1 Discovering Evola

In May 2018, in the middle of a sociological enquiry over Shiʿa communities in Italy and after my long journey in different cities, I finally reached the capital where converts administered a couple of religious organizations and intellectual circles. One of the last days of May, the secretary of the Associazione Islamica Imam Mahdi (MC)—founded and administered by Italians converted to Shiʿism—published the poster of a conference about jihad on its Telegram channel. The conference entitled Dal Bushido al Jihad: Martirio: tradizione e testimonianza sacrale (From Bushido to Jihad: Martyrdom and the Sacred Testimony) was scheduled for June 6. It was organized by an association called Acca Larentia. I decided to attend the conference as it was relevant to my research.

On June 6, slightly ahead of time, I reached the small square where the conference hall was supposed to be. During fieldwork I would observe the Islamic dress code, especially because it was Ramadan and I was even more careful with the Islamic norms. In the square I could not find any place with Islamic symbols or similar to a conference hall. There was only a group of late adolescents dressed in black, some skinhead with particular makeups, tattoos, and piercing. Given my Islamic attire, I kept distance from them. They gathered around the entrance of a garage colored in black. Around the entrance, there were graffities of Roman warriors and Celtic crosses. Besides it there was a commemorative plaque in white marble where one could see the names of three boys killed in 1978. Under their names there was written “Assassinate dall’odio comunista e dai servi dello Stato” (assassinated by communist hatred and by servants of the state). I started looking around and searching the conference hall but no other street with that name was there. I decided to leave the small square, especially because I felt uncomfortable staying near those guys. “Something has gone wrong”, I thought to myself. I headed toward the metro station for getting back home. In my way, I encountered the MC secretary Marco Husain Morelli, who had shared the poster, accompanied by Giuseppe-Youssef (another convert to Shiʿism) and an Iranian student. Marco-Husain assured that I had not made any mistake. We turned back to the square. Marco, Giuseppe, and the student entered the garage. Young boys and girls followed them and I entered at the end hesitantly, wide-eyed, and dumbstruck.

The garage was equipped with a series of shelves on my right. On the shelves, there were yellow T-shirts with green pine that bore the name of Hizbullah, placed besides Kufiyahs. On the left, there was a giant poster of Mussolini and a poster of the aforementioned three students murdered by Communists. In front of us there was a table with three chairs behind it. On the table there was a statue of eager. The small venue was decorated with black flags and a Celtic cross.

The meeting hosted two speakers and a moderator. A young speaker talked about Bushido and Kamikaze in Japan. Marco-Husain had brought an Ayatollah Khamenei’s letter written to the European and North-American youth, which he had translated in Italian. Marco-Husain mentioned the name of a person called Evola whom he presented as a philosopher. He talked about Evola and his definition of jihad. He mentioned the name of the Iranian child soldier Husain Fahmide (d.1980) and the teenage Lebanese suicide bomber Ahmad Qassir (d.1982) and their “martyrdom”. He praised the Palestinian resistance movement and the so-called Holy Shrine Defenders,Footnote 1 who “learnt new languages and went to Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan to combat extremists”. He condemned al-Qāʿida and Wahhābism and called them a “cancer”.

After the meeting, as sunset was approaching, Morelli, Giuseppe, the Iranian student, and I headed toward the MC headquarters where iftạ̄rFootnote 2 was served. Later, by googling the address of the garage I discovered that it was actually an ex-headquarters of the Italian Social Movement (MSI). I was utterly bewildered by that salad of symbolism, arguments, and colors that I had encountered in that garage. I did not know who Evola might be and what the tie could be between him, jihad, and Ayatollah Khamenei. Nevertheless, I supposed that the jumble of symbols in that garage had to be somehow related to him. In any case, I could not understand why I had never heard anything about this philosopher. Both my bachelor’s and master’s degrees at the University of Bologna were philosophy. During master’s degree, I attended a course specifically dedicated to the contemporary Italian philosophy, where I discovered Nicola Abbagnano (d.1990) and his campaign for the revival of the Enlightenment in the post-war Italy. During bachelor’s I attended another course on the medieval Italian philosophy. However, not even a tiny hint to the name of this philosopher had been dropped by my ex-professors.

In the following months, I kept hearing his name from many other Italian converts, especially men, whom I encountered, as one of the most important intellectuals who had inspired them to approach the world of spirituality, a pathway that ultimately ushered them toward conversion to Shiʿism. At this point, I was wondering what Evola had written or done that had motivated Italians to convert to Shiʿism. And if he was such an important philosopher who had motivated a group of Italians to make a life-changing decision, why no professor had even once mentioned his name.

The novelties of Rome, however, did not come to their end. Some weeks later, another thought-provoking episode caught me by surprise. To have comparative parameters for defining the ways in which Shiʿas consecrated their unpretentious places of gathering in a country like Italy where they cannot have access to their conventional worship places,Footnote 3 I decided to visit Sufi gathering halls as well. It was a hot Sunday of July, and I was at the zāwiyahFootnote 4 of the Italian branch of the Burhaniya order in Rome in Viale di Valle Aurelia. A session of dhikrFootnote 5 and chants was about to commence. I was accompanied there by an Italian man whom I had encountered for the first time at the MC. He was on the threshold of conversion to Shiʿism and liked calling himself Mansur both because of his passion for Husain ibn Mansur al-Hallaj and for the Arabic translation of his name Vittorio. At the zāwiyah I sat in front of Vittorio-Mansur on a carpet besides an armchair where a semi-veiled Italian woman, converted to Sunnism and a member of Burhaniya, had sat. Unexpectedly, she turned to me and asked why I was in Italy. “Because in Iran I was fascinated by the cultural revival that had happened during Renaissance and wanted to delve into Machiavelli to help my country get out of its medieval dark age”, I artlessly replied. On that moment, I did not know that my answer could have scandalized anyone in that place. Suddenly, I noticed the wide eyes of Mansur that had fixed me with a deep sense of preoccupation.

After the ascetic session, while Mansur and I were leaving that zāwiyah, he admonished me not to mention Machiavelli and not to repeat such statements while we were at the Dimore della Sapienza (DDS). In 2018, the DDS was among the Rome-based institutes that I would attend for my research. It was a cultural association annexed to the Irfan Publishing House, both founded by an Italian converted to Shiʿism called Giuseppe-Mahdi Aiello. The association was attended by converts to Sufism, traditionalist Catholics and converts to Shiʿism. Besides MC, Mansur also attended the DDS where he would sometimes hold lectures about Plato.

I could not comprehend why I had to keep quiet about the reasons that had brought me to Italy, namely Renaissance, Humanism, and my dream of importing Machiavelli’s teachings to my country. In the few encounters with Mansur, he would mention the name of intellectuals and currents that were utterly unknown to me. The philosophical conundrums convinced me that something special, amusing, and counterintuitive about Italian converts existed. In this way, toward the end of my long voyage among communities of Shiʿa-borns in Italy, I found myself in front of a new dilemma. Discovering Evola, his relationship with conversion to Shiʿism, his impact on the “Italian Shiʿism” and the intriguing antipathies toward Renaissance opened a new odyssey of research in front of me.

Two years later, when I finally concluded the research project mainly dedicated to Shiʿa-borns in Italy, I started to delve into Evola’s thoughts. I found him a megalomanic rambling narrator with vast publications hardly digestible and full of unfamiliar concepts. He was a follower of Guénon’s school commonly called Traditionalism surfaced as a reaction to the crisis of the modern world. I understood that he had considered Islam a lunar type of spirituality and hence inferior to Aryan solar spirituality. Moreover, he criticized conversion to Islam. Evola entered in polemics with both Guénon and Burckhardt over their optimism toward Islam and conversion to this religion. Not only Evola was against conversion, but his interest for Islam was peripheral compared to his enthusiasm for India. In addition, he did not have clear ideas about the differences and relations between various voices of Islam. Therefore, Evola’s writings alone could not have originated the conversion to Shiʿism. Some sophisticated alchemy should have accompanied his legacy. To understand the complex relationship between Evola and conversion to Shiʿism and investigate the genealogy of this religious mobility I continued the study by siding sociology with historical enquiry.

2 Conversion to Islam and Traditionalism

Regarding the reasons for conversion to Islam in the West and the converts’ contribution to its evolution, the existing literature has offered very useful insights. Like conversion to any other religion, conversion to Islam is a multi-layered and processual phenomenon that passes through various stages (Rambo, 1993; Roald, 2006, 2012). Depending on the context, it can acquire a variety of meanings (Taylor, 1999) and a series of push–pull factors are responsible for its occurrence (Maslim & Bjorck, 2009; Rambo & Farhadian, 2014; Özyürek, 2014). These factors shape the convert’s relationship to his or her new and former religions (Wohlrab-Sahr, 1999).

Former Christians are foremost in expressing dissatisfaction with their original religion (Köse, 1999; Maslim & Bjorck, 2009), usually pointing to an overly permissive church and compromised religious principles. Islam’s greater attractiveness compared with Christianity derives from several points, including the absence of the doctrine of the Trinity, the definition of Jesus as a prophet, direct accessibility of God, and Islam’s engagement with social praxes, which make this religion clearer, simpler, and more rational than others (Anway, 1995; Hofmann, 1997; Daynes, 1999; van Nieuwkerk, 2006). The presumably non-existence of hierarchy and the Church in Islam captivate Catholics (Allievi, 1999, 2002, 2017). The clarity of Islamic gender roles and family structure is another cause of fascination with Islam, especially for women. Converts are often disturbed by the transgression of sexual norms and unstable conjugal relations in the West (Sultán, 1999; van Nieuwkerk, 2006; Hofmann, 1997; Haddad, 2006; Shanneik, 2011, 2012).

The aforementioned push factors that encourage also Italians to abandon the Catholic Church, although part of the explanation, do not clarify why Shiʿism is seen as the “better” religion. Moreover, within the pull factors there are unaddressed issues; precisely due to the nature of the religion, conversion to Shiʿism cannot be explained only by Catholics’ fascination with mainstream Islam. First, any approach to a new faith depends on the availability of its proselytizing networks, and Sunnism is clearly better marketed worldwide. Second, the presumed simplicity of Islam and its independence from clerical institutions and saints—which is supposed to be the charm of Islam for Christians (Haddad, 2006) do not explain why Italians convert to Shiʿism. In Shiʿism currently, the way norms are understood should be validated by marājiʿ (prominent clerical figures) and, besides the Prophet (and still for some heterodox fringes of Shiʿism, even above him), there is a constellation of infallible Imams and saints to whom believers can make their intercessions.Footnote 6 Such tendencies have survived, albeit not very visibly, even in Italy, where the disenchanted world is thought to be eroding the irrational aspects of religions.Footnote 7 So the prime reasons for fascination with Islam hardly explain why converts should be attracted to its minor branch.

In Italy, the only comprehensive sociological study on conversion to Islam was conducted by Allievi in 1999, and this empirical study laid the foundation for subsequent theoretical developments in 2017. Out of this study, the case of female Italian converts and their relation with gender discourses in Italy (Itri, 2009; Naclerio, 2018) or the converts’ adaptation of the Islamic norms to the local culinary habits (Galletti, 2017) have become the theme of some articles. A distinct anthropological enquiry delving into conversions to Sunnism in Naples was carried out by Di Nuzzo in 2020. However, the realm of Shiʿa conversions and their activities has seen limited scrutiny, with only two articles available (Vanzan, 2007; Mirshahvalad, 2020b). Notably, none of these studies have ventured into investigating the intricate relationship between Traditionalism (the intellectual current championed by René Guénon) and the process of conversion to Shiʿism. While I addressed the issue of Traditionalism in my article, I did not delve into Traditionalism as a causal factor in conversions or its influence on the inculturation of this religion in Italy. I also did not thoroughly explore the connection between Traditionalism and the conversion to Shiʿism. An investigation into this relationship is pivotal in shedding light on why “Italian Shiʿism” has developed specific doctrinal characteristics and adopted particular stances toward various Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran.

The current volume delves into the interplay between the Guénonian Traditionalism and conversion to Shiʿism. In its barest and elementary sense, tradition stands for a traditum or anything that is handed down from the past to the present (Shils, 1981). In the strict sense, it is a belief or practice transmitted from one generation to another and accepted as authoritative without argument (Acton, 1952). Tradition in this case corresponds to custom, which comprises a series of behavior considered normal in a given community and time. It becomes the communal bond that connects members of the community and guarantees the continuity between the past and the present. The heirs of the custom or traditional people do not reflect on their repetitive behavioral patterns or familiar approaches to the world. Unawareness of traditional people about the nature of their traditions is caused by the fact that traditions are transmitted to new members of the community as fixed codes of behavior through repetition to save or enhance the group cohesion (see Hobsbawm, 1983). It is why their behavior is automatic, genuine, and spontaneous.

The traditionalist, by difference, approaches the tradition as a reaction to an external threat to its moral equilibrium. It is, therefore, reactionary and prone to fight for the protection of the said tradition (Mannheim, 1953; Munson, 2000). While the traditional hardly know anything about the sources of the tradition, the traditionalist, having approached the tradition as a reaction to the “threat”, is reflective and self-aware. The traditionalist is prone to reject, fight or deny the presumed threat to its belief system. A strategy to defend the tradition is to idealize it (Arjomand, 1984).

In the current study, Traditionalism, written with an uppercase T, reveals an important similarity to what Arjomand (1984) defined as traditionalism, namely its reactionary nature. Here, Traditionalism represents a modern offshoot of the perennial philosophy that René Guénon blended with his critical views of the modern era, which he perceived as being in crisis. Guénon’s school spread to various countries and left its mark on numerous intellectuals worldwide. In each unique context, it adopted the characteristics of its host society. As detailed in Chap. 2, Guénon’s teachings found their way also to Italy through some authors who transformed them into endorsements of military and revolutionary actions. This transformation is indebted to post-World War I Italy’s socio-political tendencies.

This book scrutinizes the role of Italian Traditionalism and Iran’s history and representatives in Italy as pivotal factors influencing both the conversion to Shiʿism and the relationship between converts and the Italian context. It challenges preconceived notions about Western fascination with Islam. For instance, it questions whether the assumed rationality and simplicity of Islam suggested by Haddad (2006) could have been significant pull factors for Italian Traditionalists converting to Shiʿism. The book investigates how the conviction about the crisis of the modern world contributes to conversions to the minor branch of Islam in Italy.

Given the intricate web of themes that elucidate the reasons and manifestations of this religious mobility, the current book transcends a mere analysis of Italian Traditionalism, neo-fascism, Shiʿism in diaspora, and Iran’s history. Instead, it establishes connections among these seemingly disparate thematic lines. Therefore, the book encompasses all of these themes and none exclusively. It sheds new light on all these topics and explores how Traditionalism intersects with conversion to Shiʿism—a subject hitherto unexplored in existing literature.

While being Traditionalist and being a European convert Muslim are two categories that do not entirely overlap, they have at least one element in common: the idea of crisis. Studies show that religious conversion can be an instrument for coping with some sort of psychological crisis (Ullman, 1989) or a means of resistance and opposition against external aggressive forces such as colonialism (Viswanathan, 2021). In such cases, the new religion is embraced because it suggests a better panacea for the crisis. Conversion to Shiʿism in Italy, as will be seen, is very much in debt with the conviction about the crisis of the modern world and the incapability of Christianity and the Catholic Church of indicating a way-out of this crisis.

It was previously mentioned that the push and pull factors shape the approach of newcomers to the new religion. Considering Shiʿism as a remedy for the afflictions of the modern world, which acts as a pull factor, imparts distinct characteristics to this religion that set it apart from the Shiʿism practiced by Shiʿa-born individuals who inherit it as a familial tradition. Therefore, as a discursive tool to elucidate the impact of Traditionalism on “Italian Shiʿism” we can envision two separate approaches to this religious tradition: the Shiʿism of converts and that of Shiʿa-borns. In this study, Traditionalism is defined as the main feature of the “Italian Shiʿism”, versus the traditional Shiʿism of the Italian-based Shiʿa-borns: a group currently composed of mainly the first generation of immigrants. Although the second category is anything but homogenous and monolithic, it is adopted as a useful discursive instrument for comparison and analysis.

3 Exploring the “Italian Shiʿism”

Neither the presence of Islam in Italy, nor conversion to this religion are novelties of the contemporary period. Italy experienced both of them since middle ages. However, Italy’s current experience features at least two new aspects. First, Italians are gradually developing awareness over the differences between some main voices of Islam. Second, ethnicity and religious belonging have been decoupled. When the Italian states had to deal with the threats of Ottomans, an Italian who would embrace Islam could be associated to moriFootnote 8 or turchi (Turks). A Muslim convert was the one who had made himself a Turk (Rostagno, 1983). In the early seventeenth century, when a certain Venetian merchant called Giovanni Battista Flaminio travelled to Isfahan and converted to Islam (most likely to Shiʿism), it was narrated that Giovanni “became a Turk in PersiaFootnote 9!” Today Italian converts do not cease their national belonging and strongly claim their Italian-ness in both religious and intellectual arena. Therefore, here “Italian Shiʿism” refers to the religion as perceived and practiced by Italian converts.

To explain the interplay between Traditionalism and the “Italian Shiʿism”, I adopted a multidisciplinary and mixed method of data gathering. The available literature on the European Traditionalism and especially Evola’s works allowed me to construct the historical background of the phenomenon, while the empirical methods contributed to a reconstruction of the current situation. I availed myself of online and onsite ethnography, literature review, and semi-structured interviews with converts. Tracing converts in certain respects was more difficult than Shiʿa-borns. The latter group is notably larger and has established communities across various Italian cities facilitating ethnographic research. Conversely, in the post-9/11 climate, many converts opt not to openly disclose their conversion to Islam. They refrain from revealing their Islamic names to others, and some even abstain from adopting such names altogether. A considerable number of Shiʿa converts practice taqīyya (dissimulation) and prefer to identify themselves as Muslims rather than specifically as Shiʿas. For certain female converts, they do not wear the veil outside of places of worship lest they lose their jobs or the support of their families and friends. Shiʿa-borns instead have somatic effects, foreign accent or dress codes that set them apart.

The total number of converts to Islam in Italy is unclear because census questions concerning religious affiliation are forbidden by Italian law. Conversion to Islam has therefore remained a hidden phenomenon and the number of converts has become a matter of preoccupation for the Church and of journalistic exaggeration. Nevertheless, some estimates are available. In 2002, it was suggested that converts to Islam might number 10,000 (Allievi, 2002, p. 110), though estimates have increased significantly in recent years, rising to 100,000 in 2018 (Ciocca, 2019, p. 33). Marriage to Muslim women is the main reason for this striking increase because Muslim women are not allowed to enter into an exogamous marriage. Putting aside conversion due to marriage, which does not usually bring about significant changes in the way of life of men who convert for this reason (Allievi, 1999), the number of Italian Shiʿa converts based on observations does not seem to be more than 2% of the total Shiʿa population in Italy. If we apply this percentage to the number of Shiʿas in the peninsula, Shiʿa converts cannot be more than 1000 people.Footnote 10

Although not numerous, Shiʿa converts, especially men, are very active in editorial initiatives and public debates, whereas, the first generation of Shiʿa-borns (the main subjects who attend the Italian-based Shiʿa worship halls), with or without Italian citizenship, both due to their linguistic incompetence and political vulnerability, do not publicize their religious affiliation or political opinion (Mirshahvalad, 2019). The second generation of Shiʿa-borns, who could have potentially become the public voice of Shiʿism in Italy, is still very young or has a limited presence in some Pakistani associations in North Italy. Therefore, the Italian authorities recognize converts as de facto representatives of Shiʿas in the Apennine peninsula. These converts play a pivotal role in shaping the perception of Shiʿism in the Italian public sphere and facilitate activities of Shiʿa-born individuals that necessitate proficiency in the Italian language, such as editing leaflets distributed during Muharram processions. Their importance stems also from their international network with anti-US public figures of Iranian, Russian, Palestinian, and Lebanese descent who are occasionally engaged in the converts’ online or onsite initiatives.

Online and offline publishing activities, coupled with international collaborations, facilitated the identification of certain converts and the application of online ethnography across various digital platforms. These platforms were websites, weblogs, Facebook pages, and YouTube channels associated with politically active converts and their Traditionalist sympathizers. Notably, Italian converts assume the primary role in generating intellectual content about Shiʿism in the Italian language. In contrast, the academic body of work on Shiʿism in Italian remains confined to a handful of Italian scholars interested in the topic, often opting to publish in English to reach a broader audience. On the other hand, converts have produced a more extensive body of literature, primarily intended for a national readership with propagandist objectives. Through an analysis of the converts’ publications, it becomes evident how the Traditionalist framework influences the reinterpretation of Shiʿism by converts.

Besides online ethnography and literature review, between June 2018 and January 2023, I adopted semi-structured interviews and onsite ethnography. I conducted 27 in-depth interviews with adult Italians converted to Shiʿism in a formal and semi-structured manner with prearranged appointments and voice recorder. They were 6 women and 21 men whom I encountered at the Italian Shiʿa gathering places particularly at the MC, which was attractive to Shiʿas of differing national backgrounds. Similar to Shiʿa-born women, female converts were less available to give interviews and had little to no public visibility. In their case, I limited myself to ethnography and informal conversations.

The interviewees were from Milan, Rome, Trieste, Canegrate, Cagliari, Naples, Palermo, Lecce, and Catania. Besides, I interviewed seven Italian-based migrant converts among men and women who had converted from Sunnism or different Christian denominations to Shiʿism to understand if one could truly identify a specifically “Italian Shiʿism”. I call the second category of interviewees “double migrants” as they have accomplished both religious and national migrations. They were from Venezuela, Morocco, Tunis, Ghana, Ukraine, and Moldavia. They undertook entirely different trajectories, had various individual reasons for their interest in Shiʿism and developed dissimilar approaches to this religion. Although, I will not dwell on them, their case helped me recognize the specific physiognomy of the “Italian Shiʿism”. Their case showed how Traditionalism besides Italy’s socio-political tendencies has conditioned the converts’ approach to Shiʿism. Outside of these formal interviews, many informal conversations were undertaken to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the “Italian Shiʿism”. The converts’ real names are mentioned when they allowed me to do so or when I refer to their online or paper publications.

Another empirical instrument of data gathering was onsite ethnography conducted at the gathering places and institutes founded and administered by converts. In summer 2018, I visited the DDS and the MC in Rome. The MC has one of the most beautiful Islamic worship halls in Italy. This cultural association accepts only Italian citizens in its executive committee. The hall, measuring almost 450 square meters, located on the underground floor of a residential building, is made up of various areas: the men’s space communicating with the female one and a conference room. It also has a small playroom for children and a library with a very rich collection of books in numerous European and Asian languages. The gathering space is adorned with pretty tiles imported from Iran which give it the appearance of a real mosque.

The DDS is a circle of intellectuals of various religious backgrounds who have evening gatherings in a simple room (most likely an ex-garage) of about 40 square meters. The simple hall is also the headquarters of the Irfan publishing house. Irfan publishes books on Shiʿa philosophy and theology or other topics pertinent to esotericism. The journal Quaderni della Sapienza contains shorter publications of this cenacle.

In May 2022, I had the opportunity to visit Centro Tarsis in Trieste, another intellectual circle of Shiʿa converts situated in a modest apartment spanning nearly 80 square meters in the city center. The main gathering area is adorned with carpets and kilim cushions, creating a comfortable atmosphere, while the walls are decorated with Islamic symbols, lending it the ambiance of a zāwiyah. Additionally, Centro Tarsis boasts a well-stocked library containing documents in various languages, primarily related to Traditionalist authors and esoteric teachings. During my research, I also encountered other converts at the gathering venues frequented by Shiʿa-born individuals, including the Iranian-backed Imam Ali Centre (AC) in Milan and the Lebanese-administered Centro Tohid in Turin. I will share a couple of noteworthy episodes from these locations as well.

4 Islam’s Third Gateway to Southern Europe and the Process of Inculturation

Islam is becoming an important religion in Europe. In many European countries it is the second religion practiced by residents. Moreover, due to the contemporary geopolitical and political situation in the Middle East and the controversial questions such as gender issues, Islam has conquered visibility in the European public space. Despite the mainstream monolithic understanding of Islam in Europe, this religion, based on its channels of entry into Europe, has taken different forms.

Islam has entered Southern Europe through three primary avenues: invasion, immigration, and conversion. Each of these routes has imparted distinct characteristics to the religion of Islam in the region. In each case, both the European host context and the Muslim communities have reacted differently due to variations in the nature and timing of their interaction. Consequently, we can identify three main types of Islam in Southern Europe. Although Shiʿism entered Mediterranean Europe through these same channels, the initial gateway was not established by Twelvers. In fact, Southern Europe’s first encounter with Shiʿism was not due to Twelvers, but rather through Ismailis and Zaydis. While al-Andalus experienced the rule of the Hammudids,Footnote 11 Sicily welcomed the vassals of the Fatimids, who held dominion over the largest island in the Mediterranean Sea from 984 to 1053 (Daftari, 1990; Zare, 2013). The longer chain of the Infallible Imams among Twelvers and therefore the longer availability of the “infallible” spiritual authority retarded the development of juridical norms and political theories among Twelvers. The latter experienced the formation of an independent state when Europe was progressively acquiring economic and militant superiority over other continents. Therefore, Twelvers did not reach Europe through military enterprise (as Ismailis and Zaydis did), but through commerce and diplomacy, especially because they had an enemy in common with Europe, namely Ottomans. Therefore, there was a mutual need for alliance between the first Twelver state and Europe.

Despite these experiences, prior to Ayatollah Khomeini’s political activism, Europeans had vague ideas about different branches of Shiʿism. The Iranian revolution attracted attention to Twelver Shiʿism and, as will be seen, opened the third gateway of Southern Europe to this Islamic school. What characterizes the Islam or Shiʿism of conversion in the current West is the type of culture that it acquires. The process of culture gaining in the case of immigrants and minority groups is studied under the profile of “acculturation”; while, in the case of converts we can adopt “inculturation” as a more suitable analytical category. This category was originally coined in the milieu of the Christian missiology and pertained to the relationship between missioners and the new Christians in different parts of the world.

Inculturation, namely the adaptation of religions to a new cultural context, as a human phenomenon is as old as religions themselves. Inculturation is an inevitable and legitimate fruit of encounter between religions and cultures. Nonetheless, its acceptance as a normal social fact among Christian missionaries did not occur sooner than the late nineteenth century. Protestants, being more concerned about the contamination of the Christian theology by new local cultures, preferred “indigenization” and later, “contextualization”, which regarded more ecclesiological form than theological substance of the religion. Despite the resistance, especially from Protestants, against inculturation in theology, gradually the idea was legitimized. The Vatican II played a crucial role in recognizing the difference among cultures as valuable (Magesa, 2020). The cultural anthropologists commenced to adopt “inculturation” around early 1970s. Today inculturation is accepted as a change not only in external wrappings and ecclesiological order, but also in the patterns of thought, language, and symbols of the religion (Stanley, 2007).

The existing literature on inculturation is devoted to Christianity and has theological approaches. This literature has been formed to facilitate the work of missionaries. I am adapting this Christian notion from missionary milieu for a contrary purpose. The contrary-ness of my use of the term does not only derive from the nature of the religions that are involved, but also from the cultures that are associated to those religions. Christianity historically associated to the Western culture, when encountered “lower cultures” in Africa or Asia reflected on the righteousness of inculturation. The first Christian missionaries found Africans barbaric, fetishist, and superstitious. They portrayed Africans as “good for nothing” (Onimhawo & Ottuh, 2018, p. 94). The superiority of the culture of evangelizers over the culture of receiving people brought about the issue of tolerance and efforts for understanding that certain cultural components could not be wiped out otherwise they might inflict harm on newcomers.

Conversely, when a religion associated to a “lower culture” reaches the West without missionaries, tolerance and understanding do not play any role. In this case, the inculturation becomes the indisputable right of converts. The inculturation of Islam in Europe has this second feature. Conversion to Islam in Europe is moving toward a lower-status religion (Özyürek, 2015). In Italy, for instance, women’s veil is associated to the old memories of women of the southern rural contexts. Therefore, it has been perceived as a sign of backwardness (Garelli, 2011). Despite our historical distance from Muslims’ medieval presence in Sicily and Puglia, Islam in Italy continues to be associated to invasion. The stigmatizing readings of this presence are (re)produced in many common institutional and media discourses. Islam appears to be a colonizer and a threat to the Italian cultural and social values.

Currently, Islam in Italy is the second largest religion in the country, with 2 million and half of followers, of which over one million have Italian citizenship (Ciocca, 2019). Nevertheless, in the public mind it is still identified with immigration. Thus, Islam is called into play when the anti-immigration rhetoric is adopted by mainly the far right organizations. In the late 1990s, with the rise in the immigrant inflows toward Italy, the anti-immigrant campaigns emerged and in the early years of the third millennium gave birth to Islamophobia. Two out of three Italians think that Muslims are a threat against Italian cultural values and freedom, especially in issues regarding women. The compulsory veil and punishment of female adulterer are among Italians’ most serious concerns regarding Muslims (Ciocca, 2019; Garelli, 2011). Muslims are considered a homogenous population without any difference among them. The northern and southern cities show different levels of Islamophobia. The northern regions that host more Muslims witness more Islamophobic episodes than south (Garelli, 2011). The ways in which Islam is incultured by Italian converts bear the influence of this general perception of Muslims and immigrants. Such a view, as will be seen, creates a significant challenge for Italian converts who adhere to a religion that comes from Global South.

5 A Guide to Reading

The “Tradition” and “Traditionalism” when written with capital T are related to Guénon’s school. When available, I have referred to English versions of Guénon and Evola’s works; otherwise, I have referred to the original Italian publications. In such cases, I have provided English translations of the mentioned passages.

The following is the list of the acronyms that will be used:

  • Italian Traditionalists (ITs)

  • Associazione Islamica Imam Mahdi (MC)

  • Dimore della Sapienza (DDS)

  • Centro Culturale Imam Ali (AC)

  • Islamic Associations of Students (IAS)

5.1 Evola’s Works

  • Rivolta contro il mondo moderno (Revolt Against the Modern World): Revolt

  • L’arco e la clava (The Bow and the Club): B&C

  • Il mistero del Graal (Mystery of the Grail): Mystery

  • Imperialismo pagano (Pagan Imperialism): Pagan

  • Il cammino del cinabro (The Path of Cinnabar): Path

  • Cavalcare la tigre (Ride the Tiger): Ride

  • Metafisica della guerra (Metaphysics of War): Metaphysics

For the Arabic and Persian words, I have used the following transliteration rules:

A list of Arabic and Persian words with their transliteration equivalents in English.