Lithuanians and Poles against Communism after 1956. Parallel Ways to Freedom? The project has been co-inanced by the Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the competition ‘Cooperation in the ield of public diplomacy 2013.’ The publication expresses only the views of the author and must not be identiied with the oficial stance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The book is available under the Creative Commons Attribution License 3.0, Poland. Some rights have been reserved to the authors and the Faculty of International and Po- litical Studies of the Jagiellonian University. This piece has been created as a part of the competition ‘Cooperation in the Field of Public Diplomacy in 2013,’ implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013. It is permitted to use this work, provided that the above information, including the information on the applicable license, holders of rights and competition ‘Cooperation in the ield of public diplomacy 2013’ is included. Translated from Polish by Anna Sekułowicz and Łukasz Moskała Translated from Lithuanian by Aldona Matulytė Copy-edited by Keith Horeschka Cover designe by Bartłomiej Klepiński ISBN 978-609-8086-05-8 © PI Bernardinai.lt, 2015 © Jagiellonian University, 2015 Lithuanians and Poles against Communism after 1956. Parallel Ways to Freedom? Editet by Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė, and Małgorzata Stefanowicz Vilnius 2015 Table of Contents 7 Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon? 23 Danutė Gailienė Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath 59 Gražina Gudaitė Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process 81 Monika Kareniauskaitė Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development 109 Valdemaras Klumbys Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology 141 Jerzy Kochanowski “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective 163 Regina Laukaitytė Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period 183 Michał Łuczewski Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution 205 Krzysztof Mazur Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement 229 Adam Mielczarek Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory 257 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania 285 Paweł Sowiński Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance 311 Marek Wierzbicki Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s 335 Dainius Žalimas The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union 375 Marcin Zaremba Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980  Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon Katarzyna Korzeniewska, 1 Adam Mielczarek, 2 Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon? he question concerning the extent to which Lithuania and Poland’s path in the struggle against communism could be seen as common or parallel, requires some justiication. On the one hand, there are few studies that would compare the experience of the anti-communist dissent in diferent countries. his phe- nomenon is most oten perceived as unique and impossible to compare. On the other hand, in the political and moral dimension, all these particular experi- ences were in fact a struggle against a common enemy. One more argument in favor of the very idea of comparing the experiences of Poland and Lithuania is the subjective factor – the image of Poles and Lithuanians as nations leading the anti-communist resistance among other communist countries and Sovi- et republics (including Russia itself), respectively. his was true both in the post-war period and later, in the post-Stalinist era, which is the focus of this book. In terms of historical knowledge, it is diicult to deny the exceptional dynamism of the pro-independence atitudes in both Polish and Lithuanian societies of that time. 1 he research has been inanced with the resources of the National Science Centre awarded in the framework of inancing post-doctoral internships under the decision no. DEC-2013/08/S/HS3/00508. 2 he research has been inanced with the resources of the National Science Centre awarded in the framework of inancing post-doctoral internships under the decision no. DEC-2013/08/S/HS6/00199. 7 Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz Ater the end of the war in Poland, mass resistance of the armed under- ground structures lasted until 1947, and single formations survived until 1956 and beyond. 3 Ater the armed opposition ceased to exist and long before the breakthrough of the 1980s, Poland – much more oten than other Soviet satellite countries – experienced mass anti-government demonstrations (1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976). he unique feature of the Polish dissent was also the variety of its forms – from independent activities of informal groups and communities, through the underground publishing movement (which was extremely rich both in terms of quantity and form) to organized civic activity, both under- ground and public. he culmination of these experiences was the rise of trade unions independent of the communist authorities – their sheer size of 10 million members was unmatched in other communist countries. he introduction of Martial Law in December 1981 and forcing the Solidarity Trade Unions underground did not stop the opposition – in fact, it oten caused just the opposite: the independent publishing movement which started in 1976, in the 1980s produced hundreds of underground books and periodicals in editions of many thousands of copies. In Lithuania, long ater the guerrilla war of the early 1950s ended, mass demonstrations of discontent did not appear. hroughout the 1950s and 1960s, the anti-communist dissent was just based on ephemeral activities of small groups of young people or individuals, which mostly boiled down to produc- ing several copies of anti-Soviet lealets. It was the year 1972 which brought changes in this respect: a petition in defense of the freedom of conscience was signed by 17 thousand inhabitants of the three million republic. In Kaunas, several days of youth demonstrations and riots in May, which took place ater the politically motivated self-immolation of Romas Kalanta showed that the 3 R. Wnuk et al., Atlas polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego 1944-1956 (Warszawa: IPN, 2007). 8  Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon Soviet regime could not count on the loyalty of a generation raised in Soviet Lithuania. What is more, it also showed that a spectacular, single act of po- litical protest may trigger mass reactions. Such reaction had no analogue in any Baltic State nor Ukraine or Russia. Also Lithuania – albeit in diferent conditions – developed a range of independent publications: in 1972, the irst issue of he Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania appeared, and ater that numerous book titles and several titles of periodicals were published by the underground press with editions of varying size and continuity, as well as political and ideological orientations: nationalist, Catholic, liberal-intellectual or socialist. From 1970s onwards, Lithuanian anti-communist dissent had been growing in scope and forms: public statements against the violation of human rights by the Soviet regime were made; people undertook activities outside the control of authorities: participated in informal religious, folk or subculture groups and took part in collective manifestations and demonstra- tions. It seems that the number and outreach of underground publications in Lithuania by far exceeded those published in fellow Soviet republics and was rather comparable in its scope with this of other socialist countries, such as Czechoslovakia. 4 Due to the fact that the atitudes of dissent in Lithuania were relatively frequent and spectacular, the country may be seen as more similar to Soviet satellite countries rather than other Soviet republics or Russia itself. he process of growing dissent proved to be crucial for the 1988 birth and shaping of Sąjūdis – a mass reformist movement which inally led to the emancipation of Lithuania from the Soviet Union. 4 See: J. Posset, Česká samizdatová periodika (1968-1989) (Brno: Továrna na sítotisk, 1991) and A. Ruzgas, Rezistentų pogrindiniai periodiniai leidiniai (okupacijų metai, 1940–1989): leidinių sąvadas (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2010) for Czech and Lithuanian samizdat perio- dicals, respectively. According to bibliographies collected by both authors’, there was about 30 titles published in Lithuania and about 150 issued in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia during 1970 and 1990. Taking into account the proportion of inhabitants in both countries, intensity of the phenomenon is comparable. 9 Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz Poland and Lithuania, despite their geographical and historical proximity, still have litle knowledge about this stage of each-others’ history. Even his- torians tend to look for references for the communist past of their countries in their own geo-political environment: the Soviet republics for Lithuania, and the so-called ‘people’s democracies’ – in the case of Poland. his fact is understandable: the reality of Soviet republics, restrictions of civil liberties or the level of control was qualitatively diferent from those of the satellite countries. However, only when some knowledge about the circumstances in which the opposition found itself in both these countries is gained, are we able to understand what these diferences involved. Yet another issue is how the leader-countries of anti-communist dissent perceive and analyze their own experiences, and which approaches and methods are applied in both countries in order to reconstruct and relect upon these experiences. However, the point here is not only to exchange knowledge in the academic dimension – which, we hope, this volume will aid. he memory of the communist period seems to be in its formative phase, and so are its coherent and clear narratives. Diverse instruments and means of sharing this experience are being tested. Because of this, communism researchers in both the countries (and probably also in other countries which have experienced communism), whether they want it or not, participate in the shaping of the memory of communism to a much higher degree than researchers concerned with other periods of history. A dialogue between researchers of diferent nationalities allows perceiving and understanding the above determinants in a more accurate way, and it may turn out to be especially valuable if the very notion of researchers’ participation in shaping the memory of the communist period is in itself analyzed as a research problem. Finally, the key here is not just transmiting the experience of the anti-com- munist dissent within the countries that have experienced it – in this case, Poland and Lithuania – but also integrating this memory into the memory of 10  Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon Europe. Memory is not only a moral issue but also a political one – both in the sphere of internal political life of the countries and in international relations. Oten it is the fall of the Berlin Wall which is the common metaphor for the end of communism in Europe. he simpliication standing behind it, although it is clear and easy to locate in historical knowledge, does not clearly point to all the actors who played key roles in the dismantling of the communist system. In other words, this metaphor lacks the answer, or even the intention of asking the question: Who was it that – metaphorically – tore down the Berlin Wall? Who was it that over the years contributed to its gradual crumbling, who scratched the mortar and pulled out brick by brick, who made the irst breaches in the wall? he point is not to take things literally, but to take such a look at the history of post-war Europe which would take into account those, who since the end of the War, had worked for the restoration of democracy across the continent as well as to east of the Oder and the Danube. Ultimately, the above is not just a political issue: for countries that have experienced communism, the version of Europe’s history in which they are only passive recipients of both the symbolic and the real fall of the wall dividing the German capital is neither politically beneicial or satisfactory. Last but not least, this version does not seem to be true either in a historical or moral dimension. Both the political and moral sphere associated with the memory of the anti-communist opposition lie outside the competence of a social researcher. However, the historical dimension is still there to be investigated. In particular, the question who?, how? and where? contributed to the collapse of communism in Europe should be answered. Without this vital resource, talking about the politics of memory is not possible at all. Valuable and interesting works on the experience of communism in par- ticular countries have been and are still being writen. In Poland and Lithu- ania - as well as in other countries, such research is almost always based on the assumption that societies were not passive elements of the communist 11 Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz system which collapsed only because of its own failure and the pressure of the international situation. However, both in the dimension of politics and memory, as well as in the ield of academic inquiry, the pursuit of compari- son, generalization and synthesis are justiied. In other words, on the plane of memory and politics, groups opposing communism should be seen not just as Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians or Hungarians, but rather as representatives of the history of the entire continent. One could research communism and its opposition in each of the former communist countries, but it is also worth trying to investigate communism in Europe as a uniied system. hus, it seems justiied to ask whether anti-communist dissent in diferent countries had some common, recognizable dynamics, whether it is possible to develop categories by which it can be described or whether any uniformity of phenomena and processes throughout the area where communism in Europe prevailed could be observed. herefore, an atempt should be made to go beyond the principle of research over communism, with a particular country, nation or society as the research unit. his volume, though it may not yet be called an atempt at creating such a comparison between Poland and Lithuania, has been prepared for those who would be interested in drawing such comparative research in the future. Our goal was to present interesting insights and areas of research which may be useful and valuable not only for studies of the anti-communist opposition in Poland or Lithuania, but also for similar research regarding other countries. We, of course, realize that the criterion of what is ‘interesting’ or ‘valuable’ may sometimes be burdened with a large dose of arbitrariness and subjectivity. his is both the weakness and the privilege of researchers or publishers who did not have many examples, models or previous works which they could relate to. In this context, irst of all, we deemed interesting all these approaches and interpretations which are not limited to the reconstructions of the facts, but whose authors atempt to use the tools developed in ields other than political 12  Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon history or explore less known or less recognized research areas. We hope that we were able to present the most successful atempts of such inquiries which are also possible to transfer to the grounds of the research of the experience of communism in other countries. We avoid presenting ‘classical’ works in this volume, but rather turn to those which present a fresh approach, also in terms of when they were writen. We were aiming at presenting interesting and daring insights as well as atempts at methodological studies concerning the struggle with communism in Poland and Lithuania, especially those which would not have analogies in the other country. In this way, we prepared a collection which includes articles writen by authors representing various disciplines, using diferent research methods and approaches. he fact that the authors and methods are so diverse makes classifying the works into chapters or dividing them into separate sections artiicial. hus, we decided to arrange the content as a whole in the alphabetic order, although there may be, and oten is, certain continuity or mutual refer- ences between some articles. Hence, the volume includes works of Lithuanian psychologists, Danutė Gail- ienė and Gražina Gudaitė. In Poland, it seems, the issue of communist experi- ence did not cause much interest among the representatives of this discipline. For the same reason, this volume contains the work of Michał Łuczewski. In a way atypical for academic discourse, but bold and original, the author atempts to connect categories drawn from philosophy, theology and political science in order to relect on Solidarity. So does Krzysztof Mazur, proposing a philo- sophical and ethical vision of Solidarity, however, using academic form and the methodology from the domain of history of ideas. In Lithuania, this kind of approach is rarely applied by researchers reconstructing the experience of communism. All three works of Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė as well as Aine Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė, though in diferent ways and in diferent dimensions, are atempts at reconstructing the experience of 13 Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz the anti-communist opposition using a classical sociological approach. hese authors have applied, respectively, the concept of social movements to describe the successive stages of the evolution of the Polish opposition and Solidarity, the category of civil society to interpret the atitudes of representatives of the democratic opposition in Lithuania and the analysis of the social networks to study the origins of the Lithuanian Sąjūdis. We have also selected a few articles that have been writen using the historical research methodology, but are not typical reconstructions of facts. he article by Marek Wierzbicki shows a late, decadent and ludic dimension of the anti-communist opposition in Poland which clearly does not correspond to its established visions and interpretations. Paweł Sowiński recreates the cultural reality of the People’s Republic in order to show in how many dimensions the oicial and unoicial worlds – including the world of conspiracy – permeated each other. he value of this text lies in the fact that it is a convincing atempt to study and reconstruct the way people in conspiracy functioned. In Lithuania, researchers are still searching for the right tools to study this segment of the country’s post-war history. Marcin Zaremba atempts to determine the ways in which the outbreak of Solidarity was possible to predict already in the late seventies. He names not only these widely known explanations – the economic downturn and the election of Car- dinal Wojtyła as Pope – but also includes data from surveys of public opinion, notes of the Security Service concerning local sentiment and local gossip, and even the impact of the exceptionally cold winters of the late seventies. As the Lithuanian authors in their text on the roots of Sąjūdis, Zaremba reconstructs these elements of social life, de-mystifying the birth of Solidarity, oten seen as absolutely unexpected, almost mysterious phenomenon. he articles of Jerzy Kochanowski and Regina Laukaitytė show how, respectively, the crossing of the state border was an atempt at broadening the scope of individual freedom and normalcy in the weakening totalitarian system both in the Polish and Lithuanian societies. Both authors have chosen quite diferent research areas – 14  Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon Kochanowski writes about illicit cross-border trade and Laukaitytė about the contacts of closed religious orders in Lithuania with their counterparts in the West. However, the subject mater of crossing the border, both in the practical and symbolic sense is essential when relecting on the struggle of individuals with totalitarianism. he article of Valdemaras Klumbys is devoted to this struggle: the Author, using the example of Lithuania, atempts to present the possible spectrum of individual atitudes towards the totalitarian state and identify which of them were in fact oppositional ones, and which may not be considered as such. his is an interesting atempt at taking the ‘botom-up’ perspective on the functioning of the system. he article by Dainius Žalimas is somewhat of a deviation from the chronological framework of this collection. However, we decided to include it because it is an interesting work, both from the point of view of the subject mater and methodology. he author is a lawyer who analyses the post-war anti-communist resistance in Lithuania from the point of view of international law. His main research focus is the opposition of the immediate post-war period, but we must remember that continuity with this period and its commemoration was one of the main ideological motives recalled by the Lithuanian opposition of the 1970s. We have deliberately refrained from presenting texts relating to the Stalinist period in this volume, mainly because collections of such texts already exist, 5 and historians of this period in both countries clearly prefer the political history methodology and cooperate in preparing publications, conferences and joint research in this ield. Our aim was to identify research areas where there were yet unused opportunities for exchanging ideas and experience. To present the scope of research that Polish and Lithuanian scientists have undertaken and the ways in which they understand the dissent against 5 Wojna po wojnie Antysowieckie podziemie w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1944- 1953, ed. G. Motyka et al. (Warszawa: IPN 2012); Opór wobec systemów totalitarnych na Wileńszczyźnie w okresie II wojny światowej, ed. P. Niwiński (Gdańsk: IPN, 2003). 15 Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz communism in its phase of stabilization, stagnation and weakening, one needs to specify the context of this research. It should be noted that the study of Polish and Lithuanian cases of communism – including the anti-communist opposition – have been conducted by domestic and foreign researchers before communism became a historical issue. In Poland, the discussions concerning communism ater 1956 went on constantly, and were conducted in touch with Polish émigrés and their works published in the West, which were relatively accessible for the academic elites. 6 Regarding the wider availability of publica- tions on recent history, the revolution of Solidarity was a breakthrough in this respect. It was accompanied by the development of independent publications, which on the one hand brought immense and lasting liberalization regarding state policy on scientiic research, on the other hand provided opportunities for readers to share knowledge of the past which had not been subject to censorship. History was the leading subject mater of the independent Polish publishing movement, and it is estimated that in the last decade of the communist period over 1500 books on the subject were published illegally. As a result, since the early 1980s, one may speak of the continuity of research on the recent history of Poland – although still without access to a number of sources and with limited possibilities of publication, but with opportunities to collaborate with Western researchers who became interested in the phenomenon of Solidarity. Achievements in the ield of social science research on Solidarity alone are vast. hey include hundreds of studies published in Polish, English and other languages. he impressive amount of source materials – especially when it comes to the post-Solidarity period in the history of Poland – could form the basis for research into anti-communist dissent in Poland. It is crucial that a large portion of these documents had been produced in the environment 6 A. Friszke, “Jerzego Giedroycia praca u podstaw (1956-1976),” in Przystosowanie i opór. Studia z dziejów PRL, ed. A. Friszke (Warszawa: Biblioteka “WIĘZI”, 2007), p. 202-225. 16  Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon of the opposition – these are, among others, illegal newspapers and magazines, lealets as well as the documentation produced by opposition groups (Solidarity, in particular), which issued oicial statements and announcements, prepared minutes of meetings as well as inancial documentationaccounts. Just as in other post-communist countries, documents produced by the Communist Party as well as those connected with the repression that the sys- tem exerted – personal iles, records and transcripts of wiretaps, interrogation reports and others – also retain their value as a source to study the anti-com- munist opposition, especially the one of the pre-Solidarity period. Additionally, public opinion polls which have been conducted in Poland since the 1970s may be regarded as a valid source of information, also in terms of research on the atitudes against the communist regime. Last but not least, a number of mate- rials were produced ater the year 1989. Numerous former opposition activists as well as authors associated with former communist authorities published hundreds of volumes of memoirs (in diferent genres) covering the communist period, and particularly its late stage. With regard to Lithuania in that period of time, one may speak about work writen by the emigrants of Lithuanian origin, mainly in the USA. 7 hese few works published in exile in English and/or Lithuanian could be located in the mainstream of Sovietological research of that time, where methodology was used primarily to cope with limited access and reliability of data concerning the analyzed, sovietized populations. hese days, source materials for studying the history of Lithuania under the rule of the Soviets – as well as the anti-Soviet resistance – are widely accessible to researchers. KGB documents are available on two websites, one of which contains information and descriptions in English 7 h. Remeikis, Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania 1945-1980 (Chicago: Institute of Lithuania Studies Press, 1980); Lithuania under the Soviets. Portrait of a Nation, 1940-1965, ed. V. S. Vardys (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); V.S. Vardys, he Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1978). 17 Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz (htp://www.kgbdocuments.eu , htp://www.kgbveikla.lt/ ); the documents themselves are mostly in Russian, less oten in Lithuanian. Several clandestine periodicals have been re-published in the last decade as well, in collections containing a set of all issues. 8 Some are available online. Diaries writen by important igures of the Lithuanian Catholic Church have also been published in full 9 or in parts. 10 hese texts of a personal and subjective nature are waiting to become the subject of research. However, the main source materials for the studying the anti-communist dissent are documents produced by Lithu- anian communist party and in the institutions associated with the apparatus of repression. hey are currently stored by Lithuanian Special Archives, he Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania and the Lithuanian Central State Archives. Paradoxically, the fall of communism did not – either in Poland or Lithua- nia – cause a wave of research on the life of societies under Soviet or Communist rule. In Poland, in the irst decade ater the fall of communism surprisingly few works on Polish communism and its opposition were writen. he experience of the communist era has oten been treated as a burden which is in fact use- less in the construction of a new democratic order, which did not encourage academics to devote speciic atention to the recent communist past. his atitude remained consistent with the views of this part of the political elite 8 Lietuvos Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika (Chicago, 1974-1997) and its electronic version at htp://www.lkbkronika.lt; Laisvės šauklys: 1976-1977 m. pogrindžio spaudos rinkinys, ed. A. Terleckas (Vilnius: Kultūros, meno ir mokslo rūmai, 2002); Perspektyvos: Lietuvos pogrindžio periodinis leidinys 1978-1981 metai, Vilnius, 2005, Rūpintojėlis : pilnas 1977- 1990 m. pogrindyje išleistų numerių (1-26) rinkinys; ed. B. A. Urbonaitė, (Kaunas: Judex, 2000). 9 J. Stankevičius, Mano gyvenimo kryžkelės. Atsiminimai (Vilnius: LKMA, 2002). 10 J. Zdebskis, Gyvenimas mąstymuose, Kunigas tarp vagių: iš kalėjimo dienoraščių (Vilnius: Lumen 1996). 18  Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon previously associated with the opposition, which managed to occupy leading positions in the irst years of transition. 11 Veterans themselves tried to ill this gap by publishing documents and memoirs which oten gave rise to wider academic studies. he beginning of the 21th century, however, brought a lively discussion on the importance of the past era of real socialism and its impact on the Polish present day, which resulted in a considerable revival of the interest the recent past. At the same time, many of the publications on recent history of the country were also a voice in the on-going political disputes about the present. Poland, compared with other post-communist countries, seems to be experiencing this phenomenon to the highest degree. Both dealing with the communist past and arguments regarding the role in its dismantling played by diferent fractions of the former opposition keep returning to the mainstream of political debate in Poland. It is those issues which delineate political divisions and prevent the creation of a lasting community of memory. hey also exert inluence upon the ways of commemorating the past, and, indirectly, on the way of conducting research. In both Poland and in Lithuania, the establishment of national institu- tions responsible for archiving and sharing the legacy of this period have be- come a positive impulse for research on communist dissent. he Institute of National Remembrance (1998) and the he Genocide and Resistance Re- search Centre of Lithuania (1992) provided both respective countries with the infrastructure necessary to ensure proper preservation and accessibility of the archival sources which proved essential for scholars studying communist past. he above institutions have also been provided with inancial and other resources which enabled them to undertake large scale research in this area. However, probably due to other functions they perform, both institutions prefer 11 Z. Krasnodębski, Demokracja peryferii (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2005); P. Śpiewak, Pamięć po komunizmie (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2005). 19 Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz conducting studies in political history or the publication of source materials. Although methodological innovation is not the aim of the research undertaken in these centers, their role in the collection and presentation of data and source materials remains important. In Poland at the time of the fall of communism, there was a widespread awareness of gaps in the history of crimes commited by the communist regime. For Lithuania, the late eighties and early nineties brought not only democra- cy and the dreamt-of independence, but were also a time of recovering the memory of the victims of the communist regime and their massive commem- orations. his fact, however, did not cause an increased interest of historians in the situation of the Sovietized Lithuanian society and the experience of its inhabitants. he origin of the Sąjūdis Lithuanian movement at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s shows much similarity to the birth of Solidarity in Poland, where a lot of emphasis was put on the open discussion about the past and the recovery of its themes and facts appropriated by the communist government. his situation had a signiicant inluence on the Lithuanian historiography of the Soviet period: in the mainstream of commemoration and remembrance the image of the Lithuanian nation – an innocent victim of the Soviets – was formed. Such a perception of post-war history and the desire to recover the memory of the victims of repressions and guerrilla war encouraged research- ers to explore the newly opened archives and reconstruct the most dramatic moments of the past. hus, in the irst decade of independence a dispropor- tionately large number of studies devoted to the Stalinist period were created, and much less atention of researchers was devoted to later periods of time. here was also a public demand for some kind of a ‘catalogue of losses,’ which would determine how many people were killed, how many were exiled, how many repressed and in what way. Researchers of the recent past oten regarded responding to this demand as their primary task. Producing reconstructions of the actual facts seemed the best way to answer this demand. 20  Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon Long-term factors also added to this narrowness of methodology during the irst years of Lithuanian independence. It would not be an exaggeration to say that during the Soviet rule in Lithuania its historiography had no chance to develop. he barriers which it crashed against were most successfully over- come by medievalists. Historians researching recent times were, for political reasons, forced to work using the criteria and vocabulary which were more reminiscent of propaganda than of methods usually employed by scholars. As a result, historians had to learn new research methods allowing for gathering knowledge other than a simple reconstruction of facts or statistics. Research skills were particularly important in studying post-Stalinist era, as archival documents of that period no longer more relect that dramatic, sharp conlict between the Communist regime and its opponents characteristic of 1940s. Nevertheless, even a decade ater gaining independence, reading archival resources was – and it still is – conductive to fascinating and fruitful research. his fact is understandable, taking into consideration that it was preceded by ity years of hardly any access to source materials. Ater more than a decade, the history told only by archival materials was no longer enough for historians, especially young ones, who could not rely on their own recollections of the communist period. hey perceived the 1960s, 70s and 80s as history, and not a part of their own biographies, and for this reason the theoretical background was indispensable in order to research these periods of time. It turned out that both the Sovietological works writen in the West in 1970s and 1980s as well as interdisciplinary studies – that is, using the psychological, ethnographic or sociological approach – could be very helpful in this respect. Undertaking research topics other than unequal confrontation between a society and a foreign power – such as everyday life, the functioning of Soviet nomenclature or the informal activities of the intelligentsia – also required an extended, more complex methodology. he resulting work was not at all consistent with the image of a society which was only a passive victim 21 Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz of an imposed system. In this way, diferences in research interests began to overlap with a generation gap and to some extent also the variety of interpre- tations proposed by particular researchers. In the decade ater the fall of the Soviet Union it brought – to some extent as in Poland – a revival of interest in the post-war history of the country among the representatives of humanities. In this volume, we are presenting selected works that have been created within the above trend. his volume is also an atempt at responding to this interest. We are seeking to reach the widest possible audience of potential readers, but at the same time we hope, that we will be able – at least to some extent – to create the missing link in mutual Lithuanian-Polish interests. Poles and Lithuanians, especially academic circles, have for years been exchanging experiences, opinions and knowledge of history of mutual relations, especially from the periods when the history of the two nations could be perceived as common. Both countries passionately argue about the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, when the heritage they once shared was to be divided. Perhaps the discussion of what Lithuanians and Poles experienced in the second half of the 20th century quite separately, but simultaneously and in similar way, could prove to be interesting and fruitful for both parties? Translated by Anna Sekułowicz 22  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath Danutė Gailienė Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath On June 15, 1940, on Stalin’s ultimate command, the Red Army entered the territory of Lithuania. he irst Soviet occupation of Lithuania and the irst wave of ‘red terror’ began. he order for the destruction of groups of residents of the annexed countries signed by Lavrenty Beria, the USSR People’s Com- missar for Internal Afairs, on October 11, 1939 took efect. 1 Traumatic History From that point onwards, the history of Lithuania does not keep to the usual criteria of periodisation, the internal processes of political, economic and cultural transformation, but is divided into periods according to changes of the occupying forces: 1940 to 1941 is deined as the irst Soviet occupation, 1941 to 1944 as the period of the Nazi occupation, and 1944 to 1990 as the second Soviet occupation. 2 During these interchanging occupations that Lithuania lost about 33 per cent of its population. Between 1940 and 1953 – 1,2 million Lithuanian citizens were deported, sentenced to death, imprisoned, killed for political reasons, or 1 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais (Vilnius: Mintis, 1996). 2 D. Kuodytė, “Traumatizing history,” in he Psychology of Extreme Traumatisation: he Atermath of Political Repression, ed. D. Gailienė (Vilnius: Akreta, 2005), p. 16. 23 Danutė Gailienė were made to emigrate. Hundreds of thousands of people experienced unbear- able sufering, losses of their family members, and long years of humiliation, persecution, and torture. It is impossible to describe and name their entire traumatic experience with precision. he extended traumatisation encom- passed physical, psychological and moral injuries. he irst Soviet occupation started with mass arrests, searches for ‘enemies of the people,’ and compilations of lists of ‘anti-Soviet elements.’ All the citizens of Lithuania who were politically and publicly active in independent Lithuania were declared enemies of the occupation regime. On July 17, 1940 the Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania Antanas Merkys and the Minister of Foreign Afairs Juozas Urbšys were arrested and sent to prisons of the Soviet Union. Members of political parties, heads of public organizations, editors of banned newspapers, the former ministers, Polish oicers, Jews (Trotskyist) and many others were imprisoned in Lithuania. he majority of them were shot dead or tortured to death in the Gulag concentration camps. he irst mass deportation of the residents of Lithuania to Siberia and northern regions of the USSR began on the night of June 14, 1941. According to the lists of the ‘anti-Soviet elements’ and their family members compiled in advance, and thoroughly prepared plans of repression, the operative groups that carried out deportations assisted by local collaborators (the so-called most active Soviet and Party members) suddenly arrested families of the ‘enemies of the people’ and transported them in trucks to the loading station. hey were crammed into windowless catle trucks guarded by Red Army soldiers. Within some days the catle trucks were illed with deportees and a long journey to the east started. A distinctive feature of the irst deportations was that men were suddenly separated from their families at the railway station and were transported to the camps in other freight cars. During those days in June about twenty thousand residents of Lithuania – among them teachers, professors, students, priests, farmers, members of public organizations, as well as war 24  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath refugees from Poland (Poles and Polish Jews) – were deported to the remotest and most desolate parts of the USSR. he lists of deportees are simply shock- ing – almost every decent individual was a potential enemy of the regime, as nearly every activity in independent Lithuania could be regarded as criminal by the occupiers. Forty per cent of the deportees were children under sixteen years of age. he majority of victims of these repressions were killed or died. Only one-tenth of the initial prisoners returned to Lithuania. 3 he war that broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union put an end to the deportations. he Red Army, when withdrawing from Lithuania, continued carrying out especially brutal criminal operations and murdered political prisoners (for example, in Rainiai, Pravieniškės and other places). he last week was the ‘most horrible week of the Soviet occupation. Having let 1 100 murdered residents of Lithuania (not including partisans) occupiers of one occupation replaced the other. he ideology of terror changed but the destruction of the inhabitants of Lithuania continued.’ 4 he illusions that people in Lithuania, as well as in Latvia and Estonia, cherished about the Na- zis recognizing the independent Baltic States were soon shatered. he Nazi repressions started. Jewish people sufered most during the 1941-1944 Nazi occupation. As in all occupied countries, the Nazis in Lithuania carried out the Holocaust policy with the help of local collaborators. Jews were killed, driven into ghetos from where they were transported to the Stuthof, Dachau, Auschwitz, and Kaufer- ing concentration camps, or were simply murdered en masse as the ghetos were being liquidated. According to various data presented by historians, as many as 160-200 thousand Lithuanian Jews were killed, the greatest part of the 3 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais (Vilnius: Mintis, 1996). 4 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais, p. 133. 25 Danutė Gailienė Jewish community that resided there. Only a few of them managed to evade repressions, either by good fortune or with the help of other people. Some of them managed to cross into the Soviet Union at the beginning of the war. he Soviet regime was not favorable to those who managed to survive in the Nazi concentration camps either. To endure hunger, humiliation, physical and spiritual sufering and survive was not everything. he country did not welcome its sons and daughters who had gone through terrible sufering with open arms. Half-dead, emaciated people were driven into iltration camps – Soviet ones; it was necessary to ascertain if they had not fallen into disrepute ‘while collaborating’ with the Nazis. If they were not sent to the gulag (though sometimes they were), their rights were restricted. he present author had the opportunity to meet the people who had tried to remove the branded camp numbers by themselves with the help of home-made means because they were afraid to seek medi- cal atention, they tried to hide their past life in the camps. 5 As the German army was withdrawing from Lithuania and the Red Army was approaching people ran together with the Germans to the west because they knew what was in store for them, having experienced the irst Soviet occupation and the terrors of repression. his was a wave of forced emigration. Ten thousands of Lithuanian people found themselves in the camps of displaced people set up in West Germany. In the summer of 1944 Lithuania was once again occupied by the Soviet army. An occupation of almost ity years began. Killings, terror, mass arrests and deportations to Siberia and other eastern regions of the USSR began anew. his time the residents of Lithuania resisted sovietization more vigorously: they evaded mobilization of the Red Army and waged organized guerrilla warfare 5 D. Epšteinaitė, Su adata širdyje: getų ir koncentracijos stovyklų kalinių atsiminimai (Vilnius: Garnelis, 2003), p. 18. 26  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath against the Soviet Union. Partisans, their supporters and those who tried to evade service in the Red Army constituted the majority of the people arrested and deported between 1945 and 1947. More than twenty thousand partisans perished. It was quite oten that disigured and deiled bodies of the killed partisans were let lying in the town squares to intimidate the inhabitants and to disclose the family members of the dead, as members of the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Afairs) watched who approached the bodies or who wept for them. Unable to endure this torture, many mothers lost their minds. Members of the partisan families were arrested and deported. he guerrilla warfare continued until 1953. Its last participant who refused to surrender shot himself in 1965. he largest deportation from Lithuania took place on May 22-23, 1948. Over these two days more than forty thousand people were arrested. his time prosperous Lithuanian farmers called kulaks, many of whom were supporters of the partisans, constituted the largest part of the deported individuals. he Soviets also began the process of collectivization, the campaign to create col- lective farms. he farmers’ property was coniscated, and some were driven into collective farms, but most oten they were deported. he most horrible repressions continued until Stalin’s death in 1953. Ater that, especially ater 1956, the regime began to soten somewhat. The Trauma of Return Many Soviet and Nazi concentration camps survivors could not return home for a long time ater their imprisonment had come to an end, or they did not return at all. Some of them were simply forbidden to do so. hose who man- aged had to overcome enormous obstacles and faced political persecution. ‘I returned to Kaunas in August of 1945. he authorities were not favorably disposed towards those who had returned from the German concentration 27 Danutė Gailienė camps, and restricted their rights. We, former inmates of the concentration camps, were second rate citizens.’ 6 Stalin’s death in 1953 and prisoner uprisings in the camps precipitated a wave of ‘liberalization’ in the camps. 7 Some of the prisoners were ‘released’, although this did not mean that they could go home. At irst the ‘liberated inmates’ were allowed to live only in certain territories, and later, ater this restriction had been abolished, political prisoners and deportees were prevented from returning to Lithuania in every possible way. It seems that the Soviet authori- ties understood that would be impossible to reform the repressed ‘anti-Soviet elements’ and turn them into Soviet citizens. herefore they did not plan to allow them to ever return to Lithuania. What Nikita Khruschev did was sheer folly favorable to the oppressed only. He created dissidents himself, who later had to be persecuted even by his suc- cessors. Even Khruschev had to impose certain restrictions on education and employment of the released individuals so that they could not acquire greater inluence and would not destroy the society created by Lenin and Stalin. 8 he magnitude of the desire to return to the Motherland was incredible. In 1956-1957 […] ater more deportees had been released the thing that the KGB men feared most happened: the former deportees abandoned every- thing and headed for their Motherland. As much as 85 per cent of the released deportees let Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Molotov, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Chita and Buryat-Mongolian regions. Trying to put a stop to this low the local MVD divisions did not let go even the ‘liberated’ deportees. he later were detained for ive days, kept under ‘administrative arrest.’ Conditionally free children of the deportees were not allowed to leave either. Nonetheless, people let Siberia 6 D. Epšteinaitė, Su adata širdyje: getų ir koncentracijos stovyklų kalinių atsiminimai, p. 102. 7 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais. 8 B. Gailius, Partizanai tada ir šiandien (Vilnius: Versus Aureus, 2006), p. 191. 28  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath all the same – without passports and documents certifying that they had been released, having sold all their property acquired in deportation. 9 he puppet Communist Party of Lithuania began to fear the returning political prisoners. In 1956, the First Secretary of the Central Commitee of the Lithuanian Communist Party Antanas Sniečkus asked the Central Commitee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to ban the returning deportees from setling in Lithuania and the neighboring territories. he number of KGB agents was increased. In 1957 the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR Justas Paleckis signed a decree banning some former prisoners from returning to Lithuania. hose who disobeyed it were punished with ive years of deportation. For this reason the number of the former political prisoners from Lithuania increased in Latvia and the Kalin- ingrad region. 10 During the Soviet period the repressed individuals were discriminated against in one way or another and were subject to a great deal of injustice and humiliation. Some of them even returned to their places of deportation. ‘We arrived in Lithuania in 1958. However, the Chairman of the district Coun- cil, a Russian, having accused us of seeking for an easier life, did not accept us, did not give us residence permit in Lithuania. We were let on the street with small children. So we had to go back to Siberia.’ (K.L., a former deportee) Only 7 per cent of the 1 500 repressed people who were interviewed speciied that they were received well upon returning to Lithuania. 11 All of the others encountered all kinds of diiculties. he property of the majority of them had been coniscated and not returned. heir houses had been taken away from them 9 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais, p. 394-396. 10 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais. 11 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Po penkiasdešimties metų: sovietinių represijų Lietuvoje psichologiniai padariniai ir įveikos būdai,” p. 78-126. 29 Danutė Gailienė and strangers were living in them. It was especially diicult to obtain a residence permit, a passport and become employed. he KGB watched every move of the political prisoners and deportees, questioned their neighbors, carried out frequent searches of their homes, interrogated, threatened and atempted to recruit them. hose people had to conceal their past and the traumas they had experienced even from their children: ‘…we were afraid that the children, having found out the truth from their parents should not oppose openly the atheistic Communist injustice and do harm to themselves.’ 12 hus, parents became dangerous to their children, and vice versa. Alienation and isolation were oten a threat even within the family. Family Drama he family lost its most important powers under the Soviet regime. From the moral-psychological point of view not a single Lithuanian family could live well in the Soviet period. he family is the primary institution in ensuring the safe development of personality and socialization in an individual. It hands down traditions and values of the family, forms the convictions of a child, and determines the standards of communal life. Later it becomes necessary for other public institutions – the school, the media, and religious communities – to become engaged in the socialization process of a personality. In healthy societies both the family and the state are interested in achieving as much harmony between the family institution and public institutions as possible. he totalitarian state deprived the family of its major function. First of all, it tried to belitle the role of the family on the whole. 13 Soviet individuals had to 12 S. Večerskytė-Daukšienė, Gyvenimas yra ne žodžiai. Juodųjų dienų sakmės (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2001), p. 371-407. 13 Prijaukintos kasdienybės, 1945-1970 metai: biograiniai Lietuvos moterų interviu, ed. D. Marcinkevičienė (Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2007). 30  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath put the welfare of his working team, and of society, above their own personal interests. he development and formation of a personality was in the hands of the state as well. For that purpose it had an ideological system of education and the mass media, it controlled youth organizations, and on the whole it had total control of all spheres of human life. Memories or values of the families that were disloyal to the system could pose a serious threat to their members. Also, members of the family could be dangerous to one another. Parents were afraid to express their opinion openly in the presence of their children lest the later should breathe a word about it at school or in some other public place. In their turn the parents sufered for their children’s ‘anti-Soviet’ actions or uterances. In this sense, the life of all Lithuanian families was not peaceful. For a family to avoid conlict with the state system, to remain loyal to it, adapt itself to it and even collaborate with it, it had to bring up its children in an atmosphere of lies. he family acquiesced to Soviet propaganda and told its children the same ictitious story of the family and the country as their school and all other public institutions did. hat, or on the whole the parents did not tell the chil- dren anything, leaving everything to the state and by their example showed obedience to the system. Some families defended their identity and sought to preserve their values by isolating themselves from the state as much as they could. In other families the parents dissociated from the families themselves – they did not demonstrate their feelings or express their opinions, which were at variance with the norms of public propaganda. In this way the parents sought to protect their family and their children from unpleasant consequences. Such experience, however, was restricting and disruptive for the children as well. hey did not learn to perceive their own feelings and feelings of other people, to form and express their ideas, which, in turn, prevented them from taking over their parents’ values and feeling part of the family. If a family was disloyal inside, and was conformist outside, it handed the model of duality down to their children. 31 Danutė Gailienė he children learned at an early age that they had to think one thing and say another and behave accordingly. hey heard one thing at home and a diferent thing at school and in public. Hence, there was not a single family who could smoothly, harmoniously bring up and educate their children. he totalitarian state is usually more powerful than the family. Research carried out at Harvard into the former citizens of the Soviet Union of two generations showed that very oten a family lost the batle with the state and was unable to resist ideological indoctrination of their youth. 14 However, sometimes it did resist. he young Latvian historian Edvin Snore, who shot the famous documentary ilm he Soviet Story, characterized his socialization experience as follows: When I was a child, my grandmother used to tell me a lot about the war and deportation. She had seen all that with her own eyes, and I could listen to her stories for hours. hat was as if the irst stimulus to take interest in these things, and when I was a pre-pioneer and a pioneer I received quite opposite information. Russian war veterans were invited to school to tell us their stories, which were absolutely diferent from those I heard about the Russian and German occupa- tions from my grandmother. It was diicult to choose whom to believe but I put trust in my grandmother. 15 Now, almost twenty years ater our liberation from the totalitarian system, we clearly see how grave and long-lasting its damaging consequences actually 14 K. Geiger, “Changing Political Atitudes in Totalitarian Society: A Case Study of the Role of the Family,” World Politics 8 (1956) 2, p. 187-205. 15 lrytas.lt, 11 October 2008. 32  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath are. Today the indicators of the spiritual health of society are overwhelmingly negative. Also, it is already clear today that it is easier to ensure the economic rather than psychological development of the country and that these processes do not run in parallel. ‘Arrested Mourning’ ‘Grief work’ (Trauerarbeit) as Freud named it, is a gradual overcoming of grief over the loss and parting with a lost person. Ater the death of a loved one grief usually lasts for quite a long time. here are deep traditions established in every culture of accepting death and parting with the departed, which are an important part of every process of mourning. Funeral rites and prayers for the dead carried out together with one’s own family members, the burial place and visiting it is the right of each mourner and a psychological, as well as a moral, necessity. he organizers of repressions, however, deprived many people of this right. In 2001, two famous researchers in the area of psychological traumas from the United States, Jacob D. Lindy and Robert J.Liton, published the book Beyond Invisible Walls: he Psychological Legacy of Soviet Trauma, Eastern European herapists and heir Patients. On the basis of the stories of psychotherapists from six former countries of the communist bloc they tried to describe the scale and contents of Soviet traumatisation, its efect on the lives of the families and separate individuals. ‘Both grief and mourning were arrested!’ 16 his is how the authors characterized the fact of the Soviet reality, pointing out that the families and family members of the people who perished due to repressions had no possibility to say a proper farewell to them, to bury them and mourn for them. he killed were oten buried in mass graves. heir 16 J. D. Lindy, R. J. Liton, Beyond Invisible Walls: he Psychological Legacy of Soviet Trauma, Eastern European herapists and heir Patients, (New York: Brunner-Rutledge, 2001), p. 24. 33 Danutė Gailienė graves and places of killing were unknown, religious rites were prohibited from being performed, and even atempts to enquire about the victims or ind them were dangerous. Mutilated bodies of the partisans let in the town squares of Lithuania ‘to be recognized’, and actually let for humiliation and intimidation, are perhaps the most obvious public symbol of the second Soviet occupation. One could neither say his last farewell, nor bemoan or bury them. To approach their bodies meant to sign a verdict on oneself. Bodies were dumped in a refuse disposal pits, or gravel pits, bogs, or wells, or were buried near the NKVD headquarters in secret. he family members of many of them still do not know to the present day where their loved ones are buried. Some of them know who could tell them, because the executors and organizers of those executions are still alive, but the later are stubbornly silent: ‘surely there are still some employees of the MGB bodies and stryibki [destruction batalions] alive who know about the burial places of partisans very well. hey receive pensions from Moscow and have sworn to tell nobody anything. And they say nothing.’ 17 he families of the people whose places of imprisonment or death are unknown will nev- er have graves of their loved ones – of a part of the prisoners deported from Lithuania and men separated from their families in 1941, as well as of many of the dead buried in mass graves, burned in crematoriums, washed away into the northern seas. When the last deportees were taken to other places to ish in 1949 waves had started washing away the edge of the brotherly grave and it started falling apart. here is no doubt whatsoever that all the bodies were washed away by 17 A. Musteikis, “J. Lukšos-Daumanto palaikų paieškos.“ Lietuvos žinios, 2008. 07.08, p. 14-15. 34  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath the waves a long time ago. What seas and oceans are they crossing in their search of the way to their Motherland? 18 People were afraid of such an ater-death fate that they had witnessed be- falling others: ‘A seventy-year-old Marcinkevičius, feeling death approaching, said the following: ‘Abromaitiene, my daughter, bury me somehow so that dogs and white foxes should not pull my bones around…’ 19 During the Soviet period monuments and memorials to the people killed in the so-called Great Patriotic War were erected but an absolute silence en- veloped the victims of repressions. Even the Holocaust victims were not iden- tiied, as the murdered people were referred to only as ‘Soviet citizens.’ Up until 1990 the names of the Jewish victims were not mentioned at any killing site or in any inscription. 20 Jewish cemeteries were destroyed in silence, and their monuments and tombstones were removed (for example, in Vilnius they were used to build the stairs up the Trade Union Palace hill). Nobody knew about mass burial sites, which, as it turns out, were, and still are (as they are still being searched for) quite at hand. It was only in 1994 that the Tuskulėnai mass burial site was discovered in the very centre of Vilnius. More than seven hundred ‘enemies of the people’ secretly killed in the prison of the Vilnius NKVD (MGB) between 1944 and 1947 were buried in the territory of the former estate. During the entire Soviet period the KGB securely guarded and carefully concealed the location. 21 Now this burial site has been investigated thoroughly and a memorial has been erected there. 18 D. Grinkevičiūtė, “Lietuviai prie Laptevų jūros,” in Lietuviai Arktyje, ed. J. Markauskas, J. R. Puodžius (Kaunas: Naujasis LANAS, 2008), p. 32. 19 D. Grinkevičiūtė, “Lietuviai prie Laptevų jūros,” p. 26. 20 D. Kuodytė, “Traumatizing history,” p. 13-25. 21 S. Vaitiekus, Tuskulėnai: egzekucijų aukos ir budeliai (1944-1947) (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2006). 35 Danutė Gailienė he fall of the Soviet Union put an end to some people’s mourning. Society publicly recognized the historical truth, identiied the victims and paid hom- age to them, and took pains to restore justice. What took place in Lithuania in 1989 is the most impressive proof of how strong and long-lasting was the feeling of mourning, over parting that had never taken place, and how strong is the need to have the graves of one’s family members in the homeland. When the period of perestroika started, many people took part in the expeditions to Siberia and other places of deportation to bring back the remains of their family members to Lithuania. ‘Lithuanians are bringing back the remains of their deported fathers, mothers, sons and daughters from Siberia, from bare islands of the Laptev Sea, from all former gulags. his is the irst action of the policy of the nation.’ 22 Coins draped in Lithuanian lags were inally buried in the homeland. hen tombstones with three, rather than the usual two, dates – the date of birth, the date of death and the date of reburial in Lithuania – appeared in many cemeteries of Lithuania. People did not refer to that process as reburial, but as bringing back. ‘Going to Siberia was like a real parting with the remote land. I brought back that which did not belong to the land of Siberia. I returned feeling at ease as now I have nothing let there.’ (A.J., a former deportee) However, very many people in Lithuania will never experience anything like that, as they do not know where their family members are buried. Everyone is looking for their own way of saying even a symbolic farewell, of ending the process of mourning. Remembrance crosses are put up, hills of remembrance and pain, symbolic graves are built, and family masses are celebrated. 22 P. Dirgėla, Tranų pasaulyje (Vilnius: Lituanus, 1989), p. 75. 36  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath The Occupied Ones he universal terror that started with the irst occupation was, of course, in- tended not only for separate groups of ‘unreliable people’ but also for the entire society. It sought to isolate and destroy some people and to intimidate and break others, to make them loyal to the occupying regime and susceptible to totalitarian management and re-education. he society was becoming passive and demoralized. Painful views of the occupied land reveal themselves in the diary writen by the partisan leader of Dainava district Baliukevičius-Dzūkas in 1948-1949: […] overwhelming poverty! Not a ray of hope for a more beautiful life. he only entertainment is drinking samogon – (home-made vodka – D.G.) oten followed by a drunken brawl. he village is completely overlown by samogon. It is brewed and drunk by ev- eryone, even children. Drowned in a sea of blood, tears and black despair, the nation seems to have found its only solace and temporary comfort in samogon. How many idiots, criminals, degenerates, embezzlers, pros- titutes and morons will these goddamned years bring to Lithuania? Some say that the years of the Bolshevik occupation and ighting will make the nation stronger. What remains will be steel, they say. Perhaps some will remain, strong as steel, melted and tempered in this struggle. But there will be few of them. hese are dammed years for Lithuania! 23 23 L. Baliukevičius, Partizano Dzūko dienoraštis (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2002), p. 112. 37 Danutė Gailienė hose who remained to live in Lithuania sufered the consequences of nationalization, collectivization, and the so-called ‘iron curtain’ and its iso- lation from the free world. Freedom of thought and freedom of expression and convictions were strictly controlled. People were intimidated. It became common for many to lead a ‘double life,’ where what is shown and declared is diferent from what is thought and felt. Some people sufered from it badly and tried to oppose it, whereas others gradually adapted themselves to it and in the long run stopped feeling any discomfort as a result of such an abnormal life. In carrying out research into the consequences of traumatisation of the individuals who experienced Soviet and Nazi repressions, a control group was chosen. It consisted of individuals of the same age as those who were repressed, but who had no oicial status of victim and were chosen at random from the Lithuanian Population Register, although they had also felt the atermath of the occupation regime. Even though they had not sufered from political repression directly, one-quarter of them indicated that they had lost family members due to political repression, and one-third of the interviewed individ- uals said they were unable to achieve their professional and scientiic aims. 24 hus, the occupation regime that lasted in Lithuania for decades afected all its inhabitants in one way or another – both those who were directly repressed and those who ostensibly did not sufer from it. herefore it is necessary to carry out thorough scientiic investigations in order to enable the efects of this long-term and complicated traumatisation of the people and society to be evaluated. From the point of view of psychology of traumas, the experience of the people residing in Lithuania and in other former republics of the Soviet Union is very interesting because people who had gone through the most severe traumas – political repression – were forced 24 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Po penkiasdešimties metų: sovietinių represijų Lietuvoje psichologiniai padariniai ir įveikos būdai,” in Sunkių traumų psichologija, ed. D. Gailienė (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2004). 38  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath to conceal their past for a long time, and the entire society experienced the systematic efects of a totalitarian regime lasting for ive decades. Taking all this into consideration, in 2000 systematic investigations into the efects of the occupying regimes on families and society were launched. In 2013, a new stage of investigations was begun, which not only delved into assessing the direct atermaths of traumatisation but also raised much broader issues: what are the efects(following the restoration of independence) of his- torical traumas and social transformations on various age and ethnic groups, and on groups of society which have undergone speciic traumatic experiences, such as people who sufered from January 13, 1991 massacre, liquidators of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, those who atempted suicide, and family members of suicide victims. Effects of Traumatic Experiences Investigations into the efects of political repression are diicult to carry out as it is almost always the case that such investigations become possible only ater signiicant political transformations have taken place and the repressive regime has collapsed. (It is true, however, that investigations are sometimes carried out in rehabilitation centers for political refugees). Until the trauma- tizing process is over, it is impossible to give any assessment of the traumatic experience itself. he number of investigations into the atermaths of Communist repressions is not very large. First of all, it is related to a political problem – the recognition of communist crimes. Ater the communist system had collapsed, unlike the Nazi system it was not recognized in the western world as a criminal system. 25 Investigations into totalitarianism as a phenomenon that were commenced ater 25 e.g. H. Olschowsky, “Der weiße Fleck.” Der Tagesspiegel, 18, August 2013. 39 Danutė Gailienė the Second World War thus far have been suppressed by political debates about the unique or universal nature of the criminal regimes. herefore, atention to the atermaths brought about by the communist regime, which manifests itself in the number of scientiic investigations (apart from other features) is disproportionally small. Actually, only individual studies can be found and almost no systematic investigations are being carried out. In the meanwhile the scale of the problem is enormous. Millions of people had fallen victim to Soviet and Nazi terror. he occupation regimes lasted for decades and also afected, and continue to afect, millions of people. It is very important to understand in what ways it afected not only individual persons but also entire societies. Effects on Public Health Specialists agree that one of the most important indicators of the psychological health of a country is the index of suicides. High suicide rates show that there is plenty of psychological pain and distress but very few resources and adequate help to overcome them. Hence, a dynamics of Lithuanian suicide rates could be read as a peculiar history of a change in our spiritual condition (Fig. 1). 40  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath Fig. 1. Suicide rates (per 100 000) by gender in Lithuania between 1930 and 1940 and between 1960 and 2010 41 Danutė Gailienė As we can see (Fig.1), during the past 80 years the Lithuanian suicide rate has been subject to great changes. he pre-war Lithuanian suicide rate, like that in Poland was low. 26 During the period between 1924 and 1939 the mean was 8,1 per 100 thousand. Indices of some other European countries (Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland) were 5-6 times higher at that time. 27 he suicide rate of males was up to two times higher than that of females. During the Soviet occupation the number of suicides in Lithuania was constantly on the increase. Between 1930 and 1939 about 200 suicides were commited in Lithuania every year; in 1962 as many as 450 suicides were re- gistered; in 1970 this igure had risen to 787, and in 1984 it amounted to 1274 suicides. During the period between 1970 and 1984, the suicide rate increased by 44,6 per cent in Lithuania. When perestroika began in the Soviet Union the number of suicides dropped to 25/100 000. During the period between 1984 and 1989 the number of suicides decreased by 34,5 per cent throughout the Soviet Union – from 5,3 per cent in Armenia to 37,9 per cent in Belarus. 28 Such a strong preventative efect of perestroika arouses great interest among specialists. No other similar case has been known in the world when the number of suicides has decreased so dramatically over such a short period of time. At- tempts are being made to ind out what important factors determined this. Some authors 29 think that the most important factor was Gorbachev’s Anti-Alcohol 26 D. Gailienė, “Samobójstwa na Litwie i w Polsce: potwierdzenie hipotezy weselszego baraku,” Nowinki Psychiatryczne 55 (2004), p. 86-87. 27 A. Kelnik, “Samoubijstva v Estonii,” Papers by Tartu University, 859 (1989), p. 64-85; D. Gailienė, “Suicide in Lithuania during the Years 1990 to 2002,” Archives of Suicide Research 8 (2004), p. 389-395. 28 A. Värnik, Suicide in the Baltic Countries and in the Former Republics of the USSR (Stockholm: Gotab, 1997). 29 D. Wasserman, E. Värnik, G. Eklund, “Male suicides and alcohol consumption in the former USSR,“ Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 89 (1994), p. 306-313. 42  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath Campaign. Other investigations, however, do not conirm that. For example, in Latvia, ‘a relational trend between the male suicide rate and the alcohol psychosis rate during the years 1980-1998 shows that the restrictive alcohol policy was an important factor, but not the only major factor contributing to this phenomenon.’ 30 In the opinion of the present authors, psychological factors played a very signiicant role. Besides, processes of democratization that started in the Soviet Union determined a decrease in the suicide rates in other countries of the former Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe even though no anti-alcohol campaigns were launched there. It is obvious that democratiza- tion, along with the mood of hope and optimism it evoked in the society, also had a great impact. Between 1987 and 1991 the suicide rate was relatively low and from 1991 it began to increase again (Fig. 1). Similar processes took place in Latvia and Estonia. From 1990 to 1996 the death rate from suicides increased by 82,4 per cent in Lithuania. In 1996, the suicide rate reached almost 47 per 100 000 and became the highest in the world. According to this index, Hungary had shown the highest rate in the world for many years. As can be seen (Fig. 2), tendencies in suicide occurrence are similar to those in Lithuania. Ater the suppressed uprising in Hungary in 1956, the number of suicides there was constantly on the increase. he suicide rate peaked in the 1980s, and with the beginning of democratization it began to decrease systematically and has thus far not increased. 30 E. Rancans, E. Salander-Renberg, L. Jacobsson, “Major demographic, social and economic factors associated to suicide rates in Latvia 1980-98,” Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 103 (2001), p. 279. 43 Danutė Gailienė Fig. 2. Suicide rates (per 100 000) in Lithuania and Hungary between 1956 and 1997 In the meanwhile it was harder for Lithuania, as with the other Baltic States, to accept the radical reforms that were carried out following the restoration of independence, which shows once again that the psychological situation in the former Soviet republics was more diicult than that in the many satellite socialist states referred to as the Warsaw Pact countries. he problem of an unusual occurrence of suicides in Lithuania is related to the experienced historical traumas. As can be seen from other indices, males appeared to be afected by psychological distress more severely, as luctuations in their suicide rates were much more closely related to all of the political changes (Fig. 1). Females turned out to be beter adapted. Today men commit suicides six times more oten in Lithuania than women do, and up to 8-10 times more 44  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath oten in youth and middle age. his has afected the country greatly. Since the pre-war years the rate of suicides in the Lithuanian countryside has increased 9-10 times, whereas in cities suicide rates have decreased (between 1970 and 1980, the number of suicides in the country increased by 75 per cent whereas in urban areas this igure stood at 20 per cent). he countryside sufered from the communist regime most because forced collectivization and the almost complete destruction of private property undermined the foundations of the existence of rural citizen. It ruptured the traditional relations between the community and the family, encouraged alcoholism, and drew people into a state of deep frustration. Furthermore, during the Soviet period the countryside was again impoverished psychologically when collective farmers tried to send their children to town where they hoped they would have beter opportunities. Suicides are widespread in the country today as well. Rural men commit suicide twice as oten as men in cities, and women take their own lives only 1.4 times more oten. Since 2003 the number of suicides has begun to decrease, and now the suicide rate amounts to about 30/100 000. Effects on the Repressed At the present time more than ity thousand people who have been recognized as victims-according to the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Legal Status of Victims of the 1939-1990 Occupations – reside in Lithuania. he fact that the status of a victim and compensations related to it are deined by law and that there are oicial lists of victims available is of great help to a scientiic research. First of all, the participants in the surveys do not relate their participation in the investigation to obtaining the status of a victim and possible compensa- tions, which reduces the possibility of single-sided results and increases the scientiic reliability of the obtained data. Besides, it provides the opportunity 45 Danutė Gailienė to investigate a representative group of victims by choosing at random from the full list of victims. he study Psychological Atermaths of Soviet and Nazi Repressions was carried out in cooperation with the Department of Clinical and Organizational Psy- chology at Vilnius University and the he Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania. A large group of people was chosen at random from the list of victims and asked to take part in the investigation. he control group also consisted of individuals of the same age who had no status of a victim and were chosen at random from the list of the Lithuanian Population Register. he activity of the participants in the investigation was especially great and accounted for 80 per cent. More than one and a half thousand people invited agreed to take part in the investigation. he number of the people who agreed to participate in the control group was also very large – about 70 per cent. he data obtained conirmed that individuals with the oicial status of a vic- tim were really much more traumatized than those who were not oicially recognized. hough the control group consisted of people who had lived under the Soviet regime, the results of the investigation showed that the traumatic experiences of the people who experienced political repressions directly were much more painful than those of the people in the control group. Repression prevented them from achieving their life goals of acquiring education and a de- sired profession (as much as 83 per cent), ruined their health (87 per cent), and led to the loss of family members for many (56 per cent). Severe, long-term and unrecognized traumatisation led to serious long-term consequences. Apart from somatic problems the repression victims oten sufered from the symptoms of post-traumatic stress. Almost half the repressed people have lashbacks (sudden, vivid, distracting memories of the traumatic events). More than one third of them have nightmares. Also, features of dissociation are characteristic of the repression victims – a certain emotional numbness, a negation of feelings that has been manifesting itself up to the present time. Dissociation strategies – 46  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath deliberate avoidance of thoughts about a traumatic situation, suppression of feelings – usually help endure the horrors of traumatisation, but they are non-adaptive in normal life. he former political prisoners had the most diicult traumatic experience. As compared with other groups of victims (former deportees; Nazi repression victims), the participants in armed resistance, having experienced more torture, threats, and physical compulsion, and being in more danger of being killed, tried to commit suicide more oten. However, they also indicated more factors of coping with the situation: political activity, communication with the people who experienced the same kind of repression, mental strength, and religious belief. heir post-traumatic symptoms manifested themselves more oten in the features of invasion, whereas in other groups they manifest themselves as depression and helplessness. he atermaths of traumas were more severe for women than for men. 31 Children of the Repressed Individuals and the Intergenerational Effects of Trauma his representative investigation into the individuals who were subject to po- litical repressions formed the basis for studies of the intergenerational efect of the trauma. Having started the new stage of the studies – a psychological investigation into the adult children of the repressed individuals – the chil- dren of the repressed individuals who were interviewed at the irst stage were 31 Extensive data of this investigation are published in a collective monograph: D. Gailienė, ed., he Psychology of Extreme Traumatisation: he Atermath of Political Repression (Vilnius: Akreta, 2005) and in Evaldas Kazlauskas’ doctoral thesis “Long- term Psychological Atermaths of Political Repressions.” Both quoted many times in this paper. 47 Danutė Gailienė invited to participate in it. his enabled the study of links between parents and children regarding their health and the psychological conditions. As already mentioned, the situation of the repressed families in Lithuania and other countries occupied by the Soviet Union difered from the situation of other traumatized groups presented in the scientiic investigations. Usu- ally traumatisation of the persecuted individuals comes to an end upon their release from a concentration camp or prison, or ater repressions of another kind are over. In Lithuania, the former deportees, political prisoners and their families were subject to further political persecution because oicially they were considered to be ‘enemies of the people.’ hey live in an atmosphere of constant tension, stress, distrust and the threat of further repression. Hence, the traumatizing experience is dangerous to both the repressed individuals themselves and to their children, making it necessary to conceal one’s life story. Only 60 per cent of children of the repressed individuals indicated that they learned about their parents’ past in their childhood. 32 In Norway, for example, 86 per cent of children of the individuals who fell victim to the Nazi occupation learned about their parents’ past in their childhood. 33 heir parents themselves or their family members – grandparents, uncles, aunts, or other relatives – told them about it, or the children themselves were born in depor- tation. More than one ith of the children (21 per cent) knew nothing about their parents’ deportations and imprisonment until they became teenagers or adults. 6 per cent of the children learned about their parents’ traumas only ater the Singing Revolution had started. Many people who knew about it earlier indicated that they began to talk about it more only ater the beginning of the 32 I. Starinskaitė, “Long-term efects of political repressions in Lithuania to second ge- neration: subjective inluence, communication, hopelessness and sense of coherence.” (MA thesis, Vilnius University, ZurichU niversity, 2008). 33 E. F. Major, War Stress in a Transgenerational Perspective (Oslo: Universitas Osloensis, 1996). 48  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath Singing Revolution. Repressions of the parents were a family secret in one third of the families. Either it was not discussed with the children at all or it was discussed only among the family members, and the children were strictly forbidden to reveal it to anybody. 34 his afected the children in diferent ways. Some of them were oppressed by it and they felt fear. Others even took pride in the family secret. hey felt respect for their parents who instilled a feeling of patriotism in them and formed a clear world outlook. More than 70 per cent of the children of the repressed individuals stated that repressions had a very negative efect on their parents’ lives and general condition. Foremost among them they mentioned that their parents had ex- perienced ruined health, nervousness and in particular fear, a constant dread and a feeling of menace. However, when speaking about themselves, 31 per cent of the children indicated a negative efect on them. Others regarded that efect as ambiguous or positive, or they did not know what to call it. 35 Some of the people stated that it was diicult to say whether they were afected by their parents’ traumatic experience or by a general atmosphere and the restrictions of the totalitarian system. For example, those who refused to join the Young Com- munist League or the Communist Party obviously experienced consequences of their actions – they were not admited to higher education institutions, were not allowed to visit the nearest foreign country, and the possibilities of their professional careers were restricted to a great extent. It was oten underlined in the studies of long-term traumatic atermaths that a general cultural atmo- sphere and the public’s atitude towards their traumas had a great efect on the 34 I. Vaskelienė, “Politinių represijų Lietuvoje ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės antrajai kartai.“ (PhD diss., Vilnus University, 2012). 35 I. Starinskaitė, “Long-term efects of political repressions in Lithuania to second ge- neration: subjective inluence, communication, hopelessness and sense of coherence.”; I. Vaskelienė, “Politinių represijų Lietuvoje ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės antrajai kartai.” 49 Danutė Gailienė general condition of the traumatized individuals and their families. Furthermore, many individual conditions should also be taken into consideration on which the current condition of the children of the traumatized individuals depend- ed: whether both parents or only one of them were repressed, whether other members of the family died or survived, and whether they received support from their relatives, friends, etc. he psychological health of the members of the same family may vary greatly. When analyzing links between the general psychological condition of the repressed parents and their children in one of the investigations we selected 22 families in which at least two children, brothers and sisters, took part in the interview about their parents’ traumatic experience. It turned out that not all brothers and sisters were equally afected by their parents’ traumatic experience. 36 Most oten the children of the repressed parents felt that the family’s trau- matic experience exerted a negative efect on the formation of their character. Due to their parents’ poor health and nervousness, a more diicult material condition, they were also in frail health and were more sensitive. Some of them however, pointed to a positive efect of their parents’ experience –that it tempered their character, and developed their spiritual strength, resolution and moral values. It is interesting to note that the subjective evaluation of the efects of the parental traumatic experience on oneself is related to the present sense of coherence (encompassing self-conidence, experience of meaningful- ness, and the perceived possibility to control one’s own life). he children of the repressed parents who evaluated the efect of their parents’ experience as positive were noted for the highest indicators of the Sense of Coherence (SOC), whereas those who assessed their parents’ experiences in the negative had the 36 S.Bagdonaitė, “Ilgalaikio traumavimo psichologinės pasekmės šeimai: išgyvenusiųjų ir antros kartos psichologinės sveikatos sąsajos.“ (MA thesis, Vilnius University, 2010). 50  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath lowest indicators of SOC. 37 Hence, the children who had seen examples of strength, irmness and resistance were substantially more mature. As has been expected, the data obtained showed that the second generation was less traumatized than its parents. heir traumatic experience was diferent, as during their lifetime they were subject to fewer traumatic events than their parents had been. Assessments of the second generation of Soviet repressions, the second generation of the Holocaust and the participants in the control group who had no traumatic experience did not difer. Hence, they no longer carried the traumatic burden that their parents had carried. Quantitative indicators of the mental health of both groups did not difer either. It can be said that no psychopathological symptoms were characteristic of them. he participants in the investigations constituted non-clinical samples; therefore they did not distinguish themselves by exceptional psychopathological features as compared with the group consisting of the unharmed individuals. No psychopathologi- cal symptoms were detected in the majority of investigations into the second generation in non-clinical groups carried out in diferent countries. 38 Diferences between the groups consisting of the victims and of relatively unharmed groups manifested themselves in more subtle features. Adult children of the repressed individuals distinguished themselves by greater irritability and sensitivity, and they were apt to react to the events in their lives more painfully. Hence, the parents who had been subject to severe and long-term traumatisation handed down a certain predisposition towards vulnerability to their children. As well, it turned out that the psychological condition of the 37 R. Stankevičiūtė, “Politinių represijų Lietuvoje tarpgeneracinis poveikis: antrosios kartos subjektyviai suvokiami padariniai.“ (MA thesis, Vilnius University, 2010). 38 E. F. Major, War Stress in a Transgenerational Perspective.; M. H. Izendoorn, M. J. Bakermans-Kranenburg, A. Sagi-Schwartz, “Are children of Holocaust survivors less well-adapted? A meta-analytic investigations of secondary traumatization,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 16 (2003), p. 459-469. 51 Danutė Gailienė children was related to the general psychological condition of their parents: the worse the general condition of their parents, the worse the indicators of the general psychological condition shown by their children. Hence, traumatic experience and the post-traumatic reaction of their parents were signiicant to the general condition of their adult children. he psychological condition of mothers was of special importance – links between the children’s general condition and their mothers’ post-traumatic reactions were stronger. 39 Of course, the efect of the parents’ traumatic experience manifested itself in the symptoms of their general psychological condition. Adult children of the repressed individuals felt that their parents’ experience had a profound efect on their lives and exerted an impact on the formation of their personalities and identities. Coping and Resilience How do people manage to endure all that? his question was has been intro- duced comparatively recently in the history of investigations into psychological traumas. For a long time the researchers were more interested in the damaging consequences of trauma to ones physical and mental health. However, it is becoming clearer and clearer that the efect of the trauma, and especially that of a severe and long-term traumatisation, is complicated – it can not only do harm to an individual, but it can also awaken ones deepest human resources and encourage the growth and maturity of personality. We asked individuals residing in Lithuania who had sufered from political repression the following question: ‘What helped you cope with the diiculties of repression?’We asked the individuals in the comparison group who were of 39 I. Vaskelienė, “Politinių represijų Lietuvoje ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės antrajai kartai.” 52  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath the same age and had not been subject to repressions the following question: ‘What helped you cope with diiculties in your life?’ 40 he participants in the investigation most oten mentioned the following factors (Table 1): The repressed Control group No. Factors of coping In per cent In per cent 1. Support of family and relatives 61,7 63,6 Support of friends who experienced the 2. 39,6 3,4 same dificulties * 3. Belief in God* 72,0 51,7 4. Chance 5,4 1,7 5. Physical strength, health* 16,8 7,6 6. Spiritual strength* 56,1 33,1 7. Political activity* 32,1 2,5 8. Hope* 42,9 25,4 9. Other 6,6 4,2 Note: * p<0.01 Table 1. Factors of coping with dificulties in the victim and control groups (in per cent) 40 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Po penkiasdešimties metų: sovietinių represijų Lietuvoje psichologiniai padariniai ir įveikos būdai.”; E. Kazlauskas “Politinių represijų ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės.” (PhD diss. Vilniaus universitetas, 2006). 53 Danutė Gailienė We see that support of the family and relatives is the most important help to the people who had not sufered from repressions. he repressed individuals also mentioned it very oten (61,7 and 63,6 per cent, respectively). However, the people who had sufered from repressions oten indicated that belief in God helped them to endure everything (72 per cent). Religious belief was important to Lithuanian people not only in concentration camps and deportation when struggling to endure their horrors. he determination of those who stayed in occupied Lithuania to believe in God was a sign of resistance and also a sign of submission to the occupying power 41 because, as we know, combative atheism has always been one of the most important means of a spiritual ‘remaking’ of society. Some people understood the situation quite clearly as an either/or choice. Either one joins the Young Communist League, the Communist party, or goes on practicing his faith. hey remained faithful to their convictions and refused to collaborate with the regime. Other people, who had no courage to resist openly, regarded going to church and celebrating Christian holidays as a certain kind of resistance, at least as a minimal preservation of their autonomy and dignity. Besides, the Lithuanian Catholic community was the most active community engaged in resistance movements against the Nazi and Soviet occupations. hey were responsible for establishing and structuring the underground resistance during the Nazi occupation, which later turned into a strong armed resistance movement in the irst decade of the second Soviet occupation (1944-1953). Despite repression against the Church coupled with aggressively atheistic propaganda, the underground Catholic movement, along with its popular 41 S. Kraniauskienė, “Tapatybės konstravimas biograijose (kartos ir lyties identitetas XX a. lietuvių autobiograijose).” (PhD diss., Vilnius University, 2003); I. Šutinienė, “Sovietinio laikotarpio atminties bruožai autobiograiniuose pasakojimuose,“ in Socialinė atmintis: minėjimai ir užmarštys, ed. E. Krukauskienė et al. (Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2003), p. 13-66. 54  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath periodical he Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, was the most stable and politically articulate movement of anti-Soviet resistance. 42 he individuals who had sufered from repression speciied ten times more oten than the people in the comparison group that it was political activity that helped them (32,1 per cent to 2,5 per cent). he current investigations into political traumatisation established conclusively that political activity was an important and strong protective factor. he irst investigations of this kind were carried out into people who had been imprisoned for political reasons and tortured in Turkey. It turned out that politically active prisoners, as com- pared with politically inactive ones, sufered from much fewer post-traumatic disorders. 43 Politically active people – the former partisans, participants in armed resistance movements – constituted the largest part of the individuals in the sample of the repressed people in our investigation. he results of the inves- tigation conirmed the protective importance of political activity: although they sufered more and had more traumatic experiences than the individuals of other groups under study, their post-traumatic symptoms were weaker. 44 Even today the majority of the repressed individuals takes a lively interest in politics, has irm political convictions, and is concerned about the topical issues of public life. 42 A. Streikus, “Democracy and Catholicism in 20th Century Lithuania.” (paper presented at the international conference ‘Democracy, Culture and Catholicism’, Rome, June 18-21, 2012). 43 M. Basoglu et al., “Psychological Efects of Torture: A Comparison of Tortured with Non-tortured Political Activists in Turkey,” American Journal of Psychiatry, 151 (1994), p. 76-81; M. Basoglu et al., “Factors Related to Long-term Traumatic Stress Responses in Survivors of Torture in Turkey,” Journal of American Medical Association, 272 (1994), p. 357-363. 44 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Po penkiasdešimties metų: sovietinių represijų Lietuvoje psichologiniai padariniai ir įveikos būdai.” E. Kazlauskas “Politinių represijų ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės.” 55 Danutė Gailienė ‘Support of the friends who have experienced the same difficulties’ means a special thing to the repressed people. hey indicate this source of support more than ten times more oten than the participants in the compari- son group do (39,6 per cent and 3,4 per cent, respectively, Table 1). Friends that were made in prison and deportation most oten remain dearest and closest friends for life. hey understand one another perfectly and feel special solidarity. Kępiński compares the situation of the former camp prisoners with that of the people who had sufered from psychosis: ater what they had gone through both the former and the later felt as though they could not return to where they had been. ‘here are certain limits to human experience and it is not allowed to overstep it without being punished; if it so happens that we step “beyond” it, it is impossible to return to the earlier state. Otherwise, the fundamental structure changes, a human being is diferent from what he was before.’ 45 It might be that for this reason it is only those people who had gone through the same experience that can understand one another best. Investigations into severe traumas showed how important people sharing the same fate were. On the whole, the individuals who had experienced political repressions speciied many more factors of coping than the unrepressed individuals did. 46 heir traumatisation was severe and lasted for a long time. Most probably they had to look for more resources to help them to endure and survive. On the other hand, people themselves oten feel that their experience cannot be deined by negative atermaths alone. As much as 78 per cent of the repressed individuals stated that the ways of coping mastered during repressions were useful to them later in life. First of all, the victims indicated that they had become hardened, and learned to cope with diiculties. Some of them acquired professional skills, 45 A. Kępiński, Rytm życia (Kraków: Wydawnictwo literackie, 1978). 46 E. Kazlauskas, D. Gailienė, “Politinių represijų metu patirto sunkaus ilgalaikio traumavimo psichologinių padarinių kompleksiškumas,” Psichologija. Mokslo darbai 27 (2003), p. 43-52.; E. Kazlauskas “Politinių represijų ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės.” 56  Traumas Inlicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath learned to communicate, to understand and sympathize with other people beter. Many of them indicated the values they had cherished – belief in God and love for the Motherland. 47 Social Coping with Traumas he general condition of traumatized individuals depends to a great extent on the general atmosphere of a society. Social recognition of traumas and aspiration for justice are necessary to the victims of traumas. his encourages the process of coping with traumas. However, society also needs processes of coping with collective traumas, which would help restore the ruined identity of separate social groups and the whole society. here is no single model to achieve that. It goes without saying that social solutions depend on many historical, cultural, political and psychosocial circumstances. he most vivid example of an atempt at social reconciliation of the present century is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, created by political will. Seeking to avoid new outbreaks of violence in society, Pres- ident Nelson Mandela’s Government decided to stop persecuting those who were guilty of Apartheid if they pleaded guilty at an open siting of the Com- mission. he Commission listened to many stories of the perpetrators, and their openness led to issuance of many acts of release from punishment and contributed to the reconciliation of society. Atempts were made to apply this model in other countries too, especially when it was possible to clearly identify 47 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Po penkiasdešimties metų: sovietinių represijų Lietuvoje psichologiniai padariniai ir įveikos būdai.”; E. Kazlauskas “Politinių represijų ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės.”; R. Žaržojūtė, “Ilgalaikio trauminio patyrimo įveikos ir vidinės darnos jausmo ryšys.“ (MA thesis, Vilnius university, 2004). 57 Danutė Gailienė two conlicting social groups among which concord had to be reached. 48 But this model raises many doubts – the victims ind it very diicult to forgive if there is no juridical justice; besides, it is quite oten that the criminals’ public confessions of guilt are very formal and the real situation of the victims still remains worse than that of the criminals. Most probably it is an impossible task for a state institution to solve moral issues of guilt and forgiveness. 49 he failure of a ‘thick line’ (gruba kreska) political agreement proposed by the Head of the Polish government Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1989 showed that quite clearly. Even Germany’s experience of several decades in seeking to systematically re-assess its historical past is sometimes criticized because so- cial measures enable avoidance of personal confrontation with the historical past. 50 Historical traumas are complicated: they afect diferent social groups in diferent ways, therefore it is impossible to adapt a single concrete method to their social remaking. Time and conscious social atempts are needed to restore one’s ruined identity. Translated by Aldona Matulytė 48 For example, following the Rwandan Genocide, see: E. Staub, “Reconciliation ater Genocide, Mass Killing or Intractable Conlict: Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery, and Steps Toward a General heory,” Political Psychology 27 (2006), p. 867-893. 49 J. Gauck, “Winter im Sommer – Frühling im Herbst. Erinnerungen,” 10 (2011) Aulage. Pantheon. 50 h. Dorn, R. Wagner, “Wiedergutmachung,” in: h. Dorn, R. Wagner, Die deutsche Seele (München: Knaus, 2011), p. 535-540. 58  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process Gražina Gudaitė Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process he Soviet legacy is a complicated phenomenon in the life of an individual, one which encompasses the consequences of mass collective traumas, as well as a speciic relationship system that formed under the conditions of the author- itarian regime. Discussions about the consequences of collective repression on an individual have been ongoing both in Lithuania and around the world for more than a decade. he investigations show that in many cases experiences of repression can be treated as traumatic events, and their consequences are oten classiied using the concepts of post-traumatic stress. In recent years more and more discussions have started not only about the individuals who had directly gone through collective traumas, but also about the second and third generations of the victims and the survivors. Non-integrated traumatic experiences can lead diiculties in behavior, relationships and the emotional life of an individual, and the language of compulsion can be transmited from generation to generation. Traumatic experiences can manifest themselves in subtle ways of passive aggression, and sometimes in less subtle outbreaks of destruction. 1 Scientiic research shows that the children of parents who have sufered from political repression not only show features of a post-traumatic stress, but they also have a much wider range of diiculties in adapting to external and 1 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, “Forgiveness ater Mass Atrocities in Cultural Context: Making Public Space Intimate,” in Cape Town 2007. Journeys, Encounters; Clinical, Communal, Cultural, ed. P. Bennet (Daimon: Verlag, 2009), p. 36-55. 59 Gražina Gudaitė internal reality. Emotional instability, suicide, alcoholism, loss of personal initiative, and depreciation of the role of the male in society and the family – these and other features are discovered in studying the Soviet legacy. 2 One can form an even broader picture of traumatic consequences when studying investigations into victims of the Holocaust and their descendants. he above list of symptoms is supplemented by such somatic disorders as breast cancer, chronic pain, diabetes, asthma, and eating disorders, the origin of which is related in the irst place to increased stress reactions, as the majority of the victims speak of stress as a constant everyday state. 3 Researchers of traumas notice that non-integrated anger can manifest itself in primitive forms of coping such as the above-mentioned suicidal behavior, and angry outbursts towards family members, even calling them the names of political enemies. 4 Psychotherapeutic practice and studies of the analyses of long-term cases in particular show that the second generation carries a burden of unprocessed suppressed aggression. By its nature aggression is an instinctive response to an atack and threat; however, in cases of cultural and collective traumas it is most oten suppressed because, as the analysis of the histories of the families shows, demonstration of open resistance (or aggression) to the Soviet conquer- ors meant death in many cases. he children of the parents who went through political repression seem to have serious problems with aggression integration 2 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Fity Years on: he Long-Term Psychological Efects of Soviet Repression in Lithuania,” in he Psychology of Extreme Traumatisation: he Atermath of Political Repression, ed. D. Gailienė (Vilnius: Akreta, 2005), p. 67-108; D. Gailienė, Ką jie mums padarė. Lietuvos gyvenimas traumų psichologijos žvilgsniu (Vilnius: Tyto Alba, 2008). 3 H. Wiseman et al., “Parental Communication of Holocaust Experiences and Interpersonal Paterns in Ofspring of Holocaust Survivors,” International Journal of Behavioral Development 26, 4 (2002), p. 372. 4 H. A. Barocas, C. B. Barocas, “Separation – Individuation Conlicts in Children of Holocaust Survivors,” Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 11 Issue 1 (Spring/ Summer, 1980), p. 6-14. 60  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process because aggression is identiied with destruction and pain, thus suppressing the constructive possibilities of its use as well. 5 An analysis of psychotherapeutic cases shows that it is not only insecurity that is internalized but also suppressed aggression, which externally can manifest itself in the symptoms of depression and be a cause of bouts of anxiety and destructive behavior. Some authors basing themselves on the psychodynamic paradigm indicate not only the traumatic legacy but also develop the depth presumptions of this phenomenon, which are important in organizing help and providing it. Harvey and Carol Barocas, basing their position on the theory of ego psychology and ego development, state that if parents or grandparents failed to psychologi- cally integrate traumatic experience, if they had no possibilities to mourn the loss of their relatives, their relationship with their children is marked by the shadows of traumatic experience. When analyzing the system of relationships of the children of those who had sufered from the Holocaust, it is discovered that processes of the development of these individuals are disturbed, and that processes of separation and individuation take place in a very complicated way because separation is subconsciously understood as death and therefore must be avoided. According to many psychodynamic theorists, the ability to separate and the ability to tolerate loneliness are an important condition for the formation of ego and for the inner relationship system. If this does not take place, an increased dependence on other people can develop, or conversely one ights for autonomy all his life, giving prominence to the independence of an individual. In both cases diiculties in interpersonal relations arise because both extreme adaptation and extreme withdrawal can determine a problem- atic self-assessment or a feeling of isolation, and frustration of the needs and problems of emotional functioning. 5 G. Gudaitė, “Psychological Aterefects of the Soviet Trauma and the Analytical Process,” in he Psychology of Extreme Traumatisation, p. 108-126. 61 Gražina Gudaitė When elucidating the trauma transmission phenomenon, proponents of objective relations mention the precondition of the mechanism of projective identiication, which means that a certain experience of the parent is sub- consciously delegated to other generations and manifests itself in dreams, in transference reactions in therapy, or emerges in other forms of symbolic language. 6 he Jungian analyst Kristina Schelinsky, when analyzing cases of long-term psychotherapy, discovered that this mechanism is useful in explain- ing some somatic symptoms or even disorders, and it can be of signiicance in understanding counter-transference reactions. he traumatized parents can transmit their emotional insecurity to their children, who can internalize that insecurity, as well as perceptions of the external reality as threatening. 7 Modern neuropsychological investigations support the hypothesis of transmiting the consequences of the trauma from generation to generation, which states that children of the traumatized parents have a genetic inheritance marked by the trauma at birth. For example, Yehuda and co-authors discover these tendencies when comparing the indicators of cortisol and others. 8 Further results of the investigations could be discussed. Investigations into trans-generational traumas are a rapidly developing sphere all over the world and they generate rather controversial assessments. Wars, oppressions and traumas have always been a part of human history. Is the human gene pool afected by the cataclysm of the twentieth century only? Mankind has survived somehow and found ways of coping with upheaval. Do we ind only 6 D. Rowland-Klein, R. Dunlop, “he Transmission of Trauma across Generations: Identiication with Parental Trauma in Children Holocaust Survivors,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 32, 3 (1998), p. 358. 7 K. Schelinsky, “When Psyche muters through mater.” (paper presented at the 19th International Congress from Analytical Psychology: Copenhagen 2013 – 100 Years on: Origins, Innovations and Controversies, 2013 August). 8 R. Yehuda, L. Bierier, “Transgenerational Transmission of Cortisol and PTSD Risk,” Progress in Brain Research, 167 (2007), p. 121. 62  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process pathology when we investigate severe experiences? hese and other questions arise during discussions about the traumatic consequences. It is most probably not by chance that so many investigations are being carried out, and they only conirm the dynamic nature and complexity of this phenomenon. A study was recently conducted in Lithuania which found that in the studied mental health of representatives of the second generation (that is, their post-traumatic reactions on the whole), their levels of hopelessness and feelings of inner harmony do not difer from the corresponding indicators of mental health of the control groups. It is only the indicators of emotional irritability that difer. 9 hese results are in line with the tendencies of the investigations into the second generation of the Holocaust: long-term consequences are established but the second generation is not distinguished for its psychopathology. Here we speak about a speciic ‘psychological proile’ which is characterized by increased sensitivity to stress, diiculties related to interpersonal relations, separation, individuation, and decreased psychological resistance. 10 he analysis of the research shows that the results of the investigations depend to a great extent on what methods are used to study this phenomenon. Natan Kellermann, in summing up 35 trauma transmission studies noticed that when such methods as MMPI (the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) or 16 factors of the California Personality Inventory are used in the investigation no diferences between the victims’ descendants and the members of the control group emerge. At the same time an in-depth interview which goes into the history of trauma, Antonovski’s ‘Life Orientation Questionnaire’ shows both increased sensitivity and relationship problems. 11 he author ob- 9 I. Vaskelienė, “Politinių represijų Lietuvoje ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės antrajai kartai.“ (PhD diss., Vilnius University, 2012). 10 H. Wiseman et al., “Parental Communication of Holocaust Experiences.” 11 N. Kellermann, “Transmission of Holocaust Trauma,” Israel Journal of Psychiatry and Related Sciences 38,1 (2001), p. 41. 63 Gražina Gudaitė serves that almost all psychotherapists who work with the second and third generations discover manifestations of the speciic consequences of trauma and diiculties related to that, whereas these diiculties are not observed when investigations are carried out with the help of traditional psycho-diagnostic methods. It seems that the creation of a safe space, careful observation of the formation of the relationship, an investigation into the family history, the analysis of symbolic manifestations (all of this taking place in psychotherapy) can be appropriate methods which reveal a complicated picture of the histor- ical legacy in the psyche of the survivors of the second and third generations. Manifestation of Collective Trauma within the Context of Analytic Psychotherapy Lithuania, like many post-Soviet countries, sufered from both the Second World War and post-war repression. he mere fact that during 50 years of dif- ferent occupations (the irst Soviet occupation in 1940, the Nazi occupation of 1941-1944, and the second Soviet occupation of 1944-1991) Lithuania lost one third of its population testiies to the broad scope of losses. On the other hand, the occupations have come to an end, but the question remains: is that legacy of the past still signiicant to the people of today? If so, how do they live with such a legacy? What are the possibilities of psychotherapy within this context? What are the dynamics of the traumatic consequences in long-term psychotherapy? Joining the discussion about the transmission of the consequences of col- lective trauma, we carried out a study which sought answers to these questions. A search for answers to those questions is important to both psychotherapeutic practice and the development of theoretical suppositions, especially when we seek to achieve a deeper understanding of the destructive and regressive behavior of an individual. We analyzed 64 cases of long-term analytical psy- 64  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process chotherapy in our study of over three years. We devoted special atention to the analysis of dreams (in particular series of dreams), to family history and to revealing dominating models of prevailing relationships. hese methods were chosen not only because of the abovementioned peculiarities but also due to the theoretical paradigm on which analytical psychotherapy is based. C.G. Jung’s theory of analytical psychology and the analytical psychotherapy based on it have several speciic features which are signiicant when working with collective traumas. First of all comes the concept of the unconsciousness, which, according to the authors of this paradigm, is explained by separating several levels: personal, family, cultural and collective. his separation means that in seeking to understand an individual’s motivation and choices, not only the personal perspective of the individual but also the role of the family and culture in the individual’s life are analyzed, as well as the manifestation of the universal tendencies of human nature. hese levels are signiicant, especially when we work with symbolic material, and when we seek to open up traumat- ic experiences encapsulated in the unconsciousness. 12 hey can be personal, cultural or collective. Another important principle of this psychotherapeutic direction is that a deeper understanding of the unconscious is sought not only on the basis of determinism but also following the principles of teleology and synchronicity. heir implementation means that during psychotherapy atempts are made not only to ind the cause or explanation of diiculties but also to reveal the resources of the individual or that psychic heritage which had not been harmed by the traumas. It is necessary to reveal and develop the strength of an individual in seeking to overcome consequences of the destructive legacy. Jung’s analytical psychotherapy pays special atention to symbolic material. he symbol can integrate in itself both the aspects visible to consciousness and 12 U. Wirtz, “he Symbolic Dimension in Trauma herapy,” in Spring 82: Symbolic Life (New Orleans: Spring Journal, 2009), p. 31-52. 65 Gražina Gudaitė those of unconscious experience: it can be a good bridge joining these spheres of psychic functioning. 13 he ability to speak and read the language of symbols is important when analyzing the consequences of cultural or collective traumas. Many practitioners and trauma researchers notice that sufering experienced during the trauma is so horrible that it is impossible to be expressed by means of words. It is only in such indirect ways as dreams, visions or other forms of symbolic language whose expression leaves a certain freedom of choice of meaning for an individual that it is possible to come into contact with this experience. Such a viewpoint and its implementation are especially suitable when confronting the Soviet ideology, which recognized neither the idea of ambiguity nor freedom to uncover diferent meanings of the phenomenon. Based on the exaltation of materialism and objectivity, it denied in essence the value of individuality and the subjective inner world of a person. Within this context, fostering of the subjective world becomes an important task when confronting the consequences of the Soviet legacy. Hence, does the theme of collective traumas remain important to the modern individual? Does this theme arise in the process of psychotherapy? Our investigation showed that evidence of political repression in family histories appeared in 44 cases, almost 70 per cent of all those we analyzed. When ana- lyzing descriptions of family histories it turned out that the closest relatives (parents or grandparents) had experienced collective torture. In seven cases torture resulted in death, in other cases grandparents or parents were deported to Siberia, were imprisoned for political reasons, were regularly persecuted by the KGB, were killed or physically traumatized because of their participation in resistance, and/or sufered from the Nazis during the Second World War. How do these facts emerge in the process of psychotherapy? 13 C. G. Jung, “Approaching the Unconscious,” in Man and his Symbols (New York: Laurel, 1977). 66  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process At the initial stage of psychotherapy our clients did not speak about the facts of collective trauma sufered in their family history, and psychological diiculties were never related to political repression or to the efect of their traumatizing consequences. A lack of self-conidence, anxiety, fear and other symptoms were related to the current situation in the family, relations at work, etc. When analyzing the cases it turned out that this taciturnity had been determined by diferent motives. Some of the clients knew the facts of historical events, although their emo- tional relationship to them was rather vague. For example, some clients knew that both their parents and grandparents had been deported to Siberia, but they accepted this as a normal thing: ‘he majority of the families had experienced this.’ Others did not ind it important or they treated it as a inished mater: ‘I wrote down my grandmother’s reminiscences a long time ago.’ Another group of clients knew the traumatic facts of the family history but they spoke of them unwillingly, as an unrealized feeling of shame was obvious in their atitude. For example, Jokūbas’ father was killed by the KGB in the 1950s but at the beginning of psychotherapy Jokūbas said only that his father had died when Jokūbas was still a child. he patient did not want to say anything more lest he create the impression that something was wrong with his father. Later it turned out that his father had been treated at a mental hos- pital, so Jokūbas began to doubt whether he himself was healthy. It was only later when the patient decided to look for the documents and learned that his father had been treated at Cherniachovsky Hospital that his relation with his father’s history and himself changed. he atitude in which the irst prevailing feeling was shame and irritabil- ity was also expressed in those cases where the family history was confused because it was not clear who was on which side. he grandparents’ generation had sufered under the Soviet occupiers, whereas the parents adapted to the circumstances, and quite oten even occupied responsible positions in Soviet 67 Gražina Gudaitė nomenclature. Members of this group felt shame (‘it is not clear what about’) and at least at the beginning of therapy avoided questions about their parents’ and grandparents’ past. Hence, our study showed that a certain defensiveness in relation to the collective traumas manifested itself in many cases. his atitude is oten related to the strategy of survival. Dissociation, repression of traumatic experience, and sometimes denial were important strategies of survival at least for the parents’ generation. Concealment of wounds and at the same time of one’s own reactions and values was an important thing in order not to once again become a victim. A fear of authority, which is perceived within this context both as destructive and as dangerous, and various forms of avoidance behav- ior were a rather typical model of relationships for many clients whose family members had sufered from political repression. 14 An even more complicated explanation of defences is revealed in those cases where the family history was rather confused. he generation of grandparents sufered, and the generation of parents adapted itself successfully. We noticed that to overcome the trau- matic consequences these various compensatory measures were employed: rationalization, the formation of reaction or a reverse reaction, and strategies of changing one’s identity. Jonas’ history is a vivid example of that: his father was killed by the KGB, and Jonas himself tried to adapt himself to the Soviet system. As he studied in Moscow, he found a Russian girlfriend and planned a prom- ising future with her there. On completing his studies, however, he gave up everything and returned to Lithuania and started to live a life that was not so successful. During psychotherapy the client said that he had had a dream ater 14 H. Dieckmann, “Some Aspects of the Development of Authority,” Journal of Analytical Psychology 22,3 (1977), p. 230-242; G. Gudaitė, “he Dynamic of authority images in the Context of consequences of Collective trauma.” (paper presented at the 19th International Congress from Analytical Psychology: Copenhagen 2013 – 100 years on: Origins, Innovations and Controversies, 2013 August). 68  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process which he understood that it was impossible to continue living like that. Jonas could neither retell the dream itself nor how he interpreted it but he remem- bered clearly that feeling of clarity which changed his life. It is obvious that the decision came from his unconscious and it seems that it was necessary to change his compensatory strategy of adaptation. his episode illustrates one of the most essential consequences of the traumatic legacy – a disturbed feeling of continuity. he link with the killed ones breaks and atempts are made to not repeat fate of the parents; the compensation, however, is inally perceived as a betrayal. Such understanding only increases anxiety and feelings of guilt and inferiority which are diicult to control. A disturbed feeling of continuity was present in other cases as well: when analyzing consequences of collective traumas not only entire episodes of the family history but also reminiscences colored with shame, hopelessness, guilt and anger that had escaped the memory came to light. It seemed that atempts were made to forget not only the fact of losses but also the hopelessness and regressive behavior of the relatives. It is not a secret that excessive use of alcohol, which could be called one of the regressive forms of overcoming a crisis, relected itself in the histories of our patients. As Jolita told us, her grandfather’s excessive drinking might have stemmed from the need to appease the pain of his ruined life, but his children and grandchildren felt shame over him staggering through the streets of their small town. To sum up, we have discovered rather irm defensive systems in the cases of traumatic experiences: dissociation, denial and repression. We have also uncovered diferent compensatory strategies, the reverse reaction, regression reactions, which manifest themselves in passivity, childlessness or learned hopelessness in crisis situations. 69 Gražina Gudaitė Psychotherapy and Changes in Traumatic Consequences Psychotherapy begins when reality is recognized, when those histories which had stayed in the unconscious for a long time and indirectly afected the life of an individual are inally begun to be told. Our study revealed that that the irst references to those untold histories are made in symbolic forms. Repeating dreams or a series of dreams in which images of the experience of collective traumas were clearly relected enable hypotheses of the collective trauma to be put forward: I saw the war in my dream again. he pogrom again. Many people are driven into a ield, shooting will start again. I am afraid to be shot dead. he soldiers surrounded the house on all sides. I know that now they will start looking for us. We have to hide. I went down into the basement of the house. Old peo- ple were laid down there. hey had been killed. I do not know how but I knew that somehow I was related to that. hese and other episodes of the dreams emerged (and repeated later). he patients themselves said that such dreams had a devastating efect and per- plexed them. he scale of destruction perplexed them, as well as the fact that most oten many people took part in them (the hypothesis about collective trauma, one of the deinitions of which is the fact that traumatic events en- compass a group of people, can be derived from that). he dreamers felt that images of their dreams were related to the historical events but naturally the following question arose: ‘what does all that have to do with me?’ In the psychotherapeutic process we sought to give an answer to this ques- tion when analyzing the family history. Sooner or later the episodes of memo- 70  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process ries emerged, which were another factor that conirmed the hypothesis of the consequences of political repression emerging in psychic life. In some cases people looked for their historical roots actively by, for example, questioning their surviving relatives, or visiting archives to search for information about their family history. In this way a picture emerged of the history of a family and the life of an individual which were both in one way or another afected by the political repression which took place in the Baltic States ater the Second World War. Donald Kalsched, one of the most prominent modern specialists on traumas, wrote in his analytical perspective that trauma in itself does not destroy the totality of one’s psyche. he psyche fragments itself as a defense mechanism. When the consequences of the trauma are analyzed it seems that the system of defense is as traumatogenic as the trauma itself. he system of defense focuses on the strategy of survival, and therefore it interprets any atempt to grow and become an individual as dangerous. 15 In many of the analyzed cases, insecurity and a fear of death, avoidance based on a fear of being seen, a low level of self-conidence, low self-esteem, emotional immaturity, emotional problems, and overreacting to adaptation to the external world was relected. We noticed many cases where any atempt to grow and be independent of a certain internal part was treated as dangerous and was to be punished. he Soviet ideology, based on a materialistic worldview which in essence did not recognize the importance of individuality and all the more so the importance of the inner world (which was identiied with the spiri- tual world) was of great signiicance to the formation of this emotional atitude. Atempts to overstep the systems of defense and restore memories and history were, at least partly, referred to as the irst stage of psychotherapy when 15 D. Kalsched, he Inner World of Trauma. Archetypal Defenses of the Personal Spirit (London: Routledge, 1996); D. Kalsched, Trauma and the Soul. Psycho-spiritual Approach to Human Development and its Interruption (London: Routledge, 2013). 71 Gražina Gudaitė working with the consequences of political repression. Most oten this stage included members of the family as well. In almost all cases the older members of the family were happy to be able to tell us about their past experience. Some of them wrote their memoirs because they knew that their writen work would be read by at least a few people. he patients and their older relatives looked at the photographs of the past, and the names of persons who had been anony- mous for a long time came back to them. It seems that an atempt to ill in the gaps of history was important not only to our patients but also to their families. Some of the clients said that ater these reminiscences had been shared, ater this communal experience, the general atmosphere within the family changed. Our study showed that one of the most signiicant aspects of overcoming post-traumatic consequences was a growing consciousness of the memory episodes, and simultaneously of one’s own identity (as well as cultural iden- tity) related to them. One of the purposes of Soviet repression was to create the Soviet Man and Soviet Culture, persistently and consistently obliterating the traditional moral values, spiritual practices, etc., which are atributed to culture in the broadest sense. Soviet culture denied the importance of the past, denied the basic needs of an individual, and was unable to serve the human being. However, it is ultimately culture (including ethnic) that helps reveal both the deepest nature of the human and the foundations of basic human dignity. More and more oten, modern authors tend to admit the importance of culture when confronted with the manifestations of destruction. 16 In the psychotherapeutic process, when confronted with feelings of inferiority, guilt, shame or other consequences of trauma it is important to restore the secrets related to traumatic experience; of no less importance, however, is the resto- ration of those historical episodes which strengthen a feeling of dignity and 16 H. Hjelmeland, “Suicide Research and Prevention: he Importance of Culture in Biological Times,” in Suicide and Culture. Understanding the Context, ed. E. Colucci et al. (Park: Hogrefe, 2013), p. 7. 72  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process self-conidence. An individual feels a certain way when he/she knows that his relatives were killed, that everything was seized from them, that they were tortured, and that when the political tension abated they alleviated their pain by drinking, unable to simply straighten themselves out. However, the feeling is quite diferent when one knows that he/she is a descendant of those who managed to survive a rather miserable existence, who avoided collaboration with the Soviet ideology and its authorities, and who somehow managed to maintain spiritual practices as well. his changed both a feeling of one’s self-es- teem and dignity and perhaps lessened the shame which is discussed at the beginning of this article. A versatile restoration of history is signiicant to the restoration of a sense of identity and of continuity. On the other hand, however, the experience of psychotherapy shows that a detailed restoration of the history of both an individual and their fam- ily is not always possible, especially when it comes to overcoming defences. Confrontation with consequences of collective traumas is in essence a ield where we encounter powerful forces of destruction. his does not only mean the restoration of history but in individual cases also a meeting with the very reality of death, which nobody can change. herefore it is not surprising that people try to defend themselves against that highly intuitively, in the same way as against pain or horror, which could be a natural reaction in cases of collective traumas. Analysis of our cases shows that the restoration of facts and history at a rational level was accessible to many patients, although deeper changes encompassing transformations of emotional life (insecurity, aggression, shame) and changes in inner relationships (e.g. the dynamics of relationships with the authority) are not always a success. Dynamics of collective traumat- ic consequences is a highly individual thing in psychotherapy and its low cannot be explained by psychological mechanisms alone. Our study showed that when analyzing the phenomenology of experiencing the consequences of collective traumas, moments of transcendental experience occupied an 73 Gražina Gudaitė exceptional place in this process. Relections of our clients showed that these moments also gave a feeling of relief, and a greater strength for coping with diiculties, a hope that life would improve in the future, as well as a feeling that their sufering had had meaning. However, we can neither foresee nor model these moments in any way. hey just happen and clearly illustrate that the suferings of an individual as well as the processes of transformation are afected by intangible forces. I would like to illustrate this with an episode in the case of Agota, whose peculiar culmination was the following dream: I am in a house in which, as far as I know, pogroms happen. he conquerors drive everyone outside, shoot some of them dead and let the rest go on living. An or- dinary pogrom. I am also driven into that ield and I am afraid that they will shoot me dead. We are laid down on the ground. here is a woman next to me. I realize that we are no longer outside but in a grave – I nestle myself to the ground, I feel even its smell. Suddenly somebody releases me and I understand that I am no longer afraid to die, that this depends on the Supreme Being. If they shoot at me, this will take a short minute and I shall endure that pain. I start praying and tell that woman that I am also saying prayers for her. Shots ring out above, they come to an end. I understand that this time it was not my turn. I look around, other people are also rising from the ground, and there isn’t a single one killed, only wounded. As Agota analyzed this dream, reminiscences from the history of her family arose, along with other associations. She said that her relatives on her mother’s 74  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process side had been killed in a resistance movement and that this had been the fami- ly’s secret for a long time. Despite the fact that both her father’s and mother’s families had gone through deportation to Siberia and there were no ideological disagreements in the family, Agota remembers her father’s words, which he said as the political situation began to improve: ‘there is nothing to be proud of if you failed to survive. It is much more important to ind ways of how to survive, even during the war years.’ his dream had an enormous efect on Agota’s sense of security in her current life as well. According to her, something had changed indeed. One can raise suppositions whether that woman who she found herself in the grave with was a representation of the historical past, something that came from her mother’s experience of post-war repression, or that she perhaps was something from her present-day life. We shall never know for sure, but perhaps it is the very experience of revealing some important moments rather than the causes that are of importance: for one thing, there is the very fact of the reality of death. his sounds paradoxical but it seems that this is a crucial moment in the process of healing of trauma, one that opens a diferent side of existence. Being in the grave soon gives Agota the feeling of a strong relationship with the earth. Earth, which contains the greatest opposites of being: both life and death. And it seems that then something happens that is referred to in ana- lytical psychology as a transcendental event – fear disappears. he activity of the Supreme Being is perceived as reality. he analysis of our cases showed that hints about the experience of the transcendental reality revealed themselves in other cases as well. Sometimes this emerged as a ritual performed in pre-Christian, Baltic religion, some- times as a Biblical motif, sometimes as a reference to the life of Christ, and sometimes as a sacriicial ritual. hese and other images can be interpreted as an adequate reference to recognizing the dimension of transcendental being. In psychotherapy we do not usually analyze the contents of such experience, 75 Gražina Gudaitė rather we raise the question: what does it mean to the life of an individual if we recognize that this reality is also a part of life? he analysis of our cases shows that this experience is signiicant to the processes of revelation, integration of losses, inding new ways to carry on, and the reestablishment of integrity – especially within the context of collective traumas. Agota’s subsequent dream is an excellent illustration of this atitude: I was travelling home but unexpectedly I found myself near some barbed wire, behind which there was a large house. I knew that it was Brezhnev’s house, the temple of Socialism. A cement canal was dug with bricks built up around it. Upon approaching it I was surprised be- cause there was no water in the canal, but there were stairs in it. I went down to the botom, the walls were very high; it was dark and slippery. I stopped so that my eyes could get used to the darkness. hen I took several steps, it became lighter, and moss appeared on the concrete. he house had been built a long time ago. I moved ahead cautiously. he walls became somewhat smaller, more light appeared. Having looked more intently I saw small shoots of grass, which had man- aged to cut through the concrete. hat was something miraculous that such fragile grass overcomes such massive, it seems, immovable concrete. I looked at that tender grass. It seemed that it had increased in volume. I moved on. he canal turned into a road winding though the meadow. Agota retold this dream cheerfully, amazed at how the unconsciousness could ‘think of it in this way.’ he metaphor of grass cuting through concrete is very 76  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process eloquent indeed. It relects the physical reality (grass really can overcome concrete) but it can also be an excellent parallel to the development of psy- chic life. his dream seems like a fairytale with a happy ending. he image of grass cuting through concrete relects the vitality of life. he plot of the dream shows that despite barriers, despite the manmade temples and atempts to cement over the natural given one goes onto the road and into a meadow, which are interpreted as symbols of the proliferation of life in many sources. his dream sounds like a hopeful metaphor and, most probably, not only to Agota. he powers of life are stronger than the obstacles created by a political regime, at least in the subjective world of an individual. he dream does not only relect a happy ending, it contains a reference to overcoming defences (a barbed fence, a concrete canal), and it contains determination of the ego to move forward and take risks (to descend into the depth and darkness of the canal). On the other hand, the ego of the dream moves slowly, cautiously, without losing vigilance. Our experience shows that this disposition is important not only on the path of an individual but also in the psychotherapy of traumatic consequences: it is important to notice it in a timely manner and adequately assess the defense systems, as sometimes it is possible to pass around them, and sometimes it is necessary to go deeper so as to understand what they protect. here are diferent ways and their choice depends on many things; perhaps the most important thing, however, is the very principle to go on moving, to look for a way out, sometimes patiently and without haste, sometimes resolutely and taking risks, although never losing the vigilance needed to enable one to see manifestations of destruction in time, as well as resources of hope and growth. 77 Gražina Gudaitė Summing up Our practice and the analyzed cases show that the paradigm of analytical psychology forms a suitable basis for working with the consequences of a col- lective trauma. Analysis of the cases shows that episodes of non-integrated trauma can be passed down from generation to generation. It shows that it is not only reminiscences that are transmited to other generations but also the methods an individual employs to cope with situations in which destruction took the upper hand. Rather rigid defensive systems are noticed in the cases of the second and third generations and a long time is needed to discover ones relationships with history, with one’s family, and with the cultural subconscious. When we work with the representatives of the second and third generation, the image of a collective trauma is complicated, and it is quite oten that we cannot give an answer to the questions who is a victim and who is a perpetra- tor. In the psychotherapeutic process it seems that both carry a heavy burden: pain of loss, anger towards the aggressor, a cry for justice, shame over betrayal, guilt over collaboration, despair and helplessness in perceiving the power and consequences of collective destruction and a collective shadow – all these motifs come to light when we face the consequences of a collective trauma and political repression. he individuals who grew up within this context have so-called blind spots, secrets related to traumatic episodes or to a shameful experience. he recreation of these untold stories is not a simple process. As we have seen in some cases, an individual takes risks when he goes deeper into his unconsciousness, as they might experience pain and fear as well as shame and mourning in order to achieve greater integration or connection. Our study shows that sometimes it works and sometimes it does not work. Sometimes an individual has the power to face destructive manifestations and change one’s activity at least in his/her psyche, and sometimes one does not have that ability, but none- theless it is important to try, because an individual’s atempt is an essential 78  Relections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process step in dis-identifying oneself from the atitude of victim. Political repression, life under the conditions of the authoritarian regime can be treated not only as a traumatizing experience but also as a condition which in essence afects the system of the individual’s relationships (internal and external), as well as his/ her emotional life. Psychotherapy is a suitable way to develop an individual’s system of relationships and also a feeling of well-being. In conclusion I would like to draw atention to the signiicance of hope in our work. I should think that one of the duties of a psychotherapist is to see hints of hope and continuity. We have to be vigilant and to direct ‘our third eye’ not only toward revealing the secret or suppressed severe suferings but also towards the possibility of the potential, towards that moment which promis- es a beter future in which we can recover experience of basic trust. In essence, another person cannot heal a wound; a human body and psyche are made so that they carry the possibilities of recovering within themselves. Our task is to help discover those possibilities. Translated by Aldona Matulytė 79  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development Monika Kareniauskaitė Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development Opposition against the overpowering of the private life by the public life in the context of suppression of freedom by the totalitarian state produces a variety of forms of cultural resistance. hese forms are systems of symbolic codes that expressively interpret a certain perceived injustice, assuming the present social inca- pability to resolve it otherwise. 1 In 1940 the Republic of Lithuania was drawn into a political and social space formed by two totalitarian regimes, the USSR and Nazi Germany. From the irst year of the occupation, the Soviet authorities started destroying the ex- isting social order and creating a new one. 2 According to the classical theory of totalitarianism, one of the main tasks of these transformations is to create state which is not separate from the society, but in which all types of social and political life of individuals were at the state’s disposal and nothing existed beyond its symbolic borders. 3 1 G. A. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations in Totalitarian States (London: Transaction Publishers, 2012), p. 157. 2 Lietuva 1940–1990: okupuotos Lietuvos istorija, ed. A. Anušauskas (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2005). 3 Z. Norkus, Kokia demokratija, koks kapitalizmas? Pokomunistinė transformacija Lietuvoje lyginamosios istorinės sociologijos požiūriu (Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2008), p. 212. 81 Monika Kareniauskaitė his deinition also includes atempts to exercise unlimited control of both the private and public lives of individuals. In such a state no political action can be developed and it is hardly possible for a private or public discussion to be held free from the all-embracing totalitarian ideology. he existence of space where such kind of communication could be developed is extremely dangerous to totalitarianism. hat is why the oppositional ideas and the development of alternative spaces that do not fall under the state control in such countries is a relevant research subject, capable of telling us much about the formation and genesis of totalitarian societies. he subject of this article is the phenomenon of various types of anti-Soviet activities existing in Soviet Lithuania from 1956 to 1988 (the formation of the Reform Movement of Lithuania). 4 he basic aim of the article is not limited to a meticulously and carefully carried out reconstruction of this phenomenon, as well as its description, characterization and typologisation. I also sought to ind a relevant theoretical perspective which could serve as one of the possible methodological tools able to explain the formation, shape and contents of anti-communist tendencies in the society of the Lithuanian SSR 5 in the late Soviet era. It was those subjects which I sought to describe and understand, and with the help of classical theories of sociology, Soviet and Communist studies, and new scientiic insights into the period, I formulated three main questions: 1. What type and shape of anti-communist tendencies existed in Soviet Lithuania? 2. Why could these tendencies exist and develop in such a strictly controlled society as a communist state? 4 In Lithuanian: Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sąjūdis, usually referred to as Sajūdis. 5 I use terms Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, Lithuanian SSR and LSSR as synonyms. 82  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development 3. How did they develop, what form and content did they take and how were these anti-communist tendencies related to trends in the whole of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc? Hence, in the research I try to remove the phenomenon of the anti-communist activities in the Lithuanian SSR ater 1956 from the limited and narrow local theoretical, methodological and conceptual contexts and to put it into more universal ones. It is important to stress here that this research was carried out in an inductive way. he initial strategy was openness to every possible theoretical approach, or to a complex of several approaches. hus, the main research method was not based on eforts to measure how the phenomenon of the anti-communist activities in the Lithuanian SSR it into the framework of one or another inluential and fashionable theory. On the contrary, I sought to ind out and describe the main features of the subject of the research. And only then was the qualitative methodological and theoretical analysis carried out. Gradually the research led to understanding that the idea of the public sphere was one of the most relevant theoretical backgrounds capable of measuring the processes that took place in Communist Lithuania. his concept introduced by the famous German sociologist Jürgen Habermas 6 and later developed by other researchers is linked with both classic and most recent theories exploring totalitarian societies in the present research. In this research the public sphere is deined as a space constituted by crit- ical inter-individual communication capable of creating an alternative to the state-dominated public and even private discourses. 7 he existence of this space under the conditions of a totalitarian regime is the main methodological 6 J. Habermas, he structural transformation of the public sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: he MIT Press, 1991). 7 L. Dahlberg,“he Habermasian Public Sphere: A Speciication of the Idealized Conditions of Democratic Communication,” Studies in Social and Political hought 10 (2004), p. 3-6. 83 Monika Kareniauskaitė problem I am trying to solve by proposing the use of a combination of already existing and well-known theories analyzing the public sphere and those devoted to the analysis of totalitarian societies. Another important concept in this research is anti-communist tendencies. It is much broader than other notions, common in Lithuanian historiography, such as: anti-Soviet resistance, passive resistance, unarmed resistance, ect. 8 All types of anti-communist tendencies, whether active or passive, could cre- ate a greater or smaller alternative space which can be identiied as the public sphere. Hence, the basic concept in the article of anti-Soviet tendencies includes all the above-mentioned forms of anti-communist activities and refers to all forms of actions and words, performed or said with the intention of criticizing or eliminating the Soviet system during the period of 1956-1988. Anti-communist activity pursued in Soviet Lithuania ater 1956 is not a pop- ular topic 9 in contemporary Lithuanian historiography. In the Lithuanian historical memory ‘armed resistance’ or, in other words, the partisan war is treated as especially important. 10 he anti-Soviet actions taken ater 1953 have not been investigated extensively enough because ater the collapse of the USSR Lithuanian scientists were engaged in the intensive work of collecting historical data and describing the phenomenon in the language of historical facts in the course of the two previous decades. Besides, the fact that social 8 Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame- aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 2 (4) (1998), p. 52-54. 9 More on the historiography tradition of anti-communist activities in Soviet Lithuania in: Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame- aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,”; Monika Kareniauskaitė, “Lietuvos neginkluotojo antisovietinio pasipriešinimo antrosios sovietų okupacijos metais ištakos ir veiksniai,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 2 (30) (2011). 10 For example, one of the research programs carried out by the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania is called ‘he Unarmed anti-Soviet Resistance, 1954- 1988.’ See more in: htp://www.genocid.lt/centras/lt/1497/a/. 84  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development sciences in Lithuania are comparatively young 11 helps to explain why anti-Soviet tendencies in Lithuania during the period of the oppressive Soviet rule have not yet been extensively studied on the basis of latest modern scientiic con- cepts related to investigations into modern and late-modern societies, whether democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian. Most Lithuanian authors agree that the development of anti-communist activities in Soviet Lithuania was not a uniform process. here were several main ideological groups: the ethno-cultural movement, the Roman Catholic activists (bishops, priests, religious and lay people), the nationalistic under- ground, and the liberals. he ethno-cultural movement was semi-legal. hree other forms were strictly persecuted by Soviet law and the KGB, particularly for their main method of activity, which was the underground publishing and dissemination of samizdat 12 (illegal press – M.K.). In this article I shall use several examples of Lithuanian historiography to represent basic research car- ried out into the various above-mentioned groups of anti-communist activists. Almost all of these groups are depicted in the above-mentioned volume edited by Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė and Ainė Ramonaitė. 13 his article also concentrates 11 In the LSSR the social sciences and humanities were under a high degree of state control and ideologization and so had very limited conditions to develop and to forma critical approach. Ater the collapse of USSR, it had to destroy the old paradigms and build new ones almost from the start. See more in: A. Švedas, Matricos nelaisvėje. Sovietmečio lietuvių istoriograija (1944-1985) (Vilnius: Aidai, 2009), English translation of this study will be published in due course, undet the title: In the Captivity of the Matrix. Soviet Lithuanian Historiography, 1944-1985. 12 I use term samizdat, which etymologically means‘self-published,’ to describe all forms of illegal publishing and dissemination of illegal press in Soviet Union. 13 J. Kavaliauskaitė and A. Ramonaitė, ed., Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant: nepaklusniųjų tinklaveikos galia (Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2011), see also the article by those authors in this volume. 85 Monika Kareniauskaitė on research by Egidijus Jaseliūnas 14 orientated towards the phenomenon of illegal publishing and the Catholic movement; work by Valdemaras Klumbys 15 on the liberal stream of the anti-Soviet movement; and an article by Živilė Račkauskaitė, 16 which analyses all streams of the movement between the 1960s and 1970s. he main historical sources of this research are authentic documents of the Lithuanian underground (usually printed on the pages of the samizdat press) and the underground periodicals. he Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania (hereinater referred to as LKBK) published from 1972 through 1989, the longest-running Lithuanian samizdat periodical. It was published and disseminated by a network of nuns, priests, and other religious and lay people. It contained mainly facts about the violations of the universal human rights in the Lithuanian SRR and all over the USSR. 17 Starting with the violation of the rights of the believers, the periodical in the course of its existence devel- oped into a more universal discourse and encompassed not only violations of religious rights but also of human rights in general. 18 Nonetheless, seeking to achieve as great degree of objectivity as possible, the relection of the reality in LKBK has to be compared with the images of the reality found in the publications of other anti-communist groups. hat is why 14 E. Jaseliūnas, “Periodinės savilaidos formavimasis: sovietinio disidentizmo reiškinys ir Lietuvos katalikiškasis judėjimas,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 1(11) (2002); E. Jaseliūnas, “Vatikano II Susirinkimo nutarimų įtaka katalikiškojo pasipriešinimo formavimuisi Lietuvoje,” Genocidas ir rezistencija, 2 (12) (2002). 15 V. Klumbys, “Pogrindžio leidinys Perspektyvos (1978–1981): intelektualiosios savilaidos pradžia Lietuvoje,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 2 (12) (2002). 16 Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame- aštuntajame dešimtmetyje.” 17 A. Streikus, Sovietų valdžios antibažnytinė politika Lietuvoje (1940-1990), (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2002), p. 251-252. 18 Lithuanian Special Archives, f. K-1, ap. 58, b. P16577, vol. 6, p. 63 86  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development I use another important source, Perspektyvos, an illegal periodical published by the liberal section of the movement between 1978 and 1981, known as one of the most intellectual and sophisticated periodicals of the Lithuanian sam- izdat. Although published by the liberal stream, it relects other streams in the movement as well. 19 I will use the published version of the source. 20 he documents found in the Lithuanian Special Archives and the pub- lished documents are important as well. he Archives contain documents that were drawn up and disseminated by the representatives of the Lithuanian anti-communist underground (such as proclamations or protest declarations). Public Sphere in the Communist Regime? From Theory to the Case of the LSSR If we seek to go deeply into understanding various anti-communist tendencies in the Lithuanian SSR ater 1956, it is necessary to start with the analysis of the regime and the society. It is also important to reconsider diferent theories and concepts, which could serve as an efective tool for explaining the anti-com- munist tendencies in LSSR. In its original meaning, the main subject of my article – the public sphere – is a speciic area in social life where individuals come together to freely discuss and identify societal problems, and inluence political action through that discussion. It is ‘a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss maters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment. here are many examples of such spaces – this type of discussion can be developed in direct tête-à-tête communication, as well through the 19 V. Klumbys, “Pogrindžio leidinys Perspektyvos (1978–1981),” p. 179. 20 Perspektyvos. Lietuvos pogrindžio leidinys. 1978-1981 m. (Vilnius: Gairės, 2005). 87 Monika Kareniauskaitė mass media.’ 21Also, the existence and shape of the public sphere is the tool that helps the existence or absence of a ‘civil society,’ which is not equal to the state, to be identiied. 22 At irst sight, the use of the concept of the public sphere to identify the processes which took place in the Communist state seems very problematic for two reasons: a) the theory of the public sphere was created and developed by Habermas observing and studying Western democracies; hence, doubts arise about it being directly applied to studies of the communist states of Eastern Europe; b) in a classical understanding of the communist societies there are many doubts about whether such a social discourse as the public sphere could exist there under the conditions of strict state control or even total dominance of the Communist Party. here are other theoretical limitations too. he concept the public sphere in its original meaning refers to the ‘bourgeoisie public sphere,’ a speciic space of democracy based on communication, developed during the modernization of European society and the growing power of the bourgeoisie as a social class in the 18th century. 23 However, Jürgen Habermashas reconsidered his theory many times. According to Habermas, scholar Mat Cooke in his recent the- oretical works, instead of ‘atempting to derive critical norms from speciic historical moments (…) aims to unearth the general structures of action’ and to understand ‘the everyday communicative practice.’ 24 21 G. A. Hauser, “Vernacular Dialogue and the Rhetoricality of Public Opinion,” Communication Monographs 65 (2) (1998), p. 86; G. h. Goodnight, “he Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument,” Journal of the American Forensics Association 18 (1982), p. 214-227. 22 J. Habermas,he structural transformation of the public sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: he MIT Press, 1991), p. 18-25. 23 J. Habermas, he structural transformation of the public sphere, p. xvii-xix. 24 L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 5. 88  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development hus, at the present time, the concept of the public sphere is not necessarily linked to concrete historical circumstances, nor to the geographical and cultural sphere in social sciences and humanities. It is not tied to the initial theory and is used within many diferent contexts. Soviet and Communist studies also try to reconsider the processes in the communist states in light of this theory. One such theoretical example useful in our research, the work by Gabriel A. Barhaim, is focused on a distinction between public and private spaces in totalitarian societies. Barhaim links the concept of the public sphere with the classical paradigm of totalitarianism. According to the author, the dichotomy between public and private spheres was accentuated by both Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas. Furthermore, both of them identiied the public sphere, irst of all, with political action. 25 According to Barhaim, many diferent kinds of phenomena exist in the social and historical reality where the public sphere is able (or unable) to exist: in the street or agora, within a political party or a workers organization (as in the case of Solidarity in Poland), or in the mass media. For example, the samizdat can be treated as an illustrative example of the public sphere if it fulils at least several necessary conditions, which will be discussed at length further. his deinition of the public sphere is very broad. Under the conditions of communism and state control it even includes unconventional events or informal clothing fashions. 26 According to Barhaim, the situation of so-called ‘weak totalitarianism’ is necessary for the existence of an alternative space and the public sphere. However, the formation of the public sphere in a communist state is diferent from that in other societies: there the state controls and restricts the public sphere and suppresses the private one. his suppression, however, contrary to 25 G. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations, p. 121-122. 26 G. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations, p. 122. 89 Monika Kareniauskaitė the case of a classical form of totalitarianism, 27 can lead to the formation of an opposite public discourse. 28 As we see, under the conditions of non-democracy, the concept of the pub- lic sphere can be understood as a speciic sphere, free or liberated from state control, in which various forms of protest and sometimes of political action pursued by individuals can be developed. Of course, this understanding difers from the classical deinition of the public sphere. In the situation of democra- cy a political action in the public sphere can inluence the general line of the state policy, and it has political power to afect real structural changes. 29 As we will see later, under the rule of communism the public sphere can have an impact on the atitudinal changes taking place in the society, and to include new participants in that sphere. Although it could hardly inluence communist leaders and the general political line of the Communist Party. Today the concept of the public sphere in Soviet and communist studies is treated as an efective tool used to measure processes that take place in the communist societies. But there is another serious methodological problem: was the society of the Lithuanian SSR, even in the late Soviet era, in a state of ‘weak totalitarianism,’ in which some alternative discourse could be borne? 30 he social sciences today have the tools to answer this question and to explain the processes in Soviet states ater the death of Stalin. It seems that, preserv- ing some features of the classical totalitarianism, such societies were able to develop new types of communism. According to Lithuanian sociologist Ze- nonas Norkus, Soviet Lithuania ater the death of Stalin gradually gained some 27 Described, irst of all, by Hannah Arendt. 28 G. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations, p. 161. 29 J. Habermas, he structural transformation of the public sphere. 30 H. Arendt, he Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: he World Publishing Company, 1958), p. 341-342. 90  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development features of a political regime called ‘national patrimonial communism.’ he common decline of communism and transformation of the communist soci- eties in the 1960s here led to the one important process: the growing impact of ethnic Lithuanians in the Communist Party of Lithuania. Besides, the earlier Communists genuinely and strongly believed in ideology and were ideological and high-principled, whereas later Communists lost their belief. hey were pragmatic and belonged to the Party only to derive beneits or make a career. hey belonged to the ethnic majority of society. hese changes brought new tendencies, and space for expressing national feelings came into legal being. It was not as great as in Poland or Hungary, but it existed. 31 Of course, this space was still strictly controlled by the Communist Par- ty. However, there was a theoretical possibility that this space could be used as a tool to generate some marginal and alternative ideas and practices under the conditions of reduced state control: in ‘the national-patrimonial commu- nist’ regime the authorities usually encounter some opposing social groups. 32 It is important to mention that under these conditions the strategy of the authorities difers from that under a totalitarian regime. he authorities do not suppress the opposite tendencies but come to a certain compromise with the society. In general the authorities manage to achieve general passivity of the majority of the society, although they do loosen their control over certain spheres of life. Most oten such spheres are related to historical national heritage and architecture, archaeology and ethnic culture. Here the society can feel free from communist rhetoric and propaganda. heoretically, such a compromise 31 Z. Norkus, Kokia demokratija, koks kapitalizmas? Pokomunistinė transformacija Lietuvoje lyginamosios istorinės sociologijos požiūriu (Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2008), p. 258-259. 32 Z. Norkus, Kokia demokratija, p. 257. 91 Monika Kareniauskaitė should prevent the society from taking real political action and bringing about direct confrontation with the regime. It creates the illusion of relative freedom. 33 In the case of Soviet Lithuania the above mentioned ‘regional’ or ‘ethno-cul- tural’ movement which started in the 1950s its into this category perfectly. It was not openly opposed to the Soviet system but focused on Lithuania’s his- tory, ethnology, traditions, celebration of traditional feasts, and the visiting of historically, politically and culturally signiicant sites, etc. he authorities, at least at the onset of the movement, did not see that as dangerous and did not expect a limited amount of nationalism to provoke real political action. On the contrary, that could be seen as a suitable method of allowing the active part of the society to express the need for social activities and, in this way, to neutralize its civic ambitions. However, the ‘ethno-cultural’ movement was gradually losing its former formality and became much more dangerous than the Soviet leaders could have imagined. Some of its members were included in the dissident social networks. he convictions of some of the members of the ‘ethno-cultural’ movement formed in social environments where not only legal forms of national feelings were expressed but also where opposite ideas spread by way of illegal printing and distribution of the samizdat. 34 hus, the changed nature of totalitarianism could be treated as part of the evidence and explanation of a critical and opposite discourse, which Jürgen Habermas called the public sphere and which existed and developed in the Communist LSSR. 33 Z. Norkus, Kokia demokratija, p. 257. 34 A. Ramonaitė, “Paralelinės visuomenės užuomazgos sovietinėje Lietuvoje: katalikiškojo pogrindžio ir etnokultūrinio sąjūdžio simbiozė,” in Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, ed. J. Kavaliauskaitė and A.R amonaitė, p. 33-59. 92  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development The Formation of Anti-communist Tendencies: the Origin and External Features of the Public Sphere in the Lithuanian SSR As I have already shown, the changed nature of totalitarianism can be treated as evidence that features of a special critical and opposite discourse, the public sphere, could exist and develop in the Communist Lithuanian SSR. Meanwhile the reconstruction of speciic historical circumstances which inluenced the formation of the public sphere helps to give an answer to the question of how, with certain features of the public sphere and social networks developing, it could exist in such a society where the authorities sought ‘to dismantle horizon- tal interpersonal relations of human being, [and] to destroy the independent organizations and communities.’ 35 Considerable doubt still exists as to whether those regimes which came to power in Lithuania in 1940 and later were able to transform society by turning it into a fully totalitarian one. he Nazi occupation lasted for only four years. And the USSR occupied Lithuania ater its totalitarianism had counted more than two decades. Hence, the processes which took place in the main part of the USSR in 1917 and aterwards had to be repeated; however, this was done in a hurry and under diferent conditions, which reduced qualitative changes and transformation indicators. Moreover, Lithuania and the Baltic States in general had historical backgrounds that considerably difered from those of other territories of the USSR. he Baltic States have been territories of Western Christianity for centuries and Catholicism played a signiicant role in Lithuania. Totalitarian transformations of these states were not so great, and they can be referred to as diferent. his is another reason why anti-communist tendencies could spread faster there. 35 A. Ramonaitė, J. Kavaliauskaitė, A. Švedas,“Savaimi visuomenė prieš totalitarinį režimą?” in Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, p. 12. 93 Monika Kareniauskaitė In the historical background there are more conditions leading to the understanding that the public sphere could be a suitable tool to explain the anti-communist tendencies in the Lithuanian SSR ater 1956. he history of peaceful Lithuanian anti-communist activities started even before the death of Stalin. However, the background of such tendencies and activities was es- tablished during the armed resistance against the Soviet regime (1944-1953). 36 During the armed resistance speciic ideological discourse (based on Lithuanian nationalism, the idea of the necessity for an independent state with a demo- cratic shape) began to develop, as well as new, non-armed resistance methods: foundations of unarmed resistance organizations, dissemination of lealets, and printing of various underground documents and newspapers. 37 he resistance was crushed by the Soviet regime. But the ideology of the participants in armed resistance, which was an alternative to communist propaganda, was gradually transferred to other groups in the society. 38 his discourse later became the foundation, leading to formation of the public sphere. One method of spreading alternative information was the publishing of the underground press. Developed by armed resistance participants, this method was actively used by members of the non-armed anti-communist resistance in the 1960s and, by the impact of Russian dissidents, gradually gained the form of samizdat. 39 36 B. Gailius, Partizanai tada ir šiandien (Vilnius: Versus Aureus, 2006). 37 B.Gailius, Partizanai tada ir šiandien, p. 13; Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame-aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,” p. 52; N. Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė, “Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdžio strategija,” p. 38; Lietuva 1940-1990: okupuotos Lietuvos istorija, p. 425. 38 A. Dabrovolskas, “Lietuvos akademinio jaunimo antisovietinis pasipriešinimas šeštajame-septintajame dešimtmetyje,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 1(29) (2011), p. 132; N. Žemaitienė, “Pogrindinė organizacija Laisvę Lietuvai,“ Genocidas ir rezistencija 1(9) (2001), p. 118. 39 Lithuanian Special Archives, f. K-1, ap. 58, b. 44614/3, t. 6, l. 303. 94  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development In the LSSR the size of the public space as an alternative to communism and the ideology of its members changed with the passing of time. At the beginning it could be hardly identiied as public sphere. It was ideologically uniform, had no features of self-relexivity or possibilities for discussion and exchange of various opinions. 40 However, during further development of an- ti-communist tendencies in LSSR the main ideological features, values and ideas changed considerably, from closed nationalism to the spirit of universal values and human rights. 41 Ater the ‘transitional period,’ in which the main type of activity was that of underground youth organizations, 1956 marked new inspiration and a change in the Lithuanian unarmed resistance movement. his was related to more general processes in the entire Eastern Bloc: the Russian dissident movement, the de-Stalinization launched by Nikita Khrushchev, and the Hungarian rev- olution. he anti-communist activities of the 1970s and 1980s were impacted mostly by the events in Hungary and Poland in 1956 and by the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia of 1968. Oppositional tendencies manifested themselves in various legal and illegal organizations, and associations, circles and under- ground discussion clubs lourished in the above-mentioned ‘ethno-cultural’ movement. 42 hus, we see that the 1950s and 1960s was a time of consolidation and dif- ferentiation of the social groups engaged in diferent forms of anti-communist activities. Diferent ideological content became the basis for forming the various streams of the movement: Catholic, liberal, nationalistic and ethno-cultural. 40 L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere.” 41 From the open leter to Albertas Laurinčiukas, editor of the main LSSR periodical, Tiesa, 1979. 03. 25, quoted in: Aušra 4 quoted in: Nenugalėtoji Lietuva. Antisovietinis pogrindis. Kalba dokumentai, vol. 2 (Vilnius: Valst. leidybos centras, 1993), p. 130-131. 42 Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame- aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,” p. 59. 95 Monika Kareniauskaitė At this time the discourse formed by these activities was becoming more and more like the theoretical public sphere of Habermas. Today the links between the Hungarian Revolution and the formation of the public sphere in the Lithuanian SSR are corroborated by science, whereas links with the Polish experience have not been thoroughly researched. I see the possibility to put forward a hypothesis about relations with the past of Poland. his is made possible by the fact that Lithuanian organizations use the same rhetoric and semantic constructions as the members of the Poznań protests. 43 he relations with Russian dissidents were established in the 1960s. In the 1970s the idea that it was important to defend human rights came from Russia to the Lithuanian SSR. he phenomenon of the Russian samizdat also contributed greatly to the underground press in Lithuania with regards to methods, traditions, contents, form and dissemination. 44 he turning point in anti-communist activities came in 1972. Publishing of the most important underground periodical – LKBK– exerted a great impact on this process. LKBK united Russian and Lithuanian dissidents in a common network through which the underground publications reached the Western countries. he underground press of both countries wrote about their anti-communist movements. 45 Estab- lishing close relationships with the Russian dissident movement was one of the main reasons why the Lithuanian anti-communist movement took a diferent turn and acquired a new ideological quality, new valuable features and began to develop new forms of activity. 46 43 J. R. Bagušauskas, Lietuvos jaunimo pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui ir jo slopinimas (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 1999), p. 187-188. 44 V. Klumbys, “Pogrindžio leidinys,” p. 185. 45 S. Tichomirovas,“Sergejaus Kovaliovo veikla disidentiniame judėjime ir ryšiai su Lietuva,” Genicidas ir rezistencija 1(21) (2007), p. 121. 46 E. Jaseliūnas, “Periodinės savilaidos formavimasis,” p. 9. 96  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development A new period in the Lithuanian anti-communist movement was also strong- ly afected by the Prague Spring. 47 Mass demonstrations provoked by the self-immolation of 19-year-old Romas Kalanta were a clear relection of that event. 48 Further development of the anti-communist movement was marked by the growth of the underground press; the establishment of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group in 1975 and other organizations aimed at ighting against the violations of human rights in the USSR and the Lithuanian SSR; the establish- ment of the Lithuanian Liberty League in 1978 (the main organization among the members of the anti-communist movement of the nationalist wing); and other activities. he development of the anti-communist movement in the territory of Lithuania was also inluenced by such factors as Western youth counterculture (hippies), the Second Vatican Council, and illegal Western radio stations, some of which broadcasted programs in Lithuanian, reading passages from the Lithuanian samizdat press. 49 All these changes in the inner discourse of anti-communism ideas were the reason for forming discursive space similar to the public sphere. In the 1950s anti-communist tendencies in the Lithuanian SSR took the shape of diferent social networks. he 1970s in particular were marked by rapid growth in alternative activities. he evaluation of such activities, as Ramonaitė 47 Clandestine Perspektyvos published in 1978 the article on Prague events, see: “Prahos pamokos” in Nenugalėtoji Lietuva, p. 37-38. 48 M. Kareniauskaitė, “Romas ir kalantinės atminties ir užmaršties verpetuose,” Naujasis Židinys-Aidai 5 (2012), p. 347-351. 49 J. R. Bagušauskas, “Užsienio radijo laidos tautos kovoje dėl laisvės sovietinio režimo metais,“ Genocidas ir rezistencija 2 (10) (2001), p. 63-71; E. Jaseliūnas, “Periodinės savilaidos formavimasis,” p. 7-44; E. Jaseliūnas, “Vatikano II Susirinkimo nutarimų įtaka katalikiškojo pasipriešinimo formavimuisi Lietuvoje,” p. 61-80; Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame-aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,” p. 52-69. 97 Monika Kareniauskaitė showed in her research, was determined by the symbiosis of two important components: the Catholic underground and the ethno-cultural movement. 50 On account of this symbiosis, two ideologically diferent social and cul- tural environments in which anti-communist trends manifested themselves were linked into a single close interpersonal network. Many members from one circle (e.g. Catholics) took part in the activities of another circle (e.g. eth- no-cultural). his is interesting, as these members were ideological opponents and many of their fundamental values varied; nonetheless, they carried out activities together. 51 Symbiosis is very important to our research. It shows that various anti-com- munist tendencies did not exist separately; they were linked into a common discourse or a network of communication. It seems that the conditions nec- essary to form the public sphere could really develop in these social networks. he LKBK started a new period and it became a symbolic mediator between diferent underground streams. 50 A. Ramonaitė, J. Kavaliauskaitė and A. Švedas, “Savaimi visuomenė prieš totalitarinį režimą?,” p. 11; A. Ramonaitė, “Paralelinės visuomenės užuomazgos sovietinėje Lietuvoje,” p. 33-58. 51 A. Ramonaitė, “Paralelinės visuomenės užuomazgos sovietinėje Lietuvoje,” p. 50, 52. 98  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development Inner Characteristics of the Anti-communist Discourse I have shown that diferent forms of free communication and an alternative discourse existed in Soviet Lithuania. Now I am going to explain why this discourse can be deined using the concept of the public sphere and describe the limitations of this treatment. According to Jürgen Habermas, the author of this concept, the public sphere was seen irst of all as a speciic discourse of free communication that was not subject to state control. 52 Hence, the possibility of one or another space in social reality being identiied as an example of the public sphere lies in special characteristics of communication which help us to identify whether any space can or cannot be regarded as a public sphere. His follower L. Dahlberg broad- ens the understanding of the public sphere. In analyzing Habermas’ texts he discovered that the public sphere was deined as a speciic discursive space that had six main characteristics: a) the reasoned exchange of problematic validity claims, b) relexivity, c) ideal role taking, d) sincerity, e) formal inclusion and discursive quality and e) autonomy from state and corporate power. 53 As we see, Dahlberg did not conceive of these characteristics, as they were formulated in Habermas’ texts. However, we cannot refer to these characteris- tics as strictly Habermasian either. Habermas established this framework, but we use the version as it was extended and concretized by Dahlberg, who took Habermas’ initial version as the basis but added something of his own to it. he irst feature means that participants in the public sphere should initiate discourse and evaluate the discussion or debates when they already have a strong and reasoned initial position. he topic under consideration should not be of local importance only; it has to be meaningful to a broader group of the society, even to those who do not directly participate in the discussion. his means 52 T. McCarthy quoted in: Habermas, he structural transformation, p. xi-xii. 53 L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 2. 99 Monika Kareniauskaitė that all arguments in the public sphere ‘have to be addressed not only to those taking part in the conversation but also to all others potentially afected by the claims under consideration, to a “larger,” “ideal” or “virtual” community of discussants.’ 54 To be understood as valid, the discourse of argumentation in the public sphere should be addressed ‘to the universal audience,’ or to be ‘universalizable.’ Even in cases of ‘less universal’ claims, participants speak to the ‘virtual’ public concerned. 55 Was the anti-communist discourse able to overcome the local level and move on to universal argumentation? Actually, among the Lithuanian underground activists such type of reasoning was highly common. We see in the samizdat and various underground documents that the underground activists maintain to be representatives of the rights of ‘all the nations of Eastern Europe.’ It is worth remembering that the Lithuanian dissi- dent movement, especially its Catholic part, deined themselves ever more oten as defenders of universal human rights (and in fact they gradually became such). Atempts to appeal even to the individuals who were heavily involved in the prevailing Communist social order, for example, teachers of a communist school, can be treated as eforts to turn the discourse into a more universal one. hose teachers were responsible not only for basic education of an individual but also for the formation of Communist values of the young gen- eration. 56 54 J. Habermas quoted in: L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 7. 55 J. Habermas quoted in: L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 7. 56 he Declaration of Lithuanian Liberty League, 1978. 06.15 in: Lietuvos Laisvės Lyga: nuo „Laisvės šauklio” iki nepriklausomybės (Vilnius: Naujoji Matrica, 2006), p. 119. 100  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development his so-called ‘Leter to the Teacher’ was published in LKBK. In it a symbolic, abstracted igure of a father, which represents much broader contexts, tries to prove to another symbolic igure, the ‘opponent’, that communist values are not absolute, that there are hierarchically higher values and aims. 57 hus, the Lithuanian anti-communist underground seems to have succeeded in ‘translat- ing their particular injustices into a more universal language of civic justice.’ 58 Relexivity is another condition under which the public sphere is able to exist. It means that during such communication ‘the participants question and transcend whatever their initial preferences may be.’ 59 So, the participants are not passive but can be afected by strong and reasoned arguments of the other side. Proof of relexivity of the discourse of the anti-communist activists of the Lithuanian SSR could be seen as a solution to the following conlict: Catholics started publishing more articles devoted to national issues because nationalists reproached them for their lack of activity. When the Catholic underground started to publish LKBK, the nationalistic underground activists were critical of its contents, as they focused insuiciently on ‘national’ issues and failed to raise the idea of the political independence of Lithuania. 60 he Catholics responded to this criticism. Although the national problems did not become as important as the activists of the nationalistic underground had expected, the number of publications devoted to it was gradually on the increase. For 57 “Laiškas mokytojui,” Lietuvos Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika, vol. 1, 7 (1973), p. 285-288, htp://www.lkbkronika.lt/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=13&Itemid=29#k7n1 (accessed June 26, 2013) 58 Alexander quoted in: G. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations, p. 161. 59 J. Habermas quoted in L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 7. 60 “he appeal of lay people to the publishers of ”he Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania,” August 4, 1975 in Lietuvos Laisvės Lyga: nuo „Laisvės šauklio” iki nepriklausomybės, ed. Gintaras Šidlauskas, vol. 2 (Vilnius: Naujoji Matrica, 2006), p. 262-271. 101 Monika Kareniauskaitė example, in 1980, the protest document addressing the Lithuanian national issues under the title ‘Lithuanians defend their language’ was published. 61 We can see that the discourse of the underground press in the LSSR was relective and its relexivity made the discourse similar to that of a classic public sphere. he participants in it were at least partially ‘willing to question and mod- ify their own positions in the light of other relevant claims and reasons, which in turn demands taking the position of the other.’ 62 Of course, the principle of relexivity worked only inside the discourse. he anti-communist activists were not ready to rethink, for example, the values of the oicial ideology. However, even the concept of communism was not always treated as exclusively negative. For example, the ideas of Gintautas Iešmantas, whose articles were printed in Perspektyvos, were aimed at creating an alternative, more faithful version of Communism or, at least, of the socialist reality. 63 he third condition for the public sphere to exist is ideal role taking: ‘in a ra- tional discourse the participants put themselves in the position of all those po- tentially afected by the claims under consideration, and consider the situation from these other perspectives.’ So, the participants in the discourse have to be ‘open and sensitive to how others understand themselves and the world.’ 64 his discourse ‘demands a commitment to working through diferences.’ 65 he above-mentioned ‘Leter to the teacher’ is a characteristic example of a situation where dissidents try to understand the position of their ideological opponents participating in the mainstream discourse. 61 “Lietuviai gina savo kalbą,” Lietuvos Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika, vol.6, no. 41 (1980), p. 111-113, htp://www.lkbkronika.lt/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=86&Itemid=69#n6. (accessed June 26, 2013). 62 L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 8. 63 V. Klumbys, “Pogrindžio leidinys,” p. 198-199. 64 L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere”, p. 8. 65 L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere”, p. 8. 102  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development here is one more example illustrating ideal role taking. he traditional Lithuanian identity in the irst half of the 20th century was deined through linguistic and ethnic criteria, and also in a defensive and negative manner. To be Lithuanian in the interwar period Lithuania was the same as not to be Russian, German, Polish or Jewish. In the anti-communist discourse we see a com- pletely diferent view. ‘Traditional ethnical narrowness’ in the environment of Lithuanian dissidents and other anti-Soviet activists was transcended, irst of all, owing to direct contacts and communication with he Other. hese contacts and communication were maintained owing to joint activities with the Russian dissidents. 66 Sensitivity towards the other was also expressed in the growing atention to the Holocaust and concern about the problems of Jewish people. For ex- ample, the Lithuanian resistance activist from the nationalistic wing Antanas Terleckas was very confused by and angry with an article in the underground periodical Aušra, 67 in which the responsibility of the Lithuanian people in the killing of Jews during the Holocaust was negotiated. He responded to it by initiating a discussion presenting the opposite atitude. 68 his example of a discussion developed in the intellectual samizdat discourse, uncontrolled by the Soviet authorities, is a typical example of a discussion in the public sphere as deined by Habermas. It does not only reveal relexivity and sensitivity to the position of the other, but it is also orientated towards a strong argumentation based on dimensions such as truth and consciousness. 66 Lietuvos Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika vol. 2, no. 15 (1975), p. 357-365, htp://www. lkbkronika.lt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21&Itemid=38#356. (accessed June 25, 2013). 67 A. Žuvintas, “Lietuviai ir žydai (Atviras laiškas Tomui Venclovai),” Aušra vol. 3, 9 (49) (1978), p. 149-154, htp://www.lkbkronika.lt/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=338&Itemid=222. (accessed June 26, 2013) 68 A. Terleckas, Laisvės priešaušryje. Rezistento prisiminimai 1970-1986 (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2011), p. 12. 103 Monika Kareniauskaitė his situation illustrates another feature of communication necessary in the public sphere – sincerity, whereby the participants in this discourse use only true arguments, and ‘all relevant information’ is ‘given honestly.’ So, un- der such conditions, ‘all communicative action presupposes truthfulness of expression. ‘In this type of communication ‘discursive openness’ is chosen instead of ‘deception’ and ‘argumentation is premised upon honesty.’ 69 his way of arguing and developing a discussion was the basic virtue and value declared by the publishers of the Lithuanian samizdat. ‘Samizdat whose roots were hidden in the Russian samizdat stuck to the basic principle that only information based on facts should be published. he information published in the samizdat, especially Catholic ones, had to be checked and veriied.’ 70 Non-Catholics acted and developed their argumentation in a similar way, avoiding ‘myths, stereotypes and rumors.’ 71 Also, to form the ‘public sphere,’ formal and discursive equality is needed. It means that the public sphere is a place ‘open to all participants potential- ly afected by the claims under consideration’ and ‘each participant is given equal opportunities’ to express his/her arguments, opinions and atitudes. 72 Cultural, social and other inequalities should not be obstacles to participation, but opportunities to put forward arguments and to be heard and understood. 73 his principle was very well expressed by the publishers of Perspektyvos, a pe- riodical which declared in its program thesis that ‘it would provide its read- ers with the possibility to express their opinions and atitudes.’ 74 his means 69 J. Habermas quoted in: L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 8-9. 70 E. Jaseliūnas, “Periodinės savilaidos formavimasis,” p. 29-31. 71 A. Terleckas, Laisvės priešaušryje, p. 138-139. 72 J. Habermas quoted in: L. Dahlberg, , “he Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 9. 73 L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 9. 74 Perspektyvos 1 (1978), reprinted in: Perspektyvos. Lietuvos pogrindžio leidinys, p. 34. 104  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development that the periodical did not only have a turn for relexivity but also questioned vertical and hierarchical one-sided relations common in the traditional mass media, where the power to express various ideas and atitudes is granted only to the publishers and writers. Under these conditions the readers have no such opportunity and can only express opinions in an indirect way, for example by refusing to buy one newspaper or another if they disagree with its contents. In this way Perspektyvos tried to achieve equality not only between authors and participants in direct discourse, but also between them and the audience. So, it is not by chance that another important program thesis of Perspektyvos was to emphasis their search for a renewal of society based on the principles of true democracy. It was also stressed that any article could be printed in the periodical if it adhered to the following principle: ‘respect the opinion of another even if you disagree with it.’ 75 Some features of the growing equality can be found even in the Catholic stream. First of all, it was inluenced by the Second Vatican Council, which in- creased the role of laymen in the life of the Church and inspired them to become enterprising rather than passive. However, the anti-communist discourse, as we saw, sometimes violated the principle of discursive equality, as seen in the abovementioned situation when publishers of the Catholic samizdat rejected the texts of the representatives of other ideological steams. he inal condition of the ideal example of the public sphere is autonomy rom state and corporate power. 76 I believe that the fact that the anti-communist activists in the Lithuanian SSR created discourse that was autonomous and free from the communist state power is discussed more than once in this article and does not need any separate argumentation. 75 Perspektyvos 1 (1978), reprinted in: Perspektyvos. Lietuvos pogrindžio leidinys, p. 34. 76 L. Dahlberg, “he Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 10. 105 Monika Kareniauskaitė Hence, the alternative discourse in the LSSR lacked some conditions under which the public sphere could function perfectly. It was illegal and could not afect the oicial ideology. However, it seems that the Barhaim’s hypothesis can be conirmed by this research: restrictions on the public sphere in a Com- munist state and restrictions on the private sphere can lead to opposition and resistance to these restrictions. And this opposition can be expressed as the formation of an alternative public discourse and in an alternative space of relatively free inter-individual communication. 77 Conclusions Ater 1956 Soviet Lithuanian society underwent a transformation of the former totalitarianism. he regime gained even more features of ‘national-patrimonial communism.’ Under such conditions the opportunities for the formation of the alternative space of communication and ideas emerged. here were several social and ideological sources that formed the basis for an alternative anti-communist discourse. Firstly, alternative space and several small groups of individuals able to create an alternative discourse existed in the Lithuanian SSR from the very beginning of armed anti-Soviet resistance. Sec- ondly, in the late 1950s the so called ‘ethno-cultural’ movement became a space of legally expressed nationalism. hirdly, the main human and intellectual resource to contribute to the formation of anti-communist discourse was the Catholic Church and its persecuted believers. We also have to mention various circles of intellectuals and intelligentsia, the underground debate clubs and ideologically suppressed scientists and artists. he consolidation of the alternative space in the LSSR started in the 1960s and it reached its culmination in the 1980s. At that time the discursive reality 77 G. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations, p. 157. 106  Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development produced by the individuals who took part in social networks of the anti-com- munist activities and spread anti-communist ideas gained features of the com- munication type called the public sphere. It goes without saying that the kind of public sphere developed in a non-democratic Communist state difered from that developed under the conditions of democracy. he essential diferences lay in the openness of the discourse to the public and the ability to inluence real political action – in the anti-communist discourse of the LSSR this did not exist because of the communist monopoly on information. Also, the de- velopers of this discourse were subject to diferent forms of repression, and it is hardly possible that the majority of the society could have been strongly afected by it. However, spreading these ideas by such means as radio could increase the number of people involved and add them to those familiar with the anti-communist public discourse through reading the samizdat. Hence, as we have seen, the discourse of anti-communist activities in the Lithuanian SSR led to a beter understanding between diferent underground groups and was the space in which democratic debates between diferent ideo- logical streams could exist and be evaluated, even under the Communist system. Owing to these debates democratic values could be strengthened. Tramslated by Aldona Matulytė 107  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology Valdemaras Klumbys Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology When discussing concepts of an individual’s relation with the Soviet regime in Lithuanian science and public opinion, we have to analyze not only the Soviet period and the history of its studies but also the post-Soviet Lithuanian society and changes to it. It is not easy to say whether such an analysis reveals more about the Soviet period or about the present. he history of understanding the Soviet period is the history of an atempt to understand (and very oten to justify, consciously or unconsciously) oneself during the Soviet period. Most oten it was the people who lived under direct rule by the occupying powers who tried to understand that. his work is an atempt to ind an answer to two questions: a) how is the relationship between an individual and the regime in the Soviet period (and the Soviet period on the whole) treated in post-Soviet historiography and pop- ular writing and b) how and why has this treatment changed? Hence, atempts will be made to show both the situation of the Soviet period and a change in Lithuanian Sovietology. To achieve these objectives it is best suited to ana- lyze a change in the deinitions of the concepts of resistance and conformity and their neighboring terms. Of course, the greatest atention will be paid to the behavior of the cultural and political elite, as that was and still is the most oten investigated subject. Only the main concepts and trends in interpreting an individual and the regime during the Soviet period will be discussed in this work. he article will deal only with the most signiicant, most accurate works on Sovietology that 109 Valdemaras Klumbys best relect relevant tendencies, therefore one should not expect to ind a de- tailed historiographical review of this theme here; that is a task for a larger volume of work. hus far the Soviet period has oten been perceived of as a disease which struck down the societies that sufered from it, not only from the outside through the occupying force but also from the inside, through a change in people’s men- tality, values, and culture in a broad sense, the formation of homo sovieticus. It is oten said that the Soviet period traumatized both individuals and the entire society. On the other hand, the downfall of the USSR radically changed the economic, social and cultural living conditions of the people. Both the Soviet period and the secession from the Soviet Union can be assessed as a trauma and a shock, which let traces in the consciousness of both individuals and the society. herefore it seems expedient to look at the post-Soviet sovietological literature through the prism of recovering from the trauma, the shock or the event that caused grief. Diferent researchers see diferent stages of recovering from trauma; the present work is based on the concept of ive stages presented in the classical work by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, through which a dying or re- covering individual must pass 1 – negation, anger, negotiation, depression and inally, reconciliation and hope. It should be noted at once that these stages are not clearly separated one from another in sovietological literature, as manifestations of a new study did not oust the manifestations of the earlier ones. Works of diferent stages were published at the same time, sometimes taking into consideration the chang- ing circumstances and sometimes ignoring them. And the separation of the stages itself has been willfully made by the present author; hence, it is highly subjective, especially when one has to convey one’s own ideas. 1 E. Kübler-Ross, On death and dying: What the dying have to teach doctors, nurses, clergy and their own families (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 240. 110  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology I. Rejection Ater the Soviet period had become a thing of the past (symbolically for us it happened before the restoration of independence in 1990) it was necessary to establish our relation with it. he very irst reaction was to emphasize its complete strangeness. In emphasizing the fact of occupation the imposition and strangeness of the regime are brought to light. Oppression and compulsion, repressions of the regime and the genocide directed against the Lithuanian nation are accentuated especially strongly. he totalitarian paradigm of Sovi- etology was especially suitable to underline that. But more vocabulary of the totalitarian paradigm rather than the results its scientiic work was used at that period. he strongest emphasis was placed on the period of Stalin’s rule, when repressions and resistance peaked and were most obvious. It was sought to lay special emphasis on the novelty of the newly restored state and the absence of links with Soviet Lithuania. he specialist in religious studies Gintaras Beresnevičius ironically identiied the causes of such a situa- tion as follows: ‘there are collaborators both on the let and on the right [of the political party spectrum – V. K.], hence, it has been unanimously agreed that there nothing there prior to Sąjūdis.’ 2 And all that was there must be turned into something as alien as possible. For example, the word tarybinis turned into ‘Soviet’ in the public space thus linguistically accentuating the alienation of the regime. Incidentally, using the anonymous semi-euphemism ‘those times’ to refer to the Soviet period as if not daring to directly call it by its true name became popular in the society. Rejection was peculiarly convenient for many because it indirectly denied the fact that they had been sovietised. Sovietness was turned into such a stig- ma that it was especially diicult for an individual to admit to himself to have been Soviet. he negative legacy of the Soviet period was oten spoken of in 2 G. Beresnevičius, “Dešimtmečio mitologija,” Šiaurės Atėnai, 2002.01.05. 111 Valdemaras Klumbys an abstract way, although nobody speciically applied sovietness to himself/ herself; it was merely applied to others. An especially strong dichotomy into ‘we’ and ‘they’ formed, where the former represented universal goodness and the later meant all that was evil in the past. During the irst stage ‘they’ were more alien: the Soviets, Russians. hey occupied, brought oppression, tried to destroy us and we sufered, resisted and survived. Of course, there were traitors, collaborators, but, we, the nation, were unanimous in rejecting the Soviet re- gime. herefore the facts of resistance and oppression were accentuated quite naturally because this epoch was a mere struggle or period of sufering. he title of the sources of the Soviet period and the series of investigations Lietuvos kovų ir kančių istorija (he History of Lithuanian Struggles and Sufering), irst published in 1994, best illustrates this understanding. he citizens of Lithuania only either fought against the Soviet regime, or sufered from it. During the period of rejection it is complicated to speak about classiications of people’s behavior or all the more so about the exact terms. Actually there was no scholarly sovietology then. he above-presented image existed in the public space and popular writing rather than in scientiic literature. herefore it is almost impossible to speak about terminology during the irst stage: any words used were highly indeinite, unclear and inaccurate. his stage did not last long as rejection is usually the shortest phase in tolerating pain. It could not be otherwise: the Soviet era lasted too long to be passed over in silence. And once one had admited that the Soviet period did not only exist but that its elements had survived to the present day, all that remained was anger. 112  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology II. Anger (and some negotiating) It meant that the Soviet regime was accused of all past and present diiculties, and atempts were made, directly or discreetly, to ind the concrete perpe- trators. he occupiers alone could not be guilty, as the Lithuanians helped them. So, the term ‘collaborator’ was taken up and used alongside the term ‘resistance member’, and applied especially willingly to political or ideological opponents. During the irst stage ater the Soviet period had become a highly negative category from the moral point of view, any term automatically meant an assessment of behavior, positive or negative. And this gave rise to the ‘rubber’ terms, which were extended seeking to adapt them to oneself or to others in order to absolve or to condemn. It should be noted that accusations made in the Soviet period have re- mained inluential to the present day, and not only in the public space but also in scientiic literature. Recently a psychological study into the atermaths of the trauma in Lithuania of the Soviet period appeared under the eloquent title ‘What have they done to us?’ 3 We see the same division of us/them and laying all the blame on ‘them’, which is a personiied but unidentiied enemy. he way the question is raised shows that thus far the Soviet period has not been accepted as one’s own, that the distinction between we – the victims – and them – the butchers – still exists. his was the irst model of the relationship with the Soviet past. It can be referred to as the radical, accusing standpoint. It was strongest during the irst decade of independence although, as we have seen, it has remained in- luential to the present day. According to Vladimir Tismaneanu, in the entire post-communist space there existed ‘a vengeful myth whose fulillment would presumably create a community of presumed just avengers versus a minority of 3 D. Gailienė, Ką jie mums padarė: Lietuvos gyvenimas traumų psichologijos žvilgsniu (Vilnius: Tyto alba, 2008), p. 244. 113 Valdemaras Klumbys villains and rascals. It is based on the assumption that the communist society was divided into two main groups: them and us.’ 4 One can discern a third stage in the search for the guilty, that of negotiation: if we sacriice those who were guilty during the Soviet period, everything will go well for us. he only thing to be done is to carry out universal lustration, which will cleanse the society of the most active igures of the past, and having sacriiced them, the most guilty, Lithuania will throw of the oppressive burden of the past and will become non-Soviet indeed. hen it will be reborn anew and prosper. However, who is to blame for our suferings? he most obvious candidates to be guilty ones were collaborators. his opinion has become established in the public sphere and actually it has taken the place of political ideology that united the nation in the constantly changing post-Soviet reality. Collaborators, however, could have been deined in very diferent ways. For a long time there was no exact deinition at all: at irst it was only the highest oicials of the regime administration, then all members of the Communist Party, then on the whole almost all the residents of Lithuania were referred to as collaborators because according to such understanding, collaboration means ‘being in the network of everyday life established and controlled by the occupying authorities.’ 5 he broadness of the deinition depended on the desire to justify oneself or accuse others. Scholarly atempts to deine collaboration were rather delayed. Vytautas Ti- ninis’ deinition seems to be quite successful, where a collaborator is deined as: an assistant to the occupiers, a traitor of the Mother- land, an oicial, a clerk or an employee of the central 4 V. Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post- Communist Europe (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998), p. 17. 5 E. Witig-Marcinkevičiūtė, “Koks skirtumas tarp Nijolės Sadūnaitės ir Antano Sniečkaus?” Kultūros barai, 10 (2003), p. 23. 114  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology and local authorities (administration) of the occupied state who carries out instructions (policy) of the occu- pying authorities and who forcibly makes its citizens (compatriots) obey the will of the occupiers. People who most oten on account of political and ideological convictions [I would add venally – V. K.] have betrayed their Motherland, its independence and begun to col- laborate with the occupiers of their own free will are considered to collaborators. 6 his deinition, however, very well suits only the beginning of the occupation period. Until the early 1950s the alternative to Soviet power existed in the Lithuanian countryside as partisan resistance. herefore the ighting parties were clearly deined and it was more or less clear what behavior was allowed and what was condemned. An individual belonged to either one camp or the other. he question of what to call the majority of the rural population who tried to avoid both parties so that they could survive and not sufer arose only very rarely. he division into us/them indicated that our people were against the Soviets and supported the partisans. However, ater Stalin’s death when partisan resistance was suppressed and the repression abated the situation began to change. In order to identi- fy a collaborator it is necessary to say that he is on the side of the enemy. And how can the boundary between ‘our people’ and ‘enemies’ be established when they all live in a single society, and when people are already more or less used to the new system? It seems rather strange to speak about collaboration of an individual who was born in the Soviet period under that regime. hroughout history ‘collaboration’ is most oten applied to a period of short-term occupa- 6 V. Tininis, “Kolaboravimo sąvoka Lietuvos istorijos kontekste,” Genocidas ir rezistencija, 1(9) (2001), p. 71. 115 Valdemaras Klumbys tion that lasts for several years, when hostile parties are very clear-cut. It seems complicated to apply it to a regime which was in power for more than 10 years. herefore atempts have been made to chronologically limit the application of the term ‘collaboration.’ In the opinion of Algis Kasperavičius, this term can be used more or less until 1957, although activity that has deserved this designation existed later as well. 7 No agreement has been reached on this question and the term ‘collaboration’ was applied to the entire Soviet period during the depressive phase as well. he antipode of collaboration – resistance – was even more diicult to de- ine. Almost no questions arose about partisans, members of the underground organizations, or dissidents. However, when only three (and actually two) possibilities were let – to be repressed, to resist or to collaborate – all those who could not boast of having been repressed could try to become at least resistance ighters. Hence, the term resistance expanded like collaboration did, and various concepts of resistance emerged: cultural, 8 passive, 9 moral-cultu- ral, 10 internal, 11 etc. he term passive resistance encompassed all of them. Two deinitions clearly demonstrate the broadness and, in fact, the vagueness of its concepts. he literary critic Vytautas Kubilius stated that such resistance: 7 A. Kasperavičius, “Kolaboravimas: chronologinės ribos,” Genocidas ir rezistencija, 1(9) (2001), p. 88. 8 For example: K. Stoškus, “Dar apie kultūrinę rezistenciją: liudininkų parodymai,” Literatūra ir menas, 19 April 1997. 9 Ž. Račkauskaitė,“Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame- aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 2 (1998), p. 52. 10 Term used by a writer – Henrikas Algis Čigriejus: G. Mikelaitis, ed., Tikėti ir rašyti, 21 šiuolaikinis lietuvių rašytojas apie tikėjimą, kūrybąir save (Vilnius: Aidai, 2002), p. 56. 11 Mentioned as especially wide-spread: K. Girnius,Tauta, išbandymai, dorovė: tarp komunizmo ir demokratijos (Vilnius: Naujasis židinys-Aidai, 2011), p. 221. 116  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology encompassed many phenomena of life. his also in- cludes religious education of children at home. his is the preservation of the principles of good, morals and honesty in the families. his is talking about Lithu- ania’s past at schools. his is reviving folk songs and dances. his is spiritual radiance of free personalities who do not curry favours with anybody. 12 he historian Živilė Račkauskaitė deined passive resistance in a narrow sense as related ‘to non-conformist atitudes that prevailed among the intelligentsia in the sphere of culture and encouraged people not to serve the system [sic!], to resist it passively (in the true sense of the word), to avoid any collaboration.’ 13 he irst deinition is really very broad and, again, it is clearly moral; however, practically it is impossible to apply. How can the preservation of the princi- ples of good and morals in the family be investigated? Moreover, this concept states that he who resists is good and honest, thus identifying two diferent things: morals and political morality. he second deinition, although it is more scientiic and somewhat narrower, is also of a clearly normative nature. he question of how an intellectual could avoid serving the system while being inancially and socially completely dependent on it, when almost any educated job was related to ideological indoctrination, was not asked. he statement in the deinition that non-conformist approaches prevailed among the cultural intelligentsia also deserves mention. his assessment of one’s own activity during the Soviet period was widespread among the cultural elite. he majority of members of the cultural elite regarded their professional activity during the Soviet period as resistance. It was especially easy to apply 12 V. Kubilius, “Rezistencijos ešelonai: paskutinysis – kultūra,” in Gairė – pilnutinė demokratija: Į laisvę fondo dešimtmetis Lietuvoje, ed. V. Valiušaitis (Kaunas: Į Laisvę fondo Lietuvos ilialas, 2001), p. 258. 13 Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui,” p. 52. 117 Valdemaras Klumbys this concept of resistance to culture, which developed national consciousness and maintained the life of the nation, and naturally became the most efective means of self-defense in the eyes of the cultural elite. Actually the fruits of professional labor of a large number of specialists in the humanities and men of leters cannot be atributed to collaboration. It oten maintained a sense of nationality or oppositional atitudes in the society. According to Vytautas Kubilius, the echelons of armed and passive resistance were followed by the line of cultural resistance. Culture ‘became the only legal way of the nation’s self-image and self-expression, strictly regulated by the Soviet authorities but preserving a small part of freedom inherent in the cultural phenomenon’ because ‘culture, which expresses the principles of humanity and preserves the nation’s historical memory, is dangerous to the totalitarian system.’ 14 Meilė Lukšeinė, who called this kind of behavior valenrodism, had a similar opinion: ‘there were people in our country who worked especially consistently, persistently, expediently, calculating minimum losses of the compromise to maintain the nation’s dignity – namely dignity – and life.’ 15 However, the authors of the concept themselves realized that understanding culture as resistance was especially fragile: ‘if the aim of resistance is to do away with occupation, Soviet Lithuanian art could not and did not seek to achieve that. […] he collective instinct of self-preservation emerged: […] now it was necessary to protect every creative force from destruction.’ 16 Nonetheless, atempts not to treat some behavior of the cultural elite as resistance failed to become established in the society. Let us take for example one such failed concept, escapism, where ‘people closed themselves in their small narrow cave 14 V. Kubilius, “Rezistencijos ešelonai,” p. 258. 15 M. Lukšienė, Jungtys (Vilnius: Alma litera, 2000), p. 218. 16 V. Kubilius, “Rezistencijos ešelonai,” p. 261. 118  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology of speciality and did what was necessary to do. hey performed their function to the nation but actually they have run away from it! hey are aside!’ 17 he preservation of the nation’s strength turned into a negative assess- ment of active, armed resistance still in the Soviet period because it destroyed the nation’s strength: people perished or were imprisoned instead of creating something. hus ‘pure’ resistance, clearly visible armed struggle, began to be assessed as ruinous to the nation, posing a threat to its physical (partisan) or cultural (active unarmed) survival. Even plain overstepping of the boundaries of creative freedom established by the regime could be seen as having atracted too-careful atention of the authorities and disturbed quiet cultural work. In this way active resistance was begun to be treated as non-resistance (wrong resistance) with respect to the nation’s survival because it posed the threat of it being destroyed. his concept of resistance and non-resistance enabled not only non-resistance to be justiied but also to see one’s own timeserving activity as non-conformism, as secret resistance without victims. Hence, in place of a clear opposition of collaboration vs. resistance another less strict opposition became prevalent: non-collaboration vs. non-resistance. Ater the strict boundary between resistance and collaboration had become efaced, tension between the pressure to see resistance everywhere and be- haviors during the Soviet period that were oten determined by pragmatic motives was reduced. Furthermore, during the Soviet period resistance raised the social status of an individual in post-Soviet Lithuania, and this mechanism was conducive to this. In this way a moderate model of assessing the Soviet past was formed. he situation, however, when the concept of resistance became ininitely expanded, enabled anyone who simply did their job during the Soviet years to state that he/she maintained the nation’s life in this way because if he/she 17 M. Lukšienė, Jungtys, p. 216. 119 Valdemaras Klumbys had not worked the strangers, Russians, would have come and that would have been much worse for Lithuania. he former Soviet ruling circles, the members of the nomenclatura, and all those who sympathized with them took advantage of this. A nomenclative discourse formed, which emphasized that during the Soviet period they ‘worked for Lithuania, too,’ 18 and resisted the occupiers by sabotaging harmful directives of the Centre and by seeking to promote the welfare of all Lithuania. he representatives of this discourse eliminated any diferences between resistance and collaboration. For example, the then Speaker of the Seimas, Artūras Paulauskas, totally identiied them with each other; ‘If we had not had collaborators, that passive resistance, today we would have had neither schools nor the Lithuanian language.’ 19 Most oten this approach manifested itself in reminiscences and popular writing; however, there were also historical works which tried to substantiate this concept in a scholarly way. Perhaps the most signiicant of them was the work of the former Party historian Konstantinas Navickas. 20 he supporters of the moderate approach to the Soviet period were unit- ed, contrary to the radical ones, by the accentuation of resistance rather than by a search for the guilty ones. here is no need to look for personal guilt because to a greater or lesser degree it can be found in everyone, as all equally lived in the Soviet years, all are equally either guilty or not guilty of that. he occupiers 18 hat is the title of memoires voliume published by former irst secretary of Lithuanian Communist Party: A. Brazauskas, Ir tuomet dirbome Lietuvai: faktai, atsiminimai, komentarai (Vilnius: Knygiai, 2007), p. 382. 19 A. Paulauskas, Seimo Pirmininko kalba iškilmingame Kovo 11-tosios minėjime Operos ir baleto teatre [Interactive]. 2009. Internet access: <htp://www3.seimas.lt/pls/inter/ w5_show?p_r=4411&p_d=13914&p_k=1> (accessed December 20, 2012). 20 K. Navickas, Lietuvių tautos savigynos patirtis: Lietuvos nepriklausomybės praradimo ir atgavimo istoriograinė apžvalga (1938-1993): Monograija (Vilnius: Mokslotyros institutas, 2003), p. 291. 120  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology were to blame for all the misfortunes of Lithuania and we, Lithuanians, were victims, we sufered from the regime and all of us, beginning with ordinary workers and ending with the KGB agents and the highest oicials of Lithuania resisted Moscow as much as we were able to. 21 By the way, one interesting thing is that some representatives of this discourse considered not only the newly arrived Russians but also all Jewish people to be guilty. 22 he impact of the moderate approach on the society was on the increase. It could not have been otherwise, as the oicial discourse on the struggles and sufering failed to relect the everyday experiences of the Soviet years of the majority of the ordinary residents of Lithuania and their personal memories of that period in any way. However, both the moderate and radical approaches remained highly politicized and in essence served as a means of ideological and political struggles in atacking and defending rather than of learning about the past. During this stage totalitarian rhetoric and a paradigm that were not highly relective prevailed. Lithuania’s experience was hardly compared with the history of other countries of the USSR or the Soviet Bloc, and the cornerstone works of the totalitarian paradigm were used rather rarely in scientiic research. It is interesting to note the fact that even the members of the nomenclatura used the terms of the totalitarian paradigm and sometimes even made reference to he Origins of Totalitarianism by Hannah Arendt. his shows the strength of the discourse on the struggles and suferings in the public sphere. It was impossible to disregard it. hough there were diferent approaches to the Soviet past and varying, sometimes even contrary, deinitions of the same terms, they coincided in 21 J. Rudokas, “Okupantų talkininkai – tautos išdavikai, patriotai ar totalitarizmo aukos?” Naujoji Romuva 1 (538) (2002), p. 62-67. 22 e.g.: J. Sadaunykas-Sadūnas, Geltonos vanago akys: Autobiograinis romanas (Vilnius: Žuvėdra, 2002). 121 Valdemaras Klumbys denying the sovietisation of the people. All atention was directed to political and resistance history; the processes that were taking place in society were not investigated and nobody went more deeply into the changes that occurred, neither into people’s behavior and values nor into their mentality at that time. herefore there was hardly any (self)-relection about how people participated in creating the Soviet variant of culture, about to what extent their creative work was useful to the regime – such a confession was actually impossible within the context of accentuating resistance. Scientiic research was oten strongly ideologies and mostly encompassed investigations into partisan resistance and Soviet repressions, quite rarely touching upon the more complicated problem of collaboration. his problem was talked about in general, in popular writing, but this phenomenon was not studied in more detail, since it could ofend and hurt too many living individuals. III. Depression here is only one step from anger to depression. In this case it was enough for the chasm between ‘we’ and ‘them,’ Soviet collaborators, to disappear, it was enough to feel the profound impact of the Soviet regime exerted not only on single individuals but also over the entire society or at least on its largest part. here were too many signs of sovietness in the new state to atribute them to separate collaborators. Having realized this, the situation turned into a stale- mate: the Soviet period has not disappeared, there is so much of it within us, it has become so irmly rooted and has penetrated so deeply into all of us that it is even handed down to younger generations. It seemed that it was impossible to escape it. Anger turned into disappointment and even into despair: if the society is simply saturated with the Soviet ideology, if there is so much of it, how can we speak about a new, non-Soviet Lithuania, and how would it be possible to create it? Depression was unavoidable and it illed the pages of both popular 122  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology writing and scientiic works. Shame over the fact that the Lithuanians had been so successfully adapted and that they still were so Soviet-like grew along with it. ‘Unrealistic guilt or shame which oten accompanies the depression’ 23 is characteristic of depression. It is not important whether during this stage the authors wrote about the Soviet years or about the present – they saw the majority, if not all, causes of the present-day evil in the Soviet years. It might sometimes seem that the problems of today are found irst and then atempts are made to look for their genesis during the Soviet period. he Soviet years are to blame for a high suicide rate, for alcoholism, and for the election not being won by those who should have. It seems that negation turned into its own antithesis, and now the Soviet regime retrospectively seems to have been omnipotent, which has created or inluenced almost everything. It seems as though the fear instilled during the Soviet period, which the euphoria of the Sąjūdis movement and restoration of independence suppressed during the irst stage, and which aroused anger during the second stage, turned freely into a terrible fear of the future and depression during the third stage. Perhaps the most signiicant work of the depressive stage is the book Ne- nutrūkusi styga (he Unbroken String) by Nerija Putinaitė, 24 therefore it was cited to reveal the mass mentality of Lithuanians, their cultural, moral and public self-image, which determined concrete choices of an individual during the Soviet period. Hence, a step further than a simple division of human be- havior into positive/negative was taken: atempts were made to ind out what cultural and social mechanisms determined human behavior and how they did so. Alongside collaboration, the term compliance was also used in that book. 23 E. Kübler-Ross,On Death and Dying, p. 70. 24 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga: Prisitaikymas ir pasipriešinimas sovietų Lietuvoje (Vilnius: Aidai, 2007). 123 Valdemaras Klumbys However, the predominant theme of the book is depression. Its main part is devoted to describing the various manifestations of compliance of Lithuanians and the extent of the nation’s sovietisation. Reading the book one can feel the author’s moral terror at the extent to which the Soviet regime had penetrated the people’s thinking, values and behavior. he very title of the book asserts that the string that links us to the Soviet period has not yet been broken. It will only be possible to break of the emotional link with the Soviet period ater we have discovered our moral responsibility. Investigations into the Soviet past again have to serve the present, only in this case it should serve as an incentive to be reborn morally. he impact of the Soviet ideology is also made absolute in this book. It is stated that the mechanisms responsible for preventing competing ideologies and value-based systems from emerging in the USSR operated efectively, therefore people could only practice forms of nationality and expressions of national feelings approved by the regime. It is not strange at all that the Soviet reality is seen in the book as a result determined by ideology when no moral supports or those of the truth survived in the society because the Soviet worl- dview erased the boundaries between the truth and lies. In this way one of the most important questions relating to the society of Soviet Lithuania (and not only) was raised: did only Soviet morality exist then, or were there also alternatives which encouraged people to behave diferently from what the regime demanded. Empirically it can be seen that there were people, and not only a few of them, who distinguished good from evil not ac- cording the criteria of the regime but according to their own personal system of values. Seeing the enormous inluence of the regime everywhere, there was hardly any sphere in which alternatives to Soviet values were developed. he author treats the use of Aesopian language, the creation of symbols that were alternative to the oicial ones and the informal abuse of the authorities in a cir- cle of friends as compliance strategies only. But did not the same alternative 124  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology Soviet values grow in silence and without any noise of resistance? However, admitance that compliance could have created a ield for the alternative does not match normative moralization at all, which prevailed in the considerations of the Soviet period during the depressive stage as well. Putinaitė perceives compliance as an interim state between collaboration and resistance, although she does not separate it from collaboration. Under- standing of compliance strategies is also confusing in the book. his is ‘the im- planted speciic world outlook and certain value-based standards,’ which allow the Soviet reality to be justiied by means of moral and rational arguments. 25 he conformist ‘did an everyday job, which maintained the functioning of the system and drew the line between the people who were acceptable and unac- ceptable to the system,’ and those people who maintained ‘the functioning of the Soviet regime’ rather than all the citizens are to be regarded as conform- ists.’ 26 However, even this deinition remains unclear without explaining what is meant by ‘to maintain the system.’ his book’s understanding of resistance is even vaguer: it can manifest itself both on a moral plane and a worldview plane, in everyday life, ‘in refus- ing ambiguities, artiices and compromises in personal life dictated by the Soviet situation.’ 27 hough in principle this understanding seems exact, it is actually intangible and cannot be proved, as anyone can claim to have done so. Perceiving a way of life as resistance is unnecessary to resistance, as the author states. In this way consciousness is rejected, which is an essential thing when speaking about resistance. All the more so, ‘to oppose the world in which artiice dominates means to perceive its defectiveness even if it were impossible 25 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 9, 44. 26 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 261, 271. 27 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 253. 125 Valdemaras Klumbys to avoid it in certain situations.’ 28 Hence, there remains no requirement to refuse artiices; one has to perceive their immorality only. In this case perhaps the majority of the Lithuanians were members of the resistance, even those who were stealing from their workplaces, although they understood that they were behaving badly. Still, the author found a way out of this confusion: those resisting had to belong to an alternative social structure. he author goes further by stating that the conformists and the resisting ones were two diferent groups of people, related by diferent socialization and solidarity. hose who resisted preserved the alternative values, and were morally and socially in solidarity with the re- pressed heroes of resistance. he Sąjūdis movement was formed of such people, and they gave an impetus to the Rebirth. Putinaitė cannot even imagine that ‘a crowd of passive conformists’ 29 could have restored independence. Perhaps there could be no other answer to the question of how alternative values could have survived, when it was thought that the regime had totally re-created the society and completely governed the process of that re-creation. Actually this answer means that during the Soviet period two societies with diferent socialization and solidarity existed in Lithuania. his answer, i.e. the concept of ‘two Lithuanias,’ was rather popular during the depressive stage. It allowed a simple explanation to be given regarding why so many artiices of the Soviet period have survived to the present day, and why Lithuania has failed to become a European state. he sovietised Lithuania of conformists dominated and the other, resisting Lithuania, was very small. his concept testiies to the transitional period from accusation to depression when atempts are made to maintain the diference between ‘we’ and ‘them.’ Only the number of ‘them’ – the sovietised Lithuanians – is so overwhelming that the depression 28 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 278. 29 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 269. 126  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology becomes progressively worse. Maintaining self-respect is of great importance to overcoming depression. 30 One should think that it is regarding oneself as ‘the best’ part of Lithuania that performs this function. Still, it was during the depressive stage that a very important step towards destroying the perception of a dichotomous Soviet past (by the way, such perception of the world is characteristic of a totalitarian, authoritarian indi- vidual) was taken. A strict division into only collaboration and resistance did not correspond to the reality and actually blocked the way to investigating the past, squeezing it into a too-strict framework that distorted the past. herefore this situation was untenable and could not last long. As far back as 1992, the art critic Alfonsas Andriuškevičius stated that in Lithuanian art of the Soviet period: one can ind several clear conformists and somewhat fewer radical non-conformists: but what to do with the middle, which constitutes the absolute majority? In other words, the greatest part of the gited Lithuanian artists of diferent generations who created during the said [Soviet] period took part in the cultural game controlled by the authorities, followed its rules, even made use of the privileges applied to the participants in the game […]; however, at the same time they (these artists) were destroying the dogmas of the so-called social realism, were scolded by the authorities for that and sometimes they were even punished. 31 30 E. Kübler-Ross, On Death and Dying, p. 70. 31 A. Andriuškevičius, Lietuvių dailė: 1975-1995 (Vilnius: Vilniaus dailės akademijos leidykla, 1997), p. 12. 127 Valdemaras Klumbys It was this, the largest group of artists, that Andriuškevičius called semi-non-con- formists. In this way a scale of possible behaviors was actually constructed, where those whose activity contained features of the activities of both negatively as- sessed conformists and positively assessed non-conformists found themselves. Also, it should be noted that although the term collaboration, which is irst of all a political category, was not applied to artists, the weight given to the term of a conformist was so negative that it actually corresponded with the weight carried by the concept of collaboration. One can guess that this determined the choice of the term itself, which accentuated non-compliance (it was possible to refer to the same phenomenon as semi-conformism) – the further from terrible compliance the beter. An article by the emigrant historian Kęstutis Girnius, 32 in which the term compliance is deined as a universal behavior characteristic of all the strata of society, inally formed a new approach. Having placed all possible behaviors on the integral scale, collaboration and resistance found themselves at its opposite poles, and the majority of behaviors could be identiied as compliance. How- ever, if Girnius deined collaboration and resistance very clearly (collaboration is ‘a certain relation of a citizen of the occupied country with the occupying authorities, which manifests itself in helping to consolidate it, doing away with its opponents or at least neutralizing them,’ this includes active participation and work as a high oicial in the occupying institutions, cooperation with the KGB, or public justiication of the crimes commited by the authorities, 33 while ‘resistance can manifest itself in (a) belonging to an underground orga- nization which ights against the occupant with arms or peaceful means, for example, printing newspapers or proclamations, (b) open demand to restore 32 K. Girnius, “Pasipriešinimas, prisitaikymas, kolaboravimas,” Naujasis židinys–Aidai 5 (1996), p. 268-279; reprinted in: K. Girnius, Tauta, išbandymai, dorovė. p. 215-238. 33 K. Girnius, Tauta, išbandymai, dorovė, p. 217. 128  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology the independence of the country, (c) protests against the essential elements of the occupying regime and major violations of human rights, and (d) personally expressed solidarity with those who fell into disfavor with the authorities due to (a), (b) or (c).’ 34 He avoided giving a more exact deinition of compliance. He proposed two measures of assessment: an individual’s atitude towards his speciality (whether an individual avoided ideology and politics in his/her scientiic activity – the more he/she avoided, the less compliant he/she was) and his/her relation with the Party and the structures of the government (the degree of participation in the activities of the Party of the oicial structures: the more active the individual was, the greater his/her compliance was). 35 Still, this triad had many drawbacks as well. he most important thing was that it confronted an individual with the Soviet reality regarding com- pliance and reconciliation with the regime as more or less immoral behavior (depending on the degree or nature of compliance). he same tension between the extreme positions of this axis remained essential on the trinomial scale too, because according to a degree of distancing from them, the activity of an individual was assessed more or less in the positive or in the negative. Besides, this scale suited intellectuals and Party activists, although it was impossible to adapt it to the majority of the people who were not engaged in the work of Party organizations and did not manifest themselves in public, but who were not members of resistance either. Eventually, compliance did not only include very many diferent practices of life but also, by its very deinition, imposed on people the concept of the Soviet regime as something external, imposed, with which it was necessary to comply because it was alien to the people. All that rather accurately relected the reality following the occupation, during the period of armed resistance to 34 K. Girnius, Tauta, išbandymai, dorovė, p. 220. 35 K. Girnius, Tauta, išbandymai, dorovė, p. 223. 129 Valdemaras Klumbys the occupation. However, in the 1960s Soviet daily life ceased to be something strange to the majority of the people. It was not necessary good or satisfying, nor did it meet their needs, but it was the only actual reality, and no other real alternatives were to be found. Meanwhile, during the depressive period as well, the supposition was made that an individual could (and had to) remain non-Soviet, and he who was en- gaged in the Soviet system the least was morally ‘best.’ he implied statement naturally followed from the idea that the less an individual was engaged in the system, the closer he was to resistance. One fact was disregarded, that as oten as not the people who believed in the ideology became dissidents ater they had become disappointed in the ideology, both in Russia and in Lithuania. If the concept of ‘two Lithuanias’ was not followed the emergence of Sąjūdis is impossible to explain, other than as a miracle. Hence, during the third phase the vocabulary of the totalitarian para- digm and the understanding of the Soviet period as the ‘evil empire’ prevailed. And a number of the texts of that phase were writen by the same authors who had writen the texts of the earlier stage, that of anger. Only during this stage were investigations into political history replaced by the investigations into the society, especially that of culture, and deep sovietisation of the society, such as changing of the national identity in a direction beneicial to the regime, was analyzed. 36 he Soviet society was seen as being ruled, created and controlled from top to botom in a hierarchal way, which had few possibilities of choice and efect on the ruling circles, which could only obey, comply or resist, and resistance was treated as the only way of exerting an impact on the regime. Although it was writen 37 that society could exert pressure on the ruling circles 36 A. Streikus, “Sovietų režimo pastangos pakeisti Lietuvos gyventojų tautinį identitetą,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 1(21) (2007), p. 7-30. 37 e.g. D. Blažytė-Baužienė, “Kultūrinė autonomija sovietinėjeLietuvoje: realybė ar regimybė?” Metai 8-9 (2002), p. 131-146. 130  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology and that it was due to such pressure that permissibility limits in culture were expanded, in reality all this was presented as secondary in a reality dominated by the regime’s oppression. An individual was also treated accordingly, as a cog in a huge totalitarian machine, as a subject rather than an object of history. Hence, in essence the inluence of the Soviet ideology still exists, where the base determines the superstructure and where an individual determines nothing. IV. Reconciliation Reconciliation came together with a new generation of researchers, with those whose childhood was marked by Sąjūdis. However, they did not become en- gaged in political struggles that took place at the beginning of independence, in which the card of the Soviet past was played so intensely. hough many of them remember the Soviet period personally, that epoch, although it arouses sentiments of their childhood, is dead for them, contrary to the older generation. herefore they personally do not need to reconcile themselves with it – a society reconciles with the past through its work. hey do not feel any internal pressure to justify themselves for their behavior during the Soviet period, therefore for them this past difers litle from any other historical epoch. It is true they un- derstand that they have been inluenced by the Soviet period, but they accept it as a consequence of a natural low of history rather than as a blot of shame. hese researchers inherited from the depressive stage an interest in those deep processes that are taking place in the society. However, it is not so much the oicial processes that had been determined by the decisions taken by the authorities but deep informal processes, which are not so closely related to the policy of the regime, that arouse their interest. In their view an individu- al is no longer a weak-willed and colorless humble executor of the regime’s instructions who has hardly any possibilities to make choices. An individual, and their various groups in particular, are seen as ‘negotiating’ with the regime, 131 Valdemaras Klumbys expanding the permissibility limits, being able to even exert pressure on the ruling circles and win concessions. he single-plan scale of collaboration-conformism-resistance became too narrow. It was not enough to introduce additional intermediate gradations so as to relect the widest possible variety of human behavior. herefore it was proposed to divide the poles of compliance and resistance into diferent planes. 38 his enabled us to show that compliance on one plane could match resistance on the other one. Hence, three horizontals of behavior were distin- guished: compliance, opposition and resistance. he same individual could act within all of them once. All three types of behavior were possible in everyday social life (perceiv- ing it as being in a social network encompassing all spheres of life, as well as social norms, the requirements of a non-political regime such as traic rules). Social everydayness included the largest part of human life, and actually the entire life of the majority. Such things that are unavoidable when living in any society, that did not depend on an individual’s viewpoints are referred to as social compliance (such as fulillment of universally obligatory ideological requirements like membership in the Young Communist League during the late Soviet period), social opposition (most oten a scarcely relected disregard of social requirements, such as larceny or misuse of public assets; membership in youth subcultures, which earlier was sometimes atributed to resistance to the regime; or manifestations of opposition to the regime on a mundane level, such as telling anecdotes, criticizing the regime in kitchen conversations or listening to foreign radio stations). Failure to fulill the routine ideological and political requirements of the regime in quotidian social life can be called 38 Here and further from: V. Klumbys, “Lietuvos kultūrinio elito elgsenos modeliai sovietmečiu.” (PhD diss., Vilnius University, 2009), p. 29-73. 132  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology social resistance (for example, refusal to join the Young Communist League based on religious and national motives). Compliance that oversteps the boundary of relations with the regime that are unavoidable in everyday social life begins with ideological compliance – at least a minimum fulillment of the ideological rituals that in one way or another the regime demanded compliance with (such as ideological introductions to books, quotations of Marxist classics, ideologies titles and dedications, and displays of gratitude to ‘the Party and the Government’ in public speeches and articles). Without them individual activity was hardly possible in public, although an individual could avoid this by refusing to do work that required that. At the same time ideological conformists avoided political relations with the regime such as Party membership or occupying important posts. When people overstepped that boundary they would do extra work, more than was obligatory, in order to be seen in public (active direct support of the policy of the regime by deeds, creative work, voluntary participation in a public politi- cal activity, membership in the Communist Party, work in political and Party institutions of the regime, cooperation with the power structures). One can speak about their activist compliance. hey formed the nucleus of the activists of the regime and cooperated actively with the regime as the representatives of the regime accepted them as their very own; however, very oten they became foreign to other intellectuals who were not so actively engaged in the activities of the regime. herefore the declaration of clearly indoctrinated creative work can be atributed to the behavior of this level. Political conformists (who can also be referred to as collaborators) are activists who acquired power, who could exert inluence on the policy of the regime. Quite oten they became members of the nomenclature, as they entered the sphere of power. Opposition and resistance activities were separated following the reaction of the regime: during the Soviet period no punishment was imposed for oppo- sition activity although it could provoke criticism. Despite the disapproval of 133 Valdemaras Klumbys the regime, which linked opposition and resistance, these two phenomena are diferent. Opposition supplemented compliance and resistance was its antipode. Behaviors atributed to opposition encompass mostly those actions that were not directed directly against the regime in the cultural sphere. Resistance was clearly political and therefore it was antagonistic to compliance, whose role was also political. Institutional and semi-legal behaviors of opposition are distin- guished alongside the already mentioned social oppositionality. Institutional opposition means activity in Soviet institutions carried out for Lithuania’s beneit in the economic, cultural, political, personnel, and education spheres. It is also appropriate to mention here the use of anti-Soviet implications in publicly declared creative work, as well as artistic semi-non-conformism and the search for a modern artistic form. Declaration of poorly ideologies or ab- solutely non-ideologized creative work, as well as a struggle for cultural heri- tage and the aspiration to cherish nationality no mater how sovietised it was, and regret for the loss of a disappearing rural culture were important traits of institutional opposition until the 1970s. Criticism of the regime in the Soviet public life, according to Dina Spechler, the formation of ‘something similar to public opinion’ 39 is also to the point. ‘Work for Lithuania’ declared by the nomenclaturists is also appropriate here, at least part of it. he artist Aloyzas Stasiulevičius deined institutional opposition especially precisely; during the Soviet period he responded to the surprise of Polish artists who said that they did not see social realism in the works of Lithuanian artists with these words: ‘you know your understanding of social realism is very narrow. Social realism is the low, which depends on the biceps – there is as much of it as you manage to stretch.’ 40 39 D. R. Spechler, Permited Dissent in the USSR: Novy Mir and the Soviet Regime (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 270. 40 V. Klumbys’ interview with Aloyzas Stasiulevičius, December 17, 2003. 134  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology Semi-legal activity operates on another level of oppositionality: active participation in organizations that, although formally Soviet, were poorly controlled by the regime, as was participation in poorly organized movements, which oten had a national character such as clubs devoted to local lore, eth- nographic movements, and discussion. On the one hand, lack of control of the regime would separate this activity from institutional opposition, while on the other hand, this activity was not repressed. But semi-legal activity could be strongly criticized by the regime, and receive stricter reactions from authorities than activities of institutional opposition. Actually some participants in the local lore movement are to be atribut- ed to resistance rather than to opposition. heir activity luctuated between semi-legal opposition and the underground resistance. here were small groups of the reliable ones in the clubs devoted to local lore, ethnographic movements. Members of these groups were related to the underground, and they acquainted the more reliable young people from clubs with samizdat. People were subject to severe repression for taking part in underground activities, and for public resistance the guilty ones were to be warned and re- formed. None of the intellectuals were severely punished for opposition activity ater the permissibility limits had become established during the post-Stalin years. he underground activists stated that they knew that sooner or later they would be subject to repression. Only especially strong mechanisms which provoked resistance could encourage people to overstep that threshold. Most probably religion was the strongest mechanism, followed by national values, whereas values related to human rights or freedom of conscience were of less signiicance. he cultural elite could serve the national values by engaging in the activities of institutional opposition. his, alongside other circumstances, prevented them from becoming engaged in resistance. Participants in resis- tance most oten perceived their activity as resistance, which cannot always be said about the activity of those who were engaged in opposition activity. 135 Valdemaras Klumbys Participation in the underground organizations which fought against the Soviet regime in diferent ways, participation in samizdat activities, and the demand for independence or protest against the policy of the regime can be atributed to underground activity. Public activity distinguishes public resistance from underground resistance when ideas directed against the regime are expressed in public, announcing one’s authorship. his is the highest level of resistance because public activity meant almost unavoidable repression (if not accusation) and negative material and social consequences, while the underground activist could expect to remain undiscovered. Some representatives of the cultural elite contributed moderately to the underground resistance, but they categorically avoided any public resistance. hese three types of behavior were oten interlaced in the life of a concrete individual. he majority of the participants in opposition activity were both ideological and even activist conformists; some of them were participants in semi-legal opposition while at the same time taking part in the underground resistance. Some ideological conformists behaved in a similar way as well. here were also people who were ideological conformists, institutional oppositionists and participants in the underground resistance at the same time. For example, the teacher of geology Associate Professor – Vytautas Skuodis did not only edit an underground periodical, but was also engaged in the activities of insti- tutional opposition in which he sought to develop national self-awareness and to teach people the history of the nation. At the same time he unavoidably had to perform ideological rituals, thus he was an ideological conformist. It is natural that atributing speciic activities to a certain category depends also on the time period when that activity is pursued. he book Soviet Lithuania by Justas Paleckis was published in Russian in 1949 in which atempts are made to legalize a positive assessment of the participants in the Lithuanian national rebirth in the 19th century alongside ideological clichés during the Stalin years, 136  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology can be valued as resistance, and during the late Soviet period it undoubtedly would be atributed to activist compliance. his abolition of the integral scale of behavior allows the complexity of the reality to be relected much more precisely. Furthermore, many colors and nuances appeared in the relationship between an individual and the regime. However, this was not the only atempt to classify behaviors of the Soviet period, and soon it was the broadest classiication. here were more detailed classiications as well. For example, Aurimas Švedas distinguished three main models of opposition behavior even in the approaches of the historians of the Stalin era: dissociation, non-participation and apoliticality; non-relected and deliberate afronts; as well as deliberate arguments with the ideology following the oicial rules. 41 However, the for- mer is more like the above-discussed strategy of compliance. his is only one of the examples testifying to the fact that there was no longer any atempt to adhere to similar concepts. Each researcher started creating his/her own terms and classiications in seeking to relect the inest nuances of behaviors as accurately as possible. Besides, during this stage not only arguments about the deinition of col- laboration actually disappear (and the term itself is used much more rarely) but conformism/compliance loses its condemning weight. his term simply becomes an ordinary neutral term, one of those which are intended for ana- lyzing and systemizing various human behaviors. On the whole, instead of atempts to condemn, to identify the righteous and the malevolent, it is sought to simply make clear how people lived at that time. 41 A. Švedas, Matricos nelaisvėje: sovietmečio lietuvių istoriograija (1944-1985) (Vilnius: Aidai, 2009), p. 79-102; English translation of this study will be published in due course, undet the title: In the Captivity of the Matrix. Soviet Lithuanian Historiography, 1944-1985. 137 Valdemaras Klumbys Western Sovietological concepts also began to be intensely applied, and the post-revisionist trend gained special popularity. Besides, various other theories concerning the Soviet past based on the achievements of diferent sciences (sociology, political sciences, philosophy, and philology) began to be applied. Paradoxical terms such as ‘disruptive compliance of colonialist constructs’ (this concept has been borrowed from post-colonialism studies) also began to be applied. hus it was sought to understand and relect the Soviet society and regime, as well as all the complexity of their relations, as accurately as possible: the subtext, or the Aesopian language, is a good ex- ample of the ambivalent cultural production: the text of a work of art testiies to the artist’s conformism, and the allegorical message underlying the subtext is aimed in the opposite direction – that of opposition. […] it is not only the artist’s situation or the status of the work of art in the colonized culture that is ambivalent, similar contradiction is characteristic of the very structure of the regime and censorship. 42 All these changes mean gradual reconciliation with the Soviet past, despite the fact that manifestations of other stages are still present in the public sphere. Reconciliation, however, does not mean that moral issues are no longer raised. hey are raised, however, in a more nuanced way, trying, irst of all, to under- stand and see the phenomena from diferent perspectives rather than seeking to justify or accuse. his is impossible without having admited the impact of the Soviet period on the society and every individual who lived at that time; 42 E. Klivis, “Ardomasis prisitaikymas: cenzūra ir pasipriešinimo jai būdai sovietinio laikotarpio Lietuvos teatre,” Menotyra 17, 2 (2010), p. 128. 138  Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology all the more so, without fear of pointing out not only negative but also positive things that took place then. Treating the Soviet period as the past is becoming ever stronger, and subjecting the investigations to current political and ideological struggles is becoming weaker and weaker. And the fear that has penetrated into the mar- row of everyone’s bones during ity years, fear which made the Soviet past so menacing that urge is still voiced to pull down some of the Soviet ideological monuments, which have survived in Lithuania as though they posed a threat to Lithuania’s independence, this fear is abating. And this means that inally we can make bold to say that in some respects we are actually still Soviet people. Perhaps this means the hope of being cured of the Soviet period? Translated by Aldona Matulytė 139 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective Jerzy Kochanowski “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective1 Introduction Speaking about ‘socialist’ tourism and illegal trade, which phenomena are closely connected, one usually concentrates on the 1970s and 1980s, forget- ting that the turning point in this case was both the ending of the 1950s and especially the whole decade of 1960s. It should also be emphasized that illegal trade associated with tourism is a much more complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon than most suspect. 2 he reasons for this unusual outbreak of economic activity, which to a larger or smaller extent swept all societies of socialist countries from the second half of the 1950s onwards is deinitely worth investigating. How was it inluenced by issues connected with modernization and social changes that also happened 1 he issue was previously tackled in the article: “Jesteśmy za biedni, aby urlop spędzać w kraju. Masowa turystyka i nielegalny handel w latach sześćdziesiątych XX w. Perspektywa polska,” Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych, LXVIII (2008), p. 125-150; “Wir sind zu arm, um den Urlaub im eigenem Land zu verbringen. Massentourismus und illegaler Handel trade in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren in Polen,” in „Schleichwege“. Inoizielle Begegnungen sozialistischer Staatsbürger zwischen 1956 und 1989, ed. W. Borodziej, J. Kochanowski, J.von Putkamer, (Köln 2010), p. 135-151; Tylnymi drzwiami. „Czarny rynek“ w Polsce 1944-1989 (Warszawa 2010), p. 302-313. 2 At the beginning of the 1960s this type of trade became the subject of research for Po- lish sociologists. See J. Węgleński, Wyniki badań nad handlem trade uprawianym przez uczestników wycieczek zagranicznych (Warszawa 1964) or A. Siciński, ed., Społeczeństwo polskie w badaniach ankietowych (Warszawa 1966). 141 Jerzy Kochanowski behind the Iron Curtain, which radically changed the scale of peoples’ needs? And inally, to what extent the wider opening of borders ater 1956 caused that the internal, autarchic strategies of survival developed by particular societies gained a trans-border character? his article does not aspire to exhaust the subject, but rather intends on focusing on the historical process (and not on its sociological, psychological or cultural aspects) as well as on the situation speciic for Poland. he article barely touches upon subjects which require deeper and synchronized comparative research as well as revaluing some notions, including that of ‘social resistance,’ and the survival strategies that it includes. he comparative atempts to investigate the issue of social resistance have been limited to only a few countries of the Eastern Bloc, and to such phenomena as armed resistance, diverse forms of political opposition or opposition within churches. 3 If everyday survival strategies were at all perceived in the context of resistance, they were seen from a national, if not regional, perspective. 4 We can only assume – on the basis of intuition and general knowledge rather that systematic research – that in survival strategies of the socialist countries there were more similarities than diferences caused by diverse local conditions. In all socialist countries farmers avoided mandatory deliveries and sold their 3 Ł. Kamiński, A. Małkiewicz, K. Ruchniewicz, “Opór społeczny w Europie Środkowej w latach 1948-1953 na przykładzie Polski, NRD i Czechosłowacji. Wstępny raport z badań” (primarily research report, Wrocław, 2004). On German Democratic Republic (East Germany), see: U. Poppe, R. Eckert, I.-S. Kowalczuk, ed., Zwischen Selbsbehauptung und Anpassung. Formen des Widerstandes und der Opposition in der DDR (Berlin 1995). Both works include rich bibliography. 4 From the Polish perspective, see: D. Jarosz, “Stalinizm polski 1948-1956: strategie przystosowawcze,” in Polacy wobec PRL. Strategie przystosowawcze, ed. G. Miernik (Kielce, 2003), p 57-74; G. Miernik, “Strategie przystosowawcze chłopów polskich do systemu władzy w latach 1948-1956 (na przykładzie województwa kieleckiego),” in Polacy wobec PRL. Strategie przystosowawcze, p. 117-147; M. Tymiński, “Nadużycia i manipulacje. Strategie przystosowawcze pracowników przedsiębiorstw przemysłowych (1950-1970),” in Polacy wobec PRL. Strategie przystosowawcze, p. 165-182; J. Kochanowski, Tylnymi drzwiami. „Czarny rynek“ w Polsce 1944-1989 (Warszawa 2010). 142 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective produce in cities unoicially, cities had illegal crat shops which could pro- duce anything thanks to illegal deliveries of raw materials from state-owned sources, workers in state factories pretended that they were working, making their beggarly wages a litle beter by engaging in pety thet or producing their own goods with the use of state materials and machines. Drivers regarded state-owned trucks or buses as their own transport companies, and the fuel they saved was sold to the owners of private cars. Oicials falsiied reports, payrolls, contracts of sale or business trips bills. And literally everyone made use of informal connections, whether with friends, family, or anyone else, in order to get the goods and services they needed. 5 he authorities, of course, declared that they would ight such behaviors, but these were oten dummy actions, especially at local levels. It was widely realized that a sound compromise in this area is one of the conditions for main- taining social peace, especially in the light of the fact that also behind the Iron Curtain together with modernization the scale of aspirations also changed, exceeding the simplest, everyday consumer needs. his process had started at the beginning of 1950s, and could be seen in the admiration for ‘Western’ goods, and giving these goods an extremely high rating in both personal and collective hierarchy of values. In Warsaw, Bucharest, Prague, Moscow or Soia these goods were an object of desire, and colorful candy, chocolate or beer packages were oten treated as interior design elements well until the end of 5 J. Kochanowski, ed., “Szara strefa Października. Notatka o nielegalnych dochodach w Polsce 1956-1957,” Przegląd Historyczny, XCV (2004) 1, p. 77-96.; A. Arp, VEB – Vaters ehemaliger Betrieb. Privatunternehmer in der DDR (Leipzig 2005); F.J.M. Feldbrugge, “he Soviet Second Economy in a Political and Legal Perspective,” in he underground economies. Tax evasion and information distortion, ed. E. L. Feige (Cambridge 1989), p. 297-338; A. V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours. Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange (New York 1998); B. Rumer, “he „Second” Agriculture in the USSR,” Soviet Studies 4 (1981), p. 560-572. 143 Jerzy Kochanowski 1980s. 6 In the isolation of Stalinist era, such goods were either smuggled – and smuggling was a phenomenon even Stalinism could not do much about – sent from the West, imitated by illegal local producers or produced both by private and state-owned factories, which were slightly upgraded. At the end of the Stalinist era the pace of civilization changes and mod- ernization in the whole Eastern Bloc increased, as the countries, missing the outside world, tried to make up for the period of stagnation. he mechanisms of imitation, mainly of the West, were developing, and they were very signii- cant when it came to shaping the true consumerist aspirations of the society. 7 Many years of isolation of socialist countries created ‘ire-victim efect’ – an urge among its citizens to recreate their property that they had lost in the ‘ire,’ but according to the principles developed in countries of mass consumption. hese paterns reached people through ilms, television, press, magazines, tour- ism, family visits, etc. 8 hese ever higher aspirations were diicult to realize in their own country, and the potential for using local strategies to satisfy them was limited, even though the strategies were constantly improved. So, when cross-border trade opportunities emerged, they were immediately noticed, accepted and systematically modiied and perfected for the next three decades. 9 6 L. Chelcea, “he Culture of Shortage during State Socialism: Consumption Practices in a Romanian Village in the 1980s,” Cultural Studies 16 (2002), p. 35. 7 J. Misala, Nieoicjalna wymiana handlowa obywateli polskich z zagranicą (Warszawa 1989), p. 4; K. Karcz, “Efekt naśladowania zewnętrznych wzorców konsumpcji jako czynnik utrudniający sterowanie spożyciem indywidualnym,” in Narzędzia polityki gospodarczej i społecznej w procesie kształtowania konsumpcji, vol. I (Katowice 1987), p. 201-205. 8 J. Szczepański, “Zagadnienia konstruowania i realizacji modelu i wzorów konsumpcji socjalistycznej,” in Badania nad wzorami konsumpcji, ed. J. Szczepański (Wrocław 1977), p. 33. On opportunities for crossing the border and leaving the country, see: D. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949-1989 (Warszawa 2010). 9 See: A. Wessely, “Traveling People, Traveling Objects,” Cultural Studies 16 (2002), p. 5-6. 144 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective he proof of increasing needs as well as the atempts to fulill them outside one’s own country is the increase of transborder traic in socialist countries since 1950s, which was much higher than the world average. In 1950 the number of world tourists was estimated to be 25 million people and in 1968 it reached 154 million. According to the data provided by the Polish Central Customs Oice, international tourist traic in Poland involved 24.1 thousand people in 1950, and at its peak in the 1960s – 2811,1 thousand. his means that numbers in Poland increased over 116 times, while in the global scale the increase was just six fold. 10 he increase was so dramatic because the inhabitants of ‘peoples’ democracies’ had been completely cut of from the outside world, and there were many more other factors which encouraged people to travel than these connected with typical western developmental changes, that is, taking holidays and wanting to get to know other countries. he Communist authorities were well aware of these expectations since the beginning of the 1960s, and believed that ‘keeping their people satisied’ was very important, so international tourism (which was limited to other socialist countries) was treated as a political issue. However, the authorities in Moscow, Prague or Berlin could not allow people – for obvious reasons – to fulill their biggest dream of unrestricted travel to the West. Only the inhabitants of Yugoslavia were allowed such relative freedom since the beginning of the 1960s. 11 hey did not refrain from visiting socialist countries either, taking active part in the unoicial trade exchange. For other socialist countries in Europe the only element of ‘new consumer- ism’ were trips to their ‘fellow states.’ Of course, this consent on the part of 10 Archiwum Akt Nowych, Główny Urząd Ceł, 23/397, p. 134, Kompendium statystyczne administracji celnej 1946-1974, Warszawa 1975. 11 B. Luthar, “Remembering Socialism. On Desire, Consumption and Surveillance,” Journal of Consumer Culture 6 (2006), p. 229-259; A. Švab, “Consuming Western Image of Well-being – Shopping Tourism in Socialist Slovenia,” Cultural Studies 16 (2002), p. 63-79. 145 Jerzy Kochanowski the authorities had to be spiced with an appropriate dose of ideology. On the other hand, tourist agencies – state or cooperative-owned – were not charities, and they wanted to make proit, or at least minimize losses. In the second half of 1960s the conscious goal of Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, Romanian or Bulgarian authorities was developing incoming tourism from capitalist countries and outgoing tourism to socialist ones. National banks were also very sparing in granting other socialist countries their own currency for the purpose of tourism. Even if they had enough socialist currencies in stock, the banks would limit the amount that would be sold to the country’s own citi- zens, and by adding a high tourism tax they made people develop their own economic activity. hirdly – and this issued is indirectly connected with the previous one – holidays in Poland were cheaper and oten subsidized by the state, but the money spent at this occasion was spent once and forever. Going abroad, even if it was slightly more expensive, could, with only a litle bit of creativity, make the expenses return or even generate proit, a part of which was usually invested in another trip. Taking into account market imbalance, diferent scale of prices and shortages in socialist countries making proit was not a problem. his was especially true because, as it was observed in the 1960s, ‘certain economic rules operate regardless of the existing geographical divi- sions, and they penetrate country borders and customs barriers.’ 12 Socialist countries were unable to eradicate form peoples’ minds ‘the desire to get rich 12 S. Banaszek, M. Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemytnicze i zasady ich zwalczania (Warszawa 1969); IPN BU 01521/784, p. 25. 146 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective quickly. he capitalist way of thinking had not been eliminated… .’ 13 In this case, ‘capitalist thinking’ started to cross borders with unusual efectiveness. Factors: Time, Space, Figures One could risk saying that from the point of view of tourism, the 1960s start- ed a litle earlier. Already in 1955, Poland and Czechoslovakia concluded an agreement concerning tourism, which made it possible to travel hassle-free to the conventional borderland zones. hanks to cheap and easily available permits, Poles could enter Czechoslovakia twice for six days and exchange a certain amount of Czechoslovakian korunas. Citizens of Czechoslovakia enjoyed similar privilege. he massive low of tourists throughout the southern border started already in the years 1957-1958. In the year 1959 the so-called passport-in- serts were introduced, which, together with a passport, were a document that enabled people to travel. hese and the Polish-Czechoslovakian agreement of the dropping of visas at private travel for the citizens of both countries (introduced on August 24, 1960) made travelling even easier. At the beginning of the 1960 other countries began participating in the socialist tourist exchange. On October 19, 1961 Poland and communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) signed a protocol on encouraging tourism and introducing the so-called holiday tourism, which included trips made from midnight of the day before Sunday until 12:00 of the day ater, provided that accommodation had been reserved. he results were modest at the beginning, mainly because of resistance on the German side. Political issues certainly 13 IPN BU 01521/784., p. 29. Sławomir Mrożek wrote in his diary on December 9, 1962: ‘How Poles do it, how they moonlight, is quite unclear to me. he oicial sources say that the situation is still quite critical, but one senses that people are moonlighting. Above all, people are not ashamed to admit that they are earning and buying. Which is quite contrary to how it was just a few years ago.’ S. Mrożek, Dziennik, vol. 1. 1962-1969 (Kraków 2010), p. 21. 147 Jerzy Kochanowski played a role here, and among others, the memory of the year 1956 in Poland. he information of ‘mass’ tourism between the Poland and Czechoslovakia reached East Germany, awakening hopes and becoming a reason to pressurize the authorities. Finally, from January 1, 1963 the tourism convention between Poland and East Germany came into force. Even though Berlin subjected it to strict regulations, fearing its unpredictable consequences, the number of tourists crossing the western border (especially to Poland) was on the increase. he agreement of July 1964 dropped tourist visas between Hungary and Poland, which made travel between these countries extremely popular (see the chart.) his was an element of Hungarian social politics, which began in 1964 (and included ‘family tourism’ between Hungary and Slovakia, thanks to which 600 thousand people travelled to Hungary, and 500 thousand in the opposite direction. 14 If tourism and illegal trade concentrated between Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia until 1965, ater that year the tourist and economic traic with countries like USSR, Bulgaria, Romania and especially Yugoslavia increased signiicantly. 15 Just like the beginning of the decade of 1960s was a bit ahead of the cal- endar, so was its ending. he crisis of this irst spontaneous and chaotic wave of tourism in socialist countries took place in the years 1967-1968. On the one hand, countries started saving money – in Romania or Hungary as a part of market reforms, in Poland because of growing economic downturn. Another factor was the Prague Spring and the intervention of Warsaw Pact army in 14 his increase was really signiicant: if in 1963, 569 775 people travelled from Hungary and 921 021 travelled in the opposite direction, in 1964 these numbers were 148 5712 and 1 799 932, respectively. T. Dessewfy, “Speculators and Travellers. he Political Construction of the Tourist in the Kàdàr regime,” Cultural Studies (16) 2002, p. 44-62. 15 On the role of Yugoslavia, see: P. J. Paterson, “Dangerous Liaisons. Soviet-Bloc Tourists and the Yugoslav Good Life in the 1960s & 1970s,” in he Business of Tourism. Place, Faith, and History, ed. P. Scranton, J. F. Davidson (Philadelphia 2006), p. 186-212; Luthar, “Remembering Socialism”; Švab, “Consuming Western Image.” 148 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective Czechoslovakia, which had a huge impact on tourism – both individual tour- ism and unoicial trade exchange were temporarily impeded. A revival came ater 1970, when the borders between Poland and East Germany as well we between East Germany and Czechoslovakia were opened in 1972, which is quite a separate issue. Table Tourist trafic through the borders of Poland: 1960 1969 1957 1964 1966 1970 1968 1959 1956 1965 1962 Incoming 78,1 115,5 147,0 184,0 404,4 878,2 1162,9 1280,1 1712,7 1974,9 1888,8 tourism Socialist states 64,1 80,4 100,7 130,0 350,0 733,6 972,8 1054,3 1487,0 1732,2 1609,5 together 221,5 CSSR 42,1 (k*) 28,5 (k) 25,2 (k) 51,8 (k) 230,3 (k) 355,8 467,5 643,0 489,2 East 37,5 330,6 525,6 542,6 539,1 Germany Hungary 10,1 53,1 107,4 92,2 116,0 115,5 131,7 Outgoing 256,7 236,3 163,8 216,4 446,5 577,3 778,4 949,9 728,1 814,4 871,3 tourism Socialist states 242,7 177,3 151,3 175,0 395,4 505,8 702,7 858,3 635,7 706,1 757,2 together 51,8 163,0 CSSR 88,2 (k) 21,6 (k) 27,7 (k) ncluding 187,3 (k) 221,7 (k) 307,7 278,0 including 102,2 150,0 45,6 (k) 54,1 (k) East 31,1 78,4 128,7 189,6 163,0 200,7 173,8 Germany Hungary 13,1 57,7 99,2 191,1 71,9 75,7 88,0 Source: Rocznik Statystyczny (further: RS) (Warszawa 1960); Archiwum Akt Nowych, Główny Komitet Kultury Fizycznej i Turystyki, 16/93, k. 6; 16/6, k. 30. * (k) – convention trafic **Does not include Polish transit trafic through Hungary. 149 Jerzy Kochanowski The Implementation If from the point of view of food consumption Poland was not much behind, the gap concerning industrial consumption between Poland and of the capi- talist countries, as well as some socialist countries, like Czechoslovakia, was dramatic. 16 Our market demand for industrial goods is immense […] – it was writen in 1957 – everything or almost everything is diicult to get: sponge, chewing gum, nylon socks or artiicial jewelry. 17 During the next decade the changes were mainly quantitative and not qualitative. Items of high quality were almost only available abroad, with prices oten many times lower than in Poland. Professional smugglers or sailors, who had enough capital, made mass purchases of items like raincoats or watches in the West. Other items were provided by tourists. It is hard to say whether it was individual tourists or package ones who were more involved in illegal trade. It seems that geography and organization were the main factors here. For example, in the border conventional zone, mass trade was the domain of package tours, organized by oten specialized tour operators, as well as workplaces. Such tours usually lasted one day, and the destination was the nearest city across the border with enough shops. he participants usually had the maximum amount of foreign currency that they were allowed to exchange. 18 his phenomenon was quickly used by Czech tradesmen, and 16 V. Holešovský, “Personal Consumption in Czechoslovakia , Hungary and Poland, 1950-1960: a Comparison,” Slavic Review 24 (1965), p. 622-635; M. Rogowiec, B. Tylec, Kierunki przemian konsumpcji w latach 1960-1973 w wybranych krajach RWPG (Warszawa 1977). 17 Prawo i Życie, issue 15, 14.07.1957. 18 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/83, J. Krynicki, “Ocena wyników badania ankietowego wśród turystów strefy konwencyjnej PRL-CSRS” (comp. by R. Łazarek), Styczeń 1963, p. 203, 204. 150 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective second quality goods were sold in stores near the border, because it was widely known that ‘Polish tourists will buy it anyway.’ 19 On the other hand, Czechs and Slovaks did not need special encouragement to buy cold meats, chocolate, cigaretes or vodka available in Poland. 20 Czecho- slovak citizens also traded on the other side of the border, taking advantage of the Polish regulation that if goods worth less than 6000 zlotys were sold to the state, no customs documentation was needed. In 1958 alone, goods worth 1,2 million zlotys (a very signiicant amount of money these days) were sold to a state owned chain of shops in the Podhale region. 21 Goods which were worth more were oten passed from hand to hand. More atention should be devoted to the border between Poland and Czechoslovakia, and especially the section that had already existed in the interwar period, mainly because very intense tourism and trade existed there, and the coping strategies used before had to be modiied to the largest extent. Main border crossings on the southern border of Poland were located in this section – like the one at Łysa Polana, which was crossed by 900 000 people in 1968. In the regions of Podhale, Żywiec, Śląsk Cieszyński where the inhabitants of both sides of the border were connected by strong economic, historical and oten family ties, the cross-border trade was a time-honored custom. he issue was emphasized in the report of the Supreme Chamber of Control concern- ing economic crime in 1959, which said that: ‘among highlanders, smuggling 19 E. Orkiszewski, “Turystyka, podróże, lecz nie tylko…,” Tygodnik Demokratyczny 31 (1958). 20 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/83, p. 165. 21 E. Orkiszewski, “Turystyka, podróże, lecz nie tylko…” 151 Jerzy Kochanowski is observed to be a profession.’ 22 When, in the second half of 1950s tourism became highly popular, local smuggling customs underwent a radical change, and social roles were reversed: ‘In the days of old Poland [before 1939 – J.K.] we did some smuggling – highlanders declared at the beginning of 1960s – kind now we do, too, but folks from Warsaw and Łódz are doing it for us.’ 23 his fact was conirmed by the observations of customs oicers. In the year 1959 the Border Guards caught 865 smugglers crossing the border illegally, in the year 1960 – 171, and in 1966 – 139. Smuggling itself had not decreased, it was only done in a way that was slightly more legal – that is, through tourism. 24 Tourism gave a precious alibi on both sides of the border, which made smuggling much easier by establishing contacts abroad and organizing traicking chan- nels. hese methods were oten used when smuggling farm animals, mainly horses, which was characteristic for the Polish-Czechoslovakian border area. Potential buyers came to Poland as tourists, chose animals, paid for them and waited for the animals to be delivered illegally through the border. Similar methods were used when ‘importing’ to Poland. A Pole crossed the border legally, using a permit, passport insert or even a passport. When he was in Czechoslovakia or Austria, for example, he bought goods and returned with them to the country illegally, or transferred the goods at the border to a smug- 22 Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Wydział d/s Nadużyć Gospodarczych, „Informacja o przestępczości gospodarczej w 1959 r.,” (Warszawa 1960), p. 19 (copy owned by the Author). See: A. Buńda, “Pogranicze mniej formalne czyli nielegalne przekraczanie granic na Podhalu,” in Góry i góralszczyzna w dziejach i kulturze pogranicza polsko- słowackiego (Podhale, Spisz, Orawa, Pieniny). Historia, ed. J. R. Roszkowski, R. Kowalski (Nowy Targ, 2005), p. 127-134. 23 Herder Institut Marburg, Pressearchiv, P 6221, RFE Research, 2823/61, 3.09.1961, „Gorale” (the Highlanders) – the privileged class in Poland. Tourists got 500 zlotys (which was half the amount of a monthly salary) for carrying 20 kilos of goods across the border. A. Buńda, “Pogranicze mniej formalne czyli nielegalne przekraczanie granic na Podhalu.” 24 S. Banaszek, M. Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemytnicze, p. 59. 152 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective gler, and the he returned to Czechoslovakia and crossed the border back to Poland legally. 25 Goods smuggled from capitalist countries (like gold or clothes from Italy) were given to several smugglers in the conventional zone, who, in a relatively safe way, brought the goods to Poland as conventional tourists. 26 Polish Highlanders did not abandon their traditional occupation of smug- gling, of course. Between the autumn of 1968 and autumn 1971 a few Highland- ers from the Podhale region smuggled 39 horses, 12 catle and huge quantities of bed linen, bed covers or curtains. For these animals and goods they got 1,1 thousand of non-iron shirts, 11 rolls of a synthetic fabric that was in demand in Poland and gold coins, mainly Austrian ducats. 27 Already in 1960s Zakopane became a Mecca for those coming from Czecho- slovakia, Hungary or East Germany seeking an opportunity to take holiday that was perhaps not that luxurious, but free from the government surveil- lance. A well known columnist, Stefan Kisielewski, in the summer of 1970 wrote the following words about Zakopane: ‘It’s full of East Germans, Czechs, Hungarians and even Russians. I don’t know how they are bearing with this place, but it seems to be a good deal, if they keep coming.’ 28 At the end of 1960 and beginning of 1970 each year almost 300 thousand guests from socialist countries stayed in private apartments, reaching an economic compromise proitable for both sides: the visitors oten paid for their stay with goods, and they made proitable exchanges, also currency exchanges. 29 25 S. Banaszek, M. Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemytnicze, p. 102, 105. 26 A. Kłodzińska, “Waluciarze,” Życie Warszawy, 10-12.04.1971. 27 A. Teneta, “Konie kraść?” Dziennik Polski, 294, 10.11.1972. 28 S. Kisielewski, Dzienniki (Warszawa 1998), p. 427. 29 J. Kochanowski, “Socjalizm na halach, czyli Patologia stosunków społeczno- ekonomicznych i politycznych w Zakopanem (1972)” Przegląd Historyczny XCVIII (2007) z. 1, p. 71-96 153 Jerzy Kochanowski If, like in the case of Polish-Czechoslovakian border area, existing smuggling procedures were simply adapted to the new circumstances, in case of travelling further away from Poland, completely new strategies had to be developed. For example, joining individual tourists in groups was introduced, which ensured beter orientation, safety and smooth border crossing. 30 In Bulgaria and Ro- mania, which saw more Polish visitors since the 1960s, and where the largest percentage of tourists was involved in trade, people were interested in both coarse products of Polish industry 31 and goods smuggled by Poles from Austria or Italy (watches, for example.) Travels to Hungary – which became very pop- ular since 1965 – package tours were replaced by individual, self-inanced trips. To a large extent such activities seemed more acceptable, because this was the way that inhabitants of Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, East Germany or Hungary behaved in Poland, and in other countries – like Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, for example. It is diicult to ascertain in a re- liable way to which extent these were grass-roots activities and to which they were indirectly inspired by the state which gave its inhabitants the possibility to travel, and the duty to exchange currency on their own. In 1968 it was said that ‘inancial authorities of the CSRS [communist Czechoslovakia] allow their citizens to exchange only 200 zlotys for their stay in Poland, regardless of its duration. his state of afairs intensiies illegal trade.’ 32 But it is diicult to say how popular this solution was. Much more oten it was a conscious decision 30 S. Banaszek, M. Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemytnicze, p. 83. 31 Already at the beginning of 1960s ‘what sold’ in Bulgaria was common knowledge. he already mentioned research by Jan Węgleński shows that ‘A respondent who was buying bed covers in the Clothes Hall in Kraków, did not have to pick and choose, because the seller immediately asked: to USSR or to Bulgaria? And she packed two covers, which were indeed in high demand in Bulgaria.’ J. Węgleński, Wyniki badania nad handlem, p. 14. On trade tourism travels to Bulgaria and Romania among Poles, see: “Kapiści,” Dziennik Ludowy 244, 12.10.1962. 32 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/84, p. 135. 154 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective of Czech or Slovak tourists, who – as Poles would report – did not accept any cheques in zlotys, but goods. ‘hey sell them here, sleep and eat in private guest houses and pay with goods.’ 33 In the second half of the 1960s this became a real problem, especially be- cause the number of people coming to Poland from other socialist countries grew much faster than the numbers of Poles travelling. In 1967, compared with 1966, the number of incoming tourists grew by 25 per cent (to 1 330 807), and exceeded the number of outgoing tourists by 495 681. his did not lead to the increase of income in foreign currency. 34 he income per one tourist from socialist countries decreased from 19,69 foreign currency zlotys (230,37 ‘normal’ zlotys) in 1966, to 18,38 foreign currency zlotys (215,04) in the year 1967. As a result, the negative balance of tourist exchange between Poland and socialist countries was 68,2 million foreign currency zlotys, and just a year later – 113,3 million. 35 he income also decreased in the countries whose media concentrated on illegal trade activities of Polish tourists – Hungary and Czechoslovakia. For example, Hungarians oicially spent 8 times less than an average Polish tourist holidaying at Balaton lake – in 1968 – 21,09 and 182,50 foreign currency zlotys. ‘his proves – a Polish oicial wrote – that Hungarians pay for their stay in Poland mainly by selling goods at atractive prices or trading currency illegal- ly.’ 36 It was enough to visit Katowice train station to realize that this was true. 33 E. Orkiszewski, “Turystyka, podróże, lecz nie tylko… .” 34 At the end of 1960s one foreign currency zloty – a conventional currency, used by the Polish People’s Republic in international setlements – was equal to 0,225 ruble and 0,25 USD. 35 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/3, Rozwój ruchu turystycznego z zagranicą 1965- 1970, p. 44. 36 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/93, p. 190. 155 Jerzy Kochanowski Crowds swarmed before my eyes – Romuald Teyszer- ski wrote about the Katowice train station in 1968. – hose from abroad were calmly siting, our folk – walk- ing around nervously, crushing polo shirts, non-irons and sweaters […] in their hands. Sellers – Hungarians, Czechs, Yugoslavs, and Austrians – were well aware of the recent prices of goods. […] Foreigners were trading almost by wholesale. hey wanted to sell their goods, earn quick money and travel around Poland. […] On arrival, they were quickly informed by their acquain- tances that this was the trading place. To reach it, they didn’t even have to leave the station building. 37 Economic losses encouraged the Polish authorities to undertake decisive, but rather one-sided actions. In 1967 a series of restrictions on excessive for- eign currency expenses was introduced, and as a result, the expenditure on tourism to socialist countries decreased. he foreign currency allocations were decreased, restrictions were placed on the amount of Polish zloty that could be taken abroad and only one trip per year was allowed. In case of conventional tourism, the amount of foreign currency that could be exchanged was limited to 80 zlotys per day. As a result, the deicit decreased to 77,5 million in 1967, in 1968 to 22,1 million and in 1969 – 14,3 million of foreign currency zlotys. 38 hese restrictions had not limited the number of incoming tourists or the scale of illegal trade that both sides were involved in. hey only encouraged, especially Polish tourists to be more efective and search for new strategies of coping with the limitations. For example, when in 1970, as a result of the above 37 R. Teyszerski, “Złote jajo po polsku,” Kierunki, 36, 8.09.1968. 38 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/3, Rozwój ruchu turystycznego z zagranicą 1965- 1970, p. 44. 156 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective mentioned restrictions, high cost of the Hungarian currency and tourist ser- vices in Hungary the price of two-week long was 1000 zlotys more expensive than similar holidays in Bulgaria or Romania, Polish tourists immediately changed their holiday destinations and adapted their trade strategies to new local conditions. As a result, the negative balance of tourist exchange between Poland and other socialist countries rose over three times – from 23,2 million of foreign currency zlotys in 1970 to 72,2 million in 1971. 39 The Effects he most important efect was deinitely the fact that both traveling and unoi- cial trade exchange became a widespread and widely accepted phenomenon in the 1960s. Smuggling – as Maciej Krasicki observed in 1967 – freed from moral dubiousness, became the indicator of smartness, intelligence and resource- fulness. ‘Today, you can’t compare smuggling with ordinary thet without causing social upheaval.’ 40 It was during this decade that ‘tourist trade’ became the force fuelling mass tourism, and a way to spend relatively cheap holidays abroad. Trade activity – ‘tourism’ is a bit of a misnomer here 41 – enabled more people of limited means, or traditionally less mobile because of their social status to travel abroad. 39 Rocznik statystyczny 1982 (Warszawa 1982), p. 496. 40 M. Krasicki, “Przemyt turystyczny,” Polityka 38, 23.09.1967. 41 his is clearly shown by dialogue recorded by journalist in the low tourist season: ‘I have friends who oten go abroad in their own car. I asked them once where they went this summer. – To Bulgaria – the husband said. – To Romania – the wife corrected him. He was not entirely sure. However, he knew the price relations very well, and he boasted that no trip of theirs has ever cost him a penny.’ “Kapiści,” Dziennik Ludowy 244, 12.10.1962. 157 Jerzy Kochanowski Anyway, in the second half of the 1960s, Poles began to use the saying: ‘We are too poor to stay in Poland for holidays.’ 42 But at the same time, already at the turn of the decades (1950s and 1960s) such trips became a source of quite high untaxed income, only a part of which was invested in another trip. 43 One is not able to estimate the scale of this surplus, taking into account the number of participants and the geographical area. A network of trade connections was established, which involved all European socialist countries, with branches in the West and other continents. Sometimes smuggling bore all signs of a pro- fession, requiring a high degree of managerial skills, market intuition, not only mediation, but a lot of creativity which helped to sell goods at a proit. What the Polish media described as ‘routes’ – the fur route to Bulgaria, clothes and cosmetics route to Romania, crystal and currency route to Yugosla- via, linen route to Hungary 44 – actually just covered a human network, which passed information from ear to ear: what? when? how much? from whom? his phenomenon was not limited to small groups of people, like in the second half of the 1950s, but literally millions. Although the major part of tourist trade in the end of 1960s consisted of simple, pre-industrial goods-for-goods or goods-money-goods type of exchange, conducted somewhere on a Budapest square, Black Sea beach or mountain chalet, it was also subject to specialization. Mass tourism, which oten crossed the Iron Curtain, made possible a truly professional reconnaissance of markets, developing lists of goods in shortage, estimating needs and possible proits and, as a result, developing new trade strategies, independent from state institutions and the whole system. It turned out that grass-roots creativity could cause a true 42 G. Gałuszczyńska, “O ludziach, metodach i sposobach myślenia,” Prawo i Życie, 6 (1966). 43 W. Nowierski, “Komisy nie powinny być centralą skupu przemycanych towarów,” Express Wieczorny 271, 15.11.1961. 44 M. Krasicki, “Przemyt turystyczny.” 158 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective economic miracle, deserving a Nobel prize: the oicially non-exchangeable currencies like Soviet rubles, Hungarian forints or Czech korunas were not only suddenly exchangeable, but also worth their value in gold. Because what brought true proits was not only a simple sale of Polish crystal glass, cosmetics or sausage and buying local (socialist) goods for the money, but investing the rubles, forints or korunas on free markets and exchanging them in Vienna, Trieste or West Berlin for gold, which was the most proitable good in Poland. One may theorize that similar mechanisms were at work in other socialist coun- tries. As a result, already at the end of the 1960s an unoicial stock exchange of money and goods originating from socialist countries was born, and the rates of exchange depended on international conditions. 45 Potential proit was one of the basic factors making the given country atractive for ‘tourists’ and inlu- encing the decision of which strategy to adopt. 46 Depending on the route and type of transaction there were national specializations as well – for example, smuggling goods and currency was to a large extent the domain of Yugoslavs. 47 Mass smuggling of toys and other wares produced by Polish cratsmen was taken over by the Roma people of Czechoslovakia. 48 hese phenomena are relected in the records of iscal proceedings for customs ofences – by the way, the numbers of these are strangely low in the case of Hungarians. In the irst 45 here was a characteristic corelation between the exchange rate of the Czech koruna and the Prague Spring events, during which the demand for korunas in Vienna and West Germany was high, and it was doubtlessly connected with mass ‘tourism’ from Austria and West Germany to Czechoslovakia, which caused an increase in the black market koruna rate in Poland, mainly in the border areas. AIPN, KG MO, 35/1740, p. 2, KG MO, Informacja o efektach ścigania przestępstw dewizowo przemytniczych w 1968 r., 8.1.1969. 46 J. Oleś, “Przemyt wartości dewizowych,” Akademia Spraw Wewnętrznych, Instytut Kryminalistyki i Kryminologii (Warszawa 1978), IPN BU 01521/2035, p. 65-70. 47 J. Koczorowski, Walka z przemytem, p. 34-35. 48 Wiadomości Celne, Styczeń 1970, p. 9-10. 159 Jerzy Kochanowski half of 1969, 2318 criminal cases were initiated on the motion of twelve largest customs oices. 49 Out of these, 985 regarded citizens of Poland (for the amount of 3 363 800 zlotys), Czechoslovakia – 349 (696 800 zlotys), Yugoslavia – 349 (1 352 800 zlotys), USSR – 70 (241 200 zlotys), Romania – 25 (91 200 zlotys), Bulgaria 18 (79 200 zlotys), Hungary – 17 (48 800 zlotys), East Germany – 5 (4 700 zlotys), other countries – 228 (2 891 700 zlotys) and cases where the perpetrators remained unknown – 326 (1 969 800 zlotys). One may suspect that the last category was mainly composed of inhabitants of socialist countries. 50 In 1970, 4 440 such proceedings were initiated against inhabitants of socialist countries: 3253 against Poles, 554 – against Yugoslavs, 394 against Czechoslovak citizens, 92 – against USSR citizens, 70 – against Bulgarians, 29 – Romanians, 27 – against East Germans, 21 – against Hungarians. 51 he efects were to a large extent schizophrenic. he authorities – for their own peace of mind – allowed for tourism to develop, acknowledging illegal trade as a necessity, which freed them from the obligation to provide the cit- izens with the goods they desired – both material goods and services, like holidays. However, this phenomenon quickly got out of control and in 1960s assumed the scale that could provoke international problems. If ‘tourist trade’ was criticized in the media with the use of legal and ethical arguments, in oicial correspondence it was mainly the economic side that was pointed out. In 1968, the irst unoicial ‘customs wars’ between socialist countries took place. his year the Main Commitee of Physical Culture and Tourism urged the government to intensify customs control regarding individual tourists from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary, in order to ‘prevent 49 Chałupki, Cieszyn, Kudowa, Kuźnica, Łysa Polana, Małaszewicze, Warsaw Airport, Międzylesie, Rzepin, Zebrzydowice, Zgorzelec, Żurawica. 50 Wiadomości Celne, Styczeń 1970, p. 6. 51 Kompendium statystyczne administracji celnej 1946-1974 (Warszawa: GUC, 1975) Archiwum Akt Nowych, GUC 23/397, p. 213. 160 “We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective them from bringing in the goods to be sold in Poland in order to cover the cost of holidays. 52 Romanian authorities also intensiied their actions against Polish traders in 1968. In this case their aim was not the protection of their own market, but rather discouraging Poles from occupying Black Sea resort apartments, which could fetch much more money, and in foreign currency, from German or French tourists. 53 Media from particular countries started propaganda campaigns criticizing trading tourists from other socialist coun- tries. Such actions aimed at integrating their own society in view of a kind of external threat. But between the lines, one can see the fear of a grass-roots, spontaneous and uncontrollable integration between societies. However, it was too late to ight this phenomenon efectively. Within one decade Poles, Hungarians or Romanians managed to establish a lasting foundation for a truly mass ‘cooperation’ in 1970s and 1980s. Translated by Anna Sekułowicz 52 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/93, p. 190. In January 1969, Polish authorities started to demand that Hungarians coming to Poland have enough Polish currency to cover the holiday expenses, and created a formal means to deny entry to the ones that failed to prove it. 53 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/1, p. 234. 161  Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period Regina Laukaitytė Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period he Catholic Church in Lithuania experienced one of the most diicult pe- riods of its existence under the Soviet occupation, especially in the Stalin years (1944-1956). Unlike the People’s Republic of Poland where the Church although terrorized by the pro-communist regime still preserved its structure (a network of parishes, the religious press, monastic institutions, scientiic institutions), the confessional policy of the regime in the Lithuanian SSR let behind the Iron Curtain was much more brutal. he structure of the Church sufered greatly, and its social status and legal position changed completely. he regime achieved its goal – the Church was forced to live according to Soviet laws that were hostile to it. During the early post-war years the dissemination of religious periodicals and books was forbidden, the number of functioning churches and theological colleges was radically reduced (only one of the colleges was let functioning and it was watched and controlled by the KGB), and a ban on priests catechizing children came into force, among other severe restrictions. Very soon, in 1948- 1949, all Catholic monasteries were destroyed. heir property was nationalized, the monks and nuns were forced to disperse and had to earn their living on their own. In the spring of 1949, the oicials of the Soviet Lithuanian authorities reported to their central authorities in Moscow that Catholic monasteries ‘had 163 Regina Laukaitytė liquidated themselves’ in the republic. 1 Although the disappearance of six men and nine women from monastic institutions (not including the Archdiocese of Vilnius; in July 1940 there were 281 men and 490 women there apart from the novices and candidates 2) was oicially treated as a spontaneous process, this was achieved only through means of brutal compulsion. Lithuanian monastic institutions adapted themselves to the conditions of underground life. In the course of almost ive decades not only did they not decline, but some of them grew considerably, and new orders of women appeared. Similarly to the Lithuanian Church, one of the acutest problems of their existence during the Soviet period was relations with the Vatican and canters of orders and congregations that existed in foreign countries. Direct diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Lithuania were severed as far back as 1940 when Nuncio Luigi Centozo was forced to leave the Soviet-occu- pied country. Ater World War 2free correspondence was terminated, and the atempts of some priests and nuns to pass on the news in secret to the Vatican about the condition of the Church in Lithuania through the foreign Dean of the Moscow Catholic Church ended in arrests and deportations. his situation led to searches for new secret contacts. Many conidential relations between the West and Lithuania were maintained through Poland. In this article we shall try to elucidate when, in what ways and to what extent the Lithuanian monastic institutions managed to overcome the border cordons, and what role the Church of neighboring Poland played in their atempts to break away from Soviet isolation. Another object of this investigation is a second secret channel of communication which ran through the Lithuanian monastic institutions 1 Information report of Bronius Pušinis, Representative of the Council for Religious Cults of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers of Quarter I, 1949, Lithuanian Central State Archives (hereinater referred to as LCSA), fund R-181, inventory 3, ile 22, leaf 29. 2 R. Laukaitytė, Lietuvos vienuolijos: XX a. istorijos bruožai (Vilnius 1997), p. 91-92. 164  Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period that existed in the countries of Western Europe and North and South Amer- ica, as well as the importance of relations to the orders and congregations of Lithuania, which operated underground. he issues related to the activity of the monastic institutions of Lithuania during the Soviet period have received much atention: since the restoration of the Republic of Lithuania in 1990 leaders of male and female monastic institu- tions have been simply looded with forms and questionnaires. hey have been urged to describe their life because no authentic documents of that period have survived, for understandable reasons. he monastic institutions, which came out of the underground, shared their history more actively at the end of the 20th century, 3 and at the turn of the 21st century several historical studies devoted especially to this problem appeared. 4 However, contacts of the Churches of Lithuania and Poland, like those of the monastic institutions that functioned both in the occupied Motherland and in exile during the Soviet period have not been speciically studied, meaning we can decide about secret relations 3 Data on female monastic institutions in the Soviet times were generalised in: Dievui ir Bažnyčiai. Trumpa Lietuvos moterų vienuolijų apžvalga, ed. L. Rimkevičiūtė (Marijampolė 1997); Lietuvos Šventojo Kazimiero seserų kongregacijai – 75 (Kaunas 1995); L. Jagminas SJ, “Vienuolijų veikla Lietuvoje nepriklausomybės ir pokario metais (1918-1990),” Lietuvių katalikų mokslo akademijos suvažiavimo darbai 15 (1995), p. 97- 118; Lietuvių saleziečių istorija, compiled by K. Juknevičius SDB (Kaunas 2000); A. P. Dydycz OFM Cap, Kapucyni na Litwie (1756-1993), (Rzym 1994). 4 R. Laukaitytė, Lietuvos vienuolijos: XX a. istorijos bruožai, p. 133-158; A. Streikus, Sovietų valdžios antibažnytinė politika Lietuvoje (1944-1990) (Vilnius 2002), p. 115-118; A. Pažėraitė, “Lietuvos vienuolijos totalitarinio režimo sąlygomis,“ Lietuvių katalikų mokslo akademijos suvažiavimo darbai, 18, 2 (2003), p. 755-777. 165 Regina Laukaitytė of the monastic institutions only from scanty hints found in the archives and historical literature. 5 hey will serve as the main research sources for this study. Lithuania was the only republic of the USSR with a Catholic majority, and it had a dense network of parishes and monasteries and a rich cultural heritage inseparable from Catholicism. During the Soviet period great ideological forces were exerted to discredit that heritage and to eliminate the Church from public life. It was sought to impoverish it and to control its activity. he situation of the Church changed radically in 1948-1949 ater church proper- ty had been nationalized and a selective campaign of registering churches, monasteries and priests had been conducted, having intimidated the priests and ordinaries. By the end of 1949 two waves of repression had passed, during which irst bishops were arrested, then managers of dioceses appointed by the former following Canon Law; only Bishop Kazimieras Paltarokas was let in his post. As at the same time the campaign of destroying Catholic monastic institutions was launched the later could expect support neither from the Church nor from a public devastated by the campaign of mass deportations. As mentioned above, harsh compulsory measures were taken, especially against male and female monastic institutions. heir members were terrorized, as they were ordered to vacate the nationalized houses within several days, singeing taxes were imposed on them, and they were dismissed from work at schools and kindergartens. Similar measures against the monastic institutions were soon taken in Poland as well, although those were much more moderate. Only some unregistered monastic institutions were made to withdraw into 5 H. Strzelecka SJE, Służebnice Jezusa w Eucharystii na terenach Związku Radzieckiego w latach 1945-1991 (Warszawa 1994), p. 129-146; A. Pajarskaitė, ed., Švenčiausiosios Mergelės Marijos Nekaltojo Prasidėjimo vargdienių seserų vienuolija (Kaunas 2012); S. Bytautas OFM, Lietuvių pranciškonų (OFM) identiteto raiška pastoracinėje veikloje 1940-1990 metais. (PhD diss., Kaunas 2011), p. 116, 119-120. 166  Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period the underground, 6 whereas in Lithuania’s case, all male and female orders had to do so. In 1948 a method of forceful transfer of monks and nuns to specially chosen locations was used there: Lithuanian nuns who refused to leave their homes in Kaunas were transferred by force to Kulautuva and the nuns from four Polish monastic institutions in Vilnius were moved to Juodšiliai. 7 In 1949 priests of the monastic institutions were forced to relinquish their monastic property in writing. It was only ater the Commissioner of the Council for Religious Cults of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers had received such writen statements that he issued certiicates to priests granting them the right to work in parishes. 8 Analogously, the way to the only theological college in Kaunas was blocked to the young monks. All monastic institutions in Lithu- ania experienced a period of turmoil and despair, many dispersed members lost contact with the leaders of monastic institutions for an extended time, and the later lost contact with their centers and the Vatican. Nevertheless, monastic life did not come to an end: later the security organs periodically disclosed the nuns, and demanded that they should be dismissed from work at schools, kindergartens, etc. 9 Ater the irst wave of repression had subsided the nuns and the monks tried to setle in small communities of 6 I. Lewandowska, Działalność Sióstr od Aniołów w Polsce w latach 1945-1980 (Łomianki 2012); M. Ordon,“Represyjna polityka władz komunistycznych wobec zgromadzenia braci sług Maryi Niepokalanej w okresie Polski Ludowej,” in Divina et Humana, ed. A. Dębiński, W. Bar, P. Stanisz (Lublin 2001), p. 159-175. 7 Information report of the Comissioner Bronius Pušinis of Quater II, 1948, LCSA, fund R-181, inv. 3, f. 17, l. 38-39. 8 Secret leter of the Commissioner Bronius Pušinis of 2 February 1948 to the Chairmen of Executive Commitees of towns and regions, LCSA, fund R-181, inv. 3, f. 20, l. 21. 9 Secret oicial leter of the Chairman of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR General Major Juozas Petkevičius of 29 January 1975 to the Chiefs of KGB Divisions of towns and regions of the Lithuanian SSR On Strengthening Secret Service-Operational Work in Fighting against Hostile Activities of Monks and Nuns, Lithuanian Special Archives (hereinater referred to as LSA), fund K 1, inv. 46, f. 205, l. 35-36. 167 Regina Laukaitytė two or three individuals. Every month they gathered secretly for recollections, and once or twice per year for longer recollections. he governing body of the monastic institutions operated in secret (ater the war, with no possibility to organize new elections according to the requirements of church canons, leaders in many provinces carried out their duties for several terms of oice). he novitiates of the monastic institutions, which were closed ater the war, began to come to life again one ater another right ater Stalin’s death in 1953. Female novices usually lived in their homes and met for secret lessons several times per month. he activity in the underground did not prevent new monastic institutions from forming: in the 1950s and 1960s as many as ive new female congregations appeared in Lithuania, and bishops granted the rights of diocesan congregation to three pious societies that had been functioning for several decades in the country; moreover, in 1947 and 1957 two completely new orders were founded whose aim was to help the priests and to catechize children. Operating under the conditions of the underground, the monastic institu- tions were faced with an important dilemma: to go on being apostolic, to carry out their special tasks, or to be limited to a personal sanctity of the members. In essence, it was an existential question: the monastic institutions which were more active in society would be destroyed; however, isolation also posed the danger of decay. Opinions on this issue difered, and it was quite oten that even members of the same monastic institution understood their mission in a diferent way. he positions of the Heads of the Lithuanian Church difered as well: some ordinaries, seeking to avoid confrontation with the aggressive authorities, the KGB, oriented monastic institutions towards a spiritual life, the life of prayer. For example, in 1967 Bishop Juozapas Matulaitis-Labukas demanded that the duty to work with children and youth should be crossed out 168  Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period of the Constitution of the Congregation of Sisters of Eucharistic Jesus. 10Many non-conformist priests, the Bishops Vincas Sladkevičius and Julijonas Ste- ponavičius who were removed from their posts urged the monastic institutions to take an active part in the life of the Church, to engage in apostolic work even beyond the borders of Lithuania. he most characteristic sphere of the activity of the nuns was assistance to the priests – they helped the priests in parishes, catechized children in se- cret, multiplied and disseminated religious literature, and rallied the youth into circles. Unable to perform their apostolic duties in Lithuania, the priests of the monastic institutions tried their best to work in other republics of the USSR. he initiators of the missions were the priests who, released from the forced labor camps in the middle of the 1950s, stayed of their own fee will to serve the Lithuanian deportees and Catholics of other nationalities. Later, in the 1970s and 1990s, leaders of the monastic institutions sent the priests who could not work in Lithuanian parishes on missions (those priests who were consecrated in secret or who were deprived of the certiicates of the cult clerks). In particular many Jesuits and Marian priests went on missions, and beginning in the 1980s, Franciscan priests as well. hough the local authorities were opposed to their activity, the KGB persecuted them, the priests gave the Sacraments to hundreds of thousands of Catholics, and several parishes were registered. Although they faced opposition and persecution from the local KGB in authority, the priests gave the Sacraments. At the beginning of the 1970s Lithuanian nuns began to embark on mis- sions. Members of the Congregation of Sisters Servants of the Jesus in Eucha- rist founded by the blessed Archbishop Jurgis Matulaitis MIC, devoted the greatest eforts to those missions. he geography of their activities included 10 K.-J. Kuodytė, “A short History of the Congregation of Sisters of Eucharistic Jesus.” (manuscript, copy of the article in the author’s archives), p. 2. 169 Regina Laukaitytė Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, and the cities of Siberia. Sisters of the Congregation of the Servants of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus also took an active part in the missions: from 1973 as many as 10 nuns had lived in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan. 11 he Congregations of St. Casimir, the Poor Sisters, the Sisters of the Eucharist Jesus, of Divine Providence sent some sisters on missions as well. Ater the downfall of the USSR the work of Lithuanian monks and nuns in the missions broke of as wide programs of apostolic work in Lithuania itself began, and ordinaries appointed by the Vatican began taking care of the Catholics in the former USSR. Isolation behind the Iron Curtain could not last forever. he Lithuanian Church had to look for ways of geting in touch with the Vatican, and the monastic institutions with the leaders of their orders and congregations. he later had no reliable information about the lives of the monks who had stayed in Lithuania. In the post-war years people intimidated by mass repressions avoided corresponding with their family members and relatives who had led abroad. Ater Stalin’s death, however, when the regime became soter, they started looking for one another, and relations were restored. he relationship with neighboring Poland has played an important role in the history of the Lithuanian Church and monastic institutions. On the one hand, the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of Poland was beyond all comparison much freer than that in the Soviet Union. During the irst post- war years in Poland the pro-Soviet regime tried to use the inluence of the Catholic Church on society to their advantage, meaning the religious policy was much more tolerant. For example, state holidays always began with masses in churches with high oicials taking part. 11 K.-J. Kuodytė, “A short History of the Congregation of Sisters of Eucharistic Jesus,” p. 12-13. 170  Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period Ater the pro-Soviet regime had become established, the monastic in- stitutions in Poland faced their most relentless persecution during the years of Stalin’s rule, 12 but later their situation stabilized. Both male and female monasteries survived in Poland, as did a number of their schools of general education and a network of hostels, although greatly cut and systematically reduced. Nevertheless, their existence created conditions to efectively re- spond to the political changes of the regime – ater the ‘thaw’ the number of schools where religion was taught was on the increase in Poland (for example, in 1959, as many as 80 per cent of Polish schools were teaching religion 13). he borders of Poland were not as tightly controlled as those in the Soviet Union and priests could go to study or work in Western countries. Later they returned and continued their careers in their motherland where theological colleges operated in dioceses, and in Lublin several thousand students studied at the Catholic University, which maintained close contacts with similar scientiic institutions abroad. Such ‘liberalism’ of the regime was unimaginable in the USSR, while in Poland the conditions of the functioning of Church institu- tions almost equaled those in the West. he oicial Lithuanian Church was controlled, and people were allowed to go abroad on trips unrelated to KGB tasks only in rare cases (in this case they served as a cover for the security oi- cials accompanying them). It was only in the underground that it was possible to carry out authentic activity – catechization, the religious press, theological studies and monastic institutions – in Lithuania. 12 J. Kowalik, “Polityka władz PRL wobec zakonów,“ Chrześcijanin w świecie 1 (196) (1994), p. 136-157; A. Mirek, Siostry zakonne w obozach pracy w PRL w latach 1954-1956 (Lublin 2009), p. 99-174; Zakony w Polsce Ludowej, Przez Morze Czerwone, 2009, część VII; E. Kaczmarek, “Prymas Wyszyński – obrońca zakonów wobec prześladowań władz Polskiej Rzeczpospolitej Ludowej,“ Teologia i moralność, 10 (2011), p. 155-165. 13 E. K. Kryńska, S. W. Mauersberg, Indoktrynacja młodzieży szkolnej w Polsce w latach 1945-1956 (Białystok 2003), p. 43. 171 Regina Laukaitytė However, the most signiicant factor for Poland was that many Polish priests, monks and especially nuns lived in the territory of the USSR. About 90 per cent of the territory of Vilnius Archdiocese was within the boundaries of the USSR ater 1944. With mass migration of the Polish population to Poland occurring, the majority of the priests and monks let. Nonetheless, they main- tained secret contacts with the members of the monastic institutions who had stayed in the USSR and in the Lithuanian SSR and who felt that they belonged to the jurisdiction of the Polish Vilnius Archdiocesan Curia right until 1991 (which moved with the metropolitan Romuald Jałbrzykowski to Białystok in 1945). his Curia preserved contacts with the priests of Vilnius Archdiocese who had stayed in the Belarusian SSR and the Lithuanian SSR, took interest in the situation of the Church in the USSR and the fate of Polish monks, and provided information to the Vatican. 14 One can judge from the clues in the sources and scientiic works that con- tacts between the monks of Lithuania and Poland were maintained by encoded leters, accidental relations or even by means inspired by the KGB. 15 However, beginning in 1965 some leaders of the monastic institutions went from Lithua- nia to Poland and met with the authorities of the congregations, visitations of Lithuanian monasteries began, and representatives of Lithuanian monasteries 14 Relatio de statu huius partis Archidioecesis Vilnensis quae intra ines URSS exstat, 1977, Śmierci się z nas nikt nie boi. Listy kapłanów archidiecezji wileńskiej z ZSRS, ed. A. Shot, W. F. Wilczewski (Białystok 2012), p. 356, 358-359. 15 he KGB of the Lithuanian SSR tried to monitor and control relations with Poland, even to take over the initiative. For example, at the end of 1957 the KGB organised a trip of a Marian priest – agent “Algis” – to Poland where he, through the monks, had to establish relations controlled by the KGB with the authorities of the congregation in Rome (Top secret leter of the Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR Leonardas Martavičius on December 24, 1958 to the Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR K. Liniov, LSA, fund K 1, inv. 3, f. 501, l. 76). 172  Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period sometimes went to take part in general chapters. 16 hanks to these relations and the care of the Białystok Curia more than half of the female monastic in- stitutions that operated in that region during the interwar years have survived up to the present day. Polish priests and monks took care of the sisters as well, constantly visiting the Soviet Union from the 1960s into the1980s. 17 During the years of Soviet rule the monks’ secret relations with Poland was a rare opportunity not only for Polish but also for Lithuanian monastic institutions to seek out contacts with the West. It should be noted that this per- spective was new and radical in the Lithuanian Church, and it required a change in the people’s way of thinking. During the interwar years due to the argument over Vilnius, Lithuania and Poland did not maintain any diplomatic relations 16 For example, in 1965, general seniors of Lithuanian and Polish branches of the congregation of the Servants of Jesus in Eucharist met in Warsaw for the irst time, in 1969-1987, when updating and improving the Constitution of the Congregation sisters of both countries considered the variants of its text. Similarly, around 1960, the Senior of the Congregation of the Servants of Mary othe province of Lithuania went to Poland, and in 1967, a member of the General Council arrived in Lithuania as a visitor for the irst time. In 1970, three sisters of the Congregation of St. Catherine let for the centre of the monastic institution in Braniewo where they could learn of the changes that had taken place in the life of monastic institutions ater the Second Vatican Council; in the summer of 1972 the new Constitution, the statute of the province and other important documents were received from Rome. In 1974 the nuns of that Congregation met for the irst time ater many years with the leader of that monastic institution, who was in Vilnius as a tourist. See: H. Strzelecka SJE, Służebnice Jezusa w Eucharystii na terenach Związku Radzieckiego w latach 1945-1991, p. 129, 147- 148; information of the senior deputy of the Congregation of the Sisters Servants of the St. Virgin Mary Immaculate Rita Bernotaitė of June 7, 1995, an oicial leter in the author’s archives; Chronicles of the Monastery of the Congregation of the Sisters of St. Catherine, l. 30, 570, 581, a copy in the author’s archives. 17 For example, in 1979-1987 Vilnius Benedictines were visited by father Bruno Zygmunt Pawłowicz OFM Conv, the Dominicans – by Polish Dominicans, the home of the Sisters Servants of Jesus in Eucharist was visited by the sisters of those monastic institutions who provided apostolic help. See: A. Słowik, Najważniejsze jest niewidoczne dla oczu (Niepokalanów 1994), p. 241, 245; Account by s. Miriam Jedynak OP, taken on June 7, 1995 is stored in the author’s private archives; H. Strzelecka SJE, Służebnice Jezusa w Eucharystii na terenach Związku Radzieckiego w latach 1945-1991, p. 23-24. 173 Regina Laukaitytė (until the later’s ultimatum in 1938). It was out of the question that the country’s monastic institutions could belong to the provinces of Poland or that contacts should be maintained between them. herefore the monasteries, which had been operating in Lithuania from the tsarist times, were made to refuse the Polish language; branches of non-public female congregations (established by Honorat Koźmiński) seceded from Poland and founded their own provinces. 18 Other newly established orders and congregations could not invite Polish individuals. During the Soviet period such opposition started to weaken: the monastic institutions tried to establish relations with the centers in Poland and in this way they not only sent personal messages but also to found out about the changes in the universal Catholic Church. It is diicult to say what role the heads of the Polish Church played in the life of the monastic institutions of Lithuania. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński had the authorization of the Vatican to head the Catholic and Uniate Churches in the territory of the USSR, and ater the Cardinal’s death another Primate of Poland, Józef Glemp, took over this responsibility. It seems that Cardinal Wyszyński was slow in undertaking any initiative on the situation of the Catholic Church in Lithuania. Most probably he lacked reliable contacts and information, as well as possibilities to realize his authorizations (to block them the Soviet KGB tried to enlist the help of not only of the security bodies of Poland but also those of Lithuania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in order to use the very fact of appointment to deepen the disagreements between the Lithuanians 18 From the tsarist times 16 secret congregations established by father Honorat Koźmiński operated in Lithuania, including three, which became integrated into ethnic Lithuanian society: the Congregations of the Servants of Mary, the Congregation of the Servants of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the Congregation of the Daughters of the Most Holy and Immaculate Heart of the Blessed Virgin Mary. During the interwar period they oicially became registered and acted as societies, and in 1923, 1927 and 1934, respectively, their independent provinces were founded in Lithuania. 174  Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period and the Poles both in exile and in Lithuania 19). It was only at the beginning of the 1970s that Cardinal Wyszyński authorized Father Pranas Račiūnas MIC to lead the female monastic institutions of Lithuania. 20 his invigorated their lives and their apostolic activity as Father Račiūnas, who had connections to the underground, began to solve their internal problems (the issues of the formation of the nuns, updating of the Constitution) and encourage them to be more active in their apostolic duties. With the underground Church gaining strength as the number of the priests of the monastic institutions graduating from secret studies increased, the female monastic institutions became stronger and their activity became more intense. Ater Lithuania re-established its statehood, it turned out that some mo- nastic institutions, hitherto unrelated to Poland, entered the jurisdiction of the Church of that country (Lithuanian Capuchins, 21 male and female Salesians, the Dominicans, Sisters of St. Elisabeth, and the Servants of Mary). he Church authorities of Lithuania and members of the monastic institutions accepted 19 Certiicate of the Chief Commissioner of Subunit 2 of Department 4 of the Second Supreme Board of the USSR KGB Major Salov of July 11, 1962, LSA, fund K 1, inv. 3, f. 534, vol. 3, l. 127 and next. 20 “Prano Račiūno 50 metų kunigystės kelias,” Šaltinis, 1/2 (1994), p. 28. 21 Acquaintance of two Capuchins with the Polish monks of this Order in one parish near Grodno opened the way to relations with the centre of the Order (in 1979, the General Deinitor Antoni Dydycz OFM Cap visited the Capuchins of Lithuania for the irst time and handed over the new Constitution of the Order to them), and later the monks of the newly reborn Order were atached to the region of Krakow, see: A. P. Dydycz OFM Cap, Kapucyni na Litwie (1940-1994), in Pranciškonai Lietuvoje XX a.: šviesa spindi tamsoje, ed. by M. A. Detlaf OFM Conv, (Vilnius 2011), p. 119-121. 175 Regina Laukaitytė this situation ambiguously. 22 On the whole, in 1989-1990, the Church of Poland demonstrated a great interest in apostolic work in Lithuania, especially in Belarus and Russia where there was a great shortage of priests. Priests, monks, nuns, and catechists went to the territory that earlier belonged to Poland. In some localities their activities revived a national discord that had abided during the Soviet period; the newcomers were accused of trying to Polonise the local population. Finally Vilnius Archbishop Ordinary Julijonas Steponavičius set down the condition that the arriving priests should speak local languages. 23 his suspended migration of the priests. Moreover, unrestricted possibilities for Lithuanian monastic institutions to maintain relations with other foreign countries opened up; the Lithuanian nuns who arrived from the USA under- took an active initiative to renew them in accordance with the requirements of the new Canon Code (1983). he new contacts downplayed the importance of relations with the monastic institutions of Poland. A comparatively liberal pro-Soviet regime in the People’s Republic of Po- land atracted the atention of Lithuanian emigrants from the very beginning of the Soviet occupation. he Lithuanian inhabitants of the so-called Suwalki triangle were in its centre. he security bodies of Poland and Soviet Lithuania 22 Due to low membershipthe male monastic institutions were atached to the provinces and vicarages of other countries. Monks of other nationalities arrived in Lithuania. he Lithuanian monks, especially those of the older generation, opposed such changes. For example, the Lithuanian Dominicans gave a very cold welcome to two Polish monks who came to Vilnius, and they refused to send their novices to Poland (they chose sending them to the Czech Republic). he authorities of the Lithuanian Salesians also expressed their opinion that ‘iniltration of foreigners did not and do not help,’ they forecasted that it would cause Lithuanians to become a minority in the community of the Salesians, see: A. Borowik, “Czy dominikanie wrócą do Wilna?” Znad Wilii, 2 (1992); “Vilniaus dominikonų bendruomenė turi išlaikyti lietuviškumą,” XXI amžius, 37 (1995); K. Juknevičius, Lietuvių saleziečių istorija, p. 318. 23 K. Renik, Podpolnicy. Rozmowy z ludźmi Kościoła na Litwie, Łotwie, Białorusi i Ukrainie 1990-1991 (Warszawa 1991), p. 85, see interview with the Dean of Vilnius Church of the Holy Spirit Aleksander Kaszkiewicz. 176  Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period had noticed that books published in the West, as well as charity, reached the Sejny-Suwałki-Puńsk region, and the Lithuanian activists in exile were con- stantly visiting it. he Lithuanians residing in that region managed to send some literature over to the Lithuanian SSR and vice versa, to receive illegal material from the USSR and pass it on to the West. 24 he clergy and the mo- nastic institutions in emigration were also interested in the potential of the Polish region – as far back as 1965 the possibilities for Lithuanian girls from Suwalki triangle to go to the USA to study and join the Lithuanian convents there had been considered. One or two such undertakings were realized. 25 Ten Lithuanian monastic institutions operated in exile (mostly in the USA, Canada and South America). Half of them were founded in the irst half of the 20th century, while others were created when small groups of monks led from Lithuania in the summer of 1944 as the Soviet occupation was approaching. he Lithuanian monastic institutions established relations with their branches operating in exile at the end of the 1950s. Correspondence started and material assistance provided by the monks in exile reached Lithuania. Strong sentiments towards the oppressed motherland, the aspirations to support the persecuted Church and their acquaintances that had stayed in the Motherland – nuns, monks, and priests – urged them to maintain these relations. By means of encoded texts monastic news was exchanged, and information about the ‘un- 24 J. Banionis, Lietuvos laisvės byla Vakaruose 1975-1990 (Vilnius 2002), p. 150-154. 25 Minutes of the sitings of the Supreme Council of the Congregation of the Sisters of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, March 23, 1965 and October 21, 1972 (Archives of the Monastic Institution in Putnam, CT). 177 Regina Laukaitytė cles’ (the familiar priests) and others was conveyed. Material support from the emigrants to the Lithuanian Church increased with every passing year. 26 More reliable news from occupied Lithuania reached the Vatican at the beginning of the 1960s when the heads of the Lithuanian Church went to take part in the meetings of the Second Vatican Council for the irst time. he So- viet regime did not allow the Lithuanian bishops who were deprived of their posts in the hierarchy of the Church and were setled in secluded parishes to go abroad. Only managers of dioceses went to the Sessions of the Council in 1962-1965. hough there are abundant data about their relations with the Soviet security bodies, the priests who went to the Vatican, especially the administrator of Vilnius Archdiocese Česlovas Krivaitis, conveyed the initial information about the real situation of the monastic institutions in Lithuania, and helped establish relations with it. We knew nothing deinite about one another for a long time. It was only during the Second Vatican Council that some Lithuanian priests were given permission to ly via Moscow to Rome. Upon their return, Mon- signor Česlovas Krivaitis in particular, brought exact news about my colleagues in Rome and elsewhere in the world. 27 26 For example, in 1960 and 1961 the branch of Poor Sisters in the USA spent more than 2 500 USD providing support to Lithuania. hey rendered assistance to 54 sisters. Supported with valuable parcels the nuns of this Congregation in Lithuania acquired a house and a car as far back as 1964; in 1980-1984 a total of 71 707 USD was spent on Lithuanian Sisters. More about it see in: R. Laukaitytė, Marijos Nekaltojo Prasidėjimo vargdienių seserų vienuolijos šaka Amerikoje (Vilnius 2012), p. 50, 74. 27 V. Aliulis, “Lengva ranka rašyti atsiminimai,” in Nuo Murmų iki Čikagos by V. Rimšelis (Kaunas 2012), p. 229. 178  Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period hus wrote the Marian Vaclovas Aliulis about the renewed relations, the begin- ning of correspondence between the Marians residing in Rome and those in the USA. Česlovas Krivaitis, who participated in later sessions of the Council, became a kind of a messenger – he did not only provide information but also brought books, prayer-books published by the monastic institutions in exile, as well as money to Lithuania. With the regime sotening somewhat, in the 1960s Lithuanians living abroad started coming to Lithuania as tourists almost en masse. here were many monks and priests among them. hough the irst trips were short and illed with tension (ater excursions in Moscow and Leningrad the tourists could spend ive days in Vilnius, going sightseeing and being able to meet their relatives only in the hotel), they strengthened communication between the monastic institutions considerably. For example, direct relations between the Poor Sisters and the branches operating in the USA and Canada were renewed in 1973. Fity-six years later they began editing their constitutions together, and during regular trips instructions issued by the leader of the Congregation who resided in Lithuania were received. Since 1980 delegates from the USA and Canada have participated in every general chapter that has taken place in Lithuania. 28 Contacts between the irst Lithuanian female congregations – the Sisters of St. Casimir founded in 1907 in the USA – and Lithuania were restored in 1978, 29 and in 1982 the Leader of that Congregation visited Lithuania for the irst time. Even upon her return to Chicago she avoided speaking about her meetings with the sisters in Lithuania. 30 Other monastic institutions behaved in a similar way: for security purposes it was recommended not to mention 28 R. Laukaitytė, Marijos Nekaltojo Prasidėjimo vargdienių seserų vienuolijos šaka Amerikoje, p. 64-67. 29 J. Žemaitytė, “Pažaislio seserys,“ Katalikų pasaulis, 10 (1995), p. 14. 30 V. Brizgys, Gyvenimo keliu (Vilnius 1993), p. 306. 179 Regina Laukaitytė any names of the nuns in Lithuania in the records and to keep the documents related to them separate. And later, when Michail Gorbachev’s perestroika started to open the Lithuanian borders, more visitors began to arrive in the USA. In the monasteries, however, precautionary measures were still taken, as monasteries contained a great deal of information about contact between the emigrants and the underground Church in Lithuania, the organization of relief, and ways of smuggling secret religious literature, such as Lietuvos Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika (he Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania), which interested the security apparatus. As familiar monks and nuns arrived from the West, their moral and inancial assistance encouraged the scatered members of the monastic institutions of Lithuania, especially some small male monastic institutions, 31 to rally and return to life again. Later, ater the independence of the Republic of Lithuania had been restored and the monastic institution had emerged from the underground and had become engaged in social work, the experience and intellectual and inancial potential of the monastic institutions in exile became an especially important factor in restoring the life of monastic institutions. 31 For example, in 1968, the priest Antanas Sabaliauskas SDB from the USA, where he worked with the Spanish Salesians, visited Lithuania; in 1972, the irst Jesuit Vincentas Pupinis SJ came from Brazil; in 1979 Father Viktoras Gidžiūnas OFM from the USA visited the scatered Franciscans. hese contacts encouraged the underground monastic institutions to act more intensely, and helped to solve inancial shortages, see: K. Juknevičius SDB, Lietuvių saleziečių istorija, p. 42; A. Saulaitis SJ, “Deimantinė apaštalavimo sukaktis. Lietuviai jėzuitai Amerikose 1931-2006,” Laiškai bičiuliams Spring (2006), p. 23; S. Bytautas OFM, Lietuvių pranciškonų (OFM) identiteto raiška pastoracinėje veikloje 1940-1990 metais, p. 116. 180  Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period Conclusions he isolation of the Lithuanian SSR was unable to bar the way to people’s personal contacts, and the Iron Curtain intimidated but in essence did not cut of the country from the remaining world. he courage of the people and their willingness to put their lives at risk in unlagging atempts to smuggle information and documents overcame the isolation. he Lithuanian monastic institutions, being vitally interested in contacts with their centers and mem- bers abroad, managed to break through the cordons of isolation and involve themselves in the changes taking place in the universal Church. In the mid- 1960s the authorities of the monastic institutions and the Vatican had suicient information about the fate of the monastic institutions in Lithuania, and had communication channels at their disposal. It is true, however, that the reliability of the later oten raised doubts. Many secret Church contacts from Lithuania ran via Poland where the religious policy of the pro-Soviet regime was much more tolerant. he Vatican tried to take advantage of this situation too, as it granted authorization to the leaders of the Polish Church to be in charge of the functioning of the Catholic Church in the USSR. he underground Polish female monastic institutions in the Lithuanian SSR received the greatest spiritual care and material assistance from them. However, contacts with the Polish monastic institutions were oten the only opportunity for the Lithuanian male and female congregations to overcome the isolation and get in touch with the authorities of their monastic institutions. As during the interwar years, such contacts were assessed am- bivalently. In some monastic institutions discontent with close relations with Poland and dependence on it was expressed more clearly, whereas in others it was not voiced so openly. Nonetheless, relations between the monastic insti- tutions helped, without doubt, people of both nations to come closer, to share the culture of the lives of the people called to monastic life. 181 Regina Laukaitytė During the Soviet period rather strong relations between the monastic institutions of Lithuania and their branches operating in exile, mainly in North America, were established. Functioned secretly for several decades, they cre- ated conditions to keep abreast of the changes taking place in the universal Catholic Church, ensured stable inancial foundations, and at the same time encouraged the Lithuanian monastic institutions to be more active. With the monastic institution coming out of the underground and becoming engaged in social work ater 1990, the experiences of the monastic institutions in exile and their intellectual and inancial potential became a signiicant factor in restoring the monastic life in the country. Translated by Aldona Matulytė 182  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution Michał Łuczewski Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution ‘Let your Spirit descend! Let your Spirit descend! And renew the face of the earth. he face of this land!’ 1 We have heard these words so many times, we have stopped understanding what they mean. We well know that John Paul II helped us to ‘count up,’ and ‘restore our dignity,’ that he became ‘the king Poland dreamt of,’ and inally created a movement which led to the establishment of Solidarity. However, we have continuously convinced ourselves about all that to the point where our ideas became platitudes. Nonetheless, underneath the clichés, which are quoted at each and every round anniversary, lies the reality. his reality seems so peculiar that we have to mollify it by means of metaphors and intellectualization. John Paul II wanted to administer conirmation to history. A thousand years ago Poland accepted Christianity, and through that, he observed, ‘we, the Poles, are born as humans of “lesh and blood” (John 3,6) of our parents, [we have been] conceived and born of the Spirit (John 3,5).’ 2 Ater a thousand years, he call the Holy Spirit to descend once more, and by conirmation strengthen our faith.‘ Allow me, thus,’ he continued ‘to per- form laying on of hands on all gathered here today, all my fellow countrymen, like a bishop who administers conirmation. his gesture symbolizes accepting and sending the Holy Spirit given onto the Apostles by Christ himself, who came to them ater Resurrection by “doors being shut” (John 20,19) and said: 1 Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia. Homilie. Polska 2 VI 1979-10 VI 1979 (Kraków: Znak, 1979), p. 33. 2 Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia. Homilie. Polska 2 VI 1979-10 VI 1979 (Kraków: Znak, 1979), p. 243. 183 Michał Łuczewski “Receive the Holy Spirit” (John 20,22). his Spirit, the Spirit of salvation, re- demption, conversion, and holiness; the Spirit of truth, the Spirit of love, the Spirit of fortitude — inherited from the Apostles — was sent by laying on hands for all generations of people living on Polish soil.’ 3 In the way the sac- raments create people of God, this time they were to create us, Poles. We were to be transformed into a new community, a community of saints, a Church. 4 Laying on hands for the entire nation? Conirmation of history? his seems like madness. Let us think straight for a second now, calmly and without meta- physical exaltation. A ‘Slavonic Pope’ comes to an atheistic country, and out of nowhere, summons the Holy Spirit. And what is supposed to happen? he Holy Spirit comes and exchanges the authorities? Heals the inances? Chases away the Russians beyond the Ural Mountains? his is not the way things are handled today. he Middle Ages ended some time ago. Transgressions of John Paul II But even from a theological point of view, the actions of John Paul II were seen as a series of hazardous transgressions. Sacraments were also individual in their character. We always stand alone before God. Meanwhile, the Pope administered a mass conirmation. he grace was given to the whole nation. he Pope treated baptism in similar way — as a mass sacrament which intro- 3 Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia. Homilie. Polska 2 VI 1979-10 VI 1979 (Kraków: Znak, 1979), p. 243-244. 4 Similar interpretation of Solidarity’s coming into being, see: E. Ciżewska, “Religijność Solidarności okiem socjologa,” Teologia Polityczna 5 (2009-2010); M. A. Cichocki, “Solidarność jako Lud Boży,” in Władza i pamięć, ed. M.A. Cichocki (Kraków:OMP, 2005); D. Karłowicz, “Solidarność jako Kościół,” in Koniec snu Konstantyna, ed. D. Karłowicz (Kraków: OMP, 2004); Z. Stawrowski, “Doświadczenie Solidarności jako wspólnoty etycznej,” in Lekcja Sierpnia. Dziedzictwo Solidarności po dwudziestu latach, ed. D. Gawin (Warszawa: Wyd. IFiS PAN, 2002). 184  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution duced the Polish people to history as a nation aspiring to God. ‘Baptism means immersion in God, the One which is (Exodus) — the One “which is, and which was, and which is to come” (Rev. 1.4). Baptism is the beginning of meeting, communing, and uniting, which continues as an introduction throughout our whole life, and is fulilled only in eternity.’ 5 Baptism refers to the future, and to be more precise, to conirmation which fulils it, and combines both of them in the ‘dual sacrament.’ 6 herefore, in 1979 the Pope not only reminded us of the year 966, when Poland accepted the Cross, but also brought this event back to himself. In this way, the period between these two moments in history became a sanctiied time, a part of the account of salvation. Shiting the essence of the sacrament from an individual to the community by the Pope was visible at the administration of conirmation in 1979. In this way, John Paul II restricted his actions only to an episcopal prayer for the descent of the Holy Spirit, without going into the ceremony of conirmation, i.e. anointment. He called the Holy Spirit upon us but did not give us its seal. He could not do it. here is no way to anoint an entire nation. he ritual of conirmation remained out of necessity uninished. John Paul II commited yet another transgression. he sacrament of conir- mation makes ‘an indelible spiritual mark’ 7 on a human, and thus, like baptism, it may be taken only once in a lifetime. he Pope, however, was aware he was administering conirmation on the Poles for second time, as the irst took place with the death of St. Stanislaus in 1079. Similarly to when a baptized member of the Church becomes a mature Christian through the sacrament of conirmation, our nation was given such 5 Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia. Homilie. Polska 2 VI 1979-10 VI 1979 (Kraków: Znak, 1979), p. 238-239. 6 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1290. 7 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1304. 185 Michał Łuczewski an event in history which constituted an act of conirmation for Poland. St. Sta- nislaus, who lived nearly a century ater Poland accepted the Cross, spilled his blood, and today symbolizes remaining true and bearing testimony to Christ. 8 By administrating conirmation for the second time, the Pope suggested the sacrament transferred onto the ield of history needs to be continually complemented. Unlike with an individual, a nation cannot be conirmed only once — the sacrament needs to be repeated again and again. However, this was not the end of John Paul II’s transgressions. In order to receive a sacrament, one needs to fulill strictly deined conditions. Were the Poles prepared for conirmation at that memorable moment? Conirma- tion is administered only to the initiated. he initiation is the baptism. Was everybody baptized? How can you interpret the Pope’s gesture? Perhaps, it could be compared to the absolution given by a priest in a state of necessity, i.e. in articulo mortis. he papal conirmation was administered in the face of discernible, widespread, and mortal danger. 9 Such a situation does not de- mand the subject to be fully aware of it — this type of a sacrament may also be received by children. 10 8 Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia. Homilie. Polska 2 VI 1979-10 VI 1979 (Kraków: Znak, 1979), p. 241. 9 See I. Krzemiński, Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji (Warszawa: Oicyna Naukowa, 1997), p. 164. 10 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1307. 186  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution Messianism for Everyone Traditional theology sees a ritual performed by the head of the Roman Cath- olic Church as suspicious, if not totally heretic. And perhaps this would be the case, if not for the decisions of the Second Vatican Council, and John Paul II’s contribution in this revolution. he basic intention of Vatican II was renewal in Church by going back to its roots. he Church proved itself once again as the People of God, pastoral people, prophetic people, and royal people. 11 As ‘everyone is appointed for the new People of God’ 12 to ‘establish a single family and single People of God’ 13 in Christ, the role of the head of the Church had to change. he Holy Father had to give up the traditional, Weberian model of bureaucratic authorization of power, which could not mobilize or unite people anymore, in favor of charismatic leadership. Charisma is always created outside of the social systems. It dismantles traditional rituals and oversteps current Law. his was, in my opinion, the essence of the liturgical reform of the Se- cond Vatican Council. Its basic aim was to increase ‘active participation’ of the congregation, 14 and to achieve this goal the Church needed to go outside of the binding forms. he actions of John Paul II in 1979 became a part of this trend. he most important semantic shit in Catholic theology to come along during this process was the return of messianism. It is no coincidence that Vatican II deined the Catholic Church as the ‘messianic people’ which brings salvation and hope to the world. 15 he Bible points to three messianic ig- ures: a prophet — the one who see God’s Truth; the king — the one who 11 Sobór Watykański II, Lumen gentium, rozdz. II; See also excellent comments in: Y. Congara, Kościół, jaki kocham (Kraków: Stowarzyszenie Pomocy Wydawnictwom Katolickim na Ukrainie Kairos, 1997). 12 Sobór Watykański II, Lumen gentium, no. 13. 13 Sobór Watykański II, Ad gentes, no. 1. 14 Sobór Watykański II, Sacrosanctum Concilium, no. 50. 15 Sobór Watykański II, Lumen gentium, rozdz. II. 187 Michał Łuczewski defends it by sword; and the martyr — the one who sacriices his life. hese three characters are embodied in Christ, who was favored by the Holy Spirit in the fullest. he Pope not only ‘follows Christ’ but also acts in persona Christi, meaning he receives the Holy Spirit and through that gathers and unites the people around him. John Paul II was the irst ‘Pope-pilgrim’ in the 2000-year history of the Church, following in the Apostles’ footsteps, and evangelizing people in far-lung corners of the world. No one ever before him, in the history of mankind, has mobilized people on such a scale. ‘he completeness of Spirit was not supposed to be reserved only for the Messiah … it was supposed to be given to the whole messianic people.’ 16 In this light, the essence of conir- mation becomes clear. It becomes a ritual which ofers its fullest potential to all the congregation. 17 he anointing with sacred oil refers us directly to the ritual of anointing a king. 18 he messianism renewed by John Paul II meant going back to the beginnings of Christianity, its Jewish roots. Messianism stopped being only a question of an inner transformation, a spiritual conversion, and became once again a so- cial mater. Similarly to Judaism, it became a process ‘performed in the public sphere, on the historical scene, and through the medium of society.’ In the process, Christian eschatology transformed from being an individual concern to becoming ‘a national mater.’ 19 We deal here with an extremely interesting reversal. he events of the holy history of Christianity, such as the Flood, the Crossing of the Red Sea, or the Exodus, became the igures of Reality (death and 16 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1287. 17 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1287. 18 J. Danielou, Wejście w historię zbawienia. Chrzest i bierzmowanie (Kraków : Stowarzyszenie Pomocy Wydawnictwom Katolickim na Ukrainie Kairos, 1996), p. 148-152. 19 On diferences between Judaic and Christian messianism, see: G. Scholem, Judaizm. Parę głównych pojęć (Kraków: Inter Esse, 1991), p. 152, 158-159. 188  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution resurrection of Christ), and simultaneously the igures of sacraments (baptism, the Eucharist, conirmation). In this way, the history of salvation of a nation became the history of salvation of a catechumen. 20 John Paul II referred the sacraments back to the history of the world and salvation. A sacrament is not only a igure but above all a ‘successful sign’ connecting us with Christ. John Paul II brought on this conceptual revolution in view of trends visible in Polish romanticism which had promoted such concepts as ‘national sacra- ments,’ or even ‘the Sacrament of a Nation.’ Cyprian Kamil Norwid, a nationally esteemed Polish romantic poet, beloved by the Pope, looked on the history of the Polish nation from the angle of baptism, the Holy Communion, priesthood, and marriage. 21 A similar perspective was adopted by Piotr Semenenko, a lead- ing Polish theologian of the Roman Catholic Church in the 19th century, the co-founder and superior-general of the Resurrectionists. According to his teachings, the sacraments were to place Poles in the history of salvation — making them children of God through baptism, counseling, strengthening, and encouraging them in conirmation, and achieving fulillment on earth through the priesthood. 22 According to the vision of Joachim of Fiore, Polish romantics waited for the arrival of the third age — ater the period of the Father, and of the Son, the era of the Spirit was supposed to arrive. Ater over a millennium, John Paul II not only waited for the Spirit, but summoned it. he sacrament is administered in order for God to manifest himself, and lead us to salvation. In order to move closer to these aims, John Paul II needed to go beyond traditional rules. By calling God to send down his Spirit, the Pope iniltrated the mystery of the Trinity, and the relationship between the 20 J. Danielou, Wejście w historię zbawienia. 21 R. Zajączkowski, Głos prawdy i sumienie. Kościół w pismach Cypriana Norwida (Wrocław: FNP, 1998), p. 158-171. 22 K. Macheta, “Misterium paschalne Polski według założycieli zmartwychwstańców,” in Polska teologia narodu, ed. Cz. Bartnik (Lublin: KUL, 1988). 189 Michał Łuczewski Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. In this way, he mediated the relations of love connecting the Holy Trinity, and acted as their internal go-between. he Pope might have seemed a bit reckless. But his ‘madness’ pushed the Kingdom of Heaven to fulill his requests. 23 Did we not experience the descent of the Holy Spirit, back then, in June of 1979? Was the time of Solidarity not the ‘swoosh of the wind,’ the descent of the Holy Spirit, the Polish Pentecost, and the ‘loosening of tongues’? 24 Besides, does not any solidarity, even non-political, result from the action of the Spirit? A ritual performed by the head of the Roman Catholic Church was deemed by many as suspicious, if not entirely heretic. Solidarity of Spirit Our natural state is a struggle for everything. We ight for money, beter jobs, prestige, and larger homes. he unity we have lost can only be restored if we ind a common enemy. However, such a unity is false. It is based on the funda- mental gesture of elimination, and ater some time, it falls apart. he community crystallizes, only to revert to its natural state. Struggle is its source and destiny. hrough such a perspective true solidarity must seem like a miracle, a result of quite, imperceptible, but clearly a real intervention of God. 25 he appeal to ‘bear ye one another’s burdens’ (Ga 6,2) requires the novelty of Epiphany. It may not come from the fallen history but should be presented from ‘Christ’s 23 Mat. 11,12. 24 E. Ciżewska, Religijność Solidarności, p. 196; T. G. Ash, Polska rewolucja. Solidarność 1980-1981 (Warszawa: Res Publica, 1990), p. 47 (Polish translation of he Polish Revolution: Solidarity by T.G. Ash). See also: R. Rojek, Semiotyka Solidarności. Analiza dyskursów PZPR i NSZZ Solidarność w 1981 roku (Kraków: Nomos, 2009), p. 139. 25 See: M. A. Cichocki, “Solidarność jako Lud Boży,” and Z. Stawrowski, “Doświadczenie Solidarności.” 190  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution law.’ his is how Solidarity was looked upon by its most eminent theologian, Father Józef Tischner, who pointed out that in order to understand its mean- ing one ‘has to reach for the Bible, and look for the movement’s origin there.’ his type of solidarity does not belong to nature, but transgresses it, for it is ‘born from the pages and spirit of the Gospel, and does not need an enemy or an opponent to grow and reinforce. Such solidarity is for everyone, but not against anybody.’ 26 When analyzing Solidarity in phenomenological terms, Tischner points out its three essential elements. ‘Solidarity does not need to be imposed on a per- son from the exterior by means of violence.’ his virtue is born spontaneously, from the heart. 27 But what does this really mean? How may a heart be spared in a world full of violence? First of all, solidarity arises from a call of another person who needs our help. But because words might always be rejected, an- other factor is needed: conscience. ‘True solidarity is always the solidarity of consciences.’ 28 Our own conscience will tell us the answer to the call. However, our conscience may be deceiving, and we may abuse it. For example, when Edward Abramowski, a Polish philosopher from the 19th century, wrote about social change, he meant human needs. 29 his is not the meaning Tischner implied. For him conscience is not another name for egoism, but a place for revelation of good and bad. Its correct recognition is the third element, and it should be rooted in God, as only God may protect us from self-deception, rouse our consciences, and make us care about it. All in all, it seems that solidarity is nothing more than an answer to a call from God. 26 J. Tischner, Etyka solidarności (Kraków: Znak, 1981), p. 6. 27 J. Tischner, Etyka solidarności, p. 6. 28 J. Tischner, Etyka solidarności, p. 6. 29 E. Abramowski. “Procesy zmian społecznych,” in Abramowski, ed. U. Dobrzycka (Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1991). 191 Michał Łuczewski If this is the essence of every type of solidarity, then in the case of soli- darity which includes not just two or three persons but a whole antagonized community, the experienced has to be multiplied. he Spirit needs to descend. When coming to terms with the Solidarity movement and Polish trans- formation, both in terms of the Holy Ghost and a more general theological perspective, our irst reaction is to reach for Centesimus Annus, a papal encyc- lical on the year 1989, annus mirabilis. However, one would be hard-pressed to ind theological relection there. John Paul II emerges as more of a specialist in religious studies, a social thinker, sociologist, political studies export, and economist than as the leader of Christianity. Consequently, this miracle we have witnessed seems more ordinary and becomes a miracle only in our belief. If we would to understand it on a proper level, we need to go back to not to social encyclicals but to the theological ones, mostly Dominum et Viviicantem, which is the most extensive meditation on the Holy Spirit. In this encyclical, John Paul II points out the three basic truths: (1) the Holy Spirit was given to the Church, (2) the Spirit convinced the world about sin and, (3) the Spirit gives life. Although we cannot always understand these truths, Solidarity became an empirical test for each of them. 192  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution The Spirit of the Church John Paul II starts his encyclical from a renewed creed in the Holy Ghost, as the source of the Church. he dogmatic basis for this faith is the Gospel of St. John, where Christ says to the Apostles: If you love me, you will keep my commandments. And I will pray the Father, and he will give you another Counsellor, to be with you forever, even the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him; you know him, for he dwells with you, and will be in you. I will not leave you desolate; I will come to you…But the Counsel- lor, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you. (14, 15-18, 26) Although Christ is gone, the Apostles may establish the Church, because Christ will be with them in the form of the Holy Spirit until the end of days. Although the Spirit transgresses the Church, and may also come down on heathens, as it ‘blows where it wills,’ only the Church may ‘see’ and ‘know’ it. If the Church collapsed, no one would see the Holy Spirit. Nobody could manifest and represent it. However, according to the promise, the Holy Spirit shall always support the Church. From this point of view, it is clear that for the Holy Spirit to imbue the people of Solidarity, the Church had to exist. Somebody needed to ask for its grace, and somebody had to be ready to accept it. It is a huge paradox that among all of other countries under the Soviet rule, only in Poland did the totalitarian communist government fail to lead to the fall of the Church, but strengthened it. But Poland turned out to be an exception not only during times of totali- tarianism. It was always special. Truly, the strength of our Church seems to 193 Michał Łuczewski be the outcome of providence. It has always overcome all waves of laicization. he Reformation, which developed rapidly in our country, made the Church close ranks, and led to the Counter-Reformation and evangelism of the masses. he national revolutions in 19th century, which were anti-Church everywhere else, were connected to faith in Poland. When industrialization hit our country, Polish workers did not abandon their convictions like their colleagues in the West. Paradoxically, the situation of the Polish Church was more diicult be- fore World War II than during the era of communism. In the interwar period, the Church had to oppose the adherents of Piłsudski (with ideologists such as Adam Skwarczyński wanting to create a national church, independent of the Holy See), as well as struggle with anticlerical parties representing the middle classes (the modern, realistic National Democratic Party) and anticlerical par- ties representing the lower classes (radical peasants’ parties, which sometimes even proposed reversion to paganism). Ater WW II only one opponent was still standing: the communist government. Its repressive machine eliminated the former state elites on the one hand, and on the other, forced the middle and lower classes to choose between the government and the Church. In this way the number of important political subjects was limited, and the people who wanted to preserve their independence had to cooperate with Cardinal Wyszyński. he Church became the only strong opposition to the totalitarian oppression. During the 1970s and 1980s, ater the Second Vatican Council, while Europe was undergoing a social revolution and laicization, Poland was religiously revived. 30 30 See: M. Łuczewski, “Polskie odrodzenie religijne i doświadczenie totalitaryzmu. Analiza fenomenologiczna,” Teologia Polityczna 5 (2009-2010); M. Łuczewski, “Do diabła z mesjaszem! Teologia polityczna polskiej transformacji,” Czterdzieści i Cztery 1 (2009). 194  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution he religion sociologists would atribute this phenomenon to the extremely strong credential structures of the Polish Church. Its strength lied in extremely wide social legitimization, and its message could not be easily disregarded. At the same time, as the Church became more powerful, its intellectual opposition with its competitive lay ideology lost its substantial grounds. Due to the thaw and the events of March 1968, the let-wing intelligentsia started to criticize the totalitarian system, as it lost its previous institutional autho- rization, and had to seek a new body for authentication. As the intellectual Letists stopped being loyal to the Party they could form new relationships, which would be unthinkable for declared communists and members of the state apparatus. Finally, its social basis was extremely poor, and wanted to overcome its alienation, meet workers and peasants — the people of Poland. All these factors made it necessary to cooperate with the Church, which stopped being its ideological opponent, and could legitimize it in front of the heart and minds of People. Such a situation needed mediators between the Church and the let-wing ideologists, the religious and non-religious circles. his brought on the highly important roles of such igures as Bohdan Cywiński, Andrzej Kijowski, Jacek Salij, Jan Andrzej Kłoczowski, Jan Zieja, Józef Sadzik, and Józef Tischner. However, the most important negotiator was John Paul II. Each of these per- sons was charismatic, graced by God, making them into a moral and religious community. hanks to them the Holy Spirit stayed within the Church, and permeated to the people. 195 Michał Łuczewski The Spirit of Truth he Church lasted and promoted the Truth, which at each stage of the com- munism era in Poland became a truth for more and more people. he Truth revealed by the Spirit is, according to the words of Christ, the truth about sin, justice, and judgment. ‘Concerning sin, because they do not believe in me; concerning righteousness, because I go to the Father, and you will see me no more; concerning judgment, because the ruler of this world is judged.’ (John 16, 7-11). In other words, the Church ‘convinces the world’ about a transcendent, objective reality, which is the perspective for judging the lord of this world. For the communists such a truth was a real danger. hey were the ones to determine what was good, and what was not, what was justice, and what was judgment. he system did not tolerate any external perspectives. It tried to le- gitimize a version of reality without any alternatives, which would be accepted as (a) real, (b) moral, and (c) unanimous with the people. In order to do that it had to eradicate any rival sources of legitimization, especially the religious ones. It had to eliminate the sacred, which would transgress the system, and provide an external evaluation body for the system. he sacral reality was dangerous for the communists, as through it a person, in the words of Andrzej Kijowski, rises above oneself to reach a higher state of its vital forces and capabilities — extended sensitivity, increased susceptibility to stimuli, heightened obedience, and unusual physical resistance. Of good and bad. Each congregation is sacred, if its participants are transformed; if it makes them strong enough to take an action, which was not possible to be performed individually. 31 he totalitarian system was afraid of such social mobilization, and had to eliminate other sources of sanctity. Consequently, the system became a religion, but its principles, its sacred things, were inner-worldly. 31 A. Kijowski, Tropy (Poznań: W drodze, 1986), p. 35. 196  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution he ideology of totalitarianism marked the boundaries for lives of Polish people under the Soviet and communist rule. But as with any worldly ideology, it was incomplete, and the social order supported by it was under constant threat. he threat of chaos includes all phenomena which deprive our lives of meaning: death, sufering, evil, fear, and anxiety. he paradox of this situation was that no mater how hard the totalitarian ideology tried to ight against the chaos, at the same time it produced it. he authorities wanted to be real but they produced the experience of unreality; it wanted to be moral but produced the experience of evil; it wanted to look like it was done according to the peo- ple’s freedom but produced the experience of constraints and enslavement. Only religion was able to describe and articulate each and every one of these experiences. Only religion could oppose the chaos and protect the sense in the world by stretching a ‘sacred canopy’ 32 over it. Eventually, in spite of its anti-Christian atitude, totalitarianism had consequences for Christians, as it could not cope with the problems it created, and those could only be solved by Christianity. By ighting religion, the system made it more and more necessary. Realizing that the system is unreal, evil and enslaving may be interpreted as a git from the Spirit of Truth. his git seems to be universally accepted. he communist state become popularly known as an ‘illusion’ (Tischner), ‘nihility’ (Konwicki), ‘pulp’ (Andrzejewski), ‘another world’ (Herling), and ‘delusion’ (Miłosz). he sense of unreality was so overwhelming that it entered the ac- ademic discourse. And so, Alain Besançon describes the socialist economy as a ‘phantom,’ 33 and Jakub Karpiński saw communism as a ‘propaganda of 32 P. L. Berger, Święty baldachim. Elementy socjologicznej teorii religii (Kraków: NOMOS, 1997) – Polish translation of Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological heory of Religion by Peter L. Berger. 33 A. Besançon, Anatomia widma. Ekonomia polityczna realnego socjalizmu (Warszawa: Krąg, 1984). 197 Michał Łuczewski unreality, or ‘imagined reality.’ 34 Jadwiga Staniszkis went even further, and in ‘ontology of socialism’ pointed out the Hegelian Schein, i.e. semblance, 35 as the main analytical category. It is no accident that one of the irst social realist books was Reality by Jerzy Putrament. 36 At the same time Kazimierz Brandys published his Unreality — the irst book in Poland and entire Eastern Block issued independently of censorship. 37 It is a story of an educated person from the communist system — precisely from Reality to Unreality. he resonance of Catholicism was also based in rational interpretation of each experience generated by the totalitarian state, and combining them into a cohesive entirety. he system could not describe its own failures. It could not talk about evil, enslavement, and unreality, only about errors and misinter- pretations. he evil, enslavement, and unreality was described by Catholicism. The Spirit of Life In the time of totalitarian enslavement, the Church breathed new life into Poles, making Poland itself again, creating a national community. his aspect may be interpreted in the context of actions of the Holy Ghost, which is the Spirit of unity. his is the best example of the Spirit’s action through nature, and how it improves nature to receive grace. 34 J. Karpiński, Doświadczenie komunizmu we współczesnej kulturze polskiej, 2005, htp:// www.omp.org.pl/index.php?module=subjects&func=viewpage&pageid=349 [31 sierpnia 2010 r.1. 35 J. Staniszkis, Ontologia socjalizmu (Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 2006), p. 22. (English version published as: he Ontology of Socialism, 1992) 36 J. Putrament, Rzeczywistość (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1947). 37 K. Brandys, Nierzeczywistość (no publishing place: Niezależna Oicyna Wydawnicza, 1977). 198  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution he religion pointed out the evil and the enslavement of the system. But moreover than that, it gave both general directives and very speciic guidelines on how to protect oneself from this evil. he communist system tried to legiti- mize itself not through special actions but by tedious, ceaseless activities. ‘here were no such words for us as morality or ethics,’ says an oicer of the communist secret police. ‘We did not use such words. hey made no sense to us, as we used immorality for our cause, and fought against morality. he more immoral the behavior, the beter for us, as we could get close to persons and iniltrate them. he people who were guilty of something were the most important for us, as they made the best future agents.’ 38 he secret police usually took advantage of secrets from three well-tried ields: money, alcohol, or sex. hese secrets usu- ally coerced people into the system. Catholicism protected people from such ofences, which easily might have become a pretext for extorting cooperation with the regime. Religion gave guidelines on how to behave in a totalitarian reality. Acting on those precepts, it was the Catholic nation, in contrast to the believers in communist ideology, which could take a proper atitude and see the ‘traces of devil claws.’ his is why there were more Catholics among the intellectuals in opposition. In building its community, the Church used the sources of social movements. And every movement, if it wants to be eicient, needs to fulill three criteria: it needs to lead a campaign, i.e. not limit itself to a single action; use a certain repertoire to mobilize people, and formulate ideology that will inspire others. All these elements were perfectly used by the Church. 39 First to consider is the campaign. When in 1956 the thaw came, the Church began the mobilization campaign. It started by renewing the vows for the Polish nation at Jasna Góra in August 1956, and inished with the celebration of the 38 Teczki, czyli widma bezpieki, ed. J. Snopkiewicz (Warszawa: BGW, 1992), p. 123. 39 See: M. Osa, “Stwarzanie Solidarności,” Pressje 21 (2010). 199 Michał Łuczewski Millennium of Polish Acceptance of the Cross in 1966. he Church did not limit itself to a single mobilization action but organized a continual series of activities as preparations for multiple celebrations throughout 1955, 1956-1957, and 1957-1966. he arrival of John Paul II to Poland was only another element of a campaign laid out for decades. Secondly, it was the repertoire. he Church demonstrated superior orga- nizational skills and used an extremely modern repertoire of means. Apart from the most obvious, such as masses, processions, or funerals, it also worth pointing out the building of chapels and churches, which mobilized huge masses of people. Consider the involvement of John Paul II in the erection of the Ark in Nowa Huta, Krakow. In order to mobilize the congregation, there were many celebrations concerning coronations of statues of saints. his was accompanied by a dynamic development of Marian piety who were treated as the ‘core of power,’ supported by Cardinal Wyszyński. In pastoral practice the motoes concerning the Virgin Mary turned out very eicient. he inal spec- tacular means by which the Church promoted itself was through pilgrimages. Already in 1966, Pope Paul VI was supposed to visit Poland for the Millennium celebrations. Only John Paul II, however, was able to use this tactic on a scale that could exceed anything the communists had to ofer. hirdly, was the employment of mobilizing ideology. John Paul II in this aspect directly used innovations introduced by Stefan Wyszyński, i.e. the theology of nation, which gave shape to Polish Catholicism ater WWII. Our nation gained God’s sanction, and became the Nation. In his work, Wyszyński referred to the history of the chosen nation, puting himself in the shoes of an Old Testament prophet. One should look similarly upon John Paul II. 40 40 D. Gawin, “Naród zwycięski. Jan Paweł II jako prorok Polaków,” Teologia Polityczna 3 (2005-2006), p. 131-135. 200  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution In his line of thinking, the nation was presented as eternal, moral, and one. he basic element which united the nation, gave it its moral value, and complemented holy time without beginning or end, was the Roman Catholic Church, which is at the same the Polish Church. he theological strength of a nation according to John Paul II was based on meeting all the criteria needed for an eicient ideology of a social movement. Furthermore, mobilization ideology encountered a paradox which could only be solved by the Pope. If the ideology is to be efective, it must present a given community as (a) numerous, (b) united, (c) moral, and (d) commited. he irst two principles, however, are in conlict with the last two. If we care about the numbers and the unity of a movement, we need to quieten the issue of commitment as it may lead to the introduction of divisions in the movement (there are diferent types of morality), and limit its inluence (rigorous morality may discourage many potential followers). On the one hand, we would have numerous and united movements which would lack distinctiveness, on the other hand, the movements would be distinctive but lacking any inluence whatsoever. his paradox may be illustrated by two visions of Polish national identity which meet head-on again and again in Polish history. According to the irst vision, which we will call nominalistic (a name adapted for our purposes from the works of Jadwiga Staniszkis), Poles are a homogenous community, numerous and united, with all its members equal. You either are a Pole or you are not. A competing notion, categorized again by Staniszkis as closer to homism, pres- ents Poles as a heterogeneous community, where you could belong in a greater or lesser degree depending on your morality and commitment within the given concept of these two features. In such a way Polishness becomes gradable — you can be a Pole to a greater or a lesser degree. he contradiction between these two visions of our nation was solved by the theology of the nation provided by John Paul II, which let social movements 201 Michał Łuczewski fulill all its criteria at once (even these which stood in contradiction with each other). On the one hand, Catholicism was the common denominator for Poles. From the Pope’s perspective, the nation is a peculiar organism with us as its members. When divided, it stops being a nation. his is why striving towards unity, as overcoming diferences between states was considered as patriotic duty. Such people as Jan Strzelecki, Jacek Kuroń, or Adam Michnik, who wanted to commune with the Polish people, also needed to get closer to Christianity. here was no other way, as the Polish people were Christian. Also, the Catholic religion gave Poles moral value and commitment. Not only it did it unite people (the realistic moment, referring to the present identities) but also transformed them (the utopian moment, referring to the future identi- ties not yet fulilled). Religion shaped the nation into a community of values, showing the moral ideal worth commiting to (‘transformation of conscienc- es’), and eliminating those opposed to this ideal (‘people with consciences’). Without a reference to religion, which gave the nation its moral spine, people would be only a nominalistic community of individuals, unable to extend their imagination beyond the social system (without a moral ideal), and incapable of common action (without commitment). Religion presented its importance towards mobilization especially well in extreme situations. If the cause we are ighting for is hopeless, if we feel marginalized, cast outside of the economic and political system, then we are more likely to invoke the sacred in order to muster our strength. When everything fails, we seek God’s support. In 1979 this was the case. he Solidarity movement shows all aspects of manifestation of the Holy Spirit, as described by John Paul II. hanks to the Church, a new communi- ty, a new consciousness, and a new morality have emerged. People started gaining hope, and overcoming their fears. he feters of ideology were broken, 202  Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution and the people were freed. he reality became spiritual. 41 All of the Polish defeats of the 20th century came suddenly into view as labor pains of the Holy Spirit. In the country where alcohol was the main problem-solver, suddenly everyone was sober, as people got drunk on the Spirit. In the where the sta- tistics of suicide were hidden, suddenly people wanted to live, because the Spirit is the Animator. In the country that was doomed to fail by many other states, people got up of their knees by geting down on their knees, because the Spirit is the Lord. But what is more peculiar is the fact that in order for all this to happen, we did not have to do anything special. We did not have to do anything. All hap- pened through us. Faith is grace, thus an individual cannot act on his or her own; one only needs to hear the call from God. ‘Christ only once,’ writes Kijowski, inluenced by the Pope, ‘entered the history of the human race, with its states, families, and individuals; and it returns as a recurring topic in a discussion, in a way that gives us exploration and airmation of ourselves. he important thing is that it is us who get back to the topic, not the other way around.’ 42 By remaining completely passive, paradoxically, the individual is given faith and strength by the Holy Spirit. his is what top-down revolution is all about. Translated by Łukasz Moskała 41 See: I. Krzemiński, Solidarność, p. 17, 49, 53, 68, 76, 150, 175; R. Rojek, Semiotyka Solidarności, p. 164. 42 A. Kijowski, Tropy, p. 36. 203 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement Krzysztof Mazur Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement 1 1st Thesis: a Political Project for Solidarity Existed In my study, I have adopted an interpretation widely dominating the social literature which views Solidarity as a social movement. I deine this notion as collective actions directed at a particular goal of carrying out a certain social change. hey take place within not fully institutionalized and formalized boundaries, and in this sense are ‘something in between a group behavior (e.g. in crowds) and a professional behavior (e.g. in oices).’ 2 Another important input assumption was to limit the time rame of the irst period of Solidarity activ- ity (from the irst strikes in July 1980 until the introduction of Martial Law in December 1981). his premise stems from the research hypothesis that only by exploring this period, when the movement was at its most enthusiastic point and functioned on a grand scale, may one capture the positive political vision of the social movement. By adapting such a model, it is possible to separate the initial project from any further fate of its creators. he third assertion was to concentrate on the positive side of the intellectual activity of Solidarity. he litera- 1 he text presents the methodological premises and most important conclusions of a doctoral thesis entitled “he political project of the social movement of Solidarity (July 1980-December 1981).” Jagiellonian University, Kraków, 2011. 2 P. Sztompka, Socjologia (Kraków: Wyd. UJ, 2002), p. 158 and 422. 205 Krzysztof Mazur ture on the subject tends to interpret all actions taken by the Union, including intellectual endeavors, only in terms of ruses carried out in the permanent conlict against the representatives of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polish communist party). hus the analysis of the political thought of those times is determined by the perspective imposed by the researchers of the political history of the movement. However, there is a diferent approach, a way of the history of ideas, which requires a change in the perspective. For these reasons I analyze the political project of Solidarity in terms of its issues, by reconstructing the most important ideas, such as dignity, freedom, and lawfulness, one by one. On the basis of these three broad notions, I have come to the conclusion that the policy achievements of Solidarity were for the most part anticipated by the dissident circles of 1976-1980 and their ideas, which were absorbed by the massive social movement. Combining the intellectual resources of people from diferent political traditions resulted in a political project which surprised by its diversity, or even eclecticism. Simultaneously, when describing successive ideas fundamental to Solidarity, it is clear to distinguish a general and coherent body of beliefs which in time was universally accepted, despite the ideological diferences dividing the creators. It is important to emphasize that inding a term, which would encompass the character of this program also posed a challenge. Eventually, I decided to use the term political project, which is deined by Andrew Heywood as a complex of historically, culturally, and socially determined, general ideas creating a broad vision of the world, including concepts of a proper social and political order, and indicating speciic solutions targeted at altering the reality in desired ways. By using the term political project, which is not burdened by strong his- torical connotations, I want to avoid a line of natural associations connected to other notions used in the literature of the subject. hus, Solidarity did not create an ideology, as this would assume the possibility of creating a system- atic and comprehensive political doctrine, which could have been used in all 206 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement circumstances, aimed at restructuring the prevailing social order according to rational models. he achievements in policy of Solidarity may not also be called a political doctrine, as that would suggest placing them on the map of traditional doctrinal disputes. he political project of the Union, which draws heavily from various political traditions, did not follow the division developed ater the French Revolution. Finally, it could not really be treated as a political program, which is usually a means for expressing exact aims for political activity by political parties. 2nd Thesis: when Examining the Political Thought behind Social Movements, it is Necessary to Establish a Hierarchy of Source Documents Before we go into a detailed description of the political project of Solidarity, it is worth pointing out the crucial methodological challenges ahead. Without any doubt, the biggest trial was establishing the components common to a massive social movement, especially when one takes into account a body of convictions shared by the majority of its activists. Two topics, which seem to be prevalent are the issue of the representative character of certain convictions, and the problem of sources for knowing this political vision. he irst subject is more of a doubt whether an opinion expressed by a circle of union leaders could be treated as popularly accepted by all or even most of the activists. he second one may be framed as a question: does one analyze only policy documents, or also the journalism and artistic movements of the period? I addressed the irst doubt by referring to data proving the subjective feeling of unanimity of experiences by the majority of activists. hose which cannot be considered as representative are strengthened by sociological analyses indicat- ing a heavy homogenization of convictions among the members of a movement. Finally, another important factor which came into play was the use of eicient 207 Krzysztof Mazur channels for transferring information between all levels of the trade union. he low was provided by a highly developed union press, information bulletins, and independent opinion polls amongst the Union activists. hese three ar- guments speak in favor of the thesis on the homogeneity of the social movement. In order to quell doubts concerning the sources needed for learning the political project of Solidarity, and the representativeness of certain judgments, I have decided to use a certain hierarchy of source documents. At the top of this hierarchy I put the Policy Resolution of the 1st National Congress of Delegates of the Independent Self-governing Trade Union Solidarity — the most important document concerning the Union’s policy, passed in the autumn of 1981 by the representatives chosen by the society. he diversity of views presented during this congress seems to be representative of the Union, and possibly the whole social movement, thus I found it legitimate to recognize the policy resolution as the most valuable source of knowledge on the political idea behind Solidar- ity. I treated other documents signed by the central and regional authorities of the Union, such as the Statute of Solidarity, or the records of the Centre for Vocational and Social Labour, as secondary. he third level, in my opinion, constituted of the journalism of the period. It is worth mentioning Tygodnik Solidarność, the biggest union weekly magazine in Poland. his category also includes publications of the intellectual and actual leaders of the Union. he fourth and last level encompasses sources presenting the wide cultural backdrop of the period, showing the ways in which the people of those times thought. his is where essay writings, journals, and even poetry from that period can be found. 208 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement 3rd Thesis: Solidarity was an Existential Revolution he ideological roots of Solidarity cannot be found in any speciic tradition of political thinking. here is no use in applying its program to the formats known from the works of classics of political philosophy, or in arguing whether its overtones are let-winged, liberal, republican, or Christian Democratic. he political project of a movement originates straight from the experiences of its makers. he wave of strikes in August 1980 were not political at their core, but gave opportunity to an authentic outcry, providing the activists with feelings of renewed pride and human dignity. In their most basic sense, they were not targeted against the authorities but were organized by the workers for them- selves, driven by the inner need for recognition. Marcin Król is right when he says we should talk not about a social or political revolution, but rather, above all about a ‘moral revolution’ or even an ‘existential’ one. Rather than seizing power or changing the social scene, the movement aimed at proving both to itself and to the world that ‘we are still living, we are capable of human kindness: doing good, establishing friendships, and respecting the truth.’ 3 he most important element of this experience was rediscovering human dignity, which recalls the inalienable value of each human being and their will to live according to moral principles, especially the principle of justice. his led to uncovering universal and inalienable human rights, which cannot be questioned by any political system. Another real need was to create an inner integrity that eventually led to a massive rejection of conformism imposed by the post-totalitarian authorities, and expression of individual convictions in the public space. his transition from inner freedom to public expression of one’s reasons automatically included a social element in the experience of the strikers — the people who publicly articulate their rights become citizens. he 3 M. Król, “Inna rewolucja,” in Po sierpniu, ed. M. Król, J. Kurczewski (Warszawa: NOWA 2, 1981), p. 3. 209 Krzysztof Mazur joint aspect of this phenomenon included these two elements in the ‘existential revolution.’ he collective character of the experience revealed the solidarity existing among people, i.e. a real bond connecting everybody into a community, which is mirrored in human nature (‘the human is a social being’), as well as in ethics (‘bear ye one another’s burdens’). Finally, it was extremely vital for people to discover the public importance of national and religious bonds, which placed the strikers in the context of a centuries-old tradition, giving a second cornerstone (apart from the social one) to the community. he strikes of August 1980 allowed the workers to experience these feelings. his is when the strikers discovered the basic rules of life in a community. his experience did not only touch them personally but became a common, fun- damentally discursive background for a universal event. And this experience became the basic ideological plane for the whole movement. hus, the existential revolution anticipated any considerations about the program of the movement. 4th Thesis: Political Doctrines (Political Identiications) Were Replaced by Values (Metapolitical Identiications) he reconstructed political project was not founded on speciic political ide- ologies , as they were replaced by metapolitical identiications rooted in the experience of Solidarity’s creators. hese identiications, ideological principles, determine the ideal of a political community. Ludwik Dorn, one of the members of Solidarity, acutely observed that the former blends of doctrines ‘had not functioned as live indicators of ideological identity’ in the social movement, and their signiicance had been only aspectual, limited to a certain area of issues. heir place were taken by metapolitical identiications stemming from recognizing the above-mentioned moral and existential principles. Dorn wrote in 1981: 210 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement Currently, we are experiencing in Poland a process of creating a political culture of a new type, unprecedent- ed here before, similar in some fashion to the political culture of the USA, where the general recognition of ideas determining the shape of public life (the so-called fundamentals) are accompanied by non-ideological political pragmatism. In Poland, these fundamentals were symbols and signs of identity connected to na- tion and faith linked to the philosophy of the nation, society, and public life, which all were far from being crystallized. his philosophy was accepted along with the direction for transformations of social instruments and institutions, such as enterprises, self-governing bodies, administration, people’s councils, and the Sejm. In such a situation there was no need for ideology, nor disputes about what is beter: the right wing or the let wing, liberalism or socialism. People who care about Poland have more important things to setle. 4 his meant that the agreement on the ideological principles, these funda- mentals, was the core of the policy of the movement. In this way the activists rejected the traditional doctrinal solutions, perceiving them as inapplicable to the contemporary challenges. We may enumerate these basic values which were supposed to be the foun- dations of the political community: (1) respect human dignity understood as corporal and spiritual unity of a man, whose humanity is realized in many natural communities (family, local societies, society, nation); (2) recognizing 4 L. Dorn, “Solidarność jako ruch ideowy,” in Niepodległość pracy (Warszawa: Ośrodek Badań Społecznych NSZZ Solidarność region Mazowsze, 1981), p. 75. 211 Krzysztof Mazur universal and inalienable human rights; (3) accepting traditional moral values of Christian civilization, such as truth, goodness, justice, equality, and solidarity, which should come into efect in politics and the economy; (4) rejecting the individual-community dichotomy, and trying to combine these perspectives in the spirit of communitarianism, respecting the principle of equality between the beneits and the obligations of the citizens; (5) recognizing society as an organic community in which members should work together for the greater good in the spirit of solidarity (‘bear ye one another’s burdens’); (6) treating national bounds deined by culture as the foundations of a political communi- ty; (7) acknowledging the key role of the state as the guarantor of public order while simultaneously maximally limiting its role according to the subsidiarity rule (units of a higher order interfere only in these issues which the lower units cannot solve for themselves); (8) inally, placing religion as an important part of public life due to its sense-creating role in tradition, clearly limiting strictly the political activity of the Church. hese ideological principles of a political community should be recognized by means of general social compromise, and entered into the area of everyday political discourse. 5th Thesis: Solidarity was Characterized by Anti-dogmatic Thinking he above-mentioned ideological principles are general rules for composing an ideal political community. hese principles come directly from the experiences of the project creators. At the same time, such values as dignity or solidarity, presented clearly during the strikes of August 1980, were universal in their character, and may be treated as the basis for a community with members who did not necessarily participate in the above-mentioned experience of existential revolution. Furthermore, the power of ideological principles lay in the fact they were not speciied by the Solidarity activists’. As the ideas came 212 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement from diferent traditions and diferent views, people were looking for the parts which were common to them, rather than those that set them apart. hese ideas were treated as the cornerstone for the community, and not as ideological ighting grounds. hese ethical roots did not lead to creation of a rigid code of detailed bans and orders. he solidarity founded in morality was not tempted to be- come entangled in a permanent political dispute over axiological diferences. his is why apart from the recognition of ideological principles, the political project was characterized by a certain anti-dogmatism of thinking, which Dorn called ‘aideological political pragmatism.’ he movement was opposed by a heavily centralized communist state which had a huge propaganda and pressure machine aimed at maximally marginalizing the Union. When ighting such an opponent, Solidarity had to demonstrate a greater degree of lexibility concerning its thoughts and actions. In these terms, we can distinguish between two basic social levels of the movement: (a) regulative ideas, i.e. universal rules outlining the ideal of political order, and (b) speciic demands of the Union, which also become a way to apply these regulative ideas to the social and political reality. he transition from the ideal patern to the speciic demands including the political reality obviously required a certain amount of lexibility in thinking. he aideological political pragmatism was based on the strong premise that the same common values could be realized in many diferent ways, and choosing one of them should every time belong to the people. his is why Solidarity called for establish- ing institutional solutions which authentically involve citizens in public life. herefore, the state should be built on the basis of the idea of assistance, where low-level institutions with real competences may solve most of the local prob- lems. Yet again, it was clear that the shape of the political project of Solidarity had depended more on the reality of activity in the communist state than in consistent reading of classics of the political idea. 213 Krzysztof Mazur It is worth adding that the most crucial reason behind this reluctance of the Union activists towards ‘self-salutary positive models’ was the rejection of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Communism was largely interpreted as a political system uterly invented by theoreticians and prophets, which was imposed on the society top-down, without any adaptation to reality. hus, in isolation of the ideology from the social life, the Union activists saw the greatest warning against creating any rival models a priori. Again, as Baczko pertinently put it, due to this rejection, Marxism was completely removed from the discussion during the Solidarity period. Marxism was worn out not due to dogmatic rigidity but, on the contrary, through its too lenient lexibility. Its compliance to any excuses for manipulating History made it perfect for propaganda. However, it proved totally inefective for geting out of the crisis in the system it helped to create. 5 In view of the deadlock of the communist ideology, old formulas and di- visions were rejected, as they were not suited for diagnosing the new situation. hus, all ideological baggage was lost, and new terms and ways of expressions were sought. 6th Thesis: the Political Project of Solidarity Was Eclectic he anti-dogmatism of thinking led straight to extensive drawing of inspira- tion from many diferent doctrines. his shaped the ideological output into an eclectic entirety. he values and ideas from diferent traditions were freely mixed, oten disregarding the tensions between them. his resulted from three circumstances. he irst reason was the absorption of the dissident circles by Solidarity from 1976-1980, which were founded on totally diferent grounds. 5 B. Baczko, Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej (Warszawa: PWN, 1994), p. 242. 214 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement heir cooperation led to a search for inspiration in many traditions, and at the same time, sought for similarities rather than diferences. he second reason was the necessity for lexibility in meeting the realities of the communist state, where activists looked for diferent solutions to increase their chances when dealing with the authorities. However, it seems a third reason may be presented, one which is far more universal. When examining basic social and political issues in terms of theory, one should pay atention to their logical coherence. In this way, the analysis of terms which stand diametrically opposed to each other (freedom-equality, community-individual, etc.) induces one to be clearly in favor of one of these values. herefore, liberalism will defend freedom and the individual, whilst socialism will sympathize with equality and community. However, when one sees past the theoretical deliberations, and focuses on the existential experience of an individual, these basic dilemmas of political philosophy will reveal themselves in a completely new light. hings which are easy setled in theory are connected together into a single human experience. On an existential level, an individual usually wants to ind a creative balance between values which are deemed as mutually exclusive by the theoreticians. It should not come as a surprise that the unionists, drawing out of their experience, associated (contrary to the doctrines) equality with freedom, the individual with community, and strong moral values with a certain openness to otherness. his was interestingly commented on by Václav Havel in his essay he Power of the Powerless. Havel pointed out that the Czech dissident movement lacked in-depth knowledge about politics. As Havel puts it, ‘it’s also not so bound by traditional political thinking and political habits and therefore, paradoxically, they are more aware of genuine political reality and more sensitive to what can and should be done under the circumstances.’ he point of departure for politically uneducated people is not some reality-deprived notion and ‘all the traditional political schemata that have been imported into our circumstanc- es from a world that will never return’ but a speciic individual with its basic 215 Krzysztof Mazur needs. ‘To shed the burden of traditional political categories and habits and open oneself up fully to the world of human existence and then to draw polit- ical conclusions only ater having analyzed it: this is not only politically more realistic but at the same time (…) politically more promising as well.’ In order to meet the challenges of the contemporary reality, politics had to remove from its plans ‘the abstract vision of a self-salutary positive models,’ which usually lead to enslavement of a society, and focus on the needs of speciic people. 6 Solidarity abandoned self-salutary positive models and grounded its ideology in a single experience. By combining these three elements — universal values which are the cor- nerstone of the community, aideological political pragmatism of action, and an eclectic way of thinking for designing speciic solutions — the political project of Solidarity was established. his unique way of thinking in politics was the most signiicant contribution of the movement to political thought. his briely described political project proved to be an extremely inconve- nient heritage. In order to accommodate this understanding, we have to revise many contemporary intellectual habits. his is why my thesis is supported by three levels of inapplicability of this political project to the modern categories of thought: intellectual inapplicability, methodological inapplicability, and political inapplicability. he next three theses expand on this idea. 7th Thesis: The Intellectual Inapplicability of Solidarity he intellectual inapplicability was rooted in our worldview, especially in terms of politics and sociology, which was shaped mainly by the Enlightenment, which to this day is a vital element of our culture and undoubtedly one of the 6 V. Havel, he Power of the Powerless trans. by Paul Wilson, at: htp://vaclavhavel.cz/ showtrans.php?cat=eseje&val=2_aj_eseje.html&typ=HTML (accessed January 16, 2012). 216 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement cornerstones of the present day. 7 he intellectual inluence of the Enlighten- ment was especially strengthened in Poland ater 1989, as the last 20 years of Polish history was about making up for lost time and catching up to the intel- lectual output of the Western Europe. One of the most important elements in this process was the Polish intelligentsia discovering political traditions of the Enlightenment. However, such a turn of events has taken us away from the possibility of understanding the political project of Solidarity, which by rejecting the basic foundations of Marxist and Leninist ideology (both heavily inluenced by the Enlightenment), automatically distanced itself from many axioms characteristic of these traditions. In order to surpass the Enlightenment heritage in our culture, the unionist demonstrated a high degree of innovation in thinking outside the boundaries, at the same time condemning themselves to incomprehension, since their project stood in clear contradiction to the line of political thought characteristic of the Polish hird Republic. Let us enumerate the most vital features of this Enlightenment vision which were rejected by the creators of Solidarity in 1980, and which returned ten years later. he basic achievement of the Enlightenment is a speciic ideal of rationality. Stanley Rosen states it was possible to see within this heritage the ‘intentions to replace the standards of reason by standards of faith, custom, or tradition.’ Reason is comprehended as Cartesian mathesis universalis, a thesis which in itself is the generalization of mathematics. his thesis leads us step by step to stigmatizing everything which cannot be explained by mathematics as rhetoric, i.e. something mindless. In this way, we reject metaphysics, religion, and tradition, replacing them with mathematics. 8 he creators of Solidarity rejected such a concept of rationality. In their opinion, both religion and tra- 7 Ch. Taylor, Źródła podmiotowości. Narodziny tożsamości nowoczesnej (Warszawa: PWN, 2001), p. 724. (Polish translationon of Sources of the Self… by Charles Tylor). 8 S. Rosen, “Rozmyślając nad oświeceniem,” in Oświecenie dzisiaj: rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo, ed. K. Michalski (K raków: Znak,1999), p. 11-13. 217 Krzysztof Mazur dition were hugely inluential, thus they reached for these values ingrained in our culture. hus, they were in favor of a thesis contrary to the Enlightenment philosophy, that one could not actually understand the social reality without wider reference to metaphysics. Together with an ideal of rationality, the Enlightenment promoted a speciic anthropological vision of human beings with a naturalistic and materialistic paradigm. According to this point of view, a human is an extremely complex organism without any spiritual element, and may be learned only by means of methods taken from natural science. 9 his perspective was connected to rejection of transcendence, which meant negation of the thesis that human life has some other meaning beyond itself. his was the birth of exclusive hu- manism, which is based on limiting the human existence to mortal life. 10 he activists of Solidarity did not agree with such an understanding of humans, seeing them more as a unity between the spiritual and the physical. hrough in-depth exploration of the concept of human dignity rooted in religion, it became obvious they could not agree with a naturalistic approach. As a result of Enlightenment anthropology, people began to reject traditional morality. It was replaced by a conviction that all our purposes, ideals, or values are nothing but preferences based on sensations of pain and pleasure. 11 his, in turn, gave rise to a tendency to treat ethics contextually, i.e. by evaluating good and evil in criteria of usefulness of fulilling speciic goals. However, the social movement, called by scholars the ethical civic society, returned to the tra- ditional moral categories. he activists were for universal and timeless status of values by supporting substantialist justice or the sense of the call to ‘bear ye 9 R. Spaemann, “Wewnętrzna sprzeczność oświecenia,” in Oświecenie dzisiaj: rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo, ed. K. Michalski, (K raków: Znak,1999), p. 200-201. 10 Ch. Taylor, “Immanentne kontroświecenie,” Oświecenie dzisiaj: rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo, ed. K. Michalski, (K raków: Znak,1999), p. 46. 11 S. Rosen, “Rozmyślając nad oświeceniem,” p. 22. 218 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement one another’s burdens.’ he revolted against reducing morality to preferences based on senses or utilitarianism. Another characteristic feature of the Enlightenment was perceiving religion as a relic of the past, which acted as the main perpetrator in trapping people in superstitions of the past. Voltaire in Treatise on Tolerance presented a vision of the community of people united with a singular vision of rationality. his concept sanctioned the model of a modern Enlightenment state where an overlord was obliged to ight any religious zealotry, especially Catholic. 12 he result of this concept was pushing all Christian traditions onto the margins of European society, all in the name of airmation of pure rationalism. he activists of Solidarity thought in a completely diferent manner. he above-mentioned theses were close to the basic Marxist ideology, and in the face of the struggle which the Church had to endure in the post-war era, it was no surprise they were rejected by the Union. In the context of the Union’s batle with the com- munist state, the language of the Church was the one showing the ideological emptiness of existing propaganda. he social movement did not want a neutral point of view of the state, but clamored for a visible presence of religion in the public space, and accepted the important institutional role of the Church. By negating traditional religion and metaphysics, the Enlightenment has established its own faith. Its centerpiece was progress, which was meant to be accomplished by the human race in terms of exploration, society, ethics, and technology by revealing the truths governing our world. he mental image of the long-lasting great march of people towards civilization is clearly visible in the works of such thinkers as Condorcet. Most of great minds of the Enlight- enment believed in ‘scientiic determinism.’ hey proclaimed liberating the human race, and stated at the same time that people are basically and irrevo- 12 Voltaire, Traktat o tolerancji: napisany z powodu śmierci Jana Calasa, (Warszawa: PIW 1956) (Polish translation of Voltaire’s Treatise on Tolerance). 219 Krzysztof Mazur cably slaves. 13 By analyzing the process of de-ideologization of the communist state, we have discovered that the Enlightenment belief in the rationality of history, which became the cornerstone of Marxism, was rejected by the Polish society. he documents of the period known as ‘the carnival of Solidarity’ are therefore free of any unwavering rules of historical development which may be discovered through rational analysis. he explosion of freedom characteristic of a massive social movement legitimated thinking about the future as a large unknown, which would be determined by thousands of particular decisions of individual persons. According to scientiic determinism, the past was closed, and the future determined; due to historical events, Solidarity perceived to- morrow as uncertain, basing its wisdom on yesterday. Finally, the Enlightenment was fond of social engineering, as the extension of faith in the rational laws of history. he period of Enlightenment popularized the conviction that the society is an organized machine in which all elements contribute to its functioning. he Enlightenment philosophy gave people deep faith in their own cognitive capabilities but also in the recon- struction of social and political order, which gave rise to theories discovering the mechanisms governing the world and human behavior, establishing rules similar to these of natural sciences which were ruthless and unforgiving. he rules dictated by reason would be implemented, only if the reality could be freed from the evil surrounding the society; they were the ones 13 R. Spaemann, “Wewnętrzna sprzeczność oświecenia,” p. 200. 220 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement determining the order to which all social actions and behavior were adjusted. 14 his aspect of the Enlightenment was also shown in communist ideology which believed in the redemptive power of the state which by nationalizing the means of production frees the authentic nature of the people. he failure of the communist project made Solidarity extremely distrustful of self-salutary positive models. By rejecting all inclinations towards social engineering, the activists demanded the rule of assistance, i.e. a model based on strong subjec- tivity of low-level institutions. In this model, it was society who should solve most of the local problems through grassroots activities. In all these aspects, the political project of Solidarity transgressed the speciically understood Enlightenment, trying to correct its basic premises. Obviously, nobody at that time deined the main task of the movement di- rectly in that way, and one can see many statements of the activists which can be deemed as taken directly from the Enlightenment. However, undoubted- ly, the cult of narrowly-understood rationality, interpretation of the human through naturalism and materialism, rejection of traditional morality in lieu of utilitarianism, acknowledging religion as a thing of the past and the greatest enemy of freeing humans from bygone superstitions, belief in universal truths which through science govern the development of civilization, and last but not least, the afection for social engineering — all these traits were treated by the creators of Solidarity as Marxist and Leninist. he activists distanced themselves automatically from basic axioms of a major trend in our culture by rejecting the communist point of view rooted deeply in the tradition of the Enlightenment. hus, we have every right to call the achievements of the movement a post-Enlightenment project. 14 W. Bernacki, “Socjalizm,” in Słownik społeczny, ed. B. Szlachta (Kraków: WAM, 2004), p. 1207. 221 Krzysztof Mazur Of course, the above description is quite one-sided. hese six features of the Enlightenment philosophy seem to be selected rather partially, as this exceptionally rich current produced many other topics which were far from extreme scientism or naturalism. Furthermore, the proposed deinition of the Enlightenment reduced this trend only to the French contributions to this age, leaving aside the achievements of the Scotish or Polish Enlightenments, which had diferent approaches to the issues of anthropology. Finally, it is also safe to say there were many philosophers who were crucial to the Enlightenment period, and yet their anthropology was closer to the concepts of the Solidarity activists than the scientiic vision (Alexis de Tocqueville or Edmund Burke). As well, there were some people in the Union who were greatly inspired by the tradition of the Enlightenment (like Leszek Kołakowski and Adam Michnik). However, it seems most legitimate to treat this concept of the Enlighten- ment as a certain type of progressive views lending a tone to the political debate in Poland ater 1989 because it allows us to fully understand the mechanism of intellectual inapplicability. According to many researchers, the last 20 years in Polish history were characterized by making up for lost time in terms of academic outcomes of the West, a period when Poles were discovering the political traditions which founded modern liberal democracy and capitalism. his heritage came with the ideas of political pluralism and neutrality of the state’s outlook; a view that secularization is an inherent features of modern- ization; a distrust towards strong national and religious identities, which were supposed to constitute threats to the modern concept of tolerance; a privatiza- tion of rules and ethical norms connected to liberalism; a conviction regarding the extremely individualistic nature of humans which is carried out only by expressing the uniqueness of a lifestyle in opposition to the community; coni- dence about the superiority of academic reasoning over religious thinking; and eventually a belief that history will end as a victory of democracy and capitalism, which through its world order, according to the theory of neoliberalism, will 222 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement provide people with eternal happiness. All these elements of Western political thinking, which developed over the course of 200 years, were learned in Po- land from the angle of the French Enlightenment. Due to the short time span available for this adoption, and drastic political and economic changes of the period, this process was perforce ‘extremely selective and supericial.’ Mostly, we were not ‘aware of any inner dilemmas, or current issues emerging from the transformations in liberalism.’ 15 Zdzisław Krasnodębski in Demokracja peryferii convincingly demonstrates that the end result was an unquestioning acceptance of Western intellectual standards. We have enthusiastically em- braced the achievements of the Enlightenment, moulding our own intellectual habits in its image, and our way of thinking about public afairs was based on stif doctrinal divisions in their 19th century form. At the same time, we have condemned ourselves to the incomprehension of the program of Solidarity, which was far more modern than the ideas rooted in 19th century, saw the current problems connected with the Enlightenment tradition, and tried to correct its basic assumptions. It was easier to acknowledge this program as an absurd creation of uneducated workers than change our own intellectual habits, which were supposed to be synonymous with progress and modernity. 16 15 Z. Krasnodębski, Demokracja peryferii (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2005), p. 8. 16 In her recollections about the August 1980 negotiations in the Gdańsk Shipyard between the strikers and the communist government, Jadwiga Staniszkis writes she had to quit the debate as the ‘thinking of experts’ was based too much on current reality, which according to her was ‘a type of corruption.’ She believed, the ‘unimaginable’ things (such as establishing free trade unions) were only atainable by people who were not aware of the impossibility — ‘this should be the workers’ choice alone,’ she adds later on. When viewing this observation in the perspective of the following 30 years, we may say that this uncritical acceptance of the speciic aspects of the Enlightenment was a type of corruption which prevented any fair evaluation of the programme of Solidarity. See: J. Staniszkis, Ewolucje form robotniczego protestu w Polsce. Socjologiczne releksje wokół wydarzeń w Gdańsku, sierpień 1980 (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo MKZ NSZZ „Solidarność”, 1981), p. 12. 223 Krzysztof Mazur 8th Thesis: Methodological Inapplicability he issue of methodological inapplicability was connected with the positivist tendencies in social studies. In the context of Solidarity this issue was irstly mentioned by Ireneusz Krzemiński, who wrote that, ‘the academic gear of sociology assumes … a particular image of the society and of an individual. his image is conirmed by a variety of philosophical grounds which cause the analysis to omit or disable the description of worldly dimensions necessary to be considered in understanding of the entirety of the social experience.’ Without any unnecessary philosophical debates, Krzemiński clearly suggests that by closely abiding the recommendations of objective professional sociology, created in the spirit of positivism, we cannot fully comprehend the metaphysical solutions of the experience of sense which was the basis for Solidarity. herefore, we have to introduce ‘new notional instrumentation’ which will enable us ‘to commemorate this exceptional social experience.’ 17 In similar fashion, I was forced to correct the methodological principles, especially by revising four rules recognized almost universally in social sciences: (1) the principle of a solid division of sciences due to the ield of research, which means a profound specialization; I have chosen an interdisciplinary method, which in a multi-faceted way combines the work of political sciences, philosophy, sociology, history, and linguistics; (2) the principle of an individual research subject applied in political thinking, which stems from the belief that only individuals may be reasonably researched in view of individually practiced political philosophy; in order to describe the political project of a massive social movement, I had to cast aside this rule, and reconstruct the political thinking of collective subjects. (3) the principle dividing the source into speciic types and categories, which is reluctant to compare sources of diferent character (e.g. legal documents with literature); in order to place the political project of 17 I. Krzemiński, “Świat zakorzeniony,” Aneks 43 (1986), p. 91-93. 224 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement Solidarity in a wider cultural contexts, I decided to use a proper hierarchy of sources (Policy Resolution, oicial documents signed by the union, journalism, cultural works) in order to juxtapose and contrast them for an outline of the phenomenon; (4) the principle of rational explanation of phenomena, which declares that the only way to reach the essence of social events is by rational analyses; I found the political project of Solidarity was founded on values directly derived from experiences identiied during the strikes by an intuitive insight of the activists into the world of values, and implicitly decided that its phenomenon cannot be understood by academic analyses. Without revision of these four methodological principles, i.e. on a plane of objective academic political science, to paraphrase Krzemiński’s words, such a social experience could not be commemorated in all its complexity. 9th Thesis: Political Inapplicability of Solidarity Finally, the issue of political inapplicability, i.e. the impossibility of simply trans- lating those ideas onto the last 20 years of Polish political struggles, seems to be rather obvious, especially in the light of earlier indings. Let us look at this problem from the perspective of theoretical disputes between parties invoking socialist or liberal traditions, and the argument between the let and the right sides of the political stage. he parties which rooted themselves in socialist ideas found the thought of Solidarity similar to their ways of treating the so- ciety as an organic whole, managing a company by workers’ self-management, and caring for the disadvantaged and dispossessed. However, at the same time, the socialists could not accept Solidarity for its desire to limit the authority of the state for low-level bodies, its reluctance towards social engineering, and rejection of mechanical perception of equality. Meanwhile, the liberals allud- ed to the liberation aspect of the social movement, as well as the demand to decentralize the state in the spirit of subsidiarity, and enhancing grassroots 225 Krzysztof Mazur initiatives in the society. But they viewed the critique of individualism and so- cial solidarity as relics of past socialist thinking, similar also to any atempts to establish moral foundations for capitalism, or the ideas of privatization through granting proprietary rights to workers rather than selling the companies. his meant that neither socialists nor the liberals of the Polish hird Republic took over the principles of the political project of Solidarity. A similar thing happened ater the division of the political scene into the let and right wings. he Let saw the heritage of Solidarity in terms of social sensitivity towards the poor and the excluded. he most important Polish let-wing party ater 1989 derived from the communist Polish United Workers’ Party, and its voters consisted mainly of people who were reluctant towards the union in the 1980s. In the end, the achievements of the social movement which contributed to the downfall of communism could not become the ba- sis for a program of a party which looked back on the communist People’s Republic of Poland. he strong religious and axiological aspects of Solidarity were also an issue for the new let-wing parties which dissociated themselves from the communist era but believed in profound neutralization of the state’s oversight. he achievements of the social movement would perhaps be most appropriate for a religious, patriotic let-wing party, rooted in the pre-WWII heritage of the Polish Socialist Party. However, there are no real inluential parties on the Polish political landscape right now which refer to these roots. Also, surprisingly, Solidarity did not either prove to be an authentic program cornerstone for right-wing parties. Obviously, almost all of them took the national, Catholic, and anti-communist character of their movement as their own, and especially within these features the right claimed to have the Soli- darity heritage. However, in reality these three key elements of the legacy were extremely inconvenient for them: irst of all, Solidarity claimed the concept of split independence, where the state would be governed both by the commu- nists and the representatives of social forces, which was an idea very far from 226 Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement the right-wing ethos of uncompromising ight against the communists. he agreement of Solidarity to negotiate with the communists during the Round Table Talks in 1989 was treated by many as treason of the August ideals of 1980, which in itself may be viewed as a paradox. Many people forgot that the trade union was established in 1980 through peaceful negotiations with the author- ities, and the following phases of talks with the communists were from the beginning the basis for this peaceful revolution. he second cornerstone of the Solidarity legacy, also diferent from the convictions of the right for the past 20 years, was the self-limitation of the social movement in axiological maters. he union acknowledged its connection to the religious plane but avoided any ideological disputes in this mater, and as a result the basic ethical principles were not up for constant political debate. he social movement managed to steer clear of treating Catholicism as the state religion, and emphasized its ethical and spiritual background for the culture; the predominant bonds which were supposed to unite the nation were not ethnic but cultural, open wide to other political or religious views. Treating axiological maters as pivotal for political struggles, which we can now witness both in right- and let-wing parties, was absent from the view of Solidarity. Lastly, the right-wing politicians who claim their Solidarity heritage usually had a hard time accepting the important role of let-wing advisers in the movement, or people from the circles of Catholic intellectuals, who had moderate opinions concerning communism. In order to reduce this discord, in time, many rightists started to voice their concern about the inluence of dishonest advisers on the trade union. All of this means that the program of the social movement established over 30 years ago could not have been accepted by any inluential Polish political party ater 1989. In this political sense, Solidarity is an orphan – no one today may approve of its achievements on the whole without reservations. 227 Krzysztof Mazur 10th Thesis: the Political Project of Solidarity May Help to Deine the Polish Constitutional Identity I want to end this paper referring to a contemporary text entitled ‘In quest for lost identity’ by Professor Lech Morawski, a constitutionalist from the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. Morawski puts forward the thesis that Poles still do not have a common constitutional identity, as up to this day there is no singular universally recognized corpus for the basis of the Polish political system. he author states that in order to have a constitutional identity, the rules for it must ‘start living in people’s hearts, and drive the interaction between the citizens and the authorities.’ he problem is now more urgent than ever as the clause on protecting constitutional identity in the Lisbon Treaty is going to determine the scope of competence which may be transferred by the state to the European Union. his means that in the light of recent changes in the EU, constitutional identity is now the frontier of a state’s independence. 18 he political project of the irst Solidarity tried to name the basic values for the entirety of the Polish political community, and may be an important voice in the contemporary discussions on, for example, Polish constitutional identity. However, in order to use that voice properly, it is necessary to cease thinking about Solidarity as a political party, and see the doctrine behind its irst period of activity, with its broader and more universal character. Translated by Łukasz Moskała 18 L. Morawski, “W poszukiwaniu utraconej tożsamości.” (working paper for the participants of the project “Fenomen państwa w wielopoziomowych porządkach polityczno-prawnych oraz w integracji europejskiej,” (Centrum Europejskie Natolin, Warszawa 2011). 228  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory Adam Mielczarek Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory he article is a proposal to use categories taken from contemporary theories of social movements in order to describe the anticommunist movements in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s. he aim of the article is to show that the demo- cratic opposition, the Solidarity movement and the underground of the 1980s could be described as elements of the same movement, which, however, had diferent dynamics at diferent points in time. hese diferent dynamics spe- ci ied to what extent the movement functioned as a spontaneous, grass-roots movement and to what degree it was controlled by political leaders, well aware of the goals that they wanted to achieve. In order to describe the changing dynamics of the movement, it is best to use approaches which in the theory of social movements used to be treated as alternative. he history of Polish opposition shows that they are in fact complementary, and they describe diferent aspects of the movement, whose meaning depends on the circumstances under which it could develop. 1 Literature Review Although most researchers seem to agree that Solidarity was a major social movement, there are very few analyses of the phenomenon which consider it 1 his paper was presented by the author during a conference of the Social Sciences Department of the University of Gdańsk entitled “ he Culture of Freedom – the Culture of Responsibility,” in Gdańsk, May 23-24, 2011, and it has recently been published in Polish, see: K. Ciechorska-Kulesza, R. Kossakowski, P. Łuczeczko, ed., Kultura Solidarności. Socjologiczno-antropologiczne analizy kulturowego dziedzictwa „Solidarności” (Pszczółki: Orbis Exterior, 2011). 229 Adam Mielczarek in the context of contemporary social movement theories. his work will aim to show that in spite of the fact that theories seen as most popular today are based on the experiences of Western democracies, rather than real socialism, many – though not all – of the concepts they produced may be used to describe the development of the Solidarity movement. he author believes that elements of these theories should be treated as complementary, which follows current trends in the way one thinks of social movements. 2 In the case of Solidarity, modes of thinking based on new theories of social movements and of resource mobilization describe particular aspects of the movement, whose meaning changed along with changing circumstances and the stages of the movement’s development. Alan Touraine was the most prominent researcher and social movement theorist to investigate Solidarity, and he devoted a large research project to its phenomenon and wrote a book about the movement. 3 Touraine’s research was on the one hand very fruitful from a descriptive point of view, but on the other hand, the social movement theory he created and applied did not prove useful in clarifying the emergence of the movement. Touraine, whose work was deeply rooted in research on ‘new social movements,’ was actually looking for a very speciic movement: one that was not ighting to achieve particular interests and partial goals, but a movement which aimed at an all-embracing change of social reality, in order to increase the social subjects’ control over their fate (historicity). his very character of the movement was meant to be an expression of new conlicts, characteristic of the new, emerging social 2 B. Klandermans and S. Tarrow, “Mobilization into Social Movements: Synthesizing European and American Approaches,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1988), p. 1-38. 3 A. Touraine, Solidarność. Analiza ruchu społecznego 1980-1981 (Warszawa: Europa, 1989). he French original was published in 1982 under the title: Solidarité: Analyse d’un mouvement social (Pologne 1980-1981). 230  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory order: a post-industrial society. 4 his notion was deeply rooted in issues char- acteristic of Western democracies, and treated as a universal stage of develop- ment. Social movements investigated within this notion were to show ‘new’ or ‘post-industrial’ social aspirations and contradictions, which slipped out of the conceptual framework of previously dominant theories which saw conlict in the class context, as a part of their Marxist heritage. Seeing Solidarity as one of such movements was an important act of ac- knowledging the universality of demands that Poles put forward, but it was not an efective analytic tool for the analysis of Solidarity, which was deeply immersed in local conditions. As Marek Latoszek argued 5 Solidarity cannot be treated as a reaction to phenomena typical of post-industrial societies. he conditions under which cultural grass-roots movements of Western Europe emerged were in fact so diferent, that the roots of Solidarity cannot be traced in analogical evolutionary processes taking place in Polish society. his may have been the reason why Touraine’s theory did not ind followers here, de- spite the direct involvement of Touraine’s team in research in Poland and establishing many contacts among researchers. It has to be said that Alain Touraine himself did not include his description of Solidarity in the body of his theoretical considerations, although he oten emphasized how important his Polish experience was. His book Solidarity. An analysis of the social movement: Poland 1980-81, writen in haste and without the participation of any Polish researchers, who were prevented from cooperating with Touraine’s team by the state of Martial Law in Poland, remains a valuable descriptive piece of work, 4 P. Kuczyński, M. Frybes, W poszukiwaniu ruchu społecznego. Wokół socjologii Alaina Touraine’a (Warszawa: Oicyna Naukowa, 1994). 5 M. Latoszek, “Solidarność: ruch społeczny, rewolucja, czy powstanie,” in Solidarność w imieniu narodu i obywateli, ed. M. Latoszek (Kraków: ARCANA, 2005); M. Latoszek, “Solidarity – A Contribution to Social Movement heory,” Polish Sociological Review 1 (2006), p. 39-53. 231 Adam Mielczarek empirically documenting the inner dynamics of the Solidarity trade union, but it does not form a theoretical approach to which other researchers could refer. David S. Mason gives more arguments for using the new theories of social movements to describe Solidarity in his article 6 He is fully aware of the dif- ferences in circumstances under which Solidarity and Western movements emerged, but points out many similarities between the former and ‘new’ social movements as described by Western sociologists. One of such similarities is the fact that Solidarity was not a class movement, but rather a reaction to alienation of people in a world dominated by institutions which intervened in and destroyed traditional systems of interpersonal relations, and its aim was not to gain material beneits, but to defend values like equality, participatory democracy, the right to self-fulillment and human rights. He airms that in fact, Solidarity was defending the same post-materialistic values as those which grew stronger in Western societies. Mason emphasizes such similarities as being rooted in Christian values, preaching non-violence and being oriented towards self-government. He also directs atention to an aspect that I shall return to later in the article: the continuous conlict between the top-down and botom-up dynamics of the movement. Elisabeth Crighton 7 tried to apply resources mobilization theory to Sol- idarity, and in her article she views the movement as a coalition of particu- lar organizations of social movements, operating in diverse and cooperating environments. he theory that she applies seems to apply to the analysis of Solidarity, and she rightly emphasizes the local and regional levels of the move- ment, observing the autonomy and diferences between its particular elements. 6 D. S. Mason, “Solidarity as a New Social Movement,” Political Science Quarterly, Volume 104, No. 1 (1989). 7 E. Crighton, “Resource Mobilization and Solidarity: Comparing Social Movements across Regimes,” in Poland ater Solidarity. he Social Movement versus the State, ed. B. Misztal (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 113-132. 232  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory Unfortunately, Crighton’s work is not based on a deep understanding of Polish reality. First of all, she seems to overestimate the importance of the non-mate- rial resources owned by the organizations she identiies, especially those that operated before August 1980. Although she is right in claiming that Solidarity was indebted to ‘social support infrastructure’ created by the Catholic Church and the democratic opposition, it is diicult to see elements of this network as organizations of social movement able to play a subjective role in the enormous social mobilization which was then taking place. As I am going to show later in this work, during the formative phase of the movement the resources of the already existing organizations did not play a key role, because they were only going to form in the course of an uncontrollable outbreak of social energy. Undoubtedly, the activists taking part in creating Solidarity were people of diverse values, interests and needs, but I strongly believe that forming these partial identities as well as forming the collective identity was destined to begin later, in the process of creation of the movement. Another work falling into the category of resource mobilization theory is Solidarity & Contention. Networks of Polish Opposition by Maryjane Osa. Osa places a lot of emphasis on network analysis, and I believe that the main advantage of her work is giving a historical perspective to network analysis – that is, broadening the scope of interest outside the period directly before the creation of Solidarity, and tracking the ways in which oppositional traditions had been formed throughout the decades of the existence of the Peoples’ Re- public of Poland. To a large extent she continues the outstanding work of Jan Kubik, 8 who shows how oppositional atitudes of Poles were rooted in culture and emphasizes the role that national traditions and institutions, mainly the Catholic Church, played in their formation. 8 J. Kubik, he Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power. he rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (University Park: he Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994). 233 Adam Mielczarek Osa justly assumes that a social movement is distinguished from isolat- ed protest events or organizations, because a movement generates a cultural framework that cognitively connects discrete episodes of contention and inte- grates organizations and actions into a single coherent narrative of collective identity and purpose.’ 9 hen she meticulously traces how this cultural framing emerged and what it looked like in subsequent protests that shook the country. She rightly assumes that the state of social discontent was permanent, and that a potential for mobilization was present during the whole existence of the People’s Republic. She also shows that the mobilizing frames of protests and dissident activities were diverse and depended on the political opportunity structure and subjects playing the main roles in them. Osa (as well as Jan Kubik) points out the central role of the Catholic Church, and especially the Church of Primate Wyszyński, in creating a discourse al- ternative to the oicial one. She shows that it has been the most important institution when it comes to activating the masses in Poland. Although this phenomenon did not have a clearly political character, its discourse was dei- nitely oppositional, as it rose against the ideological principle of atheization and encouraged believers to oppose such politics of the state. Osa recognizes the important role of the religious program of the Great Novena which pre- ceded (in the years 1957-1966) the celebration of the thousand-year jubilee of Poland’s baptism, which, in her eyes, provided the type of encompassing themes that made a master frame of dissent movements. On the one hand, it created a clear us-versus-them frame, in which us stood for the devout nation, and they were the Soviet-installed governing apparatus, which brought with itself a major threat to the country: atheization. On the other hand, it clearly broke from prevailing forms of opposition against the authorities rooted in 9 M. Osa, Solidarity and Contention. Networks of Polish Opposition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 3. 234  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory earlier Polish tradition, uprisings and military action oten taken up regardless of any chances of success, by the virtue of which it contributed to the future opposition becoming a non-violent movement. 10 Osa also notices the emergence and growth of other diverse islands of opposition, like the independent Catholic periodicals Znak, Więź, and Ty- godnik Powszechny, and later many other non-religious organizations, such as: Komandosi, Taternicy, KOR (Workers’ Defence Commmitee), ROPCiO (Movement for Defence of Human and Civic Rights) and KPN (Confeder- ation of Independent Poland). She atributes special importance to the fact that these groups were becoming more and more interconnected and inally started cooperating. Here Osa follows in the footsteps of other researchers investigating the history of Solidarity, although her research in this mater is far more systematic and scrupulous. She also emphasizes the importance of creating a common interpretative framework of the opposition, based on the contrast between us and them, and their openness to particular variants of activation frameworks, speciic to diverse dissident groups. She conducts quantitative analyses that point out the multiplication of such enterprises and organizations, the number of which peaked at the end of the 1970s. She also considers the changing political opportunity structure resulting from the situation in the governing circles. Other important factors allowing understanding of the changing dynamics and diverse efects of subsequent dis- sident outbursts taking place during those times are the severity of repressions, divisions in the governing elite and people’s access to information. To sum up, Osa’s work is an excellent study, which takes into account a large array of factors. However, the conclusion of the study is somewhat puzzling, because in the conclusion she inds the explanation for the outbreak of Solidarity in the size and density of opposition and quasi-opposition networks, which were mainly 10 J. Kubik, he Power of Symbols, p. 77-78. 235 Adam Mielczarek associated with intelligentsia. She does not point out a comprehensible mech- anism which would transform these networks into a nation-wide movement based on massive activity in workplaces. Her argumentation seems convincing when she writes about local events, for example, when she answers the ques- tion why it was during a wave of strikes on the Polish coast and not in Lublin that postulates regarding general maters were formulated and defended. She brings to light regional diferences regarding accessibility of information and contact with opposition organizations, local conlicts and economic conditions, the degree to which local authorities were loyal to the central government, and atitudes towards clergy (who in some places tried to moderate conlicts, and in others supported the striking workers). While maintaining the view that a social movement is a phenomenon created in one way or another by pre- viously existing ‘organizations of social movement,’ Osa is not able to explain the gigantic quantitative gap between numerous but isolated opposing groups trying to ‘do something’ and a massive, nation-wide movement. Connecting Two Perspectives Undoubtedly, most of Osa’s observations are perfectly valid, but they need to be supplemented, and this supplement can be found in an approach in com- petition with the one adopted by Osa, namely, in the ‘new social movements theories.’ Regardless of the above-mentioned criticism by Latoszek 11 regarding analogies that can be observed between Solidarity and ‘new’ social movements in the West, it has to be admited that many aspects of this approach seem appropriate, especially when considering the very functioning of the move- 11 M. Latoszek, “„Solidarność”: ruch społeczny, rewolucja, czy powstanie,” p. 240-282; M. Latoszek, “Solidarity - A Contribution,” p. 39-53. 236  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory ment and motivation and identity of individuals involved in it, which are very signiicant in this perspective. he advantage of the above-mentioned approach, especially in the version proposed by Alberto Melucci 12 is its serious treatment of grass-roots origins of the movement, as well as directing the analysis onto the level of an individual. Melucci – although he is seen as a representative of the movement – clearly states that ‘new’ movements are exactly the same as ‘old’ ones, because the mechanisms that created them remain identical. At the same time Melucci makes a statement that is very signiicant from our perspective, that social movements are internally heterogeneous. he starting point of his description is the observation that irst of all there are many diverse protest activities, which, with time and under certain circumstances may become a social movement. hus Melucci breaks with a homogeneous perspective on social movement (used by Touraine), which is the expression of one particular conlict central to its times. He observes that although homogeneity of a movement may be an aspect that is presented outside, it is in fact a product of constant negoti- ations and compromise between its particular parts, and these negotiations do not always succeed. In consequence, one may see social movements not from the point of view of their political aims, but their cultural self-expres- sion. Collective activities connected with movements are not perceived as created by some social-movement managers, who are aware of the goal that they striving to atain, but rather as a form in which dreams and expectations of the involved individuals express themselves. hese motives are obviously socially constructed, but they are not imposed as a form of a political message. Rather they are created on the basis of the participants’ own perceptions of their own identities. Such relections are consistent with what can clearly be 12 A. Melucci, he Nomads of the Present. Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). 237 Adam Mielczarek observed in the case of Solidarity – the fact that the movement had in fact no political agenda. 13 Although some authors 14 hold the opinion that the development of the opposition in Poland in the late 1970s and the emergence of free trade unions were in fact an implementation of a political project of ‘reinstating civic so- ciety,’ created by KOR (Workers’ Defence Commmitee) and its associates, the sophisticated concept of anti-politics presented in their writings cannot be treated as a program common for the whole of Solidarity, or even less so as a tool to activate the masses. he authors mentioned above show a certain inability to explain the transformation from a theoretical project into a mass movement. his mass movement, when it had already become Solidarity, was described by Ost 15 himself as an entity which was not subordinate to the ideas of any politicians. On the contrary, during a signiicant part of its legal existence, Solidarity was striving to overcome the impossibility of a realistic scenario of operation. Negotiations concerning which political stance the union should assume lasted until the end of its legal existence, and they involved activists of diverse status in the organization. 16 he synthetic approach that I am suggesting would be based on taking into account the grass-roots and cultural character of the movement and the inluence that diferent organizations with their own politics exerted upon it. 13 E. Matynia, “he Lost Treasure of Solidarity,” Social Research 4 (2001), p. 917-936. 14 D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); M. H. Bernhard, he Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 15 D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics, p. 187. 16 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja (Gdańsk: Europejskie Centrum Solidarności, 2010) – English version: Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution, 1984; A. Touraine, Solidarność. ; S. Kowalski, Krytyka solidarnościowego rozumu. Studium z socjologii myślenia potocznego (Warszawa: PEN, 1990). 238  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory I believe, as does Osa, 17 that the culture of protest characteristic of the dawn of the Gierek era was to a large extent shaped by organizations that existed earlier, that is mainly the Catholic Church, and to a lesser degree by opposi- tion organizations that were then emerging. hese formative activities came upon a favorable ground of the existing cultural resources transmited spon- taneously, either within the family or in models existing in literature, and also in those canonical works included in school readings. Seeing the growth of Solidarity in the irst months of its existence as inconsistent with the limited resources available to the opposition (together with the ambiguous atitude of the Church), I am of the opinion that the importance of these resources should not be overestimated. Of course, there were areas in which the inluence of these resources was considerable, but the very formation of Solidarity should be seen as a phenomenon determined mainly by the levels of cumulated social discontent, in the context of economic breakdown as well as hitherto empha- sized cultural considerations. A Crack in the System As Kubik rightly points out 18 repressions and humiliation of the nation in the times of real socialism were of diverse character: cultural, political and eco- nomic. I believe that all these aspects had an inluence on the sudden outburst of Solidarity and the readiness of the masses to engage in a movement that was seen as opposing the Party. At the end of the 1970s more symptoms of the economic crisis and incapacity of the state emerged, and it was these symptoms, and not the organizational capabilities of the opposition, that had a signiicant 17 M. Osa, Solidarity and Contention. 18 J. Kubik, he Power of Symbols.; J. Kubik, “Czyje to dzieło: robotników, intelektualistów czy kogoś innego? Kontrowersje wokół pochodzenia i składu społecznego Solidarności,” Kultura i Społeczeństwo 1 (1994), p. 175-188. 239 Adam Mielczarek inluence upon the growing pessimism regarding the situation in the country, clearly visible in results of opinion polls, which were growing more and more negative. 19 What detonated these tensions was – as had happened before in the Peoples’ Republic of Poland – an increase in the prices of meat, which led to a wave of strikes. he majority of these strikes never formulated any political aims. Against this background the events in the Gdańsk Shipyard and the political process which led to negotiating the accords were highly unusual phenomena. Undoubtedly, self-aware political activists and intellec- tuals along with equally self-aware politicians of the Party played the key roles here. Formulating strike demands, including the demand to create free trade unions, establishing and maintaining the intercollegiate strike commitee, and inally, signing the accords were the result of speciic circumstances and people involved in the process and it was not determined by the dynamics of a social process, nor was it an outcome of some strategic plan. Although the idea of free trade unions was one of many promoted by the democratic opposition, it was neither a inite nor the key postulate. It was a re- sult of the experiences of workers from the Baltic Coast in 1970, 20 and it was taken up by members of opposition intellectuals, who wanted to reach the minds of workers. Intellectuals and leaders of the opposition in the 1980s did not think the postulate was realistic, and they found it rather intimidating, as they foresaw its potential revolutionary consequences. 21 In many respects, however, it was not a well-considered postulate, and, by the same token, many 19 M. Zaremba, “Zimno, ciepło, gorąco… Nastroje Polaków od zimy stulecia do lata 1980,” in „Solidarność” od wewnątrz 1980-1981, ed. A. Friszke, K. Persak, P. Sowiński (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2013); see also English version of Zaremba’s article in this volume. 20 R. Laba, he Roots of Solidarity. A Political Sociology of Poland’s Working-Class Democratization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 21 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja.; J. Holzer, „Solidarność” 1980-81. Geneza i historia (Warszawa: Krąg, 1983). 240  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory key organizational decisions – like the one making the movement operate on a regional, rather than professional basis – were not at all taken for granted. 22 hen, the fact that the August Accords promised legalization of independent trade unions was not a part of anyone’s conscious strategy of ‘reinstating civic society.’ Nobody expected that a trade union would become such an efective tool of social activity. Although the decision was by no means well-considered, adopting the formula of a trade union was of absolutely vital importance for the further development of the movement. Agreeing to do so, the authorities allowed for a crack in the system, which directed accumulated social energy in one par- ticular direction. he strength of this formula was its wide availability – which was certainly relative, because the negotiations to create similar structures for students, farmers or other professions lasted well into 1981. A trade union is a structure whose natural purpose is to solve problems connected with work relations on the level of each production unit. In the corrupted and misman- aged economy of the People’s Republic these were truly pressing problems for practically all employees. The fact that the trade union formula was ideologically neutral and had a pro-social character which was in accordance with the oicial ideology made the operations of the union relatively safe: masses could become involved, without anyone being given the risky label of dissident. his neutrality had one more important aspect from the perspective of the birthplace of a wide social movement: the trade union formula prescribed distance to ideology, and thus it created no barriers to prospective members in this sphere. Although in its particular spheres diverse ideologies bloomed and uniied local communities, 22 A. Rębowska, “Wybrane aspekty ruchu obywatelskiego Solidarność z perspektywy ćwierćwiecza,” in „Solidarność” w imieniu narodu i obywateli, ed. M. Latoszek (Kraków: Arcana, 2005), p. 86-98. 241 Adam Mielczarek as a whole the formula followed a good path of intentional self-control – it aimed at representing employees, which also opened the door to mass participation. Because such is the nature of a trade union, and perhaps in opposition to Lenin’s formula of a central council of trade unions, Solidarity was a demo- cratic organization and it built its structures from the botom up, starting with individual workplaces. In consequence, although there was no socially root- ed democratic culture and in spite of adverse political conditions, it became possible to create an organization fuelled from the botom, and remaining under signiicant control of social forces. Undoubtedly, this democracy was far from perfect, 23 but for many of those involved it was the irst experience of democracy in their lives. A Nation-wide Movement So, in fact it was not the ideas of the democratic opposition, but the formula of a trade union spontaneously illed with content that deined the character of Solidarity. he movement, once initiated, spread throughout the country and started representing all Poles. With all due respect to all those who went on strike in Gdańsk, Szczecin and Jastrzębie, the analysis of the phenomenon of Solidarity is much more than just strikes leading to an agreement with the government. here would have been no independent trade unions, no Solidarity, if a huge wave of social activism taking place in workplaces all over the country had not followed the strikes. his wave presented the government with a fait accompli: that independent trade unions existed in all corners of Poland. One has to take into consideration the fact that the authorities were irst of the opinion that these new trade unions could only be established in work- 23 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja; S. Kowalski, Krytyka solidarnościowego rozumu. Studium z socjologii myślenia potocznego (Warszawa: PEN, 1990). 242  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory places that had signed the August Accords, and state services did all they could to make establishing new cells of trade unions as diicult as possible by in- timidating activists and multiplying formal obstacles. 24 Although signing the Gdansk Accords did make a crack in the system, a genuine change took place only when what was merely a political possibility was illed with social content, and – especially important from our point of view – started to live an independent life. Although it has just been said that adopting the formula of trade unions was relatively safe to its potential participants, still at the beginning it de- manded courage and tenacity. he main force at play in work relations in the Peoples’ Republic was doubtlessly fear, which is well shown in the Polacy 80’ research, 25 and overcoming this fear in working communities was by no means easy. Krzemiński (see footnote 25) in particular pays atention to the role played by those ‘displeased and disobedient’ – people who had stood out by voicing critical opinions before and who were ready to lead the rest of the staf. hese were oten people who had had contacts – albeit oten supericial – with dem- ocratic opposition. heir presence made it much easier to generate common demands and made manipulations on the part of management of the workplace much more diicult. he review of historical sources concerning the creation of local cells of the Unions in August and September 1980 shows that a special role was played by people who had had contacts with oppositional circles. Independent printing presses and the lealets that they produced, reaching many workplaces all 24 A. Dudek, “Dzieje dziesięciomilionowej Solidarności (1980-1981),” in Droga do niepodległości. Solidarność 1980 -2005, ed. A. Borowski (Warszawa: Volumen, 2005), p. 19-63. 25 M. Marody z zespołem, Polacy 80. Wizje rzeczywistości dnia (nie)codziennego (Warszawa: WFiS UW, 2004); I. Krzemiński, “Proces formowania się NSZZ Solidarność,” in Polacy – Jesień’ 80, ed. I. Krzemiński z zespołem (Warszawa: WFiS UW), p. 61-183. 243 Adam Mielczarek over the country, were a very important aspect of these contacts. What seems most signiicant, though, was the existence of networks of people with mature opposition atitudes, who were also highly respected in their environments and ready to establish new cells of the Union locally. In this respect Maryjane Osa 26 is perfectly right when she speaks about the key role of oppositional networks in the establishment of Solidarity. he network of potential activists and potential information channels able to reach them (using lealets or by means of, for example, Radio Free Europe) made it easier to organize struc- tures locally. But this was only a catalyst, and the force that pushed Solidarity was the pre-existing social tension, and the idea: this organizational solution, which seemed to be a new way worth trying when atempting to solve problems previously insoluble. Diversity his work avoids specifying the aims of emerging trade union organizations, because these were simply diferent in diferent environments. he idea of trade unions is treated as a practical legal formula, and not ideology. For that reason the participants in the Polacy 80’ research – conducted to investigate work relations in several workplaces in Masovia in the summer and autumn of 1980 – had diferent diagnoses of the situation and diferent aims. Diferences between the interpretations of Marody 27 and Krzemiński 28 may, in the opin- ion of the author of this work, be atributed to the fact that the research was 26 M. Osa, Solidarity and Contention.; M. Osa, “Sieci opozycji w PRL,” in Dynamika życia społecznego. Współczesne koncepcje ruchów społecznych, ed. K. Gorlach, P.H. Mooney (Warszawa: Scholar, 2008), p. 214-246. 27 M. Marody z zespołem, Polacy 80. 28 I. Krzemiński, “Proces formowania się NSZZ Solidarność,” in Polacy – Jesień’ 80, ed. I. Krzemiński z zespołem, Polacy – Jesień’ 80. 244  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory conducted in the early phase of the formation of Solidarity, and the researchers were able to grasp particular discourses of its participants before they became relatively uniied. In qualitative research the above-mentioned researchers heard diverse narratives, and treating any of them as dominant was by no means obvious, but was a result of the researcher’s individual interests: in the case of Mirosława Marody, workers imprisoned in the language of oicial propagan- da, and in the case of Ireneusz Krzemiński, ordinary activists involved in the movement. here were many more variations, resulting from age, education, regional diferences or branches of industry, but everyone could feel at home in the neutral formula of trade unions, and negotiations concerning the common identity of the movement were to last endlessly. he social movement of Solidarity connected many of its participants with strong emotional ties, and it happened because each person to some extent could have their own Solidarity, form their own goals in its name and believe that they were shared by other members of the movement. he observation that most of authors researching Solidarity made was accurate: that the main factor building the identity of the movement was the binary opposition of us-versus-them, with the later being the morally compromised authorities. here has never been a uniied program shared by all members or a single idea which could be codiied, because, even if we recognize the importance of the resolutions of the First Convention of the Union, these were only documents, and not records of a collective state of mind. he political history of the move- ment was rather turbulent, and the questions that its participants had to face were changing quickly, which was well recorded in the report of Touraine’s research 29 and which other authors also acknowledge. 30 29 A. Touraine, Solidarność. 30 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja.; D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti- Politics.; S. Kowalski, Krytyka solidarnościowego rozumu. 245 Adam Mielczarek his experience was described by authors who mainly dealt with activists of the basic rank 31 but also in later interpretations, which see Solidarity as a com- munity devoid of a political program, which created such strong binds between its members as communities of irst Christians 32 as well as of republicans. 33 he unions seem to be an ethical community based on internal transformation, which Poles experienced ater the August Accords – of people overcoming fear and taking responsibility for building a common good, regardless of adverse circumstances. Signiicantly, the Union was perceived as an autotelic value, and the right arena for realizing the good which it carried. It was not a tool to aid (the impossible) systemic transformation of the state, or a card in some kind of a political game, but it was this speciic achievement, won by rebellious workers, inside which and throughout which its participants were to regain freedom and dignity. 34 his way of thinking about Solidarity remains in opposition to those anal- yses which begin with the question about political perspectives of the move- 31 I. Krzemiński, “Proces formowania się NSZZ Solidarność,” and in Polacy – Jesień’ 80, ed. I. Krzemiński z zespołem.; G. Bakuniak, “My Solidarność – nowy związek we własnych oczach,” in Polacy – jesień 80, ed. I. Krzemiński z zespołem, p. 185-212; A. Touraine, Solidarność. 32 D. Karłowicz, “Solidarność jako Kościół” in Lekcja Sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidarności” po dwudziestu latach, ed. Dariusz Gawin (Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 2002), p. 39-61; Z. Stawrowski, “Doświadczenie Solidarności jako wspólnoty etycznej,” in Lekcja Sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidarności” po dwudziestu latach, ed. D. Gawin (Warszawa: IFiS PAN 2002), p. 103-122. 33 P. Śpiewak, “Alexis de Tocqueville i Hannah Arendt o Solidarności,” Res Publica 5 (1987), p. 83-88; D. Gawin, “Solidarność – republikańska rewolucja Polaków” in Lekcja Sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidarności” po dwudziestu latach, ed. Dariusz Gawin (Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 2002), p. 161-188; E. Ciżewska, Filozoia publiczna Solidarności. Solidarność 1980-1981 z perspektywy republikańskiej tradycji politycznej (Warszawa: Narodowe Centrum Kultury, 2010). 34 A. Mielczarek, “Solidarność jako ojczyzna,” Res Publica 2 (1989), p. 7-12; I. Krzemiński, Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji (Warszawa: Oicyna Naukowa, 1997); E. Matynia, “he Lost Treasure of Solidarity.” 246  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory ment, 35 where the union and the movement are not treated as a value in itself, but as a means of exerting pressure on the government and a tool of political negotiations. In the quoted writings the most beneicial outcome, which was indicated as the goal of a potential agreement with the Party, was a corporat- ist solution where the leaders of Solidarity could become partners with the Government as representatives of some group of interest – most probably, of workers – in exchange for the Party gaining control over the movement and limiting its demands. Ost, 36 who analyzed such a possibility in most detail, admited that it had never become an oicial project of the leadership of the Union, but he identi- ied a ‘pragmatic’ wing of its leaders and advisers as a subject which could and should force such a stance and who came close to such a solution. At the same time he realized that such a solution would be very diicult to defend in front of ordinary members and that it contradicted the core ideas that were a frame- work unifying the whole of the movement. Regardless of political connotations connected with two outlined ways of thinking, it is worth noticing that they overlap with the perspectives of social movements discussed at the beginning of this work. One of them speaks about a grass-roots movement, which is an arena of self-expression and a ield of self-fulillment of its participants, while the other sees the movement from the perspective of its managers, for whom activating the participants to act is a tool in reaching goals unconnected with the movement itself. Each of these perspectives touches upon important aspects of Solidarity, which had to coexist and at diferent points in time played a key role in the shaping of the movement. 35 D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics.; Z. Pełczyński, Polska droga od komunizmu. Releksje nad historią i polityką 1956-2006 (Warszawa: Scholar, 2007). 36 D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics. 247 Adam Mielczarek he top-down aspect of the movement connected with this second perspec- tive was also visible in the Solidarity of the period 1980-1981, and its importance grew because the importance of nation-level structures and centralization of decisions regarding the Union’s policies grew. he structure of conlict with the Party-state caused the Union authorities to oten force regional cells to setle conlicts and limit their demands, regardless of their legitimacy in the name of their own politics. 37 According to Staniszkis, the breakthrough date for the development of Solidarity was the Warsaw setlement on March 23, 1981, which was a symbolic turning point from the phase of ‘cultural revolution,’ during which Solidarity – a movement of workers – was a tool which disrupted the hierarchy, to the point where expressive functions of the movement were again entirely regained by – as she calls it – the middle class. his caused a lasting demobilization of the movement in workplaces. From a temporal perspec- tive one may assume that one of consequences of this fact was the inability of Solidarity to respond to the state of Martial Law. Undoubtedly then, with the increase in its political role, the importance to the central authorities of the Union as a social movement organization grew, as the authorities were controlling how and where its resources were allocated. he dynamics of po- litical control over the movement remained in conlict with the dynamics of grass-roots articulation of social aspirations. The State of Martial Law he imposition of Martial Law was a very spectacular act of terminating a certain political opportunity external to the movement, which was a result of previous weaknesses, divisions and indecisiveness among Polish communists – ruling 37 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja.; D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti- Politics. 248  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory Polish United Workers’ Party. Turning back to state terror, the authorities rein- stated fear as a tool for efective control over citizens and eliminated the most important tools and ields where the movement had functioned with relative freedom for the past sixteen months. While within this period of time the formula of trade unions was a certain way of articulation of social discontent under the conditions of real socialism, on the day of December 13, 1981 this way was declared invalid, and the system was again sealed. his act did not remove the existing social tension, because it did not solve any of the problems that caused this tension. Neither was it able to destroy all the capital of social relations and activities that were initiated during the legal operation of Solidarity. In spite of all that, the opposition did not ind a new way of dealing with the system when it openly resorted to violence. It used tools which were prescribed by the national tradition, which were, of course, modiied to some extent under the inluence of the experiences of being the opposition in the Peoples’ Republic, such as the ritual of national mourning and conspiracy. his conspiracy was not connected with any realistic political ideas. Al- though some opposition leaders did with time become theoreticians of con- spiracy, their works were not necessary for the formation of the movement; grass-roots activities took place independently of the exhortations of leaders, and oten preceded them. Again, the formation of underground Solidarity did not need external motivation. Even though over 5 000 leaders of the opposi- tion were interned in the irst days under Martial Law, 38 there were enough second-level activists to immediately begin creating clandestine structures under the banners of Solidarity all over the country. Regional and local illegal union councils, underground printing presses, cultural events, diverse parties 38 G. Majchrzak, Obóz władzy w stanie wojennym, in Droga do niepodległości. Solidarność 1980-2005, ed. A. Borowski (Warszawa: Volumen, 2005), p. 107-135. 249 Adam Mielczarek and organizations and protest groups existing in all major cities, and oten in minor ones, as well as in workplaces or schools were again mainly based on grass-roots activities. hey were a way of expressing the determination and despair of many, for whom Solidarity was the embodiment of hope for change. Just like before the formula of a trade union, now the formula of conspiracy, deeply rooted in cultural tradition, shaped further operation of the movement. his obviously limited its reach: in the conditions of open terror, there were few who opted for direct involvement. here were enough of them, however, and the moral support they received was enough for the movement to maintain its nationwide character. he movement, though, underwent a transformation to a loose coalition of independent structures, brought together by symbols and a clearly deined enemy. hese structures could not maintain regular contact and the possibility to negotiate their common identity. However, the national and Solidarity symbols which uniied the opposition also masked the difer- ences resulting from the diversity of circles involved and political programs that remained theoretical. Together with the symbols of Solidarity, prominent leaders of the movement maintained their authority, oten regardless of whether they engaged in political activity ater December 1981. he movement again entered a phase of domination of grass-roots activi- ty, which relects what has already been said: it was diicult to name its true political aims and strategy. What came to the front was again the autotelic dimension – the survival of the movement seen as a domain independent of the state and a place to express social discontent. he underground Solidarity maintained some central institutions, which were very important for cultivat- ing a common identity. hese were both political centers of the movement like the Temporary Coordination Commitee, as well as media, including widely available underground printed materials and national branches of foreign radio stations, mainly Radio Free Europe. All of the above made investments in maintain this unifying tradition of Solidarity and its symbols, rightly seeing 250  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory it as the crucial capital of opposition. In spite of this capital, the role of central institutions in the movement remained igurative, as the politicians of the op- position were not able to suggest any innovative formula of operation, which would be a new way to overcome the limits set by the system. If such formulas did appear, they had local and grass-roots character, like the Orange Alternative (Pomarańczowa Alternatywa), Peace and Freedom (Wolność i pokój), and the movement of economic enterprises. 39 In general, in a situation where political possibilities had dried up, all ideas concerning activity were the result of the invention of activists that were directly involved in them. hese local initiatives operating on their own, although they invoked common symbols, created on the local level diverse interpretative frameworks of their activities. hey did follow the us-versus-them patern, but these frameworks were hardly a subject of negotiations and setlements among diferent trends connected with the tradition of Solidarity. In spite of obvious weaknesses, over a period of seven years from the im- position of Martial Law the opposition managed to maintain considerable mobilization potential throughout the country. he culture and political dis- course of the opposition clearly remained more atractive than those of the authorities, and it was maintained by a network of activists that were more numerous, more experienced and beter rooted in local communities than at the beginning of the decade. hanks to this fact, on the threshold of the new political possibilities of the 1980s, the opposition possessed a lot of resourc- es which the pre-August 1980 opposition lacked. It was well-rooted in local communities all over the country, relatively well-structured, and it had a clear and recognizable identity and an array of well-known leaders on the national level. At the same time, it reminded deeply apolitical and non-ideological. Its 39 P. Kenney, Rewolucyjny karnawał. Europa środkowa 1989 (Wrocław: Kolegium Europy Wschodniej, 2005) – Polish translation of A Carnival of Revolution. Central Europe 1989, 2002. 251 Adam Mielczarek activists recreated certain cultural paterns, and were concerned about the survival of the oppositional community, but the movement had neither clear political aims nor speciied leaders. he existing resources were waiting to be managed by leaders able to propose a new and efective formula of operation. The Breakthrough of the Round Table he breakthrough that changed the political situation was the emergence of an ofer to negotiate a merger of the opposition and the institutional system of the communist Poland. his ofer, directed by the authorities to the political elite of the movement, naturally animated the movement’s dynamics. he shape of the political opportunity structure prejudged that at this decisive moment the resources of low and mid-range activists lost their importance for the sake of the resources of political leaders, which weighed more on the future of the movement. hese resources were on the one hand the ability to negotiate with the authorities and on the other, the trust of all those sympathizing with the movement and the ability to control their actions. It is worth noticing that it was far from obvious who should be established as the management of the movement. Politicians aspiring to be political lead- ers still had to persuade their supporters. Ordinary activists of the movement, whether they wanted it or not, were faced with a choice – to accept political negotiations as a potential way to change the system and support the dealings of the Round Table or to lie in wait, to see whether the proposal was a trap set by the authorities or a sign of their weakness. 40 he majority was won over by those who wanted to accept this challenge. Research conducted among opposition activists showed that in 1989 80 per cent of them supported the setlements of the Round Table. Curiously, even the activists that were ideologically against 40 A. Dudek, Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej 1989-2001 (Kraków: Arkana, 2004). 252  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory those setlements seemed to support them in practice, and worked at preparing the June elections just like everyone else. 41 he outburst of faith in the possibility of a systemic change caused the cells of the movement, which were thus far autonomous and built from the botom up, to be transformed into tools for realizing tasks set by politicians. At this time the structure of the underground movement, loose, informal and ideology-free, also proved to be lexible and universal. Activists who had been engaged in its diverse structures loyally obeyed a new political idea. All the resources which had been generated for years were now given to the common cause – the organization of an election campaign and winning the half-free elections whose possibility was negotiated at the Round Table. his new way was certainly tightly connected to a certain formula speciied by a form of organization – in the loosest sense of the word – under which the activists were now to operate. his formula included both the possibilities and limitations of its future growth. In the year 1980 this was a formula of trade unions, which was responsible for its many historically signiicant aspects, and contributed to maintaining harmony between its botom-up and top-down dynamics. Under Martial Law it was a formula of conspiracy, which mainly concentrated on printing activities and was based on grass-roots actions. In 1989 it was a formula of election commitees, organized on grass-roots levels as well, but at the same time strictly subordinate to political leadership. his new solution was supported by a irm and atractive prognostic frame – granting the opposition (including the independent trade union Solidarity) a le- gal status, and even incorporating its representation into the Parliament. With time this frame became even more atractive, as creating a government by the former opposition and conducting a system change became a real possibili- 41 A. Mielczarek, Śpiący rycerze. Szeregowi działacze warszawskiego podziemia wydawniczego lat osiemdziesiątych (Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Wolnego Słowa, 2006), also conirmed by yet unpublished data from my research in Siedlce and Rzeszów. 253 Adam Mielczarek ty. his possibility legitimized the new formula of operation as well as new leadership bodies of the movement. Leaders, who had signiicant resources of public trust and being given a real chance to seize political power, quickly started using them to implement their own idea of reforms, which suddenly materialized. his idea of reforms was in need of social discussion, but the leaders did not intend to undertake such a process. Just as ater the Bydgoszcz crisis in 1981, again the expressive functions of the movement were taken over by – to use the term of Staniszkis 42 – the middle class, or even by a very clearly deined political option presented by a group of politicians of the opposition, who sat at the Round Table during an unprece- dented centralization of the movement under entirely new conditions. Unlike in 1981, the present formula, involving access to state media and press networks, gave the political winners a huge advantage over the competition and to a large extent put all the movement cells in a fully dependent position. When the possibility of a huge political change on a central level dawned, the pressure exerted on all locally-voiced demands to be silenced was much stronger than in 1981. he movement now lacked eicient institutional tools to undertake local activities on its own. he Civic Commitee of Lech Wałęsa, or rather its informal political leadership, on an almost day-to-day basis, seized the previ- ously non-existent function of the central social movement organization, which was able to formulate new interpretative frames of the movement. he elites which emerged during the Round Table seized the control over the movement’s resources and formulated its political goals, without seeing the need to negotiate them with other movements, which they now saw as competitors. hese elites, who set political goals for themselves, largely ig- nored Solidarity’s cultural functions of overcoming institutional obstacles and self-expression. Solidarity, in its aspect described by the theory of new 42 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja. 254  Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory social movements, was a movement opposing the world of controlling state institutions and the alienation that this phenomenon wrought upon the indi- vidual. But at its moment of triumph its new leaders put all their eforts into maintaining this control and retaining many of the old institutional ways. Moreover, the non-negotiable economic solutions adopted were to deepen this alienation, fossilizing economic inequalities. he leaders of transforma- tion, who originated from Solidarity, did not understand the cultural needs of their own background and thought of them as unimportant, or saw their open expression as a potential threat. he tragedy of Solidarity during the breakthrough period, which became the reason for a permanent dissolution of the movement, was that the shape of the political reality at that time did not force the leaders to compromise. No longer in need of any assistance from their background activists, they were in favor of a gradual disintegration of this background. he hegemony that the elites gained was not only structural, or resulting from their privileged access to media or material assets, but it was a direct result of the weakness of their opponents from the movement, who were not able to propose any other convincing ideas. Although very violent conlicts appeared within the move- ment, none of the sides could ofer a formula which would carry the cultural and freedom-oriented dimension of Solidarity. All in all, in spite of a political victory, the tradition of Solidarity sufered a cultural loss, as it was not able to fulill its destiny. Theory of Social Movements and Solidarity Maryjane Osa, quoted at the beginning of this article, observes that a social movement cannot be seen as a simple sum of events, speeches or protests. A social movement creates a culture which uniies very diverse social subjects, brought together by a community of interpretative frames. his framework 255 Adam Mielczarek is a result of interaction between leaders who try to direct the activities of the movement and very diverse groups of individuals ready to participate. Alberto Melucci 43 points out that this framework is far from stable, and it is based on constant negotiations between all the subjects involved. he example of Soli- darity shows that this culture may be a lasting one, and that a common identity may unite people in changing external conditions, and the very movement may be changing its form, range and modes of functioning at the same time. he author of this article believes that today, when it can deinitely be said that the movement of Solidarity has long ago disintegrated, the traditions that it created keep inluencing the shape of political culture and the social life of this country. It is enough to say that over twenty years ater the systemic change, the relation to the heritage of Solidarity still marks political divisions and remains an element of election campaigns. It seems that the theoretical framework, which is needed today to describe Solidarity, must enable us to speak about its former unity and later decay. It should envisage the inner changeability of the movement and the factors that inluenced it. It appears that this paper’s interpretation of internal changes in the movement shows that it can be done with the apparatus of theory of contemporary social movements. It also serves as proof that the approaches assumed here do not need to be seen as competing. On the contrary, they ex- plain two parallel aspects of social movements, two opposing dynamics, which, depending on circumstances, may play a lesser or greater role in managing the activities of the movement. Translated by Anna Sekułowicz 43 A. Melucci, he Nomads of the Present. 256  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė Free from The Soviet Regime: Self- subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania 1 More than twenty years ater the collapse of the communist regime, the nature of Soviet and socialist societies remains puzzling. On the one hand, they are characterized by atomization, individualistic opportunism, and a fear of social ties and/or instrumental sociability formed from above. 2 On the other hand, these societies were celebrated for their extraordinary solidarity and civic activism in the late 1980s. Ater the glorious victory of civil society against the regime, however, the current post-communist societies sufer from social, political and economic maladies, such as corruption, distrust, and the per- sistence of nomenclature ties, all of which can be traced back to the nature of communist society. herefore, to uncover the principles of the functioning of the regime and society in the Soviet system is not a task for historians only. It is also a task for sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists, in trying to grasp the principles of functioning of the current society and to investigate unwriten social norms shaping social behavior. In Lithuanian public and academic debates, an empirical question about the functioning of society in Soviet times is usually transformed into a normative question about collaboration and resistance. Who opposed the totalitarian regime, and who deserves the name of collaborators? How does one deine 1 his research was funded by the European Social Fund under the Global Grant measure, project “Invisible society of Soviet-era Lithuania: the revision of distinction between systemic and non-systemic social networks,” no. VP1-3.1-ŠMM-07-K-02-053. 2 H. Arendt, he Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1979); B. Volker and H. Flap, “Weak Ties as a Liability. he Case of East Germany,” Rationality and Society 13(4) (2001), p. 397-428. 257 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė opposition to the totalitarian regime? Where is the dividing line between resistance and conformism, between conformism and collaboration? hese questions inspire continuous intense disputes among Lithuanian scholars representing diferent ideological positions and diferent theoretical inter- pretations of the Soviet past. he debates, however, fail to give answers to simple questions, such as how were diferent stances towards the Soviet regime translated into political action and where was the seedbed of mass political mobilization against the regime in 1988? he rigorous divide between resistance and collaboration made by Kęstutis Girnius and others ofers clear guidelines for those seeking normative criteria of moral evaluation of individual positions towards the regime. 3 According to this stance, only an explicit anti-system position combined with public action (acting against the regime and/or open support for this kind of action) can be regarded as resistance. 4 While this approach is very sound, it cannot explain the puzzle of the mass revolution in 1988. he extent of overt resistance in Lithuania was very small; moreover, the contentious mass movement was, surprisingly, not borne within the circle of dissidents. Another line of argument extends the concept of resistance to ‘invisible,’ ‘silent,’ or ‘passive’ forms of opposition to the regime. Diferent versions of this approach describe diferent strategies enabling actors to inhibit the func- tioning of the communist regime without making critical sacriices of one’s life, freedom or career. hese conformist strategies could range from Aeso- 3 K. Girnius, “Pasipriešinimas, prisitaikymas, kolaboravimas,” Naujasis židinys 5 (1996), p. 268-279. 4 K. Girnius, “Pasipriešinimas,”; N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga: prisitaikymas ir pasipriešinimas Sovietų Lietuvoje (Vilnius: Aidai, 2007); A. Streikus, “Lietuvos katalikų pilietinio aktyvumo pavyzdžiai ir ribos XX amžiuje,” Naujasis Židinys, 1 (2014); M. Jurkutė and N. Šepetys, ed., Democracy in Lithuania: Civil Spirit versus Totalitarianism at the Deining Moments of the Twentieth Century (Vilnius: Naujasis Židinys–Aidai, 2011). 258  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania pian language used by artists to the strategies of nomenclature of extracting resources from Moscow for local investments. 5 hey resulted in forming a ‘double consciousness’ of individuals widely documented in memoirs of in- tellectuals of the Soviet era and strikingly described in a prominent book by Alexey Yurchak. 6 While this approach provides a realistic view of sovietized societies, it obliterates the line between pro-system and anti-system actions and cannot explain how this so called ‘double consciousness’ could encourage political action against the system. In fact, the revolution of 1988-1989 in Central and Eastern Europe and in the three Baltic States continues to bewilder researchers in the West as well as in post-communist countries themselves, as it is not compatible with dominant understandings of socialist societies. While some accounts demonstrated the possibility of the collapse of the communist system, none of the three dominant paradigms of sovietology – totalitarianism, revisionism and post-revisionism – is able to explain the extraordinary mobilizing power of these societies in 1988. his article presents an alternative approach to the society of Soviet Lithua- nia, applied in the recent atempt to explain the roots of Sąjūdis (the Lithuanian civic movement of 1988-1989) 7 and in the ongoing research of informal social 5 E. Klivis, “Ardomasis prisitaikymas: cenzūra ir pasipriešinimo jai būdai sovietinio laikotarpio Lietuvos teatre,” Menotyra vol. 17 no. 2 (2010); E. Baliutytė, “Tyliosios rezistencijos metafora ir prisitaikymo strategijos sovietmečio literatūros kritikoje,” Colloquia 19 (2007), p. 58-79; V. Klumbys, “Lietuvos kultūrinio elito elgsenos modeliai sovietmečiu.” (PhD diss., Vilnius University 2009). 6 A. Yurchak, “Soviet Hegemony of Form: Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 45(3) (2003). 7 he results of the research were published in: J. Kavaliauskaitė and A. Ramonaitė, ed. Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant: nepaklusniųjų tinklaveikos galia (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 2011), p. 439. 259 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė networks in late Soviet Lithuania. 8 he research uses the sociological approach to collective action applying the social network perspective, which enables one to explain the causal mechanisms of social processes. his perspective allowed us to shit the focus from the question of the moral stance of an indi- vidual to the social mechanisms of building alternative social structure able to withstand the power of the regime. his resulted in the theoretical concept of self-subsistent (in Lithuanian savaimi) society, compatible and comparable with the concepts of the political thought of anti-communist activists in Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. his article presents the concept of self-subsistent society and explores its use in the analysis of Lithuanian society in the Soviet era. In the irst part of the chapter, the concept is deined and situated in the similar conceptual de- bates in Central and Eastern European countries. he second part provides an overview of empirical manifestations of the self-subsistent society in Soviet Lithuania. Finally, the third part discusses the advantages of this approach in the context of three main paradigms of sovietology: totalitarianism, revision- ism and post-revisionism. The Concept of Self-subsistent Society he debates in Lithuanian public and intellectual spheres on resistance and collaboration generating new and increasingly more complicated classiica- tions, surprisingly enough, completely ignore the political thought born in Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary during the socialist era. his political thought addresses a similar issue of resistance to a totalitarian regime but ofers slightly diferent highlights. Here a major criterion of eval- 8 Reseach grant for the project “Invisible society of Soviet-era Lithuania: the revision of distinction between systemic and non-systemic social networks.” (Nr. VP1-3.1-ŠMM- 07-K-02-053). 260  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania uation is not the degree of personal, individual resistance to the system, but the potential and ability of the community to establish a viable alternative to the totalitarian order. he idea of self-organization of society as a means of destroying the (post) totalitarian regime was indeed common for the political thought of opposition in socialist Central and Eastern Europe. heoreticians of opposition in Poland (Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuroń, Leszek Kołakowski) indicated the development of an autonomous, independent society as the goal of resistance, rather than the destruction of the system itself. Totalitarianism is a system that under- mines any form of autonomous social life and absorbs all social relations into the state; 9 therefore, self-organized society as an opposition to the state order became the ultimate goal of the Polish opposition. hey purposefully reject- ed the strategy of violent revolutionary action and the interest in state power, recognizing the futility of replacing one absolute state power with another. Instead they advocated the separation of spheres between state and society. 10 A normative vision of Solidarity was to establish a democratically organized self-governing society, conining state structures to military, police and for- eign policy functions and relegating the Communist party to an insigniicant position. 11 he notion of civil society embodied this vision well to become the axis of the political theorizing of the Polish opposition. 12 9 J. L. Cohen and A. Arato, Civil Society and Political heory (Boston: he MIT Press, 1994). 10 G. Baker, Civil Society and Democratic heory: Alternative Voices (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 18. 11 G. Skilling, Samizdat and Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989), p. 159. 12 M. Osa, “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organisations hrough Activists in the Polish Peoples‘s Republic,” in Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action ed. M. Diani and D. McAdam (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003). 261 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė A similar discussion on the goals and means of resistance to communist regimes was taking place among the intellectual leaders of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. However, having fewer chances to create a real political alternative, the leaders of the opposition there focused instead on moral and cultural op- position to the regime. As Václav Havel claims is his famous essay he Power of the Powerless, ‘the original and most important sphere of activity, one that predetermines all the others, is simply an atempt to create and support the independent life of society as an articulated expression of living within the truth.’ 13 According to Ivan M. Jirous, a member of the psychedelic rock band ‘he Plastic People of the Universe’ and one of leaders of the Czechoslovakian underground during the socialist era, these self-managed spaces of ‘living in truth’ may not lead open political combat against the regime. heir very existence, vitality and inner complexity, however, consciously or not, erodes the monolith of (post)totalitarian order. 14 As Milan Šimečka claims, ‘all in- dependent activity, without necessarily publicly manifesting it or even being aware of it, is atempting to create a kind of substitute plurality.’ 15 In Czechoslovakia, at the beginning such state-independent activities were called ‘independent initiatives of citizens,’ later on, however, the notions of a ‘parallel society,’ an ‘alternative society’ or the ‘second culture’ entered into use and were applied interchangeably. Members of Charter 77 actively reacted to the idea of a ‘parallel polis,’ proposed by Czech dissident Václav 13 V. Havel, he Power of the Powerless, available online at: <htp://vaclavhavel.cz/ showtrans.php?cat=clanky&val=72_aj_clanky.html&typ=HTML> 14 V. Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe: An Inquiry,” Social Research, 55 no. 1-2 (1988), p. 225. 15 M. Šimečka in: V. Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe,” p. 225. 262  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania Benda in 1978. 16 His idea highlighted the need for the institutionalization of independent societal initiatives. Benda called for the establishment of economic institutions, a cultural and educational system as well as a public sphere, par- allel to the oicial system, and thus to create a genuine alternative society or a ‘parallel polis.’ Similar though more elaborate ideas came from the Hungarian theoretician Elemer Hankiss, who generated a model of the ‘second society,’ an alternative social system with the following core sectors – the second economy, the second public sphere, the second culture, the second social consciousness and the second arena of socio-political interactions. 17 In Lithuania, the oppositional political thought was not as developed as in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It is most likely that activists of the Lithuanian underground did not know the concepts developed by the dissi- dents of Central Eastern Europe, and did not use those concepts to relect their own state of existence (this fact should not come as a surprise because, in the words of Vilma Visiliauskaitė, Lithuanian underground publishers were not familiar with the samizdat periodicals of Central Eastern Europe 18). However, their experiences and methods of resistance were very alike. KGB archival documentation proves that Lithuania, similarly to other communist states, had grassroots initiatives, youth subcultures, informal gatherings of artists and scholars, arising ‘from below’ and not subjected to governmental control. Lith- uanian publications of samizdat contain arguments echoing the ideas of Havel and Jirous. For example, the underground publication Pastogė ofers a simple answer to the question of how artists can defeat their own unconscious inner 16 V. Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe.” 17 E. Hankiss, “he ‘Second Society’: Is here an Alternative Social Model Emerging in Contemporary Hungary?” Social Research t. 55, nr. 1-2 (1988), p. 13-42. 18 V. Vasiliauskaitė, Lietuvos ir Vidurio Rytų Europos šalių periodinė savilaida (1972-1989) (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2006), p. 14. 263 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė censor. It suggests listening to one’s personal conscience and publishing one’s own works in the free samizdat press. 19 In other words, the publication calls for the establishment of a parallel public sphere based on diferent principles and dedicated to individuals ‘living in truth.’ he idea that the establishment of a state-independent communality equals the resistance to the totalitarian ambition of the regime, is nicely grasped by Nerija Putinaitė some twenty years ater the collapse of the Soviet order: ‘he resistance meant taking part in some alternative social structure, even if it did not enter an eyeball to eyeball confrontation with the structures of social life.’ 20 In her words, only by the development of alternative forms of ‘diferent’ sociability, subcommunities, and subcultures, can one overcome the ambiva- lence of life, moulding ‘islands of normal communication in the Soviet totality.’ However, this idea remains underdeveloped in her works, and the ‘forms of diferent sociability’ are neither deined nor listed. What Lithuanian notion could be used to embody and conceptualize the aforementioned idea? Can we follow the tradition of the Polish oppositional thought and give the phenomenon of independent society the title of civil society? On the one hand, the political thought of the Polish Solidarity that galvanized the return of a notion of civil society into the modern discourse of Western phi- losophy, along with the present usage of the term in works of political science in the West (e.g., Robert Putnam 21) seem to make such a match possible and 19 A. Patackas, Pastogės Lietuva: Pogrindžio, Sąjūdžio ir Laisvės Kronika (Vilnius: Aidai, 2011), p. 383. 20 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 276. 21 R. Putnam, Kad demkratija veiktų (Vilnius: Margi raštai, 2001) – Lithuanian translation of R. Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy; R. Putnam, Bowling Alone: he Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 264  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania reasonable. On the other hand, the notion of civil society, deined in this way, clashes with the dominant meaning of the concept in the Lithuanian discourse. In Lithuania, twenty years were not enough for the concept of civil society to gain a clear, deined and stable meaning either in the political life or intellec- tual discourse. In principle this is a result not only of maladies or weaknesses of political practice or of civil society but of other objective reasons. First, the relationship between state and society, between civil society and politics, is a relatively old and complicated issue of normative political theory with no simple solution. Second, over the decades the concept of civil society has gained a multitude of new meanings and connotations, thus doubts have arisen regarding its potential to describe the political transformation in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the twentieth century. 22 Moreover, there is no clear-cut distinction between civil society and so-called civic-ness (pilietiškumas) in the Lithuanian language. Finally, modern discourses on civil society and democratization are intertwined and based on a close mutual relationship. 23 herefore any atempt to talk about civil society under the Soviet (undemo- cratic) regime may appear to lack a conceptual validity. In order to name some phenomenon of societal self-organization under the communist regime as the manifestation of civil society, that phenomenon must have been independent vis-à-vis the communist state – established without the interference of state forces and devoid of ideological goals of the regime but also aimed at the continuous common life in its own political community and the defense of its interests against the oicial political power. A number of societal communalities (religious and spiritual movements, hippies, punks, the rock scene, practitioners of Eastern martial arts, etc.) not tolerated by the 22 K. Kumar, “Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term,” he British Journal of Sociology 44, 3 (1993), p. 375-395. 23 E. Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994). 265 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė Soviet regime and held malicious or even dangerous, are, however, rarely men- tioned in intellectual debates on civil society. hese informal societal spaces were not political indeed in terms of the aforementioned deinition because they neither nurtured a comprehensive vision of common life, nor were they aimed at political self-government (e.g. alternative hobby clubs), or because their vision of a common lifeworld stretched beyond the limits of a modern nation state or any other political constellation (e.g. a spiritual cosmopolitan hippie community). For a variety of societal formations that misited and opposed the (post) totalitarian Soviet regime, a name was coined in Lithuanian that has no direct equivalents in other languages. Savaimi visuomenė can be approximately trans- lated as a ‘self-subsistent society,’ although at the same time the old Lithuanian adjective savaimus means ‘free,’ ‘non-coercive.’ 24 his notion encompasses forms of alternative societal self-organization and management, mushrooming from below and embodying an endeavor to live on one’s own, in one’s own manner and according to one’s own will (savaip), in spite of the pressure and demands of the ideological institutionalized state system. Savaimi also has connotations of ‘self-(re)produced’ or ‘self-born’ because such an alternative society exists distancing itself from the (totalitarian) state. Self-organization is the mani- festation and the result of the inner vitality of the alternative society that may not necessarily translate into a political project. his is not a civil society in the traditional sense because it bears no compulsory binding relationship with the state and merely seeks to distance itself from state prohibitions and lead its own life according to its own will and vision in cultural and social milieus. he concept of the self-subsistent society ofers a diferent approach to resistance, conformity and collaboration in the Soviet era, if compared to well-established and dominant approaches in today’s scholarly debates of Lith- 24 Lietuvių kalbos žodynas (t. I-XX, 1941-2002), electronic version, I issue, 2005, www.lkz.lt 266  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania uanian historians and philosophers. It oversteps the ineicient opposition of individual resistance vs. collaboration and shits atention to social ‘islands of freedom’ generating alternative discourses and alternative social values, and, thus, breaking ground for the emergence of the Sąjūdis movement in 1988. ‘Islands of Freedom’ in Soviet Lithuania: the Realms of Self-subsistent Society Acknowledging the importance of autonomous life under the Soviet regime, where should we look for its manifestations in Lithuania? Sparse investigations of alternative sociability in communist states so far reveal that independent activities in (post)totalitarian regimes might appear in diferent and oten unsuspected setings. In Czechoslovakia oppositional networks lourished in the cultural sphere, such as in theatre groups or underground music. 25 In Estonia the anti-system mood was cultivated in choral groups, folk ensembles, ethnographic study groups, Friends of Book Societies, English-language circles, beekeeping societies and horticultural groups. 26 he Catholic Church was an especially important ‘space of freedom’ in Poland, as was the Lutheran Church in the East Germany. 27 25 M. Skilling, Samizdat and Independent Society. 26 H. Johnston and C. Mueller, “Unobtrusive Practices of Contention in Leninist Regimes,” Sociological Perspectives 44 (3) (2001). 27 See e. g. Johnston and Mueller, “Unobtrusive Practices,”; H. Jonston, “Towards an explanation of Church Opposition to Authoritarian Regimes: Religio-Oppositional Subcultures in Poland and Catalonia,” Journal for the Scientiic Study of Religion, 28(4) (1989), p. 193-508; M. Osa, Solidarity and Contention.; A. Smolar, “Towards Self -Limiting Revolution: Poland, 1970-89,” in Civil Resistance and Power Politics: he Experience of Non-violent Action rom Gandhi to the Present ed. A. Roberts and T. Garton Ash (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009). 267 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė Our exploration of the Lithuanian society in Soviet times reveals numer- ous manifestations of the alternative society, varying by the degree of their societal autonomy from the (post)totalitarian state as well as the nature of their self-sustained activities and values. To illuminate the inner heterogeneity of the self-subsistent society, we use here the classiication of four realms: an overt oppositional realm, a conspiratorial underground realm, an informal non-systemic realm and a legal non-systemic realm. A short overview of in- dependent activities in these four realms should shed light on the character and complexity of the self-subsistent society and enable placing Lithuania into comparative contexts with other Soviet and socialist states. 28 One should start with dissidents’ organizations and the Catholic Church, commonly recognized as the main opponents of the Soviet regime in Lithu- ania. hey belong to the realm of overt opposition, distinct from underground resistance in terms of their public and uncompromising actions to discredit the communist regime. According to Arūnas Streikus, who analyzed the re- ligious policy of Soviet Lithuania in detail, the Catholic Church, which ‘used to have a dense network of religious and secular organizations […] was seen as a potentially powerful opponent of the regime, and the regime’s institutions were forced to devote much efort in order to decrease its inluence.’ 29 While the eforts to curtail the activities of the Church were partially successful, the regime was compelled to accept an organization maintaining submission to the Holy See rather than the Central Commitee of the Communist Party, and to grant it some freedom of action. In comparison with the Church, dissident organizations in Lithuania (e.g. the Lithuanian Helsinki Group, the Commitee for the Defence of the Rights 28 An in-depth account is presented in: J. Kavaliauskaitė and A. Ramonaitė, ed., Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, chapers 1-8. 29 A. Streikus, Sovietų valdžios antibažnytinė politika Lietuvoje (1944–1990) (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2008), p. 8. 268  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania of Believers, the Lithuanian League of Freedom) did not build a solid structure but remained rather informal networks of like-minded individuals and their groupings which would pool their eforts in peculiar political initiatives, such as public protest declarations and allegations addressed at state power or in- ternational institutions. 30 For example, the leader of the best-known dissident organization in Lithuania, the Lithuanian League of Freedom (Lietuvos Laisvės Lyga), Antanas Terleckas, cannot himself tell how many members the League had because the membership in the organization was only symbolic. 31 Due to an overt anti-communist opposition, members of dissident organizations were persecuted, imprisoned, forced to leave the Soviet Union or retreat to an underground resistance. he underground realm in Lithuania was composed of political organizations, non-political organizations and networks of samizdat. Political organizations are characterized by an openly anti-systemic stance, as well as complex orga- nization and a high degree of secrecy that prevents the assessment of the size and full network of these organizations. Small groupings were oten short-lived due to the intensive surveillance and exposure by the KGB. he primary goals of such organizations were deinitely political, aimed at disseminating various proclamations campaigning against the communist rule and imperialist power of the Soviet Union. A good example of a non-political underground organization is the move- ment of the Friends of the Eucharist. 32 While its aims were religious rather than 30 I. Puzaitė, “Pogrindinis komitetas tikinčiųjų teisėms ginti,“ Lietuvių katalikų mokslo akademijos metraštis 24 (2004); Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje aštuntame dešimtmetyje,“ Genocidas ir rezistencija 2(4) (1998). 31 Interview with Antanas Terleckas taken on April 13, 2011. 32 A. Ramonaitė, “Paralelinė visuomenės užuomazgos sovietinėje Lietuvoje: katalikiškojo pogrindžio ir etnokultūrinio sąjūdžio simbiozė,” in Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, p. 33-58. 269 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė political, participation in its activities were no less risky, so it had to use similar secretive tactics. Although severely persecuted, the movement prominently overshadowed the political organizations in the extent and endurance of its activities. An underground Priest Seminary is another manifestation of an underground organization related to the Catholic Church. It was launched in the early 1970s to countervail the eforts of the Soviet regime to curtail the activity of Kaunas Priest Seminary, the only legal priest seminary in Lithuania at the time. 33 Another interesting example of an underground organization is the Uni- versity of Antanas Strazdelis, active from 1976 to 1982. It is an embodiment of a ‘lying university’ similar to that in Poland and other socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Its members studied prohibited authors’ works, had lec- tures and tasks for personal home study, shared books of private libraries and practiced a humanist way of life. 34 While the university had around 30 students, only two of them inished the whole course of study and received diplomas, as participation in the activities of the university soon became too perilous. 35 Finally, publishing networks and circulation of samizdat might be distin- guished as a special type of underground network. 36 Sometimes periodical samizdat publications were published by dissident organizations (e.g. Vytis was the journal of the Lithuanian League of Freedom), but usually the publishers and 33 J. Boruta and A. Katilius, ed., Pogrindžio kunigų seminarija: XX a. aštuntojo ir devintojo dešimtmečio Lietuvos antisovietinio pogrindžio dokumentai (Vilnius: Lietuvių katalikų mokslų akademija, 2002). 34 Interview with Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis on December 1, 2010. 35 Interview of Arvydas Juozaitis with the Rector of the University Viktoras Kutorga, in: A. Juozaitis, Tarp žmonių, (Vilnius: Diena, 1993), p. 14-15. 36 For the analysis of samizdat networks in Lithaunia see: A. Ramonaitė, V. Klumbys and R. Kukulskytė, “Exploring vindicated clandestine networks: the functioning of samizdat in Soviet Lithuania.“ Paper presented at the 7 th ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, September 4-7, 2013. 270  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania contributors of the publications did not belong to any organization but formed an invisible community linked by strong ties of trust (e.g. Lietuvos Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika, 37 Rūpintojėlis, Perspektyvos, etc.). In addition to samizdat periodicals, the underground presses publishing books of prohibited authors should be mentioned, such as those of Gediminas Jakubčionis and Alfonsas Vinclovas and the secret printing house ‘ab’ near Kaunas which printed books of patriotic and religious content. 38 he informal non-systemic realm of independent society includes irst of all hippies, punks, rock and metal music fans, as well as the other so-called ‘informal’ youth of the Soviet decades. 39 hese (sub)cultural groupings and networks lacked deined organizations and were based on a vanguard of young people striving for personal freedom, self-expression and safe environments for open and meaningful communication, in contrast to oicial ideological organizations of Komsomol. hese cultural tastes and life-styles, contravening the image of decent ‘Soviet youth,’ were suppressed by the regime as undesirable. here were also those pioneers of jazz, big beat, and rock culture who were not allowed to perform in public and remained in private spaces on the fringes of the oicial life of youth (e.g. informal student festivities). he ethno-cultural movement in Lithuania – folklorists, hikers (žygeiviai), ethnographers (ramuviečiai) – belongs to the informal non-systemic realm as well, due to the fact that communal activities in private environments – gath- erings to sing in dormitories or at someone’s place, informal get-togethers 37 he Chronicle of the Catholic church in Lithuania, Englis translation, see: htp://lkbkronika.lt/en/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=347&Itemid=232 38 See a documentary Printer rom Underground by Algis Kuzmickas on the printing house ‘ab’ at <htp://vimeo.com/23605057> 39 J. Kavaliauskaitė, Ž. Mikailienė, “Vakarų palytėtųjų autonomija sovietmečiu: nuo hipių iki Roko maršų per Lietuvą,” in Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, p. 59-97. 271 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė for ritual events (e.g. Midsummer celebrations of Rasos in Kernavė), hiking in private groups – were widely practiced and sustained the vitality of the movement. he shared identity, moral norms (rules of sobriety, respect for the environment, etc.) and cultural symbols, rather than formal membership or institutions, united the insiders of the movement. 40 he informal non-systemic realm of alternative society in Lithuania also encompasses the semi-private ‘tea clubs’ of local intelligentsia. Living quar- ters of famous intellectuals and members of the cultural elite served as ‘free spaces’ 41 to exchange information, discuss art, culture, and politics, as well as share illegal and rare literature of pre-war Lithuanian, emigrant and foreign authors. According to Marcelijus Martinaitis, a poet and a host of such a sa- lon, participants in these exclusive circles were certain ‘academic dissidents’ whose intellectual endeavors trespassed oicially allowed limits of reasoning, discussion and knowledge. 42 One of the most prominent of such salons was the house of Vladas Vildžiūnas and his wife Marija Vildžiūnienė in Vilnius. Vladas Vildžiūnas was a talented sculptor unloved by the regime’s institutions for his uncom- promising atitudes. Marija Vildžiūnienė was a daughter of the general of pre- war Lithuania Kazys Ladiga. Ater Stefanija Ladigienė, the widow of Kazys Ladiga, returned from deportation in Siberia the house of Vildžiūnai became an important meeting place of old pre-war intelligentsia and young artists and 40 A. Ramonaitė, “Paralelinė visuomenės užuomazgos sovietinėje Lietuvoje: katalikiškojo pogrindžio ir etnokultūrinio sąjūdžio simbiozė,” p. 33-58. 41 F. Poleta, “Free Spaces in Collective Action,” heory and Society 28 (1999), p. 1-38. 42 M. Martinaitis, “Iki Sąjūdžio ir po jo. Atsakymai į Aurimo Šukio klausimus,” in Sąjūdis ateina iš toli (Vilnius: Margi raštai, 2008), p. 478. 272  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania other intellectuals of non-systemic atitudes, including Vytautas Landsbergis, the would-be leader of Sąjūdis. 43 Another example of informal academic circles was the circle of devotees of Vincas Mykolaitis Putinas, a famous Lithuanian poet (1893-1967). Founded by former Putinas’ scholars Meilė Lukšienė (a would-be member of Sąjūdis Initiative group), Irena Kostkevičiūtė and others in the 1950s while Putinas was still alive, the informal circle was an important network of Lithuanists and writers until the late 1980s. Meeting at least two times a year at Irena Kost- kevičiūtė’s house on Putinas’ birthday and on the anniversary of his death the circle fostered an oppositional identity and served as a social capital for some protest actions, including a successful one in 1977 opposing plans to build garages for nomenklatura in a culturally important site of Vilnius’ old town. 44 Still one more type of informal alternative space was the legendary Café Neringa in Vilnius. his was a public but informal meeting space for writers, scientists, musicians and other artists. Neringa started hosting jazz evenings in 1969. A famous GTC jazz trio (Ganelin, Čekasin and Tarasov) used to play there, and later it was an important stage for the young generation of Lithu- anian jazz performers. At the ‘professors’ table’ many prominent Lithuanian intellectuals used to discuss diferent topics quite openly, even though the discussions were apparently monitored by the KGB. Among famous visitors to the café were not only such Lithuanian poets as Putinas or the would-be dissident Tomas Venclova, but also such people as Josif Brodskij, Vladimir 43 Interview with Vladas and Marija Vildžiūnas on February 16, 2011; interview with Vytautas Landsbergis on February 23, 2011, Interview with Marcelijus Martinaitis on December 10, 2010. 44 V. Ivanauskas, “Tinklaveika mokslininkų aplinkoje: tarp oicialiųjų sovietmečio procesų ir alternatyvių pažiūrų,” in Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, p. 132-160; S. Kulevičius, “Per praeities palikimą į ateitį: visuomeninio paveldosaugos judėjimo virsmai Sąjūdžio išvakarėse,” in Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, p. 185-213. 273 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė Vysockyj, Bulat Okudzhava and other guests from Russia, other Soviet republics and even Western countries. 45 Finally, the legal non-systemic realm includes a variety of legally recognized and institutionalized organizations of non-systemic spirit – various associations, societies, clubs, and other agencies under the auspices of establishment bodies. Oten oppositional circles would ind shelter in the amateur and professional art groups and societies. For example, the pantomime troupe of Modris Tenisons, Hana Šumilaitė’s amateur theatre in Kaunas, many folk groups, youth bands of big beat and later rock, metal and other alternative music, progressive disc jockeys (oicially registered under auspices of universities, culture houses, legal leisure clubs or even factories but promoting ideologically ‘improper’ tastes), as well as the wave of new clubs of youth, music or rock e.g. Kauno roko klubas (Kaunas Rock Club), Šiaulių roko klubas (Šiauliai Rock Club), etc., initiated by vanguard youth and established in Lithuania during the perestroika period, all have characteristics of agencies of self-subsistent society. he legal non-systemic realm also encompasses some hobby clubs, estab- lished from below and overstepping the boundaries of activities suitable for a ‘Soviet citizen.’ he Martyno Mažvydo biblioilų klubas (Martynas Mažvy- das Bibliophile Club), launched in 1970, represents an interesting example of such a club. It was formally a subdivision of the USSR’s Voluntary Fellowship of Friends of Books, although it hosted meetings with regime-persecuted dissi- dents, former political prisoners and persons returned from forced exile. 46 Many legally established organizations for ethno-cultural movements (e.g. Ramuva 45 L. Lavaste, L. Valonytė, “Legendinėje kavinėje skambėjo ir laisvės idėjos, ir meilės žodžiai,” www.lrytas.lt, 2009 m. lapkričio 7 d; A. Baranauskaitė, Čia priėjo Gorbulskis… (Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2010); Z. Mačionis, Profesorius Kazys Daukšas (Vilnius: Pradai, 2000). 46 J. Stašaitis et al., Mažvydo klubas. Vilniaus knygos bičiuliai. 1970-2010 (Vilnius: Krantų redakcija, 2010). 274  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania and Alkas in Vilnius, Tėviškė club in Kaunas, the student hikers’ club Ąžuolas, the Vilnius University Tourist Club, etc.) can also fall into this category. 47 A number of legal academic clubs and associations under the auspices of the Lithuanian Academy of Science, state universities and other institutions of education, such as the discussion club headed by prof. Paulius Slavėnas at the establishment-set Žinija in 1965-1968, the club of young scientists Po Zodiaku (Under the Zodiac), and the philosopher’s discussion club Kultūra ir istorija (Culture and History) launched in 1987. hey functioned as ‘free spaces’ for unconventional discussions, provocative intellectual exchanges and nurtured visions of future social and political life. he Open Air Museum in Rumšiškės hosted a seminar of the Lithuanian Cultural Research Society which atracted oppositionally minded people from Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda, 48 while Nida in the Curonian Spit was the venue for homas Mann seminars. he number of such initiatives increased in the late 1980s. Gorbachev’s re- forms reduced restrictions on voluntary societal self-organization in 1986 and 1987and presented an opportunity to act, 49 at once seized upon by new clubs of preservation of cultural heritage: Talka, Jaunųjų paminklosaugininkų klubas (Club of Young Monument Preservers) in Vilnius in 1987, among others, and environmentalists (Atgaja in 1987 in Kaunas, Žemyna in Vilnius and Aukuras in Šiauliai in 1988). he level of their autonomy, active engagement in revision of public life, and the initiation of mass protest mobilization distinguished them from the oicial longstanding institutions of the cultural establishment (e.g. the Union of Writers or the Union of Composers) which revealed certain 47 See: A. Ramonaitė, “Creating One’s Own Reality as Resistance: he Shape of ‘Parallel Society’ in Soviet Lithuania,” Lithuanian Historical Studies, 15 (2010), p. 79-106. 48 Interview with Vytautas Umbrasas on May 27, 2010. 49 M. Garcelon, Revolutionary Passage: rom Soviet to post-Soviet Russia, 1985-2000 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005). 275 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė alternative voices on the eve of Sąjūdis but nonetheless remained an integral part of the Soviet state apparatus to implement cultural policies. Where is the proof that the self-subsistent society formed the footing for mass anti-communist mobilization in 1988? Our analysis demonstrated that since the mid-1960s, the network of the alternative society in Lithuania was continuously expanding and lourishing, despite the repressions of the regime in 1972 and ater, even if setbacks are visible in some sectors in some periods. 50 he crucial outbreak in quantitative and qualitative terms, however, occurred in 1987, when entrenched networks of ethno-cultural movements, the Catholic underground, academic and cultural circles and rock culture were supplemented by emerging academic discussion clubs and youthful and rebellious clubs for preservation of cultural heritage and ecology. he absolute number of formal or informal organizations that could be assigned to the self-subsistent society turned out to be much larger than could be expected from previous research. Moreover, network analysis reveals that on the eve of the Singing Revolution, the oppositional social groups forming ‘free spaces’ in Soviet Lithuania were closely interconnected into a dense and solid fabric of alternative society. 51 A detailed analysis of the story of the founding of Sąjūdis demonstrat- ed that the initiative for consolidation of anti-system and non-system forces into a single movement emerged in the densest part of the network, mainly in the academic circles and clubs for preservation of the environment and cultural heritage. Quantitative analysis of actor centrality in the network of the autonomous society revealed that key members of the organizational team of Sąjūdis were in fact among the most central persons in the entire network 50 J. Kavaliauskaitė and A. Ramonaitė, Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant. 51 J.Kavaliauskaitė and A. Ramonaitė, Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant. 276  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania of opposition-minded autonomous society. 52 It explains the extraordinary success and power of mass mobilization, which is oten regarded as a ‘miracle’ in Lithuanian historiography. The Conception of Self-subsistent Society and Paradigms of Sovietology What is the relationship between our approach and the main paradigms of sovietology studies? In what terms is this approach new? he application of the concept of self-subsistent society and methodology of social network analysis reveal issues and actors let on the margins or even beyond the limits of existing discussions or misinterpreted in the academic research. It denounces the dom- inant premise of the classical paradigm of totalitarianism according to which the viable alternative society is merely a result of the weakening totalitarian control and the declining power of the institutional system of the Soviet state. We argue that the Soviet control in Lithuania did not reach its totality, and, therefore, it is vitally important to understand who succeeded in withstanding the control and oppression, and how. We ind that the Lithuanian society of the late Soviet period was not merely an aggregate of atomized, passive and victimized individuals held together by fear and coercion. his is the reason why the mass movement Sąjūdis could arise without dissidents and other forc- es of active resistance being the main drivers of the Singing Revolution. he movement emerged due to the existence of the self-subsistent society based on viable grassroots social networks of collective action that did not serve ideological goals of the regime, and remained disfavored and oppressed (but not entirely suppressed) by the Soviet state before its collapse. 52 A. Ramonaitė and J. Kavaliauskaitė, “Explaining the emergence of social movement in an undemocratic seting using social network analysis.” Paper prepared for the 6th ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, August 25-27, 2011. 277 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė he revisionist paradigm of sovietology challenges major premises of totalitarianism and denounces the concept of the total power of the Soviet regime. his approach highlights the inner erosion of the (post)totalitarian regime during the late Soviet era, deined by looser ideological control, the priority of formalism and informal rules in place of the earlier dogmatism as well as a growing plurality of power. However, revisionism in Lithuania, similarly to the paradigm it opposes, focuses on the highest Soviet political elites, ideological structures of power and explores whether nomenklatura and other oicial elites were loyal or disloyal to the Soviet system. he advocates of the later approach seek to reveal whether and to what extent members of national nomenklatura departed from the oicial dogma of the regime, if they deviated from the ideological framework, practiced partial conformism or even resistance that in the end could become an important source of the systemic failure of the Soviet regime and help to facilitate the radical transformation. Our research shows that, in contrast to revisionist arguments, the origins of the Sąjūdis movement stem not from nomenklatura, but from societal forces which neither occupied important and high oicial power posts, nor enjoyed the wide state recognition available to Soviet cultural elites. Moreover, in our approach the membership in an self-subsistent society depends not upon a prin- ciple of ‘silent resistance’ (covert personal moral convictions of ordinary citizens or overt ‘work on behalf of the motherland’ of political elites, etc.) 53 but upon the individual’s participation in state-independent, autonomous, non-Soviet spaces of collective action (clubs, gatherings, communities, etc.) beyond one’s oicial posts or work positions. Surprisingly enough, the majority of the cul- tural elite and intelligentsia taking part in the birth of the Sąjūdis movement were already members of such spaces of freedom. Finally, revisionists agree 53 A. Štromas, Laisvės horizontai (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 2001); A. Brazauskas, Ir tuomet dirbome Lietuvai: faktai, atsiminimai, komentarai (Vilnius: Knygiai, 2007); T. Venclova, “Aš buvau išimtis,” Literatūra ir menas, 10 (1991), p. 10. 278  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania that the sovietisation of masses (and elites) in Lithuania was not total, yet they cannot indicate the sources and exact mechanisms of change because their deinition of resistance is too wide. Here ‘resistance’ encompasses a huge variety of phenomena – from an inner moral stance of the individual to conformism on behalf of virtuous goals. he conception of self-subsistent society based on the social network analysis provides analytical instruments to identify such sources of social and political change. he later approach also challenges another dominant view that the decline of the repressive regime set free the mystical ‘spirit of the Lithuanian nation’ which was alive although imprisoned during the long decades of Soviet occupation. In contrast to totalitarianism and revisionism focusing on formal struc- tures of the Soviet system, post-revisionism turns to the ordinary life of society, traces of oicial ideology in everyday environments and popular mentalities of the Soviet era. In the spirit of Foucauldian philosophy, this paradigm of So- vietology argues that the ideology functioned not merely as an overt coercive instrument of the state but as a discursive order overwhelming the state and the lifeworld of ordinary people. herefore post-revisionists denounce the possibility of autonomous ‘non-Soviet’ reality because nothing and nobody could escape the prison of the reigning discourse. ‘In opinion of post-revision- ists, citizens of the USSR did not belong to the group of selfmade individuals with system-free thinking.’ 54 Even though the impact of sovietisation could not always and entirely be relected and realized by the popular masses in Lithuania, our research reveals that there are no reasons to hold the power of dominant discourse to- tal and absolute. Networks of self-subsistent societies formed in spite of risks and prohibitions, and their members felt an acute conlict between their free 54 D. Marcinkevičienė, “Sovietmečio istoriograija: užsienio autorių tyrinėjimai ir interpretacijos,” Lietuvos istorijos metraštis 2 (2003), p. 91-106. 279 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė aspirations and the coercive reality. Perhaps an individual in isolation cannot create his/her own ‘other’ identity, but spaces of collective action fed by the living memory of interwar Independent Lithuania and experiences of the free West could become a source of discourses and identities diferent from and unfavorable to the ideal of a new Soviet personhood. According to the post-revisionist logic, the spiritual degradation of society – disillusionment, disappointment, apathy – ruined the Soviet Union. However, it appears that networks of self-subsistent society became not only a shelter to protect oneself from such degradation but also a space to create constructive new visions of the future and mobilize on their behalf when the window of opportunities became wide open. Conclusions According to researchers of communist societies, mass terror and the atmo- sphere of intimidation in totalitarian states resulted in a rupture of pre-existing social networks. 55 he mass revolutions of 1988-1989, however, challenge this view. Analyzing the roots of the Solidarity movement in Poland, Maryane Osa demonstrates that Solidarity was born out of dense networks of semi-clandes- tine oppositional civic organizations, such as the Workers’ Defence Commitee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR), free trade unions, the Students’ Solidarity Commitee (Studencki Komitet Solidarności), the Movement for Defence of Human and Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela, ROP- CiO) , the Society of Scientiic Courses (Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych, TKN) and many other liberal, Catholic, nationalist, secular letist, youth, and 55 H. Arendt, he Origins of Totalitarianism.; J. L. Gibson, “Social Networks, Civil society, and the Prospects of Consolidating Russia‘s Democratic Transition,” American Journal of Political Science 45 (1) (2001), p. 51-68. 280  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania farmers’ organizations. 56 hese organizations indeed might be atributed to civil society as they were ‘social inluence associations’ engaged in public social action and independent from the Communist party. In the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries, including the rigid regimes of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, however, oppositional organi- zations were less numerous and less powerful than in Poland. According to Anders Uhlin, a researcher of politics and society of the Baltic States, dissidents’ ranks were as weak and fragmented in Soviet Lithuania as in the rest of the Soviet Union, and one cannot really speak of the existence of a civil society there until 1988. 57 Even if Uhlin underestimates the inluence of underground networks in Lithuania (e.g. the Lithuanian samizdat publication he Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania published from 1972 to 1988 was one of the most successful samizdat publications in the Soviet bloc), it is true that an overt political opposition in Lithuania was scarce and far from resembling the developed networks of the ‘civil society’ in Poland. he weakness of dissident movements in Lithuania and other communist states, however, does not mean that all manifestations of autonomous social life there were suppressed and controlled by the state. he concept of self-subsistent society suggests that the analysis of forms of resistance to communist regimes should look for independent activities in such non-political arenas as religious communities, the musical underground, ethno-cultural movements and the entire realm of alternative culture not dependent on the oicial channels of communication and culture. he analysis proves that Sąjūdis indeed was born in the network of the self-subsistent society at a time when the network reached its most complex 56 M. Osa, Solidarity and Contention. 57 A. Uhlin, Post-Soviet Civil Society. Democratization in Russia and the Baltic States (London: Routledge Press, 2006). 281 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė structure, and Sąjūdis emerged at the very centre of the network. Surprisingly enough, the development of the protest mobilization in Lithuania reiterates that of Poland, even if the nature of the political regimes and of the movements’ organizations themselves were vastly diferent (Solidarity was a trade union while Sąjūdis was established in an academic milieu). If grassroots-based and ideology-resistant self-subsistent society in Lith- uania was so important for the mobilization of Sąjūdis, why has its role not been recognized in previous studies of the Lithuanian national rebirth in the late 1980s? We may argue that this happened due to several objective reasons. Firstly, Lithuanian Sovietology studies were dominated by the paradigm of totalitarianism for a long period of time, and other two paradigms have just started to gain a voice in the intellectual arena. However, in their debates on deinitions of resistance and control, none of these paradigms anticipates an organizational and moral autonomy of collective action, similar to that pro- posed in our approach. Secondly, the structuralist explanation, arguing that perestroika policy and the erosion of the Soviet regime opened a window of opportunities, enough for Sąjūdis to break through, retains a stronghold in intellectual debates, and this allows an underestimation of the role of grass- roots-based activism. When either an abstract national spirit or oicial elites are seen as major drivers of change in Lithuania, (other) sources of collective disobedience and opposition remain not only invisible but also unimportant. hirdly, there are some primary eforts to go beyond dominant approaches and to explore the informal life of intelligentsia evolving beyond the oicial Soviet public sphere. 58 However, up to this moment the later studies have revealed only fragments of this sphere, as they have not found satisfactory methodological instruments for such an endeavor. Our approach is based 58 V. Klumbys, “Lietuvos kultūrinis elitas sovietmečiu: tarp pasipriešinimo ir prisitaikymo,” Lietuvos etnologija 8(17) (2008), p. 139-161. 282  Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania on the developed instruments of social network analysis that allow not only the purposeful systemic collection of relevant data but also the quantitative analysis of the data with quantitative results, as well as a holistic visual picture of the self-subsistent society, its structure and traits. here is also one more reason why the Soviet-era arenas of self-subsistent society in Lithuania have remained unnoticed and devoid of recognition. If we pose a simple question – what social forces are the most salient for the history of the Sąjūdis movement – we may expect a single answer: these are forces which openly resisted the occupants and were aimed at restoration of the independent Lithuania. 59 Although Sąjūdis was borne neither in the milieus of a political underground of dissidents nor in sites of open resistance, the agency of self-subsistent society is rarely mentioned because it does not meet the criteria of the dominant reasoning. Up to this day, the history of Sąjūdis in Lithuania is writen as a history of restoration of national independence, the ight against the Eastern Empire, and not as a history of anti-totalitarianism. In contrast, intellectuals of oppositional movements in Central Eastern Europe irst of all aimed at the destruction the totalitarian order and based their logic on the strict separation between state and society, where a viable society was to become the major force, able to bring down the state (the Soviet regime) ‘from below’ and to restore human dignity and national sovereignty. Here not only self-organization of societal forces aimed at national sovereignty are recog- nized and valued; any active social agency which withstood a totalitarian spirit, defended and practiced freedoms of thought, conscience, self-expression and free collective action is no less important. Similarly to this argument, in Lith- uania a variety of societal forces who acutely perceived and refused to follow the imperatives of Soviet order searched for the ways to distance themselves 59 K. Girnius, “Pasipriešinimas,“ p. 268-279; A. Nikžentaitis, “Lietuvių prisitaikymo kronika,” Atgimimas 8, 2005 m. vasario 25-kovo 3 d., p. 14. 283 from the coercive state and brew into a self-subsistent society with a diferent collective reality and the hope of a diferent life that in the end gave birth to the vanguard of Sąjūdis.  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance Paweł Sowiński Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance 1 For years now, I have been under a spell of the subtle charm of the Polish pub- lication underground of the 1980s. However, it occurred to me recently that the history of this movement and its opposition are treated rather narrowly, in order not to relate the greatness of this resistance with the constraints of the system and the obedience towards them. Ater reading some of our works, a less informed reader may even come to the conclusion that the entire lives of the opposition in those times took place out of the control of the authorities. It is also hard not to notice where we have invested our ainities. Such a convention is also favorable for a historian. It promotes separating opposition as a group and constructing a logical argument. Otherwise, the whole story starts becoming blurry social-wise to a state where all divisions are ambiguous and no longer clear-cut, which may lead to a conclusion that the entire society was in one way or another in opposition. 2 he main thing is that the Polish opposition was a heterogeneous group of several thousand people. Such a large number had to split their lives, run away from the oicial world, and sometimes return to it. heir existence was both secret and overt, which is best seen in the 1980s. Hence, it is necessary to accept a more free-form approach which could show their choices against the 1 he following article is an extension to one of my essays: Zakazana książka. Uczestnicy drugiego obiegu 1977-1989 (Warszawa 2011). I would also like to thank the atendees of the seminar: Solidarity — a new approach to the social movement organized by Collegium Civitas, Warsaw, www.solidarnosc.collegium.pl 2 “Opozycja i opór społeczny w Polsce po 1956 roku — stan badań i nowe perspektywy. Dyskusja,” in Opozycja i opór społeczny w Polsce po 1956 roku, ed. Tomasz Kozłowski, Jan Olaszek (Warszawa 2011), p. 11-23. 285 Paweł Sowiński complex backdrop of the social life and relations to the system. his history — as well as reality in general — may be treated as slightly blurred, disturbed, and not devoid of complications. he opposition had no choice but cooperate with the communist Polish People’s Republic (PRL) in hundreds of everyday situations, and in turn, the authorities remained relatively lexible towards the ‘exiles.’ he oicial and unoicial realm sometimes overlap. Ater moments of grandeur, the reality kicks in — which more oten than not is grey and mundane. When one becomes the opposition of one’s days, it is necessary also to learn how to live in such a period. You cannot really escape reality, as you grow in it, and acquire certain cultural life abilities un- intentionally. ‘his war was not as bloody, the tensions were not as clear. We have all been exposed to the same language, culture, customs’ – recalls one of the most dedicated Solidarity activists. 3 hese problems and theories are probably widely well-known, however, they have not been put into use in the historiography concerning the Polish opposition. We are always enshrouded in this intellectual climate of the era, which behaves quite like atmospheric pressure, which is invisible but forming. he samizdat publications may have lived in people, not only due to the fact they were prohibited or suppressed but also that books were treated diferently than they are now or even beforehand, as the culture of oicial and unoicial publication was only partially diferent, but partially remained unchanged. 4 Dictators contribute towards enhances the educational level of a society, and in turn the society overthrows the dictator — a thesis which was tested in 3 K. Zalewska, Będzie strajk (Warszawa 2012), p. 167 (statement by Maciej Zalewski). 4 W. Narojek, Jednostka wobec systemu. Antropologia trwania i zmiany (Warszawa 1996). 286  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance history many times. 5 Poland , with all its drawbacks and faults, may be treated as a type of a European welfare state. 6 he government cared for e.g. develop- ment in readership due to its potential as an instrument for remaining its power. his was seen in the atitude towards education, but also in general polices such as creating libraries (even in holiday houses), organizing book fairs, holding national patronage of literature, and above all in the industrialization process which encouraged people to move to the cities, creating a new type of book consumers. he number of readers grew, the level of readership increased, as well as general knowledge about the world. Also, people started to appreciate mass communication, which went beyond just chating with your neighbors, and focused on reading, listening, and watching the emerging mass media. he perspective of witnesses of these times, especially these in the opposition, was naturally diferent. According to the Statistical Yearbook of the Central Statistical Oice, in 1959 there were 161 000 students in Poland; in 1980 this number increased to 453 000. his educational leap had to inluence the emergence of social framework for the samizdat, mainly due to the fact its core was established by intelligentsia. Furthermore, the development in secondary education (and to a less extent also in the vocational education) may also correlate to the later popularity of subversive bulletins in workers’ circles. Another important element was women participation, who were partially let out by the pre-war education system. However, in the communist era as much as one third of them started graduating, becoming relevant to our ield of interest. Women 5 R. Chartier, he Cultural Origins of the French Revolution (Duke 1991), p. 69-72 and 189- 192. ‘During the educational process, the political awareness of people, importance of social interest groups, as well as organizational skills increase’ — says Andrew Heywood, a British political scientists (Politics, Basingstoke 1997). 6 G. herborn, European Modernity and Beyond : he Trajectory of European Societies, 1945-2000 (London 1995); T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London 2005). 287 Paweł Sowiński iniltrated the public sphere by taking up jobs and choosing careers. More and more females became editors, librarians, teachers, academics — vital members of the press culture. Such an approach may relativize the phenomenon of the opposition but this could be useful, if we do not want to write about something in total isola- tion from the rest of the historical landscape. While building the foundations of a new civilization, you draw on the experience of the old order, even if the Ancien Régime is considered hostile. Oten these types of cases were described in the past, however, usually people need more time to maintain detachment from such delicate maters. Two Romans, Lucius and Claudius, invented by Witold Kula in his Gusła, theorizing about the fall of the Roman Empire and the birth of the new order: ‘hey build their temples according to plans of our basilicas; in painting they follow lost Pompeian frescoes, known to us only from legends. Sometimes it amuses me, sometimes it makes me angry,’ writes Claudius. ‘But cannot you see the greatness in this?’ Lucius responses: ‘here is a new synthesis in the making.’ hus, heritage may be a result of complex transformations and mutual inluence of diferent traditions. 7 Let us take a look at the oicial publishing market of Poland. Since the 1960s many valuable books were published, as cultural life was only partly indoctrinated by the authorities. he government was not able to provide the Polish people with decent living, and this made them look for other sources for stabilization in history, literature, and book reality. It is no wonder that the milieu of the Polish Writers’ Union (at least its Warsaw oice) became the arena for deiance of the communist system. As a mater of fact, the dissidents of the 7 W. Kula, “Gusła,” in Wokół historii (Warszawa 1988), p. 385, 388. he text of Witold Kula, printed back in the 1950s, is also an example of encrypted meanings, playing cat-and- mouse with the censorship, and circumventing the regulations. Reading on Gusła in: Adam Michnik, “Lukrecjusz i Gusła,” in Z dziejów honoru w Polsce by Adam Michnik (Warszawa 1985), p. 3-31. 288  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance later years have recognized some of the publications available on the market as important for the development of opposition behavior. Proper reading was also what fuelled the dissident movement, and such writers who sought their own means of expression in oicial culture, distancing themselves from the government policy, were treated with respect by the opposition, or at the very least became a bufer between the authorities and the dissidents, which con- tributed to the status allowing for a beter intellectual criticism of the system. 8 It is true that the oicial culture with its limitation and sometimes re- ally aggressive censorship by the authorities was not the richest soil for the movement. he Stalinist supervision of the early 1950s was characterized by ‘heavily politicized and ideologized books,’ ruthless manipulations of artistic work, and destruction of publications which did not it into the new vision of Poland. 9 Stronger impulses were generated probably by family traditions, and later by organized opposition with its way of thinking and its physical presence alone. However, without any doubt the beginnings of the opposition may be traced to the oicial culture, urban space, university circles, students’ clubs, cabarets, theatres, poetry vanguard, and liberalization of culture life according to Joanna Wawrzyniak and Piotr Filipkowski, who depicted the grand scale of the opposition in Poznań of the 1970s. 10 But it continued to be like that later on. he two realities never really split ways. Joanna Krakowska in her biography of Halina Mikołajska shown the 8 K. Rokicki, Literaci. Relacje między literatami a władzami PRL w latach 1956-1970 (Warszawa 2011), T. Ruzikowski, ”Kultura niezależna,” in NSZZ Solidarność 1980-1989 (Warszawa 2010), vol. 2, p. 316-323. 9 A. S. Kondek, Papierowa rewolucja. Oicjalny obieg książek w Polsce w latach 1948-1955 (Warszawa 1999). 10 Polscy opozycjoniści. Biograiczne studium pewnego (poznańskiego) przypadku, a typescript handed over for print in the he Institute of National Remembrance publication house (ater 1956). I would like to thank Joanna Wawrzyniak for making a working version available for me. 289 Paweł Sowiński situation in mature alternative theatres. ‘he situation needs to be seen in the context of the two spheres, the oicial and unoicial one, permeating each other,’ she wrote. Usually the works presented there were published by oicial channels, shown on a mass scale. Unoicial was the audience, sometimes ac- tors, and the atmosphere, aura, emotions of people who came to see the plays. 11 However, it is worth noticing that the oicial culture also had centers of creative unrest, allusive references, and murmurs of discontent. Some examples that almost immediately come to mind are the Polish cinema of moral anxiety of the 1970s, some historical books on the Polish resistance movement in World War II German-occupied Poland (called Home Army), he Emperor: Down- fall of an Autocrat by Ryszard Kapuściński who was treated as dissident, the poetry of Zbigniew Herbert, an essay by Bohdan Cywiński entitled Rodowody niepokornych (he Origins of the Rebellious), or a sociological book by Aldona Jawłowska Drogi kontrkultury 12 (he Paths of Counterculture). he most renowned example are the works of Zbigniew Herbert, published both oicial and unoicially, but interpreted in the 1980s as antiauthoritar- ian. Such a reception was strengthened by their musical interpretation by Przemysław Gintrowski, who performed in schools and churches, and whose concerts were recorded on tape by the youth and distributed outside of any oicial means of distribution. 13 Let us revisit the theatre in this context. Salon 11 J. Krakowska, Mikołajska: teatr i PRL (Warszawa 2011). 12 M. Fik, Kultura polska po Jałcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981 (London 1989). See also the polemics between Andrzej Paczkowski and Stanisław Barańczak in: A. Paczkowski, Pół wieku dziejów Polski 1939-1989 (Warszawa 1995), p. 449-455; B. Toruńczyk, Żywe cienie (Warszawa 2012), p. 12. 13 Recently this topic was raised by Wojciech Staszewski, “Ścichł szczęk i śpiew,” Gazeta Wyborcza”, 27 th-28th October 2012, p. 18-19. 290  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance Niezależnych, a cabaret closed by the authorities ater some time, 14 and Teatr Ósmego Dnia, a struggling theatre which was funded by the state until 1984 may be located in between the two realities. 15 It is interesting to watch the whole cat-and-mouse play with the censorship: actors’ interpretations, moments when the audience cheer, as it was in the case of the famous adaptation of Adam Mickiewicz’s Forefathers’ Eve (Dziady) directed by Kazimierz Dejmek, which took place right before the student and intellectual protest action against the government of March 1968. Mickiewicz, the most prominent poet and igure in Polish Romanticism, again became current, and similarly to irst half of the 19th century, anti-governmental. 16 In January 1983, the catholic and subjected to the state censorship magazine Znak published an essay by Bronisław Geremek, the main expert of the Solidar- ity movement, writen during the Martial Law of 1981 in the internment camp, where Geremek was staying that period. 17 Before 1980 Tygodnik Powszechny weekly was home to such personae as Stanisław Barańczak, a famous Polish poet, literary critic, and translator, or Jacek Kuroń, the godfather of the Polish 14 ‘We have squeezed the liberalization given to us in the 1970s to its limits,’ said one of the leaders of the Salon Niezależnych: Jacek Kleyf, Rozmowa (Warszawa 2012). he cabaret members included also Janusz Weiss and Michał Tarkowski. he authorities prevented further performances from happening in the second half of the 1970s. 15 his perspective is most interestingly portrayed in the interview with Lech Raczak, the Art Director of Teatr Ósmego Dnia, an outstanding director, a supporter of the opposition, and at the same time member of Socjalistyczny Związek Studentów Polski (eng. Socialist Polish Students’ Association): ‘I presumptuously went to the important meetings of the Association in Warsaw, got into a ight or discussed amicably with Aleksander Kwaśniewski, then a highly placed oicial of the organization, just to go right ater that to Adam Michnik’s place to be booked by the militia at the entrance to his house,’ A. Grupińska, J. Wawrzyniak, Buntownicy, polskie lata 70. i 80. (Warszawa 2011), p. 105. 16 W. Śliwowska, Historyczne peregrynacje. Szkice z dziejów Polaków i Rosjan w XIX wieku (Warszawa 2012), p. 210-216. 17 B. Geremek “Człowiek i grzech. Trzy książki o kulturze średniowiecznej,” Znak 1 (1983). 291 Paweł Sowiński opposition, who wrote there under aliases. Ater the introduction of Martial Law on December 13, 1981, the editorial team was joined by Piotr Wierzbicki and Andrzej Drawicz, who were released from the internment camps. he magazine included other journalists dismissed from the oicial media: Stefan Bratkowski, Ernest Skalski, Wanda Falkowska, Ewa Berberyusz, Ewa Szumańska. 18 Catholic publishers have even tried, sometimes with success, to print texts of Leszek Kołakowski (in Znak) and Gustaw Herling-Grudziński (in W drodze). 19 We have even placed the proile of Jerzy Turowicz, the editor-in-chief of Tygodnik Powszechny on the list of Polish Anticommunist Opposition activists, 20 even though he was not banned by the authorities. Two Worlds he fact that so much publications came out only due to social will is amaz- ing in itself. hey were engraved in the collective memory of the society, and survived all the years in the oppressive environment of communist Poland. here is a whole separate branch of historiography which investigates the role of an individual in the course of history and dissociates itself form the police records, disregarding the investigation of power structures and its authority over societies. his perspective does not care much whether the experiences 18 W. Bereś, K. Burnetko, J. Podsadecka, Krąg Turowicza. Tygodnik, czasy, ludzie. 1945-1999 (Kraków 2012). 19 ”Bóg rezonerów,” Znak, July-August (1985), p. 64-68; “Święty Smok,” W drodze, October (1985), p. 6-10; Shit in Polish Policy Towards Emigres (8th August 1986), Open Society Archives in Budapest, HU OSA 300-50-1, Records of RFE/RL Research Institute [Fonds 300], Polish Unit [subfonds 50], Old Code Subject Files [series 1], container no. 502. However, it needs to be said that these particular publications did not have a huge political signiicance, and did not make it to a wider audience due to restricted circulation of Catholic magazines. 20 Opozycja w PRL. Słownik biograiczny 1956-89 (Warszawa 200). 292  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance of central characters were registered by the administrative system in its nu- merous iles, both the ones which were destroyed and the ones that were let. he most important are the people of the opposition itself, their story; and the inspectors behind the desks, iling papers into dossiers are only treated here as the backdrop. he main aspect which is underlined is the private dimension of the commitment, not dominated by ‘operational research,’ and other similar tricks of captains and majors. his also brings about the well-known problem of valence in studies, both positive and negative evaluation of central characters, and various interpretation experiences. We will sort the sources in a diferent way but as historians we need to be deeply and constantly aware of imperfection. We never have the full extent of knowledge, and our analyses may naturally contain some laws. Similarly, the above civilization perspective, which levels and justiies all, and brings the narration above the individuals to the level of powerful social trends, needs to interchangeable with a perspective of a single human being. Macro historical studies need to be mixed with a micro perspective. It is crucial. It makes us see the civilization surroundings in a diferent light. Perhaps, we may even come to a conclusion that an individual stands a chance in a clash with history (and historians). he individual perspective will show us how the living conditions, police ‘keeping,’ have separated the opposition from the realm of ordinary people, and how they endangered the lives of the dissidents. he things which for global history enthusiasts are considered as trile, minute, and non-sig- niicant, will grow to the level of great struggles, fascinating events, and the utmost dramatic experiences. ‘hough Pałka’s in distress, nothing’s gonna stop the press’ was a seemingly humorous rhyme designed by Jan Walc, an independent printed and literary critic, who ran it in Biuletyn Informacyjny, a well-known weekly samizdat. Ze- non Pałka was a member of the printing community of the Workers’ Defence Commitee (KOR). Years later, he explains the rhyme thus: ‘I was beaten at 293 Paweł Sowiński the militia headquarters in Wrocław in 1979. Two sturdy oicers have pulled out thick sticks, which look like giant socks illed with sand. hey batered me so badly I was lying in bed all week with my kidneys injured to a point I was literally pissing blood.’ 21 He then gives an account of his reasons for leaving Poland in 1983: ‘My mother was “removed” from her work unexpectedly, right ater December 13. She was really afected by this event. My father was forced to take early retirement due to my “lack of afection for the military,” which barely was suicient for raising my two younger brothers.’ 22 Such a complicated situation on one hand needs empathy for such witnesses, on the other, we need to step beyond the circle of personal experiences. he voice of the people who were imprisoned, dragged around from one militia headquarter to the next, and even tortured needs to be heard wide and loud. 23 However, many other life stories of these times were not as bleak. his may call for citing obvious truths, such as: you live only once, and if you live in a state 21 Zenon Pałka of Wrocław, printer at NOWA, the editor of illegal magazines in Lower Silesia. Information about the batery in the Annoncement of the Workers’ Defence Commitee from September 11, 1978, in Dokumenty Komitetu Obrony Robotników i Komitetu Samoobrony Społecznej „KOR”, ed. A. Jastrzębski (Warszawa 1994), p. 287. 22 An interview with Zenon Pałka (July 2012) in the author’s collection. In 1971 Pałka was enlisted to the army for obligatory military service. He refused to eat meat, and declared himself vegetarian and enthusiast of the Indian culture. He was recognized as unit for military service. His father, a regular oicer, was forced to take early retirement ater this incident. See also: “Nic nie wstrzyma ruchu wałka, z Zenonem Pałką rozmawia Beata Maciejewska,” Gazeta Wyborcza [Wrocław], 29th September 2006, p. 4. More about subjecting members of the Workers’ Defence Commitee to harassment in: Jan Skórzyński, Siła bezsilnych. Historia Komitetu Obrony Robotników (Warszawa 2012). 23 he case of interrogation of Krzysztof Lachowski, a student of Warsaw University of Technology, from an amateur printshop of the Workers’ Defence Commitee situated in the Mikrus student hostel. A transcript of a program of Radio Free Europe entitled “Fakty i Opinie,” March 2, 1980, Open Society Archives in Budapest, OSA 300-50-1, RFE/RL Research Institute, Polish Unit, Box 159, Wolność słowa w Polsce 1980-1981. See also Jan Józef Lipski, KOR: a History of the Workers’ Defence Commitee in Poland, 1976-1981 (Oakland, California 1985). 294  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance like Polish People’s Republic, this is your whole life — and it consists not only of moments of outrage. 24 his meant, e.g. that stamp collectors interested in underground stamps, were also collecting oicial postage stamps. Many read- ers have read the oicial press, and then turn to the opposition newspapers, or sometimes they even compared them to each other. Many people, not only in the police, had to function with a split sense of loyalty, as I have already mentioned earlier. Many lives and situations will blur heavily our view, and knock over once established theses. 25 he receiver’s perspective does not really need to correspond to the sender’s one. While books from two circulation may have met on a home bookshelf, the national and clandestine publishers probably were diferent from each other. When one reads the documentation of state publishers from the Central Ar- chives of Modern Records, it seems quite clear that their reality was completely diferent from the underground one. In the irst case, these were bureaucratic institutions dominated by oices with secretaries and council minutes; the second world was the realm of the resistance with hiding in basements, atics, kitchens from the persecutors with the looming threat of prison and losing one’s chance in life. When comparing the state presidents with independent editors, it is again easy to discern the division of Poland in these times into two factions. he people from the opposing barricades not only did not like each other, they rarely saw each other, and sometimes they even were afraid of themselves, even if their books were read by the same people. 24 S. Wolle, Die heile Welt der Diktatur : Alltag und Herrschat in der DDR 1971-1989 (Berlin 1998); M. Zaremba, Im nationalen Gewande. Strategien kommunistischer Herrschatslegitimation in Polen 1944-1980 (Osnabruck 2011). 25 An interview with Silke Plate, a specialist in Polish underground post, from the Research Centre for East European Studies in Bremen. If Poland did not have such a strong oicial philatelists’ movement, it would have been harder for the opposition to carry out their ‘postal operation.’ 295 Paweł Sowiński he authorities had large resources, vast printing houses, and the state apparatus. he opposition had next to nothing. hey had to steer clear of po- lice patrols, hide their actions, and be careful of every move. heir successes may change into failures at any given time, resulting in coniscation of appli- ances and editions, which meant the end of the ight. However, the power of the authorities sometimes felt feigned, the base sometimes illusory, and the advantage only partial. In state factories, surrounded by barbed-wired fences, guarded by watchmen, iniltrated by secret agents, a second life was under way consisting of secret prints and distribution of forbidden press. 26 he items and spaces surrounding our characters may look oicial but were ‘intercepted’ by the dissidence, and used for their own purposes. For example, the telephone lines, which were controlled by the authorities but not fully. It all depended on who was calling. Similarly, road lines were used to beneit both parties. 27 he state controlled the sea, ships, and ports. It trained sailors, extended the seashore, built dockyards, and provided custom oices. Many ships from all over the world call at Polish ports, bringing such exclusive items as oranges, which were available in Poland only during Christmas. However, these sea routes established for the good of the Polish People’s Republic were used by quite a surprising character called ‘Brother Christopher.’ He was a sailor who became an oicer and later a captain. He have sailed under the Polish lag since the 1960s, and when the opportunity occurred smuggled Kultura (a leading 26 Ewa Choromańska, the leading member of the underground Solidarity structure for Warsaw work places, in her account pictures the railway hospital in Międzylesie, where she worked as a surgeon, as a heavily opposing place even ater December 13, 1981. he nurses at that time distributed independent newsleters, organized store rooms for press, all people paid fees for Solidarity, the patients were usually only from the opposition, and the General Secretary of the Communist Party remained totally passive. See: K. Zalewska, Będzie strajk (Warszawa 2012), p. 136. 27 Another story writen by Mateusz Fałkowski printed by CDN publishing tells about using the power grid for purposes not connected to supplying electricity or guidelines from the authorities (Gdańsk 2011, p. 107). 296  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance Polish-émigré literary-political magazine published in Paris) into Szczecin; it is estimated that he had managed to bring ca. 1,5 metric tonnes until 1989. Most of his crew joined the process (however, admitedly some of them were smugglers in the irst place). His wife was a librarian in Szczecin, who used the public network of libraries for distribution of the magazines. his is how the illegal practices were continued cruise ater cruise, for several dozen of years. It is a wonder that the Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Afairs in Szczecin missed such fraud. 28 Henri-Jean Martin would say it was a tradition- al example of helplessness on behalf of the administrative authorities when coming into contract with dissemination of new ideas. 29 Let us look for a while now at the development of the opposition from the angle of inconsistent repressions towards these circles, and essentially the fall of one political community and the emergence of another one. All instruments of repression were there but were not used to the extent of the Stalinist era. 30 When Anka Kowalska joined the Workers’ Defence Commitee, she was con- vinced she would be removed from the opposition soon. During this period she worked full time in the PAX Publishing House as editor, and at the same 28 ‘Brother Christopher’ was in fact captain Józef Gawłowicz. He was a contact for Jerzy Giedroyc, a well-know Polish writer, political activist, and the editor of Kultura who lived most of his life in Paris. See: M. Paziewski, “Sylwetki. Józef Gawłowicz,” Wolność i Solidarność 4 (2012), p. 185-190; J. Gawłowicz, Byłem kurierem Giedroycia (Szczecin 1998). 29 L. Febvre and H.-J. Martin, he Coming of the Book. he Impact of Printing, 1450-1800 (London 2010), p. 244. 30 October 22, 1976 which marked the date a political and police meeting took place hosted by Stanisław Kania, First Secretary of the Polish communist party, ater the establishing the Workers’ Defence Commitee, is considered now as the starting moment for the policy of ‘reduced repression.’ “Zawężona represja. Co robić z Komitetem Obrony Robotników? Narada u Stanisława Kani 22 października 1976,” ed. Andrzej Paczkowski and Marcin Zaremba, Więź 8 (2001). See also: A. Friszke, M. Zaremba, ed., Rozmowy na Zawracie. Taktyka walki z opozycją demokratyczną (Warszawa 2008), p. 54-59. 297 Paweł Sowiński time she was a member of the underground press. When in February 1977 she was summoned to the director’s oice, she was almost sure she was going to be given notice. Despite the fact the meeting was not particularly pleasant, to her surprise the only punishment was sending her to work from home. She was to come to the publishing oice only once a week in order not to ‘corrupt’ the other staf members. ‘In this way Bolesław Piasecki, the Director of PAX, delegated me to the Workers’ Defence Commitee as I simply had more time to commit fully to the opposition cause,’ she recollects half-jokingly. 31 Throughout the 1970s, also Stefan Kisielewski, an editor of Tygodnik Powszechny, the front igure of opposition literature, the author of many books published by Giedroyc and later in samizdat circulation, was given ‘preferential’ treatment by the authorities. In spite of publishing his works under the pen name Tomasz Staliński, he was known to the security apparatus at least since 1974. He also gave numerous interviews abroad under his own name which were critical of the political system in Poland. However, the state apparatus treated him quite leniently. Of course, there is no doubt, his columns were brutally censored, and Kisielewski himself was isolated from a wider range of readers in many other way. In 1976 even a trial against him was under consideration. 32 No action was taken ater all. Kisielewski was a public igure, a guest in many Western embassies, a writer valued by opinion-forming communities abroad, 31 A. Kowalska, Folklor tamtych lat (Warszawa 2011), p. 73-74. One may treat the whole case of Kowalska as unique, as well as the whole situation connected with PAX. Bolesław Piasecki opposed the pressure from the Security Service, and perhaps even the Party. he heads of other state bodies did not have the power, nor the courage to do something like that. 32 Case code name “Cezar” against Stefan Kisielewski, Archives of he Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw, IPN BU 0712/27, ch. 7 and 18. 298  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance which meant he posed a political threat to the Security Service. 33 Despite some diiculties, Kisielewski continued to work and go abroad. Zdzisław Najder, a well-known expert on Joseph Conrad’s life and work, and a member of the Polish Writers’ Union, had some uninished business with the authorities. Ater he ended his collaboration with the Security Service in 1965, the government tried to take his passport but ater an intervention at the Ministry by Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, another Polish essayist and writer, they conceded. 10 years later, Najder, who joined the opposition, was caught at the Warsaw Airport with a copy with samizdat literature. A prosecution was on the way, however, it was closed. Aterwards, Najder was closely kept under surveillance by the police which was no small measure. His acts provided information about his contacts with the Kultura, suspicions about collabo- ration with Western agencies, and even his participation in the opposition organization – Polskie Porozumienie Niepodległościowe. But the authorities did not take his passport, perhaps also due to his marriage to a British citizen. 34 he passport policy against the protesters is indeed a great topic for research. he government divided the dissidents into two groups: these with the privilege of travelling abroad, and these without it. his policy was twofold; on the one hand, it showed the liberal side of the Polish communist regime, on the other, it was supposed to scare of any potential followers from following the path of the opposition. here were also some situations when the same person fulilled 33 For example, the Security Service was also unable to scutle the action of transporting the typescript of the book Kościół, lewica, dialog by Adam Michnik to the Western countries. Kisielewski entrusted this unusual task to his friend, a Danish diplomat, whom the Security Service had not venture to strip search at the border, despite the fact the communists had known exactly when the book would be smuggled. 34 Case code name “Caroll” against Zdzisław Najder, PN BU 248/135 Vol. 1-2. 299 Paweł Sowiński both roles. 35 Jerzy Holzer, an oppositionist historian, employed at that time at the Warsaw University, recalls: ater publishing my history of Solidarity in 1983, in the second circulation, the authorities denied me the trip to West Germany but I was supposed to accompany Professor Jan Szczepański, a sociologist who was at that time a close associate of the government. It would have been quite an inappropriate situation for him, as the organizers would have undoubtedly asked him about the reasons for my absence and his presence. Szczepański personally intervened on my behalf in the Foreign Ministry, and they called me to let me know that in spite of the earlier decision I can get a passport. 36 A large group of the opposition had their passports on temporal basis, de- pending on the mind-set of the authorities, the knowledge and policy of the Security Service, and also their personal social status. he authorities usually were less keen on repressing or withdrawn from harassing people who were known in public, had some international support, or were just popular in Church or opposition circles. he government tried to isolate the most unruly indi- viduals, and the whole political arena was full of power abuse, however, most of the actions proved less eicient in reality than in their principles. In the declining years of communism in Poland, the opposition was still too weak to pose a serious threat to the system, but the authorities were not able to destroy the dissidents completely. his was the political deadlock of the 1980s, visible 35 D. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949-1989 (Warszawa 2010), p. 315. Klemens Szaniawski was declined his passport rights for the entire 1980s, also Marek Edelman had problems with traveling abroad. 36 An account by Jerzy Holzer (February 19, 2008), typescript owned by the author. 300  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance not only in Poland but also in other communist states. Ferenc Kőszeg, a Hun- garian oppositionist, who analyzed the symptoms of the disintegration of the political system in Hungary during the reign of János Kádár, wrote ‘when disobedience is common, there is no longer a division between oppositional and normal atitudes — the repression would have to touch so many people that the means of punishment no longer are useful.’ 37 Such situations force the authorities to go into more socially complex politics. Barbara Falk, the author of a great book on the literary output of the Cen- tral and Eastern European samizdat says ‘the boundaries between what was permited and what was not clear. his was the efect of the samizdat.’ 38 A re- cent interview with Jacek Bocheński, the co-creator of the Polish independent publishing, recalled that his book was published oicially during the Martial Law. 39 his poses a paradox — on the one hand, you have internees, such as Wiktor Woroszylski, the leader of the opposition, who was locked away for al- most a year; on the other hand, the censors release to oicial print, ater holding on to it for 10 years, without any apparent reason. he whole period was still full of secret surveillance and aggressive press atacks on this barely tolerated output. However, the authorities did not expect at that time any servile hom- ages in return for privileges of print, and such experienced dissident writers 37 A. Bozóki, “Opozycja demokratyczna na Węgrzech: dyskusje programowe,” Wolność i Solidarność 3 (2012), p. 133. 38 B. J. Falk, he Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe. Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings (Budapest 2003), p. 135. 39 A conversation at a discussion about my sketches on literary underground in PRL at the Polish Academy of Sciences History Institute (May 12, 2012). See also: Wtedy. Rozmowy z Jackiem Bocheńskim (Warszawa 2011). 301 Paweł Sowiński as Woroszylski and Bocheński knew they could not aford to reject proposals for publications, even during the period of the Martial Law. 40 ‘You go ishing to get away from the real world,’ says Hanna Krall in her column entitled meaningfully ‘Smutek ryb’ (sadness of the ish) in ishermen’s magazine Wiadomości wędkarskie 41 felt they were militant members of the opposition. Apart from the declared activists, there were also dissidents who wanted to be in between, and did not side with anybody permanently. ‘All in all, I had three books published and three books retained,’ said Krall in her interview in 1987. She was a courageous author publishing her texts mainly in the underground but not only there. She is deemed one of the inest Polish reporters but obviously also a person who neither wanted to swim with the tide, nor go against it. She wanted to remain apolitical which ended in her writing columns in Wiadomości wędkarskie where she conducted interviews with ‘big ish’ of science and culture. 42 Cultural Strategies From the 1960s Polish opposition grew, challenging more and more taboos in its activities, and discovering new horizons of thought. At irst these were minor counter-cultural behaviors, such as sending parallel petition leters; aterwards, the civil protest intensiied and was more institutionalized with 40 ‘His wife brought him to this visitation a book of poetry of Don Kichote, and a book entitled Kto zabił Puszkina,’ recalls Anna Bikont and Joanna Szczęsna in: Lawina i kamienie (Warszawa 2006), p. 477. 41 Wiadomości wędkarskie 10 (1984), p. 24. Krall wrote for this column from October 1984 to January 1986. 42 “Każdy ma swoją odpowiedź. Z Hanną Krall o Hannie Krall rozmawiała Ewa Szemplińska,” Most 16/17 (1987), p. 133-138; “Mój normalny głos. Z Hanną Krall rozmawia Ewa Polak,” Arka 15 (1986), p. 41-45; Reporterka. Rozmowy z Hanną Krall, ed. J. Antczak (Warszawa 1997). 302  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance the establishment of such organizations as the Workers’ Defence Commitee, or the Movement for Defence of Human and Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela, ROPCiO). he next step was organizing underground publishing, open workshops for the youth, integration of workers and farmers into the movement. Lastly, the emergence of Solidarity which followed an explosion of social dissatisfaction and increase in the amount of samizdat up to December 13, 1981 and the introduction of the Martial Law showing the deepening division of the Polish society. 43 In a nutshell, this was the evolution of the Polish dissident movement. he culminating moment was the introduction of the Martial Law, which pushed people into more desperate measures. Małgorzata Drynio recalls the initiation into ‘Solidarni’ Resistance Group: [Waldemar] Różycki gathered us in the woods, and without any lights on ordered us to stand to aten- tion. He had an electric torch lighting a piece of paper with an oath on it. I cannot remember its words, but I am sure it ended with the following words: ‘You are the soldiers of Underground Poland.’ Ater Różyc- ki inished reading the oath, we have all said on his command: ‘We swear.’ Later, together with [Elżbieta] Rozesłaniec we tried to ask Różycki about any details about the organization we have just signed in. He just said that it has the same aims as Solidarity. However one may call it, this was an escape from the authorities but even these most radical oppositionist had to come 43 A. Friszke, Czas KOR-u. Jacek Kuroń a geneza „Solidarności” (Warszawa 2011). 303 Paweł Sowiński back home, and turn the oicial television, just to, for example, watch a movie. 44 Similar trends are visible in the richly documented study of Tadeusz Ruzi- kowski. Ater a huge drop in audience numbers and the actors’ boycot during the Martial Law, oicial culture have started again to grow — as shown by the statistics, in 1983 people returned to cinemas and theatres. 45 Similarly, any historical or literary publications plainly vanished from the bookshops. Book fairs were sometimes a scene to some real batles over good books. 46 People looked for them in second-hand bookshops, markets, and bought them under the counter. his was a clear sign there was a high demand for books, regardless of their origin. In the 1980s, the most popular titles were available only by subscription, and the authorities prosecuted second-hand bookseller (called ‘book proiteers’), as well as samizdat publishers. Books were treated as quality products, exchange objects, and real treasures. Book lovers spent 44 J. Ramotowski, Sto razy głową w mur (Warszawa 2013). 45 T. Ruzikowski, Stan wojenny w Warszawie i województwie stołecznym 1981-1983 (Warszawa 2009), p. 474. his aim is also brought to us by the book entitled Czasopisma społeczno-kulturalne w okresie PRL, ed. U. Jakubowska (Warszawa 2012), as well as the study of A. Krajewski, Między współpracą a oporem. Twórcy kultury wobec systemu politycznego PRL (1975-1980) (Warszawa 2004). 46 A radio interview of Jerzy Sosnowski with Wiesław Uchański, a president of Iskry Publishing House on reading in PRL from the series “Time Machine of the 3rd Programme.” A brief synopsis at www.polskieradio.pl; L. Żuliński, Foksal 17. Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy (Warszawa 2006). 304  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance hours roaming large cities, going from a one bookstore to another, searching for interesting titles. 47 No group in history was ever alienated from a wider stream of everyday life. 48 hese experiences from bookshops, libraries, and second-hand book- shops shed new light onto the underground book scene. On the hand, it shows the reading market was already developed, and additional publications would have found their audience. More and more readers demanded books, and the number of oicial publications declined due to the economic crisis of the 1980s. 49 here were of course also some titles, which were pure propaganda, or for any other reasons did not become popular with the readers, and illed the shelves in warehouses and shops for entire years. On the other hand, it is clear (judging from the queues outside of bookshops at that time) that samizdat could not have satisied the demand for books alone. Mostly oicial literature won the minds and hearts of Polish people. 50 his is at least the perspective of wide-scoped social research, not limited to the circles within opposition. 47 M. Baczyński, M. Cichy, “Książka na wolności,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 12th September 1997. Likewise is the case with some of the periodicals: ‘400 000 copies of our newspaper is sold every day. Street pedlars sold it in Warszawa at proiteer’s prices, from 400 to 1 000 zloty per copy,’ wrote Polityka about its sales (the price of the paper in oicial distribution was 70 zloty). Perhaps the statement was a bit self-advertising, but without any doubt there were queues in front of newspaper stands, and the best titles were sold almost immediately. “Polityka pod ziemią,” 43, 22nd October 1988, p. 15. 48 W. Kula, Wokół historii (Warszawa 1988), p. 190. 49 Ruch wydawniczy w liczbach (Warszawa 1987), p. 90. See also the typescript about the situation of writers in 1984, private archives of Wiktor Kulerski, in the collection of Stowarzyszenie Archiwum Solidarności; D. Jarosz, Dzieje książki w Polsce 1944-1989. Wybór źródeł (Warszawa 2010), p. 26. 50 he maters of oicial publications were also important to the Culture Department of Central Commitee of the Polish United Workers’ Party See also: Archiwum Akt Nowych, KC PZPR, LVI-1455, LVI-1452, LVI-1450, LVI-1499, LVI-1658. You will ind many materials on the subject there. 305 Paweł Sowiński However, this reasoning may be weakened. In history, not always the mighty ones win. he authorities might have of course had their share of publication accomplishments, although, it is doubtful that long queues for books may be treated as one of them. he opposition’s success was based on something diferent and modern. Its strength lied somewhere else, as described perfectly by Václav Havel in his essay he Power of the Powerless, and lately by Jefrey Goldfarb in he Politics of Small hings. he beginnings are usually quite hum- ble but the fact they are there at all, proves decisive in the end. Without them, the outcome might have been totally diferent. Forbidden literature, which in terms of statistics were hardly visible, proved to be a sensitive gauge of changes. Samizdat contributed to a new quality of life. By means of baby steps it brought us closer to freedom. In 1980s the authorities were no longer in power the way they were before, and no statistics, even the most favorable ones, could prevent them from leaving the political stage. 51 All in all, the identity and uniqueness of the opposition was not determined by culture or economy (the area probably with the most similarities to the communist reality in Poland: diferent lows, mergers, and connections to the deicits — the same economic conditions) but by policy. he dissidents consist- ed mainly of intellectuals, thinkers, visionaries capable of creating a political alternative to the oicial government, people such as activists like Jacek Kuroń or Adam Michnik, and creators of intellectual foundations of the movement in the persons of Antoni Macierewicz or Leszek Moczulski. hese people, as well as their friends and advisers, were the closest correspondent to the term ‘opposition’ we know and use today. heir body of texts, which nowadays can be distinguished and analyzed, proves their political intentions. he political history of those times is the best advocate of the deinition of opposition, as it 51 Timothy Garton Ash also hinted at that problem in his brilliant essays on Central Europe, he Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe (New York 1989). 306  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance separates it convincingly from the rest of the social life, and facilitates repre- sentation of the issue in sources. 52 Yet even these older leaders of anti-communist opposition were nothing like the politicians of today, who lack the intellectual commitment of that pe- riod, but are professionals in governance, members of a democratic parliament, elected and supported by the constituency. Ater the Martial Law was intro- duced, and the downfall of Solidarity as a massive movement, the opposition become less of a policy-driven force, and more of a culture, full of educational events and symbolic gestures, bringing heritage to the future generations. When there was no possibility to discuss anything with government, or even hope of any change for changes in the political system, workers’ strikes could not be enforced, and the only protest took form of street manifestations, the opposition movement had to withdraw. Publishing again became the means of actions, similarly to the times of the Workers’ Defence Commitee in the late 1970s, and sometimes even larger in its scale. his means cultural history was complemented by the political scenario, however, remaining sometimes in odds with it. It is a perspective of memories, interviews, rather than bureaucratic docu- mentation. hese thoughts may have an extremely wide range, anthropologi- cally speaking, not limited to the history of art, music, writers, and poets. It is interesting to see how the protest or distance to it formed in families, passed 52 he most merited author in this ield is Andrzej Friszke, who recently inished a monumental biography of Jacek Kuroń. Kuroń shaped the oppositionist political scene of the communist era. Friszke’s irst book on the subject entitled Historia polityczna opozycji 1945-1980 (London 1994), is already considered a historiographic classic. Some other publications writen in the same vein are: “Solidaritat”: die Geschichte einer reien Gewerkschat in Polen by Jerzy Holzer, the irst monography on Solidarity, as well as Rewolucja Okrągłego Stołu by Jan Skórzyński. However, his newest piece about the Workers’ Defence Commitee shits in a more culture-oriented direction. See also: K. Łabędź, Spory wokół zagadnień programowych w publikacjach opozycji politycznej w Polsce w latach 1981-1989 (Kraków 1997). 307 Paweł Sowiński on from parents to their children. How these behaviors translated into social groups, neighbor circles, and home situations. he source of resistance were sometimes youth, the desire to impress your peers, foolhardiness, and vitality, which sadly leaves people at a certain age. But also elderly people, especially the ones who survived World War II, and remembered the Polish underground of 1939-1945. It is also worth noticing the relations between men and women at those times. Cultural symbols, costumes, and emotions, which assisted them in their everyday experiences. According to the anthropologists, these relations are basic for every human being, which means are crucial also for understanding the political bond, creating a higher level of commitment. his level, however, is not that important to everyone. 53 he shape of the history of our opposition depends on our outlook on the characters and situations of those times. When I get closer to the characters involved, I need to balance the picture and seek other contexts. From time to time it is worth investigating experience of people who never published any banned publications. All in all, one will arrive at a conclusion there are no real symmetries in historical research. You cannot create a perfect picture out of sources. It will always have faults. It is quite clear as long as a problem is tackled from diferent perspectives. his imponderability, homogenization is and will be a central problem. Further investigations are needed deep into 53 he starting point for considerations on the anthropology of communism are the numerous treatises of Andrzej Mencwel. See also: Z. Grębecka, “O potrzebie antropologii komunizmu,” in Sploty kultury, ed. N. Dołowy-Rybińska et al. (Warszawa 2010). More empirical works on this mater include: M. Kurkowska-Budzan, Antykomunistyczne podziemie na Białostocczyźnie: analiza współczesnej symbolizacji przeszłości (Kraków 2009), A. Grupińska, J. Wawrzyniak, Buntownicy. Polskie lata 70. i 80. (Warszawa 2011), K. Dunin, Zadyma (Kraków 2007); E. Kondratowicz, Szminka na sztandarze. Kobiety „Solidarności” 1980-1989: rozmowy (Warszawa 2011); S. Penn, Solidarity Secret: the Women who Defeated Communism in Poland (Ann Arbor 2005), K. S. Long, We All Fought for Freedom. Women in Poland’s Solidarity Movement (New York 1996). 308  Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance the ield, and perhaps even some that will widen the scope of research. One might say — a look of a multidimensional character. hen, and only then, we shall ind why some have chosen the oicial circulation, some samizdat, and other were present in both currents. More conservative perspectives, which put a bold line between the two realities of those times, should be carefully supplemented. At least this is my view, a derivative idea introduced by Professor Marcin Kula in his seminars, and repeated over the years in the interdisciplinary circles of the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, espe- cially in the historical laboratory managed by Professor Andrzej Paczkowski and Professor Andrzej Friszke. Partially, such beliefs are against the current trends of what people want to relive as history. However, as the time goes by, the views will change, whether we like it or not. As we distance ourselves from the period we are so passionate about, its nuances are less and less visible, clear divisions do not mater that much anymore, and unfortunately, the witnesses of these times pass away. But as the time gap becomes larger, we also get a beter glimpse of the big picture. his mix will also bring about further reinterpreta- tions which are inevitable for historical research. Translated by Łukasz Moskała 309  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s Marek Wierzbicki Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s 1 Introduction he last decade of the Polish People’s Republic – PRL (1980-1989) was charac- terized by such rapid social and political changes that within these ten years one can observe at least three distinct periods of diferent social, economic and political circumstances: 1980-1981, when the Independent Self-governing Trade Union Solidarity operated; the period of Martial Law (1981-1983); and the period when the communist system in Poland was in the process of decay (1984-1989). he most active part of the young generation was very quick to react to these changes, and oten took part in them. hey were especially supportive of the peaceful revolution of Solidarity, and assumed its notions as their own. Because of this, the 1980s were marked by activities of independent orga- nizations, movements and youth groups. Some of them concentrated on the struggle to change the political system of the Peoples’ Republic, taking part in the anti-communist political opposition which was well developed at the time. From 1980-1981 the Ministry of Internal Afairs detected 77 underground youth groups and organizations. At the same time, more than 30 student orga- 1 his article was prepared on the basis of Chapter 19 of my book: Ostatni bunt. Młodzieżowa opozycja polityczna u schyłku PRL 1980-1990. Fakty, konteksty, interpretacje (Lublin 2013). 311 Marek Wierzbicki nizations functioned openly, although not always legally. 2 From 1982-1985 the security services detected almost 300 underground youth movements, groups and organizations. In the last years of the communist Poland at least 20 youth political opposition groups were functioning. 3 What they all had in common was giving priority to strictly political activ- ity with the objective of a profound change to the political system in Poland. Interestingly, this emphasis did not come from institutions and organizations within the system; rather, it had a non-systemic character. hese organizations most oten consisted of people aged from 15 to 25, although that was not always the case. One of the most important organizations of this line of opposition was the Independent Students’ Union (ISU), which aspired to defend the interests of Polish students and to play the role of a political force assisting Solidarity in the ield of civil liberties and limiting the monopoly of the communist party (Polish United Workers’ Party). 4 On September 12, 1981 in Gdańsk the Federa- 2 See: “Nielegalne organizacje i grupy młodzieży szkolnej w Polsce w latach 1980- 1982 (opracowanie Instytutu Kryminalistyki i Kryminologii Akademii Spraw Wewnętrznych przygotowane na zlecenie Wydziału Nauki i Oświaty KC PZPR), Warszawa 1985,” in „Jesteście naszą wielką szansą”. Młodzież na rozstajach komunizmu 1944-1989, ed. P. Ceranka, S. Stępień (Warszawa 2009), p. 387-390 and “Informacja dot. [ycząca] sytuacji w środowisku młodzieży,” in „Jesteście naszą wielką szansą”. Młodzież na rozstajach, p. 437. 3 See: D. Cecuda, Leksykon opozycji politycznej w latach 1976-1989 (Toruń 1990). 4 he Independent Students’ Union (Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów - NSZ) was a student organization established at the height of the revolution of Solidarity. It was dissolved under Martial Law, then reappeared at universities spontaneously and as an underground grass-roots organization in 1986 as the so-called II NZS. It was dissolved again on September 22, 1989, and then it removed itself from strictly political activity. 312  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s tion of School Youth (FSY) was established. 5 It was a national structure which consolidated diverse circles, organizations and commitees run by secondary school students. Its work was symbolically continued by the Federation of Fighting Youth (FFY), established in 1984. 6 In 1983 the Movement for Alter- native Society (MAS) appeared, 7 promoting anarchist notions, and in 1985 the Freedom and Peace Movement (FAP) emerged at a time of disillusionment with the weakness of underground organizations. 8 More signiicant opposi- tional organizations such as the Confederation for Independent Poland 9 and Fighting Solidarity 10 had their youth wings. here were also many youth groups and organizations on local levels. he youth wing of the opposition shared their political views with its older circles, but they retained the feeling of uniqueness of their own generation. It was 5 he Federation of School Youth (Federacja Młodzieży Szkolnej - FMS) was a national youth organization with the aim of representing the interests of school students. It had the same program and the same ideals as Solidarity of 1980-1981. Under Martial Law it was forced to cease activity. 6 he Federation of Fighting Youth (Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej - FMW) was a nationwide radical anticommunist youth organization, which existed in 1984-1990. 7 he Movement for Alternative Society (Ruch Społeczeństwa Alternatywnego) was established in 1983, and in 1988 it mutated into the Anarchist Federation (Intercity Anarchist Federation). he movement refused to acknowledge either a communist or capitalist state, and believed that the necessary condition to creating an independent alternative society was regaining independence. 8 he Freedom and Peace Movement (Ruch ‘Wolność i Pokój’ - WiP) emerged in 1985. It wanted to act in a non-violent way and was inspired by paciism and ecology. 9 he Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej - KPN) was an opposition political party, established by Leszek Moczulski in 1979. Its goals were to overthrow the communist regime and regain Poland’s independence of the USSR . 10 Fighting Solidarity was an oppositional organization whose origin was similar to that of Solidarity, established by Kornel Morawiecki in Wrocław in 1982. It was created to express discontent with the passive and conciliatory atitude – as Morawiecki saw it – of the management of the underground Solidarity. MS was determined to ight the communist system until Poland regained independence. 313 Marek Wierzbicki justiied by its speciic features, such as radical aims and methods of operation, an uncompromising desire to overturn the regime and regain independence, and a keen interest in Western youth counter-culture values, inspired by the ideals of the student rebellion of 1968. Young opposition activists enriched the programme of the political opposition with new areas of interest like ecology and paciism while emphasizing the need to solve problems of local commu- nities and struggle for issues important to the whole generation. hey also introduced new forms and methods of operation, like political happenings (popularized by a counterculture movement under the name of Orange Al- ternative 11), holding sit-ins 12 or ruszting. 13 It also advocated mutual activity of diferent factions of young wings of political opposition, who wanted to tackle issues that they found particularly important. Such issues included the struggle to abolish compulsory military preparation classes at universities, to stop the construction of an atomic power plant in Żarnowiec, and to legalize the ISU again in 1989. he irst wave of young opposition which involved the participants of the events of 1980-1983 borrowed its main ideological framework from Solidarity. his framework included such notions as: human dignity understood in the 11 he Orange Alternative (Pomarańczowa Alternatywa) was a counter-culture social and cultural movement, which in the last decade of the PRL organized political happenings mocking the authorities. hese happenings were political demonstrations, street theatre shows and simple entertainment all at once. For example, one of their slogans was ‘All proletarians be beautiful!’ Pomarańczowa Alternatywa w dokumentach aparatu represji PRL (1987-1989), ed. J. Dardzińska, K. Dolata (Wrocław 2011). 12 Sit-ins were a form of a political demonstration borrowed from student movements of the 1960s. he idea was to protest by siting in public places – in streets, in squares, on stairs – which both grabbed the atention of the public and made it diicult for the security services to react. 13 Ruszting was a form of protest which consisted in scatering lealets, hanging banners or giving speeches from the top of scafolding or from rootops of buildings. In order to grab more atention, rusztings were usually organized in city centers. 314  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s context of Christian personalism, truth understood as refraining from lying in the public domain, solidarity between people, social justice, responsibility for common well-being, reinstating the rule of law, freedom, and civic activi- ty. It also borrowed the language of moral and political demands used by the Church and the opposition to demand that the authorities observe human and civic rights and formulate a proposal to reform the socio-political system. his language was elevated by Pope John Paul II during his irst pilgrimage to Poland. hese moral and civic values were connected with national ones, such as independence of the nation and the state, its full sovereignty, and develop- ment and respect for national culture with all its elements: history, literature, science, art and tradition. 14 he next generation of young opposition (1986-1990) not only treated these values as a part of a moral and patriotic heritage handed down by Solidarity, but also added some values of their own, especially those from the realm of the alternative culture. he most important ones were the concentration on private life, individualism, love, a sense of community, friendship, independence and subjectivity, concerning both the authorities and the world of adults. 15 Young oppositionists were irst of all anti-communists, and they saw ighting the regime as the main aim of their own actions, as well as those of their organizations. To a greater or lesser degree they based their identity on Christianity, even if the ideology and programme of their organization were 14 I. Krzemiński, “Solidarność – organizacja polskich nadziei,” in Solidarność – wydarzenie, konsekwencje, pamięć, ed. A. Sułek (Warszawa 2006), p. 16; M. Michalewska-Pawlak, Obywatelskość demokratyczna jako idea normatywna w koncepcjach polityczno-programowych polskiej opozycji w latach 1980-1989 (Gdańsk 2010), p. 267-285. 15 J. Wertenstein-Żuławski, Między nadzieją a rozpaczą: rock, młodzież, społeczeństwo (Warszawa 1993), p. 65; Grizzly. Pismo studentów i absolwentów 2, November-December (1987), p. 3. See also: MIŚ. Międzyuczelniany Informator Środowiskowy [Niezależnego Zrzeszenia Studentów] (Warszawa 1985-1989). 315 Marek Wierzbicki of a letist character. hey were people searching for their own identity and tried to add meaning to their lives by conducting political activity. At the same time they were going through the irst important experiences of their youth. 16 hus, to a large extent, the character of young political opposition was based on ethos. In spite of a wide range of ideological diversity, the young opposition had many qualities in common. First of all, they belonged to an elite, mainly because there were relatively few of them. It is estimated that in the years 1988-1989 about 25-30 thousand people participated in the young oppositional circles, as opposed to about 8 million Poles aged 14-29 and 6 million aged 14-25. 17 he young generation of the 1980s, outside of the period of the legality of Solidarity when young people showed interest in social and political issues, were generally uninterested in politics, directing their energy to private life. Against this back- ground, members of independent organizations were unique in their interest in spiritual values and social and political issues, a heightened national and political awareness, knowledge of recent Polish history, and surely exceptional courage and activism as well. hey were exceptionally sensitive to tensions and contradictions in the social structure of communist Poland, and thus deeply felt the material deprivation blocking their aspirations for a higher standard of living, the contrast between the publicly voiced values and the diiculties in puting them into practice, as well as their exclusion from participation in political decision-making. 18 his unusual social and political awareness was both a blessing – they saw and knew much more than their peers – as well 16 P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie 82-89. Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim we wspomnieniach (1982-1989) (Warszawa 2011); materials from the FFY website: htp://www.fmw.org.pl . 17 Archiwum Akt Nowych, IBPM, sign. 1043, Warunki startu zawodowego młodzieży, ed. by prof. L. Ostrowski, Warszawa 1989, p. 6; J. Wertenstein-Żuławski, Między nadzieją i rozpaczą, p. 6 and the author’s own estimations. 18 M. Śliwa, Ruch Wolność i Pokój 1985-1989. (M.A. thesis, Jagiellonian University, Kraków 1992), p. 70. 316  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s as a curse: they were not able to lead normal lives according to generally ac- cepted rules of conduct. 19 he distinctiveness of the young political opposition was also clearly marked during the period of transformation of 1988-1990, when it headed a move- ment aimed at changing the political system without compromising with the communist government. As a result, radical youth factions of the opposition entered into a conlict with the moderates led by Lech Wałęsa who decided to negotiate with the authorities at the Round Table of February 6-April 5, 1989. he batle was won by the moderate wing, and its adversaries, who were at the peak of their creative abilities and already had considerable experience, were suddenly cast out to the margins of the new political scene. his article answers questions concerning the identity of the most active young opposition activists from the end of the 1980s, who lost their inluence upon the direction of transformation at the beginning of a new political era. Which qualities enabled them to ight the communist regime so efectively, and which made them lose under the new socio-political conditions? Which qualities made them diferent from the rest of the society, especially its young people? How did they see the world? 19 K. Kosiński, “Młodzież lat osiemdziesiątych w świetle badań CBOS oraz wybranych analiz IBPM, MAW i KC PZPR,” Dzieje Najnowsze 2 (2009), p. 117-136. See: T. Junes, Generations of Change. Student Movements and Student Politics in Communist Poland (Leuven 2012). On the politics of the elites, see: J. Szumski, Elity, ich miejsce i rola w społeczeństwie (Katowice 2007). 317 Marek Wierzbicki In the Arms of History he testimonies of the oppositional activists could serve as a ground for sketching their collective, social, mental and spiritual portrait. 20 he irst quality of the young opposition was the fact that they looked back to the past. he co-founder of the Federation of Fighting Youth, Jacek Górski, said ‘history formed our ideological roots.’ 21 It was not an exception, considering the entire backdrop of all opposition movements, and the number of illegal publications from 1976- 1989 collected by the National Library could be seen as proof of this interest in history. Among the books in the National Library, 1 697 are dedicated to history, and by comparison 736 to politics and 137 to economics. 22 he emphasis on the importance of history was a result of the discord between the oicial, falsiied vision of the past given in school books and pro- paganda, and the version discussed in families or churches. Many Poles inde- pendently looked for the truth about the past. What should be emphasized is the importance of traditions of oral transmission of history from generation to generation, as well as foreign Polish-language radio stations like Radio Free Europe. 23 Finally, opposition activists also experienced history directly in their own lives. Many cities in Poland had their own history of more or less violent demonstrations of discontent, many of which, like the massacre of workers in December 1970, reverberated throughout the whole country. he 20 I believe it is worth undertaking such an atempt, in spite of the risk of generalizing and oversimplifying the description of atitudes of the oppositional young wing. In order to minimize this risk, I will concentrate only on the most visible common aspects of young opposition activists. 21 B. Noszczak, “Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej w Warszawie (1984-1989),” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 1(19) (2012), p. 378. 22 P. Sowiński, Zakazana książka. Uczestnicy „drugiego obiegu” 1977-1989 (Warszawa 2011), p. 262-263. 23 See: P. Machcewicz, „Monachijska menażeria”. Walka z Radiem Wolna Europa 1950-1989 (Warszawa 2007). 318  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s most important historical event turned out to be the establishment and legal operation of Solidarity and the explosion of freedom that came with it, which was later crushed during the period of Martial Law. 24 One could also point to the historical notions and images that served as motivation to undertake opposition activity in the inal decade of the Polish People’s Republic, the most important of which was the myth of a 19th century conspiracy, fuelled by the participation of youth. 25 he myths of the Polish Underground State, the Home Army and the Warsaw Uprising were also very popular. hese experiences were seen as the matrix for underground and inde- pendent struggle. Since the Pope’s irst visit to Poland, the myth of St. Stanislaus the Martyr, who as tradition has it was murdered by king Bolesław the Bold for criticising the king’s conduct, was gaining popularity. 26 However, the most potent myth was the legend of Solidarity, which was seen as the embodiment of dreams of freedom, the peaceful ight for human and civic rights as well as the improvement of everyday life and future prospects. he legend of the Independent Students’ Union was also very important, as it mobilized subse- quent groups of students to voice concern for both social and environmental maters. he oppositionists also appreciated the already mythologized role of the student rebellion of 1968, both in Poland and in the West. 27 24 See also materials on the website of the Federation of Fighting Youth: htp://www.fmw.org.pl 25 H. Samsonowicz, “Mity w świadomości historycznej Polaków,” in Oblicza polskości, ed. A. Kłoskowska, (Warszawa 1990), p. 158; P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie’82/89. Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim we wspomnieniach (1982-1990) (Warszawa 2011), p. 130-133, 323; K. Kosiński, Nastolatki’81. Świadomość młodzieży w epoce „Solidarności” (1980-1981) (Warszawa 2002). 26 J. Kubik, he Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power. he Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (University Park, PA 1994), p. 145-150. 27 See: ‘Talking ‘bout my generation’. Conlicts of Generation Building and Europe’s 1968, ed. A. von der Golz (Gotingen 2011). 319 Marek Wierzbicki On the other hand, the young opposition showed a great deal of diversity. For example, the members of such movements as he Movement for Alterna- tive Society or the Freedom and Peace Movement oten rejected traditional patriotism based on history and religion. As one of them recalled: ‘Most peo- ple /…/ thought along the patern God – Honour – Homeland, but we wanted something diferent. hey thought that the state was something good, for us it was a ridiculous cliché. At that time we were listening to Dezerter.’ 28 Still, historical references were not entirely unknown to such groups, which can be seen in the popularity of the person and views of the creator of the Polish version of anarchism, Edward Abramowski. 29 Between Legality and Illegality When I speak about young people, I mean those who shared their time be- tween two main duties: studying (or working, but less frequently) and political activity. he later could be of overt character (like in 1980-81), but not neces- sarily legal (like he Federation of School Youth in 1981 or he Independent Students’ Union in 1988.) Many of them could not maintain balance between these spheres of life: oten political activity was so involving that there was no time let for education. Sometimes atending classes was impossible because someone was in hiding or in prison. Political activity encouraged people to 28 Dezerter – a popular punk rock band of the 1980s. Quotation from: E. Krasucki, “Alternatywne ruchy młodzieżowe wobec zmian społeczno-politycznych końca lat 80. XX wieku,” in Narodziny III Rzeczypospolitej. Pomorze Zachodnie w latach 1988- 1989, ed. M. Machałek, J. Macholak (Szczecin 2006), p. 183. See also: M. Śliwa, „Ruch Wolność i Pokój”, p. 14; J. P. Waluszko, “Czy anarchista w Polsce winien walczyć o jej niepodległość,” in Gorączka czasu przełomu. Dokumenty ugrupowań radykalnych, ed. P. Frączak (Warszawa 1994), p. 70-72. 29 Józef Edward Abramowski (1868-1918), philosopher, sociologist and psychologist. he author of the notion of the ‘stateless socialism.’ 320  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s pay less and less atention to education, which resulted in repeating years in schools and prolonging studies at university. In those times, nobody was surprised that some people spent seven or eight years at university, and not necessarily for political reasons. 30 In the later 1980s the opposition youth activists usually treated their activity as a hobby, but for many it was also a source of income. hey participated in street actions like painting slogans on walls, distributing lealets, taking part in sit-ins and kadrówkas, 31 and writing programmes, statutes, appeals and articles. here were also more mundane but necessary things to be done such as obtaining printing ink, paper, and matrixes, and organizing printing and distribution. In the early 1980s many of them earned additional money in stu- dent cooperatives. At the end of the decade, printing became professionalized and some printing presses ofered decent money for printing or distribution. Printing was also proitable because of the high social demand for independent literature. Andrzej Szozda, of the second Independent Students’ Union, recalls: I mainly dealt underground books, together with Krzysztof Czuma. Sometimes we would even sell a cou- ple of thousand books per month. We had, in fact, a big company. I had a small Fiat car back then. We crossed the city far and wide and delivered books. People from universities in diferent part of Poland visited us in Warsaw. hey received backpacks full of illegal mate- rials, which we got from diferent circles: the NOWa Publishing House, some UPR printing presses. We 30 P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 189. 31 Kadrówkas were a form of street protests, conducted without informing the public opinion, with the help of several insider activists and sympathisers of the opposition. Operating in such a way, they could count on the element of surprise, and any repressions on the part of authorities would be inefective. 321 Marek Wierzbicki also distributed the materials by the underground press Świt. 32 It was ‘a black market of ideas,’ as Paweł Sowiński justly described it, adding that one must not see trading illegal publications only in a business context, because this kind of occupation was risky and temporary. First of all, it involved constant danger from authorities, and secondly, there was a chance of losing all stock without geting paid, for example as a result of dishonest business partners. In order to understand the speciic character of this market – just like the character of the whole communism in Poland – one should bear in mind that selling illegal publications and geting money for printing them required a lot of efort and a network of informal connections. hese connections were oten acquaintances in state-owned printing houses, shop assistants and drivers who facilitated illegal purchases. Oten the goods were paid for with a botle of vodka or homemade alcohol. At times, the printing was done ater hours by employees of state-owned printing presses looking to make some additional money. 33 his ‘life of pretence’ had had a long tradition in Poland, but at the end of the Polish People’s Republic its presence became overwhelming. It resided in the notorious gap between theory and practice, disregarding regulations and decrees of the authorities, mixing private and state-owned property as well as the oicial and private spheres, only pretending to be doing things, or doing them in diferently from the intention of those who initiated them. 34 Young opposition activists operated on the borderline between the legal and the illegal, as well as that between the oicial and private worlds. In the period 32 P. Pleskot. R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 189. 33 P. Sowiński, Zakazana książka, p. 174-182. 34 See: M. Kula, “W PRL: życie na niby?,” in Buntownicy. Polskie lata 70 i 80, ed. A. Grupińska, J. Wawrzyniak, (Warszawa 2011), p. 491-496; J. Kochanowski, Tylnymi drzwiami. Czarny rynek w Polsce 1944-1989 (Warszawa 2010). 322  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s when Solidarity was allowed to operate, they were granted the luxury of the right to speak their minds and reach their goals. Martial Law forced them into the political underground, in which they had to conspire to hide the character and the scale of their activities. In the late 1980s this gap became even wider. he last years of communism in Poland were characterised by a lower level of repression towards the actions of the opposition, but there was litle hope for signiicant political change. All these issues presented the conspirators with the choice between staying underground or exposing themselves and waiting for the collapse of communism, which seemed distant at the time. he answer to the question whether to conspire or not was not simple. he environment of the Freedom and Peace Movement chose confronting the sys- tem openly, and believed that it was an assumption that formed the identity of the movement. However, most of the organizations decided to remain in the underground – in a sense, against reality. he reality was that since September 1986 when amnesty for political prisoners was announced, more organizations of the ‘older’ opposition decided to act openly. But the largest young opposition groups displayed rather opposite tendencies. In the Federation of Fighting Youth it was normal to use pseudonyms, codes, code words, double-checks and other conspirational elements. Even during the proceedings of the Round Table, the Gdańsk branch of the Federation organized a training camp in the Bieszczady mountains with the main goal of teaching the principles of clandestine activity to its members. Many of them started to publicly reveal their true names and telephone numbers only in the autumn of that year. 35 Although on the one hand the members tried to maintain an air of conspira- cy, in many cases they were unable to do so efectively; for example, they shared conidential information at social meetings where outsiders were included. At 35 See the account of Aleksandra Bakiera on the Federation of the Fighting Youth website. htp://www.fmw.org.pl 323 Marek Wierzbicki universities, many students knew full well that their some of their peers were underground activists. Of course, it gave the impression of being a prestigious ailiation, but only up to a point. When amnesty was announced, it turned out that they were very old-fash- ioned or even grotesque when compared with the old opposition. For many the necessity to give up clandestine activity ater a year or two was a dramatic decision, because they expected to stay underground until full victory was achieved. Suddenly they had to accept the changing reality of public and op- positional lives. In the following years, they started to enter the ‘grey zone’ of politics, engaging in activities that were still illegal, but overt. In 1988, he Independent Students’ Union had even rooms at the Warsaw University in which its activists worked. In the university courtyard illegal materials were sold openly. 36 Customs and Communication In the everyday life of the rebels, social and clandestine lives were intertwined. his was no surprise, because the activists spent a lot of time together. 37 heir older oppositional colleagues still operated in a diferent way, based on circles of friends. Common activities brought young activists closer to each other because they thought of underground as a passion that only could be shared with those of a similar ilk. Common experiences were a source of strong con- nections which grew into life-long friendships. he process also worked in the opposite direction, as close friends decided to undertake underground political activities together. 36 P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 315. 37 J. Górski, Moje PRL-owskie dzieciństwo, (memories on the FFY website); the account of Robert Kwiatek on the FFY website. htp://www.fmw.org.pl 324  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s It was no accident, then, that the questions: ‘How would you describe your social life as a Freedom and Peace Movement activist?’ and, ‘Did you stay in the close group of activists, or did you take part in the social lives of other groups?’ were answered by 78 Freedom and Peace Movement activists in the following way: 18 people said that they ‘exclusively socialised’ with other activists, 28 said ‘mainly,’ 24 indicated ‘partially,’ and 6 responded with ‘hardly.’ Śliwa’s opinion that the activists created a kind of a ‘gheto’ which satisied their social needs, among others, seems to be accurate. 38 In other groups and circles the situation must have been similar. he activists spent their time together and organized birthday parties and cultural and sporting events. ‘At that time private lives, school, parties and opposition were all closely interconnected,’ Jarosław Hołownia recalls. 39 Parties and social meetings were organized on many occasions, or for no particular reason at all, and they usually involved heavy drinking. ‘his brought people closer, and was necessary, because, as everyone knows, each action was very stressful, and ater a few such actions or other activities it was only natural to relax and have a party,’ one of the Freedom and Peace Movement activists recalls. he more stress, the more need to relax. As Wojciech ‘Jacob’ Jankowski recalls, in December 1987, ater the end of a hunger strike in defence of Sławomir Dutkiewicz and others who refused to do military service, 40 he and other FAP 38 M. Śliwa, „Ruch Wolność i Pokój,” p. 69. 39 K. Stachurska, “Żeby nie być szarym. Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej (1984-1989) w świetle relacji, prasy podziemnej i zbiorów Archiwum Ośrodka ARTA.” (MA thesis, Warsaw University, Warszawa, June 2009), p. 20. 40 See: B. Hrybacz, “Pamiętnik z głodówki,” in Wielka Gra, młodzieżowe pismo oświaty niezależnej 9 (April 1988), p. 1, 8-10. 325 Marek Wierzbicki activists organized a party which they called ‘he Grande Boufe.’ 41 During the hunger strike the participating activists had fantasized about the dishes that they would like to eat during the party. Everyone had to bring a dish for 21 people. hen, the whole group in fancy dress had a thunderous party for the next three days, during which moral limitations were forgoten. As Jankowski said, when Adam Michnik dropped in, he was shocked at irst, but then said that he had enjoyed the party and indeed, the Freedom and Peace Movement was unique in its unconventional atitude to life. 42 In other circles of young opposition wild parties were also a frequent pas- time. Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska recalls a New Year’s Eve Party organized in 1988 in the lat of Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna - PPS) activist Piotr Ikonowicz, with the participation of Independent Students’ Union activists. he party marked the end of a week-long hunger strike in defence of imprisoned Czechoslovakian students. he ISU representatives had to wait until midnight, when the protest oicially ended, until they ate anything. A remarkable situation took place: several men went on hunger strike in Ikono- wicz’s tiny apartment, in which his wife and newborn daughter also lived. Also, ater Tomasz Ziemiński was chosen the president of ISU in early 1989, it was celebrated with a party in the apartment of Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska. 43 It was also characteristic for the young opposition of that period to organize camps, rallies and common holidays. heir aim was to integrate representa- tives of diferent organizations. Sometimes the goals were more ambitious, as in the case of the Gdańsk Movement for Alternative Society (MAS) who wanted ‘politicians’ to get together with counterculture performers, musicians, 41 ‘he Grande Boufe’ is a well-known French-Italian production from 1973, directed by Marco Ferreri, which was perceived to be a satire of consumerist society. In its inal scene the protagonists die ater a long orgy of food and sex. 42 W. Jankowski, „Stan bezwładzy,” Karta 6 (1991), p. 66. 43 P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 117-136. 326  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s painters and writers. During the so-called ‘Hyde Parks,’ irst organized in 1985, members of MAS, FAP, FFY and ISU met with representatives of subcultures, especially punks and skinheads. As the leader of MAS, J.P. Waluszko recalls that the number of participants at such events in 1989 ranged from 200 to over a thousand. Political events were mixed with happenings, concerts and dance parties. So much alcohol was consumed that at times the events became drunken parties more than political events. 44 During a summer camp organized by the Movement of Independent Youth – he Interschool Commitee from Wrocław the participants – about sixty people – for two weeks refused to take part in discussions, lectures, or printing camp newsleters and instead lay on the beach, bathed in the lake, sang songs by the bonire and consumed beer. In the third week the leaders of the organization appeared and forced them to participate in classes. he camp ended with an all-night bonire party, where everyone enjoyed themselves. In spite of many shortcomings, especially passivity and lack of responsibility on the part of participants and bad organization, people had nostalgic memories of the summer camp, mainly because of its social aspects. 45 Yet another interesting issue is the internal and external communication among the opposition. At irst, ‘grown-up’ language was used, which was serious, full of pathos and relected the way in which older oppositionists saw the world. But soon the young wing began using slang, which was rather incomprehensible for older people. In this way young opposition established a rapport with its social background, young people who did not belong to any organizations. he language of mass youth culture played the role of a code used by young people to communicate with each other. he use of neologisms, borrowings from En- 44 M. Śliwa, „Ruch Wolność i Pokój,” p. 9. 45 B. Sokołowska-Pabjan, M. Drozd, W. Kras, ed., Międzyszkolny Komitet Oporu (Warszawa 2010), p. 62-63. 327 Marek Wierzbicki glish, fragments of lyrics of popular songs and unconventional grammar and syntax made it hermetic and inaccessible to other people. he language also strengthened the identity and the feeling of uniqueness among young people. 46 he rejection of hierarchy among opposition activists promoted the es- tablishment of contacts, and helped to build rapport and understanding with other people. For movements such as FAP or MAS this principle was elevated to dogma, which constituted the identity of the milieu, its functioning and atitude to individual and collective life. Other opposition groups displayed similar tendencies, which relected the customs and habits observable among the whole youth wing. he atmosphere of ISU at Warsaw University is recalled by Jan Szczerba, one of its activists: It was cool, because ISU was at the same time a big force in terms of opposition as well as social life. here was not much hierarchy – although we had manage- ment, nobody could feel any hierarchy. here were many people among us who were very popular so- cially. 47 No young activist was surprised by how easily one could obtain food, shelter and material support in practically any oppositional circle. he atmosphere of democracy, egalitarianism and openness to others was a feature of their identity practically throughout the whole period of the decay of the Polish People’s Republic (1980-1989). An issue connected with the above was a relaxed atitude towards time. As Remigiusz Kasprzycki noticed, time was perceived 46 K. Kosiński, Oicjalne i prywatne życie młodzieży w PRL (Warszawa 2006), p. 337-343. 47 P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 237. 328  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s as something relative, just as money was at that time. 48 Andrzej Stasiuk, a FAP activist then, wrote the following words about his youth: he mid-1980s was simply a wonderland. Time did not exist, it seemed. Or at least, it existed only in small frac- tions. It lasted from one event to another, stopped, and it had to start again. Possibly it was going somewhere, but we had the feeling that we would always make it, that if something happened, we weren’t going to miss it. Everything was close. Nobody was in a hurry. You dropped in at someone’s place, and stayed until the morning. Try doing something like this today. Yes. We were the last happy generation. 49 Partying and having fun also became a way of generational communication, as it was seen as a means of expressing aspirations, needs and opinions. Its im- portance was clearly visible at the end of the 1980s, which could be explained by the inluence of counterculture movements (as in the case of the Orange Alternative) as well as by the mentality of the young opposition. Entering the world of politics from 1986-1989, most of them were teenagers, which could be a hypothetical explanation of their interest in enjoying themselves. Using fun in political activity changed its character, leading to a connection between 48 R. Kasprzycki, Opozycja polityczna w Krakowie w latach 1988-1989 (Kraków 2003), p. 151; see also: P. Kenney, Rewolucyjny karnawał. Europa Środkowa 1989 (Wrocław 2005), p. 206-210 (Polish translation of A Carnival of Revolution. Central Europe 1989, 2001); P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 165-174. 49 A. Stasiuk, Jak zostałem pisarzem (próba autobiograii intelektualnej) (Czarne 1998), p. 105-106; R. Kasprzycki, Opozycja polityczna, p. 151. 329 Marek Wierzbicki homo politicus with homo ludens. 50 If entertainment and fun became a signii- cant if not the dominant current of mass culture of the 20th century, its transfer into the sphere of politics, especially by young people, shaped by mass and electronic media, should be seen as a natural process. New forms of political activity, like happenings, were a kind of play, also present in ruszting, which connected the kinds of acrobatic tricks associated with the shows of street acrobats in the Middle Ages and the Modern Era with political messages. A competition between members of FAP in 1988 to get ined as oten as possible (with no intention of paying the ines, of course) was also a form of play. Some treated being chased by ZOMO (the anti-riot armed militia) throughout the courtyards of Gdańsk as fun, and others stole tramway number plates in order to put them back with anti-system messages. Some editors of underground papers also saw their work as entertainment. 51 One of the most important ways in which opposition communicated with their non-involved peers were underground materials. Until 1985 they were similar to those printed by the older opposition and were dominated by histor- ical, political or international issues tackled in long articles, with absolutely no visual appeal. From 1986 onwards the situation underwent a dramatic change. A large number of student periodicals started to appear, issued by both high school and university (ISU) students. Most of them were of local character, circulating only in one school, district, town, university or even department. he content also changed as editors started to devote more time to issues likely to interest a young readership. Less was writen about ‘serious politics,’ and more 50 See. J. Huizinga, Homo ludens. Zabawa jako źródło kultury (Warszawa 2011) – Polish translation of Huizinga’s Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture (1971). Huizinga points to play/games as an important element of culture connecting entertainment with competition, and being a source of many cultural phenomena like war, poetry, art or celebrations. 51 P. Kenney, Rewolucyjny karnawał, p. 210-211. 330  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s about the everyday life of the young generation, oten defending its interests. hese papers started to entertain the audience, featuring articles on cultural events, holidays, free time and romantic issues, oten treated in a satirical way. he visuals improved greatly, as more space was devoted to photos, comic car- toons or drawings than to the writen word. Some underground magazines (like these of FFY) did not satisfy young readers, who complained of their sloppy editing, spelling mistakes, poor printing or boring content. 52 A good case in point of this evolution was the periodical Szkoła (School), called Szkoła Podziemna (Underground School) until 1986. Dropping the ad- jective was not only a formal solution, but it meant a change of proile and style of the periodical. It was taken over by students who did not remember the time of Martial Law. Editors tried to establish a dialogue with readers, for example by conducting opinion polls in which the readers could express their views on the magazine. It also cooperated with school councils, sometimes adding new impact to what they did. his was beneicial to both sides: Szkoła tackled issues connected with the lives of students and schools, and readers undertook action against the fossilized school system, for example by boycoting working Saturdays or the International Workers’ Day (the 1st of May) celebrations in 1987. It was thus not only a political periodical, but also one targeted at young people, like the oicial weekly Na Przełaj. Other periodicals like those print- ed by ISU of Warsaw University also wanted to maintain relations with the audience, for example by placing messages for organizations, groups, or even individual people. his explains their popularity: in Warsaw alone 18 ISU pe- 52 P. Kenney, Rewolucyjny karnawał, p. 206-211; K. Stachurska, “Żeby nie być szarym. Federacja,” p. 31-34. 331 Marek Wierzbicki riodicals appeared, and throughout Poland there were about 200. FFY printed about 200 periodicals, mainly school ones. 53 Conclusions Young opposition and their organizations played an important role in the political and social life in Poland of the 1980s, a role which has not yet been properly acknowledged. Its importance lay in the fact that it continued the struggle for independence both in the individual and collective dimension. he activity of young opposition was the last wave of political young oppositional movements which appeared on the arena in the 19th century to appeal for the right of Poles to be independent. his activity showed cultural continuity with its predecessors. On the other hand, the activity had all features of modern horizontal net- work structures, which emphasised the negative atitude to traditional hierarchy and paterns of dissent that had become fossilized in the previous decades. Young opposition played an important culture-forming role by propagating new ideas, paterns of activity and social resistance. Moreover, thanks to them, organizations of the young segment of the opposition became the most import- ant grassroots form of modernizing Poland. hey propagated new paterns of behaviour by popularizing elements of mass youth culture like slang, fashion and music. Young people of those days, especially those involved in social and political maters, set the trends for the development of the state and society. For example, they promoted Western political system paterns of parliamentary democracy, political pluralism and a market economy. In a surprising way they connected the striving for radical social and political change with opting for 53 P. Kenney, Rewolucyjny karnawał, p. 206-210; P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 165- 174. See: Międzyszkolny Komitet Oporu…, a CD with issues of the Szkoła periodical electronic version. 332  Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s the preservation of traditional moral, religious and national values. In this, it had a markedly conservative strain. Young opposition not only tried to realize its political goals, but also took on the role of youth trade unions and struggled for the rights and interests of its generation together with other social, cultural and identity movements. he elements of alternative culture (counterculture) perceivable in the way the young opposition operated were a clear cultural code, a sign of a generational link and community which turned out to be more powerful than connections with adults. Political activists among young people had qualities which on the one hand gave them strength for a long struggle to realize the ideals of freedom, subjectivity, justice, democracy and independence. hese qualities were above all outstanding political and social awareness, courage, energy, belief in ideals, activity, and radicalism. On the other hand, these qualities did not allow them to take a cool and rational view of the political game going on between the authorities and the opposition, or on the geo-political conditions which they were unable to evaluate, not necessarily in the context of struggle for realiz- ing national imponderables, but in the context of compromise necessary for achieving the scope of freedom available at the time. Idealistic perception of political life did not allow young activists to observe the necessity to regain independence through gradual, evolutionary changes, which – at least at the beginning of the transformation period of 1988-1989 – assumed that compro- mise with the authorities would be necessary. he failure to observe this logic of events caused the defeat of the young political opposition as a political entity, and its inal elimination from public life. Translated by Anna Sekułowicz 333  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union Dainius Žalimas The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union he aim of this article is to examine, from the standpoint of international law, the status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union in the period of 1940-1990. Certainly there is suicient uniformity of views on this issue, as well as in general, on the illegality of the 1940 annexation and the legal continuity of the Baltic States. 1 However, these issues are not always suiciently clariied, in particular for the public, when they come to the more concrete details or events, such as how to treat the former Lithuanian SSR and its ‘national’ au- thorities; or what the status of the members of the Lithuanian Resistance was, in particular those who participated in the underground political organisations 1 E.g., a comprehensive bibliography consisting of more than 100 positions on maters related to Baltic statehood is provided by D. A. Loeber in: D. A. Loeber, “Legal Consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for the Baltic States: On the Obligation ‘to Overcome the Problems Inherited from the Past,’” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 1 (2001), p. 153-166. In addition, see the relevant articles of L. Mälksoo, R. Satkauskas, I. Ziemele, and D. Žalimas in 1 and 3 Baltic Yearbook of International Law (2001, 2003) and, e.g., the following publications: R. Kherad, “La Réconnaisance Internationale des Etats Baltes,” in he Baltic Path to Independence, ed. A. Sprudzs (New York: William S. Hein & Co., 1994), p. 293-322; R. Yakemtchouk, “Les republiques baltes en droit international: Echec d’une annexation operee en violation du droit des gens,” in he Baltic Path to Independence, ed. A. Sprudzs (New York: William S. Hein & Co., 1994), p. 261-291; I. Ziemele, State Continuity and Nationality: the Baltic States and Russia (Leiden: Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 2005), p. 21-43; L. Malksoo, Illegal Annexation and State Continuity: the Case of the Incorporation of the Baltic States by the USSR (Leiden: Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 2003), p. 45-77; D. Žalimas, Lietuvos Respublikos nepriklausomybės atkūrimo 1990 m. kovo 11 d. tarptautiniai teisiniai pagrindai ir pasekmės (Vilnius: Demokratinės politikos institutas, 2005), p. 257-261. 335 Dainius Žalimas ater the suppression of the armed Resistance; or how to assess the events of January 1991 in Vilnius (i.e., as an act of aggression or an atempted coup d’état). In the wider Central and Eastern European context questions arise about the diferences in the international legal status of Lithuania and the other two Baltic States, on the one hand, and the former Soviet republics, like Belarus or Ukraine, on the other, or about the diferences between the Baltic States, which had been incorporated into the USSR, and the Central European States (e.g., Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania), which were formally independent in the Soviet-led socialist camp (soclagerj) but also had Soviet troops deployed on their soil. It is unlikely that all of these issues can be addressed in one article, but they all have a common core, that is, the international legal status of Lithuania from 1940; in turn, the key issue here is the international legal assessment of the Soviet acts against Lithuania undertaken in June 1940. Recalling an answer to that key issue is the irst reason for this article: if one knows the legally sound answer to the question of what happened in Lithuania in 1940, then it will not be hard to resolve all other questions related to Lithuania’s history from 1940-1990. One more reason to recall the international legal assessment of the events of 1940, and in general Lithuania from 1940-1990, is that sometimes in political, historical or even legal discourse one can notice a certain reluctance to call things by their true names, avoiding, for example, such terms as ‘aggression’ or ‘occupation’ and to use instead more neutral terms, such as ‘annexation’ or ‘incorporation.’ his is an expression of ‘political correctness,’ due to which we sometimes tend to forget that there were actually two aggressors responsible for the beginning of WWII: it was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939 which opened the way for Nazi Germany to launch aggression against Poland, soon followed by the Soviet Union and the division of Poland by these two states; it then also gave a free hand to the Soviet Union to start war against 336  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union Finland, to commit aggression against Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and to seize a part of Romania. Apart from political correctness, one can also notice open atempts to deny the Soviet crimes, in particular from the side of the Russian Federation, which claims to continue the international legal personality of the USSR. One of the most striking examples is that, disregarding the provisions of the 1991 Treaty with Lithuania on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations, 2 since approximately 2000 Russia has taken a line on justiication of the 1940 Soviet seizure of the Baltic States 3 and has even made the gloriication of the Soviet 2 In the preamble of this Treaty Russia expressed its conviction that the USSR had to remove the consequences of the 1940 annexation of Lithuania. However, most importantly, by virtue of Article 1 of the Treaty, Russia recognised the Republic of Lithuania as a fully-ledged subject of international law and a sovereign State under its State status deined in the fundamental acts of 11 March 1990. his means that Russia has recognised all the principles declared by those acts and the March 11, 1990 Act on the Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Lithuania, including the fact of the 1940 aggression against Lithuania, the illegality of the subsequent occupation and annexation of Lithuania, and the legal continuity and identity of the Republic of Lithuania inherent in the acts of March 11, 1990; i.e., in general Russia has accepted the concept of the State of Lithuania which was founded in 1918 and liberated on 11 March 1990 from Soviet occupation which began in 1940. See: the July 29, 1991 Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, Lietuvos aidas, 30 July 1991; English text of the Treaty in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 1 (1998), <htp://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/ File/1998-1/Treaty.pdf> (accessed on 1 November 2013). 3 he most characteristic here is the June 9, 2000 Statement No. 342 of the Ministry of Foreign Afairs of the Russian Federation concerning the beginning to consider by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania the drat Law on Compensation of the Damage Resulting from the Soviet Occupation, in which material claims to Russia are raised, see the full English text in: D. Žalimas, “Commentary to the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the Occupation of the USSR,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 3 (2003), p. 120-121 (footnote 56). Inter alia this Statement declared that ‘the USSR troops were introduced (into Lithuania) in 1940 with the consent of the highest leadership of that State, which had been received in the framework of international law of that time. During the Soviet period there (in Lithuania) the power functions had been exercised by national authorities. he 3 August 1940 Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on Lithuania’s 337 Dainius Žalimas past (including Stalin’s period) a part of its oicial ideology. 4 hus, it is also worth investigating whether the denial of Soviet crimes could have any ground in international law. Before assessing the 1940 Soviet acts taken with respect to Lithuania in the light of international law, it is reasonable to recall the broader international context of that time: the 1939 secret agreements of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the German Reich and the USSR, which was the starting point of a number of forceful acts commited by those two states against others, in- cluding the incorporation of Lithuania and the two other Baltic States into the Soviet Union. herefore the irst part of this article deals with the international legal evaluation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in order to demonstrate whether the Soviet acts of 1940 could have any legal grounds arising out of the pact. hough, certainly, the conclusion of the pact and the subsequent Soviet actions against Lithuania can be seen as separate historical events that admission to the Soviet Union was preceded by the corresponding appeals of the highest representative organs of the Baltic States’ and concluded that ‘it is wrong to qualify Lithuania’s entry into the USSR as the result of unilateral actions of the later. Statements about Lithuania’s “occupation” and “annexation” by the Soviet Union, as well as related claims of any nature ignore political, historical and juridical realities and, consequently, are groundless.’ 4 E.g., on November 8, 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Afairs of the Russian Federation released a statement on the judicial prosecution by Lithuania of the former Soviet security oicial M. Tabakaev, in which it condemned the conviction of the said person for the deportation of the Lithuanian population from the territory of the occupied Lithuania to the Soviet Union; the Russian Ministry of Foreign Afairs also stated that this kind of conviction was grounded on an allegedly false concept of the Soviet occupation, and promised all the material and moral support for the convicted person and other Soviet veterans allegedly persecuted for political reasons. See: the November 8, 2012 Response of the Oicial Representative of the MFA of the Russian Federation A. K. Lukashevich to the Question of Mass Media Regarding the Judicial Prosecution of the Veteran of the USSR Law-Enforcement Organs M. Tabakaev, <htp://www.mid. ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/F48062F0D44BE58044257AB000586E32> (accessed on 26 February 2013). 338  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union can be assessed separately, 5 i.e. the legal qualiication of the events of 1940 would nevertheless be the same, with or without taking into account the legal assessment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. he second and most important part of this article is designed namely for the international legal assessment of the 1940 Soviet acts taken in and with respect to Lithuania. Logically, the subsequent parts are devoted to the out- come of that assessment: the third part examines the international legal status of Lithuania from 1940 to 1990, including the status of the Lithuanian SSR, the key issue being whether Lithuania has ever been a legitimate part of the former USSR, while the fourth and inal part is focused on the legal status of the Resistance against Soviet rule in Lithuania. It is assumed that the reader is familiar enough with the historical back- ground of the events that fall within the scope of this article. herefore only the main historical facts and their most signiicant details, as far as they are necessary for the international legal analysis, are provided in this article. 5 N. Šepetys, Molotovo – Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva (Vilnius: Aidai, 2006), p. 75-76. 339 Dainius Žalimas International Legal Assessment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact It is well known that on August 23 and September 28, 1939 the German Re- ich and the USSR signed two secret protocols on the division of the spheres of interests in Europe, including the fate of Lithuania (those two protocols together with the third, 6 dated January 10, 1941 are usually referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 7). he Republic of Lithuania, whose independence had been oicially recognised by the international community, including both signatories of those protocols, was inally assigned to the Soviet zone of interests, and ‘the special measures’ to be taken by the Soviet government to protect its interests on Lithuania’s territory were already foreseen in the second protocol. hose special measures in practice brought about the occupation and annex- ation of Lithuania in 1940. 8 As the true content of political agreements can be seen from mutual relations and intentions of the parties to those agreements, 9 one can state that without any doubt the true intentions of the parties to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were aggressive. 10 In essence the German Reich 6 According to this protocol, in exchange for monetary compensation from the Soviet Union the German Reich waived its claim to a part of Lithuania’s territory that had been assigned to Germany pursuant to the second secret protocol of September 28, 1939, as this part of Lithuania’s territory from June 15, 1940 had already been seized by the Soviets. 7 Texts of all three protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact can be found, e.g., in: Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 39(2) (1990), p. 208-233; СССР – Германия, 1939-1941, vol. 1 (Vilnius: Mokslas, 1989), p. 62-64, 109-110; СССР – Германия, 1939-1941, vol. 2 (Mokslas, Vilnius, 1989), p. 141. 8 his is also one of the conclusions reached in 1989 by the Commission of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR for the Examination of the German- Soviet Agreements of 1939 and their Consequences. See the August 21, 1989 Conclusions of the Commission in: Tiesa, 22 August 1989. 9 И. И. Лукашук, Международное право: общая часть (Москва: БЕК, 1996), p. 32-33. 10 L. Hannikainen, “he Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Imperative Norms of International Law,” Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 39(2) (1990), p. 136. 340  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union and the USSR agreed on a territorial division between themselves not only of Poland, but also of Lithuania (as a part of Lithuania’s territory was assigned to Germany), as well as to harmonise their aggressive plans (territorial seizures) against the other states. From the standpoint of international law, the secret protocols of the Mo- lotov-Ribbentrop Pact have to be regarded as null and void, ‘invalid from the very moment of their signing (ex nunc).’ 11 hey were declared null and void by both signatories in 1989. 12 In particular, the Soviet Union declared that by the December 24, 1989 Resolution of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR on the Political and Juridical Appraisal of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty of 1939, 13 whereby the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR, then being the supreme authority of the Soviet Union, also stated that ‘territorial divisions into Soviet and German “spheres of inluence” […] from the standpoint of international law were in conlict with the sovereignty and independence of several third countries’ (here the Congress was referring to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Finland) and that, although the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had not formed a new basis for relationships of the USSR with those third countries, they were used ‘for ultimatums and pressure by force on (those) other States in breach of legal obligations assumed (by the 11 H. Lindpere, “Evaluation of the Soviet-German Pacts of August 23 and September 28, 1939, from the Standpoint of International Law,” Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 39(2) (1990), p. 106. 12 D. A. Loeber referred to the September 1, 1989 special Declaration on this issue made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. See: D. A. Loeber, “Consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for Lithuania of Today: International Law Aspects,” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 4 (1999), p. 104; D. A. Loeber, “Legal Consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for the Baltic States: On the Obligation ‘to Overcome the Problems Inherited from the Past,’” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 1 (2001), p. 131. 13 English text see in: Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 39(2) (1990), p. 198-199. 341 Dainius Žalimas USSR) towards those States’ (the Congress also speciically noted that the relationships of the USSR with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia had been based on the 1920 peace treaties and the 1926-1933 non-aggression treaties). Several legal grounds for nullifying the secret protocols of the Molotov-Rib- bentrop Pact might be mentioned. First of all, their conclusion and realisation contravened the main principles of international law that were already in force in 1939, 14 such as irst and foremost the prohibition of aggression (this prin- ciple followed from Art. I of the Briand-Kellogg Pact 15 which had already be- come a part of customary international law 16) and the respect to sovereignty of other states (the obligation to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of states was stipulated in Art. 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 17). According to the well- known Stimson Doctrine that emerged in international law in 1932, it is a duty of all states not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or 14 he August 21, 1989 Conclusions of the Commission of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR for the Examination of the German-Soviet Agreements of 1939 and their Consequences, supra note 8. 15 hat is the unoicial name of the August 27, 1928 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy. See: League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 94, p. 57 (No. 2137): htp://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ UNTS/LON/Volume%2094/v94.pdf (accessed on 15 November 2013). Under Art. I of this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounced it as an instrument of national policy. 16 C. D. Wallace, “Kellogg-Briand Pact,” Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 3 (1982), p. 238. 17 he 28 April 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations. See the UNHCR webpage: htp:// www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3dd8b9854 pdf (accessed on 15 November 2013). 342  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union the Briand-Kellogg Pact. 18 Secondly, from the standpoint of modern interna- tional law the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were in conlict with a peremptory norm jus cogens prohibiting aggression: according to Art. 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 19 a treaty is void if it conlicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. hirdly, the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact efaced the very raison d’être of the earlier treaties dealing with political status of territory, 20 i.e. the conclu- sion of such protocols was prohibited by the earlier bilateral and multilateral treaties. 21 Fourthly, the secret protocols breached ‘the universally recognised principle of law of treaties pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt – a treaty does not grant rights in regard to the third party nor does it create obligations to it.’ 22 And, inally, the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had 18 See: W. J. H. Hough III, “he Annexation of the Baltic States and Its Efect on the Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory,” New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 6:2 (1985), p. 327-329. 19 See: United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331: htp://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/ instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (last accessed on 15 November 2013). 20 V. Vadapalas, V. Žalys, “Secret Protocols to the Soviet-German Treaties of 1939 and the Problem of Prescription in International Law,” Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 39(2) (1990), p. 130. 21 Apart from the mentioned multilateral treaties (the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations), one can also recall in this regard bilateral treaties of the USSR and the Republic of Lithuania: e.g., by concluding the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet Union breached its obligations under Art. I of the 1920 Peace Treaty with Lithuania, according to which the then Soviet Russia unreservedly recognised the independence of Lithuania and renounced forever all sovereign rights over the Lithuanian people and territory, and under Art. 2 of the 1926 Non-aggression Treaty with Lithuania that placed both parties under the obligation ‘to respect in all circumstances the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other.’ See D. Žalimas, “Legal Issues on the Continuity of the Republic of Lithuania,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 1 (2001), p. 3. 22 R. Müllerson, “Soviet-German Agreements of 1939 in the Light of International Law,” Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 39(2) (1990), p. 116. 343 Dainius Žalimas never had any legitimate object, as their object was the territory of third states that had not belonged either of the signatories; therefore it is only logical that, as a treaty without an object, the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact could never come into force. As a consequence, those protocols could not produce any rights for the USSR towards Lithuania, nor could they serve as any legal basis or justiication for the Soviet acts against and in Lithuania. he nullity of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is re- garded as a well-established historical and legal fact, on which there is a gen- eral consensus by the European Court of Human Rights. 23 For instance, the Grand Chamber of the Court in the Ždanoka v. Latvia case 24 noted that the Baltic States lost their independence ‘in 1940 in the atermath of the partition of Central and Eastern Europe agreed upon by Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union by way of secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an agreement contrary to the generally recognised principles of international law.’ 25 23 In its case-law the European Court of Justice accepts well-known historical truths and the facts established in international law as well as relies on the general consensus on those issues. See: V. Milašiūtė, “History of the Communist Regime in the European Court of Human Rights Cases,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 9 (2009), p. 51-53, 67. 24 Ždanoka v. Latvia, 16 March 2006, ECHR [GC], no. 58278/00: htp://hudoc.echr.coe. int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22%C5%BDdanoka%22],%22doc umentcollectionid2%22:[%22GANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22item id%22:[%22001-72794%22]} (accessed on 15 November 2013). 25 Similarly, in the case of Kuolelis, Bartoševičius and Burokevičius v. Lithuania (19 February 2008, ECHR, nos. 74357/01, 26764/02 and 27434/02: htp://hudoc.echr. coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22Kuolelis%22],%22docu mentcollectionid2%22:[%22GANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22ite mid%22:[%22001-85152%22]} ( accessed on 15 November 2013) the European Court of Human Rights noted that ‘on 23 August 1939 Stalin’s Soviet Union signed a non- aggression treaty with Hitler’s Germany (the ‘Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’). According to a secret additional protocol approved by the parties on 23 August and amended on 28 September 1939, the Baltic States had been atributed to the sphere of interest of the 344  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union International Legal Assessment of the 1940 Soviet Acts against Lithuania As regards the 1940 events in the Baltic States, the European Court of Human Rights also perceives the Soviet armed invasion into these countries and their subsequent forceful incorporation into the Soviet Union as a well-established fact. For instance, in the Ždanoka v. Latvia case 26 the Court stated that in June 1940 ‘the Soviet army invaded’ the Baltic States, the legitimate governments were removed, new (‘people’s’) governments were formed under the direction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and ‘the ensuing annexation of Latvia by the Soviet Union was orchestrated and conducted under the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.’ Again, similarly in the case of Kuolelis, Bartoševičius and Burokevičius v. Lithuania, 27 the Court stated that ‘following an ultimatum to allow an unlimited number of Soviet troops to be stationed in the Baltic countries, on June 15, 1940 the Soviet Army invaded Lithuania. 28 he Government of Lithuania was removed from oice, and a new government was formed under the direction of the Communist Party of the USSR in the event of a future territorial and political rearrangement of the territories of these then independent countries.’ he fact of the partition of Eastern Europe, in particular Poland, by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was also mentioned in the case of Janowiec and Others v. Russia (16 April 2012), ECHR, 21 October 2013, ECHR [GC], nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09: htp://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx- #{%22fulltext%22:[%22Janowiec%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GANDC HAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-110513%22]} and htp:// hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22Janowiec%22] ,%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22], %22itemid%22:[%22001-127684%22]} (accessed on 16 November 2013). 26 Supra note 24. 27 Supra note 25. 28 To compare, in the case of Janowiec and Others v. Russia (supra note 25) the European Court of Human Rights in identical and similar terms characterised the 1939 Nazi and Soviet acts against Poland: ‘on 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland,’ and ‘on 17 September 1939 the Soviet Red Army marched into Polish territory.’ 345 Dainius Žalimas Soviet Union, the USSR’s only party.’ he Court went on to note that ‘on August 3, 1940 the Soviet Union completed the annexation of Lithuania by adopting an act incorporating the country into the USSR, with Lithuania being called the “Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania”’ (hereinater – the Lithuanian SSR); the Court also acknowledged that the government of the Lithuanian SSR was appointed and controlled by the Communist Party of Lithuania, a regional branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the course of implementation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, on Oc- tober 10, 1939 Lithuania was compelled by the Soviet Union to allow the estab- lishment of Soviet military bases, while on June 14, 1940 the USSR presented an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the immediate prosecution of two Lithuanian oicials (the minister of the interior and the head of the state secu- rity service), an immediate change of government, and immediate permission for additional Soviet military units to enter and occupy the most important centres of Lithuania. 29 he last two demands were the most important, as they actually put pressure on Lithuania to agree to the Soviet occupation of the country, as the Soviet Union had expressly sought to control the territory of Lithuania by means of deployment of armed forces and substitution of the Lithuanian government. Here it is also worth recalling that the element of efective control and authority is decisive for military occupation: as on several occasions it was stated by the International Court of Justice that, 30 ‘under customary interna- 29 he June 14, 1940 Statement of the Soviet Government to the Lithuanian Government, СССР и Литва в годы Второй мировой войны: сборник документов, vol. 1 (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2006), p. 597-599. 30 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, ICJ, Advisory Opinion, para. 78, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136: htp://www.icj- cij.org/docket/iles/131/1671.pdf (accessed on 26 November 2013); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 19 December 2005, ICJ, Judgment, Merits, paras. 172-173, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168: htp://www.icj-cij. org/docket/iles/116/10455.pdf (accessed on 26 November 2013). 346  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union tional law, as relected in Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations 31 of 1907, territory is considered to be occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.’ Having presented the ultimatum to Lithuania, Soviet Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Molotov made clear that, irrespective of the answer, Soviet troops would enter Lithuanian territory on the next day. 32 Indeed, by June 15, 1940 the Soviet Union had already inished all the military and logistics prepa- rations for a large scale invasion of Lithuania, hostilities on and occupation of Lithuanian territory, and the movement of the Soviet troops in and within the Lithuanian territory was typical of military occupation. 33 his can be conirmed by a number of the Soviet combat orders of June 7-15, 1940: instructions and reports on the preparation of military hospitals, the evacuation of eventual prisoners of war and the preparation of special camps for them, combat prepa- ration and equipment of military units, schemes of movement and stationing of troops, as well as occupation of key points, including the temporary capital 31 See the text of Art. 42 of the 1907 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Annex to the IV Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land) in the website of the International Commitee of the Red Cross: htp://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty. xsp?documentId=4D47F92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788&action=openDocument (accessed on 26 November 2013). 32 J. Urbšys, Lietuva lemtingaisiais 1939-1940 metais (Vilnius: Mintis, 1988), p. 50; From the Diary of V. M. Molotov: 11.50 pm of June 14, 1940, meeting with the Minister of Foreign Afairs of the Republic of Lithuania J. Urbšys, СССР и Литва в годы Второй мировой войны: сборник документов, vol. 1 (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2006), p. 595-597. 33 Н. С. Лебедева, “Вводная статья,” in СССР и Литва в годы Второй мировой войны: сборник документов, vol. 1 (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2006), p. 51-52; S. Katuoka, J. Žilinskas, “Lietuva ir tarptautinė teisė: 1940-1991 m. SSRS okupacijos neigimo teisiniame diskurse nepagrįstumas,” in Regnum est. 1990 m. Kovo 11-osios Nepriklausomybės Aktui – 20: Liber Amicorum Vytautui Landsbergiui (Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio universiteto Leidybos centras, 2010), p. 277-278. 347 Dainius Žalimas Kaunas, Vilnius and other cities, main roads, bridges and airports. 34 Moreover, the Soviet military invasion was started by a number of armed atacks against the Lithuanian border police stations prior 35 to the expiry of the terms of the ultimatum (June 15, 1940, 10 am). 36 In such a situation, ater some hesitation, the Government of Lithuania decided not to resist and accepted the Soviet ultimatum. On June 15, 1940 additional Soviet troops crossed the border and, together with the already stationed units, marched to the ordered points of their destination, and began to occupy and control the whole country. Against this background, it is only logical to presume that the June 15, 1940 Soviet armed invasion into Lithuania has to be treated as an act of aggression 34 See the corresponding documents in: СССР и Литва в годы Второй мировой войны: сборник документов, vol. 1 (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2006), p. 566-571, 578-579, 586-589, 600-601, 605-609. 35 See about at least two atacks on the night of June 15, 1940: СССР и Литва в годы Второй мировой войны: сборник документов, vol. 1 (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2006), p. 610-612. 36 On April 29, 2010 the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania adopted the Resolution on the 70th Anniversary of the Murder of the Border Police Oicer A. Barauskas and the Beginning of the Aggression of the Soviet Union against the Republic of Lithuania, Valstybės žinios 52-2551 (2010). he Russian text of the Resolution is available at the oicial website of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania: htp://www3.lrs.lt/pls/ inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=376025 (accessed on 10 December 2013). In the Resolution the Seimas stated that in the early morning of June 15, 1940, prior to the expiration of the term of the Soviet ultimatum, a squad of the Soviet armed forces invaded the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, atacked the Lithuanian Ūta border police station and savagely murdered the unarmed chief guard Aleksandras Barauskas. he Seimas emphasised further that ‘in such a manner the USSR started the aggression against the Republic of Lithuania seeking to intimidate anyone who would dare to resist. he armed atack against the Ūta border station and the murder of its chief guard Aleksandras Barauskas is one of the facts that deny the Soviet fabrications that the armed force has not been used against Lithuania and that Lithuania itself has admited the USSR armed forces.’ 348  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union (aggressive war) 37 that was ipso facto a manifestly grave breach of Arts. I and II of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, i.e. of the international legal obligations not to resort to war and to setle all disputes solely by peaceful means. 38 Indeed, the Soviet armed invasion fully met the deinition of the term ‘act of aggression’ as deined in para. 2 of Art. II of the Convention for the Deinition of Aggression between Lithuania and the USSR, 39 which was signed on July 5, 1933 in London: it was an exactly ‘invasion by armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State.’ 40 It should be emphasised that, according to its content, this bilateral Con- vention was identical to two multilateral conventions for the deinition of aggression, which were also signed in London shortly before: the irst, most oten referred to as the London Convention for the Deinition of Aggression, was signed on July 3, 1933 by the USSR and its seven neighbouring States, 41 including Estonia, Latvia and Poland (Finland acceded to this Convention later in 1934); the second one was signed on July 4, 1933 between the USSR and 37 As Lauri Hannikainen pointed out, ‘the Soviet Union’s occupations and annexation of the Baltic States ater a successful threat of an armed atack was equivalent to a war of aggression.’ See: supra note 10, p. 136. 38 In addition to that, there were a number of other breaches by the USSR of its international obligations, including those provided by the abovementioned treaties: Art. 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. I of the 1920 Peace Treaty with Lithuania, Arts. 1-3 and 5 of the 1926 Non-aggression Treaty with Lithuania. See: the August 21, 1989 Conclusions of the Commission of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR for the Examination of the German- Soviet Agreements of 1939 and their Consequences, supra note 8. 39 Supra note 20, p. 131. 40 Convention between Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Deinition of Aggression. See: League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 148, p. 79 (No. 3405): htp://www.worldlii.org/int/other/treaties/LNTSer/1934/95.html (accessed on 15 December 2013). 41 Convention for the Deinition of Aggression. See: League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 147, p. 67 (No. 3391): htp://www.worldlii.org/int/other/treaties/LNTSer/1934/75. html (accessed on 15 December 2013). 349 Dainius Žalimas its four neighbouring states 42 (apart from the Soviet Union, both conventions were signed also by Romania and Turkey). hus all three London conventions bound the USSR and 11 of its neighbours in diferent combinations, including Lithuania. 43 he most important is that all three conventions shared the same purpose – to clarify the meaning of aggression as already prohibited by the Briand-Kellogg Pact and in such a way to specify more precisely the obligations arising from that pact. 44 his was clear from the preambles of the conventions, whereby Briand-Kellogg was referred to as the basis that ‘prohibits all aggres- sion’ and it was declared necessary ‘in the interests of the general security, to deine aggression as speciically as possible.’ It is also important that in all three conventions an invasion by armed forces of the territory of another state and an atack by armed forces on the territory of another state (as well, ‘with or without a declaration of war’) were named as diferent acts of aggression (they were stipulated in diferent paragraphs of the same Art. II). hat leads to the conclusion that an invasion was not necessarily covered by an atack, but also had to include so-called ‘peaceful invasions,’ those not meeting any resistance from the invaded country or conducted with the forced consent of the later. his is exactly the situation of the June 15, 1940 armed Soviet invasion of Lithuania. 42 Convention for the Deinition of Aggression between Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia, Turkey and Yugoslavia. See: League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 148, p. 211 (No. 3414): htp://www.worldlii.org/int/other/treaties/ LNTSer/1934/102.html (accessed on 15 December 2013). 43 he bilateral Lithuanian-Soviet convention was concluded on Lithuania’s initiative, as due to the unsetled Vilnius issue at that time Lithuania was not willing to sign the same multilateral convention with Poland. 44 See: I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 75-76, 103; P. Kūris, Atsakomybės tarptautinėje teisėje problemos (Vilnius: Vilniaus valstybinis V. Kapsuko universitetas, 1970), p. 43. 350  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union How then does one assess the abovementioned argument regarding the consent of Lithuania as a factor legitimising the Soviet invasion? 45 Could this argument disprove the said presumption of aggression? From the very beginning it is apparent that this argument is not original; the same argument was raised to justify aggressive acts of the German Reich against other states (including Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Belgium, and Luxembourg) before the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal by the accused Nazi leaders. For example, there is a striking similarity between the Russian argument regarding the consent of Lithuania over its invasion and annexation and the Nazis’ argument about the consent or even desire of Austria to unite with the German Reich. As regards the later, the Nuremberg Tribunal irmly rejected this kind of argument: the 1938 Anschluss was treated as an act of aggression (aggressive war), since Austria’s alleged consent was regarded by the Tribunal as ‘really immaterial, for the facts plainly prove that the methods employed to achieve the object were those of an aggressor. he ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany ready to be used if any resistance was encountered.’ 46 he rule here is more than clear: the consent of a victim (in particular, when given under coercion) to an act of aggression cannot be considered as legally valid and decisive in assessing legitimacy of that act, 47 and such a consent has 45 See supra note 3. 46 Extract from the September 30-October 1, 1946 Judgement of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major German War Criminals. See the website of the Avalon Project at Yale Law School: htp://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/ judaus.asp (accessed on 17 December 2013); Нюрнбергский процесс над главными немецкими военными преступниками, vol. 7 (Москва: Госюриздат, 1961), p. 336. 47 Taking into account the Nuremberg Tribunal’s assessment of the Austrian Anschluss, this rule has been conirmed by the International Law Commission in Arts. 20 and 26 of the 2001 Drat Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. See para. 4 (footnote 321) of the Commission’s commentary to Art. 20 of those Drat Articles, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: commentaries, Oicial Records of the UN General Assembly, Fity-sixth session, 351 Dainius Žalimas to be regarded as null and void. 48 here is no legal ground to assess the 1940 Lithuanian case diferently from the Austrian Anschluss, as otherwise inter- national law would lose its objective legal character. It should be added here that the universality of the Nuremberg principles has been generally recognised. Serving as excellent examples of proof are several cases heard by the European Court of Human Rights: in its almost identical decisions on admissibility in the cases of Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia 49 and Penart v. Estonia 50 the Court declared that ‘responsibility for crimes against humanity cannot be limited only to the nationals of certain countries and solely to acts commited within the speciic time frame of the Second World War,’ and that the Nuremberg principles and their universal validity were perfectly known to the Soviet Union, which was the founder of the Nuremberg Tribunal and a founding member of the United Nations. Similar reasoning was applied by the court in the cases Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp. IV.E.2: htp://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/ english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (accessed on 17 December 2013); J. Crawford, he International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge: University Press, 2002), p. 163-164 (footnote 341). 48 Indeed, if any legal weight was given to the consent of a victim (in particular, given under coercion), then the prohibition of aggression would have become meaningless, as the (potential) aggressors would always have been given the prospect to easily avoid any responsibility for their actions, in particular in cases when resistance would have been hopeless. Such a prospect would also have been in conlict with the general aim of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to perpetuate peaceful and friendly relations between states (see supra note 15). 49 Kolk and Kislyiy v Estonia, 17 January 2006, ECHR, nos. 23052/04 and 24018/04: htp://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22kolk%2 2],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22 ,%22DECISIONS%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-72404%22]} (accessed on 17 December 2013). 50 Penart v Estonia, 24 January 2006, ECHR, no. 14685/04: htp://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22penart%22],%22documentcollecti onid2%22:[%22GANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22,%22DECISIONS%22], %22itemid%22:[%22001-72685%22]} (accessed 17 December 2013). 352  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union of Kononov v. Latvia 51 and Janowiec and Others v. Russia, 52 whereby it relied inter alia on the Nuremberg principles, thus impliedly rejecting the Russian argument that those principles could not be applied to the acts commited by the Soviet Union and the members of its armed forces. hus, the Nuremberg rule of invalidity of consent with aggression can and should be applied to the 1940 Soviet invasion of Lithuania and the other two Baltic States. Moreover, before the invasion into Lithuania, in 1938 the Soviet Union itself in the strongest possible terms condemned that kind of invasion by pro- claiming in the League of Nations that neither the direct seizures and annex- ations of other peoples’ territory, nor ‘those cases where such annexations are camoulaged by the seting-up of puppet “national” governments, allegedly independent, but in reality serving merely as a screen for, and an agency of, the foreign invader,’ could ever be recognised as legal. 53 One of the best ex- amples of the later case is precisely the 1940 Soviet invasion, occupation and annexation of Lithuania. It is also worth recalling that, by the December 24, 1989 Resolution of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR on the Po- litical and Juridical Appraisal of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty of 1939, 54 the Soviet Union acknowledged breaches of the 1920 Peace Treaty and the 1926 Non-aggression Treaty with Lithuania. Bearing that in mind, one is simply compelled to draw the conclusion that in such a way the USSR itself had recognised the 1940 aggression against Lithuania, because that is the only logical way to explain the acknowledgment of those breaches, i.e. it is obvious 51 Kononov v. Latvia, 17 May 2010, ECHR [GC], no. 36376/04: htp://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22kononov%22],%22documentcollec tionid2%22:[%22GANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22,%22DECISIONS%22] ,%22itemid%22:[%22001-98669%22]} (accessed on 17 December 2013). 52 Supra note 25. 53 Supra note 18, p. 390. 54 Supra note 13. 353 Dainius Žalimas that to violate both a peace treaty and a non-aggression pact one must commit an act of aggression. To prove the contrary would be a sophistic exercise. To sum up, there is no alternative under international law than to treat the June 15, 1940 Soviet invasion into Lithuania as an act of aggression that was followed by other acts continuing the aggression – an illegal occupation and annexation. It is not accidental that Art. 3(a) of the 1974 Deinition of Aggression by the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 3314 (XXIX), 55 in comparison with the 1933 conventions on the deinition of aggression, 56 formally and log- ically expanded the previous exemplary list of the acts of aggression so as to include not only an invasion or atack by armed forces, but also the possible consequences of such an invasion or atack: military occupation and annexation. International Legal Status of Lithuania 1940-1990 hus it is well established that in 1940 Lithuania fell victim to Soviet aggres- sion. hen the next issue is the international legal status of Lithuania from June 15, 1940 (the irst day of the Soviet invasion and occupation) to March 11, 1990 (the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania). he key to the answer lies in the general principle of law: ex injuria non oritur jus, according to which no legal beneit can be derived from an illegal act, or, to 55 Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Twenty-ninth Session, 17 September-18 December 1974, Oicial Records of the UN General Assembly, Twenty- ninth Session, Supplement No. 31 (A/9619) (United Nations, New York, 1975) p. 142-144: htp://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/ RES/3314%28XXIX%29&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION (accessed on 17 December 2013). 56 he 1974 Deinition of Aggression had been prepared on the basis of the 1933 deinition; however, it developed and supplemented the later with new provisions relecting the evolution of international law. See: И. И. Лукашук, Д. Мэрфи, “Преступления против мира,” in Нюрнбергский процесс: право против войны и фашизма (Москва: Институт государства и права РАН, 1996), p. 128. 354  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union be more concrete for the purposes of the present analysis, an internationally wrongful act cannot be a source of legal rights for the perpetrator of that act. he irst conclusion to be made from the application of the principle ex injuria non oritur jus in case of the Soviet aggression against Lithuania is that the USSR did not have any sovereign rights (or a legal title) over Lithuania’s territory. herefore, in accordance with international law, Lithuania has never been a legitimate part of the USSR; from the standpoint of international law, Lithuania could never be treated as a (former) Soviet republic. Consequently, in 1990 Lithuania did not secede from the Soviet Union, it rather restored its injured rights (independence) by liberating itself from the Soviet occupation. 57 he Soviet Union could not acquire any rights to Lithuania’s territory due to a long period (almost ive decades) of actual possession (efective authority) of that territory. 58 International law does not recognise any general term of prescription. 59 Moreover, there cannot be any prescription at all for an aggres- sion that is of the most serious breaches of international law. 60 hus, a logical consequence of the application of the principle ex injuria non oritur jus is that the Soviet annexation of Lithuania’s territory was null and void, therefore it could not alter the legal title to, or the legal status of, that 57 See more about the international legal status and the 1990 restoration of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania in: supra note 21, p. 8-21; D. Žalimas, “he Soviet Aggression against Lithuania in January 1991: International legal Aspects,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 6 (2006), p. 297-300, 321-327. 58 L. Mälksoo, Illegal Annexation and State Continuity: the Case of the Incorporation of the Baltic States by the USSR (Leiden: Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 2003), p. 164-165. 59 Supra note 20, p. 132. 60 One can recall here that in its judgment the Nuremberg Tribunal characterised an aggression as ‘the supreme international crime difering only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole,’ Supra note 46, htp://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judnazi.asp#common (accessed on 17 December 2013), p. 327. 355 Dainius Žalimas territory. his can also be supported by analogy with the case of the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territo- ry. 61 Here the International Court of Justice noted that neither the annexation of a part of the occupied Palestinian territory, nor alleged partial autonomy of the occupied territory, nor any other legislative or administrative actions taken by the occupying state (Israel) could change the legal status of that occupied territory. In the case of Lithuania, there is no reason to come to diferent conclusions: neither the creation of the Lithuanian SSR in the ter- ritory of Lithuania, nor the alleged partial national autonomy of that entity, nor any other Soviet administrative measures in Lithuania could ever change the legal status of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Lithuania itself. Similarly to the case of Palestine, regardless of the Soviet annexation the Republic of Lithuania and its territory from 1940 to 1990 has to be treated as an occupied State and territory. In line with that reasoning, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe referred to the Baltic States as ‘the (formerly) occupied States.’ 62 Indeed, it is only logical that there is no other alternative under interna- tional law but to treat all the period of 1940-1990 in Lithuania’s history as that of the Soviet occupation (with the exception of the period of the Nazi occu- pation in 1941-1944). As already proved, 63 on June 15, 1940 the Soviet Union 61 Supra note 30, paras. 75-78. 62 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, On Russia’s request for membership of the Council of Europe, Opinion no. 193 (1996), 25 January 1996, htp:// assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=htp://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ TA96/Eopi193.htm (last accessed on 26 November 2013), para. 7.xii; Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 1455(2005), 22 June 2005, htp://assembly.coe.int/Main. asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/ERES1455.htm (accessed on 26 November 2013), para. 14.iv. 63 See part 2 of this article. 356  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union launched a successful armed invasion that, according to international law, was an act of aggression. A logical consequence of that invasion was the full control of the territory of Lithuania by the Soviet armed forces and the introduction of Soviet rule. According to terms of Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, 64 it was a military occupation of the entire territory of Lithuania, even if it was achieved in 1940 without an outbreak of hostilities. Incidentally, even the ab- sence of Lithuania’s armed resistance to the Soviet occupation can be questioned: keeping in mind the re-occupation by the Soviet Union of Lithuania’s territory in 1944-1945, one can recall the undisputed fact that then the Soviet armed forces met a ierce armed resistance that lasted around 10 years. 65 However, if to turn back to June 15, 1940, it would be hard to disagree with the position that the Soviet armed forces had not become less hostile to Lithuania merely because the later had been forced to agree with the invasion. 66 In addition, the decisive factor for the existence of a military occupation is the military might of the occupying power and its de facto rather than de jure authority. 67 It is clear from the circumstances that from June 15, 1940 the Soviet military presence played a decisive role in managing Lithuania’s afairs and due to that military presence the Soviet oicials had full de facto authority in Lithuania, although 64 ‘Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army,’ supra note 31. 65 he organised armed resistance against the second Soviet occupation lasted until 1953 when the leader (underground president) of the Resistance Jonas Žemaitis was captured, while the last active Resistance ighter fell in 1965. See more about Lithuania’s armed Resistance to the Soviet occupation and its legal status in: D. Žalimas, “Legal Status of Lithuania’s Armed Resistance to the Soviet Occupation in the Context of State Continuity,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 11 (2011), p. 67-112. 66 S. Katuoka, J. Žilinskas, supra note 33, p. 278. 67 S. Katuoka, J. Žilinskas, supra note 33, p. 281; M. Bothe, “Occupatio Belligerent,” Encyclopedia of Public International Law 4 (1982), p. 65. 357 Dainius Žalimas de jure authority until the formal end of the annexation on August 3, 1940 had been in hands of the so-called people’s government of Lithuania. Moreover, even if to assume that the Soviet occupation of Lithuania can be qualiied as paciic rather than belligerent (i.e., accomplished with the consent and without resistance of the occupied state), that would not change the legal regime applicable to that occupation: paciic occupation should be treated in the same way as the use of force and the same norms of international law should be applied as in the case of classic military occupation. 68 Indeed, in the context of WWII the rule regarding applicability of the 1907 Hague Regulations regime of belligerent occupation to all the forcible paciic occupations has already emerged. 69 he legal grounds for that rule was ‘Marten’s Clause’ inserted into the preamble of the IV Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 70 according to that clause, ‘the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from usages established among civilised peoples, from laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.’ herefore, it follows that no grey zone could ever be let for unorthodox (paciic) occu- pations, as in that case the inhabitants of the ‘peacefully’ occupied territory would be denied the protection of international law and would be let at the mercy of the occupying power; moreover, if to make the applicability of the legal regime of occupation dependent on the resistance of the occupied state, then that regime would almost always be inapplicable, in particular if the much weaker state, whose resistance would be hopeless, is subjected to the 68 M. Bothe, “Occupation, Paciic,” Encyclopedia of Public International Law 4 (1982), p. 67-69. 69 Supra note 58, p. 174-177, 189-191; J. Žilinskas, “Status of Members of Anti-Soviet Armed Resistance (Partisans’ War) of 1944-1953 in Lithuania under International Law,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 11 (2011), p. 41-44. 70 Supra note 31. 358  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union occupation. In other words, the law and administration of justice would be let in the hands of the criminal (aggressor). he same would also happen in cases where the applicability of the law of occupation was dependent solely on the discretion of the occupying power (e.g., the decision to terminate the regime of occupation ater the suppression of resistance). hat obviously would be inconsistent with the Hague regime. hat development of international law, according to which the same inter- national legal regime has to cover all kinds of foreign occupations, is expressly relected in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (IV Geneva Convention), 71 which includes the rules applicable to occupied territories: Art. 2 states that the Convention is applicable inter alia in cases when a state of war is not recognized by one of the parties, and to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. hus, once more it can be conirmed that, once it is established that in 1940 the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania’s territory and the subsequent an- nexation of that territory was null and void, the only possible international legal status of Lithuania’s territory in 1940-1990 was that of occupied territory, even if the Soviet Union did not acknowledge that status and did not apply the law of occupation. 72 However, that brings into question the status of the 71 See the text in the website of the International Commitee of the Red Cross: htp://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty. xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C&action=openDocument (accessed on 26 November 2013). 72 he refusal to apply the international legal rules on occupation led to the commission of numerous international crimes by the Soviet occupation regime, including the following crimes against humanity and war crimes: mass killings and torture of the population and the members of the Resistance, denying the later category guarantees provided for combatants and prisoners of war by international law, mass deportations of the civilian population, mass arrests, deprivation of liberty and other persecutions on political grounds, forced mobilisation and recruitment to the occupation armed 359 Dainius Žalimas Lithuanian SSR – the entity established by the Soviet Union in the occupied territory of Lithuania. Again it is only logical that, as well as its predecessors also established under the dictate of the Soviet oicials: ‘Lithuanian people’s government’ and ‘Lithuanian people’s Seimas,’ the Lithuanian SSR had been nothing more than a puppet Soviet entity, 73 i.e. it was a mere blind tool of the Soviet Union, which had to disguise the aggression rather than to be an auton- omous national authority. 74 herefore, from the standpoint of international law, the Lithuanian SSR was an artiicial pseudo-state entity of the Soviet Union rather than any form of the statehood of Lithuania. With respect to the State of Lithuania, the Lithuanian SSR was always a part of the state machinery of the foreign state, which had been established illegally on the territory of the State of Lithuania. hus, the Lithuanian SSR could never be regarded as a state and a subject of international law; the term ‘Lithuanian SSR’ rather relected the following means of administration of the occupied territory of the Republic of Lithuania: to administer that territory, the USSR established its subordinate and controlled administration and granted it a national name (the ‘Lithuanian’ SSR) to demonstrate the alleged national and representative character of that forces. he Soviet occupation directly afected around one-third of the Lithuanian population and one-ith of the population was lost. For example, during the irst Soviet occupation in 1940-1941, approximately 30 000 people became victims of the Soviet terror. Out of this number, over one thousand were killed in Lithuania and nearly 20 000 were deported to the gulag camps. At the beginning of the second Soviet occupation, in 1944-1956, around 120 000 people were deported from Lithuania, more than 20 000 members of the Resistance and a similar number of the civilian population were killed, around 180 000 people were imprisoned, more than 100 000 had been recruited to the Soviet armed forces, and nearly 450 000 people had let the country before the second Soviet occupation. Figures from: Crimes of the Soviet Totalitarian Regime in Lithuania (Vilnius: Solidarity, 2008). 73 K. Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law (Geneve: Librairie E. Droz, 1954), p. 396. 74 M. Rėmeris, Lietuvos sovietizacija, 1940-1941 (Vilnius: Lituanus, 1989), p. 38. 360  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union administration. 75 Obviously no legal ties could ever exist between the Repub- lic of Lithuania (as a state and a separate subject of international law) and the Lithuanian SSR (as a part of the state machinery of the other state); the later could not have any legal powers to govern the afairs of the former. he Resolution February 7, 1990 on the 1939 German-Soviet Treaties and the Liquidation of their Consequences for Lithuania 76 was adopted by the last Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR shortly before the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania. Ater condemning the aggression against Lithuania and its occupation and annexation as international crimes commited by the USSR, the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR made the following decisions: 1) to declare unlawful and invalid the July 21, 1940 Declaration of the puppet ‘People’s Seimas’ of Lithuania regarding Lithuania’s entry into the USSR; 2) to state that the August 3, 1940 Soviet Law on the Admission of Lithuania into the USSR was both unlawful and non-binding upon Lithuania. hat Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR was unique, as even the Lithuanian SSR itself acknowledged the illegality of its nature and establishment in 1940. he inal outcome of the application of the principle ex injuria non oritur jus is the continuity of the Republic of Lithuania: the Soviet aggression could not abolish the State of Lithuania as a subject of international law, i.e. the Republic of Lithuania continued to exist as a state and an international legal person, despite the Soviet occupation of the whole of its territory and almost the complete destruction of state institutions (only the Lithuanian diplomatic service abroad had continued its activities representing the last Government of the Republic of Lithuania, dissolved on June 15, 1940). herefore, during 75 V. Sinkevičius, Lietuvos Respublikos pilietybė 1918-2001 metais (Vilnius: TIC, 2002), p. 122. 76 Lietuvos TSR AT ir Vyriausybės žinios, 8-182 (1990). 361 Dainius Žalimas the whole period of 1940-1990, the Republic of Lithuania and the USSR had always been two diferent States and subjects of international law, although the former had been illegally occupied by the later. Both pillars of the continuity of the State of Lithuania, the will of the state to exist and international recognition of the continuity, 77 have been present. As regards the later pillar, the recognition of the legal continuity of the Republic of Lithuania logically followed the non-recognition of the illegal annexation of the Baltic States. 78 As regards the former pillar, the continuous resistance to the Soviet occupation with the aim to restore the independence of the country played a key role. hat was demonstrated irst and foremost by the strong armed resistance to the second Soviet occupation; ater its suppression on the irst occasion the resistance came from the underground together with the Lith- 77 hose pillars of state continuity are pointed out by Ineta Ziemele. See: I. Ziemele, State Continuity and Nationality: the Baltic States and Russia (Past, Present and Future as Deined by International Law) (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005), p. 126. 78 See for comprehensive review of state practice concerning non-recognition of the annexation of the Baltic States and the continued recognition of their legal existence: supra note 18. See also the relevant resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament: Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, On the Situation in the Baltic States on the Twentieth Anniversary of heir Forcible Incorporation into the Soviet Union, Resolution No. 189 (1960), 29 September 1960, htp://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta60/ ERES189.htm (accessed on 26 November 2013); Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, On the Situation of the Baltic Peoples, Resolution No. 872(1987), 28 January 1987, htp://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta87/ ERES872.htm (accessed on 26 November 2013); European Parliament, Resolution, 13 January 1983, supra note 18, p. 439. In all these resolutions it was stated that the Soviet annexation had not gained recognition and, as a corollary, a great majority of the democratic states continued to recognise the independent existence of the Baltic States. he 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which provided for the principle of the inviolability of borders, had not changed the policy of the non-recognition of the annexation of the Baltic States, as pursued by the majority of the then-existing democratic states: there was also the provision of the Helsinki Final Act which obliged states not to recognise any occupation or other territorial acquisition contrary to international law. 362  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union uanian Freedom League and the Sąjūdis in 1987-1988, and that ultimately led to the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania in 1990. 79 Legal Status of the Resistance to the Soviet Occupation To determine the legal status of the Resistance to the Soviet occupation, one irst has to ind out what the civic status of the members of the Resistance was, i.e. whose nationals they were under international law. It is logical to assert that from the continuity of statehood follows the continuity of nationality, 80 as nationality is dependent upon statehood. 81 herefore, if the continuity of an occupied state is preserved under international law, the continuity of na- tionality of that state has to be safeguarded as well. As regards the continuity of nationality of the Republic of Lithuania in the light of the imposition of the Soviet nationality on Lithuanian nationals in 1940, two points have to be noted. First of all, any imposition on nationals of the oc- 79 In its 22 February 2013 Ruling (English text available at the oicial website of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania: htp://www.lrkt.lt/ dokumentai/2013/r130222.htm – accessed on 1 December 2013) the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania inter alia noted that ‘the restoration of the independence of the State of Lithuania was grounded on the continuity of the State of Lithuania, which means that the aggression that the USSR began against the Republic of Lithuania on June 15, 1940 (inter alia the occupation and annexation of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania) did not abolish the State of Lithuania as a subject of international law and its sovereign powers; due to the occupation of the territory of Lithuania and demolition of its state institutions, the implementation of the sovereign powers of the State of Lithuania, inter alia its international rights and obligations, were suspended; the annexation of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania perpetrated by the USSR on August 3, 1940, as a continuation of the aggression, was an act null and void, thus, from the viewpoint of the international law, the territory of the Republic of Lithuania was occupied by another state and it was never a legal part of the USSR.’ 80 Supra note 77, p. 12, 388, 391. 81 J. Crawford, he Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 52. 363 Dainius Žalimas cupied State of the nationality of the occupying State, as a consequence of the aggression, is illegal, null and void due to the operation of the above mentioned principle ex injuria jus non oritur. 82 Secondly, there is a speciic guarantee for the continuity of nationality of an occupied State: namely, an occupying power has a speciic duty not to impose its nationality on a national of an occupied territory. 83 herefore, under international law nationals of the Republic of Lithuania retained their nationality regardless of the imposition on them of Soviet nationality: that is why all the persons who had been nationals of the Republic of Lithuania on the day of the Soviet occupation (June 15, 1940) and their descendants had to be presumed as automatically continuing nationality of the Republic of Lithuania, while the Soviet nationality imposed on them had to be regarded as null and void. 84 82 Imposition of nationality of an occupying power on nationals of an occupied state is regarded as one of the most serious breaches of international law. See: supra note 73, p. 83. 83 Under Art. 45 of the 1907 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (supra note 31), ‘it is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power,’ that clearly includes prohibition to impose nationality of an occupying power on nationals of an occupied state. Meanwhile, according to Art. 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (supra note 71), ‘an occupying power may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces,’ that kind of restriction can be explained only by the continuity of nationality of an occupied state and, as its corollary, the prohibition to change that nationality. 84 As the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania noted in its 22 February 2013 Ruling (supra note 79), ‘from the continuity of the State of Lithuania there stems a continuity of citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania which inter alia implies that, from the viewpoint of international and Lithuanian constitutional law, the imposition of USSR citizenship upon citizens of the Republic of Lithuania in 1940, as a consequence of the aggression of the USSR, was an act null and void; thus, this act was not a legal ground to lose citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania. Consequently, during the years of the Soviet occupation, citizens of the Republic of Lithuania (the persons who held citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania on 15 June 1940 and their children) were also not bound by the obligations related to USSR citizenship, inter alia the general military obligation of the USSR introduced on the 364  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union hus, in general all the members of the Resistance (both of the armed units and of the other underground organisations) were nationals of the Republic of Lithuania who could not have any commitments and obligations of loyalty towards the Soviet State. 85 (e.g., they were not obliged to comply with con- scription to the Soviet armed forces). Moreover, as nationals of the illegally occupied state, they had a legitimate right to resist the occupation and to form any organisations and authorities for that purpose. heir Resistance to the occupation was legal and, as far as the armed Resistance is concerned, could be regarded as a manifestation of self-defence pursued on behalf of their State. 86 he corollary of that is the presumption of innocence of all those Lithuanian nationals who have been repressed by the Soviet authorities for their Resistance, irrespective of whether they have been repressed in an extrajudicial (summary) occupied territory of the Republic of Lithuania, which had been imposed upon them unlawfully.’ he Court also referred to its previous Ruling of November 13, 2006 (English text available at the oicial website of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania: htp://www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/2006/r061113.htm - accessed on 1 December 2013), repeating that the ‘citizenship of the USSR’ and the ‘citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR’ both ‘were imposed by force, were and are null and void; even though the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania temporarily used the passports of citizens of the USSR, they could not be treated as citizens of the USSR, i.e. as citizens of the state which had declared them as its citizens against their own will.’ 85 hat was also conirmed by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (see supra note 84). 86 hat appraisal is also given by the Lithuanian legislation. E.g., it follows from the preamble of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the 16 February 1949 Declaration of the Council of the Lithuanian Freedom Fight Movement (English text is available in: supra note 65, p. 105-110, Annex 1), that the armed Resistance of 1944-1953 is treated as self-defence of the State of Lithuania against the Soviet occupation. he armed ight of 1944-1953 by the forces of nationals of the Republic of Lithuania (volunteer soldiers) against the second Soviet occupation was assessed as self-defence of the Republic of Lithuania against the USSR aggression also by March 12, 2009 Declaration of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on Recognition of Jonas Žemaitis as the Head of the State of Lithuania (English text is available in: supra note 65, p. 111-112, Annex 2). 365 Dainius Žalimas way or sentenced in accordance with judicial procedure for crimes against the Soviet State and its totalitarian regime. Due to the continuity of the State of Lithuania and its nationality, the Re- sistance in Lithuania has to be diferentiated from classical national liberation movements striving for self-determination by establishing an independent State. he Resistance was acting on behalf of the already existing State of Lithuania and sought to defend that state against the foreign occupation and restore its independence. herefore the partisan war against the Soviet occupation had to be regarded as an international armed conlict, a war between two states (the Soviet Union, as an occupying power, and the Republic of Lithuania, as an occupied State represented by the Resistance). 87 Two more conclusions regarding the status of the armed Resistance can be drawn, taking into account the continuity of the Republic of Lithuania. 88 First, it logically follows that the armed forces of the Resistance had to be regarded as belligerent forces of the Republic of Lithuania (the armed forces of a State rather than insurgents or rebels). Service in these forces is considered to have been service to the State of Lithuania. 89 Under international law, the members of these forces had to be entitled to the status of combatants and, 87 B. Gailius, “he Guerrilla War of 1944-1953 in the Historical, Political and Legal Culture of Contemporary Lithuania: Summary of Doctoral Dissertation.” (Vilnius University, 2009), p. 23-24. 88 See in more detail: supra note 65, p. 87-104. 89 As it follows from the February 22, 2013 Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (supra note 79), prior to the restoration of the independence the service to the Republic of Lithuania was possible only in the survived institutions of the State of Lithuania – the diplomatic missions and consular posts abroad (the diplomatic service of the Republic of Lithuania) – and in the structures (inter alia in the Lithuanian Freedom Fight Movement) of the organised armed Resistance against the occupation, which took place for a certain time on the occupied territory of the Republic of Lithuania. 366  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union in case of captivity, prisoners of war. 90 Indeed, the partisans complied with the criteria of combatants – soldiers of volunteer armed forces – provided by international law of that time 91 (e.g., with the criteria laid down in Art. 1 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, 92 according to which a volunteer soldier has to be considered a combatant if he is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, has a ixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance, carries arms openly and conducts operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war). Secondly, the leadership of the centralised armed Resistance to the second Soviet occupation, i.e. the Council of the Lithuanian Freedom Fight Movement (the LFFM Council) established in February 1949, is considered to have been the legitimate government of the Republic of Lithuania, 93 while the head of the Resistance (the Chairman of the LFFM Council Presidium Jonas Žemaitis) is regarded as the then acting head of the State of Lithuania (as was proclaimed 90 At least the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva conventions for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in armies in the Field and on the Treatment of Prisoners of War could be applicable to both parties to the conlict (the partisan forces of the Republic of Lithuania and the USSR armed forces). See: J. Žilinskas, supra note 69, p. 38-41. 91 Supra note 87, p. 15-16; B. Gailius, Partizanai tada ir šiandien (Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2006), p. 31-40; J. Žilinskas, “Lietuvos laisvės kovotojų statuso pagal tarptautinę teisę klausimai ir MGB agentų – smogikų bylos,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 2:16 (2004), p. 96-102. 92 Supra note 31. 93 hat is relected in Art. 2(2) Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the 16 February 1949 Declaration of the Council of the Lithuanian Freedom Fight Movement (supra note 86), which states that LFFM Council ‘constituted the supreme political and military structure leading this ight and was the sole legitimate authority within the territory of the occupied Lithuania.’ his provision of the Law relies on para. 1 of the 16 February 1949 Declaration of the LFFM Council Movement (English text is available in: supra note 65, p. 107-109, Annex 1), whereby the LFFM Council declared itself to be ‘the supreme political body of the Nation, in charge of the political and military ight for the liberation of the Nation.’ 367 Dainius Žalimas by March 12, 2009 Declaration of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on Recognition of Jonas Žemaitis as the Head of the State of Lithuania). 94 he LFFM Council lacked constitutional continuity with the pre-occupation government. However, constitutional continuity does not constitute a nec- essary prerequisite even for a government-in-exile 95 that does not exercise any authority in the occupied state. In general the term ‘government’ may be characterised by two aspects: the actual exercise of authority and the right or title to exercise that authority. 96 Against this background the LFFM Council can be seen as suiciently efective under the circumstances of the foreign occupation: contrary to any government-in-exile, it exercised a certain efec- tive authority in the occupied country; however, it is more important that the LFFM Council at that time (1949-1953) was the only authority (the belligerent government) having the right and title to act on behalf of the occupied state in administering its afairs. he source of the powers of the LFFM Council to represent the occupied country was the sovereign will of the Lithuanian people (the corpus of nationals of Lithuania). It is clear that under the Soviet occupation there was no possibility for the Lithuanian people to form their government in accordance with the procedures provided by the last valid Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. he only available way to establish this kind of authority was by utilising the structures of the Resistance. It is generally recognised that emergency circumstances can render imperative the creation of emergency laws: ‘when a state of emergency exists […] the constitution does not apply 94 Supra note 86. In this Declaration it was proclaimed inter alia that from the adoption of the 16 February 1949 Declaration of the LFFM Council to his death on 26 November 1954 the Chairman of the LFFM Council Presidium Jonas Žemaitis had been the Head of the State of Lithuania ighting against the occupation. See also the commentary of the 12 March 2009 Declaration of the Seimas in: supra note 65, p. 99-102. 95 Supra note 73, p. 97-99; supra note 81, p. 688. 96 Supra note 81, p. 57. 368  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union irst and foremost, but the vital interests of State and people.’ 97 herefore, from the standpoint of constitutional law of the Republic of Lithuania, the LFFM Council has to be regarded as the supreme representative authority of the State of Lithuania vested with powers to express the sovereign will of its people. 98 Concluding Remarks here are many similarities as well as some diferences in the history and the legal status of the Baltic States and the rest of the Central and Eastern European countries from WWII until the end of the Cold War. First of all, the destiny of almost all of these nations, including Lithuania and Poland, was predetermined by the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Both Lithuania and Poland territories were divided between the two aggressors, the German Reich and the USSR, although the ‘German part’ of Lithuania’s territory was later bought by the Soviet Union. here is a general understanding, and it has been accepted as a well-estab- lished historical and legal fact by the European Court of Human Rights, that the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are to be treated as null and void, since they irst and foremost were in conlict with the most import- ant principles of international law, such as the prohibition of aggression and the respect of sovereignty of other states; as well, those protocols had never had a legitimate object, therefore one could even question whether, in terms of international law, they could be regarded as treaties at all. 97 Citation from: supra note 73, p. 98. 98 V. Sinkevičius, “Lietuvos Laisvės Kovos Sąjūdžio Tarybos 1949 m. vasario 16 d. deklaracija Lietuvos teisės sistemoje,” in Regnum est: 1990 m. Kovo 11-osios Nepriklausomybės Aktui – 20. Liber Amicorum Vytautui Landsbergiui (Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio universiteto Leidybos centras, 2010), p. 56. 369 Dainius Žalimas here is also a suicient uniformity of views that, like Poland, Lithuania fell victim to aggression. Indeed, it is clear enough from both the factual and legal circumstances (and also taken as a well-established fact by the Euro- pean Court of Human Rights), that on June 15, 1940 the Soviet armed forces invaded Lithuania and accomplished their task to control the whole territory of the country. his act was an aggression, already outlawed by international law: in particular, it fully met the deinition of the term ‘act of aggression’ as deined in para. 2 of Art. II of the July 5, 1933 Convention for the Deinition of Aggression between Lithuania and the USSR: an ‘invasion by armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State.’ A logical consequence of that invasion was the military occupation of Lithuania. As regards the atempts to justify the Soviet invasion and occupation of Lithuania by grounding its alleged legality on Lithuania’s consent with the occupation, they can be regarded as an outlying position rather than a se- rious legal argument. It is established in international law that the consent of a victim state given under the threat of force cannot be taken into account, i.e. it in principle cannot preclude the wrongfulness of such a serious breach of international law as aggression. Otherwise the prohibition of aggression would be simply meaningless, in particular it would fail to protect the weakest states (in terms of military might) whose resistance against the more powerful neighbours would not have a chance of success. As the rule on nullity of the consent to aggression was cited by the Nuremberg Tribunal in response to the Nazis’ argument to justify of their acts, one can only regret that that the Nazis argument has been recently revived by Russia. Contrary to the more general issues of the secret protocols of the Molo- tov-Ribbentrop Pact and the 1940 Soviet aggression against Lithuania, there is probably less agreement on how to deine some consequences of that aggres- sion, including the issue of occupation and the legal status of the Resistance in Lithuania. However, at least international law can provide deinite answers 370  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union to these questions, which logically follows from the application of the general principle of law ex injuria jus non oritur. First and foremost, it is in accordance with that principle to conclude that the annexation of Lithuania had been null and void (Lithuania has never been a legitimate part of the USSR); therefore there is no alternative under international law as to treat the regime in Lithuania from 1940 to 1990 as that of a foreign occupation. It should be noted that this legal qualiication is ap- plicable irrespective of the absence of Lithuania’s military resistance in 1940 and is applicable to the entire period of 1940-1990, including that ater the suppression of the organised armed Resistance in 1953. Otherwise we would acknowledge the existence of grey zones that would be incompatible with the nature and purposes of international humanitarian law (including the Hague and Geneva regimes) to provide the maximum protection for the inhabitants of the occupied territories, not to leave them solely at the mercy of the occu- pying power. In other words, if to make the applicability of the legal regime of occupation dependent on the resistance of the occupied state or on the discretion of the occupying power, then that protective regime would become meaningless, as the law and administration of justice would oten be let solely in the hands of the aggressor. hus, it is natural to treat the so-called ‘people’s authorities’ in Lithuania, including the Lithuanian SSR with its ‘national’ administration, as nothing more than a puppet entity established to disguise the Soviet aggression, in particular to create a certain visibility of ‘voluntary accession’ of Lithuania to the Soviet Union. he Lithuanian SSR was always a part of the state machin- ery of the Soviet Union, which had been established illegally in the occupied territory of the State of Lithuania as a means of administration of that territory. As the administrative entity of a foreign State, the Lithuanian SSR was never any form of Lithuanian statehood and could never have had any legal ties with the Republic of Lithuania. 371 Dainius Žalimas here were a few diferences between Lithuania (and the other two Baltic States) and Poland (and the majority of the other Central European countries). he occupation of Poland (at least formally) ended with the re-establishment of the Polish State in 1945 within its new borders under the Potsdam accords between the Allied Powers; thus, the rest of the period of presence of the Soviet Union (from 1991, the Russian Federation) armed forces was that of independent statehood with the ‘national’ communist regime supported by the foreign troops. Unlike the Lithuanian SSR, the regime of the ‘people’s republic’ of Poland, though also being to a certain degree of a puppet nature, was not a part of the Soviet State and was internationally recognised as a legitimate government of Poland. herefore, as regards the legal personality of the Polish State, there is continuity and identity between the pre-war Republic of Poland, the ‘people’s republic’ of Poland and the current Republic of Poland. hat is why, unlike the case of Lithuania, the crimes commited by the totalitarian communist regime in Poland could not be atributable solely to the foreign occupation regime (i.e. to another state); they were rather the crimes of the Polish, though certainly enforced, regime. he last important outcome of the application of the principle ex injuria jus non oritur in case of the Soviet aggression against Lithuania is the safeguarded de jure continuity of the Republic of Lithuania regardless of the foreign occupa- tion of all of its territory and the almost complete destruction of its institutions. Here one can ind the answers to the remaining questions about the status of the Resistance to the Soviet occupation. he continuity of the Republic of Lithuania has brought about the continuity of its nationality; therefore, in accordance with international law, nationals of the Republic of Lithuania have retained their nationality and, as nationals of the illegally occupied state, they in principle had a legitimate right to resist the occupation as well as to form any organisations and authorities for that purpose. As far as the armed Resistance to the Soviet occupation is concerned, in the context of the state continuity it 372  The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union has to be logically seen as legitimate self-defence of the Republic of Lithuania against the Soviet Union, i.e. as an international armed conlict between the two states. Again it is only logical to treat the Resistance forces as the armed forces of the Republic of Lithuania; meanwhile, against the background of state continuity, the supreme Resistance authority (the LFFM Council) has to be regarded as the legitimate government and the supreme representative authority of the occupied Republic of Lithuania at that time, and the head of that authority has to be recognised as the then acting head of the State of Lithuania. Certainly one can argue that these conclusions and answers might seem too straightforward, as international law of that time was probably or allegedly not so clear and unambiguous, at least as far as the issues of so-called paciic occupations and the legal status of partisans are concerned. However, I think one should seek clear and unambiguous answers to the diicult questions as much as possible, including the challenges posed by the history to a lawyer. To my mind, the conclusions and answers provided in this article have a strong legal logic and more than any other possible legal evaluation correspond to the ideas of justice and rule of law. Meanwhile, uncertainty and ambiguity may sometimes be useful to those who seek, whatever their reasons, to erase the dividing line between an aggressor and a victim. hat line is vital for the existence of modern international law. 373  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 Marcin Zaremba Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 hus far throughout history, nobody has been able to see a revolution coming. 1 If Lenin could not do so, it was even more doubtful that Edward Gierek would be able to. he Revolution of Solidarity was neither an accident nor the result of a conspiracy, as Edward Gierek claimed in his Przerwana Dekada (Inter- rupted Decade). It had its own genesis. 2 It was preceded by an aggravating revolutionary situation – increasing public discontent, tiredness and irrita- tion stemming from the deepening economic crisis and failed hopes awoken by a short period of relative prosperity, oten called ‘stewed-cabbage socialism.’ 3 But the Polish revolution would not have broken out if not for the simultaneous emergence of revolutionary consciousness, which on the one hand included the need for change, felt by an increasing number of social groups, and on the other a growing feeling of national community and social subjectiveness 1 he irst, shortened version of the text without annotations was published in: Polityka Pomocnik Historyczny, 14 (2010). 2 here are plenty of books on the subject. Mentioning only most important ones would take too much space, so let me just name ive sources which describe the issue to the largest extent: M. Marody, ed., Polacy ‘80 (Warszawa, 1981); J. Koralewicz, ed., Społeczeństwo polskie przed kryzysem w świetle badań socjologicznych z lat 1977-1979 (Warszawa, 1987); K. Ziemer, Polens Weg in die Kriese. Eine politische Soziologie der „Ära Gierek” (Frankfurt am Main, 1987); R. Laba, he Roots of Solidarity. A Political Sociology of Poland’s Working-Class Democratization (Princeton, 1991); A. Friszke, Czas KOR-u. Jacek Kuroń a geneza Solidarności (Kraków, 2011). 3 M. Zaremba, “Bigosowy socjalizm. Dekada Gierka” in Polacy wobec PRL – strategie przystosowawcze, ed. G. Miernik (Kielce, 2003), p. 183-200. 375 Marcin Zaremba among Poles. he mechanisms of spontaneous change in society started even before August 1980, as well as the process of waking up from conformist sleep, and shaping thinking in the context of ‘we, the nation’ in opposition to the authorities, perceived simply as ‘them.’ Ater the August Accords were signed, these processes gained momentum and new dynamics. However, looking for the sources of the revolution, we have to look back at several months before the event, during which crucial events happened, for example, ‘the Winter of the Century,’ Pope’s John Paul II visit to Poland, Katyń commemorations organized by the democratic opposition, the 8th Convention of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR, Polish communist party), the last Sejm elections of their kind and the irst wave of strikes in July 1980. All these factors inluenced social moods, opinions and atitudes, the description of which is the main goal of this essay. It is worth taking a step aside. One does not need special insights to ob- serve that the Solidarity revolution is not only a subject of research, but also of mythologisation. An apologetic approach to this phenomenon may lead to assuming a simpliied perception of the two main actors of those times: the authorities and the society. It can also lead to the fallacy of historicism: choosing only those facts and sources that allegedly prove the necessity of the outbreak of public discontent in July and August 1980. he revolution of Soli- darity did not break out by accident, but this does not mean that it necessarily had to happen. he human inclination towards giving causal explanations to events may easily lead us to the path taken previously by Marx and Engels as well as thousands of Marxists, convinced of ‘historical necessity.’ he fallacy pointed out by Karl R. Popper is even more dangerous because the very sourc- es that we have access to seem to suggest causality. Information provided by the Organizational Department of the Central Commitee of the communist party, various reports, and leters to the Central Commitee and to a lesser degree the OBOP (Centre for Monitoring Public Opinion) mainly reported 376  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 grim messages for the authorities. So, if one just based an argument on those, it would be easy to paint an exclusively negative picture of the last months of Gierek’s term of oice. Not only should this fact be borne in mind, but it is also indispensable to confront diverse sources and point out diferent phenomena, which could be described, using a weather metaphor, as large albeit gradually melting layers of conformism and support for the regime. On the other hand, the signs of the coming storm to come were clearly visible. The Cold he Russian Revolution broke out ater the defeats that the country sufered during World War I. hese weakened the authority of the royal house, but they mainly brought economic complications, an increase in the price of bread and hunger in the cities, which obviously had a negative inluence on the public mood. he French revolution was preceded by the unusually bad harvest of 1788 followed by an exceptionally tough winter, which aggravated the lives of the poor. ‘he sudden increase in the price of bread, stagnation and unemployment in industry, irritation and anxiety of people,’ is how Jan Baszkiewicz describes the mood of the French 4 in the spring of 1789. he ‘Winter of the Century’ brought similar consequences for the origin of the Revolution of Solidarity. hough, to repeat, although the outbreak of the Revolution of Solidarity was not an accident, chance did play an important role in it. Plainly speaking, Gierek and his associates had extremely bad luck when it came to the weather. his factor had an unprecedented inluence on the 1970s. First of all, there were rainy summers with bad harvests, which gradually decreased pork production from year to year, and then a blizzard beginning on New Year’s Day of 1978, 4 J. Baszkiewicz, Ludwik XVI (Wrocław, 1983), p. 210. 377 Marcin Zaremba which paralysed the country for almost two months. During the irst days of the New Year many towns and villages were cut of from the rest of the world. he same even happened to some districts of cities, like Ursynów, quite remote from the centre of Warsaw, which became impossible to reach or even con- tact by phone, as the phone lines were down. he few available phone boxes had to suice to provide all contact with the external world. In early January, only 25 per cent of the roads were passable in the Siedlce Region, and in other regions the situation was no beter. he regions of Gdańsk, Legnica, Poznań and Toruń announced states of emergency due to natural disaster. One had the impression that everything stopped, and not only because of snowdrits, but mainly because of failures of equipment and organization. 5 Snowploughs failed to start, as oil froze in the sub-zero temperatures. Re- gional and local bus connections came to a halt as well. For a few days the towns and cities of Poland became ghost-towns. Villages were in a beter position, as they had horses. he transportation system of the state turned out to be completely unprepared for a severe winter. For the Polish Railways these days proved to be the worst since the war and post-war migrations. Rail switches froze. In Legnica 80 per cent of rolling stock went dead, and in the Bydgoszcz region 60 electric and gas locomotives stopped. In some regions, like in Gdańsk area, train service was entirely suspended. he fuel for locomotives was scarce. Passengers crowded on platforms as delays of over 24 hours were recorded. 6 he situation was truly reminiscent of a war, and the messages from the front were rather unfavourable for the ‘builders of socialism.’ he Organizational Department of the Central Commitee of the Party reported in its special bulletin reserved only for the highest Party authorities: 5 More on ‘he Winter of the Century’ can be found in M. Zaremba, “Wywrotowa zima,” Polityka, 17 I 2009. 6 M. Wesołowska, “Próba zimna,” Polityka, 6 I 1979. 378  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 – Opole, January 4. he length of periods without access to energy de- creased, but as a result of previous limitations in the service a couple of hundred pigs died, as did over 150 thousand broilers and chickens. Some greenhouse crops froze. – Białystok, January 31: Serious breakdowns of power networks. Over 1 700 transformer stations out of 4 000 have been damaged. he heating system of Czarna Białostocka stopped functioning altogether. here are diiculties with transporting products from factories. – Piła: On the night of February 14 three passenger trains stalled in snowdrits. he passengers on the Wałcz-Krzyż train were rescued from the train by the army in the small hours of the morning. In other cases passengers are being evacuated by helicopters. – Olsztyn, February 17, no cargo trains with coal reached the region through the trunk line. In the area of Kozłów, on the line between Olsztyn and Działdowo a passenger train bound for Warszawa stalled in snowdrits. 7 Casualties were reported. A feature article by Marta Wesołowska entitled ‘A Trial by Cold,’ published in Polityka magazine on January 6, 1979 reads, ‘Do you really need to know now what is happening here? – An on-duty female emergency doctor asked with a voice so hoarse that it sounded like a man’s voice. It was her twelth hour of duty that day.’ 8 In the capital, ambulances got stuck in snow almost immediately ater they let hospitals. By January 2, 1979, fourteen cases of death by exposure had been reported, and in Bydgoszcz alone ive people died. All the victims of the 7 AAN, KC PZPR 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no III/9/79, III/58/79, III/84/79, III/94/79. 8 M. Wesołowska, “Próba zimna.” 379 Marcin Zaremba winter have never been counted. What should be taken into account are all the casualties resulting from the failure of emergency services to reach patients in time, re-scheduling operations, diseases spreading among children, the elderly failing to heat their houses properly, carbon-monoxide poisonings, and railway accidents. Six people lost their lives as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning in a train carriage bound for Moscow, and auto accidents were common as well, as winter tyres were a luxury unheard of in those days. So, it may well be estimated that the Winter of the Century caused more casualties than any other natural disaster in the history of the Peoples’ Republic. 9 he entire country was subject to regular power cuts. Piła experienced them from 6.30 till 7.00, from 11.00 till 15.10 and from 15.00 till 18.40. 10 Łódź received only 20 per cent of its daily energy demand. Briely put, it was a disaser. his fact was later admited by Jan Szydlak, Gierek’s right hand, in front of the Grabski Commitee: ‘We were truly on the brink of disaster. he power system in Poland was beginning to fall apart.’ 11 People froze, but not only due to low temperatures, but also because build- ings were neither properly heated nor insulated. Big housing estates, symbolising the housing boom of the Gierek era, turned out to be completely unprepared for an ordinary winter, not to mention the Winter of the Century. In the district of Ursynów, such houses saw temperatures of 7 degrees Celcius inside the buildings, and similar recordings were taken in apartments in Gdańsk. Pipes broke. he centralised city heating systems based on kilometres-long pipe net- works fuelled by one or two heating plants turned out to be, just like the whole centrally organized economy, dysfunctional and expensive, as well as truly 9 AAN, KC PZPR 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no. III/6/79, 2 I 1979, b.p. 10 AAN, KC PZPR 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no. III/6/79, 2 I 1979, b.p… 11 Z. Błażyński, Towarzysze zeznają (Warszawa, 1990), p. 183. 380  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 deadly during such a winter. Small boiler houses also failed, as in Włocławek, where 23 estate boiler houses could not provide any heat. he reason for this state of afairs were the power cuts, which made it impossible to pump hot water to buildings. As a result of this kind of a vicious circle – power cuts, boiler houses unable to function, radiators which froze and burst – people froze in their apartments in the Kiełczów housing estate in Wrocław, and in Strzelin, Oława and Wołów in Lower Silesia. Water poured from broken radiators, and in Ciechanów, Płońsk, Pułtusk and Mława this phenomenon lowered the temperature inside buildings to nine degrees. In Olsztyn the heating system failed almost entirely. In Włocławek, there was a shortage of home radiators, estimated to be at two thousand. he Political Bureau of the Party, which gathered on January 3, decided to increase the production of radiators, but there was also a shortage of oxygen and acetylene necessary for welding works. 12 In January most schools, culture centres, cinemas, theatres and sport halls were closed. Street lightning was turned of. In Olsztyn forty grocery stores were closed, all of the stores in the city at the time. Health services sufered enormous diiculties, both small health centres which lacked coal for heating as well as big hospitals. A Party report concerning the situation in Warsaw reads: Because of low temperatures the situation in hospitals is very diicult, and requires intensifying care of patients. In university clinics, for example, students were asked to perform such duties. It was necessary to limit operations only to these which were absolutely indispensable. It is also necessary to evacuate patients from the university maternity clinic to other hospitals. 13 he entire country experienced a lack of candles, and just like during the Cuban crisis, people stormed shops to buy lour, preserved meat and warm 12 AAN, KC PZPR, 1809, Protokół nr 124 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego 3 I 1979., k. 2. 13 AAN, CK PZPR, 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no III/5/79, 2 I 1979, b.p. 381 Marcin Zaremba clothes. Bread disappeared of the shelves within minutes. Some towns in- troduced food rationing. he black market price for a car batery exceeded 2000 zlotys. In many regions fuel was rationed as well. For example, in Szcze- cin, a person could buy only 10 litres of gas per car at one time. On January 13 prices on liquid fuels were increased without previous notice. 14 Stores, already almost empty, started lacking basic food products. Constant power cuts, delivery delays, absences at work resulting from communication breakdowns and employees having to combat winter instead of performing their usual duties caused enormous economic losses. From the beginning of the year, practically every branch of production sufered losses, and these amounting to 80 per cent were practically impossible to make up. In January Pollena Lechia factory did not produce any soap, and was unable to deliver 200 000 tubes of toothpaste. Pollena Uroda was unable to produce deodorants and hand creams. Shops lacked shoe polish, trousers and skirts, and the situation was tragic in the pharmaceutical industry. In 1979 deliveries of 418 medications and dressing materials were either limited or completely halted. he shortages included antibiotics, such as penicillin or streptomycin, vitamins C and B6, anti-asthmatic medicine, calcium supplements, antihistamine, and sleep and psychotropic drugs. 15 As powdered milk was lacking as well, rationing was in- troduced. Baby-care items were also in shortage, as parents were unable to buy baby soap, oil shampoo, powder, washing powder, feeding botles, clothes, etc. 16 Agriculture sufered particularly badly. In unheated farm buildings, hatch- eries and poultry farms animals died by the thousands. Greenhouse produc- 14 AAN, CK PZPR, 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no. III/6/79, 3 I 1979, b.p. 15 AAN, KC PZPR, 3564 (working catalogue number), Information no II/109/79, 22 II 1979 r., b.p. 16 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/161, he list of medication shortages 7 III 1979 r. in Lindley Hospital in Warsaw, k. 28-29. 382  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 tion also sufered huge losses. Cows gave less milk, which was relected in the dropping supply of buter, cream and cheese. Pork production fell dramatically. In 1979, for the irst time since the war, the country’s GDP fell, by 2,3 per cent from the previous year according to oicial statistics. 17 All these factors were of course relected in the social mood. The Effects of Winter ‘Party authorities receive many phone calls asking about the reasons for this situation,’ reads a Party report from the irst days of January. Many of these messages are aggressive, and put the blame on the Party, oten criticising its ‘risky economic policies,’ ‘working without necessary resources’ and logistical inabilities. Critics oten point out that announcing a state of natural disaster was aimed at masking the ‘messy economy’ and taking the blame of those responsible. 18 In the middle of January the Centre for Monitoring Public Opinion and Programme Studies conducted an opinion poll regarding the winter. It turned out that 55 per cent of respondents believed that the diiculties they were experiencing were a result of ‘logistical inabilities’ and 34 per cent pointed to ‘diicult weather conditions.’ Opinions on this issue difered depending on the area where respondents lived, their education and class ainity. In general, city dwellers (62 per cent), those with higher education such as pro- fessionals (73 per cent), and qualiied white-collar workers (56 per cent) oten atributed the diiculties to logistical inabilities. 19 Research from April 1979 17 Rocznik statystyczny 1982 (Warszawa, 1982), p. 69. 18 AAN, KC PZPR, 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no III/6/79, 3 I 1979, b.p. 19 Skutki ataku zimy w opinii społecznej, OBOP, luty 1979. 383 Marcin Zaremba showed a slight decrease (1-2 per cent) in public trust in the authorities, which at that time amounted to 37 per cent. his tiny shit could be explained by the fact that in 1978 the authorities had already lost the trust of about 20 per cent of the respondents. Simply put, there was no room for public opinion to fall any further for the time being. 20 he OBOP regularly investigated the levels of public optimism by asking the question about predictions concerning changes in peoples’ prosperity and life conditions. In comparison to the results of polls from the last quarter of 1978, a slight decrease was noted, from 40 to 38 per cent. ‘In comparison to re- sults from previous years (starting from 1973), similarly low levels of optimism have only been noted in the second half of 1976.’ 21 he Party could see the worsening social mood in the leters that they received. One of the authors wrote: ‘My colleagues, neighbours and I all see this situation as extreme mayhem as well as the ultimate expression of the lack of responsibility of the economic managers of the country for the well-being of citizens and the fate of the country.’ ‘A Varsovian’ expressed his views in the following words: ‘Ater we examine maters a bit closer, it turns out that many people do not have skills necessary to run a local store, not to mention a ministry.’ Piotr Nowicki from Poznań pointed out the consequences of the harsh winter for the econo- my and he predicted that the efect of these ‘far-sighted’ politics would be even more market problems. ‘Lines in stores will be geting longer, and in those lines people will be cursing the times that they live in.’ He concluded: ‘It is high time to eliminate inappropriate people from responsible posts.’ 22 Curiously, people did not grow any less upset as the snow thawed. On February 15, an explosion destroyed the PKO bank building in Warsaw, and 49 20 Nastroje społeczeństwa w kwietniu 1979 roku, OBOP, maj 1979. 21 Nastroje społeczeństwa w kwietniu 1979 roku, OBOP, maj 1979. 22 AAN, KC PZPR, XXVII-43, Selection of leters no. 43, k. 34, 35. 384  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 people died. he explosion was caused by a gas leak, which was probably a con- sequence of freeze-damaged gas pipes. he accident was on everybody’s lips. Security Services noted rumours that the accident was in fact a terrorist atack, conducted by ‘those displeased with the present situation in the country.’ In some institutions in the capital people panicked for fear of similar explosions. 23 he following week China invaded Vietnam, which for a while became the main subject of conversation. March saw the visit of a healer Clive Harris, who met the sick in churches. Church services organized the meetings very well, which proved to be a dress rehearsal before the Pope’s visit. In Szczecin Harris saw 35 000 people in two days, in Wrocław, 30 000, and the meetings were similarly popular in Warsaw. his popularity could be seen as a result of the public state of mind at that time, or a belief in a magical dimension of religion, but also problems with health services. 24 he Winter of the Century also had its positive sides. Cold radiators, power cuts and other diiculties encouraged people to act together and express sol- idarity, in spite of and apart from the authorities. In the course of meetings in apartment block corridors and unexpected visits to borrow a candle or a torch batery people met, got to know each other, exchanged views and complained about the ‘host of the country,’ the Party. In Radom and Giżycko the Security Services reported the following demands: ‘Freedom and meat,’ ‘We want light and heat.’ 25 23 AIPN, 0296/269, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in February 1979, k. 21. 24 AAN, KC PZPR 3564 (working catalogue number), Information no II/134/79, nr II/144/79, 7, 12 III 1979, b.p. 25 he most symptomatic atitude which the winter evoked in people was doubtlessly the willingness to help others. he media reported this atitude, and everyday life conirmed it, even though this view seemed idealistic. (P. Moszyński, “Przed odwilżą,” Polityka, 10 II 1979). AIPN, 0296/269, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in January 1979, k. 5. 385 Marcin Zaremba Heat Winter turned out to be one of main catalysts of rebellion. By aggravating life conditions, it enabled criticism and the possibility to deine reality as unbearable and needing amending. In October 1978 Cardinal Karol Wojtyła was elected Pope, and came to visit his homeland in June 1978, which gave rise to still more relections and conclusions. he conclave’s decision to elect a Pole to be the head of the Catholic Church caused shock, joy and pride among people, but outside of Krakow these emotions were not manifested in the streets, which may be a proof of widespread conformism, a lack of paterns for collective expression and a fear of going out into the streets, which were not ‘ours.’ he media of the time did not make things easier. Some time had to pass before people realized the importance and potential consequences of the conclave’s choice. he public eagerly awaited the events to come. On Sunday, October 22, the pontiicate was oicially inaugurated in Rome. he authorities agreed to a three-hour transmission of this event on public TV, which was highly unusual. Practically the entire country sat in front of TV screens not just to see the mass, but to take part in it. he audience igures reached an incredible and unprecedented 92 per cent of the adult population of the country. Undoubtedly, it was the most important media coverage in the history of the communist Poland. For millions of Poles it turned out to be a breakthrough religious and patriotic experience, giving hope, pride and freedom. he results of OBOP-conducted polls show that 99 per cent of respondents were pleased to see such a transmission on TV. 91 per cent knew the name of the new Pope, while only 78 per cent knew who the irst Polish man in space was, and the later was the subject of the biggest propaganda campaign of the communist Poland. Most people felt enormous joy and national pride caused by one of their own being elected Pope. An improvement in State-Church relations was predicted, as well as an increase in religiosity. Fewer respondents 386  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 predicted ‘an increase in social morality’ and an improvement of the economic situation of the country (that is, beter access to loans). Relatively, the least frequent choice was the possibility of liberalization of ‘internal relations.’ 26 In private conversation opinions were formulated in a bolder way. People speculated on the consequences of the choice, and some suggested that a Pole in the Vatican could mean the end of communism in its present shape. he fatalistic belief in the invincibility of the communist system, reinforced by the Hungarian experience of 1956 and the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, started to lose its power thanks to the conclave’s choice. Revolutions break out not only when people see their circumstances as unbearable, but just as important is the hope that such a change is possible. In this religiously orthodox environment the conviction that Poles are especially close to God and that the Virgin Mary protects the nation was growing stronger. Faith in divine airmation, just like a belief in the historical right of the people or self-accep- tance, had the same psychological efect: the feeling of one’s own – national or class – worth, without which it is diicult to maintain non-conformism or independent thinking. In other words, for a revolution to break out, it is not only necessary to believe that change is possible, but also the faith that the people are able to induce it. Let us remember, however, that such opinions and beliefs were not a widely known truth, but privately held views, formulated only in narrow circles and groups. At any rate, the harsh winter and its consequences, like the loods, quick- ly diverted people’s thinking from the Papal visit, whose date was announced on March 2, 1979. 27 In order not to heat up the atmosphere, the authorities limited 26 Opinia społeczna o wyborze nowego papieża i prezentacji tego wydarzenia w telewizji, OBOP, październik 1978. 27 More on the negotiations, preparations and the visit itself can be found in: Wizyta Jana Pawła II w Polsce 1979. Dokumenty KC PZPR i MSW, ed. A. Friszke, M. Zaremba, (Warszawa, 2005). 387 Marcin Zaremba media atention only to information that was absolutely indispensable. he number of censorship incidents grew. If someone wanted to form their own opinion, they had to listen to Western radio stations. Public opinion was also shaped by priests, who oten mentioned the preparations for the Pope’s visit in their sermons. In fact, in a relatively short time a church event security force was created. hanks to the fact that the Civic Militia (MO) were ordered to secure the passage routes of the Pope and to stay away from sectors for pilgrims during masses, for a few days these members of church staf wearing yellow caps became the only representatives of authority. he skills and discipline of these people, as well as that of scouts, medical services and other pilgrims, and the absence of oicial militia forces turned it into more than a religious event, but also a civic and national experience. Suddenly it tuned out that ‘they’ are not necessary, and ‘we’ are a community, in spite of all the partitions and barriers. 28 Ater the conclave’s decision the church in Poland gained momentum. ‘It has been observed that the choice of the new Pope and his decisions shape the bishops,’ priests’ and laypeople’s expectations of changes in the politics of the Church and state-church relations’ – Security Services (SB) oicers pointed out. Month by month, new chapels and churches were built. he bish- op of Częstochowa Franciszek Musiel initiated the petition to reactivate the Catholic weekly Niedziela. Such ideas, though still local in character, boosted collective activity. 29 Before Easter people were displeased again because of a lack of food in shops. It was not only meat that was lacking – Poles seemed to have grown accustomed to this – but also quite basic foods like buter, cheese, powdered milk, lour, tea and pasta. he longest lines in front of shops counted over 500 28 And even more: M. Zaremba, “Ojciec cięty,” Polityka, 25 X 2008. 29 AIPN, 0365/5 t. 8, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in November 1978, k. 125. 388  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 people. In May rumours spread that the food shortages were a result of accu- mulating food reserves for the Pope’s visit. It was also rumoured that prices would increase. 30 Ater the nervous Easter preparations had inished, peoples’ minds again centred on the upcoming Papal visit. According to OBOP research, 98 per cent of respondents were aware of the fact. 12 per cent, an estimated 3 million people, declared that they wanted to see the Pope. 31 It quickly turned out that these numbers were much higher than the number of entrance cards that had been prepared in parishes. Priests were neither able nor willing to limit the number of people atending. Transport problems started to appear. A priest in the parish of Koczała in the Słupsk region threatened to start a hunger strike if he did not get the bus he had ordered. One fact is certain: the preparations, especially those taking place in towns that the Pope was to visit, activated local communities and deepened their bond with the Church. 32 In this atmosphere of religious elation miraculous divine revelations took place. In May an inhabitant of Słończewo in the region of Ciechanów spread a rumour of a miracle, drawing crowds even from other regions. he authorities reported up to 2 000 pilgrims per day. A miracle in Jeżowo, in the region of Skierniewice, where a igure of the Virgin Mary was allegedly moving, also atracted thousands of pilgrims. 33 he Papal visit, which started on June 2, 1979, had both a religious and a social dimension, and the later brought truly revolutionary consequences. With- in a few months the Pope became a national authority and the centre of na- 30 AAN, KC PZPR 3564 (working catalogue number), Information no I/25/79, 23 III and 6 IV 1979, b.p. 31 O wizycie papieża w Polsce. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, maj 1979. 32 AIPN, 0296/269, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in May 1979, k. 70 33 AIPN, 0296/269 t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in May 1979, k.73. 389 Marcin Zaremba tional identity. hese feelings were revealed during his visit, as the places he visited were not only decorated with lags and banners, but were also centres of non-regime life: songs, collective prayers and outbursts of enthusiasm. Ev- erything seemed extraordinary and unusual, such as the Pope’s speeches and his kneeling on the ground of the airport. When he met Edward Gierek at Belvedere, he atracted everyone’s atention. He was cheerful, but also focused and digniied. he Pope talked about important issues: the history of Poland, the meaning of the word ‘homeland’ and the common fates of the nation and the Catholic Church. Pointing out the right of Poles to live in a free state, he returned sense to the notions of freedom, homeland and truth. Everyone could sense that it had been a very long time since anyone had spoken this way. Many people cried in front of their televisions. In this company the speech of the First Secretary of the Central Commit- tee was trivial and unremarkable. Even Józef Tejchma, who was a member of the Political Bureau, remembers it as something similar to ‘propaganda notes.’ Gierek was admired and respected by a large number of Poles, but when he stood by the side of John Paul II and spoke, he suddenly lost all his charm. his was an important event in the process of the delegitimization of authorities, which precedes every revolution. 34 Later the Pope conducted mass on Zwycięstwa Square in Warsaw, which was the only event to be transmited on TV in its entirety. he words that were spoken during this mass have been quoted hundreds of times, so I am not going to dwell on them in this work. What has not received atention is the collective experience of the mass, shared by those present and those in front of 34 J. Tejchma, W kręgu nadziei i rozczarowań. Notatki dzienne z lat 1978-1982 (Warszawa, 2002), p. 61. 390  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 their televisions. When the pilgrims sang the religious hymm ‘We Want God’ (My chcemy Boga), the viewers could feel a sense of national unity. 35 Although each Papal mass this June was diferent from the others, the feel- ings of elevation and joy, the solidarity of the faithful, the millions of banners and the cheering crowds remained exactly the same. he Pope’s meetings with young people had a particularly special character, as they were direct, sponta- neous and extremely popular. he mass at Jasna Góra gathered over 100 000 young people, as the local Regional Commitee reported. In some schools in Częstochowa as many as 80 per cent of pupils were absent from class on that day. he communists started to fear: Activists and members oten hold the opinion that the Pope’s visit created an unfavourable situation for the Party. It has also been pointed out that the Pope publicly advocates notions which are completely op- posite to the political and programme foundations of the Party, that he wants to turn the faithful into religious fanatics and encourage the clergy to confront the socialist state. 36 The Pope Effect he Papal visit changed Poles. It initiated the process of awakening a society stuck in the conformism of the Gierek era. he visit was on everybody’s lips: 87 per cent of respondents, according to OBOP, declared a high degree of interest in the visit ater it ended. It awoke enormous hopes. 71 per cent of respondents 35 For more, see: Wizyta Jana Pawła II, ed. Friszke and Zaremba. 36 AAN, KC PZPR, 3565 (working catalogue number), Information no II/241/79, 7 IV 1979, b.p. 391 Marcin Zaremba predicted an improvement in state-church relations. Most of the respondents speciied that this improvement would above all mean concessions of the state for the sake of the Church, such as increased tolerance for the Church and its followers; an increase of the importance of the Church in Poland; state help with building and renovating churches; and the hope – though expressed by few – of introducing religious education in schools, and making media avail- able for transmiting religious information and masses. In fact, these were the expectations of a complete reconstruction of the state, including abandoning its Marxist ideology. hese could be seen as actions dismantling the ideologi- cal basis of the socialist state in Poland. he Pope’s visit awoke hopes that the authorities had no intention of fulilling. History has seen huge revolutionary motivations set free in similar circumstances. 37 he hopes that were awakened were not the only efects of John Paul II’s visit to Poland. An array of changes in the sphere of social atitudes, moods and mental reactions could be called ‘the Pope efect.’ he crucial factor for the later emergence of Solidarity turned out to be a decrease in the collective fear. he Pope ‘took the fear away,’ a respondent to the poll conducted by Tygodnik Powszechny wrote. he fear of violence used to be one of the most important stabilizing factors for the regime. he memory of mass repressions of 1944-1956, and the paciication of demonstrations in Poznan in 1956 and the Baltic Coast in 1970 had inclined people to obey and had created a mood of hopelessness and total dependence on the whims of the authorities. 38 he French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville once remarked that the regime that is overturned by a revolution is always beter than the one that came di- rectly before it. It is hard to deny that Gierek’s decade was the best of all those 37 Wizyta papieża w Polsce i jej odbicie w telewizji w opinii społecznej. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, lipiec 1979. 38 AAN, XIA/930, Informacja Głównego Urzędu Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk nr 8 o ingerencjach dokonanych w sierpniu 1979, b.p. 392  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 following the war. Not only were goods more available, but also people stopped feeling paralyzing fear. However, as the research of Mirosława Maroda shows, the older generation remembered the fear, which weakened the inclination to behave in a non-conformist way. he striking shipyard workers in August 1980 had reason to be afraid of repression, but there was no threat of torture, show trials, or early morning executions. his made the decision to rebel somewhat easier. he words spoken by the Pope on St. Peter’s Square – ‘Fear not!’ – also played their role, as well as the awareness that ‘our man’ in Rome will defend us, if the need arises. Ater the Warsaw uprising and the Yalta Conference Poles felt abandoned by the world. Now they knew that they were not alone. We all remember the Pope’s photo on the gates of the striking shipyard in Gdansk – it functioned as a talisman which was meant to drive the fear away. 39 Serious changes also took place in the religious sphere, although they were qualitative rather than quantitative. Since 1973, OBOP had systematically investigated the levels of religious belief among people, based on declarations concerning relations to faith and religious practice. he results showed a very high level of religious belief, close to 90 per cent of the overall number of people, as well as litle change of atitudes in this respect ater the Pope’s visit. 39 For more on fear in the seventies see Polacy ’80, p. 117-136. 393 Marcin Zaremba Chart no. 1 Declared religious attitudes in the years 1975-1980 (per cent). Declared religious attitudes April 1975 April 1978 April 1980 believers participating in religious practices (to a greater or lesser degree) 77 76 79 believers not participating in religious practices 15 12 10 non-believers or undecided 8 12 11 he authors of the research pointed out that, ‘perhaps there is a tendency for the atitudes of the group of believers not participating in religious practices to polarize either in the direction of becoming religiously active or indiferent to religion.’ In other words, some of those who moved away from the Church be- fore, now started returning. his was mainly true of the intelligentsia. Regional commitees of the Party reported a growing number of people participating in masses even before the Papal visit. Shrines and sanctuaries also illed with people. 40 Some groups became increasingly orthodox. On August 1979 a crowd of about 200 people singing religious songs gathered in front of the city hall in Czaplinek (Koszalin region). Most of them were elderly women, but there were also young people and workers present. Led by three priests, they en- tered a misdemeanour courtroom, where they wanted to protest against the 40 Brak zmian w stopniu religijności społeczeństwa polskiego. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, lipiec 1980. 394  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 trial of a priest for puting up a roadside cross without permission. 41 A process against priests: Adam Michalski and Tadeusz Radochoński, charged with illegally building a church on a housing estate in Przemyśl brought about similar protests. On October 11, 1979, the city was looded by lealets signed by the Przemyśl Commitee of the Devout. One of them read: ‘We, believers, will be courageous and show that we are many, we are not afraid and we will not let you harm the priest.’ Solidarity with the defendants was called for. On the next day a group of about a hundred believers, consisting mainly of elderly women, went to court together with the priest, singing religious hymns. 42 On the anniversary of the day Karol Wojtyła was chosen Pope, on Novem- ber 16, 1979, on the spot where the June mass was held, a group of believers arranged a cross of lowers and put up a Vatican lag with a photo of John Paul II. Again, religious songs were sung. In Krakow, ater a mass conducted by the Cardinal Franciszek Macharski, over a thousand people gathered near the Adam Mickiewicz statue on the Main Market Square. hey were holding Papal and national lags, and one of the lags had a crowned eagle on it. 43 he authorities noted the increase in the number of pilgrims and summer religious camps. 44 he Pope efect was also visible in the symbolic and ritual sphere, that is, adorning gates of striking factories with lowers in August 1980 and during later protests in the years 1980-1981. It was quite similar to the custom of adorning church altars on the day of Corpus Christi. Since 1956 striking 41 AAN, KC PZPR, 3565 (working catalogue number), Information no I/75/79, 11 VIII 1979, b.p. 42 AAN, KC PZPR, 3566 (working catalogue number), Information no II/330/79, 12 X 1979, b.p. 43 AAN, KC PZPR, 3559 (working catalogue number), Information no I/110/79, 17 X 1979, b.p. 44 AAN, KC PZPR, 3565 (working catalogue number), Information no III/297/79, 10 VIII 1979, b.p. 395 Marcin Zaremba workers had rarely manifested their religious belief. his changed ater the visit of John Paul II. Marx and Engels assumed it was certain that the secularization of societies is an unavoidable consequence of progress. Communists in Poland also be- lieved in this assumption, but decided to help secularization a litle. he society, however, remained highly active in the religious sphere and it continued to have strong religious identity, even though it was completely absent from political life. All the great revolutions, starting from the French to those in Russia and Mexico had an antifeudal and anti-Church character. he exceptions were the revolutions in Poland and Iran, because in both of them a signiicant role in mobilizing the society was played by the clergy. In both of them a strong religious identity (just like awoken class awareness in other revolutions) con- structed a place for dispute and made it easier to identify its actors: the religious society and ‘them’ – the secular, or even atheist authorities. In Iran the Muslim clergy and Khomeini became the leaders of the revolution. In Poland, tightening relations between the opposition and the Church had its own history, whose important chapters were the meetings of Leszek Kołakowski, and later Jacek Kuroń with Primate Wyszyński. 45 In 1977 the Literary Institute in Paris published a book by Adam Michnik Kościół, lewica, dialog (he Church, the Let and Dialogue) proposing a dialog between the let and the Catholic Church. Among the founding fathers of the Workers’ Defence Commitee (KOR – Komitet Obrony Robotników) there was a well- known religious leader, Rev. Jan Zieja, and among the founding fathers of the Commitee for the Protection of Human and Civil Rights there were three priests. In May 1977 in St. Martin’s church in Warsaw opposition activists 45 Two meetings of Adam Michnik with Stefan Wyszyński in Warszawa – together with Jacek Kuroń – and Rome in 1976 were also important. For more, see J. Skórzyński, Siła bezsilnych. Historia Komitetu Obrony Robotników (Warszawa 2012), p. 182-183, 186- 187. 396  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 undertook a hunger strike. he Papal visit reinforced this mechanism, which, from the perspective of the lay West, seemed to be a particularly ‘Polish’ phe- nomenon. For ten years the Church became a haven for people involved in anti-system activity. All independent events, celebrations or feasts started with or ended with a mass, during which those present could manifest their faith, unity and patriotism. Another hunger strike was undertaken in 1979 by iteen opposition leaders in the St. Cross church in Warsaw – including An- drzej Czuma, Antoni Macierewicz, Adam Michnik, Halina Mikołajska, Anka Kowalska, Jacek Kuroń and Mariusz Wilk. Ater the introduction of Martial Law the communist authorities abolished all the administrative diiculties which once hindered the construction of churches and other sacral buildings. he purpose of this action was to weaken the ties between the Church and the opposition as well as to avoid accusations that the state was making things diicult for the Church. 46 But it was not only strong religious motivation that caused the revolution of Solidarity. National motivations, 47 connected with religious ones, were also important, and one can also see ‘the Pope efect’ at work here. John Paul II’s words spoken in Auschwitz, concerning the way in which the system of repression functions, the necessity to defend human rights, as well as totalitarian systems and the need to ight for freedom were understood by the audience to be an allusion to the current conditions in Poland, as we read in the information of the Organizational Department of the Central Commitee. 48 In June 1979 in Radziejów someone scatered lealets which said ‘Death to communists.’ In Legnica, graiti appeared reading, ‘No more imperialism of the USSR,’ ‘No to 46 J. Skórzyński, “Głodówka u św. Marcina” in Od Piłsudskiego do Wałęsy. Studia z dziejów Polski w XX wieku, ed. K. Persak et. al. (Warszawa 2008), p. 441-458. 47 AAN, KC PZPR, 3565, Information no. II/246/79, 8 VI 1979, b.p. 48 M. Kula, Narodowe i rewolucyjne (Londyn 1991). 397 Marcin Zaremba the USSR,’ and ‘No more Polish-Soviet friendship!’ If this was not a beginning of the march on the Bastille, some circles certainly began to see its walls. 49 In May and June 1980 the anti-Russian mood was on the increase, as the Summer Olympics in Moscow approached. he unavailability of building materials and food (ham, for example) was widely blamed on the fact that they had been exported to the USSR. hese moods found a symbolic expression, for example in the joy of the Polish audience ater Władysław Kozakiewicz won the Olympic pole vault competition, beating his Russian opponent, and made a famous gesture to the unfriendly Russian audience. It was July 30, 1980. The First Battle for Remembrance he reawakening of patriotic feelings was visible in the return to historical thinking, and history has always been very important to Poles. A good case in point here is Kielce, where on February 12, 1979 a tumult took place. A crowd of ive hundred people forced their way into a bookshop, where they demand- ed that the book Poczet królów i książąt polskich (he Kings and Princes of Poland) be sold. 50 Historical debates became a substitute for serious political debate. he debates from the beginning of the decade over the book Rodowody Niepokornych by Bohdan Cywiński or the person of Aleksander Wielopolski replaced conversations about current politics and relations with Russia. he movie based on a historical novel by Henryk Sienkiewicz Potop (he Deluge) brought millions of viewers into cinemas. he intelligentsia were especially inluenced by the picture Człowiek z marmuru (Man of Marble) directed by Andrzej Wajda. It is estimated that over 80 thousand visitors saw the exhibition 49 AIPN, 0296/269, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in June 1979, k. 85 50 AAN, KC PZPR, 3564, Information no.II/78/79, 14 II 1979 r., no page numbers. 398  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 Polaków portret własny (Poles in their own eyes), which opened on November 8, 1979 at the National Museum in Krakow. All these factors had an inluence on the national identity of Poles and their rebellious feelings. But there were also quite opposite trends: the memories of World War II were fading, and national memory was weakened by a turn to consumption from the beginning of a decade. Gierek and his men rarely invoked national history to form their right to govern the country on its basis. 51 Neither did the opposition use history to undermine this right. Instead they decided to stress the lack of respect for human rights on the side of the authorities. Papal homilies full of historiosophic relection made the historical past seem very important again. Party authorities were informed that, in comparison with the previous year, the interest of youth in the modern history of Poland was growing regarding, for example, issues like the reasons for the Polish loss in September 1939, ighting the occupants, rebuilding the country and establishing socialist rule. 52 In works devoted to overcoming the negative efects of the Papal visit on the socialist regime, it was pointed out that ‘history has recently become a sphere where particularly aggressive anti-socialist propaganda operated.’ 53 he necessity of historical education was emphasized, which was meant to make people identify with socialism. A war for historical memory broke out between the authorities and the opposition, who tried to undermine the position of the former. To be precise, this war had already started in November 1978, when Edward Gierek spoke at the celebratory session of the Sejm. Workers’ Defence Commitee pub- 51 M. Zaremba, Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce (Warszawa 2001), p. 363. 52 AAN, KC PZPR, 3565 (working catalogue number), Information no III/297/79, 10 VIII 1979, b.p. 53 See the project of counteracting the negative efects of the Papal visit in: Wizyta Jana Pawła II w Polsce 1979, p. 306. 399 Marcin Zaremba lished a statement and Movement for Defence of Human and Citizen’s Rights organized the irst independent demonstration at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw since 1976. he next year saw more intensive activities in this sphere. he authorities tried to take over the remembrance of the Warsaw Uprising and gain some advantage in this way. On August 1 and 2, 1979 public TV produced a series of broadcasts which included, for example, a demonstra- tion at the Memorial of Heroes of the Warsaw Uprising. Not since 1945 had the celebrations of the anniversary of the Uprising had such media coverage and grandiosity. 54 he opposition, on the other hand, organized a demonstration on the for- tieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1979. In Warsaw a relatively large demonstration took place: ater a mass in the cathe- dral, about a thousand participants marched down Krakowskie Przedmieście Boulevard singing religious and patriotic songs and arrived at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. here, lowers were laid and the participants sang the national anthem. hey also publicly announced the establishment of the Confederation of Independent Poland. Later many wondered why the communist authorities did not disperse these demonstrations. he answer was simple: in doing so the authorities would have put themselves in the position of being critics of the national remembrance of the war. And the authorities saw themselves as the main conductor of the celebrations, which were the most grandiose since the 1960s. he whole country saw meetings with veterans, lowers were laid on war memorials, obelisks and monuments were unveiled, and school celebrations were organized. Gierek also gave speeches. he next cards were played by the opposition during the celebrations of the anniversaries of September 17, as well as that of the Baltic Coast paciications in 1970. However, the most inluential initiative of the democratic opposition 54 A. Friszke, Czas KOR-u, p. 458. 400  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 was the commemoration of the Katyń Massacre. All over the country inten- tion masses for the murdered ones were conducted. On Sunday, April 27, 1980 alone, over forty such intention masses took place all over the country, as the SB calculated. Graiti saying ‘We’ll avenge Katyń’ appeared on walls, and lealets were distributed. 55 Posters prepared by the opposition appeared in Warsaw, Krakow and other cities. 56 his war for historical memory, although won by the opposition, took place in the perimeters of the spheres which were most important for Poles. The Evaluation of the Year he second half of the year 1979 was spent in darkness and using faulty goods. he Krakow region saw power cuts almost every day. he inhabitants of the Katowice region sufered limits in the supply of energy for 218 days out of ten months. In October, only one day was free from power cuts. In other regions of the country, the situation was similar. 57 he inhabitants of Warsaw were luckier as the power cuts in the capital were much less frequent. However, on October 24 half of the city sufered a power cut that lasted almost two days. People were furious, but they started to grow accustomed to the fact that ‘they’ could cut the power supply any time they wished. his fury was restrained for some time, because power cuts had a neg- ative inluence on economy: they resulted in work stoppages, lower salaries and a worsening of the general mood. Losses in production were frequently made up for on Saturdays, which almost became a regular workday, and infu- 55 AIPN, 0365/2 t. 1, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in April 1980, k. 64. 56 For more on the activities of the opposition, see A. Friszke, Czas KOR-u. 57 AAN, KC PZPR, 3566 (working catalogue number), Information no II/354/79, 15 X 1979, b.p. 401 Marcin Zaremba riated people even more. Not enough goods being produced resulted in many market shortages and longer lines in front of shops, which was all the more reason to be angry. Paradoxically, the year 1979 was a record one when it comes to the amount of coal mined, but most of it was exported, as that was practically the only way for a country in debt to earn some money. his short-lived prosperity was char- acteristic of the irst half of the decade. Emblematic of its second half was the abundance of faulty goods, second-rate products made of cheap materials that broke down soon ater they were bought and became a symbol of economic chaos and carelessness. Shops were full of broken washing machines and TV sets and other ‘non-exportable goods’, suits without butons or shirts with badly sewn sleeves. According to the oicial data, the levels of faultiness were highest in electronic goods, at 28.7per cent. For example, in the case of Rubin 714p TV sets 91.9 per cent of the sets produced were faulty. 58 In order to obtain goods that were usable people had to resort to diverse strategies. One of these, besides relying on people that one knew, was bribery. Since World War II bribery and corruption in Poland had enjoyed ‘full civil rights,’ and they were treated as objectionable but acceptable ways of dealing with life during times of shortage. he OBOP investigated atitudes towards this phenomenon in 1964 and 1976. In 1976 giving small gits to gain a favour was perceived as occurring quite oten or very frequently by 72 per cent of re- spondents. In 1964 it was 71 per cent. Bribery, that is giving money or expensive presents in return for positive outcomes, was seen as a frequent occurrence by 42 per cent of respondents in the Gierek era, although 42 per cent found it rare. 19 per cent of respondents admited to bribery at some point in their lives, and 31 per cent claimed that they were suggested to do so in order to ob- 58 AAN, KC PZPR, 3559 (working catalogue number), Information no II/210/79, 28 V 1979, b.p. 402  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 tain a positive outcome of their mater. According to the respondents, bribes were most necessary when admited to hospital (52 per cent), if one wanted to be granted a lat (52 per cent), to buy such goods as furniture or a washing machine (51 per cent) or be given building materials (47 per cent). 59 Because of the constant economic crisis and persistent shortages of goods, by the end of the decade corruption became commonplace. A Party member wrote to the authorities: Bribery has been awarded full rights in this country. It is particularly worrying that it does not concern only ordinary people any more, but also enterpris- es and institutions – it is impossible to buy allocated goods without a bribe. Goods are available, but with- out a bribe they are either sold or reserved for someone. he level of moral schizophrenia was so high that Poles did not object to brib- ery when they needed to obtain goods or services, but were highly critical of anyone from the authorities or management for accepting bribes. One could say that all authority was seen as corrupt. 60 In December the OBOP conducted an annual opinion poll regarding the international and internal situations. China’s aggression in Vietnam, the rev- olution in Iran, and above all the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan made the opinions regarding the international afairs very pessimistic. Opinions on the situation within the country were also far from optimistic in comparison with previous years. 59 Zjawisko łapownictwo – jego zasięg i ocena w opinii publicznej. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, Czerwiec 1976. 60 AAN, KC PZPR, XXVII-42, Leters and Inspections Bureau KC PZPR, Wybór listów nr 35, styczeń 1979 r., k. 219. 403 Marcin Zaremba Chart no. 2 Opinions on the international situation 1977-1979 (in per cent) Opinion 1977 1978 1979 good 51 45 29 neither good nor bad 27 28 31 bad 4 7 21 no opinion 18 20 19 Chart no. 3 Opinions on the situation in the country 1977-1979 (in per cent) Opinion 1977 1978 1979 good 43 46 32 neither good nor bad 33 33 39 bad 15 13 21 no opinion 9 8 8 Opinions in 1979 were quite diferent from the evaluation of previous years, as only one third of respondents believed that this year was good for the country. he following year was to be a beter one according to 28 per cent of respondents and neither beter nor worse according to 42 per cent. 61 Nobody could see the revolution coming, although the results of the polls could be seen as food for thought in this respect. 61 Ocena roku 1979 i prognozy na rok następny. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, maj 1979. 404  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 Boiling On January 4, Jimmy Carter announced sanctions against the USSR. he world entered another stage of the cold war. In Poland, the main event of the beginning of the year was the preparations for the February 8 – Polish com- munist party Convention. It began with the First Secretary’s four-hour speech, in which he implicitly atacked the government, which was unprecedented. He opposed power abuses and announced that those guilty of such behaviour would be punished. he speech was in fact a prelude to the removal of Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz, who was subsequently not chosen as a member of the Central Commitee. On February 18, he was oicially replaced by Edward Babiuch. For the past 25 years there had been only two heads of government: Józef Cyrankiewicz and Piotr Jaroszewicz. hus, removing the ‘iron prime minister,’ who had worked in tandem with Gierek for the past ten years, was perceived as an important and extraordinary event. he hitherto monolith of power was starting to crack. It is probable that the prospect of the guilty ones being punished made a percentage of Poles happy, as the indicators of social optimism went up. However, this could have been caused by the propaganda campaign which accompanied the convention. he trust in the government, as measured by OBOP, also rose from 37 per cent (the average from the second half of 1979) to 50 per cent. 62 On March 23, 1980, elections to the Sejm and National Councils took place on the regional level, with an oicial turnout of 99,87 per cent. In Sosnowiec, 99,97 per cent of voters cast their ballot for Edward Gierek. he opposition organized the biggest lealet distribution action in their history – in Warsaw alone two thousand lealets were distributed. 63 Gdańsk saw the appearance of 62 Poprawa nastrojów społecznych po VIII Zjeździe PZPR. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, marzec 1980. 63 For more, see: A. Friszke, Czas KOR-u, p. 479. 405 Marcin Zaremba posters which said: ‘Voter, stay at home – Brezhnev will vote for you’ and ‘No more hypocrisy – we want free elections.’ he opposition illegal party KPN even tried to register its leader – Leszek Moczulski on the list of PM candidates. he levels of social conformism remained high. he underground periodical Biuletyn Informacyjny of the Workers’ Defence Commitee conducted a survey, in which it asked for reasons why people voted. A student answered: ‘I’m going to apply for a passport in May.’ A wife of a retired university professor: ‘My husband had a second heart atack, and we applied for a sanatorium for him.’ A young worker: ‘My pals told me not to go, but I am going to apply for a technical high school referral.’ A farmer: ‘I am old, I have to do everything by myself, because my mother is ill. I mustn’t anger the authorities, so that I can keep my farm.’ 64 he Party did not manage to use the change of prime minister to their ad- vantage. Babiuch, an apt second-line activist, was completely unknown to the public. He lacked charisma and the faith in success that Poles had so loved in Gierek and Jaroszewicz at the beginning of the decade. But it was too late for new beginnings, it seems. he time for decisive moves, which was best ater the June 1976 crisis, had been wasted. he awareness of this fact grew, as did the frustration resulting from growing disparities between the real world and that of the socialist narrative. Press and television propaganda of success irritated Poles, who felt cheated by the show put up by authorities and tired of the rituals of the Gierek era. 65 hese moods are well relected in the leters to the Central Commitee in 1978: In all the speeches of the Party authorities as well as in the media it is constantly emphasized that our society is prosperous, people have high salaries and high life standards. However, no one admits that there is a huge 64 “Dlaczego głosowałem?,” Biuletyn Informacyjny 2 (36) (1980), p 5-6. 65 Polacy ’80, p. 109a. 406  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 gap between the rich and the poor, and that the prices of goods are constantly on the increase. he media just keep saying how good we have it. Allegedly, the prices are stable. his is not true. 66 he propaganda campaign before the VII Convention lited the social mood for a while. But a boomerang efect soon setled in: instead of increasing the trust in authorities, the propaganda was found irritating, and even hostile. 67 In this way, Gierek’s propaganda of success partially led to the success of the revolution of Solidarity. he social mood started worsening in the spring of 1980. Andrzej Wer- blan, a secretary of the Central Commite, predicted in March that ‘the explo- sion may happen any minute.’ 68 In some regions of the country rumours were spread that prices would increase and the national currency would be replaced by the rouble in all countries of the socialist bloc. Together with these fears, the demand for lasting goods, like cars, TVs or washing machines, grew, 69 but the shops lacked practically everything. One had to queue to buy toilet paper, school accessories, medication, furniture, etc. A leter sent by a worker from Rzeszów to the Party’s Central Commitee in April 1979 shows what shopping for meat was like: Where I live, the butcher’s opens at 9 a.m. and af- ter a few minutes the shelves are completely empty. People had been queuing since 5 a.m. to buy anything. 66 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/1064, Biuro Listów i Inspekcji KC PZPR, Wybór listów nr 22, March 1978, k. 20, 26. 67 M. Zaremba, “Propaganda sukcesu. Dekada Gierka,” in Propaganda PRL. Wybrane problemy, ed. P. Semków (Gdańsk 2004), p. 22-32. 68 M.F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1979-1981 (Warszawa 2004), p. 169. 69 AIPN Rz, 00268/34, t. 5, Meldunek operacyjny Wydziału III-A KWMO in Tarnobrzeg, 13 II 980, k. 15. 407 Marcin Zaremba Many leave work before noon, because they know that in the aternoon there will be nothing to buy. People who have time may be able to buy something, but we, workers, cannot leave our workplace. In the aternoon it is only possible to get black pudding or pork fat. 70 Since the year 1974, OBOP had been conducting polls to track social moods regarding the availability of food items. From year to year, more respondents had a negative opinion on this mater. In June 1976 ater a price increase was announced and then called of, the drop in polls was very clear: 71 per cent of respondents believed that shop supplies were inadequate, and only 6 per cent evaluated it as good. Ater the Winter of the Century, in March 1979, 15 per cent of respondents believed it was good, 34 per cent said it was acceptable and 50 per cent – inadequate. In June 1980 the results were even worse, respectively: 11, 27 and 61 per cent. he sale of basic food items like buter, cheese, lour, eggs, vegetables and chicken meat was interrupted. Formula milk for infants was sold only on the basis of a child’s medical record book. Ham and beef were described as available by 1 per cent of respondents. 71 Somebody wrote in a leter intercepted by the Ministry of Internal Afairs: I cannot ofer much, because all we manage to get is 2 kilos of lour, rice or groats at a time. Sometimes I manage to buy something using my connections. In this way Jarosław got tomato puree and wales. I my- self have a couple of kilos of lour and 3 kilos of rice. If 70 AAN, KC PZPR, XXVII/43, Biuro Listów i Inspekcji KC PZPR, Wybór listów nr 38, April 1978, k. 61. 71 Zaopatrzenie żywności w II kwartale 1980 r. w opinii społecznej. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, czerwiec 1980. 408  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 you need anything, tell me what it is, so that I know what to get. 72 On the one hand Poles grew accustomed to the constant need to wait in lines for hours, and on the other, they stopped believing in an improvement of their situation without any radical changes. But nobody knew what these changes could consist of. he dominating moods were boredom, fatigue, pessimism and increasing impatience with the authorities for not handling the problem and stealing instead. Everyone knew stories about the son of the Prime Min- ister, Andrzej Jaroszewicz, who was a symbol of leaching personal gains from his father’s position. 73 In May 1980 rebellious tendencies were on the increase, and more people expressed fears of subsequent price rises. he Security Service noted an …increase in peoples’ displeasure and critical com- ments regarding supplies in shops, price politics and activity of authorities, caused by lasting shortages of food and other goods, price rises, production disrup- tions in some production plants, as well as growing dis- cussion and rumours about further price rises, which has become a reason for buying up the entire stock of certain items. 74 he country saw ive strike incidents, the most important one being at the Polam light bulb factory, where three employees stopped work for 2,5 hours. he SB also noted 44 workplace conlicts, 36 of them in April, in the Lenin Steelworks 72 AIPN Rz, 00268/34, t. 5, Information, k. 149. 73 M.F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1979-1981, p. 157. 74 AIPN, 0365/2t. 1, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in May 1980, k. 79. 409 Marcin Zaremba in Krakow, the Adolf Warski Szczecin Shipyard, WSK PZL Warszawa II and Feliks Dzierżyński Warsaw Building Machines Works. he reason for most of them were payment issues: decreasing salaries, withholding bonuses, etc. 75 In the summer the social indicator of optimism fell to 22 per cent (from 44 per cent in February). On July 8, OBOP interviewers asked the question: How would you describe the present economic situation of our country? 65 per cent respondents answered that they found it bad. Interestingly, members of the Party were just as pessimistic as people who had nothing to do with politics. heir loss of hope in the Party’s ability to rescue the country from crisis should be seen as one of the important signs of the storm to come. 76 Meanwhile social tension was growing, mainly as a result of fears of yet another price increase. Since January 1979 the price of petrol had increased three times. Most of the price rises were introduced quietly so that the public would not ind out. In June 1980 the prices of newspapers and magazines, 88 titles altogether, went up, as did the prices of cloth, by 10 to 30 per cent. Ater the prices of sugar had increased to 26 zlotys per kilo, the prices of pastry, cakes, ice cream and carbonated drinks rose accordingly. Poles had the right to be irritated. Somebody wrote in a private leter: I’m returning to work on September 1, because life in this city is geting harder and harder. Everything is geting more expensive, and you can hardly buy any- thing. Up to now only meat and sausage was lacking, now there is no lour, no rice, not even sugar! It seems that things will not be geting beter, because this year’s loods destroyed all the crops. 77 75 AIPN, 0365/2t. 1, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in May 1980, k. 89. 76 Zmiany nastrojów społecznych w roku 1980 na tle okresów poprzednich. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, maj 1979. 77 AIPN Rz, 00268/34, t. 5, Information, k. 149. 410  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 A Summer that Was Cold and Hot at the Same Time In the last week of June Edward Babiuch dismissed the Minister of Building Industry, Adam Glazur. his decision was well received by a part of the public who understood it as a step on the road to remove corrupt authority igures. Perhaps if this dismissal had been beter played in terms of propaganda and followed by other similar moves, the feeling of deprivation would not have been so acute. It is possible that this could have been used to mitigate the efects of another price rise, which was to come into force from July 1. his was the spark which ignited the revolutionary process. he prices of meat products such as beef, bacon, pate-sausage, knuckle of pork, turkey, goose and duck rose, and these products were moved into the category of foods sold at ‘commercial’ prices. he rises also afected the can- teens and workplace eateries, where people ate their meals or took them home. he trick that the authorities used to hide price rises was the one that they had used in June 1978, when availability of goods decreased and lines in shops lengthened: they moved some of the products to the delicatessen departments or shops. 78 he public mood worsened in 1978 and, according to OBOP, the 78 his is an example of Information provided by the Organizational Department in June 1978: ‘he proof that meat deicits exist are the long lines in front of shops many hours before delivery times, the impossibility of maintaining continuous sale of most meats, excluding black pudding and short time of sale, even if large supplies of goods are transferred to the stores. For example, in Bydgoszcz region no city is able to maintain uninterrupted sale. In Łódz region, despite increasing deliveries by 300 kg of meat in May, it was available in shops only for 30 to 60 minutes. In May the supplies of ish were also scarce – there were serious shortages of smoked ish, illet, salted ish and herring. he situation aggravated in May, as there were even more shortages of vegetables – particularly potatoes – as well as buter and other dairy products. Most regions, including large cities like Warsaw, Kraków, Łódź and Bielsko-Biała feel the shortages in the supply of potatoes. […] KW assume that market shortages that have been aggravating for some time and especially those regarding food supplies cause the increase of social discontent. Many critical remarks are spelled out in shop lines, and also among shop staf.’ (AAN, KC PZPR, 3558, Information no. I/70/78, 1 VI 1978, b.p.). 411 Marcin Zaremba authorities lost the trust of 20 per cent of respondents. People were angry not only at the increase in prices, but also because it divided the society into those that could aford to shop at a delicatessen and those who could not. Research conducted in the 1970s shows that respondents described social cleavages as serious or very serious. 79 Blue-collar workers and pensioners especially perceived the divisions as unjust, because, as people said then, ‘we all have similar stomachs.’ In 1978 there were no serious protests, because the level of social optimism and trust in the authorities amounted to 40 per cent. hese factors formed a cushion safeguarding the authorities ater price increases. In July 1980 society was tired. he percentage of optimists decreased to 20 per cent, and the trust dropped to the lowest recorded levels since 1976. In the OBOP research conducted on July 8, 25 per cent of respondents had the same or higher level of trust than last year, and 61 per cent had lower levels of trust. he July price increase turned out to be one step too far, as it was introduced without diagnosing social feelings. he protests were increasing gradually. On July 1, strikes at WSK PZL- Mielec factory and the Polmet Metallurgy Works broke out. he drivers of Transbud Tarnobrzeg Company also decided to go on strike and stopped their vehicles. A day later they were joined by 2 000 people in the Engine De- partment at Ursus Mechanical Works, as well as the employees of two other factories in Tczew and Warsaw. here was nothing unusual in that, as every year the country saw a dozen strikes, which would break out for a couple of hours and rarely involved the whole staf. he only aspect that could be worrying was that these strikes were rather persistent. As soon as one production plant 79 More on the subject can be found in: E. Otawska, Wstępny raport z badania pt. „Nasze miejsce w społeczeństwie,” OBOP (Warszawa 1976); J. Koralewicz-Zębik, “Potoczna percepcja nierówności w Polsce w latach 1960-1980,” Studia Socjologiczne 3 (1983), p. 147; M. Gadomska, “Polaków świadomość struktury klasowej: nierówność nieusprawiedliwiona,” in Społeczeństwo polskie przed kryzysem, p. 13-45. 412  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 halted a strike, another started. On July 8, workers at the Communication Equipment Production Plant in Świdnik walked of work. he main reason was a 60 per cent increase in the price of canteen meals – for example, the price of a pork chop rose from 10,20 zloty to 18,10 zloty. On July 9, Róża Luksemburg Electric Lamps Works in Warsaw also went on strike. he day ater, it was the FSO factory in Żerań. By July 12, even 34 strikes had taken place all over the country, in which 57 000 people participated. 80 he demands were similar everywhere: pay rises to make up for growing costs of living, special bonuses for the poorest, meat rations at workplaces and a reversal of price increases. First strike commitees started appearing, which decided to undertake negotiations with the management. he man- agement promised pay rises just to get staf back to work again. he spreading news of striking staf, as the Ministry of Internal Afairs noted in their report, and their partial victories (as some of their demands had been met) was oten an encouragement to pressurize the management of other workplaces which had not yet seen strikes. It was then that the saying ‘you won’t get anything if you don’t stop working’ was coined. 81 Jacek Kuroń did his best to collect the news of all the about strikes and broadcast it abroad. Later, thanks to ‘enemy radio stations,’ the whole country learned about them. Whoever could, listened to Radio Free Europe. On July 2, Workers’ Defence Commitee (KOR) appealed to workers to conduct or- ganized protests and to maintain solidarity among striking workers. Special issues of the magazine Robotnik issued by the KOR circulated, but it is diicult to say how many were in fact distributed to striking workers. he fact that the democratic opposition lited the information ban kept the strikes going. Be- 80 For more on July strikes, see: M. Dąbrowski, Lubelski lipiec 1980 (Lublin 2000). 81 AIPN, 0365/2, t. 1, Tezy dotyczące oceny sytuacji społeczno- politycznej i operacyjnej powstałej w związku ze zmianą zasad sprzedaży artykułów mięsnych, Departament III MSW, 14 VII 1980, k. 114. 413 Marcin Zaremba sides Kuroń, many opposition activists from the whole country participated in gathering information about strikes. In the second half of July, Lublin Region became the hotest spot in Poland. On July 16, 32 production plants were on strike there, including Locomotive and Carriage Works of the Polish National Rails, National Dairy, the City Water and Sewage works as well as Nitrogen Works in Puławy. On July 17, the strike at Locomotive Works, led by Czesław Niezgoda, signatory of the Workers’ Defence Commitee Charter of the Rights of Workers, spread across the whole Lublin Railway Junction. It was the irst railway strike of such magnitude in the history of communist Poland. 70 locomotives blocked all the train traic. On July 18, Lublin was under general strike, with 79 workplaces and institutions participating. With municipal and railway transport stopped, the city was paralysed. Journalist Stanisław Jadczak noted: Today is the irst day of a complete standstill. No buses or red and white trolleybuses in the streets. No taxis. Women carrying children are walking the streets. […] Dramatic scenes took place in Clinical Hospitals No 1. and No.4 – kitchen staf went on strike, and hospital nurses had to shop and pay with their own money to prepare meals for sick children. Hospital laundries are also striking, and the lack of clean bed sheets and linen was noticeable. here was no oxygen, as the ox- ygen provider also went on strike. […] A completely empty main railway station was a shocking sight. At noon a few people appeared, but everything was closed: ticket oices, eateries and the information desk. Rail- way workers from Lublin called other railway stations demanding that they take up the strike as well, but 414  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 these were not eager to do so. For example, the station of Chełm answered that railways have never gone on strike, even before the war, and that they could not go on strike, because they must work just as doctors do. hey were accused of strikebreaking. On this day an announcement from a siting of the Political Bureau was read, and it said that ‘the tension was to the advan- tage of Poland’s enemies’ and that ‘it creates a danger of a political provocation.’ These were routine an- nouncements made during previous protests. 82 For the irst time the authorities decided not to use force. But one must say that the striking workers did not give any excuse to do that; they did not take to the streets, as happened in June 1956, March 1968, December 1970 and June 1976. Only at two production plants, WSK Świdnik and Rolling Stock Repair Works in Ostrowiec Wielkopolski, did the workers come close to walking outside the gates. he management of the Party decided not to repress the opposition. It was feared that mass arrests would heat up the atmosphere, radicalise striking workers and turn the strikes into solidarity protests. his strategy turned out to be an error on the part of the authorities, as the lack of reaction only stimulated further rebellious behaviour. 83 he authorities were certain that they could stop the wave of strikes through negotiations and promises of pay rises. Conlicts were resolved, as the report of the Ministry of Internal Afairs reads, mainly through accepting some of the demands of workers and as a result of negotiations between the management of production plants with employees who decided to interrupt work or their 82 S. Jadczak, “Diariusz lipcowych dni. Miesiące,” Przegląd Związkowy 1 (1981), p. 55-74, quoted in: M. Dąbrowski, Lubelski lipiec, p. 139, 140. 83 AIPN, 0365/2, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in July 1979, k.73, 135. 415 Marcin Zaremba representatives. hese negotiations oten lasted a few days and became quite turbulent. Mieczysław Jagielski, deputy prime minister and member of the Political Bureau who, as it later turned out, was the head ‘ireighter’ during this hot summer, went to Lublin and became the head of a special government commitee. Party activists – which in Lublin consisted of over 800 people – were sent to convince staf and even individuals to stop striking. hese activists even visited people at their homes. he First Secretary went to Chełm, as it seems that he was afraid to go to Lublin. It was not the same Gierek who ten years before asked striking shipyard workers in Szczecin to stop the protests. 84 he strikes started to die down. A day before the July 22 holiday, the workers of Stalowa Wola Steelworks, PKS Lublin and the car transport works in Warsaw were still on strike. In the Lublin region, 34 production plants had resumed work. his put Gierek of guard, who, along with twelve out of nineteen members of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Commitee (including Wojciech Jaruzelski, Stanisław Kowalczyk and Jan Szydlak) took a holiday in Crimea. Piotr Kostikow, who welcomed them in Simferopol, was terriied when a crowd of the Political Bureau members, their wives, children and grand- children scatered out of the plane. 85 he Moscow Olympics and the holiday season started, bringing hope for the situation to calm down. But it was not to be. he country was still on ire. On July 31, two production plants in Ostrów Wielkopolski were still on strike, and the irst shit of one of the port departments in Gdynia. ‘Still in many production plants the workers are disappointed because of low wages and diicult social conditions, and they threaten to interrupt work’, the Ministry of Internal Afairs reported. his is the atitude of the workers of the National 84 AIPN, 0365/2, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal security of the country in July 1979, k. 134. 85 P. Kostikow, B. Roliński, Widziane z Kremla. Moskwa – Warszawa. Gra o Polskę (Warszawa 1992), p. 235. 416  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 Railways in Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia tri-city, the light industry staf in Kalisz and Żyrardów and at Walter Mechanical Works in Radom. 86 On August 14, the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk went on strike. Someone wrote in a leter intercepted by SB [Security Services]: ‘I also watch public TV news, and it seems that this summer is hot indeed, although the weather is cold…’ 87 86 AIPN, 185n/1, Informacja dla członków Biura Politycznego, sekretarzy KC PZPR i Prezydium Rządu, 31 VII 1980, k. 99. 87 AIPN Rz, 00268/34, t. 5, Information, k. 149, 155. 417 Marcin Zaremba Conclusion In 177 production plants 81 thousand workers went on strike in July. his phe- nomenon preceded the outbreak of the Solidarity revolution. It did not have to happen. Many factors contributed to this outbreak, the most important ones being, in my opinion, a signiicant deterioration of the public mood, measured by the low levels of optimism and trust in the authorities, which were the efect of the worsening economic situation. In general, one may observe the existence of a revolutionary threshold of 20 per cent, which, when reached or crossed at three levels, increases the probability of the outbreak of protests, rebellion or a revolution. he irst level was pointed out by Samuel P. Huntington, referring to the threshold of 20 per cent in the context of the percentage of young people (15-24 years) in the overall population. In Poland young people (aged 15-29) formed over 25 per cent of society. 88 he second level was the drop in social optimism to about 20 per cent just before the revolution. In the irst week of July in Poland about 22 per cent of respondents were optimistic about the future. he third level is trust in author- ities, which was declared by about 25 per cent of respondents. he communist authorities in Poland were in a state of a deep crisis of conidence, as most of society believed it to be incompetent and corrupt, oten alienated from the religious and national point of view (as it was strongly connected to another country – Soviet Union). Certainly, the rule of 20 per cent must be regarded with caution, as only a sign of the probability of the occurrence of rebellious behaviour. It is not a recipe for revolution. What maters are not only cultural factors and the revolutionary tradition, but also a decrease in the level of public fear, which 88 S. P. Huntington, Zderzenie cywilizacji (Warszawa 1998), p. 167. (Polish translation of he Clash of Civilisations by Samuel Huntington). 418  Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the ‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980 enables the appearance of nonconformist atitudes. What is also needed is a vi- sion of a good social order, created by the opposition inside the country or outside its borders – for example, democracy for hird World countries. he consequences of the Vatican conclave, the Papal visit and the actions of the opposition did not only lead to some disconnected strike events, but the wave of displeasure and deiance also gained an anti-system character and trans- formed it into the national movement of Solidarity. Translated by Anna Sekułowicz 419 Lithuanians and Poles against Communism after 1956. Parallel Ways to Freedom? Editet by Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė and Małgorzata Stefanowicz. – Vilnius: PI Bernardinai.lt, 2015. 424 p. This volume consists of articles by Polish and Lithuanian researchers who focus on different attitudes toward communist reality in both countries. These texts cover a wide spectrum of experiences: from coping with the trauma of victims, via the attempt to secure minimal personal autonomy at the price of adjustment to the system, up to the stance of open dissent and resistance. The authors represent different disciplines: history, sociology, psychology, political or legal studies. The volume is not an attempt at drawing a comparison or generalization on the basis two cases: that of Lithuania and Poland. It‘s aim is rather to demonstrate how processes, sometimes similar, sometimes quite different but going on simultane- ously within both societies, inally led to the same outcome: peaceful, successful destruction of communism. ISBN 978-609-8086-05-8 Published by PI “Bernardinai.lt” Maironio g. 10, LT-01124 Vilnius, Lithuania Tel. (8 ~ 5) 231 3009 E-mail redakcija@bernardinai.lt www.bernardinai.lt Printed in Lithuania by Petro ofsetas Račių 24, LT-03156 Vilnius, www.petroofsetas.lt Size 170x 240mm Printing 200 unit