Gideon v. Wainwright
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| Gideon v. Wainwright | |
| Reference: 372 U.S. 335 | |
| Term: 1962 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: January 15, 1963 Decided: March 18, 1963 | |
| Outcome | |
| Supreme Court of Florida reversed and remanded | |
| Majority | |
| Chief Justice Earl Warren • Hugo Black • William Brennan • Tom Clark • William Douglas • Arthur Goldberg • John M. Harlan • Potter Stewart • Byron White | |
| Concurring | |
| Tom Clark • William Douglas • John M. Harlan | |
Gideon v. Wainwright is a case decided on March 18, 1963, by the U.S. Supreme Court, which decided the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteed a right to counsel binding on state governments in all criminal felony cases. The case concerned the constitutionality of a Florida law that only allowed state courts to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court and held that states could not deny counsel to defendants in criminal felony cases under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.[1][2]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision required states to assign counsel for defendants in all criminal felony cases. The court's decision in Gideon overturned the court's 1942 decision in Betts v. Brady.
Background
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
The petitioner in this case was Clarence Earl Gideon. Gideon was charged with breaking and entering a pool hall with intent to commit a misdemeanor. Under Florida law, Gideon's actions constituted a felony. At his arraignment, without funds and without counsel, Gideon petitioned the court to have counsel appointed to him. According to the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, the following exchange took place at the arraignment hearing:
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The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this case. |
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A jury convicted Gideon of the charges, and he was sentenced to five years in prison.[1]
Gideon studied the law in the prison library and attempted a number of lower court actions, one of which was to file a habeas corpus petition to the Supreme Court of Florida arguing that the denial of counsel violated his rights of due process under the U.S. Constitution.[1][4] The Florida Supreme Court denied his requests.[1]
Gideon then petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court. The court agreed to hear the case and appointed counsel for him. The court appointed Abe Fortas to represent Gideon at oral argument before the court.[1][4]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on January 15, 1963. The case was decided March 18, 1963.[1]
Decision
The decision of the Supreme Court of Florida was reversed and remanded.[1]
Opinions
Opinion of the Court
Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.
Similarities with Betts v. Brady
After a review of Gideon's procedural history, Justice Black noted the similarities between the Gideon case and Betts v. Brady (1942). The court decided in Betts that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments did not require states to appoint defense attorneys for all defendants who could not afford their own counsel in criminal cases. Justice Hugo dissented in Betts. He argued against the Betts decision in the Gideon opinion and said the court's decision in Gideon overturned Betts:[1]
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The facts upon which Betts claimed that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to have counsel appointed to assist him are strikingly like the facts upon which Gideon here bases his federal constitutional claim. Betts was indicated for robbery in a Maryland state court. On arraignment, he told the trial judge of his lack of funds to hire a lawyer and asked the court to appoint one for him. Betts was advised that it was not the practice in that county to appoint counsel for indigent defendants except in murder and rape cases. He then pleaded not guilty, had witnesses summoned, cross-examined the State's witnesses, examined his own, and chose not to testify himself. He was found guilty by the judge, sitting without a jury, and sentenced to eight years in prison. Like Gideon, Betts sought release by habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied the right to assistance of counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Betts was denied any relief, and on review this Court affirmed. It was held that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which for reasons given the Court deemed to be the only applicable federal constitutional provision ... Since the facts and circumstances of the two cases are so nearly indistinguishable, we think the Betts v. Brady holding if left standing would require us to reject Gideon's claim that the Constitution guarantees him the assistance of counsel. Upon full reconsideration we conclude that Betts v. Brady should be overruled. [3] |
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What changed between Betts and Gideon?
Justice Black argued that Betts broke from precedent established in earlier cases such as Powell v. Alabama (1932) and Johnson v. Zerbst (1938). He said the Gideon decision reestablished those earlier precedents.[1]
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We think the Court in Betts had ample precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... In many cases other than Powell and Betts, this Court has looked to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment makes them obligatory on the States ... We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights ... The fact is that in deciding as it did - that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial" - the Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents. In returning to these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice. Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. [3] |
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Concurrences
Justices Tom Clark, William Douglas, and John M. Harlan each wrote concurring opinions.
Justice Douglas said he would have gone further and incorporated the entire Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Justice Douglas said the idea had "never commanded a Court. Yet, happily, all constitutional questions are always open. ... And what we do today does not foreclose the matter."[1]
Justice Clark wrote separately to emphasize his view that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel did not make distinctions between capital and noncapital cases. In Justice Clark's words, "The Court's decision today, then, does no more than erase a distinction which has no basis in logic and an increasingly eroded basis in authority. ... The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process of law for the deprival of 'liberty' just as for deprival of 'life,' and there cannot constitutionally be a difference in the quality of the process based merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction involved. How can the Fourteenth Amendment tolerate a procedure which it condemns in capital cases on the ground that deprival of liberty may be less onerous than deprival of life - a value judgment not universally accepted - or that only the latter deprival is irrevocable? I can find no acceptable rationalization for such a result, and I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court."[1]
Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment but argued the Betts decision did not violate previous precedent. Harlan said Betts was, "entitled to a more respectful burial than has been accorded, at least on the part of those of us who were not on the Court when that case was decided. I cannot subscribe to the view that Betts v. Brady represented 'an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents.' ... when this Court ... decided Betts v. Brady, it did no more than to admit of the possible existence of special circumstances in noncapital as well as capital trials, while at the same time insisting that such circumstances be shown in order to establish a denial of due process."
Justice Harlan also argued that rights against the federal government should be incorporated to the states on an individual basis. Justice Harlan said the incorporation of the right to counsel to the states did not indicate that the entire Sixth Amendment should be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause:[1]
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In agreeing with the Court that the right to counsel in a case such as this should now be expressly recognized as a fundamental right embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment, I wish to make a further observation. When we hold a right or immunity, valid against the Federal Government, to be 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' and thus valid against the States, I do not read our past decisions to suggest that by so holding, we automatically carry over an entire body of federal law and apply it in full sweep to the States. Any such concept would disregard the frequently wide disparity between the legitimate interests of the States and of the Federal Government, the divergent problems that they face, and the significantly different consequences of their actions ... In what is done today I do not understand the Court to depart from the principles laid down in Palko v. Connecticut ... or to embrace the concept that the Fourteenth Amendment 'incorporates' the Sixth Amendment as such. [3] |
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Impact
The court's decision in Gideon incorporated the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel for indigent felony criminal defendants to the states, meaning any defendants charged with a state criminal felony could access a lawyer to represent them even if they could not afford one. The ruling overturned the court's decision in Betts v. Brady (1942), which held that the Sixth Amendment's provision requiring counsel for indigent felony criminal defendants was not binding on states.[1][2]
See also
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
- Federalism
- Court cases related to federalism
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 Supreme Court of the United States (via Findlaw), Gideon v. Wainwright, accessed July 21, 2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Supreme Court of the United States, Betts v. Brady, accessed July 21, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Epstein, L., and Walker, T. (2004). Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice (5th ed.) Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. (pages 585-589)
