 1657-1659, p. 223, 246. 1149 253 humous portrait with the eloquent inscription: “Michaá Krzyczewski, a Lithuanian nobleman and Cossack rebel against the Lithuanian Prince Janusz Radziwiáá.”1152 However, after 1596, many Pinsk nobles became Catholics. This is why Khmelnytsky, who was a main supporter of the Orthodoxy and an anti–Catholic, guaranteed all the rights of the Catholics. The inclusion of Pinsk suited Khmelnytsky’s ambition to unite all Ruthenia. From a strategic point of view, Pinsk was an important contact zone between Ukraine and the Swedish army in Poland.1153 On September 3 1657, the hetman ordered the Pinsk to approve their transition to Ukraine, and the Cossack detachment was located in Pinsk.1154 A local Orthodox nobleman, Roman Jelski, was given the position of Cossack colonel.1155 However, when the treaty was implemented, the number of Ukrainian supporters diminished sharply. Michaá Statkiewicz died in Chyhyryn at the end of 1656.1156 Another initiator, Adam Spytek, died unexpectedly during the negotiations.1157 The starosta of Pinsk, an Orthodox nobleman named Jerzy Nielubowicz Tukalski, had died in April 1656.1158 His brother, the superior of the Vilnius monastery Józef Nielubowicz Tukalski, stood behind the negotiations.1159 In August 1657, the Polish king reacted to the treaty between Pinsk and Ukraine. He declared Lukasz Jelski “a traitor who swore an oath to Khmelnytsky and gave away our royal land of Pinsk.”1160 In September 1657, Jan Kazimierz transferred Jelski’s property to the loyal nobleman Kazimierz Naruszewicz, and called Jelski “the initiator of the everlasting slavery of Pinsk to the Cossacks.”1161 The great blow to the pro–Cossack party came from Chyhyryn. On August 6 1657, Khmelnytsky died. On the day of his burial (September 3 1657), a dietine was gathered in Pinsk. Ivan Hrusha, the ambassador of Ukraine, was present. On September 10 1657, Paweá Sapieha appealed to the nobility of Pinsk to fight against the Cossacks, and the anti-Ukrainian nobles summoned an alternative dietine in Kalavuravichy with Uniate Bishop Andrzej KvaĞniĔski Záoty at its head.1162 The opposition declared the treaty with Ukraine invalid since only the marshal and the esquire carver had 1152 Imago Poloniae, Dawna Rzeczpospolita na mapach, dokumentach i starodrukach w zbiorach Tomasza NiewodniczaĔskiego. Warszawa, 2002, Vol. 1. H15 - 4, p. 68. 1153 Wibling, Carl X Gustaf och Georg Rakoczy, p. 30. 1154 LM, no. 64. 1155 Lipinsky, Ukraina na perelomi 1657-1659, p. 233. 1156 LM, no. 157, 376. 1157 Lipinsky, Ukraina na perelomi 1657-1659, p. 226, 229. 1158 LM, no. 80. 1159 Mironowicz, Antoni. 1998. Metropolita Józef Nielubowicz-Tukalski. Biaáystok. 1160 LM, no. 64 1161 Ibid., no. 523. 1162 Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII, p. 237-238. 254 signed the document, and they had done so only under the duress of Sweden. The other nobles had refused to sign.1163 A protracted struggle for Pinsk between Ukraine and Poland–Lithuania began. In December 1657, Colonel Wyhowsky entered Pinsk. Hetman Ivan Wyhowsky explained to Stanisáaw Bieniewski, the castellan of Volhynia, that the Ukrainian garrison in Pinsk was located according to the will of the Pinsk nobility.1164 Wyhowsky promised to send the king of Poland the original of the treaty with Pinsk, with all its signatures.1165 In response, Jan Kazimierz used his usual technique. He issued numerous acts, and donated the landed estates belonging to pro-Ukrainians nobles to his faithful allies. The first estate confiscated by the king belonging to Lukasz Jelski, “the traitor who switched to the Cossack side and lured away other nobles with the idea of protection.” Jan Kazimierz gave Jelski’s estate to Abram Dostojewski.”1166 For “supporting Cossack protection”, the families of Stachowski and Dochtorowicz were also deprived of their domains.1167 The Catholic nobles plundered the mansion belonging to the Nielubowicz Tukalski.1168 On June 23 1658, Kostiantin Wyhowsky ordered all Pinsk nobles to assemble in Davydharadok. No one came, however. Poland would sign an armistice with Ukraine according to which the hetman declared his right to Pinsk. This gave rise to a strong protest from Paweá Sapieha, which meant that the armistice was not ratified.1169 However, Sapieha ordered his soldiers to avoid engaging the Cossacks in combat.1170 In an attempt to find more supporters for the alliance, Ivan Wyhowsky, on July 31 1658, acknowledged the treaty with Pinsk. The Orthodox Prince and the Senator of Lithuania Mikoáaj ĝwiatopoák CzetwertyĔski began to cooperate with the Cossack government of Pinsk.1171 ĝwiatopoák CzetwertyĔski was the castellan of Minsk and the richest landowner of Pinsk. His family traced its origins to the medieval Grand Duke of Kyiv, Sviatopolk. But, at about the same time, Lukasz Jelski ceased to support the Ukrainian–Pinsk alliance. In August 1658, he and his son Roman switched back to the Polish side and, received a perpetual amnesty from the king.1172 After this, the proposed Cossack alliance lacked significant support. In August 1658, in Hadiach, Ukraine and Poland initiated negotiations on the union. This was a matter of concern for the Lithuanians. Chancellor 1163 Harasymchuk, Vasil. 1994. Materyaly do istoryi Kozachchyny XVII viku. Lviv, no. 6. Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII, p. 252. 1165 Lipinsky, Ukraina na perelomi 1657-1659, p. 230-231. 1166 LM, no. 418. 1167 Ibid., no. 174, 175. 1168 LM, no. 146. 1169 Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII, p. 272. 1170 Ibid., p. 253. 1171 Harasymchuk, Materyaly do istoryi Kozachchyny XVII viku, no. 62, 66, 68, 74. 1172 LM, no. 478. 1164 255 Krzysztof Pac justifiably believed that “Lithuania, not Poland, will pay for this union by its own territory.”1173 Indeed, the Cossacks claimed Pinsk, Belarus and Starodub.1174 Only the protest of Ludwik Jewáaszewski, the Lithuanian representative in Hadiach, prevented this from happening. On September 16 1658, Ukraine and Poland–Lithuania signed the Union of Hadiach. The Hetmanate broke off its federation with Muscovy, and re-enterered the Commonwealth.1175 Instead of the Hetmanate the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia would come into existence and would form the third state within the Polish– Lithuanian federation.1176 However, the territory of the Duchy was not to include any Ruthenian lands. It was confined to the old borders of Ukraine. In the Kyiv palatinate, only Orthodox nobles could hold state office. The Cossacks who had taken part in the Brest campaign on the Swedish side received an amnesty. Jan Kazimierz ennobled some Cossack officers who were not nobles by birth. Meanwhile, at the request of the hetman, Daniel Oliveberg, the diplomat in Ukrainian and Swedish service, was declared to be a Polish nobleman. The GDL was a significant issue in the Hadiach union. First, the Lublin union was taken as a model for the union with Ukraine. Second, a number of articles focused on support for the Orthodox Church and discrimination against the Uniates and Protestants. The Uniate Church was declared “a spreader of all misunderstandings between Roman and Greek nobility” and was therefore to be abolished. An Orthodox academy would be opened in the GDL. Arian, Calvinist and Lutheran professors were not allowed to teach at the future academy, and it would not admit Protestant students. The Orthodox Church regained its property “in all towns where the Ruthenian language is spoken.”1177 The Orthodox bishop of Belarus was to be given a seat in the senate. The ties of the Belarus eparchy to Kyiv would enable Ukraine to influence the GDL. However, under the treaty, Ukraine failed to obtain a single Lithuanian district. The Cossacks were obliged to withdraw from Belarus and Pinsk.1178 Niemirycz is traditionally considered the main author of the Hadiach union. Having become disillusioned with Swedish policy, this former general of Karl X Gustav renounced his Arian faith in favour of Orthodoxy and urged all Ruthenian Protestants to follow his example. In the senate on May 24 1659, in Warsaw, during the ratification of the union, Niemirycz publicly 1173 Yakovleva, Hetmanshchina v druhij polovine 50-kh rokiv XVII, p. 283. Narysy z istorii diplomatii Ukrainy. 2001. Kyiv, p. 172. 1175 Kaminski, Andrzej. 1977. The Cossack experiment in the szlachta democracy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: the Hadiach Union. Harvard Ukrainian Studies. Vol. 1, p. 178-197. 1176 KPK, p. 297-307. 1177 Ibid., p. 297-298 1178 Narysy z istorii diplomatii Ukrainy, p. 172. 1174 256 renounced his Swedish service and again swore allegiance to the Polish king.1179 4.7 The Place of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Swedish diplomacy, 1658–1661 The withdrawal of the Swedish army and the transition of Radziwiáá’s faction to Poland’s side, allowed the Lithuanian army to start a new war against Sweden. Gosiewski and Sapieha controlled a considerable part of the GDL. The idea of regaining Livonia back became attractive again. In October 1657 Gosiewski attacked Livonia with 5,000 soldiers. “Sweden acquired a new enemy in Livonia – the Lithuanians who acted perfectly.”1180 The Lithuanian army captured Kirkholm/Salaspils and besieged Riga. The Swedes raised the city’s siege, but their exhaustion resulted in the Lithuanian conquest of the province. Gosiewski coordinated his military operations with OrdinNashchokin who led the Muscovite troops in eastern part of Livonia.1181 In the summer of 1658, the Lithuanians controlled a number of Livonian towns including Helmet/Helme, Wolmar/Valmiera, and Roneburg/Rnjjiena.1182 According to a Lithuanian officer who participated in the campaign, the Latvian peasants supported Lithuania in its war against Sweden.1183 The Swedes also recognized this fact.1184 Faced with a two–front war, Sweden decided to reach an agreement with Russia and abandon its claims to the GDL. Karl X Gustav ordered his ambassador in Moscow to announce that he agreed to the tsar’s right to the title “Grand Duke of Lithuania and Autocrat of Belarus, even though international practice rejects giving titles over the countries captured exclusively by force and whose new status is not approved by a treaty.”1185 On May 21 1658, Sweden signed a declaration of its intention to begin negotiations with Muscovy.1186 The Governor of Estonia, Bengt Horn, led the Swedish delegation. The mission also included Gustaf Carlsson Banér, Andreas Walwick and Johan Westring. All were experts in Eastern European problems. The Russian delegation was led by Ivan Prozorovskii and Afanasii Ordin– 1179 Kot, Jerzy Niemirycz, p. 46. Blomberg, An account of Livonia, p. 167. 1181 Kobzareva, Documents from Russian State Archives of old acts, p. 221, 223. 1182 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 117-123; Codello, Wydarzenia wojenne na ĩmudzi, p. 49. 1183 PamiĊtnik Jana Wáadysáawa Poczobuta Odlanickiego (1640-1684). Warszawa, 1877, p. 26. 1184 Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 119, 150. 1185 Soloviev, Istoria Rossii, vol.10, p. 60. 1186 PSZRI, no 228, p. 451- 454. 1180 257 Nashchokin. As Elena Kobzareva has noted, the Russian leaders were frightened of renewed Swedish influence in Lithuania.1187 Nevertheless, Sweden showed no interest to control the GDL during the negotiations.1188 On December 20 1658, Russia and Sweden signed an armistice in Valiesar.1189 Russia signed it for 20 and Sweden for 3 years. Sweden recognized the new title of the tsar as “Grand Duke of Lithuania and Autocrat of Belarus.” In the language of diplomacy, this implied legal recognition of Muscovy’s rights to the GDL. Under article 23, the king of Sweden had renounced active political activities in Lithuania, promising “to mean no harm to the autocrat of the newly acquired lands in the GDL and Belarus.” The questions of commerce were also significant. Trade between Russian and Swedish merchants was to resume, and the merchants of Lithuania and Belarus were listed as “the people of the tsar.”1190 Thus, the agreement removed Sweden as a political rival to Russia in its struggle for the GDL. The Kremlin regarded the armistice of Valiesar as a great diplomatic success and the tsar ordered all Orthodox churches to hold solemn divine services.1191 The cease-fire with Russia enabled Sweden to concentrate on its campaign against the Lithuanian army in Livonia. In September of 1658, the Swedish troops, led by Robert Douglas, dislodged the Lithuanians from Livonia. Sweden occupied Courland, in violation of its neutrality. The Duke of Courland Jacob Kettler and his family were arrested and brought to Riga.1192 Early in 1659, Sweden waged a successful campaign in Samogitia. However, Douglas was unwilling to provoke Muscovy’s discontent and so did not advance towards the central districts of Lithuania. 1193 When Gosiewski was joined by Prussian troops led by Bogusáaw Radziwiáá, Lithuania took the initiative again.1194 As a result, the Lithuanian–Prussian coalition won over Sweden. In October 1659, Radziwiáá conquered the Baltic ports of Libau/Liepaja and Grubin/Grobina. The siege of the capital of Courland Mitau/Jelgava resulted in its surrender to the Lithuanian army on January 9, 1659. The Swedish garrison of 500 soldiers led by Johan Renn was allowed to withdraw to Riga. Colonel Aleksander PoáubiĔski marched from Mitau with 2,000 horsemen in order to capture Riga. The city panicked. The Swedes managed to throw the Lithuanians out of the city. However, Sweden 1187 Kobzareva, Diplomaticheskaya bor’ba Rossii za vykhod k Baltiiskomu moriu, p. 244-248. Nordwall, Svensk-Ryska Underhandlingar före freden i Kardis, p. 40-53; Kobzareva, Diplomaticheskaya bor’ba Rossii za vykhod k Baltiiskomu moriu, p. 238. 1189 Nowadays in Estonia, south to Narva. 1190 PSZRI, no 240, p. 468-478. 1191 Ibid., no 241. 1192 A relation of the horrid injuries committed by the King of Sweden, upon the Duke of Curland. London, 1659. 1193 Nordwall, Svensk-Ryska Underhandlingar före freden i Kardis, p. 70. 1194 Jacoby, Jörg. 1959. Boguslaus Radziwill: der Statthalter des grossen Kurfürsten in Ostpreussen. Marburg/Lahn, p. 88. 1188 258 had lost nearly all its positions in Livonia and Courland. In the spring of 1660, on the eve of the negotiations between Sweden and Poland–Lithuania in Oliwa, only one castle in Courland remained in Sweden’s control. This was Bauske, which at this point had been besieged by the Lithuanians for one-and-one-half years.1195 Radziwiáá’s lands, most of which had been occupied by Lithuanian troops, were the object of Bogusáaw’s concern during the negations between Sweden and Poland. Gosiewski captured Biržai and Kơdainiai; Sapieha captured Tykocin, Orla and Zabáudów. Taking advantage of the hostilities against Sweden in Samogitia, Radziwiáá retook Kơdainiai and Biržai. However, legally the problem was unresolved. Therefore, Radziwiáá wrote to the king of Poland and informed him of his progress in the war against Sweden. He also complained about Gosiewski’s pillaging in Biržai and Kơdainiai. Radziwiáá asserted that the occupation of these private towns was entirely unlawful, and therefore he asked to be allowed to recover his possessions. He stressed that the results of the Gosiewski administration was dreadful. In Biržai, almost all weapons and military equipment had disappeared. The townspeople were exhausted by plunder and had fled to Courland.1196 A detailed list of Janusz Radziwiáá’s landed estates was made.1197 With the consent of the widow Maria Radziwiáá, Bogusáaw appointed himself in 1658 guardian of Maria’s daughter Princess Anna Maria. During the negotiations with Sweden in Oliwa, Radziwiáás’ interests were represented by the Lithuanian Chancellor Krzysztof Pac and Jan MierzeĔski. The joint efforts of Radziwiáá and Pac, who had recently been enemies, are explained by the new political situation, particularly the struggle between the Pac and Sapieha families for influence in Lithuania.1198 In March 1660, Anna Maria Radziwiáá asked De la Gardie to guard her interests during the negotiations with Poland.1199 For reasons of caution, Radziwiáá did not write letters to De la Gardie (he was actually on the enemy’s side). Rather, he acted through intermediaries. The day before the negotiations, Krzysztof Pac received 18,000 zloty from Radziwiáá, of which 6,000 were to go to the Chancellor as a bribe so that the latter “would treat us well at the negotiations with the Swedes.” Pac was to give another 12,000 to ”the Swedish ambassador [De la Gardie?], so that my interest during the negotiations were not forgotten, and the interests of the daughter of His Excellency were satisfied 1195 PamiĊtnik Jana Poczobuta Odlanickiego, p. 22-35; Codello, Wydarzenia wojenne na ĩmudzi, p. 49-56; Fagerlund, Kriget i Östersjöprovinserna, p. 139-207. 1196 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Jan Kazimierz. October 26, 1659. Memel/Klaipơda. Polish. NHAB. Fond 694. Sprava 19, f. 22-23. 1197 Inventarium Über des weÿland Goigebornen Fürsten, gern Johannusen Radziwillen. NHAB. Fond 694.. Sprava 17, f. 1-8. 1198 Wasilewski, Zarys dziejow Bogusáawa Radziwiááa, p. 78-81. 1199 Anna Maria Radziwiáá to Magnus De la Gardie. March, 12 1660. àochów. Latin. RA. De la Gardieska Samlingen. Skrivelser till M. G. De la Gardie. Ser. C:I. ȿ 1531. 259 in full.”1200 Karl X Gustav instructed Oliwa to do the following in relation to Lithuania. First, the king knew that an anti-Swedish candidate would be Jan Kazimierz’s successor. Therefore, it was necessary to ensure guarantees for the rights of the Protestants in order to preserve Sweden’s fifth column. The Livonian province of Rositten/RƝzekne was to be claimed for Sweden. Lithuania had closed its customhouses along the Daugava River for a period of ten years.1201 The Swedes intended to use Pac, who had already accepted a bribe of 30,000 livres through a French intermediary.1202 However, during a secret meeting with the Swedish ambassador Johan Weydenhayn, Pac, who was torn between his personal interests and the interests of Poland– Lithuania, noted that the Swedish demands were unrealistic.1203 Peace negotiations between Sweden and the Commonwealth, Brandenburg–Prussia, the Habsburg Empire and Denmark were started in the Cistercian monastery of Oliwa near Danzig.1204 The main intermediary between the Commonwealth and Sweden was the ambassador of France, Antonius de Lumbres. The Swedish side was led by Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, as well as by Bengt Gabrielsson Oxenstierna, Christoffer Carl von Schlippenbach and Anders Gyldenklou. Only one out of the seven commissars of the Commonwealth, Krzysztof Pac, represented Lithuania. This violated the principle of equilibrium between the representatives of Poland and the GDL in international relations. On May 3 1660, Sweden signed an eternal peace with the Commonwealth and Brandenburg– Prussia. An analysis of the negotiations is beyond the scope of this work and requires more extensive research.1205 Swedish archival materials concerning the matter encompass many volumes.1206 Therefore, I will analyze only the final text of the treaty. The Swedish text of the treaty did not mention Lithuania when it gave the official name of the Commonwealth. This is one of the first agreements between Sweden and the Commonwealth where the “Common Republic of both nations”, or Poland-Lithuania, was represented only as the “Republic of Poland” (Republiken Pohlen), which is evidence of decline of the international status of Lithuania. Under paragraph IV, Article 2, legal prosecution was ended and a general amnesty was declared for those who during the war “were called to military or civil service of Your Majesty the King of Sweden and in future they will not be questioned or persecuted for that.” It was emphasized that this applied 1200 NHAB. F. 694. Sprava 146, f.7. Fahlborg, Sveriges yttre politik 1660-1664, p. 21. 1202 Ibid., p.159, 169. 1203 Ibid., p. 21, note 3. 1204 Mamuszka, Felix. 1985. Oliwa. Okruchy z dziejów, zabytki. GdaĔsk. 1205 Haumant, Emile. 1893. La guerre du Nord et la paix d’Oliva 1655-1660. Paris. 1206 Handlingar, Akter angående Oliviske Fredstraktaten. RA. Diplomatica Polonica. Vol. 34-50. 1201 260 to all Lithuanian collaborators “no matter in whatever places they lived, and to whichever estate, position and faith they belonged, whether they were private individuals or held any public office.”1207 Under Article 8, Sweden promised to avoid any future support of separatism among the Lithuanian elite. “The kings and the kingdoms of Sweden announce that they do not want and can not lay claim to certain rights in the provinces, districts or over private persons in the GDL.” According to paragraph I of Article 14, “the captives from both parties, the Poles, Lithuanians or Swedes, will be released without any compensation.” The Lithuanian authorities promised to assist in gaining the release of Swedish soldiers captured at Prostki from Tartar captivity“ without ransom and within a period of 6 months”, and promised them safe conduct through Lithuania to Swedish Livonia (paragraph II, article 14). Article 15 called for the resumption of pre–war conditions of free trade and free rafting of goods along the Daugava River. Article 17 was entirely devoted to Janusz Radziwiáá’s legacy. The Polish king promised to grant protection to Anna Maria Radziwiáá, “the only daughter of the deceased Janusz Radziwiáá, His Grace the Prince and palatine of Vilnius, Grand Hetman because of the general amnesty.” Most of Radziwiáá’s landed estates were still occupied by the Lithuanian army. Thus, because of Sweden, the Polish king agreed to risk a dangerous conflict with the GDL army. Under Articles 4 and 5, the Commonwealth once and for all ceded to Sweden its part of Livonia, on the conditions that had existed before 1655. Thus, “Lesser Livonia” remained in the condominium of Lithuania and Poland. However, since the tsar still controlled a large part of Livonia, both parties agreed that in case of future wars with Russia, they would return to each other those parts of Livonia which they had reconquered. The title of Duke of Livonia passed into the joint use of the Kings of Poland with respect to southern Livonia, and to the Kings of Sweden regarding northern Livonia. The Swedish commissars failed to obtain guarantees for the Protestants. As a result, a “Declaration of legates of the Swedish Crown at the negotiations on peace relative to the freedom of dissidents” was composed. This document was published with the signatures of four Swedish ambassadors.1208 Thus, the Protestants’ political future remained vague. 1207 Pacta Olivensia. VL, p. 344-354; Instrumentum pacis perpetuae. Eller instrumentet af den ewiga freden, hwilken emellan Hans Kongl. Maytt. wår allernådigste Konungh och Sweriges rijke, på then eena; och Hans Kongl. Maytt. och Republiken Pohlen, tillijka med thesz bundzförwanter och krijgs consorter såsom Hans Keyserl. Mayst. sampt Hans Durchleuchtigheet Churförsten af Brandenburgh. Stockholm. 1660. UUB. Palmskiöldiske Samlingen 95. Vol. VIII. Acta Sveco-Polonica, p. 313-347. 1208 Declaratio Coronae Svecia ad tractatus Pacis Prussiacae Legatorum pro pace et libertate dissidentium. UB. Palmskiöldiske Samlingen 95. Vol. VIII. Acta Sveco-Polonica, p. 309-312. 261 The Lithuanian nobility disapproved of the results of the negotiations in Oliwa. Despite its success in Courland and Livonia, Poland–Lithuania had to cede most of Livonia to Sweden. According to an Lithuanian officer, “under that treaty all Livonia passed to Sweden for good, and only a small piece fell to our share.”1209 In his turn, Bogusáaw Radziwiáá expressed his satisfaction with the results of the peace, since “the interests of my household have been solved.”1210 After the treaty, Radziwiáá took back all his towns.1211 The Oliwa treaty was anti-Russian in its content, and enabled Poland to start a war against Russia in order to liberate Lithuania. Immediately after the treaty, the Lithuanian army, led by Sapieha, joined Polish troops headed by Czarniecki, and marched off to the GDL. There, on June 27 1660, in a battle at the Palonka River close to Liakhavichy, they defeated the main Russian army led by Ivan Khovanskii.1212 After this defeat, Russia, which had broken off peace negotiations with Sweden after receiving the news of Karl Gustav’s death, was forced to resume peace talks. On June 21 1661, Sweden and Russia signed an eternal peace in the town of Kardis/Kärde in Livonia. Bengt Horn, Gustaf Carlsson Banér, and Andreas Walwick represented the Swedish side. Ivan Prozorovskii and Ivan Boriatinskii headed the Russian delegation. The key issue for Russia was its hopes to incorporate central districts of Lithuania and Belarus into Russia. The ambassadors also insisted on Muscovy’s right to Polish-Lithuanian Livonia, “as the country which bordered upon Belarus.” The issue of Livonia was closely connected to Russian control over the GDL. The main Russian army, which was quartered in Polatsk, became a hostage to its own policy. According to Ordin-Nashchokin, Polatsk and Vitsebsk brought no profit to Russian treasury. Owing to banditry and plundering, it was impossible to provide the garrison of Polatsk with local bread. Loyal city authorities complained to the tsar that the activities of Russian soldiers had caused a complete decay of Polatsk’s trade with Sweden. The city treasury was empty, since the Belarusian merchants had no goods with which to trade with Riga. Some merchants “ for fear of the tsar’s soldiers, fled, their houses in Polatsk have been ruined and burnt and their possessions were stolen by the Swedes.”1213 Therefore, food could be brought in only from Muscovite occupation zone in Livonia.1214 For Russia, the loss of its part of Livonia would mean the forced withdrawal of its army from Belarus. 1209 PamiĊtnik Jana Poczobuta Odlanickiego, p. 180. Radziwiáá, Autobiografia, p. 145. 1211 Ibid., p. 287. 1212 Frost, Robert. 2000. The Northern wars. War, state and society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721. Longman, p. 186; Kossarzecki, Krzysztof. 2005. Kampania roku 1660 na Litwie. Zabrze, p. 201-236. 1213 PSZRI, no 199, p. 414-415. 1214 Kobzareva, Diplomaticheskaya bor’ba Rossii za vykhod k Baltiiskomu moriu, p. 269-273. 1210 262 The Russians suggested that the Swedes be given Samogitia as compensation for their loss of Belarus and Lithuania. However, the Swedish delegation noted that it was the Lithuanian army, not the Russian, that controlled Samogitia: ”therefore there is no point in promising Samogitia, since we [Swedes] also will start giving away lands which do not belong to us.”1215 The Swedes claimed that the Muscovites hindered Swedish trade along the Dzvina, and the issue of trade was discussed in detail.1216 As far as political relations with Lithuania were concerned, the content of the peace treaty coincided with that of the armistice in Valiesar. Once again, Sweden recognized the tsar’s new title of “Grand Duke of Lithuania and Smolensk and Autocrat of Belarus.” The Swedish king promised not to assist the king of Poland in a future war against Russia. Under Article 9, Sweden acknowledged the Russian right to the GDL and to Lithuanian–Polish Livonia, and promised not to create a pro-Swedish party in either country: Also it has been agreed upon no hostilities shall be stirred up in the towns and lands which henceforth are under His Tsar Majesty power, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Little Russia, Belarus and Little Livonia, none of His lands and fortresses shall be conquered and the towns that could be under command or possession shall not be sought for and no harm shall be done or allowed to be done.1217 In the fall of 1659, the military and political situation changed in favour of Poland. The Lithuanian nobility terminated all separate negotiations with Russia. The voivode Yurii Dolgorukii informed the tsar “that all native nobles of all the districts betrayed us and joined the Lithuanian hetmans and killed and captured your soldiers, Tsar.”1218 In these circumstances, it became very difficult to maintain control over the GDL. In 1660, Belarus’s delegation of Orthodox priestship visited a synod held in Moscow and presented a book written in Ruthenian to the tsar. It was a calendar, with astrological prognoses of future events. Tsar Aleksei was styled “Autocrat of Belarus”, and it was prophesied that he would be the greatest ruler of this province. However, the title of Grand Duke of Lithuania was missing.1219 On July 7 1660, the Polish-Lithuanian army liberated Minsk – the key city of central Lithuania. On February 11 1661, Mahileu, the largest city of Belarus, rose against Russia. The rebellious townspeople slaughtered the 2,000-man-strong Muscovite garrison and swore allegiance, again, to the Polish king. Dzisna and Sebezh followed their example. The patriarch of 1215 Soloviev, Istoria Rossii, vol.10, p. 68. Nordwall, Svensk-Ryska Underhandlingar före freden i Kardis, p. 124, 137. 1217 PSZRI, no 301. 1218 Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p. 79. 1219 BAN. Department of manuscripts. PIA. No 2, f. 1-22. 1216 263 Moscow, Nikon, cursed the inhabitants of Belarus for their betrayal.1220 On 4 November 1661, the Polish-Lithuanian troops defeated the main Russian army, which was led by Ivan Khovanskii, at Kushliki and liberated northern Belarus. On December 2 1661, the Muscovite garrison of Vilnius surrendered to Polish–Lithuanian troops led by King Jan Kazimierz, which had been supported by Bogusáaw Radziwiáá.1221 In Russia’s the 13-year long war against the GDL, a radical turn had come, the result of the Lithuanian nation’s consolidation around Poland. 4.8 Conclusions As a result of the crisis precipitated by the war, a paradoxical situation arose in the GDL. Four rulers simultaneously claimed the position of legitimate Grand Duke of Lithuania, and the country became the arena of the five countries: Poland, Sweden, Russia, the Ukrainian Hetmanate and Transylvania. Each of them counted upon the political support of local nobility. Russia viewed Lithuania’s future from two points-of-view. In accordance with Russia’s plan, the whole Duchy was to be incorporated into Russia. At worst, the western part would remain with Poland, the northern part would be annexed by Sweden, but Belarus would become part of Moscow forever. Here, Sweden and Russia acted in similar ways. Separating Samogitia or Belarus from the GDL, they declared incorporation of those provinces into their states. However, whereas Sweden had designed a political alliance, Muscovy chose the right of force. The Patriarch Nikon tried to give Russia’s war against Lithuania a religious slant. Orthodoxy was declared the one and only indivisible faith. The tsar made it unequivocally clear that he would not tolerate Uniates, Catholics, Protestants, or Jews, and that only Orthodox believers could be the true subjects of the Russian state. The Kremlin established new central ministries to administrate the conquered territories, the socalled “Office of the GDL”, which administered in the same way as the other subjects of Muscovy: Kazan and Siberia. While the Swedes regarded the KU as incomplete, and had never negotiated with the lower-status nobles, the Russian political strategy was different. Muscovy came to an agreement with all interested representatives, entrusting high positions to petty nobles. Might was more important to Moscow than legal rights. Karl X Gustav had hesitated as to whether he should accept the title of Grand Duke, which had been delegated to him by a con1220 In 1666 Metropolitan Józef Nielubowicz Tukalski abolished this damnation “because the Patriarch of Moscow had climbed in my Belarusian eparchy contrary to the law”: Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p. 103-104; Marzaliuk, Mahilou u XII-XVIII, p. 77. 1221 Sahanovich, Neviadomaia vaina, p.109-110. 264 siderable part of the Lithuanian elite. The King of Sweden had waited for a political solution to Lithuania’s status in future negotiations with Russia and Poland. Tsar Aleksei, on the contrary, after capturing Vilnius, declared himself Grand Duke and started a diplomatic war with Sweden and Poland for his right to the title. The KU had put substantial obstacles in the way of Russia’s plans to establish domination over the GDL. As a result, Muscovy had conducted negotiations with various groups of Lithuanian leaders regarding the Russian– Lithuanian Union. The number of nobles who pledged allegiance to Muscovy exceeded the number that signed the KU. The nobility recognized the tsar as their Grand Duke, and promised to be “under his sovereign hand forever.” In agreements reached with Sweden, the key role had belonged to the Lithuanian Protestants. Russia enjoyed the support of a considerable number of Orthodox nobles. It would be wrong to assert that only the Orthodox nobility deserted in favour of Russia. The Catholic nobles, representing the largest confessional group, made up the majority of those who had signed treaties of both Russian and Swedish domination. However, during the war, the betrayal of those of Orthodox or Protestant confession became a standard part of Polish political terminology. All of the agreements reached between Russia and the nobility of Lithuania failed to delineate the most essential thing: the details of the future status of Lithuania within the Russian state. Both the Russian and the Lithuanian leaders viewed the future federation from the point of view of the political system extant in their own states. The nobility of Lithuania and Belarus dreamed of an equal federation, based on the principles, which had obtained in the federation of Lithuania and Poland. Thus, the terms put forward by the Lithuanian nobility to the tsar were quite similar to the principles laid down in the KU. This was quite natural, since the Lithuanian nobility was oriented towards the continuation of its own political system. Lithuanian senators saw themselves as delegates of ”a democratic” Boyar Duma, and dreamed of the possibility of influencing the tsar. The Lithuanian nobility saw their future in a equal federation with a common capital – Smolensk. Russia, by contrast, treated Lithuania from the point of view of an autocracy. The GDL would be incorporated on the same terms that had applied to the Kazan Khanate, and would form a regular part of centralized Tsardom, without any autonomous status. Lithuanian public activity was deemed unnecessary by the tsar. The Russian elite did not understand the sophisticated noble republic political system of Poland–Lithuania, and a mental abyss appeared. In this sense, Russian leaders could, unlike the Swedes or Poles, not promise the Lithuanian elite’s federation much of a future. The complex status of the GDL and the unwillingness of Muscovy and Sweden to abandon their claims to Lithuania were the key factors behind the Russian–Swedish war. All of Sweden’s and Russia’s attempts to divide the GDL failed. The Lithuanian nobles played a particular role in the Russian– 265 Swedish conflict. The Russian policy found support, and the nobles of Belarus took an active part in the war against Sweden. Ukraine entered the GDL in war together with Russia for its own reasons. The Cossacks occupied a sizeable portion of Belarus. In the struggle over Belarus, Khmelnytsky relied upon the support of the Orthodox nobility. Muscovy lost the propaganda war for the support of the local population. The democratic slogans of Ukraine were more popular. As a result of the mass cossackfication of the Ukrainian army had been reinforced by the local Cossack units of Belarus. The Russian administration failed to protect the nobles’ estates against Cossack raids. This worsened the relations between the nobility and Russia, and affected diplomatic relations between Russia and Ukraine. Thus, Russia became a hostage to its own policy. The success of Ukrainian foreign policy in the GDL was one of the reasons for the Russian–Ukrainian war. Ukraine’s independent course in Lithuania and Belarus also attracted Sweden’s attention. After the Russian–Polish armistice at Nemơžis, the need to establish a Swedish protectorate over the Ukrainian Hetmanate became acute for Stockholm. Ukraine’s alliance with Sweden during the Brest campaign adversely affected Russian–Ukrainian relations. At a time when Russia and Poland–Lithuania were signing an armistice which established the tsar as the future king, the Cossack army was taking part in a war against Poland–Lithuania on the side of Muscovy’s enemy. However, the Hetmanate set its own conditions for the acceptance of a Swedish protectorate. The key question was whether Sweden would acknowledge the legitimacy of the Cossack state, and recognize its future borders, including Belarus. An interesting episode in the political fight over the GDL was Ukraine’s attempt to incorporate the district of Pinsk. According to the 1657 pact of Korsun between Sweden and the Cossack state, Ukraine claimed, as a condition for the alliance, most of the Ruthenian lands in Lithuania. After the pact, the proMoscow faction of the Cossacks launched a civil war in Ukraine. The withdrawal of the main Swedish army to Denmark resulted in the weakening of Ukrainian interest in the Swedish protectorate. Hetman Wyhowsky started to move, instead, towards a Ukrainian–Polish alliance. On September 16 1658, Ukraine and Poland–Lithuania signed the union of Hadiach. The Hetmanate abrogated the federation with Muscovy and joined Poland–Lithuania. After the uprising in Samogitia, the desire for a hereditary state under Swedish protection became urgent for Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. This future state was to consist of the palatinates of Brest and Navahradak, as well as Podlasie. It would have been a vast territory. These territories were outside the control of Russia. However, Radziwiáá lacked the power to take control over these lands himself. His only remaining hope was for diplomatic and military aid from Sweden. In 1656–57, Swedish diplomats formed an anti-Polish coalition of the small non-Catholic states of Eastern Europe. Radziwiáá played a considerable role in the new coalition. The compact between allies 266 was signed on December 6 1656, in Radnot. The pact was the first detailed plan to eliminate Poland–Lithuania from the map of Europe, by partitioning its territory between Sweden, Transylvania, Prussia, Radziwiáá and Ukraine. Under Swedish protection and on the basis of the Lithuanian palatinate of Navahradak, Radziwiáá hoped to create his own semi-independent state. Sweden considered the compact of Radnot a great diplomatic success. Swedish affairs were going badly in Lithuania and Poland. Stockholm responded by organizing a potentially strong military alliance that might change the situation in its favour. The non-Catholic allies of Sweden agreed to the partition of Poland–Lithuania, and took energetic steps to make it a reality. Thus, the local political elites of the Polish state, namely Ducal Prussia, Ukraine and Radziwiáá’s faction, found themselves in the ranks of the anti-Polish coalition. This shows that there existed a serious centre–periphery conflict in Poland–Lithuania between the central government and the provinces. Following the compact of Radnot, the allies started a new war with Poland–Lithuania, in order to partition it once and for all. Sweden planned to capture Brest, and thereby gain control of the main lines of communication between Lithuania, Mazovia, Poldlasie, Prussia and Ukraine. However, Sweden’s gift of Brest to Transylvania had caused conflicts within the Radnot coalition. Both the Cossacks and Radziwiáá demanded that Brest should be given to them, instead Transylvania. Sweden refused to hand Brest over to Radziwiáá, which would have brought Sweden into conflict with militarily powerful Rákóczi, in order to benefit a weaker ally. After this, Radziwiáá abandoned his project of forming his own state under Swedish protection, and withdrew from cooperation with Sweden. Radziwiáá’s political defeat over the issue of Brest caused the final reconsolidation of the Lithuanian elite around Poland. Thus, by the autumn of 1657, Sweden had lost its allies in Eastern Europe. Transylvania and Ukraine subsided into political turmoil and could therefore no longer ally themselves with Stockholm. Brandenburg–Prussia agreed to wage war against Sweden together with Poland. The Radziwiáá faction in Lithuania was forced into the camp of Sweden’s enemies. The Lithuanian army started a successful campaign against Sweden in Livonia. Later, Radziwiáá joined them. The Habsburg Empire entered the war on the Polish side. Russia maintained its armistice with Poland–Lithuania, and continued its war with Sweden over Ingermanland. Swedish attempts to form a coalition of the non-Catholic countries failed. The withdrawal of the Swedish army from the GDL and the transition of Radziwiáá’s faction Poland’s side allowed the Lithuanian army to start a new war against Sweden. Faced with a two-front war, Sweden decided to reach an agreement with Russia. In the armistice at Valiesar and the 1661 peace of Kardis, Sweden abandoned its claims on the GDL. According to the Swedish-Polish peace of Oliwa, reached in 1660, Sweden abandoned all its claims to Lithuania and Samogitia. The military and political situation shifted in favour of Poland. 267 The Lithuanian nobility terminated all its separate negations. When Poland recovered its military prowess, all groups of the Lithuanian nobility consolidated around Warsaw. 268 5 General Conclusions 5.1 The post-war crisis in the GDL The Commonwealth’s wars with Russia and Sweden (1654–1667) were a disaster for the GDL’s population. The country lost 48 per cent of its population. In Belarus, this figure reached 72 per cent.1222 The difference in the population losses in the Swedish and the Russian zone of occupation is obvious. The losses of households in the districts in the Swedish zone were: in Samogitia –31 per cent; Ukmergơ – 23 per cent; Upytơ – 34 per cent and Kaunas – 37 per cent. Kơdainiai lost 17 per cent of its houses. At the same time, districts that were under Muscovite control lost 70 per cent of their estates.1223 The Catholic Church lost practically all its estates in Belarus. At the same time, in the zone formerly occupied by Sweden, the Catholic Church lost 20 per cent of its estates.1224 The only GDL town that remained undefeated was Slutsk. Swedish protection had prevented enemy armies from capturing this town. In the post– war period, Slutsk enjoyed steady growth in the political and cultural influence of its non-Catholic population. The town kept its Protestant gymnasium and publishing house, and became the capital of Belarusian Protestantism. Here, in 1764, the Confederation of Slutsk held an anti-governmental congress of the Protestant and Orthodox nobility that symbolized the political end of the Polish state.1225 Slutsk remained the only great centre of Orthodoxy to the west of the Biarezina River. The town’s Jewish community survived without great loss. Because of this, in 1691, Slutsk became the capital of the Jewish Council.1226 During the war, thousands of people were forcibly removed to Russia. In Moscow alone, former natives of the Ruthenian and Lithuanian districts made up about 20 per cent of all artisans.1227 Thousands of people migrated 1222 Morzy, Kryzys demograficzny na Litwie i Biaáorusi, table 23. Morzy gives statistics to the decimal even though this gives an apperearance of accuracy that is not normal in the 17th century. 1223 Ibid., table 22, 41. 1224 Ibid., table 28. 1225 Anishchanka, Yauhen. 2003. Litouskaya pravintsyya u padzelakh Rechy Paspalitai. Inkarparatsyya. Minsk, p. 102-104. 1226 Slutsk. Evreyskaya Entsiklopedia. Moskva, Vol. 14, p. 392-393. 1227 Hrytskevich, Bielaruska-ruskiya pieraselenni u XIV-XVIII, p. 31-38. 269 towards the west, as well. The refugees from Polatsk established a trade settlement in Courland on the Daugava River, called Slabada (Freedom). In 1670, Duke Jacob Kettler gave the Magdeburg rights to this new, flourishing trade centre. In honour of the duke, the town was renamed Jakobstadt/JƝkabpils. Later, the old-believers and Lithuanian Jews joined the Ruthenians, and the town became the most multi–cultural settlement of Courland.1228 In 1684, in Jakobstadt, Marta SkawroĔska was born to a family of Ruthenian refugees. She would be the future wife of Peter the Great and Empress of Russia, Ekaterina I. The GDL nobility suffered the greatest demographic loss. After the war, the number of Lithuanian nobles was increased by the ennoblement of new social and ethnic groups. Among noble families of Orsha, the nobles of Jewish origin made up 10 per cent. They became nobles on the basis of the 1588 Statute (Section 12, Article 7). They converted to Christianity and obtained noble status. However, all of them converted from Judaism to Catholicism. Most of the nobles traced their noble origin to the late 17th century.1229 The overflow number of new nobles contributed to the sharp growth of the political chaos which characterized 18th century Lithuania. After 1667, even among new senators, we can find one who came from a non–noble family (Kryszpin Kirszensztein) – something which was unprecedented. The demographic crisis changed the structure of the towns, and many emigrants from Western Europe now filled the place of natives. For example, the acts of Hrodna show that there an inflow of German artisans into the town, which had lost 46.4 per cent of its population.1230 The Russian and Cossack troops destroyed most of the Protestant centres, and seized all Cyrillic printing houses.1231 In 1687, under pressure from the Catholic authorities, the last Protestant publishing house was closed in Slutsk. The rich tradition of Protestant publishing ended.1232 As of 1678, and for more than 10 years, the only remaining Orthodox diocese of Belarus was vacant.1233 All of this contributed to the mass decline of Lithuanian and Ruthenian ethnic cultures. The first post-war book in Ruthenian was published in Vilnius in 1691. In the foreword, the publishers expressed sorrow about the long delay in publishing the book, which they blamed on the scar- 1228 Apine, Inga. 2001. Mesto belorusov Latvii v riadu drugikh narodov. Belaruskaja dyayspara yak pasrednitsa u dyyalogu tsyvilizatsyi. Minsk, p. 43-46. 1229 Jackiewicz, Zmicer. 1999. Maly herbounik Khalopenetskai szlakhty. Minsk, p.119-131. 1230 Gordziejew, Jerzy. 2004. Uwagi o biaáorusko-polskich kontaktach jĊzykowych w miastach Wielkiego KsiĊstwa Litewskiego. Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. Vol. 49, p. 281-294. 1231 Vladimirov, Lev. 1988. Vseobshchaya istoriya knigi. Moskva, p. 275-276. 1232 Buchwald-Pelcowa, Paulina. 1967. Kazimierz Krzysztof Káokocki i drukarnia w Sáucku. OiRwP. Vol. XII, p. 135-172. 1233 Sahanovicz, Historyia Belarusi, p. 291-292. 270 city of printers who knew Cyrillic.1234 In 1697, the last Catholic mass in Lithuanian in Vilnius was replaced by the Polish language mass.1235 In 1722, the last book in Ruthenian was published. After the mass conversion of the Protestant and Orthodox nobles and merchants, the Ruthenian and Lithuanian books had no sponsors. In the first half of the 17th century, non-Catholic support had been given out about 120 Ruthenian books, and 40 books in Lithuanian were published in the GDL. During the same period, about 400 books were published in Polish. After the war and the mass conversion of nobles, only a total of 20 books in Lithuanian and Ruthenian were printed for the period of 1667-1700. However, the number of Polish books remained at its previous level of 400 titles, despite of the war. Thus, the number of books published in Lithuanian and Ruthenian comprised a number that was the equivalent of only 5 per cent of the total number of books published in Polish.1236 At the same time, the Polish language definitively replaced Ruthenian in the official records.1237 Those nobles who supported Sweden or Russia were subjected to repression after the wars. Meanwhile, those who had supported the Polish king made remarkable careers. The King’s main political allies became the Catholic family of Pac. In the 1660s, the representatives of this family had concentrated all important positions in their hands: Chancellor (Krzysztof Pac); Grand Hetman and Palatine of Vilnius (Michaá Pac); Castellan of Vilnius (Mikoáaj Pac), who became later a Roman Catholic bishop of Vilnius; Chamberlain of Lithuania (Feliks Pac); Head of Military Transport (Bonifacy Pac); Catholic Bishop of Samogitia (Kazimierz Pac) and Standard– Bearer of Lithuania (Konstanty Pac). Consequently, this period is often called the “Era of the Pac domination.”1238 The Polish king thus destroyed one of the main principles of the Lithuanian political system, the principle of a balance of power between the different magnate families, who were to share royal offices between them. The all-mighty kin of Pac set up its clients at the district level, and refused Protestants access to public positions.1239 A former commissar of the Advisory Swedish Council, Paweá Prozor, claimed in 1669 that the Catholic senator Michaá Ciechanowiecki had arrived at the dietine of Samogitia. The latter publicly opposed the election of ambassadors 1234 Kniha Belarusi, no 166. Kosman, Marceli. Problem stoáecznych funkcji Wilna do poáowy XVII wieku. Zapiski historyczne. Vol. LXIV. Z. 3-4, p. 40. 1236 Kniha Belarusi. Zvodny katalah. 1517-1917. Minsk, 1986; Knygos Lietuviǐ Kalba. Vol.1. 1547-1861. Vilnius, 1969; Ivanoviþ, Lietuvos lenkiškos knygos. 1237 This process started after the Union of Lublin. However until the middle of the 17th century approximately 25 per cent of all records of the Lithuanian Metrica were written in Ruthenian. 1238 Codello, Aleksander. 1970. Hegemonia Paców na Litwie i ich wpáywy w Rzeczypospolitej 1669-1674. Studia Historyczna. Vol. XIII. Z. I. p. 45-46. 1239 Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 55. 1235 271 belonging to the Protestant party, since they were “disturbers of our Republic.”1240 After the war the kings nominated representatives of those middle–class families, who during the war had supported Poland or quickly switched to its side from enemy camps, to senator status and military high positions. Hrehory Podbereski became Palatine of Smolensk, Aleksander PolubiĔski – Starosta of Samogitia, his brother Dymitr PolubiĔski – Palatine of Navahradak, Aleksander Judycki – Castellan of Minsk, his cousin Mikoáaj Judycki – Castellan of Navahradak, Jerzy Biaááozor – Roman Catholic bishop of Vilnius, Cyprian Brzostowski – Palatine of Trakai, Jan Chrapowicki – Palatine of Vitsebsk, Kazimierz Jewáaszewski – Palatine of Brest, Jan Dolmat Isajkowski – Castellan of Smolensk, Jan Korsak – Castellan of Polatsk, Hieronim Kryspin Kirszensztein – Treasurer of Lithuania, Teodor Lacki – Court Marshal of Lithuania and Samuel Kmicic– Chief–Guardian of Lithuania. All the newly-appointed office-holders were either born Catholics, or had converted to Catholicism for political reasons.1241 Thus, the royal authorities sent an explicit signal to the nobility that only the Catholic faith in combination with faithful service would give access to the highest circle of power. Those of non-Catholic faiths, no matter their family’s noble origin or great wealth, were no longer given an opportunity to make political careers. After the wars, Vilnius lost its status as a capital. The grand duke’s ruined palace never recovered. Provincial Hrodna, which was geographically closer to Poland, became the new political centre of the GDL. In 1697, the unification of the administrative and judicial power of Lithuania with Poland was adopted with the sophisticated name “The GDL and Poland Holy Union”.1242 The results of these reforms were negative for the GDL, since they meant integration of the Duchy into the Polish administrative machine. Finally, during 1747-51, the State Archives of Lithuania were transported to Warsaw.1243 As a result of the post-war crisis, Lithuania gradually devolved from an equal state in the Polish–Lithuanian federation, into a Polish province. 5.2 The Exile and Decline of Protestantism The religious aspects of the Protestant struggle against the Catholic league were not explicit in the Swedish correspondence with Lithuanian separatists. Protestantism was not mentioned in the KU. Nor do other sources mention 1240 Kosman, Marceli. 1975. Sytuacja prawno-polityczna kalwinizmu litewskiego w drugiej poáowie XVII wieku. OiRwP. Vol. XX, p. 100. 1241 Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 443. 1242 Lappo, Uravnenie prav Velikogo Kniazhestva Litovskogo, p. 53-67. 1243 Dziarnovich, Aleh. 2003. Plach pa Vialikim Kniastvie. Metriciana: Dasledavanni i materyjaly Metryki Vialikaha Kniastva Litouskaha. Vol. 2, p. 33-54. 272 this faith with any frequency. Among letters written by Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Karl X Gustav only one advanced the common defence of Evangelical faith.1244 The issue of Protestantism in Lithuania was hardly ever raised at the Swedish Council of the Realm. In October 1656, while discussing the affair of the captivity of Radziwiáá, the senators concluded that this leader of the Protestants “could be poisoned in secret by the Jesuits.”1245 Nevertheless, the most radical group of Protestants – the Arians, did not hide their aspiration to gain the help of the Swedish king. During the Swedish invasion, its leaders, Jerzy Niemirycz and Jan Moskorzewski, showed Karl X Gustav the draft of a decree under which the Arians would be guaranteed all liberties, including access to senatorial positions. However, the king declined to issue this decree. He feared that it would alienate the Catholic nobility, which would make the position of the Arians still more difficult. In exchange for their collaboration with Sweden, the Arians hoped to solve their problems. However, these aspirations failed. Wáadysáaw Lubieniecki, wrote to Niemirycz: “Our Poles decided to kill and plunder all of us and to distribute our estates among the soldiers. They think that we are the reason for all their troubles. Thus, we find ourselves in a tight spot.”1246 The Arians rendered the Swedes enthusiastic assistance during the occupation of Kraków and Brest. On October 25 1655, in the church of Kazimierz, Stanisáaw Lubieniecki, an ardent supporter of Sweden, made a public oration in honour of Karl X Gustav.1247 This resulted in the theft Protestant noble’s landed estates and the murder of some of them. A royal decree prohibiting such actions was issued, but to late. Victims of these disturbances included many Lithuanian Brethren. Among these was Krzysztof Przypkowski, who was murdered by a mob of zealots. His sons Samuel and Stefan were forced to convert to Catholicism. Of all the members of this large Arian family, only Samuel Przypkowski did not abandon his faith.1248 After the Lithuanian army had captured Mir, the Catholic officers forced the local relatives of Maskiewicz to accept Catholicism.1249 The Lithuanian army destroyed the Lutheran church at WĊgrow as well as many others Protestant churches. Consequently, most of the Swedish collaborators came over to the Polish side. The Polish king granted them an amnesty. The first was Bogusáaw Radziwiáá.1250 Other collaborators 1244 Bogusáaw Radziwiáá to Karl X Gustav. July 4, 1657. Preüschmark/Prezmark. French. RA. Skrivelser till Konungen Karl X Gustaf. Vol. 47. 1245 Sveriges Ridderskaps och Adels Riksdagsprotokoll. Vol. 7, p. 172-173; Sveriges Ridderskaps och Adels Riksdags- protokoll. Vol. 6. 1656-1658. Stockholm, 1877, p. 144-145. 1246 Kot, Jerzy Niemirycz, p. 37. 1247 Jorgensen, Stanisáaw Lubieniecki. Zum weg des Unitarismus von Ost nach West im 17. Jahrhundert, p. 39. 1248 Chmaj, Ludwik. 1927. Samuel Przypkowski na tle rządów religijnych XVII wieku. Kraków, p. 54-59. 1249 Wasilewski, Zdrada Janusza Radziwiááa i jej wyznaniowe motywy, p. 142. 1250 Kopia dok. Amnestyjnego dla Bogusáawa Radziwiááa. CL. No. 2248/32, p. 193-194. 273 followed suit. In 1658, the officer of the Lithuanian cavalry in the Swedish army, Jan Ering, was granted a pardon and was given back his confiscated estate, because he, during the rebellion, switched back to the Polish side and with his own hand killed the Swedish commandant of Užpaliai. The Calvinist Gabriel Sipowicz, who was the Swedish chief tax collector for Samogitia, later became a partisan against Sweden “and together with Samogitians got out from under the Swedish yoke.”1251 In 1658, the Lithuanian and Polish Arians were, by decision of the Diet, forced either to accept Catholicism or be banished from the country. At the same time, Arians were deprived of all public offices. Those who refused to renounce their faith were given three years to prepare for exile.1252 All the Arian churches were either destroyed or handed over to the Catholics.1253 The publicly given reasons for expulsion were more religious than political. The Arians were blamed for “sectarianism”, not for their collaboration with Sweden. This explanation made sense, since the Arians could protest against being singled out as guilty of treason, when if fact many Catholics had also collaborated with Sweden. The Diet demanded that local administrators hunt down the last Arians and expel them. In 1661, Bogusáaw Radziwiáá initiated the reconstruction of Biržai, which had been ruined by the Lithuanian army. The construction was managed by Arians. However, Bishop Biaááozor forced Radziwiáá to send the Arians back into exile. In 1662, the last 32 Arian families of Hrodna sought refuge in Ducal Prussia, where they settled on the private estates of Radziwiáá in Ducal Prussia. The 1668 law affirmed that the religious liberties did not apply to “the Arian sect as apostates under the public law, condemned to be banished by the Holy Catholic Church.1254 As a result of repression, about 5,000 Arians migrated to Prussia, Germany and the Dutch Republic. The anonymous author wrote that after having been banished, the Lithuanian Arians settled in Prussia, the Netherlands, England, Transylvania, Upper Silesia, Holstein and Manheim. Despite being spread out over the world, they still managed to keep in steady contact with each other.1255 However, the exiled Lithuanian Brethren assimilated with the larger community of Polish Arians.1256 A large number of them settled in Ducal Prussia, where Radziwiáá had became Governor. Some went to Amsterdam, where they published Bibliotheca fratrum Polonorum, a monumental collection of the history of the movement. Some left Holland for America, where they founded the Unitarian Church. In 1659, Alexander Carolius Curtius, an 1251 LM, no. 16, 760. VL, p. 238-239. 1253 Tazbir Janusz. 1968, Vol.1, p. 81-105. 1254 VL, p. 484. 1255 A letter giving an Account of the Present state of the Socinians, p. 238-247. 1256 Tazbir, Janusz. 1977. Bracia polscy na wygnaniu. Studia z dziejów emigracji ariaĔskiej. Warszawa. 1252 274 alumnus of the Kơdainiai gymnasium was appointed schoolmaster of the very first school in New York.1257 Few followed Niemirycz’s example of converting to Orthodoxy. Moreover, many of them, such as Jósef Olewski from Pinsk and Helena Lubieniecka from Hrodna, later abandoned Orthodoxy for Catholicism.1258 The Arians organized their main centre at Prussian Andreaswalde/Kąsinowo. Some Calvinists emigrated there also. In Königsberg, the cathedral and publishing house of the Lithuanian Union was founded in 1707. Here the Lithuanian Protestants published about 230 books in Polish, Latin, Lithuanian and Ruthenian.1259 A few of the Protestants kept their identity and returned to Lithuania, when religious freedom had been restored in 1767. The last Arian minister died in Prussia in 1803, and in 1811 the surviving members sold the church property. Thus, the Lithuanian Brethren were now a part of history.1260 When active military operations in Lithuania ended, the Catholic administration gradually excluded the remaining Calvinist and Lutheran nobility from political life.1261 At the 1661 Diet, the Lithuanian Protestants, who were led by Bogusáaw Radziwiáá (who had been elected from Podlasie), asked for the confirmation of religious liberties. When Radziwiáá asked for the floor, the ambassadors of Great Poland entered a protest. They declared that their instructions forbade them to recognize Radziwiáá as a member of the Diet. The ambassador of PoznaĔ, Remigian Zaleski, accused Radziwiáá of treason and fratricide, when “he merrily led the Swedish troops against our king.” After that, the father of a Lithuanian noble who had been killed in the battle at Warsaw accused Radziwiáá of murdering his son, who had been defending his motherland. He reminded the Diet that when his son, Jakub Kowalewski, knocked Karl X Gustav off his horse, the king of Sweden had shouted “do not kill this brave knight. But Radziwiáá killed him with his own hands.” Because of the scandal, Radziwiáá was forced to leave the Diet and return to Prussia. The boycott of Radziwiáá recurred at the Diet in 1662, when he arrived as ambassador of Minsk.1262 The situation ended in a fight between Radziwiáá’s dragoons and the king’s soldiers. As a result, the ex-Arian Jan MierzyĔski was to be excluded, for life, from attending Diets. The political defeat of Radziwiáá symbolized the defeat of all the Lithuanian Protestants. In 1662, the Lutherans of Kaunas informed Radziwiáá that the local administration stopped them from rebuilding the ruined Lutheran church. In the 1257 Eriksonas, The lost Colony of Scots, p. 180. Kot, Jerzy Niemirycz, p. 55. 1259 Kriegseisen, Ewangelicy Polscy i Litewscy, p. 107, 180. 1260 Wilbur, Earl. 1925. Our Unitarian Heritage. An introduction to the history of the Unitarian Movement. Chapter XIX. The Socinians in Exile, 1606-1803. Boston. 1261 Kozak, Eugeniusz. 1987. Walka kalwinów Īmudzkich o zachowanie praw politycznych (1668-1669). OiRwP. Vol. XXXII, p. 125-139. 1262 Siedlecki, BraĔsk Bogusáawa Radziwiááa, p. 66-71. 1258 275 same year, the authorities closed the Calvinist church in Raseiniai.1263 In 1669, Samuel Medeksza, a Protestant noble from Ukmergơ, was sentenced to death. During a discussion on how to find resources held at the dietine, which was held in the Catholic church, he advanced a proposition to sell the church silver to pay the army. At the 1669 dietine of Samogitia, Bishop Kazimierz Pac struck off all six Protestant nobles from the list of chosen officials, and added a new article in which Protestants were prohibited from assuming any public positions. The Protestants opposed this, but their arguments went unheard.1264 The articles of the Lithuanian Statute concerning the equality of all Christian confessions were seriously infringed. The Statute had formerly stated that Jews could be granted noble status in case of conversion into Christianity. Only those Jews who converted to Catholicism could become nobles.1265 The Diet gave noble status to a number of Lithuanian officers from Belarusian merchant families. However, under the act of noble status, all of the Orthodox applicants had to convert to “the Holy Roman Catholic faith.”1266 The Uniate Church was not considered an alternative. It was, rather, treated as a plebeian variant of Catholicism. The 1668 Diet prohibited Protestants, who were visiting Warsaw from attending public divine services. The synods of the Lithuanian Unity were not allowed to assemble in Vilnius. The conversion from the Catholic to the Protestant faith was prohibited. After 1673, non-Catholics could no longer acquire noble status.1267 The 1669 Diet adopted a new law Rex Catolicus esto according to which only a Roman Catholic could become king. This law was in breach of the principles of the 1572 Confederation of Sandomierz, which declared the nobles’ equality in political rights independent of confession.1268 In 1669, the Catholic synod of Vilnius prohibited the pastors to go out in public in clerical dress.1269 In Vilnius, the students of Jesuits attacked the pastors and took off their clerical garb. The tendency to limit the religious rights of the Tatar population also increased. The situation of Muslim inhabitants in Lithuania was better than in Poland, because of the explicit law. However, became increasingly difficult for them to build new mosques. The Catholics claimed that the Tatars had to accept Catholicism. The harsh con- 1263 Kosman, Marceli. 1975. Sytuacja prawno-polityczna kalwinizmu litewskiego w drugiej poáowie XVII wieku. OiRwP. Vol. XX, p. 81-110. Rachuba, Wielkie KsiĊstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym, p. 87-113. 1265 Goldberg, Jacob. 1982. Die getauften Juden in Polen-Litauen im 16. -18. Jahrhundert. Jahrbücher für Osteuropas. Vol. 30. p. 83-92. 1266 Kriegseisen, Ewangelicy Polscy i Litewscy, p. 22, 99. 1267 Kiaupa, History of Lithuania, p. 286-290. 1268 Kriegseisen, Ewangelicy Polscy i Litewscy, p. 21. 1269 Synodus Dioecesana Vilnenis. 1744. Vilnae. 1264 276 ditions imposed on Muslim settlers contributed to the rebellion of the Tartar cavalry in 1672.1270 In 1660, the Castellan of Polatsk, Jan Sosnowski, the last Protestant senator, died. In the same year, another Protestant senator, the castellan of Vitsebsk Tomasz Kossakowski, solemnly accepted Catholicism. The celebrations of this event took place in a new Jesuit church in Slutsk – the Protestant capital.1271 After the death of Bogusáaw Radziwiáá in 1669, the Protestants did not have a single powerful protector. Only the petty nobility, town dwellers and Samogitian peasants remained Protestants. Without powerful patrons, the Protestants were subjected to attacks by the Catholics. A number of Lithuanian pastors were severely beaten and even murdered.1272 In the 1670s, more than half of the Protestant parishes of Belarus were destroyed. In 1697, a mob of Catholic nobles burnt Protestant crypts in Krasnagališkơ and Gruzdžiai. The repression culminated in the total destruction of the Vilnius Reformed cathedral on April 3 1682.1273 Cedrowski described the details in his diary. The Jesuit students, led by the priests and supported by Palatine Michaá Pac, removed the cross and then destroyed the church and the houses of the priests, burnt the library and stole the silver and bells. The students taunted the pastors, without sparing the memory of the deceased, “they dragged out the corpses of the deceased with the coffins and shamelessly scoffed at them and burnt them. They put the dead men on the dead women saying: join and multiply. The burnt corpses stank terribly all over Vilnius. The pagans never did anything like this.”1274 In 1688, Kazimierz àyszczyĔski, a crypto-Arian from Brest, was burned for blasphemy in Warsaw. He had stated that “not God made a man but man made a God.”1275 The Catholic counter–reformation in Lithuania and Belarus was successful. By the end of the 16th century, Lithuania had about 260 Protestant churches and in 1696 only 46 parishes were left.1276 Those Protestants who stayed in their motherland after the war were strongly repressed. Let us take as an example an associate of the Radziwiáás, Józef Chrapowicki, who was a Calvinist noble from Belarus. The Jesuits did not allow him to regain the Protestant parish in Vitsebsk, whose patron he used to be. The grounds for 1270 Borawski, Piotr. 1988. Religious tolerance and the Tatar population in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: 16th to 18th century. Journal Institute of Muslim minority affairs. Vol. 9:1, p. 119-133. 1271 Lulewicz, Elita polityczno-spoleczna, p. 180. 1272 Bem, Kazimierz. 2001. Kielmy na ĩmudzi –dzieje zboru i pewnej rodziny. Jednota, no. 3-4. 1273 Zwolski, Bolesáaw. 1937. Zburzenie zboru ewangelicko-reformowanego w Wilnie w 1682. Ateneum WileĔskie, Vol. XII, p. 482-514. 1274 Pomniki memuarnai litaratury, p. 133. 1275 Brückner, Aleksander. 1930. Dzieje Kultury Polskiej. Vol. II. Kraków, p. 498-502. 1276 Kriegseisen, Ewangelicy Polscy i Litewscy, p. 100-101; Lukšaitơ, Reformacija. Lietuvos Didžiojoje Kunigaikštystơje, p. 583-591. 277 the prohibition were that the church was located too close to the Dominican cathedral. Therefore, the Vitsebsk Protestants were forced to attend services at Chrapowicki’s private home, outside of town. However, the Catholic administration also forbade that. Chrapowicki himself was unable to withstand the harassment, and as an old man he also converted to Catholicism. The sources described the miserable situation in which the Calvinists of Belarus found themselves.1277 Thus, the Protestant nobility were turned into a stigmatized minority. Under these circumstances, many non-Catholic intellectuals were faced with only two options: to accept Catholicism or to leave the country. Many chose exile. The Protestants moved to the West, and the Orthodox moved to Russia. Most of the refugees left home shortly after the anti-Swedish uprising. Via Courland, they set off for London or Amsterdam. Those who fled to London included Jan KraiĔski, a historian; Bogusáaw ChyliĔski, a translator who published the Bible in Lithuanian; Andrzej Wiszowaty, a spiritual leader of Lithuanian Brethren.1278 The former rector of Kơdainiai Jan Starkiewicz, the historian and theologian Samuel Przypkowski, and the philosopher Florian Cricius, settled in Amsterdam. Such well-known scholars as Hartlib, John Worthington, and Comenius gave them aid.1279 Sweden was also among the countries to which Protestants emigrated. The last Lutheran pastor of Nyen, which was captured by Russia in 1703, was a certain Zacharius Litovius.1280 Many Calvinist students from Lithuania and Belarus studied at universities in Western Europe. The success of the Catholic reaction prevented them from returning home.1281 Some Ruthenian Protestants chose Moscow. Among these were Eljasz Kopiewicz, the greatest publisher of Slavonic books, translator, and the author of the modern design of the Cyrillic print letters; and Jan Manuel Byaloboczky, a famous religious writer and translator. A great number of prominent Orthodox Ruthenians emigrated to Russia. Among these were: Symeon Poáocki, the outstanding Belarusian and Russian writer; Simon Hutowski, the designer of the first Russian press for musical books; Leon Tarasewicz, an outstanding engraver of pictures; Mikoáaj Dylecki, the founder of modern 1277 Liedke, Od prawosáawia do katolicyzmu, p. 175. Hans, Polish Protestants and their Connections with England, p. 211. 1279 The Diary and Correspondence of Dr. John Worthington. Ed. J. Crossley. Vol. II. Part I. (Chetham Society) Vol. XXXVI. Manchester. 1855, p. 74-87. Noted: MS copies at University Library, Cambridge (Baker’s MSS. Mm 1.40, pp. 193-238), and British Library, Add. MSS 32498; Johann Comenius to Samuel Hartlib. August 3, 1657. Amsterdam. The Hartlib Papers Electronic Edition, Disc 2 (CD ROM). University of Sheffield. Bell and Howell, 1995. 7/61/11A-B. 1280 Bonsdorff, Carl Gabriel. 1891. Nyen och Nyenskans: historisk skildring. Helsingfors, p. 84. 1281 àukaszewicz, Józef. 1843. Dzieje koĞcioáów wyznania helweckiego w Litwie. Vol. 2. PoznaĔ, p.171-173. 1278 278 Orthodox singing; Jan Kokla and Kazimierz Wasiliewski, musicians; Klim Michaáowicz, the sculptor; Iwan Podborski, the founder of the first Russian theatre; Ihnat Maksimowicz, the first manufacturer of Dutch tile, and many others. The departure of so many outstanding people was a enormous loss to Lithuanian and Ruthenian culture. The famous Polish tolerance was not a part of Poland’s cultural traditions. Rather, it was the result of Poland’s attempts to reach political consensus with strong regional non-Catholic elites. As soon as these non-Catholic elites had vanished, Polish tolerance disappeared as well. The 18th century were a time of repression of confessional minorities. Catholicism became the foremost sign of loyalty to the Commonwealth and the king. Gradually, the nobility and the burghers adopted a Polish religious and cultural identity. The loss, during the early modern crisis, of Belarus and Lithuania’s elites contributed to the delayed emergence of their modern national movements. 5.3 The post-war identity of the GDL nobility For a normal Catholic noble, the Swedish occupation was associated with the mockery of the “Holy” Catholic Church and the favouring of the apostate Lutherans, who were aided by “the heretic and blasphemer, Calvinist hetman Janusz Radziwiáá.”1282 The Arians and Lutherans had betrayed the motherland by supporting “the Swedes and the wild Hungarian thief Rákóczi.”1283 The nobility that remained true to the Commonwealth considered the Lithuanian Protestants enemies of the motherland. In Tykocin in 1657, the Catholic Lithuanian officers organized a show trial of the local Protestants.1284 The wars against Sweden, Russia and Ukraine marked the end of the power of the Protestant and Orthodox elites. The Catholic Church treated the Swedish invasion as God’s revenge for allowing the Protestants to live in peace. The Catholics publicly accused the Protestants of high treason, on the behalf of the advantage of a powerful Protestant neighbour.1285 Accordingly, the Protestants became branded as traitors.1286 The Protestants defended themselves, asserting that, on the contrary, the Catholic reaction and the decline of tolerance in noble society had brought on the crisis of the state during and after the Deluge.1287 Just after the wars, historan Jan KraiĔski tried 1282 Kriegseisen, Ewangelicy Polscy i Litewscy, p.170. Pasek, PamiĊtniki, p. 5-7. Tazbir, Arianie w Biaáymstoku i okolicach, p. 90, note 49. 1285 Augustyniak, Urszula. 1994. Potworne konspiracje, czyli problem zdrady w Rzeczypospolitej w czasach Wazów. Barok. Historia-Literatura- Sztuka. Vol. I, p. 89-103. 1286 Libiszowska, Zofia. 1957. Antyszwedzka literatura propagandowa z czasów “Potopu”. Polska w okresie drugiej wojny póánocnej 1655-1660. Warszawa, p.481-527. 1287 Krasinski, Historical Scetch of the Rise, Progress and Decline of the Reformation. Vol. II, p. 196. 1283 1284 279 to prove that the Protestants’ collaboration with Sweden had not taken place. Painting Sweden’s policy in dark colours, KraiĔski asserted that the Lithuanian Protestants, during the war, had remained faithful to the Polish king: In the year 1655 the multitude of our Enemies was augmented by the coming of the Swede; whose Armies, by reason of the vicinity of these three provinces, Borussia [Prussia], Courland and Liefland [Livonia], which they had in their power, have, for the space of five years, afflicted our country also. And, without any respect of the Protestant Religion, they used us as Enemies. And, by their coming into the country, they made us liable to be more hated by those of the Roman Religion, than before; although after that all the Polish Armies had forsaken their King, and that His Sacred Royal Majesty had withdrawn himself out of the Kingdom, by reason of the power of Enemies, who pressed all places, and being absent for a very long time in Silesia, yet the Lithuanian Churches all that time remained still constant, and faithful to their Gracious King.1288 Catholicism became the primary manifestation of political loyalty. All the nominated Lithuanian senators were Catholics. Most of them came from the middling nobility and owed their high position entirely to the Polish king. In order to take the post of the palatine of Navahradak, the Calvinist Ʉrzysztof Woáodkiewicz converted. The mother of this popular colonel was a Calvinist, and his father was an active protector of the Orthodox Church.1289 In 1686, a former member of the Swedish Advisory Council, Kazimierz Siesicki, accepted Catholicism.1290 Teofiá Dunin–Rajecki, the marshal of Lida and a great supporter of the KU, died a Catholic.1291 Very often, the exProtestants destroyed the evangelical churches that were located on their estates. Thus, Bogusáaw Blinstrub, the son of a signatory of the KU, destroyed the Protestant family crypt in Viduklơ, and even pulled down the mausoleum that held his ancestors’ coffins.1292 In 1696, Hieronim Puzyna, the former ambassador of Upytơ to Sweden became one of the last great Protestants to convert to Catholicism. He subsequently ordered the destruction of the Reformed church in his town of Linkuva.1293 The Orthodox nobility of Belarus was accused of collaborating with Muscovy. During the war, Orthodox faith acquired new political salience. The Polish king began to treat Orthodoxy as “the treacherous Muscovite 1288 Krainski, A relation of the distressed state of the Church of Christ, processing the Protestant religion in the Great Dukedom of Lithuania, p. 325-328. 1289 Lulewicz, Skáad wyznaniowy senatorów, p. 441. 1290 Rachuba, Andrzej. 1996. Siesicki Kazimierz. PSB. Vol. XXXVII/1, p. 366-368. 1291 Ivanoviþ, Lietuvos lenkiškos knygos, no 348. 1292 Kriegseisen, Ewangelicy Polscy i Litewscy, p. 221. 1293 Liedke, Marzena. 2002. Szlachta ruska Wielkiego KsiĊstwa Litewskiego a Reformacja. Biaáoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne. No. 18. 280 faith.”1294 According to the 1667 treaty of Andrusovo between the Commonwealth and Russia, Moscow was to pay 1,000,000 zloty in compensation for the estates lost by the Lithuanian nobility in Smolensk. However, the royal administration excluded from the list of recipients those who had pledged allegiance to Muscovy and converted to Orthodoxy.1295 For a nobleman, to remain Orthodox meant to be treated as disloyal by the state. The end of the 17th century is marked by the mass conversion of the Orthodox nobility to Catholicism. In 1667, the last Orthodox Ruthenian senator, Alexander OgiĔski, died. In 1669, his son Marcjan OgiĔski, the last Orthodox magnate, converted to Catholicism, in order to obtain a senatorial position. The authorities required that he did this.1296 The leader of another great Orthodox family, the podkomorĪy of Orsha, Krzystof Stetkiewicz, was to accept a Greek Catholic rite.1297 Orthodoxy ceased to be the religion of the nobility. It turned into a lackey’s faith and was regarded as the religion of those who were not destined for a public life. With the conversion of the non-Catholic nobility, a gradual change in ethnic awareness took place. Being Polish became the mark of a Lithuanian noble’s cultural and political identity. The first symptoms of the emergence of a new pan-Polish consciousness appeared as early as during the war with Sweden. The final part of Szemet’s address to the Polish king is of great interest. The author describes a new variant of Lithuanian political identity. The text begins with the traditional historical discourse. King Jan Kazimierz is portrayed as a descendant of the glorious Lithuanian Jagiellonian dynasty. The 1385 union of Kreva that united two states under the Jagiellonian’s wing comes to mind. Instead of the myth according to which the Lithuanian nobility was of Roman origin, Szemet introduces the ideological construction of Sarmatia, according to which Lithuanian and Polish nobles are united into a single nation via their common ancestry [the Sarmatians]. In this way, the discourse of all-Polish patriotism and Polish identity is turned into a eulogy. The author asserted that noble liberties are “liberties of Poland.” The Lithuanian state emblem, the pahonia, disappeared and the Polish coat of arms appeared as the coat of arms of Lithuania. 1298 In 1665, the Vilnius Jesuit Academy published a book in honour of the Lithuanian hetman Wincenty Gosiewski, praising this leader of anti-Swedish resistance as “a glorious son of the Polish nation.”1299 In 1697, the Ruthenian language was officially eliminated from public life and replaced by Polish. The resolution of the Diet is explicit: “On the 1294 LM, no. 991, 1087. Kulecki, WygnaĔcy ze Wschodu. Egzulanci w Rzeczypospolitej, p. 63-64. 1296 Lulewicz, Skáad wyznaniowy senatorów Ğwieckich, p. 440. 1297 Ibid., p. 443. 1298 MSR, p. 206-208. 1299 Ivanoviþ, Lietuvos lenkiškos knygos, no 348. 1295 281 grounds of the fact that the Ruthenian language and script is difficult for educated Poles, the Lithuanian scribes must write all acts not in Ruthenian but in Polish”1300 With the decline of Protestantism, books were decreasingly published in the Lithuanian language.1301 Lithuania gradually changed into a Polish province. At the same time, the Lithuanian nobility began to see themselves as part of Polish nation.1302 The Lithuanian nobility increasingly developed a Polish national consciousness, which began to play the role of newly invented identity. This “polishness” was later expressed by the terms gente lituanus, natione polonus.1303 The Poles were well aware of the results of this process. For example, the famous Polish writer of the early 19th century, Henryk Rzewuski, evaluated the effects of Polish domination in Belarus as follows: “Sigismund Vasa and his son established Poland in Ruthenia. When the Roman Catholic religion became dominant, all other manifestation of the Polish way of life took root completely and the Ruthenian names became offensive to Ruthenians.”1304 Just before the partition of Poland– Lithuania, a translation from Latin of the “History of King Jan Kazimierz” by Kochowski was produced in Lithuania. The author of the translation was the Castellan of Minsk Szymon Zabieááo. He added many personal comments to Kochowski’s book, expounding the view that the Lithuanian nobility had on the KU. According to Kochowski, politics motivated Radziwill’s treason.1305 Zabieááo, on the contrary, emphasized religious motivation, and stressed that Sweden was aided by a great number of traitors who were Lithuanian Protestants.1306 Poland–Lithuania ultimately disappeared from the map of Europe after the 1795 partition between Brandenburg–Prussia, Russian and the Habsburg Empires. However, Lithuania lost its autonomous status much earlier, when it became a Polish province, de jure. On May 3 1791, the Diet adopted the constitution under which the federation of Poland and Lithuania was abolished and the Commonwealth instead became the Unitarian state of the Polish nation.1307 It was the next stage of polonization of multiethnic Lithuanian nobility.1308 Adam Mickiewicz (born in 1798), who originated from a Ruthe- 1300 Wielhorski, Wáadysáaw. 1951. Litwini, Biaáorusini i Polacy w dziejach kultury Wielkiego KsiĊstwa Litewskiego. London, p. 130. 1301 Lukšaitơ, Inga. 1970. Apie lietuviškǐ reformatǐ knygǐ plitimą Lietuvoje XVII a. Vilnius. 1302 Wielhorski, Litwini, Biaáorusini i Polacy, p. 138-141. 1303 Bumblauskas, Alfredas. 2002. The heritige of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: perspectives of historical consciousness. The peoples of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Vilnius, p. 24. 1304 Rzewuski, Henryk. 2005. Uspaminy Saplicy. Minsk, p. 38-39. 1305 Kochowski, Wespazjan. 1966. Lata Potopu 1655-1657. Warszawa, p. 41-42, 81-82. 1306 Ibid., p. 334-337. 1307 Konstytucja 3 maja 1791 = 1791 gegužes 3-osios konstitucija. Ed. Juliusz Bardach, Anna Gogut and Jerzy Kugler. Warszawa, 2001. 1308 Radzik, Ryszard.2000. MiĊdzy ZbiorowoĞcią zbiorowoĞcią etniczną a wspólnotą. Lublin. 282 nian family, became the symbol of this process. This long process is similar to the germanization of Czech nobility after 1621. After the defeat of the 1863 uprising, the Polonized nobility of Lithuania and Belarus established several cultural and political organizations within the Russian empire. All of these were founded with a view to a future in which the Lithuanian and Belarusian lands belonged to Poland.1309 The enormous class of former Lithuanian nobles transformed themselves into Poles, culturally as well as politically. As a result of this process, the Belarusian and Lithuanian peasants, by the 19th century, had came to regard most of the native aristocrats as “alien people”. Most descendents of the Lithuanian nobility treated the modern national movements of Belarus and Lithuania with animosity. The nobility made up only four per cent of those active in the Lithuanian movement and was thus under-represented.1310 The ancestors of the Lithuanian nobility did not contribute much to the Belarusian political movement either. The native nobility made Polish interests their own, and fought for a Greater Poland, reaching up to the Dniapro River. They lost the respect of the local Belarusian and Lithuanian population for their pro-Polish stand. In 1918-1920, most of what had originally had been Lithuanian nobles fought for Poland against newly-arisen Lithuanian and Belarusian republics. The generals of the Polish occupational army were two Lithuanian nobles: Józef Piásudski and Lucjan ĩeligowski.1311 5.4 The European crisis: The case of the GDL Among the different economic, political and religious explanations for the general crisis, the case of Lithuania directs our attention primarily to the significance of political conflicts. The external and internal characteristics of the crisis are to be explained primarily by political motivations. In the case of Lithuania, a provincial rebellion was led by parts of the native nobility against their monarch, and justified by a tradition, which argued for the former existence of Lithuanian independence and statehood.1312 Here, the case of Lithuania is similar to that of Scotland or Catalonia.1313 It was not nationalism in the modern sense, but rather a crisis of identity precipitated by a 1309 Smalianchuk, Ales. 2004. Pamizh kraiovastsu i natsyanalnai ideiai. Polski rukh na belaruskikh i litouskikh zemliakh 1864 - luty 1917. St. Peterburg. 1310 Hroch Miroslav. 2000. Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, p. 87-97. 1311 Snyder, The reconstruction of Nations, p. 41-65. 1312 Zagorin, Rebels and Rulers, vol. I, p. 41. 1313 For the Scottish case see: Cowan, Edward J. The Union of the Crowns and the Crisis of the Constitution in the 17th century Scotland. The Satellite state in the 17th and 18th centuries. Ed Ståle Dyrvik. Bergen-Oslo-Tromsø, p. 121-140. 283 conflict between the Patria and the Central Power. First and foremost, the struggle of the native nobility against the central power, and their collaboration with the enemy, aimed at the recognition of their own legal system.1314 For the Lithuanian separatists, the main motive for turning against Poland, and for promoting alliances with enemies like Sweden, Russia or Ukraine, was political. The primary motive was Poland’s inability to help the GDL during the Russian war. During this war, the nobility of Lithuania revived the union as their political weapon. The different factions of the nobility effectively conspired with the elites of neighbouring states, advancing various ideas of entering into union or vassalage with them. Separatist groups among the Lithuanian elite probably thought that Swedish or Russian protection would be preferable to having a marginal position in relation to Poland. In reality, when under the rule of Sweden and Russia, the Lithuanians found themselves in an extremely marginal position vis-à-vis these centralized states. To the Lithuanians, the cost of maintaining the huge Swedish or Russian army was overwhelming compared to that of maintaining Poland–Lithuania’s troops. As a result, they perhaps realized that to be under the rule of the weak Polish king might be preferable to being in the power of the strong Swedish king, or of the Russian tsar. The cost of being of part of Sweden or Muscovy was greater than the benefit of military and political protection. The dreams of GDL independence turned into a nightmare. Therefore, the pro-Polish orientation finally prevailed, and when Poland recovered its military strength, all groups of the Lithuanian nobility consolidated around Warsaw. As a result of political manoeuvring, the GDL managed to stay on the political map of Europe, and the native nobility kept their privileges. However, religious Catholization and cultural Polonization was the price of this rescue. Religion was an important determinant factor in this crisis. The principal initiator of the KU was the Protestant faction led by the Radziwiáás. Most of the Orthodox elite collaborated with Russia or Ukraine. However, the Protestant and Orthodox nobility were numerically the second largest faction within the political nation of Lithuania, the Catholics making up the largest faction. According to the KU, Sweden would guarantee the religious freedom and rights of the three non–Protestant Christian religions. However, later, the Swedes occupied many manors belonging to the Catholic Church, and wished to use the Catholic churches for Lutheran divine service. This led to hostile reactions from the Catholic population. The failure of the Russian occupation politics in the GDL also shows that the Kremlin did not see the importance of religious policy in relation to the multi–confessional Lithua1314 Moote, A. Lloyd. 1978. The preconditions of revolution in Early Modern Europe: did they really exist? The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century. Ed. Geoffrey Parker. London, Henley and Boston, p. 134-164. 284 nian society. In the Russian occupational zone, Orthodoxy was declared the one only loyal faith. The tsar made it unequivocally clear that he would not tolerate Uniates, Catholics, Protestants, or Jews, and that only Orthodox believers could be true subjects of the Russian state. Many native nobles therefore became hostile to the new authority, and as soon as possible they switched back to the Polish side. In its turn, Poland united all its supporters in Lithuania under the banner of the “Holy Catholic faith.” Socio–economic motives also played a role in the crisis. The question of ownership of landed estates was a key issue for the Lithuanian nobility in their relations to all foreign powers, and to the Polish king. Traditionally, the Lithuanian nobility had important economic interest in the trade with Riga. Thus, according to the KU, Sweden was to guarantee the safety of the external trade routes. The pro–Russian nobles of Belarus, motivated by their interest in Riga’s market, supported the Russian aggression against Sweden, militarily and politically. The motives behind Swedish foreign policy were, to some degree, of an economic nature.1315 Sweden was following its traditional foreign policy of seeking economic dominance of the Baltic coast, particularly of the harbours and major rivers. Thus, Samogitia, not Belarus, became Sweden’s highest priority. The Swedish leaders wanted to keep Samogitia, since this part of Lithuania was important from a geo-economic point of view. The merchants of Riga saw their own commercial interests as being met by Sweden regaining control over Samogitia and northern Lithuania, even after the anti-Swedish uprising. There were conflicts over economic competition. However, the economic issue was not discussed much on paper, and in the case of the GDL, I did not find much evidence supporting an internal economic explanation of the 17th century crisis. The GDL middle class was small, and was traditionally politically passive. With exception of the middle class of the city of Mahileu, which supported Muscovy for reasons of trade benefits, the middle class did not have its own political position. The economic explanation of the 17th century crisis can, probably, be used to explain the crisis in the Western Europe, but is less useful for explaining events in this part of Europe. My research has shown also the importance of lesser powers in changes of the geopolitical balance between the Great Powers. Territorial conflicts over Lithuania and Belarus were the main reason for Swedish–Russian, Polish–Russian and Ukrainian–Russian disagreement, military as well as political. The Lithuanian, Cossack or Transylvanian elite’s role in the Eastern European crisis is obvious. At the time, each of them had their own geopolitical aims, and rebelled against their formal rulers, and collaborated with 1315 Attman, Artur. 1973. The Russian and Polish markets in international trade 1500-1650. Göteborg; Attman, Artur. 1985. Swedish aspirations and the Russian market during the 17th century. Göteborg: Vetenskaps- och vitterhets-samhället, p. 1-41. 285 foreign powers. All of this transformed not only the development of these semi-independent peripheral states, but changed the balance of power in Eastern Europe as well. In 1669, Gotfried Wilhelm von Leibniz published a political pamphlet concerning Poland–Lithuania, which applied a mathematical model to political issues. Leibniz published his monograph under the pseudonym of a Lithuanian nobleman, as the book was published in Vilnius. In Leibniz’s opinion, the wars between Poland–Lithuania, Russia and Sweden disturbed the balance of power because they caused a drastic rise in Russia’s geopolitical importance. For the first time, Poland–Lithuania had become the arena of political struggles between neighbouring countries. Leibniz’s conclusion was univocal: in the shadow of Russian domination, Poland–Lithuania had no political future, and eventually it would disappear from the map of Europe, i.e. cease to be an independent state.1316 In my opinion, Janusz and Bogusáaw Radziwiáá were the patriots of the state, understanding as it Lithuania, not Poland. First and foremost, they were thinking of the Patria, not of their private lands or political positions. If, Janusz Radziwiáá had concentrated on his own interests, collaboration with Russia rather than with Sweden would have been his best option. Radziwiáá could have follow Khmelnytsky’s example. In that case, Moscow would have granted him the position of Grand Hetman and Palatine of Vilnius, second in power after the tsar. This would have guaranteed the safety of all his lands, and would have left him with the option of negotiating for the GDL’s future autonomous status within the Muscovite state. However, Radziwiáá did not do that. Instead, he chose the much riskier third way, namely the protection of Sweden. This step automatically brought his faction into conflict with two Regional Powers: Poland and Russia. However, only the political decision of Radziwiáá kept the GDL on the map of Europe. Radziwiáá’s political project, the building of a Protestant semi-independent state between Orthodox Muscovy and Catholic Poland, failed. If the KU had been implemented it perhaps would have benefited both Sweden and the GDL. A political victory in Lithuania would have given Sweden control over the entire East Baltic coast. For Lithuania, it was a real chance to stop the Muscovite and Cossack invasion and to save the country from the crisis. The KU would have ensured the stable development of Lithuania, Samogitia and northern Belarus within the dynamic Swedish Empire. The relatively short (1622–1704) period of Sweden’s power is remembered in Latvia as “the good Swedish time.” The Swedish government implemented a land reform, founded a university, established a system of general education, published the Bible in Latvian and supported Latvian-language literature. By furthering 1316 Ulicovius Lithuanus, Georgius. 1659. Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro elegendo rege Polonorum novo scribendi genere ad claram certitudinem exactum. Vilnae [Danzig]. 286 the education of ethnic Latvian teachers and Lutheran clergy, the Swedes ended the germanization of Latvians, and actually built the foundation for a modern Latvian national movement. Internal as well as external factors caused the failure of the KU. Internally, various groups within the GDL nobility were oriented towards different foreign powers – beginning with Muscovy and ending with Transylvania. The external cause of the failure of the KU project was the failure of the Swedish strategy. Sweden concentrated its military activity on Poland, not on the GDL. The Swedish goals in Poland were prioritized, even though the Swedes could not expect any substantial support from the Polish nobility. After the KU, Swedish civil and military authorities viewed Lithuania as an occupied country, not as an equal confederate. The Swedish administration instituted a hard tax regime, while being unable to prevent its army from committing acts of violence. This alienated the Lithuanians. As a result, Sweden was defeated in both Lithuania and Poland. 5.5 Lithuania and Sweden after the European Crisis The crisis of the mid–17th century sharply consolidated the political fragmentation of the Lithuanian elite. In 1663, two Ruthenian noblemen from Lithuania - the esquire carver of Polatsk Paweá Tetera, and the Orthodox bishop of Belarus Jósef Nielubowicz Tukalski - became Ukraine’s leaders. Tetera obtained the position of hetman, and Nielubowicz Tukalski was elected metropolitan of Kyiv.1317 The 1667 treaty of Andrusovo had far– reaching consequences for both Lithuania and Ukraine. Under that treaty, Russia obtained Smolensk and a number of towns near Vitsebsk and Polatsk. The Orthodox Church administration was partitioned between the two hostile powers. A Russian national became the Metropolitan of Kyiv, but the Belarusian eparchy remained within Poland–Lithuania. The tsar was recognized as the protector of Orthodoxy in the GDL.1318 The Ukrainian Hetmanate was divided into two parts: a Polish Right–Bank Ukraine and a Russian Left–Bank Ukraine, each with its own hetman. The Cossack Zaporozhian Sich was declared a joint possession of Poland and Russia. In a few years, the Poles succeeded in abolishing Cossack autonomy in their part of Ukraine. Thus, the early modern Ukrainian state ceased to exist. It but later remerged like phoenix, in the era of Mazepa and Karl XII. 1317 Krykun, Mikola. 2000. Instruktsya poslam Viiska Zaporozskoho na varshavskyi sejm 1664 roku. Ukraina moderna. No. 4/5, p. 374-449. 1318 Wójcik, Zbigniew. 1992. The Orthodox Church and the Polish reason of state in the 17th century. Nuovi Studi Storici. Vol. XVII, p. 425-435. 287 The Swedish and Ukrainian retreat from the arena of Lithuanian politics resulted in the temporary dissolution of the pro-Swedish and pro-Cossack parties. Russia, however, continued its expansionism, and its fifth column in Lithuania became even more influential after the war. The Russians repeatedly and publicly expressed their wish to see Lithuania and Belarus in the power of the Tsar.1319 In 1674 the Pac, the OgiĔski and the Brzostowski factions proposed Tsarevich Fedor (the son of Tsar Aleksei) as a candidate for the Polish–Lithuanian throne. Under Pac’s dominance, the international position of Lithuania became decidedly anti-Swedish. The Pac faction started a propaganda campaign for a new war against Sweden, with a view to recovering all of Livonia, including Riga. They succeeded in uniting the Lithuanian opposition against Sweden, and kept the army on a war footing. According to their plans, the Lithuanians should persuade the royal court and the Polish senators to declare war against Sweden.1320 The Lithuanian administration looked forward to the founding of a new port, independent of Riga. 1321 Acceeding to their requests, King Jan Sobieski gave English merchants permission to build a port at Heiligen Aa, at the mouth of the Šventoji River, on the border between Samogitia and Courland. In 1690, this port received the status of a town and was named Janmarienburg, in honour of names of the Polish king and his wife. Sweden expressed its concern over the successful, competitive Baltic trade emanating from the new Lithuanian port. The General Governor of Swedish Livonia, Johan Hastfer, reported to the king that a number of new “illegal” ports on the border between Lithuania and Courland had been opened. He wanted the English merchants to withdraw from Janmarienburg, which activity undermined Riga’s trade.1322 Hastfer ordered naval vessels to capture the “illegal” port and confiscate all the goods and ships found in it.1323 At the beginning of the Great Northern War, the Swedish navy finally destroyed Janmarienburg, thereby bringing the trade of Lithuania and Belarus back to Riga.1324 Under the peace treaties of Oliwa and Kardis, Sweden managed to preserve the status quo, and kept its pre–war territories in the east of Baltic. Russia did not succeed in reaching the eastern shore of the Baltic, and Sweden rescued most of Livonia from Polish claims. However, the overall results of the wars were detrimental to Sweden. According to Göran Rystad, these peace treaties spelled the end of Sweden’s era of expansion. Sweden’s 1319 Sahanovich, Shlakhta Belarusi pamizh Maskvoi i Karonai, p. 111. Piwarski, Kazimierz. 1937. Lithuanian participation in Poland’s Baltic policies 16501700. Baltic and Scandinavian Countries. Vol. 3, p. 221. 1321 VL, p. 191, 251. 1322 Dunsdorf, Merchant shipping in the Baltic during the 17th century, p. 26-27. 1323 Ibid. 1324 Alertas, Dainius. 2002. Sventoji-den litauiska marinarkeologins vagga. Östersjöns skatter 2001-2002. Sjöhistoriska museet. 1320 288 problem was now how to defend its empire with resources that were far from sufficient for this formidable task. Thus, Sweden’s self–evident goal had to be the preservation of the status quo.1325 According to Gustaf Bonde, the 17th century well-known Swedish politician, “Sweden was always trying to preserve an equilibrium between Russia and Poland.”1326 After 1661, this balance was disturbed. Russian military power gained strength, and for the first time in its history Russia managed to completely defeat Lithuania, thereby gaining considerable territories. Other Swedish enemies, such the Habsburg Empire, also consolidated their positions.1327 Sweden’s internal politics also came to a crisis. Power struggles broke out between the nation’s aristocrats, lower nobility, non–noble estates and bureaucracy.1328 In 1660, the Swedish senator Per Brahe and the bishop Johannes Elai Terserus considered the country to be close to a civil war.1329 With the beginning of the Great Northern War, Sweden and Russia resumed their struggle for the GDL. Once again, Poland rather than Lithuania was Sweden’s main political target. The situation strongly resembled that which had existed before the signing of the KU. Poland, being politically and militarily weak, could not help Lithuania. However, the polonized Lithuanian elite was no longer inclined to propose a union with Sweden. Nor did the Swedish leaders have plans for Lithuania’s political future. The political manoeuvring of the pro-Swedish party in Lithuania restricted itself to serving the interest of the Sapieha family. None of the other magnates challenged the power of the Polish king. The strong Protestant faction of Lithuanian no longer existed. Therefore, despite having establishing in 1708 control over the GDL, Karl XII did not give the Lithuanian nation a special political status. Rather, he respected the authority of the Polish king. One reason for this was the changed political identity of the Lithuanian nobility, which no longer exhibited anti-Polish attitudes. After the 1709 defeat of Sweden at Poltava, the GDL de facto became a territory ruled by local magnates with the consent of the Tsar and the Russian troops. Accordingly, when the Russian empire annexed the GDL, St. Petersburg’s leaders saw no point in preserving the special political status of 1325 Rystad, Göran. 1990. The rise and fall of the Swedish empire: the experience of a small state as a great power in the 17th century. Relations between Poland and Sweden over the centuries. Ed. Zenon Ciesielski. Wrocáaw, p. 19-29. 1326 Fahlborg, Sveriges yttre politik 1660-1664, p. 22. 1327 Wójcik, Zbigniew. 1960. Zmiana w ukáadzie siá politycznych w Europie Ğrodkowowschodniej w drugiej poáowie XVII wieku. Kwartalnik Historyczny. Vol. LXVII. No. 1, p. 25-32. 1328 Wittrock, Georg. 1908. Carl X Gustafs testamente. Den politiska striden i Sverige 1660. Uppsala; Upton, Anthony. 1998. Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism. Cambridge University Press. 1329 Roberts, Michael. 1965. Queen Christina and the general crisis of the seventeenth century. Crisis in Europe 1560-1660. Ed . Trevor Aston. New York, p. 197. 289 Lithuania and Belarus. Rather, they accepted them as former Polish provinces. The authors of the 1655 KU had dreamed of escaping from under the shadow of Poland and Russia through a union with Sweden. This dream was now gone forever. The historical Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a land which had united ethnic Belarusian and Lithuanian regions, was degraded during the modern era into a deeply Russian province called ”North-western land”, and ended its common history in 1939 as “Eastern border districts of Poland.” 290 Maps Map 1. Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its administrative, geographical and religious divisions, 1654-1667 Map 2. Swedish military operations and zones of control in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 1655-1657 291 292 293 294 295 Figures Figure 1. Text of the Kơdainiai Union between Lithuania and Sweden. 1655. Original. F. 1. RA. 297 Figure 2. Swedish order of “the name of Jesus”. Award from Karl X Gustav to Janusz Radziwiáá. Livrustkammaren (Royal Armoury of Sweden). 298 Figure 3. Swedes enter Kơdainiai. Józef Brandt. 1899. Figure 4. Kơdainiai. The view on the town. Napoleon Orda. 1875. 299 Figure 5. The map of the Kaunas district and southern Samogitia. 1656. Georg von Schwengeln. RA. 300 Figure 6. Plan of Hrodna. 1655. KA. Sveriges krig, 05:35. First publication. 301 Figure 7. Parade of the Swedish-Transylvanian-Cossack coalition forces led by Karl X Gustav and György II Rákóczi. 1657. Erik Dahlberg. KA. Historiska planscher 1657. No. 5. 302 Figure 8. Plan of Brest. 1657. Erik Dahlberg. KB. Photo by Marie Persson. First publication. 303 Figure 9. Panorama of Brest. 1657. Erik Dahlberg. KB. Photo by Marie Persson. First publication. 304 Figure 10. The bell. A gift from the Swedish Lithuanian Society to the Lutheran Church of Kơdainiai to the memory of the 1655 Union. 1929. Ladled out by Bergholtz Klockgjuteri AB in Stockholm. Photo by Vydas Beþelis. Figure 11. Monument of Janusz Radziwill in Kơdainiai. 2005. Julius Urbanaviþius. 305 Figure 12. Jan Kazimierz Vasa. King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania. 1660. Unknown painter. Figure 13. Janusz Radziwiáá. Grand Hetman of Lithuania, Palatine of Vilnius and Duke of Biržai. 1652. Unknown painter. National Art Museum of Belarus. Fragment. 306 Figure 14. Bogusáaw Radziwiáá. Duke of Slutsk. 1654. Unknown painter. Figure 15. Wincenty Gosiewski. Field Hetman of Lithuania. 1651. Daniel Schultz. 307 Figure 16. Paweá Sapieha. Palatine of Vitsebsk. 1665. Unknown engraver. Fragment. Figure 17. Karl X Gustav. King of Sweden, Grand Duke of Lithuania in 1655-1656. According to: Fowler, John. 1656. The history of the troubles of Suethland and Poland, which occasioned the expulsion of Sigismundus the Third, King of those kingdoms, with his heirs for ever from the Suethish crown. London P. 1. 308 Figure 18. Bengt Skytte. Viceroy of the Swedish King in Lithuania in 1655-1656. Lorentz Pasch. 1793. Riddarhuset. Photo by Göran Mörner. Figure 19. Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie. Governor General of Samogitia and surrounded districts of Lithuania in 1655-1656. 1649. Mathias Merian. 309 Figure 20. Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov, Grand Duke of Lithuania and Autocrat of Belarus in 1655-1667. 1664. 310 Figure 21. Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Hetman of Zaporozhian Cossacks. 1651. Willem Hondius. Figure 22. György II Rákóczi. Prince of Transylvania. 1648. Unknown painter. 311 Appendices Appendix I Declaration of the Lithuanian Estates to Karl X Gustav, King of Swedes, Goths and Vandals. Kơdainiai. August 17, 1655. [Nos Proceres et Ordines Magni Ducatus Lithvaniæ infrascripti notum testatumqve facimus ..ac Domini Domini Caroli Gustavi Svecorum, Gotthorum, Vandalorumque Regis] Without signatures Translated from Latin to English 1. The Nobility and the other Estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania owing to the threat of invasion and being separated from the military assistance and protection of the Serene Highness King of Poland had to join one of the parties, namely the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden Serene Highness and Potent Ruler and Lord over Lords Karl Gustav, King of the Swedes, Goths and Vandals, Grand Duke of Finland, Estonia, Carelia, Bremen, Verden, Stettin [Szczecin], Pomerania, Kassubia and Vandalia [sic should be Vendalia] Duke, Prince of Rügen, Ingermanland and Wismar, Sovereign and Count of the Palatinate of Rhein, Bavaria, Jülich, Kleve and Berg Duke.[1330] Represented by his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden Royal Senator and Treasurer, the General Governor of Livonia, Governor of the City of Riga, the Chief-Military Commander in Livonia, Estonia and Ingermanland, the Royal Vicar and the Chansellor at the Royal Uppsala Academy, the High Judge of Götaland and Dalecarlia, Illustrious and Excellent Lord Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, Count of Läckö and Arensburg [Kurresaare], Sovereign Baron of Eckholm, the Owner of Haapsalu, Magnushof and Höjentorp. Having tasted 1330 The title Duke of Livonia disappeared from the royal title. Probably it was connected with the conflict over the nationality of Swedish Livonia in the eyes of the Lithuanian elite. 313 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 314 the consideration and sympathy of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden, shown to us, we undersigned that document, do not hesitate to give ourselves under the protection of the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden, and promise and pledge ourselves to remain in inviolable fidelity and obedience to the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden as Grand Duke of Lithuania and Our Lord, ratifying this document by our signatures and seals on our behalf and on behalf of our successors, so that His Excellence [Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie] on his behalf shall sign it, and on behalf of the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden shall make a promise that in due time it would be ratified and approved [together with] written below conditions proposed by His Excellence and supplemented by us in accordance with our state of affairs. All armed forces shall be placed under the trusteeship of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden and shall join the Swedish detachments [in the GDL] without detriment to the King and the Kingdom of Poland. All the estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania shall make calculating so that the Royal Swedish army, which is now entering Lithuania, could be provided with food and money. However, the ruined and destroyed provinces, as well as the depressed state of the subjects should be taken into consideration: first payment of debts to the army and garrisons of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, including subsidies for money and food allowances for that army and detachments that might be demanded. The castle of Biržai for the sake of love for the Fatherland and respect for his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden the Serene Highness and Illustrious Prince Lord Janusz Radziwiáá by God’s will Duke of Biržai and Dubiningai, Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, Starosta of Nevel and Sebezh, Palatine of Vilnius, Grand Hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, upon the request of the estates, shall pass under the authority of His Excellence the Royal General Governor [De la Gardie] or his representative, on condition that it shall be given back as soon as the war ends. All Royal privileges and rights to Royal landed estates, as well as the patronage rights of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden shall hold valid as they used to be for the Kings of Poland and Grand Dukes of Lithuania, with reservation, in accordance with the statutes, laws and traditions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, first of all, the full rights of the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Church of both rites their privileges and traditions, as well as the rights on landed estates to the Knights of Malta. The Guardianship and protection of the Royal Governor General acting on behalf of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden, over all belongings, movables and real estate in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which has not yet been occupied by the Muscovites and Cossacks are accepted with gratitude, provided that the king shall guarantee restitution of all occu- 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. pied lands, including those in occupied territories of Livonia [Lithuanian-Polish Livonia], to their original owners after the liberation. The Promise of religious liberties in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is also accepted with thanks, warning at the same time, that in accordance with the law, privileges, rights, immunities, customs and habits of persons and property of all religious structures in each region, first of all prerogatives of the Roman Catholic Church, senator dignity of its bishops and jurisdictions of Orders, Convents for monks and nuns and all their colleges, abbeys, canons, parishes and their incomes and possessions without any exceptions, as well as Catholic church-buildings, schools, asylums and all Holy places with their foundations, privileges, religious practices, public and private, rites and ceremonies and all that concerns their dignity, respect and honour must be inviolably preserved and kept inviolate. They also accept the promise of home security and safety of external trade routes and demand that the soldiers keep military discipline. Inasmuch as fate has willed, and by Divine Intent it so happened that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania passed under the authority of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden we demand weighty guarantees that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania shall not be incorporated into the Kingdom of Sweden but will be co designed into one [federation] by the same agreement as it has been united with the Kingdom of Poland hitherto, and namely so as both nations, senates and the nobility of both nations could have equality in everything. However, both nations shall preserve their own rights, statutes and traditions, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania shall preserve their liberties, first of all liberty of conscience, unless changes for the welfare of the people will be introduced by agreement with the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden and by our consent. They demand that the place for the Diet of both nations of the common federation must be acceptable to both parties. And first of all, let it be promised that his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden tries to take away and return to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its original owners everything that has been lost and removed during that war, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania promises to do its best to assist in this. They approve and sign the present terms with their own hands and provide that guaranties to sign them are given at any time to those who are not present, so that they shall not treated as enemies within that time. They are not against incorporation into the treasury of the king the property of those who broke away or denied signing the Conditions within the terms established by mutual consent of both parties. They only want compensation for testamentary succession owners who were deprived of property by Muscovy at the expense of confiscated property or Royal estates. However, those who oppose should not be treated as enemies, otherwise many of them will prefer to change to the Muscovite side. 315 Also, they want His Excellence [De la Gardie] on behalf of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden to inform the Grand Duke of Muscovy and all his soldiers that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has passed under the guardianship of the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden with the demand that they stop all hostile activities against the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, refrain from sieges and if they have already besieged the cities or castles, raise the siege, Muscovy should withdraw its troops from all the districts on this [right] side of the Borysthenes River [Dnieper/Dniapro] and restrain the Cossacks’ raids. If Muscovites keep on ruining the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or go on with besieging cities or fortified castles, the troops of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden together with the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania shall set out against the Duke of Muscovy and protect the districts and cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that have accepted the protection of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden. If his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden wants and the negotiations between the two Kings and Kingdoms [Sweden and Poland] take place, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania shall be admitted to those negotiations together with the Kingdom of Poland. After the Peace with the Kingdom of Poland those who have sworn to his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden shall have a choice to select a side [Sweden or Poland] and the right to sell their lands and property. If during future negotiations his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden concedes something to the Kingdom of Poland, the similar should be conceded to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However if it happens that the Kingdom of Poland ends this war by signing the treaty on the worse terms than the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, we do not agree to recognize them freely, only if a common Diet by the mutual consent of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden and the Estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania decided to do it. Signed by both parties and sealed in Cajodunum [Kơdainiai] on August 17, 1655. 316 Appendix II The Accord about the Union between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden. Kơdainiai. October 20, 1655. [Nos Magni Ducatus Lithuania Proceres et Ordines Universis et singulis has inspecturis...ac Domini Domini Caroli Gustavi Suecorum, Gotthorum, Vandalorumque Regis] Without signatures Translated from Latin to English By this document the Nobility and Estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania inform and give evidence. The GDL is strongly oppressed by hostile forces and estranged from the military aid and guardianship of His Serene Highness King of Poland Jan Kazimierz, thus this fatal and inescapable necessity urged us to make for the custody of the Serene Highness and Potent Ruler and Lord over Lords Karl Gustav, King of the Swedes, Goths and Vandals, Grand Duke of Finland, Duke of Estonia, Carelia, Bremen, Verden, Stettin [Szczecin], Pomerania, Kassubia and Vendalia, Prince of Rügen, Ruler of Ingermanland and Wismar, and the Palatinate of Rhein, Bavaria, Jülich, Kleve and Berg, Duke and accept his protection and recognize him and all future Kings as the Grand Dukes of Lithuania and the Kings of Sweden to them we swear fealty under the particular declaration signed in August this year, and now we pledge allegiance to them by signing the public declaration which is solemnly presented to the Illustrious and Excellent Lords his Holy Royal Majesty Plenipotentiaries, the Illustrious Excellency Lord Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, Count of Läckö and Arensburg [Kurresaare] overeign Baron of Eckholm, the Owner of Haapsalu, Magnushof and Höjentorp, his Holy Royal Majesty of the Kingdom of Sweden’s Senator and Treasurer, the General Governor of the Duchy of Livonia and the City of Riga, ChiefMilitary Commander in Livonia, Estonia and Ingermanland, the Royal Vicar and the Chancellor of the Royal Academy in Uppsala, the High Judge of Västgötaland and Dalecarlia; and Illustrious Excellency Lord Bengt Skytte Sovereign Baron of Duderhoff [Mozhaiskoe], the Owner of Grönsöö, Marby, Skytteholm and Strömsrum, Knight of his Holy Royal Majesty of the Kingdom of Sweden Senator, Governor of Estonia, General Castellan of Reval [Tallinn] and Weissenstein [Paide], Chancellor of the Academy in Dorpat [Tartu] who accepted [this document] on October 20, 1655. On the other hand, on the basis of powers given by his Holy Royal Majesty the Lord of Sweden to his Illustrious and Excellent Lords Plenipotentiaries we, following the decision to keep fidelity and obedience to his Holy Royal Maj317 esty and his successors the Kings of Sweden, conclude an everlasting and holy union with the Kingdom of Sweden to be inseparably together preserving the rights of each side. In the reply document handed over by the Illustrious and Excellent Lords Plenipotentiaries on the same day, they promised the favour and protection of his Holy Royal Majesty as well as the favour and protection of all his successors as Kings of Sweden. And since the GDL cannot avail itself of the right to Elect the king, which had in the union with Poland, owing to accepting his Holy Royal Majesty and all future Kings of Sweden as Grand Dukes of Lithuania and has not clarified itself a particular Lord and has no claims for equality in the Elections nor to participation in the voting of the Estates of the Kingdom of Sweden. Therefore, we, the Nobility and Estates of the GDL in the presence of the Illustrious and Excellent Lords Plenipotentiaries of his Holy Royal Majesty declare that in case of interruption of the royal dynasty (which God forbid) to be admitted to take part in the Election in some way. However, since no consensus was reached in this matter and the way of its solution is unperceivable, they secure the right to negotiate this separately with his Holy Royal Majesty, and the Nobility and Estates of the Kingdom of Sweden. Apart from that all should be equal Nations within Nations, as well as Senate with Senate and Nobility with Nobility with love and respect for each other at public and private meetings. However, all the rights, statutes and privileges both common for the whole GDL and particular [legal system] like in the Duchy of Samogitia as well as in the other Provinces and Palatinates including customs, estates, dignities, liberties, immunities, Officials and forms of legal Courts, possessions and jurisdictions within the GDL will remain intact. Any changes in the Estates of the GDL, liberties of conscience and religion excepted, are within the control of his Holy Royal Majesty and all future Kings of Sweden only after the consent of a common Diet, whose place of convocation is the prerogative of both sides. Therefore, the Writ on behalf of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden and the Illustrious and Excellent Lords Plenipotentiaries of his Holy Royal Majesty was requested by the Nobility and Estates of the GDL and obtained as follows. The customary religious liberties of the GDL will be inviolably and inseparably preserved, as well as the privileges, rights, immunities, rites and ceremonies of parishes, individuals and all patrimonies, including Senator Dignity for the Ecclesiastical Roman Catholic Bishops, the liberties and benefices for the Greek Religion of both rites, as well as for all Religious conventions and colleges, Abbeys, Observances, the dignity and clericature of the Canons, Parishes, Schools and Asylums and for all holy places with their foundations, rites, ceremonies, incomes and landed estates. Provided if his Holy Royal Majesty and our Lord recaptures the occupied property in Lithuania that will be returned to the owners who signed this document and who remain faithful and obedient to his Holy Royal Majesty of the Kingdom of Sweden. Our military forces, both domestic and foreign will be submitted to his Holy Royal Majesty and his successors in the 318 Kingdom of Sweden, who, in case of necessity, is free to amalgamate them with his army, the gentry’s levy, which has the colloquial name Pospolite Ruszenie, will used only against nearby enemies, not overseas, as for distant military operations, the require of additional forces for the Kings of Sweden and the Swedish Realm, as well as the equal proportion of which and the Contribution will be the subject of negotiation between the Estates of the GDL and the King and Kingdom of Sweden, if his Holy Royal Majesty and his successors the Kings of Sweden will have eternal the prerogative of making peace or declaring war, as well as the right of recruiting, building of Fortifications, castles, and fortresses in any domestic place of the country, without exception to increase the strength of the army both at home and abroad, the owners of such a place will have previous compensation, the Sum of which will be fixed on legal ground by the respective commissars. It is in the King’s Rightful Competence to preserve intact the rights to Patronage of ecclesiastical estates (for every faith), Allotment and Distribution of Benefices in the GDL, both Ecclesiastical, for Clerics of the same faith, that are in the disposition of the Royal Competence under the royal right and old customs, and nomination of Secular dignitaries including all Offices, civil, military, Count, Urban, Public and all Estates within the Jurisdictions rightful belonging to the Royal disposal of his Holy Royal Majesty and the future Kings of Sweden according to long-standing rights and traditions. His Holy Royal Majesty, as well as his successors the Kings of Sweden, is also unrestricted choosing his place of Residence and he can, according to his wish, choose it outside the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and appoint as his Viceroy for the GDL someone, who will govern here under the law and Pact of covenant and he will be treated by us with due respect and obedience. The current or future Possessions of the Nobility of the GDL and its other Estates in the Kingdom of Poland will be preserved for them as well as their rights provided it does not harm the Swedish Realm and our everlasting union with the Kingdom of Sweden. In case of a conflict or war between the two Kingdoms, the GDL will take the side of his Serene Highness the King and Kingdom of Sweden in order to help against the King and Kingdom of Poland and, on the contrary, if the Kingdom Poland wages war against the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the King and the Kingdom of Sweden will support us. The Power to grant residency in both countries belongs to his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden and his successors the Kings of Sweden. Livonians, who became Lithuanians under the right of Residence Permit, will preserve the same Rights as they had in the GDL before. All articles of the treaty can not be appealed against or suspended by the Pope, Bishops or other Ecclesiastical authorities or diets, nor the other Decrees and Authorities, only his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden has the right to demand from the Nobility and Estates of the GDL alterations if his Holy Royal Majesty finds them necessary. However, if his Holy Royal Majesty wishes no changes, all this remains lawful, valid and eternal. The approval of the above-mentioned is 319 authenticated with our signatures and seals. Keidani [Kơdainiai], on Day 20th October. 1655. 320 Appendix III Glossary Central, Royal, Military and Local Officials of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania ca 1654-1667 1331 Original Title Possible English Translation Wielki KsiąĪĊ Litewski Grand Duke of Lithuania wojewoda, starosta [in Samogitia] palatine, starosta [for Samogitia] kasztelan castellan marszaáek wielki litewski grand marshal of Lithuania kanclerz wielki litewski grand chancellor of Lithuania podkanclerzy litewski vice-chancellor of Lithuania podskarbi wielki litewski grand treasurer of Lithuania marszaáek nadworny litewski court marshal of Lithuania hetman wielki litewski grand hetman of Lithuania hetman polny litewski field hetman of Lithuania pisarz wielki litewski grand notary of Lithuania podczaszy litewski deputy cupbearer of Lithuania krajczy litewski ----------------------------- stolnik litewski esquire carver of Lithuania podskarbi nadworny litewski court treasurer of Lithuania miecznik litewski sword-bearer of Lithuania czeĞnik litewski cupbearer of Lithuania chorąĪy wielki litewski grand standard-bearer of Lithuania straĪnik wielki litewski chief-guardian of Lithuania oboĨny wielki litewski head of the military transport of 1331 The GDL had a very complicated system of the central, military and local officials. The exact system of hierarchy existed only on the top level and within the army. There were also many honorary officies. 321 Lithuania pisarz polny litewski field notary of Lithuania podkomorzy litewski chamberlain of Lithuania pisarz skarbowy litewski scribe of the Lithuanian treasure referendarz litewski referendary of Lithuania chorąĪy nadworny litewski court standard-bearer of Lithuania podstoli litewski vice-esquire carver of Lithuania koniuszy litewski esquire of Lithuania lowczy litewski huntsman of Lithuania podwoewodzi deputy palatine instygator litewski instigator of Lithuania wice-instygator litewski vice-instigator of Lithuania piwniczy litewski ----------------------------- general artylerii general of the artillery puákownik colonel podpuákownik vice-colonel rotmistrz captain porucznik lieutenant marszaáek marshal stolnik esquire carver podkomorzy ----------------------------- chorąĪy standard–bearer skarbnik treasurer podczaszy deputy cupbearer starosta ----------------------------- ciwun bailiff wojski vice-castellan miecznik sword-bearer sĊdzia ziemski land judge 322 sĊdzia grodzki castle judge pisarz ziemski land scribe pisarz grodzki castle scribe sĊdzia wojskowy military judge oboĨny head of the military transport podwoewodzi deputy palatine koniuszy esquire áowczy huntsman podstoli vice-esquire carver podstaroĞci vice-starosta podsĊdek vice- judge podskarbi vice-treasurer podwojski deputy vice-castellan horodniczy ----------------------------- budowniczy ----------------------------- mostowniczy ----------------------------- piwniczy ----------------------------- 323 Bibliography Unpublished sources RA – Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Militaria. 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Andrej Kotljarchuk, In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the mid-17th Century. 2006. 5. Håkan Blomqvist, Nation, ras och civilisation i svensk arbetarrörelse före nazismen. 2006. 6. Lindelöf, Karin S, Om vi nu ska bli som Europa: Könsskapande och normalitet bland unga kvinnor i transitionens Polen. 2006. 347 S Ö D E RTÖ R N D O C TO R AL D I S S E RTAT I O N S 4 Södertörn Doctoral Dissertations 4. Cover illustration: Map of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Fragment. Tomasz Makowski. Amsterdam. 1613. www.sh.se distributed by: Södertörns högskola, Biblioteket, S-141 89 Huddinge phone: +46 (0)8 608 40 00 fax: +46 (0)8 608 40 12 e-mail: publications@sh.se