1 Introduction

Jesus and Socrates are two figures who resemble each other in many ways. They left no written works, only oral teachings, they enjoyed great respect from their contemporaries and had numerous followers, they fell into conflict with the establishment (Socrates fell foul of the city council, Jesus of the priests), both were accused of scorning others (Socrates for scorning the youth, Jesus for religious blasphemy and scorning the crowds). Both were also condemned and sentenced to death. Over the last one hundred years, psychologists have tried to assess their personalities and motivation, but it is an extremely difficult task, if it is possible at all (Brickhouse and Smith, 2010; Capps, 2004a, b; Charlesworth, 2004, 2014; Karpas, 1914; Schweitzer, 1913). Social sciences offer a very rich conceptual framework, the most important psychological theories, however, were formulated in the Western culture (mainly in the USA and Western Europe) in the twentieth century and they are not always adequate for this kind of analysis.

The perception of a person in ancient times differed significantly from the contemporary perception. Biblical literature, for example, presents characters from a dynamic perspective. They are people who are involved, who act, who fight, who are in action. The Semitic culture, however, differed from the Greek culture in terms of the presentation of the person of the narrative. They differ in the dynamics of description. In the Jewish tradition, for example, in the Old and New Testaments, characters are characterised by a certain changeability, and there are often dramatic transformations in their lives and actions. “Biblical characters can display change, unpredictability, ambiguity, complexity and surprise. Indeed, characters such as Jacob, Joseph, Saul or David can hardly be labelled as ‘static’, ‘type’ or ‘flat’ (…) biblical conception of character is often unpredictable, in some ways impenetrable (…) character is not subordinated to plot (as in Aristotle’s view and modern structuralism)” (Bennema, 2009, pp. 381–382). By contrast, in Aristotelian thought, the character is fixed and subordinated in the plot. “Aristotle’s ‘character’ or ἦθος comes close to the modern notion of disposition, people’s inherent qualities that influence their thought and actions. Aristotle’s notion of character corresponds to the modern category ‘flat’ or ‘type’” (p. 382). Sophocles or Euripides, however, portray the characters more dynamically, which consequently prompts the view of the Hellenistic description of the character more between Aristotle and the Semitic world, rather than clearly in opposition to the latter. In the Greco-Roman period at the turn of the era, characters were not subjected to a typical psychological analysis but were described from the perspective of their actions and words, often in a rather stereotypical way (Burridge, 2004; Pelling, 1990).

Character descriptions are very often interwoven with social relations, which strongly determined the perception of reality in the antiquity. The subject is usually perceived through their relationship with the in-group, either as its representative or as its enemy. Such a dichotomy strongly influenced the preference for specific forms of description, among which broad moral categories were especially important (evil, good, purity, enemy, etc.) and the resulting characteristics (good, bad, pure, holy). This was a typical cognitive and linguistic procedure, which is also described by contemporary social psychologists (Semin & Fiedler, 1992; Wigboldus et al., 2000), aimed at maximising the knowledge of social objects like individuals or groups. A harsh criticism of enemies or a very positive assessment of one’s own was the order of the day, as can be found in both biblical and Greco-Roman traditions (Batten, 2014).

2 The Concept of Individuum in the Ancient Mediterranean World

The problem of the individuum has been devoted much space in the literature, but in order not to complicate the course of considerations, a reference will be made to the anthropological and sociological research conducted in the second half of the twentieth century, the results of which have proven valuable for understanding and defining the individuum in the Mediterranean culture. The American biblical scholar, Bruce Malina, and his colleagues have presented interesting results of the analysis of the ancient Greek and Jewish world, according to which it is evident that the concept of individuum belongs primarily to the modern vocabulary. The ancient biblical and Hellenistic world was primarily socially determined. The individuum as an independent, autonomous entity, acting independently of the group simply did not exist. There is no basis for referring to the individuum understood in the modern way, as a unique, separate and autonomous centre of consciousness, feelings or actions which relates to other similarly understood subjects.

The personality of those times should be defined as dyadic personality. “A dyadic personality is one that simply needs another continually in order to know who he or she is (…) the person perceives himself or herself as always interrelated to other persons, as occupying a distinct social position both horizontally (with others sharing the same status, ranging from center to periphery) and vertically (with others above and below in social rank). Such persons need to test this interrelatedness, with the focus of attention outward from ego (…) such an individual needs others for his very existence, since the image he has of himself has to be indistinguishable from the image shared and presented to him by his significant others” (Malina, 1979, pp. 127–128). The image of “the self” was shared with others and with the social environment. Similarly, conscience was something located not so much in the centre of consciousness as an internal-psychic instance, but located externally, intersubjectively. Also, mental acts, behaviour and emotions have a social character. A person does not have similar or the same beliefs as the others in the group, but is immersed in a common and obligatory world of shared values, beliefs and behaviours. Such an establishment of the individuum had a direct impact on the perception of the world mainly from the perspective of the community. When describing and explaining the surrounding reality, the subject did not show the typical concentration on what is psychological or available introspectively, but concentrated on objective, observable phenomena. In the Greco-Roman tradition, especially among the philosophers, there was more space (than among the Semites) for describing man from the perspective of the body, the will or the consciousness. In both cases, however, the key dimensions of perception and description seem to be those focused on “inmost reactions (eyes-heart) as expressed in language (mouth-ears) and/or outwardly realized in activity (hands-feet)” (Malina, 1993/2003, p. 132).

In other words, a person is usually perceived as having a collectivist mentality, which is the opposite of the individualistic mentality (Triandis, 1995) so typical of the Western societies of the modern world. If they were to be described somehow by their notion of self or mind, the best category seems to be that of the dependent-self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) or the relational mind (Rotman, 2021). It is even immanently, organically connected with the social space of the world in which it lives. It is the collective, relational and contextual self, which is formed and exists in a high context society (Hall & Hall, 1990). The key features of the self are determined by the community, and one of the signs of maturity is the ability to build harmonious relations with the group. What is now called personal development depended above all on being rooted in a community, on the dyadization. “The ultimate meaning of life consists precisely in conforming to the purely procedural and institutionally variable rules and regulations” (Malina & Neyrey, 1996, p. 230). The dependent-self or relational mind can be successfully applied to describe both the Semite and Greek mind of the time, albeit with a slightly different emphasis.

3 Sociological-Anthropological Conceptual Framework: Honour-Shame Cultural Code

The honour-shame cultural code has become one of the central conceptual categories of Mediterranean culture, proposed by anthropologists and sociologists as a result of their research in the 1960s and 1970s. The analysis of social relations, conducted first in southern Spain, then in Greece and Egypt, led to the conclusion that one of the dominant dimensions regulating interpersonal relations in these countries is the concept of honour-shame (Peristiany & Pitt-Rivers, 1992/2005; Pitt-Rivers, 1977). The analysis of social relations from the perspective of both variables allows not only adequate description of the interactions occurring between people, but also penetration into the real motives of their behaviour and prediction of the course of mutual interactions and conflicts. The study of other Mediterranean countries and, most interestingly, the analysis of cultural artefacts in the Mediterranean from the mediaeval and ancient periods have provided similar conclusions (Gilmore, 1987; Horden & Purcell, 2000). This is evident in Greco-Roman culture, the subject of many analyses (Barton, 2001; Lendon, 1997), and above all, the Semitic, biblical culture, which has experienced literally a deluge of studies and publications of this kind in recent years (Bechtel, 1991; Patterson, 2019; Rohrbaugh, 2009).

The notions of honour and shame performed an important regulative function, allowing the control or channelling of emotions and attitudes. Honour helped to identify socially desirable behaviours, whereas shame was a tool for their elimination. Honour is defined as a type of social recognition with a twofold character. On the one hand, it is an ascribed honour which is, in a sense, inherited, resulting from the affiliation to a particular family, clan or community. This honour should be maintained, protected and strengthened. However, any deeds incompatible with the group ethos or detrimental to its image may tarnish or weaken the honour. On the other hand, it is acquired honour which is closely linked to personal behaviour. It is not an attribute given once and for all, it requires a constant commitment to maintain it. A person entering into social relations is constantly confronted with various forms of threat. The loss of honour (both ascribed and acquired) is the equivalent of losing face, losing public respect and losing dignity. The individual remains in a permanent relationship (physical or psychological) with the social environment, even when acting separately and alone, so that the community constantly regulates the subject’s attitudes. The community judges whether a given behaviour upholds honour or not. The subject is therefore dependent on social judgement, which their place in the group and public esteem depends on. Any deed that undermines honour becomes a source of shame, and it is important to emphasise that this is not about shame as a sense of shame or guilt as it is known nowadays. The notion of guilt is strongly connected with the individualistic perception of the self, and this in the ancient Mediterranean culture was rare and might only concern people who rose above the status quo of the time (prophets, poets, leaders). The individual voice of conscience is rather the voice of the community in which the person is immersed. Thus, it is not so much about guilt as it is about shame experienced in public, shame resulting from condemnation, loss of honour and face, and shame resulting from committing acts condemned in public (Bechtel, 1991; Rohrbaugh, 2009).

A typical element of the honour-shame culture was a kind of social game of preserving honour in every public confrontation. Every social interaction could be a threat to honour, especially when it was public. Conversations, disputes and arguments usually followed a specific pattern: challenge–riposte. Behaviour, questions and allegations were most often perceived in terms of a challenge, which could be positive (e.g. an expression of appreciation, a gift) or negative (e.g. an accusation, criticism). However, it always required a response that strengthened or weakened the honour. What is important is that the decision about the outcome of the challenge–riposte game was made by the community and the social environment by expressing appreciation or disapproval (Malina, 1993/2003; Peristiany & Pitt-Rivers, 1992/2005).

4 Socrates and Jesus

Greek and biblical literature is heavily saturated with a terminological grid relating to the concepts of honour and shame. Power, glory, strength, exaltation, praise, exalted, humbled, inferior, superior, diminished, honoured or the asymmetry of human relationships are common concept in this literature (Olyan, 1996). The interpretation of the personalities of Jesus and Socrates will always remain more or less plausible, but it seems quite clear that their behaviours, statements and reactions reproduce the patterns of the interpersonal relationships mentioned above.

In the last 30 years a number of monographs and articles have been published (Hellerman, 2000; Krecidło, 2013; Landry & May, 2000; Malina, 2001; Neyrey, 1994) whose authors interpret the Gospel picture of Jesus according to the honour-shame code. Currently there are only four canonical gospels from the first century AD, two of which were written by the apostles (John, Matthew) and two by the apostles’ disciples (Luke, Mark). In each of them, the narratives are usually subordinated to this code. Beginning with Jesus’ birth, the Gospel writers expose his Davidic (and therefore royal) and even divine origins (Matt. 1; Luke 3). The baptism in the Jordan is the moment when a voice from heaven proclaims him “the beloved Son of God”. The temptation in the desert shows Jesus in the classic challenge–riposte pattern: Satan provokes with questions, denying his dignity as the son of God, while Jesus counters the accusation by showing Satan’s incompetence, until finally exposing his aspirations (Matt. 4; Luke 4). Exactly the same pattern is observed in Jesus’ disputations with the priests and Pharisees. Their questions are usually of a nature to question his position as master-teacher, an attempt to deprive him of his honour. And his answers prove that he accepts the challenge and responded to it. The consequence is always to discredit the authority or honour of the priests. For example, when asked, “By what authority are You doing these things? And who gave You this authority?” (Matt 21:23), Jesus rises to the challenge by asking a new question about their attitude towards John the Baptist. Each of their answers undermines their religious, ethical and social credibility. The episode closes with the public court of reputation, which admires Jesus even more and, at the same time, denies the rabbis’ competence. The notion of honour and shame also underpins Jesus’ speech, i.e. the Sermon on the Mount, and more specifically the eight beatitudes (Matt 5; Luke 6). Jesus addresses the poor, the destitute, the hungry, the persecuted and the rejected, in other words, the dishonoured. And it is to them that he promises the restoration of dignity in the future in his kingdom. A similar construction can be found in the Passion narrative, in which, despite the attempt to disgrace Jesus through his scourging and death on the cross,Footnote 1 he overcomes death and regains eternal glory. The challenge–riposte can already be witnessed in the trial: the accusations of the priests (challenge) are met with a subtle riposte,Footnote 2 ending with Pilate’s recognition of innocence (he passes sentence under pressure from the Jews), and finally with the resurrection (Malina & Rohrbaugh, 1992).

In many respects, the life of Socrates resembles that of Jesus, except that while the latter was admired mainly by the people, the former formed close relations with the intellectual elite of Greece at the time. Jesus was a charismatic prophet, a messiah; Socrates—an intellectual, a philosopher. Practically all the dialogues of Socrates presented by Plato can be understood as a game of honour. Usually, either Socrates asks a question that opens the discussion, the question being a kind of a challenge addressed to the interlocutor, opening the game of honour or it is the interlocutors who open the game by posing questions to Socrates. The person to whom the question is related must enter into the dialogue, and if this person fails to do so, they automatically lose, in other words, they lose face. In the milieu of the Greek philosophers, the challenge–riposte has a far more intellectual character than in Judaism (Lendon, 1997; Pitt-Rivers, 1977). Although the disputes concern ethical, religious or social issues, the way of reaching the truth remains closely related to intellectual abilities and education (Kronska, 2001).

Socrates had exceptional intellectual abilities, ensuring him great success in verbal skirmishes and argumentation. Interestingly, Socrates seems to attach no importance to ascribed honour; it plays virtually no role in his relations with others. His eccentric and often bizarre behaviour even seems to openly disregard this kind of honour. Meanwhile, it is possible to suggest that the claim that acquired honour was a matter of paramount importance for Socrates and that everything else was subordinated to it. And it is not only about disputes as the main area for defending or gaining honour. It also applies to his manner among men: he does not show physical fatigue, he is unmatched in the amount of wine he drinks, forgoes sleep, etc. (The Symposium, 214–223). Similarly, during his military service, Socrates evidently displays his dignity as an expression of admiration from other Greeks. “There was another occasion on which his behaviour was very remarkable—in the flight of the army after the battle of Delium (…) you might see him (…), just as he is in the streets of Athens, stalking like a pelican, and rolling his eyes, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody, even from a distance, that whoever attacked him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance” (The Symposium, 220). The importance of Socrates’ dignity and honour is also revealed in the trial ending in the death penalty. As it is known, he had the opportunity to escape from prison and live on in exile, outside his homeland. Nonetheless, he chose death and drank the hemlock, explaining that escaping meant losing his dignity. Not only will he sink into shame, but he will be “regarded as a destroyer of young and thoughtless men (…) the conduct of Socrates would seem most disgraceful”, others “would be amused to hear of the ludicrous way in which you [Socrates] ran away from prison by putting on a disguise, a peasant’s leathern cloak or some of the other things”. He will “live below his dignity(…) [Socrates] transgressed the highest laws (…) will have to listen to many things that would be a disgrace to you [Socrates]. So you [Socrates] will live as an inferior and a slave to everyone” (Crito, 53, C-D).

However, Socrates reveals quite unusual characteristics, for even considering the game of honour in his relations with people, he behaved in a way that went beyond the set social standards. In the challenge–riposte situations, regardless of whether it was he who posed the questions to the interlocutors or the interlocutors to him, he usually aimed at a complete victory in the dispute. It is possible to get the impression that, at a certain point, he was no longer engaged in the dialogue, but sought to defeat his interlocutor, or even to publicly humiliate and ridicule him. Having written about this in a previous publication (Citlak, 2021a), I identified one of the more interesting features of Socrates’ personality, namely the quest for a sense of power and superiority. It can be asserted that the dynamics of honour played an extremely important role in his life, disregarding the psychological, social costs in the form, for example, of humiliating others. He is willing to defend his honour by depriving others of it. Of course, in Plato’s Dialogues, Socrates is always guided by the moral goal of discovering the truth, but in practice this took quite controversial forms. His ethical intellectualism, although it seems to be the overarching goal and to serve the salvation of man in the broadest sense (through liberation from the lack of knowledge and therefore from evil), is covered by the shadow of a specifically understood honour, which was perhaps subordinated to other motivations of the Greek philosopher which will be mentioned later.

What is most intriguing, however, is that both Socrates and Jesus very quickly enter into conflict with the social status quo. Socrates points the way to the truth found at the bottom of the soul, Jesus points the way to God and truth regardless of the temple system and ritual. The teachings they preached were interpreted as a threat to the established philosophical or religious authorities. Although in the case of the Greek culture, this was a different type of conflict than in the Judaism of Jesus’ time, in the end, both masters were considered enemies of the people and of morality, who should be punished by death. Jesus was considered to be a blasphemer, possessed by demons, Socrates—a deceiver who demoralised young people and spread atheism. The life of Jesus is an exceptionally interesting example of breaking the status quo of the time. The socioeconomic realities of the Palestine of the first century was based on a patronage system, adapted from the political order of Rome, which, combined with a strict Judaism, created very unfavourable living conditions for the poor and those from the lower social strata (Lendon, 1997; Malina, 1993/2003). It was a system fostering social differentiation, dividing people into groups of those in power, with high authority and prestige, and the subjects, often poor, who did not enjoy much respect or recognition. The lowest was also the group of outcasts, the condemned, beggars and slaves, who instead of honour, were stigmatised, excluded and marked with shame. Some of this group were identified by the cultic rules of Judaism (e.g. lepers, sinners, the uncircumcised, cripples and illegitimate children). According to the gospels, Jesus’ teachings and activities were directed mainly at this particular group—the dishonoured. He offered them a new source of honour independent of the temple system and the existing socio-religious order. This source was the new community created by Jesus, a community of the table, a community open to all, regardless of social position, religion, authority, or moral purity. Jesus created a new socio-religious order that was totally independent of the prevailing social hierarchy. He created a new family (Mark 3:31–35), he promised a blessing to all the “poor in spirit”.Footnote 3 It was a community that transcended the prevailing social divisions. The old dividing line of the circumcised vs. the uncircumcised was to give way to a unified community of disciples in which the principle of mutual love against the principle of retaliation applied (Matt 5:43–48). Moreover, the previous social and religious hierarchy was disappearing here, from then on, all were to be brothers and their master was to be Jesus of Nazareth (Krecidło, 2013).

Similar features of public influence can be found in Socrates, only that the whole energy of the Greek philosopher concentrated on creating a new ethical consciousness, which referred to the hidden, yet unexploited potential of reason and soul. Virtue (arete) is simply knowledge (episteme). Through them, a new social, religious and political reality could emerge, not only in Athens but also in Greece. Socrates, like Jesus, criticised the social order of his time (democracy and Judaism), indicating its flaws and creating new rules for living together. In both cases, these figures proposed non-standard forms of obtaining honour that departed from accepted social practice. Unfortunately, it is precisely for this reason that they have offended the authorities and then public opinion. Their death, however, paradoxically became a source of even greater recognition and admiration instead of dishonour and condemnation (although this concerns mainly the opinion of their disciples).

5 Psychological Interpretation

The first attempts to analyse the personality of Jesus appeared as early as in the early years of psychology as a science. Hall (1917) perceived him as the epitome of the process of human moral evolution. Hitchcock (1908) believed that he was the perfect type of the human psyche. Jung (1959) and Drewermann (1986/1994) were convinced that Jesus was an example of individuation. Martinez and Sims (2018) regarded him as having had the healthiest mind in the world. These publications show the personality of Jesus to be fully healthy, even perfect, a sort of crowning achievement of human development. But the history of the study of Jesus’ personality also has another face, created to a greater extent by the psychiatrists of the early twentieth century, such as Binet-Sanglé (1908–1915), Hirsch (1912) and De Loosten (1905). What emerges from them is an image of a man with a personality disorder, usually paranoid. To avoid becoming entangled in detailed problems, it is sufficient to mention that as early as 1913 and 1922, it was convincingly demonstrated that the authors of these diagnoses not only disregard historical sources, but uncritically incorporated the twentieth century notions of psychiatry and psychology (Bundy, 1922; Schweitzer, 1913). A completely new perspective on the figure of Jesus appeared in the 1950s, which was connected to the development of biblical research on his self-awareness (the second and third quest for historical Jesus) and the development of transcultural psychiatry. Social-scientific criticism has played an important role, which draws on the achievements of contemporary anthropology, sociology, and psychology (Malina, 1993/2003; Elliot, 2008. Esler, 1994).

Currently, the behaviour of Jesus is not actually attributed to a personality disorder, but attention is drawn to the family context, especially the religious and social complications arising from the fact that Jesus was not physically the son of Joseph. According to Judaism, this deprived him of many rights of community life and even stigmatised him. It must have had a significant impact on his personality and his actions. Andries Van Aarde, for example, argues that the Gospel picture of Jesus well reflects the concept of ‘fatherless figure/child’ typical of the realities of Palestine at the time (Van Aarde, 2001). Donald Capps, referring to the DSM IV, argues that the spectrum of Jesus’ behaviour is well represented by the concept of ‘fictive personality’, which although it may characterise people with clinical disorders, in many cases socio-cultural conditions, it provides a coherent complex of beliefs and emotional and behavioural patterns that appear to be a classic ‘fictive personality’ and not necessarily related to clinical disorders (Capps, 2004b). In the tradition of Judaism, the function of a ‘fictive personality’ could be fulfilled by the notion of a prophet or messiah. They were not only cognitively accessible but also very popular and ennobling. In a similar vein, albeit from the perspective of anthropological analysis, Peter Craffert interprets the figure of Jesus, referring to the notion of the ‘shamanic complex’, the ‘shamanic figure’ (Craffert, 2008). The Gospel accounts of Jesus’ life seem to be very consistent using these concepts and do not allow for attributing to him a disease entity according to the criteria of the twentieth century psychiatry.

However, what seems most intriguing to me is not the fact that the figure of Jesus is no longer viewed in terms of a disorder. This, by the way, raised many objections from the beginning, especially since his social competence (not only cognitive) was exceptionally high, which does not fit the image of a personality with delusions or schizophrenia. More intriguing appears to be the personality traits or motivation that may have played a key role in his life. Van Aarde, mentioned above, emphasises that the sense of alienation and marginalisation resulting from being an illegitimate son among the Jews must have become one of the most important motivational factors leading to the recovery of his deprived position and social recognition. Jesus achieves this regardless of the prevailing social rules of the time. He creates a unique relationship with the God-Father, creates a new type of community and undergoes an act of sonship at the baptism (“this is my beloved son”) (Van Aarde, 2001). Capps (2004a, b) draws similar conclusions: Jesus had to face social rejection by finding his own identity in a unique relationship with the God-Father (Abba), in acts of sonship and religious—and indeed psychological—purification. A different, though complementary, proposition has been put forward by the psychiatrist, Jay Haley, even claiming that Jesus intentionally sought religious dominance in Palestine by claiming to be a prophet and messiah (Haley, 1985).Footnote 4 In trying to create a new socio-religious reality, Jesus had to display the characteristics of a charismatic leader with a rather radical way of thinking and behaving. Moreover, in order to realise the unique religious-social plan in which he played a key, salvific role, he often behaved in an uncompromising manner. Harold Ellens’ words are significant here: “Jesus is not gentle, meek, or mild. He is robust, aggressive, uncompromising, incapable of negotiating his perspective on God’s ways with humans (…) He was that tough guy from Nazareth” (Ellens, 2014, p. 1; see Capps, 2004b). Regardless of what the exact motivation of Jesus would be and which of the above-mentioned authors would be closer to the truth, their interpretations seem to form a certain picture of a character that can be described in terms already proposed a century ago by Alfred Adler as a character motivated by the desire to overcome powerlessness and achieve psychological strength/power (Adler, 1920) through a new type of social relations and a unique relationship with God the Father.

The figure of Socrates obviously (and unfortunately) did not live long enough to witness such a rich tradition of psychological or sociological research. Psychologists and psychiatrists have not really dealt with his personality, apart from identifying similarities between his activities and proclaimed philosophy and the techniques of modern psychotherapy (Buckley, 2001; Lageman, 1989). He was mainly of interest to historians of philosophy or scholars of the ancient culture. Certain insights into the motivational mechanisms of Socrates’ personality were provided by research conducted in the honour-shame cultural code (Barton, 2001; Peristiany, Pitt-Rivers, 1992/2005), which are referred to above. The diagnosis of personality was presented long ago by Morris Karpas (Karpas, 1914). Karpas, as was the case with many other authors, emphasised Socrates’ extraordinary need for self-control and even ascetic tendencies. On the one hand, he was a man of great physical strength, battle-scarred and admired for his endurance; on the other, he not only denied himself physical pleasures (e.g. eating, drinking), but actually derived satisfaction from it. He similarly treated love and feelings of sensual pleasure as things to resist. Karpas quotes him “And what do you think that you incur by kissing a handsome person? Do you not expect to become at once a slave instead of a freeman? To spend much money upon hurtful pleasures? (…) I advise you, Xenophon, whenever you see any handsome person, to flee without looking behind you” (Karpas, 1914, p. 190). Socrates, therefore, controlled himself in order not to show any weakness towards his own desires and wanted to have full control over them. This resulted from, firstly, the specifically understood notion of virtue, which was a reflection of reason and cognition, and therefore something different (and even opposite) to the body and its instincts. Secondly, Socrates was said to be emotionally dependent on his mother, who was a midwife. Even as a philosopher, he remained under her psychological control, which can be seen, inter alia, in his style of handling philosophy: he helps with the birth of truth, extracted from the bottom of the human soul by means of the dialectical method. Karpas also attributes psychopathic traits, hallucinations, ecstatic states and the mother-complex to him. However, he is a character who tries to achieve a certain balance between the wrong, the antisocial (usually unconscious) and the good, the socially desirable and the result of rational thought (usually conscious); he is also a character who values self-control and the ability to influence others above everything else. Despite his eccentricities and even personality dysfunctions, he is ultimately considered the father of modern psychology and psychopathology.

6 Lvov-Warsaw School Psychological Tradition and the Problem of Social Dominance

In the Lvov-Warsaw School, founded by Kazimierz Twardowski (a student of Franz Brentano),Footnote 5 two original psychobiographies of Socrates and Jesus were written. These are the only psychobiographies of both characters in the world written according to the theory of power, which was created largely on the basis of the analysis of ancient sources. The image of Socrates was created in stages, although the main theses were published as early as 1909, developed later in 1918, 1920 and 1922 (Witwicki, 1909, 1918, 1920, 1922) and constitute one of the oldest psychobiographies in the world (Citlak, 2021a). A Portrait of Jesus was created in 1941 but not published until 1958 (Citlak, 2016). Psychology in Twardowski’s school is available in the literature (Bobryk, 2014; Citlak, 2019, 2022; Płotka, 2020; Rzepa & Stachowski, 1993); this paper will only draw attention to the issues related to the presented topic. The psychobiographies of Socrates and Jesus were created by Władysław Witwicki—Twardowski’s student and the professor of psychology at Warsaw University in the years 1919–1948—based on his own psychological theory, the theory of striving for power (the theory of cratism). It is twinned with the theory of Adler, although presented somewhat earlier (Witwicki, 1900, 1907). Witwicki considered the striving for power to be a culturally universal, biological instinct. It would determine the personality, emotions and even the whole social life of a human being. This striving for power is most often revealed in every human being in a unique combination of four tendencies: (a) humiliating oneself (e.g. remorse, humiliating oneself), (b) humiliating others (e.g. cruelty), (c) elevating oneself (e.g. pride, ambition), (d) elevating others (e.g. altruism) (Witwicki, 1907).

Witwicki analysed both figures based on the written sources (the canonical gospels and Plato’s DialoguesFootnote 6) and concludes that their motivational force was cratic desire: striving for a sense of power over oneself and the social environment. Socrates achieved it mainly by using his intellectual abilities. He delved into the secrets of his soul and learned the truth hidden at its bottom in order to achieve control over his own limitations and weaknesses of the body. “He abhorred the sight of a glutton and a debauchee, or any man who bows his neck (…) to his own passions. He needed a sense of power so much that in his own eyes he felt insulted by his own young desires (…) bursting inside him, and which used to possess his soul” (Witwicki, 1999a, pp. 12–13). Witwicki attributes to him a cratic aspiration linked to ambition, according to which self-mastery is a matter of honour for Socrates. This is also exactly the reason for his reluctance to escape from prison or to exchange the death penalty for another (exile). It was ambition, dignity and pride that prevented him from behaving like a coward: “Ambition kept him in prison, ambition towards himself and towards the public” (Witwicki, 1999b, p. 607). This would be self-denial, condemning oneself to dishonour. Interestingly, however, Witwicki somehow unmasks the lofty aspirations and ethical intellectualism by attributing a cratic motivation to Socrates, which in practice meant something more than ambition, namely the desire for superiority and domination: “It is a need for power, for strength, for superiority over the surroundings and over one’s own drives. He was not impressed by anything; he would not tolerate anyone’s moral superiority, anyone’s nimbus of seriousness” (Witwicki, 1999a, p. 13). This is how he interprets this part of Socrates’ disputes, in which it is evident that he does not so much try to convince his interlocutor or make him aware of his error as he strives to humiliate and publicly discredit his adversary. It is as if he derives deep psychological satisfaction from this—the satisfaction of cratic desires.

Witwicki also recognised a similar motivational mechanism in the activity of Jesus of Nazareth, although compared to Socrates, to whom he devoted many years of work on Greek literature and culture, his translation of the Greek gospels and his analysis of the personality of the founder of Christianity were objectionable from the very beginning in Poland. Basically, Witwicki did not refer to any biblical research in this field, especially concerning the self-consciousness of Jesus—a subject which he was well acquainted with. Moreover, he attributed extreme cratic desires to him: the striving for a sense of power through domination over others and a tendency to humiliate them. He also considered him a schizotimist according to Ernst Kretschmer’s typology, with severe difficulties in social relationships. However, he was not a sick man who had lost his cognitive faculties. According to Witwicki “the messianic self-feeling was his driving force, and sound human judgment—he retained it—served as his regulator of action” (Witwicki, 1958, p. 210). Claiming himself the messiah (which was to be the proof for his cratic desires), he accepted only those people who acknowledged his divine mission and were obedient to him and only to such people did he show mercy. Jesus expected absolute submission; he was even inclined, Witwicki argues, to induce a sense of guilt in people in order to later offer them forgiveness of their sins and salvation.

Jesus felt “superhuman power” (Witwicki, 1958, p. 203) and considered himself as “a unique being, chosen, destined for power and triumph over the world” (Witwicki, 1958, p. 205). He helped others insofar as they “accepted humiliation without protest and recognised his beneficial power and messianic dignity, regardless of his coldness and rejection” (Witwicki, 1958, p. 298). Thus, while Socrates is an example of positive cratism, involving the achievement of a sense of power by elevating oneself and others (albeit coupled with a readiness to humiliate enemies), Jesus exhibits the pursuit of a sense of power coupled with a high readiness to humiliate others (negative cratism). Leaving aside the problem of the credibility of Witwicki’s conclusions, it should be added that a preliminary verification of his theory has shown that the Gospel picture of Jesus is the least cratic when compared to the discourse of the Old and New Testaments. Moreover, the gospels present two psychological portraits of Jesus: one with a relatively high (Synoptic) and the second with a low (John’s) intensity of this trait (Citlak, 2021b).

7 Conclusion

The honour-shame cultural code proposed by anthropologists and the interpretation of the social behaviour of Jesus and Socrates suggested in Twardowski’s school according to striving for a sense of power are very similar. The first proposal has the character of a cultural and social framework; the second refers to the motivational dimension. Although they refer to different levels of functioning of the individual in social relations, I believe that they can be treated in a complementary sense. Witwicki identified an important motivational mechanism, although it is debatable whether the notion of cratism—the striving for a sense of power—is the most adequate. The cultural milieu of Israel and Greece at that time created a reality in which personal strength, not only physical strength but also a certain kind of charisma, and the ability to publicly demonstrate one’s authority were of exceptional value. In this perspective, the notion of cratism or ambition seems to correspond very closely to the notion of honour, and therefore also to dignity, authority, social position and even power. I would add that the concept of power does not necessarily have negative connotations. Power, especially in the case of Jesus, appears to have a very different character as dignity, honour, authority and high social status. It also might seem intriguing that the honour-shame code is identified nowadays not only in Muslim culture (Mosquera, 2018), but also in many parts of the world like the Far East and South America. Personally, I think this is an emphatic signal that honour-shame may reflect another, more universal, regulatory mechanism that takes different forms of expression that social, cultural and evolutionary psychologists have been mentioning for many years, namely the quest for social status and social dominance (e.g. Patterson, 2019; Sidanius et al., 2004). This is exactly the conclusion reached by Saul Olyan, “In short, honour and shame communicate relative social status which may shift over time” (Olyan, 1996, p. 204). So did Collin Patterson, “Core values of honor and shame (…) can be subsumed under the broader category of social dominance, a biological/psychological motivational system which underlies each of them” (Patterson, 2019, p. 12).

I do not think it is an exaggeration to assume that not only the concept of honour but also the striving for a sense of power (cratism) are closely related to “social status and dominance”. In other words, Socrates and Jesus appear in two independent research traditions (honour-shame and the psychology of Twardowski’s School) as figures with a similar psychological profile that can be discerned on an individual and social level. Was this their deliberate and conscious aspiration, or rather their natural trait, typical of the charismatic masters of antiquity? I suppose the latter, but this will remain more a matter of private conjecture that cannot be verified after more than 2000 years.