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fT^I.B.CLARKf co^ 














"tZ-'R I «^ 

7 n •. v. /c ^- wc/'vwC ^ .'1'^'^- 


This book is an attempt to review the problems of 
Nationality in the area affected by the War* My 
principal object has been to present the existing facts 
in their historical setting, and where these facts are of 
a psychol<^cal order, as they so often are, I have 
tried to reproduce sympathetically the different nations^ 
conflicting points of view* 

Some readers will regret that I have not confined 
myself to narrative altogether, and will resent the ** will ** 
and " ought *' that punctuate the *' was '' and ** is/* 
I would answer them that this practical application is 
the justification of the book* 

National questions are of absorbing interest at all 
times to the particular nations they concern ; they are 
of occasional interest to the professional historian who 
toudies them in the course of his research ; to the world 
in general they are normally of no interest at all* ** But 
what are we to do about it i '" people exclaim when a 
problem is thrust upon their attention, and finding no 
answer they hark back to their own affairs* 

This normal life of ours has suddenly been bewitched 
by the War, and in the ** revaluing of all our values "" 
the right reading of the riddle of Nationality has become 
an affair of life and death* The war has exploded the 
mine upon which diplomatists have feared to tread, 
and we are walking in a trance across ruins* Solvitur 
ambulando, or else we break our necks* 

This is my apology for laying down the law, and it 
will dear up a further difficulty which might otherwise 


cause trouble* '' When you change from present to 
future/' readers will say, ** which do you mean to 
expotmd — ^what will happen, what may happen or what 
ought to happen i ** 

Certainly not what ** will happen ** : '* If we win *' is 
the implied hypothesis of every sentence I have written, 
a hypothesis that baffles prophecy* If I become cate- 
gorical, it is a lapse of style, not of standpoint* 

Certainly not what ** ought to happen '* in the 
Utopian sense : political problems have no universal 
solutions* What does not meet the situation meets 
nothing : what meets it to-day will not meet it to- 
morrow, because the situation itself will have been 
transformed by being met* 

My text is what *' may happen,*' yet ** may " partakes 
of both ** will ** and ** ought *' : its meaning varies 
with its application* The problem of Nationality has 
come to concern ourselves, and so far as it concerns us 
it depends upon us for its solution — upon our intellectual 
judgments, the making up of our mind, and upon our 
moral judgments, the determination of our will* We 
''may*' think this or that thought, feel this or that 
feeling, and each will give a different cast to the clay 
fate has thrust into our hands. We have to decide 
which way we ** ought ** to fashion it* 

Yet the solution depends upon others as well* In 
*' ourselves *' we often include our allies, but the power 
of British will to influence Russian action is slight 
indeed, and when we deal with neutrals or enemies, our 
own will ceases to cotmt while theirs becomes all- 
important* This will of other parties is for us an 
objective fact : we can conjecture what it is Ukely to 
be, and frame our own action either to thwart or to 
promote it, but we cannot determine their will from 


i, and it is therefore idle for us to debate what 
they ''ought*' to do. In discussing what ''may 
happen ** on the European continent we have simply 
to discover what national ideals or ambitions will assert 
themselves if the war removes certain forces like the 
traditional regime in Prussia or the Dual System in the 
Danufaian Monarchy, which hitherto have prevented 
large groups of population from exercising dieir will 
and working out their own salvation, 

I thus repudiate Utopianism, and declare solvency 
for every draft I make upon the future. The only piece 
of Utopianism of which I am deliberately guilty is the 
suggestion that the UJSJ^, might undertake the ad- 
ministration of the Black Sea Straits (Ch, K, Sect, B,), 
Of course they will not, and of course Russia wiU, and 
again the reader will resent my inconsistency, " Better 
have left out the suggestion "' he will say, 

I have left it in because it crowns an argument. It is 
the rednctio ad absurdum of that dearth of international 
oq;anisation which is largely responsible for Europe's 
present pass, and possibly it will serve to bring out an 
tmderlying purpose of this book. 

My review of problems does not pretend to be 
exhaustive — ^that would be beyond the scope of a single 
book and a single writer, and it would also be a weariness 
of the flesh. Problems are legion, and they have no 
individual significance in themselves : they are valuable 
only as illustrations of a phenomenon. By looking at 
Nationality in the concrete from successive perspectives, 
we may gain a clearer notion of what Nationality is than 
by the direct approach of an abstract definition. At any 
rate it is worth while making the experiment, for under- 
stand Nationality we must, now that it has proved itself 
die dominant political factor in Europe, 


I have still to acfaio^rfedge my obligations. The chief 
source of this book is an ingrained habit of gazing at 
maps, and much of my material had been imbibed 
unconsciously in this way long before the war broke out 
and I sat down to write. My consdous debts are to 
Stieler's HandrAdas of the contemporary world, and 
to the wonderful Historical Adas created by Karl 
Spriiner and Theodor Menke his apostle. Both of 
these I have consulted continuously ^Aiile writing the 
book and compiling my own maps that accompany it, 
and I have also derived much profit from the little 
AUdeutscher Adas published under the auspices of the 
Attdeutsche Verband by Justus Perthes, which plots out 
the distribution of languages in Central Europe with 
admirable exactitude, though it combines scientific 
execution with duuvinistic inspiration in a duracteristL- 
cally German fashion* The reader will note in passing 
that the other atlases cited are also of German author* 
ship, and that oondusions based on their evidence are 
not likely to be biassed to Germany's disadvantage, 

I am also indebted to books. Among works of 
reference I would single out two of Baedeker's hand- 
books, the deventh edition of Austria-Hungary (191 1) 
and Konstantinopd and Kleinasien (1905), but in this 
case the German source yidds precedence to the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (deventh edition, published 
in 191 1), which has proved the most indispensable of all 
my guides. My extracts from the official census returns 
of various states are nearly all derived through this 
channel,^ and I have made especially diligent use of the 

' The 19x1 editicm of the Encychpiedia takes its Austxx>-Hungarian 
statistics nom the census of 1900 : I might have rectified them by the 
more recent returns of 1910, but I have deliberately refrained from 
doing so. The figures of 1910 of course represent the present absolute 
totals of the various populations more accurately than those of 1900^ 


exodlendy arranged articles on '* Austria-Hungary '^ 
and ** Hungary/' 

For what I have written on Hungary I am likewise 
in debt to the illumixiating study on Hungary in the 
Eighteenth Century ^^ by Professor Marczali, the Magyar 
historian, but atx>ve all to the work of Dr* Seton- 
Watson. So far as I deal with his subjects, my informa- 
tion is taken at second hand : I have learnt all I know 
about ** Magyarisation ** from his Racial Problems in 
Hungary, and all I know about modem Croatia from 
his Southern Slavs* I can do no better than refer the 
reader to these two books for the substantiation of my 
indictment against the Magyar nation* 

The War and Democracy, written in collaboration by 
Messrs. Seton-Watson, Dover Wilson, 2Smmem and 
Greenwood, was only published after the relevant part 
of my own book was already in proof, and I have not 
yet had leisure to read it. Yet though I have been 
unable to borrow from the book itself, I owe an incalcul- 
able debt to another of its authors besides Dr. Seton- 
Watson. I have had the good fortune to be Mr. 
Zimmem's pupil. 

So much for maps and books : they caxmot compare 
with friends. Widiout the help of my mother and my 
wife, this book would never have grown ripe for publica- 
tion, and I have to thank my wife's fadier. Professor 
Gilbert Murray, Mr. A. D. Undsay and Mr. H. W. C. 

bat relative rather than absolute quantities are valuable for my purpose, 
and in this respect the figures of zgoo are undoubtedly more accurate 
than those of zgio. In 1900 the " official " proportions were doubdm 
already distorted by the Hungarian census-officials, and doubtless the 
real proportions have slightly shifted in the meanwhile, but both these 
margins of error are insignificant compared with the gross perversions 
of truth perpetrated by Hungarian officialdom in 19x0. So rapidly 
is a nation demoralised when once it succumbs to chauvinism. 

> Published by the Cambridge University Press. 


of BalUol College, and Mr. R* W* Qiafmian of the 
Clarendon Press, all of ^i^m have read the book in 
^i^le or part either in manuscript or in proof. Their 
advice has enabled me to raise the standard of my work 
in every respect. When the critics tear my final draft 
in pieces, I shall reahse how my first draft would have 
fared, had it been exposed naked to their daws. 

Last but not least, I must express my gratitude to my 
publishers, Messrs. J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., for their 
unfailing kindness, cspedally for bearing with my delays 
and reproducing my maps. 


Febntary 19x5. 



L The Futdre ••••••«. z 


A. The German Empire 21 

B. The French Frontier 40 

C. The Danish Frontier 48 

%^ D. The Polish Frontier 51 

E. Prussian State and German Nation . • . 80 

IIL The Vitalitt of Austria 98 

IV. Rkx mis ' imuch ow in the Balkans .... 138 

A. Hungary Z4& 

B. The Southern Slavs 167 

C. A Balkan ZoUverein 2x6 

V. TRiBsn AND Italy 246 / 


^ VIL Parslavish, (» Germany's Fears • . . . 273 

wVIIL The Russian Empire and National Self-Government 281 

A. The Risorgimento of Poland .... 281 

B. The National Evolution of Russia . 294 
C Devolution 300 

D. Expansion 325 

^ DC. Russia's Needs •••..••. 337 

A. The Liberation of the Baltic • . • . 339 

B. The Liberation of the Black Sea . . . 358 
X. Tbb Dismantling ot Titrkby 379 

A. Thrace 379 

B. Armenia 385 

C. Pantslamism 399 

D. The New Anatolia 412 

E. The New Arabia 433 

XL Nationality, Esoploitation and Strong Government 
IN Persia ..•..•• 

uXIL Natignauty and Sovereignty 

Appbndix on the Map op Europe • • • . 501 

Index •••••»••• 513 

449 / 



The Kiel Canal Fatmtpaie 48 

The Dahube Page 105 

The TRBmxiio ^ 260 



L The Frahoo-Gebuan Frontier 

IL POLAIID * • • • 

IIL The Sodtbebn Slavs • 
IV. The Balkans 
V. The HnvTEKLAND of Okssa 
VL TtaE Nearer East 
VIL The NAnoNALrms of Europe 

Fadttg page 41 










For the first time in our lives, we find ourselves in 
coniplete tmcertainty as to the future* To uncivilised 
people the situation is commonplace ; but in twentieth- 
century Europe we are accustomed to look ahead, to 
forecast accurately what lies before us, and then to 
choose our path and follow it steadily to its end ; and 
we rightly consider that this is the characteristic of 
civilised men« The same ideal appears in every side of 
our life : in the individual's morality as a desire for 
** Independence '" strong enough to control most human 
passions : in our Economics as Estimates and Insur- 
ances : in our Politics as a great sustained concentration 
of all our surplus energies, in which parties are becom- 
ing increasingly at one in aim and effort, while their 
differences are shrinking to alternatives of method, to 
raise the material, moral, and intellectual standard of Uf e 
throi^out the nation* From all this fruitful, con- 
structive, exacting work, which demands the best from 
us and makes us the better for giving it, we have been 
violently wrenched away and pltmged into a struggle for 
existence with people very much like oturselves, with 
whom we have no quarrel* 

We must face the fact that this is pure evil, and that 
we cannot escape it* We must fight with all our 
strength : every particle of our energy must be absorbed 


in the war : and meanwhile our social construction must 
stand still indefinitely, or even be in part undone, and 
every class and individual in the country must suffer in 
their degree, according to the quite arbitrary chance of 
war, in lives horribly destroyed and work ruined* We 
have to carry this war to a successful issue, because on 
that depends our freedom to govern our own life after 
the war is over, and the preservation of this freedom 
itself is more important for us than the whole sum of 
concrete gains its possession has so far brought us* 

Thus we are sacrificing our present to our future, 
and, therein, obeying the dviUsed man's ideal to the 
uttermost* But we shall only be justified in our most 
momentous decision, by which we have put to the 
touch the whole of our fortunes at once, if the path we 
choose and follow is worthy of the sacrifice and the 
danger we are incurring for the sake of it* 

At present we are all working, according to our 
individual capacities, for success in the war, but we 
have little influence, even collectively, upon the result* 
We have unreservedly put the control of it into the 
hands of experts whom we trust, and rightly done so, 
because it is the essence of this evil, war, whether the 
veiled war of Diplomacy or the naked war of military 
force, that its conduct must be secret and autocratic* 
Naturally our thoughts are with the fleets and armies, 
for we know that if they are beaten, we lose the thing 
they are fighting for, freedom of choice; but we are 
in danger of forgetting that, if we win, our object is not 
automatically attained* If we read in the newspaper 
one day that the powers with which we are at war had 
submitted unconditionally to the Allies, we should only 
be at the beginning of our real task* The recotistruc- 
tion of Europe would be in our hands ; but we should 


be exposed to the one thing worse than defeat in the 
field, to the misuse of the immense power of decision, 
for good or evil, given us by victory* 

This is an issue incomparably graver than the 
miUtary struggle that lies immediately before us. 
Firstly, we are more personally responsible for it as 
individuals. The war itself is not oidy being managed 
by experts : it was brought upon us (the ** White 
Paper ^' leaves no doubt in our minds) by factors outside 
Ei^^d altogether. But our policy after hostilities 
cease will be decided by our own government relying 
for its authority upon the cotmtry behind it, that is, it 
will be decided ultimately by public opinion. Secondly, 
the state of war will have shaken our judgment when 
we are most in need of judging wisely. 

The psychological devastation of war is even more 
terrible than the material. War brings the savage 
substratum of human character to the surface, after it 
has swept away the strong habits that generations of 
civilised effort have built up. We saw how the breath 
of war in Ireland demoralised all parties alike. We 
have met the present more ghastly reality with admir- 
able calmness ; but we must be on our guard. Time 
wears out nerves, and War inevitably brings with it the 
st^;gestion of certain obsolete points of view, which in 
our real, normal life, have loi^ been buried and 

It rouses the instinct of revenge. ** If Germany 
has hurt us, we will hurt her more — ^to teach her not to 
do it again.'' The wish is the savs^e's automatic 
reaction, the reason his perfunctory justification of it : 
but the civilised man knows that die impulse is hope- 
lessly unreasonable. The ** hurt '' is being at war, and 
the evil we wish to bann is the possibility of being at 


war againt because war prevents us working out our own 
lives as we choose* If we beat Germany and then 
humiliate her, she will never rest till she has ** redeemed 
her honour/* by humiliatii^ us more cruelly in turn* 
Instead of beii^ free to return to our own pressing 
business, we shall have to be constantly on the watch 
against her« Two great nations will sit idle, weapon 
in hand, like two Afghans in their loopholed towers 
^en the blood feud is between them ; and we shall 
have sacrificed dehberately and to an ever-increasing 
extent, for the blood feud grows by geometrical pro- 
gression, the very freedom for lAdch we are now giving 
our lives* 

Another war instinct is plunder* War is often the 
savage's profession : ** * With my sword, spear and 
shield I plough, I sow, I reap, I gather in the vintage*' ^ 
If we beat Germany our own mills and factories will 
have been at a standstill, our horses requisiticmed and our 
crops unharvested, our merchant steamers stranded in 
dock if not sunk on the high seas, and our * blood 
and treasure ' lavished on the war : but in the end 
Germany's wealth wiU be in our grasp, her colonies, 
her markets, and such floating riches as we can distrain 
upon by means of an indemnity* If we have had to 
beat our ploughshares into swords, we can at least draw 
some profit from the new tool, and recoup ourselves 
partially for the inconvenience* It ^ no longer a 
question of irrational, impulsive revenge, perhaps not 
even of sweetening our sorrow by a litde gain* To 
draw on the life-blood of German wealdi may be the 
only way to rq>lenish the veins of our exhausted 
Industry and Commerce*" So the plunder instinct 
m^t be clothed in civilised garb : ** War," we might 

' TIk soQK of ItyboM the KiclML 


eipress it, "' is an investment that must btwg in its 

The first ailment against this point of view is that 
it has clearly been the inspiring idea of Germany's 
policy, and history already shows that armaments are 
as unbusinesslike a speculation for civilised countries 
as war is an abnormal occupation for civilised men. 
We saw the efifect of the Morocco tension upon German 
finance in xgiit a&d the first phase of the present war 
has been enough to show how much Germany's com- 
merce will inevitably suffer, whether she wins or loses* 

It is only \^en all the armaments are on one side and 
all the wealth is on the other, that war pays ; when, in 
£act, an armed savage attacks a civilised man possessed 
of no arms for the protection of his wealth* Our 
Afghans in their towers are sharp enough not to steal 
each other's cows (supposing they possess any of their 
own) for cows do not multiply by being exchanged, and 
both Afghans would starve in the end after wasting all 
their bullets in the skirmish* They save their bullets 
to steal cows from the plainsman who cannot make 

If Germany vrere really nothing but a ** nation in 
arms," successful war might be as lucrative for her as 
an Afghan's raid on the plain, but she is normally a 
great industrial commtmity like ourselves* In the last 
generation she has achieved a national growth of which 
she is justly proud* Like our own, it has been entirely 
social and economic* Her goods have been peacefully 
conquering the world's markets* Now her workers 
have been diverted en masse from their prospering 
industry to conquer the same markets by military force, 
and the whole work of forty years is jeopardised by the 
change of method* 


Fighting for trade and industry is not like %hting 
for cattle* Cattle are driven from one fastness to 
another, and if no better, are at least no worse for the 
transit* Civilised wealth perishes on the way* CXir 
economic organisation owes its power and range to the 
marvellous forethought and co-operation that has built 
it up; but the most delicate organisms are the most 
easily dislocated, and the conqueror, whether England 
or Germany, will have to realise that, though he may 
seem to have got the wealth of the conquered into his 
grip, the total wealth of both parties will have been 
vastly diminished by the process of the struggle* 

The characteristic feature of modem wealth is that 
it is international* Economic gain and loss is shared 
by the whole world, and the shifting of the economic 
balance does not correspond to the moves in the game 
of diplomatists and armies. Germany's economic 
growth has been a phenomenon quite independent 
of her political ambitions, and Germany's economic 
ruin would compromise something far greater than 
Germany's political future — ^the whole world's pros- 
perity* British wealth, among the rest, would be dealt 
a deadly wound by Germany's economic death, and it 
would be idle to pump Germany's last life-blood into 
our veins, if we were automatically draining them of our 
own blood in the process* 

But issues greater than the economic are involved* 
The modern ** Nation " is for good or ill an organism one 
and indivisible, and all the diverse branches of national 
activity flourish or wither with the whole national well- 
being* You cannot destroy German wealth without 
paralysing German intellect and art, and European 
civilisation, if it is to go on growing, cannot do without 
them* Every doctor and musician, every scientist. 


engmeer, political economist and historian, knows well 
his debt to the spiritual energy of the German nation* 
In the moments vrhen one realises the full horror of what 
is happening, the worst thought is the aimless hurling 
to destruction of the world^s only true wealth, the skill 
and nobility and genius of human beings, and it is 
probably in the German casualties that the intellectual 
world is suffering its most irreparable human losses. 

With these facts in our minds, we can look into the 
future more dearly, and choose our policy (supposii^ 
that we win the war, and, thereby, the power to choose) 
with greater confidence* We have accepted the fact 
that war itself is the evil, and will in any event bring pure 
loss to both parties : that no good can come from the 
war itself, but only from our policy when the war is 
over : and that the one good our policy can achieve, 
without which every gain is delusive, is the banishing of 
this evil from the realities of the future. This is our 
one supreme '" British interest,*' and it is a German 
interest just as much, and an interest of the whole world* 

This war, and the cloud of war that has weighed 
upon us so many years before the bursting of the storm, 
has brought to bankruptcy the '' National State/* Till 
1870 it W3S the ultimate ideal of European politics, as 
it is still in the Balkans, where the Turk has broken 
Time's wings* It was such a fruitful ideal that it has 
rapidly carried us beyond itself, and in the last genera- 
tion the life of the world has been steadily finding new 
and wider channels* In the crisis of change from 
nationalism to internationalism we were still exposed to 
the pk^e of war* The crisis might have been passed 
without it, and war banished for ever between the 
nations of civilised Europe* Now that the catastrophe 
has happened (it is childish to waste enei^ in incrimina- 


tions s^ainst its promoters) we must carry through the 
change completely and at once : we cannot possibly 
afford to be exposed to the danger agam« 

No tool, machine, or idea made by men has an 
immortal career* Sooner or later they all run amuck, 
and begin to do evil instead of good. At that stage 
savage or unskilful men destroy them by force and 
replace them by their opposite : civilised men get them 
under control, and build them into something new and 
greater* Nationality will sink from beii^ the pinnacle 
of politics only to become their foundation, and till the 
fotmdations are laid true, further building is impossible. 
But the bases of nationality have never yet been laid 
true in Europe* When we say that ** nationality was 
the political ideal of the nineteenth century,'* and that 
1870 left the populations of Etux)pe organised in 
national groups, we are taking far too complacent a view 
of historical facts* The same century that produced 
a united Italy and Germany, saw out the whole tragedy 
of Poland, from the first partition in 1772 to the last 
revolt in 1863* Human ideas do not spring into the 
world full-grown and shining, like Athena : they tnul 
the infection of evil things from the past* 

In the Dark Ages Europe's most pressing need and 
only practicable ideal was stroi^ government*^ Strong 
government came with its blessings, but it brot^ht the 
evil of territorial ambitions* The Duke of Burgundy 
spent the wealth of his Netherland subjects in trying 
to conquer the Swiss mountaineers* Burgundy suc- 

^ The expression " Strong Government " is used throughout this 
book in ^e quasi-tedinical sense of " Government in which the 
governed have no share." " Absolutism '* and *' Autocracy '* are 
terms more usually employed, but both have acquired a sinister 
connotation, and it is better to use some neutral word that implies no 
judgment on what it denotes. 


cumbed to the king of France* But the very factor 
that made the Frendi kings survive in the struggle for 
existence between governments, the force of compact 
nationality which the French kingdom happened to 
contain, delivered the inheritance of the kings to the 

The French Nation in the Revolution btirst the 
chrysalis of irresponsible government beneath which it 
had grown to organic life, but like a true heir it took 
oiver the Royal Government's ideal : ** Peace within 
and piracy without/' France had already begun 
aggression abroad before she had accompli^ed self- 
government at home, and in delivering herself to 
Napoleon she sacrificed her liberty to her ambition* 
Napoleon's only endurix^ achievements outside France 
were the things he set himself to prevent, the realisation, 
by a forceful reaction against force, of German and 
Italian nationality* Nationalism was converted to 
violence from the outset, and the struggle for existence 
between absolute governments has merely been replaced 
by a stru^e between nationalities, equally blind, 
haphazard, and non-moral, but far more terrific, just 
because the virtue of self-govenmient is to focus and 
utilise human energy so much more effectively than the 
irresponsible government it has superseded* 

Naturally the result of this planless strife has been no 
grouping of Europe on a just and reasonable national 
basis* France and England, achieving racial frontiers 
and national self-government early, inherited the Earth 
before Germany and Italy struggled up beside them, 
to take their leavings of markets and colonial areas* But 
the government that united Germany had founded its 
power on the partition of Poland, and in the second 
Balkan War of 1913 we saw a striking example of the 


endless chain of eWl forged by an act of national 

The Hungarians used the liberty they won in 
1867 to subject the Slavonic population between 
themselves and the sea, and prevent its union with 
the free principality of Serbia of the same Slavonic 
nationality* This drove Serbia in 1912 to follow 
Hungary^s example by seizing the coast of the non- 
Slavonic Albanians ; and vAien Austria-Hui^ary pre- 
vented this (a right act prompted by most unrighteous 
motives), Serbia fought an unjust war with Bu^aria and 
subjected a large Bulgarian population, in order to gain 
access to the only seaboard left her, the friendly Greek 
port of Salonika* 

Hungary and Serbia are nominally natiotial states : 
but more than half the population in Hungary, and 
perhaps nearly a quarter in Serbia, is alien, only held 
within the state by force against its will* The energy 
of both states is perverted to the futile and demoralis- 
ing work of ** Magyarisii^ ** and ** Serbising ** subject 
foreign populations, and they have not even been 
successful* The resistance of Southern Slav nationalism 
on the defensive to the agression of Hungarian 
nationalism has given the occasion for the present 

The evil element in nationalism under its many 
names, ** Chauvinism,*' ** Jingoism,*' ** Prussianism,** is 
the one thing in our present European civilisation that 
can and does produce the calamity of war* If our object 
is to prevent war, then, the way to do so is to purge 
Nationality of this evil* This we cannot do by any 
mechanical means, but only by a change of heart, by 
converting public opinion throughout Europe from 
** National Competition ** to " National Co-operation*** 


Public opinion will never be converted so long as the 
present system of injtistice remains in force^ so long as 
one nation has less and another more than its due* The 
fiist step towards internationalism is not to flout the 
problems of nationality, but to solve them* 

The most important practical business, then, of the 
conference that meets when war is over, will be the 
revision of the map of Europe* Merely to suggest such 
a thing is a complete reversal of our policy during the 
last generation* We in England have been steadily 
shutttt^ our eyes to nationality, and minimising its 
importance* CXur English national question was 
settled long ago* Our geographical situation as an 
island of manageable size gave our mediaeval Norman 
and Angevin kings an exceptional opportunity for 
establishing at an early date a strong well-knit govern- 
ment* The nation became self-conscious when it 
e^Kuided under the Tudors, and self-governing by the 
political revolutions of the seventeenth century, a full 
hundred years ahead of France* While France was 
realising her nationality, we were passing through the 
Industrial Revolution, and during the last century we 
have been working, with rapidly increasing success 
doling latter years, to adapt ourselves to our new 
economic concUtions* 

If we do not think about nationality, it is simply 
because we have long taken it for granted, and our mind 
is focussed on posterior developments; but it is 
increasingly hard to keep ourselves out of touch with 
other countries, and though our blindness has been 
partly distraction, it has also been in part deliberate 
policy* We saw well enough that the present phase of 
the national problem in Europe carried in it the seeds 
of war* We rightly thought that war itself was the 


evil, an evil incomparably greater than the national 
injustices that might become the cause of iu We knew 
that, if these questions were opened, war would follow* 
We accordingly adopted the only possible course* We 
built our policy on the chance that national feeling could 
be damped down till it had been superseded in the 
public opinion of Europe by other interests, not because 
Nationalism was unjustified, but because it endangered 
so much more than it was worth* Knowing that we 
had passed out of the nationalist phase ourselves, and 
that from our present political point of view war was 
purely evil, we hoped that it was merely a question of 
time for the Continental populations to reach the same 
standpoint* Notably in Germany, the focus of danger, 
we saw social interests coming more and more to the 
front at the expense of militarism* We threw ourselves 
into the negative task of staving o£F the catastrophe in the 
interim, by a strenuous policy of compromise and con- 
ciliation, which has been successful on at least two 
critical occasions* Now that the evil has been too 
powerful and the catastrophe has happened, the reasons 
for this policy are dead* Nationalism has been strong 
enough to produce war in spite of us* It has terribly 
proved itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force to 
be reckoned with* It is stronger on the Continent than 
social politics* It is the raw material that Utters the 
whole grotmd* We must build it into our foundations, 
or give up the task, not only of constructive social 
advance beyond the hmits we have already reached, but 
even of any fundamental reconstruction of what the 
war will have destroyed* 

Perhaps we might have foretold this from the case of 
Ireland immediately under our eyes* Failure to solve 
her national problem has arrested Ireland's develop- 


me&t since the seventeenth century, and inq>nsoned her 
in a world of ideas ahnost unintelligible to an English- 
man till he has travelled in the Balkans* This has been 
England's fault, and we are now at last in a fair way to 
remedy it* The moment we have succeeded in arrang- 
ing that the di£Ferent national groups in Ireland govern 
diemselves in the way they really wish, the national 
question will pass from the Irish consciousness ; they 
will put two centuries behind them at one leap, and 
oome into line with ourselves* The Dublin strike, 
ocmtemporary with the arming of the Volunteers, shows 
how the modem problems are jostling at the heels of 
the old. Although '' Unionist '' and '' Nationalist '' 
politicians could still declare that their attitude towards 
the strike was neutral, the parliament of the new Irish 
state will discuss the social problem and nothing else* 

Ireland, then, has forced us to think about the problem 
of nationalism ; and our Irish experience will be in- 
valuable to us when peace is made, and we take in hand, 
in concert with our allies, the national questions of the 
rest of Europe* To begin with, we already have a 
notion of what Nationality is. Like all great forces in 
human life, it is nothing material or mechanical, but a 
subjective psychological feeling in living people* This 
feeling can be kindled by the presence of one or several 
of a series of factors : a common country, especially if 
it is a well defined physical region, like an island, a 
river basin, or a mountain mass ; a common language, 
eqsedally if it has given birth to a literature ; a common 
tdiffoaf and that much more impalpable force, a 
common tradition or sense of memories shared horn 
the past* 

But it is impossible to ai^e a priori from the presence 
of one or even several of these factors to the existence of a 


nattonality : they may have been there for ages and 
kindled no response* And it is impossible to aj^^ue from 
one case to another : precisely the same group of 
factors may produce nationality here, and there have no 
efiTecL Great Britain is a nation by geography and 
tradition, though important Keltic-speaking sections of 
the population in Wales and the Highlands do not 
understand the predominant English language* Ireland 
is an island smaller still and more compact, and is 
further unified by the almost complete predominance of 
the same Englisdb language, for the Keltic speech is 
incomparably less vigorous here than in Wales; yet 
the absence of common tradition combines with 
religious differences to divide the country into two 
nationalities, at present sharply distinct from one another 
and none the less hostile because their national psycho- 
logy is strikingly the same* Germany is divided by 
religion in precisely the same way as Ireland, her 
common tradition is hardly stronger, and her geographi- 
cal boundaries quite vague : yet she has built up her 
present concentrated national feeling in three genera- 
tions* Italy has gec^aphy, language and tradition to 
bind her together ; and yet a more vivid tradition is 
able to separate the Tidnese from his neighbours, and 
bind him to people of alien speech and religion beyond 
a great mountain rai^e* The Armenian nationality 
does not occupy a continuous territory, but lives by 
language and religion* The Jews speak the language 
of the country where they sojourn, but religion and 
tradition hold diem together* The agnostic Jew accepts 
not only the language but all the other customs of his 
adopted countrymen, but tradition by itself is too strong 
for him : he remains a Jew and cannot be assimilated* 
These instances taken at random show that each case 


must be judged on its own merits, and that no argument 
kolds good except the ascertained wish of the living 
population actually concerned* Above all we must be 
on our guard against ** historical sentiment/' that is, 
zgaixist arguments taken from conditions which once 
eiisted or were supposed to exist, but which are no 
longer real at the present moment* They are most 
easily illustrated by extreme examples* lulian news* 
papers have described the annexation of Tripoli as 
** recovering the soil of the Fatherland " because it was 
once a province of the Roman Empire ; and the entire 
region of Macedonia is claimed by Greek chauvinists on 
the one hand, because it contains the site of Pella, 
the cradle of Alexander the Great in the fourth century 
BX«, and by Bulgarians on the other, because Ohhrid^ 
in the opposite comer, was the capital of the Bulgarian 
Tzardom in the tenth century a*d*, though the drift of 
time has buried the tradition of the latter almost as deep 
as the achievements of the ** Emathian Conqueror,'' on 
wiiich the modem Greek nationalist insists so strongly* 
The national problems of Europe are numerous, and 
each one is beset by arguments good, bad, and indif- 
ferent, some no more specious than the above, some so 
elaborately staged that it reqtures the greatest discern- 
ment to expose them* Vast bodies of people, with 
brains and money at their disposal, have been interested 
in obscuring the truth, and have used every instmment 
in their power to do so* It is therefore essential for us 
in England to take up these hitherto remote and un- 
interesting national problems in earnest, to get as near 
to the truth as we possibly can, both as to what the 
req>ective wishes of the different populations are, and 
as to how far it is possible to reconcile them with each 
other and with Geography ; and to come to the con- 


ference which will follow the war, and is so much more 
important than the war itself, with a clear idea of the 
alternative solutions and a mature judgment upon their 
relative merits* 

To accomplish this we need a co-ordination of know- 
ledge on a large scale, knowledge of history, geography, 
religion, national psychology and public opinion* It 
is a case for the collaboration of experts, but mean- 
while an attempt to review the whole question, even if 
there is no deep knowledge behind it, may, if honestly 
made, serve at least as a plea for more detailed and 
authoritative contributions* 

The remainder of this book is an attempt to make 
such a beginning* We will take a series of actual 
political groups, some of them states with no national 
basis, some in which state and nation roughly coincide, 
some that are true nationalities at present prevented from 
realising themselves in concrete form, and we will start 
in each case by trying to understand the group's own 
point of view* We shall find that it nearly always has 
some justification, and is hardly ever justifiable in its 
entirety* This need not make us pessimistic : it is one 
of the commonest traits of human nature* Right and 
Wrong are always a question of degree, and our next 
step will be to criticise the case of the group tmder dis- 
cussion, and estimate how far it is just and reasonable to 
give it what it asks* In reaching our conclusions we 
shall find ourselves evolving a scheme for the recon- 
struction of that particular comer of Europe* 

Such a reconstruction must be guided by certain 
obvious principles* 

(i*) It must be done with the minimum of territorial 
or administrative chai^e*^ There is always a pre- 
sumption in favour of the existing machinery, so long 


as ft works, varying in proportioii to the civilisation of 
At people concerned* In a civilised country the plant 
€f self-government is elaborately installed, not only in 
ihe material sense of public services and administration, 
business concerns with capital invested in them, which 
nust in great measure be wasted if they are broken up 
aid reconstituted on quite different lines, but in the 
more important psychological sphere of political habit* 
There is a certain political value, for instance, in the 
esprit de corps of the motley Austrian army, or even in 
the still callow constitutional tradition of the Austrian 
C^own*-lands' parliament* It is very hard to make 
people work together, very easy to pull them apart 
again. If they work together so badly that they bring 
the whole organism to a deadlock, there is no course left 
but to part them, and r^oup theni on other lines which 
will enable the various elements to function more 
smoothly* But we must never forget that the negative 
work of demolishii^ what other men have spent their 
labour in building up, even if it be a Bastille, is at best a 
regrettable necessity* 

(ii*) In the last resort there must always be minorities 
that suffer* This must be so if men are not to let 
difference of opinion prevent them workii^ together, 
and co-operation in spite of disagreement is the 
foundation of politics* We can only secure that the 
minorities are as small and the suffering as mild as 
possible* This again is a question of degree* In 
Macedonia, until the year before last, one Turk with 
one rifle caused a ** minority *' of a hundred Christians 
with no rifles to suffer robbery, rape, and murder* 
Every one ^^es that this was an abomination* In 
Great Britain at the present moment the numerically 
small Welsh-q>eaking minority of school children have 


to learn English as well as their mother tongue, but the 
English majority do not learn Welsh. Here we have 
'* suffering '" or disadvantage to one party, without 
injustice : the Welsh child does not learn English 
because it is the English-speaking majority's interest 
that he should do so, but because it is his own. His 
only quarrel is with the fact that the English population 
is much larger than his, and its language much more 
widely spoken, and it is as useless to quarrel with £acts 
as it is to beat the sea and bind it in chains. 
I^The Irish question has produced a rich crop of mis- 
guided arguments on both sides. First came the 
skirmishes of ** historical sentiment.*' The Unionists 
wished to keep everything as it was ** because Ireland 
has been conquered by England, and united thereby 
to the English Kingdom.'' They were silenced by the 
outstanding fact that the Catholic Irish are a separate 
nationality, but not content with this, the Nationalists 
declared that the whole island was the herits^e of the 
** Irish nation," with the deplorable result that the 
Ulster Protestants made good their objection by threats 
of force. Now the Protestants in turn are trying to grab 
more than their share by maintaining that Ulster is ** one 
and indivisible," in defiance of the fact that the territory 
** Ulster " as such has no organic life, or in other words 
no nationality, of its own. This is mere encouragement 
to Nationalists to claim all Ulster counties complete 
where there are Catholic majorities, though one comer 
of them may be entirely Protestant in population. 

The only way out is for both parties to face the fact 
that there are two nationalities in Ireland, English- 
speaking Protestants and English-speaking Catholics, 
which in the greater part of the island form uniform 
populations covering continuous territories; but that 


there is an irreducible zone, especially in County Tyrone, 
ivhere the two nations are inextricably minc;led, not 
only Catholic village interspersed with Protestant, but 
Cadiolic and Protestant householders occupying 
akemate premises in the same town* Even here the 
territories justly belonging to each nation could be 
plotted out to a nicety on a big-scale map, but it would be 
quite impossible to draw a frontier of equal delicacy 
for the practical purposes of public service and self- 

With the growth of civilisation the human and the 
terxitDrial unit become less and less identical* In a 
primitive community the members are tmdifferentiated 
from one another : the true human unit is the total 
group, and not the individual, and the territory this 
group occupies is a unit too, self-sufficing and cut off 
from intercourse with the next valley* In modem 
Europe every sub-group and every individual has 
developed a ** character "' or ** individuality "' of its own 
which must have free play ; while the growth of com- 
munications, elaboration of organisation,, and economic 
interdependence of the whole world have broken down 
the barriers between region and region* The minimum 
territorial block that can be organised efficiently as a 
separate political unit according to modem standards 
is constantly growing in size : the maximum human 
group which can hold together without serious internal 
divergence is as steadily diminishing* 

This would look like an impasse, were it not corrected 
by the virtues of civilisation itself* We started with 
the fact that the essence of civilisation was ** Fore- 
thought ** and its ideal the ** power of free choice '' : 
the complementary side of this ideal, on the principle 
** Do as you would be done by,'^ is to allow free choice 


to others when they are in your power. It is a virtue 
with as many names as there are spheres of human life : 
•* Forbearance/^ '* Toleration/' ^* Constitutionalisnu'' 
When we have drawn our frontier through Tyrone with 
all the ixq^uity that Geography allows us, there 
will inevitably be a minority left on either stde^ a 
minority no map-makix^ can further reduce* Savages 
wipe out minorities : civilised men take testimonials 
from tfaem« The drawing of the frontier is only the 
first step towards the solution of the Irish question* 
It will truly be settled if the minorities find that the 
disadvantage to which Geography puts them is more 
than made up by the good-fellowship of the population 
with ixdiich it yokes them* Then they will become as 
strong a link between Catholic Ireland and Ulster, as 
the ** colonies ** of business men, that voluntarily take 
up their residence in Liverpool and Hamburg, are 
between Germany and England* 

Having stated these principles, which once more 
draw our attention to psychological hcts as beii^ the 
really important forces to whidi all concrete, mechanical 
manipulations of frontiers and institutions must be 
referred in the end, we may now more safely plunge 
into the great sea of European controversy* Let us 
begin with the nation ^ose action has drawn us into the 
vortex, Germany* 




A« The German Empire 

The living generation of Germans is suffering for a 
thousand years of history* They started in the raoe 
to emerge from the Dark Age with a smaller fund 
of civilisation than France had accumulated by her 
thoroi^ Romanisation, and than the Norman con- 
querors carried from France to England; and they 
further handicapped themselves by the only Roman 
tradition they did inherit, the ghost of universal empire. 
The Hohenstaufen dynasty, Germany's chance of a 
strong government, spent its strength warring in Italy, 
on the impossible quest of bringing this ghost to life 
again* When they failed, Germany fell to pieces into 
a debris of principalities, of every size and character: 
self-governing trading-cities, often more in touch with 
foreign traders across the sea than with the serfs at their 
gates ; Imperial knights, the landlords of these serfs, 
ruling their estates with practically sovereign power; 
prince-bishops, who governed some of the most civilised 
districts of Germany in the valley of the Rhine ; and 
lay princes small and great, from the Thuringian dukes, 
whose dominions were subdivided equally among the 
^irfiole male issue of each generation, to the strong 
military lords of the marches, Brandenburg and Austria, 
and the compact, steadily-growing duchy of Bavaria* 
When the Reformation brought religious war, even 
unified France and England were riven by the conflict : 
German particularism fought out the issue to an incon- 


dtisive compromise in the devastating War of 
Years, which paralysed the growth of Germany for 
a century, just when England was workii^ out her 
internal self-government and preparing for the immense 
development of her colonies and industry* During the 
Thirty Years' War Germany's consolidated neighbours 
began to fish in her troubled waters : in the eighteenth 
century she had become the plaything of the powers, 
her principalities pawns in their game : at the end of 
the century she fell completely under the dominion of 
France, and had to endure the merited ridicule of the 
conqueror for her particularism and its results, a 
** second-handness ** and a helpless inert stoUdity* 

This was the more bitter in that she was not merely 
feeding upon memories of a past dawn that had never 
become day : she was conscious of an immense vitality 
in the present. While Napoleon was annexing or 
humiliating her principalities, Germany was giving 
Europe the greatest philosopher and the greatest poet 
she had yet known, Kant and Goethe, while the succes- 
sion of German masters who were creating European 
music was represented by Beethoven* Germany was 
already a nation : the spark had been kindled by 
intellect and art* An intense desire followed to build 
up all the other sides of national life* 

Germany's striking defect was her poUtical disinte- 
gration : this delivered her into the hands of the French, 
who preached their creed with drums and bayonets* 
Civilised Germany turned again to the ideal of the Dark 
Age, which more forttmate nations had long realised 
and transcended, a strong military government* An 
organisation of just this type presented itself in the 
kingdom of Prussia* Its nudeus was the march of 
Brandenburg, the old frontier province against the 


Slavs across the Elbe^ which had grown by conquest 
Eastward and been united, after the Reformation, with 
the colonial territory carved out by the Teutonic 
knights among heathen Prussians beyond the Vistula* 
Its history expressed itself in the character of the 
population* The rather thin soil was well cultivated 
by a hard-working submissive peasantry of German 
settlers or Slavs conquered and Germanised, bound by 
a system of serfdom little modified from the extreme 
mediaeval type, under a ruling class of landed pro- 
prietors who remembered that they had come in as 

The government had all the virtues of European 
absolutism. By the middle of the eighteenth cen- 
tury it had built up an administration and an army 
extraordinarily efficient for the size and wealth of the 
territory* Frederick the Great used this instrument 
to double the extent of his dominions and raise Prussia 
to the status of a European power*^ The debade at 
Jena in 1806 and the unwise humiliations to which 
Napoleon subjected her, only roused the Prussian state 
to a thorough reconstruction : serfdom was abolished 
and universal military trainit^ invented* The rising 
of the Prussian population in 1813, when they cast out 
force by force and broke the French power, really stood 
for a national movement of the whole German people ; 
and its success was achieved under the leadership of the 
Prussian government* 1813 marked out Prussia as 
the tool ixdiich was to fashion a new political structure 
for Germany* 

The transition Germany went through in this genera- 
tion may be illustrated by the career of Stein* Inherit- 
ing the sovereignty of an Imperial knight (his little 

* Invasion of Sflesia, X74o* 


principality was absorbed in Nassau during his lifetime), 
he did not find his vocation therein, but took service 
in the Prussian administration. He came to the front 
after 1806, and was the inspiration both of the internal 
reforms and of the war of liberation they made possible* 
He was afterwards fired by the Romantic movement, and 
devoted his old age to promoting the collection and 
publication of documents for the origins of German 
history, a historical interest that really looked towards 
the future. 

But the dibris of the middle ages could not be cleared 
away in a moment, and the next fifty years were a period 
of flux and indecision. Two factors were striving to 
harmonise and never succeeding. On the one hand, the 
intellectual and artistic growth of Germany was gather- 
ing momentum : in music, philology, philosophy, and 
theoretical politics the nation had not only found itself 
but achieved the primacy of Etirope. On the other side 
stood the political organism of Prussia, far stronger than 
before, for the Vienna congress had greatly increased 
her territory, and far more representative of Germany 
as a whole, for she had exchsuiged the greater part of 
her alien Polish provinces in the East for the German 
Rhineland on the West, which made her a Catholic as 
well as a Protestant state and the bulwark of Germany 
against France. She used the fifty years to unite all 
North Germany in her customs tmion ; but her ruling 
class kept within its mediaeval traditions and only came 
into hostile contact with the spiritual movement in 
which German nationalism still concentrated itself. 
The Prussian governing class aspired to rule Germany, 
but it did not wish to merge itself in the growth of the 
German nation. 

These two discordant elements were welded together 


by a genius, Bismarck* He persuaded the German people 
that the Prussian machine alone could give them what 
they wanted, and that to make the machine work 
effectively they must conform themselves to its action : 
there must be no more liberalism* He persuaded the 
Prussian government that irresponsible absolutism 
could only survive by ** giving the people what it wants/' 
and that if it took the pltmge, from which other obsolete 
institutions, like the Pope and the Hapsburgs, had 
shrunk to their ruin, it had a great future before it* 
He worked with titanic tools* In the blast-furnace of 
three great wars with Denmark, Austria and France, 
he poured the whole energy of the German nation into 
the Prussian crucible, and successfully drew out a solid 
mass of metal, molten in just the form he had intended, 
the German Empire. 

To those ^o look at his work from outside after a 
generation has passed, it appears that the task was too 
gigantic even for his powers* The metal shows a flaw* 
The Prussian machine has not proved itself adaptable 
enot^ : it has not learnt to understand and work for 
the needs and tendencies of the German people* The 
nation on the other hand has lost in success some of the 
qualities it preserved in adversity, and taken a Prussian 
alloy into its soul* Bismarck's harmonisation was 
sovereign for achieving the immediate result he had in 
view* If his material had not been men but stone, the 
statue of Germany he carved would have been a monu- 
ment to him for ever* But living material is always 
growing, and those who work in it must direct their 
eye less upon the present than upon the future* 

Bismarck brought Germany into line with France 
and England* Her national question was solved at last, 
and she was free to throw herself into industrialism* 


She threw herself into it with all that concentratton of 
energy of which Bismarck had first mastered the secret* 
Here was a new sphere where intellectual activity and 
disciplined organisation might co-operate to give 
German nationality expression* 

The commerce and manufactures that Germany has 
built up during the last forty-three years are among the 
most wonderful achievements in history : there is a 
vigour behind them that feels itself capable of inheriting 
the whole Earth* Perhaps if the Earth had lain un- 
tenanted for Germany to inherit, she would have found 
salvation in the achievement, and Prussian principles 
and German character might have hardened into steel 
of a temper that Bismarck, in idealistic moments, may 
have dreamed of* 

But unforttmately the pleasant places of the Earth 
were occupied already* The tropical countries that 
supply Europe with raw materials her own climate 
cannot produce, were in the hands of England, France, 
and Holland: in the temperate regions arable of 
receiving the overflow of European population, new 
white nations of English, Spanish, or Dutch speech 
were growing up, one of them, the U*S*A*, already 
a world power, the rest guaranteed an undisturbed 
development to maturity either by the United States or 
by Great Britain* In the partition of the waste places 
of Africa during the last twenty years of the nineteenth 
century Germany took her share, but she got little by 
it* Her tropical acqiusitions seem not to pay their way 
from the commercial point of view, and the only colony 
with a temperate climate, S.W* Africa, was vacant 
simply because its soil was desert, while its one asset, 
the good harbour of Walfisch Bay, had been earmarked 
by Great Britain* In 1870 the Germans thought they 


had at last buried their unhappy political past, yet 
here in the new chapter they had magnificently opened, 
they were suffering for history still* This has been more 
than they can bear, and explains, though it does not 
excuse, their foreign policy ever since* With the 
brilliant success of the Prussian military machine fresh 
in their minds, they ttumed to Prussianism once more 
to accomplish their desire* Instead of purging out 
the alloy ^en once the metal was cast, the new in- 
dustrial Germany has become Prussianised through 
and through* 

In hoping to cancel by the use of military force the 
grave initial disadvantage with which they started their 
industrial career, they have made a miscalculation 
that has brought evil upon themselves and all Europe* 
The machine is entirely unadaptable to the new task set 
before it* ** Blood and Iron ** could drive other nations 
off German soil; they could even, in Bismarck's 
handling, cause a great psychological revolution in the 
political feeling of the German people* They could 
not possibly be made fruitful for economic progress* 

Economic advance can only be made by economic 
effort* We are deeply conscious of this in England* 
War as a constructive national activity is for us essentially 
a thing of the past : between our warlike ancestors and 
ourselves there is a great gulf fixed, the Industrial 
Revolution, which has put us into a new environment* 
In the effort to adapt ourselves to that environment we 
are increasingly absorbed ; we more and more recognise 
the vital importance of succeeding in this, and resent the 
unremitting ** burden of armaments,^' the distracting 
rumours of war, and now this destructive folly into 
which we have really been drawn at last. 

The retort is easy : ** Ei^;land has all she wants* 


She got it by war a century ago : now she wants to be 
let alone to exploit it/^ That merely proves that we 
have been more fortunate than Germany : it does not 
prove that the same military method will produce the 
same result now that the century has passed* The 
conditions have changed^ and not, after all, in Germany's 
disfavour* In spite of her bad start, she has developed 
such immense industries that her town population has 
increased at a greater rate than that of the U*S«A* dturing 
the same period : she has won markets for her manu- 
factures, not only in her own protectorates, but in the 
colonies of other nations, and even in the homeland of 
industrialism — Great Britain itself* The surplus of her 
population, whose growth has even outstripped her 
demand for labour,^ has found outlets, entirely satis- 
factory from the individual's point of view, in North 
and South America, where they already form a very 
prosperous section of the population, and play an 
influential part in the self-government of their adopted 
countries* German enterprise has competed on equal 
terms with French, English, and American in China and 
Turkey, and obtained contracts that offer good invest- 
ments for all surplus German capital for some time to 

This has been Germany's true victory in the en- 
vironment of modem civilisation, and she has done it 
all without moving a single gtm against her ne^bours* 
She has not yet got abreast of England in wealth : that 
is not the fault of living England or Germany, but of 
dead history : but, so far as she has thrown herself into 

> This is true in the sense that the home market for skSUd laboar 
xs ghitted. But while the skilled Gennan is seeking new openings 
abroad, the uoddlled Pole is drifting into Westphalia to do the work 
for which the native German's standard is too high, so that the *«-—-- 
gntioii statistics at present otttbahttice those of EmigratJon. 


the eoonoinic field, she has, by her own merit, gained 
upon us to the utmost extent possible. Her only avoid* 
able handicap has been the great Prussian fleet and army 
miiich she has deliberately imposed upon herself* Their 
creation, upkeep, and increase have steadily taxed her 
economic growth, and their existence has tempted her, 
in her foolish trust in their efficacy for her ulterior 
objects, to risk all her real economic gains by bringir^ 
them into action* 

This policy of Germany's has been an immense 
mistake* It can work her no good, but it has a vast 
potentiality for working both herself and the rest of 
Europe evil. There is the sum of all evil in the fact 
that by attacking the rest of Europe with arms, she has 
forced us all to take up arms against her* It is only our 
subordinate object to beat her, because we know that 
if she beats us her public opinion will become more 
convinced than ever that her militaristic policy was 
right* But the converse by no means follows, that if 
we beat her we thereby convince her of her error* 
Masses of people are only converted from ingrained 
opinions about complicated questions, if they have every 
opportunity given them to be reasonable* It is always 
tempting to refuse to be reasonable : if you are being 
harshly treated, and at the same time presented with 
unanswerable refutations of cherished beliefs, you 
inevitably prefer to go mad rather than be convinced* 
Our ultimate object is to prevent war for the future, and 
the essential means to this end is to convince Germany 
that war is not to her interest* We and the French 
disbelieve in war already, but a minority of one can 
make a quarrel, in spite of the proverb* The only 
way to convince Germany is first to beat her badly and 
dien to treat her well* 


U we bitnwliarf her, we shall strengdicn the obsolete 
ideas in her oonsdoastiess more than ever — pahsKps 
no longer the idea of ** Phinder,^ but certainly that of 
^ Revenge,^ which is much worse : if we deal ** dis- 
interestedly ^ with her (thou|^ it win be in our own 
truest interest) we may produce sudi a reacdon of 
public optnion in Germany, that the curse of aggress i ve 
mihtansm wiU be exorcised ficom her as effectively in 
19x4, as the curse of pditical paralyse was exordsed 
in 1870. 

We have seen that Germany was led to pursue the 
policy which has nilnrinaird in this war, by the oppres- 
sive sense that her development was bong cramped by 
the action of her nei^iibours. At first she conceived 
their action as of a passive kind, as the mere automatic, 
** dog-in-the-manger ** instinct of effete powers to ding 
to possessions they had not the initiative to utilise, and 
in ^^ch nothing but historical diance had given them 
their vested interest : her own mission, she thought, 
was to bend all her youthful energy and resolution 
to the task of evicting them, in order to actualise all 
the golden opportunities that they had missed* More 
recently, however, since her methodical pursuit of her 
aim has roused her victims to a sense of their danger 
and stimulated them to concert measures for their 
security, she has viewed their behaviour in a more 
sinister light, as an active, though veiled, campaign of 
hostilities unremittingly carried on to compass her 
destruction ; and now that her ambition has combined 
with this undercurrent of fear to predpitate her into 
an aggressive war, so that she finds herself actually 
engaged in a life-and-death struggle with these neigh- 
bours whom she has envied, despised, and feared in one 
oonq)licated emotion, she is more firmly convinced than 


ever that the aggression comes, not from her side, but 
£fom theirs* 

We cannot dispel this obsession by discussions of 
the past : the only aq^ument that has a chance of going 
home is our action in the future, that is, the attitude we 
adopt when we meet Germany at the coi^ess that will 
fellow the war* Assuming (what is the necessary pre- 
supposition of this book) that Germany has been 
defeated, and that the settlement, in so far as it depends 
on terms imposed by superior force, passes thereby 
into the hands of the Allies, on what principles shaU 
we govern otur clearance of acootmts with the German 
Nation i" 

One thing is dear : whether Germany's feeling of 
constriction has good grounds or not, we must avoid 
deliberately furnishing it with further justification than 
it has already* It would be possible to maintain that 
the oolotiies and concessions Germany has already 
acquired give her room for expansion ample enotigh to 
deprive her of excuse for her envy, not to speak of the 
conduct by ^^ch she has attempted to satisfy it; 
but even this view would be rash in face of Germany's 
vehement conviction to the contrary* Germany is 
likely to judge her own plight more tnily than we can, 
and even if she has judged wrongly, her opinion is more 
isapartant for our purpose than the objective truth* 
To give the lie to this national belief by taking from her 
even that which she hath, would be the surest means 
of deepening and perpetuating her national bitterness* 

Let us make the unlikely assumption that, before 
the end of the war, every fragment of German territory 
overseas wiU have come into our power: there will 
certainly be a body of opinion in this country in favour 
of retaining the spoils of war* ** The retention of Ger- 


man S*W. Afirica,'' tfacy will say, ** is essential, firstly 
in order to round off the frontieis of the Soodi African 
Conunonweakh, and secondly to prevent for the future 
the fostering^ from thin li^)^Tff» fef^tffj of th ff disloyalty 
against the British Entire, unfoctonatdy still rife in 
the Dutch dement*'' 

But it will be a pervetse cure for Dutch disaffiwtian 
to reinforce it by including a still more irreconcilable 
German populatkm within the same mrnnrnnity, unless 
we mean to abandon the liberal policy which has gone 
so far towards wiping out the memories of die South 
African War, and rule Dutdi and German alike with a 
heavy hand« Such a disastrous course would lose us 
Soudi Africa altogether, by a war of independenoe like 
that wtddi severed from us the North American states, 
the finest colonies we ever had. If, on die other hand, 
we restore Germany her territory, and avoid disturbing 
die natural development of our own South African 
G>mmonweat]h by the problems in volved in the 
annexation, we shall see a new Soudi African nation- 
ality grow up, which will first blend Dutch and British 
into one people, and in process of time exercise an 
attractive mfluence upon the temtones adjoming, vdien 
they too have filled up with a vriiite population drawn 
ficom their respective mother-countnes, and have 
evolved a sqiarate life of their own* J£ German S*W. 
Africa is not subjected to the South African Common- 
wealdi now as a conquered province, she is more dian 
likely to join the Federation, vdien she is ripe for self- 
government, as an independent member of her own 
free win, and so enridi the new nationality by adding a 
German strain to the Dutdi and Engli^ ba^« When 
diis happoasp the Soudi African federal state wiU take its 
place by the side of Great Britam on the one hand and 



Germany on the other as a separate political tinit^ 
absolved £rom the control of either, but inheriting the 
tradition of cordial relations with each, and will become 
the strongest bond of good understanding between them 
instead of the bitterest cause of dissention* 

The case of the other German possessions in Africa is 
sinq>ler« They are not ** white men's countries/' and 
do not adjoin any great self-governing member of the 
ftitish Empire, whose policy and interest must be con- 
sidered as well as our own : they all lie within the 
tropical belt, and like most European protectorates in 
those latitudes, profit their owner, if at all, as fields for 
enterprise, sources for raw products, and markets for 
manufactures^ Towards these too we may be tempttd 
to stretch out a grasping hand. ** They do not even pay 
their way,'' people wiU declare ; "" and she has not learnt 
the secret of governing natives : it would save Germany's 
pocket and her African subjects' hides, if we took over 
the business instead of her* Perhaps Togoland and 
Kamertm might be passed over; every country in 
Europe, after all, has some little claim staked out on the 
West African coast, and they are hardly worth picking 
op : but German East Africa is another question ; and 
think how satisfactory it wiU be to obtain an * all-^red 
route ' for the Cape-to-Cairo Railway*" 

Here we see the cloven hoof, and it is sufficient to 
answer that the profit and loss of Germany's African 
possessions is emphatically her afiEair not ours, that the 
skill to govern native races is only acquired by experience 
(we ourselves, for instance, bltmdered into our present 
more or less satisfactory Crown Colony system through 
an unhampered century of experiments in misgovern* 
ment), while the all-red route, even if it ootild be 
achieved without alienating Germany (and it would 


be out of all proportion to obtain it at the cost of 
the alternative), actually presupposes the continuance 
of that national ants^onism which it is our object to 
abolish* Not the monopoly of the chief trunk railway 
of the African continent, but the co-operation of all 
interested parties in its construction and utilisation, 
will open die way to the international entente we hope 
to call into being* 

The most serious claim to German East Africa might 
be lodged by the Indian Empire* The population of 
India is sufifering from congestion at least as acutely as 
that of Germany, and the East African coast that f^oes 
India across the Arabian Sea, offers the obvious field for 
her expansion* There has indeed been an attempt to 
convert into a ** white man^s cotmtry ** the highlands 
that, both in the German and in the English territory, 
intervene between the coast and the great lakes ; but 
the experiment seems to be in process of breaking down 
in both provinces* India, then, might conceivably ask, 
as a reward for her loyal aid in the present war, that 
both British and German East Africa should be assigned 
to her as a specifically Indian colonial area* 

This, however, is asking for more than is in our 
power to grant* We shall be ill-advised if we do not in 
future offer the Indian citizens of our empire the most 
favourable openings we can, at least in regions whose 
climate renders them pre-eminently suitable for Indian 
immigration, like our own East African protectorate* 
We hope that our German neighbours on that coast will 
do the same, and we might even point out to them that 
the introduction of a civilised Indian population into a 
cotmtry where there is little question of their coming 
into competition with white settlers, will enormously 
increase its economic productiveness, which is its para* 


nouiit asset to the white nation to which it belongs* 
Moreover^ British government in India is building for 
the Future an immensely powerful Indian nation ; and 
the exclusion of Indians from this territory would 
involve Germany in the same conflict that already 
threatens Canada and the U*S«A*, unless they modify 
their poUcy in the meanwhile* But we must let our 
action rest at that* The problem of Asiatic expansion 
must be met primarily by every state concerned on its 
own account* It is probable that they will find the 
difficulty of its solution so great that they will organise 
in time some international authority to co-ordinate their 
policy on this question, and voluntarily submit them- 
selves to its direction ; but the solution cannot possibly 
be furthered by pressture of one individual state upon 
another, exercised as the result of a victorious war* 

Germany has another group of possessions in the 
Pacific, and perhaps here she cannot succeed in coming 
out of the war unscathed* Her Pacific territories have 
little value as areas for settlement or commerce* 
Kaiser-Wilhelmsland in New Guinea is the only one 
of any extent ; several archipelagoes of small islands 
only useful as coaling stations, and the notorious 
fortress of Kiao-Qiao, planted like a piratical strong- 
hold on the Chinese peninsula of Shantung, constitute 
the remainder* They are not so much an Empire in 
themselves as a strategical framework laid down for a 
future empire of indefinite extent, and as such have 
caused considerable uneasiness to the maritime states 
in this part of the Pacific, especially to Japan our ally, 
and to Australia and New Zealand, two self'^veming 
members of our empire* The anticipations of these 
nations with regard to Germany^s designs are revealed 
by the tntrgy with which they proceeded to attack 


these positions as soon as war broke out. New 
Zealand struck at Samoa, Australia at Neu-Ponunem, 
Kaiser-Wilhelmsland, and the Solomon islands, while 
Japan undertook the severest task in the reduction of 
Kiao-Giao. Japan will emerge from the war in posses- 
sion of the latter place, and she has handed over the 
Caroline and Marshall Islands, which she occupied in 
the course of her operations, not to ourselves but to our 
two Pacific Commonwealths. 

The disposition of Germany's Pacific dependencies 
will therefore not come into our hands at alL We may 
ensure that Japan keeps to her declared intention of 
consigning Kiao-Chao to its ultimate owner China, by 
ofiTering to resign simultaneously Wei-hai-wei on the 
other coast of Shantung, which we only leased as an 
ofSset to Germany's coup in seizing Kiao-Chao; but 
in any event Kiao-Chao will not pass back into 
Germany's possession, and it is most unlikely that any 
of the other territories in question will be relinquished 
by their respective holders. Certainly Great Britain 
has no authoritative power to procure dieir retrocession 
to Germany, even did she desire it, and there is after 
all no reason why we should deplore Germany's loss 
of them. It will involve no corresponding loss to 
her industrial and commercial prosperity, a German 
interest that we mean scrupulously to respect and if 
possible to promote, but will only cripple her design of a 
militaristic world-empire, a German interest that we 
intend, in self-defence, to remove from the sphere of 
practical politics. 

Great Britain's true policy, then, is to allow Germany 
to retain all openings for peaceable, as opposed to 
forcible, expansion afforded her by her oversea 
dominions as they existed before this war broke out. 


and we shall have a particularly free hand in die 
decision of diis question, because the command of the 
sea, and the world-wide naval operations it makes 
possible, fall almost entirely within our province, and 
not within that of our European allies* We must 
furthermore give just as great facilities as before to 
German immigration through all the vast portions of 
our empire that are still only in process of being opened 
up and settled, and we must urge our allies to adopt 
the same principle with regard to the territories in a 
similar phase of development which acknowledge their 
sovereignty. We must also respect the concessions 
which German enterprise has secured for its capital, 
with such fine initiative and perseverance, in neutral 
oountries of backward growth* We shaU find instances, 
similar to the coaling stations in the Pacific, where 
professedly economic concerns have an essentially 
political intention — certain sections of the projected 
B agdad railway occur at once to our minds — ^and here 
we may be compelled to reqtiire Germany to abandon 
her title; but we must confine such demands to a 
minimum* Both we and our allies must take care that 
neither political panic nor economic greed induces us 
to carry them to excess, and in every case where we 
decide to make them, we must give Germany the 
opportunity of acquiring, in compensation, more than 
their equivalent in economic value* 

If we meet Germany in this spirit, she will at least 
emei^ from the war no more cramped and constricted 
dian she entered it* This will not, of cotuse, satisfy her 
ambitions, for they were evil ambitions, and could not 
be satisfied without the world's ruin ; but it will surely 
allay her fears* She will have seen that we had it in 
our power to mutilate her all rotmd and cripple her 


utterly, and that we held our hand. Once her fear is 
banished, we can proceed to conjure away her envy : for 
to leave her what she has already would prepare the 
ground for an invitation to join us in organising some 
standing international authority that should continuously 
adjust the claims of all growing nations, Germany among 
the rest, by reasonable methods of compromise, and so 
provide openings for the respective expansion of their 
wealth and population* 

Such an international oi^an would replace the struggle 
for existence between nations, in which each tries to 
snatch his neighbour's last crust, by a co-operation in 
which all would work together for a common end; 
but many tangled problems strew the ground in front 
of us, before we can clear it for such a construction. 
The national foundations of Europe must first be relaid ; 
and just as in the question of territories over sea the 
decisive word will lie with ourselves, so in the case of 
European frontiers it will lie with otu: allies, because 
the war on land is their province and because the 
national problems at issue affect them even more 
directly than us* 

This does not absolve us from the duty of probing 
these problems to their bottom : rather it makes it the 
more imperative that we should do so, inasmuch as 
our influence upon their solution will depend principally 
on the impartiality of our point of view and die reason- 
ableness of our suggestions, and very litde on any power 
of making our will prevail by mere intransigeance, 
or by the plea of paramount interests* Great Britain 
ought to come to the conference with very definite 
opinions about the details of these problems, even at the 
risk of annoying her allies by the appearance of meddling 
with what is less her business than theirs* The Allies 


have proclaimed to the world that they will wage this 
war to its conclusion in concert, and that declaration 
will not be difficult for them to observe : but they have 
also implied that they will negotiate in concert the terms 
of peace, and it is here that the separateness of their 
positive interests, beyond the negative bond of self- 
preservation, will be in danger of manifesting itself* 
They have morally pledged themselves to a settlement 
that shall subordinate their several, and even their collec- 
tive, interests to the general interests of the civilised 
world, and it is on this grotmd that they have claimed 
the sympathy of neutrals in the struggle with their 
opponents* To fulfil their promise, they will need all 
the wisdom, patience and disinterestedness that they 
can oommand; and the supreme value of Great Britain^s 
voice will lie in the proposal of formulas calculated to 
reconcile the views of the Allies with each other and also 
with the relatively impartial standpoint of the non- 
nationalistic element that happily obtains some footing 
in all countries and in all strata of society* 

The solutions we o£Fer, then, for the national problems 
of Europe must not be conceived as demands which it 
is in Great Britain^s vital interest to propound and 
in her absolute power to enforce, but rather as sug- 
gestions compatible with British interests, and capable 
of acceptance by otu: allies* The satisfaction of all 
parties on whom their translation into fact will depend, 
is, however, only a negative condition : they must 
further be governed by the positive aim of dealing im- 
partial justice to ourselves, otu: friends and our enemies 
alike* We must follow the principle that a "' dis- 
interested ** policy ultimately serves the truest interest 
of its authors* 

The first problem that confronts us is that of the alien 


nationalities included against their will within the 
present frontiers of the German Empire* The settle- 
ment after this war must bring justice to these popula- 
tions by affording them an opportunity for choosing 
freely whether they will maintain their connection with 
Germany or no, and if not, what destiny they prefer* 
When we have estimated the probable results of their 
choice, we may proceed to consider what the effect is 
likely to be on German public opinion, and look for 
some means of cancelling the bitterness which cannot 
fail to be aroused in some degree* But this is essentially 
a secondary consideration* We have accepted the 
principle that the recognition of nationality is the 
necessary foundation for European peace ; and peace 
is endangered far more by the unjust violation of the 
national idea than by the resentment due to the just 
reversal of the injustice, even if the wrongdoer be the 
most potent factor in Europe and his victim the most 
insignificant* We will proceed, therefore, to consider 
in turn the national problems within the German 
Empire on their own merits* 

B* The French Frontier 

The question of Alsace-Lorraine is insoluble S 
it is treated as a controversy between France and 
Germany* ** This land,"' the Germans will say, " has 
legally remained German soil ever since Karl the Great 
divided his empire between his three sons* It is true 
that the French annexed it by a series of conquests in 
the 17th and i8th centuries, but the German speech of 
the major part of its inhabitants is a living proof of its 
true ownership*^' 

** Granted,'' the French will reply, ** that we won 


our title by oonquestt yet its recognition by innumerable 
German governments in inntmierable treaties gave it a 
validity at least as great as that inherent in Qiarletnagne^s 
testament, before you wrenched it from us again by no 
other right than a conquest of precisely the same char- 
acter. If your present daims rest on ancient history, 
why did you still leave us half Lorraine in 1871, for you 
had no worse a tide to it than to the half you took i 
You left it because you knew you could not hope to hold 
down by force so large a territory as that« No, force 
is your sole tide now, as you say it was ours before, and 
the moment has come for our revenge/^ 

The two nations have bandied historical arguments 
like these for forty*three years, without approaching 
any nearer to a conclusion, because their pleas, though 
mosdy correct in fact, are none of them relevant to the 
sttuatkm* The question, indeed, only a£Fects France 
and Germany in a secondary degree : the parties 
primarily concerned are the inhabitants of the disputed 
territory themselves, and their present will is the only 
solution* But the autocratic regime on the Prussian 
model, established in the ** Reichsland ** since its cession 
to the German Empire, has assiduously suppressed any 
attempts on the part of that will to declare itself, and 
our first business, once this pressure is removed, will be 
to oi^anise some machinery for ascertaining what the 
people^s will may be« 

We must, in fact, insist that a plebiscite be taken 
throughout the Reichsland* Many people will treat 
this proposal with cynicism : ** A plebisdte,^^ they will 
say, ** invariably confirms the desire of the authority 
tkit conducts it* A vote taken under the auspices of the 
Allies would as certainly decide for union with France, 
at one taken by the German regime before the war 


would have declared for adhesion to the German 

This, however, assumes a sinister intention, when the 
presupposition of the proposal is the desire on our part 
to deal justice to all nationalities and a behef that it is 
our interest to do so ; and it is clear that we are capable 
of honestly conducting a plebiscite, if we will. A 
more valid objection would be that, however honest our 
conduct, our opponents would never credit the fact if 
the result issued to our advantage and to their dis- 
advantage, so that even the reality of free dioice by die 
voters would not modify the resentment of their former 
masters. The remedy for this would be that the 
victorious party should evacuate the districts in dispute 
altogether, and hand over the oi^anisation of the voting 
U> some neutral power. It might even then be objected 
that the forgoing decision of the war would necessarily 
influence the decision of the vote, and this is probably 
true ; but it will certainly not influence it automatically 
in favour of the conquerors. All sorts of events, isolated 
incidents of the war itself and the varied memories of 
half a century before it, will affect the voters' judgment 
more than the total sum of past history drawn by the 
war's issue : in fact, this issue will be only one ai many 
stimuli to the complicated motives that viJl go to make 
up the final desire of the voting population. 

A plebiscite, then, need neither be an unreality to the 
voters nor seem so to the parties interested ; and just 
as the will of the former is more important than that of 
the latter, so the moral effect upon the voters themselves 
of its true declaration is especially valuable. The great 
merit <si the plebiscite is that it saves populations from 
being consigned like cattle from pen to pen, a treatment 
the more intolerable in proportion to the civilisation 


of the people that sufifer it, and little calculated, as the 
case of the ** Reichsland *' itself has proved, to conciliate 
them to the nationality with which they are thus 
arbitrarily yoked* 

The mere taking of a plebiscite will always go far 
towards easing the situation : the real difficulty lies in 
determining the practical method on which it is to be 
conducted* Clearly the result will differ according to 
the' size of the minimum unit within which a separate 
poll is taken. If the votes of the whole population of 
the Reichsland were polled, for instance, they would 
probably produce a balance in favour of the reunion of 
the whole unit with France, while at the same time a 
smaller unit or units could have been detached from the 
wbcie, which with almost equal certainty would have 
declared for standing by Germany. But it is obviously 
unjust that units capable of being separated out geo- 
graphically and possessed of a local consciousness of 
thdr own, should be denied the esqpression of their will 
by artificial inclusion in a larger but inoi^anic mass. 
The most important preliminary, therefore, to the taking 
of a plebiscite is the definition of such minimitm areas, 
and it is here that the impartial application of as much 
objective knowledge as we can muster is most essential* 
Many of the following pages are occupied by tentative 
experiments in this direction* 

The Reichsland ^ is shaped like a T-sqtiare with its 
angle pointing North-East, and its two arms are sharply 
divided by the barrier of the Vosges** The Western 
ann stretches across the gap between the Vosges and 
the Ardennes, and forms the transition between the 

* Tbe total pofmlation was ifii$/xio in 1905, the Gcnnaii-speaktiig 
dcfncnt oonstitutitig 85 per cent, of the whole* 
•Sec Map L 


plains of Northern France on the one hand and the 
Prussian Rhineland on the other. 

This district includes both French and German- 
speaking populations, and a line drawn diagonally 
aooss it from North -West to South -East, and 
rot^^y coinciding with the watershed between the 
Seille and the Saar, would indicate the boundary 
between the two elements. It is certain that die 
French-speaking section of the district^ would vote 
unanimously for reunion with France, while the German- 
speaking section, on the other hand, seems either never to 
have felt, or easily to have lost, pohtical sympathy with 
France, and to have become conscious now of solidarity 
with its Northern neighbours of the same speedi, 
further down the Saar and the Moselle. The areas 
respectively inhabited by the populations in question 
form compact blocks adjoining the countries with which 
each is hkely to seek union, and the boundary between 
them follows a line quite suitable for a military and 
political frontier. Clearly, therefore, these areas present 
two natural units within ^lich the vote shoidd be 
taken separately, and the result of the polling should 
decide definitively the fate of each. 

The town and distria of ThionviUe (Diedenhofen) 
ot^t perhaps to vote by itself, because here the 
population is mixed and the decision correspondingly 
doubtful, while its geographical situation would equally 
permit its inclusion in either country. It is probable 
that it will vote for the connection with France, and 
this will certainly be the case with Metz, the great 
fortress of purely Frendi population, at the junction of 
the Seille and die Moselle ; with dl the villages and 
townships of the Seille basin itself; and with the 
■ About 15% of the total population of the whole Retdnland. 



tippet valley of the Saar, as far North as^ and including, 
Saarbourg. The rest of the district is almost equally 
certain to remain with Germany* 

In the Western arm of the Reichsland, then, the 
solution is fairly simple, but the Southern wing pre- 
sents more difficult problems. This district, once the 
province of Alsace, consists firstly of a lox^ strip rutming 
North and South, bounded on the West by the summit of 
the Vo^es, and sloping down on the East to the left 
bank of the Rhine, and secondly of two passes, leading 
through the Vosges, towards their Northern end, into 
that Western arm of the Reichsland with which we have 
already dealt* The more Southerly pass is commanded 
by Zabem at its Eastern exit and Phalsbourg at its 
Western, and is traversed by a railway and a canal, 
connecting Strasbourg near the Rhine with Saarbourg 
on the upper Saar, and ultimately with Lunelle, 
Nancy and Toul : the Northerly pass carries a railway 
from H^enau in the Rhine basin through Bitsch to 

The speech of this entire district, except for a few 
communes high up in the Vosges, is German ; but the 
sympathies of the population have remained persistently 
alienated from the German Empire. This does not 
necessarily mean that the Alsatians desire reincorporation 
in the French nation ; there remains the alternative of 
cutting their connection with France and Germany alike, 
and during the last forty-three years there has been a 
considerable party in the country which favoured such 
a programme, pointii^ out that Alsace has suffered from 
the quarrel between the big political units on either 
side of her out of all proportion to her own local stake 
in the issue* 

It is by no means certain, however, that they are 


imconqiromtsu^y detennmed to break loose from their 
present ttnion with Germany. The notorious incident 
that occurred at Zabern less than a year ago, advertised 
the fact that Prussian military government was intoler- 
^le, and that, so long as Alsace was subject to it, the 
grant of constitutional self-government would remain 
an empty formality ; but it might well become a reality 
as a result of this war, and if Alsace had the opportunity 
of entering the German Empire as an independent 
member on an equal footing with the other states, still 
more if she could enter it as part of a united Soutii 
German state, strot^ enough to hold its own within 
the Empire against the Nordi, there is strong reason to 
expect that the bond of common speech would assert 
itxlf, and attract her strongly to her Soudi German 
brethren only parted &om her by the Rhine.^ 

On the other hand the crescendo and culmination 
of Prussian brutality may have alienated Alsace from 
Germany altogether, and made her feel that her salvation 
lies neither in a problematical reform of the German 
Empire's internal oi^ianisation, which she would have 
little influence in promoting, nor in a precarious 
autonomy, i^ch she could never defend by her own 
resources, but solely in placing herself once more imder 
the aegis of France, ^ere the gratification afforded by 
her choice would ensure her a peculiarly benevolent 

liie decision, then, of Alsace, or in other words her 
nationality, is quite unpredictable, and the question of 
method in oiganising the plebiscite accordingly assumes 
here a special importance. It is clear, in the first place, 

' EcDnomia, as well as Ungtugc, dnw Aliacx towards Gennany ; 
ail ihe maikets tot bcr manufactuies lie down the Rhine, none of ihaa 
Wcsi of the Vo^cs. 



that the probable decision of North-Eastern Lorraine 
to remain within Germany would incidentally decide 
the £ate of the northenmiost strip of Alsace adjoining 
it on the East* If Saai^emund continued German, it 
would not be feasible either from the military or from 
the economic point of view that the railway connecting 
it with the Rhine valley should become French, so that 
if the rectified frontier of Germany crossed the Saar 
not far North of Saarbourg, it would have to include 
at least Weissenburg, Hs^enau and Bisdiweiler on its 
way to the Rhine* The small minority of population 
inhabiting this strip would thus inevitably staffer the 
loss of their freedom of choice ; but the rest of Alsace, 
that is, the Southerly pass and the whole country South 
of it between the Vosges and the Rhine, would still 
dedde its own fate* 

The crucial question next arises : What tmits of voting 
should be adopted in this area i Seeing that the decision 
is so delicately balanced, it might be argued that the 
units should be as small and numerous as possible, 
and that every commune should be allowed to make its 
own choice* Such a procedure, however, would in- 
volve us in difficulties* Suppose Phalsbourg voted, like 
Saa^emOnd, for Germany, while all the other com- 
munes voted for France, it would be impossible 
to give Phabbourg its way, because its fulfilment 
would drive a German wedge across the extremely 
important railway and canal connecting French Saar^ 
bourg with French Strasbourg ; or again, suppose that, 
^idiile Strasbourg voted for France, Colmar and 
Mulhausen voted for Germany, it would be geo- 
graphically impossible to link both groups with their 
diosen fa^erlands* In fact, Alsace itself is a minimum 
unit* There are no suitable lines for a frontier to follow 


between the Vosges and the Rhine, or between Phals- 
bourg, Strasbotu^ and Mulhauaen ; so that, if we take 
the pldnsdte by fragments of the district, we shall be 
compelled seriously to tamper with its mult in order 
to reduce it to a workable shape, and so nullify the voting 
to the discontent of all parties. It is worse than useless 
to take a vote unless it is meant to be definitive, and the 
disappcuntment of a single large minority is a lesser 
evil ^lan the disillusionment of many sm^ majorities. 
Alsace, then, within the limits defined, must vote as 
a single umt. We cannot foretell how the decision will 
go, and the importance of the result, both for France 
and Germany, is momentous. Only one thing is 
certain, that die accession of Alsace would profit either 
country little, unless it were compassed by the desire 
and the initiative of Alsace herself. 

C. The Danish Frontier 

The question of Schleswig-Holstein > has not yet 
been opened by this war, but we must not for that 
reason neglect it, for the seeds of future war are there. 
When the German Confederarion fought Denmai^ on 
this account in 1864, the two provinces had long been 
united tmder the Danish Crown, and the prize of victwy 
was their cession as a single tinit to the conquerors ; 
but the situation before the war, and the settlement 
after it, were alike unjust, because this political unity 
has neither a national nor a gec^rapbical foundation. 
It was monstrous that the whole territory should be in 
Denmark's hands, fcff 85% of the total population 'is 
Gertnan ; but it is equ^y outrageous that the Danirii 
minority of 15% should have been violently wrenched 
' See map on opposite page. * Total population 1,504,000 in igoo. 





away firom their national state* The problem should 
DOW be solved by allowing either province to go its 
own way* 

Holstein belongs entirely to Germany^ by nationality, 
gec^raphy, and tradition* No Danish is spoken within 
its limits ; it flanks the Right bank of the Elbe estuary 
bek>w Hambu^ ; it contains the whole course of the 
Kiel Canal, a vital artery of Germany's commerce that 
gives her the necessary direct connection between 
the Baltic and the North Sea; and even while 
actually under Danish control, it always formed a 
juridical part, first of the ** Holy Roman Empire ** 
and then of the ** German Confederation/' throt^h the 
darkest days of Germany's political history* To sever 
the connection of this province with Germany is un- 

Schleswig, on the other hand, is predominantly 
Danish in speech, and the plebiscite will almost certainly 
show that the whole province (for it is one of those 
minimum units that are not susceptible of sub-divi- 
sion) is Danish in national sentiment* Geographically, 
moreover, its links are as strong with the Jutland 
peninsula as are those of Holstein with the German 
continent, and the present Dano-German frontier is as 
unnatural and meaningless a line as is the South-East 
boundary of Holstein against Hamburg, Lubeck and 
Mecklenburg* The true frontier of Germany and 
Denmark does not lie at either extremity of the two 
provinces, but between them* In sketching it, we 
must compromise between racial distribution and 
geographical necessity* The presumption in favour of 
an existing line would suggest that we should simply 
fdlow the historical boundary between Schles#ig 
and Holstein, but unfortunately the Kiel Ship Canal 


coincides with this along its Eastern section, and both 
banlcs of the Canal must clearly remain within German 
territory ; so that while still taking the estuary of the 
Eider as the Western terminus of the frontier, we must 
draw its Eastward course further North, and bring it to 
the Baltic at the head of Eckemfdrde Bay, instead of the 
left shore of Kiel Haven. 

This hne, though it leaves to Germany a slice of 
Schleswig in addition to all Holstein, which is in itself 
by far the more populous and important of the two 
provinces, still assigns to Denmark a small German- 
speakii^ area, including the towns of Schleswig and 
Flensburg, which cannot be detached ftom the Danisfa- 
speakit^ unit.^ The sympathies of this tiny minority 
will be revealed by the plebiscite. Probably the factor 
of language will be outweighed by historiotl tradtttoa 
and by the rigour of Prussian admuiistration, for which 
the German nationality of the Prussian state, in which 
Schleswig has been forcibly incorporated, is only a 
theoretical compensation; but even if these German- 
speaking Scbleswigers would prefer to remain within a 
reconstituted Germany, they are one of those minorities 
that must inevitably be sacrificed * to the exigencies 
of get^aphical facts, for there is no natural, physical 
frontier to be found that corresponds more closely than 
the Eider-line to the actual frontier of speech. 

In detail, then, and it is better to descend to detail, 
for concreteness* sake, the new frontier should probably 
run as follows : starting from the head of EckemfSrde 
Bay, so as to assign the town of Schleswig to Denmarit 
but to leave Eckemfdrde to Germany, it should make a 

' With ig,ooo and 49/xx> iohabiunts respectively. 
' Without prejudice to a possible guarantee, on the part of Europe, 
of thdf natioaal culture and individuality. 







It ootifse for Suderstapel on the North bank of the 
r, and follow the river the rest of the way to its 
on the North Sea* 

D. The Polish Frontier 

is yet a third alien nationality in Germanyt 

^les, and, judging by numbers at least, the Polish 

lem is the most serious of all* There are over three 

Poles within Germany's Eastern frontier* What 

national desire of this important population i 

situation in German Poland is different from 
in Schleswig and Alsace-Lorraine* There is no 
ident national state across the frontier for the 
jected fraction of the race to join upon liberation : 
whole nation is partitioned between three empires, 
ly, Austria and Russia* The peaceful main- 
of the statm quo in Europe meant for the Poles 
(perpetuation of this calamity for an indefinite period, 
ips for ever* The outbreak of war, the common 
of their taskmasters, kindled for them a glimmer 
The war brought offers of better treatment for 
future from all three parties* In such an evenly 
struggle the decisive adhesion of the whole 
nation to one side or die other became of im- 
ice, especially as their country was fated to be the 
a of hostihties* 
(fr) It brought them, however, no expectation of 
»lele independence* Their oppressors are divided 
die two camps, and the victorious party, which- 
way victory declares itself, will certainly not relin<* 
its hold upon territory already in its possessicm 
the war began. 


(c) The Poles' possible gain from the war amounts, 
therefore, to the creation of a united national state, enjoy- 
ing internal autonomy, but incorporated in a la^er 
political organisation. Any of the three powers wotitd 
be williag, if the opportunity arrived, to make concessions 
to the Poles already subjea to it, in order to attract 
within its frontier upon the same terms the remaining 
sections of the nation. 

The Poles, then, can make a bargain on much the 
same lines with either group. We have now to consider 
which group is in a position to negotiate most favourably 
with them. 

Our ally Russia is the traditional enemy of the Polish 
nation. The two peoples have been rival leaders of 
die Slavonic world. Poland drew her culture from the 
Latin West, and her peasantry remained staunch to the 
Catholic Church ^ during the crisis of the Reformation : 
Russia took upon herself the inheritance of the Byzan- 
tine Empire, Since 1814 more than half Poland's 
territory and population, including the national capital, 
Warsaw, has been incorporated in the Russian &npire. 
Accordingly, the national revolts of 1831 and 1863 
were directed primarily, and in effect solely, against 
Russian rule, and in the concerted repression which they 
provoked from the three powers, the Russian govern- 
ment has taken the lead. The most cruel symbol of 
Poland's humiliation is the flaunting Orthodox Cathedral 
planted in the chief public square of Warsaw. 

The bitter hatred Russia had incurred from the Poles 
was an opportunity for Russia's enemies. Austria, 
realising that some day she would be drawn into a 
life-and-death struggle with Russia over the question 
of the Balkans, was clever enough to seize it. 
' The hittofy of Poland and Ireland hai been parallel in many pamt>. 


The Hapsburg Empire, with its medley of races, 
oottld never convert itself into a ** uninational " state, of 
the type to which nineteenth-century Europe was con- 
fionmng : its true policy was to become a ** happy 
hmStf,** in which various nationalities should live and 
let live side by sidt. When the disasters of z866 forced 
internal reconstruction upon the government at Vienna^ 
it miserably failed, on the whole, to realise this ideal : ^ 
only in the case of its Polish subjects did it carry its new 
policy to completion* In 1869 the province of Galida, 
Austria's share in the Polish spoils, was granted a fsu> 
reaching measure of Home Rtile, and Polish was declared 
the normal lat^fuage of its administration and higher 

These concessions* have made the Poles the most 
byal citizens of the Empire* The Polish ** dub ** or 
parliamentary block has practically become the ** govern- 
ment party ** in the Austrian Reichsrath, on which the 
ministry can always rely for the voting of supplies and 
die passing of army bills. The Austrian Poles have not, 
of course, abandoned the dream of national reunion, 
but diey have learnt to seek it under the Hapsburg 
banner, and their propaganda in the Rtissian provinces 
serves Austrian foreign policy at least as much as the 
cause of Polish nationalism* When the Russians 
occupied Galida towards the beginning of the war, the 
Polish population rose en masse against the invaders* 
Their own experience will never commend to them the 
diange from Austrian to Russian allegiance* The only 

* See ch. m. 

* It nmi be mcntioiied that this recognition of the Pdtah language 
m Galkta Ut not only Gennan, which was fonnerly the univtnal 
taoguap of official btaincs in the province, though it was only sp^en 
b^ an magntficant piopoction of the population^ hut also the Rudicac 
dalect of Ruanan, the native speech of nearly half the ' ' ' ' 
Set Ch. Vm* C 


£actor that may modify their feeling is the Polish poliqr 
of Austria's German ally* 

Prussia, too, found her interest in fomenting the 
enmity between Russian and Pole, but since, till the 
last generation of the nineteenth-centiury, she was still 
Austria's rival and had not yet become her ally, she 
worked for the same object by supportix^ the opposite 
party* She consistently played second fiddle to Russia 
in the Polish concert, and at the same time contrived 
to call the tune* Prussian diplomacy at Petersbu^ 
thwarted all attempts at a Russo-Polish reconciliation, 
and then the Prussian military authorities lent a helpii^ 
hand to the Russian government across the frontier to 
suppress those insurrections which the breakdown of 
oondliadbn had stimulated* By their machiavellian 
handling of the Polish situation, the Prussians secured 
that their Russian ne^bour should have neither the 
will nor the power to menace themselves* 

In 1879, however, the German Empire transferred its 
alliance from Russia to Austria, and the counter-alliance 
between Russia and France, finally consummated in the 
'nineties, made the breach irreparable* Yet while she 
thus reversed her foreign policy, Germany entirely 
omitted to correct her behaviour towards the Poles at 
home, so as to bring it into line with that of her new 
Austrian ally* Instead, she succumbed to the obsession 
of nationalism, and began to chastise her Poles with 
scorpions instead of whips* 

In z888 the Prussian parliament established an 
'^ Ansiedelungs-kommission " (Q>bnisation Board) for 
buying up the land of Polish proprietors in the provinces 
of Posen and West Prussia and plantit^; German setders 
upon it* In 1908 the Board was even granted powers 
of compulsory expropriation* Since 1872 pressure of 


the most eztxeme kind^ has been exerted to make 
German instead of Polish the medium of instruction, 
not only in h^er education, but in the local elementary 
sdiools* In fact, the whole Prussian administrative 
machine has been brought to bear against Polish 
nationality within the German Empire, and in this case 
its efficiency has been Germany^s misfortune* Russia's 
intentions towards the Poles may have been equally 
amister, but she lacked the means to carry them into 
effect, and national sentiments are determined less by 
motives than by results* Germany has robbed Russia 
of the premier place in Poland's hatred. Her Polish 
policy since 1871 has been as unintelligent as it was 
astute during the fifty years preceding* She has called 
down upon her head the enmity of both Poles and 
Russians at once* 

At the outbreak of war, then, the Polish national con- 
sciousness hated the three powers in the following 
order of intensity: Austria, Russia, Germany* It 
remains to be seen whether the strong preference for 
Austria over Russia will be outweighed by the extreme 
detestation of Austria's German partner* 

Several factors make it probable that this will happen* 
Jn the first place there are the events of the war* The 
war has already made it patent to the world that 
Germany is the dominant partner in the alliance, and 
Austria merely her tool* If, therefore, the Central- 
European powers win the war, it will be Germany's and 
not Austria's policy that will be imposed upon Europe 
in general and Pbland in particular* Meanwhile, the 
Germans have shown beyond all doubt what that policy 
win be* They began, of course, like the other two 
powers, by proclaiming the tmity and autonomy of the 

^ Not stopping short of corporal punishment* 


Polish nation ; but i^en they crossed the frontier to 
make their word good, they dealt with the Polish sub- 
jects of Russia, the nation's central core, not as friends 
to be liberated but as a hostile poptdation to be terrorised* 
The treatment of the frontier town of Kalisch was on a 
par with the worst incidents in Belgium* Warsaw has 
been shuddering ever since at the possibility of the same 
fate overtaking her, and there has been something like 
a national rising of the country people against the German 
troops in occupation. Poles and Russians seem in 
process of being fused together in feeling by the fire 
of a common hate* They are stimtdated now by the 
instinct to defend their united cotmtry against the 
invader, but when the Russian armies cross the frontier 
in turn, both the Polish and the Russian soldiers that 
march in their ranks will respond alike to the ** Panslav " 
impulse of rescuing the Polish minority in Prussia &om 
the jaws of Pangermanism* 

If, then, we and our allies are victorious, the erection 
of an autonomous Poland within the Russian Empire is 
almost assured, and it will include not only the former 
subjects of Russia but the Polish victims of Prussia as 
well* This will come about not so much in virtue of 
the Grand Duke's proclamation, which tmder other 
circumstances might well have left the Poles cold, but 
becatise Germany's behaviour has put the Poles in a 
mood to respond warmly to her opponent's overtures, 
and to compromise with Russia in a spirit of ** give and 
take*" The chief obstacle to an entente between Poles 
and Russians was the memory of wrongs inflicted by 
Russia in the past* These memories will be eclipsed 
efifectively by the direct action of Germany in the 

There is also the permanent factor of Geography. 


The Russian provinces by their central position and their 
great superiority in eactent to the Prussian and Austrian 
fragments, are die necessary nucleus of a united natioiial 
state. The same cause that made the Poles single out 
Russia for attack when they hoped to restore their nation 
to complete independence, will make them rally rotmd 
Russia now that they have accepted the principle of 
autonomy within a larger Empire* The victory of our 
enemies would certainly ensure to the Austrian section 
of the nation the hberties it already enjoys ; but in 
promoting such an issue, the Galidan Poles would be 
sacrificing the one chance of national tmity to the 
preservation of their local Home Rule* 

In making her bargain with the Poles, Russia has the 
supreme advantage of being one and indivisible, while 
on the other side there are the ambitions of two parties 
to be satisfied* Whatever their professions, or even 
their wishes, Germany and Austria cotdd never arrange 
between them the erection of a tmited Poland* 

The retmion of the whole nation within the frontier of 
either one or the other is clearly out of the question, for 
neither would surrender its own Polish provinces to its 
ne^^ibour* A second possibility wotdd be the creation 
of an autonomous Poland under their joint protectorate, 
to which they shotdd cede their respective Polish terri- 
tories* But though the Galidan Poles are perhaps a 
strong enough power in Austria to compel assent to their 
secfssion into the new national state, it is hardly con- 
ceivable that Prussia would of her own free will relax 
her grip upon her Polish districts* The German and 
Mish poptUations on her Eastern frontier are desperately 
intemiingled, and she still hopes to simplify the tangle 
by the forcible Germanisation of the aliens* Moreover, 
modi of the country in question is important, to her 


strategically* A Poland manufactured under Austio- 
German auspices would therefore be robbed from the 
outset of at least three million of its citizens, no less than 
17 per cent* of the whole nation ; and it is further pro- 
bable that the government at Vienna, in order to maintain 
the balance of power between itself and its ally, would 
insist upon following Prussia's example, and success- 
fully oppose the transference of the Galidan Poles 
from their Austrian allegiance to the autonomous 

In the event of Austro-German victory, therefore, the 
promises of national restoration would result in nothing 
but the grant of autonomy to the present Russian 
provinces, which include no more than three-fifths of the 
total Polish population* The new Poland would start 
life a cripple, and even this maimed esdstence would 
probably be short, for the situation thus created could 
hardly be permanent. The emergence of a self- 
governing Polish state in their immediate neighbourhood 
would rouse the nationalism of the Prussian and Austrian 
Poles to fever heat. They would be obsessed by resent- 
ment at their arbitrary exclusion from it, and the 
autonomous principality, in turn, could not ren:iain in- 
different to their struggles. Gratitude towards Austria 
and Germany, its Uberators from Russian rule and its 
official guarantors against the reimposition of it, would 
be eclipsed by indignation at these patrons' flagrantly 
inconsistent treatment of its brethren within their own 
borders. The national government at Warsaw would 
begin to bargain, behind its '" protectors' " backs, with 
defeated and chastened Russia for a genuine reunion of 
the whole nation tmder Russia's banner. Berlin and 
Vienna would get wind of the danger in time, and they 
would forestall it by partitioning the principality itself 


and adding its dismembered fragments to their subject 

Thus the failure to achieve national unity now would 
after all compromise the local liberty of the Galidan 
Poles in the future* Atistria^s Polish policy would be 
degraded to the Prussian standard, not merely in her 
dealings with the Poles formerly subject to Russia, but 
m her relations with her own Polish citizens* The ideal 
of Polish nationality would be shattered more cruelly 
than it has ever been since the black decade that foUowed 
the Partition of 1795, and this time it could hardly hope 
to recover* 

On the other hand, the victory of Russia achieved 
widi die Pbles' co-operation, wotild restore liberty and 
unity at once to all the Russian and Prussian districts,' 
and when such a lai^e majority of the nation had been 
consolidated into a self--goveming state, the reluctance 
of the Galidan minority to commit itself could be 
removed by a guarantee that it should forfeit none of its 
constitutional liberties* It would then succumb to the 
attraction of the greater mass, and fall away from Vieima, 
with which it has no latent cohesion, to the national 
centre of gravity at Warsaw* 

The positive terms on which the new Poland will be 
incorporated in the Russian Empire, must be the sub- 
ject of a later chapter*' For the moment we may be 
content with reaching the negative conclusion that, if 
Germany is beaten in the war, her Polish subjects will 

* The dfviwMi of spofls would probably follow the precedent of 1705, 
whea Poland was triatd, for ten years, from the map of Europe. Tbt 
Attitro-Pnissian frontier then delimited ran diagonally across Poland 
from Soutb-West to North-East, following the course of the River 
Pilfta^ and reducing Warsaw, the national capital, to the pontion of a 
Fkmsian frontier town* 

' A te fri to cy roughly cotnddent with Napoleon's ** Grand Duchy of 
it eiisted r 

Wanaw,** as it eiisted from 1809 to 1813. 
> See Ch. VIII. A. 


vote to a man for k'beration from her dominion, and will 
carry the Austrian Poles with them* It is one of the 
ironies of history that Gahda, the best governed pro- 
vince of Austria, should also be the province whose loss, 
in the event of defeat, we can most confidently predict* 
Austria will lose the reward for her righteousness in 
Galida, in retribution for her ally's sins in Posen and 
West Prussia* 

The exasperation of national feeling on this Eastern 
frontier makes it considerably easier to ascertain the will 
of the populations concerned than on the frontiers 
towards Denmark and France* We can assume, before 
any plebiscite is taken, that every Pole desires secession 
from Germany, and we must also keep it clearly before 
our minds that every German in the disputed zone will 
be still more eager to remain a citizen of the German 

In seeking to compromise between the wishes of the 
German and Polish inhabitants of these districts, we 
must not let ourselves be prejudiced by the atrocious 
policy of the Prussian government* A government's 
actions are no certain test of a nation's fundamental 
character: political systems come and go, and their 
ideals pass with them, while the nation's growth main- 
tains its even course* Let us foi^et, for the moment, 
how the Prussian administration has treated the Poles, 
and refrain from conjecturing how a nationalist Polish 
regime might treat any German subjects it acquired, 
but compare with open minds the relative culture of the 
individual German and Pole* We shall probably receive 
the impression that the German would suffer greater dis- 
advantage by being annexed to a community of Poles, 
whose standards wotild be lower than his own, than the 
Pole wotild suffer by enrohnent as a German dtizent 


wlitdi would be a kind of compulsory initiation into a 
superior civilisation* 

Of course compulsory conformity to an alien system 
of life, even if the compulsion does not extend beyond 
the sphere of politics, is almost equally distasteful, 
whether the people whose citizenship you have been 
forced to adopt are relatively more advanced than your- 
self or more backward ; but in the present instance we 
are in face of the situation that so commonly arises in 
questions of nationality : a minority must inevitably 

The German and Polish poptdations along this frontier 
are intricately interlaced* This is not due to the 
modem activities of the ** Q>lonisation Board "" : their 
result has been the stimulation of national feeling, not 
the modification of national distribution*^ The racial 
confusion is the gradual effect of four centuries, the 
twelfdi to the sixteenth, during which the superiority 
of German culture over Polish was so marked that 
German speech and nationality were continuously push- 
ing out their advance-guards Eastward at the Poles' 
txpense, less by violent conquest than by ** peaceful 
penetration '' at the summons of native Polish rulers* 
This movement died down as soon as the Poles began 
to overtake in civilisation their German teachers,* and 

X Dimng the genentioo stnoe the Board's institution, the percental^ 
ol the peculation in Prussian provinces containing both nationalities 
have p er sis t en tly shifted in favour of the Poles. Ine Poles' birthrate 
is much httjier than the Germans', and this gives diem a greater share 
in the tDtafannnal increase. A higher birthrate is, of course, vympto- 
mafic of a lower standard of life : ma sense the Germans are su£Fering 
for their superior civilisation, and this eicplains why they tolerate ^ 
bttiMfous methods by which the Prussian government attempts to 
riglit the balance* 

*Li the sixteentfa century the Polish nobility was converted to 
Calvudsni, and took a leadmg part in the cultural development of 
Enrope. In the next century the Polish renaissance was submerged 
by the Counter^Refbrmation* 


the ** Q>bnisation ^' policy is an unjustifiable and im- 
practicable attempt to set it going again by force ; but 
by whatever process the various German enclaves have 
come to be established on what was originally Polish soil, 
their sole but sufficient tide is their actual presence there 
now. In dealing with these awkward German minorities 
we must eschew all historical arguments, and simply 
start from the fact of their present existence* 

Besides the intermixture of the two nationalities, there 
is a further factor which limits the possibility of recti- 
fying the Eastern frontier of Germany in accordance 
with the wishes of the local population in the various 
districts affected* 

Our object in changing the poUtical map is to sift out 
as large a proportion of the Polish element as we can 
from the German, and free them from their present 
compulsory association* If the hberated territories were 
destined to be incorporated in an entirely independent 
Polish state, we cotdd pursue this object without any 
secondary considerations, but we have seen that the 
Prussian Poles will break their association with Germany 
only to effect a new association with Russia. We have 
still to examine what form this partnership is likely to 
take, but we can prophesy this much with certainty, that 
the New Poland and Russia will have a common tariff- 
system and a common military o^anisation : in the 
economic and the strategical sphere, the Western frontier 
of autonomous Poland will be identical with the Western 
frontier of the whole Russian Empire* 

No setdement would be permanent which left Geiy 
many's Eastern flank strategically and economically at 
Russia's mercy* Frontier-lines must be drawn so as 
to enable the ootmtries divided by them severally to 
lead an independent and self-sufficient life of their own* 


This is the first condition they must satisfy if they are 
to have any significance at all, and an essential part of 
** Independence "' is the capacity for resisting by force 
of anas an armed attack on the part of the neighbour- 
ing state* 

This fact is unquestionably true at the present time in 
Eampe, and our reconstruction after the war is over 
mH be Utopian if we ignore it* We are all hopiag that 
revulsion fiom war will lead to disarmament, and that 
die military factor will cease to play in the international 
politics of the future the terribly dominant part which 
it has played in the past ; we are all agreed that the posi- 
tive impulse to disarm can come from no calculation of 
material advantage, but only from a change of heart ; 
but we must recognise that this psychobgical conversion 
will not be produced automatically by shutting otur 
eyes to the difficulties in its way* We must at least 
facilitate it by securing that it involves no material 
sacrifices of prohibitive magnitude* 

We saw that we could banish the struggle for existence 
between nationalities only by solving national problems 
and not by neglecting them. This principle applies to 
the crudest form of the struggle, its conduct by the brute 
violence of war* Nations will have no ear for the 
gospel of Peace, so bng as they feel themselves exposed 
to each odier's arms* The present war was precipitated 
when several nations reached breaking-point in a long- 
diawn agony of mutual fear* We shall not cure them of 
mtlitaiism by placing them at each other's mercy more 
completely than ever* War will only become impossible 
when either party's ftontier has been made so invul- 
nerable that the other abandons all idea of violating it* 
U die firontiers of Be^tmi against Germany and France 
had been as invindbly fortified as the Franco-German 



frontier itself is fortified on either side, there would have 
been no campaign in the West* 

{In delimiting, therefore, our new frontier between 
Germany and the Russian Empire, we must escpose 
neither country to the other's strategic initiative (other- 
wise we shall only accentuate their fears, and open a 
new era of war between them, instead of dosing the era 
that is past), and here we are confronted with a dilenuna, 
for the existing frontier, though it grievously violates 
the national principle, was negotiated with the precise 
intention of producing a true strategic equilibrium* 

This frontier dates from the Q>ngress of Vienna, 
which resettled Europe in 1814 after the overthrow of 
Napoleon* One of the main lines of settlement, upon 
which all were agreed, was that Prussia should take her 
share of the spoils in Western Germany, while Russia 
should be paid off with those Polish provinces which had 
been seized by Prussia and Austria in the last partitions,^ 
and subsequendy erected by Napoleon into the Grand 
Duchy of Warsaw* Prussia stipulated, however, that 
this principle should not apply to the districts of Kulmer- 
land * and Posen, and insisted upon their inclusion within 
her own frontier* She gained her point, because it was 
universally recognised that her demands in this quarter 
were bas^ on considerations of strategical necessity, 
and were not prompted by territorial ambition* 

The present frontier, dien, was admitted in 1814 to 
be the minimum line which Prussia could defend success* 
fully against Russian attack* We now propose to push 
this line still further back towards Breslau and Berlin in 
deference to the principle of Nationality, but we must 

* 179^ and 1795. 

'Situated on the Right bank of the Vistula^ and containing the 
fort res s e s Graudenz and Thorn* 


not allow our insistence upon true national frontiers to 
Uind us to the strategic factor* Our final result must 
be a compromise between the two principles, and before 
we put the question of national allegiance to the vote 
amoi^ the inhabitants of the debatable zont, we shall 
have^ like the diplomatists of 1814, to lay down a limit 
behind which the German frontier must not be driven, 
even thot^ it may deprive considerable enclaves of 
Polish popubtion lying within it of the right to choose 
for themselves their own political destiny* 

This limit imposed upon the new frontier will 
seriously restrict the range of the Polish plebiscite. 
Theoretically the vote might still be taken in the strip of 
territory between the German minimum and the present 
fitontier-line ; but in practice there would be a one-sided- 
ness about such an arrangement against which the 
victorious Poles and Russians would energetically 
protest. A minimum has always a strong tendency to 
become a maximum as well, and our allies will probably 
accept the principle of the minimtun line only on con- 
dition that Germans on the wrong side of it shall sufiFer 
the same toss of free choice that the Poles must sufiFer 
who are left on the opposite side. 

In this case the situation would be exactly opposite to 
that on the Franco-German border. There the tracing 
of boundaries by the parties to the conference will be 
simply a preliminary step towards constituting the local 
population into groups, and the free vote of these groups 
wiU then decide the fate of their respective districts* 
In Poland, on the contrary, the plebiscite would be 
eliminated altogether, and the new frontier definitively 
constituted by negotiations between plenipotentiaries 
of Germany on the one side and Poland and Russia on 
the other. 


The actual ootsrse the new line will follow must 
depend lately upon the bargaining-power possessed at 
the close of the war by the two parties, and is to that 
extent unpredictable, but the transaction will not be 
conducted by Germany and Russia alone. All members 
of the Congress will take a hand in it, and Great 
Britain^s influence as a mediator will be especially 
valuable in this question, because she has absolutely no 
direct interest in the issue* It is incumbent upon us, 
therefore, to work out for otirselves a compromise vfbich 
we can recommend, independendy of bargaining power, 
as the best possible under the permanent geographical 
and racial circumstances, and we had better frame 
suggestions for a new frontier in some detail. 

Our discussion will be clearer if we treat the extensive 
line from the Carpathians to the Baltic in several 
sections.^ We will begin with Silesia* 

(a) The province of Silesia occupies the whole upper 
basin of the River Oder* It forms a portion of the great 
North-European plain, and its only physical frontiers 
are the Riesen Gebirge Range on the Soudi-West, which 
lies between it and Bohemia, and the Carpathian Moun- 
tains on the South, which divide it from Hungary* The 
country possesses two chief lines of communication with 
the rest of the world : North-Westward, the Oder 
descends to the port of Stetdn at the head of a land- 
locked arm of the Baltic, the '' Haff '' : S.S.W., die 
great Moravian Gap between the Riesen Gebiige and 
the Carpathians opens a route to the Danube basin 
which is traversed by several lines of railway leading 
to Vienna* 

These geographical factors have determined Silesian 
history* Silesia was occupied about 600 a*d* by the 

> See Map IL for all aections* 


Polish wing of the Sbvonic migration from the East, 
which found no obstacle to its progress across the plain 
till it struck against the mountains on the further side, 
but five centuries later ^ the province detached itself 
£n>m the main body of Poland, and ttuned its face in 
the opposite direction* 

The native princes were converted to German culture, 
and invited German settlers from the Saxon marches to 
ascend the vaUey of the Oder, just as the Gaelic kings 
of Scotland introduced Teutonic ** Lowlanders ^^ from 
across the Firth of Forth into the long coastal strip from 
Fife to Aberdeen* By the end of the thirteenth century 
Sksia, like Bohemia, had been drawn entirely within . 
the orbit of Germany, and after the Thirty Years^ War 
the two countries remained together under the sceptre of 
the Hapsbturgs, who could easily control Silesia from 
Vienna through the Moravian Gap* The Hapsburg^s 
ritle to the province was challenged by the government 
at Berlin, wliich ruled the lower course of the Oder and 
so commanded Silesia^s North-Westem door* Exactly 
a century after the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of 
Aachen * settled the destitiy of the province in Prussians 
favour by a partition, whidi left nothing to Austria but 
the Southernmost strip* The frontier then delimited 
between Prussia and Austria has never since been altered* 

The Industrial Revolution has made Silesia one of 
the most important districts in Europe* The Eras 
Gehirge is rich in mineral ores, and there are immense 
coal-seams in the plain. These assets have enabled 
her to devetop great manufacturing activities, and the 
new economics have further emphasised her essential 
geographical unity * The industrial area extends imparti- 

* XZfo A«I>. 

* Z748, at the ooaduaioa of the *' Austrian Suooessjon ** War. 


ally on either side of the Austro-Prusstan frontier, while 
the focus of the ooal-district ^ lies just within the Prussian 
frontier against Russia, near the point where the German, 
Austrian and Russian Empires meet, and is continuous 
with the mining districts of Russian Poland, from which 
it is only separated by an artificial boundary* 

The existing frontiers, then, do not eiq>ress economic 
articulation, but they correspond still less to the bound- 
aries of Nationality* The German colonisation up the 
Oder never reached the head-waters of the river* Up to 
a point between Brieg and Oppeln, slighdy above the 
confluence of the Neisse tributary, the Oder is flanked by 
a German poptdation on either side ; but above that 
point, though along the motmtains the German element 
stretches still further South, and even spreads into the 
Moravian Gap as far as the water-partii^ between die 
Oder and Visttda systems, the native Pole has main- 
tained himself astride the actual course of the Oder, and 
is in occupation of the river's Left bank as well as its 
Right* Above Ratilx>r, again, along the highest reaches 
of the Oder, the Pole is repbced by the Tchech* We 
have to devise a new frontier which shall do more justice 
than the present to national distribution, without running 
violendy counter to economic facts* 

The Western frontier of the Russian Empire and the 
New Poland, or in other terms the Eastern frontier of 
Austria and Germany, might start from the Hungarian 
boundary on the summit of the Carpathians, at a point 
just East of the pass through which the railway connects 
Sillein (Zsolna) in Hungary with Teschen in Austrian 
Silesia and thereafter with Ratibor in Prussian Silesia on 

^The towns of Gleiwitz» Beutfaen, Kftnigshiitte, 
Myslowitz form one practically continuous urban zone skirting the 


the Left hank of the Oder* From this starting-point it 
might run parallel to the railway, along the divide 
between the Oder and Vistula systems, and continue 
in a N.N«W. direction till it struck the Oder's Right 
bank a few miles below Ratibor* It might thence follow 
the Oder downwards to a point opposite the jtmction 
of the H5tzenpl5tz tributary from the Left bank, and 
dien take a straight line, slightly East of North, to the 
Southernmost point in the province of Posen. 

This frontier would exclude from the new Poland the 
Polish popubtion on the Left bank of the Oder, but even 
akmg this section of the Oder's course it is only the rural 
population that is PoUsh : the towns on the river-bank 
— Oppeln, Kosel, and Ratibor — are predominantly 
German. If, moreover, we allowed Russia to cross the 
Oder, and extend the frontier of her Empire right up 
to the Erz Gebii^e, we should be transferring to her 
die strategical command of the Moravian Gap, placing 
Vienna at her mercy, and cutting the direct communica- 
tion. East of the mountains, between the Prussian and 
Austrian sections of Silesia. 

We are proposing, on the other hand, to include in 
'Polmd the extremely important mining-district of the 
^ Five Towns/' Germany will doubtless protest against 
this, on account of the considerable German population 
that has been attracted to this area by the openings it 
o£Ens for all kinds of employment ; but we can fairly 
write off this German minority abandoned to Poland 
against the Poles across the Oder whom we have assigned 
to Germany. Moi^ver, the German element here is 
not merely a minority, but actually a small and a decreas- 
ing one. The mass of the miners and workers is 
recruited from the PoUsh countryside, and the growth 
of the PoUsh majority has already made itself felt in 


politics. In spite of official pressure exercised upon 
elections, the ** Five Towns ** now return Polish 
Nationalist representatives to the Prussian Landts^ and 
the Imperial Reichsts^* 

The economic issue raised by the transference of this 
district to Poland is not so simple as the national. By 
driving a political frontier between these coal*mines in 
the comer of Silesia and the industrial towns further 
North-West, which at present consume their output, 
shall we be ruining the prosperity of both i We may 
answer that a political frontier need not imply an insur- 
mountable tarifif-wall, yet if such a fiscal barrier were 
to be erected in this instance, all parts of Silesia would 
certainly sufiFer economically for the adjustment of the 
country's national problem. Even in the latter case, 
however, the dislocation would only be temporary. 
There are coal-seams in the German portion of Silesia, 
round Breslau, which could be developed to supply in 
sufficiency that region's industrial demand. This would 
of course deprive the ** Five Towns '' of their current 
market, but they would rapidly find a new market 
towards the East. A considerable manufacturing 
industry has already grown up in Russian Poland, notably 
in the neighbourhood of Lodz. It is capable of almost 
limitless expansion, because the huge agricultural and 
pastoral hinterland of Russia is its potential customer. 
If the produce of the frontier coal-fields were diverted 
from German Silesia hither, the expansion of Polish 
manufacture would receive an immense impetus, and 
would more than keep pace in its demand for coal with 
the output the ** Five Towns *' offered it. 

The frontier-line, then, which we have suggested in 
the Silesian section, seems to stand the economic as well 
as the nationalistic test. We may now turn our atten-* 
tion to the section that follows. 


(6) The pfovinoe of Pbsen is shaped like a flint arrow- 
head, with its wings resting on the present Russian 
frontier, and its point directed inwards straight towards 
Berlin* Strategically, as we have seen, its control is 
vitally important to Germany for her security. A 
foreign power established in military possession of Posen 
City could, from this fortified base, strike South-West- 
ward towards Glogau on the Oder, and cut the con- 
nectbns between Silesia and Berlin ; or it could strike 
North-Eastward towards Danzig on the Baltic, and 
oobte from the rest of Germany the provinces East of 
the Vistula. If the Russian General Staff were given a 
fitee hand in Posen, Germany would virtually cease to 
be an independent power* 

In Naticmality, on the other hand, Posen is predomin* 
astly Polish.^ It is a wedge of alien population driven 
deep into the German mass, and the consuierable 
German minority is mosdy concentrated on the Northern 
boaadary, along the River Netze. Isolated German 
enclaves, however, are scattered over the whole area of 
the piDvmce. 

These advance-guards are not the fruit of the 
** Cokmisation Board's ** plantations, which have hardly 
succeeded in affecting the racial map : like their com- 
patriots in Silesia, they are descended from German 
burghers summoned by the native government in the 
Middle Ages to civilise the cotmtry. Their history, 
therefore, is above reproach, and even had the tide of 
the original setders been doubtful, that would not have 
warranted us in treating the present generation with 
kss than justice. 

Neverdieless, in so far as the destiny of Posen is to 

' ^ "Hie populatioii of the provuice totalled x,987/x)o in 1905 : the 
Midi demett mimbered over a miUkMu 


be determined by the national factor, this dispersed 
minority of Germans is not sufficiently stroi^ to retain 
fDr Germany any part of the province but its Northern 
fringe, and we find ourselves placed in a dilemma* If 
we give precedence to Nationality, almost the whole of 
Posen shotild be ceded to the New IV>land : if to 
Strategy, then no portion of the cotmtry should be 
detached from its present connections. 

There seems to be only one possible solution of the 
difficttlty* The overwhelmingly Pblish districts must 
be incorporated in the Autonomous Principality, and 
this means that they will come within the bond of the 
Rtissian Empire ; but Russia in return must allow the 
fortifications of Pbsen City to be dismantled, and must 
undertake not to push forward her military line into the 
new territory, but to keep it within the limits of the 
present frontier. 

Military conventions of this kind, which have no sanc- 
tion behind them but the good faith of the contracting 
parties, are best secured by being made reciprocal, and 
the question of Posen might give occasion for a compact 
between the Russian Empire and Germany of a much 
wider range. Russia on her side might promise to con-* 
struct no military works in any of the territories she may 
acquire from Germany along the whole line from the 
upper Oder to the Baltic : Germany might demolish, tn 
compensation, all fortifications in her provinces East of 
the Vistula, and withdraw her strategical front to the 
line of the Vistulan fortresses. 

Such an anangement would greatly diminish the 
extent to which each country was e3q)osed to an 2ggctsr 
sive movement on the part of the other. Of course it 
would be in the power of either to break its word at any 
moment, and fortify the neutralised territory within its 


own frontier, and this wotild give it a momentary 
strategical advantage over its more honourable neigh- 
bour; but fiortifications cannot be built in a day, and the 
other would immediately retaliate by doing the same in 
its own neutralised area. If, as we have suggested, fear 
is a more potent stimulus of armaments than ambition, a 
General Staff would be very reluctant to increase their 
power of offensive against the rival nation, if they knew 
diat the inevitable price would be similar action on the 
other's part, which would correspondingly diminish their 
own power of defence* A compact, therefore, which 
strengthens the defensive capacity of both parties, has 
the greatest possible chance of stability* 

If such a compromise could be effected, the new 
frontier might run from the Southernmost comer of 
Posen along the whole Western boundary of the pro- 
vince, to the point where that boundary hits the River 
Warta. After crossing the river, the frontier should 
dumge direction abruptly to slighdy North of East, and 
take a course midway between the Warta and the Netze, 
contintiing in the same line till it struck the Vistula 
between Bromberg and Thorn. Tins would leave 
within German territory the whole course of the River 
Netze, and also the amal which links the Netze and 
Vistula systems through Bromberg, and is one of the 
principal inland waterways of Prussia. 

(c) The lower course of the Vistula, from a point just 
above Thorn to its mouth, runs through the German 
province of West Prussia, which flanks the river on both 
sides. West Pnissia, in spite of its name, is a com- 
paratively recent acquisition of the Prussian kingdom. 
It was only incorporated at the first Partition of Poland 
in 1772* Before that date it had been Polish territory. 


ever since Yagiellon ^ broke the power of the Teutonic 
Knights at the battle of Tannenberg in 14x0 aj>. 

In the manifesto addressed to the Poles shordy after 
the outbreak of the war, the Grand Duke made a pointed 
allusion to this historic victory/ and hinted that if the 
Russians and Poles in concert carry the present struggle 
to a tritunphant conclusion. West Prussia will be one of 
die national heirlooms which he will restore to the new 
Polish state. 

The Pblish claim to the province has strong argu- 
ments in its favour. The Polish element is hardly less 
important here than in Posen*' The Germans are in a 
majority, but they are concentrated in the great port 
of Danzig, and only thinly scattered through the rural 
districts* On strict grounds of nationality, a strip of 
West Prussia on the Left bank of the Vistula, stretch- 
ing all the way to the Baltic so as to include a small 
extent of coast immediately West of Danzig, ought to be 
detached from Germany, and added, just like the major 
part of Posen, to autonomous Poland* 

Probably this would not content the Poles. For 
economic reasons they covet the fundamentally German 
city of Danzig, and would therefore insist on a ** dean 
cut ^* of the whole province, PbUsh and German portions 
alike, although any such demand is of course refuted by 
the National Principle itself. Yet the "" mangled slice,^^ 
as well as the ^^ clean cut,"" receives a categorical veto 
&om Geography. 

^ The first king who ruled at once over the Polisb and the Lithuanian 

■ The reverse sustained a few weeks afterwards on this very spot by 
die Russian armies in their first invasion of Trans-Vistulan G«nnatty, 
has made the name less auspicious. 

*At the German census of 1905 the population of West Prussia 
totalled 1,643,000, of whom S^/Ooo (34%) were oflSdaUy admitted to 
be Poles. 


The seizure of West Prussia is the most pardonable ! 
dieft Berlin ever oonunitted. It brought the solid bbck 
of German population which had established itself 
ftirtfaer afield in East Prussia round the intensely German 
centre of Kfinigsberg, into direct territorial contact with 
die main body of Germany. Even Napoleon, when he 
beat Prussia to earth, did not venture to reverse this 
inevitable outcome of the geographical situation. He 
cut off Danzig and made her a free dty, but he left the 
land-bru^e between Berlin and Kdnigsbei^ intact* 
Now that the bpse of a century has cemented more 
firmly than ever the union between West Prussia and | 
die German lands on either side of it, we should be ill- 
advised if we departed from Napoleon's precedent. 
The German majority in the country would never 
reconcile itself to Pol^ rule. They would hate thej 
Russian Empire as bitterly as the "' Reichsland "' torn i 
from France in 1871 has hated its German masters, and 
the German nation, on its part, would never rest till it 
had liberated its enslaved brothers and thereby restored 
Its own geographical integrity. If every other ques-i 
tkm in Europe had been justly solved. West Prussia! \ 
would suffice in itself to pltmge all Etm)pe into an- j 
other war. 

In view, however, of the Prussian Government's 
Polish policy in the past, the large Polish minority in 
West Prussia cannot be abandoned once more to the 
mercy of German chauvinism. Germany's retention 
of the province must be conditional upon a solemn pledge 
on her part, to respect the Polish language wherever 
Bpohtn witfain her reduced frontier, and in general to 
allow such Polish citizens as still remain to her com- 
plete freedom in the development of their national 
individuality. This guarantee must be endorsed by all 


the parties to the European conference. The national 
ideals of the West Prussian Poles are to be subordinated 
to a paramount interest of the German nation* It is 
Germany^s part to see that the sacrifice entailed shall 
be as lis^t as possible, and she must not be allowed to 
repudiate her obligation* 

Moreover, the exclusion of this half million of Poles 
from their national state a£Fects not only the disappointed 
fragment itself, but also the liberated Polish nation. 
The new Autonomous State has a daim to compensation 
for submitting to this national loss, and the account can 
best be settled by an economic concession* 

The Vistula is Poland's river* It rises on the Polish 
flank of the Carpathians, both the national capitals, 
Cracow and Warsaw, lie on its banks, and it is the 
main artery of the country's commtmications* If the 
lower reaches of the river, and the numerous Polish 
population that dwells along them also, must definitively 
remain outside the new political frontier, there is no 
reason why Pblish traffic on the river should be barred 
by a tariff-fence at this line* A further condition for 
the retention of West Prussia must be imposed on 
Germany* She must grant the new Poland free trade 
down the Vistula to the Baltic, and throw open to her 
Danzig, at the river's mouth, as a free port* 

This provision is essential to Poland's future pros- 
perity* Its extortion through military defeat may 
wotmd the pride of the German nation, but its most 
ardent advocates will be the great German business 
firms at Danzig itself, who will be fully sensible of the 
possibilities opened to them by this immense extension 
of their city's commercial hinterland* 

(d) We have still to discuss the frontier East of the 
Vistula* The homogeneous German population of 


Bast Prussia, compactly marshalled along the Baltic 
coast between the Vistula and the Niemen, does not 
properly come into question. In all Germany there is 
no more German land than this. We shall doubtless be 
reminded, however, that this inheritance was won for 
Germanism not by the peaceful penetration of burghers, 
like Silesia and the fringes of Posen and West Prussia, 
but by the sword of the Teutonic Knights* ** The 
Germans came here,"' the fanatical Germanophobe will 
cry, ** by brute force : by brute force let them be 
expelled again/^ 

If historical aq^uments must needs be answered, we 
may point out that the folk they dispossessed were not 
Poles nor even Slavs. The original Prussians belonged 
to a separate branch of the Indo-European family, and 
were kinsmen of the Lithtianians across the Niemen ; 
but the German crusaders who set themselves to root 
out heathenism from this secluded comer of Europe, 
did dieir work so thoroughly that they annihilated the 
heathen themselves together with their beliefs. No 
native Prussian now survives to daim his ancestral 
inheritance, and the title remains with his destroyers, 
yifbo have robbed him even of his name, and raised it 
from an obscure tribal appellation to be the official style 
of the greatest political oiganism that Germany has yet 

The German-speaking region in East Prussia, then, 
must be left on the same side of the frontier as before. 
Its natural boundaries are sharply defined towards every 
quarter, not merely by the Sea on the North and the 
rivers that guard its flanks, but by the chain of the 
Masurian Lakes, that stretches parallel to the coast, and 
divides the district from its hinterland. 

The Slav advancing from the South-East has never 


penetrated this barrier* It sheltered first the aborigjaal 
Prussians and then their German namesakes from the 
Poles^ and in the present war it is provif^ itself a 
formidable obstacle to the Russian armies ; yet while 
Geography has made it the permanent strategical 
frontier of East Prussia^ the political frontier has never 
coincided with it since the setdement after Tannenberg, 
but has kept to a quite artificial line drawn further in- 
land towards the South* 

The strip of country between this present frontier 
and the lakes cotdd be detached from East Prussia with- 
out a£Fecting the strategical situation, and it is inhabited 
by a Pblish population, the Masurians.^ This is perhaps 
the only unit in the whole of the Eastern £rontier-wne 
of Germany to which the decision by plebiscite can be 
applied, and we must not neglect the opportunity, for 
we cannot predict a priori the choice the Masurians 
will make, as we can predict that of the other Poles* 
They have been united politically with their German 
neighbours beyond the lakes for considerably more than 
five hundred years, and in the sixteenth century they 
foUowed them in their secession &om the Roman Church. 
They have shared since then in the Lutheran culture of 
Northern Germany* It is highly probable that tradition 
will prove a stronger factor than language in determinit^ 
their nationality, but certainty will not be reached till 
that nationality declares itself in the vote* 

(a) As far as the Left bank of the Niemen, East 
Prussia, with the possible exception of the Masurian 
unit, will thus maintain its present connections* We 
have still to consider the fragment of the province beyond 
the river's further bank* This is the only portion of East 
Prussia that ought undoubtedly to be ceded to the 

^ Thty mmiber about 400^000* 


Ruanan Empire. The majority of the inhabitants are 
Lithuanians, at present separated by an artificial line 
£rom the mass of their fellow-countrymen on the 
Russian side of the frontier. The only considerable 
German endave is the port of Memel/ situated on the 
exit from the '' Kurisches Haff "" or lagoon, into which 
the Niemen debouches ; but we can write off against 
Memel the Lithuanian endaves on the South bank of the 
liver,' which we propose to leave within the German 
frontier, and from the economic point of view Russians 
datm to Memel is as strong as Poland's to West Prussia. 
The upper system of the Niemen provides waterways 
for the traffic of Russians Lithuanian and White Russian 
provinces, and Memel is the natural point of connection 
between this internal trade and the sea. 

We can now suggest how the frontier East of the 
Vistula should run. 

Crossing the Vistula at a point between Bromberg 
and Thorn, it should assign Thorn to Poland. The 
possession of this fortress is strategically essential to the 
new principality, for the present campaign has already 
shown how a German force concentrated on the lower 
Vistula can from this base strike towards the interior in 
any direction. If Thorn remained in Germany's hands, 
Poland would be exposed perpetually to a German 
<^cnsive, and communication between Pdsen and 
Warsaw might be cut at any moment. In Polish hands, 
on the contrary. Thorn would not be a menace to 
Germany, for the course of the Vistula below it is flanked 

' Popoladon, ax/x)o in 1905. 

■There are X07«ooo Lidnianiaiis in East PruBti altogether. In 
S905 the totol poptilation of the province was 4/>3O/)0O. Since the 
iM^*ri»wtm and Lithuanians amount together to about half a million, the 
Ocraiatt block most total a milliott and a half. 


by a series of German fortresses ^ all the way down, 
lliis is the one instance we have encountered in which 
the strategical factor outweighs the racial to Germany's 
detriment and not to her gain, for Thorn is inhabited by 
a German population** 

Beyond Thorn the course of the frontier will be deter- 
mined by the Mastuians' choice* If they elect to abide 
by Germany, the new frontier, after skirting Thorn to 
the North, will bend Eastward, and coincide with the 
present line a few miles East of the fortress : if they 
merge themselves in Poland, the frontier will head Nortfa- 
Eastward towards the line of the lakes. It will run 
just South of Deutsch-Eylau, Osterode and Allenstein, 
and parallel to the railway that connects them. Then, 
leavii^ LStzen to Germany but giving Lyck to Poland, 
it will converge upon the present frontier where it is 
intersected by the 54th parallel of latitude* 

From this point the new frontier will in any case 
foUow the line of the old, till it hits the Niemen* Thence 
the Left bank of the river will form the remainder of its 

E* Prussian State and German Nation 

We have completed our survey of Germany's 
European frontiers, and have found diat, however con- 
siderately we treat her, she cannot escape without very 
serious territorial curtailment* Can we reconcile her 
feelings to this necessary loss i 

1£ we glance back at the cessions we have demanded 
from the German Empire, we shall see that nearly all of 
them are at Prussia's expense* In fact, our proposals 
might seem intended as a deUberate reversal of Prussian 
history* The acquisition of Silesia and the Polish 

> Gfaudco]^ Maricttwerder, Mancobttcg* • 43/xx>* 


provinces first raised her to the rank of a great power* 
The campaign against Denmark in 1864 won her not 
only Schleswig but most of Northern Germany two 
years later* The territory taken from France in 1871 
did not become Prussian soil, but as the ** Reichsland ** 
it symbolises the hegemony over all Germany, which 
Prussia attained through her French victory by the 
fott&dation of the German Empire* 

Those to whom V3t victis nuJces the paramount appeal 
will here find a fresh opportunity to interpose* ** We 
are now prepared to grant you/' they will say, ** that 
in the Allies' settlement with the German nation, justice 
and mercy may prove the best policy* Your hopes of 
reconciling Gemuiny are not so fantastic as m^t be 
supposed ; but the facts to which you have just called 
our attention prove far more conclusively that you 
cannot possibly reconcile Prussia* We therefore offer 
you a general principle for your guidance* Spare 
Germany by all means, but humiliate Prussia without 
restraint* Destroy Prussia's hegemony in Germany by 
libeiatmg all the German lands which she armexed in 
18x4 and 1866* Make them independent members of 
a truly federal Empire, and remove the diminished 
Prussia's last hold upon the remainder of the nation, by 
stipulating in the terms of peace that the Hohemoollem 
shall resign the d^nity of German Emperor* You 
cannot make your peace with Prussia : then you must 
annihilate her with a ruthless hand*" 

Our first reply to this will be that the interference of 
foreign powers in a nation's internal affairs is the sove- 
re^ means of weldii^ together that nation's most 
dttooidant elements*^ If we ordered Hanover to secede 

^ The nsoooi of Btmaick's policy is a commentaiy 00 this fiict* 
He tndiioed fomgnefs to put wpikts into Gcnnan/s wheel, in ofder to 
ose flicm himself as levels for upheaving German/s national sentiment* 


firom Prtissia, the Hanoverians would for the first time 
realise their pride in Prussian citizenship, and if the 
Kaiser were bidden doff his Imperial Crown, Bavaria 
would for the first time acclaim him whole-heartedly as 
her war*lord* Instead of crushing Prussia by isolating 
her from the German nation, we should most effectively 
alienate the German nation by rallying it round Prussia. 

So much is certain, but we can clear up the argument 
more satisfactorily by thinking out what meaning the 
name ** Prussia ** conveys to our minds* 

Historically, the Prussian is the ** Squire from beyond 
the Elbe,'' ^ a character in which we divine the feiodty 
of the Borderer, the fanaticism of the Crusader, and the 
dogmatism of the Protestant, while behind the squire 
marches the peasant from his estate, who seems to have 
no life beyond obedience to his leader's commands, and 
to revert, whenever he finds himself leaderless, to the 
habits of his barbarous ancestors in the days before the 
squire appeared in the land. 

Looked at from one point of view, the growth of 
modem Prussia is simply the story of how this sinister 
troop (hostility makes us distort their features beyond 
the truth) has imposed its domination progressively upon 
the whole German world, first stretching out its hands 
from Elbe to Rhine to swallow up the North, and then 
compelling the South to follow in its train* We picture 
the ** Prussian drill-sergeant " fordx^ the too pliable 
Rhinelander into his iron mould, and we feel that we 
have been watching the deUberate depravation of a 
nation's character. ** You may know Prussia," we 
exclaim, ** by her fruits* Prussianism made the war, and 
the war is a disaster for Germany and for the whole of 

' Ost-Elbiischer Junker. 


This account of the matter is not so much false in 
statement, though at best a gross exaggeration, as mis- 
taken in perspective* The shadow from beyond the 
Elbe doubtless darkens the country, but the shadow 
will pass : the present situation is no more than a 
historical survival* 

If we ignore origins for a moment, and look at modem 
Prussia as it actually is, we shall see that it is only another 
name for North Germany* The present frontiers of 
the Prussian state include samples of North German 
society in all its varieties : world-ports like Danzig and 
Kiel, scientifically developed agricultural districts like 
Brandenbuq; and Pomerania, centres of twentieth- 
century industrialism like Westphalia and Silesia* The 
remaining states of North Germany may be as important 
individually as the corresponding elements in the Prus- 
sian OTgxDism, but the total sum of their population 
and economic energy does not affect the balance in 
comparison with Prussia's weight, and territorially they 
are mere enclaves, emei^g here and there on the map 
from the background of the Prussian mass*^ 

The most significant factor we have mentioned in 
nxxlem Prussia is the new industry on the Rhine and 
the Oder* We have already explained that the national 
development of Germany during the last forty-three 
years is due to the amazing speed and thoroughness 
with which she has accomplished her industrial revolu- 

Pmml area in sq, miles. Population in xgos* 
^ Gcman Bnqnre 208,780 6o,64x/kx> 

North Geraany : 166^x41 49,8o4»ooo 

Pnaata I34»6i6 80% | 37#293#ooo 75% ) 

RemsdauiK >ofN*G* >ofN.G* 

N* G. States 32,535 ao% I xa,5ix/)oo 35% I 

The figuns for North Germany are obtained by subtracting the totals 
of Bavaria, Wiirtemberg and Baden from the totals of the Empire, but 
ffHinfiftg m^** Reichsland*** 

1 e< 


tion. These two Prussiaii areas have been the actual 
theatre of this Gennan achievement. Looted at from 
die economic point of view, Prussia is not an incubus 
whith has bstened itself upon the German nation's life, 
but the most vital element of that life itself, which has 
raised Germany to her present pitch of greatness. 

The I>russian state may still be controlled by the 
" Agrarian Interest," but the squirardiy is not tbe 
factor in Prussia which enables her to control in turn 
die rest of Germany. The German Empire is held 
togedier by the hegemony not of the Eastern " mark " 
but of the Industrial North. Westphalia and Silesia 
are not merely typical elements of modern Germany : 
they are the country's core. Junkerdom, the traditional 
Pnusia of the squire, may still call the tune, but no 
music would follow, if the resourceful, inde&t^ble 
Prussia of the industrial workers were not there to trans- 
late the demand into reality. Germany could never 
have borne the cost of her stupendous armaments, if 
the new Prussia had not all the time been disseminating 
her manufactures through the markets of the world and 
winning for her profits an ever-increasing proportion of 
the world's surplus wealth : she could not have outdone 
the armaments of Great Britain and France in quality 
and elaboration as well as in mere mass, had not West- 
phalia lent all her engineerit^ skill to manu&cture and 
improve Germany's armaments, as well as to pay for 
them. The new Prussia has virtually supplanted the 
old even in her own peculiar sphere : the works at 
Essen are the driving force behind the militarism which 
we are combatting in this war, and the Krupps have 
eclipsed as the exponents of Prusstanism tixe von 
Bluchers and von Billows. 

Hie future character of Prussia, then, will in no case 


be determined by the military caste which originally 
bttilt her up* Already they seem to feel the reins slip- 
ping from their grasp, and to stispect that the creature 
will one day be impelled to deny his creator* llie 
future, however, belongs to Herr Krupp as little as to 
his aristocratic godfathers* Behind the capitalist stand 
the myriads of his workers. All over Etux>pe they are 
coming to realise the services of their dass to the state, 
and its potential power in politics, and they are resolv- 
ing to conquer the position in society which is their 
due ; but in Germany the dass-consdousness of the 
Workers is even stronger, and their resentment more 
bitter, than in the countries of the West, because 
they are here thrust more ruthlessly into the outer 

It is certain that the German Workers will one day 
come into their own* Krupp may still claim all credit 
for the cannon and armour-plate, and hold his own 
against his employees ; yet machines, however perfect, 
do not constitute an army : its essence is always its men* 
The German General StafiF boasts far more loudly of 
its four million trained combatants than of its 42-centi- 
metre guns, and the new industrial Prussia supplies the 
bkxxl as well as the gold and the iron* The increase of 
50% in the popubtion of the Empire, between the years 
1871 and 1905, has been entirely urban* The new 
industry of the Westphalian and Silesian towns pro- 
duces the subsistence for these new mouths* The 
industrial centres have become the main reservoir on 
yAddi the General StafiF depends for its recruits*^ 

In a militaristic state, political power gravitates into 

> Bcmhaidi, in Gtrmany and tfm Next War, diaciisacs this widiout 
muting to realise its significance. He notes, and deplores, the foct 
mat the townsman is not such sympathetic material for the Army as 
the peasant* 


the hands of those who bear the military burdens. It 
has been hinted diat the forces which now govern 
Germany, Capital and Privilege in coalition, actually 
precipitated the war in order to forestall the outbreak 
of die internal class-struggle and their own downfall. 
Whether there is any tru^ in this or not, the social 
problem in Germany will not be decided automatically 
in this sense or in that by victory or defeat. An army of 
workers, elated by a inihtary triumph and convinced 
that it was due to their own organised endeavour and 
sacrifice, m^t well make short work, after the war 
was over, of the unscrupulous directorate which had 
deliberately involved them in this fiery trial. We have 
seen, on the other hand, that defeat followed by undia- 
criminating humiliation might reconcile the principal 
vicCtms to the schemers who were ultimately responsible 
for both misfortunes. In either case the attitude 
of die industrial masses will be the important boor, 
and their state of mind, in the event of the Allies* 
victory, will depend much more upon how we deal widi 
them in the settlement at the close of hostihties than 
upon the military results of the war itself. 

Here the believer in external intervention will inters 
nipt us ^ain. " I discern," he will exclaim, " an 
infallible means of securing for ourselves the gratitude 
and sympathy of this industrial class, whom you have 
now proved to be the real Prussia of the future. I no 
tenger propose to crush Prussia — I see that the Prussian 
hegemony in Germany is synonymous with the natural, 
unalterable economic supremacy of the North — but I 
do advocate interventfon in the social evolution d 
Prussia heiself. You say that the workers are bound to 
gain the upper hand, let them gain it by our good 



** The political monopoly enjoyed in Prussia by the 
present ruling class rests on the reactionary structure of 
the existing constitution. The direct manhood suffrage 
by which the Imperial Reichstag is elected is in striking 
contrast to the machinery of the Prussian * Landtag/ 
The present system dates from the Reform Bill of 19x0, 
but the reform was illusory* It was virtually a reissue 
of the constitution of 1851, and that in turn was intto- 
duced as a reversal of the truly liberal charter extorted 
from the autocracy in 1848* 

^ In a Prussian constituency the electors are stratified 
in three * property classes/ equal to one another in their 
respective total taxpaying capacity, but most unequal in 
the number of individuals they include* Each of these 
numerically disparate groups chooses its own representa- 
tive, but he does not sit in the Landtag : his function is 
to vote at his own discretion for the actual deputy, in 
conjunction with his colleagues* Thus the Prussian 
franchise is both narrow and indirect* The Prussian 
liandtag ^ is not a modem parliament : it is a medixval 

"" The European settlement/' he will continue, ** offers 
an excellent opportunity for sweeping away this political 
anachronism* Let us stipulate in the terms of peace 
diat the Pnissian constitution shall be liberalised at least 
to the standard already prevailing in the South, in 
Baden, Wiirtembei^ and Bavaria* Thus we shall bring 
the true Prussian nation into belated control of its 
own political destim'es* The standpoint of the Social 
Democratic Party, debarred from practical expression 

*Tbe House of Peeis would be an almost better illustration of 
Pr uwfan olifaschy* The hereditary members are reinforced by othta 
created for hfe bv the king^ but a certain proportion of the latter are in 
the nomination of tfie landed aristocracy from the eight senior provinces, 
ta other ifocds ttut ** East-of-Elbe Junkers.'' 


heretofore, will make itself felt at last, and will inspire 
Prussian policy with a new spirit* 

** Moreover, this ' change of heart * (your own phrase) 
will prepare the way for a further salutary modifica- 
tion of Prussia's equilibrium* Formerly I proposed to 
detach all the Uberal parts of Prussia from her irreclaim- 
able core : now I st^est that we smother and soften 
the core by reinforcing the fruitful fibres that surround iu 

** You have pointed out that the non-Prussian com- 
munities in Northern Germany are isolated survivals, 
destined to ultimate absorption in their Prussian environ- 
ment* Perhaps you have not sufficiently emphasised 
the effect their assimilation will have upon Prussia her- 
self, for their importance cannot be measured by their 
territorial extent* There are the three Hansa towns for 
instance* Hamburg is the second laigest city in the 
Empire, even Bremen is b^ger than Danzig,^ and the 
group as a whole conducts all the trade of the Elbe 
and the Weser* The barren naval bases of Cuxhaven, 
Wilhelmshaven and Helgoland are the only mark 
Prussia's advent has made upon the North Sea ooast« 

** You have related, ^ain, how the German national 
consciousness was first fostered by German Intellect and 
Art ; but if you call to mind the spiritual centres of 
Northern Germany, you will half fancy that they have 
purposely been boycotted by the Prussian frontier. 
Drc^en^ Leipzig, Jena, Weimar, Gotha — not one of 
them Ues on Prussian soil* Berlin has striven for a 
century to array herself in their glories, but there is 

^ Populations in 1905 : 

Berlin 2|040/>oo 

Hambturg 803^000 

Bremen 3x5,000 

Danzig loofioo 

Ltibeck 94»ooo 


a tradition in their very names which she cannot 
plagiarise* Finally I will meet you on your own ground, 
and remind you that in the industrial world Silesia and 
Westphalia have not entirely outdistanced the older 
manufactures of Saxony« Chemnitz can still bear com- 
parison with Beuthen or Elberfeld. 

^ The incorporation, then, in Prussia of the other 
North-German elements will immensely strengthen that 
industrial democracy whose triumph we wish to ensure, 
^prfiile they on their part will find no grievance in such 
change of status, if it coincides with a radical revision of 
the Prussian constitution, guaranteed by the hand and 
seal of Europe/' 

There is far more wisdom in these suggestions than in 
the pn^^nunme they supersede* The ** eradication of 
Prussia ** hardly needed refutation, but the Uberalisation 
of the Prussian constitution and the consolidation of all 
Northern Germany within the Prussian state are clearly 
essential steps towards a better future* In this instance 
die end is not at fatdt, but only the means* We shaU 
have to insist once more in reply that even the mildest 
and most beneficial of internal transformations cannot 
be effected by external pressure, that a ready-made 
constitution has no more charm than a ready-made coat, 
and that even if Industrial Germany accepted the 
political costume we offered her, there would be no 
telling in what fashion our gift would be worn : she 
might even give it a militaristic turn, and disconcert us 
by aping the ** drill-sergeants '' from whom we had 
delivered her* Nevertheless, when these objections have 
duly been filed, we shall probably admit that we have 
sighted our desired goal, if only^some road thitherward 
were apparent* 

The upshot of our discussion is this* We hope £or a 


fuwreadung dumge of equilibrium m Nordiem Gei^ 
many, but we realise that if we meddle with the scales 
ouiaehns, we shall end by inclining the balance more 
heavily then ever in ^e present direction. The 
au^dous revolutioQ can only be produced by a 
spontaneous internal raovenwnt. 

Can we promote, or at any rate foresee, any issue 
iriiicfa would rouse Northern Gennany to cast out 
Pmssianism on its own initiative I* 

We know the cause of Germany's devoted loyalty to 
the military caste in the present war. She sees in tfaem 
the champions of her nationality, the leaders in her 
life-and-death struggle against a world in anns. One 
thing alone would utteriy discredit the Prussian squire- 
archy in German eyes : if, on some grave question of 
state, die Junkers sacrificed the naticmal interest to the 
interest of their own tradition. 

We have seen that die keystone of Bsmarck's policy 
was ibe creed that Prussia's and Germany's interests 
were identical. He equated the unification of Germany 
with the extension of Prussia's hegemony, but h^ 
doctrine had one stunU}ling-bk>ck to overcome : it 
involved the exclusion from the national Bmpire of 
one sixth part ^ of die nation's strength, the Germans 
of Austria. 

The settlement between Prussia and Austria after die 
" Seven Weeks' War " of 1866 was a violation of German 
Mfinmal tradition. Since the " Great Interregnum " 
into vriiich the Holy Roman Empire fell after the niga erf 
Frederick II. in the thirteenth century, German unity 
had been little more than a name ; but die ghost of it 
that lingered on had attached itself during the last four 

Not oountiiig the Gennao-speakins Si 


owmirigs to the House of Hapsburg, and haunted the 
inqxiial city of Vienna* In 1866 Austria was banished 
beyond the pale of the German world, and Prussia was 
left in possession > Prussia had entered the arena of 
Htstoiy only a century and a quarter before, when 
Fxcderidc the Great challei^ed the Hapsbui^ suzerainty 
iidierited by Maria Theresa, and the state's subsequent 
career had been one long struggle with Austria for the 
hegemony of Germany* For Prussia, therefore, the 
events of 1866 were the consummation of her destiny : 
the rupture of the old German tradition set upon die 
new tradition of Prussia the seal of success* 

Bisniarck's gmus reconciled Germany to the accom- 
plished fact, and between the decade of Bismarck's three 
wars and the outbreak of the present strug^e, the tution 
grew and prospered so exceedingly under Prussian shep- 
herding, that it remained insensible to the Austrian 
brethren's absence from the fold ; but if Germany is 
now defeated and shorn of her alien provinces, she will 
remember once more that the Austrians are of German 

We have seen that to the ** traditional Prussian " the 
bfli of Posen, Schlesw^ and Alsace wouki mean the 
end of all the gtories, the levelling of the edifice built 
by hts ancestors' valiant hands* Among the "" modem 
Prussians," however, who constitute the industrial 
world of Northern Germany, the misfortune would 
awake no echo of sentiment, but only an anxious com- 
putation of forces* To them the forfeiture of these 
piovinces would betoken the weakening of Germany's 
material power by so much territory, population and 
weahfaf and the strengthening in the same degree of 
mal powers on Germany's flanks, who had already 
proved themselves more than Germany's match, and 


who would be enabled by this he^tening of the odds 
to hold her entirely at their mercy. They would respond 
to the militansts' call for still greater armaments, not 
^m motives of revenge so much as in self-protecti(»i 
against a greater evil. 

Such mi^vings would be set at rest completely by 
the reunion of the Austrian Germans with the Emptce. 
Even if every Alsatian, Schleswiger and Pole managed 
to extricate himself firom Germany's net, the accession 
of the Austrian block would more than doubly com- 
pensate the loss. Germany would be placed beyond all 
danger from her neighbours, and the North German 
would have solved effectively the external problem of the 
nation, without seriously oompromisii^ his internal 
supremacy within it. 

The economic primacy of Northern Germany is 
almost certainly sufficient to outweigh Austrian Gennany 
in addition to the South, but to make the continuance 
of their hegemony sure, the Northerners would probably 
take of dieir own free will the steps we so intensely desire. 
The reinforcement of the Southern groups would give 
Prussia and the Northern " enclaves " a strong mutual 
interest of their own in consolidation, and this would 
necessitate a preliminary reform in the Prussian 
franchise, for Hambuig and Sazony would decline 
membership of the Prussian state on the present terms.^ 

* tlw comolidatioii of the North woukl probably evoke ■ simiUr 
niovcnuat on tbe port d the three Southern itates. Their umted 

population in 1905 was only lofyjfioo and their ana, 43,649 iqiiare 

division between lb* comolidatwl atatci of Nordi and South mnld 
start from the Auatnan feuuki at the exttemc Notdi-West oonet of 
Bohemia, and follow the present botudaiy between Bmm on (be one 
hand and Saxony and the Thuringian p r i nc ^ l^^i[iil on the oAei, 
Thence ii would cut into what is now Pruman tenitory, paning ili^tly 
SeaA of Fulda, till it hit Ae boundary of Hene-DamMadt (the 



Thus the fntemal effect upon Northern Germany of 
Austria's restoration to the Empire would immediately 
prove fatal to the traditional Prussian ruling class. They 
would have the choice of letting the reins drop quietly 
fiom their hands, or of being overthrown ignominiously 
in the effort to deflect the nation from its natural course. 
The revision of the Imperial constitution would crown 
tfaetr discomfiture. 

Under the present system the supremacy of Prussia is 
vested in the Imperial title and privileges of her Ifohen* 
aolkin king, who is the war-lord and executive head of 
the whole nation; but if the Hapsburgs return, the 
Hbhenioollem can be suzerain no more* Bismarck 
banished the Hapsburgs from Germany, because he 
knew that they could never take a subordinate place 
within it. H^burg and Hohenzollem can only come 
into partnership agsin on terms of absolute equality. 

TI10 does not mean the weakening of that unity with 
wltidi Germany was endowed by Bismarck: it only 
means that unity, will no longer be maintained by a 
monarchical bond. The Hohemoollem will sink to be no 

Ndrthctxi blodc of tbt pnnctpality). It would ootacide with this 
hoandafy alooy its Southern segment, and break next into Prusnan 
Naann, following the crest of the Taunus Mountains till it reached the 
Kiiioe opposite Bmflen. 

Tltti would assign to the South not only Kanau and Wiesbaden but 
Fnnkftir^ the centre of German railways and finance, which has been 
i nco rp o rat ed in Prussia since z866. By Geography the whole basin 
of file Main beloogi to the South as well as the upper basin of the 
Rhioe as £ar as Bingen and the Taunus, for at this point the united 
sticam foemed through their junction pierces by a narrow dfifile a line 
ofhtUs athwart its course, and enters a new stage when it emerges again 
■io uie open* 

Beyond the Rhine the boundaiy-line would owicide widi the present 

a Palai 

bo u n dary between the Bavarian Palatinate and Rhenflh Prussia, as far 
as tlie boundary of the '* Reichsland '* in the ne^bourhood of Saar^ 
oAady where it would take to the water-parting between the Rhme 
and tlie Biowlk till it reached the frontier of France* The position 
off the Ffaaoo-German frontier would, of course depend on whether 
Alnoe united herself widi France or with this new South German unit. 


more than oonstittttional sovereign of die new North 
German state, consolidated under the Prussian title and 
governed from Berlin : the Imperial Reichstag will gain, 
correspondingly in scope and authority by diis relief 
from monarchical concurrence* The national unity that 
overrides federal particularism will thus receive in 
Germany the same parliamentary expression that it 
possesses in the U*S.A., and through this common 
democratic organ the various groups within the nation 
will be represented in the national counsels in strict pro* 
portion to their several importance* On this principle 
the North will preserve its leadership in Germany, 
Germany will be freed from fear of her neighbours, and 
Europe will be reassured as to Germany's policy in the 
future* The ejection of the Hohenssollem from the 
highest place in the Empire will be equivalent in 
European eyes to a renunciation of Prussianism. 

These are great expectations, but as far as Europe and 
Germany are concerned, there is no apparent obstacle to 
their realisation* Germany, however, is no more in 
command of the situation than ourselves* Everything 
turns upon the reincorporation of Austrian Germany, 
and this lies in the hands of the Austrians alone* No 
one can compel them to re-enter Germany against their 
will, nor prevent them from doing so if they wish* 

Will the Germans of Austria be moved to take this 
step or no i Certainly they will not take it to oblige 
Germany or Europe* Nations do not dispose of them- 
selves upon altruistic motives* Austria will only seek 
membenhip in the German Empire if she finds her own 
interest in doing so, and obviously her interest will not 
point this way tmless the restilt of the present war 
upsets the statos qao even more momentously for her 
than for Germany* 


The regime under which the Austrians at present 
live was established in consequence of the events of z866. 
Neariy half a century has passed since then, during 
wfaidi they have been perfecdy at liberty to change it 
and adopt some alternative form of political organisation. 
The £act that they have not done so seems to prove that 
they will uphold, or at least tolerate, the existing system 
until some stonger force intervenes* 

The reasons for such an attitude are not obscure. In 
the first place there is the factor of inertia* The present 
Hapsburg Monarchy is oq^anised so elaborately and on 
so large a scale that it possesses an incalculable momen- 
tum. Enormous energy must be mobilised against its 
mechanism before it can be brot^t to a standstill. 
Even such a catastrophe as this war might fail to shatter 
it, and one of its own elements would find the greatest 
difficulty in dissolving its structure by a dehl>erate« 
uwtfimulated exercise of will. 

The change, moreover, would not only be diffictdt for 
the Austrian Germans, but also positively to their dis- 
advantage. If inertia has been the only restraint upon 
their freedom of choice, it is because, during this half 
century, they have been one of the dominant factors in 
their own political enviroimient, with power, as far as 
human will avaib in politics, to bind or to loose. By 
txansferrmg their allegiance from their present society 
to the German Empire, they would inevitably sti£Fer 
in status, for we have seen that they would have to 
yield precedence to the consolidated state of Northern 

We may therefore draw the negative conclusion that 
the Germans of Austria certainly will not enter the 
German Empire, unless the Hapsburg Empire has 
pceviously broken up, and that such a break-up could 



only be caused by some external agency in their 

This definition of what a break-up of the Hapsburg 
Empire implies, may forestall an objection that must 
long have been in the critic's mind. ** You talk very 
glibly/' he will have been thinking, ** about reconciling 
Germany by giving her two-fold compensation for her 
European losses, but perhaps her conquerors may find 
such conciliation dear at the price* Do you really 
suppose that the Allies, if they finally beat Germany by 
an exhausting war, will allow her to emerge even stronger 
than before from the subseqpient setdement i '* 

It is of course obvious that they will not, and the 
objection is so &r cogent* It is not relevant, however, 
to the case in question* 

During the last generation, the states of Europe have 
tended to play a less and less individual part in the game 
of diplomacy and war* The coalition, not the sii^e 
country, has become the unit of power* Germany's 
military strength can only be estimated in terms of die 
whole group to which she belongs, and, since the 
German and the Hapsburg Empires have now been 
partners in international politics for thirty-five years,^ 
we must for this purpose treat them as a single block* 

It is true that the standard of social efficiency in 
general, and of military organisation in particular, is 
considerably higher in die German section of the block 
then in the other, so that the transference within the 
block of an important element from the inferior Haps- 
burg system to the superior German would certainly 
increase the power of the btock as a whole, given that its 
total composition continued the same* If the break-up 
of the Hapsburg Empire were merely nominal, and the 

^ Since tBjg* 


group which had formerly cx)nsisted of Germany and 
Aiistiia-cum-Hungary were reconstituted as Germany- 
cum-Austria and Hungary, then our critic's comment 
would be quite in point* The coalition would indeed 
emerge stronger than before, with a margin of increase 
that would cover the bss of a few border provinces, and 
die Allies could not suffer events to take such a course* 

This possibility is disposed of, however, by our con- 
clusion that Austria will never merge herself in Germany 
unless the other elements of the Hapsburg Empire do 
break away from her in some real sense, and fly off at 
a tangent both from the Hapsburg state and from the 
German coalition. If this were to happen, it would of 
ccmrse immeasurably lessen the total offensive power of 
Germany and her group, and we could regard a con- 
siderable addition to the individual strength of Germany 
herself with perfect equanimity* 

We are accordingly faced with the question : will 
the War produce a radical break-up of the Hapsburg 
Monarchy, and if it does, on what lines will the dis- 
solution take place i 

We shall then find a further question awaitif^ us* 
Dnsolution, supposing we come to believe it probable, 
will certainly cancel the factors which at present render 
union with Germany tmdesirable to Austria, but it need 
not inspire her widi a positive desire for it. If the 
Hapsburg compleicus is loosened, Austria will find 
herself released from old ties* She may prefer to con- 
tract no new ones, and embark instead upon a phase of 
independent existence* This is a contingency we shall 
have to consider, before we can proclaim our Austrian 
solution of the German problem as a certainty; but we 
must not be over-hasty* We will try to deal with only 
one questioci at a time* 




Can the Hapsburg Empire survive the present crisis i 
The question has been asked several times akeady during 
the past oentury, and has been answered invariably in 
the n^^ative, yet the Empire still exists, and is playing a 
leading part in international politics at this moment* 

Twice over Austria was utterly defeated and shorn of 
eactensive territories by Napoleon, only to emerge in 
18x4 with wider frontiers than she possessed in 1792* 
For the next thirty-three years international statesman- 
ship took its cue from the Atistrian Chancellor Met- 
temich. Then the international revolution of 1848 
overthrew Mettemich with bewildering suddenness, 
and it seemed as though the Monarchy would vanish 
with the diplomat who incarnated its ideals. 

In this year it was bu£Feted from one quarter by the 
full storm of Italian Nationalism, which had been brew- 
ing for half a century, and now swept the people of every 
Italian principality into a common crusade against the 
alien master encamped on the Po« On the other flank 
Tcfaechs and Magyars renounced all participation in a 
Germanised state, and summoned the Hapsburg to 
accept the crowns of independent Bohemia and Hungary 
at Prag and P6sa9ony, unless he were willing to forfeit 
their allegiance altogether* Even Vienna, the capital 
and core of the Empire, rejected her native sovereign* 
The fire of Liberalism set the Viennese popuhtion in 
a blaze : they made common cause with the Magyar 
Liberals further down the Danube, and the Enq)eior 


Ferdmand retired to the loyal and conservative Tyrol. 
At one moment the army of Radetzky, whom the Italian 
Tiohmteers were besieging in the fortresses of the 
** Quadrilateral/' ^ was the only rock of authority that 
still defied the flood* 

Under these circumstances Ferdinand despaired of 
the Monarchy and abdicated.* The task of recovering 
for the dynasty its ancestral inheritance viras undertaken 
by his nephew Frands Joseph as a ^^ forlorn hope/' 
Yet his venture met with such success that he has enjoyed 
a reign of almost unparalleled duration* Radetzky had 
already broken the Italian onset at the battle of Custozza, 
and the government had re-entered Vienna by force : the 
gage was now thrown down to the Magyars* During the 
winter months of 1849 the struggle in Hungary was 
bloody and indecisive ; but in March Radetzky's crush- 
ing victory over the Piedmontese at Novara enabled the 
Monarchy to concentrate all its forces on the Hungarian 
front, in May the Tsar Nicholas decided to succour his 
fellow-autocrat, and before the end of the summer the 
Hungarian army capitulated to the Austro-Russian com- 
manders at Viligos* Every foot of territory within the 
Austrian frontier was thus once more under the govern- 
ment's control, and towards the end of 1850 the 
Monarchy reasserted its hegemony over Germany by 
extorting a public apology ' from Prussia for the coun- 
tenance she had lent to the German national move- 
ment while Atistria had her hands full on the South 
and East* 

Austria thus succeeded in stifling the first birth- 
spatsms of the new Europe : it is a still more remarkable 
ac hi evement that she survived their inevitable renewal 

* Maotua, Peschiera, Verona and Legnano. 

* Dccrmbr r X848* * The Convention'of OlmQtz. 


and consummation. Napoleon IIL dealt her a hard 
blow in 1859, which led direcdy to the establishment 
of the Italian national state* In z866 the new Italy and 
Prussia, drawn together by coincidence of resentment 
and ambition, attacked Austria simultaneously from two 
flanks, and ousted her completely from the Italian and 
German spheres* Yet the main body of the Bmpire did 
not dissolve under these strokes : external humiliation 
merely opened a new epoch of internal evolution* 

The Hapsburg Monarchy, then, has resisted the 
shock of three titanic phenomena : Democracy, the 
Risorgimento and Bismarck* The earthquake carried 
away Lombardy, Venetia and the hegemony of Germany 
— ^two pinnacles and an ornamental facade — but the 
building itself stood firm* So, we might infer, the 
present catastrophe may detach Galida, and possibly 
Bosnia as well, but still the Monarchy will not collapse : 
if it outlived the nineteenth century, it need have no 
fear of the twentieth* 

Nevertheless, the prophets of death have reason, 
though not precedent, on their side* 

The Hapsbui^ state, like the Prussian, has grown out 
of one of Germany's Eastern "" marks*'' It is entirely 
the creation of the Hapsbtirg Dynasty, which estab- 
lished its hold on the duchies of Austria and Styria in 
1282, when Rudolf of Hapsburg was Holy Roman 
Emperor* Round this nucleus successive generations 
of Hapsbui^ have gathered the present collection of 
provinces by conquest, inheritance, feudal escheat, 
marriage-settlement, free gift, legal chicanery, and all 
the other methods which contribute to the growth of 
private estates* Austrian history has therefore been 
dominated likewise by the personal factor, but here the 
anal(^ with Prussia ends : both developments are 


espressions of family character, but their comparison 
iUustrates the marksd divergence of Hapsbtu^ and 
HcAenzollem temperament* 

The Prussian collector has been systematic and self- 
controlled. Starting on the Eastern fringe of the 
German world, we have seen how persistently he shifted 
his land-marks towards the West, never grasping too 
eagerly but never relaxing his grip, till his estates co- 
incided with Northern Germany in extent, and his 
administration was adopted for the government of the 
German nation* 

The Hapsburg has shown no such consistent policy* 
He has pursued his hobby in happy-go-lucky fashion, 
gaining here and losing there with good-humoured in- 
difference* There are few territories in Europe that 
have not passed through his hands. Before the great 
prize of Austria became his, he Uved in a casde on the 
hanks of the Aar,^ from which he derives his family name* 
The warriors of the Five Cantons ejected him from his 
ancestral dweUing when they founded Switzerland, and 
at present not one rood remains to him of this land, nor 
of Alsace and the Black Forest, his earliest acquisitions* 
He has owned Spain and Belgium in the West, Venice, 
Milan, Naples and Sicily have been ruled by him ; in 
combat with the Turk he advanced far deeper into 
Serbia during the eighteenth century than his armies 
have penetrated during the present war, and the occupa- 
txm of the Danubian principalities once carried him to 
die Black Sea coast* All these bizarre properties have 
been lost to him, but there is variety enough in the assets 
that remain* 

Prussia has made herself the exponent of German 
natbnality : modem Austria is representative of no 

* The chief Southern tributary of the Upper Rhine* 


nationality at all« It is true that two ^ small nations^ the 
Magyars and the Tchechs, are wholly contained within 
her frontiers ; but these constitute no more than 18*9 
and 17*5 per cent* respectively of her total population** 
The majority that remains is composed of fn^^ments 
detached from six nationalities : Germans^ Italians and 
Roumans ; Poles, Ruthenes and Southern Slavs* In aU 
these six cases the main body of the race lies beyond the 
Atistrian frontier, while in four of them it is organised 
into a national state immediately conterminotis with it* 
Germany, Italy, Roumania and Serbia are each waiting 
to claim their Atistrian ** irredenta ** when the favoui^ 
able moment arrives* 

The Hapsburg Monarchy has set Nationality at 
defiance, and that is why the prophets shake their heads 
over its destiny* What is the secret of its extraordinary 
vitality, which has falsified all the prophets' calculations 
and enabled it to survive both internal dissidence and 
pressure from without $* An organism cannot thrive 
with complete disregard to its environment* If the 
Monarchy has not adapted itself to the national principle, 
it must have responded to some other factor of equal 
significance in the modem world* 

We shall find this factor in Geography* 

The political maps of mediaeval and contemporary 
Europe produce quite different impressions* The 
former is complex and variegated like a mosaic, or like 
some rich window of stained glass, which has been 
shattered by cannon and pieced together again hap- 

> We might bring the number up to four, if we treated the Slovaks 
as a nationality independent of the Tchechs, and distinguished the 
Slovenes from the Southern Slavs. 

* Total population of Austria-Hungary, 45,405,000; Magyars, 
8,589,000 ; Tchechs-Slovaks, 7,946,000. The figures are taken mm 
the census of xgoo. 


hazard out of the fragments, without regard to the 
or^jtnal design* The latter recalls the work of a skilled 
nineteenth-century restorer, who has taken the patch- 
work to bits, and patiendy regrouped the fragments till 
the plan of their creator is once more apparent* If 
Nationality is one characteristic of the modem state, the 
second is geographical compactness and homogeneity* 

The Hapsburg Monarchy has conformed itself with 
striking success to this geographical law* At the setde- 
ment of 1814 it abandoned its tide to Belgium and the 
Black Forest in exchange for Italian territories im- 
oiediately contiguous to its main mass, and the events 
of x866, which expelled it from Italy and Germany 
altogether, completed efifectually its geographical con- 

The triumph of the Risoigimento and of Bismarck 
seemed the Hapsburg Monarchy's disaster : in reality 
it did the Monarchy good service by forcing it to accept 
its natural destiny as the Danubian tmit in the European 

We have seen that the nucleus of the Dynasty's 
dominions was the Mark of Austria* This province 
was founded in 976 a*d* by Otto II*, the Holy Roman 
Emperor, to be the bulwark of Bavaria and all Southern 
Gennany against the Magyars, a horde of nomads from 
the Eastern steppes,^ who had forced their way up the 
Danube and raided Western Europe for a century as far 
as the Mediterranean and even the Atlantic* Otto's 
father, the Great Otto, had at last broken their power in 
a series of crushing victories,' and the new mark was 

* The Magyar language belongs to the Ugro-Pinnish group, but they 
mst have amtfnflatfd an important Turk^ element, for the Byzantine 
Bmpuor and htstorian Constantine Porhyrogennetos could write of 
them in the tenth century as the ^ Turks **par exctUence^ 

• The battle of the Lechfeld in 955 was tte final stroke. 


intended to confine the chastened Magyars within iron 
limits. It was therefore similar in design to the Mark 
of Brandenbtirg^ which was founded during the same 
period to protect Northern Germany against the 
Slavonic tribes likewise advancing Westward on the 
further flank of the Carpathians* 

Austria^ however, outstripped Brandenburg in its 
early development* Under die House of Babenbeif;, 
which ruled it from its fotmdation until their own 
extinction in 1246, it grew steadily in population and 
extent : when the Hapsburgs took possession of it in 
1282, it included not merely Upper and Lower Atistria 
up to their present boundaries, but the Mark of Styria 
as well, and was thus already one of the most important 
units in the German world* 

This prosperity was due to the province's command- 
ing geographical situation. Vienna, which has been its 
capital since the tniddle of the twelfth century, is die key 
to the Danube basin, because it lies at one of the 
principal breaks in the river's course.^ At this point 
two great mountain^piants stretch out their arms towards 
the Danube from opposite sides* On the South-West 
the Alps press forward till dieir last spur, the Wiener 
Wald, plunges into the stream immediately West of the 
city: North-Eastward the Carpathians spread their 
wings fanwise, and one of them, the ** Little Car- 
pathian '' ridge, descends as far as the North bank of the 
Danube immediately East of the March tributary and 
jtist above the Htmgarian town of Pdszony (Pressbutg)* 
Between these two lines of motmtains there intervenes 
a strip of plain, the Marchfeld, in the angle formed 
by the junction of the March with the Danube* 

Across the Marchfeld, Alp and Carpathian beckon to 

^ The ** Iran Gates " are the other* 


one another, and the river whispers to all human way- 
Carers from the South-East that they must sb'p throi^ 
this gap if they wish to reach his source, since to left and 
right the mountains close their ranks and present an 
impenetrable barrier. Vienna, however, has seized 
control of this narrow gate. Ensconced between the 
Wiener Wald and the Danube, it commands the March- 
feld on the opposite bank. An army that traversed the 
I^aiii &Dm tbe East and sot^t to ascend the rivei 
further in Vienna's despite, would make the attempt 

Vienna has proved its strategic worth against more 
fonnidable enemies than the Magyar : in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries it shielded Germany^ and 
Westem Europe from the Turk. The two sieges kud to 
it by die invader, first in 1530 and then again in 1683, 
were the most critical moments in the protracted assault 
opcm Christendom, but the Turkish tide found here its 


high-water mark* After the crucial year of the second 
siege, it ebbed steadily back, and Vienna ceased to be a 
military outpost, as the border between Christendom and 
Islam shifted further and further down the Danube again* 

Thus ended the medieval phase of Vienna's history* 
For seven hundred years die place was a fortress 
severing the upper from the middle basin of the 
Danube ; since then it has become an imperial dty, the 
centre of a state formed by the union of both regions 
within a common frontier* Superficially, this looks 
like a complete reversal of character : in reality, Vienna 
has risen to be the capital of a great modem monarchy 
precisely because it has continued to be the point of 
contact and division between two worlds* 

The portion of the present Hapsburg Monarchy that 
lies West of Vienna belongs to the indtistrial world 
of Central Europe* The manufacturing district of 
Reichenbe^ in the Northern comer of Bohemia is con- 
tinuous with the Saxon Black Country immediately 
across the frontier* In Silesia we have seen how 
negligible the political boundaries are from the economic 
point of view : Austrian and Prussian Silesia constitute 
an indivisible economic unit, and this unit in tum is only 
one section of a vast industrial belt, which htgjaas in 
Poland, and extends Southward through Moravia and 
Lower Austria as far as Styria beyond the Danube, on 
the Alps' South-Eastem slope* 

The portion of the Monarchy that lies East of Vienna 
presents a striking economic contrast* The immense 
plain of alluvium deposited by the Danube and die 
Theiss, which opens out below Buda-Pest and is known 
as the " Alfold,'' specialises in the production of wheat 
and horses* The mountainous country between the 
Drave and the Adriatic is devoted to stock-breeding* 


Both these districts belong to the Soudi-Eastem gzoup, 
which lemains in a much lower stage of economic 
development than Central and Western Europe* Here 
modem industry has not yet struck root, and economic 
activity is still confined to the production of raw 
materials for the industrial world^s factories and of 
foodstufEs for its multiplied workers. The AlfSld is 
homogeneotis in productive capacity with die Rou- 
manian and Bulgarian plains in the lower basin of the 
Danube beyond the ** Iron Gates '' : the live-stock trade 
of the mountains reaches its acme in Serbia, which is 
dependent entirely upon its export of swine. 

The two sections of the Monarchy which meet at 
Vknna are thus economically complementary* Co* 
operation widi the Soudi-East assures to the North- 
western worker that raw materials will not run short 
and that the cost of living will remain low : oo-operation 
with the North-West guarantees the South-Eastem 
husbandman and shepherd a stable market for their 
amuial surplus* Isolated, each section would be 
txposcd to all die dislocations of shortage and over- 
piodtiction ; combined, they constitute a self-sufficient 
economic unit* 

We can now understand how the Hapsbuq; state, 
after centuries of territorial fluctuation, attained throt^ 
the aetdement of 1866 an equilibrium which has 
endured for nearly fifty years* From the standpoint of 
Natiooality, the Monarchy in 19x4 is as chaotic as it 
was in 1793 or x6z8 : from the point of view of economic 
geography, it has slowly but surely advanced from chaos 
to order* The Mark of Austria has forfeited its national 
significance as the bulwark of Germany, only to realise 
its economic destiny as the focus of the Danube Basin* 
The great river which Vienna commands runs from 


head to foot of the Empire like a spinal oord, and the 
Hapsburg dominions have consolidated themselves 
roimd this central conductor of economic life* Hquftmig 
territories beyond the range of the Danubian "" nervous- 
system " have inevitably fallen away and been absorbed 
m other organisms, while territories within its compass 
have been irresistibly drawn into the Hapsburg sphmt, 
and vitalised into an organic whole* 

The centripetal princ4>le we divined in the Hs^burg 
Monarchy reveals itself, therefore, as economic* The 
Monarchy has accommodated itself to the current set 
going by the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth 
century, and this augurs strongly for its survival* The 
economic factor operated side by side with the national 
in the moulding of nineteenth-century Eufope* The 
territorial simplification, which we have noted in general 
and traced more closely in the Hapsburg instance, 
was determined principally by the economic cause* 
Economics have been winning their way to primacy, 
and we may prophesy that in the future ** international *' 
phase of dvilisatum, they will play the dominant rftle* 

The setdement of z866, then, brought the Hapsbuq; 
Monarchy economic unity and equilibrium* A living 
organism cannot, however, remain static : to survive, 
it must grow* All states are in process either of growth 
or of decline, and they are inevitably reduced to the 
btter phase by failure to succeed in the former* Until 
z866 Austria wasted her strength and jeopardised her 
future by failing to recognize her Danubian character : 
l^marck and the Risoi^^imento tai^t her, by a rude 
lesson, that the true field for her expansion lay neither 
towards Italy nor towards Germany, but in the same 
direction as die Danube's current* Thenceforth Austria 
set her face steadfasdy towards a South-Eastem horizon* 


This '' trend Eastwards''^ has taken a very sintster 
oomplezibn^ and has even occasioned the present war ; 
yet its motive forot is not the dynastic ambition which 
governed Austria's development as recently as the 
Napoleonic period* It is only pardy acootmted for 
by that national chauvinism of the '' Prussian " type^ 
wliidi during the last century has been supersedit^ the 
rivalries of Autocracy and caricaturing them in its 
escaggerated egotism* The essence of the movement 
IS not militaristic but economic* It is the penetration 
of an indtistrialised unit, in search of wider markets and 
wider sources of raw produce, into r^ons still on the 
far side of the Industrial Revolution* 

The most striking expression of the Eastward Trend 
is the position won by the Austrian Uoyd Steamship 
Company in the traffic of the Levant* You can board 
these steamers bound for Trieste at every great port in 
tbe Nearer East* The express service firom Alexandria 
has become the favourite route of British officials 
returning from Egypt and the Soudan on leave, and the 
Company has had die enterprise to run anodier service 
90 hr afield as Bombay and Ce^n, in order to capture 
the passenger-traffic from British India as well* Batoum, 
the port of Russian Caucasia, is another terminus of the 
Une, and it serves the whole of Asiatic Turkey for the 
Gtfiiage of the European mail* In all the ^ean you 
wiO not meet finer ships than these, and diey produce 
die sense of some strong, civilised power behind the 

As soon as you have passed Corfii the impression 
deepens* Slerious competition from the French 
Messageries Maritimes or from the various Italian 
lines ceases conspicuously at the mouth of die 

1 ** Drang aach Oitai*'' 


Adriatic^ and the whole trade up the East coast of 
this gulf is monopolised by the Lloyd*^ 

In Epinis and Albania the Lloyd stands for European 
civilisation* It provides the only means of transport 
for no practicable roads have yet been constructed on 
land. Goods, mails and travellers depend upon it 
entirely for bcal as well as for foreign traffic : in the 
squalid coast-towns the arrival of the Austrian packet- 
boat is the event of the week, and even the hosdle 
Montenegrins cannot afibrd to boycott it from their 
more imposing harbour of Antivari. 

Montenegro is an improvement upon Albania* Here 
for the first time the steamer can come direcdy alongside 
a quay, instead of anchoring a mile out and transacting 
her business by means of lighters plying dumsily to 
and fro across the strip of shoal water inshore. When, 
however, you leave Antivari behind, and turn to enter 
Cattaro Fjord, you stumble suddenly into European 
civilisation* As the reaches of the ** Bocche ** open out, 
finely-metalled and graded roads, substantially buih 
cottages and beautifully - terraced mountain slopes pie- 
sent themselves on either hand, and a general air of 
prosperity and good management pervades the scene. 

TheresdFter you touch in succession at the Dalmatian 
ports — Gravosa, Spabto, Sebenico— each busier than 
the last, and you wonder curiously in what this series 
will cuhninate, and what is the fountain-head of this 
continually intensified economic activity, the first 
symptoms of which you encountered in such distant 
quarters. In Dalmatia, as in Krete and the Morea, 
your imagination is fired by the majestic remains of 

'The Ungstfo-Cioata line from Fiume is an arttfictal enterprne, 
with the same political intention as the recent attempt to make Hungary 
industrially independent of Austria by the development of Hungarian 


Venetian fortresses with the Lion of St* Mark sculptured 
upon their bastions, but you are aware that their signifi- 
cance has vanished. Your goal is not mediaeval Venice, 
and you are not disappointed when finally you make 

If the Danube is the Hapsburg Monarchy's spinal 
cord, Trieste is the sensory oi^^an through which it 
communicates with the rest of the world. Atlantic 
Imers are moored at its jetties, and it is in direct railway 
communicatjon with every part of Central Europe. 
Here you become fully conscious of the great industrial 
hinterland in Styria and Lower Austria, Moravia and 
Bohemia, which gives the Lloyd work to do in ports 
thousands of miles away, and you remember the grain 
and cattle of Hungary which feed the Austrian manu- 
fixtures like fueL Standing in Trieste, you at last 
behold the modem Hapsburg Empire in its true 

You understand, too, how this racially heterogeneous 
state not merely holds together, but achieves a con- 
structive and even aggressive foreign policy* Economic 
exploitation of semi-dvilised areas demands a backing 
of political prestige* The Austrian Lloyd could not win 
and hold its ground without the constant aid of the 
Austro-Hungarian consul, and the ultimate guarantee 
erf the "" dreadnoughts ** docked at Pola* The business 
of modem commerce can only be conducted with the 
capital^ both material and mo»l, of a great power, and 
no single element in the Monarchy is strong enough to 
play this part alone* The populations of the Hapsburg 
Empire depend upon union for the maintenance of their 
present position in the world*^ 

*A reocflllHniilt Atatriaii^dfeadnoiight was chnstened "Viribus 
Units **— « tragically ratiooal piece of utopiaiitsin* 


The economic solidarity of the Bmpife was striking 
illustrated during the crisis of 1908* The Min^try for 
Foreign AfEairs had seised the opportunity of the Turidsh 
Revolution to proclaim the formal annexation of die 
'' Occupied provinces/' Bosnia - Herzegovina. The 
inhabitants of the district are Southern Slavs, and the 
act was a much heavier blow to Serbian nationalmn, 
which still aspired to incorporate the territory in the 
Serbian state, than to Ottoman Imperialism, which had 
long resigned itself to a merely nominal suzerainty* 
The armounoement accordingly aroused the deepest 
resentment throughout the Slavonic world, and not 
least among the Slavonic citizens of the Empire itself. 

The Slavs, however, could make no reprisals* Russia 
was paralysed by disaster in the Far East and revoludbn 
at home, pro-Serbian demonstrations within the Haps* 
buig K^narchy itself were vigorously suppressed by the 
government, and Serbia was impotent without external 
support* Turkey, on the other hand, was able to re- 
taliate most effectively by boycotting Austrian shipping 
along her whole immense coast-line, and eschewing the 
use of Austrian manufactures. In particular the Turks 
abandoned the ** fez,'' for they had come to depend 
for the supply of their national headgear almost entirely 
upon Austrian industry* 

This Austrian manufacture of fezes hxppantd to have 
become localised in Bohemia,^ and so the Turkish retort 
hit the German and Magyar elements in the Monardiy, 
who were really responsible for the government's actioa, 
far less severely than the Tchechs, its bitterest opponents. 
Austrian ** Official Circles " might therefore have been 

^ Rekhenberg, the chief industml centre of the p r ov i nce, lies in a 
German-speaking district ; but the whole of Behead^ Tcfaecfa and 
German portions alikCy has become thofouf^ily ««i#t««f>*ffiff^ dtuine 
the last century* 


txpected to ooi^ratulate themselves on Hllmg mo birds 
widi one stone. Yet the eoooomic interactioti of eadi 
port of die Monarchy with every other is so dose, and 
Rohtmian industry is such an indispensable element in 
this delica te rhythm, that the effects of the local blow 
made themselves imiversally felt. Instead of rubbing 
its hands, the Ministry for Foreign AfEuis was broi^t 
tt> its knees, and strenuously exerted itself on the 
Tcfaecfas' behalf. The Turkish Government was able to 
extort mose than adequate material reparation for the 
Monarchy's moral delinquency b^re it gave the signal 
for the boycott to cease. 

The breach with Turkey in 1908 was an interlude. 
Since the Balkan crisis which culminated in the Russo- 
Tuitiih war of 1878, the Hapsbui^ and OtK>man 
Empires have normally maintained a good undeistand" 
ing, and the birth of this friendship was fbUowed 
immediately by the alliance with Germany in 1879. 

Tliis trqtle association, which has endured ever since, 
and has embaAed in common upon the present war, is 
likewise aplaincd by the economic situation. If Pan- 
gcnnan pc^tidans dream of eventually consolidating 
a gone of territory " from Hamburg on the North Sea 
to Koweit on the Persian Gulf " into a sii^^e pohdcal 
tmit, this is simply a hypothetical expansion of the 
giDupii^ which already exists in miniature in the Haps- 
butg Monarchy itself. The Hapsbui^ state is built up 
oat of the inckistrial districts West of Vienna and the 
agrarian districts East of it : the " Pangerman Con- 
federation " would include the whole of industrialised 
Central Europe on the one hand, and a proportional 
agrarian element in South-Eastem Europe and Nearer 
Asia on the other. 

There is oonsiderable economic iustification for this 


programme.^ Gec^^phy has imposed the ** Tiend 
Eastward '^ upon the youi^r industry of Central 
Europe as inevitably as she summoned the older 
industry of the West to the Atlantic, and to the colonial 
areas which lay along its highways* Yet Pangiermaniam 
has set itself a difficult and perhaps a disastrous goal, in 
determining to convert this economic possibility into a 
political fact* It has begun by challenging the rest of 
Europe to a mortal duel upon this issue* We have good 
hope that the battle will end in the discomfiture of the 
aggressor and the frustration of his plans, but even if 
he were victorious in the war, he would find himself 
hardly nearer to his objective* He hopes to fashion a 
vast political structure upon his economic framework : 
he has first to learn whether this basis suffices for the 
execution of a less ambitious piece of craftsmanship* 

Will the centripetal force of economics finally over- 
come the centrifugal force of Nationality in the present 
Hapsbui^ Empire i The programme of Pangermanism 
stands or falls by the answer to this question, and it is 
also a repetition, in more precise terms, of the question 
we asked ourselves at the close of the last chapter : 
Will the Hapsburg Empire break up as the result of this 
war i Our attention is recalled to the internal struc- 
ture of the Hapsburg state, this time in its political 

The countries which have coalesced into the present 
Hapsbui^ Empire are some degrees removed from the 
original centres of modem European dvilisatton, and 

* The Germano-Austio-Turkish league has proved itself firmer than 
the official ** Tr^le AUiuioe,'' of which Italy, not Turloey, ts the tfatrd 
member* Italy joined the Central Buropcan powers in xSSa on 
account of a temporary economic clash with Franoer but her funda- 
mental interests, as we shall see later, are entirely dififiucnt from theirs. 


medixval oondidons here continued almost unmodified 
until the middle of the eighteenth century. 

The new leaven began to work rather suddenly in 
Maria Theresa's reign. She weathered the European 
storm which burst out upon her accession by arousing 
the national patriotism of the Magyars/ but the Empire 
had been in danger of complete dissolution, and the 
attempt to recover Silesia from the Prussians by alliance 
with France did not meet with success.' Maria Theresa 
was led by these misfortunes abroad to develop the 
Empire's latent strength by reo^anisation at home. 
She initiated her dominions into the ** Strong Govern- 
ment '' phase, by a policy of centralisation on the model 
of contemporary Prussia and France. 

Political evolution in the ** Danubian tmit ** thus 
itself at the outset from the process in the 

West* There "" Strong Government '' and Nationality 
prevailed in succession, and the latter was enriched with 
the former's inheritance : here the two forces appeared 
simultaneously upon the scene, and it was not long before 
they came into violent collision. 

Li 1780 Maria Theresa was succeeded by her son 
Joseph II. Joseph was a devoted disciple of the French 
philosophers, and he attempted to carry out uncom- 
promisingly in backward Austria that transformation 
of society which was accomplished a few years later in 
such partial measure in progressive France. The actual 
achievements of the French Revolution were none the 
less stupendous, however short they fell of their aim, 
and they were only made possible by the spiritual 
response of the Nation to the philosophers' gospel. 
Joseph undertook the mission of the ** philosopher- 

> ** War of the Austrian Successoii/' 1740-1748. 
• •* Seven Years' War,** 1756-17^. 



king," and attempted by means oi " Strot^ Govern- 
ment" to wrench unenlightened populations out of 
their (dieiished traditions and convert them fordbly by 
the accomplished fact. Neglecting all local differences 
of language^ religion, and custom, he proceeded to re- 
fashion his dominions on a pedantically uniform plan. 

Joseph's crusade was a disastrous failure. Reform 
was checkmated by revolt, and he was killed by ten years 
of unrelieved disappointments. Yet his short reign has 
determined the course of the Monarchy's internal history 
ever since. 

He contrived to rai^e NationaUty and Enlighten- 
ment in opposite camps. His dt^matic disr^ard for 
national feeling awakened it into frantic life, and it 
arrayed itself for the battle not in the " Rights of Man " 
(of viutii it had never heard), but in the familiar 
harness of mediant vested interests. The centres of 
nationalistic resistance were the provincial " estates," 
bodies representative not of peoples but of castes. 
Hiey were dominated by the nobility and the Church, 
so that nationalism in the Hapsburg Empire started with 
a strong feudal and clerical bias,' whidi has left pei^ 
manent effects. The movement has remained legalistic 
instead of becoming philosophic. It looks to the past 
rather than to the future, and has fallen a willing victim 
to the malady of " historical sentiment." 

Joseph's death in 1790 concluded the first bout 
in the contest between enl^tened despotism and 
nationalistic reaction, but the factors of success and 

' Thii n true of dw difbmit movemeoti in nnou* degrees. Magyar 
iutioaaIi>m. for instance, hu been wholly ariitocntic sad oot dencal ; 
among the Slovenes, wheie the nobility was German, dcricalkB has 
till recently been supreme : national feeling among the Tdiecfas ms 
fostered, in its earlier phase, by the Church and (be oiiginaUy Gtmaa 
--•--■''- f in conjunction I 



failure were too evenly divided between the two forces 
to allow a speedy decision* The struggle continued 
intermittently till the revolutionary year of 1848 brought 
it tD a head* 

We have already seen how Hapsbturg autocracy was 
overthrown in one year only to rise again in the next^ 
how the national principle was championed by the 
Magyars, who were willing to take up arms on its behalf, 
and how their heroic resistance to Francis Joseph's 
armies was overcome by the intervention of Nicholas, 
Us accomplice* 

From 1849 to z86x Joseph's theories seemed to have 
triumphed, but in the Uttemess of the conflict despotism 
had discarrifd its enlightenment* A uniform regime 
of absolutism was imposed upon the whole Monarchy, 
and the official use of German, the language of the 
Viennese bureaucracy, was umVersally enforced, with- 
out regard to the nationality of the governed* Such a 
system could not last, because its spirit was entirely 
negative* It was created to repress the evolution of 
mneteentli-oenttiry Europe, and was bound to succumb 
under the wave's return* 

The external btows which forced the Monarchy to 
rcs^ its Western ambitions and set it free to pursue 
die economic career of a Danubian tmit, had an equally 
momentous effisct upon its internal politics* 

The war of 1859 ind u ced the govenunent to temper 
centralisation by the grant of a constitution* The 
provincial estates or ** diets " were called into existence 
again, thotsgh their traditional institutions were now 
standardned to an official pattern, and each diet was 
empowered to elect representatives to a two-chambered 
parKammt for the vAiole Monarchy; but the utter 
iUtde of 1866 foUowed hard upon this concession. 


and the government found itself at its subjects' 

At this crisis the initiative was seized by the Magyar 
nation. The relative weight of their numbers in the 
motley population of the Monarchy, the corporate 
feeling inspired in this mass by the tragedy of 1849, an 
inherited political tradition and able leadership in the 
present all combined to give them the mastery of the 
situation. They were able to dictate their own terms, 
and the ** Ausgleich ** or ** G>mpromise '* which they 
imposed upon the Dynasty has remained the basis of 
the Monarchy's internal organisation ever since. 

The principal terms of the compact were as follows : 

(i.) Hungary recovered her separate existence as a 
state, with the territorial extent traditionally claimed by 
the ** Crown of St. Stephen/' and with Magyar as its 
official language. 

(iiJ) This state was o^anised as a constitutional 
monarchy, and the sovereignty was declared hereditary 
in the House of Hapsbu^. Francis Joseph and his 
heirs were to reign with the tide of king after coronation 
at Pest. 

(iii.) The new Hungarian Kingdom was made 
autonomous in every department of political activity, 
with three exceptions : 

(a) Foreign Affairs, including the Q>nsular Service. 

(b) Naval and military o^anisation. 

(c) The budget required for these purposes. 

(iv.) The control of these three departments was 
vested in an orgaai of authority common to Hui^ary 
and the rest of the Monarchy, and the character of the 
common institutions was jealously defined : 

(a) Hungary's allegiance to diem was oonditionai 
upon the establishment and maintenance of a unified 


system of parliamentary govermnent throughout the 
rematmng Hapsbu^ dominions* 

(A) This parliament, and not merely the Dynasty, was 
to ratify the G>mpromise* 

(c) The Hungarian and Austrian parliaments were 
each to elect annually a committee or '" Delegation/' 
and the two delegations were to share the control of 
the Jomt Executive. 

(iQ The Joint Executive was to consist of three 
ministries : for Foreign AfiEairs, for War, and for Finance 

The Magyars' ultimatum was accepted uncondition- 
ally. In 1867 a constituent assembly was convened to 
represent the remainder of the Hapsbui^; dominions, 
the Au^eich was formally voted as the fundamental 
constitutijon of the whole Monarchy, and all relations 
between the new Hungary and the diminished Austria 
which were not covered by its terms, were settled more 
or less satisfactorily by direct negotiations*^ 

The ''Dual System'' created by these actsj^has 
remained in existence forty-seven years without being 
denounced by either party, and we can draw important 
ooodusions both from its structure and from its per- 

The Ausgleich was a compromise between tmity and 

* The foUowtng wetc the chief outstaiidiiig questioas : 

(a) There was die public debt which had been contracted by the 
oentralised autocratic government. The Magyars repudiated responsi- 
bOfty for it, but guaranteed an annual contribution which amounted 
10 somewhat less than a quarter of the total interest The rest of the 
bofdcn devolved upon Austria* 

(b) A cnstoms Union was formed between Austria and Hungary. 
All revenues derived from it were assigned to the Joint Budget, and the 
proport i on was fixed in whidi the two states should oontrmute the 
deficit id the Customs-receq)ts on the joint expenditure. Both the 
Costoms Union and the current quota were made terminable after 
periods d ten years, but the Customs agreement has been renewed in 
one form or anodier ever since, and the readjustment of the quota has 
always been satisfactorily effected* 


independence* During the war of 1849 the Magyars 
had deposed the House of Hapsburg^ denounced all 
connection with the other parts of the Monarchy and 
proclaimed Hungary a republic. This declaration of 
the national will had been nullified by brute fiorce^ for 
seventeen years the national freedom had been paralysed 
by a tyrannical regime, and now at last in 1866 the bonds 
were broken in sunder* After passing through such 
an experience as this, the Ms^ars might have been 
expected to assert their independence more vehemently 
than ever before. Yet in this supreme moment the 
nation was guided not by the violent *' Kossuthists/' ^ 
but by the moderates under Deik : it chose constitu- 
tional monarchy within the Hapsbui^ complex instead 
of republican independence outside it. 

The Magyars are strongly influenced by sentiment, 
and this choice involved the most severe sentimental 
sacrifices. Their constancy in abiding by it therefore 
proves that since 1848 they have become conscious of 
a higher necessity which impels them to maintain the 
Hapsbu^ unit unbroken. 

The Austrians, on their part, made perhaps even a 
greater sacrifice in accepting the Magyars' terms* 
Sentiment they could not have saved, for it was bound 
up with the maintenance of the ** Germanising ** regime, 
and since the dibdcle that was of course beyond their 
power ; but it might appear that they would have con- 
sulted their material interests better by resorting to the 
other extreme, and breaking ofiFfrom Hungary altogether. 
The compromise imposed upon them a disproportionate 
share of the common burdens : they must accordingly 
have found that co-operation with Hungary brought 

' Louis Kossuth was the Mapyar exponent of the ideab of '48^ and 
he was president of the Hungarian republic in 1849. 


tfaem more than adequate material compensation in other 

The explanation lies in the economic structure of the 
Danubian unit which we have already analysed* The 
Ausgkich is simply the political expression of the 
economic situation* The Austrian half of the Dual 
BAonarchy corresponds to the industrial region above 
Vienna/ the Hungarian half to the agrarian region below 
it. Their economic interdependence is recognised in 
die common tariff: Hungary abandons the possibility 
of building up an indigenous industry of her own, by 
protection against Austrian manufactures, in order to 
secure a virtual monopoly of the Austrian market for 
foodstufib and raw produce* The value of political 
massiveness in the competition of international com- 
meroe is recognised m the three Joint Ministries: 
Austria helps Hungary to pay her way, because these 
common organs enable her to draw on Hungary's 
strength as well as her own for the dipbmatic and 
military support of her commercial expansion* 

The political powers, then, which control respectively 
the Austrian and the Hungarian half of the Monarchy, 
have reckoned with the economic factor, and have bodi 
concluded that it is the determining force in their 
polidcal destinies* They see that neither of them is 
economically strong enough to stand alone, and that 
the akemative to ** Dualism ** is not independence, but 
die incorporation of each in another group or unit* 

Yet why shoukl such a change of grouping be 
caimrially less desirable for them than the present 
arrangement i It need involve no economic loss : we 

* The pioviiioe of Dahnatia beloags to Aistria, thouj^ it Iks fiv 
down the Adtiatic, 00 the other side of the ^ Crown of St* Stephen's '' 
nxip of coast-line ; but it is an insignificant exception, due to chance 
ij g lifi thm design* 


can imagine cxmditions under which it would actually 
be advantageous. Suppose the Central Powers won 
this war and realised the Pangennan's dieam by building 
their poKtico-economic confederation from Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf, this colossal complex would 
naturally articulate itself into two groups. The German 
Empire and Austria would coalesce to form the industrial 
half : the agrarian half would constitute itself out of 
Htmgary, the Balkans, and the Ottoman Empire. 

It might seem that Austria and Hungary would both 
gain by such re-organisation. We have allowed that 
the Germans of Austria would be d^^raded to a second- 
ary rdle in the German Empire ; but meanwhile we 
have discovered that they cannot stand alone. For 
them it is merely a choice of yoke-fellows, and their 
mightier kinsmen of Northern Germany would be 
more sympathetic companions than the Magyars with 
their aUen speech and inferior culture. Moreover, as 
members of a consolidated German block they would 
obtain mtich better terms in a new Au^eich with the 
agrarian wing than they enjoy in their present Ausgldch 
with the " Crown of St. Stephen." 

The Magyars, on their side, would gain consider- 
ably in political importance. In the Dual Kbnarchy 
Hungary is no more than an equal, if not actually an 
inferior partner : in a new South-Eastem group, her 
comparative population, wealth and culture would give 
her undisputed leadership. 

The loyalty with wfaidi bodi parties have chmg to the 
Ausgldch must therefore depend upon some further 
factor in addition to the economic. 

We have seen that the Ausgleich takes fiiU account of 
the economic facts. It is a compromise between unity 
nd independence dictated by economic necessity. 


but it has another and a less creditable side* It is 
abo a compromise between compulsory uniformity and 
national devolution* It does not attempt to do justice 
tQ the £acts of nationality in the Hapsburg Monarchy : 
it merely concedes a modictmi calculated to shelve die 
discussion of national problems that are in urgent need 

The Magyars drew the boundary of the ** Kingdom 
of St* Stephen/' and they daim to speak in the name of 
its people* Yet at the census of 1900 only 44*6 per 
cent* of the kingdom's total population was Magyar in 
nationality^ while even in Hungary proper the Magyars 
only amounted to 52*38 per cent*, a bare majority.^ 

The terms of the Ausgleidi between the new 
Hungary and the rest of the Monarchy were thus 
formulated on the one part by no more than a fraction 
of the Hui^arians, and the parliament which accepted 
those terms on the other part was even less representative 
of the ** diminished Austria*'' * Nominally the Ausgleich 
was an arrangement between the whole people of one 
half of the Monarchy and the whole people of the 

^ Pofpahdsm at the Census of xgoo : 

Grown of St* Stephen • • • i9$!3i$%fioo 

Huogtty proper .... z6328/xx> 

Magyais 8^589/>oo 

' The Tcfaechs leftised to send representatives to this constituent 
asseflabiy, and so tbt Aus^eidi was passed without their voice, while 
an the noo-Gennan deputies who did attend were in opposition except 
the Pcks, The hrttcr were won over fay thesovemment at the price of 
■■p«****«* concessions to their nationality, since the Germans formed 
hanUy more than a third of the Austrian population, their supremacy 
ooald only be maintained by a coalition, if the test semblance m 
oooatitutioiial government was to be preserved. They chose to make 
tenm witfi the Polish block radier than any other from motives of 
fordgB poliey which we have already examined. The internal parlia- 
lueuiaiy situation explains why the concessions to tiie Poles were so 
Ut ^^ ta iSbiag, and also why^ they have never become a precedent for a 
feaend acfaeme of devolution. ^ This piece of Austrian liberalism was 
paDsatovy, not romcructive, in intention* 


remainder: actually it was concluded between the 
M^Cyan of Hui^ary, a strong miaocity, and liie 
Germans of Austria, who constituted do more dian 
J5.I J per cent, of the extra - Hungarian or " Austrian " 
population in 1900.^ 

bi this light the " Dual System " acquires a sinister 
connotation. It could fairly be representtd as a 
conspiracy between the two strongest narionalities in 
the Hapsinurg Empire for the concerted oppression of 
the rest. From 1849 to z866 the entire population of 
the Empire was subjected to compulsory Gtermanisation, 
but the buffets the German master received &om his 
enemies in 1866 so weakened him that he was driven 
to take one of his serfe into partnership. He strudt a 
bargain with the Magyar, the sbve with the most 
powerful fists. He raised him to be his peer, made 
over to him a large share of his land and chattels to deal 
with as he pleased, and obtained for himself in letum 
immunity to exploit the remainder (^ his ill-gotten 
possessions jast as unscrupukntsly as ever. Hie 
Au^jleich roisters no real advance in political ideab. 
After its institution, no less than before, the population 
of the Monarchy has been divisible into two categories, 
oppressors and oppressed. The grouping has been 
modified, the system has endured. 

This secondary compromise between uniformity and 
devolution makes not for stability but for disruption. 
The Germans and M^yars muster between them only 
43.35 per cent, of the total population. They will not 
succeed in expbitit^ die tnajority for ever. If they rely 
upon economic solidarity K> cover their sins, they axe 
leaning on a broken reed, for we are in presoice of a 
factor infinitely stronger than the economic. Man is 
' Populatjon of Austria, 36,icrjjooo. GttmanM, 9,173,0(10^ 



no more exclusively '' homo eoonomicus '' than he is 
'' homo sapiens '' : his motives are determined neither 
by free choice nor by mechanical reaction^ but by an 
incalculable combination of both, yet as he advances in 
civilisation his own will plays a more and more dominant 
part* No amount of economic pressture will stifle a 
growing nationality's revolt against injustice* The 
break-up of the EKial Monarchy would dislocate the 
economic life of oppressors and oppressed without 
discrimination, but the latter will assert their freedom at 
the cost of any sacrifice* Samson dragged down the pillar, 
though he knew he must perish with the Philistines. 

The ** Dual "' phase of the Hapsburg national problem 
is therefore essentially transient, and since a return to 
the centralisation of the 'fifties is out of the question, 
the alternatives before the Monarchy are thorough 
devolution to all nationalities ahke or a series of national 
secessions which will be equivalent to a break-up. 

We have now defined our original question within 
narrow limits. To forecast the fate of the Empire 
after the present war, we have to examine whether the 
tendency towards devolution has been on the increase 
or on the decrease during the forty-seven years since 
the Dual System was established. A house that re- 
mains divided against itself must fall in the end. Has 
the rift grown so wide that the Hapsburg Monarchy 
must succumb to the first tremor of earthquake, or is 
it so nearly closed that the danger-point is passed, 
and the building can defy even the most appalling 

To discover this we must review the internal politics 
of the Monarchy since 1867. There are two strands 
of development to foUow, for tmder the Ausgleich the 
'' Crown of St. Stephen '' has disengaged itself from the 


rest of the Danubian Unit, and led a separate life of its 
own. We will leave this junior Hungarian partner for 
the moment^ and concentrate our attention upon the 
" Austrian " * half of the complex, which has continued 
in the direct line of the Hapsburg tradition. 

The Ausgleich stipulated for the establishment of 
parliamentary government in the Austrian as well as 
the Hungarian state. The cotmtry thus re-awakened 
tt) poUtical life found itself divided into two camps. 

On the one side stood the Paiticularists who had 
beaten Joseph e^hty years before. They championed 
the traditional rights of the provinces, and preferred the 
most conservative measure of local Home Rule to the 
most hberally-conceived centralist constitution. Demo- 
cracy was indifferent to them, for their mainstays were 
still the nobility and the Church, and their influence was 
confined to the backward provinces. 

They were not primarily nationalists. One of their 
strongholds was the Tyrol, a purely German district * 
more devoted to the Dynasty than any other part of the 
Empire. It was Particularist because the unsophisti'- 
cated peasants had not emaodpated themselves from 
clerical leadership, and because the piovince itself is 
motintainous and isolated. Another Particularist strong- 

■ Since 1667 the official style of the Hapaburg state hat been the 
" Atstriaiv-Huiwariaa Monafcby," yet the non-Hungariao half i> not 
tcdmicalljr cattOcd AuKria. Toe only oAdal " AuMriai " arc the two 
Danubian arch-duchics, the old German mark, and the concct title of 
Ac non-Hungarian partner as a whole seems to be the " Miigdomi and 
lands repmenied in Ac Rcichantb at Vienna." A ooonnient, though 
quite unofficial formula is " Cts-Lciduaia " and " Trana-Lcilhania." 
The Lcitha is a Southern tributary of the Danube, which forms the 
boundary between the two sections of the Dual Monarchy for a few 

■ Noi counting the Italian-Speaking Trentino qipcnded to it on the 



hold was Bohemia* Here the majority of the population 
was Tchech^ yet the programme of the local diet was not 
conceived on racial lines* They did not agitate for the 
recognition of the Tchech nationality within Bohemia 
so much as for the segregation of the whole province, 
Tchech and German elements alike, from the undis- 
tinguished mass of the Dynasty's dominions* They 
demanded the restoration of the historical Kii^dom 
of Bohemia* ** The coronation of Francis Joseph at 
Prag ** was their party cry, not ** The acceptance of the 
Tchech language as a medium of secondary education 
and official intercourse*'* 

If the various Sbvonic groups in Austria tended, on 
the ^ole,^ to range themselves on the Particularist 
side, it was because the general level of education and 
enlightenment among them was at that time lower 
than in the German section of the population* Bohemia 
was then only in the first stages of the Industrial Revo- 
lution, and her peasantry was as fast in the Church's 
grip as the Slovenes remained till a few years ago* They 
were not acutely anti-German in feeling : nationalism 
cannot flourish without the support of a national 

On the other side stood the Liberal Party, who were 
really Joseph's disciples* They had much in common 
with die party of the same name which had won 
its way to power in Great Britain by the Reform Bill 
of 183a, a generation earlier* They held the same 
xadier narrow but intensely important doctrines, and 
acted with the same honesty up to their principles* 
Like the ** Manchester School," they were zealous for 
material progress* They were determined to bring 
into line with Western Europe, and transform 

We have already explained why the Poles were an exception* 


her into a dosely-knitt efficiently organised^ i 

The Liberals found their chief support in the German 
element^ especially in the provinces of Lower Austria 
and Styria* The reactionary sympathies of the 
Tyrolese were as exceptional among the Germans of 
Austria as they were normal among the Sbvs^ and the 
German nationality contributed an overwhelming 
proportion of the commercial and professional classes^ 
by whom the new Austria was to be built up* 

The Liberal Party accordingly envisaged its policy 
from a German point of view. They oontempbted 
the Germanisation of the Austrian state^ not so much 
through national chauvinism as because uniformity 
was part of their theoretical programme and was only 
conceivable on a German basis* 

The Liberals of 1867 met with far more success than 
their imperial forerunner* The leaven had worked its 
way deeper since his time* The philosopher-autocrat 
had wrestled alone against all his subjects : now his 
ideas were being put into action by the best-educated 
and best -organised section of the poptdation itself* 
Moreover, they were setting themselves a more modest 
task* Joseph had grappled with the whole Hapsburg 
Empire : the Liberals were loyal and convinced sup- 
porters of Dualism* By letting the '' Crown of St* 
Stephen "" go its own way, they had relieved themselves 
of the more backward and stifif-necked half of the 
Danubian Unit, and saved all their eneq;ies for dealing 
with the rest* 

In the parliamentary strug^e with the Particularists, 

^ The application of their political creed to economics led diem to 
the fame condusions as their English prcdecesKis* They were 
convinced Free-traders. 


the liberals won an easy victory. The Aui^ich 
itself gave them a preliminary advantage by stipttlating 
for unified parliamentary government* A common 
Gonstittient assembly had to be summoned, as we have 
seen, to ratify the Compromise on Austria's part, and 
this body proceeded in the same session ^ to frame a 
parliamentary constitution on centralist lines* On 
this occasion, and on many others, the Particularise 
Bohemian deputies played into their opponents' hands 
by refusing to take their seats as a protest against the 
rejection of their demands* With the assistance of the 
Polish group, the German Liberals were still able to 
muster a quortmi and carry on the government according 
to the letter of the constitution* Bohemian abstention 
merely relieved the government of an opposition* 

The Liberal ministry rallied to itself all the forces of 
enlightenment in the cotmtry by passing in 1868 a 
series of laws which tmcompromisingly abolished the 
dvil authority of the Catholic Church*' In 1871 the 
Tchechs made their supreme effort for the restoration 
of the Bohemian kingdom, and failed* In 1873 
Centralism achieved its final tritunph by carrying a 
law which took the election of parliamentary deputies 
from the provincial diets and transferred it to the direct 
vote of the constituencies* 

The Liberals, however, had a short career* They had 
shot all their bolts* Austria was freed from her most 
gaJling mediaeval handicaps and initiated into her 
industrial phase ; the party had no more to offer the 

> Dcoembcr X867* 

* JoBcph had already done this work, but the ecdcstastical otgaoaa- 
tioo had been swept back into power by the re-action against the 
Revoltttioii* The concordat of 1855 between Viennese /Q)8olutann 
aad Fqnl Obscurantism had given the Church ahnost complete power 
over maniage and education in the Hsqjsburg Monarchy. 


country, and its influence began to decline. A financial 
crisis in 1873 tainted it with discredit, and six years later 
it feU. 

The era of Liberal reform was followed by a Itdl. 
For fourteen years ^ Austria acquiesced in the neutral 
ministry of Count Taaffe, who conciliated all parties 
by a poUcy of parliamentary inactivity* The Industrial 
Revolution, however, was producing its effect, and great 
changes were taking place beneath the surface* 

(a) The first symptom was a dramatic reversal in the 
clerical position* llie workers of the German-speaking 
industrial centres were beginning to achieve dass- 
consdousness* They were profotmdly hostile to the 
Liberal capitalism which had created and exploited 
them, and were determined to gain a hearing for their 
own point of view* The Clericals saw their opportunity* 
Their old enemies and conquerors were being attacked 
on the opposite flank : they did not remain passive 
spectators, but circled round the Liberals' rear from 
Right to Left, and joined forces with the new movement* 

In 1882 the Catholic group had detached itself from 
the Conservative mass : during the next decade it 
began to be converted to Christian Socialism* The 
ideas of Joseph had triumphed by appealing to the 
middle class : the Church went one step further, and 
sought to re-establish its hold over the people by 
identifying itself with Industrial Democracy* In the 
course of the 'eighties the ** New Toryism ** achieved 
striking successes* Factory legislation was passed and 
National Insurance introduced* The clerical current 
was confirmed in its new trend* 

(b) The general rise in economic prosperity had 
likewise affected the Austrian Sbvs* Education had 

» 1879-93, 


spread, a cultured class had grown up,^ and therewith 
the Language Question had made its appearance* So 
kng as the Sbvonic tongue remained a peasant patois, 
the use of German was tmchallenged ; but now Tchech 
students in the secondary schools and universities 
demanded instruction in their native medium, and 
Tchech bwyers and officials cotdd claim with authority 
that their language shotdd be placed on an equal footing 
with German in the administration of Bohemia* 

The Language Question was taken up by a new 
party, the '' Yotmg Tchechs/' The historical kingdom 
of Bohemia meant little to them, and they did not insist 
strongly upon Home Rule, much less upon secession* 
They vehemently disagreed with the *' Old Tchechs' '* 
parliamentary policy of passive resistance : they intended 
to extort the recognition of their national individuality 
by taking a vigorous part in the sessions at Vienna* 
Their ideal ran directly cotmter to the old Germanism 
of the Liberals* They were impressed by the fact that 
three-fifths* of the Austrian popubtion were Sbvs, 
they believed that with the advance of democracy 
numbers must prevail, and they conceived of Austria in 
the future as a Sbvonic state* Instead of detaching 
themselves from the Austrian unit, its Sbv citizens were 
to conquer it for Sbvdom, and convert it into the chief 
focus criF Slavonic culture in Europe* 

^The native Tcfaedi and Slovene aristocracy had been either 
Germanised or replaced by Germans in the later Middle Ages* 

" At the Census of 1900 the population of Austria was composed as 

Slavs • 

Total * 06,107,000 zoo% 










This ptogxanune was not Utopian* The Tchedis 
and Poles had entered the pale of European civilisation 
earlier than any other branch of the Slavonic race : 
Pmgand Cracow had played a prominent part in history 
before the foundation of Petersburg or Tobolsk* More- 
over, the emergence of the new Christian Socialist party 
among the Youi^ Tchechs^ German feUow-dtizens 
offered hopes of racial reconciliation. Industrialism 
and the Catholic Church both overrode the divisions of 
nationality. The German Liberals had failed to remove 
the national problem : tmity might still be attained by 
transcendii^ it* The Promised Land, however, was 
still far off, and the path was so beset by dangers that it 
was doubtful whether Austria would reach her goal* 

(c) Christian Socialism was not the only new move- 
ment among the Austrian Germans. The old Liberals 
had fallen because they failed to move with the times* 
They had lost control over the Industrial Revolution, and 
the dericab had snatched from them the initiative in 
social politics; but they had also mismanaged the 
assimilation of the Slavs, and the Youi^ Tchechs had 
arisen in their despite* This Slavonic renaissance 
evoked a German party of a purely nationalistic 

Austrian ** Pangermantsm " had its root in the 
'German districts of Bohemia, which were threatened 
most immediately by the progress of the Tchechs in 
numbers and education* The alliance widi the Ger- 
man Empire in 1879 gave the movement great impetus* 
In z88o an association called the ** German School 
Union ** ^ was founded, to foster education in the Ger- 
man language througlKmt Austria* Bismarck became 
the part/s hero, and Prussian methods their ideal* 


They wished to direct all the resources of government 
to the Germanisatk>n of Slovenes and Tchechs. 

This German chauvinism thwarted the lai^er interests 
of the German nationality* The new ** German Left'' in 
the Austrian Reichsrath was obsessed by the nationalis- 
tic idea, and spumed all the factors that were making for 
progress and unity* Had it triumphed, the bter con- 
ception of a German confederation from Hamburg to 
At Persian Gulf could never have taken shape, for the 
Danubian Unit, the central link in the chain, woukl 
have been shattered in pieces by German fanaticism* 

The crisis came four years after Count Taaffe's 
resignation* In 1891 the Young Tchechs had com- 
pletely ousted the old Bohemian Particularists, and 
thenceforward they were a power in the Reichsrath* 
By 1897 they had become strong enough to impose 
Adi will upon the government, and ordinances were 
promulgated which established Tchech as an official 
language side by side with German through all districts 
of Bohemia* 

The result was a complete breakdown of constitutional 
government* The German nationalists made parlia- 
mentary procedure impossible* Obstruction developed 
into a physical struggle between the parties for the 
possession of the House* The resignation of the 
ministry and the repeal of the decrees eased the situa- 
tion at Vienna, only to necessitate martial law in 
Bohemia* Both sides were intractable, and since they 
combined to prevent the conduct of any business in 
pariiament, government had to be carried on for nearly 
nine years independently of it, by aid of an emergency 
clause in the Constitution* During this period national 
hittemess steadily grew, to the exclusion of all other 
political interests* 


Such oonditioiis could not last for ever. Austria was 

rapidly losing all political moraU, and unless the non- 
nationalistic forces in the country could rally themselves 
sufficiently to make some great step forward, nothing 
could prevent the state from sinking through a phase of 
irresponsible government into utter disruption. 

The situation was saved by a fresh appeal to demo- 
cracy. In 1905 people began to discuss die introduction 
of Manhood Suffrage) in place of the old franchise of 
die Prussian type. 

The proposid brought out the positive community of 
interest between the Slavonic national groups and the 
German socialists. Both had everything to gain by an 
electoral system based not on privilege, either of class or 
of race, but upon the numerical proportion between the 
various sections of the popubtion, and there was no 
rivalry between them, because their aims did not come 
within the same plane of politics. The Slavs were still 
occupied by the preliminary question of nationahty, the 
German workers were devoted to social problems. The 
satutfaction of the Slavonic nationalists could bring 
German Labour nothing but gain. National aspirations 
would pass out of the realm of poUrics as soon as they 
were realised, and their Slavonic devotees would be 
h'berated to recruit the non-nationalisric ranks of Social 
Democracy and Christian Socialism.^ 

The projected Reform Bill produced a beneficent 
effect even before it became law. Durii^ the months 
when it was in debate, a &esh current of polidcal interest 
swept through the mass of the population, and it did 
not disappoint the country's expectations when it was 
finally promit^ted towaicb the dose of 1906. 



Besides distributing parliamentary seats between the 
different races in far juster proportion than before^ the 
new electoral law made an admirable attempt to mini- 
ffl^ racial friction in the details of its mechanism/ but 
its full significance was only seen in the first elections 
held in accordance with it at the beginning of the 
following year* For the first time the people of Austria 
had been free to return a chamber of deputies really 
representative of the country's national divisions^ yet 
the actual result was a relative weakening of the various 
national groups, and an enormous increase among the 
advocates of social reconstruction* Out of a house of 
5x6 members, the Social Democrats mustered 87 ' and 
the Christian Socialists 67 ' : together they amotmted 
to 30 per cent* of the whole* 

Thus between 1897 ^^^ <907 the Austrian State 
braved and weathered the tempest of nationalism* 
During those years it achieved for itself a success we 
hoped to see shared in due course by the whole of 
Europe : it passed over, without suffering shipwreck, 
from the nationalistic to the post-nationalist phase of 

As far as her own seamanship availed, Austria was 
ottt of danger* The session of 1907 revealed the 
influence of nationalism distincdy on the decline, and 
sodal-eoonomic factors in the ascendant* The cotmtry 
needed nothing but a free hand to work out its own 
salvation* Austria, however, is more cruelly involved in 
external trammels than any other state in Europe* She 
is not affected merely by the international situation : her 
fortunes are at the mercy of her yoke-fellow Hungary* 

^SceCh*VL *Fonnerlyxi. 

* Formerly a?. Tbey had by this time absorbed all the clericals 
down 10 the last of the Conservative rear-guard* 


If the unity of the Hapsbuq; oomplex is essential to 
the maintenance of its members' position in the worlds 
developments accomplished in one half of the Monaidiy 
will be of little consequence unless they extend them- 
selves ultimately to the other* Austria had transcended 
nationalism in vain if the same sinister force were still 
capable of precipitating catastrophe in Hungary ; yet 
the Ausgleich rigidly debarred the Atistrian people from 
any intervention in Hungarian aflTairs* There was only 
one power in the Empire to which an appeal from the 
Ausgleich could be made^ and that was the Hapsbutg 

The Ausgleich had never challenged the Dynasty's 
supreme position* Francis Joseph had witnessed many 
transformations of his Empire before z866, and he 
remained the living symbol of a tradition older and 
more endturing than the setdement of that year. It was 
to the King-Emperor's credit that he accepted the Dual 
System with whole-hearted loyalty, though the very 
sinosrity with which he devoted himself to securing its 
success rendered him, as he advanced in years, less and 
less capable of seeing beyond it. 

Francis Ferdinand, however, his nephew and his 
heir, held a very different opinion about the Dynasty's 
mission in the present* For him Dualism was no state 
of perfection, but only a passing phase in the Monarchy's 
bng history* He saw with a clear eye that the Magyar- 
German compact was botmd up widi racial oppression, 
and that so long as it remained in force, the Danubian 
Unit went in danger of a devastating explosion of 
nationalism* What he would have accomplished had 
he ascended the throne, it is impossible to say* People 
are always apt to magnify possibilities that have been 
denied the chance of realisation, yet this much seems 


oertam, that he contemplated the abolitioii of Dualism, 
and die substitution of a ** Trialism *^ in its pbce* The 
Slav was to be raised to an equality with the German 
and the Magyar, and to receive h^ just share in the 
political control of a state which depended upon him 
so largely for its wealth and popubtion* 

Had Francis Ferdinand lived to do his work, he might 
have created an epoch in Hapsbturg history even more 
important than that of the Ausgleich. The forward 
movement which triumphed in Austria in 1906, might 
have conquered the remainder of the Monarchy within 
the next generation* Such hopes were cut short by his 
assassination at Sarayevo in June 1914* That crime 
was the tragedy of Austria* By pltmging her into a 
European war, it cancelled in a moment all the con- 
structive work of half a century and made the wound 
of nationalism break out again, to bleed more violently, 
perhaps, than it has ever done since z848* 

We have seen that this mortal disaster was due to 
no causes latent in Austria herself* To understand 
its antecedents, we must examine contemporary events 
in the other half of the Monarchy, the ** Crown of St* 




In Vienna people like to say that '* the East begins at 
the River Leitha ** : if we borrow the epigram with the 
modification that the '' Balkans *^ begin there, we shall 
bring Htmgarian history into its true perspective* 

Vienna is not merely the dividing-point between two 
economic worlds : it is also the point of transition 
between opposite phenomena of racial distribution* 

West of the Leitha, the nationalities of Europe are 
mainly grouped in compact blocks, which correspond 
with considerable accuracy to the physical and economic 
articubtion of the continent*^ The national basis would 
suggest itself naturally to the observer as a principle of 
political o^anisation, and this quarter of the world was 
in fact the cradle of the National State* South-East 
of the Leitha, however, the nationalities are interlaced 
in inextricable confusion over an area that extends to 
the Bbck Sea and the iEgean, and the international 
congress which will follow the war might well despair 
in this region of coaxing sovereign national states out 
of Geography, not to speak of reconciling their structure 
with the necessities of modem economic life* 

The problem must be faced nevertheless* The 
popubtions of South-Eastern Europe are possessed by 
the idea of nationality to a morbid degree* Intimate 
contact has produced mutual exasperation instead of 
understanding and good-fellowship, while the difficulty 
of devising any compromise that would deal impartial 

* For a visuai prcsentatum of this £sict see Map VIL 


justice to all has only made each faction determined to 
push its own interests recklessly at the expense of its 

These nations contribute litde to European culture* 
Hitherto they have been accustomed to take rather 
than to give, and their spiritual evolution has not the 
same intense interest foi us as that of Germany or of 
Russia* Their importance to Europe lies in their 
immense capacity for doing her injury* 

If the destructive power these elements have accumu- 
lated threatened nothing more precious than themselves 
with destruction, their fate would be comparatively 
tndififerent to us, and a reader who had followed with 
patience our laborious diagnosis of German and Austrian 
oomplaints, and our minute prescriptions for their cure, 
might refuse attention to Magyar or Serbian pathology* 
Yet the physician comes to heal the sick rather than the 
oomparatively sound, and if the sickness is an infectious 
plague, the interests of the whole community urgently 
demand his intervention* 

The Nearer Eastern Question has been with us now 
for a century in continuously aggravated form* The 
Congress of Berlin tried to bury it tmderground in 1878, 
and succeeded in laying a mine where the slightest 
eiq>losion threatened to blow up the European powder- 
magazine* Till this mine is thoroughly damped, we 
shall not have reached our supreme objective — the 
abolition of European war* 

The whole of the unrestful zone beyond Vienna thtis 
£alls within our scope, and in the present chapter we 
shall not confine ourselves to the Hungarian half of the 
Dual Monarchy, but shall extend our discussion to 
Hungary^s Balkan neighbours* The various national 
problems of the region are indeed so closely intertwined 


dttt we oould not deal with any one ai them in isolaticHi. 
Wc will therefore include Htmgaiy with the rest under 
the common denomination of a " Balkan State," and 
we will approach her first, because she holds the premier 
place in the group both in geographical situation and 
in d^iee of ^iritual and material development. We 
shall find Aat she displays all the characteristics of the 
Balkan type. 

A. Hungary 

The Kingdom of Hungary coveis the major part of 
the middle Danube-basin. From the junction of the 
March tnbutary as far as the " Iron Gates " the river 
flows through Hungarian territory. The Carpathian 
Range, which circles from the former point to the second 
in a vast sweep towards the North and East,^ constitutes 
both the watershed of the Danube-system and the 
frontier of the Hungarian state. Southwards alone 
Ae kingdom is bounded first by the Drave descending 
from the Eastern face of the Alps, and then by the 
Danube itself, from the point where it unites widi the 
Drave and adopts the latter stream's Easterly course. 
The mountainous zone on the other side of this line, 
which intervenes between the Danube-basin and the 
Adriadc, has never been incorporated in Hungary 

The heart of the Hungarian land is the AlfSld, an 
alluvial plain deposited in the hollow of a vanished sea. 
In shape it is roughly an isosceles triangle, with die 
Southern river-boundary of the kingdom as its base, 
and with its apex at the Vereczka Pass,* the midmost 
point of the Carpathian arc. The Danube flows through 
it from Buda-Pcsi to its junction with the Drave, and 

■ See mu) on p. lo;. 

■ Immedtatcty Bast of the l^ok Pis. 


it includes the strip of country between the Danube 
and the Theiss, as well as a wide zone beyond the Left 
or Eastern bank of the latter river* 

This central plain was occupied by the Magyars in the 
ninth century A«o* Bursting through the Carpathians 
by the Vereczka Pass, they entered the AlfSld at its apex, 
flooded it with their setdements, and pressed still further 
up the Danube above Buda till they were checked, as we 
have seen, by the Austrian and Styrian Marks* 

Yet the Magyars never made the whole of Hui^^ary 
their own* On either flank of the AlfSld there are 
stretches of hill-cotmtry, included like itself within the 
encircling wall of the Carpathians, but sundered from 
it by lesser mountain barriers* In two comparatively 
isolated regions the earlier possessors of the land 
managed to maintain their existence under Magyar 

North-West of the AlfSld a series of long, winding 
valleys descends from the Carpathians and opens upon 
the Danube between Pressbttxg and Buda-Pest* They 
have remained in the possession of the Slovaks, a 
Slavonic population hardly distinguishable in dialect 
bom the Tchechs of Moravia and Bohemia on the other 
side of the River March* 

East of the Alfdld lies the district called Transylvania* 
Between the Vereczka Pass and the Iron Gates the main 
diain of the Carpathians makes an extremely salient 
angle towards the East, but a secondary brandi of the 
range takes the shortest cotuse from the one point to the 
odier, and skirts the Eastern side of the AlfSld in a 
North'-and-South direction*^ A considerable extent of 

* Id the tfatrteenth century this ridge was clothed in dense forest, and 
the settlefs who penetrated it from the direction of the Alfdld therefore 
gme the name of Transjrhrania to the country they reached on the other 
side of it. 


tangled hill and valley is caught within this split in the 
mountain line, and is almost equally secluded by it 
from the more open cotmtry on all three sides. 

The passes which lead through the outer Carpathian 
wall, North-Eastward into the Moldavian steppe and 
Southward into the plain of WaUachia, carry as many 
lines of railway as those which pierce the interior wall 
and debouch upon the levels of the AlfSld. The 
province is rich in rivers, but the water-system hardly 
facilitates commtmication with the outer world. The 
ootmdess streams have to concentrate their forces in 
three main channels before they can succeed in breaking 
through the motmtain barriers, and even then they 
content themselves with precipitous gorges, barely 
wide enot^ for the current itself* Two of these 
channels,^ however, find their way to the Alf5ld and 
only one' to the WaUachian plain, so that to that extent 
Transylvania may be reckoned to have closer geo- 
graphical links with Hungary than with Rotmiania. 

When the Magyars appeared in the Alfdld, this 
sheltered province was already occupied by the Rotunans, 
a popubtion of Latin speech.* 

The Kingdom of Hui^[ary was thus heterogeneous 
in nationality from the beginning, and as her history 
developed the confusion increased. 

After the conversion of the Magyars in the eleventh 
century aj)., German colonies were introduced to 
civilise the country. They opened up the mineral 
resources of the Slovak hills, and established themselves 

^ The MaiQS and the Szamos. * The Alt (Alula). 

'Prohably they are descended from the Tjfininfd inhabttaiita of 
niyricum, die aectkm of the Roman Entire between the Alps, the 
Dnve and the Adriatic. When Sbvonic munigrants from die North 
descended upon the Adriatic coast tn the seventh century aj). (see 
beksw), they would have been hkety to press the native piovindais 
Eastward across the Danube. 


still more successfully in the no-man Viand of Transyl- 
vania* The seven Saxon towns of this province were 
diartered in the thirteenth century by the Hungdiisoi 
Crown as practically autonomous communities.^ 

During the same period the Ruthenes,' the southerly 
wing of the Russian race, overflowed the Carpathian 
d^, and following upon the heels of the Magyars, 
possessed themselves of the eictreme fringe of the Alf 6ld 
from the Vereczka Pass as far as Ungvar. 

These two new factors added to the complication, but 
die present phase of the national problem in Hungary 
has been principally conditioned by a much later event. 

An essential element in the modem Balkan type is a 
past experience of the Turk* The evolution of all the 
Balkan States might be stated in terms of a devastating 
Turidsh conquest, which destroyed the previous tradi- 
tion of native culture, and a hardly less devastating war 
of Liberation, waged with a depraved ferocity and an 
exalted heroism* The heroism seems to inspire the 
liberated populations with the spiritual energy to rebuild 
dieir national life from the foundations, die ferocity 
smirdies the fresh page in their history with a Turkish 
stain, which it takes many generations to wash away. 

Hungary suffered this characteristic Balkan calamity 
in common with her South-Eastem neighbours. In 
1536 the Magyar Kingdom perished on the terrible 
fiekl of Mohacs, and for a century and a half' the AlfSld 
was ruled by a Turkish pasha established in the fortress 
of Buda. The Ttirk was expelled again, as we have 
seen, after the crucial siege of Vienna in 1683. Half a 
century of vigorous campaigns drove him back behind 

' Hcnoe the German synoaym for Traaaylvania — ** SkbeobOigen." 
■Abo known as ** Little Rusnans '* or ** Ukrainians.'' See Ctu 


the line of the Save and the Iron Gatts, and the Peace 
of Belgrade in 1739 delimited a frontier between the 
Ottoman and Hapsbuxg Empires which resigned the 
whole of Hungary to the latter.^ Yet the ejected Turk 
had not failed to set his mark upon the bind, and the 
victors found the AlfSld a desert* 

In the middle of the eighteenth century the Hapsburg 
Monarchy was entering the '* Strong Government "' 
phase, and the newly-acquired territories offered a 
magnificent field of experiment for the ideas of 
'* Enlightened Autocracy/' 

The country was ridi in natural resources: it lay 
waste through want of population to develop them, and 
the Government met the need by schemes of cobnisation 
and town-building on an extensive scale* The re-con- 
struction of Hungary was the most striking success of 
Maria Theresa's and Joseph's policy* During their 
reigns the material traces of the Turk's presence were 
obliterated, and before the end of the century the 
Kingdom once more approached the standard of 
Central Europe, in acute contrast to the territories still 
blighted by Turkish mis^vemment immediately beyond 
her frontier* Yet in restoring Hungary's material pro- 
sperity, her new rulers immeasurably aggravated the 
impending problem of nationality* 

Before the Turkish conquest die Alf5ld had been the 
stronghold of the Magyar race, and the Magyars had 
therefore suffered more severely than any other element 
in the country by the devastation of the Turkish wars* 
The remnant of the nation that survived on the plain, 
and the fragment of it that lay West of Buda along the 

^ ThB frontier remained unaltered mitil tbe oc cupati on of Bosnia- 
Hetxegcmna tn 1878* The only change in the interval was the anneBi- 
tion to Austna of die Dafanatian coait-praivino^ lonneriy a VcnetiaQ 
poBcasion, at the settlement of x8z4. 



Attstrian and Stynan bofder, might perhaps have made 
good the losses by their own gradual increase under the 
regime of peace and security that had descended upon 
diem at last* The process^ however^ would have 
been extremely sbw, and the autocracy was neither 
psdent nor far-sighted, while it wotdd have ignored the 
factor of nationality on principle^ even had it realised 
its bearii^ on the situation* 

The Government therefore re-peopled the Alfold 
by the indiscriminate introduction of setders from all 
the surrounding races* Roumans from Transylvania 
were allowed to encroach upon the plain till they had 
advanced half the distance between their mountains 
and the Theiss* Serb refugees from Ottoman territory 
were encouraged to setde on the Northern bank of the 
Danube* Enclaves of German colonists from Swabia 
were distributed all over the land to leaven the other 
elements with Western civilisation* By the time the 
work was finished Htmgary had been reduced to such a 
racial medley that the Magyars no longer constituted 
more than a bare majority of the population*^ 

' An analyn of the census taken in z ooo for the Kingdom of Hungary 
(cKtaaive of Croatia-Slavonia) is the best oonunentary on the result : 







Total population 
















■f yaw** 



Had historical continuity been broken as completely 
in Hungary as in other Bsdkan lands, this confusion of 
tongues might have proved harmless. Joseph^s political 
genius might have steered the cotmtry into the wake 
of the Swiss Confederation, and initiated it into the 
European fraternity as a non-national state. The 
Turkish rule in Hungary, however, had been short, 
and it had never extended to the whole kingdom. The 
Slovak country in the North, Pressburg on the Danube, 
and a strip of territory between the Danube and the 
Drave atong the Styrian boundary had all escaped 
conquest by electing the Hapsburg as their king and 
sheltering themselves beneath his strong arm. In die 
opposite quarter Transylvania had been saved by a 
vigorous line of princes, who secured the autonomy of 
the province under the suzerainty of the Turkish Empire. 
In a very considerable portion of the country the 
mediaeval tradition thus maintained itself unbroken, 
and when the unconquered North-Westem border, the 
Turkish pashalik, and the Transylvanian principality 
were united once more, the forces derived from the past 
were strong enot^ to challenge the Hapsburgs' schemes 
for the future. 

We have seen that the Hungarian ** Estates '' took 
the lead in the struggle between Centralisation and 
Particularism which convulsed the whole Hapsburg 
Monarchy from 1780 to 1849. They were able to do 
so because mediaeval Htmgary had developed her 
parliamentary institutions more strongly than any other 
European country except our own. 

The Hungarian nobility was abnormally numerous. 
The majority of the class consisted simply of the free 
proprietors in the Magyar-speaking districts, including 
almost everybody who was not a serf. Many were 


natuially of quite bw standing, but there was also a 
ocmtii^ent of great landed magnates, and these were 
principally to be found on the non-Magyar territory* 
They were descended from barons established there by 
the kings 'to keep the subject races in hand or to guard 
the border against foreign powers* Some of these 
families were of pure Magyar blood, still more of them, 
peifaaps, were of native origin and had been Magyarised 
by contact with the royal court, but the difference was 
immaterial: in tradition and culture all alike had 
become Magyar to the core* 

Both these estates of nobiUty were represented in 
the Diet.^ The magnates ordinarily overshadowed the 
minor gentry, but since they were equally Magyar in 
their point of view, they consistendy directed the Diet^s 
activities in the Magyar interest, and whenever less 
oligarchic tendencies prevailed, it was always the body 
of the Magyar freemen, never the tmenfranchised mass 
of the subject nationalities, that made its voice heard in 
pariiament* Thus the Hungarian Diet, unlike the diets 
of Bohemia and Tyrol, showed a strong national bias 
from the first, and particularist traditionalism passed 
over into nationalistic chauvinism more rapidly here 
dian in any other part of the Hapsburg Empire* 

Long before the struggle with absolutism was over 
die Magyars gave unmistakable proof of their intentions 
widi regard to the other nationalities in Hungary* 
In 1848, when liberty seemed on the point of 
triumph, the Serb population in the South-Eastem 
part of the Alfold sent a deputation to the Htmgarian 
Diet assembled at Pressburg* They expressed their 
determinarion to aid the Magyars in defending the 

As in Bngtatid^ the lepctsentatiQO wis based 00 a oountsr- 


new-found liberties of their oommon country^ but 
required the recognition of the Serb language as the 
official medium in Serb bcalities* The Magyar 
ministry refused to consider their claim. Magyar, 
they declared, must be the only language of administra- 
tion in the whole kii^dom of Hungary, and when the 
Serb leaders refused their allegiance on sudi terms as 
these, Kossuth replied that ** then the sword must 
decide between them/' 

The ruin of the Magyars' hopes in the following year 
was largely due to the dread with which the rest of the 
Hungarians looked forward to their success. All other 
nationalities in the kingdom sympathised with the 
Hapsburg cause, and the Serbs, at least, fought valiantly 
on its behalf. When the events of z866 enabled the 
Magyars to snatch victory out of defeat, the forebod- 
ings of their alien fellow-citizens were more than realised* 
To the remaining inhabitants of the Hapsbuxg Mon- 
archy the Ausgleich brought some measure of relief 
from the intolerable regime of the 'fifties: for the 
subject populations of Hungary it opened the gk)omiest 
page of a precarious history. 

The Compromise with die Germans of Austria and 
the Hapsburg Dynasty delivered Hungary into the hand 
of the Magyar Liberal Party. If the Liberals of Austria 
correspond to the Rnglish Radicals of 1833, we can 
only liken their Magyar namesakes to the men of 1688. 
The ** Glorious Revolution " was heralded with a 
flourish of trumpets, and the tale has been continually 
enhanced by conventional eloquence ; yet in Hut^^ary, 
as in Engkmd, the ** era of free institutions " merely 
established the ascendancy of a dose oligardiy . 

The Hungarian magnates, who in 1867 emerged 
victorious from nearly a century of political wac£aae> 


leptoduoed both the virtues and the vices of the English 
\ini^^ They treasured an ingrained tradition of 
statesmanship that has been valuable to the backward 
majority of their ootmtrymen, and experience had made 
than convinced haters of certain pernicious political 
ideab ; but they were not concerned to practise their 
principles too pedantically, and in the last resort they 
subordinated all scruples to the retention of their power* 

The Liberalism of the Magyar Whigs was more 
than a veneer* In questions of religion, for instance, 
Ihrngpay remained true to her traditions of toleration** 
But diey were fanatical nationalists, and the whole 
political energy of the party rapidly became absorbed in 
a campaign of Magyarisation* 

Magyar chauvinism has been of a different stamp 
£tom Ae policy of any German party in Austria. The 
Austrian Germans have always been content to dominate 
dieir fellow-nationalities. The Magyars, however, were 
less civilised than the Germans, and they bore a much 
larger proportion to the total population of their 

'Tbe ooowfvatiofi of tttt Wh^ fainiliiw dependted on the systetn 
qC ** Batui/* which had developed in the seventeenth century* In 
Hnngary the consolidation of landed estates was sdU more drasticalljir 
pRxnoied by a bw forbidding any noble to alienate his land* Ths 
SMBine was introduced by Louis L in 1351, and remained in force tiU 

'Hnneary is divided between many creeds* The Ronum Church 
dfam its adherents from three of the races Magyars^ Germans and 
Slovaks— and accounted in 2900 for nearly 49% of the population. 
CalvittiBm, the nest stron ge st sect (14%), is confined to the Magyars* 
All the Serbs and a su^ority of the Rotmuuis are orthodox (ia%)# while 
^ remainder of the Roumans and all the Ruthenes are Uniats (zi%), 
obs BT f iug the Orthodox ritual but owning allegiance to the Pope. 
Luihsfantmi (Tjf %) is common to Slovaks mi Gmnans* 

The era of Turkish rule in Hungary was contemporary with the 
Otfbolic reaction. While the Hapsburgs were savagely repressing 
PWKisfiiifrim in the territories under their control, the Turks extended 
their toleration to all Christian sects in the Alf61d, and the Magyar 
CdviniMs m revolt against the tyranny of Vienna often made common 
cause with the Moslem across the bocder* In the autonomous princt- 
V^ikf of Transjrlvania Pro tes t an tism was the official religioa* 


country* They aimed at nothing less than the extirpa- 
tion of other languages and cultures, and the ultimate 
conversion to their own nationality of every inhabitant 
of the Hungoiiaai Kingdom* 

The methods for obtaining this result which were 
inaugurated by the Magyar Liberals after 1867 were an 
imitation on a far larger scale of Prussia's policy on 
her Polish frontier* Nothing comparable to them has 
been perpetrated in Western Europe for at least a 
century. To find an English parallel we must hark 
back once more to the Whigs of 1688, and call to mind 
the repression of the Catholics by the British administra- 
tion in Ireland during the blade era that followed the 
Batde of the Boyne* 

The Magyars, like the Russians, Ottoman Turks and 
other peoples on the outskirts of European civilisation, 
are ostentatious of theoretical enlightenment, but their 
borrowed idealism serves to cloak the survival of 
realities which have ceased to be possible further West* 

By the new constitution all citizens of Hux^;ary were 
declared equal before the law without distinction of 
race, and were expressly guaranteed the enjoyment of 
their national individuality* Yet the same constitution 
recognises Magyar as the only language of state, and 
the other tongues have been jealously excluded from 
official use* 

This ordinance is perpetually in evidence* In 
ptu*ely Slovak or Rouman towns the names of the streets 
are posted up in Magyar, and the name of the place itself 
is Magyarised in official parlance* On the state railways 
the Magyar language has a monopoly: time-tabtes, 
notices, and even the tickets are printed in Magyar 
alone, and Magyar is the administrative langu^e of the 
railway staff* The same thing applies to all other 


public services* Magyar is the sole medium in which 
their business is conducted* 

It might be answered that these are superficialities* 
"The meticubus enforcement of Magyar is childish 
rather than oppressive* Official formulas are easily 
learnt by rote* If Englishmen or Americans who know 
no JDreign language can still travel without incon- 
venience on the Continent, the Slovak peasant ought 
not to be at a loss on a Hungarian railway* Moreover, 
some general measure of linguistic tmiformity is essential 
if the various nationalities of Htmgary are to be organised 
at all in a single state* The Welsh citizen of Great 
Britain and the Breton citizen of France are not outraged 
by the ubiquitousness of the English and French tongues* 
Why should not Roumans and Slovaks be as reasonable 
as they< In almost every European state there are 
minorities of alien speech, to whom the ** national ** 
language is merely a lingua franca. It is true that in 
Kii^^ary litde more than half the popubtion inherit 
from their parents the ruling tongue ; yet if the absolute 
maiority of the Magyar-speaking element is slight, they 
are in a great relative majority over any other single 
linguistic group in the population* If Magyar were 
deposed from its supremacy, no other language current 
to Htmgary wotdd be qualified to take its place* It is 
tiofortunate that Hungary is such a medley of races, 
but the &tdt lies with history, and not with the Magyar 
statesmen of the last half-century*^' 

The Magyar would thus defend the Hungarian 
language-ordinances as a necessity of state, yet more 
than petty inconvenience is involved : the measure 
places half the popubtion at a serious disadvantage in 
fiice of the other half « It gives those who speak Magyar 
native tongue an undue monopoly of pubhc 


service* The state itself must suffer by forfeiting the 
assistance of some of its most capabk citizens* 

Again the Magyar will have a ready answer. ** We 
Magyars/' he will say, '* have a much higher standard of 
education and culture than the other inhabitants of our 
country* Power gravitates towards efficiency, and even 
if no hmguage-ordinanoes had been passed, the Magyars 
would have found themselves in control of die Hungarian 

This also is true* In 1867 the Magyars were ahead 
of the rest in education, and they have likewise main* 
tained their lead in the meanwhile* Yet the history of 
education in Htmgary during this period should put 
the Magyar apologist to silence* 

The Magyars have ensured their superiority by 
paralysing their neighbours' progress rather than by 
progressing themselves* If the subject nationalities 
are more and not less illiterate now than they were fifty 
years ago, it is because the Magyar government has 
closed practically all their secondary, and the great 
majority of their primary schools, and has made it 
increasingly hard to obtain instruction in any but the 
Magyar tongue. The Magyars' political monopoly 
was or^;inally justified by culture, but they have 
perverted politics to the monopolisation of culture 
itself by grotesquely uncultured means* Under these 
drctunstances the relative degree of education attained 
at present by the Magyars and their fellow-dtizens loses 
all significance as a standard of political valtte* 

Hungary, however, is at least a constitutional country* 
Why, then, have the minor nationalities failed to redress 
their wrongs by constitutional pressure i They amount 
to litde less than half the population* Surely they 
oould return such a formidable contingent of represents^ 


tives to the parliament at Buda«*Pest, that Magyar 
fflinistries would be driven to a compromise i 

This door is closed because the government of 
Hungary is not constitutional in the modem sense : it 
is only called so by cotutesy* The country still awaits 
its ** Great Reform Bill/' and the mediaeval franchise, 
which Great Britain sloughed off in z832# has here 
endured till the present day* We have said that the 
Magyar politicians of 1867 were Whigs : we shall 
discover their '* rotten boroughs *' in the non-Magyar 
OMistituencies. They were as well-veised in corruption 
as English politicians were in the eighteenth century, 
and they reinforced bribery by intimidation* In non- 
Magyar constituencies the precedent of overawing 
" opposition '^ voters by the presence of troops has 
become well-established, and the device has more than 
once led to bloodshed which wotdd have been called 
** massacre " if it had occurred in Turkey* 

No redress, therefore, is possible through parliament, 
because the leaders of the non-Magyar nationalities 
can never obtain a seat there* They are rigidly debarred 
from a political career, and even in the neutral sphere 
of literature, art, history, and all that is included under 
the name of culture, diey are made to suffer for the 
privilege of leadership* 

The Magyars have adopted the Greek tyrant's policy 
of ** cutting off the tallest ears in the cornfield*'' Any 
form of distinction renders a Slovak, Rouman or Serb 
dtixm of Hungary immediately suspect to his country's 
police. Personal hberty in Hungary suffers direly from 
the want of a Habeas Corpus Act* The laws of oon- 
spincy are so comprehensive that arrest without 
specification of the charge and protracted imprisonment 
befofe trial are events of normal occurrence* When 



it is remembered that, in virtue of the language-ordin- 
ances, all proceedif^ in court have to be conducted 
exclusively in the Magyar langu2^e, the picture of racial 
oppression is complete* 

This atrocious system was eleborated by the Liberal 
Party which came into power in 1867* 

The Liberal regime was protracted. Deik, the 
statesman of the Ausgleich, was succeeded in 1876 
by Count Coloman Tisza, the Magyar Walpole, who 
remained uninterruptedly in office tmtil iBgo. His 
resignation in that year started the party on its decline, 
but its fall was staved off for a dozen years longer by 
the raising of those ecclesiastical issues which Austria 
had setded as early as i868* In 1902 the Liberals 
were first challenged on their real standing-ground^ 
the maintenance of the Ausgleich. 

A radical movement had been gaining strength, which 
aspired to pass beyond compromise to independence. 
The ideal of the "" Left '" was self-sufficiency* They 
wished to see Hungary take her place as a sovereign 
unit, on an entire equality with the other states of 

In our analysis of the Danubian Monarchy we have 
noted that great economic difficulties stood, and always 
will stand, in the way of such a development. The 
oidy chance of overcoming them would be the enthusi- 
astic co-operation for this end of the whole Hungarian 
people. The first object, therefore, of the Magyar 
Left should have been the conciliation of the non- 
Magyar nationalities. They shotdd have driven their 
Liberal opponents from office on this issue, justified 
their own installation by a complete reversal of the 
prevailing chauvinism and a definitive solution of the 
racial problem on democratic lines, and then joined 


battle with Austria and the Dynasty on the question of 
Independence with the whole country at their back* 

bstead of this, they chose the language-question in its 
most inflammatory form as the chief plank in their plat- 
form* They demanded the substitution of Magyar for 
German as the executive language in all the Hungarian 
regiments of the Joint Army, with the avowed object 
of promoting the Magyarisation of the non-Magyar 
Hungarian conscripts. 

This was a simultaneous challenge to the Liberals, 
die subject nationalities, and the Crown, for the 
Ausgleidi had left the supreme control of the Army 
in the King-Emperor^s hands, and Francis Joseph was 
convinced that the efficiency of the service and there- 
with the safety of the Monarchy as a whole depended 
upon strict uniformity of organisation* 

The sovereign failed to maintain the Liberals in office* 
His persistent summoning of Liberal ministries was 
countered by obstruction on the Opposition's part* 
Count Stephen Tisza, the son of Coloman, who took 
office in 1903 as a forlorn hope, tried to meet the situation 
by revolutionising parliamentary procedure, but he 
merely provoked parliamentary anarchy as deplorable as 
die hrndc-down at Vienna in 1897* At the beginning 
of Z905 he appealed to the electors and suflTered utter 
defeat* The Liberal Party was dead, and a coalition 
of die radical groups had won the leadership of the 
Magyar nation* 

The King-Emperor, however, refused to give in. 
He proceeded to govern without parliament's assistance, 
and towards the end of the year he took the offensive 
against the Coalition by engineering a bill for universal 
suflEcage* Their attitude towards the national question 
made the Coalition defenceless against such an attack. 


and they surrendered at discretion as soon as it became 
certain that a bill of identical purport was on the verge 
of passing into law in the Austrian half of the Monarchy. 

At the beginning of 1906 a G>alition ministry wfaidi 
had renounced the ** Magyar word of command ** was 
at last called into office, but their quiver had been 
emptied of its arrows. 

Towards the end of 1908 they introduced a carefully 
planned reform bill, which would have advanced the 
Htmgarian franchise from the mediaeval to the Prussian 
level. The electorate was to be increased very con- 
siderably in numbers, the qualification for su£Erage was 
to be literacy, the electors were to be classified acoordii^ 
to degrees of education, and the more highly qualified 
were to possess more than one vote. Political power 
was thus represented as the privilege of culture, but 
since the dominant Magyars had long been engaged in 
exterminating all non-Magyar culture within the borders 
of Hungary, the bill was calculated to produce a demo- 
cratic impression without extending the franchise 
beyond the limits of the Magyar race. 

It was of little consequence, therefore, that the 
ministry's main programme of independence eclipsed 
their perfunctory efforts towards internal reform before 
the franchise bill had time to pass into law. Its mere 
formulation proved once and for all that the subject 
nationahties had nothing to expect from M^;yar 
Radicalism,^ and in the trial of strength widi Austria 
and the Crown to which the G>alition now committed 
itself, Francis Joseph was still able to wield his master- 

^ Aldiottg^ one of the oomponents of the Coalition was the '* People's 
partjr/Y^clerical group whidi had taken the cause of the nationalitses 
dito its prosranune* 


Early in 1909 the more extreme elements of the 
Left forced the G>alition premier^ Dr. Wekerle, to 
open the campaign for economic autonomy with die 
demand for a separate Hungarian state bank. The 
Crown refused to consider the question so long as the 
franchise remained unreformed : such a momentous 
proposal, Francis Joseph declared, must be endorsed by 
a parliament truly representative of the whole Hungarian 

This shrewdly-aimed blow broke up the Coalition 
into fragments. The moderates and the intransigeants 
were each strong enough to stalemate the other, no 
ministry could be formed, and in 1909, as in 1905, 
parliamentary government was suspended* At the 
beginning of 1910 Francis Joseph appointed a ministry 
of '' king's friends ** under the leadership of Count 
Khuen-Hedervary, a notorious political ** boss "" who 
had thoroi^;hly learnt his trade during a twenty-years 
tenure of the Croatian vice-royalty.^ The Hedervary 
cabal scattered promises broadcast to all aggrieved 
elements in the country, and the elections conducted 
under its auspices next stmmier surpassed even Hun- 
garian precedent in their corruption* When the new 
parliament met, the Count had a docile majority at his 
beck, and the Magyars saw their constitutional tradition 
reduced to a farce* 

The lesson sank deep* Khuen-Hedervary was too 
shady a diaracter to serve as more than a stop-gap, and 
when he vanished from the scene all sections of Magyar 
opinion were more than content to accept Count 
Stephen Tisza once more* Tisza remains in office at 
the present moment, and his restoration means that the 
evolution of Magyar politics has come to a dead stop* 

' Sec S cc tiott B* 


He stands for a reaction to the programme of 1867 : 
compromise with Austria and the Dynasty, war to the 
knife against the non-Magyar nationalities in Htmgary 
itself. The Magyars have realised that democradsa- 
tion and Magyarisation are incompatible, and they have 
preferred to sacrifice progress to chauvinism* 

Thus Hungary and Austria have dive^ed profoundly 
in their political history since the year of the Ausgleich. 
In 1867 Hungary possessed the more enlightened 
tradition of the two, and the initiative towards constitu- 
tional government came from die Magyar side* Then 
for a time they marched abreast ; but when die problem 
of nationality emerged like a steep cliff athwart their 
path, Austria pressed forward, and after a hazardous 
struggle attained the summit : Hungary halted, and 
without even scanning the cliff's face for a handhold, 
turned about and began to retrace her steps. 

Between 1867 and 1914 the political standard of the 
Magyar nation has grieviously deteriorated* 

The results of our sturvey warrant the assumption 
that if the two Central-European monarchies suffer 
defeat in the present war, the subject nationalities of 
Hungary, when the plebiscite at last enables them to 
express their desire, will act like the Polish subjects of 
Germany, and vote to the last man for liberation from 
die Magyar state* We have to examine whether their 
secession from Hungary will involve the disruption of 
the Danubian Empire* 

Just as in the case of Poland, their extrication will 
necessarily be incomplete* Geography has made 
Hungary a natural unit, sundered from her neighbours 
and knit together within herself by pronunent physical 
barriers, and within this area the races are extraordinarily 


mtemiingled. Certain xninorities will therefore remain 
fast in prison, and it will be the first duty of the Euro- 
pean Congress to convert their enforced abode into a 
ixMise of liberty, before it discusses the destiny of their 
more fortunate companions who are able to effect their 

The parties to the European Conference must 
goarantee the observance of the excellent law regarding 
the rights of nationalities, which has nominally been 
valid in Hungary since it was passed in 1868, but has 
remained in practice a dead letter. 

Critics will point out that such a guarantee would be 
an intense humiliation for the Magyar people, that they 
would only submit to it under constraint, and that every 
time a Slovak or German-speaking Htmgarian appealed 
from Magyar injustice to the guarantors, there would be 
danger of racial war in Hungary and of a conflagration 
m Europe. This is true, but it is equally certain that 
dse minorities will no longer submit to Magyar mis- 
government, and that if the Concert of Europe does not 
help them, they will help themselves, and tmhesitat- 
tngty appeal for intervention to the several states of their 
own respective nationality which lie immediately beyond 
the Hungarian frontier. The evil inheritance of the 
past cannot be charmed away in a moment, and no 
reconstruction of the Hungarian state will leave all 
parties content. In either event, therefore, the immedi- 
ate future will be fraught with anxiety, and the most we 
can do is to initiate Htmgary into a more promising 
career than she has followed in the immediate past. 
If some hearts must still be sore, it is better that the 
Magyars should chafe at restrictions upon racial persecu- 
tion than that the minor nationalities should groan 
under exposure to it. 



From the sentimental point of view, we need 
have little scruple in wotmding the Magyars' pride. 
Individually they are an attractive people, and they 
have known how to keep the sympathies of Western 
Europe alive on their behalf by harping on the tragedy 
of 1849 ; but since the year of the Compromise they 
have behaved like the servant in the parable, who was 
forgiven by his lord and then seized his fellow-servant 
by the throat. They cannot altogether escape the 
hypocrite's retribution* 

In the interests of common justice, therefore, Europe 
must guarantee the alien enclaves in Magyar territory* 
Yet a guaranteed re-oi^anisation of the Hungarian state 
on still more drastic lines might well be in the best 
interests of the Magyars themselves, for it would be 
their one chance of inducing the much larger blocks of 
alien population which are not debarred from secession 
by geography, to hold fast of their own free will to their 
present allegiance* 

The principal terms of such a guaranteed re-settle- 
ment should run as follows : 

(i«) Local self-government should be re-organised. 
At present it is based upon the medieval counties, 
which are very unequal in size and entirely out of 
rebdon to racial botmdaries* These county divisions 
should be recast into new local units, standardised 
approximately in area and population like the French 
departments, and each department should be made 
racially homogeneous as far as possible* This 
would give every nationality in Hungary a number 
of local units more or less proportional to its per- 
centage in the total population of the country* 
The department should employ its national language 
as its official medium of administration, and should 


be the basts of electoral organisation for the central 
Hungarian parliament. 

(iL) There should be no parliamentary devolution to 
national blocks* The races are so interlaced that it 
lOttld be impossible to carve out areas including all the 
Rouman or all the German inhabitants of Hungary, 
aod endow them with extensive Home Rule* The 
various national territories are too scattered for effective 
Qfganisation as unities. 

(iii«) On the other hand, national education and all 
public activities that contribute to national culture 
should be placed under the exclusive control of national 
ammiittees, consisting of the deputies elected to the 
central Hungarian parliament by the various depart- 
ments belotiging to each particular nationality. These 
omimittees should share between them the annual 
budget voted for public education by the parliament as 
a whole, in proportion to the percentage of the total 
population which they respectively represent. 

(iv.) All questions of universal interest, such as 
ammmnications and defence, social and economic 
development, fiscal relations with other countries, 
consular service and foreign policy in general, should 
remain as heretofore within the province of the central 
l,^ now to be elected on the new departmental 

If the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary were 
assured some such reforms as these, it is conceivable 
that geographical and economic considerations would 
prevail with them over hatred of the Magyars and desire 
for incorporation in their own nationd states; but 

* And therefore presumably subject to the conditions of the Ausgleich, 
nnlcB other ctreinnstances lead the Hungarian parliament to terminate 
the connection with Austria* 


piedictioii is impossible, and we must reckon with the 
coQtif^ency that certain elements may in any event 
secede.' Will the cohesion of the whole Hapsburg 
Monarchy be endangered by their secession i 

The German colonies in the Alfdld and in the Slovak 
hills are too widely dispersed for extrication,* and the 
Sbvaks themselves do not come into question from our 
immediate standpoint. They may be eager to secede 
from Hungary, but they would only do so in order to 
coalesce with the Tchechs of Austria. They have no 
blood-brethren outside the frontiers of the Danubian 
Empire, and the satisfaction of their national aspirations 
would affea the internal organisation of the whole unit 
rather than its solidarity towards the outer world. We 
are left with the Ruthenes, Roumans and Serbs. 

(i.) The Roumans are the strongest non-Magyar 
nationality in Hungary, and we have seen that they are 
concentrated in Transylvania and the adjoining strip 
of the AlfOld, towards the border of the national 
Roumanian Kingdom.* Their transference, therefore, 
horn Hungary to Roumania would seem a natural 

' In BpiU of Magyarisatton, the Slovaks, Ruthenei and Roumans 
have steadily been dwwigagirg tbenuelves since 1867 from the Magyar 
toils. The growth of ■ native intellt^wum has heightened tbett 
national coosctouuuss, and in recent yfan the cunent of eaiigtation 
U) the VSA. has brought wealth into their dutricts. Peasans who 
have made tbeii littfe jnlt in America have been buying out the big 
estates of the Whig magnates, and thereby freeing their soil tram the 

■ Though the Germans of Hungary would escape from die Magyars 
if they could, for the Ausgleich has secived them no better tteatment 
than the other nationalities. While the Magyars have been in alliance 
with the Germaos of Austria, they have not hesitated to " Magjnrise " 
the two miUion Germans in their midst. For the distribution of the 
Uiter see Map III. 

■ The free Roumans of the present kingdom are jmbaUv dacended 
from Transyivaman settlers, mo during the early Middle Ages pushed 
out through th? Carpathians and established themselves in the optn 



appUcation of the national principle to political group- 
ing. Since Transylvania is hardly less isolated from 
the Alfold than from the Roumanian plains^ the geo- 
gr^hical objections would be comparatively slight, 
wfafle Roumania on her part would gain immensely in 
territorial compactness by the incorporation of this 
region. At present she embraces Transylvania on two 
sides, as the young moon holds the old moon in its arms, 
and she is eager to grow to her full orb. 

Unfortunately, however, the heart of Transylvania is 
tenanted by an important non-Rouman poptdation. 
Three counties are almost exclusively inhabited by the 
Szekels, a flying column of the Magyar host which 
became entangled and isolated in the Transylvanian 
hills, when the main body of the nation pressed down 
into the AlfSld. There are also the Saxon towns, which 
are the most important German endaves in all Hungary. 

The Szekel and Saxon districts cannot be separated 
bom the Rouman zone which hems them in. The 
whole ge(^;raphical block must be transferred or retained 
together, and if the status quo does injustice to two- 
and-tfaree-quarter millions of Rotunans, the alternative 
would merely reverse the parts, and put over a million 
Saxons and Szekels in an identical plight.^ We are in 
presence of a case where a very considerable minority 
mtist be disappointed. The decision probably depends 
upon the action of the Roumanian Kingdom in the 

^ The ocosus of 1900 revealed the foUowing figures : — 

Saaons 333,000 9.5% 

Szekeb 8z5/)oo 33«a% 

Rotunaiis in Transyhrania . 1,397,000 56^% 

Total pop. of Transvlvania • • a,4A<:/xx) xoo.o% 
RoomaDs m die Alf 61a • . x,388/xx) 

Total pop* of whole block • • 3,833,000 (of whom die 

Roumaaa constituted 7a.43%)« 


present crisis. If Roumania intervenes in the war in 
favour of the Allies, the prize will fall into her grasp : 
if she remains neutral till hostilities cease, her claims 
will not obtain preference in the subsequent settlement. 

(ii.) The Seri) settlements in the Alifold are conter- 
minous with those of the Roumans. They skirt the 
Northern bank of the Danube from a point opposite the 
junction of the Morava tributary as far upstream as 
the junction of the Drave, but they are bewilderingly 
entangled with German and Magyar endaves* The 
majority of them lie within the ** Banat of Temesvar/' 
a square field delimited in the South-Eastem comer 
of the Alfold by the Transylvanian mountains on the 
East, and the Maros, Theiss and Danube rivers on die 
other three sides. 

The Banat was one of the principal theatres of 
eighteenth-century colonisation : the Roumans have 
established themselves in the Eastern half of it, and 
the Western half is divided between Germans and 
Serbs, while the Magyar element is almost negligible* 
If the Rouman section became detached from 
Hungary, the annexation of the remainder to Serbia 
would be a logical corollary.^ The courses of die 
Theiss and the Maros offer a good frontier in this 
quarter for the Magyar state, and the Serbian national 
kingdom South of the Danube will be anxious to incor- 
porate its ** irredenta ** on the river's further shore, 
in order to remove Belgrade beyond the range of siege- 
artillery planted on Hungarian soil. If, however, the 
Rouman part of the Banat fails to break away &om 
Hungary, its fate will be decisive for the Serb districts 

^ This would inyolvt the transference of the German endavcs m the 
Banat as well ; but they are doomed in any case to be memd m a 
state of alien nationality, and any alternative would be a xtdief from 


15 wdL They are no more than a wedge dnven in 
between die Magyar and Rouman populations of the 
Aifajd,^ and could not be excl u ded from the Hungarian 
frontief if the country on both sides of them remained 
within it* 

{iii.) The Ruthenes occupy the opposite comer of the 
Aifdki, round the head-waters of the Theiss* They 
number less than half a million, and are divided from 
their Magyar nei^bours by no natural boundary, while 
die other twenty-five millions who speak the same 
dialect' live on the furdxer side of the Carpathians. 
The geographical factor, therefore, strongly favours the 
existing political situation, yet the force of national 
antipathy and sympathy is more imperious still, and 
die mountain barrier is not impassable* Two lines of 
railway traverse that section of the range under the 
shadow of which the Hungarian Ruthenes dwell, and one 
of die routes is the famotis Vereczka Pass, which gave 
entrance into the land first to the Magyars and then to 
the Ruthenes themselves, and has witnessed the passage 
of Russian invaders during the operations of the 
present war* It is therefore possible that the Ruthenes 
may set geography at defiance, and throw in their lot 
with the vast body of their race which stretches tmin- 
terruptedly Eastward from the Carpathians' further 
slopes to the upper waters of the Don. 

These, then, are the three instances in which Hungary 
is liable to sufifer territorial loss. Our discussion has 
yielded no certain conclusions,' but it has sufiiced to 
show that secession in these quarters will not jeopardise 
the continued existence of the Hapsbui^ Empire. Even 

> See Map IIL > See Ch. VIII. C. 

* Rectifications of the Hungarian frontier are indeed so problematical 
that we have not attempted to indicate possibilities in the maps attached 
to this book. 


if all possibilities were actualised, die Magyar Kingdom 
wotild still be left with nearly twelve million inhabitants ^ 
in occupation of a compact and productive territory* 
The balance between Austria and Hungary would, of 
course, be destroyed, but the break-down of die Dual 
System might strengthen the inward cohesion of the 
Monarchy by opening die way for a federal re-construc- 
tion of the whole on genuinely national lines. Even 
if the losses in Galida and Hungary were serious enough 
to degrade the Danubian unit f]x>m die ranks of the 
Great Powers, it might survive as an essential member 
in the re-organised fraternity of European nations* 

We have now examined die state of die national 
problem in die Kingdom of Hungary, as well as in the 
** Kingdoms and Lands Represented in die Reichsrath 
at Vienna,^' without discovering any ulcer fatal to the 
life of the Hapsburg organism ; but our examination 
of the Trans-Leithanian half of the Monarchy is not 
yet complete* In addition to die Hungarian realm, 
the ** Crown of St* Stephen ** comprises the *' Kingdom 
of Croatia-Slavonia ** beyond the Southern bank of the 

This Hungarian dependency has implicated the 
Hapsburg Monarchy in the natk>nal problem of the 
Sottdiem Slavs* 


itioB of nmiguy willuii ptf.scnt 

^ (aooQfdtng to oemas of 1900) 16,838/300 

Possible ksssts tfttr tbt piutat war, caico-' 

latKl atammmim-- 

Rounuos» Swksli and ?8aOTW • ^Ji^/Mso 



SMMQumsisly • • • • 2i5^/)oo 
{ij Rumtacs 4a3tOoo 

Total of possible ksssts • 4,953/xx> 

MiBimmi ftsaaiiidcr • • • 1x^79'/'^'^ 


S--'^ ^-N 











B* The Southern Slavs 

is not co-extensive with the Middle Danube 
: ^ it is bounded by the Drave, and the Danube 
a considerable area South as well as North of 

tributaries which reach the river from the Right 

in this section of its course, take their rise in a 

of limestone mountains linking the Alps with the 

le of the Balkan peninsub. The chief affluent 

Save* Its source is close to that of the Drave, in 

igle between the main chain of the Alps, where 

bend North-Eastward towards Vienna, and this 

Lc ** branch, where it falls away in the direction 

Adriatic coast* The two streams follow a parallel 

The Drave draws its one auxiliary, the Mur, 

the Eastern face of the Austrian Alps on its Left 

: the Save is enriched by several large rivers from 

ight,* which spring from the Dinaric watershed 

[pursue their tortuous way through the hilly country 

[intervenes. Swelled by the united volume of these 

\, the Save finally enters the Danube at a point 

Semlin and Belgrade, nearly a hundred and 

miles below the confluence of the Drave. 

le second affluent is the Morava, which flows into 

lube from the South, about fifty miles further 

Its drainage-area extends from the Drina on 

fWest to the extremity of the Balkan mountains on 

Bast, a chain which continues the line of the Car- 

on the other flank of the ** Iron Gates,*' and 

)letes the partition of the Lower from the Middle 

of the Danube. 

See Map 00 p. Z05 ; abo Map IIL ' Uiia^ Vrbas, Boana, Dium* 


The system of the Morava and the Save, and in fact 
the whole region between the Drave, the Iron Gates, 
and the sea, was occupied in the seventh century aj). 
by a swarm of the great Slavonic host, ^^ch found its 
way throt^ the Moravian Gap and the Marchfeld, and 
drifted down upon the Adriatic coast* 

This flying column of the Slavonic invasion did not 
remain undifierentiated within itself* Its reai^uard 
tarried under the lea of the Alps, and is rep r ese n t e d 
by the modem Sbvenes* Its vanguard crossed the 
watershed of the Middle Danube, spread out fanwoe 
towards the ^ean and the Black Sea, and has developed 
into the Bulgarian nationality* Both these detached 
groups have evolved racial and dialectical characteristics 
which distinguish them sharply from the main body 
whidi lies between*^ We will leave them aside for the 
moment, and concentrate our attention upon the btter, 
for whom we will reserve the tide of " Southern Slavs." 

The ^ Southern Slavs,** in this specialised sense of 
the name, speak an absolutely ho m ogeneous dialect, 
and occupy a compact geographical area, extending 
from Agnun (Zs^reb) to Uskub (Skoplye), and fron 
Belgrade to Salona* They have thtis become immediate 
neighbours of the Magjrars, who two centuries later 
descended upon the country on the furdier bank of tbe 
Danube and the Drave, and at the present time the tivo 
races are approximately equal in numerical strength,' 
but in every other respect their history has been 
strikingly different* 

The rich, unbroken levels of the AlfSld offer a natunl 
cradle for a strong, unified national state : the Sotsthen 

>The Bulgars derive their name, but nothing else, from a 
Stavooic catte of nomad conquerors off the steppes. 

* Either language is now spoken by between ogfat and nine miOiDfls 


Slavs, on the odier hand, have been grievously handi- 
capped by their physical environment* The gaunt 
tibs of the Dinaric Alps, which shoulder the Danube* 
system away from the Adriatic, are not kindly to Man* 
The lodcHnsfface cropping out through the scanty soil 
sets a figkl limit to the growth <rf population, whik the 
scanty communities that maintain dieir existence are 
isolated from one another by the parallel ranges of 
mountains and the rushing rivers which carve their 
way among them* Even the Adriatic coast-line, which 
ri^ Norway in the maze of its fjords and islands, is 
of little avail for internal communication* The land 
opens towards the Danube, and the watershed rises 
hard above the shore* The rivers invariably flow inland, 
and only one, the Narenta, drains South-Westward to 
the sea* 

Such a land oould never have beoome an independent 
focus of human life* Its physical ftmction as a link 
between the motmtain-masses of Central and South- 
Eastern Europe has conditioned the history of its in- 
habitants, and doomed them to be the victims and the 
spoil in the warfare of alien worlds* 

The country of the Southern Slavs has been debat- 
able ground from the begmning* Christtanity pene- 
trated it simultaneously from opposite directions* 
The Croats in the North-West were converted from the 
Catholic centres of Aquileia and Saltburg : Ordiodox 
missaonaries from Byzantium mounted the valley of the 
Vardar and secured the allegiance of the Serbs in the 

* Gnat jod Serb weie in origm two kmdftd tribes^ ideatkai with the 
Chiobat aad Soiab who lemained Ndctfa of the Camutuaoi. The 
oaoKs have siadaaUy been adapted tt> denote all Soitth-SlaEfonic 
ipeahcfs who betoag respectively to the Catholic and te Orthodox 
Cbuich, irrespective of political grouping or local habitat* 


The independent career of both these tribes was 
brief* The Croatian principality flourished in the 
eleventh century, but in zzoa it was annexfid to the 
txpsmddxig realm of the Magyars, and for the next three 
centuries Hungary and Venice fought for the sovereignty 
of the land, till the dispute was settled by a oomptomise. 
About 1430 Venice finally established her rule along 
the Dalmatian littoral, while Hungary retained her 
suzerainty over the hinterland. 

The fortunes of Serbia were grander* In Z159 ^ 
House of Nemanya came to the front, and steadily built 
up a national state which attained its ssenith in the 
fourteenth century* Stephen Dushan, Tsar of the 
Serbs from 1336 to 1356 a*d*, ruled from the Danube 
to the SgtzDL, and threatened to beside Constantinople 
itself, but disaster followed dose upon his triumphs* 
The year before Stephen's death, the Ottoman Turks 
had occupied Gallipoli on the European shore of the 
Dardanelles : thirty years bter ^ they fought the Serbs 
in the heart of their country on the field of Kossovo,* 
and their crushing victory made an end of Serbian 

The advance of the Turks ajs^ravated the disunion of 
the Southern Slavs by introducing another creed* In 
the twelfth century the Paulidan heresy from Armenia 
had obtained a footing in the region,' and the nobility 
of Bosnia, a Hungarian dependency on the banks of 
the Bosna River, embraced it as their national faith. 
Their choice isolated them from their neighbotus, and 

• ifixBovo Pdlye»'' Field of BUckbuds.'' 

' It was brought by Armenian subjects of the Bast Roman Bmpire, 
whom the Byzantine government had failed to convert to OrthoaoKy, 
and had punished for their contumacy by exiling them to the opposite 
border of the Imperial territory. The Slavonic converts they made in 
their new home took the tide of Bogumils (** theo-t>hiloi ''). 


the breach was only widened by the stubbornness with 
wbich they dung to it during three centtuies of indis- 
cnininate persecution : when the enemies at their gates 
succumbed successively to the Turk, the Bosniaks 
mdoomed him as a deliverer. Their creed had origi- 
nated on the borders of blam, perhaps under Moslem 
inspiration, and there was mudi in common between 
die two religions. When the conqueror offered them 
the traditional alternative between conversion and 
hek>tage, they did not hesitate. Before the dose of the 
fifteenth century the Bosniak landowners had adopted 
blam en masse, and were transformed at a stroke from 
oppressed outcasts to equals and comrades of the ruling 
face. The change in their position, however, was not 
feally fundamental. Their new-found prosperity was 
destined to flow and ebb with the Turkish tide, but they 
have held to their second ** apostasy ** as tenadously 
as to their first, and have remained sundered in sympathy 
from their South-Slavonic kinsmen who share the same 

In the sixteenth century the Southern Slavs were 
diawn into the supreme struck between Christendom 
and Islam. The Bosniaks had given their allegiance 
to the Ottoman cause, and broken away from Htm^arian 
suzerainty, but their example was not followed by the 
other South-Slavonic dependendes of the Htmgarian 
Crown. When Htmgary herself was prostrated in the 
fatal battle of Mohacs,^ and the remnant of the Kingdom 
elected the Hapsburg as its sovereign, the prindpalities 
of Croatia and Slavonia* followed their suzerain's 


'Ooatsa is a strn> of territory eztendtng from the Drave to the Sea 
m the e xtr e m e Norm-West of the South Slavonic area, along the Slovene 
border. Stovonsa is the '* Mesopotamia '' tnteromted between the 
Dnve and Danube on the one side and the Save on the other. 



example. From 1527 to die present day, the Dynasty 
has ruled this section of the South-Slavonic world by 
hereditary right. 

The battles between Austrian and Turk were decided 
on the banks of the Danube, but the Dinaric mountaon- 
i^one was the scene of fierce and continuous subsidiary 
warfare. Durit^ two centuries of inconclusive strife 
the Turkish cavalry sometimes penetrated ri^t up the 
Save, and ravaged the Venetian plains at the head of 
the Adriatic, while for nearly twenty years > the Haps- 
burg standard was planted in Belgrade and the Austrian 
frontier pushed far up the valley of the Morava. 
Neither power, however, proved strong enough to 
wrest from the other the undisputed dominion tA 
the whole South-Slavonic region, and the Treaty of 
Belgrade in 1739 terminated the struggle by a partition. 

The whole of Croatia and Slavonia fell to tix Haps- 
burg : the Ottoman retained Serbia and Bosnia. The 
new frontier started * &om the Iron Gates, and followed 
the course of the Danube, upwards as far as the junction 
of the Save. Belgrade, in the South-Eastem angle 
between the two rivers, remained a Turkish fortress, 
and the Hapsburg frontier proceeded along the Save's 
Northern bank, till it reached the point where the latter 
river is joined by the Una. Hience it turned South- 
Westwaid, first oonfonoing to the Una's winding, and 
then taking an irregular course of its own across the 
mountains, till it struck the coast opposite the island 
of Pago. 

This made the Hapsbu^ Empire immediately 
conterminous with the province of Dalmatia, which 
the Venetians had managed to defend against Ottoman 

■ Sec Mapll 


aggresBioa, ever since it finally passed into their hands 
in die fifteenth century* Napoleon made an end <^ 
die Venetian Republic and cast her territories into the 
meldng pot* In the general re-setdement of 18x4, 
Dalmatia and Ragusa were definitively incorporated 
in the Hapsburg dominions, and the whole Eastern 
Uttoral of the Adriatic, from Trieste to the fjord of 
Cattaro, thus came to be united under the same Austrian 
government. With this exception, however, the terri- 
torial arrangements of 1739 still remained in force 
when die events of 1866 forced the Danubian Monarchy 
into the most recent phase of its history. 

In the year of the Ausgleich the Monarchy's position 
with regard to the Southern Slavs almost exacdy 
rqModuced its relation towards the Italian nation 
af^ the settlement of 1814* In both cases one section 
of a nationality was included within the Hapsburg 
frontier yNbHc the remainder lay beyond it, and the 
Monardiy's Italian experience had proved that 
such a situation was essentially unstable* A divided 
nationality was bound to attain tmity in time* It might 
achieve it within the compass of the greater Empire, if 
the btter succeeded in advancing its frontier to include 
the whole race, but the frontier could not remain 
stationary* If it failed to advance it must retire, and 
national tmity be realised at the Empire's expense by 
the total secession of the nationality from its (organism* 

In the Italian case we have seen that such secession 
could occur without vital injury to the Monarchy's 
structure : in the present instance failure involved far 
more serious consequences* The Monarchy had just 
been forced to accept its geographical destiny as a 
Danubian state, and in the new development of its 
hotory the Soudi-Slavonic region offered the necessary 


avenue for expansion* Excluded from Germany and 
Italy, Austria-Hungary must grow Eastward, or else 
resign herself to paralysis, diminishment, and final 

Since 1867, therefore, the attention of the Joint 
Ministry for Foreign A£fairs has become increasingly 
concentrated upon the South-Slavonic problem. The 
Monarchy has never been faced by a graver issue, but 
on the odier hand it has seldom enjoyed conditions so 
favourable for a successful solution* 

The South-Slavonic population within the frontier 
included Orthodox as well as Catholic elements, and the 
Dynasty had a strong traditional hold over both its Serb 
and its Croat subjects* Each regarded the Hapsburg 
as their saviour from the Turk. The Croat^s loyalty 
was reinforced by religion, for he was a devoted clerical, 
and Austria has never abandoned the rdle of the 
leading Catholic state : the Serb was conciliated by 
an exceptional measure of toleration* Imperial rescripts 
of 1690 and 1 691 granted the Serb refugees in Hapsburg 
territory complete freedom in the practice of their 
ritual, and allowed them to organise an autonomous 
churdi under the presidency of a patriarch established 
at Karlowitz. 

The erection of the ** Military Frontiers ** along the 
Save, towards the close of Maria Theresa's reign, 
transformed the South-Slavonic borderers into regular 
soldiery, and in the stn^gles against Napoleon and the 
Risorgimento, the Croat regiments were the flower of 
the Austrian armies* To their enemies they were 
merely notorious for the savagery they had acquired 
in their warfare with the Turks, but the Dynasty they 
served was deeply indebted to their admirable constancy* 
In 1848 Croatia was the only non-German province 


wfaidi never wavered in its loyalty, and in the Autumn 
of that crucial year JellaiH^^ the '' Ban '" ' of the 
kingdom, led across the Drave the first army that 
attacked the Magyars in Francis Joseph^s name. 

The relations between the Monarchy and the Southern 
Slavs within the frontier were thus on an excellent foot- 
ing, and the situation on the further side of it was not 
incompatible with Austro-Htmgarian interests. 

In this quarter the chief event since 1739 had been 
the emergence of an autonomous Serb principality 
in the basin of the Morava* The population of this 
region revolted against Ottoman government in 1804, 
and after a long, fluctuatix^ struggle, in which it received 
support from Russia and Austria in turn, it extorted 
the Stdtan's consent to Home Rule in 1817. The 
Treaty of Adrianople, imposed on Turkey by Russia 
after the war of 1828, stipulated for the confirmation 
of this status, and the Sultan acknowledged Serbian 
autonomy by a formal proclamation in 1830* 

This development in South - Slavonic history had 
left the Danubian Monarchy at a disadvantage. For 
nearly a century after the second siege of Vienna, 
Austria had been able to monopolise the part of sym- 
pathiser, protector and possible saviour for all the 
Turk's Christian subjects in Europe, till the crushing 
bbwB inflicted upon Turkey by the Empress Catherine 
enabled Russia to intnide herself as Atistria's rival* 
The Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 prepared 
the ground for a general Russian protectorate over all 
Christian populations in the Ottoman dominions. The 
Serb revolt offered Mettemich an opportunity for 
reasserting Austrian influence, but his extreme dread of 
nationalism made him averse to supporting any mani- 

* PMiottiiocd YeUacbit * ** Vicooy.'* 

\ oa 


festatkm oi it against any constituted autfaoiity 1 
ever. By his over-k^cal policy he played into Russia's 
bands. Russia followed up her advantage with dedsioa, 
and -when Serbia started her new life under Russian 
au^ces, the Danubian Monarchy found its rival 
established on the very threshold of its Balkan doorway. 

Ever since the turn of the Turkish tide in 1683, it had 
been obvious that the ebb would never cease till all 
Europe was free of 1^ flood. The Tu^'s presence 
might be protracted, but it had become prov is ioiial, 
and sooner or later he must vanish otit of the land. 
The Treaty of Adiianople taught Austrian states m en 
that in playing for the Turk's inheritance they must 
rcdun with Russia henceforward. 

In 1867, therefore, die Monarchy's road Eastwards 
was already overshadowed by the Russian doud, but 
die dai^er, though fbrmidabte, mi^t still be braved 
with impunity. The cloud might pass without 2 storm. 

The Balkan drama was not yet played out. The 
Serbs irfio had won their freedom with Rnssa's 
aid were only a fraction of the race. The miqoTtty 
still remained under Turkish rule, and the principality 
in die Kbrava valley aspired to liberate a " Serbia 
irredenta " of greater territorial extent than itself. 
West of the River Drina lay the South-Slavonic province 
of Bosnia, where more dian half the pc^mlatian -was 
Ordiodox in religioa : Soudiwards round the iq>per 
waters of the Motxn and its tributaries, the district of 
Kossovo, once die focus of die patinial life, stiU awaited 
its reden^>tion. Serbia and the Danubian Mooarv^y 
were both tmder a vital necessity to advance in the same 
direction, and both were obstructed by the same Turkish 
occupant of the land. Why should they not advsmce 
in unison bi satisfy their comnuo need at the Turk's 


txpmst i Serbia had one supreme desire, the accom- 
plishment of her national unity. Russia had left the 
work half-done, and had alienated her protege into 
the bargain, by intriguing to strengthen her influence 
over her* Serbia was ready to throw herself into the 
arms of any great power that would help her to complete 
the realisation of her ideal* The refugee-communities 
North of the Danube, which had become the diief 
centres of modem Serb cultture, afforded a spiritual link 
between the Hapsbui^ Empire and the autonomous 
principality* If the Hapsburg Government had 
, profited by the experience of 1830, and espoused the 
cause of Serbian nationality, it might still have rallied 
the ^diok South-Slavonic race tmder its own banner* 

The breakdown of the reactionary regime in 1866 
o£Ened the oocasion for such a change of policy towards 
the Southern Slavs* Some concession to the principle 
of nationality was essential if the internal cohesion of 
the Monardiy was to be saved : liberalism in this 
particular instance would bring positive gain as well, 
by setting the salvaged ** Danubian unit ^* upon its new 
path towards expansion under the most auspicious 

Unfortunately, however, reform was baulked by 
oompcomise* We have seen that the Ausgleich of 1867 
was no reconstruction of the Hapsburg Empire on the 
bass of nationality, but simply a deed of partnership 
between Germans and Magyars for the continued op- 
pression of the rest* It made the Magyar oligarchy a 
power in the Monarchy* That was the only new factor 
it introduced, and its e£Eect upon the foreign policy 
of Attstria-Htmgary as a whole has been even more 
disastrotis than the internal race-conflict to which it has 
given vent within Hui^ary itself* 


The Magyars were reckless, q;otistic and well- 
organised. These qualities gave them an undue 
influence in the Dual State, and their geographical 
situation made that influence paramount on the South- 
Eastem frontier* After 1867 the South-Slavonic 
problem, and therewith the fate of the ** Eastward 
Trend,'^ passed more and more completely under 
Magyar control, at the very time when it was becoming 
of extreme importance to the whole Danubian Unit* 

The terms of the Ausgleich assigned to the Crown 
of St. Stephen almost all the Southern Slavs within 
the Hapsbuq; frontier.^ The struggle of 1848-49 had 
inspired the Magyars and their Slavonic neighbours 
widi mutual fear and resentment, and the memcMry of 
it did not promise well for the future of the Hapsbu^ 
Croats and Serbs, now that they were abandoned to the 
Magyars^ mercy. 

We have already examined the case of the Serbs in 
Hungary: we have now to consider the relations 
between the Magyar government and the vice-royalty 
of Croatia-Slavonia* 

The Magyars secured this province for the ** Crown 
of St. Stephen,*' basing their claim upon their mediaeval 
suzerainty over it. Such a ** historical argument '' was 
of course without value, yet the terms Croatia obtained 
seemed generous enough to compensate her for incor- 
poration with her lai^^ neig^ibour. 

The Croato-Huii^arian Compromise was voted by 
the Hungarian parliament and the Croatian diet in 
z868. It conceded at once to the Croats and Serbs 
beyond the Drave fundamental rights ^^ch the 
nationalities in Htmgary itself have been struggling 
vainly for half a century to obtain. There was no 

> The Dabnatiaos were the czoepctoii. 


attempt at Magyarisation, and South-Slavonic was 
constituted the official meditun of all administration 
within tbe limits of Croatian territory. The adminis- 
tration itself was organised in a liberal spirit. In the 
spheres of education, justice, and local self-government 
Croatia obtained complete Home Rule : defence, 
finance, and questions of economics and communications 
were made common afTairs of the ** Crown of St. 
Stephen,*' but the Croatian Diet was entitled to send 
deputies to the parliament at Buda-Pest to discuss and 
vote upon these subjects. The deputies had the right 
to debate in their native language. Their numbers 
were not quite proportional to the population they 
represented,^ but on the other hand the Croatian 
contribution to the ** Crown of St. Stephen's ** common 
exchequer was rated disproportionately low. 

Nothing could have been fairer on paper. In practice 
the Magyars have taken advantage of their partnership 
to eq>loit Croatia systematically in their own economic 



The province is important to the M^yars simply 
because it offers the only access from Htmgary to the 
sea. In the settlement of z868 the Magyar negotiators 
succeeded in excluding from the boundaries of Croatia 
the port of Fiume, which lies dose to the Austrian 
frontier in the extreme Western comer of the ootmtry, 
and the town was organised as an ^' autonomous 
municipality *' tmder a governor responsible to the 
Hungarian ministry. The trunk-railway from Buda- 
Pest to Agram and Karlovatz was pushed on over the 
Dinaric range, and reached Fiume in 1873.* 



By the terms of the Cioato-Hungarian ** Com- 
promise ** this state-built and state-owned railway was 
common property of the ^' Crown of St. Stephen/^ and 
the control of it fell within the province not of the 
Home Rule government at Agram but of the central 
government at Buda-Pest. If the ^^ Compromise ** had 
any meaning, the railway administration should have 
taken due account of both Croatian and Hungarian 
interests, but the fashion in which Buda-Pest inter- 
preted its trust revealed the ** Compromise '' as a 

The Magyars have used their political predominance 
in the common parliament to govern the Fiume railway 
exclusively to Hungary's economic advantage, and 
deliberately to the economic detriment of Croatia* 
Freightage-tarifiEs are manipulated so as to favour 
through-traffic from the Alf did to Fiume at the expense 
of local traffic in Croatia itself,^ and every effort is made 
to focus at Buda-Pest all railway connection between 
Croatia and the rest of the continent. Where more 
direct routes are already in existence, not only tzri& 
but time-cables are distorted to induce goods and 
passengers to travel to Vienna or Belgrade by way of 
the Hungarian capital : where the railways have yet to 
be built, the Magyar government does everything in its 
power to obstruct their development* While Hungary 
itself is covered with a network of lines, the section of 
the Fiume railway between Agram and the coast has 
never been extended by a sitigle branch, so that Croatia 
is deprived of independent communication with her 
natural market in Austria on the one hand, and with her 

> In 29x1 the goods-tarifif from Eisek on the Drave to Agram 

lower than the tanff from the same place to Fiume, though the dtstance 
in the former case is only three-fifths as great as in the latter. 


Sottth-Slavooic neighbours in Dalmatia and Bosnia on 
the other* 

The Croats could not be expected to submit gladly 
to such a system, and the attitude of the M^yars 
towards them has been governed solely by the deter* 
mination to force it upon them* For this purpose it 
was necessary to hold Croatian politics well in hand, 
and the settlement of 1868 offered facilities for the 

possesses her own autonomous legislature, 
but the ** Ban ** or viceroy, the supreme executive 
authority, is appointed by the ministry at Buda-Pest* 
The Magyar government perceived in this office an 
instrument for keeping Croatia to heel, and they found 
the right man for the post in Count Khuen-Hedervary« 
The Count governed Croatia for twenty years ^ by a 
** Tammany ** regime which he worked out almost to 
perfection* He paralysed the opposition in the Diet 
by fomenting the rivalry between the Croat and Serb 
sections of the population, and secured a safe govern- 
mental majority over the disorganised nationalist votes 
by the Magyar method of electoral corruption*' Official 
pressure was not difficult to exert, for the entire political 
patronage of the country bebngs to the Ban, but if the 
polling turned out against him, Khuen-Hedervary was 
always prepared to dissolve the newly-elected diet and 
repeat the process till he obtained a house of a more 
satisfactory complexion* 

Such were the effects of Magyar domination upon die 
South-Slavonic communities under the *^ Crown of 
St* Stephen '*: meanwhile, M^yar influence had 

> i8%-i909. In the Utter year he lent his services to Frands 
Jtweph and accepcsd the Hungjanan pceniiersb^)* See above* 

■ Even the Diet of z868, which voted the ** Compromise ** with 
Himgary, had been ** packed " with safe men by illegitimate means. 


asserted itself in the relations between the Monarchy 
and the Southern Slavs beyond the frontier* 

In the summer of 1875 there was a general risix^ 
of the Christian peasants in Bosnia* The Ottoman 
Government failed to suppress it^ and in the following 
stmmier the Serbian principality in the Morava valley 
intervened in favour of the Bosnian Serbs, and was 
followed by Montenegro, a little oommtmity of Serb 
mountaineers above Cattaro i^ord which had never 
forfeited its independence to Austrian, Venetian or 
Turk* In a few months the Ottoman armies crushed 
Serbia to earth, and a sympathetic insurrection of the 
Bulgar population along the Danube was quelled with 
appalling savagery, but the only result of these Turkish 
successes was to bring Russia into the field* The 
Tsar declared war in Turkey in the spring of 1877 : 
before the dose of the year the Tchataldja lines were 
forced, and the Russian troops within striking distance 
of Constantinople* In March 1878 the Turkish govern- 
ment signed the Treaty of San Stephano. 

Thus once more salvation had come to the Balkan 
Christians from the Muscovite, and the Danubian 
Monarchy had missed another opportunity* This 
time the fault lay not with the authoritarian principles 
of Vienna but with the M^yar chauvinism of Buda- 
pest* While Russia was hesitating in 1876, the Monarchy 
might have forestalled her by championitig Serbia in 
her desperate straits* The Croats and the Hungarian 
Serbs were watching with intense anxiety the vicissi- 
tudes of their Slavonic brethren's struggle for liberty, 
yet so far from being guided by the feelings of such an 
important element in the ** Crown of St* Stephen," 
the Magyar government brutally trampled upon them* 
Not only were Hungarian subjects rigorously debarred 


from crossu^; the Save to join the Serbian ranks, but 
demonstrations of sympathy with the Slavonic cause 
were suppressed in various Hungarian towns, while 
pro-Turkish demonstrations were officially encouraged 
at Buda-Pest.' 

By the end of 1877 ^^ Monarchy had alienated from 
itself the sympathies of all Slavs, and when Russia 
emerged triumphant, it was as profoundly alarmed 
about its own future in the Balkans as Great Britain was 
about the security of its route to India* At the congress 
called at Berlin in the summer of 1878 to revise the 
San Stephano Treaty, the two powers acted in co- 
operation, and Disraeli assisted Count Andrassy, the 
Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary, to secure his share 
of the spoils. 

The Coi^;ress gave the Dual Monarchy a mandate 
to occupy and administer Bosnia. The mandate was 
acted upon immediately, and the military task was 
completed before the autumn* 

Superficially, the occupation was an unfriendly act 
to Turkey, and the Moslem Bosniaks offered a stout 
resistance to the Austro-Hungarian army, but the 
province was in any case irretrievably lost to the 
Ottoman Empire, and the blow was really directed 
against South-Slavonic natiotiality* 

The history of eighteenth-century "' paternal govern- 
ment ** in the Alf61d has curiously repeated itself in 
Bosnia during the last generation. Baron Kallay, who 
administered the ** Occupied Provinces '" * from i88a 
to 1903 on behalf of the Atistrian and Htmgarian govem- 

* The leading Mamr politicians were bound by ties of personal 
sntitude to the Turkish Government, which had given them asylum 
duBDg the daA years after 1849. 

*Tbey are accurately described as BosmVHerzegovim^ but '^ Bosnia'* 
alone is used in practice to cover the whole. 


ments/ has produced remarkable results. In striking 
contrast to die policy pursued in CtoztisL during the 
same period by Magyar statesmanship, the material 
prosperity of the country has been conscientiously 
fostered. Law and order have been established, roads 
and railways have been built, education has been 
provided for. On the other hand, the development of 
national self-oonsdousness has been uncompromisingly 

The hostility of the Moslem Bosniaks was quickly 
overcome. Left stranded by the ebb of the Turkish 
tide, they found their existence threatened once more 
by the Orthodox and Catholic majority of their fellow- 
Slavs, among whom they had lived a life apart, as 
pariahs or taskmasters, for more than seven centuries. 
Naturally they turned for protection to the German 
and the Magyar, to whom the Christian Slavs were as 
alien as to themselves. The Joint Administration, on 
its part, espied in this powerful but denationalised 
element the very ally it needed, and set itself with 
success to win die Bosniaks^ support. Although the 
Moslems constitute barely a third of the Bosnian 
population,* they were encouraged to regard the country 
as their own, and to stimulate their particularism still 
further, Kallay even attempted to create the conscious- 
ness of a separate ** Bosniak language,^' differentiated 
from the standard South-Slavonic idiom of Croat and 
Serb by a few insignificant dialectical peculiarities : 

' The adfflinistratiQn of Bosnia was assigned to the departsient of 
the Joint Ministry for Finance. 

' Total population of Bosnia in 1895 . . 1,568,000 
South-Slavonic element about 

( Orthodox Serbs 
Consisting of < Moslem Bosniaks 

Catholic Croats 

670/x)0 (4X«38%) 

550fioo (33-97%) 

334*000 (ao.^%) 

For their distributiott see Map IIL 


die Serb element in the province, which amounts to 
two-fifths of the total population, was correspondingly 

This deliberate discrimination in treatment between 
the various sections of the population has marred the 
Administration by giving it an illiberal cast, and in one 
important sphere it has hampered the policy of material 
improvement* To conciliate the Moslem landowners the 
pressing agrarian problem has been indefinitely shelved* 

The occupation of Bosnia thus sowed seeds of 
dissention between the Serb nationality and the Dual 
Monarchy, yet these seeds might still have withered 
without bearing fruit. The excellence of the Bosnian 
Administration worked potently for stability, and the 
step might plausibly have been explained as the final 
act in die Danubian Staters geographical evolution* 
Ever since the Hapsbtu^ had added Dalmatia as well 
as Slavonia to their dominions, the ultimate inoorpora- 
tioa of Bosnia had been a geographical necessity* 
The province is shaped like a triangular wedge, and its 
^>ex presses upwards, perilously dose to the lines of 
oooomunication between the centres of industry and 
agriculture in the Danube-basin and their ports on 
the Adriatic seaboard* The occupation of the triangle 
gacve the Monarchy its short base-line for a frontier, 
instead of the combined length of the other two sides* 
The General Staff might have vindicated it as a defensive 
measure oi purely military import* 

Unfortunately, however, the Berlin Conference 
did not confine its mandate to Bosnia* Serbia and 
Montenegro were both granted considerable increases 
of territory,^ but their frontiers were carefully held 

obtained in addition complete independence from Ottoman 
smetainty — ^Montenesio had never submitted to it* 


asunder* The Ttirkish Government was left in 
possession of the Sandjak ^ of Novi-Bazar^ a strip of 
mountainous country which ran from South-East to 
North-West in the general direction of the Dinaric 
Range, and served as a land-bridge between the Dual 
Monarchy now in occupation of Bosnia and the Ottoman 
Empire still established in the interior of Macedonia 
and along the littoral of the .Sgean* To make the 
maintenance of this bridge secure, the two powers 
concluded a convention, under which the district was 
garrisoned by Austro-Htmgarian troops, without pre- 
judice to the Ottoman civil administration^ 

The garrisonix^ of the Sandjak revealed the occupa- 
tion of Bosnia as the first step in a new movement 
of offence. The ** Trend Eastward *' was to find its 
realisation in territorial escpansion to an ^Bgean sea- 
board, but instead of proceeding in tmison with South- 
Slavonic national aspirations, the Dual Monarchy had 
made up its mind to march over the Southern Slavs' 
dead bodies* 

Ever since 1878 Austro-Hungarian statesmanship has 
been paving the way for a fresh advance* During 
the Hamidian regime the garrisons in the Sandjak 
looked on while the Serb population of the Kossovo 
district, a few miles away, was being exterminated by 
bands of Moslem Albanians, armed and incited by 
the Ottoman Government. Austria-Hungary refused to 
interfere : she professed scrupulous respect for Ottoman 
sovereignty, yet all the time she was spreading her 
propaganda among Ottoman subjects in the immediate 
neighbourhood* She established a virtual protectorate 
over the Catholic Albanian clans in the hinterland of 
Skodra,* a mountainous region between Kossovo and 

« " Province/* * Skutari. 


the ooast* She kept them supplied with arms, and 
txpUAttd their lawless instincts in order to harass 
Montenegro, their traditional enemy, and even to 
coerce, if necessary, the Turkish government itself* 

The Danubian Monarchy had thus leagued itself 
with the Southern Slavs' most deadly foes* Over- 
shadowing Serbia and Montenegro already on the West 
and North, she was remorselessly turning their flanks, 
and threatening to surrotmd them on the South and 
East as well* Magyar ideals had involved her in a 
stru|^ to the death with the principle of nationality 
in the Balkans*^ She had thrown in her lot with the 
dying Turk, and made herself both his physician and 
his executor* The Turk's own death would have set 
the natural term to his outworn system of government : 
Austria-Hungary showed her intention of perpetuating 
it for ever. 

The Monarchy had thus committed itself to a very 
serious contest* To reach its goal, it must overcome 
the opposition of the Balkan nations and the Russian 
Empire simtdtaneously. In this undertaking conunon- 
sense dictated two guiding principles : the Southern 
Slavs must be kept divided,* and Russia must be 
** squared ** by an adequate compromise* 

* The mandate to occupy Bosnia was the achievement of the Magyar 
Andsaasy, plcaq)otentiary at Berlin and Joint Foreign-Minister, and 
he was s u pported whole-heartedly by Cokmian Tisza, leader of the 
Magyar Liberal Party and Hungarian premier. It is true that the 
appar e n tly anti-Turkish tendency of the coup aroused violent opposi- 
tsoo among the rank and file. Magyar public opinion compelled 
Aadnmy to retire, and Tisza only foiced the measure throu^ parlia- 
ment by plaoring his last card and tendering his resignation. Yet 

the two poliadans had shown their statesmanship by anticipating 

le import oft 
policy revealed itself, Magyar opinion veered round, and Toza and 

the luatuier tudgment of the nation itself. As the true import of their 

Andraasy were both national heroes again before their deaths. 

* At the dose of 2878 they were partitioned between no leas than seven 
political regimes* In Dalmatia mey were Austrian citiseas. North of 
the Danube they were Hungarian, in Croatia they were autonomous 


At first the statesmanship of 1878 seemed likely to 
be justified by success* The supersession of the San 
Stephano Treaty by the diplomats at Berlin went far 
to cancel the prestige wfaidi Russia had won by her 
military victory, and the new principality of Bulgaria, 
which the Powers had grudgingly allowed to come into 
existence within reduced limits, did not prove a source 
of strength to its Russian creator. Like the Serbs after 
1829, ^^ Bulgars found Russian tutels^ a doubtful 
blessing, but they displayed far more vigour in shaking 
themselves free. In an incredibly short time they 
ventured to steer an independent course of their own. 
Flouted by Bulgaria, Russia looked to Serbian loyalty 
for consolation, but Serbia had been mortally offended 
by the erection of a rival Slavonic state in the Balkan 
area, and had entered on a new political phase. 

The throne of the principality was occupied at this 
time by Milan Obrenovitch,^ the most notable statesman 
modem Serbia has produced. He saw that Serbia was 
not strong enough to achieve her destiny tmaided, and 
that to invoke the assistance of greater powers was 
merely to offer herself as a pawn in their game. It was 
clear that the Berlin settlement would not be upset in a 
day, and Milan determined to take advantage of the 
inevitable lull for the development of his country's 
material prosperity. Geography has made the Morava 
valley a natural appendage of the Middle Danubian 
Basin. The Danubian Monarchy spreads its bulk 
between Serbia and Western Europe, and the little state 
could not begin its economic growth unless it had secured 

under the Crown of St. Strahen, in Bosnia they were under the joint 
protectorate of the Dual Monarchy, in Serbia and Montenegro they 
were members of independent national states, in Kosoovo they were still 
subject to Turktth miagDvemment. 
^ He ascended it in x868. 


its big ndg^bour^s good-will. Moved by these con- 
skieratioiis, Milan did not hesitate to sacrifice national 
ideals and turn his kingdom into a satellite of Austria- 

The next ten years witnessed a struggle between the 
king supported by the Liberal or ** Progressive *' Party 
on the one hand, and the Russophil Radicals on the 
other* Milan succeeded in carrying out his programme* 
Railways were built and the finances reorganised, in 
spite of the opposition aroused by increased taxes 
without any immediately visible returns* In 1885 an 
opportunity presented itself for striking at Bulgaria, 
and jealousy prompted Serbia to seize it* She declared 
war only to suffer a severe defeat, and nothing but the 
Dual Monarchy's veto prevented the Bulgarian army 
from marching upon Belgrade* This intervention 
marked die zenith of Austro-Hungarian ascendency 
over Serbia,^ yet Milan actually survived the bankruptcy 
of his foreign policy* It was not till 1889 that he was 
driven to abdicate, and allow Alexander his son to reign 
in his stead* 

Alexander was a minor, and the Liberal regency found 
itself unable to cope with the growing Radical block in 
pariiament* In 1893 the young king took the reins into 
his own hands, and attempted to govern through a 
Radical ministry, but the experiment soon broke down* 
Hie Radicals endangered the understanding with the 
Dual Monarchy, and wrought havoc with the public 

* And abo die lowest ebb of Russtan influefice in the Balkans. At 
tke oatbflvak of the war, Ruana had immediately witbdfawn her 
fldtury atafif which was engaged in building up the Bulgarian anny. 
She hoped that this step would at once conciliate Serbia and t«ich the 
w if w aid Bolgais that the^ could not dispense with Russian assistance. 
When the Bulgars impioviaed victorious generalship out of their native 
ifjomi e a, and Serbia applied to die Dual Monarny to save her from 
the consequences of defeat Russia was dealt two staggering blows. 


finances: a political catastrophe was imminent, and 
the country recalled the only man who could avert it. 
Five years after his exile, the old king returned to 
Belgrade in triumph* His policy had conquered. 
Serbia submitted herself to his guidance, party rancours 
cooled down, and the national energy concentrated 
itself in economic channels. 

King Milan^s success did not fail to produce its effect 
upon the Russian Foreign Office. Deserted by two 
of her protegtei, Russia found herself left with no friend 
in the Balkans but Montenegro, and was forced to 
reconcile herself to an abatement of her ambitions. 

Russian and Austro - Hungarian interests in the 
Balkans were not essentially incompatible. Russia's 
objective was the Black Sea Straits : the Danubian 
Monarchy coveted an ^Bgean seaboard. There was no 
geographical obstacle to the partition of the Balkan 
peninsula by the two powers into an Eastern and a 
Western sphere,^ and Russia was now prepared to 
consider Atistro-Hungarian overtures to this efiFect. 
The advent of the next phase in Turkey's dissolution 
precipitated a compromise. 

The Berlin Congress had stipulated for administrative 
reform throughout the territories abandoned to Ottoman 
sovereignty in Macedonia,* and the Porte had published 
a pretentious scheme of enlightened government, but 
the project remained a dead letter, and the Christian 
populations at last determined to help themselves. The 
situation, however, was complicated by their distmion. 

> The idea had already commended itself to Joseph IL just a oeatiiry 
before. In 1789 he made an alliance with Cathenne of Ruasta lor the 
partition of the Ottoman Empire^ but the Turks defended themselves 
stoutly, and the vultures soon diverted their attention to the Pblsh 

* An unofficial name employed to cover the three Ottoman vilayets 
{** governments ") of Kdssovo, Monastir, and Sakmika. 


Maordonia is the meeting-plaoe of Southern«Slav, 
Biilgar^ and Greek. In this area the three races are 
ioezthcably intermingled^ and their territorial daims 
ffltttually incompatible : the bitterness of each against 
the other exceeded their common hatred of the Turk. 

In 1893 ^ terrible revolutionary propaganda b^;an. 
Macedonia became infested by armed bands, equipped 
and controlled from the national states immediately 
beyond the Ottoman frontier. Their activity wais only 
secondarily directed against the Turkish government : 
their principal function was to exterminate villages of 
alien race in districts damied by their own nationality, 
and in this they were more successful than in protecting 
their own nationals from a similar fate, for to harbour 
a band exposed the village to Turkish reprisals* The 
Macedonian peasant had to choose between the scourge 
of die Anatolian soldier or of the Balkan brigand* 

The crisis developed rapidly from bad to worse, and 
in 1897 the two interested powers arrived at an under- 
standing with regard to their eventual policy. In 
February 1903 this fotmd expression in an ^^ identic 
note "" to the Porte. In the summer of the same year 
events were hastened by a general insurrection of the 
Bulgarian element,^ and its brutal suppression by the 
Turkish troops. In the October of the same year the 
two Emperors met at Miirs^steg, and their Foreign 
Ministries elaborated a concrete programme, which 
they compelled the Porte to accept. The civil adminis- 
tration of Macedonia was placed tmder the supervision 
of Russian and Austro-Hungarian commissioners, and 
the gendarmerie service was organised in local zones of 
inspection, which were severally assigned to all the Great 

' Which constitutes the great majority of the Macedonian population. 



The Murzsteg Programme seemed to have started 
the Dual Monarchy upon the last stage of its advance 
towards Salonika without committing it to the dreaded 
conflict with Russia^ In 1904 Russia was diverted 
from the Balkans by her war in the Far East, and its 
disastrous close in the following year gave Austro- 
Hungarian statesmen cause to congratulate themselves* 
Apparently the *' Eastward Trend ** had an absolutely 
dear field before it : their good fortune had exceeded 
their expectations* 

At the very moment, however, when Russia retired 
from the lists, South-Slavonic natiotiality was coming of 
age, and preparing to champion its own cause. 

In 1900 Alexander of Serbia made an unfortunate 
marriage, and broke away from his father's influence. 
His action was bitterly resented by the country, MOan 
died before he cotdd recover his authority, and his loss 
increased the general misgivii^. A conspiracy was 
formed among the officers of the army, and in 1903 King 
Alexander and Queen Draga were murdered in their 
palace under the most brutal circumstances. 

This atrocity did not strike the Austro-Hungarian 
Foreign Ministry as important at the time,^ but Austro- 
German and Magyar hatred has battened upon it during 
the struggle between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia 
which has supervened. In the October of 1908 the 
writer happened to be dining in an Oxford college where 
a distinguished Magyar was a guest. He was an owner 
of vineyards in the Tokay district, a major of Honved * 
cavalry, and a professor of mathematics into the bargain, 
in fine, he was a typical representative of the cultured 

la-Htsngary, Riasia, and Montenegro weie the only foreign 
states which did not temponuily withdraw their diplomatic representa- 
tives from Belgrade as a protest, 
■ *• Yeomanry." 


Whig oligarchy. The Balkan War had jtist broken out, 
and the name of Serbia was mentioned in the conversa- 
tion, when suddenly the table was startled by an 
exclamation : ** The Serbs I Liarsand thieves ! They 
killed their king and queen with bayonets. Thieves 
and liaxsT" During the hush which followed, a 
graduate of the college, who was by birth a Galidan 
Jew, was heard remarking aside that ** in our part of the 
world you can always guess a man's nationality by the 
people he abuses/' 

The conunent hit the mark. The hate was primary 
in the professor's mind, his jtistification of it an after- 
thought. In arriving at his estimate of the Serbs' 
national character, he had never consulted his reason : 
had he done so, it would have shown him the absurdity 
of judging a yotmg nation by the scandals in its high 
places. The history of Serbia since 1878 is not to be 
divined in the intrigues of a handful of politicians at 
Belgrade, but in the industry of the peasants, who have 
been pturging from the Morava-basin the traces of 
Turkish misrule. The success with which they have 
overcome their initial handicap, and brought their 
country into line with more fortunate parts of Europe, 
is sufficient to vindicate their capacity for civilisation. 

When Alexander was murdered, his father's economic 
policy was already bearing fruit* Serbia had developed 
her agrarian resources to the point of producing an 
annual surplus : she was now in a position to enter the 
field of international oonunerce. Her ziatural market 
was the industrial world of Central Europe, and the 
direct line for the export of her produce accordingly lay 
through the Danubian Monarchy. So long, however, 
as she monopolised all Serbia's economic outlets, 
Austria-Htmgary ootdd impose on Serbian exports 


vAisitcvtt prices she chose : economic independence 
could only be achieved by opening up an alternative 
route* Alexander Obrenovitch was succeeded on the 
throne of Serbia by Peter Karageorgevitch, the heir of a 
rival dynasty, and the first important act of the new reign 
. was the negotiation in 1906 of a tariff-convention with 
Bulgaria, which promised Serbia access on reasonable 
terms to a port on the Black Sea* 

This sudden change in the relations of the two 
principalities caused considerable consternation at 
Vienna and Buda-Pest. Not only did it threaten to 
relieve Serbia from her economic thraldom to the Dual 
Monarchy : it portended a political entente between the 
rival Slavonic groups in the Balkan Peninsula* More 
ominous still, it coincided with a similar movement 
among the South-Slavonic citizens of the Monarchy 

When Khuen-Hedervary resigned the Croatian vice- 
regency in 1903, he left no competent successor behind 
him, and the political life of Croatia began to revive* 
The prolonged parliamentary crisis at Buda-Pest, which 
followed the overthrow of the Magyar Liberal Party, 
produced its echo South of the Drave* In the Autunm 
of X905, a conference of Croat deputies from the 
Croatian Diet and the Austrian Reichsrath was held at 
Fiume.^ A resolution was adopted, expressing sym- 
pathy with the Magyar Coalition in its struggle against 
the Cro¥m, but demanding that the liberties for which 
the Coalition professed to be fighting should be extended 
to Croatia as well : the Compromise of z868 was to be 
observed in spirit as well as in letter, and constitutional 

^ The initiative came from the Croat leaders in Dahnatia, who as 
citizens of Austria had been able to develop a more untiammeled 
political activity than their less fortunate brethren under the *' Crown 
of St* Stephen* 


autonomy to be made a reality* The union ^ of Croatia 
and Dalmatia was to be achieved under the *' Crown of 
St. Stephen/' 

Before the Conference dissolved, an executive 
committee was appointed to give effect to its intentions* 
They at once opened negotiations with the Sefb 
members of the Croatian Diet** Less than a fort- 
night later a Serb congress met at Zara, endorsed 
the ** Resolution of Fiume/' and proclaimed the need 
for political co-operation between the Croat and Serb 
elements in the Dual Monarchy* During the winter 
the two groups actually combined to conduct a vigorous 
political campaign, and in the spring of 1906 the same 
elections that brought the Magyar Coalition into office 
at Buda-Pest, returned to the Diet at Agr^m a formidable 
block representative of the new coalition between Serbs 
and Croats* 

Within the Monarchy as well as outside it^ the 
Southern Slavs were thus beginning to close their 
ranks* Austro-Hungarian statesmanship had counted 
on its ability to play off against one another the several 
victims of its ** Eastward Trend ** : the events of X906 
threatened it with the forfeiture of its most effective 
weapon, when the last and most hazardous step in the 
advance was still to take* A strong personality was 
required at the Joint Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and 
the appointment of Baron Aerenthal followed before 
the end of this critical year* 

Aerenthal was fully alive to the danger : he resolved 
to forestall it by a determined offensive* Russia was 
still paralysed by her disaster in the Far East : the 

'Or the '^ reunion/' as Croat nationalists prefer to txprtss it,harkixi« 
back to the ** Triune Kingdom " of Dalmatia-Croatia-Slavonia which 
floansbed for its brief moment in the eleventh century a J>. 

* About one quarter of the total population of Croatia is Scib. 


Danubian Monarchy must seize this opportunity to 
realise its ambitions, or else abandon them for ever* 
Aerenthal deliberately embarked upon the death* 
struggle with the Soudiem Slavs* 

The first bout in the conflict did not result in his 
favour* Dtuing 1907 he retaliated upon Serbia for her 
effort towards economic liberty by waging a remorseless 
tariff-war against her.^ The Serbian peasantry suffered 
severely, but they showed unexpected obstinacy: 
instead of coming to terms, they developed new outlets 
and markets with such enterprise that Aerenthal had 
to abandon his campaign as a failure* 

Next year, however, he returned to the diarge* In 
January 1908 he concluded a convention with the 
Ottoman Government for the construction of a railway 
through the Sandjak of Novibazar, which was to link 
the Austro-Hungarian railway system in Bosnia with 
the Turkish railhead at Mitrovitza* His object was to 
** side-track ** Serbia by diverting to this new route the 
through-traffic between Central Europe and the ^Bgean 
littoral, which had utilised hitherto the line through 
Belgrade and up the Morava valley to Salonika** He 
paid dearly for this move, for it drew Russia once more 
into the Balkan arena* 

Russian opinion regarded the railway scheme as a 
direct violation of the Miirzsteg agreement : it por- 
tended the consummation of the Danubian rival's 
"' Eastward Trend*'^ The Government shook off its 
lethargy, and determined upon a counter-stroke* In 

^ Nicknamed the ^Pig War*' in Austria-Hungary, swine being 
Serbia's chief article of export. 

*The Mitiovitza line traverses the Kossovo district and joins the 
Salonika Railway at Uskub* Like the Bosnian system'and the piopoaed 
connecting link, it is narrow-gauge, while the Belgrade-Uskub-SaKuuka 
Railway h built on the rq^ular CSmtinental standard. See Map III. 


June 1908 the Tsar entertained King Edward VIL at 
Reval, and Great Britain and Rtissia announced in 
oonjtinction a new and drastic scheme of Macedonian 

The effect was momentous* A ** Young Turk ** 
committee had been planning for years the overthrow 
of Abd-^-hamid's absolute government* Educated by 
exile in Western Europe, they had imbibed its national 
chauvinism as well as its liberal ideals* The ** Reval 
Ptogramme'' convinced them that Turkey would 
forfeit the sovereignty over her European territories 
altogether, unless she could accomplish immediate 
reform from within* They resolved to risk everything 
to save the integrity of the Empire* The revolution 
was started among the troops in Macedonia before the 
next month was out, and in a few days Turkey was 
converted into a constitutional state* 

The dtiel between Aerenthal and Serbia had thus set 
all the Balkans and the Nearer East in commotion before 
the autumn of 1908* Meanwhile, the South-Slavonic 
problem had rapidly been assuming more serious pro- 
portions within the borders of the Dual Monarchy* 

The Spring of 1907 witnessed the inevitable 
breach between the Serbo-Croat G>alition Party and 
the Ms^;yar Coalition Ministry* In a biU submitted 
by Francis Kossuth * to the parliament at Buda-Pest, 
Magyar was declared the sole official language for the 
railway-system not merely of Hungary as heretofore, 
but of all territories included under the ** Crown of St* 
Stephen*'' This was a dear contravention of the 
Compromise of 1868, by which the South-Slavonic 

* Qimmra fear of Gennany had led these two |K»wen to oompQW th^ 
ootrtandtiis dixEueiiccs the year befdce* 

* The aoa of Lotttt. 



tongue had been guaranteed official status within the 
limits of Croatia* In proposing it the Magyar Radicals 
had shown their hand* Their Liberal predecessors 
had confined the policy of Magyarisation to Hungary : 
this bill was an attempt to extend it to Croatia* 

The Serbo-Croat deputies in the parliament at Buda- 
pest at once resorted to obstruction* They were 
defeated by a tactical manoeuvre and the bill became law, 
but the struggle was only continued the more fiercely 
at Agram* At the beginning of 1908 the Magyar 
government dismissed the ** Ban ** then in office as 
unequal to the situation, and specially appointed Baron 
Paul Rauch to superintend as viceroy the impending 
elections in Croatia ; yet Rauch, though he strentiously 
applied Khuen-Hedervary^s methods, did not obtain 
from them his gifted predecessor's results* The 
Croato-Serb coalition secured an absolute majority in 
the new Diet, and all that Rauch could do was to 
prorogue the session for an indefinite period, and govern 
in defiance of the constitution* 

Durixig the months, therefore, that followed the 
Turkish revolution, Aerenthal found all sections of the 
South-Slavonic race in a dangerous state of agitation* 
Being a man of courageous temper, he resolved to crush 
the spirit of Serb and Croat alike by an overwhelmii^ 
blow* In October 1908 he repudiated the sovereignty 
of the Porte over Bosnia, and declared the annescation 
of the ** Occupied Provinces '^ to the Austro-Hungarian 

This act at once provoked a European crisis, but 
Aerenthal showed himself not unequal to the occasion* 

^The com was effected in coUusioii with Bulgaria, which 
simultaneotisly denounced Ottoman suzerainty and proclaimed the 
'' annexation '' (in a similar sense) of Eastern Rumelia. 


By January 1909 he had compounded with the ** Young 
Turk"" government* Serbia and Montenegro^ whose 
interests were much more vital than Turkey's in Bosnia, 
had mobilised and threatened war, but this was provided 
for in Aerenthal's programme* He met it by a vigorous 
counter-mobilisation along the Save and the Drina, 
and uncompromisingly rejected all claims to territorial, 
economic or moral compensation* When Russia took 
steps in support of the two Balkan principalities, he 
appealed with success to the Monarchy's German ally, 
h the last week of March Berlin addressed a virtual 
ukimattun to Petersburg, the Russian protest against 
the Annexation was withdrawn, and Serbia composed 
a paUnodia in the form of a note to the Austro-Htmgarian 
foreign office, in which she renotmoed all stake in the 
destinies of Bosnia* 

Aerenthal had carried his manoeuvre throt^, but it 
was a Pyrrhic victory* G>mmon adversity had linked 
Serbia fast to Montenegro, and her latent loyalty to 
Russia was re-kindled by the championship she had 
received from the diplomacy of Petersburg* Russia 
on her part was stirred to the depths by the humiliation 
she had endtired*^ The Far Eastern disaster and the 
revolutionary convulsion which followed it had left her 
still too greatly diso]^;anised to fight ; but she was well 
on the way towards recovery, and she needed but this 
stimulus to dispel her paralysis altogether* Deter^ 
mined to be ready ** next time,^^ she devoted herself 
to preparations* The South-Slavonic question became 
onoe more the focus of her foreign policy, and was 
promoted thereby to be the crucial issue between the 

* TbK Kaaer's speech in which he imaged himself as ** ■»a«Ht<ig 
boide his ally in shining armour'* rankled especially deep in the 
RdBian iHinn. 


two camps into which the European powers were divided. 
Aerenthal had unchained forces beyond his control* 
He had asserted his will in a problem of vital importance 
to the Danubian Monarchy, but he had done so at the 
price of transferring the initiative for the future to the 
dominant partner in the Central-European alliance. 

The aftermath of the crisis within the Monarchy 
itself was hardly less embarrassing* Baron Rauch 
had rid himself of the Croatian Diet for the moment : 
he was resolved to ruin the Croato-Serb Coalition before 
he faced it again* During the early summer of 1908 
his official press worked up a scare of ** Pan-Serb ** 
conspiracy ; in July the first arrest was made on the 
charge of High Treason, and before the end of January 
X909 no less than fifty-eight Serb citizens of Croatia, 
all people of obscure station, were in prison pending 
their trial on this account. The judicial proceedings at 
Agram did not open till March, when the external crisis 
was approaching its dttente, and the attention of Europe 
was concentrated upon them before they dragged to 
their belated close in October* Thirty-one of the 
victims were sentenced to terms of imprisonment 
varying from twelve to five years, but Rauch had failed 
in his real objective : all attempts to implicate the 
Coalition members of the Croatian Diet had broken 
down, and the party was able to follow up this negative 
success by a triumph of a more startling character. 

During the same month of March in which the 
Bosnian crisis ended and the Agram trial began, the 
Neae Freie Presse newspaper had published at Vienna 
an article on the relations of the Dual Monarchy to 
the South-Slavonic problem by an eminent Austrian 
historian. Dr. Friedjung. This article was written in 
an authoritative tone : it specifically^charged the Serbo- 


Qoat Coalition with being the exponents and tools of 
agencies in Belgrade, and supported its assertions by 
quotations from documents* Some of the documents 
purported to be official correspondence of the Serbian 
Foreign Office, others were minutes of a semi-official 
revolutionary society, but Dr« Friedjung, when chal- 
lenged, refused to reveal their provenance, and the 
Coalition deputies accordingly entered a libel action 
against him at Vienna* 

The hearing of this case only came on in December 
1909, after the treason trial was over, but this time the 
proceedings lasted no longer than a fortnight* The 
trial at Agram had cast a lurid light upon the methods 
of espionage employed by the Austro-Htmgarian 
Administration in Bosnia, Croatia, and Dalmatia : now 
at Vienna Dr* Friedjung^s documents were revealed 
as forgeries concocted within the walls of the Austro- 
Hungarian legation at Belgrade, oommimicated to 
Friedjung as genuine by the Joint Foreign Office, and 
utilised by him in all good faith* 

The action was hastily stopped by a compromise, 
before these results could be registered in the verdict 
of the court, but the evidence of the witnesses had 
created an immense sensation* Dr« Spalaikovitch, 
the incriminated Serbian official, put in an appearance 
and brilliantly vindicated himself and his country : 
The Tcfaech savant Professor Masaryk of Prag, who 
counted among his pupils men of the rising generation 
in all the Slavonic countries of the Danubian Monarchy 
and the Balkans, proved himself still more formidable* 
Implicated as a witness in the trial, he refused to let 
the matter drop* He was a member of the Austrian 
Reichsrath, and when the Delegations next met in 
November 1909, he was elected as one of the Austrian 


representatives. This gave him an opportunity for a 
direct pas5^;e of arms with the Joint Foreign Minister : 
Aerenthal hardly attempted a defence, and Masaryk 
proceeded remorselessly with his interpellations till he 
had pieced together and exposed the whole official 
conspiracy. Aerenthal aspired to be the " Austrian 
Bismardc " without possessing the capacity of his 
Prussian ensample. The exposure was as Hamning 
as that of the " Ems Telegram," and it had overtaken 
him with disconcerting speed. 

Thus ended the first bout in the conflict : before the 
next began Baron Aerenthal had been removed from the 
scene, but during five short years of office ^ he had fixed 
the lines on which it should be fought to its conclusion. 

Baron Rauch did not survive the Friedjung incident : 
early in 1910 he was superseded, and the Croatian Diet 
was convened once more. The respite, however, was 
brief. The ideals of the Serbo-Croat Coalition and of 
M^Cyar nationalism were not compatible with one 
another. So long as Magyar ministries could control 
the politics of Croatia, it was possible to observe in 
outward form the Compromise of 1868 : now that the 
majority in the Diet was possessed by a party truly 
representative of the Croatian people, consperation 
between the parliaments at J^ram and Buda-Pest had 
become impracticable, and the Compromise inevitably 
broke down. A fresh deadlock led once more to the 
suspension of constitutional govenmient in Croatia in 
the spring of 1912, and almost immediately afterwards 
the Serb Chtirch in the Hapsbuig dominions was 
deprived of its charter, i^ch had been consistently 
respected since its original grant in 1691. 




At tlie height of this intemal crisis^ the Monarchy 
1RB suddenly £aoed by that external event which its 
ittafesmen had dreaded beyond all others* During 
the same sununer the four independent states in the 
Balkans,^ upon whose rivaby Austro-Hungarian policy 
depended, contrived to effect an understanding, and 
in September 191a they declared war upon Turkey 
sifflultaneously** Within two months the Turkish 
armies were driven off the field, the Balkan allies were 
assaulting the Chataldja and Gallipoli lines, which 
cover the Black Sea Straits, and only three fortresses 
sdll held out further West* Negotiations opened at 
London during a winter armistice proved abortive, but 
diey were renewed after the fall <^ all three fortresses 
in the spring* By the resultant treaty the League 
oorporately acquired from Tturkey all her European 
territories beyond a line drawn from Ainos on the 
£gean to Midia on the Blade Sea«' 

Serbia had joined the League for two objects. The 
first was to recover her *' irredenta ** in Kossovo, before 
it was overtaken by the same fate as Bosnia : the second 
was to obtain direct access to the Adriatic* 

A country without a seaboard is economically at the 
mercy of its neighbours. Serbia had experienced this 
in X907, when the Danubian Monarchy had closed 
agamst her trade the land-route to Western Europe. 
The nearest seaboard to the Morava-basin is die 

' Serbia, Montcncgio, Bulgam and Gfceoe. 

'Tb e ync i e givat tfaetr opportunity by the Turoo-Italian War, which 
began m the atftumn of 291 land dragged on for a y«ar. The signature 
of peace by the Turkish and Italian plenqntentiarics at Latisanne and 
the dt rlararion of war by the Balkan Lngue were pncticaUY simul- 

ffntnand of ^ 

and undl that moment the Italian fleet's command of the sea 
kxked up in Tnpoh some of Turlrey's most serviceable troops, and 
paialyaed commimtcatinns between the Turkish military estabhshment 
a Marrrionia and its Anatolian reservoirs of men and supplies. 
'See Map IV. 



Dalmatian coast, and nationality as well as geography 
supports Serbia's title to an outlet in this direction, since 
the whoit territory that intervenes between Belgrade 
and Spalato ^ is occupied by a homogeneous South- 
Slavonic population. Yet here, K>o, Serbia's ubiquitous 
neighbour blocked the way : the crisis of 1908 had 
shown that Austria-Hungary was established just as 
permanently West of the Dnna as North of the Save, 
and that Serbia's dream of oonoessioos in this quarter 
had been Utopian. 

A casual glance at the map suggests that, after the 
annexation of the Kossovo-district, Serbia might have 
engineered a railway across it to the Montenegrin port 
of Antivari, and thus obtained an outlet only sU^tly 
further K> the South ; but with a map that represents 
the relief (tf the land, the idea will be dispelled by closer 
examination. Antivari possesses a tolerable harbour 
but an impassable hinterland. The massif of the 
" Black Afeuntain " rises immediately behind it, and 
the very physical qualities that luve sa£q;uarded 
Montenegro's liberty have denied her the possibility 
of railway development. The Dinaric barrier between 

■ Spalato lies appio mn a tt ly at the mid-point of die Soutb-Sbvooic 
coan, half way bctWccD Piume on the one bond and ttw mouth of Ac 
Boyana Rivet on die odiei. It is destined by geography to be die 
principal pott of die Soutb-Slavonic area, but at present ita c^iacidei 
are neutnUwd by the lack of railway connections with its binteriand 
(see Mq> IIL). The Boonian Railway hai not yet opened its way to 
any port further up the coast than Metkovitdi on the estuary of the 
Narenta, though a branch diverges from that point in the opposite 
direction to Ragtaa, and continues still further South-Bast as tar as 
Caitelnuovo, at the entrance of Cattaro fiord. To link ifae Serbian 
railway system with these actual or potential ports on the Dalmatian 
QUMt, bttle furdier railway construction is required. A Serbian line 
aaceods the valley of the Western Morava and ita tributary, the Tsetinya, 
as fax West as XTpat : a branch of die Bosnian Raitwav starts ftoin 
SarayevD, crosses the Drina at Vishegrad, and runs li^t up to iIm 
Serbian frontier at Vardiahtc. The distance between the two rail- 
heads is less than twenty-five miles (see Map III.). 


the Danube-basin and the sea is at no point more 
di£Bcult to surmount* 

Serbia was thus driven to look further South* As 
soon as the Turkish resistance in Northern Macedonia 
had been overcome, she despatched a coltunn by forced 
maidies across the Albanian mountains, and occupied a 
stretch of the Turkish coast-line extending from Alessao 
at die mouth of the Drin as far Southward as the port 
of Durazso« 

At this point the Dual Monarchy intervened* Count 
Berchtold, who had succeeded Baron Aerenthal at the 
Joint Ministry for Foreign AfEairs, set his veto upon the 
establishment of Serbian sovereignty at any point on 
the Adriatic coast* Once more the Monarchy had to 
mobilise her troops in support of her diplomacy, and 
this time against Russia on the Galidan frontier, yet 
by Sir Edward Grey^s efforts the catastrophe was once 
more averted, and Serbia yielded to Berchtold's demand* 

Berchtold^s action was not defensible* He made play 
with the Austro-Hungarian protectorate over the North- 
Albanian dans, and posed as the champion of a small 
nationality against its unscrupulous neighbour, yet in 
a precisely similar case the Magyars had avowedly 
been sacrificing the interests of the Southern Slavs in 
Croatia to their own need for railway conuntmication 
with the sea* The hypocrisy of Berchtold's plea was 
enhanced by the fact that Serbia, tmlike Hungary, could 
have found a seaboard in Dalmatia without doing any 
violence at all to the national principle, had not her way 
been barred by the Dual Monarchy itself* 

Even the occasion for this stroke seemed ill-chosen. 
Feeling in Croatia and Bosnia was abeady inflamed 
against the government by the internal situation : the 
Serbian sucoeflses had further agitated it by a wave of 


sjraqiatbetic enthusiasm, and the morale of Serbia 
herself was very difierent in the spring of 1913 from 
what it had been in the Spring of 1909. Berchtold's 
diplomacy, however, had an ulterior object. He 
divined that Serbia, now entirely debarred from the 
Adriatic, would insist on obtainii^ an j^ean outlet 
in compensation. This would brit^ her into coUiKon 
with Bulgarian claims in Macedonia, the Balkan allies 
would quarrel over the division of their Turkish spoil, 
their formidable harmony would be destroyed, and after 
they had exhausted one another by an inttraedne war, 
the Monarchy's path towards Salonika would once more 
be open. 

In starting this train of events, Berchtold overreached 
himself. Serbia duly enlarged her Macedonian claims, 
the tension between the Balkan allies increased, and 
towards the end of June 19x3 Bulgaria opened the 
Second Balkan War by a treacherous night-attack upon 
the Serbian outposts sixmg the line of the Vardar. 
Yet the result of this secondary contest was an even 
greater surimse than the collapse of the Turks. The 
Greek and Seri)ian armies almost immediately assumed 
the ofEensive, and cleared Macedonia of Bulgarian troops ; 
Roumania declared war, and invaded Bulgaria from the 
opposite quarter : hardly more than a month had 
passed before the Bulgarian resistance was completely 
broken. The Treaty of Bukarcst, which defined the 
terms of the re-settlement, was a proclamation of 
Berchtold's failure. 

Serbia's gains were fai greater than they would have 

been if the Treaty of London had remained in force, 

and the four allies had settled their claims by peaceful 

I compromise. The Dual Monarchy's discom^ture was 

L pn^icionattly aggravated. Jn the autumn of 19(3 


die ** Eastwatd Trend ** had indeed lost all prospect of 

(i*) In the first place the gateway through the Sandjak 
had been walled up, and a continuous belt of Serbian 
and Montenegrin territory now extended all the way 
bom Belgrade to Antivari* This was a legacy from the 
Bosnian coap of 1908. Part of Aerenthal^s indemnity 
to the Ottoman Government had been the withdrawal 
of the Austro-Hungarian garrisons from this district, 
and the bargain had proved a bad one for both parties. 
In e£Eect the Monarchy made way not for Turkey but 
for her Balkan heirs, and after brief service as a sop to 
** Young Turkish " pride, the Sandjak went to swell the 
booty of Serbia and Montenegro* 

(ii.) In the second place Serbia had triumphantly 
adiieved her economic independence. The elimination 
of Bulgaria left Serbia and Greece in joint possession 
of the Salonika Railway, and while Greece incorporated 
the Southernmost section of the line, as well as its 
terminal port, within her political frontier, Serbia 
retained complete equality with her in the economic 
utilisation of both. She had thus secured an immedi- 
ately available oudet to the sea without expenditure of 
time or capital, whereas the task of pacifying Northern 
Albania and constructing a new railway throt^ its 
mountains from the Morava-valley to Duraszo would 
have absorbed her energy for years. She had reason 
to diank G>unt Berchtold for saving her from a false 
step I 

(fii.) Worse still, Serbia and Mcmtenegro had both 
almost doubled their population and their territorial 
extent. When they had assimilated these new tissues, 
and had shaken off all traces of their two wars except 
die prestige of rictoty, they wouU develop into a 



fennidabk miUtary power. They would be strcmg in 
dmnsehres, and, wotst of all, tliey would be strcmg in 
tbeir friends. 

Berchtold's diplomacy had exorcised the first Balkan 
Confederacy only to conjure up a more dangerous 
entente in its place. The alliance between Serbia and 
Bu^aria was essentially directed against Turkey : once 
the Turks were driven behind the Qutaldja lines, its 
positive stimulus would in any case have vanished. 
Roiunania, however, was as disLiterested in respect of 
Turkey as Bulgaria was towards the national problems 
of the Middle Danube-basin, and her new understand- 
ing with Serbia could have but one meaning. Just 
as Serbia had made common cause with Bulgaria to 
liberate the Slav populations under Ottoman rule, so 
she would fight shoulder to shoulder with Roumania 
to wrench away from the Hapsbu^ complezus the 
" irredenta " coveted by each <^ them in this quarter. 
The cherished dream of a " Trend Eastward " was 
foding away, and the foreboding of a "Westward 
Trend " at the Monarchy's e:qiense was beginning to 
take its place. 

Thus ended the second bout in the conflict between 
the Dual Monarchy and the South Slavonic nationality. 

Could the Monarchy retrieve its position before the 
drama was played out i Yes, if the face of Europe were 
changed by a trial of strength between the opposing 
camps into which the European Powers were divided. 
If the central group triumphed, the Danubian partner 
could snatdi success out of failure, and lay hands upon 
Salonika after all.^ 

Would Germany, the dominant member in the 
partnership, be willing to stake her all upon this issue i 
I Sec die Britiih Vhiu Paper, No. 8a. 



Yes agaisi, for while the events of 1908-9 had akeady 
endowed the South-Slavonic problem with international 
stgnificance, the solution of the Moroccan question after 
the crisis of 19x1 had promoted it to be the supreme 
test of the '' Balance of Power/' 

These considerations counselled the Joint Minister 
for Foreign AfEairs to precipitate a dinouement at the 
first opportunity, and the murder of the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand at Sarayevo in Jtme 19x4 presented 
him with the initiative. 

The crime was perpetrated by a South-Slavonic 
subject of the Monarchy, a Bosnian Serb. It is idle 
to brand a whole race with an individual's misdeed : 
Qrstni's attempt to assassinate Napoleon IIL in X858 
did not stain the honour of the Italian people, still less 
did Napoleon tax the Sardinian Government with 
responsibility for the act of a man who was not a 
Sardinian subject. There is no shadow of proof that 
King Peter's ministers were implicated in the present 
a£Eaar any more than Cavour was in the other : the facts 
can only be established when the trial of the murderers 
has run its course, yet before the proceedings were 
opened at Sarayevo, Count Berchtold had exploited the 
occasion to force war upon Serbia against her will. 

German and Magyar apologists represent this un- 
provoked attack as a '^punitive expedition.'' They 
remind us that when the A^hans massacred Sir Lows 
Cavagnari and his suite at Kabul, Lord Roberts retraced 
his steps and exacted a bloody vengeance : ** Suppose," 
they argue, ** that the Viceroy of India or the Prince of 
Wales were sniped at his camp-fire during a tour along 
tbt North-West Frontier, you would carry fire and 
sword through the hills without remorse." 

We will accept the comparison, if we may carry it to 


a sfustained conclusion. If we suppose so ifiudi, we 
must likewise suppose that the inhabitants of Ireland 
and the Scottish Highlands happen themselves to be 
Afghans in race, that the Welsh and the Cornishmen, 
if they are not actually Afghans too, speak some dosety 
allied Persian dialect, and that Afghan is recognised 
as an official language in the British Navy :^ add to this 
an inflexible system of universal conscription, and we 
shall be able to picture our A^hans from Ireland and 
Scotland being mobilised in company with their 
English-speaking neighbours and marched across the 
Indian frontier to slay their ** barbarous '' brethren who 
had sniped an English grandee.* 

Whatever the German and the Magyar may feel about 
their onslaught upon Serbia, for their South-Slavonic 
fellow-dtizens it is compulsory civil war. 

This abominable culmination of the ^ Dual System '* 
is the Third Act in the South Slavonic drama, but the 
plot has broadened out. This time we are participating 
in the action ourselves, and playing for life and deadi* 
If we and our allies succeed in dominating the finakf 
in what guise will the original actors emerge from their 
protracted ordeal i 

If the Dual Monarchy suffers defeat in the present 
struggle, its South-Slavonic subjects will find themselves 
for the first time at liberty to consult their own interests, 
instead of being exploited in the selfish interest of other 
nationalities. We can be sure beforehand of their 

* Every officer in the Aastro-Htmgar&n Navy is required to show 
profidency in the Sooth-Slavomc tongue^ because the crews are drawn 
ahnost entirely from the Croat population (tf Dalmatia and Istxia, 
and are Mt to understand nothing but their native language, beyond 
the bare Italian words cf comffland. 

* To make our comparison exact, we must imagine that the Aijghan 
who fired the dastardly shot proved to hail from Ireland. 


cfaoioe. Dalmatian Croatia, and Bosnia will break 
away from the toils of Austria-Hungary, and form 
some kind of union with Serbia and Montenegro* The 
European fraternity will be enriched by a new national 

What political organisation will the South-Slavonic 
nation adopts Will the provinces mei^e themselves 
into a centralised kingdom, like the states of the Italian 
peninsula half a century ago, or will they preserve their 
individuality and content themselves widi federation, 
Kke the Swiss cantons or the U*S*A* i 

The Italian precedent might siiggest the former 
alternative. In Italy there was the same utter lack 
of a common historiod backgrotmd,^ accentuated in this 
case by the marvellous evolution of local politics and 
culture, yet here the mirade was achieved* Florence 
and Venice gladly humbled themselves to exalt their 
common country : why should not Agram and Uskub 
do likewise < 

If the Southern Slavs fall short of their Italian fore- 
ronners, we shall find the reason in two differences of 

The contrast between Sicily and Lombardy in 
x86o was striking enough, yet Italy had been spared 
the worst degree of spiritual disunion* The Turk 
has never set his mark upon half her territories* The 
disparity between Milan and Palermo was as nothing 
compared to the gulf between Agram, whidi has never 
submitted to the Ottoman conqueror, and Uskub, 
lA^A ejected him hardly more than two years ago* 

■ The Roman Emptre was the first and last political organism that 
had united all Italy before 2870^ and the Empire was not a specifically 
Iialtai institution* Like the Roman Church it was a common possession 
of Wcslem Europe, and its tradition persisted more strongly in Germany 
than Sotttfi of tfie Alps* 


This gulf will take many years to brieve, and here again 
drcumstances have ptaod the Southern Slavs at a 
disadvantage : they have been compelled to begin the 
work of construction from the wroi^ end. 

In Italy the initiative came from the most advanced 
community in the country. Starting horn Piedmont on 
the borders of France the movement proceeded methodi- 
cally towards the East and South : Lombardy, Emilia, 
and Tuscany were consolidated into a national state 
before Garibaldi sailed for Sicily with his Thousand. 

If Piedmont had shared tht fate of Venetia and 
Lombardy, and had been assigned to Austria at the 
settlement of 1814, the course of events would have 
been very different. By i860 the North would have 
been consolidated not as an independent kingdom but 
as a complex of provinces jumbled together in the 
Hapsburg collection. Italian Nationalism would have 
been forced to abandon Tuscany and Romagna, and 
would have found no standing-ground North of the 
Marches. If at this stage the Pope had identified him- 
self with the Risorgimento, and had incorporated the 
South in his dominions, as Serbia incorporated Mace- 
donia after her Balkan victories, he might have preached 
a crusade against Austria and liberated all the Notth 
from her yoke with the assistance of her European rivals, 
yet when the oppressor had been driven beyond the 
Alps, his highly-dvilised victims and their Papal 
clumpion wotUd have been left in an embarrassing 
position. The Pope would have become the hero of 
the North, but the clerical ideals whidi had inspired his 
victorious armies would not have commended them- 
selves to Italians the other side of the Apetmincs. 
The Northerners released from Austrian " strong 
government " would have hesitated to accept a clerical 
parliamentarianism in its place. 


This fantastic analogy may serve to indicate the 
attitude of patriotic Croats towards the '' Orthodox *' 
nationalism of the Morava-prindpality* When Serbia 
prostrated the Turkish and Bulgarian armies in two 
successive campaigns^ her triumph reacted upon the 
South-Slavonic provinces of the Dtial Monarchy. The 
Serbs of Hungary and Croatia turned their eyes in 
earnest towards Belgrade, and the Croats took pride in 
their kinship with the victors* This spiritual exalta- 
tion brought the South-Slavonic nation to setf-oon- 
sdousness, but we mtist guard against over-estimatixig 
its effect. The spell of the Hapsbtirg is broken, and 
Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia are ready to transfer their 
aUegianoe to the Karageoi^evitch, yet they will not do 
so at the sacrifice of their ** historiod sentiment/' 

We have noted the strength of tradition in this part 
of Europe. When Croatia and Dalmatia are set free, 
their first impulse will be to restore the ** Triune 
Kingdom '^ ^ as it existed in the eleventh century A J>., 
and they will insist on entering the South-Slavonic 
Union on this basis. The national state will thus take 
shape as a federation of at least two members. 

in Bosnia the Serb element predominates over the 
two others, and Serbia will doubtless incorporate the 
whole cotmtry. The Bosnian problem involved her in 
her struggle for life and death, and the possession of 
the province is the stake of victory : as the protagonist 
in the national cause, Serbia is worthy of her reward. 

Whether the federation will contain more than two 
members depends upon the choice of Montenegro. 
No South-Slavonic commtmity cherishes so glorious a 
tradition as she, but her history is bound up with the 
national adversity. She remained a virgin fortress of 

* Croatia-: 


liberty when all her brethren had succumbed to alien 
masters : when they are hve once more» her isolation 
will have lost it significance, and if she clings to her 
particuUhsm, she will be holding her friends at arm's> 
length instead of her foes. She will be cutting herself 
off from the social and economic development upon 
which the South-Slavonic world will enter as soon as 
the " preUminary question " of nationality has been 
solved. When Bosnia gravitates towards Belgrade, the 
moment will have come for Montenegro likewise to 
merge herself in a " Greater Serbia." 

The South-Slavonic Union, then, will articulate 
itself into a " Triune Kingdom " of Croatia-Slavonia- 
Dalmatia on the one hand and a " Greater Serbia " 
on the other, with an autonomous Montenqpto as a 
possible third partner. 

Its geographical frontiers ^ are dettrmined already 
by the boundaries of the several provinces. On the 
North-West it will inherit the former frontier between 
Austria and the " Crown of St. Stephen," on the Nortfa- 
East it will be divided from Htugary by the line of the 
Drave * and the Danube, on the South-West it will take 
possession of the Adriatic coast-line from Spisca to 

< See M^ IIL 

■ The triangular enclave between the Drave, the Mur, and the 
Styiian border ta inhabited exclusively by Ctoats, and should therefore 
b« anigaed to Croatia in addition, instead of being tnchtdcd, ai at 
pKient, in the kingdom of Hungary. 

' The coast ihould be distributed between the members of the 
Confedency. At present it a entuely mooopolBed by Dafanatia, but 
the " Triune Kingdom," as the price of its particularBOi, should cede 
to Serbia and Montenegro such parts of the Dalmatian littoral as lie 
Soutb-Bast of the Narenta estuary, induding Mctkovitch and Ragun, 
the tennini ot the Bosnian Railway, as well as the shores of Cattaro 
fiord, which is the natural doorway of the Montenepm Highlands. 
The " Triune Kingdom " should be compensated m the op p o si t e 
quarter by the addition of three islands — Vc8lia,Chefao,and Lessin— - 
31 present included in dte " Kltstenland " province of Austria. 



Its constitution can only vaguely be surmised* The 
indiiridual states are certain to retain a very wide sphere 
of sovereignty for themselves : what powers will they 
ooflsent to delegate to the Federal Government i 

Last stunmer, on the eve of the war^ Serbia and 
Montenegro were negotiating a military and customs 
union. The provisions of this conventioa will obviously 
be extended to the wider federation : the defensive 
organisation of the South-Slavonic Unit will be central- 
ised under the presidency of King Peter^ and the 
common military frontier will coincide with a common 
tari£F-wall* This, however, is a minimum, and the 
federal authorities will probably obtain control over the 
more important financial and econbmic departments of 
government as well* The administration of the railways 
wQl assuredly pass into their hands. 

At the same moment Serbia was concluding a conr 
cordat with the Pope regarding the status of the Roman 
Qiurch in Serbian territory* This agreement will 
likewise ezteodn itself to the whole Union, and will 
suggest an essential clause in the federal constitution* 

The Federal Government must proclaim the com- 
plete dvil equality of the three creeds current among 
its dtittns — ^Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, 
and Islam — and it must guarantee the observance of 
thb principle by the governments of the individual 
states* The transformation of the South-Slavonic race 
into a self-governing nationality depends on religious 

The new regime will stand or fall by its success in 
conciliating the Moslems in Bosnia* While Serb and 
Croat will rejoice whole-heartedly at their escape from 
the Magyar yoke, the Bosniak alone will regret Austro- 
Hungarian bureaucracy, as he regretted the Ottoman 



anarchy it aapersedtd. He mil regard the national idea 

with suspicion, and the long-deferred but inevitable 
solution of the agrarian problem will seem to confirm 
his fears, by aipg lin g h'T" out from the Christian 
peasants and impoverishing him to their advantage. 
Yet the spread of education will break down even the 
Bosniak's sulleii tradition. As the consdousness of his 
Slavonic language grows upon him, the barrier of his 
oriental religion will melt away. Nationalism will 
ultimately heal the breach between the descendant of the 
Bogutnils and the men of his own blood from whom he 
has been alienated for eight centuries by religion. 

C. A Balkan ZoUverein 

The secession of the Southern Slavs will dislocate the 
structure of the Danubian Monardiy more seriously 
than any mutilations on its Carpathian border. The 
Hungarian member of the Dual Partnership will be cut 
off from the sea by an independent sute of its own 
calibre,^ occupying the whole region between the 
Morava-basin and the Austrian frontier. The Magyars 
will find the tables turned upon them. They will 
eiqxrience henceforth the geographical disabilities they 
imposed upon Serbia heretofore. Deprived of a coast- 
line of their own, they will be compelled to make terms 
with one of their neighbours to secure access to a port. 

Satisfy this vital need they must, yet they vrill still 

■ A reduced Hungary will itiU number nearly twelve milliaD 
inbabiiana : a South-Slavonic Union will - - 
nine, viz.: 

Scibi . . . < 


Moslemi . 



be free to choose between two alternative means of 
doing so. They may address themselves either to 
Austria or to the South-Slavonic Union^ and the issue 
will probably be taken up by the two political parties 
yAddi have been struggling for the allegiance of the 
Magyar nation. 

Tisza and his following will press for closer tmion 
^th Austria* They will take advantage of the national 
animus against the Slavs, which will have been em- 
bittered immeasurably by the result of the war, and 
they will appeal to the national pride never to acknow- 
ledge defeat. '^ Fate/' they will say, ** has robbed us 
of our railway to Fiume, and of the harbour to which 
we have devoted so much money and labour, yet Fiume 
is only sundered by the Istrian peninsula from the 
Austrian harbour of Trieste, and the one port is hardly 
more remote from the AlfSld than the other. Through 
Laibacfa, Marburg, and Steinamanger Trieste can be 
brought into direct railway communication with Buda- 
pest. Why humiliate ourselves by begging favours of 
the enemy, when we can fall back upon the loyalty of 
our Atistrian partners, who have passed with us through 
the terrible ordeal of war i ^* Thus Tisza will argue 
for the maintenance of the Dual System. 

The secession of the Southern Slavs, however, will 
upset that economic balance on which Dualism depends. 
When either half of the Monarchy stretched from the 
Carpathians to the sea, Austria controlled Hungary's 
access to her markets in Central Europe, and Hungary 
in like measure controlled Austria's access to her source 
of raw material in the South-East. Each was in a 
position to inflict equal economic damage upon the 
other, and both would have been left losers by fiscal 
warfare, while fiscal co-operation brot^t them mutual 


gain. It was therefore in their common interest to 
compromise on a joint tariiF, which gave each the 
monopoly of the other^s custom* 

Under the new conditions, on the other hand, the 
operation of the Dual System would place Hungary at 
Austria^s mercy* So long as the Southern Slavs on 
the Austrian border were under the Magyar yoke, 
Austria was debarred by Magyar policy from opening 
up relations with them : once they are independent, she 
will be able to deal with them as principals, and the 
long-delayed railway connections will at last be estab- 
lished between Salzbui^ and Vienna on the one hand, 
and Agram on the other. 

After this, Htmgary^s co-operation will no longer be 
indispensable to Austria* Austria will be able to turn 
Htmgary's flank at any moment by puttii^ her industry 
into direct communication with the Balkan area in 
Hungary's rear along this new land-route South of the 
Drave. Htmgary will be ** side-tracked "" as effectively 
by the completion of the Croatian railway system as 
Serbia would have been by Baron Aerenthal's abortive 
railway schemes in the Sandjak. 

This would give Austria a crushing tactical advantage 
in the decennial readjustment of the Joint Tariff* By 
threatening to abandon the existing partnership, and 
to contract a new one with the Southern Slavs instead, 
she could force the Magyars to tmconditional surrender. 
If the threat were carried into effect, Hungary would 
be powerless to disturb Austria^s communications with 
the South-East, while the Austrian tariff-wall would 
debar her from her sole remaining egress to the sea. 
Austria^s economic life would be tmaffected, Htmgary^s 
would be completely paralysed. 

Under these circumstances the equality of the two 


states would be reduced to a fiction^ and the Magyars 
would discover that ** Dualism '* was compatible with 
a thraldom worse than that from which they escaped 

This would give the ** Party of Independence '^ their 

The Magyar ^* Left "" will issue from the war stronger 
than it has ever been before. In 1906 the ** Coalition ** 
ruined itself over Magyarisation, but the European 
settlement will loose this millstone from the Party^s 
neck. When the majority of the non'-M^;yar popu- 
lation has been detached from Htmgary altogether^ 
and the status of the remnant has been placed under 
an international guarantee^ the racial problem will be 
expunged from practical politics, and the ** Left "" will 
actually be able to make party capital out of this blessing 
in disguise, by casting the whole responsibility for it 
upon their opponents* 

'* Tisza/' they will say, ** has been Hungary^s evil 
genius. He involved us in a European war ; he sent 
our soldiers to their death in Poland, while he let the 
Russians invade our homes across the tmguarded line 
of the Carpathians ; to ransom half the land from the 
tavagers he signed away the other half to the diplomatists: 
now, not content with his disastrous war and his still 
more disastrous peace, he has handed us over bound 
hand and foot to Austria, in order to enshrine otu: 
disasters in a permanent settlement. 

'* Let us look facts in the face. Tisza tells us to hate 
the Southern Slavs in the future, because we have 
struggled with them for the mastery in the past. That 
struggle is over : thanks to Tisza's own policy, it has 
been concluded by our defeat. Why foster our hatred 
any fenger, when the conclusion is unalterable f He 


bids us be loyal to die AustTuiis,«4io at this very moment 
afe taking advanta^ of our diffiailties to exploit us 
in cold blood. Why sentimentalise over a partnership 
solely recommended by opportunism, mbea loyalty 
to it quendies the last glimmer of hope fisr our national 
future 1* 

" Let us shake o£F our paralysis, and help ourselves. 
The secession of the Southern Slavs has destroyed tlie 
equilibrium between Austria and out own country, 
but it has also cast the South Slavonic Confederation 
as an independent weight into the balance. The 
equilibrium may still be righted, if we can indine this 
weight to our side of the scales. Let us take the 
initiative out of Austria's hands by denouncing the 
' Ausgleich ' ourselves, and fisrestall her by securing 
the partnership of the Southern Slavs for Hungary." 

liiis hypothetical disputation between two political 
parties stands in effect for the contest between national 
fanaticism on the one hand and eocmomic necessity 
on the other. Let us assume that a short experience al 
" Dualism " under the new conditions converts the 
Magyar nation * to the " Independence " point of view, 

* Tbe Skrvaki art the only important element in Hungary that b 
likely to ding to the Austrian connection. Theit country is boked by 
nature with Ptewny, Buda-Pcst, and the Alffild : their dialect is 
identical with that of the Tchechs ta Austria. Get^n^iby and nation- 
ality thus draw them in oppoaitc diiectioni, and their one hope of 
reconciling the two factors lies in some form of nattooal devolution 
within an unbroken " Danubian Unit" If Austria and Hungary pan, 
the Slovaki must lacrifioe one factor or die other. The Tcbcois will 
urge them to vindicate their nationality by ttf^fding frocB Hungary 
to Austria. Ths would benefit the Tchcchs thcmsetvcs by ranr^ftrug 
their numerical inferiority to the Austrian Gcnnani and giving them dte 
proipect of a majority in the Reichtrath at Viemia, but it a doubtful 
trbeuier the Slovaks would be influenced by this considefiitioa. Tlieir 
tnitherbood with the Tchcdn extends to lai^uage alone : thnr have 
never shared a common tradition, and there are few indicatam at 
present of a common national consdousnes. The Slovaks will 
probably defer to geography, and work out a natioeal 1^ of their 



and suppose that the ** Left "" supersedes Tis:^ in office 
to carry out its rival programme : what response will 
its overtures receive from the Southern Slavs i 

The Southern Slavs will be torn between the same 
two motives as the Ms^ars themselves. Their 
national hatred of their neighbours is at least as strong 
as their neighbours' hatred of them: with distant 
Vienna they have always been on friendly terms* When 
they find themselves in the proud position of being 
wooed by Austria and Hungary in competition, prejudice 
will certainly incline them to favour the Austrian suit« 
Their economic interest, on the other hand, will really 
be identical with the interest of Htmgary. 

At the first glance their new economic position might 
appear invulnerable : the territorial resetdement that 
cid u ded Htmgary from the sea will have assigned to 
the Southern Slavs an extensive Adriatic seaboard, and 
the possession of open ports is a guarantee of economic 
independence. Yet so long as the new G)nfederation 
stands alone, the settlement will not essentially have 
improved the nation^s continental situation. 

Before the war Serbia was isolated from Central 
and Western Europe by the whole btdk of the Dual 
Monarchy : after the setdement, the Austrian half of 
it will still present a narrower but no less impenetrable 
barrier to the tmited South-Slavonic nation, and the 
game will be in Austria's hands more completely than 
ever. She may start by playing off the Confederation 
against Htmgary, but she will be free to reverse her 

own witfam a regenerated Huflgarian state. Prophecy^ however, h 
ioipcMnble. The relation of the Croats to the Serbs remained precisely 
imUd till as recently as xgxa, and with this precedent before our eyes 
we can oi^ say that if the Slovaks are inspired to identify themselves 
with the Tchech nationality, they must be granted pet&ct liberty to 
cny their cfaoioe into effect. 



tactics vbeaxvetaht pleases, and play o£F Hungary 
against the Confederation. The Southern Slavs will 
discover, like the Magyais, that Austria is mistress of 
ihe initiative, so long as they attempt to cope with her 
^ngle-handed. By the time the Hungarian Indepen- 
dence Party makes its overtures, the Federal Govern- 
ment will be ready to welcome xixm. Ezperienoe will 
have prepared both nations simultaneously to compose 
their feud and adopt the alternative policy of co- 

If the negotiations are crowned with success, the 
geographical structure of the " Danubian Unit " 
will have proved itself a stronger force than national 
chauvinism. The political edifice of " Dualism " will 
have collapsed under the tempest, yet the Transleithania 
which perished with the break^ of " St. Stephen's 
Crown " will have reasserted its economic function in 
a Zollverein between two independent national states. 

The new Zollverein will prove in turn that the national 
and the economic principles of articulation are not 
fundamentally incompatible. A reconciliation on this 
basis between the Magyais and the Southern Slavs 
will win for both parties what they really want. The 
Southern Slavs will enjoy national unity, the Magyars 
economic freedom. The port of Fiume will become the 
common property of the two states, and the railway that 
links it with the AlfSld through Agram will be ad- 
ministered oonjoindy in the interests of both. 

The South-Slavonic Question has been the most 
difficult problem in the Balkans. If we have fotmd its 
solution, can we not apply our discovery to solve the 
rest i The " Transleithanian ZoUvetein " will already 
cover a wider area towards the South-East than was 


in the frontiers of Hapsbtu^ ** Trans- 
cannot its limits be extended still further 

idships as well as the enmities of Serbia will 

by the South-Slavonic Federation, and 

^ooxid Balkan War Serbia has maintained a 

iding yrith Roumania and Greece* This 

been inspired in part by the fear of 

reprisals, but chiefly by the discovery of 

lomic interests of an endurix^ character. 

means of providing for these interests could 

jthan the incorporation of Serbians two friends 


itely after the settlement at Bukarest in 
of 1913, Roumania began to negotiate with 
the construction of a railway-bridge across 
tbe at Tumu Severing whidi was to link 
ly systems of the two countries. Roumania 
a coast-line of her own on the Black Sea, but 
this door is condemned to make the 
passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, 
at any moment be brought to a complete 
by the caprice of the Ottoman Government, 
convention with Serbia was Rotunania's 
towards an open port on the Adriatic, and 
It struggle between Serbia and the Dual 
ly Roumanian as well as South-Slavonic interests 
If Bosnia becomes Serbian soil and the 
Serbian railhead at Ujitze is connected through 
system with a port on the Adriatic, the new 
serve not only the basin of the Morava, but 
Wallachian plain beyond the bridge at Tumu 



The freedom of this eoooonuc higfaw;^ will be s 
important to Roumania as tbe freedom of du Fiome 
Railway is to Hungary, and it will be open to her to 
secure it by the same method. Rouraania mtl almost 
certainly ^iply for membership in the " Transleithaniaii 
Zotivemn," and the two origmal members will consuk 
their beat interests by grantii^; her request. Roumama 
will win her outlet on the Adriatic : Hungary and die 
Southern Slavs will gain in return free passage over die 
Roumanian railways to the port of Costanza <» the 
Black Sea.' 

(ii.) By another railway convention the Bukaiest 
settlement linked Serbia to Greece. 

Befrice the Balkan Wars, Greece was practicaUy in 
the position of an island : for communication with coa- 
tinental Europe she was as dependent upon the sea as 
Great Britain and Ireland. By 1908 she had constructBd 
a railway of standard European gai^e from Athens as 
br Nordi as Larissa, and before 1913 she had extended 
it throu^ the pass of Tea^>e to the point liriiere dv 
Gncco-Turkish frontier struck the coast of the JBgean. 
The undertaking had involved great engiaeering 
difficulties and a proportionate expense, yet just vhea 
the arduous part of the task had been accomplished, and 
no physical barrier remained between the Gieek railhead 
and the terminus of the European system at Salomfca, 
die Ottoman Govenmient cheated the Greek nation d 
its object by refusing to allow die ptolongaticm of the . 
line throi^ Turkish territory. 

tt ta tia i 8;6> 1871, 167^ iS^ — the riw r wat ihrown open to fm 
ninCiCioo &aQi tis nmiai k ttr ttpwanli tM the " Iran GfttBA." Sc^ 
gaiaa cnft, bomtvtt, canoot mxad above BtaHn, and the gnatmt fie 
o[ Qiit internatioiul section ii only availabk for barges and mc 


In X9Z2-*i3 this obstacle was removed by force* The 
Titaty of Bttkarest left Greece in possession of Salonika 
tiaeif , and the construction of the last link in the railway 
from Athens was immediately taken in hand«^ With 
its eomidetion, the orientation of Greece will be chat^^« 
Heretofore the traffic between Greece and Europe has 
oamcd at Patras on the G)rinthian Gulf, the terminus 
of steamship routes to Brindisi and Trieste : hereafter 
the primacy will pass from steamer to railway, and 
Rattvas yield precedence to Sabnika* 

The connection of Athens and Salonika, however, is 
of litde use in itself, unless Greece can secure free 
passage for her commerce along the route kadii^ from 
• Sfllnnflra to Central and Western Europe. This neces- 
:i sky has given Greece an economic interest i d en t ical 
^ nith that of her new Serbian neighbour. 
i^ While Sakmika and the seaboard of Macedonia was 
ff assigned to Greece, the whole hinterland was incor- 
^ porated in Serbia, and from the frontier-station of 
^\ Yetyeli* Northwards the trunk-line up the Vardar 
1^ valley to Uskub and down the Morava valley to Bel- 
^ gItaAt now runs exclusively through Serbian territory. 
^4 Beyood Belgrade the Dual Monarchy shut out Greece 
^i and Serbia alike from Central Europe, just as it barred 
^ Roomania and Serbia alike from the Adriatic beyond 
j^ the laflfaead at Ujitaoe. 
^ Greece therefore had as strong an interest as 

* See lifap IV. The Mctjon under oonstnictioii k about acve&ty 

nuks long. Starting from the old railhead beyond Tempe, it iktrfi 

^ the Saltan fhore in a Northerly ditcction, below the Eastern apim of 

Je^ linnt Olym^u*, bridges the River Vistritsa C Haliacmnn % and 

*zl cSmcs a junction tnunraately beyond it with the old line oonnecttng 

9^, Sakmiha and Monastir. Fiom this jimctjon die Athens Railway will 

See Map IV. 

^ wwr aooas the ffailoniian " Campagna. 


Roumania in seeking economic partnership with the 
South-Slavonic state, and she negotiated a railway 
agreement on very similar lines. She gave Serbia free 
access to the JEgtaa, and received in return the freedom 
of the continental route as far as the Austro-Hungarian 
frontier. Like Roumania, she speculated on the 
eventual removal of the Austro-Hungarian barrier : 
in the present stru^e the Southern Slavs are fi^^iting 
the Greeks' battle as well as their own, and any policy 
that enables them to succeed in their endeavour must 
oommend itself equally to Greece. If the South- 
Slavonic federation can only oope with Austria by 
joining Hui^ary in a Zollverein, then it is the interest 
of Greece to enter the Zollverein too. Her application 
will not be refused, for she has as much to give as to 
receive. The admission of Roumania will extend the 
Zollverein to the Black Sea : the admission of Greece 
will realise the " Trend Eastward " by bringing it 
down to the JEgtaa. 

This twofold increase in its membership will have 
eiq>anded the Zollverein from its Transleithaman 
nucleus to the opposite limits of the Balkans. Four 
national imiis will ab^ady be included within its 
boundary : will it succeed in federating the two that 
remain i U Albania and Bulgaria can be induced to 
enter the fold, the Zollverein will become co-extensive 
with the whole Balkan area. 

(iii.) Albania will not find it easy to stand out c£ a 
combination to which both Greece and the South- 
Slavonic Federation beloi^. Tlie country consists of a 
strip of coast fronting the heel of Italy across the narrowest 
part of the Adriatic and backed by a sone of b ar r en 
mountains, through which several passages lead East- 
ward into Macedonia and descend eventually to the 


Nortfaern littoral of the JBgtBn. This hinterland is 
enctrckd by Greek and South Slavonic territory on all 

Albania has no history* The principality was created 
fay the fiat of the Pbwers ; its limits were laid down 
by the conference of ambassadors that supervised the 
making of the Treaty of London ; its frontiers were 
drawn out in detail by an international boundary- 
Qommission. It was called into existence not because 
it had the will to exist as a national state^ but simply 
as an alternative to a vacuum that would inevitably have 
been filled by the encroachment of the Greek and 
Serbian frontiers* Its function is to ^' hold the ring/* 
wfaSe the xiative population develops from a biarbarous 
aggregate of dans into a civilised nationality* 

Meanwhile^ Albania has started life destitute. Her 
population is uneducated and her material wealth 
tueiploited. Her only immediately available asset 
is her geographical position. She is mistress of two 
ports wiiich have recently won notoriety in Burope. 

The direct transit from Brindisi ^ leads to the Southern 
extremity of the Albanian coast. Here lies the moun- 
tatn-lodoed basin of Avlona, which disputes with Spezsia 
Bay the daim to be the finest harbour in the Mediter- 
ranean, but suffers more than Spessda from the high 
mountains that hem it in on the landward side. In 
^te of the limestone barriers, Avlona is likely to 
become the termintis of a narrow-gauge railway,* 
wfaidi will work its way up the valleys of the Viosa 
and Dhrynos to Greek Yannina, and thence descend to 
Arta and Agrinion, whence a line of narrow gaug^ runs 
already to a point opposite Patras on the North coast of 

Tlie cfOBuiff occupMS most of the niglic in an onltiiafy inafl 


the Connthian Gulf. This route will probably coinpefr 
with the Salonika Railway for die ei^Mreaft-ttaffic 
between Paris and Athens* 

Duraao, the other port, lies half-way up the Albanian 
ooast-line; The transit from Italy is aooordingly 
longer, and the harbour itself is wretched beyond 
description. The town lies huddled under the Southern 
lee of a group of sand-dunes, which are linked to the 
mainland by a malarial waste of marshes and lagoons. 
The deposit of the swamp has silted up the sea &r out 
beyond the actual shore-line, and die smallest steamer 
cannot approach within half a mile of the jetty • Durazvo 
has nothing to recommend it except its oommunicatioos 
with the interior, which are as excellent as those of 
Avlona are poor. 

Since the Roman period Duraao has been the 
terminus of a route ^ which ascends die valley of the 
Skumbi to Elbassan, penetrates by a pass to the valley 
of the Black Drin, crosses die stream at Struga, what 
it issues from the Lake of Ohrida, and then, after 
skirting the lake shore and passing through (Mirida 
itself, breasts a second mountain range and descends 
at last into the basin of Monastir. 

To compensate Serbia for the renunciation of terri- 
torial sovereignty over Duraao, the Powers bestowed 
on her the freedom of the port, and gave her the ri^ 
to construct a railway through Albanian territory 
in order to connect this outlet with her own railwaj 
system* The route we have described will probably 
be diosen for the final section of the new Serbian line. 
From Mbnastir a railway already leads South-Eastward 
through Greek territory to Salonika : it will only be 

* Set Hap IV. The Rofnam tmpiovtd the tack mto a neCafled 
road, tbcir ^ via Bgnatu.'* 


necettary to construct anotiier section Northwards from 
Moosstir to Uskxib,^ and the whole of Macedonia wiU 
have been broug^ into direct commtinicatton with the 
Adriatic seaboard* 

Albania thtis possesses two commercial highways of 
pcKential value to her Greek and South Slavonic neig^- 
bottfSy and her future prosperity depends upon die 
development of traffic aloi^ diem* It is therefore of 
vol tmportanoe for her to obtain entrance into the 
Balkan Zollverein* If she remains otrtside it, Greece 
and the South Slavonic Federation will dispense widi 
her ports, and open up equivalent routes to the Adriatic 
within their own frontiers* The iron tarifif-wall of the 
Zottverein will ring Albania round on the landward 
side, and since there is no local traffic in die principality 
itself, Aviona and Dttrasczo will never be awakened by 
the sdr of commerce* If she decides upon isolation, 
Albania will be condemning herself to death : if die 
joins hands with her neighbours, she will be laying the 
faundadon of that economic progress whidi is her first 

incofporation in the ZoUverein will also solve several 
pfoUems raised by the delimitation of the Albanian 

(a) Towards die North-Bast, die diplomatists as- 
s^poed the yAiait ** Metoya ** district to Serbia and 

The award did justice to die principle of nationality, 
for die South-Slavonic element in the local population 
sdll preponderates over the Albanian intruders licenced 
fior years to exterminate it by the Turkish Government* 


•SKMapIV: tfie dtstrict couidd« with te b«fai of tfie WWie 

L " 


On tbe other h2iid, it inflicted considetable hard- 
ship upon the dans inhabiting the mountainous 
country immediately West of the Metoya, iriio had 
been accustomed to deal with the outer world through 
Ipek, Jakyva, and Prisren, the thiee towns of the plain, 
and now found themselves barred out from their only 
available market-places by the new Serbian frontier. 
The Zollverein wilt eliminate the new injustice widwut 
restoring the old. The Serbo-Albanian frontier will 
remain where the commissioners drew it, but since it 
will no loiter constitute a customs-barrier the clansmen 
from the Albanian side will once more be able to visit 
the towns in the Serbian plainland as freely as ^riien 
plain and moimtain were yoked together politically by 
Ottoman misrule. 

(6) The mountains of Northern Albania verge on 
their other flank towards the Lake of Skodra/ and half 
the clans descend to market at Skodra town, which lies 
at die lake's South-Eaatem extremity. Geography has 
destined Skodra to be a focus of traffic, llie late 
discharges itself past her walls into the channel of the 
Boyana River,* and for the small steamers that ply upon 
the lake ^ Boyana is navigable from this point to the 
sea. The sea-going steamers employed in the coastal 
trade find good ports of call at Duldgno, a few miks 
North of the Boyaoa's mouth, and at San Giovanni di 
Medua, a few miles South of it. Both these barbotus 
(if they may be dignified by the name) are connected 
with Skodra across level country by good high-roads. 

If all die shores of the lake were Albanian, no problem 
vnMild arise, but unfortunately its North-Westcm 

■ A bfaacfa thrown off by the muted lueam of the White and Bbck 
Dno, after tt has wound it! way thn»»h the Albaniia nututtaiiiii, ud 
- 'leiea. SceBbpEV. 


extftmity passes beyond the Albanian frontier, and 
penetrates deep into die mountain-mass of Montenegro* 
PbysicaUy, Montenegro and Northern Albania con- 
stitute a single region, of which Skodra is the natural 
cqutal : historically, this homogeneous hinterland has 
been partitioned between two hostile races, which 
can never merge themselves into one political organism* 
An open door at Skodra is equally vital to Albania and 
to Montenegro, yet the town cannot be included in the 
political frontiers of both at once. 

The rightful ownership of Skodra is not in doubt* 
The Southern Slavs extend to the head of the lake, but 
an Albanian population dwells along its lower shores, 
and Skodra itself, at its opposite extremity, is a purely 
Albanian dty* The struggle for Skodra is the history 
of Montenegrin encroachment upon alien territory* 

The Sfontenegrins have been forced in this direc- 
tkm through the fatilt of Austria-Hungary, which has 
debarred them from their lawful outlet to the South- 
Slavonic coast* Had the Montenegrins been at liberty 
to reach the sea through Cattaro fjord, by incorporating 
the kindred villages that fringe the waterside, they 
would never have tried to reach it throtigh Skodra by 
subjugating an Albanian population almost as numerous 
as their own* 

In 1878 the Gmgress of Berlin assigned to 
the harbour of Antivari, beyond the 
ity of the Austrian littoral* Antivari is not a 
convenient port for the Black Mountain* A hig^ range 
of hills blocks the way thither from the head of Skodra 
Lake, yet the Montenegrins have striven with success to 
overcome this physical disadvantage by the construction 
of a motmtain-railway across the barrier*^ Austria- 

^ It stam from Virpaaor, on the lake-slioft. 

k jr*i«if ««(U^*j 

^ 41 I ^ I iT, 


t^ingary, however, grudged her South-^avonic ad^- 
bour even this haxd-wcm economic liberty. By a 
ooiollary to the Berlin Treaty she secured for beiidf 
powers of control ^ over the trafi&c of the new Montene- 
grin port, and to win an nntrammeled outlet Montenegio 
was forced to go still further afield. After the Berlin 
settlement had produced a revulsion of feeling in Great 
Britaint Gladstone succeeded Disraeli in office to undo 
as far as possible what Disraeli had done, and one of 
his first acts ' was to extort the transference of Duldgno 
from Turkey to Montenegro. 

C^adstone's gift was more beneficent in its intentton 
than in its result. The only practicable route b e t w e en 
the Montenegrin hinterland and Duldgno lies throi^h 
Skodra. So loi^, therefore, as Skodra remained in 
other hands, Dulc^no was of no economic value to its 
new masters, while Skodra was deprived of its natural 
port. In 191J the Balkan War gave Montenegro die 
opportunity to annex Slasdra as well, but mbea the 
fortress capitulated the Powers rightly intervened, aaid 
the inclusion of Srodra in the new Albanian principality 
put an end for ever w Monten^^ hopes. 

Skodra and Duldgno can now never be reunited tinder 
Monten^rin sovereignty: the logical alternative is 
their reunion within Albania. Baulked of Skodca, 
Montenegro will lose nothing by the retxocessiao of 
Skodra's port, and her whole title to Duldgno wdl £ill 
to the ground as soon as Cattaio ^ord and the Austrian 
Uttoral on either side of it have passed into her posaesBton. 
Vet no amount of compensation on the opposite flmk 
mil induce Montenegro to yield territory to Attica 
witiiout some equivalent return on Albama's part. 



The present territorial arrangement renders Duldgno 
eoooomically useless to both states : Montenegro will 
not barter away her political rights exotpt on terms 
vhidi restore Duldgno^s economic utility not only for 
Albania but for herself, and it is easy to see how the 
bargain must run* If Montenegro on her side is to 
leaotmce all claims to territorial sovereignty over 
Dulctgno as well as Skodra, Albania on hers must 
grant Montenegro complete freedom of traffic through 
Skodra as well as Duldgno* 

By joining the Balkan ZoUverein Albania vnll fulfil 
her part of this compact. Economic co-operation with 
her neigfabours will thus win for her a most desirable 
extension of her territorial soverdgnty, and wiU heal 
her long feud with Montenegro by recondling here also 
die daims of nationality and economics. 

(c) Beyond Avlona, the Powers assigned to Albania 
die country known as Epirus.^ 

Their decision set Geography at defiance* With 
Avlotia Epirus possesses hardly a single link : with the 
Greek territory towards the South and East her com- 
munications are well established* In this instance maps 
are misleading* The rivers of Epirus certainly debouch 
upon, the Albanian coast, but they force their way 
dnrmgh gorges where no road can follow* To travel 
from Koritza to Etux>pe you do not descend the valley 
of die Devol to the Adriatic but cross the watershed into 
Macedonia and board at Fbrina the train to Salonika* 
If you follow the road inland from Santi Quaranta, the 
only port of call on the Epirot coast, it does not lead you 
Northwards to Berat, but South-Eastwards to Yannina, 
die prindpal town of North-Westem Greece* From 

^SeellapIV* llieiiaiiieliMbMOQiiMdtooovcrtfieihicedJMnofii 
of ffiiiriifTij Aigyfokaitio^ md Koritxi* 


the ge(^taphical point of view, Epinis and Gttece are 

liu Powers took their stand upon nationality. 
" The country," they argued, " may be Greek, but the 
people are Albanian. They speak an Albanian dialect." 

This ai^ument betrays a misconception of vrbat 
nationahty means. Nationality is not an objective 
attribute but a state of consciousness which depends for 
its stimulus upon a certain degree of civilisation. We 
have seen that among the majority of the population 
included within the prindpahty's frontiers it is con- 
spicuously absent : they have no group consciousness 
beyond the clan. The Epirots alone are civilised enot^ 
to possess it, and their civilisation and nationality are 
both drawn from the same external source. 

The s^nificant fact about the Epirot is not that he 
speaks Albanian at home, but that he learns Greek at 
school,* and finds in his adopted langu^e a passport 
to a wider life. The Epirots are the only Albanians 
who can boast a history, and their history consists in 
the casting off of Albanian barbarism and the putting 
on of European culture in its Greek form. After the 
Turkish conquest the majority of the Albanians were 
converted to Islam : the Epirots alone followed the 
example of their Greek neighbours, and remained loyal 
to the Orthodox Church. In the eighteenth century 
the Orthodox ecclesiastical tradition developed into a 
national Greek renaissance : the Epirots were fired by 
the new movement, and welcomed the Greek sdiool 
^t grew up beside the Greek church. They looked 
forward as eagerly as the Greek of Macedonia or 

' The village schools in Epirus hne monl^ been endowed bf natives 
who nude their fortunes in Greek commefcul centns like Sn^ma and 


Ifitylitii to the day when nationality should find 
Gtpttsskm in political liberation and unification. When 
Yanmna fell in the spring of 1913, the day seemed to 
have dawned. The Pbwers thrust them into the outer 
darkness of the Albanian principality just when they 
were on the threshold of the promised land. 

The Bpirots have not submitted tamely to the ruin of 
their hopes. The Powers could prevent their annexa- 
tion to Greece^ but they could not compel their adhesion 
to Albania. In* the summer of 19x3 they raised a 
national militia, and have successfully resisted all 
attempts on the part of the Albanian Government to 
assert its sovereignty. If Albania is to secure the 
friendship of Greece, she must abandon a daim which 
she cannot enforce* The Bpirots have proved that 
common language is in this case no national bond, by 
taking up arms for the rig^t to me^e themselves in a 
nation of other speech. 

When she has solved the frontier problems of the 
Metoya, Duldgno, and Bpirus, Albania will be free 
to face the task of internal construction. The new 
government will here find the exercise of its authority 
hanqiered by the very lack of that national consciousness 
the presence of whidi in Bpirus has made it altogether 
i]]^)ossible. Its writ wiU run where the Ottoman 
sohan's ran, in the ports and the plains, but if 
it is wise it will follow the Ottoman policy of leaving 
the mountains to themselves. To the clansman it will 
make no difference that the government is ** national ^ : 
he will still view its action simply as a menace to the 
liberty of the dan, and he will feel no greater obligation 
to pay taxes to an ** Albanian '^ exchequer at Duraao 
than to a Pasha who collected them at the same '' konak ** 
for transmission to Cotistantinople. The Albanian 


revenues vnH depend not upon the oontribittions of the 
Albanian population but upon the customs levied od 
the trade of Avlona and Dunao: diat trade in turn wili 
depend upon the admission of the prindpalitjr to the 
Balkan 2^11verein* 

(iv.) The 2^11verein vnH not be complete until it has 
secured the adhesion of Btilgaria. 

Snce the Balkan Wars the Bulgarian territory has 
extended to the ^ean as well as to the Black Sea,^ 
and the Bulgarian frontier thus blocks every land-coute 
from the remainder of the Balkan area to the Black Sea 
Straits and to the Anatolian continent that lies beyond** 
The Zollverein would suffer grave injury from Bulgarians 
economic hostility, and in her present mood Bulgaria 
is prepared to inflict as much injury upon her neighboucs 
as she can* 

The latest liberated of all the Balkan natioost she 
devoted herself with fierce singleness of purpose to the 
realisation of her national destiny* In the Balkan Wars 
she staked all to win all, and issued the loser* For 
her misfortune she has chiefly herself to blame* By 
her murderous attack upon the Serbian outposts she 
deliberately provoked the disastrous struggle with her 
allies, and her tactless dipk>macy was responsible for 
the intervention of Roumania* Yet the victors sacrificed 
the righteousness of their cause to a most unrighteous 
exploitation of their victory** In the division of spoils 
at Bukarest they stripped Bulgaria naked, and unless 

'See Map IV* 

* The moot impofiant of these routes is the " Oriental Railway/' 
which strikes Eastward out of the Morava valley at Ntsh» entecs 
Bulgarun territory just beyond Pirot, andpanes through Sofia, Philip- 
popolts,attd Adnanoplc to StambouL Ine line is continued on tbe 
opposite ride of the Bosphorus by the Anatolian Railway, which atarts 
mtn Stamboul's Asiatic suburbs. 

* Bulgaria is the Germany of the Balkans: the Treaty of Bukareit s 
a wamiiBg lo the Allies. 



iiiif^S ate pnspoxtd to faru^ tfactr setdement more into 
acoocd with justioe, they must not expect forgiveness 
fmn their victim* 

The treaty left Bulgaria with a heavy score ^painst 
eadi of them* 

(a) Between the Danube and the Black Sea Roumania 
took a atrip of territory which had belonged to Bulgaria 
stnct her creation and contained no Rouman inhabi* 
tanta.^ Her object was to lengthen her cramped coast- 
liae and to open a direa route throt^ Siltstria between 
Bokarest and the sea, and she regarded her act as a 
rectification of frontier, not as the recovery of a saoed 
national inheritance* 

The difEerence between die two states should thus 
be cafiabk of adjustment* If die present war brings 
Roumania accessions of territory in other quarters, she 
flMght modify the Dobrudja frontier again in Bulgarians 
favour : ' if Bulgaria enters the ZoUverein, she mig^ 
rctrocede the whole strip, for the political fcontiet will 
then no longer constitute an economic barrier* 

Nq^tiations on this subject are already on foot 
b etween Bulgaria and Roumania, and there is every 
reason to anticipate their success* 

Greece and Serbia did not mulct Bulgaria of territory 
she possessed before the war, but they took the Uon's 
share of the Turkish spoils* The setdonent of Bukarest 
pcactically eaduded Bulgaria from Macedonia, ahhou^^ 
the majority of the Macedonian population is Bulgsur 
m nationaUty* 

(6) The Bulgar race borders upon the Greek along a 
line nfimding from Salonika Eastwards as far as the 
Bb^ Sea** Throughout th» zone die coast is pre- 

* Ite poptilafipo li oompoMd of Biilgm md BtdsMopUl Tsitis* 
' At pccent the line rum from Tttrtiifad ID Baltdttk. 



dominantly Greek and the hinterland predominantiy 
Bulgar, but there are large areas where the two nationali- 
ties are inextricably intermingled^ village ahemattng 
with village in the same valley* 

It is impossible to draw a political frontier in strict 
accord with the racial distribution* If Bulgaria claimed 
every Bu^^ar village, it would not be feasible to sift 
out the Greek enclaves, and the whole debatable zone 
down to the coast-line itself would be drawn within 
the Bulgarian frontier : on the other hand, if Greeoe 
asserted her title to every patch of Greek population, 
she would have to incorporate not only the whole coast 
but extensive portions of the Bu^ar hinterland* 

It is dear that the problem can only be solved by a 
compromise, and durit^ the negotiations which were 
interrupted by the Second Balkan War, Venezelos, the 
Greek premier, worked for the partition of the zpot into 
two sections* 

The Eastward or Thradan section was to be co- 
extensive with the lower basin of the River Maritza : 
here he proposed to resign the coast as well as the 
hinterland to Bulgaria* The Westward or Macedonian 
section was to indude the lower courses of the Vardar 
and of the Struma, and here he claimed for Greece a 
suffident hinterland to cover the coast* 

When the negotiations were superseded by war^ and 
victory put the initiative entirely into Vene^elos* hands, 
he interpreted his prindple in the sense most favourable 
to Greece, and extended his ** Western section *^ as 
far as the River Mesta*^ 

From the racial point of view the settlement v^as still 
a compromise* If Vene^elos annexed to Greece the 
Bulgar hinterland West of the Mesta, he honourably 



abandoned to Bulgaria the Greek littoral between the 
'Mesta and the Marit^a. The Bu^ars demand a modi- 
fication of the present frontier on economic and not on 
national grounds. The natural route from Sofia, their 
c^tal, to the sea follows the valley of the Struma 
down to die port of Kavala, a short d^tance East of its 
mouth* The Treaty of Bukarest left the greater part 
of this route in Bu^aria's hands, but barred her out 
from its terminus* Bulgaria repudiates reoondliation 
with Greece till this economic wrong is righted : Greece 
refuses to satisfy Bulgaria at the cost of territorial cessions 
which would violate Venezelos* racial settlement* 

Bulgaria's entrance into the ZoUverein is thus the 
only means of composing the quarrel, for it will satisfy 
Bulgaria's economic need without necessitating the 
change of political frontier* Kavala, like Salonika, 
will remain under Greek government, but Bulgaria 
will be as free to make commercial use of it as Serbia is 
free to trade through Salonika* 

In this instance the benefits of the ZoUverein accrue 
to Bulgaria, and by refusing to enter it on this account 
she will be inflicting more harm on herself than on her 

(c) Bulgaria's differences with Roumania and Greece 
have proved to be not irremediable : her last and most 
serious difference is with Serbia, and this time the parts 
are reversed* Bulgaria claims territory on national 
grounds: Serbia refuses to cede it for economic reasons* 

The Vardar rises on South-Slavonic soil, and Uskub, 
at the junction of its head-waters, is as truly a Serb 
city as Nish or Belgrade* Below Uskub, however, the 
whole basin of the river is occupied by a Bulgar popula- 
tion which extends as far Westward as the Albanian 
frontier* The nationality of this population is not in 


doubt : it is as Bulgar in sympadiy as In diakctr^ 
and it regards the Serbian regime as a foreign doimii»- 
tion. Serbia gave witness against herself in the treaty 
she oonduded with Bulgaria in the mtwnmrr of 1913 
before their ioint declaration of war i^^inst Turkey. 
She admitted Bu^aria's ezclusiTc r^t to the region 
South of Uskub, and even left the allotment of Usknb 
itself to the arbitration of the Tsar. 

By extendii^ her sovereignty down the Vardar &om 
Uskub to Yeryeli, Serbia committed a crime ;^ i ps t 
the principle of nationality \riuch can only be ilii 1I 
by the retrocession of the irtiole territory in qucstioa 
to Bulgaria.' Before the oa^xtak of the present war 
sudi a suggestion would have been Utopian : without 
compensation, Serbia would never have cons e n t ed Q> 
disgorge the greater part of the spoils for which she had 
fought two desperate campaigns. If Bosnia faUs to 
her at the impending settlement, and her strength is 
fiirdier increased by the incorporation of die " Triune 
Kingdom " in a South-Slavonic Federation, she will be 
in a position to do full justice to Bulgaria on her IMacc- 
donian frontier without being crippled by the territonal 
loss. Should she still persist in her refusal, she would 

*Tbne » no troth in tfas Strtnan coatentiaii that At SInvnc 
dahct ipoken in Centnl Macedonia a a niiety of " Sotttb-Stmak " 

" SonA-Slavooic " and Bulgar. The two bnguaga an atrnf^ 
dillltratiited ttom one anotbet, and then can be no ainbiguitjr in dw 
dan u fi catfo n of the Macedonian paton uoda ooe head or iba oOta. 


twanty yean 

with OMipcalratt of ifatiriootw who live b«|anddwBulnriaa& 

*Tha moral obli^ttoo cowr ac wd by her treaty in the Snmnol 

ui3> On dK odiet hand, if the securti her naiio«ial unity aa a cmdt 
ol the prcacnt war, her obligation to itapect the prtndplc of natiaoaSiy 
h Bwlg a ri a 'i case will be p roportionately mcifed. 


be infhienccd by eoonomic considerattons that aie not 
afiecced by the racial and territorial factor. 

By fe&oundng her sovereignty over the Vardar-basin 
Serbia would put herself out of touch with her Greek 
and Albanian partners in the Zollverein* Astride the 
Salonika Railway £rom Yevyeli to Uskub, Bulgaria 
would sever Serbia from her outlet on the Agean and 
deprive Greece of her continental railway-connection 
widi Western Europe through the territory of the South- 
Slavonic Federation. Established West of the Vardar 
in the basin of Monastir, Bulgaria would block Serbians 
p tospecrive route through that point to an Albanian 
port on the Adriatic. 

Unless they are guaranteed against these economic 
disast e rs^ it is certain that neither Greece nor Serbia 
will allow Bulgaria to recover an inch of Macedonian 
territory, and the only effective guarantee is the entrance 
of Bulgaria herself into the Balkan Zollverein. 

The situation, therefore, will stand thus : Bulgaria 
will make her entrance into the ZoUverein conditional 
upon territorial compensation : Serbia and Greece will 
only grant her this compensation on the condition that 
she enter the ZoUverein. 

It will not be difficult to mediate between these two 
points of view, and as soon as Bulgaria has redinte- 
grated herself into the Balkan brotherhood she will find 
die way open for a rectification of the Macedonian 
frontier. This definitive line of cleavage between the 
two Slav nationalities will coincide in general with the 
line laid down in the abortive convention of 19x2*^ 

Starting £rom the Eastern firontier of Albania as 
AMftMt^A by the International Commission, it 
probably follow the old boundary between the 

'See Map IV. 


'' vilayets ** of Kossovo and Monastir in an Easterly 
direction, till it strikes the River Vardar at a point 
below the junction of the Peinya tributary but above the 
town of Veles.^ After crossing the Vardar, it nug^t 
run along the river-bank up-stream, and continue its 
course up the Left bank of the Peinya to a point due 
East of Uskub* Here it might turn Eastward once more 
and mount the watershed between the Peinya and 
Bregalnitza valleys till it reaches the summit of Mount 
Qsigova on the present Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. 

This line would leave to the South-Slavonic Federa- 
tion both Uskub itself and the railways that connect 
Uskub with Mitrovitza, Nish, and the Egri Palanka 
Pass : to Bulgaria it would assign Ohrida,' the basin of 
Monastir, the middle course of the Vardar, and all the 
cotmtry between the Vardar and the Struma*' 

We have now discussed the economic federation of 
the six Balkan units : Hungary and the Southern Slavs, 
Roumania and Greece, Albania and Bulgaria* We 
can abstract our conclusion in the following formula: — 

** The political deadlock between national aspirations 
in the Balkan area is due to economic individualism : 
economic collectivism is the necessary condition of 
national self-realisation/' 

^ Better known under its Turkish name as KGpriilQ (^ bridge-place *^. 

* The cajxttal of the Bulgarian Empire in the devendi centuiy aj>. 

•To begm with, Bulgaria will depend for railway oommunicatioa 
with her new territory upon the Serbian line throu^ Uskub and the 
Greek line through Salonika ; but she will certamly follow t^ her 
inoorporation in the Zollverein and the rectification of her ficontier by 
the construction of two new railways : 

(i) From Kostendil down the valley of the Struma to Sertes, wliicfa 
wiU give her a connection along the Greek railway system through 
Drama to Kavala. 

(iL) From Kostendil to Kodjana in the Bregalnitsa valley, over a 
pass South of Mount Osigova, and dience throu^ Ishtip, Vcdcs, and 
Prilep to Monastir. This will give her an independent connection with 
her Macedonian territories. 


Li the envifonment of a Zollverein Hungary and 
die Southern Slavs, the Southern Slavs and Bulgaria, 
Bulgaria and Greece, Albania and Montenegro — all 
alike can compose their respective feuds and arrive at 
a mutually satisfactory territorial recoxistruction on a 
national txisis* The Zollverein seems to be the instru- 
ment that will eradicate the seeds of war from the 
Balkans, so far as those seeds are sown by the Balkan 
nationalities themselves* 

Our discussion, however, has also shown us that the 
Balkan peoples are only responsible in a secondary 
degree. They have erred in leaving their field unfenced : 
dieir stronger neighbours are the enemy that has 
scattered the tares. 

1£ we recall the outstanding factors that militate 
^;ainst Balkan peace, we shall find the root of them all 
in the machinations of the Great Powers* If Serbia 
has fallen out with Bulgaria and Montenegro with 
Albania, it is because Austria-Hungary excluded both 
Serbia and Montenegro from the Adriatic* If Albania 
is at enmity with Greece, it is because Italian diplomacy 
robbed Greece of Epirus* If Roumania and Bulgaria 
are in dispute over the Dobrudja, it is because Russia 
in 1878 swindled Roumania out of her coast-line North 
of the Danube. If Albania is still likely to be convulsed 
within, when she has setded her differences with her 
two neif^ibours, it is because Austro-Hungarian pro- 
paganda has incited the Catholic clansmen to make 
the task of the Moslem government impossible* By the 
boilding-^p of a Zollverein these standing tares may 
be pulled out by the roots : how can we hinder their 
replacement by others more devastating still i 

The Balkan area has been a menace to peace because 
it has been a no-man^s land, an arena flung open to the 


strong natioDS of Europe, to tttapt them to turn aside 
&offi the strait and narrow way of social advance and 
tear each other in pieces for tiie proprietorship oi a 

Once Germany has been what the Balkans are now. 
In the seventeenth century she was dismembered by 
the " Thirty Years' War," and in ^k eigfateei^ 
century the Powers fought over her carcase, as they have 
been fi ghrip g over the Balkans durii^ the century that 
has just eiqiired : Sweden drew the sword to hold 
Pomerania, France to seize the Left bank of the Rhine. 
Bismarck did one good service to peace. By raiamg 
Germany from the dead and making her the peer of die 
Powers instead of their prey, he closed the German 
arena to the conflicts of Europe. 

No Bismarck will arise to weld tc^etber the Balkan 
states and enrol them in the front rank of the com- 
batants : that possibility need cost us neither hope nor 
fear. Inspiration will come not from Central Europe, 
die shadow from which the Balkans are being delivered 
by the present war, but from America, the land of 
promise to which Balkan immigrants are fin<1ing their 
way in ever increasing numbers. 

On the American continent durii^ the last century 
the Latin Republics have lived through their " Balkan 
phase " without disturbing the peace of the world at 
lai^e, because the United States have held the ring 
and have prevented the big dc^ outside from taking 
part in the little dogs' sctiG9e. The Balkan situation 
in Europe calls even more urgently for a " Monroe 
Doctrine," and if it is to be directed inqurtially against 
all the European Powers, its sanction must proceed 
from the Balkan peoples themselves. 

la co-operative movements it is the first step that 



is hard* J£ the Balkan states succeed in organising 
diemselves in a Zollverein, the ZoUverein will almost 
automatically develop into a defensive league* 

Many dreams will be shattered when the Balkan 
world presents a tmited £ront to the rest of Europe* 
Turkey will realise that her tide is not destined to 
ittttin £rom its ebb ; Russia will understand that there 
is no k>nger a high-road to Constantinople on the 
farther side of the Danube-delta ; Italy will recognise 
diat die Straits of Otranto are a natiomd frontier ; and 
Austria will avert her gaase at last £rom the East, and 
knock for admission at Germany's door. 




We are now in a position to solve the problem raised at 
the close of our chapter on Germany* We had con- 
cluded that if Germany were beaten by the Allies in the 
present war, she would have to relinquish her subject 
provinces of alien population, French, Danish, and 
Polish ; and we had argued that it would be in the best 
interests both of Germany herself and of her present 
opponents if this loss were compensated by the gain of 
** German Austria/^ 

We admitted, however, that this solution of the 
German question, convenient though it might be to us 
all, depended upon the wishes neither of Germany nor 
of Europe, but solely upon the initiative of the Austrians 
themselves ; and we saw that we could only conjecture 
the Austrian point of view by making clear to ourselves 
the internal situation of the Dual Monarchy* Our 
survey showed that the Austrian Germans would never 
amalgamate with the German national state unless the 
Hapsburg Empire had previously been laid in ruins, but 
that in that event no other alternative would be left them, 
since they were incapable of standing alone* 

We then proceeded to discuss the Hapsbui^ Empire's 
strength and weakness* We found that the Southern 
Slav question was the determining factor in its fate : 
if the Southern Slavs won their national unity outside, 
and in despite of, the Dual Monarchy, the Monarchy 
would inevitably be shattered in the process : but the 
very victory of the Allies, which would make the in- 


corporation of the German Austrians in the German 
Enqnre desirable from the general point of view, would 
mddentally dissolve the Dual Monarchy by solvit^ the 
Southern Slav question on just these lines, and would 
thereby indirecdy cause the special interest of German 
Austria itself to coincide with the universal interest of 

If, then, our forecast comes true, and the present 
Austro*Hungarian organism is superseded in South- 
Eastern Europe by a Balkan ZoUverein or Entente, 
biiik up in harmony with Nationality instead of in 
defiance of it, we may fairly confidently assume that the 
"'New Germany ** which will simultaneously come into 
being will include within its frontiers the Germans of 

We have now to define what territories and popula- 
tions this ** New Atistrian ** member of the ** New 
Germany ** will include* Large portions of the present 
Wapabvag dominions have already been eliminated £rom 
consideration* We have prophesied that all Galida 
beyond the Carpathians will gravitate, under some 
status or other, to the Russian Empire ; and all '' Trans- 
kithania,'* both the territories of the Crown of St* 
Stq>hen, and the outlying Austrian province of 
Dahnatia, enter the vortex of the Balkans* There 
remains only the section of the Austrian Crown-Lands 
situated to the West of Hungary^s Western frontier* 

Will the whole of this region rally to Germany en 
Unci It is hardly conceivable that it should do so, 
for there are several most important non-German 
elements still entangled in it* The German population 
in Austria, like the Ms^ar population East of it in 
Hungary, ceases on the North bank of the Drave, and 
Slavonic speech re^^ns South of the river as far as the 


sea ; but the situation is not so mmph here as in 
Croatia. The Ooats, we stir, hare been atrocioody 
treated by the Magyars, and, moreover, they are only 
one fragment of a larger homogeneous popnlatian, t)i£ 
Southern Slavs, with -vthost other sectims they can 
federate as soon as they have thrown off the Magyar 
yoke. The Austrian " Slovenes " are an isolated little 
branch of the Slavonic family, speaking a dialect dis- 
tinctly different from Southern Slav.^ They have been 
well treated by their German masters; and, what is 
more inq>ortant still, they have no independent tradi- 
tion or civilisation c£ dieir own. Laibach, die ducf 
town of Krain," has a dioroughly German character, aod 
GottBchee, in the extreme South of the country, is a 
genuine enclave of German population. 

U Krain were a unit by itself, it woukl probably 
vote for continued union with the Germans aocss die 
Drave, with iriiom politics have knit the district for 
five centuries. But unfortunately Krain is inseparably 
linked by get^raphy with the province of the " Kiisteii- 
land," and the Slovene population, neglecting the 
artificial boundary between the two arft«wtii» ir a « i »> 
districts, spreads evenly to the sea. Tha coast, how- 
ever, has had a very different history from its hinter- 
land. Here, too, the Slovene has adopted dvilisaiiaD 
seoond^iand; but it has come to him from the opposite 
quarter, and die ports have taken a completely baUan 
colour. Trieste, indeed, was an early acquisition of die 
H^sbu^,' but the Western half of Istxia belonged tD 
Venice tfll the caOinction of her independence in rTgy, 
and did not pass definitively to Austria till 1814. MoR- 

* Tbcy aus^end j,im/xn> «t the oi 


' It bat bdcoKcd to them since 1389 aj>. 


over, the Slavonic substratum in the Southern parts of 
the btriaa peninsula does not even speak the Slovene 
dialect, but belongs to the neighbouring Southern-Slav 

It is dear, therefore, that the coast, at any rate, will 
sete die opportunity to detach itself £rom its present 
German connections* But this coast and hmterland 
fioim together just one of those geographical minima, 
wUdi are the limit of practical political subdivision* 
They most share the same political destiny, idiatever 
it ni to be* 

This brings us to the claims of Italy* The Italian 
nation re-arisen has picked the mantle of Venice out of 
the dust, and adorns her ambitions with an extensive 
** fena irredenta ** across the Adriatic* We have passed 
over her aspirations in Dalmada without a word, because 
here the Venetian regime is a mere msmory, and has 
lesttlted in no living racial fact, as any one who travels 
up dies coast can see* Educated Dalmatian Slavs still 
speak Italian as a second language» as educated Greeks 
do in die Ionian Islands ; but the current speech of the 
diope, streets and even the quays, and the exclusive 
spcedi of the country-side, is the native South Slavonic, 
and Italy has as little justification for coming here* as 
she has for ruling in Corfu or 2^te * 

In dbe Austrian Kiistenland her case is better* The 
Ijtile Irtrian ports still possess a purely Italian popula- 
tioo, and so did Trieste a century ago ; but in sharing 
the economic movement of the nineteenth century and 

^ In 1900 ibs provmoe of btria had ^4*000 inhahitaiila^ of vHioib 
^>b(Mst d3S% were Italian and 66.7% Slav : the Istrian Croats number 
about aoojooo : so that 90«ooo ta the highest estimate we can giTe for 
the ftmatnuig Slavs in me penlBStth, j«e. the Slovcaes. 

*Zan ii me onfar place in Dalmsiia where Italian ii in aav seoee a 


beooming a world-port, Trieste has vastly increased her 
sise, like other European cities, by drawing into herself 
the rural population £rom a wide zone of attraction. 
Modem urban concentration takes no accxnint of 
mediaeval race-divisions, and the nucleus of Italian 
Triestini has been alloyed with a mass of Sknrene 
imm^fiants who have come to stay. Encouraged by 
the Austrian govenunent, the new Slovene element h^ 
been struggling for some years with the Italian to share 
the control of the municipality and seems likely to make 
good its claim : at any rate Trieste is no longer a purely 
Italian city.' 

Th^ brings us to the negative conclusion that the 
" Slovene Unit " must not be incorporated politically 
either in Italy or in the new Germany. Laibach and 
Gottschee would veto Italian annexation, Parenzo and 
Abba^ia German, the Slovenes who are making them- 
selves a power in Trieste would veto both. It remains 
that it should either enter the " Southern Slav United 
States " or become an independent political unit 
guaranteed by Europe. 

The latter alternative is undesirable. Tiny states in 
occupation of important and intenselyKOveted economic 
assets are not likely to possess the resources for ad- 
ministering these assets on the increasinj^y large scale 
to which modem life is tending, or for defendii^ tiiem 
against the agression of bi^er organisms that dunk 
they cotdd use the opportunity better. But it would be 
still worse to force a political destiny upon a population of 
this size against its will. It is probable, however, that 

' The total popnUtion of Ttieue is 339.000, iaduding about 
170.000 Italiant = 7404 % 
^fioo Slovenes = 18.77 % 


the general sense of the various elements, as expressed 
in die plebiscite, will reveal itself in favour of federating 
die unit vrith the Southern Slavs as a third member of 
dieir Union* Guaranteed independence would hardly 
relieve the Italian and German minorities from the 
iheniatLve fear of being engtdfed respectively in the 
German and Italian national state ; and such a possi- 
bility would be &r more reptxgnant to them than the 
pioqpect of loose co-operation, more or less on their 
own terms, with a Slavonic nationality. The Sbvene 
majority has recently been roused to active conscious- 
xKss by that wave of national enthusiasm ^^lich the 
Serbian victories over Turkey and Bulgaria sent vibrat- 
tBg through the Southern Slavs* While a few years 
ago it would have foUowed in the Italians' or die 
Germans' wake, it will now take an initiative of its own« 
Neverdieless, where wishes are divergent, the negative 
proposition often wins, and if the plebiscite decides for 
separatism, there is no more to be said about the political 

The economic issue is quite independent of the 
political and far more dear* We saw that the Dual 
Monarchy, in its present shape as a political structure, 
was a negation of natural grouping imposed upon more 
than half its total popubtion by force ; and that to 
safeguard the peace of Europe we must allow the im- 
prisoned elements to burst their artificial bands asunder, 
and fundamentally reconstitute themselves on the 
national basis* But we noted first of all that it had a 
cogent raison JChre as an economic organisation. The 
raw production of the Soutfa-Bast, the manufacture of 
die NorthrWest, and the sea traffic up the Adriaric 
coast, are complementary to each other; and our 
political reorganisation, so far from dislocating this 


ecoaomic relatJon, will actually emphasise it oa a 
gfaader scale. Austria-Hungary as a polidcsi geoup 
will perhaps have disappeared ; but the economic ueer- 
play between its sections wiU thereby extend itself to 
the whole Balkan Zollverein on the one hand, aad to 
the whole rehabilitated German Qnpire on the other, 
and the port of Trieste will still remain the node of 
this larger rhythm. 

Trieste has a great future before her, and it is very 
important for the prosperity of Europe to keep mi- 
broken all her economic links* Whatever its political 
disposition, the state of ** Sbvenia ** must remain 9n 
open martet where the new Germany and the Banian 
Zollverein can meet, that is, it must have foee trade 
with both at once. But there is no economic oonnectioQ 
between Trieste and Italy. Italian manufactnrca are 
devebping along the Northern rim <rf the Po basin where 
they can avail themselves of Alpine water power; but 
the port of Lombardy is Genoa on the Riviera coast. 
Italian industry faces Soutfa-West, and belongs to an 
economic sphere in which the centre of gravity verges 
towards the Mediterranean, and not towards the 

This is perhaps the strongest reason of all for not put- 
ting Trieste into Italy^s hands. Even if the eychwkin 
of the Slovene territory from the Italian tari£F-watt wttt 
guaranteed as a condition of its inoorporaticm widun 
her political frontier, she cotdd hardly fail to use her 
political control to deflect Triestine trade in her own 
interest. To abandon her daim to Trieste wiU be a 
grievous disappointment to her ; but she will receive 
compensation in other directions. 

(i.) Though she must throw no covetous glance tqxm 
Canton Tidno, which is Swiss in soul, yet farther East 


the ltalian-q)eakiiig populatioti ctf the Tientino is eager 
to aasert its true nationality. The rectified frontier 
l ie nw e cu Italy and the Austrian Tyn>rwould diverge 
bom the present at the summit of the Ortler/ run 
Eastivard akmg the Northern watershed of the Nooe 
faOey, and dien South-Bast till it crossed the Adige just 
Sottdi of Neumarkt. Thence it would again tal^ a 
SKue Northerly direction along the Northern watershed 
of the Avisio valley, and rejoin the old line again on the 
siffliflut of Monte Marmolata* 

(ti.) If Alsace-Lorraine elects to reunite itself with 
Fnoioe, the French could well restore to Italy the 
balian poptdation of Nizza, whose session was part of 
the pace for French aid in 1859* '^^ tawm has a 
sentiniental value for the Italian nation as the birthplace 
of Garibaldi. Italy would doubtless wish to receive 
Coaica as well ; but sentiment of exactly the same land 
will make the French always ding to Napoleon's native 
islaad, though strategically and economically it is an 
unp r ofi t a ble possession in spite of its size. The 
Coisicans speak an Italian dialect, but they have no 
feeling of national affinity with the peninsular state, 
because dieir horizon has never extended beyond their 
own coasts. They are a lavrfess people, still in need of 
strong government firom outside ; and this the French, 
with more than a century'is e^ierience, can continue 
to give them much better than a new Italian administra- 
tion ttntramed to the task. 

(tii.) Italy's chief gain, however, will not be these 
minor territorial pickings, but the undisputed naval 
command of the Adriatic, for which she is at present 
driven to compete with the Dual Monarchy. The 
dttappeanmoe of the latter power as a political unit 



leave the Eastern coast of this sea in less formidable 

At least two of the Austrian naval bases, Sebenioo 
and Cattaro, will ^ to the inheritance of the Southern 
Slav Union, lAdda. will have neither the interest nor the 
resources to initiate a policy of naval adventure* The 
headquarters of the Austrian navy are at the fortress of 
Pola, the key of the whole Northern Adriatic, iMxh 
juts out into the sea on the tip of Istria, and menaces a 
la^e stretch of Italian coast including Venice on the 
one hand and Ancona on the other. Pola is destined 
to form part of the Slovene unit, and if the latter inclines 
to a guaranteed autonomy, the natural corollary to the 
grant of such a status would be the razing of all fortifica- 
tions within the guaranteed area. But even should 
Slovenia elect to throw in her lot with the Southern 
Slavs, Italy would still be quite justified in insistii^ 
upon the dismantling of Pola as the condition of her 
consent to the loss of Trieste, while the other parties 
to the conference could not deny her such a logical 

While Pola controls the bottom of the Adriatic bottle, 
its neck is potentially dominated by the bay of Avlona ^ 
in Albania, whose future we have already sketched as 
a part of transit and a railway terminus. Under the 
Turkish regent its strategical possibilities were never 
exploited, but in the hands of an efficient naval power it 
could be converted into a position strong enough to 
seal up the Adriatic, and it is obvious that it wouU 
threaten Italy's vital interests if such a strategical asset 
passed into the possession of any other nation than 

The fall of Yannina in the Spring of 19x3, during the 

'See fXap IV. 


ooufse of the Balkan War, brought Greek armies into 
the neighbourhood. The Greek government politicly 
lefinined from proceeding to the occupation of Avlona 
itself, but Italy^s susceptibility with regard to the fate 
of the town was so extreme that, as we have seen, she 
created an international complication by insisting upon 
the inclusion of Epirus, a district of Greek nationality, 
in the new principality of Albania, in order to interpose a 
broad zone of territory between Avlona and the new 
Greek frontier. Events have already shown that the 
artificial severance of Epirus from Greece cannot be 
maintained against the will of both ; but since Avlona 
lies beyond the Epirot border, and her Moslem Albanian 
population will under no drcunostances incorporate 
itself in the Greek national state, there is no reason why 
any step the Epirots may take with regard to their own 
destiny should involve the permanent presence of Italy 
at Avlona,^ a state of things that would virtually reduce 
Albania to an Italian province, and would hopelessly 
compromise the ** Monroe doctrine ** which we formu- 
lated for the whole Balkan region as one of the necessary 
safeguards of European peace* Italy's interests can be 
completely satisfied by another alternative, the perpetual 
neutralisation of Avlona, tmder a guarantee, similar to 
that we have proposed in the case of Pola, containing 
the following provisions : 
(a) Avlona shall always remain part of Albania* 
(ft) It shall never be fortified, either by Albania 
herself or by any la^er political group with a tmified 
military organisation, of which Albania may at any time 
hereafter become a member* 

'la November 19x4 Italy virtuaUy occupied Avlona itaeli^ and 
fofmaliy aanoooced htt ooctspatjon of Saacno, me idaad U^ 
the tDtianoe to tlie Bqr* 


The gtntfal tBtctf tfaen^ of these vsnous pfoponb 
will be to leave Italy the control of the Adriatic by the 
disarmament of its whole Eastern coast* Sympatfaisefs 
with Italy will probably declare that this is after all a 
negative gain^ and hint that a great power like Italy 
cannot in the re-settlement of Btirope be treated in so 
cavalier a fashion* To this we would reply that we have 
taken our lead from Italy^s own policy* Her decisive 
adoption of neutrality at the beginning of the present 
war proved that she herself realised what was already 
patent from the facts^ that she had no vital interests at 
stake on the European continent* 

If the ultimate reunion of Trieste had been to her not 
merely a cherished object of national sentiment^ but a 
necessity of life» she could not have abstained from 
intervention now* In reality^ if she were to yield to 
sentiment and insist on the zssignmtnt to her of Trieste 
by the conference that will meet after the war, she would 
deUberately be involving herself in intimate relations 
with Central and South-Eastern Europe : every phase 
in the policy of the great German and Balkan groups 
would thenceforth seriously affect her, and she might 
finally bring down upon her head the combined force 
of the two groups in a concerted effort to oust her again 
from the possession of a port which, thot^ of no 
economic interest to herself, would be the centre in vAiiA 
their own respective interests met and coincided* 

The relief from naval competition in the Adriatic 
would, on the contrary, be a very positive advantage to 
her* Instead of the promissory notes of continental 
ambitions, it would yield her ^e immediate gain of 
millions of Ure struck off from her annual budget for 
naval construction, and enable her at once to reduce 
her naval estimates and yet spare greater facoe dian 


befejre for the pursuance of interests beyond the xnoutfa of 
the Adriatic on which her future development depends* 

Italy, like Germany, has come late into the field, 
and like Germany she needs above all things to obtain 
reservoirs of markets and raw materials for her growing 
industry, and unea^loited spheres of activity for her 
enterprise* The manufactures of Lombardy shipped 
from Genoa have recently secured a destination in 
Tripoli; but the war with Tturkey in ip^ch Tripoli 
was won opened up the prospect of more fruitful 
e^Kuision in the Levant* Italy's future beckons her 
across the Mediterranean, and it will occupy otur atten- 
tion again when we oome to consider the problems of 
the Nearer East ; but it does not call her to Trieste, and 
we can discount the Italian factor in turning our minds 
once more to the relations between the ** Slovene unit '* 
and its hinterland on the North* 

We have now defined the ** New Austria "' still more 
dosely, by detaching the Trentino and ** Slovenia '' in 
the South : we have only to determine her frontier 
against the latter in detail,^ before we pass on to the 
consideration of her internal constitution* 

We have seen that the unity of ** Slovenia ** is 
primarily geographical rather tluui racial ; so that, in 
settling its exact extent, while we must satisfy as far as 
posttble the claims of the Slovene substratum and 
majority, after which we have named the whole territory, 
we must subordinate ihem in the last resort to geo- 
graphical considerations* Slovenia is a junction of 
economic arteries, and the disposition of these arteries 
most be the decisive factor in its delimitation* We are 
creating Slovenia in order to give Austria, and the whole 
of Germany behind her, a £ree communication with the 
Adriatic that shall pass neither through Croatian terri- 

' Sec Map in* 


tory on the one hand nor through Italian on the other, 
and there are two existing lines of railway along which 
such communication can be effected : 

{L) The ** Sudbahn '" from Vienna, that skirts the 
Eastern flank of the Alps, passes trough the heart of 
Krain at Laibach, and proceeds thence to Trieste, which 
it thus links to an industrial hinterland towards the 
North-East in Bohemia and Moravia* 

(iiO The Tauem Railway, only opened in 1909, which 
has yielded Trieste a new hinterland in Southern 
Germany by giving her a direct Northward connection 
through the Alps themselves* 

This line, in its Southern section, skirts the present 
Italian frontier, keeping just outside Italian territory. 
Starting from Trieste, it runs to Gorz on the East 
bank of the Isonzo, crosses the river, follows up 
its West bank to the junction of the Idria stream, 
and then penetrates by a tunnel into the upper valley 
of the Save, crosses this river too, and next pierces the 
Karawanken mountains by another tunnel, to emerge 
on the Drave at Villach* Hence the Tauem tunnel, 
the biggest engineering feat on the line, carries it 
through the main chain of the Alps into the Danube 
lowlands, which it enters at Salzburg. It is clear that 
this railway sets a limit to the advance of Italy^s Eastern 
frontier against Slovenia* All that we can give Italy here 
is a tiny strip of territory on the West bank of the Isonzo 
below GSfZ, where the population is Italian in nation- 
ality, and which possesses a sentimental importance as 
containing the little towns of Aquileia and Grado, with 
their beautiful cathedrals and their splendid ecclesiastical 
memories so closely bound up with Italian history* 

The North-Westem extension of Slovenia in turn is 
limited by the trunk line from Vienna to Italy, which 


passes by Leoben up the valley of the Mur, crosses into 
the Drave valley at Villach, and proceeds thence into 
the T^^liamento basin at Tarvis* It is equally dear 
that this line must run entirely through Austrian and 
Italian territory, and pass outside Slovenia altogether* 

This further suggests the limits of Slovenia on the 
North* The Slovene population overflows the water- 
shed between Save and Drave, and occupies the whole 
Southern bank of the latter river along its upper course, 
even passing beyond it in places; but the Northern 
bank is predominantly German, the towns, such as 
Klagenfurt and Marburg, being completely German in 
diaracter, and the whole valley forms an indivisible 
geographical unity, which is linked by its railway con- 
nections with the German mass towards the North 
rather than with the Slovene mass towards the South* 
Slovenia must therefore abandon her frontiersmen in 
die Drave valley to Austria, and accept the Southern 
watershed of that river as her Northern limit* 

We are now in a position to designate the whole 
frontier between Slovenia and Austria* It should start 
from the present Italian frontier at Mount Kanin (thus 
leaving the railway junction of Tarvis within Austrian 
territory as before), and follow the Southern boundary 
of Karinthia along the Karawanken mountains till it 
reaches the point where the Karinthian boundary turns 
North* Here it should part from the latter, and con- 
tinue the Easterly direction of the Karawanken range, 
cutting through Styria till it reaches the Bacher moun- 
tains on a line that leaves Windischgratz and St* 
Leonhard to Austria* Thence it should turn South- 
East, run along the watershed between the Sann and 
Drann systems over the Cilli-Marburg railway ttmnel 
to the Wotsche motmtains, and then follow their summit 
till it hits the frontier of Croatia* 



Thif is a rot^ attempt to sift Slovene from Gennan 
along a line corresponding mdi geographical struc- 
ture, and it will succeed approximately in shaking 
German Austria free from her Slavoiic accretims en 
the Southern side. But the Austria that is left, thou^ 
now a compact geographical unit, has a last and most 
bitter national problem buried in her heart ; she has still 
to settle her relatitms with du Tchechs. \ 




BoHEHXA is a foux^^quare block of primitive mountains, 
the relic of a Europe older than the folding of the Alps 
and Carpathians* Like the Baltic plain and the Danube 
valley North and South of it, it was occupied in the 
Dark Ages by the Slavs in their Westward su^* 
About 1000 AJ>« the Germans, e3q>anding with the 
inq)etus of civilisation, bq;an to roll the tide back* 
Meissen and Brandenburg, the Saxon marches, turned 
the Bohemian Slavs' flank on the one hand, the 
Bavarians pushed their settlements down the Danube 
to build Austria on the other, and when, during 
the thirteenth century, Silesia, the province of the 
Upper Oder, was cut away from the body of Poland 
and Germanised by settlers from the North-West, 
Bohemia was isolated on the East as well, and Germans 
bom Vienna, pressing up the Right bank of the March 
River, almost joined hands with Germans from Breslau 
through the Moravian gap*^ Even the thickly-forested 
mountain-dykes did not keep out the flood, and a 
German population oozed far into the interior of 
Bohemia on the West and North* 

But Geography still saved the native Slavs from 
destruction* Their mountain-shelter gave them time 
to adopt from the Germans the armament of Latin 
civilisation by which they were beit^ conquered, and 
the Kingdom of the Tchechs began to hold its ovm as 
a recognised, independent member in the family of 

' Sm Map II. 


Western Christendom. In die fourteenth century its 
ruler, Charles of Luzembourg, attained the (by this time 
shadowy) dignity of Holy Roman Emperor, and his 
Slavonic capital Prag became for a generation the 
pohtical focus of Central Europe. 

The cosmopolitan university of Prag, founded in 1348 
and organised in four " nations," whidi was Charles' 
most enduring legacy to the country, linked it still 
closer to the great world, and wandering students from 
England sowed seeds of Wyclifs ideas from which 
sprang two leaders of European importance, John Huss 
and Jerome of Prag, the fore-runners of the Refbmu- 
tum. They were both burnt at the Council of Constanz 
in 1415, but their followers took up arms for the rights 
of the Laity against the Cleigy, and repelled the crusades 
of all Catholic Europe. 

In this democraric uprising, half a universal ttiiffovs 
movement, half a local revolt of the peasant against his 
brd, the Tchech nation found itself and defied the 
world. But the glory of the Hussites was brief. They 
were ruined, not by the power of the Roman Church, 
but by the bitterness of their own internal factions. In 
1436 the moderate " Utraquists " crushed the fanatical 
" T^x>rites," who were the really vital element in the 
movement, and proceeded to make a concordat widi 
Rome, in which they abandoned their actually achieved 
religious independence in return for a formal acknow- 
ledgment of the Laity's right to communicate in both 
kinds, the empty claim enshrined in the party's title> 
The star of Huss had set before Luther's sun rose : in 
the seventeenth century, while the Dutch were assert- 
ing their national independence against the Hapsburg 
dynasty, the Tchechs fell under its autocratic rule, and 
have never extricated themselves since; but ttaditioii 



Kved on, and fed the flame of nationalism, which the 
nineteenth century kindled in the Tchechs as in all other 
European populations, to a white heat* 

No settlement of Austria is worth considering that 
does not satisfy the Tchechs' aspirations, but their 
daims are likely to be eactravagant* At first they will 
probably demand the erection of the two provinces, 
Bohemia and Moravia, where they form the preponderant 
element of the rural population, and the substratum 
of the urban masses, into a completely independent 
national state* It would be a dose parallel to this claim 
if the Irish Nationalists proposed the complete separa- 
tion of the whole island from the British Empire and 
the absolute supremacy in the new state of the Catholic 
popttIatk>n; except that to the Tchechs' programme 
the objections are graver still. 

(i.) In whole districts along the borders there is a solid 
German population, and a German element has estab- 
lished itself permanently in most of the towns, especially 
in the more accessible province of Moravia*^ In the 
streets of Prag, riots between Tchech and German mobs 
often lead to bloodshed ; and the present war, in which 
the Austrian government has forced the Tchech con- 
scripts to fight against their Slavonic brethren, the 
Russians, and shot them down when they hesitated to 
obey, will have immeasurably embittered the race- 
hatred* This German minority cannot be abandoned 
to Tchech nationalism, enjoying power for the first 
time, and schooled, as a victim, in Austrian methods of 
using it* 

Tefuchs. Gtrmans. 

. 4»xo7/)oo (65%) 3^1X1000(35%) 

. x,738/)oo (71%) 679/)oo&8%) 

Totil pop. of both*^ 5»845iOoo (68%) a^Sgo/xx) (31.5%) 


(ii.) Bohetntt and Mofavia are great manu&cturti^ 
and mining diBtricCs, depending for dietr ptoeper i ty on 
gcxxi oommunication with markets.^ If they separate 
diemaehes politically from the New Germany, diey put 
it in her power to build a tariff wall against ^em vAdA 
will cttt them off from the oiftn world* Hie interior (rf 
the Bohemian bastion is drained by the upper system of 
ibtWbt, and its trade is tendmg more and more to flow 
down with the river to Hamburg throiqli the gorge 
?dieie it breaks the Brt-gebirge ; iwdiile the arteries of 
Moravia focus at V^nna, where the Austrian tmsk Hot 
starts for Trieste* In both difectk>ns exit and entrance 
can only be made dirous^ German territory* 

(iii.) The Tcheds possess a third door to the East, 
of which Germany does not own die thresfai^, the 
Moravian gap that leads to Roland* But none of their 
trade pmses in diat direction to the vast Russian marisets 
diat lie beyond, because these are already monc^iolised 
by the important Polish manu&ctttrmg districts that 
intervene, and the Polish Blad[ Country and the Russian 
cofttkAxods form a closed economic system of their own. 

On die old political scale, then, Gec^praphy decreed 

* 1 iMse mo pfofiBCcs are tn net me ccinve ok suticj oi Auwmn 
Mosstfyv bt oOTnimncips DOCB ijoiver aimimi taa on^En n lav 
wittt^fiy activity ifld tlmr tBitilc fimwinictun^ wiule tiie pfovinotf 

SoUllHWCSt OK VlCtlMy the SlJQflSBOlds of pUfC CjCflllAB iMitionAfy» 

lit Mtnde the BmIboi Mctioa of the Alp^ and aie 
e c ono micaWy bv th eir ge ogr^ihical diaiacter. A flompai i a' vc 
popwlatiom (taken €rmii the teiimi of 1900) will flMke tUs dear : 

^^'^^'"'* . ^x%OQO Lower Aiotna . . j^zoo/xx) 
Moravia af^J«ooo Styrb^ . z^j6/)00 


iZfOoo Cifinthia ... ^d/jMV 

— — "— ijnii \iiiiniuim me 

»4S4/MM» If alimi nf theTitatiBP) gSo^ooo 

SnsNBS • > • r^Si'BSO 

t^perAMtfia . Oie^ooo 


dial tiie Tdbcchs should be a nation : on ihc newMonmnic 
scak it has brigaded them inexorably vvith the Gemua 
group* But though her common frontier with the 
Russian BmfAxe would give an independent Tchccii 
state no economic advanta^e^ it would have political 
effects most dangerous to the peace of Europe* The 
iarritable persecution of the German minority by the 
Tdiecfa nationalists would provoke economic retaliatioa 
from the German Empire, and the Tchechs would dien 
ask for the intervention of Russia in a fit of Panslav 
pasBton« The Bohemian bastion is the strategic key 
to the New Germany/ and Russia could throw as many 
troops into it as she pleased through the Moravian gap, 
whidif though it woukl be strategically Germany^s most 
Vtthierable spot, woukl be entirely out of Gmnany's 
military control. Such a situation would be intoleraUe 
to Germany* She would have to insure herself against 
its oocurrence by a system of alliances like those till now 
in vogue, and the re^t would be another tmiveisal war* 
An independent Tchech state, then, would be against 
the uhimate interest of the Tchechs themselves (for 
neither the German boycott nor the Rtissian suzerainty 
that broke it wouki please them), and against the direct 
interest of all Etuope* On the other hand, if the 
Tdiecfas are to enter, as a tiny minority, the vast cor- 
pQfatkm of the new German Empire, ihtir natk>naltty 
will have to be safeguarded energetically, and they will 
pBobibly propose in the second place that Bcrfiemia- 
Kloravia enter the German Empire as an individual tmit, 
a femth member by the side of the North, the South, 
and Austria, with a special international guarantee 
beiiind her* 

^BfaaaxdL once said that the mtlitafy pofwar which ooatroltod 
BoboDtt oontfoUed Europe. 



Guaiantees to a weaker partner that outsiders will 
iq)hold his interests are a poor alternative to a c^Mcity 
for tqjholding them himself, and they gall the stronger 
partner, whose free action they limit and whose honesty 
they put in doubt. They are an occasion for bicteings, 
and we had better do without them if we can. A 
guarantee can perhaps be avoided in this case by Uttiiig 
the whole of Austria, within the limits to whidi we 
have reduced her, enter the German Empire as a single 
unit,^ on condition that she grants Home Rule within 
this district to the whole Tchech nationality. The 
Tchechs, possessing more than a third* of the total 
population and equipped with national self-government, 
would easily hold their own within the Austrian state, 
and the whole Austrian unit, representing proportioa- 
ately the interests of all its components, would hold its 
own in turn within the German Empire. 

By such an arrangement the Tchedi tutionality 
would assert itself through co-operation with the 
German neighbour, and not by making war on him, 
and two farther advantages wiU appear when the 
formula is worked out in practice. 

(i.) The existing pohtical machinery will suffer the 
minimum amount of disturbance. In the Crown-lands 
Parliament which at present sits at Vienna, representa- 
tives elected by manhood suffiage from pc^nilalioos 
speaking half a dozen different languages, have nude 

' To whkh " North Germany," for comractoen' sake, migtat cede 
tht fragment of Silesia, which our propaaed Polish frontier woud knc 
bcr bejbnd the Rigbt bank of the HgtzenplBtt stream. 

* Rcckonm^ by ptoviaces on the boss of tbe bat ccnun {19)0) iht 
total population i» our "Reduced Austria" will be about sintts 
millions ; while in the same year there were 5,953,000 TdicdK nd 
9,173,000 Germans in tbe whole Austrian Crown-bnda, all of whoa 
Will remain, acrordine to the preaent scheme, within die Au9>iix> 
uni^ though practicalqr all populationa of other nationality will biK 
been deladbed from it. 



the efifort to do legislative work together^ and in spite of 
scenes that the tension of the racial atmosphere almost 
excuses, have begun to acquire the constitutional habit* 
It would be a pity if Germans and Tchechs (the other 
nationalities will have simplified the situation by 
dropping out) should deprive themselves of this field 
for collaboration and mutual understanding*^ 

(ii*) The pattern for Tchech Home Rule already 
exists in the Constitution of the Austrian Crown-lands, 
under induch the several provinces, besides being 
represented in the Vienna parliament, enjoy a modicum 
of local self-government under diets of their own*' 
This system, and the present British government's bill 
for Home Rtile in Catholic Ireland, would be good 
precedents for the scope of the new Tchech parliament 
to be established at Prag* As in Ireland, the chief 
difficulty will lie in settling, not the powers to be 
del^^ated, but the geographical limits within which 
they are to be operative ; and this problem brings out 
the most decisive advantage of the scheme for Home 

> The following table shows the c t spe cti vc strengths of the di£Bereiit 
aatiooalities within the Atsstrian Crown-hnds, accordiiig to the census 
of zgoo, and the number of seats assigned respectively to each nation- 
aiity in the parliament at Vienna by the electoral law which mtxoduoed 
Miuhood Su£Erage in 1906. 

Soitdiem Slavs 




a33-xs 39r365 


108-1: 55«3 


80-1: !B#X50 

34-X5 9M7X 

z,Z93/)oo I 
7zi«ooo i 

37-x: 5M59 


X9-x: 38;^ 


5-1 : X43/»o 

Total . . a6,i07,ooo 516 

The represen tation of certain nationalities is thus still very te 
from being proportioiial to dieir real numbers* 
* GaUcta nas secured more complete Home Rule than any other 



Rule vnAin Austria as against separate membetship 
in the German Empire* 

In the latter case just as much as if she became a 
completely independent state^ Bohemia-Moravia wDold 
have to be organised as a compact gec^^raphical unit, 
so that the German minority in the country would in 
both cases be forced to take its government from Prag, 
and would need an external guarantee against the 
Tchechs of just the same kind as the Tchedis them- 
selves would be requiring gainst the whole German 
nation. But in the event of Home Rule within a united 
Austria, the total population, Tchech and German 
alike, would be represented in the Vienna parliament 
already; the plebiscite to ascertain what sections wuhed 
to avail themselves, in addition, of the proffered devolu- 
tion, could be taken parish by parish ; and the area 
the Tchech Nationalist administration should control 
from Prag could be determined to a nicety by its 

We can, in fact, state the general principle that the 
less absolute the sovereignty, that is, the power of 
uncontrolled, irresponsible action, demanded by any 


^ The materials for dcawtng out the map of the Tchech Home Ruk 
area aie akcady to hand, m the electoral districtB constituted in 1906 
for the Austnan Central Parliameat. Some distrkti are purely Tchedi 
in poptifaifion and return only Tchech deputies : dicse would oettajoly 
chooR Home Rule« Others contain a miied popfulation of Tcfaeds 
and Getmansy and are organised in two constituencies of identical tool 
cjrtent but d^erent nationality, each provided with its own register of 
voters and returning its own national candidate to parliament: the 
fatte of these would be decided by whichever natiofiality was in the 
ni^onty* The Tchech constituency, if its register contained more voces 
tfatti the German constituency fat the same area, would outvote the 
latter in favour of devolution for die area in question, while the Gcmufl 
constituency in ^ opposite case would retain the area for centraltsatioa ; 
but of course every racial constituency, those whidi fell witlun the 
Home Rule area and those which remained outside it alfte, would 
continue to smd representatives to the general parliament at Vieiuia 
00 the same esoellent system as before* 


gjvcn political group^ the more exactly we can draw its 
firontiefs in harmony with the national feelings of the 
k)cal populations; while the more complete the 
independence it demands^ the more we shall be com- 
pelled to sacrifice the wishes of minorities to considera- 
tions of administrative^ economic and even of strategical 
geography. But it is not yet time to discuss the con- 
chisions to which this will lead us* We have so far 
surveyed only the first of our main problems, namely, 
irfiat gains and losses an honest relayix^ of national 
feondations will bring to Germany^ and before we 
turn our attention elsewhere, we will attempt to give a 
ckar summary of our present results* 

(u) We have detached from Germany the following 
populations, estimated at maximum figures, on the basis 
of the census taken in 1905 : 

AhaefLoataat . 1,8x5^000 i^upjfomDg that tfaa whole of tht 

RadHlaad elects to sepifate 
itself fRxn Germsfiy*) 

Schleswig 0oo/xx> (AppfOKunate csttmate to include 

both die X99fOoo Danes and the 


aodW.ftasBa . 3/Mfioo (Atwimfng that all Poles subfect to 

Gefmany are detached from her, 
tfaoup^ we have actualh^ left 
*^*^*?f*^ff abtf iiMWffititi in oJIwia 
and W. Pkusna.) 

Total detadied 5iaox/xx> 

(ii.) In compensation we have added to Germany a 
reduced Austria with a population (on the basis of the 
census taken in 2900) of approximately 16,000,000. 

We have ultimately, there£Dre, increased the popula- 
tion of the whole German Empire, which numbered 
6o,64Z/x>o in 1905, by 20,799,000, raising it to a total 
of 7i|44o,ooo> Statisticians calculate that the popula- 


tion of Germany, within its present limits, has risen in 
the interval since 2905 to 65/)oo,ooo, an increase of 
7*5 per cent*: if we add this percentage to our total for 
the United Germany,^ we shall find that the popula- 
tion of the new German Empire within the proposed 
frontiers would amount at the present moment to no 
less than 76,798,000 souls, distributed into the following 
groups : 


(a) North Germany . 46,50X1000 (Of ^idioin * 36,i3S/xk> would 

formerly have faciooged Ip the 
prcaeot ktogdom of Prussia*) 
South Germany . 13,0971000 * 

7) Austria 17,900,000 (Including about io^ao/x» Ger- 

mans and 6,88p»iooo Tchecfas.) 

Total T^/J^fi^^ 

If, at the Conference which will meet at the end of this 
war to attempt, like the Vienna G>ngress a century ago, 
the lasting settlement of Europe, we could succ^ in 
reconstituting the German Empire on some such lines 

* The rate of increase among the added Austrian populatioo is 
certainly lower than the average within the present limits of Gcmiasy; 
but on the other hand the Geiman census was only taken in tgof, wmte 
the census on which our figures for Austria are based was tuen five 

* pop. of Prussia \ .^ i total of SdUmwigtrs 
in 1905 f \and PoUs in 2905 

37/)oo/)oo X '^^ -. 3,38^,000 X ^^ . 36,i35/)oo. 

'Bavaria 6,534*000 

Wurtemberg a,3oa/xx> 

Baden 2tOiifioo 

Hessen (the Southern block only) 9x3,000 

Frankfurt ^ ^ 3B4>iooo 

Other territories detadied fRrni Prussia 00 

either side of Frankfort .... xoo/)oo 

Total (by census of 1905) Z3,z^/x» x -^ 

■■ X3/)97/>oo. 


2s these, we should have accomplished most of the 
objects with which we started this discussion, and 
avoided most of the dangers vihich we saw ahead of us* 

We should have relaid the foundations of Nationality 
in Alsace-Lorraine, Schlesw^ and Poland, where 
Prussian policy has deliberately broken them up, and 
we should have restored the superstructure of European 
peace endangered thereby for many years and now 
finally shattered ; yet by honourably applying the 
principle of Nationality to Germany's advantage as well 
as to her detriment, we should have left her with a 
considerably larger territory and population than she 
possessed before this war* This just aggrandisement 
would primarily benefit Germany herself, but ulti- 
mately it would further the best interests of all Europe, 
because it would be more likely than any other measure 
to produce that change in German public opinion whidi 
is the only possible keystone of peace in the future* 

ff Prussian militarism be refuted by the issue of this 
war, the German nation will assuredly be alienated from 
the Prussian system for ever, unless either or both of 
two consequences follow : eidier the humiliation of the|| 
national honour, or such a rearrangement of frontierslj 
as would leave Germany at the mercy of her neighbourship 
and reduce her to a state of permanent fear* 

Were the G>nference to create such a situation as this, 
the German nation would be thrown into the arms of 
Pnissianism, and would serve its unsympathetic ideals 
with greater enthusiasm than it has ever yet lavished 
upon them* But if the settlement takes the line of our 
proposals, both these consequences will be avoided* 
The German Empire will emerge more majestic and 
less vulnerable than before* The element that is not 
Prussian, but is Germany's true soul, will regain free 


flfav* take the lead in the natioii's life ivhidi it held till 
] BJemarck wxested it away ^ and swamp Prmwiantim not 
merely by the greater vteality of its ideas, but even by 
the weight of superior numbers* 
j We can readily discern the policy ^Niiuch the New 

Germany will fc^ow* Her first tadc wifl be the re- 
building of that magnificent commerce and industry 
which it took forty-three years to conjure up, and ooe 
season's campaign to spirit away again* She will have 
a bitter moment when she gazes at its ruins, but her 
emotion will be regret and not despair* Our setdemeiit 
offers her once more the promise of a great economic 
future* Hamburg, Danzig and Trieste will be secured 
to her as open doors for her commerce, and motual 
interests will bring her to an understanding with the 
Balkan ZoUverein, more stable and of wider effect than 
Ae present precarious customs-uaion between the tm 
halves of the Dual Monarchy* This labour of good 

1 hope will occupy the New Germany's best energies for 

I many years to come* 




Wi have now cosq>kt6d half our task^ the reconstruction 
of Central and South-Eastem Europe* We concluded 
the last chaq>ter with a summary of our results. A 
leca^tulation of the steps by which we reached them 
will be the best introduction to the problems that still 
lie before us* 

(L) The first necessity of primitive societies is ** Strong 
Government,'^ external to the govemedt because they 
have no organic lirJcs with one another in themselves* 

(IL) Within this chrysalis of mechanical union, a 
natural, oq;anic unity grows up between the governed 
among themselves, expressing itself through diverse 
common factors: language^ geography, religion, 

(IIL) It is a necessary phase of political growth that 
diis common self-consciousness or Nationality should 
become the principle of political structure, and the 
self-government of natural human groups replace the 
arbitrary grouping of ** Strong Government '" as the 
ideal of the State* 

(TV*) This ideal of self-governing national states with 
natural frontiers (frontiers, that is, whose sanction is not 
external force, but the respective common desires of the 
pqwilafions on either side of them) has been realised in 
the West of Europe so thoroughly that the national 
states so formed have been able to turn all their energies 
to new phases of development based on this achievement* 

(a) All of them (Holland, Belgium, England, France, 


Spain, Portt^) have expanded over the less civilised 
parts of the Earth, and have divided between them both 
the regions producing the best tropical raw materials, 
and the temperate regions outside Europe best suited to 
European colonisation. 

(6) Two of them, France and England, have become 
" Great Powers " by leading the way m the " Industrial 
Revolution " which has transformed the environment ctf 
human civilisation ; and they are now with all their 
energies and with increasing success adapting themselves 
to these new conditions. 

(V.) In Central Europe, on the other hand, owing to a 
less favourable start in civilisation and to subsequent 
misfortunes, Nationality did not assert itself till z866- 
1870, and then only by a compromise with " Strong 
Government " typified in the policy of Bismarck. This 
has caused several serious flaws in development here as 
contrasted with the West : 

(a) Only two nationalities, the German and die 
Magyar, have here attained self-government, and diey 
have been usit^ it ever since (foUowing " Strong 
Government " tradition), to maim and stunt the develop- 
ment of weaker nationalities behindhand in the race : 
Frenchmen of Lorraine and Alsatians, Danes of 
Schlesw^ Poles, Tdiechs, Italian Trentini, and 
Southern Slavs. 

(6) They have also entered with vigour the " post- 
nationalist " phase of expansion and Industrialism, but 
here they have been handicapped by coming late in the 
race themselves, as compared with the Western poweis, 
who have already " inherited the Earth." 

(c) Germany is bitterly conscious that she has not 
found for herself " a place in the Stm," but in order 
to win it she has not concentrated all her efforts vpon 



eoonomic and social oonstruction, though this is the 
nonnal activity of the present phase of Eutopean 
civilisation* During the last forty-three years she has 
displayed amaring ability in this direction, and already 
won for herself a very large niche at the expense of her 
rivals in the field, and to their advantage as well, for 
the whole world in the industrial phase profits by the 
success of any one member of it* Nevertheless, she has 
chosen to foster her Militarism, the obsolete weapon 
of ** Strong Government,'" which Bismarck partially 
adapted to the solution of the national problem, but 
iidiich is entirely unadaptable to the conquest of 
industrial supremacy* 

(VI*) The present war is Germany's attempt to ** hack 
her way through'' the Western nations to the best 
'' place in the Sun," by military force* The best com- 
mentary on her action are the results she hopes to 
achieve by it* 

(a) She hopes to annex Belgium, and possibly to force 
Holland into a disadvantageous zoUverein, in order that 
she may have more convenient ports for her industrial 
districts in Westphalia and the Rhineland ; and so to 
break the power of France that she may cease to be 
an independent factor in European politics* If she 
succeeds in this, she will have reduced the West to a 
diaos of ** robbery under arms " such as it has not 
known since the ** Hundred Years' War " and the career 
of Charles the Bold, and have swept away the work of 
four centuries, not merely the ** national self-govern- 
ment " inaugurated by the English and French revolu- 
tions, but even the preliminary ** national consolidation ** 
accomplished by Louis XI* and Henry VII* 

(6) She threatens to seize the transmarine possessions 
of aU the Western nations alike, great powers and small. 


btUigcmUs and neutrals. The attitude of Votta^ 
and Spain i1io«b wbat tiiey fear. This would desoojr 
the whole vigorous oolomal development of the nine- 
teenth century, triiidi only began after die resuk of dw 
Napoleonic wan had definitively settled the ownenfaip 
of these tcrritoiies. 

(VII.) We may birly awdude that in this piratical 
atta^ Germany stands for reactiott to a crude idui 
that European Gvilisation has consciously transcended, 
vrbiic the Western powers that are defending diemselves 
^^ainat hex represent the new activities by which 
European Civilisation is opening a better diapter. In 
diis stn^gle, therefore, it is the Worid's vital interest 
that Getmany should fail. 

We have reached these propositions through a survey 
of the facts, starting for fairness' salie with the fact that 
is at once the most important of all and the most di£B- 
culc for us to appreciate jusdy: Germany's attitude 
towards her own ambitions. But we found tiut " tout 
conqucndxe, c'est unit pardonner peut-ttre, mais oe 
n'est point tout petmettte ; " and we made up our minds 
that we must refute German force by force, in order that 
we may bring it into our power to reoi^janise the political 
structure of Central Europe on the basis of the West, 
instead of sufFerii^ the West to succumb to the level 
of the centre. We have therefore approached the tadc 
of leoomtruction on a national basis, and painfully 
striven to right the injustices the German system has 
perpetuated from Alsaoe-Lorraine to the Westen 
frontier of Poland and from Schleswig to Macedonia. 

But we have also recognised that this recasting of 
Europe, based though it be on the living will of popula- 
tions, has no virtue in itself, and that it is merely the 



pcduninary oondition for a change of hearty the sole 
e&ctnre cuie of the evil* Our objective is to convert 
the German nation from the Prussian idea to otir own, 
and we can only do this by first crushing their hopes 
of military victory, and then convincing them that we 
are striving for a settlement on impartial lines* We 
have to show them that we find our own interest in tht 
peaceful industrial development of all the nations, 
Germany included, side by side with ourselves* 

If we have taken all the factors into considexalmn, we 
ous^t to succeed in this, but we have not yet con- 
skteted them all* Germany is at war not merely with 
Eoi^aiid, Fiance and Belgium, but widi Russia, and 
if we tie concerned with the German nation^s psydbo- 
logy, here is die factor that dominates its pmseat 

At this moment the German nation is as tmited in 
feelii^ as otur own, and every individual in it as pr ep a re d 

tomake the ^Ktreme sacrifice for the tiattfinal cause* 
People do not rise to this temper for a cause whidi 
they know to be bad in dieir own hearts, and which 
they aie aware the public opinion of the World will 
oondenm* Such a cause may be the tihimarr or pre- 
ponderant object for which they are fig^uing: ihey 
may dehl>ecately have been concentrating all their 
satkmal energies upon it for years : but in the suprem e 
stress it will not inspire them* The Bulgarians lost the 
aeoottd Balkan War because in a bad cause their qiirit 
fttled them* If the nation ruies to the occasion never- 
theless, as the Germans are doing now, it wiH be 
heoauoe they are looking at the atrugs^ xd fones in 
y/Adch they are engaged from a wholly di£Ferent point 
df view* 
The Germans aie -noc flo^ nwnking of ambitiOBS to 


be realised at the expense of the Western nations, 
although that is the real issue at stake. The conscious 
idea that spuis them is substantially identical with the 
conviction that governs our own minds. Hiey feel 
themselves to be the champions of European civilisation, 
" whose cause Great Britain has basely betrayed," 
against the many^headed hydra of Panslavism, " whom 
envy has moved Great Britain to aid." For them 
Russia is the principal and we are merely her seconds : 
German defeat spells the abasement of civilised Europe 
beneath the barbarous Russian idea. 

The whole policy of Prussianism, which we have 
weighed and found wanting, transforms itself to German 
eyes under this l^ht.' If Germany is attacking tlie 
Western nations, it is because they have sold their 
birthright, and the champion of civilisation must exact 
from them the power and wealth they have prostituted 
to make it bear fruit again in civilisation's cause. U 
Magyardom persecutes the Slovaks, and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs at Vienna ruthlessly represses 
Southern Slav nationality, it is because these are new 
heads of tibe hydra reared suddenly from an unexpected 
quarter, and must be crushed bdTore the vaster fangs 
of Russia have time to fasten upon the German world 
from the other flanks If German policy maitifaing the 
scandalous mi^;ovemment of the Turk^ Empire over 
large alien populations, it is not simply in order to coax 
a market for German enterprise, but to close the Russian 
monster's Southern sally-port. We can understand 
Germany's frame of mind most easily from this last 
instance, for if we had not kept the same dii^^oeful 

> Thti, of cooTK, expUini why the officul Tusti&catioa of dieii actioa 
publiAcd by the German govenimeat aftet the aUamophc had 
happened, bean the title " How Rtnda made the Wv." 



guard over Turkey all through the nineteentfa century^ 
Genoany would not have been able to relieve us of it 
in the twentieth. 

The arguments with which we defended our conduct 
then read like first drafts of the German arguments now : 
'"Russians expansion threatens our position in India, 
where our rule stands for civilisation and progress and 
where Russian conquest would bring darkness and 
reaction* The most vulnerable point in otu: position is 
our line of oommtmications through the Mediterranean, 
which is at present screened from Russia by Turkey* 
It will be laid bare to her if Turkey collapses* We must 
therefore bolster up the ' integrity of Tturkey/ and 
if the Berlin Treaty brings a generation more of 
misery to the Balkans, only to be terminated by a 
bloody war, that does not weigh in the balance against 
the harvest of civilisation that the respite, perhaps 
permanent, will have enabled India to reap*'' 

We pass our verdict on this argument in the shame 
with which we recall it* The lacquer of idealism, 
deposited upon it by a school of Victorian statesmen 
with such good faith, has worn away, and we can see 
the base metal of unenlightened self-seeking beneath* 
Our own error in the past will help us both to excuse 
and to correct the strongest and most conscious element 
in Germany's feeling at the present* 

We must come to grips with Panslavism* Germany's 
fear of it is a psychological fact* In her belief she has 
been driven by deadly peril to put her whole fortune 
to the touch* In the light of our own attitude towards 
Russia, which we began to abandon less than a dozen 
years ago> this creates a presumption dut some real 
fulcrum exists to sustain such an immense spiritual 
leverage, and if Germany's presentment of the Russian 


aatjooal duumcttr is trtie, all ottr hbeturs will have been 
of no avail* England and Fiance may be ^dis- 
interested/" and Germany may oome to believe it; 
but it is no use bringing Nationality iinto its own in 
Central Euiope, and preserving it in the West, if West 
and Centre alike are thereby delivered over to be ^ 
prey of Russian militaristic ambitions as bad as, or wofse 

than, those we are now combatting in Germany* 

If the Allies win this war, Russia will probably have a 
more decisive voice than any of us in the European 
setdement that must follow* It is our imperative task, 
therefore, to analyse those forces immanent m the 
Russian Empire, which may so gready modify the 
realisation of our own intentions, and the remainder of 
this book will be devoted to dififerent aspects of the 
same question* In Eastern as in Central Europe, we 
will approach our problem from the standpoint of 




A* The Risargimtnto of Pdand 

The last chapter left on our hands the question : 
What will be the attitude of a victorious Russia towards 
the National princq;>le in Europe i Will she respect it 
or will she trample upon it i 

The German conceives ** Panslavism *' as a vast 
conspiracy on Russians part, in which the minor Slav 
nationalities are her tools, and the domination of Europe 
her object* He will argue that it is simply a specious 
name for ** Pan-Russianism/* The Russian will pro- 
bably ezdaim that the very meaning of the word is 
sufficient vindication of his honest intentions* ** The 
only Panslavism,** he will say, ** that the Russian People 
has ever taken to heart, is die impulse to release any 
and every Slav population in Europe from alien oppres- 
sion, precisely in order that each may work out for itself 
its own national salvation ; ** and he will point out that 
Russia has committed herself to a lif e-and-death struggle 
at Serbians call* But the German will return to the 
charge, and, waiving for the moment the case of Serbia, 
will put die Russian to silence by the mention of the 

** U Russia is the leading Slav nation, Poland is die 
second : indeed, she may claim priority over her more 
badEward Easterly neighbours as a focus of Slavonic 
culture* Yet while Russia has been preachif^ Pan- 
slavism in BohiCTnia and the Balkans, she has been 



persistently endeavouring to blot out &om the roll of 
nations the noblest member of the Slavonic brotherhood. 
It is irrelevant that we Germans have aided and abetted 
her Polish pohcy. We are not now concerned to dis- 
poove our own gaUt, but only to demonstrate that 
Russia's is at least as great as ours. The history of 
Russia's past relations with Poland does not augur well 
foi: the sincerity of her new homage to the National 
Idea. Woe to any nationality in Europe which refuses 
to subordinate its destiny to the destiny of Russiat H 
Russia emerges omnipotent from this war." 

This formidable retort offeis us a definite field for 
our disputation. In our second chapter we saw that 
Germany's action during the present war is transform- 
ing the feeling between Russian and Pole with almost 
miraculous completeness, so that, when the re-settle- 
ment of Europe is made, the Pol^ nation will almost 
certainly be prepared to accept its resuiration as a gift 
&om the Tsar, and try to realise its aspirations as ao 
autonomous member of the Russian Empire. But 
stich a compact demands good faith from both parties, 
and the autonomy of Poland will indeed put Russia's 
to ibt test. It may be a piece of Utopianism, and the 
Grand DuIk's manifesto simply the vow extorted &om 
the sinner by the menace of God's thunderbolt : in diat 
case the suppression of Poland on the morrow of the 
settlement might well herald the successive ruin of 
the other European nations : or Russia may really 
abide by her word, and respect Poland's new-found 

The latter event would serve as an immediate 
guarantee of Russia's good intentions towards the 
nationalities less closely involved with her and situated 
altogether outside her pohtical and economic frontiers ; 



but it vrotUd also have a momentous effect upon the 
mtemal structure of the Russian Empire itself* The 
kaven of Liberalism would not confine itself to Poland* 
It would steadily penetrate the whole lump, and 
produce a Russia that might lead the van of European 
civilisation, instead of straggling in its rear* 

We must discover, then, whether Polish and Russian 
Nationalism are indeed capable of reconciliation* We 
will begin by attempting to acquaint ourselves with the 
Polish point of view* 

The history of Polish Nationality really begins with 
the partition^ of the old Polish Empire during the 
last generation of the eighteenth century by the three 
vulture powers, Russia, Prussia and Austria, which had 
established themselves on its flanks* 

Their work was not so gross a crime as it is often 
painted* Vultures devour carrion, never living area* 
tures; and the disappearance of the Polish state was 
the old story, a long-accepted commonplace further 
West, of efficient ** strong government *' imposing law 
and order by force upon a society in chaos* 

The Empire yoked together diverse nationalities and 
national fragments* Its nucleus was the union of two 
Catholic popubtions, the Poles on the Vistula and the 
Lithuanians North-East of them, between the Niemen 
and the Duna* They were linked first in 1386 by the 
acceptance of a common dynasty, and were subse- 
quently fused into a single constitutional kingdom by 
die Act of Lublin in 1569. From that date the strong 
monarchy gradually degenerated into an inept oligarchic 
republic* The Polo-Lithuanian noble caste was 
paralysed by family feuds, and more inclined, when its 

^ In diree stages : 1773^ 1793, 1795. 


members met in diet moimted and armed, to relieve ks 
feelings in bloodshed than to carry on the business of 

If the Polish nobility had reduced merely their own 
country to anarchy, it would have been bad enough; 
but they were visiting their incompetence upon large 
alien populations as well, and the eighteenth-century 
Partitions, while they opened the Polish national 
question, dosed once and for all several others of long 

(u) In the fourteenth century, after the Mongol 
invasion had shattered Russia into fragments, Poland 
and Lithuania incorporated by conquest vast districts 
stretching South-Eastward into the Cossack steppes 
towards the Black Sea* The population of all this 
region was Russian by language, creed and tradition. 
It induded the White Russians, who lay North of the 
Pripet marshes, and were hardly distinguishable from 
the Muscovites in dialect, and the Ruthenes or Little 
Russians, extending South and South-East of them from 
the Carpathian mountains to Kieff half-way down the 
course of the Dniepr* The eighteenth-century parti- 
tions retmited these peoples with the national Russian 
state, except for a Westerly fn^;ment of the Ruthenes 
in Galida, which fell to Austria in 1772* We shall find 
later on diat the relation between the Russian Empire 
and these branches of the Russian race still requires 
adjustment, but their transfer from Poland to the 
Muscovite state at least advanced the problem many 
stages nearer solution* 

(ii.) Besides these Russian-speaking regions, which 
became a more or less integral part of the Russian 
national oi^^anism, the Russian Empire had incorpor- 
ated by 1795 the vtdiole Lithuanian nation. No 


pnbkm, however, atose tn iUs case, becauwTtht 
lirhiianiam ait the most backward race in Buiope* 
They were not converted from their primitive paganigm 
till the fourteenth centnry, and since then they have 
drawn their civilisation at second hand from other 
people, instead of creating a national tradition of their 

{Hi.) The highly-dvilised German townspeople of 
West Prussia were annexed by the Berlin government 
in ZTTdf and have never since been severed again 
policicdly from the entirely German-speaking provinces 
be t ween which they lie. We have already explained the 
reasons, racial and geographical, why West Prussia 
must remain part of the German national state. 

Having disposed of Pbland's alien subjects, let us 
turn to the fate of the Poles themselves. The P^fftition 
gave them, no less than their subjects, the much- 
needed strong government in place of the extreme chaos 
under which they had suffered for more than a centtuy ; 
but in doing so it deprived them of the one priceless 
possessi o n they had won and kept, their national 
unity. There was no question for them, as for their 
former Russian subjects, of rejoining a larger national 
unit. They did not even pass, like the Lidiuanians, 
under the dominion of a single State. The carcase 
of Poland herself was shared by the two Western 
vultures, for Russia, thot^^ reckoning by mere extent 
of territory, the lion's share of the spoils had fallen 
10 her, had not acquired a single Pblish-speaking district. 
Warsaw, the Pbl^ capital on the middle Vistula, be- 
came a Prussian frontier fortress ; Cracow, the second 
dty of the country near the river's source, was assigned 

_^_^^ ^ dariy tht pwciod of ladtpsadgnot. While RwMan mm the 



tD Austria^ The Poles drank the cup of national 
humiliation to the dregs. 

The nationalist movement to which the Partition gave 
birth had hardly time to gather force before the deliverer 
came from France* Napoleon overthrew Austria and 
Prussia in succession/ and imposed on them, in the 
territorial re-settlement that followed, the cession of all 
their Polish acquisitions except the first of 1772. He 
reconstituted the territory disgoi^ed into the ** Grand 
Duchy of Warsaw/' The reversal of fortune was 
complete* Not only was the whole Polish population, 
with insignificant exceptions, rescued from the foreign 
yoke, but for the first time it experienced the benefits of 
self-government* To Heine, the lonely Jew spumed 
by a Germany with a still unsoftened medieval heart, 
the French armies came as the bringers of good tidings 
to the individual soul* In Poland, which had seen native 
aristocratic anarchy succeeded by alien bureaucratic 
repression, the ** principles of the French Revolution '' 
became the gospel of a whole nation* The advanced 
political system of Western Europe, suddenly intro- 
duced and applied for seven years with the intense 
energy of the Napoleonic spirit, left a tradition in the 
nation which never died out, and which differentiated 
them &om their neighbours on all sides, on whom the 
French had impressed other memories. 

With Napoleon's fall the flood of misfortune did not 
return upon the Poles at once* We have seen how the 
Congress of Vienna shore away the province of Posen, 
to give victorious Prussia a strategic frontier, and met 
Russia's claims by erecting the remainder of tiie Dudiy 
into a '* constitutional kingdom of Poland " under die 

^ At Auicerlits in 1805 and Jena in z8o6. AuiCm did not fofleit her 
share of the spoils till after the second war of 1809* 


Russian Imperial crown, with the exception of Cracow; 
which was cut off and permitted to be a ^^ free dty *^ on 
its own account, to satisfy the strategic susceptibilities 
of Austria. For fifteen years the diminished nation 
retained its liberal constitution and even its French- 
o^;anised native army, but its position between the 
three vulture powers, risen s^ain from the dust with 
beaks and talons sharper than ever, was too precarious 
to survive the first spasms of that birth of nationalism 
in Central Europe, which the shock of the Napoleonic 
wars inevitably precipitated* The July Revolution of 
18^ in France stirred Poland to an ill-considered re- 
volt in the following year, which gave Absolutism its 
opportunity. The constitution was abolished, and the 
ootmtry organised in Russian military governorships, 
v/hUe in 1846 the Austrians marched into Cracow. 
The desperate revolution that broke out again in 1863 
was suppressed by the cool co-operation of the three 
interest^ powers. It had come too late. The crisis of 
Italy's risorgimento was already overpassed ; in Prussia 
Bismarckianism was on the point of tritmiph. With 
the strangling of this last convulsion, the life of the 
Polish nation seemed to be extinguished for ever. 

But the nineteenth century saw a more important event 
than the ups and downs of national aspirations — ^the 
spread over Etirope of that Industrial Revolution which 
takes no account of the political ordinances of men. 
Pbkmd's rich mineral deposits turned her into a strong- 
hold of the new economic regime, and during the 
blackest years of political persecution her population has 
grown steadily in numbers and wealth. There are now 
at least eighteen million Poles in the world : within the 
shelter of the Imperial tari£f-wall, the manufactures of 
the Russian districts have a preference in the vast rural 



market that stretches East o( them into Asia ; while 
Polish unskilled laboui has supplanted the native 
German in Wes^halia, permeated to Odessa on the 
Black Sea, and found its way in increasing volume to 
the United States. 

Thus the majority of the Polish nation under Russian 
rule has actually benefited ecooomically by its subjection, 
and economics have gone far tomrds settling the 
political destinies of the whole reunited Poland, for 
yrbosc creatiim we now hope. Even her eighteen 
millions > cannot stand by themselves, with no coast- 
line and no physical finnttiers.' She must go into 
parmership with one of her larger neighbours. 

The Ca^thian barrier shuts her out from the Balkan 
Zollverein. The course of the Vistula and the £cee 
navigation down it to Danzi^ that we have stipulated 
for her, point to union with Germany ; but the bulk <rf 
EHsland's eqxjrts do not flow down this natural route to 
the Baltic. Her real commercial links are with the 
great Rtissian continent. If Galida becomes Russian 
soil up to the Carpathians, the trunk railway connectii^ 
Warsaw with the Black Sea will pass through Lemburg 
to Odessa without encotmtering either political frontier 
or customs' barrier, and Poland will turn her face South- 
Eastwards once more, but this time in co-opetatioii 
with Russia, and not in rivalry widi her as during the 
Middle Ages. 

Muttial economic interests, then, favour die idea of 

■ Accofdii^ to the last eeaaaaea <£. tbe ic^Mctivc Bmptm, tbex aic 

{SSififoo PcHci in Ruaua, 4^33/000 in AusUia, md ova 3,000,000 ia 
'nuBia. This ^ves a total of ij.tSj/rao : but there b«s been no 
centus in Ruma siiice 1897, and in 1907 the Russian Pokt wcrt 
unofficially enunated at 10,740.000. 

' Except for a short sectioo erf the Carpathians, the boundaries of the 
Polirii natkn are demaications of the Baltic plain as aibitiarilr dnwn 
IS the outlines of the prairie states in the U£^ 



incorporating the new Poland within the Rtissian 
Empire by a federal union. Till the outbreak of the 
present war, the growing economic bond, which pointed 
to oo-operation in the future, had no opportunity of 
asserting itself in face of the political enmity inherited 
from the past by these two rival leaders of the Slavonic 
World* But now that the war has miraculously broken 
down the barriers of tradition, the economic factor will 
obtrude itself in full force. If the war is won by the 
Allies, the experiment of federation, which will almost 
certainly be attempted in the subsequent European 
settlement, will have been made possible by this sudden 
sentimental reconciliation; but in nations as in in- 
dividuals, violent emotions pass as abruptly as they 
oome. The psychological crisis of the war is important 
in the present case, just because the economic motive is 
there to deepen its e£fect into a friendship and under- 
standing durable enough to survive the psychological 
ditente of Pftaoe* 

The scheme of federation will have to be framed in 
the most liberal spirit. The national self-oonsdousness 
of die Poles has been almost morbidly hypertrophied by 
generations of repression, and though die removal of 
the evil will gradually weaken the memory of it, the 
Catholic Polish nation will still be sundered by language 
and rel^on from the Lutheran Prussians and Orthodox 
Russians on either side of it. Moreover, the capacity 
for self-government will be present, as well as the desire 
for it (the modem Polish people has travelled far from 
the PoUsh aristocracy of a century and a half ago) and 
this capacity will have the highest demands made upon 
it by die industrial problems with which the new state 
will be confronted. Pbland will take her share with die 
odier nations of Europe in the search after a new 


harmotiy between Man and his changed economic 
environment, and this effort cannot be guided to success 
by an alien '' strong government "' imposed from without, 
but only by a national democracy of the Woriceis 
evolved from within* 

If, then, the new Poland is to be a healthy organism, 
she will require the maximum measure of Home Rule 
and the minimum of external control consistent with 
membership of a wider political group. The local 
autonomy of Galida, the most liberally-treated province 
of Austria, will fix a level which the Russian govern- 
ment's concessions will have to surpass. We have 
seen that if Russia is in a position at the end of the war 
to reunite the Polish nation, the Galidan fragment will 
be irresistibly attracted by the possibility; but it will 
also be full of apprehension at exchanging the certainty 
of Austrian toleration for a dubiotis reception into the 
bosom of Russia, and probably it will refuse to commit 
itself without a guarantee from all the parties to the 
European settlement that the autonomy of the whole 
nation within the new state shall be at least as far reach- 
ing as that which this favoured section already enjoys. 

The Russian Government would certainly chafe at 
such a proposal, and deny the right of other nations to 
intervene in Russia's internal politics. If the proposal 
concerned merely the Poles already indtided within 
the Russian Empire, this protest wotdd have weight; 
but it would actually arise as the corollary to a large 
extension of the Russian frontier, made possible by the 
joint action of the Allied Powers, and Russia must 
admit the authority of France and Great Britain to 
assert their point of view in the settlement of questions 
raised by the war in the East, unless she is willing to 
resign all share herself in the settlement of the West. 


Without derogating from the dignity of Russia, the 
Western Powers might well define a certain measure 
of Home Rule as the indispensable condition for the 
re^union of the Austrian and Prussian fragments to the 
main body of Poland within the common fix>ntier of the 
Russian Empire* They cotdd not, of coturse, bring 
more than moral pressure to bear upon Russia either 
to admit or to endorse the guarantee ; but if Russia 
withheld her pledge, the Galidan plebiscite would give 
her a rude shock by declaring itself for federation with 
the Balkan Zollverein or with the New Germany, and, 
deprived of the support of her friends, . she wotdd find 
herself compelled to yield subsequently with a bad grace 
what she might have granted beforehand as a bounty* 

The federal relation, then, between Poland and 
Russia shotdd be as secure as material interests and 
treaty-stiptdations can make it ; but we have still to 
define the geographical limits of the future autonomous 
state against the main body of the Russian Empire. 
It goes without saying that die Poles must abandon the 
memory of their past dominion* The New Poland 
must include no districts but those of Polish nationality ; 
and, since the line to be drawn will simply be an 
administrative botmdary, not a tariff wall or a strategic 
frontier, it can follow with some accuracy the convolu- 
tions of the linguistic border* Determined on this 
principle, it will exclude from Poland not merely a strip 
of the present ** Vistula-governments *' of Russia, but 
also the major part of Galida inhabited by a Little 
Russian population* At the moment when they are 
regaining their own liberty, the Poles cannot grudge 
ne^bour nationalities the same boon* 

The course of the new boundary should be more or 
less as follows : 

^ wiihi 


Starting ^ from the South-East comer of the East- 
Prussian fiontier, just West of the point where the 
Lyck-Bialystock Railway crosses it, it should run South- 
East to the North bank of the River Narew, hitting it 
near the junction of die Augustowo Canal, that links the 
Vistula and Niemen systems. Hence it should follow 
die river's course upwards to a point due South of 
Bialystock. Here it should leave the river and take 
a S.S.W. direction, excluding Bielsk awards the East, 
till it reaches the Bug. Crossing the latter river about 
fifty miles below Brest, it should continue in the same 
direction till it hits the Wieprz, and should then follow 
up the course of this stream in turn towards tlie S.S.E., 
as far as its most Easterly bend, thus including Lublin 
but excluding Cholm. After leaving the Wieprz, die 
line should run due South, excluding Zamosz, till it 
hits the present Austro-Russian frontier, whence it 
should b^ South-West, tiU it meets the River San 
at its great at^ horn East to North-West, between 
Yaroslav and Przemysl. Thence it should follow dte 
course of the San upwards, thus assigning Yaroslav 
to Poland, but exdudit^ Przemysl, which lies on the 
river's R^t bank, till it reaches the other great bend 
horn North »> East between Przemysl and Sanok. At 
this point it should leave the San, excluding Sanok, 
run due South-West till it strikes the Hui^arian {louda 
along the summit of the Carpathians, and proceed to 
follow the mountains Westward, till it reaches the point 
on the summit of die range, just East of the Ratiboi- 
Sillein Railway, which we took as the starting-place for 
our western frontier.' 

' Sec Map II. 

' The boundary which we have just sketched between Autafxnwui 
PoUod and the main body c^ tiie Rusnan Empire practically coinddti 
with die Baitem border of the lemtory eontuaiaufy inhabited by Poks : 


Between this new boundary and tfae.Russo-Gennan 
frontier sketched in our second chapter^ we have 
delimited a territory of hardly less eactent than the area 
of England and Wales* Up till now^ Russia has been 
draining her strength by holding down half this country 
against its will ; but if the whole cotmtry is organised 
as a national state in partnership with her, it will be 
transformed into a magnificent btdwark against her 
ne^bours on the West, and give its whole eneqy to 
swell the economic and military resources of her 

Russia, then, has every motive of self-interest for 
permanendy conciliating the Pbles. Otur advocatus 
diaboli, however, will not throw up his case* ** To the 
common sense of liberal Western Europe,^^ he will say, 
** your argument wotild be a truism, but it is truer 
still that ' Itistinct is Lord of All/ Russia has not the 

bat just as our Western frontier of Poland detadbed numerous nolated 
enclaves of German population from the German national state (Ch. IL, 
Sect. D), so its new eastern boundary will leave Polish enclaves of 
equal importance entangled in the Ruthene section of Galida which we 
are proposing to eidude from the Autonomous Polish Unit* These 
PoUsh advance-guards in Eastern Galida and those German advance- 
snards in Western Poland are precisely parallel to one another in 
mslocJcal origin and contemporary character. Just like the Germans» 
the Poles overflowed into the domain of their more backward neigh- 
bours : diey have Polonised the urban centres— such as Lvov, Tamc^ 
and Staaislau — as thoroughly as the German immigrants have Ger- 
manised the cities of Posen and Thorn, and they have also established 
themselves in force in the suburban countryside; yet it would be 
Bw yjp hically impossible to include this Poluh ** Dtmersion ** in the 
Pofash Autonomous State without transferring with them a far more 
numerous Ruthene element. We must mete the same measure on 
both frontiers : if the Poles are to gain at the Germans' eipense on the 
West, tfiev must reconcile themselves on the East to corre sp onding 
kssBcs in me Ruthenes' favour. This is only another instance of that 
ic re duci ble nnWttwtm of national injustice which is involved in the most 
ttfoatabiy drawn political frontiers. The Polish minority is doomed to 
da a ppn i ntme nt as inexorably as the German, but like the German it 
nmit oe granted in co mp ensa t ion a European Guarantee of its national 
tndlviduality under the alien government which geogrqihy imposes 
tqMO it* 


understanding to grasp a liberal policy* If she were 
merely unscruptdous, she wotdd begin to act righteously 
as soon as it paid her to do so ; but she is stupid as weU> 
and from the combination of these two vices no good 
can spring* ' 

This criticism compels us to abandon the field 
of Russia's objective interests^ and to reopen our 
discussion on the more fundamental plane of her 
subjective character ; for unless we can vindicate that^ 
the New Poland we have so elaborately built up will 
prove a house of cards^ and may carry the other nations 
of Europe with it when it collapses in ruin* 

B« The National Evolution of Rassia 

Germany's reproach to England for having joined 
forces with Russia agaixist her, is couched in terms like 
these : '' You have decided to fight us because you 
hate and fear our Militarism* You believe we aspire 
to ' World Empire ' and mean to take your inheritance 
from you by force ; and naturally you imagine, as every 
nation must, that your own downfall wotdd be a setback 
to civilisation* We will not be at the pains to argue 
with you, but we point out that, if you succeed in 
crush^g us with Russia's aid, you are laying up a worse 
fate both for yourselves and for the world* Russia, on 
the most favourable interpretation, is only made of the 
same stuff as ourselves, but in an inferior quality and of 
a coarser grain* Her ambitions and her mediods of 
forwarding them reflect our own, and our strength is the 
only bar to their realisation* The Cossack will ride 
over our corpses to the conquest of the world, and 
when you see him enter Copenhagen and Stamboul and 


Koweitf you will regret the annihilation of Gerznan 

We could dismiss Germany's ** Panslav ** bogy with 
a smilet if it had not found a response in this country, 
but ^* After Germany, Russia '" is a phrase that already 
comes too glibly upon people's lips* Is the supreme 
objective of Peace, for whidi we are sacrificing every- 
thmg now, illusory^ And does the lifting of one war- 
cloud merely draw a heavier one above the horisson < 
U the sotd of Russia is like the soul of modem Germany, 
with the evil heightened and the good expunged, there 
seems no issue for the World* Germany has challenged 
die comparison, and we will take her at her word and 
test it* 

If we compare the governments of the two empires, 
die German contention is clearly right* The purposes 
and methods of the Russian and German bureaucracies 
are roughly the same ; but whereas the German govern- 
ment is efficient and, on the whole, has public opinion 
behind it, the Russian is out of touch with the nation, 
obscurantist and ineffective* Judging, then, by the 
functioning of the administrative machine, Germany 
is far superior to Russia, and it may be argued diat 
administrative efficiency is an adequate criterion of com- 
parative civilisation, because it presupposes that faculty 
of orderliness and looking-ahead, which we emphasised 
at the beginning as civilisation's essence* 

This argument would be valid if the government 
and the governed cotdd be equated ; but even in the 
democratically-organised states of Western Europe the 
two factors do not coincide, and in the Centre and 
Bast diey do not approximate to one another* On die 
one side stands the German Government, exploiting all 
the national accuracy and forethought bom of civilise- 


tjon to bring about its own specialised^ and^ as we jtidge 
it, uncivilised end of world-conquest, jtist as a tnist 
exploits security of property and rapidity of communica- 
tions to gnaw die wealth ci the community in which it 
shelters* On the other side the great German nation, 
renotmdng its ideals and surrendering that very essence 
of civilisation, the power of free choice and of lookii^ 
ahead with one's own eyes, has indentured itself to the 
service of the Government's bad cause* The success 
of the German Government in its present policy has been 
an indictment of the German Nation in the present 
phase of its character. You need employ no violence 
against a willing accomplice, nor conduct an obscurantist 
campa^ against a demoralised inteUigenzia which has 
the lie already in its sotd* 

We have seen that Germany's history has reversed the 
normal order of European evolution* Prussianism is in 
the ascendant : it is the dominant, inspiring force of 
the nation's growth, and any success Germany may 
achieve tmder its banner will impress the iron mould 
more deeply upon her soul* The Prussian militaristic 
bureaucracy is a living power* Russia, on the other 
hand, has reproduced so far precisely the phases of 
Western Europe, though, like Serbia and her other 
Balkan prot^^es, she has suffered from a very bte start* 

Her history began little more than two hundred years 
ago* In the seventeenth century she was a stagnant 
mass, still dazed by the shock of Mongol conquest that 
had struck her down four centuries earlier, half 
orientalised by the Mongol suzerainty that had followed 
the impact, and cut o£f from the outer World by the 
lack of a seaboard* She stood to Europe as Macedonia 
stood to Hellas at the beginning of the fourth century 
B«c*, and she fotmd her Philip in Peter the Great* 


Peter gave Russia that '^ strong government'^ and 
** oonsolidation ** without which a nation cannot begin 
to grow* He forcefully shook her into wakefulness by 
Europeanising her organisation and breaking her a 
doorway on to the Baltic through which the current of 
European ixifluence should thenceforth flow in* The 
foundation of the new capital, Petersburg, typifies both 
his actual achievement and die orientation he gave to 
the future* At first the leaven seemed only to be 
fermenting on the surface (Peter did not strike his 
acquaintances in England and Holland as an apostle of 
culture), but the stir of the eighteenth century kneaded 
it deeper in* On the West, the Swedish dominion over 
the Baltic was finally broken, and Russia securely 
established along its whole Eastern shore : Southwards, 
the Empress Catherine of German birth, whose long 
reign marks the acme of the ** strong government *' 
phase, opened another door on the North coast of the 
Black Sea, and in this quarter Russian advance identified 
itself with the march of civilisation* Prosperous com- 
mercial ports repbced the Turkish villages on the 
seaboard, and the taming of the nomad Tatars on 
die steppe threw open the hinterland to agricultural 
development for the first time since the break-up of the 
Ancient World* 

The e^teenth century in Russia corresponded to the 
Tudor period in England, and to the regime of Richelieu 
and Colbert in France : ^^ L'^tat, c'itait le Gouveme- 
ment,*' and the Administration had an imposing record 
of progress to show for its masterful all-pervasiveness* 
As in France, there followed an age of transition, 
charged with an atmosphere of foreboding like that 
which drew ** Aprte moi le d^uge ** from Louis XV* 

The nineteenth century has brought the Russian 


bureaucracy to bankruptcy. It has no loiter risen to 
the problems of internal growth, and it has suffeied 
grave military discredit abroad. The Crimean cam- 
pa^ was its " War of the Spanish Successkm/' ^ 
unexpectedly disastrous stn^i^ with Jiq>an its 
" Seven Years' War." Its prest^e has suffuied bknn 
fetm which it can never recover, but the outworn 
chrysalis has held together long enoi^;h to do its wotk. 
During this same nineteenth century the Russian 
nation, an inarticulate Tityos lying prone across half a 
continent, has awakened to the dearest consciousness, 
and expressed itself in a literature as distinctive and as 
momentous for the spiritual history of the Workl as 
the literature of eighteenth-century France. 

Nor is this a house built on the sands. The Russian 
int^igeruia draws its living water from a deep well- 
spring of national Ufe. When you read a Russian novel 
you pass out of the cosmopolitan environment of 
Industrial Europe into " Ikly Russia," an environment 
of river and forest and snow and sun, and a tradition of 
religion and of social customs, utterly unfamiliar to you 
before, but you habituate yourself to it with unlooked- 
for ease, because the sense of life that pulses through 
it is as convincing as the sound of the sea, when it 
falls, after months of absence, upon your ears. The 
Russian nation has found its soul: the next phase 
will inevitably follow, and effete " strong government " 
give place to the captaincy of the nation over its 
own destiny. 

The present war is a very important moment in this 
transformation. It, too, finds a parallel in the history 
of France, namely, the successful intervention in the 
cause of American Independence, that gave liberalism 
entrance into the fortress <tf official policy. The 



Russian Government cannot unfurl its banner in a 
similar cause, without considerably changing the legend 
embroidered upon it before it is laid away zgzin* A 
change of outlook will mean a change of personnel : 
Russia may find a Turgot and a Necker who, profiting 
by the experience of their French forerunners, will solve 
the problems of which they despaired ; and there may 
even now be fighting in her army's ranks a stronger and 
more purposeful Lafayette* 

The friction and misunderstanding, then, that at 
present exists between the Government and the People 
of Russia is not, as German opinion suggests, a sign 
of dissolution but a symptom of growth* If the nation 
here assented to the bureaucracy's standpoint, that 
would indeed be a proof of national depravity* But 
the Rus^an bureaucracy belongs to the past : Liberalism 
is in the ascendant, and will prevail* 

We have now compared Germany and Rtissia by 
bringing out the respective tendencies that are asserting 
themselves in each ; and this is the only true principle of 
estimating national valties* The symbolism of political 
cartoons, in which the figure of John Bull, a squire in 
'' Regency '' costume, stands for the British Nation, 
and Uncle Jonathan, a business man with the beard and 
coat of the 'sixties, for the United States, is actively 
misleading* It takes a vivid impression of a nation at 
some critical moment in its history, when the attention 
of the World is centred upon it, and perpetuates it with 
the inqplication that that is the nation's eternal essence* 
The device produces the same comic effect as the snap^ 
shot of a race-horse galloping, but the humotur con- 
sists just in the static presentment of a kinetic reality, 
and thus depends upon a distortion of ** historical " 
truth. National character is not sutic, because a nation 


is alive. The essence of it is not the phase it happens 
to occupy at the moment, but the vibole movement c£ 
its growth, and we can forecast a movement's tendency 
with most probability, though, of course, any calcula- 
tion of the future is ex hypothesi conjectural, by a 
survey of such phases of it as have already been 
Met in this way, Germany's challei^e turns to her 
■ own despite. Our conclusion makes us more eager 
than ever for Germany's discomfiture in this war and 
more zealous in our alliance with Russia, for we feel 
that the triumph of Russia, as well as the triunq>h of 
Great Britain and France, will be in harmony wi^ the 
true advancement of European civilisation. 

C. Devolution 

We have compared the past history of Russia with 
that of other European nations, and analc^ has 
inclined us to augur for her a liberal future. Yet we 
shall not satisfy our German critic till we have offered 
him some concrete programme of the lines on which 
this prospective liberalism can, should, and will be 

The chief obstacle to the prc^ess of self-government 
in Russia has been the shortness of her history. The 
second, and hardly less formidable, factor is the im- 
mensity of her territorial extent. Before the invention 
of modem communications, a v^orous absolutism 
seemed the only force capable of holding bother 
such a widespread mass of humanity. But now the 
mechanism of telegraph and railway can take the plaa 
of " strong-government's " centripetal action, and local 
U individuality receive free play in the political ^here 



widiout risk of ultimate disruption* The new oi^anisa- 
tion of Poland will react on the rest of the Empire of 
which it is to form a part, and the first step towards 
self-government will be devolution on an extensive 

(i*) The Baltic G>ast populations/ from the North- 
East jErontier of Prussia to the Gulf of Finland, are none 
of them Russian in nationality, and, till their successive 
absorption in the Russian Empire during the course of 
the eighteenth century, they have all had a distinctive 
history of their own. 

(a) The Lithtianians, occupying the provinces of 
Kovno, Vilna and Suvalki, are not Slavs, but speak a 
separate language of the Indo-European funily. Its 
closest relations are with Slavonic on the one hand 
and Teutonic on the other, and its development, like 
that of its speakers, has been arrested in a phase more 
archaic than any other living form of Indo-European 

The Lithuanians have remained Roman Catholics 
since their voluntary conversion from tribal heathendom 
in the fourteenth century aj>., and they were in political 
partnership with the Poles between that time and the 
Partitions, so that neither language, religion nor tradi- 
tion bind them to the Russian people. Though geo- 
graphical considerations have made it advantageous 
to both parties that this little country' should come 
within the jErontiers of the great Empire, the Imperial 
Government has no call here to take cognisance of other 
than such Imperial business as communications and 

■ See the map of European NatiQiiaiitks (VIL). 
' The number of Lithuanians in the Russian Empire is estimated at 
h'^59/ioo. There are further about 107,000 Lithuanians in East 


defence^ and might satisfactonly leave the whole internal 
administration of Lithuania to Home Rtde* 

(6) The Letts, inhabiting Courland and Livland on 
either bank of the Duna, lie next to the Lithuanians in 
the Northward direction* They speak a variety of the 
same language, but their history has been different. 
They were converted to Christianity by the sword of the 
Teutonic Knights, and at the Reformation submissively 
followed their masters into the Protestant camp like the 
Masurians in Prussia* After the dissolution of the Order, 
this territory was partitioned between Sweden and 
Poland, and, when it became one again under Russian 
government, the German landed aristocracy, descended 
from the secularised knights, played for a time a 
prominent part in the history of the Empire, owii^ to 
their superior education and acquaintance with Euro- 
pean life* 

(c) The Northern part of Livland, from a line drawn 
East and West between the Lake of Pskov and the Gulf 
of R^a, together with Esthland, the sister province along 
the Southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, has shared 
the political and religious history of the Lettish districts ; 
but the population here speals a language of entirely 
different origin, a dialect of the great Ugro-Finnish 

The bond of common Protestantism and German 
culture may override these differences of native speech, 
and incline the people of Courland, Livland and 
Esthland to consolidate all three provinces into a single 
self-governing area ; or, inasmuch as public education 
in the national langtu^e is one of the chief objects of 
devolution, the Lettish-speaking and Esthonian-speak- 
ing sections may elect to organise themselves apart 




i^rnatives can be decided by the plebiscite 


re now passed in review fottr nationalities — 
Lithuanians, Letts and Estfas — ^linii^ the 
Western fringe of the Russian Empire, on whom 
tule should be devolved in varying degrees, 
iding to their respective material importance 
units, and to the strength of their national 

the present war, such a policy would have 
to the Russian government little less than a 
of the Empire* For a century the autocracy 
*sar had been leagued with the autocracies of 
Europe in the struggle to repress all nationalist 
wherever manifested* But the vitality of 
Itsm proved so great that it swallowed up in 
tocracy's point of view, and ever since Bismarck 
concordat between these two political forces. 
It of principles in Europe has been gradually 
^ts ground and changing its character. It has 
be waged between ruler and people on the 
' strong government "" and self-government, 

of census taken in 1897 — 





• • 
























and the nations themselves have come to man die 
opposing camps, with their former despots at their 
head as their chosen leaders, while the issue now at stake 
is whether the strong nation shall use the freedom that 
it has won for the oppression of its neighbour, or whether 
all nations, great and small, shall live orderly side by 
side as members of a wider commonwealth* 

Hiis issue is being fought out in the present war, and 
Russia has joined battle on the side of national liberty. 
If her efibrts, in co-operation with those of the Westeto 
powers, decide the struggle in favour of our common 
cause, and we achieve the much-desired re-settkment of 
Central Europe on the national basis, at the expense 
of German and Magyar chauvinism, Russia will have 
neither the will nor the power to tarry longer from setting 
her own house in order* She has sinned against the 
National Idea in the past no less than her present 
antagonists, and if all the nationalities in her Empire 
have rallied rotmd her government at the present crisis, 
it is because they are willing to forget the past in the 
hope of a happier future* Russia cannot now afibrd 
to disaqppoint this hope, even if she is tempted to do so. 

The spark of Nationalism has oontinued to smoulder 
in the hearts of these border nations, during the century 
that they have been ground b e tween the hammer and 
anvil of rival imperialisms, and each oppressor has 
fostered it in turn to point a thrust in the long bout of 
fence against his accomplices. But now Russia, by 
putting fordi all her strength to remove the pressure 
from the one side with ** blood and iron,'' has pledged 
herself to relieve it by her own free grace on the other. 
The raising up of these prostrate nations in the blackest 
hour of their despair will transform diem from a fringe 
<^ disaffection into a gtrdk <^ loyalty, and will be the 


best guarantee that Russia will not have spent her 
strength in vain ; but if the settlement^ at the dose of 
this war^ fails to alleviate their condition by Russia's 
good-will, the liberal spirit of Europe which will have 
triumphed in the victory of the Allies, will inevitably 
accomplish their redemption in spite of Russia, and 
perhaps to her undoing. Russia has put her hand to 
the plough, and cannot turn back* 

(ii.) The same considerations shotild induce Russia 
not merely to grant Home Rule to a ring of nationalities 
within her frontier, but actually to abandon all hold 
txpon a population whose national centre of gravity lies 
definitely on the f tuther side of it* In the present 
camjiaign the Rtissian armies have occupied the Austrian 
Ciown-land of Bukovina, pinioned between the Car- 
pathians and the North-East angle of Roumania ; but 
with the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy the province 
shotild pass, not to Russia, but to the neighbouring 
Roumanian state, to which its inhabitants beloi^ by 

Raumania is at present considerably the most pros- 
perous and well-populated > of the Balkan States, and 
would take the next place in importance to Htmgary 
in our proposed Balkan League; but she is in the 
unfortunate position of possessing a large ** irredenta *' 
both in Hungarian and in Russian territory, which has 
so far alienated her sympathies both from the Dual 
Monarchy and from the Russian Empire, and prevented 
her arrivmg at an enduring understandii^ with either. 
Should the European settlement, however, secure a 
satisEactory modos vivendi for the non-Magyar nationali- 
ties of Htmgary, including her Rotmian citizens, and 
so enable Htmgary and Rotunania to co-operate in the 

^ Populatioo about 6^0,000 in zgzo. 


new nlhreseiiit the quanrel between these two states 
would be at an end^ and Roumania's resentment would 
oonoentrate itself upon Russia^ much more to Russia's 
detriment than before, because Roumania would have 
the whde Balkan group behind her. It would therefore 
be worth Russia's while to satisfy, if possibk, Rou- 
manians just claims by conceding to her not merely 
territories conquered in this war, but a province long 
incorporated in her Empire* 

Roumania covets Bessarabia,^ the district between 
the Pruth and the Dniestr. This country is valuable 
to Russia simply for its coast-line, which gives her 
access to the Northern arm of the Danube delta* The 
interior is unimportant to her, for though her chief 
Black Sea port, Odessa, lies (mly a few miles up die 
coast East of the Dniestr ^^ liman,'"* the railways linking 
it to its hinterland, even to the new Russian territory in 
Galida, all pass outside Bessarabia, beyond the Dniestr's 
Left bank* The interior, however, is the part of the 
province where the Rouman element is strong, vrbSt the 
steppe towards the coast is inhabited by the relics of 
Tatar nomads, by German colonists planted there to 
teach them agricultture, and by a large Slavonic element, 
Russian colonists and Bulgarian refugees, who have 
drifted in during the course of the century* 

This gives us a reasonable basis for division* The 
new frontier between Russia and Roumania should start 

* Ceded by Turkey to Russia in 1812. The popiladoii registettd id 
the Russian census of 1897 was 1,9^8,000, includmg 

931,000 Rouinans (47.5%) 

103,000 Bulgars (5*9%) 

60,000 Germans (3.2%) 

but Rouman authorities reckon the Rouman element to be three quarters 
of the population. See Map V* 
* Estuary. 


at the junction of Prutfa and Danube, pioceed N*NJE* 
between the Pruth on the West and the Galatz-Bender 
railway on the East, leaving Bender to Russia, but 
assigning Kishinev to Roumania, and hit the Dniestr 
at the elbow of its South-Eastward bend between 
Kriulyany and GrigoriopoL Then it should follow 
the course of the Dniestr up to a point just below 
Cliotin, whence it should take a line rather South of 
West till it hits the left bank of the Pruth again, just 
above Tchemowitz* After that, it should follow up the 
Pruth till it strikes the present boundary of Bukovina 
towards Galida, and should take a South-Western 
course identical with that boundary till it reaches the 
Hungarian frontier along the summit of the Carpathians, 
This compromise, while it satisfies justice, would 
not in itself content either party* Roumania, for 
economic reasons, wants more coast-line, in spite of 
her recent acquisitions from Bulgaria, and strategic 
considerations would disincline Russia from introducing 
this enormous bend into her new frontier. The trans- 
action must be clinched by an economic arrangement. 
Even if Roumania acquired the coast between the 
Danube delta and the Dniestr Liman, it would profit 
her very little, since Odessa, which is, of course, for ever 
beyond Rotunania's political grasp, offers the natural 
outlet, not only to Bessarabia, but to Moldavia and 
perhaps even Transylvania as well. What Roumania 
really needs is the use, free from tariff, of this port and 
of the railway leading to it from Yassy and Tchemowitz* 
It would serve Russia's own interest to grant her 
this as well, for Odessa would almost double the 
volume of her trade, by focussing all the traffic from her 
Western hinterland in addition to that from the North, 
yAiSit in return Russia could obtain from the Balkan 


2^11verein the free use of a railway to a port on the 
^ean ooastt where she could lade and unload her 
goods on the open sea* 

We have now dealt with the whole fringe of alien 
nationalities within the Western frontier of the Russian 
Empire* A fringe is all that they are : their territories 
are insignificant slices carved from the Empire's enor- 
mous bulk, and their populations weigh l^t in the 
balance against the Russian-speaking masses that lie 
away to their East* The Russians have far less excuse 
than the Magyars for the oppression by force or fraud 
of their fellow-nationalitiesi because the most quixotic 
generosity could not endanger the Rtissian element's 
preponderance*^ The mere weight of the Russian 
population is sufficient to assture for ever the Russian 
character of the Empire, and the balance of numbers 
is continually shifting further in its favour year by year, 
as colonial areas fill up in the Great North-East* The 
only really difficult problem of devolution within the 
Empire concerns the relations between the different 
branches of the Russian Nation itself^ 

The Russian race falls into two great divisions, 
distinguished by considerable difference of dialect : — 

^ The following table, showing the oomparative strengdis of the most 
io^ortant natJooalities within the Russian Bmpkt, was compflcd boa 
estimates made in 1906 : 

Great Russians 
White Russians 
Little Russians 

Poles • • • 'j^ijQoo 

Lithuanians • • X/^9»ooo 

Letts * • • Z/43^/)oo 

Finns . • a^496/xx> 

Tatars . 9#738,ooo 

Bashkirs i,^^ fi co 

Kirghiz • • 4,084,000 

The total population of the Empire was estimated at i49,299»ooo 
in the same year. 

55,^/x)o \ Total North itostdm. j, ^ j^^^ 


(iO The ^ole North of the oountry is occupied by 
the ** Great Russian ** group, which is compositd of 
three sub-sections : 

(a) The Northern, corresponding to the area of 
the former republic of Novgorod, where the Great 
Russian dialect is spoken in its most extreme form* 

(6) The Western, coinciding with the region once 
subject to Lithuania, where the so-called '' White 
Russian ** variety of the dialect is current. 

(c) The Eastern, round the original core of the 
Mtiscovite principality, where the dialect shows diverg- 
ences from the pure Northern type similar to those 
that prevail in White Russia* 

These three modifications of the Great Rtissian speech 
have remained mere parochial peculiarities, and have 
not aroused any separatist feelings between the popula- 
tions that respectively speak them. The third, or 
** fSoBcow,** type has established itself as the otgim 
of official administration and of educated interooturse, 
because the principality of Moscow was the nucleus 
out of ^Aiich the New Russia grew up as the Mongol 
storm subsided. The sudden birth of a wonderful 
literature in the nineteenth century, and the gradual 
spread of primary education since the beginning of the 
twentieth, have secured it for ever from challenge by 
the odier local patois. 

(ii.) ** Great Russian,"' then, is a single lai^;u2^e, 
and all the populations that speak it form a single 
national unit; but when we come to the second or 
"' Little Russian ^* division of the race, we find ourselves 
in £ace of a real cleavage. The extension of the ** Great 
Russians ** coincides on the vdiole with the forest-mne 
of the country. The Little Russians lie South of them, 
deployed in a long line on the borderland between forest 


and steppe, which extends from the headwaters of the 
Vistula and Dniestr systems in the Carpathians towards 
the E*N*Ev till it strikes the upper oourse of the Don 
near Voronesh* 

This wide«flung ribbon of population has a strong 
national feeling of its own* The ** Great Russian ** can 
claim that it was he ^o freed the race from the Moslem 
yoke, and that the living Russia of the present, with its 
glories of arms and of letters, is solely his creation; 
but the ** Little Russian ** looks back to the day before 
the Mongol appeared in the land, when the Dniepr, not 
the Volga, was the holy river of Russia, and Kieff, half 
way down its course, her holy dty, the meeting-place of 
the ** strot^ government ** and the world-i«l^;ion diat 
came up to her from opposite quarters, out of the 
Baltic and the Black Sea* He regards himself as the 
true heir to this primitive tradition, and his loyalty to 
it is all the keener because so many centuries lie between 
the Golden Age and his present obscurity. 

Little Russia, unlike Muscovy, never recovered from 
the Mot^ol catastrophe* She escaped from allegiance 
to the Moslem only by submission to the Lithuanian 
and Polish dtholic ; and even vdien the Polish Empire 
was broken up, she did not win her unity from the 
re-settlement, but was divided with the rest of the 
spoils between the governments of Moscow and Vienna* 
Yet the problem of Little Russian nationalism might 
still have been solved* The Ruthenes of Galida were 
only a small fraction of the race : the major part of it, 
including the national centre, KiefiF, and the whole of the 
Dniepr basin, was once more gathered into the fold of a 
national Russian state; and if Moscow could have 
been liberal enough to accept Kieff as her peer, the 
Little Russians would soon have foo^tten thetr 


partCcuJarism, and only remembered that they and their 
Great Russian brethren were all members of One 
Orthodox Churchy and citizens of one Holy Russia* 
But unfortunately the rulers of Moscow, that true heart 
of Russia vdiere all her races and dialects meet, had 
migrated Northwards to the Baltic, and the new regime 
of Petersburg, established at the farther extremity of 
the Great Russian area and exposed to the full influence 
of German ideas, had initiated a policy of uniformity 
as baneful as that of Joseph IL in the Hapsburg lands, 
btst unrelieved by the touch of genius that characterised 
Joseph's activity* Russia was to be "" Great Russian,'" 
and the Little Russian division of the nation was to be 
neither conciliated nor assimilated, but ignored* 

This unconstructive policy has been pursued 
mrchanirally for more than a century* The Litde 
Russian language has been treated as a patois on 
the same footing as White Russian or the dialect of 
Novgorod, and has rigorously been denied any official 
status* All public education and administration has 
been conducted in the Moscow variety of Great Russian, 
the natural medium in the North, but in Southern 
Russia almost a foreign toxigue* The results of this 
system have been tmfortunate. Litde Russian national- 
ism, effectively prevented from manifesting itself in 
external forms throughout its native home, the Ukraine,^ 
has been irritated by this wanton provocation to an 
unnatural tension of consdotisness, and has found a new 
stronghold across the Galidan border* 

The Little Russian or Ruthene population of the 
Austrian Crown-lands has its grievances. Though 

^"Ukntne'' (meaning ^borderland/' the same word as the 
** Kratn ** of the Slovenes) is the term used to cover all distrjcts of 
Ltttk Russian population within the present frontiers of the Russian 


the Rutfaene peasant proprietors constitute the bulk of 
the poptilation in Eastern Galida,^ the big estates 
are still nearly everywhere in the hands of a Polish 
upper dass, a relic of the Polish domination before the 
Partition of 1772, and in the 'eighties of the last century 
the Austrian government abandoned the Ruthene 
majority to the mercy of the Polish minority, yAaen it 
was bidding for the support of the Polish vote in the 
parliament at Vienna* 

The Poles had the game in their hands, because both 
wealth and education were at that time their monopoly, 
and they took steps to confirm their racial predomin- 
ance* They compelled the Austrian government to 
recognise Pblish as the official language of the whole 
province, and it has taken the Ruthenes a generation to 
secure a modicum of instruction in their own language 
at Lemberg ' University* Resentment at their betrayal 
to the Poles raised a movement amot^ them in favour 
of Russia, and a ** Moskalophil ** party grew up, yAost 
programme was that reunion with the national Rtissian 
state which is now being realised ; but the Moskalophils 
have always been in a minority, and no indictment 
against Russian policy in the Ukraine could be more 
damning than the almost universal rejection of Russiafl 
overtures by the Ruthenes of Eastern Galida* 

In modem Austria ** official language ^* has not the 
same sinister connotation as in the neighbotur states of 

*■ The Ruthene territory amounti to about two*tfairds of the whole 
area of Galida, even if we make a liberal allowance for the Msh 
enclaves embedded in it : on the other hand, the lUithene deaiait is 
only a minority of the total poptdation of Galicia (3/3831000 in igoo, as 
a^unst 4^a/xx> Poles), because the Ruthene country is more moan- 
tainous amd less developed than die Western districfB occupied by tbe 

' The German form of Russian Lvov, Little Russian Lwxw, Pdlah 


Russia, Prussia and Hungary. Like German in the 
remaining Austrian provinces, Polish is ** official ^* in 
Galida in the sense that it is the vehicle of ** internal 
service ** in the administration of the country. In the 
'' external service/' however, that is, in all relations 
between the provincial government and the individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction, Austrian public law prescribes 
in Galida as elsewhere the employment of the private 
party^s native speech, if it is recogtiised as customary 
{** Landesiiblich **) in the district* 

A Ruthene thus enjoys the right to conduct all his 
business with the Polish administration in his own 
Ruthene tongue* If he is a peasant, he can bring an 
action in Ruthene before the public courts : if he is a 
deputy, he can debate in Ruthene in the provincial diet* 
If he can secure a majority in his village or municipality, 
he may make Ruthene the medium of his local self- 
government* If he travels on the Galidan railways, he 
finds every official notice down to the inscription on his 
ticket printed in Ruthene as well as in German and 
Polish* In every one of these points his status presents 
a remarkable contrast to the position of his brethren 
beyond the Russian and Hungarian frontiers. Even 
in the sphere of higher education, where the Polish 
regime has laid itself open to most criticism, the number 
of Ruthene secondary schools in Galida has at least 
risen, though slowly, since 1867, while in Hungary the 
non-Magyar secondary schools have steadily shrunk 
in numbm during the same period* On the whole, we 
may say that the Ruthene majority in the Eastern part 
of Galida is treated as equitably as is consistent with the 
radal supremacy of the Polish minority in the region, 
and that here, as elsewhere, Austria has been Europe's 
pioneer in the settlement of the problem of nationality. 


In Galiddt then, the Little Russian language is 
deprecated but in no sense banned* A society has 
floturished for many years at Lemberg which fosters the 
living literature, collects and edits the peasant-poetry of 
the past, and studies the philological characteristics of 
the dialect, with a freedom unheard of East of the 
frontier* The Tsar^s government has held the mistaken 
point of view that the encouragement of traditional 
culture inevitably gives rise to new-fangled political 
aspirations, and has thereby provoked this literary group 
at Lemberg to become in fact the mouthpiece of a Little 
Russian nationalist party, which has the allegiance of a 
majority among the Austrian Ruthenes* This party 
dreams of a national state in which all fractions of the 
Little Russian race shall be united, and its feeling against 
Petersbtu^ is so bitter that, in spite of the entente at its 
expense between Vienna and the Poles, it is ready 
to march under Austria's banner, and aUows its 
canvassing in the Ukraine to assume the form of 
Austrian propaganda*^ 

This bizarre situation has suddenly been terminated 
by the present war* In the event of the Allies' 
success, we have seen that Galida will pass to the 
Russian Empire* The whole of the Little Russian race 
will finally be united within Russia's frontier, but the 
annexation of the Galidan Ruthenes will create the 
same situation for her as that of the Galidan Poles. 

^ It is true that to win the loyalty of the Ruthenes the Central Govern- 
ment at Vienna has had to reverse in some measure its Galidan policy, 
and that it has thereby shaken the loyalty of the Pole9» who were out- 
raged to find the racial balance in Gadida bein^ redressed from above. 
To drive Pole and Ruthene in double harness is really a hopeless task, 
and it n probable that Vienna only attempted it at the mstanoe of 
Berlin. Since her bungling policy began to reconcile Russian and Mt, 
Germany has sought to embarrass Russia in another quarter by txpidt- 
ing the problem of the Ukraine. 


She cannot afford to be less liberal at Lemberg than 
Austria has been* She will have to take accx>unt of 
her new Ruthene citizens' demands, and this will raise 
simultaneously the question of the Ukraine* 

The Nationalists will doubtless daim the utmost, 
namely, the consolidation of the whole area speaking 
the dialect into a single poUtical unit endowed with 
very extensive Home Rule, but such a solution has 
almost insurmotmtable difficulties in its way* 

(i«) The Litde Russian area is woefully lacking 
in geographical compactness* It would include the 
Ruthene section of Galida, and the present Rtsssian 
governments of Volhynia, Podolia, Kieff, Poltava, and 
Kharkov, together with the Southern parts of Chernigov 
and Voronesh; but, as we have said, this is not so 
much an independent region as a border intermediate 
between two others* 

It is true that it has acquired a peculiar economic 
importance, because it more or less coincides with the 
famous "'Black Earth'' zone, where during the last 
century agrictdture has been developed on a vast scale 
under modem methods, bringing in its train a network 
of railways, and therewith the beginnings of an industrial 
growth* The new wheat production has not confined 
itself, however, to the Litde Russian fringe: it has 
pushed out South of it into the Black Sea steppe, 
which, since the break-up of the Ancient World, had 
been a ** no-man's land " swept by one wave after 
another of nomad barbarians, till in the latter half 
of the eighteenth century the Russian government 
wrested the title to its sovereignty from the Porte, 
and began to replace the handful of Nogai Tatars, 
that had wandered there under Ottoman suzerainty, 
by a steady influx of agrioiltural 



From the outset this new population has been very 
hettrogeneous. The Germanophil government Ot 
Catherine II. copied the Hapsbui^ experiment of sowing 
civilisation by scattering plantations of German settlers, 
and in " New Russia," as in Hui^ary, the balance was 
largely made up of refi^ees from the various Christian 
populations subject to Tturkish oppression. The 
colonisation of the district received an immense impetus 
from the emancipation of the ser& in 1861, since when 
the peasants ia every province of Russia have been 
leaving their ancestral villages and drifting into all the 
tmdeveloped areas to take up freehold allotments there ; 
but, inasmuch as the Great Russian population of the 
Empire is vastly stroi^r than the Little Russian in 
□umbers, the Great Russian immigrants into the steppes 
outwe^ the Little Russian in the like proportion. 
When New Russia has been completely filled up, the 
Little Russian element will not be found to predominate, 
and so, when the various elements subsequently fuse 
themselves into one type, the " New Russian " blend 
will not asstune a specifically " Little Russian " colour. 

What is true of the Bladk Sea steppes is still truer 
of the coast upon whidi they open. Odessa, the new 
port founded in 1792, is an indispensable factor in the 
economic system of the " Black Earth " ^one, for die 
whole grain export passes through its harbour ; but it 
has no special links of tradition or dialect with the little 
Russian nationality, and is essentially a common oudet 
and meeting-place of all races in the Empire, inctudii^ 
the Poles, whUe the isolated Crimean peninsula whidi 
adjoins it on the East has remained the stror^fhold of a 
dviUsed agricultural and vine-growing Tatar population. 

New Russia, then, has no social bonds of cohesion with 
Little Russia, and could never be absorbed into it ; but 


a sdf-govenui^ Little Russian unit which did not extend 
to the coast would gec^aphically and economically be 
almost unthinkable* It would possess none of the pre- 
requisites for self-sufficiency* 

(ii«) Yet even if Little Russia were able, by assimilat- 
ii% the coast or otherwise, to consolidate herself, a more 
serious difficulty would still remain : she would be too 
unwieldy a block for the architecture of the Russian 
Empire. There are two possible plans on which a 
federal group can be built up. 

(a) Where the whole population to be federated is 
honu^eneous in nationality, and the only problem is 
caused by its bulk, it is best oi^anised in a large number 
of self-governing units, which, being ex hypothesi 
identical in quality, will probably work together in 
harmony, if only their parity in size and importance is 
secured as well. This structure has approved itself in 
the history of the U.S J^*, and will probably be adopted 
as the basis of the New China. 

(b) American history, however, has also shown that this 
system of equal units is extremely dangerous where the 
total population is divided by differences of nationality. 
In fact, so soon as the least divergence of national self- 
ooosciousness creeps in, it will transform the divisions 
between units, y/bidi formerly had merely administra- 
tive significance, into spiritual lines of cleavage, and 
since the units are equal and share no particular centre 
of gravity, there will be no constructive force to counter- 
act this centrifugal tendency. A gradual divergence of 
this kind within such a structure cost the United States a 
civil war before they could remedy it : in a case where 
the national differences are violent and traditional, and 
where the architect has still a clean slate, to adopt this 
principle would be deliberate folly. 



When common interest or necessity induces several 
different nationalities to attempt combination in a single 
oi^anic political group,' success CrT only oome through 
inequality, by subjectix^ a number of lesser satellites to 
the attraction of a central planet, and the inequality 
must be signal. If the satellites approach the planet too 
nearly in mass, or the planet shiinla into too even a 
ratio with the satellites, they will all, when a certain point 
is reached, fly off at a tai^ent, and probably collide 
fatally with one another before diey severally disappear 
in space. 

"The unity of the Russian Empire is to the interest of 
nearly all the nationaUties that are members of it ; but 
that unity can only be maintained by grouping the rest * 
round a Russian national state of immense preptmdei^ 
ance. We have said that the Russian nation nud have 
no fear of being swamped by its fellow-nadonalitia, 
but ^t remains true (uiiy so long as the nation itself 
remains united. The Uttte Russian element forms 
nearly a third of the mbtAt race,' and if it were to break 
off from the main body and attempt to follow an orbit d 
its own, it would fatally dislocate the balance of the vbak 
Imperial system. It would approximate sufficiently 
in mass to the Great Russian remnant to struck with 
it for predominance, and this fratricidal strife ifouU 
wear down the strength of the two fragments, and 
prevent them from concentratit^ their energy to keep 

' As eoMtaaad with a loose, panne concert like the proposeil Balkaa 
* Without prejudice, of course, to their own local sclf-gaverameii(> 
' Great Ruasians . , 6i.Si9,ooo (.~70.$%) 

Little Runtaos : 
latheUbaiae 33,381,0001 ---«,—„./_—,_« 1 
InGalida . 3%^] 3S,763.«>o (=39.5%) 

Total of Ruasian Nation . 87,333,000 


the minor bodies in their courses* The result would be 
at worst the complete break-up of the Russian Empire, 
and at best a protracted political paralysis* 

If diis catastrophe is to be avoided, the Little Russians 
must abandon their particularism, and allow themselves 
to be reabsorbed in the indivisible body of ** Holy 
Russia/^ But this can only come about if the splendid 
traditions of a thousand years are no longer obscured by 
the bitter experience of a century* The Tsar^s govern- 
ment cannot grant the Little Russians autonomy ; but 
it can see to it that the sacrifice of sentiment which the 
refusal demands shall entail no loss of honour or of 
material advantage, and that the Little Russians shall 
take up their citizenship in the new national unit gladly 
as the Great Russians' peers, and not sullenly as their 
inferiors. The Little Russian dialect must at last be 
given just recognition* It must not merely become the 
official language of those provinces where it is the 
native speech, but it must be allowed equal currency with 
the Moscow dialect in the central executive and in the 
common parliament, not indeed of the whole Russian 
Empire, but of the Russian national state that will be its 

This Russian core will be an experiment in centralised 
self-govemment on a lai^er scale than any yet attempted.^ 
It will embrace the whole country from Archangel on 
the White Sea to Odessa on the Bbck, from Petrograd 
on the Baltic to Astrakhan on the Caspian, and from 
the summit of the Carpathian mountains to the further 
slope of the Urals* C)n the East and South it will be 
bounded only by the vacant areas along the Trans- 

* The^ actaon of the ezxstjng representative organ, the Imperial 
Duma, if r e str i cte d, and it cannot in any sense be considered as the 
fomnug power in Rusia : ultimate authority is still in the hands of 
uie bureaucracy. 



Siberian Railway, irtiidi still await effective colonisation, 
and by the military districts of the Caucasus and the 
Asiatic steppes, whose primary need at present is the 
unbroken maintenance of strong government, and which 
will not become able to govern themselves till many 
years have habituated them to a civilisation established 
from without. The region ripe for immediate self- 
government is nevertheless immense, and the popula- 
tioa contained within the limits indicated, which will 
be represented in the parhament of the national Rus^an 
unit, falls little short of a hundred milUons. There 
are, however, several factors eminently &vourable to 
the successful oi^anisation of this huge mass of human 


(i.) The geographical unwieldiness of the country is 
counterbalanced by the extraordinary fadUty of com- 
munication. The great navigable rivers have always 
afforded magnificent natural highways : the Volga 
steamer was as important a factor in nineteenth-century 
Russia as the Mississippi steamer was in the contem- 
potary development of the U.SA., and the network of 
railways whidi, as in America, has first supplemented, 
and now begun to supplant, the river-steamer's use, 
especially in the new comlands of the South, can extend 
itself over the length and breadth of the land without 
encountering any barrier of mountains. 

(ii.) The Great Russian race has uken full advantage 
of the geographical elasticity of its habitat, and, expand- 
ing from its original centre of dispersion in the Nortb- 
Westera forests, has kept pace with the political exten- 
sion of the Muscovite state's frontiers. In its contact 
with the alien races that it has thereby encountered, it 
has displayed a vitality and assimilative power com- 
parable to that of the Anglo-Saxon race in Amedca. 


The little patches of Ugro-Finnish population that still 
survive in the heart of Great Russia, — ^Karelians between 
Novgorod and Tver among the Valdai hills, Chere- 
misses and Mordvins between Nijni Novgorod and 
Kazan on the Middle Volga, — ^testify to the vanished 
majorities of these tribes, which have adopted the 
speech and nationality of their Russian conquerors as 
far as the White Sea* The same process is being con- 
tinued to-day at the expense of the more widely spread 
Finnish groups of the North-East, — Votyaks and 
Syryens and Voguls and Ostyaks, — ^protected though 
they are by the rampart of the Northern Urals.^ 

The nomadic, Turkish - speaking communities, 
Bashkirs and Chuvashes,' that adjoin the Volga-Finns 
on the South-East, wandering with their flocks among 
the Southern Urals and along the border of the steppes, 
are suffering the fate of those pathetic litde Red Indian 
reservations in Canada and the U*S.A«, round which 
the tide of European immigration surged higher all 
through the nineteenth centtuy, till some inconsequent 
act of lawlessness broke the moral obligation that had 
so far preserved their bounds, and abandoned them to 
submergence beneath the flood* But the mere engulfing 
of inferior races is not the greatest triumph of the 

A The remnants of Finnish population still awaiting absorption by the 
Rmsian race, indudtng the Ural groups, but excluding, of course, the 
9,3 j3/)oo Finns of the Grand Duchy who have a avilisatioa and a 
natioiaal consciousness superior, on the whole, to the Russian, make up 
a total of a,353,ooo (identical, curiously enough, with the total A 
civilised Finns in Finland). There are furthermore 141^,000 civilised 
Finns in Russian territory adjoining the Grand Duchy who are unlikely 
to be assimilated. 

'Bashkirs .... im9iOOO 
Chttvashes • 844)000 

Total • . a,337,ooo 


Russian nation : it has known how to lecondle a rival 

Christian and K^>slem have met as enemies on many 
fields, and the result of the struggle has often brought 
them into the relation of conquerors and conquered. 
Yet whichever party has triumphed, a great gulf has 
generally remained fixed between the two, and enforced 
political union, instead of passing over, as in ao many 
other cases, into oi^anic political unity, has only 
accentuated their mutual antipathy, Russia alone has 
tnan^^ed to solve the problem. The Tatars of the 
Volga-Khanates,* conquered by her in the sixteenth 
century, were communities of peasants and merdiants 
widi a tradition of culture, derived from Persia and 
Baghdad, as strongly characterised as that which Russia 
herself had drawn from Q)nstantinople and the West ; 
yet now the Tatars, while remaining true to their 
religion, have become Russian in soul, and have fbtmd 
both the opporttmity and the inclination to play a full 
part in the social and political life of the Russian nation. 
This is a victory not of race but of civilisation, or 
rather, what is better still, it is the blending of two 
civilisations into a new harmony. 

It is clear, then, that ttx Great Russian element has 
the power to weld the whole hundred millions into a 
consolidated nation, and in the process not only Finns, 
Bashkirs and Tatars, but the more compact Litde 
Russian masses as well, will ultimately lose their 
peculiar individuality. It would be idle for the Utile 
Russians to complain at the prospect. U tlieir language 
is henceforth given as good an opporttmity for self- 
assertion as the Moscow dialect, and still yields ground 
before the latter, the cause will no longer be human 
> Kotu and AftraUua. 



violence and injustice, but the simple, unalterable 
fact of the other tongue's superior vitality* The 
Little Russian need not be ashamed of accepting for 
his own a language which during the last century has 
become the vehicle of a literature of world-wide im- 
portance, beside which the traditional peasant ballads 
sedulously published at Lembei^ sink into almost 
comic insignificance* 

The new Russian nation will look not towards the 
past but towards the future, and the national character 
that VTill emerge will be finer than any of its component 
elements ; for litde Russian and Tatar will nobly 
leaven the Great Russian lump, and ** Scratch the 
Russian and you find the Tatar *^ will invert its meaning, 
and turn from a national reproach to be the national 

This homogeneous national state will finally achieve 
devolution, not through antagonistic, or at any 
rate unsymmetrical, nationalistic sub-parliaments, but 
through strongly developed county councils* In 1864, 
towards the end of the great decade of reform, 
Alexander II* called into existence elective assemblies 
based, like the medieval ** Estates ** of Western 
Europe, upon distinctions of social caste, and graded 
in two scales : the provincial zemstvos, representing 
whole governments, and the district s^emstvos and 
municipal dumas, representing their sub-divisions* 

These councils did not produce many concrete results 
by the feverish activity that marked the first years of 
their existence* In 1890 their powers were severely 
restricted, and it seemed as though confinement to 
the purely consultative sphere would reduce them to 
complete unreality ; but the revolutionary movement of 
1904-6, precipitated by the disastrous war with Japan, 


awoke in them an unexpeaed energy. During the 
chaos into which the Empire fell for three years, they 
took the initiative. Repeated congresses of delegates 
from the local dumas and zemstvos evolved, in con- 
ference with the autocracy, the constitution of OcKiber 
190;, and the elective machinery of the first national 
dumas was modelled on the local plan. The provincial, 
district, and municipal councils have not let their 
recovered power slip again from their hands, and a 
phase of really constructive activity undoubtedly lies 
before them. 

This, then, is the Russia of the future, which we 
can discern through the chrysalis of eighteenth century 
autocracy, from which the Russia of the present has been 
so painfully extricating herself. It is not a mere dream 
of the imagination. The regime in possession fasdnaus 
our attention, just as the royal murders in Serbia occu' 
pied the whole vision of the Magyar professor. The 
repressive, unscrupulous police^ovemment keeps us 
unpleasantly aware of its existence by the starring 
echoes of its misdeeds that filter tlirough into our press, 
and the hysterical, often criminal, intrigues c^ the 
revolutionists, who claim to represent the intelligtiiiia, 
reveal a dearth of constructive ideas that almost justifies 
the government's attitude. Yet beneath this sordid 
surface a less melodramatic political activity has been 
at work for a generation without attracting the world's 
notice. The exploitadoo of the " Black Earth " zone, 
the conciliation of the Moslems, and the evoludon of 
the zemstvos are s^ns of the times. 


D* Expansion 

We have not, however, completely answered the 
Germans' case* ** Granted/' they will say, ** that 
Russia has this liberal future before her, that national 
self-government will be attained by the different races 
within the Empire, alien and Russian alike, and that 
the old ideal of * Repression at home and aggression 
abroad,' will be sloughed off together with her obsolete 
eighteenth-century ^ strong-government ' : if we grant 
you all this, you must allow us to turn against you your 
own weapon of historical analogy* You have illustrated 
the tendency of Russia's growth by a comparison with 
eighteenth-centtuy France. But France, after she had 
achieved national self-government in the Revolution, 
proceeded to rob territory from other nations like the 
most vulgar-minded despotic conqueror* Perhaps you 
may ascribe this conduct not to France herself, but to 
the personal ambition of Napoleon ; or you may say 
that, though the French nation a century ago did adopt 
unmodified the Bourbons' dynastic point of view, the 
Industrial Revolution has intervened meanwhile and 
entirely changed the attitude of self-governing nations 
towards their foreign policy — ^that they do not now wage 
war for territorial acquisition but for economic advan- 
tage, aiming to add market to market, not province to 
province* If you take up this position, we can answer 
you out of your own mouth* 

** Let us return to your comparison of Germany and 
Russia* You have proved that the present analogies 
between them are deceptive : strong government in 
Russia did its work under Peter the Great, and is now a 
functionless survival, while Bismarck had to rehabituate 


a coltuied, peaceable people to ' blood and ircm ' and 
put strong government in the foreground £^:ain, because 
in Germany its primary task of consolidation had nevet 
previously been achieved. But our new militarism did 
not die with the accomplishment of the task for wfaicb 
it had been called into being : rightly or wrongly, wt 
Germans have cherished it (as you have pointed out) 
precisely as a weapon in the modem economic battle, 
to snatch the industrial markets of the World from the 
nations established in possession of them. If you beat 
us in this war, we shall have failed, but when we iaSi, 
the Russian nation steps into our shoes. Like ourselves 
they will covet, and justly covet, a ' place in the Sun/ 
and do you imagine that, however liberal their ideals 
may be, economic pressure will not in the end fora 
them to stake their all on the same desperate throw iot 
World Empire that we are making at this moment^ 
Think also of the analogies of the Future : economic 
environment is a stronger force than national dis- 

This is the German advocate's last and most dangerous 
cotmter-attack ; but we can meet it with a crushing reply, 
for it rests on an entire misconception of the Russian 
Empire's economic character. Germany, by the 
density of her population, the nature of her physical 
resources, and her geographical position and extent, 
inevitably came into line with the Western nations of 
Europe^ and was forced into industrial competition 
with them under exasperatit^ly disadvantageous con- 
ditions. The economic structure of the Russian 
Empire belongs to a different type altogether. 

Beyond the densely-populated, highly-organised little 
states of Europe, whidi at present focus in themselves 
the civilisation of the world by drawing all its raw 


products into the crucible of their industry, lies a ring 
of states in the making, which dwarf Europe by the 
vastness of their cahbre* None of them are full grown 
yet« Some of them, like Australia and Canada and the 
Argentine, have all the weapons of civilisation at their 
command, but not the hands to wield them — empty 
lands, crying out for the life-blood of population to fill 
their veins* Some, like India and China, seethe with 
human life, but have found no spirit to brood over the 
waters and call order out of chaos, so that their human 
forces evaporate in anarchy, and the material wealth, 
that might make their millions of lives worth living, still 
remains untapped* Only one of them, the U*S*A*, 
has yet developed far enough on its course to give us 
an inkling of what Time will make of them all* 

These cosmopolitan units of the future will not 
compete with the present national units of Europe : 
they will grow up to supersede them as human life 
passes over from the national to the international scale ; 
but they are still young and can afford to abide their time* 
We have only to look East of the Volga and the Urals 
to see that the Russian Empire is one of their brother- 

When the Trans-Siberian railway was completed, 
after ten years^ work,in 1902, we thought of it as a move in 
the Imperialist game, which was to bring the Russian 
military machine within striking distance of the Yellow 
Sea, and perhaps reduce China to be the Empire's vassal* 
This idea may, in fact, have been uppermost in the 
Government's mind, and it certainly was an important 
link in the chain of events that led to the Japanese 
War* But the real significance of the railway is far 
different, and has been in no wise affected by the ruin 
of Russia's ambitions in the Far East* Its building 


marks an epoch in the expansion of the Russian nation 
as important as that marked by the first trans-con- 
tinental railways of North America for the expansion 
of the Anglo-Saxon race* 

During the seventeenth century, when the Frendi 
explorers were penetrating up the St« Lawrence into 
the Great Lakes, and discovering portages to the Ohio 
and Mississippi that brought their canoes on to the river- 
system of the Mexican gulf, 0)ssack adventurers had 
already crossed the Urals and worked their way along 
the equally magnificent water-routes of Northern Asia, 
up the Obi and Angara rivers, across Lake Baikal, and 
then down the Amur to the shores of the Pacific. 

Like Great Britain, however, in Australia, the Russian 
Govenmient at first found no better use for this vacant 
land, that had fallen so casually into their hands, than to 
relegate their convicts to the Siberian mines,^ and Siberia 
has become the by-word for a desobte pbce of torment, 
like the frozen asone in Dante's Hell. But in the nine- 
teenth century the expanding peasantry of Great Russia 
b^an to cross the middle Volga, and a current of 
Eastward migration set in among them as strong as 
that which carried the American squatters across the 
Alleghanies into the prairies of the West* Any one vAo 
has read Tolstoy's tsde of the land-hui^ry peasant, who 
abandoned one plot after another for still larger allot- 
ments further East, till at last he struck a bargain with 
the wandering Bashkirs and fell a victim to his own 
greed, will reo^inise the analogy at once, and mentally 
translate the scene into incidents of the 'forties, T^en 
Mormon settlers bought up the hunting-grounds of 
Red Indian chiefs* 

I The ooly wealth of the country they diought of eiq>loitiiig, beside 
the fur of its forest creatures* 


Here, as in America, colomsation has followed the 
railway, and now the peasant is establishix^ himself on 
either side of the new. line, right across Siberia* The 
eiq>erience of Canada has shown what human occupation 
can achieve in the teeth of adverse conditions, how it 
can even modify the rigour of climate and temperature 
by introducing agriculture and breaking up the surface 
of the soil* Siberia will be the Canada of the twentieth 
century. Already the well-watered grazing grounds of 
the steppe, which the railway traverses between the Urals 
and the Yenisei, are exporting dairy produce to Western 
Europe, and the plateaux of Irkutsk and Trans- 
baikalia will yield greater wealth still when their timber 
and mines are exploited to their full capacity* 

The human wealth of the new territories is even 
more promising than their material prospects* The 
criminal convict has not proved a bad fotmdation for 
the new Anglo-Saxon nation of the Australian common- 
wealth ; but a considerable proportion of the Siberian 
convicts have been political offenders, that is, the most 
independent, enei^etic and intellectual members of the 
Russian urban class* Governmental selection has en- 
dowed Siberia with Russia's fittest, and the descendants 
of these exiles, granted their freedom on condition that 
they setded in the country for ever, have mingled with 
the stock of the Cossack trappers and already produced 
a racial variety characterised by the same enterprising 
qualities as distinguish the Westerner in the United 

The territories strung along the railway, then, have 
as great a future before them as the Western provinces 
of the Canadian Dominion* As they fill with a vigoious 
population of Russian speech, they will gradually claim 
Home Rule, and take their place by the side of ** Holy 


Russia '^ herself and the lesser natioiialities of the 
Western border, as independent members of die 
decentralised Empire* Just as in Canadaj moreover, 
setdement and exploitation will push further North 
from their base-line along the railway than is at present 
conceived possible, moving down the course of the great 
rivers till they reach an impassable limit in the frozen 
tundras* That, however, will not be the end of Siberia's 
ei^ansion: she has already stretched out her hands 
toward the South* 

The settlement after the Japanese War left under 
Russian control the Northern section of Manchuria 
through which her railway takes a direct line from 
Lake Baikal to Vladivostodc, while the recent revolu- 
tion in China gave the pastoral tribes of Outer Mongolia 
an opportunity to throw off Chinese suzerainty and 
place themselves under Russian protection* It would 
be a gain to civilisation if these territories were per- 
manendy and in formal terms annexed to the Russian 
Empire* China's sole tide to them is their conquest by 
the Manchu dynasty two and a half centuries ago. 
She has done nothing to improve their condition all 
the time they have been in her power, and now that 
she has undertaken that task of internal reconstruction 
which will demand a century of devoted concentration 
if it is to be carried through, they can be nothing 
but a drag upon her ill-spared strength* In taking 
them over once for all, Russia would have the precedent 
of the United States, which compelled Mexico to cede 
her neglected Northern territories in 1847* They 
were much criticised at the time for their conduct, but 
have been completely justified by its results* 

Outer Mongolia is sundered from China by the broad 
zone of the Gobi desert, while its frontier against the 


Russiaii Empire is an arbitrary line^ for all its rivers 
flow either into Lake. Baikal or into the Amur* It is 
that ** Cauldron of the North ** from whose pasture- 
plateau wave after wave of nomads used to pour out 
over the mountain rim into the Asiatic steppes, and 
devastate the cultivated lands of the South and West 
upon which they burst* The expansion of Russia 
stemmed that tide, and now Russian enterprise will 
penetrate in its turn into the ** cauldron/^ and make of 
it one of the most productive stock-breeding areas in 
the World. 

jNor is Mongolia the only Chinese dependency that 
would benefit by transference to Russian rule* South- 
West of Mongolia lies the Tarim basin, the heart of 
Asia, girdled on South, East, and North by giant 
motmtains, the Kuen-Lung, the Pamir pbteau and 
die Thian Shan, but open towards the Gobi desert on the 
East* The popubtion is as alien to the Chinese nation 
as are the Mongols* In spite of the mountain barriers^ 
all its links are towards the West* It is Turkish in 
speech, a rearguard of the great race,^ and it is Moslem 
in faith, an outpost flung Eastward between the two 
Buddhist masses of Mongolia and Tibet* In the 
'sixties of the last century national antipathy vented 
itself in a fierce rebellion against Chinese dominion, 
which for several years secured the country a harassed 
independence ; but the tide soon turned* Turkestan 
was reduced once more to subjection by the weight 
of Chinese numbers, and has been held down by 
Chinese garrisons during the forty years that have 

In truth the country is not hard to hold* It did not 

^ Lost to this blind alley when the main body bufst out of the 
** cauldron ** and streamed towards the Oxtis and the Volga. 


need the bloody vei^eance of the Chinese anmes to 
crush the people's soul ; it was being crushed already 
by the losing fight 2^;ainst the physical environment 
The Tarim basin is undergoing a long-drawn-out 
process of desiccation. Every year the streams that 
flow inwards from the snow-covered mountains pene- 
trate less deep into the basin's centre, and are stifled by 
the desert after a shorter course ; while the sand, blown 
forward by the constant North-East wind in great wave- 
ridges many miles long, engulfs every year a fresh village, 
and buries another patch of cultivation* The batde 
against the desert is beyond the native's strength, but 
both he and his country are worth saving, and a vigorous 
European government, with the material apparatus of 
modem civilisation at its command, could stem the 
sand waves by embankments and plantations, eke out 
the snow-water's gift by subterranean irrigation, and in 
some measure restore the Basin to the prosperity of two 
thousand years ago, when the cultures of Greece, India 
and China found in it their blending-grotmd. Only 
Russia can accomplish Tturkestan's salvation, and 
Great Britain would willingly allow her a free hand 
there, if she undertook in return to make Kuen-Lung 
the limit of her Southward advance, and to leave Tibet, 
that lies beyond it, under the tmdisputed influence of 
the Indian Empire. 

Here is Russia's field of expansion for the twentieth 
century. She has to fill these immense empty terri- 
tories with the white population their temperate climate 
invites, and the achievement of the task will be a race 
against time* The population of the Empire may now 
total 150 millions, but it is still the most thinly-inhabited 
of the European states, while South of the Gobi desert 
lies China, with perhaps three times as many millions 


Gxowded on to a space less than a quarter of Russia's 

The first ripples of Chinese migration are already 
striking upon the East Indies^ Australia and the Pacific 
sea^board of North America, and the brutality with 
which these states are repelling this peaceful, casual 
invasion shows how terribly they dread the pressure to 
come. Forcible exclusion will succeed for the present, 
because China still lies in the grip of a thousand years' 
political paralysis; but the power of movement is 
already returning to her limbs. The fundamental 
factor of world-politics during the next century will be 
the competition between China and the new common- 
wealths* China will strive to reorganise her national 
Hfe, and to bring all her immeasurable latent strength to 
bear on the effort to win her '' place in the Stm ** (a 
more titanic struggle this than Germany's present 
endeavour) : the others will make haste to swell the 
ranks of their white population till they can muster 
enough defenders to man the wide boundaries of the 
inheritance they have marked out for themselves, and 
become strong enough either to fling back China's onset 
or to deter her from making it at all* All the threatened 
natbns — Canada, the U*S*A*, the South American 
republics. New Zealand and Australia — ^will draw 
together into a league, to preserve the Pacific from 
Chinese domination* Japan will probably join their 
ranks, for she is the Ghreat Britain of the China Seas, 
and, just like ourselves, would be menaced most seriously 
by the emergence of a World-power on the continent 
opposite her island country* Russia, who has not 
even a strip of sea to protect her, but is China's im- 
mediate continental neighbour along a vast land- 
frontier, will actually be the chief promoter of this 


defensive entente, for she will be exposed to the first 
brtint of the Chinese attack* 

Under these drcumstances it is quite inconceivable 
that the German forecast should come true. The great 
Russian army of 19x4, when it has fulfiilled its task of 
crushing militarism in Central Europe, will have no 
more temptation to proceed to the warlike conquest of 
the world than the American armies had, after they 
had vindicated the Union in the 'sixties. Like them 
it will disband, to answer the call of economic conquest 
from the steppes and forests of the great North-East. 
Nor will the Russian peasants, in the generation to come, 
flock into urban centres and exchange agriculture for 
industry, as the German peasants have been doii^ since 
zSyx* Russia will send every stirplus child bred in her 
home villages to build up the new Russian villages in 
Siberia : she cannot spare a man for the towns* Yet 
if Russia does not contemplate an industrial career, then, 
however triumphant be her issue from this war, she 
cannot possibly become a menace to the Industrial 
nations of Europe. Grant that her strength increases 
till she has it in her power to overcome their united 
forces, she will still have no motive for doing so. The 
only spoils of victory would be the great tropical de- 
pendencies these nations maintain, primarily as sources 
of raw material and to a lesser degree as markets for their 
own production : to a nation without manufactures 
there would be no value whatsoever in their possession. 

These considerations finally dispose of that bug-bear 
which haunted British fore^ policy during the nine- 
teenth century, the darker to India of Russia's East- 
ward advance. The Indian Empire is the vastest, the 
most populous, and the most difficult to govern of all 
tropical dominions held by European powers : it is 


also the best tropical market for European industry that 
there is, and we are the most industrialised nation in 
Europe : and yet, so far as we can estimate the economic 
restilts of our position there, the balance of trade is 
steadily going less in our favour* It is accordingly 
most unlikely that Russia will ever stake her fortune on 
an attempt to burden herself with the administration of 
India, which in her case would bring no economic 
reward whatsoever, and would cripple her in the vital 
task of building up her bulwarks against China* 

The Indian Empire, moreover, is no passive con- 
glomeration of populations, that can be transferred like 
slaves from one master to another* That was more or 
less the condition of the peninsula a century and a half 
ago, otherwise we should never have established our rule 
over it, with the absurdly small resources of which we 
could dispose ; but in the meantime ** strong govern- 
ment '' has here performed one of its most brilliant 
achievements in all history* The three htmdred millions 
of Indian people are divided by religious barriers in 
the extreme form of caste, by differences of language 
that coincide with the traditional race-hatred of con- 
querors and conquered, and by geographical diversity 
as great as that between the Kashmir valleys and the 
Deccan ; yet under the fostering aegis of British rule 
they are being liberated successively from chaos and 
from particularism* They have at last begtm to find a 
common self-consciousness, and to give sure promise 
that India will take its place in the end as a great self- 
governing nation of the new calibre* So far from being 
in danger of another foreign conquest, India is beginning 
to dispense with that trusteeship into which the British 
conquest of the eighteenth century has gradually de- 
veloped, and when she is mistress of her own destiny. 


it is she that will be the danger to others. The pioblem 
of Indian emigration is as serious as that of Chinese, 
and the Khyber Pass, instead of being traversed by 
Russian armies marching South, will become the high- 
road of Indian coolies migratiiig Northwards to labour 
on the irrigation of the Ozus and Jaxartes basins, and 
settle upon the lands thdr industry will have recLnined 
ftotD the desert. 

Russia, then, has no booty to gain &om the other 
nations of Europe. " But if this is so," the Gennan 
will ask, " why has she thrown herself into the present 
struggle with the German Empire and the Dual 
Monarchy < Why does she regard it, as she evidently 
does, as a supreme crisis in her history, an issue of life 
or death i What is the meaning of her passionate inter- 
vention on Serbia's behalf i " The answer to these 
questions demands a separate chapter. 





We have seen that the Russian Empire will never become 
an industrial and commercial power; but like every 
other unit in the new international World she has need 
of a free outlet to the high seas, through which she may 
transmit to foreign markets the raw produce of her 
vast continental hinterland, and supply herself with the 
manufactured goods of industrial cotmtries in return* 

Such outlets she has never yet obtained* Till the 
eighteenth century her only port was Archangel on the 
White Sea, and this perhaps sufficed her during the 
era of stagnant isolation : at any rate the English 
Merchant Adventurers found it worth their while to 
trade there, though it is ice-bound two-thirds of the 
year.^ In the year 1700, the Baltic was a Swedish lake, 
and the Black Sea a Turkish one* Peter and Catherine 
broke the maritime monopoly of these two powers, and 
gave Russia a sea-board on both waters* Odessa and 
Riga have grown in a century and a half to be magnifi- 
cent ports, and would suffice in themselves for the needs 
of a Russia much more highly developed than the 
present* But they are no more in direct communication 
with the Oceanic highways of international commerce 
than are the ports of Milwaukee and Chicago on the 
Great Lakes. By an unlucky fotality, both the natural 
coastlines of Russia only introduce her to land-locked 
seas, and the narrow passage that connects each of them 
with the great ocean-spaces beyond has in either case 

> From about October to May. 


lemained till tiiis day outside die boatiea of the 
Russian Empire, and must continue so to remain for 
cogent reasons. 

(i.) The population of the shores in question, betveen 
which these narrow seas flow, namely, of the Danish 
peninsula and islands on the one hand and of the 
Bosphonis and Dardanelles on the other, is aUen to 
Russia in nationality, and would in neither case wish to 
become part of the IRussian Empire. 

(ii.) Even if these populations did consent, throi^ 
hope of economic advantage, promise d pohdcal 
privilege, or the like, to throw in their lot with Russia, 
the situation thus created would be still more unfair 
and disadvantageous to the smaller states that share 
with Russia these inland waters, than it is to Russia as 
it stands at present. It would place their oommera 
completely at Russia's mercy, whereas at present Russia 
is already formidable enough in streng^ and size to 
make the powers in control of the straits respea her own 
commerce under ordinary drcumstances. 

The solution indicated by these considerations is that 
the command of the entrances to both these seas should 
be held in trust, without prejudice to the national self- 
government of the populations through which they Sow, 
for all parties, without distinction, that are interested 
in their use — primarily for all states possessing ports on 
the inland seas in question, and secondarily for all 
political and economic groups the World over that trade 
upon the sea, since commerce is an international concern 
and will become so more and more as our civilisation 

We shall be able to discuss more effectively how this 
can be done, if we deal with the two regions separately 
and in detail. 



A« The Liberation of the Baltic 

The mouth of the Baltic consists of several winding 
channels^ that force their way between Sweden, the 
Danish islands and Jutland. They are all of them 
narrow enough to be commanded in pbces by fortress- 
artillery on shore, and their length and intricacy make 
them ^ ideal area for mines. wUch, as the pre^t war 
has shown, can be laid down effectively enough to 
block all traffic through them, even by a navy that is not 
in immediate possession of their coasts* In fact the 
power to close or open these entrances to the Baltic 
really passed from Denmark, which had neither the 
interest nor the strength to treat Russia unjustly, to 
Germany, which had the very strongest interest in 
obtaining the power to do so, as soon as the cutting 
of the canal from the Elbe estuary to Kiel Haven gave 
the German fleet the means of transferring its whole 
force from the North Sea to the Baltic and back again 
by a private passage under its own exclusive control* 
This new asset gave Germany such a decisive advantage 
over Russia, who had to divide her strength between 
three separate squadrons in the Baltic, the Bbck Sea, and 
the Far East, that the btter Empire abandoned naval 
competition for the control of the Baltic, and sought 
to find egress to the North Atlantic by another way* 

We have noted that Archangel, the earUest port 
Russia had, and still her only port on the open ocean, 
is practically valueless because it is ice-bound the greater 
part of the year* But if you follow the coast Westward 
beyond the mouth of the White Sea, and then round 
the North Cape, which is the North-West comer of 
the Eurasian continent, you come within the influence 


of the Gtilf Stieam. Its impetus carries it past the 
British bles up the West coast of Norway, keep- 
iag the clinute temperate and the sea perennially free 
&om drift ice at least a dozen degrees further North- 
ward than along any other meridian.^ Unfortunately for 
Russia, Norwegian colonists, following the warm current 
and availing themselves of the easy coast-wise oavigatum 
from fjord to fjord, had already occupied the whole of 
this open littoral before the backwoodsmen of No^^rod 
had made their laborious way overland to their illusoiy 
sea-board at Archangel. The whole coast-strip as fiar 
as the North Cape and round its comer to the Varai^r 
Fjord has become and remained Norwegian in nation- 
ality, and is now an inalietuble portion of Norway's 

Between this important region and the Russiin 
frontier a broad barrier was interposed by Finland, so 
long as she remained a Swedish province, but the 
settlement of 1814 endorsed an accomplished fact by 
bringing Finland within the Russian Empire as a self- 
governing national state under the Imperial crown, widi 
much the same status as the constitutional kingdom of 
Poland. During the whole century that has elapsed, 
there has been a silent contest on Russia's part to press 
her way over Finland's carcase to a Norwegian port on 
the open Atlantic, and on the part of the Scanc^navian 
powers, backed by Great Britain, K> maintain the ezisdi^ 
arrangement of constitutions and frontiers. 

To fortify the Scandinavian peninsula against Russian 
encroachment, the Vienna Congress linked its two dts- 

■ On the fnrtber side of tbc Atlantic a c^d current setting dom dw 
Greenland cout carrica the vanguard of die drift ke so £ai Soudi that 
it endangen shipping plying on the routes between Europe and Nc* 



oofdant natjonalities together by a personal union. This 
experiment had a more successful history than the 
United Kingdom of the Netherlands, which the same 
Congress welded together as a bulwark against France ; 
but it collapsed finally, none the less, nine years ago/ 
while on the other side Russia has been levelling her 
path by a systematic attempt to crush Finnish nation- 
ality out of existence* 

In their politics and social life the Finns are one 
of the most li^;hly-civilised nations of Europe* The 
smallneas of their population ' and the unindustrialised 
character of their economics have simplified the 
problems set them to solve, but within their modest 
dimensions they have solved them to perfection* The 
tradition of their culture, and their Lutheran religion, 
both come from Sweden, and the townspeople on the 
coast are still lai^ely Swedish in race and language ; 
but since the political connection with Sweden has been 
broken, the native Finnish speech, which belongs to a 
non-Indo-European family, though enriched with many 
primitive Teutonic loan words, has raised its head and 
proved itself to possess enough vitality to become the 
vehide of national development. 

With Russia Finland has no inward bonds of union 
whatsoever, neither of religion nor of language nor of 
tradition nor even of geography, for she lies away in a 
comer, and her sea-board, besides fronting merely upon 
the Baltic, is much less accessible from the Russian 
hinterland than are the outlets upon the Baltic, White 
Sea and Black Sea which Russia possesses elsewhere* 

'In 1905. 

* The censiif taken to 1901 showed a total of 3,713*000, ttM>i*<^^fig 

3,353,000 Finns 
35O1O00 Swedes 



Finland has simply been the victim of Russia's ambi- 
tion for an open port on the Norwegian ooast^ because 
the eventual railway to that port must run through her 
territory* It is a precise repetition of the relations 
between the Magyars and Croatia. A small nationality 
has been inahenably endowed by Geography with the 
fatal function of standing between a powerful nation 
and a sea-board to which she ardently desires access : 
the stronger power has been so stup^ and barbarous 
as to imagine no better means of satisfying her wants 
than the destruction of the little nation that stands in 
the way of their realisation ; and the latter, fighting 
desperately for life, is looking round for some stxot^ 
helper ^o will bring the oppressor to his knees, set 
her free from all connection with him, and shatter 
for ever his projects, for which she has stiffered so 

There would be poetical justice in such a consumma- 
tion, for it would be the natural outcome of the bullying 
power's behaviour ; but it would not solve the problem 
at issue, but only bring forth evil from evil, reversing 
instead of eliminating the injustice and sowing the seeds 
of future war* 

We have seen that if we win this war, and the Dual 
Monarchy collapses, Croatia will probably achieve 
complete political freedom from Magyar tyranny, but 
that she must not, in such an event, be allowed to use 
her advantage merely to take the offensive in the racial 
feud : she must give Hungary facilities for realising all 
her legitimate political desires by enterii^ into economic 
co-operation with her* But the same issue of the war, 
for which we hope, will not effect the forcible h*bera- 
tion of Finland, and this imposes all the more urgently 
upon us the duty of securing that, ^en the setdement 


comes, Finland shall obtain as much and more from 
the justice, good sense and liberalism of our victorious 
ally Russia, as she would have obtained from her com- 
pulsory resignation in the event of defeat* 

The war has already taught Russia that her Scandi- 
navian policy has been a blunder. The Eastern 
boundary of disaffected Finland is only a few miles 
from Petrograd* Germany's complete naval command 
of the Baltic gives her the initiative along the Finnish 
coast, and though the inntunerable islands and skerries 
are a favourable field for the Russian coast-defence 
torpedo-craft, the extent of coast to be patrolled and 
the sympathies of the population with the enemy 
make the landing of German troops quite a feasible 
project* Once a German expeditionary force was 
operating successfully in the country, there is little 
doubt that the war party in Sweden would gain the 
upper hand, and send two htmdred thousand men across 
the Bothnian gulf to support it, and this pressure on 
the other flank would have as weakening an e£Fect upon 
the Russian offensive along the Vistula as the advance 
of the Russian armies in the latter quarter has had upon 
the German invasion in the West* 

We trust that the danger is now past, and that 
Sweden will preserve her neutrality, but we must take 
care that her peaceful policy brings gain and not loss 
to her interest and her honour, by including in the 
European settlement some such terms as follows : 

(i.) The perpetual integrity and independence of both 
Norway and Sweden shall be guaranteed by Europe* 

(ii*) In return for this, Norway shall allow Russia to 
lead a railway of Russian gauge across Finland and up 
the left bank of the Tomei River to some perennially 
open port on her North-West coast, either TromsS or 


Hammeif est or both^ according to the lie of the land,^ 
without interposing a customs-barrier at any point along 
this route between the Russian frontier and the open 

The Russophobe party in Sweden might still be 
inclined to take the view that Swedish ^'national 
honour ** could only be satisfied by obtaining a European 
guarantee of autonomy for Finland within the Russian 
Empire^ in addition to that of integrity and independ- 
ence for Sweden herself. ** The national self-govern- 
ment of Finland/' they will say, '" is secured to her under 
the terms by which she was incorporated in the Empire 
in 1814, yet it is gradually being nullified, by the 
machiavellian policy of the Imperial Government, to 
the same dead level of absolutism to which constitu- 
tional Poland was reduced at a stroke in February 183a. 
Fitmish liberty can only be rescued by intervention 
from outside/' 

The facts in question are tmfortunately true, but the 
foundation upon them of such a proposal would be 
open to very grave objections* In the first place it 
would certainly be Utopian to expect that a victorious 
Russia would submit to the imposition of a guarantee 
which would reflect upon her conduct in the past and 
thus imply her humiliation in the present* The case 
of Finland is radically different from that of Norway 
and Sweden. The two latter countries are entirely 
external to the Russian Empire, and the guarantee we 
are demanding for them in no way affects Russia's 
internal structure* It might be argued that it is levelled 
specifically at Russia in fact if not in name, and would 
seriously limit her freedom in these two countries' regard ; 

^ The last sectkm of this raflway wiU tn any case be a difficult engineer- 
ing problem : see map of European Nationalities (VII.)- 


but the formulation in general instead of individual 
terms is of great importance for the psychology of 
national pride, and after all this potential check upon 
Russia's free action 2^;ainst Norway and Sweden is only 
to be imposed in rettun for a substantial concession 
on their part to Russia's vital economic interests of 
facilities which by their very nature would give Russia, 
in addition to her fair economic gain, a wholly un- 
warrantable political leverage in this quarter, imless 
such a result were deliberately guarded against by a 
provision of the kind proposed* 

Guarantees will never be stable so long as they are 
one-sided, for their ultimate sanction is not the ^inill of 
the guarantors, but the mutual advantage of the parties 
affected* This explains how our previous require- 
ment of a guarantee for the New Poland is consistent 
with our present standpoint towards the Finnish 
question* Both Poland and Finland are to be members 
of the Russian Empire ; but if the European Concert 
guaranteed the constitutional autonomy within this 
larger group of the united Poland, it would only be 
imposing an obligation upon Russia in return for the 
simtdtaneous extension of her imperial boundaries by 
the reunion in the new constitutional state of the Poles 
at present subject to Prussia and Austria* Indeed, these 
fragments of the Polish nation would be so unwilling to 
enter the Russian Empire without a European guarantee 
to reassure them, that it would actually be in Russia's 
interest to st^gest such a guarantee herself even if no 
other party took the initiative, in order to make sure of 
rallying to her flag the whole Polish nation* In that 
case she would be conceding autonomy to half a 
nationality already subject to her, in order to obtain the 
willing co-operation of the whole* Finland, however, has 



ao " irredeata " beyond the Russian frontier i^ch could 
be made the basis of a bai^ain for the improved status 
within that frontier of the whole nationality, and there- 
fore a guarantee extorted from Russia in Finland's 
favour would not be set off by any corresponding gain 
on Russia's part. The element a( reciprocity would be 
lacking, and the swallowing of such an tmsweetened pill 
would implant a dangerous resentment in the heart of 
the Russian nation. 

Yet even supposing that Russia would not only 
submit in this question to the dictation of Europe but 
would also recover from the resentment it at first 
aroused, we learnt from our discussion of the Hungarian 
and Tchech problems that the intrusion of an inter- 
national scafiblding in the structure of an independent 
political unit, so far from being a salutary principle, is 
a dangerous extemporisation. It is only to be employed 
as a pis aUer when some particular national house is too 
seriously divided against itself to stand on its own 
foundations and cannot be allowed to coUapse without 
involving the whole Etuopean block in its ruin. 

The assumption underlying the federation of a 
number of different nations within a sit^e pditical 
group like the Russian Empire is that, yrt^e they are 
severally involved with one another too closely to 
disengage for themselves a completely independent 
political existence, they possess a common interest and 
a common unity whidh sharply sunder their devekip- 
ment as a group from that of all other groups or units 
outside their common frontier. If Russia and Finland 
cannot adjust their differences entirely between them- 
selves without the intervention of an external guarantee, 
the Empire in which they are nominally federated 
becomes an unreality, for the guarantee will piise its 


joints asunder like a wedge* Even if the initial friction 
between Russia and Finland were overcome^ the 
reference of their quarrels to European arbitration 
would aggravate them on every occasion, and the 
tension would extend itself to the relations between 
Russia and Sweden, who would almost inevitably 
assume the r61e of Europe^s inspector, watching to see 
if Finland were enjoying her guaranteed rights* 

The Finnish guarantee, then, would only spoil instead 
of perfecting those good relations between Russia and the 
two nations of the Scandinavian peninsula, which our 
original proposals were designed to create. We must 
trust the future of Finland to Russia's good faith and 
good sense* In opening to her a free railway across 
Finland to a free port on the Norwegian coast, we 
eliminate her chief motive for trampling the Finnish 
nation to death, and this is all that we can do* We have 
already convinced ourselves that the ultimate solution of 
the national questions of Europe, and therewith the 
establishment of European peace, depends not upon 
mechanical adjustments, but upon a change of heart in 
the nations themselves* If we cannot obtain a reversal 
of Russians attitude towards Finland by negotiating her 
Atlantic railway, we cannot artificially produce the 
desired result by forcing her to submit to a guarantee* 

There is every reason to expect, however, that the 
issue between Finland and Russia will find its solution 
as a secondary consequence of the Atlantic railway and 
the guarantee to Scandinavia, and if so, our arrange- 
ments will have secured to all parties concerned what 
they really want : to Norway, Sweden and Finland 
their national self-government, and to Russia her direct 
commercial access to an open Atlantic port* But the 
problem of the Baltic remains to be solved* 



" Your pfoposed railway to the Atlantic," a critic 
would object, " will onl^ provide a clumsy and ci> 
cuitous channel of communication between Russia and 
the outer World. Russia will always fmd the most 
direct, and by far the cheapest, passage for the flow of 
trade between her own frontiers and the commercial 
highways of the Atlantic, not by railway transit overland 
to a foreign port on the open Ocean, but by shipment 
from the ports on her Baltic oiast down the water- 
passage that communicates with the North Sea througli 
the Baltic's narrow mouths. These entrances of the 
Baltic, the natural outlet for the vast hinterland of 
Russia, are at present at the mercy of the German navy. 

" I can answer off-hand the first of the two questions 
which gave rise to this chapter : Rtissia has entered upon 
this struggle against Germany with all her national 
mu^t to realise an object vital to her national existence, 
the hlieration of the Baltic Sea from German control. 
I&r relations with Scandinavia and Finland will cer- 
tainly require settlement, and you are r^t to devote 
attention to them : nevertheless, they are of altogether 
secondary importance. If our hopes are fulfilled, and 
the Allies win this war, Russia's most just and most 
urgent mandate to the Peace Conference will be the 
removal from the strategical points of vantage in the 
Baltic of this German pirate, who menaces the peaceful 
commerce of all other nations with ports upon die 
Baltic coastline. 

" The satisfaction of Russia's demand is the problem 
before you, and till you have solved it, you will not 
have quenched the well-spring of dissension between 
the German and Russian nations. Again and again it 
will spring up into war, vbik even your Atlantic railway 
will turn from an alleviation into a new danger. Rusia> 


tf she ts compelled once and for all to resign to Germany 
the naval command of the Baltic, will not submit to 
the lack of any naval sally-port whatsoever upon the 
Western seas, but will attempt to repeat on her railway 
to the Norwegian coast the policy she devised at the 
beginning of the century in Manchuria. She will seek 
to turn her free port into a fortified naval base, and the 
danger of Tromso or Hammerfest developing into an 
Atlantic Port Arthur may finally wreck the good under- 
standing between Russia and Great Britain, and involve 
the latter power in a war for the stronghold's destruction 
as costly as the sieges of Sebastopol and of Port Arthur 
itself* Such may be the consequences of indecision 
now* In the question of the Baltic the futture peace of all 
the European powers is at stake/' 

We cannot neglect our critic's warning, for the con- 
siderations by which he supports it are unanswerable, 
but we shall be in a better position to give him satisfaction 
if we can persuade him first to set forth on his own 
account what he considers the indispensable minimum 
of conditions necessary to ensure the liberation of the 
Baltic in the sense Russia intends* We will remind 
him, however, before we let him speak, that such terms 
inevitably involve a serious alteration of the status quo 
to Germany's detriment, and that it is therefore doubly 
important in this instance sympathetically to bear in 
mind her national point of view, and scrupulously to 
avoid all wanton offence to her honour and interest* 
He will probably accept otir proposal with assurance, 
and launch out into his disquisition with studied 

** In the first place," he will begin, ** the independ- 
ence and neutraUty of Denmark must be guaranteed 
by Europe, and the guarantors must further subsidise 


her to a sufficient extent to enable her to carry ottt 
her intenuttonal duties effectively. Her task is to 
fortify the three channels ^ between the Danish islands 
and the peninsulas of Jutland and Sweden, that connect 
the waters of the Baltic with the North Sea, and also the 
approaches to these channels at either end, with such 
formidable batteries on land and torpedo flotillas cm 
sea, that she will be able to ' move on ' any fleet that 
attempts to bbckade them or seal them up with mines. 

" Denmark would have every reason for fulfillii^ this 
task honottrably and impartially. The national inde- 
pendence guaranteed her in consideration of it is the 
tmly remaining object of her foreign policy, when oscx 
she has recovered her national tmity by the restoration 
of Schleswig ; and the only event that could endanger 
that guarantee would be another attempt by a sii^ 
power to impose its dominion on the rest of Europe by 
war. If any power planned such a stroke, Denmark 
would be the last state to enter into collusion with the 
criminal, and the knowledge of her incorruptibility 
wottld go far to discotur^e the design. 

" But Denmark cannot perform this function suc- 
cessfully so long as the Kiel Canal is at the disposal 
of the German navy, and therefore some permanent 
arrangement must be made that will put it in Dennia^'s 
power, in the event of war, at once to hinder Gemun 
warships from passing through it." 

He will admit the fact which we have already estab- 
lished, that the whole province of Ifolstein, thiou^ 
which the Canal runs, is German in nationahty, and 
cannot be cut away from the United German state, 
and he will therefore hesitate to propose the singles! 
solution, which would be to hiing the territory on either 

■ Great Belt, Little Bel^ and Sound. 


bank of the Canal withm the Danish frontier* Nor, 
he will agree, would it be just in itself to deprive Ger- 
many of all profit from a great engineering work 
adiieved by h^ enterprise and at her expense. ** But 
we shall judge the issue better/^ he will explain, ** if we 
distinguish in our minds between the Canal^s economic 
and strategic consequences* 

** Geography/' he will continue, '' has put the 
German nation in possession of a low-lying isthmus 
between the estuary of the Elbe and the Baltic Sea, 
and the nation, by its own energy, has taken Nature's 
hint, and extracted full valtie from the asset* The 
artificial canal across the natural isthmus provides a 
much shorter and easier route than the Danish straits for 
commercial traffic between the Baltic and the North 
Sea, and German Commerce has the right to take every 
advantage of this that it can, by giving its own shipping 
rebates on the toll, rights of precedence in the order of 
pass^e, or any other privilege that commends itself to 
German economic theory, while alien commerce has 
no right to complain of less favourable treatment in the 
Canal, so long as the Danish channels are open to it* 
If all the states that possess a sea-board on the Baltic 
were to claim that by economic justice they ought to 
enjoy equal rights with Germany in the nav^ation of 
the canal that has been cut by that nation through its 
own soil, Germany could of course with much greater 
justice demand freedom of trade through the ports of 
Be^um and Holland, which have been rescued from 
the sea by the Netherlanders' dykes, on the similar 
ground that they are placed more conveniently for her 
manufacturing districts in the Rhineland than are the 
German ports on the estuary of the Elbe* Both claims 
would be unfounded* 


^'Nations, like individuals, enter into oompetitioo 
with one another very unequally equipped, in respect 
both of natural and of acquired advantages: like 
individuals, they must accept the conditions as they 
find them, neither making their own lack a justtficatkin 
for robbing by force their neighbour's superfluity, nor 
using their own strength to tyrannise over their neigh- 
bour's weakness* So far as the Kiel Canal gives 
Germany an economic ptUl in the commercial conq)eti- 
tion of the Baltic, she has a right to make use d it : 
Russia, if we win the war, must not be allowed to take 
this advantage from her : but so far as it puts it in her 
power by naval force to paralyse whenever she likes the 
entire conunerce of other nations whose only oudet is 
thiough the Baltic, and the commerce of the whok 
World in so far as it wishes to do business with die 
nations in question, it is a stumbling-block to Justia 
and a menace to Peace* 

'' We must devise a scheme, then, by which (a) the 
province of Holstein shall remain within the German 
frontier, and (b) the economic control and profits of the 
Canal shall be left in Germany's hands, but (c) the 
strategic control shall be taken from her/' 

Having thus explained his standpoint, he will proceed 
to formulate lus proposals* ** We can destroy Gei^ 
many's naval command of the Canal completely by 
putting any single vital point along its course into the 
possession of some alien military power. We must 
choose a point which, while of decisive importance for 
the Canal, affects as little as may be Germany's 
interests in other quarters* This rules out the Western 
terminus, for the power which commands that camiot 
help commanding likewise Germany's chief artery of 
Ocean traffic, the estuary of the Elbe* We are accord- 


ti^y kft with Kiel, and the right power to hold Kiel in 
trust for Europe is clearly the ' policeman * Denmark* 

'' Denmark must maintain, at Europe^s expense, a ring 
of the heaviest fortifications covering Kiel itself and 
the last section of the Canal where it enters Kiel Haven, 
^a^l^^t>g her at any moment to block the Canal against 
armed German attack, and, if the attack presses her too 
hard before help arrives, to blow up if necessary canal- 
mouth and fortifications together, and to mine all the 
sea approaches, thus putting the Canal out of gear for 
an indefinite period. This fortified area in Danish 
hands must be secured by a margin, broader than the 
range of the most powerful siege artillery, which shall 
be under the military authority of the Danish, and not 
of the German, general staff. 

^ The boundary of this zone ^ should start from the 
Dano- German frontier you have already delimited 
between Eckemfdrde Bay and the Eider, at a point just 
West of the Schleswig-Rendsburg railway, and should 
proceed Southwards parallel to the railway, crossing 
the Canal at a point just West of Rendsburg. Thence 
it shotild run South-East to the Brahm See, then East 
to the Bothkamper See, then North-East through the 
Post- and Selenter-Seen in a direct line to the Baltic, 
leaving the town of Preetz outside. 

'^ The administration of the Canal itself, its upkeep and 
its traffic, both outside the ssone and within it, must in 
any case remain in the hands of the German government, 
and if possible the population of the zone should be 
included, no less than the rest of Holstein, within the 
political organisation of the German Empire for all 
purposes of civil self-government, in spite of the 
exceptional status of the territory in the military sphere. 

^ See map facing p. 48. 


But if such absolute separation between the military and 
the dvil control of a district is in practice impossible^ and 
military exigencies require that both administrations 
should be united in the hands of the same govemmenti 
then there is no choice but to detach this strip of 
Holstein altogether from the body of Germany, and 
allow a plebiscite of the popubtion to decide between 
direct incorporation in Denmark, or * Home Rule ' 
under the Danish government, always leaving in the 
hands of the German nation full property-r^ts over 
the Canal throughout its whole length/' 

With these suggestions our critic will conclude, and 
it will be our turn once more to pass judgment. We may 
first commend his fairness and moderation, and admit 
our conviction that he has herein stated the strict 
nunimum of precautions necessary to enstire all the 
entrances to the Baltic Sea against any forcible attempt 
on Germany^s part to seize the strategical command of 
them* As far as the freedom of the Baltic is concerned, 
it will tmder such an arrangement tDake no difference 
whether Germany reverses her aggressive policy or 
continues in her present courses. But the Baltic ques- 
tion is only one factor, however important, in the 
problem of European peace* For that problem's 
general solution the future mood of Germany is of more 
direct and vital importance still, and no Baltic settle- 
ment, however perfect in itself, is worth the cost of 
drivix^ Germany into exasperation in the hour of her 
spiritual crisis, when other influences have so fair a 
prospect of inclining her into the paths of peace* 

The Kiel Canal is really a military weapon, like a 
conscript army or a 42-centimetre gun* It is a part of 
German/s national armament, and while we hope diat 
one of the results of the settlement will be a scaling- 


down of armaments all round, by a voluntary agree- 
ment among the nations that possess them and an 
honourable performance of its respective obligations by 
each nation that becomes a party to an agreement of 
sudi a kind, no one would seriously propose that the 
limitation of troops to so many millions of trained men 
or of guns to a maximum cahbre of so many centimetres 
should be enforced by international police-commissions 
established at all the recruiting depots and factories of 
war material with authority to control the output and 
with material power to give sanction to their commands* 
^The imagination of such a thing is chimerical, and 
even if it came within reach of realisation, it would 
absolutely violate one of the most essential principles of 
a settlement on the basis of national self-government, 
that ikett must be no interference &om outside with a 
nation's internal afiiairs* The cutting off of ikt Kiel 
endave, though on the one hand it is a more feasible 
project to execute, is on the other a far grosser violation 
of national liberty and tmity* It involves, at least in 
part and probably altogether, the detachment from the 
German state of a considerable body of popubtion, 
including the citizens of Kiel, a great port and dis- 
tinguished university town, not becatise they desire 
this severance in order to incorporate themselves in 
another national group, nor even becatise ikt facts of 
geography make it impossible to fulfil ihtit national 
desire. They are' Germans in speech and in sympa&y, 
the district forms an integral part of the German 
province of Holstein, and the sole motive wotdd be the 
establishment of a ** balance of power ^ in the Baltic, an 
object in which they have no concern themselves, but 
which is demanded by the interest of the Russian Empire, 
a^Utical group with which theyare in no way connected* 


This would be to inflict an injustice on one nadon 
to the special advantage of another. It would be 
parallel to the Dual Monarchy's treatment of the 
Southern Slavs, to Russia's recent behaviour towards 
Finland, and to all the other smouldering grievances of 
nations, which have combined to ignite the present war. 
Just as those had caused war in the past, so, even were 
they all eliminated in the settlement, this alone would be 
a new and most efficacious stimulus to war in the future. 

The spectacle of Kiel under the military oontiol of 
Denmark would be a perpetual incitement to Germany 
to take up arms. The more intricate fortifications 
Denmark threw up, and the heavier guns she placed 
in position behind them, the more grimly Gomany 
wouU toil to construct artillery heavier still, and to open 
lines oi attack that would more than counter the Danish 
lines of defence, and the more bitterly she would hate die 
"Concert of Europe " that provided the Danish staff with 
the material means for carrying out its commissioo, 
and that brought pressure to bear upon the Danish 
government whenever the latter indicated its wish to 
resign an international office which involved it in un- 
requited responsibility and danger. We should witness 
a competition of armaments and an aggravation of 
national antagonism more naked and direct tiun any we 
have experienced yet : the crisis would be precipitated 
by the harsh treatment of the German pi^mlation at 
Kiel, provoked by their natural recalcitrance towaids 
Danish administratiOQ and their eager collusion with 
the German spy-bureau, or else by the imminent 
completion of a Russian programme for buiUing op, 
behind the Danish bulwark, a Baltic fieet more dun 
stttMig enough to cope with the German naval force in 
these inland waters now isolated strategically bom its 



sister squadron in the North Sea. Either or both of 
these causes would drive Germany to throw down the 
gauadet once more to the rest of Europe, not this time 
in hope but in despair* 

The remedy, then, for the German command of the 
Baltic entrances would ahnost certainly be worse than 
the malady itself, and we find ourselves placed in a 
dilemma : if we leave the Kiel Canal in the hands of 
the German navy we cheat Russia of one of the diief 
objects for which she fought this war, and &il to remove 
a stumbling-block to her peaceful progress in the future : 
if we take the Canal out of Germany's strategic control, 
we cannot avoid measures that must exasperate her, and 
create a new obstacle to her spiritual conversion* We 
have, it seems, to choose the lesser of two evils* 

In this choice of dubious alternatives we have one 
dear beacon* Mechanical manipulations of geogr^hical 
frocitiecs and political statuses possess, we agree, but a 
secondary virtue : the sure foundation of Peace Ues in 
the direct production of a healthy state of consciousness 
in all the nations of Europe* J£ we adopt the former 
alternative, and do not alter the present status of the 
Canal, we afford the German nation the most favoturable 
conditions for throwing off the disease which now 
vitiates its spirit ; but a reformed Germany would no 
longer desire to use for aggressive purposes the weapon 
left in her hands, and so this psychological change, 
when once it came about, would automatically remove 
the grounds of dissatisfaction on Russia's part which 
the policy entails* To remove them immediately we 
must adopt the other alternative, and turn Germany 
out of Kiel, yet we can only do so at the price of aggravat- 
ing instead of alleviating her diseased nationalism, while 
Russia's satisfaction, instead of providing a natural cure 


for Germany's sickness^ would obviously promote it 
still further, in exact proportion to its own intensity* 

We conclude, accordingly, that we shall best serve the 
cause of ultimate peace if we oppose ourselves to such 
a drastic bbw at Germany's national strength and pride 
as the military confiscation of Kiel* Our judgment is 
tentative, but at least it seems to have logic on its side, 
for it is surely inconsistent to say to Germany in the 
same breath : *' Europe expects of you that you will 
chai^ your heart, because that is her only hope of 
securing Peace for the future," and ** Europe regrets 
that she is obliged to take measures for the security of 
her Peace, in case you should not change your heart 
after all/' If we approach Germany in this insinoere 
spirit our overtures are sure to prove futile* 

Russia, then, must be persuaded to forego her 
demands in part* The guaranteeing of Denmark and 
her armament at international expense are both excel- 
lent proposals* She is one of those small nations that 
contribute much to European civilisation, and her 
conservation will be a benefit to all Europe as well as a 
partial solution of the Baltic question* But the transfer 
to Deiunark of Kiel, though necessary for the im- 
mediate solution of that question in its entirety, must be 
rejected, because it would impose upon Germany a 
humiliation much less justifiable and much more acute 
than that which we are propositi to spare Russia in 
the case of Finland* 

B. The Liberation of the Black Sea 

We have answered one of the questions with wfaidi 
we started this chapter : Russia is fighting Germany 
now for the liberation of the Baltic from German naval 


controL We have tried to arrive at a compromise, by 
which this control shall be vested in the hands of some 
neutral power with effective sanction behind it, and 
this to an extent which will finally sadsfy Russia without 
alienating Germany once and for all* We can now pass 
on to our second question : Why is Russia also putting 
forth her strength against Austria-Hungary on behalf of 

Russia's dominant motive is simple. She has looked 
on for more than a generation while the Dual Monarchy 
oppressed a small, weak, divided nationality, the 
Southern Slavs, till the oppression has culminated in 
an implacable war of annihilation against this nation's 
largest fragment, the state of Serbia. 

The treatment the Southern Slavs have received 
arouses the indignation of every fair-minded spectator 
who acquaints himself with their case, but the Russians 
are not detached spectators. The Southern Slavs are 
their closest kixismen ; they speak a variety of the same 
tongue, and turn their eyes towards Russia for salvation. 
The Germans, blinded by the menace to their own 
aspirations, can only see in the Panslav movement an 
engine of Russia's imperialistic ambitions. Herein 
they greatly err : Panslavism was not bom of Russia's 
pride and covetousness, but of the Tchech's and 
Southern Slav's deep distress. It comes from their 
lips as a cry for help, not from Russia as a solici- 
tation to revolt; and it is in answer to this cry 
that the Russian Nation has at last risen with a 
unanimity undreamed of either by friends or foes, 
and is sweeping westwards with the spiritual exalta- 
tion of a Crusade to break her brethren's bonds. 

Here, just as in the case of Belgium's neutrality and 
France's loyalty to her allies, German policy has shown 



itself singularly obtuse to the psycholc^ of natioDS. 
It has disastrously neglected the factor of Russia's 
disinterested national enthusiasm in its estimate ot 
military forces. Human motives are always complez, 
and Germany was led into this miscalculation by con- 
centrating her attention on a real, though subordinate, 
aspect of Russia's intervention in the Balkans. The 
concerted action in those quarters of Austrian and 
Turkish rule does not merely challenge Russia's kni^t- 
errantry by blighting the growth of the small Balkan 
nationalities : it directly injures her economic interests 
by blocking the exit from the Black Sea, while every step 
the Balkan nations gain with Russia's assistance is a 
further step forward for Russia herself on the road to 
the open Mediterranean. 

The Germans a^^ that Russia is preparing 
patriarchal despotism under the cloak of fraternal 
oo-operadon ; and that, if they are beaten in this war, 
the only result for the Balkans will be to subsQtule 
Russian for Austrian domination. 

" We will not deny," they say, " that Austria, in 
declaring war, intended to seize the railway to Saluuka, 
and annex the whole territory through which it runs 
as &Lr as the £gean ; but if Russia wins, she will aooez 
the v^le Eastern coast of the Black Sea, and botb 
shores of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, while she will 
incorporate Routnania and Bulgaria in her empire, 
in order to lead through them a railway of her own to 
the Sea of Marmora or the £gean." 

The persistent aloofness of both Roumania and 
Bulgaria towards Russia's advances, ever since the 
Treaty of Berlin, and the reserved attitude they have 
taken up in the present crisis, prove that the German 
argument is not altc^iether groundless. 


If the prophecy really came true, it would be a grave 
mttfortune both to Germany and the Balkan states 
themselves, and a violation of national rights and wi^es 
fatal to the endurance of Peace, but we have already 
sketched a series of arrangements calculated to make 
Russian and German hegemony in the Balkans alike 

{u) The grouping of the six Balkan states into a 
'^ soUverein '' which may develop into a defensive 

(ii.) The maintenance of this s^ollverein's economic 
links with Germany throu^ Trieste, and the creatu^n 
of new links with Russia through Odessa* 

(iii.) The complete settlement of racial disputes 
between the Balkan League and the Russian Empire, 
by the cession of North- Western Bessarabia to Roumania* 

None of these arrangements will stand in the way of 
Russia's real objective, towards which hegemony over 
the Balkans would be merely a means, — the Liberation 
of the Black Sea. 

The entrance to the Black Sea has been the strongest 
naval position in the world through all history, but 
never more so than at this day, when waterways can be 
blocked by mines capable of destroying instantaneously 
the most magnificent battleship. 

The first section of the passage is the Bosphorus, 
a winding strait eighteen miles long, and varying 
from 700 to 3500 yards in width, with a strong 
outward current flowing through it, and steqp blu& 
overhai^ing it on either side. At the further end of 
its European shore the hills sink, and a splendid harbour, 
the ** Golden Horn,'' runs inland, protected from the 
more open waters of the Sea of Marmora by the penin- 
sula on which G>nstantinople stands. The passage 


of about ijo miles dovn the Sea of Marmora, £com the 
Golden Horn to the begmning of the Dardanelles, farms 
the second section ; the Dardanelles thetsselvea an 
ihe last. These straits are forty miles long : Aeir 
average breadth ^ is considerably greater than dut of 
tlie Bosphorus* but at the decisive strategical point 
between Kilid-Bahr and Kaleh-i-Sultaniyeh they 
narrow to 1400 yards, and inside this line thdr ampUt 
windings provide good anchorage for la;^ warships 
at Ni^ara and at Gallipoli. When you have put the 
Dardanelles behind you, you have still to clear the 
channel between Imbros and Tenedos islands, before 
you really reach the open waters of the ^gean. 

The free use of this extremely difhcult waterway is 
of vital importance to all states possessing potts on 
the Black Sea, principally, of course, to Rusta, vAto 
depends entirely on this route for the export of her 
wheat and her petroleum, but likewise to Roumania 
and Bulgaria in their degree. And yet control of die 
whole passage remains in the hands of Turkey, the least 
civilised of all the Black Sea states and the only one of 
them who has no commerce of her own. to give her a 
Iq^timate interest in the waterway's economic utilisa- 
tion. Moreover, she takes unscrupulous advantage 
of its incomparable strategic qualities to push a policy 
of adventure even more dangerous to the Peace d 
Europe than the national chauvinism of Germans and 
Magyars. Turkish chauvinism has no ideas behind it 
or objectives in front of it, and is conducted with a 
travesty c£ opportunism by ignorant and ill-educated 

The Turks have held this waterway for five hundred 
years. They seized it first by the r^t of "stunt 

' Three to four miles. 



govemment/' and till 1700 their administnttion was 
perhaps the most efficient, and the poptilation subject 
to it the most civilised^ of any that bordered on the 
Black Sea. But in the last two centuries the balance of 
dviltsation and efficiency has been entirely reversed, 
axid has turned the Turk's continued presence at Con- 
stantinople into a scandal* He has not stayed there by 
his own e£forts : he would have been cast out k>ng ago 
if first Great Britain and then Germany had not feared 
that his disappearance would merely establish Russia 
in his place. Russia entrenched under arms on the 
Bosphonis and Dardanelles would certainly threaten 
German enterprise in Asia Minor and English com- 
munications with India; but Turkey entrenched 
there, besides putting Russia in such an intolerable 
position that she will end it by war at the first oppor- 
tunity, has again and again proved herself an in- 
sufferable nuisance to England and Germany, her rival 

It is time that we abandoned altogether the dis- 
creditable rdle (in which, for that matter, Germany 
has already supplanted us) of safeguarding the most 
sinister political interest in Europe, for if, at the oon- 
dusion of this war, we attempt to keep the Turks at 
Constantinople in face of a victorious Russia, we shall 
bring about the very result we want to avoid. It is 
a phenomenon of htunan nature that if people are 
thwarted from obtaining their due by peaoeftd settle- 
ment, they will take by violence not only their due but 
much more besides. If we do not want, a generation 
hence, to see Russia challenge all Europe to war for the 
mastery of the Straits and of their whole Balkan hinter- 
land, we must secure her the freedom of the Straits 
witlx>ut delay. If we satisfy her just deihands, she will 


not demand more than is just : boilers only eqilode if 
you refuse to open the safety-valve. 

In the Black Sea, then, as in the Baltic, we have to 
devise some organ fdr holding the entrance in trust for 
the states that have ports on the Black Sea coast, and 
for the commerce of the whole World. In one way die 
question is simpler here : there is no back-door, like 
the Kiel Canal, between Black Sea and ^gean, and we 
have only the sii^le passage to consider* Turkey has 
sunk no capital in improving that, and we need have 
no compunction in throwing her out, neck and crop, 
without compensation. In another way it is more 
difficult. Turkey does not merely control the Bbck 
Sea as Germany controls the Baltic : she is in actual 
possession of the strategical points, and there is here no 
respectable, impartial policeman like Denmark, waidi^ 
on the spot, and ready to take up his duties as soon as he 
is commissioned. Turkey cannot, without a European 
catastrophe, be entrusted any longer with the points in 
question, but when we eject her we shall have to 
organise a brand-new administration in her stead : let 
us begin by defining exacdy the territories to be 

(i.) To control the Bosphorus, the New Administration 
must take over both its shores, and also the shores of the 
Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea for a certain distance 
along both the European and the Asiatic side of either 
entrance to the Straits. The European territory should 
include the whole district of Constantinople, as far as its 
boundary against the vilayet of Adrianople, that is, up 
to a line leaving the Marmora coast midway between 
Eregli and Silivri, crossing the Adxianople-Constanttfiopk 
railway half-way between Chorlu and Chataldja, and 
proceeding North to the Black Sea coast between 


Istrandja and Onnanlu. The frontier of the Asiatic 
territory should start from Deredje, on the Northern 
sliore of the Gulf of Ismid^ and run N.N*E« till it hits 
the Black Sea coast at Kilia. 

(ii«) In the Sea of Marmora all the islands, and widi 
them the peninsula of Artaki (Kapu Dagh) should pass 
to the New Administration. 

(iii*) At the Dardanelles it should be given authority 
on the Asiatic side over the whole district of Bigha 
(the *^ Troad *'), West of a line starting from the Gulf of 
Edremid at a point on its North shore on the same 
meridian as Aivali, and passing first over the summit of 
Mount Ida and then in a general North-Easterly direc- 
tion to the Marmora coast East of Demotika. On 
the European side it should be assigned, not only 
the Gallipoli Peninsula (** Thradan Chersonnesus **) 
but sufficient hinterland to cover the peninsulars neck, 
where it is lowest, narrowest, and strategically most 
vulnerable* The line here should leave the £gean 
at Ivridje burun, on the North shore of the Gulf of 
Xeros, run North-East along the summit of the Kuru 
Dagh, cross the Sayan Dere just below Emerli, and 
thence proceed due East, over the summit of Mount 
Pyrgos to Ganos on the Marmora coast. 

(iv.) In the ^gean the Administration should receive 
the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, which were left in 
Turkey's possession by the Peace of London, because 
they play an essential part in the command of the 

The population of these districts is very diverse in 
nationality. The peasants of the Troad, the lai^est 
continuous mass of land within the Territory, form a 
solid Turkish block, only broken by a few Greek 
enclaves along the shore of the Dardanelles and of the 


Edremid Gulf. The islands, on the other hand, are 
purely Greek, but their area is small. Constantinople, 
which, together with its suburbs, accounts for the great 
nujority of the Territory's inhabitants, is the most 
cosmopolitan City in the World. 

When the Turks conquered her in the fifteenth 
centtuy, she was the focus of Greek nationality and 
civilisation, and the modem kingdom of Hellas, vriiich 
r^^ds itself as the Romaic Empire's heir, openly 
aspires to raise its standard over the capital of the last 
Constantine. But for four and a half centuries Con- 
stantinople has harboured the government of the 
greatest political power in Islam, and the honour of its 
long-protracted presence has altered both her orienta- 
tion and her character. She has drawn within her 
radius lands further East than the rule of her Romaic 
emperors ever extended, her population has been 
enriched by all the races of the Ottoman Empire, and 
Commerce has combined with Government to swell her 
numbers ; but in this steady growth the Greek element, 
handicapped by the Porte's disfavour, has not taken its 
proportionate share. At present it stands at no more 
than 153,000, perhaps 17.5 per cent, of the total popula- 
tion,^ so that it is hardly superior numerically, while 
decidedly inferior in wealth, to the flourishii^ Armenian 

It is true that the present Turkish majority is lately 

' The present populatioci of Coastantinople is estimated aa Gallows : 
Moslems .... 385,000 


Foreign subjects 


Others . 





artificial* It is mainly recnuted from two classes, 
firstly £rom ** official circles '" with their immense 
households and ** retired official circles ** in their palaces 
along the Bosphorus, all of whom would automatically 
migrate to the new Turkish seat of government, where- 
ever it was established ; and secondly, from unskilled 
labour, demanded in increasii^ quantities by the 
docks, and supplied by the surplus of the Turkish 
population along the Northern ooast of Anatolia* This 
army of stevedores, though it has won itself notoriety 
by its unruliness and fanaticism, and lent itself to Young 
Turkish chauvinism by boycotting the shipping of 
various foreign nationalities (a proof that Turkey is 
no more fit to be entrusted with the conunerdal con- 
trol of the Black Sea Straits than with their military 
command), is really just as casual and transient an 
element in G>nstantinople as the governing dass 

It is probable, then, that if the Straits Territory were 
cut off from the Turkish Empire and erected into an 
independent unit, the Greek element would once more 
become sufficiently preponderant to colour the wiiole 
population, and would devote its political capacity, in 
which it is undoubtedly superior to the other nationali- 
ties, to organising the whole into an autonomous republic 
on a Greek basis, and with Greek as its official language. 
Therewith, in spite of occasional friction between 
Greeks, Armenians and Turks, the question of civil 
administration wotdd be more or less satisfactorily solved, 
but that is really a minor problem* The distinctive 
characteristic of this territory is its international im- 
portance* Even in its social and economic life, the 
139,000 foreign residents count for more than the 
native inhabitants, yet it is not its internal condition 


but its military importance for the rest of Eurq)e 
that has led us to mark it off for special treatment. 
Here our difficulties begin, and we will consider the 
possible solutions of them in turn. 

(u) We might simply demolish all existing fortifica- 
tions, and organise no military force in the Territory at 
all. But to leave the Straits defenceless would be a 
mere invitation to all powers interested and well armed 
to scramble for their occupation : we could not offer a 
more potent apple of discord. 

The freedom of vitally important international 
communications can only be secured by a military 
sanction so formidable that no individual nation will 
have the means to challenge it, and it is Utopian to 
expect that the several nations of Europe will consent to 
that simultaneous reduction of armaments which is the 
goal of our hopes. They will not do this till the balance 
of armaments has already shifted from national to inter- 
national control and the military force of the individual 
states has ceased to be (what it tmdeniably has been until 
now) the decisive factor in the political destiny of the 

Artificial compacts cannot, in themselves, limit the 
contracting parties' freedom of action* In the last resort 
they will always break the agreement if they can, and 
try to get their own way by summoning up aU the 
resources they actually command. When Sparta and 
Argos proposed to settle their differences by a toumay 
between three hundred chosen champions from either 
dty, the Argive champions won ; but the result was 
reversed when the whole Spartan army rushed in to the 
rescue of their comrades, and took the more honour- 
able Argive army off its guard* Fair play could only 
have been secured if the lists had been commanded by 


a dottn twentieth-oentury troops with a machine gun* 
Cotttract s are only effective if there is a power in the 
background that makes it worth neither party's while to 
break their plighted word* 

The necessary preliminary, then, to the reduction of 
aafianal armaments in Europe is the establishment of 
other armaments, controlled by some agency acdng 
ftofii an impartial, tntemational point of view, at the 
strategical keys of Europe — points which have such 
military strength innate in their geographical disposi- 
tion, that a comparatively small force stationed there 
can act more decisively, ** to bind or to loose,"' than 
the kd^iest forces of vrbick the separate European nations 
or grot4>s of nations dispose* We have proposed to 
install such a force at the mouth of the Baltic by guaran- 
teeing Denmark and putting her in possession of the 
necessary military positions, and we have a similar 
duty to discharge at the Black Sea Straits* 

(iL) Our problem, then, unfolds itself as the co- 
ordination of a strong international military 0]^;anisation 
with the k>cal Greek civil government of the Straits 
Territory* Obviously the most desirable solution would 
be that the Autonomous State should be subsidised, 
like Denmark, to organise and maintain the military 
defence of its own territory* It is a restricted and 
unsatisfactory form of self-government that does not 
esctend to the military sphere, and the friction between 
the native dvil administration and the alien military 
authorities, which we anticipated in the Kiel enclave, 
would be more serious here in proportion to the wider 
territory and larger population afiEccted. But unfor- 
tunately, while the interests of Denmark and Europe 
coinctde, those of Europe and the proposed Autonomous 
Greek State do not* National self -consciousness 



makes Dennurk wish for independgnce, and the 
guarantee, the terriuiml gains, and the armament- 
subsidy give her the best means of securing it ; but the 
same inspiration of national feeling will make dte 
Greeks <^ the Straits Territory naturally and justty 
desirous of union with, and absorption in, the Kii^dom 
of Hellas. 

This is another instance \diere a minority must 
suffer. If the Autonomous State had it in its power 
to vote by plebiscite for union with the Kingdom, a 
majority would inevitably be secured for that motioii, 
and either Russia or Turkey or both would make the act 
a cams bdli against Greece or even against the wbok 
Balkan League, because it would falsify the eiqtecta- 
tions under which they had originally consented to the 
liberation and intemationalisation of the Straits. Even 
if war were averted for the moment, it would break «U 
in the end. The acquisition by the Balkan League of 
this new asset would encour^^ it to start a policy of 
adventure (the pohtical sense of the Balkan people is 
still in its in&ncy), or worse still, the enlarged Greece 
would break off bom the zollverein, and begin a still 
more extravagant career on its own account. Tbt 
Greek population of the Straits Territory must acocsd- 
it^ly suffer, and, while enjoyii^ local autonomy, must 
for^ the consummation of its national ideal. Yet «t 
cannot expect the Greek temperament to suffer ^adtjr. 
We have the experience of Krete to warn us, ^ete 
Unionist activity made itself a nuisance to Europe for a 
doven years, till union was achieved, and the &ct dut 
separation was a wantonly inflicted evil in that case and 
is a necessary evil in this, only makes it more imperative 
that in this case the arrangement should be unswerving 
maintained. The fortification of the Straits is essential 


to the peace of Europe^ but to place these fortificatioiis 
in the hands of the native Greek population would be 
to invite a coup d*itat. 

(ill.) We are reduced to search for some alien ex- 
ternal military administration. One plan wotdd be to 
garrison the territory with a composite force^ supplied 
on some agreed system of proportion by the tiational 
governments of Europe* We have recent precedents 
for this in the joint occupation of Krete by four powers 
from 1897 to Z909 ; in the ^^ asones of inspection/' 
maintained from 1904 to 1908 in Macedonia, which 
were unsuccessful, and did not even achieve their 
minimum palliatory object of staving off a Balkan 
war ; in the naval landing-^parties despatched last year 
CO Skodra, which would probably have succeeded 
in establishing law and order throughout Northern 
Albania, if the present war had not brought about their 
dispersal ; and, on a far larger scale, in the common 
defence of the Pekin legations against the Boxers in 
zgoo, and the composite expedition fitted out to relieve 
them under single command* 

Most of these cases of co-operation, however, were 
only initiated in face of some ui^ent crisis, and all of 
them were designed for a temporary purpose, to carry 
out a limited task* The concerted defence of the 
ItgiaLtioDS, in particular, was enforced by the fear of 
instant massacre and the hope of speedy succour: 
the fortifications were improvised, and of no import- 
ance except to the refugees they sheltered and to the 
Boxer fanatics they kept at bay* But we are now 
proposing, as a permanent part of the machinery of 
Europe, to put into the hands of national contingents 
a system of fortifications stronger and more elaborate 
than any other in Europe, which will be of vital interest 



to the policy of the several national governments, to 
whom these contingents belong. 

A fortress demands the entire loyalty of its garrison, 
the fcitiHIipg in them of a common spirit as wmng as 
that of a wvship's crew. It is essential to its efficiency 
that it should work smoothly under centralised direction, 
and that knowledge of its organisation and funcdoning 
should be the directorate's monopoly. Yet this loyalty, 
which shows its colour most crudely in the m^tary 
sphere but is likewise the badq^round of all social life, is 
in modem Europe monopolised by the national state, 
and men cannot serve two spiritual masters. The 
supreme commandant, supposing that the diplomatic 
custom were followed as usual, and the appointment 
devolved auttmatically upon the doyen of the contingent- 
commanders, would feel that he held the post in trust 
for his government (a point ol view the other govern- 
ments would not endoise). Each member of his cotn- 
posite general staff, '"«««^?H of sharing a professional 
enthusiasm for their common duty, would feel himself 
to be an cUtacIU retained on the spot by his parbcular 
government to report upon the secrets of his colleagues. 
The contingents themselves would feel httle respect for 
their superiors, and would regard the various positions 
with which they were entrusted as precious additions 
to the sacred soil of their respective fatherlands. 

(iv.) A commandant, staff and personnel that had 
no prior allegiance, would be relieved from this blot 
position, and it might seem possible, by rectuitii^ 
citizens of all European sutes individually, and ofiefing 
them a life-loi% career, to build up a service with i 
tradition and a professional pride of its own. Experience, 
however, is discouraging. Since national loy^ still 
holds the field, some form of national service will attract 


the nation's best men, and those that choose to bestow 
their energies elsewhere will probably have a discredit- 
able reason for so doing. Soon after the beginning 
of British control in Egypt, the Egyptian government 
attempted, with our sanction, to raise a cosmopolitan 
force, but dropped the idea after a short trial* The 
French Foreign Legion in North Africa has a per- 
sistently evil reputation, and even the ** Papal Zouaves '' 
in the middle of last century were notorious for their 
bad behaviour, though they were inspired not merely 
by mercenary motives, but by a spiritual cause which 
had once no rival in Europe, and was then only in 
process of being supplanted by Nationality* 

To find an auspicious precedent we must go back 
to the time when Christendom was struggling on the 
defensive against the advance of Islam. In the 
thirteenth century each nationality guarded its section 
of curtain and tower along the walls of Acre,^ and 
more than two centuries later national diversity was 
still, as King Stephen had conceived it, a strengdi and 
not a weakness, a spur to emulation and not a paralysing 
blight, among the cosmopolitan Knights of St« John 
in their last heroic defence of Rhodes.* Yet at that 
very time the Most Christian King of France was o£fer- 
ing his harbour of Toulon to the Turkish fleet, because 
the Ottoman power was the greatest thorn in the side 
of his nation^s Hapsbui^ enemy. The National Idea 
was replacing oecumenical anardiy by parochial peace- 
and^mity, and it was a symbolic incident when, in 
1798, the armada of the French Republic One and 
Indivisible, on its way to the conquest and condliation 
of an enfeebled Egypt, extinguished the rule of the 
Hospitallers* Order in its final refuge, the island of Malta. 

* Fall of Acre, 1291 aj>. * Fall of Rhodes, 2523 aj>. 


We hope for the birth of a loyalty and an ideal tbat 
shall overshadow Nationality in its prime even moie 
conqiletely than the Church overshadowed it in its 
infancy ; but such a spirit is not abroad among us yet, 
and it is useless to build up concrete cosmopolitan 
organisations before its comity, for they will have no 
vtrttie in them until they have received its baptism. 

(v.) For the guardianship of the Black Sea Straits, 
then, we must fall back upon the services of some 
single ezistii^ national state. Though there is none 
in this case that has a special interest of its own identical 
with the general interest of Europe, as Denmark has 
in the Baltic, we may at least hope to find one with no 
special interest adverse to the interest of Europe, wfuch 
we may induce to undertake the impartial conduct of 
the task for the general advant^e. 

As the question is primarily a European concern, 
it would be reasonable te choose a European state 
for the commission ; and, since the Great Powen 
are ex hypothesi ruled out (the whole problem arisii^ 
from their mutual rivalry), our choice must 1^ 
upon some minor nation. But here, too, the piece- 
(tents are disquieting. The Belgian customs-senrice 
and the Swefhsh gendarmerie, introduced into Persia 
to establish strong government, have not been equal to 
their task there. They have no natural connection with 
the country, and no power of influencing its destiny 
on their own initiative : that power lies with Russia and 
India, the great armed states immediately beyond its 
frontiers. The Persian population reahses this, and 
r^tly regards the Belgian and Swedish administraton 
as secondary agents, put in by Russia and Great 
Britain as a stopgap, to shelve the settlement of their 
own rival ambitions. The two services therefore lack 



that prestige and moral authority which are the only 
invincible weapons of "" strong government ^^ in war- 
ring against the chaos of the "' Dark hgt*^ 

The Dutch Gendarmerie, established last year with 
such solemnity in the new Albania, has been, through 
no fault of its own, a still more lamentable fiasco, and 
there is no reason to suppose that if we place another 
small European nation, for example the Swiss, in 
command of the Black Sea Straits, the result will prove 
in any way more satisfactory. In fact, it is almost 
certain that Switzerland wotdd decline the proposal. 
It would implicate her most unfairly in every cydone 
that swept over the European horizon* She would 
have constantly to make grave dedsioxis, and individual 
powers might attempt to force her hand, either by 
mobilisii^ against her frontiers at home, or combining 
to bar her troops and officials from all geographical 
access to the Straits* Her relations with the autonomous 
Greek population, which would resent the control of a 
state not immeasurably stronger than itself, would be 
chronically strained. Neither Switzerland, nor any 
other small power in Europe, is capable of tmdertaking 
the charge. 

(vi.) There is one recourse left, which is at least 
worth tentative suggestion. President Wilson has 
offered Europe the good offices of the United States 
for mediation at the close of this war and for devising 
arrangements that shall prevent war for the future. 
Europe would do well to take President Wilson at his 
word, and ask the United States to give her permanent 
assistance of a very practical kind, by relieving her of 
the concrete problem under discussion. The proposi- 
tion would doubtless come to American public opinion 
as a shock, for it has been a constant maxim of their 


foreign policy to incur no political obligations across 
the Atlantic, and they will be more eager than ever to 
maintain this principle, now that they have seen what 
volcanoes underlie Europe's smiling sur£ace. 

Great Britain, however, has pursued for a century a 
policy of precisely similar intention, keeping her eyes 
fixed upon her Empire and her social problems, and 
refusing to intervene on the continent across the 
channel, and yet drctmistances have been too strong 
for her. In the present crisis we have been carried 
into the storm-centre of the struggle, and America 
herself, while she has avoided war, has by no means 
escaped the effects of iu The financial business of New 
York, no less than that of London, is at a standstill. 

She must take to heart the lesson of this catastrophe, 
and realise that for her, too, the phase of ** splendid 
isolation ** has come to an end. The present hurricane 
has bereft the ship of International Peace of her water- 
tight compartments : the next breach in her side will 
put the whole vessel in danger of foundering. 

By taking this burden, then, upon their shoulders^ the 
U.SJV. would be performing an act of international 
generosity which would be the proudest record in their 
history, but they wotild also be consulting their true 
interest, which is fundamentally identical with the 
interest of united Europe. They would be btlpiog to 
assture universal peace. 

From the objective point of view, there is no doubt 
that they are admirably qualified to tmdertake the task. 
They have no private interest in the Black Sea Straits^ 
and they are one of the strongest powers in the world : 
their decisions would therefore pass tmchallenged by 
all parties affected, especially as the self-denyir^ side 
of the Monroe Doctrine and the attitude they are main- 


taming in the present war, have won the U.S.A* an 
imperishable reputation for impartiality. Moreover, 
they have intimate connections with the population of 
the Territory. Since the close of last century the most 
enterprising and able-bodied peasants all over Eastern 
Europe have been finding their way across the Atlantic, 
undergoing the industrial metamorphosis, and returning 
home with smart coats on their backs, strong boots on 
their feet, and hard money in their pockets, to preach 
the good tidings of this Eldorado in the West* America 
is an even more present reality in the minds of the vast 
uneducated majority in Turkey and the Balkans than 
are the powers of Europe in the calculations of the semi- 
educated minority that controls their politics. Yet 
America has a strong footing among this important 
dass as well, for the only thorough secondary education, 
up to the modem civilised standard, that the inhabitants 
of these cotmtries can obtain without resorting to the 
foreign universities of Central and Western Europe, is 
given by Robert College, the famous American fotmda- 
tion on the European shore of the Bosphorus, which 
opens its doors to students of all religions and nationali- 
ties,^ and has been for years a beacon light amid an 
inconsdonable welter of hatreds and particularisms. 
The relations, therefore, between the American adminis- 
tration and the autonomous population of the Territory 
would be fotmded upon a strong tradition of respect and 

We conclude that America is the only power in the 
world capable of accomplishing this mission, and that 
the omens are in favour of her accomplishing it well. 

1 This foundation for men is supplemented by the American College 
for women on the Asiatic side of me Straits. It was originally opened 
for Christian girb of all nationalities within the Turkish Empire, but 
Moslems, too, have recently begun to send their daughters there. 


The true solution, then, of &e Black Sea problem, would 
be for Europe to throw herself on the United States' 
iaercy» and ask them to accept her commission, until 
she has built up among her various nationalities that 
common European patriotism which alone can give her 
the spiritual force to administer the trust herself. Those 
acquainted with the American political outlook will 
probably object that it is Utopian to propose sudt an 
issue, however desirable it might be ; yet even if the 
logical conclusion to which our ai^;ument has led us ts 
no more than a rednctio ad absardtan of the prevailing 
national antagonisms of Europe, it will at least point 
the moral that Europe can only be saved by her own 
efibrts, and that if she does not find an occasion for 
setting her house in order in the settlement after this 
war, she will never be able thereafter to arrest its 
progressive rum. 





We have seen that, by her presence at the Straits, 
Turkey chokes the egress of all the nations fronting the 
Black Sea coasts, which in every other respect have 
severally achieved national self-stiffidency and inde- 
pendence* This, however, is the least of her crimes. 
The area within her frontiers is a veritable cockpit of 
nationalities so mutilated that they have never even 
achieved that unity which is the essential preliminary 
to a national life* 

Turkey in 19x4 is sailing in those shoal waters in 
which Poland foundered in 1795, and if she wishes to 
avoid Poland's shipwreck, she must promptly lighten her 
drai^t by throwing overboard all superfluous cargo. 
We shall have eased her coturse considerably by relieving 
her of that solid bullion, the Territory of the Straits ; 
but she must reconcile herself to making jetsam of less 
cherished but bulkier properties as well, if she is finally 
to dear the ree£i and make the open sea. We will pass 
in review these bales of tetritorial merchandise. 

A. Thrace 

The carving out of the Straits Territory completdy 
severs from the Anatolian body of Turkey die European 
province of Thrace, left to her by the Treaty of London 
and the subsequent compromise with Bulgaria that 
followed the Second Balkan War. The population of 
Thrace is predominantly Greek, and though there 



is a sprinkling of Turkish villages throughout, and 
a considerable Bulgarian element in its mountainous 
North-Wcst comer, Greek Irredentism has naturally, 
and quite justly, kept the v^ole region inscribed on 
its book of claims. Most of those claims are already 
satisfied or else in process of satisfaction, but Thrace is 
probably destined to remain a bad debt. The decisive 
foctor here is Geography, and it assigns the territory 
unmistakably to Bulgaria. 

The natiural route of egress from the Bulgarian 
hinterland to a door on the .^^ean follows the lines of 
the Maritsa and its tributaries, &om their sources and 
&om over the watershed beyond, to their triple junction 
at Adrianople, and then proceeds due Southwards aloug 
the united stream, to the ports of Ainos and Dedeagatch 
on the East and West flanks of its mouth. 

Adrianople was built with the express strategical 
purpose of blocking this route. It was the bulwark 
of the venerable Bysantine Empire against Bu^aria 
in her Spring, and since the Berlin Treaty it has been 
the bulwark of a Turkey galvanised into life against a 
Bulgaria miraculously re-arisen from the dead. For 
a few months in 1913, Bulgaria, for the first time in her 
history, held the coveted prize in her grip, to lose it 
again by her own folly, when the Turkish artny quietly 
re-occupied the fortress during the war she had wantonly 
provoked with her former allies. The compromise 
which Turkey forced upon Bulgaria in her eztteniity, 
confirmed the retrocession of Adrianople and Kiik- 
Kilisse (its strategic complement) to the Turkish 
Empire, and though Bulgaria retained the Sgeaa coast- 
strip between the mouths of the Mesta and the Matitsa, 
for practical purposes her road to the sea was cut off 
again as effectually as ever. 


Near the Western end of .that coast there is the excel- 
lent harbour of Porto Lagos, backed by the fertile 
tobacco-growing plain of Xanthi, but this district 
is separated from the upper valley of the Maritsa by 
die immense barrier of the Rhodope motmtains, and 
though from the port a narrow-gauge railway might 
be engineered across them through Gimirdjina, Kir- 
djaU and Haskevi to Philippopolis, it could never, any 
more than the Bosnian railway, become a main artery 
of commerce. The main economic route must con- 
tinue to skirt the course of the Maritsa, and in fact a 
railway already runs from Sofia over the watershed to 
Philippopolis, and thence along the Right bank of the 
river all the way to Dedeagatch, the port westward of its 

This railway was purposely led by the Turkish 
military authorities through the ring of the Adrianople 
forts, and thus, though Dedeagatch itself has passed into 
Bu^;aria's possession together with the Right bank of the 
Maritsa below Adrianople, its railway communications 
with the Bulgarian interior are cut. It might seem 
possible to avoid Adrianople by constructing an "' all- 
Bulgarian "" loop-line from point to point on the Right 
bank of the Maritsa well inside the Bulgarian frontier ; 
but the low cotmtry suitable for railway engineering 
between the river and the Eastern bastions of Rhodope 
is narrow, and the Turkish military authorities quite 
justifiably insisted in indudii^ within their frontier, as 
rectified by the compromise, a wide radius of territory 
beyond the Adrianople forts on the Right banks of the 
Tundja and the Maritsa, on the ground that its pos- 
session was essential to the defence of Adrianople 
itself. This ^one stretches right up among the moun- 
tain spurs : the loop-line would have to be carried by a 


tmar ie force over the shoulder of Rhodope, and even 
then it could be cut at once, in the event of war, by a 
force astride the natural line of communications at 
Adrianople itself* 

This simply proves that Adrianople excellently fulfils 
its object, and that so long as it remains in Turkey's 
hands, free communication with the JEgtan is denied 
to Bulgaria. We proposed to meet the problem of 
Hungary's railway to the Adriatic and Russia's to the 
Atlantic by putting the politico-military and the eco- 
nomic control in different hands, but a similar solution is 
in this case impossible, because the Turkish government 
is too uncivilised and tmeducated to refrain on the least 
temptation from exploiting the brute force we should be 
leaving at its command. Unless she can prove some 
strategical necessity more pressing than Bu^iaria's 
economic need for an outlet on the JEgean, Turkey 
must evacuate Adrianople altogether. Till now she 
has been able to allege the defence of the Dardanelles 
and Constantinople, but when we have relieved her of 
that duty by pladi^ these positions in the keeping of a 
power, and tmder the sanction of a concert of powetSi 
that neither Bulgaria nor the united Balkan League 
would venture to impugn, the case for her presence at 
Adrianople falls to the grotmd, and nothing remains 
but to rescue Thrace at once from that misgovemment 
which Turkish chauvinism has aggravated during the 
past year in its impotent thirst for revenge* 

The incorporation of Thrace in Bu^ana will not 
benefit the latter cotmtry only : it will vastly improve 
the condition of the whole population of Thrace. The 
Greek elements will have to abandon their dream of 
national retmion, which, in the bitterness of the Second 
Balkan War, made them prefer the return of Turkish 



f, because it is by nature transitory, to Bulgarian 

tent that is too efficient not to strike roots* But 

le the Turk has made them suffer for their 

iwn policy of possessing their souls in patience. 

goaded them beyond human endurance, and 

such a foil to the Bulgar that they may actually 

once more as a deliverer, as they hailed him 

the Autumn of 191a. 

ly if we can install Bulgarian government in 
again with the good-will of the Greek population, 
make the future easier for all parties concerned, 
their atrocious behaviour in the Second Balkan 
is almost more than the Bulgarians deserve, 
not rely on good feeling alone to settle the 
question, but must safeguard the Greeks 
province by the strictest guarantees for their 
individuality* In fact, this is the least we 
to satisfy public opinion in the kingdom of 
vAndi has not yet risen to the insight of the 
^'s political good-genius, the premier Venezelos. 
ideed, recognises that the solution of all Balkan 
lies in compromises rationally concluded 
Lourably observed, and was always willing to 
funder Bulgarian rule the Greek population of 
itsa basin, if Bulgaria in return agreed that 
;es of her own nationality in the hinterland of 
should pass to Greece. The result of Bul- 
uncompromising nationalism was the Second 
War, by which Greece got more than her due, 
(aria lost much of what she could justly claim, 
id arrangement would at last make the 
ke even, and allow the two nations to forget the 
ttable relations of the past. 
It Turkish elements would actually have less cause 



for dreading the change than the Greek. The Turk 
has found by eq;>erience that good government by the 
fore^ner and the infidd is a happier lot than the I^k 
Age of his native regime ; and the Bulgars have been as 
successful in reconciling and assimilatix^ their Mosiem 
f ellow-dtisens, of whom there are la^e numbers in the 
North'-Eastem parts of the country^ as the Austrians have 
been in Bosnia or the Russians in Turkestan. When 
every Christian peasant in Bulgaria was called to the 
colours in the Stmmier of Z912, the Moslem neif^bour, 
whose services the Government did not demand for the 
Turkish war, undertook to gather in the harvest on the 
campaigner's fields. There is little doubt that if the 
Moslems of Thrace pass tmder Bulgarian administra- 
tion, their loyalty to their new cotmtry will soon be 
equally intense. 

The Bulgarians have no incentive to treat diis 
minority ill : the battle of Lule Bui^as settled old 
scores, and after the joint occupation of Salonika the 
Greek eclipsed the Turk as the national rival. Protests 
will come, not from the local Moslems, but from Turkish 
nationalism across the Straits. Adrianople was for a 
century the capital of the Ottoman State, and the tombs 
of the Sultans are there : the sophisticated Ottoman 
claims them as national monuments, and the city in 
which they stand as inalienable Ottoman soil. No 
apter example could be fotmd of the ai^;ument from 
historical sentiment, and we have only to classify this 
fallacy in order to dismiss it from consideration. The 
desire of a living poptilation, and not the pride of dead 
conquerors, must settle the destiny of Adrianople, asd 
it will not settle it in favour of the Turkish Empire, b 
Bulgaria's hands the tombs will be as well tended as the 
whole province. 


The material advantage that would accrue to all 
sections of the population alike is not open to doubt. 
For the first time since the Goths crossed the Danube, 
the country would be united economically with its 
natural hinterland, and therewith the prosperity it 
enjoyed in the second century after Christ would 
assuredly return : roads and railways would be multi- 
plied, and stock-breeding, vine-^n^wing and agricul- 
ture regain their footing on its desolate downs. 

After placing the national rights of minorities tmder 
guarantee, we may accordingly hand over to Bulgaria 
the sovereign rights of defence, communications and 
civil government throughout the province, up to the 
frontiers we have marked out for the Territory of the 
Straits, with the one proviso that she shall not fortify 
her new port of Rodosto on the Marmora coast, nor 
establish a naval base therein* 

B. Armenia 

We have now cut back the Turkish Empire from its 
encroachments on alien grotmd in the West : ^en we 
turn to the North-Eastem frontier, we are faced with a 
political anarchy and a racial chaos that demand more 
drastic pruning still* The question of Armenian nation- 
ality lies at the heart of this tangle* 

The Armenians have shown an indomitable national 
consciousness, and there are several strong factors to 
inspitt iu The first is common religion, a variety of 
Christianity with certain dogmas peculiar to itself, which 
distinguishes its professors not only from the Moslems 
among whom they live but from the international 
Oiristian Churches in other parts of the World. A 
second is common language, a branch of the Indo- 


European group that has followed a very indmdaal 
development of its own, and produced a voluminoQS, 
though chiefly ecclesiastical, literature. Finally diere is 
the common tradition of a political independence wfaidi 
endtured almost tmbroken for twelve centuries, and 
occasionally played a decisive part in the history of the 

Unhappily this tradition was eactinguished mm 
than eight centuries ago* Since then the only admifiis- 
trative bond uniting the Armenian people has been the 
organisation of their national Church, and the nation's 
history has resembled that of the Jews. The A^n^ 
nians in Dispersion have prospered exceedingly. They 
have shown an adaptability capable of assimilating 
European ways of life, not merely the social supe^ 
fidalities achieved by tibe Young Turks, but the solid 
f otmdations of spiritual ideas and technical skill ; and 
they have fotmd the energy to turn their acquisitions 
to account by rivalling and even outstripping their 
European teachers in the economic exploitation of the 
Nearer East, Their recent evolution has bridged the 
gulf between Asiatic and European, and, like the rise 
of Japan, tends to prove that the contrast between 
** Oriental *' and ** Occidental ** does not express unde^ 
lying difference of temperament so much as differena 
of phase in an identical process of growth. 

Japan, however, in her awakening has mainly utilised 
the political line of advance, while the political con- 
dition of the Armenian peasant who has stayed at home 
in his native mountain-valleys, has steadily been g(»ng 
from bad to worse. Moslem govenunent has gives 
the advantage to his Moslem neighbours from die 
Zagros moimtains on the South-East, the quite bar- 
barous nomadic Kurdish clans; and during the last 


generation of the nineteenth century the regime of 
Abdul Hamid converted this inevitable tendency 
towards official partiality into a deliberate policy of 
inflaming a racial feud, and destroying the Armenian 
nationality in the confl^ration* The Kurdish chiefe 
were decorated with Ottoman military rank, and their 
retainers enrolled as Ottoman irregular troops* Rifles 
were distributed to these ** regiments ** in abundance, 
while the Armenian population was prohibited under 
the severest penalties from carrying arms* Then the 
Kurds were let loose on the Armenians, as the Alba- 
nians were let loose on the Serbs in the valley of the 
White Drin* Village after village of native peasants has 
been laid desolate, that the intrusive Kurd may pitch 
his tents and pasture his flocks over the abandoned 
fields : the concerted massacres which have shocked us 
from time to time, are merely accentuations of a steadily 
pushed process, which is successfully annihilating the 
most civilised and industrious race in Western Asia, and 
replacing it by the most idle, squalid and unruly* 

The Armenian Dispersion lavishes its wealth in 
building schools, supporting refugees, and stemming 
^erever it can the tide of destruction, but it is powerless 
against the brute force of Turkish government in posses- 
sion* The situation is even worse tmder the new 
regime than under the old, for the administration cannot 
easily recall rifles recklessly delivered into Kurdish 
hands, even if it has the yNiXL to do so, while Young 
Turkish diauvinism looks askance at the Armenians' 
success, and contemplates their disappearance with 

The civilised World cannot zSord to let these out« 
n^es continue, and if the two Central European powers 
that have so far secured Turkey impunity are defeated 


in the present war» the whole territory where this state 
of things prevails must be severed firom the Turkish 
Empire at once* 

The true solution of the Armenian question is for- 
tunately not difficult to discern* There is no possi- 
bility yet of national self-government : the Armenian 
peasantry constitutes only one half of the population 
in this region, it is defenceless, and it is crushed by 
persecution* The first requisite is efficient govern- 
ment, inexorably just and irresistibly strong, which will 
carry out the serious military task of disarming and 
pacifying the Kurds, and proceed to establish law-and- 
order throughout the land* Under the shadow of sudi 
a government both races would for the first time be 
free to increase, multiply, and inherit this portion of 
the earth, according to their respective talents and 

** Strong govenmient ** of just the kind required 
exists already immediately across the frontier, and 
a large section of the Armenian population has long 
prospered tmder it It has been the fashion in 
England to depreciate the Russian administration in 
the Caucasus* ** It was imposed,'^ we say, ** by re- 
lentless warfare against small native mountain tribes 
struggling for their freedom, and this sacrifice of blood 
has not been justified by its results* On the one hand 
order is far from being perfectly established (we re- 
member the racial riots between Armenians and Tatars 
at Baku in 1904-5),^ and on the other hand the national 
development, not only of savage mountaineers, but of 
civilised Georgians and Armenians, has been stifled 

^ Though they are mot a fair exainple to cite, itiioe they were due to 
the transitory phase of anarchy which swept during these years over 
the whole Russian Empire, while agauist them must be set many decades 
of continuously efficient admihistnitiQn* 


with a heavy hancL^^ But we have only to look at our 
own ** North-West Frontier ** in India to see that 
Russians work in the Caucasus has been the most 
brilliant ttiumph of pacification in the nineteenth 

The British advance has stopped short at the outer 
spurs of the Hindu Kush* We have debarred the hill- 
tribes from makix^ a Uvelihood by raiding the Plains, 
and subsidised them in compensation for their loss; 
we enforce peace upon the road over the Khyber Pass, 
fay which trade passes from India to Kabul—and that 
is all, though those who have experience rightly account 
it much* But Russia has boldly penetrated to the 
Caucasus' heart, cut her military trails through its forest 
slopes, and built her post road over its central pass of 
Dariel from rail-head at Vladivkavkas to another rail 
at Tiflisy where the Transcaucasian line passes on its 
way from the Black Sea to the Caspian* Then she has 
cxmnected these two railway systems by a new line 
skirting the Caspian coast, and turning the range's 
Eastern flank* Above all, and through all, she has 
opened up the material resources of the whole territory 
to economic exploitation* 

It is true that Russia's Armenian subjects have 
sufEered, like the other national minorities in the 
Empire, from her mistaken policy of repression* 
Just as the Poles found the efficiency of ad- 
vanced Prussia more terrible than the slackness of 
backward Russia, the Russian poUce in turn pressed 
more hardly than the paralytic Turkish administra- 
tion upon Armenian nationalism* Twenty years ago, 
and again for a moment when the Turldsh Revolu- 
tion kindled so many hopes, there were Armenians 
who planned a national unification within a Turkey 


deceatcalised after enlargement at the ea^ense of 
the Russian frontier; but, as in Thrace, the Tuiis 
themselves have eflTectually shattered such ddusions, 
and there is not an Armenian now in the Turkish 
provinces who does not pray for the coming of Russia. 

Btrhmiadrin, the ecclesiastical cs^ital of the nation, 
is already in Russian territory, and even wbUt 
Armenian political ideah'sm still had a Turkish orieata- 
tion, the actual political centre of gravity was auto- 
matically shifting across the frontier* The Armenian 
husbandman, ^en the barrenness of the mountains 
and the ferociousness of the Kurds drive him to seek 
his fortune abroad, naturally gravitates to the most 
favourable market for his enei^es* He has found it in 
Russian Caucasia, and this is the best testimony of all 
to the virtue of Russian rule* Tiflis, the ancient 
capital of the Georgian nation, has become practically 
an Armenian city, boasting almost as large an Armenian 
colony as Constantinople, while the population of the 
native Armenian districts on the Rtissian side of the 
frontier is now about a quarter as lai^e again as the 
Armenian population in the Turkish provinces East 
of the Euphrates and North of the Tigris, though it 
occupies a territory of less than half this area*^ 

We must, therefore, attempt to hrixig within the 
Russian frontier all Turkish territory where the funda- 
mental population is Armenian, and where this popular 
tion's prosperity is being mined by the lq[alised 
aggression of the Kurds* 

^ Annenian populatioa in Tiflis xSSfOoo 

Armenian population in Constantinople • . xoz^ooo 

Armenian population in Russian provinces Akfaaltsik^ 

Kars^ Alocandropol, Erivan^ Nacfaitcfaevan, Shusa • 75o/x)0 
Armenian population in Turkish t e i ii t o f y within limits 


This territorial settlement ^ of the national question 
must take due account of the geographical factor, and 
it would begin by assigning Trebizond to the Russian 
Empire, because a great caravan route starts from that 
port across the mountains through Baiburt to Er^roum 
in the Armenian interior* The Lazic population of 
the coast strip, though it is not itself Armenian, is 
not Turkish either, but akin to the Georgians of 
the Caucasus*' The frontier should accordingly start 
from Tireboli on the South coast of the Black Sea West 
of Trebizond, and run due South, excluding Karahissar 
to the West, till it strikes the upper reach of the Kara Su 
C' Western Euphrates *') at a point below Endngan. 
Thence it should follow fhe course of the Euphrates 
Southwards, as far as Telek, where the river hits the 
Tatirus range running East and West, and slashes its 
way through fhe mountain barrier in a long, tortuous 
gorge, impassable for human traflic* 

The Armenian race is not confined to the Eastern 
bank of the Euphrates* When the Turkish avalanche 
from Central Asia shattered the old kingdom of 
Armenia in the eleventh century A.D*, a considerable 
fragment of the nation migrated across the river and 
beyond the open plateau of Malatia to the broken ribs 
of Taurus further West, where the Sihun (Sarus) and 
Jihun (Pyramus) come down Southwards between 
parallel mountain-lines to the plain of Adana and the 
sea* Here they founded a kingdom of Little Armenia, 
^vbidi threw in its lot with the Latin principalities 
carved out by the first Crusade, and took its full share 
in the losing battle against the returning tide of Uam. 

> See Map VL 

* Diitcreuce of religjoOy however, prevents Laze and Geoffian €roai 
sharing a coounon nat&mal conaci o mn cas. The Latcs are Modon* 


All the Ghrisdan states alike were extinguished in 
the fourteenth century, but the population did not perish 
with the kingdom, and the Armenians have hdd tbeir 
ground to this day in their second home* They have, 
moreover, been reinforced by that more recent eaqiansion 
from the original motherland, which has not aflEected 
this South-Eastern comer of Anatolia alone, but has 
endowed the urban centres throt^out the whole 
Eastern half of the peninsula with strong Armenian 

Yet in spite of their vigour and their increasing 
numbers, the Armenians have not made Eastern 
Anatolia their own* The Turkish substratum remaim 
the preponderant element West of Euphrates, as the 
Armenian East of the river, and though the memory of 
the terrible Adana massacres, perpetrated under the 
Young Turkish regime in 1909,^ will cause us to take 
the most stringent precautions for safeguarding the 
Armenian nationality in the territories left under Turkish 
government, it must not blind us to the actual numlkrical 
proportion between the two races in this region* Bxcqyt 
where professional brigands are subsidised for the tas^ 
like the Kurds across the river, it is only very weak 
minorities that suffer massacre: what tempted the 
Turkish masses to the crime, and justified it in their 
own eyes, was the sense that they were in an immense 
majority, and the hope that one determined stroke of 
brute violence might rid them altogether of these hated, 
progressive, alien tares in their uniform Moslem fiekL 
In execrating their action, we must not forget that the 
facts on which they based it remain roughly true* 

Having reached the goq;e of Telek, the new frontkr 
should leave the Left bank of the Euphrates, and proceed 

* Len than a year after the proclamation of the Constttutioa. 


fiist North and then East along the watershed between 
the Murad Su ('' Eastern Euphrates '0 ^^^ the upper 
Tigris, formed by a ridge of Taurus aknost overhanging 
the former stream, to a point immediately South of 
Mush. Here it should abandon the ridge, and turn 
through a complete right angle, taking a course due 
South alot^ a line West of the Bitlis-Sert road, till it 
strikes the Left bank of the upper Tigris. After reach- 
ing the Tigris, it should follow its course Eastward, 
past the junction of the Sert River (** Eastern Tigris '') 
from the North, to the point where the united stream 
turns abruptly South -East, and enters the gorge 
between the Tor-Abdin and Judi Dagh ranges. 

South-East of the basin of Lake Van and the course 
of the Sert River the Armenian element does not 
extend, and its limit coincides with the transition from 
the Anatolian plateau to the Zagros system, of which 
the Judi Dagh is the most North-Westerly spur. The 
Armenians are here replaced by another Christian 
popubtion, of di£Ferent race and sect, the ** Chaldaeans ** 
or ** Assyrians/* 

These are descended, as their name implies, from 
the earlier stratum of Semitic population in the 
lower basin of the Tigris and Euphrates* G>n- 
verted to the Nestorian form of Christianity in the 
fifth and sixth centuries A j)« by missionary propaganda 
from Edessa, they survived the oppression of the 
fanatically Zoroastrian Sassanid dynasty, and 
under the benevolent protection of the 
Abbasid Caliphate of Bagdad* This era of pros- 
perity was broken in the thirteenth century by the 
terrible Mongol invasions, which ruined Arabic 
culture* When Bagdad was sacked, the Christians 
fled to the fastnesses of Zagros which look down upon 


the Meaq;)oCaintan plain^ and the seat of their patriardi ' 
has been established sinoe then at Julamerk^ on the 
highest teach of the Greater Zab* Most of the refugees, 
however^ have not tarried on the Western slope of the 
mountains, but have crossed the watershed into the 
Urumia basint where they form the exclusive populatkm 
of a coxap^ct district on the West shore of the lake* 
Latterly the Chaldaeans have been exposed even more 
cruelly than the Armenians to Kurdish barbarity, and 
about half their villages on Lake Urumia have abandoned 
their allegiance to the patriarch at Julamerkr and 
accepted the Orthodox creed, in order to secure the 
protection of Russia* The inauguration of Russian 
^ strong government '* is in fact as essential to the 
survival of the Chaldaeans as it is to that of the Armenians, 
and the only solution is to include within the Russian 
frontier the whole area inhabited by this race, in addition 
to the Armenian plateau. 

The distribution of the Chaldaeans, however, oom- 
pletely cuts across existing political divisions. While 
Julamerk is in Ottoman territory, the Urumia basin, 
the nation's centre of gravity, belongs to Persia, and 
the Turco-Persian frontier follows the summit of the 
Zagros range* If, then, the whole Chaldaean nation is 
to be united under Russia's aegis, the Russian frontier 
will have to be advanced at the expense of Persia, as 
well as at the expense of Turkey* 

Fortunately, there is no obstacle to this, for Azer- 
the North-Westernmost province of Persia, 
^iriiich the Urumia basin lies, has no national 
connection with the state in which it is at present' 

^Ukt the Armenian Katholikot at Btchmiadztn, he is the political 
as well as the reli^fious head of the nation. 

"During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it several nmes 
dUMged hinds between Persia and Turkey. 


poltticaliy incorporated* While the Chaldatans occupy 
the Western side of the lake, the valleys that drain into 
it from the East, one of which contains the important 
town of Tabriz* are inhabited by an equally compact 
population of Tatars, who were deposited there by the 
Mot^ol dominion of the fourteenth century, and speak 
a variety of the wide-spread Turkish tongue* lliese 
have as little sympathy as the Chaldaeans with their 
Persian masters on the South, whose Iranian language 
they do not understand, and whose Shiah heresy they 
detest. All their links are Northward, towards the 
valley of the Aras, whence the railway is coming to 
Tabriz from the present Russian railhead at Julfa, and 
towards the broad steppes that fill the lower basin of the 
river as far as Baku on the Caspian coast, where half 
their race is already living contentedly under Russian 
rule* The ^ole population of the province appreciates 
the ** strong government " and the economic progress 
vfbidi the de facto Russian occupation ^ has begun to 
give them, and it would still further foster the advance 
of civilisation here if the gift were assured by the formal 
annexation of Azerbaijan to the Russian Empire* 

At the gorge between the Tor-Abdin and Judi Dagh 
ranges, the new Russian frontier should leave the course 
of the Tigris, and proceed Eastward again along the 
summit of the Judi Dagh, cross the Greater Zab below 
Julamerk, where it makes an abrupt bend from a 
South - Westerly to a South - Easterly direction, and 
continue Eastward along the Giaour Dagh, till it strikes 
the present Turco*Persian frontier at a point on the 
same parallel as the South end of Lake Urumia* After 

> Stfice I909» when the anarchy of the Penian Revolutictti led Russia 
to send a mce across the frontier into Azerbaijan, where the situation 
specuiily acute* 


crosao^ the eaasdng frontier-line it should run South- 
East^ excluding the whole basin of the Lesser Zab. 
When it reaches the thirty-sixth parallel, it should turn 
due Eastward along the latter, till it hits the headrwaters 
of the River Kisil Usun, ^ose course it should follow 
down continuously to its most Northerly point. Here, 
where the river turns at a sharp angle to the South- 
East, the frontier should break away again on a North- 
Easterly course of its own, and maintain it till it hits 
the present Russo-Persian frontier a few miles before 
its terminus at Astara on the Caspian Sea. 

The rectification of frontier we have just sketched 
out to Russia's profit and to Turkey's and Persia's loss, 
is unimpeachable from the point of view of the territories 
and populations immediately concerned* 

(u) It transfers nationalities, iii^ch, owing to their 
geographical interlacement and to the lawlessness wfaidi 
it stimulates, are in any case incapable for the present 
of governing themselves, from a vicious inconqietent 
government whose only policy is to foster anardiy by 
encours^ng the inferior elements to exterminate tbe 
higher, to a civilised '' stroi^ government " yAiidi has 
already dealt successfully in the Caucasus with a similar 
problem of even more serious dimensions* Ths 
government, if we place it in control, will use its ex- 
perience to secure the most enterprising, receptive and 
industrious races in the region from artificial reprcssico 
by brute force* 

After a few generations of good government, the 
Armenian peasant will have outstripped the Kurdish 
shepherd entirely, not by another abuse of oflfidal 
favouritism, but by his innate superior qualities* Every 
patch of soil will have been brought tmder cultivatioii is 
the valley bottoms and on the terraced moimtain-slopei 


of tke plateau, and the flocks of the nomad will have been 
pushed up into the high bleak hills, where vine and 
cereal can no longer compete with them* The popula- 
tion will have rapidly increased, and the growth will be 
to the account of the Armenian and not of the Kurdish 
section, because it will go hand in hand with the ^;ri- 
cultural development of the cotmtry* In the cruel 
winters the Kurd will be glad to descend from his 
mountain wilderness and harbour his sheep and goats in 
the comfortable Armenian village below* His children 
wiU frequent the local school (the Armenians may be 
trusted to establish a school in every hamlet), learn the 
Armenian language, and adopt in time, if they have the 
ability, the Armenian way of life* Like the Romance- 
speaking Vlach shepherds in modem Greece, the 
Kurdish dans will be absorbed in the Armenian nation, 
and ¥dule advancing in individual prosperity with the 
advance of the whole country, will sink to the relative 
position they deserve* They will cease to be a dominant 
race, and lend their name instead to a subordinate 
economic dass* 

When this stage has been reached, the national 
problem will have been solved* Armenia will be ripe 
to enter the phase of "' Home Rule,*' and take her place 
beside Poland and Finland as one of the self-governing 
members of the Russian Imperial Federation* 

(ii*) Besides securing the Armenians their spiritual 
birthright, the proposed frontier has an economic 
jtistification* It dosdy follows the ** divide ** between 
the commerce that flows to the Black Sea and Caspian 
ports on the one hand, and that which goes down to the 
Gulf of Iskanderun and the Persian Gulf on the other* 
This will become apparent when Western Asia has been 
better equipped with railways than it is at present* As 


omstniction prooeedst the frontier mil be found to 
mark a boundary between independent systems, that 
will only be crossed at a few points by trunk lines. 

In spite, however, of these undeniable merits, any 
proposal for such an extension of the Russian frontier 
will meet with a storm of protest from at least two 

(i.) Russophobes in Great Britain will have taken 
alarm already at the idea of ejecting the Ottoman 
Government from the Black Sea Straits, and this 
second scheme for docking Turkey on her Eastern 
frontier as well, and installing Russia in full possession 
of the Armem'an plateau, will put the last touch to their 
fears. ** How,'* they will ask, ** can we expect Turkey 
to act any longer as the bulwark of our Mediterranean 
route to India, if we wilfully break her strength<^' 

It will be sufficient for the moment to take these 
critics entirely on their own ground, and reply that, from 
the strategic^ point of view, size of territory is not die 
ultimate criterion of strengdi. It is true that we shaD 
have advanced the Russian frontier half the distance 
from Kars to Iskanderun, but the other half still 
remains, and Turkey, rid of her ulcers by the surgeon's 
knife and enabled to devote all her strength to building 
up her internal health, will erect a more formidaUe 
barrier in this comparatively narrow strip of native 
territory, than if she pushed a precarious, eiduusting 
domination over intractable alien populations as far as 
the very summit of the Caucasus. 

(ii*) We have a mudi more serious opponent to con- 
vince in Panislamism, which, so far as it concerns us, is 
the public opinion of the Moslem community in India. 


C* Panislamism 

The Indian Moslems have developed in latter years 
a strong self-consciousness* Unlike most Moham- 
medan populations, they are in the position of a minority* 
The Hindu and Tamil mass threatens more and more to 
engulf them, and in face of this danger they have put 
their trust in British rule* They have devoted them- 
selves loyally to the support of our ** strong government " 
in India, and adopted our ideal for the future of the 
** Indian Empire/^ With the increase of education 
among themselves, and of means of communication 
throughout the world, their interest has extended 
beyond the limits of India to international politics, and 
has natturally concentrated on the fortunes of Islam in 
other parts of the world* 

The spectacle that meets their eyes is melancholy* 
Everywhere Islam is receding and Europe triumphant. 
The battle for the penetration and possession of Central 
Africa has been fought out between them in the nine- 
teenth century to Islam's loss* The lAiolt continent 
is now partitioned among European powers, and even 
the ancient seats of Moslem civilisation along the 
Mediterranean coast have passed under European 
suzerainty, from Egypt to Morocco* In Central Aria, 
during the same period, Russia, which once obeyed 
the Tatar Khans on the Volga, has subjected the last 
independent Khanates along the Ozus, and bridled 
the freedom of the desert Turkomans* 

As they survey the Moslem World, the Ottoman 
Empire seems to them the only exception to the general 
dMkle. It akme, in the &ce of all Europe, preserves 
the old tradition that the Moslem is marked out by Gpd 


to be ruler, and fhe Christian to be his slave ; and wfaat 
is more important still to an orthodox Indian Sanm, 
cut off from his fellow-believers by a ring of headien 
Sikhs and Hindus, and of heretical Persians, the Otto- 
man state is the guardian of the holy cities of Islain, 
and the Ottoman sultan, by Itgai inheritance, the 
official head of the whole Faith. 

The grandeur of Turkey gives a concrete embodiment 
to the Indian Moslems^ sentiment. They feel them- 
selves to be a strong community, they have deserved 
well of the British Empire, and in return they jusdy 
claim the right to make their voice heard in its counsek. 
There is no doubt that they will exert their influence in 
favour of the Ottoman Government's point of view, and 
uncompromisingly resist any proposal to interfere with 
the integrity of the Ottoman &npire as it stands at 

We cannot neglect this attitude of Panislamism in 
India. We must examine the ideals that underlie it, 
and the view of existing facts on which it is based ; and 
if we conclude that these ideals will not be realised 
by the programme of supporting the present Turkish 
regime, because the real situation in Turkey does not 
correspond to the facts presupposed, we must franUy 
declare our belief. We must try to convince Panis- 
lamism of its error by argument, just as we have grappled 
before with the attitude of Germany, or with the Dual 
Monarchy's reason ffitre. 

The real desire of Panislamism is that the BXoslem 
populations which have so far preserved their inde- 
pendence from Christian dominion should not suc- 
cumb to the fate of the majority, but should on the 
contrary so develop their material resources by economic 
enterprise, and their spiritual wealth by educatioa, as 


to nise themselves to a footing of equality with the 
Euiopean nations^ and prove to the world that now once 
more, as a thousand years ago, Islam has an indis- 
pensable part to play in the advancement of civilisation* 

This is a noble ideal* It is the vision of a national 
regeneration in every sphere of human life, and 
because of its very universality, it includes as an 
incidental element the object of the British Rtissophobe* 
The latter, starting from the selfish standpoint of 
'' British interests,^' is led to demand that ** some power 
with the mihtary capacity to protect its own frontiers ** 
shall interpose itself permanently between the Russian 
Empire and the Mediterranean : the Panislamic hope 
of a Tturkey renewed in every limb fulfils and transcends 
this narrow, negative stipulation* Panislamism and 
Russophobia show signs of making a strange oppor- 
tunist alliance for the furtherance of their incom- 
mensurate aims, and we can answer them both in a 
single disputation* If the doubts of the Panislamist are 
set at rest, his British ally may depart assured that his 
own qualms are thereby satisfied* 

We first reply to Panislamism that the policy of die 
present ** Young Turkish '' regime is a mistake* Like 
the chauvinism of Berlin and Buda Pest, it is the obses- 
sion of a clique, not the interest of the people ; and now 
that it has been given rein, it will carry the last inde- 
pendent Moslem state into the same irreparable disaster 
into which the Central European Empires are being 
plunged by the present war« 

The Turkish Govermnent still rules Christian sub- 
jects, Greeks in Thrace and Armenians East of 
Eiqphrates* If this really ministers to the Indian 
Moslem's pride, it is a condemnation of his political 
judgment rather than of his political morality, for the 


opptfwon of Greek and Armenian is almoit out- 
balanced by the su£Fering of the Moslem peasant on 
whom falls the burden of holding them down by fioioe. 

Turkey has only half the population ^ of the smallest 
of the six Ettfopean powers ; she is infinitely poorer 
than any of them, in eoonomic and social development 
incomparably more backward ; yet no European state 
exacts such a heavy blood tax from its citizens as Turkey, 
whose people can least afiford it* The length of service, 
both with the colours in youth and with the varknis 
classes of reserve in later life, is in excess of most other 
conscript armies,* and mobilisation is far more frequent* 
On a partial scale, to combat the never outwearied unrest 
of the subject poptUadons, it is practically chronic^ and it 
occurs on the grand scale whenever the breath of war 
begins to blow in Europe, even when, as in the pcesent 
crisis, the interests involved do not naturally afifect the 
Turkish people at all. This lu^pens because the sub- 
ject populations are ever ready for the final war of 
liberation, and because the neighbouring states are 
always waiting for the opportunity to assist them* They 
know too well the Turkish government's incurable 
policy of adventure, which will not face acconqrftshed 
facts, but still dreams of recovering Mitylene and Khios, 
and perhaps of re-entering Sabnika* 

Supposing that, through the tritmiph of the Central 
European powers, the Porte were to recover all the 

* No exact statistics have ever been taken, but since the territonal 
losses of Z9za-z3 the numbers cannot much exceed ao,ooo,ooo. 

* The terms of compulsory service for the infantry are as follows : 

Active service with the colours « .3 years. 

Active service in the reserve • 6 ^^ 

Landwefar service g „ 

Landsturm service 2 ^ 

Total service (from aoth to 40th year of age) ao 



territories it held in Europe before the Autunm of X9Z2# 
this success would bring the Turkish peasant nothing but 
added misery* For him it would be a shouldering of 
cast*o£F burdens : he would once more spend years of 
hts life garrisoning Macedonia far away £rom his family 
and his Anatolian farm, to perish at last most probably 
in some futile summer campaign to ** Ottomanise "" the 
untamable Albanians* The Turkish peasant is dumb : 
he has no education or cohesion, and therefore no public 
opinion : but if he could give expression to his will in a 
plebiscite, he would vote for being left in peace, and ask 
for some government which would not herd his folk out 
oi their villages in thousands, and send them .without 
commissariat, muziitions of war, or medical succour, to 
perish in the deserts of Tripoli or on the stricken field of 
Luk Burgas* Since he is too inarticulate to express 
this, it is surely the mission of Panislamism, which has 
the ear of the civilised world and knows how to address 
itself to it, to speak for him and save him from his own 
government, instead of encouraging that government 
to exploit him to the detriment of his neighbours, and 
the danger of the general peace* 

The Porte claims the Indian Moslem's allegiance as 
the protector of the Holy Cities* But here again let 
him try his religious sentiment in the fire of reality, and 
imaiffnt himself in the place of the unhappy Turkish 
conscript, transported £rom his temperate upland home 
in Anatolia to the military posts along that tropical 
volcanic plateau of ** Stony Arabia '' over which the 
Hejaz railway runs from Damascus to Medina, or 
worse still, dispatched by troop-ship down the Red Sea 
to the terrible, interminable Yemen campaign from 
which no soldier ever returns ; or let him think of the 
Yemeni Arab himself* Heir to an archaic civilisation. 


isolated to an unparalleled degree by the deserts, he 
IS not normally afiEected for good or evil by the rise 
and fall of world-empires ; but now he is desperately 
at bay against the brutal, meaningless aggression of 
Turk^ Imperialism, which has no better gift for him 
than for the Armenian or the Greek* 

The Indian Moslem is misled by his own eacperienoe. 
In India Islam is a nationality* Its professors may have 
been Arab, Persian, Afghan or Mogul when they came 
as oonquerors to the oountry, yet now they are ooe 
blood, bound together by the common menace of Hindu 
race-hatred* Conditions are different in the Ottoman 
Empire* The menace of the Unbeliever is here imper- 
fecdy realised, and national antagonisms find an arena 
within the ** Bulwark of Islam*^' Otur educated Indian 
Panislamist should talk to an educated Panarab from 
Egypt, if he wishes to discover how Moslems of Arab 
speech feel towards the political ambitions of their 
Turkish co-religionists* 

The Egyptian will agree with the Indian emphatically^ 
that the rule of the European is a humiliation for Islam, 
and that British administration, however beneficial or 
even necessary it may be for the moment,^ must be no 
more than a transitory phase in the long history of 
Egypt and India ; but he will tell him that he has e^>eri- 
enced one thing worse than British occupation, and diat 
was the tyranny of the Turkish official class, which 
Great Britain ended just a generation ago* '' It is 
only when I think what we su£Fered from the Turk," 
he will conclude, ** that I can find it in my heart to 
tolerate his British successor*'' 

The founder of Islam was an Arab* He wrote his 

* Though, except for the work of the irrigation engineers, he will bt?e 
much less good to say of it than the Indian. 


Book in his native toi^ue, and his nation carried the 
book and the religion it proclaimed to the Atlantic 
on the one side and to Central Asia on the other* The 
Empire they founded converted Islam from a frenzy 
of outcast barbarians into a culture whose poetry, 
science and philosophy are the foundation of all Nearer 
Eastern civilisation to-day, just as the culture of the 
Roman Empire is the spiritual basis of Modem Europe* 
The Arab empire, moreover, like the Roman, was 
broken in pieces by a deluge of rude invaders £rom 
the North* The Turks, like the Teutons, had vitality 
enough to realise the greatness of the civilisation upon 
which they had stumbled, and to submit themselves to 
its spell ; but they too lacked the genius to conjure back 
to life the exquisite thing they had destroyed* The 
confused attempts of Turkish dynasties to build up 
again in brick the Arab palaces of marble constitute 
the Dark Age of Moslem history* The house of 
Othman, the supreme creation of Turkish political 
strivings, is a house built upon the sands* It was 
doomed to dissolution from the beginning as surely as 
was the ** Holy Roman Empire*'^ 

When Sultan Selim I* conquered Egypt in 15x7, he 
caused the last Arab Caliph of the Abbasid line, who 
sheltered there under Mamluk protection, to bestow 
the mande of the Prophet upon him and his heirs 
for ever* The transaction was as unreal as that scene 
in the Vatican, when the Pope, the highest representa- 
tive of Latin civilisation, crowned Charlemagne with the 
diadem of the Roman Empire which his predecessors 
had trampled in the dust ; and the one inheritance was 
no less fatal than the other to its recipients* Selim, 
like Charlemagne, has had many successors of strong 
will and able counsel, but they have su£Fered the tragedy 


of the Hohenstaufen, and squandered the strengdi of 
their empire in pursuii^ the wiU-o'-the-wisps of a dead 
world's ideas. 

Meanwhile, the Arab revival has been paralysed by 
this heroic sham, as Italy was paralysed by ^e visitations 
of the medixval Emperors ; and if the encoun^ement 
of Indian Panislamism breathes misduevous confidence 
into this sham once more, it will work as mudi woe to 
all Islam, Arab and Indian and Turk alike, as the 
triumi^ of its accomplice, the renovated Gernun 
Imperialism, will work to Europe, if it wins this war. 

Yet our Panislamist (or his Young Turk ptot^, 
speaking through his mouth), while admitting all that 
we have pointed out, will still put up a plea of hif^ier 
necessity for the existence and policy of the present 
Turkish regime. It will be very much like the apologia 
of Piussianism, its ensample. " We confess/' he will 
sadly begin, " that Turkish Imperialism frustrates the 
material advancement of the Turkish peasant, and stunts 
the national life of his Arab fellow-subject ; but it is 
their common duty to bear these disadvantages patn'otic- 
ally for the sake of Ishna. They must sacrifice them- 
selves to support their government, because the Ottoman 
Empire is the one sovereign independent state left in 
bhun, and if this empire falls, the Menlem populations 
it safeguards will be partitioned, like all their brethren, 
among the Christian powers. Sudi an event might, 
quite probably, increase the economic prosperity and 
social well-being of the individual Moslem more 
rapidly, for the moment, than the continuance of die 
Ottoman administration ; but even the Christians have 
a proverb that ' Man does not live by bread alone.* 
For a ' mess of pottage ' the Moslem subjects of die 
^Porte would be bartering away the birthright of Islam, 

^Fortc w 


making impossible the great ideal of the futtire, a self- 
goveming Moslem nation that shall hold its head as h^ 
as the nations of Europe/' 

If Pamislamism takes up this position, we must 
undeceive it still further* We do not call "' Young 
Turkey ^' a sham merely because it taxes the strength 
of the Turkish peasant in order to maltreat weak 
Christian nationalities in defiance of strong Christian 
powers, and to pose grotesquely as the successor of the 
Arab Caliphate in the captaincy of Islam* In spending 
the blood-tax wrung from the peasant upon objects 
entirely alien to the peasant's interest, the government 
of Turkey would be practising a fraud at least no grosser 
than that committed by the two Central European 
Empires against their industrial conscripts* The 
supreme sham is the '^ strength and independence "' of 
the Ottoman Empire itself* 

The German government takes toll of blood and iron 
from the German nation, to fashion from them a mailed 
fist, quivering with a vitality that gives government and 
nation enleagued not only security to walk their own 
ways unhindered, but power to take the initiative in 
evil Bggrtsaion against their neighbours* The mili- 
tarism of the Porte, which impresses the Indian Moslem 
and ruins the Turkish peasant with its wars and 
rumours of wars, has no effect whatsoever on the destiny 
of the Turkish Empire* Her army would not have 
saved Turkey from annihilation sixty years ago, if 
England and France had not fought the batde against 
Russia in her behalf, and during the two generations 
that have passed since then, Turkey, threatened with 
destruction again and again, has owed her preservation 
invariably to the mutual jeabusies of the European 
powers, and never to the strength of her own right 


arm* In 1877 the defence of Plevna, gallant ^aouf^ it 
was, did not prevent the Russians from forcing the 
Qiataldja lines : a diplomatic warning from the other 
powers kept them out of Constantinople when the forts 
were down, and the Treaty of Berlin rescued for Turkey 
half her territories in Europe* 

The Indian Moslems must face the fact that the Porte 
is not the champion of Islam, but a parasite upon the 
national rivalries of Europe* Turkey^s fate is not in 
her own hands, and whatever be the issue of the war 
that is now being waged between the European powers, 
it will in any case expose the Turkish sham by patting 
a decisive end to Turkey's present position* 

But the Panislamist who has studied the relaticms 
between the Porte and the European nations during 
the last century, will be justified in forming the very 
lowest idea of European political morality* The actual 
survival of the Turkish regime until the present moment 
is the most crushing indictment of it ; and the attitude 
of all the powers to the calamities Turkish chauvinism 
has continued to cause, has been so uniformly selfish 
and cold-blooded, that even an impartial spectator might 
plausibly ignore Turkey's guilt, and lay the responsi- 
bility at Europe's door* In discussing, then, with an 
Indian Moslem the probable behaviour of these natkms 
towards Turkey after the present war is over, we shall 
carry greater conviction if we leave any possible factor 
of idealism out of the question, and assume that all alike 
will follow motives of the strictest self-interest* 

What has Turkey to expect from the respective tritimph 
of the two rival groups of powers i 

Ever since the rapprochement between France and 
Russia nearly twenty years ago, Germany has been 
offering her friendship to Turkey with increasii^ 


earnestness* The two powers have fotuid a oonunon 
object in their policy towards the Entente, and at the 
present crisis Germany has put ready money, first-dass 
warships, and skilled soldiers at Turkey^s disposal, and 
persuaded her to join in a struggle the issue of which is 
this concerted policy's success or failure* 

If Germany had no other interest in the Turkish 
Empire than its military value in the battle for the supre- 
macy of Europe, Turkey might win Germany's gratitude 
and her own advant^e by throwing her sword into the 
balance; but the Tturkish sword weighs too light to 
affect the scales* Its value to Germany is negligible, 
and if the Entente is crushed it will vanish altogether. 
In her inmost heart Germany looks at the Turkish 
Empire, not as an ally in the war, but as the prize of 

Turkey lies nearer than any other part of Asia to 
Europe ; it contains temperate country suitable for 
European colonisation, besides semi-tropical ootmtry 
that can grow raw materials for Europe's industry, and 
supply markets for her finished productions ; above all, 
it is a dominant position in the strategical geography of 
the World* Germany claims the ** Sick Man's " grati- 
tude because she has saved his festering limbs from the 
amputation which was their natural destiny, but she 
has only done so because she has a more voracious 
ambition than his former physicians : she purposes to 
swallow him whole like a boa-constrictor, and digest 
him without any preliminary breaking of his bones* 

If Germany wins, the Porte may be maintained in 
being for many years as Germany's cat's-paw, but the 
Moslem nationalities, over whom the Porte rules, and 
whose future is the hope of Panislamism, are doomed 
to extinction* Germany knows that she cannot undo 


Great Britain's work in Australia or New Zealand^ and 
transform them into German lands : the vitality of the 
new Anglo-Saxon nations we have founded there is 
already too strong* Anatolia offers far better prospects. 
Its cliioiate is equally temperate, while its poputation 
is no match yet for Europeans in numbers, energy, 
civilisation, or any other factors of survival* Turk and 
Arab would vanish away before German immigratiofi 
as the Red Indian faded before the Anglo-Saxon onrush 
in North America, and the last hope of Islam would be 
blasted by the first realisation of the Pangerman Idea* 

Turkey may be linked to Germany by common 
ant^onism towards the EnUnUp yet for ^e Moslem 
nationalities the result of Germany^s victoiy would be 

** But what,^^ our Panislamist will ask, ** if the Allies 
are victorious i You have already spoken plainly about 
dismantling the Turkish Empire, and if once you lay 
violent hands on its integrity, I fear you will not 
stop till you have achieved its dismemberment* You 
reassure your Russophobe by promising that his de- 
mands shall be satisfied, and reassure us by explaining 
that the Russophobe^s standpoint is identical with our 
own, but the flames of a war like this melt down the 
established policies of nations* You hope to fof^e in 
this furnace a Concert of Europe* Suppose you succeed, 
and that England, France, and Russia pass beyond the 
stage of opportunist alliance and arrive at a profound 
mutual understanding : the Russophobe^s point of view 
will have become obsolete in a moment, and the union 
of Europe will be cemented by the partition of the 
Moslem nationalities* The opiate of * compensation * 
dulls the ache of the most irreconcilable ambitions^ 
France rested her daims on Egypt when England 


secured her a free hand in Morocco, and we can easily 
forecast how the Three Powers will carve the Arabic 
provinces of Asia into * spheres of influence/ and 
actually bring sullen, defeated Germany within die 
European fold (if their statesmanship rises to the 
occasion) by offering her the coveted Anatolia as a 

This is a shrewd interpellation, and it does even more 
than justice to our lade of scruple; but it fails to 
envisage the fact that this war, though it may have been 
precipitated by the conflict between incompatible 
applications of the same crude nationalistic idea, is 
being fought out on the issue of incompatible ideals* 
The cause of the Allies does not stand for the triumph 
of one group of aggressively ambitious nations over 
another, nor for the coalition of both groups in a 
criminal conspiracy against the rest of the world : we 
have identified ourselves with the victory of three great 
principles — 

(L) That the general peace of the world is our 
sovereign interest, and that no political or economic 
advantage of an individual kind is commensurate with it. 

(ii.) That peace can only be secured by giving free 
play to every manifestation of the spirit of Nationality* 

(iii«) That national self-government, so far from being 
inimical to foreign economic interests in the country 
whert it obtains, is able to reconcile otherwise incom- 
patible ambitions by giving them a neutral political 
medium to work in. 

The statement of these principles at last brings us 
out of the wood* The realisation of self-conscious- 
ness and self-government by the Arab and Turkish 
nationalities in the Nearer East is not merely the 
ultimate object of Panislamism or the ephemeral 


programme of English Rtissophobia : it is one of die 
most important foundation-stones of that ideal structure 
of European harmony and international peace to wfaidi 
Great Britain and her allies stand publicly pledged, and 
which we cannot betray without forfeiting the sympadiy 
of neutrals in the present crisis, and destroying all 
confidence in our honour for the future* The Pan- 
islamist may assure himself that not even the most 
brilliant opportunity of immediate material gain would 
tempt us thus to &lsify our ^ndiole position, while the 
fact that adherence to these principles is the sole meaos 
of winning the Panislamist^s trust and good-will, afibrds 
a further proof to ourselves of the proposition from 
which we started, that our own true interest lies in a 
** disinterested ** effort to secure impartial justice to all 
our neighbours. It is our part, then, to proclaim our 
solenm intention of laying this stone true, and to sketdi 
out a plan for fashioning it to fit its destined place. 

D. The New Anatolia 

Anatolia is physiologically a part of Europe, the 
fourth of those mountain-ribbed peninsulas that reach 
out from the European mass, and bathe their feet in 
the Mediterranean sea. It is an immense plateau of 
the same proportions and climatic diaracter as Spain* 
An arid central upland is embattled against the coast on 
North and South by parallel sierras, clothed in forest, 
and rich in streams which are all engulfed, after a brief 
course, either by the sea on the outer flank or the steppe 
within : only towards the West does the plateau sink 
in long, fertile river valleys to a clement, sheltered 

The aboriginal population of the region is a 


in that chain of ^' Brachycephalic ^^ stocks which 
occupies the Eurasian concatenation of mountains from 
the Alps to the Mongolian tableland. It is distinguished 
by its sturdy build, hooked nose, and ** sugar-loaf *' 
skull* No race in the world's history has succumbed 
so readily to the impress of foreign nationality and 
civilisation, while none, perhaps, has shown such a 
reserve of passive vitality, stich a power of perpetuatmg 
its fundamental characteristics* 

For more than two thousand years ^ the race was 
exposed to the continually intensified influence of the 
Greeks, the strongest nationality in the Andent World, 
till the Greek language had supplanted all the native 
dialects, and Greek civilisation become the standard of 
Anatolian uniformity. Dtuing the last eight centuries 
the Turk from Central Asia, the most vigorous race 
that has yet entered the world of Islam, has conquered 
this land from the Infidel and made it peculiarly his own. 

The Turkish lat^^us^e, always one of the crudest in 
the world, and the Greek, once the most exquisite, 
match one another in nothing but vitality and proselytis- 
ing power : they have meastured their strength in the 
battle for the dominion of the Anatolian race, and the 
Turkish speech has won. In Cappadoda (the Eastern 
part of the plateau) the Greek dialects spoken by the 
dwindling Christian section of the population are on 
the eve of disappearance at this moment : their syntax 
has already conformed to the Turkish structure, and 
soon no trace will be left of them except a few fossils 
in the local Turkish vocabulary. Even on the East 
coast, Greek nationality nowhere now maintains itself 
with any vigour except at a few ports like Smyrna and 
if where it is backed up by the Greek sea-traffic 

^ Pxom about zaoo b.c« to zo6o aj). 


of the JBgtan and by the dose pioxunity of Greek 

Yet though the Anatolian race has been converted 
to the speech of its Turkish conquerors as completely 
as it was converted to Hellenism before, and has adc^jited 
the Moslem creed they carried with them, it has in- 
formed its new religion and nationality with its own 
peculiar spirit* The "' Ottoman '" peasant thus pro- 
duced has litde in common with other populations that 
hold the same faith and speak the same tongue — Tatars 
of Baku, Kirghiz nomads on the Central Asiatic steppe^ 
or Kashgari villagers in Chinese Turkestan : we can 
discern much more clearly his aflKnity with the Phrygian 
or Cappadodan familiar to the andent Greek* He has 
the same stolidity and lack of initiative (with thetr 
complementary virtues), as antipathetic then as now to 
the Levantine of the /Egean« He has even the same 
trappings of material life, from his housing-system down 
to the conical-hat and curly-toed boots that distinguish 
the Hittites in ^yptian bas-reliefs ; and beneath this 
exterior crust bum the same volcanic fires of religious 
frenzy which gave the cult of Attis and the Great 
Mother to Hellenism, and have forced upon Islam, 
since Anatolia entered the Moslem world, the "" reviva- 
listic'' ecstasy of the '^spinning dervisli,"" so extra- 
ordinarily alien to Islam^s sober genius* 

The Anatolian, then, has a marked national character : 
he is also ripe for national self-^vemment. To us 
the Tturkish Empire is a symbol of political ineptitude^ 
but three centuries ago our ancestors looked upon the 
Sublime Porte as the most effident government in 
Europe, and admired the solidity of its paved h^^ 
roads and nobly-arched bridges, the magnificence of its 
karavansarais, mosques, and arsenals, the professional 


skill of its fleets, artillery, and standing army, precisely 
as Herodotus admired the far less ably oi^anised empire 
of Darius* Since then the Turk has been outstripped 
by Europe, but if he has stood still, he has at any rate 
not lost ground* To govern oneself, moreover, is an 
easier task than to govern an empire, and if the Turk 
now confines himself to this, there is no reason why 
he should not succeed as well as his former subjects 
in the Balkans* 

Anatolia will not become, any more than the Balkans, 
an industrial country, and the Turk will always be a 
laborious peasant rather than a keen-witted business 
man, but the political problems set before him will be 
simple* For four centuries the country has been in 
profound peace, and law and order are as firmly rooted 
there as in any state of Southern Europe, in striking 
contrast to the anarchy into which race hatred has 
plunged Macedonia and Albania, so much nearer to the 
centres of Etuopean civilisation. Abdul Hamid first 
conceived the fiendish idea of spreading this infection 
to his Asiatic subjects, yet unlil^ the chronic violence 
of the '' bands '" in Macedonia, the massacres of 
Greeks and Armenians in the Anatolian towns have 
not become more than hideous violations of a normal 

If official chauvinism, by murder, forcible con- 
version, banishment, and that terrorism which leaves 
no real alternative to emigration, were to succeed in its 
object of eliminating these Christian populations from 
Anatolia altogether, it would be dealing as fatal a blow 
to the country^s future prosperity as the Castilian 
government dealt to Spain, when it robbed her of her 
Moors and Jews* At that period the Porte showed its 
superiority to contemporary Christendom not merely 


in efficiency but in liberality of soul, by giving tlie 
Spanish Jews harbourage in its own commercial ddes, 
to their contentment and to the advantage of their 
adopted home* Since then Ottoman ** official drdes/' 
in contradistinction to the Ottoman nation, have 
deteriorated indeed* They are venting their fury for 
their Balkan defeats not only upon the Greeks dF the 
Thradan frontier, but upon the entirely unimplicated 
Greek population of the West coast, and now that they 
have pltmged their country into the great European 
war, they may be expected to instigate fresh massacres 
of their Qiristian subjects at any moment. 

This governing class, with the hopelessly debaudied 
tradition which has descended from Abdul Hamid to 
the clique that overthrew him, must be swept away 
before it can complete its disastrous work. The 
Armenians and Greeks whom it is seeking to destroy 
are an indispensable element in the progress of die 
country. They possess all the qualities of brain that 
the native Anatolian lacks, and they have furdier 
improved their brains by education. To begin with, at 
any rate, the new Anatolian national government will 
depend largely upon them for its personnel, and they 
will render faithful service to the alien country of their 
birth if she grants them the scope which their abilitks 
deserve. They are as able minded as are the classes 
of corresponding education in Europe, they have 
always been employed in the subordinate grades of 
the Ottoman administration, and the greatness of the 
Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
falls in lai^e measure to their credit* The Anatolian 
Christian is the chosen vessel for the fulfilment of die 
Panislamist's prayer, the elevation of the Anatolian Turic 
to an equality with die nations of Europe. 


The people of Anatolia must be given as free a hand 
as possible to build up a native political tradition on a 
new basis* The present government has taken the 
opporttmity of the European war to denounce the 
** Capitulations/' and the diplomatic representatives of all 
European powers have protested s^ainst their action* 
It certainly has no legal justification, and is but a further 
exemplification of the existing regime's true character* 
If, however, the immense changes we have proposed are 
to any extent realised, we must do our part by letting 
this protest lapse* In reimposing the Capitulations 
upon a reformed national government of Anatolia we 
should be committing a grave error, not because the 
administration of justice will be pu^ed by magic of its 
imperfections, but because any improvement of it will 
be impossible so long as these humiliating exceptions 
to its writ are maintained* 

European residents in Turkey enjoy these privileges 
by a historical chance, but Europeans elect to reside 
in many worse-governed cotmtries without similar 
guarantees* If, moreover, that vital artery of inter- 
national commerce, the Black Sea Straits, be removed, 
as we propose, from Turkish jurisdiction, the most 
important European commercial colony which the 
Capitulations serve to protect will be withdrawn from 
the operation of Turkish justice* 

Anatolia must start its new political life untrammelled, 
yet political self-government is not the only factor in 
the prc^ess of a cotmtry* If it is to play its part in 
modem international civih'sation, it must also tap its 
native sources of material wealth, and this can only be 
done by the generous application of capital* Deposits 
of minc^ ore are valueless till elaborate plant is brought 
to bear on them by men with skill to work it* The margin 


of the central steppe cannot be made to yield com again, 
as it did in the eleventh century aj)* before the Turk 
came^ till the motmtain torrents have been made to 
deliver their last drop of water to the husbandman by 
irrigation-canals below and barrage-storage in the high 
valleys, and till reapii^ machinery has been imported 
from Lincoln or Chicago* Neither grain nor metal 
can be brought within reach of consumers till mine and 
field have been put into communication by rail with the 
port on the coast* 

These operations must be carried out before a single 
atom of wealth can be extracted from the resources 
they are intended to throw open, and their installation 
is very costly* They can therefore only be tmdertaken 
if some surplus has been saved from wealth previously 
produced by another source or in another quarter. 
Such surpluses do not easily begin to accrue, but once 
they have started, their effect on the production of 
wealth is so immense that they grow by geometrical 

The nucleus of that capital which in little more than 
a century has transformed the face of the world, was 
accumulated by the middle class in the nations of 
Western Europe, after they had put wars of religion and 
constitutional struggles behind them, and arrived at a 
strong national government which set them free to turn 
their best energies into economic channels* The force 
that resides in capital, the magic power of transforming 
the earth and of conjuring wealth from its bosom, has 
placed the rest of the world at Europe^s feet ; but in 
Turkey, as in other countries that have lagged behind 
Europe in political advance, such accumulation has 
never been made* Aimless wars of adventure have 
continued to keep the peasant living from year to year 


on the verge of ruin, and the Greek and Armenian towns^ 
folk, who had the intellectual and moral capacity for 
achieving as much as the European middle class, have 
been singled out for repression by the Turkish govern- 
ment* Turkey must borrow the capital she requires, 
not from her own citizens, but from Europe ; and 
Europe, finding that she holds a monopoly of this 
commodity with which Turkey cannot dispense, is not 
disposed to offer her a market on easy conditions. 

The history of exploitation in Anatolia centres round 
the construction of her railways*^ Immediately after 
the Crimean War an English and a French company 
acquired concessions for lines which started from 
Smyrna, the natural capital of Anatolia on the middle 
point of the West coast, and worked Eastwards up the 
river valleys on to the interior plateau* The French 
line has now been pushed up the Hermus valley through 
Ala Shehr (Philadelphia) to Afiun Kara Hissar, and 
the English line up the parallel Maeander valley to the 
south throt^h Aidin to Qiivril and Buldur** Germany, 
however, since she supplanted England and France in 
the Porters friendship, has blocked the further advance 
of these two railways by securing the concession for a 
railway to Bagdad. 

The German line starts from Skutari, the Asiatic 
suburb of Constantinople in a remote comer of Anatolia, 
and makes its way Southwards past Ismid to the 
plateau level at Eski Shehr, across a very difficult series 
of mountain ranges among which the Sangarius winds 
in gorges* Thereafter the way is plain to Afitm Kara 
Hissar, and the line proceeds South-East along the inner 

Vf > See Map VL 

f-V'The two lines reached Kassaba and Aidm r e sp e c t i vely in i866. 

See Map VI. 



edge of Taurus through Konia to Bulgharlu, a village 
at the foot of the Bulbar Dagh, where the Taurus wall 
begins to ttim Nortb-East, and the railway, if it is to 
continue its oiuise, must pierce it by a mighty tunnel. 

As £ar as this tunnel, the line has been in working order 
for some years.* Its achievement is a triumph of that 
co-operation between individual capital and national 
diplomacy by vriiich modem Germany has effected so 
much. Besides pointing the way to the promised land 
beyond the Taurus, it absorbs such internal trade as 
already exists in the section of Anatolia to the North- 
East, except for the little that goes in and out by the 
Bladi Sea coast. Connection with the French rail-head 
at Aiiun Kara Hissar is carefully avoided, so that 
all tiafiEc which reaches that point from the East is 
oon^xUed to pass the vriiole way along the German line 
to l^taii instead of takii^ the natural route to Smyrna. 

This masterly railway is the most potent instrument 
Germany has foiged for diverting all new wealth tapped 
in Anatolia into German pockets, and finally turning the 
country itself into a G^man-peopled land. Yet this 
policy is not peculiar to Germany. It is only a particu- 
larly successful instance of whzt all European nations 
attempt, with more or less singleness of aim and persever- 
ance, so soon as a well-placed loan brii^ a more back- 
ward country into their power. It is usury in the most 
sinister sense, conduct^ on a national scale. 

Honourable investment aims at an increase of wealth 

< Tbc ooacaa i on for die txttaaoa n Bagdad was unedta Jamatr 
1900. jlKCddBtantuioptt-unudsecDoiiivaiooQiiHftcdascnff asi87% 
•nd estendcd to Kotua after 1888 by die Anatolian Raihray Cmofaaj. 
This was M first a combined Gennano-British concern; but the 
German poop aoon bou^t out the Britisb rigba, and proceeded to 
obnin the B^dad concwwon. They then ce^nised a new " Bagdad 
Railway Coo^pany " to which the Anatolian Railway Com pan y" 
'- of thecontraa. 


which shall bring the investor a just profit out of the 
surplus thereby created : Usury forces the borrower 
to pledge all that he has, up to many times the value of 
the loan, trading on the fact that he cannot do with- 
out borrowing at the moment* It hopes, not for his 
success, but for his ruin, because its quarry is the pledge 
and not the interest : its object is achieved when it has 
got the victim into its power, body and soul* The 
plentifulness of capital and the competition of investors 
have made usury on the individual scale an almost 
obsolete evil in modem Europe, but the centralisation 
of capitalistic control has introduced it into the inter- 
course of nations* It gives the stroi^ a subtler, more 
business-like means of oppressing the weak than the 
clumsy warfare of mere diplomacy and armaments* 
Since Peace depends ultimately on Justice, our ideal 
of making Peace secure will not be realised till we have 
exorcised, not only "' blood and iron,'" but National 
Usury as well* 

It is neither possible nor desirable to confiscate 
foreign capital in Anatolia. That would be an inde- 
fensible breach of faith with the bond-holders, and the 
worst folly from the point of view of the country's own 
interests, for it would close to her the coffers of inter- 
national finance at the moment when she needs to dip 
more deeply into them than ever* We must devise 
arrangements by which foreign enterprise shall secure 
profits advantageous enough to evoke it to the full extent 
of Anatolia's needs, without enabling it to seize the 
paramount economic control, and thereby the ultimate 
political dominion, of the Anatolian national state* 

The most powerful foreign authority to which the 
material resources of the Ottoman Empire are at present 
subject, is the International Administration of the Public 


Debt. Turkey's allies in the Crimean War tattght her 
how to borrow in the European money market, and a 
reckless period of extravagance followed. When it 
terminated towards the end of the 'seventies in the 
Balkan revolt and the disastrous Russian War, Turkey 
found the purse-strings dosed against her, and became 
unable either to meet her past obligations out of her 
revenue or to incur others to liquidate them. The 
result was the Decree of December 1881, which oon- 
solidated the whole outstanding debt, handed over die 
problem of dealing with it to a mixed committee, con- 
sisting of delegates from the bond-holders of all the 
interested nationalities, and put at the absolute disposal 
of this committee, in which the Ottoman Government 
itself had no footing, six classes of pubUc revenue for 
the debt's service. 

This international administration has wielded for a 
generation a power far greater than any single foreign 
government has yet acquired in Turkey, or could ever 
acquire without the virtual supersession of Turkish 
sovereignty ; but it has employed it entirely tt> the 
country's benefit, just because it does not represent 
the sinister interest of national rivalry, but the common 
interest of bond-holders of all nationalities to co- 
operate with the Turkish people in order to promote the 
increase of the country's resources upon which all alike 
have their respective claims. The commissioners have 
interpreted their mandate in a liberal spirit, and some 
of the most fruitful economic developments that Turkey 
has experienced in the meanwhile have been initiated 
in the spheres tmder their control, and financed by 
funds accumulated in their coffers. Whatever political 
transformations the Ottoman Empire may tmdergo, 
the finandal authority of the International Admints- 



tration must remain unimpaired, not only out of 
justice to the foreign bond-holders, but because its 
continued activity will be the New Anatolia's best bul- 
wark against exploitation by individual nations, and the 
best guarantee for the continuance of her economic 
progress on lines primarily advantageous to her own 

But there are other, and less legitimate, forms of 
foreign privilege in Turkey which might well lapse with 
the dismantling of the Empire, or at any rate be allowed 
to drag less heavily upon the freedom of the rejuvenated 

(L) It is not enough to give the new Anatolian 
government judicial independence by abolishing the 
Capitulations, tmless we give it fiscal independence as 
well, and that is at present seriously limited by a 
number of treaties with the various European powers, 
iniiicfa fix a maximum ad valorem import duty for the 
Turkish Customs* It might be argued that if European 
thrift has been hit so heavily by Turkish insolvency, 
it is only fair that Europe should be given the chance of 
recouping herself by obtaining favoured treatment in 
Tturkish trade* Yet European merchants have already 
gained infinitely more by the customs-treaties than 
European investors lost by the bankruptcy, while the 
latter interest is actually prejudiced by die present 
arrangement, for the Customs were one of the six 
revenues ceded to the Debt Administration, and their 
augmentation would profit the European bond-holders 
as well as the Anatolian government* Even in equity, 
then, the statas quo has litde justification, but legally 
there is no case for it at all* Most of the treaties 
lapsed over twenty years ago, and have only been 
maintained in operation by the cynical refusal of the 


powers oonoemed to discuss their modification* In 
fact, the Powers^ attitude towards Turkish finance has 
rested latterly on their ability to exercise coercion. 

The time has now come to cry quits. In 1907 the 
first step was accomplished, when Turkey obtained per- 
mission to raise the import duty to iz per cent*, in order 
to pay for the special administration of Macedonia 
demanded by the Powers themselves. This is a good 
precedent for compensating the Anatolian government 
(and its European bond-holders) for the loss of their 
most important source of Customs revenue in the 
Black Sea Straits, by setting them at liberty to fix 
their tariff at whatever rate they choose within the 
sanctuary of their reduced frontiers. The authority 
of the Debt Administration gives security that the con- 
cession would be used with prudence, and even a mis- 
taken fiscal policy would only injure Anatolia herself, 
and could be regarded with indifference by Europe, so 
long as the vitally important waterway to the Bladk Sea 
was excluded from its sphere of operation. 

(ii.) The foreign railway companies, in framing their 
contracts with the Government, have stipulated that the 
latter shall guarantee them a certain minimum of annual 
profit, calculated at so much per kilometre of permanent 
way in working order. The Government has to make 
good any deficits on this amotmt. 

Considering the poorness of the country and die 
irresponsible character of the Government, which by its 
provocative foreign policy was capable of disorganising 
at any moment such trade as there was, it was reason- 
able that Turkey should shoulder the economic conse- 
quences of any political folly she committed.^ li, 

^ The system was not applied to the earlier railway enterprises in the 
Ottoman empire. It was only initiated in z888, when railway axh 

ANAtoLlA 425 

howvftt, under a new regime the annual average of 
Anatolian trade increases, and the country schools itself 
to a more reassuring political tradition, the risk to bond- 
holders will gradually sink to the same average as in 
Europe, and the survival of the ** kilometric guarantee ** 
will leave them with an unearned advantage, while 
retaining the Anatolian government under an tmmerited 
liability* When this stage is reached, the public opinion 
of the European nations will be at fault, if it does not 
permit the cancelling of the guarantees before the term 
fixed by the contracts* 

{in.) The Anatolian nation can most effectively parry 
the political danger from foreign railway enterprise 
by establishing a ^'balance of power'' between the 
companies of the different nations concerned*^ 

At present the German concession threatens to 
dominate Anatolia. After cuttix^ diagonally across 
the country from the Straits to the Taurus, it is to 
proceed through the Cilidan tunnel (which is being 
excavated at this moment) to Adana, the urban centre 
of the largest and most fertile Anatolian coast-plain, 
whence two lines already run to the ports of Mersina 
and Iskanderun.* It will thus include the two most 
important strategical positions in the peninsula, Afiun 
K^ Hissar, the central node of communications, and 
the Glidan tunnel, the door through the chief barrier 
between the country's two most important pieces of 

stracdoa, although urgentiy needed for the development d the ooontry, 
had oome to a standstill because no foreign investors would tat thor 
capital^ and its adoption certainly brought the required capital into 
the field. The scale of guarantee is fisted independendy for each oon- 
ctmkm, and there is no umifonn rate. 


*A British enterprise compleied in x886 and bought out by the 
Oeman compaii^* 


It would be feasible to demand that the German 
company^ in return for adequate compensation else- 
where^ should resign its claim to the sections of the 
railway South-East of Konia* It is clear that these 
sections are not economically desirable in themsehres. 
The first runs through a desolate strip between steppe 
and mountains, the second is the costly tunnel, ^di 
will eat up any profits the Adana section beyond it 
may bring in* Their importance to Germany is political, 
and in asking her to resign them in exchange for 
economically more advantageous openings in another 
direction the Anatolian government would be safe- 
guarding its own interests without violating the legiti- 
mate interests of Germany* The German company 
would be more than compensated by receiving the 
monopoly of all construction in the well-watered but 
at present entirely undeveloped Cappadodan region 
North-East of the central steppe, as far as the new 
Russian frontier* A branch has abready thrust itself 
Eastward from Eski Shehr to Angora* Hence it oodd 
be carried across the Kizil Irmak River (Halys) and 
might split thereafter into two arms* One would stretdi 
E*S*E* through Kaisaria to Malatia on the West bank 
of Euphrates, skirting the ribs of Taurus on the Nordi ; 
the other would work its way North-East through 
YozgSLt and Amasia to the Black Sea port of Samsun*^ 

What nation is to step into Germany^s shoes, and 

^ The startling advantage gained by Germany in the Anatolian Rail- 
way ooatract led Russia to obtain an agreement from Turkey rca j uving 
to her own enterprise the construction of all railways in Anatolia that 
should debouch on the Black Sea coast* As yet, however, she has 
taken no advantage of this concession, and if she gained the proposed 
extension of her Caucasian frontier to the West and Soudi she bu^ 
fairly be asked to abandon economic interests in Anatolia ootnde ths 
new line, in exchange for com|>lete political and ecooomic oostrol 


secure for its own investors the right to buy out 
the German company^s interest in the Konia-Adana 
section^ Every consideration suggests Italy. Italy 
has suffered even more than Germany by being handi- 
capped in the European race* Her Abyssinian adven- 
ture was disastrous; her recent acquisition on the 
North African coast gives her a very limited field ; in 
the interest of Balkan independence and European 
peace we have proposed to deny her expansion across 
the mouth of the Adriatic into Albania, and finally 
we have asked her to relinquish her aspirations to her 
Istrian and Triestine ** irredenta/^ in deference to 
Germany^s need for a neutral economic outlet upon 
the Adriatic. If, then, the Anatolian government, for 
reasons of its own, decides to remove a certain region 
from the sphere of German enterprise, Italy has surely 
the best claim to fill the vacant place, and receive the 
commission of opening up Anatolians resources in this 
particular direction* 

Italy, moreover, is already in negotiation with the 
Ottoman government for a railway concession in the 
hinterland of Adalia, the only port on the South coast 
of Anatolia to the West of the Adana district that has 
practicable lines of commtmication through the Taurus 
with the central plateau* One branch of the new Adalia 
railway would run N.N.W., and meet the English 
company^s railhead at Buldur: another would work 
across the mountains in a North-Easterly direction, and 
emerge after many detours at Konia. Konia would 
thus become the junction of three railway systems* The 
German lines from the North would meet at this point 
the two railways leading to Adana and Adalia on the 
South coast, and it would be an obvious convenience 
that the latter should be under the same management* 


We have su^ested the partition of Anatohan railway 
enterprise among companies of four different naticmali- 
ties, French, English, German, and Italian, co-ordiiut' 
ing their spheres in such a way as to give no one of them 
the opportunity of becoming a political power in the 
land. The bond-holders and the governments behind 
them, instead of regarding their economic presena in 
Anatolia as the thin end of a political mdge, must 
count it all gain that they find scope for theii enterprise 
there at all, and resign themselves to see their bold 
diminish annually, as the country is gradually raised 
by their agency towards the level of narive wealth viach 
will enable it in the end to dispense with their services 
alt(^ether. On the day when she has accumulated 
enough capital to buy out all the foreign companies at 
a generous price, and enough human skill to administer 
their enterprises with a national personnel of her own, 
Turkey will have reached her majority, and fulfilled 
the Panislamist's dream by taking her stand on an eqiul 
footing with the nations of Europe. 

We have now only to mark out the frontiers of the 
rejuvenated Anatolian state, before we pass on to 
Arabia. On the North-West towards the Black Sea 
Straits and on the North-East towards the Russian 
Empire, they are already defined : we have still two 
questions to consider, the sovereignty of the Islands 
and the frontier towards Arabia itself. 

(i.) The islands off the AnatoUan coast ^ into 
three divisions. 

(a) The group along the Northern section of tile West 
coast, whidi is entirely Greek in nationaUty, and was 
conquered by the Kingdom of He l las in the late Balkan 
War. It consists of Mitylini, Khios, Psara, Samos 
and Nikaria. In spite of the Young Turk chauvinists, 


these islands must remain united with Greece, since 
that is the unanimous desire of their inhabitants* 

(6) Those along the Southern section of the West 
coast, stretching in a chain from Patmos to Rhodes 
(the "" Sporades **) and including the stragglers Asty- 
palia, Karpathos and Kasos besides* This group was 
occupied by Italy in the course of her war against 
Turkey in 19x2, and she stipulated in the treaty of 
Lausanne that it should remain in her hands till Tripoli 
had been completely evacuated by Turkish troops, after 
which it should be restored to the Ottoman government* 
Italy has shown no signs of relinquishing her hold, 
but Europe must make the sanction of the Adana and 
Adalia concessions conditional upon her doing so* The 
islands, however, must not pass s^ain into the hands of 
Turkey* They are as Greek as the Northern group in 
speech and feeling* The New Anatolia must resign all 
claims over them to the Concert of Europe, and the 
Concert must assign them to the Kingdom of Hellas. 

(c) Just at the comer where West and South coasts 
meet, the tiny rock of Kastel6ritsa lies in the lee of the 
mainland* Its population makes a considerable liveli- 
hood by the Mediterranean sponge-fishing industry, 
which attracts its sailing-boats as far afield as the North 
African coast, and it is intensely Greek in national 

Kastel6ritsa is the smallest Greek island : the largest 
is Cyprus* It, too, lies off the South coast, but further 
to the East and far out to sea, its outer flank being 
roughly equidistant from Adalia, Iskandenm and 

Till Turkey entered the war, the status of Cyprus 
was similar to that of the Sporades* It dated from a 
secret agreement, concluded between Ttirkey and Great 


Britain in June 1878, after the close of the Russo- 
Turkish war and on the eve of the Berlin Cos^;ress« 

The Russian victory had alarmed Great Britain £>r 
the safety of her Mediterranean route to India* She 
therefore arranged with the Porte that if Russia retained 
the Armenian fortress of Kars in the settlement, the 
island of Cyprus should be placed in British hands. 
The legal sovereignty was to remain with the Sultan, 
and Great Britain tmdertook in return to guarantee the 
integrity of the Sultan's continental dominions in Asia, 
within whatever frontiers were fixed at the impending 

The terms of the Berlin Treaty brought these 
provisional stipulations into force. Russia kept Kars, 
but the British guarantee vetoed her further advance 
towards the Levantine coast : even should the guarantee 
prove abortive, the occupation of Cyprus left Great 
Britain in strategical command of the situation. 

At the rupture of peace, however, the Berlin Treaty 
lapsed with all its corollaries, and Cyprus was formally 
annexed to the British Empire.^ 

Russophobes will rejoice at the step, because it brings 
Cyprus completely under our control* "" According to 
your own proposals,'^ they will say, ** the resettlement 
after the present war is to advance the Russian frontier 
right across the Armenian plateau, at least half the 
distance towards the Mediterranean shore. This makes 
the retention of Cyprus more important to Great Britain 
than ever it was before/^ 

Yet the problems of Cyprus and Armenia are comr 
pletely on a par. In bodi the national factor is at 


i Ths transfer of legal sovereignty to the actual p og e a s o r was parallel 
to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908. It was merely a farmal 
act. Austria, however, was at peace with Turkey when she took the 
step, and therefore acted in violation of valid 


variance with such strategical considerations, and if in 
Armenia nationality is to prevail, we must defer to it in 
Cyprus likewise* The war has set us free to dispose of 
Cyprus, as well as to retain it* We shall choose the 
former alternative, if we are wise* 

The island has benefited much by our strong govern- 
ment (a process of disinfection which every country 
needs to go through, when it passes out of Turkish rale), 
but that phase is now almost past* The population is 
Greek in language and civilisation, and is becoming 
more and more so in national aspiration*^ It cannot 
be separated permanently from the Greek national 
state* At some moment Great Britain must gracefully 
retire, and we should allay irritation if we were to 
proclaim forthwith tmder what circumstances we should 
consent to do so* The natural term to fix would be the 
moment when Anatolia buys out her foreign railways* 
When she has so far recruited her native economic 
strei^;th, she will afford such an effective strategical 
bulwark for the British route to India that the Russo- 
phobe will sleep in peace at last* 

Thus all the islands off the Anatolian coast would 
pass eventually into the hands of Greece, and the 
continental state might justly complain that if Greece 
were allowed to fortify them and convert their harbours 
into naval bases at her pleasure, Anatolia would virtu- 
ally be subjected to a continuous blockade* The pass- 
age from Smyrna itself to the open sea would be liable 
at any moment to be dosed by flotillas actii^ from 
Mitylini and Khios on either flank* In handing over, 
therefore, to Greece the islands nowin Italianoccupation, 
Europe should stipulate that not only they, but those 
acquired by Greece in 1912, and also Cyprus whenever 

* The population was 337,000 in Z90Z, of whom 33% were Moslem* 


she may acquire it, shall be neutralised from the military 
point of view : Greece on her part must promise Europe 
to leave them unfDrtified, and Europe on hers mus: 
guarantee their perpetual political union with Greece* 
When this is done, it will be both needless and useless 
for Anatolia to covet the possession of the islands any 

(ii.) In drawing the frontier between Anatolia and 
Arabia, we must compromise, as usual, between national 
distribution and the configtuation of the country* The 
line^ should start from the Mediterranean coast at Ras 
al Hanzir, the cape that contains the Gulf of Iskanderun 
on the South-East* It should run first North-East and 
then North along the summit of the Amanus range, 
parallel to the coast of the gulf and only a few miles 
distant from it, thus assigning Iskanderun itself to 
Anatolia* When it reaches the latitude of the most 
Northerly point in the gulf, it should turn East, cross 
the valley of the Kara Su, and proceed North-East again 
along the summit of the Kurt Dagh* Thence it should 
follow the divide between the Pyramus and Euphrates 
basins in the same direction, till it reached the latitude 
in which the Euphrates makes its great bend from a 
Westerly to a Southerly course, below Samsat* At 
point it should turn due East and head for the Euphrati 
striking it just at the bend* 

This line leaves a fringe of Turkish population outside, 
but the districts this minority inhabits are geographic- 
ally dependent on the great Arabic dty of Aleppo^ and 
cannot be sundered from it politically* 

^ See Vbp VL 


E* The New Arabia 

We have now to deal with the remainder of the 
Ottoman Empire, which forms an indivisible geo- 
graphical unit* 

Since the beginning of the present geological period, 
the heavy rain and snow falls of the Armenian plateau 
have been furrowing out the Euphrates and Tigris 
systems for their issue, and grinding away the surface 
of the mountains to deposit it as silt at the head of the 
Persian Gulf, under the Western lee of the neighbour- 
plateau of Persia* In the cotirse of ages the rivers^ 
action has made the sea give place to an alluvial plain 
hardly less level than itself, nearly four hundred miles 
long and about a third as much in breadth* 

If we compare this land of Irak-Arabi (the ** Shinar "" 
of the Bible) to the orchestra of a Greek theatre, we shall 
find the auditorium in the gently-tilted plateaux that 
rise from the plain in a great semicircle to the West and 
South* From the point where they ascend above the 
irrigation-limit of the rivers, these plateaux become 
waterless desert, producing at best a sparse crop of 
grasses in the spring, and presenting at worst a surface 
of shifting sand-hills, or of basalt botdder-fields, the relic 
of volcanic upheavals* As the barren shelves mount 
away from the rivers their slope becomes steeper, till 
finally it culminates in agreat retaining wall of mountains 
which rises higher than all, and then plunges straight 
down to sea-level on its sheer Western face* 

This mountain-rim of the desert falls into two sharply 
contrasted sections* Syria, in the North, abuts upon 
the Mediterranean, and the West winds from the 
Atlantic carry their moisture down the whole length 



of the Inland Sea to surrender it in life-giving rain when 
they strike Lebanon and the ** Hill country of Judah '' 
on its extreme shore* Syria shares the climate and 
vegetation of Southern Europe, but the Hejaz, idiich 
continues the line of Syria towards the South-East, 
is backed by nothing better than the Red Sea, a sultry 
creek separated from the Atlantic by the vast breadth 
of the Sahara. Here the desert has no redeemmg 
Western fringe, and the strip of coast beneath the motm- 
tain wall, along which lie the ports of the Holy Cities 
of Islam, is the most cruel ootmtry in the whole region* 

In this stem theatre has been played the world-<irama 
of the Semitic Race* Bred in the keen air of the pitiless 
plateaux, which gives men the fire of vitality without the 
fuel to maintain it, the Semitic nations in wave after 
wave have surged down into the arena of Irak, or beaten 
upwards against the breakwater of the Syrian mountains, 
to scatter themselves in spray over all the Mediterranean 
shores* The last and mightiest of these catadysms 
was Islam, whose tide in the seventh century a*d* swept 
out from the Hejaz over the world ; and, though it has 
bng since receded from its furthest marks, it has settled 
permanently over this original Semitic area, and given 
it its final colour both in religion and nationality* 

In spite of a few surviving outcrops of earlier strata, 
the present population of the region is as homogeneous 
as its permanent geographical structure* Arabic speech 
and Moslem faith provide an adequate basis for a new 
national life, and materials for the superstructure itself 
are ready to hand* The civilised urban class of the 
Syrian towns has sent repr^entatives of considerable 
pohtical ability to the Ottoman parliament, and is no 
less capable than the Anatolian Turk of carrying on the 
functions of self-government on its own account* Its 


own constructive efforts will be immensely reinforced 
by the co-operation of talented and highly-educated 
volunteers from Arabic lands like Egypt and Algeria, 
whose populations have enjoyed the benefit of European 
** strong government/' and will welcome the oppor- 
tunity of propagating its fruits without its thorns in this 
new independent focus of Arabic tradition* Moreover, 
the ** New Arabia '" will not be the spiritual centre of 
the Arab race alone* By taking over from the Ottoman 
Empire the guardianship of the Holy Cities, it will 
inherit from it the primacy of the whole Moslem world* 
The sovereign of the new state will become the official 
head of Islam, and Arabia would do well to elect as 
its first constitutional sultan some prince of the reigning 
Ottoman house, who would inherit by birth the personal 
claim to the Caliphate won by his ancestor SeUm, and 
transmit it to his heirs. This junior branch of the 
Ottoman line would soon eclipse its cousins who con- 
tinued to rule over Anatolia, and the Arab would oust 
the Turk again from the dominant place among 
Mohammedan nations* 

Yet however much assistance the new nation may 
receive from the loyal sympathy and service of aU 
Islam, the task before it is not easy* The Arabians 
will inherit more evil than good from the Ottoman 

Europe must, of course, free them from the bondage 
of the Capitulations and the customs-treaties, vnih the 
same UbtrHity for which we have appealed in the case 
of Anatolia ; but they will have to shoulder a heavy 
burden in their proportionate share of the Ottoman 
national debt, and will pay for the follies of a ruling 
class for which they are even less responsible than the 
Anatolian peasant* 


The revenues ceded, by the decree of z88z, to the 
international Administration of the Debt must be left, 
as heretofore, tmder the Administration's control, in 
spite of the break in political continuity* The surveil- 
lance of an expert European executive over the chief 
factors of native finance will indeed be as great a boon 
to the New Arabia for many years to come as it has been 
to the moribund Ottoman Empire during the last 
generation* The native government will be able to 
devote itself to internal problems of nationality, which 
are ultimately of more importance and immediately 
more within its scope* 

(i*) The Christian minority falls into several groups, 
of which the Maronites in Lebanon are consider- 
ably the most important* Descended from the older 
Syriac race, they have preserved their dialect and 
religion ever since the Arabs brought Islam into the 
land* In the eighteenth century they entered into full 
communion vnth the Roman Church, and came thereby 
into relation with France, already the leading Catholic 
power* The French influence was confirmed by the 
result of the Crimean War* In 1864, not many years 
after peace had been made, there was a rising of the 
Maronites in defence of their prescriptive autonomy, 
and France insisted upon the erection of an autonomous 
Lebanon-vilayet, which was placed under a Christian 
governor nominated by the Porte, but was also guaran- 
teed by Europe* The Maronites constitute about three- 
fifths of the population in this favoured area*^ Thanks 
to their native history and to the French missions, they 
are at once the most vigorous and the most intelligent 
element in Syria, and however optimistic we may be 

' There are about 300,000 of them in the Lebanon, and perhaps 
half a million in the whole of Syria* 


of the New Arabia's success, we must on no account 
allow the Lebanon to lose its special status* 

Not only must the Maronites' autonomy be preserved : 
it must be extended, if possible, in a more rudimentary 
form to the remnant of Monophysite ** Jacobites '' 
scattered through the provinces of Urfa, Diarbekr 
and Mardin, and to that fraction of the Nestorians that 
has ventured to leave its mountain refuge in 2^gros 
and the Urumia basin, and to setde among the Moslems 
in the lowland district of Mostd on the Tigris* Unlike 
the Maronites, these fragments of more Easterly com- 
munities are sadly broken in spirit, but their social 
condition has been gready improved of late years by 
the splendid American missions* The revival already 
manifesting itself among them may even spread to the 
neglected and isolated litde sect of Satan-worshippers 
who dwell West of Mosul in the Sinjar hills, and secure 
for them a similar recognition* 

(ii.) While there is no friction between the Qiristian 
peasant and his industrious Moslem neighbour of Arabic 
speech, both alike are harried by alien mountain clans* 
It will be one of the first duties of the new government 
to pacify these with a strong arm, for hitherto they have 
defied the distant authorities at Constantinople* 

In Syria itself the Druses, Arab in speech but heretical 
in faith, have so far proved irreconcilable Ishmaelites* 
They are strongly entrenched in the trough between 
Lebanon and anti-Lebanon, and their setdements in 
the Hauran place them astride the pilgrim railway from 
Damascus to the Hejaz*^ 

In the extreme North-East comer of the country, 
beyond Mosul, the Kurdish shepherds in the intricate 
valleys of the Greater and Lesser 2^b are more formid- 

^ The total ntmibcr of Druses m Syria is about X45/X)0. 


able still, and their reduction presents the problem of 
the Caucasus or the North-West Frontier of India on 
a small scale. The task here will be lightened by the 
£act that by far the larger section of the Kurdish raa 
falls within the sphere we have assigned to Russia^ 
so that the section left to Arabia will already be hemmed 
in by the strong Russian military frontier in the North 
and East, when the Arabian gendarmerie attempts to 
penetrate it from the South-West* Even so, the opera- 
tion may prove beyond the new state's powers, in 
which case Europe must give Russia the mandate of 
acting here on Arabia's behalf, with the strict under- 
standing that temporary military occupation of a district 
gives her no permanent political claims to it* 

(iii.) When Christian communities have been recon- 
ciled by some measure of devolution, and when Kurds 
and Druses have been chastised, the new Arabian 
administration will find itself in effective possession of 
the whole Northern portion of its territory, from the 
Syrian coast to the head of the Persian Gulf* This is 
the only part that counts from the economic point of 
view, but the uninviting South cannot simply be left 
to its own devices. It is no use establishing law and 
order in the cultivated lands and among the mountaia 
fastnesses in their midst, if the Bedawin of the desert 
are still stififered to raid them at their pleasure, and 
tmless the government effectively polices the pilgrim 
routes to the Holy Cities, which lie in the very heart 
of the South, it will forfeit altogether the esteem of the 
Moslem world* Its duty is to achieve these two objects 
with the least possible expenditure of effort* 

A pilgrim railway, stirveyed by Moslem engineefs, 
built by Moslem labour, and financed by the offerings 
of the Faithful, was completed from Damascus as far 


as Medina in 1908/ and will be carried forward as soon 
as possible to Mekka : a further line will link Mekka 
with the port of Jidda on the Red Sea coast, a way 
of approach already much nu>re firequented than the 
Damascus route* The railway does not merely make 
the journey easier for the pilgrims : it greatly simplifies 
the government's task of securing their safe passage, 
for it gives oq;anised troops a strategical advantage 
diat more than counterbalances the Bedawi's superior 
adaptation to his native desert** To keep its garrisons 
at Jidda, Mekka and Medina in touch with their Syrian 
base, the government need only patrol the railway, and 
throw strong military detachments into the nearest 
oasis-towns, like Teima and Kaibar, on the railway's 
Eastern flank. Further North it shotdd occupy tht 
oasis of Jof, half-way between Akaba and Basra, 
where the Northward trail from Nejd emerges out 
of the Great Nefud sand-waste into the steppe land 
between Damascus and Euphrates* A chain of forts 
held in Al Hasa, the province along the Arabian shore 
of the Persian Gulf, would protect Koweit and Basra 
from South-Westem raiders* 

Having thus secured the routes to the Ifoly Cities 
and the borders of the Northern provinces, the new 
state would be well advised to treat the remainder of 
the Arabian peninsula as we have recommended the 
Albanian government to treat its mountain clans : it 
should take the responsibilities of sovereignty as lightly 
as it can* 

Nejd, the heart of the plateau South of the Great 
Nefud, is divided at present into several prindpalitit 

* It was begun in xgox. 

' Con^Mre the use made of railways m tfie Angk>-Egypttaa reoonqties^ 
of the Soudan. 


Hayyilt Kasim, Er-riad — ^whose rulers govern the popu- 
lation of the oases, and exercise a shadowy control over 
the Bedawin tribes, which would starve if they could not 
supplement the miserable produce of their flocks with 
the dates of the oases^ palm-groves* The country is 
built on so vast a scale, and the means of life and com- 
mtmicadon are so scanty, that permanent occupation, 
even by a power that had tmlimited blood and treasure 
to waste upon an unprofitable adventure, would 
certainly prove an impossibility, and the prophet 
Mohammed himself was the first and last sovereign to 
attempt it, till the seizure of the Holy Cities by the 
Wahabi sectaries led Ibrahim Pasha, the brilliant son of 
Mehemet Ali, to make a oompaign of reprisal. For a 
few years the whole of Central Arabia was held down by 
Egyptian garrisons,^ but the strain was too great, and 
upon the first weakening of Mehemet^s prestige, his 
Arabian Empire vanished into thin air. The new 
Arabian government will be promoting its own interest 
best if it leaves Bedawi-sheikh and oasis-prince to keep 
each other in check, satisfied that so long as it holds 
Jidda, Basra and Damascus in its own hand, all Nejd is 
ultimately amenable to its sovereignty. Except through 
these three gates the region can have no intercotirse with 
the outer world, and can neither sell its dates and 
camels abroad, nor import arms or other goods of 
civilised manufacture, without the government's know- 
ledge and sanction. 

The same policy of non-intervention should be applied 
to Asir, the Red Sea province inunediately South of 
Hejaz« The poptilation is strongly tinged with Shiism, 
in spite of its proximity to the hearths of Moslem 

^ The Bmtbn oocupsittoii of Nejd lasted altogether, tn varying 
degrees of esectivencss, from z8i8 to 1843. 


orthodoxy, and is in a state of perpetual revolt against 
the present Ottoman regime. Further South still, the 
Arabian State should resign altogether its claims to 
sovereignty over the Yemen. 

Yemen is the Southenmiost section of the plateaux : 
the Western retaining-wall of mountain rises here to 
its greatest he^t, and like the corresponding Abyssinian 
highlands beyond the opposite coast, it comes within 
the range of the equatorial rains. Fed from the 
Indian Ocean, the monsoons discharge themselves 
against the Yemen from the South, and produce a wealth 
of moisture and vegetation in striking contrast to the 
desert belt fifteen degrees broad that separates this area 
from the Syrian region within the influence of the 

The Yemen has been no less isolated frx>m the rest 
of the peninsula in its political history, than in its 
geographical character : whenever the opportunity has 
occurred, it has placed itself under a native dynasty of 
its own, and it will doubtless wish to do so once more. 
The most satisfactory arrangement wotdd be to give 
the country complete internal self-government under 
the protectorate of Great Britain. Our authority has 
been established for seventy-five years at Aden, the 
chief port of the region just outside the entrance to 
the Red Sea, and our influence is already paramount 
in Hadramaut, the province immediately Bast of the 
Yemen along the peninstila^s Southern coast. The 
Southern frontier of the New Arabia wotdd accordingly 
start frx>m the Red Sea coast at about latitude 17, 
opposite the Farsan islands ; it wotdd follow an imagin- 
ary straight line in a North-Easterly direction, skirting 
the Northern edge of the Roba-al-Hali, the greatest 
desert in all Arabia, and wotdd run right across the 


peninsula to the Persian Gulf, reaching it at latitude 
25 near the head of the Bahrein bay between Al Hbfuf 
and the peninstila of Katar. 

In mere extent of territory the state whose frontieis 
we have now delimited would contain an enormous 
preponderance of irreclaimable land inhabited by 
intractable poptilations, yet as we prophesied in the 
case of Armenia, the continuous action of good govern- 
ment will shift the true centre of gravity more and more 
decisively from the ** desert ** to the ** sown/' Arabia 
has a more splendid economic asset than any that 
Albania, Armenia or even the Anatolian plateau possess* 

The great alluvial plain of Irak is potentially one 
of the most favourable environments for human life 
in the world, and has actually rivalled the valley of the 
Nile and the great Qiinese rivers in bringing the earliest 
civilisation to flower, but its value to Man depends 
upon Man's own mastery of it. Left to themselves, 
the Tigris and Euphrates allow half the plain to crumble 
into the dust of the desert, and ttun the other half into 
malarial swamp, as unfriendly to human habitation as 
the tmreclaimed Egyptian delta. Only civilised fore- 
thought and organisation, regulating the river-system 
by a network of canals, can distribute the water in better 
proportion, and enable Irak to realise its destiny as a 
cornland of marvellous capacity* 

From the dawn of history in the fourth miHennittm 
B.C., tmtil Babylon was crushed by the leaden yoke of 
Darius' empire, the irrigation of Irak was perfect and 
its fertility the wonder of the world. Again under die 
Abbasid caliphs, ^o niled from this centre a realm 
broader than Darius', and revived the glories of Babylon 
in their new city of Bagdad on the Tigris, the 
province enjoyed a second lease of prosperity nearly 


five centuries long, till the Mongol invasion devastated 
it in the thirteenth century aj)« Since then Irak has 
lain desolate, like a symbol of Islamic civilisation itself* 
The canal-system is derelict : only a few of the main 
arteries are kept in working order* The population has 
dwindled : there are more Bedawin in the land than 
husbandmen* Nature has assumed her primitive face, 
as it was when Oannes, the Sumerian culture-fod, 
first arose from the sea; but Nature cannot be left 
unchallenged by the twentieth century, with its vast 
material power and its still vaster increase of popula- 
tion that threatens to outstrip that power's capacity to 
provide for it* The Yotmg Turk government has 
already negotiated a contract for irrigation work on a 
modest scale, and the New Arabia must throw herself 
into the task in the grand manner* There is the 
possibility of recovering for cultivation as many acres in 
Irak as British engineering has won back in the Punjab 
during the two generations we have ruled there* The 
chief need will be human labour, to dig the channels, 
cast up the embankments, and till the new fields created 
by these operations, and a vast reservoir of men exists 
in the twenty-four million Moslems of Bengal* They 
are already hard pressed for some avenue of expansion, 
and their religion would accommodate them without 
difficulty to the country* 

When the fertiUty of Irak has been restored, it must 
be put in commtmication by railway with Arabia's chief 

(i*) Bagdad has heretofore communicated with the 
Mediterranean by circuitous routes to the North- West, 
which cling to the tiny ribbon of moisture and vegetation 
deposited across the Northern section of the steppe by 
the Tigris and Euphrates, in their descent from the 


Armenian mountains towards the Gulf. The hanrests 
of Irak, «4ien they are reaped once more, will fully 
repay the construction of a railway from Bagdad to 
Damascus, idiich will cross Euphrates and run due West 
over the steppe. The distance is under five hundred 
miles, less by one-third than the course the German 
company has surveyed from Bagdad to bkanderun, and 
Damascus, lying on the inner rim of the Syrian retaining 
wall near the middle point of its extent, is the natural 
railway-centre of Arabia. Besides being the starting- 
point of the pilgrim-lme to Medina, it is already con- 
nected by a full^^uge railway with Haifa, the harbour 
under Carmel's shadow, and by a narrow-gauge line 
over Lebanon with Beirut, the greatest port on the 
Syrian coast. 

(ii.) Immediately after it has put Et^hrates behind 
it, this new Bagdad-Damascus railway will dctadi a 
brancli to the South, vibidi will pass through Kerbela, 
skirt the Eastern foot of the plateau parallel widi 
Euphrates' course, touch the Shatt-al-Arab at Basra, 
and find its terminus on the Persian Gulf at 

(iii.) Direct connection between Bagdad and Europe 
will be established by a line * following up the Right 
bank of the T^ris as far as Mosul. There it will change 
direction from North-Wcst to West, and nin across the 
head-waters of the Khabour, between the Sinjar and 
Tor-Abdin hills. After passing through Harran, it will 
strike the Euphrates, cross it by a bridge at Jerabis, and 
continue in the same westerly direction through the 
hilly country between Aleppo and Aintab, up to the wall 

> Tbii line will be identical with the latt aectkn of the pcoitclrt 
Gcnnan railway to tbe Gulf. 
* Thit wnbodiM aoochcr part of the German company's idea. 


of Amanus, which it will have to penetrate by a tunnel 
before it can make a junction with the Adana-bkanderun 
line in Anatolian territory* 

A branch line between Jerabis and Aleppo is already 
completed, and the last link in the chain, the direct 
connection between Aleppo and Damascus along the 
plateau East of Lebanon, has been in working order 
several years* 

(iv.) Owing to the lack of any accessible port on the 
North Syrian coast, the cutting of the Amanus tunnel 
will probably bring a large area in Northern Arabia, 
as far as Mostd, within the commercial hinterland of 
the favourably situated Anatolian ports, Mersina and 
Iskanderun. If this happens, Aleppo will forfeit to 
Adana much of its importance as an urban centre, 
unless it can find a new harbour of its own* At present 
its nearest outlet towards the South is Tarabolus, reached 
through a convenient gap in Lebanon by a branch line 
that leaves the Aleppo-Damascus railway at Homs : 
tmless Aleppo can open up more direct communication 
with the sea, and establish a port for itself either at 
the mouth of the Orontes or slightly further South at 
Ladikia, its future will seriously be compromised* 

Our progranmie for the economic development of 
Arabia is far more ambitious than any plans we have 
sketched for Albania or Anatolia, and since only a small 
fraction of the work has so far been accomplished, the 
amount of foreign capital required by the country in the 
immediate future will be more than proportionately 
larger* The system on which this capital is to be raised 
and applied deserves careful consideration. Are the 
enterprises to be entrusted to syndicates grouped on the 
basis of nationality, and the country partitioned out into 
economic ** spheres of influence,'' on the analogy of 


Anatolia i There are strong reasons for rejecting such 
a proposal* 

In Anatolia most of the work in contemplation has 
already been put in hand on the nation^d-syndicate 
system, and the majority of these contracts have been 
carried to their conclusion : the still unexploited areas 
are appropriated by claims Uke the Italian, which 
cannot be disregarded* Arabia is in a di£Ferent position. 
Even the most important operation, the irrigation of 
Irak, has not yet been taken up in earnest. No railway 
enterprises have been pledged to foreigners, except the 
few stretches in Syria already constructed by a Frendi 
company, and the Amanus-Mosul-Bagdad concession 
acquired by the German group. The latter wotdd cer- 
tainly be an important fact if it were a fait accompUf 
but so far only an insignificant section has been btdlt^ 
and most of the course remains unsurveyed. Arabia, 
then, has still a comparatively clean state. 

There is always a lurking danger that commercial 
** spheres ** may develop a political character. This 
would be serious enough in Anatolia, but in Arabia 
it wotdd be absolutely fatal to a good understanding 
between the nations concerned, because in this quarter 
their political ambitions and jealousies are infinitely 
more intense. 

ff the French railways and missions succeeded in 
transforming Syria into a dependency of France, the 
British position in Egypt wotdd be severed 6om the 
Persian Gulf by a strong military power, which could 
lead a branch from the Hejaz railway to Akaba, and 
establish there not merely a port in rivalry with Suez, 
as Arabia will doubtless do herself, but a naval base to 
dispute the control of the Red Sea. If, on the other 
hand. Great Britain eUminated France, which she could 


hardly do without a permanent breach in the two 
nations' friendship, and extended her influence from 
Damascus to Bagdad and then to Koweit, she would 
be cutting across the path of Germany. Even if Great 
Britain and Germany effected a compromise, they 
would both be threatened in turn by an attempt on 
Russia's part to penetrate to the Mediterranean from the 
Armenian plateau through Diarbekr, Jerabis and Aleppo* 
Here are seeds of war indeed, and their detection shows 
that we must discover some other basis than the national 
group for the conduct of these enterprises. 

A precedent is given by the action of four powers in 
19x0 with regard to the Sse-Qiuan railway concession 
in China* The governments concerned &rst arranged 
among themselves what proportion of the loan should be 
allotted to the investors of their respective nations, and 
then aUowed the private financiers of these nations to 
subscribe in this ratio ^ the total capital required* 

In the case before us the Concert of Europe should go 
a step further. It should not only determine the share 
of the several nations beforehand, but should draw up 
a compulsory formula for the charters of all the com- 
panies to be constituted* The chief principle of this 
formtila should be that each company must contain 
shareholders of all the nations concerned in the propor- 
tion agreed upon* If any company is floated in defiance 
of these terms, its contract with the Arabian govern- 
ment should not receive the Concert's sanction, and in 
case of disagreement between the two contracting parties, 
the Concert should withhold its own support, and like- 
wise restrain individual powers from intervention* 

Even the contracts already concluded with national 

^ The four powers were Great Britain^ France^ Germany, and the 
U^JL : the amount of capital to be issued was £6,000,000, and they 
agreed to take equal shares. 



The Iranians have twice expressed the racial antipathy 
which generations of border-warfare and the vicissi- 
tudes of empire and subjugation have aroused, in the 
creation of a national religion. While the native 
religious developments of the European nations lost 
their savour, and succumbed one by one to a universal 
religion of Semitic origin, the Iranian, like the Hindu, 
found a prophet in his own country, and, unlike the 
Hindu, possessed the insight to pay him honour. 
Zarathustra probably Uved under the great Darius, in 
the latter half of die sixth century bx., about two 
generations before the incarnation of the Buddha. The 
reformed faith which he founded grew, like the Yawth- 
ism of the Hebrew prophets, to be the distinctive marie 
of his nation, and the restored national kingdom, which 
put an end to the interlude of Greek predominance in 
the third century A.D., incorporated its religion in a 
highly-organised national church. 

For four centtuies the national church and state of 
Iran battled with the oecumenical religion and empire 
of the Roman world without any decisive issue. Tlien 
the avalanche of Islam overwhelmed them both, and Iran 
was utterly submerged. Zoroastrianism was proscribed ^ 
and the new-bom Arabic civilisation dominated the 
nation even more strongly than the Greek had done 
before, yet Persian nationality had enough vitality to 
assert itself again. When Turk and Mongol broke 
their way into the Moslem world, the Arab went down 
before them, but Iran, over whose corpse they trod their 
road to Bagdad and Anatolia, found in the general ruin 
an opportunity for her own revival. 

The schism concerning the succession to the 

^ Its faithful votaries found refuge in Western India, where they still 
survive as the p rosperous Parsee sect. 


Caliphate, which rent Islam in the second generation 
of its existence, had been trenchantly settled against 
the house of Ali by the sword, but a minority of stead- 
fast heretics handed down the tradition of Ali's claims, 
and Persia gradually became the stronghold of their 
opinion* In the sixteenth century aj>* a native Persian 
dynasty, the Sufi, which adher^ to this sect, swept 
away the Turkish princelings who had divided Iran 
between them since the Mongol era* The plateau was 
united once more in a national state, and once more 
again the renaissance of Iran expressed itself in religion. 
The heresy of its kings became the belief of the nation, 
and under the banner of ** Shiism,'^ Persia kept at bay 
the hated Turkish powers which hemmed her in on 
every side and uniformly professed the orthodox 
** Sunni ^ faith : Ottoman Turks on the West, Uzbeg 
Khans upon the Oxus in the North, and the Uzbegs' 
Mogul cousins, who had carved themselves a mighty 
empire in India upon Persia's Eastern flank. 

The feeling has lasted on both sides to this day* 
Persia is outcast from the legitimate family of Islam, 
and at the same time she has developed the most 
vigorous national consciousness in the Moslem world, 
for the very reason that racial distinction is in this case 
emphasised by religious cleavage, instead of bemg 
overridden by the sense of religious community* 

This magnificent national history has not failed to 
enshrine itself in tradition* It is true that the Avestas, 
the sacred scriptures of Zoroastrianism, have been lost 
to the Persian nation, and become the heritage of an 
Indian sect* The memory of the Achaonem'd kings, 
whose figures impressed themselves so deeply upon the 
mind of the Greeks, has likewise perished among their 
own successors* Their Empire always remained a 


the plateau-steppe slightly North of Kom* Thence it 
will follow the river^s course up into the 2^ros till it 
reaches Hamadan* Here it will be joined by a line from 
Tabriz workit^ through Maragha and Saldsys over die 
extreme Southern watershed of the Urumia basin. West 
of the Demirli Dagh, and directly linking Hamadan 
with Europe through the Caucasus* 

The united line, which will thus concentrate traffic 
for the Indian Ocean from all quarters of the Russian 
Empire, will negotiate the Zagros defiles along die 
well-known caravan route, past the mountain of 
Elwend, past the batdefield of Nehavend where die 
Sassanian made his last stand against the Moslem 
invader, past the rock of Behistun, whereon Darius 
inscribed the triumphs of his '' strong government," to 
the town of Kirmanshah* Here a branch will take aa 
easy course South-West to Bagdad, linking together 
the Persian and Arabian systems, while the trunk line 
will turn South and South-East, and follow the river 
Kercha throt^h the foothills beneath Zagios' outer 
bastions, to Dizful in the plain of Khuzistan* Then it 
will bifurcate again, sending one arm Southward down 
the Karun river to the moderately good port of Moham- 
mera on the Shatt-al-Arab, almost opposite Basra, 
and another in the original South-Easterly directioQ 
beneath Zagros and along the ''Burning Coast,'* to 
the magnificent harbour of Bushire, on the Persian 

This railway would relieve Russia of the last shackle 
upon her commerce : her door on the Pacific, and the 
new doors we have demanded for her on the Norwegian 
coast and through the Baltic and Black Sea Straits, 
would be supplemented by an outlet upon the Southern 


Russia, however, is not the only foreign empire that 
has vital interests in Iran* 

The region contains a great zone of mineral-oil 
deposits, extending North and South from Baku on the 
Caspian as far as Khuzistan on the Persian Gulf, which, 
taken as a whole, is perhaps the richest petroleum field in 
the world. The Northern section of this zone, at Baku 
and in Azerbaijan, has long been opened up under 
Russian auspices, but the Southern section, like most 
natural resources within the Persian frontier, has never 
yet been tapped* When, therefore, the recent adoption 
of petrol as fuel for warships vastly increased the total 
demand, and made the question of its supply a pressing 
concern to the governments of naval powers, tfais vii^ 
field in Persia acquired sudden significance* Only 
last year a company was formed to exploit it on a very 
big scale, and the British government bought a major 
interest in its share-capital* 

This company may play as important a part in British 
foreign policy during the immediate future as the East 
India Q)mpany played in the eighteenth century, and it 
gives us a stake in Persia at least as great as Russians 
railway-interests* Great Britain has already concluded 
a railway agreement with Russia for a line that will link 
Lidia, fiifst with these oil fields, and ultimately, through 
the Russian system, with Europe* 

The road (of Indian gauge) will start from Karachi, 
the port of the Lidus-basin, and run along the Mekran 
coast through Gwadar and Jask to Bunder Abbas, the 
Persian port on the Hormuz Straits* Hence it will turn 
inland, and motmt through the tiers of the Pars moun- 
tains, which continue the line of Zagros along the border 
of the Gulf* When it attains the level of the plateau, it 
will take a line due North-West, between the mountain- 



lakes and tangled peaks of Fars on the left, and ibt Kskr 
rud range (a pandlel outwork of Zagros towards the 
Kevir) on the right, till it reaches Ispahan, the seomd 
city of Persia. From this point it wilt probably take its 
way through the mountains to Khunsar, and thence 
down a river-defile to Kom, whidi will be its juncticm 
with the Russian railway. 

These immense enterprises will not bring advantage 
merely to the fore^ powers which are pressing for 
permission to carry them out : Aey offer the only hope 
for the restoration of Persia's own economic prosperity. 
The terrible Mongol invasions, which ultimately gave 
her the means of recoverii^ her national independence, 
cost her the material wealth which centuries of strong 
Sassanian and Arab government had built up. In 
the thirteenth century Aj>. Khorassan, her Northern- 
most province, was one of the most flourisbii^ industrial 
countries in the world : the Mongob in a few cam- 
paigns reduced it to a desolation from which it has never 
recovered, and the shock of the calamity brought upon 
the whole nation a chronic economic paralysis whidi it 
will not throw off by its own efforts. 

From a purely economic point of view, then, the oD 
and railway concessions will be mutually advantageous 
to both parties in the contract, to Great Britain and 
Russia on the one hand, and to Persia herself on the 
other ; but in discussing the future of Anatolia and 
Arabia we recc^nised the fact that, v^tn a backward 
nation delivers into the hands of an advanced nation 
the monopoly over its e^loitation, the influx of the 
fbre^ state's capital altnost inevitably leads on to 
the establishment of its political sovere^ty over the 
exploittd area. The Mongol invasron brought one 
boon only at the cost of another: will the Anglo- 


Russian ** penetratioii ** merely invert th^ situation, 
and compel Persia to sacrifioe her political existence to 
the redempticm of her economic well*being i 

Persians economic revival can only be accomplished 
under the shield of strong government, for the function- 
ing oi modem civilisation depends on the power of 
looking ahead, and that in turn rests upon the uni- 
fMmity o£ human environment artificially produced by 
law-and-order* Therefore, if this economic revival is 
the common interest of all the parties involved, they 
will all be of one opinion that the immediate practical 
object to be achieved is the establishment of strong 
government in Persia* The crucial question is this : 
Can Pdsia perform the essential task herself, or will her 
faifasre compel the two foreign powers to undertake it 
for her i 

Persia has rich elements of national life, but so far 
she has built nothii^ out of them* The tong-drawn 
revolution of 1906-9 was an attempt to replace the 
corrupt, incompetent autocracy of the Shah by con- 
stitutional machinery of self-government, and it ezdted 
high hopes* It has only ended in a fiasco* The 
chrysalis was broken, but disckssed no vigorotis orgaamm 
within, and such tissues as there were have been 
battered by eiq>osure to the rude air* 

The banishment of the Shah was the signal for all 
unruly elements to break their bounds* The aboriginal 
dans of Zagros, Luris on the Kercha and Baktiyaris 
above Ispahan, who have never truly been assimilated 
by the Iranian race, returned to their ancient profession 
of robbery and have brought commerce to a standstill 
on the Ahwaz-Ispahan road,^ the chief existing artery 

* A concegsioQ obtained in 1897 by the Bakttyari cfakfa tfaemsdvcs, 
and transferred by them to Messrs. Lynch and Co., who opened the 
road for traffic in xgoo. 


of commtinication between the Gulf and the Plateau* 
The immexise, straggling Southern provinces that border 
on the Gulf have been cut off by this zone of uxucst 
from the central government's support, and under 
ambitious viceroys have taken the path towards seces- 
sion* The national parliament at Teheran, torn by 
faction and threatened with extinction by reactionary 
rebels, has been driven to place its cause in the han<^ 
of hardly more estimable military adventurers, and 
to buy the good-will of Baktiyari chiefs and Southern 
governors by never refusing their demands* 

This is not an encouraging record, and it looks 
blacker still in contrast with the British and Russian 
achievements. A century ago the Persian Gulf was 
infested with Arab pirates : the British Navy has swept 
them out of every creek, surveyed the coast, laid down 
btioys at the harbour entrances and in the channel of 
the Shatt-al-Arab, and opened the whole of Southern 
Persia to international trade* Fifty years ago, all 
Northern Persia was overrun by the Turkomans of the 
steppe, who made their livelihood by systematic raids, 
plundering, burning and carrying captive without 
resistance : Russia has razed the Turkoman strongholds, 
and built the Transcaspian railway through their steppe, 
dose along the Persian frontier, thereby bringing 
Northern Persia into easy communication with Etuope 
and converting it into the most orderly region in ^ 
cotmtry* The two foreign empires have already done 
more for strong government in Persia, without setting 
foot within its borders, than the Persian nation has 
accomplished for itself* 

Recently we have taken a momentous step forward. 
The agreement concluded by Sir Edward Grey with the 
Russian Government in 1907 assigned to each power a 


political sphere of influence inside the Persian frontier : ^ 
the intervening zone was left as common ground, where 
both powers were at liberty to pursue their interests 
side by side« 

This policy leads straight to partition* 

** That is after all a lesser evil/' its defenders will say, 
** for the Persian nation has tried the experiment of 
governing itself, and proved incapable : it is therefore 
its own interest to submit to being governed by its big 
ne^bours, whose capability is proven/' 

We must answer that it is useless to cure present evil 
by laying up evil for the future. Inasmuch as all the 
potential factors of nationality are conspicuously present 
in Persia, a very few years of strong government, 
whether it be introduced from within or from without, 
will suffice to kindle the spark and raise the flame* 
Economic prosperity will do for Persia what it has done 
for Poland : it will bring the native population into 
better proportion with the area of the country, and con- 
front the two vulture empires with a nationalist move- 
ment of vast dimensions* 

''But,'' the defendant will reply, ''the ultimate 
interests and desires of the Persian nation are not the 
real issue* By its present incompetence it has forfeited 
any claim to futture consideration* Political dismember- 
ment may become very irksome to it, but it will at 
any rate not endanger the peace of the world : on the 

* See Map VL The South-Eastern boundary of the Rusnan 
Sphere starts from the meeting-point of the Russian^ Persian, and 
Afghan frontiefs, makes a straight course to Yezd, a town South of the 
Salt Desert on the inner flank of Pars, and then turns North-West, 
heading directly for Kasr-i-Shirin on the Turco-Persian frontier. This 
leaves Ispahan and Khuzistan within the neutral zone. The North- 
western boundary of the British Sphere starts from Gazik, near the 
Perso-Afghan frontier, and runs through Birjend and Kerman City to 
Bunder Abbas on the Hormuz straits. 

4fio PERSU 

ocmtnry, a oonunon interest m keeping Pfefsia quiet w3i 
provide Russia and Great Britain widi the very bcuid 
that diey have lacked heretofore^ and if this hqspens at 
Persia's eiq)en8e^ Persia wQl only be one erf your ' minori- 
ties that must inevitably su£Eer/ ** 

This really b^s the question by agMuwmg that 
a sdieme of territorial partition can be devised that 
will give equal satisfaction to the individual interests 
of Russia and Great Britain. That is the necessary 
preliminary to their having an interest in common, yet 
the authors of the present agreement, at any rate, do not 
seem to have been very sanguine as to its possibility* 
All the points where the interests of the two empir e s are 
really vital have been left by them within the debatable 
zone* Neither the routes along which the Russian 
railways must pass to the head of the Gulf, nor the oil 
fields in which the British Admiralty has since acquired 
a predominant commercial interest, have been dpptO' 
priated by their respective claimants. 

It is easy to see the reason for this : there is no means 
of disentangling these interests on the basis of territorial 
sovereignty* If Russian sovereignty is to foDow 
Russian railways over the pbteau to the sea, Russia will 
obtain a port of her own on the Indian Ocean, whidi 
she will be able to fortify, if she likes, as a base for a new 
fleet, and Great Britain could not possibly tolerate a 
naval rival in Indian waters* If, on the other hand, 
British sovereignty follows British trade along all the 
coasts of the Gulf, and up into the oil fields of Khuzistan 
at its head, Russia will finally be cut ofiF from her outlet 
upon the Southern Sea by the territory of a rival power : 
she will enjoy her free railways to the coast and her free 
port in whidi they are to terminate, merely on Great 
Britain's sufiferance, and such a position would be no 


less intx>leiable for Russia* The partitton of Persia 
initiated by the current agreement can never be carried 
to a conclusion on peaceful terms : if it proceeds further 
than at present, it will fulfil the Russophobe's woist fore- 
bodings, and plunge the two empires into desperate war. 

We find ourselves in a serious dilemma. Everybod/s 
interest demands strong government in Persia, ^e 
Persians have failed to create it themselves, and Great 
Britain and Russia, who have accomplished much, 
cannot complete their work, because they will bring on 
the world, if they try, a disaster infimtely worse than 
Persian anarchy. Either the assignment of spheres of 
influence in Persian districts of secondary importance 
was intended only as a temporary, palliatory measure, 
or if it was not, it must be interpreted stringently in that 
sense henceforth. Is there any reasonable issue i 

The immediate occasion of Sir Edward Gre/s con- 
vention was the breakdown of an attempt to put life into 
Persian self-fpvemment by administering a European 
tonic. First the customs were handed over to Belgian 
offidab,^ then Mr. Shuster, an American expert, was 
put in control of public finance, and finally Swedish 
oflBoers were introduced into the country, to organise a 
native gendarmerie. We have already explained \i4iy this 
experiment was bound to fail : the new personnel was 
excellent, but the sanction behind it was utterly in- 
adequate. The Persian nation can only be educated in 
self-govemment by an authority in the land strong enough 
not merely to rrndse short work of the native anarchy, 
but to maintain an independent, and if necessary a com- 
manding, attitude towards the two great foreign interests 
of Russia and Great Britain, which will inevitably be the 
dominating factors in the economic devebpment of 

* Gradually tntroduoed during 1898-1900. 


Persia^ and will grow not less but mote important pro- 
portionally as the whole country advances along the 
path of good government and prosperity* 

Such an authority can only be established by the 
sanction of all Europe* Already we have found the 
solution of many problems in the intervention of a 
European Concert, but in no case has the need for it 
been so urgent as in this, or the danger to which European 
peace is eaqposed by the lack of it more irremediaUe. 
We caimot much longer postpone the supreme problem of 
our whole discussion : how this Gmcert of Europe can 
be brought into permanent, active existence* Mean- 
while, no such Qmcert exists to help us, and till we have 
called it into being, we must palliate the situation in 
Persia as best we can* 

(i*) The private understanding between Great 
and Russia must be superseded by a collective agi 
of all the European powers, defining the frontiers of 
Persia, and then guaranteeii^ her independence and 
integrity within these limits* 

(ii,) The system of administering public services by a 
personnel drawn from lesser European nationalities must 
be persevered with, and, if possible, extended in range, 
and the states of Europe must make themselves responsible 
collectively both for the good behaviour of these officials 
and for their just treatment* 

(Ui.) The finandal support, without which no attempt 
at political reform can be carried forward, must come in 
futture from all Europe, and not, as heretofore, from the 
Two Powers* 

An arrangement must be made by which the European 
governments shall give facilities to the Persian govern- 
ment for borrowing in their respective money markets 
such capital as it may require for public purposes, in the 

lMt> :.4(| Ut 


same pxoportion as shall have been agreed upon for com* 
merdal investments in Arabia* If private investors 
hesitate to take up any particular loan, but the govern- 
ments approve the purpose for which it is being issued, 
the latter should either guarantee the loan to their 
investing publics, or else subscribe the capital in the 
agreed proportion out of their own public funds on 
moderate terms* It is only fair that if the nations 
of Europe enjoy the advantage of being the world's 
capitalists, they should accept the responsibilities of the 
position as well, the more so as their failure to intervene 
may lead to a breakdown involving the world in war and 
themselves in ruin* 

(iv«) The railway and oil enterprises will inevitably 
pass under Russia's and Great Britain's exclusive control, 
and draw many other subsidiary commercial concessions 
in their wake* But it would clearly be beneficial, as tend- 
ing to counteract the commercial predominance of these 
two powers, if all economic developments independent 
of these were thrown open to international finance, on 
the same principles as we proposed in the case of Arabia* 

These suggestions do not claim to be more than stop- 
gaps* They are designed to give the Persian nation the 
best chance possible of keeping pace in its growth towards 
maturity with the progress of British and Russian power 
in the cotmtry* It is the vital interest not only of 
Persia herself but of the two neighbour empires that she 
should finally become strong enough to hold her own 
against them both, and so to maintain the balance im- 
partially between them* Yet the haven is still bebw the 
hoTizpn, and while the ship of Persia is strug£[lix^ pain- 
fully towards it, her safe passage depends entirely on the 
self-control, good will, and good understanding of Russia 
and Great Britain* Such an understanding will best be 


brought about by a satisfactoiy settkment of the Perstan 
frontiers^ under the sanction of Europe. 

(i.) Great Britain at present commands the Persian 
Gulf, because till now she has been the only efficient 
power in the neighbourhood ; but when the New Arabia 
and Persia begin to come into line with the nations of 
Europe, and when the Greater Russia East of the Ural 
finds its economic outlet through Persian ports, the 
freedom of the Gulf will become as u^ent a necessity 
for the states bordering on its coast and for inter- 
national commerce as the freedom of the Baltic and the 
Black Sea. Unless Great Britain modifies her policy 
to meet the new situation she will become as intolerable 
to her neighbours in the Gulf as Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire have become to theirs in the Black 
Sea and the Baltic. 

Our only justification for commanding the Gulf is diat 
we police it* As soon as Arabia and Persia are capsiAt 
of undertaking the task, we must retire in their favour, 
only stipubting diat they shall maintain a flotilla neither 
less nor more than sufficient to patiol the coasts, and shall 
not build, or allow to be built, any base for a battle fleet 
upon their shores* 

The evacuation of the Gulf would invdve the cession 
of Bahrein Island to Arabia, and the abandotmient of our 
protectorate over the Sultanate of Oman* Oman is a 
straggling territory with a long coast-line, isolated from 
the rest of the Anbian peninsula by the great Roha-al- 
Hali desert in its hinterland* It controls the entrance 
to the Gulf at the Straits of Hormuac, and the Uberation 
of the Gulf would not be a reality tmless this state were 
neutralised and guaranteed by all the powers* 

(ii.) In fixing the frontiers of Persia herself, we should 
her of all territory alien in population, and inoor- 


pofate it in political oqjanisms really capable of dealing 
with it« This will directly lighten the task of self- 
government in the genuinely Persian territory* 

We have already proposed thatthe Tatar population of 
Azerbaijan should be annexed to the Russian Empire, 
and we may supplement this by handing over to the 
Indian Empire the Baluchi and Brahui populations in 
the extreme South-East, since the major part of these 
races is already included within the Indian frontier. 

The new frontier-line^ would leave the coast of 
Uannuz Straits half way between Bunder Abbas and 
Jask, and take a North-Easterly direction, assigning 
Bam on the left of Persia and Bampur on the ri^t to the 
Indian Empire, till it reached the present meeting point 
of Indian, Persian and Afghan territory* Thence it would 
follow the present Perso-A%han frontier till it arrived at 
the Western margin of the Seistan hamun C swamp *% 
but instead of crossing the swamp and including a slice of 
Setstan beyond it, it would bear Northwards along the 
swamp's Western edge, till it came to the point where 
the present frontier traverses it again near its Northern 

In eadbange for these direct territorial compensations, 
both Russia and the Indian Empire must give assurances 
to Persia and the European powers that they will abandon 
all daim to the wider ** ^heres of influence ** that diey 
have assigned to themselves by private s^^reement widi 
each other* 

(in.) While we have been drifting towards the partition 
of Persia, a country in which Nationality is potentially 
strong, and where all the cross-currents of British and 
Russian interests in the Middle East meet as in a mal- 
stfSm, we have been at pains to preserve the external 



mtegrity of a state which occupies a considerably leas 
important economic and strategical position than Persia, 
and which lacks all internal cohesion. 

Afghanistan is a typical example of those mushroom 
Oriental empires that spread their shadow in a day and 
vanish in the night« Its nucleus is the upper Kabul 
valley, which offers the best route across the Hindu Kush 
range from the Oxus-plain of Central Asia to the Indus- 
plain of the Punjab* The dynasty entrenched in Kabul 
City commands the South-Eastern issue of the pass, and, 
tak^ advantage of their geographical positbn, the amirs 
of Kabul have extended their stu^erainty over a terxxtory 
on both sides of the great motmtain-barrier, slightly 
larger in its total area than the Atistro-Hungarian 

The motmtains cover the major part of the coimtry, and 
the population of four and a half miUions, spread thinly 
over it, bes^ars the Dual Monarchy itself in its motley 
diversity : Pachtu-speaking A^^hans in the South-East, 
scattered through the vast tangle of valleys that feeds the 
West bank of the Indus and the North bank of the 
Helmund; Persians in the West, in the Seistan basin and 
at Herat ; Mongol-descended Hazaras in the fastnesses 
of Hindu Kush it3elf ; Turkish-speaking Uzbegs in the 
plain between the mountain-barrier and the Southern 
bank of Oxus, and Iranian Tajiks on the Pamir plateau, 
whose snows feed the head-waters of Oxus and the 
Northern tributaries of the Kabul* This last population 
is so isolated from the world by the great mountain- 
bastions on which it struggles to live, that it has not even 
been touched by the advance of Islam, and remains a 
primitive island of Indo-Eturopean paganism in the 
midst of the Moslem Ocean, like the pagan Lithuanians 
who resisted Christendom till the fourteenth century A j>. 


Th^ precarious empire^ founded in the latter half of 
the e^teenth century in a reaction against Persian 
aggression, would have fallen to pieces again in the 
'' eighteen-forties/' had not the British government in 
India interfered. A generation of half measures followed, 
which cost several disasters and brought no tangible 
results, while all the while the Russian Empire^s advance 
towards Afghanistan's North-Westem frontier con- 
tinued without intermission up the Oxus and Jax- 
artes. The relation between Afghanistan and the 
Indian Empire was finally settled by Lord Robert's 
masterly campaigns in 1879 and i88o« The Afghan 
government submitted its foreign policy to British 
control, and was granted in return a subsidy (which 
has never been claimed) and a territorial guarantee* 
Accordingly, when the annexation of Merv in 1884 
brought Russia into direct touch with the Afghan 
marches, she found not merely the Amir but the 
British government barring her further advance, and 
after an interval of extreme tension between the two 
principals, a definitive frontier between Afghanistan 
and the Russian Empire was laid down by an Anglo- 
Russian boundary commission in 1885* 

The conventions with Afghanistan in 1880 and with 
Russia in 1885 are still looked upon in this country as the 
main bulwark of India's defence, but it is most im- 
probable that this bulwark will continue to be effective* 
We may keep the Kabul government under our thumb, 
and even prevent foreign powers from tampering with 
its subjects, but we cannot save the government from 
destruction at the hands of those subjects themselves* 

Strong governments come into existence in order to 
give cohesion to populations which cannot effect it for 
themselves, and they only remain strong so long as they 


promote the interests of the populatioiis they govern by 
carrying this cohesion still further. During the last 
thirQr*£bur years the government of Kabul has mam- 
tain^ itself by British support in the interests of the 
Indian Empire : its sbw petrifaction, whidi from the 
point of view of British diplomacy has been such a satb- 
factory sign of the growing stability of the situation, has 
become in its subjects' eyes a patent indication <^ its 
bankruptcy. A few months ago ominous rumours found 
their way into the papers that the Amir's writ had ceased 
to run among the chief Pachtu tribes of the South, the 
only populations in the whole territory that are bound to 
the government by racial kinship. A family quarrel in 
the dynasty or the emergence of a ^^ mad mullah " (die 
Af s^bans are fanatical Moslems) may burst the diplomatic 
bubble in a moment, and ei^lode the carefully tended 
bu£fer-state between the Indian and Russian Empires in 
a blaze of anarchy. 

Sooner or later the ezpk)sion is bound to come, and 
if it is to discharge itself harmlessly into the air. Great 
Britain and Russia must arrive at a frank understanding 
beforehand as to how they will dispose of the ruins. It 
is possi1)le that the eventual dismantling of A^hanistan 
is already die subject of a secret treaty between the two 
powers; but if it is not, it is an essential measure of pre- 
caution that they shall provide for it by a public treaty as 
soon as possible, in some such terms as these : 

(i.) Since Afghanistan is merely a gec^praphical area 
oorresqponding to no national reality, it is expedient that, 
so soon as the present government becomes incapable of 
discharging its functions, the territory should be parti- 
tioned between neighbouring states capable of govern- 
ing it effidendy. 

(ii.) That the pardtion shodd follow natural physical 


\, taking account as far as possible of racial 

On these principles the frontiers might be corrected 
roughly as foUows : 

(a) The dty of Herat would &dl to Persia* It is Persian 
in nationality; it lies in an open valley dose to the 
present frontier of Persia, and could therefore be 
admincstered without difficulty by the Persian govern- 
ment; and its position commanding a route up the 
Heri Rud which turns the Western flank of the Hindu 
Kush, is so important strategically, that neither Russia nor 
Great Britain can allow it to pass into the other^s hands* 

The new Persian frontier would leave the Western 
margin of the Seistan hamun at its Northern end and 
follow the course of the Harud River N«N*E* to its source. 
Thence it would take a line due North across the valley of 
the Heri Rud, cutting the river itself at r^t-angles about 
75 miles above Herat, and proceed on its cotirse till it 
reached the summit of the Hindu Kush* Here it would 
turn sharply to the West, and follow the watershed 
between die Heri Rud and the Murghab systems, till it 
hit the present Perso-A^ghan frontier again on die bank 
of the Heri Rud at Jtilfikar, just at the point where the 
present Russo-Afglum frontier impinges upon it* 

(6) The remainder of the country would be divided 
between the Russian and Indian empires* Their new 
common frontier would start (beginning at the Western 
end) from the most Easterly point of the Persian frontier 
on the summit of Hindu Kush, and proceed Eastward 
along the motmtain-chain, following &st the watershed 
between the upper courses of the Mu^jhab on the 
Russian side and of the Heri Rud on the Indian, and 
thereafter that between the Oxus basin on the Russian 
side and the Kabul basin on the Indian* It would motmt 


onto the Pamir plateau between the very head-waters of 
the latter systems, till it reached the present frontier of 
C3iinese Turkestan* 

This division would unite the Turkish-speaking ele* 
ments to their brethren in Russian Central Asia,^ and 
assign the Pachtu populations to India, which already 
includes their kinsmen in the North-West frontier 
province* The Iranians of the Pamirs would be split 
between the two states, but they would hardly be aware 
of their misfortune, for radal bonds become meaningless 
in face of such mountain barriers, and the stru^^e for life 
against the physical environment ousts all other interests* 

We cannot propose the naval evacuation of the Gulf 
and the dismemberment of Afghanistan without en- 
countering a last desperate assault from the Russophobe* 

We have repeatedly challenged his general policy, 
but here we are trampling under foot the perfected 
details of his strategical dispositions* It is a funda- 
mental principle of his faith that the Indian Empire 
must be sundered from foreign powers by a zone of 
neutral territories on land and of British waters on sea : 
having established such a zone, he is indifferent to what 
goes on beyond its limits* This passive, mechanical 
attitude is really untenable in face of the momentous 
changes that are happening both in India herself and in 
the cotmtries beyond the neutral pale* 

British statesmanship in the nineteenth century 
regarded India as a '' Sleeping Beauty,'' v^m Britain 
had a prescriptive right to woo when she awoke, so it 
hedged with thorns the garden where she lay, to safeguard 
her from marauders prowling in the desert without* 
Now the princess is awake, and is claiming the r^t to 

^They have been severed from them merely by the aoddent of 
Afghan conquest in the eighteenth century* 


dispose of her own hand, while die marauders have trans- 
formed diemselves into respectable gendemen diligendjr 
occupied in turning their desert into a garden too, but 
grievously impeded by the British thorn-hedge* When 
they politely request us to remove it, we shall do well to 
consent, for they will not make the demand till they feel 
themselves strong enough to enforce it, and in the tussle 
that will foUow if we refuse, the sympathies of die Indian 
princess will not be on our side* Now that she is awake, 
she wishes to walk abroad among her neighbours: 
she feels herself capable of rebufiing without our ootm- 
tenance any blandishments or threats they may offer her, 
and she is becoming as weary as they of the thorn-hedge 
that confines her to her garden* 

If we treat her with tact, India will never wish to 
secede from the spiritual brotherhood of the British 
Empire, but it is inevitable that she should lead a more 
and more independent life of her own, and foUow the 
example of the Anglo-Saxon commonwealths by estab- 
lishing direct relations with her neighbours* If these 
relations are to be good, India must neither encroach 
provocatively beyond her proper botmds, nor retire 
timidly behind them* Her interest in the Persian Gulf 
will continue to be important but cease to be paramotmt, 
and she must be careful to yield her neighbours in that 
quarter their just ** place in the Sun ** : in Afghanistan, 
on the other hand, she must advance beyond her zariba, 
and boldly put herself into touch with the Russian Empire 
on the other side of it* 

The real function of Kabul is not to divide India from 
Central Asia, but to link her to it* For Bengal and the 
Punjab, as for Khorassan, die natural route to Europe is 
the Transcaspian railway* The Indian trunk-road system 
cannot halt forever at the Khyber Pass : some day it must 


push up the valley to Kabul, and over the great passes 
commanded by Kabul to Kunduz and Balkh on the 
Qxus^lain; and where the high road leads, the raihvay 
will ultimately follow* The Hindu Kush will one day 
be pierced by a tunnel more stupendous than those 
which already penetrate the Alps and are penetrating the 
Taurus, and express trains will run straight through 
from Calcutta to Krasnovodsk* 

The Russophobe will shake his head over the omen. 
By these passes, he will recollect, the great oonquenxs 
of India have marched in, from Alexander the Great to 
Babar the Lion* Yet such precedents are no longer 
valid* Then India was in the position of the civilised 
man unarmed, while her invaders from the North-West 
possessed arms and nothing else, so that the spoils of 
war were their only livelihood : now the civilised rule of 
Russia in Central Asia is fast obliterating the contrast 
between life on opposite sides of the Hindu Kush, and a 
new Rtsssia is growing up there which places its treasure, 
no less than India does, in the '' works of peace/' What 
we said of Germany at the outset is no less true of the 
Russian Empire : die destiny before her is to become a 
** community of workers,'^ and she has already put behind 
her the phase of being a mere '' nation in arms/' Russia 
and India will make each other's acquaintance across die 
passes of Hindu Kush, and acquaintance will ripen into 
friendship as each grows to maturity* They will meet 
on an equality, and develop on parallel lines* 

If, however, we must contend with the Russophobe 
on his chosen ground, we can show that from the 
strategical point of view it makes litde difference whether 
the political frontiers of Russia and India march widi 
one another along the summit of the Hindu Kush, or 
whether they are artificially separated by a buffu^terri- 


lory of varying width, stretching all the way from the 
border of Persia to the Chinese Empire* 

The whole breadth of Afghanistan is so effectively 
barricaded by Nature, that it oould not possibly become 
the theatre of war between the powers on either side of 
the barricade. As the frontiers lie at present, Russia 
could overrun in a moment the Nordiem glacis of 
Afghanistan that extends to the Ozus, before we could 
bring up forces from Peshawar, and she would only be 
stopped by the line of Hindu Kush* If the frontier were 
rectified to fcrilow that line itself , she would be in a position 
to commence operations against it immediately war broke 
out, but on the other hand otir own front, instead of being 
die other side of the Khyber Pass, would be there along 
the mountain crest, and all the passes would be blocked 
by elaborate fortifications. Under such conditions the 
(dances of a successful advance from the North-West 
would be even smaller than in die former case, and the 
likelihood of war breaking out would proportionally be 

Wherever, then, the dipbmatic frontiers may be drawn, 
the Hindu Kttsh is the inevitable strategic frontier 
between Russia and India along this front, and it is so 
formidable by nature that no attempt to force it would 
ever be made from either side. The real military road 
between Russia and India only begins where the Hindu 
Kush comes to an end. 

An invadii^ Russian army would concentrate mudi 
further to the West, along a front extending from the 
Caspian Sea to the Heri Rud, and would advance across 
the plateau of Persia, restii^ its lefr wing upon Herat 
and swinging its whole line rotmd upon that pivot, till 
it faced East instead of South and brought its right 
wing into position abng the Western edge of the Seistan 


basin. Here its progress would be impeded by die long 
and difficult barrier of the Hamun, and this would be the 
point where it would encotmter the Indian army of 

This front has long monopolised the attention of the 
Indian General StaS, and in order to make the critical 
area accessible to the Indian army^ they have built a 
narrow-gauge railway, the costliness of which may be 
estimated by the difficulties its engineers had to over- 
come* It starts from the Indus-plain in the North of 
Sind, climbs N*N.W* through the Bolan pass to Quetta, 
and then negotiates the Chodjak pass beyond, which 
brings it into the basin of the Helmund River, the great 
feeder of the Seistan swamp from the East* This rail- 
way is the key to the defence of India, because from its 
terminus Indian troops can be potired into Seistan from 
the East quicker than Russian troops, starting &om the 
Transcaspian railway, can reach it from the North-West* 
Seistan is, and will remain, the military door between 
Russia and India, though little commercial traffic is 
ever likely to pass through it, and conversely the passes 
of Kabul, though they will probably become the most 
direct economic thoroughfare between India and Europe, 
will never lend themselves to the passage of armies* 

Our proposed partition of Afghanistan, therefore, 
does not affect the strategic defence of India in the 
slightest degree, except that it brings the whole of 
Seistan up to the Hamun under the direct control of the 
Indian government, and so gives it the power of extend- 
ing the Quetta railway to the East bank of the Harud 
River, if it likes, and of masking the present line of 
defence by an exterior line thrown more than three 
htmdred xniles forward* From the limited point of view 
of strategy as well as from the more general point of view 


of economic expansion^ Persia, not Afghanistan, is the 
mine beneath the feet of Russia and Great Britain, which 
threatens, if either makes one false step, to explode 
between them and perhaps to shatter them both. 

It would be foolish to blind ourselves to this danger : 
true wisdom bids us face it and seek its cause* When 
we look steadfastly, we see that this fearful doud upon 
the future, no less than the war that is at this moment 
crucifying Europe, is due to the lack of an international 
power, stronger handed and wider minded than the 
individual national states. 

If a Concert of Europe could arise, skilled enough to 
build up national self-government in Persia, Russia and 
Great Britain wotdd never come into conflict over their 
interests there, and even if the Concert could not muster 
the initiative for this, but were merely strong enough in 
authority to maintain its external guarantee of Persia's 
neutrality against all comers, Russia and Great Britain, 
thot^ they might quarrel over interests inextricably 
tangled by Persia's anarchy, could not ptish their quarrel 
to war. Their only practicable battle-ground lies 
athwart Persian soil, and by the European guarantee 
this arena would be closed against them* 

The present war wotdd probably never have been 
fought if the violation of Belgian neutrality had auto- 
matically mobilised against Germany the active inter- 
vention of every other European state. If we learn no 
lesson from the present catastrophe, and allow the 
national state hereafter the same tmbridled licence that it 
has enjoyed before, then this war will not be the last and 
most terrible in the world, but the prelude to a cyde of 
increasing horror, till the nations of Europe are ground 
to powder, and the national idea perishes simultaneously 
Etux)pean dvilisation itself. 




We have completed our survey of national problems in 
the area affected by the war. 

We entered upon it with an ideal before our minds — 
the severe^ national state of the West. How far 
have we found this ideal applicable to the rest of Europe 
and to the Nearer East i 

As we proceeded Eastwards, the national atom proved 
less and less capable of adoption as the political unit* 
In Central Europe, we discovered, the Tcfaedis will 
be unable to work out their national salvation as an 
independent state : the economic factor necessitates 
their political incorporation in the German Empire.^ 
In the Balkans the political disentanglement of one 
nationality from another is only possible if all alike 
consent to economic federation in a general zoUverein.* 
In the North-East, geographical conditions decree that 
national individuality shall express itself by devolution 
within the bond of the Russian Empire.' 

In all these cases the political tmit reveals itself not as 
a single nation but as a group of nationalities ; yet even 
these groups cannot be entirely sovereign or self- 
contained. Like the chemist's molecules, they are 
woven out of relations between atoms, and are bound 
in their turn to enter into relation with one another. 

The nationalities of the Soutb^East coalesce in a 
Balkan Zollverein ; the ZoUverein as a whole is involved 

' Ch. VL > Ch. IV. Sectkm C. ' Ch. VIH. 


by mutual economic interests with its neighbour 
molecule, the Russian Empire ; ^ similar necessity 
produces similar contact between the Russian Empire 
and Norway or Persia* The simple tminational 
molecules of the West and the complex multinational 
molecules of the East and Centre all dispose themselves 
as parts of a wider oi^anism — ^the European system* 

Every organism needs a special mechanism to execute 
its functions* Each of its members may be instinct 
with its own vitality, yet there must be a vitality external 
to them all to co-ordinate them severally with one 
another* The provision of a Russian railway to the 
Atlantic sets up a complicated interaction between 
Norway and the Russian Empire beyond the individual 
control of either tmit* Norwegian sovereignty cannot 
secure Norway's independence gainst Russia : Russian 
sovere^ty caxmot secture Russia's right-of-way through 
Norway* If these two molecules are to interact har- 
moniously, their functioning must be regulated by some 
force superior to them both* 

In the course of our sturvey we have often had to 
postulate such a force, but so far we have left its scope 
and character quite indefinite* We have glibly stmi- 
moned ** Europe,'' the "" G>ncert of Europe " or a 
** European Guarantee " to our aid, and passed on our 
way rejoicing* 

We can no longer screen otuselves behind such 
formulas* They were invented at the G>ngress 
of Vienna just a hundred years ago, to embody the 
same vision of an international organism which still 
floats unsubstantiated before our minds* This 
century is the measture of their failure : they have 
not maintained the organism in beii^;^ — they never 

' Ch. VUI. Sectjon C 


brought it into beitig at all — and successively tfaey 
have been cast upon the scrap-heap* One genera- 
tion passed^ and the ** G>ncert '' was shattered by 
the convulsion of 1848; a second, and Europe was 
divided into two camps by the ** Triple Alliance ** ; ^ 
now the third has passed and ** Guaranteed Neu- 
trality/' the most solid of all the international links our 
great-grandfathers fo^ed, has snapped at the first 
shock of battle between the marshalled hosts* 

Guarantee 1 The formula coined in 1814 rings 
ironical to-day* Belgium was guaranteed in order to 
secure the stability of Europe, yet on account of that 
guarantee Great Britain and Germany, two of the 
greatest sovereign units in the European complexus, 
are at this moment engaged in a life-and-death struggle* 
Germany violated the Belgian guarantee deliberately in 
her attempt to destroy the European system by war. 
The effect of the guarantee may still prove momentous : 
it has drawn us into the war, and our intervention may 
turn the scale* Yet even if the Allies are victorious, and 
the new Europe is fashioned by them after their own 
hearts and not by Germany after hers, this will not save 
the credit of the guarantee itself* Germany may be 
punished for her work, but the work cannot be undone* 
Europe must drink the cup of war to the dregs — the 
pain, the hate, the waste, the pure evil that is not 
dinunished one drop by cause or consequence* The 
guarantee was invented to avert that catastrophe £rom 
Europe* The catastrophe has happened and the 
invention is bankrupt* 

The old Europe is dead, the old vision vanished, and 
we are wrestling in agony for .new inspiration* That 

* Italy joined Gennany and Austria-Hungary in i88a, three years 
after they had joined each other. 


has been the motive of this book. '' And yet/' the 
reader will say, *' you return to the discredited fetish 
once more i With the crash of the Belgian guarantee 
about otur ears, you propose to regulate by guarantee 
the future relation of Norway and the Rtissian Empire, 
and replace the snapped link by a hundred others more 
britde than itself i '" The objection is just, and we 
must meet it« 

We must beware of putting our new wine into old 
bottles. While guarantees hold, they conserve their 
chaise : when they break, the destruction is worse 
than if they had never existed. Unless we can ensture 
that the sovereign states of Europe respect European 
guarantees hereafter in other fashion than Germany at 
the present crisis, we must modify the formula or else 
discard it altogether. 

Can the mechanism of the European system be 
safeguarded against its individual members i Several 
means have been mooted to this end. 

(i.) One means is ** Disarmament/* We discussed 
it in connection with the Russo-German frontier in 
Poland^ and with the military control of the Kiel 
Canal,* but in both cases we found it Utopian. A 
war may be just or unjust, defensive or aggressive, yet 
when once a nation is at war, its existence is at stake : 
Germany is fighting for her liiFe no less than the powers 
she has attacked. Armament is self-preservation, and 
self-preservation is the last sovereign right that a 
sovereign state will surrender. 

(ii.) ** Disarmament by Compulsion "" thus presup- 
poses the complete suppression of individual sovereignty, 
and no one seriously proposes it as a means of '' break- 
ing in '* the untamed sovereign state : '' Voluntary 

^ Ch. IL Section D. * Ch. DC Sectkm A. 



Disarmament ''{is J' the catchword^ yet the difficulty 
involved is just the same* Nations may promise 
to disarm, but war is a question of life-and-death : at 
the whisper of war they will break their word, and who 
is to call them to accotmt i 

{^^ ** Limitation of Armaments '' would prove even 
more ineffectual* It would save men's pockets in 
peace time, but it would not save Peace itself* The 
essence of the idea is to make the reduction proportional: 
ex hypothesi there would still be the same balance of 
forces, and therefore the same calculations on the part 
of sovereign governments, upon which the possibility 
of war depends* 

Armament is self-preservation, and living creatures, 
whether individual men or individual states, will safe- 
guard their existence with all their soul and all their 
strength* There is no other limit than their capacity, 
and limitation of armaments in peace time wotdd mean 
at most that each nation would arm to the uttermost 
after war had broken out, as Great Britain is doing 
now, instead of arming to the uttermost before its out- 
break, as Germany and most other European powers 
have done hitherto. 

In practice it would not even mean that* Artificial 
limitation would set a premium upon dishonesty* One 
extra submarine concealed in a canal, one extra howitzer 
in a cellar, and the stipulated balance would be upset, 
the calculations invalidated, and the offending state 
ensured against defeat* *' After all," the offenders 
would say to themselves, ** what is to determine our 
rightful proportion except our own willingness to spend 
our strength^ Our neighbours wrote themselves off 
at nine guns, we at ten : if we can make the e£fort to 
build an eleventh, that alters the real proportion between 


our own and our neighbours* capacity, and entitles us 
to the extended licence/' 

When the cross-bow was invented, the Pope called a 
conference, and limited the employment of this lethal 
weapon to warfare against the infidel : a few years 
passed, and the people of Christendom were destroying 
one another not only with cross-bows but with gun- 

(iv*) '^ International Armament '* is propounded either 
as a supplement or an alternative to the three means we 
have dealt with already. This also we discussed when 
we threshed out the problem of the Black Sea Straits,^ 
and we found it as impracticable as the rest* There 
is a spiritual force — ^" group-feeling,'* ''public spirit,** 
** patriotism,** or however we name it — ^without which 
no human organisation can live, but upon which military 
organisation is particularly dependent* In the con- 
temporary world the national state* alone generates 
this spirit with an intensity sufficient to organise 
armies : that is why the national state is the most 
magnificent and the most dangerous social achievement 
in existence* The creation of an international army 
equal to its task would be proof that the task was no 
longer necessary: it would mean that the national 
unit had forfeited its moral sovereignty, and that its 
members had sunk their narrower dti^nship in the 
citizenship of the world* 

The four solutions thus assume one and all the very 
conditions they are intended to bring about, and we 
can neither force the individual state to abandon its 
sovereignty nor threaten it with the competition of a 

> Ch. DC Section B. 

• Ihdttding under the term complex molecules of several complete 
national units. 


sovereignty superior to its own. If we are to maintain 
the mechanism of European society by compulsion, we 
must swear in as special constables^ the individual 
members themselves. 

This policy may answer under very favourable 
circumstances : Denmark may take chaise of the Baltic 
Straits and faithfully execute her commission/ yet as 
soon as we pass to the Black Sea Straits the method 
breaks down. We foresaw * that here our chosen candi- 
dates would fail us, and that we should have to consign 
the task to Russia. To instal Russia at the Bosphorus 
and Dardanelles or to leave Great Britain in control of 
the Persian Gulf or Suez Canal is much hlce posting a 
brigand to guard his professional haunts. ** Set a thief 
to catch a thief ** : apply it to guarantees and we are 
driven back upon the old system, neither more nor less — 
the system that one of the wolves in sheep^s clothing has 
just discredited by violating the guaranteed indepen- 
dence of Belgium. 

We have asked our question and must accept the 
answer. It is useless to fortify our new European 
organism by guarantees of the old order, because we 
cannot fortify such guarantees themselves against the 
sovereign national state. Whenever it chooses, die 
sovereign unit can shatter the international mechanism 
by war. We are powerless to prevent it : all we can 
do is to abandon our direct attack, and look for the 
causes which impel states to a choice as terrible for 
themselves as for their victims. 

** You ask,** the Germans say, *' why we broke our 
contract towards Belgium i It would be more pertinent 
to ask how we were ever committed to such a contract 
at all. 

^ Ch. IX. Section A. * Ch. IX. Sectioa B* 


''The heart of modem Germany is the industrial 
world of the Rhineland and Westphalia* The Belgian 
frontier and the Belgian tariff-wall rob this region of its 
natural outlet at Antwerp, yet the contract expressly 
forbids us to ri^^t this economic and geographical 
wrong by uniting the sea-port to its hinterland. 

'' The chief need of modem Germany is a source of 
raw produce and a market for her finished products in 
the tropical zone* Belgium has staked out for herself 
the one important region in Africa which was not 
already occupied by France or Great Britain. She can 

do nothing with it, while we but this contract 

expressly forbids us to kick the Belgian dog out of 
the manger. 

''Because of this Belgian guarantee we must go in 
want of almost everything we need, yet meanwhile our 
great neighbours on either flank have conspired to 
take from us even the little we possess already. The 
struggle with France and Russia on which we are now 
engaged has been impending for years, and on our part 
it is a struggle for existence, but even here the same 
remorseless contract operates to paralyse our efforts. 
On the scale of modem warfare the Western battle- 
front must extend from Switzerland to the North Sea, 
yet the greater part of this immense zone is neutralised 
by natural and artificial obstacles on either side. From 
Switzerland to the Ardennes there will be stalemate: 
the decision will be reached in the open country between 
the Ardennes and the coast. Here, as soon as war 
broke out, France and our own fatherland had to con- 
centrate the terrific energy of their armaments, yet we 
had contracted away our initiative in this vital area, for 
it lies within the fh>ntiers of the Belgian state. The 
government we had guaranteed might prepare the ground 


for France and ruin it for ourselves, yet because of the 
guarantee we must look on passively at the digging of 
our grave. 

** Why, then, had we suffered ourselves to be bound 
hand and foot i We had not : our grandfathers had 
entailed the bonds upon us« When they signed the 
contract in 1839, they knew not what they did* At 
that time Germany had no industry, Belgium had no 
colonies, and the Franco-German frontier between the 
Ardennes and the Jura was not closed to field operations 
by two continuous lines of opposing fortifications. 
Had their signature been demanded in 19x4, they would 
have refused it as indignantly as we should have refused 
it ourselves. To us no choice was offered, and if we 
have asserted for ourselves the right to choose, who 
dares in his heart to condemn us i Who will impose a 
changeless law upon a changing world i ** 

This is Germany^s argument about Belgium. Her 
facts may be true or false, the arguments she builds 
on them valid or fallacious.^ That is not the point. 
Behind arguments and facts there looms an idea that 
can inspire an individual nation to make war on Europe. 
We must do justice to this idea, if it is not to play the 
same havoc again. 

Humanity has an instinctive cravix^ for something 
eternal, absolute, petrified. This seems to be. a funda- 
mental factor in our psychology : it has obtruded itself 
equally in spheres as diverse as religion and politics, 
but it has been especially dominant in diplomacy. 

^ For instance, the argument does not justtfy in the least the pro- 
ceedure by which Germany actually asserted her freedom. If the sttiUf- 
tion had altered so vastly that she felt herself no longer bound by the 
guarantee, she ou^t to have denounced it formally in time of peace. 
By professing observance of it up to the last moment and only breakiog 
it by the declaration of war, she obtained a grave military advantage. 
That was downright dishonesty. 


Whenever the European organism proves its 
instability by breaking down, we start in quest of a 
perfect mechanism, a ** permanent settlement/^ We 
are invariably disappointed, but invariably we return 
to the quest again. The Congress of statesmen at 
Vienna followed this will-o^-the-wisp in 1814 : in 1915 
the belligerant democracies are preparing to lead them- 
selves the same dance. ** Etirope is in a mess,** we 
are all saying : ** Let us tidy her up * once for all,' and 
then we can live comfortably ever after/' 

We might as well expect a baby to ** live comfortably 
ever after '' in its swaddling clothes, or say to a snake, 
as we watch it slot^h off its old skin and wriggle out 
radiant on a Spring day : ** Now that you have got 
through that tiresome business, you won't need to do 
it over again when next Spring comes round/' We 
are always mistaking the dead clothes for the living 
creature* A year hence, and it will be the new skints 
turn to shrivel, but year in and year out the same snake 
will be living his life tmder each skin in turn. In 
treating one of these annual skins with preservatives, 
we are not doing our snake a service* When the 
season arrives, he will have either to burst it by an 
exhausting effort or die inside it conquered and stifled. 
The one thing he cannot do is to live in it another year* 

So it is with the European organism* It is as ftiU of 
life, as perpetually in transformation, as the individual 
national molecules of which it is woven, yet we confuse 
it in turn with each of its transitory garments* If we 
are to find a satisfactory issue out of the present crisis, 
we must begin by correcting our standpoint* 

The impending settlement will not be permanent, and 
the better it fits the situation, the less permanent will it 
be* As soon as the war is over, we have to devote all 


our energy of thought and will to the racial and economic 
problems of Europe : we have to solve each one of them, 
and solve it to a nicety, yet when the work seems done 
and its result stands embodied in map and treaty, we 
must confess that we are tmprofitable servants, and 
recognise that we are only at the beginning of our task* 

Our real work will be to regulate this immediate 
settlement so that it varies in harmony with the sttbse- 
quent growth of Europe and modifies its structure and 
mechanism to meet the organism's changing needs* 

We have now discovered the flaw in guarantees of the 
old order* They were framed for rigidity, and there- 
fore were doomed to crack* Our new guarantees must 
be elastic : they must be forged of steel not cast in iron* 

How can we frame guarantees of this malleable 
character i* We may shed light on the problem by 
analysing into classes the actual guarantees we have 
proposed in our survey* 

(i*) Firstly, we have proposed guarantees of political 
independence and integrity in the case of the three 
Scandinavian states/ the Slovene Unit,' the Greek 
islands off Anatolia,' Persia,^ and the Sultanate of 
Oman*^ The autonomy guaranteed to Poland within 
the Rtissian Empire ' comes under the same head* 

(ii*) Secondly, we have proposed to guarantee 
economic rights-of-way to one state across the political 
territory of another* Instances of this type are the 
Russian railway through Norway to the Atlantic* 
and through Persia to the Indian Ocean ;^ Poland's 
title to free trade down the Vistula, and to the enioyment 

' Ch* DC Sectkm A* >Ch*V. 

*Ch*X. Section D. Strictly speakings we pi opo y d to yaiantge tbt 

fngdoQi of Gfeece to the extent of this porticci of its temtocy* 

« Ch. XL • Ch. VIIL Sectkn A* 

* Ch. DC Section A* ' Ch. XL 


of a free port at Danzig ; ^ and Germany^s similar daim 
to an unhampered outlet at Trieste.' 

Both these classes of guarantee are adapted from the 
international machinery invented during the Nineteenth 
Century. The first class is an extension of the political 
guarantee given to Belgium in 1839, the second of the 
economic ris^t-of-way secured to her through Dutch 
waters, in order to furnish the oonmierce of Antwerp 
with a free passage down the estuary of the Scheldt 
to the open sea* 

Our standpoint towards these two classes is inevitably 
prejudiced by their associations* We envisage them 
as embodied ''once for all/^ like their nineteenth- 
century precedents, in a contract, and like nineteenth- 
century diplomacy we tend to regard such contracts 
as so many girders in a '* permanent settlement/' 

{iii.) There is a third class, however, which has no 
precedent in the past, and which will react upon our 
standpoint in the very opposite direction : our proposed 
guarantee of alien minorities within the national state. 

We have resorted to this formula more often than to 
either of the others. The German populations trans- 
ferred with Schleswig to Denmark and with the 
Eastern frontier-asone to Autonomous Poland;^ the 
Poles abandoned to Germany in West Prussia;* the 
Germans and Slovaks who caxmot be disentangled from 
Hungary ; * the Christian elements in Anatolia ' and 
Arabia' — ^these are a few out of many instances, and 
each one of them is a refutation of ** finality.^' 

The fact that such minorities must inevitably be left 
on our hands compels us to recognise that beyond a 

' Ch. II. Sectioa D. >Ch.V. 

* Ch. II. Scctkm C « Ch. IL SectKm D. 

■ Ch. IV. Section A. * Ch. X. Section D. 

' Ch. X. Section B. 


certain degree the economic and the national factor are 
not commensurable. Here is an essential imperfection 
in the best settlement we can possibly devise* 

The fact that these minorities require a guarantee 
reveals a deficiency still more grave than the other, inas- 
much as it is not environmental but psychological. It 
means that hardly a single national society in Europe 
has yet become capable of national toleration. Just 
as people were persecuted for their religious belief in 
the sixteenth century and for their political opinions in 
the nineteenth, so they are still in the twentieth century 
almost universally exposed to persecution for their 
national individtudity* In this sphere the social evolu- 
tion of Europe is exceptionally backward, and the 
problem of nationality will never be solved till this 
psychological incongruity is removed. 

This at once reduces to their proper proportion both 
the immediate geographical settlement of the problem 
which we have elaborated in this book and that guarantee 
of alien minorities which we have found to be its 
necessary supplement. In this light, the contracts in 
which such guarantees are enshrined appear as the 
transitory scaffolding they are* Weakened by the 
morbid hypertrophy of nationalism whidi has been 
preying upon her for years, exhausted by the con- 
vulsion of war in which the malady has culminated, 
Europe must walk on crutches now or else collapse; 
yet she will not be a cripple for ever. Relieved by 
these guarantees from the immediate strain of unmiti- 
gated national friction, she will be able to concentrate 
all her energy upon her spiritual convalescence. As 
soon as she has trained herself to national toleration, 
she will discard the guarantees and walk tmaided. 

So far from constituting a ** permanent settlement,^ 


our third type of guarantee is an intimation that the 
problem stUl remains unsettled* The work will not 
be complete until we can dispense with the instrument, 
but the instrument will not accomplish the work 
unless it is wielded by a craftsman^s hand* Not only 
are guarantees of our third type merely the means to 
an end beyond themselves : ilie contract in which it is 
embodied is in this case the least important part of the 

When we guarantee a national minority we have of 
course to define certain liberties which it is to enjoy — 
liberties, for instance, of religion, education, local 
self-government ^ — and all the parties to the G>nferenGe 
must contract responsibility for the observance of such 
stipulations ; yet when we have done this, we cannot 
simply deposit our document in some international 
** Ark of the Covenant ** and go our ways* The essence 
of the guarantee is its subsequent interpretation* 

The relation between the different elements in a 
country is continually changing* One church dwindles 
while another makes converts; one race advances in 
culture while another degenerates ; Man^s indefatigable 
struggle to dominate his physical environment alters 
the natural boundaries between localities: a barrier 
that once seemed insurmountable is pierced, and leaves 
one formerly insignificant in relative prominence** 
Each of these modifications demands an adjustment of 
the guarantee, and since they are an infinite series, the 
guarantee itself requires ceaseless manipulation if it is 
to perform its function aright* 

This need cannot be satisfied by the original fiat 

^Sce the pfogmnme for the re-orgamsation of Hungary in Ch* 
IV. SectkmA* 
' An obvious example of this ts the tunnelling of the Alps. 


of the International Conference : it can only be met by 
the iqipointment of a standing international oommittee 
vith executive powers, empowered, that is, to administer 
and interpret the contracts to v^ch the members 
of the Conference have originally subscribed.^ Our 
third type of guarantee has thus presented us with the 
clue we sought. The letter of intemati<»ial law has 
proved ineffective hitherto because it has lacked die 
inspiration of a living spirit, and this spirit can only be 
breathed into it by a human oi^an of international 

Supposit^ that such an organ were called into 
existence, what kind of international relations would 
naturally fall within its scope i We can analyse its 
probable sphere of activity into several departments. 

(i.) The first branch would of course be du»e 
guarantees of national ininorities whidi have )ust 
taught us the necessity for its existence. 

(ii.) The second branch would include the two 
subi«As of guarantee we dealt with first, namely 
" Political Independence " and " Rights of Way." 
We can see now that their administration by a repre- 
sentative intemationat executive would eliminate diat 
defect of r^dity which has always proved fatal to tbem 

Between them these two branches would cover all 
the madiinery we have suggested for our regenerated 
European organism. Are there any further qiheics of 

' It would be preoutuie to diKusi the cooititutioiial retotion faetifeta 
thk TCDmcntadvc uoenutioiial organ and the mdmdual oatiDaal 
I which iti delegated authority would be derived. We 

^ wo 

1 frei 

^ aln 

free hand to " interpret " in the widut Mine, but on the qtaati on of 
emending the actual letter of the o " 


national interaction over which our international organ 
might properly assume control i It would be logical 
to assign to it, if possible, all relations between sove- 
reign national states which are peculiarly subject to 

Change is a harmonisation of two rhythms — Growth 
and Decay* Some sovereign units are continually 
waxing in population, material wealth and spiritual 
energy : such are Great Britain and Germany, France 
and the Russian Empire* Others, like the Ottoman 
Empire or Spain, are as continually waning in respect 
of the same factors* 

This ebb and flow in the current of life causes, and 
mtist cause, a perpetual readjustment of the relations 
between units in the two complementary phases* Units 
in the positive phase inevitably absorb the fibres and 
trespass upon the enviroimient of those which have 
passed over into the negative rhythm* We cannot arrest 
this process any more than we can abolish change 
itself : what we can do is to regulate it on the lines of 
civilisation, instead of letting it nm riot in a blind 
struggle for existence* 

The current radiates in an almost infinite variety of 
interactions* Great Britain, Germany, and India are 
discharging surplus population into the empty lands 
of the New World ; Great Britain and France are 
applying surplus wealth to evoke the latent resources of 
countries with no surplus of their own ; Great Britain 
and Russia are putting forth spirittial tnttgy to inspire 
primitive peoples with the vitality of civilisation* 

Our international organ can handle no more than a 
fraction of this world-wide interchange* 

(i*) We may exclude at once from its competence 
every interaction that is confined within the limits 


of a single sovereign unit. Within the British 
Empire, for example, it is patently impracticable to 
** internationalise *^ the problems of Indian em^;ration 
to Vancouver or the Transvaal, of the closure of the 
Australian labour-market against labour from the 
British Isles, of commercial exploitation in Nigeria or 
Rhodesia, of autonomy in Ireland or the Asiatic De- 
pendencies. The Empire may handle its own problems 
well or ill, but it will never consent to waive its sove- 
reignty in respect of them. We should regard the 
proposition of international intervention as a menace 
to the Empire^s existence. We should undoubtedly 
fight rather than submit to it, and every other sovereign 
state would do the same under similar circumstances. 
In purely internal afiiairs international authority will 
never obtain a footing at the expense of the individual 

(ii.) We may likewise exclude interactions between 
two or more sovereign states in spheres that fall entirely 
within their respective sovereignty. The Dominion 
of Canada or the U.SJV. would never submit to 
international regulation the question of Japanese 
immigration along their Pacific seaboard. If Russia 
wished to float a loan, she would never allow our inter- 
national organ to decide where and in what proportions 
it should be placed : she would insist on keeping her 
hands free, and making the best bargain for herself 
both from the financial and the political point of view. 
Italy and the Argentine would never relinquish their 
respective sovereign rights over the Italian labourers 
who cross the Atlantic every year to reap the South 
American harvests. International authority would be 
flouted as uncompromisingly in these instances as in 
the former. 


{Hi.) There are some units, however, so raw in their 
growth or so deeply sunk in their decay as to lack the 
attribute of sovereignty altogether — units which through 
want of population, wealth, spiritual enei^, or all three 
tc^ether are unable to keep the spark of vitality s^ow* 
Such dead units are the worst danger that threatens the 
peace of the world : each one of them is an arena 
enticing the living units around to dash in conflict, a 
vacutmi into which the current of life swirls like a 
malstrdm. In these ** no-man Viands '" where no 
sovereignty exists, our international organ can and 
must assert its own sovereignty against the sovereign 
states outside* 

(a) In every such area the standing international 
executive should regulate immigration from over- 
populated sovereign units — German colonisation, for 
instance, in Anatolia,^ or Indian settlement on the 
alluvium of Irak.' 

(b) It should likewise regulate the inflow of capital. 
We have discussed this question at some length in 
connection with the economic exploitation of Anatolia ' 
and Arabia*^ 

(c) In areas where the pressure of spiritual energy 
is so low that the population cannot save itself by its 
own efforts from political anarchy, the international 
executive should be prepared to step in and organise 
** strong government/* 

The problems of Persia ^ and the Black Sea Straits ' 
will here occur to our minds, and we shall recognise that 
this is at once the most indispensable and the most 
formidable task that our international executive has to 

' Ch. X. Section C >Ch«X. Section E. 

• Ch. X. Section D. « Ch. X. Section B. 

*QlXL • Ql DC Section B. 


take in hand* We shall frankly repeat our oonfession 
that acdve political construction of this kind will be 
beyond the capacity of any international organ which 
the immediate settlement may bring to birth after the 
present war. Europe will not be reborn in the fulness 
of her strength like Athena : she will strengthen herself 
in pain and sorrow, advancing laboriously from small 
things to great* The assertion of international sove- 
reignty in Persia and at Constantinople will not be the 
first step in international organisation : it is the goal 
of our hopes, the extreme horizon that our vision can 
wrest from Utopia* 

We have now established the nature of that inter- 
national force which is to regulate the relation between 
sovereign national molecules, and we can abstract our 
conclusion in two formulas* 

(i*) There is no virtue in lifeless contracts, unless 
they are administered by a living organ with executive, 
or in other words with sovereign, authority* 

(ii.) On the other hand this international sovereignty 
must scrupulously confine itself to the adjustment (^ 
the eqtiilibrium between individtial units, and to the 
apportionment among them of untenanted areas* 

It cannot encroach upon individtial sovereignty in 
any way that effects, or is deemed to affect, the sove- 
reign right of self-preservation : in particular, it cannot 
aspire to the regulation of War, and it is waste of in- 
genuity to propound any international machinery for 
this purpose* The best-conceived arbitration or con- 
ciliation is bound to break down, when once a sovere^ 
state has made up its mind that the surrender of its will 
on a particular issue is equivalent to annihilation* No 
international authority could ever prevent parleys like 


those of last July from resolvifig themselves into a 
conflict of arms.^ 

The reader may feel this distinction of spheres 
casuistical. '' I admit/^ he may say, '' that each com- 
batant has staked his existence on the result of the 
struggle, but surely he has staked it for a cause i The 
issues of the war are certain concrete problems — 
Morocco, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire — all of 
which conspicuously fall within the sphere you propose 
to internationalise* Have you not been making a 
distinction without a difference i If you cannot re- 
gulate war itself, how can you regulate the relations 
that precipitate iti In July 1914 your * international 
organ * would have proved just as ineffective in the 
sphere you reserve to it as in any other/* 

Yes, we must answer, if it had only been called into 
existence that very month : no, if it had already been 
in commission during the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 
Z911, or had been there to take in hand the Balkan 
problem in 1875, the moment when the revolt of Bosnia 
against the Ottoman Government opened that chain of 
events which has culminated actually in the present 

Morocco, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire — the 
present war is not really being ws^ed to settle these 
problems : it is being ws^ed because they have been 
settled already, and setded on such unjust and inju- 
didotis lines that all parties concerned have found it 
worth while to stake dieir existence for the reversal of 
the settlement. No one need have been involved by 
such problems in a struggle for life. They were all 
problems of expansion, and their solution ought at 

>Afl the bdligerents matntatn that they tookTup arms for sel^ 
preaervatioiv and they all speak truth— 4t a a tnnm* 


worst to have disappointed the expectation of im- 
moderate gains : it ought never, as it has done, to have 
threatened the parties with the loss of what they 
possessed already before the problems were probed. 

Why has the contrary occurred i Because, just for 
lack of that international executive with the sovereign 
authority we postulate, these issues that were not vital 
have been fought out, like issues of life and death, by 
war — not by the war of arms which has descended 
upon us now like some recurrent plague, into which we 
relapse at rarer and rarer intervals as we advance in 
civilisation, but by the unobtrusive, unremittent war 
of diplomacy whidi is being waged year in and year 
out between the sovereign states of Europe, and whidi 
has increased appallingly in violence during the last 

In this disastrous dipbmatic warfare our opponents 
in the present war of arms have been uniformly the 
aggressors* If Austria*Hungary is now struggling 
for existence, it is because she deliberately embarked 
nearly forty years ago upon a diplomatic campaign of 
aggrandisement against South«Slavonic nationality.^ If 
Germany is fighting back to back with her in the same 
ghastly struggle, it is because Germany has wielded 
diplomatic weapons still more ruthlessly against her 
other European neighbours* 

For the terrible embitterment of the diplomatic 
contest Germany herself is entirely responsible, but she 
has inevitably exposed herself to reprisals as severe as 
her own provocative blows* She opened the battk 
over Morocco by forcibly intruding upon a sphere 
where she had no shadow of claim to expansion: 

> In Ch* IV* Section B we have traced the history of this c ampa^ 
at wearisome length* 


thereby she drew France and Great Britain into diplo- 
matic alliance against her, and laid herself open to the 
htuniliation of 19x1, when Franco-British diplomacy 
mobilised its finandal forces and drove her to retreat 
by cutting off her supplies. In Turkey she might 
easily have satisfied her needs without any battle at all* 
The untenanted area was vast, the claims staked out 
on it were singularly narrow : when German enterprise 
circumvented the enterprise of Great Britain and France, 
and secured all the railway-concessions in the yirpn 
hinterland of Anatolia, French and British diplomacy 
grumbled but did not attempt to open hostilities. Yet 
instead of reaping her harvest in peace, Germany again 
precipitated a diplomatic conflict by extending her 
ambitions to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf .^ The moment 
she aspired to absorb the whole Ottoman Empire, Great 
Britain and Russia entered into diplomatic co-opera- 
tion, and opposed her purpose with all their might. 
Germany's Arabian venture has jeopardised her 
Anatolian gains, and if she is defeated in the present 
struggle, she will probably be excluded from the 
Ottoman area altogether. 

The diplomatic warfare over three secondary issues, 
which ought never to have been settled by fighting at all, 
has thus left none of the combatants unscathed. On 
the contrary, the wounds inflicted then have festered 
till their poison has threatened each combatant with 
the pains of dissolution, and made that quack-physidan 
the diplomat call out in panic for the knife of that 
quack-surgeon the war lord. 

This diplomatic warfare is the objective of our new 
international organisation. Upon diplomacy we can 
and must make a direct attack. If we can draw this 

^ Ch. X. Scctioa D. 




monster's teeth, we shall no longer be troubled by its 
still more monstrous ofiEspring — ^War* 

Attack diplomacy ! ** the reader will eacdaiffi : 

Stated in these terms, your scheme takes on a more 
revolutionary aspect. You are really demanding that 
the sovereign national state shall delegate to your 
international executive its entire sovere^ty in the 
diplomatic sphere* When it grasps your intention, will 
it not shrink from the sacrifice after all ^ '^ 

Otu: answer can be no more than a prophecy, and we 
shall frame it best on the analogy of that assodation 
among individtials of which every sovereign state 

In the philosophy of the individual society it is a 
oonunon-place that liberty and political organtsation 
increase in a direct ratio to one another. Mankind 
has never lived in the ** State of Nature,** for if our 
progenitors had not evolved the Herd already, they 
would never have been able to evolve the Soul. The 
life of Ishmael, which sovereign states are leading still, 
is a discredited myth in the individual's history: 
nevertheless, when first he comes within our ken, he 
has not committed himself entirely to the ** Social 

The most primitive individual societies we know are 
still in the phase of transition. In almost every sphere 
of life their members have already discovered the value 
of political co-operation, but there is one anarchic 
tradition they have not yet brought themselves to 
abandon — the '' Blood-feud.** Yet the Blood-feud too 
is doomed, and we watch it die out as the individual's 
political sense develops. The increasing political 
regulation of all other relations between man and man 
eliminates occasions for the shedding of blood, and 


instead of being an everyday necessity, murder becomes 
a last resort* The individual begins to think of it as a 
dreadful exception to the normal reign of Law : he 
misses here the liberty which Law has elsewhere given 
him, and longs here also to abandon tmlimited rights 
in order to cast off the bturden of unlimited duties* Then 
the Blood-feud dies out, and Law wins undisputed 
sovereignty within the state* 

Why should not the State itself repeat the history of 
the Individual i If the evolution of individual societies 
was compatible with the survival of the Blood-feud, 
surely we need not despair of organising sovereign states 
into a still greater political association merely because 
they are unwilling to abandon the sovereign right of 
War; and if once this international organisation is 
accomplished, surely we can look forward with hope to 
the eventual disappearance of War also* States like 
individuals must eventually discover that the Blood- 
feud is a bturden, and that the sovereign right to wage 
it is not Liberty but a mockery of it : we shall be past 
teaching indeed, if the present catastrophe is not a 
sufficient object-lesson for us. If sovereignty means 
freedom of choice, when were the nations of Europe 
ever less free to exercise their will than in the summer of 
19x4^ No choice was open to them* One and all 
they were compelled to turn aside from the pressing 
task of social reconstruction upon which their heart is 
set, and take up in self-defence — poor sovereign puppets 
— that task of mutual destruction for which they have 
no heart at all* 

The political philosophy of Modem Germany 
vehemently repudiates this anabgy of ours* It refuses 
to regard the State and the Individual as homologous 
organisms* ** The Individual — ^his function is to merge 


himself in the society to which he belongs : the State — 
that is the political Absolute. For the State there is 
no law, no vision of a wider society/' 

This dogma may be true or false : that the future will 
show, yet this much we can proclaim at once : If it is 
true, then European Civilisation is a failure. 

** The function of Society/* says Aristotle, ** is not to 
make life possible, but to make it worth living/' This 
saying, at least, applies not only to individuals but to 
states* Hitherto the national states of Europe have 
been absorbed in the preliminary struggle to secure 
their existence. If they can profit by the present crisis 
to liberate their energy for higher ends, then the 
Kingdom of Heaven is at hand : if inspiration fails them 
in this hotu:, then we are witnessing ** the beginning of 
great evils for Hellas,'' and the Sovereign Nations of 
Europe are doomed to the same destruction as the 
Sovereign Cities of Greece. 







p is an attempt to symbolise in visual form 

3 of the book. 

^ not chart the physical varieties of the human 

it occupy this portion of the Earth's surface,^ 

^tn (a much simpler task) the domains of the 

t languages spoken indiscriminately by groups 

ividuals of the most diverse racial types within 

area* It aims at expressing something at 

9re familiar and more subjective, and therefore 

Bceptible of scientifically accurate demarca- 

the groupii^ of the European populations 

-conscious national units* A definition of 

oiality/' elicited from a series of concrete 

ts, was ofifered in the course of the first chapter, 

le discussion in greater detail of successive 

jis, to which the remaining chapters are devoted, 

dred by at any rate one persistent object, a closer 

eeper understanding of the ** National Idea/' 

onmentary that follows will perhaps serve both to 

I the intention of the map, and also to recapitu- 

>y a few representative examples, the r^tilts 

1 at in the book itself. 

Under the British Nationality on the one hand 

** racial " maps m the true sense consult W. Z. Rqile/s Raeu 

t figures refier to the corresponding numbers placed opposite 
nafP^* in ^e map. 



are indtided, besides the predominant English-speak- 
ing population of Great Britain, the considerable Welsh 
and Gaelic minorities, becatise, though their Keltic 
speech is entirely alien, and the Welsh, at any rate, have 
a special literary and religious group-consciousness of 
their own, they are all entirely fused into one political 

In Ireland, on the other hand, the conquering 
English tongue has triumphed far more tmiversally than 
in the larger island, and has almost reduced the native 
Keltic dialect to extinction, yet religion has been potent 
enough to implant in three quarters of the Irish popula- 
tion a national consciousness totally distinct from the 
British, although the vast majority of the Catholic-Irish 
nation speaks English as its native tongue. In this 
island the only adherents of the British nationality are 
the Protestants of Ulster, and they are the most fanatical 
partisans it possesses, because they are a minority, or as 
their enemies call them a ** garrison,'* planted on the 
territory of another nation, and continually threatened 
with ejection or fordble assimilation at the hands of 
the latter.^ This explains why the distribution of 
stipples in the British Isles is considerably di£Ferent from 
that which would be presented on a linguistic map, 
where the Erse-speaking Irish Catholics, for instance, 
would be distinguished from their English-speaking 
co-nationalists, while no distinction would be made 
between the latter and the Uster Protestants of identical 
speech but violently antipathetic national feeling* 

(2) Belfast, though the capital of Ulster, has attracted 
by its immense mercantile and industrial development 
a large urban immigration from the rural districts of 
Catholic Ireland, so that a strong minority of its present 

1 Compare the positidii of the Gennans m Bohemia. 


population (349/>oo)» monopolising solid blocks of 
streets^ is intensely Nationalist. It is of course im- 
possible to separate out this Catholic population of 
Belfast horn the rest of Ulster by any territorial frontier, 
and they are one of those minorities that must inevitably 
remain unsatisfied* 

(3) A Welshman resident in Jersey once told the 
author that he was able to carry on a Keltic conversation 
with the Breton peasant women who came over from the 
mainland for a fair ; yet though the Welsh and Breton 
dialects are so little di£Ferentiated, there is no common 
consciousness whatever between the populations that 
speak them. 

The Breton is as good a Frenchman as the Welsh- 
man is a ^^ Britisher/' The Welshman is distinguished 
within the general British mass not so much by his 
language as by his Nonconformity, which he shares 
with an inq)ortant class of the whole English-speaking 
population : the Breton is a clerical, like his French- 
speaking Vend&m neighbour, not because of his Keltic 
speech, but because he is a peasant and inhabits a 
district remote from the centres of French national life* 

(4) The French-speaking Belgians or Wattoons have, 
unlijke the Keltic-speaking Bretons, been left blank, 
because, though they have several times in the past 
been incorporated by conquest in the French state, 
they have never till lately shown any active desire for 
its membership*^ If they ever htesk away from the 
Flemings, their secession will be due far less to 
sympathy with the neighbour nation with which they 
share a common laxiguage, than to the antipathy of 

* In ooatiast to the Freneh-flpeaktng populatkm of a dstiict itke 
Fnnche-Compt^ which till the seventeenth century lay outaide the 
political frontier of France, yet has bcoi completiely welded into the 
rrench nation. 


socialists and free-thinkers towards the conservatism 
and clericalism of Flanders. The heroic stmgg^t for 
freedom against the Germans is more likely, however, to 
fuse Walloons and Flemings into a really Uving Belgian 

(5) The FlendngSf who, together with the Walloons, 
constitute, or will constitute in the future, the Belgian 
nation, speak a ** Low-German '' dialect hardly dts- 
tii^^uishable from the Dutch, but since the decline of 
medieval Flemish civilisation in the sixteenth century, 
French has ousted the native idiom as the medium of 
education and literature. The Flemish literary revival 
is a movement of very recent growth : the Dutch, on 
the other hand, began to raise their patois into a ** culture- 
language ** during the same sixteenth century, and have 
won it a permanent place beside French and High 

The gulf between Fleming and Dutchman has further 
been accentuated by Religion : the Dutch became 
ardent Calvinists, while the Flemings were captured 
by the Counter-Reformation* Thus there remains no 
factor capable of inspiring a common national con- 
sciousness, and it is tmlikely that such will arise in the 
future, unless the ** Yotmg-Flemish ** revival really 
pervades the whole Flemish people, and brings linguistic 
consciousness to the forefront* 

(6) The Dutch themselves (as well as their Flemish 
neighbours) are claimed by Pan-Germans as truant 
members of the German nation, because they speak 
(like ourselves ^) a ** Low-German "' dialect* It is true 
that the peasant of the Zuider Zee polders and the 
peasant on the Baltic coast preserved a close dialectical 

> " Btead, tmtter, and cheese 

Are good English and good Fries." 


kinship before the days when national elementary 
education began to standardise language according to 
political grouping; yet while the classical scholars 
and Calvinistic theologians of Holland elevated their 
tongue into one of the literary languages of Europe, their 
Baltic cousins succumbed to the Lutheran movement 
from High Germany, and adopted the High German 
dialect of Luther's Bible as the vehicle of their culture. 
Moreover, this divergence of religious doctrine and 
literary medium has been a mere concomitant and 
symbol of a totally dissimilar development of national 
Itfe. Nothing could be more different than the history 
of Holland and Prussia during the last three centuries* 
Prussia has worked out her traditions and destinies 
on the cramped plain of Northern Germany, Holland 
hers in all the Indies and the Equatorial seas. To call 
Dutch and North Germans one nation because they 
originally spoke an tmdifferentiated patois, is to ju^^le 
with words* 

(7) The portion of the German Reicfasland included 
in the mediaeval province of Alsace is left blank, because 
the nationality of the Alsatians can only be decided by 
the population itself, and it has never yet had the 
opportunity to formulate its will* 

(8) The Swiss are the supreme example of the 
phenomenon of Nationality as independent of Religion, 
Region and Language* On a map of religious or linguistic 
** distribution ** they would not figure as an entity at 
all : on a map of Nationality they deserve distinction 
as much as, or more than, any other European group* 

(9) The Corsicans are left blank, though they speak 
an Italian dialect, because it is certain that they would 
be no less irked by an administration controlled from 
Rome as by the present government organised by 


France : they would perhaps choose, if they could, to 
be left to their iosular anarchy, and would certainly 
repent their choice before long, if they did* National, 
as opposed to local, sentiment is hardly more strong 
in Sardinia and Sicily than in Corsica, and it is more 
by chance than conscious will that two out of the 
three islands have become united with the continental 
speakers of their language in the Italian national state. 
Sicily has revolted more than once since Garibaldi v^on 
it for Italy in i86o. 

(xo) Trieste is a city with an Italian nucleus and a 
fringe of Slovene suburbs, inhabited by the industrials 
and dock-hands ii^om the commercial development 
of the port has attracted from the countryside* The 
Italian element has kept its hold upon the civic ad- 
ministration by preventing the new Slovene quarters 
from incorporating themselves in the municipal area. 
The population of ** official " Trieste is 133,000, and 
is predominantly Italian : the population of Greater 
Trieste, that is, of the whole urban complexus centred 
in the port, totals nearly a hundred thousand more. 
Reckoning on this wider basis, the Slovenes can claim 
over 18 per cent, of the total population, and the pro- 
portion is always shifting in their favour. Their 
admission to joint control of the mtmidpality is only 
a question of time, and Trieste is essentially a *'bi- 
national ** city. 

(11) The Slovenes themselves are left blank. 
Common Slavdom may incline them to enter the South- 
Slavonic tmion, but their dialect difiers from that of 
their South-Slavonic neighbours, and has never de- 
veloped a literature. Their culture is German and 
Italian, and there are strong German and Italian 
elements in the population of the country* If these 


influences prevail, the Slovene Unit will prefer to stand 
by itself* 

(xa) The Slovaks along the 'Northern border of 
Hungary speak the same dialect as the Tchechs in 
Austria, but their history has proceeded on entirely 
independent lines. Their case is the same as that of 
the Croats and Serbs. The stress of common persecu- 
tion awakened the consciousness of South-Slavonic 
natiotiality, and the same causes may produce the same 
effects upon Tchechs and Slovaks* There is no indica- 
tion, however, that this has happened yet, and the two 
peoples are therefore distinguished on the map. 

(13) Pdszony (Pressburg) is a Hungarian town 
situated on the North bank of the Danube, at the point 
where the ** Little Carpathian ** range descends to the 
river. It is the meeting-^bce of German, Magyar and 
Slovak, but the German element predominates in the 
population ^ of the town itself. 

(14) The Masttriam are Poles in language, but 
culture, religion and tradition link them to their German 
neighbours in East Prussia, and make their national 
feeling unpredictable. They are therefore left blank. 

The '" Wends ** of Lusatia are left blank for the same 
reason. They are the remnant of a Sbvonic tribe, the 
Sorabs, cut off by German eicpansion from their kinsmen 
further East. 

(15) The Pomaks inhabit the Rhodope Mountains 
in Thrace. Linguistically they are Bulgarian Sbvs, 
but like their South-Sbvonic kinsmen in Bosnia they 
have been converted to Isbm, and the bond of religion 
has prevailed over the bond of speech. During the 
campaign of 19x2 they were violent partisans of the 
Turks, and their guerilla bands harassed the communi- 

> 691O00 at the census of 1900. 


cations of the Bulgarian army* National consciousness 
will probably be kindled in them, as in the Bosniaks, 
by the spread of education, but under present circum- 
stances it would be misleading to represent them as 
Bulgars, and accordingly they have been left blank* 

(i6) The Tatars in Bulgaria are descended from 
refugees transplanted by the Ottoman Government to 
the South bank of the Danube when Russia annexed 
the Bessarabian steppes* Since the Turkish frontier 
retreated still further in 1878, the Tatars have been 
left stranded under Bulgarian rule, but though they are 
sundered from the Bulgars by speech as well as religion, 
they have become completely reconciled to the new 
situation* While the Bulgar-speaking Pomaks in 
Rhodope were fighting for the Turks, the Turkish- 
speaking Tatars in Bulgaria were tending the fields of 
their Christian neighbours who had been mobilised for 
the Turkish war* They are another instance in which 
language is no criterion of national feeling* 

(17) In Constantinople the Turkish element at present 
possesses a majority over all the other elements com- 
bined, but it will sink to the level of the Greek, Armenian 
and ** Frank ** colonies, as soon as the city is liberated 
from Ottoman Sovereignty* Constantinople is essenti- 
ally a cosmopolitan trading-centre like Shanghai, and 
has no nationality of its own* 

(18) In 1913 Greece and Bulgaria fought for the 
ownership of Salonika, yet on grounds of nationality 
neither of them has any claim to rule there, for the 
Greek and Bulgar elements in the city are negligible. 
Two-thirds of the population ^ are Spanish Jews» 
welcomed by the Ottoman Government after their 

^ Approximately 80/300 out of 150,000. Exact statistics have never 
yet betaken. 


expulsion from the Peninsula in the sixteenth century* 
The commerce of the port is entirely in their hands, 
and their Spanish patois is the current language of the 
shops and streets* 

(xg) The Albamans are left blank, because their 
group-consciousness is limited to the canton* The 
Roman Catholic Mirdite feels no kinship with the 
Moslem from Elbassan or Berat, and their native 
speech counts for so little with the Orthodox Christians 
of the South that they employ the Greek language in 
their churches and schools, and reckon themselves 
Greek in nationality, though at home they talk as good 
Albanian as their Moslem or Catholic neighbours* The 
Albanian language has entirely failed to kindle a sense 
of common natiotiality among those who speak it, and 
this failure is striking, because it is a very individual 
tongue, and its speakers are sharply distinguished by 
it from the Greeks and Sbvs who border upon them. 

(ao) Zara ^ is the only pbce on the South-Slavonic 
littoral, with the possible exception of Fiume, where 
Italian can still be reckoned as an indigenous language* 
Elsewhere it has sunk to be no more than a lingua franca 
— a secondary speech acquired by sailors and traders 
who speak Slavonic as their native tongue* 

(21) and (22) In both Krete and Cyprus the majority 
of the population is Orthodox in religion, Greek in 
language, and accordingly Greek in national feeling, 
but in both islands there are strong Moslem minorities 
— perhaps ao per cent* in either case — ^which have no 
sympathy at present with Hellenism, though in language 
they are as Greek as their Christian neighbours** 

> Populatioii 3a/)oo in 1900* 

' In Krete uitek ts timversaUy sjjoken : in Cyprus, however, a 
fdr of the Moslem villages q)cak Turkidi* 


(33) More than half the population of Smynta ^ is 
Greek, the remainder is cosmopolitan. Ge(^raphically, 
the city is the diief commercial centre of the AnatoViui 
peninsula, and is marked out to be the capital of a 
diminished Turkey. The Smymiots are one of the 
ridiest, most cultured, and most influential Greek 
communities in the World, but if Smyrna were amiezed 
to the Kingdom of Hellas and detached from its conti- 
nental hinterland, they would be ruined. 

(34) The Maroniu and Dime communities in the 
Lebanon speak Arabic like thetr Moslem neighbours, 
but difference of reUgion and a tradition of k>cal 
autonomy have combined to implant in each of them a 
corporate feeling of their own. Druse and Maronite 
villages are so intricately intermingled that it has 
been impossible to distinguish one community from 
the other on the map. 

(35) The Georgians are a Caucasian people irtio 
remained loyal to the Orthodox Churdi when all their 
neighbours adopted Islam. They developed a strong 
sense of nationality during their struggle for inde- 
pendence against Persia and Turkey, the great Moslem 
powers, but about a century ^o they placed themselves 
under the protection of their Russian co-religionists, 
and since then they have rapidly become Russianised. 
Their nationalism has thus been conditioned by religion 
and not by language, and they have no feeling (tf 
brotherhood with their Lazic neighbours, who speak 
an identical dialect but are devout Moslems. The 
Lazes on their part sympathise with the Turks, and 
when the Ottoman armies penetrated beyond the Russian 
frontier in January 1913, the Lazic population flocked 
to their standard. 

■ Total population about ajo/xia 



(26) Tiflis was the capital of the Georgian national 
kingdom, but under the Russian regime it has attracted 
a large Armenian popubtion, and has even become the 
chief Asiatic focus of Armenian national life. 

(27) The Kalmucks of the Cis-Caucasian steppe are 
distinguished from their nomadic neighbours by both 
language and religion* They are a conmiunity of 
Mongol Buddhists which sought refuge within the 
Russian frontier when the Manchus conquered Mongolia 
in the seventeenth century. The Russian Government 
transplanted them to this distant quarter of the Empire, 
to hold the Turkish-speaking Moslem tribes in chedc. 



SoMK refeNDoin (i 

1. Oieat Brlt&ln, Fruioe, Germ&nr. Pnuala, ttiualA) 

r to be nvlstered in the Iikdez; others— tor 

InaUnoe, Beocnphlo*! amtm dBdnliig lines ot ntllwaj oi 


The Aikblo Diimeittia dene 

lubet denot 

It sabjeot. 

DtnasTT. 393. 405, 442 

AdUe Blver, S53 
Adibnople, 338. 384, X. A 
Adiluiople, Tteat7 or, ITS-S 
AdrlatlD Sea, IDS, 110, 113, 187-9, 
1. IKS. SOS-8, IV. C, V. 

ISO, 19 


Africa. EOBt, 33-4 

AMos. PartJtloD of, SS, 3W, 483 

AtrloB. SaQth-WGirt, 36. 33 

A«IUU. 16B. ns, ISO, 311, 318. 233 


Trtftl, 300- 1 
396, *~ 

AkklM, 4si, 448 

AlbuilA, 10. 110. 307. 336-336. 341, 

3M-a,3Tl. 403. lis. 4ST. 439. 443. 

443. 6DB 
AlbMitao CatboUos. 180. 305. 330, 

343, 509 
AlbulMi Moalenu. ISfl, 355, 3ST. 509 
Albanlui Orthodox. •« Bplms 
Aleppo. 433, 444-5. 44T 
Alexander the Oreet, IS, 413 
Alexander II.. Tsar. 333 

AlfUd. 106-T. iV. A. 1S8. 180. SIT, 
330, SSI 

Alps. 104, 106, 143, 18T-8, 313, 358, 

:A1, 364, 413. 4T3. 4SB 
^litnw or Alaace-lionalne, II. B, 51, 

81, at, »3. 101, 3S3. 360, 371, 505 
Amanna Uotmtaua, 433, 445-6 

'-- Padfle Coaet ol, 333, 493 

avU War, 334 

War at Independence, 308 

Aioiir Rirer, 338, 331 
Anatolic "" "'■ "" 


I, 111, X. D, 435, 143, 445- 

D, »>. 450, 450. 481. 4SJ, 497, 610 
AoatoUai) Islands, 138-133 
Anatolian RaUtmr. 338, 130, 4Z5-7 
Ancona. 351 

Andrasay, Ooiint, 133, ISI 
AiveTln Dynastf , 11 
Aiuledelanss • kommlisiOD, 51. 61. 

AntlTorl. 110. 304, 307, 331 
Antwerp, 183, 187 
AqnlleU, IBS. 35 B 
Aisbka, 111, 438, S. E. 160, 163-1. 

487,493, 407 
AiabB, 404-8, 410. X. E, 150. 452. 456 
Anu Rlvor, 306 
AnhanKel, 318, 337. 339, 310 
Ardeimes Mountains, 43, 483-1 
ArKectlne. 317, 493 
Anuema, LlCtle, 3B1-3 
AnnenlanB. 14. 386, 387, X. B. 101-3. 

nt Ip Ocrao. 111. 339, 347-3. 376- 
iii *Db. 133-4. 477. 18G, 483 
m™'[i, Au=(r«-HniW»H4[l, 118- 

Aii'iL-lflrli. Hunnaro-Otpotlail. 178- 

Ai..4^'liU. BattiB ot, SSS 
ADStnUa. 35, 337 •». 333, 410. 181 
Anstrta, DikAi' (Mark) of. 100, 103-4, 
106-7, 111. 126. 138,111, 361 


Atuttlui Cxown Lkads' PullKment 

n MllltaiT Fnmtien, IT 4 
a SnoOfiidMi, Wu «f. 111 
o SDdbstmriSS 

«Tbai|ui, SBl-«, lOS, 4aS 

Babar tlio Lion, iti 

Babenbora, Houbo oI 

Babylon, US. Ibi 

Baddu, 83, 87 

Btucdad. 323, 3B3, 443-1. 441, 4iS0, 

Tss, If ■ -"■ 

4S3. 4S4. 491 

BNidad RaUwuT, 3T, 419, 430, 432-7, 

44S. 448 
Bnlireln Inland, 161 
Bajkat, Lakp, 33S, 330-1 
BakUrari«, 1ST -8 
Baku, 3a$, 414, 4SS 
Baku, riots at, 3S8 
BalkKDB. S3 133. IV 37fl, 381 MS, 

Baltic PcovlnoBB, 301-3 

BBJtio Sea. 4B, 60. 71-2. TS-T. tBB, 

307. 310-11.318, 337, IX. A. Ml. 

36S. 374. 4S1. (64, 483 


Belgluin, Sfl, 63. 101, 103, 9TS, 373, 

3S1. i5», ITS. 478. 483-1. 48T, 

Belgrade, 1«1, 167 8, 1T3, 180, IBS, 

301, 31)4, SOT, 33S, 38B 
Belgrade. Pe«oe of, 144, 173 
Belt, Great and Little, 3S0 
Benbtold, Count, 309-310 
Berlin. Coognee of, 13S, 183, 18S, 

lSI-8, ISO. 331-t, 37S, 360, 380, 

408, 430 
BcsBurablB, 30S-S, 361. 908 
Benthen, 6B, SB 
Blnnarok, 39. 81, BO-I. 93, 100, 103, 

103. 133, 344, 309, 373, 3T4-fi, 

387.303. 335 
Black Foreat, 101, 103 
Blaolt Sea. 101, 138, 1S8, 194, 17. C, 

98S.3S4, 3SS, 3BT. 310, 318. 337, 

SS8, TX. B, 383. 3111. SBT, 430, 4tS 
Black Sea Stralta. 180,-303, 333, 33S, 

338, 341, IX. B, 38S, 3B8. 4IT, 

434-9, 438. 494. 464, 481-3, 4B3 
BoKumlk (PanliolBiu). 170, >1S 
BoEraiia, ee-T. B3, B8, 106, 111-3, 

19S-13T. 141, 147, 3S8. V. 381, 903 
Bombar. 109 

Bomw BITOT, 187. 170 

Bomia. 100, 111. 144, IV. B. 19B- 

100, 110-6, 133, 240, 384. 430, 499, 

BomlakB, IV. B, $08 
Boanlan Rallwa;, IBS, 304. 314, 113, 

BoraiW RlTSr, M4, 130 

Borne, Battle of the, 150 

Boxm, 371 

BiaotiroepliaUBin, 411 

B^nl tribes, 461 


Brandenbnrs, 31-3, 83, 101. Mt 

Bnddfilani, 331. 511 

Bukoreat. 337 

Bukarest, Treaty of, 106, 133. tU. 


Bukodna, SOS, 307 

Bnldur, 410, 43T 

Buleorla. 10. 15, 106, 188-9. 1B4, 

m. 303, aoe-8. ass, 33s, isb-si!:. 

251. 3T7. 307. 300. 363. X. A. SOg 
BiDitar-, IBS, 1S2. 181.337-313,306. 

Buiidoi' Abboa. 455. 150, 4BS 

BniKUn^. 8 

BrnoUne Emplra, 53. 36S, 380 

CaUphate, 404-9. 407. 439. 461 

Oalvliiliin, 14B, 904-9 

Canada, 3£, 311, 337, 33B. 330, US. 

Cappadods. 413. 416 

Cappodoolans, 414 

Caroline Islands, 38 

Carpatblui Uonntalns, 68. 78, 104. 

HiV. A. 16T. ISB, 318-T, 319, 34T, 

Wiei. 3S4. 388. 193. 309. 307, 310, 



Oftttaro Fjoid. 110, 173, 182, 204, 

214, 230, 232, 254 
Ganoasos, 109, 320, 388-9, 890-1, 

396-7. 449, 455, 473 
Cauldron of the North, 331 
Cavonr, 209 
Ceylon, 109 

Cbaldceans (AssyriaiiB), 393-5, 437 
Charlemagne, 40, 405 
Charles of Loxembouig, 262 
Charles the Bold, 275 
Chataldja Lines, 182, 203, 208, 364, 

Gberemiaaeej. 321 
ChemigOY, 315 
China, 28, 317, 327, 330-5, 442, 447, 

Chrobatfl, 169 
ChiiTaahes. 321 
GUidan Tunnel, 425 
Constantlne Paiaiologos, 366 
Constantino Porphyrogennetos, 103 
Oonstantinqple, 169, 170. 182, 235-6, 

245, 295, 322, IX. B. 382, 390, 408, 

419, 420, 437, 494, 508 
Conatanc, Council of, 262 
Corfu. 109, 249 
Corinthian Gulf, 228 
Corsica, 253. 505-6 
Coaaaoks, 283. 328-9 
Costanza, 224 
Courland, 301-3 
Gkaoow, 76, 132, 285-6 
Crimea, 316 

GMmean War, 298, 419, 422, 436 
Croatia-SUyonia. 145, 157, 166. IV. 

B, 248, 260, 343 
Croats. 145. IV. B. 507 
Crusade, First, 391 
Cnstoxxa, Battle of, 99 
Cuxhaven, 88 
Cyprus, 429-431. 509 


Dalmatia, 110, 120, 144, IV. B, 247, 

Damascus, 403, 437-9, 440, 444-5, 

Danube River. 66, III., 125, IV., 258, 

261, 306-7, 385, 507-8 
Danube, navigation of, 224 
Danubian Principalities, see 

Danzig. 71, 74. 76, 83, 88, 272, 288, 

Dardanelles (see Black Sea Straits), 

170, 338, IX. B. 382, 482 
Dariel, Pass of, 389 
Darius the Great. 415, 442, 450. 454 
Dark Ages, 8, 21-2, 374, 384, 405 
De4k, 120 
Dedeagatoh, 380-1 
Denmark, 25, 48, 81. 338. IX. A, 

364. 369. 370. 374, 482. 486-7 
Dlarbekr, 437, 447 

Dinario Alps, 167, 169, 172, 179, 186, 

Distal. 188, 282 
Dniepr River, 284, 310 
Dniestr River, 306-7, 310 
Dobrudja, 237 
Don River, 165, 310 
Draga, Queen of Serbia, 192 
Dmno nocA Otten, 109, 114, IV. B, 

Drave River, 106, 140. 142, 146, 166, 

IV. B. 247. 258-9 
Drin River, 205. 228. 230 
Drin, White, 229. 230. 387 
Drina River, 167, 176. 199, 204 
Druses, 437-8, 510 
Dublin Strike, 13 
Duldgno, 280-3, 235 
Dfina River, 283. 301 
DurazBO, 205, 207, 228-9. 235-6 
Dutch gendarmerie in Albania, 375 
Dutch in S. Africa, 32 


East India Company. 455 
East Indies, 303, 505 
Edessa, 393 
Edward VII., 197 
TCgnAJiJA. Via, 228 

Egypt, 109, 373, 399. 404-5, 410, 
435, 442, 446 

Egyptians, 404 

Sighteen-thirteen,*' 23 
Elbe River, 23, 40, 82. 88, 264, 389, 

Ems Telegram, 202 
Epirus, 110, 233-5, 509 
Erse Language, 502 
Era Gebirge, 67. 69, 264 
Esthland, 302-3 
Etohmiazin, 390, 394 
Euphrates River, 390, 392-3, 401, 

Euphrates, Eastern, 393 
Euphrates, Western (Kara Su), 391 

pars (Persia). 452, 455-6, 459 
Ferdinand, Emperor of Austria, 98 
Fife, 67 
Finland, 321, 340-8, 356, 358, 397, 

Finland, Gulf of, 301-2 
Finland, Swedes In, 341 
Finns, 308, 322 
Fiume, 109, 179, 180, 204, 214, 217, 

222, 224, 509 
Fiume, Reeolatlons of, 194-5 
Flemings, 503-4 
Flensbuiv. 50 

Foreign Legion. French, 373 
Forth, Firth of, 67 
•• 'Forty-Eight." 87, 98. 117. 478 


■cte-JOHph, M, llT-8, 1*7, 138. 
iij3-T, ITS, IBl 
Ftankfnlt. n 

QalMk, SS, ST-g, BO, 100, IM, S4T, 
MT. 381, tSS. tW-1, »S, 304-T. 
311-S, 31B 

Oal^aU, ITO, 103, SOI, SOA 

OMlMdL lit, ta, MS 

OetM^ iit. til 
aS^^oM, m, 3M-1. 3 

GemiM) ODDfMmUoa, 

-O. 9». __ . 
I3T.118-S, ITT. 

ei, 141, rv. A. 
. 30t-3. 300, 310 


Gobi Desert. S30-1 

I Dt, 203 lOT, las-o, 

H&mmertMt, 141, 34B 

t, 130, 140, lis. ITl. 

..S, 'no,' 100. Vso ' 

HkpBbarg Monorchy'B Allianoe wltb 
OennuiT, tI3, 133, ITS 

BelEOlaod, SS 
Hollas. Sfifl. 500 
B.'Imimd River. ISa, 4T1 
Hi-Qry VII., 273 
B>'i:.i. 160. 16B. tI3 
" 3, IBB, 1J3 

H il, -nslButeD nruaetT, SI, 100 

H.iiii'ijiollcni Drns^tf, Si. 03. M. 

B^.Uimd. 30. 103, 1T3, !IS, »T. 3S1, 

HolBtPln. 350. -iiS-a 
Boly Rouiiui Emplrf, IS, M, MS4 
BosplUUera. are EnlghU ot SU Icba 
Honiiiu ^tmlUi, li5. ISO, IM-S 
HnQ ,™i Tesfs' War. ST5 

- " " 111, IIS-IIS, 
3te, ISS, 48T, 


IbtmhilQ PMha, 410 

niriicom, lis 

Imbrofl bUDd. 303, 305 

ladlk. 31. 100, 31T, 331, 331-9. 3T1. 

iDdlk, BrfUdiroDta to, 183, tTO, 3*3, 

308, 130-1 
India, HoalemB In, 398, X. C, 113 
India, N.W. Frontier ol, 109, 3SB, 

131, ITO 
Indian Ooaan, 111, IM, ISO. tS6 
Indus Rlyer 155, 100. 471 
Indnslrlal BertdiiUon, 11, 37. ST, 

H3, lOS-e. 111. 130, 131. STI, tSf. 

InteTTeenmn. OieM, 90 
loDlan lalands, 310 
tpek, 330 

Irak Anbl, Ti. K, 110, 193 
Inn, Plateau ol, 395, 133, XI. 
Ireland. IS, 11. 310. 311. BST, 19t, 

Irlab Oatbollo NatloDaUsta, IS, 134, 

ISO, 383, SOS 
Iron Oates. 101, lOT, 110-1, 111, ISI- 

S, 1T3, 331 
Igkandenm. 398, 115, 139, 131. 111-5 
Iskandenin, Qnift at, 301, 133 
lalam, 108. 171. SIS, 131, 331. 38S. 

3T3, 391. 398. X. C, llS-1. 131-0. 

130. 110, 113, 150-K. 486. SOT. 510 
lalam. Holr atleeof, 100, 103. 131-S, 

Ispoban. 158-7, 159 
b&ta, 110, 117, llS-8. SSI. 117 
Italian manntaotiiRS, 953 
ItaUtuu In Amrtjls. 101, v., ISl, 1«T 



Italo-TnrkiBh War, 203. S67, 489 
Itabr, Idngdom of. 100, 102. 243. 245. 

v.. 406, 427, 429, 446, 478, 492, 606 
ItalT, Union of (Bisorgimento). 8-9, 

98, 100, 103, 108, 173-4, 211-2, 

249, 287 

Jacobites. «ee Monophysites 

JakoTE, 280 

Japan, 35. 838, 386. 492 

Jazartes KlTer, 336, 467 

JeUadc, 175 

Jena, Battle of, 286 

Jerome of Pras, 262 

Jews, 14, 366, 886. 415-6, 608 

Joeeph n.. Holy Koman Emperor, 

115-6. 126-8, 130, 144, 146, 190, 

Jndah, HiU Ooontry of, 434 
Jnlamerk, 394-5 
JolT Rerolntion, 287 
JnUand, 49, 339, 350 

Kabul, 209, 389, 466, 471-4 

Kabul VaUey, 466, 469 

Kaiser-Wilhelmaland, 36 


Kallay, Baron. 183-4 

Kalmnolm, 511 

Kamenm, 33 

Kara So, mt Euphrates, Western 

Karelians, 321 

KarloYatz, 179 

Karlowits, 174 

Karlowits, Treaty of, 172 

Karpathos Island, 429 

Kars, 390, 398, 430 

Kashgaris, 414 

IfnfltTfl. 420 

Xa8tei6rit6a Island, 429 

Katar, 442 

Katholikos, Armenian, 394 

KattowitE, 68 

Karala, 239, 242 

Kacan, 321, 322 

Keltic language, 14, 502-3 

Kerir Deeert, 453, 456, 459 

Kharkov, 315 

Khiofl Island, 402, 428, 431 

Khoraasan, 456, 471 

Khuen-Hedervary, Count, 157, 181, 

194 198 
Khustitan, 414, 455, 459, 460 
Khyber Pass, 336, 389, 471, 473 
Kiao-Ghao, 35 
Kiel (aty), 83, 353-8, 369 
Kiel Oanal, 49, IX. A, 364, 479 
Kiel Haven, 60, 339 
Kir^, 308, 414 
Xirk^KJUlsse, 380 
Kirmanshah, 454 

Kishinev, 307 

KiflU Irmak. 426 

Kom, 454. 456 

Konia, 420, 426-7 

KOnigsberg, 75 

KOnigshtttte. 68 

KOpraiO, 241 

Koesovo, 176, 186, 188, 190, 196. 

203-4, 242 
Koesovo BatUe of, 170 
Kossuth, Francis, 197 
Koesuth, Louis. 120, 148 
Kostendil, 242 

Koweit, 113, 295, 439, 444, 447 
Krain, 248, 258, 311 
Kmpp. 84-5 

Kuen Lung Mountains, 331-2 
Kulmerland, 64 
Kurds, X. B, 437-8 
Kuilsohes Half, 79 
Kutchuk Katnardji, Treaty of, 175 

Lalbach, 217, 248, 250, 258 

Lakes, Great, 328. 337 

Larissa Railwav, 224-5 

Latin prindpautiee in the Levant, 

Lausanne, Peace of, 203, 429 
Lases, 391. 510 
Lebanon Mountains, 434, 436-7, 

Leohfeld, Battle of the, 103 
Leitha Biver, 126. 138 
Lemberg, see Lvov 
Letts, 301-2, 303, 308 
Lithuanians. 74. 77. 79, 283-5, 301. 

303. 308-310, 466 
LivlandL 301-3 
Lodz, 70 

Lombardy, 100, 211-2. 252, 257 
London. Treaty of, 203, 206, 227, 

865, 379 
Louis I. of Hungary, 149 
Louis XI. of France. 273 
Louis XV. of France, 297 
Lttbeok, 49, 88 
Lublin, Union of, 283 
Lule Burgas, Battle of, 384, 403 
Luris, 457 
Lusatia. 507 
Luther, 262, 505 
Lutheraniam. 78. 149. 341, 505 
Lvov, 288, 293, 812, 314-5, 323 


Macedonia, 15, 17, 186, 190-2, 197, 
203, 205-6, 212, 225-6, 229, 233, 
235, 237-242, 371, 403, 415, 424 

Magyarisation, 10, IV. A, 179, 198. 
219, 278 

Magyars, 98, 102-4, 112, 114-126. 
IV., 247-8, 308, 342, 507 

Main River. 93 


IbtoUk SBI, «S6 

nor ocnooj, itt 
D7iwatr,330, 911 
■oMiHuurl*, ISO, US 
Harbiuv. ail. »•■ ISO 
Harohleld, IM-S. IM 
Haroh River, IM, 140, 141. 2fll 
Httrik TbeMM. 91, IIB, 144. 1T4 
IbrlUk Rlvir. >££■», X. A 
MMmma, Sm of, IX. B, Hi 

a Rlnr, 141, 1*4 

■etkOTltoh, 104. ti 4 
lfet07K. 32S. SSS 
■ettemiob. Prtnoe. SS, ITS 

Itedoo. 390 

Hoxloo. ault or. 32 s 

llllaa(CitT). 101. Ill 

Mlaa Obrenovitoh, 188-lMO, 103 

WrdltM, S09 

HlMMIppl RireF, 310, 31H 

WtroTlEu RoUivsr, ISn. 343 

HUrlinl iBloud, 236, 102, 4It!. 431 

Honl DroBSty, 40S, 4sl 

MiAuB. BattlB of. US, ni 

Hohuniniid tbe Prapbet, 40S, 440 

MoldATlB. Ml. 307 

Hnustlr, ISO, »S, 118-0, 2tl-J 

HongollA, 413. fill 

HoneoUa, OaUr, 330-1 

Honnld. 2S4. 300. SOO-IO. H93, 309, 

113, 4iir. iso-1. 45(1, ino 

.^i. ' '" '" '\-'i'. 1~'.. IST-B. 

■ . ,-ii,;m,:'13-S, 

Hoon in SptUo. 419 
Morova River, 164, IV. B, 315, 13T 
MoTBTla, lOfl. 111.141. V. 
Moiaviui Gap, 06. flB-9, IBS, 2B1, 

HoTdvlni, 331 
Momioiu, 338 
Uom, 110 
Uoroooo. 390. 411 
HDiDoaD oilan, 5, (00. 495-6 
Uoacow, SOS. 311 

^Ko«>ow DlalMt, 309, 319 

MoOTUe RlTer, 44, 93 

MoakBkiphlb. 31! 

Moml. 43T. 444'fl 

HtUhAoran, 47-8 

Hurad Sa, ttt KnpbratM, Ettstent 

Hnr River, IBT, 211, 290 

Naplea, 101 

NaiKdeoii I., 0. 13-3, 04, 79, S8, 173- 

(, 353. sga 
NapalsoD m.. SO, 300 
NareuU Rivei, 1«9. S04, 314 
N«Aid Dnert, QnM, 439 
Nejd. 43S. 440 
Nemaiir& Drnaatr. 170 
Nattoriana, aw duudaeaait 
Notheriandi. 8. S41, 361 
Waua Pnia PiiMK. 200 

Naw Onlneft, )'6 
New TOTSrS40, 378 
New ZekUAd, 3S. 333. 410 
NIoholaa, Tear, 09. IIT, 1ST, 140 
Nloholaa, PrwdamaUon of Onud 

DDke, SO, T4. 333 
Niemen Blver, 77-60. 383. 3S3 
Nlkaria Iiluid, 428 
Nlab, >3T, 339. 343 
NomTTatan, 319 
Normaiu, 11, 21 
NoTtb Sea. 49. 51. 88. 113. 339, 348, 

360-1. 361. 4S3 
Normr. les. 340-6. 34T. 349, 493-4. 

477, 480 
Novara. Battle of. SS 
Novgorod, 309. 311, 331, 340 
NovgOTDcl. NUui. 321 

Obi River. 33B 

Odsr River, ea-8, 71-2. 83. 281 

Odeaaa. 388, 308-7, IIS, 318, 331, 

Ohrtda, 19, 228, 343 
OlmOti. CoDventloD at, 99 
Oman, 484.488 
Orpeln, 68-9 
Orient^ RaUwar. 33T 
OrBLU, 209 
Orthodox Chimb. 1S9. ITO. 113. 216, 

Ost-Slblaobei Jnoker, 82. 84. 87, 



Ottoman, Me Turkiflh 
OxoB River, 331. 336, 399, 451, 
466-7. 469, 478-3 

Pachtn tribes, 466, 468. 470 
Padfio Ocean, 35, 338, 454 
Palatinate, 93 

Pamir PUtean, 331, 466, 470 
Pangennanism, 56, 113-4, 128. 410, 

PanalaYism, 56. VII., 359 

PaiMoy. 25. 212. 215. 405, 481 

Papal zouayes, 373 

PaxBees, 450 

Patmos Island. 429 

Patraa. 227 

PanliomnH, see Boflrnmlls 

Pekin Legations, relief of, 371 

PeUa. 15 

Penda, 322. 394. 396. XI.. 477. 486, 

Persia. Belgian Cnstoms Service in, 

374, 461 
Persia, Swedish Gendarmerie in, 374, 

Persian Gxdf, 113, 122. 133, 397, 433, 

438-9, 442. 444, 446. XI.. 482. 497 
Persian ReTolution, 395. 457 
Persians, 395, 404, XL 
Peshawar, 473 

Peter the Qieafc. 296. 325. 337 
Peter ELarageorgeritch, 194. 209, 

Petershnrg, 54, 132, 297, 311 
Petiogiad, 318, 343 
Phalsbonig. 45, 47 
Philip of Maoedon, 296 
Philippopolls, 236. 381 
Phrraws, 414 
Piedmont, 212 
Pledmontese. 99 
Piff War, 196 
mtxa River, 59 
Plevna, Siege of, 408 
Po River, 98. 252 
Pola, 111, 254 
Poland, 132, 219, 261, 264, VIII. A, 

300, 302-3, 308, 310, 340, 344-5, 

397, 459, 486, 487 
Poland* Partitions of, 8, 9, 190, VIII. 

A, 301, 312, 279 
Poles In Anstrta. 53, 102, 123, 127, 

129, 267, 312, 345 
Poles In Prussia, 24, II. D, 80, 158, 

269, 271. 345, 389, 479, 487 
Poltava, 315 
Pomaks, 507-8 
Pomerania, 83, 244 
Port Arthur, 349 
Porte, the, see Turkish Empire 
Portogal, 274, 276 
Poeen (dty), 71-2. 293 
Posen (Province), 54, 60, 64, 69, 71-3, 

77, 91, 286 

Pdssony (Pressbuiv). 98. 104. 141. 

146-7. 220, 507 
Pn«, 98, 126, 132. 262-3 
Prag University, 262 
Pressbnrg, see Poszony 
Pripet Marshes, 284 
Prisren. 230 
Protestant Refonnation, 21, 23, 52, 

262. 802 
Prasdia. Bast, 76-80. 292, 301. 507 
Prussia, West, 54, 60, 73-7. 269. 285. 

Prussian Landtag, 70, 87 
Prussian Zollvereln, 24 
Prussians, aboriginal, 23, 77, 78 
Pruth River. 306-7 
Psara Island, 428 
Pskov. Lake of, 302 
Punjab, 443, 466, 471 

Qnetta Railway, 474 

Radetzky, 99 

Ragnsa, 173, 204, 214 

Ratibor, 68-9, 292 

Ranch, Baron Paul, 198, 200, 202 

Red Indians, 321, 328, 410 

Red Sea. 403, 434, 439, 440, 446 

Reform Bill, Great British, 127, 153 

Reichenberg, 106, 112 

Reichstag, Cterman Imperial, 106. 

Reval Progianmie, 197 
" Revolution, Glorious," 148 
Rhine River, 21, 45-7, 82-3, 93, 101. 

Rhineland. 24. 44, 82, 93, 275, 483 
Rhodes Island, 373, 429 
Rhodqpe Mountains, 381-2.1507 
Riga, 387 

Riga, Gulf of, 302 
Riviera» Italian, 252 
Roba-al-Mali. 441, 464 
Robert Ck>llege, 377 
Roberts. Lord. 209, 467 
Rodoeto, 385 
Romaic, see Byzantine 
Roman Chnndi, 52. 78, 116. 126-7, 

129. 130, 132, 149. 109, 215, 262, 

374. 436 
Roman Empire. 15. 170, 211, 405, 

450. 452 
Romantic Movement, 24 
Rotten Boroughs. 153 fiQ 
Konmanta (Danubian Prindpalitim), 

101-2, 106, 142. 162-4. 206. 208, 

223-5. 236-7. 239. 305-8. 360-2 
Ronmans in Humeary. 102. 142. 145. 

149, 150, 162-4. 166 
Roumella, Eastern, 198, 297 
Rudolf of Hapeburg, 100 
Russia, White. 79, 284-5, 308-9, 3U 


nperlal Dnou, 311) 

Onmt fMiwoOTltce), »8*, 

303-311, 31B, 318, 3SD-3, 3S8 
RoBBliuu. LItUe, tee RutbeDeii 
RuBaa-jAfODeae War, 111. IBS. IBS. 

, a 9S?3« 

TtuChenea S3 1D2, 1(3 146. IIB, 

iS, IT, B3 
IsbU ot. 373 


I 61 

383-1. 403, 608 
Salonllu RAllwar, 196, SOT, ESS-<I, 

eoUbuTK les, SIS. ss8, sei 

Sftmoe'lBl&Dd, 4S8 

Siin Olnvaiml dl Medua. 230 

San SUsphano. TmtT or. 18S-3, 188 

Suill Quaratita. 333 

8aniyeTo, 137, S04, SOB 

Sardinia. SOO 

Biueno iklond, SS5 

SBMOnld Driuwtr, 3BS, 460. 432, 

4S4, 466 
B«tui-wot8hippen, 43T 
Bave River, U4, IV. B, 968-8 
SaxoDT. SI. 88, 8S. 106, 261 
Soheldt RlTcr. 48T 
Boblnwla: (town), to, 153 
Bohleswls or SctiiaBwlK-BolHlolD, II. 

a 61, SI, 81, BB8, STl, 360, 487 ■ 
Bchol-Vereb, Deataolw, 13S 
SociUili Hlffhbndm, 14, 118 
Sootoh Lowluidere, ST 
SetttBtopoI, 348 
Sebenloo, 110, Mi 
Setlle River, 44 
SeiBtaD, 465-e, 474 
SeteUn Snamp (H«mtm), 466, 469, 

Bellin I., Sultan of Turkey, 406, 43S 
Semites, 3B3. 434, 44B. 460. 462 
Serb Churoh In Hnnmry, ITi. SOS 
Sertlfl, 10, 101-3, 106, 113, IV. B. 

C, SBI, S81, SB«, 338, 369 
SerbB, rV. B. 387. 60T 
Serbs In Htuisut, 146, 14T-e, IM-t. 

ITT, 18S 
Bate, enuutoliMttloa of Riiesian, 316 
Heiiea, 343 

8even Yews* Wu, 114. S»g 
eeren Weeks' Wu, 88 
Shantaog, 3S 

Shatt-Bl-Anb, 444, 464, 4 
Bhlah HeresT. 395. 440, 1 
Shlnu, we Ink Anbi , 

-ria. S28-330, 334 

Iv. 101. 311, 606 

-la. OB-Tl. TI, 83-4, 80. 1U6, US, 

11. 264, 366, 368 

'ria. 337 

III (Sioinu), ee, 80, SB! 


i. 43T, I 

Lakp of, s'3»-3 

, 116. 13T. 133. 168, T^ 
t6, 606 -T 
413,410.430. 431,610 

Auglo- Egyptian, 109. 438 

U 2T4. 276, 41t. 416, 491. 

h. Doctor, !0l 
0. 204 
uuguaffe, 36, 500 
h 3 Mxseiaa, War ot. 198 

Su phoii. Crown of St.. 118. HO, 1». 
135, 138, 137, iV. A, 166, 178- 
18S, 188, 191-5. IBT. 314, tSl, 


StcpliL-Q Ilusbui, 170 

SrepliBu, King of Hnngary, 37S 

Slro-ihuiK, 45, 4T-8 


47, 350, 488 

id. 8. 146, ill. 3TS, *8S, 

" ■ t, X. E. 

Euus, 321 
IrlB, 163, 166 

TaaOe, Ooniit, t30, 133 

TaaOe, Ooniit, 
TaborftM, 363 

TammibetB, BMUe of, Tl. 78 
Arlll-i»iiventl(ni, Serbo-Bnlsailui, 

Tailm BailD. 331-1 
Tunopol, SB3 

TkUn In Aierbiiljsii, 39S, 463 
TkUn In BulffoilK, S3I, SSI, 308 
n RuMlB, 8BT, 30S, 3S8, SIB, 

3SS-3, 38B. sea. Hi 

"- "-"wBr, 368 

intains, SBl, 

TaDem RailwvT, 268 
TanniH Monr— '-" "" 

133-T. 17! 
Toheobs, S8. iv, iii-o, »u. . 

12B. 13T. 1S3, iW, ISO, VI. ; 

TT. 3oa 
I. us. leis 

33a, *ia, 90T 
TwnMTar. Baoat of, lSl-3 
TtoedM iHluid. 3«1. ses 
T«atanlo KnltrhU, 33, T4, 

TbelM Blioi. >vii, iiv. iiu. 1 
Tldan Bluu) Mormt&ins. 331 
TblonvUle (Dledenlioten), 1 ' 
Thlrtr Yeaa' War, SS, 67, 
Thorn, r- ■" -" '■- *" 

S07 ' " ' 

Thmiiula. 21, 62 


Tldno, CantoD, 14, S33 

TUlii, 580, 3S0,S11 

TWrlB IUt«t. 3M. 393, 39S. X. S. 

TteiU. EaatMD, 39S 

Tina, Ooimt Colaman, 134, 187 

TlBca, Ooont Stepben. IBS, 137. ItT, 

ToKoland, 33 

Tor-Abdln Honntaiiu, 393, 395, 444 
TORMB Birer. 343 

-iiBUBoiBpiHi luulwar, 493, 458, 474 
TiaiMoaaeaalan Railway, SSB 
TmvMUuuit*, lie. ISO. SM-3, 241 
Traoa-Slbnlan RaUwar. B19, 337. 

399. 330 
TmnsTlTBiiia, 141. I4B-a, 149, iat-4, 

379, 3fll, 4tT, i87, J0« 
THple AlUanoe, 113. 17S 
TitpoU, IS. 203, 297, 403, 4!T, 499 
THune Kluvdom, IBS. 313, 311, 

Tioad. 389 
TnimsO, 313, 319 
Tador Drnaitr, 11. 291 
Tundra*. 330 

Tnrkertan, 331-2, 384, 414, 470, 471 
TnrUab CastoDU-raMa, 433-1 
TnrUah (Ottoniao) Emplm. 28, 109, 

111-3. 133, 144. lis, lis, 133, IV. 

B, 1)3-4, 2M, 191. 378, 317, IX. 

B, Z.., iBl. 431, 499, 497, MS, 

TnrUih Pobllo Debt Admli 

onng, 197, 199,167, 
i*i, tOlTvM-l, 116, 43S, 1» 
Tamn Seretln, ISS 
Tver, 331 

Trrol, 99, 136, 138. IIT, 393, 264 
TTTone. 19, 30 
TieUnj-B Riier, 201 

UKro-Finnlali lanKoxce. lOS. SOS, 
Ulil.zc, 304. 223, 339 

Ur<:.'<>[u-Cn>alA atfanuhlp Une, 109 
U[.;.il CTiureh. US _ 

Unil MountaluB, 313. 321, S9T-9, 161 
UrumiB Lake. m<9. 131, 454 
U.S.&., 20, 2S. 35. 94, 1S3, 911. 341, 

388, 299, 317, SSO-l. 337, UO, 333, 

U^knb, 1S«. IHS. 211. 225,199,339, 

Veles, gee EOprOla 

VenetlB 100 173 313 
Veneielos, 138 9 3B3 
Venice 101 110 144 170. 173, 211, 

248 9 3S1 
Vereoika Pan, UD 1 113, 105 
Vienna. BS 7j 69^ 91^ in.^ ISS, 1S7. 

n 310 1, 411, JbS 
109 113, 175 
C on of, M 

flS IS 76-7, 19. 185 

) 330 1, 331-S, 331, 



Wahabis, 440 

WalflMh Bay, S6 


WaUooDB, 6S-40 

Wanaw, 62, 56. 69, 76, SS6, 3SS 

Wanaw, Qrana Duohy of, 69, 64, 

Wei-hai-Wei, 36 
Wekerle, Dr., 167 
Westphalia, 88-4. 89, 276, 288, 


WhigB, 149. 160 
WhliB ~ 

Sea, 318, 321. 337, 339, 
Wiener Wald, 104-6 
WUhelxnshayen, 88 
WUaon, Preddent, 376 
Wllrtembnis, 83, 87 
Wydlf , 262 

TaffleUon, 74 

Yannlna, 227, 233, 236, 264 
Yemen, 403-4. 441-2 
Yenisei RlTer, 329 
YeTjeU, 226. 239-242 

Zab River, Greater, 394-6, 437 

Zab Rlyer, Lesser. 396, 437 

Zabem, 46-6 

Zacreb, see A^rram 

Zairos Mountains, 386, 393-4, 437 
449, 464-7 

Zara, 249, 608 

Zaia, Oonfetenoe of, 196 

Zarathnshtra, 460-2 
i Zemstvos, 323-4 
' Zoroastrtanlsm (see Panees). 393 

'TcMfU PMg^Jj^««.g«r 






3 2044 074 312 588