Keywords

You can see that distinctive kind of Spartan wisdom in their pithy, memorable sayings, which they jointly dedicated as the first fruits of their wisdom to Apollo in his temple at Delphi, inscribing there the maxims now on everyone’s lips: ‘Know thyself’ and ‘Nothing in excess’.

(Plato 1997: 774)

Criticality Scholarship

This book explores the concept of criticality. What do we mean by criticality? How do we use it? And how can we connect the concept with making the world a better place in which we can all live freely and equally? Criticality links education with our social, political, cultural and economic existence. Yet for the connection to be significant, to be meaningful, we want to be able to say what we mean by a critical citizenry. As Ronald Barnett observes:

What criticality amounts to is nothing short of the formation of critical citizens, to be critical through their very being (running like the words through a stick of children’s rock) and who are disposed to carry their criticality into and across the world, sizing up matters of their own volition, discerning alternative arrangements and working for them and so promoting a critical public sphere. The idea of criticality, therefore, is entangled with that of democracy: each is necessary for the other. (Barnett 2021: 152)

This book also proposes a new philosophical field, which I coin ‘criticality scholarship’, in which to conduct my inquiries. Here I want to talk about criticality, the critical being and a critical education. This new space is designed for scholars to engage in genuine dialogue. I propose that criticality scholarship is underlined by the notion of human flourishing. We all have different ideas and positions, but I hope we can agree on the importance of living out meaningful and fulfilling lives in a shared environment.

My conversations, my critical exercises, will take place in this open-minded space. Here I will also choose to walk my own path and think about the ways in which the concept of criticality might be applied to meet the demands of democracy and social justice. I appreciate that my political and philosophical aspirations are not neutral and are open to challenge. Notions of democracy are complicatedFootnote 1 and there are always new conceptions of social justice emerging.Footnote 2 In criticality scholarship these problems are meant to be thoroughly examined. Interested parties are invited to negotiate possible solutions and devise alternatives.

My argument is that we should explore the notion of criticality from within the genre of criticality scholarship. We can tackle important questions. What is criticality? Who is (and who is not) a critical being? What is a critical education? And, pursuing my own interests, what link can we make between criticality and the advancement of democracy and social justice? Much of this work is developed in the book, but there are many more conversations to be had. My journeys across this vast intellectual landscape will traverse some of the critical traditions connected with criticality as well as the works of Paulo Freire and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Let me say a few words about the significance of criticality scholarship. It is, as I have intimated, a logical space of perspectival horizons. An open-minded forum for imagining new vistas, new alternatives, and for creating opportunities to bring them about. A receptive space to listen to and acknowledge different perspectives and viewpoints and reflect on direct and indirect confrontations.Footnote 3 To make this work, we must be prepared to challenge our assumptions, change our positions and work with others to negotiate and navigate new critical paths. It is, to be sure, a space for collective dialogue and negotiation in the interests of human flourishing. Here we can ask fundamental questions. How can I live an examined life? How can I be a meaningful participant in society? And how can I act in the world as a socially transforming agent?

I draw inspiration from Wilfrid Sellars, Homi Bhabha and John Hopkins. Sellars writes:

The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. (Sellars 1997: 76)

Criticality scholarship is a comparable logical space of reasons in which different conceptions of criticality, the critical being and a critical education can be examined.Footnote 4 I am also connecting with the postcolonial literature in envisaging this public space to mirror, at least in part, Homi Bhabha’s concept of a third space (Bhabha 2004: 54–56; and Bhabha 2009: ix–xiv) and John Hopkins’ idea of a decolonising conversation (Hopkins 2018: 130–131 and 142). Here I am visualising the interstices between colliding viewpoints, a liminal space which gives rise to things new and unrecognisable and where we negotiate identities. Further, I draw an analogy with the notion of survivance and its war on reconciliation.

Criticality scholarship allows for different philosophies and movements without any one or more of them assuming seniority. Equity remains key. I make it plain that there are no sharp boundaries engulfing the domain of this new enterprise. There are no fixed paradigm markers. Indeed, the value of the novel approaches scholars may take, along with their investment of ideas and lived experiences, is dependent on an agreed understanding of openness and mutual respect and a willingness to compromise and negotiate. The objective is certainly not to ground the study of criticality in any one particular intellectual tradition.

Criticality

What grounds criticality in a philosophical sense? My investigations look into the ordinary workings of criticality and underline the concept’s significance in contemporary policy and scholarly debates. I survey the educational policy underscoring the notion of criticality in maintained (state-funded) schools in England. I offer a snapshot of comparative models dealing with critical thinking skills and dispositions. Then I examine relevant considerations arising in the educational philosophy scholarly literature. Criticality continues to be a fluid concept and is informed by a number of rich and varied movements.

I address a number of issues. What is critical thinking? What is the function, or the relevance, of criticality in education and in the broader society? What is the connection between skills, propensities and character traits that pertain to criticality? Who is and who is not a critical being? How should we deal with field dependency and the problem of transfer? What pedagogical strategies support the teaching of criticality? How do human beings think? Why do traditional rationalistic ways of thinking and scientific methods continue to assume such a privileged position? And what other forms of knowledge and canons of rigour and validity are relevant to a critical education?

I am interested to know more about criticality in a broad sense. That said, I have also made the conscious decision to try and connect this concept with the resolution of democratic and social justice issues. I readily accept that others may choose to walk very different paths. Some scholars may well object to my approach if, for instance, they choose to address criticality from a non-democratic standpoint or take issue with how I employ the notion of social justice in later chapters. I cannot anticipate all of the possible objections but they would indeed serve as a stimulus for lively debates in subsequent conversations. I also take Michael Apple’s cue that divergent paths can steer us back on track. In his words:

I—all of us—also owe a continuous debt to seen and unseen people who keep the critical tradition(s) alive and who correct its paths when it is insufficiently sensitive to emerging social movements involved in the ongoing struggles over redistribution, recognition, and representation. (Apple 2019: 235)

For my part, social justice is intimately related to human emancipation and I want to emphasise an important point about this theme. It is, as Gert Biesta correctly reminds us, a general criterion that is operating ‘dogmatically’ (Biesta 1998: 476). In addressing the question of what ‘gives educational philosophy the right to be critical?’, and in describing one style of critique as critical dogmatism, Biesta notes that ‘emancipation’ operates as a ‘general criterion for the evaluation of educational theory and practice’ and that this is unobjectionable provided we recognise and accept its dogmatic character (Ibid.)

Therefore, in relation to how I am choosing to apply criticality in this specific sense, I accept, as one of its limits, the paradoxical role that emancipation, as the criterion being applied, plays in my investigations―namely, that it is ‘itself beyond critique’ (Id. 477). I could choose to apply, in other words, a different criterion for employing criticality but its truth or validity is, as it were, beyond critique; it escapes evaluation.

Walking down this pathFootnote 5 (among other possible paths within the umbrella of criticality scholarship) means that my theoretical framework is grounded in overcoming human suffering, exposing and eradicating hidden contradictions and hegemonies, and removing prejudice and inequalities. The latter’s empirical reference points also include making sovereign the concrete needs and sincere desires of others who are enduring hardship, discrimination and oppression and for their voices to be listened to, acknowledged and acted upon. I seek ‘epistemic friction’ among ‘significantly different perspectives’; and I am trying to make ‘others our eminently relevant significant others’ (Medina 2013: 18, 157).

Again, I make a distinction between my specific philosophical and political ambitions and the more general claim that criticality scholarship is grounded in the idea of human flourishing.Footnote 6

In this book I delve into the works of Freire and Wittgenstein to further our understanding of criticality. I analyse Freire’s notion of the critical being naming the world and the word and juxtapose this with Wittgenstein’s aphorism that philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’ (PI §124).Footnote 7 I make a case for aligning Wittgenstein’s later philosophy with Karl Marx’s eleventh thesis on Ludwig Feuerbach.Footnote 8 My unorthodoxy presents Wittgenstein’s ideas in the context of promoting democracy and social justice.Footnote 9 I examine points of commonality and of difference in respect of Freire and Wittgenstein’s lived experiences as pedagogues. I consider Freire’s idea of conscientização and Wittgenstein’s stance on encouraging his students and readers to think for themselves and of the ways in which each of these relate to the critical being developing his or her own criticality. Also I draw on Freirean aesthetic curiosity and Wittgenstein’s deep respect for the mystical and, with it, questions touching upon aesthetics, questions of value, God and the meaning of life to envision new horizons and complementary vistas that criticality scholarship offers.

Reflection on theory, practice and policy leads to some general observations, key findings and recommendations in relation to criticality. Also, I sketch out how my conception of criticality can continue to gain purchase in the new domain of criticality scholarship. I erect signposts indicating possible paths that might be taken towards imagining and bringing about a more humane and just world.

Now I interpret Socrates’ laudation of the Delphic maxims, ‘Know thyself’ and ‘Nothing in excess’, in the opening quote from Protagoras, 343b, as a caveat addressed to the critical being, ‘Engage in a perpetual process of reflection’. Be aware of the limits of your epistemological and ontological positions. Be humble. And, at the same time, be not only critical of what you think you know, but remain open to new perspectives and new meanings.

This is also what, in my view, links Freire with Wittgenstein and what ties both thinkers to the concept of criticality. Freire wants his readers to be critically conscious persons who can read the world and the word critically and simultaneously and whose individual and collective duty it is to problematise their reality. Reflection, dialogue and transformative action are key components of both the pedagogical paths Freire walks and what he challenges his readers to discover for themselves and vigorously pursue. This is what he means by an ‘authentic praxis’ in which the contradictions underpinning oppression can be unveiled and the oppressed, together with the oppressors, struggle to become liberated (Freire 2017: 25–26). Likewise, in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is at pains to stress that he should not like his writing ‘to spare other people the trouble of thinking’, rather, and most importantly, it should stimulate his readers to thoughts of their own (PI Preface x).

Both thinkers are concerned with self-knowledge and with better understanding the human condition. There are parallel connections to be made with the Delphic maxims, Freire’s notion of conscientização and the importance of thinking for one’s self as underscored by Wittgenstein. Becoming independent critical thinkers and fostering our own criticality are, to be sure, what we want all critical beings to accomplish.

I also make a brief comment on their respective styles. Freire and Wittgenstein approach philosophical problems from a pedagogical perspective. Both thinkers connect with criticality through their lived experiences as teachers. Chapter 11 addresses this.

Further, a genealogy of criticality should include Immanuel Kant. I respect his caution, in the Critique of Pure Reason, that the ‘duty of philosophy was to abolish the semblance arising from misinterpretation, even if many prized and beloved delusions have to be destroyed in the process’ (Kant 1998: 101). For ‘all of the steps of reason’, in his system, are ‘ to be seen in the clearest light’ (Id. 643).

Critique—criticism, critical philosophy—is still very much concerned with the nature, boundaries and limits of knowledge (Id. 101, 133, 149 and 653–655). His simile of the surface of the earth as a plate speaks to this. We may cognise the limits of our actual knowledge of the earth at a given point in time, but not the ‘boundaries of all possible descriptions of the earth’ (Id. 653).

Dispensing with doctrine and dogma, I embrace the idea of a critique that is self-critical and strives to be free of mistakes and errors (Id. 133 and 149–150). I advocate an approach that operates ‘with modesty, indeed with a complete renunciation of all pretensions to dogmatic authority’ (Id. 643). A ‘critique of pure reason and its utility’, Kant says, ‘would really be only negative, serving not for the amplification but only for the purification of our reason, and for keeping it free of errors, by which a great deal is already won’ (Id. 133). He writes:

Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. Now there is nothing so important because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons. The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back. (Id. 643)

My interpretation of Kant’s first critique recognises the value of critical philosophy as it acts ‘through its office as censor’ (Id. 701). His final and closing remark is right, in my view, that given our ‘lust for knowledge’ the ‘critical path alone is still open’ (Id. 704). Indeed our critical paths remain open and there will always be new ones waiting to be drawn (and redrawn).

Relevant Background

National and transnational educational policy suggests we encourage the development of critical thinking and independent thought.Footnote 10 Secondary schools in England that follow the National Curriculum are, for example, required to incorporate six ‘key skills’ into their school curriculums; namely: communication, numeracy, information technology, group work, self-improvement, and problem solving (QCA 2004: 21). Five ‘thinking skills’ then complement the core skills and are designed for pupils ‘to focus on “knowing how” as well as “knowing what”―learning how to learn’ (Id. 22). These thinking skills are, in turn, information-processing skills, reasoning skills, enquiry skills, creative thinking skills and evaluation skills (Id. 22–23). The intent is that these critical thinking skills are transferable across the curriculum.

Indeed the assumption that critical thinking skills are generic in nature and are transferable across different subject domains likewise underlies the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority’s publication in 2011 of A framework of personal, learning and thinking skills. It promotes six generic skills that, together with the functional skills of English, mathematics and information, communication and technology, are said to be ‘essential to success in learning, life and work’ (QCA 2011: 1). The ‘interconnected’ groups of generic skills are independent enquiries, creative thinkers, reflective learners, team workers, self-managers and effective participators (Id. 1–2).

This policy stance raises a number of fundamental questions. What do we understand by the manifold of critical thinking skills advanced today? Are these skills generic and transversal or knowledge and context dependent? Does the concept of critical thinking in fact extend beyond skills to dispositions and even intellectual virtues? What should count as critical thinking? What pedagogical strategies would best foster critical thinking and promote independent thought?

These concerns certainly touch upon an important part of the story of criticality. But how do they relate to broader concerns in education? Given an encroachment in the arts and humanities of the rationalistic thematic and the Cartesian method, how does this influence our way of approaching criticality? How do we reconcile the teaching of criticality and the development of the critical being with the politics of market forces?

All of these questions bring into sharp focus the interplay between criticality and the social and political context in which we perform our activities as educationalists. I acknowledge that my critical investigations take place in a post-truth society that is still unpacking what Friedrich Nietzsche problematises as the ‘value of truth’ (Nietzsche 1967: III: §24). Truth remains very much ‘local, provisional and changing’ (Brookfield 2012: 219). My (our) interpretation(s) are able to draw on a multitude of practices of critical reflection (Tully 2003: 41). We have to accept that we have ‘different readings of the idea of “post-truth”’ (Barnett 2021: 56). This has important consequences for how we continue to legitimise knowledge in educational settings.

The ‘diversity of the world is inexhaustible’, Boaventura de Sousa Santos reminds us, and is calling for an adequate epistemology (Santos 2007: 65, 2014: 15, 108–111). The problem of truth, I might add, continues to strike at the heart of social, political and cultural discourses where our identities are shaped and reshaped (Cf. Bhabha 2004) and where our bodies and emotions now stand alongside reason in negotiating them (Freire 2016: 50).

I question the privilege afforded to propositional, or content, knowledge. We need to allow for a more nuanced approach to what counts as knowledge. Barnett is right to suggest that ‘epistemic justice’ is widening and that we should now be talking about removing the preferential status the ‘traditional disciplines, as homes for propositional knowledge’, have enjoyed and consider granting legitimacy to ‘more practical, processual or embodied forms of knowledge’ (Barnett 2021: 48). There is considerable merit in bringing this to the table.

The priority afforded to propositional knowledge is evident especially in the context of English maintained primary and secondary schools and to which Chapter 2 speaks. Policy decisions concerning the inclusion (and thus exclusion) of subject content and related assessment processes are very important. Standardising (fixing the limits of) knowledge is problematic. And so is setting targets. I ask policymakers to work more closely with scholars when it comes to curriculum design and assessment and to be informed by their specialist knowledge and concrete experiences of research and teaching. I challenge the legitimacy of rigid attainment targets and the traditional banking model of education. Moreover, I favour a Freirean transformative (or problem-posing) style of teaching (Freire 2017: 52–59). Surely, we want our pupils to ‘let-learn’ in critical ways, to challenge the confines of out-dated thinking practices and bring imagination into their lives. I underscore the intrinsic value of research and of teaching and learning (Cf. Ashwin 2020: 23–24). I envisage, in other words, a critical education that helps young learners gain traction in the real world.

My narrative will therefore take stock of what the community of educational philosophers understands by the term criticality. Whom do they include and, significantly, whom do they exclude from being a critical being? How is criticality conceived as a conceptual phenomenon? In addition, what contributions can Freire and Wittgenstein bring to the scholarly debates? My desire is that the answers to these questions will influence scholars in meaningful ways. Moreover, Freirean and Wittgensteinian approaches to the idea of criticality should serve as a heuristic for critical beings in their search for new horizons and new meanings as well as form an integral part of the philosophical edifice of criticality scholarship.

Rationale

The teaching of critical and independent thinking has been pushed to the fore by educational policymakers. The ideas underscoring these notions can have valuable roles to play in our schools and in vocational, adult and higher education. Yet what they mean and how they should be employed and assessed remains controversial. Clarity and coherence are brought into question.

Without seeking to identify precise definitions or exhaustive explanations, my analysis is concerned with surveying the philosophy of education literature regarding the notion of criticality and gleaning important insights from Freire and Wittgenstein with a view to advancing an enriched conception of criticality that informs the scholarly literature. My approach is to recognise the contributions that the Frankfurt School of critical social theory, critical pedagogy, critical thinking and informal logic make to the debates on criticality before moving on to consider Freire and Wittgenstein. There are many other genres that inform the scholarly literature and can be employed to analyse the concept of criticality. They include feminist theory, race theory, political theory, ethical theory, Marxist theory and sexual preference theory as well as ancestral wisdom and I acknowledge their value. Stephen Brookfield in his seminal work, Teaching for Critical Thinking, takes a different approach again and surveys five critical intellectual traditions—critical theory, analytic philosophy and logic, pragmatism, natural science and psychoanalysis—to explore the concept of critical thinking (Brookfield 2012: Chapter 2). My method does differ, however, in virtue of the added twist of mixing Freire and Wittgenstein in the same equation.

Thus my method is very much an eclectic one. And I acknowledge the tension inherent in bringing together seemingly different movements as well as thinkers as diverse as John Dewey, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Wittgenstein. At times there will appear to be some slippage between these traditions and thinkers, but my intention is to present each of them without changing the literature.

In my view, the epistemological and ontological benefits gained from such an approach outweigh any objections based on the criss-crossing of traditional intellectual boundaries. We are open, in criticality scholarship, to recognising as legitimate all interpretations, forms of knowledge and canons of validity. None of this is to deny the difficulties inherent in reconciling conflicts that will inevitably arise. Moving forward, dialogue, open-mindedness and the search for common ground become key.

My aims in this book are four-fold. First, to reflect on the idea of criticality as it arises in policy and scholarly debates. What grounds criticality in a philosophical sense? Second, to promote criticality scholarship as a new and dynamic philosophical space in which to explore the concept of criticality. Third, to develop original ideas about criticality drawing on Freirean and Wittgensteinian thinking that will complement the principles I derive from educational philosophy. And fourth, to make available to scholars, my general observations, key findings and suggestions for further theoretical and empirical research; and to policymakers, my recommendations concerning criticality in educational settings. This aim is vital given the lack of clarity and coherence regarding criticality and to which my connections between theory, practice and policy endeavour to address.

I take this opportunity to reflect on the rationale of my approach to fulfilling these objectives some aspects of which I have already touched upon. In the same breath, I empathise fully with Brookfield’s self-critical appraisal of his own work (Brookfield 2012: 214–221). Adopting his words, it is very easy for me to fall (as I’m sure I will) into the very trap of committing an ‘uncritical advocacy of the process’ in which I present my ideas in this book ‘ignoring its contradictions and minimizing its complexities’ (Id. 214). I only ask that you respect the spirit in which I conduct my investigations. And to the extent that I inadvertently steer criticality scholarship in erroneous or improper directions or that I am insensitive to other critical paths, may I take some comfort in the belief that others will soon correct me.

First, my analysis of the educational philosophy literature concerning criticality starts with a survey of four critical traditions that I find very helpful. They are not the only positions from which we can explore the concept. I have mentioned some of the others and, rightly so, new genres will emerge and add meaningfully to discussions at later times. My intellectual jigsaw of critical theory, critical pedagogy, critical thinking and informal logic provides a foundation for agreeing on some of the features of criticality. I then add ideas from Freire and Wittgenstein into the mix. The results serve to provide a different gloss on the concept’s meaning and use. My intention is to bring new ideas to the debates on criticality.

Second, you may rightly ask what intellectual gain is there in joining Freire with Wittgenstein? It is my contention that there is considerable merit in witnessing the originality of bringing these two philosophers together in the context of criticality. I choose to focus on Freire and Wittgenstein given their influential status as thinkers and because they shed light, in different ways, on the features of criticality, the critical being and a critical education. They also show, following my own interests, what connections can be made between education and the promotion of democracy and social justice.

Freire shows us how to teach well and he espouses an ethical imperative to try and improve our students’ worlds. Wittgenstein offers insight into the teaching and learning process itself and his numerous examples of educational terms sharpens our understanding of criticality. Both share a style of doing philosophy that includes tackling problems from a pedagogical perspective. Yet there are notable differences in their thinking. They also have nuanced approaches to aesthetics, ethics and religious belief. For these reasons, I will deal with them separately when considering their contributions to the criticality debates and while highlighting points of commonality and disjunctions as they arise. This is in contrast to my approach in Chapter 6 where I will bring Wittgenstein and Marx together in the discussion and align Wittgenstein’s later philosophy with Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach.

Third, I add that my novel treatment of Freire and Wittgenstein in these debates demonstrates how the boundaries of criticality scholarship are not rigidly defined and certainly not confined to the eclectic approach I am taking. Rather, this perspectival space is open to all scholars to explore the concept of criticality from their own unique traditions and invites a richness of new and different ideas and existential experiences. It is an unbounded arena.

Fourth, it will become apparent in the emerging narrative that I favour cross-disciplinary research and teaching (across the arts and humanities together with the formal, natural and social sciences) and that I also support a mixed approach to teaching criticality (drawing on both the domain-specific and the generalist camps). However, I will not focus on how to support the development of the teaching of criticality. Such a vital task is well beyond the scope of this book since it encompasses research in respect of curriculum design, pedagogy, assessment strategies and teacher training and it cuts across educational policy, theory and practice as well as psychology and neuroscience.Footnote 11 For this reason, in Chapter 9, I merely introduce a number of new and insightful pedagogical strategies and, then in Chapter 15, make the case that they warrant serious consideration under the auspices of further theoretical and empirical research. The latter chapter will, nevertheless, seek to address some of the implications my work holds for scholars.

Fifth, I am writing from a Eurocentric tradition but, at the same time, challenging its normative status and its tacit presuppositions and pretensions (or at least I am trying to). I am acutely aware of the need to engage with other philosophies and practices and of the necessity of disentangling the many and varied webs of deception and domination that distance the thinking and lived experiences of peoples across the globe. The divisions we frame between the Global North and the Global South, Western and non-Western, colonial and Indigenous and between mainstream and the Other should be dismantled and the marginalisation and the pain and suffering they inflict cease. Criticality in the twenty-first century should show itself in dialogue with a view to bringing legitimacy to all our epistemes, beliefs and practices. Only then may it engender emancipatory or transformative action, socio-political change. Indeed without such a conversation it is very difficult to see how we can move forward.

Sixth, in thinking about criticality I am exploring what might ground the concept in a philosophical sense. Yet, to be clear, I approach this exercise from a Nietzschean post-truth perspective, as I have mentioned. I accept that knowledge is socially and historically constructed (McLaren 2017: 58–59). I accept Santos’ counter-epistemological notion of the ecology of knowledges which is founded on the premise that knowledge is inter-knowledge (Santos 2007: 63–72, 2014: Chapters 6 and 7). And I endorse his thesis ‘that there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice, that is to say, that there has to be equity between different ways of knowing and different kinds of knowledge’ (Santos 2014: 237).

And finally, I take a Wittgensteinian approach to addressing the problem of criticality. I seek not to discover explanations or hidden definitions of the concept, but have the humble aim to make plain everyday accounts of how it is used so that criticality can be meaningfully employed in educational settings. My tools of trade will include observations, examples and descriptions.

Terminology

For the sake of clarity, I attribute the following meanings to the expressions: critical thinking, criticality, criticality scholarship, critical being and critical education.

Critical Thinking

The policy language of critical thinking generally refers to sets of skills (or abilities or competencies) and to dispositions (or propensities or attitudes). They tend to be viewed as generic in nature and either transferable across subject domains or infusible within curricular content and across the curriculum. Singaporean educational policy also captures the notion of virtues.

Scholars deal with the baggage of abilities, dispositions and virtues in different ways. Some see critical thinking as knowledge and context dependent. My analysis in subsequent chapters will take stock of ideas from prominent scholars including Brookfield, Robert Ennis, John McPeck, Richard Paul and Harvey Siegel.

Criticality

Criticality does include these sets of abilities, dispositions and intellectual virtues (or character traits), but is a much wider concept than critical thinking (Davies and Barnett 2015: 17). It includes not only thinking, but extends to being and acting. Hence there is a cross-over with critical thinking and criticality, between a critical thinker and a critical being and it refers to critical action (or transformative or emancipatory action). The concept also encroaches, quite legitimately, on the terrain of a critical education.

My contribution includes an argument that criticality is a family resemblance concept in a Wittgensteinian sense (PI §§66–67). It shares features in common with critique, critical awareness, critical thinking, critical thought, reflective thinking, creative thinking, independent thought and related educational terms (including problem solving). Moreover, if any of these resemblances should deviate from normal usage we should be able to point out how they do and all of this serves to shed light on the overall concept of criticality. I am not concerned about the lack of a precise definition or list of exhaustive explanations, but rest content with consistent and clear descriptions, examples and illustrations of how criticality is used in educational practice and I am mindful of the ways in which it develops, changes.

I will argue that criticality is a fluid concept and that its paradigm markers are not fixed. Different conceptions of criticality will continue to emerge, and the roles which these conceptions play and the sets of principles they have in common will together shine further light on the concept itself (Cf. Rawls 1972: 5–6).

Criticality Scholarship

Criticality scholarship is a logical space of perspectival horizons. It is a receptive space to listen to and acknowledge different perspectives and viewpoints. Participants are invited to imagine alternative realities and to create opportunities to bring them about. Collective dialogue and negotiation are important features.

Criticality scholarship underlines the idea of human flourishing. It is concerned with how we can live fulfilling lives, contribute to society and, potentially, act as socially transforming agents.

Criticality scholarship tackles questions relating to criticality, the critical being and a critical education.

Critical Being

The critical being and the critical thinker are interrelated family resemblance expressions. I simply prefer to use the nomenclature ‘critical being’. My inclination is due to my perception of criticality as encompassing thinking, being and acting.Footnote 12

The critical being is someone to whom I attribute the quality of criticality. I distinguish an unreflective person who does not, for instance, question her internal intellectual framework or the tenets of the prevailing social, political and economic order and who, perhaps, manifests a conservative attitude.

Criticality incorporates a wide range of epistemological and ontological features. The critical being is someone who reflects, as I have intimated, on her process of critical thinking and on her relations to others and the world around her. She consciously connects to her capacity for criticality.

For example, the critical being may reflect on her internal intellectual framework and challenge some of the underlying assumptions, ideologies, biases, worldviews and values she holds. She may be motivated to develop her capacity for criticality and practise exercising her personal traits (as well as her skills and dispositions). She may, in other words, choose to work hard to keep her epistemological and ontological limits in-check. She is acutely aware that she is, as Freire puts it, an unfinished and uncompleted being (Freire 2017: 57). But her attitude is one of becoming. That said, and borrowing from Wittgenstein, this working on herself, on her own interpretation and on how she sees things, may well alter her expectations in life (CV 16). Being critical in this sense may even mean dismantling her pride and ‘that is terribly hard work’ (CV 26).

Critical beings are living embodied persons armed with a full complement of economic, cultural, gender, sexual, race, ethnic and other personal attributes.

The critical being is someone who takes action when it is appropriate to do so (Bowell and Kingsbury 2015: 236).

Critical Education

Freire provides progressive educators with numerous examples of how to teach criticality. Wittgenstein’s contributions are concerned more with how the teaching and learning process itself works and to which he adds great depth. Also, Freire and Wittgenstein show educators the value of approaching philosophical problems from a pedagogical perspective and to which Chapter 11 speaks. They also demand that they should not be followed, but that students must walk their own critical paths. Together both philosophers offer significant insights into the planning and delivery of a critical education.

A Freirean critical education presents a variety of methods and is connected with how we live. It brings together educational theory and practice empowering students to engage in their own authentic praxis by unveiling and critically reflecting on their own limit situations and critically acting upon them (Freire 2017: 73–74, 82, 142). Freire’s conscientização thesis thus connects critical consciousness with critical action (Id. 54). Education becomes a practice of freedom. Students are equipped with powers to perceive critically the way they exist in the world, seeing it as a ‘reality in process, in transformation’ (Id. 56) and themselves and others as ‘beings in the process of becoming’ (Id. 57) in search of completeness and authenticity. Moreover, a critical education is only possible, Freire contends, ‘when the educator’s thinking, critical and concerned though it may be, nevertheless refuses to “apply the brakes” to the educand’s ability to think’ (Freire 2014: 108). In this way, educators and students ‘both share criticalness’ and the ‘educational practice can affirm itself as the unveiling of hidden truths’ (Freire 2016: 52).

Wittgenstein confesses, as we have seen, that his work is meant to stimulate students to developing thoughts of their own (PI Preface x). Indeed, anything they can do for themselves should be left to them (CV 77). And in terms of those hard philosophical problems, for instance, Wittgenstein wants his students to work through them for themselves (Cf. Schroeder 2006: 119). As Patrick Quinn explains, stimulating his audience to thoughts of their own represents Wittgenstein’s ‘mature understanding of teaching’ and is reminiscent of his last words to his former student, Maurice Drury, ‘Drury, whatever becomes of you, don’t stop thinking’ (Quinn 2000: 29). Wittgenstein wants students to ask those difficult questions and demand clarification especially of those that education represses without solving (PG 382).

Finally, Freire and Wittgenstein, even given their differences, allow us to connect a critical education with human flourishing. Encouraging students to develop their own criticality is vital in their individual pursuits to live out meaningful and rewarding lives. Also, Part III of this book positions both thinkers’ ideas in the context of democracy and social justice (and to which my personal interests align). I take the view that a critical education should help students imagine what a better world might look like and think about how to make some of that dream become a reality. I agree with Apple that our notions of democracy and citizenship are under threat by prevailing economic considerations and that there is a serious risk of citizens being reduced to mere consumers (Apple 2019: 184, 203). In many respects, as a citizen, he laments, ‘You are defined by what you buy, not by what you do’ (Id. 203). A Freirean-Wittgensteinian critical education serves to redress this moral predicament.

Why this Book is Important

This book is significant for a number of reasons. First, we are better informed about what we mean by the concept of criticality and how to use it. I bring together policy, theoretical and practical considerations relating to the concept. The enriched understanding gained helps us to make better use of our own criticality. In essence, we know what the concept entails for us as critical beings.

Second, my analysis of some of the theoretical landscape brings a noteworthy degree of clarity and coherence to the concept. This is an allied benefit. This offers help, in the sense that our epistemological and ontological bases are broadened, and it offers a challenge for us to use our criticality rewardingly and productively. After all, if a concept is to be meaningful we have to be able to think through what it means to avoid the platitudes that are often associated with it.

Third, my observations, key findings and recommendations are made available to educational policy reformers. There is a call for collaborative research efforts to produce empirical data and theoretical analyses focusing on the nature, purpose and teaching of criticality that, in turn, informs educational policy.

Fourth, I signpost opportunities within the new domain of criticality scholarship for further empirical and theoretical research. I recommend an unbounded and open-minded space in which the diverse perspectives and views of scholars may advance the notion of criticality, reflect on the development of the critical being and deliver an effective critical education. The arena of criticality scholarship is, essentially, an invitation to interested parties to engage in genuine dialogue where the participants work to negotiate, among other things, a shared vision of how to achieve forms of human flourishing.

Fifth, my position also supports an interpretation of criticality that connects with resolving democratic and social justice problems. Some scholars may agree on the importance of emancipating oppressed and marginalised people, of eliminating injustices, inequalities and all forms of domination and discrimination as well as the general claim of helping people become more fully human. Others may oppose my stand on democracy or how I view social justice in which case mutual respect, open-mindedness and negotiation come into play and, borrowing from James Kirylo, we will be ‘celebrating differences while at the same time nurturing commonalities’ (Kirylo 2011: 216). In short, though, we want to try and make a difference in our own lives, in those of our students and to the critical citizenry as a whole.

And finally, my ideas and suggestions are intended to make their way into the policy arena, educational philosophy literature, teacher training and, possibly, curriculum design.

The Book’s Structure

The first part of this book sets the scene for the journeys I wish to undertake and houses this chapter.

The second part explores the policy underscoring the concept of criticality. Chapter 2 speaks to this in the context of maintained schools in England. It demonstrates the importance of criticality in educational settings but stresses the need for clarity and coherence. Chapter 3 takes a snapshot of comparative critical thinking models. I start with higher education in the United Kingdom. Then I consider the educational policy supporting the notion of critical thinking competencies as they arise in the European Union, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (‘UNESCO’), Singapore, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. I witness a call for collaborative research into the nature, purpose and teaching of criticality and note the necessity of providing teachers with pedagogical strategies and methods designed specifically for teaching criticality.

The third part of this book takes up my own political and philosophical aspirations by linking criticality with the promotion of democracy and social justice. Within the perspectival space of criticality scholarship, Chapter 4 assesses the concept of criticality in this particular setting. I focus on aspects of critical theory, critical pedagogy, critical thinking scholarship and the informal logic movement. I argue that the dynamism of criticality scholarship is able to transcend these classical traditions and take the concept of criticality beyond mere critique and self-reflection into the realm of emancipatory or transformative action. Chapter 5 considers Freire’s pedagogical and political perspectives on critical beings naming the world and the word and demonstrates the significance this holds for democracy and social justice. Chapter 6 assesses Wittgenstein’s dictum that philosophy leaves everything as it is and aligns his later philosophy with Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. I present Wittgenstein as an advocate for social and political change.

The fourth part is concerned with thinking. Chapter 7 examines the scholarly literature and sheds light on the meaning of criticality. We find it is a fluid concept. Chapter 8 focuses on our different conceptions of criticality, explores the concept’s provisionality and iterability, and discusses the views of leading exponents from critical thinking and informal logic. Chapter 9 looks at a critical education. It assesses the notion of field dependency and the problem of transfer, and highlights some contemporary views on how to approach the teaching of criticality. Chapter 10 concerns the critical being. What skills, dispositions and intellectual virtues pertain to her? Who is and who is not a critical thinker? Chapter 11 explores the lived experiences of Freire and Wittgenstein as pedagogues and underlines how they approach philosophical problems from a pedagogical perspective. Chapter 12 considers how we may develop a person’s criticality by making connections with the Delphic maxims, ‘Know thyself’ and ‘Nothing overmuch’, Freire’s notion of conscientização and, as stressed by Wittgenstein, the importance of thinking for one’s self.

The fifth part takes up the problem of knowing. Chapter 13 reflects on different ways of knowing. It speaks to the stronghold that the rationalistic conception of thinking and scientific methods of investigation wield in education. Then it raises criticisms of the primacy of reason and the scientific paradigm in the social sciences and the arts and humanities. Finally, it investigates the possibility of alternative accounts of rationality that the scholarly literature offers. Chapter 14 explores some of Freire and Wittgenstein’s concerns for aesthetic, ethical and religious concepts with a view to amplifying and broadening our epistemological and ontological outlooks. I underline the importance of respecting different ways of knowing in educational research and teaching.

In the final part of this book I reflect on the consequences of my critical inquiries. First, in Chapter 15, I make some general observations and then provide six key findings concerning the concept of criticality. I also make a couple of recommendations specifically directed to policymakers. And second, I sketch out a road map showing how our enriched conception of criticality can continue to gain purchase in the new domain of criticality scholarship. I signpost possibilities for further empirical and theoretical research. It is a public space which allows for different perspectives and lived experiences including my own (that is to say, raising democratic and social justice orientated conversations). Chapter 16 incorporates my remarks in closing.