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MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION

PROPOSED EXHIBIT (PL TF)

11o.2

Case No.

A?-.J~J/

Private and Confidential

Las Vegas Sands Corp &


The Venetian - The Palazzo

15 May 2010

International Risk Limited

SJ001177

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00001

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)
Independent Assessmeni of Reuters ArtiCle & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 20.10

SECURITY WARNING
This report may not be copied or shared wlthp~rtie$
other than the authorised employees of Las Vegas Sands

Corp. and The Venetian - The Palazzo & their Legal


Advisors without the written permission .of International Risk
Ltd., which will not be unreasonably withheld.

Las Vegas Sands Corp., and th$:\/f$tl.~ti.~il-:- The Palazzo


acknowledge that thrs report is issued in ar;eordance with the
agreed terms al)d 90nditions Sittached.

- -- --------1

International Risk Ltd., its employees, agents and servants specificalfy deny any
liability whatsoever to any other party who may seek to use or rely on the whole,
or any part, ofthis report or to the parties to whom it is addressed for the use,
whether in whole or in part, for any other purpose than as set out in our
engagement letter_

This report is prepai'ed on information made available up to the date of this report
and we reserve the right to amend opinions, conclusions or recommendations, if
nem~ssary,

based on factual information that comes to our attention after that

date.

International Risk Limited

Page 2 of 54

SJ001178

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00002

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Ass.essment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tal
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION TO ASSIGNMENT ......................................... ,.......... ";, . ,... 6


Background ............................................................................................,..... :............. 6
Agreed Scope of Work ...........................................................................................7
Methodology ............................................................................................................8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................",,. .................................. 12


INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE

REUTEtlSl~RTICLE ...................

OveNiew of the Article .................................................

....................................

18
18

The Operation of VIP Rooms or Private G?ming Rooms in Macau .................... 19


Material or Factual Errors Contained in theAliicle ............................................. 20
"Hit ordered on casino dealer suspected of cheating'', ... :............ .. ....... .....
.. 20
Misleading use of the term ''the BustiJops"-.,.., .. ................................................... 22
Th.e Sum of Money that Wong A!lege/ifYWohliJ Macau ........................................... 23
Other Unsupported Claims in the Article ........................................................... 23
Poor Referencing .................. ................ ,;:,......................................................... 23
Issues Regarding 'Previously Uqdisciosed Transcripts" .. .................................... 24
Description of the Actual Gritriinaf Charges............. ............................................ 25
Overall Assessment of the Arti!0 ...... ;~ ................................................................. 26

DISCREET DUE D!UGEI\iCE


Investigative

!NVEST~GATION

lNTO CHEUNG CHI-TAL 27

Reso<~n~i1., .. ,,,,. ................................................................................27

Media and Internet Searches ........................................................................... 27


Profile ............................ .......................................................................................... 27
Jumbo Boom ffa1din.[[S Limited ............. ............................................................... 30
Adverse Pros~~ Reports...... . .. .. .. .... .. ... .. . .. ... .. .. ...... .. . ..... . .. ... .. . .
. 32
Database & PutEc Records Searches ............................................................... 35
....... 35
V1.loiid-Check Search ..... ......................................................... .
Sanctions Ust Searc/Jes ..... .................................................................................. 36
Director~c;hfo Searches in l-Iang Kong.
.. ... .. ... .. .. .. .. . .. .. .
.. ...... 36
Hong l<:ong Litigation & Bankruptcy Searc!Jes....... .... .. ... .. ......... .. .. .....
. ......... 37
Macau Utigation Searches..........................
..... . .... .. .. .....
.. .......... 38
US Litigation Searches..
. .. 38
US Exclusion and .Rejection Lists ..
.. 39

- - - - - - -..--- ....- ..--..--..--- ..-- ..


Page 3 of 54

!nternationai Risk limited

SJ001179

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00003

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung
15May2010

Chi-t;;:~i

Clie.nt Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

US Treasury Department ................................................................................... ,.... 39

US Senate Report .................................................................................... ,., .... ,... 3$


Investigative Research into Cheung's Connections with Hou Wan .................. .:41
Public Records .................................... ..... ,......................................... :.................... 41
Documents Provided by Sands .................................................................... ;....... 44

Discreet Field Enquiries ........................................................................";'-'' ...... 49


Background & Reputation of Cheung ............................................... ,............... A9
Cheung's Connection with the Trial Subject Matter .......................................... 50
APPENDICES ............................................................

.u .........................................

53

Appendix 1: Copy of Proposal and Agreed T~rms & Conditions for this
................................... 53

Engagement ..... ,...........

Appendix 2: The Reuters Articie, "Special Report High-R.ollers, Triads and a Las
Vegas Giant" ................................................. ,...... ,.. ,; ................................................. 53
Appendix

3: State of New Jersey, Departl11ent ofL?w and Public Safety -

"Special Report of the Division of Gaming Enforcement to the Casino Control


Commission on its Investigation otMC::~M Mirage's Joint Venture with Pansy Ho
in Macau, Special Administrative Region, People's Republic of China" ............. 53
Appendix 4: The Reuters Artido, "Special Report: High-Rollers, Triads and a Las
Vegas Giant" (Highlighted arn:.i Numpert;d) ......................................................... 53
Appendix 5: Sands' Request for Court transcript from the Registrar of the High
Court ......................................................................................................................53
Appendix 6: Official Transcript of the Court Audio Recording of the Sentencing
of the Defendant:; ................................................................................................ 53
Appendix 7: Report made by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of
the Committee

on {3overnmental Affairs, United States Senate (December 1992),

''The Hew International Criminal and Asian Organized Crime" .......................... 53


.i\p;nmdix 8: Organisation of the Wo Hop To Triad Society ................................. 53
Appendix 0: Staff Statement of Scott E. Orchard, Staff Investigator, US Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 18 June 1992 ............................... 54

____________ _
.........

..............- - - - - - - -

Page 4 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001180

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00004

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Appendix 10: Document Showing Cheung to be a Guarantor to Hou W~nf i 'it


t~"'}\.1"'=Jfif:h">N))

.........................................................................,.................... 54

Appendix 11: Document Showing Cheung to be a Guarantor to Hao Cai (i-r'!T.f5


t!5i!!i;t!--FAITrHi)c~J)

........................................................... ,.................................. 54

Appendix 12: Three Surveillance Department Log Entries provided by Sands .54
Appendix 13: Diagram Indicating the Relationship between Cheung and the
"Chengdu VIP Club" as Drawn from Public Records .......................................... 54

- - - " - .. ----..-----

- - - - - - - ...........- -

.......................................

_..

__

Page 5 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001181

Plaintiff Ex. II 02_ 00005

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (.5) of (5)

iNTRODUCTION TO ASSIGNMENT
Background
The following background was provided to International Risk by Las Vegas Sands
Corp and The Venetian - The Palazzo ("Sands") t:!l the outset of this project:

We were informed that a Reuters article dated 30 March 2010 entitled "Special

Repott: High-Rollers, Triads and a Las Vegas Giant' {''the Article") had recently
surfaced in the international media and which article made claims that a person by
the name of Cheung Chi Tai

G.t?:Ytnk)

("CheunJJ")

wf!J:s "the person

in-charge" of "one

of the V!P rooms at Sands Macau" and that he was also Triad leader.
The Article alleged that Cheung was "ldY)tifi~q" as a leader of t11e Wo Hop To, a
Hong Kong-based Triad Society; this etT1ergir1(jduring a criminal Trial in Hong !<ong
in 2009 ("the Trial").

According to the Article, four men were convicted at the Tria! for their respective
roles in a "conspiracy to cornrnlt .bodily harm'' and a fifth person was (again according
to the Article) accused of fsdkiiting a murder" of a "dealer" at Sands Macau. The
article claimed this person was suspected of ''helping a patron cheat miliions of
dollars from the business".

According to the /\;tide, authorities acknowledged only that a 49-years old male,
surnatned Cheung "was arrested in connection with the case but released after legal
advice was souoht due to insufficient evidence".

Hle Nevada Gaming Control Board expressed an interest in the matter and

Page 6 of 54

International Risk Lim1ted

SJ001182

Plaintiff Ex. 1 I 02 00006

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15 May 2010

reportedly stated on 31 March 2010 that it is analyzing the status of ViP room
operations in Macau casinos and their possible links with Chinese criniinafs.

As a highly ethical and prudent organization, Sands requested lnterfiationa!Risk to


.conduct an Independent Investigation into the allegations contained within the
Article and into the background and reputation of Cheung.

We understand that, at some future time, Sands may wish to share the findings of
our Independent Investigation wlth key gaming regulators.

Agreed Scope of Work


In response to a written proposal, Sands engaged International Risk on 15 April

2010 to conduct an Independent lnvestigetlon into the aliegations contained in the


Article, including into the accuracy and
well as concur-rently to conduct

\/en:tc!tyof the claims that are made in it, as

focused yet discreet investigation into the

background of Cheung in Macau, Hcng Kong and elsewhere.

Speciflcally, International Risk was engaged to independently review the content and
the veracity of the claims made in the Article; this with a view to separating fact from
(any) unsubstantiate,c! rumour(sj and identifying any factual errors contained within
the Article (Phas(~ One fnv;;;,t>tigation). In addition, Sands engaged International
Risk to undertak,e a discreet investigation into the background and reputation of
Cheung (Phase Two investigation), including:

.,

Devebplng intelligence as to Cheung's background and connection with


Triad s,;)cieties (if any) and of any other related enterprise;

'''Nevada regulators analyzing Macau rzsino aciivity . Reuters. 1 April 2010

International Risk Limited

Page 7 of 54

SJ001183

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00007

Las Vegas Sands Corp


lndependeniAssessmenl of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

An examination of Cheung's (alleged) connection with the deferld<illl$ f,lt


the Trial, as referred to in the Article;

Intelligence and reasoned commentary as to why charg~s ag$inst Cbt:lung


were not laid; and

Other issues or relationships uncovered in the course of

ow'

discreet

inquiries into Cheung which might be of interest to Sands and which might
be of value in minimizing future business risk.

A copy of our proposal and engagement letter, which det;1Jis the agreed scope of our
work on this project, as well as the mutually agreed busfrt$ss terms and conditions,
is attached as Appendix 1 for ease of reference.

Methodology
International Risk commenced this fnvestlg$itlon by critically analysing the claims
made. in the Article and by carefully reviewing the material provided by Sands, which
included, but was not limited to:

"

Ucenca de Promotor De Jogo Pessoa Colectiva- Hou Wan UT3JEM~-~!ft--A. tl'


[5~01}), 15 Decarnber2U09 to 31 December

2010:

Licenca de Promotor D!'J Jogo Pessoa Colectiva - Hao Cai Entertainment


Company Lirnited (t ,'{ )1:,;[1,%~

A 1:! ~~ 0 ttl), 28 December 2009 to 31

December 2D1G;
e

Licenca de Promotor De Jogo Pessoa Colectiva - Neptune Ours Sociedade


Unipessoa! Lirnitada Golden Neptune Limited CV!~iiZiitLI --),fii;_&:j}F(J),

15

December 2008 to 3'1 December 2009;

Venetian Macau Limited Junket Credit Agreement between Venetian Macau


Limited and Hou Wan WF!ili~U~

Al:illh> tfJ), dated

International Risk Limited

18 April 2008;

Page 8 of 54

SJ001184

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00008

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Ciient Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Venetian Macau Limited Junket Credit Agreements between Venetian Macau


Limited and Hao Cai Entertainment Company Limited

(HPJ

,;~~!;'::

,_ A:i;;S:

,~~

H]), dated 27 August 2007, 13 December 2007, 20 Febr,uary 2008; 18 April

2008;
"

Documents pertaining records from Venetian Macau Limited (Casino Credit


Department), and Central Credit LLC, on Cheung, Chi Tai's credit line and
dated 27 February 201 0;

"Sands Macau Live System" printout's on Cheung Chi Tai dated 25 March

2010;
.,

World-Check report on Cheung dated 25 January 2010, indicating a no-match


on the Subject;

Document entitled "Chronology of VML's busirless relationship with "Hou


Wan'';

Sands' "Junket Representative AppHcalion and Disclosure Form 1", "Junket


Representative Appiication and Disci6$ure Form 2", "Junket Representative
Appfication and Disclosure Form 3" f<Jr Hou Wan (ftyi.PI~~-- Af.T~fh}i'lj).
dated November 2004;

lnformacao Por Escrito Do Rpglsto e<omercial for Hou Wan (~J-i\gM:;,(;_I'f- .A.~-

Certidao do DegfstoGomercial for Hao Cai (tHHJt~~--)'-~f;l\V.G.f.fj);

Summary of .Sand's d'laracter-reiated checks and background referral on


"Luck Enterainrnent Urnited (Hou Wan)" (~fj~frf;.1~t(--.Af'!)l{i~-l'IJ);

Photocopy of Cheung Chi Tai's Hong Kong ID card and British National
Overseas passport;
Photocopy of Luu, Muoi Heng's Macau ID card;

"

Photocopy of Lei In Peing's Macau ID card;

International Risk Limited

Page 8 of 54

SJ001185

Plaintiff Ex. II 02_ 00009

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Ass.essment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Clieni Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

An external due diligence report on Guo Nan, the principal oC'f{aoYtH'l \/llu!e
Yi Ren Youxian Gongse" (assessed

to

actually refer to

fig\.! VVar.J,

dat~('L8

July 2005;
o

Hong f<ong Companies Registry Search on Cheung Chi

undert~ken

by

AGA Information Ltd in August and September 2009;


,.

Bank Reference issued by Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited, on Cheung


Chi Tai;

"Civil Litigation Check" and "Plaintiff Check" reports on Cheung Chi Tai,
conducted by agacreditonline.com;

&

Surveillance Department log entries containing reference to Cheung Chi Tai,


Wong Kam-ming and Siu Yun-ping_ These logs
made to the Surveillance Department

"

bY casino

purport to

be a reeord of calls

oper.:t~ions personnel;

Cheung Chi Tai's Credit Application to The Venef!an, dated 14 April 2000,
successive Central Cred[t Inc Gamfng Reports

oo him from 20 August 2000 to

31 March 2010, and his succ.S<3$ivo ;;,4,greement[s] to Guarantee the Payment


of Another" with Las Vegas Sands Inc and Venetian Casino Resort LLC, 6
August 2003 to 4 January 2D08; and
e

Videotaped Depositions of \<ViHiam Weidner, dated 27 September 2005, 28


September 2005, and 5 Januahf 2067, amongst others.

We then independently und:ertook a comprehensive search of available on-line


sources in the EngfJsh and Chinese languages for information on the public profile of
Cheung; this in

or9er to

i<ientify any unsavoury associations, details as to the Tria!

itself, and other relevant information.

Concurrently we conducted a search of available litigation and other public records in


Hong Kong, Macau and the United States, for any information or indication which
might suggest fhat Cheung llad been involved in court actions or bankruptcy actions
etc. We also conducted inquiries with the Official Receiver in Hong Kong and

--------------.-------.-------Page 10 of 54

lnternalional Risk Limited

SJ001186
Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00010

Las VegC!s Sands Gorp

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Independent Assessment of Reuters Articie & Report on Cheung Chi-tai


15 May 2010

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
.

International Risk has completed an Independent lnvestigatio/1

intf) the allegf!tions

published by Reuters on 30 March 2010 and also into the backgroundant.treputation


of Cheung Chi Tai

(5:&if\f;:) ("Cheung")

both in Macau, Hong Kong and elsewhere.

Independent Assessment of the Reuters Article

At the outset of this project, International Risk caretut analysed the allegations
contained in the Reuters article "Special Report: HiglVRo!lers, Triads and a Las

Vegas Giant" (''the Article") (a copy of which is a:ttachE!d at.Appendix 2 for reference).
This analysis is described in greater detaH. ur1der the se~Hon entitled Independent

Assessment of the Reuters Article at page 18.


The Article makes a number of serious C:laiiris and assertions: a key thrust appears
to be an explicit attempt to link Cheung, a reputed Wo Hop To "Triad member",
directly with the Sands operation ib Macau.

International Risk examined some eightit-four assertions (many of which are interrelated) contained in the Articlo (Appendix 4); we found that a number of these
statements and claims are factually ihaccurate and/or misleading, including the
following:

"

''!-fit ordered on casino dealer suspected of cheating". This claim (on line. three
of the Article) is materiafly incorrect Wong Kam-ming CI.~f)i:J) ("Wong"), the
would-be victim of the "hit order", is erroneously identified as being a "casino
dealer" and the impression given is that he is a dealer at Sands Macau.

Page 12 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001188
Plaintiff Ex. I 102_ 000 12

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Jndependent.Assessment of Reuters Artrcle & Report on Cheun.g Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15May2010

Wong has never been an employee of Sands Macau.

..

Sands have informed International Risk in writing that Wong has: never been
on ils payroll.

"

In fact, Wong was an introducer I chip-changer (.'ifi.~fF) for high-rollers in


Private Gaming rooms in Macau.

None of the media references or other live sources we consulted suggest that
Wong was a "casino dealer" at Sands.

The Article alleges that Wong was "helping a patron cheat millions of dollars",
the obvious inference being that this was inside the Private Gaming room at
Sands, Macau.

"

In fact a gambler, Siu Yun-ping (y:r:\<~.

f'J

("Siu") is at the centre of the cheating

allegation. Wong was Siu's personal ''chip-changer".

"

Similarly, the phrase in tl'lt'J Article that, "Later. a call went out to murder the
dealer" is clearly incorrect; he was not a dealer.

..

Misleading use ol'N1e t(;rm "the Business": "At first, the men had been ordered
to break the arms and ~egs of a dealer at Sands Macau suspected of helping
a patron cheat millions of dollars from the business." The use of the term "the
business" here may lead a reader to erroneously assume that "the business"
and fhe cheating allegation are referring to Sands Macau.

None cri the Chinese-language media references we consulted, have


described or even inferred that Sands was a party to this "cheating issue".

----

...............

_...... __ ___________
,

Page 13 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001189
Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00013

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Poor Referencing: The Article makes a number of unsupporteci claims .and in


places the qualifying reference is lacking.

!$sues Regarding "Previously Undisclosed Transcripts": Reuters have affeged


that much of their information .comes from a "previously undisclosed court
transcript". 2 lntemational Risk has thus far been unable to access court
transcripts of the Trial (other than the Official Transcript of the Court Audio
Recording of the Sentencing of the Defendants). Such records are not
publlcafiy available to non-involved parties. 3

niete!s some doubt therefore as

to whether or not Reuters h.ave had comprehen$ive access to the full "official"
court transcript.

The Description of the Criminal Charges: The

R;Jqhsrs

article misstated ttle

actual criminal charges laid; wnHst on the sun'ace this is not materially
damaging to the overall article; it

!.s

indicative of a lack of rigour in the

research and reporting process. Agaib:lfofficiai court transcripts were in ttle


hands of the authors thensui;;h ah ei$I11entary mistake would be unlikely.
.

Due Diligence Investigation into Ch~l.ll'l~ Chi' Tal


Concurrently with the hldep$r\dent Assessment of the Article, International Risk
conducted an in-d~nth invest[gation into Cheung Chi Tai, his background and
reputation:

Ch.~ung is undoubtedly a leading member of the Wo Hop To Triad Society in

Hong Kong and Macau.

1
' HKSAR

vs SEE WAH LUN AND OTHERS (HCCC13/2009)


involved parties are the court. the prosecution and the defeqce

--------

-----------....

---------Page 14 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001190
PlaintiffEx. I 102_00014

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

"

Client Confidential
Copy {5) of (5)

Cheung is identified as a leader of the Wo Hop To Triad Society in a report to


the United States Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

oftne

Committee on Governmental Affairs, 102nc Congress, 2~ Session, United


States Senate (December 1992), "The New International Crlrninal and Asian
Organised Crime" ("the US Senate Report") (Appendix 7). He appears clearly
on a diagram showing the leadership and structure of the Wo Hop To Triad
Society (Appendix 8).

A reliable (now retired) law enforcement source, who previously had direct
and personal knowledge of Cheung (during the. 1980's).,. has independently
reported that Cheung had always claim?ti to b!:' arw<::mber of the Wo Hop To
Triad Society. The same source .dt}s.cfibed Cheung's previous criminal
activities, as Including the trafficking of illegal drugs and engaging in the
extortion of public light bus driver;;;,

"

In August 1996, Cheung is reported to have been charged by the Royal Hong
Kong Police in relation to the b1ackmZiH of street vendors at the Aberdeen Fish
Market, in Hong Kong. However, he was acquitted at triaL

Independent sources who are knowledgeable about the 2009 Trial (subject of
the Article) have achtlsed that all five defendants are 1/Vo Hop To Triad
members.

Cheung (U.ilder both his real name and nickname, "Tsang Pau") was
mentioned by prosecution witnesses as being the "boss" of the five
defendants in the ''murder-for-hire" Trial.

..

Cheung was arrested on the same day as the five defendants in the case. but
he was reieased due to insufficient evidence.

lnternationai Risk Limited

Page 15 of 54

SJ001191

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00015

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15 May 2010

------

Chinese media references stated that Siu's "alleged cheating" had "offet}cJed"
Cheung, who was behind the .Junket operator(s) operating in three Piivate
Gaming rooms. 4

"

Cheung, as the person identified as extending considerable credit to the

Junkets concerned (as a "guarantor"}, would, by extension be a "victim" of any


such "cheating".

Our open source media research exercise b~\S esiablished a connection


between Cheung and Huang Guangyu

UtUL 'f)

Electrical Appliances), and to Zheng Shaodong

(former chairman of GOME

>':tO and

Chen Shaoji (li*

.fi.1:/ti) (both former senior Chinese Gov:~tiirl'lahfPubik~ Security Officials);

all of

whom have recently been exposed fn flnaric:ial irn)Jropriety and corruption-

related case(s) on the PRC mainlanz:t Media repotts state that Cheung was
also arrested by mainland authoritle$\)'l\'1:1spect of this matter during 2009. 5

Cheung's Connection with Hou W<n andHao Cai

Cheung is recorded in doevrtlflfli& (Appendix 10 & Appendix 11) as being


involved in extending credit; thiD ss a Guarantor to both the Hou Wan and
Hao Cai Junket.~. the~;(< Junkets operate inside the Sands property in Macau.

Surveillanq:r Record t:Qgs (Appendix 12} make clear reference to Cheung,


Wong and Ski.

'".lldc!,\1" "; ::11l'!:l%iHi<l'iJ'f-IHJi!?k)'C'. Next Magazine (HK), 29 October 2009: 'J.Ii:?zt,:..\fU!Jff 5 ~;;{i~i'lt!~Q. f
)!;J~: i i
f :~l1'c, Y J f :LPJHT! ft'Z'{:Jitr!l'''. Ming Pao Dai!y News. 24 October 2009: ''H,!l)!l:f;B; i>t
~t 300 /~~ ;t;RJJ~1:',~' >: .f~--:f;::qx.;rM1~~~t~f~~4~~~. E.astwee.k, 14 october 2009
5
,.:~:l.~!!JJ'!lY/il,.S'..~:.: .=,~IL0!~!2Q.Q~~:.Q9.::Q;.!Q~~QJ.2Z~~~.~~SO~_..LliTDJ, 3 June 2009; .: .. .:;~..
~
~).:i.f.'-!:t.':t!.'t'r~~?s.t.s~~::!.:~:!LD.~:Y.~:~f.n~rr.!.... J?1.JitCCd~ ' 5K i1~ :J~~'!J; J~ Jt1ti1r~ -~71th ..'i.J ~~ P~ IT:iJ. t~ fi1 -6 f:it" J!_: ).:. '',
''~''"'':"'",.. .- .. ~ .4..~:?LGt.?.g::_;;?.fAG!.!W.;.E?PVif.lQ1d.Y.:YKQg_~~.~~J,;Jif~.G.~~~~g:.(9.tD!J:i"~E"ii~il9.t.YL~.Y.f.DS~.':f~~::
.....:2.?\~f~_%:~Q5~~t-?.f::?.~?n.?;1:;.~ft~~!z.f:Q1:2A.4.l'~.t\e~~%??f~~~p.::.~Q&h!::~tt:..L!l:Pl~.~~n.~.~g!~.bf.~
1

Page 16 of 54

lnternalional Risk Urnited

SJ001192

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00016

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 20i0

"

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

The same surveillance logs make reference to, what we assf:)ss lb be the
"cheating" allegation against Siu; this on the 141h of February 2008.

"

Through a complicated arrangement, Cheung had (at !past) a. financial


interest in the Junket operating at the Chengdu Private Gaming R.o:om at the
Sands Macau; this betvveen July 2007 and September 2008. Please see the
diagram at page 43 (and Appendix 13), which explains this structure in detail.

Overall Assessment
International Risk has completed an independent analysis of the Article as well as
undertaking focused but discreet investigation$Jntqthe background and reputation
of Cheung.
The Article contains multiple flaws. andln~ccvracies as outlined above.
Our investigation into Cheung htY-f1~ver has revealed worrying information about him
and his activities.
Cheung exercises a measure of control over both the Hou Wan and Hao Cai Junkets
because of his role as a '\qll0r<Vitor"; extending very considerable amounts of credit
to these Junkets.

As is detailed in tht

report there

is little doubt that Cheung is a (senior) member of

the Wo Hop To Triad Society.

We therefore recommend that Sands adopts measures to distance itself from


Cheung and this group.

-----------International Risk Limited

Page 17 of 54

SJ001193

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02_ 00017

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Ciient Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

obtained by Reuters". The Article contains allegations as to Cheung's "ties to .Sands


Macau", alleging "multi-tiered arrangements" which lead to the Hou Wan (a Junket
operator) "entitled to profits from Sands Macau's Chengdu VIP roonci";

The Article also seeks to shed light on the "links between China's secretive Triad
societies and Macau's booming gambling indust1y". A core theme is the suggestion
of a direct connection between Triads, organized crime, Junket operators and the
VIP rooms inside of Macau's casinos.

International Risk has also reviewed the Report issued by ttle State of New Jersey,
Department of Law and Public Safety, entitled "SpeCial Report of the Division of
Gaming Enforcement to the Casino Control Comrnissidn on its Investigation of MGM
Mirage's Joint Venture with Pansy Ho in Macau, Speda( Administrative Region,
People's Republic of China" (18 May 200fl} ("the New jqrsey Report") (Appendix 3)
which is referred to in the Article.

The Operation of VIP Rooms

Private Gaming Rooms in Macau

We were informed by Sands that there appears to be two markedly different models
in relation to the operation of\/lP Rooms Or Private Gaming Rooms in Macau.

The predominant busriless model in the VIP rooms owned by SJM ("the SJM Model")
is to lease out thqse VIP Rooms via "service" agreements with third parties. Those
third parties operate the VIP Rooms owned by SJM, hire the staff, pay the staff, run
the Roorns, incur the risk, retain the revenue, and pay SJM a service fee for the use
of the VIP Room. In other words, the typical VIP Room in an SJM owned casino is a
VIP Roorn operated by an independent third party for the benefit of the third party.

International Risk Limited

Page 19 of 54

SJ001195
Plaintiff Ex. I I 02_ 000 19

L<!S Vegas Sands Corp


lndependenl Assessment of Reuters Artfcle & Report on Cheung ChHai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

!n contrast, the Sands Macau actually operates the gaming in thE? V~tious :Frrly$te
Gaming Rooms at the Sands Macau, and does not cede contr:qlover: Its
Gaming Rooms ("the Sands Model'} The Sands Macau is free to

Prlv$te

?SS1gn or re-~f:!$ign

a Private Gaming Room where a Junket operator is permitted to bfitig his hl)sihess.

Subject to licensure, the Sands Macau enters into Junket agreements with Junket
operators; Sands Macau compensates the Junket operators under various programs,
including a percentage of what is referred to as "chip roW' for the players produced by
the Junket

Junket operators in Macau are therefore different to ';vhat are called "Junket

representatives" or "independent agents" in Las \ft-).gas; who are essentially


commissioned outside sales persons.

International Risk examined some eighty--four key claims (many of which are inter-

related) which are contained in the Article (Appendix 4); we have determined that a
number of these statements ant! claims are factually inaccurate, including the
following:

Material or Factual Errors Contained in the Article

"Hit ordered on caqtfi9 dealert!vspected of cheating"

This claim, on line three of the Article, is materially incorrect

Wong f<am-ming ('Wong"), the would-be victim of the "hit order", is erroneously
identified as being a "casino dealer" and the impression is clearly given that he is a
dealer at Sands Macau.

Page 20 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001196

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00020

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15 May 20i0

Wong has never been an employee of Sands Macau.

Independent sources as weil as Chinese-language media references; relating

to the

Hong Kong High Cowi Case, HCCC13/2009: HKAR vs. SEE WAH UJN and Others
("the Trial") report that Wong was an introducer I chip--changer (1!~!~~~ i) for highrollers in VIP gaming rooms and Private Gaming rooms in Macau.

Wong reportedly earned a commission when these high-rollers exchanged gambling


6

chips. None of the media references or other sources we consulte.d have suggested
that Wong was a "casino dealer" at Sands.

Sands has also confirmed to International Risl( iii an ernai! dated 28 April 2010 that
Wong has never been on its payrolL

The Article also makes the specific a!legR~tion th?t Wong was "helping a patron cheat
millions of dollars from the busini;iss" (the inference being that this was inside a
Private Gaming Room at Sands Macau).

lnternatiohal Risk's assessm~nt o'f the situation is that the actual suspect in the
"cheating issue'' is, in fact;\'! g?mbler named Siu Yun-ping

(iilififf,\FF)

("Siu") and not

Wong as stated.

Wong was reportl'ld to be Siu's personal ''chip-changer" (and as stated was not an
employee of Sands).
Siu is r~ported

by the media to have been "so successful'' in his gambling trips to

Macau that he was attributed the nickname of ''Yuen Long God of Gambling"
~

, m;:~,ri. aka : ::.:,:ff.


"' :-: 300, :,

(it.E!JJ!l\~

=':tH~)::i"L:WJH~f;f!H1~;t~tr~)!fHti-H.~{:)Y:' Next i"1agazine(HK): 29 Octcber2009; Jlfl:1i'f}


i''' t:1 t;.#, '(!Yft.fl!<.J@i:s r-\ ?;;,", EastNeek, 14 October 2009

;iLGHI~

Page 21 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001197

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00021

Las Vegas Sands Gorp


Client Confidential
Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
Copy (5) of (5)
15 May 2010

{;;fl). 7 His apparent success had led to (currently and as yet unproven} ;:;uspipiOf){ltt)~t
he had in fact cheated at gaming.

International Risk has reviewed numerous Chinese-language media reports on the


trial; none of these concur with the Reuters' assessment that Wong (the "Sands'
dealer") was the suspect in the cheating issue. 6

Similarly, the claim in the Article that "Later.

8.

caH went out to murder the dealer" is

clearly incorrect given that Wong was not a dealer.

Misleading use of the term "the Business"

"At first, t!Je men h<Jd been ordered to break the arms at]d legs of a dealer at Sands
Macau suspected of helping a patron cheat millions of dollars from tlw business."

The use of term "the business" ln the cheflfklg aiiegafion may iead an uninformed
reader to assume that "the business" referred to is Sands Macau.

None of the Chinese-language medk~ references we consulted describe or infer that


Sands was a party to tfK:< cheating issue. 9 Siu's "alleged cheating" is said to have
"offended" Cheung, the pe:mson behind the Junket operator(s) working at tile three
Private Gaming Roorns that Siu frequented, and not Sands Macau as is inferred.

Siu is said to be a native of Yuen Long district, ;n the New Territories of Hong Kong, hence thrs

nicknam,;,
8
",'' '),. <: ' ){T 5 xr,

.' L'& Fii'!J i;j!!'J Kif/, f :~~W?J'f.: ' T fi)j{'f! Jf'i'(?(~'~f". Ming Pao Daily News. 24
OG\ober 2009:" '; l,iJi/J:J; h~i%;.'-;llf ;;It", Apple Daily 24 October 2009, "'ic\ltJI!<HH 'lJ;j!;; iO \\\ ~(;j;(Yi'i
;;: ?:; ll'HY ;
.,,f.", Eastweek, 16 Sept 2009
s :i:!A~ JlJ!j.jP1'U'
:.~ ff"Jtt; F HH~YC\ Next Magazine (hK). 29 October 2009; "iGt~~ttliif~ft 5 .RUfl~:af.::i)( }.
)"i]j!IJ ?,~fl. )>)lcW'f' J !Tf!fiH. tt'~\;<f!fJ;fi", Ming Pao Daily News, 24 0Gtober2009; "jC(!!Jii!f1l J:);
~0 ':. ''" ., i!!h ifJ){;;:ii;if VF<~''itYC', Eastweek, 16 Sept2009

Page 22 of 54

lnternationa! Risk Limited

SJ001198

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00022

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

The Article claims that the so-called "dealer at Sands Macau" (see abov$) is
"suspe.cted of helping a patron cheat millions of dollars from the business". The
accuracy of this statement is questionable.

Chinese-language media reporting at the time suggested that Wong had won some
US$12 mi!lion in Macau; this differs significantly from Reuter's more general report of
"millions". There are also reports suggesting that the true figure may be closer to
US$64 million. Some of these media reports speculate as to the possible
methodology used in such "cheating". ' 0

Other Unsupported Claims in the Article

The Article makes a number of Ci21ims wb~re the qualifying evidence. is lacking. For
example, page 5 of H1e Artide dairn<> that "Documents show that his [Cheung's]
investment allowed him a share in thE> profits from a V!P gaming room at the casino
[Sands Macau]". Not only ls it unclear as to what "documents" are being referred to,
but the Article also fa[IG to specify the name of the VIP gaming room concerned information which .one would reasonably expect to be indicated in the said
"document" and, in

th$ context of such a claim, to be provided or referenced.

0
' "t$cJ;NHH~/{
,lj(,ifji;! f&ii'i:'i''lfgi 14 l ~}i./iJ:;';';~;\i]:)(J". Sing Tao Daily, 28 October 2009 (possible
US$64+ miilion); 'Jn.f,ti'i:iiVi hit i'dTi&". Apple Daiiy 24 October 2009, "TA'i i.tiJWfif'i":;\M i'r!1T
Ne:<:t Magazine (HK), 29 October 2009.

x:

international Risk Limited

Page 23 of 54

SJ001199

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00023

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of {5)

---------------------------Issues Regarding "Previously Undisclosed Transcripts"


The article also refers to previously undisclosed court transcripts ..' 1

International Risk has thus far been unable to access official court transcripts of the
Trial (other than the Official Transcript of the Court Audio Recording of the
Sentencing of the Defendants) through regular channels: these are not publically
available to un-involved parties. ' 2 Indeed, a full written tr!;lnscript of a trial is normally
only produced when either the prosecution or the defence wishes to lodge an appeal
(against conviction or sentence).

In the absence of such official court tranf)ctif)fs, lnterhational Risk are currently
unable to verify if Reuters is accurately reporting on an l?.Gtual court transcript: nor
are we able to comment on the veracity

ofth~

authors' Claim that they have referred

to such "previously undisclosed courttrf)n,Scripts" whilst writing the article.


"Official records" of the trial, most likely !n the form of voice recordings, are only
accessible by involved pariies,

the

def~hdants

and their legal counsel, or the

prosecutor. As criminal trials are (1Aiith T'evjiexceptions) open to the public in Hong
Kong, media organisations such as RetJters could sit in and take notes during such
hearings. The press ho\Vev::~r haVe no special access to the official court transcript,
nor are they allowed to make voice or video recordings during any court hearing.
We cannot rule out however the possibility that one or more of those involved in the
Article may have had access to hand-written notes of one sort or another taken
during the proceedings.

"HKSAR vs. SEE vVAH LUN AND OTHERS (HCCC13i2009)


' 2 !rwolved p<.uiies are the c.ourt. the prosecution and the defence

-"""'"'"""""""'"'"""""-"""'"""""'-'"""""""""- "------OOOO----------------fntemational Risk Limited

Page 24 of 54

SJ001200

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00024

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15May2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Since our engagement and on the request of International Risk, S;.mds has written to
the Registrar of the Hong Kong High Court to seek a copy of the officlH( transcrit>t of
the TriaL A copy of the draft letter is attached (Appendix 5).

Description of the Actual Criminal Charges

The first paragraph of the Article states that four dtifendants were convicted of
"conspiracy to commit bodily harm" and a fifth of "solidt!hg a murder".

In reality, the actual charges were different:

According to the official transcript of the audio recording (Appendix 6) of the


sentencing at the Trial (Criminal Case No. i 3 cf2009), 11 See Wah-lun, Tang Ka-man,
Wong Chi-man, Yeung Chun-kit ano Chan Ht>-!eung (collectively, "the Defendants")
were charged and were all found gv!ity of chBrges of "Acting as a member of a triad
society" and "Conspiracy to C8\!2\T9rlil'f9\J? bodily harm with intenf', See Wah-lun
was also found guilty of two a\:.i<:titionG1 counts of "Conspiracy to commit murder" and
"Soliciting to murder",
Whilst on the surface thin is ned seriously detrimental to the veracity of the overall
article, it is indicative <Jf a lack of rigour in the research and reporting adopted by the
authors. It would be particu'~':r'ly odd to have made such an obvious mistake if the
party(s) writing trw <:H1kJ<', >vere in possession of a full and official court transcript

''' Obtaine(i fnn"< the website of tr1e jiJdicier/ of Horg Kong, at

-------------------------------------

------
Page 25 of 54

International Risk L\mited

SJ001201

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00025

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Client Confidential
Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
Copy (5) of (5)
15May2010

Overall Assessment of the Article


As outlined above, the Article contains a number of important factual errors. It is also
misleading in a number of respects.

As is detailed in the later sections of this report, there is however little doubt that

Cheung is a (senior) member of the Wo Hop To Triad Society.

Cheung does, in reality exercise a significant measure of)nfluence over both the Hou
Wan and Hao Cai Junkets; this by virtue of his substantial guarantor status to both.

His name appears on documents (Appendix 10& 11) itdhisrespect

Cheung was arrested in connection with the "murder--for-hire" case but was released
due to insufficient evidence to substantiat~acriminal charge.

it is the overall assessment of internatior1af .l'(isk that the Reuters Article, whilst
containing important factual errotS.,J$
...

.;;ortE;ct in highlighting Cheung's Wo Hop To


.

(Triad) connections and his inffuerice.~v#fthe operations of the Junkets concerned .

........ -------------------------------------

International Risk Limited

Page 26 of 54

SJ001202

PlaintiffEx. I 102 00026

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15May2010

CHEUNG CH!wTAI
In this section of our repmi we detail the investigations undertaken by f.nternational
Risk into the background and reputation of Cheung Chi Tai (~R?f:J)~J ("Cheung").

Investigative Research
Media and Internet Searches

Comprehensive media, internet and public records research into Cheung located a
large number of references to him, mainly ln relation tl1 his connection with Lin
Cheuk Chiu GI~Al:iriJ) .and his brother Lin Cheuk Fung (itt /'f,f.:), allegedly members of
a small organized crime group named the "L0e Kwan"

(/-Uiln; this at the beginning of

the 1990s.

Our research also identified nUrnerous references to Cheung as a leader in the Wo

Hop To Triad Society, in Hong Kong.


Our open source: find!ngs are summarized under the headings below:

Cheung, aka 'Tsang Pau (rlit$)" is reportedly a leader of the Wo Hop To. 14 He is
said to hstve grovvn up in Wah Fu, Aberdeen, Hong Kong and to have joined the Wo
Hop To when he was still a teenager.

1
"
1

15

"Triad f;ve jai!ed over plot to kin croupier" South Cl;ina Momi1g Post. 28 October 2009
i}.Ji,~1d-YTWt T iHf~~q~_):c''~ l'-Jext fv1agazine. 29 October 2009

''

Page 27 of 54

lnternationai Risk Limited

SJ001203

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00027

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Atiic!e & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15May2010

At the beginning of the 1990s, Cheung reportedly met Un Cheuk t~hlu


his brother Lin Cheuk Fung Gl!:l+'-~$(!?:}, both reportedly members t5f+ysmall orga11ized
crime group named Lee Kwan

(f!l!n. The Lin brothers are reported to hnve a close

relationship with Huang Guangyu

CiWYC:fii"tl,

the disgraced former chafrrnan of the

GOME Electrical Appliances Holding Limited

(tiltX: l'frfr~t5~!J!Y-H f!i\lf: HJ).

and with

Zheng Shaodong (Wli~J<rt:). the disgraced former assistsmt to the Minister of Public
Security and Director General of the Economic Crimina) investigation Bureau of the
Chinese Ministry of Public Security. 16

At the end of the 1990s, Cheung and Lin Ch~W!<

wer-t riclporteclly involved in the

gaming industry; one of their better known projects was th<' !\Jeptune Cruise (?;'ti.iJiin,
a casino vessel.~ 1

1.i}

<''i.J )

("Neptune Group") (fonYi\id}i knnvr1 as Massive Resources International

Corporation Limited

;: : >! )J; fl company publlcly"liste.d on the Hong

Kong Stock Exchange with stock cod<:<?G. t($

f\Jote: Zheng Shaodong lat<H became a subject of a financial crime case in which
Huang Guangyu was also involved. This would ultimately lead to the fall of his former
boss Chen Shac~ii

},_) as well as Huang Guangyu who reportedly received

bribes and in return provided protection to gangsters in Hong Kong and Macau. 19

Page 28 of 54

International Risk limited

SJ001204

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00028

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Please see below a chart derived from open source and media reports whichdepJcts
Cheung's alleged connection with the Lin brbthers, Zheng Shaodong, Huang
Guangyu and Chen Shaoji.

,--------------------------------------

P.P.s;:<.rte-~ 1=-~tr.~( in

.... ~

~~~!)~; t~~~/

. ,. - - t~~kJ.k)
Ch~lff!g

_('

Chi 1 &

\,\
3--!:>~~,:F,s..tw;.~

::.-:-po1td e:J:',;I(*-~~- ~...~~tr..-...


;r, ~;;!:J!.:. r-~..:c~ .c~t.:d .:: ~;ne <?W3'

il~;;r1.W !W!~c:

~l ?>.:t>!+:.: t:>~1C'~
,....d~t('.d :1."1~{'. ZCJCl?

/'.1-~l~tur--e Cn:'i:ie.

s:~.:;:rr:l-:::ftv

,..,~ < ,. J,J-.r ~:)7}

>1..."ted 3 .111lt' ~c~

!>~lh

..~:;;;~~~~;;:;~;;

..

~ ~lJli! :e~~~l

t:11 0'->!cl< 0:--J


(~~:11:1:re1

r/

rl.:>pl;'-\' ~.;reup :.;,nt~d

.-... ~-~-...::~;;::~'i,',~':_ ______ ~:~{~ -~i'l~K ..,.e!Sd~

u:.'!ll c..:,

>f ~e~ !.;~~:-: Tr~:; x.~t:11

:.~,-~

'=:'~

-2'~

.;;~:~-~
(h~rt.$~>(l,>~

i"f<.e~~~t~o.ir .-c~!!rn:C"! t-nt:~ &

><~~~

:r,retu'I1P!'I).-i9"2dp:"0:2ct;:x,oo

:u 'J"et;~- f.ff:;c
:.- .; ~e Kw~:'t lr:~.:: !.:-,:,tf:i '::..
''~i..-p~z:e Gr.-;w ~~,,a~}

P.t:'!<''t"f".d(kt--;2~(
.R.R..~-:.>;!~i=;,;r~tr.o

C<:llO~t~~s-t"l He~ K-~~"'J l}.~~e<.;}

(Jix~t,~!.f.:t.:;v:"t.'d;i

Reii-(.:t.,:::l-"':~-r.:er

&:W ~ )F.e Z~'fl~

~H ;.-; ?:J* Me-db

~:/!:ted

!7 A;;!"~::ro:t

...~

I
I

!_ __ ~- ------------

_,;;

-"

..<;':!t<0.'1

,';iu;:,.~~,;;;-:,

;;.:::

(Oi>-;T::::..::~i=Cfi:l~'( .. f-:'

fJe-:tJ,:;;;: Ap~~:::"1(:~ :' :. ;.

~,_,.

.:.::.::."H<!'::i;y p.;,:~t~6. ~~

.- ~.

~-: ~ ::uetcM-~11;..

:~ ' JArJi>:) ;:-.,J(,-

Z!"K<~~~~:q

s:C<.:u~-,.~~ :=c"'l::! Msistllr:t t,;, d"a


Nii:~te ~ff':.t~o: :;e::.:~t."f~.c.... e~:):
"G!r-~~:>1 t~P. 1::-=:r:J<.:.~ ~:~:w~}: J;<vv...t:q;,:J<'"
31.;;-1':~.! :Y <1-~(t--i-fl)S,, ~~~ o.< P.i..:~ ::;,.r.:.:r-~~;

Diagram Illustrating Cheung's possi!Jiq B<.!S:inoss Conn6'ctions with the Lin Brothers, Huang Guangyu,
Z!Jeng Shaodong. ent~.r::tler~ BtlHJ>}i!. sourced frorn rnedia reports

According to issue no. 04& of Next Magazine ( !tJfU) published in May 2008,

Cheung was reporte-d to be "th& person-in-charge" of a VIP room owned by Crown


Macau. 20

Other colourful bad>Qtound research has connected Cheung and others (including
Sonny Yeung Hoi Shing (f,~;;t;}s;t.) (the brother of Emperor conglomerate leader Albert

International Risk Limited

Page 29 of 54

SJ001205
PlaintiffEx. 1102_00029

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

-----------------------------

Yeung Sau Shing

WA:Z{:f!R),

Robert Chan (ff~U;~5f) and others}, to the ffm;riCI>"Ig o{a

very high-profile civil action between the late Nina Wang (ff$;)7.!!{) and her father-inlaw, Wang Din Shin

CIA);MJ:).

Reportedly, Wang Din Shin signed an agreement with this "consortiurr( (including
Cheung). Pursuant to their agreement, Wang Din Shin would apparently give 10% of
the ChinaChem estate (approximately HK$4 billion), to the consortium if he won the
litigation. 21

Jumbo Boom Holdings Limited

i an investment company

According to an online reference, Jumbti

incorporated in the British Virgin Islands ("BVI") and is seid to be beneficially owned
by Cheung In this media reference.

i; described as being a merchant in

Hong KongY

On 16 January 2007, it was f\\fYlrhd ~hat the Neptune Group entered into an
agreement to acquire the entire bsu>:Jd sr1#r~~ capital of Credible Limited, a company
incorporated in the BVI and which
as an independent third

vias b~m~~ficially owned

by a "Mr. Guo", described

. l\t that time, Credible Limited was said to hold 20%

equity interest in B<<W< MovP Investments Limited, a company incorporated in the


BVI and which is siso benef\cially owned by Mr. Guo. Pursuant to the agreement,
Base Move lnve&.trnentc Limited entered into another agreement to acquire 100% of
Highest lncrease Limited's profits, this was said to represent approximately 0.4 of the

~ ,. jff1W:.&~~.n{),!! ~

=:;:~ ~~~. !Vext fi!lagazine. 'i9 Apnl 2007; ''dR/J--Ht ;~tli' 400 H?:Y~~i?t:~~ihih}~tf.f;~l~~{", Next

t:f~'qt~;~~~Y"~ s;~~~~~,~~bX~~~t;.;;i;;qf!.;\\tq;>Qgy;gf.~st~!2Q()/Q;i,1?!\,Jli;!QQ/Q2J2JH;:~g.r;!f. 8 February

20Dl

international Risk Limited

Page 30 of 54

SJ001206

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00030

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15 May 2010

rolling turnove,-2 of Hou Wan Entertainment Unipessoal Limitada

bJ) ("Hou Wan"), a Macau-incorporated company that is sairJ to be prindp?HY

engaged in gaming promotion at the Chengclu VIP room "owned" hy Sands Macau.
Highest Increase Limited is reportedly a company incorporated in the BVi which is
also beneficially owned by Mr. Guo. 24

An announcement made by Neptune Group dated 9 February 2007 reported that


,Jumbo Boom and Kingston Securities Limited were the joint under..vriters of Neptune
Gro.up. Jumbo Boom had no undervvriting

experi~)flC8

announcement and became involved in the deal

as at the date of the


Neptune Group through

Kingston Securities Limited.

Jumbo Boom was said to have agreed to become one of ihs underwriters because it
was confident of the future growth oi th<c: Neptt.n\l;l Group. Pursuant to the
undervvriting agreement, the undef\h;Titers agre;;:d to underv.rrite 719,881,500 sh<Jres,

of wt1ich Jumbo Boom underwrote 621 ,i}ff',616 shares in the first place and
Kingston Securities Limited undBf\vrote the remaining 97,903,884 shares, on a fully
undep,vritten basis. 25

According to another annt\wncement made by Neptune Group and dated 6 July 2007,
310,817,678 shares (represontlng approximately 43.18% of the total 719,817,678
shares of Neptun~l

23

Group) went undersubscribed.

Pursuant to the earlier

Ro:Hng .turnovc:c-r: ihfj va!u.e of rolling/dead ch;ps bet by the customers that the Junket operator

~~':,'[~;l~:'i~t~ '~~T-~~:. .t:~&itedc~'.i!&Qflt:'.Wf.'.ltlt/.;?_QQ/Q~.1?f.LT!':!?QQ7Q2J:GCi.':i.fl.~{ 9 February

?,007

~,~ c.t!Q.:l/]t{:l:J.V. ~-, ,,~~t:n.?~:.:..t~.!5/!.:;&tQ.QQ.Q[l.i2lG.GD~S~~/ggtJ:i.fJ)QLQ2.12/.LIJ:l;{;Q.QZQlJ.f~f.J3i\QQ.t.

__

,_,,

__

_________,_

.... ,_,, .............. ,_,_,

9 February

_________
Page 31 of 54

lnternationai Risk Limited

SJ001207

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00031

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 20i0

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (.5)

underNriting agreement, these 310,817,678 shares were to be tak13n op by Jurt!bo


Boom, which we note to be beneficially owned by Cheung. 26

According to the online database of the Hong Kong Stock Exchar\ge, Juriii)o Boom
held 12.91% of the issued share capital of the Neptune Group on 4 July 2007

27

Further research revealed that Jumbo Boom ceased to be a substantial shareholder


in the Neptune Group since 3 September 2008. 28

An article published by South China Morning Post dnted28 June 2009 reported that
that Wen Wei Po (a local Chinese language newsp~pmt) had claimed that Cheung
an9 Lin Cheuk Chiu had jointly invested in 1996 Neptunq Cruise. 29

Adverse Press Reports

The following references relates to the

M~ilk~

Trial that is the subject of the key

Reuters Article (Appendix 2) which!ntematinnai Risk has examined:

a. According to a Hong Korg

reference dated 16 October 2009, Senior

Detective Inspector Cheung

r>Aan Shing,. described as an experienced anti-

Triad officer, gave ev\dnnce as an expert witness in the trial of five alleged Wo
Hop To Triad rnernb,z;rs who were accuse.d of taking part in a plot to murder a
"chip-changer", Wong Kem-ming

(:E~ft';)

(aka

:D!Wf) ("Wong"), in May 2008.

See Wah Lun, Tar;g KaMan, Wong Chi Man, Yeung Chun f\it and Chan Ho

26
2

!1~t~.

-:-~LbJ~SE~!!~:.Y?.:llkli_~~.Q/.ll9J9.9.D.f"tY;{!.~Lgft1~20QZ.Q1Q.Qt.~TN29.QZ.QLQ_626B.pdt, 6 July 2007

~-h~i~.=-. ,-.. =--=':l-'2~~~--:'

~Q!J2;.11KLQ.JN.8l$.~~Jt9J~9..~2a2::1l~~-t::.?f.\l.$.P.J.QJ&.GQ~NQQllirJg:.Gr.~F!.P.:t.L

.. .

.?.Q.9.?f.~~.J.~.~!t~!:lYSd~21/jClfk11.:!.9.~f~QQ

;~;,j~~~7~.f;~~;.. ,:&~:rm.tk/0.if.NBAi!8Si.J..La.Ql.'}??.~':'f!i?5~.Jd"'izi~~~~t2~r~ry::N~R.\'Il'e+GroJJJ2.+1~
:~9f?rP.G9L.P,._._ ..: .) LL~.E~:~_qr.qgp:~L~~t. &gi::.24LQZi.fQQ}.~s;~~t=::Q.;LQ~/?O@&s~_i~~J.~S...~~~~t~:;f;f3~?!&;2f2QQ
.;~ ~ ~~~Q.::Q;f'~. :? \/~S?f~Q:fL~.?..G~~:l.Q{~:.#H~.::=~tV:!~l:~iEQQ::f~, retrieved 24 Apri! 2010

,.,. e;:.,n,Wng f..ir;g' took faHen tycoon aboard tc tJe!". South China Morning Post. 28 June 2009

----------------

Page 32 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001208
PlaintiffEx. I 102_00032

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15May2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Leung, the five defendants. pleaded not guilty to their respective charges., See
Wah Lun, alleged to be a senior member of Wo Hop To,

was also charged

with conspiring with Cheung to commit murder and of soliciting nine people,
including the other four defendants, to murder. 30
b. A media reference reported that, on 23 October 2009, See Wah Lun, Tang Ka
Man, Wong Chi Man, Yeung Chun Kit and Chan Ho Leung were convicted of
acting as Triad members and conspiring to cause grievous bodily harm. See
Wah Lun was also convicted of conspiring

to murder and soliciting nine

people, including the other four convicted, to corntnit murder. See Wah Lun
was sentenced to imprisonment for 14 years. Tang l\a Man, Yeung Chun Kit,
and Chan Ho Leung were each sentenced fo knpr!sonment for 9 years and
Wong Chi Man for 8.5 years. In was reported that the five men were ordered
by Cheung in April 2008 to abduct Wong and break his arms and legs.
However. reportedly Cheung chanoed his mind in May 2008 and ordered
Wong to be killed. Wong reportedly testified that Siu Yun-ping (iN,f)j\'!JZP:) ("Siu"),
also known as the "Yuen Long God of Gambling" had won between HK$ 500
million to HK$600 m!llion playing baccarat between August 2007 and January
2008 in Macau casinos, including 1hE'rVenetian. the Lisboa and Sands Macau.
Reportedly Wong fl'.),':lde more thf;lli HK$1 0 million in tips from Siu. " 1
c. An article published by a local newspaper, Ming Pao. dated 9 October 2009
revealed other details .relating to the aforementioned Trial. It was reported that
Siu, describ~d as a witness during the trial, was suspected of cheating while
gaming in tlitee VIP rooms in Macau and was asked to return the money he
had won. On 15 February 2008, Siu was reportedly abducted and attacked by
five 1/1/o Hop To Triad members. Wong, who took Siu along, reportedly made

30
"Officer lifts !id on workinqs of the undef\Vorld'', Soutl; China Mommg Post. 16 October 2009
"''Triad .five }ailed over plot to kiil croupier", South China Morning Post, 28 October 2009

Page 33 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001209

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00033

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

-----

approximately "60 mii!ion" in commission and tips by changing chips Jor S\u.;
this allegedly was the reason for Wong being targeted by Cheung; Wongwas
reportedly sche.duled to attend the third day of testimony oft!'! iS trl<31. 3 ~

d. Numerous articles published by South China Morning Post ih Oc\ober 2009


report See Wah Lun, as an alleged senior member of the Wo Hop To, and he
was also charged with conspiring with Cheung to commit murder, and with
soliciting nine people, including the other four convicted persons, to murder.
Siu reportedly testified that he believed the plan to abduct and murder Wong
was orchestrated because someone was angry

he had won such a huge

sum of money and wanted il back. Siu .also reportedly revealed that he was
attacked by five men after dinner wit!itvfo frt0nds in Gtlenzhen. PRC in midFebruary 2008; this foliows an arson attack on his home and threatening calls
to his son. 33

Accoiding to muitiple online referen:::ms, Cheung was reportedly arrested by police in


mainland PRC in connection with f.hdr invpstigations into Huang Guang Yu and Lin
Cheuk Chiu (aka Lih Chiu) in 2t109.Hf~eportedly Huang Guang Yu was arrested in
November 2008 for alleged stock rnanipulgtion, and Lin Cheuk Chiu was arrested
one month later in connecfinn with the Huahg Guang Yu investigation.

35

~ b~tg:ifr.~ViS. SiQfi..Q~;.:L;., ~:.;-/~,-~1\~t- ~-:';_:; '::itf:~Q'f.L9.9!f.J:Q:~.!.;1!.J.LJ?~Q.9_9.L1.. htQJl. 9 October 2.009

"Gambiing God' piac;,,d i';i~h' of up to HK$1.qm" South China Mon11i1g Post. 10 October 2009: "God
of Gamblmg lent HK$20m tq <:as; no dealer in Macaw. court toid", Sout11 China Morning Post, 9
October 2009: "God o[ (;;ambling' attacked over wins, court toid", South China Morning Post, 8
:L

~c.t..~.-,to,'. b..:.e:
.2008
_ ''r,,~~-~:iJ2!D.g:::~-~~~"tl.Gn/gt2_QQ...tt:-.Q~~;;Q}t:Q(i.9Q1. gr'2_fj3~~tsht.D:H~ 3 June 2008.
,J~-),..._\,,._t:;2cft.<:,~

:_'.:.'..:.1f:lN/.rt~'li:?..,...1~1. tnrn!~ 27 Nove!nber 2009, t~f1P.JLW~":-:~Y.Si.?..E:.og coi"n.cr:/2010-Q~:.

:.QJ2Zl.1.9_ ;: ' :' :; ;;

j.~...:.,:J!.?::L.J?B.J.~-:~ ~,:::;Y.?..Br:;t(~G:=.{;.?.~)J.Q.rnQYY..tf.~~~;.~Y.V~/~!:9.9.JX~(f!~:.J2.~@:stine.com.tX~.~f.?.~(QD.:Y.l.v--n(:;\vJt.
~-:nj_Q:.:J..~?.A.$2~:~- ., ..:,~i~?~t.~J1.S~/:?.B?.~?.f.~J:2.9.22Y.~2P~-Q1:Y./\.4.~~s..t~l\~i~:?.?~gg_::.1Y.&tt:.?:.b.:.1V'1&.~;.t::.9.!D,&Jl::Dil

::},\me 2009
35

'"Garnbling king' took fallen tycoon aboard to bet", South China Mommg Post, 28 June 2009.

- - - - - . ------------......-..- - - - - - -

Page 34 of 54

lniernational Risk Limited

SJ001210

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00034

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

-----

lh March 1996, the police in Hong Kong reportedly organised a series of operations
against local Triad groups. One such operation reportedly targeted the \1\io Hop. To,
during which 20 men, including Cheung, and 3 women were am~101<:KL 3"

Another media reference reported that Cheung, identified as a leader ofthe Wo Hop
To, was charged in August 199.6 with blackmailing street vendors at the Aberdeen
Fish Market in Hong Kong. However, he was reportedly released due to insufficient
evidence. 37

Separately, an online reference dated 4 May 2010 repYied that the Hong Kong
police had arrested twenty-five alleged Wo Hop T<> rnembers in Aberdeen,
.apparently in connection with internal dispu\BH witflin

Triad society and an

38

planned affray .

Database & Public Records Searcr,,1rt

World-Check Search

Search of the World-Check

datahg~x s>~rvice

found one relevant finding for

Cheung.

Cheung, describe<! in this

rri<f~CJrence

as the owner of Jumbo Boom, is allegedly

a leader of the \:No Hop 'Tn organized crime group in Hong Kong and is a
purported casili<l V!P room operator in Macau. According to this database,
Cheunq 'AH~s charged with extortion in Hong Kong in August 1996. However,

cherg<Y<i were dropped due to lack of evidence. In addition, this database

~--:, iJ~1Q.//.WY:/'i'!.. f. '-~~@f.t.Y~:;:;:c::!)!.~/P.?:/.t!.OWlf:?}_JL 2 June 2009


:.: >::.~-_QJ.fld!J~?;.', ,,__ :;:;~f:t\.~.Q.ill.SD!iJfl.h~UlX1.:s~{q!29Q0i'22Q~b1.z.;y, 4 June 2009
~~~ .,,., :~' : \:~-:.~_._y~_>-;:~L:;;Q.:.D::!;?.t1!.9.i~C..Q.Q~2.Q3{A!t.t9tL[!~m!. 4 Ma}' 2010

lnternationa\ R1sk Limited

Page 35 of 54

SJ001211

Plaintiff Ex. II 02_ 00035

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15May2010

indicated that in June 2009 Cheung was arrested by


gambling and organized crime-related investigations.

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of(5)

main!~nd ppHc~

for

39

Sanctions List Searches


International Risk conducted a comprehensive search of relevant international
sanctions lists. Our search found no records to suggest that Cheung is currently
registered by major global organizations as being associated with any money
laundering issues, terrorism, frauduient practices

or denial ot certain trading

privileges.

Dtrectorship Searches in Hong Kong

Search of Hong Kong company records revealed that Cheung is a director of the
following 11 companies registered in

~he

terrHorv, two of which are now-dissolved:

Live companies:

1.

Acetime Development Limited c::;;:~~'li:'t!fi2:.:P;r!oN{;iYJ) [CR no.: 0768264]

2.

8 8 Limited [CR no.: 1167329}.

3.

Great Harbour international Limited ( l'.~ fiG:');,: ~~~g

'PIll~ :L}

UJ) [CR no.:

0432094]
4.

K M K Umited [CR no.. : 1357968]

5.

Ocean Pa!a~:o Limited

6.

Orienta! Pe<i\ce Entertainments Company Limited U~Iti1.'4)U~tiiTF!i}fi'J) [CR

(i:fif1Ff:f6R:z;;'f\l) [CR no.: 1222700]

no.: 0902726]

>'i 'Ne note thsl World-Check searches conducted by Sands. on 25 January 2010. faiied to secure a
rnatch on Cheung.

-- .. - .... - - - - - -

Page 36 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001212
Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00036

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

7.

Pacific Harmony Investment Limited ( ~::

t!l 'I~

Clieni Confidential
Copy (5) of(5)

rsm.~~

[CH no.:

0759635]
8.

Pro Champion Investment Limited (~t$f!;!:j;ff;pj!\N~}~ 1) [CR flo.: 0872624]

9.

Star Nice Enterprise Limited ('!1t.J'Ri"~:;\tf:JI~1} q]) [CR no.: 05098bOJ

Dissolved companies:

i.

Smart Base Investment Limited (:9'~:Hl~f!

2.

Well China Investment Limited

('i'f?ti!tfff;,;

,:L}i'f)) [CR no.: 0803435]

+>

'j) [CR no.: 0798813]

Hong Kong Litigation & Bankruptcy Searches

A search of online litigation records revealed that Cheung was involved in the
foJiowing legal proceedings in Hong Kong: ..

Category:

High Coprt

Action no.:

HCMP8:i.5/189B

Filing date:

12 March }996

Description:

In the mattef' of The Organized and Serious Crimes

Or<flrwmce (Chapter 455)

<:~nd ln the matter of Cheung Chi

Tal, i1older of Hong Kong Identity Card no. 0684555(0),

Ng Chor Har holder of Hong Kong identity Card no.


D390887(A) and Goldnice Hongkong Ltd
Cause:

Others

An individual witt! the same English name as Cheung was reportedly involved in the
following legai proceedings in Hong Kong:

-------..- - - - - - - -..

-----Page 37 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001213

PlaintiffEx. I 102_00037

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Articie & Report on Cheung Chi-lai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Category:

High Court

Action no.:

HCMP278/1991

Filing date:

26 January 1991

Description:

In the matter of an application for bail l:{y Cheupg Chi Tai


and in the matter of case no. 022602/90

Cause:

Application for bail

Without further identifier information on the abovementioned bail applicant, we are


current unable to determine whether he is identical tothe Subject of our inquiries.

Note: We are currently seeking to access all information

ttlat is

publically available

on the two above court cases. These are currently <:1\VEJiting.ggvernment retrieval. We
will forvtard any relevant findings to Sands in a timely manher.

Further investigative research at the Offtc;;; pf the Official Receiver's Office has
determined that no bankruptcy petitions have been filed against Cheun.g in Hong
Kong.

Macau Litigation Se.arches

A search of an online Ht>g.atior; rJgtabase reveal.ed that Cheung has not been involved
in any legal (civii or (~dmina1) proceedings in Macau.

US Litigation Searh?P

international Risk carried out extensive research through online database sources
covering bankruptcy filings, US federal district court fllings, as we!! as State and
Municipal court filings, with a view to identify litigation involving Cheung. Our

----- ..---.. --- --.. -- .. - - - - - - - -

Page 38 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001214

PlaintiffEx. I 102 00038

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Cllent Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

research of these available records found no references to Cheung being involved in


legal proceedings in the US.

US Exclusion and Rejection Lists

Searches of the websites of the gaming control boards in Nevada and New Jersey
uncovered no record of Cheung on the exclusion and reject lists. Further searches of
the gaming control board, gambling commission, and gaming registry in Illinois,
fvfississippi and Louisiana, respectively, aiso located no record of Cheun.g on their
equivalent lists.

Searches of various checklists produced by fbe Victoria Commission for Gaming


Regulation determined that there is no record of Cheung as being involved in any
disciplinary action decisions, appeals or inquiries in this f\ustra!ian state. There is
also no record of Cheung being a major license holder according to the Queensland
Office of Gaming Regulation.

US Treasury Department

Searches of the list of 'Spech;!ly Designated Nationals and Blocked Individuals'


published by the US Treasqry, found no reference to Cheung.

US Senate Raper'{
During

HlH

course of our investigations, we identified and secured a copy of tile

Report made by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee


on Governrn~mts! Affairs, 102n>:1 Congress, 2nd Session, United States Senate,
entitled "The New International Criminal and Asian Organised Crime" (December
1992) ("the US Senate Report") (Appendix 7).

International Risk Limited

Page 39 of 54

SJ001215

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00039

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Client Confidential
Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
Copy (5) of (5)
15 May 2010
-------------------------------..----------:----

Page 8 this authoritative Report provides a diagram entitled "Wo Hqp Tq Trtad'!! and
in this diagram Cheung is named as one of the key leaders of the Wb Hop To Triad

Society. He appears under the "Dragon Head", Chan Ting hlting.

40

We have

reproduced this diagram as Appendix 8 for ease of reference.

This Report also states that the ''Wo Group" is the second largest Triad organisation
in Hong Kong, and consist of at least ten separate Triad factions, the largest of which
is the Wo Shing Wo. The crimina! background of the VVoHop To in North America
and Australia was particularly noted in the Report. as toHo~\s:

.. TfJf:l SuiJoommittee heard considerable e\tidenc& 1'l1atJtle Wo /-lop To T!iad, a part


of lf!o Wo Group. has taken controf of Asian criminal aciivil'l in tl?e San Francisco
Bay Area. The Wo Hop To has al$0 been lied to c;rimina/ actMty in Los Angeles.
Honolulu, .Oottland, Las Vegas,
Australia and Canada.

Atlantic C;ily;

Boston, anci New York, in addition to

41

Separately, in the statement rnade \':ly Scott E. Orchard, Staff Investigator of the US
Senate Permanent Subcommittee dn h}vestigations on 18 June 1992 (Appendix 9),

he stated that

T/Je other leaders of tt/r:;< Wo !--fop To in 1-:iong Kong are active in promoting heroin
trafficking, i!IQQ'~lf g<.Jmbling, loan-sharking, extortion and alien smuggling

''"US s~"nate R<:port, p. S


" US Senate Report, p. 10. Pages 24-27 of this Report also briefty oL,tfined some of Wo Hop To's
(d!ega~) ad:ivHies i0 the US

Page 40 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001216

Plaintiff Ex. I 102 00040

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15May2010

----------------------

Investigative Research into Cheung's Connections with Hou Wan

Public Records

According to public records, Cheung was allegedly a beneficia1 own,r of JumbO


Boom, an investment company incorporated in the BVI. 42 Through a convoluted
series of business arrangements, the documents show that he was connected to the
Hou Wan Junket between July 2007 and September 2003.

As of 11 July 2007, Jumbo Boom was one of the substfm'Ual shareholders (12.91%)
of Neptune Group, 43 a publicly-listed company on th.e !--long Kong Stock Exchange
(stock code 70), which was primarily engaged in thQlGa$!ng and management of its
70%-owned casino cruise business. It also received profits from gaming and
entertainment related business in Macau '' 1

At that tirne, a wl1olly-owned BVI-incorpo;-rrt<A subsidiary of the Neptune Group,


Credible Limited. held a 20%

>;iq~;fty

another BVI-incorporated entHy.

4
"

interest in Base Move Investments Limited,

ee:J;C Move Investments Limited was reportedly

entitled to approximately 0.4% of the wl!ing turnover 46 generated by Hou Wan


Entertainment Unipessoai Lin;b'lda

(f!~if)j\~-B--- AX1W~{~ fol)

("Hou Wan") and/or its

customers at the "Chfu-;gctu VlP Club".

?. .h!tiJJ!.~2~:. r~i~~~DgnJ :~. ,.,~. f g9Jico!U~~9f.~.Q~Y/(lb1st200ZG21.6L~IN6.QQ.l.Qf.:i.?~i::.tL~!IJl. 9 February


2007
43
tr~hp:.:,.>_:.:. Af~;:~J1~f<JY.QQ~:J1f~!Q~iN~~~~U~~J~?l..fJ.J?.~i~?.?~~-0.~:%si(J:-::22_Q~Q.1QJ~!~QfPX!.~~~1Vle+-.Q:1!.v.P..~:k
4

~'~~~:~~4~!1~!1~~~ii:::::::,::::~:~,:WQ

?CO?
,,,, iblllng turnover the value of roliingidead chips bet by the customers tnat the Junket operator
t/('i~~ns tc ${i::-~;j~:; Macau

-----------------Page41 of54

International Risk Limited

SJ001217

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02_ 00041

Las Vegas Sands Corp

Client Confidential

lndependentAssessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai


15 May 2010

Copy (5) of (5)

According to this media reference, Hou Wan is a company incorporet~~d in Macau

1x1

9 November 2004 and is wholly-owned by Mr. Guo. Furthermore, this refeH,)fli:;e


claimed that Mr. Guo is the founder of Hou Wan and, through
as a Junket representative for Sands fvlacao since July 2005.

H<>u Wnn,

had eded

47

We note that according to the online database of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange

that, Jumbo Boom ceased to be a substantial shareholder in the Neptune Group on


3 September 2008 48

- - - - - - -....-

........................................................................................................ -

_ _ _____

........... _............ .......

.. ,

Page 42 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001218

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00042

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15May20i0

g~~~i~f

Cheung Chi Tai


I

6~nefir.:~!!y

Whoil\tCwned
-..~

.1umho Boor('~
Holding.s Limited
!

!:2.91'-~ 3ham!-:o!de?
(i% -~t 1: J.:l;,;2007)

,):
Nspf.:.:n~

Group

~:n~!;:ed (Si:'HK~ 7.C)

+ .

lOll''t(, :~;h.::rf.'hofct::'

~
Cr>:':t~~bli~

Lii:':it>;!rl

''

Ho:JJ..

:'. -~~~:~a:nrf1ent
-, .:: ;.imlta:d.::t

Lin;'pe-~':

Ji;ni<e.t ;)pe-r ..;.to~

Sands. Macml

Diagram indicding t.!Je Relationsh(o between Cheung ano tile "Cilengdu VIP Club" as Drawn from
Public Records (aiso as Appendix 13j

_____ _____
,

_ ____ ____________
,,

Page 43 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001219

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00043

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Giient Confidential
Independent Assessment of Reuters Artide & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
Copy (5) of (5)
15 May 2010

Docurnents Provided by Sands

Separately, Sands provided International Risk with documents as part of our start~up

materials. These included:

"

Venetian Macau Limited Junket Credit Agreement betv.reen Venetian Macau


Limited and Hou Wan (~H1i'i0Ji:a~

A.Tiil~:L~; I~j)

(Appendix 10), signed by Lei

Choi In, Cheung Chi Tai on 18 Apri12008;


"

Venetian Macau Limited Junket Credit Agreement between Venetian Macau


Limited and Hao Cai Entertainment Company Um!ted (fr.Ftf1.:34vl'ilf~

/ . . hill~:!}

8]} (Appendix 11), signed by Lei In Peng, Cheung Chi Tai on 18 April 2008;

and
"

Three surveillance record lags, datf)d 29 Febrw~ry 2008. i4 February 2008,

and 26 September 2009 respectiVE!iy.(cci!iectiveiy as Appendix 12),

Review and analysis of the two Junket Cr0dit Agreements reveal that Cheung
is recorded as being a credit

~'EM?x\.nlsr

to the Hou Wan and Hao Cal Junkets,

respectively.
These two documents recorded the following information:

Venetian Macau Limited Junket Credit Agreement betvveen Venetian Macav Limited
and Hou Wan (if:,

, fJ!f/{:~:':'f!) (Appendix 10)

Lender lnfwmation

Company f'Jame:

Venetian Macau Lirnited

Busines;s Address:

Estrada da Baia deN. Senhora da Esperanca, s/n,


Taipa, Macau SAR.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -..-..-----------------------------

Page 44 of 54

International R1sk Limited

SJ001220

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00044

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Business Phone:

(853) 8118-7000

Business Registration #:

15702(SO)

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Borrower Information

Junket Company Name:

~f)jg~iJJ.,t)l~--}.,f'Iif1tL.~Hj

Business Address:

Avenida do Infante D. Henrique, Nos. 25 a 31, Edif

Business Phone:

(853) 2881-1662

Business Registration#:

21830(80)

Junket License #:

E025

Patron f-\ccount #:

125583

Credit Limit:

HKD1 OO,OQ0,000.00

Wa long, 12 andar B, em Macau

Company Director Information


Director Name:

Lei, Chof!n

Patron Account#:

282050

Guarantor Information:

Ciieung, (:>hi Tai

Marital Status:

Single

Patron Account No.:

47537

Address:

J!fH/Ffii~'t~JA\C'i.'A~fl'ti 6 .f~t G

Residence Phone No.:

(852) 8118-0818; (852) 9090-6644

Date of Birth:

9 July 1960

ID Card I Passport No.:

HKID 0684555(0)

BF

Vens-ifon Macau Limited Junket Credit Agreement between Venetian Macau Limited
end Hao Cai (J1ppendix 11)

International Risk Limited

Page 45 of 54

SJ001221

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00045

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Client Confidential
Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
Copy (5) of (5)
15 May 2010

Lender information
Company Name:

Venetian Macau limited

Business Address:

Estrada da Baia deN. Senhor.a 6a .Esperanca, s/n,


Taipa, Macau SAR.

Business Phone:

(853) 8118-7000

Business Registration#:

15702(80)

Borrower Information
Junket Company Name:

Hao Cai Entertainment Company Limited

Business Address:

Rua de Berlim, Nos. 214, Magnificent Court, 1


andar H, Macau

Business Phone:

(853) 2881-'i662 49

Business Registration #:

28052(80)

Junket License#:

E116

Patron Account #:

5305Tl

Credit Limit:

HKD150,000,000.00

Company Director lnfornmtion


Director Name:

Lei, !n Peng

Patron Account#:

i 38025

Guarantor Information
Guarantor hlatne:

Cheung, Chi Tai

Marital Status:

Single

Palron Account No.:

47537

Address:
Residence Phone No.:

')

(852) 8118-0818

Identical Business Phone number as the one prov1ded for Hou Wan.

Page 46 of 54

International R1sk Limited

SJ001222

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00046

Las. Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Date of Birth:

9 July 1960

10 Card I Passport No.:

HKIO 0684555(0)

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Surveillance Department Log Entries

Additionally. we analysed surveillance record logs provided by Sands which provide


interesting short commentaries. (Appendix 12)

The Surveillance Department Log Entries (J4ppendix 12) make ciear


reference to Cheung, Wong and Siu.

"

The same survetllance logs make rpf;renc;e to, v;hat we assess to be an


example of the "cheating" allegation against Siu; this on the 20th of February

2008.
"

Also, public records show that Cheung, through the complicated arrangement
(outlined earlier), had (at !east) a financial interest in the Junkets concerned,
which were operating inside the Chengdu Private Room at the Sands Macau;
this between July 2007 and.Sepk~nlb~)r 2008 Page 43 refers.

Although the logs reviewed appear to be separate and distinct from each other,
Cheung is variously described in the logs as being ''in-charge" of the Junket
concerned in all three sepan1te log entries (Appendix 12).

Two of the entries refer to Cheung

as

the "Junket Director" of Hao CaL in the third

record, he is refer-red to as being "the boss" of Hou Wan Junket.

International Risk Limited

Page 47 of 54

SJ001223

P1aintiffEx. 1102 00047

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

The details of these three entries are as foilows:

1. !n the first of these logs, relating to Incident File Number !1<.!200$0028757 and
dated 29 February 2008 6:00:28 PM, Cheung is described

as "Junket Director

ofHao Cai".

2. In the second of these surveillance record logs, relating to Incident File

Number IN20080025539 and dated 14 February 2008 7:00:i 5 PM. Cheung is


recorded in this log as "he is now the Director of Hao Cai". (We also note that
Lei Lu Peng is recorded as "Director of Junket operator Hao Cai" earlier in this

document).

3. In the third of these surveillance record logs, relating to incident File Number
IN20090161092 and dated 26 September 2009 5:17:00 AM, Cheung is
recorded as "the boss of Hou VVan Junket".

Clearly the fact that such comments .>Nere recorded is of considerable note. However
these comments do not necessarily constitute "proof' of Cheung's ownership of the
Junkets: rather this is the opinion ofthe pruson(s) whose comments were recorded
in the logs.

---------

_..................... ___ ......... - ....... - ....- .... - ....--......

-------Page 48 of 54

international Risk. Limited

SJ001224
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00048

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15 May 2010

Discreet Field Enquiries


We carried out discreet enquiries with a number of well-placed sources to secure
information on the background and reputation of Cheung.

Background & Reputation of Cheung


We spoke discreetly to a former law enforcement officer (crime officer) of the thenRoyal Hong Kong Police and who knew Cheung personally in the i 980s. According
to this trusted source, Cheung grew up in a iarge, poor and very "messy" family in
the Aberdeen area of Hong Kong Island. Cheunq's eldest brother is also said to have
died several years ago from drug-abuse.

This source reported that Cheung had aiweys claimed to be a member of the Wo
Hop To Triad Society. As

a teenager Cheung stood out as a prominent Triad

member. He took a leading role in various iHegal activities. including the trafficking of
illegal drugs and engaging in the extortion of public light bus (PLB) drivers. This
sometimes involved the throwing of human excrement into the mini-buses of "noncompliant" PLB drivers.

Cheung was also kni.l'Nf1 to him to have taken a prominent role in "territorial disputes"
with other Triads .in the Happy Valley and Wan Chai areas of Hong Kong over
criminal enterprises.

Moreover, this source further reported that by his mid-30s Cheung had accumulated
sufficient capite! through his illegal Triad activities to expand into the "gambling

----"--

Page 49 of 54

International Ris'K Limited

SJ001225

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00049

Las Vegas Sands Corp


lndepetident Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

-------------------------------Together with other Triad members, he reportedly took part in [V~tiovs and
unspecified] illegal money lending and money laundering actiVities. These are
reported to have taken place inside casinos "controlled by StanleyHd'.

Cheung is currently described as being a rich man who counts arnongst his
numerous business interests, casino ships and VIP gaming rooms.

Another well-plac--ed law enforcement source stated th?t Cheung Chi Tai, aka Tsang
Pau, is a notorious Triad member in the Wo Hop To Triad Society.

According to a usually-reliable and trusted former Hong Kong law enforcement


source. Cheung is a very tough Triad leadl:1L Morl.}ovor, although he reportedly
would not hesitate to use violence against followers who are perceived to have
betrayed or to have been disloyal to him, he is also known to be generous to those
who are loyal to him.

This source recalled that Cheung. was previously charged with biackmaii and other
Triad related offences by the Royal Hong Kong Police Force Crime Unit in 1996,
when Cheung and his gang were accused of extorting fishermen for protection
money at the Aberdeen Fishery Market. However, Cheung was acquitted of the
criminal charges .at triaL

Cheung's Conm::otion with the Trial Subject Matter

We spoke discreetly to two very well--placed law enforcement sources, one of whom
hat' just retired, vvho are both very knowledgeable about the October 2009 Trial
n1ferred to in the (Reuters) Article.

Page 50 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001226

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00050

Las Vegas Sands Corp


independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

15 May 20!0

-------------------
Both sources reported that Wong Kam-ming (J::11f;,:t}j) ("Wong"), aka \t'\long Mirig,chai

CJYHfl is a Junket operator (Jfi'fi!:'\iFFJ and not a casino dealer.


According to these sources. all five defendants at the Trial are members of the Wo
Hop To Triad Society. During the Trial. our sources reported that none of the five
defendants elected to give evidence in court Cheung's name (and his nickname,
'Tsang Pau") was nevertheless mentioned repeatedly during the Trial b)' prosecution
witnesses: who referred to Cheung as being "the bm;s" of those charged and the
mastermind behind the piot to kHI Wong.

Our sources reported that. during the evidence given in the court proceedings. a
specific allegation was made that Cheung had given instructions to "Tai Ngan"
who. 50 as Cheung's right-hand man and Wo Hop To Triad member, further instructed
a group of Wo Hop To Triad members ''to.do the job".

One of these would-be-assassins later r;qported the matter to the police: the
information he gave would ultirria!!.':iy lead to the arrests of a number of people
(including Cheung) and the subsequt":nt prosecution and conviction of the five
defendants at TriaL

Our sources also advk'>ed that Cheung was arrested bv police on the same day as
the other five defenq:mts. Shortly after his arrest the police also searched Cheung's
addresses in Wah Fu Estate. Aberdeen (which is apparently his parents' home
address) and a 8E;cond address at Shouson Hill Road. However, no evidence
incriminating Cheung was located.

lnternationa! Risk Limited

Page 51 of 54

SJ001227

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00051

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai

Client Confidential

Copy (5) of (5)

15 May 2010

-----------------------

In the absence of eye witness or other incriminating evidenco. Cheung Wf:lS


ultimately released unconditionally by the Police. Our sources h~tve confirmed

that

none of the five defendants were willing to name Cheung as being their 'Triad "boss"
or as the one who had organised the plot against Wong.
Uncorroborated information (from the two law enforcement sowces) states that each
of the five defendants was paid "HK$2 million or more" in return for not providing any
evidence to police which might implicate Cheung in the ease.

During the Trial, according to the same two law enforcement sources, Siu's evidence
included, inter alia, a statement that he had been beaten Up by "some gangsters"
outside of a restaurant in Sflenztlen, and that he oeHeveo this attack to be arranged
by Cheung's follower: "Fat Cheung", a man whom he w<>s supposed to have dinner
with on the day of the attack.

The poiice sources stated that Wonp is a close friend of Siu Yun-ping
aka the "Yuen Long God of Garnbling"

("Siu"),

j{f!fiP) aka "Gambling Addict Ping"

Page 52 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001228

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00052

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of Reuters Article & Report on Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Copy of Proposal and Agreed Terms & Cmv:ntlons for this
Engagement

Appendix 2: The Reutors Article, "Special Report: High-RoHers, Triads and a


Las Vegas Giant"

Appendix 3: State of New Jersey, Department of Law and Public Safety "Sp.ecial Report of the Division of Gaming Enforcern0nt to the Casino Control
Commission on its Investigation of MGM 1\llir~ge's .!o!nl Venture with Pansy Ho
in Macau, Special Administrative Region,

Feopik~'s

[l(epu!Jiic of China"

Appendix 4: The Reuters Article, "Spm:;t,;J Report; High-Rollers, Triads and a


Las Vegas Giant" (Highlighted and Ntimber~d)
Appendix 5: Sands' Request for Cow1 Transcript from the Registrar of the
High Court

Appendix 6: Official Tmmtcript of the Court Audio Recording of the Sentencing


of the Defendants

Appendix 7: Report
of the

mad~1

Committe~> (m

by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

{3ovemmental Affairs, United States Senate (December

1992}, ''The New International Criminal and Asian Organized Crime"


Appendix 8; Oruanisation of the Wo Hop To Triad Society

International Ris~. Limited

Page 53 of 54

SJ001229

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00053

Las Vegas Sands Corp


Independent Assessment of .Reuters Article & Report or. Cheung Chi-tai
15 May 2010

Client Confidential
Copy (5) of (5)

Appendix 9: Staff Statement of Scott E. Orchard, Staff lnvestigl:ftr, US $~nate


Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 18 June 1992
Appendix 10: Document Showing Cheung to be a Guarantor to rloJ.! w~JtMl (!lr~
frt#:~

-A:ffr~i;. ~)

Appendix 11: Document Showing Cheung to be a Guarantor to Hao Cai {llfl1f~


~~-A.:ff~i~'i!i])

Appendix 12: Three Surveillance Department Log entd;:H.l provided by Sands


Appendix 13: Diagram Indicating the Re!ati0 n:shlp ti1tWeen Cheung and the
"Chengdu VlP Club" as Drawn from Public Records

Page 54 of 54

International Risk Limited

SJ001230

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00054

Appendix 1

International Risk Limited


1009-18 Shui On Centre
6-8 Harbour Road
Wanchai, Hong Kong

Tel: (852) 2501 52.13


Fax: (852) 2501 523 7
' Website: W'NW.intl-risk,eom

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

13 Apri12010

The Venetian - The Palazzo


3355 Las Vegas Blvd. South

Las Vegas NV 89109, USA

For the atten.1i.90..Qf.f.r.?derick H. K.r.f!.US. Vice President & General Counsel

Las Vegas Sands Corp


3355 Las Vegas Blvd. South
Las Vegas NV 89109, USA
FoUh_~ attention

of Mr. AJ.Q_gnzalez, Genen=!LQ.Q.lJJJ.Sel

Dear Mr. Kraus and Mr. Gonzalez,

PROPOSED

DISCREET

INVESTIGATIVE AND

CONSULTING

SERVICES IN MACAU AND HONG KONG


Thank you for the opportunity to be of further service to Las Vegas Sands Corp
and The Venetian - The Palazzo ("Sands"). Pursuant to our recent discussions,
International Risk Ltd ("International Risk") has much pleasure in submitting this

proposal for your consideration.

Thfs proposal fs the intei!ectual property of international Risk Ltd No part of this document may be
reproduced or used without the express and written consent of lntemaiional .Risk Ltd.

SJ001231

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00055

Appendix 1

Page 2 of9

Private & Confid_Qfli!?!


Background & Our Understanding of Your Requirements

International Risk understands that a Reuters article entitled "Special Report:

HighMRolfers, Triads and a Las Vegas Giant" ("the Article") has recently surfaced
and has, in essence, claimed that a person by the name of Cheung Chi-tai
("Cheung") was "the person in-charge" of "one of the VIP rooms at Sands Macau"
and that he is also a triad leader.

The Article has alleged that Cheung was "identified" as a leader of the Wo Hop To,
a Hong Kong-based tr!ad Society: this during a trial in Hong Kong in 2009 C'Trial").
According to the Article (which appears to be largely but not entirely based on
English translations of extracts from the Chinese media) four men were convicted
at this Tria! for their respective parts in a "conspiracy to commit bodily harm" and a
fifth person was apparently accused of ca!iing for thern to murder, a "dealer" at
Sands Macau who was suspected of herping a patron to cheat millions of dollars.
According to the article a 49 year old male, surnamed Cheung was arrested by
Police but vvas released after legal advice was sought due to insufficient evidence.

Since the publication of this article, we understand the Nevada Gaming Control
Board has taken an interest in the matter and has said on 31 March 201 0 that it is
analyzing the status of VIP room operations in tv1acau casinos and their possible
Hnks with Chinese criminals.

Accordingly Sands, as a highly ethical and prudent organization, has requested a


proposal from International Risk to conduct an independent investigation into
the a!iegations contained within the letter and the background of Cheung.

This proposai is the intel!ectuaf property of fntemat:onai Risk Ltd. 1\Jo part of this document may be
reproduced or used without the express and written consent of International Risk Ltd.

SJ001232
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00056

,Ji;:/~71~}':.}~":,-

J ~TERN_~IJQ~l~-~-Rt~K

Appendix 1

filteg:ity Jnd~pendence ~ tnsiyht

Page 3 of 9
We further understand that Sands may wish to share the findings of our
independent investigation with the Nevada Gaming Control Board.

Sands are

therefore most keen that this report is able to stand up to the most rigorous
scrutiny and that it be fair and balanced in ail respects.

Our Qualifications

International Risk (!YW\YinU~.rl.sk,ggm). formerly the regional investigative arm of a


major global accounting and professional services firm and now a wholly-owned
subsidiary of NYSE-Iisted FTI Consulting Inc (>&.:~~Y.,.ftl.t::.9.Q0..t.@.DIL.f_QflJ.), is the
leading risk mitigation consulting and investigative organization in Asia.

International Risk provides comprehensive business risk solutions including


investigative due diligence services, business intelligence, fraud and corporate
investigations, brand protection and IP strategies, political and security risk
assessments and crisis containment services to the world's leading organizations.
International Risk has offices strategically located in Hong Kong, Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tokyo, Singapore, New York and San Francisco, and
operates globally.

Our professionals have extensive regional experience in the delivery of timely,


cost-effective risk solutions, including sensitive business intelligence assignments
into corporate entities and their principal officers in Macau and Hong Kong for
investment banks, private equity funds and venture capital funds. VVe have
extensive experience in conducting discreet investigations in Macau and Hong
Kong on beha!f of financial institutions and multi-national corporations and have a
range of on-ground resources available to assist us with this project.

This pro,oo.sai is the mteitectuai property of International Risk Ltd. No part of this document may be
reproduced or used without t!Je express and writien consent of lntemationai Risk Ltd.

SJ001233

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00057

Appendix 1

Private &

ConfJ.9enti9..1

Page 4 of 9

International Risk has specific and deep knowledge of the gaming industry in Asia
and members of our staff have held senior positions in the former Royal Hong
Kong Police. the Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Singapore Government Anti
Corruption Body and other related agencies who have been involved in monitoring
organised crirne and gaming in the region.

Objective( s)

International Risk wiil conduct an independent investigation into the allegations


contained in the Article, including Into the accuracy and veracity of the c!airns that
are made in it, and will concurrently conduct a focused yet discreet investigation
into the background of Cheung in Macau and Hong Kong.

Proposed Methodology

Based on our experienco of sirniiar situations, the information which is currently


available to us and our understanding of your requirements and timeline, we
propose conducting this project using the following methodology:

Provision of Relevant Starlwup Material

Upon our engagement for this assignment, Sands will furnish to International Risk
all reasonably available information on Cheung

T!Jfs proposal js tfte jrdefiecluat property of lnternabonel

r~isk

Ltd.

lVD

part of Uus docurnent rnay be

reproduced or used without the express and written consent of International Risk Ltd.

SJ001234

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00058

Appendix 1

NTERNATIONAL RISK
ln!~grity 11 lnt!tpt}rd:enf:~~ 9 {n~c9hl

Page 5 of 9

Phase One; Independent Analysis of the Article


International Risk wH! independently review the contents and the veracity of the
claims made in the Article, with a view to separating facts from (any)
unsubstantiated rumour(s) andior factual errors contained within the Article.

Our analysis will include a comprehensive search of available media and other
relevant on-Hne sources, for information on the Trial and allegations regarding
Cheung and his alleged unsavoJry associations. Areas to be covered include:

1.

Detailed analysis of the original judgement of the Trial;

2.

English and Chinese, press reports and trade journals;

3.

Business database sources, to !nciude trade and industry sources and


the Internet:

4.

A search of the Hong Kong Corporate Registry to identify any


directorships in the narne of Cheung, along vvlth any further litigation
and bankruptcy records of Cheung;

5.

A search of available online Lower Court civil Htigation records in


Macau;

6,

An online search of available litigation records in the US for any


available information on Cheung;

7.

Relevant international sanction lists and other on-line sources that


contain information related to money laundering, terrorism, fraudulent
practices and denial of certain trading privileges, for example; and

8.

A search of World-Check, a database that provides information on,


amongst other matters, individuals who are regarded as "politically
exposed people".

This proposal is thf~ inte!lectuai property of International Risk Ltd No part of this docurnent rnay be
rep reduced or used without the express and written consent of tntema!ional ,Risk Ltd

SJ001235

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00059

Appendix 1

Er)y_ate & Confidential

Page 6 of 9

Using our local knowledge and our broad range of discreet contacts in Macau and
Hong Kong, we will also conduct discreet field inquiries in these two jurisdictions
with government, regulatory and law enforcement sources, current and former
business associates, and other sources who may be knowledgeable about such
matters and that we know can be relied upon to keep such inquiries and
conversations confidential, with a view of meeting the objective of this phase of
the investigation.

Phase Two: Discreet Investigations into the Background of Cheung

In this second phase of our investigations, using information obtained from Phase
One, our local knowledge and our broad range of discreet contacts in Macau and
Hong Kong. International Risk will undertake focused but discreet field inquiries
into the background and activities of Cheung.

Additional issues that will be covered in this phase include:

Intelligence as regards to the background and connection(s) with Triad


Societies ( if any) of Cheung and/or other related enterprises:

<~>

An examination into Cheung's (alleged) connection with the defendants


at the Trial referred to in the Article;

Intelligence and reasoned commentary as to why charges against


Cheung were not laid at trial; and

Other issues or relationships uncovered in the course of our discreet


inquiries into Cheung which may be of interest to Sands and which may

be of value to minimizing risk in the future.

This propose/ is the inte!iectua! property of International Risk Ltd No pad of this document may be
reproduced or used without tt;e express and wrtften consent of International Risk Ltd.

SJ001236

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00060

1~-;;r~!'lATIONAL !I?~

Appendix 1

Integrity lodej:.l'.mdence * fnsight

Page 7 of 9

Private & Conf!.Q.t2o.H91

At the condusion of Phases One and Two (which will be conducted in parallel),
International Risk will critically collate and analyse all available information and will
prepare a comprehensive report on our findings.

We currently estimate that Phases One and Two will take approximately three to
four working weeks to complete.

Fees, Expenses & Payment Arrangements

We propose to undertake Phases One and Two QJ:l.fY of this engagement, as


outlined above, for a fixed fee of US$80,000 plus expenses, including database
costs, local travel, etc, that we vvould not expect to exceed 12% of the budget for
our professional fees.

On receipt of instructions for this assignment, lntemational Risk will receive a


retainer fee in the amount .of US$40;000. This amount will be deducted from our
final invoice following issuance of our report for this assignment.

All payments should be free of withholding or other taxes. Payment of our invoice
is due promptly and we would appreciate payment within thirty days of issue of the
invoice.

This proposal JS the intellectual property of International Risk Ud. !Vo part of l!Jis document may be
reproduced or used without the express ana' written consent of lntemattonai Rt:sk Ucl.

SJ001237

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00061

Appendix 1

Private & Confi.ggo.tigl

Page 8 of 9

Conduct of the Investigation

As a project develops, new aspects or new lines of enquiry may be identified,


including in additional jurisdictions and may require further work. In such situations,
we will review this information with you and will discuss its relevance to your
overall objectives and determine whether any further investigations shou!d be
undertaken. We wili agree any additional budget necessary. Any budget so
required will be mutually agreed in writing before comrnencement of such enquiry.

Reporting Milestones

We will provide verbal and brief written reports to you whenever any significant
developments take place.

Our goal is to compiete Phases One and Two of this discreet investigation. as
outlined above, and to provide you with a written report of our findings, together
with any recommendations, approximately three to four working weeks after
commencement of the project.

Terms and Conditions

A copy of our Standard Business Terms and Conditions ("business terms") for the
provision of lnternationa! Risk services to

las Vegas Sands Corp is attached as

Appendix 1.

This proposal is the in!oiiectuaf property of International Risk Ltd No pari of this document may be
reproduced or used \Vithout the express and written consent of lntNnaiional Risk Ltd.

SJ001238

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00062

Appendix 1

Priy~te

'

& Q.Q[lfigDJ.@!

Page 9 of 9

Commencement of Assignment

Should the matters set out above be acceptable to you. I would be grateful If you
would please sign and return to us a copy of this proposal which, together with the
business terms, form the Contract for our engagement.

International Risk is available to commence work upon receipt of a signed copy of


this proposal letter and settlement of our retainer invoice.

Please do not hesitate to call the undersigned on +852 3120 8688 if you need to

discuss this proposaL

Yours sincerely
International Risk Limited

. , Stephen G. Vickers
{":

President & Chief Executive Officer

This proposal accepted by:

Signature: ----------------------------Name:
Title:

Date:

This proposal is the intellectual property of International Risk Ltd. No part of this documeni may be
reproduced or used without the express and written consent of international Risk Ud.

SJ001239

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00063

Appendix 1
Appendix 1

Standard Business Terms and Conditions for Engagements


undertaken on behalf of Las Vegas Sands Corp.
Thase terms and coi~ditiOfls apply in respect of the Servic~::s

ne.cess~uy authorisations. consents and approvals to enter

contemplated or described in the fetter of engagement to. be


performed by ln!ernatianai Risk Ltd ('"lr.terr,ationa; Risk" or
we' or ou( or "us") for you ("Ciient" or "yo!J") T~.e ietter of

vaiidly and la\~fully int.; the Contract

3.

Information and Assistance

3 1

Provision of information and assistance

engag_ernent ~mJ these terms and condition~ are together


referred !o as the

"Gontracf or the ''Er:gagemenf'

The

the

Contract forr0s the cnttre agreerner:t bet\veen us rcmting to

success of the Services is dependent on you' timely c.c-

the Se1vicas It repraces and supersedes any prev:cus


proposais. correspc:nde:1ce understandings or other
communicat!ons whetr-~e: ~,-vritten or ora! The ~ead~ngs and
titles in the Contract are included tc make it easier to read
but do not fom1 part of the C:.mtreact

ope..-ation, ir:ciuctir:g:
(a)

and (if stated i11 your brief: our pmposal, or our

comput.,r faci!ities you P'DVid~. if pplicable.


Mak!ng senior executives available
(c)
cor:sult.atlor: liPCn reason.aD!e reque::!t;

Reliance on drafts yo;, acknowiedse th<lt no

rel!ance shall be placea on qraft reports. pr~!irninar-t


ccnc~us!ons or aovice, v.rhe.the: crai or written, issued by us
as they may bU subJect to further work. revisiorl ;gr:d other
factors which may mean that s.ch cra.fts are
different from any final !"epo:t or advi:::e iss wed.

1.2

Use ar.d .purpose of advice and reports .. any

use and benefH and oniy in connection w~th tl"1e P.urpose in


respect of which the ServicBs are p~cvid,~d Untes~:; requ\red
by !aw, court order or any reguiatcry agency 01 authority to
"~;h!ch

{d)

fOr

Providing reason~bfe working facilities for us;

a11d

substa~i!al'y

advi(;e given or report issued by us is provided soieiy for your

the materials anei information we

engagemeni letter) your staff to work with us;


(b}
Ensunng that appropriate backAwp. security
and virus checking proCedures are In p~ace for any

Reports and Advice


1i

Pro~ding

reasonably require from time to iime for the Services,

(e)
Making decisions promptly, in
fac;Htate the peiformanc..:: of the Services

3.2

order

to

Time estimates - estimates of time fer compfetioc. of

the Service.s are giver or. the ass~Jmp!ion that we receive


th!s co.:operatior: a11d commitment from employees in your
org;:misatian or your represantatlves ar.cior advisors. to tt:e
exlenl. applicable. If you do notprovicte, or delay m providing

you are sub;ect, you sha<l no! prov;de such repon to

that co-op,;:rat:cn, you agree to pay us ar>y additional

any third party or refer to us or the Services vvit!iout our pr!or

reasotlabfe and documented consuftir.g fees and expenses

written consent, which consent may not be unreasonably


withheld or deiayed
In no everrt. n=garcless of vvheiher
consent has been provided. shall .,Ne assume ar:y
responsibility to any third party to which sny advice or repmt
is disciosed o' othe~N:se made a,a;lable No copy, extract or
quote from it may be made ava,lebie to any other party
w:thout our prior written con..;e11t as to the form ar.d content
of the disdC;Slire Not\"Yithstanding the foregoing. you may
share the contents of any s:Jch report with your emp!oyee.sl
representative and legal and f;nancia! advjsors ;.vno have a
iegit!mate busir:ess reaso!1 to have access to suci1

that may result from the failure to co-operate on a timely


basis, after receipt cf prior wr1tten notice that any such
antscipated <x;-operatior: is not fortho;;m!ng.

3.3

Punctual and accurate information - you shaii use

reasonable skin. care ar.d attention to ensure th<'H all


information that we may reasonably require is provided on a
Ume!y bas1.s and !s. lo the best of your kr:owiedfl~. accurate
and cornp!e~e. You sha!! also notify us 1f you subsequently
learn that the informat;cf\ provi.ded is !ncorrect or inaccurate

or othervVise should net be re!ied upon.

:~forn:at~or..

1.3
all

<1.

Fees and Additional Services

41

Fee bas!s

Intellectual property - intdiectua! p10perty r'ghts in


pre~existin.g

lnternatic.l!'ia!

Risk

materials

ant:i

om fees {which unless otheMise

methodologies utilised in the Engagement or !ncorporated

specified are in Vnlted States doi!ars) wil! be charged en the

intc a report or ar.y ether materi~l provided to the Cl:er.t


remain vested ir! International R.lsk

basis sel out in the Letter of Engagement


4.2

2.

Legal and Regulatory Requirements

21
You confirm and undert.;ke that you have an
necessary corpo1ale powers ard !"1ave obtained all materia!

Changes to Services - ei!her oarty may request

cr!anges to the Se:.;ices. VVe st:aH work with you to r.onsidar


and. if appropriate. to vary any aspect of the Eng3garnenL
subject to reasonable adjustr:'lent ir the fees {which
adjllstrnenl may be up or down depending

on

the proposed

SJ001240

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02_ 00064

.Appendix 1

J. N_I_tB_t!~I.LQ.~_Ab _ R.L~~
i:j},~ ,~~>-4~<:<>:::'?':>..

Integrity

lncep('r<Cien~e

Insight

~he

variance to the original Engagement) tG ref1ect the rev;scd

termtnated

scope cf Sen.d~s aod a reasonable actdiiu:;nal pedod to

international Risk shall be enWed to be paid for wor: that

provide

any additional

Secvices

.'\ny variaiion

to

the

pnor

tG

completion

of

the

Contract,

has been ccmplelsd or documented expenses reasonably

tre

Contra-:l, incfvtJing any variation tc fees, services or t!me fo:

incurred prior ~o

performance of the Services, shaii be deta~led in a se:pa,rate


letter and sha11 fc;"m part of the Contract and be suoiect to
these tem1s and conditions

the work cornpieteo 'n accordance with the fees detailed in

the E::gagament sutJfeC! to any agree;) upper lim!t.

43

the Contra;;t:

6.2
Payment of fee.s - lime ior poymenl of our fees and

Actions following termination - uoon tennination of

expenses shall be x1f t1"1e esser:Ge !f we do nnt fece~ve


payment of any in"o;ce with1n 45 days of ti10 HwoiGe date w::;
sh.a:il be ent:Hed, 1.-vithoul pie.fud;;;:~ to anv ether r~ghts that we
may~ have, to chcrge a nornir:al r8te of Interest on the
cutstandif'!g fees in the invoice in an amoum not ~c e-xcel::d
3% and, aftef 45 days ftC.H11 W'-<'oic~ date. to su~p~nd
provision of the Ser.;!ces unbi al! st:rns due are pwd :r: full. If
yoi.J disagree with or QUt~st;o:: e:ny amcum 0~1-e lif:tJer an
invoi::;e submitted by us, yo~; must cornm:.:nk:;.a~e svch
:;H$agreement or objectron tv us. in \Vriting, 'Ni:f1in 30 dews of
the involce date Yot.; wm be deerned t:.:1 havt:! wa:ved any
clafrn :iot me,de w!thin tr~at period.

44

date of terrnna!icn tnat d!rectiy relal~ to

62i

each p~rty sr1an upon Wf:tten request from ti~e

otner retum io the other ~~~ hfom:ation. property ar:d


docwrne~:tat:o0

of the other that is ir. i!s possessior.,

pro11ided that wt:.: shall be er1Ht1ea to !"etain one cop~


vf ~H;ch docurner.ts thf.t we- requiri5 ttt maintain a
profes.sional f\.7ccrd of our involvern~J:'!t in the
Engagernent.
6 2 2 you shaU prornpt1y pay upon reasonable
written request ~1! fees and expenses tii.H?. ;n respeGt
of th~ S~:vic~s provided up to the aate cf termlnaW:Hl
as set forth ;o Ciauso 6 1

Your responsibility for other parties - y-ou shall be

Date of termination ~fer the fiVOidance r:tf doubt, tne

solely responslbie fc: tt!e wo<k an;J fees cf ar:y other party

d-ate of terrninatron shalr be th1:1 ctate iJpcn Nhich any period

engaged by yo~: to palHcip8te in the Eligagement regardless

of nofica exp~res.

of whether slich party was introduced to you by us Except


as provided :n the ~etter of engagement. we shaH not be
responsible for providing or :evlf}Wir:g })pecia~~st advic-e or
se:vH;es indud~ng !ega!, regulatory, acc.o.mt.ir.g or taxat;or:
matters, due diligence or any other 1~:vestigative services

without prejudice lc any

Accrued rights terminat;or, of the Contract shaH be


ac~rued ::ignts or botr: parties.

6.4

Continuation of terms

6.5

l.he terms of the Contract

\vhich expressiy or by impHcation are intended to survive its

45

Payment of Consumption tax an svrns due ;n

conn~ct!c0

t,litn the Scp-:icas will be suDwct to tt:e


of consurnpt;on tax, ;,...;here applicable

pay~nent

ttJrrn:rtatinn or expiry wiil

Confidentiality

5j
confiaenlia! infom1atior: atwut the othe:
pnor 'Nritten consent..

;,Atho~.<l

the othe(s

71
!nt~m1.at:cna: Rfsk wm use rer:sonable skill and cere
!n the provision of !he Serv1ces tc tf1e Client and Si'fali at aH
times ccrr-;ply with appllcabie local taws and :egu;ations.

Conf:dential ir:fc;rn1ab:-m !ncivdes. but

ls rl.Ct llmited !0. any proposal or tender document. the nature


qr scope of the E.ngage::nent, prospectiv:; cr cngoing

transactions or business dedfings with the p3ttie~ that are the


subject of the Er:gagement. tn;s:nes~. at~d ffnancia~
info;mat!Ofl, trade secrets: meti"H::dologies or cocU'll<:mts that
are not jn the pt.;blic dorne'lir:
E~:cept:cms lo H1ese are
disciosures tt.1 legal adv!sers, disc:osures req~s;red l:;y Ia~" anj
discicsures neces.-sari for the prope~ pi':Fforrnance Gf the
Se!Vicss

and o:mtin.u.e tc bind both

Liability Limitation

?.

5.

S>..~rvive

parbes

Termination

?2
To Hte e;<tent per:r.itted by appHcao!e !aw.
intemat1ona; R:sk axci:.Jdes .r:.:! wafrBnties. cor:ciiticr:s or
terms, other t::an thLHile: express~y set oui H1 these tem1s and
c0nditions ir:dudlr:g, but net Hrn!ted tu, ali w~rrantie~:;.
conditions or terms implied ir: faG! or by law Nothing m this
Ciause 7 t"iaS the effect of exclud:ng. restricting o: mcd!fyir:g

any nonviS>;c/udab!e statJJtory eondJio::, warranty. guarantee,


f:ght. remedy 01 cthet beneflt th;::t ;S preserved fo; the Cner:t
by any legislative prov!SIG!lS
'/>/here lntemation~i Ris~. is net eni1tled ti) exch..:cie

1:1

warranty, c.ondttior: or term implied if: fact ur by lavv, end to

E1
Either party may termln~te the C::mtract pho: to
compietion if the oiher party fcH1s to rerneay a n'!aterial breach
of the terms ar:d conditions 'Nithin 30 day!;; of cor:fi:rned
rece1pf wdtten rtot:ce cf rnatenal oreach If the con~:act is

tt1e extent permitted b:t appl1cabie lovi. lf~te:nat1onaf Risk's


!iabiHy for breach cf any s;..H;:\", wMranty. condition cr terrn is
l;mited io

SJ001241

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00065

Appendix 1

m the case of serv1ces. at the cptron of C!!er:t.,

{a)

you -:r1ay exper~ence as a result of the provis:cn of me

!;lither the resopply of the ser.1ices

or payment of the
reasonable cost of having the services resuppl!e:d ?Jy

Senilces.

another suitao!e replacement party: and

10.

{b)

Governing Law and Disputes

in the case of Oocvrnenta1y deliverables cr

mater~a!s. at the cpHcr: of Client: either 1he resupply

Applicable law this Contract sha'l be governed oy

or materiais cr reasonable

and interpteted in ac-.c<ifdance with the la\rVS of Hcng Kor.g

of the

de!iVerabies

payment of the cost of j~aving H1e deiiverables or

ar;,j the Geurts of Hong

materials resupp!ied by another ~uttabte ;0p!<Jcernent


party.

in :elatio0 to any ciairn, dispute cr difference concerning the

K~"">l"'1Q'

shall have excrusive jurisdiction

Contr8cl and any matter arjSing from it

fhe partfas

irrevocably waive sny right the)' rnay nave to object to any

an 1n.stanc.es, otr:r:;r than

as S8t 0Ut !n C!;.Juses 7 2

oct;on being bro~ght in tt:;::$$ Co:Jrts. to c!airn that the act:e.n

and ?.3, H:B ~oi;i aggreg~te fie~bt!!ty of lnternationai Risk k.:

ha$ been brought to ar mcor.vedent forL?m cr to clB!rr: that

the GHent !cr lt1ss (): damage Oncl:;d;ng lr.di:ect :~nd


conseque!ltiaj !ass or damagE:'), caused by, resultrng from, or
in re!at.1on !G !he Ser,ri~es. in:;iuct:ng whether arismg frorn
breach of contract, rt8;;;!1igence, or ani .::ther tort, ir. equity cr
othl3rv;ise, and \\'?:ether ()i r:~,:1! lnt;;;n~at!O"!:ai Rish was advised
of the poss:bilfty cf such ioss or CEnnage.:, is iitnit~d (!c tre
~xtent psr:n~tted by !a;,.~i} r.o ar: amcunr eqwaf t.c five times the
fees pa:d by
Client to l!1te:naHonal R:s.K in re.spect vf H:e
Services

those- Cawts do not have juriscjictlor.

7..4

in

v-,e

fndemnity Against Third Party Liability

8.
6.1

lnten:atinnal R!sk and :ts empk)yees f:vn: ana

ar:ai::st any
th.at rr.ay be

Hl.2

Resolving disputes

If any di!:<pute arises between

u.s ~ve wil: attempt to resolve the d;spY!e in g;.:;;:~;j faith by


sepicr !eve: negotiations
scn!ar executives.

bet..v~er.

\~Vr:er:e

the part1es' approprjate

both cf us agree !h3t il

tn<~y

be

ber:eflcia1 after Lws;.;ccessfuHy attempting to resc!ve the


chspute through senior levei negotiations, we will seek t.n
resolve tne d'sputc fvsl tllrowgh med;a\1cn and then through
arb;traticn. If the aisp>..:~e iS not reso!ved tnrot~gh negctiaH::Hi,
mediat=cr"~ or arbitra~km. both of us agree ths.t the courts of
Hong Kong w:ll have e>:cll:~.Hve jurfsd!ction Hl connection with
the resoft1tlor~ of tht: dispute- as detailed in Clause ~ 0.1

1i.

Miscellaneous Provisions

asserted b:, arry- third oa1y,: that m-ay resu!t from any !h:rd
party cfairn:.s ansi:'lg ou~ of or in relation to the prov:.s:on of the

; t 1

Validity of Contract terms if any provis1or. of th1s

Ser.;ices o: any 1..1se by you of any d~Hverable item under this

Gonlr.acl is twid to bl? :nv.;l.lid, in whole or in part. sucl~

Engagement and wm re:rr.burse ln.ternational R1sk ft..)r all


reaso!'"labte a::d doaumer.ted cos!s and eApenses {ir"~ducting

provision sh~g be deened not to form part of the Contract


1:: ~ny event, the enforceability of tt;e remainder of the

reE:so!lab!e a~d doc.;rner:ted !ega! fees en a soHcitN die~t

Conttact >.vHI r:ot be affCGied, provijed ahvays that if any such

loss, expense, damege nr liabtlities {or acth:ms

basis f;~r c,ne fega~ :x.unsel} H1cUrxed by lnternat\cnal Risk "In

deletion

connectio:1 witr: defendn:g ar:y such act;cn or clairn, ur:le.s.s

of tf';ese terr;ls

such d~im or t=ction ar~ses out of ar:y g:oss negl!gence. wilful

gocd faitn to amer:d and

misconduct or bad faith on the cart of lr:t.erru:Jtional Risk cr


ar:y of its employeeE

or desirs ir: the C!rcu:nstances.

82

Breach of ccntractlcontributory negligence You

to a party may be deiivered in person, by !elter or by

agree that if you rnake any cfairn against us for ioss as a

facs!rnile transmission, to our address. clearly rnarked for the

cor:tribut~d

aa~nth":m of tha engag~ment partner. app~ar!ng ~n the letter


of engagerr.er.; i~ t0e casll oi notices to us, and to the

11 2

resun of a r,reach of cur Contract! s.nd tr,at loss :s

to by yCU(

::!~/:1

nctioi1s.

t~:en Habili~y

kr yoiJr loss v.;iif be

apportioned as is appmpr:ate hav;ng regard to the rtspective


responsib!lity fer the loss. ant tr:e arnovn~ ~ou may recover
frcm us Niil be reduced by the extent of your corttribut;{)P t:.)

that loss.

or

aftt;;~s

~r:d co:;ditio~:s. th~


r.:o~:~ity

the

comrnerd~l

basis

pa::ties shall negotiate

:~~

them as may be necessary

Address for service any written nctice to be given

a~1dress
~ 13
st!:fj!l

~ubstar:tlaUy. affect~.

last not;fied by yo:..: in the case of notices to you


Actions required by law nothing in the Contract

preve:~t

reqo~red

us

ffon~

taking any su:.::t-1 action as may be

by law or s!atuta ar to comp]y wiih the regulations of

Warranties

sny refevant prores~io:~al body

9. 1

You aCCE;!pt and acknowledge that. swbject to ary


made ip lhese teFns and cor:ditil:n~. we have p()f

11.4
Force majeure nr-:ithe1 i)f us w~li be ;iab!a to the
oti1er for any delay or fculure to fulfU cbligat!or:s caused by

stalen~cPt

made any

vi~:ranties

or guarantees of any nature in respect

of the Ser...ices or saHs~actory :onchJsion of ths Services or


with respect to the economic

financi~l

,;;r other resu:ts wh1ch

circu!'~sta0-:es

cuts=.de our reasonable control

reasons contH1ue to

pr,~ve:d

If such

performance of Htt1er partys

duhes and obHgat:ons for a penod

at

mer~ than -0 d:1ys. we

SJ001242
Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00066

1liT~BI:l,:\II.9-~~!:J3J?.~

Appendix 1

lr.tegrity

~ lnrieDenc~onee

w!l~ consu!t eacn other for


action shocld be taken,

11 5

th~

lns!ght

purpose of agreeing what

Working for other clients we will net be prevented

or res!rtctea by anything in tr.e Contract from provid!ilg


services for other clients; provided that o,.ve w!lf not provide
investigative serv!ces to those parties that are fh ta.:gei
subjects during the period of the engagement. t:Ve will t:L~e
steps to ensure that conf:den~ial information communicated
t0 us durin.g lM course cf this engagement w;H be
rr:aifitalned confidentially and separate from sb::ff ass~gned tc
ar.gagement.s :n whid1 Hmm JS a :nanifest cornpet!ng interest
of another client
Assignment
lnternetk:na! Risjr, may withou~ the
11.e
consent of the Client assign cr nD\lCte tt:1s Contract to a
successo.r to the tm:~i:)ess of 1:)ternat;cnai Risk w which fnfs
Contract re~ates
n

11.7

Electronic

communication

'lo/6

rnay

Eiectronir:a!!y

transmjtted ;nfcrrr:ation cannot be guaranteed to be secure o:


error free arJd lt rr:ay be adversely affet;.~!ed or unsafe to us~

VVe do not accept any

~!abilrt.y

in

re.~pect

of sny error or

nrnisslor'l a('ising from cr in connection with the e!ectrcnic

comrnun:catbn of idorrnation to you. Please !st us know if


you do not want us to ccmm1.:r:ic.a.te electron!caily wlth you.

SJ001243

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00067

Appendix 2
SPECIAL REPORT-High-rollers, triads and a Las Vegas giant
2868 words
30 March 2010

05:50
Reuters Nsws
LBA
English
(c) 2010 Reuters Limited

Macau economy booming on $15 bin a year casino revenues


Court case linked gang member to Sands junket contractor
* Hit ordered on casino dealer suspected of cheating
By Matt Isaacs and Reuters staff
SAN FRANCISCO/MACAU, March 29 (Reuters)- Late last autumn. a Hong Kong jury
convicted four men of a conspiracy to commit bodily harm and a fifth of soliciting a
murder.
At first, the men had been ordered to break the arms and legs of a dealer at Sands
Macau suspected of he!ping a patron cheat millions of dollars from the business. Later,
a call went out to murder the dealer, court records shov\"' But then one of the gangsters
balked and reported the plans to authorities.
The plot's mastermind. according to testimony in previously undisclosed court
transcripts obtained by Reuters, was Cheung Chi-tai. .At tria! a witness identified
Cheung as a leader of the Wo Hop To -- one of the organized crime groups in the
region known as triads. Another witness, a senior inspector with the Hong Kong police
called to testify because he is an expert on the triads, identified Cheung by name as
someone 1Nho would commit crimes for money Cheung's organized crime affiliation was
corroborated in interviews for this article with law enforcement and security officials
intimately familiar with the gaming industry in Macau.
The murder-for-hire case sheds light on the links between China's secretive triad
societies and Macau's booming gambling industry. It also raises potentially troubling
questions about one of the world's largest gaming companies, Las Vegas Sands , which
plans to open a $5,5 billion Singapore casino resort in late ApriL
Cheung was not just named as a triad member but also, according to a regular casino
patron testifying in the trial, "the person in charge" of one of the VIP rooms at the Sands
Macau, the first of three casinos run here by Las Vegas Sands. In addition, Cheung has
been a major investor in tile Neptune Group, a publicly traded company involved in
casino junkets -- the middlemen who bring wealthy clients to Macau's gambling halls.

SJ001244

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00068

Appendix 2
Documents show that his Investment allowed him a share in the profits from a VIP
gambling room at the casino.
An examination of Hong Kong court records, U.S. depositions from the former president
of Sands, and inte1views with law enforcement and security officials in both the U.S. and
Macau, reveals a connection between Las Vegas Sands and Cheung -- ties that could
potentially put Sands in violation of Nevada gaming laws.
The Reuters investigation is a collaboration with the Investigative Reporting Program at
University of California, Berkeley.
U S. casinos operating in Macau are all headquartered in Nevada and must comply with
that state's laws which prohibit "unsuitable" associations that "discredit" its gaming
industry. Those laws are meant to keep organized crime figures out of the casinos.
Leading up to its public offering in Hong Kong last November, Sands China . a
subsidiary of Las Vegas Sands, acknowledged the risks of working with gaming
promoters -- another term for junkets: "If we are unable to ensure high standards of
probity and integrity of ow Gaming Promoters with whom we are associated, our
reputation may suffer or we may be subject to sanctions, including the loss of (Sands'
Macau gaming license.)" the company wrote in a public filing.
Randall Sayre, a member of the Nevada Gaming Control Board that monitors casino
compliance, declined to comment specifically on Sands Macau, writing in an email that
the state "takes no public position on suitability ... without a full investigative work-up."
A gaming official. who insisted upon anonymity, said: "This relationship (with Cheung)
would be of concern to Nevada authorities. You're talking about direct ties to bad guys.''
Another said the agency is monitoring the situation.
Las Vegas Sands issued a statement saying, ''to our knowledge, Mr. Cheung Chi Tai is
not listed as a director or shareholder'' with any of the gaming promoters the company
uses in Macau. but declined to comment further.
Sands was the first U.S. operator to cash in on the Chinese passion for gambling when
it entered Macau in 2004 after the government opened the casino market to outsiders.
Since reverting to China in 1999, Macau, an hour away from Hong Kong by ferry, has
flourished as one of the world's wealthiest cities. The territory's economy has soared in
recent years -- much of the wealth generated by the enclave's casinos.
Indeed, the former Portuguese colony has become a playground for China's nouveau
riche. And the gleaming neon red lights of the Sands Macau casino are the first sights a
visitor takes in as the ferry approaches Macau.

SJ001245
Plaintiff Ex. I 102 00069

Appendix 2
THE JUNKETS
The link between Macau's gambling industry and organized crime may be an open
secret, but it has come under increasing scrutiny lately. Within the last two weeks, MGM
Mirage said it would give up its holdings in New Jersey in response to pressure from the
New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement. The state agency had said that Pansy Ho,
MGM Mirage's partner in Macau and the daughter of casino tycoon Stanley Ho, was an
"unsuitable" associate, an assertion stemming from the agency's belief that her father
has links to organized crime.
The involvement of the triads in Macau's casinos is cehtered on the murky and highly
profitable junket business. The VIP sector brought in $9.9 billion last year, t'No-thirds of
the enclave's total gambling revenues.
Macau has about 187 licensed junket operators, said Manuel Joaquim das Neves.
director of Macau's Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau.
The junkets are crucial because they ensure the flow of capital by extending credit to
gamblers, often mil!fons of dollars on a visit. They assume responsibility for collecting on
their loans-- at times indelicately, authorities say.
They also often assume management of the private VIP rooms. And while many lawabiding junkets are active in Macau, experts say the industry is highly susceptible to
criminal influence given the extra-legai functions and opaque environments in which
they work.
In an interview, Dan Grove, a former agent for the FBI who oversaw security for Sands
Macau in the first few years after its opening -- and before the casino became involved
in junkets-- characterized pressure from triads to work with the casino as ,;immense."
When known crime figures applied directly for contracts, blocking them was easy, Grove
says. But if legitimate professionals submit applications and then sub-contract the work
to the triads, detecting such ties was more difficult if not impossible. [201 00329 215028
GMT]

JUMBO BOOM
Cheung Chi-tai's ties to Sands Macau carne through such a multi-tiered arrangement
His solely owned company, Jumbo Boom Holdings, provided capital for another firm,
now called Neptune Group, to acquire a stake in Hou Wan. a junket operator. Hou Wan
was entitled to profits from Sands Macau's Chengdu VIP room.
Cheung owned more than 8 percent of Neptune Group in 2008, according to public
filings with the Hong Kong stock exchange. That rnade him a substantial shareholder
when the call for the dealer's murder went out.

SJ001246

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00070

Appendix 2
When asked about Cheung, Nicholas Niglio, Neptune's chief operating officer, said; "I'm
not familiar with him at all."
After a reporter showed him Neptune's 2008 annual report listing tile firm's substantial
shareholders, including Cheung, Niglio declined to respond specifically. Cheung does
not appear in Neptune's 2009 annual report.
Niglio said Neptune wasn't a junket itself but invests in VIP junkets that operate at th.e
Sands Macau, the Venetian Macau and Galaxy Entertainment's StarWorld casinos. He
said Neptune now had a 20 percent stake in Hou Wan, a junket operator that runs
around 20 VIP tables at the Sands Macau.
In Neptune's public filings three years ago, Cheung was described as a ''merchant in
Hong Kong" whose company "generally does not engage in underwriting business and
has no underwriting experience as at the date of this announcement."
While Niglio described Neptune merely as an "investor" in junkets, trial testimony placed
Cheung inside the casino's private room
According to testimony by Siu Yun-ping, aka the "God of Gambling", who won about
HK$100 million ($12.9 million) between August 2007 and January 2008 at various
casinos, Cheung was "the person in charge" of the Chengdu Hall, one of the VIP rooms
that Siu frequented.
Las Vegas Sands, however, has said it maintains management of all its VIP rooms,
though it acknowledges working with gaming promoters to attract customers.
FRIGHTENED AWAY FROM THE SANDS
A triad member turned informant named Lau Ming-yee testified that he, and the five
men who would be convicted of engaging in triad activities, referred to Cheung as "the
boss."
Cheung, however, didn't appear in court and was not charged. Hong Kong police
declined to answer detailed inquiries on why this was so In an emailed response,
authorities acknowledged only that a 49-year-old man surnamed Cheung was arrested
in connection with the case but "released after legal advice was sought due to
insufficient evidence."
Attempts to determine Cheung's current whereabouts with the Hong Kong police and
U.S. gambling industry sources in Macau were unsuccessful.
The judge in last year's murder-for-hire case, Madame Verina Bokhary, said in passing
sentence that "I bear in mind of course that, behind the scenes, there is a person or are
persons even more blameworthy than any of them."

SJ001247
Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00071

Appendix 2
In the summaries of the trial called "particulars of offense" the judge identified Cheung
by his Cantonese nickname, ''Tsang Pau," or "explosive money maker."
Siu, the "God of Gambling'' suspected of colluding with the dealer at the Sands Macau,
testified that he had been attacked, his house had been set aflame and that his son had
received threatening phone calls. "As a result of Tsang Pau (Cheung), he (the witness)
was frightened away from the Sands Casino,'; according to the judge's summary.
Macau's regulator Neves acknowledges that the junket business in Macau has links to
organized crime, though he says it is less prevalent and more under control than in the
past.
"This kind of business certainly involves people related to organized crime," he said.
"That's why we established the license for just a year Every year, they (the junket
operators) must renew the license.''
Asked specifically about whether Macau will strip the license from a casino operator if
the regulators discover that it is hiring a junket operator with links to organized crime.
Neves said: "It's separate. In principle, it doesn't affect the concessionaires."
Neves said he was informed by police of Cheung's alleged role in the murder-for-hire
case. But he described the accusations against Cheung as "rumors'' and said without
formal charges being brought against him, he would be free to continue to operate in
Macau.

"If he (was) condemned by the Hong Kong court ... if he was arrested and condemned ...
we wouldn't allow him to run the junket," he said. "In this kind of case we must deal very
carefully ... Sometimes if we use this (rumor) to deny the license, he can put us in
court"
Unlike Las Vegas, where casinos tend to have direct relationships with their VIP
customers. Macau's casinos rely on junket operators to bring them the majority of their
high rollers, who might easily lose US$1 million in an evening. [20100329 215035 GMT]
THE $64,000 BET
On a late Friday night in February, gamblers vvere exchanging wads of golden one
thousand Hong Kong dollar banknotes ($130) for expensive chips in the exclusive and
restricted VIP gaming rooms of the Sands Macau.
The labyrinth of rooms - decorated with classical Greek columns, Italian marble and
chandeliers -- were largely filled with mainland Chinese clients at high-stakes Baccarat
tables.
The atmosphere was smoky, hushed and privileged, as casino employees kept watch.
The rooms seemed a worid removed from the mass market gaming floors below.

SJ001248

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00072

Appendix 2
At the ''Luoyang" room, named after a gritty Chinese city, most gamblers were
Mandarin-speaking mainland Chinese, who constitute more than half of Macau's VIP
gamblers. As two Reuters reporters looked on, a middle-aged woman with diamond
bracelets staked a single HK$500,000 ($64,440) bet-- and shrugged off the loss.
A supervisor of the VIP floor and several employees said the Chengdu hall - the room
that Cheung Chi-tai ran, according to the court testimony -- has been renamed.
Most VIP gambling in Macau is leveraged: gamblers usually bet more than their cash on
hand. This is particularly true of mainland Chinese high-rollers who, because of Beijing's
strict capital controls, are limited to carrying the equivalent of US$5,000 in renminbi per
trip when they leave China. Macau's six pub!icly listed casino operators lend to only a
small minority of their patrons., according to company filings. That is because collection
of gambling debt is illegal in Chiha and Macau forbids casinos from writing off their bad
or uncollectable debts.
Concerned that junkets with possible links to organized crime could harm their
businesses, some U.S. casino executives were reluctant to enter Macau. Harrah's
Entertainment Inc [HAMLEH.UL], the world's largest casino operator, decided not to bid
for a gaming concession there. Michae! Chen, Harrah's president for Asia, said in an
interview with Reuters last year that the company worried that its regulators around the
world would not permit it to run casinos in Macau.
That issue was front and center in the official report released by New Jersey gaming
regulators in mid-March regarding MGM Mirage's partnership with Pansy Ho.
Regulators cited the junket influence within her father's VIP rooms as a prime concern.
''The VIP rooms in {Stanley Ho's) casinos provided organized crime the entry into the
Macau gaming market that it had previously lacked," the report said.
When Sands first won a license in Macau in 2002, it was paired with Hong Kong-based
casino operator Galaxy Entertainment Group , but the U.S. company ultimately ended
the arrangement William Weidner. the former president of Sands, in a deposition for an
unrelated Nevada court case in 2007, cited Galaxy's intent to run the VIP rooms in the
traditional Macau style as one of the reasons for the split.
"These guys want to do VIP rooms the way they ... do them in Macau where the ... triad
guys run them because they're the only ones that can grant and collect credit in
mainland China, and they smuggle the renminbi across the border," he said. "I can't do
that business Thafs the way they want to do it, so I can't do it."
Sands' major competitor, Wynn Resorts , said the company would decline its Macau
gaming concession if it was barred from extending credit and coilecting debts directly in
an effort to avoid the junket system, according to company fiiings.
But the U.S. companies realized soon enough that they could not compete with local
casinos without junkets

SJ001249
PlaintiffEx. 1102_00073

Appendix 2
China's high rollers tend to prefer the personal. informal relationships of the junkets,
experts say, and often demand a level of anonymity incompatible with the credit
applications required by the casinos.

LOWER PROFILE
While triads remain active in Hong Kong, the gangs have burrowed deeper into
mainland China including cities like Chongqing and retain a strong imprint in Macau.
The triads are believed to have originated as a rebel grouping in the early Qing Dynasty
formed to help overthrow the Manchu regime.
Ko-lin Chin, a professor at Rutgers University and one of the foremost experts on Asian
organized crime, disputes the regulator's contention that the triads are less prevalent in
Macau. But he said they db keep a lower profile than before internationally owned
casinos entered the market and revenues grew from $2.26 billion to $i5 billion today.
Even if crime groups are involved in the junket business, he says, with the casinos
making so much money, the government reaping huge taxes, and the citizens of Macau
enjoying full employment there is scant political will to remove them.
"No one wants to crash the party,'' he said. "This is a feel-good story." (Reporting by
Reuters in Macau and Hong Hong and Matt Isaacs in San Francisco and Las Vegas;
editing by Lowell Bergman, Jim lmpoco and Claudia Parsons) [.20100329 215044 GMT]

SJ001250

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00074

Appendix 3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY


DEPARTI\1ENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY

SPECIAL REPORT OF TH.E


DIVISION OF GAIVUNG ENFORCEIVIENT
TO THE CASINO CONTROL COMMISSION
ON ITS INVESTIGATION OF MGM 1\tliRAGE'S
JOINT VENTURE "\-VITH PANSY HO IN MACAU,
SPECIAL ADJ\fiNISTRATIVE REGION,
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ANNE MILGRAI\,1
ATTORNEY GENERAL

JOSH LICHTBLA U
DIRECTOR
ASSIST ANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

MAY 18,2009

SJ001251

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00075

Appendix 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. lNTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. !

ll. THE PARTIES AND ENTITIES INVOLVED IN MGM'S JOINT VENTURE


EFFORTS fN IV1ACAU ........................................ , .......................................................... 5
III. MACAU-- GENERAL BACKGROUND ............................................ ,. .. ,. ..................... 7

/\. THE GROWTH OF GAMING lN MACAU AND THE INVOLVEMENT


OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN STANLEY HO'S CASINOS .............................. 7
B. :vtACAU OPENS ITS GAMING INDUSTRY TO GREATER
COIV1.PET!TION ............... ,.................................................................................... 10
IV. MOM'S EFFORTS TO ENTER THE MACAU GAMING MARKET .......................... J2

A. M.GM DISCUSSES .BID SUBMISSION AND JOfNT VENTURE


WITH NE\V WORLD DEVELOPMENT AND JOHNNY CHAN ................... [ 3
B. f'v1GM'S OVERTURES TO STANLEY HO ........................................................ 15
C. MGM AND SHUN TAK NEGOTIATE TERMS OF JOfNT VENTURE,

WITH PANSY HO SERVING AS REPRESENTATIVE OF STANLEY HO


AND SHUN TAK ...................................................................... ., ........................ l8
D. MGM'S DUE DILIGENCE ON STANLEY HO, PANSY HO, AND
SHUN TAK DISCUSSED STANLEY HO'S BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
AND RELA TTONS WITH ASIAN ORGANIZED CRIME AND NORTH
KOREA, AS WELL AS PANSY HO'S ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN
STANLEY HO'S COfvfPANIES
.......................................... ,.............................. 2[

E. NEVADA REGULATORS EXPRESS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE


STRUCTURE OF MOM'S PROPSED JOfNT VENTURE WITH

SH!..IN TAK AND SJfv1 ....................................................................................... 25


F. MGM AND SHUN TAK REACH CONSENSUS ON A JOINT VENTURE

STRUCTURE ..................................................................................................... 26

SJ001252

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00076

Appendix 3

G. NEVADA REGULATORS EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT MGM


PART!CIPA T!NG IN ANY TRANSACTION fNVOLV fNG
STANLEY H0 .....................................................................................................27
H. PANSY HO REPLACES SffUN TAKAS MUM'S JOINT VENTURE
PARTNER ........................................................................................................... 29
I. MGM KNEW THAT PANSY HO'S FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE
FROM HER FATHER WOULD BE A KEY REGULATORY ISSUE.. ............ 32

J.

PANSY l-.lO SOUGHT THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTJA TIONS TO


INCLUDE SHUN TAK IN THE JOINT VENTURE PROJECf ........................ 33

K. MGM CONTRIBUTES $100 MILLION DOLLARS TO JOINT


VENTURE AS "PREMJU/vl" TO INCREASE PANSY HO'S EQUfTY
CONTRIBUTION ................................................................................................ 35

L. NINETY PERCENT OF PANSY HO'S EQUf'l'Y CONTRIBUTION


TO THE JOINT VENTURE CAME FROM GIFTS FROM STANLEY H0 .... .36
M. PANSY HO, RATHER THAN SHUN TAK, ACQUIRES SITE B
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS FOR NOML"!AL CONSIDERA TfON
AND THEN SELLS THEM SlXTEEN MONTHS LATER FOR
$239 MILLION .................................................................................................. 38
N. MGM AND PANSY HO ENTER INTO A JOINT VENTURE ........................ .40
0. A U.S. LAW ENFORCETVlENT PROFESSfONAL JN HONG KONG
UNOFFICIALLY ADVISES MGM THAT DOING BUSINESS WJTH
PANSY HO WILL ENTAIL A CERTAIN RISK DUE TO STANLEY
HO'S CONNECTIONS TO ORGANIZED CRIME ........................................... 44
P. STANLEY HO A1TENDS MAJOR EVENTS TN THE LAliNCHfNG OF
THE JOINT VENTURE ..................................................................................... .45

Q. REGULATORS FROM OTHER U.S. GAMING JURJSDICT!ONS DO NOT


OPPOSE MOM'S JOINT VENTlJRE WITH PANSY HO ............................... .46
V. THE SUITABILITY OF STANLEY HO AND PANSY H0 .......................................... .47
A. MGM ACKNOWLEDGES THAT S'fANLEY HO'S BACKGROUND AND

ASSOCIATfONS RENDER HIM UNSUITABLE ......................................... .47

ll

SJ001253
PlaintiffEx. 1102_00077

Appendix J

B. PANSY HO HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE PERSONAL, FINANCIAL,


AND PROFESSJONAL INDEPENDENCE FROM HER FATHER AND THE
COMPANIES UNDER HiS CONTROL ............................................................ 52
VL MGM'S COMPLIANCE EFFORTS ............................................................................... 63

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..............................................................................63

B. MGM FAILED TO APPRISE ITS COMPUANCE COMMITTEE AND


REGULATORS OF ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION !N A 'flMELY MANNER,
AND LEFT UNEXPLORED KEY QUESTIONS RELATED TO PANSY HO'S
SUITABILITY .............................. ., .......................................... ".......................... 67
VII. CONCLUS!ON ............ , ... ,. ............................................................................................ 69

vm. RECOMMEND/\ TIONS .............................................................................................. 70

!ll

SJ001254
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00078

Appendix 3

L INTRODUCTION
This Special Report to the New Jcrst:y Casino Control Commission ("Commission") sets forth
the tindings and recommendations of the New Jersey Division ofGnming EntrJrcemcnt ("Division")

regarding the joint venture between the New Jersey yualitied entity, MGJ'vl MIRAGE (''MGM"), and
Grand Paradise Macau, Limited, an entity wholly owned by Pansy Ho C'atilina Chiu King ("Pansy
Ho"), to develop and operate a casino in Macau. Special Administrative Rcglon, People's Republic of
China {"Macau''}. This joint venture resulted in the December ! 8, 2007 openingofthe MGM Grand
Macau, n casino in which MGM and Pansy Ho each hold a one-half interest.

in accordance with the Casino Control Act, NJ .S.A. 5:12-1 et seJL ("the Act"), l'v1GM, as a
licensed entity, bears the burden of establishing, by denr and convincing evidence,, its "good
t:haracter, honesty and integrity" on a eontinuing has is.

tLLS,b, 5: 12-84{ c). MOM and three reiated

t:ntities are -;ubject to the Act's suitability requirements and the jurisdiction of the Commission as
licensed entities that hold a once half ownership interest in f\-1arina District Deve.!opmcnt Company,

LLC, which, in tum, owns and operates the Borgata Hotel Casino and Spa ("Borgata") in Atlantic
City, New Jersey.' The Act further recognizes that a licensee's "business, professional and personal
associates" are relevant in assessing the suitability of a licensee such as fv1GM. As the Commission
has noted, ''associations an: relevant only to the extent that they may rc!1ect upon actual character and
present fitness to either hold a casino license or participate in gaming operations." In re Resorts
Casino Application, 10 N.J.A.R. 251 (CCC !979). The Commission has also noted that "it is

------------1

The three rdarcd c;ontities are (I) MAC, CORP, which is wh<,lly owned by Mirage Resorts, Incorporated, (2)
Mira g.: Resorts, Jncorpora!ed, whir:h in tum is wholly ovmed by MGM, and (3) Trac:nda Corp., which owns a majority of

SJ001255

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00079

Appendbt 3

incumbent upon the applicant to demonstrate either that it had no involvement with notorious or

unsavory persons or that such invoivement indicates no iack of good character, honesty and integrity,"

This Special Report is the culmination of the Division's review of the MOM/Pansy Hn joint
venture to detem1ine whether this business association negatively a!Tects MGM's "good character,
2

honesty and intcgri!y." The Division's June 2005 report to the Cornmission in connection with the
renewal of the Borgata casino license referenced MGM's proposed casino operation in Macau and
MGM 's association with Pansy Ho. It infiJrmed the Commission that, "over !.he years there have been
numerous public allegations suggesting that Stanley Ho, the father of MGM 's joint venture partner

Pansy Ho, has ties to Asian organized crime." The n~port discussed the proposed joint venture with
Pansy Ho and signaled to the Commisshm that the Division would review this business relationship

and provide any marcrial information to the Commission as appropriate.


The Division investigated ali a<;pects of MUM's joint venture \vith Pansy Ho to detemTine
whether MGM's actions, as well as its present business association with Pansy Ho, were consistent
with the "good character, honesty and integrity" and compliance obhgations required by the Act
Pursuant to the Division's request, MGM'sjoint venture partner, Pansy Ho, and her sister, Daisy Ho,

submitted Multi-Jurisdictional Personal History Disclosure Fomw ("MJ-PHD") in Jammry 2006 to

the outstanding shares nf MGM common stock and whieh is controlled by Kirk Kerkorian. Boyd A.t!antic City, lm:.
("Boyd") i~ the other one-half owner ofBorgata. Boyd had no involvement wilh MGM'sdevelopment activities in M.a~au.

2 Unless othenvise stated, this Report is based upon informati;)n as of December 31.2008.

SJ001256

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00080

Appendix 3

assist in the Division's investigation of the business association.

The investigation included 35

sworn interviews of seventeen individuals and numerous other investigative interviews. Attorneys
and investigators made several trips to Hong Kong and Macau, as well as a host of other locations,
both within and outside the United States, seeking information relevant to this investigation. In
addit10n, Division staff analyzed thousands of pages of dor..:uments, including e-mails and

e<mcspondence, and contacted numerous domestic and international law erdbrccmcnt and regulatory
authorities .

.A.s a starting point of the Division's analysis, the character and rt:putation of Stanley Ho, the
tather ofMGM'sjoint venture partner, precludes any t1nding other than that he is unsuitable. MGM
senior executives conceded his unsuitabflity during this investigation.

Furthennore, numerous

governmental and regulatory agencies have referenced Stanley Ho's associations with criminal
enterprises, including permitting organized crime to operate and thrive within his casinos. Stanley
Ho's unsuitability, and the obstacles that it posed to MGM in its eff(m to enter the Macau gaming
market by partnering with entities under his control, is at the root of the joint venture's fi.mnation and
current structure. In particular, upon conciuding that it could not partner with Stanley Ho or entities
under his control, and without conducting adequate due diligence on her suitability, MGM simply
substituted Pansy Ho as its joint venture partner despite her financial dependence upon Stanley Ho

and his

~ompanies.

'P:1n.~y Ho and Da.i;;y Ho voluntarily filed these limns with rhe Diviswn lor investigative purposes; neither is an
applicant for licensure.

SJ001257
PlaintiffEx.II02 00081

Appendix 3

Pansy Ho's extensive and continuing personal, financial, and professional relationship with
her father directiy affect her individual suitability and ieave her vulnerable to his potentia! influence
and controL She had no prior gaming experience before the joint venture, bringing to the partnership
primarily opportunities and influence provided by her business and personal relationship with her
father. Simply put, she has advanced professionally and accumulated wealth due to her father's

largesse, and she continues to hold leadership and governance positions in his companies. Indeed,
prior to MGM concluding that Stanley Ho and his companies were not a suitable partner, Pansy Ho
participated as his company's representative at the negotiations with MGM. Ultimately, ninety
percent of the fimds on which she relied to fund the joint venture derived from her fitther. Her
interactions with other persons associated with Asian organized crime also call into question her
individual suitability. Together, Pansy Ho's susceptibility to her finhcr's intluencc and issues of
personal suitability render the joint venture and MGM vulnerable to improper assodations and
influences and compromise iVtGM 's suitability as a New Jersey licensed entity.

Moreover} MOM's compliance failings during the fonnation and consummation of the joint
venture were pervasive and persistent, suggesting that the company's fervor to entering Macau
compromised its commitment to regulatory compliance. Throughout the ~}rocess, the communications
between MGM's management and its own Compliance Committee ("Committee") were, taken in the
most favorable light, incomplete and untimely, effectively negating the Committee's ability to engage
constructively and critically in the company's entry into Macau. MGM officials failed to keep the

Committee apprised of the parties with whom it was negotiating. Regarding these parties, MGM

failed to share with the Committee the due diligence or derogatory information that the company

SJ001258
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00082

Appendix 3

possessed. Additionally, l'vtGM failed to examh1e the most clitical aspects of Pansy Flo's suitability,
numely, her ability to finance her contribution to the joint venture and her independence from her

father and

tlll~

companies that he controls. In short, this is not an instance where MGM 's research and

due diligence led it to conclude that Pansy Ho was indepmdent from her father; rather, MGM simply
faded to explore the issue of her t1nancial independence. At the same time, MGM also failed to
adequately disciose the limited information it did possess rei evant to its review of the Pansy Ho joint
venture to regulators from New Jersey, as welf as other jurisdictions. This conduct renders MOM's
compliance efforts related to the Macau joint venture inadequate and insufficient to fulfill its
obligations under the Act.

II. IHE PARTl.ES .A:ND

ENTITIES

IN\iOLVED lN fl.-fGM'S
IN MACAU

JOINL.Yt;;:t:n::UR~ EFFORTS

This Special Report will examine the interactions between MGM senior executives and
employees and Stanley Ho, Pansy Ho, Daisy Ho, their representatives, and the constellation of entities
that Stanley Ho and Pansy Ho own or controL For the convenience ofthe Commission, the following
table provides a brief description of the persons and entities central to the t!.xmation and creation of
the MGM-Pansy Ho j11int venture.

J. Terrence Lanni

Chief Executive Oft1cer, Chainnan ofthe Board~

'Effective November 30, 2008, L;mni n'hred from his executive p0sitioos at MOM Mirage. He also res1gne'd
from lhe company'~ Board ,Jf Directors. On a!! dates reicvant to this investigative report, Lanni held the titles Chief
Executive O!Ticer and Chairman olthe Board.

SJ001259

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00083

Appendix 3

James Murren

President & Chief Operating Officer 5

Gary Jacobs

Executive Vice President, General Counsel,


Secretary

Kenneth Rosevear

President of Development

William Hornbuckle

Executive Vice President

Philip Wang

Senior Vice President Far East Marketing

Kyle Edwards

Vice President, Corporate Security and Gaming

Survei Jtance
Bryan Wright

Assistant General Counsel, Compliance Officer

Kenneth Feng

Assistant Vice President- Finance

Ho Family Members

Stanley Ho

Group Executive Chainnan, Shun Tak


Managing Director, STDM
Member, STDM Board of Directors
Managing Director, SJM

Pansy Ho (daughter (Jj'Stanley flo)

Managing Director, Shun Tak


Director of STDM
Managing Director, MGivf Grand Paradise

Daisy Ho (daughter ofStanley Ho)

Deputy Managing Director. Chief Financial


Officer, Shun Tak
Member, STDM Board of Directors 6
Class A Director, MGM Grand Paradise Limiled

Chen Yau Wong (CY Wong)

Employed by STDM ( J 993-1999)


Financial Advisor- Shun Tak (1999-2007)
Class A Director, MGM Grand Paradise Limited

Limited

5
Effecttvc December l, 2008, Murren holds the utles of Ch~innan and Chief Executive Officer. On all dates
rcie\ant to this investigative report, Murren held the titles Pretiden! and Chief Operating Ot11ee.r.

r'Arcording to Daisy l-lo'~ ~:ounsd, as of September 13, 200f!, Shun Tak was appointed a corporate director of
STDM. Tht Shun Tak board nominated Daisy Ho to ac:t ns its representative on thnt Board. As a result of that

SJ001260

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00084

Appendix 3

Companies Owned or Coptrolled by ~tgnle_y_l.jQ


Sociedade de Turismo e Diversocs de

Macau (STDM)

One of the largest private busjnesses in Macau,

founded with partners and now controlled by


Stanley Ho.

Socieclade de Jogos de Macau (SJM)

Shun Tak Holdings, Limited {Shun


Tak)

A.

Awarded one of the three Macau gaming


concessions in 2002; owned and controlled bv
Stanley Ho and STDM. 7

A large publicly-traded Hong Kong-based


conglomerate founded and controlled by Stanley
Ho and family members.

THE GROWTH OF GAMING !N tv1ACAU ANQJ]Jt..JJ:!Y_QL V~_ME..tJT Of' ORGANIZED


CRIME lN STANLEY HO'S CASINOS
lntroduced into the territory in 1847 to offset a decline in it:; shipping and trading industries,

legalized gaming has long been Macau's chief economic engine. By the end of the nineteenth
century, gaming tax revenues had already become the main source of income for the government of
Macau.

For most of the twentieth century, the Macanese gaming industry has operated under

monopoly ownership. In i 937, Macau granted monopoly gaming concession rights to Tai Heng. ln

July !961, Macau opened ownership of a 25-year casino monopoly to public bidding, Two groups
offered bids. Tni Heng, who nt that point still held the monopoly, led the first group. The second
group consisted of Ho Hung Sun, hereinaiter teferred to as Stanley Ho; Henry Fok, a wealthy Hong

Kong businessman and developer; Yip Hon, a Macau gambler; and Teddy Yip, Stanley Ho's brotherin-law. Stanley Ho '::;group won the bid. They formed Sociedade de Turismo e Diversoes de Macau
------..-------

appointment. counsel has represented that Daisy Ho resigned from her position as a member of the Superv.isory Bourd of

STDM
;This report does not takl~ into a<.Toum any ..:hanges in ovmership or directorship resulting irom SJM 's July 2008
initial public cffering.

SJ001261
Plaintiff Ex. II 02_ 00085

Appendix 3

(STOM") and, in Jum~ 1962, signed a gaming concession contract with the Macau government.
STDM opened its firs! casino, Casino Estori!, in ! 962. ln 1970, STDM opened its flagship casino,
The Lisbon.

STDM's control of gaming in Macau proved extremely lucrative for the company and Stanley
Ho. By the mid-1980's, Stanley Ho had gained control ofSTDM. DUling its forty years of monopoly

over Macau's gaming industry, STDM became one of the largest private business enterprises in
Macau, with investments in transportation, hospitality and tourism services, banking, and finance.
Stanley Ho' s personal net \VOrth has been estimated most recently at approximately $l bil!ion. a

Asian organized crime, attracted by the f,rrowing gaming market and accommodated by the
establishment ofVJP rooms in STDM casinos, penetrated the Macau gaming market. Beginning in
the early 1990's and continuing until the transfer of sovereignty to China in ! 999, Macau experienced
a wave of violence as A:>ian organized crime enteq>rises, known as "triads," stmggled for control of
the pdvate, high-stakes "VIP" rooms in STD1vl's casinos. As a report prepared by the Library of
Congress observed, "[t]op individuals in the triad structure often have established reputations as
9

legitimate businessmen." The VIP room structure, introduced in 1986, facilitated the involvement of
Asian organi:.ed crime in STDM casinos. Upon receipt ofun up-fiwlt fee for the right to operate in
one of the gaming rooms, STDM relinquished control of the VIP rooms to third party operators. The
third party ,)peratnrs would then enter into business arrangements with junket operators or'promoters

'"The \'/odd's Billion:1ires 2009.'' Forbes, Man:h II, 2009, available at


llt!p:/lwHw.jorbes.com/lists/2009/ I O!bil/ionain:s-2009-richest-p~ople .. Stan{ev ... lw .. umen. htmi (last visited May 5,
200Q),

SJ001262

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00086

Appendix 3

who market and promote the VfP rooms to attract customers. The VfP room operators would then
compensate the junket operators on a commi'lsion basis.

The VIP rooms in the STDM casinos provided organized crime the entry into the Macau
gaming nwrket that it had previously lacked. According to one commentator, before STDM brought
in third parties to manage the VIP rooms, "the power of triad societies was Iimited because they did
not have direct administrative access in the casinos[.]" 10 With the establishment of the VIP rooms,
however, STDM created a "lawless space" that allowed organized crime to gain a foothold in the
Macau gaming industry. 11 This expert noted that the VIP room operator would employ his friends or
"triad brethren" to hdp operate the room, serve as sales agents, and provide protection and other
"ancillary" services (e.g., drugs, prostitution, loansharking, and debt collection). 1! Another scholar
noted that. "organized crime in Macau's casino industry began to grow in the wake ofthe STDM's
administrative decentralization."

13

The lntemational Narcotics Control Strategy Report, published

anni.lally by the United States State Department, observed that ''[uJnder the old monopoly framework,
organized crime !,'TOUps were closely associated with the gaming industry through their control ofVIP

--------------..--..- ....---
"Glenn E. Curtis er al., Fed. Res. Div., Library of Congress, Transn;ltional Activities
Orgunizations, 3 (April 2003). (lntemal footno!es omitt~!d.)

pi.. Chinese Crime

'"Angela Veng Mei Leong. ~Lhe "BqJe-fich<L' Bl1Siness and l!:.i_~..9~.in.Maq;E,_!,j!sin22, 2 Qtleensland University
of Technology Law and Justice J0umal 83. H&-89 (2002).
I i !.Q.

1
1. Lwng,

supra, at 86 .. 90.

ul.o Shiu Hing, Casin.Qj'_Q.(Ltif.& Organ.i?~!tCrirr.lr..<J.illi.the Post-Colonial State iru':-:iK~JJ, 14 J. Contemp. China
207,

210(Ma~'200.5).

SJ001263

PlaintiffEx. I 102 00087

Appendix 3

gaming rooms and activities such as racketeering, loansharking, and prostitution. As a result, the
gan1ing industry in particular provides an avenue for the laundering ofiHicit funds.>H

B.

MACAU OPENS IT_S G..6MINO lND\JSTRY TO GREATER COMPETITIQ[i


Soon after becoming a special administrative region of China in 1999, Macau moved to

expand and encourage competition within its gaming industry. fn December J 999, pursuant to a
treaty between Portugal and China, Macau reverted to Chinese sovereignty. A!mosl immediately
thereafter, and in the context of Macau's pervasive gaming-related violence, Edmund Ho, the newlyappointed chief executive of Macau, announced a review of the casino gaming industry. 15 fn July
2000, the government formed the l'vlncau Gaming Committee, which conducted that limited
competition among several gaming operators would stimulate the economy and prornott\ tourism. In
/\.ugust 200 l, the Legislative Assemhly passed a law providing that three gaming eLm cessions would

be granted upon the December Jl, 200 t expiration of STDM's monopoly concession. The law
required that each bidder t<.1r a concession htlVc a local partner who held at !east a l 0% interest in the
casino venture.

The bidding and award process for the three concessions happened quickly. On October 30,
2001, the government timned an eight-member Casino Concessions Committee ("Concessions
Committee") responsible tiJrcoordinating the tt:ndering process, receiving and reviewing the bids, and
making recommeudations to the Macau Chief Executive. T'he Concessions Committee accepted
twenty-one bids between November 2, 200 l and December 7, 2001. MOM submitted its bid on

---14.. - - - -

Uililt'd State;; Dcpartm~nt of State, Bureau of International Narcotk~ and Law Enf(Jrcemen! Affairs,

fntemation<tl

Nurcotic;.~

Control Strategy Reuon (March 200R).

tO

SJ001264
Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00088

Appendix 3

December 4, 2001. On february 8, 2002, the govemment announced the results of the bidding
process. The government granted a concession to the following entities: Sociedade de Jogos de

Macau, S.A. C'SJM"), the company created and owned by STDM for the purpose of applying for a
gaming license; Wynn Resorts; and, Galaxy Casino, S.A.("Galaxy") and

Vem~tian

Macau Group

(''Venetian Macau"), a venture formed by Galaxy Casino owners Lui Che Woo and Peter Ho On
Chun and Venetian Macau, a wholly owned subsidiary ofthe Las Vcgas Sands Corporation. Two of
the successful bidders- Las Vegas Sands Corporation and Wynn Resorts- are Nevada competitors of

MGfvL In announcing the winning bidders, the government also announced the fburth- through sixthranked proposals. The Concessions Committee ranked MOM's bid filth.

The government ultimately granted three subconcessions, one for each concession. The
;,:ubconccssions allowed groupt: other than the original three top bidders to establish r.:asinos in Mac<tu .
.In December, 2002, the Macau government split the Galaxy concession and authorized the granting
of a subconces~ion to be held by Sheldon Adelson and the Venetian Macau. ln April 2005, the
government approved the grant of a subconcession by SJM to the MOM/Pansy Ho joint venture.

Finally, in September 2006, the Macau govemment approved Wynn Resorts' grant of a subconcession
to a group comprised of James Packer and Lawrence Ho, Stanley r-Io's son. Accordingly, the Macau
govemment has issued a total of six casino concessions or subconcessions in the Macau gaming
market, with members of Stanley Ho's family involved in three ofthe six.

The Macau gaming industry has expanded significantly since the issuance of the concessions.
As of March 31, 2008, the number of casinos in Macau has increased from II in 2002 to 29, with
-------------- ------------------------15

Chief Execlltive Ho is no rdalion io Stanley Ho.

11

SJ001265

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00089

Appendix 3

SJM operating nineteen casinos, Galaxy five, Venetian Macau two, Wynn one, Melco PBL one, and

the

MG~1/Pansy

!!o joint venture casino one, the rvlGf\.1 Grand Lvfacau. In calendar year 2002l

Macau's casino revenues were

.~2.77

billion. By 2004, they had risen to $5.17 biltion. In calendar

year 2007, these revenues increased to $10.38 billion, an amount that exceeded casino revenues in
2007 for Nevada's Las Vegas Strip ($6.83 billion}. By way of further comparison, casino revenue for
the entire state ofNevada in 2007 was $12.85 billion.

IV. !YJQfy[$..J~EFORTS TO ENTER THE MACAU GAMfNG 1\:"it\J:\_~g_J.:

The belief of senior MGM ot1icials that MGM had to pursue entry into the Macau market or
risk being at a competitive disadvantage to its counterparts in Nevada motivated the company's
concerted effixts to secure gaming rights in Macau. In testimony before the Nevada Gaming Control
Board ("NGCB"), the a~;ency responsible for regulating the gaming indnsoy in Nevada, Gary Jacobs
testified that MGM's "Nevada operations would he significantly disadvantaged if our competitors,
Wynn Resorts and Li.ls Vegas Sands, are in that market [Macau] while MGM Mirage is not." MUM's
own analysis and research concluded that, despite its turbulent past, Macau's gamingmal'ket could be
a potentially lucrative investment for the company.

As discussed in detail below, MGf'v1 pursued partnerships with several entities in an effort to
fashion a workable venture Ihat would meet regulatory approval. In its efforts to develop a viable bid
to enter the iv1acau gaming market, MOM held discussions in the spring of 2001 with potential
partners in Macau. Throughout 2001, MGM discussed and pursued various torms of partnership with
several individuals and entities. MCiM executives testified that they were constantly approached by
outside parties pitching potentia! opportunities and claiming to have the necessary local contacts to
12

SJ001266

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00090

Appendix 3

secure one of the gaming concessions. It began its exploration of entry into the Macau market with
New World Development ("NWD"), a Hong Kong conglomerate led by Cheng Yu-Tung, an

individual with extensive and longstanding associations with Stanley Ho, and Chan Siu Hung
("Chan"), an individual involved in several VIP moms, After learning that it was not selected for a
concession in February 2002, MGM then sought to patiner with Shun Tak and operate under SJM's
concession, entities prominent in Stanley lJo's empire. After Nevada regulators voiced concerns over

the proposed arrangement with those corporate entities, in the tall of2003 MGM began discussions to
partner directly with Pansy Ho, the daughter of Stanley Ho, which culminated in a joint venture
arrreement entered into in June 2004.
.
~

A.

M(1M DISCUSS.ES BID SUBMISSfON AND JOINT VENTURE WITH NE\Y_Ir.YS)RLD


QJ;YJ;;b._QJ~\1.);!.'LLt.\ N D_l.P HNNY CH.~N
Tl1roughoul much of2001, MGM senior executives engaged ln joint venture discussions with

representatives ofNWD, a conglomerate based in Hong Kong. In its June 5, 2001 corporate meeting,
the MGM Executive Committee authorized the negotiation of a joint venture agreement with NWD.
NWD representatives included its director and chainnan, Cheng Yu-Tung, and his son and l'v1anaging
Director of NvVD, Henry Cheng Kar-Shun ("Henry Cheng"). Cheng Yu-Tung has had extensive
business relations with Stanley Ho, is a substantial shareholder of STDM, and holds govemance
positions on the boards of both STDM and Shun Tak. Chan was also involved in the discussions M
behalf of NWD. Chan and Chen Yu-Tung had established VIP rooms together in three differenl

STDM casinos.

.1-.:\

SJ001267

P1aintiffEx. 1102 00091

Appendix 3

Also during this time, MGM considered Chan individually as a local partner. 16 In a November
6, 2001 n1cn1orandum

t()

:Kyle Ed;,vards" Jacobs identified (~han ns the com puny's prospective ~v:fa.cau

partner r.~nd directed rviGM's Corporate Security Department to begin a background check on Chan.
On December 4. 200 l , MGM submitted its bid to the Concessions Committee without naming a local
partner. On December 6, 200 I, a private investigation firm retained by MGM provided MGM
Corporate Security a background investigation report on Chan. While the report noted that Chan had
no criminal n:cord in Macau, it stated that "Chan is directiy involved in the VfP rooms of the Casinos
that are notorious

tor triad

activities, He is in partnership in one of thest: with CHENG Yu-tong a

partner and associate of Stanley Ho." Edwards prepared and provided to Jacobs an MGf'vl iv1IRAGE
Corporate Security Report on Chan. ba~ed on the background investigation report, The report
indicated that"[ L]aw ent~1rcement and private sources show no criminal arrests or convictions in Hong
Kong." Noting Chan's role in operating ihree VIP rooms, the report commentrA.i ihat "[t]hese VIP
rooms are notorious f()r triad activities" and that, according to sources, "it is nearly impossible to be in
the casino business in Macau at present, without having associations with triad groups or what is
known as organized clime:' By memorandum dated January 4, 2002, Jacobs fonvarded Edwards'
Chan report to Terrence Lanni and Kenneth Rosevear, noting that Edwards' "cautionary note
concerning 'associations' with individuals invoived with organized crime are probably inevitable fbr
people in the casino business in Macao under the old regime,"

[n the event one of the three successful bidders could not finalize its a~o>rcement or another
opportunity arose, MGM continued to seek a iocal partner even aiter not receiving one of the initial

16

Te~timony af Jacobs, May JO, 2007, pp. 5961.

i4

SJ001268

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00092

Appendix 3

gammg concessions.

In the event that any of the top three bidders were unable to finalize an

agreement with the government, MGM anticipated that the government would grant a concession to
the next-highest ranked bidder.
representatives of New City

In a MHrch 25, 2002 letter to Henry Cheng and Chan, as

(~asino

Ltd., Lanni stated that MGM maintained "a keen interest"in

obtaining a concession should one become available. The Jetter proposed a joint venture that would
be owned 40% and 20{%, respectively, by an entity or entitles led by Henry Cheng and Chan, and
noted that MOM "contemplate[ d) that Johnny Chan \.Vould serve as Executive Director of MGM
Grand Macan," The letter concluded that "we are ready, willing and able to proceed with discussions
with you on the basis outlined above," with the caveat that the proposed stmcture was "subject to the
approval of the govemment of Macao S.A.R. and the gaming regulators to which we are subject." By
.func 2002 each of the entities granted an initial concession had l:xecuted a gaming concessions
contract with the l'v"iacau government and MGM's conversations with N\VD, Cheng, and Chan
proceeded no further.

MG.M signed and delivered the March 25, 2002 letter proposing a partnership despite its own
internal due diligence noting the connections between Chan, the VIP rooms, a11d organized crime.
Although both Lanni and Jacobs later testified that tht~y had reservations about Henry Cheng as a
partner, the letter suggests that the company would have entered the Macau market with Cheng and
Chan as partners had the opportunity arose.

B.

MOM'S OVERTURES TO STANLEY HO

MGM continued in its attempt to enter the Macau market. As Jacobs stated, "we licked our
vmunds for a bit, and then tried to analyze whether there were any other opportunities for us to enter
15

SJ001269
Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00093

Appendix 3

the Macau market." In interviews with the Division. Jacobs stated that MOM had "no appetite
whatsoever" to consider a partnership with those concessionaires who competed with MOM in the
Nevada market, namely, Wynn Resmis and Las Vegas Sands. This decision to exclude its Nevada
competitors tiom consideration Jefl SJM, the entity established by Stanley Ho and STDM, as the sole
remaining concessionaire.

MGfvl <wproached SJM through outreat:.h to Stanley Ho in spring 2002. Philip Wang, who had
known Stanley Ho on a social basis, testified that he sought prior approval tiom Lanni before

cont11cting Ho. 17 Lanni testified in direct contradiction that he v1as not aware that Wang was going to
contact Stanley Ho. 18 Wang stated that contacting Stantey Ho ''was really a wild card. At the time,
we were very desperate." He testified that Lanni said it was a "crazy idea" but said to "give it a shot."
Wang met with Stanley Ho ut Ho's office, and then

to Ilowed up the meeting with a phone call.

On

both occasions, Stanley Ho responded, ''are you serious?" Wang stated that, during the phone call, be
replied "we [MGiv1J arc very, very serious." He testified that Stanley Ho advised him that he would
"be leaving with a t,rroup of people, some family members and some of my business associates to the
United States, and we [will] see what happens.'' Wang stated that he infmmedLanni of Stanley Ho's
future visit. Both agreed that it would be appropriate for MGM to host a dinner for Ho and his family
in Las Vegas.

Stanley Ho designated Pansy Ho as his representative in discussions with MGM.


Accompanied by business

associatt~s

and family members, including Pansy H.o, Stanley Ho visited

-------------17

Testimony of Philtp Wang, July 31, 2007, pp . .20-2l.

16

SJ001270

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00094

Appendix 3

Las Vegas in April 2002. The Ho party accepted MOM's invitation to stay at u IVfGM property, the
Mansion at MGM Grand, during their visit. During this trip, members of the Ho patiy, including
Stanley [lo and Pansy Ho, had dinner with Lanni, Wang, and MGM majority shareholder Kirk
Kerkorian. Wang testified that Stanley Ho stated to him after the dinner that, "from now on I wam
you to start the discussion and my daughter Pansy Ho will be my representative negotiating \Vith you."
Lanni simi.larly recailed that Stanley Ho designated Pansy Ho as his representative in the
negotiations. Wang indicated that no further discussions with Stanley Ho occUlTed during the April

2002 trip.

Pansy Ho testitied that she made it clear to Rosevear that because she was the Managing
Director of Shun Ta.k, she would be representing Shun Tak, and not SJM, in the negotiations. She
also ttstificd that Stanley Ho had concluded that "of course SJM i3 not going to work with [MGMJ as
in becoming p~rrtners, there's no reason. I mean they're competitors at best."

Regardless of the particular entity that Pansy Ho wa:> representing during the initial
discussions, STDM, Shun Tak, and SJ M have significant governance and ownership overlap. Stanley
H(J

is the largest individual shareholder of both STD!v1 and Shun Tak. As of June 30, 2008, five

individuals serve on the boards ofboth STDM and Shun Tak. Three Shun Tak directors serve on the
SJM Board. Six STDM directors and tlvc Shun Tak directors are members of the Ho !amily. The
refusal of Pansy Uo and Daisy Ho to release material information relating to Shun T'ak and STDM has

-----------------------------------;XTe~aimony of Lanni, August I. 2007, p. 70.

-------

,..,

1 r

SJ001271

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00095

Appendix 3

limited the Division's ability to fully evaluate and detennine the corporate and business relationship
between these entities.

C.

MOM AND _SHUNTAK NEGOTIATETERJviS QE)OlNTVEI'{fURE._W.JTH PANSY HO


,'lER\::_'(NG AS R_EPRJ;SENTATIVE OF STA"t:/LEY.H9 AND SHUN TAK
MGM pursued its efforts to partner with Shun Tak, initially, and, then, Pansy Ho individually,

despite the warnings of regulators and its own due diligence on Stanley Ho and his companies.
Throughout the remainder of 2002 and through the summer of 2003, MGM and Pansy Ho,
participating in her corporate capacity as managing director of Shun Tak and as her father's
representative, negotiated and reached agreement on various aspects of a joint venture, including
ownership, control, and the venture's arrangement with SJtv1, the holder ofthe gaming concession.

By July 2003, the parties intended to travel to Jvfacau in September to discuss the venture with
~.,:1acanese

regulators. i\-n intervening request by Nevada regulators fur discussions on the proposed

joint venture struc:ture convinced MGM ofi1dals that the proposed joint venture, as the parties had
conceived it, would likely not meet regulatory approval because of the involvement of companies
owned and controlled by Stanley Bo. Rather than abandon the joint venture, Pansy Ho, individually,
replaced Shun Tak as the joint venture partner, the Macanese government reversed its position on
granting any additional subconcessions, and SJM agreed to convey the subconcession to the joint
venture at what MGM has acknowledged was a bargain price. This section will discuss the broad
parameters of these negotiations insofar as they are pertinent to the final structure of the joint venture.

Following the April 2002 dinner conversation, Shun Tak and MGM began exploratory
discussions on September 9 and 10,2002, in Las Vegas regarding a joint venture between the parties.

18

SJ001272

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00096

Appendix 3

Pansy Ho and CY Wong participated on behalf of Shun Tak. L8tmi, Rosevear, Kenneth Feng, and
Wang participated on behalf of MGM. Wong testified that MGM was "quite responsive" to the
suggestion of a possible joint venture with Shun Tak and MOM owning 51 percent I 49 percent,
respectively. The parties proceeded to work together to produce a financial business model. In early
October, Feng and Patrick Crockett, an MGM development executive, went to Hong Kong to meet
with Wong. Later that month, Lanni and Rosevear met with Pansy Ho and Wong in Hong Kong.

After additional meetings and subsequent discussions, the parties produced a general outline

of the joint venture. As rdlcetcd in a February 4, 2003, document, major characteristics of the joint
venture included:

Ownership: MG!Vt MIRAGE/Shun Tak project ownership in


the ratio of 49%/51 %;

Size of venture: MGM MfRAGE and Shun Tak would make


t:quity contributions of $88.4M and $92.1 M. respecttvely;
"'

VIP rooms: No third-party operated VIP rooms in the initial


years; and,

,.

Income sharing with S.JM: SJM to receive 12,5% of


iicense holder.

"

Casino site: Land concession price payable to SJM by the joint venture tor
the casino site would be capped at $60 million. I<J

!,'fOSS

revenue as

Regarding discussions on the VIP rooms, MOM's position, as articulated by Jacobs and Rosevear,
was that the rooms would have to operate in a manner that satisfied the 'standards of United States

1
''The $60 million included monies that the jt,int venture would pay to both SJ1\-1end the Macanese government.
Macanc5e law mandated th!lt only a gaming concessionaire, or someone nominated by a con~e~sionaire, could apply to the
gt'vcrnmenl to develop land tksigna!ed as casino-related land. Development ~pproval f.:Jr land designated as cas.inorelated land IaJis under the discretion ot; awl accderated review by, the Chief E'(ecurive. Additionally, the Macanese
government retained ownership of the land.

!9

SJ001273

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00097

Appendix 3

casino regulators. Furthermore, MGM maintained that all persons involved in VIP room operations
would have to be investigated in a manner that satisfied United States casino regulators.

Several issues reiating to operational control of the joint venture and the nature of SJM's
involvement remained unresolved. Regarding operational control, MGM maintained that it would

accept minmity ownership in the venture if it had an equal role in all signiticant operations decisions.
Pansy Ho insisted that she hold the title of Managing Dirt:ctor. Jacobs testified that MGM's concerns
regarding that condition were ( 1) Pansy I-lo 's lack of garning experience; and (2) accountability to
other regulators, particularly those in the United States. Jacobs testified that

~KiM

was concerned

about Pansy Ho's abi!ity to run the project "because at that time she was not knowledgeable in the
gaming areas and in compliance."

The second outstanding issue related to the joint venture's business relationship with

snvt

Per Jacobs, ''it was generally understood that no matter what the tonn of the transaction, the substance
had to be that SJM had to be passive and could not operate," due to the nature of public allegations
relating to Stanley Ho, his ownership and control of SJM, and anticipaied regulatory concerns
regarding these aHegations. 10 MGM concluded that joint venture payments to SJ!vl made pursuant to
an income formula would be sufficient to render SJM a passive participant. Jacobs testified that, at
this stage of the negotiations, Pansy Ho understood that !'vlGM could not enter into any type of
relationship with her fflther.

:~uTestimony of Jacobs, l\1arch 21, 2007, p. I 77.: t~stimony of Jacobs, May 30, 2007, p. l54.

20

SJ001274
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00098

Appendix 3

D.

_Iv1Gtyf1L..QU.t

DILIGEN~.~ __Ql:L_STI\l'i_.I,EY HO, Pt\NSY HO, AND SHUtL.TAK


DISCUSSED STANLEY HO'S BUSINESS ASSOC1ATION~ AND. RELATrONS WJTH
l\$IAN.. Q_B._Qi\l':f..!z.J;:.Q CRIME AND NORTH KORE.,~ ....A.S_}Y.,E,l,Je. ...r'\S PANSY 1-JO'S
A~J1V E .Jt:JY_Qk_VEiv1ENT_Ili_~I.,_-\.NL~Y ._ti.O' S. __ (::QMJ'.6.N lES,

MOM's due diligence and back:;,rround reports provided MGM executives with derogatory

infonnation regarding Stanley Ho and Pansy Ho 's fom1er husband. In the early stages of negotiations
with Shun Tak in March 2003, Jacobs directed MGM's Corporate Security Department to investigate
the backgrounds of Shun Tak, Stanley Ho, Pansy Ho, and Daisy Ho.

In a March 7, 2003,

memorandum to Jacobs about Stanley Ho and Shun Tak, Edwards referenced a commercial fraud

investigation in Hong Kong during the 1990s that involved Tomson Group/World Trade Centre,

companies of which Stanley Ho was either a director or chairman. The memorandum detailed
numerous material derogatory allegations about Stanley Ho personally. It noted that Australian
gaming .authorities had found that Stanley Ho was "unsuitable to hold a gaming license,'' and added

that a 1992 United States Senate committe': investigation had conducted that Stanley Ho, while not a
member of Asian organized crime, associated wi!h individuals and business associates who were
members.

The March 7, 2003 memorandum also commented on Pansy Ho. It noted that, in August
2000, Pansy l-lo had a relationship with Gilbe1t Yeung Kei-tung ("GilbeJt Yeung"), the son ofYeung,
Sau Shin g. Albert ("Albert Yeung"). Edwards explained in the memorandum that "Gilbert Yeung is
the :>on of Albert'( eung a convicted felon tbr illegal bookmaking." A handwritten notation by Jacobs
on the memorandum indicates that he fonvarded it to Lanni, Rosevear, and James Murren. Later that
month, on March 25, 2003, Edwards incorporated the various allegations of the l\1arch 7, 2003
memorandum into a draft MGM Mirage Corporate Secunty Background Report. In the transmittal

21

SJ001275
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00099

Appendix 3

memorandum accompanying the background report, Edwards indicated that he had retained a private
investigation firm to do further research. The memorandum also advised Jacobs that "(i}fthere is any
information you specifically need please tell and I will have them do the work. Upon each update I
will torward to you the information .. ,

The private investigation finn submitted several investigative reports to MGM that
documented derogatory infom1ation regarding Stanley Ho and Pansy Ho. [n an e-mail dated March
14, 2003, the private investigation tirm concluded that triads or persons associated with triads
operated the VIP rooms in !be SJM casinos. The private linn also noted that Stanley Ho was ''linked
closely" to the two major triads operating in Macau, the 14K and Sun Yee On. The finn also reported
on its invcstigatiotl into Shun Tak, discussing the extent oftbe Ho enterprises, the substantial business
connections between Shun Tak and STDivt, and other ''cross pollination" betv.reen the two entities. H
referenced the inl1uence of the Ho family, noting that the family, through their v<uious associations
and interests, controlled most aspects of business in Macau and had substantial influe-nce \Vith the
Macau govemment.

A report by the ti1m further discussed the involvement of organized crime in Stanley Ho 's
casinos. lt observed that "[t]he alieged Triad involvement in the VIP gaming rooms has been
documented and corroborated information from two confidential sources" and concluded that "[tjhere

is no doubt that he [Stanley Ho Jwould have to and has interacted with Triads and must have dealings
with them, by vi tim; ofthe VIP rooms and other projects." The report a!sn included a chart listing 48

VfP rooms, the individuals believed to be in charge of each room, and those individuals' triad
association. T'he report stated ''that the majority of VIP rooms are in establishments that are either
owned, controlled or a shareholding is held by one of[Stanley Ho'sJ group of companies." While the
report noted that it had ibund no "definitive evidence" ihat Stanley Ho "is associated with, is a

22

SJ001276

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 001 00

Appendix 3

member of or is a leader of a Triad Society nor has be been convicted of any such offense," it
commented that "[Stanley HoJ has been associated with such [conuption) offenses in Hong Kong,
Philippines and Canada, but no charges were ever brought against him."
The report also discussed Stanley flo's "strong tics" to North Korea and noted that a casino
located there "is ostensibly said to be owned by a reputed (but never convicted) senior Triad member
Albert Yeung Sau Shing (alleged senior office bearer of the Sun Yee On), who also controls the
Emperor Group a listed company on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. "

21

In discussing Stanley I-Io's

c.asino presence in North Korea, the report stated that "Wong Sing Wah (owns

t\.'!O

VIP rooms),

another suspected senior Triad member, is alleged to be a partner with SH [Stanley Hoj in a casino in

North Korea."

The finn aiso documented Pansy Ho's personal relationships and her importance in Stanley
Ho's companies. The finn's March 14, 2003 e-mail to Edwards noted that Pansy Ho had been
married to Julian Hui (''Hui"), who operated a nightclub in Hong Kong,
fn a separate repati, the finn noted that Stanley Ho bad named Pansy Ho as
'his heir apparent" and that she was 'actively involved in most facets of the day-to-day operations of
two key companies in the Ho Empire: Shun Tuk Holdings Ltd. and STDM." It also stated that Pansy
H.o had no record of any crimina! or corruption offenses and that the report's author was unable to
obtain any intelligence reports on Pansy Ho.

---------------
''As no red above, .i!JJ[/?. ar 21, Edwards' March 7, 2003 memorandum discussed !he relatJOoships between Pansy

Ho and Albert Yeung's so1. Gilbert

23

SJ001277

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 001 01

Appendix 3

Edwards distilled the various reports tlom the private investigation tirm into two MGM
MIRAGE Corporate Security Backt,>round reports that set foith substantial derogatory infonnation
regarding primarily Stanley Ho, with some discussion of Pansy Ho. One tepoti was seven pages: the

other was five pages. They omitted some derogatory irdi.Jmlation contained m the investigative
theaJieged triad involvement of

rcpo11S and c-m.ails, including

Albert Yeung. Both reports were unsigned and undated and the seven-page report was stamped
"DRAFT. "~ 2 The reports stated that there ''is no doubt that by virtue of the setups of the VIP rooms,
Stanley has interacted with individuals that are members of Triads." The longer report also contained
detailed aliegations of Stanley flo's involvement with members of Russian organized crime; his

t::asino in Pyongyang, North Korea; and his relationship with Wong Sing Wah. The repmi identified
\Vong Sing Wah as a VIP room operator, a suspected triad member, and us an individual with ties to
North Korea. ft also noted press reports that, in a January 2003 meeting with a senior ofticial of the
Russian Consu.late, Stanley Ho, "claiming that he was acting on behalfofthe highest North Korean
authorities, offered to facilitate the movement of Saddam Hussein, his family and other senior Iraqi
leaders. to North Korea." The repoltS did not discuss Pansy Ho's relationship with Hui. Edwards
sent both reports to Jacobs.

On March 20, 2003, Lanni and Jacobs also received. derogatory due (iiligencc infom1ation
regarding Stanley Ho directly from Alan Feldman, MGM's Senior Vice President of Public Relations.
!n Feldman's e~mail to Lanni and Jacobs, he informed them that, in 1986, Australian authorities

.:"Edwards testified that he .. generally" marked reports "draft'" because "thM was Mr. Jacobs general instruction
at all times.''

24

SJ001278

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00102

Appendix 3

f<.)rced Stanley Ho to divest himsel ffrom an entity applying fi.1r a casino license becatJsc the regulators
concluded that Stanley f-lo was ''an unsuitable person to hold a casino license_'' The e-mail referred to
and quoted two news articles tiom an Australian new-spaper that discussed the connection of the VIP
rooms to organized crime and violent crime in Macau. The e-mail also referenced a 1992 United
States Senate Report that, according to Feldman, said that, "while Ho was 'not known to he involved
in organized crime' Stanley Ho had 'some connections' to organized crime figures."

E.

NEYADA REGULATORS EXPRESS RESERVATIQ~f3 AflPLlJTHE STRUCTURE QE_


MGM'S PROPOSED JOINT VENTURE WITH SH1)NTAK AND SJM
Although MGM senior executives maintained during their testimony that the company would

not do business with Stanley Ho, MGM pursued plans to enter the Macau gaming market with two

companies in which StHnley Ho had controlling ownership and held leadership positiOns: Shun Tak
and SJivf. ln early 2003, Jacobs discussed MGM 's joint venture plans with individual members ofthe
NGCB. Jacobs testified that, very early in the dialogm.\ a NGCB board member advised MGM that
an affiliation or association with Stanley Ho "was going to cause some difl1culties for our regulators."
Jacobs recalled receiving a telephone call from MOM's outside counsel to discuss what he
characterized as a NGCB member's "t,>rave reservations" about the proposed structure of the joint
venture. Counsel also advised I acobs that the same Board member had stated that "Nevada really had
a problem with this strw:;ture because of the participation

because of Dr- Ho and SJM's income stream

r.}"

[n an attempt to address these concerns, MGM pursued a .,vritten statement fiorn Macau
regarding the probity of Stanley Ho despite derogatory due diligence wits possession. On March 18,
2003, Jaeobs advised the MOM Executive Committee that "in fin]fom-tal conversations with members

25

SJ001279

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 001 03

Appendix 3

of the Nevada Gaming Control Board, reservations were expressed concerning this involvement by
Mr. [Stanley] Ho.'' The minutes ofthis meeting note thai Jacobs ''had requested (and Ms. Ho agreed
to provide) a written statement from the government of Macau S.A.R., to the effect that it had
investigated and was satist1ed as to the probity of Mr. Ho. Jacobs said that such a finding would be
essential to support the company's own probity review and to allay the concerns of Nevada and

possibly other regulators.'' Jacobs later testitled, "my thinking was that ... ifMaeau were prepared to
provide documentation and/or support ofthe probity of Dr, Ho and his enterprises, that that would be
a useful piece of evidence to present to Nevada."

Despite the Nevada gaming regulators' preliminary indication of concerns, MGM and Shun

,rak proceeded to

negotia.t(..~

the tcnns of the pro_posed joint venture throughuut the spring of 2003.

The negotiations continued to focus on operational control and the ret,'Ulatory viability of SJM as a
partic.ipant in the joint venture. Pansy Ho maintained that she, as a representative of Shun Tak, must
be the Managing Director. Jacobs responded that, due to "the realities that MGM Mirage must deal
with at our regulatory and board level make it clear that we cannot go fonvard without demonstrating
that MUM has operational control over t.he joint venture."

MGM reached n&Teement with Pansy Ho, on behalf of Stanley Ho and Shun Tak, on the
structure of a joint venture that would develop, construct, and operate hotellresOJi gaming complexes
in Macau. By July 2003, the parties had agreed on the "salient aspects" of the structure of an MGM-

Shun Tak joint venture that still involved entering into a management agreement with SJM. On July
31, 2003. Pansy Ho, as the Managing Director of Shun Tak, and Lanni, as Chainnan of the Board and

26

SJ001280

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 _ 001 04

Appendix 3

CEO ofMGM, exchanged reciprocal letters acknowledging that the parties had reached a consensus
regarding the structure oft he joint venture. They further noted that they were prepared to recommend

to theirrcspcctive Boards of Directors that the project proceed but only after the parties consult with
their prospective regulators to determine whether the regulators expressed any materiaf objections or
concems to the proposed joint venture. A document titled "Proposed Casino JVC Structure," dated
July 31, 2003, retlectcd those mutually agreed principles and arrangements that both MGM and Shun
Tak were prepared to recommend to their respective boards of directors. With the general structure
for an MG.M-Shun Tak partnership

Ill

place, MGlvi executives planned to travel to Macau in

September to resolve several outstanding issues with SJ M and to present the joint structure to Macau
regulatory authorities.

G.

_('JEVAOA REGULATQJh"-.EXPJWSS CONCERN AI;!.Q];J.I_MGM PARTIClPi\TJNG IN


t\lJ.Y.TRANSACTlON.I0LY9LY_lNG STANLEY HQ
Nevada regulators continued to indicate to MGM that partnering with entities controiled by

Stanley Ho was problematic. Prior to the proposed September 2003 meeting with regulators in

Macau, on August 15, 2003, a staff member of the NGCB requested that Jacobs meet with a board
member and staffto 'discuss specitical!y and not generally" MOM's plans in Macau. Pursuant to that
request, on August 26, 2003, Jacobs, Lanni, and William Hornbuckle, met with NGCB member
Bobby Siller (''Siller") and NGCB staff Siller advised that he was aware of information about
Stanley Ho that was very troubling. Specifically, he raised concerns about Stanley Ho's alleged
organized crime connections, issues involving loansharking and debt collection at his Macau casinos,
and Stanley Ho' s experiences with other casino regulatory agencies. V/hile Siller noted that he could
not speak for the other two members of the Board, he advised the

MGlV1 executives that any

27

SJ001281

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 001 05

Appendix J

transaction involving Stanley Ho would necessitate a fi.lll investigation and some type of public
suitability hearing in Nevada. Silier indicated that gaining approval for such a venture would be a
''very difficult path," and he advised that he, as a member of the NOCB, would not support any
agreement that included Stanley Ho, Shun Tak, SJM, or STDM. For their part, the MGM executives
did not present at the meeting any of the due diligence, background reports, or other records in their
possession that contained due diligence, derogatory or otherwise, concerning Stanley Ho. To the
contra.ty, MGM executives advised Siller that they had no "smoking gun'' related to negative
inf(Jm1ation about Stanley Ho.

On August 26, 2003, the same date as the meeting between MGM otTicia!s, Siller and NGCB
staff~

Siller received a letter signed by Secretary Francis Tam Pak Yeun (''Secretary Tam"), a high-

ranking Macanese government otncial, but largely written by Jacobs and Pansy Ho's attorney, David
Stannard. 23 The August 1, 200J letter, signed by Macau's Secretary for Economy and Finance, was
written pursuant to Jacobs's request noted in the March 18, 2003 meeting of the MGM Exeeutive
Committee. The letter stated that the rv1acanese Government was seeking to "maintain the highest
possible standards in the conduct ofits gaming facilities," including ensuring that "the operation and
running of casino gaming is conducted in a manner which is tair, honest and free ofthe influence of
criminal activities." It further indicated thai the Macau government had conducted a thorough
background investigation on SJM and Shun Tak and had found both entities suitable, as well as their
directors, holders of 5% or more of its share capital and its ultimate controlling shareholders. Further
33

On August 7, 2003, Wong emailed signed copies of the Secretary Tam letter to Jacobs. Wong also
testified that he gave the stgned original version of these letters to W(lng t-or delivery to Nevada. The Secretary Tam
kuer received by Siller was R signed origimi.l that was sl;unped "Received Angusl26, 2003.'' This is the same date as

28

SJ001282

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00106

Appendix 3

review of the August I, 2003 letter and MGM's internal documents reveals that, in large part, Jacobs,
wiih some assistance from Stannard, wrote almost verbatim the Secretary Tarn letter endorsing the
suitability of Shun Tak, SJM and, by implication, Stanley Ho, due t<l his status as director and
shareholder of those companies.

The assertions contained in Secretary Tum's letter notwithstanding, however, the meeting with
Siller led MGM executives to conclude that the joint venture in its current fonn would not obtain
regulatory approval in Nevadn.

On September 16, 2003, Jacobs informed MGM's Executive

Committee that, ''i()r regulatory reasons it would be necessary to deal directly with the Macau
government, as distinct from participating in the market through an existing concessionaire and that
the Company was exploring the feasibility uf such an approach." In early September, 2003, MGM
exeeutives met with Stanley Ho to advise him personally ofNevada's regulatory concerns. Jacobs.
Hombuckk, and Wang met with Stanley Ho, .Pansy Ho, Daisy Ho, Wong, and other advisors at Shun
Tak's Hong Kong corporate offices, Jacobs testified that he advised Stanley Ho that MGM could not
partner with him because of regulatory concerns expressed by Nevada regulators. According to
Jacobs, Stanley Ho was "upset" by the news.

Later that month, after Stanley Ho had teamed that MGM would be unable to partner with
Shun Tak, the Macanese government reversed course on the granting of additional subconcessions.
The government inf(mm::d MGM that it would allow SJM to issue a subconcession tin an MGM

the meeting b.:rween MGM oflkials, S.ilier and NGCB staff.

29

SJ001283

Plaintiff Ex. I 102 001 07

Appendix 3

<:asino, According to Jacobs, Jorge Oliveira, the head of the Macau Legal Commission, urged MGM
to ''rnnve quickJy ~ to reach a definitive agleernenl with Pansy [HoJ.H

MGM and Pansy Ho, in her individual capadty, explored different structures for a joint
venture arrangement that would, in their views, meet regulatory approva! while providing Pansy Ho
sufficient involvement in the enterprise, Countering an MGM proposal that would have given Shun

Tak a purely passive, 11()rFvoting role in <\joint venture, Pansy Ho suggested that she replace Shun
T ak as the subconcession holder. By early November 2003, MGM was negotiating with Pansy Ho
individuatly, Jacobs tcsbfied that, despite Prrnsy Ho 's lack of gaming experience, Iv1GM did not
consider any partner other than Pansy Ho because of her influence with SJM. Both he and Rosevear
acknowledged that the father-daughter relationship of Stanley Ho and Pansy Ho was instrumental in
SJM being willing to dea! with MGM. As Ja...:obs testit1ed,

Well, the way [ would more characterize it is that MGM, with any
other partner, would not have been able to, in my judgment, obtain a
subconcession from SJM. Clearly, it was in relationship- she was
the duughter and they were more amendable [sic] to allowing such a
transaction.
As Rosevear noted, "we recognized that [Pansy Ho] had potential influence that others wouldn't

have,"

In November 2003, MGM and Pimsy Ho met individually with members of the NGCB to

apprise them of the modit'ications to tlwjoinl ventun; and to introduce them to Pansy Ho, At least
rwo of the NGCB mcmber.s. reiterated their serious concerns about the suitability of Stantey Ho,
noting that their concerns also extended to Shun Tak, as welL The NGCB members, aware of Pansy
Ho 's leadership position in Shun Tak but unaware of any issues relating to her persona! suitability,
30

SJ001284
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00108

Appendix 3

advised MOM that it could proceed with a proposed joint venture with Pansy Ho individually. Jacobs
later testi tied that, while the individual NGCB members indicated that MGM could further pursue an
association with Pansy Ho, this preliminary indication did nor mean that they had officially approved
Pansy Ho's suitability, her independence, or the business association.

\Vhile the entities fom;ing the proposed joint venture changed, the individuals at the
negotiating table remained the same. Pansy Ho, previously negotiating on behalf of Shun Tak, was
now negotiating in her individual capacity. Wong, who had previously negotiated on behalfofShun
Tak, was now representing Pansy Ho in her negotiations with MOM. He was also serving as a liaison
to SJM on behalf of the joint venture for various issues, induding the cost of the subconcession.
During the negotiations. he retained his title of Financial Advisor at Shun Tak, occupied an oftlce
"yards" away from Stanley Ho's at Shun Tak Centre, served on Shun Tak's informal executive
management committee, and was a director of approximately 66 Shun Tak group companies. Pansy
Ho 'spersonal attorney was a pminer at the Jaw finn established by Rui Cunha ("Cunha"), a director
and the corporate secretary ofSJM. Other Shun Tak and STDM employees continued to perfotm
important functions, even after Pansy Ho. mdividually, had replaced Shun Tak as the joint venture
partner. For example, Fred Chan, a Shun Tak employee with t:xpertise in property issues, handled the
land premium and boundar! issues for the joint venture. Colin Ching ("Ching"), a Shun Tak
employee with expertise in corporate finance, provided advice to Pansy Ho regarding the financing of
the joint venture. Ching remained involved after Shun Tak was no longer a party to the deal. Miguel
Queiroz ("Queiroz''), an STDM employee who functioned as counsel for SJM, pertormed legal work

31

SJ001285

P1aintiffEx. 1102 00109

Appendix 3

for the joint venture during its fi:mnation and provided comments to MOM and Pansy Ho regarding

the Shareholders 1\.gree1nent a.nd .~~rticles of ;\.ssociation. 24

MGM KNEW THATf_.A._NSYJIO'S FIND,.NCIAL INDEPENDENCE FROM HER.f.}..THER


WOU~D Jtl;. A KEY REGlJLATOR Y ISSUE

By mid-November 2003, MOM executives knew that Pansy Ho's independence from her
father would be a critical area of inquiry by casino regulators. Specifically. they recognized that
regulators would be interested in Pansy Ho 's source of funds lnr the joint venture, her business and
i1nancial ties to ber father, including her roles and responsibilities at Shun Tak and STDM, as well as
her degree of independence from her father. Jacobs con firmed that, dHring the meetings with Nevada
regulators, individual NGCB members inquired into Pansy Ho 's source of funds. He testified that it
was "no secret" that Pansy Ho's independence from her father was the underlying issue and that

Hfh ler source oftl.Jnds \:vould be a very~ very significant cornponent of such a detennination.'~ f-Ie also
noted:
And again, in candor, the relationship of Pansy and her independence
has always been from a due diligence standpoint or a regulatory
standpoint the key issue because we always took as a posture that we
accepted the notion that \Ve couldn't be and wouldn't be in business
with SJM, and so if you can draw the distinction between the daughter,
the accomplished daughter and the controversial rather, that was
always an issue that we had to deal with.
He added that "[w Je did know that she would have to be making this investment personally fiom her
personal funds.''

He stated that he told Pansy Ho that "she should anticipate that the gaming

regulators will inquire and delve very, very deeply into her source of fhnds for this." Jacobs further

4
' 1n March 2006. Division attorneys had a hrid'meeting with Stanley Ho at his Shun fak corporate onices in
Hong Kong. /1.! that meeting, Stanley Ho wali accompanied by Cunha and Queiroz.

32

SJ001286

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00110

Appendix 3

testified that he made it "abundantly dear" to Pansy Ho that "this had to be her own money," and that
she indicated that she understood the issue. fn his testimony, Lanni maintained that he did not discuss
Pansy Ho's tinances or funding sources with her.

The degree of separation between its then-proposed joint venture partner, Pansy Ho, and her
father, was a primary concern of MOM in its assessment of a business association with her. Despite
this concern and knowledge of potential problems, from the fall of 2003 to the issuance of the
<;uhconcession in April 2005, MOM conducted no further due diligence on the issues of Pansy Ho's

independence. her source of funds for the joint venture, or other inquiries related to her financial and
business affairs with her father or the entities he controlled.

J.

J~~!iS_LHO

SQUQJ.ii.THROL[Qf!QVT THE lif_OOlJATIONS TO INCLUDE_ SU_!,lli Ti;\K

lN_:I_Hf:JP!NL:V.gtJTJJRE_ PRQm.G.I
Both Pansy Ho and Wong sought to secure some role in the joint venture tor Shun Tak during
the negotiations with MOM. In an October 23, ;~003 memorandum to Jacobs, Rosevear noted that
Pansy Ho and Wong remained "highly desirous ofShun Tak making an investment in the non-gaming
element for a sttictly wmmercial retum unrelated to the gaming win or profits." Hornbuckle also
recalled that Pansy Ho tried to convince MGM that a Shun Tak development would benefit the joint
venture, Jacobs attributed Pansy 1-fo's advocacy in this area to her status as Managing Director of
Shun Tak. He added that she wanted to find a development opportunity for Shun Tak because she,
individually, had replaced Shun Takas the joint venture partm~r. Jacobs observed that "my guess
would be that

~he

was trying to be sensitive to Shun Tak and its shareholders to try to minimize the

inherent conflicts of this situation_'

SJ001287

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00111

_Appendix 3

Pansy Ho's efforts to include Shun Tak in the joint venture centered upon the inclusion of a
Shun Tak project adjaceni to the site of the proposed casino. In September 2002, the parties were
considering the Nam Van site, which consisted of two contiguous parcels of land, one rectangular and
the other triangular, The rectangular portion of land was approximately I 0 acres. Vanous entities
owned and controlled by SJM heid the rights to petition the government to develop this parcel. 25 The
4 acre triangular parcel was located at the southern end and was undervmter at the time. The
triangular piece had been designated by the Macau government as land subject to reclamation and, as
26
a re:;;uit, it was directly under the control of the Macau govemment.

In early 2003, Pansy Ho and her Shun Tak colleagues rejected MOM's initial plans that
utilized the entire 14 acre site for the casino project and instead proposed the inclusion of a
cornpkmentary project for the site that would be adjacent to the casino project and increase density on
the entire site. MOM was asked to participate in the cornplementary project but declined.

27

Lengthy

discussions ensued between the joint venture partners regarding the division of the 14 acre site for
both projects. By spring of2004, they had resolved the ultimate division of the property such that
each site included a portion of the original rectangular site and the reclaimed trian,srular parcel. The

15
As noted, land in Macau is uwally owned by the government Rnd is leased, not sold, to third patties pursuant to
a land concession t!greemcnL The developer pays the governmeut a land premium based on the size and type of proJect
for the tight to develop the property.

6
' Rosevear testified that he believed that SJM. as the OW!ler of the ad;acent parcel, was the appropriate party to
apply for reclamation of the triarlgular portion. He testified, "[SJM was) the adjoining landowner and, I think, to expedite
things l think they had to do the application tor the land !ill until the land got transferred." He contmued, "for expediency,
they [SJM] started the development of the application proc.ess because you had w be an adjoining land ov.mer to make that
application."

N~vada

~ 1 According to Jawhs, after the November 2003 meetings b.etwe<:n NGCB members atid Pansy Ho and Daisy Ho,
regulators informally advised MGI\1 that rhey had no general objections to the develnprnent and operation of a

34

SJ001288

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00112

Appendix 3

site on which the casino project would be constructed became known as Site A; the site

tor

the

complementary project became known as Site B.

K.

MGM

CONTRIBUTES $.100. MILLION DOLLARS TQ_l_QfN..L. VENTURE AS


TO fNCREASE PANSY HO'S EQUJTY CONTRlBUTfQN

~.'PREMIUM"

Once Pansy Ho replaced Shun Tak as the joint venture partner, the parties structured the
financing of the joint venture to accommodate her limited ability to finance her interest. Rosevear
testified that, throughout the negotiations, Wong emphasized Pansy Ho's financial limitations and
advised that Pansy Ho's maximum equity contribution to the joint venture was $80 million. Rosevear
arrived at the "common sense" conclusion that Pansy Ho was leveraging herself to fund her portion of
the joint venture equity. He testified that he believed that he discussed the subject of Pansy Ho's
borrowing with Lanni or Jacobs.

Underscoring both limitations on Pansy Ho 's abihty to mise funds independently as well as
her reliance on Stanley f-lo's money, Pansy Ho's representatives inquired whether Stanley Ho could
directly gi11 Pansy Ho a portion of her required equity contribution to the joint venture. On June 15,
2004, four days betcm:: the signing of the joint venture agreement, Jacobs sent an e-mail int'bnning
Rosevear, Lanni, and Munen that the question was raised whether 'TStanley] Ho could gift a portion
of the PH/PH Co. equity,'' referring to the equity contribution ofPansy Ho's joint venture investment
company. Jacobs e-mail indicated that he replied, "f said that would not be desirabie, as a [key]
question will always be PH's source of equity."

-------------

---

..........

____

,,

___

______________

retail wd!or hotel project by Shun Tak on land adjaeent to the JO.int vcnmre project, provided that the joint venture casino
had no economic relanonship with the Shun 1'uk project.

35

SJ001289
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00113

Appendix 3

While equal contributions to the joint venture would have required Pansy Ho to contribute
$ t 80 n1iHion of the project's anticipated costs of$360 r11i1Jionl 1Zosevear testified that he recognized

that Pansy Ho lacked the financial resources of a corporate entity such as MGM. To compensate for
these limitations vvhile achieving the project's initial capital contribution, l\KiM agreed to contribute
an extra$ I 00 million as a "premium" to Pansy Ho for the ability and opportunity to be in business
with her in Macau. The premium, not contemplated in the joint venture with Shun Tak, was
designated as equity and increased Pansy Ho 's equity contribution to the joint venture by $50 million,
with no cash outlay on her part.

L.

t/lNI;_TY PERCENT OF PANSY fiQ'S" ...&QWTY CQNT.B.JJ.:!l).JIOl':L TQ THE JOINT


VENTURE CAME FROM GIFTS FRQ!Y.L$T6.N.1EY HQ
The MGM Grand Paradise joint venture required an initial capital contribution by Pansy Ho

totaling $80 1ni11ion~ ()fthis "$80 million equity contribution, Pansy f.lo contributed $70 n1ilEon, and

her sister Daisy Ho loaned her the remaining$! 0 million. A total of$72 million- or ninety percentof the contribution came from gifls made by Stanley flo to Pansy Ho and Daisy Ho. 28 The various
sources of funds used by Pansy Ho to fund her interest in the joint venture are set forth below:

3
' During the Febnmry 2'1, 1007 hearing before the Nevada Gaming Control Board, the Board explored Pansy
Ho's financing of her equity contribution. Through questioning by the chair, Pansy Ho discussed her funding of the
contribtHion through her "personal funds," including !he "pledging of some of my Shun Tak tem1s'' acquired through
"share opiions granted," "shares that (she] bought !rom the marker," and through the rights is,;ue. She inlbrmed the Board
that th~ fl.mds used to exercise the righis ;;ame as a gift frorn Staniey Ho. Fa nay Ho agreed with the chair's assessment that
'"it looks like your current status has been ll\~hieved through a -:ombination ofgi11s from your father as well as your exerdse
of options which were granted to you based on your po<;itions with Shun Tak. us well as the rights issue." She also agreed
that the chair's characterization encompassed the "basic source~ of the capi~al that [Pansy Ho] infused into this particular
pmject."

36

SJ001290

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00114

Appendix 3

Pausv Ho's Source of Funds for the Joint venture


So_@ce
Withdrawal from Petunia Trust
(Trust.fimded entirely by Stanley Ho)

Amount
$24,000,000

Brmk Loan from Goldman Sachs


(Loan collateralized 100% by Shun Tak stock
obtained through 2002 rights o.Oering)

$20,000,000

Bank Loan from UBS AG


(Loan collateralized JOO'h) by Shun Tak stock
obfained rhrough 2002 rights offering)

$8,000,000

Bank Loan to Pansy Ho from HSBC Private Bank


(Loan collateralized !00% by Shun Tak stock
obtained through 2002 rights offering)

$13,000,000

$5,000,000

Funds from Pansy Ho's Accounts


29

Loan fhm1 Daisy Ho


Withdrawal from Trust
(Tru.u.fimded entirely by Stanle.v llo)
Funds from Daisy Ho's Accounts

$7,000,000

$3.000,0qQ

Total Funds

$80,000,000

Pansy Ho obtained $24 million of the $80 million that she invested in the casino joint venture
from the Petunia Trust, a trust funded entirely by her father. w Additionally, Shun Tak stook obtained

"~ln her January 2006 disclosure fom\, Daisy Ho chara.ctetized the $1 0 mill ion as a loan to Grand Paradise Macau
Ltd. Of the $10 million that Daisy Ho loaned to Pansy Ho, $7 million >:a me from a tmst that their father established and
6mded on Daisy Hn's behalf:
0
' Pansy Ho testitied that Stanley Hv established the Cordoba Trust in 1999. In September 2002, at the request of
the bcnefir.iaries, the Cordoba Tmsl was terminated and its assets were distributed inro three sub-trusts, with Pansy Ho the
beneficiary of the PeiUnia Trust ~.ub-trust. Pansy Ho further stated that Stanley Ho initially funded the trust with $10,000.
Through 1rs Tru~tees, the Trust has represented that, approximately one month later, Stanley Ho contributed an additional
$60 million to the Trust It has further advised that, with the knowledge and consent of the trustees, Stanley Ho transferred
these funds directly to two individuals designated as investment rnr.nagers for the trust thnds.
Pansy Ho testifi.ed that '
waa ~persona[ friend,'' and
fun her testified that she asked him to serve as the investment rnanager tbr the trust's assets,

The Division was ll!lab!e to independently corroborate the representations made regarding rhe timing of Stanley
Ho's deposits to the tmst. The managers never deposited thes~ funds in any account controlled or maintained by the.
Trustee~ During the existence of this arrangement, the investment managers did not provide any reports or statements

37

SJ001291

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00115

Appendix 3

through a series of gifts from her father served as collateral for the $4! million dollars worth of bank
loans to an entity wholly owned by Pansy Ho, Beeston Profits Limited, from Goidman Sachs, UBS
AG, and HSBC.

31

Of the $10 million that Daisy Ho loaned to Pansy Ho for the express purpose of

funding the equity contribution, she obtained $7 million frmn the Daisy Ho Trust, a trust funded
entirely through a gift by Stanley Ho. Her remaining $3 million contribution carne from her personal
bank accounts.

M.

PAN~:'L.HO, RATHER T.fiAN SHUN TbX. ACQUiRES SITE B DEVELOPMENT


RIGHTS FOR NOMI.N/\L CONSIDERATION .AND _IHE~..SELLS THEM SIXTI;_pN

MONTHS LATER FOR $.;?39 MILL.IOt{


Although all documents exchanged between the parties prior to the signing ofthe joint venture
agreements on June l9, 2004 indicated that Shun Tnk was to acquire Site B for its complimentary
project, Pansy Ho in fact acquired the site. On the same day that MGM and Pansy Ho formally
entered into the joint venture, she acquired, through a wholly owned company, Classic Time
Developments Limited ("Classic Time"), the Site 8 development rights from SJM for nominal
consideration. fn March 2005, at the suggestion of Pansy Ho's counsel, the joint venture acquired the
development rights to Site 8, allowing the approval process tbr the developmer1t of Site B to proceed

- - - - - - -..--------regarding these funds to Pansy Hq, Daisy Ho, or the fund's Trustees. Through Pansy Ho's counsel, the investment
manager refused to provide evidence relating to the investment of these funds and "unequivocally refused" to meet with

Division investigators.
11
Through a series of gifting transactions from her father, Pansy Ho obtained 97.82.0,70'7 share ofShun Tak stock
in connection with a 2002 rights offering. The otTering allowed existing shareholders to acquire one sh~re ofShun Tak
stock for every four existing shares held. Based on their individual holdings, Pansy Ho and Daisy Ho were eligible to
purchase 7..1 million and 2.3 million shareR, respectively. StanleyHo and the companies that he controlled were eligible to
acquire approximately 219 million shares. Un April 29. 2002, the Shun Tax Board of Directors announced that Stanl~y
Ho and hi!-i companies had procured their full subRcription. wilh the ngbts act1Jally subscribed by Pansy Ho, Daisy Ho, and
Maisy Hu. This transaction allowed Pansy Ho and Dai$y Ho to each acquire almost. n million Shun Tak shares- more
than 50% of all shares issued pursuant to tim; otTering- and to increase substantially their mmership ofSbun Tal<. Pansy

38

SJ001292
PlaintiffEx. 1102_00116

Appendix 3

through the same expedited process granted to casino development proposals. On Aprill9, 2005, the

day the Macau government issued the subconcession, thejoint venture transferred all development
rights back to Pansy Ho and Classic Time for HK $10. 32

Ultimate-ly, Pansy Ho received approximately $239 million in cash and stock from the sale of
these development rights that, by MOM's accounts and understanding, were intended to be transferred
to Shun Tak in the first instance. Furthennore, she received the proceeds of the transaction with no
personal investments on her part.JJ In September 2005, Classic Time agreed to sell her Site B
interests to two companies, Hong Kong Land and a wholly owned subsidiary of Shun Tak. When the
transaction closed in June 2006, Classic Time received $82 million in cash and approximately $157
million worth of Shun Tak shares. Rosevear stated that "f always thought it [Site B] was going to
Shun Tak,'' and commented that he was "surprised" both by Pansy Ho's acquisition of the Site B
rights as well as her subsequent sale of those rights.

\Vhen Pansy Ho appeared befbre the NGCB in February 2007, board members questioned her
about her acquisition of this parcel for tittle consideration and the financial windfall she received from
its sale. She testified that she acquired the land and bore the risk of the property not being suitable for
development Pansy Ho also indicated that the prospects for mixed--use development were highly
speculative at the time, given uncertainties in the market.

- - - - - - - - - - - ---------
Ho tes(ified that Stanley Ho gifted to her the approximately S 12.2 miHion necessary ro convert her rights into shares. As
of April 19, 2005, these shares had a value of$123 million.
1
' Uniess otherwise noted, all currency references are m U.S. dollars. The conversion rate used hy the
Division w convert Hong Kong dol!ars lo United States dollars is $1 US"' $7.8 HK.

39

SJ001293
Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00117

Appendix 3

N.

MGM..8..ND PANSY.!-IOJ~NTER INTO A JOINT VENTURE


On April 13, ?004, the MGM Exec:utfve Committee considered MGM's proposed joint

venture with Pansy Ho.

At the meeting, committee members received a four-pagt: document

captioned Executive Summary - Macau CExecutive Summary") that outlined the structure and
various other aspects of the joint venture. In particular, it nott::d:

That the joint venture would operate under a subconcession


autonomous fiom SJM.
That virtually aH decisions of significance could only be made
with the agreement of both parties.

"

If Pansy Ho should become a controlling person of SJM, she


would retain a passive economic interest in the joint venture
but would give up her management authority.

"

If Shun Tak enters the Macau gaming market in a ''significant


or non-passive way," Pansy Ho would have to either step dow:n
from Shun Tak or cease to have a management role in the joint
34
venture, with one identified exception<

"

That a portion of the joint venture site would he acquired by


Shun Tak separately for a wholly separate Shun Tak
development.

On that same day, the Executive Committee passed a resolution authorizirtgmanagement to enter into
det1nitive agreements with Pansy Ho "provided such agreements ate substantially consistent with the
Executive Summary,"

.n Although Pansy Ho did incur some expenses for retaining consultants in respect of the Site B deveiopment
plans, Hong Kong Land/Shun Tak reimbursed her tor all expenses at the lime of dosing.

J-nus provision, although present in various drai\s as !ate as April 12, 2004, was not incorporated into the final
Shareholder Agreement.

40

SJ001294

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 _ 00 I I 8

Appendix 3

The signing of various documents related to the joint venture at Stanley Ho's house
demonstrated his continued involvement in the affairs ofthe joint venture. On June !9, 2004, MGM,
Pansy Ho and SJM signed various agreements relating to the casino joint venture at Stanley Ho's
private residence. Stanley Ho was present at the signing and executed documents on behalfofSJM.
Jacobs testified that the parties signed the document at Staniey Ho's personal residence as "a matter of
courtesy" and shared a celebratory glass of champagne. Jacobs described the chosen location of
Stanley Ho's home to Lanni as a ''very nice touch, one symbolic, but highly meaningfuL" The creation

of the joint venture between MGM and Pansy Ho, as well as the transfer of the land rights and
acquisition ofth~: subconcession, required the execution of several documents, the most significantof
which are described briefly below.

(i)

The Shareholder Agreement Between MGM and Pansy Ho

The Amended and Restated Subscription and Shareholder Agreement ("Shareholder

Agreement") established the terms and conditions of the ownership and control of the joint venture,
MGM Grund Paradise Limited. Pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement, each party, through various
entities, owned 50% of the joint venture. The joint venture's govemance structure created two dasses
of directors. It allowed Pansy Ho to appoint a maximum of four "A" directors and MOM to appoint a
maximum of three "B" directors. However, both groups of directors, "A," and "B," collectively,
possessed three votes. lt gave Pansy Ho the right to nominate the company's Managing Director from
the "A" directors while giving MG!v1 the right to nominate the company's Chairman of the Board

from the "B" directots.

41

SJ001295
PlaintiffEx. 1102_00119

Appendix 3

The Agreement grants each partner in the joint venture effective veto power with respect to
major decisions. ft provides that all "decisions of signii:icance" involving the joim venture require
agreement between the shareholders, or a majority of each of the "A" and "B" directorsY ln the

event of a deadlock on any matter, the Chainnan is not permitted to break a tie. According to Jacobs,
the agreement. purposely contains no dispute resolution mechanism and merely provides that any
disaf,>reements urc to be resolved "reasonably and through good taith discussions."

The Shareholder Agreement allows Pansy Ho to acquire a significant shareholding interest in


SJM Without afTecting her management or economic interests in the joint venture The Shareholder
Agreement provides that if Pansy Ho exceeds certain defined shareholding thresholds in SJM, or were
to become its Managing Director, she would be deemed in control of SJM" and be required to
relinqui~h

her operational authority, but not her economic interest, in the joint venture. The agreement

places no restrictions ttpon her management or economic interests in the joint venture in the event that
she increases her shareholding in, or becomes a controlling person ot: STDM or Shun T11k.

(ii)

SJM Agreement

On June 19, 2004. the parties entered in an agreement >\lith Stanley Ho that specified the tem1s
and eonditions under \vhich SJM agreed to .enter into a gaming subconcession with MGM Grand
Paradise and to transfer to MOM Orand Paradise the interest, held by an SJM subsidiary company, in
Site A. Pursuant to this Agreement, SJM was to receive a total of $260 million, $200 million of

__.._______ ------..

The Shmeho!der~ Agreement identifies 44 decisiong and anions .that are considered major, such as the hiring of
any employe~ making more: than US $100.000 per year, the approval ofslandards for the operation of the casino. and the
sale, transfer nr lease of the properly ;mdlor assets of the joint Yl!nture.
:t

42

SJ001296
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00120

Appendix 3

which was the one time lump sum payment for the subconcession.Jo The remaining $60 million
related to the cost of the land. 37 The SJM Agreement was amended on March 22,2005 to provide a
mechanism fix MGM Grand Paradise to acquire the interests, held through SJM subsidiary
companies, in both Site A and Site B.

(iii)

Subconcession Agreement

The Subconcession Agreement is a trilateral agreement between MGM Grand Paradise, SJM
and the Macau government. >x On June 19, 2004, the parties entered into a draft subconcession
agreement, with Stanley Ho signing on behalfofSJM and Pansy Ho and Jacobs signing on behalf of
MGM Grand Paradise. Less than one month after the signing ofthe Shareholders Agreement and
other joint venture related documents, Secretary Tam issued a memorandum. dated July 6, 2004, that
stated, in part. that the subconcession to be granted to MGM Grand Paradise ''shaH be autonomous in
relation to SJM." The Macau government officially approved this agreement on April t 9, 2005. The
Subconcession Agreement provided that Sltv1 would grant a subconcession to MOM Grand Paradise.
The term of the subcont:ession expires on March 31, 2020, at which time the subconcession, the

Due to its conc~;:rn about the regulatory perception ofMGM maintaining a continuing business relationship with
Sumley Ho and SJM, MGM favored a one-time lump sum payment to SJM lor the sub concession. MGM estimated that
the wbconcession was worth a lmnp sum pa):ment of$100 million. Althongh SJM documents indic!lte that SJM valued
the concession between $300 and $400 million, SJM uilimately agreed with MGM's valuation and sold the subcooce:ssion
to the joint venture for $200 million. Rosevear acknowledged thal the $200 million figure was tow, and he sunnised that
SJM com;entcd ro this amount bccuuse of the relationship between Stanley Ho and Pansy Ho.
36

1
' The tina! land price paid by the joint venture \vas .'560 million, with $22.7 million paid tnSJM and $J7.J million
paid to the lvtacau gtlvemm~nt.

nThe subconcession agreement is entitled Subconcession Contract Jor the Exp!Qltat1on of Games of Fortune and
Chance or Other Gume;; in Casino in the Spe,~ia! Admini~tnnive Region of Ma::all.

43

SJ001297

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00121

Appendix 3

casino, nnd nil of the <:asino equipment revert ''gratuitously and automatically" to the Macau
government.

39

Three MGM executives recei vcd special bonuses in retum for their etrorts related to the joint
venture.

Jacobs received $700,000.

Rosevear and Wang received

and

respectively, f(>r their efforts. According to Lanni. these bonuses were in recognition of their
"extraordinary efforis" on behalfofthe company in securing a subconccssion in Macau. He testified
that he proposed these bonuses on April 25, 2005, which was shortly afler the Macau government
issued the subconcession to the joint venture. Lanni also testified that Jacobs had no input in Lanni's
decision to award these special bonuses. MOM paid one-half of the bonuses at the groundbreaking
t'tx the casino, with the balance paid at th.:' opening of the property.

A JJ.S. LA \Y__ENf.ORCEMENT PROFESSION/tk.lN Jl.ONG KONG VNOFFICIALL Y..


ADYlSES_JY.1..QM ..IfJAT DOING BUSINESS __.!YJIH _PANSY HO ~JLL ENT/~.!L A
CERTAIN RI;:lK Q.VE TO STANLEY HO'.~_CO.NNECTIONS TO ORGt\NIZED CR.JME
MGM undertook additional due diligence efforts relating to Stanley Ho and Pansy H.o in early

2005. Sped f!cally, in January 2005, Bruce Gebhardt ("Gebhardt"), M GlYl' s newly hired Senior Vice
President of Global Risk, a.sked a Bong Kong source about Stanley Ho and MOM's association in the
joint venture with Pansy Ho. 40 The source, whom Gt;bhardt described as a "very knowledgeable" "US

-~---------------

19
The Subconccssion Agreement also provided that a lotal annual premium w~s payable by MGM Grand Paradise
to the Macau government ;{8 consideration for the granting of the subconce~sion. This ann11a1 premium was comprised of
an 'uuJual fixed payment of approximately $3.7 5 million and a variable annual payment based on the number of table
gnmcs and electrical or rrtr:chanical machines operated hy the subconcessionaire. Additionally, the agreement requires that
the subconccssionaire make monthly contribtnions ro a public foundation whose purpose is for the development and
promotion of various cultural and social actions.

")Gebhardt began working at MGM on November l, 2004.

44

SJ001298

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00 122

Appendix 3

law cntorcement official assigned to Hong Kong," responded to Gebhardt via e-mail. Gebhardt's
source stated, in pa1t:

Due to [Stanley] ftO's current social status, and connections to the


government and crime underworld in both Macau and HK, no one
would openly accuse him ofT1iad membership or affiliation. Further,
there is usually no ''proof' showing a person's triad membership, since
a person becomes a made member of a Triad after participating in a
ceremony, which may have occurred decades ago. 'There is no contract
or anything in black and white.

* **
Due to the sensitivity of the issue and the high-profile status of
[Stanley] HO, l urn certain the HKP [Hong Kong Police] would not
confinn or deny his Triad aft11iation or membership unless 1 can
produce an official requesr showing the need-to-know. iJoing business
with his daughter will, undoubtedly, entail a certain risk down the
road.
Gebhardt provided this document to Lanni and Jacobs on February ! 5, 2005. Jacobs acknowledged
receiving this email from Gebhardt and reading it. Although Lanni testified that he never received the
document, Jacobs' secretary noted on the document that Gebhardt told her that he had provided Lanni
with a copy.

P.

STANLEY HQ_ATTENDS MAJOR EVENTS IN THE LA..UNCHING OF THE JOINT

VENTURE
Stanley Ho was a visible presence at three major public events associated with the joint
venture's activities. On April 19, 2005, the parties held a public event at Macau govemrnent oft1ces

to officially sign the Subconcession Agreement. In addition to high ranking government ofl:icials and
the principals of the joint venture partners, Stanley Ho was present on behalf of SJM. He was also
present at a reception following the June 1, 2005 groundbreaking ceremony held at the MGM Grand

45

SJ001299

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00123

Appendix 3

Paradise casino site. Pansy f-lo testified that he was an invited guest. According tQ Lanni and Jacobs,

Stanley Ho was not invited to the event. They restified that he showed up after the fom1ai
groundbreaking ceremony bad concluded. At the December l S, 2007 grand opening ceremony for the
joint venture casino, Stanley Ho sat at the head table along with govemment ot11cials, MGM senior
executives, and his daughters Pansy Ho and Daisy Ho.

Q.

REGL[l,-_ATORS H~.QJ\tJHHER U,.$. GAMING HLR.ISDICTlQl':J.;? QO NOT OPPOSE


ijl:GM'S jOINT VEN_TURE WITH PANSY f::l.Q

Other regulators have either waived approval of or approved the joint venture. On Febmary

17, 2005, MGM announced that "the Missir>sippi Gaming Commission has unanimously granted a
waiver of approval with respect to the Company's application to engage in gaming activities in Macau
S.A.R." On Febmary 27, 2007, the NGCB held a public Special Meeting regarding MGM's
app!kation for a finding of suitability under Nevada's fureig,'ll gaming act fbr it to engage in the

Macau joint venture, The Board heard testimony from Lanni, Jacobs. Rosevear, Pansy Ho, Daisy Ho,
and others.

At the conclusion of testimony, NGCB members unanimously approved MOM's

("NGC") conducted a pubiic hearing to detem1ine whether it would support the NGCB decision. At
the conclusion oftestimony, the NGC unanimously approved MUM's application.

~ Mr. Siller retired from !he NGCB on December 3 i, 2006.

46

SJ001300

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00124

Appendix 3

V.

A.

THE SUITABfLITYOF STANLEY HO AND PANSY HO

MOM ACKNOWLEDGES THAT STANLEY


ASSOCIATIONS JiENDER HIM UN SUITABLE

HO'S

BACKGROU_ND

AND

Stanley Ho's acknowledged unsuitability on multiple bases frames the inquiry into whether
Pansy Ho has demonstrated financial and professional independence from her father and the entities
that he controls. While MGM executives state, in direct and candid terms, that Stanley Ho is not
suitable for licensure under United States standards and that MGM would not consider entering into a
business relationship with him, the company nonetheless pursued a business relationship with
companies that he controlled.

MGM senior executives acknowledge that Stanley Ho is unsuitable. In sworn testimony,


Lanni, the company's chief executive oftlcer at all times relevant to this inquiry, stated lv1GM could
not do business with Stanley Ho:

Well, l would put it this way is I don't think it gets down to the
specifics ofhis [Stanley Ho] companies, I think the issue is could we
be involved in business as a joint venture in which he would be
opei'ating a casino with us, I mean why waste anyone's time even
thinking about that.
I wouldn't want to [be involved in a joint venture with Stanley Ho], no
regulator would allow us to do that. I mean that's a pretty foregone
conclusion. I realize he's never been indicted, he's never been
convicted. but perception is reality and maybe there is reality there also
beyond the failure to have the indictments or convictions. But it just
never crossed my mind in that regard.
As to whether anyone on the MOM Board of Directors, Executive or Management Committee
inquired about Stanley Ho 's suitability, Lanni noted,"] think it was so clear that it wasn't necessary. I
wouldn't say it wouldn't merit, it just would be redundant to things that people were well aware of

47

SJ001301

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00125

Appendix 3

anyway.'' He stated that, because most of the MOM Board members have been around the industry
for a long time, "y<-'u wouid have to be living under a rock not to know about Stanley Ho and what the
perception of Stanley Ho is. I think it is common klwwledge."

MGM's most senior executives were aware of the problems associated with Stanley Ho.
Lanni stated he was aware that Australian authorities had found Stanley Ho unsuitable as early as
1986. He added:

I've detemlined [Stanley Ho] many, many years ago to he an


individual we couldn't do business with and be a partner of. It was not
going to be the case. So I knew this particular piece of information
from the - unrelated many years ago. just reading about it, about the
Australian issue.
Lanni was asked whether he felt that MGM should assume that Stanley Ho was unsuitable:

Q:

MGM. In other words, ! know you are not saying that the
speci-fic Hnding was rna de, but for purposes of your corporate
decision-making process, was the position we are going to
assume that he's unsuitable?

A:

I think that--! c:an speak for myself. .f'v1y assumption is that


that is correot. [ cannot speak for others.

He further indicated that he made his opinion on Stanley Ho 's unsuitability "abundantly clear" to
J&cobs :md Edwards and that''[ don't think anyone in our company thought that that was different."
He later added, "there was no way of clearing Stanley Ho in the eyes of regulators."

Jacobs expressed ::;imi!ar views, conceding Stanley Ho's unsuitability. He stated that "a
relationship with Dr. Ho would be very, or SJM would be very, very problematic with the regulators

48

SJ001302
Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00126

Appendix 3

because of his reputation[.]" Indeed, Jacobs states that he had ''made the assumption that

tor

regulatory purposes and any other purposes Stanley Ho was a bad man." Jacobs also stated:

[... J certainly we knew- I mean we never thought that we were going


to either have the ability to or the substance to or the responsibilities to
persuade any regulator that Stanley Ho was okay that was not
something that we would ever have the capaeity to do, nor any appetite
to do. I mean it was a tact of life that he was whoever he was and was,
call it connected, call it functional in Macau, whatever that implies.
So I never, nor would management ever, dream of trying to say
through evidence that we could accumulate, that the Nevttda or New
Jersey or anybody should bless an association with Stanley Ho. That
was never going to happen, nor perhaps should it ever have happened.

He testified that the MGM's objective was "to see if we can figure out how to structure a transaction
that wouid make econom-ic sense and structure it as well that would have the maximum ability to
withstand regulatory scrutiny, because to a certain degree SJM is the elephant in the room [.]'" In a
February 2005 letter to Mississippi gaming regulators, Jacobs echoed these comments, stating that
"we iong ago recognized that our regulators would not want us to engage in ongoing business
relatiOns with him [Stanley HoJ."

MGM's due diligence on Stanley Ho amply supported the conclusion of senior MGM
executives that Stanley Ho was unsuitable. The Division's own independent investigation of Stanley
Ffo not only con-obora!ed the opinions expressed by MGM executives and the company's
investigative findings but also uncovered additional derogatory information concerning Stanley Ho.
Specifically, the Division located several reports issued by United States govemmental agencies that
concluded that Stanley Ho, through his involvement in the casino industry, has been and continues to
be associated with organized crime figures.

49

SJ001303

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00127

Appendix 3

A 1988 report by the United States Department ofJustice noted Stanley Ho's associations with
Asian organized crime. in the report, the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the
United States Department of Justice, Climinal Division, described the triads and their illegal
activities. lhe report included an appendix that identified some mdividuals as associated or attiliated
with triads, and indicated their "location'' and primary triad aftlliation. 42 Under the location "Hong
Kong (and Macau)," the report listed three names: Stanley Ho, Hung Wah Yin, and Yip Hon, one of
the original founders ofSTDM. The report identified the particular triads f(.)r Yip Hon and liung Wah

Yin; lor Stanley Ho, it indicated "Unk,'' as in unknown. The author of the report informed the
Division that the ''unk" designation next to Stanley Ho's name reflected Stanley Ho's close ties to
more than one triad and the aL!thor's inability to conclude that Stanley Ho had a primary affiliation
with one particular triad over another.

United States Senate Subcommittee hearings in 1992 similarly documented Stanley Ho's
association with organized crime groups. Materials submitted to the Subcommittee during the course
of the hearings noted that Stanley Ho had direct associations with two known members oftriads, Yip
Hon and Lau Wing Kui.

44

Vlhile the materials did not identify Stanley I-Io as a member of a triad, it

--------41

The body of the report does .not mention Stanley Ho. The Division .contacted the author of the report.
According to the n:pon's author, the body .of the report intentionally omitted any mention of Stanley Ho for two reasons.
First, the report focused on the United States and Canada, and rhe USDOJ had no definitive infom1ation regarding St~nley
Ho's involvement in organized crime in those c.ountries. Second, members of the Royal Hong Kong Police who provided
substantial intelligence and assistance in support of the report asked 1har Stanley Ho's name not be included out offear of
retaliation.
"Asinn Qr..gmized Crim~.:._T.pe New 1nlernaJ)Q11!!-l Crimina!: l'k<l.f!.rillLbefore 1he P.t;.nnanent_$p_Q.committ.,~_tm
of rhe Committee on GQ.Yt:JJ1J!J.enta! Affairs, I02nd Con g. ( l992,1 (materials submitted by Scott E. Orchard,
Staff Investigator to the Minority, Senate PemJanent Subcommi.uee on Investigations} pp. 991 00, 139-41

Jnv_~Jions

50

SJ001304
Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00128

Appendix 3

noted: ''The Macao casinos are a major center of Asian \)rganizcd crime activity, including money

laundering and loansharking, and while the exact role of Yip Hon and Stanley Ho in such criminal
activity is unclear, they have specifically been linked to a number of criminal11gures."45

Other United States government agencies have noted Stanley Ho's association with the
organized crime groups that operate in his casino's VIP rooms. In its 2007 annual report. the United
States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
speci fica I!y commented on Macau's casino gaming operations noting, in pertinent part, that''( u]nder
the old monopoly fi"amevvork, [i.e., when STDM was the sole casino .operator in MacauJ, organized
crime groups were, and continue to be, closely associated with the gaming industry through their

control of VIP gaming rooms, and activities such as racketeering, loan sharking and prostitution."
Virtually identical language was included in the Bureau of fnternationat Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Afhirs' annual reports tiJr Macau in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. 46

Through his leadership position and ownership control of SJM, Stanley Ho continues to
associate with individuals in the Macau gaming industry who are connected to organized crime.
Specifically, a number of casinos in Macau are refened to as third-party-promoted casinos and are

Hld. at 173, 184.- The materials explain that, "[a "llthough .Sll;\niey Ho has been tied to organized crime tigures
such as Yip Ho.n and Ll)Jl..\Vlm;..Kl!i, he does not meet the Subcommittee'~> $trict criteria tl:>r identit1cation as an Asian
Organized Crime Figure,' The Subcommittee requires !:'No independent Jaw enforcement sources to identifY an individual
as a member or associate of an organized crime group tor such identification lo rake place, Additionally, the
Subcommittee Staff was not able to establish Ho's ties !0 a ~pedfic criminal group."
41

'~~ also lnremalionql_('LLJJ!!;_.Jhr('!!JL6..~~1JTI<:nr, Chapter III, Worldwide Areas of International Crimina!


Activity- China, p. 2L (2000), available ar hap.>~~(",v...fits,org!irp!threat/puh45270chap3.html (visited on November 3,
2008) (noting thm organized crime dominate~ Macau gaming industry and commenting that "Macau business tycoon
Stanley Ho, 11 reputed organized crime tigure, controls the gaming monopoly that has the sole license for casino gambling
in Macau.").

51

SJ001305

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00129

Appendix 3

engaged in gaming activities through a management or income sharing agreement with SJM. In each
arrangement, monies are paid to SJM by owners of the casino property in nccordance with the tenns
of an agreement with SJM. fn numerous instances, the owners are alleged to be associated with
organized crime. 47

B.

PANS'( __ HO t:L:<\S __EA.I_L.,r;P._TQ_QEMQJ::t!iTik\TE.....P..ERSONAL. ...lliANCIAL, ANQ


FROM HER FATHER i\.ND THE COMPANJE.~
!l.1'1Q.E,R HIS CONTROL

P.RQ.FE.S. !~.IO..i."'l\~_fr-JDEPJ;.NI!JiNCE

Pansy I-:lo's familial relationship to her father, as well as her business relationships and
financial interconnections with him, created the oppo1iunity and
venture with MGM that is the subject of this review.

t~m11ed

the foundation for her joint

fndeed, she initially participated in the

negotiations with MGM as her father's representative and took the lead individually only after
members of the NGCB informally advised MOM that any ongving arrangement .vith Stanley Ho and
entities under his control was problematic, She has advanced professionally through positions and
titles in

companie~>

that her father controls or that derive a significant portion of their business from

Stanley Ho-owned entities. She has accumulated the vast majority of her wealth through gifts from,
and business relationships with, her father. Pansy Ho's receipt and acceptance of-financial benefits
and professional opportunities fimn her father raise suitability issues where her involvement in the
project results trom her hither's reputation, int1uence, business connections and financial resources, as

opposed to just receiving gitls in the ordinary course. Simply put, not only are the tlnancial

nSJM ha~ entered sudl amtngements with numerous indi,iduals, including Heung ltVah Keung, tdentified by the
1992 United Stares Senal0 Rt=port as an nftice bearer in the Sun Yee On triad, and Albert Yeung, identifkd in MGM'sdue
diligence as a reputed office bearer in the Sun Yce On triad.

52

SJ001306

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00 I 30

Appendix 3

connections to her father relllted to her primary and continuing source of income, but they serve to
establish her position in the same field as her father: gaming in Macau.'~R

Pansy Ho has depended upon companies controlled by Stanley Ho for the majority of her prejoint venture income and professional advancement. While Stanley Ho is the Group Executive
Cbainnan and the largest individual shareholder of Shun Tak, Pansy Ho has assumed the role of the
public face of Shun Tak and has held its highest operational title, Managing Director, since 1999. 49
She is also the company's second largest individual shareholder. Without considering any income
that she may be receiving now from the joint venture, Pansy Ho has historically relied on Shun Takas
her primary source of income. She has historically derived the vast nHtjority of her taxable income
from Shun Tak; for tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006, she earned at least 970.f. of her total reported
earned income

trom

Shun Tak.

Furthemwre, her total compt:nsation from Shun Tak more than

doubled during the time in which she was acquiring fi.mding ten her contribution to the joint venture.

8
'' 0thercasino regulatory agencies have expressed ,;oncer.as that Stanley Ho might be behind an application for
licensure submittd by a family member. In 1996, Stanley Ho';; will; and two of his daughters, Daisy and Maisy Ho,
submitled an application for a Cllsino license with the British Columbia Gaming Commisslon (''BCGC"). The regulators
thund "support for the proposition that De llo was quite capable of exerting undue influence given his great wealrh,"
noti11g the potential for undue in11uence by Stanley Ho upon his [1mily members, specifkally, in that instance, hia witb.
His wite ultimately declined to provide fuii disclosure of Stanley Ho's financial intom1ation ro tbeBCGC, which, in tum,
rejected the application fbr licensure.

Moreover_ in 2004., the A.ldemey Gambling Control Commission ("AGCC"), concerned tlmt Stanley Ho might
be involved in his daughter
company, conducted a speciai invcstig~tion iillo the company. l\t the close ofits
investigation. the AGCC expressed concerns about the "reput!lfion" of Stanley Ho and whether he could influence.
company. ft furthen:onciudcd that ''it would be diftkuit to sepnntte the business actiiilies of
from that
of her falher, Stanley Ho, and it wa~ likely !hat her involvement may have been a front for her tatha."

wln January [ 995. on the recemmendation of her father. Pansy Ho joined the Shun Tak Board ns a director.
50

The~e ligures were deri ;ed from the earned mc,Jme as reported on Pansy Ho ,; Hong Kong tax returns, and do
not include more than $2.ol'vl in dividend income from Shun Tak sr.ocb that she eamed in this period.

53

SJ001307

P1aintiffEx. 1102 00131

Appendix 3

Pansy Ho has also received significant compensation from STDM and STDM-related
entities.

51

Between January 2001 and June 2006, Pansy Ho received more than$ i .87 miilion from

STDM. Similar to her compensation pattem at Shun Tak, payments by STDM to Pansy Ho increased
in the interim between the signing ofthe Shareholders Agreement t1nd the parties' contributions of
equity to the joint venture. For the fiscal years ending March 31, 2004 through March 31, 2005,
Pansy Ho's total pay1nents from STD!v! increased by 38.3'%, from $!67,949 to $232,319. For the
fiscai year ending March 31, 2006, those STDM payments had increased to S l ,020,206. or an increase

of 339% from the prior fiscal year. Beginning in 2002, STDM paid Pansy Ho an annual Director's
Entertainment Allowance of $64,000. She stated that this is an entertainment allowance given to
STDM board members to conduct business on behalfofSTDM, fn August 2004. STDM gave Pansy
Ho $64.000 as a past due "lnsurance Allowance" for calendar years 2002 and 2003. She testified that

she was not exactly sure as to the speci.fic purpose of this payment, bui believed it might have been
related to the purchase of insurance for STDM employees. ln April 2005, two weeks before the
official signing of the Subconcession Agreement, STDM paid Pansy Ho a special director's bonus of
S641 ,000. In addition, bank records ref1cd that, in 2005, Pansy Ho received S !26,000 as a dividend
on her 100 shares ofSTDM stock t()r years 2002 and 2003. She has stated that STDM only started

________

........- ........

----

HOne of those t:nlities is Air Macau.~ Macau- bused company that is fourteen-percent owned by STDM. Pa11sy
Ho testitied that her iath.;:r appointed her 1.0 serve as an e.'\ccutive director on the Board of Air M;JCau as a corporate
repreHentarive ofSTDM to supernse the company'.~ interests in Air Macm1. In that capacity, she receives monthly salary
checks from Air Macau, regularly at1ends board meetings, and is involved in pulley-making deciswns and the oversight of
the operationul management team. Between .January 200 I and June 2006, l'ansy Ho received more than $425.000 in total
compensation from iur Macau.

54

SJ001308

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00132

Appendix 3

paying dividends again that year after changing its tax stmcture and having a better cash position. In
November 2005, STDM issued Pansy Ho another dividend payment for $85.000. >}

Pansy Ho 's personal business affairs delive substantial revenue from entities controlled by her
father. Pansy Ho has two wholly owned personal businesses that have significant business
connections to Shun Takas 'Nell as STDM. Since 1998, one of the companies has had a S25,000 per

month retainer agreement with STDM to serve as its marketing and public relations consultant.
Between 2001 and 2004, Pansy Ho received approximately .~ l million in pay111ents from these
entities.

A.dditionally, STDM compensates Pansy Ho for her active involvement in STDM's corporate
governance. Pansy 1-lo t;;:stifled that, although she attends STDM meetings of the directors, she does
not have any day-to-day involvement in

!ht~

cbmpany or its subsidiaties. How~ver, Pansy Ho's role as

an STDM Director is not simply a passive one. She testified on several occasions in Macanese legal

proceedings as the corporate representative tr;r STDM,

53

and serves as an STDM representative on

several STDM-rdatcd entities. On at least one occasion in June 2005, she served as Stanley Ho's

r!ln a September ll, 20071eHer, Pansy Ho contirmcd rhat "neithr!r my sist~r, M8 DaiS>' Ho, nor! filed tax returns
in Macau SAR between 1995 and 2006." In an April 9, 2008 letter m i:ounsd, the Division requested additionul
information from Pansy Ho regarding her tax obligations lo the Macau govemmcnt Specitku!ly, the letter requested (a)
a letter mdicating whether or not any type of e(;onomic bene!it paid to or received by Miss P<msy Ho ... lrom STDM,
STDM related entities and Air Macau, as wdl as Destinations Network, are subjec!to tax by government authorities in
Macau"; (b) the amc,unt of mxes. if any, paid on behalf ofPan.'ly H(> by each such entity for tax years 1995-2007; and (c)
documentation evidencing any type of tax payment vr withholding. ln letters dated June 25, 2008, both Pansy fk and
Daisy Ho indicated that they were "awaiting infonnation &om third parties and will revert ro you on this matter .in due
course." Pansy Ho stated in sworn testimony that she bei1.eved that 'an entiry whi'h give" a direct re.muneralion to us, will
have already taken care orthat tax t!ling, vi s-il-vis the gnvenunent. So our payments are net ofgovemment tMes." Daisy
Ho also chnrac.terized the Withholding ofmxes as the obligation and duty ofthe employer. To date, they have provided no
further informari<:>n or doturncn(ation in respome to the April 9, 2008 letter-

55

SJ001309

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00133

Appendix 3

representative at an STDM General Assembly meeting. Additionally, evidence suggests that she has
been involved with STDM's business and gaming activities outside ofMacau, including a January
2007 trip to Kazakhstan at her father's request to assess gaming and non-gaming development
1

possibilities on behalf of STDM and Shun Tak. 5' Wong Sing Wah accompanied her on that trip. 55
Pansy Ho' s position as an STDM board member has also provided her at least an indirect involvement
in SJM's significant strategic and investment decisions. 56

MGM executives recognized the problems posed by Pansy Ho's presence on the STDM
Board. ln a May 24, 2004 e-mail to Lanni, Rosevear, and Murren, Jacobs commented,"[ should note
that Pansy is on the board ofSTDM- it would not surprise me ifNevada nsks her to step down from
that position." rna February 22, 2005 e-mail to Lanni, Rosevear, and Murren, Jacobs recounted a
conversation with a high-level Macau official concerning Pansy Ho's STDM directorship.

In

pertinent part, the e-mail stated:

Pansy is a member of the board of STDM; this is being and will be


used against us as showing too ciose a link to SJM (note - we have
previously discussed this internally, and i have raised it with Pansy,
CY. and David Stannard as a problem we could anticipate; Pansy's
response is that she needs to be on the Board to protect Shun Tak's

--------

...... ----.. -- ...


Ho has as~erted, through counsel, that Ma10anese law precludes her from providing intorniation regarding
the nature or sub~tance of her testimony in these proceedings.
51
?ansy

'STDM also has investmenrs ii:J companies with gaming operations in Notih Korea, Portugal, and Vietnam.

B:;;<!.~ i.D.fra, ar 23 (discussing Wong Sing Wah's involvement in VrP rooms and alleged connections to organized

crime).
5

''Shc: testified als(l that the STDM Board has no invo!vernent wi!h S.IM's casino operations, although she
acknowledged that STDM must approve any significant or major transactions entered into by SJM. She also
acknowledged that the decision to go forward wiih SJM's initial public offering required the approval ofthc STDM board.
The July 2008 SJM initial public oftering states that Stanley Ho and ST'DM are the comroiling shareholders of SJM
Holdings, implicating their control ofSJM, as wel.l.

56

SJ001310
Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 _ 00134

Appendix 3

investment and investor equilibrium ut the STDM level, and that she
docs not/will not be involved in the SJM aspect ofSTDM (STDM has
vast other holdings). [The government official] clearly thinks Pansy
7
needs to step down from STDM; I do not disagree. 5

This correspondence evidenced MGM's concerns about their joint venture partner being involved with
this Stanley Ho-controlled entity.

Pansy Ho relied on individuals associated with companies owned and controlled by her father
for professional and technical services. Throughout the joint venture negotiations and fbrmation,
employees of Shun Tak and other individuals Jssociated with Stanley Ho assisted Pansy Ho.
Throughout the negotiations and the fom1ation ofthe joint venture, Pansy Ho and Wong negotiated
with MGM on behalf of Pansy Ho individually. !n fact, when MGM abandoned plans to establish a
joint venture with Shun rak in favor of a joint venture with Pansy Ho individually, the faces at the
negotiating table--Pansy Ho and Wongremained the same. She also relied on other Shun Tak
employees tor t1nancial and land.use assistance.

Pansy Ho 's positions with Shun Tak and STDM, het father's influence and control over SJM,
and her relationship with her father were indispensable in SJIVf selling a subconcession to the joint
venture, as well as the joint venture's ability to secure the concession at a discounted price. MGM has
acknowledged that various aspects and lavorableoutcomes ofthcjoint venture's negotiations with
SJM were a result ofthe father/daughter relationship between Stanley and Pansy Ho. \Vhen asked if
Pansy Ho's re1ationship with her father was "instrumental" in getting the subconcession from SJM,

-------1n his 3WQfl1 testimony, Jacobs qualified the sentiments expressed in his e-mail. He stated that. based on his
conversations wirh Pansy flo. Smnnard, and others, as well as his underMamling cfher role on the STDM board, it was
appropnate lor her to rern~in on ihe STDM board
57

57

SJ001311

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00135

Appendix 3

Jacobs replied "Oh, I' rn sure. I couldn't go and get one." Jacobs candidly stated that he did not think

the subcon~ession vvould have been available unless Pansy rro \Vas involved. f-Ie noted, H[t]baCs why

we pay the premium in order to be in busii1ess with her because it was our conclusion we couldn't
have gotten, ~~ome hell or high water for anything because it was a unique commodity and, sure, I
mean, as parents, i help my kids." Similarly, the joint venture obtained the subconcession at a cost of

.$200 million when its value \Vas, arguably, much greater. Rosevear acknowledged that MOM would
have been willing to pay a higher amount. In sum, as acknowledged by MOM, MOM ultimately
partnered with Pansy Hounder this arrangement because of her personal and business connections to
her father and the companies under his controL

[n addition to Stanley Ho's remuneration to Pansy Ho through companies he controls, Stanley


Ho has aiso given her numerous sizcabic gifts. These substantial and continuing gifts provided to
Pansy Ho by her father cany with them a degree of influence that is relevant to the independence
analysis.

Pansy Ho receives from her father monthly contributions and other significant cash

payments on an annual basis (e.g., birthday presents). Between January 200 l and June 2006, these
gifts totaled almost $5 million.

58

Her father has also gifted her significant interests in real estate

assets, with those gifts accounting for ninety-six percent ofthe total estimated value ofthe real estate
portfolio identified in her January 2006 MJ -PHD tiling. [n early 2004, Stanley Ho provided her, in

two. transactions, with $16.6 million dollars as a gift to purchase a residence in Hong Kong. 511 A

'fn addition (O gifts !rom her t\lther. on May 13,2004 and May.3l, 2004, respeclively, Daisy Ho and Pansy Ho
each also received a gift ofHK S5 million from their mother. Lucinda Ho. Daisy Ho !esrilicd that ''she [rny moth~rj catled
rnt:' and said f Wilnt to give al! the girls <J gift, a c;1sh gin." Daisy Ho continued, "I though! it wa~ .>o odd."

'''The purchase price tor the property was$ 15.2 million. Pansy Ho retained the surplus $!.4 million as a gill

58

SJ001312

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00136

Appendix 3

separate parcel of real estate, gifted to Pansy Ho and her sisters by her parents, was sold in March
2004 with Pansy Ho and DaisyHo receiving $2 million. Added to these transactions are substantial
gifts provided to Pansy Ho by her father via the Pansy Ho Trust, the Cordoba/Petunia Trust, the 2002
Shun Tak Rights Issue, and the Alpha Davis transaction.

(i)

60

Pansy Ho 's Relationship With Individuals Who Arc Not Suitable

Apart from her tinancial, professional, and personal dependence upon her father, Pansy flo's
relationships with several other individuals who .are known or alleged to be associated with organized
crime independently call into question her personal suitability and MGM's business association with

her. Those individuals include

Gilbert Yeung, Albert Yeung, and

Albert Yeung's brother Yeung Hoi Sing, Sonny ("Sonny Yeung"). Pansy Ho, herself, however, has
no criminal convictions and no bankruptcies.

11
'' ln 2004, Pansy Ho and Daisy Ho, on behalf of Shun Tak and a wholly owned subsidiary of Shun Ta~
negouated for the acquisition of development rights f(Jr an undevdnpedparcd efland adjacent to the Macau Tower. Shun
Takand the ;;ubsidiary would pay HK $1.5 billion, in equal proportions cash and Shun Tak stock, to the seiling entity,
which was controlled by Stanley Ho. The selling entity desigm1ted a new entity, i\lpha Davis Investments Limited ("Alpha
Davis"), to be the recipient of the 148.9 m:llion shan::s of stock rece.ived by Stanley Ho a5 proceeds of the sale. The
owners of Alpha Davis, and iheir eftecuve percentage ofoi/,11ership, are, as ibllows: Stanley Ho. 47%~ Pansy Ho, 27.03%;
Daisy Ho. 20.67%; and Maisy Ho, 5.3'l\,. Per the testimony of Pansy Ho and Daisy Ho, Stanley Ho created Alpha Davis in
order to gtft.the Shur.l T~k shares to his three daughters. Thus, despite participating in negotiations on behalfofShun Tak
during rhe transaction, Pansy Ho stands to receive more than 40 million Shun Tak shares from the fransacr.ion when it
closes in June 2009.

59

SJ001313
PlaintiffEx. 1102_00137

Appendix 3

Pansy Ho has had personal relationships and financial transactions with various member of the

'l cung family. Pansy Ho was also involved in a relationship with Gi lbett Yeung in August 2000.
During that time, Gilbert Yeung was arrested and charged with drug possession. Pansy Ho also
indit:atcd that Gilbert Yeung misappropriated some of her money at the end of their relationship.

60

SJ001314

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 _ 00 13 8

Appendix 3

Pansy Ho has also had t"inancial transactions with Gilbert Yeung's father, Albert Yeung. Albert
Yeung is a partial owner of the Emperor Palace Casino in Macau, which operates under an SJM
concession. He also controls several VIP rooms in Macau casinos. Albert Yeung has two previous
teJony convictions in Hong Kong, including a 1986 conviction

tor

illegal bookmaking, and is a

reputed member of an organized crime group. In her testimony before the Division, Pansy Ho stated

she was aware of public reports


that indicated that Albert Yeung wns associated with ttiads, and .vas aware that Albeit Yeung had
''trouble with the police and had been investigated by the Commercial Crime bureau.'' Pansy IIo's
bank records indicate that. in April 2001, Pansy Ho deposited a check

f{)T

approximately $166,000

from Albert Yeung into her savings account. Pansy Ho has stated that the payment by Alberi Yeung
reimbursed her k>r funds she had loaned to Gilbert Yeung in 2000.

Pansy Ho has also had several financial transactions with Gilbert Yeung's uncle. Sonny
Yeung, who is also a reputed member of a triad. He is a partner with SJM in the Ponte 1.6 casino
resort project and involved in VIP rooms in Macau. She stated that she had presented her allegation
that Gilbert Yeung had misappropriated her funds to Sonny Yeung and had threatened to notify the
police i fshe were not reimbursed. Pansy Ho testitled that Sormy Yeung made regular payments to her
totaling approximately $461,000 to reimburse her for monies misappropriated by Gilbert Yeung.

(ii)

Dr1isy Ho

Daisy Ho's position as. a Class A director ofthe joint venture, her financial support of Pansy
Ho in meeting her equity requirements and developing Site B, and Daisy Ho 's llnancial and
professional relationships with her father and companies under his control merit discussion of Daisy
61

SJ001315

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00139

Appendix 3

Ho's relationship with her father and his companies. 61 In fact, DaisyHo has benefited from many of

the san1e professional and personal r~lationships., gifts:: und transactions detailed above i-n respect of

Daisy Ho has advanced professionally and holds leadership pusitions within companies
controlled by Stanley Ho. She is the Deputy Managing Director, Chief Financial Officer, and the
third-largest individual shareholder of Shun Tak, which is the primary source of her personal income.
Daisy Ho serves on the STDM Board as Shun Tak's corporate representative,

a8

wel! as serving as

STDM and Stanley Ho 's owner representative for Shun Tak Centre, the building housing Shun Tak' s
.corporate offices.

She has accumulated her wealth through her employment at her father's companies and his

substantial gifts to her_

Financial records and her testimony indicate that her annual STDM

compensation is approximately HK $! million. She also receives an annual entertaimnent allowance


of$64,000, as well a!> in-kind benefits through an STDM charge account. Additionally, her father's
gifts have allowed Daisy Ho to substantially increase her ownership interest in Shun Tak through the
2002 rights offering 62 and the Alpha Davis transaction, 53

'''Between December 2004 and Marci12005, Daisy Ho made approximately $587,000 in payments for the
pro!essional costs relating to the dcw!opment of Sire B. Pansy Ho reimbursed her t<>r these expenditures in July
2005.
"'See discussion oi' 2002 rights offering, OillQfil at note 3!.
!See disc.u~sion of Alpha Davis transaction, 3!lQ@ at note 60.

62

SJ001316

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00140

Appendix 3

Stanley Ho provides her a monthly allowance of $25.000, as well as annual bitihday gitls.
Additionally, as noted above, her mother gave her HK $5 million (US $641 ,000) as a gift in May
2004. She benefited from her father's establishment and funding of the Daisy Ho Trust, from which
she provided the bulk of her loan to Pansy Ho for the joint venture eguity contribuiion. She, along
with Pansy Ho and a third sister, was a beneficiary of the Cordoba Trust, and its subsequent
distribution into sub-trusts.

64

VL

MGM'S._h:OMPUANC~__ EFFORTS

As with other gaming companies, the MGM Compli~:mce Committt~C was designed to "identify
potentially unsuitabk situations. potentially unsuitable persons'' and to timction as an intemal';quasigaming regulatory body." Lanni test! fied that an effective compliance program required a "proactive
and well-informed'' Compliance Committee that is made aware of significant issues, particularly
those relating to suitability1 early enough to engage in a meaningful review of the issues.

MGM's Compliance Committee leamed little about the company's plans in Macau or the
background of the entities and individuals with which it sought to partner. The minutes from the
Compliance Committee meeting of February i l, 2002 retlect that the Committee was advised that
"the company was not selected as one of the three t!nalists for a license to be issued in Macao."
i\ttinutes from subsequent meetings indicate that the Committee did not discuss an~/thing related to the
subject of Macau, Stanley Ho, Pansy Ho, Shun Tak, and STDM again until approximately two years

''~See diseu:;s10n of Cordoba Trusl. supra at note 30.

63

SJ001317

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00141

Appendix 3

later at its February 19, 2004 meeting. While MGM and Shun Tak were negotiating the tem1s of a
proposed joint venture fro1n early 2003~ the Cornmlttec received no due diligence infOnnation or

repotis gathered or produced by the MGM Corporate Security Department on Stanley Ho, Pansy Ho,
Daisy Ho, or Shun Tak .. During this same period, MGM 's Compliance Officer also did not receive
any due diligence information or reports relating to Macau. 95

MGM did not provide its Compliance Committee with information that would have been
rei evant to its consideration of the Macau joint venture, According to its minutes, the Compliance
Committee first learned of MGrv1's potential joint venture ;vith Pansy Ho at its Febmary 19, 2004
meeting. The minutes state:

Gary Jacobs ihen discussed a potential joint venture in Macau with


Pansy Ho, daughter of Stanley Ho. Mr. Jacobs indicated that he has
discussed this potential joint venture extensively with the Company's
gaming regulators, Also, he reported that Corporate Security has
completed a backwound investigation on Pansy Ho, and such report
has not generated any derogatory information about Pansy Ho.
Earlier minutes ret1et:t that the Committee was not infom1ed about the proposed Shun Tak!SJM
relationship or the regulatory concerns about Stanley Ho and his affiliated entities raised infonna!lyby
the Nevada regulators. The minutes arc devoid of any indication that Jacobs infonned the Committee
of the derogatory infbrmation that MOM possessed regarding Pansy Ho, including her relationship
with Gilbert Yeung, the reputation of his tl:tther, Albert Yeung,
Similarly, the minutes reflect that the Compliance Committee did not consider Pansy Ho's financial
and business relationships with Stanley Ho,

''

Edwards. MGM's head of Corporate- Security, testified that he provided all of his Macau due diligence

64

SJ001318

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00142

Appendix 3

The Compliance Committee did not learn ofthe terms and structures of the deal until after the
June 19, 2004 signing of the joint venture's Shareholder Agreement. The Committee did not receive
the April 13, 2004 Executive Summary, which was presented to the MGM Executive Committee,
regarding the terms and structure of the joint venture, until August2l, 2004, despite having a meeting
on May 17, 2004.

Jacobs, although aware of derogatory information in MGM's possession and a member of the
company's Compliance Committee, did not share that information with the Committee or MGM's
Com pi iance Officer, Bryan Wright ("Wiight"). As a corporate officer as well as a member of the
Compliance Committee, Jacobs had obligations in both roles. When asked about his failure to infonn
the Compliance Committee of the derogatory information, he attributed it to 'some sloppiness in our
procedures."

66

Both Lanni and Jacobs acknowledged that MGI'vi should have shared its due diligence

with the Committee by July 2003, when MGM and Shun Tak had reached a general consensus on the
structure of a proposed join! venture.

67

MGM did not engage in or request from a private firm any investigation or analysis of her
independence from her father or of her financial resources, including her source of funds for the

-..---------..--..--------------------iniormation to Jacobs only, to whom he reponed on all marters,


""Jacobs also indicated thm he did not bring it to the arrcntion of the Committee because the responsibility of
reporting matters to the committee was the respon~ibility of his ~ubordinate, Wright Thatjushfication carrie~ li!t1e weight
because Jacobs did not give him the reports umil much later. Jacobs was aware that Wlight had no access to background
and due diligence reports reque~ted by either Jacobs or Lanni unless the requestor prov1ded a copy oftht'lie reports to
Wright.
7

~ M(iM executiw~ similarly did no! apprise ttw CommiHce regarding the company's discussion~ with NWD and
Chan. In 2(10!, despite the MGM Exel~Utive Committee's June 2001 resolution authorizing MGM to negmiate a joint
venture agreernt>rH with N\VD and Gorrespondence between tht< p~rticR conceming >pecific corporate structures and

65

SJ001319
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00143

Appendix 3

transaction, net worth, income sources, or business or tinancial relationships. Beginning in October

2003, when Pansy Ho individually was identified as MGM's joint venture partner, the company was
aware that the central regulatory issues were Pansy Ho's independence from her father and her source
of funds fbr the joint venture. Wright, Edv;ards, and Gebhardt testified that neither Jacobs nor any
other MGM executive asked them to investigate these areas.

Addiriona!ly, MGM failed to timely disclose the due diligence within its possession to New
Jersey, Nevada and Mississippi regulators. On October 14, 2004, Jacobs provided an MGM Mirage
Corporate Security report, captioned "Shun Tuk", to New Jersey regulators. In the cover letter, Jacobs
stated that "enclosed are materials .ve have on Pansy and Daisy." The letter noted, "[S]ince we have
accc-ss to public sources, these materials are limited. With their tilings and refeases, you will, of
course, be able to go deeper." As noted in this report, beginning in early 2003 MGM possessed a
significanl amount ofderogaiorydue diligence relating to Stanley Ho and Macau's casinos, as well as
information about Pansy Ho, much of which was incorporated into MOM Corporate Security
Background reports that were shared with senior MGM executives. Regarding the transmittal letter to
New Jersey, Jacobs testified that he "should have been dearer" that "this was not everything we

[MGM] had.'' He characterized it as ''probably ... a miscommunication."

MGM provided Nevada and Mississippi regulators the identical MGrvt MIRAGE Corporate
Security Background Report that it hadprovided to New Jersey. NGCB has advised the Division that
MGM admitted that it had ;failed" to provide certain due diligence documents during its investigation
----------------------------------- - - - - financial tenns, !he Colllpli;m,e Committee's minutes do not indiea!e that it received any information regarding the entities
or individuals involved. Simibrly, the

Committee~

minutes contain no

n:fl~rences

to Chan.

66

SJ001320

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00144

Appendix 3

and "that the t1ow of information relating to its then constituted Compliance Committee was not
adequate. " 0 a

B.

MGM FAILED TO APPRISE iTS COMPLIANCE CQMM!TI'EE AND REQ_[,,LLATORS OF


ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION !N A TIMELY MANNER, AND LEFT UNEXPLORED
!5.EY_Q.IJESTIONS RELATED TO PANSY HO'S SUITABTUTY
MGM fell sh01i of its obligations !o its Compliance Committee and its regulators in

conducting and disclosing pertinent due diligence in a tirnely fashion. The minutes oft he Compliance
Committee meetings ret1ect that MG!v1 executives did not disclose, let alone discuss. virtually any
aspects of the Company's development activities in Macau with the Compliance Officer and
Committee. Despite possessing a significant amount ofderogatoty infimnation, much of which was
incorporated into various written investigative reports, neither Jacobs nor Edwards, both rnt.."l11bers of
the Compiiance Committee, provided any of these documents to the company's Compliance Officer

or the Committee as a whote .. In addition, with the exception of one report that omitted the hulk of
derogatory information in the company's possession, MOM did not share any other due diligence with
the Division of Gaming Enforcement. Rather, the Division uncovered certain due diligence that
MGM possessed in the course of its investigation of the joint venture.

''"In a letter dated April 4, 2008 to the Division regarding MGM's admitted compliance failures, the NGCB
advised that:

.. certain Nevada reia.ted faetors !ihou!d be considered: (a) ~'thi!e various mtonnation
required to be provided to Compliance Committees pur~uant to the terms of their
Compliance Plans. the NGCB views such requirements as guidance lor self
gewrnnnce rather than an automatic grounds lor discipline; and (b) none of the
NGCB Memb~rs. in rheir discretion, pursued disciplinary action regarding the matters
detailed in the referenced sections of the Investigative R~port.s a.~ they were not
deemed senous rnough to warrant 5uch action in YJew of the totality of the
mvestigation regarding compliance with the foreign Gaming Act.
i.~

67

SJ001321

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00145

Appendix 3

Moreover. once MGM became aware in the tall of 2003 that Pansy Ho was to be its JOint
venture partner. company executives knew that Pansy Ho's independence from her father was,
according to Jacobs, ;'fiom a due diligence standpoint or a regulatory standpoint the key issue."

Nevertheless, MGM tailed to investigate the issue, conducting no due diligence on the question of
independence or Pansy !Io's personal tinancial resources or business relationships. lt assumed

independence, ignoring the mnple evidenct: within its possession to the contrary, including:
knowledge that the individuals participating in the negotiating and tormation of the joint venture did
not change when Pansy Ho individually replaced Shun Tak; knowledge that Pansy Ho was bonowing
to finance her egui ty contribution, and sought to obtain the funds directly from Stanley Ho mere days
before the joint venture's fonnation; and knowledge that Pansy Ho held leadership and govemance
positions in companies controlled by Stanley Ho. In shoti, MGM cannot now claim surprise at the
extent of her dependence upon her father's financial and corporate resources when it tailed to pursue
the requisite i11vesrigation into these issues on its own.

MGM's efforts to obtain a letter from the Macau government attesting to the integrity of
SJM's gaming operations and the probity of that company's major shareholders (induding Stanley
Ho) evidences a lack of commitment and sensitivity to compliance and the role of regulators. As set

torth above, MGM was in possession of derogatory information relating to Sianley Ho and his
companies. Despite believing that Stanley Ho was unsuitable for regulatory purposes, Jacobs took a
lead role in drafting the August l, 2003 Secretary Tam letter. In addition, although MGM knew that
the NGCB possessed the Secretary Tam letter, the company failed to present the derogatory due
diligence in its possession that undercut the tetter's very assertions.

On this record, MOM's

68

SJ001322

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00146

Appendix 3

presentation of the Secretary Tam letter to members of the NGCB constitutes an unacceptable

. ot.. rcgu Iatory ltltegnty


.
. m
. 1avor

.
.
6''
comprom1se
o f'b usmcss
mterests.

Pansy Ho 's relationship with her father, the central role that he and his companies have played
in her successes and the formation of the Joint venture, and her associations with persons alleged to be
associated with organized crime render lwr susceptible to inf1uence by unsuitable persons. The joint
venture Shareholders Agreement provides no mechanism for dispuie resolution other than the

agret..>rnent of both parties. \Vhile l'v1GM points to that provision as assurance that the joint venture
will act in a manner that is consistent with MG!v!'s regulatory obligations by requiring MGM
approval tor all significant actions, the converse is also true: all signitkant actions by the joint venture
will require the appnrval of Pansy Ho. Given the extent ofSTDM, SJM, and Stanley Ho's iniluences

and

involvemL~nt

in gaming in Macau, and the multiple roles that Pansy Ho plays in the Stanley Ho

~mpire, the possibility of Pansy Ho's competing and conflicting interests influencing the operation of

the joint venture's casinos is real and Sif:,'11ificant.

[n addition to and apart from questions of suitability related to the parties with whom MGM
has entered into the joint venture, its conduct in pursuing and consummating that venture raises
concerns about its commitment to corporate regulatory integrity.

Jn several instances, MGM's

conduct evidences a '.villingncss to seek partnt;rships with persons it knew to be associated with

or

''uThe S<:cre!ary Tam fetter was also provided to Mis:>i~sippi regulators. MGM never presented the leuer to
the Division.

69

SJ001323

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00147

Appendix 3

alleged to be associated with organized crime. Additionally, the company failed to conduct due
di!igem:e on issues that it acknowledged were important to regulators, primarily whether Pansy Ho
was sufticiently independent from her father. Finally, MGM minimized lhe role and effectiveness of
its own Compliance Officer and Committee, by tl1iling to present to its Compliance Offker and
Compliance Committee complete and timely due diligence relating k) the negotiations. the joint
venture, or its partner.

In sum, the joint venture between MGM and Pansy Ho was the culmination of a concerted
effort by rvtGM to enter the Macau market. The Macau market represented to MOM not only a fastgrowing and lucrative gaming market in Asia, but also an important market from which it could
attract additional clientele to the company's Las Vegas properties. MGM believed that it had to
establish a presence in Macau, which it did by seeming a local partner, obtaining a subconcession,
identifying and gaining approval for development on a particular parcel, and ultimately constructing
and opening a casino. Its efforts and actions in Macau fmthered those corporate objectives. As a
licensed entity in the State of New Jersey, however, MGM must at all times satisfy its statutory
obligations. Here, the lack of personal, financial, and professional independence of its joint venture
pattner

trom an individual acknowledged to be unsuitable, the partner's own questionable personal

suitability, and MGM's failure in compliance and disclosure, lead the Di-vision to conclude that

MGM's joint ;enture partnership in Macau docs not satisfy its obJigations under the Act.

Based upon the information contained in this Special Report and revealed pursuant to the
Division's investigation, the Division recommends that the Commission find Stanley Ho to be an

70

SJ001324
Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00148

Appendix 3

unsuitable person under the Act. The D1vision's recommendation is supported by the opinions of
MGM senior executives, MOM's own due diligence, the actions of other casino regulatory agencies,
Stanley Ho's continued business ties to persons associated with organized crime, and the Division's
own investigation. [n addition to his substantial, although indirect, funding of Pansy Ho's joint
venture equity contributions, Stanley !-lo was present at every major event leading to the opening of
the joint venture, including the signing of the joint venture agreement at his personal residence, the
g,roundbreaking, and the grand opening. In

m()St 1f

not all instances, he was present at the invitation

ofMGM.
The Division recommends that the Commission also find Pansy Ho to be an unsuitable person
under the Act based on her dependence upon her father and her association with individuals
connected to organized crime. The Division's recommendation is supported by the fact of her direct,
substantial, and continuing business and financial ties to her father, Stanley Ho. HistOJically, almost
all of her income and accumulated wealth was directly attributable to him, or entities controll,:d by
him. The majority of the assets used to fund her interest in the joint venture with MGM came directly
or indirectly from Stanley Ho.
The Division also recommends that the Commission find that Pansy Ho is not independent of
her father, Stanley Ho. The closely intertwined financial and business associations that support a
negative finding on her individual suitability similarly require a determination that Pansy Ho lacks
independence from her father. Her controlling position at Shun Tak and her presence on the STDM
Board present obvious conflicts with the MGM joint venture that leave her vulnerable to the potential
int1uence or control of her father or his associations. Moreover, her involvement with MGM in the
very industry in which her father's organized crime associations, both past and present, are linked
give the Division extreme concern. Aside t!om the significant evidence of substantial and continuing
business and financial connections to her father, genuine concems about Pansy Ho's lack of
independence are evidenced by, among other issues, the pervasive involvement of individuals
71

SJ001325

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02_ 00149

Appendix 3

associated with or employed by Stanley Ho or the entities he controls, her January 2007 trip to
Kazakhstan on behalf of STDM/Shun Tak, her representation on behalf of her father at a STDM
General Assembly meeting, her designation as a representative of STDM to testify in court
proceedillgs, and Stanley Ho's appeanmce at the MGM Grand Macau's opening in December 2007.
These economic and professional ties to her futher demonstrate a lack ofthe independence necessary
to insulate tht: joint venture ti-om the potential of influence or control by Stanley Ho, his business
entities, or as~ociates.
Separate and apart from her father's organized crime assocwtions, Pansy Ho herself

ha~;

been involved in several financial transactions with other

individuals reputed to have triad associations.


The Division also recommends that the Commission find that MGM failed to follow its own
internal compliance procedures. From the beginning of its efforts to enter Macau, MOM pursued
partnerships with persons that it knew were associated with those aspects of gaming in Macau most
heavily penetrated by organized crime. After its unsuccessful bid to obtain a gaming concession,
fvfGl'v1 proposed a joint venture with Henry Cheng und Chan, with Chan as managing director of the

joint venture, despite its Corporaie Security report documenting Chan's involvement in VIP rooms
and his associations With persons involved in organized crime, After it became apparent that the
original tfuet' successful bidders \Vould, in fi.1ct, receive a concession, MGM sought to partner with
SJM, the only concessionaire who was not a direct competitor in the Las Vegas market Despite their
s\vom statements to the contrary, MGM's interest and efforts in securing an arrangement with SJM
evidences a wil!ingness to do business with Stanley Ho and his companies. Indeed, Pansy Ho was
initially present at the negotiating table at her l'itther's request as a representative of Stanley Ho.
77

SJ001326

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00150

Appendix 3

Additionally, in light of the due diligence in MOM's possession at the time, MOM's role in
acquiring a letter from a high-ranking member of the Macanese government attesting to the suitability
of SJM and Shun Tak, and its subsequent delivery to members ofthe NGCB, reflects, at. best, a lack
of candor to that regulatory entity. The drafting of the letter, the efforts to secure the signature, and its
presentation to regulntors-despite the significant amount of due diHgence within the company's
possession that contradicted or qualified the assertions contained tbcrein-demonstrate that MGM did
in fact attempt to rehabilitate Stanley Ho and his companies in the eyes of Nevada regulators.

MGM provided inadequate and untimely disclosure ofthe Macau venture and its partners to
its compliance personneL In part1cular, despite their presence on the Compliance Committee, and

their awareness of the due diligence MGtvt possessed, and in the case of Jacobs his additional
knowledge of the various negotiations, neither Jacobs nor Edwards kept the Committee or
Compliance Officer informed. In light of Jacob's complicity in failing to provide the Compliance
Committee with timely and complete inti.xmation, the payment of a bonus \6 Jacobs creates, at the
very least, an appearance that the securing of a lucrative joint venture absolved any shortcomings in
following intemal policies regarding comp!iance. Furthermore, MOM's presentation of the joint
venture to the Compliance Committee after the joint venture signing left the Committee unable to
offer any meaningful guidance.

MGM also fai.kd to conduct adequate due diligence on the very issue that the company's
leadership acknowledges is central to regulatory inquiry on the joint venture, namely, Pansy Ho's

financial independence hom her father and her source offunds f()r the joint venhtre. fvlGM 's records
reveal that MGM did nol undertake additional due diligence or background investigation into Pansy

73

SJ001327

PlaintiffEx. I 102 00151

Appendix 3

Ho 's personal, tinancial, and professional independence, despite the company's recognition that Pansy
Ho had limited ability to finance the deal and despite the extensive derogatory public allegations
relating to Stanley Ho, organized crime, and his casino empire.

Bused upon a careful review of all the 1cts, the Division makes the following
recommendations to the Commission:

I.

That Stanley Ho be found to be an unsuitable person under the Act;

2.

That Pansy Ho be tound to be an unsuitable person under the Ae:t:

J.

That Pansy Ho be found not to be independent of Stanley Ho;

4.

That MGM be directed to disengage itself from any direct or indirect business or
financial association with Pansy Ho, or her related entities;

5.

That MOM's due diiigence/compliance etforts be found to be deficient under the Act;
and

6.

Thtll a public hearing be heid to address the facts and cir{:.umstances set forth in this
Speciai Report.
Respectfully

SH

1itt:J,

LICJ.E.A~-.
---

tRECTOR/
ASSfSTANTATIORNEY GENERAL

Members of the Commission

74

SJ001328
Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00 152

Appendix 4
SPECIAL REPORT-High-rollers, triads and a Las Vegas giant
2868 words
30 March 2010

05:50
Reuters Nev.-s
LBA
English
(c) 2010 Reuters Limited
*Macau economy booming on $15 blnf1J a year casino revenues
* Court case linked gang member to Sands junket contractorl2l
* Hit orderedl31 on casino dea!erf4l suspected of cheatingr5l

By Matt Isaacs and Reuters staff


SAN FRANCISCO/MACAU, March 29 (Reuters) - Late last autumnf6l, a Hong Kong
juryl71 convicted 181 four men of a conspiracy to commit bodily harmf9l and a fifth of
soliciting a rnurderl11
At first. the men had been ordered to break the arms and legsl 11l of a dealer at Sands
12
Macaul i suspected of helping a patron cheat millions of dollarsf131 from the businessi 141.
Later, a call went out to murder the dealerl151, court records showl 16l But then one of the
gangsters balked and reported the plans to authoritiesl 171.
The plot's mastermind 18l, according to testimony in previously undisclosed court
transcriptsf1 91 obtained by Reuters, was Cheung Chi-tai. At trial a witness identified
Cheung as a leader of the Wo Hop Tol201 - one of the organized crime groups in the
region known as triads. Another witness, a senior inspector with the Hong Kong poltce121 l
called to testify because he is an expert on the triads, identified Cheung by name as
someone who would commit crimes for rnoneyr221 . Cheung's organized crime affiliation
was corroborated in interviews for this <;~rticle with law enforcement and security officials
intimately familiar with the gaming industry in Macaul23l.
The murder-for-hire case sheds light on the links between China's secretive triad
societies and Macau's booming gambling industry. It also raises potentially troubling
questions about one of the world's largest gaming companies, Las Vegas Sands , which
plans to open a $5.5 billion Singapore casino resort in late Apriil 24I
Cheung was not just named as a triad member but also, according to a reoular casino
patron testifying in the triall 25l, "the person in charge" of one of the VIP rooms at the
Sands Macau, the first of three casinos run here by Las Vegas Sands. In addition,
Cheung has been a major investor in the Neptune Groupl26l, a publicly traded company
involved in casino junketsi27 J -- the middlemen who bring wealthy clients to Macau's

SJ001329

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00153

Appendix 4
gambling halls_ Documents show that1 28i his investment allowed him a share in the
profits from a VIP gambling room at the casino.
An examination of Hong Kong court recordsf291, U.S. depositions from the .former
president of Sandsi301 , and interviews with law enforcement and security officials in both
the U.S. and Macau, reveals a connection between Las Vegas Sands and Cheung -ties that could potentially put Sands in violation of Nevada gaming laws.
The Reuters investigation is a collaboration with the Investigative Reporting Program at
University of California, Berkeley.
U.S, casinos operating in Macau are all headqumtered in Nevadaf31 l and must comply
with that state's laws which prohibit "unsuitable" associations that "discredit" its gaming
industry. Those lavvs are meant to keep organized crime figures out of the casinos.
Leading up to its public offerin,g .ln Hong Kong last November. Sands China . a
subsidiary of Las Vegas Sands'"2 l, acknowledged the risks of working with gaming
promoters -- another term for junkets: "If we are unable to ensure high standards of
probity and integrity of our Gaming Promoters with whom we are associated, our
reputation may suffer or we may be subject to sanctions, including the loss of (Sands'
Macau gaming license,)" the company wrote in a public filingl 33l.
Randall sar;re, a member of the Nevada Gaming Control Board that monitors casino
compliance 34J, declined to comment specifically on Sands Macau. writing in an email
that the state "takes no public position on suitability ... without a full investigative workup."
A gaming official, who insisted upon anonymity, said: "This relationship (with Cheung)
would be of concern to Nevada authorities. You're talking about direct ties to bad
guys"f35 J Another said the agency is monitoring the situation.
Las Vegas Sands issued a statement saying, ''to our knowledge, Mr. Cheung Chi Tai is
not listed as a director or shareholder" with any of the gaming promoters the company
uses in Macau, but declined to comment further.
Sands was the first U.S. operatorP 9l to cash in on the Chinese passion for gambling
when it entered Macau in 2004[371 after the government opened the casino market to
outsiders,
Since reverting to China in 1999, Macau, an hour away from Hong Kong by ferry, has
flourished as one of the world's wealthiest cities. The territory's economy has soared in
recent years -- much of the wealth generated by the enclave's casinos.
Indeed, the former Portuguese colony has become a playground fo,r China's nouveau
38
riche. And the gleaming neon red lights of the Sands Macau casinol ! are the first sights
a visitor takes in as the ferry approaches Macau.

SJ001330

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00154

Appendix 4
THE JUNKETS
The link between Macau's gambling industry and organized crime may be an open
secret, but it has come under increasing scrutiny lately. Within the last two weeks, MGM
Mirage said it would give up its holdings in New Jersey in response to pressure from the
New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcementl3 9l. The state agency had said that Pansy
Ho, MGM Mirage's partner in Macau and the daughter of casino tycoon Stanley Ho, was
an ''unsuitable" associate, an assertion stemming from the agency's belief that her
father has links to organized crimel40l.
The involvement of the triads in Macau's casinos is centered on the murky and highly
41
profitable junket business. The VIP sector brought in $9.9 billionf J last year, two-thirds
42
of the enclave's total gambling revenues! J
Macau has about 187 Hcensed junket operators, said Manuel Joaquim das Neves,
director of Macau's Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau 143l.
The junkets are crucial because they ensure the flow of capital by extending credit to
gamblers, often millions of dollars on a visit They assume responsibility for collecting on
their loans -- at times indelicately, authorities say.
They also often assume management of the private VIP rooms. And while many lawabiding junkets are active in Macau, experts say the industry is highly susceptible to
criminal influence given the extra-legal functions and opaque environments in which
they work.
In an interview, Dan Grove, a former agent for the FBI who oversaw security for Sands
Macau in the first few years1441 after its opening -- and before the casino became
involved in junketsf45l -- characterized pressure from triads to work with the casino as
"immense."
When known crime figures applied directly for contracts, blocking them was easy, Grove
says. But if legitimate professionals submit applications and then sub-contract the work
to the triads, detecting such ties was more difficult if not impossible. [20100329 215028
GMT]
JUMBO BOOM
Cheung Chi-tai's ties to Sands Macau came through such a multi-tiered arrangement.
His solely owned company, Jumbo Boom Holdings06l, provided capital for another firm,
now called Neptune Group, to acquire a stake in Hou Wanf471 , a junket operator. Hou
Wan was entitled to profits from Sands Macau's Chengdu VIP room 1481
Cheung owned more than 8 percent of Neptune Group in 2008H 91 , according to public
filings with the Hong Kong stock e~~~ange. That made hirn a substantial shareholder
when the call for the dealer's murder"0 ' went out

SJ001331

PlaintiffEx.1102 00155

Appendix 4
When asked about Cheung, Nicholas Niglio, Neptune's chief operating officer, said: "I'm
not familiar with him at aiL"
After a reporter showed him Neptune's 2008 annual report listing the firm's substantial
shareholders, including Cheung, Niglio de9lined to respond specifically. Cheung does
not appear in Neptune's 2009 annual report'5 li
Niglio said Neptune wasn't a junket itself but invests in VIP junkets that operate at the
Sands Macau, the Venetian Macau and Galaxy Entertainment's StarWor!d casinosr52 l.
He said Neptune now had a 20 percent stake in Hou Wan1 53i, a junket operator that runs
around 20 VIP tables at the Sands Macau154I
In Neptune's public filings three years ago, Cheung was described as a ''merchant in
Hong Kong'' whose company ''generally does not engage in underwriting business and
has no underwriting experience as at the date of this announcement. ..res]
While Niglio described Neptune merely as an "investor'' in junkets, trial testimony placed
Cheung inside the casino's private room[S&J.
According to testimony by Siu Yun-ping, aka the "God of Gambling", who won about
HK$100 million ($12.9 million) between August 2007 and January 2008 at various
casinos, Cheung was "the person in charge'' of the Chengdu Hall, one of the VIP rooms
that Siu frequentedr571 .
Las Vegas Sands, however, has said it maintains management of all its VIP rooms,
though it acknowledges working with gaming promoters to attract customers.
FRIGHTENED AWAY FROM THE SANDS
A triad member turned informant named Lau Ming-yee testified that he, and the five
men who would be convicted of engaging in triad activities, referred to Cheung as "the
boss."1581

Cheung, however, didn't appear in court and was not charged. Hong Kong police
declined to answer detailed inquiries on why this was so. In an emailed response.
authorities acknowledged only that a 49-year-old man surnamed Cheung was arrested
in connection with the case but ''released after legai advice was sought due to
insufficient evidence."
Attempts to determine Cheung's current whereabouts with !he Hong Kong police and
U.S. gambling industry sources in Macau were unsuccessfulr"'91 .
The judge in last year's murder-for-hire case, Madame Verina Bokhary[GOJ, said in
passing sentence that, "I bear in mind of course that, behind the scenes, there is a
person or are persons even more blameworthy than any of thern. "[611

SJ001332

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00156

Appendix 4
In the summaries of the trial called "particulars of offense" the judge identified Cheung
by his Cantonese nickname, "Tsang Pau," or "explosive money maker."i621
Siu, th,e "God of Gambling" suspected of colluding with the dealer at the Sands
631
Macaut , testified that he had been attacked, his house had been set aflame and that
his son had received threatening phone calls. "As a result of Tsang Pau {Cheung), he
(the witness) was frightened away from the Sands Casino," according to the judge's
summary.
Macau's regulator Nevesf64l acknowledges that the junket business in Macau has links
to organized crime, though he says it is less prevalent and more under control than in
the past.
"This kind of business certainly involves people related to organized crime,'' he said.
"That's why we established the license for just a year Every year. they (the junket
operators) must renew the license."
Asked specifically about whether Macau will strip the license from a casino operator if
the regulators discover that it is hiring a junket operator with links to organized crime,
Neves said: "It's separate. In principle, it doesn't affect the concessionaires."
Neves said he was informed by police of Cheung's alleged role in the murder-for-hire
case. But he described the accusations against Cheung as "rumors'' and said without
formal charges being brought against him, he would be free to continue to operate in
Macau.
"If he (was) condemned by the Hong Kong court ... if he was arrested and condemned ...
we wouldn't aliow him to run the junket," he said. "In this kind of case we must deal very
carefully .. Sometimes if we use this (rumor) to deny the license, he can put us in
court."
Unlike Las Vegas. where casinos tend to have direct relationships with their VIP
customers, Macau's casinos rely on junket operators to bring them the majority of their
high rollersf65l, who might easily lose US$1 million in an evening. [20100329 215035
GMT}
THE $64,000 BET
On a late Friday night in February, gamblers were exchanging wads of golden one
thousand Hong Kong do!lar banknotes ($130) for expensive chips in the exclusive and
restricted VIP gaming rooms of the Sands Macau.
The labyrinth of rooms -- decorated with classical Greek columns, Italian marble and
chandeliers -- were largely filled with mainland Chinese clients at high-stakes Baccarat
tables.

SJ001333
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00157

Appendix 4
The atmosphere was smoky, hushed and privileged, as casino employees kept watch.
The rooms seemed a world removed from the mass market gaming floors below.
At the "Luoyang" room, named after a gritty Chinese city, most gamblers were
Manclarrn-,~peaking mainland Chinesef 66l, who constitu~e more than half of ~acau's VIP
gamblersfo, . As two Reuters reporters looked on, a mtdd!e-aged woman w1th dtamond
bracelets staked a single H K$500, 000 ($64,440) bet -- and shrugged off the loss.
A supervisor of the VIP floor and several employees said the Chengdu hall - the room
that Cheung Chi-tai ran, according to the court testimony -- has been renamedf68l
Most VIP gambling in Macau is leveraged: gamblers usually bet more than their cash on
hand[i.\GJ_ This is particularly true of mainland Chinese high-rollers who, because of
Beijing's strict capital controls, are limited to carrying the equivalent of US$5,000 in
renminbi per trip when they leave ChinallO] Macau's six publicly listed casino
operatorsFti lend to only a small minority of t11eir patrons, according to company
filingst 72J That is because collection of gambling debt is illegal in China 731 and Macau
forbids casinos from writing off their bad or uncol!ectable debtsf'4l.
Concerned that junkets with possible links to organized crime could harm their
businesses, some U.S casino executives were reluctant to enter Macau. Harrah's
Entertainment Inc [HAMLEH.UL). the world's largest casino operator, decided not to bid
for a gaming concession therel7'-'l. Michael Chen, Harrah's president for Asia, said in an
interview with Reuters last year that the company worried that its regulators around the
world would not permit it to run casinos in Macau.
That issue was front and center in the official report released by New Jersey gaming
regulators in mid-March regarding MGM Mirage's partnership with Pansy Ho.
Regulators cited the junket influence within her father's VIP rooms as a prime
concemf76J "The VIP rooms in (Stanlev Ho's} casinos provided organized crime the
entry into the Macau gaming market that. it had previously lacked," the report said 771 .
When Sands first won a Hcense in Macau in 2002, it was paired with Hong Kong-based
casino operator Galaxy Entertainment Groupl78l, but the U.S. company ultimately ended
the arrangement \/Villiam Weidner, the former president of Sands, in a deposition for an
unrelated Nevada court case in 2007, cited Galaxy's intent to run the VIP rooms in the
traditional Macau style as one of the reasons for the split.
''These guys want to do VIP rooms the way they ... do them in Macau where the ... triad
guys run them because they're the only ones that can grant and collect credit in
mainland China, and they smuggle the renminbi across the borger," he said. "I can't do
that business. That's tt1e way they want to do it, so I can't do it."r'uJ
Sands' major competitor, Wynn Resorts , said the company would decline its Macau
gaming concession if it was barred from extending credit and collecting debts directly in
an effort to avoid the junket system, according to company filingsfBO]

SJ001334

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00158

Appendix 4
But the U.S. companies realized soon enough that they could not compete with local
casinos without junkets.
China's high rollers tend to prefer the personal, informal relationships of the junkets,
experts say, and often demand a level of anonymity incompatible with the credit
applications required by the casinos[81 I

LOWER PROFILE
While triads remain active in Hong Kong, the gangs have burrowed deeper into
mainland China including cities like Chongqing and retain a strong imprint in Macau.
The triads are believed to have originated as a rebel grouping in the early Qing Dynasty
formed to help overthrovv the Manchu regimel82l.
Ko-lin Chin, a professor at Rutgers University and one of the foremost experts on Asian
organized crirner83l, disputes the regulator's contention that the triads are less prevalent
in Macau. But he said they do keep a lower profiie than before internationally owned
casinos entered the market and revenues grew from $2.26 billion to $15 billion today! 84 J
Even if crime groups are involved in the junket business, he says, with the casinos
making so much money, the government reaping huge taxes, and the citizens of Macau
enjoying full employment, there is scant political will to remove them.
"No one wants to crash the party," he said. "This is a feel-good story." (Reporting by
Reuters in Macau and Hong Hong and Matt lsaacs in San Francisco and Las Vegas;
editing by Lowell Bergman, Jim 1m poco and Claudia Parsons) [201 00329 215044 GMT]

SJ001335
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00159

Appendix 5
[ADD VENETIAN MACAU LETTERHEAD]
Luis M. de Melo
Venetian Macau Ltd
The Venetian Macao Resort Hotel,
Executive Offices, L-02,
Estrada da Baia deN. Senhora
da Esperanca s/n,
Taipa, Macau
Registrar of the High Court
High Court Registry,
LGi, High Court Bui!ding,
38 Oueensway,
Hong Kong
29 April 2010

Dear Sir,
Request for Official Transcript, HKSAR v. SEE WAH ! UN AND OTHERS (HCCC1312009)

I refer to the above High Court Case, the sentencing of which took place on 27 October 2009.
On 30 March 2010, Reuters, the news agency published an article (copy attached for reference)
entiUed "Special Report- High-rollers, triads and a Las Vegas giant". According to the Articie,
an individual by the name Cheung Chi~tai was reportedly named during the aforementioned
Trial as a leader ofWo Hop To, a triad society. as well as being "the person in charge" of one of
the VIP rooms at Sands Macau, a property of Venetian Macau Ltd.
Following the publication of the Article, we have become a concerned party to the Case. As
such and given the severity of the allegations contained in the Article and the (potentially)
considerable reputational damage to my organization, we therefore request a copy of the
Official Transciipt of the Trial, with a view independently to verifying what was and was not said
during the Trial.
Your favourable and prompt response to this request would be appreciated.
Yours Sincerely,

Luis M. de Melo
Executive Vice President,
Genera! Counsel and Company Secretary
Venetian Macau Ltd

SJ001336

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00160

Appendix 6
HCCCOOOOJ3!2009 HKSAR v. SEE WAH LUN AND OTHERS

Pagel of4

HCCC 13/2009
fN 'THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECI!\L ADMINISTRATIVE REGJON


COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13 OF 2009

HKSAR
SEE Wah-llm (Al)
TANG

Ka~man

(A2)

WONG Chi-man (A3}


1" ro c 1
"4)
1:.~\...1,...;
:,1un- k.!t(11.'
Y.L'l

CHAN Ho-leung (A5)

Before:

The Honourable Mrs Justice V Bokhary

Date:

27 October 2009 at 3.00 pm

Prcsent:Mr Simon Tam, SPP, and l'v1r Franco K uan, PP, of the Department of Justice, for
HKSAR
Mr John

Haynt~s,

instructed by [vlessrs Mike So, Joseph Lau & Co. (assigned by

DLA), for the 1st Accused


Mr William Chan, instructed by Messrs Lan, Chan & Ko, tor the 2nd Accused
Mr Paul Tse, instructed by f'vfessrs Tam, Pun & Yipp (assigned by DLA), for the
3rd Accused
Mr Peter Cahill, instructed by Messrs Li, Wong, Lam & W 1 Cheung (assigned by
DLA), for the 4th Accused
1\{r Francis Cheng, instructed by Messrs Louis K Y Pau & Co. (assigned by DLA),
for the 5th Accused
Offence:( l) Acting as a member of a triad society ( LL>Z'l ~t i-&!W !jJ 15J\<1-f +Ji)

(2) Conspiracy to cause grievou;-; bodily hann with intent (.'$1 ct!~1L~~:I.; rM 5&*t

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SJ001337

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 _ 00161

HCCCOOOO 13/2009 HKSAR v. SEE WAH LUN AND OTHERS

Appendix 6
Page 2 of4

(3) Conspiracy to cornmit murden C*ill~i!t~~)


(4) Soliciting to t.murder (P~f.'N~.ffi)

Transcript of the A.udio Recording


of the Sentence in the above Case

_XHJR'f: See Wah-lun, Tang Ka~man, Wong Chi-man, Yeung Chun-kit and Chan Ho-leung,
in respect of each of you, I have considered everything urged on your behalf by your
counsel.And J have of course given separate eonsideration to each of you on the question of
sentence.
As far as you, See Wah~lun, is concerned, your offences under Counts 1, 2 and 4
are all related to the conspiracy lo rnurder under Count 3. 1 will pass concunent
sentences on you on all f()ur counts.
As far as you, the other four accused, are concerned, your offence under Count 1 is
related to the conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent under Count 2.

1 \Vill pass concurrent sentences on each of you four on those two counts. And as
far as the role which each of you fiJur played, J will draw no distinction.
In respect of all t1ve accused, 1 will of course take the most .lenient view that can
reasonably be taken. The appropriate total sentence tor each of the five accused
will be achieved by making the longest of the concurrent sentences against each
accused rel:lect aU the appropriate elements of aggravation, including those which
come under another or other counts. Tbat will achieve the appropriate total but no
more than the appropriate total since all the sentences will be concurrent.
The maximum penalty for the offence under Count l (of acting as a member of a
triad society) is 3 years' imprisonment on a first conviction and 7 years'
imprisonment on a .second or subsequent conviction. 'fhc maximum penalty for the
offence under Count 2 (ofconspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent),

for the offence under Count 3 (of conspiracy to murder) and for the offence under
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Plaintiff Ex. I 102 00 I 62

4i~~ 1!:'W l

n
SJ001338

Appendix 6
HCCC00001Ji2009 HKSAR v. SEE \VAH LUN t\ND OTHERS

Page 1 of4

Count 4 (of soliciting to murder) are the same. It is life imprisonment.


As to the counts against all five accused, namely Counts l and 2, the position is

this. The evidence clearly indicates that the way in which the 1st aec.used acted as
a triad member is more serious than the way in which the other tc1ur accused so
acted; and his role in the conspiracy to cause grievous bodily ham1 with intent is
more serious than theirs. As against all five accused, it has to be said that the
grievous bodily bann which they conspired to cause with intent was to be carried

out pursuant to a carefully planned attack.


There are cases which Rhow that the sentence for causing grievous bodily harrn
with

intent commonly range

hom 3 years'

imprisonment to

!2 years'

imprisonment although everything wilt ultimately depend on the paliicular


circumstances. There are also casGs whid1 show that conspirators are not
infrequently punished in the same \vay as if they bad completed the offence \vhich
they conspired to cnrnrniL Again, it all depends ultimately on the particular
circumstances.
In respect of each of these five accused, I bear in mind of course that, behind the
scene, there is a person or are persons even more blameworthy than any of them.
Tuming to the l sl accused alone, the murder -.vhkh he conspired to commit and
'vhich be so.licited others to commit was likewise to be carried out to a carefully
planned attack. The use of stun guns and very deadly knives vvas part of the plan.
As far as mitigation is concerned, the only real mitigation available

is the

mitigation available to the 3rd accused in the form of his previous good character.
The other accused's criminal record -.vi11 of course not be held against them when
they are scntc11ced. I have serious doubts as to whether a previous good character

is effective mitigation jn a case like this one. But l vvi!1 err on the s.ide of leniency
if I err at all, and give the 3rd accused some discount, even though it cannot be
much of a discount, for his previous good character.
\

When it comes to the role each ofthem played, I will draw no distinction betvveen
the 2nd to .5th accused.
A court should always be as lenient as possible, but tbe seriousness of a case

cannot be ignored. The seriousness oC this case speaks for itself one.;.~ the basic

tl!'J I /1{1 ~ ()

SJ001339

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00163

Appendix 6
HCCCOOOOJ3/2009 BKSAR v. SEE WAH LUN AND OTHERS

Page 4 of4

facts are noted. Each of these conspiracies involved a p!an to abduct a man in the
street and take hlm as a captive to a prepared location. In the first conspiracy, the
plan was to break his anns and legs at that loeation. In the second conspiracy, the
plan went even further. It vvas to kill him at that location.

All things considere,d, I will sentence as follo\0'/S,


lst accused, on Count 1, I sentence you to 2~1, years' imprisonment. On Count 2, l

sentence you to 11 years' imprisonment. On Count 3, I sentence you to J 4 years'


imprisonment On Count 4, l sentence you to l2 years' imprisonment. All the
sentences \vill be c.oncurrent. So you will go to prison ibr l4 years.
2nd accused, on Count l, I sentence you to t ~'2 years' imprisonment On Count 2, J
sentence you to 9 years' imprisonment. Those sentences vvill be concurrent. So

you \viU go to prison f(Jr 9 years.


3rd accused, on Cour1t 1, I adopt a starting point of l Y2 years. On Count 2, 1 adopt
a starting point of 9 years. For your previous good charaeter, I will give you such
discount as to sentence you to J year's imprisonment on Count 1 and to 8~S years'
imprisonment on Count 2. rhose sentences will be con<.:un"''nt So you will go to
prison for 8\12 years,
4th accused, I sentence you to J \'2 years lmprisonmem on Count 1 and a
concurrent ternl of 9 years' imprisonment on Count 2. So you will go to prison for

9 years.
5th accused, I sentence you to l 1/2 years' i1nprisonment on Count l and a.

concurrent term of Y years' impJisonment on Count 2. So you will go to prison for


9 years.

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SJ001340

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 ,00164

Appendix 1
l02nd Ccrnqr.-ess

S E N A T E

S . .Pr:i.nL

2nd SesSion

THE

NE~V

INTEP,.Nl'>-t]:J:ONJ\l.t CRININ . ;.L


.
1\ND ltSiitN OHGI\J:JIZED CRIME

R E P 0 R T
Mad71 By The

De.centbe;: J. 9 9 2

SJ001341
Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00 I65

Appendix 7

CO!\<l:MIITEE ON GOVE.ffi\'l\:ULNTAL AFFAIR"!


.JOEN GLENN, Ohio, Cho.inr.;;m
SAM ~n.rN"t-?, G~-~H
WlLL!t\.M V. ROTH, Jn., Dl"'""'
CA...!{L LEVI:f, Mu:higau
Tgo st~r.;vg~"'.i.Sj Alaekn
,fj M S/',S-9ER., TM!nl-"'S.~
W!LL!It.c'\.1 S. COlEN, M~in:
DAVlD PRYOR, Ark.aMtH3
WJ......RREl'{ B RVDl\L~~ .New H!lmpetnre
HEH~RE':!' KOHL, W1Mi..~cmrin
JOHN SEYMOtm, CaJifom~a
,JOSEPH L UE8F~H1~IAN, Com;t:-.:ticut
DANJSL I{ AKAKA, Hwaii
.Lronard fNeiB::t:. Staft' D~ri!C:fO,.
Fr.ankbn G Fd"k, lrf:'n.tJri.:.y ,::Half _r.itn:cro.~ a.ru:i CM4 C;;;.;,;r:sd
Mkhal Sue Pro.Jser: Chi,f Cttrk

PERi\5ANENT Sl.IBCOMnfi'J.':rEE ON lNVESTlGATIONS


SA.'& N'""t...Tl'->N, G.f:1.Jrrllt!.: Cl-...tlirmw~
,J(}HN GL.t1N1 Ohio, Vi~ Chairman

V. JH.1TH, Jf<.,

CARL L.E:VC\. Mkhigutt

wrLLIA~s:i

.;r~-1 SABSJ~R. 'fcnncss~e


D.A V~ D .P"!~YGH, A.:-1<!~:1~.~

T0 STEVE_NS.

Hf-~HBERT
-J(A~EPH

KOHL,

De~ttwHr~

Alasl(J~

VfiLl.JAM S. COHEN. Mn}n(!


WAHHI~N B RL1)M.~>,:\, ~~w Hil.mpsh"'

Vlis~on1<1n

JOH.~~ s~~YM~)t:ml c.,lifbrnH~


BiD, Chi-!.{' Cow-e!Jf.i
Daniel l''. Hin:i~11, C."h.ie{ C.'Ju...'u>el !.:) fh.t M~r&.~.rity
:Mllry D. Hob~!rtF;Jn. Chf.r( Clt<rk

LrEBEJ~.,.JA:.:, Ct)fLO~bt:1.\t

F.:1en~are

u.n

SJ001342

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00166

Appendix: 7

CONTENTS
lmroductiou ................................. , .......................................................................... .

Ge"[J~ii~~~}~~~~.~~Y=:~~:~::f7:~f>:~:::::::.:~:~;.~.:.:::;;:. :::;:;;;;:.::L
;~'k1oJ ~o .::~.~d. ~::.~ .~:".~ ~:. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :. ~::: : : : : : :: :
Sun Yee O.n Triad ............................................................................ ..
8

Ta i w~~~B:.~{tfrf:dsu ~~- :~:::

:. :~~~::: :::::::::::::::::~: ~:.':.~ : ~:::: ::::::::: :~ -~ ~: ~.' :~: ::~: : :

J:;:~~~l~i:~!.fo;~~,;o~:i~:

M~~Z~~~~~a~:l..~-:~.~~~~~-1:~.~-~. ,~ ~~~.~~--: ::::~: :~::: ::~::: :~:.:. :::: :::: :~: :::::::::: :~:::: _
~::: ::: ::::

Ethnic Chinese and Vietnamoe Activity in the United States ........................ ..

~Z~1~k2~H1~~1~. : : : : : :::: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

;J
3
3
9

ro

10

10
11
11
12

13
14

14
18
18
21
21
2?

Criminal Activities .................................................................................................. ..

27
2.8
29

~1~'~f.~.;~;:~~r~~~:ai:~::~~::)~7::;~::~:;~~:.~::;:::.::;~;:..:.~::::::;;;:._:;;::::;;;:;

30
31
31
35

Ne.rH;.i~J~~~~-~~!~.~.::::::::::::.:::~::~:::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::~::::::~:::::::::.":::~:::::::::::::::::

Home Inva.sion lkbbEries ............................................................................... .

m~l~r~Rf~~ii::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.::::: . :::::::::.::.:::::::::::::.
.

&1ooey

I..i!UJl~e~~ng

EiTCrt$ by Jspaneil:e Organized

Crim~o~ ...~ .............. ..

s!~~J~7t?E~~~ia~~~~~~~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Ch~:;..~~~- ~:~~:~:~:~:~:~:~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

~;;.!:!~f: ~~~~~;~[. ~::~.~. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

29

35

36
37
38
39
44

44

47
49

50
51

52

Rr::."':(;JX.U:nendations ....................................................................................................
l:at.ernationHJ Initiatives ....................... ~ .......................................................... .
Ii~-:>mestic In.itio.tive1 ~~ ..................
~.
l.cJ1I'lig;-ation lssue6 ........................................................................ ~ ................ ..

52
53
53
54
54
56
58

Condusicn

59

Canada ... ,. ......................................................................................................... .


Japan ................................................................................................................ .

# ..............................................................

on;

SJ001343

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00 I 67

Appendix 7

Ust of Charts:

s!"' y.,., /?". Tri\<~..............., .......................... ..


~a

Hop fu I;rut<l ;t.,wrnut:onal) ..................................................... .

~ umu~ucnt-(,u.rra

.......... , ........... ~w-

........................................ ,h ..................

Other Major .lnpSrJeE<> Borvoln<dHn Gmup" ................................................ .


I....et!de~gf!~p Stnu:turl~ of I>riJtutry Jo:ngs nnd A!li Utned Gangs in Nt~w
l:ork Cny ................................. ,..................... ,. ................................ ,. ..... ..
Wo Bop To Tdud fUSA) .............................................................................. ..
.l!:f.raues.u Bun~okudun Lln.k w 1Ln:),fatian H.i:.!~d E~ol.:it\L Pu rchH::\Ht: or

:.:~~;r~J;~~~}~;~~~;:.?~Jf~~;~if~.f~i~::;:~:~~~~;~~;;;::t;f:~i=~;;,:~~-:;:~.~~~.~~:;_:

SJ001344

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00168

Appendix 7

THE NEW Il\"'TERNA'I'TONAL CRIMINAL A.l\TD ASIAN


ORGA.I'i'IZED CIUME
!NTROf>UC1'ION

Over t.he past decudr,, t.here has been <! substantial increase in
i'lshtn organ.ized crime ~wUvity in the lJniteJ State$. Asian organizt-d crime t,'1oups have extended their reach to a wide array of
c:rimimd activity, much of it violent. F.tJmic Chinese criminai
gToups have comt} to dominate the heroin .irnportmjon trade, whieh
appears tv be t~xpandin'. Highly mobile Vietrwme;H' street gangs
have turned to extremely violent home invasion robberies. Japa
n!)Se mobsters hav~~ reportedly been laundering money in the United St.ates a.nd making real estate purchases. In fact, while the De
partment of Justice now ranks Asian organized crime as its No. Z
priority nationwide just after La Cosa Nostra, there have been relativdy few successful prosecutions.
In response to this growing problem, and in light of the historic
interest in organized crime by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSl),l Sent~tor \\'illiarn V. Roth Jr., Ranking Mjnority
Mt:mber, with the concurrence of Chairman Sam Nu.nn, initiated
an investigation into Asilll1 organized crime groups in June, 1991.
The Subcommittee had three goals in this investigation: First, to
examine how these organizations are structured 1md how they op<~rate. Second, to identif; deficiencies and opportunities for improvement, in both domestic and international law enfortemer.t responses to t\sia.'l organized t~rime. A.nd1 ti.na lly, by publicly exposing
these organizations and identifying ttJeir principal members, the
Subcommittee attempted t,o neutralize their most important weap.
ons: Anonymity and invisibility.
Between October, 1991 and August, 1992, the Subcommittee held
5 days of hearings, and heard testimony from 40 witnesses. The
witnesses included representativ!JS from Federal, Stare and local
law enforcement agencies, the intell.igence community, and AsianAmericlll1 1.-ictims of orgMized crime activitie.s as well as current
and fOnner members of Asia..'1 orglll1ized crime !!Toups.
Th<: investigation led t.o lll1 inescapable conciusion: Today, Asian
criminal grcmps represent a pToblem of dramatic proportions, both
in the United States and int.emationally. Indeed, Asian criminal
l P~rat.anent Sub-'tlrr:..r_nlHeo~

1'mf7i.;;.kir" Orl!onU.e,tit>nS:, ..
ll, 15, 21, ~2. 29. l

A~rll

vn hn-<?6-Qgatir..ns

heu.nn~

<'In: The

Strttdtut~

f'J( Jr~/.t!n:.cJimw.t Drlt.iJ

m~~ 12~13, l.r-80, Organi;ud Cri.Fru!.: 25 t~earo i\lif.r Vci(fdH,


~r&'i~ Cr;mir:ai Grr.w.p:;;, Septmni;>er- 17, 2.{, lSSt;. Prr;{i/..2 v/

Org:J.t,i.z:ed Crime: Great _1


Octobet :1, 1S84, Jiqul .Jlmp~t::l and Resi.a.uro!oi f..'m
p!c'yt;i!S Jnt.ur..m.wrw.l Vn~an, AugUt 27. 108>1, Pr(;(l.le f>( 0:-J!<Um:.ed Crirr~~ lfirlA:!.t:Jnhe /'legum,
Juiy ! 7, ~9-.94, WaNr{roJt! Corns.pliim, Mart:h 27, 1~}, R.e{wla: cl A.r..rhon,)' J, .Aeccrdo to 'l'e:m/y.
F~bnlP.l')' $ ta84, h'ot;;l Emplo_"'tteS end. Reslcu.nlr..t Empiny~es llliernaJio:'t.1 Vnv.m, Parl.B 1-.;,
Jm::i! 1902 ihrnugh ..f:.me 1984, J.-"~-rofi.k c{Org-::niz~d Crim~: !fnM La.k<ts P.~~Ticm . ci.emuarf 25. 26.
~1 a:.d Februa.rv l, !004, Water(m:H Car.......s.ptk\'l, F.ebrumy l7, 19, 25. '27, l9tH, Orgcm:ted
Crun~ (l.!ld. Use 0{ Viokn.ce, April 28-2t\ May 1, 2 and 5, 19813. t1~d Orec:.n:..z.i!d Cdm~ lllld llltdl
1'rotTu: in Na.n::r.wa.. (V,UaJ::.hl Hea!'lng:s.!. Pttrta l--5. Mpte:n.tr.!t lfl-63 t.hrcugh AugUi:it 1964

(1)

SJ001345

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00 I 69

Appendix 7

groups nre a major new threat confronting law enforcement around


the glolk Such groups have become invoived in a v.r!de range of or
ranized crimir~nl adiviti_es, ine!ndin,g nar~)tics tmffi:.king, morH.'Y
aLmdenng, bnbery, busl!less extort.wn, allen smugghng, home m
vasion robbel'ies, computer chip theft, and credit card counterfeit
ing. While warnings hnve previously been heard about the possible

m:igralion of secret criminal triad organizations to t.he United


from thr~ir b;u,, in Hong Kong r>rior t:o the assumption of
control by t.l1!! Peolde\; Republie of China in 1997, the Subcommittee's invest.ig-!Ition reveal<td that structured triad organizations already exist. in tJw Unilr~d Statf's nnd in other countries around the
wodd.
A.sian crime i:~rll!lp:;' h1gh rnobiiity, inSctantaneous global communicat.ion:.;: c.<:tpa!.Jilit.y. and internali(ln<ll conneetinns suggest that
they represent. a d:w.]lt:ngt nf global dimensions to law enforcernenl
which cannot be snccr,ssfnHy rnd. by any single country or by any
single law enirm:enH:ni. agency. lndeld Asian crime groups represent a new breed of int(:rnativn.lll criminal. As Senator Roth stat
ed during the June lB, 1992 PSI hearing: "[Jsing easily obtained
phony oassports a.nd taking ndvantl.ure of newly relaxed inter
national tTavel restrictions ns wdl ns the greatly increased volume
of international trade, the mw international criminals trent national bordeTs as not.hing more than minor inconveniences to cheir
criminal enterprises."
Senator Nunn, the Chairman nf PSI, noted the need for inter
Sl.aL!;~;

ni.l.t.ional cooperation in con:frcn!.ing As.iun organiz.ed e:rime when h(;


stated, "Not enough progress ha:> D('t'll mndc in estnblbhing furnml
cooperative relationship:; arnonr,; thosP law (nfbrce:rnent. bodie;; >vill
lng to address this problem. Wnil<! the rhr:toric o!l.en is positive, in

real!ty, too often information is. n?t shnr<d,

ces.:~nbiH,

dorurnent~

an" n?i

llt-

and efforts t.fJ locate cnmtnals d> not re{.~t..~,ve n1h::tnanonrd


assista.TJce. Their international capabilities makes these Asian

criminals a world problem and one that we should be eage:r to address t.ogethel'."
The investigation ll.l1coveroo little {:vidence to sugge~t th!lt either
U.S. or foreign law enf)rcement entities are currently cqu.ipped to
meet the challenge of this new breed of international criminal. On
the contrary, it is clear that. the current la,w enforcement responses
are inadequate. Problems confronting U,S. law enforcement ngencies include lack of foreign language expertise, inadequate knowledge of Asian cultures and customs, .and limited success in gathering or sharing criminal intelligence.
At the international level, an entirely new approach is needed.
As Senator Roth stated at the June 18, 1992 hearing: "Our current
situation is .analogous to the 1920's when the United States ex peri
enced a rash of interstate bank robberies. Bank robbers, like the.
infamous Bonnie and Clyde, began using automobiles to rob bunks
and then quickly crossed State !i.ne.s, t1&ereby evading StaLe and
local law enfoTcement jurisdiction. While we eventually remedied
this problem by creating a Federal bank robbery statute, the solu
tions to the challenge posed by the nev,: international criminill are
not so obvious,"
Law enforcement efforts too often stop at international borders.
While informal contacts among law enforcement agencies have

SJ001346

PlaintiffEx.1102 00170

Appendix 7

3
been expanding and ought to be strong'ly encouraged, the current
formal methods for exchange of information and evidence, as well
a.s for extradition, are inadequate to cope w:ith .international organiz.ed crime as we approach the 21st Century.
The Asian American populaticn in the United States hns grown
more rapidly in the past decade than any other ethnic [{roup. Thus,
it. may be exp0cted that A.sia.n crime would also gro">v. But the va.st
majority of Afiian Arnericans nre hard working, law abiding citizens. Indeed, there may be no other group of immigmnts lo America who have been harder working m: who have f(,,wer welfare reciPients than Asiun An1erkans. (}nlv a small fmetion of /\.";ian
Ainericans an' involved in organized crime. MoreHver, il must be
kept in mind that most victims af Asian organized crime groups an;
themselves Asian. Distrust of law enforcement authorit.i(:s. languagf; harriers and perceived law enforcement disi.ntarest. ha:_,t' all
contributed to the victimization of Asian Americans by i\;;ian OJgani;wd crime.
There is, unfortunately, an often unspoken, but m;vertheless
widely held view that becaus.:: most Asian criminal activities are directed against Asians, other Americans D(eed not be concenwd. The
Subcommittee emphatica.lly rejects that point of view, tlrst., bccause
all residents of the United States are entitled to proteetion, whatever their background, and second, because history demonstrates
that all or_ganized criminal ~oups in the United States, whatever
their ethmc origin, eventually extend their corrupting tentacles to
the larger community as they Sc:ek more power, influence, and prof-

its.
GKI\'ER.'I.L STRUCTURE A.i''ffi NI'.1'U'RE Of SPEC!Ji'IC GROUPS

'fhe Subeomtnlttee's inve:atigadon coneentrated primarily on et.h


nic Chinese, Vietnamese, and Japanes(' crhne groups because they
reprr.se,nt the ~Jrimarr Asian groups involved i!~ eriminf!-1 activity in
the Untted States toaay. Each of these groups ts orgamzed and op
erates differently.
ETb"NIC Cll'J!.IESE 0RGAl'o1ZED CR!Mfi:

BlSI'OPJCAL OVERVIEW

Ethnic Chinese organized crime grou?s in the United States are


of three kinds: Triads, criminallv-infmenced tongs, and street
gangs. Triads are secretive criminal fraternities that are primarily
headquartered in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Criminally-influenced
tongs are business associations located in many U.S. cities which
engage in lawful as weil as unlawful activities. Street gangs often
operate under the influence o:r sponsorship of tongs, but may also
operate independently. Both tongs and street gangs are often influ
enced by what ca.n be referred to as "triad subculture.''
Tl~<illS

Modern triads trace their history to secret polit.ical societies


formed in China during the 17th Century to overthrow the Chmg
Dvnasty and to restore the M.ing Dynasty w po,ver. The term
"trlad,n'later coined by British authorities in Hong Kong, is based
on the triangular symbol found on flags and banners of the early

SJ001347

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00 I 7 I

Appendix 7

secret. societies. The symbol represents t.he three essential elements


of heaven, earth, 8..\'1d man.
Because the early triads were attempting to topple the ruli11g elements of the day, and had, in fact, been persecuted in the past,
they developed secret forms of identification and communication.
Triads today remain obsessively secretive and closed niminal fraternities. Th,~ tri::lds also developed highly ritualized initial:ion cenz>mon.ies rn<>llllt to instill a strong sense of secrecy, tmd more importantly, it':ynlty to other triad members. Thirty-six oaths, most dNl.l
ing with loyalty to the lriad, traditionally arc part of the~;o initi ..
ai:.ions. Each oath f)!ilh with a prnrnis<~ of deaUt if i.he oath is hroken.
The existent:n of t.r-iadH is rnost ext.ensiveiy documented in Hong
Kong, where t.he number of triad rnembers is e.stimated to be in the
tens of thousands, and to <l lt;(>ser extent in Taiwan. Wltllo theru
is clear evidenee that triad members have engaged in crimi11al activities in tlw Unit.<Jd States, the ext.Hnt of triad structure and operations in the Onited StaLes is disputed among law enforcement.
Perhaps the best evidence of trinrl structure bel.ng transplat1ted to
t~e United ssates has b;1ery the recent Hs~endency_ of the I~ong
Kong-based Wo Hop 'f(l 'l'nad ;is the dommant As;;m organJzecl
crime group in San .Francisco, discussed in greater detail later in
this renort,
Triad societies a.ll display some degree of hierarchy, and a typical
triad has members Ol'ganized by rank. Each rank carries a title and
a numerical value, based on triad ritual. The leader of a triad is
known as the "Dragon Head," and carries t.he rank "489." Other
''office b<,arer~ positions also f:'x.ist, including ''4:38," which is the
~eeond highost rank in a triad, and may be hdd by several different of!lcials. If a Deputy Leader is appointed, he will hold the

: 438~~ rard-.:~ as .\vell !-ls

O:fl

ulnee:-1s.~ .~~~ster'~ or ~':r~l~ff,u.a.rd;/'

v,:h. ~r~

ln charge of tnad ntmus and tnttJailons. The '-4io or Rea rote


is a fighter official responsible for enfon:enwnt. The u432" or "Straw
Sandal" handles liaison and communication for the triad. The "415"
or ''Wni~e Paper l''an 1n is in charge of planning and administration,
All other triad mem::Hrrs are known as ordina,ry members or sol
diets, and hold the ra.nk of "49." The relationships among individ
ual triad members are based on ties between "Dai-Lo's" {big broth
ers) and ''Sai-Lo's" (little brothers), where the Sail.o's give loyalty,
support and sometimes money to their Dai-Lo, in exchange for pro
tection and advice.
Although hierarchical in nature, triads tend not to be strictly
controlled from the top, in contrast to more familiar crime groups
such as La Cosa Nostra, Instead, triad members frequently branch
out into their own criminal ent11rprises. \v'hile the triad leadership
does not alwavs in.itiate and direct the activities of all the triad
members, triads clearly serve as international necworking associations that facilitate such activity. Moreover, monetary profits from
criminal activity of triad members often flow to the top in indirect
ways, su~h as thraugh gi~ts. Thisyr_ac~ice prompt.ea,,one knowledgeable affic<al to describe tnads as cnmmal Amways.
As one member of the Hong Kongbased 14.K triad testified: 2
3

Ta:~timtwy

of .cou!idenual wit.nese ''Mr. YJ.R." bef<ire PSI, June 18, 1902.

SJ001348

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00172

Appendix 7

5
"f was not n~quired to pay any pmcentnge r;f profit;; to tlw
14 K hwdership. Triads do not worh that way. Triad mem
bers do f:\lvor~ for eaeh other, provide intro.dudions and assistance to each ()thfrr, engage in criminal schemes with
nne s.noLhnr, but triads gm.1t':n11lv do not luwH th<i kind of'
stri.:t.ly discipl-ined organizaiional strud.ure Lhat. ot,hcr
crimirwl !;,'Toups likt~ the It.alian mafia haw. For example,
a triad nHJrt,ber would not nec(~Ssad1y bE requ.ired to got
permission froro t.Jv, dragonhead of h{s partiru.lur tri;ul i.n
ord<~r to engage in a pfirtieular criminal undert.akingrwtm if the partiwlar d(~al involved an outsider or even u
member of another triad, On the other h<<nd, on t.he occ11
sion of t_ra~ition<~l Chinese.. ~lolidays such .a,s Chiues~ J>f,E'w
Year, t;Jact, me:no5'rs traq_lt.!onally ffVe _g-J!t:s t<:. r,helr mg
brother or u.nc:e.s who often are ornce J)earers lll t,h;-: tnads."

Further testimony regarding relationships among Chinese crirnt>


groups carne from Johnny Ken, ,, convicted heroin smuggler and
triad member. He noted the importance of the Chinese concept of
"Guan Shin in facilitating criminal relationships:
"Members of the Big Cirde get power from 'Guan Shi,'
which is a relationship among people, Through such relationships, Bi~ Circ.le members ean eall on triad members
or other Big {.,ircl!J rnembers for help,"
'l'riad membership is thus a valuable asset to the new inter
national criminaL Triad membership facilitates eriminal activities
in a manner similar l..o the way membetship in business associa
tiom faciiitn.tes the adivities of a legit-imate hnsine:>3ma.n. 'l'hu.s,
even. th.ough tr!ach, ~-s organizations,_ rmiy not control a wide. r~nge
of cnmma1 act1v1ty, rt. IS unport.ant. for law enforcement nfficwls to
understand, investigate, and dw<elop intdlig-ence about triad orga,
nizat.ions, because individual triad members are invariably in
volved in a wide range of cdminal acr..iv"ity.
Although the criminal activities of triad members can be thought
of as constituting both domestic and international activities, even
domestic activities such as illegal 9arnbling, extortion, and prostitution oflen have an international e<em~;~nt. For example, prostitutes
a:re imported or smuggled, sometimes against their will, over na,
tional borders, while proceeds from illegai domestic activities such
as gambling are often la.w1dered internationally. International ac
t.ivities indude narcotics trafficking, money laundering, counterfeit
ing currency and crdit cards, and alien smuggti.ng.
"Triad subculture" often permeates Chinese criminal groups in
the United States. In other words, some C.hinese criminal groups
in the United States, although not triads themselves, are influ,
enced by triad culture and traditions, characteri.zed primarily by
dtuahsm, obsessive secrecy and loyalty
The triads of Mainland China migrated lo Hong Kong and Tai,
wan when the Communists took over Mainland China in 1947.
Even though it is now a criminal offense to even be a member of

.a

Kc-lin Chin, ChUH?:ie Se.bcultu11 flr..A.1 Crirr.,jr:A!.i:y: Nan.-Tro.d.ilivr..al Cn.'me Groups in A.'7U?I"i.t-...a

(Grei:!UWUO<J

.Pres!',

.l990)

SJ001349

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00173

Appendix 1

a triad in Hong Kong, Hong Kong is the undisputed capital of modem day triads.
Over time, triad members infiltratGd much of Hong Kong society.
lncluding government agencies. At the Subcommittee's Jww 18,
1992 hearing, il convicted hetoin smuggler testif1,1d that he joined
the R(\yal B(mg Kong Poliee (RHKP} 4- y<m:rs nfwr being initiated
into .the 141~ T~iad, ~.:round 1~_62.'1 ~e testified th~t a significan~
number of hHE:P officers at Wat: tww were tnaC! mmnbers mHi
that the police were paid to protect gambling dens, opium dens,
and houses of prostitution.
In W74, the Hnng Kong government ost.ubllsh.::d t,he Independent
Cornr.nission :\g<"dnst. COrruption OC:t\C) to att.ack corruptit)n ln tht::!

fH.llice dermrtmcnL Although no one daims that the ICAC has corn
plet-ely ewdicated 1:rrrruption from .Hong Kong hlw enfbrcement, ii
is eredit<;d wHh making wbstanLi.al pn)gtess. The iCAC stili fun<:tions today, im'i;stignting cor.mption in law enforcein<-nt and other
areas of gz.venrment.
The RHKP estimate that. thtne are cmor(mtly about 50 triad sociebes in Hong Kong, with 11b<mt H.'> of those being very actl\:e, While
it is very .difficult LQ deterrnirH; the exact number of triad members
in Hcmg Kong, most authorities agr1!e that there are at least
80,000. Some triads are thought to have as liJ;tl'e as 100 mt)mbers
y;hile lfong .Kong's largesi; triad, the Sun Yee On, is believed to
have at least 25.000 rnembers,
i\:fter thc Sttn Yee On, the next largest triads are the W<> Group,
including th<~ Vlo Hop To and at 'least nine other subf.;'T(.l\lps, which
have over 20,000 Hong Kong members. The JAJ\ Triad, including
ov.;'r 30 subgroups, is also believed to have over 20,0()0 Hong Kong
members. The fourth largest group is the Luen Groun w.ith ap
proximately 8,000 Hong Kong members. The 'l'ung: Group is
thought to havt) approx.imat~?.ly 3,000 Hong Kong members. All of
thesE groups a1sc have substantial ovt::rsea.s nHnnbership. Other tr-i
ads exist with smaller membership.
(Sun Yee On Triad nnd Wo Hop To Triad chans follow:!

ju-':

SJ001350

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00 174

SUN VEE ON TRIAD


Heung Chin
Founder
(Deceased)

I
Heung Wah Ylm
Dragon Head

:--...._ Kong K"'"' \'lln9


(Convicted of triad crimes !c"'';;;,~-~~~~ ~~:~'::',1 ,.,
ln 1987 in Hong Kong} (1}
., HV11n ,.,,,,~ K<mol {t)

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Psrmamml Subc.ommitloo
hwostlgailooo

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on rJppe::.I.J

--

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00175


SJ001351

~------------

----------

WO HOP

TRI.AD

ChanTing Hung
aka ChanTai
aka "Crazy Tai"
aka Sor Chai Tai
aka Tom Hung Chan .,
"--..,
Dragon 11Jead

I
Pol,;~ Chon$!
aka Chong 81119

Ke<ong

No Tal Wah
Aus!lalia

Kung Chu11g Hoi


aka"MaoTw"

N<r Loi On

~
Lw'Ni~>g

I lop

r
Chr;ung <:;td Tai

!-lui

L~i

Ch-ln K"t>v<:ok Mmg

I
Chan i<wok Keung

L~,.

V/.<:li Fu

aha Cao Fu
aka "Undo"
San FrandsoJ

,,

)t
1'1)

:sg.
)('

......
Prepared by: United Stales Senat.e
Permanent Subcommittee
on lnvesligations.

P1aintiffEx. 1102_00176
SJ001352

Appendix 7

9
SUN YEE ON TR!A!l

The Sun Yee On or San Yoe On, ~ometimos referred to as the


Yee On Commercial and Indu;;~rial Guild, is the largest. and most
powerful of the Hong Kong-based triads, Gons(~rvative eslimatM of
Sun Yee On membership count over 25,000 members, bul rna.ny estimates are signitkantly higher.
The Sun Yee On .vas founded in the early 1050's in Hong Kong
by the lnte H~'ung f:hin. i\:Iany of the early leaders of t!1e Sun Yee
On ~,;n; thought co nave been members of the Mainland-b<lsed H<Jd
Pang :>Ociety. 5 During t.hr; 1950's the Sun Yee On was lJHJ main
Hong Knng sodef.y of former residents of China's Ghiu Chau regioJL For most of its histcry, Sun Yee On has been active through

out Bong Kong! the f{<:.~\v (fi:rritories, and Kowloon,


The Sun Y0E' On ha> a present(' in the United Stat,-,s, Canada,
Australia, Tha.iland, Vietnam, and Mac110 in addition to Hong

Krmg. The group has been linkt>d to a vdd(' variety of crirnim;l a,;
including heroin trafficking and contml of the entertain
rneni. industry in Hong Kong.
The Sun Yee On continues to be controlled bv members of the
Heung family, specifically drrough the many sons of Sun Yee On
founder He\m~ C:hin. At. 58 years o!d, H~l!ng: Wah Ylm ~s the eldest
son of Hueng Chm and lS currently the tnad's Dragon HeadY
Thomas Heu:ng, also known as Heung Wah W1ng, is a Sun Yee
On office bearer and one of the brothers c.f Dragon Head Heung
Wah 'lim. Thomas Heung hDlds himself out as H trl:lnsportation
mer.ehant in Ron" Kong, but is repuled to be the Sun Yee On's l'irl
ancier and one of the t-riad's top leaders. In addition to his role as
tlr.a.nder, Thomas Henng is bcoiieved to act ae- 11 l.la.ison betwf!en
high ranlting police ofi'it~ers, governrnentnl ofndals, and prominent
businessmen.
Thomas Heung exercises influence in the United States through
associates in the Tung On Tona in New York's Chinatown. Thomas
Heung is the ~Dai-Lo'' or Big Brother of Cl.ifford Vv'ong, President
of the Tung On Tong, as we.ll as Wong's younger brother Steven
\'long, w1lo is known as "Tiger Boy," and who is a former leuder
of the Tung On Boys, a New Yorkbased streat gang affiliared wit.~
the Tung On Tong. Steven Wong is currently incarcerated lor heroin trafficlr..ing. Confidential witness "Mr. Ma" testified that,
"Clifford Wong represents the Sun Yee On's interests in New
t"iiti~s,

York."
Sun Yee On associates have been involved in the A.sian enter
ta.inment industry in the United States. Vincent Jew, the former
leader of the Wah Ching Gang in San Francisco is an associate of
the Sun Yee On Triad. Vincent Jew fled San Francisco to the Far
East in response to law enf<)rcement pressure in 19Si, and is now
active in the Sun Yee On T"riad in Hong Kong. Vincent Jew, alon"
with Tony Young, who has been identified as the leader of the \Vah
Ching Gang in the Los Angeles area for several years, have used
G\ii.P, Mm:"gl.Hl, Tr-iad. S~i.e-ties in Hon.g Km:.g, (O'wi!inm;mt ?-rt~o. Hong K~.x~g 1900}. p. ~06.
~ H~\..!flg' Wnh Yim waH cnr."icteci in lfNS7 in H~ug Kong ot"trtlhJJUB. C'f'lmt."S re~nu-Y.i w manng.~
!r::~!H. .or u. t.ri~d a.-x:;f;!L}'. !'.nrticipnti~:m !n tri..a~ nct;.~"'-,ti~ or even tria.d mernbernh.iv u.> a.;nram.Bl
VlOiAUon :.n H~!Og Kor:g. Ten o~her !et!d::n;. of t.h.e ~\;;1 r~ On w(!TH abo conv'let.e"!. bill B.:l conVJ!:
t1Gfl.'i were n."!'<er.:>ed on appeal .tvJ a t"'CBUh, those incti\1daals e<n~tinue w flt"'.Jrrtote the Sun Yee
o~;s

crurio..ti.l ven!::u..""'eS.

SJ001353
Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00 I 77

Appendix 7

10

their ties to the Sun Yee On Triad to control Asian enterta..inment


brought to the West Coast of the United States from Hong Kong.
Wo Hop To T!UAD (Wo GBO!Jl'i

The sewnd largest group in Hong Kong is the Wo Group. This


group mdu.des .at least t<m triHds, the largest of which is the \Vo
Shing Wo. No significant \Vo Shing Wo presencr. in the United
Stat-es has yet been identif\ed, However, the Suhcoullnitte<J h~>ard
considerable evid,mc;J that. the Wo Hoo To Triud, a part of the Wo
Group, has taken control of Asian cdminal ac.Uvh:~- in the Sii!l
Francisco Bay Area. The Wo Hop To has also been tied to crirninal
&,r;tivit;~' .in Los Al.life]es,, H,on:)iulu,_, portland, Las yegas, Atlan~k
Cnv, hoslon, and New xorK, m aadJtwr. to Auslraha and Canaaa.
_'1'iw leader o( -~he Wo I:I~!? 'fo Tri~;d, in Hong Kong is Chnn 'ffd,
also known as Cnuc.v TaL' Cbw 'l'a1 operates l\lah Jong parlors,
n:.staurams, 1n<:ssage parlors, tend Hl\,gal gambling operations in
Hong Kong. 6 The other leaders of the Wo Hop To in Hong Kong
are aetive in promoting heroin trafficking, illegal gambLing,
loansharking, extortion, and alien smugg1ing.
The Subcommittee has identified various Wo LJ.op To leaders
throu&!:ont the world that appear to, in var;ying degrees, answer to
Chan nu. These leaders include Peter Chong in the United States
and No 'l'ai \Vah in Australia. The Wo Hop To's Unit-ed States con,
nections are further ddailed be1ow.
Tru; 14K 'l'lUAD

The 14K Triad comprises over 30 snbp-oups which include an es


timated membership of over 20.000. This triad is loose knit in
~tructure, and many of its subgroups do not have firmly established leadership.
In Hong Kong, 14K members are involved in a wide range of
criminal enterprises including illegal gambling, extortion, prostitution, credit card fraud, and narcotics t-rafficking.
OTHER TlUAD GJlOliPS

The Luen Group comprises over 8,000 memhers in nt least four


subgroups. '1'he subJ,:rroup with t.he most inllu.ence in North .-:\:merica
is the Kung Lok Triad, which has a major base of operations in Toronto. Many Kung Lok members in Toronto have associates in the
United States The Kung I.ok controls entert.ai.ners from Hong Kong
who come to North America to perform, utilizing connections with
individuals in New York, Atlantic City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, to control such tours.
The Big Circle Gang, which is sometimes referred to as a "Mainland-based triad" is a relatively new group. This group initiarly
consisted primarily of former Red Army Guards who left China for
Hong Kong. Big Circle Gang members are particularly v-iolent, specializing in armed robberies of jewelry stores in Hong Kong as we1l
as in heroin trafficking. The Big Cirde Gang is not technically a
1 Charta preparod by l'>Sl, "'Wo Hop 'l'o Triad,"' h~i.:ro<.!u....-..ed at hearing on November 5~ 1001
nnd '"Wo Hop 'To Tnad'' mtnxlu.r.cd st bennng on June 16. ls<.tl: see alr;.o A.ffidavil of L.Q'i Ka
!.t<k, Moy S, !992. f..>:hil:lll 19, Jt.conl of H<l4rin0 of PSI on A!Wn O'g""i>d Clime, .lu."" J8
ancl Al!lr..:.Qt 4, 199"2.
e Amda\>i~ or" Lat }~Luk, Muy S, 199"'2. Exhibit l$, RS2!-r.rd af Huring of PSI on A.::to.n (J?gar.i<:e-.1 Crir.w, Sune 18 and l"i:.ga.u;t. 4, 1992.

SJ001354

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00178

Appendix 7

11

tr.iad, but niost Big Circle Gang mP.mbers are also members of var,
ious trh~d societies, Johnny Kon, a former Big Circle associate and
convicted heroin smuggler, testified that he J:wlpt<d organ.ize a
group of Big Circle Gang members into !l tightly organized and dis,
dpli!ied group known as the Flaming EagJes which expand1~d from
j<::vclr; store robberies ir~, H~on!f K:mg .~~ a worid wide heroin distnbutlon network. AJ] or hon s Btg L:m:k assoc1att's wer<! alsu
members of other triads. 9
With the impending Communist ta.keover of Hong Kong in HlS7,
dw triads have been expanding th!!ir netwGrk worldwide and have
generall_v gained a foothold ~ihenwer large Ch.inese immigrant
communities exist, including Australia, The United Kingdom, The
Netherlands, and Canada as wet! as the United States.
TA1W.l\l'~ ~RASF.D ~1 R!A DS

The main law enlon:enwnt body in Ta.iw!;.n, the Nationc.ol Pulice


A.drninistration (NPA), nwognizes two major Taiwan-based triads.
The best. known and largest of the two is the United Bamboo Gang,
also known as the Chu Lien Pang. The second group is the Four
Seas Gang, also known as Sei Hoi.
The United Bgmbao Gang has Rl'l estimated membership of over
20,000. This group was formed by young Taiwanese who banded together with triad members who had f1ed to Taiwan in the mid1950's. 'l'he United Bamboo novo? operates intemationallv in the
UnHed States, Cnnada, and throughout the Far East. 'T'he United
Bamboo has been active in the Unjted Statt>s for over a decade, and
is b.;;st known for l.l 1985 casB lu whith members of the United
Bamboo were recnrlted by the Taiwanese Defense Intelligence Bureau to murder San Frru1cisco journalist Henry Liu. The group is
particuJarly active in Los An<>eles, Houston, New York, and Vancouver, British Columbia, andhas been linked to murder, kidnapPing, alien, s1~1ugglin~, _i!Jeg~J gambJiJ!g, loa.'1sharking, and a variety
o! other cnmmal activ1Wes w the Lmt.ed States.
'l'he Four Seas Gang has an estimated membership of over 5,000
'I'he Four Seas Gang, while a traditional rival ofthe United Bamboo Gang, has recently wot'ked volith the United Bamboo in t}Je
United States in .some ventures, 'l'he Four Seas Gang has ties in
Los A.ngeles and New York.
ClUML"iAU.Y-JNFLUENCF.D TONGS

The second tvpe of Chinese criminal group in the United States


is the criminafiy-influenced tong. Tongs hold themselves out as,
and in some cases are, lefiiit.imate business associations. Many of
the tongs in the United :::itates are national organizations with
chapters in cities that have large Ch.ines~e communities, These
tongs engag<' in a variety of legitimate activities and take an active
and public role in their communities. On the other hand, tongs also
have secret initiation ceremonies, a:nd they are, in some cases,
fronts for criminal activities.
The economic mainstay of most cri.m.inally-influenced tongs is illegal gambling. Not all members of such tongs are involved wjth
Hlegal activity, but officials and membeB of such rongs have been
i3T~timo::y

of Johrrny Kon WtO~ PS!, Aug-~Jst 4, 19H2.

SJ001355

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00179

Appendix 1

12

known to direct criminal enterprises that include extonion, drug


trafiicldng, robbery, and alien smuggling. Thus, tongs, while not
triads, do .in some respect imitate triad activity.
The typical organizational structure .of a tong is similar to that
of a corporation, headed by a president and vice president, oifi.
cers---ofhm including an auditor, public relations otficers, counsel,
and collector-and the regular members. Tlw regular members
typically pay dw)s and huv{ litth~ invDlvement in th~ operation of
the tong.
Th0 evidence that t.ong Jead,uship is involved in c:rinrinal act.ivit.k,s is substantial. ln September, 1H90, tho New York On Ler:mg
Tong, along with local chapt11rs in Chicago <Jnd Houston, were indicted on :racketeering, gambling, rmd tax dmrges. 10 Ati:er a 5
month trial, th~ jury t:(lnVided tb!, Chicago On Leong and three
other men of tax conspinH'Y but WM deadlocked on the rarketoeting charges. Other On Leong members were convicted of individual
tax d1~rges, a~1d the I:Ioustml On Leong pled ~'llilty to raeketH~ring.
A retnal on the deadlocked counts is scheduted. In Boston, Harry
Mook, a leader of the Chiw~M~ l"reemasrms, recently pbd guilty to
inyo}vement in a ~ub~tantial .money laur_1dering operation tmd for
bnblng Boston pohce. 1 The former pres1dent of the Three Mountain Association, a now defunct New YMk-based tong, i!> currently
jailed on dmg charges.
In order to prot{!ct a.nd further support their crimina[ activities,
tongs have, in many instances, affiliated with Chinese street gangs,
Most major New York City tongs me affiliated with a street gang.
Kenneth Chu, a former member of.both the On Loong Tong and the
Ghpst Shadows street gang testified to the close association betwE;en th<;1 Gh(St Shadows and the On Leong Tong. He asserted
that the Ghost Shadows wouJd not contimw to exist without the
support and assistance of the On Leong. 12
STREET GANGS

The third type of ethnic Chinese organi:?.ed criminal group in the


United States is the street gang. Chinese street gangs generally
consist of males in their late teens fu"ld eariy twenties. While some
gang members join voluntarily, others are coerced into joining. Cru
nese gang:s sometimes conduct. initiation ceremonies tnode!ea' after
triad tractition and ritual.
VVhile the organizational stmcture of the Chinese street gangs in
the United States appears to vary, all have some type of h.ierarchical stmcture. The Ghost Shadows, for example, have three or
ganizational levels. The top level consists of gang leaders referred
to as "dai-.los" or big brothers. These leaders are the ones most. like
!y to have contact with other groups and are the farthest removed
from the actual execution of any given crime. The second level consists of the lieutenants of the gang who ma.n<~ge che ordinary members. Finally, there nre the members, or street soliliers, known as
lJJ !ndictrne-n.t, Un iu.d S:a.t~!Z :;. National On [,smr..g Chin~$ts Muclum. !...;; M.mcir..t'MJn. et al.. No.
90 CR 0760. IJ n.ittx:i State& Dilit1-ict C!lu.rt, Northern Diatrit:~ of Illinois.
"Uni!ed stat<S of .4Jtle<'iw u. Roi:>ert Chitt, CR No. 00-10185-H, JdnL Plea A.,"TTOment WMass July 29. J99l).
!:.1: Tehtimony of Ke:m~t.h Chu, fcrm1er Ghe61. Shndo-w-s Gang and On Leong Tung mcrnbr befa,..~ l'Sl, Ck\<)h<r 3, 199!.

SJ001356
Plaintiff Ex. II 02 _ 00180

.Appendix 7

13
ma-)ai Oittle horse). The soldiers cnrry out the assignments of the
leauers.
Chinese street gangs function on t.wo rehited but distinct levels.
First, the gangs (~ngage in their own indep~m.dent. criminal activi
Ue:> such as extortion and robbm-y. S<icond, the street gangs work
for and with other Chinese or!)'aniZ(<d erimt~ groups such <tS tongs
or triads. For example, a ton<> tnat ru.ns a gambling hou5e may hire
a gang to pro!.ert the pmbi.ing house from oth~Jr gangs or from
local law enfon(:mcnt ln exclll;\.nge, the gang rec{liv(S the prestig<)
of being associated with the tong and has acces'3 to Lhe t<mg's protectio.n and resources, including lawyers. Gang membnrs (>ften belong to both tnng:~ and gang5 . .\.~{
..
V'.tS:NAMif:SB GANGS

The fail of S~ligan to Communist (brces in 1975 marked Uu~ be


~inning of a n1nss-ive int1u.:x of Vietn.a1nese nationals into the Unit:d
States. Although the Vietnamese have settkd across t.h(' eountry,
their major popttlat.ion centers are in 'fexas, N<Jw York, and Cflli
fomia. Califomia alone is <;stimat.ed to be the homo of nearly
700,000 Vietnamese.
Vietnamese gm1~p; are knovm to be highly mobile. Vi0tnum{lSfJ
gang meml:wrs often travel interstate, perpetrating a variety of
criminal acts in a short period of time. Such gangs utilize contacts
in various U.S. cities which were rnade in refugee camps in Southeast Asia,
Vietnamese crime groups ar<. g~mera.lly considered to be less or
ganized but mor<~ viohmt than oHmic Chine~e orge.nized crime
g!,~~PS, Some f,"foups, such a~ t~S New Y?rk-based B!~ .CBorn to
KulJ Gang aN wf!J! strudurua Wltn a defirut if!adershtp hH'?rarchy.
Other gangs arc very unstru.dured and constantly chang.ing i11 nf
filiation. Ethnk Chinese frorn Vietnam (sometimes called "Vietch!ng") often play an lmportanl role il.S members of Vietnamese
gangs or as links between Vietr'll'tnleSE' a.nd Ghinese crime groups.
Detective William Oldham of t.he New York Police Departr:wnt
testified at the Subcommitte;:.'s October 3, .1991 hearing that many
Vietnamese ga.ng members came to the United States as refugees,
often as unaccompanied minors, in the early t-o mid 1980's. Many
of these individuals had spent 2 to 3 years in ofwn crime-ridden
refugee camps in Southeast Aslr1 before arriVing in the United
States and being placed in foster homes. These ycuths often ended
up on the streets becoming idea] candidate.s for gang membership
and gang-related acti<.rities.
Vietnamese crime groups are involved in a >dde range of crimi
nal activities. Sgt. Douglas .Zwemke of th<~ San Jose Police Department t.estifl.ed that th.e Vietnames~ crime groups have left "vir
tually no illegal stone unturned." He identified the ffil\ior .areas of
Vietnamese-related criminal activity to include: Extortion; fraud:
auto theft; terrorism (political and criminal}; high-tt}chnology theft:
gambling; prostitution: narcotics trafficking, and home :mvasion
robberies.
;'\lthough the f:lTK is t~ongbt ~o have ?een w~akened by successfw prosecutiOns m the New t(lrK area, lt remrune one of the most
~.3

Ibid.

SJ001357

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00 I 8 I

Appendix 7

14
powc:rful ethnic Vietnamese gangs. Its membership includes some
ethlll.c Clunese who grew up i11 Vietnam. ~Phe BTK was fou.nded in
1988 by the recently jailed David Thai a:ft.er Thn.i kit fl gllllg known
as the Vietnamese l''lving Dragons to form B'l'K 'rhe gang, also
kno>vn as the Cunal Stn1et Boys, sinee they controlled the Canal
Street area of .New York'~ Chinatown, is believed to consist of from
50 to 100 members, with associates in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut. and Canada.
The BTK has not confined its criminal activity to New York's
Chinotown, but has regularly committed oft1mses aaainst primarily
A~ ian victim~ throughout the Unit~d Stat.es and Canadn. 1<1 David
Tba.i nnd six othe, BTK members were con~ictcd on March SO,
19~12 on charges of robbery, murder, illegal possession and sale of
firearms, and other violent crimes. Johnnv Lai, aka Lam Loc, is
now believed to lead the gang.
'
,!Ai'ANSSE 0HGANIZI!:D CRJME: T.HE BORYOKTJDAN

,Japanese crimr:: groups are referred t.o by the Japanese National


Polite t\g<:,.ncy HS the "B<>ryoknda.n,'' which nwe.r1s "the violent
ones." Boryokudan has replaced the historical label of "'Y'akuza," a
slang term Japanese ga.ng members gave t.hemselves to depict an
underdoa- image, 15
The official. membership of Bmyokudan gY(lUps in Japan is estimated to be 88,300, but them may be as many as len times that
number of other crimina! associates, The Borvokudan wield enor
rnous influence in Japan, and have penetrated many aspectB of
Japam:se life, reauing substun.t.ial illegltiinate prol1ts and investing
in .m<>.ny lq;itimat,, businesses. Borvokudan have become incrt!Hs
ingly active internationally, pm-ticula:rly in global money-lau.ndering operations and narcob.cs trafilcking. The .Japanese National Po
lice est?m::1te Boryokudan earnings worldwide to totai $JO billion
annually, a third of \lthich comes from drug tratiicking activ1t,ies.
Boryokudan members are actively laundering drug profits by purchasing American real estate., including golf courses and other
property. Botyokudan members are also involved in other criminal
activities in the United States, inc.luding murder, extortion, illegal
gambling, prostitution, and illegal immigration.
HISTORY

The roots of the Boryokudan can be traced to the early 17th Century, .vhen there exist-ed a lower class of jndependent samurai w~n
riors.16 These legendary fi~res have been the subject of many Japanese stories, and as banait herQeS, can be likened to Robin Hood.
Boryokudan origins can be traced to two other groups which
evolved during the 18th and 19th Centuries-street peddlers and
gambling gangs. 'f'he street peddlers were organized into gangs
wit.h complex organizational structures emphasizing total loyalty.
The gambling gangs were knovm as "Bakuto." Tattooing, which
:"T.s-lit~m.?.ny_

or Wi!luun OMhmR. N'~w York Po!a:~ Deptutmet~t. t~(ere PSI., 0\.."t-~e:- 3- 1 !991.

~t: YaKo~n w the nu.nilier S-.c.)-..'lln Jnr..o.nil'::3f! .n.od t5 n ;om.r..g har.d ln u poptUarJapl':lne:w c:a.rd
&.u.me . Thu.s., Yakv:.:a ~ilo)jll:':t.es l"Jugh!y to ~.OS.. ~;-.. "The Bor'j'Okudur. hBVI! c:ultha.t.OO thcir "u.r:cier

aoi' 1magc O'ler the yeun a.ud have uar:d it.

ttJ

C:!Ucit a

degre~;J

of

sympa~.hy

trom

t..~c Japan~

pubhr..

HlS~tef':!,'1t

on JtSpnntml! Or-5an!;J.ed Crirnt!, AJt:.c Dubro, ftt_>.Cu-rd nf ~'!Ul:rtnga 1>f ?ennancm


S.ul:w.ommif..t.ee on I!r-..t-1lttgaocru; oi1 B:Mr-gr..lf C'rimir.ai Grou,o.c, S.CptefT'.hm- 17 nnci 24, .19&3.

SJ001358

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00182

.~

Appendix 1

15

until recently was widely popnlar among Boryokud<.ln members,


and finger-cut.t.i.ng (thn practice of' eutling oil a joint of the little fln
~;;er as_ an indication \lf f"tm~orse when an assigned t.nsk was not per
tormoa) bega~ v:ith th: halmto, ;<:hid_; also maintained ~~me degrep
of S()Cm<:y w1thm eat:n group. l.be tmkut.o wer(' the first to cwl
t.henEJEdves 'nfa.ku.za/' ta.king prkk~ in their societ~11 ::ltatus a:;

"worthless" outcasts.
In the 2t)t.h Cc:;ntu.ry ~ e.xpansion of Bory{)kudan

acth.tlt.i~s cor
responded with the grawth of the Japane'ie (1\.0nomy Borynkud;Jn
ent.ered into fl variety of' busiih~:i-SE:S, most notably construction and
tmn~portation. The gang$ al~o enten;d the politin-:;1 arena, typk<llly
r:hoosing to nflgn thr.~rnsf~1_ves with right\ving nationalist politicians
BGryokudan as~odate Yoshio Kodama, an ultra-n<ltionali!lt., d(J
natBd large surns c,f rnoru~y to the Liht~ral Dc~tnoerati~~ Purty during
the Anwrir:an occupation of Japan, and rnanag~d to cultivate close
rc~Iatlcnships 'vitb u variety of in1portRnt. irldiv:idu.als, including
other Boryokudan l~:ader;; ar\d ,Japanese poiliitians.'' Kodama's
widespread inf1uence in .Japanese political eircles laid the ground
work tbr future Boryokudan influence in ,Jupanese fina.nda! circles.
Hec.:mtly, there h8ve been numerous publicly reported incidents re
vealing t.he Boryokudan's involvement in publie corruption which

have also involved ma,jur figures in industry and finance,


Two recent reports illustrat.:~ the influence of the modern
flt)r.yok~~dan in th~ <:ppn: echelons ''\ tl-;e ;.lapanBSfl financi;:tl world.
In tnc~ <:ium;n~r ot l_~;!H, 1t wa~ re":c~aH~fJ t.n~t two of J._apan_ " largesl:
and rnost lniHH~nt1al socunt~es nouscs.. l..Jonu.tra ~ecunbes a.ntt

Nikko St<curities, had previou.sly i<mt O\'er $268 million w Susumu


Ishii, the h\i.0 boss of tiw lrwgiJWUkai ;,;ymlicat". The. same pres,
t~gi?:U.S firms. were ;found lc hav;) oxecuted stos~ ,trad,;;s tl:.r Ishii, in
enullng rne.rnpul.at.Jve trades o1 the stock of l"oKyu Co11L\ a J.arge

.Japanese conglomerau~ . 10
A seeond financ.iai scandal involvd a prominent Japanese ex
press delivery company, Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin, which was linked

to biUions of dol.lars in loans to n variet.y of indtvidua.ls, including

prominent politicians as well as cqmpanies O'N"lled by the fnagawa


kai. Loans valued at $765 million w<~nt to urJden.,.ortd figures or
businesses, including moni<JS lent w Susumu Ishii to speculate in
the stock market. 19 The loans n~ported)y generated ldckbacks, ac
cmding to news reports, that were paid to politicians. :w
Over the past three decades, the Boryokuda.n haw become im
mersed in real estate development, company racketeering, and
large-scale loansharking. Mueh of their busin;;ss activity is facili
tated through extortion, and Boryokudan lenders have often used
st.rong-arm tactics in business transactions of all sizes.
The involvement of the Boryokudan in legitimate business ;vas
detailed in the testimony on lm&'Ust 4, 1992, of a Boryokudan asso"
ciate before the Subcommittee:
~? Da.,.1d . K."tpht.n anrll\]~ DuL"tV, Yahu.:m (Aclc:ht!OnWMlcy Publ:~hing, 1986), p. S:i~-69.
l& !te:;>or.. of ,].:I pAt: E<"onorrJc ~r..atltute, ~fal": Eyt!!; (in Ytak:.u:.;J':;; Role m Japanese Er.or..rm1}', 11

:tt~.1::~~~"'""

"roF japuneH; Pnn:; uade!S Ac'\OuMd of bnis.< to MobLen;," Septambr

SJ001359

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00183

Appem:iix 7

16
~r was formerlv involved in real estate investment and do
velopment. Through my business, I became closely associ
ated with a nmnber of high-level Boryokudan ligu.res, including leaders ofseverHl Boryokudan groups. My relation
ships were important to my success in the real estate business in Japan . . .
"Some would argtle that their createst impact is now in
more legitimate activities. The "Boryokudan have become
increasingly sophisticated, and cnrn~ntly play an active
role in many Japanese business enterprises . . . the
Borvokudan 3-..ndJ~;utes are active investors !n the stock
1t11'1rket a.nd hiwe b.'!1n linked to sever;d major financ.ial
scarlda1s in recent years. Such seandals have also sho\Vn
the Boryokuda."1 to have inf1ue.r-:ce in political drcies,
where certain gang members have cultivated the favor of
a small number of poi1ticians." 21
The success of Japanese cr:imjnal groups on the domestie front
has been facilitated by their being allowed to operat-e in the open.
Boryokudan have functioned largely as public corporations, maintaining offices which display the:ir g:roup logo, and even carrying
business cards identifying their gang.2 2
The Boryokudan, until recently, submitted membership lisb to
the National Police Agency (NPA). While th" ,Japanese police have
recently used the substantial intelligence .base generated by these
li.sts to expand anti-Boryokudan efforts, a si!,,rnificant number of
Japanese. police o!Ucers have traditionally held some degree of respect for th> gangster.sJW Breaking with past acceptance of
Boryokuda.n, on l\1arch 1, 1992, the Japr~nese Government began
<mforcement of H new "Borvokudan Ccuntermeasan~s Lmv." The
,Japanese Government has ai"so promulgated new money laundering
statutes tu go into effect <lt the end of 199!1~14 It remains to be seen
how effective these laws v.ill be in counreracting Boryokudru1 power
and influence rn Japanese society. \Vhat :is clear, however, is that
the Boryokudan have attempted to disguise their activity by mov
ing their offices underground. Some Boryokudan groups have
changed their names in an attempt to masquerade as legitimate
businesses,
BORYOKUDAN OPERATIONS ABROAD

Over the ltJst three decades, Japanese organized crime has expanded overseas. VVhile Japanese crime groups hav<: been active in
Korea since the end of World \Var Il, Boryokudan prostitution operations in Korea t,'Teatly expanded in the 1970's. During that decade, the Boryokudan became deeply involved in the international
sex trade. B-:Jryokudan-controlled prostitution, pornography, and
"sex tour" operati-ons stretched to Taiwan, the Phillipines, Thailand, and Jatar to South America, Europe, and the United St.ates.
21

Tethncny of cvnfidontial ;vim ... 'Bully'" before Pi31, Augu'" 4. 1992.


lli!p.:lrt of Japa1'1 Et:,momic lnztitu!.e,. rtp. ca., p. 4.
"''d Dubro, op. <>l., p. 162-163.
2-i \i.nP:lrw~te LA'P, '~A-ct. ~niH;.& e,'{ceptton, etc:., _ot the Nan.:~Jtu:~. s.nd Tr~qniHter Control :\ci

:ie.!

"'K~olan

rnvem. Aetion; uu., l'lf promotmg trw}pt'U.f;tii..'i! ln o::mnoctioa wi!.h ?"f.!:l>tncted cirugs under the
international CO'Jpettrt:lnn.
to

SJ001360

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 _00184

Appendix 7

17

Boryokudan members have recndted American women from Hawaii and the West Coast. into prostitution in Japan. 25
Boryokudan operations in the Unired States during recent years
have included gun running, drucr traffic:king, gambling, extortion,
immis'Tation fraud, securities \riorations, and money laundering. ln
1985 Masashi Takenalut, the brother of the former boss of the
Yamaguchi-Gumi, was arrested in Honolulu for conspiring to buy
guns and rocket launchers, which were intended for use in a war
tlgainst the Ichiwa-kai, a now defunct rival splinter group in
Japan. Other members of the Yamaguchi-Gum.i were charged with
conspiring tc sell amphetamines
heroin ir< Hawaii, as well as
murder"for-hire. \\'bile U1e prosecution u.ltirnately 1.vas unsuc:cess"
ful, the charges resulted in significant loss of "face" and money for

ano

th~ Yama,guchi~Cnn1L 26

Bor.yokudan gangs currently play a primary role in bringing crys


tal methamphetamine, als.o known as "ice," into Hawaii, where it
is now regarded by law enforcement officials as the No. 1 drug
problem.
Japanese criminal figures routinely visit Las Vegas, and to a
lesser ext.eni, Atbntic City, on gambling jtwkets. A.dditionally,
Bcryok udan members hav<!?. been tied to ll.legal gambling operations
in the United States, 2 7
Boryokudan members have kept a low profile in extortion oper"
ations in the f.Jnited States_ Altheough Boryokudan corporate extor
lioni,;ts, knnwn a;l sekolya, made appearances at corporate board
mN~ting:;; ,lf sur:h eorr<panies, as Bank.Ameriea and Chase Manhat..
tan Bank in t.br~ early 1980's, these "visits" were cf little eonsequence. Neo recent attempts to strong-arm bluc chip Ameriran
firms have been documented. Street-level extortion ofbusinesses bv
Boryokudan has been reported in Hawaii and Southern California
in recent yea.rs, but such activ'ity has been minimal compared to
the high level of Boryeokudan ext~rtion operations in Japan.
Currently, U.S. law enforcement concern about Japanese crime
gyoups is primarily tocused on money laundering. Numerous instances e;dst where U.S. properties were pu.rchase.d by individuals
with alleged Boryokudan ties. Unfo:rtunately, the difficulty of ob
taining intelligence from the Jananese Natieonal Police makes t.hl.s
a particularly difficult area to document. A Boryokudan associate
testified before the Subcommittee that dose to 50 major prgperties
in Hawaii have been purchased with Boryokudan money. Property purchases have primarily been in Hawaii, Nevada, California,
and U.S. territories in t.lw Padfic~ Such purchases grew dramatically during the expansion cf the so-called Japanese "Bubble Economy," whkh ended in 1991. While it is unclear what effect the economic downturn in Japan will have on Boryokudax1 meoney laundering efforts in the United States, U.S. law enforcement authorities
are convinced that substantial sums of money are still being successfully latmdered in the United States.
2~

ciL

...a plan tUid Dtiliro, ap cit.. p 251;

Dee a;no ~a~timony

cl-utr,Jiw .:wd Dubrv..t. :J.P- at.. p. wg_

of

confidcnt~a!

i\'itueaa ..Bully," pr>!.c:.

;.r~ T'e5Umc;r.y of '\lmdemifkrl VotitneJs'" beli~re th1~ Pru;~dIlt'.8 Cornrui.e.siun en Crganil::d


Re::.:Nl Q( H?!~ri~ !U: Organ.i:ud Grunt< o{ .A.sil",.n. Origin... p '259-25-CJ.
UJe&tmlon}' nfcofl.fident:ll.ll wiu~L~ ~'Bully,'' pn:;. ell.

Crime~

SJ001361

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00185

Appendix 7

1"
-':\

The United St;Jtes Attorney in Hawuii )1as taken an aggressiv~


stance against the- Boryokudan membe-rs attempting to enter Ha
waii, prosecuting more than !00 members and associates for immlgrat.ion fraud, usually for lving on visa flpp!ications. Unfortunatelv,
not an uf thi,,se t;a:>t1s havt:! llt:!en suttf!Ssfu!, due to the problerris
U.S. h:tVI enforcernent fn;qnentJy f;.)CCS in obtaining ~~offidalu vr:rineation of Boryokudnn affili~ttions from the .Japt<nt:!se l'i"ational PG
lice. Most information related to Borvokudan membership status is
passed among law enf(m;ement offic;;rs on an individuitl, "unofficial'' basic; and is therefore of limit;;d use in cuurt proceedings.
i\Joreov<=r. ev1:n successful proseeutions hav;; nol usually resulted in
sig-nific-ant sentern~e.s~ ()u:t;:;ide of lhnvn:i.i, thE.re h;~~ve been very fe\v
successful prosecutions of Bc.ryokudan members. Evw in Hawaii,
prose<~n.~crs i_1aw thus fnr i'oun,d it imp~lssHJie t,? ehnlle~g;!_,.fth
pected bnryo.Kttdan n)OriJ" lnunc.ten.ng aer.rv~tH~S b\:~cnuse ot <htt~eul
ties in tra<:.ing souree5 of funds in ,Japan and becau:m of the iim.it.a
tions of LJ.S. nu.).ney laundering statutes .
.':lTJH.rGTV !U:

.1\s noted previously, Boryokudan group organization is hier


an;hical in nature, Different Eoryoku.dan groups display varying
degref,s of top-to-bottom, c~mtr?L One ;1utJy.}rii.y descr~b.ed Japl7.nese
gang structure as combmmg 'strong verncal Dnks WJth a htgn defu'Tee of compartmentalhtation among fomponent suh-~;,;roups, each of
~'hie~ ret.ai?s ::onsiderahle flexihD.it:.: and ant<JnOf0Y,,wovided (t fult!lls 1t.s obhgattOns to the orgaruzabon as a whole. 2J [ndeea, the
largest Bcrryokudan organizations are umbrelh.! !.;"YOups for numerous subgroups. The .Japanese National Polk<' recently estirnntl!d
the largest group, the 'YamaguehiGumi, to inelud0 P44 affiliated
;;ubg:roups. 30 Overall, most. Boryokudan grnup-; are strudured ,vith
a Boss, Cha.irman, or Pr(osident, (Oyabun, Kurnieho or Kukho) at
thfr t~p o_f Lh~ hi~rarchyt foUp'*'e.d. by tul tJnderbos:.~ (<{Vi:-).kagashir~~:-;
who l!i chri<etty li.Dove a .small group known B~ the l.nnt?l' Councll
(\Vakag.ashirahosll}, followed by variou!; bo!lses of s~1bgroups. Each
subgroup, in turn, is filled with variolls members CKobun). apprentices {Sa.nshita) and associates. :n
Total membership of' the Boryokucian, most ret'enUy estimat.,d tJ.)
be 88,300 by the NPA, is dispe.rsed among more than 3,000 gangs,
Overall, membership bus declined s.ince 1963, Nhen the gangs
boasted their highest level of 184,000 members. Nevertheless, today's gangsters are becoming increasingly sophisticated and mor"
a~g!'essive, demonstrating a propensity tor violence far beyond that
ot earlier Boryokudan members,
[Yamaguchi-Gurnl _and Otbt;l' Major ~Tapa.nese Boryokuda11
Grou.ps chart> follow:!

SJ001362

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00186

YAMAGUCHI-GUMI (Yaanaguchi Gang)

Kazuo Nakanishi
Highest Advisor (Saiko Komon)
Osaka

I
3 Komon {Advisors)

\
Sub-gangs

Saizo Kishimoto
Headquarters Chief (So-honbucho)
Kobe

/~
Sub-gangs

Masaru
Underboss (Wakagashira)
Keisuke Masuda
Head ot Brotherhood
(Shateigashira}
Nagoya

/
4 Deputy Heads

\
Sub-gangs

of Brotherhood
(Shateihosa}

)>
"C
"C

Osak\

Board of Yamaguchi -gumi


(Shiko-bu)

Sub-gangs

!
7 Assistant Underbosses
(Walmgashira-hosa)

Tetsuo Nogami
Asst. Headquarters Chief
(Fuku-honbuclw)
Osaka

Sub-gangs

(t)

:s
0..
)('

.....

. Affiliated Gangs: 944


L.. T.otai Mer.nbers: 26,170

102 Young Followers/


Junior leaders
Prepared ~ Urn teo SUd~s Senate Permanent Subcummlnee on tnv~stigatiOO$

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00187


SJ001363

A----

.... ,,,,_,.,,

Ooooo ...

00 00 . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 00000

ooAo......._,, _ _ OOOOooOOOO--

Other Major Japanese Boryokudan Groups

lnagawa.. kai
(lnagawa So~_jet.~)

Yuko lnagawa

Sumiyoshi .. Kai

Toa Yuai Jigyo Kumiai


(East Asia Friendship

(Sutni~LEe..deraUon).

.EnterpJ1ses ~&soc.)_
Morihiro Okita
Boss
Tokyo

Shigeo Nishiguchi
Boss
Tokyo

Boss
Tokyo

I
I
l

\ Est. Membership:

L_ _~.682

Est. Membership:

Est. Mernbership:

886

7,000

~
'tJ

..........._............- -......

('j)

:::s

a.

;;

...,

Total Gangs Under Control: 716


j

_______ ______
,,_.,

..............

______________________ _I

Prepared
by Unlle1l Slates Senate Permanent StJbcommlilee on inves!lgaUons
...... _________, _.............................. .. ........................

. .............

,_

---"""''""'"""""'""'

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00188


SJ001364

.Appendix 7
'~.

21

The Yamaguchi-Gurni is the largest Boryokudnn group in ,Japan,


and with 26,170 members, constitutes moTe than 29 percent of all
Boryokudan rnembers.'1 ~1 Y;:rmaguchi-Gumi acUvity has been identified in the United States on several occasions. As previously indicatc!d, some members were arrested in 1885 on dmg- t.raftkking
charges and for attempting Lo purchase guns ruld rocket launchers
in Hawaii In 1988, a Japwwse company run by a former member
of the. Yama~.;'Uchi-Gurni with continued close relations with the
group, purchased rea! estate valued at $1G4 million in Oahu, Hawaii, induding the Turtl!~ Bay Hilton ResorL'n ln 1991, a
Yamaguchi-Gumi"backcd front company, ASA Devdopm.;nt, proposed a $300 mi!!ion casino project on dw island of Tinisn, u U.S .
.possession .in the Northern t-.lari.anns Islands. 3 '1 The proposal was
tu.rned t'L:nvn, but Boryokuchm efforts Lo enter the (~asino busitH-;ss
or, Ti:nian continue.
The second largest group, known as the lnagawa-kai, contains
appTox.imately 8,682 members, or 10 percent of the Boryckudan.
The Inagawa-kai. i based in Tokyo, along 'hith the third largest
group, the Sumiyoshi Rengo"Kai, a group numbering over 7,000
tnernbers. A fourth group is the Toa Yutti Jigyo Kumiai (TYJK).
With 886 members, TYJK comprises only one percent of all
Boryokudan, but it has been particularly active in the United
States. Ken [i,fizuno, a close associate of TYJK, has purchased as"
sets in the United States va.lued at more than $400 million, including golf courses in Nevada, California, and Hawaii, He was arrested in Jttpan during F<~bru.ary, 19H2l on corporate t.ax evasion
t~harges. Allegedly, he fraudulenL1y sold golf membersh.ips, generat.
ing approximately $$00 mitlion.

'I'YJE is also bd.ievcd t.o he, heavily involved in the importation


of cryHtal methamphetamine into Hawaii.
ETHNIC CHINESE Al\'l) VIETNAMESE 0RGA."llZED CRIME AcTIVITY f.N

THE UNITED STATES

\Vhile Asian organized criminal activity takes place in many


areas of the United States, it is particularly concentrated in two
areas, New York and California.
NEW YoRK CITY

During the past 25 years, New York's Chinatown population has


grown dramatically, It consists largely of first-generation Chinese
and has been viewed as the ccnt.er of ethnic Chinese organized
crime in the United States. New York City :is distinguished in part
by the strong tradition of specifically delineated street gan~ and
tong territories, and by the wide prevalence of extortion of Legitimate Asian operated bus.inesses.
[Leadership Structure of Primary Tongs and Affiliated Gangs in
New York City chart follows:)

32 N~tione!
~Honolulu

4-11

PcJic-e A.genr.-;, l!;.-:._ cil.

A!!'.ve'f"tiser, vR.i~ort Offidal Former Yakur.e. Member/ Aug-J.Bt 23, 1988.

WntLen tedtimony cf Frederic E.

Guah~n. Ruhr.Utt..~

""''PSI,

AuguD~ ~.

1992:.

SJ001365

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00189

Leadership Structure of Primary Tongs


and Affiliated Gangs in New York City

(!}

{!)

r---:-:----,1

H1pSmg
Association

~ 6 Pel! Street

r--.. . . _. . . . . . ___
,

Tung On
Association

27 Oi-As!on Sreer

<:

Fukien American
Association

F~~;:~ ~:'::1!,;::;,!

125 East Brcacjway

(.':,if('>r.,(\',}":t
Z.O:dl Cl'y~'"'

At"'"f..lli

,,~ .....

"'~" M~n Sm ~llu

::O,e~of)M>I

Ghost Shadows

U)
~

Mott Street-Bayarrl S~eet

<:

~
~

h:U)

r F~~i~l!,~:;:?~ ,
S~J>K..

~ll~~~ '!.ck~~

fi.?~!:=:
1

--.. .:.:~-----~-J l. . .~=


!

~~,Ch:.

1?<<N""i.t:W<

'~<>!:.:""r."'J(~

'~~ <_._-;:;;-:"

---,

,....---

White Tigers

Born to Kill

Ou~'?.l'..~

(a.k.a. Canal Street Boys)

st!J

I.,~~,~~[.., I

It

!lU

l')'~i,o-f'..httt

CNom..,,.

!
I

Green Dragons
O;w~s

"e

tD

l(~

,:a>
:::Q.,

~~

Ji

..

en.-uc......

p, .... ~.,,..'1
..1.1:6 .....

I::<P<.l~,v~:-.
,...!~f~<>%ton

1ll1
r1l

"-~t)f'; $1;1,.,~

,/!,.';1-'.::r.-;

)'('
....a

JXJI .<'~o)o.:l>(;.,. f-.JM>

>Mif'!

~>1"';\~:h::' ."~'.ll'

Gb:3~1 St.z~,,k>.,..~}

-----

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00190


SJ001366

Appendix 1

23
New York gangs and tongs are involved in a w.ide range of illegal
activities. These crimes include extortion, theft, alien smuggling,
drug smuggling, mun:kr, gambling, and prostitution.
New York Cil,'t', ns nuted ptevious1y, is th: destination for most
of the Southwst A.sinn hemin ente1ing the United States. In 1989,
in a single Gase, authoriti;~.s in .l\ew York City netted $3 million in
cash and 820 pounds of 90 percent pure Southeast Asian heroin
with an estimated street. vaiue of over $1 billion. It was the largest
heroin seizure in the United Staws at that time. and has to dat..e
resulted in over 40 arrests worldwide. 35 rn fact, New York City
serv-=s as the distribution center for most Southeast Asian heroin
wh.ich enters the United States. There is elear evidence Gu;t in{llvidunl tong oH:'icials a.nd street gang leaders are involved in heroin
traf'fir.k.ing, but organizat.ional involvemE>nr by the tongs and stn,et
gangs in drug trafficking appears limit.;.>d.
The so-caned godfather of Chinatown is Benny Ong. Ong, also
known as 'rUncle Seven," is the ofl:icially df,signHted ".advisor for
life" leader of the Hip Sing Tong located on Pe!l Streel Now in his
eighties, Ong has long bl!en associated with organized crime in
Chinatown. Mr. Ong invoked the J:<1ft.l:l A.men.dment. and refused to
answer questions dming a staff deposition.
The Hip Sing 'Tong is the sponsor of thr Flying Dragons street
gang in Now York. This relationship exists in other cities a.s welL
The Hip Sing's tra.d.itiona.l rival is the On Leong Chinese Merchants' Association. The On Leong Tong is hea.dquartered nabonally in New York City a.nd is currently headed by Chan Wing Wah.
His brother, Chan Wing Y(mng, resigned the post in April of 1989.
The Chan brothers, as well as the Nat.i<mal On Leong Association,
have bem intiicted in a ChicHgo,based R! CO prosecution which
charged 29 officers and associates of the National On Leong Tong.
The case recently resulted in a hung jury on the RlCO counts and
several individual convictions on tax eva5ion ch<uges. The case is
e~pected t.o be retried, A third brother, Chan Wing Lok, is the main
street leader of the affiliJlted Ghost Shadows Ganr:. Robin Chee and
,James Lee, aka "Bradley Joe," are also .street leaders of the Ghost

Shadows.
Another major tong Jn Chinatovm is the Tung On. The '!'w'1g On's
president is Clifford Wong, a.lta "Chi Fai Wong." Wong is widely believed to be a member of the Hong Kongbased Sun Yee On '1'rlad
which, among other activities, dominates the entertainment industry there. Wong was hea1rily involved v:ith Asian entert.J.linment in
Atlantic City unti1 his license was revoked in early 1989. Wong invoked his Fifth .t'\:mendment rights and refused t<J answer questions
when subpoenaed bofore the Subcommittee.36
The BTK, or Born to Kill Gang, is currently the most. n~ared of
the Chinato\o'.>TJ street gangs. Members are mostly of ethnic Viet
namese origin or are ethnic Chinese who grew up in Vietnam and
are considered more violent than the other street gangs. (See discussion, supra p. 13-14.)

'* V..S.

No. 89-CR"lE.$ and 15f.l. I~8J.IU:n~ !)lla!'i('t of New York


\Vcr:g, bdhH: PSJ, Novero.!:.~5. 1:1':}1.

'-'S. Woo K.nk l.ung, tL al.,

~-?etitimnnycfCli!forrJ

SJ001367
Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00191

Appendix 7

24
NOUTHEH~ Cti.tlf<'O&.~:IA

The structure of Asian organ.ized crime on the West coast differs


from thal in New York City in two respects. First, while i11erH are
syme _reiati?ns~ip;; between gangs and tongs, p;nticularly in San
I! rn.nt?I&Co, the h.:~v~) ofponi:ruJ. e>;H::_clsed by tn~igs ~-~er gangs is ~.ub
stantwlly less on the \Jest const. oeeond, a Hong hong-based tnad,
Lhe Wo Hop To, has established itself as thB dominant force in
Asian organiz<d er-irne in the San Fr11neisco Bny Area by eHminating or co-opting oth>~1 gnngs. In both Northern and Southern Ca1ifornia~ (~thnic Ch.ine:-!.;s ('.t'rganiz(~d crinlt~ grou.ps often use young
Hlm1hers of Vietnnrnese str~]et. gangs to J.H'otn.ct garnbling dens~ <~x
tort nH~rdu:rnLs and conduct home invash}n n;bberies.

The Wah Ching Gang, under the l<:aden;hip ofVineent .hw:, was
th:", dornif.l,ill'lt :<\.sian erlmi.nal g~oup in .Norll~em C:>lifornia pnti! ,the
nnn J.9~v s. Under pressure Jron1 law enforcernent, v1ncent. aew
t.:.>\t:ntually left San Francisco and noV/ reportedly resid8~ l.n T"aj~
wan, while spending a significanl amouni oi' time in Hong Kong.
He passed the leadership of the Wah Ching in San Francisco to
Danny Wong. Or.f! of Jew's lietltena.TJts, Tony Young, rdoc\i;ed from
San _Franeisc~l to ~he Los An~eles are_a .'Yl~ere he now !.!ontrols the
Southern Califorma Brandl 01 the Wah clung.
During the m.id-1980's, Chu Kong-Yin, aka Alfred Chu, a n.:puted
H-1~l6" or enforcer of t.he Hong Eong-based We Hop To Triad, began
recrwtil;l~ mer:t_J;H;rs _.('or his orgm;.iz?-Lion, in t~te E_ast B.ay, ~hu was
arrestea oy I!\S m udober of 1988 on !rnrmgratiOn vwlatwns and
eventually sentenced to 5 years for lr-ine on his applic:at.ion for per
m.mmt O.S. residency.:n By the timf: oi"t:hu's armst, he had established n siutbie \Vo Hop Tt', operation in Or1kland, <tnd his recnlits
make up a key segment :)f the eurrent. Wo Hop To structure.
After fjfred Ch!.t's an-est, Peter Chong, aka Clv:>ng B.ingKeung,
a_ Wo Hop To 'ITind rnembt,r frum Bon~ 'Kong, as;;uli1ed leadership
of thi:.> group. 3" Chong has sueN>ssf\ll!y integrated a number of
crirninal factions ur,der tht' Wo Hop To umbrella., includina Oak
\and gangs, disgnmtled Wah Ch.\ng rnembe.rs, and several Viet
namese street gangs. Chong's activities prompted a number of retaliato.ry moves by thP Wah Ching. At: bast five murders of Wah
Ching and \Vo Hop To members have occurred, including the assassination of Danny Wong, the Wah Ching leader, on April 19, 1991.
Although retaliatory moves continue, the Wo Hop To is now in con ..
trol of virtually aU Asian organized crime in the Bay Area .
a.s previously stated, V.fo Hop To members are invoived in a wide
range of illegal activities in the San Francisco Bay Area, including
heroin trafficking, money laundering. extortkn, home invasion robberies, kidnapping, and assault. Peter Chong, the leader of the Wo
Hop To in San Francisco, has also beer: active in Asian ent-ertainment brought to San Frs..>1eisco, and a number of other seeming. ly
let;-:it.imate business \'entures.
Gambling is a major source of ca.sh for the Wo Hop To's operatwns. Underground gambling parlors, numbering at least 50 in
n !~por. of 'he {m..-rUg:att:ol! r:.nd :Xat.ura.JiZJH:Wn 5~T'<1::'C cr1 fl"fhe INS Enfor~em<?r.t Appruadl
Chim.~ 0-rganlz:.;ci Crime," ,J;!.na 19~)0. pagu 10.
:.u M~rnor.tn.cl~.t<~ in Su::.p<n\ of D~. ~.nni:1g P~fendiln!. WtthmH Bsi1 P~u.ant L.c 18 C.S C. Sec
tian 3~42 :;.n <:i.l~ of US ;t. Ch1er..!. Ch;.JJraJj. t-:onhr!m DisJ.nc.;, ofGe.~Ubn::.i..B.. Case Nc. 3--91......09&S L, (ktaber 7. ! 9S!, pag~ 4.

r.o

SJ001368
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00192

Appendix 1

25
San Fnwcisw's Chinatown alone, pay $200--$750 per table, per
\Veek for protecth'm. :w Wo Hop To assoc.iates are also active in
ma.ny of the legal ~arJ clubs in Erneryvil1e; San Bruno, and San
Jo,3e. Sueh activity ineludes dispatching Joan sharks to the various
locations to eonttlct denlers and pit bosses about pottntially vulnerable customers. Some of iJws<. c:ard dub~' employef:'s an~ al~o \Vo
Hop To assoeiat.es or members.
!Wo Hop To Triad chart follow$:]

SJ001369

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00 I93

Wo

Ho~p

To Triad

Dragon Bead
Chan Ting-Hung
11ka Scr Chal Tai
ak~ Tai Chan

HONG KONG
LEADERSHIP

Hui lui
(Uncle d
William Mui)

aka "Crazy Tai"

USA WEST COAST


LEADERSHIP
Peter Chong
,
[ aka Chong 8ing-Keung '

'aim "Uilde"

Fonner Leader

Allred Chu
aka Chu Kong Yin

ly"Rav1-1ond Chow

.;~.ka

8ohhy Tsang

,lohruw Yea

~~~a Oiow K~.>if.lk: C!'!l;::g

aM

'"Stufmp 8oyw

~:.uJ

':._

G.::Tw

we~ Mtn Jt;r~g

I
1

I
S;:;:m "frt~n
;~Ka ~cog sov
(r...{t;fllert'd 7/,219l

... a

"t~~--:q

t,.,.1Jnq-

j
"""""".low

-..,..~- r~

Tim Huang

aka Beuny 11ua.nq


aka Soc L.at

Bo Xu
(!rnp,t!~)(!t~ri)

K2oo Tcrtg

,}l)hftfl'(

San

Tom

Tsang

ts~ng

T:;an~.;1

Ml~Nlel V'it~

~
..........
Former Wah Ching
Gang Associates

a!-:a Wu Bit Chell


5/i 4JSO)

tMuraart~d

[M,Jrae'i'eo
budy

!own~ :.1;2~;o:J1}

Ou11c

,_t

aka Huang Xiao luo

Ht.Ji,q O!JGC 0U(!llQ


a:.:it -~~lJl'lq Pi;o

!'\'.:tl~~

Cil(;

all.a -An N.:u::lf!npri'Son-aai

Raymond Jew

a~;a

AnthonvMa
Ma W109 Kwon

Tony Peon
aka PiJnn L3m

W<tm:nMr..:l
{N.n;-:;,~e~:::.:

!i ~~~

~. ~:i:;

:l',.<; !'.!J_,,Fal

>

""
'tS

::;
Q.

.....

J.>Jfwo 01~0.
aka 'Fa~ Drilgon"

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00194


SJ001370

Appendix 1

27

Three individuals noted en the Wo Hop "1'o organizational chart

app~ared before the Su.beormnittee on Nnvember 5, 1991. Peter

Chong, the U.S. lead,,r of the gr\,up, r<!fu;wd to tesUfy, asserting his
Fifth lunendment privilege. Bobby Tsang, one of P(;>tcn Chong's
lieuttlrlllnts, ulsll inv<>ked his Fifth Amendment privilege. Tony
Poon, identified as "an affiliate- o( Pi3ter Chong [;1nd.l1i known bookmaker," o testi1ed about the Wo Hop To and its rival, the \Vah
(~~in~ Gang. .. .
~
-r~
.
.
~
lfl Jum' of 1992, tlH! !Bl arrested SOVHnll key\\<() Hop ro ngure>,
including Lhe triad's n:pnted No. 2 m:Jn, Raymond Chow, also
f

kno.;.;n
hin:.~

as

l(Shrlrnp

Boy.~:~.! Chov..~ \ViiS

chnrg("d v.:iLh

<1

..

r.nurderwt'Qr.

plot in nos~on which ta~gett~d a riva.l gong nv;on1berJ and in n


lv~roin conspiracy scheme- involving a ntnnbt:r of key Wo Uop To
mcrnbers. Other ,June, 19D2 Hn-est~ involved two Portland indi:id
uals tied to Wo Hop To pm smuggling aet.ivil:_y.
The fu.li impact of the r~e,~nf. law enl'<ncemenl efforts against the
Wo Hop To remains to bt: seen. Tbt~ tr-iad is W(:ll entrenched, and
key leaders remain. Thn recent efforts cf the FBI are, however, ex-

tremely encouraging and are to be highly commended.'


Bay Area Asian gang actidty is not confined to San Francisco or
Oakland. In the South Bay, San .Jose has recently s<?en a massive
influx of Vietnamese immigrants. 'l'he Vietnamese population has
increased 500 perc<:nt in the inst decade, and now tot.als over
100,000, the largest in California. Tbere are several Vietnamese

gangs in San ,Jose, most nN..."tbly the Httng Pho, which has been
brought w;der the Wo Hop To umbrella. You.ng Vietnamese gangst'ilrs are involved in home invasion robberies, ear t.hdt, and extor
tion of merchants and gambling operations. 42
SOUTHERN CAL.tf.X)H.N1A

Southern California has three distinct Asian puptliatinn cenwn


The oldest {>f thes1~ is the downtown Los Angeie;; Chinatown The
second is the San Gabriel Valky, part of Los Angels,~ Cou.nt.y, in,
eluding communities such as Monterey Park, Alhambra, Rosemead,
and San Gabriel. Many of these cities have seen a dramat.ic influx

of Asians over the past decade, and Asian organized crime has acthis Asian i)1lmlg,r~tion. The San GaJniel Valley is home
to 1mm1grants from Chma, 'Imwan, and Hong Kong.
The third and newest Asian population center, sometimes cailed
"Little Saigon," is comprised of. t~ree cities in Orange County....Westmin.ster, Garden GN\'e, anct Santa Ana-home to more than
col!lp!H~ied

75,000 Vietnamese and more than 40,000 Chinese residents. 43


Large numbers of yotu;g \li('tnamese have had difficulty assimiiat
ing into American life. Thi~ has contributed to a rise in gang mem ..
bership and gang-p,,rpet.raLed violener,.
Orange County law enforcement authorities estimate t-hat there

are as many as 80 Indo-Chinese gangs in the region. These gangs


are often extremely vioi.ent and engage in home invasion robberies.
+fJ

De(.iO'i.;itwn

~;fcontider.'b;a!

witaess

"'~\1r.

T.:un,"' N;.;vemb;...:rr 6. 1991

H A..ffidar,t of FBI 8p.c;..da\ Agm":.i. A.I!thr.:ny Leu, JU!I~ 9. 199~.


.
" a:'i~~s:;.im~:ny of ~Lf:<.tivt: Doug!.:u; Z.wP.r;-..ke. San JC6e Po!!m Depar..me.at bcfure PSI, Ocwber

~- 199~.
"3

Tht:so!:

nun\~ni e.r<.! ~r<.>m

the

I~ {;ertEWi. whi~h local authori!ies e.rgu.;- :.wdercnUfltfi th~se


130,000 VietJlatn.e-n~ ln !..he a::-ea. 'Thf::. fa..:t ~h.tlt th~ Vi

popujac:::ous. Other t-ztl.::n.aws- ~J.!lge ~p

em:uotWe pJpWntJC:n more th.n:1 t!i.ph~ci i.::1 ili:e l98G'e is nul d!!3.putcd.

SJ001371

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_00195

Appendix 7

28
ext.ortkn, and auto theft Many of these ethnic Vietnamese giuJ.g
sters asp1re to follow their et.hnic Chinese cotmterparts into more
lncrat.ive crime such as narcotics ~rafricking Hod illegal gambling.
. In contrast in Northam California, ther is cur-rently no single
dGminant Asian rrirnimd group in Southern Califomia. The United
Bt~mb~o f3-ang, a 'l.'aiw~n-based tri<:cl, hu~ op~n~tions ~n the San Ga
bnel 'n1lrey. A law entorccnwnt rmd on fl safe nouse m the Los An
geles area uncovered an orgmrizational chart showing part of the
United Bamboo's Los A.ngele~ organization. The chart details the
involvement d' Benson Wang, aka \\'ang Chih Pin, in garnbling and
~'xtortion activilies on bt,half of the United Bamboo.'' 1 Benson
Wang was deported to Taiwan in Oi:toher, 1991, in t~onnection v:ith
~he murder of a Taiwar;_ese family, ir~ the, P!;illtpines. O~her .l]nited
Bamboo operatwns 1n ~outhern Ctd1forn:w H'H.~mr.le sem1-legmmate
busin.-,ss ventures, thlough wh.ich money i3 launderNI.
The 'Nah Ching Gang is iJwQ]ved in cl'im.i.nal activity in the
downtown Los Angeles Chinatown and, to a ksser extent, in Mon
tE:rey Park and surrounding San Gabriel Valley cities. The V/ah
Ching is also active in semHegitimate businesses such as enter
tainment promotion and bulk leasing nf video cassettes. Both the
United Bamboo and the Wah Ching utilize et.hnie ChineseViet
namese gangs for intimidation and street-level activity, such a~
horne invasions and protection of gambling establishments. The
\Vah Ching Gang in Southern Califomia is led by Tony Yottng, aka
"Sweet Plum," the former lieutenant of Viah Ching: leader Vincent
Jew:'> Y(mng has a.lso been identified as an associate of tlw Sun
Yoe

On 1'riad:; 6 Be has used his Sun Yee On ties to bring Asian

r,nt)rtainment to Los Angeies.


r\sian gang activity "in Southern California appears to be ln a
stnte of tu:rnwil, influenced by the gang WfJ.rfare in Northern Cali
fornia as well as by the emergence of more independent Vietnam
ese and VietChing groups in Southern California. The Wah Ching
have been orchestrating Viet-Ching groups in streeL-level activities,
but have recent.ly experienced control problem~ as these young
group'; mature and begin to act independently. The United Bamboo
have previously utilized the Black Dragons (an offshoot of the
Ghost Shadows), t.he V-Boys and the Hung Pho Gang for street
level criminal activities. The affiliation of the Hu.ng Pho wit.h the
Wo Hop TQ in Northern Califomia, however, has created some
question as to whether these relationships will endure.
CRIMINAL AC'TIVITJES

As previously stated, Asian organized crime groups are involved


in a wide variety of criminal activity, both in the United States and
abroad .

. ~ F.x.hib~t 44, ~~o;d .?f ~z~~g;' ~~-r~Si nn Asian OrgMizi!d Ci;.me, OcLo~ 3. Ncrven::ber 66c ,991, S. Hr-g. :C.t;.....JJ.ti. gagl!t;; :.172........,.,,),
A.hChart prepared by P'SL ~uh Ch!ng Gt~ng.~<" lnU't~.hu:ed ~!it heilring- on No,;e;rber 6. 199!
..wchart p-t!pared by PSI, ... Sun Yee On1':1ad/' introduced' at hi~nng <.:n June 18, 1992.

SJ001372

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00196

Appendix 7

29
HP.O!N

Ethnic Chinese Triad members are heavily involved in heroin


trafficking. The French ConrHJction, the old heroin smuggling route
from Turkey r.o New '{ork by way of Msrseilks, has brHm replfu:;'td
by tht: Chinese connection. Heroin from Southeast Asia begins in
thil poppy Gelds of the Golden Tdangle area of Myanmar (formerly
Bu~ll!<l\ . L!;o?, and Thailrmcl .nnd contin:ws thr~u/Zh .ffong Koi1~
M'nnlanrt Chwa, TaJwl!n or otner wmes, to the Ln:.tr"1 Star.es Wltn
the ultimate destination usually Nev/ YMk Ci,y.
. At_,the Subcomt;;ittee's Augtls~ 4, 19~J2 hMrirq~, Dayi~l C<>he!!; of
t)e (.enual I;'tk.lllF,;ence Agenc:_)! s c;ountemarco.tlcs Uruf.., test.J.nc,cl
lhaL woddwwe opnnn producuon nas more tnan doumerl >;met;
1986 and that t\v'o-thirds of that tntal originates in Southeast Asia.
Cohen reported that op.ium produr.t.ion in t.he gohl<m triangle is eur
n';ntiy at record levels. Growing areas appear to be spreading as
China has once again become an opium producer. Vietnam has also
becon1e a source for op-ium production.
Th<, increase in opium production in Southeast Asia coincides
w)th trends in the United States. The Drug Enforcement Administration's heroin signature program has found a substantial increase
in th,-, vroportion of Southeast A'>ia.n heroin entering the United
States 41 The DEA reported in 1991 that 56 percent of aU heroin
availabk in the Un.ited Stittes was of Southeast Asian orig:in.
In N;:,v. York, the street-level purity of iJ(lroin in 1991 averaged
41 percent, signitkantly higher than just :3 years ago. While purity
has steadily increased, the price of heroin has dB('IeE!sed. Eighty
eight percent of the heroin randomly sampled in New York was of
Southeast Asian odgin 4 ''
David Cohen of the CIA further tJ.'li.hfh,J that triad members
have e. long stanclJng involvement. in hBroin traffirking regionally
and intematlonal)y. Ethnic Chinese, many of whom an~ triad, rong.
or gang members, doa.ti.nate the Southeast !'\sian heroin business.
However, neither triads, tongs nor gangs appear to be currently involved, as organizations, in heroin trafficking. W11ile members of
these groups frequently utilize their membership to benefit their
heroin trafficking enterprises, the groups themselves are not typically part of the heroin smuggling.
The testimony of a convict-ed heroin dealer and 14,K triad member is illustrative. Confidential witness "Mr. 1'1-fa'' testified that
after initially operating a loan shark .and prostitution business in
Hong Kong, he got involved with heroin traJflcking through a 14K
associate from whom he purchased t.he heroin. H( also testified
that aft.er he began importing heroin into the United Si:.9.tes, he employed his "Httl~ brothers" in the 14K to help him launder the proeeeds back to Hong Kong. However, not all the members of h.is
drug smH"'fi.ling organization were members of his triad. In fact, it
is relativcly easv for triad members to form criminal associations
with members oi' other triads or l'tith outsiders.
47
U.S. Di?.nartmer~.t Jt" Justie::, Dnig Enfor'Cer::Hmt Adr.-Uruatratioo "'World~'!de HCJ"!::1in SitU8&:iDn
19<'.A:," Mav l99t. PA&"'' L
't~ U.S. f;~p-:lr..rne:r:t of J:.lStice. f>r-tg Enfcrcmnl?nt Adnnnim.l'"litio.-,, "Wodd?-ide Hercin Situs
uon 1990," t.?t.. ct:.

SJ001373

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02_ 00 I 97

Appendix 7

30

In contrast, convicted heroin smuggler and triad member, Johnny Kon, aka Kon Yu.Leung, testifie(J that he formed a group of Big
qircl~ Gang members. into a tight knit ~;roup, knownas the l''!am,-.
mg r~agles Gang, whiCh he hoped WO\lld become a .. super tnad ..
The main business of the Flaming Eagles Gang was heroin trnftlckine:. 1N1Jile the F!amln& Eagles Gang fell apMt aft.;r the arrest t)f
.Johnny Kon, the creation of this gang demonstrates the potential
of triad like organizations becoming. mort:~ in~:olved, i;-. heroin .traffick mg. It. should be noted that Kon alsc ut1i1zed tns connecnons
as an office bearer in the \Vo On Lok Tr.iad to further his criminal
enterprises.
CRYSTAL .Mb.'?HAMPHE'l'AM!Nii. ("leg")

In contrast to tho Ch:ines<'l triads, Jnpa.nese organi:~ed cnnw


groups t.end t:o be nwre structured and hierarchal and <V!' more
heavily involved as criminal organizations in crimin;ll enterprises,
rather than as individual crim.ina!s who also arc mernt)f.'l'S of cdrni
nal argrutizatio:ns.
This is important in considering !.aw enforcement strategies for
attacking thi:! smuggling of crystal methamphetamine, or "ice." FBI
Director WJlliam Sessiom testified that, '"I'he Boryokudan control
an estimated 90 percent of the 'ict:' t1ow .into Hawaii." Sessions also
acknowh=dged that ice smug15line is "ha.sically mn by the
Bo.ryokudan in association with It'oreans." 49 Assistant Attorney
General Robert Mueiler told the Subcommittee on November 6,
1991 that, Min Hawaij, the Korean svndicate known as the To<>
Yu.a.l Jigyo Kumi~-an afi~liat<} .of .the. Boryo~ud~.n---eontr:o!s ~nost
of the ICe trade. The ') oa Yual Jmvo h.um1m. or TYJK Js
headquartered. in .Japan, bnt. most of its membership is of <'thnic
Korean descent.
Crystal met.hamph<iltaminfi, also known as "ice," is a 5t.imul>lnt
n:!rrco~i~: v;hic.h has bac~n~~ ~n~1~ef:'singly prevH1ent in l-l,a \.V~i) ~;.n_d
the West Coast of tne Umted bl:.ates over the past decaue. Ice 1s
.smoked by its users, who obtain a ''h.igh" which is longet lasting
than that of cocaine, T'he drug is cheaper uJ produce than cocaine,
and sells for a higher price per tmit, making it. Vf:Pj profitable. The
drug is extremely debilitating, and has been known to put user;;
into a violent, paranoid state. The drug has ~~n particularly dam.
aging to some of Hawalfs lower income communities, where ice has
become t.he drug cf choice.
FBI Director Sessions also noted that, "[according to] the National Police Agency of Japan, the Boryokudan, in 1988, grossed aJ.
most 10 billion U.S. dollars in revenue one-th.ircl from crystal
methamphetamine ('ice')," The rok of the ,Japanese in the ice trade
appears to be largely focused on the financial end organizational
ends. Boryokudan groups fmance the lee and pass responsibility for
production, transportation and distribution along to other ethnic
[;'Toups Korean and l''ilipino crime groups are most visibly involved
in ar.tual.ice distribution in Hawaii.
FBI Director Sessions also testified that "'The production of ice is
primarily done in Korea and in Taiwa.'l." According to law enforcement sources, Taiwan currently appears t-e be the dominant proi

'"'Testim!~ny o( F'BI Director \VlUiam Sessiant:, befom PSI. October 3, 1991.

SJ001374

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 _ 00198

Appendix 7

31

duction site. ke production only nH:ent.ly became illegal in Taiwan,


and while many laboratories have reportedly been driven under
ground, Taiwan remains a major source cou.ntry. The Philippines
have also been identified as a production site for tl1e ice brought
into the 1Jnited States .

. Asian orgm:ized cr_ime po~p,s. have de.monstrated only a}irnited


wvolvernenL .m cocmne tra.fhckmg. However, .Japanese, Chmese,
and Vietnamese gangs have to some extent b<~en linked to cocaine
operations .
.. . A contidenti_al :vit~less, a Bo~yokuqan . associate, u,stifled that
Boryokudan tHlS m South Amenca ex1st for the purpose of obtam
ing cocaine, wh.ich currently forms a small part of the Boryolmdan
drug business." 50 JapaneSe' po Ike have recently expresSE>d concern
over growing evidence that Boryokudan figures are teaming up
with South A1nerican drug lords to carry out large scale cOCflino
distributoion in ,Jaoan. 5 t
Chinese and Vietnamese groups have also involved themselves in
cocaine smuggling. The Subcommittee heard evidence that the Wah
Ching Ganf? in Califhmia ha.s historically been involved in cocaine
traffkkin~.";; Additionally, convi(:ted heroin trafficker Johnny Ken
testiiled that he used "Bolivian connections" and utried to get into
cocaine smuggl.ing." 83 Kon, who is a Wo On L.'lk Triad member and
a lormer .leader of the Blg Circle Gang (Flaming Eagles group) told
the Subcommittee that his smuggling et1hts were unsuccessful dun
to theft and law enforcement inter.:ept!ons.
There is also (:vidence that ethnic Chines<.' aliens being illeguily
smuggled into the United State:> are somdirn<cs offered a reduction
!n the fet;s .ch~~ed th:'P' if they aw .vilLing tn trrmsport cocaine
mto the Umtea N.ates.
GAM.HtJNG or~KH.ATJV"NS

Illtgal gambling has long be~:n a con~ criminal activity of Asian


criminal groups. In the Umt.ed States, illegal gambling operations
are a maior revenue source for Chinese crime groups, The same is
t.ru.e for Chinese _crime; group~ in _other co1J!!tries, including the tri
ads, who control illegal qamblmg m Hong l\ong. 5 "
At the Subcommittees October 3, 1991 hearing, former Ghost
Shadow and On Long Tong member Kenneth Chu explained how
illegal gambling enterprises cement the rel:Hionship between crimi
nalfy-inf1uenced tongs in the United States and street gangs. The
street gangs, Chu explained, provide protection for the tt>ng's illegal
gambling operations and in turn the tong provides the gang members with mo:wy as wel.J as ot~er services, includin lawyers when
necessary. After Chu snot a nval gal1g member, tor example, 1H;.
l.tl Teatinwny of ... i.3:uliy,~" t*.farel::.::-)i, AU.!f.mt 4. 1992.
15 l Rs.mtJ2n, ... DrV:t; Abuse Gro~-ing Probh?m ln J"flpa.n, PoiiCIZ' S:l.y," AugYBt. 2. 1991
of''!lr!r. Tarn:' Nowu'!'1lwr 6, 199L
~ Te~timtmy of Joh:wy Kun !.n!fQre P:.~l, /"'.l;.g-t!st. 4, 19'-)2 .
~ A1lidant of J..,-:1i Ka-Luk. M2:y 3. 199'2. Exhibit lR, R...~~....,~ ~~c HP.-.orn::.g (>f PSI or. Minn Orso
r..i.zt~d Cnrn.e, Junr: 1.9 nlid Augo.,t.:;~ 4. l99'.2 .
u The&:e ill ega} gambling op.:;-rtHio.n;; t)~kally c:-on:3tfl~ o( A'ifu; gamef' svch J:G Pm Go'\\', Mn..h
dong, F~r1 Tan Rnd atht:'r ga~ 5...'11!/C ot thlltf! gam~ a~ nuw hci.r.g offered D.l i1~6.l g-an:tbH.ng
6.:1 Di!~!.Uan

cMBno!; w

.s't=v~<.lli ~nJ

New

.i~rfl~)'

,:md

i1~

1eg.a1 wr-d dn.bs 1n C.ahi'cnun.

SJ001375

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00199

Appendix 1

32

was moved from New York to an On Leong thcility in Boston in


order to avoid the police.
Chu further testifled that lhe On Leong maintained illegal gambli11g operations around the country. Chu himself worked in the On
Leon$'s Honst~n gamb!~ng opemti.on for }5 _years: He asserted. that
the Un Loongs gami)tmg Op(mo.twns ali "report to the NatiOnal
grand pnlsidenL and the ~at_ional iwt\?qu.arters, and some of th~
procee(ts ~lre sene. to the Nat1mH1l heaaquarters from thes<C 1Lega!
ouerations. u
Tr~ August 19~0. the NationpJ, Chic.a~o, Hotl~Lon, and Ne:v York
On Leong Mercnants Assocwt.mn.> and t9 memoers or assocwtes of
the tong were indicted in Chicag11 on charges related t.t> illegal gam
bUng (U.S. v. Ne.tiona! On Leong Chinese Merchant.s Association,
et. al, 90 CH. 0760, N.D. ILL l9HQ). The national and local cht\pt.ers
of the tong, along with 13 individual defendants. faced H.ICO
charges stemming from a pattern of racketeering that included ille
gal gambling and eollecci>Jn of unlawful debts. Some convictions
wer~ obtained on income t~x ~harges, but Lhe ju.ry ;vas deadlocked
on tne RICO counts. A retnal JS planned.
The Subcommitt-ee also heard evidence of the control by ethnic
Chinese gangsters over wldesprnad illngal gambling on the West
Coast.. On November 6, 1991, confidential vritness "Mr. Tam" testi
fled that uThere I.'H'e 50 to 60 Mah ~Tong parlors alone in [Sun Fran
cisco's] Chinatown. An operator must seek permission and 'give
face,' that is, a percentage, to Peter Chong. Peter may make as
much as 90 percent of the protlts, with the operator getting onl.v
about 10 percent." ,\s previously discussed, Peter Chong is t.he
leader cf the Wo Hop To 'I'Tiad in San Francisco.
.Accmding to one law enforcement witness, Lo5 Ange!(oS CounLy
is also the site of widespread illegal gambling. Detective \Viiliam
fio\veU of the Los ;\.ngeles Cou.nty Sheriffs fJfficf: Lest.iilt~d on 1"-ln~
vember 5, 1991 that ~there are eu.rrent.ly believed tn be 150 to .200
Hlegal und.:rground gambling parlors operating in Los Angeles
County. M.l.lny of these und.;rground g<m1bling parlors are under
the control of Asian organiz<ed crime groups.n
Besides serving as a large and dependable source of revenue, illegal gambling i!l important to Asian organized crime groups for several other reasons. First, it allows gangs to launder their money.
Second, gambling activity provides potenti<~l victims of loan
shark.ing, residential robbery and follow-home robbery. Finally,
gambling debtors are sometimes recmit.ed as "mules" to carry heroin from Southeast Asia to the United States or for other criminal

tasks.

Asian gangs also take advantage of legal gambling venues to further their criminal acthrities. Lga.1 casinos operating in Nevada
and Atlantic City, as well as legal card clubs in California, have,
in recent years, made special efforts to attract Asian customers.
Ma1<y of the large casinos are now offering Sic Bo, Pai Gow and
other Asian games. The marketing efforts of tho various casinos
have attracted not only the legitlrnat.e gambler, but somu Asian or
ganized crime figures as well. Numerous Asian o-rganized uime figures, including some from Hong Kong and ;Japan, patronize American casinos. They are usually known as "high rollersn who gamble

SJ001376
P1aintiffEx. 1102 00200

Appendix 1

for hig~ stakes. They are suspected of laundering money through


the casmos.
Etfort.s have been made by Asian organized crime members Lo become involved in legal gambling operBt.ions by m<~ans of purchasing
ownership interests, suh<:ontracting to operate Asian games or
other st:rvices, and by providing ,<\.sian entertainment.
Clifford wong, the Pres.ident of the Tung On Tong in New YoTk
City, and an associat<; of the Hong Kong-bawd Sun Yet' On Triad,
ran bus jun.kets to Atlantic City in the 1980's, until hi;; junket li~;ense wat: revoked by the New Je.rsey Casino Control Cmnnission
in 1989 becrsJJS<1 of his organizc-,d cdme ties, Wong previously prornoLed Asian entertainment in Atlant.ic Citv, a bmin.~ss in which
the Sun Yee On has played e dominant role.-
Individuals associated with the Japanese Borvokudan have actively purs1_1ed ow-rJership interests in legal U.S. ~:asinos_and casinn
vendor busmesses. The tint documented attempt by a Boryokudan
associate to invest in the casino industry took place in 1978. At
chat time, Takasb.i Sasakawa, the son of Boryokudan associate
R_yokhi Sasakaw8, ~;~nno1.wced plans to lef!se the Shelburne Hct.el
in Atlantic City 1md convert it to a casino, His attempt. waB not
successful, due to scrutiny by law enforcanwnt and his fll.ilure lo
g:et _fi"nancial support in the wake of allegations of Boryokudan
tH~S. tJt:

In 1982, Ken Miz.uno, an associate of the Toa Yuai Jigyo Kumiai


Boryokudnn syndicate, opened a restaurant in Las Vegas'
Tropicam< HoLd. He laten opened a spa in the casino a:nd has ooerated th<~ business<;s fbr nearly a decade. Mizuno was arrested in
February 1992 in Japan l(~r alleged Lax evasion and fraud.
1n Hl86, Ginji Yasuda ptm:based t.b<:- Alladin Hotei and Casino
in Las Vegas. Following the purchasf:, $6.6 million was lent t.o
Yasuda by ;\:ichi Corp., a ,Japanese finance company run by
Yasumkhi MorishitH, a Buryoku(.iHn <1ssociat!) who has aHegHdly
used m_embers nf the Sumiyoshi-Kai Boryokudan group to collect
debts. 5 ~ Yasuda was the first foreit..>n citizen to obtain a casino license in Las Vegas. He died in 19.39, shortly after putting the casino .into Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
Other Japanese organized crime associa~es have followed Ginji
Yasuda into Las Vegas, including Minoru IsutanL Isutani has been
associated with the Bor;okudan by numerous sources, including a
Boryc!kudan associate who testified befor~ the Subcommittee on
August 4, 1992. I.sutani's investments, ,'lhich are discussed in
weater detail below, include the purchase of the Barcelona Hotel
m Las Ve.gas. Isutani applied for a casino license for the property
in 1988, hut. ;vit.hdrew his application in 1991, prior to the completion of the Nevada Gaming Control Board's bankground investigation.
Subsequently, lsutani's Cosmo World of Nevada Co., filed for
ba.f.lkrupt~Y. in December _1991. The COJ!!pany had been undertaking
a ;}600 m1fhon resort pr-oJect near Las Vegas.
Finally, Boryokudan interest in casino investments was recently
uncovered in the fledging gaming industry ir. Tinian, in the North

SJ001377

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00201

Appendix 7

ern Marianas Islands. In .1991, ASA DHvelDprnent and Investment


9orp., a Tok~'O compp.:<Y: Wf!S identifi~d by casino regulators as a
rrom fer a YamagucnJ"GumJ Gang effort to purchase a casino on
Tin ian. 5 8
While Nevada nnd New ,Jersev gaming authorities have be.:m
diligent in efforts to prevent Asia~n organized crime members from
gaining a foothold in le15al gambling operations, California hH~ Dver
300 legal card clubs wnich are subject to little regulation, and as
il result, uppear i:() have becom;;, centers of Asian -organized crime
activit".
Card clubs in both Northern and Southern California have been
exploited by Asian crime groups. In the mid-1980's, Alfred Chu,
also known as Chu Kong-Yin, was the manager of the Kev Club,
a cardroom in Em<nyville, which is acljacent to Oakland. Chu has
been identified as the former leader of the San Francisco-based Wo
Hop To Triad. 5 9 Chu is currently serving a 5"year sentonce for false
immigration statements.
In March 1991. arrests were made in connection with a brib0ry
scheme masterminded by Fu.ng Kao, who h:as ties to at least two
Hong Kong triads. Fung's son and daughter-in"Jaw attempted to obtain a gaming permit for the King Mldas cardroom in Emeryville
through bribery. Fung .V..ao had reportedly purchased the dub in
1989,'"'1

In April 1992, Ban Francisco Bay Area authorities conducted


raids "n the King rvlidas cardroom. The rai.ds followed an investip-'"
tion into a Taiwanesil kidnapping :>r1dic.ate, which fc.u.nd ties De
tween Taiwa!"lese gang members and the King Midas Club, including all.~ge<~ part<?;"~ersh}p!ll
.
.
In ~outnem Caufonua, many cardrc-orns emp!Qy Amm g11ng
members who have been tied to money laundering and
loanshar-king, The largest eard ciub in California is the Bicycle
(:!iub, located in Hell Ga.rdens, The. Bicycle Ch1b"s P.s..sian gan1es -rn~
run by Hollman Cheung, who contracts with club ownership.
Hollman Ch"ung is allegedly associated with members of the Wah
Ching Gang and t.he Wo Hop To Tr.iad, and has hired various gang
members as empioy;;es at the Bicvcle C!ub.~>2
Robert Koppe, t'he Assistant tlirector of the Treasury Devan
ment's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCENl or the
Department of Treasury, testified that ~the card chills offer opportllllities for extortion, money laundering, and tax evasion. Law enforcement sources believe that an extensive amount of money laun
dering and profit skimming takes place in card clubs." A significant
amount of the revenue generated by the California card clubs is
from Asian ~ames, m~my of which are played for very high sta..ites.
The card chms typically subcontract the Asian games to a so"ca11ed
"eonsu.ltant." According to tbe testimony of Detective Howell of t.he
ea Wri!-l.lln tcatimon~r i"Jf F'hxteril.:'
"~Ciwrt v~~a.~~.:d 6y .?Sf, -<\.Vo

E. Gt.:.sh!::. l>ubmhu~d ti> PS!. Augu.$:t 4-f 1992.


Hup To T'Mt3d." unn.~ured at- h~..alir.g on Nl)vt;rnb;,rr 5. l%1.
A..~'i.:st.cd w C11rd Cfub B1lbery ;;w~tigation,<' M<:l"'~::i'::

~ !J:m.~~ ?';re~s b~?rrt-t,tl!..)r.!!:, u~oman

15. 1!'<'11
~o~1~h1..;.,d 'I'rih!J..:"a~. "'};.as;, BaS' G.umblin.g. Club ?..a~d: :?n::Ce int<.\ As")an Gangz," A~:ril 2:..~. l9fi~\
p A-1; Se:e a.l&.> A!fiditV'it 1lf S;.~~-!:"n ~. S.AkH~. C!ilW::rr:i:J Depen.rw:n ~~[ JOBtl<:e, lf> ll.~pf::...Clt of
s~~l~~;:~~~ll.~~ J3eart:h WH.ITlW!., April 22, .lW2, &mn::h w~o:rrnnL !'i'u. 1.0310, Cu.y and (;;>wat.'j uf
,~;.'

v,Jil S;n<et J<mrnci( . ....,CBh(;)rn.Hl. c~~n:J C~.Bnt.e ::Ht~ .Suarx~w.d


.Junr? l, 1992. p. 1.

n.tf.

Fronts fer- Rming A.::.n1n

Mat1a,~

SJ001378

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00202

Appendix 7

35
Los Angeies County Sheriffs Office, some of the Asian games contractors "have ties to [~-sian. orgaJ!ized crime. Additionally1 gang
members a:re often usee by the A$Ul.n games contractor as ae<1lers
and
bosses in the casinos." !V1oreover, he added, "Chinese o:ga.niz<'H crime !:'Toups use leq,] card clubs to launder substantial
Hmounts of illicit proceeds from fiBmbling, loansharking, extortion,
prostitution, and narcotics trafficKing."
Detective Howell noti.Jd that the lack of an effective State Gam
in~ Cormnission in Cal.lfornia contributes to this problem: "As are
su:t of the lack of regulat-ion, card clubs operating in both Northern
~1nd Sout!!ern c:ahfGrn.itl have come Wlder ;\zdan organized crime
mfluenee.

fit

EXTOR'flO.'I

One of the Llrimarv activithls of eth.nic Chinese street eanp in


t~~ United ~uites is the ~ystema~!,t, ?x.to0ion o~ le(:;"itirnate and i}k
gJtlmHte Cfunese-ru.n busrnessns.s. . lhJs IS uart.IcuJa.rly true 1n Ne-vv
York City's Chinatown. One academic study of New York China
town merchants indicated that more tlum 80 percent pay monthly
extortion tv street gan(?s in order to stay in business.s-1
The Subcommittee heard anonymous testimony from two New
York Chinese businessmen about gang extortion techniques. 65 New
York Asian streut gangs employ. numerous techniques to extort
bu~i;nesse~; !''or toxample, gar:g m'embers may ask a_pus.iness owner
u, myest m the gan" busmess or make a cont.rmucwn to some
caus<:. Gangs are also known to ask for substantial discounts from
businesses such as restaurant-s. During Chinese holidays, gang
members often sell festival- related goods to merchants at grossly
inflated prices.
But the most typical rrwtlwd of t?Xt0rtion is to denw.nd mont.hiy
payments of a specified urnount. T'be amount generally depends on
t.he tjt1)e of business involved and more importantly, on the profit
ability of the business. A small business that is not particularly
profit.able might pay the relatively low amount. of $108 or $208 per
month. As the number "eight" in Cant:.mese rhymes with the word
f~r prosperity in Cantonese, gm1gs often ask for amounts ending in
that number.
In New York's Chinatown, where e:..'torticn is most extensively
documented, gangs have tended to extort merchants located on tJ1e
specific streets controlled by the gang. This practice, ht>wever, ap
pears to be breaking down a;; the gangs become more competitive,
and a~ new gangs, including Vietnamese gangs, become involved in
extortton.
HOME LWASlON HOBJJERIES

One of the most frightening of all Asian or~anized crime activities is the home invasion robbery. In a typical home invasion, gang
members enter a home, tie up the inhabitn.nts, and terrorize, torture, beat, and rob them .
.ro Husin~ extortion is U:w.:: a tnaimtay of the ttin.ds io Hong KJng. Some expP.t"tt:J .canlr.md
lhat it is the Only criminal a\:tivit;y in which tfi.ailii, a.o t'ried5, engage.
u Ko-lin Chi.n, R;.)hert: Kelly, Jaffrey Pagan, unpublhlhed pape:r, ... Chin~e Stret Gar:.g ~
tm::, .. February 5, 1900.

e.">1'heae \\ritnee.3e& tatiiied under the nllru;es

becauae t:hey fee red fo't' tht:i:r .s.afe!,:y.

~1-.r.

Woo.(( and "1Y1r. CM.n" on Ck!t.ob<!r 3, 1991,

SJ001379

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00203

Appendix 1

36
H<)me invasions are typically committed by strHd gang rnemrwn
who target a particular home after intelligence has been gat.h<'n:d
about the residents. Home invasion gangs are sometimes ad hoe
groups whose members are from outside the area where the roh
bery is perpetrated. Home invasion gangs Hre highly mobile, often
entHring a city to co.nunit one or more ho!nB irrvas-ions$ then travel
ling i.o another part of the country to commit more invasinns or to
"cool off."
Preventi11g and prosecut.ing home invasions are difficu.lt tasks.
Many home invasions go urtreportecl because of intimidation of vic
tims and because of distrust of law enforcement among the Asian
community.
One innovative rcspons~' t..:l home invasions involves a San Jose,
California Polic<: Depmt.ment sting operation. The sting operation
employed an informant who put out the word that he was inter
ested in participating in home invasions, Those who volunteered to
participate were then invited to an a.partm.en!. equipped with vid(>O
cameras where the proposed robberies were planned in detaiL 'I'he
police arrested t.he participants as thev drove to the site of the pro
posed home invasions. The sting operation resulted in mu.ltiple ar
rests and a subsequ<>nt reduction in reported home invasion robberies, at least for a time.
PsosrmrrioN

Most As.ian organized r.r:irne gnmps, both in the l"ar East and in
the United States, are involved in prostitution. Triad societies
largely control prostitution in Hong Kong; and triad, tong and
street gang members a:re .also involved in pro:>Lit.ution oper.:stions in
lhe United States two b"iad xnembers who t"st.ified before the Sub
committe<' noted their involvement in prostitution in the early days
of Lhr~.ir erint:inal careers. ~r.lr. :r.1ht t.o]d the Subcornnrittee on rJunE
18, 1992 that he ''opened a 'call girl centt'2r' after obtaining the ap
provEd of my 14K triad gnmp.n His prostitution business preceded
his involvement in more sophisticated heroin smu~gling operations.
Johnny Kon, a Wo On Lok 1nad m<)mber and a leader of a group
of Big Circle Gang members kJwwil as the Flarn.ing Eagles Gang.,
testified that he "began helping young Blg Circle leaders t.o set up
illegal businesses of their own in Hong Kong, I financed their oper
at.ions, which included prostitution. . . .n Kon's financing of pros
titution operations also preceded his entry i.nt.o the heroin business.
In New York, Subcommittee staff learned of a. typical massage
parlor employing ethnic Korean prostitutes. These women a.re frequently legal U.S. residents or citizens because of previously ar
ranged marriages to U.S. servicemen in Korea for which the .S<<rV
icemen are paid a fee. Once in the United States, the women typi
cally divorce and begin work in a massage parlor as arranged by
the prostitution organization that assisted in arranging their bogus
marriages. The women often become v'trtua1ly indentured servants
until their debts to the organization are satisfied. Taiwanese, Malaysian, and other Asian .\~Om<m are also imported to work as prostitutes. Most of these prostitution operations are controlled by eth
nic Chinese crime groups andior prot:Ct.ed by Chinese t1nd Viet
namese street gangs.

SJ001380

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00204

Appendix 7

37
Japanese organized crime has also been linked to the "sex trade"
in the United States, including prostitution and child pornography
in Guam. A Boryok.udan associate testified before the Subcommittee that the Boryok.udan are also active in the recruitment of
American women into prostitution in ,Tapanr,e
ALlEN SMUCCWNG

Chinese alien smuggling rings hnv(! been increasingly active in


recent years. There is evidenc" lhrtt organized Asian criminal
groups, attracted by the high profits (smugglers charge up to
$30,000 per person) ~md .low risks (penalties, even if smugglers are
caught, are low), are becoming mere heavily involved in alien
smuggling operations.
A study completed in April of 1992 attempts t<) quantify this
problem.'-h The study compiled information from interv-iews of
1,453 Chinese aliens who have been smuggkd to the Umted States
and includes information on a total of 108.975 such aliens 1.-ho
were smuggled between 1983 and 1992. BHsed on current arrival
rates, the stud.)' projects that smuggling entities are collecting more
than $250 milJion per month, which could potentially generate
more than $3 billion per year. Whatever the accuracy of these projections, Chinese alien smuggling organizations have clearly been
able to generate enormous profits from their operations.
Every smuggling group the Subcommittee examined involved
Asian organized crime Iigures. For example, one alien smuggler (or
''Snakehead" as Asiru1 aiien smugglers are e.alled) told us fh.at his
smuggling operation, which brought natives of Fukit:tn Province in
Mainland China to New York C.ity, was nm from Hong Kong by
a 14K triad member. 68
The largest current source of ill'"gai Asian imrn.igrants is the
rural and relatively poor F'ujia.11 Province of th!> Peoples Republic
of China. Aliens typically travel ft,om Fujian Province lc Bangkok
by air or overland. Once in Bru1gkok, they recE:il'e fraudulent identification papers and are then t1ov,n to a third country before entering the United States by land, sea, or air. Several popular smuggling routes -run through South ruJd Central America, because visas
for Bolivia, Belize, and Panama are readily purchased by the smugglers. One route took a Fujian native through Beijing to Bolivia to
Miami and then to New York.
Usually the aliens being smuggled do not pay the entire charge
before departure. As one INS agent stated, "ff vou have $30,000
and live "in Fujian Pro0..nce, there is no :reason to 1eave because you
are one of the richest people there." In such cases, t.he alien, cr his
re1atives, become indebted to the smuggling organization. When an
alien is unable tD pay, New York street gangs are sometimes hired
to threaten or even kidnap the individual a-"\d hold him to ensure
payment. 69 There are also reports of recently smuggled aliens
00 'l'e~f..imony or con6-dc:ntio:d v.-iti1etm "Bully" before PSlr r'\Ug'.l..$l 1, 199'2.
137 WlDarcl H. Myen; Hi, "Th~ United States Und~r Se.ige, ,<;\M.2!uh en the Borde!'li, Chinese
Smngg:ing, 1983-1992," .~pril 41 199'2.
e.= Affidavit of "?1.1-r. L-ee,',- Exhibit 47, Rt.."Cw.rl of Hearing of PS1 on Asian Otgar..iMd Crirru~. Oc~
t.!::.Oer 3-~nv~mber 6, 1991, S. Hr& _102.-.14t1. .
.
,~
~
~
~
.
00 Tesi.ornony of L~. Jooeph Po;hm, New Ycrk Pohr:e l..~epartrnenl. beEore PS1, Nnveamer 6,

1991.

SJ001381
Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00205

Appendix 7

88
))(;ing used as drug couriers and being forced i.nto prostitution to
pax their debts.
bince May of 1992, at lr-,Hst six boats holding aboul 100 Lmdocunwntcd Chinese aliens hnvt! been intercepted by Imnu.gration authorities in Am<n1can waters. Points of arrival have inclu.dc,d Hawaii, Norf.h C!nrolina, California, and Massachusetts. Undoubtedly,
many mc,re such bGats ure not being interr.epted When smuggkd
aliens are apprehended, they cannot generaDy be detained for extender! pe_riod,, of.. t~~le 'l'his. is a, si_gnific:ant r.robl.em in t.ryip~ to
stop tne mf1ux or ulegal al.1ens lk"mg smuggled mto the limted
States, Key ports of f.!ntry an~ typically ovenvhelrrH'd with ilkgal
entrants lor which there is not adeauate detention space. Such
aliens [!1US,t Chen be; relef.lsed on parole: and often do not. appear for
scnedutd neanng~.
MONEY UUNUEP.ING

At Uw Subcomm:iltee's June 18, 1.992 hearing-, the F'inancial


Cnrnes Enforcement Network U'inCEN) of the Department of the
Trerts.ury reported that Asian nrgan.ized crime groups were engaved
in a variety of large-scaie moru:y !at1ndedng operat.ions. Like otner
organized crime groups, Asian groups are necessarily involved in
laundering the proceeds from their Hlegal operations.
On August 4, 1992, Johnny Kon, also known as Kon Yu-Leung,
testified before the Subcommittee. Mr. Kon is a former leader of
the Flaming Eagles Gang, a distinct group of Big Circle Gang
members. Kon is alstl a membe.r of the Wo On Lok Triad, and is
currently serving f.l 27year srmtence in the United States for heroin trafficking. Kon successfully imported over 1,000 pounds of her
oin into the Un.ited States b<.liore he was arrested. Kon testifie.d
that "Mv multi-million dollar heroin proceeds wer invested around
the wor'id,l inchtding inv(!stmcnts i.n New York and San Francisco .
. . My share of profits from heroin smuggling totalled over $10
rniliion. Much of this was invested in the United States." Mr. Kon
laundered the proceeds of his U.S. hero.in sales by purchasing real
estate, ar1d by having associates carry heroin money back to Hong
Kong.
FinCEN representatives testified that Hong Kong was being used
as .a launderi~g site _for much of the. illicit pf?Ceeds generated by
Chmese orgamzed cnme groups. Bes1des ser;rmg as headquan~ets
for most criminal triad groups, Hong Kong also serves as an impor
tant and highly sophisticated international banking: center. Moretwer, Hong Kong has no currency exchange controls and no currency transaction reporting requirements, making it a11 attractive
center for both legitimate .and illegitimate financial activities.
In lflf).l the amount of inbound currency !'rom Hong Kong to the
United States, according to C'MIR filings, increased 540 percent to
over $3.8 billion. Outbound currency to Hon"' Kong from tlte United
States, on the other hand, was approximately $1.2 billion, creating
an imbalance of $2.6 bilhcn. Hong Kon"' is the second largest
repatriator of U.S, currency. \Vhile no one kows how much of tlris
hug~: surplus of U.S. currency is generated by criminal enterprises,
it is bel.ieved teo be a significant percentage.
Law enforcement in this country has made little progress in at
tacking money laundering among ftsi.an organized crime groups.

SJ001382

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00206

Appendix 7

39

PinCEN found in its study that the law enforcement community


had only limited information regarding money hmndering among
Asian crime groups.
One recent successful Pedeml prosecution in Bost.on, however, in,
volved a high -levc,J tong mHmher ln Boston's Ch.inato~vn. Th~ lead
ckfendan~., Han..~.!fook laloo kn?'':n. as Goon Chun Yee), v;as. the
past pre:sJdf;J"nt. elf ~ne J-Iung ?vi.un tCtu.nese Freernasvns i\ssocH:ttlon).
The defendants 1vired monc,y, with the help of fl banh insider, and
pbysice.lly smuggled money frorn Boston to Hong Kong. The source
of the rnon'JY is be!leved to have been narcotics proceeds generated
in New Ycrk. Mock abo pled gJJilty in the same case to a charge
that he paid bribes to sl.'veral Boston police officers to ensure protection for several illegal gambling operations.
!\1ol'ii:.'Y LA.trNJ>EWNc ErF~:)HTs nv ~IAPA.NJ:;s;.;; OnaANl.ZUl CmME

Despite t.he fact that. Japanese organized crime groups are believed t':J have invested hu.ndred;:; of millions of dollars of profits
from thei.r criminal enterprises in U.S. real estate during the past
decade, U.S. law enforcement authorities have had a.lmost no suetess in dealing with thi;; probkm. Tlw reasons are twofold: First,
U.S. officials face almost insurmountable difficulties in tracing the
source of Japanese funds used tG purchase U.S. properties; second,
even if such infon:nation is obtained, loopholes in current U.S. law
on money laundering make successful prosecut.ion unlikely .
.!\dditionally, ,Japanese polict' aui.hi';ritins arE> reluctant to supply
information about members of .Japant~'"' orgr.mi:wd crime to American authorities, apparently in part {H.1f.. of' fN;.r of civil liability
under Japanese law. At least two instanres hav<) lwen rf:ported to
t.h(e Subcommittee where Boryokudan members or associates have
s~w.d ~b-~ Japane:s:" National Pc,hct for tell~as.ing information to
U mtea l)t.:ates offioals.
The Su.bcommittBc' hea.rd ;:;ubstaiitial evidence of money laundering by Japane.s crime groups on A.ugust 4, 1992. Confide11tial witness "Mr. Bully,~ an associate of :wveral major Boryokud.an groups,
tied the Borfokudan !x, numerous purchases of United States properties. He first notJd that, ~1 myself have knowledge of at least five
major properties in Hawa.ii which >vere bought with money generated illegally by the Boryokudan, and I know that personally.
From my own experience, my educated est-imate is that. there am
probably doser to 50 major properties in Hawaii which have been
purchased. These properties include resort hotels and golf courses.
All such prop,~rties ure f'ronts for Boryokudan money laundering."
In his testimony, "Mr. Bully'' gave a detailed description of the
methods by which Boryokudan groups la.under money in the Unit-ed
States:
Japanese holding companies capitalize the U.S. companies, which then provide th.e vehicle for further investment. The companif.'s .attempt to evade U.S. taxes by filing
false documE:nt~ and false reports with the IRS, until the
authoritie~ catcb on. As soon as the IRS gets suspicious,
the Boryokudan 1vill fold up the front company .az1d send
the money, which has been laundered, back to Japan."

SJ001383

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00207

Appendix 1

Asked by Senator Roth t.o provide Epecifie examples of U.S. prop


ertics bouht with Bv!Jokndan money, Lhe witness de':'cribed tht
loll owing mart:
(.,Japanese Boryokudan Link to Hawaiian RHal Estate Purchases
of Had<idai Sangyo Corporation chan. follows:]

SJ001384

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 _00208

r
t

Japanese Boryokudan Link


to Hawaiian Real Estate Purchases
of Hachidai Sangyo Corporation
Hachidai Sangyo
'\-z
0}~'- ;:f
"'
'
;0-~Yo''
,,z.y ,_ ,'? '~"
'\,

'

. . . 0"

'

,(j

'<'
I/

Surniyoshi-Kal r
Boryokudan Associate
(Previous Business
.,
Relationship with

I
I-

'\'U

'\,'-

'I,.

\,

'0~

\
\

. "'" , ,

o.e? o

(:;,<:.., ,...('\"
'' "-"'
''0'

\
\

\
l

Loan

No Previous

I Dealings Between

: These Companies
t

8oth Companies)

l
J

.I

I
/
/

---

> ltornan & Co. _./

,..

,,l>
(t\

::;

c.

-X
-...!

/
/

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00209


SJ001385

Apperu:Ux 7

42
According to the testimony, Hacbidai SangyD Coq-.oration "is a
development company in the real estate area, and they, in fact, got
financing fiom Homan and they purchased ru1.developed l'<1a1 estate
on the east side of Oahll. . . . If you look at this chart, you dw
see th~J~: t.hr. H.'J.chidai Sangyo Corporation here does net have any
dir~<ct. rdationship with Itoman & Company. Therefore, to recdve
the loan fTom Itoman, they at Hachida.i Snngyr) tfllked to an lnflu
entia] person at I.tomnn, to have him help fin the loan. And as is
written on dw chart, they would then give the gift. to th(l
Boryokudan associHle (for in~r,,ducing Hachidai Sangyo n~pre.sentt'l
tives to the ftoman &. Company repmsC!nt.ative.l and therefore, they
(an associate of the Sumiyoshi-kai Boryokudan group) .vould receive a finder's fee of[) io 10 percent of the loan."
~(1vlr. Bully'' pro~tided a t\nthcr exan1pie~ d.ct.a.iliog the high f.>l~oflie
purchase d the Pebble Beach Country Club in rvronterey, Calii.brnia, one of Amerit:a's most famous golf courses. Pebble Beach was
bought by Mi.<1oru lsutani, through a number Df holding companies,
including Cosmo World Company, for H n.!ported price of $S41 million i.n September 1~190.
The Pebble Beach purchase was brgely financed throu&h loans
from !toman & Company to Minoru Isut.ani's Cosmo Wond Company. "Mr. Bully" detailed the Boryokudan link to this financing:
urn Japan, there is a man c.a!led Mr. Shigeru Sato. He has
associations v.oi.th members of almost
of the main
Yakuza groups, ar1d sometimes sel'Yes as atl intermediary
amon~ these individuals. Sat.o also uses Yakuza members
as boayguards.
"The Su:miimno Bank wanted to bnv ll bank . , . which is
35 percent owned by Mr. Sat.<r. He rtgreed t.o sell, and
therefore, very highranking people ai SumH.omo felt an
obligation to Mr. St<to . . . [who] owed favors to certain
Ya..lmza associates. . .. These peoplt! were plac{ld with
ILOman wh.ich is a .su.h~iJ.li[Jry of Surnitomo. For example,
the person i:n charge of real estate, development at ltoman
becam& one of these Yakuza associates. The Boryokudan,
therefore, have substantial influence on Itoman, in part,
because they were aware of the deeds of Homan. Itoman
loaned to Isutani money, which enabled him to purchase
the Pebble Beach Golf Course. . . . Itoman would have the
right to sell memberships to Pebble Beach Ckllf Course in
lieu of payment, the principal and interest payments by
Isut.ani."
Th" Pebble Beach purchase was undennined in 1991 ,,,..hen Cali
fornia regulators denied Cosmo \"lorld's request to sell memberships to the course, which is on land under the supervision of the
California Coastal Commission. The go1f course was sold in Feb
r-uary 1992 for $500 milbon, 40 percent less than the originally re
ported purchase price, to a Japanese investor group. Minoru
Isutani has also been involved in a number of other U.S. business
ventures.
In addition to the Boryokudan lin.k to the Pebble Beach purchase, Isutani has been identified by a hi(;h-ranking member of the
lnagawa-kai Boryokuda.n sy11dicate as having used Boryokuda.n

an

SJ001386

Plaintiff Ex. 1 I 02 00210

Appendix 7

4~l

connections in his golf business in .Japan. The lnagawa-kai member


also claimed that. Isutani ran gambling rackets when he wus
younger. 70 Mr. Isuta.ni has hen hivolved in other businesses wh.ich
fit the so~called "Bo:ryokn.dan profiie," inclu.ding companies which
run bath tlouses, a popular Boryokudan business in Japan. More
over, Japanese pres.;; reports havo? !inked Mr. Isutani to one of .II!
pan's biggest scanda"ls., knov;n as the HH.ecrulf) scandaL 1'his seanv
dal involved insider trading in the shares of H.eeru.it Co., by several
top politicians, Bo:ryokudan members and other prominent. figures
in Japan.
Three oth('r individuals with al10ged Boryokudan ties are bwwn
LO have invesL<?,d in the United States. Ken M.i:mno. who has h<wn
identified bv law 0nforcement. as an associate of tht: 'Toa Yuai aigyD
Kumiai crYJK) Boryokuctan rroup, O'NTIS an estimated $400 milfion
worth of as.o;,;ts in ttlt' United States, including golf ctnusc,s in Ne
vada. Califi1rnia, and Hawaii. He also holds the leas(; to a res
taunint in the 'Frnrdcana Hotel/Casino in Las Vegas. In August
1992, the U.S. Customs Service and the ms seized .Mizuno's Indian
Wells Hoi.d, Co<lnLry Club and R1r:quet Club, located near Palm
Springs, Cnl.ifornia. This resort hos been valued at: $50 rnillion.n
The s.~iz11re was in connection with <L'l ongoing investigation into
Mizuno's tLS. 1nvestments.
Mizuno was arrested in Japan in February 1992 on charges of

corporate tax evas.ion and fraudulent sale of golf memberships, generating some $800 mi.llion. He allegediv sold 51.000 memberships
while advertising that only 2,000 wouJJ be sold. The membetships
were in Mi2.uno's Ibaraki Country Club in Japan.
Yasumichi Morishita, also known as "Mamushi" or the "Snake,"
runs a finance company called Aichi Corparat.ion in Japan.
Mori.shitn has used members of the Sumiyoshi -kai Boryokudan syndicate to handle debt collection for his comnanv. Morishita has
bc,en identified by law enforcement as an aUe;ied !Joryokuda.n asso .
ciate who has invested in the United Stales. 'Morishita currently
owns two golf courses in CaHfomia and one in Arizona. H(! also
owns a la.rge shareholding in Christie's Auction House in New
York, and has bought over $80 miHion worth of a.rt at auction for
his prominent Tokyo art gallery. His purchases have included
works by Van Gogh and Picasso,
In 1988, Asahi Jyuken, a Japanese company run by Kizo
Matsumoto purchased $163.5 million worth of Oahu real estnte, including the Turtle Bay Hilum Resort.. Kizo Matsumoto founded
Asahi Jyuken in 1968, shorth afl-.er "resigning" his affiliation with
the Yamaguchl-Gumi Gang.'h Individuals who resign from the
Ye.kuza in Japan often do so to gain an appearance of legitimacy,
but maix}tain connections to their former gang."'
Kizo Matsumoto and his brother, Kihachi, were affiliated '.'lith
the Yamagu.chi-Gumi subgroup lwov.m as the Shiragami-Gumi.
This sub-group has been tied to other activity L"l the Ur>jted States
7::1 !';'f.\C ~ t:::'\t{&, "".)(po:lC," J~.inc 2, 19"J l.

'll \iV!UJhjngwn F'oot_, At:glli.H. 20. 1992, p. Bl.l.


~

Hond'J.iu

Advf!ctln:t.~.

j'P...e8ort

offi<:~al_

fot""mt:.r yaku.w

mt:mb:n-~"'

Al.:{rw:t 23, 19-38.

,.._~ SnJJ$_Cquer;t t.c the ttlentifictr!.~or~. :Jf ~f'f~tu~moto ~ Y.akut~ UBt~ntiC.:'I, t.he M3t.aurn-cto _br~l:l~
c_n> ccmo:amec u.~ th~ JapaneNt. 1'\at.iOH~! P(~_hce~ nn<j sc""r:ral p.nh<" office:-F WO"f"C re~t!cliy d:it;
tJp!.in&.(ru; e P...''-st.:.lt. Ja.p<Snef.C crirr..inal im.eJhg~!'lC'!tJ eh.:m.n,Jh;. repurwdi,Y dn('!.i up f:;.'l' h shon bmi!
.s.fier ;.hilS ~vent...
1

SJ001387
Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00211

Appendix 7

44
as well. ne head of the sub-group, Hideo Shiragami, was assassinated in the U.S. territory ofSaipa11 in 19.87.
CGMP1fl'ER (';up Tl!EI"l'

A ptirne example of the innovutiv appmaeh of sonw Asian organized cnme gr-oups is thei< involvement in the th(,ft of computer
chips. It lu\s b(;en esb_1;1ated ~h?t compukr chip ~h,,ft is_ ~osti!_lg
/l.mencan eompan11~s mduons or ao!lars each yenr. Theft.s of:Pl nullien or more have b<;en reported in Oklahom~l, Tm;as, ['lorida, and
Californiu, wh.ich has bad several multi-million dollar thetls.'''1
Cornputer chips are (~Spe;eiarly at.truetivu Lo Aslan eYirr.J;C-:' groups
for several reasons. Chip thdl is very lu.cra!.ive and difllcult. to detect and to proser:ule. Cornputer chips an: typicdly r<>sdd for 80
percfUJl of their vaJue as oppos(~d to 20 pereont f;.!r othe.r stolen
it.r~n1s such as jcv-lelry. Cornputer chips .are fUn&,ribil(?s do not lurve
n~gistration n1unb~'?.rs, H.nd ar'e very difficult to tract.\ Ash1.n c.rime
groups are nDiquely positinned for computer chip theft becaus(e
ma.ny A5ians work for computer chip rnanuJacturers and becr.mse
there are markets for the chlps in Southeast A;ia. Sergt<~mt Douglas Zw(,mke of the San Jose Police Departrnent ~estified that "IIJn
San Jose, also known as Silicon Valley, approximately 70 percent
of all b igh-tecb theft cases are generated by Vietnamese criminals,"'"

.Asian crime groups obtain compt1ter ehips in several ways. In


some: cases, street gangs, often Vietnamese, commit. armed robberie.> of computet chip manufacturers, employing a modus operandi
whi.ch is disturbingly .similar to that of dw t.ypirul home invasion
robbery, Ln other cas,,., individuals who have run up gambLing
debLs and who happen t.o work for eompan.ir:s lhat manufacture
computer chips are recruited to Heal chip.~.
There are at rl':ast five major i~ncing rings for stolen computer
chips in Southern Cal:ii:ornia aJ.one. 'I}lese rings receive, \epack~ge
and then sell the, ch1ps m the Urut~:'d ~tates and abroad. 1 he sto:en
chips are sold at computer swap meets or shipped overseas to Taiwan, Thailand, or Hong Kong. Few cases bave been successfuHy
prosecuted, although indictments have been handed down in Austin, Texas, and Oklahoma Clty, Okla.homa. 16
C.m;:.nrr CAJ!D COU!-iT&RFEITlNG

Losses resulting from counterfeit credit card actwJty have risen


dramatically over the past few years. Technological innovations
during t.he mid-1980's managed to stem a previous spurt of counterfeiting, but the criminal sophistication of Chinese criminal
groups based in Hong Kong has led to a notable n:surgence of credit card counterfeiting in the past few years. Hong Kong-based coun
terfeiting rings were responsible for as much as 40 perc;mt of the
wt.al worldwide counterfeit credit card losses of uhout $200 million
.,"'()rnnt~~ (~ounty H.~IT\~<ter, "'i'wo Allegt...><lly M.c:ute~ir.~ded Chif- Thet"ts.." Man-:h 14, 1990; anci
Au<X'lRU:-d Press, "FBi Pn:x~as Sirr-.ilnritiM Hi Computer Chto Hd,;U;.''July 10, 1991.
.,~Te!ir.irn::.m:.. of Sl?.tg$an.t Douglas Zw~w..ke, &m Jose Pafi.:-e Departmen~ before PSI. Oct.obe:t
3. 1991.
?e US v. Dm.f. Hu;.l Tr-un eJ aL, Cfl..SC Nv. CR Ot')-28, W!::'t=tro Distnc-t of Oktlihon~, February
6, ISS<~.

SJ001388

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00212

Appendix 7

45
7

in lf)9 P While much of the actual counterfeiting is done in such


locales a~ Hon1r Kong, 'rhailp.nd, Sil;g.apor:e. and Malays.ia, the
eon:nterfmt earos an: now hemg nsea <n b;unme, Austraha, and
North Americn as welL

The threat tothe United StaU:.-s is p<:rhaps bt,st Hl,Jstrated by the


imp!lc.t on our Canadian neighbors, .vho sufffm)d an estimated $50
mi!lion in Joss~s in 199 .1.. Det.eetive Kenn!;th Yates of the MeLropoli
tan Torontn PoHce u.td the Subcommittee that. highly sophisticated
syndieal.es, which consist primarily of H.ig Circle Bo}':> Gang ntem
bers, were responsible for a large proportion of the losses r,xperi
enced by Gnnadia.n t'in:m<:ial institutions in lf:l9Ln1 Detective Yates
also expres;;ed concern about i;ho potm\tinl impact on th(; United
States when he noted that "If counterfeit card aeti vi tv re.adH:!s tht>,
same proportiOfiS as Canada, the United States could see H half-bil
lion-dollar.;t-y!:ar ainti.nal industry." 19
Heprestmt!ltives of Visa International nssert.<-:d that Hong Kong
based cred:it card counterfeiting was n "major threat to the global
credit card payments sysu~m
_ . a '"'orlawide problem!' 30 Visa
lnt~n;,ationai repr~sentative~ d.eseribed how c~iminal organizaLions
m Tanvan, Hong h.ong, and t.::hm& procure valid cardl1.olde:r acn>~f\t
numbers and then manufad,ure, emhoss, and encock tn.e cards Wltn
compromised v.al.id accOUJ)t numbers.
An interesting twist in the eounterfeit credit card problem has
been documented in Canada, where Asian ga:ngs have been able to
obtain the cooperation of certain merchants through extortion. In
this scenario, gangs procure stolen cred.it ct,rd numbers and print
the numbers on s.imple white plastic cards Merchants are intimi
dated into agreeing or voluntarily agree to charge a [o.rge amount
of merchandise on these obvionsiy counterfeit cards. Cooperatiw;
merchants avoid violence, while gang r.nemlwl"s make off with the
merchandise and banks are left with tlw losses Another significant
aspect of this crime is that merchants who participate in this activity, either through coercion or otherwise, become an active part of
the conspiracy and are thtts .less likely to report the crim;J,
In the United States, the primary responsibility for combating
cotL'1terfeit credit cards liils with the U.S. Se<:rot Service. Unfortu
nate1y, the Secret Service has not made counterfeit credit cards a
priority, contending that the use of such cards is not currently a
major problem in the United Statns. That assertion is contradicred,
however, by credit card company statistics which show a dramatic
increase in U.S. losses to COI.ll'1Wrfeit credit cards.
[Visa International, Risk Management and Security, Reported
Cou.nterfeit Activity by Region of Transaction chart follows:J

77P...eut:e-rn, ,..Vake Cr--.::du Card lc.du..at!y F1ourieh.cs in HDilg Mng.~ by Kathy Chen, Murch 15,
1992.
70 Te.!i.tir:aony

Ju.n~

of Dete-ctive Ken.net..l-t i:'R~C6, Met.>"OpuUt.an Toronw Polke Dep:artment; be!o:re PS1,

lB, 1992.

'!PToront..c; Stiit., ''Ru:k~lr:86 .W:m gar..r,o repmt.ecl on ri~ in U.S.,"' .J!lne 19, l~!:Y.i., Page A24

T~timuny iJ{

Donn Slc:kJes, Via.a

lnternntion~,

befo:-J FSi, Jwie JB, 19'&2,

SJ001389
Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00213

VISA INTERNATIONAL

Risk Management and Securl!y


Reported Counteriell Acllv!ty by Region of Transaction
Distribution of Country/Stale of Transnc!lon {US$ Thousand$)

Region: USA Region

___F0l!..!3.. 9.t.:!_~!_~!.S E.~DE~J~.9-~nterfelt 0."2.!J1.__--.. /' 3i'DECEMBEW{99l'.' .,.

~--

. ...--'-'----

~lo

..

L_. . :l i' DEC Ef'l1 E.~!~.~~~ :!_9_


B_O--'--

of

Change ln
Reported
_ _ _ _.:...F..:..r=au=d=-

Reported

_.!:~.~.1:1.1.12.~

Heported

%of
Region

CALIFORNIA

$8,106

42.63%

$2,4'17

34.99%

$5,689

2:J~).4%

NEW YORK

$2,717

14.29%

$1 ,4B3

21.47%

$!,235

a:J.3%

FLORIDA

$748

3.94%

$6fl6

9.93%

$63

~3.'1%

NEW JERSEY

$492

2.59%

$263

3.81%

$229

37.2%

TEXAS

$373

1.96%

$152

2.20%

$221

i45.4%.

WASHINGTON

$355

1.07%

$7!1

1.13%

$277

356.1%

GEORGlA

$333

1.75%,

$1!4

0.64%

$238

54!.l.l%

tJEVADA

$304

1.50%

$181

2.61%

$123

68.2%

PENNSYLVANIA

$303

1.60%

$'13

1.05%

$230

315,0%

$194

2..81%

CounlryiState

__ __

lLUNO!S
.;;_:;__

,,

HEGION TOTAL

..........--_!~~-- . -

1.50%

------ "------

$92

---------

...

Growlh
Rate

47.6%

-~------

,,:I>
ID

:s

1:2.

-..!
$19,015

100.00%.

$6,S06

100.00%

$12,109

175.3%

Conlirrnocl Fraud Volume JS of 4/22/92.

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00214


SJ001390

Appendix 7

47
As the chart demonstrates, Visa lnt.emational';; losses from counterfeiting virtually tripled in 199 .L Visn has <llso reported thal.>uch
los:;es reached a ?year high in the first quarter of 19H2. 8 l
One nctabl~: rt<cent: cmw involved the Aprfl H192 arrest> of Ul
people in Hong Kong, as well as the nrresL of lwo residrmts of Falls
Church, Virginia. Oi1E; of tho individuals in FaHs Church W<lS id~,n
Ufi~d a:; H member of both tlv" UK Triad and Hw On Leong Tong
In \Vashington, D.C. 82 Thi'; syndicate was alkg;)(lty responsible for
over $2.:3 million in credit card fraud worldwide. This is not the
cnlv reGent counterfeit ease in which triad members have been invdvcd. In February 1H92. Tha.i Polin" arre;;ted fout' HK Trind
mernl:krs in Bangk(lk with' counterfeit- ~redit card~ nnd passports
Ethnic Chinc:sn crirm~ groups have also been linked to c<)unterfi~it
cn~d.it <:nrds in Phoenix, Seattl<), and Gmun, 8 " as wdi HS New York
~!nd Los Angeles. 8' 1 It is nor y<:t clear that U.S. law enforc~ment. i;;
propi!rly fbcused on this ~,;Towing problmn.
GONTRO~ .. C:P .AS!..AN E"N'7EH'I'AlNMEN1'

M<H of the As.ian entertainment industry, basGd in Hong Kong


is controlkd by triads. This triad eontroi was the subject of a public
dJmonstTation and protest on Jrmuary 15, 1992 in Hong I<ong dur-ing which pn;m)nent actors, aet.:resse&, singers and producers com
pla.ined abnut t.h<' involvement of triad societies in the industrv. 85
Protesters dted instances of extortion .and violence perpetrated by
triad rnornbers in flong [{nng.

Triad societies, particularly th<, Sun Yee On Triad, eJWrt:is.e great.

inflr.wnce in tlw ent,?rt..a.innknt indu~trv, 'l'his intltwnc(' extends to


r.r orth i\n1eric.a: wher_e rn. nn,~rous \rrg;{niz\~t:~ crhn~ figures are in
volved in {lrganizi.ng North Amencan lours cJ Asian entertainers
t~om th9 Far E!l:.~- This !nfltw;:ce is eummt)y se''~l, according to
tn<': testlmODJ: of ror-onl<? tkt(;_n.rve Knln(~l.h Y,ates, m "a rnonopoly
on the control of entertamrs from Hong Kcmg,'
A c/u1rt introduced at the Subcommitu,:'s hearing on AngtlSt -1,
I992 graphicall) illustr-ated Asian nrgnnized crime infh,;ene\'1 and
connection in the North American market for Asian entertainment.
Twenty-one of the 36 names included on the chart havli been ideo
tined as &ian organized crime figures, Fifteen other names are
noted as participants in the Asian enterta.inment industry who are
not known to be involved .in organized crime, but who have some
connection to the organized crime figures listed on the chart, A document det..<Uling the connections listed on the chart can be found
in the hearing record.&;
[Asian Organized Crime bfluencr., in the Asian Enterta.ir.ment
Industry chart follows:]

SJ001391
Plaintiff Ex. I 102 002 I 5

Asian Organized Crime


Influence in the Asian Entertainment Industry

Pet-er Moy
Andv Suen
92 ?roct Co.
New York
Al!anHc City

Rose Lam
Shang.hai
Prod..,cl!ons
N~wYork

Raymond Miu

Raymond Miu
Productions

New York

Al!anlic Cily

Peter Lee
aka
Tong
SinCJ Bo
ProducHons

u,,,

N~.wYork

1'0

:I

Identified Asian Organized


Crime Figures

Entertainment Industry
Participants Not Known
to be Involved In
Organized Crime

c.

;
~

Prepared by the United Stales Senate Permanent Subcommi11ee on Investigations

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00216


SJ001392

Appendix 7

49
The evidence is clear that numerous .Asian <frgani:wd crime i1gures dthlr currently have, or t;wrne.rly had, substantial intlum1cc
in Lhe Asian enteli.ainmerit. indu$l.rv. Most notable are Clifford
'Wong, th;, hem! of the Tung On 'I'or!'g in New York City, and an
associate of tlH: Sun Ye<: On 'I'd.ad; Vim~ent. ,Jew, the /~1rmer leader
of the San Francisco WBh Ching Ci.-:tng, who hns ties t.o both th:
Sun Yee On and 141< Lri<<ds in Hong Kong; Danny Mo, u Tonmtv
resid~mt who has ties to both the Kung Lok and 14K triads; and
Peter Chong, the head of the Wo Hon 'To Triad in San Francisco.
Members and associates of the cri1ilinally-int1uenced On Leong
Tong in New York's ChinatoVI>'!l are alBo active in the .<\sian entertainment industry. Al.l of these individuals have played a role in
promoting tours of i\shrn Gnterta:iners who have come to North
.An!&Tiea frnrn J-Jong .K:)nf{ . ,
..
.
.
. .. . .
"
H.ec(:nt tours hrn'(~ 1ncH.HH1<l penonn.ancc-!s u; Atlantlc Clt:y . Ss_n
Francisco. Los .<\..ngd;:,s, Chicago, Boston, Toronto, l.'donlreal, Calg(-HOJ'1 .and \!a.ne(HlV(~r. Such tours .are supposedl~l contro.Uod by Nevt'
York producr;:rs who often huve contracts with Atlantic City casi
nos, whkh are important vonues for Asian perfc;;nnanres. The re~~lity {s, h~wever, that ei:hnic Chinese gangsters ~rom l'{ew York,
.:->an FrmH'lSCO, Lo;: /\.ngeles, Toronto, and Hong h.ong p;ay maJor
role$ in arranging Hnd promoting such performances.
The prominence of Asian erimf: groups in the entertainment industry is troubling f(n several reasons. First, companies set up by
gangsters to promote and produce Asian entertainment sho,.vs provide vehides for mnney laundering. Second, promotion of Asian entertainment ls a way ft>r heal gang bosses to "gain fate" and legitimacy in North Amerkfm Asian communitie~ 87 Finally, other
criminal activity has been tied to Asian concert tours, inelnding vi
olence at the shows and extortion of potential ticket buyers,
CHALLENGE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

A.s.ian organizc;d crime poses a profound challenge to law enforcement in the United States a:nd worldwide. That cha!lenge is not
currently being met. In the United St-ates, there has been a failure
to make Asian organized crime the law enforcement priority it deserves to be, and there has also been a failure to recruit and hire
su...'fkient personnel fluent in A.~:ian languages and knowledgeable
about Asian culture.
Inten1ationa1ly, there is a need for much great-er cooperation
among Jaw Enforcement agencies and development of streamlined
methods for (:xchanging evidence and informat.ion. The Justice Department ranks Asian orga.r.):r.ed crime as a No. 1 organized crime
priority in only one city-San Francisco,<~> and prosecution cf A_sian
organized crime is uneven at best. While one U.S. Attorney's office,
the Eastern District of New York, has filed a large number of cases
i\g.ainst Asian organi:r.ed c:ime figures, most other U.S. Attorneys
have filed lew such cases, even those with large A~ian populations
and substantial Asian organized crime acti\rity.
1 D1~positio:n

ISNTe:sdm:::ny

uf cm'l6cl.~nti1il witness ")t.~r 'T"am." Na~.ernber B: l991. p. 6.


1lf' R<~hrt. ~1:Jeller,

U.5..~i.st.unl Alwrney General, before PS1.

N:Jv~m.b-=r

6,

19Hl.

SJ001393

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00217

Appendix 7

50

U_S. law onforeenltni. agendes suffer fron1 ;l shortage in officers


and Bupport personnel fluent in ,o\.<;ian languages and kno,v]edgable
aboui Asian culture. In the New York City area, for exa1.nple, desp.ite th~ f~1ct that there has. been a massive, influx in recent vears
of ethnic Chines'~ who speak th!~ Fukimwse dialP.ct, there is cur
rently only .me bw enforct;mcnt o.trle<:r-Fedcral, State or localwh:.l spe;.ks the dialed. The Federal Bureau of lnvesiigation ha;;
only 7 agents with sufficient fluency in Japn:neS(! to rnonitor u \Viret:ap and loss than ;,::, <>gents with similar fluency in lUlY Chinese
di;<\.;;ct. 'Tbe Dn1~ Enf(m:i>Hlent Administration has no ugents fluent
in Japan est\ und has JpBs .than !?.-0 ltgents with adequate Huency in
Chinese to rnonH.or a \Virctnp. A tnajor .Asian organiz.f}d erirne indictment in a northe:lsl.trrn cit,v bns been deh.lyt:d fCJT more thnn a
year sok.Jy be:cuuse (>f th<~ irw.bihty <Jf law enforcement. age.ncks to
translate the win: intercepts involvc-!d in the C<1Se.
The problem of law enforcement's inahifity to adequately ~otddress
Asian organix.ed erime is compounded in the face of technically sophisticnted cr.ir.nes such as money laundering, The Financial
Crimes Enftrrcernent Network (F1nCftN) found in its studv of Asian
organized crinw t.haL due to such factors as lingt1istic arid cultural
barriers, U.S. law enforcement had litt.le knowledge of money laundering methodotogy employed by Asian organized crime groups.
The abs<~nce of adcqmlt-e intQmatiorwl law enil>rcerncnt cooperation is also a mnjor imp(~diment. to the fight against Asian organized crime. Tho h~vel and c,xt;ent. of coop.;,ration bet'.vecn U.S. law
onforternent and f!.m~ign law onf(;n:emcnt. varies subst.ant..ial!y from
cow1try to cou.nt.!}'. l.t is, therefore, nec;);:;sary to dcseribt Har.h coun
try separat<oly.
lh'YN(.: .KONG

Law enforcerncnt cooperati-on bet\vecn tbr: Uo.itt~d St~H:es and

Hong Kong is generally thoughL to be good, yet not l'tithout problems. These problems could increase as Hong f{ong prepares t.o b(:
taken over by the Peopk's Republic of China (PRCj in 1997. A
growing concern is that Hong Kong ofl'icinls will cooperate l<!ss as
1997 approaches so as not to appear overly friC'ndly with western
law enforcement and invite the animosity of Lhcir future M.ainland
Chinese sup.eriors.

Theoretically, 1997 will not affect Hong Kong law enforc(~m:mt.


Under the "one country-two systemsn arrangement called for by
a series of Sino-British agreements, Hong Kong lEw enforcement
will remain separate from law enforcement in the PRC, In addition,
.an independent judiciary is to remain in place in Hong Kong. Many
top Hong Kong officials will, however, be replaced w1th PRC offi
r.ials. Voluntary departures of both high and low level Hong Kong
iaw enforcement personnel are also expected.
\-v"hile current working relations between U.S. and Hong Kong
law enforcement are good, cooperation appears to take place primarily en a case--bycase> basis. For example, while Hon"' Kong au.
t.horities may provide information abou.L individual triad members
upon request by U.S. law enforcement, they will not Sl.lpply U.S.
law enforcement ag1mcies with a general list of Hong Kong triad
rnernbers.

SJ001394

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00218

Appendix 7

51
t.he United SLates has a heavilv utilized extracauon treutv with
Hong Kong through Great Britain that will expire in wn7. The
Justk~ Department is curren(Jy negotiating a post-1997 treatv
with Hong Kung thlli: will adht:re to- the "o!H: country---two ;;.ysterns" cnncept. The treaty will allow for continued extradition b<) .
tween the United StHt<~s and Hong Kong but will not involve the
PRC as a whole. The United States has no extradition treaty with
the PB.C and no current pians to m"gotiate one.
TA!WAN

Law en.fbrcernent cooperatioH between tbe United. States and Taiwan is a problem on several fronts. Taiwan ha$ effectively becolll('
a haven for the new internatjona l criminal of Chinese descent since
illerB is ne ext.rHdition u;.rr(:H)rnent betv-leon ra:i\-van 8nd the United
Staws nr betw>:'en Taiwan and mw other Asian country, ln addi
tion, Taiwanese l;1w enforcement officials ll.Tt! g.:merally u:nw-iEing to
sha.HJ in formation and evidence with foreign Ia w enforcement, agen
ci~s. l\loreover, Ta!wm1ese law enforcement has been unwilling to
share intelligeru~e information about the structure, activities, 1Wd
membership of t:Y\ad otga.nization,s in Taiwan.
Taiwan's stat:u~ as a haven for fugitives of Chinese descent ls
W<;H documented. Two corwicted heroin smugglers tesWied befonJ
the SubcommJLte:; that they sought temporary haven in Taiwan
when the Hong Knng police began investigating their heroin oper,
ation$ sincE they were aware that Taiwan had no extrad.it.ion
agreenn~nt with Great Britain or Hong Kong!'~' Fonner Ghost
Shado;v and On Leong Tong member "Kenneth Chu" testif'led at
t~E Subcommift~e's October 3, 19~ i., _he;.ri.ng that -~he
Leong
'long once: lwlo ns annual convenuon 1n Ta1wan so that 1b former
grand president, who was wru1tP.d in the United States, could at-

qn

tend.
Subeommit.tee sta!'f )Jresented Taiwanese law enforc<!ment with a
list \)f 11 criminal fugitives wanted in the Unlt<)d States who are
believed to be residing in Taiwan. Th,~ Taiwanese responded with
rega.rd to five individuals on the list, ronfi:-rning that three of the
individuals are, in fa;!t, in Ta.iwan,
The lack of an extradition at,'T?ement with Taiwan also affects
Taiwan's efforts t.o enforce its own laws. Taiwanese officials presented the Subcommittee ;vith n list of 87 raiwanese citizens who
faced criminal charges in Taiwan but were believed to have i1ed to
the United States. Although most of these fugitives are charged
.vith economic crimes such as embezzlemeni, some are sought for
violent crimes. 90
Contributing factorll to the current lack of cooperation may in
part be attributable to the fact that the Unjted States does not recognize Taiwan diplomatically and does not have any law enforce
ment representatives stationed in Taiwan.
i<iT~o.wnony

af Johnny Kr.m. A.:..:gMI. 4 . .1992: end. conOclen'l:ial witne;e ~{r. Ma" Jt3J\e l.S, l99:Z.

before PSL

S:.dxomrn:i~u..~s Novemt;.er 5. le92, hear:l:-1g O~:nect!-vi!- HoY<(>H o( thf? L.ci) Aogll?5 Sh~
i.ff'~ 1';i)i~11 expl<l~:::n:d thl! d1fficuiti~e in ~r.:urning a (Uf.ql.i\'e wuntfd !O Taiwn.n for murdering.nn
l::'rHlro (a.n,ily. Ht)WeU had oo obtai:l Lhe fugiL1\1e!$ voluntar.; ugl'\~mcm. by rc~1uxl!y nrri!!!tir\f;

;(!At th'{!

tom for mmct \'id!:u.:i1-'1W.

SJ001395
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00219

Appendix 7

52
TrfF.; f'EO!'LSS REPUBLiC OF CHII<:A

Law enforcement cooperation behveen the United Swtes and the


Peoples .H.epuhlic of Chin~ is currentlv at o low point dw:. t<> the so.l q
. " '
n
p J\.
o ('

,
.
..
.
l
cal! <~u.
gortr 'll-lSl 1 Ci.lil(<.
,; ._b."'' _coopf~Ta.twn.......P.:rllllfl.nt:~ _m t le
nan:ohcs area..was steadily unprovmg nrml tb;; ume of tnls case.
The goldfish c.ase involved a cooperative dfort between the PRC
an_d U.S. law en~or:cement in \;,hkh ,h,e:oin stuffed inside .rro]df.sh
srnpp<:d to th<- cmted Stales tn:.m <.:mna was successfnllv urt.er
cepted. Suspeds were arrested b()t.h .in the Llwted Stutes imd the
1-:Rc. Tfry PJ'(C then ag.n;)d t? send :ne c;f their defe!1donts. tu the
Lmteu. t>L<Jtes to be a w1tness m the L.S. Uovernment's cas<:' mvolving the seized heroin. The agreement to send this witness to the
United States was considen;d a high point in U.S and Chinese law
enforcenwrd cooperation. The high point hetarne the low poinl.
whcm the wiUl'""" dxtimed politieal asylum, 1'1.nrl the Unit.:.d Stabs

wns unabh~ to xetu.r.n the \VitnHss to Chinn under the pn;visions of


U.S. immigration Jaw!D
Tlw current ch.ill in law enforcement ::ooperation between thc
PRC and th(, United States is alarming due to the increased narcotics activity within the PRC, RS well as the PRC's impending
takeover of Hong Kong. 'l'be DEA currently has no pre;Hmce in the
PRC, and the United .States h.as no extradition treat.v ;vith the
PRC,
,

to

,.\.?s~nce of diplomatic reiatim1s wilh \'i<:tlH>ll! is a !l'aj:~r cone ern


L)S la\V eninrcenH~rH duH to the ~lct.1V1t.Y of f~thruc '\qer..natnest>

g~\ngs._ /\.lthough tj.~. ~ol~cy ha.fi alkwed V[eLmmH6P n:i;;~ns tp irn


U11!;'Tat:<~ to the Umtea Stilti<S, rnany as wwccompa.n;ed tmnor~,
there is currently no '.'?HY !;!) dceport or extrad.ite Vietnl.ltne:l{: illegal
Dr criminal aliens clue to the lack of U.S, n~latkms with Vietnant.
SincE the Vietnam vvar ended in 1975, Congn,ss hns enacted l!tg-islat.ion92 that in recent yen:rs has allowed us many us 48,000 Viet
namese to immigrate to the United Swtes, The vast majority of
those irnmir:,"rati:ng from Vietnam w the United States are screened
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service within Vietnam
w-ith the cooperation of the Vietnamese govenm10nt Hov;ever, little
o:r no effort is made t.o screen these immigrants for criminal back-

growids.
Law er.forcement cooperat-ion between thn United States and the
major Southeast Asian heroin cu.ltivating and producing countries
is equally important due to the prevalence of heroin trafficking
among Asian organized crime groups. Of the t.hree major cultivating a<1d producing countries-Bnnn.a., Laos, and Thailand-the
United States has what are gene:raHy considered good law enforcement relations \\oith Thailand only. 'Law enforcement cooperabon
with Burma, .,.,hich is credited v.ith 60 ne:rcent of the world heroin
production, is virtUElly non-e:dstent,

"J Te~Hlrnony ':lf P.s.l~'Tt &m.r.cr, Adm.tni$tr.:tor, Drn.g t.:nfm;~n.le!:lt t\:imittHI;.:rnuor. befo"N~ t.ht!
Juchd.ary C'Jmmit-t~. May 19. l99Z.
!l:S.t_J:t:iU!:lWft i\!'l'te.r.d.ment to L.h~ Fl.J'reig:: Open~ti()nU .:\pprupriavivm:: Ar::t C",f 1~; (P.L. W1l5'7>; t\~t u{ Octdx~ 21, tMZ ~:P.L 97~}5!/J and A.~l. d Decemtx<r 2'2. j957 \P.L~ 1{)0~202.1 both
a.mf:lldmg the lm.m;g"rt~tion. sr:ri Na!~urwli\y !v:i. of J.952.

s~mHc

SJ001396

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00220

Appendix 7

53
CANADA

Carwdian-U.S. Jaw enforcermmt coo~\eration in joint investigations is very good, particuJarly in drug investigat.ions. The vast majority of heroin ontring Carwd2 f'rom Southeast. 1\..sia is destined
for N.:;w York City, so it it; irnporbnt th11t such cooperation continUl'<.

In attempting to fight Asian organized crime. cooperation between American and Canadian law enforcement authorities is criticaL Canada's lax immigration laws and enforcement aiJd the open
border between t.he Unit.ed St..ates and Canada result in Canada
serving a;; an entry po.int for criminal elements from the Far East
who want: to establish onerations in the United States as well as
in Canada. Canada has exuerienced a dramatic increase in l>.sian
irnntit:rratinn in re.Ct"'!Dt. verrrS~
A:;ian 01gani;~ed c1in1e has firmly est.ahli:>hed itself in Canada's
mii!Jor cities, most notably Tomnto and VancotPWL Asian organized
crime rnernber:_s are also ,f;.ctiv? .in C~llE[My, Montreal, Winnipeg, E\J.
montnn, and l:laskatoonY" As1an tnaa nnd street. gang members m
Canada am active in heroin trnflir.king, extortion, illegal gambling,
robbery, prostitution, murder, r.nonBy .!HtmdErring, and fraud. The
potential impact on the United States was outlined by Detective Inspector .Roy '1'eeft of the Toronto Joint Task Force who testified
that in excess of lOG Triad members had lllready applied for immigration into Canada frorn Hong Kong in anticipation of 1997. He
add<;d that "Over the past few years, our lax immigration laws
have afrected our American neighbours by allowing criminals into
Canada who have been using our country as a sprin~oa.rd int) the
U.S.A. wher-e they ront.i.nue the.ir criminfl1 activities.'
Hong Kong residents do not need a vha to enter Canada. Canada
is act.ive.ly trying 1:.0 attract immigrants frorn Hong Kong viho could
infuse capital into the cotmtry. The Canadian Constitution ~;"ives
anyone present on Canadian. soil nyany of the, riP.hEs of a citizen of
Canada and makes deportation a tengtlly ana cuffi.cult process. In
addition, information gathered througn intelligence channels is not
admissible in 1nnnigration hearings.
Canadian authorities need to
abie to exclude triad and gang
members before they arrive on Cs.nadian soil. As Detective Yates
of Toronto po.inted <mt, "Not only can we expect a gro'lvth of Triad
members "v:ithin Canada if thev are not refused entry, the number
of potential victims of crime v.ifl also increase dramatically." 114

oo

JAPAN

Numerous difficulties currentlv impede cooperation between


Japan and the United States in efl'Orts to stem the influence of Japanese organized crime groups.
The Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) ~\'lhite Paper on Police 1.991" reported that there were over 88,000 members of Japa
nese organized crime groups as of December 1990. The NPA has
detailed information regarding these groups, due to the former
practice followed by J'apanese crime groups of submitting memberB.3Csm..e.d'i.a>i. Arr.aociaticn ofCMefa ct P(il.il..'e, 'Orgaoil:ed Crime

48.

~'i'ei:Limony

of Detective Kenneth Yates,

Met.~:t--.;litrut

Corr..mit~-re R.epi::J\.,

1991," p. 4S-

TarontG ?ohce Depa:rt..ment, before PSI.

June 18. 1992

SJ001397

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00221

Appendix 1

ship lists tD the poliee. Prior to !\larch 1992, when H new anti-gang
law took effect, Bo:ryokndan groups opemted quit' openly. As a. uisult, the NPA possesses r:xumsiv11> infonnation about ,Japanese
crime group members and associates, includinr.; those who have
t.rnveiea w ft)r,;ign cou.nt:ries.

Numerous law enforcement representatives have complained of


the, ditncnlty of obtaining criminal bwlligence information TJ.}garding JaparHlse organbed crime from the ,Japmwse NPA. Some law
eni0rcement agents have been successful in procuring intelligence
information on an ''unoffidal" basis. Such information i~ irnportont,
but of limited use iu bringing piosr;cuiions against ,Japanese gnng
memrwrs who tnnnnit crimes in the United States, including v-Isa
fraud. Only r.are.lv have V,S, officials been ahle t1; obtr.~.in of\t{Jnl intelligerH~-' frotn tht! ,Japanese Government, r.nd then nsuHHy only
after long delays, This is reportedly the rr.sult cf ve1~y strict Japn
nes;:> Mtitudes and laws with respect. tn privacy, whkh I<!Hd to great.
hesitancy on the part of Japanese omcb!s asked to releas(; infor
mation about Japanesr-: eitizens,
An additional problem stems fTom the fact that the ,Japanese pvtice operate under a udual criminality" sumdnrd. They will disseminate in:Jrmation only if the alleged criminal uttivitv is abo a crime
ip J:_;pan, Since Japanese laws targeting organize-:1 crime are still
aevaioping, there are gaps-such as in the important area of moner
laundering-v;hich sf;'rvo to prevent net~d(~d t~cce~q tG informatioi1
and evidence by U.S. law entbrcemenL
, IJ? li_ght of ind:i:;atiops of si.g~ifkil_n~ .Japtu'"'M! m'_gani:t.<~0 erirne actr,rt~;y m the Umted States, 1t lS critical tnat tne t:>:(;eunve Branch
pursue discussions with Japam;se authorities regnrding these concerns. Diplomatic channels shmdd hf ut.ili:wd to convince th;-) Japa
n(~se Governrne11t to improve inli!rllational law eooperation.
R.ECOM.MENDATWJNS

Bold new approaches are needed t.o better combat Asian organized crime and the new international criminal which Asian crime

groups represent.
l.!i'l'F.!L'1ATJON AL li\'IT!ATr.'!cS

These approaches should include the follovring initiatives at the


international leveL
1. Streamlined and formal mechanisms for exchange of evidence.
information, and intelligence, as well as for extradition of pris:
oners, are essential and must continue to be developed,
2, Consideration should be given to expar1cling the anti-crime role
and authoritv of entitles such as the United Nations and Interpol.
Interpol currently serves primarily as un international message exchange intermediary among polk~ agencies,
,
, 3. Expande,d exchanges of lu.w enforcement personne:l am~n;,;; uf
lected ccu:ntries should be encouraged. Por example, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation should consider increasing the number of
la.v enforcement cfficers from ft,reign countries, especially fron1
Asian countries, who attend the FBI's National Academy in
(;;lkantico, Virginia., as weH as offering training for fordg:n law ~n
forcement officials iJl other fb:rums, Proposals such as "V.'n1te
Lotus," a DEA plan which would bring law enforcement officials

SJ001398

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00222

Appendix'7

55

from Southeast Asian countries ta the United States to work iointlv


with the DEA in developing anti-drug case.s nnd lntellrgenc(;,
should be implemented. The Italian American Working Group,
whk}l,.;has foste;-,ed ~uccess('ul joint efforts ~gains.t I..a Cosa Nostra
by L.b, ana Itallan taw enforconwnt. agencws, m1ght well serve as
a m-~del for developin[' similar coormrative eftt);ts with A3ian coun
tries.
'

4.. While the Drug Enfim:ement Agency currently has 1.1 subslfm
<i:;J presence in Southeast. Asian comitries. the involvement of
AsiaD crime groups in international crifninal B.ctiviti~~s .extends "vall
bc'yond rlntg trafficking. Conscr.pHmtl?, agencies such as the Fedend Bureau of Im,1st.igation and the lrnmign1tion and Naturaliza
tion Servic(' shm.dd consider expanded roles for their personn<tl sUI
tioned in t.LS. t~rnbassies in Southet:nn. A.sian eou.ntf-ies,. iro avoid
and resolve contHcts among the various agencies, the State Department mu.st exereise more effective control.
5. The Central lntelligen(e Agency is perfonning a ''aluable sen
ice ~n the G.ht. against .A>ian o~gan~zed crimi!_. through_ the. anal:~sis
performed by 1ts AntJ-Narcotlts Control Center. C:ons1deratwn
should be given to expa.nding the CIA's analysis function beyond
narcotic,s. traf?c~ing si?;e<: :nany Asian oq,{anized t~rin:"" groups ore
mvclvea m cnmma1 ecr.rnt.Ies other than nrug traifiCkmg.
6. 'I'hose countries wh.ich eil'ectively !;erv,, as sanctunries for
intematlon.al criminals by their refusaf to extradite such crim.inals,
or to prosecute those within their bounda.rius who engage in international criminal activities, should be subject to international sam>
tions. Gonside1atlon should be given t.o expanding 22 U.S.C. 2291.
which imposes sanctions on countries not cooperating in thH fight
against drug trafficking. Sanctions could be expanded to include
th;-se countries sfonrin~ as s~nctua0e~. for the new int1mwtional
cnmmals who are mernnars nt orgamzed cnnw groups, wnether en
gag<:d in drug trafficking or other intematio!H1l criminal activity.
7. Major efforts are necessary to improve Jaw enforcement co
operation with Taiwan. A recent n~:,rreernent between the United
States and Taiwan provid.ing for exchange (rf evidence and wit
nesst'<s in criminal prosecutions is an important first step. NevH~
theless, Congress shou.ld amend the Taiwan Relations Act, to re
move any doubt that may exist as to wh(!ther the United States
can enter into an extradition agreement with Taiwan, and such an
agreement should be negotiated as soon as possible. U.S. Jaw enforcement liaison o.ffidals should be stationed fu.ll time in Taiwan
(with the consent of the Taiwanese government) to establish liaison
channels for excha."lge of information and evidence about criminal
activity of mutual interest.
8. \~ihile the Japan-ese Government has recently adopted new
:mti-organized crime laws, the effect of these laws remains to be
seen. What is clear is that the heretofore anemic ,Japanese law enfon:~ment efforts against Boryokudan ga.ngs have had an adverse
impact. on the United States and other countries where the
Borvokudan have begun t0 extend their influence and investments.
The fa.ilure of Japa.'1ese law enforcement officials to share infom1a
tion and intelligence about Borvokudan members in e timelv fash
ion and in a ftJlm which is legally admissible in U.S. courts has se
verely h;mdicappl.':d U.S. lavt enforcernent efforts.

SJ001399

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 _ 00223

Appendix 7

56
The ex<;cutivo branch should make a priority the neg.otiation of
formal and informal agreements with Japan to promptly Jmprove
law enforcement cooperation in part:icular evidence, information,
and inteiligence sharing.
In furtherance of this effort, the 8t.ate [hmart.ment should amend
current visa re5>ulations to make Bor;;okudt:i.n membership an inde,
pendent basis for den:ying a visa. While Boryokudan members with
criminal records are curren(:ly subje.ct to visa dan.ial, many
Boryokudim members do not hHvE, Hrrest records.
9. As the 1997 PR.C takeov~?r of Hong Kong appronchks, in
creased strains in the current good working relaLionship HnHmg law
enforcement authorities may be anticipated. The United States
should cont.irn.<.e b.) press Hong r-:ong and British authorities for better int.elHgenc(-) sharing r(~g;irding t.riad HH~rnbers ~1nd organizations. su~pped u.p effort~ by U.S. CODSlJiar and immigration officials
to prevent triad rnemlwrs from coming to the United States are
necessary. TiHo rec<mt State Department initiative makJng triad
memb.;rship an independent ground for v-isa denial is encouraging.
Negctiution.s should continue and be completed as soon as pos.
sible to ensure that law enforcement cooperation between Hong
Kong and the United States will continue post-1997 under the uone
country-two systems" concept.
DoM5'Tlc lNtTI.ATIVF.S

On the domestic level. substantial add'it.ional attention and law


enforcement resour.ces must be devoted to Asian organized crime.
1. Law enforcement officials at all levels hnvl' end()rsed the task
force approach, This approach hdps to diminnte jurisdictional ri
valries which have proved to bf n nwjor hinderance t~l law enforcement efforts to combat Asian organized crime and allol'lS law en
forcement personnel t.o take nd\..-n.ntH(;<!: of dh~parate laVt' enforct-Jment jurisdiction and expertise.
The task force approach should bl.' imp!emented to combat Asian
organized erime in all jurisdictions where practical. The tasl> force
should be a partnership of Federai, State and local iaw enforcement entities. In some cases, a case speciflt: !.ask force could be established that would later expand to an ongoing task force. Task
force participa11ts should, where possible, be housed in t.~e same location.
2. Law enforcement agencies at all levels in the United States
should recruit and hire Asian language speakers and train current
employees in Asian 1anguage skills.
To combat Asian organized crime it .is essential that individuals
proficient in Asian languages and knowledgeable about. Asian cul
ture work at alJ levels of law enforcement. Such persons are essen
tial for encouragi..?Jg community cooperation, conducting undercover
operations, and developing cooperative witnesses. Lingtdsts are
needed to l1e!p manage cou.-:i; authorized wiretaps and perform
other essential functions.
Law enforcement agencies should also utilize the foreign Ian
guage expertise of other agencies. For exarnp!e, Department of Defense language specialists have provided occasional assistance to
Federal law enforcement agencies. These efforts should continue.

SJ001400

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00224

Appendix 7

57

U.S. law enforcement ageneks have thus t:ar failed t;o make seri
ous efforts Lo recruit Royal Hong Kong PoHce offida!s, despite the
fact that most ~vitncsses who testif1ed br,fore tht! SubcornmitterJ
agreed that such an endeavor would be fruitful. Many Royal Hong
Kong Police oiiicers are reportediy interested in leaving Hong Koug
prior t.o 1997. Canada and Australia are currently exploiting this
potential resource, and the Unjted States should do the same. If
necessary, Congress should enact 1egislation to facilitate such re
cru.iting efforts.
S. Law enforcement a~;encks al all leveb should implenH?nL
measures desig-ned tn r~ach out to /\sian communities in order to
g!.dn their trust and underst-anding., Such measures mny ind.ude
Lelephone "hotJines" which allow crimes to be reported in Asim1
languages; aggressive public information pmgnuns designed to in
crease reporting of crime; and joint Federal-locnl efi~?rt.s lo develop
better relations v.'ith lociJ.l Asian commw-Jitit:s.
4. The U.S. Secret Service, which has primary responsibllity for
enforcement of credit card fraud st-atutes, should d}Vote sufficient
attention and resources to the growing problem of A:;ian organized
crime .involvement In fraudulent credit card manufl\cture and distribution. While manufacture of fraudulent cards is centered in
Southeast Asia, the impact is being felt by U.S. consumers who ultimately pay higher interest rates to cover the losses suffered by
card issuers.

5. U.S. law enforeHment efforts against ll.sia:n organized crime


money laundering are weak, uncoordinated and ineH:ocUve. The
1991 surpius of $2.6 hillion returnin<> to the Unit-ed States from
H_ong Kong sugg;est tho in;men:;ity of t~e problem. The. e;,;ister_Jce
of such a large 1mbalance m currency !1ows can bo an mmcatwn
of illegal money laund.~ring activity. Ji'or example, one billion dol-

lars per year in surplus currency returned from Panamu to the


Un iteci Stat('S in the mid-1980's. This surplus was cited as evidence
of t.he use of Pe..namanhra banks f(1r money laundering by South
American cocaine cartels. 95 Neither the Interr<al Revenue Service,
U.S. Customs, DEA nor the FBI, all of which have jurisdiction in
the money laundering area, have thus far had a significant impact
on A<>ian organized crime money laundering,
The IRS, in particular, should crack do10m on the legal California
ca:rd duns, These clubs, which have in some cases become centers
for .A,sian organized crime activity, including money laundering,
have thus far escaped close Jaw enforcement. scrutiny. Treasury department reguJat.ions should be clarified to make clear that such
clubs are required to file reports det-ailing large cn.sh transactions.
In addition, the State of Califomia shou.ld move to exercise more
effective control over the operations of these clubs.
6. Asian organized crime figures are taking advnntage of the new
commm1ications technology. Law enforcement must keep pace with
technologiea1 developments. New digital telecommunications technology, for example, poses potentially significant technical prob.
!ems for aut-horized wire intercept capabilities of Jaw enforcement
authorities. Legislation may be necessary to ensure that law en~Hearing

of PS! on DrtA!Js !VV1 }J.o:uy LaL!n.dt'nng v-;. PtJJ?.am;:a, Jan.UB.lj' 28, ! gs.;t S. Hre.

l00-854.

SJ001401
Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00225

Appendix 7

58
forcement agencies ean maintain access to new telecommunications
systems through court-authorized sunreillance.
IMMIGRATION fSSUES

Immigration lnws and practkes musl be reformed to help limit


easy access of Alrian organized crime mem!x:r$ t.o the United StatN;
anci speed deportation of such memb(~rs.
L Current penalties for alien snmggling and visa fraud are inadequate ..Alien srnugglin~ has become a lucrativ<o business for Asian
organized crime operative;, who run little risk of prosecution or of
serious penaltie3 E,ven when they are pro$er;uted, Under current
sentencing guidelines, eonvictions currently resu.lt in sentences of
less than 6 months. Visa fraud cases. e\ren when successfully .prosecuted against Asian organiz~)d crim0 memb.;,rs, seldom result in
significant pena.ltir~s. Congress should enact legislation similar to
the D'Amato amendrnent, adoptod by the Senate as an amendment
to 8. l?Al, which would adjust sentencing guidelines substanLinlly
upward for vioiations of 8 O.S.C. l324(a) (alien smuggling) if certain factors t,xist, indud. iny. the. smu&tgling of five or more aliens or
of persons associated wiL11 organized crim(!, or if the aliens are
treated in an inhumane fashion.
2. The Immigration and Naturalization Service must become
n;on!. inv9}v.ed in ~he fight~a~ainst 4-~ian organized c.ri~e. INS_officulls testlTYJn7 beto:re the ouncomm1ttee on November o, 1991 mdJ
cr>ted that INS would be establishing AsiRn crime task forces to
specifically atta.ck the problem of Asian organized crime. Subse
q,uent w-ritten communications from INS indicate, however, that
tne 1NS no longer int.~nds to create such task forces. f'Jor has INS
made a sustained eommitment. to assigning its investigators t.o task
forces where stnh task forces exisL Aslan t)rga.niz(;d crime figu.res
who entil:r the United States freQuently obcai11 visas nnder false
pretenses or violat-e other immigratiori' laws and. ar!t potentially
subjed to prosecution and deportation. No sustained or coordinated
effort has yet been undertaken by INS to enforce current immigration laws aera:inst Asian organized crime leaders. This must change.
Congress should consider mandating creation of special INS task
forces to accomplish this task.
3. Obtaining adequate detention space is essential to fully enforce the }mmi~ation laws. Key ports of entry !~or alien smugglers
suc<h as .Ne'.v \ ork, Los Angeles, and San l<'rnncisco are frequently
over.vhelmed with illegal entrants who, because of t.he lack of d<:tention space, are released on parole, in many cases never to be
heard from again. But as one INB official testified, "Detention is
t.ruly a deterrent. 1t works." 00 Congress should therefore take steps
to provide additional detention facilities by re-allocatin~ <cx.isting
space to INS for the purpose of det~'l.ining undocumented aJiens.
':L Coq:ress should considet: amending: current.lmmigration, lav~:s
to grant INS summary exduswn aurlwnt'J for aliens who amve m
the United States with fraudulent documentation or v.-ith no documentation >,vhatsoever . .Many of these aliens have destroyed their
documents en route in an attempt to avoid scrutiny of the:ir docu
ments by INS officials at the point of entry. Aliens are freqLtently
se'l'c:s.Lim~.Jny

fore PSl,

of Michael

Nr.,v~rnl:;.:t"

~ropres,

INS

Exc::n~ve

AB.Eocia.w C...ommi&i.iuner for Opm-a.t1ona, b&

S, 1991.

SJ001402

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00226

Appendix 7

59

arrivi<Jg at U.S. ports of. entry with no travel documents w!wLso


ever. The lack ot detention spat:(< means th?Y t~re frequenuy pa
roled into the United States without any certain knowledge by INS
officials of the real name of the alien, aild r.(rta[nJy vrithotit a.ny ussurance whatsoever that the alien will ever return for an exdusion
hearing. Carefully limit-ed summary exclusion authority for INS officials would deter such efforts.
CONCLUSTON

Asian organized crime

pr.~szmts

an increasingly formidable cha.l-

lenfJe to law e.nfiJrcernt~nt thnn1ghout the v.;orld. The HKten.si.on of

Asitm orgunized cri!lli:? from its origins in the Fur East to Lhe Unit ..
ed States and els<)where has been clearlv documented. Asia.n crime
groups have proven themselves to be d)nunnic, sophisticated, and
internationally connected.
Law enforcement. in both the United States and abroad must
take the necessary stepH to recognize, pursue, and prosecute A. .>ian
criminal figures. New anproaches rtre necessary, and such ap
proaches must seek t,o dramatically incn:~ase the level of international c.oorcli11ation. A failure to do so will only serre to further
endanEer Asian-American communities and ultimately t.o threaten
the sruety and weB-being of all citizens.
The following Senaoors, who were members of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations at the time of the hearings, have
Hpproved this report:
Sam Nunn
\Villiam V. Roth, Jr.
John Gle1m
Ted Stevens
,James R. Sasser
WilliamS. Cohen
David Pryor
Joseph Lieberman
Other Senators, who are Members of the Committee on Governmental Affil.irs, approving this repo:rt are:
Daniel K. Akaka
T'ne Members of the Committee on Governmental A..fl'airs, except
those who were members of the Senate Pe.n:nanent Subcommittee
on Investigations at the time of the hearings, did not- participate
in the hearing on which the above report is based. Accordingly,
they have taken no part in the preparation and submission of the
report, except to authorize its filing as a report made by the Sub
committee.

SJ001403

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00227

Appendix 8

0 HOPT: TRIAD
ChanTing Hung
aka ChanTai
aka ucrazy Tai"
aka Sor Chai Tai
aka Tom Hung Chan .
",
Dragon Head
""
Hui Lui

.nr

--

P<lor Chn<><i

No Tal Wh

Kvng Chu11!~ Hoi

a!< a Ch<><'9 8hJ


KI(J'""J

Australia

ak"MaoTse

r --Ng LalOn

lu1.<

Wing I lop

Cf,"'""!7 Chi 'f.1i

Chon l<wol\ Ming

--~

Chan Kw< Koung

Lo Wai Fu

aka C~o Fu
ab"Unclo"

San Fm..'1dsco

Prepared by: Uniled States Senate


Permanent Subcommiliee
on !nves!igalions.

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00228


SJ001404

Appendix 9
STP..FF S'l'..l\TEl'iENT OF SCOTT E. ORCHJ-0~D, ST.A.FF I!fVES'riGATOR
u.s. SENJ,TE PERHANENT SUBCOMMITTEE: ON INVESTIGATIONS
June 18 r 19 92

Mr. Che.irma.n and Senator.

Rc~h!

tht~

i.n

course o cur

.Ye~"I:C

long investigation into Asian organized crime, we have identified

a nurnber of rna jor

..:~sian

cr-iminal groups

~.,.hich

operate globally.

While not all

~sian

crganizatio~s

in the United States, all of the major Asian crime

groups have U.S.

criminal g=oups have established structured

connec~ions.

The focus of today's hearing

international Asian crime g=oups of ethn1c Chinese orig1n.

~s

At a

future date, we will address international Asian crim1nal groups


of other ethnic backgrounds.

ac~ivities

reaching the United States.

~hese

groups have ori;in

in Hong Kong, China and Taiwan.

Of the Hong Kong-based

gro~?s,

identified four najcr groups.

Mcsr

o=
o~

'triads",
~hase

we have

groups are umbrella

groups for various triads which a=e united only by name.

larges"C t.riad i.s t:he Sun Yee On

Sun Yee On

merrJ::ershi.~

T~~.i.ad.

The

2onse.r.-vati.ve t::?stirnc.tes

e;f

count over 25 r 000 m?3rr:.bers, but many

estimates are significantly higher.

Staff has prepared e chart of the Sun Yee On Triad and its'
international leadership.

All of the names on this

char~.

as 1n

previous charts we have in:rcduced, have been independently

SJ001405

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00229

Appendix 9
Page 2

corroborated by at least two law enforcement sources, and most


have been corroborated by other law enforcement and informant
sources as 'p""ell.

The Sun Yee On was founded in the early 1950's in Hong Konq
by the late Heung Chin.

The group continues to be controlled by

his family, through his many sons.

His eldest son, Heung Wah Yim

is the current leader, or Dragon Head, of the Sun Yee On.

Heung

Wah Yim was convicted in 1987 in Hong Kong of various crimes

related to management of a triad society.

Participation in triad

activities o:r: even triad membership is a criminal violation in


Hong Kong.

Ten other leaders of the Sun Yee On were also

convicted, but all convictions were reversed on appeal.


result,

As a

these individuals continue to promote the Sun Yee On's

criminal ventures.

Several of the names on the chart of the Sun Yee On warrant


additional discussion.

Thomas Heung, also knovrn as Heung ;-<ah

Wing, a Sun Yea On office bearer and one of the brothers of

Dragon Head Heung Wah Yim.

Thomas Heung exercises influence in

the United States through associates in the Tung On Tong in New


York!s

Chinato~~.

Clifford Wong was identified as the leader of

this group at the Subcommittee's hearing on November Fifth o


last year.

Vincent Jew, the former leader of the Wah Ching Gang in San
Francisco has also been identified as an associate of the Sun Yee

SJ001406

Plaintiff Ex. 1 I 02 _ 00230

Appendix 9
Page 3
On Triad.
response

Vincent Jew fled San Francisco to the Far East in


~o

law enforcement pressure in !984, and

in the Sun Yee On.


along with

~cny

lS

now active

He was identified at last year's hearings,

Young. who has been the leader of the Wah Ching

in Lo.s i\nge.1.es fo.r

se,;e:r~~al

year~s.

Both individuals have been

linked to the Sun Yee On Triad, and have used their ties to the

f:rcrn HonJ Kong.

C~her

s~~

Yee On leaders nave also been tied to the United

Franc:s Heung, aka Heung Wah


.::\t ~ant..Lc

i'
_.
\...- .l..

Boo~,

was convicted of an

+-,_ ""
)"

schsrne

cheating, and generatea ever 52.7 mi!lion in a !1ve month


F~ancis

Heung

~eceived

a fine, and is now in Hanq

Kc~g

On .

~he

Sun Yee On has a presence in the United States, Canada,

Australia, Thailand, Vietnam and Macao in addition to Hong Kong.


The group has been linked to a wide variety of activities,
including heroin trafficking and the control of movies and
entertainment in Hong Kong.

The second largest group in Hong Kong


groups includes ten triads,
Wo.

the largest of

lS

the Wo Group.

w~ich

This

is the We Shing

No significant We Shing Wo presence in the United States has

yet been identified.

However,

in November of 1991,

the

SJ001407

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 0023 I

Appendix 9
Page 4

Subcorn.rni ttee heard evidence t:ha t the Wo Hop To Triad, a rnerrber of


~he

Wo Group, has taken control or Asian criminal

San Francisco area.

activi~y

in the

The Wo Hop To has subsequently been tied to

activity i.n Los Angeles, Honolulu, Portland, Las Vegas 1 Atlantic


City, Boston and New York, in addition to Australia and Canada.

At the Subcommittee's hearings l.nst year 1 a chart was


presented which detailed the structure of the Wo Hop To Triad in
Today we present a chart of the international

the United States.

leadership

Hop To Triad.

noted last fall,

the

leader of the Wo Hop To Triad in Hong Kong is Chan Tai 1 also


kno~-ln

as crazy Ta.i

~~

Crazy Tai exercises authority through a

nlL-nber of other leaders, including Peter Chong in the United


States.

As Senator Roth noted in his statement, several of Peter

Chong's Wo Hop To underlings have been arrested by the FBI in

recent. "-'Beks.

Peter Chong was subpoenaed before the Subcorr.m.ittee

last yea::, but: invoked the Fifth .'\.rnendment in response to


questions.

The other leaders of the Wo Hop 'I'o in Hong Kong are

active in promoting heroin trafficking, illegal gambling,

loansharking, extortion and alien smuggling.


leader of the Wo Hop To in Australia, and is

No Tai Wah is the


ac~ive

in promoting

Wo Hop To gambling operations in that country'.

The 14K Triad comprises over

thi.r~y

an estimated membership of over 20,000.

subgroups which include


This triad is loose knit

in structure, and many of its subgroups do not have firmly


established leadership.

The

Subcorr~ittee

will hear testimony

SJ001408

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00232

Appendix 9
Page 5
today from a 14K office bearer, and Toronto Police officials will
testify
14~

1a~er

today about the 14K's activities in Canada.

The

engages in a variety of criminal activities, including heroin

trafficking, alien smuggling,


manufac~~ring

counterfeit credit card

and has connections in the United States

~or

~hese

purposes.

Th(-3' Luen Group comprises ove:c 8, 000 1nen1be.r.-s in four


subgr~)'w.ps.

The subcrouc with the most influence in North America

is t.he Kung

:..,,~)}:

Ll.S.

Triad,. y.,.hich has a. major baSf:? of operat.ions in

This group is also active in ths contrsl of

s1nge~s

t~am

connections with individuals in New York, Atlantic City, San

The Big Circle Gang, which is not a traditional triad,

relatively new
A~ny

Guards who

g~oup.

lef~

The group consists primarily of !oDnsr Red


China for Hong Kong.

The Big Circle Gang is

stores in Hong Kong as well as in heroin trafficking.


C.ircJ.t.~

Gang

n~f::1!n.bers

is a

are al.o

rnerr~bers

of a :.:riad.

explained by witnesses from Toronto later today,

Most Big

As \'lill be

the gang a1so

utilizes connections in the UniLed States and Canada.

Two

~aiwan-based

groups are also of particular importance.

The largest of these groups is the United Bamboo Gang,

~hict

has

SJ001409

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02_00233

Appendix 9
Page 6
an estimated :membership of over 20,000.

This group was formed by

Hong Kong criminals who fled to Taiwan during a law enforcement


crackdo~~

in the mid-1950's and now operate internationally in

the United States, Canada and throughout the Far East.


United

Barr~oo

The

has been active in the U.S. for over a decade, and

is most famous for a 1985 case in which members of the United


Bamboo were recruited by the Taiwanese Defense Intelligence
Bureau to murder San Francisco journalist Henry Liu.

The group

is particularly active in Los Angeles, Houston, New York and

Vancouver, British Columbia, and has been linked to murder,


kidnapping, alien smuggling, illegal g.ambling, loan sharking and
a variety of other criminal activities in the United States.

The second Taiwan-based group is the Four Seas Gang, >lhich

has an estirr.ated membership of over 5, 000.

This group, V>'hile a

traditional rival of the United Bamboo, has recently worked with


the United Bamboo in the United States in some ventures.

The

Four Seas Gang has ties i.n Los .1\.ngeles and New York.

We will hear a great deal more about these groups through


testimony of our witnesses today.

SJ001410

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00234

SJ001411
Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ 00235

Appendix 9

-------------------ASIAN ORGANIZED CRIME


(Ethnic Chinese Groups)
Sun Yee Triad (Hong Kong)
Largest Hong Kongbased Triad
25,000+ members
2,000+ office bearers
Associates In New York City, los Angeles, Canada, Australia
and Thailand

Wo Group (Hong Kong)


20,000+ members wlth!n i 0 subgroups
Wo Shing Wo Triad is largest subgroup
Wo Hop To Triad has a major base of operations in San Francisco

14K Triad (Hong Kong)


20,000+ members
Over thirty subgroups
leadership is dispersed
Associates in the United States, Canada, Australia and
throughout the Far East

Luen Group (Hong Kong)


8,000+ members in 4 subgroups
Luen Kung lok Triad has a strong presence In Toronto and has
associates in the U.S.

Big Circle Gang {PRC/Hong Kong)


Created by former "Red Guards" from China who fled to Hong Kong
Most members are also Triad members
Cells active worldwide; particularly active in Hong Kong, Canada,
New York

United Bamboo Gang (Taiwan)


Largest Talwanbased group
20,000+ members
North American operations !n Houston, Los Angeles, New York
and Vancouver

Four Seas Gang (Taiwan)


Second Largest Talwan~based Group
5,000+ members
U.S. operations in Los Angeles

L....-----------------------------___1

SJ001412

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00236

SUN VEE ON TRIAD


Heung Chin
Founder
(Deceased}

I
Heung Wah VIm
Dragon Head
..___ K<>"'~ l<.wo!V.1ng
(Convlcted of triad crlmes
"'"""'""~~~ ... ,...
fn 1987ln Hong Kong}{1) ~~~~~~~~H.,~~':1"~'i{;)

~::-~.~~<><

Foe>< o1 co""'ll Lo'-";1 s~or~

~-----

l
I
I

!
!
!
!

-~~~>:~

{<;,:-:;.:."

\
lkx~~~~~

l.o~~-~tC~Ni!Q:ro,

n..l'aX"""

~~~l'r:~~"~~U.!:,

r:t:'3d.\l-.m

.....

"'"""''"

~
... !""'fCM>ol
!~~K"""9

~-,...,,.,......,

r........

-~""'~

BonryH<J!>q
-.~~~~~;qW~

'"'""'

Ho:oq>~j'H~

fhAn

,....,"~~".;.~

.,

""""'~.t,

,.,.,t....,~

..

tL~~i~~-:~ -~~~~~ ~-:~~t; ""'"


=~'"1
Clo+<n;j~"'f..mJ
-~ lb>g~){i) ~~~~~';';'
Clf,"'"lioo>fq

------E.
1..

"'"""'I "'

1.,.. 10......"1

.l..l:lt!IIO

~n.t~

~lj:l';f<l;lo~1

.....Cfo.n

.........

~k.lilt

_.,.,.

'
...~~u.....

!'w)l;lollef

r#lld.

~fn"6.~

r~t~

.... C>iN,;""'J

,..~

. '"""''d"'"'l

tr~d~U.S.In!~

....

.,..,u..,. l

Jb}~~~k..-... ~!~f1llWW:~r

_,"""a
...~~""'3

~"'~

r.~~~~

1
Ch~~orK

1
~'"'1PnCh,:,~ttl'

~---

--

C~~.(ll'~

-r--l--1

~C3d"-

~f..n

~f<W>

Hol~~tn

'"""""' '""~

r.w,,, ""''" bwrs ""'''':too d

~ia<t ctln""' In 1001 !n Hoog K""\1. (f)

)).
"a
"a
I'D

:::s
a.
)<'
w

S!<sl~ S<>nsto
Suboornmlt1oo
oo ln'-""\lgal!c11s

Prl'pnroo by: Unft'>d

Pfl:rftnr:tnc;~t~1

Not>: ('I) Rworsed on af010Gal.

- - - - - . - ..--------

.........

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00237


SJ001413

HOP TO TRIAD

I!

Chan I-II 10 Hung


aka Ct mnTai
..
.
aka .. Cr azvTai
aka Sor Chai Tai
aka Tom Hung Chan """
Dragon Head
""'

I
l

Hui lui

I
P>Me< Chor9
Ilk" c~ Bmg
Xoo<1Q

I
NoT"! Wah
Auslf.tdla

l
Kung Ch11>g Hoi

Ng Lnl On

LmJ Wing Hop

Chetmg Chi Tai

Chao Kw<lk Ming

Cllafl !<wok Koong

Lo Wai

Ft~

Ilk& "Mao Tso

11J<~.Coofu

el<i!! "Urod<>"
S$n F:anchoo

..,..,

I'D
::'li
g.

U)

Pmparoo by: United States Senate


Permanent Subcommittee
on lnves!iga!!ons.
----------~------

------------~---------

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00238


SJ001414

Appendix 10

VENETIAN MACAU LIMITED JUNKET CREDIT AGREEMENT


~.tefiirAi\tLE15H~i~iJ1flli~i}n:Jt%~rtr:fiAffi?~~tr[q]
J.t,J',J:A:\-'10 LENDER fNFOPu\1ATION
1)f.!Jf:,ff.i Company Name: wiillff..~1E9:ii'J.i!fh~i~?.lY!;Nf!I!Al\i'!:!Ai:,~w..1JMITED____.. ..

---...

;;:~:~~ ~~:~:;: ;r~~::~~~~:;~'ni~6.;~~ ~JL~nhfrm~fii:~:'~~~~~~~~~:~'i!~~;~;~;:~-tlo2~rso1=


fg;;;t:}Sff:>f BORROWER JNFORMATlON
P!J:~t~[f.!/(. A.. f~ r.;:J ~~ f~ Junket Con1puny Name ... !!.:t:~!!;;;:-r,s::::.~.!.0:lllii;;,:;.f3L-... --.--...........................................................................
1"> -~~J:~flt Bu~:lne&s Address Aven ~da dn Jn.t~n.~~LP . . i.:J.9.n.ri~J.~!,~.~i9...J2.?~ 3 t. HdiU1tt1!1~J.6J~.Dri~J.U;. em J\.1aL'-<lU
i}BJ~~-3 Bu~!ne% Phollt:! _Q!;2 .3) 2?.li::J.t!DZ.....
~Y.:~~2~t-lfJt Eh:sines~~ Registration# 2I830(!S_Q)__ _
l#f.~'1'~'.:f)". A~iU~fc!% Junki':t License# .. JJ025 ..........
<g~).,$f{F5.if,\~:fc Perron Accoum I! JZ~3J............
..
{8B'f\f.:'!ift Crdit Limit ~lQQ...(LQQ..QQQ.JlQil(ONG KONG DOLL!'..l!.S O:NE li.UNDRED MUUON ONl.YL_

~(B:,Aj~':iSf GUA.R./1.;."/TOR

fNFOlUviATlON

tfl{#-,A.:.f'Ai'J GtH!ranl{>rName ~ii.rJ\ Ch"EUNG. CHI TAl

~~~iij~.';~~- Mutit!t! Stilt~~- Singk...___________

%r},Jbt:::if.~n~rt

Patron Acr:curH # _4-'-'-7"'5"'3"'7____


f[b,~li: Address itSJ!f::MH*'mt~;] 6lli\ G ,m

............................. _........................................_. . _.......... .

{:\:8.t1!1iki Residenc~ Phvm:{S.~?J8Jl?.:.Qill&.L(~:i.2.)2(i\iiJ.o.6.9.L .'E'ES*'i Da[eofBilth

Julv 9.1%0

#fH~:! ~l\\{,jiii~~ k~ntif\cr.tiot; Card I Passpoli # ...1lf'itJ;};_2:tl\:5.~8&:ili~~L1.Jd@4~~,5.('Q_L.

1W.~J~)... ( ijJ~1?%'\f~~~)"~:) ttfrtrqJ ffi.f2$Jf)-~~f~fl.QVJ:fJf!R1}~ ( ''P.t~tA.'') t.pg~)fit(bt.tti!:* . Aff.il:t~~~lli)\~;f.!


~*t':J~~ijt~),_.ESfi"r.p.tjjg~~~rf.f;f.;~~j:~~I~;~J;.L'"f1~~:K~~5*.~ffif.iJ :The Bon:O\.Ver~ (aka the !:Debtor~) here'by applies

for ~ crt1dit Jine \Vith Ven~t!a1"! },..1:J.cau Lirn.ited {the ~~.LemJef~) and th.~ Guarantor hereby penzouaHy guarantees the.
debt of tht: Borrower/Dcbt<.~r~ subj~ct tv the fulh::vting rerms nnd condttkm.s:
ffJ~i:),&~Af?f;!:t:F,B:B;lf'!i'~J::!ffi:1Jttt.*f;-j{Y.;;),z'tv~'4W.Y~F.flifW~if';'i:~.f~J::J:!H~~iJ~t&i'*l~.MIEti*/AA
ill!:f1.1J~8:&r%tX. .A
. EJCU,t~fi~&.rit~~fJ:J:~m~*iJ::M~.:~%:H'~tFtf!91J. ~ /Est5-~~JtftEPJffJtlt-.HfY>Ji}f:"(:Wlff~ . . \.

( -)
&.~.

'

#3ffifj~:lJtf, ;~~-flttff!R~2~JIX.~Jf:lff'J.~.Z~~-~ft%

o)

J. The Borrovi<'r and the Guarantor both attest thor ali informat.inn provided above or provided il1 the Cred!t
ApplicMbn Forms by the Borrower and the Guaramc-r tC> the Lender iH true m~d accurate, nn.d the Lend~r bas the
Bono\ver's as: \V1:H as the Chu:.rantor~s pe:rni:--,sio.n r.n (,erif)' such infonnatkxl~ including v~rifict1ti:.:m cf any listed
company or .individual crcd~t~ other tn.:s.ine:% an.d/o; crn_p.loyr.n.e.r.t hhtory~ thmugh any Iegitinwte .snnr::e,

( :.::) f,ff;t;kA&Jijf.f:). !:ui:t!Shl:~ii~:.<fH~'lf;\GV.jjl:\ii1'0Yr'tF , ilil.Jt?it;;i';f,;:)/Et!fit'J::Ai<1}:-tn~fifi'n1!J~jfi'J.~


)tt:~~~1~ti~lY~~~),. .~ ':a.ttf/~}'-'f.lJlf#ff:fbti:}-~Z~~} . ~}~~~t.:l.2~:rf.fft~-~:i.:.~-Fil:ti9fi$,q.~~~:~~t=~~
I

J)\ f*;mf${ ~)~ . A, -~JtRJi!t~ff.~.X:t !tJ3;~ ifJZ:f.~H f~! t~i. . ~Mil~1 tft~~I ~

2. Tl:e Borrower ~'ld G.ua:antor e~em~Jt ~:e Lender fro.m._"h.is duty o~ ~e;~recy:. a:J~.ho~t!?g the.Lender} ~.s long as ar~y
amotJnts. arc (!',s.red ~o t.ne LeDdex trv tne .Borrower. ~o d:tEdose to tmrd rJart1es the mforrnatwn p:rov1cred abc.,.e. cr
provided in the Cre.rl.it ApplJc:atio;l Fonn o: the. emount of credit n{ved, to the extt~nl required to nbtai:1 .the
lepaymenr of (":.rt.'tJlt granted to the. Borrower pursu~n'; t(~ thjs agreer.nel~{.

(;:::) J.tt/\ iiJ{ti'i lJJli .:-.A-~t~.t.t~~~fr%&-&.~ill~~O{'tf$)J\.$(f,"!fff.:),.fg~-fifRJJ~;j,~)..__.-;::~;p- -~


3. Th.t.-: addre..~se' ~~~ted abov:."! will serve <lS propnr nctice to the f:k~rro'-Ner or to the G--uarantor of any demtind

SJ001415
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00239

Appendix 10

( /1:1) !'ff:ltrfiH?:.A~A~~}~JJ>.&~!.lRA~itf.llf.fltSJJ{:f.:ff%~3b.ti~\f\)j':;~J!!Jl~.ITH::.!JS:l.!E ~'Jf.i~:Jt


.~A~i.f~M1fr?l'13FFJJill'dl<'J{'F7J.rF ,;,:L&~fi~Jij)l)(flf:WBfiH'lf;'fu\'~l:t\;zJt.W;~ i.Y.1'Um:=:=:~(tlfHi!M~1it
~~J~tulf~~)!{8Jflj~i~1

\1

4. Personal or com.pany data or any ether related infor:nation provided by tin: Borrower as well as by the Guar<l:Itor
will be subject to automated proce.ssing hy tim Lt:nder fer the pmpDse~ of analyzing credit risk and ensuring t.he
repayment of amounts :ent to the Borr.ower, and for credit risk inquiries to third party credit agencies.

( fi J P!rtJ1t,%i:f{:iSJF:t ;;T t.z~~~l&\Wff~1H::i:\~3Kit~k:4 , sit. B. {ff~j,F "'t1i';'f&.JS1.9 ) .. i~I''JJ!ft!S1iJilJA5} EJt~~

~~tt(Jit~l'f.l;_I;1:.~~8'J~f!.\; ,

5. Credit isst1ed by 1he Lender to the Bnrrnwer shail be only grunted by me~r;s of transfer of casino chips of the
Lender l<.l be used by tlte Borrower solely \Vithin the Venetian ~Aacati Li:dted casincs f{'Jr legitimate casino play
pUlJOSSS.

( /\ ~ ) {'~t.l.. ~*:.tf!t\}J1lH~f:t~f;J.:;t:~~r~.Hff}J!;:0:WJig}iill~~J.L~~~(1-fKDLOMQ9..100D.00).~J?t~1J!a~f,~

~~1~0 ~~)Ji~~:;;}~~~.;r;~,~~t.,~~~o~::~t'l~~i{~~~~.~~;l~~r~(~::_t~'-~,~~ ir. c<~sino chips up to Lie amo,;;,t of


( 7\ ~ =) iW.~J~ A..~1 ~ ~~;~ifi:~fll~Jfi~~z,;\)-..ifi.J?tlffJ~~J,fij~:~~}.~tt9.4~~--rJ{{NfP . .~L**& -f;}fflj~:!!!t ~
'ffk&!lJ.~~1'!;J:!yfi~ttJ;~Tf.&.1;~~I.~~fF-'1Bl' ,

fit.:+

62, The avlilfabHity of the credit lihe shaH be conditiona! 1.1pon ;he receptioD by {he L~nder Df a Prur.niti5ory N~...1tt~
("Livruuga") ctnJ a Lctt<:r of Consent C'l'acw de Precnchimcr:to") in favor of !he Lender, as attached to thi!i
Agreement:u Annex 1, and sec.ured by the Guarantor as lmd(~nv:riwr CAvalista' 1).

<i\ \ .::. ) ~ffi!Jif:~ ~-J:rt~~ttf~ , f~:(,-:'f~(fiftRt~-f-gr*~t.J. . n~rz.1rmsJA-~.3N


63. Sub_1ect m the provision above, tht~ credit mn}' be wits."ldra.\J:.'"Il u.pm; reque~f. of tht~ Borrower.
( f~ \ r21) ~~tJ~~JlJ:.ffhl~lriJffrM-}f:'~~fD.:tt~.tz~~ffi1~*~flH/.1f~.r~~(mlb~ff:ff}(t~~~ (lY1adwr)
,lJB.~f.i~~-~i':'~Lt::t.Jim~~JfL~:~ ;)~Jt>ztf~:if.fr!t1'~{ff;j;:l::~I~ ([vfarker) ~~fPHJf.~fS;. ~

UWH3 :?g~~~t -

fW8t/-~

~.4. EaJ.:_~I <.a~d:t g;.~an!.ed under t~tl.s agrcernent shall_ be paid il; the ma~uDty d~~.to srawd in (~.t~ch negodable instrument
tiv1a.rker) w1Hcn \V1U be ex.ecuted by the Bm''i'\~"Wer for each Wlthtir<1\.Vi1L

( /~ E.) ~{;W;ft.:}~1ff51d~~f.r);7:~t, fD:t{r.f.~~iL~i~!.f-~~1~{JiEJfkUR~t~2:ffr~~llR-:~ge~tf...fZ(..A..!E1ii.fftJf~~.~~


i!l'f~i!..ii'iW4'~\)..;;.';:'ill'rT'f;t~~~31!1l!.W;tt:W ?t.iili M~.\iltMl'<J)\btJ:b~::l T~)<(f~t#'J.1:!it:*~;l!!J'lifi'*
13'Rht~if%ftgj]j;~ ) f:i.iTI.'A:l~ ttJfEt~ifrm;\.A.8~1a~~EPg~ ~
6.5. The Lender may refuse any request of cnxHt wlK~ne.ver ~he Borrvwer has aay outstanding atnount to be paid to
!he Lender~ whenever the reque~t is above ihe lh:nh of the credit gra.ctted under this agr=.;ernent ox \vhcnever a
matedaJ advcr~e ch!1nge oo~UfS 1 in Hw cn.mmcrcially re~sorHtble cpinkm of the Lender, in the s~~ope or natura of
bu.::;iness~ operationt assets or fin~"'ciaJ. conditions oftb.e Borrr;wer 7 in iL;; ability to per.fh:nn its obligationt"t hereunder.

( 1". " /\)

;.f.:?J!:a:J-JcHi~Z.{fl~I!~~'f!T~J@{f.fJ~5~ . .A.. rl~J!:fJ ~j-tffffi]JOJ:),f;~Jf- , {.-ffr;;t::),_.&,!:$(:.A.&~.ffi#:lJ:iTi~~-;~:f:1

!5:1~Hf4~ ::.~~:c: lW~t?ft.,A..F:f.ff.1:t2lf&5T41~*r'

I)

6.6. The r.n.~d.it Hne granted under this agree:.nent.~ !nay be i.ncr..za.sed at Borrower's request! \Vho} toge~he.f with the
Guarantor) must sign a :'Jun.ket Cu.:dit Line l::v~n~ase Recp..1e~t', in the tOrm presented a~; A..-1nex 2 of this agrc~.:n~nt.
( f; t;) !#T.O:A1Ji$~#i!"-1flf.nTiiiiDtl!.if:~l8:tS'tffikAJ$C::;Jtl{'U,.5F'l:#~iYJ4<i'rfJJ:~f'Jf+-,z ;$:~"'\Z .. MiBJ.\1\

~T:~.&J\I:;t;If/''.l1.!Ui~rt~XF~bf:.J"~l&f1:{lJ~
6;7. The availability of the increase...-1 credit 11ne shall be conditional up0n the .rt:~:eption by rhe L::,ndcJ of a n~w
Pn.m1issory Note C~Lhrti.nya:=) and a Letter of Co.nsew. ('t,.ado de Preenchimcntoll) in favor of the Lendor, us
an ached to this Ag(l-!emen.t. ~1s Annex l~ and se~-:tn~d by 1h.~ Gn;:s~ntor a::. ll!lderv..-THer (".Avv.lista 11 )-

wf"

SJ001416

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00240

Appendix 1 0

U: , f..,) 251-~{~~521 Jt-FJJi5Jtf~t)J!r;(~~At:IWtP.fi <P~t-i11<J{~J.r~llil{-;\T~;),:o/.:~Re#li!Jl:T ii?Z-i.1~~~ ('~

lrr

j""' ~ f!it: .lli.?llJJ lm~ A f,.tJh:; J;J @J A :6 ~ l~~ iK1 {t!R fif: !\~ flrr I* ~A fl1T Fi ~:A tr'j {a j;f~ ~ W1 1ifi Wfit -r~.
{HKD lOOJlOO.Q.Q.QJ)_Q.).
6.9. For valuable consideration, r.,;.eipt ofwhic:, is herehy aGknowledg:ed by the Bo1Tower ar1d which includes the
g:-anting and extension of a casioo crcd.it line by Creditor to the Borrow0r (Account.#,1].'i5S3), 1.hc Guarantor
personally and unconditionally gu~mntees th~ paymeD.t, to the Creditor of ~ny amot:nl requested by the Borrower's
under ;:he credit line g<nnted m this agreement up to the amount and including Q.tn:; HllNLlllliD M!LL!Ol';' HQNO

I<ONQ__QQLL. ".!,R.~.G'iKD lOO.ooo.ooo.Oo).

t!f:'ff.' ~:JJHtit'iltt.AS~lt-6-I~Ji'\~~?;:f.19-i.mf5:'ifB'f~J:J!!i~'Jt1:E , t:;w*t/J~W:l?'.i&f=.t;fl;il!iJ%:Rf:f.mi' , i!B'il?:A


WU~i!~P~W&fS:ff . A. ~~~f5l{~J~~J} UJf.lW~fi~}J~.Jffll* 63 6 fft~~h~:ff::~3.ft!1G.{t1~iEiW~1ff~X).,.~ ~Tfl~ fJ~ ~ ~~~ml!f

ft.:J,~:trn=:f}~)~.f/i}.:.~}'ti~*i~it~Xi&:Hi!t.HRN:fffi :Further, Grmnmior is jcintly ar,d severally liable for a.ny amount owed by th<: Hom)\Wf uncl~t this Agreemem. In the
event of any tit~fqull in payrnenl by BG;rower~ Guanmror agrees that 1/1\<!L ma~t comn1cnce collec-tion efforts o!
related \ega! pror:<X!rhng directly ag;linst Guanntm for the ddimlwd pr<yme<tt without t.he r.eed of exhaugi\ng b;
collection (:ffhns a.gain~r Borro\'!er/Debtor, ir: ac('. (.)Tdance lAril"l.: a.nd fur fhe. purpo.r;es of !ll~kle 636 nf the ~.;1.~cau
Civil Code.

( t~) ft~J.:/\J;:;J32!\~'J1i{t!t8%,~1':fffj!Jlli!J~tf.7ti;)Wi:!{):Ur!!l:t..1~fii;,~.\Will!;i:#:Z.HHM~.it'tiff~t~2f'17it~kA
7. The Borrovrt.~r shall pny to the Lender th.e am.ounf of the casino d1ips transfZ!rred t'o the Boaowei" r~o Jaf.er than the
cL:e dc.tc stated tOr e-ach withdrnwJl.

( ;\ ) f~~rttt ~~~1.f:fT}:.;~:tlWJ~m~affurGJ:*;rftiJVJt~.~'F:1:1ir~~i'fl~~ Hirit~J\.Z.t'k~1\I~Miffi:.~J~Zif!~,


I

fi 18% , 'f1L~~.~t~~i:1~X.tll\8U.fi.e~..:~~~~t~~~fi~t1!11i~:
8 .L /\ny instaUrnc.nt or Hn.tount loaned not p;.dd or) the due date(sJ set oul for ec.d: wirhdmw"E.d sheH be subject to

default im.erest at the rate of l8%~ per annurn.l

fxon: the date they be-c:on1e due ~nd

1'"'h t-Y~tr- (.t,.,JI h<-> '"""'"'~llr!d~\t'rl rtJl


t
....,r\r:n,rs:
Slt_.,_,._
H~ !"~.a f~~~rur""
t..t.~<
...,.~_~:.:.:.
v ...
.,>. l~._,., .>.-..,.,>~C...":.
s-naH be cornpoundea tnonthiy up to the m.mner:t the Lence:

o, ":
') ';;;('
;.< .,,,r~""
.. ~

csiC\J.mt~.d.

a~

>:);.>

,_., ...

!.

1..0,\.

,J( {;

-=:::n)i"

1"l ....
!:J,~
""":

"V"

p<lyt-.:.bk~

0L,as;~
-'",

deLern1~ne..s

until

effectiv~.~

t-''"f"''t;'tef
.~ ... """ ...

payrrmnL

anr!
._,. intef''~t
~ "''-' l S"
'v

sucn lndebtedne. .-;s w t1e fJ.tly

sett!ed.

c.:1t;

~~~~J"-~.rJ~.I.t{1f~1~ ...i-... ~tfrJ~trlti3ti~)J!~i-~tii1lp~{*fr~;$:~r~.;~A~ftfi.iJ~~;tffi~i~1

JP):S:mu ::::.) i~Stt:ruw! s ,

?J/2

c-)

9. The Lend~r m~y comp~ete any pcrticn nf any Prornissory Note CLirron;;i.i'1) e>::conted by the Borrower, and
guaramcet\ by the Guarantor by Ava!, thul muy be' missing, in:,\\Jding (!.) th~ arnn1.rnt cf credit dr.wm a:ld (ii) the

:no;\trity dai<1.

( +) {1#~fJ:),f.~Lla:t1i'~~: . A}f1I8~!J:!&ff!f?.~~M.f~r# l!f!_t%J&;fl~fEi'qJ-tt::f~~~lf.~~~!U~;f ~f:j:fill*liJXS


tWif~:NJ~0Uf':ffl& ~Z!t-ffgf1.~ ~t;}#1;7\:.~.&t4*Fjif.~~~~-~8Jlf /~~FJBi~llJ%~iNi} tiJ ~
l 0. The l3on-owor agrees to pay t~l the Lender
casino chips tra.nsferr~:.d to :he B~:HO\VCf frtX' of :my chu rgcs or
dechJction~ of whatso.wer nature at its prf-rnlses knovln as Venetion 1Y1a;:.~au LirniteJ.~ ln f\.1s.cau~ at Estrada d~ Ba1a de
N. Scn.hom Ja Esrn~rar:.ca, si'fl, Taipa, Maca\l S.A.R.
I

an

SJ001417
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00241

Appendix 10

ll..l. fn the event of any non-paynwnt by th~ Borrower andior rhe Guaramor of any flmol~'lts due hereunder, the
Bor::owcr aml the Guarantor hereby irrevocably empower the Lender (but without obligation, (In rhe part nf t.he
Lender) to apply s.ny t~rt;"(fi~ b~lance {in what.;;ver C"!.!r.tent~y) {1) standing upo.u ~:1/ accvurH. of L~e Borrower and/or of
the Guaranior in the Venetian Maca:: United casinos, (ii) hold in any other form by t.l:le Lender, r.umely any
corrunission payrnem that the Bonuwer may have earned or be entitled to thmugh. the rolling program(s) at
Vendian Ma<".JU Limited casinos, or (iii) by using any casLrw chips that the Bcrrowe: ur the Guarantor may redeem
or any fron( deposit mo1~cy of the Borrower or the Guarantor towards sntisfaction of any sum whether princip;1l,
interest or otherwise at any time due to ~he Lender under this AgrcemenL

( -1- =.) ii~J;Ef~?:z/\.~it)H*"-/PJ@.?. J.fii)~*?.lrtURTIE:.ZY.tf~ 1'~~ ..A.. &:Vkt{~J,~m~.BJJ;J,;r.:u.r~.lt.S9/5"A


~;y.-g:~:}._.ft.~f,:J f\i:ji;"iiJ~;(fF.fVt<:A ~!ii:.FJ~l(;:9f~AZ.i5~, ~t&.fT:?:fl'?i#tl:iliitl!.~JY;IlJ..<:.1't~?5?T~f.Tff{nJ

ffgiJJ&%\'~{fiTJx!t H03JttTfif~_g;:_.z~f.Et'i!~!#iik),,;;,f*,
11.2. The Borrower and the Guarantor also hereby i.rrevoc..ably er;-tpO\Ver tf-~ Lender, in tht~ event of any rH.~.n . .
payJnent. by the Borro\vcr u.r:J!or. the G.:arant()f of any arnc!ur.:ts hereundtJI when due, in the nmne of the Borrnv.'er
andA.:r of the Gu~rantor or of the Lender and a.t the expense cf the Borrowt;r to do
such acts a1xl to exec:.:tf) r.H
su-::h documents as may be requlre.d te eff{..~t ~ntch app.Hcation.

an

c !.=: , -) 1r~J)ldf"rkki. R/Wtf2tf:~J"?~~J~t-Je-f...vtt~R~ilRit~a'1fffriJ~11: , B.r.f~l'1NH1ft~J~{4:ft.. rt:=a!~l'A~.~J


{P.f*~:~tl!i.(.tNi*-7.$:8'~Ei:fE'i~l;!J;.E;Z.f:Efr'iJ~1:Ji , f"r~;:\:/.. {Jtfilf.lf::i<:NfJih!1$~?Rf-l81lii'~ZAflM~.:Lttt:8J tlfcifAJ
:'x.:z~.:t~;;Fz , fEf5J1.7.fH~t~t~H~s:z: ~ ft~]zt~e~.~~f":.i:~:tmF.If.:rt~.:i:E:j[~;l-aJtifjjr.rf;gfff~:~nJZ.11l:f.J.f!tZid~fT~Af: ~
12.1. Should the Bon(.rwcr and/or the G\irtrantor deft:;Jlt any of its obligations now assunltd 01' tc be assurned,
namelv should the Borro"~..vcr fail to pav in thz rnatw.er .and time set forth in th.hs tH!reement or which mav be claimed

frorn the Borrower hereunder, th{~n th~ Lender slwH bt! entitled tG decnt due iHld....pa.yubk aU amounts i'cmcd to the
Borrower, namely as pri~dpa.l, fe<.:S and expense-a and tbe Lender s},a!l thereafter be entitled w, with fl.lll powers ami
.at its fuil dlsGrt:.tion, e.nforce aU the g~~arantccs provided hcretJ.Dder.

(+-=.

~ ~::~) (~L~ffE*t~~::(:1ff }-,__~ffi~{_Jfiff~j~)... f5J;Eff~Q::~ttfr-- )-~.:!.ftfr'i.FG~~~~ttP1~%~t.:ZHf~R1~~t}J ~*S.


J:~l~L~St?;fJ 612nc2 ~~rH~~{#~fs1.::7. ~~*ITfft.&tt: lt.stff.-t~9 ~ r.=:;ttur:-~Lf.%~tJ, 52.!~lt?~:~~~tt?t~~~fia~-a1rn
{f:{~"J~:f;tJ~;;r~~S:SJitr!~~;&~ ~

12..2, The smmc.nsion or te.nninatbn (~f the Borrovl'er~s WJtivitv as a g3ntin~ pnnnoter~ the w:m Hmewal or th~
termination of the re:::.neCthe .Hcen~e G:: def<.-ntltin2 (l:..flV of :J1~; Oblig.ati~n;:; liet" force in .Adrnkist::Htive Regulation
6/?..00:!, whic:. comprO::nise.~ it~: ga.ming pro.rr,oti.on. . . a.ctfviry, .shaH be d(l".cm.~""'i! for a.U events and pnq>oses, events of
default and have the exact. ~an:e CQn;:~equences _pro;.-]dcd for in Law or in this agreement

( +.:::)

fi&J=E:tEtrrSJ v~.~JrJF..zffit,tt Fl :;;:Jifii?rro!~tftA. :~;*~e;.;~ili'IfJiil)( \lti: - ~rr~ :W:i!to,:rxJ.lliRI itt~J:J..,


1-J.J'D"Zf*-'::~t.=~i-(~J~~.9F.Jf3t.{-;J;?.':f.i"J"H -ft.it~~~ffJ~.-A.. ~f~.~;:.!ft~I# .. tnT~.tt.I.J'25~~.tl~~4rf.~"ft.~ ~-~[!~~.FE
J.;Oii".*.~:-:Af~] j((.~J\'f:if.:f;IJ.i!(S~t-#1>:.2::tm 7:. B:~'f~<J;fJ!.!8!. '
13. 1.'1 the eve;lt the Borrower does not puy mfull to the Lender ony inBtt: :h:ncnr {}f .a1nour1t loan.~d on the :r:.aturiry
\lutes set O'lt for each withdrawai, the Lender shall he entitled to
costs of wllectim;, im:luding reasonable
aTtorney fees: comi costs, ns per the r:.rnnunt stated in the billing note. to be prep~:red by the Lendert and to de..fuult
interest at :he rate .:;et: out in such spec.i1in terrn.s and condilien!l.
j

an

( i[CJ -)

F!Ji'~;t~;S-Pi~f~'1i~fffi~Jtf.{?.J~~~gK{;E!~F~\'lWih'itc~;(.r1Ziift'W"~+fil

/AJr,}fF,1~.iit~t#;\;ii;tJ\.SZ~f*:/.. ;~~rF%.i1;~t rr;s~aJt..-~1&-tJl.; ~m;z.~~-t~~

,.

f.E..illH<t"5?ifk).:(if..':

14.1. Any disoute~s arising fro~YI this t~g-rccrnent shall be subiect to the excbsivr: juri.sdivtion of the courts of the
!v1acau S./'L.R ... This shuli t~ot prc.ch:uk d~c. inditution of legal }!ro,~.cdlngs against the Borrn\ver O"o> the Guo.nmtor to
the fA~nder ln the Courts of any ntherjorisd"iclior~.

(hill ' ....:) ;l:[;~~0!fiJ~st~l'~l:i:;i~,~fi~\l$.1i"


14.2. This lo~n agreement shall be govemC\i by the law;; of Macau.

(+Ii ) frf! ~:_.,A._fill.~ ~ Tij{] ?,;tW~t}-..8-:.J l~~-)~~ li~}rt-y" ~ ~t~ . .~..-~1J!~ ]f~ / ...~~ ~ tf~t 3!: fA ft=:~ 1~ &:~:;<~: t'FHW.~ ~t li rr:ll ~ ~
t-5: . .A... ;{g~F:4J ..t3ii'~ :z. {~.1 /~-.:k~~.f.HfF*!tE {~JfAJ ::~ ~)Y i.;iDS !J~ if~: " ~t~{#J: . . \.11J..f..;.JJLt~{~1: ..\. ;2:.{~1.A. :~!.. ~~ Vs:!ffit]% {ffi"iJ i~ ~~

SJ001418
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00242

Appendix 10

15. The G\laramor agre~;.s to FOVide Lender, at Lender's option, tmd as scc-.1rity forth~ issu~n~e of ~r~riit, ll personal
check which Lender may apply toward payment. The lender may complew iHly portinn ofihe guarantor's personal
cheque or cheque en board that may be missing or let! blank including (i) the amoun\ of the ,;ut~t~nding credit
balance; (i.i) date on the clwque.

C+>'\) :tf.liillr-PF1i:ilft~:J?'JJ0M*lit~\'1i,~i31f~?f1'fi!ff!f~;.A,i5jfjg>.R!ifrw.4R_,\.f;JTP.ii~R<J1tJft@lt
16. The tem1s and concl.itio.ns provided in d!is agreement will be applicable to !IIi the increases of the credit !inc
requested by the Borrower and um:ler:1ig1wd by the G~>m:antor.

C++;)

f~~}.. ~BA%~9<D:JBB'c7':fuBJJ8;.t.t:ffl'~*ti~Iif~.:$'~89?s$.

}..f1'T~:d<B'-J~!*?J:>*J?g;;:.~'f.~.:&_{f{iffi.rmii.~{jzylllfi.Qgi'j

PJH'YJdFJflf.t9\.A2.7E~~-ttli!!;!J#"?i?r~t

'

J7. The Borrower declares that he is follv aware of the t:ontents of tht' ab:we wrineo dauses, that he has been duly
i.'l:ormed on its contents and thai all clarifications re{\ue,-.te;:i hy him on this matte.r have b~en duly pmvlded by the

Leuder.

~F'j
FJ i '~ El 2008 -lf1\.facaul f\p!, I ~ i S ~ 2.003
~f.'XA Th~ Lender

;.\fffKt:?~:.12~~fi.::J1iA.BQJ~j_':~~~~j) .EJ..O.E.QYh~~tf. S!LY ~.191!-~n.-~1~-~1.YJ::~P1~-~~-g

~).~ Si!,;a-~~:~C:::=-_:.._....------

Ei

~'?J{;:.~~-f:f:~c....::l.m:>:::.:_:.~:.......__

~S:-f:

Name: 'JuP.6f ~1VI0 \l,frl,J!i";Xfi!


li*J'&Y Tir.le: {'!' frtJflG1.tJ6 vtRG?:<r:..f<

. . . . . .l~V/J.:~l___Li.

L.!JQ

g ...

FJ}I}J 1Date

SJ001419

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00243

Appendix 1 0

CART6RIO 00 NOTAR!O I'RIVAOO FONG !(iN !P

CONTA REGISTAOASOB 0 N'b!Yi'


Art' 1~' da TSRN ....... $14.00
TtaL .................... ,... $H.OO
o lmposto tfo solo davldo !ol pago ~" o'lelnal.
P.econh><> a >Mir,sturs Mro da LEI, CHOIIN il!":(t.;ffi, 1<1\1\ pomnte
mrm, cuja ~der.Ud~de vetifqluei por exlblvfia ~o 5Hhet~ de !de:ntfdade
d!ll Residentu Pe.:manente nP 7365683(7), ~m!Hdo em 29 de J;.~lito
de 2005. pelo Dirac.;:ilo dn Se~;l90~ ds ldont:neo9~0 da r-<AEM. n~
quali<lad~t de admml$trado.'\> da soelod~d~ denomineda ''13'11J!ffl-~
.... .A.fl!'A1}\'1f". q~ai!~ads $ pc<i~rss ~;ue vadnql por ~:<!ol9'io da
uma certrct~a ernltldii em 28 d';! Janeiro da :weB. pel,; Ccm&ervaterla
das R.egl.stos Comercfal s d~ B!~f!S MGveis.
Macau~ aos 18 da: Abril de 2008.

0 Notar!e Prlvacto,

CARTORlO 00 NOTARIC PR<VAOO FONG K!N ;p


CO NTA REaliSTADA SOB 0 N' {o lj 0
Art~ 13Q da TERN .. ~$7.00
.

$7.oa

Total.. .........................

ttl~" no or!gln~l.
RCoM\~ a asslnatura retro de CHEUNG, CHI TAl ?!!l!l:fo..:.fett~
perani~ m}m, cuja ld~mU~ade v~:1fq1t:ai por ra.:Ci~o de H(lng K(>r~
Permanent ldeittlty Card r,f DBa4555{0i, cm~ido em 9 <IS Setambm

0 lmposto do selo do vi do fof

d~

2003. pa1{1 Gcver;lG d2 Hm;iAo Adm?r,~t(sti'l~

E~pecl~l

de Hong

K~ng.

Macuu. ttos 18 ct~Z~:Abf:~ cl~ 2008

0 No~rio i"rt"acto,

Re;)lnnEY;<> a a&lioiiur~ ro!ro, leila rm r;;ii\1>~ p;e~e.190. dB JOAQUIM JORGE FERESTRELQ NETO
VAI.ENT!:, quo prof.ss!onalmentt~ \!Sa JORGE NETO VALENTE, na qu~f;<fmle ;)e Admin!;treoor.Celll(lad-~.
ern !<>pr~mw,ao tia VENETIAN MACAU, S.A., em chh6>, m'>l!tli!Jf . ?,.iiJ'!.F'Jflf:llHirl'li~jj'j e, em ir~les.
Vendian Mar..IH; Umshd, cii)as id~nlid;;Oo, asid~ile ~ pcdsres nilcessarios pam o a~to.$&\ do ffiti'J CC<lh.>
r:lmento pesso<::t
JAaca:.~, 28 :;Je Abrli de t.YJQ5.

ANo!Sria P&.:a-0~.

~~ \JJ. Q~.Q.\~
Marl de L~rdos CostB
EmoL; c~k'!tze pai~c:es . ..
Conh"? 61

SJ001420

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00244

Appendix 11

VENETIAN MACAU LIMITED JUNKET CREDIT AGREEMENT'


1
A?tm~~
f"'tt~~r+t-0
WI ...AI~~;ilt.k1f:'~ffgl'i!'f~--o-J
.... ~./...... .J,.J..>-.,. JJ '.J .. UJ<:..........,.
~~ ,~...- ~1 . . . / I ,/;," ~fi,ri:;-n:r
- .... .,.. '1-'! ..:J

jj'jft\J-,~+ LENDER tNFORMATlON

0- '1'1J4Ji1lli Company Name: &ililltli.li1!f9!lif.fft:WV~ 1.'!1 VENEii.A;'\'_}18CAliLtMJI:EP .....- ---------i;1.;Uii.~.il!: Buslne;;s l\ddr~..ss: ~~.HJHJ.<l.dJL1d.?~.i~t.1~.9.. N.~ ..~-~Hh!,!J~t.d.a Esper.~nca. stn, 1~ainf~,.-~:[~1.f:flL~J~J?L............
i}i'f]'il[~ Husiness Phone: (853).!U1~:.7000_

j!.J!i~:W~i;&f/\S Business RegistraiiOJ> 15702(0)

{~Hi:..A. ~-~ BORROWER INFORl\1iiTfON


j\lj:f3rf'1/'/..i~'8);?.:if;.f! Junket CompRny Name ... !i.Tlf..1J:j~-~=J,

:gp!;ti;:.31J-lb0 C\I ENTERTAINMENT


....... ----------------------

b:.QH.Pill':i.Y UlvfiT&IL..____

2;~::~ ~~::~::; ;~;~~::~si~~~~~~:i~::G@~~r:~~ , ~,[ag~i:~~~~~ r;.~~;;,~R~;;~~~~;ion # --~~i.,~2f.SJJL


1

14

t~:+')rt-:ff')\.1~2~71;~ !tmket License# Ell6 ....


~ . . ~~$~;::-,~~~Patron :\ec!ount # 5305?1
{~ J!i ~-~~ ~ Credit Limi: H.K>.'ll~.OOQ,QQ\1.0(1 (Jl.QNQ ....KQNQ PQ!,Lf'JS.;'i..QJif;,__ JEJND..KTI.R... ,~P.J::!HY
M!LLIQN O.Ni,Y,L...........

!!,_._._.,

c~ ::,;_-. :.~.r. /D"'~.:_:.::~


.
.:::.~:.,/r~~-'.~-mo;_,l:w;_!_--,~--~.;...,.<.,,:,_.:,_.J~}~l:.'.~=-.:l\_~~ ~E~~.,,;_~~..c_.. Tt)R INFOIUv1ATION (I!l~i--; icl:ua~ Di.r<~do:;: uf J unkct Comp3ny)
"~ ~-~ ~:=~--~----F~
f8:/\. .~~}~_f{[~5'1tPatn.mAccourH#lJ.?.m2______ _

ffi="""'
..

-~ ;.)'!-..""""-

.1.:.,1>

.:."'....,

~!if::A~lf.~ GUAH.ANTOR .NFORM.ATlON

Wtil:)....-f:~~ Ormm.ntor Na.rne ~~;i."'..__QJEUl.fCL err -rAJ.


?~'-/\A~J5~~ Patro~l Account# --~?5.If...... .

ftJ,:tJJ. Addre:>s ..1tf.#fJ1Jiii.~f#1[!N) 6 .!$Q.ii]L


1T::~Jhtt~#i Re<id.ence Phone 1852)3 llR-O!l !ll

.f~~~ ..A..

Ht1:8Wl Date<:>fBirth Julv 9.1%0

( t*~ :~{f{~_A. 11 ) ttlt-t;tu J~\.f8~~).JJ!f1j}j~-i~ff~:i.} 'RJ ( r:ft~~:}, ,, ) q-:; ~~~~~t2tt~)'-illtLJ.{fri)-..;~

~~~~~f1fr~~/Jfrt-\iH~Uj$:~tJh~~#f5Jf9~~~~ ""Ff~~-2Rt.ffi~ij The Bonc-wc.r, (nka the '~Debtor~:>) hereby appHcs


for a credit ljne. wi;h Ven.~'1ia.:.1 ~1acau Limitt::d (tht:! uLende-;..!~} iZUd th~; Oua.::antor hereby personally guarantees the
d.ebt nf the J3mTo;.ver/Debtor~ suhjec:t to the fO tk;-;.vihg term~ and condition!i:

( ... ) -fK~~.A.. 2~ ~~ ..k.:~t~J.ttg?.t-it~Pii1~tJ::Jiffif.J8'tf:i:S.~~Z),,2:~:f4 Ii~~Et:SW~~;.:~f~ J:J;f:{ft:~Jitf3~:t~ff& lE~~


a~ ~ }Y?.~~~-~'~}~n:J~it.1-r:r:.fEJr5t?~75~;:~~~t;~f.#~~J:.1.itZ~.~rf.~l.r:r'ffiN:r?. l 't\,f&.ftl1rfft'sJHfYlJ:tl8ZJ1}f:IJ.~Wil . .,
i&wt~{:Sl ~ Jtf%~!t..&J~~.~~.2..Zfflclglj: =
l. The Borrc\ver and the Guarantor both aue~t th;.it all infonnation .Provided. ab<Jve or provided in the Credit
,1-.:pplkadon Fom1~ by the Borrower and Ll:ie .Gt.t~r~ntor tc~ ~~he L~n?e: is t~e an:d ~cct:rate.! a:td tJ~? Le11~Jer h~:' fh~
Boin.rv. .erss as wetl as the Guamntor's pernTtS:\Jon tn venfy sucn m.forJnatto.n.~ lilc:md:.ng venf.icanon of t:ny l:stcn
company or individual cnodit, otbe.r busil>~s~ nndiot employme:1: history, tbtough any legitirnate.>m1W:>.

( .~..) ft.r~:.,A. .z:t#aUft,\.~tJ;~.~0"~9.: . . \~J.Jt~'!}1*~~"'~Fff ~ illi::ft?l:Wf~."':.;--:f-~:/~J8);t:1{%J~F1:Y-ti Jt~US~


~f:i~.-.~{'J~?Ftfit: ,A,H~~: , :f.i~J~J... F:JPJfif~)... Z~:~~k :.R ~t~~~J~J&.$B~~$)~~ft J:.t:I~-*H!r;EM~ :::: 1* ~
J.;t f*~ ;f.t~tA~ 'Ut~~;}:J.f~i:-~ft]~~~0:@1 iF.Nft(.A~~~,~&j~fi# ~
2, The Borro~,yer aud Guure.t~to.;: exentpt the I.enrk~r fro.m his Cuty- of stx:recy, e-'~llthori.d.ng ;he Lendcr1 as kmg a~ any
amounts :;re owed w the Lendt:: by the Borrcw~r. tu d\cdose to third parties the infomwtion provided above, or
prcvided in the Credit Application Furrn of the a.m,)unt of cred.it vwe<l~ to the extent r~quired to obtain the
repaynwr.( i)f credit grn)!i;d lD th~! Borrower pnr-stw::tt tG fhis ngreerneni
//

(:::; J:4:1t:t:J.... n.JWif-5.~;.(

r.zJr~.~.tfY5ifM~ &t~;J:n'ttEtt/. . ~mtfi*),_~:~Jt~hl11nJfd.m.'t)~;7_~)J< ~

3. The fH.Idre~~ Uste.ct ab:T/i.~ Nnl serve HS p:o.pGr nolle~ to the Bunnwer or tc.~ Lhe Guaranwr of any dern.~ nd.

pf(.. .

;r~~~:

ti

!{6t.'4&- /

)j/~

\1~\~ r~\~

p,u-

~~~~~k
SJ001421

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00245

Appendix 11

CfiB) fTB'f~~\),.!!~ ...I.J~0ii:l~).&~-''~;<'t.fti;'Nii-IE~:tH~~1Zij~;,;1:_A.~Is~7f::iU1ti'El!fj O';JfiMif~

;:(.A...~l%fflffi{g}t{tUTI!~~ff.-~F ~ f;:.J)},{~~8~~lfXff1.rB~~:Ff~~1:.A~.~~;t-'\~~ ~ l~1-TI~..:::~(',fl1.ifi1)t;1t


?t1J.Iijlfffi'14'1~ ?.:L~\~&.

,.

l. Pl>rsooal or company data or any other related infonnation provided by the Borrower as well as by :he Gu2rantor
wi11 be subject to automat~d processil1g by lite Lender for the purposes of aoalyziug credit ri~k and emu~ing the
repayment of amou.'lts hmt to the Borrower, atid for credit risk i11quiries to third party credit agencies.

(.h) fif;fffittX~t--~;H i1JJ;:J.~,%~.f&~~if}i:t~R{~:!~$~ ,iQi.!t,i~}..0..'fiJt"NwJellf )._i~f'51\i:1frf'Ji'H1) ~'6L~


lJA?q??*&!JfJ~&)tt~S~f:.!;

1\

5. Credit issued by t.1e Lende.r to the .Borrvwer shall he only granted by rneans of trnnsfer of cosino chip~l of the
Lender to be used by the BcHtower ..-~olely within the Venetian r..Jacau Lhnited c<~siHos for legitimate casino p~ay

purposes.
~-,; \
~ri~~ ~

... ) i& ~-\~;J(jz[J}X)\,.1~fJ~1ld~::~-f=! f~F~Friffu1&:~R.1tli~E:tttiliffJThl:f.l!JKD 1501Q.Q9.s._G...QQ..Q\!.J.ZJ~J~~;-

6.1. '!'he Bon ower requesw the I.. .~:mder to .make available a crt.;dit Jbe to be llsed :rt (..'J..;s.ino chips up
t!,&Dl~!).OOO.OOO.OO (ONE HVNJll;tED AND FIFTY MlllJQN.H9.NGJ>,QNqQQU",AR.;?).

tcJ

the ;;!ITWUJ\t of

( 7:. ' =) ~1ft~~AJi!T$E"&{B.~~I~h':t~tXj\t&iHFfm.~.-. t.F.if~'irt!~J~:~}.iJ~N+T 7:-4:~.:&-- f;;iHJIT.~;; [?<;.~::


~;.lf!.ifiY~~~;:);t5Jf.ll\i:B!:JTf!ll.'1}.. 'it\\~\ffi':~if
6.2. The availability of the credit lin~ shall be c<>nditionnl upon the nxq:tlion by the L<mder of ll Pmmhsory Note
(''Livmnya") and a Letter of Cpnsent ('~Pacto de ?ree.nchimento") in favor of the Lender~ as attached to this
Agreement as }..Jtl1CX 1, and sccJred hy tl~eGuarm1tor ilS r.mderwdter {: 1 Avalist~: 1 ).

(h., ~=- J ~ff~{I1itl:.:fnti*>Ei~ '-1f1J~f~iJ.ff~t~f#~X)~Jt!i~~~~ffrlt.tlilfX


6.3. Subjed to the pr(Pth~kn above, the credit rnay b~} wiu1dra~rn. tipon reque:St of the
11

Bm.rt":W~~r.

<"/;; , LB) 'BJ"Y'it.N*i:ffi.{l\'!8if1ii'Jr.~?!:Jft'i1-t!2@.1::{m@FiH%\~@!\:t{~~t~~- (Mflrker)


EtLW.:~~\:f'~~iif~~~~~~Zffi-~X~fBm~J-fff~;\:~~~- (~i.[arker) ;m.~o~1-:~~h17

.ti:l\il8 P'lJ.l!*r f!J'~(}..

<)

6.-4. Each credit grante.:t under this egreetnent shall be paid. fn the :nat~Jrity dittC stated i.'1
(f.\1arkcr) which '\viH be executed by the Bc1rrnwer for each wlthdrrtwal.

~ach

neg,otiab.tc

ins~n.unenl

C~~ ~ .) -~--firrmtA+'f;::t.:j1f~~X~~ ffj:Wt~fl~:f&Mi%'tr~'*"'8~~H1J:ft:Z~Jir~lffui!1;(/~~ffP~}...:a:;5~W.~~~ft'J


&'fiR?~it2X.AZ1:5J:f.L~fii~~11:~, 'fgj)i\ Rtitt1Z~i.d;ZiiX;:)CJ:BiiW:!f'. IJ!1Alt-1~:~!lli1t'~Jd;.n/t7:<f.:
"AJt!JZ~~5~G1Jf."*J :W::t;>\/\ n:Jj.~~W.J~}...fY~d@~$R~ ~
6j, The Lender rnav 1\~.fuse anv request of credit ~~vhen~.ver the Borrower has anv <YJtstanding amount to be paid to
t.he Lender, whene;jer the req;e,.)t is above the. !ilnit of the credit granted under this O.h't'eemenr ur whenev<:~r a
m.atcrhd adverse change occurs~ in t.~e commerc.~bDy re--asorwbie opin:io.n of t.he Lender, t.:. the scope or nature of
business, operation, assets orf;nancial condithms of the Borrower. in its ability to perform its obligations hereunder.

( /\ ~ /\)

*f.:PJ/tl'ffLZ(~':L1~~PJ:~~l.4f~}~~fff.tX/,jr:f. fitffiftut.:.i.!J!1f~

: i!J.{f:tj}.. 17.-wt~.A.&:~~:H~!~~~~~;-~5

f2Jl~~~{q:: :.~.ZH'f:Wt3tFit'- }-.~f-'f~~~5ttftii1JS:n "


6.6. Tbe c-redit line grant~d u.nder this ag-reement 1 ma_y be h:c:re-.used ~t Born31,-s.'er1s reqt1est: who; together with the
ChJarantD1\ rntl!.H s)gn a ~'Junket Cr~dit Line fncrcasc Reqne.st'', in lhe f';Jnfi pres~nted a?l ?-Jlnex 2 of ~his agn:t:mcnt.

c::t, .. ti J

u~:mt),ffiCfJrti'f~jr{~f.i~9lff.~ft.!;~:r~-itf~~;.. .J?~s~ifg6J.:J.~P:.rf~~~yj/.}:"f51f11~f~:-f4:~~z.~f:j~iYz ...... {;}rt.~J.~

~ ~ ~:4:~ . :k~t~a:~-ry'~H~}:t~,I;J.T~f~~.A.:~:~-{~-f~Mf.,
.

5.7. 11w avnikbilitv of the increased credit Iine shall br c~ond\ti<Jn.al uoon the reception by the. Le-nder nf a n"w
Pn.)m.bsory 'Note (;,Livm.n.<;al!) and a Letter r.d' Const::nt {''Pecto ric. Pr~enchirnents'Jn) tn fa\.or of the Lender. arl
attnuh::d tn ~his Agre,~rnent as A.nnex 11 an.d secured by the GUC!l~\ri{OJ 1.\$ undcr~.'Titer Avr: Hsta '~).

ct

SJ001422
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00246

Appendix 11

6.8. The signed "Junket Cn;dit Line lncre~.oc Request" will be ;uffident evidence of the further arnotmls granted by

rhe Lender to the Borrower.

C;\ td f-1~\U;ii;;Ai0~ ;M;'@:t&J.\tm~Ar~;!tr?.-\:)'":i:*f:!t?;'fEf!~%!1J13:iil"lti1!l2f~mtA:i!':~EJ.&~nJ.f-g:~ ('~


~}P~.1J.) ' tri~A~JtJ;< {fiLA Z:. ~B:f!!M~f"f~lfl:f!!!:fi\l'V; A rt.;J;tf,'l: Afi~{B'ji{.}i\.f.&~'W4?~;.Ltiri.Jf~ft

P g,(ltr;~:

(HKD 150,000,000.00 l.
6.9. For vahlr.ble ean~Ido;rntion, receipt of whkb is hereby ackn0wledged by Li-te Borrower and whkh includes the
gntming and exr.en3ion of a ca$ino credit line by Crediw: to tho Borrower (Account#53057l), 1he Guarantor
pcr:sona lly and 1Jncrmditkm;1l!y J;.'rltnrante~s tiw paym~m~ tfi the Creditor of any amount requested by the BorTo\ver's
under the crerli! :ine grant~d itl this atacr.meu up :o th~ ?.HKH~nt and illduding ONE HUND:P..J~)J A}i'D FlFTY
Mlf,LlON1ill.JiQJ.;,Q.tQJlQLl.AKS.. CH.~DJ;iQ,\1i-!PP:JQJ:Q}

ftJ:: : 1rm_.A,htJ:&rcJ-,;[~~Mt~~lff~);::;t~{m{fim;_~1... Litf!h~-:~ff: : 1:EiiN~~}-.. ~fui::f:Jm{f;t5~-fltt:~t.T:J~ t1tf;i,L,\.


~Jf:~L~rJ:./t:n~ A]ft{fJ:ffi~:l}~j~~f~.~{"t~;n 636 {~fS:Illi~t.1R~~~l~N~~~~IDT1Mi~.--\~1f..nJt~-~ t~r~rD1~
f~). . ~ftr~t,\..?Jf7.:{jtfif~;J~1ffiffttt:tf.lf:i;J~fi~E ~
Further) Guara.nror is jointly and severally li~1.b1e for tmy .:tmounr Lnved by tJ:~e Bcrrowerunder thi!>: Agreement ln t11e
event of any defauh in payrr:ent. by Born:r\vcr,. Gunrant~)!' agr{~C.~ that V~.,-IL nu:.y cnrnrnence coll~c~.ion efforts or
r<;luted legn] prccc~cting, directly aguinst Guarantor for 1he defauHed pay!11eat withnu! the need of exhausting its
collection effon~~ against Bi.?rrn\.ver/Lkbtors in nccordancc ?.:iu~ unrl f{)r the pt:rpose~; of article 636 of the .Macau.

C1vilCode.
C-t::) fn;$i:.).,)J-~ .1:_i'ttflllffi.~J:15Jfiif}Jrdft~iRWJ . ~ITfJf~if%-P..~gm<~N-~-~~{c~.~t.fF.fruJ.fT.~t~:rf..~t~Y11J~$t*X).~ ~
1. The Borrower $han pay to the Lender th0 on1ow1t of th~. 1!3SiJ.~c; chips tf1.nsf~.rred r.o d:te Borrower no later than the

due. <l<Hc stated for each withdrawaL

c;\, -~; if:rrfH~t.l~~~J1flfi1:iL.<~L~:%gt-i%~B rn.rr~L~-*-~fi11Jm:~\:~-~~~#!~r:~;fitH# f~~~.J"~R-i,:tift~~~&~~;.:.-4}~!~


~ 18% ~fJf~.ti~t1UL.':l..61:~f1j!ili~.~~.r:(~*Zt1i;J~J.C,
8.1. Ar:.y installment or amonnr lo<.rw;lnol p,1id un the d1:e date(s) set out for each vlithdrawlll shall be ~ub_iec( tCI
detUuJt intere. :.;t nt the mte of 1 Wl-;; per a.nm.an, as frorn the date thc.Y be.cc1ne due and payable untit eftf:.ctlve pnyn1ent

Jt:,
8.2. So kmg as the fa.ih.rre continuGS

su~h nH':! shaH be ret":alcuhted ;:;.n the san1e basis thereaner and interest so
>..::alcufateri shall be con1pound.ed rnn.nt.h.iy up to tbe n'IOlnent the Lender detennin~ such indebtedness to be fuHy

settled.
( fL) tt@~)..)lJJ;LtE:(tr~?t. .\~9t~1t{it!.ffif~;'~}J3.;1~~fi(f~taf~~l1t*~Ps~~ttfriJti~~~{;j

'

E+~

( ...... ) Pl.

( .:::) ~:~t7Xifi!AA B
9, The LeJ1d~~r ma.y ccJnpltite ?1ny port~o11 of any Prorn.issory N.GI.e ("Livra.n~:JJ ) exe<;.t!ted by the Iku"'t\sw~r: anfl
guar~ntf.r:ed by the Guaranror' by ,A..va 1: th5.t may bf:: mifis\n.gs inc.ludmg (i) the arneunt of credit dnrwn and (ii) the
ff.J:~~Q

<I

11

HHlturiry date.

( +)

iN.ijttAJEJ~~:!f.f1Jt~t.AJ~ftr8Jt}:J[Xf13fo;t~~-:~~~~ . M:~~~~:?~~t61(ft.:Jt~llH~;ti.:Z~~~~AJV:f~

t.ik"-fttt1t~1f;

#1.Jr~tif~!.lfJMcl@:~fT-~tg~~taiM!:ic.%~~r~F-.t~~i1(;~:uW!JtVJJ(),~F~LtQ:fJf<~~Jki>15'J ~
I0. The Borrower agr~e;: to pHy !9 the Le;;der ull cu:;ino chips tmw;fe;red to the Bon-ower freed any chargeB or

dedu;;tit;ns ofvdm~suever ne1ture n: its pn:m.ises knov. .:r: as 'h;n~nian


N. Sen.hora da Espe-..:m~~.~a. sh1, Ta1pa, !v1aca~.t S.r'\..R.

~1acau Limited~

in

}.,1fh-:au:. iH E.~tr~da

da 8aia de

SJ001423
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00247

Appendix 11

ll.i In the evcm of a:;.y w.m-payment by the Borrower endior the Guarwtnr of any amounts due hereunder, the
Bmrower a.nd the G"ar;mt<Jr hereby .irrevocably empow::r the Lender ('out without obligRtit.m, on t11e part of the
I:c:ndcr) to apply my cR>dit balance {in whatever currency) (i) standing upon any accocull of th; BOJTJWer andior of
tt;e Guamntur in the Venetian Macau Limited cusuws, (ii) hold in anv other form bv th~ Lender, namelv any
corrJJ"~ssion pa)1tlent that the Borrower may havE: ea!r~ed or be c;ntil'Jed to t.hrc.tugh .. the ro1ling progratn(s) at
Vcncttan t{acau Limited VtJsirws~ or (iii) by using any cas;no chips that tlv:- Bm.lD\~et or the Goaramor may redeen)
or any front deposit n1oney of l~c Borrwwcr or the Ch.:.arar:tot towards satisfaction of ar:y sum whether principalr
btere~t or othcnd~e at any tir.ne due rn the I,ende.r under this Agrccn1{~nt.

C-i-- , .=.) fMl*"1'''%(Ai.i\:.1f'ifi*J)f'~17titrrt:<t:tsfili!JYF.: Z.J'f~J.: , fi;\'#J.: A&VJ:ilii: .AJg~fiJ;.z;;r; oJrff;i>.itJl~JJ.r:t~


P.is~7t(~~.A...fmf~J ' ~;JttJ j;l.{j;tj:) .. ~ i;t!-~). . ~-~~~..,<_~_:;7::~ ~ ~Jf~JT::~::f$ff~Yd:]~Jf&:~\~~z 1~tir-if~Hff.EffJ

1"r!ltb.f.UW:~ffi'!f.:X:iif. B.Zlvtii'D'.@f*..:Z_'~IHJ ~r:to~RtA;iiKJ,I:i ,


l1..2. The Bono~.ver und the Gu;.trurncr aho hereby irrevocably empo\vcr t.h~:: Ler~cl<.:t, in the evcn.t o.f any non..
payment hy the Borrower andior the Guarantor of any amGlmts hereunder when due, in the name of the Bo.rrower
and/or of the Guarantor or of the Lender and at the exnense of the Borr0~.;sler to do a11 sur:h ucts and to e:xccJ.:tc all
S\lch dvcumen1s as may be required tc effect such appli~ation.

(+.=. , --- :)

ft~li?i~m:'\J-...i'5:2J~~?:Fif~rA)fJfjl'f1Ei3:3<~~it0*r,gtr~J1j!EflJ~/f ~ f:JJ3'~:Fft~iffJ;~~~1~!?:;JPFJ.EZ{:f.:
fEJ~r~*fRfG~;.~'jqj:t!lJE@it~0;~:2:Jf.fr:J~:tm ~ ~ffii:),~:f[:~~:~p:ttDW!fiUl!~~J~f.~W~:~~~-;..Jtifr!J<;~:.ffj~Jf.i' iQ,.YiiT~~
1(2_:t.:::;)z ~ f:t:{qr~rft~rfftSE SlfttiJEE?0:%~~~:T.:~tHT1XR:!.f1TrqJ~Itft~$~J~:FfTfri~;;!tfJ:;f5tiifffF.:@.Tft~~?=r o
12.L Shn~1!d th~: Borro\.ver and}ot fhe Gt1amntor dei1nJt any oJ: its nbHw.at.io.ns now ttSSl.lmed or to be a.ss.u.med7

.ili~rneiy should the Borrovler fail to p:.ty in the .m~nner and time set t~Jrt.h i1....th~s agrce.n-wrlt or v:hich rru.y be c1air.ncd
from the Born:nver hereunder~ th,;.n tlH:: Lender ~hall be. cr:t.itled to dee.1n dut~ and pay~h1e flll amnunts ioaned to t1:c
Borrower, Jlarne1y a.s ;.>rincip~l. fee,> and expense~ and the Lt':lder shall thereafter be enlitle<l to, with full pov.><>rs itnd
iH its fuH discretion, enfOrce aH the guurante,$ provided hereunder.

(+.=. ' :_-:_)

1'~Yk:ft~~H~~JtflJ'J")\,;~f0A~i'8;~:()\~ ~ fftiJ~~?~~7:fr-- . .A.. 2Jfi:l%1'f&U?4JiJJ~ff~.Zftt?.~~.1J-flbf.f

~;~!Eit~bL~ 6/20~~2 &ttfT-iE.~<1f.t}t;ZJ~t~<Jii-:r{:: ~~*fif:j , ~-tr~~~~_gif(J , ]t:H,.7ji:f.~ti\;J~:ft1~~7:;4;:f;j;;j


tffift%m;;~?ft~it~J1.~1*:f$t* ~
12.2. The su~pension or te.rm.ination of the BcrroJtt>ls activity a~ a g3.rui.ng promoter, the non renewal or the

lcn.ni.natlon of tt:e respective li.::ensc or dcfadting any of \he obligalion;; set fcr.::c in Alhniniatrative RegulaHon
612.002., \vh!ch comprom.ises it.i ge:ming prornotion activity~ ;;huH h;: deemed~ for an events and purposc.j, :!vent~~ of
dcftuJfl an.d iun.-e lho exac1 sarne consequences provided for in Lav{ cr in thi~ agreement.

( +::::.)

t<9'ti-:tt;5mJv~8rJr.;G;~l: 8ttiJt!JB-&imi~~tA.f4:J?K!%-#f.--lW:J:J:::fY:--~I!Jk\!, r~~A~Wli<'ilHh~tA..


i&~::tt:4k14ilfE-J:~,W;ii~Hiil.41 P.i:iZN;(_~!tl 'EitE.tntHHtU,Jfi/~;Z;$R.I--.t:f'f:illfl~g'J)f;~"S~!V%!, 71~/iif;1tl'IT
J;J.&f:R!ifi:,');:f.fii5J9ffikit'&f!iJF.iU*il+;;i:;?.j!JL'z~tiltt).~'iJ,tt: ,,

13. In the event the Borrower does not pay in fuU to the Lenth~r any in:::talirner:.t or amount Soaned en the uH1iurity
set 01't for each wit.hdrawa1, the Lender shell b<: entitkd to aU costs of collection, indudng reasonable
attorney f~es~ cou..rt cost~ 1 as per the am.ount stated in the blUing- ne\e tn be prepared by tbe Lendcc and to JcfuuH
interest al the. rate set out in such spxi.fic terrr~> and c:'mdit.ions.
da:e~

(I-~

...... )

Jf.~:::i:tt~a-r~2.1*i;;~Tfff.~~atttfPJ~it~tJ-j;L1~tf.~~j*if;;J!J~~i~fu~:&~:f*~. Wi-2i

{fi5ift/FW'Jtf::Jt~\

~A?.l~-~Jitl~tt1!W.:,A.~.~~)\..:z:.-~~~i~:ffl.ry;xs~i1i!.!'tl!IJ1:: ;,~.r*i~~s~~
14. L A:ny dis~n.l1~s ari~ing fro1n this agreen\ent ~he.H b~ subj::.ct to the exdus1ve jurjsdictiCin of the co~lrtS of the
<)

!v!a~'.au

the

8./.:R. Th~s sh:a]J not pre7!ud~ t~~~-~ns_w.ution of lega.! prnr;eerlings agairtst the Borrower or the Gtmruntor tc
m. the Courts of any otne.r JUnsGtctlo.::o,

L<~n.dcr

SJ001424

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00248

Appendix 11

( +li) ~i*:}.Jfl)~"fiJ.tN~Jii'f?O..il~~>l< ~ift:Yfot"tl:t.~.. -5EH@A~mts<Ji'diiH'f~~#:Z~X?i'ill.fif:'~~


if!O,~-ifiilf1J:.~!JLZff!iJA:RS'!fJ{'p;,(.ij(1'.Jfi!JiktilfJ!ti:J!J{if:~ w~;A<iJJJtf.~tii:A.;;):1'A$Ciri9-!j_"{~f0Jif!ill!
$t~21~i:li1i5}'-'=i:ff: Ji!i \fF .l *N~J:;mt~ltR& (Z,) stJm:a;o~,~
15. The Guarantor agrees tn provide Lender1 at Lender's option. and as Hecurity for the issuance of credit, a persorH.tl
check which Lender may apply toward payment. The lender may eomplete arry poM.ion of \he guarantor's personal
cheque or cheque <)n board ihat may be missb.g or left blalik including (i) the amount of the o'.ltst<mding credit
bn lance; (i~) date on tJ1e cheque.
C !/.;) 0&ft1.19Nijgd<J)\"J~~~1i!f~#1~il31r~fFfJffi{]f~J.~~~>P31.t8iW:AR1HIB1~ffittfE7t ,
16. The terms and condlr.ion!-1 provided i.a thit~ agreem.ent wiD he applicable to all the increases of the credit iine
reg:.H~sred by the Borrower and unders.igm:d by the Guarantor.
<+t:; i fi\':RO. . ~i!-IJ'#G.:R::Wl!L~~:!ah 8.1!.-l.J:J'fr'f\If!'f@i!'*l.t"Jttfl~z~ !?iHF-H<l!!J~ilttAE','f55} illltf:i-f:itffM'\\.i:.
.A.Plf:R>f~l:;~=J1~*:1:0i~ZJf;m..r.:zffr.;J*-J~s~tMlitfr~EiJ3 "
17. The Borrower declares thut he is ful.ly aware. of t,1e c<.mtcnt:; of the ab()w written clauses, that he h~s been duly

infbrmed oe its contents and !.hat aU clarificutions requested by hin-:. on this

mattt.~-;

have b~o duly provided by rhc

Lende~.

iil:i'J. /, The Lender


f2r:tY~li~~.?~C~L~.A~J.t1:.1~.tQJftJilJ!lii~.~iLOJ.tJ2?ha.Lf..~{.Y.~g~ht!:w.}:t1~~Jt:4Mni~d

~;;:;:-) ~

{l.>' J <X-<

itJ:M Snmat:..1re

~1-.-,g N;;ne: }FR4--fl

---------

,.,..--u, V.&l.fN'fE:

~w Tirlc:f.!'.fr!Vr0-l riG- '.P1 f.t;l:-7/l.

SJ001425
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00249

(0

"<:!"
-.0

0
--,
(/)

,;
:;:
{j"

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~:

r.

~
~

,,

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......
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!)

Appendix 13
Cheung Chi Tai
I

Beneficially
Wholly-Owned

Diagram Indicating the


Relationship between
Cheung and the "Chengdu VIP Club"
as Drawn from Public Records

Jumbo Boom

Holdings limited

12.91% Shan?.holder
(as at 11 Ju!y 2007)

{t
Neptune Group
I inoit-,- ISEHK 70';

--

~"

'! ' ... '

100% Shareholder

Credible Limited
20/~

Shareholder

Base f..1ove Investments Urr:lted

Entitled to 0.4%
Roliing Turnover-

1!~!1
Hou Wan Entertainment
Unipessoal Lmtada

Junket i ,Operator

~t1~

"Chengdu VIP Club"

t
I

Owned

Sands Macau
Page 1 of 1

SJ001429

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 _ 00253

Footnotes for Report on Cheung

SJ001430
Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00254

Footnote 1
Article l

~il)usten to Articie

Nevada regulators analvzing Macau casino activitv


303 words
1 April 2010
06:27
Reuters News
LBA
English
(c) 2010 Reuters Limited

LOS ANGELES, March 31 (Reuters) - Nevada's Gaming Control Board said on Wednesday it was
analyzing the status of VIP room operations In Macau casinos and possible links to Chinese
criminals.
Reuters reported on Monday that an examination of Hong Kong court records, U.S. depositions of
a former Sands executive and Interviews with law enforcement and security officials in the United
States and Macau show a connection between Las Vegas Sands Corp and a Macau-based
businessman alleged to have ties to organized crime.

"At the conclusion of our analysis of the situation In its entirety, this agency will move appropriately
as governed by Nevada law and standards required of our Nevada licenses," Randall Sayre, a
member of the Nevada Gaming Control Board, said in an e-mailed statement.

Sayre said the situation at Sands, along with the general environment regarding VIP operations In
Macau, was known to the agency and would be addressed "at the point the investigative product is
ripe for consideration."

Sands operates three casinos In Macau as well as the Palazzo and Venetian resorts on the Las
Vegas Strip. Other casino companies with operations in both Nevada and Macau Include MGM
Mirage and Wynn Resorts Ltd.

SJ001431

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00255

Las Vegas Sands, which !s about to open a new $5.5 billion casino complex In Singapore, also
operates a casino In Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

A spokesman for the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board said in a statement that "the review of
sultablilty by the Bureau of Investigations and Enforcement Is ongoing for all license holders, and
it will not confirm or deoy whether this is a matter In which It Is actively Investigating.' (Reporting
by Deena Beasley; Editing by Toni Reinhold)

NEVADA-MACAU/jLANGENIAFAICSAjLBYjRWSAjRWSjREULBjGNSjABXjBNXjSXNA

Document LBA0000020100331e63v0021b

SJ001432

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00256

HCCC000013/2009 HKSAR v. SEE WAH LUN AND OTHERS

Page 1 of4

Footnote 2
HCCC 13/2009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13 OF 2009

HKSAR
v.
SEE Wah-lun (AI)
TANG Ka-man (A2)
WONG Chi-man (A3)
YEUNG Chun-kit (A4)
CHAN Ho-leung (AS)

Before:

The Honourable Mrs Justice V Bokhary

Date:

27 October 2009 at 3.00 pm

Present:Mr Simon Tam, SPP, and Mr Franco Kuan, PP, of the Department of Justice, for
HKSAR
Mr John Haynes, instructed by Messrs Mike So, Joseph Lau & Co. (assigned by
DLA), for the 1st Accused
Mr William Chan, instructed by Messrs Lau, Chan & Ko, for the 2nd Accused
Mr Paul Tse, instructed by Messrs Tam, Pun & Yipp (assigned by DLA), for the

3rdAccused
Mr Peter Cahill, instructed by Messrs Li, Wong, Lam & WI Cheung (assigned by
DLA), for the 4th Accused
Mr Francis Cheng, instructed by Messrs Louis K Y Pau & Co. (assigned by DLA),
for the 5th Accused
Offence:(l) Acting as a member of a triad society (!2A-=:ir-@r!&;jj,~15Hf~)
(2) Conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent ( s$~:f.f;t([ilffrif:~~

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HCCC000013/2009 HKSAR v. SEE WAH LUN AND OTHERS

Page 2 of4

footnote 2
UJlUE1~~)

(3) Conspiracy to commit murden. ($~~~)


(4) Soliciting to t.murder (~1!~~)
,.. _ _ .._ ........ _ ....... ,.. .... _ # ............ ,... . . _ ............ _ _ . . {A ... __ ... ,..,.. ............... -

...........

Transcript of the Audio Recording


of the Sentence in the above Case

COURT: See Wah-lun, Tang Ka-man, Wong Chi-man, Yeung Chun-kit and Chan Ho-leung,
in respect of each of you, I have considered everything urged on your behalf by your
counsel.And I have of course given separate consideration to each of you on the question of
sentence.
As far as you, See Wah-lun, is concerned, your offences under Counts 1, 2 and 4
are all related to the conspiracy to murder under Count 3. I will pass concunent
sentences on you on all four counts.
As far as you, the other four accused, are concerned, your offence under Count 1 is
related to the conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent under Count 2.
I will pass concurrent sentences on each of you four on those two counts. And as
far as the role w~ch each of you four played, I will draw no distinction.
In respect of all five accused, I will of course take the most lenient view that can
reasonably be taken. The appropriate total sentence for each of the five accused
will be achieved by making the longest of the concurrent sentences against each
accused reflect all the appropriate elements of aggravation, including those which
come under another or other counts. That will achieve the appropriate total but no
more than the appropriate total since all the sentences will be concurrent.
The maximum penalty for the offence under Count 1 (of acting as a member of a
triad society) is 3 years' imprisonment on a first conviction and 7 years'
imprisonment on a second or subsequent conviction. The maximum penalty for the
offence under Count 2 (ofconspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent),
for the offence under Count 3 (of conspiracy to murder) and for the offence under
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Page 3 of4

Footnote 2
Count 4 (of soliciting to murder) are the same. It is life imprisonment.
As to the counts against all five accused, namely Counts 1 and 2, the position is
this. The evidence clearly indicates that the way in which the 1st accused acted as
a triad member is more serious than the way in which the other four accused so
acted; and his role in the conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent is
more serious than theirs. As against all five accused, it has to be said that the
grievous bodily harm which they conspired to cause with intent was to be carried
out pursuant to a carefully planned attack.
There are cases which show that the sentence for causing grievous bodily harm
with intent commonly range from 3 years' imprisonment to 12 years'
imprisonment although everything will ultimately depend on the particular
circumstances. There are also cases which show that conspirators are not
infrequently punished in the same way as if they had completed the offence which
they conspired to commit. Again, it all depends ultimately on the particular
circumstances.
In respect of each of these five accused, I bear in mind of course that, behind the
scene, there is a person or are persons even more blameworthy than any of them.
Turning to the 1st accused alone, the murder which he conspired to commit and
which he solicited others to commit was likewise to be carried out to a carefully
planned attack. The use of stun guns and very deadly knives was part of the plan.
As far as mitigation is concerned, the only real mitigation available is the
mitigation available to the 3rd accused in the form of his previous good character.
The other accused's criminal record will of course not be held against them when
they are sentenced. I have serious doubts as to whether a previous good character
is effective mitigation in a case like this one. But I will eiT on the side of leniency
if I err at all, and give the 3rd accused some discount, even though it cannot be
much of a discount, for his previous good character.
When it comes to the role each of them played, I will draw no distinction between
the 2nd to 5th accused.

A court should always be as lenient as possible, but the seriousness of a case


cannot be ignored. The seriousness of this case speaks for itself once the basic

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Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00259

HCCC000013/2009 HK.SAR v. SEE WAH LUN AND OTHERS

Page 4 of4

Footnote 2
facts are noted. Each of these conspiracies involved a plan to abduct a man in the
street and take him as a captive to a prepared location. In the first conspiracy, the
plan was to break his arms and legs at that location. In the second conspiracy, the
plan went even further. It was to kill him at that location.

All things considered, I will sentence as follows.


1st accused, on Count 1, I sentence you to

2~

years' imprisonment. On Count 2, I

sentence you to 11 years' imprisonment. On Count 3, I sentence you to 14 years'


imprisonment. On Count 4, I sentence you to 12 years' imprisonment. All the
sentences will be concunent. So you will go to prison for 14 years.
2nd accused, on Count 1, I sentence you to 1~ years' imprisonment. On Count 2, I
sentence you to 9 years' imprisonment. Those sentences will be concurrent. So
you will go to prison for 9 years.
3rd accused, on Count 1, I adopt a starting point of 1Y2 years. On Count 2, I adopt
a starting point of 9 years. For your previous good character, I will give you such
discount as to sentence you to 1 year's imprisonment on Count I and to 8Y2 years'
imprisonment on Count 2. Those sentences will be concurrent. So you will go to

prison for

8~

years,

4th accused, I sentence you to 1Y:z years' imprisonment on Count 1 and a


concurrent term of 9 years' imprisonment on Count 2. So you will go to prison for
9 years.

5th accused, I sentence you to 1Y2 years' imprisonment on Count l and a


concurrent term of 9 years' imprisonment on Count 2. So you will go to prison for
9 years.

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SJ001436

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00260

footnote 4
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2009-10-29

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SJ001437

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00261

footnote 4
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SJ001438

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00262

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SJ001439

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00263

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SJ001440
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00264

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SJ001441

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00265

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Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00266

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SJ001443

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00267

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SJ001444

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00268

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SJ001445
PlaintiffEx. 1 102_00269

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SJ001446

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00270

Footnote 5
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SJ001447

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00271

footnote 5

SJ001448

Plaintiff Ex. 1102_ o0272

footnote 5

(Source: http://www.52cft.com/news/news 124.html)

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SJ001449

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00273

Footnote 5

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SJ001450

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00274

Footnote 5

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SJ001451

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00275

Footnote 5
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SJ001453

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00277

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2009-10-29

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SJ001455

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00279

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SJ001456

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00280

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Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00281

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Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 00283

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Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00284

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Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00285

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Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00286

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Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00287

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SJ001464

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00288

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SJ001465

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00289

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SJ001466

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00290

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Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00291

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Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00292

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SJ001469
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00293

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Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00294

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Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00295

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Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00296

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Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00297

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SJ001474

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00298

Footnote 1 0
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SJ001475

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00299

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SJ001476

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00300

footnote 10

Next Magazine
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SJ001477

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00301

footnote 10

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SJ001478

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00302

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SJ001479

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00303

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SJ001480
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00304

HCCC000013/2009 HKSAR v. SEE WAH LUN AND OTHERS

Page I of4

Footnote '11
HCCC13/2009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13 OF 2009

HKSAR

v.
SEE Wah-lun (Al)
TANG Ka-man (A2)
WONG Chi-man (A3)
YEUNG Chun-kit (A4)
CHAN Ho-leung (AS)

Before:

The Honourable Mrs Justice V Bokhary

Date:

27 October 2009 at 3.00 pm

Present:Mr Simon Tam, SPP, and Mr Franco Kuan, PP, of the Department of Justice, for
HKSAR
Mr John Haynes, instructed by Messrs Mike So, Joseph Lau & Co. (assigned by
DLA), for the 1st Accused
Mr William Chan, instructed by Messrs Lau, Chan & Ko, for the 2nd Accused
Mr Paul Tse, instructed by Messrs Tam, Pun & Yipp (assigned by DLA), for the
3rd Accused
Mr Peter Cahill, instructed by Messrs Li, Wong, Lam & W I Cheung (assigned by
DLA), for the 4th Accused
Mr Francis Cheng, instructed by Messrs Louis K Y Pau & Co. (assigned by DLA),
for the 5th Accused
Offence:(l) Acting as a member of a triad society (~_:::1-f~JJX;~5J-ful.{f$)
(2) Conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent C*~tL~Ii'i!Tm~3&~

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SJ001481

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00305

HCCCOOOOB/2009 HKSAR v. SEE WAH LUN AND OTHERS

Page 2 of4

footnote 11
U!t~l!1~~)

(3) Conspiracy to commit murden (.$~~~)


(4) Soliciting to t.murder (ri~H~~J!IJ~)

Transcript of the Audio Recording


of the Sentence in the above Case

COURT: See Wah-lun, Tang Ka-man, Wong Chi-man, Yeung Chun-kit and Chan Ho-leung,
in respect of each of you, I have considered everything urged on your behalf by your
counsel.And I have of course given separate consideration to each of you on the question of
sentence.
As far as you, See Wah-lun, is concerned, your offences under Counts I, 2 and 4
are all related to the conspiracy to murder under Count 3. I will pass concurrent
sentences on you on all four counts.
As far as you, the other four accused, are concerned, your offence under Count 1 is
related to the conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent under Count 2.
I will pass concurrent sentences on each of you four on those two counts. And as
far as the role which each of you four played, I will draw no distinction.
In respect of all five accused, I will of course take the most lenient view that can
reasonably be taken. The appropriate total sentence for each of the five accused
will be achieved by making the longest of the concurrent sentences against each
accused reflect all the appropriate elements of aggravation, including those which
come under another or other counts. That will achieve the appropriate total but no
more than the appropriate total since all the sentences will be concurrent.
The maximum penalty for the offence under Count 1 (of acting as a member of a
triad society) is 3 years' imprisonment on a first conviction and 7 years'
imprisonment on a second or subsequent conviction. The maximum penalty for the
offence under Count 2 (ofconspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent),
for the offence under Count 3 (of conspiracy to murder) and for the offence under
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PlaintiffEx. 1102 00306

Page 3 of4

HCCC000013/2009 HKSAR v. SEE WAH LUN AND OTHERS

footnote 11
Count 4 (of soliciting to murder) are the same. It is life imprisonment
As to the counts against all five accused, namely Counts 1 and 2, the position is
this. The evidence clearly indicates that the way in which the 1st accused acted as
a triad member is more serious than the way in which the other four accused so
acted; and his role in the conspiracy to cause grievous bodily hann with intent is
more serious than theirs. As against all five accused, it has to be said that the
grievous bodily harm which they conspired to cause with intent was to be carried
out pursuant to a carefully planned attack.
There are cases which show that the sentence for causing grievous bodily harm
with intent commonly range from 3 years' imprisonment to 12 years'
imprisonment although everything will ultimately depend on the particular
circumstances. There are also cases which show that conspirators are not
infrequently punished in the same way as if they had completed the offence which
they conspired to commit. Again, it all depends ultimately on the particular
circumstances.
In respect of each of these five accused, I bear in mind of course that, behind the
scene, there is a person or are persons even more blameworthy than any of them.
Turning to the 1st accused alone, the murder which he conspired to commit and
which he solicited others to commit was likewise to be carried out to a carefully
planned attack. The use of stun guns and very deadly knives was part of the plan.
As far as mitigation is concerned, the only real mitigation available is the
mitigation available to the 3rd accused in the form of his previous good character.
The other accused's criminal record will of course not be held against them when
they are sentenced. I have serious doubts as to whether a previous good character
is effective mitigation in a case like this one. But I will err on the side of leniency
if I err at all, and give the 3rd accused some discount, even though it cannot be
much of a discount, for his previous good character.
When it comes to the role each of them played, I will draw no distinction between
the 2nd to 5th accused.
A court should always be as lenient as possible, but the seriousness of a case
cannot be ignored. The seriousness of this case speaks for itself once the basic

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SJ001483

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00307

HCCC000013/2009 HKSAR v. SEE WAI-l LUN AND OTHERS

Page 4 of4

Footnote 11
facts are noted. Each of these conspiracies involved a plan to abduct a man in the
street and take him as a captive to a prepared location. In the first conspiracy, the
plan was to break his arms and legs at that location. In the second conspiracy, the
plan went even further. It was to kill him at that location.
All things considered, I will sentence as follows.
1st accused, on Count 1, I sentence you to 2Y2 years' imprisonment. On Count 2, I
sentence you to 11 years' imprisonment. On Count 3, I sentence you to 14 years'
imprisonment. On Count 4, I sentence you to 12 years' imprisonment. All the
sentences will be concurrent. So you will go to prison for 14 years.
2nd accused, on Count 1, I sentence you to 1Y2 years' imprisonment. On Count 2, I
sentence you to 9 years' imprisonment. Those sentences will be concurrent. So
you will go to prison for 9 years.
3rd accused, on Count 1, I adopt a starting point of 1Yz years. On Count 2, I adopt
a starting point of 9 years. For your previous good character, I will give you such
discount as to sentence you to 1 year's imprisonment on Count 1 and to 8Yz years'
imprisonment on Count 2. Those sentences will be concurrent. So you will go to
prison for 8Y2 years.
4th accused, I sentence you to 1Yz years' imprisonment on Count 1 and a
concurrent term of 9 years' imprisonment on Count 2. So you will go to prison for
9 years.
5th accused, I sentence you to 1Y2 years' imprisonment on Count 1 and a
concurrent term of 9 years' imprisonment on Count 2. So you will go to prison for
9 years.

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4/21/2010
SJ001484

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00308

Footnote 14
Soolh China Morning !>us.!

scmp.com
Hong Kong
Triad five jailed over plot to kill croupier

Yvonne Tsul
329 words
28 October 2009
scmp.com
SCMCOM
English
(c) 2009 scmp.com. All rights reserved.

Five Wo Hop To triad members were jailed yesterday for 6-1/2 to 14 years for taking part in a plan
to murder a casino dealer in May last year on the orders of a senior gangster.

The dealer was targeted after the "Yuen Long God of Gambling", Siu Yun-ping, won hundreds of
millions of dollars in Macau casinos, the Court of First Instance had heard.
The five men, who pleaded not guilty, were convicted by a jury last Friday,

See Wah-lun, 30, Tang Ka-man, 31, Wong Chi-man, 26, Yeung Chun-kit, 22, and Chan Ho-leung,
35, were convicted of acting as triad members and conspiring to cause grievous bodily harm. See
was also convicted of conspiring to murder and soliciting nine people - Including the other four
convicted - to commit murder. He was jailed for 14 years. Tang, Yeung and Chan were jailed for
nine years and Wong for 8-1/2 years.

The court had heard that triad boss Cheung Chi-tai, also known as "Tsang Pau", ordered his
followers in April last year to abduct dealer Wong Kam-ming and break his arms and legs. But
Cheung changed his mind in early May, and ordered wong killed.

Information from triad member Lau Ming-yee had led to the arrest of more than 10 men in a Yuen
Long village house on May 15. Police found a range of weapons inside.

At the trial, Wong testified that Slu had won an estimated HK$500 million to HK$600 million playing
baccarat between August 2007 and January last year in Macau casinos, including the Venetian, the
Usboa and the Sands Macao.
Wong said he had made more than HK$10 million in tips from Siu,

SJ001485

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00309

footnote 14
Slu testified that he suspected the plot was orchestrated by someone who was angry that he had
won so much money and suspected him of cheating.

Document SCMCOM0020091028e5asOOOlr

SJ001486

Plaintiff Ex. I I 02 003 I 0

footnote 15
2009-10-29

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Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00311

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SJ001488

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 003 12

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SJ001489

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00313

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PlaintiffEx. 1102 00314

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Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 003 15

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Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00316

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SJ001493

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00317

footnote 16

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(Source: http://news.ifeng.com/ma in Ia nd/201001;0101_17 _1495276.shtml)

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SJ001494
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00318

footnote 16

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SJ001495

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00319

Footnote 16
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SJ001496

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00320

footnote 16
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(Source: http://news.sin a.com.cn/c/2009-06-0l65015725380s.shtm I)

SJ001497

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00321

footnote 17

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SJ001498

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00322

footnote 17

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SJ001499

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00323

Footnote 17
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'il!f?f13J:.:'Ilc(f.f.t}!!}f'i'lif{:!.}r.'D , i\f)lfi'?i'Jl.:~l?li"l:tj;1'}fi'pNi}HJ~~ )J)f.iJ,lJI"\Il'l~:EJi'.d;JUJIIt~Rilllil'ti0J.\il
if!UiHJTT!.i!lliii*k1lii~J.{:i}'i.'i)(fli'#t3t~Jirf{-~~!1

(Source: http://news.sina.eom.cn/c/2009-06-0W65015725380s.shtml)

SJ001500

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00324

footnote 18

of Directors

;N;r,

tlr. Cheuk Fung, aged 35, was appointed as an

~~<i'Uve

director on 21 June 2005 and re-designated as

'\:'il"' .,:f~>rman of the Board of the Company on 8 June 2006.


;M;-, i:.&r. has over 10 years of experience in a number of
!l:.~ir<~5 activities ranging from garment industry,
~~;:,rt;;;obile business, property investment, cruise ship
<-'F-~Ii'!~,t")n

to casino operation. Currently, he Is Hong Kong

;;'::..ymrt~crce & Industry Association Ltd. and the vice


pffiO'~li.;nt of The Association of Industries and Commerce of

rLE, Th-'I.W Territories. The Board is of the view that Mr. Lin's
.iiJiTFI~rve business experience is valuable to the Group and

will, In the long run, assist the Group to diversify Into other
areas of business.

Mr. Nicholas J. Niglio, aged 62, was appointed as an


executive director on 3 September 2007. He has over 25
years varied background In gambling focused
entertainment field dating back to 1983. Through out all

SJ001501

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00325

footnote 18
these years, he versed himself in management of all kinds
of gaming activities and have proven success of his
accomplishments.

Prior to his current position, Mr.Niglio previously was


Executive Vice President of Trump Taj Mahal Casino Resort,
Inc. Atlantic City NJ, ("Trump") serving as senior executive
In Casino marketing and international operation, from
October 1993 to August 2001, he originally joined Trump In
October 1993 as Executive Vice President to oversee all
operational and administrative management of marketing
program. Regional offices Including Asia, Middle East,
Europe and Latin America were under all his management.

Mr. Nigllo worked at Caesars World Inc, Atlantic City NJ


from 1986 to1993 in such capacities as: Senior Vice
President Eastern Operation and Vice President Casino
Operations of Caesars Palace. He worked at Caesars in such
capacities to develop casino marketing operation in all
aspect and to train up staff to raise the level of customer
service.

Mr. Niglio was also a senior executive holding the position of


Vice President Casino Marketing and director of Casino
Administration in Resort International Hotel and Casino,
Atlantic City NJ from 1978 to 1986.

Mr. Niglio graduated from the California State University


with a Master degree in business administration, a B.S.
degree In accounting from Saint Peter's College, Jersey City
NJ.

Mr. Chan Shiu Kwong, Stephen, aged 52, was appointed


as an executive director of the Company on 20 April 2005.
Mr. Chan holds a Master degree in Professional Accounting
from Hong Kong Polytechnic University and a Bachelor of
Commerce. He is currently a fellow member of CPA

SJ001502

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00326

Footnote 18
(Australia) and member of Hong Kong Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, the Institute of Chartered Secretaries
and Administrators, the Hong Kong Institute of Company
Secretaries. Mr. Chan has over 23 years of experience in
property development, manufacturing, travel and gaming
related industries. He has worked for multinational
companies and listed companies providing him profound
experience in merger and acquisition, treasury and
corporate finance.

Mr. Lau Kwok Hung, aged 62, was appointed as an


executive director of the Company on 11 October 2001. Mr.
Lau holds a Senior Executive Master Degree in Business
Administration from Charles Darwin University. He Is a
fellow of the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public
Accountants. He has over 25 years of experience in
accounting and finance, auditing, taxation, company
secretarial practice and corporate finance. He is also the
company secretary of the Company.

Mr. Wan Yau Shing, Ban, aged 43, was appointed as an


executive director ofthe Company on 11 April 2007. Mr.
Wan Yau Shing Is a management veteran In gaming
Industry. Mr. Wan has over 20 years working experience in
Macau gaming industry and cruise management, of which
more than 10 years In senior management position. Mr.
Wan was an appointed junket of several renowned casinos
in Macau (Including Lisboa) and was the operational director
in cruise companies including Orient Princess, Success
Cruise and sea Pearl). With his remarkable success to
manage gaming industry, he has a reputable standing in
Macau gaming industry.

SJ001503

PlaintiffEx. 1102_00327

Footnote 18

INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS


Mr. Alton Cheung, aged 45, was elected as an
Independent non-executive director on 5 June 2007. He has
over 12 years business experience and is an elite of
automobile dealer Industry. At present he Is currently
holding directorship In a number of private companies
which engaging in automobile distribution in PRC, China
among most of the finest brand automobile in the world.
He graduated from California College of Arts and Craft,
Berkeley, USA holding a Bachelor degree major in faculty of
communication and fine arts. Also he is currently an
Independent Non-executive Director of Hang Ten
(Holdings) Ltd, being a listed company in Hong Kong and
now a full membership of Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club and
Hong Kong Jockey Club.

Mr. Vue Fu Wing, aged 40, was appointed as an


independent non-executive director and a member of the
audit committee of the Company on 15 January 2005. Mr.
Yue is a fellow of the Association of Chartered Certified
Accountants and an associate member of the Hong Kong
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. He has a Master
Degree in PRC Accounting from Jinan University In China
and a Bachelor Degree In Accountancy from the City
University of Hong Kong. Mr. Yue has over 10 years
experience in accounting and finance. He has worked for a
multinational company, a Hong Kong listed company and an
international accounting firm.

Mr. Wong Tat Tung, aged 38, has over 12 years business
experience In the field of wealth management, asset
management specializing in fund portfolio and offshore

SJ001504

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00328

Footnote 18
financial arrangement. He is a co-founder of CASH Federick
Taylor ltd and was subsequently appointed as managing
director thereafter. At present Mr. Wong Is a director of
CASH Asset Management ltd. Prior to joining CASH, Mr.
Wong obtained vast experience in asset management whilst
working as Vice President for Credit Suisse Privilege Limited
in Hong Kong and across Asia.

At present, Mr. Wong serves as a councilor of Sham Shui Po


District Council for the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and a committee member of the city of Jiangmen
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in
Guangdong province. He is also an Honorary Citizen of
Ararat Rural City, Australia. Mr. Wong Is a keen supporter of
many community service organizations including but not
limited to "Guangdong Jiangmen City Young Entrepreneur's
association", "Guangdong Young Entrepreneur's
Association", "Sham Shu! Po District Fire Safety
Ambassador Honorary President's Association" etc. and
now is Vice Chairman of Yan Oi Tong and at same time
offered by many educational institutions as distinguished
school board members of their schools. Mr. Wong Is
currently a Honorary advisor of Registered Financial Planner
institution

us.

(Source: http://www.neptunegroup.eom.hk/en/directors.htm)

SJ001505

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00329

Footnote 19

20090417

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(Source:
http://news.sina.com. hk/cgi-bin/nw/show.cgi/9/1/1/11 04362/1. html)

SJ001506

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00330

Footnote 20
May 08

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SJ001507
Plaintiff Ex. II 02 003 31

Footnote 20
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SJ001508

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00332

footnote 20
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SJ001509

PlaintiffEx. I 102 00333

footnote 20
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SJ001510

PlaintiffEx. I 102 00334

footnote .20

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SJ001511

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00335

Footnote 20

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SJ001512

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00336

Footnote 20

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SJ001513

PlaintiffEx. I 102 00337

Footnote 20
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SJ001514

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00338

footnote 20
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SJ001515

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00339

footnote 21
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SJ001516

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00340

footnote 21
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SJ001517

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00341

Footnote 21

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SJ001518

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00342

Footnote 21

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SJ001519

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00343

footnote 21

SJ001520

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00344

Footnote 21

SJ001521

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 00345

Footnote 21

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SJ001522

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00346

Footnote 21

SJ001523

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00347

footnote 21

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SJ001524

Plaintiff Ex. II 02 00348

footnote 21

SJ001525

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00349

footnote .21
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SJ001526

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00350

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SJ001527

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00351

Footnote 21
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SJ001528

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00352

Foe>tnote 21

00 W 2 il ;J!<S;t,f:./lli!Y:!~ 90 lf\Jl!i!~ililil!.H,
f One life one love J .,

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SJ001529

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00353

footnote 22
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited takes no responsibility for the contents of this announcement,
makes no representation as to its accuracy or completeness and expressly disclaims any liability whatsoever
for any loss howsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any part of the contents of this
announcement.
This announcement appears for information purposes only and does not constitute an invitation or offer to
acquire, purchase or subscribe for the securities.

MASSIVE RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION LIMITED


~m~~~m~~
(htcorporated in Hong Kong with limited liability)

(Stock Corle: 70)

(1) VERY SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONACQUISITION OF 100% EQUITY INTERESTS IN CREDIBLE LIMITED;


(2) PROPOSED SHARE CONSOLIDATION;
(3) PROPOSED OPEN OFFER ON THE BASIS OF
ONE OFFER SHARE FOR EVERY TWO CONSOLIDATED
SHARES HELD ON THE RECORD DATE;
(4) PROPOSED CHANGE OF COMPANY NAME;

AND
(5) RESUMPTION OF TRADING
Financial adviser to Massive Resources International Corporation Limited
KINGSTON CORI'ORATE FINANCE LIMITED

Underwriters to the Open Offer

.JUMBO BOOM HOLDINGS LIMITED


(1)

KINGSTON SECURITIES LIMITED

VERY SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITION


The Acquisition Agreement
The Company and Mr. Guo has entered into the Acquisition Agreement on 16
January 2007. Pursuant to the Acquisition Agreement, the Company has
conditionally agreed to acquire and Mr. Guo has conditionally agreed to dispose
of 100 shares of US$1.00 each in the share capital of Credible, representing
100% of the entire issued share capital of Credible, free from any option, charge,
lien, equity, encumbrance, rights of pre-emption or any other third party rights
whatsoever and together with all rights attached to them at the date of Completion
or subsequently becoming attached to them, at a total cash consideration of
HK$140,000,000. Credible holds a 20% equity interest in Base Move, a company
which has entered into the Second Profit Agreement with Highest Increase to
acquire 100% of its profit, being approximately 0.4% of the Rolling Turnover
generated by Hou Wan (who has on 17 February 2005 entered into the Junket
Representative Agreement and on 17 February 2006 renewed such Junket
Representative Agreement with Venetian Macau Limited as a gaming promoter
for Sands Macao) and/or its customers at the Chengdu VIP Club.

SJ001530

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00354

footnote 22
First Profit Agreement
On 9 January 2007, Highest Increase as purchaser entered into the First Profit
Agreement with Hou Wan as vendor and Mr. Guo, the ultimate beneficial owner
of Hou Wan, as guarantor. Pursuant to the First Profit Agreement, Hou Wan has
conditionally agreed to sell, as beneficial owner, and/or assign and Mr. Guo has
conditionally agreed to procure Hou Wan to sell and/or assign to Highest Increase
absolutely Hou Wan's right, title and interest and benefits in and to 100% of the
Profit, being 0.4% of the Rolling Turnover generated by Hou Wan and/or its
customers at the Chengdu VIP Club gaming rooms commencing from the
completion date of the First Profit Agreement and Highest Increase shall
purchase/accept the assignment the Profit, free from all liens, claims, equities,
charges, encumbrances or third-party rights of whatsoever nature and with all
rights attached thereto as from the completion date of the First Profit Agreement.

Second Profit Agreement


On 9 January 2007, Highest Increase, Base Move and Mr. Guo entered into the
Second Profit Agreement for the acquisition of the net profit of Highest Increase,
being approximately 0.4% of the Rolling Turnover generated by Hou Wan and/
or its customers at the Chengdu VIP Club. Pursuant to the Second Profit
Agreement, Highest Increase has conditionally agreed to sell, as beneficial owner,
and/or assign and Mr. Guo has conditionally agreed to procure Highest Increase
to sell and/or assign to Base Move absolutely Highest Increase's right, title and
interest and benefits in and to 100% of the Profit, being 0.4% of the Rolling
Turnover generated by Hou Wan and/or its customers at the Chengdu VIP Club
gaming rooms commencing from the completion date of the Second Profit
Agreement and Base Move shall purchase/accept the assignment of the Profit,
free from all liens, claims, equities, charges, encumbrances or third-party rights
of whatsoever nature and with all rights attached thereto as from the completion
date of the Second Profit Agreement.

Call Option
Certain Champ has, pursuant to an agreement dated 16 January 2007, granted to
the Company the Call Option. The Call Option is, subject to Completion,
exercisable by the Company within 24 months after Completion. The aggregate
price for the exercise of the Call Option is HK$350,000,000.
The Company has no current intention to exercise the Call Option. Further
announcement will be made by the Company upon exercise of the Call Option.

Risk factors of junket business


The junket business operated by Hou Wan involved certain risk factors, details
of such risk factors have been disclosed under the section headed "Risk Factors
of Junket Business" herein.

(2)

PROPOSED SHARE CONSOLIDATION


The Board proposes to implement the Share Consolidation pursuant to which
every ten Existing Shares of HK$0.02 each be consolidated into one Consolidated
Share of HK$0.2. As at the date of this announcement, the authorised share
capital of the Company is HK$1,000,000,000 divided into 50,000,000,000
Existing Shares of which 14,397,630,000 Existing Shares are in issue and are
fully paid or credited as fully paid. As at the date of this announcement, the
Company has no derivatives, options, warrants and conversion rights or other
similar rights which are convertible or exchangeable into Shares.
2

SJ001531

Plaintiff Ex. 11 02 003 55

footnote 22
(3)

PROPOSED OPEN OFFER


The Company proposes to raise approximately HK$143.98 million, before
expenses, by issuing 719,881,500 Offer Shares at a price of HK$0.2 per Offer
Share by way of Open Offer, on the basis of one Offer Share for every two
Consolidated Shares held on the Record Date and payable in full on acceptance.
The Open Offer is only available to the Qualifying Shareholders. To qualify for
the Open Offer, all transfers of Shares must be lodged for registration with the
Registrar by 4:00 p.m. on 3 April 2007 and the Shareholders are not Excluded
Shareholders. The register of members of the Company will be closed from 4
April 2007 to 12 April 2007, both dates inclusive, to determine the eligibility of
the Shareholders to the Open Offer.
Pursuant to the Underwriting Agreement, the Underwriters have conditionally
agreed to underwrite, on a fully underwritten basis, all the Offer Shares not
being taken up.
The estimated net proceeds from the Open Offer will be approximately HK$140
million (net of expenses of approximately HK$4 million). The Board intends to
apply the net proceeds as to approximately HK$140 million towards the
Acquisition.

Warning of the risk of dealing in the Shares


Shareholders and potential investors of the Company should note that the
Open Offer is conditional upon the Underwriting Agreement having become
unconditional and the Underwriters not having terminated the Underwriting
Agreement in accordance with the terms thereof. Accordingly, the Open
Offer may or may not proceed.
Shareholders and potential investors of the Company should therefore
exercise extreme caution when dealing in the Shares, and if they are in any
doubt about their position, they should consult their professional advisers.
Shareholders should note that the Shares will be dealt in on an ex-entitlement
basis commencing from 2 April 2007 and that dealing in Shares will take
place while the conditions to which the Underwriting Agreement is subject
remain unfulfilled. Any Shareholder or other person dealing in Shares up
to the date on which all conditions to which the Open Oiier is subject are
fulfilled (which is expected to be on 3 May 2007), will accordingly bear the
risk that the Open Offer cannot become unconditional and may not proceed.
Any Shareholder or other person contemplating selling or purchasing Shares,
who is in any doubt about his/her/its position, is recommended to consult
his/her/its own professional adviser.
(4)

PROPOSED CHANGE OF COMPANY NAME


The Board proposes to change the Company name from "Massive Resources
International Corporation Limited" to "Neptune Group Limited" to reflect the
Company's expansion plans into Macau as the Company owns a passage vessel
with gaming facilities called "Neptune", and as such the Directors believe that
the Change of Company Name would be appropriate. Upon the change of name
becoming effective, the Company will adopt "#ij: ~E ~ J!#lff ~~ .Z~ PJ " as its
new Chinese name.

SJ001532
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00356

Footnote 22
(5)

GENERAL
As some of the applicable percentage ratios as referred to in Chapter 14 of the
Listing Rules are more than 100%, the Acquisition constitutes a very substantial
acquisition on the part of the Company under Chapter 14 of the Listing Rules.
Accordingly, the Acquisition is subject to the approval by the Shareholders at a
'
general meeting under Rule 14.49 of the Listing Rules.
An EGM will be convened to consider and, if thought fit, approve (i) the
Acquisition and the Call Option; (ii) the Share Consolidation; and (iii) the
Change of Company Name. To the best of the Directors' knowledge, information
and belief having made all reasonable enquiries, no Shareholder is required to
abstain from voting at the EGM.
A circular containing, among other things, the details of (i) the Acquisition and
the Call Option; (ii) the Share Consolidation; (iii) the Open Offer; and (iv) the
Change of Company Name, together with a notice of the EGM will be despatched
to the Shareholders as soon as practicable.

(6)

SUSPENSION AND RESUMPTION OF TRADING


At the request of the Company, trading in Shares on the Stock Exchange has
been suspended from 9:30a.m. on 17 January 2007 pending the release of this
announcement. Application has been made by the Company to the Stock
Exchange for resumption of trading in Shares on the Stock Exchange with
effect from 9:30a.m. on 12 February 2007.

(1)

VERY SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITION


THE ACQUISITION AGREEMENT
Date

16 January 2007

Parties
Purchaser
Vendor
Others

the Company
Mr. Guo, an Independent Third Party
Certain Champ and Hou Wan

Assets to be acquired
Pursuant to the Acquisition Agreement, the Company has conditionally agreed to
acquire and the Vendor has conditionally agreed to dispose of 100 shares of US$1.00
each in the share capital of Credible, representing 100% of the entire issued share
capital of Credible, free from any option, charge, lien, equity, encumbrance, rights
of pre-emption or any other third party rights whatsoever and together with all
rights attached to them at the date of Completion or subsequently becoming attached
to them. Credible holds a 20% equity interest in Base Move, a company which has
entered into the Second Profit Agreement with Highest Increase to acquire 100% of
its profit, being approximately 0.4% of the Rolling Turnover generated by Hou
Wan and/or its customers at the Chengdu VIP Club, one of the VIP gaming rooms
owned by Sands Macao and which currently has 5 gaming tables.

SJ001533

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00357

footnote 22
Consideration
The total consideration for the Acquisition is HK$140,000,000 and shall be satisfied
in cash upon the Completion. The consideration was arrived at by reference to the
track record of the Rolling Turnover of Hou Wan at Chengdu VIP Club during the
period between July 2005 and October 2006, the number of gaming tables at the
Chengdu VIP Club, the First Guaranteed Profit, the Second Guaranteed Profit, the
Call Option and the research reports conducted by leading investment banks that
made a revenue estimate of approximately HK$300,000,000 a month to be derived
from one gaming table of Baccarat (being the 1nost accessible ga1ne in a VIP Club
in Macau).

Conditions precedent
Completion is conditional upon the satisfaction and/or waiver of the following:
(A)

the Purchaser undertaking a due diligence investigation in respect of


Credible, Base Move and Highest Increase including but not limited to the
affairs, business, assets, results, legal and financing structure of Credible,
Base Move and Highest Increase in particular, the Second Profit Agreement
and the Purchaser being in its reasonable discretion satisfied with the results
of such due diligence investigation;

(B)

the Purchaser having received to its reasonable satisfaction a Macanese


legal opinion on the legality and validity of the Junket Representative
Agreement and the First Profit Agreement and the transactions contemplated
thereunder;

(C)

no event having occurred since the date of the Acquisition Agreement to


Completion, the consequence of which is to materially and adversely affect
the financial position, business or property, results of operations or business
prospects of Credible, Base Move or Highest Increase and such material
adverse effect shall not have been caused;

(D)

the warranties in the Acquisition Agreement remaining true and accurate


and not misleading at Completion as if repeated at Completion and at all
times between the date of the Acquisition Agreement and Completion;

(E)

the passing by the Shareholders at an extraordinary general meeting of the


Company to be convened and held of an ordinary resolution to approve the
Acquisition Agreement and the transactions contemplated thereunder; and

(F)

the Open Offer having been completed in all material respects.

:FIRST PROFIT AGREEMENT


On 9 January 2007, Highest Increase as purchaser entered into the First Profit
Agreement with Hou Wan as vendor and Mr. Guo, the ultimate beneficial owner of
Hou Wan, as guarantor. The major terms of the First Profit Agreement are set out
as follows:

SJ001534
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00358

footnote 22
Asset to be acquired
Hou Wan has on 17 February 2005 entered into the Junket Representative Agreement
and on 17 February 2006 renewed such Junket Representative Agreement with
Venetian Macau Limited as a gaming promoter for Sands Macao. Hou Wan has
conditionally agreed to sell, as beneficial owner, and/or assign and Mr. Guo has
conditionally agreed to procure Hou Wan to sell and/or assign to Highest Increase
absolutely Hou Wan's right, title and interest and benefits in and to 100% of the
Profit, being 0.4% of the Rolling Turnover generated by Hou Wan and/or its
customers at the Chengdu VIP Club gaming rooms commencing from the completion
date of the First Profit Agreement and Highest Increase shall purchase/accept the
assignment of the Profit, free from all liens, claims, equities, charges, encumbrances
or third-party rights of whatsoever nature and with all rights attached thereto as
from the completion date of the First Profit Agreement.

Consideration
The consideration payable by Highest Increase to Hou Wan for the Profit sold and/
or assigned is HK$1.00.
Conditions
Completion of the First Profit Agreement is conditional upon the following
conditions having been fulfilled or waived (as the case may be):
(a)

Highest Increase obtaining such legal opinions as it may in its absolute


discretion require on, inter alia, the legality and enforceability of the junket
operation conducted by Hou Wan at Sands Macao and the legality of the
transactions contemplated thereunder;

(b)

the warranties given by Hou Wan in the First Profit Agreement remaining
true and accurate in all material respects; and

(c)

Highest Increase being satisfied in its absolute discretion with the results
of the due diligence investigation in respect of Hou Wan, including but not
limited to the affairs, business, assets, legality of all business and
commercial activities conducted at Sands Macao, any other due diligence
relevant to the sale and purchase of the Profit, liabilities, operations, records,
financial position, value of assets, accounts, results, legal and financing
structure of Hou Wan.

Long-stop date
The First Profit Agreement provides that should the satisfaction of all the above
conditions, if not waived by Highest Increase, not occur on or before 30 June 2007,
the First Profit Agreement shall terminate.
Completion
Completion shall take place on the fifth Business Day or on such date as may be
agreed between the parties after the last of the conditions of the First Profit
Agreement having been fulfilled or waived.

SECOND PROFIT AGREEMENT


On 9 January 2007, Highest Increase, Base Move and Mr. Guo entered into the
Second Profit Agreement for the acquisition of Highest Increase's right, title and
interest and benefits in and to 0.4% of the Rolling Turnover generated by Hou Wan
and/or its customers at the Chengdu VIP Club.
6

SJ001535
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00359

footnote 22
The major terms of the Second Profit Agreement are set out as follows:

Asset to be acquired
Highest Increase has conditionally agreed to sell, as beneficial owner, and/or assign
and Mr. Guo has conditionally agreed to procure Highest Increase to sell and/or
assign to Base Move absolutely Highest Increase's right, title and interest and
benefits in and to 100% of the Profit, being 0.4% of the Rolling Turnover generated
by Hou Wan and/or its customers at the Chengdu VIP Club gaming rooms
commencing from the completion date of the Second Profit Agreement and Base
Move shall purchase/accept the assignment of the Profit, free from all liens, claims,
equities, charges, encumbrances or third-party rights of whatsoever nature and with
all rights attached thereto as from the completion date of the Second Profit
Agreement.

Consideration
The consideration payable by Base Move to Highest Increase for the Profit sold
and/or assigned is HK$1.00.

Conditions
Completion of the Second Profit Agreement is conditional upon the following
conditions having been fulfilled or waived (as the case may be):
(a)

Base Move obtaining such legal opinions as it may in its absolute discretion
require on, inter alia, the legality and enforceability of the junket operation
conducted by Hou Wan at Sands Macao and the legality of the transactions
contemplated thereunder;

(b)

the warranties given by Highest Increase in the Second Profit Agreement


remaining true and accurate in all material respects; and

(c)

Base Move being satisfied in its absolute discretion with the results of the
due diligence investigation in respect of Hou Wan, including but not limited
to the affairs, business, assets, legality of all business and commercial
activities conducted at Sands Macao, any other due diligence relevant to
the sale and purchase of the Profit, liabilities, operations, records, financial
position, value of assets, accounts, results, legal and financing structure of
Hou Wan.

Long-stop date
The Second Profit Agreement provides that should the satisfaction of all the above
conditions, if not waived by Base Move, not occur on or before 30 June 2007, the
Second Profit Agreement shall terminate.

Completion
Completion shall take place on the fifth Business Day or on such date as may be
agreed between the parties after the last of the conditions of the Second Profit
Agreement having been fulfilled or waived.
Pursuant to the Second Profit Agreement, written evidence showing that the First
Profit Agreement has become unconditional and completed shall be received by
Base Move on completion of the Second Profit Agreement, otherwise completion
on Second Profit Agreement shall not take place.

SJ001536
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00360

Footnote 22
The Company understands that the arrangement of the First Profit Agreement and
the Second Profit Agreement is for the purpose of ringfencing and ensuring there is
no tax burden arising from the Profit for Base Move upon completion of the
Acquisition. To the best of the Directors' knowledge, information and belief having
made all reasonable enquiries (including obtaining legal advice from the legal advisor
to the Company), the First Profit Agreement and the Second Profit Agreement are
legally enforceable.

THE CALL OPTION


Certain Champ has, pursuant to a call option agreement dated 16 January 2007,
granted to the Company the Call Option. The Call Option is, subject to Completion,
exercisable by the Company within 24 months from Completion. The aggregate
price for the exercise of the Call Option is HK$350,000,000 (with reference to the
consideration of the Acquisition) and shall be satisfied in cash.
The Company has no current intention to exercise the Call Option. Further
announcement will be made by the Company upon exercise of the Call Option.

DIRECTORS' VIEWS

As the Junket Representative Agreement is confidential, its major terms cannot be


disclosed to the Directors. However, the Directors had (i) visited Sands Macao on
various occasions to observe the level and operation of Hou Wan's business; (ii)
reviewed the junket representative settlement forms issued by Sands Macao to Hou
Wan evidencing the Rolling Turnover generated at Chengdu VIP Club; (iii) reviewed
the licences issued to Hou Wan to operate its business and the Macanese legal
opinion on the legality and validity of Hou Wan; and (iv) conducted extensive
research on junket business in Macau, including reviewing reports prepared by
well-known investment banks in relation to Macau gaming business and making
enquiries with the practitioners in the gaming industry, in order to understand the
arrangement between the junket operators and Sands Macao operators generally.
The Directors understand that generally, the term of the agreement between the
junket operator and Sands Macao operator is tied with the term of the junket licence.
Such kind of agreement will be revoked once the renewal of the junket licence
fails. Having reviewed the Junket Representative Agreement, the Macanese lawyers
are of the view that Hou Wan is validly licensed to act as a gaming promoter in
Macau. As such, the Directors have exercised their fiduciary duty to ensure that the
Junket Representative Agreement does indeed exist and the interests of the Company
and the Shareholders are protected in respect of the Acquisition.
Despite this, the Directors consider that the consideration is fair and reasonable
given that:

(1)

Benefits of the Acquisition


(a)

The right to the Profit under the Profit Agreements is for an


unlimited period of time, instead of a fixed period of time. It enables
the Company to continually enjoy the potential strong growth in
Macau gaming business.

(b)

There is no share of loss under the Profit Agreements as the Profit


is essentially based on 0.4% of the Rolling Turnover generated by
Hou Wan and does not include expenses incurred by Hou Wan
(which will be borne by Hou Wan).

SJ001537

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00361

footnote 22
The Company understands that Hou Wan receives monthly junket
representative settlement forms signed off by Sands Macao. Therefore, based
on such settlement forms, the monthly profit is calculated and ascertained.
The Company will appoint representative to attend the monthly settlements
of commission paid by Sands Macao to Hou Wan in the future and review
those junket representative settlement for each month. The Company has
indicated that, for each month, Sands Macao will pay to Hou Wan the
commission/service fee for the Rolling Turnover brought by Hou Wan to
Sands Macao. Hou Wan will then pay the Profit, being 0.4% Rolling
Turnover, to Highest Increase and Highest Increase in turn will pay the
Profit to Base Move.

(2)

Mr. Guo's personal interest


Mr. Guo's personal interest lies with the failure and success of Hou Wan.
Upon Completion, Mr. Guo still indirectly holds 80% equity interest in
Base Move. That means he still has a substantial interest in Highest Increase,
the one holding the Profit which depends on the renewal of Hou Wan's
junket licence and partially on the Rolling Turnover generated by Hou Wan
and/or its customers pursuant to the Junket Representative Arrangement.
In view of Mr. Guo's substantial interest in Base Move and Highest Increase
and his abundance of experience in gaming industry, the Directors believe
that, after Completion, Mr. Guo will continue to manage Hou Wan in a
prudent and efficient manner as the performance of Hou Wan has a direct
impact on him. As such, the risk of non-renewal of the junket licence and
Junket Representative Arrangement upon expiry is minimized.

(3)

Renewal of junket licence


The appointment of Hou Wan as a junket representative by Sands Macao,
evidences Hou Wan's and Mr. Guo's credentials. Also, Hou Wan has
renewed its junket licence from the Macau Government on 15 December
2006 and is valid until 31 December 2007. So far, the Company is not
aware of any circumstance that makes Hou Wan unable to fulfill the probity
requirement that it had fulfilled for the grant of the junket licence.

After balancing the risks as stated in the section headed "Risk Factors of Junket
Business" below with the benefits of the Acquisition, including the Group's perpetual
rights to the Profit, no share of loss by the Group and the source of the Profit under
the Profit Agreements, the Directors consider that the consideration is fair and
reasonable and the Acquisition is in the interest of the Company and the Shareholders
as a whole.
The consideration is determined after arm's length negotiation between the Company
and Mr. Guo after considering that (1) the Acquisition will broaden the Group's
revenue source and provide a substantial and stable income source to the Group in
view of the acquisition of the Profit by Base Move from Hou Wan under the Profit
Agreements; (2) the loosening of travel restrictions of mainland Chinese visitors;
and (3) the prospects of Macau's gaming business.
The Company considers acquiring a profit stream which has no share of loss under
the Profit Agreements of Hou Wan will not prejudicially affect the Company. The
Company understands that no guarantee has been given by Mr. Guo and Hou Wan
under the Junket Representative Agreement.

SJ001538
Plaintiff Ex. I 102 00362

Footnote 22
As such, the Directors (including the independent non-executive Directors) consider
the consideration for the Acquisition to be fair and reasonable. Please refer to the
paragraph headed "Reasons for the Acquisition" for further details of the reasons
for the Acquisition.

RISK FACTORS OF JUNKET BUSINESS


The following are the risk factors in relation to the junket business operated by
Hou Wan:
(I)

The provision of junket business is competitive in general. There is no


guarantee that the targeted customers of Hou Wan will not be lured away
by other junket operators.

(2)

The Rolling Turnover generated by Hou Wan operating as a junket


representative in Sands Macao relies on, among other factors, the
attractiveness of Sands Macao to the prospective customers, Hou Wan's
ability to procure customers to Sands Macao, annual renewal of the junket
licence of Hou Wan by the Macau Government, tenure of Hou Wan acting
as junket representative for Sands Macao under the Junket Representative
Agreement. There is no assurance that Sands Macao is always attractive. In
the event that Hou Wan ceases to be committed to the junket business or
cease to be appointed as junket representative by Sands Macao, the junket
business, and thereby the Profit to be paid to Base Move, may be adversely
affected. Moreover, if Hou Wan fails to obtain the renewal of its junket
licence from the Macau Government, it can no longer operate its junket
business and no Profit can be paid to Base Move as a result.

(3)

In the event that Sands Macao becomes the target for carrying out money
laundering, the Rolling Turnover generated by Hou Wan may be affected
and/or interrupted.

(4)

The availability of the Profit relating to the Rolling Turnover generated by


Hou Wan at Sands Macao gaming rooms pursuant to the Junket
Representative Agreement heavily depends on the subsistence of the Junket
Representative Agreement and on whether the Junket Represcntati ve
Agreement can be successfully renewed. The Junket Representative
Agreement may or may not be renewed by Sands Macao at the expiry of
the term of the Junket Representative Agreement. In general, the term of
agreement between the junket operator and Sands Macao operator is tied
with the term of the junket licence. Therefore, the term of the Junket
Representative Agreement can also be tied with the term of Hou Wan's
junket licence, which is valid for one year.

(5)

As the Profit is sourced from Rolling Turnover generated by Hou Wan and/
or its customers pursuant to the Junket Representative Agreement, there is
a risk that the source of the Profit will cease if the Junket Representative
Agreement expires or the junket licence of Hou Wan cannot be renewed.

(6)

The Junket Representative Agreement may be terminated at any time by


either party thereto.

(7)

The term of the Junket Representative Agreement is substantially shorter


than that of the Profit Agreements and may or may not be renewable upon
expiry.

10

SJ001539

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00363

footnote 22
(8)

The Company is not a party to the Junket Representative Agreement and


therefore it has no control on the termination and the renewal of the Junket
Representative Agreement.

(9)

The junket licence of Hou Wan granted by the Macau Government is subject
to renewal annually.

(10)

Sands Macao's licence may be revoked by the Macau Government.

(11)

There is a possibility that another junket representative could be appointed


at Chengdu VIP Club and if this is the case, the Profit would be affected.

SHAREHOLDING STRUCTURE OF THE RELEVANT ENTITIES AND THE


COMPANY
The diagram below shows the shareholding structure of the relevant entities
immediately before Completion:

.""".
First Profit
Agreement

The diagram below shows the shareholding structure of the relevant entities
immediately after Completion:

First Profit
Agreement

11
SJ001540
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00364

footnote 22
GUARANTEED PROFIT
Hou Wan has irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed to Highest Increase that
the annual Profit during the period of one year commencing from the date of
Completion ("First Relevant Period") shall not be less than HK$120,000,000 ("First
Guaranteed Profit"). In the event the Profit received and/or receivable by Highest
Increase for the First Relevant Period shall be less than HK$120,000,000, Hou Wan
undertakes to pay to Highest Increase the sum calculated in accordance with the
following formula (the "First Adjustment") within 60 days after the First Relevant
Period (provided that the First Adjustment shall not be more than HK$ 120,000,000):
First Adjustment

= (A I -

B 1)

where:
Al
Bl

::::
=

HK$120,000,000
the Profit received and/or receivable by Highest Increase during the
First Relevant Period

and if the resulting First Adjustment shall be a negative figure, Highest Increase
shall not be required to pay any adjustment for the First Relevant Period.
In addition, Hou Wan has also irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed to Highest
Increase that the Profit during the period of one year commencing from the first
day after the First Relevant Period ("Second Relevant Period") shall not be less
than HK$132,000,000 ("Second Guaranteed Profit"). In the event the Profit received
and/or receivable by Highest Increase for the Second Relevant Period shall be Jess
than HK$132,000,000, Hou Wan undertakes to pay to Highest Increase the sum
calculated in accordance with the following formula (the "Second Adjustment")
within 60 days after the Second Relevant Period (provided that the Second
Adjustment shall not be more than HK$132,000,000):
Second Adjustment

= (A2 -

B2) x 4

where:
A2
B2

HK$132,000,000
the Profit received and/or receivable by Highest Increase for the Second
Relevant Period

and if the resulting Second Adjustment shall be a negative figure, Hou Wan shall
not be required to pay any adjustment for the Second Relevant Period. The
Guaranteed Profit is still valid in the event that Hou Wan failed to obtain a junket
licence from the Macau Government.
The Guaranteed Profit is determined under arm's length negotiation between relevant
parties by reference to the performance of Hou Wan (the Company was given to
understand by Hou Wan that the Rolling Turnover per annum in average was
approximately HK$30 billion) and, as a reference to the market condition of the
gaming industry, research reports conducted by leading investment banks that made
a revenue estimate of approximately HK$300,000,000 a month to be derived from
one gaming table of Baccarat (being the most accessible game in a VIP Club in
Macau).
Mr. Guo has agreed to guarantee the obligations of Hou Wan under the First Profit
Agreement.

12

SJ001541

Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00365

footnote 22
INFORMATION OF THE TARGET GROUP
Information of Credible
Credible was incorporated on 13 November 2006 and is an investment holding
company.
The main asset of Credible is its 20% equity interest in Base Move. According to
the unaudited management accounts of Credible, the total assets of Credible as at
31 December 2006 is HK$780 and Credible has no liability as at 31 December
2006. There is no profit or loss recorded in the unaudited management accounts of
Credible for the period commencing on 13 November 2006 (the date of its
incorporation) to 31 December 2006.

Information of Base Move


To the best of the Directors' knowledge, information and belief having made all
reasonable enquiries, Base Move is an investment holding company incorporated in
the British Virgin Islands on 22 September 2006, and owned as to 20% by Credible
and 80% by Certain Champ (wholly owned by Mr. Guo). To the best of the Directors'
knowledge, other than the Second Profit Agreement, Base Move does not have any
assets or liabilities nor does it has any profit or loss recorded as at the date of this
announcement. Mr. Guo has over 15-year experiences in the gaming industry (both
in Asia and North America). He has been working as a junket in various VIP Clubs
in Macau (including the Chengdu VIP Club at Sands Macao), responsible for
introducing customers to the VIP Club. Mr. Guo is the founder of Hou Wan and
has through Hou Wan acted as a junket representative for Sands Macao since July
2005.
Hou Wan is a company incorporated in Macau on 9 November 2004 and is whollyowned by Mr. Guo.
So far as the Directors are aware, Hou Wan with its first junket license granted on
17 August 2005 is the only appointed junket representative at Chengdu VIP Club.
The Profit Agreements do not provide for the profit of other VIP Clubs to be
included as part of the Profit and there is currently no intention for Hou Wan to be
a junket representative of other VIP Clubs. Acting as a junket representative at
Sands Macao is the only track record that Hou Wan has in respect of its operation
as a junket representative. Other than being a junket representative, Hou Wan does
not engage in any other business. As at the date of this announcement, the Company
has been informed that Hou Wan has approximately 500 junket agents. The licence
granted to Hou Wan for acting as a junket operator is valid for one year and is
renewable. Hou Wan's re-newed licence has been granted on 15 December 2006
and is valid until 31 December 2007. In relation to the requirements for obtaining a
junket licence from the Macau Government, the licence can only be granted when
the applicant is found to comply with the probity requirements. If the applicant is a
corporate gaming operator, the probity requirements also apply to its shareholder
with 5% or more of the share capital and its key employees. The applicant, when
submitting an application request, has to produce, among other things, a questionnaire
to ascertain the probity of the applicant. To consider whether the applicant fulfill
the probity requirement, the relevant authorities of the Macau Government will
consider the information provided by the applicant in the questionnaire, including

13

SJ001542

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00366

Footnote 22
its corporate, business and financial information, information regarding its key
employees and shareholders, judicial litigation and governmental investigation,
bankrnptcy and insolvency, its previous experience in junket business. The relevant
authorities will also consider the information provided by the corporate applicant's
shareholder with 5% or more of the share capital and key employees, including
their personal and family background, their financial information and civil
proceedings or criminal investigation that they may be involved. To the best
knowledge of the Directors, the role of Sands Macao in renewing the junket
representative license for Hou Wan is to issue a letter to the relevant government
department in Macau confirming that the gaming promoter continues to be a gaming
promoter for Sands Macao.
As a junket representative, being an independent contractor responsible for soliciting
customers to casinos, Hou Wan is primarily responsible for directing gaming
customers to Sands Macao and using its best endeavors to actively promote Sands
Macao to existing and potential customers. It receives a commission on the Rolling
Turnover from Sands Macao. The net profit it receives, after deducting commission
paid by it to its agents, administrative expenses and tax payable to the Macau
Government, is approximately 0.4% of the Rolling Turnover.
To the best of the Directors' knowledge, information and belief having made all
reasonable enquiries, Base Move, Mr. Guo and their ultimate beneficial owners, are
Independent Third Parties and all of them are independent of and not connected
with the Directors and their respective associates.
REASONS FOR THE ACQUISITION
The principal activities of the Group are manufacturing and trading of electrical
equipment, provision of electrical engineering and contracting services, securities
trading, and leasing and management of cruise.
Sands Macao is operated by Venetian Macau Limited, a subsidiary of Las Vegas
Sands Corp., the securities of which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
Based on the monthly junket representative settlement forms, which are the official
invoices issued to Hou Wan by Sands Macao evidencing the Rolling Turnover and
the commission of Hou Wan, the unaudited Rolling Turnover generated by Hou
Wan for the period between July 2005 and October 2006 amounted to approximately
HK$44.34 billion.

In view of the recent economy of Macau and the prospects of Macau's gaming
business, the Directors believe that the Acquisition will broaden the Group's
revenue sources and provide a stable income stream to the Group. Accordingly,
the Directors consider that the terms of the Acquisition Agreement are fair
and reasonable and in the interests of the Company and the Shareholders as a
whole.
IMPLICATIONS UNDER THE LAWS OF HONG KONG AND THE LISTING
RULES
As covered by the legal opinion as the Macau law, Hou Wan is validly licensed to
act as a gaming promoter (or junket) in Macau. To the best of the Directors'
knowledge, information and belief having made all reasonable enquiries, Sands
Macao is licensed to operate junket business and gaming business by the relevant
authorities in Macau.

14

SJ001543
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00367

footnote 22
Shareholders should be aware that under the guidelines issued by the Stock Exchange
in relation to "Gambling activities undertaken by listing applicants and/or listed
issuers" dated 11 March 2003, should the Group directly or indirectly be engaged
in gambling activities and operation of such gambling activities (i) fail to comply
with the applicable laws in the areas where such activities operate and/or (ii)
contravene the Gambling Ordinance, the Company or its business may be considered
unsuitable for listing under Rule 18.04 of the Listing Rules, the Stock Exchange
may direct the Company to take remedial action, and/or may suspend dealings in,
or may cancel the listing of, the Shares.
In relation to the prevention of the money laundering activities, as both Hou Wan
and Sands Macao are respectively licensed to operate junket business and gaming
business by the relevant authorities in Macau and the amount of bet/Rolling Turnover
is properly registered by both Hou Wan and Sands Macao, their gaming activities
and businesses are subject to stringent control and regulation of the Macau
Government. As their activities are under the regulation of the Macau Government
and covered by a local legal opinion (as to Hong Kong law) that the gaming
promotion businesses carried out by Hou Wan do not contravene any applicable
laws of Hong Kong, the Directors, based on the legal opinions issued by Macanese
lawyer and Hong Kong lawyer, confirms that the activities they participate are
legal and lawful and thereby the income derived from these activities is also be
lawful and proper.
Apart from relying on such stringent official control, the Company, with the aid of
Mr. Ban Wan, an chief executive officer in the Company who has been working in
the gaming industry in Macau and passage vessel with gaming facilities for about
20 years (of which he has participated in the management level of gaming industry
for about 10 years), will also use its best endeavours to procure that effective
internal control systems are in place to make sure that the dividend distributed
from Base Move is derived from proper source, for instance, the Company will
adopt the guideline set by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in formulating antimoney laundering measures. The Company will also cross-check the Profit received
and/or receivable with the original monthly junket representative settlement forms
issued by Sands Macao to Hou Wan. Further, the Company will from time to time
obtain direct confirmation in respect of the Rolling Turnover generated by Hou
Wan from Sands Macao.

LISTING RULES IMPLICATION


As the relevant ratios as referred to in Chapter 14 of the Listing Rules are 100% or
more, the Acquisition constitutes a very substantial acquisition on the part of the
Company under Chapter 14 of the Listing Rules.
Accordingly, the Acquisition is subject to, among other things, the approval by the
Shareholders at the EGM. No Shareholder has an interest in the Acquisition and is
required to abstain from voting at the EGM.
A circular containing, among other things, further information in respect of the
Acquisition, together with the notice of the EGM will be despatched to the
Shareholders in accordance with the Listing Rules. The circular will contain
additional disclosures as required under the Stock Exchange Gambling Guidelines.

15

SJ001544
Plaintiff Ex. 1102 00368

footnote 22
(2)

PROPOSED SHARE CONSOLIDATION


The Board proposes to implement the Share Consolidation pursuant to which every
ten Existing Shares of HK$0.02 each be consolidated into one Consolidated Share
of HK$0.2. As at the date of this announcement, the authorised share capital of the
Company is HK$1,000,000,000 divided into 50,000,000,000 Existing Shares of
which 14,397,630,000 Existing Shares are in issue and are fully paid or credited as
fully paid. As at the date of this announcement, the Company has no derivatives,
options, warrants and conversion rights or other similar rights which are convertible
or exchangeable into Shares.

Effects of the Share Consolidation


The Consolidated Shares will rank pari passu in all respects with the Existing
Shares in issue prior to the Share Consolidation becoming effective and there will
be no change in the respective rights of the Shareholders. Fractional Consolidated
Shares will not be issued by the Company to the Shareholders. Any fractional
entitlements of the Consolidated Shares will be aggregated and sold for the benefit
of the Company. Board lot size for trading in the Consolidated Shares will remain
unchanged at l 0,000 Consolidated Shares per board lot, which is the same board
lot size for trading in the Existing Shares on the Stock Exchange. Based on the
closing price of HK$0.22 per Consolidated Share (assuming the Share Consolidation
becoming effective) on the Last Trading Date, the value of each board lot of 10,000
Consolidated Shares would be HK$2,200.
The effects of the Share Consolidation on the share capital of the Company is set
out under the section headed "Effects of the Share Consolidation on the share
capital of the Company" in this announcement. Other than the expenses to be
incurred by the Company in relation to the Share Consolidation, the implementation
thereof will not, by itself, affect the underlying assets, business operations,
management or financial position of the Group or the interests of the Shareholders
as a whole (including the respective rights of the Shareholders).

Conditions of the Share Consolidation


The Share Consolidation is conditional upon the following conditions having been
fulfilled:
(a)

the passing of an ordinary resolution by the Shareholders at the EGM to


approve the Share Consolidation; and

(b)

the Listing Committee of the Stock Exchange granting the listing of, and
permission to deal in, the Consolidated Shares in issue upon the Share
Consolidation becoming effective.

Reasons for the Share Consolidation


Taking into account that the Share Consolidation will increase the nominal value of
the Existing Shares and their trading price per board lot, and hence reducing the
overall transaction and handling costs for dealings in the Consolidated Shares, the
Directors are of the view that the Share Consolidation is in the interests of the
Company and the Shareholders a whole and recommend the Shareholders to vote in
favour of the ordinary resolution for approval of the Share Consolidation at the
EGM.

16

SJ001545
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00369

Footnote 22
Application for listing
Application will be made to the Listing Committee of the Stock Exchange for the
granting of the listing of, and permission to deal in, the Consolidated Shares in
issue upon the Share Consolidation becoming effective.
Subject to the granting of the listing of, and permission to deal in, the Consolidated
Shares on the Stock Exchange, the Consolidated Shares will be accepted as eligible
securities by HKSCC for deposit, clearance and settlement in CCASS with effect
from the commencement date of dealings in the Consolidated Shares on the Stock
Exchange or, under contingent situation, such other date as determined by HKSCC.
Settlement of transactions between participants of the Stock Exchange on any trading
day is required to take place in CCASS on the second trading day thereafter. All
activities under CCASS are subject to the General Rules of CCASS and CCASS
Operational Procedures in effect from time to time.

Arrangement for odd lot trading


In order to facilitate the trading of odd lots (if any) of the Consolidated Shares
arising from the Share Consolidation, the Company has appointed Kingston Securities
to match the purchase and sale of odd lots of the Consolidated Shares at the relevant
market price per Consolidated Share for the period from 29 March 2007 to 9 May
2007 (both dates inclusive). Holders of odd lots of the Consolidated Shares who
wish to take advantage of this facility either to dispose of their odd lots of the
Consolidated Shares or top up to a full board lot may, directly or through their
brokers, contact Ms. Rosita Kiu (Tel.: 2298-6215 and Fax: 2295-0682) of Kingston
Securities during this period. Holders of odd lots of the Consolidated Shares should
note that successful matching of the sale and purchase of odd lots of the Consolidated
Shares is not guaranteed. Any Shareholder, who is in any doubt about the odd lot
facility, is recommended to consult his/her/its own professional advisers.

Trading arrangement for the Consolidated Shares


The detailed trading arrangement for the Share Consolidation will be set out in the
circular, which shall contain, inter alia, further information on the Share
Consolidation, to be despatched to the Shareholders. A further announcement will
be made when the expected timetable is available.

Free exchange of share certificates


Shareholders may exchange their share certificates for the Existing Shares for new
share certificates for the Consolidated Shares on or after 29 March 2007. This may
be done free of charge by delivering the share certificates for the Existing Shares
to the office of the Registrar, Computershare Hong Kong Investor Services Limited
at Rooms 1712-16, 17th Floor, Hopewell Centre, 183 Queen's Road East, Hong
Kong, during the period from 29 March 2007 to 16 May 2007 (both dates inclusive).
After the prescribed time for free exchange of share certificates, share certificates
for the Existing Shares will be accepted for exchange for share certificates for the
Consolidated Shares only on payment of a fee of HK$2.50 (or such higher amount
as may be stipulated by the Stock Exchange from time to time) for each new share
certificate to be issued or each old share certificate submitted, whichever number
of share certificates is higher, to the Registrar for exchange of share certificates.
It is expected that new share certificates for the Consolidated Shares will be available

for collection on or after the tenth Business Day from the date of submission of the
certificates for the Existing Shares to the Registrar. Unless otherwise instructed,
new share certificates for the Consolidated Shares will be issued in board lots of
10,000 Consolidated Shares.
17

SJ001546
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00370

Footnote 22
Effect of the Share Consolidation on the share capital of the Company
The following table shows the total authorised share capital of the Company as at
the date of this announcement and immediately after the Share consolidation
becoming effective:

As at the date of
this announcement
Number of
Existing
Shares

(3)

HK$

Immediately after
the Share Consolidation
becoming effective
N11mber of
Consolidated
Shares

HK$

Total authorised

50,000,000,000

1,000,000,000

5,000,000,000

1,000,000,000

Total issued

14,397,630,000

287,952,600

I,439,763,000

287,952,600

Total unissued

35,602,370,000

712,047,400

3,560,237,000

712,047,400

PROPOSED OPEN OFFER


Issue statistics
Basis of the Open Offer

One Offer Share for every two Consolidated


Shares held on the Record Date

Subscription Price

HK$0.2 per Offer Share

Number of Existing Shares


in issue as at the date of
this announcement and
Consolidated Shares
assuming the Share
Consolidation becoming
effective

14,397,630,000 Existing Shares (equivalent


to 1,439,763,000 Consolidated Shares)

Number of Offer Shares

719,881,500 Offer Shares

Number of Offer Shares


underwritten by
the Underwriters

Pursuant to the Underwriting Agreement, the


Underwriters have conditionally agreed to
underwrite 719,881,500 Offer Shares (of
which Jumbo Boom underwrites 621,977,616
Offer Shares in the first place and Kingston
Securities underwrites the remaining
97,903,884 Offer Shares on the second place)
on a fully underwritten basis

Number of Consolidated
Shares in issue upon
completion of the Open Offer

2,159,644,500 Consolidated Shares

The Offer Shares proposed to be issued pursuant to the terms of the Open Offer
represent 50% of the entire issued share capital of the Company upon the Share
Consolidation becoming effective and approximately 33.33% of the entire issued
share capital of the Company as enlarged by the issue of the Offer Shares.
As at the date of this announcement, the Company has no derivatives, options,
warrants and conversion rights or other similar rights which are convertible or
exchangeable into Shares.
18

SJ001547
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00371

footnote 22
Qualifying Shareholders
The Open Offer is only available to the Qualifying Shareholders. The Company
will send (i) the Prospectus Documents to the Qualifying Shareholders and (ii) the
Overseas Letter together with the Prospectus, for information only, to the Excluded
Shareholders. To qualify for the Open Offer, the Shareholders must at the close of
business on the Record Date:
(i)

be registered on the register of members of the Company; and

(ii)

not being Excluded Shareholders.

In order to be registered as members of the Company on the Record Date, the


Shareholders must lodge any transfer of the Shares (with the relevant share
certificates) for registration with the Registrar by 4:00 p.m. on 3 April 2007. The
address of the Registrar is:
Computershare Hong Kong Investor Services Limited
Rooms 1712-16, 17th Floor, Hopewell Centre
I 83 Queen's Road East
Hong Kong
The invitation to subscribe for the Offer Shares to be made to the Qualifying
Shareholders will not be transferable. There will not be any trading in nil-paid
entitlements on the Stock Exchange and the Qualifying Shareholders will not be
entitled to subscribe for any Offer Shares in excess of their respective assured
entitlements. In the view that each Qualifying Shareholder will be given equal and
fair opportunities to participate in the Company's future development and thereby
entitling to subscribe for his/her respective Offer Shares without discrimination at
the same price at an attractive discount to the Share price as at the Latest Trading
Date in proportion to his/her existing shareholding of the Company, the Directors
are of the opinion that the Company will not attempt to serve additional effort and
extra administration work to consider the allocation basis to accommodate any
Offer Shares not validly applied for by the Shareholders in the event that the Open
Offer is under-subscribed.

Rights of the Overseas Shareholders


If, at the close of business on the Record Date, a Shareholder's registered address
and correspondence address on the register of members of the Company is in a
place outside Hong Kong, that Shareholder may not be eligible to take part in the
Open Offer as the Prospectus Documents are not expected to be registered and/or
filed under the applicable securities legislation of any jurisdictions other than Hong
Kong. The Board will make enquiries to its lawyers as to whether the issue of Offer
Shares to the Overseas Shareholders may contravene the applicable securities
legislation of the relevant overseas places or the requirements of the relevant
regulatory body or stock exchange pursuant to Rule I 3.36(2)(a) of the Listing
Rules. If, after making such enquiry, the Board is of the opinion that it would be
necessary or expedient not to offer Offer Shares to such Overseas Shareholders, the
Open Offer will not be available to such Overseas Shareholders. Accordingly, the
Open Offer will not be extended to the Excluded Shareholders. The results of the
enquiries and the basis of exclusion of Overseas Shareholders will be disclosed in
the Prospectus.
The Company will send (i) the Prospectus Documents to the Qualifying Shareholders
and (ii) the Overseas Letter together with the Prospectus, for information only, to
the Excluded Shareholders.

19

SJ001548
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00372

footnote 22
Closure of register of members
The register of members of the Company will be closed from 4 April 2007 to 12
April 2007, both dates inclusive, to determine the eligibility _of the Shareholders to
the Open Offer. No transfer of Shares will be registered during this period.

Subscription Price
The Subscription Price for the Offer Shares is HK$0.2 per Offer Share, payable in
full on application. The Subscription Price represents:
(i)

a discount of approximately 9.09% to the closing price of HK$0.22 per


Consolidated Share (assuming the Share Consolidation becoming effective)
as quoted on the Stock Exchange on the Last Trading Date;

(ii)

a premium of approximately 1.01% to the average closing prices of


HK$0.198 per Consolidated Share (assuming the Share Consolidation
becoming effective) for the last five consecutive trading days up to and
including the Last Trading Date;

(iii)

a premium of approximately 5.82% to the average closing prices of


HK$0.189 per Consolidated Share (assuming the Share Consolidation
becoming effective) for the last ten consecutive trading days up to and
including the Last Trading Date;

(iv)

a discount of approximately 6.10% to the theoretical ex-entitlement price


of approximately HK$0.213 per Consolidated Share (assuming the Share
Consolidation becoming effective) based on the closing price of HK$0.22
as quoted on the Stock Exchange on the Last Trading Date; and

(v)

a premium of approximately 19.76% over the audited net asset value per
Consolidated Share of approximately HK$0.167 based on the audited
consolidated net asset value of the Group as at 30 June 2006 as shown in
the annual report 2006 of the Company for the year ended 30 June 2006
and the number of the Consolidated Shares in issue immediately after the
Share Consolidation becoming effective but before the completion of the
Open Offer.

The Subscription Price was arrived at after arm's length negotiation between the
Company and the Underwriters after having taken into account, among other things,
(i) the recent price performance of the Shares and (ii) the potential investment
opportunity to the Shareholders. The Directors consider that the terms of the Open
Offer are fair and reasonable and in the interests of the Company and the
Shareholders as a whole.
Status of the Offer Shares
The Offer Shares (when allotted, fully paid and issued) will rank pari passu in all
respects with the Consolidated Shares (assuming the Share Consolidation becoming
effective) in issue on the date of allotment and issue of the Offer Shares. Holders
of the Offer Shares will be entitled to receive all future dividends and distributions
which are declared, made or paid on or after the date of allotment and issue of the
Offer Shares.

20

SJ001549
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00373

footnote 22
Fractions of Offer Shares
The Company wiil not allot fractions of the Offer Shares. Any fractional entitlement
to the Offer Shares will be aggregated and sold in the open market (if a premium,
net of expenses, can be obtained) and the proceeds will be retained for the Company's
own benefits.
Certificates of the Offer Shares
Subject to fulfillment of the conditions of the Open Offer, share certificates for the
Offer Shares are expected to be posted on or before 8 May 2007 to those entitled
thereto by ordinary post at their own risk.
Application for listing
The Company will apply to the Listing Committee of the Stock Exchange for the
listing of, and permission to deal in, the Offer Shares. Dealings in the Offer Shares
will be subject to the payment of stamp duty in Hong Kong.

UNDERWRITING ARRANGEMENTS
Underwriting Agreement
Date

16 January 2007

Underwriters

Jumbo Boom and Kingston Securities

Number of
Offer Shares
underwritten

Pursuant to the Underwriting Agreement, the


Underwriters have conditionally agreed to underwrite
719,881,500 Offer Shares (of which Jumbo Boom
underwrites 621,977,616 Offer Shares in the first place
and Kingston Securities underwrites the remaining
97,903,884 Offer Shares on the second place) on a fully
underwritten basis

Commission

2.5% of the aggregate Subscription Price in respect of


the number of Offer Shares agreed to be underwritten by
the Underwriters

Pursuant to the Underwriting Agreement, the Underwriters have conditionally agreed


to underwrite all the Offer Shares not being taken up. Accordingly, the Open Offer
is fully underwritten. To the best of the Directors' knowledge, information and
belief and having made all reasonable enquiries, the Underwriters and their respective
ultimate beneficial owners are third parties independent of and not connected with
each other, the Company and its connected persons.
To the best of the Directors' knowledge, information and belief and having made
all reasonable enquiries, Jumbo Boom, which generally does not engage in
underwriting business and has no underwriting experience as at the date of this
announcement, is not required to procure license to conduct underwriting on the
Offer Shares under the Securities and Futures Ordinance. Jumbo Boom is an
investment company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and beneficially
owned by Mr. Cheung Chi Tai who is a merchant in Hong Kong. The Company got
acquainted with Jumbo Boom through Kingston Securities. Jumbo Boom is willing
to become one of the underwriters for the Open Offer because it is confident about
the future growth of the Company.

21

SJ001550

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00374

footnote 22
The 2.5% commission payable to the Underwriter was determined after arm's length
negotiations between the Company and the Underwriters based on normal commercial
terms and with reference to the market rates.

Termination of the Underwriting Agreement


If, prior to the Latest Time for Termination:

(1)

in the reasonable opinion of Kingston Securities (on behalf of the


Underwriters), the success of the Open Offer would be materially and
adversely affected by:
(a)

the introduction of any new law or regulation or any change in


existing law or regulation (or the judicial interpretation thereof)
or other occurrence of any nature whatsoever which may in the
reasonable opinion of Kingston Securities (on behalf of the
Underwriters) materially and adversely affect the business or
the financial or trading position or prospects of the Group as a
whole or is materially adverse in the context of the Open Offer;
or

(b)

the occurrence of any local, national or international event or


change (whether or not forming part of a series of events or
changes occurring or continuing before, and/or after the date
of the Underwriting Agreement) of a political, military, financial,
economic, or other nature (whether or not ejusdem ,generis with
any of the foregoing), or in the nature of any local, national or
international outbreak or escalation of hostilities or armed
conflict, or affecting local securities markets which may, in the
reasonable opinion of Kingston Securities (on behalf of the
Underwriters) materially and adversely affect the business or
the financial or trading position or prospects of the Group as a
whole or materially and adversely prejudice the success of the
Open Offer or otherwise makes it inexpedient or inadvisable to
proceed with the Open Offer; or

(2)

any adverse change in market conditions (including without limitation,


any change in fiscal or monetary policy, or foreign exchange or currency
markets, suspension or material restriction or trading in securities)
occurs which in the reasonable opinion of Kingston Securities (on behalf
of the Underwriters) is likely to materially or adversely affect the success
of the Open Offer or otherwise makes it inexpedient or inadvisable to
proceed with the Open Offer; or

(3)

there is any change in the circumstances of the Company or any member


of the Group which in the reasonable opinion of Kingston Securities
(on behalf of the Underwriters) will adversely affect the prospects of
the Company, including without limiting the generality of' the foregoing
the presentation of a petition or the passing of a resolution for the
liquidation or winding up or similar event occurring in respect of any
of member of the Group or the destruction of any material asset of the
Group; or

(4)

any suspension in the trading of securities generally or the Company's


securities on the Stock Exchange for a period of more than seven
consecutive Business Days, excluding any suspension in connection with
the clearance of this announcement or the Prospectus Documents or
other announcements or circulars in connection with the Open Offer,
22

SJ001551

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00375

Footnote 22
Kingston Securities (on behalf of the Underwriters) shall be entitled by notice
in writing to the Company, served prior to the Latest Time for Termination, to
terminate the Underwriting Agreement.
Kingston Securities (on behalf of the Underwriters) shall be entitled by notice
in writing to rescind the Underwriting Agreement if prior to the Latest Time
for Termination:
(1)

any material breach of any of the representations, warranties or


undertakings contained in the Underwriting Agreement comes to the
knowledge of the Underwriters; or

(2)

any Specified Event comes to knowledge of the Underwriters,

then and, in such case, Kingston Securities (on behalf of the Underwriters)
may, by notice in writing given to the Company prior to the Latest time for
Termination, rescinds the Underwriting Agreement and thereupon the
obligations of all parties under the Underwriting Agreement shall terminate
forthwith and no party shall have any claim against any other party in respect
of any matter or thing arising out of and in connection with the Underwriting
Agreement (save for any antecedent breaches thereof) and the Open Offer
shall not proceed.
Conditions of the Open Offer
The Open Offer is conditional upon:
(1)

the passing of an ordinary resolution at the EGM to approve:


(i)

the Acquisition; and

(ii)

the Share Consolidation;

(2)

the delivery to the Stock Exchange for authorisation and the registration
with the Registrar of Companies in Hong Kong respectively of one copy of
each of the Prospectus Documents duly signed by two Directors (or by
their agents duly authorised in writing) as having been approved by
resolution of the Directors (and all other documents required to be attached
thereto) and otherwise in compliance with the Listing Rules and Companies
Ordinance not later than the despatch of the Prospectus;

(3)

the posting of the Prospectus Documents to the Qualifying Shareholders on


or before the date of the Prospectus; and

(4)

the Listing Committee of the Stock Exchange granting or agreeing to grant


(subject to allotment) and not having withdrawn or revoked listing of and
permission to deal in the Offer Shares.

In the event of the said conditions not being fulfilled before the Latest Time for
Termination or the respective dates aforesaid (or such other time or date as the
Company and Kingston Securities (on behalf of the Underwriters) may agree), the
Underwriting Agreement shall terminate and all obligations and liabilities of the
parties thereunder shall forthwith cease and determine and no party shall have any
claim against the others (save for any antecedent breaches thereof).

23

SJ001552

PlaintiffEx. 1102 00376

Footnote 22
WARNING OF THE RISK OF DEALING IN THE SHARES
Shareholders and potential investors of the Company should note that the
Open Offer is conditional upon the Underwriting Agreement having become
unconditional and the Underwriters not having terminated the Underwriting
Agreement in accordance with the terms thereof (a summary of which is set
out in the sub-paragraph headed "Termination of the Underwriting Agreement"
above). Accordingly, the Open Offer may or may not proceed.
Shareholders and potential investors of the Company should therefore exercise
extreme caution when dealing in the Shares, and if they are in any doubt about
their position, they should consult their professional advisers.
Shareholders should note that the Shares will be dealt in on an ex-entitlement
basis commencing from 2 April 2007 and that dealing in Shares will take place
while the conditions to which the Underwriting Agreement is subject remain
unfulfilled. Any Shareholder or other person dealing in Shares up to the date
on which all conditions to which the Open Offer is subject are fulfilled (which
is expected to be on 3 May 2007), will accordingly bear the risk that the Open
Offer cannot become unconditional and may not proceed. Any Shareholder or
other person contemplating selling or purchasing Shares, who is in any doubt
about his/her/its position, is recommended to consult his/her/its own professional
adviser.

SHAREHOLDING STRUCTURE OF THE COMPANY


The following illustrates the shareholding structure of the Company (i) as at the
date of this announcement, (ii) immediately after the Share Consolidation and before
the Open Offer, and (iii) immediately after completion of the Open Offer:

As at the date of t!tis


announ~emcnt

E.tisting Shares

Immediately after Share


Consolidation and before
Open O!'fcr
%
Cou.wlidated

(1\,VJifOX.)

Share.~

(Appm.r.)

!0.42
12.75

150,000,00()
i 83,596,00D

10.41
12.75

150,0011,000
!83,596,000

6.95
8.50
28.8(1

76.83

621,977,616
97,903,884
I,106,167,000

lllO.OO

2,159,644,500

I,500,000,000
Mr. Lin Cheuk Fung (l'iote Jj
I,335 ,960,011()
Mr. Chim Pui Chung (Not!' 2!
Underwriters (Nole .l):
--- l!imk Buom (lsl place)
- Kingston Securities (2nJ place)
11,061,670,000
Other public Shareholders

76.83

l,l06,167,C~JO

14,397,630,000

100.00

1.439,763,UOO

Totai

Immediately after
Immediately after
completion of the Open Offer completion of the Open Offer
(assuming no Qualifying
(assuming all Qualifying
Shareholders take up
Shareholders take up
hisi11er/ils entitlements
his/her/its eutitlements
under the Open Offer)
under the Open Offer)
Co11so/idated
%
Consolidated
%
Shares (Approx.)
Shares (Approx.)

225,000,000
275,394,()00

10,42
12J5

4.53
5122

1,659,250,5@

76.83

100.00

2,159,644,500

lOO.OO
............

Notes:

Mr. Lin Cheuk Fung is an executive Director and the chairman of the Company. These
Shares are held by Mr. Lin Cheuk Fung personally.

2.

Mr. Chim Pui Chung is a substantial Shareholder. As at the date of this announcement, of
the I ,835,960,000 Existing Shares, as to 1,264,220,000 Existing Shares are held by Gallery
Land Ltd (a company wholly-owned by Mr. Chim Pui Chung), as to 568,800,000 Existing
Shares are held by Golden Mount Ltd (a company wholly-owned by Mr. Chim Pui Chung)
and as to 2,940,000 Existing Shares are held by Mr. Chim Pui Chung personally.

24

SJ001553
PlaintiffEx. 1102 00377

footnote 22
3,

To the best of the Directors' knowledge, information and belief and having made all
reasonable enquiries, the Underwriters and their respective ultimate beneficial owners
are third parties independent of and not connected with each other, the Company and its
connected persons,

REASONS FOR THE OPEN OFFER AND USE OF PROCEEDS


The principal activities of the Group are manufacturing and trading of electrical
equipment, provision of electrical engineering and contracting services, securities
trading, and leasing and management of cruise.
The estimated net proceeds from the Open Offer will be approximately HK$140
million (net of expenses of approximately HK$4 million). The Board intends to
apply the net proceeds as to approximately HK$140 million towards the Acquisition.
The estimated expense in relation to the Open Offer of approximately HK$4 million,
will be borne by the Company, The Board has considered various fund raising
methods apart from the Open Offer, including banking finance and issue of
convertible securities, and concludes that the Open Offer is in the best interests of
the Company and its Shareholders as a whole as it offers all the Qualifying
Shareholders an equal opportunity to participate in the enlargement of the capital
base of the Company and enables the Qualifying Shareholders to maintain their
proportionate interests in the Company and continue to participate in the future
development of the Company should they wish to do so. However, those Qualifying
Shareholders who do not take up the Offer Shares to which they are entitled
should note that their shareholdings in the Company will be diluted.

FUND RAISING ACTIV