The strategy articulated by Deng Xiaoping in 1990 as a guiding tenet of China's foreign policy was: “Observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership 1”. Today, Beijing has clearly deviated from this tenet and under the garb of ‘striving for achievement’ (fen fa you wei), it has been increasing its politico-military assertiveness in the conduct of its international relations, particularly against its maritime and continental neighbours. One wonders why, since in its quest to reorder the established international system, China may be doing much harm to its own image as a responsible world power. The book under review aptly answers this conundrum. It says that a ‘low-profile’ approach may portray China as ‘too soft’, thereby seriously impairing its ‘core interests’, and particularly its national security against enemies, both within and without, thus jeopardising ‘regime survival’. Such approach would also be untenable as China's power grows, along with the nationalistic feelings amongst its citizens. 

To understand the nuances of China's military strategy, and more specifically its concept of 'active defence', the book adopts a net assessment approach. It begins with a detailed examination of China's perception of its security environment, along with its overarching national strategic objectives, notably the fulfilment of the ‘Chinese Dream’ of building a well-off society and great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, leading to its strategic approaches for national development and national security. It is refreshing to note that the author goes much beyond the more widely known aspects of Sun Tzu's teachings and connects the provisions of China's defence white papers on military strategy with its actions on ground, notably during the India–China military standoff in eastern Ladakh in mid-2020.

While this assessment seems to be beset with no grave omissions, some questions remain unanswered. For instance, it remains unclear whether in its actions on ground across the India–China border, China has lately tended to avoid war altogether or has merely adopted Sun Tzu's dictum of ‘winning wars without fighting’. This may be seen in context of China's ‘new security concept’ (xin anquan guandian) articulated in the late 1990s, which says that ‘force cannot fundamentally resolve disputes and conflicts…(and) the use of force and the threat to use force can hardly bring about lasting peace’2. This policy shift essentially dictates that China should resolve disputes with other countries through soft power—including diplomacy and charm offensive (meili gongshi)—to find accommodation in their respective positions, thereby arriving at 'win-win' solutions. Therefore, is China's 'salami slicing' tactic meant to avoid war or does it represent a more malicious form of war combined with psychological operations and lawfare? One may even question if China's actions against India across the India–China border were in consonance with its 'new security concept', but then it always takes two to tango! 

The Chinese conceptualisation of 'active defence' is subject to diversely disputed interpretations and views worldwide. The concept may have been valid in the 1980s when the strategic direction of Mao Zedong called for ‘...luring the enemy deep and the use of mobile warfare (against it)...’ (p. 78), but its applicability in the present times remains ambiguous. The Chinese leaders' endeavour to rename the concept to ‘active defence strategy under new historic conditions’(p. 78) does little to dissipate the fog.

The book aptly cites the 2020 United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) report reflecting the predominant view among military professionals. It says that ‘active defence’ draws from China’s military doctrine of offensive action at operational and tactical levels, while retaining a defensive posture at the strategic level. However, strategic defence is not specific to China, which is why the military forces of most countries across the globe are called 'defence forces'. Even the United Nations (UN) Charter permits a nation the right of individual and collective self-defence (Article 51) at the strategic level, whereby international law of armed conflicts confers upon it belligerent rights under the principle of jus ad bellum. So, how is the concept of 'active defence' unique to China? Furthermore, some military powers across the globe, notably the US, even interpret Article 51 of the UN Charter as a right to undertake 'pre-emptive' self-defence. In this context, where does China's 'active defence' stand? Will Beijing adhere to the policy articulated in its 2008 Defence White Paper3, which talks about China ‘...striking the enemy only after the enemy has started an attack’? Both the aforementioned US DoD report and the author of this book do not believe so.

Not claiming to hold all answers, the book only attempts to advance the debate, which may continue for a while. The applicability of China's 'active defence' doctrine is yet unclear in terms of the quantum of force and the time of its application, but it possibly applies more clearly in spatial terms. It mandates the neutralisation of a military threat well outside China's national periphery; and thereby translates into the need for ‘strategic depth’ beyond—rather than within—Chinese sovereign territory. Beijing has never precisely defined the measure of such ‘depth’, possibly since such distance would be enhanced progressively in tandem with China's military power projection capabilities. The growing Chinese naval footprint in the Indian Ocean is germane in this context. It brings to the fore the essence of the distant maritime warfare for China. The book thus aptly examines China's naval doctrines and capabilities, along with those relating to space and cyberspace, all of which are now increasingly feeding into China's military strategy.

The analysis in the book is based on a very sound understanding of basic concepts of statecraft, notably national interest and objectives, the constituents of national strategy and the various elements of national power that contribute to the formulation of such strategy. The Chinese perception of strategy (zhanlue) differs much vis-à-vis Western thinking, and the author does well by basing the study on the understanding of this core fact. Since Sun Tzu’s Art of War—the oldest treatise on military operational art—Chinese military strategy has developed in insular environs. This has led to a wide difference between the Chinese military forces and the military forces of other major powers, not only in terms of fundamental doctrinal nomenclature and concepts but also in terms of strategy formulation. The doctrinal variance is best exemplified by the differences in two strategy board games—the Chinese ‘Weichi’ and the Western ‘Chess’—which explains how the Chinese think vis-à-vis their counterparts in the West. In ‘Chess’, the player aims to checkmate the opponent’s king through a single decisive encounter. ‘Weichi’, on the contrary, is essentially an ‘encirclement game’ involving multiple battles over a wide front, where the objective is to fully surround a larger total area of the board than the opponent. Clearly, the Chinese ‘Weichi’ is oriented towards fighting a land campaign, thereby—unlike the Western ‘Chess’—entailing capture of territory. ‘Chess’, on the other hand, is more akin to a naval campaign, which usually does not entail holding of territory.

Another difference between Chinese and Western operational thought lies in the subtle nuances of ‘operational manoeuvre’. Although ‘manoeuvre’ is the cornerstone of Sun Tzu’s treatise, and also essential in the Chinese game of ‘Weichi’, its relevance is confined only to the initial part of the campaign to avoid the strength of the adversary. In the Chinese operational thought, decisive victory is achieved at a later stage only through ‘attrition’. In contrast, in Western doctrine, as exemplified by the ‘Chess’ game, ‘manoeuvre’ is critical for the entire length of the campaign, particularly since the operational objective would not usually involve capture of territory. This variance possibly emanates from the historical–cultural divergence between China and the West. Whereas the Western military forces, having learnt lessons from their ‘bloody’ histories, seek to avoid ‘attrition’ of own forces at all costs, China perceives its strength to lie in numbers—in terms of both platforms and human resource—and thus its ability to absorb ‘attrition’ of own forces. 

The book also examines other aspects closely linked to China's military strategy, notably its defence industrial complex, defence management and defence budget. The analysis in the book is based on diverse and credible sources—much of these references being Mandarin Chinese—which make it an authentic and credible assessment. In addition to the evolving Chinese military strategic thinking, the book also attempts to answer some key questions of immense relevance today with regard to China as a neighbour, as well as China as a major global power. How will China behave with its maritime and land neighbours? How will it contribute to international peace and stability as a great power? Or more generally, as the author says, ‘What entails China's rise?’ The findings of the book are, therefore, valuable for statesmen, professionals and analysts alike, not only in the countries neighbouring China but of the entire Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

• 1. See https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/661734.shtml
• 2. 'China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept', People's Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 July 2002. Available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm, accessed on 15 April 2021.
• 3. 'China's National Defense in 2008', Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, January 2009, Beijing. Available at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-04/11/content_4778231_4.htm, accessed on 15 April 2021.

Present-day world order marks a new dawn in the field of international law. The unusual pace and nature of technological advancements has resulted in the creation of a world where problem solving is leading to the creation of more complex problems. Development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), on land, air, sea and space, generally gains momentum as a force multiplier. Military advantages are huge, but there are calls for ban on such systems from international humanitarian law (IHL) activists, which would be wishful thinking and an effort to snub the destined eventuality of future's technologically advanced weapon systems. The wiser option is to regulate this contingency before it snowballs, with disastrous outcome. The experts have just scratched the surface of the grave challenges posed by the operation of LAWS in the field of IHL. The issue is similar for LAWS in the maritime domain from a naval operational viewpoint. The general area of operations for warships is usually beyond territorial waters and within international domain. Complexities in application of maritime laws are further aggravated by operation of LAWS in maritime domain. Thus, seeking accountability in case of commission of unlawful acts alongside or in addition to the conventional weapons with LAWS is a vexed question in maritime or any other domain.

INTRODUCTION

The operation of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in present-day world order has brought in complexities in the application of existing set of rules concerning international humanitarian laws (IHLs), such that the state of rules is like that which existed in pre- to mid-1800s, namely, non-existent. Robots and unmanned systems have been incredibly valuable on the battlefield during recent wars, including in Afghanistan and Iraq, and are likely to play a larger and more sophisticated role for militaries in the future. From 2000 onwards, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has proliferated, with similar astounding increase among land and sea-based unmanned systems. In future, all branches of military are poised to rely more heavily on unmanned systems,1 also known as LAWS. The LAWS are autonomous military robots capable of searching and engaging targets in air, water or land, as per specifically programmed military needs. The potential deployment of LAWS raises significant legal and ethical concerns. These profound concerns in maritime domain, including whether such systems would even conform with the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), have not yet been definitively resolved. The technology continues to race forward regardless; however, a need is felt for operational commanders to examine the command-and-control implications, in consonance with the legal implications, of using such LAWS. This would encourage the future development and doctrine of unmanned systems, as also steer it on to the correct path.2

Naval application of LAWS in the maritime domain is further complicated. Historically, in the maritime domain, the practice of freedom of navigation was followed by mariners universally as per the applicable maritime laws and traditions. However, there was an absence of a legal doctrine concerning the status of sea, or a legal code about the rights of men. As regards naval operations, for most of the nineteenth century, sailors and diplomats in distant waters had no promising means of consulting with the sovereign and were practising and shaping international law with a handicap. At times, commanders had to combine naval force with diplomacy in dealing with the various issues. Later, with the advent of worldwide communication and technology, a naval officer’s wide latitude to determine foreign policy declined, but not necessarily his ability to affect war and peace in crisis situations at sea. This partnership has continued to this day, evident in the variety of conferences and conventions that followed World War II to regulate the legal regime concerning merchant ships, as also the warships during peacetime. The most prominent of these are: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958); Convention on the High Seas (1958); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of High Seas (1958); Convention on the Continental Shelf (1958); and UNCLOS (1982).3 

The present-day technological advances, however, again pose a conundrum for a naval commander at sea. The likes of these issues only existed in the days when maritime practices were at a nascent stage and were being developed based on maritime traditions. The legal status of LAWS in the present day can be best described as unsettled. Although it does not pose an insurmountable problem in peacetime, it could prove to be a major impediment during war considering the LOAC.4 The LAWS would qualify as a means of warfare and though they may not be unlawful per se, the use will have to be in compliance with LOAC.

Further, maritime coastlines are vast and resources are limited, thus posing significant challenges in the protection of marine resources. To monitor and respond to marine peacetime activities, nations need maritime capability. In this regard, unmanned maritime systems (UMSs) are useful. From a naval standpoint, being an autonomous system, the UMSs installed with weapons do form part of the LAWS as they have the capability to operate autonomously. These UMSs enhance the capabilities of defence and coast guard authorities, and their assets, to execute multiple tasks by providing low-cost resources, capable of operating over large areas for extended periods.

The incident of the seizure of a United States (US) government-operated (USNS Bowditch) unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), on 15 December 2016, by Chinese forces has highlighted the legal ambiguity surrounding the operations of such UMSs. The incident took place at about 50 nautical miles (nm) from the coast of the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS) region.5 The legal basis for its actions were not clarified by the Chinese government, although statements referred to the ambiguity of the law surrounding the use and seizure of ‘drones’ as well as to repeated US ‘reconnaissance’ in Chinese waters as a basis for staking claim. Responding to this, the US government demanded the return of the device, which it stated had been ‘conducting routine operations in accordance with international law’ and which, it claimed, was a ‘sovereign immune vessel of the United States’.6 As regards the disputes arising out of the SCS, varied interpretations under international law have been applied by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the US. Accordingly, the seizure of a US Navy UUV by the PRC was also no exception. There is simply no plausible international legal basis for China’s actions and according to the US Department of Defense, the USNS Bowditch was conducting routine operations.7 

Although the positioning of the UUV was within the Philippines exclusive economic zone (EEZ), China could have argued that the UUV operated by USNS Bowditch was within the EEZ limit as claimed by it across Scarborough Shoal. Therefore, China could have invoked the violation of its Surveying and Mapping Law concerning marine scientific research in Chinese EEZ. There are two issues which merit attention with regard to this incident. First, the disputed Chinese jurisdictional claim over the area of recovery of UUV. This should be seen in the light of multinational claims over Scarborough Shoal and the fact that 2016 SCS Arbitral Tribunal award declared Scarborough Shoal as rock, entitling China only to a territorial water and not an EEZ. Second issue is with regard the status of UUV. Till date, UUVs have not been defined under any bilateral, multilateral or international treaty or convention, thus making the status of UUVs ambiguous. However, the US has always accorded it a ‘sovereign immune craft’ status, as mentioned in the US Naval Commanders Handbook (2017 edition). Be that as it may, jurisdictional point concerning the area of recovery aside, the status of vessel (UUV), due to lack of any recognised definition, has to be considered as per the national laws of the state operating it. Thereby, as the US presently claims it, in its own interpretation the UUV is to be considered as ‘sovereign immune craft’. Therefore, the Chinese action is further illegal as under Article 32 of UNCLOS, ‘“warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes” retain their immunities under customary international law. This absolute sovereign immunity from seizure would be applicable even within China’s territorial waters.’8 Although the incident was resolved peacefully, the resolution is still surrounded by the legal issues relating to navigational rights and obligations of UMSs under the umbrella of the International Maritime Law. The possibility of use of UMSs has come of age and drawn widespread attention in the legal community with focus on its combat role.9 Use of UMSs for surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance purposes is a preferred option of armed forces of many states.

The growing use of UMSs needs wider attention in the legal spectrum,10 although there is low-pitch use of such systems at present in the maritime operational domain in comparison to the air and ground assets. However, future security operations in the maritime/naval warfare domain are likely to increase the use of UMSs at a fast pace. The likelihood of these systems expanding peacetime monitoring capability of naval forces is an accepted reality. In the peacetime operations context, UMSs could be deployed for counter-piracy, counter-drug and refugee operations, marine biological survey missions, as also for countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. During wartime, operational deployments are particularly promising with respect to improving maritime battlespace awareness/transparency and enhancing anti-access/area denial capabilities. Also, UMSs are likely to prove themselves vital in maintaining the security of fragile sea lanes of communication, during both peacetime and periods of armed conflict, upon which global economic prosperity depends.11 What necessitates immediate deliberation is the present-day laws vis-à-vis UMSs activities during international conflicts and their rights and obligations.12  

UNCLOS AND LAWS

The LAWS have been named differently in their different areas of operation. They, as perceived in maritime domain, broadly engulf UMSs and take on a larger role. The terminology UMSs includes inter alia ships, warships and weapons systems installed onboard such ships/warships. The issue of the legal status of UMSs has been debated in various academic circles. What needs to be seen is the status of such UMS as a ship and in case the definition could be extended to include it as a warship. Both are complex and, as mentioned earlier, somewhat unsettled issues. The US position in this context is interesting. Although it is a non-party to the UNCLOS, it is of the view that many of the provisions of UNCLOS reflect customary international law.13 The 2017 Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations mentions UMSs as:

Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) are water craft that are either autonomous or remotely navigated and may be launched from the surface, subsurface, air or land. The anticipated stealth, mobility, flexibility of employment and network capabilities of USVs make them extremely valuable as force multipliers, particularly in the littoral environment. Missions envisioned for USVs include laying undersea sensor grids, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) prosecution, barrier operations, sustainment of carrier operating areas, mine countermeasures, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, bottom mapping and survey, and special operations support.14

The UNCLOS, in Article 29, defines warship as:

For the purposes of this Convention, ‘warship’ means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.15

This definition replicates the legal requirements set forth by 1907 Hague Convention (VII). Thus, to include UMSs under the ambit of Article 29 would be stretching the definition too far to interpret it as a warship.

If UMSs are qualified as warships, they could become a part of the defence forces and marked appropriately. However, the notion of command by a commissioned officer would have to be stretched to include operations undertaken remotely. Moreover, as these systems are unmanned (or remotely manned), the requirement of it to be manned by a crew which is under regular military discipline would not let it qualify as a warship. In time, these principles may get diluted. However, in the present-day scenario, even if UMSs qualify as ships, it may not be appropriate to declare them as warship. Warship status under UNCLOS affords certain rights designed to safeguard the maritime domain.16 Ships authorised and on-government service, as clearly marked and identifiable, are also granted few of these rights, thereby placing them on a similar pedestal as a warship.

No additional conditions are imposed under the UNCLOS, so there is no reason why a UMS cannot be duly authorised to exercise peacetime rights by a government as afforded to warships.17 Sovereign immunity of warships is recognised under UNCLOS regime. Similar rights and obligations are bestowed upon other vessels on government non-commercial service, thereby putting an embargo over the enforcement jurisdiction of other states over such ships.

As regards the LOAC, the same has evolved throughout history to respond to changes in the means and methods of warfare.18 War has evolved dramatically and the existing laws are ill-equipped to deal with it.19 International laws must evolve once more to cover these new challenges, so as to protect mankind in times of conflict. There, thus, exists a need to highlight the deficiencies in the current law and propose reforms to bring humanitarian law in line with the realities of modern warfare.20

During wartime, attack upon or by UMSs cannot be ruled out as they, in every sense of the meaning, meet the criteria for being a military target and thereby would be devoid of any sovereign immunity. The status of being a warship during an international armed conflict would entitle UMSs to exercise belligerent rights and, in that sense, they would be authorised to use force against enemy warships and take part in imposing effective naval blockade. Qualification as a warship authorises UMSs to take part in many of the wartime activities, despite the legal issues surrounding their status.

MODERN WARFARE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The LAWS in other domains, like UMSs in maritime domain, are majorly devoid of human element. However, for the purpose of accountability, a human being is required in the chain of responsibility to enable enforcement of IHL. The vexed question is to seek accountability in case of an unlawful act due to replacement of conventional weapons with autonomous weapons. Thus, in this context, the accountability for operation of autonomous weapons may lie with the following.

Weapons Operators

In future weapons platforms, the human role envisaged is that of ‘human-in-the-loop’. Under human-in-the-loop mode, the system has the ability to autonomously suggest to the weapons operator the threat level, as also whether a target is to be engaged or not. Based on the suggestion of the artificial intelligence (AI)-based weapons system, the weapons operator has the final authority to engage or not to engage the target. The pace of technological advancements, however, may bring about an era of ‘human-out-of-the-loop’, wherein the AI-based weapons system may autonomously engage a target without human intervention. Therefore, for the purpose of accountability, as human-in-the-loop system envisages ‘veto control’ of a human being in the weapons platform, it is preferred. The fear in case of human-in-the-loop-system still persists due to the phenomenon of ‘automation bais’. Under this phenomenon, an operator, by virtue of his/her training, is inclined to exercise options as suggested by the AI system. Hence, though the system is operating on the basis of human-in-the-loop, there is no meaningful control being exercised by the operator. In such scenarios, the deficit of accountability has been qualified by many as more of a systemic than individual one.21

Computer Programmers

In case the weapon operators are not being held responsible for the actions of UMS due to system malfunction or software design flaws, a more sought-after option for fixing of accountability could shift to the engineers, computer programmers and designers responsible for creating the system in the first place.22 Such a liability structure would result in a paradigm shift from the earlier models adopted for accountability. The present system of near-zero liability being attributed to engineers, computer programmers and designers could be ascribed to the fact that all the weapons platforms are tested and inducted subject to clearance by respective national defence authorities. Thus, till date, the engineers, computer programmers and designers have been discharged of their liability upon clearance by competent national defence authorities. However, in the most likely scenario wherein future weapons systems would also have the ability to learn on their own, known as ‘machine learning’, the engineers, computer programmers and designers may be attributed liability for a product malfunction resulting in loss of life or otherwise. In an incident in March 2018 involving an Uber self-driving car, a crash led to the loss of a human life, further highlighting the importance of the issue of accountability.23 Though the incident led to fatality, it was legally settled out of court. However, the same cannot be the scenario in case of a malfunction by weapons system, as strict regulations seem to be the only way to ensure a framework with defined accountabilities, leading to a safer development of such systems.  

Operational Commander

Utilisation of LAWS, like any other weapons system in wartime, is expected to be as per the directions/instructions of the operational commander. To achieve victory in war, operational commanders plan to gain military advantage and in doing so, they are expected to be mindful of the collateral damage they might cause in achieving their goal. Accordingly, in future weapon systems like LAWS, it would be expected that the operational commander will set the threshold value of collateral damage to very low, so as to avoid destruction of civilian property and fatalities to the civilian populous. Provided that the operational commander has directed programming of autonomous weapon systems correctly, their use could be attributed to command responsibility as it concerns the responsibility of a commander for the people under his/her command. Due to the very nature of LAWS, wherein the ability to ‘identify and engage’—which was earlier being undertaken by a human—would now be undertaken by an AI-based system, the proposal for expanding the responsibility to operational commanders to encompass the actions undertaken by LAWS would be only prudent. As the limits on the LAWS during a conflict are expected to be within the domain of an operational commander, the responsibility also needs to be placed at higher levels for the purpose of accountability for the actions of LAWS.

WEAPONS LAW

Assessment of legality as regards weapons law vis-à-vis LAWS generally involves analysis of various aspects. Clear distinction of targets (legitimate or illegitimate) constitutes one of the major basis for assessment of legality for a weapons platform, in addition to its ability to inflict unnecessary sufferings. Furthermore, another scenario where the weapons law prohibits a weapon is in case a state possesses the weapon not permitted due to it being a party to a certain convention or agreement (bilateral/multilateral). Violation in any manner of the above-mentioned conditions constitutes a breach of the weapons law under the regime of IHL. Thus, the use of such a weapon would be in blatant violation of the principle of distinction as the inability to target specifically may lead to unwanted harm upon civilians and non-combatants, which is against intended use of any such weapons. The ability of a weapon to strike accurately, but with uncontrollable effects, is a contravention of principle of distinction, also known as principle of discrimination, and thus such a weapons system qualifies for a ban. The final aspect would be whether new weapons technology is prohibited under any agreement or treaty, thereby barring its use per se.

Presently, there is no international treaty that bans the use of LAWS. However, certain organisations have voiced their concerns and are constantly prompting governments to adopt a pre-emptive prohibition policy. The need for a human control/intervention to prevent human loss of life and breach of LOAC is the fundamental basis for such calls for pre-emptive prohibition policy. Lack of international consensus for a policy over LAWS necessitates their assessment under the present regime of weapons and targeting laws. It is felt that to abide by the weapons law, at the stage of manufacturing and designing itself, there is a requirement to put an embargo on the capability of operating weapons which would result in unnecessary suffering or superfluous injuries.

TARGETING LAW

Law of targeting regulates the use of any weapons system in warfare. As in case of conventional weapon systems, LAWS are also expected to adhere to the targeting laws. One of the facets of targeting laws, the principle of distinction, demands that a weapons system is able to distinguish between combatant and non-combatant as a legitimate military target. Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocol I describes targets as: ‘limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.’24 Thus, military necessity means that weapons must be configured to apply only the requisite force to achieve a legitimate military objective to defeat enemy forces. Proportionality is yet another important principle under law of targeting. It deals with the quantum of force to be applied to a target to achieve a legitimate military advantage, with the least amount of collateral damage. Finally, necessary precautions must be taken when operating weapons based on the principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction. This also involves taking precautions in avoiding, and in any event minimising, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

Under targeting law, there are no international treaties restricting certain legal uses of LAWS. It is presently opined that restriction on such systems could actually be a more viable alternative as opposed to a prohibition. Indeed, to persuade nations across the world for an all-out ban would be wishful thinking. Rather, a restrictive development (in compliance with IHL and LOAC rules) of such weapons technology would be preferred by the nations because having LAWS in their inventory is likely to change the outcome of war/conflict. As possessing LAWS would be relevant in projection of a state as a superpower in future—the way the nations projected in the past on possessing nuclear weapons—the states are only expected to outperform each other for possessing LAWS by any means possible. The principle of distinction places an obligation that the future weapons systems are capable of distinguishing between combatant and non-combatant. This principle also casts a duty upon LAWS for distinguishing a wounded combatant and not targeting him/her. Furthermore, as is often the case in modern warfare, the enemy does not always wear a uniform, making it difficult to determine who is a combatant. Military necessity, as it pertains to a weapons system, is intricately tied to distinction. The degree of expectations as well as responsibility on LAWS is very high as they are expected to pass the test under the principle of distinction. Under targeting laws, LAWS are expected to cause damage in proportion to the military advantage expected out of a target. Thus, for LAWS to be compliant of IHL, the way out is to prioritise the level of collateral damage expected out of the target.

The continued integration of technology into warfare means that the speed of combat is becoming faster, outpacing the ability of human beings to accurately react in a timely manner. The tempo of warfare in future is bound to be at an amplified rate than the present pace. Indeed, LAWS would be programmed and expected to perform at such a high tempo to be relevant in future warfare. Human-in-the-loop system may become irrelevant in future as the pace of warfare can only be expected to be matched by LAWS. Finally, such system’s decision-making programme could be more logical than its human operator’s. Therefore, by way of instilling restrictions on machine learning capability of such systems at the development stage itself, weapons could be programmed to be compliant of laws concerning targeting.

LAWS AND GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS

The ambiguity surrounding legal principles concerning LAWS had been taken note of by the international community and therefore, in 2013 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) meeting, it was decided by the chairperson and high contracting parties to convene an informal meeting of Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the issues concerning LAWS. Towards this end, meetings have been held since 2014 to evaluate various aspects, such as human–machine interaction, human responsibility, risk assessment and mitigation circumstances, in relation to LAWS. 

Till 2019, the GGE on LAWS had addressed the above-stated issues and had arrived at the guiding principles for LAWS, wherein the use of potential technologies concerning LAWS is developed and conducted in accordance with present IHL norms. It was agreed upon by all that at the present juncture, the involvement of human judgement is essential for LAWS for compliance in accordance with IHL.25 However, till date, despite best efforts in this direction, no agreed-upon definition of LAWS has been formulated.

MARTENS CLAUSE

A Russian professor, Von Martens (1899 Russian delegation member to Hague Peace Conference), introduced a clause now named after him. Under Martens clause, which appeared in the Preamble of Hague Convention (II), 1899, it was mentioned that:

Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.

26

The Martens clause has been referred to and reproduced in different forms over the years so as to provide a legal basis for general statements of humanitarian protection. Various international declarations and judgements have referred to it for providing a basis for regulating issues of IHL, which were unregulated in the past. In terms of LAWS, the same would appear to be relevant and a sound basis for regulating development of such weapons till any legal basis for regulating them is agreed upon by nations.

THE WAY FORWARD

It is not war but technology that has shaped warfare since the beginning of mankind. Wartime operations have had the most telling impact on technology by making it constantly evolve during war. Military innovation, throughout history, has been both the primary source of technology and primary driving factor impacting the warfare.

The present-day warfare chivalry finds at its core a code of conduct that is held as the gold standard by the military elite. Jean Pictet, the most influential twentieth  century expert on the LOAC, noted that the institution of chivalry brought with it the recognition that in war, as in the game of chess, there should be rules and that one does not win by overturning the board. While a direct comparison between chess and warfare may well be somewhat away from reality, the underlying presumption that organised violence amounts to warfare only when it conforms to certain prescriptions is a fundamental aspect.27

Naval warfare and warships have been the most sophisticated technological tools of warfare in human history. Advances in technology may change warfare, but it can never determine warfare, neither how it will be conducted nor how it will turn out.28 Thus comes the need to regulate (like any other facet of human life) the facet of modern warfare with effective legal machinery to make the modern warfare IHL compliant. 

At higher academic and diplomatic levels, it needs to be examined how warfare has changed from that imagined by the drafters of the previous conventions and its impact in the present-day scenario. Advances in the modern warfare necessitate an urgent conceptual change in the laws concerning warfare as it may serve as a foundation for future legal reform.

Lieutenant Commander Abhimanyu Singh is working as Deputy Judge Advocate (Naval Operations) at Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defence (Navy), Delhi.

Disclaimer: The views expressed and suggestions made in the article are solely of the author in his personal capacity and do not have any official endorsement.

• 1. ‘The Future of Unmanned Vehicles: Militaries Keep their Options Open’, available at https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/future-unmanned-vehicles-militaries-keep-their-options-open, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 2. M.L. Cummings, S. Bruni, S. Mercier, S. and  P.J. Mitchell, ‘Automation Architecture for Single Operator, Multiple UAV Command and Control’, The International Command and Control Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2007,  available at https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/90285, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 3. Lt Cdr Abhimanyu Singh, ‘Journey of Maritime Law’, Maritime History Society, 38 Seminar Proceedings 2017 Mumbai.
• 4. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Robert Frau and Tassilo Singer (eds), Dehumanization of Warfare: Legal Implications of New Technologies, Springer, 2018.
• 5. Ben Blanchard and Steve Holland, ‘China to Return Seized U.S. Drone, Says Washington “Hyping Up” Incident’, Reuters, 16 December 2016, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-drone-idUSKBN14526J, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 6. ‘US Demands Immediate Return of Underwater Drone “Unlawfully” Seized by China’, Hindustan Times, 17 December 2016, available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-unlawfully-seizes-us-naval-underwater-drone-says-pentagon/story-P0sP1PzmCrlImqL3F0cQ0K.html, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 7. Julian Ku, ‘The Nonexistent Legal Basis for China’s Seizure of the U.S. Navy’s Drone in the South China Sea’, Lawfare, 16 December 2016, available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/nonexistent-legal-basis-chinas-seizure-us-navys-drone-south-china-sea, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 8. Ibid.
• 9. John Grady, ‘House Panel Explores Ethics behind using Unmanned Military Systems’, USNI News, 19 November 2015, available at https://news.usni.org/2015/11/19/house-panel-explores-ethics-behind-using-unmanned-military-systems,  accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 10. Lana Jacobs, ‘The “Ghost Ship” Set to be the Future of Shipping’, Ships & Ports, 20 March 2017, available at https://shipsandports.com.ng/ghost-ship-set-future-shipping/, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 11. Michael N. Schmitt and David S. Goddard, ‘International Law and the Military Use of Unmanned Maritime Systems’, International Review of the Red Cross: Humanitarian Debate: Law, Policy, Action, Vol. 98, No. 902, August 2016, pp. 567–592, available at https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irc902.pdf, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 12. Bob Nugent, ‘Unmanned Maritime Systems for Naval Applications: Bringing Real Capability to the Fleet’, 11 September 2015, available at https://www.amiinter.com/pdf/UMS-ARMAMENT&TECHNOLOGYBobN.pdf, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 13. Angelle C. Smith, ‘Note: Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War’, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2011, pp. 651–680, available at https://www.unclosdebate.org/argument/855/us-already-abides-unclos-matter-customary-international-law-and-domes, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 14. The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations August 2017 Edition NWP 1-14M MCTP 11-10B COMDTPUB P5800.7A, available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=806860, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 15. UNCLOS, Article 29, available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf,  accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 16. See UNCLOS, Article 105, available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 17. UNCLOS, Article 224, available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 18. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘The Law That Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems’, ASIL Insights, Vol. 17, Issue 4,  available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/4/law-applied-autonomous-weapon-systems, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 19. The Guardian  Editorial ‘The Guardian View on Robots as Weapons: The Human Factor’, available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/13/guardian-view-on-killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 20. Neringa Mickeviciute, ‘Lessons from the Past for Weapons of the Future’, International Comparative Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2016, pp. 99–106, available at https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=590641, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 21. ICRC President Peter Maurer’s Interview dated 10 May 2013. Available at https/www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-..., accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 22. Ajda Hosseini Ghasemi,‘Semi-Autonomous Weapon Systems in International Humanitarian Law’, Thesis, Faculty of Law, Lund University, Sweden, 2014.
• 23. ‘Uber’s Self-driving Operator Charged over Fatal Crash’, BBC News, 16 September 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54175359, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 24. Article 52(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750067, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 25. Information on the meetings of the GGE on LAWS. Available at https://www.un.org/disarmament/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/background-on-laws-in-the-ccw/, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 26. Preamble of Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 Jul 1899. Available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/150, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 27. Rain Liivoja, ‘Chivalry without a Horse: Military Honour and the Modern Law of Armed Conflict’, in Rain Liivoja and Andres Saumets (eds),  The Law of Armed Conflict: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2012, pp. 75–100, available at https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:715441, accessed on 14 April 2021.
• 28. Nikolas Sturchler and Michael Siegrist, ‘A “Compliance-Based” Approach to Autonomous Weapons Systems’, 1 December 2017, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-compliance-based-approach-to-autonomous-weapon-systems/, accessed on 14 April 2021.

Myriad complexities underlie the India–China–Pakistan triangle, with narratives varying from competition to collaboration. Recent developments in Galwan, renewed ceasefire agreement with Pakistan and a resurgent Quad, all amidst Covid diplomacy, necessitate a relook at traditional approaches and narratives on Sino-Pakistan collusion. Is it only a common anti-India sentiment that is driving it or is the pentagram of the United States, Russia, China, India and Pakistan, with their dyadic interplay, manifesting itself? From a game theory perspective, the probability of such a collusion is explored to argue that leveraging of diplomacy, information, military and economic (DIME) instruments of national power, combined with astute statecraft and foresight, is the way forward for India

We worked out our methods to say how collusive [action] could happen and not happen, how much and how far one Nation can go against another. How they would support, we have worked out our contingencies, but yes, some kind of collusive [action] should be anticipated.

—General Bipin Rawat, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)1

INTRODUCTION

There are many intricacies in the inter se relations of China, Pakistan and India while correlating the behavioural patterns of these nation states with the various schools or thoughts of international relations theory.2 Shared history, traditional baggage of differences, differing perceptions on various issues and the prism of competition–collaboration add on to the complexities. Relative national power of these countries and the role of other players, like the United States (US), Russia and even the recently activated Quad, create a complex interconnected theatre. An often-repeated threat scenario within this paradigm is that of Sino-Pakistan collusion, wherein either of the two launches an offensive against India which is followed by the other, or both launch an overt, synchronised war, either in a geographically proximal battlefield like Gilgit-Baltistan or on two different fronts, to create a joint effect.3 Is such a collusion a chimera, propped up by warmongers, or a plausible reality which could threaten Indian national interests and security paradigm?

Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines ‘chimera’ as an ‘imaginary monster compounded of incongruous parts’, an illusion or fabrication of the mind. Similarly, the word ‘collusion’ is defined as ‘a secret agreement or cooperation especially for an illegal or deceitful purpose’. Sino-Pak collusion would imply the congruence of interests between China and Pakistan, even as both individually have their own ambitions and varying internal priorities. How much are the collective interests of the two on a collision course with India or is there a common path for all to tread?

If it becomes a two-front war, what will be the theatre of decision: will it be the traditional plains of Punjab or the glaciated unfriendly environs of Gilgit-Baltistan? Increased presence of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Gilgit-Baltistan (not-so-recent newspaper reports), recent announcement on funding for the long-pending Diamer-Bhasha Dam and the provisional provincial status accorded by Pakistan to Gilgit-Baltistan are certain indications of renewed interest in the area; and increased participation by China in trilateral groupings of Pakistan–Afghanistan–China and engaging the Taliban,4 even if for own energy security, have to be seen in the backdrop of such developments.

TRIANGLE VERSUS QUADRILATERAL VERSUS PENTAGRAM

In the realm of strategic management and geopolitics, it is easier to analyse bilateral relations or dyads. In the case of India and China:

Both are attached to a range of multilateral mechanisms and bodies at regional, cross-continental and global levels, which helps them to establish new layers of engagement and power politics. The emerging layers of power politics do take the scope of their relationship far beyond the purview of bilateralism.5

When the focus is on India’s neighbourhood, China, Pakistan, the US and Russia fall into a closer group of influencing actors.

Recent Chinese actions in Galwan and reaffirmation of the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan, followed by increased proclivity from Pakistan for peace,6 necessitate the need to deeply understand the triad of China, Pakistan and India. When viewed as a triangle or an intersecting mix of Indo-Pakistan dyad and Sino-Pakistan dyad, it can be seen that Indo-Pakistan dyad is based on a mix of shared ancestry and mistrust, whereas that of Sino-Pakistan is bolstered by the needs of both countries to achieve strategic aims, with China as the dominant partner. For China, it is a window of opportunity to expand into Central Asia as well as have a two-ocean presence through Gwadar Port, while simultaneously encircling India. The recent developments in Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Chinese response ‘about forming small cliques’ are some indicators of China’s concerns.7

On the other hand, Pakistan sees in China a long-term ally, often termed as ‘high as mountains, deep as the ocean’ friendship which has seen various ups and downs in terms of covert and overt support. Pakistan’s nuclear programme is a testimony of this dyad and its effectiveness, but China’s reluctance to engage during Pakistan’s 1971 debacleand the 1999 Kargil War, due to extraneous factors, are past indicators of the extent to which China is willing to go. However, China of 1971 and 1999 is not the China of 2021, and the relative national power and inter se security threat perspectives have changed ever since.

China supports Pakistan with a view of sustaining the strategic pull it exerts on India’s security calculus. The various platforms over which this generally one-sided friendship has manifested include transfer of technology, joint development of war machinery, nuclear enrichment ideas and infrastructure projects. In fact, the development of the nuclear option created a new set of warfare options at the sub-conventional level wherein the threshold had to be maintained below a nuclear trigger and at the same time, brought in strategic advantages to a comparatively weaker side, that is, Pakistan, in a one-on-one with India.

Within the triangle or triad of these three nations, India’s nuclear policy, Act East Policy and increased maritime domination, including participation in regional forums like the Quad, impacts China’s strategic interests. The Sino-Indian dyad therefore is influenced by the US–China dyad, and similarly the US–India dyad’s strength depends on the collaborative/competitive spectrum of the US–China relations. To term this multilateral series of actors as a pentagram or pentagon would be oversimplification, but for ease of understanding and restricting the scope, the focus of this article will remain on the China–Pakistan–India triangle, with emphasis on the game theoretic possibility of a collusion.

GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE

Under conditions of risk and uncertainty, especially when choices are to be made, an interesting perspective emerges when game theory is used or applied. In traditional Indo-Pak relations, experts speak of the Nash equilibrium8 of continuing with the status quo or ‘no war–no peace’ (NWNP),9 instead of a mutually beneficial Pareto-optimal solution of opting for peaceful resolution of the conflict.10 What makes the whole subject interesting, and at the same time intriguing, are the recent developments in Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan relations, like the Galwan standoff and the renewed ceasefire agreement.

Prior to diving straight into a three-player game theory setting, let us first understand the dyadic relations between India and Pakistan. Within the prism of game theory, the payoffs for each when they play a ‘simultaneous move game’11 are represented in the matrix given in Table 1. For example, if India adopts ‘negotiate’ and Pakistan opts for ‘not negotiate’,12 India gets 0 and Pakistan 3; and if both opt for ‘not negotiate’, the payoffs are similar, that is, 1. The options, as described in the matrix, can be understood as ‘peace’ versus ‘no peace’ and within the option of ‘no peace’, the countries have a gradated range of options varying from ‘posturing’ to ‘NWNP’ to ‘all-out war’.  

The value or payoffs could vary as per existent situations and interpretations of subject matter experts. In the model given in Table 1 , both India and Pakistan get a better payoff of 2 each if they opt for peace or ‘negotiate’ for a peaceful settlement. If one opts for peace and the other adopts ‘not negotiate’, the former gets a lower dividend of 0, while the latter gets a higher dividend of 3. Despite having a Pareto-optimal solution of higher payoffs if both opt for peace (both get 2 each), it is seen that the strategy adopted is the Nash equilibrium state of ‘not negotiate’ or ‘no peace’, wherein the players (India and Pakistan) get a payoff of only 1 each.  

Why does this Happen?

In game theory terms, when payoff available to each of the player irrespective of the other’s stance is analysed, the following observations emerge:

1. If India opts for peace, Pakistan has an option between peace and ‘not negotiate’ with payoffs of 2 and 3. Pakistan will prefer ‘not negotiate’.
2. If India opts for ‘not negotiate’, Pakistan has an option between peace and ‘not negotiate’ with payoffs of 0 and 1. Pakistan opts for ‘not negotiate’.
3. So, irrespective of Indian options, Pakistan will prefer to adopt the ‘not negotiate’ (despite a payoff of 2 if both opted for peace), and similar is the case for India too. The Nash equilibrium is when both opt for ‘not negotiate’ as the players avoid opting for the dominated strategies where the other player stands to gain. This predicted outcome also satisfies the iterated elimination of dominated strategies as they are for India and Pakistan.

INDIA–CHINA–PAKISTAN TRIANGLE

In case of a three-player setting, the scenarios could be:

1. India and Pakistan at war; China as quiescent onlooker.
2. India at war with Pakistan; China covertly supports Pakistan (collusion).
3. India at war with China; and Pakistan joins to exploit.
4. India at war with China and Pakistan simultaneously, or a combined offensive by China and Pakistan against India (collaboration).13

Irrespective of the scenarios, Chinese support of or collusion with Pakistan can be at these levels:

1. Support in international forums—diplomatic manoeuvres.
2. Economic and technological support.
3. Military equipment supply/support.
4. Overt military action in case of a two-front war.

THREE-PLAYER GAME—PAYOFFS

Payoffs in a three-person game can thereon be worked out for each of the scenarios with varying outputs for each player. It is obvious that with China as the additional player, the payoffs will alter and make it more lucrative for Pakistan to continue with the ‘not negotiate’ option. Similarly, in a two-player game between India and China, actions by Pakistan will make the payoffs favourable for China. However, a point to ponder is the comparative payoff for China to change its present stance of covert support in the domains of economy, technology and equipment transfer to an overt military action.

Such a matrix is given in Table 2, with various payoffs. Effectively, it is a two-player matrix with an additional player (China) having an option of ‘not collude’ or ‘collude’.

The matrix in Table 2 is slightly different from the dyadic matrix given in Table 1, as the payoffs vary once the third player enters the game or influences outcomes. The payoffs have been worked out by the author based on existent factors. A more detailed explanation of the logic behind each payoff is given in the Annexure.

The following are the observations:

1. If India opts for ‘negotiate’ or peace and China adopts ‘not collude’, Pakistan has an option between ‘negotiate’ and ‘not negotiate’, with payoffs of 8 and 6. So, Pakistan opts for ‘negotiate’.
2. If India opts for ‘not negotiate’ and China opts for ‘collude’, Pakistan has an option between ‘negotiate’ and ‘not negotiate’, with payoffs of 4 and 6. So, Pakistan opts for ‘not negotiate’.
3. In view of the multiple challenges that Pakistan faces, varying from economy to internal struggles, and the existential arrangements with China as a permanent ally, it is highly likely that Pakistan continues with the ‘not negotiate’ or the ‘NWNP’ option and pursues the strategy of sponsoring terrorism and keeping Kashmir issue alive. Essentially, Pakistan will prefer to ‘negotiate’ if the collusive support from China is not available.
4. When a similar analysis is done for China, the preferred choice would be ‘collude’ (as Pakistan will prefer ‘not negotiate’ and so, India will choose to ‘not negotiate’ no matter what China does)!
   
   1. If India and Pakistan continue with ‘negotiate’, China has payoff of 8 for ‘not collude’ and 6 for ‘collude’. So, China will prefer ‘not collude’.
   2. If India and Pakistan opt for ‘not negotiate’, China has payoffs of 4 for ‘not collude’ and 7 for ‘collude’, so China will prefer ‘collude’.

Once the preferred strategies of each player are mapped (refer Annexure), the Nash equilibrium emerges as ‘not negotiate, not negotiate, collude’ for the three players of the India–Pakistan–China triangle. In a similar manner as the two-player matrix, despite having better payoffs if they opt for peaceful negotiations, the players continue with status quo, unless there is a motivation to change strategies and quit the existential Nash equilibrium.

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE: STAG HUNT

When it came to tracking down a deer, everyone realized that he should remain dependably at his post, but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, he undoubtedly would not have hesitated to run off after it and after catching his prey, he would have troubled himself little about causing his companions to lose theirs. (Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 1755)14

Having seen the three-person game theory outcomes, it will be worthwhile to get another game theoretic perspective of Pakistan–China dyad with India as the third player or factor against which they can collude. In this extended dyad (Table 3), the game resembles Rousseau’s ‘Stag Hunt’, wherein two pure strategy Nash equilibrium options are obtained: one with higher payoffs (stag, stag) and one with higher risks (hare, hare). Players can hunt for a stag together (cooperate) with a greater payoff, or separate and hunt for a hare individually (defect) with varying and lesser payoffs for each. Focus in this game is on cooperation and mutual trust between the players, which in this case is Pakistan and China.

Unlike the Indo-Pak dyad which resembles a prisoner’s dilemma, wherein option for player 2 was the same irrespective of the options played by player 1 and Nash Equilibrium was for ‘Not Negotiate’, in Stag Hunt, pure strategy Nash equilibrium is there for two options, that is, both going for stag or both for hare, the only difference being that the quantum of payoff is less if both players do not cooperate and go hunting a hare (4 versus 2).

In the China–Pakistan–India triangle, if a comparison can be drawn with the matrix in Table 3, greater payoffs are there for both China and Pakistan if they collude against India (stag) rather than both going for different targets, like China going for Taiwan (hare) and Pakistan pursuing its own agenda, maybe in Afghanistan. Colluding with each other gives higher payoffs to both, thereby making it a better choice. The extent of collusion and its expansion onto the collaborative domain will depend on the risk propensity and external strategic orientation of the players.

PENTAGRAMMIC INFLUENCES

The US

An analysis of the triangle will be incomplete without seeing the other players of the pentagram, namely, the US and Russia. Even as the US adopts a hedging strategy with India against China, within the Sino-Indian dyad, the concept of intergovernmentalism (refers to arrangements ‘whereby nation states, in situations and conditions they can control, cooperate with one another on matters of common interest’) seems to be the dominant strategy. Economics and pragmatism seem to be driving relations between the players in the US–China–India triangle, even as some argue about Thucydides trap becoming a reality and predict a future war between an aspiring power and an existent power.15 As Brahma Chellaney posited in the context of nuclear overhang in 2002, ‘China is driving New Delhi closer to the United States by seeking preeminence through balance-of-power politics.’16 It would be in Chinese interests to engage constructively with India even as it props up Pakistan to prevent a state collapse, and consequent challenges to its ongoing projects, and to avoid terror in the backyard in terms of support for Uighurs, etc.17

Russia

The pentagram of US, China, Russia, India and Pakistan is influenced by the dyads of US–China, US–Russia and Russia–India. India does not, and cannot, view China–Russia dyad as a zero-sum game and has sought to engage both China and Russia bilaterally, as well as through a raft of organisations, such as the Russia–India–China (RIC) grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping.18 Within the Russia–China dyad, China buys 14 per cent of Russia’s exports and supplies Russia with 22 per cent of its imports, whereas India gets a mere 1.7 per cent of Russian exports and supplies 1.6 per cent of its exports to Russia.19 India’s plans of cutting import dependence and increasing self-sustenance has seen a considerable drop in traditional imports from Russia, though 49 per cent of India’s defence imports are from Russia20. There is also concern in the US about India’s plans to acquire the Russian S-400 missile system, to the extent of even inviting sanctions under Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).21 The interests of the players in the Indo-Pacific, the Indo-Russian strategic partnership of yesteryears, Russian concerns about Quad and the need of Russia to adopt a hedging strategy with India against China are certain competing and contradicting factors which merit consideration.22

Essentially, the security dilemma and inter se power equations between the various members of the pentagram, combined with the preferred strategies as derived from game theory, give indications of a ‘status quo’ even as various players jostle for strategic space and regional alliances. The greater returns in balancing the national power instruments of economy and diplomacy seems to be influencing the strategic behaviour of all players. The game will get more interesting if a three-player setting is explored for India–US–China or US–Russia–China, which is beyond the scope of this article. However, as is evident from various historic developments in this pentagram and assuming that all players will adopt their strategies rationally, it is fair to state that the existent payoffs for collusion cannot entirely motivate China to transcend into the realms of overt military support, with damaging consequences in the realms of diplomacy and economy.

Maybe, the differing strategic culture of the Chinese vis-à-vis that of Clausewitzian concepts of war is clouding the perceptions of those predicting a likely strategy. Sun Tzu propounded that ‘the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting’, while Clausewitz spoke of Napoleonic mass army clashes and war as a continuation of politics by other means. In the immediate future, pursuing a policy of true collusion (covert collusion) is a better strategy for China as the payoffs are better and the strategy is in sync with the teachings of masters like Sun Tzu. Maybe, in game theory terms, China will hunt the hare (Taiwan) now and cooperate with Pakistan to hunt the stag (India) later?

WAY AHEAD FOR INDIA

The chimera of collusivity exists, but has it grown or transformed into a fire-breathing dragon is the point of concern from Indian perspective. The strategies of ‘not negotiate, not negotiate, collude’, as the Nash equilibrium for the three players, makes peace a distant dream. As seen earlier, if China has lesser payoffs in ‘collude’ and adopts ‘not collude’, chances of Pakistan being ready ‘to negotiate’ increase. To achieve such a strategic shift, India will have to adopt a multipronged strategy. The role played by other players of the pentagram, and those beyond, will also have to be influenced. What needs to be seen by strategists and policy planners is about swinging the payoffs in India’s favour.

As Chellaney mentions, China and India can go down one of four paths: a downward spiral towards armed confrontation; armed coexistence; coexistence with cooperation and rivalry; and partnership.23 In the Sino-Indian dyad, armed coexistence seems more probable for the near future. What can be done in the interim is to prepare for the worst outcome, following the age-old dictum of ‘forewarned is forearmed’. The diplomacy, information, military and economic (DIME) instruments of national power have to be further leveraged with astute statecraft to ensure that the principles of coexistence and pragmatism combine with an attitude of cooperation rather than competition.

In the military domain, there is a need to change the traditional orientation of offensive/strike formations from the plains and deserts to that of high altitude, with more predominance of technology like swarm drones. Our doctrine, training and equipment need to be more joint and adapted to cater for multiple-domain operations, including air, maritime and even the cognitive domains. This can be combined with force restructuring, alongside other steps being adopted towards theatrisation. Developments in the domain of space and cyber, and creation of new organisations like the Strategic Support Force,24 need to be factored in own calculus.

At no point should deterrence be sacrificed at the altars of those who profess the futility of force. Capability and will, two essential components of deterrence, need to be demonstrated, even as our diplomatic manoeuvre reduces the probability of a physical manifestation of Sino-Pakistan collusion in the military realm.

ANNEXURE

The matrix for three-player game has been worked out in the following manner for three players, namely, India, Pakistan and China. Both India and Pakistan have an option between ‘negotiate’ and ‘not negotiate’, whereas the option available to China is ‘collude’ or ‘not collude’. The assumptions are that all players will act rationally and that the Chinese options vary between ‘not collude’ to ‘more overt military action in support of Pakistan’. Effectively, it is a two-player matrix with an additional player (China) having an option of ‘not collude’ or ‘collude’. When both India and Pakistan are opting for a strategy like ‘negotiate’, and if China is opting for ‘not collude’, it is assumed that China will not undertake any actions with offensive or detrimental interests.

If both India and Pakistan opt to ‘negotiate’, all long-standing disputes will be resolved and there will be overall progress in terms of collaborative peace; so, both get a payoff of 8. In such a scenario, if China opts for ‘not collude’ and show peaceful overtures, the payoff is 8 and if option is ‘collude’, with negative, conflict-oriented tendencies, the payoff is 6, as the assumption is that Chinese actions will be to not let peace prevail. In such a scenario, the Indian payoff will drop to 6 too.

If both India and Pakistan opt for ‘not negotiate’, the payoff is 4 without Chinese collusion. If China colludes in such a scenario, the Indian payoffs drop and gets reduced to 2. Pakistan, with Chinese collusion, gets a larger payoff of 6 (slightly greater than a scenario without China). From Chinese perspective, an option of ‘not collude’ when both India and Pakistan opt for ‘not negotiate’ earns 4 (lesser than ‘negotiate’); and the alternative of ‘collude’ will earn 7 (higher than payoff of collusion when both were opting for ‘negotiate’, but lesser than opting for ‘not collude’ or peace when both were opting for ‘negotiate’).

The Nash equilibrium—when each player’s strategy is analysed against the other two—works out to be ‘not negotiate, not negotiate, collude’, with a payoff matrix of 2, 6, 7.

Calculation for Nash Equilibrium

In summation, the strategies that emerge are shown in Table A2:

Table A2 Dominant Strategies

Based on the given matrix, when the strategies are superimposed on the three-player matrix, an idea of Nash equilibrium can be obtained. The payoffs underlined and in bold highlight the preferred strategies extrapolated from Table A2. The cell having the preferred strategies of all players in the same indicate Nash equilibrium. In this case, it is India and Pakistan for ‘not negotiate’, with China opting to ‘collude’.

Colonel Govindan Praveen is posted as Directing Staff in the Faculty of Decision Sciences, College of Defence Management, Secunderabad.

Disclaimer: The views expressed and suggestions made in the article are solely of the author in his personal capacity and do not have any official endorsement. Attributability of the contents lies purely with the author.

• 1. The CDS, General Bipin Rawat, in an interview given to The Hindu, available at https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/interview/story/20201228-there-will-be-no-compromise-1750669-2020-12-18, accessed on 27 April 2021.
• 2. Byron Chong, ‘Understanding Sino-Indian Relations—A Theoretical Perspective’, Centre for International Maritime Studies, 28 April 2016, available at https://cimsec.org/understanding-sino-indian-relations-theoretical-perspective/, accessed on 15 March 2021.
• 3. Monish Tourangbam, ‘The China–India–Pakistan Triangle: Origins, Contemporary Perceptions, and Future’, 25 June 2020, available at https://www.stimson.org/2020/the-china-india-pakistan-triangle-origins-contemporary-perceptions-and-future/, accessed on 17 March 2021.
• 4. Happymon Jacob, ‘China, India, Pakistan and a Stable Regional Order’, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020, available at  https://ecfr.eu/special/what_does_india_think//analysis/china_india_pakistan_and_a_stable_regional_order, accessed on 14 March 2021.
• 5. Jagannath Panda in Review Essay, Strategic Analysis, 2014, quoted in General V.P. Malik, ‘A Comprehensive Response Strategy to a Collusive and Collaborative Threat from China and Pakistan’, 30th USI National Security Lecture, 2014, available at https://indianarmy.nic.in/WriteReadData/Documents/national%20Security%20Lecture%202014.pdf, accessed on 1 May 2021.
• 6. Zainab Akhter, ‘India–Pakistan LoC Ceasefire Decision: A Thaw in Sight?’, IDSA Comment, 12 March 2021, available at https://idsa.in/idsacomments/india-pakistan-loc-ceasefire-decision-zakhter-120321, accessed on 1 April 2021.
• 7. ‘Quad Summit—Small Cliques will Destroy International Order, Says China’, The Hindu, 16 March 2021, available at https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/quad-summit-small-cliques-will-destroy-international-order-says-china/article34076342.ece, accessed on 17 March 2021.
• 8. Nash equilibrium represents an action profile for all players in a game and is used to predict the outcome of their decision-making interaction. It models a steady state (i.e., a combination of strategies of all players) in which no player can benefit by unilaterally changing its strategy. If a unique Nash equilibrium exists for the game, then all players are expected to converge to the state represented by the equilibrium if they are all rational, that is, each player aims to choose the strategy that maximises its utility function. 
• 9. The NWNP model, as explained in various publications, implies a situation characterised by continued insecurity, low-level violence, inter-group hostility and persistence of the factors that sparked and sustained the conflict. See Tommy Andersson and Conan Mukherjee, ‘Seeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier’, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2021, pp. 253–70, doi: 10.1080/10242694.2019.1660839, accessed on 28 April 2021.
• 10. Arvind Gupta and Sarita Azad, ‘India–Pakistan Game-Theoretic Interplay’, IDSA Comment, 20 April 2011, available at https://idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiaPakistanGameTheoreticInterplay_sazad_200411, accessed on 1 January 2021.
• 11. In such a game, the strategy of the other player is not known to the player while executing his game. The alternative is ‘sequential game’, wherein the player is already aware of the other player’s strategy.
• 12. A similar analysis with payoffs and clarifications for ‘negotiate’ and ‘not negotiate’ on Nash equilibrium and Pareto-optimal options can be found in the article by Gupta and Azad, ‘India–Pakistan Game-Theoretic Interplay’, n. 10.
• 13. <BQ>‘Collusive threat’ from China and Pakistan to India implies both countries acting in secret to achieve a ‘fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful goal’ or being engaged in secret or hidden avowed goals vis-à-vis India. ‘Collaborative threat’ implies a joint threat by working together. Basically, that would cover overt as well as covert threats to India from the China–Pakistan nexus.</BQ>
  
  See Malik, ‘A Comprehensive Response Strategy to a Collusive and Collaborative Threat from China and Pakistan’, n. 5.
• 14. Quoted in Christina Fang, Steven Orla Kimbrough, Stefano Pace, Annapurna Valluri and Zhiqiang Zheng, ‘On Adaptive Emergence of Trust Behavior in the Game of Stag Hunt’, Group Decision and Negotiation, Vol. 11, No. 6, 2002, pp. 449–467, available at https://personal.utdallas.edu/~ericz/GDN02.pdf; emphasis in original, accessed on 12 May 2021.
• 15. Richard Hanania, ‘There is No Thucydides Trap between the U.S. and China’, 8 June 2020, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/06/08/there_is_no_thucydides_trap_between_the_us_and_china_115359.html; and Kevin Brown, ‘For the US and China, Thucydides’ Trap is Closing’, The Diplomat, 11 June 2020, available at https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/for-the-us-and-china-thucydides-trap-is-closing/, accessed on 16 March 2021.
• 16. Brahma Chellaney, ‘The India–Pakistan–China Strategic Triangle and the Role of Nuclear Weapons’, The Proliferation Papers, IFRI, Winter 2002, available at  https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/37/066/37066507.pdf, accessed on 20 February 2021.
• 17. Rhea Sinha, ‘BRI in the “Af-Pak” Region: Security Challenges and China’s Response’, Observer Research Foundation, 12 October 2020, available at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/bri-af-pak-region-security-challenges-china-response/, accessed on 1 March 2021; and Michael Kugelman, ‘Imran Khan’s Silence on Uighurs Undercuts his Defense of Muslims Worldwide’, Foreign Policy, 29 January 2021, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/29/imran-khan-uighurs-muslims-china/, accessed on 3 February 2021.
• 18. Manoj Joshi, ‘India’s Strategy in the China–Russia–USA Triangle’, Observer Research Foundation, 20 December 2019, available at https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-strategy-in-the-china-russia-usa-triangle-59417/, accessed on 14 March 2021.
• 19. Anita Inder Singh, ‘A US–Russia–China Tightrope: In a Complex, Changing World, Countering China is a Multifaceted Problem for India’, The Times of India, 10 January 2021, available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/a-us-russia-china-tightrope-in-a-complex-changing-world-countering-china-is-a-multifaceted-problem-for-india/, accessed on 2 April 2021.
• 20. Hindustan Times, 15 March 2021, available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indias-arms-imports-down-by-33-says-sipri-report-101615806230302.html, accessed on 16 March 2021.
• 21. ‘India, U.S. Resolve to Deepen Strategic Cooperation’, The Hindu, 20 March 2021, available at  https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/rajnath-singh-holds-talks-with-us-def-secretary-austin/article34115821.ece, accessed on 24 March 2021.
• 22. A Chinese perspective of Indo-Russian relations is outlined in an article by Qian Feng, ‘India Embraces the US at Cost of Russia Ties’, Global Times, 24 December 2020, available at https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202012/1210947.shtml, accessed on 27 March 2021.
• 23. Brahma Chellaney, ‘The Road from Galwan: The Future of India–China Relations’, 10 March 2021, available at
  https://carnegieindia.org/2021/03/10/road-from-galwan-future-of-india-china-relations-pub-84019, accessed on 28 April 2021.
• 24. John Costello and Joe McReynolds, “China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era”, China Strategic Perspectives No. 13, October 2018, available at   https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf, accessed on 2 May 2021.

The pandemic induced economic slowdown in Oman, compounded by the vagaries of the international oil market, has resulted in a series of youth protests in the country. Hundreds of unemployed Omani youth, protesting mass layoffs, took to the streets in May. The government had to use force to quell these protests. For the new Sultan, Haitham bin Tariq Al-Said, these protests amplified the economic and political challenges that lie ahead. Meanwhile, his government has announced 32,000 new employment opportunities and subsidy to private companies employing Omani youth. The fruition of these measures would depend on its success in spurring economic growth. However, whether accommodating the demands of the youth would help Sultan Haitham in securing popular legitimacy and further consolidating his leadership, is something that remains to be seen.

Plummeting Economy

Sultan Qaboos, who ruled for close to 50 years (1970-2020), modernised and transformed Oman through increased economic diversification, industrialisation, natural gas production, infrastructure development and privatisation. Nonetheless, Oman essentially remained an oil-based economy. The oil price crash of 2015-16 led Sultan Qaboos to adopt economic reforms that included a drastic cut in public spending, increased taxation, and reduction in subsidies by 20 per cent. However, these measures subsequently triggered the unrest of 2017-18. Depleting reserves and falling oil prices had led to an economic slowdown and rise in unemployment, especially among the youth.

Largely dependent on the export of hydrocarbons, Oman’s economy has been vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices. It also suffers from structural issues that are unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Oman’s oil production is going through a long-term slowdown. According to the country’s finance ministry, the future growth in reserves will be limited to a successful implementation of enhanced oil recovery techniques.1 Besides, Oman is over-reliant on external funding. As per the Fitch Ratings, Oman faced a higher fiscal deficit and drawdown of fiscal reserves in 2020, and the willingness of lenders to fund Oman’s huge external financing needs will be critical to the sustainability of the country’s government finances.2  

The COVID-19 Shock

The succession of Haitham bin Tariq Al-Said in January 2020 generated hope among the youth, but the new ruler inherited a low performing economy that required tough decisions. Before Sultan Haitham came to power, the global economic shock caused by the pandemic had already dealt a blow to the weak economy of Oman. Due to containment measures, the non-hydrocarbon GDP decreased by 10 per cent and the economy contracted by 6.1 per cent in 2020. Sectors such as construction, hospitality, wholesale and retail trade took the heaviest toll. According to the International Monetary Fund, lower oil-generated revenue, economic contraction and fiscal support measures led to the widening of the fiscal shortfalls, and in 2020 Oman’s deficit widened to 17.3 per cent of the GDP.3 Oman had to depend on the issuance of external bonds, the drawdown of deposits and sovereign funds, and proceeds from the privatisation drive. Oman’s debt rose to 81 per cent of the GDP in 2020, from 60 per cent in 2019.4 It is to be noted that, like most other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Oman does not have ample fiscal buffer to rely on.

Political Fallout

The protests in Oman have also highlighted the political challenges for Sultan Haitham. Oman has in the past witnessed protests advocating political reforms and the introduction of political participation. Muscat and other major cities had witnessed protests in 2011-12 soon after the Arab Spring spread in the region. The protests renewed in 2017-18. Though Oman had since 2007 incorporated incremental political reforms by introducing elections for the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) and the Majlis al-Baladiya (Municipal Council), it has not significantly changed the political situation. Oman remains an absolute monarchy, and the youth who aspire for democratic participation remain disenchanted. The recent protests, although largely focused on economic issues, and coming at a time when the government has announced an indefinite postponement of the municipal council elections due in 2021 owing to the Covid-19 pandemic, underline the mounting challenge for Sultan Haitham who was reportedly handpicked by Sultan Qaboos to succeed him. Given the slow pace of political reforms in Oman, the youth are demanding accelerated measures to devolve more power to both chambers of the council of Oman.

Haitham’s Economic Reforms

In the past year-and-a-half, Sultan Haitham has taken a number of measures to revive the economy. First, the 10th five-year plan (2021-25) focuses on economic diversification, fiscal sustainability, labour market, youth employment, investment and the private sector, besides emphasising education, health and skill development.5 The sectors earmarked for economic diversification are agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, transport, energy, mining and tourism.  In order to diversify its economy, Oman focuses on attracting foreign capital in non-oil and export-oriented sectors by taking regulatory reform measures and infrastructure development. Second, the government intends to capitalise on its geographic advantage to develop into a regional logistics hub. And third, the government emphasises enforcing local procurement requirement for foreign companies along with the promotion of Omanisation of the workforce.6 Sultan Haitham imposed a 10 per cent budget cut for the government authorities and introduced a five per cent value-added tax in a phased manner currently applicable to businesses earning more than one million Omani Rial (OMR).7  He also minimised grants, reduced the retirement age, and decreased wages for the new hires.

It is apparent from the protests that the reforms were not received well by the Omani youth. Responding to the protests, the government announced new jobs for youth and accelerated Omanisation of the workforce and asked the public sector companies to appoint Omanis in place of foreign staff by July 2021. The foreigners make up more than 40 per cent of Oman’s population of 4.6 million. The government reserved 11 professions in the private sector for the Omani nationals in June 2020. Between March 2020 and March 2021, more than 200,000 migrant workers engaged in the private sector left Oman.8 However, the young population in the Sultanate perceives the private sector as exploitative and seeks jobs in the public sector. The young demography of Oman is getting restless and needs quick solutions to the economic woes, which is a challenging task for Sultan Haitham considering the country’s dependence on oil.

Conclusion

The recent protests have renewed the focus on need for economic and political reforms in Oman, and it is apparent that any short-cut to reforms will not prove beneficial in the long run. The reforms have to be systematic and bring long-term stability to the gulf country with modest oil resources. The economic and political reforms have to go hand-in-hand while time is of the essence. The tact lies in keeping the youth contented while re-inventing the ailing economy.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Katie McQue, “Oman says may struggle to grow oil reserves and production”, S&P Global, October 19, 2020.
• 2. “Oman’s External Funding Risks Rise”, Fitch Ratings, April 06, 2020.
• 3. “Oman: Staff Concluding Statement of an IMF Staff Visit”, International Monetary Fund, February 12, 2021.
• 4. “Oman economy shrank 6.4% in 2020, IMF says”, Reuters, February 12, 2021.
• 5. “10th Five Year Plan 2021-2025 Launched”, Oman News Agency, January 01, 2021.
• 6. John Davis, “Oman: Challenges to limit pace of diversification”, Gulf Monitor, January 10, 2020.
• 7. Bastiaan Moossdorff, “The impact of VAT on the Omani economy”, Gulf Business, May 05, 2021.
• 8. “Oman says expat workforce fell by 200,000 in year to March”, Reuters, June 02, 2021.