Keywords

1 Introduction

The topic devoted to the defense policy of the British Empire and the process of its transformation in the first half of the 19th century did not receive due attention from Russian historians, and there are still no serious investigations on this issue in Russian historiography. In foreign historiography this issue has been investigated thoroughly. The first writings on the topic appeared in the first quarter of the XX century [1]. The First World War challenged the political elite of the British Empire to comprehend the need to change the defense policy, and most importantly, to offer the imperial territories directions for the future integration. The second wave of research came in the 1930s, when the British Empire was transformed into the Commonwealth of Nations [2,3,4]. The development of a defense strategy for the new political entity required a historical retrospective investigation of the process of interaction between the metropolis and the colonies in the field of defense.

The aim of this work is to investigate the defense policy of the British Empire and the process of its transformation in the first half of the 19th century. The authors set the task to characterize the defense policy of the British Empire in the first half of the 19th century, to analyze the views of the British political elite on the problem of its transformation; to reconstruct the transition from the Anglocentric model of building relations with the colonies in the field of defense to the principle of mutual responsibility.

In this work, the term “imperial defense” is used in accordance with the definition proposed by the British Admiral Herbert Richmond (1871–1946). He used it primarily in the meaning of “security”. The word “security” has many meanings. Richmond proceeded from the concept that imperial defense is security achieved as a result of the use of force in the interests of the peoples and territories that made up the British Empire [3]. The use of this definition of the term makes it possible to single out the three-stage structure of the defense of the British Empire, which consisted in the first half of the 19th century of the following elements: protection of the territory of the metropolis; defense of the British colonies against external aggression and internal unrest; protection of imperial routes and communications that connected the territory of the metropolis with its overseas possessions. Obviously, this definition includes both military and naval aspects of defense.

2 Materials and Methods

The work uses published historical sources of a memoir, the author of which is Henry Gray, the initiator of the transformation of defense policy in the first half of the 19th century, who held key posts in the military and colonial departments of the British Empire. Based on the principles of historicism and objectivity, the authors examined the object of the investigation (the defense system of the British Empire) and its dynamics in the context of specific historical events and circumstances that influenced the policy of the British Empire in the first half of the 19th century. The complexity of intra-imperial relations predetermined the use of an integrated approach for their investigation. The work is based on the comparative-historical (comparative) method, which made it possible to compare the various defense plans developed by the British political and military leadership.

3 Results

In the first four decades of the XIX century the British Empire used the practice of basing British garrisons in all territories under its control. The Royal Navy was the primary instrument for defending global British interests and imperial foreign policy. British warships served as a deterrent to the expansion of European powers, being a kind of show of strength. During this period the superiority of the Royal Navy was indisputable. The power of the fleet was enhanced by the significant military presence of British garrisons in the peripheral territories of the empire. The practice of basing British troops in each newly acquired territory of the empire began systematically after the end of the Seven Years War (1756–1763 years). The weakness of the British army did not allow it to successfully participate in large-scale European wars. Minor border conflicts and internal disorders in the British-controlled possessions were fertile ground for the actions of the army of the mother country.

At the beginning of the XIX century defense spending was considered the most significant item in the country's budget. However, the funding of the imperial defense policy gradually began to decline, which had support at the parliamentary and public levels. The desire for economy has arisen mainly due to the reluctance of taxpayers in peacetime to support the “bloated institution”. Decreasing expenditures cuts were supported by reformer economists, believing that they were damaging other areas of government in particular social policy.

In the period 1816–1834 the cost of maintaining the fleet decreased from 9.5 to 4.5 million pounds. The number of active warships was reduced from 80 to 58 units. The cost of maintaining the army fells sharply. If in 1815 they were 43 million, then by 1837 they were limited to 8 million pounds sterling. The British army consisted of 103 infantry regiments and only 24 of them directly defended the British Isles and the remaining 79 served in British-controlled territories [5]. Statistical information about the dynamics of the costs of the British army and navy (1810–1830s) is grouped in Table 1.

Table 1. The dynamics of the costs of the British army and navy (1810–1830s).
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Since the late 1840s. The threat of a French invasion raised doubts about the Royal Navy’s ability to guarantee the safety of the British Isles and encouraged the withdrawal of British troops from the colonies. Panic arose as a result of the construction of a naval base in the French port of Cherbourg and intensified the activities of British alarmists, who claimed that “the steam overcame the strait”. A brief turmoil in the government circles of the metropolis was the reason for a comprehensive review of the British imperial defense strategy and an increase in appropriations for this purpose. Fleet maintenance costs increased from £ 4.5 million to £ 8 million. The personnel of the fleet increased from 27 thousand to 45 thousand people. A similar picture was observed also in the army. The expenses for its maintenance increased to 10 million pounds sterling, the staffing - to almost 100 thousand people. Statistical information about the dynamics of the costs of the British army and navy (1840s) is grouped in Table 2.

Table 2. The dynamics of the costs of the British army and navy (1840s).
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By 1846, of the 112 battalions of the British army, 23 were localized in India, 54 in the rest of the controlled territories, 35 in the British Isles. At the same time defense spending on the dependent territories began to slowly but steadily decline. In 1846–1847 they already accounted for 1/3 of all British military spending and about 1/17 of total imperial spending [6]. But they also seemed excessive to the British taxpayers. Statistical information about the number of regiments stationed in the British Isles and in British-controlled territories (1830–1840s) is grouped in Table 3.

Table 3. The number of regiments stationed in the British Isles and in British-controlled territories (1830–1840s).
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The military-political leadership of Great Britain conducted a comprehensive analysis of the strategy of the imperial defense in order to develop a viable system of its functioning in the presence of a budget deficit. The initiator of the transformation of the defense policy of the empire was the Minister of Colonial Affairs Henry Gray (1802–1894), who in the 1830s served as Minister of War and had a reputation as a reformer. In October 1846, he presented to the government a document, the content of which boiled down to the idea of concentrating all British troops on the territory of the metropolis. In such circumstances the entire security of the colonies was entrusted to the Royal Navy. In the case of a military threat, the metropolis could send expeditionary forces to the controlled territories. During the period necessary for the transfer of British troops, the colonists had to rely on their own forces. The military-technical complex, which ensured the stable functioning of the British garrisons, remained at the same level and was transferred under the control of the local authorities. Gray tried to gradually establish the principle of colonial self-defense in internal affairs, when the metropolis was responsible only for the protection of the main naval and military bases, as well as the protection of all colonies in the case of an attack by a foreign power [7].

Gray’s proposal caused a wide public response in the metropolis. Supporters of the centralization of the empire (imperialists) regarded the reduction of British garrisons as a political action aimed at weakening imperial ties and promoting the idea of autonomy within the empire [8]. “Skeptics” believed that Britain should ensure the security of its overseas possessions not only by the naval forces, but also by the garrisons, which acted as a symbol of enormous power, which should be demonstrated in any crisis situation [5]. Gray’s supporters took a moderate position, which had a certain influence in the metropolis. They believed that the proposed plan, on the contrary, would support imperial unity and give it a more stable form, since it does not imply a complete rejection of British obligations. Moreover, they believed that a reduction in defense spending abroad would initiate a course for the sustainable development of imperial relations based on the principle of reciprocity. Prime Minister John Russell (1792–1878) fully supported H. Gray, to whom he wrote in 1846: “I always thought that the British colonies should maintain a militia for their own defense and pay for the construction of fortifications” (Morrell 1930).

Gray’s scheme was aimed at a long-term perspective, immediate practical results were not possible due to various circumstances in different colonies [9]. For example, it was decided to start the implementation of the “Gray’s plan” in the Australian colonies, since, due to their geographical location, they were the safest possessions of the British crown and could be effectively protected by the forces of the colonists themselves. In the North American colonies, on the contrary, it had to be introduced gradually due to their proximity to the United States, which, in the case of a deterioration in relations in England, could attack them in order to harm the mother country [7]. In addition, a significant portion of the Canadian population - French-Canadians, Irish Catholics, and the trading community, unhappy with the abolition of preferential tariffs - was characterized by an unstable imperial loyalty. It could be undermined by the impression that Britain was refusing to defend the territory of the colony, and as a result, the redistribution of responsibility in the field of defense could be a prelude to the disintegration of the empire. Therefore, for a period of 15 years (1841–1856), the British garrison in Canada was gradually reduced from 16 to 2, 8 thousand people [5].

In the British colonies themselves, opposition to the new colonial policy gradually began to take shape, since they were not yet ready to take on significant defense obligations. Building and maintaining defenses was so costly, and military departments in some colonies had such bloated states that they seemed more imperial than local. In addition, Great Britain continued to control the foreign policy of the colonies, and the redistribution of the burden of responsibility in the field of defense could involve the colonies in imperial wars that were not of interest to them. That is why the colonists argued that Britain should independently bear the burden of defense in full [4].

At the end of the 1850s the second phase of the withdrawal of detachments from self-governing colonies began. It was characterized by sharper confrontation between supporters and opponents of the idea in Britain. The financial issue was a key issue for politicians. During this period, a group of so-called “colonial reformers” emerged in parliament, which advocated the withdrawal of British troops from the territories of the colonies without taking into account specific local conditions and colonial aspirations. They believed that Britain would be able to free itself from the obligation to defend its dominant territories, while maintaining imperial ties based on a sense of kinship and common interests. This position was widespread in the official circles of the War Department and the Treasury and also had support among cabinet ministers, including William Gladstone (1809–1898) and Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881). “We must withdraw most of our troops and promote the full development of self-government” - said Disraeli [10]. Some British parliamentarians have come up with more radical ideas. Henry Parnell (1776–1842) argued that the number of British colonies should be reduced, and the rest should bear all the costs of their defense on their own. He calculated that the maintenance of the North American colonies alone had already cost the metropolis 60 million, and the annual costs were at least 600 thousand pounds [8].

The War Department, represented by the Deputy Minister and “Colonial Reformer” John Godley (1814–1861), in accordance with the new approach, formulated the concept of integrating the colonies into the imperial defense system. Given the fact that imperial security depended on naval superiority, key Imperial bases and British garrisons stationed there, Godley proposed withdrawing British soldiers from all other strategic bases. Ensuring the internal security of the colonies was to be entrusted to the local authorities. In the case of an external threat, Britain undertook to provide assistance, but the colonies had to pay for this assistance at a fixed rate, regardless of the amount of damage. The calculation of payments for military expenditures was to be made according to a single principle or an automatic rule established by the British administration. Military officials were convinced that these measures were intended to stimulate patriotism, self-confidence, and the military spirit of the colonists.

Officials of the Ministry of the Colonies condemned Godley’s plan, in fact, insisting that the colonies conduct their own policy in the field of ground defense, acting as independent nations [5]. Despite this, in March 1861 Godley’s plan was adopted at the parliamentary level. The Colonial War Expenditure Committee was formed, headed by Arthur Mills (1816–1898), who was also part of the cohort of moderate colonial reformers. In March 1862, the House of Commons approved the cost estimate proposed by Mills [11]. In a condensed form, the resolution of Godley and Mills repeated the policy initiated by Gray. On their basis, in 1865, the Colonial Naval Defense Act was adopted, which became the first legislative measure towards the division of responsibilities in the field of imperial defense. He encouraged the development of a local defense system, including the acquisition of warships and the construction of coastal fortifications at the expense of the governments of the colonies concerned. At the same time control over them was to remain with the British authorities [1].

4 Conclusions

Until the 40s XIX century the British government consistently adhered to the Anglocentric model of imperial defense, the essence of which was that the entire range of responsibilities for ensuring the security of the empire was entrusted to the mother country. The deterioration of the international situation and, as a consequence, an increase in financial responsibility for ensuring the security of the imperial space, forced the metropolis to radically reconsider the previous ideas about mutual obligations. By the middle of the XIX century several strategic plans for the integration of the colonies into the defense of the British Empire were developed, during the implementation of which it was to acquire a collective character. However, the active opposition of the imperialists and the passive position of the colonies on this issue predetermined a slowdown in the pace of integration. Thus, the intention of the British authorities to involve the colonies in ensuring their internal security by the middle of the 19th century failed to be fully implemented.