So far, I have organized and analyzed Mao’s thoughts and actions, albeit from limited aspects. As repetitive as it may sound, he was a revolutionary, a military strategist, a poet and a thinker. Certainly, he was also a politician and, with his extensive historical knowledge, we might even regard him as a historian. Naturally, the way we evaluate him will differ depending on which angle we view him from. He referred to himself as “Marx plus the First Emperor of Qin (Qinshihuang),” which may in a sense be the most convenient starting point for evaluating him. He was a rare figure in Chinese history who possessed, or attempted to possess, both the immense power of the First Emperor and the high authority of Marx. His thoughts and actions were sometimes consistent, sometimes contradictory, sometimes mild, sometimes ruthless, so it is not necessarily easy to systematically grasp his overall image, but I will try to capture and evaluate him from my own perspective. This is the task of this chapter.

1 Marxism as Religion, Mao as Guru

As mentioned in Chap. 3, what attracted Mao Zedong most to Marxism was the concept of class and class struggle. If he had not known this concept and had not discovered the power of the peasant class during the Chinese Revolution, he would not have attempted to launch a revolutionary struggle and, even if he had, it would have been a small military faction at most or remained a local force which would have ultimately been crushed by the superior military power of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. He had no interest in the central themes of Marxism, such as the liberation of the individual and individuality, or the overcoming of alienation. An idea like the “association of free people” so idealized by Marx was irrelevant to Mao. His highest and greatest purpose in studying Marxism was to figure out how to deploy class struggle theory as a tool to liberate a nation oppressed by imperialist powers, to revive China, release it from poverty, enhance national power, and thereby establish his own power.

But in hindsight, is Marx’s concept of class and class struggle really an indispensable, and moreover “scientific” framework for understanding history and historical reality? I do not think so. Marx’s terrifyingly simplistic view that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,” seems to be nothing more than rhetoric and should be theoretically considered a wishful hypothesis rather than an explanation of reality, as is the discourse that capitalist society is a society that necessarily involves “conflicts between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.” This discourse reflects a one-sided interpretation of the “labor value theory,” the basic theory of Marxian economics—that “since commodities are created by workers, the original profit should belong to the workers by nature, therefore, the profit received by the capitalist constitutes exploitation.”

Ralf Dahrendorf accurately points out how Marx’s class theory is oversimplistic and one-dimensional. He says:

“In principle a theory of class illuminates only a small segment of the wide field which can be described by the vague concept of structural change. We can neither expect nor, above all, assume that a theory of class will cast a glimmer of its light on other aspects of structural change as well.” (Dahrendorf 1959, p. 129)

Therefore, political revolutions that bring about rapid changes in class structure are only a part of “structural changes with a vast domain,” and the class struggle is only one form of expressing conflicts of interest among classes, and conflicts among classes are only one way of expressing conflicts of interest “among social groups with a vast domain.”

Marx saw the determinant of class in the private ownership of the means of production, but as Dahrendorf puts it:

“This connection between the concept of class and the actual ownership of or exclusion from private property has limited the applicability of class theory to only a relatively short period of European social history,” and:

“Class theory, based on the idea of dividing society into owners and nonowners of the means of production, loses its analytical value as soon as legal ownership and de facto control are separated.” (Ibid., p. 189)

“We have seen …. that this tie between the concept of class and the possession of, or exclusion from, effective private property limits the applicability of class theory to a relatively short period of European social history. A theory of class based on the division of society into owners and nonowners of means of production loses its analytical value as soon as legal ownership and factual control are separated.” (Ibid., p. 136)

For example, is there a “proletariat versus bourgeoisie” relationship in the present day between the stockholders, who are the owners of the joint stock company, and the labor unions, who represent the workers? Instead of linking class to private ownership as Marx did, Dahrendorf’s interpretation below is far more persuasive:

“As an element of social structure and a factor effecting change, they [classes] are as universal as their determinant, namely, authority and its distribution itself.” (Ibid., p. 137)

Without critically and thoroughly analyzing Marx’s concepts of class and class struggle, Mao Zedong combined class with analysis of the current situation, and class struggle with revolutionary struggle, which was pragmatic at best and opportunistic at worst, and he interpreted and expanded these concepts in order to establish his own power. This was his so-called “Sinicization” of Marxism. Since Marxism was born in the Western world in the nineteenth century as a type of modern thought, it does not fit well when directly imported into China, a country with a completely different history and culture. In fact, Marx’s theory of revolution, centered on the proletariat, cannot be applied as such in twentieth century China where the majority of people are peasants. It was indeed a major “discovery” of Mao Zedong to focus on the peasants as a revolutionary force. Or it may be said to be a major contribution to a theory of revolution in developing countries by the “revisionist” Mao Zedong.Footnote 1 However, given how he divided society under the banner of class struggle, thoroughly suppressed critical groups and individuals, persecuted and purged comrades who voiced dissent, it may rather be called a cruel misuse of Marxism than a new discovery, creation, or a contribution to Marxism.

In China, Mao Zedong is revered as a great thinker who applied the “universal truth” of Marxism to Chinese reality.Footnote 2 But what is the universal truth of Marxism in the first place? Is there any universality in its thought? Is the materialist view of history nothing more than a historical hypothesis? Why is the progressive historical view that history moves linearly from feudalism to capitalism, and then to socialism, as Marx predicts, a universal truth? Are Marx’s propositions that changes in productive forces change production relations, and changes in the economic base (infrastructure) change the superstructure, “universal” phenomena? No, they are not. Countless counterexamples can be raised against these propositions.Footnote 3 In actual fact, Marxism and historical materialism are not universal truths, but mere hypotheses. As an example, let us acknowledge the historical reality that socialist countries, including China, have simultaneously defected to capitalism. As Branko Milanovich puts it, “Capitalism alone remains” in today’s world (Milanovic 2019).Footnote 4

When this Marxist historical hypothesis is elevated to “science,” it becomes a historical truth and a powerful ideology that binds many thinkers and revolutionaries, and even justifies taking the lives of a vast number of innocent people. Then the “accountability for outcomes” of Marx himself, albeit indirectly, is significant, not to mention that of revolutionaries like Lenin and Mao Zedong. Marxists around the world call the socialism advocated by Marx “scientific socialism” while they have scorned the socialism of Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen prior to Marx as “utopian socialism.” But is the socialism conceived by Marx and Engels a “science” equivalent to natural science? The socialism of Marx and others, or the communist conception of Lenin, which abolishes division of labor, discards the market, and distributes according to needs, is nothing more than a cartoonish world akin to fantasy, like trying to create a paradise for humanity as distant as the Andromeda Nebula.

Hannah Arendt saw Russian Bolshevism as a secular religion. In her view, “the emergence of ‘secular religion’ is itself an expression of the inevitability of human religious desire and a supreme political warning against traditional religion” (Arendt 2002). She then noted that Marx saw religion as a kind of ideology, and then reversed the relationship, positioning ideology as religion. Accordingly, we can see Marxism, Leninism and Maoism as “religions” rather than science, and it seems that this can explain well the socialist revolution, movements, and historical events of the Mao era.

What if we were to boldly change the terms “Marxism,” “Leninism,” or “Maoism,” into “Marxist-Religion,” “Leninist-Religion,” or “Maoist-Religion,” respectively? Then the discourses and theories of Marx, Lenin, and Mao would be elevated to the word of “God,” or the “Bible,” so to speak, to an absolute truth that must never be doubted in the communist party dominated countries. If you dare to doubt or “revise” the word of God, you will be labeled an “apostate,” as Lenin cursed Kautsky, and in some cases you may be put on trial as if in a religious court, declared “guilty” and even executed. The members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union belong to a religious group called Leninist-Religion (let me call it a sect for now), and those who guide or control them are equivalent to priests or pastors.Footnote 5 Similarly, the members of the Chinese Communist Party are members of the Maoist sect, and their leaders are the equivalent of priests or pastors of this sect. The priest of the Leninist sect’s cathedral was a great dictator named Stalin, and the founder of the Maoist-Religion or sect was strongly influenced by the new doctrine of intensified class struggle from the socialist dogma that he advocated.Footnote 6

Like Christianity and Catholicism, these sects still have a variety of rituals. Portraits of Lenin and Mao are displayed in “churches” around the country, and believers are baptized by a priest or pastor (Party secretary). At times, the believers reverently swear, “I will strive hard for the realization of communism (God’s kingdom).” Those who have a promising future go to a seminary called a “party school” to study doctrines more deeply and devote themselves absolutely to God through the founder or guru.

The general believers of this sect do not doubt the guru at all. Would Christians doubt God? They firmly believe or have been led to believe that the guru is the one who saved them. Mao Zedong is an absolute being who speaks the only truth; he is the founder and the incarnation of God, so doubting his word is “blasphemy.” Even if they are forced to live a hard life, sometimes even to the point of starvation, the believers continue to believe in the doctrine and the guru. Even if they are sometimes exploited or abused by vicious local priests, they appeal directly to the guru, saying that it is the priests who are at fault and not the guru, or that the guru may not know the priest’s wrongdoing. They continue to adore the God and the guru in their hearts. And at meetings they offer prayers saying, “We pray for the longevity of the guru” (wanshou wujiang) and they sing “hymns” called revolutionary songs.

Events such as the unprecedented famine and starvation during The Great Leap Forward (GLF), or the severe violence of the Cultural Revolution (CR) when the number killed was tremendous—such events would ordinarily precipitate a revolution or a great rebellion and the subsequent collapse of the regime. First, there would be a split among leaders, then the Supreme Leader who had caused such a tragedy would be ousted, his statue toppled, his portrait torn down, and he might finally be killed by the crowd or by the military. But why did such dramatic changes not happen in Mao’s China? When the GLF policy failed spectacularly, resulting in famine and starvation that wreaked havoc on the economy, commentators abroad predicted that China would collapse.

One American commentator saw the Chinese economy as being on a veritable “downward spiral.” Yet, despite tens of millions of deaths from starvation, China’s regime did not collapse, the Communist system did not waver, and Mao Zedong was not ousted. Is it because a strict surveillance network was laid out in every corner of society, and anyone showing even a slight anti-Party, anti-government, or anti-Mao tendency would be anonymously reported and cracked down on? That might be part of it. However, when a great famine occurs and society seems to be on the verge of collapse, it would be normal for the anonymous reporting and police surveillance network to also collapse.

Or was it because the regime was able to concentrate on domestic measures without interference or invasion from foreign powers, especially from powerful military nations such as the Soviet Union and the United States? That might be one factor. However, it can also be interpreted that such interference or invasion was suppressed precisely because domestic control was in place.

In my view, the two most likely reasons why China did not collapse during the GLF disaster are as follows:

First, during this period of economic turmoil, the masses did not actively resist, but rather passively took various actions to circumvent the system, such as fleeing from their hometowns, cultivating illegal farmland and food crops, and hiding forced food procurement. Such “counteractions” (fanxingwei), as Gao Wangling calls them, allowed many farmers to survive to some extent (see Gao 2013). However, while this factor may explain the relative stability of the regime in areas where there were relatively few deaths from starvation, it is difficult to explain the cases of areas where starvation had reached a critical point. In such dire areas, where more than half and in extreme cases almost all of the people in a village starved to death and even cannibalism was rampant, the means of “counteractions” must have been exhausted.

The second and even more powerful regime “stabilizing” factor is the abovementioned “religious” factor: In the fourteenth century, the plague spread widely in Western Europe, causing a drastic decrease in population. Some say that as much as 60% of the entire population of Europe died because of this disease. However, we do not hear of any immediate political upheaval resulting from the plague. Was it because so many people fell ill that they lacked the strength and energy to overthrow the monarchy? That might be part of it, but a more important cause seems to have been the strength of the mental control exerted by medieval Christianity. Many of the people prayed frantically as they watched over their dying family members and friends. For the common people of Europe at that time, Christianity, the Pope, and the church (priests) were absolute entities. Kings and lords, who ruled over their people and held power obeyed this religious authority and protected the church, and opposing the king or lord would have meant opposing the church, and by extension, the Pope of Rome.

If we were to transpose this onto China during the Mao era, a similar case emerges. That is to say, during the catastrophic crisis that followed the GLF movement, Maoists believed in their guru, Chairman Mao, and indeed they did not even consider Mao to be responsible for the great disaster, but saw the People’s Communes and county leaders—equivalent to the priests and pastors of the “local church”—as the culprits, and so resorted to passive resistance.Footnote 7 Yang Jisheng points out that for 17 years before the Cultural Revolution, people were indoctrinated with the official ideology every day in textbooks, media, meetings, and other forms, and this became the collective consciousness of the entire society (Yang 2019, p. 210). Put it differently, ideology was applied like a strong religious doctrine.

Before the start of the CR movement, when the rural socialist education campaign described in Chap. 8 was being developed in many places, meetings were held in a village in Guangdong Province two or three times a week in the evening, where peasants were required to learn new revolutionary songs and Quotations from Chaiman Mao from something called a “Mao Zedong Thought Learning Guide,” and teenagers in particular were gradually inspired by such activities. One of them later confessed:

“I was very much inspired by the Maoist ideology. The youths truly believed in Mao’s thought. In their hearts they really felt this Mao Zedong was something, thought every one of the quotations made sense.” (Chan et al. 1984, p. 81)

No doubt, the “stability of the regime” during the Mao era cannot be explained by one or two factors alone, but rather by a variety of factors, and these factors may differ from region to region. The abovementioned reporting and surveillance system would have been in effect, and above all, information was controlled, bad news was not transmitted, and as a result of repeated political struggles, leaders who opposed Mao Zedong were successively ousted. Furthermore, even during the catastrophic situation of the CR movement, when the Party and government structures throughout the country were paralyzed, the fact that Mao firmly controlled the military is cited as an important reason why the system did not collapse.Footnote 8 In fact, it was Mao who said, “What is power, what is force, what is authority, it is nothing but the military.”Footnote 9 However, it seems to me that the most fundamental factor stabilizing the regime was Mao’s “deification.” No one dared directly defy Mao, the God and the guru of the religion called Maoism, or even dared to think of rebelling against him. Why did the peasants not revolt when Peng Dehuai desperately told Mao about the earnest appeals of the peasants in Hunan Province, the appeal that caused him to be ousted?

2 The Charisma of Mao Zedong

In retrospect, the root of the abnormal and distorted structures that emerged in China at that time can ultimately be traced back to Mao Zedong’s powerful charisma. What is charisma, in the first place? And what was the source of Mao’s charisma?

Max Weber identifies three types of legitimate authority: Rational-legal authority, traditional authority, and, in addition, charismatic authority. Charismatic authority, in this context, is characterized by the attribution of “innate qualities of the leader, especially magical abilities, revelation, heroic attributes, and emotional devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person,” and is often rooted in the perception of “eternally new, extraordinary, and unprecedented” qualities and the emotional fascination they generate (Weber 1960, p. 47). Because Mao was recognized as possessing “extraordinary qualities,” ordinary people “believed” in him, were fascinated by him and emotionally devoted to him. The legitimacy of the charismatic figure is based on their adoration of his “exceptional sanctity and heroism.”

Then, where did Mao’s “extraordinary qualities” come from? He was not a shaman, so he did not have magical powers, nor did he make divine revelations. However, in the 1930s, when he was holed up in Jinggangshan, he repelled the powerful Kuomintang (KMT) army that surrounded the revolutionary government four times, and in the Civil War between the Nationalists and Communists that began in 1946, he started from Harbin in the Northeastern region and moved southward, besieging and capturing one major city after the other from the KMT army, which had overwhelming military power, aided by the United States, and also had the weapons of the surrendered Japanese army. This is probably one of the main reasons why Mao Zedong was revered as a person with “extraordinary qualities.” Mao left Jinggangshan with the Red Army and conducted the so-called 25,000 li Long March from 1935 to 1936. In reality the Long March was a great escape, but if dramatized and idealized it may remind us of Moses’ “Exodus” in the Old Testament. The peasants in the northern part of Shaanxi Province praised Mao by singing a song called “The East is Red” (dongfanghong) and exalted him as the “Great Star of Salvation” (dajiuxing). He indeed became the “Moses” of revolutionary history, even modern history in China.

His achievements and “miracles” during the liberation struggle alone are enough to shape the charisma of Mao Zedong, but he also possessed a vast knowledge of history, a philosophical cultivatison, and ability as a poet, that is, all the essentials for a traditional intellectual (dushuren). From our point of view, there was as much difference between him and other political leaders in terms of humanistic cultivation, eloquence and persuasiveness, as there is between adults and children. Undoubtedly, compared to Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai was probably superior in terms of his human appeal, which attracted many people. In terms of understanding and knowledge of the economy, Mao Zedong could not match Chen Yun. In terms of practical ability, Deng Xiaoping was more outstanding than Mao Zedong. However, when Mao launched his “rash advance” policy in 1956, they all prostrated themselves before Mao (see Chap. 5). This was because they did not have the “extraordinary qualities” to compete with Mao.

If we only consider knowledge of history and understanding of Marxism, Mao Zedong may be inferior to professors of history and Marxist philosophy at Peking University, for example. However, the professors at Peking University have no track record in the revolutionary struggle. In Chap. 1, I pointed out the serious pitfalls or logical flaws in his two major philosophical works, “On Contradictions” and “On Practice.” As far as I have researched, there are not many scholars in China who have explicitly addressed and criticized these flaws. However, there must have been intellectuals who noticed serious shortcomings inherent in his philosophy. In particular, intellectuals from the democratic parties, such independent thinkers as Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji, for example, must have privately despised Mao’s philosophy.Footnote 10 But no one mentioned this in public, nor could they do so because to do so would have been blasphemy against God and the guru, and if they were not careful, these intellectuals might not only have been “excommunicated,” but might have lost their lives.Footnote 11

There was another factor that underpinned and even strengthened Mao’s charisma. That is the Marxist “scientific socialism” theory mentioned earlier. The fact that society “dialectically” transitions from feudalism to capitalism, and then to socialism, was deemed “scientifically proven” by Marx’s teachings as if a revelation from God, so Mao’s revolutionary theory was considered to have a “scientific” nature that cannot be changed by human will. Most of the Chinese people, including intellectuals, must have thought in the following way:

“What Chairman Mao says is absolutely correct. In fact, just as the prophet Marx predicted, didn’t the socialist revolution occur in Russia and then in China?” As Marx said, “Religion is opium.” For followers of the Marxist-Religion and Maoist-Religion, once they committed to such religions, it settled deeply in their brain cells. They embraced these religions without reserve.

One more comment regarding the perceived “scientific nature” of Marxism is that it served to justify brutal violence in practice. Stéphane Courtois says the following:

“Totalitarian leaders claimed the right to put their kind to death, and in fact had the ‘moral power’ to do so. Their fundamental justifying logic was always the same– based on the inevitability of science.” (Courtois 2006, p. 357, my emphasis)

When the policies and directions of absolute leaders are said to be “scientific,” no one can argue against them. If the Russian Revolution and the Chinese Revolution are said to have scientific inevitability, any opposing argument is declared unscientific, giving the leader the power of life and death.

During the Mao era in China, just as God was the creator of all, Mao Zedong was the ultimate decision-maker. Believing in Mao’s words was a way of life for almost everybody, at least until the Lin Biao incident in 1971, when Lin Biao, Mao’s “closest comrade-in-arms” and designated successor, attempted a coup. A young woman sent to a state farm in the Northeast (former Manchuria) was so shocked by the Lin Biao incident, she confessed that “the pillar of spiritual certainty had completely crumbled inside me. The belief in communism and my unwavering faith in Mao had collapsed.” (Dikötter 2016, p. 252)

According to Gao Wenqian, who is familiar with the Party’s internal documents, wrote:

“[Due to the Lin Biao incident] Mao’s image was severely tarnished, the paint of the Cultural Revolution was peeled off, and his true image began to appear. Doubts, disillusionment, and negative feelings toward the Cultural Revolution, and Mao himself, began to emerge.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 2, p. 74)

Charismatic worship of politicians and leaders is not limited to Maoist China. It was also seen in the worship of Hitler in Nazi Germany and Stalin in the Soviet Union. In pre-war Japan, too, the Emperor was revered as a “living God.” Why do people succumb to such abnormal psychology? In the end, it may be because democracy does not exist or has not taken root, or even if it does exist, if there are various institutional devices and environments, such as information manipulation and education, that prevent people from thinking independently, the masses will easily follow their leaders. In addition, for many people, it is easier to have everything decided at the top than think hard and take responsibility for themselves. This is what Erich Fromm calls “escape from freedom.” Like Hitler, Stalin, and other dictators, Mao succeeded in creating such masses. However, there is a big difference between Hitler or Stalin and Mao. While Hitler and Stalin no longer have much influence in the contemporary world, Mao is different. Even now, his authority stands tall on the land of China together with his big bronze statues.

3 Mao’s Legacies to Contemporary China

In December 1978, the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held its third plenary session, Deng Xiaoping’s power was established, which symbolized the start of a new era of “reform and opening-up.” Subsequently, marketization and privatization, which had been avoided during the Mao era, progressed, the People’s Communes were dismantled, and Deng Xiaoping’s economics began to be effective. In particular, after 1992, the full marketization of the economy in the name of “socialist market economy,” started and China achieved epoch-making long-run rapid economic growth (see Chap. 7).

But is Deng-era China completely different from Mao-era China? Not at all. Deng Xiaoping inherited and utilized Mao’s legacies. Without those legacies, there would be no Deng Xiaoping era. Then, what legacies did Deng’s China receive from Mao’s China?

First, it inherited the political system of a one-party dictatorship as well as the institutional framework of decentralization introduced in Chap. 7.

Second, when we look at the economy, China inherited the technological foundations of industry and agriculture, which were developed during the Mao era as we noted in Chap. 7. China squeezed the peasants, made industrial workers work for low wages, invested the profits obtained from this investment, promoted heavy industrialization following the Soviet Union, and created an industrial system that did not exist before the founding of the country. In the early years, China invited many engineers from the Soviet Union, learned from them, and trained a large number of technical personnel. When relationships between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated and the Soviet engineers withdrew, China developed its own atomic bomb under the spirit of self-reliance (1964). In agriculture, under the system of collective farming and the People’s Commune system, the government mobilized “600 million ants” to invest in infrastructure, including large-scale water conservancy construction, while at the same time developing basic technological capabilities. It is noteworthy that many agricultural technicians were produced compared to traditional China, and modern technology in areas such as crop cultivation became widespread.

Besides that, Under Maoist rule, China achieved the widespread provision of fundamental education and healthcare. During the Maoist era, the average life expectancy of the Chinese people increased, and the school enrollment rate rose, especially in rural areas. Regardless of the quality, many people were able to go to hospitals for free or at low cost and receive basic education in primary and secondary schools, providing China with important human resources as a valuable initial condition for the economic development.

Needless to say, these achievements are significant. However, they were obtained at great and numerous costs. Furthermore, it is not the case that such achievements could only be made in Mao’s China. I hold the belief that there could have been an alternative, less costly path to achieving the same objectives initially set by Mao. What stands as a tragedy for China is the absence of an individual capable of presenting such an alternative approach to economic development during his era.

There is the fact that in Taiwan and South Korea, where there was not such a big difference compared to China at the starting point, economic growth after the war was faster than in China, and it was achieved without great upheaval China has experienced. It is true that the population size of China is different from that of Taiwan and South Korea. But in terms of development strategy, it cannot be said that Mao Zedong’s “developmental dictatorship” under the Marxist ideology was far superior to the same type of system applied within the capitalist framework of Chiang Kai-shek—Chiang Ching-kuo’s Taiwan and Park Chung-hee’s Korea. In fact, from a cost-performance perspective, Mao’s development strategy was overwhelmingly inferior to these economies. In Taiwan and South Korea, during the period of development of the dictatorship and rapid economic growth, policies were never adopted that resulted in the incrimination of several percent of the population, much less the loss of normal life.

Third, the legacies that post-Mao China inherited from Maoist China are not only the institutional infrastructure, technological foundation, and human resources that we have seen above. In addition to these, there are principles of governance that move the entire system. The greatest legacies that Deng Xiaoping inherited from Mao Zedong, in my view, were the following three governance principles established during the pre-reform era.

The first is authoritarianism (quanli zhuyi), which regards power as the supreme and ultimate entity. Mao Zedong believed that “power is everything” (quanli jiushi yiqie). Because he equated his own power with that of the Party, he thoroughly eliminated anyone who opposed him or who might oppose him, as “anti-Party or counterrevolutionary elements. Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, fully aware that he did not possess the same charisma as Mao Zedong, firmly believed that the power of the Party, rather than his own power, was everything. Once power is obtained, it must not be relinquished at any cost. This kind of authoritarianism is not an invention of Mao, but it was solidified by him, passed on to his successor Deng Xiaoping, and is firmly inherited by Xi Jinping today.

The second is elitism or anti-democracy. Deng Xiaoping, who was aware of the adverse effects of the concentration of power in individuals and the personality cult, emphasized a collective leadership system. Immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident, he called for the formation of a collective leadership system with Jiang Zemin as its “core,” saying that “the establishment of a third-generation leadership group is an urgent task at hand.” Acknowledging that Mao Zedong was the core of the Party’s Politburo in the first generation during the Mao era and he himself as the core after the reform and opening-up, Deng wished to revive the collective instruction system.Footnote 12 Specifically, he proposed that authority be centralized in the Standing Committee of the Politburo. This approach is a “democratic centralized system,” the traditional decision-making method of the Communist Party since Lenin, but it is also a kind of “saint politics” or “rule by a few wise individuals” system.Footnote 13 Democracy does not guarantee the stability of power and can possibly lead to mob rule, so it is not adopted. Thus, he hated universal values such as freedom and democracy. The elitist view that politics, that is, decision-making, can be carried out only by a few, and in some cases only one “elected” or “wise” person, has been developed and established within the Communist Party system since Lenin. In China, it was ironically introduced and consolidated by Mao, who advocated the “mass line.” Deng can be said to have faithfully inherited this system and spirit from Mao.Footnote 14

The third is pragmatism. Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism, which could be considered his trademark, although strange to say, was actually inherited from Mao Zedong. However, as mentioned above, Deng’s pragmatism originates from Mao’s theory of practice—the principle of “seek truth from facts (shishi qiushi)”. As mentioned in Chap. 1, the “Historical Resolution” of the Chinese Communist Party in 1981 interpreted “Mao Zedong Thought” to consist of the mass line, seeking truth from facts, and independence as well as self-reliance. Deng, who practiced the pragmatic principle of “seeking truth from facts” more than Mao, may be said to be his most faithful disciple. This is because, contrary to the principle of pragmatism that he advocated, Mao often chose reckless policies that ignored reality, such as the GLF and the CR movements, which could have ruined the nation.

The abovementioned authoritarianism, elitism, and pragmatism have been passed down from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping and then to Xi Jinping, albeit in different forms, and have become the basic governance principles of contemporary China. Reform and opening-up have indeed dramatically transformed China’s politics, society, and economy in all aspects. The emphasis has shifted from politics to the economy, from production relations to productive forces, from moral incentives to material motivation, from egalitarianism to tolerance of inequality, and from self-reliance to openness to the outside world. People began to pursue financial wealth rather than ideology. The leadership also came to rely on faith in power, with Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought being virtually ignored. In order to maintain and consolidate power, the Communist Party and Deng Xiaoping, through years of practical experience, became convinced that these three governance principles could promote economic development in a material sense. Xi Jinping has merely added the somewhat mundane principle of governance, i.e. nationalism, to these three principles, by advocating the “China Dream” and the “Revival of China.”

What is important is that these three governance principles complement each other to create a powerful structure, with authoritarianism at the top or as the ultimate objective (see Fig. 1). Once power is formed, vested interests are created, and those in power will inevitably seek to maintain their power in order to protect those vested interests. Qian Liqun says that Mao Zedong was concerned about power because protecting the Party as a formed interest group would enable him to maintain his power and realize his ideals (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 128; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 91). In Mao’s case, he may not have been as strong as Deng Xiaoping in his will to protect the vested interests of the Party, as the Party was once destroyed by the CR movement. In any case, democracy and a multiparty system must be eliminated as obstacles to preserving power, and the principle of elitism becomes necessary, as it is easier to maintain and develop established power with the support of certain elites (individuals or specific groups). Power can also confer various vested interests on such elites.

Fig. 1
A path diagram. Authoritarianism or doctrine of supremacy leads to elitism or anti-democracy and pragmatism which are interconnected, and lead back to authoritarianism.

Self-perpetuating and expanding mechanism of power in China

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On the other hand, pragmatism is indeed useful for preserving power. If those in power can change rules, laws, etc. at will, they can maintain and develop their power. Moreover, ideology, Marxist theory and the like, can be remolded, adapted freely or even ignored, if necessary. In addition, those in power reward those who pragmatically change existing systems. And the principles of this pragmatism and elitism work complementarily. Only the elite, in principle, can change the system pragmatically, and the pragmatists can rise to the elite. With such a structure, it can be said that the spirit and system of “truth falls from the heavens” is easily created and perpetuated.

There is no need to say that any rulers in any country will want to use their power freely and for a long time. And there are never only a few individuals in any society who seek power. It is true of all politicians. However, few individual have paid attention to the fact that only when the two principles of elitism and pragmatism are at work can the power of a few be maintained and developed in a stable and powerful manner. Mao Zedong must have discovered the existence of such a mechanism in the long and fierce struggle for power within and outside the Party, and within and outside the country. The power thus created is maintained and expanded by its own power, as mentioned above. Thus, a mechanism of self-perpetuation and expansion of power was formed.

Stalin also maintained dictatorial power for a long time and used it as he wished. Both Khrushchev, who succeeded Stalin, and Leonid Brezhnev, who succeeded Khrushchev, monopolized power for a long time in the Soviet Union. In the former Soviet Union, therefore, a similar mechanism of self-perpetuation and expansion of power must have been at work as in China. But because they lacked the principle of pragmatism and tried to maintain the old outdated socialist system as well as ideology, the system aged and corrupted over the years, and the Soviet Union finally collapsed 74 years after the Russian Revolution.Footnote 15 In contrast, contemporary China continues to expand its system even after the 74th anniversary of its founding in 2023, and contrary to the expectations of China-hating people around the world, it does not seem to collapse easily.

4 The Character of Mao Zedong

I have already stressed that Mao Zedong was a man of diverse talents. On the other hand, it is clear from his behavior that he had a multifaceted and complex character. I believe that his character determined his policies and actions, at least to a certain degree. I am neither a psychologist nor a psychoanalyst, but let me try to boldly analyze his character so as to understand Mao Zedong and his behavior.

Lin Ke, who once served as Mao’s secretary, describes Mao’s characters. According to him, Mao Zedong had two different characters: The tiger-like character and monkey-like character:

“The tiger-like character is to persistently pursue the goals one believes to be correct and to see them through to the end. The monkey-like character refers to … being very romantic and unbound, living as one pleases …. Mao Zedong had said of himself, ‘I possess both of these characters, but the tiger-like character is dominant,’ …. the tiger-like and monkey-like characters are balanced …. Problems arise when this balance is upset and the monkey-like character surpasses the tiger-like one …. During the Great Leap Forward and the Peoples’s Commune movements, it seems that the monkey-like character came to the fore and the tiger-like one receded.” (Lin and Ling 1994, p. 226)

In other words, the reckless policies of those two movements were adopted because the balance in his mind was upset, and the tiger-like character became less dominant than the monkey-like quality.

By the way, Lin Ke refers to the monkey-like character as romanticism; then what is the tiger-like character? According to Lin, the tiger-like character is a realistic spirit (ibid., p. 257). But how much of the realistic spirit was reflected in such reckless movements? Also, can the tremendous sacrifices and tragedies that resulted from these policies be dismissed as due to Mao’s “romanticism”? A more accurate description of Mao’s character, based on his criticism of Hu Feng and his actions in the Anti-Rightist Struggle, would be to see him as a balance/imbalance between the tiger-like character of ruthlessness and the monkey-like character of tolerance. Once someone infuriates him, he is quickly dominated by the tiger-like character, becomes ruthless, intimidates his opponent like a fearsome tiger, and eventually devours them. Borrowing the words of Gao Wenqian, Mao Zedong was “originally very conceited, full of ambition, and enjoyed solitude and challenge. This is the quality required of someone who commands an entire army.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 1, p. 75)

Undoubtedly, considering the dream he had for the People’s Commune, we may need to capture his character from another dimension. That is, in terms of his attitude toward fantasy and reality. This fantasy corresponds to what Lin Ke calls romanticism. Mao’s attitude and judgment in the case of the communization moved from fantasy and tolerance at the beginning to reality and tolerance later on, and then to reality and ruthlessness, while in the case of land reform, did he not move from fantasy and ruthlessness at the beginning to reality and ruthlessness later on? In other words, he had both the ruthlessness of the First Emperor of Qin and the fantasy of Marx. According to Gao Wenqian, Mao had qualities of “cunning, cruelty, autocracy, tyranny, a tendency to surpass even his own mentor, and an inclination to go to extremes.” (Gao 2007, Vol. 2, p. 198) It seems to me, however, that his character was more complex.

At the Shanghai Conference held before the Lushan Conference, Mao was indeed tolerant toward Peng Dehuai (see Chap. 6). However, when Peng sent a personal letter to Mao during the Lushan Conference, implicitly criticizing the GLF and PC policies, Mao suddenly turned ruthless. Why? What happened to him? Was it because of historical resentment, or because he feared that Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentian, and others had formed a “counterrevolutionary group” and he felt insecure about his own power? It seems that both factors were at play.

He is at times furious. In Young Mao Zedong written by Li Zehou, Mao reflects on himself as follows:

“Regrettably, I had a disease of being too emotional and getting furious with righteous indignation. I am more easily moved by emotions and have difficulty in keeping regularity in my life. My personality dislikes restraint.” (Requoted from Su et al. 1992, p. 250)

The man who served as Mao’s bodyguard recalls him as “someone who was sensitive and tenderhearted” and described him as having a “kind and gentle heart.” (Takeuchi 1989, p. 200).

However, it does not appear that Mao, the outstanding figure of the century, was merely an emotional, sensitive, and tenderhearted person. At times he was extremely rational. It might be necessary to add a third axis of rational vs. emotional to the above two axes (see Fig. 2). When he was rational and fanciful, as well as calm and tolerant, he would ponder philosophy or, in the midst of war, conceive of various military tactics. But when he is emotional, ruthless, and pragmatic, as in the case of the Anti-Rightist Struggle and the criticism of Peng Dehuai, he thoroughly pursues those who oppose or disagree with his policies. According to Wang Youqin, the reason why Mao cornered Liu Shaoqi during the Cultural Revolution and made him die a miserable death was because he took “a kind of sadistic pleasure in the process of persecution” (Wang 2017a).

Fig. 2
A 3-D coordinate graph. The x-axis ranges from realist to idealistic. The y-axis ranges from emotional to rational. The z-axis ranges from cruel to tolerant.

Structure of Mao’s character

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Sometimes he is compassionate, sometimes ruthless. Sometimes he is humble and modest, sometimes he is haughty and arrogant. What brought about his arrogance was a strong desire for self-display and an insatiable thirst for absolute power. He was strongly opposed to Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin (20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 1956) because he suspected that if he completely denied Stalin’s achievements and authority, it would bounce back to him someday. Gao Wenqian perceives that Mao was afraid that someone like Khrushchev would deny him his legacy after he died, which is why he hunted down Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao (Gao 2007, Vol. 2). At the same time, however, he also had an intense latent desire to be worshipped by others, and he might have feared that such a desire would not be realized under those leaders.

Hu Angang has collected several examples of how Mao Zedong wanted his name and achievements to be praised. For example, in November 1963, he deliberately added the following sentence to Zhou Yang’s article “The Combat Mission of Philosophical and Social Science Workers.”

“In China, Comrade Mao Zedong pushed forward a fierce argument against the various opportunists in the Party, disregarding the ridicule of ‘narrow empiricism’ once showered upon him, politically striking and isolating them, linking the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete reality of the Chinese Revolution, and creatively developing Marxism-Leninism using the new theory of revolution under new conditions.” (Hu 2008, p. 62, Hu’s emphasis)

If Zhou Yang were saying it, it might be one thing, but Mao Zedong himself wrote that he “creatively developed Marxism-Leninism.”

Furthermore, on September 29, 1964, Mao Zedong himself added the following phrases to Peng Zhen’s “Speech Manuscript at the 15th Anniversary of the National Day Ceremony.” “Comrade Mao Zedong always says to us ….” and, “the people of all ethnic groups of our country armed with Mao Zedong Thought” (ibid., p. 63). In addition, on January 3, 1965, Mao Zedong inserted in He Long’s “Speech Manuscript at the First Session of the Third People’s Congress” that “the people and the army of our country, under the guidance of the Party and Chairman Mao, will carry out the revolutionary spirit ….” (ibid., p. 63). He also changed the title of that meeting to “Comrade Mao’s great idea of people’s war will forever be the guideline for the construction of our national defence” (ibid.).

If he were truly humble at all times, he would not have added words that elevate himself or have “creatively developed” other person’s manuscripts. Calling one’s own thought “great” is something that a normal and ordinary person would be too embarrassed to say. It was because he was the charismatic guru, Mao Zedong, that he could do it. He not only had a strong desire for self-display, but he intentionally and strategically tried to enhance personal worship of himself within the Party. My understanding is that this was driven by his intense desire for power, and at times, his pragmatic thinking used in various ways for this purpose, acted as a switch, changing his character. This is my judgment and hypothesis about Mao’s character and its changes.

Such arrogant acts by Mao Zedong were against the “prohibition of personality cult” regulation of the Party’s Eighth National Congress in 1956, which Mao himself admitted, but Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Zhen did nothing to reprimand him.

At the Party’s Seventh National Congress in 1945, Liu Shaoqi included the term “Mao Zedong Thought” in an official document for the first time. But Liu remained silent when, about 20 years later, Mao Zedong Thought became the personal thought of Mao Zedong.Footnote 16 To return to the earlier metaphor, Liu was not a priest or pastor who would openly confront the guru. It was at the December 1964 meeting of the enlarged Standing Committee of the Politburo that he finally stood up to the guru face-to-face (see Chap. 8). That was why Mao was determined to eventually overthrow Liu. In the end, Mao chose his admirer Lin Biao, and a short time after the start of the CR movement, he wrote the name of his “close comrade-in-arms,” Lin, as his successor into the Party’s Constitution at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party in April 1969. In April 1970, Mao Zedong edited Lin’s political report, which described him as having “genius, creativity, and comprehensive development of Marxism-Leninism.” Mao removed the phrase “genius, creativity, and comprehensive development”, probably sensing Lin’s ambition and out of a growing concern for his own hold on power, after which Mao became more calm, pragmatic, and rational.Footnote 17

5 An Evaluation of Mao Zedong: My Tentative View

Recently, the limits of capitalism have been argued worldwide, and some are hoping for a revival of “socialism.” There is also a wave of populism sweeping the world, and the defects of democracy based on a free electoral system are being loudly proclaimed. Upon reflection, all of these are rooted in the latent conflict between freedom and equality that modern societies have pursued. On the other hand, China has been promoting the “superiority” of its authoritarian regime on the basis of its remarkable economic development and, for a time, on the basis of the forced suppression of the novel coronavirus.Footnote 18

As capitalist countries promote development through free competition and market economies, inequality widens, and as globalization progresses, the movement of people and immigration increases, and those who cannot benefit from competition and markets promote populist politics. On the other hand, socialist countries in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and other regions have opted for capitalism en masse since the late 1980s, largely because socialism, contrary to Lenin’s oath, did not guarantee “true freedom,” it eliminated the market, the economy lagged and people were given “equality of results, but at a low level.” Winston Churchill left us the now famous quote: The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings. The inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries.

What Yu Luoke sought was the elimination of social, political, and economic discrimination between “classes” (see Chap. 8). He felt strongly that the terrifying disparity between the Red Five and Black Five was inhuman and inherently contrary to socialist ideals. Moreover, if the class from which one’s parents came was passed on to one’s children, this would conform to the very tradition of pre-modern feudal society. If he had been allowed a “free spirit” and enjoyed full freedom of thought, he would have discovered that this irrational system originated from Mao Zedong’s view of class, and if he further developed his thinking, that this class view is fundamentally based on Marx’s historical materialism.Footnote 19 If he deepened his thinking even further, he might have realized that the idea that a certain class is “advanced” and that society progresses by overthrowing the backward class creates serious inequality and unfortunate conflicts in society. Although he praises Mao’s ideology and Marxism-Leninism in words, I imagine that he, being a brilliant youth, could have eventually broken through Maoism and Marxism-Leninism. And he might have raised fundamental questions about the “truth falls from the heavens” system. This would have been the bomb that would have “shaken the entire system” in the true sense. If it were him, he should have been able to identify more fundamental issues beyond mere criticism of “bloodline theory”.

The thought of “scientific socialism”, beginning with Marx, could ironically be described as an “ideological current born during the long transitional period from modern times to modern times.” The original form of the current, derived from modern thought seeking freedom and equality, has resulted in tremendous violence and discrimination, and now we may be embarking on a journey to seek what true freedom and equality really are. At least, it is certain that such thought cannot be sought from Lenin or Mao Zedong.

During the Cultural Revolution and its immediate aftermath, there were quite a few individuals who praised “Mao Zedong Thought” and sought something transcendent in it. However, upon dissecting the three elements that constitute Mao Zedong Thought, we become aware of the pitfalls, contradictions, and expedience inherent in the philosophy underlying this ideology (see Chap. 1). That is to say, the “seek truth from facts” thinking is essentially the same as pragmatism, the “mass line” is ultimately nothing more than instrumentalism that treats the masses as mere tools (see Chap. 3), and “self-reliance” is a simple policy doctrine that anyone would come up with if external resource supply is constrained. Mao Zedong Thought, therefore, can hardly be called an original and unique invention.

I believe that humanity has over a long period of time devised and developed three fundamental institutions related to relationships between individuals and groups. The first is the market. Humankind created the institution of exchanging goods at first in the form of barter, which evolved into the emergence of money and the ever-expanding market. Monkeys and apes cannot create such a system. They have forms of goods transfer such as giving and taking, but there is no act of exchange that is conscious of value or ratio.

The second is the law. Humanity created the institution of law. Even before the appearance of ancient, codified laws like the Code of Ur-Nammu or the Code of Hammurabi, there must have been something like “customary law” in the form of various rules and promises within and between tribes. Otherwise, stable order could not be maintained within and between groups such as tribes and clans. A similar system is not absent in monkeys and apes. There is a powerful male boss in a herd, and the group obeys this rule. However, there is no rule for each action of the members or the group in their herd. There is no systematized rule that this rule applies to this action, and this penalty applies to this action, except in human society. Fundamental rights related to things and property, such as the right of ownership and possession, are established and function effectively only when there is a rule of law.

The third is the institution of democracy. As the institution of law developed, rational political rules developed among people, which led to ancient democracy in Greek and Roman times, and to parliamentary democracy in England since the Magna Carta. The reason why modern capitalism was able to develop so effectively in the advanced countries is that these three institutions were strongly connected and formed around the market.

No doubt, all of these institutions have flaws. It is well known that markets, if left unchecked, tend to create monopoly and oligopoly situations, and that inequality among people grows. As for law, people have made various attempts to find loopholes since ancient times, and if detailed regulations are made to try to block these loopholes, society will become stifling. But markets and laws are still alright. Despite their flaws, they may function reasonably to some extent, and as a result, society does not immediately collapse. However, democracy, historically the most recently established system, is the most flawed of all systems, easily prone to dysfunction or potentially causing intense societal conflicts. It is exactly as Churchill said, “democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.” That is why it is a difficult political system with room for improvement and reform. In contrast to Fig. 1, in modern civil society, the market and the law support each other in the fragile institution of democracy. As can be easily seen, when we contrast this with the Chinese governance principles referred to above, power corresponds to the market, elitism to democracy, and pragmatism to law.

Mao Zedong, by the way, has either ignored or consciously destroyed all three of these important institutions created by mankind. First, China imported the planning system from the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, then abolished markets for food and other important goods and commodities, and later cracked down on even small markets that tried to revive them. Next, Mao advocated “lawlessness” (wufa wutian), occasionally issuing “supreme directives” in place of laws, thus blatantly violating even the National Constitution as well as the Party Constitution. And, as mentioned above, he despised modern democracy as “bourgeois,” following Lenin, and even ignored the pseudo-democratic system of “democratic centralism” introduced from the Soviet Union, preferring to establish a de facto personal dictatorship. In May 1953, he scolded Liu Shaoqi and Yang Shangkun,Footnote 20 stating that all documents and telegrams issued in the name of the central authority must go through Mao’s scrutiny, and those that did not were deemed invalid (Li 1996, Vol. 1, p. 241).

Why did Mao Zedong establish such a system? Hu Angang says that Mao was stuck in feudal despotism (Hu 2008), and Takeuchi Minoru points out that Mao was aiming for “emperor-type power” in the Chinese tradition (Takeuchi 1989). Li Rui argues that the mistakes Mao made in his later years came from feudal despotism and the patriarchal thinking associated with the peasant economy (Li 1999d, p. 361). In his view, “democracy” was merely a gift and a decoration for Mao (ibid., p. 333).

Certainly, it is undeniable that there is such an aspect, but is it enough to liken Mao Zedong to the First Emperor of Qin, to criticize his anti-intellectualism as similar to the burning of books (fenshu) and burying of scholars (kengru), and to highlight the feudal patriarchal influence on him? Does the other half of Mao Zedong’s face not resemble Marx and the revolutionary Lenin, as he himself said?

Marx and Engels advocated violent revolution in the Communist Manifesto, Lenin carried out that violent revolution in the October Revolution, and after the revolution, Marx’s “proletarian dictatorship” was literally interpreted and violent red terror (violent suppression) was waged. The Great Purge by Stalin goes without saying. Where did the seeds of violence and brutality exhibited by Lenin, Stalin, and their successors, Mao and his followers, come from? Li Rui, an old Communist Party member, sees Mao’s tragedy as ultimately not understanding Marx correctly, but I cannot help but feel that another seed of violence and brutality was embedded in Marxism, especially in the class struggle view, its inherent absoluteness in historical materialism, the arrogance of Marxist believers who call it “science” and a certain religiosity that it produces.

After the new policies started in the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping certainly tried to revive the market, develop laws, and introduce a system of democratic centralization. However, in today’s China, despite significant progress in marketization, the rule of law has not been realized, and the country is trying to maintain and strengthen a one-party dictatorship, which is the opposite of modern democracy. People’s courts, public executions, and private punishments, like those in the Mao Zedong era, have certainly disappeared. The infamous “labor reform camps” (laogai) have transformed into prisons, and the notorious “laboring penitentiaries” (jiaoyangsuo) that allowed detention and confinement without due process have been officially abolished. However, witnessing the peculiar repressive regime, where human rights lawyers can suddenly disappear one day and the suppression of minority populations like those in Tibet and the Uighur region occurs, we cannot help but realize that contemporary China, if Marx or Lu Xun were to see it, would astonish and sadden them, as its essence remains unchanged from Mao’s China.

Deng Xiaoping and the current Chinese leadership that succeeded him have firmly inherited Mao Zedong’s legacies. In China, both in the past and now, truth is still falling from the heavens.

According to Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, “Mao Zedong was the tyrant of twentieth century China and a political giant who brought about a great revolution in Chinese society” (Yan and Gao 1996, p. 271). He was indeed a despotic tyrant; he was a “political giant” in Chinese history, even in world history, and his achievements were far more “giant” than Lenin’s, not to mention Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen died saying, “The revolution is not yet over,” and Lenin fled to Switzerland for safety just before the Russian Revolution. Mao Zedong, on the other hand, risked his own life in a prolonged and severe struggle in China, practiced the revolution, and finally succeeded in building up his enormous power as well as the nation’s.

China has always called Mao “great.” During the CR period, the slogan “Great Leader, Great Teacher, Great Commander, Great Helmsman, Long Live Chairman Mao!” echoed across the country day in and day out. Even today, Mao Zedong appears in statues, portraits, and on banknotes as a symbol of China and the Communist Party, and as a “great man” he is the object of adoration for many Chinese people. However, as far as Mao’s actions after the founding of the country are concerned, was he really “great”? I cannot see him as truly “great” at least when I look at him from the post-Revolution era. Churchill left an extremely meaningful warning: “The price of greatness is responsibility.”

In June 1959, Mao delivered the following instruction to Wang Renzhong, then Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party:

“If the policy decision is wrong, the leader must take responsibility, and cannot unilaterally push the responsibility to the lower ranks. Leaders take responsibility on behalf of those who are led, this is one important condition for gaining the trust of subordinates.” (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi et al. (eds.) 2003, Vol. 2, p. 953)

Yet, upon reflection, Mao Zedong never took responsibility for the immeasurable catastrophes he caused, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Even though he made a superficial “self-criticism” at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in 1962, he never took responsibility for the disastrous consequences of the GLF policy. Looking back on his own serious experience of the CR movement, Wang Hui reflects with a gloomy tone, “People stood up in response to the call of Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, but the Revolution ended in failure. And the responsibility was imposed on the people.” (Wang 2013a, p. 248; Wang 2013b, p. 192, my emphasis)