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    • Title Date Date Unique Author Body Research Area Topics Thumb
    Withdrawal of French Troops from Mali June 24, 2022 Sindhu Dinesh

    At the request of the then interim government led by President Dioncounda Traore, France militarily intervened in Mali in 2013, by launching Operation Serval. The operation was authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1 The imperatives that drove the French decision included the need to safeguard its economic investments (uranium mining fields in neighbouring Niger), political interests (long-standing close relationship with Mali, Francophone African countries and international obligations as a UNSC permanent member), and security interests (protection of the French diaspora in the region and to prevent the threat of an Islamist takeover).2 Operation Serval was successful in pushing back the rebels to the northern part of Mali. Owing to the spread of these outfits to the neighbouring regions, Operation Barkhane, a counter-terrorism operation in the Sahel region, was launched in August 2014.

    Over the years, international missions and regional players have made tremendous efforts to counter the terrorist threat and security challenges. International missions included the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), instituted in 2013 and the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), launched in February 2013. Regional efforts included the G5 Sahel Joint Force launched in 2017—comprising Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The European Special Task Force ‘Operation Takuba’ was also established in March 2020.

    Despite such military interventions over the past decade, there has not been much improvement in Mali’s security condition. Apart from being the epicenter of terrorist, jihadist and insurgency activity in the Sahel, Mali also faces threats from vigilantes and communal violence between the farming and herding communities, and is a hub for organised crime and illegal activities like smuggling and drug trafficking. Apart from political instability and the worsening security situation, the Covid-19 pandemic has also weakened the Malian economy, one of the poorest countries in the world.3 The country is dealing with high rates of poverty and unemployment and is heavily dependent on gold exports and oil imports.

    Triggering Factors for French Withdrawal

    Mali is currently being governed by a transition government led by Col Assimi Goïta, who led two coups in August 2020 and May 2021, with Choguel Kokalla Maïga as the prime minister.4

    The military coups exacerbated tensions between France and Mali. France decided in June 2021 to unilaterally end its latest military Operation Barkhane. Later in February 2022, France and its allies announced a ‘coordinated withdrawal’ of their forces due to ‘multiple obstructions’ by the military-led government.5

    The triggering factors were the rising tensions and differences with the Junta, delay in elections and the deterioration of bilateral ties. While announcing the decision to withdraw, President Emmanuel Macron stated that “we cannot remain militarily engaged alongside de-facto authorities whose strategy and hidden aims we do not share”.6 The decision of the military government in January 2022 to postpone elections to 2026, the ban on the Danish contingent of Operation Takuba, expelling of the French Ambassador and entry of the Russian-based Wagner Group at the end of 2021 as a security provider, deteriorated the bilateral relationship and fueled the decision on troop withdrawal.

    There are additional geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic imperatives underlying the French withdrawal.

    Geopolitical Imperatives:France has become increasingly unpopular among its former colonies in Africa. There has been a growing anti-French sentiment, especially in Mali. The local population has been protesting against the nearly decade-long foreign military presence by the former colonial power, that has yielded limited results. In December 2021, local protestors blocked a convoy of French troops repeatedly at multiple instances as it crossed from Burkina Faso and Niger towards Mali.7

    Geostrategic Imperatives: With French presidential elections scheduled in April 2022, France was cautious of the execution of its withdrawal. The French government took measures to avoid comparisons with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Prior to the announcement, it held a meeting with the G5 Sahel leaders (except Mali and Burkina Faso due to the Junta rule) and portrayed the exit as a “coordinated withdrawal”.8 At home, there has been a growing domestic public dissatisfaction with France’s prolonged military involvement in Mali.9 Moreover, of the 53 French soldiers killed in Operation Barkhane, 48 had died in Mali.

    Geo-economic Imperatives:France has withdrawn its troops only from Mali and not from the extended region. The troops are being re-deployed to Niger, giving France a base to continue its commitment to conduct anti-terrorist operations in Sahel and overlook its economic investments.10 As a country dependent on nuclear energy for electricity, French companies like Areva have huge investments in the uranium fields in Niger.11 Besides, the operation was proving to be costly for France, which was spending about one billion Euros (US$ 1.14 billion).12 By June 2022, France has handed over its military bases at Tessalit, Kidal, Timbuktu, Gossi and Menaka. The last withdrawal will be from the military base in Gao which would be returned to Malian forces “at the end of the summer”.13

    Implications for Mali and the Region

    The withdrawal of the French troops creates a security and political vacuum in the region and exacerbates the current security challenges.

    Internal Implications: Mali has been left vulnerable to increased jihadist activity and militancy. The security crisis will continue to escalate with terrorist groups consolidating and setting up safe havens in northern parts of Mali. On the other hand, since the withdrawal of French troops and its allies indicates the withdrawal of foreign presence in the country, perhaps the insurgency elements and jihadist outfits would now be willing to negotiate with the Malian authorities. The withdrawal of foreign troops including the MINUSMA was one of the primary demands of these outfits as they perceived these forces to be an interference in the internal affairs of Mali, signifying an inability on the part of the government to handle its own matters.14

    Additionally, there will be challenges in routing and distributing the developmental and humanitarian aid that comes into the country. French presence was complementing the efforts of MINUSMA. The mission was dependent on the logistical support and medical infrastructure of Operation Barkhane. MINUSMA Peacekeepers are equipped to protect civilians from attacks by armed groups and authorised to counter asymmetric threats but are not authorised to engage in counter-terrorism activities.15

    The security and political vacuum created in Mali with the exit of France is being filled by external players like Russia. Reports indicate that mercenaries from the Wagner group are already stationed in Mali and Russia has given military equipment like combat helicopters and others to Mali.16 Mali has renounced a military cooperation agreement with France and has withdrawn from the G5 Sahel Force. These developments isolate Mali and raise concerns on the success of regional efforts to fight against terrorism in Sahel.

    External Implications: In the short-term, the French withdrawal would perhaps cause the security situation in Mali to escalate out of control. There could be an increase in transnational and cross-border terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the developments pose a security threat to countries south of the Sahel. These include the littoral countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana, Togo and others. There has been growing concern about the spillover of jihadi activities towards the Gulf of Guinea.

    Macron, while announcing the troop withdrawal, had pointed out that

    Al Qaeda and the Islamic State group have made the Sahel region of West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea nations ‘a priority for their strategy of expansion’. They are investing there and exploiting local causes in order to better pursue their global and regional agenda.17

    Côte d'Ivoire President Alassane Ouattara warned that the withdrawal would create a political vacuum and pledged to take steps to enhance border protection.18

    Another challenge is the political instability in the West Africa region. The region has witnessed three coups within a year, in Chad (April 2021), Mali (May 2021) and Burkina Faso (January 2022). Political instability would embolden the terrorist outfits who already control large territories in the region. Additionally, there has been an increase in the displacement and migration of people towards neighbouring countries, mostly northern Africa. Regional governments would need to prepare for the challenge of managing this influx.

    Conclusion

    The French withdrawal from Mali has created a security vacuum in the region. The security situation will likely deteriorate further, rendering Mali vulnerable to an increase in terrorist attacks. The efforts of MINUSMA would also be impacted. Apart from the challenge of tackling the increase in migration to neighbouring countries, the likelihood of the spread of terrorist threat to the littoral countries south of the Sahel has been heightened.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN France, Mali, Security, Africa system/files/thumb_image/2015/france-mali-t.jpg
    Quad’s Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative Needs Time to Deliver June 24, 2022 Shruti Pandalai, Abhay Kumar Singh

    The Quad is often criticised for underplaying its security agenda for the greater good of consensus-building. The Tokyo Summit in May 2020 may have changed that, with an announcement which is being seen as a clearest signal yet to China on its aggressive tactics at sea. A collaborative effort by the US, India, Japan and Australia—the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) Initiative—is aimed at delivering on the promised goals of enhancing maritime security and shared domain awareness  in the region via technology and training support.1 Capacity-building of regional countries to guard against Chinese misadventures near their waters, in essence, is the focus of this effort.

    South East Asia is among the key focus regions of this initiative. The White House read-out outlines that the IPMDA will share commercially available satellite data and alert smaller Southeast Asian states on possible territorial intrusions or illicit activity such as illegal fishing, smuggling or piracy in waters within their maritime boundaries.2 China’s muscle-flexing in the South China Sea was discussed by India and the ASEAN leaders during the recently held Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue in New Delhi. For a grouping like the ASEAN, which finds itself at the receiving end of the strategic fallout of US–China competition and Chinese belligerence, capacity-building measures like IPDMA could augment strength.

    Aims of the IPMDA

    Simply put, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is about having comprehensive position and intentions of all actors at sea in the given area of interest. This requires creation of compilation, correlation and fusion of surveillance data collected from diverse sources, i.e., satellites, radar, reconnaissance planes or human intelligence, in order to detect and identify actors with irregular or threatening behaviour.

    Given the vast expanse of the ocean and resources required for comprehensive surveillance at sea, a collaborative approach for information-sharing and domain awareness has remained a major ask. The end goal is to develop among like-minded countries a shared understanding of developments and threats at sea.

    The key to this line of effort is to link up existing regional collaboration mechanisms which are already analysing and assessing threats and challenges in their respective areas of interest. Each of the Quad members have their space-based assets for maritime surveillance, which are supplemented by their airborne and land-based sensors.

    In addition, the Quad countries support/operate regional fusion centres. These include India’s IOR IFC, Australia-sponsored Pacific Fusion Centre in South Pacific, Japan’s MDA Situational Indication Linkages (MSIL) and the US Navy’s SeaVision platform.3 Protocols exist, as it is, for information-sharing and by creating more linkages with other such mechanisms, the initiative aims to develop the ability to predict patterns for big picture analyses.4

    Keeping China in Check

    IPMDA is an effort to supplement existing arrangements and is a reiteration that habits of cooperation and trust among like-minded countries can help augment regional capacities through rapid distribution and processing of shared data.5 Official statements explain that integration of three regions—South East Asia, South Asia and the Pacific—and being responsive to their needs as to what “is happening in countries’ territorial waters and in their exclusive economic zones” in real time, drove this effort.6

    Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing has emerged as a major area of concern. Many regional countries are endowed with vast Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) but have limited resources for effective monitoring of these zones. IUU Fishing has led to many countries losing fiscal revenues and has had disastrous consequences on conservation and sustainability efforts.

    The scale of the challenge is compounded given that most fishing vessels are not obligated to carry any vessel tracking system, i.e., Automatic Identification System (AIS) or Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). Even when they are mandated, as in the case of vessels more than 300 metres, illegal actors go dark by either switching their tracking system off or transmitting false/spurious data as spoof. Identifying such illegal actors requires persistent monitoring of relevant areas with high resolution, surveillance sensors. It is only when you process this data that illicit actors’ patterns of behaviour can be identified. Therefore, the challenge in identifying illegal actors at sea is as much about data collection as it is about data processing. IPMDA aims to address this gap via pooling of resources.

    While the stated goal is to contribute towards an effective deployment of maritime assets by regional partners to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters, and combat illegal fishing, the signpost of ‘We are watching you’ to China is not explicitly stated but is implicit. It is no secret that fishing fleets from China have aggressively targeted Indo-Pacific waters and have sparked outrage with frequent clashes. The IPMDA initiative would in practical terms assist in not just identifying Chinese actions but also help push back on its grey-zone activities.

    Limitations of the Initiative

    Critics have argued that the announcement was the lowest hanging fruit the Quad countries could deliver on, given that the collaborative efforts this initiative aims to institutionalise are already in play. However, the fact is that regional MDA remains far from comprehensive and extensive gaps remain in terms of information sharing. To deter China actively at sea, investments for the long haul in terms of persistent tracking of the vast span of Indo-Pacific are essential for realising the stated goals.

    Clearer answers on how Quad members will mobilise necessary space-, air- or land-based surveillance assets required for such constant tracking or queries on how demands for additional resource mobilisation will be met, requires further elaboration. India, for one, is already setting up coastal surveillance radar stations (CSRS) in strategically located IOR countries, but has faced problems where demand has exceeded supply.7

    For Quad to succeed as a force of public good, a strategic buy-in from South East Asia is essential. Given the region’s scepticism towards the Quad and apprehensions about the Quad’s rhetoric on ASEAN centrality, the IPMDA could serve as a reassuring platform to deliver on the most fundamental requirements on regional maritime security and prove its effectiveness.8 However, time will be of essence, as Quad countries divvy up responsibilities and resources while managing the crunch of post-pandemic economies.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 South East Asia and Oceania, Military Affairs Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Maritime Security, United States of America (USA), India, Japan, Australia, Indo-Pacific, China, Southeast Asia system/files/thumb_image/2015/quad-t_0.jpg
    Quad and Cybersecurity June 22, 2022 Krutika Patil

    The Tokyo Summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the ‘Quad’, was held on 24 May, 14 months after the first Summit-level meeting held in March 2021. Apart from pledging to advance ‘a common vision of free and open Indo-Pacific through practical cooperation on diverse 21st century challenges’, and ‘uphold the international rules-based order …’, the Quad also highlighted issues like global health security, climate change, critical and emerging technologies, and cyber and space security.1 An assessment of Quad’s cybersecurity initiatives indicate that they are designed keeping into consideration cyber threats from China as well as the Quad’s emphasis on ‘cyber resilience’ rather than on ‘offensive cyber capabilities, which is a more robust way to tackle widespread cybersecurity challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

    Quad’s Cybersecurity Initiatives

    At the Tokyo Summit, Quad leaders recognised the urgent need for a ‘collective approach to enhancing cybersecurity’ through initiatives like Quad Cybersecurity Partnership guided by the 10 Joint Cyber Principles2 , the first-ever Quad Cybersecurity Day, information-sharing among Quad countries’ Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), and improving software and Managed Service Provider (MSP) security by coordinating cybersecurity standards for Quad governments’ procurement of software.

    The Quad’s progress on cybersecurity issues has been encouraging since the September 2021 Summit meeting in Washington, where the members pledged to ‘facilitate public–private cooperation and demonstrate in 2022 the scalability & cybersecurity of open, standard-based technology’. The Quad Senior Cyber Group was also launched then.3 Experts met on 25 March 2022 to discuss strategies to improve cybersecurity in an increasingly digital world with sophisticated cyber threats.4 During the February 2022 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Quad members reiterated their support for ASEAN neighbours to ‘build resilience and counter disinformation’ while developing coordinated efforts to assist Indo-Pacific partners to address the growing threat of ransomware and capability-building to counter cybercrime.5

    Each of these initiatives indicates implicitly the critical security challenges Quad members face, and an understanding of practical deliverables. The Quad Cybersecurity Partnership aims to build resilience to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities and cyber threats by focusing on critical infrastructure protection (led by Australia), supply-chain resilience and security (led by India), workforce development and talent (led by Japan), and software security standards (led by the US). This targeted approach is coherent with the cyber threat trend and patterns in 2021 where multiple ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure led to supply-chain related disruptions all across the world.6

    CERTs are nodal agencies that collect, analyse and disseminate information on cyber incidents; take emergency measures and coordinate handling of cybersecurity incidents; forecast and alert cybersecurity incidents and issue guidelines, advisories, and vulnerability reports of information security. Information-sharing and exchange of best practices will help Quad members' CERTs to develop a comprehensive and trust-based strategy for all stakeholders.

    The US government and the Five Eyes intelligence partners—the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand—issued a joint advisory in March 2022 warning about the ‘increasing cyberattacks by nation-state threat actors’ against managed service providers (MSPs). A MSP is a third-party organisation that maintains a customer's IT infrastructure and end-user systems from a remote location. Because MSPs have privileged access to their customers' networks at all times, successful cyberattacks against them can be disastrous.7 Hence, Quad's attention to MSPs’ security is linked to safeguarding software product supply chains from cyberattacks, especially ransomware attacks as witnessed in 2021.8 Three of the Quad members—India, the US and Japan—were also victims of the 2018 compromise of the MSPs that severely affected the software product supply chains all around the world, an attack that originated from China.9

    The Cybersecurity Day campaign is an effort to strengthen cybersecurity awareness and promote action on cybersecurity for countries across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This will enable Quad members to push for the UN Voluntary Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace for norm-building and the promotion of ‘international peace and stability in cyberspace, and to help build the capacity of regional countries’.10

    Critical and Emerging Technologies Initiatives

    While there is a different working group for Critical and Emerging Technologies, many of its initiatives on 5G supplier diversification, semiconductor supply chains, and global technical standards have a direct impact on cybersecurity. At the Tokyo Summit, Quad members launched the Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains to enhance supply chain resilience.11

    The push for having a diverse, competitive and reliable market for semiconductors is due to the complexity of the semiconductor supply chain management, which increases the chances of tampering.12 While China accounts for only 6 per cent of the total value of the global semiconductor supply chain,13 it is China’s manufacturing base and hold on Rare Earth Metals14 which is troublesome for the safety of the semiconductor supply chain.

    Further, for the pursuit of ‘open and secure telecommunications technologies’ in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad members have committed to Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) Track 1.5 dialogues with the industry stakeholders. These dialogues will also include a Memorandum of Cooperation in 5G Supplier Diversification, cooperation between Quad for ‘technical exchanges and testbed activity to advance interoperability and telecommunications cybersecurity’.15

    The Prague Proposals on Telecommunication Supplier Diversity16 recognises the need for a successful transition to 5G and beyond. This can be achieved through O-RAN interfaces where interoperability standards between suppliers' equipment are supported, and network flexibility is provided at a lesser cost. The O-RAN standards aim to break the RAN market's monolithic nature, where a handful of RAN suppliers offer exclusive equipment and software.17

    While there are some cybersecurity concerns pertaining to 5G,18 in comparison to previous generation networks, O-RAN 5G networks might offer greater security and subscriber privacy. As the technology shifts from centralised core and RAN to distributed, virtual networks, security will become more agile and layered.19 Quad’s focus on 5G Supplier Diversification and Open RAN is due to the security threat from Chinese telecommunications companies like Huawei and ZTE that have invested heavily in the development of global 5G standards and have a sizable number of 5G patents.20 It is pertinent to note that many countries have banned Huawei and ZTE 5G equipment.21

    While standardisation and promotion of open-source technologies in 5G technologies is the Quad’s focus, it is also committed to cooperation in international standardisation organisations like International Telecommunication Unit (ITU) and Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) through the newly established International Standards Cooperation Network (ISCN).22 Quad's attention to this initiative is due to China's assertive international standards promotion strategy and its China Standards 2035 project,23 which has cybersecurity implications. China's advocacy for cyber sovereignty has aided the country's elevation as a ‘great cyber power’ as it focuses on controlling norms, information, data, next-generation technology and standards.24

    Recognising that the above-discussed initiatives require collaboration with academia and the industry to foster innovation in these technologies, Quad has launched the Quad Fellowship and Quad Investor Network. The Quad Fellowship intends to bring 100 students from Quad countries to the US each year to pursue graduate degrees in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) subjects. This will help develop a talented cohort of next-generation STEM leaders who will lead in cutting-edge research and innovation.25 The Quad Investor Network aims to seek funding for critical and emerging technologies within and across the Indo-Pacific, by engaging with an independent consortium of investors.26

    Conclusion

    While many cyber threat actors are operating in the Indo-Pacific, the attacks from China are particularly politically motivated. Chinese-based actors have indulged in nearly 200 cyber operations since 2005, primarily against the US.27 China has also perpetrated cyber-espionage operations against all Quad members to gain access to critical information. Due to China’s Civil–Military Fusion initiatives, select Chinese universities and research centres in association with Chinese military have been directly involved in these aggressive and successful cyber-espionage operations.28

    The Quad’s approach to strengthen cyber resilience through its various initiatives is essential to mitigate such threats. Quad’s ‘practical cooperation’ approach is an attempt to solve existing cybersecurity challenges that affect millions of people in the region and beyond. The Quad has indeed cautiously carved out a practical and cooperative agenda on issues of cyber security.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 Strategic Technologies Cyber Security, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, India, Australia, United States of America (USA), Japan system/files/thumb_image/2015/quad-n-emerging-technology-t_0.jpg
    India–Russia Energy Cooperation in Russian Far East June 21, 2022 Bipandeep Sharma

    The Ukraine crisis has led many Western oil and gas companies to terminate their joint energy projects with Russia in the Arctic. This has been due to the fear of Western economic sanctions as well as to mark opposition against Russia for its military operation in Ukraine. Companies like BP, Equinor, ExxonMobil and Shell are some of the major energy giants that are in the process of finding suitable exits from Russian energy projects.1

    Sakhalin-1, which is an international consortium of oil and gas development companies in the Russian Far East, has started witnessing similar trends. The US energy giant, ExxonMobil, which owned 30 per cent stake in Sakhalin-1, has already stopped its operations and is expected to formally exit from this joint venture.2 The other entities in Sakhalin-1 are Sakhalin Oil & Gas Development Co. Ltd. (Japan), ONGC Videsh Ltd. (India) and Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf and RN-Astra (Russia). These companies hold 30 per cent, 20 per cent, 11.5 per cent and 8.5 per cent stakes respectively.

    Similarly, Sakhalin-2 is an international energy development consortium of Gazprom (Russia), Shell (US-based subsidiary of Royal Dutch), Mitsui & Co. (Japan) and Mitsubishi Corp. (Japan). Shell, which holds 27.5 per cent stake in Sakhalin-2, has announced plans to exit this energy consortium. There were also reports that Japanese companies, Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corp., which hold 12.5 per cent and 10 per cent stakes in Sakhalin-2 respectively, were also under strong Western pressure to terminate their partnership with Russia.3 Though Japan has so far resisted this pressure owning to the country’s dire energy needs, uncertainty remains as to the future prospects of this cooperation.

    Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 are Russia’s most important integrated oil and gas development projects that operate in one of the world’s harshest climatic conditions. The Sakhalin-1 is estimated to hold approximately 2.3 billion barrels of oil and 17.1 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves.4 Sakhalin 2 accounts for 4 per cent of the world’s total LNG supply.5 The region is prone to earthquakes and requires special technical expertise and engineering skills for exploration. Moreover, the development and operational costs of these projects is much higher.

    Russia, therefore, needs reliable long-term partners to develop its Far Eastern regions and sustain its economy. Oil and Gas are sectors whose strength is vital for reviving the Russian economy, post the Ukraine crisis. If European and Western countries become successful in reducing their oil and gas dependency on Russia6 (which they intend to do so in near future), the most viable option for Russia is to tap energy markets in East, South East and South Asian countries. Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, therefore, can become the most promising projects for supplying Russian oil and gas to these markets.

    India–Russia Energy equation

    Oil and Gas trade between India and Russia remains significantly low, despite Russia being the world’s third largest producer and India being the third largest consumer.7 The most obvious reason for this pertains to the shipping distance, cargo delivery time and cost escalation as a result of long geographical distances between the two countries. India’s energy engagements with Russia, other than the direct purchase of oil and gas, is through ONGC Videsh Limited’s (OVL) direct investments in Russian energy projects.

    Apart from Sakhalin-1, OVL holds 100 per cent stake in Russia’s Imperial Energy Corporation and 26 per cent stake in the Vankorneft field. Also, 23.9 per cent stake in Russia’s Vankorneft field and 29.9 per stake in the Taas-Yuryakh field, are jointly held by the consortium of Oil India Limited, Indian Oil Corporation and Bharat PetroResource Limited.8

    In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s offer to supply India with cheaper crude oil (US$ 35 lesser than the international market price), was criticised by the West. Indian companies though significantly increased their volumes of oil imports from Russia. India’s total import of Russian oil despite buying additional volumes in March 2022, remained less than 1 per cent of its total oil import.9 These figures increased to 18 per cent in May, 2022 as per a report published by CREA.10

    The Western exit from Russian oil projects could become a big opportunity for Indian oil companies to directly invest in Russian energy projects to secure the country’s long-term energy needs. ExxonMobil’s decision to sell its 30 per cent stake from Sakhalin-1 needs to be carefully thought through, and India’s OVL could consider increasing its stakes in Sakhalin-1. Similarly, OVL or a joint consortium of companies led by OVL, could consider buying Shell’s 27.5 per cent stake that it intends to sell in Russia’s Sakhalin-2 project. OVL already maintains the technical expertise required for drilling in these harsh terrains. Therefore, such investments would significantly strengthen and diversify India’s energy supply chains and reduce the country’s dependency on Middle East countries for oil imports.

    Strategic Calculus

    Both Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 offer tremendous opportunities for India. Though there looms the current fear of Western economic sanctions and other technical shipping hindrances, India needs to pragmatically think through the long-term energy benefits from this region. Western exits from Sakhalin energy projects may negatively impact Russia economically, but it would simultaneously create investment voids, thereby giving a free hand to China to make long-term energy investments. China’s stakes in Sakhalin could enhance geopolitical disparities, owning to the presence of Japan and India as the other two partners in these projects. But, if India becomes successful in increasing its stakes in Sakhalin, it would not only benefit Indian oil refineries with high-grade sweet crude (especially Sokol grade form Sakhalin-111 ) to sustain domestic needs, but Indian oil companies could also process and can further sell Sakhalin crude and its derivatives to South East Asian, South Asian and even European markets.

    An increase in energy investments in the Russian Far East would further enhance India–Russia naval cooperation and would significantly strengthen Indian naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. Indian oil shipments coming from the Russian Far East would also be free from piracy risks which remains a threat near the Horn of Africa. One may argue that in an adverse case scenario, China may put a blockade to Indian oil shipments coming from the Russian Far East. But a valid counter argument is the fact that it would be difficult for China to stop Russian oil shipments to India, given the China–Russia strategic partnership. Still, if ever the situation arises, India may also use similar leverage against China on its energy shipments passing through the Malacca Strait.

     Shipping Factor and Distance Analysis

    India has four major oil refineries located on its eastern coast. These include Haldia Refinery (West Bengal), Paradip Refinery (Odisha), Manali Refinery (Chennai) and Visakhapatnam Refinery (Andhra Pradesh). The shipping distance between Russia’s De-Kastri oil export terminal (Sakhalin-1) and Chennai Port is 9,626 km. It would take approximately 16 days and 15 hours for a large oil cargo ship to cover this distance, running at an average speed of 13 knots. Similarly, the average distance between Korsakov port (Sakhalin-2) and the Indian ports of Haldia, Chennai, Paradip and Visakhapatnam is around 9,256 km (Map 1). At an average speed of 13 knots, it would take approximately 16 days for these oil shipments to reach all major Indian refineries on its eastern coast. This is a significant reduction in travel time as compared to Russian oil coming to India’s western coast from its Baltic Sea ports, for which average transit time is 23 days.

    Map 1: Shipping distance between Sakhalin ports and oil refineries on India’s Eastern Coast

    If we compare India’s oil shipments coming from US Gulf Coast to Mumbai port, the approximate transit time is 31 days and this further increases to 35–40 days, if the shipments need to reach Indian refineries on the country’s eastern ports.12 The only limitations that currently hinder enhancing India–Russia oil trade relate to payments, availability of shipping vessels and cargo insurances. Western sanctions on shipping companies and insurance providers are hindering the transportation of Russian crude to its required destinations. If India and Russia develop credible mechanisms to bypass Western economic sanctions or can find suitable alternatives complying with international norms, there remains immense potential for both the countries to cooperate in Sakhalin.

    Conclusion

    India in 2019 issued a US$ 1 billion line of credit for the development of the Russian Far East region.13 The government’s vision inclines well with the current emerging opportunities in Sakhalin. The government is in talks with state-run oil companies to consider increasing their stakes in Russian energy projects.14 Though the Middle East remains India’s most viable choice for energy imports, emerging geopolitics and shifting traditional alliances compels India to diversify its partners. Russia, with its abundant energy resources, coupled with the exit of Western oil companies from its energy projects, offers tremendous opportunity for India.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 Non-Traditional Security India-Russia Relations, Energy Cooperation system/files/thumb_image/2015/ind-russia-energy-t.jpg
    Agnipath: Addressing the Manpower Challenges of the Indian Armed Forces June 21, 2022 D. Padma Kumar Pillay

    The ‘Agnipath’ scheme has been baptised by fire even before it has been launched and has turned into an ‘Agnipariksha’ for the Government of India. Given the ‘out of the box’ nature of the proposal, many have raised questions about the scheme negatively impacting the ethos of the armed forces that have brought glory to the country.

    Army recruitment policies over the years

    To understand what the future holds and if indeed the Agnipath is as radical as it is made out to be, one should place in historical perspective the recruitment policies of the armed forces. In the armed forces, especially so in the Army, soldiers have traditionally come from the same socio-economic strata. Until 1977, soldiers were enlisted only for seven years, plus eight years in reserve, which was then changed to 17 years. In other words, all the major wars fought by the army were won by soldiers on seven-year terms of active duty.

    The selection of soldiers then was based only on a certain standard of physical fitness. The written test for examining standards of literacy got introduced in the 1980s. The literacy standards of the recruits were not uniform and they therefore went through lengthy processes of training, as compared to other armies, to bring them up to certain minimum levels of education. The training also helped in improving the health and physique of the soldiers, given the rigorous physical training and better diet provided to them. It was in the 1980s that the army extended the basic training from 36 to 52 weeks, at the end of which they were granted an Army Third Class Certificate of Education. The soldiers also got introduced to specific subjects such as map-reading and other necessary skills.

    Defenders of the lingual/caste-based/regional recruitment model overlook the fact that some of the most battle-hardened units in Independent India’s military history had All-India, All-Class compositions. The most notable among these are the Brigade of Guards and the Parachute regiments (Special Forces) as well as the Artillery and Armoured Corps. No doubt, the overall recruitment practice did throw up some anomalies. Personnel from less than 200 districts of India were supplying soldiers to the armed forces. Also, certain classes/communities had higher representation in the military, fuelled no doubt by such concepts like martial races, stemming from the prejudices and biases nurtured by the British.

    Current protests in context

    It is important to understand why the current protests against the Agnipath recruitment model have gained steam. Unlike the protests against the farm laws that impacted nearly 46 per cent of the population, or the protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) that generated the angst of a particular community, it was not anticipated that a sector that employs less than 0.5 per cent of the workforce or one per thousand capita of population would lead to such widespread protests.

    It is important to highlight that the appeal of the armed forces as a profession lies in the fact that the armed forces is open to all Indians purely on a merit-based entry. Secondly, joining the military service is seen as being honourable and patriotic, given the status soldiers have always enjoyed in Indian society. No one can deny the riveting and mesmerising hold of military power and even war itself, on society. Membership of the armed forces is not just an identity but also an opportunity to escape from the anonymity of the rural socio-economic strata of society which supplies the majority of men in uniform. Last but not the least, this profession afforded a security for a lifetime which included a lifetime pension, including medical cover.

    The current demonstrations on the street are, therefore, fuelled in part by concerns that the aspirations of the aspirants may not be fulfilled, concerns which are no doubt being fanned by the political opposition, which sees an opportunity to challenge the decisions of the government.

    Options before the Government

    It is pertinent to highlight the previous instance of the roll-back of the government’s policy on farm laws, on account of the opposition which charged that such laws were anti-farmer and pro-business. Instead of tweaking the laws, the government was forced to withdraw the laws. Subsequently, the Supreme Court-appointed Experts Committee report revealed that a majority of the stakeholders were in favour of those laws while only around 13 per cent were against them. The recall, in effect, stalled reforms in the farm sector.

    The current government’s many successes in reforming the national security system include the creation of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA), the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), fulfilling the principles of One Rank One Pension (OROP)—which was pending since 1972, the establishment of the National War Memorial, pioneering initiatives to strengthen self-reliance like Make In India, among many others.

    In the current context of the protests against the Agnipath scheme, it is a challenging task to set right the narrative that the recruitment policy is against the interests of the youth of the country. It is to the credit of the government that several amendments have been made which indicates that the scheme is not set in stone.

    However, what can make the scheme more trustworthy and appealing is changing the method of selection to a national-level examination instead of focusing on regional recruitment. The testing has to be at a national-level, similar to the Combined Defence Service (CDS) exams and a common merit list must be prepared. The qualifying candidates then need to be subjected to an intelligence and aptitude test at the testing centres. This will call for a major change in the existing practice. Based on the various matrices that should include allocations for physical fitness, qualifying marks and medical fitness, a hierarchy of selection criteria can be decided for allotment to various arms and services.

    There are apprehensions that biases and prejudices may set in for identifying the soldiers to be retained, four years after recruitment. To address such apprehensions, the percentage considered for retention may be increased to anything between 33 to 50 per cent and the term may be extended to five years, instead of the current four. Furthermore, the retained soldiers have to be again on an all-India merit list, that will take into consideration the achievements and progress made by them, which not only includes the annual appraisals but also the standards of fitness and individual accomplishment, all of which have to be quantified.

    As a spin-off, the current agitation has succeeded in kindling interest in post-military employment of soldiers. Many additional benefits, including on the long-standing demand of assured entry into the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) and other organisations, have been announced. This demand has been routinely aired, and was also highlighted by the Group of Ministers report following the Kargil War. The option of lateral entry has to be streamlined and an added commitment could be shown by enrolling all Agniveers to the National Pension Scheme (NPS), with the government footing the additional burden for the service. Their NPS accounts could then be transferred to the CAPF or other organisations that the Agniveers subsequently join.

    Finally, there is a need to change the narrative that the government is looking to abdicate its responsibility to soldiers. It needs to be highlighted that the government is looking for a talent pool that is not just qualified, but also capable of being absorbed into the needs of a futuristic army. The fact that the Agnipath is not a short-term contract needs to be emphasised. History has always shown that forces that fail to keep up with technology have been overwhelmed by smaller, more agile and lethal forces. This scheme provides an opportunity for the armed forces to leap into the next generation of warfare with a manpower that can embrace the technological challenges.

    The government should also launch public outreach programmes showcasing the advantages that will accrue as a result of its implementation. Instances of youth preventing mob rampages whose sole purpose is to destroy national property have to be highlighted, as they gel with the ethos of soldiering, which is that a true soldier will give his life than destroy what his country stands for.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 Military Affairs Indian Army system/files/thumb_image/2015/Agnipath-T.jpg
    Russia’s Re-Engagements in Africa January-June 2020 Kamala Kumari

    Africa is a geopolitical arena where many big powers have been engaging either due to their own strategic interests or due to the changing dynamics of geopolitics. Russia is no exception. Russia’s interests in Africa are mainly due to heavy investments in raw resource megaprojects and as one of the major suppliers of arms. However, Russia needs to unveil an ambitious and new vision that could satisfy the requirement of African countries and subsequently could be leveraged for tangible rewards for Russia, and the year 2019 set the tone for such actions.

    Historical Background

    Russia has had links with Africa since centuries. Russians, several times in their history had interacted with Africa, even though Africa was never a Russian colony. It is believed that Russian explorers, sailors and merchants did visit Africa including Afanasy Nikitin, who visited Ethiopia in the 1470s. Orthodox missionaries from Russia met Ethiopian and Coptic Christians numerous times.  Even Peter the Great had engagements in Madagascar and Ethiopia. The first diplomatic relationships were established in 1898 with Ethiopia and South Africa however, Cairo and Alexandria had consulates even in the 18th century.1

    In the Soviet era, Russia had been a significant supplier of arms to Africa. At that time, Soviet arms trade was largely confined to countries that were ideologically aligned, or at least friendly to USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), giving the commercial relationships clear Cold War overtones.2 The relationship between Soviet Russia and African countries was basically “an exchange in all sectors: political (socialist policy), economic, social (sending Soviet teachers and doctors to work in those countries and (on the other hand), reception of African students in Soviet schools) and military (sending weapons and technicians)”.3

    The Soviet Russia-Africa engagement in the real sense commenced at an opportune time in the early 1950s.  Change of power in Soviet-Russia due to Stalin’s death coincided with the independence movements in Africa, generating interest in Soviet Russia for the possibilities of engagement “with the newly independent states and the anti-colonial movements across the continent”. However, the first major arms transfer by Soviet Union took place in 1955, to Egypt. Ten years later, Soviet Union established diplomatic ties with the newly-independent African countries namely Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Morocco and Libya. These countries were invited to Moscow in 1961; “to attend the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with the aim to outline the vision…, of how the developing African countries could bypass capitalism and advance straight to socialism, fostered by the USSR”.

    Subsequently, “one of the most prestigious schools in Moscow bore the name of Patrice Lumumba, the Soviet-supported Congolese independence leader brutally executed in 1961; and till 1992, the Patrice Lumumba University recruited and educated generations of foreign leaders, especially African leaders, (and was just one of the many such ways in which the Soviet Union cultivated ties with Africa)”.4 Transcending its brief strategic hibernation during the last years of the Soviet era and in the initial year’s post-1991, Russia has managed well in the new scenario, giving a new direction to its bilateral relations with different African countries. When Vladimir Putin became the president in 2000, he created a new dynamic for foreign policy making and foreign policy that was holistic. He systematically restored the position Russia had lost after the disintegration of Soviet Union and the turbulent decade that followed.

    President Vladimir Putin became the first ever Russian leader to visit Sub-Saharan Africa in 2006. This visit was followed by series of ministerial level bilateral visits to South Africa, Angola and Ethiopia, resulting in surge of Russian investments.  President Dmitry Medvedev accompanied by a delegation of 300 businessmen visited Nigeria, Angola, and Namibia in June 2009. This visit indicated “Russia’s intensifying desire to foster investment and involve and engage with the region. For example, with South Africa, the political initiatives included, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, covering joint work in healthcare and intellectual property rights”.5

    Russia’s interests in Africa are not new however, to compete with other major powers and keeping the current geopolitical realities in mind, Russia must make sound investments so as to have access to natural resources and other business opportunities.

    Russia-Africa Relationship Today

    For Russia, Africa is strategically and geopolitically important, as the developing economies could emerge as significant markets for Russia’s arms and its strategic interests. Post the sanctions on Russia imposed by the West after the Ukrainian crisis; the Russo-African relationship has become an important aspect of their international engagements. The economic sanctions constrict Russia’s trade with the West, making Africa an attractive alternative opportunity for investment. Apart from trade and commerce, the fifty-four countries of Africa are potential supporters for Russia in the UN as “three of the 54 countries sit in the Security Council; … and form the largest and most coherent voting bloc”6 .  Also, Russia’s presence in Africa provides credibility to its status as a global power.

    Besides, Russia’s trade with Africa increased tenfold between 2000 and 2012. Russia, in fact, is a better alternative to US weaponry, as US weaponry is costly, both politically and monetarily.  In 2014, when the Nigerian request for Cobra attack helicopters was rejected by US, Nigeria cancelled the U.S. military training program to fight Boko Haram and instead opted for Russia. Till date Russia continues to train Nigerian Special Forces. The Russian soldiers involved in peace peacekeeping operations in Africa, surpass those of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States combined. Apart from these, Russia has invested heavily in raw resource megaprojects. It, signed “a $4 billion deal with Uganda, to build and operate a crude oil refinery; and $3 billion deal with Zimbabwe, to develop platinum mine”.7  

    Russia has also expanded its ties with Egypt, the bilateral trade already doubled to $5.5 billion in 2014; in June 2015 they held their first joint naval drills and in October 2016, military exercises. Later, Russia negotiated with Egypt to build its first nuclear power plant. Russia also deployed Special Forces to Egypt on the Libyan border, signaling, Russia’s growing role in Libya, a country with the world’s ninth largest reserves of oil. Relations with Tunisia and Algeria have also deepened. For the first time, in the history of Russia-Tunisia relations, a Memorandum of Understanding on nuclear cooperation with Tunisia was signed in June 2015 which grew into a nuclear cooperation agreement in September 2016. Algeria has been a favourite of Russia as it remains a “top buyer of Russian arms and also signed a $1 billion arms deal, supposedly the largest export contract for main battle tanks in the world.8 The two countries also have agreements on energy and counterterrorism. The draft proposal to legalise ‘private military companies’ (PMCs, meaning ‘mercenaries’), in Russia, could give Russia, a competitive edge over its rivals and consequently also, enable Russia to leverage its strategic advantage; by “helping Russia carve out a niche as a reliable security provider in Africa and to reap energy, mineral, economic, and other ‘rewards’ in incentivising Russia, to undertake a full-on ‘Pivot to Africa’ policy”.9

    By February 2018, “nine planes with weapons were sent by Russia along with contractors to train local soldiers; and secure mining projects; marking the beginning of highest-profile military foray in Sub-Saharan Africa”.10 Since the 2014 economic sanctions, in sub-Saharan Africa, alone, Russia has signed 19 military cooperation deals, with Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe; and simultaneously reviving some of the so called lapsed relationships due to the Soviet Union’s disintegration. Russia further aims, like many others such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to set up bases that will facilitate so as to “mediate in diplomatic stand-offs and strike business deals”.11

    Russia’s push into Africa is broadly for arms sales and economic influence, as it has great potential for cooperation based on mutual interest. However, Russia’s objective is also geopolitical and geostrategic in nature. The North African countries on the Mediterranean’s southern coast could potentially favour Russia, a traditional land power, in its military moves in the Middle East and North Africa, which would eventually, limit the West’s ability to maneuver; and also give access to additional warm water ports.12 Speaking at Russia’s premier annual Valdai conference in October 2016, President Putin said, “Africa cannot be on the periphery of international relations”.13 In fact, Russia, with help from its trusted partner China, could have more robust engagement, as it will be able to partner to protect China’s dream project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - particularly the ones which fall in Africa, in exchange for lucrative commercial contracts in energy or mining deals, as China controls ‘a sizeable amount of extractive industries’ in Africa.14

    The prospects of deepening the Russia Africa engagement are huge and in the process, it might face some challenges as well, or there may encounter concerns in terms of competition, but nothing serious that can hamper the process of this engagement process entirely.

    Exploring New Areas of Cooperation  

    Times have changed significantly for Russia, as its efforts to regain its Soviet-era influence in Africa have achieved success. Moreover, “Russia is clearly showing that, open partnership with and support of Africa remains a priority”.15

    On January 14, 2018, marking the 60th anniversary of Russia-Ghana diplomatic relations, Foreign Ministers of Russia and Ghana, exchanged congratulatory messages and “emphasized the traditionally friendly nature of Russia-Ghana relations hinting of an active political dialogue on key international and African affairs, and agreed to improve mutually beneficial cooperation in economy, trade and culture as well as other areas”.16

    African countries have been eager to find a viable third balancing partner and Russia seems far better suited than any other country, to play the role. The ultimate ‘reward’, of making Russia their strategic partner is to counterbalance any real or imagined fears of, or from China.17 It is anticipated that, Russia and China may create an environment for ‘friendly’ and complementary multipolar competition in Africa benefiting and diversifying relationships and solidifying stability in the continent.18

    Russia sees lot of potential in Africa, given the concerns about rising Islamist extremism, in some countries and defense spending across Africa. Russia being the second-largest arms exporter in the world, after the United States, already sells billions of dollars in weapons annually across Africa. And in mid-December 2017, an exemption to arms embargo on Central African Republic was granted by UN following a petition from Russia to supply the country’s embattled military with light arms and ammunition.19 Russian arms are cheaper than American and other West-produced arms, and have a comparative advantage over their competitors. Hence, keeping the importance of the African market for the Russian arms industry, Russia since 2013, has built several service centers in Africa, to maintain and repair Russian helicopters and other arms exports. It also offers modernization programs for existing weapons stocks, providing relatively inexpensive ways to enhance military readiness, suggesting sales are part of a broad package of military technical cooperation and assistance.20

    Bearing the external political and economic challenges in mind, Russia needs Africa and Africa also needs Russia. Since 2014, Russia has signed several deals for cooperation with governments in Sub-Saharan Africa such as 19 military deals, valid for five years and further renewable and also stepped up its efforts to diversify its economic and diplomatic partnerships. Apart from these, there are agreements regarding training as well as coordination for counter-terrorism and piracy.21 In October 2018 Russia indicated that it will send more equipment and military trainers to Central African Republic, intensifying its military engagement in Africa.22 Russia’s trade with Africa increased from $5.7 billion in 2009 to $20 billion in 2018.23 Also, Russia would continue support in reforming the security sector, for strengthening combat effectiveness and training of the armed forces.24 In October 2019 Russia once again stated its ambition to expand its existing power with the first-ever Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi, Russia.25 Putin held back-to-back bilateral meetings, and $12.5 billion worth of deals were signed 26 with an emphasis on creating more opportunities and posturing to be seen as a global power.27

    In addition, being a part of BRICS too would enable Russia to play an active role in the future engagements in Africa. President Vladimir Putin met the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa on the sidelines of the 2019 G20 Summit in Osaka. “BRICS remains important as a kind of a balance within the G20 to balance the influence of the G7 grouping… In 2017, BRICS countries’ joint contribution to the world economy was 23.6 percent, and according to IMF predictions this is set to rise to 26.8 percent by 2022”.28 The power balance has been affected due to the presence of BRICS countries in African market. As the BRICS member-countries, account for 30% of foreign exchange (over $ 200 billion), with total investments estimated at 50-60 billion dollars… Subsequently, further consolidation of BRICS and other International implications, are most likely to further shape the Russian-African relations.29

    There is further potential for cooperation at multilateral level as well, particularly with India, as India is strategic partner of Russia and would be comfortable working together with Russia in Africa. However, this needs to be further explored.

    Conclusion

    The impression of Russia’s political influence is embedded in African society and is being further nurtured by Russia. With president Putin assuming power in 2000, Russia’s re-engagement in Africa has grown manifold and Russia is again ready to be a major player in Africa. Political and economic compulsion for Russia and Russia becoming a reliable ‘third party’ for Africa make the Russia-Africa engagement strong  and long lasting and is expected to remain so for a long time. In the process, the engagement would deepen and expand and the year 2019, has already set the tone in this regard. In the times to come, Russia, as part of BRICS, could also play significant role in paving way for multilateral cooperation, including along with India

    *Ms. Kamala Kumari is Assistant Professor and Guest Faculty, University of Delhi.

    		 Russia, Africa
    China’s Africa Strategy: Salient Facets and Implications January-June 2020 G.G. Dwivedi

    Background

    On assuming mantle of Fifth Generation leadership of People’s Republic of China (PRC), President Xi Jinping unfolded his China Dream (Zhong Meng); ‘prosperous and powerful’ China. It envisioned restoration of China’s past grandeur and rejuvenation (fuxing), given China was a global economic power for better part of the last two millenniums. To extend its strategic outreach, Xi pronounced China’s ‘international economic cooperation vision’ in 2013 which later got incarnated as ‘Belt Road Initiative’ (BRI). The BRI covers Eurasia, South-South East Asia and Africa. The underlying rationale is to use abundant wealth as soft power to extend its influence through ‘cheque book diplomacy’. Alongside, ‘Maritime Silk Route’ initiative was also launched to effectively control the maritime space.

    Till 1990s, China’s influence in Africa was rather limited and its economic engagement insignificant. Main thrust of Beijing’s diplomatic activities then was to defend its core interests like ‘One China’ principle and winning over friends across Africa. Over last two decades, Beijing has adopted a proactive approach to engage with Africa.  To position itself as a leader of the developing world, China has expanded its scope of bilateral and multilateral engagements. Africa is integral to Beijing’s grand design to shape a new global order.

    China’s changing approach to Africa is driven by its national interests; namely continent’s strategic location, oil and rare earth metals besides fish. While China’s engagement with Africa is multi-dimensional, its geo political intent often overrides economic considerations. China has evolved a clear ‘Africa Policy’ enunciated in its updated 2015 White Paper.1 Africa on the other hand does not have an overt China policy.2 Nonetheless, African leaders are increasingly treating China as a great power. Broad objectives of Africa China policy include mobilising Chinese financial resources, winning Beijing’s support in the international arena and seeking alternate development partners.

    China’s Africa strategy has yielded considerable success in building close ties with nations of the continent and Beijing an ideal test case in projecting its influence beyond its borders. This paper delves into the salient facets of China’s Africa Strategy and its implications.

    Salient Facets

    Changed Approach

    Chinese approach with regards to engagement with Africa has undergone significant change over the years. While infrastructure remains predominant, China’s engagement with the region has evolved significantly driven by new narrative. It is no more about resources or offering blank cheques and guaranteed results. Instead, the focus is on creating opportunities to fast track economic development through major infrastructure projects. These are in sync with Beijing’s global ambitions. Most of the investments are being undertaken by Chinese state owned companies to facilitate nation’s exports.

    China’s Africa strategy 2.0 has four overarching components. These are: access to natural resources particularly oil and gas, tap huge market for Chinese exports, strengthen Sino-African relations to enhance international influence and play more constructive role in regional stability. Even the African governments look up to China to contribute to their economic development through aid, investment, infrastructure development and trade. Some even aspire to replicate China’s rapid economic development model. Essential facets of China’s Africa strategy are enumerated in the succeeding paras.

    Economic Engagement

    Chinese economic engagement with Africa has grown over the years. In terms of investment, as per Global Tracker, between 2005-18, it stands at $299 billion.3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) especially in technology and ‘Small and Medium Enterprises’ are critical component of China’s current investment policy in Africa. In terms of FDI growth rate, Chinese investment increased by 24 per cent during 2010-14 while American FDI grew only by 10 per cent. Chinese financing helps closing massive infrastructure gap estimated at $170 billion per year by the African Development.4

    As per McKinsey, there are over 10,000 Chinese owned companies operating in Africa; Huawei and Transsion have become as well-known as General Electric and Coca-Cola. Low-cost smart phones as ZTE and Tecno are gaining increasing market share, with latter claiming 25 per cent of continent’s smart phone market.5 Jack Ma owner of Alibaba launched $10 million initiative for the African entrepreneurs. There is significant competition amongst the Chinese companies vying for the same contracts. More than 25 per cent of Chinese investment is concentrated in Nigeria and Angola.

    Third summit meeting of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Beijing in 2018 where vast majority of Africa’s 55 countries top leaders participated. Xi Jinping committed $60 billion in new financing for Africa. It marked a shift in focus revealing China’s attempt to shed the tag of ‘neo-colonialism.6 From traditional model of ‘resource for infrastructure’, China apparently is recasting towards next stage of equity investment.7 One of the reason for the shift is the effort to rebrand China in Africa in the wake of global accusations of Beijing engineering debt traps. Case in point is China’s occupation of Kenya’s profitable Mombasa port where China had lent 550 billion Kenya Shilling for Kenya’s Railway project which, Nairobi is unable to pay.8 Djibouti is another a country in severe debt distress as a result of excessive Chinese borrowing, with public external debt as percent of GDP increasing from 50% to 85% in two years.9

    Military Dimensions and UN Peace Keeping

    For many years, Chinese leaders dismissed external military deployments as characteristic of Western imperialism. Hence, until recently, experts considered China’s relations with the African states to be focussed mostly on economic matters. In fact Africa’s relations with the major powers appeared to follow a pattern; collaboration with US in defence and counter terrorism and with China in trade-economic arena. Over the past decade, China’s role in peace and security has grown rapidly through arms sale, military cooperation and peace keeping deployments in Africa. It is has made efforts to adopt a systematic pan-African approach to security. China’s policy with regards to defence in Africa is significantly different from US strategy. It is a comprehensive blend of trade cum investment alongside cultural exchanges, medical assistance and anti-piracy operations.

    It was in 2008, the Chinese Navy undertook its first operational deployment beyond Asia-Pacific in the Gulf of Aden to support UN sanctioned anti-piracy task force. In March 2011, Beijing deployed a warship to evacuate Chinese nationals in the wake of mounting violence in Libya. Since 2012, People Liberation Army (PLA) has been sending combat troops to high risk theatres like Northern Mali and Southern Sudan. Currently around 2500 Chinese troops and police personnel are deployed across the continent. In September 2015, China joined UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) and built 8000 strong peace keeping standby force.10 Beijing also allocated $1 billion over 10 years to UN peacekeeping and development fund besides $100 million in new funding to the African Union’s rapid deployment capability.

    In 2016, PLA located troops in Djibouti, with ten years lease at $20 million annually; its first permanent overseas deployment.11 All these moves are in sync with the ‘New Historic Missions’ Doctrine, which calls for an expeditionary capability which can safeguard growing Chinese interests on the African Continent, maintain naval presence in the Western Indian Ocean, protect merchant ships from piracy and support its UN missions in the region.12 In 2015, China passed a counter- terrorism law authorizing PLA’s deployment on overseas counter terrorism missions. PLA has also established as active partner in the defence diplomacy encompassing training, arms sale and establishment of military facilities.

    At the China-Africa ‘Defence and Security Forum’ 2018, organised by China’s Ministry of National Defence, Beijing showcased an increasingly strategic approach to its defence relations with the African countries. According to recent data provided by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2009-13 and 2014-18, States in Sub-Saharan Africa received 25 per cent of total arms shipment with top five importers being Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Cameroon and Senegal.13 China was the second largest supplier of weapons to Sub- Sahara Africa after Russia, accounting for 22 per cent.

    Soft Power Projection

    In its pursuit to acquire great power status, soft power with Chinese characteristics has been the core of Beijing’s grand policy. It is primarily driven through non-coercive approach combining politico-diplomatic measures along with economic initiatives and education cum cultural exchanges. China’s persistent claims about its peaceful rise enables it to soft sell various projects through attractive loan options or gifts-case in point funding of $200 million African Union Headquarters. Today total Chinese diaspora in Africa is estimated at one million.

    Since the 1960s, in the garb of anti- colonial initiatives, political party training has been an important element of China’s engagement with Africa, steered by its ‘Central Party School’ to export ideology and culture. Over a period of time, these programs have been restructured and expanded in scope, becoming highly technical, hands on to share China’s experience; its model of economic development and governance. Wang Huning is the architect of Chinese concept of soft power to achieve nation’s strategic objectives.14 The Chinese model is based on the subordination of military and government to the party and state sponsored capitalism.

    Implications

    China’s engagement with Africa is a critical element of Beijing’s strategy to regain its rightful place in the global polity. Africa provides China an excellent platform to test its ability to exert influence in the extended neighbourhood. China’s role in Africa defies conventional approach as it has astutely combined its role as a long established diplomatic partner and of late as an investor. Chinese interests in Africa are multi-prong; include trade, security, diplomacy and soft power. Beijing is a major aid donor but its intent and aid practices are often misunderstood. It has adopted benign approach vis-à-vis other nations like the US, wherein it portrays as the flag bearer of the developing world. China also refrains from paying heed to American values of democratizations and mode of governance.

    As per Rand Corporation report, China has sought a constructive role as a contributor to the stability of the region, partly to mitigate security related threats to its economic interests. African governments look up China to lend political recognition and legitimacy as also contribute to their economic development. They also expect China to deal with them in ways that US and Western governments do not. China is the largest trading partner of Africa and has economic ties with the continent have expanded over the years. Overall, African officials view China’s role positively.15

    However, China’s presence in Africa is not without controversy. Some nations are critical of Chinese engagement with respect to poor labour condition, unsustainable developmental practices and unfair negotiation deals by taking advantage of African government relative weakness. In few cases resentment at Chinese business practices has let to popular protest and violence. Many countries have been pushed into debt trap due to Beijing’s BRI; Kenya being the latest victim. Even the Chinese policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Africa has come under scrutiny. 

    While USA and China may not be strategic rivals in Africa, the two are in competition due to conflicting business interest. Chinese engagement in Africa has been primarily focussed on the extraction of natural resources, infrastructure development and manufacturing, with ‘no string attached’ approach. US on the other hand has concentrated on high-tech trade and services as also on aid through policies aimed at promoting democracy, good governance and human development. Mr John Bolton former ‘National Security Adviser’ to President Trump while outlining US Administration new Africa strategy had stated: “greatest threat to America in Africa comes not from migration or extremism but from China due to Beijing’s corrupt and predatory business practices.16

    India’s engagement with Africa was summed up in two words; “Continuity and Change”, by Shri H V Shringla, Foreign Secretary recently in a speech at a conference on Africa in New Delhi.17 He further elaborated that India’s relationship with Africa has been advanced using consultative and responsive mechanism under the rubric of India-Africa Forum Summit. India’s association with Africa is more about facilitating the capacity building of African people. There are thousands of African students studying in India at any given point. Thirteen of the current or former Presidents, Vice Presidents and PMs have studied at institutions in India. PM Modi in his speech to the Ugandan Parliament in 2019 had said that India’s priority is Africans: every man, woman and child in Africa.18

    The 2015 Summit in New Delhi saw participation from 54 countries of African Continent. India’s trade with Africa in 2019 was valued at $69 billion.19  Delhi’s bilateral partnership with Africa is defined by the spirit of ‘developing together as equals’ with emphasis on capacity building, skill development and investment in ‘Small and Medium Enterprises’. While Indian projects have had positive impact on lives of Africans, there is a definite realisation that the partnership is yet to attain its full potential. Poor track record of project delivery and implementation in comparison to China is one area of principle concerns. Indian Government has enunciated “Ten Guiding Principles for India-Africa Engagement” in July 2018 to have coherent Africa policy in place. Whereas India cannot compete with China’s economic prowess, Delhi can definitely take advantage of growing realisation in Africa about Beijing’s terms of engagements which are being resisted.

    China’s engagement with Africa is an important component of its grand strategy. Chinese investment in Africa has expanded both in scope and size, marking a definite shift from the traditional model of ‘resources for infrastructure’. Today, even the African governments are well aware of Chinese interests and have refined their negotiating skills to pursue their objectives. Still, Chinese presence in Africa has not been without controversy. India needs a coherent Africa policy and leverage its inherent advantage of goodwill, marked by human touch. Given its strategic location and vast growth opportunities, Africa will be an arena of inter power rivalry, with China being a major player.

    *Maj. Gen. (Dr.) G. G. Dwivedi, SM, VSM & Bar retired as Assistant Chief Integrated Defence Staff (Strategic). Veteran of Bangladesh War, later commanded Battalion in Siachen, Brigade and Division in intense CI environment. A PhD from JNU, he is alumnus of National Defence College and Harvard Kennedy School. He served as Defence Attaché in China, Mongolia and North Korea. As Professor and founder Chair at Aligarh Muslim University he was instrumental in establishing new faculty of International Studies. Well published, he is a visiting faculty to reputed institutions, speaks at international forums; frequently appears as a panellist on national TV.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 China-Africa Relations
    Security and Foreign Policy Priorities of Australia’s New Labor Party Government June 15, 2022 R.P. Singh

    Anthony Albanese won the closely contested general election in Australia in May 2022, marking the return of the Labor Party to power after nine years. Though the election campaign revealed minimal differences in foreign policy positions between the two major parties, it is expected that the change in foreign and security policies is likely to be in the process rather than on substance. Experts believe that there will be a stronger emphasis on bolstering close relationships with regional partners.

    Albanese’s first overseas visit was the Quad Leaders’ Meeting at Tokyo on 24 May 2022.1 Before the Quad Summit meet in Tokyo, Albanese stated that the "Quad leaders' meeting is an absolute priority for Australia, there will be some changes in policy, particularly in regard to climate change and our engagement with the world."2

    During his address at the Lowy Institute on 10 March 2022, Albanese enunciated three key principles for national security policy.3 These included:

    defending Australia’s territorial integrity, protecting nation’s political sovereignty from external pressure, and promoting Australia’s economic prosperity and social stability, with sustainable growth, secure employment, and a unified community.4

    He further articulated that the Labor Government will achieve these objectives and build a more secure and resilient Australia by supporting a stronger Australian Defence Force, prioritise better and smarter cybersecurity, shore-up economic self-reliance, strengthen institutions, deepen partnerships in the region and globally, and take action on climate change.

    Australia’s foreign policy is reasonably bipartisan and it has remained apolitical, which helps the relationships with partners in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Albanese has consistently stated in the run up to the elections that his government’s aim will be to “deepen” defence cooperation with close partners like Japan, India, Singapore as well as “bolster our joint capabilities, shape our strategic environment and uphold the rules of the road”.5

    On China, Australia’s biggest trading partner, the Labor government has traditionally taken a more nuanced approach. While speaking to The Guardian Australia, Albanese admitted that relations with China "will continue to be difficult".6   Albanese also affirmed that Canberra will continue to stand up for its values and interests, against any aggressive behaviour by China in the region against Australian interests. Albanese further added that he supported the Biden administration's perspective on China—‘competition without catastrophe’—and called for “more considered responses to China's more aggressive positioning in the region than just ramping up rhetoric”.7   Whether Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong will be less forceful than the previous government in dealing with China’s assertiveness and expansionist activities remains to be seen.

    Australian diplomacy and tug of war with China was on display in South Pacific in the recent weeks, after China signed a security deal with Solomon Islands and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited eight Pacific countries in May–June 2022. As Australia is changing its relationship with Pacific nations to a more cooperative one, Wong asserted that Australia would ‘listen (to Pacific Family) because we care what the Pacific has to say’.8

    During Wang’s visit, the China–Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision was proposed by China, which caused deep concern among some of the island nations as well as in Canberra and Washington DC, pushing Penny Wong to make two quick trips to the Pacific. Wang Yi had hoped to ink the ambitious deal with 10 South Pacific nations covering cooperation in areas ranging from security aspects to fisheries. Consensus on that deal was elusive but Wang was able to sign bilateral agreements with many of the countries he visited. Concomitantly, Wong met Pacific leaders in Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and conveyed that Australia respected the right of sovereign nations to make their own security decisions, but added that those decisions "have the potential to affect the nature of the security arrangements of the region”.9

    Australia’s bilateral relationship with the US, its only treaty-ally in the Indo-Pacific, is likely to continue growing deeper and broader. When the Morrison government announced AUKUS in September 2021, the Labor Party supported the decision. Moreover, Labor Party has maintained that to defend Australia and deter its potential aggressors, the government needs to quickly increase Australia’s strike capabilities. While addressing Lowy Institute, Albanese pointed out that there were some contradictions between the 10-year time-frame as indicated in the 2020 Strategic Update to examine issues of national security and other policy statements that look towards building future defence capabilities.10 Albanese has also talked about the need to address the submarine capability gap in the period until the nuclear-powered submarines are delivered. 

    The Quad Summit meeting in Tokyo presented an opportunity for Albanese to meet Joe Biden and to reiterate Australia's commitment to the AUKUS security pact with the United States and the United Kingdom, under which Canberra aspires to acquire nuclear-powered submarines and other high-end defence technologies. The new government observes that given the present challenges and geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific, a credible deterrent capability is vital to maintain peace and security in the region. Labor Party has also underscored the need to resource Australian Defence to defend Australia and deter potential aggressors.

    At the Lowy Institute address, Albanese observed,

    We will consider whether tomahawk missiles can be fitted to the Collins Class submarines. We will review progress of the Frigates project, and explore whether our naval power could be bolstered through upgraded weapons on the Arafura Class offshore patrol vessels or through additional Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers.11

    The new Australian government has renewed its focus on Southeast Asia, looking at a broader engagement in the region, rather than the earlier focus on the US–China competition. Southeast Asia has been the pivot of Australian diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, as was demonstrated by Albanese and Wong during their first visit to Indonesia, a major economic and strategic partner, on 6–7 June 2022.12 Albanese is trying to create a new constructive environment in its relationship with Indonesia, and Southeast Asia, as against merely condemning Chinese coercion and expansionist activities in the South China Sea.

    As for climate change issues, the Labor government has highlighted the need for firm obligation that Australia will reduce its own carbon footprint in line with the Glasgow Climate Pact 2021 and Paris Accord 2015. Albanese and Wong will look at implementing Labor Party’s promise for a climate infrastructure partnership and recently announced plans to boost development assistance and labour mobility. Under the Labor government, Australia intends to co-host a future global climate summit with Pacific partners. This will address Australia’s security concerns in the region, as also ensure dialogue with Pacific leaders to meet their development requirements. At the Lowy Institute address, Albanese stated that climate change was the “number one issue that Pacific nations are concerned about”. At the Quad Leaders’ Summit also, Albanese articulated climate change as one of the biggest security threats facing the Indo-Pacific.13

    The Labor government is likely to broaden trade diversification with a focus on new markets for exports, as also work with businesses to build domestic economic capacities, as part of the Future Made in Australia plan, so that Australia will be “less vulnerable to economic coercion and global shocks…”.14 In addition, Labor Party’s shadow government had released Defence Industry Development Plan which looks at sustenance of defence supply chains, development of self-reliant defence industry and encouraging innovation in both defence and wider industry. Labor Party’s plan for a National Strategic Fleet of Australian-flagged vessels reinforces security of supply for critical resources.

    Australia has joined the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which goes beyond the original Quad intent and includes many other Asian and Pacific nations. Canberra supported IPEF and Quad initiatives for larger functional aspects of economic connectivity, supply chain resilience, clean energy initiatives and standards based on just economy. The resilient supply chain initiatives are an effort to protect the region from disruptions and inflationary pressures, as was seen during the pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict.

    With the new government in Australia, India will look to bolster and broaden the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership as well as have renewed focus on economic and technological cooperation. There are enormous opportunities for growth in cooperation at multilateral bodies, namely Quad and G20, East Asia Summit, among others. Broader synergy between the two nations is expected to continue in maritime security issues as also in non-traditional security matters, namely, energy security, climate change and foreign policy objectives. Analysts will also closely watch India’s bilateral relationship with Labor government on issues of differences, in particular, Russia–Ukraine conflict and developments in Myanmar and Afghanistan.

    In conclusion, the Labor government in Australia is likely to strengthen and deepen its strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region by leveraging AUKUS and Quad frameworks. Defence and strategic issues, particularly those against China, may get a re-look. Moreover, the government can be expected to look at Australia’s security and economic engagement in the Pacific and Southeast Asia with new vision and energy, and may take significant and concrete actions to maintain its regional sphere of influence.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 South East Asia and Oceania Australia, Indo-Pacific, AUKUS, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue system/files/thumb_image/2015/australia-labor-party-t.jpg
    China’s Response to Indo-Pacific Economic Framework June 15, 2022 Mayuri Banerjee

    The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), launched in Tokyo on 23 May 2022, is being touted by the US as a mechanism to counter China’s regional economic influence. The four policy pillars of the initiative include digital trade, building of resilient supply chains, fulfilment of clean energy commitments and implementation of fair trade rules with effective taxation and elimination of corruption.1 Reports cite US officials as stating that the initiative will present the Indo-Pacific countries “an alternative to China’s approach and strengthen political and economic ties with partner countries”.2 China has responded strongly to the initiative, calling it an ‘economic NATO’ aimed at stoking regional divisions. Beijing has also moved rapidly to initiate counter-moves against the IPEF.3

    IPEF as a cause of anxiety

    Chinese analyses of IPEF contend that the economic pact, if implemented, is unlikely to immediately affect Chinese economic interests.4 Highlighting existing China-led cooperative mechanisms like Regional Comprehensive Economic Programme (RCEP) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese policy experts opine that China is better integrated with the region than the US.5 For instance, many South East Asian industries are dependent on China for raw materials which are processed for export to the US or European Union (EU). Further, China’s economic cooperation with the region is also deepening. Besides trade with RCEP countries, China’s trade with ASEAN bloc totalled US$ 212 billion in the first quarter of 2022. Due to China’s large domestic market, South Korea and Japan could also be inclined to strengthen economic cooperation with Beijing under RCEP.6

    As regards possibility of China’s economic isolation from the regional economic framework, analysts assert that China cannot be ignored due to its economic influence. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a press briefing on 22 May, claimed that China has emerged as the largest trading partner of most of the countries in the region and those trying to isolate China will eventually isolate themselves.7 A section of Chinese media and members of strategic community reiterated the sentiment.8 Another prominent Chinese commentator argued that it will be impossible to exclude China economically since it is the largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity and the largest trading nation with most of the Asia-Pacific countries.9 Chinese observers conclude that IPEF is bound to fail as it is a ‘political tool’ to target China and devoid of any economic substance which will benefit the Asian region.10

    However, a sense of alarm was also perceptible, with Beijing declaring policy measures relating to trade and cooperation in the region while criticising the framework as being divisive at the same time. On the day US President launched the IPEF, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the UN ESCAP summit pledged deeper cooperation with the Indo-Pacific through better BRI projects and higher investments.11 Reportedly, he also promised to proactively pursue China's accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement to counter the new trade and economic initiative of the Quad alliance.12

    Similarly, the urgency with which Wang toured the Pacific Island Countries offering them ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ demonstrated Beijing’s anxiety regarding IPEF. In a bid to undercut Washington’s network of alliance and consolidate China’s economic and military footprint, Wang offered economic, infrastructural and security cooperation to these island countries and pledged greater support in terms of humanitarian relief and ensuring food security and climate change mitigation.13 Some Chinese observers, though, affirmed the possibility of adverse impact like reduced regional trade and shift in production chain, and suggested that China should strengthen RCEP cooperation through accelerating digital partnership negotiations with the ASEAN members. Moreover, analysts suggested that China should leverage its geographical proximity and attractiveness of its markets to deepen cooperation with ASEAN, Japan and South Korea.14

    In view of China’s robust trade linkages with the Indo-Pacific countries, Beijing is confident that economic decoupling is not in the horizon in the near future. However, the cause of its concern is the “exclusive institutional balancing” underlying the idea of IPEF.15 Such institutional balancing can be used to diminish China’s economic edge in the region by pressurising Chinese economy through export controls, import screening and shifting supply chains, which could eventually reduce China’s strategic clout.16  

    Implications for the region

    Anxious about the threat posed by IPEF to China’s regional economic clout, Chinese leaders and analysts have called for enhancing regional economic cooperation. Beijing’s pushback against Washington’s IPEF strategy is likely to result in an intense zero-sum geo-economic competition. China is likely to add more teeth to its regional economic diplomacy. We can, therefore, witness China rolling out more capital investment, technology transfer and infrastructure development plans for the neighbouring countries. For the smaller regional economies, it does offer an opportunity to resist economic domination by one power while simultaneously compelling them to provide public goods tailored to their needs. Further, competition between China and US-led institutions could perhaps drive reforms within these institutions that could lead to an improvement in the regional economic architecture, ensure greater supply chain resilience and enhance intra-regional trade. The increased geo-economic competition in a region with security deficits, though, could also result in greater diplomatic confrontations and further deterioration of regional security.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 East Asia China, Indo-Pacific, United States of America (USA), Economic Relations, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) system/files/thumb_image/2015/indo-pacific-economic-forum-t.jpg
    Decoding Turkey’s Foreign Policy Recalibration in West Asia June 14, 2022 Md. Muddassir Quamar

    Turkey’s approach towards its West Asian neighbourhood in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings evoked sharp criticisms from regional countries, which accused Ankara of pursuing a neo-Ottoman and pan-Islamic foreign policy. The regional response partly emerged from the growing popularity of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the Arab streets, at least in the early phase of the uprisings. Turkey, on the other hand, was driven by global power aspirations, as articulated in the Strategic Depth doctrine promulgated by the former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. This contributed to the sharp geopolitical competition among regional powers for influence, and shaped the outcomes of protest movements in countries such as Syria, Egypt and Libya.

    Turkey’s confrontationist approach led to serious diplomatic and political backlash leading to deterioration of ties between Ankara and other regional capitals, including Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Turkey­–Israel relations had already worsened, prior to Arab Spring, over Ankara’s stand on Israel–Palestine conflict, and support for the militant-Islamist Palestinian movement, Hamas. What this meant was that the so-called policy of “zero-problem” with neighbours turned into “zero-friends” in the neighbourhood.1

    A Foreign Policy Rethink?

    Since 2021, a discernible shift in Turkey’s approach towards neighbours in West Asia is noticeable. In the past year and a half, Turkey has initiated rapprochement with Israel, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and has also initiated a rethink in its policy towards Syria and Libya. In March 2022, President Isaac Herzog became the first Israeli head of state to visit Ankara since 2007. There have been talks on enhancing bilateral economic ties, especially in the energy sector with an eye on tapping the potential for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean (East Med). Erdoğan termed Herzog’s visit as heralding a “new era” in bilateral relations.2

    Turkey and UAE too have taken steps to improve relations. Mohammed Bin Zayed’s visit in November 2021 was a departure from the acrimonious relations since Turkey accused Abu Dhabi of meddling in domestic politics, and funding the July 2016 failed coup. Bin Zayed’s visit paved the way for a return visit by Erdoğan in February 2022. The two countries have focused on economic cooperation with a promise of US$ 10 billion Emirati investment fund in Turkey, and several agreements for collaboration in defence industry, climate change, healthcare, food security and other sectors.3

    With Saudi Arabia, the signs of a reconciliation emerged when Turkey’s foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited Riyadh in May 2021. The tense relations between the two regional giants had ruptured over the Jamal Khashoggi murder case wherein the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received international backlash for his alleged involvement. Weeks before Erdoğan visited the Kingdom, and met the King and embraced Bin Salman, a Turkish court suspended the Khashoggi murder trial and decided to transfer it to Saudi Arabia. The focus of the discussion during Erdogan’s visit was again on tapping the economic potential.

    In the case of Egypt, although there are no high-level exchange of visits, the two have engaged in delegation-level talks between officials from the foreign ministries focussing on improving trade and commercial ties. Importantly, Ankara has asked Muslim Brotherhood-linked media houses in Turkey to tone down their criticism of the government in Cairo.4 This indicates that Turkey might be ready to be more accommodative of Egyptian concerns vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood than it has been in the past. Ankara has been keen to improve relations with Cairo eyeing the lucrative energy fields in the East Med wherein Egypt has emerged as major player through the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Additionally, Turkey has taken steps to reach out to the Bashar al-Assad regime for peace and stability in Syria, and has reviewed its policy of military intervention in Libya.

    Drivers of Change

    The most important drivers for the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy approach lie in domestic political and economic developments. Turkey has been struggling with economic challenges since 2017, and the hopes for a recovery in 2019 were dashed with the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. In 2021, the Turkish economy recorded a sharp upturn in GDP growth at 11.7 per cent, but the World Bank has projected a modest growth of 2 per cent for 2022.5 Notwithstanding the uncertain growth trajectory, other economic indicators, including record inflation at 70 per cent in April 2022, devaluation of Lira, rising poverty and Covid-induced slump in tourism and export sectors, underline the seriousness of the economic challenge facing Turkey.6 President Erdoğan in his re-election bid in the 2023 elections does not want to leave any stone unturned to revive the economy, which is vital for winning the vote of his conservative-nationalist support base.

    Given that economic situation can harm Erdoğan’s electoral prospects, he is focussing on improving trade and commercial ties with West Asian countries to help recover the export slump. Turkey also depends on imports for both agricultural and manufactured products. That it can also bring the tourists from the regional countries is an additional advantage. Besides Erdogan’s foreign policy failures have become a domestic political issue, which the opposition, buoyed by their performance in the 2019 municipal elections, can raise to undermine the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) electoral prospects. Hence, the chance of presenting Erdogan’s foreign policy volte face as an achievement in an election year can be a worthwhile factor in Ankara’s conduct in the region.

    The foreign policy recalibration is also linked to regional and international politics. The Middle East has over the past two years witnessed a shift from geopolitics to geo-economics with many parallel ongoing talks and negotiations including, for example, between Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as the rapprochement between the Arab Gulf and Israel after the Abraham Accords. Additionally, Iraq has taken initiatives for talks among regional countries held in Baghdad, while UAE had taken lead in re-inducting Syria into the Arab fold. This can be attributed to several factors but the two most important developments that have impinged on the regional trend are the need for economic recovery after Covid-19 and the change in US approach to the region with the transition from the Trump to the Biden administrations. The flux in international politics and the resultant gradual shift in US focus away from the Middle East is also one of the driving factors for Ankara to pursue a more reconciliatory approach regionally, underlining the desire for recognition as a “middle power” in international politics.

    Challenges and Implications

    While the change in Turkish approach is refreshing, one cannot ignore the challenges Ankara faces in this pursuit. With Israel, serious difference over the Palestinian issue remain, and Turkey has not indicated any reversal in its policy of supporting Hamas. Similarly, with Egypt and Arab Gulf countries, the challenges remain because of Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, with Saudi Arabia, the claim to global Islamic leadership can adversely impact the reconciliation. More importantly, there is no evidence to suggest an ideational change guiding Turkish foreign policy conduct. That is, Ankara continues to be guided by the neo-Ottoman and pan-Islamic principles that had led to deterioration in ties with the regional countries in the first place. The change in foreign policy conduct are rather tactical wherein the foreign policy managers in Ankara now view a reconciliatory approach as more beneficial in securing Turkey’s interests and advance its regional ambitions.

    Nonetheless, the change in Turkey’s foreign policy approach in West Asia can be seen as an encouraging sign that can help reduce regional tensions. It also underlines a desire on part of Ankara to pursue diplomacy rather than confrontationist politics. Seen together with the wider regional trend of diplomatic engagements and geo-economic prospects, Turkey’s foreign policy recalibration generates some hope. Unfortunately, those familiar with the fractious nature of Middle East politics know that this is way too optimistic.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

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