C L A U S E W I T Z O N S M A L L WA R
Clausewitz on
Small War
C A R L V O N CL A U S E W I T Z
Edited and Translated
by
CHRISTOPHER DAASE AND
JAMES W. DAVIS
With an Introductory Essay by
JAMES W. DAVIS
1
3
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Acknowledgments
In preparing this volume we have benefitted from the assistance and counsel
of many colleagues and friends. Preliminary drafts of the translations were
presented to a group of eminent Clausewitz scholars at a workshop convened
at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC,
and revised to address critical feedback. And while we no doubt have failed to
redress every shortcoming identified, we are deeply indebted to Christopher
Bassford, Eliot Cohen, Antulio Echevarria, Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Terence
Holmes, Jan Willem Honig, Timothy Hoyt, Brad Lee, Jack Levy, Thomas
Mahnken, and John Sumida for their constructive criticism. We wish to
extend special thanks to Thomas Mahnken and his colleagues in the Philip
Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Nitze School for hosting the
workshop.
Over the course of the translations, we also benefitted from discussions with
General Klaus Naumann, Sebastian Schindler, Peter Platzgummer, Marc
DeVore, Rolf Sieferle, and Dirk Ippen.
Alexander Graef, Karl Hampel, and Sebastian Plappert provided invaluable
assistance preparing the manuscript for publication and creating the
bibliography.
Finally, we gladly acknowledge the financial support we enjoyed from the
Smith-Richardson Foundation without which this project would not have
been possible. In particular, we thank Nadia Schadlow who not only saw
merit in the project but also stuck with us during eventual delays in its
completion.
Christopher Daase and James W. Davis
Contents
List of illustrations viii
1. Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War 1
2. My Lectures on Small War, held at the War College
in 1810 and 1811 19
3. Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift) 169
4. On the political advantages and disadvantages of the
Prussian institution of the Landwehr 217
5. The arming of the people (Volksbewaffnung) 221
Bibliography 227
Index 231
List of illustrations
Figure 1. Battalions in Customary Order of Battle 35
Figure 2A. Positioning of Weak Isolated Units 36
Figure 2B. Extension of Small Detachments 36
Figure 3. Defensive Occupation of Palace Towers 77
Figure 4. Positioning of an Entrenchment 86
Figure 5. Barriers on the Edge of a Trench 87
Figure 6. Positioning of Side Patrols and Rearguards along
Paths and Defiles 101
Figure 7. Positioning of Massed Units 148
Figure 8. Positioning of the Cavalry amidst the Infantry 149
1
Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War
James W. Davis
Ongoing and lively debates over the continuing relevance of Clausewitz in an
era in which the incidence of interstate warfare pales in comparison to that of
civil and ethnic conflict, transnational terrorism, and other forms of asym-
metric violence, attest to his enduring status as a giant in the study of war. In
the English-speaking world, that status results largely, perhaps even exclusive-
ly, from the prominence accorded his major work, On War, in universities,
think tanks, and military academies. Engagement with the ideas developed in
On War is facilitated by the fact that the first edition, published in 1832, now is
available in numerous English-language translations.1
The corpus of Clausewitz’s writings on the topic of warfare, however, is far
greater. The military historian Werner Hahlweg, long-time curator of Clau-
sewitz’s papers at the University of Münster, eventually edited and published
two collections of his articles, studies, lectures, and letters, that together
amount to over two thousand pages.2 With few exceptions, most of these
texts are inaccessible to scholars and military analysts who do not read
German. They simply have never been translated. The current volume repre-
sents an effort to begin to redress this unfortunate state of affairs.
Persuaded that many arguments over Clausewitz’s general theory of warfare
and its relevance for contemporary developments could benefit from a more
thorough knowledge of the evolution of his thinking on the subject, as well as a
better appreciation of the specific political context within which many of the
ideas emerged, we have translated what we regard to be Clausewitz’s most
important writings on the subject of “Small War.” For most of what is
included here, no other English translation is available. The goal is not to
1
See, for example, Clausewitz (1835), which originally appeared in The Metropolitan Maga-
zine (London), 13 (May and June 1835), 64–71, 166–76; also Clausewitz (1873, 1908, 1909, 1943,
1984). Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent English language quotations from On War and
the relevant page references refer to the 1984 volume.
2
See Hahlweg (1966–90).
2 Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War
offer a particular interpretation of Clausewitz’s writings, although some of
the ongoing controversies are engaged in this introductory essay. Rather, the
intention is to stimulate additional scholarship and debate: both over the proper
interpretation and the relevance of his analyses for understanding various forms
of warfare.
Our approach to translation is not different from that adopted by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret in their widely acclaimed and cited translation of On
War (Clausewitz 1984: xi): “We have attempted to present Clausewitz’s ideas
as accurately as possible, while remaining as close to his style and vocabulary
as modern English usage would permit. But we have not hesitated to translate
the same term in different ways if the context seemed to demand it.” Because
the meaning of many German terms has evolved since the time of Clausewitz,
we consulted sources from the period as well as the works of military histor-
ians in an effort to ensure their proper translation. For many terms, the
German is included in parenthesis for the benefit of those with knowledge
of the language. When confronted with awkward or overly complex formula-
tions, we chose to simplify them, preferring to sacrifice nineteenth-century
style for clearer meaning.
We have translated the original texts as they appear in the Hahlweg volumes
and added some annotations, but we have not included the marginalia con-
tained in the original lecture notes or the extensive annotations, historical
references, and comments provided by Hahlweg. Diagrams found in the
original lecture notes, which are accessible to scholars in the Universitäts-
und Landesbibliothek Münster, have been photographically reproduced and
integrated into the text with explanatory captions provided by Daase and
Davis. However, we chose to omit some additional material that Clausewitz
apparently used to provide historical examples of general points. And whereas
Hahlweg provided precise transcriptions of original texts, reproducing errors
in spelling or numeration, in most cases we have corrected errors in spelling,
used contemporary spellings for names and places as well as German-language
terms, and provided consistent numerations in the various lists that appear
throughout the manuscript. To foster easier comparison with the Hahlweg
transcriptions, we have not corrected for Clausewitz’s inconsistent number-
ing of paragraphs in the “Lectures on Small War,” but have included the
bracketed corrections made by Hahlweg. Because Clausewitz circulated them
among fellow reform-minded soldiers, the original lecture notes also comprise
numerous comments of uncertain provenance written in the margins of the
main text. Hahlweg went to great lengths to try to establish the identity of
the authors of the marginalia, but we have restricted our translations to those
parts of the text that are clearly written by Clausewitz himself. Footnotes
that are original to Clausewitz are indicated by a cue system that follows
the pattern: *, {, {, }, }. Annotations and references from the editors of
this volume are footnoted with Arabic numerals. Finally, we have chosen to
Clausewitz on War 3
identify sections in the texts that Clausewitz underscored, presumably for
emphasis, with bold font.
We chose four texts for this collection. In the “Lectures on Small War” held
at the Prussian War College in 1810 and 1811, Clausewitz analyzed small-unit
warfare by studying the rebellion in the Vendée (1793–8), the Tyrolean
uprising of 1809, and most prominently, the then ongoing Spanish insurrec-
tion in the Peninsular War against Napoleonic France. In the Bekenntnis-
denkschrift, or testimonial, of 1812, Clausewitz calls for a “Spanish civil war in
Germany” and develops a political argument and military strategy for a
popular insurgency against the French occupation of Prussia. In the short
text, “On the political advantages and disadvantages of the Prussian institution
of the Landwehr,” from 1819, Clausewitz discusses the specific organizational
form of the Prussian citizen militia that was improvised in 1813, officially
established in the Defense Act of 1814, but ultimately subordinated to the
regular army in 1819 as a result of the fear and resentment it inspired among
aristocratic officers and an alleged history of poor performance.3 For Clause-
witz, the military effectiveness of the Landwehr, especially in strategic defense,
was a proven fact. Hence he devotes the text—which he sent to his fellow
military reformer, Field Marshal Neidhardt von Gneisenau, as well as the
Prussian Chancellor and political reformer Karl August von Hardenberg—to a
political defense of a citizens’ militia in an era of revolution.4 Finally, we
provide a new translation of a short chapter from On War. In Chapter 26 of
Book VI—entitled Volksbewaffnung or “The arming of the people”—Clause-
witz addresses the practical as well as theoretical aspects of popular uprising
and guerrilla warfare. Placed in the context of the “Lectures on Small War”
and the Bekenntnisdenkschrift, it seems safe to argue that biographically and
intellectually “The arming of the people” reflects some of Clausewitz’s earliest
thinking about warfare.
CLAUSEWITZ ON WAR
Widely recognized as one of the most influential theorists of war, if not
the greatest of all time, Carl von Clausewitz is nonetheless more often cited
than read. Frequently taken out of context, his thoughts have been used to
support a stunning range of contradictory claims by journalists, businessmen,
scholars, soldiers, and politicians. But even serious scholars and military
students of Clausewitz disagree on the precise meaning of key tenets of
his thought and interpret central arguments in rather different ways.
3 4
See Showalter (1971). See Moran (1989).
4 Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War
Thus, Clausewitz is variously criticized as the spiritus rector of Prussian
militarism and championed as an advocate for the subordination of the
military to civilian political authority.5 Some criticize him for an excessive
level of abstraction bordering on the metaphysical.6 For others, his analysis
stands out for its “jargon-free language” and the successful combination of
abstract theory and historical practice.7
By no means the product of intellectual dilettantism, the origins of these
ongoing debates are at least twofold. Most fundamental is the fact that
Clausewitz’s magnum opus, On War, is an unfinished work, published post-
humously by his widow. Clausewitz was aware of the ambiguities and imper-
fections in the manuscript, and in a note dated July 10, 1827 (four years prior
to his death) admitted: “I regard the first six books, which are already in
a clean copy, merely as a rather formless mass that must be thoroughly
reworked once more.” In 1830 he wrote: “The manuscript on the conduct of
major operations that will be found after my death can, in its present state, be
regarded as nothing but a collection of materials from which a theory of war
was to have been distilled.”8 Prior to his death on November 16, 1831, the
great theorist of war had completed revisions on only the first of the eight
books comprising On War.
Exacerbating the confusion created by the ambiguities of the original text
are disputes arising from its translation. Many scholars of war and the history
of ideas cannot read German, and hence their understanding of Clausewitz is
strongly influenced by the way individual translations cope with ambiguities
in the original text as well as with concepts for which there may be multiple
meanings. The problem is central to English-language debates, where scholars
working from translations of On War in which key concepts as well as
important analytical and theoretical devices have been translated in different
ways reach very different interpretations of central claims as well as of the
work as a whole.
Take, for example, what is certainly Clausewitz’s most famous dictum: “Der
Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln.” For trans-
lators the rather short sentence poses a daunting challenge, owing to the fact
that the German word “Politik” can take on at least three meanings for which
5
For the former claim, see Mertsalov (2004). Additional examples are provided in Strachan
(2001: 373–4); B. H. Liddell Hart (1932: 24) attributed the pernicious effects of Clausewitz’s
writings to an “obscure” style of writing. For claims that Clausewitz provides an intellectual
antidote to militarism, see Brodie (1973) and Huntington (1957).
6
See, for example, Camon (1911: vii), quoted by Rothfels (1943: 93) and Eikmeier (2013).
7
The former argument was made by Brodie (1984: 45). The latter argument is developed in
Sumida (2001: 333–54).
8
Both notes are reproduced in Clausewitz (1984), the Howard and Paret translation of On
War, pp. 69–71. There is some debate as to the correct dating of these letters. See Gat (2001:
257–65).
Clausewitz on War 5
English provides distinct words. If one translates Politik with “policy,” as do
Michael Howard and Peter Paret in what is perhaps the most widely used
English language translation of On War, one is likely to conclude that Clau-
sewitz is making a normative argument: Because “war is merely the continu-
ation of policy by other means,” its conduct should always be governed by an
appreciation of the state’s ultimate political goals. For many scholars and
military analysts, the belief that Clausewitz was a strong proponent of the
subordination of military means to political ends then serves as a justification
for criticizing historical instances of the militarization of politics.9
If, however, one translates Politik with “politics” or “political affairs,” as
suggested by scholars such as Antulio Echevarria, Clausewitz’s dictum seems
more appropriately understood as a descriptive statement.10 War is merely the
continuation of politics by other means.11 Understanding Clausewitz’s dictum
as an assertion of fact leads to the conclusion that On War is first and foremost
an effort to uncover objective knowledge about the phenomenon of war rather
than a primer on military, let alone political, strategy.
Although some might argue that good strategy rests on an understanding,
if only intuitive, of valid causal regularities, Clausewitz was not so certain.
If commanders were to try to master all that can be known of war, they
might become bogged down in the trivial details of academic knowledge.
“[D]istinguished commanders,” Clausewitz (1984: 145) asserted, “have never
emerged from the ranks of the most erudite or scholarly officers, but have been
for the most part men whose station in life could not have brought them a high
degree of education. . . . Everyone with a grain of common sense realized the
vast distance between a genius of the highest order and a learned pedant.”12
At other points in the text, however, war is analyzed less through the lens of
political process or substantive policy objectives and more through that of the
formal, structural, or institutional manifestations of politics. Thus, in Book
VIII, Chapter 3 B, “On the Magnitude of the Military Purpose and its Corres-
ponding Efforts,” Clausewitz (1984: 586) engages in a form of comparative
political analysis in which different political systems are held to produce
different forms of warfare:
9
This was at least one of the claims made by Harry Summers in his influential critique of the
American conduct of the Vietnam War. See Summers (1984: 137). Also see Cohen (2002).
10
See Echevarria II (2007: 4) and Echevarria II (1996: 76–80).
11
The dictum appears no less than six times in On War. Twice, however, Clausewitz replaces
the word Politik with the concept “politischer Verkehr,” which is best translated as “political
intercourse” or perhaps “political commerce.” Insofar as intercourse and commerce refer to a
relationship between two or more political actors, confining the meaning of Politik to the policies
of one or the other of these seems misplaced. See the discussion in Daase and Schindler
(2009: 712).
12
Sumida (2008: 2) has argued that Clausewitz was interested in developing a theory of the
practice and not the phenomenon of war, because “no theory of war as a phenomenon was
capable of representing the nature of war as it occurred in reality.”
6 Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War
A more general and theoretical treatment of the subject may become feasible if we
consider the nature of states and societies as they are determined by their times
and prevailing conditions. Let us take a brief look at history.
The semi-barbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and
commercial cities of the Middle Ages, kings of the eighteenth century, and finally,
princes and peoples of the nineteenth century all waged war in their own way,
conducted it differently, with different means, and for different aims.
In the ensuing analysis, Clausewitz (1984: 586) demonstrates how specific
historical relationships among rulers, their populations, and military institu-
tions combine to produce distinctive forms of warfare:
The Tartar hordes searched for new land. Setting forth as a nation, with women
and children, they outnumbered any other army. Their aim was to subdue their
enemies or expel them. If a high degree of civilization could have been combined
with such methods, they would have carried all before them.
The republics of antiquity, Rome excepted, were small and their armies smaller
still, for the plebs, the mass of the people, was excluded. Being so many and so
close together these republics found that the balance that some law of nature will
always establish among small and unconnected units formed an obstacle to major
enterprises. They therefore limited their wars to plundering the countryside and
seizing a few towns, in order to gain a degree of influence over them.
A few paragraphs further Clausewitz (1984: 589) argues:
The Tartar people and army had been one; in the republics of antiquity and
during the Middle Ages the people (if we confine the concept to those who had
the rights of citizens) had still played a prominent part; but in the circumstances
of the eighteenth century the people’s part had been extinguished.
Because the outer form of warfare changes in each specific instance owing to
differing relationships between peoples, soldiers, political authority, and ter-
ritory, Clausewitz compares war, the essence of which he seeks to understand,
to a chameleon. Although the essential biology of the chameleon remains
constant, its appearance changes to match particular circumstances.13 The
same, Clausewitz argues, is true of war.
To account for war’s changing appearance despite its enduring constitution,
Clausewitz (2010: 46–7) develops and employs the analytic device of the
trinity:
War is thus not merely a chameleon, because it changes its nature somewhat in
every concrete case. Rather, with respect to the dominant tendencies within, it is
in its complete appearance a wondrous trinity, comprised of the primordial
violence of its elements, hatred and enmity, which can be seen as a blind natural
13
The irreducibility of an organism’s phenotype to its genotype is now widely accepted in the
biological sciences.
Clausewitz on War 7
instinct; of the play of chance and accident, which makes it an affair of the free
spirit; and of the subordinated nature of a political instrument that is subject to
pure reason.
The first of these facets is allocated primarily to the population, the second
more to the commander and his army, the third more to the government. The
passions, which should burn in war, must already be inherent in the peoples. The
scope that the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of chance and
accident depends on the characteristics of the commander and his army, but the
political purpose is the propriety of the government alone.
These three tendencies, which thus appear as three different laws, are deeply
anchored in the nature of the subject and simultaneously subject to variation in
relationship to one another. A theory that ignores one of these facets or wishes to
set an arbitrary relationship among them, conflicts with reality to such a degree
that it must be disregarded for this reason alone.
Thus the task is to suspend the theory between these three tendencies, as
between three points of attraction.14
Clausewitz’s comparative analysis of different historical manifestations of
warfare—e.g. war perpetrated by stateless Tartar hordes, ancient city-states,
feudal lords, and the territorial states of the nineteenth century—and the
analytic device of the trinity, which draws our attention to the effects of
changing relations amongst the constitutive features (hatred and enmity,
chance and contingency, subordination to reason) of war, attest to the goal
of developing a general theory of warfare, freed from the specifics of time and
place. Clausewitz warns against fixing an arbitrary relationship amongst the
elements of the trinity. To do so would be to miss the point of the analytic
exercise.15 It is an exercise in which he had engaged at least since 1812, as the
following passage from the Bekenntnisdenkschrift makes clear:
The war of the current era is a war of all against all. Kings no longer wage war
against kings, nor armies against each other, but one nation against the other, the
nation encompassing the king and army.
It is unlikely that this character of war will change again, and it truly is not to be
wished that the old bloody and the too often boring chess-game of struggling
soldiers will ever return.
This is not to say that the national uprising en Masse, as we have twice
witnessed in great examples (France and Spain), will be the only way in which
nations will wage war against each other in the future, heaven help us. This
phenomenon belongs alone to the present and its fateful hours.16
14
Translation mine.
Because I find the Howard and Paret translation of this essential passage unsatisfactory and a
source for much subsequent confusion, I have chosen to offer my own translation here. Similar
efforts (for similar reasons) have been made by Bassford (1999) and Echevarria II (2007: 69).
15
For an excellent discussion of Clausewitz’s method of analysis, see Echevarria II (2007: chs
1 and 2).
16
See p. 216 of this volume.
8 Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War
Curiously, however, Clausewitz’s ideas regularly come up for criticism as time-
bound and obsolete. Thus, in the period leading to the First World War, the
Prussian officer and military historian Colmar von der Goltz (1887: 114–16)
argued that Clausewitz had lost his relevance in an industrial era characterized
by ever larger armies with modern arms, complex mobilization schedules, and
dramatically increased costs:
War has not withdrawn itself from the effects of politics; yet its influence is
modified in comparison with former times. Clausewitz may talk of wars, such as
the wars of coalition, or the Austrian Wars of Succession, when the Allied Powers
bound themselves to support one or the other with a definite number of com-
batants, when operations were undertaken with a part and not the whole of the
forces, and policy alone stood in the foreground, but we, in these days, can
disregard all this. Such conditions are scarcely conceivable in modern Europe. . . .
If two European Powers of the first order clash together, their whole organised
forces will, from the outset, be set in motion to decide their quarrel. All political
considerations, such as attach to the lukewarm half-ness of wars of alliance fall to
the ground. . . . In the face of the great weight of warlike events in our modern
times, politics retreat more and more into the background, so soon as the cannon
thunder.”17
Goltz may have been correct to note that the specific form of the Wars of the
Austrian Succession was different from the likely form of wars to come, but he
does not provide sufficient grounds for dismissing the analytic framework of
the trinity. The relationship between the increasingly urban and industrial
population, a mechanized army, and a semi-constitutional monarchy in
Wilhelmine Germany was already quite different from the relationship of
the people, army, and government that prevailed in the absolute monarchies
of the mid-eighteenth century.18
During the Cold War, Goltz’s argument, that Clausewitz had become
irrelevant because the dynamics of the industrial age removed political con-
straints on the scope of warfare, was echoed by those who believed that nuclear
war would inevitably lead to annihilation. For example, Peter Moody argued
that the inherent escalatory dynamics of nuclear war transformed Clausewitz’s
notion of total war from an ideal type to an empirical form. War, he argued, “is
no longer an instrument of state policy, a means whereby those who rule the
state achieve their values; instead it is the fact or possibility of total war that
determines the values of the state” (Moody 1979: 424).
By contrast, at the start of the twenty-first century, it is his alleged inapplic-
ability to low-intensity, irregular, and asymmetric conflicts that lead many to
dismiss Clausewitz as obsolete. Thus, Mary Kaldor (2012: 17) argues that
17
See too the discussion in Howard (1984: 31–3).
18
Goltz was himself an advocate of uniting the roles of statesman and Commander-in-Chief
in the person of the King. See Goltz (1887: 117).
Clausewitz on War 9
globalization has produced a situation in which “the centralized, territorialized
modern state gives way to new types of polity . . . so war, as we presently
conceive it, is becoming an anachronism.” Because “the type of war that
Clausewitz analysed, even though he did devote some writing to small wars,
was predominantly war between states for a definable political end, i.e. state
interest,” Clausewitz is of limited utility when trying to understand contem-
porary asymmetric conflicts (Kaldor 2012: 17). In a similar vein, Philip
Wilkinson (2003: 29) finds that in the current age of low-intensity conflicts,
“the European Westphalian state model and Clausewitzian approach to mili-
tary operations [have] been thoroughly challenged and found wanting.” Some
have gone so far as to blame the suboptimal outcomes of the US engagements
in Iraq and Afghanistan on the undue influence of Clausewitz and his out-
moded conception of “monarchical war” (Melton 2009).
The claim that Clausewitz’s thought is obsolete is justified not only by a
purported exclusive focus on states and state interests at the expense of non-
state or sub-state actors, but also an asserted failure to appreciate that some wars
are governed by an economic rather than political logic (Kaldor 2010: 271–81).
Clearly influenced by the prevalence of ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and conflicts
over the control of natural resources in late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries, Kaldor (2010: 274) argues that war is no longer best characterized as a
“contests of wills” but rather as a “mutual enterprise” in which “both sides need
the other in order to carry on the enterprise of war and therefore war tends to be
long and inconclusive.” Old wars were about defeating the enemy, whereas in
new wars, “[t]he aim is to create a state of war in which particular groups
benefit. In new wars, battles are rare and violence is mainly directed against
avoidance of direct combat” (Kaldor 2010: 274). “The inner tendency of such
wars is not war without limits but war without end. Wars, defined in this way,
create shared self-perpetuating interest in war to reproduce political identity and
to further economic interest” (Kaldor 2012: 218).
Kaldor is not alone in her dismissal of Clausewitz’s relevance for an
understanding of contemporary warfare. Herfried Münkler (2008: 37, 2004,
2003: 25), though an admirer of Clausewitz’s mode of analysis, nonetheless has
argued that the concept of war today needs to be decoupled from that of
politics, as warfare is increasingly governed by processes of privatization and
their attendant economic logic. Similarly, David Keen (2000: ch. 2) has
suggested that in the current age war is rather more the continuation of
economics by other means. And the claim that wars driven by ethnic conflict
and the politics of identity cannot be accommodated in Clausewitz’s frame-
work is echoed by the Tofflers (Toffler and Toffler 1994), Donald Snow
(1997), and Monty Marshall (1997: ch. 6).
Martin van Creveld (1991) has repeatedly argued that the trinitarian con-
ception of warfare—understood by him simply in terms of the people, the
government, and the army—does not apply to contemporary non-state
10 Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War
actors.19 John Keegan (1994: 58) has dismissed Clausewitz as inapplicable to
the sorts of “primitive war” seen in the Balkans and Transcaucasia in the
1990s. These, he argued, were “fed by passions and rancours that do not yield
to rational measures of persuasion or control: they are apolitical to a degree for
which Clausewitz made little allowance.” And writing in the decade prior to
the terrorist attacks of September 2001, Edward Luttwak (1995: 115–16)
derided an American military mentality that was steeped in outdated
Clausewitzian concepts and thus ill-suited to meeting the challenge of “ag-
gressors inflamed by nationalism or religious fanaticism.” Leaving aside
the problematic interpretation of Clausewitz presented in his analysis, Lutt-
wak seems to have missed the fact that at the time, at least some in the US
military were making similar arguments. According to one army officer:
“Combating modern terrorism or large drug-dealing enterprises may require
nations to mount warlike efforts against amorphous and shadowy trans-
national networks—an idea rather far removed from the Clausewitzian
concept of war between states obliging the clash of opposing field armies”
(Shepherd 1990: 86).20
The alleged obsolescence of Clausewitz in the early twenty-first century is
thus attributed to a time-bound framework of analysis and a failure to anticipate
forms of warfare beyond the rather symmetric pitched battlefield exchanges of
large regular armies—the “old wars” that are said to have characterized his own
times.21 The problem with such criticisms is that they apply rather more to later
interpretations of Clausewitz’s writings than to the writings themselves, for
Clausewitz did write on the interrelationship of national identity and war, the
economic logic of warfare, and also low-intensity and asymmetric conflict.22 To
date, however, the most extensive treatment of these subjects, Clausewitz’s
“Lectures on Small War” held at the Prussian War College (Allgemeine
Kriegsschule) in Berlin from 1810–11, have been inaccessible to scholars unable
to read the original German. The near exclusive focus of Anglo-Saxon scholars
on the unfinished work On War obscures the true breadth of Clausewitz’s
strategic thought, which extends to the prosecution of wars of national liber-
ation, guerrilla-style warfare, light-unit tactics and their relationship to overall
strategy, and the political economy of sub-state warfare. Indeed, the develop-
ment of Clausewitz’s thinking on war in general is closely linked to his analysis
of Small War. Seen in the context of the evolution of his thinking over time, the
political conception of warfare at the center of On War is clearly not limited to
state actors engaged in pitched battles, but provides an analytic framework with
19
The US version of the book is entitled Transformation of War. See too van Creveld (2002: 8).
20
For an excellent critique of van Creveld’s and Luttwak’s interpretations of Clausewitz, see
Kinross (2004: 35–58).
21
See Strachan (2011: 113).
22
For a similar critique see Villacres and Bassford (1995: 10).
Small War 11
which the transformation of political violence can be understood or even
explained.23
In presenting Clausewitz’s most explicit thinking on these topics outside of
the rather short discussion in Book VI, Chapter 26 (“The People in Arms”) in
On War, we provide the first full English translation of the lectures on Small
War. The concept of Small War and its relationship to Clausewitz’s overall
approach to understanding war are the topics of the remainder of this
introductory essay.
SMALL W AR
In the language of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, asymmetric military
conflict was routinely referred to as Small War.24 In French, the appropriate
term was “petite guerre”; in German, “kleiner Krieg.” The Spanish-language
term “guerrilla” originally referred to the nature of the conflict—Small War—
rather than the political aspirations of the combatants. The original guerrilleros
were reactionary Roman Catholic Bourbon royalists, not supporters of the
revolution (Heuser 2010b: 393–4). In his survey of the literature, Martin
Rink (2006: 360) identified approximately sixty works published on the topic
of Small War in the period between 1750 and 1850. He found the early
literature primarily devoted to describing and conceptualizing the phenom-
enon, a process that stretched at least from the writings of the French officer de
la Croix from 1752 to the publication of Scharnhorst’s military handbook in
1792. As late as 1864 one author could still criticize what he regarded the
“checkered list of items” presented by contemporary analysts of Small War.25
Clausewitz thus began his lectures with a definition that was consistent with
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century usage: “We understand Small Wars
to be the use of small units in the field. Battles of 20, 50, 100, 300 or 400
soldiers, as long as they are not part of a larger battle, fall under Small War.”26
Similar to that of others in the period, the definition is narrower than later
uses of the term, which came to encompass almost any form of asymmetric
conflict.27 Nevertheless, the makeup of units engaged in Small War as defined
by Clausewitz and practiced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was
23
For a full development of this argument, see Daase and Schindler (2009).
24
Beatrice Heuser traces the term’s origins to Sebastián de Covarrubias who in his dictionary
of 1611 used it to refer to feuds and civil war. See Heuser (2010b: 391).
25
See Rink (2006), Croix (1759), and Scharnhorst (1980).
26
See p. 21 of this volume.
27
See, for example, Jeney (1759: ch. 1), Roche (1770), and Ewald (1774: 74, 1798, 1790:
17–23).
12 Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War
diverse and one should be careful not to impose more conceptual order on
Clausewitz’s thinking than the texts allow. Indeed, Clausewitz goes on to say
that the “definition may seem mechanical and unphilosophical,” thus betray-
ing a rejection of absolute definitions that characterizes his approach to the
study of warfare in general.28 In addition to light regular troops, he variously
applied the term to units recruited from the ethnic minorities of the Habsburg
Empire who were skilled in so-called “Eastern” methods of sabotage and
ambush (a practice later emulated in other parts of Europe); specialized
units equipped with precision rifles (e.g. the Tirailleurs of the French Revolu-
tionary Wars and the Jäger, spawned by Prussia’s encounter with the Napo-
leonic forces); as well as irregular troops taken from the ranks of the peasantry.
Small units of the sort devoted to specialized operations were referred to as
Partheyen in German, parties in French; their leaders as Partheygänger or
partisan respectively.29
Beatrice Heuser maintains that well into the nineteenth century, the term
“partisan warfare” was reserved for what we today call special operations:
“Until the American War of Independence and then the Napoleonic Wars,
partisan warfare was entirely devoid of ideology or other political content, but
was professional warfare carried out by professional units specializing not in
regular war and pitched battles but in irregular activities” (Heuser 2010b: 391).
For example, the Hessian Andreas Emmerich, who led light units during the
American War of Independence (1775–83) on the side of the British, referred
to his own men as “partisans.” Their purpose was to harass the enemy, gather
intelligence, and support the efforts of the regulars (Heuser 2010a: 143). But
developments during the two revolutionary conflicts led to the expansion of
the concept of Small War such that by the time of Clausewitz’s writings, it
could include ideologically driven “peoples’ wars” as well as insurgencies
backed by small bands of ideologically motivated fighters supported by the
local population (Heuser 2010a: 149–58).
Clausewitz was clearly aware of the use to which General Washington put
irregular light units in the American War of Independence, and cites numer-
ous examples from the writings of Emmerich, Scharnhorst, and Johann von
Ewald (who was a veteran of the Seven Years’ War and also fought on the side
of the British in the American War) in the lectures.30 Nonetheless, he makes
no mention of the ideological motivations of the colonists—the desire to shake
off the yoke of British rule—in his discussions of the American War. Indeed,
the lectures are largely devoid of any discussion of ideology as a motivation for
28
On this point see Paret (2010).
29
The discussion here follows that found in Rink (2006: 361–5). See too Heuser (2010b:
391–2).
30
In addition to the works of Scharnhorst and Ewald cited above, see Emmerich (1789).
Small War 13
engaging in Small War, a significant oversight in the opinion of some (Heuser
2010a: 149).
By contrast, the Bekenntnisdenkschrift, with its frequent references to the
counter-revolutionary and monarchist peasants’ uprising in the Vendée
(1793–6), and the Tyrolean insurgency against Napoleon’s Bavarian allies in
1809, betrays a keen understanding of the martial potential of ideologically
motivated irregulars drawn from the population. The discussion of the Land-
sturm (people’s militia) is particularly illustrative:
Very few people have a clear understanding of the full extent of this fearsome,
decisive measure, which throws the country into a state of dangerous crisis. They
do not understand how individual citizens or communities, united into loose
bands, can possess the daring courage to resist a large army or even just to enrage
it through inflicting losses on its distant units.
The basic idea is the following. Every able-bodied man from 18 to 60 years,
who does not serve in the standing forces, is armed and belongs to the Land-
sturm. Their arms and equipment include nothing more than a musket, if
unavailable a pike or a scythe, a pack to carry a few days’ worth of foodstuffs
and some munition, a cap, outfitted with a straw wreath to protect against blows
and on which a sign of the province and the commune is affixed.
This outfitting certainly does not demand too much. The farmers in the
Vendée have equipped themselves without any external support even more
completely.31
For Clausewitz, extraordinary courage and morale would be guaranteed by the
fact that the irregulars of the Landsturm would be fighting to defend their own
homes and villages against a foreign foe.32
In separating his discussion of the technical and practical dimensions of
small-unit warfare from his thinking on the political purposes toward which
Small War could be applied, Clausewitz was not only keeping true to his
general approach to scientific analysis but also was quite characteristic of the
period. Most writings on the subject of Small War at the time were apolitical,
whereas the plans of Prussian patriots to engage in it were revolutionary, both
because they were inspired by national ideology and because they proposed
the integration of the historically unarmed peasantry into the war effort (Rink
2006: 373).
Together, the “Lectures on Small War” and the Bekenntnisdenkschrift
provide a more complete picture of Clausewitz’s thinking on Small War
than either alone. Thus, whereas Heuser is correct to note that he devotes
31
See p. 196 in this volume.
32
See, for example, pp. 189, 196, and 214 in this volume. Clausewitz betrays similar
sentiments in the short analysis, “On the political advantages and disadvantages of the Prussian
institution of the Landwehr.” See pp. 217–20 in this volume. For an analysis of the political and
ideological effects of the French Revolution on Small War thinking in Prussia, see Hahlweg
(1962: 56).
14 Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War
the bulk of his analysis in the lectures to the ways in which small detachments
can be used for special operations in support of the major war effort, the
conclusion that Clausewitz understood Small War exclusively as “an auxiliary
part of major war . . . a side show to the main confrontations of regular forces”
is open to debate (Heuser 2010a: 145). For example, in the lectures, Clausewitz
discusses how small forward posts can be used to confuse the enemy and slow
his advance. By avoiding direct confrontation of the main enemy formation,
small units can contribute to strategic goals by hindering the enemy’s ability to
conduct reconnaissance, forcing him to disperse his forces, and thereby
lengthening his lines of communication.
The potential contribution of the Landsturm to the goal of driving French
forces from Prussia as discussed in the Bekenntnisdenkschrift is far greater
than that of auxiliary support for the major war effort: “The first characteristic,
if it is to be that which it was for the Austrians in 1809—namely, a rich source
for reinforcing the army and a defensive militia for remote spots of the war
theater—seems to be inappropriate for our situation, because a large number
of our provinces will be cut off from the army.” 33 Rather, through raids on
convoys and storehouses as well as by ambushing and harassing enemy
detachments, irregular forces could play an independent role in the war effort
by forcing the French to disperse their forces in an effort to gain control of the
countryside:
If the enemy does not want to accept these disadvantages, if he wants to continue
to rule all the distant provinces, he must maintain specific corps therein. It is easy
to see that if, from an army of 200,000 men, 50,000 men are used for this purpose,
this would already create a significant diversion in the central theater of war, for
one must not forget, that from the remaining 150,000 men, according to all
historical experience, another 50,000 will be absent, either in the sick bay or left
behind as occupying forces. Thus, the Landsturm deprives the main theater of
war of 1/3 of its armed forces according to simple calculations. Whoever is not
able to appreciate this great advantage is lacking in good judgment in this matter.
For he knows nothing of how things develop in war.34
Clausewitz’s thinking here probably reflects the historical origins and devel-
opment of Small War in eighteenth-century Europe. Rink (2006: 365; 1999:
93–8), for example, points out that attenuated rule along the fluid borders of
the European “Wild East” and within the southeastern Slavic territories of the
Habsburg Empire and the Ukraine depended on the presence of Cossacks,
Hussars, Uhlans, and Pandurs. And it echoes the similar call of Ewald (1798:
vol. 1, 106) to remember the experience of the Seven Years’ War and allow
small and light units to act independently of the army and beyond the main
field of battle in the war against the French Republic.
33 34
See pp. 195–6 of this volume. See p. 197 of this volume.
Small War 15
The military historian Hew Strachan (2011: 177) maintains that most of
Clausewitz’s thinking about warfare was devoted to strategy understood rather
narrowly as “the use of engagement for the object of the war.” In the lectures,
Clausewitz states clearly that “the strategy of Small War is a component of
tactics . . . the entirety of Small War belongs to tactics” whereas the purpose of
Small War is based on the necessities of strategy.35 In the Bekenntnisdenk-
schrift Clausewitz defines tactics as the “art of battle” whereas the term strategy
is reserved for “the art of combining individual battles (for the end of the
campaign, of the war) into a whole.”36 Insofar as the avant-garde and the
forward posts, subjects to which Clausewitz devotes a great deal of attention in
the lectures, detect the enemy, try to divine his intentions, and shape the
subsequent battle, they are located “on the cusp of strategy and tactics,” as
Strachan (2011: 109) maintains. In many circumstances, they constitute the
first forces to encounter the enemy and engage in combat. Understood in these
terms, the question of whether Small War constitutes a “sideshow,” as Heuser
(2010a: 145) argues, is a function of whether and how it proves crucial to a
given strategy.
Many contemporary failures to appreciate the potential that Clausewitz
attached to Small War in pursuit of strategic ends probably result from the
focus devoted to his discussion of decisive battles and the “center of gravity” in
On War.37 Others miss the fact that the ends for which Small War was to bring
about its effects were both political and military in nature.38 But in the
discussions of the nature of defensive operations in the Bekenntnisdenkschrift
and the lectures, Clausewitz makes clear that Small War can serve tactical
military, strategic military, and political ends.39 Political defense consists of
the nation fighting for its survival rather than expansion. Strategic (military)
defense involves the defense of national territory rather than conquest of
foreign lands. Finally, tactical defense requires waiting for the enemy’s attack
rather than seizing the initiative and striking first.
It is certainly significant that Clausewitz used the Bekenntnisdenkschrift—
an affirmation of his commitment to Prussian nationalism and call for
popular insurgency in defense of the state’s territorial integrity—to develop
ideas on the relative strength of offense and defense that led to later and more
35 36
See p. 23 of this volume. See p. 210 of this volume.
37
See Clausewitz (1984), Book IV, Chs 9–12, Book VI, Ch. 27, and Book VIII, Ch. 4. There is
considerable debate on whether “center of gravity” is the appropriate translation of the German
term “Schwerpunkt” used by Clausewitz. For useful discussions of the issues involved, see
Echevarria II (2004) and Strange and Iron (2004).
38
See Rink (2006: 385, 1999: 357–9) and Pertz (1865: 106–42). The correspondence of
Gneisenau reprinted in the latter volume contains arguments also found in the Bekenntnisdenk-
schrift and betrays the close friendship and frequent exchange of ideas that took place between
the representatives of the anti-French faction in Prussian military and political circles.
39
See pp. 209–16 in this volume.
16 Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War
elaborate expression in Book VI of On War. After calling for the arming of
the peasants, the employment of bands of 2,000–5,000 men as well as larger
formations of the Landsturm, Clausewitz turns to arguing that a defensive
strategy can be supported through the effects produced by such units em-
ployed tactically for offensive ends: “It is self-evident, that the strategic
defense does not necessarily imply a tactical defense. Within the theater of
war that one has committed to defend, the enemy can be attacked wherever
and whenever one pleases. Hence, one thereby has a means to completely
destroy an enemy army as good as that offered by any offense: yes, it is easier
in our own theater of war for us than for the enemy.”40 As Christopher Daase
and Sebastian Schindler have pointed out, this form of “active defense”
corresponds to contemporary understandings of guerrilla warfare, which
aims to defeat the enemy through exhaustion.41 Or as Clausewitz puts it in
his discussion of the Landsturm: “In this way the enemy corps will have to
overcome the most difficult defense and will lose strength daily in this most
unfortunate of all wars.”42
Thus, while Heuser (2010a: 149) yet again may be correct in pointing out
that Clausewitz never focused on counter-insurgency, she distracts from the
more interesting point that the writings on Small War comprise a rudimentary
theory of insurgency as Werner Hahlweg (1986: 127–33), editor of the most
comprehensive compendia of Clausewitz’s writings, maintained. The main
focus of the discussions of the Landwehr and Landsturm is directed at the
strategic advantages that would accrue to Prussia if it were to move from
reliance on a centralized state-controlled army toward a system of defense
based on decentralized and relatively independent groups of armed volunteers
drawn from the rural population. Indeed, this form of strategic defense is not
far removed from guerrilla strategy as understood by Mao (Tse-Tung 1961:
46): “When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he
advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue
him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and
other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed,
attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated.”
Clausewitz returned to the subject of popular insurrection in the relatively
short chapter, “The People in Arms,” in Book VI of On War. Echoing themes
already developed in the Bekenntnisdenkschrift he argues that “general insur-
rection” or “popular uprising” must, with few exceptions, remain a form of
strategic rather than tactical defense (Clausewitz 1984: 482). As such, it
achieves its aims through a slow process of attrition:
40
See Bekenntnisdenkschrift, p. 212 of this volume.
41
The discussion here follows Daase and Schindler (2009: 705). See too Daase (2007).
42
See Bekenntnisdenkschrift, p. 203 of this volume.
Still a Chameleon 17
Its effect directs itself, as in the process of evaporation, toward the outer surface.
The larger the surface area and the contact between it and the enemy army, that
is, the more the latter is diffused, the more effective is the arming of the people.
The arming of the people destroys the foundations of the enemy army like quietly
smoldering embers.43
Because he thought that a very large territory would be a necessary condition
for an insurgency by itself to sufficiently weaken the enemy, Clausewitz
maintained that in practice, most insurgencies would be conducted in support
of regular army operations. Nonetheless, the chapter identifies many of the
specific mechanisms by which subsequent insurrections defeated occupying
powers.
Moreover, the emergence of popular uprising as a feature of nineteenth-
century warfare can be analyzed within the general trinitarian framework.
Once again, the chameleon changes its outer form as a result of a shift in the
relations amongst its constituent elements. Of particular importance is the fact
that insurrection originates with the people rather than the state: “Where the
enemy has not yet appeared, courage to get ready for him is not lacking, and
bit by bit the bulk of the neighboring population will follow this example.
In this way, the flame will spread like a fire in the heath and in the end
will reach the territory on which the attacker is based.”44 Whereas in the
eighteenth century the king and army could be conceived as independent
from the people, in the nineteenth century the relationship was one of
“the nation encompassing the king and army.”45 For Clausewitz, the people
are the facet of war most characterized by primordial violence and its con-
stituent elements hatred and enmity. Hence, “people’s war in general is to be
regarded as a consequence of the breaching of old artificial barriers by
the warlike element in our times; as an extension and reinforcement of the
entire process of fermentation, which we call war. . . . In most cases, those
who resort to people’s war in a rational manner will gain relative dominance
over those who scorn it.”46
STILL A CHAMELEON
Augmenting our understanding of Clausewitz with his early writings on Small
War leads to the conclusion that asymmetric warfare is not a historical
development that can be termed pre- or post-Clausewitzian as many
43
See “The arming of the people,” p. 222 of this volume.
44
See “The arming of the people,” p. 223 of this volume.
45
See Bekenntnisdenkschrift, p. 216 of this volume.
46
See “The arming of the people,” pp. 221–2 of this volume.
18 Introduction to Clausewitz on Small War
contemporary scholars of war and military strategy argue. Rather it is an
empirical exemplar of the general concept of war that can be analyzed, perhaps
even explained, in terms of Clausewitz’s general analytic framework. The
theory developed in On War does not constitute a break with his earlier
ideas on Small War; it reflects their further development. Hence, the appro-
priate test is not whether Clausewitz anticipated the forms of asymmetric or
hybrid warfare that have come to characterize much armed conflict in the
early part of the twenty-first century, or indeed transnational Islamist terror-
ism of the sort that has consumed the West in the decade following the
attacks of September 2001. Rather, the question is whether the application of
the analytic framework he developed leads to novel insights into important
interrelationships. Clausewitz’s framework directs our focus to changes in the
relationship between the identity of warriors, the means of violence employed,
and the purposes to which it is put. For these are the outward expressions
of an inner change in the interaction among hatred and enmity, the play of
chance, and efforts to subordinate violence to reason in pursuit of political
objectives.47
Ultimately, war is an act of violence (Gewalt) intended to compel the enemy
to submit to a foreign will (Clausewitz 1984: 75).48 A close reading of Clau-
sewitz’s writings on Small War leads to the conclusion that he did not have a
fixed conception of the political organizations that might adopt violent means
or of the form the ensuing clash of wills would take. Rather, it is that which
unifies warfare despite the diversity of its empirical forms that interested him.
47
Daase and Schindler (2009: 736, fn. 16) argue that twenty-first-century terrorism shares
much in common with insurrection and guerrilla warfare and is thus quite amenable to analysis
in Clausewitzian terms. Whereas terrorist groups can pursue offensive or defensive political
objectives, militarily they share with guerrilla war the strategic defense.
48
I believe that “violence” rather than “force” is the more appropriate translation of the term
Gewalt that appears in the German original.
2
My Lectures on Small War, held at
the War College in 1810 and 1811
INTRODUCTION TO MY LECTURES
The topic of my lectures1 is Small War and the operations of the General Staff.
The reason for separating these from the other lectures on war is the intention to
differentiate the mechanical from the scholarly. The General Staff ’s operations
are mechanical, or, if you would prefer, technical skills, which relate to general
war: reconnoitering, marching orders, etc. Small War, however, is not some-
thing mechanical or merely technical, though it depends even more on a certain
virtuosity, that is, on the development and training of the natural abilities,
whereas in general wars more scholarly and articulate views predominate.
You will certainly understand, that when Major Tiedemann2 teaches you
about the nature of war in its broad outlines, when he develops the general
principles of war, and wishes to demonstrate the most important issues, the
large battles and the relationship between them for the purpose of war, then he
is not able to discuss simultaneously the positioning of pickets, the command of
patrols etc. in similar detail, without overstretching the bounds of his lecture.
Therefore, those things are separated from these, which, though not quite
so close to the main issue, nevertheless are too important to just to skim over.
It has been left to me to analyze these things in detail for you and even more,
to train you therein, so that you acquire that certain virtuosity, of which
I spoke above.
1
Clausewitz’s lecture notes consist of 244 handwritten sheets of paper of varied size. See
Clausewitz (1810). The text is not edited and was not intended to be published. Rather, it mirrors
the spoken word. The translation is based on Werner Hahlweg’s careful edition: Carl von
Clausewitz, Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe (1966–90: 226–449). The translation consists of
the actual lectures, but omits the appendix comprising a collection of examples and collectanea.
We greatly benefitted from Hahlweg’s annotations and commentaries. We have inserted brack-
eted references to figures where useful to the reader.
2
As Hahlweg notes, Karl Ludwig Heinrich v. Tiedemann (1777–1812) was, like Clausewitz,
one of General Scharnhorst’s favorite disciples. In November 1810 he was Director of Studies at
the Allgemeine Kriegsschule zu Berlin.
20 My Lectures on Small War
In order to facilitate a coherent division, the analysis of the whole system of
forward posts and other security measures of the army has been left to me,
because these are encompassed primarily by Small War.
This will therefore be the first main subject of my lecture.
The second will be wars of smaller parties with offensive aims.
The third the General Staff ’s operations.
Since the subjects of my lecture are those things that first and foremost
concern you, that primarily will determine your effectiveness, and in which
you should have a certain competence, I will, therefore, mainly concentrate on
giving you assignments and letting you work on these independently. I will do
this more than I did last year because this year I have more time for it and also
am more convinced of the utility of this method.
You would err if you always were to expect great insights in my lectures.
Their subjects simply do not lend themselves thereto. Moreover, I am inclined
to view things from the most natural and compelling position, and my entire
merit will perhaps be found in the destruction of preconceived notions and the
eradication of prejudices, and in this way, to remove every obstacle to such an
extent as to allow you a clear view of the issue so that you will soon be in the
position to draw your own conclusions, which is always best.
INTRODUCTION TO SMALL WAR
Introduction
What is Small War—what gives its tenets their autonomy—what is its rela-
tionship to the other teachings in the Art of War?*
* Note: As an overview, this is our classification of the Art of War. The entire Art of War is
composed of
A. The Supporting Arts, which are concerned with the acquisition and preparation of war
materials.
1. Acquisition.—military economy borders on the civil affairs and relations.—
Warminister.
2. Training of the acquired forces.
a. Weaponry Training
α. Artillery,
β. Construction of fortresses and Entrenchments.
b. The teaching and training of the troops.—Elementary tactics.
c. Knowledge of the theater of war in the widest sense.
B. The Art of War Proper, which teaches the employment of the trained forces
1. Strategy
2. Higher tactics. Of which Small War is a separate part.
Introduction to Small War 21
We understand Small Wars to be the use of small units in the field. Battles of
20, 50, 100, 300 or 400 soldiers, as long as they are not part of a larger battle,
fall under Small War.
This definition may seem mechanical and unphilosophical, but it is the true
one, if one takes the traditional views of the concepts into consideration. It also
may be the only one, but to prove this here would take us too far.
Thus, all warlike acts that are carried out with small units are elements of
Small Wars. Of course it is impossible to determine strictly what is understood
by small and large units. Such precision, however, really is not necessary at
this point. The fact that there is no strict borderline between them, this
classification has in common with others, which as a result are neither false
nor unfruitful. It is enough, if we provide the grounds for the classification.
Since the boundaries between Small and Large War (if one allows me the
latter expression, which by the way is neither very scholarly nor very abstract),
I say, since the boundaries merge into one another, judgment and experience
are of course a precondition for deriving a clear conception of Small War.
Whoever lacks these must for the time being take our word for it and later
come back to this introduction.
Since the foregoing definition is taken from common usage, it does not yet
contain the grounds for the classification according to which war is divided
into large and small, and thus the question is: is this classification inherent
to the Art [of War], does it contribute to the development of the same,
and why?
The answer to this is that the classification is indeed inherent and precisely
because the doctrine for Small War is different in several general respects from
the remaining doctrines of the Art of War, as we will determine more precisely
forthwith.
If what we have just claimed is true, then particular characteristics of the
use of small units must be found, which are general, which means that they
can be found in most cases. And these particular characteristics, we believe, are
basically the following:
1. Small units can sustain themselves quite easily almost anywhere.
2. They can conceal their presence more easily.
3. They can move faster. Especially for combat.
4. New insights suggest the necessity of breaking down armies and larger
corps into several separate parts, which is impossible in the case of
smaller units.
5. Small units by their very nature lose the advantage of an artful emplace-
ment (although the advantage of a good choice [of position] often
remains), all the more as size decreases; on the other hand, they gain
the ability to move to the right or left during the battle.
22 My Lectures on Small War
6. Nearly all of their engagements are meant to be supporting.
7. Their retreat is less difficult and can be conducted on unpaved roads and
in opposite directions.
8. Their deployment requires no great preparations.
9. Finally, their purpose is not always defense or offense, which is the case
with large units. Rather, they usually have a purpose that is relatively
alien to Large Wars, namely observation of the enemy.
In addition to these characteristics, several more could be provided. How-
ever, to generate such long lists for theory would render them incredibly
boring. Perhaps those mentioned above are the primary and the most essen-
tial and this is sufficient.
If we add to these previously mentioned characteristics the one that many of
the small detachments have neither a defensive nor offensive purpose, but
engage in a war of observation—a characteristic that of course is less general
than the abovementioned—then this new peculiarity, which is thus added to
the tenets of Small War, enhances the difference between it and remaining
forms of war.
If the Art of War is divided into strategy and tactics, that is, if every warlike
action must be the subject of the one or the other, then the question follows: is
this also the case in Small Wars?
To this we answer with the following considerations.
Tactic in our opinion comprises the teachings of the use and command of
the armed forces in battle; strategy comprises the teachings of the employ-
ment and utilization of the battle.{
Hence, strategy determines for every battle the end and time, place and
strength of the forces insofar as these three things have an impact on the
aforementioned end; what remains is left to tactics.
It is self-evident that decisions regarding place, time, and strength must also
take place with regard to small units; though one can ask whether this is not
predetermined by strategy and tactics? Indeed it is. Since the purpose of all
actions associated with the Small War is based on the necessities of strategy
{
Note: This definition is based on a conceptual development, which would take us too far
afield, and of which we only want to mention that we believe that every warlike action is based on
a possible battle. We deduce this from the fact that one uses armed forces for warlike actions,
which would be unnecessary if there were no possibility of battle. We believe, therefore, that the
battle is to war what hard cash is for the general trade.
However, we should not be mistaken for having meant that the purpose of all warlike action is
the battle. To the contrary, strategy makes use of the battle as a means to reach its purpose.
To determine, that means to define, strategy according to its means instead of its purposes is
appropriate because the means (that is the battle), of which it makes use, are singular and cannot
be dismissed without destroying the concept of war itself. Potential purposes, by contrast, are
manifold and cannot be exhausted.
On the Nature of Small War 23
and tactics—that is on the Large War—it cannot lie within the Small War
itself. Most decisions on the strength, place, time, etc. are already determined
by this purpose. These decisions usually follow tactical considerations: the
security measures, bivouacs, etc. . . . . Thus one can say that the strategy of
Small Wars is a component of tactics, and since the tactics of Small Wars
certainly must be a component of tactics in general, then the entirety of Small
Wars belongs to tactics. That is, it comprises a specific chapter thereof.
ON THE NATURE OF SMALL WAR
So far we have talked about the ends and means of Small Wars. Now a few
words on its nature are in order; that is, on the spirit in which it is conducted
by the armed forces.
Small Wars display the peculiar characteristic that in addition to the
greatest audacity and boldness, a much greater fear of danger exists than is
the case in Large Wars. And this characteristic is also evident in the troops
who conduct Small Wars. The individual hussar or rifleman has a spirit of
initiative, confidence in himself and in his fortune, of which those who
always held the line hardly can imagine. It is his experience and habit that
make him calm and relaxed while facing the manifold difficult tasks, whereas
others would be timorous. Nevertheless, the hussar and rifleman have more
respect for the danger inherent in common battles than do soldiers in closed
ranks. Where it is not absolutely necessary, he will not engage in battle. He
withdraws and looks for cover whenever possible. A single shot of a cannon
can keep an army at great distance if it does not itself possess cannons and
therefore believes itself to be at a disadvantage. 100 infantrymen can some-
times keep entire cavalry regiments at bay, if they believe the terrain to be
advantageous for the infantry and therefore recognized that fortune has not
been distributed evenly.
This is an entirely natural characteristic of light units. If this were not the
case, how could it be possible that under constant enemy observation they
daily engage in battle without being completely destroyed in a single cam-
paign? This is far removed from blaming light units for something that is in
their very nature. The greatest audacity must alternate with prudent caution as
circumstances require, and every single man must be equally adept therein.
One thing is clear: we never have to teach men the fear of danger, therefore the
same goes for light units. Natural instinct provides for it. Instinct would so
affect the other troops if everything were not done to suppress it. In large
battles, one has to face the danger. The individual may not rely on cunning
and intelligence. Intelligence and creativity must govern the general war
plan and the conduct of its most important aspects, whereas with regard to
24 My Lectures on Small War
individual positions, the greatest energy, the most furious defiance of danger,
constitutes the highest wisdom.
A battalion will seldom have the opportunity during a battle or any other
larger engagement to distinguish itself through wise deployment. It distin-
guishes itself through its bravery, through its spirited assault, through a
steadfast and orderly endurance of lengthy firefights. If, when speaking of a
battalion, one says that it has lost half or 2/3 of its men in battle, one has said
enough. But this is not the case with regard to light units. In a battle between
closed ranks the masses are pushed closer together and for small units there is
little opportunity for combination. A battalion that is paying no regard to a
neighboring battalion and attacks the enemy in a rash fashion (assuming that
a firefight is already underway) could completely ruin itself. However, this
danger is hardly comparable to the advantage that could be created. For
perhaps from this point the entire battle would take a new turn and thereby,
perhaps, the whole campaign could be won. It is impossible to calculate what
success could develop out of this and it would be desirable that more battalions
would take such risks. In Small Wars such advances by single units can create
advantages but they will seldom be crucial and decisive. On the other hand, the
dispersal in a larger space during Small Wars creates opportunities for thou-
sands of combinations and the advanced units could easily be destroyed
without thereby gaining the prospect of a large success. This free play of the
intellect, which takes place in Small Wars, this clever combination of audacity
and caution (I wish to say, this lucky admixture of courage and fear), is what
makes Small Wars so immensely interesting.
ON THE TACTICS OF S MALL WAR OR
BEHAVIOR DURING BATTLE
The use of weaponry in Small Wars is not different from that in Large Wars.
The same is true of those things that are taught to soldiers. Flanking (blän-
kern3) and sniping (tiraillieren) are in Small Wars just the same as in Large
Wars. It is thus not necessary to expand here on these issues, which are taught
in official instructions and in Major von Tiedemann’s lectures.
However, the order of battle in general, as well as the conduct and spirit
thereof, are distinguished by peculiarities, which we want to raise here by
providing a clear image of the battle in Small Wars.
3
The term “blänkern” is generally translated as “flanking” but during the eighteenth century
often referred to a tactic employed by mounted Hussars whereby a loosely organized unit briefly
appears and engages in rather random shooting only to quickly ride off again. See Adelung et al.
(1808: 1042).
On the Tactics of Small War 25
Later we will also talk about the defense of small positions and about their
attack, when this is linked to specific goals. Often, however, one arrives at a
battle without these goals. In this case, only very broad principles, which apply
to battles generally, can govern behavior.
1. On Infantry Battle
The characteristics of battles and Small Wars that should be mentioned
here are:
1. That one often or even in most cases confronts a superior enemy.
2. That even if one were not weak in relation to the enemy, one is
nevertheless so in relation to the region that is to be occupied.
3. That defense seldom requires absolute resistance, but only such of a
certain duration. A few observations on this:
3.1 Absolute resistance is the goal, if a point definitely should not be
ceded to the enemy. This is the case for every entrenchment.
3.2 Relative, that is proportionate, resistance shall only last a certain time,
however. It should impede the enemy’s advance, not preclude it.
3.3 In the end, the success of any resistance is uncertain, however
designed. And a resistance is only termed absolute if I mobilize all
energies, if I invest everything, if I sacrifice everything to reach my
goal. The degree of danger to oneself: individual security is no longer
an issue, and consequently the retreat is only of secondary
importance.
4. That one has greater respect for gunfire in Small Wars because one
accepts great losses only in pursuit of great goals; that these seldom are
found in Small Wars, and one more often is led into battle by the
other side.
Reflecting on all these circumstances, what we perceive to be common to all
wars reveals itself as the rule.
}1
The infantry in this case is distinguished more through its fire than its thrust
and thus fights in a dispersed rather than closed formation.
How could one defend a wide terrain in closed formation?
Against a vastly superior enemy an attack of a small and closed unit is
equally ineffective; hence nothing else remains other than to do damage
through well-focused gunfire. Resistance with gunfire is admittedly an uncer-
tainty, since those who are to be repelled by fire really are not damaged by it.
26 My Lectures on Small War
The resistance is more moral than physical and therefore it is uncertain.
Hence, the defender does not feel completely secure unless he knows that in
the most extreme emergency he also can withstand adequately the enemy
advance physically.
In Small Wars, however, it is more important to impede the enemy’s
advance than to preclude it.
Finally, owing to number 4, a line of snipers has a greater effect in Small
than in Large Wars.
}2
The infantry never completely disbands, but an appropriate component is held
together to the rear.
Nearly all books, in particular the Austrian Regulations,4 prescribe this rule for
lines of snipers within the infantry line in Large Wars. It is thus not a
particularity to Small Wars, but it is more important to them, because in
Small Wars one often only can expect support and reinforcement after a
period of some hours, whereas in Large Wars, it is usually within a few
hundred to 1000 paces’ reach.
Four closely related considerations illustrate the plausibility of this rule:
1. There is a reserve for the protection of the flanks and other unforeseeable
situations. If these men are not grouped, they would not stand for ready
disposition.
2. Men in the sniper lines who have spent their fire can be replaced.
3. There is a component to which, in case of calamity, dispersed snipers can
reassemble.
4. A coherent component is necessary for the protection of the command-
ing officer.
}3
If circumstances allow, the firing line as discussed in }} 1 and 2 is intended for
a combined assault. One then divides the troops into two parts: the first
constitutes the sniper line with auxiliary troops, the other remains concealed
for the combined assault.
Very weak infantry detachments, for example to the size of a company, nearly
always have to settle for resistance through mere gunfire. Several battalions,
however, would do wrong if they were to do so. Against a weak enemy they
4
Clausewitz refers here to Österreich (1816).
On the Tactics of Small War 27
can offer absolute resistance; can defeat him. For that, however, assault in
closed ranks is necessary. For against a mere line of fire even the weakest
enemy can approach a single point with superior power.
If the enemy advance is so forceful that an assault is impossible even with
the assistance of those components kept to the rear, then these same compo-
nents can be used for replacement and reinforcement of the firing line, and
consequently the arrangement has been appropriate for the circumstances.
Which of these two arrangements is appropriate depends not only on the
strength but also on the circumstances.
Examples:5
[...]
}4
Where absolute defense is in order, one must never arrange oneself in a single
sniper line but rather must retain most of the troops for combined assault.
The resistance of a firing line is never certain. It is equally unclear what one can
achieve through a combined assault. All that is certain is that in this way the
troops are animated to the greatest exertion. It is also certain that the assault
with closed ranks will have a stronger impact on the enemy than the entire effect
of dispersed gunfire. Hand-to-hand fighting is what soldiers fear most. If the
defender is unable to resist an attack by way of hand-to-hand fighting, as is the
case with a firing line, then the attacker will already have lost all fear.
The advantages of a combined assault, if it is unexpected, are the following:
1. One at least concentrates on one point. It is likely that one will win at this
point, and it is very possible that the victory at that point will influence
the entire endeavor. It is quite possible that in defeating 1/3 of the enemy
force, one wins everything. But it is inconceivable that with 1/3 directed
at every point one can successfully resist the entire enemy force.
2. It is easier to respond appropriately to circumstances and one can retreat
if one is unwilling to approach, etc.
3. One can throw oneself into the battle and if defeated, it is without doubt
honorable, whereas in a firefight, one is more likely to suffer ambiguous
judgments.
This does not contradict } 1, for cases where absolute resistance should be
exercised in Small Wars are, as we know, few.
5
At various points throughout the lectures we have left out examples or elaborations found in
Clausewitz’s notes but have indicated their existence with an ellipsis in brackets.
28 My Lectures on Small War
}5
During attack, one must keep ready troops in closed ranks wherever one wants
to break through.
Although in general, closed ranks seem more natural for attacking, the line of
fire is associated with decisive advantages, even when attacking in great battles:
1. It conceals our measures.
2. It often compels the enemy to unfold his own measures and functions
generally as a kind of reconnaissance.
3. It distracts his fire.
4. It prevents our closed ranks from becoming involved in a firefight
against their will.
These advantages remain the same in Small Wars.
When Should One Start to Fire?
}6
Individual riflemen can begin fire at great distance, that is 300 to 400 paces;
one thus keeps the enemy at bay. Incidentally, the early commencement of fire
as well as its energy should reflect existing stocks of munitions.
But it must also remain the rule that a rifleman should only shoot if he
expects an effect.
2. On Cavalry Battle
The cavalry has its flankers as the infantry has its snipers, but admittedly the
former have a less important purpose. What they lack is firepower. Their
actual engagement is almost without effect, they rather serve to observe the
enemy, often also to make some noise through their shooting.
Their actual engagement only becomes effective in combination with the
infantry snipers.
From this it follows:
The cavalry flankers only have a secondary purpose; the proper battle is always
conducted in closed ranks. They only become important, when a light cavalry
through greater agility is able to do harm to a heavy cavalry with flankers.
}7
The cavalry commits as many soldiers to flanking as is necessary for the
observation and harassment of the enemy or as the strength of the enemy’s
On the Tactics of Small War 29
flankers requires. The actual battle of the cavalry is always united, unless one
believes oneself superior to the enemy in individual combat. In this case
one allows as many as is possible to flank without too great a danger. But
here too, one part must always remain in closed formation.
It is another question whether the combined units should be larger or
smaller, whether one should keep them as one component or divide them
into many. We are not speaking here of actually dividing them on the terrain.
This will be determined by other objectives. Rather, we are speaking of
whether a squadron should act in one or in two separate troops if it is alone;
whether two squadrons should act in 1 or 2 units or perhaps in even more.
This leads in a certain way to the determination of the order of battle for the
cavalry in general. We cannot address this here. We will assess these only
insofar as the peculiarities of Small Wars require special attention.
In Small Wars, where the battle is more of a free play, where it does not
depend merely on a determined onslaught, the simple formation in a unit is
almost never advisable. One is subject to too many contingencies and
doesn’t know what to do. Every cavalryman knows that it is difficult to
retreat as a unit. But in Small Wars it is the case that retreat may at any
moment be necessary. In short, effective maneuver is almost impossible as a
troop.
}8
A cavalry troop, if stronger than 20 men and independent, does not need to
stay together, but can divide itself into two parts, which remain close to and
support one another.
Whether one should divide larger cavalry units into more troops than 2,
I leave to the gentlemen officers of the cavalry. Here the particular circum-
stances often will be more decisive than a preconfigured system. But the
following principle cannot be disputed.
}9
If the light cavalry finds it advantageous in view of the heavy cavalry to divide
itself into many troops, then the division and dispersion may only go so far as
would still allow them all to take part in one and the same attack.
3. Cavalry and Infantry in Combination
Nowhere is this combination closer than in Small Wars and in Small Wars, in
turn, nowhere closer than in dispersed battles; and this close combination
30 My Lectures on Small War
constitutes the strength of the troop in the Art of Small Wars. Experience has
provided the infallible proof; besides, the reasons are so obvious that no
further deliberation is necessary.
} 10
Wherever the terrain allows a horse to scrimmage one can never neglect to
support the infantry snipers with cavalry flankers. Their number may be
considerably smaller than that of the snipers; yet it should reflect more or less
the number of the enemy flankers. They remain more or less far to the rear,
depending on the proximity of the enemy sniper line and the roughness of the
terrain. They are kept behind for reasons that are easy to comprehend. [ . . . ]
} 11
In the same way the cavalry’s flankers are supported in the plane (Ebene) by
individual proficient riflemen of the infantry, provided the danger of losing
them is not too great. If the men have grown accustomed to one another they
will not act just as machines, but rather with consideration. If the retreat is not
too distant, they will seldom be lost. At most, they should be half as many as
the cavalrymen. Why half as many?
} 12
If the riflemen and flankers are linked to each other, so too are their support-
ing troops. With, however, the following qualifications:
1. In varied terrain, the supporting troops of the cavalry either do not take
part in battle, or they are positioned beyond the reach of rifle shots.
2. In the field, the supporting troops of the infantry are located so far to the
rear that they are not in danger in the event of sudden retreat.
In both cases the individual combatants of the auxiliary forces are already
covered by the individual combatants of the main force and thus require no
immediate reinforcement.
The combination of the cavalry and the infantry in closed formations
generally has the same tendency as in Large Wars. However, there are two
considerations, which are particular to the use of the cavalry in Small Wars.
Thus, the following reflection is necessary.
The cavalry in Large Wars is mainly designed to
1. Make use of the chaos that has resulted among the enemy through the
infantry battle and thus further prosecute the ongoing battle.
On the Tactics of Small War 31
2. Serve as a reserve for unexpected contingencies.
3. Pursue the enemy in general after he has suffered a defeat.
In general, however, as mentioned earlier, the cavalry in Small Wars has this
purpose. It completes what the infantry has started and thus both belong together.
Nonetheless, (and this is the 1st reflection) the large space, which one is
often compelled to occupy in Small Wars, easily leads to a disconnection of
both forces, so that they cannot properly support each other in battle, and
hence the purpose of their combination is not achieved.
Examples:
[...]
Sometimes one perceives the necessity in Small Wars to act in this way.
Sometimes it is merely a misunderstanding of the rule that forces should be
used according to the terrain.
Examples:
[...]
} 13
As long as one can reach one’s objective without separating one’s forces, one
should avoid doing it. For the cavalry is meant to further prosecute the battle
initiated by the infantry and to exploit the advantages that the infantry has
achieved.
Therefore, the proper location for the cavalry if it is combined with the
infantry is either directly behind it or to the side and slightly back, but in any
case nearby.
In Small Wars it is not so important whether the cavalry is positioned just behind
the infantry or to its side. The first is the natural position. Sometimes, however,
the possibility arises to position it completely concealed to the side. In this case,
one is not bound by the rule, which is only important for large masses of troops.
[...]
The second reflection regarding the use of the cavalry is that the general
effect of the cavalry in Small Wars is bigger and its scope more widespread
than in Large Wars.
If it is an axiom of Large Wars, as revealed in the history of all campaigns,
that the cavalry can achieve nothing against an infantry and artillery that still
function and possess ammunition, then this claim requires a large qualifica-
tion for Small Wars.
Although defending a very weak infantry unit in the field against the cavalry
is not impossible and has often occurred, you may not reckon with it. Yet it
32 My Lectures on Small War
remains possible that such a unit, if it enjoys no protection from the terrain,
will be overrun.
From this it follows that the use of the cavalry and infantry in Small Wars
should more often be determined by the nature of the terrain, while their use
in Large Wars is more a function of the natural course of battle than it is
dependent on the terrain. (Oral elaborations)
Furthermore, it should be noted that in Small Wars, where all battles are
intended as supporting measures, time plays a much more decisive role than
in Large Wars. But since one often cannot afford to lose any time, one must
use the cavalry, which always arrives first, whenever possible.
From all this it follows that the law of using the cavalry only after the
infantry has already initiated the success, must be qualified in Small Wars by
big and numerous exceptions. The question arises of what sort of rule should
be stated. Such a rule is difficult to create and must be judged with hindsight
more as a suggestion of what is to be done. With this reservation in mind,
I would say the following.
} 14
Where the terrain provides too many advantages for the infantry and the
artillery and no infantry can be employed as quickly and effectively, the
cavalry must shoulder the first attack without any concern for the good
condition of the enemy infantry.
These two }} (13 and 14), were necessary as a qualifying condition for the
battle of closed formations in Small Wars. Moreover, everything that is taught
about these issues in Large Wars applies here.
4. Artillery in Combination with Infantry and Cavalry
In Small Wars one usually employs mounted artillery. Why? The cases, for
which artillery is provided, are the following:
1. The defense of defiles and other small defensible positions.
2. For reserves, which are intended to reinforce other troops (additional
comments on this).
3. For attacking small positions.
The first of these cases, which is most common, leads to the provision of the
artillery (though mobile) to the infantry.
This also happens for other reasons. On the one hand it is more natural to
keep firearms together. On the other, the cavalry in light wars is usually
dispersed in small units and one does not like to entrust a cannon to such a
small unit of the cavalry.
On the Tactics of Small War 33
Furthermore, both cases—Nos 1 and 2—lead to the much dispersed use of
the artillery in Small Wars, so that quite often a cannon becomes isolated from
the others and more than 2 or 3 are seldom together.
Only in the third case, in the event of attack, can one exploit the concen-
trated effect of the artillery.
Yet even in Small Wars, this advantage can be carried too far. The cannon is
most essential in the main positions. In minor positions instead of cannons
one can provide more infantry instead.
The conditions for the use of cannons in Small Wars will be the following.
} 15
One must only provide cannons to areas where the infantry cannot achieve the
same effect; and above all, the cannon should not be placed in dangerous
positions unless there is an urgent need.
} 16
In every case, a special unit of the detachment must be established to cover the
cannon and to move it, because otherwise it will be abandoned in the event of
retreat. In skirmishing, this provision is particularly necessary. Here, one of
the closed units must be in near proximity to the cannon and direct their
attention toward covering it at all times.
5. On the Plan of Battle and the Utilization of the Terrain
A. Defense
The features one seeks in the great battle are the following:
1. Support for flanks.
2. Hindrances in access to the front.
3. Unrestricted view of the front.
4. A varied terrain to the rear, but no real defiles, at least nowhere close by.
5. A concealed positioning of the troops.
6. An advantageous form of posture.
In Smalls Wars one generally has to dispense with anchoring the flanks. In
the same way, an advantageous positioning does not come naturally to small
detachments.
The advantages are admittedly not entirely ineffective, however, they are
only conceivable in conjunction with a firing line, and then they are not very
reliable. [ . . . ]
What in the end emerges, if one thinks of the tactics of small detachments as
scaled-down tactics of larger masses, can be observed in the weak, ineffective,
34 My Lectures on Small War
and pitiful defensive postures (cordon systems), and in particular the
maneuvers.
[...]
Whether they enjoy hindrances in access to their frontline, a free view, or a
varied terrain to their rear, is usually not a matter of their choice. All these
advantages are for them probably more essential than for the army. Because,
however, their position usually is a matter of other circumstances, in these
respects they are very often in a disadvantageous situation.
The battle of a detachment is different from great battles insofar as defiles
near their rear are not as dangerous for the detachment as they are for corps
or armies. The reason is obvious.
In general, the retreat of a detachment is not as easily cut off as is that of an
army. The former can march faster and more unobservably on all ways. In a
mountainous region it nearly always has the opportunity to escape.
The last advantage of a position, namely that it is concealed, is natural to a
small detachment and must be used to compensate for all other disadvantages.
That the firing line of a small detachment urgently demands those features
that to some extent secure it from enemy fire and assault is something it shares
in common with Large Wars.
Thus:
} 17
In positioning small units of the troop for the purpose of defense be
mindful of:
1. Supporting the flanks.
2. Obstacles to access, which delay the enemy within our range of fire.
3. Unrestricted view of the front and the flanks.
4. Varied terrain to the rear, but above all
5. Means of cover against enemy fire and the 1st assault of the infantry
firing line and the cannons. And
6. Concealed positioning.
The more the position resembles an ambush the better.
} 18
If there are hindrances in access to the front and in addition no means of cover
against the assault, one positions the firing line close to the hindrances to
access with the exception of the cannons, which are positioned 300–400 paces
behind. If there is an additional obstacle, located 100–200 paces behind the
defile, then one positions the riflemen in the obstacle, unless the defile is
several hundred paces wide.
On the Tactics of Small War 35
Figure 1. Battalions in Customary Order of Battle.
Source: Clausewitz (1810: 79v.) Copyright © Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster,
N. Clausewitz 4,001.
[...]
In contrast to large troop units, the extension of the front that is assigned to
a detachment organized in a firing line is not determined by the mere order of
battle. Wherever closed attack is the main objective, the positioning must be
shoulder to shoulder. This is the case with large masses of troops. Here, the
firing line acquires the extension necessary for its effective use only because it
is weaker than the closed ranks and usually can outflank them to some degree.
The figure [see Figure 1] depicts three battalions in customary order of
battle, both kept somewhat to the rear of the flanks. Here, the extension of the
firing line a b is more or less determined by the front of the battalions. The
extension of the battalions themselves, insofar as they are parts of a larger
whole, is not, however, bigger than the space they themselves occupy.
With regard to weak isolated units of 100–50 men or even smaller units, or
even individual battalions, where, as mentioned above, fire is the primary
purpose, this law of positioning does not apply. The principle of bringing as
many combatants as possible into battle at a single location is inappropriate.
For if the enemy wants to break through the attack, a firing line will be too
weak to withstand.
In this regard the extension cannot be limited easily.
On the other hand, by extending too little, one would subject oneself to
unnecessary disadvantages.
If one wished to concentrate 50 riflemen in this or that varied terrain as shown
in Figure 1 [see Figure 2A6], then the following disadvantages would accrue:
1. The enemy fire would be more effective both frontally and from
encirclements.
2. If attacked from encirclements, chaos is more likely to arise.
3. One would defend less terrain than the range of fire would otherwise
allow. For the enemy who wished to evade us by few hundred paces, we
are nonexistent.
6
In his lecture notes, Clausewitz refers to this figure as Figure 1. It is the second figure to
appear in the notes and is here labeled 2A.
36 My Lectures on Small War
Figure 2A. Positioning of Weak Isolated Units.
Source: Clausewitz (1810: 80v.) Copyright © Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster,
N. Clausewitz 4,001.
Figure 2B. Extension of Small Detachments.
Source: Clausewitz (1810: 80v.) Copyright © Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster,
N. Clausewitz 4,001.
As a rule, small detachments must extend themselves to an extent more
than is provided by the order of battle. But what determines the extension?
1. Defense of the terrain
If 100 men are commanded to occupy a wood that has an expanse of 400 paces
and is accessible from all sides and defend it against the advance of snipers and
weak cavalry detachments, then it is self-evident that those 100 men will draw
their firing line from one end to the other with closed troops behind it. In this
case, one would still have a relatively strong firing line; if only 1/3 snipers,
every 24 paces 2 men [see Figure 2B].
One could if necessary spread throughout the whole wood even if it were the
size of 1000 and 1500 paces. This would be impossible if it were a mile long.
At times then, the extent of the terrain that is to be occupied is determined
by the fact that a certain piece of territory is to be defended.
2. Advantages of the terrain
Sometimes supporting positions are determinative.
Sometimes the means of protection, which the terrain offers.
On the Tactics of Small War 37
If one finds hedges, trenches, or large groves, etc., then one takes position
entirely within them or behind them and unless necessary does not move any
elements into the field.
3. Easy command of the whole
Finally, the rule applies that one should not expand unnecessarily more than
the maintenance of oversight and command of the whole allow. This rule
replaces to a certain extent the rule of victory through closed ranks of large
troop masses.
} 19
Troops intended for the closed assault must be kept together both in Small and
Large Wars. But where one wishes to defend through a well-focused rifle fire,
the positioning is to be determined according to one or more of the following
conditions.
1. According to the expanse of the terrain that one wants to defend.
2. According to the advantages the terrain offers.
3. According to the oversight and ease of command of the whole.
Given the fact that the infantry (according to } 4), when it is a matter of
absolute defense, can be effective only through closed assault—and the cavalry
never functions any differently—the curious rule emerges that one should
wherever possible defend oneself offensively; that is, to lure the enemy into an
area and to attack him there from all sides. This rule is the most important
when planning entire defensive battles. It constitutes the capstone.
} 20
A passive defense is sufficient only for steep passes. In all other cases, one
should not count on it too much and wherever the strength of the detachments
allows, one should combine offense and defense.
} 21
This happens:
1. If one awaits the enemy with a sizeable part of one’s troops united in a
remote terrain while another part takes up extended positions in order to
attack unexpectedly the enemy if it believes it has already defeated us.
2. If one assumes forward or sideward a position of ambush in order to
attack the enemy from behind.
3. By approaching him head-on and attacking as he marches.
4. By withdrawing without great resistance in the event of the enemy’s
advance, but immediately thereafter resuming the attack.
38 My Lectures on Small War
} 22
One should never be misled into developing an artificial and overly complex
arrangement, which would subject oneself to too many contingencies.
} 23
Two rules are to be observed in the event of an assault:
1. That it must be unexpected,
2. That the men be given an assembly point in case of failure.
[...]
B. Offense
Until now we have spoken about the plan of battle for the case of defense and
all that has been mentioned about the offense was related to offensive defense.
The rules for assault remain the same when used in a proper offense and
will not be repeated here. But the arrangement of the entire battle in the event
of an offensive has some features that are absent in the case of defense and
must therefore be dealt with.
The first question is whether and why one also should use a firing line in the
offense.
The objectives of the firing line in an offense are the following:
1. To do damage to the enemy through well-focused fire.
2. To lure him into early fire.
3. To cover the closed units against enemy fire.
4. To conceal the movements and strength of the same.
5. To a certain degree to function as a forward post in varied terrain in
order to learn about enemy measures.
All these points apply to Small Wars as to Large Wars, but numbers 1 and 5
are the most important. They do not, however, always apply in the same way.
Nevertheless, only rarely can one dispense with a firing line entirely, and these
cases are: surprises; an all too flat terrain in conjunction with great weakness;
and great superiority on our side.
The firing line admittedly is not appropriate for a thrust. Nonetheless, it is not
impossible to attack with it, especially when it is more a matter of displacing the
enemy than destroying him. Bypassing a line of snipers that enjoys no further
cover is usually sufficient to compel it to retreat. This is best accomplished, if one
does not wish to endanger oneself too much with one’s own line of snipers.
From all this, I draw the following rules.
On the Tactics of Small War 39
} 24
1. In an area that cannot be surveyed, one must not attack the enemy by
day without a line of fire.
2. Generally, one must use a line of fire to uncover enemy measures and to
weaken his troops, to outflank him, and for mock assault.
3. One must never place trust in the ability of rifle men to break through if
the enemy is not simultaneously outflanked.
With respect to the combination of forces one should note that when
attacking in Small Wars, one gladly makes use of the cavalry to bypass the
enemy. There can be no objection to this, given the greater effectiveness of the
cavalry in Small Wars and the necessary speed of maneuver. One should only
be careful not to separate both forces too much.
} 25
One should never use the infantry without the cavalry, except in cases where
the terrain is not at all varied (for example in deep forests), for otherwise it is
impossible to exploit even the best achievements. An[other] exception to this
rule is found in cases where the enemy is defeated and the cavalry is dis-
patched in pursuit.
} 26
An especially opportune moment (which one should not miss) to gain the
most benefit from the cavalry is the instant when a dispersed infantry aban-
dons its posts in order to withdraw across the field. If it finds no strong
support in the field it will seldom be able to reassemble and fall into the
hands of our cavalry (as for example the French by Bingen7). Eylau after the
conquest of Kutschitten.8
Finally, it must be mentioned that generally there are two different goals of the
offensive, which in Small Wars are even more different than in Large Wars.
The first is to inflict a proportionate loss on the enemy. This goal is also found
in Large Wars, although today much less often than before, whereas in Small
Wars it is more common than the first [goal].
We will talk about the 1st and the rules that are connected to this goal if we
deal with offensive undertakings of small detachments. The 2nd is more
appropriate here.
7
Clausewitz refers to a situation during the French Revolutionary Wars in which French
troops offered a weak defense against Prussian and Hessian troops in Bingen in the Rhine valley.
8
Battle of Eylau between the Russian Army and Napoleon’s Grande Armée in East Prussia on
February 8, 1807.
40 My Lectures on Small War
Abandoning a position only becomes necessary if it has lost its nexus; that
is, if the flanks have been bypassed, the rear is threatened, and if the frontline
has been breached. In Large Wars, one will not have yet reached one’s goals by
these means in every case. For if the defender has taken adequate measures,
especially if his position is deep enough, he will be able to recover from such
misfortunes. But in Small Wars where the retreat is so much more essential,
these means are even more potent.
} 27
To displace the enemy from his position, one bypasses him if his flanks are not
supported and his front is not too extended. If the latter is the case, one breaks
through. That is, one attacks with concentrated strength a single part of his front.
} 28
When dealing with an inept enemy, one can hazard something. But if the
enemy is resourceful, one has to reckon with an active defense and rather more
conserve one’s strength.
SMALL WAR
First Chapter: Forward Posts Forward Post System
Outposts (Feldwachen)
Soutiens9
Chain of Posts10
Mobile Corps
Patrols
Reconnaissance
Second Chapter: Small Detachments Large Patrols
A. Offensive Reconnaissance
Organization and Conduct during Observation
Marches Assaults
Cavalry Seizure of small posts, Choke points, Villages,
Infantry Houses, Entrenchments
Artillery Destruction of depots, bridges, etc.
Joined Neutralization of convoys
of forages
of individual persons
Collection of intelligence
Organization of supplies
foodstuffs
clothing
bridging materials
9
In the original handwritten manuscript, Clausewitz (c.1810) crossed out the term Patrouil-
len and substituted it with soutiens. The English equivalent is “backup” or “support.”
10
Clausewitz uses the French term chaine.
Purpose and Organization of the Forward Posts 41
B. Defensive Defense of post Accompanying a convoy
Either in a chain of Choke points Covering a forage; a depot.
forward posts or alone.
Villages and houses
Entrenchments
Woods
Accessible areas
Third Chapter: Operation of small detachments during skirmishes.
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION O F THE
FORWARD P OSTS OF AN ARMY
1. If an army is encamped or in quarters, or when it marches, a line of light
troops is always positioned between it and the enemy. Those are the
forward posts.
2. They observe the enemy and at all times provide cover for the army
against assault. Depending on the strength provided by the terrain, they
sometimes offer resistance against the enemy. They thereby provide time
for the army to take up measures which the enemy does not expect.
3. They are comprised of small corps of all service arms, which here will be
called brigades. The number of brigades corresponds to the number of
divisions within the army corps, so that one brigade is attached to each
division and marches with it, when it is deployed.
4. They occupy all points of access to the army and thereby create a chain of
small defensive posts. If possible, the position of this defensive chain of
posts should be chosen so as to convey the cover and strength offered by
the terrain.
5. A chain of guards is positioned in front of the chain of posts in order to
enhance its security. With nothing between them and the enemy, these
are called “outposts” (Feldwachen). They consist of infantry only in
dense forests, otherwise always of light cavalry.
6. Behind these outposts (Feldwachen) and between them and the chain of
posts, small supporting units are in the field, which are called soutiens.
They consist of infantry or cavalry; more or less, depending on the lay of
the land.
7. Behind the chain of posts of the brigades stands a considerable corps for
their support. These are the soutiens of the forward posts.
8. The soutiens of the forward posts and the forward posts themselves
together constitute the army avant-garde. Together they resist the
enemy to the extent afforded by their strength: in the best case compel-
ling the enemy to adopt its measures earlier, thus winning time for our
42 My Lectures on Small War
army to respond accordingly. If the terrain is so accessible [to the
enemy] that the resistance of the forward posts is insufficient, then
the rear units serve only as accommodation for the forward units.
9. Every brigade has its own commander, the whole chain of forward
posts a common higher commander; the general of the avant-garde
exercises total command and is positioned at the soutienes-corps.
10. The forward post system thus consists of three main parts:
10.1 The line of guards and their supporting troops; they are located in
the field.
10.2 The line of actual posts. These are in camps and quarters.
10.3 The supporting corps.
11. If we do not speak of an army, but rather a division, the supporting
corps is often lacking, and so is the division with its forward posts.
If we speak only of a detachment, the supporting corps and the chain of
posts are lacking, and the detachment itself takes up the position of the latter
and assumes its own guard.
12. Consequently, the first part of the whole forward post system is simul-
taneously the forward post system of a small detachment.
13. In addition to the forward posts the army deploys field and camp
guards in its vicinity. They:
13.1 Preserve order,
13.2 Provide greater security,
13.3 Accommodate the forward posts.
At one point the enemy could break through the chain of forward posts
unnoticed and suddenly approach the camp or the quarters. In this case the
camp and village guards protect against a regular attack.
14. According to our former rule, they are located close to the camp.
During the Prussian War, however, they were positioned approximate-
ly a quarter hour’s distance forward. Without doubt, they are thus more
useful and provide more security. If there is great danger and the
current forward post weak, then pickets, who otherwise remain on
call, deploy to support the camp and village guards.
15. The strength of the resistance provided by the forward positions varies
greatly. For one, this resistance depends on the strength of the forward
posts; for another, on the expanse of the terrain which they occupy; and
finally, on the size of the obstacles the terrain provides for their protection.
16. The resistance they offer, or more precisely the time lost to the enemy
fending them off, always must be sufficient to cover the army against an
attack.
Purpose and Organization of the Forward Posts 43
17. They achieve this goal mainly through compelling the enemy to ad-
vance with caution.
18. But if one can provide them with true defensive strength and if thereby
the security and the duration of their resistance increase, then the most
important advantages accrue to the army.
1. Freedom of movement. The army can march wherever other
circumstances allow.
2. It can avoid a battle.
3. It can defend itself offensively.
4. It can conceal its measures from the enemy.
5. It compels the enemy to develop his measures earlier both in time
and space.
6. Because he has to disperse the forward posts the day before and
encamp for the night, the enemy usually can only attack with weary
troops.
7. Finally, in many cases the enemy will have come to believe he has
survived the greatest difficulties at the moment he encounters the
army itself.
Among these advantages, 1 and 2 are of strategic importance for both the
offensive and the defensive. The remaining serve only tactical purposes and
mainly the defensive.
19. The reason for using light troops mainly for forward posts is found in
their composition and training, which is akin to battle in small groups,
or at least should be.
20. 1. The systematic composition of the forward posts provides the ad-
vantage of simplified service regulations.
2. The permanent organization has the following advantages.
2.1 The troops become better acquainted with their duties than if
they were to change.
2.2 There is no need for a new policy whenever a new situation arises.
3. The reason these posts comprise brigades from all service arms is
the same as for the arrangement of the army in divisions. In rare
cases the terrain will make the modification of this composition an
urgent necessity. If such cases arise, there is still enough time to take
the infantry or cavalry from another post. Moreover, at the time one
deploys the forward posts, one never knows enough about the area
to arrange the forces according to the terrain. If this is the case, then
use all you have.
4. One needs to have at least as many brigades as there are divisions of
the army. If the terrain is advantageous, one can break up twice as
many brigades.
44 My Lectures on Small War
5. Obedience to command is an essential issue. Therefore it is neces-
sary to have one commander for the whole chain of forward posts,
who can guarantee the necessary coherence of the whole, since the
general of the avant-garde, positioned with the soutien, is too far
away, and when the terrain is very large, one divides the forward
posts into districts, putting an officer in charge of each.
More about the composition and efficacy of a chain of forward posts will
follow. Beforehand, we will concern ourselves with two specific topics. The
first concerns the outposts (Feldwachen) and their soutiens, the other concerns
the small defensive posts. Both can be seen either as parts of the forward posts
system, or they can be analyzed separately.
REMARKS ABOUT TH E AIM AND NATURE
OF THE AVANT-GARDE
1. In our introduction we said that an army, in every position and quarter
as well as when on the march, is to be cordoned by a chain of light troops
against the enemy, which are called forward posts; that these are supported by
a corps of troops, which is called the soutien of the forward post; and that the
entirety is given the name avant-garde. However, what we here call an army is
either an army of modest strength, which is merely organized into divisions
(like ours) or a single army corps; but by no means a big army, which consists
of several army corps. Because of the large area, which by its nature it needs to
occupy, a big army cannot have a unified system of forward posts and in most
cases does not have a true corps of the avant-garde.
2. The question arises of which concept one commonly associates with
avant-garde?
It is a corps, which is positioned in front of the army, or when on the march,
precedes it in order to impede the advancing enemy, so that the army can
implement its measures. This is without a doubt the main idea one associates
with it.
In addition thereto, the avant-garde should fulfill the following aims,
1. To attack first.
2. To occupy a position faster than the army can reach it.
The first identified aim is evidenced first by the name itself, and second by
the fact that this aim is always present. That is, it gives rise to the need for the
corps in the first place.
On the Duties of the Forward Posts 45
The other two aims are sometimes present and sometimes not, hence other
corps may be designated thereto. Furthermore, every corps of the army can
fulfill the other two aims just as well as the avant-garde. There is, therefore, no
need for a specific organization. For the purpose of the forward post, however,
it is advantageous to avail oneself of a specific organization, namely small
brigades of light infantry and cavalry troops.
3. It follows then, that the corps that fulfills the first and main aim, namely
the forward posts and their support, truly deserve the name avant-garde. If in
other cases a division or a corps of the remaining army proceeds in order to
achieve the two additional aims identified, this is not really different from
every other particular use and employment of divisions and army corps, and
the term avant-garde is then used quite inappropriately.
4. If one speaks of a division or an army corps, then its avant-garde, that is
its forward posts and their support, can in many if not most cases also fulfill
the purpose of an earlier occupation of an area and the initial attack. This is
precisely the case when the army is not large, only subdivided into divisions,
and is concentrated in such a way that the avant-garde of their corps or
divisions constitutes an entirety.
If, however, the army is divided up into corps, each of these having its own
avant-garde, then the army is left without a general avant-garde. As was
mentioned earlier, with regard to security, this also is not necessary.
Consequently, when those secondary aims mentioned above arise, a specific
corps has to be designated.
5. If, in what follows, we speak of avant-garde, we do so in the first and true
sense, and our arguments can only be understood as they apply to this avant-
garde.
O N T HE DU T I E S OF TH E F O R W A R D P O S T S
}1
The surveillance of the enemy and the longest possible defense of their
appointed terrain is the purpose of the forward posts and the avant-garde.
The commander of the same must at all times keep this purpose in mind
and employ all means in his wherewithal to fulfill this aim. This demands
constant exertion and attention, that is much more activity than within the
army. Hence, the duties of the forward posts are more difficult than any other
and their service regulations and procedures more important and consequen-
tial than anywhere else.
46 My Lectures on Small War
}2
The principal aims, which should be reflected in the specific service regula-
tions include:
1. To provide every commander as fast as possible the necessary overview
of the status and conditions of his subordinate troops.
2. To subordinate, to the greatest extent possible, the surveillance and
defensive measures to the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief (gen-
eral of the avant-garde).
3. To control the vigilance and operation of the troops.
4. To maintain order and discipline.
5. To assure rapid communication and transmission of commands.
}3
Before we turn to the individual provisions, we must determine the chain of
subordinate commanders at the forward posts and through which the com-
mands and reports pass.
We have to mention that in general the number of subordinate command-
ers can just as well ease duties and warfare as it can make them more difficult.
In specific cases it is a matter for judgment.
One has to try to manage with as small a number of layers of command as
possible. In specific cases, however, one may have to ask oneself if an add-
itional layer will ease the cause.
Consequently, all guards positioned in the forward posts will be placed
directly under the command and supervision of the officer, who is in charge of
the entire post. Only if this officer finds it necessary to place some guards
under the supervision of a specific officer, for example because they are far
away and he cannot keep them within his sight, then this additional officer will
be appointed and placed between the guards and the post commander.
In normal cases, the post commanders constitute the first line of command.
They are followed usually by the commander of the forward post brigade. In
specific cases, for example, if one part of the brigade is far removed from the
other, the commander of the detachment will be placed under the commander
of the entire forward post line and thus there is one layer less.
Hence the brigadiers constitute the second layer of command.
The third is the overall commander of the forward post. He exists only when
the forward post consists of several brigades. If the army is not large, the
strength of the army corps or division consisting only of a forward post brigade,
then the respective brigadier is placed directly under the general of the avant-
First Reports 47
garde. In any case, this general of the avant-garde is the last and highest
authority, and receives his orders directly from the commanding general.
Hence: The post commander.
The brigadier.
The forward post commander.
The general of the avant-garde.
}4
The forward post commander is necessary because only he can assure the
cohesion of the individual posts of which a chain of forward posts consists.
This, however, requires that he visits them frequently. If one were to assign
this task to the general of the avant-garde, he too often would be absent; orders
coming from the main army would not be instantaneously transmitted and in
important cases this could lead to dangerous lapses.
The forward post commander is the one who draws together all the bits of
intelligence and observation of the enemy that are provided by the forward
posts. To this end he must be located within the chain of posts, frequently visit
the outposts, and more often approach the enemy in order to verify incoming
information. He is the eyes of the army.
The general of the avant-garde is granted supreme command over the entire
troops of the avant-garde and forward posts, he gives the necessary orders,
masses the troops, directs marches, etc. For this reason he must be located
with the soutien-corps.
If the commanding general entrusts the divisions of the avant-garde to the
most able and determined of his subordinate generals, then the latter shall in
the same way choose the most able, agile, and determined of his officers to
command all forward posts. There is no more important position in the entire
avant-garde.
The forward post commander could, by the way, be the commander of a
brigade, on whose side a deputy commander is assigned to command in his
absence. We now turn to the actual service regulations.
}5
FIRST REPORTS
As soon as a post commander arrives at his designated station, he regards
himself first and foremost as a patrol that has been sent to gather information
on the enemy. He will thus send out patrols of appropriate strength, which,
assuming one is not trying to remain concealed, move forward to the enemy
line in order to determine as precisely as possible where the enemy is located.
48 My Lectures on Small War
Whatever the patrol does not see with its own eyes it will learn from the
inhabitants, and regardless how little information it brings back, it neverthe-
less will on the one hand serve as guidance for the security measures that the
posts have to take, and on the other will be highly welcomed by the avant-
garde and the army. The post commander, as soon as he arrives at the location
of his post, immediately sends back a very short message on whether and
where he has found the enemy.
}6
When the detachment has arrived at its determined post, the commander will
survey the area in order to position the guards and soutiens in accordance with
the terrain, as well as is possible at this early stage. If the patrols have not
returned, the posts can be changed later if necessary in accordance with any
information they bring back.
Until this preliminary positioning of the guards is in place, the detachment
has to remain armed and ready.
If one arrives at night, without knowing the area and the position of the
enemy, then one has to settle for the very close placement of guards, in order
to assure first the most essential degree of security and thereby double its
vigilance.
The initial positioning of the guards will give the officer a first indication of
the means at his disposal for the defense of his post, for taking up his forward
posts, etc. Subsequently the officer submits his first written report.
He will include therein as many of these circumstances as is possible
without delaying its preparation. It will always include:
1. The information that has been gathered about the enemy.
2. The site and location of the post.
3. The guard line.
4. The contact, which does or does not exist to the next post.
5. Comments about the terrain. Whether it is forested or open, cut across
by valleys, etc.
This report usually can and must be submitted within the first hour after the
arrival of the post. It is to be sent to the brigadier.
The brigadier adds his own report to the incoming reports and sends them
all to the commander of the forward post and simultaneously to the general of
the avant-garde.
In most cases the general of the avant-garde will be informed within two to
three hours about the status and position of his forward post brigades and will
be able to issue a report to the commanding general.
In order for these first reports to arrive as soon as possible, the brigadiers, if
absent, have to designate an officer to receive them and once they have all
First Reports 49
arrived, to pass them on. It might be helpful to designate once and for all a
period of time after arrival at the post within which the reports must be sent
without consideration for any outstanding information. This creates no dis-
advantage other than that sometimes the first report will have to be followed
immediately by a second, for the fast and precise drafting of the report is of the
utmost importance.
}7
The overview provided in the initial hours to the general of the avant-garde
by the reports on the status of his forward post brigades will be supple-
mented and achieve greater reliability a few hours later by the forward post
commander. As soon as he has arrived, he surveys the entire chain of
forward posts, makes the necessary changes, and reports either in person
or in writing to the general of the avant-garde. In most cases it will be
helpful to report in person, as then he can discuss any number of issues
with the general of the avant-garde and immediately receive decisions on
his recommendations.
If the general of the avant-garde is not held up by important circumstances,
he will survey the chain of posts himself, and within a day at the latest, gain
rather complete knowledge about the entire line of forward posts, and thus be
able to take up position with the soutien-corps and take measures appropriate
to the specific situation.
To sustain this knowledge of the entire situation, the daily reports of the
brigades, which will be discussed below, indicate such changes as have
occurred.
This should suffice with regard to the first point raised in } 2.
}8
The first report submitted by the post commander probably will not entail the
provisions he has made and the description of the post’s circumstances. If the
forward post remains stationary, he will write a short memorandum on this to
the brigadier who in turn will forward it to the commander of the forward
posts. The latter will present these reports to the general of the avant-garde
and further discuss with him the measures taken.
From this, an overall plan emerges, the preparation of which has been
ordered by the general of the avant-garde. This is communicated in writing
to the commanders of the brigades and to the forward post commanders, to
the extent deemed necessary for their instruction. He will often keep this or
that idea to himself in order not to run the risk of betrayal.
Such provisions will land in the hands of the post commanders by the
second or third day at the latest, which in most cases is sufficient, because an
army is rarely attacked within the first two days of its arrival.
50 My Lectures on Small War
}9
Whatever happens within this time span—or whenever no such provisions
have been communicated—must be determined by general procedures that
the general of the avant-garde has provided to his forward posts. The prin-
ciples on which these procedures rest are part of the section devoted to the
ways in which the forward posts can be effective against the enemy and will be
taken up later.
} 10
As a consequence, it is most unlikely to be the case that an officer without orders
and without knowledge of the overall plan will be left to his own devices; in
which case he might well act like a sensible man and thereby fulfill his duty, but
not always do what is right and best for the situation. Men who are not very
determined easily become discouraged and behave irresolutely if it appears that
no one cares about them and what they do. By contrast, an officer who knows
that he acts in accordance with the thinking of his superiors will fulfill his duties
with eagerness and great courage even in difficult situations.
This is what we intended in the second point of } 2.
} 11
Vigilance is the main attribute of the forward post troops, amongst whom
discipline, without which vigilance is almost unthinkable, is most at risk. To
secure both through service regulations is therefore truly essential. Although
service regulations cannot compensate for deficits in the personal initiative of
the commander, they nevertheless serve to support this initiative and to
motivate the average man.
The vigilance consists primarily of three things,
the attentiveness of the outposts,
the diligent patrols, and
the readiness of the quarters and camps.
As regards the first two, the post commander can do nothing other than to
visit the guards often and at any time without notice. To increase the number
of these inspections, the post commander, if not lacking in officers, will
appoint one who in addition to himself oversees the vigilance of the forward
posts, an adjutant, who assumes responsibility for this matter.
The readiness of quarters and camps is one of degree.
1. At night the troops remain clothed in their quarters. A few men remain
awake in every quarter and in every quarter lights are left burning.
The cavalry is saddled.
2. When encamped, the troops are housed at night in alarm houses.
The cavalry in barns. Bridled.
First Reports 51
3. Everything remains under open skies. The cavalry demounted, the
infantry bearing their arms.
In most cases the post commander determines the degree of readiness. He
will not exhaust his troops without need, but he is responsible for the readiness
of his post if the enemy approaches.
The higher officer will determine whether the post’s readiness is sufficient
or whether he wishes it to be raised. This is especially the case for the forward
post commander and the brigadier who remain responsible for accidents
which result from negligence.
It is rarely the case that a subordinate officer demands a higher degree of
vigilance from his men than his superior. Should this occur, however, the later
will be reluctant to change the orders of the former. Rather, if such excesses
occur too frequently and the men thus appear too exhausted, he is more likely
to try to remove the anxious commander from his position entirely.
Ideally, the forward post commander will be responsible for the vigilance of
the aggregate: on the one hand because he has been invested with a special
trust; on the other because he is well suited to this task.
The forward post commander will thus precisely monitor the vigilance of
the individual posts and in particular their respective commanders, and report
back to the general of the avant-garde.
} 12
Since the troops shy away from every exertion and never have a clear under-
standing of the situation in which they find themselves, nothing is more
common than to see them complain about the timidity of their commanders
and even to become quite discontented. The older soldiers even tend to
cultivate a certain argument in this regard, so that at first glance one might
be impressed and inclined to think that one had requested too much and more
than is necessary.
Against this one cannot warn enough, especially with regard to our (north
German) troops. The officer is in every case better equipped to judge the
situation of his troop, and since he is responsible, has a much better standpoint
than the private, in any case better than the subordinate who usually only
thinks of his own bodily needs. The apparent wisdom and experience with
which the subordinates argue in such situations is usually false and upon
closer examination the entire argument simple-minded.
One must thus reckon with dissent and discontent and compel oneself from
the beginning to a strictness that comes naturally only to a few. As a conse-
quence, if the discontented have come to know the officer as strict and
implacable, he now impresses them with that ease with which they earlier
tried to control him.
(Comment)
52 My Lectures on Small War
(As a very young officer during a two-year campaign, I had more oppor-
tunities to make this observation than any other.11 Since then I have seen it in
the writings of Ewald,12 Emmerich,13 and many much-practiced officers and
thus conclude that even officers of great experience and reputation have
witnessed it.)
If one wants to insist with strictness on the execution of an order, it is of
course necessary to thoroughly consider in advance what it is one wishes to
command. On the one hand, so as not to demand impossible things, on the
other, so as not to waver if one discovers that one has commanded something
unnecessary.
There will seldom be a forward post at which one will not be compelled to
leave the men dressed in uniform at night. If this order is given, anyone who
neglects it must be punished with unwavering strictness, the quarters thus
inspected for this purpose.
This, as well as the second degree of readiness, are moreover efforts that can
be sustained by the troops for a very long time, because they are not thereby
entirely deprived of sleep. Even the second degree of readiness is not an
extraordinary sacrifice for a unit that has not marched the previous day,
since men can sleep and rest during daytime.
However, if one has completed a long march by day, only arriving in the
evening, it is impossible to remain under arms the entire night. In such cases,
one settles for a bivouac or leaves one component under arms while the other
rests.
} 13
What one demands from the subordinates one must first perform oneself. In
part to provide an example, but even more so because the commanding officer,
if he is quick, can issue orders in the first moment whereby everything else is
secured.
In most cases it is probably better if the entire assembly of troops lasts five
minutes longer than if the commanding officer were to come five minutes late.
11
Hahlweg notes that Clausewitz participated as a Cadet in the ranks of the 34th Prussian
Infantry Regiment in 1793–4 in the Rhine Campaign against France.
12
Johann v. Ewald (1744–1813) was a Military Officer and expert of partisan warfare. As
Captain of the Hessian Army, he participated in the American Revolutionary War. Upon his
return to Europe, he joined the Danish Army in which he served as Governor General of
Holstein during the Napoleonic Wars. Ewald wrote one of the first books on small wars in
1785 (Ewald 1798), and kept a journal during his time in North America (Ewald 1979).
13
Andreas Emmerich (1737–1809) was a Hessian forester and rifleman. After he had
participated in the Seven Years’ War, he was sent to North America and led his own unit of
light cavalry in the American Revolutionary War. On the basis of his experience, he wrote an
influential treatise The Partisan in War or the Use of a Corps of Light Troops to an Army
(Emmerich 1789), which was translated into German as Der Partheygänger im Kriege, oder der
Nutzen eines Corps leichter Truppen für eine Armee (Emmerich 1791).
First Reports 53
If he is the first to arrive, then the troops immediately can be deployed
according to purpose. Alarm and confusion can be avoided, and there will
be nowhere a lack of necessary orders.
The vigilance of the commanding officer during the night is thus an
essential quality; and whoever is unable to meet the necessary requirements,
must not serve as forward post.
This does not mean that a forward post officer has to keep guard regularly
during the night. But he must make arrangements so that he is one of the first
on the spot and in urgent cases he should keep guard himself. There are
enough means available to compensate him for this sacrifice and, in addition
to the abovementioned advantages, it produces amongst the soldiers great
confidence and great affection when they see that their officer guards them.
} 14
Just as the tendency towards comfort and sleep at night must be kept in check,
so too with absences from quarters and day leave.
Usually the soldier in the field has no other interest in leave than to procure
foodstuffs, and this matter captivates him above all others.
However, it is necessary to make arrangements appropriate to the circum-
stances in order to provide everyone with foodstuffs. If this has been accom-
plished, then the preferential treatment of individuals is unnecessary and
inconsequential, even if measures to secure foodstuffs prove inadequate.
Thus, such and indeed every leave of absence from the forward post
quarters must be strictly prohibited.
What is said for the private must also apply to the officer.
} 15
All other aspects of discipline are covered by the provisions of the ordinary
service regulations and thus are not considered further here. We must note,
however, that it is impossible to draft a regulation so general as to apply to
every single case. The commanding officer thus would be wrong simply to
assume that the regulations are effective with his subordinates. Rather he must
consider which directives of the internal service could be useful to him and
issue such directives.
} 16
We have already discussed in another place regulations within the quarters,
the allocation of duties among the officers, the location of alarm stations, etc. It
remains only to recall that when on forward post duty, special vigilance must
be directed toward spies. The most general rule is that nobody is to be allowed
to pass the vedettes and that nobody is tolerated in a forward post quarter who
is not a resident of the location. The Magistrate shall be made responsible for
suspicious individuals.
54 My Lectures on Small War
} 17
Generally, reports are distinguished in military terms from messages insofar as
the former entail news, whereas the latter notify that nothing has happened.
Notwithstanding that the latter seems to be self-evident even if no message
arrives, it is nevertheless necessary that one acquires certainty from time to
time because a message easily could have been lost.
The common village and camp guards provide their reports in the evening
and the morning, as is clear enough from the regulations and duty.
Morning hours are especially important for the forward posts, since most
plans are carried out in the morning. Therefore, immediately after sunrise, a
report to the posts from which they were sent is quite essential. This report will
be forwarded as soon as possible to the headquarters of the avant-garde and
simultaneously to the commanders of the forward posts. These reports are
drawn up on maps.
The latter reports to the general of the avant-garde, if possible in person.
The brigadiers are unable to do so because it is more important for them to
remain at their posts at all times.
In general, orders from headquarters are issued around midday.
Formerly, in our army, officers were sent by their respective corps for this
purpose. Today this not possible, because the officers no longer are mounted.
The orders, written under seal, are sent to the regiments by couriers, who in
and of themselves undoubtedly do not replace the former aide-de-camp
(Ordonanz) but are much preferable.
The commanding generals, however, often have an interest either in riding
to headquarters themselves to conduct necessary discussions or in sending an
officer of their general staff. These officers collect the necessary instructions
and the requested information about this or that issue from the commanding
general and the general staff.
At such occasions supply and other lists, requests, recommendations, etc.
are received. The post commander often submits these to the brigadier, and he
to the general of the avant-garde, so that the same envoy can bring back the
order of the day.
A written report on tactics is combined with this submission of lists, etc.
1. Every change of one’s own position.
2. Every new observation of the enemy.
3. Any skirmishes that have taken place.
4. The length and manner of supply of troop rations.
If nothing is to be said of these issues, the entire report consists of the
phrase:
“nothing has happened at the post (the brigade) NN.”
Rapid Transmission of Orders and Messages 55
This midday report, which of course often has to be sent several hours
earlier, is necessary because one often does not have the time needed to ensure
that the first early report is complete.
Only this report is sent to the forward post commander, and indeed early
enough so that he can take it with him to headquarters. This officer has
nothing to do with the supply lists etc.
Whether an evening report is so important that it cannot be omitted in
pursuit of minimizing superfluous communication, I don’t want to decide.
But even if it has not been generally implemented, nothing hinders us from
ordering it under exceptional circumstances. As a rule, reports would be sent
from the forward posts to the headquarters of the avant-garde and from there
to the general headquarters twice a day.
} 18
If an army, no matter how small it may be (army corps), is dispersed across
many miles in cantonments or encamped, it is quite necessary that the
forward post brigades simultaneously dispatch to the headquarters of their
corresponding division or brigade all the reports and messages, which they
send to the general of the avant-garde, for they would otherwise receive
such communications only after a long detour, namely from the general
headquarters.
} 19
RAPID TRANSMISSION OF ORDERS
A N D ME S S A G E S
The reports and messages that are sent from the small posts and corps to the
larger ones are submitted, insofar as individual officers have not been desig-
nated for the task, most appropriately through assigned liaisons (bleibende
Ordonanzen). The persons must be suitable to the task and the horses must
receive additional feed. The brigadier has three to four such soldiers, who can
also be used for other conveyances.
By contrast, the transmission of difficult commands, which are sent from
above, is accomplished most appropriately through couriers, who are sent
daily from the individual posts to the brigade quarters. This has the advantage
that the individuals know the way to their posts.
} 20
For long distances, which are common to quarters during winter, one resorts
to relays. Small cavalry commandos of three to four men are kept quartered in
56 My Lectures on Small War
houses no further than a mile apart; two of these must always be saddled up.14
If great punctuality is enforced strictly, even on the worst of roads a distance of
three miles can be traveled in one-and-a-half hours, which otherwise would be
impossible.
The hour of departure is noted on the letters that such couriers transmit,
with either “trot” or “walk” added.
} 21
Very rapid communications are carried out through signals.
It would be wrong to neglect them and to only avail oneself of the usual
means of notification.
The signals are:
1. Prepared. Beacons, flags, lanterns, etc.
2. Shots. 2.1 cannon shots. 2.2 rifle and pistol shots
3. Drums, horns, and trumpets
4. Bells
ON PICKETS AND THEIR S UPPORTING TROOPS: AS
FORWARD P OSTS OF SMALL DETACHMENTS
1. Pickets (Explanation)
}1
They usually consist of cavalry, more precisely, light cavalry. In rare cases,
namely if no cavalry is available, or where dense forests are to be occupied,
infantry guards are positioned toward the very front.
}2
A picket should never be positioned without a post at its rear to absorb it; or
unless a Piquet is held in quarters ready for action. Otherwise the picket would
be at too great a danger of being neutralized and dispersed.
(This is the forward post system of detachments; in the case of corps and
armies this is only a part of the whole.)
}3
The strength of the pickets is chiefly a function of the number of forward
posts, each consisting of six men, and the number of the forward posts
14
One Prussian mile was the equivalent of 7,532.48 meters.
On Pickets and their Supporting Troops 57
depends on the terrain, the darkness of the nights, etc. Under adverse condi-
tions one has to calculate one man per 100 paces of the line to be covered.
[...]
}4
If possible, the distance between the pickets should not exceed 2500 paces. For
in this case, the furthest forward posts are already 1500 paces from the guard
and at this distance one can barely hear a pistol shot, which is essential at
night. From } 3 and } 4 it follows that the individual pickets will have a
strength of 20–30 men; one should not make them weaker without grounds,
for stronger pickets can achieve more.
(During daylight hours they can be further apart, and at night one can
position intermediate posts if needed.)
}5
The distance of pickets from their post is usually 2000–3000 paces; in case of
close enemy proximity, shorter.
(We are speaking here about small detachments, which do not need as
much time as entire armies. But even in the case of the former, the pickets do
not always provide for the necessary security if the quarter is not yet ready,
since the enemy usually arrives along with them. If they can be bypassed,
safeguard distant pickets with intermediate posts.)
If the picket is positioned 2500 paces from the quarters, then the enemy will
be detected by night at a distance of 3000 paces from the quarter. If the enemy
covers this distance at a trot, then he will need approximately 10–12 minutes.
This provides the security that the quarters gain through the picket. This
interval (8 minutes after we deduct the time that has elapsed prior to the
alarm) is just enough for the cavalry, which is saddled but not bridled, to
mount. This is probably the shortest interval necessary for a troop that is
already fielded. An infantry quarter with a strong village guard constitutes an
exception.
}6
The distance between the forward posts and the picket must be such that they
are within sight and earshot of a pistol. If, at night, they are located no further
than 500–600 paces from the picket, then one has the advantage that they
cannot be neutralized.
Infantry sentinels are positioned at night at least 200 and no more than
400–500 paces from the picket.
}7
The positioning of the picket. Close to large paths, yet such that the picket is
concealed, or at least cannot be seen from a distance. A picket, which exists for
58 My Lectures on Small War
more than 24 hours, should never be positioned at the same place by night as it
was during the day.
}8
Forward posts are positioned on mountains, in defiles, paths, etc. At night, it is
easier to observe higher points from below than vice versa.
The forward posts also alter their positions at night. In rare cases, a picket
can entirely dispense with forward posts to its side and rear.
}9
Conduct of Pickets
Before an officer marches, he makes a record of his men, checks whether they
have the necessary ammunition, rations, and bread. As far as he himself is
concerned, a watch, a quill, ink, paper or maps, a lead pencil, and a telescope
are very useful.
} 10
Familiarity with the area is the most important issue. The officer, if he is
unfamiliar with the area, has a man brought to him from the next village, and
inquires about the essentials. Above all, he has to take note of:
1. The names of villages to his front and rear.
2. The main roads.
3. The location of bridges and fords.
} 11
Usually the forward posts are positioned by the post commander. If, however,
an officer sees a necessity for change, he improves the situation by stationing
an additional forward post and notifies the officer who was responsible for the
original stations.
} 12
Everything that approaches the chain of forward posts must come to a stop at
a distance. The forward post reports what has appeared through a man sent
back to the picket, which then dispatches a troop.
Emmerich15 describes a case in which he stood with a commando of
Hussars and riflemen in the year 1760 near Northeim. His position was
disclosed to the enemy, which wanted to neutralize him. The French attacked
15
See Emmerich (1791: 41–3).
On Pickets and their Supporting Troops 59
one of his forward posts with the aid of a farmer’s wagon, whereby three
Frenchmen were soldiers in disguise. In the meantime, Emmerich took note of
some noise, hurried back several hundred paces behind the fire only to
discover the enemy, who rushed the fire and plundered the knapsacks. He
descended upon them and captured nine men.
} 13
No enemy trumpeter or officer, so desiring, is allowed to be brought directly
into the headquarters. He must be taken to the guard blindfolded and wait
there until the officer receives orders from headquarters.
(General Ewald16 provides several examples, where English light troops
made use of envoys17 in order to gain information about the enemy post.)
If, however, the trumpeter or officer brings letters or captives they will be
accepted against receipt.
} 14
Messages
If nothing new has transpired, normal messages are sent to the post com-
mander who established the picket.
Exceptional messages are to be sent to this commander but simultaneously
to the commander of the forward posts, if there is one, and if the issue is
important, directly to the headquarters. Those posts that are directly affected
will be notified at the same time.
} 15
The format of messages. They must contain:
1. The time.
2. The location of the observation.
3. The name and rank of the reporting officer.
4. Who made the observation.
(This is very important because whoever receives the message can thereby
judge its degree of credibility; every message does not deserve the same
attention and very many contradict each other.)
5. The orientation.
6. The strength, etc.
16
On Ewald see footnote 12. Hahlweg refers to Ewald (1798), where he describes several
episodes from the American War of Independence.
17
Clausewitz uses the French term Parlementairs.
60 My Lectures on Small War
} 16
Passwords18 and watchwords19 are sent to the officer under seal. The password
is revealed only to the guard officer, the watchword is given to every forward
post and sentinel. Every forward post or sentinel will employ the watchword
for his own security. The officer discretely retrieves the password from arriving
troops by sending a non-commissioned officer to meet them.
(The watchword substitutes to a certain degree for the password, so that the
latter is not used too often and too easily betrayed.)
} 17
Conduct of Forward Posts
(One man is chosen to deliver the message, the other remains at his post
during the day for observation.) The men always have to keep their designated
position and may not dismount or communicate.
At night: If it is very dark or if the forward post is otherwise not visible from
afar, then the men are positioned one behind the other so that they are just
within sight of one another. The forward posts have to be addressed loudly so
that one can hear from a distance that something is approaching.
As soon as the forward post is suspicious with regard to whatever approaches,
it opens fire; one man hurries back to report, the other remains in the vicinity.
If a forward post is rapidly chased back by the enemy, he may not retreat
back to the picket. (During daylight hours, the forward posts should take care
not to reflect the sunlight with their rifles; during night, they should not draw
their caps over their ears.)
} 18
Vigilance of the Guards Themselves
By day, the pickets dismount; one half feeds the horses, the other has bridled
them. The horses are ridden to the watering hole one at a time.
In his treatise on the service of light troops, Ewald provides two examples
from the American War in which French officers fell upon pickets by daylight,
scattering them and capturing a few.
At night: one half is mounted, the other keeps the horses reined in and in
emergency near the enemy. If there is a danger of annihilation, the picket
changes its position.
18
Clausewitz uses the term Feldgeschrei whereby is meant an agreed-upon verbal signal,
usually a first name, which is used to distinguish friend from foe.
19
Clausewitz uses the term Losung. A Losung comprises a signal and an agreed-upon
response used to distinguish friend from foe.
On Pickets and their Supporting Troops 61
} 19
Retreat from the Enemy
Conduct in response to an approaching enemy.
Pickets are intended not to fight but to observe. During the day, this is not
difficult, since the picket can observe, communicate, and yet retreat without
engaging the enemy. During the night this is more difficult.
If, however, the picket is able to prevent the enemy from advancing too fast
by assaulting him, then this is one of its functions. Hence, I believe the
following rules to apply:
1. The picket only retreats when faced with a stronger enemy, but tries to
lure a weaker enemy into a trap.
2. A picket never retreats during the day so fast as to lose sight of the enemy.
3. If the picket is able to keep the enemy from advancing too rapidly by
assaulting him, this must be done with resolve.
4. If the picket retreats by night, it leaves flankers behind who continuously
deliver fire.
5. The retreat is accomplished in several squads, which support each other.
6. A detached squad never retreats directly toward the picket or the latter
directly toward the soutiens, unless the terrain compels it.
} 20
Retreat under Assault
If an officer is unlucky enough to be assaulted, there is no better choice than to
attack the enemy with the few he has with him. If he gains thereby some space,
then he wins time for the retreat.
} 21
Relief: Takes place 2 hours prior to sunrise and the old picket does not depart
until complete daylight.
} 22
Patrols that are sent by the picket can only be weak and cannot cover long
distances. They are intended:
1. To prepare the forward posts to guarantee their alertness and at the same
time to scan the terrain between them and the guard.
2. To detect the enemy earlier than could the forward posts, that is, to
approach him along his expected route.
62 My Lectures on Small War
(Their primary purpose is to gain information from the inhabitants. Since
they are weak, they can do little more. Larger patrols are sent by the soutiens or
the forward posts themselves.)
2. Support Posts of the Pickets
} 23
They are either already positioned or are kept ready in their quarters for
dispatch. Indeed, they deploy throughout the night, in which case they are
called Piquets.
The purpose of this rear cohort is:
1. To prevent the enemy from too rapid pursuit so that the pickets cannot
be annihilated.
2. To secure the pickets from being cut off or to at least to inform them of
this. They can just as well be composed of infantry or cavalry; if one has
both service arms at one’s disposal it is only a function of terrain.
(Infantry in defiles, woods, and in areas which are cut across by hedges.
Cavalry in the plain.)
A cannon, light or mounted artillery are very useful.
(A cannon shot usually repels light troops; one always can keep the enemy
at bay, which is always an important objective during retreats; one hears the
cannon shot in the rear . . . .)
(Piquets are less able to accomplish this than trained posts; this is why only
very weak detachments resort to piquets. If the pickets are very close, a piquet
is very natural. Concerning the manner in which such weak posts can stall the
enemy. Basic principles that follow for the assemblage.)
} 24
Positioning of the Supporting Posts
If possible:
1. Concealed.
2. To the side of the pickets.
3. At an appropriate distance.
} 25
Conduct of Supporting Posts
The cavalry is bridled and the horses reined.
For every picket that they are supposed to support, they have a reliable man
for information.
Preliminary Remarks 63
They place some posts between themselves and the pickets.
They provide for larger patrols.
} 26
The manner in which the pickets absorb them.
The infantry tries to keep the pursuing enemy at bay through considered
rifle fire.
The cavalry attacks resolutely in the flanks and the rear.
Concluding Remarks
The nature of pickets is twofold: first, one’s own security and the observation
of the area we hold; second, the defense of this area against enemy patrols and
against all too rapid advancement of enemy detachments.
The first objective is achieved by the forward posts, by patrols, by one’s
own vigilance, and changes in position and soutiens as rearguards. On its
own, each of these individual measures would not produce any great secur-
ity. Taken together, however, they are sufficient to defend against too many
mishaps.
The second objective is achieved through the deployment of the soutiens,
the use of the terrain, and a decisive assault in urgent circumstances . . . .
PREL IMINARY REMARKS
On the Defensive
1. If one restricts the concept of the defensive to absolute passivity, com-
plete nonsense would be a likely result. There would be two men fencing,
one always striking, the other, only parrying. There would be a kind of
war where only one side wages war.
2. Thus it is necessary to broaden the concept. How should we determine
its borders?
No doubt, the defensive must have its own advantages, for otherwise the
defensive would not exist; everyone would proceed offensively. Hence,
whatever one has said about the superiority of the offensive, there must
be some qualities of the defensive to keep it in the balance.
These can be no other than:
2.1 That one gains time by awaiting the enemy’s actions.
2.2 That one can fight the enemy in an area one knows well and is in a
position to prepare according to one’s own aims. With one word, that
one enjoys the support of the locality. If these are the main advantages
64 My Lectures on Small War
of the defensive, then one also can regard them as the chief charac-
teristics, according to which the concept is determined in general.
2.3 Thus, it is the defensive when I wait:
2.3.1 For the enemy to approach me; hereby the main purpose of
the defensive is sufficient.
2.3.2 For him to come close enough for me to use the locality to my
advantage. I can fight him here in whatever way pleases me.
The action always is to be called defensive.
The defensive is thus the combating of the enemy in my
theater of war or within my emplacement.
3. If we apply this to small defensive detachments, it then follows that every
type of formation that can be taken up within or behind their positions is
available for use against the enemy.
4. If one were to restrict small defensive posts to the merely passive, one
could indeed give precise reasons for doing so, namely that: (1) these
posts are usually calculated in terms of support; (2) in their area it is not a
matter of absolute resistance, but only of resistance for a certain dur-
ation, by which passive defense becomes possible. And in fact, passive
defense appears more often in Small War than in Large War, and even if
in most cases it does not have any great effect, it suffices for its intended
purpose. For very small detachments, however, there is almost never
natural coverage for the flanks and similar things, and nature does not
create small miniature positions for 500 men. Hence, even in Small War,
one has to rely primarily on the active defensive wherever a reasonably
meaningful resistance is desired.
5. Passive defense usually is restricted in Small War to very weak infantry
posts, which by means of their fire are intended to keep the enemy
cavalry at a distance; or which are deployed for the defense of entrench-
ments, defiles, and if necessary villages; or which are part of a forward
post chain and absorb the retreating pickets, forward posts, etc.
6. If more than a very precarious resistance is desired in situations where
the terrain is not very supportive, nothing remains but the offensive
defense, which in the case of a detachment can only consist of a sort of
ambush. In the case of an entire forward post corps, however, it consists
of combinations very skillfully adapted to the terrain.
7. What we here term defensive detachments or posts are all those detach-
ments that have the aim of fighting the enemy only after he enters
their area, that is, there where he cannot be tolerated. Also included
are those detachments that are only supposed to absorb forward posts,
prevent enemy reconnaissance, etc. By contrast, we will not speak
here about those posts that mainly deal with the art of entrenchment.
On Small Defensive Posts 65
This issue is handled in every book and it can be dealt with according to
certain rules. Here it will be more important to subject those issues to
healthy common sense, that in the absence of great technical reinforcing
measures are by virtue of natural circumstances primary and essential.
FOURTH CHAPTER
On Small Defensive Posts, Primarily in Forward Post Warfare
}1
The actual forward post chain of an army, that is, those points where the
brigades are stationed, is in fact a line of defensive posts, which do not,
however, act absolutely defensively but also offensively in order to achieve
the purpose of defense. In this regard, even the cavalry is pertinent.
}2
Alone the infantry belongs to literal or passive defense. However, the defensive
purpose in general also can be achieved by the cavalry, although to a lesser
extent. Cavalry is able to absorb the forward posts; cavalry can prevent the
advance of enemy patrols and reconnaissance; cavalry can, in emergencies,
defend a defile, although here infantry and artillery perform better. In rough
but accessible regions, both services combined are most suitable.
}3
In addition to the forward post and winter positions, such small defensive
posts often are used for other purposes. Where they are not part of an entire
chain, but rather isolated, they have to defend a specific location: a bridge, a
depot, a mountain pass, etc.
}4
Although in the last ten to twenty years one has abandoned cordon warfare
and many have inveighed against it, there are yet cases where post and cordon
warfare is unavoidable. Namely:
1. If weak detachments occupy mountains,
2. If two armies want to secure their lines through mountains.
Example: The French Danube Army under Masséna20 stood with its core
positioned on mount Albis behind Zurich and had occupied the river Limmat
20
Clausewitz refers to the Army of the Danube which was a field army of the First French
Republic. After its defeat in the battle of Ostrach (March 21, 1799), the Army was reorganized
66 My Lectures on Small War
to the Rhine and the river Aar for a stretch of five miles. In the Frikthal, along
the Rhine, one corps was positioned as a link between the core and the left
flank. The left flank stood near Basel. The right flank under Lecourbe was
spread out four to five miles between Lake Lucerne, Lake Zug, and the river Sill
up to mount Albis. For the purpose of linking with Italy, one corps stood in the
Valais. The Austrians under Archduke Charles stood opposite to this position
equally spread out.
In this type of post chain a large number of defensive posts exist. They do
not, however, belong to Small War proper, for the defense of mountains yet
could be a matter for Large War. In addition, they differentiate themselves
from the defensive positions of forward posts insofar as they aim for absolute
defense. Thus, they are covered here only to the extent that what is said about
small posts in Small War is applicable.
}5
As regards the defensive posts in Small War, one or more of the following
goals is present.
1. To hold the position, that is to secure the army’s way through it. This
applies mainly to bridges and other water crossings.
2. To merely defend the position or to prevent the enemy army from
advancing through it, namely:
2.1 The troops should defend the position until help arrives from the rear.
2.2 One should defend the position as long as troops are returning from
the front.
2.3 One should defend the position only for as long as is required for the
army to gather arms, etc.
Sometimes the nature of the aforementioned goals has some influence on
the defensive measures.
}6
Regardless of the purpose envisaged, a supportive terrain is almost always
necessary. In a completely clear and flat area, one can at most deploy cavalry
for these goals, and their actions would be quite simple.
Thus, the terrain must afford some cover or an entrenchment must exist.
We will not deal with entrenchments here.
}7
On the defense of natural geographic barriers. These are:
and participated under the command of André Masséna (1759–1817) in the Battle of Winterthur
and the First and Second Battles of Zurich. The Army was disbanded in November 1799 and its
units integrated into other French field armies.
On Small Defensive Posts 67
1. Defiles.
1.1 Rivers and swamps, which are otherwise not passable, across which a
bridge or a dam leads.
1.2 Swamps and rivers, which can be passed without a dam.
1.3 Mountain defiles.
2. Villages and individual houses.
3. Woods.
4. Other rough but accessible areas.
1. Defiles
}8
The defense of defiles is a common task for small defensive posts. The effect
can be quite different depending on the circumstances. If the defile cannot be
bypassed and is quite large (more than 100 paces), and one has had time to
prepare, a few men can achieve quite a lot. If circumstances are different, the
post can be lost in the first moment.
}9
Two perspectives can and must be considered here. If one is responsible for
defending such a position oneself, one should look for opportunities to achieve
something extraordinary through determination and appropriate measures, in
order to make a name for oneself, even under adverse conditions. History
provides many examples of such opportunities.
(Concerning willingness and defiance in war.)
It is different if one has delegated the task to someone else. Then one has to
consider the large number of cases in which under the best of circumstances
little has been achieved. Among the most dangerous delusions is the belief
that, when designing and deploying a forward post system or a defense, a
certain area is so advantageous that some 100 men can hold up an entire army.
} 1021
Examples: 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th from the file.22
21
At this point we follow the second numeration of paragraphs found in Clausewitz’s lecture
notes, which also contain errors of numeration. For example, paragraph 12 is followed by a
paragraph numbered 14, with no paragraph 13 appearing in the original text. We have left out
some paragraphs that contain cryptic references to historical examples and literature. Presum-
ably Clausewitz spoke from these notes extemporaneously.
22
Clausewitz maintained a collection of examples and illustrations on issues relating to Small
War taken from his readings and experience that are available at the Universitäts- und Land-
esbibliothek Münster (Clausewitz 1810). These were also used by Hahlweg (1966–90: vol. 1,
529–99).
68 My Lectures on Small War
} 11
Example of Limburg.
} 12
The means of defending an otherwise inaccessible defile are the following:
1. One tries to adopt measures to close off the defile, as soon as one’s troops
have passed.
Barbed Wire
Barriers
Wagons
Pyres
Planks
Powder Barrels
Grenades
2. One lays the path beyond the defile in such a way that the retreat of one’s
own troops does not lead directly back to it.
This is always the main difficulty. Sometimes, strong determination can
help. Example: Major Ziehen at Bentheim.23
3. One places the cannons just behind the defile; or if it is long, also on top
of it. If there are no cannons, the infantry has to close off the defile.
4. One places the infantry along the side of the defile and allows them to
shoot individually, under cover of terrain.
5. Wherever possible one takes measures for troops and parapets, because
otherwise they could be easily dislodged by enemy fire.
6. One places the troops in front of the defile (this is a very dangerous
measure, which should only be adopted in cases of urgent need). Such
cases can only emerge if the length of the defile and the locality do not
allow for its defense from the other side, and one has to accommodate
cavalry.
} 14 [sic!]
In all these cases the cavalry can do nothing other than to deploy in a
concealed fashion behind the defile in order to attack the enemy if it passes.
} 15
The so-called claiming of a defile is quite a different matter.
This mainly occurs if an army or corps wants to make use of the defile and a
detachment occupies it as an av[ante]-g[arde] so that the enemy cannot
contest its passage.
23
Clausewitz’s elaboration of the example can be found in Hahlweg (1966–90: vol. 1, 581).
On Small Defensive Posts 69
1. If the occupation occurs earlier, then there is no question regarding what
is to be done. One entrenches behind it and establishes a sort of
bridgehead.
2. If there is not enough time to entrench and if the terrain beyond is not
suitable for defense, and if the detachment is likely to be attacked, it
should occupy the terrain beyond the defile, but position its forward
posts far ahead, so as to be informed in a timely fashion of the arrival and
strength of the enemy, and if he approaches with decisive superiority, to
be able to retreat behind the defile. If the army itself has arrived at the
defile, the situation is no longer any different from every other battle.
Hence, the detachment, because of the close support can take some risks.
} 16
If there are several crossings or fords and one is concerned about the flanks,
one takes the measures above, but positions, if one is not altogether too weak,
part of one’s troops concealed to the rear. This is ideally the cavalry.
Or:
If one is very weak, one remains hidden with the entire detachment until the
decisive moment, in which, through an unexpected action, one achieves more.
} 17
Example:
The battle near Thein. Example Sheet No. 3.24
} 18
The battle near Audenroy upon the Dommel. File Sheet 2.25
MOUNTAIN DEFILES
} 19
They are as different as River and Morass Defiles. If the face of the mountain is
very steep, the defile narrow, and the road wide, then the defile itself must be
occupied with troops and artillery; and in case one is weak, one occupies it
with all of one’s forces. When it comes to ordinary defiles, where the moun-
tains right and left are still passable, the road is very curved, and it is not
24
See Hahlweg (1966–90: vol. 1, 472 ff.).
25
This must refer to additional lecture notes prepared by Clausewitz. The referenced sheet
does not appear in the Hahlweg collection.
70 My Lectures on Small War
possible to man the entire length, then one positions oneself in part or entirely
on the most inaccessible heights. Here one is secure from the first assault; one
can weaken the enemy through fire and then retreat through the mountain
valleys if the danger of being cut off grows too great.
} 20
Most mountain accesses are extremely difficult to defend. Almost everywhere
the enemy is able to circumvent the small established posts, and the posts are
seldom able to expand to such an extent as to use a rearguard to circle behind
that part of the enemy troops that is circling around it. Therefore it is
extremely dangerous to place oneself with the entire detachment in the middle
of the defile. In any event, not much is won thereby, because the streets are
usually so windy that it makes shooting difficult. At least the Tyroleans do not
appear to have done so.26
It is more effective to position the entire detachment sidelong on one of the
least accessible heights. Then one is secure from being overrun in the first
assault, the men are not fearful and one is able for a relatively long period to
weaken the enemy by fire. The enemy will try to circumvent us at accessible
locations. However, since the danger of being cut off with an infantry in the
mountains is not that great, one can wait until the enemy’s attempt to
circumvent, thereby gaining time. The enemy does not always adopt the
quickest and most powerful means. In the beginning he will try to dislodge
us by fire and since this will have little effect, will allow his troops to press
forward against our mountain ridge. Under such conditions, one can fire
about for hours without much effect. The defender is the one who thereby
gains time, and when at last he is almost circumvented, he can try to escape
through the mountains.
} 21
It is much easier to be circumvented on the street. As soon as the enemy
deploys something right or left of position one has to make a move. Admit-
tedly, one has the advantage that one can retreat faster than the enemy can
approach from off road. But, in such areas, the roads are so windy that the
danger of being cut off is nevertheless great.
} 22
The artificial means that are used to enhance such positions are entrench-
ments and abatises. If there was time to employ these means, the defense is
much stronger. The following points, however, are important:
26
Clausewitz refers to the Tyrolean rebellion in 1809, a peasant uprising led by Andreas
Hofer against French and Bavarian troops.
On Small Defensive Posts 71
1. Abatises and other obstacles if possible within the range of fire, otherwise
they are removed easily.
2. Entrenchments with a steep profile, otherwise they are easily climbed.
3. The entrenchment must defend a considerable span of the road with
close fire.
4. It must not be too easy to see.
5. In such a situation, every consideration of retreat must be abandoned
and a battle over life and death engaged.
} 23
We are speaking here about positions that are very small, at most 1000 or 1500
men strong. A larger detachment has other means at its disposal in the
disposition and combination of offense and defense, etc. Such detachments,
however, no longer belong to Small Wars.
Example:
} 24
A battalion of riflemen and fusiliers, 500 men strong, has to defend the
Engadin Valley in the region of Scamfs.
1. If it only has to accommodate troops that are retreating along this way,
one will deploy the battalion in front of Scamfs, positioning them behind
the narrowest point, with a number of good shooters to be placed on the
knoll to the left along the way.
2. If the battalion is to defend the pass at any price until support arrives; it is
better to position oneself in Scamfs or Zulz or in an entrenchment close
to the road so as to increase the obstacles to entry as much as possible
and to give up every idea of retreat.
(Regarding the Position and Shape of the Entrenchment)
3. The Detachment should defend the position for a certain time, just
impeding the enemy’s passage. However, since it is uncertain whether
it can be reinforced, it must keep open the possibility of retreat. In
detachment wars, this is most common in the mountains. Several
kinds of formation are possible:
3.1. Such a position can be taken up along the path where it is most
narrow, for example near Capella. The mountain face to the left and
the chasm to the right are so steep that no infantryman could climb
them, and therefore the battalion would have to be circumvented at
great distance. Otherwise the defense would last only a quarter of an
72 My Lectures on Small War
hour because the enemy would circumvent us close to the road with
a number of snipers who would fire at our rear and attack, and since
there would be no room for quick maneuvers here, one probably
would be overtaken quickly.
3.2. On the road or close to it in front of Scamfs. This would be the way
in which an ordinary infantry battalion would behave.
(Advantages and Disadvantages of Such a Position)
3.3. Finally one positions oneself alongside the road in the least access-
ible part of the mountains, for example behind Capella; the precon-
dition is that one is without artillery. This is the way the Tyrolean
insurgents would do it, and this is without doubt the best one can
do. But one has to be close enough to the road to strafe it with
effective fire.
If one has cannons, they must remain on the street and consequently a
number of troops. In this case, only half or a third of the infantry can be placed
on the hillside.
} 25
The following example demonstrates how little one can count on the difficul-
ties nature places before the attacker.27 In the campaign of 1799 General
Loison had to surmount a huge mountain peak covered with 1½ feet of
snow with a battalion and then slide down an abyss of more than 100 fathoms
on the other side in order to attack the position of Martins Brücke and
Finstermüntz from the rear, which was also under attack from General
Lecourbe. In this very campaign, a French detachment of Lecourbe’s division
near Scharl in the Engadin Valley was circumvented by 1½ companies of
infantry and a few riflemen by way of an alpine peak, which they could pass
only with the aid of climbing irons, after which they fell upon the backside of
the French in an avalanche, taking the position.
One sees then that even as nature increases her obstacles, human efforts to
overcome them likewise increase.
} 26
It is true that chains of mountain posts have altogether little effect; almost
every general assault destroys their artificial construction, setting back the
whole venture. We saw this only recently in the campaign of 1799, where the
Austrians and French dislodged each other in the highest mountain ranges of
Switzerland without great difficulty. However, this is only true for the entire
27
Clausewitz refers to an incident during the War of the Second Coalition (1798–1802)
between revolutionary France and the European monarchies, led by Britain, Austria, and Russia.
On Small Defensive Posts 73
chain. With regard to individual positions as long as they are not taken in the
rear by columns advancing from left and right, their resistance is strong
enough to last for a half or whole day, an effect that is very important for a
small detachment. Thus, if one does not improperly use these small defensive
positions for great aims, and for example limits their use to forward post
chains or wars of small parties, one can be satisfied with what they accomplish
and gain great benefits therefrom.
2. Woods
} 27
Up to now, forests were regarded as natural obstacles that enhance small
defensive positions; but we know the danger which they entail. Previously they
were treated the same as any river or morass.
} 28
Advantages which woods offer:
1. If one is positioned on the edge of the woods facing the enemy, one is
covered and the enemy is not. He is unaware of our preparations.
2. Through the use of abatises one can now and then gain a measure of
security.
3. The battle cannot be decided by the cavalry, and therefore not quickly;
and if one is not at all able to hold a position, one nevertheless gains time
by retreating slowly.
} 29
Disadvantages:
By contrast, the danger of being circumvented and of other surprises is greater
than in the plain, because one cannot see what is around.
} 30
In woods, one usually only deploys the infantry. Nevertheless, the following
items should be kept in mind:
1. Chance can also lead the cavalry into the woods.
2. In a sparsely wooded forest, light cavalry can be used with great success.
3. An infantry post must never be left without some cavalrymen who are
indispensable for reporting, reconnaissance, etc.
74 My Lectures on Small War
} 31
If one is positioned in a wood and does not enjoy the advantages conveyed by
barriers to access, one does not position everyone at one point only, but a
portion laterally to the rear. Thus, one obtains the means to attack the enemy
unexpectedly and to avoid being cut off. (Lake Plötzen example.)28
(Some remarks about battle in rough and mountainous terrain. Here it is no
longer the bellicose nature of troops or the skill of the commander and the
training of the troops that counts.)
} 32
If in individual battles our troops did not excel, one might forgo looking for
woods in which to erect defensive positions. However, one has to occupy them
for more important reasons. A forest ahead of the front or on the flank may
never go unoccupied. Even if a forward post chain in the woods would be
much weaker than on the other side, it must nevertheless be deployed.
For this reason it is often the case. Specifically in forward post wars, small
detachments of infantry are very often deployed along the way to man forward
positions without any other obstacles of terrain providing for cover. For such
cases, the abovementioned rule is important.
3. Small Towns, Villages, and Houses
} 33a
Sometimes the strength of a locality, its defensibility in connection with its
location, is the reason why it is occupied and defended. Sometimes the locality
is only chosen for the deployment of a small defensive position because no
better barrier of terrain was available. Finally, the location is just a quarter for
encampment, in which the occupying troops offer only as much resistance as
is necessary to avoid being dispersed by enemy patrols and to accommodate
returning forward posts.
These different cases will be considered in what follows.
} 33b
The difficulties arising from the defense of towns, villages, and houses, etc. are
not to be misjudged.
1. If no defile is connected, they easily are circumvented and then any idea
of retreat must be abandoned.
28
See Hahlweg (1966–90: vol. 1, 505 ff.).
On Small Defensive Posts 75
2. Most localities are much too expansive to be occupied in a proper
fashion. Yet, history provides many examples in which under seemingly
unfavorable conditions very much was accomplished.
} 34
1. One should accommodate only the most forward troops and retreat in
the face of an overwhelmingly superior enemy.
In this case one should occupy the locality, as long as it is not a defile but can
be circumvented, with only one detachment and position oneself to the side
or rear.
2. One should hold out until reinforcement arrives.
If the locality is to some degree defensible, if it has walls or trenches etc.,
then one takes up position, observes the walls by means of sentinels, brings the
guns into position at the gates (only in rare cases can the guns be used to fire
on the enemy at a distance) and assembles the garrison at one or two points in
order to advance against the enemy wherever it attacks.
} 35
If the locality that is to be defended cannot be held, then one hides in
individual buildings, such as churches, palaces, manor houses, etc.
If the locality affords no such positions, nothing else remains than to deploy to
cover outside, leaving behind a detachment and waiting for further developments.
} 36
Regarding the defense of individual houses, churches, palaces, etc. there is little
objective that can be said. Those who steadfastly stick to the rules of engin-
eering textbooks of course will not think very highly of these means. But
experience shows by way of many nice examples, that it is possible in such
circumstances to make a big name for oneself. Even if those who set up such
positions must believe in the ease with which, according to the rules, they can
be overrun, so as not to expect too much from them, so too must those who
find themselves within these positions believe in the possibility, through
determination and sacrifice, to become useful and to distinguish themselves.
} 37
Examples:
1. The example of Charles XII in Turkey is well known.29
29
Charles XII, King of Sweden (1697–1718). During his exile in Turkey, the Swedish colony
in Bender was attacked by a mob and Turkish elite infantry soldiers (Janissaries) took the
Swedish King prisoner in 1713.
76 My Lectures on Small War
2. The Marshal of Saxony defended himself in the year 1715 with 18 men
against 800 Poles in a house for an entire day and broke out by night.30
3. In the war between Charles-Gustav, King of Sweden,31 and Casimir,
King of Poland,32 five months before the battle of Warsaw, a Swedish Lt.
Colonel Aschenberg was sent to the town of Radom with 300 horsemen.
He encamped for the night in a noble estate named Sakersau. In the
morning, when he was ready to depart, 1500 Poles broke into the village
and he was compelled to defend himself at the estate. The enemy had no
cannons; there were only three entrances, namely two gates, which led
into the courtyard and the house door. The courtyard was surrounded by
a wall; the entryways were barricaded in haste with beams, through
which hand to hand fighting could be avoided. A firefight ensued and
after this had lasted a certain time and parts of the buildings were burned
down, the Swedes dashed against the Poles and fought their way
through. They even took prisoners and captured an enemy standard.
4. Often the enemy does not know how weak the garrison is. King Sobiesky
of Poland33 fired upon a small village Nemiszi, in which no more than 19
riflemen were positioned, for four days.
5. 60 Hanoverian riflemen defended themselves during the 7 Years’ War
for an entire day in the fortified Palace Friedewald against a large corps
under General Stainville.
6. 1. In the year 1759 the allied army of Cassel advanced against Bergen.
During this march, the column of the Duke of Holstein came across
the mountain castle Ulrichstein, in which 400 men were said to be
located.
2. When, during the campaign of 1794, the Observation Army advanced on
St Winox across the mountains, a small location called Esselbeck was
attacked by a battalion of grenadiers under Captain Hotze. He conquered
the town in which a palace was located. Immediately thereafter, the men
dispersed in order to plunder. The French returned and attacked the
Germans. A heated battle ensued in the streets. The Germans were driven
out again. A corporal with 14 men was left behind in a wine cellar, and
when he found the streets full of Frenchmen, he retreated with his men to
the palace. He pulled up the bridge and occupied with his 14 men both
towers. As soon as the French approached, he gave fire; and as evening
was approaching, he remained in his position until the next morning and
then was liberated by the allies [see Figure 3].
30
Moritz, Count of Saxony, later Marshall of France (1696–1750), natural son of August the
Strong and Aurora of Königsmark.
31
Charles X, King of Sweden (1622–60).
32
John II Casimir, King of Poland (1609–72).
33
John III Sobieski, King of Poland (1624–96).
On Small Defensive Posts 77
Figure 3. Defensive Occupation of Palace Towers.
Source: Clausewitz (1810: 101v.) Copyright © Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster,
N. Clausewitz 4,001.
7. In 1777, during the American War, General Washington34 wanted to
attack the English army under Lord Howe,35 which was located two
hours from Philadelphia. After forced marches General Washington
suddenly approached, fell upon the right flank, dispersed the light
infantry, which was positioned a half-hour forward, and would have
attacked the army if Lt. Colonel Mousgrave, who had remained behind
with three companies as soutien near Tews’ country house, had not
retreated into the house with the firm determination to sacrifice himself.
In haste, he blocked the entryways with tables and chairs and defended
himself with such persistence that General Washington, who had fas-
tened onto this position, was delayed until the English army arrived,
attacked the Americans, and defeated them.
8. Lieutenant Gauvain of the fusilier battalion defended himself with 35
men on the 20th of March 1793 on the Goldfels near Stromberg for a
half-day against 700–800 Frenchmen.
(Some remarks about the dangers of such a defense and the nature of
attacking such positions. Ewald’s rule to never ask for advice.)
} 38
Whatever the ends or objectives with regard to defending a locality and
whatever the means one wishes to apply, the following issues are important:
1. To be informed early about the advance of the enemy.
2. To quickly take position.
34
George Washington (1732–99), Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army 1775–83
and first President of the United States 1789–97.
35
Willliam Howe, Fifth Viscount Howe (1729–1814), British General and Commander of the
English troops against the Americans 1775–8.
78 My Lectures on Small War
The chief concerns of an officer who mans such positions are thus the following:
1. Security vis-à-vis the enemy, therefore the deployment of forward posts.
Here the rule is never to believe your rear is secure. (Example of Hoya36)
2. Barriers to access, mainly blocking of entries to villages. One should
never neglect this, even if very few means are available.
3. A certain policing. It provides for order and security from within.
One delegates the supervision to one of the most highly regarded inhab-
itants and makes him responsible.
4. An adequate allocation of quarters. At night one either remains under
arms or one stays together in some houses or fully dressed in quarters.
Furthermore, in every quarter someone must hold guard.
5. An adequate allocation of duties. An officer is commander of the forward
posts; he must be responsible for their vigilance. A second supervises the
police; a third the distribution of foodstuffs and the allocation of quarters, etc.
(Reasons why such arrangements are better than giving orders one after
another.)
6. Determination of alarm stations. Here the following rules apply:
6.1 For companies in the precinct.
6.2 For the entire unit, if one does not want to stay in the locality, if
possible outside of the village.
6.3 No unnecessary distances; that is, if it is not especially necessary, no
specific alarm stations for battalions but only for companies and the
entire unit.
6.4 The alarm stations must be chosen with regard to function, namely,
the retreat, if this is the main purpose.
6.5 If one has cannons but does not want to defend the locality, then
these are brought to the alarm station to be guarded.
6.6 Cavalry has to have its alarm station whenever possible outside of
the village.
6.7 If possible, cavalry and infantry should not cross paths on the way to
their respective alarm stations.
} 39
Very often one has erected entrenchments near localities that could not defend
themselves, be it in order to provide at least some defense of the position
36
Town in Northern Germany where, according to Scharnhorst, French troops under
General Chabot lost a secure position due to false reliance on forward posts in the winter of
1757/8.
On Small Defensive Posts 79
through such entrenchments, or just to provide a secure place for assembling
the garrison where they can await the return of their forward posts. Such
entrenchments are called place d’armes.
1. If the point itself is to be defended by the entrenchment, then the locality
is secondary, the troops have occupied it merely for their convenience.
But this is not the issue here.
2. If, however, the entrenchment is merely meant to be an assembly point
for the troops in which they await the return of their forward posts, then
it has to be noted that this is a very dangerous measure. If the point at
which one wants to assemble and line up is determined by the entrench-
ment, then the enemy will move against this point. And since the
entrenchment manned only with a weak guard rarely offers resistance,
the enemy will take it before or while the garrison occupies it. (Example
of the entrenchment of Mosbach near Mainz37).
} 40
38
All partisans also regard the following as important:
1. To make friends amongst the inhabitants of the locality through cordial
behavior.
2. To maintain a determined but calm attitude toward them.
3. To draw on them for information. (Ewald39 himself advises that if
informants cannot be found in enemy territory, one should compel
them in a sense, and make the principals of the village responsible for it.)
} 41
Although cavalry is never used to defend a locality, in connection with the
infantry it can contribute by chance or purpose to its defense.
Thus it will be deployed outside the locality.
1. To fall upon the enemy as soon as he attacks and to assault his flank
and rear.
37
The entrenchment at Mosbach was attacked only days before Mainz capitulated October
21, 1792.
38
In Clausewitz’s time, the term Parthey (sometimes written Partei) generally referred to a
band of armed fighters. The terms Partheygänger (sometimes written Partheigänger) and
Partisan, translated here as “partisan” referred to their leader. See Rink (2006: 360). Clausewitz’s
definition of the terms appears below.
39
See Ewald (1790: 45).
80 My Lectures on Small War
2. For small unit chases through the streets where people are shooting at
each other.
4. Varied But Nonetheless Accessible Terrain
} 42
Little can be said here about defensive measures as such. They are always very
weak. Gardens, trenches, and hedges are obstacles that can be easily circum-
vented or broken through. The less that can be said in such cases about
defensive measures as such, the more we must apply what has been said in
the chapters above regarding the planning and conduct of defensive battles.
Offensive defense is absolutely essential if the battle is to be anything more
than a slow retreat.
} 43
Such features as accessible mountains, rivers, morasses, villages, trenches,
woods, hedges, gardens, etc. etc. do provide some cover against the first assault
and allow any number of combinations; advantages which one would have to
do without in completely flat lands. One quite correctly favors such areas over
flat lands for the deployment of small defensive posts.
SOME ADDITIONAL RULES FOR
THE E NTI RE UNI T
} 44
If one arrives at a position during the night and does not know the area, then
one remains at arms, deploys sentinels around oneself, and sends patrols to the
villages closest to the enemy to collect information.
} 45
The measures taken up at defensive posts, of which we have heretofore spoken,
differ from one another in part according to the objective of the post. The
officer assigned to such posts must therefore first know the objective. If it is not
clear from his instructions, he is well advised to ask. In many, if not most, cases
the objective of the post is quickly revealed by the location and other circum-
stances, as long as one examines these without preconceived ideas.
Some Additional Rules for the Entire Unit 81
On the Use of the Art of Entrenchment with Regard
to Defensive Posts
}1
The art of entrenchment is taught separately. It does not belong here. But
because it so closely touches upon the former chapter, and since we have
availed ourselves of it in the cases just examined, it will nevertheless be an
element of our instruction at least to link our analysis to the art of entrench-
ment as such, and to use the latter for the analysis of our cases.
}2
The advantages of entrenchments are:
1. To shield oneself against continuing fire.
2. To defend against the force of the assault (bayonet assault).
Both measures require small posts, especially when facing a superior enemy.
There is no doubt that in this way a small troop can gain the capabilities for
strong resistance. On this, a few additional remarks.
}3
The disadvantages of entrenchments are:
1. One cannot attack the enemy unexpectedly.
2. In most cases one has to forego the idea of retreat.
}4
Obstacles to entrenchments are:
1. Insufficient time.
2. The terrain. Rocks. Woods. Morasses.
3. Too few men for defense.
4. Uneven terrain.
5. Too steep a camber.
Elaboration of these points.
6. Ease of circumventing the position of the entrenchment.
}5
The most difficult aspect of application is found in weighing the advantages
and disadvantages and in choosing the best option.
82 My Lectures on Small War
} 3 [sic!]
When located behind a causeway that cannot be circumvented, then without a
doubt, an entrenchment that provides cover against superior fire conveys great
advantage. Here, this advantage is the only objective. Under such conditions
one erects open rather than closed structures, because if they by chance are
lost, we easily can take them back from the enemy. This, by the way, is almost
the only case for which open structures are advisable.
} 4 [sic!]
If the causeway can be circumvented, the entrenchment must in every case be
closed. But then the problem arises that one is often too weak and suffers from
the disadvantage that no retreat is possible. Both must be accepted if holding
the position is essential and the area does not provide for any further cover.
A steep profile can correct for the first disadvantage.
} 5 [sic!]
In the mountains, entrenchments are essential for the defense of passes, when
enemy columns cannot circumvent the point in the road somewhere nearby. If
they can, the entrenchment at times becomes ineffective, whereas troops not
assembled in entrenchments could have followed enemy movements.
} 6.
The difficulty of avoiding the problem of too strong a camber (which we
discussed earlier) has led to the well-known blockhouse.
Nothing can be said against blockhouses as such; but their construction
requires so much time, that using them in the way we are discussing is hardly
possible in the midst of a campaign. They can only be used:
1. In fortifications and aforementioned entrenched camps.
2. In defensive cordons that were built for the defense of the province long
before. However, these cordons, having a purely defensive objective (and
not one of the objectives of which we have spoken), are precisely the
most dangerous and objectionable. Therefore, these measures count for
little in the field of battle.
}7
The rough terrain in mountainous areas often presents an obstacle to erecting
entrenchments, if one does not want to place them directly on the road. For on
the one hand, one cannot build on a very steep surface with many small
canyons and hills. On the other hand, one cannot observe anything properly
from such entrenchments.
Some Additional Rules for the Entire Unit 83
}8
From a different perspective, entrenchments are less necessary in the moun-
tains. The advantage of the terrain protects against the sudden assault, the
woods against the effects of enemy fire. When encountered by the artillery, an
irregular terrain can diminish the effectiveness of fire, often by a half, some-
times by 2/3.
}9
The consequence of all this is that in the mountains one avails oneself of
entrenchments only when one has the time and means to clear away any
obstacles, when defensive measures have been taken in advance, and when an
absolute defense is expected.
There are only a few examples from the 7 Years’ War40 where light troops
entrenched themselves in the mountains. They usually occupied existing
entrenchments but almost never erected such entrenchments themselves.
} 10
Entrenchments in woods present problems of their own because of the many
roots. Moreover, the woods themselves provide cover against the cavalry and
the trees provide some protection against enemy fire. Hence [entrenchments]
are not as common [in the woods] as in the plain. However, the difficulties are
not insurmountable and strong abatises covered by fire from the entrench-
ments provide them with greater strength. Because one cannot rest with
wagons at many points along a road in the forest, one often finds points
where the enemy cannot avoid being attacked from the entrenchment, and
where he is unable, at least with artillery, to attack the entrenchment with
concentrated artillery fire. These are reasons that very much speak for the
erection of entrenchments.
If it is a matter of defending an isolated position in the woods, one will
entrench oneself and build abatises and palisades for reinforcement, and
choose, wherever possible, a point on the road where the enemy is constrained
in the use of his artillery.
} 11
If villages and other localities are to be defended in war, the art of entrench-
ment very often is used but more in Large than in Small Wars. But here too
there are cases.
40
While the Seven Years’ War (1756–63) involved most of the great powers of the time,
Clausewitz refers mainly to the Third Silesian War waged between Prussia and Austria over
Silesia.
84 My Lectures on Small War
Hereby, the following points are the most essential:
1. One no longer encircles entire villages with entrenchments41 as was
previously done. This is even less the case when speaking of Small Wars.
2. Blocking entrances does little good when everything else is accessible.
Only when everything else is inaccessible and one intends to fire upon
the enemy at a distance is it advisable to erect flèches and redoubts in
front of the entrances. Otherwise one can content oneself with bringing
guns into position in the streets.
3. Erecting entrenchments for lateral defense in closed villages is only
sensible when one seeks to elevate the locality to a fortified position
and the time and energy for this is not lacking. Such cases do not arise in
Small Wars.
4. Therefore, in most cases in Small War there is probably nothing better to
do than to erect the entrenchment apart from the village or behind it.
5. An entrenchment with a steep profile can in general be made better and
stronger than an entrenchment erected in an expansive or open location.
Thus, if there is time to erect an entrenchment, one will prefer its
advantages to those of the village.
If one views the entrenchment in combination with the village, it may
gain by this connection great strength.
In this case it can be situated behind the village so that the village
presents a barrier to access; located in such a fashion that the enemy
has to advance under our most effective fire. Or, it can be placed in front
of the village, the latter covering to some extent its rear. This will in the
main only be the case if one is able to simultaneously occupy the village
and the entrenchment.
6. It will not be the case that one prefers the advantages of the entrench-
ment to those of the village, if the village is to be occupied as a goal in and
of itself, which is sometimes the case when one occupies a village because
there was no better access barrier. Most common are cases in which one
wants to use the locality merely for quarters. In the latter case, one calls
the entrenchment a place d’armes.
The most important thing to note in this regard is the difficulty of
securing this place d’armes from any attack if the garrison is not in the
entrenchment but in the village. To have but a guard in the entrench-
ment is dangerous. The danger here is twofold. First, that the place
d’armes is lost before we arrive. Second, that the enemy, because he
knows our exact assembly area, can prevent us from assembling. In any
41
At this point, Clausewitz uses the French term retranchment rather than the German term
Schanze.
Some Additional Rules for the Entire Unit 85
case, such entrenchments have to be situated close to the quarters and
heavily protected.
If the entrenchment is the primary issue, then it is safe to quarter in or
next to it, and if quartering in the village is the primary issue, to take
defensive measures there.
} 12
Entrenchments in completely open or varied but easily accessible areas are the
simplest to build and enjoy great advantages. However, they suffer from the
disadvantage that they should be built at a location that the enemy cannot
circumvent. Since they are usually erected in such a way that they intersect
direct routes, the enemy does not gladly ignore them. Advance detachments
can be defeated if they do not retreat via detours: one can steal a march on
them along straight paths, etc. For these reasons, one does not leave a manned
entrenchment to one’s rear lightly. Habit and preconceptions add to this and
one can assume with some certainty, that if one fortifies a small post with an
entrenchment along the path of the enemy, the enemy will first take it before a
further general advance. But this does not prevent the enemy from circum-
venting the entrenchment at the first opportunity, cutting off the garrison’s
route of retreat.
From time to time cases also will arise in which the enemy decides to
continue his march via small detours before taking the entrenchment.
It is self-evident that those light obstacles of the terrain that are found in the
region must be taken by effective fire.
} 13
With regard to the positioning of the entrenchment, in general, the following
applies:
1. The entrenchment should strafe a certain point with its firepower. (In
most cases artillery)
2. The entrenchment should hold a certain point, preventing the enemy
from establishing himself there.
The first case is more common in Small Wars. Here, the entrenchment has
to subordinate its self-defense and try to achieve it through other means. One
can strafe the area a d quite well from the rampart a, thus the entrenchment
completely defends the access to its trench. The area b c cannot be observed,
and because it is so large that point c is out of the range of cannon fire, the
entrenchment does nothing else than defend itself and point a [see Figure 4].
The rampart d allows for the strafing of the area e c, but not the area d e
nearby the entrenchment.
This case arises quite often, because in general this is the shape of all moun-
tains, and the summit is rarely so flat that they can be observed from the ramparts.
86 My Lectures on Small War
Figure 4. Positioning of an Entrenchment.
Source: Hahlweg (1966–90: 321), own reproduction.
Thus the entrenchment d has to help itself by other means, mainly through
profiles, palisades, trench defenses, etc.
The purpose of the entrenchment and the circumstances must determine
which position is to be chosen.
} 14
If we take together everything that has emerged from observing individual
cases and add the general thereto, the following propositions follow:
1. Individual entrenchments of small defensive posts must be situated in
such a way that the enemy cannot pursue his intentions without attack-
ing them. (Consequently they cannot prevent assaults as was the case in
Dittersbach.42)
2. In woods and mountains they are most difficult to erect, but since they
are also more easily dispensed with, they are less common, even if here
they are most likely to fulfill their purpose.
3. Indeed, entrenchments do not offer more defensive strength than open
villages with stone houses, but one takes fewer chances, because one
doesn’t lose sight of the people.
} 15
As far as the construction of the structure itself is concerned, the following
issues are the most important ones and should be taken into consideration in
any case:
1. Never build open structures.
2. Provide steep profiles. Trenches 15–18 feet deep and never less than 9.
The main difficulty with deep trenches is the water. Working in water is
very difficult. What one cannot achieve in the depth of the trenches must
be added to the height of the parapet. 6–8 feet high ramparts.
42
Scharnhorst describes an assault on a Prussian infantry regiment in 1759 by Austrian
forces. See Scharnhorst (1980: } 58).
On the Effectiveness of the Army Forward Posts 87
Figure 5. Barriers on the Edge of a Trench
Source: Clausewitz (1810: 113v.) Copyright © Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster,
N. Clausewitz 4,001.
3. Other barriers to entry, palisades, and pitfalls43 on the edge of the trench.
Small spikes, etc., through which storming is impeded [see Figure 5].
4. Simple redoubts are preferable to all other forms. The sideward defense
of the trenches through small structures with inward-looking angles
cannot be maintained anyway and the inward-looking angle unneces-
sarily narrows the area. Even outward-looking angles are defensible only
in the case of a dodecagon (namely if the inward looking angle is square).
As regards small star-forts successful defense results from steep assault,
on which nobody likes to depend.
5. A unit in the trench.
O N T H E E F F EC TI V E N E S S OF TH E A R M Y
FORWARD P OSTS, THAT I S, THEIR
BE H AVIOR IN GE N ERAL
}1
Having spoken of the establishment of the new forward post system, we went
through the behavior of the outposts and their soutiens, spoke about small
defensive posts, because the actual forward posts can be regarded as such. Now
43
The German term is “Wolfsgruben,” and denotes a 0.6–1.6 meter deep, cone-shaped pit
with a sharpened spike pointing upward from the bottom, typically placed in front of entrench-
ments as a physical obstacle.
88 My Lectures on Small War
it is a matter of getting to know how the entire forward post system fulfills its
purpose when the enemy advances, how the individual elements relate to one
another and to the whole.
This is possible if we clearly think through the behavior when facing an
enemy advance:
1. Of the individual brigades,
2. Of the soutien-corps and the whole.
Some examples from forward post wars. Forward post battle upon the river
Boxtel 1794 and on the river Vechte in the winter of 1794 and 1795.44
}2
It is very often the case in war that a weak group confronts an enemy three or
four times its strength. One should believe the ruin of the first to be the most
likely consequence. But this is only the case if the stronger knows exactly the
strength and situation of the weaker and support is not close enough to
prevent the detachment’s entire destruction and dispersion.
In most cases the advancing party does not know enough about the position
and strength of the troops he first encounters and the area they occupy, and
thus will be compelled to that caution that is considered to be a norm in war
and which is only violated in specific cases.
This caution plays an inconspicuous but nonetheless extremely important
role in war, presents itself in every development, and only through it are we
able to explain phenomena that otherwise appear incomprehensible.
Remark:
One can compare this caution to a very general force of nature, for example
gravity, or friction, etc. without whose existence phenomena as we see them
would be entirely impossible.
}3
It is primarily this caution that provides the endurance for the resistance and
effectiveness of the forward posts, which otherwise could not be explained.
An outpost and its soutien cannot be pursued hotly and destroyed by the
front line of the advancing enemy cavalry because the latter has to fear being
lured into an ambush or suddenly being confronted with a superior enemy.
In order to drive out a posted brigade, it is necessary to analyze its position,
call on the infantry, develop a plan, form columns, etc. This leads to the loss of
time, which the defender gains, whereby this does not include the amount of
time won by the resistance itself.
44
Clausewitz refers to battles during the War of the First Coalition in which British, Dutch,
and Austrian troops had attempted to invade France through Flanders.
On the Effectiveness of the Army Forward Posts 89
It is equally unlikely that the enemy will be able to pursue rapidly and to
destroy retreating brigades with a substantial cavalry, for similar reasons as in
the case of outposts and their soutiens. Thus, the enemy can pursue only in
large mass and therefore less rapidly.
If a substantial corps is located in the area, it will have to await the arrival of
its columns. If the area is at least somewhat varied, as is the case in most
cultivated regions, the enemy will reconnoiter the area before him only after he
has occupied the terrain that was formerly occupied by the forward post
brigades, and then he will find it difficult to distinguish between a substantial
corps, c. 10 battalions and 20–30 squadrons, from the army itself. He will not
be certain of this before he has given his columns directions for their efforts
against the army itself, and the battle has already begun at some places. Even if
this corps does not want to provide any resistance but rather to retreat, by its
mere appearance time is won, which in most cases probably is sufficient to
fulfill the purposes of the forward posts.
This time, gained through the methodical advance of the enemy and the
retreat of the forward posts, constitutes the actual and general effectiveness of
the forward posts.
One nonetheless cannot completely avoid actual combat, that is, resistance
as such. Because:
1. The resistance of the individual brigades in any case must endure long
enough for their guards and soutiens etc. to return.
2. They can be attacked during retreat.
3. They must be able to defend themselves against a rapid and carelessly
advancing enemy, otherwise the aforementioned would no longer
obtain.
4. It is not always the enemy army that forces them back, but often only a
relatively small corps, because the enemy is interested in possessing the
terrain that they occupy.
5. One should in general only retreat when facing a superior enemy, and
even then only if one can assess him accurately, because otherwise one
would be retreating before every weak detachment. This also applies to
the soutien-corps in their relations with their brigades.
}5
Thus the battle of the forward posts can be divided into two phases.
The first consists of the resistance of the individual brigades, the other in the
uniting of the soutiens with several or all of the brigades.
90 My Lectures on Small War
}6
Consequently, for a commander of an individual forward post brigade, the rule
applies that if there is no hope of conducting a successful raid against the enemy,
or if he believes he is not up to the challenge, his resistance should be limited to
compelling the enemy to prepare an attack and to adopt precautions, which slow
him down. Thereafter he should retreat to the soutien. Whatever measures are
adopted, this retreat to the soutien must never be left out of sight.
}7
Besides a strict defensive, for which there is seldom an opportunity, there are
various postures, which are suitable for the forward post brigade.
The first is when one defends a single point, the [second] when advancing
with a large part of one’s forces to attack the enemy.
For the former case, infantry and artillery are best suited, in the latter,
cavalry. This assault can only be effective if it is directed toward the flanks and
rear of the attacker.
This posture is appropriate only against an enemy that is not too prepon-
derant, for example, an ordinary reconnaissance unit. It thus can only be
adopted at that moment when the enemy is close and his strength can be
estimated relatively well.
In general, the posture is more appropriate to the wings of the forward post
positions than to the center.
}8
The second posture is retreat without great resistance upon enemy attack, but
immediate return to the attack before the enemy contemplates any defensive
measures.
In most cases, it is the unexpected that generates here a large effect. If one is
again expelled, a considerable amount of time nevertheless thereby is gained.
The enemy will always believe that we had returned with reinforcements and
therefore will want to reinforce himself.
Of course this idea can only be executed if the enemy position is not strong
and he does not occupy it with a large column.
}9
The third posture involves occupying a weak position with cannons and
infantry to make the enemy believe he is confronting the true position. With
the remaining forces one retreats and takes cover. As soon as the enemy breaks
through, he is attacked. This posture is appropriate in those cases where the
terrain is not conducive enough for local defense. If the enemy arrives in great
numbers, however, the attack can only be directed against the front lines of the
columns.
On the Effectiveness of the Army Forward Posts 91
} 10
All these elaborate postures require precise knowledge of the area and other
preparations. If there is not enough time, as is very often the case for the
forward posts of armies that march a lot in war, then only one thing remains to
be done.
} 11
Fourth posture. One rather concentrates from the start and favors a concen-
trated assault against the enemy over a dispersed resistance, which usually
cannot be sustained for long in an unsuitable terrain.
} 12
All these postures of battle, however, can be successfully applied against an
enemy which is not vastly superior. If one confronts a main enemy column,
the attack will be repelled.
In most cases this can be duly assessed and thus one can avoid taking on
more than is advisable; sometimes, however, one believes oneself to be assail-
ing a weak enemy only to discover he is quite strong.
There is no avoiding this in detachment wars, as otherwise one would easily
be expelled by every weak enemy, and in any case, it will not lead to ruin.
} 13
By means of these three types of resistance the retreat to the soutien is eased
greatly because one has all one’s troops close together and does not need to
attack the enemy any more than one believes advisable.
} 14
With respect to all these operations, the chain of outposts and the double or
single chain of soutiens serve to report on the enemy’s arrival and to delay him
long enough for the post to take necessary measures.
} 15
All these measures are at the discretion of the individual brigade commander.
There exist other measures, however, which depend on the superior com-
mander. The soutien, in which the latter is based, is mainly intended to
accommodate the brigades and rarely in a position to support them in their
moment of battle:
1. Because it usually arrives too late.
2. Because it is uncertain of what is taking place at other positions, and thus
cannot devote itself too much to anyone.
92 My Lectures on Small War
} 16
In addition to the accommodation of the forward posts, the measures at the
disposal of the aforementioned commander for their benefit are:
1. The reinforcement of some posts with cavalry or infantry, which
he either attaches to them or places closely to their rear, taking
infantry or a part of the cavalry from others. Cannot be withdrawn in
the plain.
A post will rarely be able to do without cavalry completely.
The infantry which one withdraws must not be divided amongst the
other brigades, but deployed behind their brigade or as a soutien.
2. The redeployment of the brigade if one is informed of an enemy attack
and believes the enemy has gained knowledge of its position.
In this way one at least maintains the advantage of surprise.
3. Placing the soutien closer to the most dangerous spot.
} 17
With regard to the behavior and effectiveness of the soutiens themselves, one
might say the same as was said about the forward posts of the brigades.
Nevertheless, the following particularities should not be overlooked:
1. The soutien has the main purpose of accommodating the returning
brigades and since it is located relatively far away (¼, ½ mile), it will
have to set out to meet up with the brigade if it is hard-pressed. This will
often prevent it from offensively advancing against elements of the
enemy forces.
2. If the soutien and its attached brigades want to undertake an action
against an enemy that has advanced:
2.1 Either because they believe themselves able to fight him under
favorable conditions, or
2.2 Because it is essential to stop the enemy,
then a concentrated assault on an enemy column without much
posturing in most cases would appear to promise the best success.
} 18
The strength of the forward posts is discretionary. Stronger ones allow for
greater resistance and provide more security. But because they suffer many
losses through continuous combat and exertions, it is not economically wise to
strengthen them any more than one believes the conditions require.
If one confronts an enterprising enemy and does not want to risk much,
strong forward posts are essential.
On the Effectiveness of the Army Forward Posts 93
In general, this provision depends on the way in which one wages the war
and thus cannot be dealt with here.
} 19
With regard to the relation between the brigades and the soutien the following
must be mentioned:
1. If too weak, brigades suffer from the disadvantage that they would be
unable to offer resistance without support, which would lead to a
continuous marching of troops back and forth.
2. A soutien that is too weak would not allow for measures appropriate to
the circumstances. One would have one’s forces distributed equally, but
one would no longer be in a position to create more of a barrier for the
enemy where it is stronger, because the reinforcement of a brigade
through others has several difficulties. Moreover, the retreat of the
brigade thereby would be less secure. For only that which directly
accommodates the withdrawing troops guarantees the retreat with any
reliability. Counting on the flanking effect of other brigades would betray
a very limited knowledge of war.
Finally, even with overly strong brigades one would not be able to impress
the enemy with considerable corps of the avant-garde before he reaches the
army, because the brigades will not always be able to unite.
If the soutien-corps are equal in strength to forward posts, one has the
advantage that they can replace them.
If this feature is absent, then it is good to have more cavalry and mounted
artillery in the soutien.
} 20
If a forward post system is to be reinforced under specific circumstances, then
this is best accomplished by establishing new soutiens and not by reinforcing
the brigades themselves, on the very grounds of the frequently reiterated
principle that with regard to the defense, one should concentrate more on
active than local and passive defenses.
} 21
What has been said thus far regarding the forward posts applies mainly to
middle-sized armies. Very large armies such as those of the last war, of 100 and
150 thousand men, cannot easily be surrounded by a fully integrated forward
post system. In such cases, every corps d’armée of 20–30 thousand men has its
own forward posts. However, most of what has been said above also applies
to them.
94 My Lectures on Small War
EXAMPLES OF THE F OUR P OSTURES
I N F O R W A R D P O S T WA R
1. The battle at the river Dommel in September 1794.
2. The winter posting of the English on the river Vechte in the winter of
1794 to 1795.
3. Fictitious example from the region of Berlin.
3.1 One has occupied the lower Panke from the river Spree to Luisen-
brunnen against the enemy advancing from Spandau with two for-
ward post brigades, which consist of 4 battalions and 8 squadrons.
The infantry builds 9 defensive posts at the bridge of the Invaliden-
haus, at its windmill and at the bridge of the Hamburger Strasse. The
cavalry is positioned behind Wedding and Luisenbrunnen. The
infantry has the order to offer the utmost resistance, the intention
being to cross with the cavalry the river Panke and to attack the
advancing enemy on its left flank.
3.2 A post of 2 battalions is located in Biesdorf and Friedrichsfelde; the
enemy approaches from Marzahn.
The entrances to the villages and the bridges, which cross expanses
leading to the enemy, are occupied. The battalions in this way
disbanded into several street posts. The commander does not believe
that such resistance can be very successful. Therefore, he issues the
order to retreat if a strong enemy approaches, and establishes a point
in the woods to which the troops should withdraw.
Once they have united and the support that he perhaps expected
from the soutien has arrived, or whenever else the moment appears
opportune, he returns to assault one of the two villages, attacks it
with several columns from various sides, and expels the enemy from
it. It is most likely that considerable time lapses before the enemy
returns with reinforcements; by then, either support has arrived for
our troops or they also withdraw at nightfall.
3.3 4 battalions and 2 squadrons are to defend the varied terrain between
Kaulsdorf and Köpenick. The area around Kaulsdorf is defended by
cavalry.
At Otten’s Hill, one chops down the trees and erects some entrench-
ments on the heights of the Wuhle. Additionally one builds an abatis
to the breach; but on the Königswege at the bridge across the Wuhle,
again an entrenchment. At each of these different posts one places one
or two battalions with some cannons and gives the order to withdraw
if circumvented to the area of Kikemahl. One remains here with the
two squadrons and the remaining infantry and attacks the first enemy
in sight with united force and tries to repel him as quickly and far as
possible. Without energy this assault cannot be effective.
Deployment of Forward Posts 95
If one were to be cautious with one’s right flank and therefore attack
the enemy from the left in the region of Wulfs Garten and only use
part of the troops to protect the flank, then one would be unable to
accomplish anything, but instead promptly be compelled to retreat
before one had even attempted anything. In addition, this retreat
would be very hurried and with great losses. This would be the effect
of a half-measure.
But if one hurls oneself with any regard against the enemy’s left and
decides if necessary to retreat to Friedrichshagen, then one is in a
position to defeat completely the enemy attacked, inspiring fear in
the others. It is unlikely that the column that is advancing along the
Königsweg will continue its march if the other column is completely
repelled across the Wuhle.
3.4 If one has just arrived in the area and thus has neither abatises nor
rods, such that one is unable to position troops along the Wuhle
without exposing them unnecessarily to the danger of being overrun,
then one positions only guards at the Wuhle and keeps the troops
together in the area of Kikemahl in order to adjust to the
circumstances.
DEPLOYMENT O F FO RWARD P OSTS
Reflections on the Deployment of the Entire
Forward Post System
1. The forward posts occupy the access routes to the army at a distance
which is conducive to the purpose at hand.
2. One occupies those areas which the enemy could approach in an un-
detected fashion.
3. One has to be careful not to be drawn into disadvantageous battles by
deploying forward posts in certain areas. If the enemy is superior and
enterprising at the same time one has to act with great care. This does
not mean that one should not venture anything against him; for great
objectives one may always risk a great deal. But one has to be careful with
regard to minor matters that have no decisive purpose, and among these
are forward posts.
4. One surrounds the army’s flanks to the degree they are threatened.
5. One occupies main roads and other important points with single bri-
gades. If the brigades are insufficient for this purpose, or they would be
positioned so far from one another that they could not observe the area
96 My Lectures on Small War
without difficulty, they are to be divided. This division, however, may not
be undertaken unless necessary and not with the intention to maintain a
light chain of posts. Practice alone may provide a solid judgment.
6. The first division of the forward posts is usually made according to plan
by the general quartermaster or another officer of the general staff. He
sends the brigades out to the most important points of access and only
there where it is obvious, decides to detach from the brigade, leaving it
to the commander of the forward posts to decide what other points
should be occupied by detachments.
7. When detaching, one does not divide weapon groups unless necessary.
Ideally, one keeps the cannons on the main road.
8. In most cases an intermediate post is useful only:
8.1 If in connection with the terrain it prevents the rapid advancement
of the enemy toward the flanks of the main positions.
8.2 If it is necessary for guarding the area, since this is the first
requirement of all forward posts.
9. The forward post soutien maintains its position behind the middle or
somewhat closer to the threatened point. Whenever possible it must
remain covered, because if one wants to impress through a show of
strength, one can reveal it at any moment.
10. In most cases, after they have left their positions all forward post troops
unite and create an impressive corps. Camp guards and their pickets serve
to accommodate these corps as well as single brigades that returning
separately, or even dispersed, otherwise would be prevented from uniting.
Given the distance of the forward posts one cannot do without them.
Therefore, they are doubly useful.
11. The camp guards are located 1000 to 1500 paces in front of the bivouac,
camp, etc.
12. To position these in flèches given the cannons is not inappropriate. The
enemy generally does not come close to the army with great speed; a
light cannonade might easily erupt in which case a flèche is always
useful. Ordinary, closed entrenchments are of no help if the army does
not intend to fight here; or if the army does not intend to feign a passive
defense before the enemy.
13. The strength of the camp guards depends precisely on the number of
necessary sentinels. Their soutiens can be located as pickets within the
army. These guard chains are deployed by the general of the division or
his general staff officer.
14. The essence of this entire forward post organization, to repeat it once
again, is to provide the army a certain degree of freedom of action. Woe
Deployment of Forward Posts 97
to the army that must accept in every situation the enemy’s rules, must
fight as soon as he appears at its front, or must retreat as soon as it
senses his approach and now, pursued and driven, does not find any
rest and peace, and is so thrown off-balance, that it misses the best
opportunities to regain a solid footing.
In addition to the proper forward posts, every bivouac and cantonment has
its own guards, partly for keeping the internal order, partly vis-à-vis the enemy,
because in extraordinary cases, one cannot completely rely on the forward posts,
which are quite often rather far away. The enemy might sneak through at one
point; he might attack the post etc. and thus quickly penetrate our cantonment
or camp. Were one to have no guards at all, one would be ambushed.
These guards also serve the purpose of accommodating the forward posts if
they retreat.
They are located in cantonments, usually at the entrance to villages, on
bridges, etc. With regard to bivouacs and camps, they are best located at a
distance of 1000–1500 paces from the enemy on appropriate terrain. Their
strength depends only on the number of necessary sentinels.
If they are supported by soutiens, then these are pickets, which stand ready
in the camp, etc.
Patrols and Reconnaissance
}1
We are not talking here about small patrols, which are sent by the outposts in
order to visit their own sentinels and to search the surroundings. Their job is
quite simple. Wider-ranging patrols can be stronger or weaker. The stronger
they are the more they resemble reconnaissance units.
Larger patrols are usually called reconnaissance units, and are used to scrutin-
ize more closely the enemy position, if need be with a certain amount of violence.
On Patrols
}2
1. Kinds of patrols.
1.1 In-depth reconnaissance patrols (Schleichpatrouillen).
1.2 Which are sent toward the enemy.
1.3 Which are to gather information about the enemy.
1.4 Which should appraise the enemy position.
98 My Lectures on Small War
2. Strength and composition.
2.1 Very weak. Infantry often better than cavalry. In-depth reconnais-
sance patrols.
2.2 5-man cavalry. The customary.
2.3 The rather strong 20–30 men; if the area is varied, with infantry.
2.4 Ditto.
Patrols that are sent out in order to be informed about the approaching
enemy are very weak; they consist of a few men. If they are supposed to report
on whether a specific point is occupied and this point is not far away, then they
also are only a few men strong. If they venture several miles; if they are to
search out the enemy, because one has no information about him; if they are to
investigate the surroundings, because one wants to determine whether the
enemy is present; if they are to investigate the features of the area; if the
sentinels return in fear; then they must be made much stronger, because in this
case they must divide themselves into as many groups as the situation requires
and at times must secure themselves with side patrols.
General Rules for all Patrols
}3
(General Scharnhorst suggests the fastest horses and vigorous men.45)
On the strength and composition of patrols. Only in very thick forests
infantry; otherwise the cavalry and infantry together. In areas that are rela-
tively flat, cavalry alone. If, however, defiles are to be occupied in order to
guarantee the retreat, then infantry is very useful. Patrols are sent out not by
outposts but by soutiens troops and the post itself, indeed sometimes even by
the soutiens-corps.
}4
Routes
If it is possible to march off-road, this is better. The patrol should never return
via the same route.
Examples:
If patrolling one path, do not ignore another nearby. If the road parts at the
beginning, then better to send two patrols; if it only parts later, a strong patrol
45
Clausewitz refers to Gerhard von Scharnhorst’s Militairisches Taschenbuch zum Gebrauch
im Felde. See Scharnhorst (1980: 3).
Deployment of Forward Posts 99
that then divides the task. In the 7 Years’ War Lt. Colonel Poleretzky of the
French army was assaulted when encamped with 300 men in the village of
Stokendrebber because the patrol, which was orienting toward Rethen and
Alden, chose the road via Hören, ignoring an alternative via Gilten on which
the Prussians happened to be advancing. Scharnhorst page 17.
During the campaign of 1758, Hoya was likewise attacked, because the
prince took the footpath beyond the main road. Scharnhorst page 13.
}5
Intelligence
It is very important to gather information from the inhabitants; otherwise
patrols would return with little news. For this reason they choose paths
through villages and apply thereby the following precautions.
}6
A patrol, which has been sent out in the direction of the enemy, regularly
reports back whether or not it has found the enemy. The English army near
Breda sent out an engineering officer who made it to Leuven, sending back
reports all along the way.46
}7
Patrols sent to find the enemy should march as clandestinely as possible; they
should never return before having first seen the enemy for themselves.
If the enemy is nowhere in the area, they are to return with sworn state-
ments from the mayor or other office holders.
One cannot rely on the information that one gains from the peasants. In the
campaign of 1776,47 General Ewald was ordered to take 10 riflemen and 30
grenadiers from Bordentown to Burlington in order to determine whether the
American oar boats still held station at this point along the Delaware. During a
vigorous daylong march he passed by the left flank of the enemy corps at a
distance of two hours and arrived at Yorkshire Bridge at dawn, a half-hour’s
distance from Burlington. He found two houses that were occupied to prevent
anyone from escaping. A strong snow flurry aided his undertaking. One of the
inhabitants attested to the fact that the ships’ soldiers had occupied Burlington
and that the oar boats were beached there, another claimed the opposite. General
Ewald thereupon took four men, positioned his command post in a concealed
location, and gave the officer the order that if he were to hear shooting, it would
46
Clausewitz expands on this incident in his collectanea. See Hahlweg (1966–90: vol. 1, 553–4).
47
Clausewitz refers to the New York and New Jersey Campaign during the American
Revolutionary War between British forces under General Sir William Howe and the Continental
Army under General George Washington in 1776 and 1777.
100 My Lectures on Small War
signal that he had been captured. In this case the officer should retreat through
the woods along the Delaware. He then went to the mayor and ordered the four
men to follow him, walking one behind the other, and to give fire the moment
they heard his pistol shoot and then to rescue themselves. The mayor answered
his questions equivocally, whereupon Ewald himself sprang through the town to
the harbor, convinced himself of the presence of the oar boat and also saw some
men who looked like ship soldiers, and then sprang back.
Ewald’s Treatise on Small War, page 108.
}8
The March Formation
A front line at a distance of 100 to 1000 paces and even further; then the main
group; then at a certain distance, the rearguard. The same on the way back [see
Figure 6].
(The further the front line the better. A strong patrol can extend it further
than a weak one, because it can have single men between it and the front line.
The further forward the front line, the more secure the march, which cannot
be completely secured by the side patrols.)
The main body of troops searches the surrounding area for flankers.
(This is necessary because of ambushes.)
}9
Side Patrols
If the area is to be searched, they develop by themselves. But also for security
reasons, a larger patrol needs smaller side patrols, namely on the nearest paths
to the left and right.
} 10
Rearguard
At defiles and other points prone to circumvention, some men have to remain
behind; in the worst-case scenario they will be able to report back and through
shooting to inform the patrol that danger is behind it.
(Infantry if the terrain is suitable.)
} 11
Marching through large forests is dangerous. If the danger is great, one follows
guides along back trails. In this case infantry is necessary; it forms the front
line. One hides quickly. March through defiles. Never move into a defile
without first having scoured it. (Ewald treatise on the service of light troops.
Page 88. Example of French officers with a forty-man field guard. (Villages to
be searched.)
Deployment of Forward Posts 101
Figure 6. Positioning of Side Patrols and Rearguards along Paths and Defiles.
Source: Clausewitz (1810: 131r.) Copyright © Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster,
N. Clausewitz 4,001.
} 12
Marching through a Village
As in the case of defiles. If one has information or is suspicious that the enemy
is hidden in the village, then some men have to be sent out to carefully search
the farmsteads and in the meantime to try to secure a concession from the
inhabitants.
102 My Lectures on Small War
(In most cases, they will reveal it.)
Nevertheless, one should never proceed all at once with the entire squad
into the village.
(Scharnhost, page 8)
Scharnhorst TB, page 1448
Example: Lt. Colonel Freitag leaves behind Lieutenant Thies hiding with 39
horses near Uslar and intercepts a French patrol, which having earlier pa-
trolled the village, completely moved into it, once the villagers gave assurances
the enemy was not present. No man escaped, and these volunteers from Alsace
were attacked in Hemeln.
In a village not far from Hamm, Major Scheiter intercepted a patrol during
the 7 Years’ War. He hid in a barn until the patrol had passed and was in a
narrow street.
In the year 1760 an officer ordered to proceed to the area of Marburg with a
patrol of 20 horses, marched without great caution through a long defile with
an avant-garde that was 50 paces in front of him. A detachment of Hussars
attacked the avant-garde, pushed them back to the main unit and took the
entire squad as prisoners.
Scharnhorst TB page 14.
In the year ’59, after the battle of Bergen, Emmerich49 was sent into the
region of Würzburg with a cavalry patrol in order to gather information about
the imperial army. Upon arriving in Nieder Weißbach he inquired about the
enemy and was informed that no Austrian troops were in the region. Hence,
he entered with his detachment and ordered them all to dismount and feed.
An enemy commando of Hussars was hidden in a nearby forest and had
observed Emmerich entering the village. He was attacked and taken prisoner
with his entire commando.
Emmerich, Partheygänger page 102.50
} 13
The men sent to search the village approach with great care during the night;
not on the paths, but through gardens, look into windows, etc. If the enemy is
in the village, the patrol may have the opportunity to attack it and take
prisoners.
} 14
In wintertime, if it is impossible to march off-road, if one is strong, one has to
split up into small units that follow one another at a large distance. In this way,
one can prevent being completely cut off.
48 49
See footnote 45. See footnote 13.
50
Clausewitz references Emmerich (1791).
On Reconnaissance 103
} 15
Whenever the fear of interception is large, as for example in large forests, one
sends out very small patrols of 2–3 men; each patrol following the other at
distance of 1000 paces.
It would be advantageous always to send small patrols if not for the fact: that
bigger ones can search a large area much quicker; that a large patrol is less
easily cut off than a small one; that small patrols are afraid of a stronger
enemy. As a rule, use a larger patrol if it should advance boldly.
}} 16 17 [sic!]
One encounters the enemy. 1. As soon as someone at the front of the patrol
comes to a halt, everyone in the field must stop. 2. Some good horsemen must
receive orders in advance to immediately ride back and report if one is
unexpectedly attacked. 3. One has to keep the men oriented. That is, one
has to keep them informed of the enemy location, the location of our own
army, and of morning, evening, noon, and midnight. 4. As long as one has not
been detected by the enemy, nobody is permitted to fire.
(With these measures, even in the worst situation one cannot be intercepted
without the army receiving word of it.)
} 18
1. If the enemy is under one’s control, that is, one has discovered him first
and recognizes that he is not much superior, then the opportunity presents
itself to strike successfully. But one must first send back one man.
2. If one comes across a strong enemy and is pursued by him, one likewise
immediately reports back and retreats with a patrol as with a field guard
as long as it is safe to do so, keeping the enemy in sight and under
frequent fire.
(A patrol is not for combat, but the officer who withdraws too quickly and
loses the enemy from his sight will not be in a position to deliver a proper report.)
3. If in spite of every precaution one is unexpectedly detected by the enemy
and cut off, then one falls upon him and fights one’s way through.
(Example from the American War. Scharnhorst TB, page 4)
O N RECONNAISSAN CE
(Here we are concerned only with the reconnaissance of the enemy; recon-
naissance of the territory will be dealt with when we turn to the work of the
general staff.)
104 My Lectures on Small War
Composition and Strength
} 19
They usually comprise all three weapons groups, but the cavalry is commonly
the most important and the artillery must be light, or even better, mounted.
The strength of the detachment depends on the strength of the enemy corps
that is to be reconnoitered. If the position of the enemy is known, or if one
needs to remain in his vicinity longer, then the danger is greater and return
more precarious if the detachment is not of sufficient strength.
(Reconnaissance usually involves the attack of enemy posts. Only if these
are located entirely on the plain and consist only of cavalry, will cavalry be
sufficient. In most cases, infantry is also necessary. If the area is very wooded
or varied, then the infantry is indeed the main service arm, otherwise it is the
cavalry. For assaulting posts and especially for retreating, artillery is required.
With regard to strength it can be said that less time, distance, effort, as well as
fewer assaults are needed for the reconnaissance of a division’s position than
the position of an army. Thus, the enemy has more time to bring up reinforce-
ments and to react against the reconnaissance unit, something for which one
must be prepared.)
(The primary intention is to push back the enemy forward posts and to
alarm the enemy army, as if an attack were imminent, and thereby induce it to
reveal its plan of action.)
} 20
Before beginning a reconnaissance one asks for instructions (preferable writ-
ten) regarding its purpose. One familiarizes oneself with the region as much as
possible by way of a special map. For this, a writing tablet, telescope, and
special maps are indispensable.
} 21
The reconnaissance is directed at the most important point of the enemy
positions, or at several points simultaneously, and develops prior to this a plan
for attacking and expelling those troops that stand in the way of our intentions.
One preoccupies other positions with mock assaults. Not to prevent the
enemy from coming to the aid of the position under reconnaissance, but in an
effort to prevent the enemy from guessing that a reconnaissance is underway.
} 22
One selects several officers to observe the enemy’s position and strength, and
provides them with small units for their personal security so they can use the time
to detect as much as possible without having to concerning themselves with the
On Reconnaissance 105
actual course of battle. The commanding officer would be well advised to take the
task upon himself and to transfer command of the battle to another officer.
} 23
If one is relatively strong, one can proceed with the attack methodically. If one
is too weak, however, one has to try to conduct one’s march as clandestinely as
possible so as to gain momentary advantages through a surprise assault.
(The enemy cannot differentiate between large columns of 20, 30, or more
squadrons and the army. Thus he cannot undertake countermeasures until
our intentions become apparent. In this time span one has the opportunity to
achieve one’s purposes. The enemy would easily recognize small detachments
of 5 squadrons and a few battalions for what they are, and adopt quite early
such measures that they would not only fail to achieve their purpose but would
be in danger of not returning.)
} 24
What cannot be observed must be established through reports, and therefore it
is important to:
1. Try to capture prisoners, who can be interrogated by officers.
2. Ask the inhabitants of the area about the enemy’s position.
} 25
The prisoners are mainly questioned about: 1. the regiment in which they
serve; 2. high-ranking generals they have seen in the corps; 3. the strength of
the company in which they serve; 4. the strength of the corps; 5. about the
foodstuffs they receive; 6. the strength of their quarters, the location of
individual divisions, whether there are entrenchments, etc. (One can ask
other questions that a common solder usually will not be able to answer; the
answers therefore will be very unreliable.)
The inhabitants of the area are questioned about the strength of the
quartering in the villages and about any of the areas where the enemy is
located and finally about the character of the region.
(A peasant rarely knows whether one or two divisions are in village A, the
soldier knows this better. But the common soldier does not know whether
there are any troops at all stationed in town B, this the peasant knows better.)
(The best information comes from educated inhabitants, such as preachers
and office holders, especially if they are well disposed, which then can be
compared to what one observes oneself. Since time usually is precious and
short, it would be good to assign these tasks to several officers. If an officer
identifies a highly valuable man, he shall bring him to the commanding officer.
106 My Lectures on Small War
In any case, some conclusions can be reached by the corresponding elements
of various statements.)
} 26
If the enemy’s march is to be reconnoitered, one inquires as to his direction in
every village the enemy has passed through. If one is next to him and has
approached him to a certain degree, one leaves his detachment in a concealed
location and proceeds for observation with a smaller team as close as is
possible without being detected.
} 27
Retreat
Usually the enemy takes revenge, if he could not prevent the reconnaissance,
by trying to defeat the detachment on its retreat. Therefore, strong soutiens
must rush forward from the camp to meet the detachment. Mounted artillery
provides an invaluable service during retreat.
Examples:
1. A weak detachment has occupied Charlottenburg. But the enemy has
moved into Berlin in large numbers.
A spy patrol is sent out in order to see whether the enemy has occupied
the Tiergarten and what measures he has taken to secure the city.
1.1 If the bridges are occupied, nothing else but the trench is left for
reconnaissance.
1.2 If the bridges are not occupied, the patrol proceeds alongside the
road as concealed and cautious as possible. For this, infantry would
be better suited than cavalry. Here no side patrols, but not together.
3 men, no more than 5.
2. The detachment from Charlottenburg has to retreat via Schmargendorf
and Dahlem and discovers that the enemy has already occupied these
localities.
A spy patrol to Wilmersdorf and from there to Dahlem. It reports
back from Wilmersdorf and thus has to be somewhat stronger, about 5
men. Already has a man on every side.
3. The enemy is not in the region surrounding Wilmersdorf. The detach-
ment has withdrawn to Steglitz and sends at the break of dawn a strong
patrol to establish the strength of the enemy in Berlin and whether or not
he is also in Schöneberg and Wilmersdorf.
It would be advantageous to make this patrol 20 to 30 men strong.
First, it has to detach to Wilmersdorf; secondly, to send a unit to
On Reconnaissance 107
Schöneberg; thirdly, to Tempelhof; and fourthly, it would be good if they
could take some prisoners.
As regards the occupation of Berlin, the patrol would not be able to
secure any information other than that provided by the peasants and
prisoners. Moreover, they could draw some inferences from enemy
behavior.
4. The enemy approaches from Niederlausitz. A strong patrol is sent out
from Spandau to establish whether he has already arrived at Groβ
Ziethen etc.; whether he has already occupied Köpenick. One is not
familiar with the area. It is daylight.
4.1 20 man infantry and 30 man cavalry.
4.2 In two units, one in the plain, the other in the varied terrain.
4.3 Instructions for the first unit.
4.3.1 Attack if you come across the enemy.
4.3.2 Send reports from Tempelhof to Rixdorf, von Rudow to
Köpenick.
4.4 The main detachment in two parts. One from Rixdorf to Johannis
Thal. The other straight to Köpenick.
The infantry either remains in Rixdorf if one has not heard anything
on the enemy, otherwise 10 men are to be taken along to form the
front line.
4.5 The patrol in the plain
1. Finds the enemy
2. It does not find him and returns via Marienfelde and Teltow
The other unit
1. Comes across a field guard, does not withdraw immediately
2. By day approaches two guards from Rixdorf, but by night, if
necessary, just one
3. Field guard in front of Köpenick does not move in
5. A Hussar field post with 30 horses is located near Reinikendorf, whereby
its post is located in Panko[w]. Another stands in front of Niederschön-
hausen. During the night, the latter sends from time to time three
patrols, one comprising two men to Dahldorf, another of two men to
Rosendal, another comprising four men to Tegel.
So that one man can go right, one man left, and two men can remain
on the road, this patrol returns via the Chausée House.
The post at Pankow sends from time to time a patrol of five men in
order to learn earlier of the enemy’s approach and at the same time to
revive the guards’ vigilance. They have the order to take the
following route.
Field guard from Niederschönhausen, Rosenthal, Dahldorf, through
Tegel Forest, toward the Chausée House bridge. Here they split up: one
to Reinikendorf, the other to the sheep farm.
108 My Lectures on Small War
6. A patrol is sent by night from Spandau to Charlottenburg and Berlin.
6.1 [sic!] It may not be too weak.
1. At the edge of the Grunewald Forest some infantry and one
cavalryman remain.
2. The same in Charlottenburg.
3. Those on the way to Berlin send a side patrol toward Hofjäger.
4. They can return via Wilmersdorf.
7. The enemy has an encampment of 1000–1200 men near Rosenthal. We
have occupied the river Spree; he the Jungfernheide. We want to recon-
noiter his camp.
A column near Charlottenburg, with the other near Berlin.
The first weak and with infantry. It is only intended to alarm the enemy.
The other ten squadrons and four battalions, ½ mounted battery
strong, advance toward Königin Plantation and Niederschönhausen. 10
squadrons advance to Wedding with one battery of mounted artillery.
5 squadrons remain near Pankow towards Blankenburg.
On Small Observation Detachments, Which Are Sent Some
Miles in Front of the Army toward the Enemy
}1
Such detachments do not belong to the forward post system because they are
positioned far ahead of it and are not permanent. They are needed if one is far
away from the enemy thus not able to observe him from one’s forward posts.
And one can only separate them for a short time from the army lest one
expose them to very unfortunate battles.
}2
In the plain they can consist only of cavalry, but if the terrain is varied, they
can consist of both weapons groups. In very rough terrain, like woods, very
few cavalry are to be found. Sometimes one provides them with light cannon,
be it to delay at suitable points the pursuing enemy, or just to make noise
with them.
They comprise select troops and are commanded by officers well suited for
this duty.
}3
They are deployed on roads or in their vicinity; in front of the enemy’s
position or at his flanks. They are intended to observe points of access and
the position of the enemy corps.
On Reconnaissance 109
}4
Their strength varies greatly: from twenty to thirty horses, to several battalions
and squadrons, depending on whether secondary objectives are also present.
We will consider only the actions of the weaker, namely up to a few
hundred men, because those with more battalions and squadrons are in a
different situation. They can provide for their own security more or less
through the usual means of forward posts and must act more or less as any
other corps.
}5
The smaller ones of which we are speaking have some particularities that we
want to investigate further.
Detachments of this type are not at all designed for resistance. They won’t
allow themselves to be pushed back by a weaker enemy. This is demanded by
military honor. They will resist a somewhat superior enemy with cunning and
courage and this explains the reputation of light troops and partisans. In both
cases, there does not emerge great danger for them. In the face of a consider-
ably superior enemy, however, they retreat without any resistance, since it is
enough to have detected him. They do not need to impede his advance, which
is not necessary at this distance, and for which they are not appropriate.
Nonetheless, they should not lose sight of the enemy while retreating, a rule
which was already recommended with regard to other situations.
They never allow themselves to be drawn into battle with a superior enemy,
unless to battle their way through.
}6
As a connecting chain of posts they will not be able to occupy the area they
have been instructed to observe because they are too weak. If they were to
accomplish this by dissolving the chain, they could not support the individual
positions and the enemy could seize one or the other daily. Thus, they must
adopt other means both to accomplish their task and to secure themselves
against too great a danger.
}7
For this purpose they position individual weak posts far to the fore, either in
the field or in villages.
In this way, these weak posts will be able to observe the area just as well as a
forward post cordon, however this is not necessary:
1. Because the enemy at such a distance from our army would hardly act
with that caution and effort that he would employ to circumvent our
forward posts and to approach the army covertly.
110 My Lectures on Small War
2. Because it is not important to detect the enemy in the first half-hour,
which would be very important for the forward posts. However, while
the enemy marches several miles, it will not be very difficult to learn
something about him.
3. The enemy will not send out weak detachments at this distance, or at
least they will not be of great importance; but large columns are easier to
detect. By contrast, the forward posts must be able to detect even a weak
detachment in a timely fashion.
Finally,
4. These detachments are often in a region where the enemy is not. They
are to provide reports of his arrival. This is possible without difficulty in
a hundred ways.
}8
The individual posts do not need to be very strong and they must not be.
Because of the abovementioned reasons they do not need many sentinels and
vedettes. In most cases, one will be sufficient. If they are weak, they are in less
danger of being intercepted, because the enemy will not bother himself too
much about a few men. The commander thus keeps his detachment together
and does not run the danger of losing a part through the ineptitude of others.
Where necessary he can assemble strong patrols and reconnaissance.
Only in specific cases, when the enemy juxtaposes a relatively strong
detachment to ours, might one feel compelled to provide ours with a similar
strength, so that it is not in too much danger.
}9
Small observation detachments have to be deployed as far forward as possible,
because the enemy can only be observed with success in close proximity.
Moreover, because of the provisional nature of this observation system, one
must have the ability to calculate the time it will take for the enemy to advance
to the main detachment from our outermost posts.
The main detachment may not be deployed so close to the enemy that its
strength would provoke him to take immediate measures.
The danger to which small posts are exposed owing to their great distance has
to be considered inevitable. Because they usually are comprised primarily of
cavalry they are not easily completely destroyed. A few men can escape more
easily than many, and hence the loss is not too great if such a post is taken.
For all these reasons, if one does not want to put them into villages, it is
necessary to position the posts next to them. But if they are located in villages,
and the enemy is in the region, they have to come out at night and change their
position.
On Reconnaissance 111
} 11 [sic!]
For such detachments, positioned beyond the forward post chain, it is neither
necessary nor feasible to constantly patrol the area in which they are located. It
is essential to observe the enemy in his positions, because every activity
precedes or follows a change in his location. Hence, it is necessary to reassure
oneself daily that the enemy guards and forward posts are still in the same
position. By night, this is accomplished most easily by very weak or spy patrols
through the observation of enemy campfires; by day, through reconnaissance
with stronger troops, ideally at dawn.
The officer conducts, wherever possible, such patrols himself, because he is
principally responsible for observing the enemy, and one sees more with one’s
own eyes than through others.
} 12
Another method for gaining information about the enemy is through detach-
ments of 15 to 20 horses with very able and enterprising officers, which are
sent by the commander of the entire detachment into the flanks and rear of the
enemy army to sneak around and report on what is going on behind the army.
This, however, cannot be undertaken under all circumstances.
} 13
Such detachments gather most of their information from the inhabitants. Of
course it is not always true, but the sheer quantity allows one to compare and
to draw in the end the most certain conclusion. Thus, it is very important for
the commander to make acquaintances in the region and to endear himself to
the population.
The reports that one receives from actual spies also belong here.
The means of providing information for the army are thus:
1. Proper spies.
2. The inhabitants.
3. The observations made by the small posts themselves.
4. Patrols and reconnaissance.
5. Everything the detachment has come across.
} 14
What we have said thus far concerned primarily the way in which the detach-
ment fulfills the purposes for which it has been established. Now we must say a
few things about its own safety. For even if one were to think that a detachment
had been dispersed and to a large extent destroyed by the enemy columns, yet
nevertheless thereby achieved its purpose of informing the army of the enemy’s
112 My Lectures on Small War
arrival, one will still try to avoid such mishaps as much as possible. Indeed, a
partisan will have the ambition of losing as few men as possible.
None of the means we have discussed thus far for detecting the enemy’s
arrival are sufficient for preventing the detachment from being completely
destroyed, being ambushed, etc. Hence, it must deploy the necessary field
guards near its position in order to detect the enemy at some distance. This
will not be difficult during daylight and only a few guards will be necessary.
Since such detachments are often so small that after the redeployment of the
distant posts there are insufficient men left for a proper field guard, they have
to be content with mere sentinels, which during daytime are usually sufficient,
especially if one deploys two in opposing directions.
But it is different by night. On the one hand, a small detachment cannot
deploy enough sentinels to prevent the enemy from stealing in. On the other
hand, a closely linked chain of sentinels often is insufficient for the security of a
strong detachment because the enemy advances simultaneously and the detach-
ment, even if it were alert, would have insufficient time to mount its horses.
In such cases there is no better response than to change position. Such a
detachment marches out during the night and often assumes another position
or, when the season is quite raw, remains together in some remote barns.
CONDUCT OF A DETACHMENT DU RING
MARCHES AND CANTONMENTS
}1
If a detachment undertakes a long march, it must conduct itself in a different
manner than a patrol, which remains close to the army. While underway, it
must assume and secure its camp and quarters. This subject shall be dealt with
here. The purposes for which the detachment is sent out at a greater distance
are quite diverse. The following are the most common.
1. To occupy outlying locations.
2. To reinforce distant corps.
3. To search for the enemy and deliver intelligence about him.
4. To pursue his march.
5. To conduct small offensive actions against bridges, depots, convoys, etc.
6. To neutralize individual posts, detachments, couriers, etc. in the rear of
the enemy army (clandestine marches).
7. To collect foodstuffs, contributions, weapons, clothing, etc.
Conduct during Marches and Cantonments 113
Where appropriate, we will discuss the conduct of these individual tasks to
the degree to which special mention is warranted. But here we limit our
discussion to the conduct during marches and cantonments that is common
to all these detachments.
}2
A. Marches. 1. Ordinary
We have already discussed in connection with the field guards what an officer
has to observe before decampment; what he has to take along.
On the avant-, arrière-garde, and the side patrols.
}3
In completely open terrain, the avant-garde consists exclusively of cavalry. In
varied terrain and in woods, of cavalry and infantry. The more varied the
terrain, the more infantry, yet always some cavalry for communication.
}4
Likewise, the side patrols ideally consist of cavalry unless defiles are expected,
in which one would leave infantry positioned, or the terrain is altogether too
difficult for cavalry.
These are of two types. Very close to the detachment some men search
secluded areas in order to prevent a lateral attack. This is only necessary when
the enemy is in the vicinity. At a greater distance, stronger patrols march along
the nearest routes left and right, in order to gather information on whether the
enemy is located in the area.
(Example from the area of Berlin.)
}5
In retreat, the arrière-garde consists ideally of both infantry and cavalry and if
possible of one or a few mounted artillery. When advancing, infantry is
sufficient for the arrière-garde, yet some cavalry should be present.
}6
Never march without any avant-garde. It is extremely dangerous to proceed
along a single street if one has to retreat and was so careless as not to have an
arrière-garde while advancing.
}7
The strength of the avant-garde depends on the strength of the detachment. ⅙
for strong, ⅓ for very weak provide rough ratios.
114 My Lectures on Small War
}8
When retreating, the arrière-garde is at least as strong as is the avant-garde
when advancing. The latter [when retreating] is a bit weaker.
When retreating, the arrière-garde is central.
}9
The strength of the side patrols depends on the size of the area they have to
search. If no less than six men, they are more reliable.
(In some cases, 6 men can be the side patrol for 1500 men and can cover
them as effectively as could 50 men. If, however, the area that the side patrol is
intended to search is vast, then it is better to strengthen it. For a detachment of
1500 men, for example, it could comprise 20 men without any difficulty, which
would not be the case if the detachment were only 30 men strong. Moreover,
sideward deployments from weak detachments do not create such difficulties
because they do not serve the same purpose; hence the detachments are not
afraid of dividing their strength.)
} 10
The distance of the avant-garde depends on the area and the position of the
detachment. An avant-garde deployed far ahead has the following advantages.
1. It is easy to come into battle formation. This is not so important here.
2. One can choose a good position. This is very important.
3. One can retreat from a dangerous area.
4. One can create a hideaway.
5. One can retreat in a timely fashion.
6. One can more easily secure supplies.
These advantages depend on very timely information.
The disadvantages of an avant-garde deployed too far ahead are:
1. One loses sight of them.
2. One attracts the enemy.
From these observations follows the rule that:
The avant-garde should never be so close that an attack is possible; never so
distant as to lose sight of it. If a detachment is not at all supposed to engage
with the enemy, then an avant-garde deployed far ahead is good. If, however,
its purpose is in some sort of attack, then the avant-garde should not be
deployed any further to the fore than security demands. This is precisely the
case when the detachment intends to slip through enemy lines. At night, weak
detachments must have their avant-garde very close in front of them, stronger
detachments can push them further forward as circumstances allow.
Conduct during Marches and Cantonments 115
} 11
The distance of the side patrols is even more difficult to determine in the
abstract. If the detachment is supposed to return, as is the case for all
detachments that are sent out for information, for collection of contributions
and requisitions, then it has to cover its considerably extended flanks. If it is
supposed to reinforce a remote position, then the side patrols proceed only as
far as the security of the detachment requires. If the detachment is supposed to
undertake an offensive action against enemy posts, then a part of the army
often moves forward to guarantee its retreat. Then there is no need for it to
weaken itself through side detachments. If the detachment proceeds at a larger
distance and does not return right away, as is the case for all who operate to
the enemy’s rear, it should send out its side patrols only so far as is necessary to
inform the detachment about the enemy’s presence in a timely fashion in
order not to be attacked. By the way, such detachments march clandestinely.
We will return to clandestine marches below.
In spite of these differences in purpose, one nevertheless can assume the
usual distance of side patrols to coincide with the nearest roads and villages.
Villages are particularly important, since their inhabitants can provide add-
itional intelligence.
A detachment that was sent from Gross Ziethen to the area of Tegel in order
to provide information on the enemy, certainly will visit and perhaps even
occupy Charlottenburg with a side patrol. The same detachment sent to
reinforce the corps at Tegel will not dispatch to Charlottenburg unless neces-
sary, so as not to attract the enemy, and it will not march via Britz and
Rixdorf without having a side patrol on the road from Köpenick to Berlin.
A detachment sent after the enemy from Ziethen across the Spree to Rosen-
thal will not only patrol the nearby villages because some ambushes might
have been positioned there, but will also occupy the crossings as soon as
it has passed the river and send side patrols to Jungfernheide along the
Hamburger Straße in order to find out whether the enemy has not marched
to Tegel as well. The same detachment, sent out to requisition in the villages of
Niederschönhausen, Panko[w], and Reinikendorf, will have to secure itself in a
similar fashion through side patrols, which occupy Jungfernheide, Weissensee,
and Heinersdorf. The same detachment sent out on the road to Oranienburg
in order to attack convoys to the rear of the enemy army will cross the river
Spree during the night close to Charlottenburg and position some men on
the other side in order to observe Charlottenburg quietly. It is self-evident
that the strength of the side patrol influences its route and distance from the
detachment.
116 My Lectures on Small War
} 12
Conduct of the Avant-Garde and the Side Patrols
The avant-garde and the side patrols form a front line and side troops. Once
the front line comes upon the enemy without being discovered by him, it stops
right away and if one man stops, everyone stops.
By day, the commander of the avant-garde interrogates the population of
the area as to the enemy. By night he has to rely on his ear. Ewald recommends
that the officer place himself at the front and often hides along the way in
order to destroy enemy patrols. One night he captured in this manner 7
American officers, among them one major, all of whom were sent by the
commanding general with written orders to arm the country folk. This service
was extremely important.
Diligent and appropriate reporting is one of the most important obligations
of the avant-garde.
Detached units must not lose sight of the main unit. (What this means)
An avant-garde under pursuit never retreats directly toward its detachment.
(The conduct with regard to defiles, villages, woods, etc. was dealt with in
the discussion of patrols above.)
} 13
If an avant-garde repels enemy vedettes and field guards, it is necessary to take
great care while pursuing, and only if the field guard finds itself in a decidedly
inferior position is rapid advance appropriate.
} 14
Arrière Guards
(Arrière guards usually remain closer to the detachment than avant-gardes.
This lies in the nature of things.)
1. They may not be located further than the time necessary to bring the
detachment into battle formation, should the enemy advance.
2. They must always be divided into two components that withdraw
alternatingly.
3. They never pause unless necessary.
4. They must not lose sight of the enemy as long as he is in the vicinity.
5. The commander is present.
Conduct during Marches and Cantonments 117
} 15
In heavy fog one marches as in the night, that is, one draws all the detached
troops closer to oneself. (The fog is more dangerous than the night: firstly,
because it deceives the eyes; secondly, because one does not hear well.)
} 16
Routes, Guides
The officers who command the avant-garde and side patrols must know the
route along which one is supposed to march to the extent possible, and to ask
for a list of the villages that one wishes to pass. They have to take along guides
from village to village (preferably woodsmen and shepherds), who guide them
and try to orient themselves with a map.
} 17
If there is a danger of encountering the enemy, it is safer to march on back
roads. Small detachments often can do so without great discomfort.
} 18
Even with small detachments, the order of the march is not of the same
importance as with armies. Yet, in most cases, it will be most appropriate to
march with the infantry to the fore, the cavalry to the rear and the artillery in
between.
} 19
One keeps the detachment as close together as official regulations suggest and
does not allow anybody who is not ill to fall out or to remain behind. In return,
one takes 3, 4, or 5 short breaks during every daylong march.
} 20
Should the avant-gardes and side patrols encounter the enemy, one hastens to
deploy his detachment concealed; (to hide it;) if there is no other possibility
right in the middle of a village, pushed close together. Previously one started
marching. This closed and concealed deployment allows all combinations,
eases retreat, etc. The rest is here out of place.
} 21
While the detachment is pursuing its objective, from time to time (at least
once a day) it sends information back to the army, if this can be accomplished
without danger, in part to give notice of its own fate, in part to share the
information that has been gathered on the enemy.
118 My Lectures on Small War
} 22
Absent any obstacles on the path of the enterprise for which we are under-
taking the march that could cause us to turn around at the outset, we cannot
allow ourselves to be deterred easily by difficulties that concern only the
march. If the direct route is blocked, one often can get through by back
roads. It is often said that the road is closed when the enemy either is not
there or only weak. Often one can attack unexpectedly a sizeable detachment
and open the path. Through strenuous marches one often can take an indirect
route and happily get through. All these are alternatives that one has to think
of before turning around too soon only then to be admonished and ridiculed.
Examples:
1. [sic!] One enemy corps stands in the vicinity of Rosenthal, another on this
side in the vicinity of Tegel. Two battalions, three cannons, and three squad-
rons are to march from Spandau to Küstrin. The enemy patrols up to the area
of Berlin and Köpenick.
1. Marching route
It goes via Charlottenburg, the Hallesches Tor, Rixdorf, Köpenick,
Mahlsdorf, etc. The detachment spends the night in Köpenick, as it set
out only after noon.
2. Situation in general
One fears the enemy has been informed of the detachment’s march, has
crossed the river Spree, and has concealed itself in order to attack and
destroy it. One has little to fear from the right side; yet one has to remain
vigilant.
The avant-garde has been equipped with one squadron and one
company of fusiliers in order to send out side patrols when necessary.
Because it is not the objective of the detachment to search the area, it
does not split up further but rather contents itself with small troops left
and right to guard against assault.
Because one will not arrive in Rixdorf long before the onset of evening,
one has to march the last mile to Köpenick with great caution: partly
because of the night, partly because of the terrain.
3. Instructions of the Commanding Officer to the Officer of the Avant-
Garde
You begin to march a short half-hour before the detachment.
It is your responsibility to survey the area all the way to Rixdorf, in
order to prevent the detachment from falling into a trap; or to encounter
the enemy unexpectedly. You advance only to Rixdorf and await there
the detachment. You occupy the Spree river crossings with some caval-
rymen until the side troops of the detachment arrive. From time to time
Conduct during Marches and Cantonments 119
you report back and inform me even if one has not learned anything
about the enemy. As soon as you arrive in Rixdorf, you send out small
patrols towards Köpenick.
4. Conduct of this Officer according to the General Instructions
Under the command of an officer, he sends out 10 infantrymen and a
number of Hussars from Spandau to Grunewald and from there to the
Fasanerie and the Hallesches Tor.
1 non-commissioned Officer and 6 cavalrymen to Charlottenburg with
the order not only to patrol the village but also to search for the enemy
beyond the bridge. As soon as he arrives with the avant-garde in Charlot-
tenburg, he sends one officer with ten infantrymen and twelve cavalrymen
to Berlin, in order to patrol the Tiergarten and to occupy the Berlin Bridge.
This is achieved by a few cavalrymen who stay until the main detachment
occupies the bridge with a side troop. The rest of the side patrol moves
through the city via Bergmüle and Treptow toward Rixdorf.
The officer sends a patrol of 6 or 8 infantrymen and a few cavalry from
the Hallisches Tor to the Hasenheide, which stretches from there to
Rixdorf.
As soon as the officer of the avant-garde arrives at Rixdorf, he inquires
about the road to Köpenick. He discovers that two roads exist: one via
Johannisthal, the other along the Spree.
At the same time he learns that an enemy infantry detachment had
arrived in Köpenick at noon, but that one does not know whether it has
stayed there and how strong it is. The officer at once dispenses sentinels
around Rixdorf and informs the commander of the detachment. Then he
sends out two small patrols toward Köpenick, which are only three or
four men strong and have been ordered to inquire about the enemy at
the next houses they come across, and to return as soon as they have
some certainty of the enemy’s presence in Köpenick.
1. The entire detachment is assembled in Rixdorf, the patrols report that
only one enemy infantry patrol had been in Köpenick but immedi-
ately had left the village.
Hereupon, the commander of the detachment decides to march
toward Köpenick as soon as possible. Having heard that the route
via Johannisthal is not difficult, he chooses it. He sends ahead one
officer with one infantry company and 20 cavalrymen on the main
road with the order to occupy immediately the bridges and to deploy
forward posts towards Mahlsdorf and Friedrichsfelde. This officer
simultaneously serves as side patrol. Another patrol proceeds via
Johannisthal. Smaller patrols follow the larger at a distance of
600–800 paces. The avant-garde now remains at a distance of
300–400 paces from the detachment and only individual flankers
120 My Lectures on Small War
ride through the shrubbery right and left along the way. One marches
with the greatest silence and order. If an ambush has been planned
against the detachment, it will presumably be triggered by the avant-
garde along the main road, leaving the detachment enough time to
retreat.
As soon as the detachment arrives in Köpenick, patrols are sent out
in the same night to Mahlsdorf, Kaulsdorf, and Biesdorf, which bring
the necessary information for the next day.
2. Information is received that Köpenick is heavily occupied by infantry,
while the patrols have covered the area to the gates of the town
without having encountered the enemy.
If he could be certain of the Fürstenwalde passage, the officer would
rather decide to go via this route than attack Köpenick. Nonetheless,
he would like to know whether the enemy is indeed in Köpenick and
whether he perhaps is not so weak that he would leave the town upon
our approach.
Therefore, he marches with the detachment to Johannisthal and
sends from there 100 infantry volunteers and 20 horses to Köpenick
with the order to advance across the bridge into the town, unless they
find it impossible. If the attack fails, the officer of the avant-garde has
the order to retreat to Britz, in order to mislead to enemy while he
himself marches via Fürstenwalde.
If, however, Fürstenwalde, is occupied by an enemy corps and thus
there is no hope of crossing the Spree at that point, an attempt should
be made on Köpenick.
Thereupon, the commander of the detachment is to approach the town
as clandestinely as possible and to attack the garrison if possible.
He inquires whether it is possible to cross the Wendische Spree with
cavalry. His intention in this case is to march to Rudow, allow his cavalry
to cross the ford, then, however, continue to march with the infantry
along the Spree via Schöneweide and suddenly attack the town.
But having heard that the Wendische Spree cannot be crossed, he
keeps the detachment together and marches with caution up to a
location 600–800 paces in front of Köpenick. There he holds up in the
woods and forms an avant-garde that suddenly assaults. If the attack
fails, the detachment retreats via Adlershof and Britz.
He informs the commanding general in Spandau of this decision.
3. Information is received that the enemy has been seen with cavalry
and infantry on the road from Köpenick to Berlin; that a quarter of an
hour from Köpenick a number of vedettes were present and that some
of the houses have been found to be deserted. The commander of the
detachment no longer risks advancing by night instead deciding not
to move through the varied terrain of Köpenick before daybreak.
Conduct during Marches and Cantonments 121
He takes his security measures in Rixdorf and sends patrols of 10–12
infantry and 5–6 cavalry along every road at the break of dawn.
He does not march before he is certain that the enemy is not in
Köpenick and the adjacent area. If this not the case, he awaits orders
from Spandau.
2. Clandestine Marches
Notion of Such Marches
} 23
If one is supposed to attack, assault, or reconnoiter a position, it is only natural
to conduct one’s march as clandestinely as possible. This is usually not very
difficult. Usually, such marches take place at night. One has to pass the
enemy’s chain of posts, the position of which is vaguely known, and to
avoid the enemy patrols, whereby, of course, much depends on chance. But
there is another kind of march that has to be conducted in particular secrecy
and is more difficult. It involves marching through areas that are under the
complete control of the enemy and lasts for several days. Such marches often
occur:
1. As measures against enemy convoys.
2. Against bridges, depots, etc.
3. For the elimination of individuals.
4. For the gathering of intelligence.
5. In the retreat of detected detachments.
(In civil wars, the arming of the nation, etc. such circumstances are more
frequent than otherwise was the case with armies. If they now seem to be less,
or not at all, common to armies, we nonetheless should not believe that they
have lost their importance. On the contrary, they have gained in importance.)
In addition to the organization of the marches, some additional rules apply.
} 24
On the Organization of the March If One Intends to Conduct
It as Secretly as Possible
The avant-garde, side patrols, and the arrière-garde are very close to the
detachment and only at a distance that can be secured against an actual attack.
Hence, one marches with greatest discipline and stops as often as one senses a
danger.
122 My Lectures on Small War
(What is lost in terms of security must be replaced by exertion. It is not
possible to sustain this exertion and vigilance during a march. Therefore, one
keeps one’s detachment, wherever possible, far ahead of oneself and to the
side. Where circumstances do not allow this, one has, of course, to accept the
momentary exertion.)
} 25
Time, Route, and Further Conditions
1.1 One marches, wherever possible, during the night and rests by day in
the woods.
1.2 One takes the most concealed routes.
1.3 One arranges for the delivery of supplies from the nearest villages or
individual houses to a location where one does not intend to remain and
does not reveal the entire detachment; this ideally occurs in the evening.
1.4 Also, one takes the guides by night, wherever possible from separate
houses, and does not release them until they no longer can do any damage.
1.5 The information one hopes to secure must be extracted from the
country folk.
1.6 If, by chance, one is discovered by inhabitants, one detains them until
they no longer can cause any damage. Since one is dependent on them to
such a great extent, a friendly treatment, money as much as one can give,
and ultimately even threats that one could take revenge through murder
and setting fire, are necessary means for reaching one’s objective.
(If one is unable to pay for foodstuffs, one must at least issue
generous receipts, and the guides must never be released without
having been rewarded.)
1.7 If the season is so unpleasant as to render the open air unbearable, then
one has to establish quarters in a nearby barn.
1.8 One often and suddenly changes the direction of one’s march and
positions oneself vis-à-vis the inhabitants as if one had quite different
intentions than truly is the case.
(If one does not do so, despite all caution, one will be eliminated,
because the enemy receives information in any case and the main issue
is therefore that he does not know where to find us.)
1.9 Ewald recommends discretion and to inform only a few individuals of
the march’s aim.
Example:
An army has advanced from Magdeburg via Plauen and Brandenburg to
Berlin and encamps from the river Havel to Wusterhausen. In Plauen, large
Conduct during Marches and Cantonments 123
amounts of foodstuffs and ammunition are stored in order to be loaded onto
ships. An average sized corps (6000–8000 men) has proceeded on the right
bank of the Havel toward Spandau in order to cover these supplies. It has the
order to retreat to Brandenburg and Plauen if the opposing army advances
with superior force. This opposing army stands between Berlin and Spandau.
Its general has been informed by a trusted spy that Plauen is occupied only by
a weak battalion, further weakened by detachments that have been deployed as
forward posts against Ferchesar, etc. It is late fall. A partisan of this army
receives permission to take action against Plauen. He intends at some distance
to circumvent the right flank of the enemy army with 50 cavalrymen and 100
infantrymen and to attack Plauen from a side where no enemy is expected.
Preparation
1. Men and horses are selected.
2. Every man takes along ten Congreve Rockets.51
3. Bread and feed for three days.
4. The officer receives a good special map and 100 Louis d’or.
5. He receives written instructions on his mission in which only the
purpose is specified, whereas the means are left to his discretion.
March that Could Be Undertaken by this Officer
The Frankfurt Road to Fürstenwalde. In the evening, the officer crosses the
Spree here or at an earlier point and marches during the first night on the
other side of Lake Scharmützel to Neuen Mühl, where he arrives at daybreak.
He sends one man into the town who presents himself as a deserter and
inquires as to the enemy. He returns with the information that the next
quarters are in Storkow. Since the officer still has foodstuffs and is very close
to the enemy army, he remains in the woods during the day without disclosing
himself. He decides to break camp in the evening and to advance to Teupitz. In
the second night he arrives at the Hermsdorf forest station. There he learns
from the forest ranger that Teupitz is occupied by a detachment that has
issued requisition regulations for the area. He declares his intention to destroy
this detachment, but marches during the same night through the Teupitz
Forest and arrives by morning near Halbe. He keeps the guide who led him
there close by for the entire following day and talks with him about routes to
Lübben. If he has sufficient foodstuffs, water etc., he remains undetected in the
woods and breaks camp around evening and in this third night marches
5 miles to the vicinity of Luckenwalde.
51
The Congreve Rocket was originally a British military rocket designed by Sir William
Congreve in 1804, inspired by the armies of Tipu Sultan and his father, who was of the Kingdom
of Misore in India.
124 My Lectures on Small War
This location is not occupied by the enemy. The partisan hears that the next
quarters are located in Belitz and Trebin. He assumes position near the
Lindenberger Mühle, and sends someone in the night there to bring back
enough grain for 2 or 3 days. He also takes as much bread as possible and pays
the miller for both. He keeps the miller with him for the entire day and
threatens to shoot his family if he is betrayed. The miller serves as a guide
during the next night and he rewards him when he releases him.
He intends to march during the fourth night to the vicinity of Brück and
Belzig but learns that a considerable corps had arrived at Belzig and Brück in
order to proceed on the next day to Potsdam. Thereupon he decides to go only
to Treuenbrietzen and to stay there in the woods until the march has passed
by, and then to approach within one mile of Plauen by means of a forced
march of 7 miles. He intends to hide here until he has gathered information
through a number of disguised men about the position of the posts and
especially about the means to cross the canal, in order to attack then according
to circumstances by day or night so as to disperse him and to set the depot in
flames. He decides to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy while
retreating along the right bank of the Havel and then to return to the army on
the other side of the Havelland Lowland through the district of Ruppin.
B. Cantonments, Camps, and Bivouacs
} 26
The issue here is conduct in cantonments, quarters, camps, etc., but only to the
extent that these are intended to provide rest for the troops. Such rest can be
enjoyed only if it does not impede the very tactical and strategic purposes. The
issue is above all security and a few other things. In this regard, those rules
must be observed that are meant to secure the foremost goal. Otherwise,
however, the true tactical or strategic purpose of the cantonment, quarter,
camp, etc.—for example the defense of the location, taking up of forward
posts, etc.—should not be mentioned here any further, as it was dealt with
above under small defensive posts.
} 27
Cantonments
Cantonments assume a higher degree of security than bivouacs and camps. If
an entire detachment can be accommodated at a single location, the difference
is not that great. If one is forced to divide up, the difference is considerable.
The enemy’s proximity and danger alone, however, do not determine whether
or not to establish bivouacs. If the detachment is very exhausted, its
Conduct during Marches and Cantonments 125
maintenance not easy, aggravated perhaps by very harsh seasonal conditions,
then one might be compelled to settle in cantonments under great danger, or
at least to separate so as to establish bivouacs in small villages.
Of importance here are the conditions to which the commander of a
detachment, which has established cantonments in one or several locations,
should direct his attention.
} 28
A. The Individual Quarters
BEFORE ONE MARCHES INTO THE QUARTERS
1. One sends in advance the quartermaster sergeant (furier) and his men as
early as possible, if possible with three officers. The first secures the
quarters, the second the foodstuffs, and the third surveys the area in
order to position the forward posts. If the quartermaster and his men
arrive at the same time as the avant-garde then the latter officer also
serves as commander of the avant-garde.
(These three officers retain this duty for a length of time.)
2. When the detachment arrives, it comes to a halt, either as a whole or in
parts. The guards are brought forward. The orders are distributed.
These must include:
2.1 How the troops are to behave in the quarters at night.
2.2 The time of decampment in case the march is to continue.
2.3 The place of assembly.
2.4 The point to which one will retreat if attacked.
} 29
SECURITY MEASURES
1. The forward posts and patrols usually only close, the next bridges and
nearby defiles. Patrols, field guards.
2. The entries into the village are blocked, with the exception of two entries
opposite one another. If place and time require doing the same with
distant entries, security is greatly increased, provided that the barrier is
kept under observation by a guard.
(Means for blockade: Wagons, rocks, haystacks, trees, abatises, etc. etc.)
3. Assembly places. Already have been mentioned. Cannons and equipment
are brought up behind the villages to the side not directed at the enemy.
} 29 [sic!]
ADDITIONAL MEASURES
1. Division of duties among the officers.
Already has been mentioned.
126 My Lectures on Small War
2. Reports and guides. One has to compare several statements with one
another. Several guides for the next day. Reasonable men.
} 30
CONDUCT UNDER ENEMY ATTACK When a detachment is not intended for
defending the location it must have another purpose assigned to it that it must
try to fulfill as soon as possible if the enemy approaches the quarter, engaging
the enemy only to the extent that it is unavoidable. The following principles
thereby always are important.
1. The disposition is simple to the highest degree.
2. It is based less on defense than attack.
3. One tries to secure a concealed position.
4. The route of retreat in every case is precisely predetermined.
5. One marks the paths one would have to march with Strohwische.52
} 31
REGARDING THE VARIOUS SERVICE ARMS Cavalry needs more time to assem-
ble than infantry, and artillery more than cavalry. Therefore, the infantry must
be assigned the most dangerous quarters if different troops are in the same
cantonment. However, one tries to avoid this because of the disorder that
easily can develop.
} 32
If one cannot accommodate all of the troops, usually the cavalry is ordered to
assume bivouacs, partly for reasons of security, partly because infantry
marches are more arduous.
B. Rules to Be Observed When Taking Up Several Quarters
} 33
If one cannot be accommodated in a single village and if one has to take up
cantonments, the following issues are important.
CHOICE OF QUARTERS
1. One tries to reach a town in which one can stay together.
2. One tries to reach a piece of terrain behind which the quarters enjoy
some security if one mans the entryways.
52
A Strohwisch is a bundle of hay attached to a post of roughly one meter length used by
farmers to demarcate territory.
Conduct during Marches and Cantonments 127
None of this is possible if it leads to detours. For as regards marches,
advance is the chief objective.
3. Wherever possible, one chooses a quarter close to the road and thus
rather positions the troops behind instead of next to one another.
} 34
ORGANIZATION OF THE CANTONMENT
1. The quarters next to the enemy are assigned to the cavalry, the furthest
to the artillery. (If the terrain suggests a well-founded reason for deviat-
ing, that would be different.) The reason for observing here a rule that
runs contrary to those in Large War is that a small detachment is only
capable of providing resistance if all service arms are kept together. It is
much easier for the cavalry to retreat without serious losses toward the
infantry than would be the case vice versa. (Moreover, this does not
contradict } 20.)
2. If bivouacs are taken up at several points, one can leave the cavalry and
infantry together, if the infantry is not weakened too much by this partition.
3. The commanding officer remains in a quarter close to the enemy.
} 35
1. One remains together until immediately prior to quartering and desig-
nates for the following day, when the march is to continue, the rearmost
or the foremost quarter for Rendezvous depending on whether one is
moving forward or backward.
2. If possible, the villages are chosen during the morning Rendezvous and
quartermasters sent there in advance. These are best taken from the
cavalry.
3. A unified arrière-garde or avant-garde commanded by a select officer
constitutes the forward post vis-à-vis the enemy. If there are impedi-
ments to access then infantry is introduced. Otherwise it consists solely
of cavalry; but where possible, one or two mounted artillery. Besides
these unified forward posts, every quarter deploys its own guards and the
commander of the same is responsible for security.
4. Orders are given prior to the dispersion of the troops. The orders include
the following:
4.1 The Rendezvous for the following day and if one is advancing an
additional one in case of enemy attack; the rearmost or middle
quarter being best suited.
4.2 The hour of decampment.
128 My Lectures on Small War
4.3 The general terms of the following day’s march. In case the com-
mander has reason to keep it secret, then he will advise only the
individual quarter commanders or in an emergency remain silent.
5. Upon encampment, every quarter dispatches to headquarters a young
courier (Ordonanz), who remains there.
6. If there is no reason to conceal one’s march, patrols are dispatched
toward the quarters that one intends to assume.
} 36
1. If the enemy attacks a quarter during the night, then it retreats as well as
possible to the Rendezvous but at once informs the nearest quarters and
headquarters.
2. One agrees on signals that, in event of emergency, will allow one to
communicate one’s location by night. Three shots, two in rapid se-
quence, the third somewhat later.
} 37
Camps
Although camps provide more security than cantonments when an entire
detachment is in the same locality, cantonments are nevertheless to be pre-
ferred in this case because one can provide for security through vigilance and
the troops prefer a bad cantonment to the best camp. Troops are ordered to set
up camp only if it is essential to maintain them in a specific location that is
devoid of houses.
} 39 [sic!]
Setting up a camp for 24 hours is hardly advisable since it requires material
and time. If one remains at a location for a longer time, material for building
huts needs to be secured. Straw and wood. (Thus, camps are more commonly
used by great armies than in Small Wars.)
} 40
Bivouacs
They provide the highest degree of security. Since the men are not supposed to
undress here, and are not protected against the weather, one should avoid
allowing the troops to bivouac too often and for too many nights in a row,
which one commonly feels compelled to do in Small Wars due to the enemy’s
proximity.
Attacks and Assaults on Small Posts 129
} 41
1. Bivouacs and camps near villages are quite commodious for small
detachments, but the proximity of the woods is even more important.
2. One should not camp or bivouac on a meadow without good cause, as
Vegetius maintained.53
3. Next to the proximity of wood, the proximity of water is of utmost
essence; in summer it is key; at most ¼ mile.
} 42
When choosing a bivouac in most cases tactical considerations are determined
first by its purpose, although most of the time a concealed deployment will
fulfill all of them.
A T T A C K S AN D A S S A U L T S O N S M A L L P O S T S
A. Purpose of Such Undertakings
}1
We will deal here only with such measures as are undertaken for the sake of
the post itself; that is, with appropriate but also superior numbers of troops.
Attacks on small posts, which occur during the general advance of entire
columns, do not require much preparation. Nevertheless, the following par-
ticularities can be specified:
1. One enjoys a disproportionate superiority.
2. One seeks to remove the barrier constituted by the enemy post as fast as
possible.
3. To inflict as much damage on the enemy detachment as possible is only a
secondary purpose.
From this follows the subsequent guideline:
If the front of a column encounters an enemy forward post, then the chief
objective is to clear it out of the way quickly, to overwhelm him more through
vigorous advance than through maneuvering, and to inflict losses more
53
Flavius Vegetius Renatus was a Roman military writer of the fourth century.
130 My Lectures on Small War
through hot pursuit than through circumvention and annihilation. Cases in
which a single guard post can be annihilated, and our advancement thereby
concealed from the enemy, do not belong here. But it is hard to annihilate
entire detachments without word getting out.
}2
If, however, the attack of a small post is not the consequence of the general
advance, then there must be another reason for the undertaking.
Usually, such undertakings have the following purposes:
1. If the enemy post poses a burden, which is often the case with forward posts.
2. If the position is particularly threatening and crucial to the conduct of
the undertaking it invites attack.
3. If one intends to take revenge on the enemy for similar losses suffered.
4. If the enemy post is intended to defend important objectives that could
be taken thereby, such as bridges, warehouses, depots, generals and other
important persons.
5. If it occupies a location important for the operations.
}3
In general, we can say the following about the purpose of such undertakings:
1. The loss of troops, which one thereby inflicts on the enemy, is never
decisive and can become significant only through repeated raids of
this sort.
2. If the campaign is very quick, undertakings of this sort may be rare or
completely absent. If defending, one does not have the opportunity since
one’s hands are full with the necessary general measures. If attacking,
one does not have the time necessary for such undertakings since more
important measures can be adopted.
Only when roughness of terrain, shortage of men and foodstuffs,
sieges, fear of the enemy, etc. compel or necessitate the attacker to
proceed less adventurously, more carefully, and hence more slowly, is
there enough time remaining in both cases for such small undertakings.
3. The intention to instill courage in one’s troops and to provide combat
experience without the danger of great losses through small undertak-
ings of this kind, over which one always maintains control, causes one to
think of such undertakings, which go beyond the cases addressed in } 2,
more than would otherwise be the case.
Attacks and Assaults on Small Posts 131
Almost all authors have regarded this game of Small War as excellent
training for the troops, as one has the opportunity to ruin the enemy’s
troops through frequent alarms and to instill the spirit of terror in them
through individual successful raids.
One should not forget, however, that this already implies superiority
over the enemy, for otherwise he would not allow this to happen. Rather,
he would try to take revenge immediately following the first undertaking
through similar measures.
4. In cases of national mobilization (Nationalbewaffnung) and defense, as
Spain is currently mounting and Tyrol has mounted, in cases of civil war
such as the Vendée, nearly all battles are attacks against small posts or at
least these are the most common. The Landsturm are unable to do much
else, which provides them with the greatest security. The countless posts,
which he who seeks to hold a hostile and rebellious nation must main-
tain, provide ample opportunity.
B. Rules for all Cases. Superiority
}4
Such undertakings are usually carried out with great superiority of force in
order to secure success. The gain that can be achieved thereby is not substan-
tial enough to warrant exposing oneself to the danger of great losses.
It is carried out with equal or weaker forces only if one has no more at one’s
disposal or if the detachment that is supposed to undertake the attack is not
near the army. Partisans, who undertake operations of this type, are often
compelled to attack many with few troops.
It is most opportune to do so when the detachment, which is supposed to be
attacked, has not yet arrived and one has the chance to locate a concealment
behind the position it intends to take up.
In any case, the weaker the attacking detachment, the greater must be the
speed of execution and cunning of the plan.
}5
If such an attack is to be carried out, one usually is not content with a force
two, three, or four times as strong, but also designates a substantial unit of the
army’s troops that moves forward in order to be able to absorb one’s attacking
detachment in the event the undertaking fails, and to provide means for any
unforeseen eventualities. The enemy, by accident or purpose, could have
placed his troops between our detachment and the army, etc. etc.
132 My Lectures on Small War
}6
In most cases, nothing can be done without a number of reliable persons with
precise knowledge of the area. One cannot rely on even the best specialized
maps, the more so as one is considering an attack.
The individuals of which one avails oneself have to be relatively intelligent
human beings; otherwise they will not be able to understand the idea. It is
much better if the commanding or other officer knows the region. Neverthe-
less, one cannot do without the people from the region entirely, since the
execution of the entire plan often depends on great detail. It is good to have
more than one such person. One should mind them well, promise them a gift
if they are not too noble, treat them well, etc.
Besides knowledge of the locale, knowledge of enemy measures is required.
Usually, such undertakings are based on reports that one receives about the
enemy’s negligence, and usually these are the best.
Depending on whether the operation is smaller or larger, more or less an
attack, it is more or less important to have specific knowledge of enemy
positions. Regarding attacks on smaller quarters, outposts, etc., which can
evade attack with the slightest notification, approaching undetected depends
on knowing the position of the outpost, vedettes, etc. Reliable spies from the
lower classes have to secure here the necessary information and when possible
they should accompany the operation. It is easily said that one needs spies, but
they often are difficult to secure. In addition to the information provided by
proper spies, one also receives information:
1. From disguised men sent out to proceed and await us at a certain point.
2. From people from the region where the enemy is located; or who have
lived there; or were born there. Such people almost always are found in
the countryside within a few miles of the posts.
3. From deserters.
4. From envoys.
}7
Secrecy is of the utmost importance for such undertakings. Whoever wishes to
carry them out must conceal them until the very last moment; otherwise they
will be disclosed to the enemy despite the best of odds. Since no additional
measures are required, in most cases it is not necessary for the one with the
idea to share it with others; and it is nothing more than common human
loquacity when such secrecy is not observed. If it is a principle of such
undertakings not to inform anyone of anything prior to the moment of
execution, or none other than those persons who absolutely have to know,
Attacks and Assaults on Small Posts 133
because they have to provide information, etc., then it is the duty of every
officer assigned to a superior officer to guard closely the secret that has been
entrusted to him. Nothing is as unmanly as loquacity.
The troops that are needed for the operation should receive their orders
either while decamping or even better during the march.
Regarding other means of concealment, the following is to be observed:
1. That the march itself is carried out clandestinely. (See clandestine marches.)
2. That one tries to conceal the decampment of the troops since this most
certainly informs the enemy spies that something is going on. For this
reason, if one cannot march by night, many have advised beginning the
march after exercising.
C. On Proper Assaults
}8
Almost all attacks in Small Wars are carried out by means of assault because
they are operations of small components of the army against other small army
components. If the enemy were to learn about the operation before its
execution it would be sufficient for preventing it. Even if he were to learn
about it during execution, one would have to fear in many cases that he will
have set traps for our returning troops.
The real assault differs from assault-like attacks, insofar as one does not
want to take the position but rather to benefit from the confusion in order to
take prisoners and loot, to destroy something, etc. and then quickly remove.
It is even more necessary to assault the enemy one intends to attack if one is
oneself so weak that success can only be found in the enemy’s confusion.
Remarks on the effects of assaults on morale—enemy troops are fatigued;
terror is easily spread amongst them.
}9
The best time for assaulting is:
1. At night; more precisely, in the middle of the night, not in the early
morning, as is the case with substantial and large operations, for which
one only uses the night to approach undetected.
2. If it is supposed to occur by day, midday would be best, as people are
cooking and usually least likely to be thinking about the enemy. Some-
times the enemy’s security is enhanced by falsely alarming him during
the previous night and thereby only exhausting one’s own troops.
134 My Lectures on Small War
} 10
The difficulties that one has to overcome in the conduct of assaults tire the
common soldier. Other conditions serve to facilitate the assault.54
1. Stormy weather, snow flurries, rain, severe cold.
2. Through continuous alarms, one can lull the enemy.
3. If one discovers in advance that the enemy intends to take up a position
and can place oneself in a concealment behind it.
4. If one comes across a post that has just arrived and neglected to deploy
sentinels.
5. If one slowly retreats and quickly reappears from another side.
6. If one can approach the enemy unexpectedly through vigorous marches.
This is where the operations of partisans belong.
} 11
Weapons That Are to Be Used
Cavalry and infantry are almost always combined.
1. The infantry marches less noticeably; thus, at the moment one reaches
the enemy one can approach him herewith undetected.
2. By shooting, the infantry can, under certain circumstances, inspire
terror. It can intrude into houses, tents, and huts more easily.
3. The cavalry is necessary for taking prisoners; it can easily disperse
assemblies; its speed increases chaos and terror.
Artillery is not employed in very small operations. It would offer little
assistance and only run the risk of being lost. If such a detachment neverthe-
less comprises artillery, then it is best employed to provide rear cover or in that
section that moves against enemy support.
Artillery is only necessary for positions one intends to maintain.
Also if one has to pass through and occupy defiles on the way back.
Finally, in all larger operations which could not be decided by night battle.
Infantry can always be used alone. However, in open areas one cannot
proceed too far, either because they cannot march fast enough or because one
54
The original text is here opaque. The alphabetical numeration in the original text is
confusing. The translators have tried to reconstruct Clausewitz’s thinking from the principal
text and relevant marginalia in his own hand.
Attacks and Assaults on Small Posts 135
has to worry a great deal about the retreat. Except in very mountainous areas,
cavalry can be employed alone. One uses then whatever arms one has at hand,
combines both when both are present, and provides light cannon only in
special cases.
} 12
Order of March
1. The avant-garde consists of infantry, is very weak, and very close to the
detachment. Only if the detachment is very big should a part of the
cavalry be close to the avant-garde in order to achieve something
through quick intervention in the event it is detected too early.
2. At the front of the avant-garde the most trustworthy men, whether
officer, non-commissioned officer, or private.
3. Envoys, under the watch of two men, with the avant-garde.
4. The infantry to the fore, the cavalry to the rear.
} 13
Defiles that have to be passed must be occupied with some troops, even only a
few. In the worst case, if the enemy disperses them in our rear, they will be able
to inform us, through gunfire or otherwise, of what is transpiring and we can
retreat via another path.
At the same time a unit is sent to thwart anyone who might come to the aid
of the enemy.
It occupies those defiles through which the enemy could advance, or makes
them impassable. Without these precautions one could be assaulted while
assaulting.
Neither precaution is to be neglected unless:
1. The assault is decided in the very first moment.
2. The enemy cannot immediately move forward to the Souccours.
} 14
1. One assaults the enemy from several sides and tries to cut off his
retreat.
2. One first has to separate into several units only if one has already come
close to the enemy. In cases of small operations that are only calculated
for immediate terror and are quickly decided, it is hardly possible to act
jointly and with the highest degree of precision if the columns are
136 My Lectures on Small War
divided from the start and follow different routes. Thus, one circumvents
the enemy position together and separates into multiple units when one
comes near to the enemy position.
3. The avant-garde remove their shot because a careless gunshot can easily
spoil everything. Whether one should allow the remaining troops to
shoot or not is disputed. What is certain is that one should shoot as
late as possible and only deliver a general salvo at a very close distance.
The fire causes terror and distress. If one is detected, then one pursues
the enemy with great speed and in many cases arrives together with the
guards or patrols and assaults.
4. One divides one’s troops into many units, for which one appoints
exceptional commanding officers, who coordinate with one another or
rather must cohere.
5. One designates, if one is not too weak, a unit to receive the prisoners.
6. One agrees to a signal by which one can be identified.
7. One designates a place of assembly or two, to which one retreats after the
attack.
8. One designates a signal with drums, horns, etc. for retreat.
D. On Assaulting under Particular Circumstances
} 15
1. Assaulting an outpost
For this, cavalry is most appropriate. Infantry will rarely take many prisoners,
which is the purpose. In highly varied terrain and against infantry, one surely
can make use of infantrymen, but several cavalrymen will be very helpful in
such cases.
1.1 One does not divide oneself into too many units.
1.2 One races with greatest speed toward the enemy.
1.3 One detaches against enemy Souccours only under special circum-
stances, simultaneously establishing a rearguard. It is best to be
absorbed by other troops advancing from the rear.
1.4 One beats retreat as soon as possible and withdraws along different
paths and wherever possible through woods.
Attacks and Assaults on Small Posts 137
} 16
2. Assaulting an open quarter
2.1 The detachment is divided into as many units as there are exits and
in addition, one unit is designated to proceed against the Souccours
and another for the prisoners and for later assembly.
2.2 One provides the commanders of the individual units as much as
possible with a sense of the position and character of the locality.
2.3 If the cavalry and infantry are united, then every unit is composed of
both service arms.
2.4 A unit is never entirely disbanded. About one third is designated to
storm the houses if the enemy is still in them. This is infantry; weak
cavalry units of three or four men chase through the streets to take
individuals prisoner. The remainder of each unit stays together at
the entrance or other suitable point so that the enemy cannot readily
escape and takes charge of the prisoners who are immediately
delivered to reserve units. If the enemy has already assembled at a
given location, then the remaining combined component of the unit
advances toward him with bayonets.
2.5 One of the units is sent toward the market, the main guard station,
or wherever else the enemy’s place of assembly might be.
2.6 A number of designated men are immediately sent out toward the
commander’s quarters.
2.7 If the enemy has erected entrenchments near his quarters, then the
main rule is to observe these with a part of one’s forces to prevent
anyone from retreating to them. To remove them would cause
unnecessarily delay, although in most cases it would not be that
difficult.
2.8 In this case gunfire should be avoided as much as possible, even if is
impossible to prevent it entirely.
2.9 Every infantry unit carries with it some axes in order to remove
obstacles.
} 17
3. Assaults on fortified locations with Escalade.55
3.1 They are usually only successful if one had the opportunity to hide
in near proximity to the location.
55
An escalade is a storm ladder.
138 My Lectures on Small War
3.2 Other useful means, such as disguises, wagons, ships, etc. are well
known. One cannot come up with an exhaustive list but anyone who
is capable of conducting such an operation will easily find the means
demanded by the circumstances of the particular case.
3.3 Here it is dangerous to concentrate one’s entire detachment in the
town and to focus exclusively on the markets and squares. The
example of Cremona demonstrates that nothing is won if the gar-
rison assembles on the wall and remains its master.56 Because of the
concentric and eccentric effects, the point is rather obvious. Thus,
regarding fortified locations, one is well advised to leave a gate
occupied once one has taken it; to allow the cavalry to chase through
the streets; also to send some weak infantry detachments through
the streets in order to shoot and to search for the superior officers in
the houses; to advance against the wall with the remaining troops
immediately and from here to direct one’s assault on the enemy.
3.4 Since nailing up the cannons57 is essential, some of the troops, prefer-
ably from the artillery, must be specifically designated for the task.
3.5 The remaining issues should be dealt with in the same fashion as
open locations.
} 18
4. Assault on a position covered by a wide river.
4.1 The security that such a post believes itself to enjoy provides the best
opportunity to assault it and to do so with even fewer men, which in
any case is necessary, because otherwise one could not approach it
undetected.
4.2 In addition, the proximity of the magazines, bridges, depots, etc.
provides good reason to attempt such assaults; for if one wants to
undertake measures against such targets one often has to overcome
difficulties such as crossing a wide river or covering a great distance
without being noticed, etc.
4.3 The means of crossing a wide river once the enemy has seized the
ships for himself, as is always the case:
4.3.1 Fords; often the widest rivers have them.
4.3.2 Row boats of fishermen; those the enemy overlooked.
4.3.3 Row boats that are brought over land from nearby rivers.
4.3.4 Flotation devices.
4.3.5 Swimming.
56
Clausewitz refers to the battle of Cremona where French and Spanish troops defeated
Austrian troops under Count Eugen of Savoy in 1702.
57
That is accomplished by hammering a thick jagged iron nail into the vent.
Concerning Attacks without Assault 139
One of these means is almost always available.
5. The assault of several quarters.
We can deal here only with those that are carried out by small detach-
ments, namely partisans. Here the following issues are essential.
5.1 Quick and concealed marches.
5.2 Assault in the rear; when possible the rearmost quarters first.
5.3 Disruption of guard posts and patrols.
5.4 If one was successful with a bold attack on a second one, better not
one of the next nearest.
5.5 To intimidate those not yet under attack.
CONCERNING ATTACKS WITHOUT ASSAULT, OR,
WHEN THESE ARE MERELY INCIDENTAL
} 19
The actual assault is associated with the intention to use the initial terror, the
chaos, and the gloom to inflict heavy losses on the enemy, to take prisoners, to
seize cannons and other loot.
If the intention is to take and hold the position from which the enemy is
expelled, then we are talking about attacking a stronger detachment, and in
order to expel it or to inflict heavy losses, we ourselves have to use a consid-
erable detachment. In this case, the mere effect of an assault is not enough.
Even if it is very advantageous or necessary to start an operation with an
assault, as has been previously discussed, one has to adopt those measures that
are necessary to continue the battle by day and to assume the presence of a
more or less well-prepared enemy.
It is very difficult to approach an enemy with a strong detachment without
detection and in most cases he will be prepared to receive us or even will have
achieved full readiness.
} 20
Therefore, such an assault has to be conducted according to the rules of Large
War. What distinguishes one from the other is the following:
1. The great superiority with which one can arrive, and which one tends to
exploit, enables one more or less to cut off the enemy posts’ retreat.
2. In most cases this is the purpose of such assaults as otherwise they would
not be worth the effort.
140 My Lectures on Small War
3. As it is impossible in Large War, either in the offense or defense, to
dispense with any of the service arms, so it is here as well; but one usually
employs more cavalry
3.1 because it is essential to destroy the enemy detachment upon his
retreat;
3.2 because speed in the execution is essential and because one can move
forward and retreat more quickly with cavalry than with infantry.
Finally, one takes along less artillery, because one cannot be delayed
with a large number of gunners.
4. The entire skirmish must be decided more quickly and thus conducted in a
more rapid and bold spirit than is the case in battles and larger engagements.
5. If one is not strong enough to approach the enemy from all sides, then
one attacks his rear with the entire detachment, for a detachment is not
as easily truncated as is an army.
} 21
Examples
1. From Hoya, page 174, Scharnhorst’s pocketbook.58
2. Attack and ambush of the French corps under General Glaubitz near
Emsdorf in Hesse. With Captain Rozière’s map.59
ON AMBUSHES AND CONCEALMENTS
} 22
Ambushes can be used for many purposes. They also can be effective as a kind
of offensive defense. In most cases, however, they are attacks on small enemy
detachments and thus they take their place next to assaults.
} 23
Because troops that are positioned in a concealment are usually quite exposed,
these can be used successfully only under specific circumstances and can be
dangerous if they fail.
Under the following conditions, the ambush is better suited than other
types of assault:
58
Scharnhorst (1980: ch. 2).
59
Hahlweg (1966–90: vol. 1, 409, fn. 21) indicates that Clausewitz refers to survey maps of
Hesse from the year 1760.
On Ambushes and Concealments 141
1. If one intends to attack a small detachment on the march.
2. If one intends to attack a detachment that is assuming position.
Convoys and foraging almost always fall under 1 and 2.
3. If one intends to destroy small detachments completely, which include
patrols.
4. If one intends to halt a pursuing enemy.
5. If one intends to punish an enemy that harasses our forward posts.
6. If one intends to eliminate single persons in the rear of the enemy army.
These goals are unlikely to be achieved by means other than an ambush. As
a condition, we have to add, however, that the terrain needs to be suitable.
} 24
It is no longer as common as it used to be for detachments to march without
due precaution; in this regard one has become much more prudent. Conse-
quently one will have fewer opportunities to achieve something through
ambushes. Nevertheless, the following issues are to be considered:
1. If one can position oneself with superior strength in a concealment, then
even if the enemy detachment were to be careful and detected us, one
would be able to conduct an advantageous battle, to take prisoners, etc.;
and since on the other hand, the danger to oneself of suffering losses is
not great, it is worth such an attempt.
2. Many environs have to be searched with extreme diligence, such as
woods, mountains, etc. If one places an ambush here, one can indeed
be detected if the enemy sends out side patrols. Detection need not be
inevitable, rather is more by chance, and hence in such regions there is
still a chance of success even against a careful enemy. In such areas the
retreat also is not too much at risk.
3. As a rule, convoys and foragers should be attacked from ambushes; if one
is detected, one still enjoys every advantage of a direct attack.
The recurrence of such circumstances is the reason for the continuing
use of ambushes, insofar as armies wage Small War at all.
4. They are almost always successful when the enemy is in hot pursuit.
5. They are necessary when the enemy harasses our forward posts. There is
almost no other effective means of punishing him.
6. For this it is advisable to place a lure, for example, a field guard, a patrol,
etc. that entices him to follow.
142 My Lectures on Small War
} 25
The danger that is associated with an ambush is great:
1. If the enemy is quite superior and we are detected.
2. If the ambush has been disclosed and the enemy has the opportunity to
encircle it with superior force from all sides. Therefore, ambushes in
enemy territory are less advisable than in one’s own.
} 26a
Combined cavalry and infantry are best for ambushes; although each of them
can be used separately as well. United they provide the advantage:
1. That the enemy can be thrown instantaneously into chaos with very
close and unexpected fire, which cannot be accomplished through cav-
alry attack. Cases in which one can place the concealment so close to the
road, however, are today seldom.
2. That one accomplishes more by shooting at the cavalry than by the
attack itself.
3. That infantry is easier to conceal than cavalry; that they more easily take
up arms, etc.
4. That one takes prisoners with the cavalry and the enemy’s initial retreat
is turned into stampede.
5. That in retreating the service arms protect each other according to
whichever is favored by the terrain.
} 26b
The most important rules that have to be observed in the conduct of ambushes
are the following:
1. Secrecy of the forward march.
2. Supply of bread, water and fodder.
3. No neighing horses.
4. Trustworthy men.
5. If one intends to destroy the enemy completely, two or three units are left
in the concealment. If one is very strong, one divides into units. If one
fears one might be detected at several nearby locations, then one places
one unit significantly to the rear. If it is not intended to completely
encircle [the enemy], it is at first not a matter of sheer numbers and the
On Retreat 143
approaching soutien certainly will have a strong effect, because the
enemy will be convinced that we are strong in the vicinity.
6. One must not strike out too soon and the men must be strictly
instructed.
7. One conceals some smart men as sentinels who send out an agreed-
upon signal upon enemy contact.
8. One agrees upon a signal for the assault; another one for retreat. One
determines a location for the retreat.
9. One detains anybody one suspects of having taken note of us.
10. The moment one is detected, one thrusts oneself, without any further
planning, upon the enemy.
11. If one is detected too early by enemy patrols without previously having
been revealed, one often will have enough time to escape, and because
the enemy is uncertain about our strength and the distance of our other
troops, he will not engage with us in the first moment. In this case, the
infantry is sent forward and the cavalry tries to cover the retreat as well
as possible.
12. If it is too late and the enemy is encircling us, one attacks the unit that
blocks our path. Thus, at least some individuals will escape. Losing the
unit is no worse for the supply chief and the army’s esprit than
capitulation.
ON RETREAT
}1
The retreat in Small War quite appropriately deserves its own chapter:
1. Because it often occurs.
2. Because often it must be carried out under difficult circumstances.
3. Because it provides the best opportunity to distinguish oneself.
}2
The first and perhaps most important question is when one should retreat.
Retreating too early from an important position is very dangerous for the
commanding officer’s reputation, even if the army suffers no further damage
as a result. But the cause of premature retreat is not always a lack of good will
and eagerness, but quite often a false appraisal of the situation and timidity.
144 My Lectures on Small War
It is very difficult if not impossible to determine through abstract rules
whether in the individual case the time is right to retreat, but some caveats
nevertheless might be possible and appropriate here.
}3
1. A detachment that is supposed to observe the enemy whenever possible
must not retreat without having seen the enemy.
2. Absent evident danger of being cut off, such a detachment must not
retreat so far as to lose sight of the enemy.
3. The fear of being cut off is the most common ground for retreat. Very
few detachments are intended to defend themselves to the utmost. Thus,
this fear is well founded and reasonable. But the problem in such cases is
that one judges the danger to be much larger in advance than it later
turns out to have been and that having given in to the fears of the
moment, one later must admit that one was too timid. Such timidity is
hardly advisable and in many cases one incurs the greatest blame
through early retreat. The only rule that applies here appears to be the
following:
Never retreat from a position on the basis of rumor, or rely on the
statements of country folk, refugees, etc., but rather confirm the danger
with a patrol. If one is convinced that a short delay would lead one to be
cut off completely, and if one has not been ordered to defend the post at
all cost, then one can call the retreat in good conscience. The retreat
easily can be justified.
4. One must be aware, as always in war, but especially in this situation,
that the enemy will do everything he can. This assumption inspires
incredible fear. But first, one should remember that the enemy cannot
do everything he is capable of at once; further, that he does not know our
position and all of its disadvantages, as we do; and finally, that in most
cases he will not do what he could and should, because in war, more than
is otherwise the case, the execution falls short of the theory. Thus,
through the theoretical prediction of what the enemy will do, one
acquires an inflated estimation of one’s own danger. Consequently, the
rule is:
Always base one’s behavior on those things one knows rather than
those one believes it necessary to assume.
5. One should not ask subordinates for advice since they undermine the
best resolutions with their own ideas.
6. If a post is to be defended to the utmost, one must surrender any idea of
retreat.
On Retreat 145
7. Much as an early retreat is not very honorable, likewise it is not laudable
to give up the idea of retreat entirely if this is linked to danger. I will not
allow myself to completely rule out capitulation, but I regard the follow-
ing remark to be necessary:
If ever one finds oneself in the sad situation of having to think about
capitulation, then one should consider what would happen if one were to
charge the enemy or to allow one’s men a disorderly retreat.
So much for reasons for retreat.
Principles for all Cases of Retreat
}4
1. The main objective is to escape. If one can march, one should not be
delayed by foolish rules of parading.
2. One must not, on the other hand, run away from every enemy Hussar
out of fear if one has just paused to allow the men to rest.
3. One has to inspire, as far as possible, respect in the enemy, so that he
does not advance recklessly.
On the Various Cases of Retreat
}5
The diversity of these cases originates primarily in the distance of the retreat,
the service arms that are retreating, and the terrain.
1. A retreat within sight of our army does not present great challenges;
although it provides an opportunity to distinguish oneself. A courageous
resistance of short duration is demanded.
1.1 Cavalry alone. We assume a great superiority of the enemy cavalry.
The enemy will try either to cut us off before the army can come to
our support, or to chase us so that we arrive entirely disbanded and
confused. The only way to prevent this is to break up into two or
three units and in case of emergency to hurl oneself blindly against
the enemy, thus perhaps preventing a too rapid pursuit or at least
allowing an honorable defeat.
1.2 Infantry alone. In woods, between hedges, etc. the infantry will
rarely come into great danger. In the plain, mass is the only means
146 My Lectures on Small War
of rescue. In case of close support, the danger for such masses is not
too great. Here everything depends on the quality of the troops.
1.3 Both arms united. Insofar as we are discussing small detachments
and the proximity of support, the cavalry may never abandon the
infantry, even if the terrain is not entirely suitable for it. One
dismisses redundant cavalry only if one has more than can be
accommodated by the terrain. One would do the same if the
enemy cavalry were far superior to our own and could annihilate
it easily in full view of the infantry.
}6
2. The retreat of an isolated detachment if it is several hours away from
any support.
Such a retreat within sight of a superior enemy is undoubtedly the most
difficult task in the entire art of war; and therefore, only a few rules apply:
Alone in the plain, infantry masses or if there is more than one
battalion instead creates several groups. They surround themselves with
sharpshooters and try to gain terrain to the rear as well as possible. One
stands still only if the enemy is so close that any movement would create
the expectation of chaos, and first scares him away with rifle fire.
If one were pursued only by infantry, the danger would not be that
great. But the appropriate order always would be to mass. If, however,
one is pursued by cavalry, everything depends on the quality and for-
tuitous steadfastness of the troops. History provides a number of ex-
amples of infantry withstanding cavalry. In such moments, this should
inspire courage in the infantry and since there is no other choice, nothing
else can be done but to think about the possibility, proven by experience,
of a successful resistance. Perhaps it also can be demonstrated historically
that there is even the possibility of fortuitous success for the infantry if
the cavalry lacks artillery.
Mounted artillery is the chief means of providing access to the battal-
ion’s masses. An easy success is quite natural under such circumstances.
Nevertheless, one should not believe that everything is now lost. Artistry
certainly won’t do. But this much is certain: if the masses are dispersed
into an unorderly crowd by artillery fire, this crowd nevertheless will be
able to resist the cavalry by holding close ranks. For the orderliness of the
formation in any case is not decisive.
This observation is intended only to help those who find themselves in such
an unlucky situation and to remind them that everything is not yet lost and
that such cases have occurred in the past.
Infantry in varied terrain. The most advantageous terrain is undoubtedly
the forest. The denser the better. A defile, if it cannot be circumvented, would
The Superiority of Infantry vis-à-vis Cavalry 147
end the pursuit. But if this is not the case, defiles are of little value, unless one is
so strong that a small unit can be sacrificed to save the rest. Mountains, woods,
and meadows. If the infantry is able to reach such terrain, it is usually safe.
If one has artillery at one’s disposal, then one enjoys a great advantage
because one can keep the cavalry at a much more respectful distance from
oneself.
VERBAL OBSERVATIONS O N THE SUPERIORITY
OF INFANTRY VIS-À-VIS CAVALRY
1. From the sheer probability60 that the infantry can withstand the cavalry
the general superiority of the former does not follow. The cavalry enjoys
the same advantage if we turn the argument around.
2. If the infantry were in general a superior branch of the army, the cavalry
would not need to feel embarrassed, since it is superior in some
particular cases.
3. The fact that the infantry under normal circumstances is as likely to
succeed in its resistance cannot intimidate the cavalry. For on the one
hand, it has the prospect of completely destroying the infantry if things go
well, whereas it can never be destroyed completely, even by the very best
infantry. On the other hand, war provides hundreds of thousands of cases
in which one had to act against all odds of success, namely, when nothing
better could be done. Very very [sic!] much could be said about this.
Although it has been argued that experience, demonstrating that the infan-
try can withstand the cavalry with a certain probability of success, should be
withheld from the cavalry, and that one must demonstrate to them the
opposite so that they do not become intimidated, the argument is one-sided
and utterly baseless.
Position of Several Massed Units
a and b are two units that defend one another; the riflemen and cannons can
be placed at c.* [See Figure 7.]
(Regarding the positioning of guns in the units and the mutual defense of
massed units.)
60
Hahlweg notes that the following remarks, up to *, were added later by Clausewitz to the
margin of the main body of his lecture notes.
148 My Lectures on Small War
Figure 7. Positioning of Massed Units.
Source: Clausewitz (1810: 165v.) Copyright © Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster,
N. Clausewitz 4,001.
1. Cavalry alone. If it is pursued by a superior cavalry and does not wish to
be destroyed or cut off, then it will always find it necessary to hurl itself
repeatedly with the greatest determination against the nearest part of the
enemy cavalry. There are few rules governing the use of the terrain.
However, it is certain that troops concealed by a narrow point along the
way can achieve great effects.
Mounted artillery renders great service here.
2. Both service arms united
2.1 In the plain
One assumes that a superior cavalry is pursuing, as otherwise there
would be no great danger. Two cases are to be distinguished.
2.1.1 If there are very few infantry but much cavalry. Then one has to
send back the cavalry, as General Lukner once did, in order to
save it.
(Remarks on the ignoble spirit of such measures. It is still
regarded as acceptable for a general, but never for the cavalry
regiment itself.)
2.1.2 Few cavalry but substantial infantry. Then the above rule
applies again, because then the few cavalry, if they are not
placed directly under the protection of the infantry, will be lost
immediately. If one can place them amidst the infantry so that
they cannot be attacked by the enemy cavalry without also
attacking the infantry, then they will contribute to the infan-
try’s protection. This requirement is not easy to meet, yet there
are cases and arrangements that have a fair chance of success.
For example, if four battalions are positioned as indicated in
the figure [see Figure 8], so that a space of 400 paces remains
in the middle, one certainly could accommodate some squad-
rons. (Considerations concerning this.)
If, however, this arrangement is also deemed too dangerous
and one sends the cavalry away, it may not go too far, leaving
the infantry utterly alone. It retreats until the enemy cavalry
ceases to menace it with great superiority and then it stops
again. If they are pursued only by a small part of the enemy
The Superiority of Infantry vis-à-vis Cavalry 149
Figure 8. Positioning of the Cavalry amidst the Infantry
Source: Clausewitz (1810: 166r.) Copyright © Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster,
N. Clausewitz 4,001.
cavalry that is not too strong, then they attack it. In this way
the cavalry will be useful to the infantry, even at a distance.
2.2 In varied terrain
Here, in most cases, it will not be necessary to abandon one service
arm for the other.
Although when the enemy is not pushing too hard one is well
advised to send the infantry forward in order to gain terrain, one
nevertheless has to place the cavalry behind the infantry the moment
one could come to blows with the enemy.
}7
On the Advantages of Mounted Artillery
during Such Retreats
1. The artillery is an extremely effective service arm in every retreat because
it keeps enemy fire at a distance, owing more to perceptions than actual
effects. On the other hand, it has the disadvantage that it provokes the
enemy to take risks, because a captured enemy cannon is always a
shining coup.
2. If the artillery is mounted, the danger of losing it is slight since it is as
agile as any other unit and in addition has the great advantage that man
and horse work alternatingly and thus one is rested if the other is tired.
3. If one wants to exploit every advantage of mounted artillery upon retreat-
ing, then one has to employ it with the Prolonge.61 (Verbal elaborations.)
61
According to Hahlweg, a prolonge is a rope fitted with a hook and used for towing a gun
carriage.
150 My Lectures on Small War
Marching Retreat over Several Days
}8
For small detachments such retreats are not as common as they are in Large
War. Yet a detachment can find itself in the position of being pursued by a
superior enemy and be compelled to march retreat for several days to the army
or to a fortress.
Here one has to pay due regard to the following issues:
}9
One marches by night if one:
1. Intends to sneak through completely undetected, or
2. Otherwise has the intention to march secretly to gain a head start on the
enemy, to take an unexpected path, etc. In short, to get out of his sight.
3. Needs to avoid the heat.
Under normal circumstances, however, one is better advised to march by
day.
1. Because marching by day is less tiring and can be conducted more
orderly and thus more quickly.
2. Because during the night there is less danger of having one’s rest
disturbed by the enemy.
3. Because during the night one may venture a skirmish with the enemy
with less danger.
} 10
If severe cold does not prevent it, one bivouacs. In every case, one positions the
bivouac near a village, or even better, close to a town, to facilitate rapid
delivery of supplies.
If one is too numerous to be sustained by a single village, one divides into
two or three units and positions them in the vicinity of the next three villages.
One does not march into the bivouac before complete darkness and one
leaves it after daybreak or once the men have had enough rest.
Four to five hours are enough for a rest. If the men are well fed and if one
pauses for an hour several times during the march itself, then one always will
be able to cover seven to eight miles and perhaps more, every 24 hours.
} 11
One takes along as many wagons as one can procure.
The Superiority of Infantry vis-à-vis Cavalry 151
1. To carry away the exhausted, so that the drifters do not all fall into the
hands of the enemy.
2. To carry stocks of foodstuffs, mainly meat.
The wagons are changed in every quarter, if possible, but the used ones are
not abandoned unless one has replacements.
} 12
Securing foodstuffs is essential.
Thus one dispatches an officer with some soldiers to requisition the neces-
sary number of rations. One requisitions double the amount one needs, to be
certain one hasn’t received too little.
The rations can consist of beer and wine, brandy, of bread, cooked and
smoked meat, and cooked vegetables.
One should only take raw food in case of emergency.
In addition to those rations that are delivered to every nighttime quarter,
raw foodstuffs are delivered so they can be carried along and be available in
case of hardship.
} 13
If possible, the wood is delivered in advance so that the men are not fatigued
by the need to fetch it.
The fodder for the horses is collected in one, two, or three barns, where it is
distributed. The number of the barns follows the number of the squadrons,
batteries, etc.
} 14
Since one is only bivouacking, one does not need many forward posts.
1. One leaves some Hussars a half-mile behind the bivouac, who signal
upon enemy approach, avoiding detection by him. This is the simplest
forward post arrangement and is completely sufficient here. (why?)62 If
one can leave stronger detachments behind to serve as forward posts and
arrière-garde all the better.
2. One places infantry sentinels at a distance of 1000 paces around the
bivouac.
3. One sends patrols toward the enemy and the region to which one intends
to set out the next morning.
62
The “why?” appears in the original lecture notes. Presumably this was a cue to remind
Clausewitz to elaborate on the reasons why this arrangement of the forward posts is sufficient.
152 My Lectures on Small War
} 15
1. One retreats along the shortest route and refrains from taking a detour
on the basis of every rumor. Should one in this way come rather close to
the enemy, it will nevertheless be possible to evade him through a strong
unexpected march to the side.
2. If one unexpectedly encounters an enemy detachment, it is better to
throw oneself at him resolutely than to lose time with a detour.
Ewald says if you don’t run they won’t chase you and tells a story from
the American War, when he was in the rearguard foraging. Riflemen
were hot on his heels such that he could not move on. He at once
frantically charged against them, struck some of them down, and had
his peace.
3. If the enemy with the front of his avant-garde is so hot on our heels that
we are delayed thereby, then one hides in ambush with the entire cavalry
in the next best defile and assaults the front line upon its arrival.
Ambushes always play a large role in retreats. They are the only means to
earn the enemy’s respect.
As the army of Prince Heinrich retreated toward Dresden in the
campaign of 1758,63 the arrière-garde was harassed in the area of Kes-
selsdorf by Austrians, Croats, and Hussars to such an extent that they
could not move on. Lt. Colonel Belling64 hid with his Hussars in an
ambush in a village located to the side. While Meineke’s dragoons and an
available battalion from Wunsch engaged them head-on and lured them
out, Lt. Colonel Belling assaulted them from behind and took 2000
prisoners. That helped.
4. If one is very weak, escape is easiest if one frequently changes the
direction of one’s march.
} 16
1. The infantry always at the front and the cavalry and mounted artillery
remain behind.
A retreat of several days requires a certain head start. Hence, it is very
unlikely that the entire detachment becomes engaged. Rather, it will be
only the front of the enemy column and our arrière-garde that always
deal with each other. If the cavalry is delayed in this way, it nevertheless
easily can catch up. This is the reason it stays behind.
63
Clausewitz refers to an episode of the Seven Years’ War.
64
Wilhelm Sebastian v. Belling (1719–79), Prussian Hussar general under Frederick
the Great.
On Breaking Through 153
2. One has to familiarize oneself as well as possible with the region through
which one is going to pass:
2.1 With maps.
2.2 Through interrogation.
2.3 Through scouts.
3. If one fears that the enemy could reach a pass prior to us, then one has to
resort to extraordinary measures and load part of the infantry onto
wagons, even if only a hundred men, sending them ahead, and to hold
the commander responsible for the success.
In many, indeed most, cases, the enemy will believe nothing more can be
done, since we have preempted him.
4. Good envoys must be cared for on the evening of the march; they have to
remain in the bivouac at night.
} 17
ON BREAKING THROUGH
This is one of the most glorious acts of war; it is the best way to a great
reputation.
One breaks through if one attacks an enemy detachment, which has placed
itself on the path of our retreat, and either completely defeats it, or at least
throws it into such chaos that one finds the opportunity to pass it.
Naturally, this can only be accomplished by assault; and usually, this will
only be possible by night.
One always chooses to break through at night; not only because the enemy
is assaulted more easily at night, but also because he who wishes to escape can
do so better by night than by day.
If one considers that there are only a few cases in which a detachment is
encircled in such a way that it encounters enemy defenses on all sides, as this
requires a quality of terrain that is rare; if one considers that chaos is inevitable
in every battle during the night, but in most cases is more advantageous to
those breaking through than to those who seek to prevent it; and finally, if one
considers the advantages of a completely unexpected attack—then it becomes
understandable how an undertaking, which at first sight appeared to be the
boldest in the entire realm of warfare, nevertheless is so often successful, as
history shows us.
} 18
The following rules are to be observed:
1. Divide the ensemble into several columns and divisions in which all
service arms are present and place a clever commander at the top.
154 My Lectures on Small War
If one directs the columns to different positions one probably has the
chance to break through with one or more. But one should not suspect a
collective effect of such columns. Strength alone is of little value in such
cases; it is easier to break through with a small division than with a
large one.
2. The arrangement of the columns should be such that the infantry is at
the front, the cavalry follows, and the artillery brings up the rear. If there
is freight and the like, this follows at the very end. This and the artillery
are not of primary importance.
3. Under no circumstances should the infantry unreel, and when fighting, it
must fight in closed ranks.
4. The commander of these columns should become familiarized, as much
as possible, with the location of the villages and the route of retreat.
5. All men should be informed of two points of retreat, to which they
should proceed if they are cut off.
6. If a column is repelled in battle with the enemy, it may not retreat to its
point of departure.
7. Perhaps remove the ammunition.
Examples:
1. In the year 1760, six hundred French infantrymen and one detachment
of cavalry were attacked at Nordheim by Major Bulow of Freitag’s
infantry corps with a half-brigade of riflemen (Jäger) and two hundred
and fifty cavalrymen. The cavalry galloped away, the infantry assembled
in a churchyard and started to retreat through a gate, in front of which
eighty cavalrymen had already taken position. The infantry had formed a
quarrée65 and the eighty men had not the courage to attack. The quarrée
retreated into the mountains without loss.
2. Just how much the determination of a few men can achieve is demon-
strated by an example from the Seven Years’ War.
In 1758, while retreating from Moravia through Bohemia, the Cuirassier
Regiment Bredow from the Retzow’s column, which constituted the
arrière-garde, was attacked in a defile by 1100 cavalrymen under the
command of General St. Ignon. At this point, Lieutenant Korzhagen
from the Zieten’s regiment arrived with fifty Hussars. He was sent from
the king to Field Marshal Keith with correspondence. He seized the
opportunity and while pursuing, resolutely attacked the Austrians’
65
A quarrée is a rectangular formation.
On Breaking Through 155
flank. Bredow’s regiment caught its breath, reorganized, joined the
attack, and took three hundred prisoners.
3. In the year 1758, after the battle of Zorndorf, General Wedel marched
against the Swedes and learned that a detachment had advanced via Fehr-
bellin in order to forage. Hereupon he advanced with Möhring’s Hussars
and Plettenberg’s dragoons and encountered 100 cavalrymen and 200
infantry at the village Tarnow, half a mile from Fehrbellin. The hundred
horses bravely charged against the Prussians, but were immediately scat-
tered. The infantry, however, had time to form a quarrée. Herewith they
were able to retreat happily to Fehrbellin, which was located at the end of a
long causeway, and the attacks of the Prussian cavalry were to no avail.
4. Example of Menin.66
In the year 1794, the fortress Menin, originally a strong structure built
by Vauban but later ruined and now in a very run-down condition, was
occupied by two thousand Hanovarians under the command of General
Hammerstein when General Pichegru arrived in Flanders.
The position was rather more a bad retrenchment than a fortress, and
a defense of a few days was possible only through great effort and
exertion, because almost everywhere the enemy could enter the town
over the walls without hindrance and thus could only be deterred with a
defense à force de bras.
On April 26, the locality was surrounded by a column of twenty thou-
sand men under the command of Generals Moureau and Vandamme.
General Hammerstein resisted until the 29th by keeping the garrison
almost always on the walls. Two demands [for surrender] were refused.
The English army stood at Courtray. That of Clairfait at Mouscron.
On the 26th, Courtray was taken by the French. The defense of Menin
depended on whether or not General Clairfait, who stood at Mouscron,
would be defeated by the French.
The garrison in Menin was stretched to the limit. The enemy ad-
vanced closer to the wall every day with his snipers and columns. The
garrison’s ammunition was running short and the danger of being taken
by storm increased day by day.
The garrison consisted of:
the first Hanoverian Grenadier Battalion 354 Men
two Battalions of the 14th Hanoverian light infantry regiments 1148
one Battalion of loyal immigrants67 400
1902
66
The siege of Menin in 1794 was an early French victory during the campaign in Flanders.
67
Abbreviation of note from Hahlweg: A unit of French immigrant mercenaries paid by
England.
156 My Lectures on Small War
General Hammerstein decided to hesitate no longer and to break
through in the night of the 29th–30th.
Observations
1. The cannons caused the first and greatest disruption of order. Since in
such cases they are not central to the operation, one is well advised to
leave them in the rear.
2. If the two Battalions of the 14th Infantry Regiment had been in columns
and remained that way, then the enemy would not have been able to
scatter them, even if he had surrounded them.
3. If one had had the chance to divide into two columns, the outcome
would not have been so bad. The first column would have marched along
the path taken by the immigrants, the second along the street. Then only
the second would have encountered misfortune, the first would have
escaped without difficulty. No doubt chance played a major role, how-
ever chance is always in play, and if one has two columns, as a rule one
makes it through better than the other.
ON PU RSUIT OF THE ENEMY WHEN H E RETREATS
}1
We are not dealing here with the way in which those circumstances, which
induced the enemy to retreat, can be exploited to compel him to accelerate his
retreat to the utmost. This is usually the task of the army or larger corps and
not a matter of Small War, but rather of strategy. By pursuit of the enemy, we
mean the harassment and hindrance of his march that makes his retreat more
arduous and leads to larger losses.
}2
Either the army’s avant-garde or a specific detachment is ordered to follow the
enemy so closely that it can detect and exploit every mistake of the enemy,
capitalizing on the disadvantages that are related to the retreat, in order to
inflict heavy losses on him. If the terrain is completely flat, one employs
cavalry and mounted artillery, but since this is seldom the case when a
march lasts for several days, the infantry is only rarely completely dispensable.
The infantry becomes more important the more the terrain is varied and in
real mountains, it is the main weapon and is only supported by the cavalry.
On Pursuit of the Enemy When He Retreats 157
}3
The great disadvantages, to which the retreating side is subjected, comprise:
1. The troops are dispirited. Ewald argues that much can be achieved with
soldiers during pursuit and nothing during retreat. He was never short of
volunteers in an emergency, regardless how tired the men, but while
retreating received from even the bravest of men no more than that to
which they were obliged.
2. As retreats are usually strenuous marches, there are always many strag-
glers. The pursuer doesn’t have any fewer, but he doesn’t lose them as is
generally the case with the retreater. The result is a large number of
captured.
3. Although the retreater has more opportunity and means to arrange for
his provisions, his men are nevertheless less well fed than those of the
pursuer. For if it is relatively crowded and dangerous, then the retreater
rarely has the time to provide for the supply and preparation of essen-
tials. Usually he is overrun by the attacker who consumes that which was
intended for him. Additionally, the peasants always tend to conceal their
resources more from the retreating than from the pursuing forces; the
sense of the victor’s superiority comes over them as over the troops
themselves. Furthermore, they believe that the retreating forces cannot
further delay and if one can only hide the provisions for a few more
hours, they will be salvaged. They have not the same opinion of the
pursuing forces, although they usually have as little time to halt as do the
retreating forces. They fear revenge from them for which the retreating
forces in their sorry state haven’t the time.
4. The pursuer can afford his troops a certain amount of time for rest.
During this time they can enjoy their rest to a certain extent without
worry. The pursued will be startled by every footstep and unnecessarily
withdraws from many a bivouac.
}4
If one intends to maximize the disadvantages for the retreating forces and at
the same time intends to reap the resulting advantages, then the following
items are important:
1. One spares no effort to achieve one’s goal. The private is animated by the
prospect of plunder. One has to march with the very same exertion that
would be required to rescue oneself. For otherwise the enemy would
soon gain an edge.
158 My Lectures on Small War
2. Whenever the enemy halts, one tries to reach him with the front line of
the avant-garde. If the enemy commander does not conduct himself
accordingly, its appearance usually will be enough to deny him rest and
foodstuffs, as he will immediately continue to march.
3. One tries to cut off the enemy. If this cannot be accomplished success-
fully because one would bring oneself into a dangerous situation, then
one would try to pretend to cut him off by allowing very weak detach-
ments to move ahead of the enemy, by spreading false rumors, etc. It is
hard to believe what sometimes can be achieved if the enemy command-
ers are not resolute or men of much experienced in war.
4. One tries to compel the enemy to march by night. Night marches are
always slower than daytime marches and exhaust the troops infinitely
more. Every sort of confusion occurs and a spirit of terror readily
overcomes the troops.
However, it is easy to coerce the enemy to march by night, if one
attacks or tries to circumvent him during the very night he tries to afford
his troops rest in a bivouac or in villages. He will then most likely
decamp and not stop again throughout that night. He will reach his
next position during daytime and rest there. While the enemy marches,
we take rest and begin marching around noon so that we approach him
again in the evening in case he intended to stay the night.
5. If the area through which the enemy retreats is favorable to the infantry,
then it can be of great use for impeding his retreat. One approaches the
enemy with a detachment of riflemen or snipers to a distance from which
one can fire into his formation with bow shots. If this measure can be
applied in defiles and similar situations that are given to disarray, it will
often result in outright flight.
For this purpose one should always have infantry near the forefront.
6. If the enemy intends to decamp in the morning, units of riflemen are
deployed during the night, approach his position as much as possible,
and greet him with unexpected light rifle fire. Ewald argues that this fire,
as ridiculous as it may seem, has a great effect on the retreating soldier’s
heart, insofar as it foreshadows how dangerous and arduous the coming
day will be for him. It is certainly all too easy for a spirit of terror and
anxiety to take over retreating troops and to lead to great results for the
victor.
7. If the retreat is through mountains, one attempts to reach defiles at the
same time as the enemy. One proceeds with the infantry to the right and
left as far as possible, accompanying the enemy columns and exchanging
fire the entire day with the enemy’s forward, rear, and side units, thus
delaying the enemy’s march.
On Pursuit of the Enemy When He Retreats 159
Ewald argues: “One tries to gain the heights in mountainous areas and
the deepest forests with riflemen and sharpshooters who constantly
harass the enemy with gunfire. Exhausted, he loses many men and his
march is held up. During the American War, I quite often witnessed how
a handful of riflemen often delayed our marches and constantly harassed
us and how little could be done against these people, who with great
courage attacked our columns, our vanguard and rearguard. I saw few of
them killed, while we were constantly losing many men. And if they were
pushed back, they quickly returned” etc.68
All of these measures, which are the result of principles and great exertion
on the part of the victor, only seem to be the result of his sheer audacity, only
appear to be the simple expression of his natural superiority, therefore leaving
such a devastating impression.
}5
These are the means at one’s disposal for causing as much damage as possible
to the enemy during his retreat and bringing the enemy troops ever closer to a
state of dissolution, which can be regarded as the goal of all these measures.
These rules do not lead always to the desired success and the small measures
that are undertaken in this spirit do not work out always. As disadvantageous
as the enemy’s situation during retreat may be, it will never be desperate if the
commanders are able and the troops courageous. And even if they are not in
the position to prevent every last loss, they will nevertheless find in their
conduct means against disproportionate disadvantages. If the retreating
troops do not lose sight of the necessary precautions, if they remain courage-
ous and firm, if they know how to punish a brash pursuer, then the pursuer
will not only have expended his effort partly in vain, but rather could come
into danger himself.
}6
One should not be annoyed by the futile endeavor; but the danger in which
one finds oneself must be a topic of our attention.
We know from the previous chapter that if the pursuing forces too often
push forward, the retreating forces will set up ambushes and by these means
attempt to deliver a strong blow. The pursuer needs to guard diligently against
this.
}7
What one can or cannot undertake against one’s enemy, how much, how little,
cannot be determined by rules, but depends on a certain tact that one
68
Clausewitz quotes Ewald (1798).
160 My Lectures on Small War
possesses, and on the exercise of that judgment, which one obtains through
war. As with every art and performance of human life, these elements are the
spirit of action. One can undertake three times as much against a terrorized
enemy as against an enemy who upon retreat inspires respect, whose troops
are courageous, steadfast, and experienced in war.
Nevertheless, one should not allow them to pass quietly or build them
golden bridges. Rather, one should at least try to do what one can against
them, and in any case, to inflict that damage that can be caused without
endangering oneself, by measures initiated with prudence, caution, and great
exertion.
No one doubts that Frederick II would have suffered heavy losses on his
retreat through Bohemia after ending the siege of Olmütz,69 if the Austrians
had taken full advantage of the possibilities offered by their many light troops.
The transport of wagons, which accompanied the 33-battalion-strong army of
Marshall Keith, consisted of 4000 horse and cart. And although the Austrians’
main army held back completely, taken together, the generals Zischkowitz,
Laudon, Janus, and Buko were certainly much stronger. Laudon indeed
ventured a number of bold assaults for which he was punished through skillful
countermeasures. Thus, it was quite appropriate that he became more careful.
But this need not have prevented the Austrian light troops from harassing and
delaying on a daily basis Field Marshall Keith’s army and compelling it to take
up battle under very disadvantageous circumstances. Obviously, this was a
mistake of the Austrian generals, notwithstanding the respect the Prussian
troops deserve.
ON THE P ARTICULAR P URPOSES A PARTISAN OR
SIMILAR DETACHMENT CAN SERVE
}1
By partisans, I mean chiefly a detachment of select officers (especially the
leader), men, and horses. If such a detachment is permanently organized for
the entire campaign or war, then it will be better trained for its type of
missions and more reliable in their execution. These are partisans properly
so called. It is not always the case that armies have them, but it appears to be
certain that although mere partisan attacks are not valued in the new war,
such detachments nevertheless are quite useful, because they receive
69
Clausewitz refers to the unsuccessful siege of Olmütz by Prussia in 1758.
On the Purposes a Partisan Detachment Can Serve 161
hundreds of assignments for which they are better suited than an ordinarily
commanded unit.
I specifically deal with partisans here because those matters pertaining to
light units, which I still have to address, are well-suited for these detachments;
although they also can be employed for previously mentioned tasks, namely
for reconnaissance of an area, and on occasion the bearing of all detachments
at march, even clandestine marches, to which they are uniquely suited.
}2
A detachment with no defensive or reconnaissance objective must have an
offensive purpose.
We have already dealt with proper assaults on enemy detachments or posts.
Furthermore, there are additional purposes that can be achieved through
smaller detachments and that are commonly the tasks of partisans or similar
units. At least we should like to mention these purposes. Moreover, it will
suffice for us to offer just a few rules and remarks, because the means of
success so often are a matter of pure common sense that rules take on the
appearance of pedantry.
The usual such purposes are the following:
1. To collect information.
2. To intercept couriers.
3. To capture generals and other important persons.
4. To collect supplies and other materials.
5. To destroy bridges.
6. To destroy magazines.
7. To block paths.
}3
The first and most important element of the accomplishment of such tasks is
most often the successful and unnoticed execution of the march. No further
rules are necessary here, since in all cases the march remains the same. Stealth
is usually decisive and always advantageous. Thus, the chapter on clandestine
marches applies.
}4
Collecting Information
If a partisan is sent out for this purpose, then the case is different from
common patrols or reconnaissance insofar as the former go to where the
162 My Lectures on Small War
other no longer can, namely in between and behind the enemy. For such
missions, a select officer is needed with chosen men and horses. Training is
also required, which differentiates the partisan from an ordinary patrol.
Such deployments are rarely directed at merely reporting on whether the
enemy is here. Rather, a specific task is usually the primary objective. Hence,
the following remarks seem to me to be important:
1. When one receives one’s instructions, one attempts to ascertain a clear
understanding of the primary subject on which one is supposed to
report. An officer who really does not know what he is to do, is unable
to take appropriate measures.
2. One ascertains with as much certainty as possible the status of the main
subject. One does not rely on mere hearsay, that is, on reports of the
population, but one tries to push one’s detachment forward in order to
investigate the subject oneself or with one’s own men. For example,
when, while marching with 40 infantrymen during the campaign of
1776, Ewald70 was sent around the American army to Burlington in
order to gather information on whether the American row-boats were
still stationed in the Delaware at Burlington, he could not and would not
rely on the information supplied by two inhabitants at the Yorkshire
Bridge, but instead took his chances and proceeded to the precise
location. This was obligatory, and since he had taken the necessary
precautions for an eventual mishap, it was understood by his post if
not by his detachment.
3. In most cases one will try to get close to the main subject by means of a
clandestine march, and remaining concealed will try to secure the
necessary information with sneak patrols by night. Sneak patrols are
here the means of choice.
4. Often it will be necessary to disguise some men, who are sent toward the
enemy to gather information.
5. Never forget the rule to send back information on a regular basis
whenever possible.
}5
Intercepting Couriers and Patrols
1. One hides along the road where couriers and patrols are supposed to
march and deploys some lookouts.
70
See Ewald (1790: 190ff).
On the Purposes a Partisan Detachment Can Serve 163
2. One doesn’t stop anyone by whom one has not been detected and who is
not the target of the ambush.
3. One absolutely forbids shooting and even instructs the removal of
the shot.
4. One promises the men the prisoners’ money and watches as well as the
captured horses.
Emmerich provides a remarkable example of how long one can remain
undetected by these means.71
}6
Capture of Generals and Other Important Persons in Quarters
Ewald72 reports that such things often happened in the American War because
the American riflemen exhibited here, and in Small War more generally, great
skill and much initiative. With respect to our armies, it was always uncommon
and nowadays perhaps even less so. But such things very often occur in civil
wars and when the nation is armed.
Instead of listing every rule, we allow ourselves the simple observation that
under such circumstances, namely in civil and national wars, it is not unim-
portant to direct one’s actions directly against the personal security of generals
and leaders. In this way it may be possible to inspire unrest and trepidation.
}7
Collecting Supplies and Other Materials
1. Foremost, in this case, a written instruction is indispensable: both for one’s
own authentication and because it makes it easier to meet one’s goal
amongst the people. They are more willing to pay a contribution to the
commanding general because they hope that it will redound to their
advantage, whereas what the partisan acting on his own extorts from
them they regard as thrown out the window. Regardless of how much
power one might have, it is undeniable that a great recalcitrance on the part
of the people can impede the collection of contributions to a certain degree.
2. One detains some of the most important persons of the locality, intend-
ing to take these hostage in case the demands are not met.
One has to inspire fear and terror in this way in order to achieve
one’s goals.
71
Clausewitz refers to Emmerich (1791: ch. IX, 56–7).
72
Clausewitz refers to Ewald (1798: ch. 3).
164 My Lectures on Small War
3. If it is not money, but cloth, grain, or other provisions, one seizes these in
case of emergency by force in the supply magazines of private persons.
4. One secures a bill documenting what one has received.
Requisitions of this type usually occur in enemy countries. Thus, it is
unlikely that we will resort to them. We can expect that the provinces in
which we are waging war will happily yield what they have.
}8
Destroying Bridges
1. Wooden
1.1 One burns them down. A heap of straw and dry wood set on fire in
the middle of the bridge serves the purpose. However, one has to
remain there because someone might extinguish the fire or it might
burn out too soon.
1.2 A bridge that is to be defended can be torn down, this might suffice.
However, a bridge that is to be destroyed so that the enemy cannot
use it once we have left must be completely burned down, and yet
the enemy often uses the wooden posts of such bridges in order to
quickly rebuild them.
2. Stone
These are detonated. One places two small hallows with 20 to 30 pounds
of powder in two adjacent posts in the middle. For the ignition, one uses
a proper slow match and the usual fuse made of loose powder.
If there is not enough time for these measures, one affixes a powder
keg under the bridge between two posts with ropes, attaches a long fuse,
and lights it as one leaves.
If a powder keg is nowhere to be found, then a 25 lb grenade will do
the job instead. However 25 lb grenades are rarer than powder kegs.
3. Floating bridges, like wooden, are to be burned down. Every other measure
can easily be counteracted by the enemy. We will not deal here with the
detonation and burning of floating bridges through specially designed ma-
chines, which are sent down the river. This is in the purview of the engineers.
}9
Destroying Magazines
Of course one can set a magazine afire by shooting incendiary or firebombs or
if necessary also with grenades. But an ordinary grenadier has only a few of the
former and the latter only seldom ignite a fire. Since a small detachment will
On the Purposes a Partisan Detachment Can Serve 165
not easily have enough howitzers to fire sufficient numbers of incendiary and
firebombs into the location that one intends to burn down, or to set it ablaze
through a complete bombardment with howitzers, the burning of a magazine
from a distance will always be very difficult. At most, villages can be set afire in
this way; hardly towns. But magazines are usually located in towns.
Thus, if a detachment wants to achieve this goal, it would be wrong to lose
time with a barrage of cannon fire, insofar as something else can be done. It
attacks the enemy, tries to force its way into the locale and if it cannot remain
therein, uses the first success and chaos to set a number of houses on fire as
close as possible to the supplies. Several units with determined leaders must
have this special assignment and follow the first troops equipped with incen-
diary rockets, pitch wheels, or torches.
} 9 [sic!]
Blocking and Mining Roads
This is only possible in deep defiles. For it would be easy for the enemy to
circumvent every other road that is too troublesome for him to clear. But usually
clearing an abatis is not that difficult. Even if a small detachment should face a
situation in which it appears necessary to build an abatis on a common forest
trail for its own security, this is not a job for a detachment sent out especially for
the purpose; it is something so easy as to require no further discussion.
Here we are talking about a situation in which a partisan or other detach-
ment is sent out to block and ruin roads and trails through the mountains in
order to force a significant delay upon the enemy. A delay of one or
several days.
A trail is rendered useless:
1. If all bridges and crossings are destroyed.
2. If it is blocked with trees.
3. If stones are rolled into it. If these are heavy, they are better than
every tree.
4. By digging through the trail, that is, one digs a ditch as wide and deep as
possible and spreads the soil in the surrounding area.
Common sense spurred on by hatred of the enemy will inspire thousands of
inventions that are impossible to list exhaustively.
The repairing of roads, which is a more technical issue, will be dealt with
elsewhere.
166 My Lectures on Small War
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON S MALL WAR
1. Herewith, gentlemen, I am concluding my [lectures on] Small War in the
hope that you will find the principles, opinions and rules that I have presented
to you worthy of your continued contemplation. For only through personal
reflection and coming to terms oneself, not through memorizing rules, is
knowledge of the subject matter and the ability to behave accordingly
achieved. Above all, I wish that from time to time in the course of your studies
you will come back to these sentences and subject them to the test of your
more mature powers of judgment. It goes without saying that I am speaking
here only to those among you who have not dealt much with these issues and
are less familiar with the history of war, that is, to those for whom the topic of
these lectures was partly new.
2. At the start of these lectures I could not promise you much and I must
now confess that these hours could have been much more useful for you if
I could have conveyed to you, through a very elaborate description of personal
experiences in the fabric of particular circumstances, a sense of the whole that
is the rule, instead of presenting it to you in a dry manner substantiated with a
few meager examples. For the rule is only intelligible and useful to those who
remember specific incidences or at least have a vague notion of how war is
waged. This is also why I hope you will come back to this after you have dealt
for a time with the history of war.
3. I took it upon myself to tell you nothing of which I am not convinced.
One is easily misled into repeating others in matters of the art of war. The
sheer number of books, which up to the present provide so many examples
thereof, prove the point. One can say that many authors have written many
things that they did not understand, mainly for the reason that most were
mere compilers.
I believe I am innocent of this charge. Whatever I did not understand or
clearly grasp I left out, such as the many meandering, abstract, vacuous
elaborations, which most authors use to substantiate their principles.
My greatest aspiration is that you might find my rules natural, that is, as
close as possible to the subject matter and not in contradiction to the process
of war. Although my experience in war is limited, it is nevertheless sufficient to
afford me the right understanding of the emergence of most of the incidents in
war, of the manifold happenstances with which everything is interwoven, and
the various difficulties that impede the precise execution of those systematic
plans theory tends to produce. One could call this the friction of the entire
machinery, which as every other friction, can only be recognized through
experience, and which so many authors completely forget.
Thus, I hope this limited personal experience guards against the danger of
pedantry.
Concluding Remarks on Small War 167
4. There are many more authors writing about Small War than Large War.
Most cover the same material and in a similar fashion. It is hardly worth the
effort to read more than one or two.
Of those books I know, the following stand out through more or less
originality:
1. The booklet by General von Scharnhorst. No other book is so rich in
historical examples and written in such classic brevity and precision.
One could say there is not a superfluous word in it.73
2. General Ewald’s analyses of the services of light troops distinguish
themselves through a number of examples taken from personal experi-
ence, which the author places next to his rules thereby making them very
practical and instructive.74
In any case this author stands out in that he tries to teach with many
examples, which is certainly appropriate. In this regard, he has collected:
2.1 Examples of great heroes. 1 volume.
2.2 Instruction in Small War. 2 volumes.
But they are inferior to his analyses, because the examples are not
taken from personal experience and in addition most examples are
very poorly detailed.
3. Valentini’s treatment of Small War75 presents most issues rather ad-
equately and accessibly, and has the advantage over the other books of
providing maps to accompany the examples. However, it is short on
good historical examples.
4. Regarding the forward post service, there is a very wordy but well-
written book by a German cavalry officer Süßmilch76 that has the benefit
of shedding light on the new forward post system and in addition grasps
the issue in a very spirited fashion.
5. Emmerich’s Partheygänger77 is a very small booklet in which Lt. Colonel
Emmerich recounts in a very simple and pleasant way the incidents he
experienced as a partisan, and provides in the process some rules.
The opinions of these authors about Large and Small War are very
different and thus they are of varying utility. I leave it to you to judge
which of them is to be preferred.
73
Clausewitz again refers to Scharnhorst, Militairisches Taschenbuch, zum Gebrauch im
Felde, Hannover 1794. See Scharnhorst (1980).
74
Clausewitz refers to Ewald (1790).
75
Clausewitz refers to Valentini (1802). Hahlweg points out that Valentini’s work had just
been reprinted when Clausewitz wrote his Lectures.
76
Clausewitz refers to [Süßmilch] (1805).
77
Clausewitz refers to Emmerich (1789) and the German translation (1791).
168 My Lectures on Small War
6. Examples as well as individual analyses on Small War can be found in
the military journals. The best are:
6.1 Bellona, a military journal Dresden. (In the early ’80s of the last
century). (18 volumes).
6.2 Neue Bellona, by Porbeck. 9 volumes. (In the first years of this
century, up to the war).
6.3 Neues Militärisches Journal (von Scharnhorst) (13 volumes, 1789
until shortly before the war. The last volumes have the special title
Militärische Denkwürdigkeiten).
6.4 Collection of unpublished reports, such as the history of the Prussian
Campaign, 1740–79. Dresden in the early 1780s. 4 volumes.
6.5 Militärische Monatsschrift by Massenbach. (1785–87. 5 volumes).
6.6 Magazin der Merkwürdigsten Kriegsbegebenheiten. 7 volumes (Leip-
ziger and Knesebeck) (93–96).
6.7 Kriegsbibliothek in 8 Versuchen (56–69) (contains nothing about
Small War but rather translations of analyses and historical essays
in foreign languages. Beslau.)
6.8 Militärische Bibliothek 4 numbers. 82. (von Scharnhorst)
6.9 Neue Militärische Bibliothek. 4 numbers. 85. (A continuation of the
proceeding) (both contain no war events but rather notes on the
armies and military literature.)
6.10 Hoyer’s Militärisches Magazin (The first years of this century. 3
volumes quarterly) (Leipzig).
6.11 Thielke’s Beiträge zur Kriegskunst und Geschichte der Kriege. (in
the 1770s. 6 volumes).
6.12 Böhm’s Magazin für Ingenieur und Artilleristen. (in the 1770s).
5. For the time being, I would not advise you to read much about the theory of
Small War but rather to invest the time you intend to spend reading in the
history of warfare. Only subsequently, if you again feel the need to return to a
theoretical orientation and to round out your thinking, will you benefit from
consulting the authors I have suggested to you and from asking yourself: If
I leave all prejudices aside, and if I do not commit myself to any traditional
rule, what if that said by the author still remains true?
Then I hope that you might remember these hours from time to time in
order to reflect on them further.
3
Testimonial
Bekenntnisdenkschrift
February 1812
Motto
Certainly I know the value of repose, the comforts of company, the joy of
life; I too would like to be as happy as anyone. As much as I covet these
commodities, however, so little do I wish to acquire them through perfidy
and dishonesty. The philosopher teaches us to perform our duty, to serve
our Fatherland faithfully with our blood, and to sacrifice our repose, or
even our entire existence.
Frederick II,1 from his posthumously published papers
This short text2 is designed to justify before the eyes of the world, the political
opinion of those who regarded necessary the resistance against France, who had
to give way to conventional opinion and were denounced as quixotic fools, or
dangerous revolutionaries, or frivolous cacklers, or self-serving schemers.
Who can hold it against them that in the moment they departed the scene
and abandoned their fortune and all that is dear to them—because they were
unable to serve with diligence and honor the enemy whom they abhor from
the bottom of their hearts—that in this moment they wished to show them-
selves to be men of calm deliberation, of mature and cool judgment? Out of
acquiescence to the government, their opinion could not be stated openly
[and] through foreign tyranny was withheld completely from the public; it is
attempted hereby to place it on an equal footing with the other opinions.
1
Frederick the Great (1712–86), King of Prussia 1740–86.
2
This handwritten memorandum was sent by Clausewitz to Gneisenau in February 1812 and
circulated among Prussian military reformers of that time. In it Clausewitz defends his view that
only a Small War, i.e. a revolutionary uprising of the people and what he terms “active defense”
has the potential to stand up against the overwhelming Napoleonic forces. The translation is
based on the printed version in Hahlweg (1966–90: vol. 1, 682–750) and incorporates correc-
tions, addenda, and emphases (in bold) made by Clausewitz but not those of others who also
revised the manuscript.
170 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
Certainly a king will not begrudge this satisfaction to those of whose
unselfish service he is certain; in whose hearts his cause has found warmest
favor; and who were not amongst the least capable of his officials.
Once Prussia has thrown itself into the arms of France, once the men, whose
confession is recorded here, no longer outwardly belong to this state (although
forever in their hearts), then this text can be published without compromising
the government. Perhaps under these circumstances it will be able to ignite a
flame in the hearts and minds of those subjects, who at some point might
prove to be the government’s salvation.
FIRST CONFESSION
The moment of a new war in the North is approaching. Perhaps the outbreak
will be delayed for some months. That the storm will completely dissipate, as
some deceive themselves, is impossible.
Anyone abroad who commiserates with the Prussian state (and without
doubt there are many) anxiously awaits the fate that shall befall her in the new
catastrophe.
Not only the fate of this state, but also its behavior, is the subject of great
and general interest. All will hope that Prussia at least will have fought with
honor and suffered a glorious downfall.
This short text is directed to those sympathetic friends as a confession of a
private opinion, which few, though some, of my fellow citizens share. Fur-
thermore, it is directed to all other citizens as a formal protest against any kind
of participation in that which is to be decided, which may transpire, and which
at some point will be heavily penalized and regretted.
Perhaps these lines will inspire a sense of duty and honor in the hearts of
some; perhaps they will enlighten some minds, purging the phantom monster
of fear, showing clearly the danger that truly exists, and distinguishing it from
that which does not.
Since 17943 Prussia has withstood a single struggle, which by far did not last
long enough, and which was conducted with much too little effort and
strength of will to justify complete despair.
Rather, the whole of Europe must expect that this state will at last rise
against a complete subjugation and annihilation, and in a struggle of life and
death, dignify the name of Frederick.
3
In 1794 Prussia had to contend with a military insurrection in Poland, parts of which had
been divided between Russia and Prussia and annexed the previous year (Second Partition of
Poland). The defeat of the Polish insurrection would lead to the Third Partition in 1795. 1794
also marked the adoption of the Prussian General State Laws (Allgemeines Landrecht), a civil
code that was in effect until the Stein-Hardenberg Reforms initiated after the defeat by Napoleon
at Jena-Auerstedt in 1806.
First Confession 171
This name, Frederick the Second, which is on the lips of every Prussian,
rightly leads the entire world to expect that we can find an honorable ethos: a
feeling for duty, virtue, and honor, that far from being blunted and weakened
through the force of time, has instead increased in resilience and filled us with
noble ire. Indeed, to speak of honor and glory when both have been acquired
and secured is mere vanity; and we could have spared the world the many
phrases with which we often have annoyed it. How contemptuous and un-
worthy this swagger must appear, when one sees that we cower in front of the
danger without regard for honor and shame.
It is unbelievable, that of all people, those who were witnesses to Frederick’s
deeds, and others, who constantly invoke his name, only approve of that which
he did, and ridicule with contempt that which is not of his manner; that these,
through a brazen cowardliness, which they openly display, are completely
unworthy to be the heirs of this heroic dynasty, which earned the Prussian
name respect and sympathy throughout the world.
It is not my intention to present a complete picture of public opinion and
sentiment in Prussia. I lack the necessary experience and mainly know the
capital city and the courtly estates. In order to officially break with that
public opinion that surrounds me, however, I am obliged to outline its main
currents.
The argument that one could resist France has disappeared amongst us
almost completely. One believes in the necessity of an unconditional alliance, a
submission to benevolence and malice, a final renunciation of the merit of our
own dynastic house. One shrugs away these gradations of evil—and at most
blushes, by merely looking toward the ground.
This is the general mood. Some distinguish themselves through the
impertinence with which they insist on safety and the docile indulgence
of bourgeois affluence; on the necessity of sacrificing everything thereto,
even the rights of the king, even the honor of the king, even the security and
freedom of the king!
This is public opinion with few exceptions. The various estates, and indi-
viduals within the estates, distinguish themselves in the ways in which they
express and emulate it. The aristocracy is depraved; the Court and the civil
servants are the most depraved.
Not only do they wish for tranquility and safety as others do. Nor have they
only forgotten to fulfill their duty when confronted with danger. Rather, they
hound with unforgiving hate, those who do not despair.
For what else other than despair, if the current condition and a much worse,
which is to follow, is preferred to resistance?
Therefore, whoever does not despair believes in the preservation of the state
through duty and honor. Whoever does not believe that duty compels us to the
most unconditional disgraceful submission and that there is no need for
honor, is a traitor. He can be sure that he will be hated and hounded by
172 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
those civil servants who have forgotten their sense of duty; denounced before
the public; accused before the king; and betrayed to the French envoy.
The true patriots, who alone are candid and faithful to the king, are placed
in the scorn of public opinion, and by virtue of the folly and spite of self-
serving weaklings and unworthy gluttons, are accused of being members of a
league directed against the state and king.
Who hasn’t heard of the ridiculous pursuit of the Tugendbund?4 Those who
have been accused of being the head of this league and of being its most active
members barely know whether and how this society exists. The most frivolous
lies are needed to evoke this phantom, like a sorcerer’s ghost conjured from
smoke, with which one continuously seeks to frighten the Court and citizens
of Berlin. But if it is a matter of scaring a fearful public, such an illusion is
sufficient.
This system of belief easily gives rise to personal hate, envy, and an
addiction to persecution, and they, who shamelessly enough openly avow
this system of cowardice and daily preach its rotten maxims, are not ashamed
to impugn the personal merit, the heart and the character of those whose
political principles they merely question.
Let us, however, turn our attention away from these sorry signs of national
depravity, which, like ulcers, are outward signs of an inner illness that can
enfeeble, poison, and destroy the whole.
Those who through the depravity of their heart and principles have not
succumbed to fear and despondence, as is all too common, are not forever lost,
but could and would elevate themselves to a better state, if offered a helping
hand thereto.
All loyalty to the government notwithstanding, one cannot deny that the
source of general despondence reflects first and foremost a lack of confidence
therein. Equally weak is the government’s confidence in its subjects, indeed in
itself. This total absence of confidence in itself and others is the general cause
of our public opinion. The continuous influence of weaklings, reprobates, and
the dutiless on this opinion is the cause of public sentiment.
From this opinion and sentiment, which here is born as if it sprang from
some pristine concern for the welfare of all or were identical thereto,
I solemnly disassociate myself.
I disassociate myself from the frivolous hope of rescue by happenstance;
from the inane anticipation of the future, which a dulled sense will not
recognize;
4
The Tugendbund was a club established in 1808 in Königsberg to cultivate Prussian
patriotism and restore popular morale in the wake of Napoleonic victories. On the insistence
of Napoleon, the King of Prussia decreed its dissolution as of December 31, 1809.
First Confession 173
from the childish hope that the tyrant’s ire can be appeased through volun-
tary disarmament, his confidence won through base subservience and flattery;
from the misplaced resignation of restrained intelligence;
from the imprudent mistrust of our Godgiven faculties;
from the sinful carelessness of duties toward the common good;
from the shameless sacrifice of the honor of state and people, of personal
and human dignity.
I believe and confess, that there is nothing more worthy of a people’s respect
than the dignity and freedom of its existence;
that these must be defended to the last drop of blood;
that there is no duty more holy to fulfill and no higher law to obey;
that the blot of a cowardly subservience can never be cleansed;
that this poison in the blood of a people is inherited by their offspring, and
the strength of later generations is paralyzed and eroded;
that the honor of the king and the government is one with the honor of the
people and the only palladium of its welfare;
that a people is insurmountable in the noble fight for its freedom;
that the very defeat of this freedom through a bloody and honorable battle
guarantees the reincarnation of the people; it is the seed of life from which a
new tree strikes firm roots.
I declare and affirm before the world and posterity:
that I hold the false cunning, with which the small-minded wish to defy
danger, to be the greatest bane that dread and fear can instill;
that I would regard the wildest desperation as wiser, if we were prevented
from meeting the danger with a manly courage, that is, with a calm but steady
determination and clear awareness;
that in the delirium of today’s anxiety I will not forget the foreboding
developments of the past and present, the wise lessons of entire centuries,
the noble examples of renowned peoples, and abandon world history for the
page of a tabloid;
that I regard myself free from any self-interest, that I may lay bare all my
thoughts and feelings before my fellow citizens, that nothing would please me
more than to go down in glory in the noble struggle for the freedom and
dignity of the fatherland.
Is my conviction and that of the like-minded deserving of the contempt and
scorn of our fellow citizens?
May posterity decide!
I place these pages on the holy altar of history, in the firm belief that once
the tempest has passed, a reverend priest of this temple will preserve them
carefully and file them in the chronicles of a turbulent human history.
Then posterity shall judge and spare from the damning verdict those who
courageously swam against the current of depravity and remained as faithful
in heart to the sense of responsibility as to a god.
174 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
SECOND CONFESSION
If in the first section of this small text I allowed myself to speak from the heart
and to express in the language of emotions what is and should be a matter of
emotion. I shall endeavor in this second, to speak in the language of calm
deliberation, as it is my desire herein to provide a clear depiction of our
situation and thereby demonstrate that emotional people are not incapable
of calm deliberation just because the heart they carry in their chest does not
retract, as if it were a polyp, whenever touched.
1.
A nine-month-long war conducted with little sacrifice and even less exertion
of strength, fought with sparing loss of blood,*5 would appear to have com-
pletely ruined the Prussian state’s inner makeup, to have left the nation in
poverty, one could say deep misery. But it only appears to be so; for where is
the necessary relationship between cause and effect if one is to accept this
opinion as true?
It has only arisen from a lack of insight and from the fear of a new war,
which some thereby wish to depict as impossible.
The presence of the French throughout the land, imposed by the Peace of
Tilsit6 and the Treaty of Paris,7 as well as scarcely affordable contributions,
which direct the cash reserves abroad; a feigned state administration that is
focused only on outward appearance and has subverted welfare; the excessive
price of grain; the exorbitant interest rate; the speculation craze of property
owners, which has led to changes in land ownership; these are additional
arguments brought to bear by landlords quartering troops, the financier and
the conscientious civil servant.
We do not wish to measure their value and their weight precisely, but they
are overstated if one considers that embargoed world trade is regarded by most
to be the least important cause of our misery, is not mentioned by many, and is
completely denied by a few paradoxical minds.
* Note: The Battle of Eylau, where the Prussian state stood at the tip of the épée, cost the
Prussian troops no more than . . . dead and wounded. It was nevertheless the bloodiest engage-
ment of the Prussian Campaign in which our troops participated.
5
In the Battle of Eylau on February 8, 1817, 75,000 French troops fought against 67,000
Russian and 9,000 Prussian troops. There were heavy losses on both sides, between 10,000 and
25,000 wounded or dead on the French, 15,000 on the Russian and the Prussian side.
6
Treatise of Tilsit between France on the one hand and Russia and Prussia on the other
signed in the town of Tilsit in July 1807.
7
Treaty of Paris signed on September 8, 1808 by France and Prussia.
Second Confession 175
Nevertheless, it appears clearer with regard to human affairs, that nothing is
more obvious than the overwhelming importance and effectiveness of
this cause.
Trade and commerce flow through every branch of civil society with an
energetic spirit. How could this trade, through the refinement of navigation
and the development of geography, grow to such magnitude, universality,
reliability, and vitality, without to a certain extent having enveloped
every element of human society, infiltrating every relationship, and step by
step over the course of centuries becoming the very foundation of all these
relationships?
It was truly so. Millions of occurrences vouch for it. But it was also strictly
necessary and no human authority other than that of a commander victorious
from the Ebro8 to the Niemen9 could have been in a position to stop, steer, or
extinguish this development.
If then this most general principle of our social constitution is forcibly
subdued, what else could follow but a sudden breakdown of all affairs and, to
be precise, a true national bankruptcy, namely, a thousandfold bankruptcy of
one against the other, that without a doubt cannot be compared to an ordinary
state bankruptcy.
This development has occurred because the equilibrium amongst the states
of the continent has been lost.
The Emperor of France blockades trade and the entire continent suffers in
misery.
Besides this great general adversity there appears a second enemy of all
welfare, all domestic order, and consequently all revival. This is uncertainty.
It disrupts the entire financial system and ruins the welfare of hundreds
of thousands of families. It paralyzes the activities of all inhabitants and
renders part of the national wealth fallow and a substantial portion of that
production, which it should generate, and with it a large portion of the
national product, lost.
Lethargy, discontent, and moral depravity must be the consequences of
these ills. It is impossible for a state with such poison flowing through its veins
to recover its strength.
But how can this uncertainty be overcome?
As long as the relationship of France to the other states continues, the
insecurity of all property and all civil existence will continue. Therefore, the
only true remedy is the fight for independence.
Would not, however, an alliance with France considerably lessen the ill?
Yes! At first glance, as the report spreads through the money exchangers and
speculators, but hardly for long. Alliance with France provides no security; of
8
River in northeast Spain.
9
River in eastern Europe draining into the Curonian Lagoon.
176 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
that Spain, Holland, Italy, and North Germany provide evidence. Of all those
countries that have dared to enter into alliance with France and the
revolution—Northern and Central Italy, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Switzer-
land, Southern Germany, and several North German Princes—only little
Switzerland and divided Southern Germany have remained formally inde-
pendent. Perhaps 5/6 of the entire territory should be considered the property
of France. What an admirable security has been provided by this alliance!
Everyone would say it, and hardly anyone would forget what happened with
Holland’s state debts. The subjects of states allied with France will have as little
confidence in public order, law, and justice, as the subjects of any other.
I wish to leave aside whether through a forceful preparation for resistance,
through adherence to the existence and honor of the state, through the
courageous determination to sacrifice everything for it, more confidence and
security could have been provided. The probability of this beneficial effect
speaks for itself.
The internal constitution of our state and people is hence unlikely to be
restored under such conditions of external pressure. It is truly the same great
folly to have hoped on the one hand that this could be achieved through the
internal administration, and on the other hand to have demanded it from the
administration. It would have been more appropriate if the exertions made in
this regard had been used for preparations to fight. Ever since the Peace of
Tislit, whoever wished to support the state of Prussia should have thought of
nothing else but the preparation for the new fight, and only of that. Thereby,
he soon again would have felt himself to be formidable, external affairs would
have changed subtly, and the body would have recovered little by little through
its own strength.
If the internal recovery of the state and its regeneration are not to be
expected through an alignment with France, the question then is whether or
not the state can preserve its external independence through the temporary
abandonment of all honor and security until the dangerous period of political
turbulences has passed.
One hopes that an alliance with France will be a means thereto.
This leads us to a consideration of our external affairs and that which we
can hope to achieve through our diplomacy.
2.
If France genuinely had been reconciled with Prussia through the Peace of
Tilsit, then an alliance with the same immediately should have followed this
peace. Through such an alliance France would have been able to entangle
Prussia to such a degree, to so strongly shackle her, as thus far has happened
with Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony.
Second Confession 177
From that moment on the Emperor Napoleon could have relied on Prussia.
Neither the king nor the nation would have had the bold wish to break free
again. Forced to take this step, everything gradually would have become
accustomed to the new shackles, and if, as in Saxony, Bavaria, and elsewhere,
the mood were against France, it would be as inconsequential here as it was
there. If on account of Prussia’s size and location one could not be certain of
this, there would exist hundreds of means of political tyranny through which
the strength of this state could be paralyzed. For example, if half of the
Prussian troops were to be sent to Spain, if strong and brave men were to be
dismissed from public office, if even more Prussian fortresses were to
be occupied, and so on.
Napoleon is too experienced to be at a loss for means, even for a moment,
which he could employ against Prussia. The alliance presented itself to him as
a ready and natural means, and its consequences surely could not have been
unimportant to him.
Whether Prussia would have entered into this alliance is no longer a
question. Having heretofore never shown the courage to resist France, it is
hard to imagine this could have been the case at the moment of the Peace of
Tilsit. Moreover, those men who negotiated the peace on the Prussian side
were the primary advisors to the king. And because France discovered in the
Peace of Tilsit to what extent they out of fear conceded to French interests, it
could have counted on complete submission. Prussia itself has made proposals
for such an alliance that were rejected coldly out of hand; and apart from the
few months of the Austrian War, there was certainly no moment at which very
firm words from France would not have led Prussia to give in.
Instead of turning this state into a tool for use against Spain, against Austria,
against Russia, the Emperor Napoleon allows it to remain neutral.
This generosity was an obvious trap. For where else had France provided
similar examples of restraint? And how is restraint possible at all for a state
that aims with extraordinary means to achieve extraordinary ends, for which
every breath is an assault? In this case restraint would be as unreasonable as
is pliance elsewhere.
France allows Prussia’s continuing existence, but leaves it in complete
uncertainty regarding its future fate.
It appears neither to recognize what is taking place within this state, nor to
concern itself therewith, apart from demonstrating from time to time its
harshness, its pride, its enmity and its disdain. The vacillations of the Cabinet,
party conflicts, the impatience of the population regarding the uncertain and
burdensome condition, appear to leave France indifferent. As the moment of
the Austrian War approaches, Prussia, thrown back and forth in indecisive-
ness, comes perhaps to the point of declaring itself for Austria. France obtains
thereby an additional non-negligible enemy, whose influence can create cir-
cumstances in Northern Germany, the importance of which should not be
178 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
underestimated. All these considerations, which at the Peace of Tilsit were
completely evident to France, prevent the Emperor from making Prussia his
ally and drafting it into his service.
Are these observations at all exaggerated? Certainly not! And what must we
conclude? That the Emperor Napoleon had determined to destroy Prussia at
the very moment he conceded to the Peace of Tilsit. The remaining strength of
this state should be broken once again; above all, however, the dynasty toward
which he had directed his hate should be expelled.
The execution of this plan should be accelerated by Prussia’s own conduct
and mistakes; yes, it should shoulder the appearance of all blame. This is why
the Emperor Napoleon put the Prussian state in such a dangerous spot, where
it was impossible for any ordinary government to stand fast, and where any
misstep could instantly lead to ruin. If the plan can be executed only now, as
the year 1812 approaches, then this is due to a number of intervening
circumstances, which the Emperor Napoleon could not have foreseen.
The hate that the Emperor Napoleon has directed toward the House of
Hohenzollern10 cannot be made clear to everybody, nor can its origin be
explained. For many, it would suffice to hear that at the time of the Tilsit
negotiations the behavior of the Emperor Napoleon toward Fredrick William
III11 and his family was characterized by an unmistakable disdainful chill, even
a restrained hatred; and that the behavior of the royal family toward him
(thanks to a human dignity that could not be suppressed by politics!) betrayed
a serene and dignified demeanor, which naturally could further infuriate a
vain and impulsive person. There are certain facts over which there can be no
doubt. The basis of the enmity lies predominantly in the liberality that
characterizes the Prussian government, through which it has become an object
of general interest in the whole of Germany. Prussia, especially the royal
house, more than any state enjoys public support, of which the Emperor
Napoleon is a suspicious enemy. The princes of Southern Germany may be
tired of French domination, but they have never enjoyed independence, fear
the revenge of others, and are without pride and self-esteem, each half-
admirer, half-flatterer of the French Emperor. It is not so with Frederick
William III. This king, as everyone knows, is above all a righteous man,
incapable of hypocrisy. The hate of the French Emperor comes naturally,
and since he is sensitive and easily irritated, the feeling of being upset by the
Emperor’s constant mistreatment has never abated. If, for political reasons, he
has refrained from any mention thereof (as countenance comes naturally to
him), and in this regard admirably sacrificed both his dignity and his people,
he nonetheless could never mislead the French Emperor and nothing is more
10
House of Hohenzollern is the dynasty of Prussian princes and kings.
11
Frederick William III (1770–1840) was King of Prussia from 1797 to 1840.
Second Confession 179
natural than that the Emperor has seen more deeply into the heart of the king
than the king has seen into his.
Considering the condition of the Prussian state, it is remarkable that the
government did not decide earlier to free itself to some degree from this
uncertainty and decide to observe certain standards of behavior; thereafter
to create a framework to which they would remain unswervingly true. There
appeared to be two ways of achieving this, as was then said. One was utter
unconditional subservience, the most devoted annexation to France. In this
case, one would have to accommodate France in every way, to a certain extent
force oneself upon it in an effort to engender its trust.
Whether this would have led to the objective (the alliance with France) is
by no means certain, even unlikely, if one considers that the French Em-
peror could not be interested in what he himself never wanted, and that he
is not the kind of man who is led by the interests of others. Whether the
alliance with France would have met the objective of external independence
is even less certain. Be that as it may, it has not come to pass. Prussia, always
ready to receive commands from France, has still not done enough to place
itself in the master’s good graces, and thus enhance its security to the
furthest extent.
The other way would be the organization of a military state that the French
Emperor would fear; the introduction of the general military draft, so that
burden more easily could be shouldered by all; the reorganization of the army
in a new spirit; the removal of the old weak bad generals and staff officers; the
procurement of an abundance of weapons and munitions; the supply of every
fortress with sufficient provisions; the establishment of secure depots in
entrenched camps, the establishment of a general militia; the strict punish-
ment of committed mistakes and unpatriotic attitudes amongst the military
and civilians; the continuous renewal of the army after 2 to 3 years of service,
by which one would today, after 4 years, have had an army of at least 150
thousand trained men, and military service thereby would be less burdensome
to the population. Of these measures, some were not in violation of the treaty,
some were not easily detectable, and France was not capable at all times, as was
the case immediately after the Peace of Tilsit, of enforcing Prussian obedience
through swift and instant punishment. In this regard, if the negotiations with
France had been conducted in a lawful and public manner, if the king had
decided, as far as France and Prussia are concerned, to inform the newspapers,
he would have had public opinion behind him and would have become doubly
dangerous to France.
It might thus have been possible to have turned unexpectedly the tempting
but false neutrality that had been conceded to Prussia true and robust;
neutrality that for a hundred reasons would have been stronger than that
which Prussia observed prior to 1806. But these are matters of the past and we
consider them only because the past leads us to the present.
180 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
Likewise, this second option was not chosen by Prussia because it lacked the
necessary courage and determination as well as political insight. Without
courage and determination in great matters, nothing can be accomplished,
since danger exists everywhere and politics is not always a cowardly deceit as
many believe it to be.—The king would not have been incapable of such a
decision had he not been surrounded by two parties, one of which out of fear
of catastrophe advised submission to France with great sacrifice, lack of noble
pride of heart, and insufficient historical cultivation. This party chained itself
to the best decisions of the king like a lead weight, thus destroying or
weakening all those measures that the king, through a courageous resolve,
adopted against his own misgivings.
Turning to the present, the question emerges: 1. Is the present moment
different from that of the Peace of Tilsit?
Absolutely. At that time, Russia, fresh from the battlefield, was deeply
entwined in France’s interests, and Austria not to be feared; Prussia itself lay
disarmed, sick, feeble. Now Russia, again enraged by France, is rearmed.
Prussia, although it has not done everything for its military organization,
nevertheless has not neglected the essentials and is by no means without the
ability to resist. Spain and England hold down half of the entire enormous
power of France.
2. Is an alliance with France now possible?
Absolutely. But only because Prussia has done something for itself, has
outdone itself, one last time shown a spark of energy. Thanks to these reasons,
France has conceded to an alliance.
3. Is the salvation of the state, or at least its external independence, to be
expected from this alliance?
Less than ever. As much as conditions have changed to Prussia’s advantage
as regards the first two questions, on this point they have changed to its
disadvantage.
Had Prussia, as Bavaria,12 annexed itself to France, Emperor Napoleon
might have countenanced its existence, but also might not have—much as
the unrestrained will of a successful general defies calculation. But now that a
disquieted Napoleon has survived the dangers of a lateral attack from Prussia,
now that he has realized that Prussia cannot be suppressed immediately and
could become a danger, that in 4 years more animosity than devotedness
toward France has been nurtured, that the mistreatments to which it has been
subjected have been deeply felt and painfully suppressed, now the impassio-
nate tyrant will not have abandoned the decision to destroy this state, and the
alliance he is offering is only the means thereto. Things have turned out
differently than he expected. He realizes that he made a mistake allowing
12
Bavaria had subdued itself to the will of Napoleon in a secret treaty in 1805.
Second Confession 181
Prussia to remain independent; that at this moment he cannot overthrow it, he
even needs it. But he is committed not to make the same mistake twice.—
Although for 4 years he could not use Prussia’s strength, he does not want to
have sacrificed in vain. At the next possible opportunity he wants to grab the
spoils that he for so long has reserved for himself.
Many will miss the clarity of strict necessity in this reasoning and say: it
indeed could be so, but also it could be otherwise. They have to stick to the
truly objective facts.
If then, one disregards the intentions of the Emperor Napoleon, his opinion
of us and his hate, and strictly sticks to the matter, the question is: which
advantages and securities could flow from an alliance with France, and which
disadvantages are to be expected?
Advantages of the Alliance with France
1. Guarantee of existence. Roughly half as much as Spain, Italy, Holland,
and Northern Germany.
2. Removal of war from our country: certainly does not happen.
3. Delay of the war. Equally unlikely, because the outbreak of war depends
on the rupture with Russia. Even an alliance with Russia, which is not
necessary, or at least need not be made known, would not accelerate the
war for a moment. For the principal offense has already occurred:
Prussia has achieved the level of defensive capability that makes it
impossible to be treated like Hesse. Further increases would not provide
the French Emperor a definite basis for an earlier break with Russia.
Russia is continuously increasing its strength and the Emperor does not
break. Therefore other grounds are necessary.
4. An alleviation in the prosecution of the war will not occur, for it is not a
particular burden of warfare to fight with 20 instead of a hundred
thousand men, if one has to maintain 400,000 in either case. In any
case Prussia will be the theater of war between Russia and France and
experience shows that French allies are no better than French enemies. It
may be different with the Russians.
Disadvantages of the Alliance with France
1. One debases oneself and the nation by fighting out of timidity for a
government that is our worst enemy, deprives us of our greatness, and
that has mistreated us to the extreme. The people must become corrupt,
if they are to be compelled to spill their blood for a cause that they abhor.
182 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
A government that thus coerces the people compels it to vice and
depravity.
2. One delivers oneself, hands tied, to the will of the French Emperor. Every
alliance with him will utterly destroy the power to resist. He places one
component of the army under his command and the other is so placed
that it cannot offer resistance. He incorporates some of the fortresses
(most importantly the sea ports), the others are so poorly staffed and
supplied, that they cease to be of importance. Those steadfast people who
are not acquiescent to France are released. The king surrounded with
French authorities and troops, in a state of constant concern for freedom
and honor, loses all ability to oppose the impending ruin. Assuming this
characterization were exaggerated, and it were indeed possible to con-
clude an alliance with France on moderate terms, that is, terms under
which one’s own continued independence would be secured, the ques-
tion arises, is the latter truly the case? Could that be the case? Are we
settling for mere appearances, to deceive ourselves in order to justify our
choosing the path of least resistance?
The question is easily answered once one considers that every alliance will
necessarily absorb some of our energies, that we already doubt these energies
are sufficient for defying the demands of France, and that we doubt even more
our trussed, our paralyzed energies. Moreover, having once invested in a
cause, nothing is more human than to make additional sacrifices in hopes of
recovering the initial investment. It all depends on answering candidly and
honestly the following questions:
Will the Prussian government, having once taken the first large step toward
concluding the alliance with France, even assuming the conditions were this
moderate and honorable, ever refuse a new demand, regardless of how
oppressive and drastic?
Will one of those, who now advise the king to ally with France and claim
only to have the well-being of the king and the nation at heart, then advise
resistance?
Will we not then follow with inescapable certainty, one step after another,
the road to ruin and end as Charles IV and his son?13
Oh those reckless advisors who now credit themselves with wise prudence,
because they propose to the king the easy path, and denounce as lunatic those
who demand resolve and a worthy sacrifice!
How will they show their embarrassed faces to the king, if overwhelmed
with violence and disgrace, abandoned by his people, and forsaken by public
13
In 1808 Napoleon forced Charles IV of Spain and his son Ferdinand VII to abdicate after
they had changed sides several times and installed his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, as King Joseph
I of Spain.
Second Confession 183
opinion, he is left standing alone like a sorry captive? How will they face their
own consciences?
Hence the situation for the king, but what about the people?
Woe to those who would divide king and people in order to continuously
set the interests of one against the other. Such malicious sophistry has only
become fashionable so that they, by means of specious arguments, can evade
the courageous decision that is demanded of us.
The honor of the prince had to give way to the interest of the nation; and the
interest of the nation had to give way to the preservation of the princely house.
Thus one was constantly turning in circles and playing with words. The king is
the representative of his nation. The nation takes part involuntarily, even
undeservedly, in everything he does, in whatever is admired about him, both
today and in posterity. The king, who disgracefully decays, brings shame onto
the nation and is responsible for her misfortune. The king, who gloriously
perishes, exalts the nation and his exalted name is balsam for their wounds.
The people, whose king has lost honor and freedom, have with him lost
them both. They will be in a state of internal dissolution and external oppres-
sion. They will feel their misery and have no hope of escaping therefrom,
because they sense that they are themselves to blame; that too early they
carelessly have given up everything. They will despise themselves, daily sub-
jugate themselves ever deeper, elevate their enemy higher and thus with every
passing day sink ever deeper into cowardly fear and subservience.
Thus will be the fate of a prince and a people, who surrender themselves—
voluntarily and shackled—to their natural, their irreconcilable, their hereditary
enemy, at the very moment they could have offered the final and brave resistance;
when this was the primary duty that they owed themselves and others.
What would be the fate of this king and his people if, in the noble struggle,
which they fought for one another, they emerged unlucky; the king expelled,
the people enslaved?
Both would retain their honor, both their mutual affection and esteem!—
Would this be nothing in such misfortune? Especially then, when everything is
lost, would this noble sentiment be worth nothing? Should not the seed of a
future rebirth there lie? Let everyone answer these questions with his own
heart and mind!
If there is no external security in the alliance with France, if there is no other
remedy for the internal malady than this resistance against France, then this
resistance should be regarded as the last and only salvation.
This idea of resistance should be on everyone’s mind, even if the heart does
not abhor the present condition of subjugation.
From there should arise a clear determination to throw off the yoke.
This determination within the government and the people should lead to a
preparation for the great moment of combat, through which alone this combat
is made possible.
184 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
Thus prepared one should await calmly the appropriate moment.{
If this is the only truly political behavior that a people in our situation can
observe, then we are so far away from it that we will have to go through a
number of steps before we reach this point.
One surely wants to be freed of France’s tyranny. One recognizes the
benefits of this liberation but not the necessity thereof, which is a big
difference.
One wishes to wait until chance does something for this great cause—by
which one means the violent death of the Emperor Napoleon. Should this
never come to pass, then one is prepared to wait for his natural death. Judging
by the strength of his body, however, the Emperor could live another 30 years.
Who, having carried that yoke for 30 years without murmur, would contest his
heir the inheritance of his thus acquired and affirmed rights? Would not the
same reservations set in? Is one certain that it will be a weak regent that follows
him on the throne, and if he were weak, is there not the example of Rome,
which survived its great dynasties by 400 years?
But the question remains whether this situation can last thirty years.
One can answer boldly: No. It is impossible. Sooner or later, out of neces-
sity, a disquiet must and will emerge amongst the peoples that will lead to that
evil, which one currently fears. The desire to avoid it forever is thus futile.
Indeed, and most irritating—if every superstitious belief of weak minds and
souls were fulfilled, if finally the point arrived, where a child, a weakling,
became Napoleon’s successor, and all people awakened to action—what else
would occur other than a general battle, an unbridled imbroglio of all, a bloody
feud amongst the parties, a time filled with misery and despair!
Is it thus not unbelievable folly to hope that everyone will recover the
peaceful enjoyment of their property and their independence without a stroke
of the sword?
Must not everyone acknowledge that this crisis will be more awful than the
current; this battle of disunited forces against a tenfold enemy, even more
{
Note: At this moment, and as long as the war with Russia has not broken out, as regards the
policies of the Prussian Cabinet, it depends more on a decision than on action. Nobody demands
that Prussia should initiate an offensive against France. Nobody demands that Prussia suddenly
refuses to fulfill the demands required by existing conditions. But one should not be persuaded to
relinquish that power which is still present for its defense. It should boldly declare to France: that
it values its independence above all else; that it will never accept being deprived of the means to
preserve this independence; and that it could agree to no other alignment with France than one
that would guarantee absolutely its own security. One can make such declarations only if one has
made a firm decision to go down with a fight. Everything depends on this decision.
It is very unlikely that such language will accelerate a breach of the peace, as the Emperor
Napoleon will not be so foolish as to regard such language to be more important than the issue:
to allow Prussia to complete its armament and then to be dragged into war by mere words.
Should it come to pass, however, one would reach the point but a few months earlier. Failing to
see what is unavoidable is to concentrate the entire folly of our frivolous policy on a single point.
Second Confession 185
lamentable than the battle of all those tightly aligned by duty, revenge, hate,
self-interest, against a single enemy that is recognized by all?
The current opinion and mood of the people cannot truly be a consequence
of rational deliberation. Rather, it is fear of the coming misfortune and short-
sighted self-interest.
One cowers for fear before the danger, before the sacrifices one will have to
bear, above all, before the improbability of success, of which one is convinced,
and so one believes one behaves wisely by evading these dangers.
It is correct, that the odds of success are against us, but under what political
conditions would they not be against us? How could we expect that the odds
are for us, given that for many decades mistake after mistake, fault after fault
has amassed, and we now see all the consequences thereof cumulating in the
misfortune of our times?
Our misfortune resides in our facing precipices wherever we turn. Under
such circumstances how can one hope for a chance of serendipitous success? It
is enough that it is not impossible; whoever asks for more contradicts himself.
It would be futile to try to conceal the recognition of those true sources of
public opinion, for it is impossible to further the argument, which unduly
claims to be the considered judgment, without landing between the starkest of
contradictions.
From everywhere one hears the call that reason alone shall decide. As if fear
were not an expression of emotion, as if an independent reasoned judgment
were possible. All that one can admit is that both creeds, for resistance as for
submission, emerge in equal measure from emotions; but that one emotion is
courage, the other is fear. Fear paralyzes reason, courage animates it.
These few general observations must lead to the conviction that however
our situation may appear, the decision to gain our independence is indispens-
able. The formidable weight of current circumstances forces this decision
upon us. It would be folly and weakness to try to avoid this pressure, which
then with greater certainty would destroy us.
This truth requires no further evidence; it is not a function of whether we
have more or less means for rescue. The resolve should emerge from the
necessity of rescue, not from the ease of the same. There is no help apart from
ourselves. There is no salvation apart from that which is found in our strength,
in our reason and in our hearts.
Should a consideration of our political situation lead us to the decision to
risk everything for our salvation and to regard this battle as indispensable,
then an unbiased assessment of our available resources must reinvigorate our
courage and cast away our faintheartedness, to which fears of a great danger
and hopelessness have given rise.
We are rich in resources. Our situation is not desperate. Such is the
conclusion of anyone, who, free of preconceived opinion, casts the eye of
mature judgment on these circumstances. But the artisan spirit has cloistered
186 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
this judgment behind a bulwark of false views, rules, maxims, and prejudices,
so that only he who comes from the guild attempts to develop his own
opinion.
In this spirit I add my third confession, in which I discuss our current status,
as it appears from a military point of view.
THIRD CONFESSION
The resources of the Prussian state are:
People in General
A population of 4,600,000 people. Thereof comprise men
between 18 and 30 years of age 450,000
between 30 and 40 " " " 300,000
Sum 750,000
This is a weapons-capable crew. If from them an army of 100,000 men were
raised for a few years it certainly would not lead to the domestic ruin of the
state. That is only one in 7 and if we include the elderly only one in 10
adult men.
100,000 men could be provided by the state without disrupting the usual
social fabric.
Officers
The entire officer corps, which for the Prussian army once numbered 210,000
men, with the exception of roughly 1/5, is still available. If we are to commis-
sion officers experienced in service and the code of conduct, we can do so
without difficulty. Otherwise we will produce officers the way we produce
soldiers; that is, by selecting from the entire population those citizens who are
suitable.
Weapons
Prussia has more than 120,000 ready firearms. Partly in the hands of the
troops, partly in the depots.
Third Confession 187
Following the common ratio, these can be used to arm 160,000 combatants.
At any time and at reasonable price the state can purchase twenty to thirty
thousand guns from Vienna. England is prepared at a moment’s notice to set
sail entire shiploads (fifty- to sixty-thousand armatures) for Prussia’s needs.
They are already mooring in the Baltic Sea, and the mere possibility that
Prussia might once again take up the issue of its independence and honor has
led the English government to offer these to Prussia’s disposition.
Cannons
Prussia itself has a field artillery sufficient for 80,000 men following the
common ratio. It has supplied all of its fortresses with artillery, following the
same axioms according to which the French fortresses once were supplied.
England has shipped 30 to 40 artillery in case Prussia takes sides against
France.
Thus without affecting the artillery for the fortresses, Prussia can equip an
army of 100,000 field soldiers.
Munition
As with artillery, Prussia has supplied its fortresses with munition. In addition,
the necessary munition for the entire campaign of an army of 100,000 men is
in place. Much as England has offered generous support with regard to guns
and artillery, it will not hesitate to send munition in superabundance; and
since we ourselves have the essentials, we can regard as superabundant the
extensive support that we can have at any moment.
Horses
In the entire Prussian state, according to the official registers, 725,000 horses
are available. The actual number is probably closer to one million. Of those,
624,000 are on the right bank of the Oder and in Silesia. Is it not foolish to
believe that there could be a shortage of horses? Yes, to muster one of 15
horses would amount to 40,000 horses just for the right bank of the Oder and
for Silesia, which is more than an army of 100,000 men requires.
It would be a weak objection to assert that those horses were unfit for service
in the cavalry. For one, Prussia already has a 10,000 man cavalry, which in any
case is sufficient for its situation, since the infantry and not the cavalry is the
main weapon in any war, especially in a war of defense. Second, if needed,
every healthy horse that is not too old can be used for the cavalry.
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Clothing
This is an issue that does not merit mention in such a general analysis. None of
the 750,000 men is running around naked and the form of clothing is not
important. Strictly speaking, there is hardly any urgency. Moreover, in a state
such as Prussia, which has so many mills for raw fabric, the demand can be
satisfied very quickly and under all circumstances.
Sure enough, packs, ammunition pockets, and boots seem to some of our
generals to be so essential, that one cannot wage war without them. But the
nature of circumstances sufficiently reveals this pedantry.
Foodstuffs
The Prussian fortresses are sufficiently, even over-supplied with all necessary
items. Others have stores nearby, readily available at a moment’s notice.
The field soldiers will not suffer from lack of foodstuffs as long as the enemy
is fed. If food ever becomes a limiting condition for warfare, then this
limitation must affect the French before us. In any case the entire argument
is folly. The army lives as well now in the countryside as it would in the event
of war, and the diminished production caused by war, will, as history teaches,
be compensated with foreign imports.
Money
Formerly money was the nerve of war. This is no longer the case. Guibert14
said prophetically:
Assuming that in Europe a people arises, powerful through genius, potent means,
and a good government, a people that combines with the strictest virtues and a
good national militia a coherent plan of expansion, and never loses sight of this
plan, a people that knew how to wage war with limited means and preserve itself
through victory, and was not forced to lay down its arms because of lack of
finances; such a people would subjugate its neighbors and destroy our weak
constitution, much as the North wind blows the weak reed back and forth as it
wishes.
This people has indeed existed, although armed with only half the attributes,
with potent means and a good national militia, without virtue and a good
government (France). This people courageously resisted as it was attacked
14
Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert (1743–90), French general and military
writer.
Third Confession 189
from all sides, became itself a conqueror, and cast aside the old weak consti-
tutions. It was able to do so without money, for France had no treasure and
twice has declared national bankruptcy.
Why can’t we do the same? For what do we need money? To pay the army?
The army must be fed, but doesn’t need high pay. The state can provide what
little is essential, which it would also have to provide in time of peace.
An army that fights on its own soil for its most vital interest cannot and
must not be regarded as a bunch of mercenaries, who sell themselves to the
highest bidder. The spirit of this army should be guided by the strongest
renunciation of all luxury and affluence. Then the high salaries, which one
believes reward the higher ranks for long service and retain talent, are not
necessary. Fighting for the fatherland is the highest reward for service, the
strongest attraction for talent. England will supply us with arms and munition,
insofar as replacing spent material is of concern. It is unreasonable to call this
into doubt, as England, not only now but also in the last war, has demon-
strated a willingness to do so.
We thus should not look with greed upon Britain’s treasures, uncertain
whether millions in hard cash, which we have not earned, will flow from a
minister’s generosity. What does our freedom have to do with England’s
money? Should England purchase from us the courage necessary to achieve
this freedom? No, once Guibert’s prophecy has come true, the time will
not return in which conceited money is the nerve of war and the nations.
The history of our times demonstrates to us that the most forceful war can
be waged with little money; but only with a great deal of courage and
good will.
The Time
It is a common opinion, that France would not be so foolish as to leave Prussia
much time for significant rearming; that the first steps in this direction would
bring the French army, which would nip all such measures in the bud.
Disorder, flight, and losses of all kinds would be the consequence, and the
ruin would be just as inglorious as without any resistance.
This opinion holds up to scrutiny as poorly as many other dismal ideas.
The assumption that we must repeat the same mistake we have already
made is an unworthy philosophy to which no one is entitled.
In fact, Prussia is now ten times as well prepared for war as in 1806, when
nothing happened but the issuance of the so-called (laughable in our times)
mobilization budgets. Everything has not been accomplished. Nevertheless, as
was already pointed out, the most necessary has not been neglected.
Those measures that require time already have been taken. The fortifica-
tions (the most important of these measures) are ready to accommodate the,
190 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
as of yet not fully organized, armed forces; the weapons-, clothing-, and
munitions-depots are secured; the troops, by and large suitably deployed,
already organized for war during the peace.
Under these conditions only two issues need to be settled.
First, the mustering of the men necessary to reinforce the army. This
measure can be prepared so that it can be carried out in eight days. In eight
days, however, the enemy is not likely to have advanced far into the country:
At most one would lose those districts adjacent to him.
Second, the organization and training of the mustered troops. If necessary,
this can be done in the fortified camps.
Thus we have reviewed those issues, which constitute the subject of war. We
have seen that Prussia has everything in abundance for an army of 100,000
men. It thus follows directly, that with a little exertion, an army of 150,000
men can be raised.
Now we ask whether any of those assertions and the inferences we have
drawn from them are exaggerated?
Any allegation of this sort would at once reveal itself as malicious intent and
spiteful obstinacy.
After we have reached this conclusion, we wish to proceed to the analysis of
the military situation and character of the Prussian state.
Under the current circumstances, the geographic position of the Prussian
state, so ill reputed, is much more beneficial than detrimental.
The fact that the capital city is forwardly positioned and would have to be
surrendered quickly, that an entire province, the Kurmark,15 cannot be de-
fended, is problematic, but not of highest priority. All the less so, as neither
Berlin nor the Kurmark provide any extraordinary sources of help.
The benefits include a right flank that is covered by the sea to the outermost
point of the Memel with three seaports (Memel, Pillau, Kolberg) for the link to
England; the separation of Silesia from the remaining states, by which one
gains a theater of war on the enemy’s right flank; the alignment of this
province with Austria and the position of the two poorest provinces (Neumark
and Pomerania) in the middle of the theater of war, so that the enemy must
extract his resources from them, while for the Prussian troops, the richest
provinces of Lithuania, East Prussia, and Silesia remain.
The Prussian fortifications are tied precisely to these advantages.
Prussia has 8 fortifications manned by her troops in
Pillau, Kolberg, Graudenz in Prussia.
Glatz, Neisse, Silberberg, and Cosel in Silesia.
Spandau near Berlin.
15
Western core region of Brandenburg.
Third Confession 191
The majority of these fortifications are amongst the strongest in the world.
All are well maintained and supplied with every necessity.
Amongst these fortifications number the fortified camps of Kolberg, Pillau,
Neisse, and Glatz.
There is space for 100 thousand men in these eight fortresses and three
fortified camps; they therefore are invincible to every violent attack. These
fortifications and camps can be defended adequately by 40 thousand men.
What then is to be feared under such circumstances, provided one does not
reckon with extraordinary means?
Can Prussia lose her 8 fortresses with one stroke of the sword?
Are the examples of 1805, 1806, and 1809 applicable to Prussia?
Anyone who does not answer these questions with no must be out of
his mind.
Assume that Prussia were to suffer the misfortune of being attacked with the
full force of France before the war with Russia breaks out, because the
Emperor Napoleon sought revenge for Prussia’s rearmament on the spot.
Then the army would rush into the fortresses and fortified camps. All that
the government would have to do is to name eight resolute commanders, and
itself escape from hostile violence.
Finding these eight commanders is held by many to be an insurmountable
difficulty. But this is a misjudgment. Amongst so many officers, the king will
surely find eight, who combine resolve and insight. You don’t have to be a
Julius Caesar or Gustavus Adolphus to command a fortress or fortified camp.
Even if with regard to his insights one of these commanders were to fall short
of expectations, no great harm would result, as long as one had not erred with
regard to his resolve; and that would be the government’s own fault. Further-
more, it is mere hearsay, a simple prejudice, if one argues that 5 million people
are not intelligent enough to produce extraordinary men for extraordinary
ends. As long as the governments decide to create extraordinary men, even the
smallest nation will not fail, for a hundred men tend to go down in dust before
a single man overcomes the difficulties and hurdles that society has placed
before him. France, over the course of the Seven Years’ War,16 had a shortage
of first-rate generals such that one might come to believe that nature no longer
begets Condés, Turennes, and Luxemburgs. In the Revolutionary War,17 the
French army was suddenly just as rich in excellent generals as was any other
army. One could say much more, but these pathetic and truly absurd preju-
dices are not worthy of further rebuttal.
16
The Seven Years’ War, which actually lasted nine years, took place from 1754 to 1763 and
involved all of the major European powers of the period.
17
The Revolutionary War took place from 1792 to 1802 and pitted the French First Republic
against several European monarchies.
192 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
How much more difficult it would be for the government to find, instead of
those 8 commanders, one man, who combines the great qualities of a
Commander-in-Chief (OberFeldherr), genius, knowledge of war, initiative,
and constancy, in a serene greatness, and thereby unifies the tact of a gentle-
man and the energy of a Czar Peter. Indeed, one must regard it as impossible
for the government to overcome its hesitation to place its entire trust in the
hands of one man and to confer in him the highest authority. The daily history
of our state has recognized no service, or exalted it high enough, such that it
could be guarded from envy and defamation. No one could achieve so much
for the state that his deeds could compel trust and respect. In order for a
government to select among the more deserving the one man on whom it
wishes to confer the highest authority, a self-confidence, achieved by means of
open deliberation, is necessary. This, I must admit, is difficult to expect from
the Prussian government, given the extreme consideration and little august-
ness with which the government proceeds in the appointment of its civil
servants.
But precisely in this respect, it is a great advantage of our current situation
that we do not need a Commander-in-Chief. And if, in the eight fortresses,
men of resolve and ambition have the command, then the entire effect
emerges by itself, without demanding the degree of conformity in measures
and precision in the execution of orders that is necessary in every other war,
but which we can hardly expect. This is not to say that one should not appoint
a Commander-in-Chief in the various provinces, and that he would not be
able to employ the armed forces with a certain coherence, but rather it merely
follows that if those higher requirements of military organization are not
fulfilled, nothing essential to the effect would be lost, and thus large setbacks
are in no way to be feared.
This is a more decisive advantage than one might believe, because herein
lies the main source of every skepticism that the people have in the govern-
ment, and which, in turn, can be regarded as one of the main reasons for the
widespread despondency.
We come back to our question: What could the enemy accomplish against
these fortresses? To lay siege to them. Albeit France cannot lay siege to all 8
fortresses at the same time, and there has never in history been an example of 8
well-defended sites being taken in one campaign. In addition, it can be evinced
that in this case it is impossible. Indeed, more than one campaign will be
necessary. It will require the sacrifice of 40 to 50 thousand men in order to
conquer these 8 fortresses.
We cannot expect a better result. It is highly unlikely that Russia and
Austria would allow the fall of 8 fortresses without starting the war against
France. The political constellations of today allow such expectations.
So Prussia will not stand alone; not fall alone. It will be a strong rampart for
its natural allies. It will cost the common enemy a considerable amount of time
Third Confession 193
and blood and through its significant weight give the entire war a different
direction.
It might be that the Russian army will be defeated; that Prussia’s fortresses
will fall after honorable resistance; that Austria remains neutral; that Russia
abandons Prussia for the next peace. But all conceivable misfortunes are not
probable, and we have already discussed elsewhere how little we should be
deterred in the event they were indeed likely. In any event, one must
admit that this impact of Prussia is more important than in the years 1806
and 1807, that the successes were seldom, perhaps even never, a matter of
chance, and that one can boldly march into the decisive days of the future
without demanding too much greatness from the government.
This is the result of the foregoing deliberations, if we leave things as simple
as possible, and do not assume a greater exertion of energy, be it physical or
intellectual. —
Without a doubt, however, one can imagine several degrees of higher
potency, without approaching the border of impossibility.
First, in addition to the aforementioned straightforward analysis of Prus-
sia’s war preparedness, we can assume that in the most likely case, Russia will
decide for war at the very moment in which Prussia is handled in a hostile
manner by France. Thereupon, the Prussian troops do not need to seek shelter
behind the walls of their fortified camps and fortresses. One no longer needs to
fear that the army will be defeated and dispersed by a disproportionately
superior enemy army.
Hence, in this case, while dispatching a corps of 30,000 men to the Russian
army, Prussia can arrive on the scene as strongly in Silesia and with 20,000
men in Kolberg. The sum of 80,000 men will engage an equal number of
enemy troops and thereby assure the Russian army a decisive predominance.
For, without engaging in a debate about the opposing forces, which at this time
in many respects would be very difficult, we can infer a more general and
reliable measure of their relative strength from the wars of 1807 and 1809. The
French did not significantly outnumber the Russians and by no means
matched the Austrians in number. There is no reason why the French should
now appear with far greater forces. Rather, one can imagine that the Russians
will begin the campaign of 1812 better prepared than that of 1806. All reports
justify this conclusion. If one thereby considers that the battles of Eylau,
Friedland, Aspern, and Wagram were fought with armies of far fewer than
100,000 men, then the advantages offered the Russia armies by 80,000 Prus-
sians in the field and 20,000 in the fortresses becomes apparent.
Under these circumstances the form of the Prussian theater of war is of
decisive importance. Silesia lies on the right flank of the French operations.
A decisive defeat of their corps in Silesia can call back the main army from the
river Weichsel, or in any case will cripple their operation. With its four
fortresses and mountain range, and its abundance of resources, Silesia is itself
194 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
difficult to conquer; and without applying a decisive preponderance in Silesia,
which would deprive the main army’s operations of necessary power, France
has no hope of conquering Silesia before Russia itself.
Kolberg, nearer to theater of war of the main armies on their left flank,
strengthened by its link to England, will play a no less important role.
That these flank operations are of greater importance than a direct resist-
ance and assault is an established truth, without thereby conceding the
childishness of Herr v. Bülow18 to be military wisdom. Whoever doubts this
greater effectiveness lacks not only a clear conception of war, but also the
judgment of common sense.
To completely discard these estimates of probability, which are based on
physical advantages, in order to subordinate everything to the French advan-
tage in morale, is a completely unreasonable view. War consists of the
application of physical strength and morale; we could ignore the degree of
one and yet hope to achieve the desired end result. Regardless of how superior
the French morale may be, the aforementioned physical advantages will
always animate our hopes.
With regard to the advantage in morale, we will have the opportunity to
discuss this in more detail below.
The heretofore mentioned means exist under normal circumstances. Con-
sidering the shortness of time, they require no extraordinary efforts that might
lead us to doubt that we could expect them from an undistinguished
government.
One need not even count on great enthusiasm amongst the people. Every-
thing will occur in standard fashion as required by the mediocre and narrow-
minded. —
What then are the real sources of the accusations of exaggeration, gullibility,
eccentricity, and carelessness, which one has spread behind the backs of those
who believed in the possibility of resistance? Only ill will and a lack of insight
can explain it. Whoever continues in this manner, after all that we said here, is
such a pitiful person, that he should be ashamed of himself.
It is not impossible to suspend for a time the usual conditions; history
teaches it. A nation is not ruined because it accepts for one or two years
exertions that would be impossible to endure for ten or twenty years. If,
however, the importance of the end requires and demands it, if we are
speaking of the preservation of independence and honor, these exertions
become a duty, and the government, which otherwise has the means to compel
the people to fulfill its duties, can expect, demand, and coerce such exertions
from them. This is how one behaves if one is strong, resolute, and able to
conduct one’s own affairs.
18
Dietrich Adam Heinrich von Bülow (1757–1807), military writer, whose ideas Clausewitz
had criticized publicly in 1805.
Third Confession 195
The exertions of which we are speaking consist of:
1st a considerable expansion of the army.
2nd the establishment of a Landwehr or of a Landsturm.19
The possibility of expanding the army to 150,000–200,000 men proceeds
from the information above. There is no lack of the necessary materiél, if we
give our utmost to achieve it. Through the most concerted action in the
negotiations with England, through a firm indissoluble life and death alliance
with this state, we could expect from this nation support, which would be
adequate to our exceptional needs or even surpass them. The position and
wealth of England, the truly noble disposition of this nation and of its
government, confirm this in a way something in the political world never
before has been confirmed.
Lacking time for its organization, one probably could not lead an army
expanded in such a way against the enemy immediately. Nevertheless, it would
be a decisive advantage in the event of a loss of a large number of the
provinces, which the Prussian state would suffer at the outbreak of war, to
be able to deploy disproportionately strong reserves behind the active army.
Wartime experience teaches that the rapid reinforcement of the army is of
decisive advantage, because most armies are robbed of a third to a half of their
men in action in the course of the campaign. Regardless of how well the
French have organized their system of reinforcement, because they are unable
to start conscription before January 1st, and their reserves must be positioned
in the middle of their enormous warring state far removed from the northern
theater of war, their reinforcement can be only as rapid as that of the
Prussians, which is made possible through such a reserve. Toward the end
of the campaign, the Prussian field army would have increased from 80,000
to 100,000 men. The corresponding number of French troops would have
decreased from 80,000 to 60,000 men. The importance of this advantage can
be appreciated only by those who have read many war histories.
Finally, we come to the Landwehr or to the Landsturm.
The first characteristic, if it is to be that which it was for the Austrians
in 180920—namely, a rich source for reinforcing the army and a defensive
militia for remote spots of the war theater—seems to be inappropriate for our
19
In German-speaking countries, the concepts of Landwehr and Landsturm were used in
various ways for more or less regular militia or guerrilla forces. In Prussia, a Landwehr was finally
formed by royal edict on March 17, 1813. It called all men between 17 and 40 years of age,
capable of bearing arms and not serving in the regular army, to defend the country as part of
a militia. On April 21, 1813 another edict made all men between 15 and 60, not serving in the
regular forces or the Landwehr, members of the last national military reserve, the Landsturm.
20
Clausewitz refers to various battles the Austrian army fought in alliance with the Tyrolean
militia under the leadership of Andreas Hofer against Napoleon’s forces.
196 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
situation, because a large number of our provinces will be cut off from
the army.
Every general arming of the entire population for the immediate defense of
a country can be called Landsturm.
Thus was the Landsturm in Tyrol.
Very few people have a clear understanding of the full extent of this
fearsome, decisive measure, which throws the country into a state of danger-
ous crisis. They do not understand how individual citizens or communities,
united into loose bands, can possess the daring courage to resist a large army
or even just to enrage it through inflicting losses on its distant units.
The basic idea is the following. Every able-bodied man from 18 to 60 years,
who does not serve in the standing forces, is armed and belongs to the
Landsturm. Their arms and equipment include nothing more than a musket,
if unavailable a pike or a scythe, a pack to carry a few days’ worth of foodstuffs
and some munition, a cap, outfitted with a straw wreath to protect against
blows and on which a sign of the province and the commune is affixed.
This outfitting certainly does not demand too much. The farmers in the
Vendée21 have equipped themselves without any external support even more
completely. (See Chambeau, Geschichte des Vendeekrieges.)22
Two to three communities come together and create a band or a company,
however you wish to refer to it. The bands of a county constitute a column or a
Landsturm and the Landsturm of an entire province a small army. At the head
of this division stand leaders, who in large part are elected for and from the
communities and counties, or are appointed by the king. The commander of
the entire Landsturm of the province (Landeshauptmann) will be selected
from the provincial population by the king. From the moment in which they
assume their position, all these superiors of the Landsturm are official officers
of the army.
This, in a few words, is the general outline of the organization. To achieve it,
little time and preparation are required.
The task of the Landsturm is to mobilize quickly large numbers of troops
everywhere in the country where the enemy does not have his armies. Even if
they do not have the effect of standing armies, they can achieve the following
objectives. First: To prevent deliveries and contributions of all kinds, which
the enemy in far-off provinces extorts through means of tender or mere civil
servants. Second: To fight enemy detachments, which show up in the province
21
The war in the Vendée was a royalist insurrection against French revolutionary forces in
western France from 1793 to 1796. Starting as peasant rebellion it quickly gathered counter-
revolutionary momentum. After initial successes, the insurgency was finally defeated with
utmost brutality by Republican forces.
22
Clausewitz apparently erred when penning this parenthetical note. Werner Hahlweg
(1966–90: vol. 1, 721, n. 134) suggests that rather than to someone named Chambeau the
reference is to Alphonse Beauchamp (1806).
Third Confession 197
for similar reasons. Third: To secure the materiél that their own government
wants to extract from the country, especially men and horses.
All of these objectives can be achieved with columns of one to two thousand
men without extraordinary exertions and means of assistance.
The ringing of storm bells is the sign that the Landsturm of a village or
county is to assemble. Assembly grounds are previously determined. Within a
few hours, 2, 3, 5 thousand men are assembled where previously there was no
hint of a war.
These are no flights of fancy. In the Vendée it happened so and exactly so;
the practicality of a measure never was founded better historically.
If the enemy does not want to accept these disadvantages, if he wants to
continue to rule all the distant provinces, he must maintain specific corps therein.
It is easy to see that if, from an army of 200,000 men, 50,000 men are used for this
purpose, this would already create a significant diversion in the central theater of
war, for one must not forget that from the remaining 150,000 men, according to
all historical experience, another 50,000 will be absent, either in the sick bay or
left behind as occupying forces. Thus, the Landsturm deprives the main theater
of war of 1/3 of its armed forces according to simple calculations. Whoever is not
able to appreciate this great advantage is lacking in good judgment in this matter.
For he knows nothing of how things develop in war.
But what can 50,000 men achieve against an armed mass of 500,000?
It is a matter of course that in a single district, where with 5000 inhabitants
one is lord of the land, the enemy can only deploy 500 soldiers. One would
have to have a ridiculous regard for saber, ammunition pocket, and lower
tactics, if one were to fear that one could not master the enemy with a tenfold
advantage. In this way, the enemy would hardly achieve its goal.
The enemy, therefore, will have to resolve himself to enter into a formal war
with the Landsturm. In doing so, he generally will have to sacrifice a great deal
of time and energy. Therefore, the true end of defense will be achieved, and
this measure will not be futile; this much is entirely clear.
Of course there are some people who are not content with such an account
and although they themselves do everything with common means, neverthe-
less wish to be certain of the most uncommon. They are not to be contented
until one has proven with mathematical certainty that the destruction of the
enemy army is at hand. This laughable demand was not met by the Romans at
the height of their power and even less by the Greeks, as they fought against
the Persians for their freedom.
We do not want to content ourselves with that general result, but rather to
examine more closely the kind of war that will emerge between the Landsturm
and the enemy army; remaining true to what we have already experienced in
order not to be seduced by wishful thinking and false hopes.
To become more precise and to speak with more clarity, we wish to
introduce an example and with it attempt to make clear our ideas. Therefore,
198 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
we choose the example of a Landsturm employed against the French in the
Mittelmark,23 because sadly it is only too certain that the government, which
does not have the courage to reach for this last means of rescue, is even less
likely to employ it in a province that is so close to the enemy that it is almost
too late for it.
Example of a Landsturm in the Mittelmark
Organization in General
The Mittelmark has 10 counties; every county establishes a Landsturm under
the Landsturm Obersten.24 All are subordinated to a Landeshauptmann.
1. The County Assembly Ground Ruppin
With 43 thousand souls can provide 7–8000 men.
Should the enemy advance into the province with might, the Landsturm
withdraws either into the faults of Havelland County or into the woods in the
north of Ruppin County itself.
2. The Havelland County
Assembly Ground the Island of Potsdam and Rathenow:
With 90,000 souls can provide 10–15,000 men.
Should the enemy appear with overwhelming force in the province, the
Island of Potsdam will be defended; the other part withdraws into the
Havelland fault.
3. The Counties Glien and Löwenbergsch
Population 13,000 people, can provide 2–3000 men.
Assembly Ground Cremmen.
It is unlikely that the enemy, regardless of the number of directions from
which he advances into the Mittelmark, will appear strongly in this county,
which lies out of the way of the direction of his march. The Landsturm there
will thus be able to support the remaining counties.
4. The Niederbarmisch County
Assembly Grounds Berlin and Liebenwalde
A population of 190,000 including Berlin, and 30,000 excluding Berlin, results
in a Landsturm of 10–15,000 men.
23
Mittelmark refers to the core territory of the Margraviate of Brandenburg between the Oder
and Elbe rivers.
24
Clausewitz alternates between the terms Obristen, Oberst, and Obersten, all indicating the
highest rank of a staff officer (e.g. Colonel).
Third Confession 199
Should the enemy appear with predominance in the county, the Berlin
Landsturm withdraws to Spandau and the Island of Potsdam; that from the
Liebenwalde withdraws to the woods and swamps.
5. The County of Upper-Barnim
Assembly Grounds Strausberg, Neustadt, Eberswalde
With a population of 40,000 souls can provide 7000 men. Should the enemy
appear with predominance in the province, the woods along the Spree and in
the north of the county provide security.
6. The County of Lebus
Assembly Grounds Fürstenwalde, Seelow
With 50 thousand souls can provide a Landsturm of 9000 men. Should the
enemy appear with preponderance, it withdraws to the woods along the Spree.
7. The Counties of Beeskow and Storkow
Assembly Grounds Beeskow and Storkow
With a population of 25,000 men, can provide 4000 men.
The many woods and lakes provide sufficient security against a superior enemy.
8. The County of Teltow
Assembly Grounds Teltow and Zossen
With a population of 30 thousand souls can provide a Landsturm of 5000 men.
The Island Köpenick and a number of other locations in this county rich
with lakes and faults provide means to secure against a superior enemy.
9. The County of Luckenwalde
Assembly Ground Luckenwalde
Population 12,000. Landsturm 2500.
If a superior enemy appears in the county, withdraws into the County of
Teltow.
10. The County of Zauch
Assembly Ground Brandenburg
With 30,000 souls a Landsturm of 6000 men.
Will find in the area of Plauen, and in addition on the Island of Potsdam,
positions of security.
With regard to the enemy, because every possibility cannot be considered,
we will assume the following:
He decamps with columns from Magdeburg, from Mecklenburg and the
Lausitz, in order to unite with the corps from Stettin and Danzig and to deploy
an army against the Russians, while a strong corps is deployed for the siege of
Kolberg and another for Silesia. The enemy is aware of the arming of the
200 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
Landsturm in the Mark Brandenburg; he has decided first to destroy this
general armament with his entire massed troops before he moves into Prussia,
etc., so he wants to proceed carefully and secure his rear.
Thus, the troops from Mecklenburg receive orders, while marching with the
main army against Stettin, to direct a corps (10–12,000 men) toward Berlin.
30,000 men are marching toward Berlin from Magdeburg, another 10,000
Saxons are marching toward Berlin. All of these diverse columns should fight
and destroy any element of the Landsturm which crosses their path. After they
unite in Berlin one shall detach strong corps to those regions, in which
remnants of the Landsturm remain, in order to search out, to fight, and to
destroy them. At the same time, the remaining troops besiege Spandau, to
contain the capital city and to secure the route through Berlin and Frankfurt25
for the follow-on troops.
We first observe the amount of time gained by the Russians and other
powers through this mode of advancement, an effect of the Landsturm, which
is by no means insignificant and which will never fail, even if everything else
develops badly.
In view of these and other assumptions regarding the enemy, the following
general provisions for the Landsturm are provided.
Instruction for the Landsturm
1. Every healthy man between 18 and 60 years of age is obliged at the
ringing of the storm bell to assemble with arms in the community.
Whoever avoids this will be subject to corporal punishment and fine.
2. The storm bell will be rung as soon as the enemy appears in the province
or if the Landsturm of a neighboring province has assembled.
3. The Landsturm Obristen will decide on the assembly grounds.
4. They have complete freedom to do with the Landsturm of their county
what they deem to be appropriate. They must only carry out an order if
they receive it from the Landeshauptmann.
5. The task of the individual Landsturm bands is to attack with superior
numbers weak parties and enemy posts, to take away and disperse
supplies, etc.
6. The Landsturm band will retreat from a superior enemy; it will certainly
avoid proximity to the great army.
25
Clausewitz refers to Frankfurt on the Oder roughly 100 km east of Berlin.
Third Confession 201
7. If the enemy is not in the county, the Landsturm Oberst is required to
rush to the assistance of the Landsturm of a neighboring county—
which one, is left to him.
8. If the enemy endangers a Landsturm too much and there is no room for
retreat, the Landsturm Oberst is permitted to disband it. The same
applies if there is a grave shortage of foodstuffs. Nevertheless, a Land-
sturm Oberst should maintain a small group of determined individuals
with whom he can dart into a neighboring province or rove about.
A Landsturm Oberst, who cannot maintain any, is dismissed. Someone
else is to be appointed in his place.
9. When attacking the enemy, one of the primary objectives is to seize
artillery, mainly cannons, munition, foodstuffs, and from dead
soldiers—money, and to equip oneself therewith. Prisoners can even
be taken and sent to the rear as far back as space allows, where they are
guarded in walled cities. In the event of disbandment, and if there is no
opportunity to hand over the captives somewhere, they are to be set free.
10. The attacks occur mainly at night and it is essential for the Landsturm
to determine a location for reassembly in case something goes wrong.
11. One or two positions, which are strong enough to be well defended, will
be fortified in each province. The choice is left to the Landsturm Oberst,
as is the decision whether or not to retreat to them.
12. The Landeshauptmann confines himself to locations where he is not in
danger. He has the following responsibilities:
1. to oversee the activities of the Landsturm Obersten,
2. to meet the needs of the Landsturm as much as possible,
3. in exceptional cases to unite the Landsturm of multiple counties in
order to carry out large ventures. Yet, he leaves as much freedom of
action to the Landsturm Obersten as possible.
The storm bell is rung as soon as the enemy advances. The Landsturm of
every county assemble. Where they encounter enemy columns they withdraw
a significant distance laterally into the woods without engaging in battle.
As soon as the bulk of the enemy columns has passed through, the Land-
sturm attacks the detachments and the wagon trains that follow, disperses
them wherever possible, and withdraws as soon as the enemy returns with
considerable force.
In this way the march of the columns toward the rendezvous in Berlin is
impeded and the enemy soldiers receive a foretaste and preview of that which
is to come: a Spanish civil war in Germany.
As soon as all columns have arrived in Berlin the actual defense plan is
activated.
202 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
Depending on what previously, through thorough consideration, has been
determined useful, Spandau—either alone, or Spandau and the Island of
Potsdam—will be defended most tenaciously by the regular troops and Land-
sturm located there. On the Island of Potsdam one eventually would be
defeated, but not without considerable enemy casualties. Spandau will not
fall so quickly.
While this is happening near the capital city, the Landsturm Obersten attack
those positions, which the enemy has left occupied in the rear, and where he
can be attacked with superior force; for example Burg, Genthin, Fehrbellin etc.
In the vicinity of the army one is careful not to be seen. Because the
Landsturm was not destroyed through the march of the individual columns,
as indeed it could not have been, the enemy dispatches corps to attack
individual counties.
How many such corps he will dispatch cannot be surmised, and is more or
less irrelevant.
12,000 men have been ordered to advance into Havelland County. They
march through Fehrbellin. Here, the Landsturm offers resistance. The defense
of a dam with the length of 3000 paces is not difficult. The enemy circumvents
the position and sends a strong column via Friesack. Here too, a strong defense
is possible. But a new misfortune occurs. The enemy has decided to march
simultaneously from Magdeburg against Habelberg, such that one would be
attacked in the rear. One thing comes to another. The Landsturm of Havelland
County withdraws into the woods of the northern county of Ruppin, unites
with the Landsturm of this county and hopes to attack and defeat the enemy
detachments with superior force in a territory that is to them unknown and
unfavorable.
But the enemy corps is cautious; it realizes that it has 2 ways of dispersing
the Landsturm.
The first is to assume a position between Fehrbellin and Ruppin, but to
avoid sending detachments into the wooded areas where they inevitably would
be destroyed. The enemy corps controls the fertile Havelland County and the
best part of the County of Ruppin. The Landsturm, having been displaced
from this area, is restricted to an arid region, poor of produce. It will be lacking
in foodstuffs and far from home, will not remain together for long. The
majority will disband of itself.
The second way is for the corps itself to advance methodically and carefully
into the wooded areas, to pass through them while attacking and beating
anything they encounter on their way and to drive to the Prignitz whatever is
left of the Landsturm, namely that which has not disbanded itself or been
captured. Assuming that success bears out these considerations and one of the
two operational plans is carried out; then the enemy corps would assume
position near Ruppin, occupy the northern areas through strong detachments,
and hunt for anything that continues to appear in single squads of Landsturm.
Third Confession 203
Now an article appears in the newspapers, reporting that Havelland and the
County of Ruppin are pacified. One would have to admit that we have not
demanded of the Landsturm a miracle. Nonetheless, 4 weeks might pass before
we arrive at this point. We have, for example, said nothing regarding the
possibility, in the event foodstuffs were lacking, of withdrawing with the
Landsturm beyond Lake Ruppin and the Bog of Kremmen, where one can
find a fairly fertile area and sustain oneself for a long time; and nothing of
the possibility of crossing the river Havel into the region of Magdeburg and
even under these circumstances of maintaining a considerable corps—
10,000–12,000 men.
We have admitted that little by little the Landsturm disbands, and the main
leaders, with but a few committed men, withdraw into other provinces or
rove about.
What is to happen next? First we ask, where have the Landsturm gone?
The true answer is: they are sitting calmly at home. For even if a good
number of them are captured (although in relation to the whole this can only
be a small part), it is nevertheless unlikely that many of them will be sent to
France. The difficulties of transporting large numbers of prisoners are insur-
mountable. Of 150 thousand Prussians, which according to French accounts
and according to the Etats of the Prussians themselves were said to have been
captured in 1806, less than 20,000 were actually confined in France!
If the enemy corps remains in the County of Ruppin, it will, little by little,
establish positions to secure its lines of communication, for the procurement
of materiél, and to rule the country. But it is not that easy to control a country
where everything directed against us enrages and leads to the idea of resist-
ance. The inhabitants will recover from their initial fright. The enemies will
enrage them through individual repressions and cruelties. One or the other
will see that the affair is not so dangerous, that one can play a role in it. Some
of those not yet disbanded bands will give cause. The storm bell will ring in
some district; a Landsturm will reconstitute itself anew. One will raid individ-
ual weak posts, inflict considerable losses on them, cut off deliveries, capture
money and munition and retreat from stronger detachments. In this way the
enemy corps will have to overcome the most difficult defense and will lose
strength daily in this most unfortunate of all wars.
Perhaps at the moment in which the enemy sustains itself with difficulty,
encouraged by this example of national struggle, the whole of Northern
Germany resorts to arms, so that in Hesse and Westphalia the enemy already
is running out of those recruits, munition, weapons, foodstuffs, money, and
intelligence, which one attempts to cut off in the Mark.
But can the enemy corps remain here?
Can the enemy patrol 70 square miles with 12,000 men, whereas the
Prussian state comprises 2500 square miles of surface, of which those 70
miles thus are barely one 35th?
204 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
And are not the enemy armed forces primarily directed against an enemy of
a different sort, against the standing armies?
What will the enemy be able to leave behind in the entire Mittelmark?
Maybe one division of 10–12,000 men. Can one division besiege Spandau
and in addition keep the Landsturm of P[otsdam] County in check?
But assuming that Spandau has been conquered by a larger force, can one
division keep Berlin, and in addition to Berlin, 250 square miles, which are
littered with an armed people, at bay?
And if the enemy only had to devote 12,000 men to every 250 square miles
of the Prussian monarchy to keep the country under control, what else would
he be able to deploy against the Russians?
The scenario that we have played out here is founded on the history of the
war in the Vendée;26 that is, on historical evidence, through which it attains
some cogency, even if one already has not been forced to admit that it is not
inherently improbable.
How much force the enemy thus must employ in order to remain master in
those rear and flank provinces, if only to such an extent that he can be certain
of having secured the main routes, that his rule in the provinces is secure and
the creation of a great army of insurgency is prevented!!
This is the case in Spain.27 The French have half of their entire force in
Spain, namely 300,000 men (of course not always at full strength, as this
can never be the case) and they fight their main battles against Wellington28
with armies of 40 and 50 thousand men. Anything remaining is used to keep
the insurgent troops separated and to prevent the uniting of all forces of
insurrection!
But who can promise that at some point the insurgents will not become
masters of the enemy troops, led by some warrior, animated by fortune,
inspired by rage? Then, larger incidents emerge from the individual setbacks
and at some point it could happen that the insurgent army assumes the leading
role. Then the tide of victory and of events is directed against the enemy. It no
longer depends on individual happenstance and adroitness, from the dubious
fortune of combat. A great general cause becomes dominant and the talent,
strength, and greatness of the individual man are smashed to pieces like a light
skiff on the waves of an angry sea.
There are a number of objections that one can raise against the Landsturm.
1st Above all, one believes that it will be difficult, without having prepared
the means, to sustain the number of armed bands. But one only need consider
26
See footnote 21.
27
Clausewitz refers to the Spanish War of Independence (1808–14) against Napoleon which
was fought both as a guerrilla war and in alliance with Portuguese and British regular forces
under the Duke of Wellington.
28
Field Marshal Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington (1769–1852).
Third Confession 205
that the enemy also has to live; that only there, where the presence of the
enemy makes it necessary, are the armed bands concentrated; and that one is
in possession of the fortifications, and in conjunction with the inhabitants,
possesses ten times more sources of sustenance than the enemy.
This observation should remove every source of concern. Only a consider-
able army could give rise to the same, because only through a two- or threefold
superiority, which one would have to have, could provision become more
difficult for us than for the enemy.
However, such armies will be sustained from the fortifications of the
country or otherwise assembled stockpiles; or they will be allowed to disband,
in order to reinforce the bands reconstituted in the rear as described above.
2nd It is commonly held that the enemy can deprive us of the necessary
courage through cruel treatment of captured insurgents, through the death
penalty, etc. But what an unnecessary concern! As if we could not be as cruel as
the enemy, as if the enemy would not consist of flesh and blood! The enemy
will indeed try to use such means, and the war will rapidly acquire a barbarous
quality. But to whose disadvantage? Obviously to the disadvantage of those
who can put fewer lives on the line, who fight with standing armies! So let us
take our chances and answer cruelty with cruelty, respond to atrocities with
atrocity. It will be easy for us to exceed the enemy and to force him back into
the bounds of moderation and humanity.
Wasn’t it the case that the tiger, that ruled France in the years 93 and 94
under the name of a republican government, had to stop drinking thirstily the
blood of the Vendée?—In the competition of atrocities the Republicans were
the first to give in. The Vendée was not defeated after one had fought against
her with considerable luck for one-and-a-half years, more than once marched
across her with the sword of devastation, with death and destruction—only
humane principles, pardon, respect, peace, could soothe the enraged nature of
man. Only this balsam could heal the cancerous wound, which Barère29
wished in vain to destroy with the knife and red-hot iron.
But these extremes, of which one hears from Spain, will not necessarily
occur everywhere, and perhaps may be avoided if the government takes every
armed man of its population under the protection of its authority, and
threatens to take out reprisals on the captives for every atrocity that is contrary
to the law of war and custom and directed against the true defenders of the
fatherland. How many executions will the enemy venture? And should we not
accept that a few dozen men die in this manner for the fatherland given the
many casualties that war claims every day? —
Truly, the fears one has had of this danger, which is no more a danger than
any other in war, have been far too great and completely exaggerated. Even the
29
Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac (1755–1841), French politician and member of the National
Convention during the French Revolution.
206 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
situation in Spain is not as grave as one thinks and the enemy readily would
concede, after the warning shots of its military police, to treat the insurgent
troops as any other.
3rd The claim is often repeated that our regions are not mountainous and
inaccessible enough for such a people’s war. But the Vendée, that is the areas
of Poitou and Anjou, which waged the famous war of the Vendée, and which
consist only of some hundred square miles, are nothing other than a hilly
woodland. They are as far removed from inaccessible mountains as are the
principalities of Schweidnitz and Jauer and the County Glatz in Silesia; by far
not as inaccessible as the woody and faulty regions of the Mittelmark, the
boggy forests of Pomerania, East Prussia, West Prussia, and Silesia.
The other objections that are raised against the Landsturm concern the
courage, the skill and the intelligence of the nation, the good will and patriotic
enthusiasm that it requires, of which it is believed our people in comparison to
other nations, specifically the French, have less. Let me take this opportunity
to share some observations, which flow from my innermost convictions.
It is outright absurd to rank the German nation behind the French in terms
of true intelligence. Neither in the history nor the literature of the two nations,
nor in the arts and crafts, which flourish in both, is there any rational reason
for that—and to put it bluntly, it is nothing less than the language and idle talk
of the French, which has given rise to such a rash judgment. If it is generally
disagreeable to rank a whole nation in terms of intelligence ahead of another, it
is childish to be misled by mere talk and esprit. Is the talkative man, the wordy,
the rattler, yes even the eloquent, always the man of reason? Isn’t the latter
here, at least in most cases, more introverted and silent? Shouldn’t this give us
ground for thought?
It is quite clear to me how the spirits of both nations relate to one another,
and I see no advantage for the French. Adam Smith30 has remarked that if the
occupation of the lower classes is indicative of the true development of their
minds, then one must grant the peasant a higher stage of intelligence than the
city dweller. His affairs constitute an organic whole of manifold variety, which
necessitates the continuous use of his capacity of judgment and makes possible
a certain degree of freedom of action. It is different for the city dweller, whose
entire life and occupation often consist of a neverending repetition of skilled
movements of his hand.
Nevertheless, when they meet, the city dweller appears to be infinitely
superior to the peasant, because of the liveliness of his presentation and the
wealth of expressions he has acquired.
The same applies to the Germans and French, and even if I do not assume
the superiority of the former, I cannot concede the opposing argument.
30
Adam Smith (1723–90), Scottish philosopher and pioneer of political economy.
Third Confession 207
The French language, rich in phrases, that is, in ready-made thoughts,
which of course are a dime a dozen, and which everyone uses without
shame, cannot provide the true sign of genius and intelligence. But it can
conceal defects in nature. I consider a person who speaks French to be a
woman in a farthingale. The natural activities of the mind, as in this example
the body, are concealed through rigid forms. The German language is a wide
garment, in which every movement of the body is perceived, including the
clumsy and the blundering movements of those natures not privileged by fate.
But even if the German is not at all to be ranked behind the French in terms
of intelligence, it is still possible that the French is superior to the German in
terms of liveliness and esprit. Yet it is not clear, and seems to me to be very
unlikely, that these qualities are essential for the war, the battlegrounds or the
vaulting stable. Fearlessness, courage, and good judgment are such essential
qualities of a good soldier, that if they are present, the others no longer are
decisive.
These qualities, however, cannot be denied the Germans; and one need only
look beyond our present circumstances into more distant times in order to be
convinced of the small-mindedness with which we cling to the agility of the
French tirailleurs.31 Everything in the world has its measure, nothing should
be overrated, and one should not overlook the more important for the less
important.
It would be easy, through an extended refutation, to expose this admiration
for the French spirit as laughable, if this were the appropriate place and if we
did not have more important things to say. Another matter that concerns the
nation is the courage for such undertakings, the enthusiasm, the patriotic
allegiance. One tries to avoid seeing these amongst the Germans and regards
the mood amongst the people, especially here, with a sort of consternation.
Granted, the mood is not propitious, if one limits oneself to superficial
appearances. I myself must admit, that a despondence is amongst us, a lack of
confidence that increasingly is spreading itself from top to bottom. But mood,
what is it? What, in the entire sphere of moral phenomena, could be more
ephemeral, more superficial, more governed by unworthy, unimportant
chance? The mood of the Prussian army before the battle of Auerstedt32 was
splendid, after the battle most miserable, the mood of the people is also so.
It is, however, different when it comes to the public’s opinion of itself and of
the government, to allegiance to the constitution, to the depravity of customs,
to the enervation, and all that is more deeply established in a nation and
31
Tirailleurs are sharpshooters.
32
The battle of Auerstedt on October 14, 1806 was one of two simultaneous French victories
over the Prussian army. Marshal Davout defeated the larger part of the Prussian forces with a
single corps, while Napoleon with the bulk of the Grande Armée overwhelmed Prussian flank
guards at Jena.
208 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
previously brought about. These qualities admittedly do not change with
insignificant events. But even if we were to grant that these things weighed
against the prospect of a forceful resistance, that the people were weak and
discouraged, could this be a reason for the government to act in the same way?
Should not the government be better than the people? A nation does not
become suddenly as weak and discouraged and immoral as can be imagined,
the path thereto is long. It is the responsibility of the government to stop it on
that path, at whatever point it may find itself. If the French are stronger than
we, it is thanks to similar exertions.
Why didn’t the government want to force the nation? Why didn’t it want to
coerce the people to do and to be what it deemed prudent?
The government often enough has used coercive means against the people
for much narrower aims and insignificant purposes. Thus shall a fatherly
government, as is the Prussian (and it is in no danger of being misunderstood
in this respect), use all means of coercion at its disposal to energetically compel
the people to observe their most sacred duty. There is coercion, and even the
most fearsome coercion, which is not tyranny. Who can doubt for a moment
that this energy and these reasonable measures of the government will quickly
bring back the confidence of the subjects; that the powerful spirit itself will
flow back into the people? Nothing is so certain as the fact that extraordinary
cases of misfortune, once men resolve to confront them with extraordinary
means and to direct all their energies against them, serve to elevate them above
themselves and inspire within them powers of mind and reason of which
they never dreamt. One may be assured that a people which is subjected to
the utmost danger, that is, not lacking in necessity, will not light-headedly leave
behind the narrow existence and calm of private life and be seized by
an enthusiasm, spurred by hate and rage, which are falsely attributed only to
religious fervor. Everything can develop in man, given the proper circumstances.
The German peoples have demonstrated in more than one way the ability to
move toward such a state, which in the beginning one might term tense, but
which calls forth a new vigorous life. If they decline, if they completely decay, it
is the fault of the governments, which out of a concern for their own safety, let
pass the moment at which they could have been saved. A concern, which if
looked at more closely, is nothing more than the fear of not being up to the
task, as the meager worry not to compromise oneself. If the first step already
has been taken, additional steps require less motivation, for nothing is truer
than that man loves those things most and pursues most passionately those
things for which he already has sacrificed most.
Therefore, one need not fear that the misfortune that befalls the people will
destroy the people; far more will it thirst for vengeance.
Only if it has placed its entire confidence in a salaried army and is an idle
spectator to the great disaster of defeat, only then is the maximum despond-
ence to be feared.
Addendum 209
There are others who do not deny the possibility of a Landsturm, but warn
against the danger to the existing order of things, to the governments them-
selves, that could result from the application of this means. However, this is in
fact an advantage of our present condition: the government, which itself
arouses this storm, remains its master. It is in general able to provide the
Landsturm with the proper direction and to direct all forces toward one aim.
Even the discordance in opinions and actions, that we saw destroy a large
degree of effect in Spain, and that once split the forces of the Vendée, can and
will be prevented by a government, which relates to its people as Prussia does.
Every danger predicted by the know-alls, is based on a single historical
example.
Finally, there are those who tremble before the idea of a people’s war,
because it is bloodier than any other, seldom remains free of dreadful scenes,
and will escalate all tragedy and ruin.
But who is to blame for that? Is not he who drives others to the height of
despair to blame? The people’s war is here. You condemn its ruinous effects—
well condemn those who forced it upon us. If you pose as judges of human
behavior, then do not condemn the oppressed because he is weak, but be just.
Hurl your allegations at those who have made this evil necessary.{
ADDENDU M
On the Nature of Defense
Traditionally a state regards itself as being already halfway on the road to
defeat if it awaits the enemy within its borders and has to secure its independ-
ence through a defensive war.
This customary view in government and people generates a dulled sense of
fear that soon will be transformed into despondency. Therefore, it is worth the
effort to clarify the concepts of offense and defense. What once was timidity
might then become the source of courage.
Since war no longer consists of a single battle, as was the case with
barbarous peoples, the art of war decomposes into two parts, distinguished
by ends and means.
{
Note: You wish peace, direct yourselves to those who can give it to the world. These are,
however, people whose minds are full of lofty projects; they wish to be independent arbiters of
the rulers, and people who think as I do are ill disposed to like that. I love peace; but no other
than a good, stable, and honorable peace. Socrates and Plato would have thought as I do if they
had stood in the unfortunate position that I assume in this world.
Frederick II in his posthumously published papers.
210 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
The first is the art of battle. (Tactics)
The second is the art of combining individual battles (for the end of the
campaign, of the war) into a whole. (Strategy)
The difference between offensive and defensive war runs through both
parts, and even extends into policy.
Defense, therefore, can be tactical, strategic, or political.
Political defense, which consists in a nation fighting for its survival rather
than for conquest (by the way, regardless by which manner) has nothing to do
with proper warfare, although it has an important influence on the spirit of the
army and may in that way become significant.
Tactical and strategic defense have their own properties, some common,
some specific, thus we will discuss both.
First, what is defense? Evidently not the mere repelling of enemy thrusts,
not an entirely passive behavior; that would be nonsense. One can be active in
defense and thereby combine it with an attack. It remains defense as long as
the intention and the advantage, which one enjoys in the defense, are not
suspended through the procedure.
These intentions and advantages are:
1. To await the attack. One should fight only if it is unavoidable. This is
impossible if one attacks.
2. To enjoy the assistance of the locality.
3. To be close to sources of support.
We wish to apply these three points to tactics and strategy and ask ourselves
whether the offense offers any advantages over them.
1. Tactical
1. If I am in a position from which I wish to await an enemy attack, my
behavior is tactically defensive. The strategic advantage accrues to me, insofar
as I engage in battle only when it is unavoidable. In the event that the enemy
neglects to attack me, the time that elapses without incident is lost to him and
not to me, for I am only interested in maintaining the status quo. This calculus
would be wrong if I were not allowed to assume that the enemy will make
mistakes. If the enemy behaves exactly as he should, I will not escape the battle,
but then it might have been advantageous to at least choose the moment that is
most beneficial to me, that is, to become tactically the attacker.
It would be foolish, however, to always count on the perfect behavior of
one’s enemy in war. It would even be a contradiction, and whoever believes
that in general everything happens in war that can possibly happen, can never
have read any war history. The rule is rather that less happens.
Addendum 211
Frederick II counted on the inactivity of Field Marshal Daun33 and the
Russians during the four final years of the Seven Years’ War rather than his
own talent. He spared himself thereby many a battle, and one can say that this
patience from 1758 onward was the main component of his defense and saved
his state.
But it is unreasonable in war to count on improbable mistakes. It follows, of
course, that one cannot expect to reap from the advantage of the defense a
large harvest when faced with a very active enemy.
2. If I await the enemy attack in a certain position, it means nothing more
than that I do not engage in battle before the enemy, which advancing for
attack, enters the territory that I have chosen to be the battlefield. Whether or
not I am in this position; or whether I have it in front of me, and wait for the
moment of his advance to enter, or behind me, in order to withdraw thereto;
whether it is to my right or my left; whether I attack the enemy only with a part
of my army; remain passive with others, or conduct the attack with all; none of
this changes the essence of the matter. My conduct remains defensive and
I enjoy the support of the locality.
From this it is clear that through defense one can accomplish results as
decisive as through the offense, for in this respect the active defense is in no
way different from the offense. It is self-evident that the enemy will be pursued
after he has been overcome, and therefore, the tactical defense ends; for one
only made use of it to achieve victory.
But what does support of the locality mean? It consists not only in every
advantage offered by the ground, which in itself is a huge source of predom-
inance, but also primarily in the preparatory arrangements that one can
complete for the battle.
One can use the entrenchments, one can deploy one’s troops in advance,
one can familiarize them with the terrain; all advantages that are essential for
an army, but especially for one that has little training for war.
It would be possible to say much more about these things, but shortness of
time limits us to the essentials.
2. Strategic
1. If I behave in a theater of war in such fashion as to only fight the enemy
that advances into this theater of war, whether fighting defensively or offen-
sively, my behavior is strategically defensive.
33
Count Leopold Joseph von Daun (1705–66) was an Austrian field marshal and commander
in the Seven Years’ War (1756–63).
212 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
As in the previous case regarding tactics, here the advantage emerges in that
I might not need to defend a theater of war that the enemy refrains from
attacking, his opposing forces remaining idle.
Usually those theaters of war remain defensive in which forces weaker than
those of the enemy are deployed, while in all others the war is waged
offensively (Saxony in the Seven Years’ War). Moreover, it is possible that a
state, having more than one theater of war, conducts itself defensively in all of
them at the same time.
2. The support of the locality is much more decisive for strategic defense
than for the tactical, more important for the theater of war than for a
particular position. This is mainly the case because of the fortresses.
A theater of war that is strong owing to its fortresses and fortifications is
able to double the effect of its armed forces as the history of war teaches. It is
self-evident that the strategic defense does not necessarily imply a tactical
defense. Within the theater of war that one has committed to defend, the
enemy can be attacked wherever and whenever one pleases. Hence, one
thereby has a means to completely destroy an enemy army as good as that
offered by any offense: yes, it is easier in our own theater of war for us than for
the enemy.
Obviously, one can pursue a defeated enemy beyond the borders of his own
theater of war and thus proceed to the strategic offense, as was the case in
tactics above. Indeed, one will have to do it, if one does not want to use the
superiority provided by victory in other locations and transfer part of the
armed forces to other theaters of war.
3. For the defender, the proximity of his supplies is of strategic importance
in order to replace the loss of men and other forces faster than the enemy, who
requires far more time for this, not only because of the great distance, but also
because he has to employ part of his army to secure his long lines of operation.
On the other hand, what advantages are offered by the offense?
First, it determines time and place.
The measures of the defender must have a certain general character and are
therefore weak when compared to the measures of the attacker, as these can be
adjusted to circumstances and be concentrated in time and space.
Tactically, this was a very decisive advantage, as long as defenses were
largely passive, as was formerly the case.
Every point along a defensive position, from which one only seeks to repel
the enemy attack, must be equally advantageous if complete victory is the
desired result. In order to secure a decisive victory the attacker only needs to
break through a single point. What an incredible advantage for the attacker!
A second, equally important, was that the attacker had learned about the
defender’s measures through reconnaissance and other means, so that he
Addendum 213
could adjust his own and appear with overwhelming force at specific positions.
In one word, he appeared to dictate the terms and the defender either had to
adjust his measures accordingly or to settle for weaker measures altogether.
But since the idea has emerged to defend oneself actively—to lure the
enemy into a region chosen by ourselves as into an ambush, to mass one’s
troops as little as possible, to hide them as much as possible—since then, the
extreme advantage of the tactical offensive has vanished and perhaps the
advantage in this respect is on the side of the defense.
At least nothing is more certain than that ignorance of the terrain calls for
generals and officers with war experience and remains a disadvantage for the
attacker for which there is no compensation.
Strategically the advantage of which we here speak, namely knowledge of
time and place, and the ability therein to make concentrated use of his armed
forces, never could have been more important.
In most cases, one realizes the direction of the enemy attack and the general
distribution of his forces at the initiation of the campaign, early enough to
adjust one’s countermeasures.
More important are the surprises with which the attacker, through quick
marches during the campaign, can direct overwhelming armed forces on a
single point where we have not expected them.
Then, in most cases, it would be impossible and detrimental if the strategic
defense were willing and coerced to accept the rules of the enemy offensive.
But because the strategic defense by no means excludes the tactical offense
inside one’s own theater of war, where one has superior forces, one easily
proceeds to the tactical offense, attacks the enemy and destroys him. Hence,
the aforementioned disadvantage is not at all restricted to strategic defense.
For the strategic defense it is only important to know toward which theater of
war the enemy has directed the bulk of his forces, and as previously men-
tioned, this will not be difficult to surmise. For one cannot transfer troops
during a campaign from one theater to another quickly enough to surprise the
defender.
From this we conclude with great conviction that the aforementioned
advantage of the offense is not as decisive as it used to be and as one
commonly believes.
2. The attacker carries the war into the countryside of the attacked, destroys
a part of his forces from the first moment of war onward, where the battle is
already decided. Sending his forces toward the attacker, the defender’s sources
of sustenance run dry.
This advantage is so decisive that in all times men of great insight were able
to choose offensive war for the purpose of defense.
However, time and circumstances also can change this point of view
dramatically. If the army already has been withdrawn from the countryside,
214 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
and if the forces required for defense have been segregated from the state’s
forces for the campaign, then the loss of a part of the countryside is far less
decisive for the initial campaign than for whole war.
Of course a war that is to be waged defensively for several years can hardly be
shouldered by a small state that has developed completely into a theater of war.
But it can be expected that the defensive of the first year, if it becomes as
decisive as it can be, will transform the war into an offensive war.
The example of Prussia during the Seven Years’ War, by the way, proves
how long a state of modest size nevertheless can sustain a defensive war.
Holland and Switzerland provide further evidence.34
Be that as it may, we should not overlook that this disadvantage of the
defense is actually more of a political than of a military nature.
Victory and the destruction of the enemy army are the military aims, and
these are more likely to be achieved through defense than through offense, so
that one can say: the defense as such is stronger than the offense.
A defense that over the course of many years cannot proceed to offense is a
war that is waged for several years unhappily. But it would also be unhappy if
it were waged offensively, for as we have just demonstrated, the defense itself is
stronger than the offense. Yet, an unhappy offensive war will throw us back to
the defense, and we will not be in a better position than the state that began
with the defense.
Therefore, it could be advantageous to start with the defense, in order with
more assurance to finish with the offense, rather than to run the risk of taking
the opposite course.
From this one can draw the conclusion that for the political end of the
defense, the opening of a war with an offense is only appropriate if, like
Frederick II during the Seven Years’ War, one can assault an unprepared enemy.
We have thus far not discussed the sentiment of moral advantage, which
tends to accrue to the offense.
Moral qualities must be included in the calculus of war. But is the sense of
defending one’s own hearth, which the common man experiences only by
actually defending, worth nothing? Nothing indeed, if one treats humans like
machines and does not try to influence their hearts and minds; otherwise just
as much as that sense of advantage.
Apropos, this sense of advantage by no means will belong exclusively to the
attacker during an active defense, as is self-evident.
So far we have not said a single word about the truly great defense, which by
means of a Landsturm is mounted by a whole nation.
34
Hahlweg (1966–90: vol. 1, 747) points to the Franco-Dutch War (1672–78) and the idea of
a Swiss National Redoubt.
Addendum 215
It is not necessary to mention or further expand on the enormous amount
of strength, both physical and mental, which thereby is thrown into the
balance of the defender.
This will be decisive. Posterity will recognize it. The preservation of all
constitutions and states will depend on this great means. Peace in Europe will
be restored solely by it.
If we want to confirm our reasoning regarding defensive war through
history, a single glance from the paper to the real world, from theory to the
realm of action, is sufficient.
Wasn’t it always the case that one of two belligerents deliberately chose the
role of the defender? Must not defense possess particular advantages?
Since it always has been the weaker who traditionally assumed the role of
the defender, doesn’t one have to conclude that with regard to the effectiveness
of the armed forces, the defensive form is stronger than the offensive? Or
should one believe that from the beginning of the time, ignorance and
prejudice have created such principles?
What would one think of a commander, who uses weaker forces where he
attacks and stronger forces where he defends himself?
I believe that all these questions answer themselves and demonstrate what
we hope to have learned thus far: that only a complete conceptual confusion in
conjunction with many false perspectives has created the idea of the advantage
of the offense that now tends to rob the courage of the defender who is fighting
for his legitimate cause.
It is to be excused, if one had this opinion with regard to earlier political
circumstances and the nature of war; since both have changed, it is only a
prejudice and conventional wisdom.
Formerly, that is especially during the last centuries, one waged war as two
duelists waged their petty conflict. One fought with moderation and caution
according to traditional conventions. This knocking about began and ended
depending on whether or not the petty interests of a prince weighed in favor of
keeping the machine running. The entire end of the war was to assert a
diplomatic whim, and its spirit could scarcely be elevated above the aim of
the military point d’honneur. A contemporary author has quite rightly and
nicely said: honor is not the fruit but the blossom of human education.
It was not the citizens who took up arms and fought one another, but the
armies. It was not the hearts of armies, but rather of the rulers that inspired
them to battle.
The citizen took part in such a war only to the extent that he was pressed
into the service of its interests; and then it was quite important, whether this
common war was waged at the expense of one state or the other, that is,
whether through offense one should carry the whole ruin of war into the
country of the other, or await the same in one’s own. There was nothing in
the world that could have compensated the defender for this disadvantage.
216 Testimonial (Bekenntnisdenkschrift)
Moreover, in a war in which the entirety of the moral forces resided in the pure
point d’honneur of the commander and his army, the proud or haughty
sentiment necessarily generated a substantial superiority.
Finally, the attacker could, through a sudden move, create a small disad-
vantage for the defender; the loss of a position, a depot, even a so-called
bataille; and given the short supply of war resources, this was a decisive loss.
One no longer speaks of this kind of war. One would have to be blind not to
see the difference between our wars; that is, the wars that our times and our
conditions require and for which there is more than one example. The war of
the current era is a war of all against all. Kings no longer wage war against
kings, nor armies against each other, but one nation against the other, the
nation encompassing the king and army.
It is unlikely that this character of war will change again, and it truly is not
to be wished that the old bloody and the too often boring chess-game of
struggling soldiers will ever return.
This is not to say that the national uprising en Masse, as we have twice
witnessed in great examples (France and Spain), will be the only way in which
nations will wage war against each other in the future, heaven help us. This
phenomenon belongs alone to the present and its fateful hours.
As certain as this great remedy results from a natural expression of sup-
pressed national energies and not some individual intrigues, so certain will it
cease to be necessary, once, through it, the European peoples out of their
chaos, and following the laws of nature, will have formed organic states.
If there are ever again to be centuries in which no nation will be compelled
to take refuge in the last desperate means of a national uprising, in these
centuries every war will be regarded nevertheless as a national affair and
waged in this spirit, according to the degree of effort that the national
character and the government determine.
4
On the political advantages and
disadvantages of the Prussian institution
of the Landwehr
The institution of the Landwehr1—insofar as it assembles a significant share of
the population in regular regiments, namely about 1/3 of all men eligible for
war, provides officers from its midst, and stores its weapons in open arsenals—
obviously places the weapons into the hands of the people.
The people, like all people, are difficult to satisfy completely. One could
even say that in the strictest sense this is quite impossible. But the present
moment is characterized by a vague aspiration and by a spirit of discontent
with governments, and thus it is now twice as dangerous to lay the weapons
into the hands of the people.
In times of internal turmoil and of resistance of the lower classes, every
government must be ready, after every means of persuasion and advice has
been exhausted, to regard the sword as a last prop of its laws and affairs. This
sword, however, is no longer a prop if the government does not wield it alone,
if the most recalcitrant part of the population is just as well outfitted.
We do not intend to challenge the inner truth of the sequence of these
propositions and conclusions. Rather, we only want to find the counterweight
that is present and balances its effect on the scale of truth and wisdom, as if the
propositions themselves were destroyed.
The arming of the people, that is the institution of the Landwehr, provides
an outward resistance that cannot be achieved through a standing army.
Whatever measures are adopted, one will never be able to enhance the fighting
power of a standing army to the same extent as the Landwehr system, with the
1
This handwritten memorandum was sent by Clausewitz to his superior and friend August
Neidhardt von Gneisenau (1760–1831) in December 1819. In it he reflects on the arguments,
emphasized by conservatives in the Prussian government, that making the Landwehr militia a
regular feature of the Prussian Army and, consequently, arming the people would greatly
enhance the danger of revolution. The translation is based on Hahlweg (1966–90: vol. 2.1,
367–72).
218 On the Prussian institution of the Landwehr
same financial means, and with the same devotion on the part of the subjects.
Whoever denies this completely needs to be convinced by arguments of a
different kind than we are able to supply here. We only want to continue
speaking with those who accept this proposition, at least for the time being; for
whom, leaving aside the internal proof, the experience of the years 1806 and
1813 taken together provides strong evidence.2
The Landwehr increased the danger of revolution. The disarming of the
Landwehr increases the danger of an invasion and subjugation. Which of the
two according to historical evidence is the greater? Where in Germany should
one look for revolutionary incidents, which have appeared so often in Italy,
France, and England? In which century, in which province? I should think that
Doubt would feel ashamed by these questions. Was it perhaps in the Prussian
lands that the otherwise calm and bloodless Germany was most restless and
violent? Could it have been mainly in the 18th century?
We know nothing of a revolution, of a true rebellion. Do we also know
nothing of an invasion?
If then in this regard it may be risky to rule an armed people, is it not in
another regard much more risky to rule an unarmed people?
We would recommend a conscientious answer to this first question to those
who are swept away by the inconvenient requirements of the moment.
The second point we wish to clarify is the relationship between the disarm-
ing of the people and the internal order and security of the government in
order to determine the measure of advantage provided in this regard by the
disarmament, and thereby compare it to the counterargument.
Does it depend only or primarily on the weapons? Were the Tyroleans3
inferior subjects because they were armed?
Was the French population armed in 1789?4
Furthermore, are the Landwehr and a standing army, politically speaking,
truly opposed to one another, as some suggest?
Is it so easy to exclude from the standing army the spirit of the people when
it starts to deteriorate? Was this not the case to the highest degree with the
standing army of Louis XVI? And was it not destroyed by the spirit of
2
1806 and 1813 are important dates for the Prussian Army in general and the idea of the
Landwehr in particular. In 1806 Napoleon’s forces defeated the outdated Prussian army in the
Battle of Jena and Auerstedt. In the years after, Gerhard von Scharnhorst with the support of
Gneisenau, Clausewitz, and others, introduced wide-ranging military reforms, including univer-
sal military conscription. In 1812, when Napoleon retreated from Moscow, Karl Freiherr vom
und zum Stein created a Landwehr which was later instrumental in the victory over Napoleon in
the Battle of Leipzig in 1813.
3
The Tyrolean uprising in 1809 was a peasant rebellion against French and Bavarian
occupying troops. Temporarily victorious in several battles, the insurgents under Andreas
Hofer (1767–1810) were finally defeated in November 1819 and Hofer executed in 1810.
4
The French Revolution started with the storming of the Bastille in 1789 where the insur-
gents found large amounts of weapons and munitions.
On the Prussian institution of the Landwehr 219
revolution, melted away like the snow in springtime? Can we really regard the
dissolution of the Landwehr and the enlargement of the standing army as a
Talisman against the fire of revolution if the necessary sparks already are
present? Obviously, nothing would be more pernicious than this belief. The
sword on which a government, attacked by a people who have been seduced by
a drunken spirit, ultimately relies must be the martial personality of the ruler
and his family in conjunction with a virtuous will. For these two things there
will always be a group of men who, permeated by a sense of right, will closely
attach themselves to the throne.
This extreme situation is only touched upon in order to suggest that we are
not of the opinion that an ever-accelerating process of concession, an unfailing
meekness, a martyrdom of sufferance, are the only or true means of remedy.
Otherwise it strikes us as rather futile to talk about this extreme situation as
long as there is not yet any fighting.
Thus, the formula of a standing army is not what could prevent such a
mishap if it were brewing. It is not the arming of the Landwehr that constitutes
the focus of danger.
Only an honest and prudent treatment of the army, the Landwehr, and the
people can keep and enhance the elements of loyalty and allegiance in all three.
Otherwise, there is nowhere security and the danger of the Landwehr cannot
surpass their power.
The third point we wish to touch upon relates to the source of all these
concerns. What else is the source other than the government’s feeling of standing
alone? It sees the arousing spirit of dissatisfaction and the spirit of open
resistance. It fears this element will sooner or later ignite, and with what could
it then respond? The strength of an armed power will be destroyed by a much
more numerous Landwehr. Thus, one advises disbanding the latter and reliance
on the former. That this prop is illusory we believe to have demonstrated. Rather,
the government should assemble around itself the representatives of the people,
chosen from men who share the true interests of the government and are not
alien to the people. They would be its first prop, its friend and advisor, as has
been the parliament to the King of England for 100 years. With this instrument it
should guide the lofty forces of a stalwart people against its external enemies and
rivals. With this instrument it should shackle reckless forces, when in the rage of
fermenting spirits they seek to turn the sword on themselves. From our point
of view, there is no other way, and the goal cannot be reached comfortably or at a
lower price. Whoever promises to achieve this through palliatives is to be
regarded as a charlatan who only exacerbates the malady.
And would not the impression made on the people by their disarming be
the first sign of this exacerbation? If there is a tension, will it not be amplified
and would not the last measure of trust in the government perish?
This argument is of course secondary in the entire reasoning with respect to
its philosophical position, but not with regard to its practical importance.
220 On the Prussian institution of the Landwehr
And this disarming of the people, the benefit of which has to be regarded as
minor when seen in relation to the danger of internal ferment, is perhaps more
rightly regarded as a means of promoting the same. How does it increase the
dangers that threaten us from abroad?
We don’t even want to mention the current situation and leave untouched
the issue of whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous. Rather, we only
want to consider the general condition of Prussia since its elevation to the
great powers, its relation to the others, and to think about what has constituted
its particular existence.
It is everywhere surrounded by powerful enemies. Both its acquisitions and
its internal constitution have given rise to hate and envy in others. Most of all,
the splendor of its armor has aroused in small and large alike, a secret
resentment, a malicious intention to inflict harm upon it in Germany. It is
said that Prussia has an inflated military system, by which is meant that
Prussia has inflated it more than the others and thereby maintains a balance
with the first powers despite its lesser resources. What will happen if Prussia
eases this so-called inflation? It will fall back considerably from its position
and importance and once in decline, it will not be difficult to put it down
completely, or it will only persist at the mercy of others. This prospect must be
too attractive for other self-interested powers not to encourage the first
voluntary steps through all means of solicitation. Out of a ghostly fear of the
sword, we do it ourselves, and let ourselves be led away in chains.
Only great institutions of real forces, permeated by a vital spirit, can
maintain our position; not empty forms such as we had prior to 1806, not
the echo of glory which becomes weaker year by year. Our own recent history
has made it abundantly clear, such that we cannot ignore it as long as we are
guided by the slightest desire for the truth.
Thus may the men of 1806, who looked for salvation in the obsolete forms
of that time, honestly submit all the questions that we have posed here to their
conscience and then feel the tremendous responsibility for destroying with a
wanton recklessness that was perhaps only the work of a dilettante, that
building on which our great fortune in the years 1813, 1814, and 1815 rested
like a goddess of victory on her war chariot.
5
The arming of the people
Volksbewaffnung
In cultivated Europe, people’s war is a phenomenon of the nineteenth
century.1 It has its proponents and its opponents, the latter either for political
reasons, because they regard it as a revolutionary means, that is, a legally
declared state of anarchy, which is as dangerous internally for the social order
as it is externally for the enemy; or, for military reasons, because they believe
that the success does not correspond to the expended effort. The first argu-
ment is of no consequence to us here, as we will treat people’s war merely as a
means of combat; that is, in its relationship to the enemy. The latter point,
however, leads us to the observation that people’s war in general is to be
regarded as a consequence of the breaching of old artificial barriers by the
warlike element in our times; as an extension and reinforcement of the entire
process of fermentation, which we call war. The system of recruitment and
general conscription that enabled the surge of the army to enormous size and
the use of the Landwehr are all matters, which, from the perspective of the
traditional circumscribed military system, point in the same direction. In this
direction also lies the appeal for the Landsturm, that is, the arming of the
people.2 If the first of these new means is a natural and necessary consequence
of the discarded restraints, and if it has increased the power of the one who
1
This text consists of Chapter 26 of Book VI of Clausewitz’s main work On War, which was
published posthumously by his wife Marie in 1832. Clausewitz had started writing On War in
1816 but had not finished his work when he died of cholera in 1831. In On War, Clausewitz
integrates his ideas about people’s war and the Landwehr and Landsturm militia into his larger
theory of war and identifies the arming of the people as only one measure of the defense among
others. He thus takes back some of his earlier enthusiasm evident e.g. in his “Bekenntnisdenk-
schrift” of 1812. The translation is based on Clausewitz (1980: 799–806).
2
According to a royal edict of March 17, 1813, the Prussian Landwehr consisted of all men
older than 18 and younger than 45 who were able to carry weapons and did not serve in the
regular army. By contrast, the edict of April 21, 1813, called all men older than 17 and younger
than 60 to serve in the Landsturm, if they were not already drafted into the regular forces or the
Landwehr.
222 The arming of the people (Volksbewaffnung)
used it first to such an extent that the other has been forced to follow suit and
adopt it as well, then such will also be the case with regard to people’s war. In
most cases, those who resort to people’s war in a rational manner will gain
relative dominance over those who scorn it. If this is the case, then the only
question is whether or not this new intensification of the warlike element is
altogether beneficial for humanity. The question probably is to be answered in
similar fashion to the question of war itself. We leave both to the philosophers.
One could argue, however, that the energy, which is consumed by people’s
war, could be used with greater success when applied to other means of
combat. Yet no great investigation is required to convince oneself that these
energies for the most part are not freely available and do not lend themselves
to arbitrary usage. An important part, namely the element of morale, first
comes into being through this practice. We therefore no longer ask: What is
the price of resistance for a people if the entire population takes up arms?
Rather we ask: What effect can this resistance have, what are its preconditions,
and how can it be used?
It is in the nature of things that a resistance dispersed in this fashion is not
suited to achieve the temporally and spatially concentrated effect of large
strikes. Its effect directs itself, as in the process of evaporation, toward the
outer surface. The larger the surface area and the contact between it and
the enemy army, that is, the more the latter is diffused, the more effective is
the arming of the people. The arming of the people destroys the foundations
of the enemy army like quietly smoldering embers. Requiring time to achieve
their successes, while both elements interact, a state of tension emerges that
either gradually eases, if in some locations the people’s war is smothered and
in other locations slowly burns out, or leads to a crisis, if the flames of this
general fire envelop the enemy army and compel it to leave the country before
it is totally destroyed. Inducing this crisis through people’s war alone, either
requires a surface area of conquered territory such as only Russia and no other
European state possesses, or a mismatch between the invading army and the
surface area of the country, which in reality does not occur. If one does not
wish to chase an illusion, one must conceive of people’s war in combination
with war waged by a standing army and both united through an all-
encompassing plan. The conditions under which people’s war alone can be
effective are the following:
1. that the war is waged within the borders of the country;
2. that it not be decided by a single catastrophe;
3. that the theater of war comprises a considerable track of territory;
4. that the national character is conducive to the measure;
5. that the country is rough and inaccessible, either through mountains or
through woods and swamps or through the nature of the agriculture.
The arming of the people (Volksbewaffnung) 223
Whether the population is large or small is not decisive, for a lack of people
is of least concern. Whether or not the inhabitants are poor or rich is also not
particularly decisive, or at least shouldn’t be, for it cannot be denied that the
poorer classes, accustomed to hard work and exertion, usually prove to be
more belligerent and strong.
A particular characteristic of the countryside, which promotes tremendous-
ly the potency of the people’s war, is the scattered pattern of settlement that
can be found in many German provinces. The countryside is thereby more
dissected and concealed, the roads are made worse, although more numerous,
the quartering of troops entails endless difficulties, and above all, the singu-
larity that characterizes people’s war in general repeats itself in particular:
namely, the principal of resistance exists everywhere and nowhere. If the
inhabitants live together in villages, the most restless will be occupied by
troops or ransacked as punishment, burned down, etc., which, however, is
not easily carried out against a Westphalian peasantry.
The employment of the Landsturm and of armed crowds cannot and
should not be directed against the main body of the enemy, not even against
sizeable corps; it should not quash the center. Rather, it should only gnaw at
the surface and the boundaries. It should rise up in the provinces that flank the
theater of war and into which the attacker cannot project power, in order to
deprive him entirely of influence in these provinces. These storm clouds,
surging at his side, should pursue him to the extent that he advances. Where
the enemy has not yet appeared, courage to get ready for him is not lacking,
and bit by bit the bulk of the neighboring population will follow this example.
In this way, the flame will spread like a fire in the heath and in the end will
reach the territory on which the attacker is based. It spreads to his supply lines
and saps the lifeline of his existence. Even if one does not have an exaggerated
conception of the omnipotence of a people’s war and does not regard it as an
inexhaustible and invincible element, which is as unstoppable by brute armed
force as are the wind and rain by man, in short, if one does not base one’s
judgment on polemic pamphlets, one nevertheless has to concede that armed
peasants cannot be pushed back in the same way as a division of soldiers.
These cling together like a herd and in general keep moving straight along,
whereas those dispersed [armed peasants] scatter themselves in every direc-
tion needing no artificial plan. Hence every march of small units through the
mountains, in a forest, or other varied terrain, becomes a dangerous endeavor.
For at any moment the march can turn into a battle. And though there had
long been no mention of belligerent enemy population, at any time the same
peasants can appear at the rear of the column, which had already been
dispersed by its front. When it comes to the destruction of routes and the
barricading of narrow streets, the means employed by army outposts or
reconnaissance teams, and those used by enraged crowds of peasants, are
about as similar as are the movements of a machine to those of a human
224 The arming of the people (Volksbewaffnung)
being. The enemy has no means against the activities of the Landsturm other
than the deployment of many units to escort its supplies, the manning of
military stations, passes, bridges, etc. As minimal as will be the first attempts of
the Landsturm, so weak will be the deployed units, because one fears a large
dispersion of the forces. But the fire of the people’s war tends to ignite all the
more amidst these weak units. If in some places one overwhelms them
through numbers, courage and passion grows and the intensity of the struggle
increases until it reaches the point of culmination that will decide the outcome.
According to our understanding, people’s war should resemble fog or
clouds. It should nowhere consolidate into a concrete entity, otherwise the
enemy can direct an appropriate force against this core, destroy it, and take a
large number of prisoners. Consequently courage is lost, everyone believes the
main issue has been decided, further efforts are futile, and the people drop
their weapons. On the other hand, it is nonetheless necessary that at certain
locations the fog concentrates into a dense mass, creating threatening clouds
from which at some point a lightning bolt can strike. As mentioned earlier,
these locations are mainly along the flanks of the enemy theater of war. Then,
the armed people must unite into larger and more orderly entities, with
modest reinforcements from the standing army so that it achieves the appear-
ance of an organized force and is enabled to undertake larger activities. From
these locations the intensity of the Landsturm is removed to the enemy’s rear
which is exposed to the strongest blows. These denser masses are intended for
ambushing the more sizeable garrisons sent back by the enemy. Moreover,
they inspire fear and unease, increasing the entire impact on morale. Without
them, the whole effect would not be strong enough and the entire situation not
troubling enough for the enemy.
The commander achieves the intended configuration of the arming of the
people with greatest ease through small units of the standing army with which
he supports the Landsturm. Without such encouraging support from some
troops of the standing army most of the population will lack the confidence and
drive to take up arms. Hence, the greater the units which are created for this
purpose, the greater will be their force of attraction and the greater the ava-
lanche, which they are intended to trigger. But there are limits. On the one hand,
it would be ruinous for this subordinated end to disperse the entire army, in a
sense dissolving it into the Landsturm and thus creating a widespread yet
everywhere weak defensive line. One could be certain that both the army and
the Landsturm would be thoroughly destroyed. On the other hand, experience
seems to teach that when too many regular troops are deployed in the province,
people’s war tends to decrease in energy and effectiveness. The cause of this is
first, that too many enemy troops are drawn into the province; second, the
population wants now to rely on their own regular troops; third, the existence of
large numbers of troops consumes the strength of the population in a different
way, namely through quartering, consignments, deliveries, etc.
The arming of the people (Volksbewaffnung) 225
Another means of preventing too strong an enemy reaction against people’s
war is at the same time a chief principle of its use. It is the principle that in
using this great means of strategic defense one should rarely or never allow
oneself to be drawn into tactical defense. The character of a Landsturm battle
(Gefecht) is that of all battles with inferior troops: great force and heat in the
run-up, but little cold blood and persistence.3 Furthermore, it is not very
important whether the bulk of the Landsturm is defeated and dispersed. For
this it is prepared. But it should not be entirely destroyed by myriad fatalities,
wounded and prisoners. Such defeats would smother the embers. These two
particularities contradict the nature of tactical defense. The defensive battle
requires a sustainable, slow, well-planned proceeding and decisive action.
A mere attempt, from which one can withdraw as soon as one wants, can
never lead to a successful defense. If the Landsturm is to defend a certain
terrain it must never come to a decisive defensive battle; then it would be
eliminated, regardless how beneficial the circumstances. The Landsturm can
and should defend mountain approaches, swamp embankments, river cross-
ings, as long as it can. But if they are overrun, it should disperse and continue
the defense with surprise assaults rather than concentrating in a formal
defensive posture and letting itself become encircled. No matter how cour-
ageous a people may be, how belligerent its culture, how great its hatred of the
enemy, how favorable its terrain: it is undeniable that people’s war cannot
sustain itself in an atmosphere that is too dense with danger. If its combustible
material is somewhere to burst into flames, it must occur at remote locations
where there is enough oxygen and where it cannot be beaten back with a
decisive blow.
After these considerations, which are more an effort to gain a sense of the
truth than an objective analysis, because the phenomenon is simply too rare
and has not been thoroughly described by those who for long have observed it
with their own eyes, all that remains to be said is that the plan of strategic
defense can incorporate the contribution made by the arming of the people
in two different ways: namely, either as a last resource after a lost battle
(Schlacht), or as a natural support in the run-up to a decisive battle (Schlacht).
The latter requires withdrawal into the heart of the country and the sort of
indirect response of which we spoke in chapters eight4 and twenty-four5 of
this book.6 We therefore have but a few words to say about the employment
of the Landsturm after a lost battle (Schlacht).
3
Because the German-language terms “Gefecht” and “Schlacht” usually are both translated
into the English term “battle” in this text we have indicated in parenthesis which term is found in
the German original. In this passage, Clausewitz is speaking of single encounters in the context of
a larger campaign.
4
Chapter 8 of Book VI is entitled “Types of Resistance.” See Clausewitz (1984).
5
Chapter 24 of Book VI is entitled “Operations on a Flank.” See Clausewitz (1984).
6
Book VI: On Defense. See Clausewitz (1984).
226 The arming of the people (Volksbewaffnung)
No state should believe that its fate, that is its entire existence, is dependent
on a single battle (Schlacht), even the most decisive. If it is defeated, the
mobilization of inherent new energies in conjunction with the natural weak-
ening which every attack suffers over time, can lead to a reversal of fortunes, or
the state can receive help from abroad. There is always enough time left to die,
and just as it is a natural instinct for the drowning to grab at straws, it is the
natural order in the realm of morale, that a people grasps at the last means of
salvation if it is pushed to the outermost edge of the abyss.
No matter how small and feeble a state may be in relation to its enemy, it
should not eschew these last exertions of energy, lest one should say there is no
longer a soul left in it. This does not preclude the possibility of saving oneself
from complete ruin through a bitter peace, but such an intention does not
exclude on its side the utility of new defensive measures; the peace is made
thereby neither harder nor worse, rather easier and better. They are even more
necessary if help is expected from those who have an interest in our preser-
vation. Hence, a government having lost a battle can think of nothing other
than dragging the population to the comforts of peace and is overwhelmed by
a sense of some grand failure of hope, no longer feels the courage and passion
to mobilize its entire energies, and for reasons of weakness, lacks consequence
and demonstrates that it was not worthy, and for this very reason perhaps was
not even capable of victory.
Regardless of how decisive the defeat suffered by the state may be, the
retreat of the army into the heartland of the country must call forth the activity
of the fortresses and the arming of the people. In this regard it is advantageous
if the flanks of the main field of battle are bordered by mountains or other
difficult terrain, which now emerge as bastions from which the advancing
force is subjected to strategic barrage.
If the victor is in the midst of laying siege, he will have left behind strong
garrisons along the way to establish conduits, or even sent corps to make room
for maneuver and to keep the neighboring provinces under control. If he
already is weakened through manifold losses of men and materiel, then the
point has come for the defensive army to once again assume its battle position
and to topple the attacker in his precarious condition through a well-
placed blow.
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Index
à force de bras 147 alliance 8, 176–7, 180, 182, 204
abatis(es) 70–1, 73, 83, 93, 95, 125, 165 with England 195
abroad 170, 174, 220, 226 with France 175–6, 179–83
abundance 190 with Russia 181
of resources 193 unconditional 171
super- 187 ambush(es/ed/ing) 12, 14, 24, 34, 37, 64, 88,
of weapons and munition 179 97, 100, 105, 112, 115, 120, 140–2, 152,
abyss 72, 226 159, 163, 213, 224
accelerate(d) 156, 178, 181, 184 American (Revolutionary) War 12, 52, 60, 77,
acquisition 20, 220 99, 103, 152, 159, 163
Adlershof 120 of Independence 12, 59
advancement 130, 200 ammunition 31, 58, 123, 154, 155
rapid 63, 96 pocket(s) 188, 197
advantage(s) 14, 21, 24, 28, 31–3, 36–7, 43, see also munition(s)
53, 56–7, 63–4, 70, 72–4, 80–2, 84–5, 95, analys(is/es/ts) 2, 4–7, 9–11, 13–14, 18, 20, 81,
105, 114, 142, 147, 149, 153, 157, 160, 167–8, 188, 190, 193, 225
163, 167, 181, 190, 192–5, 197, 206, military 1, 5
209–15, 218 Anjou 206
of a combined assault 27 annexation 179
of the defense 211 annihilate(d) 16, 62, 130, 146
of a direct attack 141 annihilation 8, 60, 130, 179
of entrenchments 81, 84 area(s) 17, 33, 37, 39, 41, 43–5, 48, 62–4,
moral 214 66–7, 70, 80, 82, 85, 87–9, 91, 94–6,
of mounted artillery 149 98–100, 102–5, 107, 109, 111,
of the offense 212–13, 215 113–16, 118, 120–1, 123, 125, 132,
political 3, 13, 217 141, 152, 158, 161, 165, 199,
of a position 33 202, 206
Prussia’s 180 accessible 41, 67, 85
strategic 16, 210 assembly 84
of surprise 92 familiarity with the 58
of the terrain 36, 83 fertile 203
see also disadvantage mountainous 82, 135, 159
advantageous 23, 29, 33, 43, 45, 67, 103, 106, open 134
139, 153, 161, 210, 212, 214, 220, 226 surface 222
battle(s) 141 wooded 202
terrain 146 artillery 20, 31–3, 40, 65, 69, 72, 83, 85, 90, 93,
see also disadvantageous 104, 117, 126–7, 134, 138, 140, 146–7,
affluence 189 149, 154, 187, 201
bourgeois 171 mounted 32, 62, 106, 108, 113, 127, 146,
alarm(s) 50, 53, 57, 104, 108, 131, 133–4 148–9, 152, 156
stations 53, 78 armament 184
Alden 99 dis- 173, 218
alignment general 200
with Austria 190 re- 191
with France 176, 184 arming of the
allegiance 219 nation 121
to the constitution 207 people 3, 17, 217–18, 220–6
patriotic 207 see also mobilisation; Nationalbewaffnung
Allgemeine Kriegsschule 10, 19, see Prussian(s), army(’s) 6–10, 14, 17, 20, 23, 34, 41–9, 52,
War College 54–5, 65–6, 68–9, 77, 87, 89, 93, 95–7,
232 Index
103–5, 108–9, 111–12, 115, 117, 122–4, concentrated 91–2
131, 133, 140, 143, 145, 147, 150, 152, first 34, 70, 80
156, 160, 179, 182, 186–91, 193, 195–7, general 72
199, 202, 205, 210–13, 216, 219, 221, mock 39, 104
223–4, 226 of the infantry 34
active 195 on small posts 129, 131, 133, 135
American 162 proper 133, 161
Austrian 195 in the rear 139
avant-garde 41, 156, see also avant-garde signal for 143
big 44 spirited 24
Continental 77, 99 steep 87
corps 41, 44–6, 55 sudden 83
Danish 52 surprise 105, 225
defensive 226 assault(ed/ing) 61, 99, 104, 133, 135–7, 152–3
elite 76 assemble(s/d) 75, 79, 82, 110, 119, 126, 137–8,
enemy 16–17, 66, 89, 104, 111–12, 115, 154, 197, 200–1, 205, 217, 219
123, 141, 193, 197, 212, 214, 222 re- 26, 39
English 77, 99, 155 assembly(/ies) 134, 137
entire 67, 224 area 84
esprit 143 ground(s) 197–200
expanding the 195 place of 125, 136–7
expansion of 195 point 38, 79
flanks 95 re- 201
field 195 of troops 52
French (Danube) 65, 99, 189, 191 atrocity(/ies) 205
great 200, 204 attack(s) 18, 24–5, 27–9, 33, 35, 37–40, 42–4,
Hessian 52 61, 68, 72, 74–5, 77, 79, 81, 83–4, 90–1,
imperial 102 94–5, 97, 102, 104–5, 107, 114–15, 118,
insurgent 204 120–1, 123–4, 126, 130–3, 136, 139–43,
invading 222 149, 153–5, 158, 165, 191, 200–2, 210–11,
large 13, 196 213, 215, 226
main 160, 200 assault-like 133
mechanized 8 bold 139
Prussian 186, 195, 207, 217–18 cavalry 63, 142
Observation 76 closed 35
operations 194 direct 141
opposing 123 enemy(’s) 15, 90, 92, 126–9, 210–13
regular 3, 17, 195, 221 first 32
reinforcement of the 195 initial 45
Russian 39, 193 lateral 113, 180
salaried 208 partisan 160
small 133, 196 regular 42
standing 217–19, 222, 224 terrorist 10
state controlled 16 attack(ed/ing) 16, 28, 32, 35, 37, 39, 49, 58, 69,
troops 131 75–7, 79, 83, 86, 89–90, 95, 99, 102–4,
arrière-garde 113–14, 121, 127, 151–2, 154 115, 125, 130–1, 139, 141, 148, 154, 159,
arrière guards 116 188, 191, 201–2, 212–13, 219
Aspern, battle of 193 attacker 17, 27, 72, 90, 130, 157, 210, 212–14,
assault(s) 27, 34, 38, 40–1, 61, 63, 79, 86, 90, 216, 223, 226
94, 104, 118, 120–1, 133–40, 152, 177, audacity 23–4, 159
194, 214 Auerstedt, battle of 207
bayonet 81 Austria(n/ns) 14, 66, 72, 83, 152, 154, 160,
bold 160 177, 180, 190, 192–3, 195, 211
closed 37 forces 86
in closed ranks 27 generals 160
combined 26, 27 Regulations 26
Index 233
Succession 8 unfortunate 108
troops 88, 102, 138 see also Gefecht; Schlacht
War(s) 8, 177 Battle(s) of
authority(/ies) 205 Aspern 193
French 182 Auerstedt 207, 218
highest 47, 192 Bergen 102
human 175 Cremona 138
political 4, 6 Eylau 39, 174, 193
avant-garde 15, 41, 44–5, 47, 54–5, 93, 102–3, Friedland 193
113–14, 116–21, 125, 127, 135–6, 152, Jena 218
156, 158 Leipzig 218
commander of the 116, 125 Ostrach 65
general of the 42, 44, 46–51, 54–5 Wagram 193
officer of the 118–20 Warsaw 76
Winterthur 66
bank Zorndorf 155
of the Havel 123–4 Zürich 66
of the Oder 187 Bavaria(n) 13, 70, 176–7, 180, 218
bankruptcy bayonet(s) 81, 137
national 175, 189 Beeskow 199
state 175 Bekenntnisdenkschrift 3, 7, 13–17, 169, 221
Barère, Bertrand de Vieuzac 205 belief 5, 67, 172–3, 184, 219
barn(s) 50, 102, 112, 122, 151 Belitz 124
barrier(s) 68, 74, 78, 84, 87, 93, Belling, Lt. Colonel Wilhelm Sebastian v. 152
125, 129 Berlin 10, 19, 94, 106–8, 113, 115, 118–20,
artificial 17, 221 122–3, 172, 190, 198–201, 204
geographical 66 Bergmüle 119
battalion(s) 24, 26, 35, 71–2, 76–8, 89, 94, Biesdorf 94, 120
105, 108–9, 118, 123, 146, 148, 152, bivouac(s) 23, 52, 96–7, 124–9, 150–1,
155–6, 160 153, 157–8
battery(/ies) 108, 151 boat(s)
battlefield 10, 14, 180, 211 oar 99–100
battle(s) 9, 11, 15, 21–5, 27–35, 38, 43, 69, row 138, 162
71, 73–4, 76, 80, 82, 88–9, 91, 94, 105, Bog of Kremmen 203
109, 131, 139–40, 153–4, 160, 184–5, Brandenburg 122–3, 190, 198–9
195, 201, 204, 207, 209–11, 213, 215, Mark 200
218, 223, 225–6 bridge(s) 40, 58, 65–7, 76, 94, 97, 106, 112,
advantageous 141 116, 119–21, 125, 130, 138, 160–1,
art of 15, 210 164–5, 224
cavalry 28 Berlin 119
decisive 15, 225 bridgehead 69
defensive 37, 88, 225 Chausée House 107
disadvantageous 95 destroying 164
dispersed 29 floating 164
formation 114, 116 stone 164
great 28, 33–4 wooden 164
honorable 173 Yorkshire 99, 162
individual 15, 74, 210 brigade(s) 41–3, 45–6, 49, 54–5, 65, 88–9,
infantry 25, 30 91–3, 95–6, 154
Landsturm 225 commander (of) 47, 49, 91
large(r) 11, 19, 21, 23 forward post(s of the) 46, 48–9, 55, 89–90,
lost 225 92, 94
night 134 quarters 55
order of 35–6 brigadier(s) 46–9, 51, 54–5
pitched 10, 12 Britz 115, 120
position 226 Brück 124
234 Index
Bülow, Dietrich Adam Heinrich v. 194 chance 7, 18, 73, 79, 82, 86, 121–2, 131, 141,
Burg 202 148, 154, 156, 162, 184–5, 193, 205, 207
chaos 30, 35, 134, 139, 142, 146, 153, 165, 216
cabinet 177, 184 Charles-Gustav X, King of Sweden 76
Caesar, Julius 191 Charlottenburg 106, 108, 115, 118–19
campaign 15, 23–4, 31, 42, 52, 72, 82, circumvent(ion) 70–5, 80–2, 85, 94, 100, 109,
130, 160, 187, 192, 195, 210, 123, 130, 136, 146, 158, 165, 202
213–14, 225 city dweller 206
against France 52 civilian(s) 4, 179
during the American Revolutionary civil
War 99 affairs 20
in Flanders 155 code 170
of 1758 99, 152 conflict 1
of 1776 99, 162 existence 175
of 1794 76 servant(s) 108, 174, 192, 196
of 1799 72 society 175
of 1812 193 war(s) 3, 9, 11, 121, 131, 163, 201
Prussian 168, 174 clandestine(ly) 99, 105, 112, 115, 120–1, 133,
camp(s) 50, 54, 82, 97, 106, 108, 112, 123–4, 161–2, see also march(es)
128–9, 179, 191 clothing 40, 112, 188, 190
campfires 111 clouds 224
fortified 190–1, 193 storm 223
guards 96 see also weather
see also encamp(s/ed); encampment coerce(s/d/ive) 158, 182, 194, 208, 213
cannon(s) 8, 23, 32–4, 56, 62, 68, 72, 76, 78, coercion 208
85, 90, 94, 96, 108, 118, 125, 135, 138–9, Colonel 198
147, 149, 156, 165, 187, 201, see also Aschenberg 76
artillery Belling 152
cantonment(s) 55, 97, 112–13, 124–8 Emmerich 167
capability(/ies) 81 Freitag 102
defensive 181 Mousgrave 77
capitulation 143, 145 Poleretzky 99
capital city 171, 190, 200, 202 see also Oberst(en)
caution 23–4, 43, 88, 102, 109, 118, 120, 122, combat 9, 15, 21, 29, 89, 92, 103, 130, 183,
160, 215 204, 221–2
pre- 90, 99, 103, 135, 141, 159, 162 combatants 8, 11, 30, 35, 187
cavalry 23, 28–32, 36–7, 39–41, 43, 45, 50–1, commander(s) 5, 7, 42, 44–6, 48, 50–1, 59, 74,
55–7, 62–6, 68–9, 73, 78–9, 83, 89–90, 77, 92, 94, 110–11, 116, 127–8, 137,
92–4, 98, 102, 104, 106–8, 110, 113, 117, 153–4, 158–9, 175, 191–2, 196, 211,
119–21, 123, 126–7, 134–8, 140, 142–3, 215–16, 224
145–9, 152, 154–7, 187 of the avant-garde 116, 125
enemy 88, 148–9 of a brigade 47, 91
flankers 30 deputy 47
heavy 28–9 of the (entire) detachment 46, 111,
light 28–9, 41, 52, 56, 73 119–20, 125
man/men 29–30, 73, 108, 118–19, 154–5 forward post(s) 46–9, 51, 54–5, 59, 78,
see also horses 90, 96
chain(s) 41, 44, 46, 49, 65, 73, 91, 109, in(-)Chief 8, 46, 77, 192
112, 220 post 46–51, 54, 58–9
of forward posts 42, 44, 47, 58, 64–5, subordinate 46
73–4, 111 superior 91
of guards 49, 96 commerce 5, 175, see also trade
of mountain posts 72 component(s) 26–7, 29, 52, 116, 133,
of posts 40–2, 47, 49, 66, 96, 109, 121 137, 211
of soutiens 91 of tactics 15, 23
chameleon 6, 17 of the army 133, 182
Index 235
conceal(s/ed) 21, 26, 28, 31, 34, 38, 43, 47, Niederbarmisch 198
57, 62, 68–9, 106, 117–18, 122, 128, Potsdam 204
130, 132–3, 142–3, 148, 157, 162, 185, (of) Ruppin 198, 202–3
207, 223 of Teltow 199
deployment 129 of Upper-Barnim 199
location 99, 106 of Zauch 199
position(ing) 33–4, 126 courage 7, 13, 17, 24, 50, 109, 130, 146,
concealment 131, 133–4, 140–2 154, 159, 173, 177, 180, 185, 189,
confidence 23–3, 176, 207–8, 224 196, 198, 205–7, 209, 215, 223–4, 226,
self- 192 see also courageous(ly); discouraged;
conflict 7, 9, 11–12, 18, 215 encouraged
asymmetric (military) 8–11 courageous(ly) 145, 159–60, 173, 176, 183,
ethnic 1, 9 188, 225, see also courage; discouraged;
low-intensity 9 encouraged
party 177 courier(s) 54–6, 112, 128, 162
Congreve intercept(ing) 161–2
rocket(s) 123 see also Ordonanz
Sir William 123 Court 171–2
conquest 15, 39, 210 -yard 76
conscription 195, 218, 221 Courtray 155
consignments 224 Cremmen 198
constitution(al) 6, 8, 215 Cremona 138
allegiance to the 207 cruelty(ies) 203, 205
internal 176, 220 Czar Peter 192
social 175
weak 188–9 Dahlem 106
convention(s/al) dam 67, 202
national 205 damage(d) 25, 38, 122, 124, 129, 143, 159–60
opinion 169 danger 23–5, 29–30, 42, 56, 73, 84, 100, 104–5,
traditional 215 109–10, 117, 121, 124–5, 141–2, 144–6,
wisdom 215 148–50, 159, 166, 170–1, 173, 180, 185,
convoys 14, 40, 112, 115, 121, 141 201, 205, 208–9, 219–20, 225
cordon(ed) 44, 82 of annihilation 60
defensive 82 of being circumvented 70
forward post 109 of being cut off 70, 144
system 34 of being intercepted 110
warfare 65 of being overrun 95
corps 14, 21, 34, 40–2, 44–5, 52, 54–6, 64, 66, of being taken 155
68, 76, 89, 93, 96, 105, 109, 112, 115, of great losses 130–1
123–4, 140, 154, 156, 186, 193, 197, of an invasion 218
199–200, 202–3, 207, 223, 226 of the Landwehr 219
army 41, 44–6, 55 of revolution 217–18
d’armée 93 dangerous 13, 33–4, 47, 67–8, 70, 79, 82, 84,
enemy 16, 99, 104, 108, 118, 120, 202–3 92, 100, 113–14, 117, 126, 138, 140, 143,
soutienes- 42, 47, 49, 88–9, 93, 98 148, 157–8, 169, 176, 178–9, 196, 203,
supporting 42 217, 221, 223
Cosel 190 Danzig 199
counter-insurgency 16, see also insurgency; Daun, Field Marshal Count Leopold Joseph
insurgent(s) v. 211
countermeasures 105, 160, 213 Davout, Marshal Louis-Nicolas 207
countryside 6, 14, 123, 188, 213–14, 223 decamp(ed/ing) 133, 158, 199, see also camp
County 196–200 (s); decampment; encampment; encamp
Glatz 206 (s/ed)
of Lebus 199 decampment 113, 125, 127, 133, see also
of Luckenwalde 199 camp(s); decamp(ed/ing); encampment;
Havelland 198, 202 encamp(s/ed)
236 Index
decision 22–3, 49, 120, 180, 183–5, 201 depravity 172–3, 182, 207
defeat(ed/ing) 9, 16–17, 27, 31, 37, 39, 65, 77, moral 175
85, 95, 106, 138, 145, 153, 155, 170, 173, national 172
193, 196, 202, 205, 207–9, 212, 218, deserter 123, 132
225–6 desire(d) 12, 64, 159, 174, 184, 194, 212, 220
the enemy 9, 16, 39, 202 despondence(/y) 172, 192, 207–9
defense 15–16, 22, 25, 32–4, 36–8, 41, 45, 48, detachment(s) 33–5, 42, 48, 56, 64, 68–9,
63–71, 74–5, 77–9, 81–2, 93, 124, 126, 71, 75, 96, 102, 104, 106–26, 131, 134–5,
131, 140, 155, 184, 196–7, 201–3, 209–11, 137, 140–1, 144, 150, 153–6, 158, 160–2,
213–15, 221, 225 165, 201–2
absolute 27, 37, 66, 83 advance 85
act 3 cavalry 36
active 16, 40, 169, 211, 214 commander of the 46, 119–20, 125
of defiles 67 considerable 139
disadvantage 214 defensive 64
lateral 84 enemy 14, 63, 129, 140–1, 152–3, 161,
local 90 196, 202
military 15 entire 69–70, 111, 119, 122, 124, 128, 130,
mutual 147 138, 140, 152
offensive 38, 64, 80, 140 French 72
passive 37, 64–5, 96 of Hussars 102
political 3, 15, 210 infantry 26, 119, 138
self- 85 isolated 146
strategic 3, 15–6, 18, 210, 212–13, 225 larger 71
strong 202 main 119
successful 87, 225 observation 108, 110
tactical 15–16, 210–12, 225 retreat of a 34
of the trenches 87 side 115
war of 187 sizeable 118
weak 39 small(er) 14, 22, 33–4, 36, 39–42, 56–7, 64,
defensive 15, 22, 41, 43, 63–5, 86, 90, 73–4, 105, 112, 117, 127, 129, 139–41,
210–12, 214–15 146, 150, 161, 164–5
active 64 strength of the 37, 104, 113
army 226 strong(er) 110, 112, 114, 139, 151, 202–3
battle(s) 37, 80, 225 wars 71, 91
capability 181 weak(er) 62, 65, 89, 106, 110, 114, 131, 158
cordons 82 determination 29, 67–8, 75, 77–8, 148, 154,
detachments 64 173, 176, 180, 183
line 224 detour(s) 55, 85, 127, 152
measures 46, 66, 80, 83, 85, 90, 226 dignity 173, 178
militia 14, 195 diligence 141, 169
occupation 77 diplomatic 215
(political) objective(s) 18, 82, 161 diplomacy 176
positions 66, 73–4 disadvantage(s) 3, 13–14, 23, 34–5, 49, 72–3,
posts 41, 44, 64–7, 80–1, 86–7, 94, 124 81–2, 85, 93, 114, 144, 149, 156–7, 180–1,
postures 34, 225, see cordon(ed) 197, 205, 213–17, see also disadvantageous
strategy 16 disadvantageous 34, 95, 160, 220, see also
war 209–10, 214–15 disadvantage(s)
defiles 32–4, 58, 62, 64–5, 67–70, 74–5, 98, discipline 46, 50, 53, 121
100–2, 113, 116, 125, 134–5, 146–7, 152, discouraged 50, 208, see also courage;
154, 158, 165 courageous(ly); encouraged
Delaware 99–100, 162 disorder(ly) 126, 189
deliberation 30, 169, 174, 185, 192–3 retreat 145
delivery(/ies) 122, 150, 196, 203, 224 despair 170–1, 184, 209
depot(s) 40–1, 65, 112, 121, 124, 130, 138, dissolution 159, 172, 219
179, 186, 190, 216 internal 183
Index 237
division(s) 20, 29, 41–7, 55, 72, 96, 104–5, position(s) 90, 97, 104–5, 108,
125, 153–4, 96, 204, 223 132, 136
draft(ed/ing) 49, 53, 178, 179, 221 post 59, 104, 115, 129–30, 139, 200
duty(/ies) 43, 46, 50, 53–4, 78, 108, 125, 133, proximity (of the) 30, 57
169–73, 183, 185, 194, 208 rear of the 111–12, 115, 141
of the forward posts 45 sniper 30
among the officers 53, 125 strong(er) 16, 61, 94, 103
superior 25, 75, 81, 88, 89, 109, 146, 150,
Eberswalde 199 193, 199–200
Emmerich, Lt. Colonel Andreas 12, 52, 58–9, territory 79, 142
102, 163, 167–8 troops 70, 133, 159, 193, 204, 224
emotion(s/al) 174, 185 weak/er/est 26–7, 61, 91, 109
Emperor 178–9, 181, 184 England 155, 180, 187, 189–90, 194–5,
French 178–9, 181–2 218–19
Napoleon 177–8, 180–1, 184, 191 English 1–2, 4–5, 11, 40, 94, 225
of France 175 army 77, 99, 155
encamp(s/ed) 41, 43, 50, 55, 76, 99, 122, government 187
see also camp(s); decamp(s/ing); (light) troops 59, 77
decampment; encampment entrench(ed) 69, 83
encampment 74, 108, 128, see also camp(s); camps 83, 179
decampment; decamp(s/ing); entrenchment(s) 20, 25, 40–1, 64, 66, 70–1,
encamp(s/ed) 78–9, 81–7, 94, 96, 105, 137, 211
encouraged 203, 220, see also courage; advantages of 81
courageous(ly); discouraged defense of 64
en Masse 7, 216 disadvantages of 81
endeavor 27, 174 obstacles to 81
dangerous 223 see also place d’armes; trench(es)
futile 159 envoy(s) 54, 59, 132, 135, 153, 172
ends 15, 23, 77, 209 equilibrium 175
extraordinary 177, 191 equipment 13, 125, 196
offensive 16 escalade 137, see also storm(y/ing), ladder
political 5, 15 escape(d) 34, 70, 102, 110, 137, 143, 145,
strategic 15 152–3, 156, 191, 210
enemy evidence(d) 44, 176, 185, 214, 218
advance/ing (of the) 25–7, 37, 44, 77, 88–9, historical 204, 218
94, 116, 198 Ewald, General Johann v. 11–12, 14, 52,
army 16–17, 66, 89, 104, 111–12, 115, 123, 59–60, 77, 79, 99–100, 116, 122, 152,
141, 193, 197, 212, 214, 222 157–9, 162–3, 167
attack (the) 37, 39, 61, 68, 74, 81, 90–2, 95, execution 52, 131–3, 140, 144, 160–1, 166,
126–7, 210–13 178, 192, 205
cavalry 64, 88, 145–6, 148 exertion(s) 27, 45, 51, 92, 122, 155, 157,
column(s) 82, 91–2, 111, 152, 158, 201 159–60, 174, 176, 190, 193–5, 197, 208,
corps 16, 99, 104, 108, 118, 120, 202–3 223, 226
detachment(s) 14, 63, 129, 140–1, 152–3, expansion 12, 15, 188, 195
161, 196, 202 extraordinary 67
encount(er/ers/ered/ing) 15, 103, 117–18, cases 97, 208
120, 129, 152–3, 201 courage 13
fire 34–5, 38, 68, 83, 149 efforts 194
force(s) 27, 93 ends 177, 191
formation 14 exertions 197
forward posts 104, 129 means 177, 191, 208
infantry 32, 119 measures 153
main 91 men 191
measures 38–9, 132 sacrifice 52
observation/observing 22, 47, 54, 104, 111 sources 190
patrols 63, 65, 74, 116, 118, 121, 143, 203 Eylau, battle of 39, 174
238 Index
fate(ful) 7, 117, 170, 177, 183, 207, 216, 226 irregular 14
fear(s/ed) 3, 23–4, 27, 88, 95, 98, 103, 118, Napoleonic 12, 169
130, 133, 142, 144–5, 153, 157, 163, 170, occupying 14
172–4, 177–80, 183–5, 191–3, 197, 205, opposing 193
208–9, 219–20, 224 pursuing 157, 159
fearful 70, 172 regular 14
fearsome 13, 196, 208 republican 196
fearlessness 207 retreating 157, 159
Fehrbellin 155, 202 standing 13
Feldwachen 40–1, 44, see also outposts stronger 215
fermentation 17, 221 superior 123, 142, 202, 213
fertile 202–3 weaker 131
field 11, 14, 21, 30, 31, 37, 39, 41–2, 53, 103, foreign imports 188, see also trade
109, 193 forest(s/ed) 48, 73–4, 83, 102, 107, 123, 146,
army 65–6, 195 165, 206, 223
artillery 187 deep(est) 39, 159
of battle 82, 226 dense 41, 56
guard(s) 42, 100, 103, 107, 112–13, 116, large 100, 103
125, 141 thick 98
post 107 see also woods
soldiers 187–8 fortification(s) 82, 189–91, 205, 212
Field Marshal fortified 76, 84, 201
Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of camp(s) 190–1, 193
Wellington 204 locations 137–8
Count Leopold Joseph v. Daun 211 fortress(es) 20, 150, 155, 179, 182, 187, 191–3,
Keith, James Francis Edward 154, 160 212, 226
Neidhardt v. Gneisenau 3 French 187
firebombs 164–5 Prussian 177, 188, 193
flank(s) 16, 26, 29, 33–5, 40, 63–4, 69, 74, 79, forward post(s) 38, 42, 44–6, 49, 52–3, 58, 60,
90, 95–6, 108, 111, 115, 155, 194, 204, 65, 127, 151, 167
223–6 battle 88
left 66, 94, 99, 194 brigade(s) 46, 48–9, 55, 89, 90, 94
guards 207 chain(s) 64–5, 73–4, 111
out- 35, 39 commander (of ) 46–9, 51, 55
right 66, 77, 95, 123, 190, 193 cordon 109
flankers 28–30, 61, 100, 119 corps 64
cavalry 28, 30 duty 53
flanking 24, 28, 93 enemy 129
flèches 84, 96 officer 53
fodder 142, 151, see also cavalry; horses organisation 96
fog 117, 224 positions 90
folly 172, 176, 184–5, 188 quarter(s) 53
foodstuff(s) 13, 40, 53, 78, 105, 112, 122–3, soutien 96
125, 130, 151, 158, 188, 196, 201–3 system 40, 42, 56–7, 87–8, 93, 95,
foraging 141, 152 108, 167
forces 8, 14–15, 20, 22, 31, 39, 43, 69, 90, 93, troops 50, 96
137, 193 warfare 65
armed 14, 22–3, 190, 192 war(s) 74, 88, 94
Austrian 86 see also light troops
auxiliary 30 France 3, 7, 72, 76, 88, 170–1, 174, 176–82,
British 99 184, 188–9, 191–4, 196, 203, 205,
combination of 39 216, 218
disunited 184 alliance/allied/alignment with 175–6, 179,
enemy 92 181–4
French 14 against 52, 169, 177, 183–4, 187, 192
guerrilla 195 Franco-Dutch War 214
Index 239
Frankfurt 200 North(ern) 78, 176–7, 181, 203
Road 123 Southern 176, 178
Frederick II, the Great 152, 160, 169–71, German(s) 1, 2, 4, 10–12, 15, 18, 51–2, 76, 84,
209, 211, 214 87, 167–8, 195, 206–8, 223, 225
Frederick William III 178 Gilten 99
freedom 173, 182–3, 189, 197, 200 Glatz 190–1, 206
of action 96, 201, 206 Glien 198
of the king 171 Gneisenau, Field Marshal August
of movement 43 Neidhardt v. 3, 15, 169, 217–18
French 3, 11–12, 14–15, 39, 58, 65–6, 70, 72, Goltz, Colmar von der 8
76, 102, 140, 154–5, 172, 174, 177–8, 181, government 7–9, 169–70, 172–3, 178–9,
187–8, 193–5, 198, 203–8, 218 181–3, 187–8, 191–5, 197–8, 205, 207–9,
army 99, 189, 191 216–19, 226
emperor 178–9, 181–2 Prussian 192, 217
-men 59, 76–7 republican 205
officer(s) 11, 60, 100 greatness 181, 192–3, 204
Republic 14, 65 grenade(s) 68, 164
Revolution(ary) 12–13, 39, 196, 205, 218 Grenadier 76, 99, 155, 164
term 40, 59, 84 Grunewald 108, 119
troops 39, 78, 138, 174, 182, 195 guard(s/ed) 42, 46, 48, 50, 53, 57, 59, 60–1,
friction 88, 166 78–9, 84, 89, 95, 97, 107, 112, 118, 125,
Friedland, battle of 193 127, 130, 133, 136, 159, 166, 192, 201, 207
Friedrichsfelde 94, 119 arrière 116
Friesack 202 camp 42, 54, 96
front 33–5, 40, 66, 74, 97 chain(s) (of ) 41, 96
(in) 41, 44, 56, 58, 68, 71–2, 84, 87, 96, close placement of 48
102–3, 107–8, 114, 116, 120, 129, 135, enemy 111
152, 154, 171, 211, 223 field 42, 100, 103, 107, 112–13, 116,
line(s) 88, 90, 100, 107, 116, 152, 158 125, 141
Fürstenwalde 120, 123, 199 infantry 56
fusilier(s) 71, 77, 118 line (of ) 42, 48
positioning of the 48
garrison(s) 75–6, 79, 84–5, 120, 138, 155, posts 139
224, 226 station 137
Gefecht 225, see also battle; Schlacht village 42, 57
General see also rearguards
Chabot 78 guerrilla 3, 10–11, 16, 18, 195, 204,
Clairfait 155 see also war, Small
Ewald 52, 59, 99, 167 gunfire 25–7, 135, 137, 159
Glaubitz 140 guns 75, 84, 136, 147, 187
Hammerstein 155–6, 167 Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden 191
Howe 77, 99
Lecourbe 72 Habelberg 202
Loison 72 Hahlweg, Werner 1–2, 13, 16, 19, 52, 59, 67,
Lukner 148 68–9, 74, 86, 99, 140, 147, 149, 155, 167,
Moureau 155 169, 196, 214, 217
Pichegru 155 Hallesches Tor 118–19
Scharnhorst 19, 98 harassment 28, 156
Stainville 76 Hardenberg, Karl August v. 3, 170
staff 19–20 Hasenheide 119
St. Ignon 154 Havel 122, 124, 203
Vandamme 155 -land 124, 198, 202–3
Washington 12, 77, 99 haystacks 125
Wedel 155 headquarters 54–5, 59, 128
Genthin 202 Hesse 140, 181, 203
Germany 3, 8, 178, 201, 218, 220 hindrance(s) 33–4, 155–6
240 Index
history 3–4, 6, 31, 67, 75, 146, 153, 166, 173, volunteers 120
188–9, 192, 194, 206, 215, 220 weak 26, 31, 64, 138
of the Prussian Campaign 168 information 47–9, 54, 59, 62, 79, 80, 97–9,
(of ) war(fare) 166, 168, 204, 210, 212 101–2, 105, 107, 111, 113–15, 117, 120,
Hofer, Andreas 70, 195, 218 122–4, 132–3, 161–2, 195
Hohenzollern, House of 178 inhabitants 48, 62, 78–9, 99, 101, 105,
Holland 176, 181, 214 111, 115, 122, 162, 175, 197, 203,
honor 169–71, 173, 176, 182–3, 187, 194, 215 205, 223
-able 27, 145, 171, 173, 193, 209 initiative 15, 23, 50, 163, 192
military 109 insurgency 16–17, 21, 204
horse(s/men) 30, 55, 60, 62, 76, 98, 102–3, counter- 16
107, 109, 111–12, 120, 123, 142, 149, 151, popular 3, 15
155, 160, 162–3, 187, 197, see also cavalry Tyrolean 13
hostile 131, 191, 193 see also insurgent(s)
Howe, General Sir William 77, 99 insurgent(s) 204, 218
howitzers 165 army 204
Hoya 78, 99, 140 captured 205
humanity 205, 222 troops 204, 206
Hussar(s) 14, 23–4, 58, 102, 107, 119, 145, Tyrolean 72
151, 152, 154–5 see also insurgency
insurrection 16–18, 204
identity 2, 9, 18 popular 16
national 10 royalist 196
political 9 Spanish 3
impatience 177, see also patience intelligence 12, 23, 40, 47, 99, 112, 115, 121,
independence 175, 178, 182, 184–5, 187, 173, 203, 206–7
194, 209 intensity 224
American War of 12, 59 low- 8–10
external 176, 179–80 interest(s) 9, 53–4, 170, 174, 178–9, 183, 189,
Spanish War of 204 215, 219, 226
independent(ly) 14, 16–17, 20, 29, 176, 181, economic 9
185, 209 France’s/French 177, 180
infantry 25–6, 28–33, 37, 39–41, 43, 51, of the nation 183
62–3, 65, 68, 70, 72–3, 78–9, 88, 90, 92, self- 173, 185, 220
94, 98, 100, 104, 106–8, 113, 117, state 9
119–21, 126–7, 134–7, 140, 142–3, intimidate(d) 139, 147, see also timid(ity)
145–9, 152–6, 158, 187 invincible 191, 223
advantages for the 23 Island of Potsdam 198, see also Potsdam
battalion 72 Italy 66, 176, 181, 218
battle 25, 30
corps 154 Janissaries 75
detachments 26, 74, 119, 138 Jäger 12, 154
dispersed 39 Hof- 108
elite 75, see also Janissaries see also tirailleurs; units, specialized
enemy 32, 119 Jena 207, 218
guards 56 judgment(s) 14, 21, 27, 46, 96, 160, 166, 169,
light 45, 77, 155 185, 191, 194, 197, 206–7, 223
(firing) line 26, 34 Jungfernheide 108, 115
post 73
Prussian 52, 86 Kaldor, Mary 8–9
marches 126, 134 Kaulsdorf 94, 120
-men 23, 119, 123, 136, 154, 162 Keith, Field Marshall James Francis
quarter 57 Edward 154, 160
regiment 52, 86, 156 King
sentinels 57, 151 of England 219
snipers 28, 30 of Poland 76
Index 241
of Prussia/n 169, 178, 180 Mahlsdorf 118–20
of Sweden 75–6 maneuver(s) 29, 34, 39, 72, 129, 226
Kolberg 190 march(es) 34, 37, 40–1, 43–4, 47, 58, 76, 85,
Königsberg 172 91, 95, 99–100, 105, 112–13, 115, 117–28,
Köpenick 94, 107, 115, 118–21, 199 133–4, 141–2, 145, 150, 152–3, 156–9,
Kurmark 190 161–2, 193, 198, 201–2, 223
Küstrin 118 clandestine 112, 115, 121, 161–2
concealed 139
Landeshauptmann 196, 198, 200–1 daylong 99, 117
Landsturm 13–14, 16, 131, 195–204, 206, 209, daytime 158
214, 221, 223–5 detachments 112, 118
bands 200 enemy(’s) 106, 110, 158
battle 225 forced 77
Oberst(en) 198, 201–2 formation 100
see also people’s war infantry 126, 134
Landwehr 3, 13, 16, 195, 217–19, 221 long 52, 112
law(s/ful) 6–7, 32, 35, 170, 173, 176, 179, 205, night 158
216–17 off-road 98, 102
liberation 10, 184 order of 135
Liebenwalde 198–9 quick 139, 213
light troops 41, 43–4, 52, 59–60, 62, 83, 100, strenuous 118, 157
109, 160, 167, see also; forward post(s); through defiles 100
troops unexpected 152
Lithuania 190 vigorous 134
locality(/ies) 63–4, 68, 74–5, 77–9, 83–4, 106, marching 100–1, 117, 121, 150, 158,
128, 137, 155, 163, 210–12 162, 200
location 35, 48, 53, 65, 74, 80, 85, 103, by day 150
111, 120, 122, 124–5, 128, 130, 137, of troops 93
142–3, 154, 162, 165, 199, 201, 212, orders 19
222, 224 retreat 150
accessible 70 route 118
of alarm stations 53 marginalia 2, 134
of bridges 58 market(s) 137–8
concealed 99, 106 material 2, 4, 20, 40, 128, 161, 163, 167, 189,
defending/defense of the 124, 126 225, see also materiél
of (individual) divisions 105 materiél 195, 197, 203, 226, see also material
of duties 78 measure(s) 28, 40, 43–4, 49, 53, 68, 69, 80–2,
enemy 103 90–3, 103, 105–6, 110, 121, 129–31,
fortified 137–8 138–9, 148, 158–60, 164, 174, 179, 180,
of the observation 59 185, 189–190, 192, 197, 207, 212–13,
open 84, 138 217–19, 221–2
outlying 112 additional 125, 132
of the post 48 adequate 40
proper 31 appropriate 67, 162
Prussia’s 177 dangerous 68, 79
of quarters 78 decisive 13, 196
remote 225 defender 212
small 76 defensive 46, 66, 80, 83, 85, 90, 226
loot 133, 139 enemy 38–9, 132
Löwenbergsch 198 extraordinary 153
Lübben 123 half- 95
Luckenwalde 123, 199 individual 63
Luxemburg 199 rational 10
reasonable 208
magazine(s) 138, 161, 164–5 reinforcing 65
Magdeburg 122, 199–200, 202–3 reliable 193
242 Index
measure(s) (cont.) misfortune(s) 40, 156, 183, 185, 191, 193,
of security 20, 23, 48, 73,121, 125 202, 208
supporting 32 mistake(s) 156, 160, 178–81, 185, 189, 210–11
Mecklenburg 199–200 Mittelmark 198, 204, 206
Memel 190 mobilization 189, 226
Menin 155 complex 8
mercenaries 155, 189 national 131
military 1, 4–5, 15, 54, 179, 186, 214, 221, 224 see also national (mobilization)
aims 214 moderation 205, 215
American 10 moral(e) 13, 26, 194, 207, 214, 216, 222, 226
analysts 1, 5 assault on 133
conflict 11 depravity 175
conscription 218 French 194
draft 179 im- 208
economy 20 impact on 224
effectiveness 3 popular 172
handbook 11 qualities 214
historian(s) 1, 2, 8, 15 morass(es) 69, 73, 80–1
honor 109 mountain(s/ous) 34, 58, 65–7, 69–72, 74, 76,
institutions 6 80, 82–3, 85–6, 135, 141, 147, 154, 156,
journal(s) 168 158–9, 165, 193, 206, 222–3, 225–6
literature 168 Mousgrave, Lt. Colonel Sir Thomas 77
means 5 munition(s) 13, 28, 179, 187, 189, 190, 196,
officer 52 201, 203, 218, see also ammunition
operations 9 Münkler, Herfried 9
organisation 180, 192 musket 13, 196
Prussian 15
police 206 Napoleon, Bonaparte, Emperor of France 39,
point d’honneur 215 170, 172, 177–8, 180–2, 184, 191, 195,
purpose 5 204, 207, 218
reformer 3, 169 Napoleonic
reforms 218 France 3
reserve 195, see also Landsturm forces 12, 169
rocket 123, see also Congreve victories 172
service 179 Wars 12, 52
situation 190 nation 6–7, 15, 17, 121, 131, 163, 174, 177,
state 179 181–3, 191, 194–5, 206–8, 210, 214, 216
strategic 15 interest of the 183
strategy 3, 18 national
students 3 affair 216
system 220–1 bankruptcy 175, 189
tactical 15 character 216, 222
US 10 Convention 205
wisdom 194 depravity 172
writer 129, 188, 194 energies 216
militia 195 identity 10
citizen(’s) 3 ideology 13
defensive 14, 195 -ism 10, 15
general 179 liberation 10
Landsturm 221 military reserve 195
Landwehr 217 militia 188
national 188 mobilization 131
people’s 13 product 175
regular 195 Redoubt 214
Tyrolean 195 struggle 203
misery 174–5, 183–4 territory 15
Index 243
trans- 1, 10, 18 defense 38, 80, 140
uprising 7, 216 ends 16
wars 163 objectives 18
wealth 175 purpose 22, 161
Nationalbewaffnung 131 officer(s) 44, 46–8, 50–5, 58–61, 78, 80, 96,
necessity 21, 31, 43, 58, 171, 181, 184–5, 191, 208 99–100, 102–5, 108, 111, 113, 116–20,
negligence 51, 132 123, 125, 127, 132–3, 135, 151, 160, 162,
negotiations 178 186, 191, 196, 213, 217
with France 179 American 116
with England 195 army 10
Neumark 190 aristocrats 3
Neustadt 199 of the avant-garde 118, 120
neutral(ity/lize/d) 56–8, 112, 177, 179, 193 cavalry 167
false 179 commanding 26, 52–3, 105, 118, 127,
Neutralization 40 136, 143
newspaper(s) 179, 203 corps 186
Niederlausitz 107 engineering 99
Niederschönhausen 107–8, 115 forward post 53
Niederbarmisch County 198 French 10, 60, 100
night 43, 52–3, 57–8, 60–2, 76, 80, 102, 107–8, (general) staff 96, 179, 198
111–12, 115–18, 120, 122–4, 128, 133–4, gentlemen 29
150, 153, 156, 158, 162 guard 60
at 48, 50, 52–3, 57–8, 60, 78, 110, 114, 121, military 52
125, 133, 153, 201 non-comissioned 60, 135
-fall 94 Prussian 8
mid- 103 scholarly 5
-time 151 superior 133, 138
North(ern) 170 On War 1–5, 7, 9–11, 15–16, 18, 221
America 52 opposing
Germany 78, 175–7, 181, 203 argument 206
Italy 176 army 123
wind 188 directions 112
north(ern) 198–9, 202 field armies 10
-east Spain 175 forces 193, 212
German 51 oppression 183
theatre of war 195 Ordonanz 54–5, 128
nuclear war 8 outposts 40–1, 44, 47, 50, 87–9, 91, 97–8, 132,
136, 223, see also Feldwachen
OberFeldherr 192, see also commander (in
Chief) palisades 83, 86–7
Oberst(en) 198, 201–2, see also Obristen Pankow 107–8
obedience 44, 179 Partheygänger 12, 52, 79, 102, 167
objection(s/able) 39, 82, 187, 204, 206 partisan(s) 12–13, 79, 109, 112, 123–4, 131,
Obristen 198, 200, see also Oberst(en) 134, 139, 160–3, 165, 167
observation(s) 22, 25, 40, 52, 59–60, 63, 76, warfare 12, 52
106, 110–11, 114, 125, 146–7, 156, 163, patience 211, see also impatience
178, 185, 205–6, 221 patrol(s) 40, 47–8, 61, 63, 80, 97–100, 102–3,
detachments 108, 110 106–8, 111–12, 115–16, 119–21, 125, 128,
(of the) enemy 22–3, 28, 47, 54, 111 136, 139, 141, 144, 151, 162
obstacle 6, 20, 34, 42, 71–4, 80–3, 85, 87, cavalry 102
118, 137 command of 19
Oder 187, 198, 200 common 161
offensive(ly) 37–40, 43, 63–5, 92, 112, 115, diligent 50
210–15 enemy 63, 65, 74, 116, 118,
against France 184 121, 203
aims 20 French 102
244 Index
patrol(s) (cont.) context 1
guards of defense 3, 15, 210
infantry 119 economy 10, 206
large(r) 40, 62–3, 97, 100, 103 effects 13
ordinary 162 end(s) 5, 9, 15, 214
reconnaissance 97–8, 161, see also goals 5
Schleichpatroullien identity 9
side 98, 100–1, 106, 108, 113–19, 121, insight 180
141, 143 instrument 7
small(er) 97, 103, 119 intercourse 5
sneak 162 logic 9
spy 106, 111 nature 214
strong(er) 98, 100, 106–7, 110, 113 objectives 18
wider ranging 97 opinion 169
peace(ful) 97, 152, 176–7, 184, 189–90, 193, organizations 18
205, 209, 215, 226 principles 172
Peace of Tilsit 174, 176–80 process 5
peasant(s/ry) 12–13, 16, 70, 99, 105, 107, 157, purpose 7, 13
206, 223 reasons 178, 221
rebellion 196, 218 reformer 3
pedantry 161, 166, 188 situation 185
people’s war 17, 206, 209, 221–5, see also systems 5
Landsturm turbulences 176
Peoples 6, 7, 173, 184 tyranny 177
barbarous 209 violence 11
European 216 world 195
German 208 Poitou 206
of the nineteenth century 6 politics 5, 8–9, 178, 180
’s war 12 Pomerania 190, 206
performance 3, 160 population(s) 6–8, 12–13, 16–17, 111, 116,
picket(s) 19, 42, 56–64, 96–7 162, 177, 179, 186, 196, 198–9, 205,
Pillau 190–1 217–18, 222–4, 226
place d’armes 79, 84, see also entrenchment(s) Portugal 176
plain 62, 73, 83, 92, 104, 107–8, 145–6, 148 posts 46, 48–9, 51, 54–5, 57, 59, 62–4, 70, 80,
Plauen 122–4, 199 92, 94, 104, 110, 112, 124, 131–2
point d’honneur 215–16 chain of 49, 96, 109, 121
Poleretzky, Lt. Colonel 99 commander 46–7
policy 5, 8, 43, 184, 210 defensive 64–7, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79–81,
political(ly) 5, 15, 210, 218 86–7, 94, 124
actors 5 distant 112
advantage(s) 3, 13, 217 enemy(’s) 104, 115, 121, 139,
affairs 5 161, 200
analysis 5 guard 139
argument 3 infantry 64
aspirations 11 mountain 72
authority 4, 6 outmost 110
behavior 184 small 55, 66, 88, 110–11, 124, 129, 131
circles 15 support(ing) 62
circumstances 215 weak 62, 109, 203
commerce 5 see also forward post(s)
conception 10 powder 68, 164
conditions 185 keg(s) 164
considerations 8 precaution(s) 90, 99, 103, 135, 141,
content 12 159, 162
constellation 192 predominance 193, 199, 211
constraints 8 Prignitz 202
Index 245
prisoner(s) 75–6, 102, 105, 107, 133–4, 136–7, troops 39, 160, 174, 177, 190, 193
139, 141–2, 152, 155, 163, 201, 203, war 42
224–5 War College 3, 10
prolonge 149 public opinion 171–2, 179, 185
prop 217, 219 pursuer 157, 159
province(s) 13–14, 82, 164, 190, 192, pursuit 39, 116, 147, 157, 172
195–201, 203–4, 218, 223–4, 226 of the enemy 156–7
proximity 110, 137–8, 212 of great goals 25
to the cannon 33 hot 130, 141
(of the) enemy(’s) 30, 57, 124, 128 of minimizing superfluous communication 55
to the great army 200 of political objectives 18
of support 146 rapid 62, 145
of water 129 of strategic ends 15
of (the) wood(s) 129
prudence 160, 182 quarrèe 154–5, see also rectangular formation
Prussia(’s) 3, 12–14, 16, 83, 160, 170–1, quartering 85, 105, 127, 174, 223–4
174, 176–81, 184, 186–93, 195, 200, quartermaster 96, 125, 127
209, 214, 220 quarter(s/ing) 41–2, 44, 50, 52–3, 55–7, 62,
disposition 187 74, 78, 84–5, 105, 112, 120, 122–8, 132,
East 39, 190, 206 137, 139, 151, 163, 174, 223–4, see also
King of 169, 172 headquarters
needs 187
rearmament 191 range of fire 34–5, 71
strength 181 ranks 5, 12, 52, 189
war preparedness 193 close(d) 23–4, 27–8, 35, 37, 146, 154
West 206 Rathenow 198
Prussian(s) 99, 155, 171, 193, 195, 203 rational
(field) army 186, 195, 207, 217–18 deliberation 185
Cabinet 184 manner 17, 222
cavalry 155 measure 10
Campaign 168, 174 reason 206
Chancellor 3 rearguard(s) 63, 70, 100–1, 136, 152, 159
citizen 3 reason(s/ed/ing) 7, 18–19, 30, 32, 34, 43, 47,
dynasty of 178 64, 74, 78, 83, 85, 89, 99, 100, 110, 126–8,
flank guards 207 130, 133, 138, 141, 145, 151–2, 166,
forces 207 178–81, 185, 192–3, 197, 206, 208, 215,
fortifications 190 219, 221, 226
fortresses 177, 188, 193 reasonable(/y) 64, 126, 144, 187, 208
government 178, 182, 192, 208, 217 un- 177, 189, 194, 211
hussar 152 rebellion 218
infantry regiment 52, 86 in the Vendée 3
institution (of the Landwehr) 3, 13, 217 peasant 196, 218
lands 218 Tyrolean 70
Landwehr 221 recalcitrance 163
mile 56 reconnaissance 14, 28, 40, 73, 97, 103–6,
militarism 4 110–11, 161, 212, 223
military 15, 169 patrols 97–8
monarchy 204 (of the) enemy 64–5
name 171 ordinary 90
nationalism 15 unit(s) 97, 104
obedience 179 see also Schleichpatrouillen
officer 8 reconnoiter(ed/ing) 19, 89, 104, 106, 108, 121
patriot(s/ism) 13, 172 rectangular formation 154, see also quarrèe
side 174, 177 redeployment 92, 112
state 170, 174, 178–9, 186–7, 190, 195, 203 regiment(s) 54, 105, 154–5
theatre of war 193 cavalry 23, 148
246 Index
regiment(s) (cont.) Rixdorf 107, 115, 118–19, 121
infantry 52, 86, 155–6 risk(y) 24, 49–50, 69, 92, 95, 120, 134, 141,
regular 217 149, 185, 214, 218
regulation(s) 53–4, 117, 123 river(s) 67, 69, 73, 80, 138, 164
Austrian 26 Aar 66
service 43, 45–7, 50, 53 Boxtel 88
reinforce(d/ing) 14, 32, 65, 71, 90, 93, 112, crossing 118, 225
115, 190, 195, 205 Dommel 94
reinforcement(s) 17, 26–7, 30, 75, 83, 90, Ebro 175
92–4, 104, 195, 221, 224 Elbe 198
Reinikendorf 107, 115 Havel 122, 203
Rendezvous 127–8, 201 Limmat 65
reputation 52, 109, 143, 153 Niemen 175
rescue 100, 146, 157, 172, 185, 198 Panke 94
reserves 32, 174, 195 Sill 66
resistance 25–7, 37, 41–3, 64, 73–4, 79, 81, Spree 94, 108, 115, 118
88–94, 109, 127, 145–7, 169, 171, 176, Vechte 88, 94
182–3, 185, 189, 193–4, 202–3, 208, 217, Weichsel 193
219, 222–3, 225 wide 138
absolute 25, 27, 64 road(s) 56, 69–72, 82–3, 98–9, 106–8,
resources 9, 157, 185–6, 190, 193, 216, 220 115, 118–21, 123, 127, 142, 162, 165,
responsibility(/ies) 50, 118, 173, 201, 208, 220 182, 209, 223
restraint 177, 221 back 117–18
Rethen 99 main 58, 95–6, 99, 120
retreat 8, 22, 25, 27, 29–30, 33–4, 38, 40, 60–1, off- 70, 98, 102
68–71, 74–5, 78, 80–2, 85, 89–91, 93–5, unpaved 22
97–8, 100, 106, 109, 113–15, 117, 120–1, rocket(s) 123, 165
123, 125–7, 135–6, 139–41, 143–6, 149, Congreve 123
152–60, 200–1, 203, 226 Rosenthal 107–8, 115, 118
cases of 145 route(s) 61, 85, 95, 98, 107, 113, 115,
disorderly 145 117–20, 122–3, 126, 136, 152, 154,
early 144–5 200, 204, 223
from the enemy 61 Rudow 107, 120
initial 142 rule(s/ed) 8, 14, 25–6, 28, 31–2, 36–9, 42,
marching 150 53, 55, 61, 65, 74–5, 77–8, 80, 90, 97–8,
premature 143 103, 109, 114, 121, 124, 126–7, 131, 137,
route of 154 139, 141–2, 144–6, 148, 153, 156, 159,
sudden 30 161–3, 166–8, 186, 197, 203–5, 210,
under assault 61 213, 215, 218
retreater 157 British 12
retreating 71, 73, 89, 104, 109, 114, 124, 137, rumor(s) 144, 152
142–3, 145, 149, 154, 157 false 158
brigades 89 Ruppin 124, 198, 202–3
forces 157, 159 Russia(n/ns) 72, 174, 177, 180–1, 184, 191–4,
pickets 64 199–200, 204, 211, 222
troops 158–9
soldiers 158 sacrifice(d) 2, 25, 52–3, 75, 77, 147, 169,
revenge 106, 122, 130–1, 157, 178, 185, 191 173–4, 176, 178, 180–2, 185, 197, 208
revolution(ary/ies) 3, 11–13, 169, 176, salvation 170, 180, 183, 185, 220, 226
217–19, 221 Saxony 76, 176–7, 212
American 52, 99 scenario 204
counter- 13, 196 worst-case 100
France 72 Scharnhorst, General Gerhard v. 11–12,
French 12–13, 39, 191, 196, 205, 218 19, 78, 86, 98–9, 102–3, 140,
riflemen 28, 30, 34–5, 58, 71–2, 76, 99, 147, 167–8, 218
152, 154, 158–9, 163 Schlacht 225–6, see also battle; Gefecht
Index 247
Schleichpatrouillen 97, see also patrols shortage
Schöneberg 106–7 of first-rate generals 191
Schöneweide 120 of foodstuffs 130, 201
Schweidnitz 206 of horses 187
secrecy 121, 132, 142 of men 130
secret(ly) 121, 128, 133, 150, 180, 220 siege(s) 130, 155, 160, 192, 199, 226
secure(d) 26, 34, 50, 52, 65, 78, 93, 98, 100, be- 200, 204
109, 115, 122, 124, 128, 164, 171, 200, signal(s) 56, 60, 100, 128, 136, 143, 151
203–4, 212 Silberberg 190
against an actual attack 121 Silesia(n) 83, 187, 190, 193–4, 199, 206
against a superior enemy 199 War 83
the army’s way 66 situation(s) 9, 14, 39, 43, 49, 50–1, 58, 64, 69,
the city 106 71, 88, 97–8, 109, 118, 143–4, 158, 165,
a concession 101 174, 184–5, 187, 192, 196, 206, 220, 224
decisive victory 212 dangerous 158
depots 179, 190 difficult 50
foodstuffs 53 disadvantageous 34
from being overrun 70 the enemy’s 159
from the first assault 70 extreme 219
independence 182, 209 for the king 183
(necessary) information 107, 132, 162 military 190
the march 100 political 185
the materiél 197 sad 145
place 78 unforeseeable 26
the pickets 62 unlucky 146
(concealed) position 78, 126 worst 103
(the) quarters 112, 125 Smith, Adam 206
route(s) 200, 204 sniper(s) 26, 28, 30, 36, 72, 155, 158
spies 132 infantry 28, 30
success 131 lines (of ) 26–7, 30, 38
supplies 114 Souccours 135–7
security 41–3, 45, 57, 78, 92, 114, 122, 124–8, soul(s) 184, 198–9, 226
138, 175–6, 179, 199, 219 soutien(s) 40–1, 44, 48, 61, 63, 77, 87, 89–94,
degree of 48, 124, 128 96–8, 106, 143
of (a strong) detachment(s) 112, 115 -corps 42, 47, 49, 89, 93, 98
enemy’s 133 (of the) forward post(s) 41, 44, 62, 96
external 183 Spain 7, 131, 175–7, 180–2, 204–6, 209, 216
of the government 218 Spandau 94, 107–8, 118–21, 123, 190,
great(er/est) 42, 63, 131 199–200, 202, 204
individual 25 Spanish: civil war 3, 201
of the king 171 insurrection 3
measure(s) (of ) 20, 23, 48, 73, troops 138
121, 125 War of Independence 204
own 60, 63, 104, 165, 184 spies 53, 111, 132–3
personal 104, 163 Spree 94, 108, 115, 118–20, 123, 199
reasons (of ) 100, 126 Wendische 120
sufficient 199 squad(s) 61, 102, 202
Seelow 199 squadron(s) 29, 89, 94, 105, 108–9, 118,
self-interest(ed) 173, 185, 220, see also 148, 151
interest square miles 203–4, 206
sentinels 57, 75, 80, 96–8, 110, 112, 119, 134, state(s) 5–6, 8–10, 13, 15, 17, 170–3, 175–8,
143, 151 180, 186–90, 192, 195, 209, 211–12,
Seven (7) Years’ War 12, 14, 52, 76, 83, 99, 214–16, 226
102, 152, 154, 191, 211–12, 214 actors 10
shooters 71 administration 174
sharp- 146, 159, 207 bankruptcy 175
248 Index
state(s) (cont.) of the enemy 28, 69, 90, 104, 106
of affairs 1 of the forces 22
city- 7 of the forward posts 42, 92–3
-controlled 16 of a locality 74
debts 176 modest 44
European 222 physical 194, 215
forces 214 of the pickets 56–7
interest 9 of the population 224
military 179 Prussia’s 181
modern 9 of the quarters/quartering 105
non- 9 relative 15, 193
policy 8 of the resistance 42
Prussian 170, 174, 178–9, 186–7, 190, Russia 181
195, 203 of the side patrols 114–15
small 214 sufficient 104
sub- 9–10 superior 141
territorial 7 of the troops 30, 88
of war 9 Strohwisch(e) 126
Westphalian 9 struggle 170, 173, 183, 203, 224
Steglitz 106 submission 54, 171, 177, 180, 185
Stein, Karl Freiherr vom und zum 170, 218 subordinate(s/d) 3, 7, 18, 46–7, 51–3, 85, 144,
Stettin 199–200 194, 198, 224
Storkow 123, 199 success 24–5, 32, 73, 92, 110, 131, 133, 141,
storm(y/ing) 87, 134, 137, 155, 170, 209, 146–8, 153, 159, 161, 165, 185, 202, 221–2
218, 223 successful(ly) 27, 91, 103, 137, 139–41, 153,
bell(s) 197, 200–1, 203 158, 161
ladder 137, see also escalade combination 4
strategy 5, 10, 15, 20, 22, 156, 210 defense 87, 225
defensive 16 general 180
guerilla 16 raid(s) 90, 131
military 3, 5, 18 resistance 94, 146
political 5 succession, see Austria(n/ns), Succession
of Small War(s) 15, 23 superiority 38, 63, 69, 129, 131, 139, 145,
strategic(ally) 211, 213 147–8, 151, 157, 159, 205–6, 212, 216
advantage(s) 16, 210 supplies 40, 114, 122–3, 150, 161, 163, 165,
barrage 226 200, 212, 224
defense 3, 15–16, 18, 210–13, 225 surveillance 45–6
ends 15 survival 15, 210
goals 14 Süßmilch 167
importance 43, 212 swamp(s) 67, 199, 222, 225
offense 212 Switzerland 72, 176, 214
purposes 124 sword 184, 191, 205, 217, 219–20
thought 10
Strausberg 199 tactical 15–16, 23, 43, 124, 129, 210–13, 225
strength(en/ed) 16, 22–3, 27, 38, 40–1, 59, tactics 10, 15, 20, 22–4, 33, 54, 197, 210, 212
83–4, 88, 92, 96–8, 104–5, 109–10, Tatar(s) 6–7
114, 143, 154, 170, 173–8, 184–5, Tegel 107, 115, 118
194, 203–4, 219 forest 107
appropriate 47 telescope 58, 104
of the army 46 Tempelhof 107
of the avant-garde 113 terrain 23, 29–33, 35–7, 39, 41–5, 48, 57,
concentrated 40 61–4, 66, 68–9, 81, 83, 89–90, 96, 100,
of the camp guards 96 113, 118, 126–7, 130, 141–2, 145–9, 153,
of the corps 104–5 156, 211, 213, 225
defensive 43, 86 accessible 80
of the detachment(s) 37, 104, 113 advantages of the 36
Index 249
advantageous 146 148, 157–60, 165, 174, 186, 190, 196, 200,
appropriate 97 211, 213, 223–4
barrier of 75 assembly of 52
defense of the 36 Austrian 88, 102, 138
difficult 226 auxiliary 26
extend of the 36 Bavarian 70, 218
flat 38 British 88
irregular 83 cavalry 29, 45
mountainous 74 closed 36
obstacles of (the) 74, 85 corps of 44
open 113 decampment of the 133
remote 37 detached 117
rough(ness of ) 82, 108 dispersion of the 127
uneven 81 Dutch 88
unsuitable 91 enemy(’s) 70, 131, 133, 159, 193,
varied 30, 33–5, 38, 80, 94, 107–8, 113, 120, 204, 224
136, 146, 149, 156, 223 English 77
wide 25 follow-on 200
terror(ism/ist) 1, 10, 18, 131, 133–6, 139, forward post 50, 96
158, 163 French 39, 70, 78, 138, 174, 182,
Teupitz 123 195, 218
theater of war 14, 16, 20, 64, 181, 190, 193–5, German 51
197, 211–14, 222–4 Hessian 39
theory 7, 18, 22, 144, 166, 215 infantry 45
abstract 4 inferior 225
of insurgency 16 insurgent 204, 206
of Small War 168 irregular 12
of war(fare) 1, 4–5, 7, 221 large masses (of ) 31, 35, 37
Tiedemann, Major Karl Ludwig Heinrich large numbers of 224
v. 19, 24 light 41, 43–4, 52, 59–60, 62, 83, 100, 109,
Tiergarten 106, 119 160, 167
timid(ity) 51, 143–4, 181, 209, see also loss of 130
intimidate(d) marching of 93
tirailleurs 12, 207, see also units, specialized; occupying 74, 218
Jäger Prussian 39, 160, 174, 177, 190, 193
trade 22, 174–5 quartering of 174, 223
blockades of 175 rations 54
traditional(ly) 209, 215 regular 12, 202, 224
circumscribed military system 221 remaining 136, 138, 200
conventions 215 retreating 158–9
rule 168 returning 133
views 21 Russian 174
trap 61, 118, 133, 177 side 116, 118–19
treasure(s) 189 small 81, 118
Treaty of Paris 174 soutiens 98
trench(es) 37, 75, 80, 85–7, 106, see also Spanish 138
entrenchment steadfastness of 146
Treptow 119 subordinate 46
Trinitarian supporting 30, 42, 56
conception 9 units 35
framework 17 weary 43
trinity 6–8 withdrawing 93
troop(s) 20, 23, 26–30, 32–4, 37, 39, 43, 46–7, Tugendbund 172
50–3, 57–8, 60, 66, 68–72, 74–5, 79, 82, tyranny 169, 177, 184, 208
88, 91, 94–5, 100, 104–5, 108, 111, tyrant 173, 180
124–31, 133, 135–6, 138, 140, 143, 146, Tyrol(ean/s) 70, 131, 196, 218
250 Index
Tyrol(ean/s) (cont.) uprising in the 13
insurgen(ts/cy) 13, 72 vengeance 208
militia 195 vicinity 42, 60, 104, 108, 113, 116, 118, 123–4,
rebellion 70 143, 150, 202
uprising 3, 218 victory(/ies) 27, 37, 155, 172, 188, 204, 207,
211–12, 214, 218, 220, 226
uncertainty 25, 175, 177, 179 vigilance 46, 48, 50–1, 53, 63, 78, 122, 128
undetected 95, 123, 132–4, 138, 150, 163 of the commanding officer 53
unit(s) 11–12, 16, 24, 29, 32, 52, 87, 106–7, of the forward post(s) 50
135–7, 142–3, 145, 147, 149–50, 155, 161, (of the) guards 60, 107
165, 224 individual post 51
advanced 24 village(s) 13, 40–1, 58, 64, 67, 74, 76, 78–80,
cavalry 29, 52, 66, 137 83–6, 94, 97, 99–102, 105–6, 109–10,
closed 25, 33, 38 115–17, 119, 122, 125–7, 129, 150, 152,
combined 29 154–5, 158, 165, 197, 223
detached 116 guards 42, 54, 57
distant 13, 196 violence 9, 18, 97, 182, 191
entire 78, 80 asymmetric 1
first 107 act of 18
forward 42, 158 primordial 6, 17
individual 137 political 11
infantry 39, 137
large 21–2, 35 Wagram, battle of 193
light- 10, 12, 14, 23–4, 161 war(s)
main 102, 116 of all against all 7, 216
massed 147–8 of alliance 8
professional 12 American 12, 52, 59, 60, 77, 99, 103, 152,
rear 42, 158 159, 163
reconnaissance 90, 97, 104 art of 20–2, 146, 166, 209
reserve 137 Austrian 8, 177
of riflemen 158 character of 7, 216
side 158 chariot 220
single 24 civil 9, 11, 121, 131, 163
small(-/er) 3, 6, 11–14, 21–2, 24–5, 32, of (the First/Second) coalition 8, 72, 88
34–5, 41, 80, 102, 104, 147, 223–4 Cold 8
special(ized) 12, 33, see also Jäger; concept(ion) of 9–10, 18, 22, 194
tirailleurs of defense 187
substantial 131 defensive 209–10, 214–15
supporting 41 experience(/d) (in) 158, 160, 166, 213
unconnected 6 First World 8
weak 35–6, 137, 224 forward post 74, 88, 94
unsuccessful 160, see also successful guerrilla 18
Upper-Barnim 199 history (of ) 166, 210, 212
uprising knowledge of 93, 192
national 7, 216 large 21–4, 26, 30–2, 34, 37–40, 64, 66, 127,
peasant(’s) 13, 70 139–40, 150, 167
popular 3, 16–17 monarchical 9
revolutionary 169 Napoleonic 12, 52
Tyrolean 3, 218 nature of 5, 19, 215
new 9, 160, 170, 174
Valentini, Freiherr Georg Wilhelm v. 167 nuclear 8
vanguard 159 offensive 213–14
vedettes 53, 110, 116, 120, 132 old 9–10
Vegetius, Flavius 129 outbreak of 181, 195
Vendée 13, 131, 196–7, 204–6, 209 Peninsular 3
rebellion in the 3 people(s)’s 12, 17, 206, 209, 221–5
Index 251
primitive war 10 limiting condition of 188
Prussia(n/s’) 42, 193 logic of 10
regular 12 manifestation of 7
resources 216 nineteenth-century 17
revolutionary 12, 39, 52, 99, 191 partisan 12, 52
Seven (7) Years’ 12, 14, 52, 76, 83, 99, 102, professional 12
152, 154, 191, 211–12, 214 scope of 8
Silesian 83 small-unit 3, 13
Small 1–3, 9–33, 38–40, 52, 64, 66–71, study of 12
83–5, 100, 128, 131, 133, 141, 143, 156, sub-state 10
163, 166–9 theory of 1, 7
Spanish (civil) 3, 201, 204 warlike
of Succession 8 action(s) 22
theater of 14, 16, 20, 64, 181, 190, 193–5, acts 21
197, 211–14, 222–4 efforts 10
theory of 45, 221 element 17, 221
total 8 events 8
Vietnam 5 Washington, General George 12, 77, 99
with Russia 184, 191 weather 128, 134
warfare 1, 9, 15, 18, 46, 153, 210 Wellington, Field Marshal Arthur Wellesley,
absolute 3 Duke of 204
asymmetric 17 Westphalia(n) 9, 203, 223
burden of 181 wood(s/y/ed/den) 36, 41, 62, 67, 73–4, 80–1,
(trinitarian) conception of 9, 10 83, 86, 94, 100, 104, 108, 113, 116, 120,
contemporary 9 122–4, 128–9, 136, 141, 145, 147, 151,
cordon 65 164, 198–9, 201–2, 222
forms of 2–3, 5–6, 10 -land 206
forward post 65 -men 117
guerrilla(-style) 3, 10, 16, 18 see also forest
history of 168 Württemberg 176
hybrid 18
interstate 1 Zauch 199